Source: http://me.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150206_0000073.DME.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-05-24 17:43:10
Document Index: 676493303

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3601', '§ 4357', '§ 3602', '§ 4357', '§ 1331', '§ 3602', '§ 4357', '§ 1331']

| Undercliff Cottage, LLC v. Fhre, LLC
Undercliff Cottage, LLC v. Fhre, LLC
UNDERCLIFF COTTAGE, LLC, THE PHELAN 2006 FAMILY TRUST, CHARLES CAWLEY, JULIE CAWLEY, PARKER S. LAITE, SR., and FRIENDS OF CAMDEN, MAINE LLC, Plaintiff,v.F.H.R.E., LLC and THE McLEAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant.
Before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 10). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
F.H.R.E., LLC ("Fox Hill") and the McLean Hospital Corporation ("McLean") (together, the "Defendants") seek to create an in-patient treatment facility for persons suffering from drug and alcohol addiction at 235 Bay View Street in Camden, Maine (the "Bay View Property"). Compl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 1). Undercliff Cottage, LLC, Charles Cawley, Julie Cawley, Parker S. Laite, Sr., and the Phelan 2006 Family Trust, all nearby property owners, and Friends of Camden, Maine, LLC, an entity made up of Camden, Maine property owners and voters (the "Plaintiffs"), oppose the facility. Compl. ¶ 3-7. The Plaintiffs demand a judgment:
a. declaring that the proposed Bay View property facility does not constitute a "Community living arrangement" for persons suffering a "handicap" and "disability" under the governing laws;
b. enjoining Fox Hill and McLean from proceeding with the proposed Bay View Property facility; and
c. granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Compl. ¶ 44. In essence, the Plaintiffs are invoking the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and a particular Maine land use law, 30-A M.R.S. § 4357-A, in an attempt to prevent the creation of a facility they believe violates Camden's Zoning Ordinance.
Although brought as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, the Court applies the Rule 12(b)(1) standard to the Complaint. Rule 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that Rule 12(b)(1) is the "proper vehicle" for challenges to the existence of federal question jurisdiction). One way to determine whether the plaintiff has offered the necessary basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is to "accept[ ] the plaintiff's version of jurisdictionally-significant facts as true and address[ ] their sufficiency." Id. at 363. In so doing, "the court must credit the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations... draw all reasonable inferences from them in her favor, and dispose of the challenge accordingly." Id. DISCUSSION
As pled, the Court initially understood the Plaintiffs' Complaint as requesting a declaration on whether the patients proposed to be treated in the Bay View Facility were "handicapped" as defined by the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h), and therefore "disabled" under 30-A M.R.S. § 4357-A. See Compl. ¶ 41(A). The Defendants appear to have shared this understanding of the Complaint, as they initially conceded the existence of embedded federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 4 n.3, and went on to address issues of standing and justiciability. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 5-8.
In their brief opposing the instant motion, however, the Plaintiffs declared the following: "Plaintiffs have never asserted that the patients proposed to be treated by the Defendants are not disabled.'" Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 12 (ECF No. 11). Indeed, a review of the Plaintiffs' Complaint confirms that technically they never alleged that patients at the Bay View Facility will not be "handicapped" or "disabled." The closest the Plaintiffs get to such an allegation is a statement made at ¶41(A) of the Complaint, where they assert that a controversy exists over "whether the proposed Bay View Property facility will admit persons suffering from a handicap' as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) and thereby be suffering a disability' under 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4357-A(1)(A)." With the clarification the Plaintiffs made in their opposition, the Court now understands that this allegation was not an assertion that the proposed patients are not "handicapped" or "disabled."[1]
The Defendants seize on the Plaintiffs' concession and assert as an additional ground for dismissal that the Court now lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Defs.' Reply to Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 1-3 (ECF No. 12). Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is "invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law." Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). There is a small category of state law claims over which federal question jurisdiction nonetheless lies where "a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the ...