Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19840314-962781
Timestamp: 2017-07-27 23:03:56+00:00
Document Index: 304606539

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 5', 'arrêt ', "l'article 272", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 7", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 7", "l'article 7", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 15", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 27", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 27", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", "l'article 7", 'art 1']

FERRARI-BRAVO contre l'ITALIE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche FERRARI-BRAVO contre l'ITALIE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de l'Art. 5-4 ; Non-violation de l'art. 5-1 ; Préjudice moral - constat de violation suffisant ; Remboursement frais et dépens - procédure nationaleNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9627/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1984-03-14;9627.81 Analyses : (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1-e) ALIENE, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURSParties : Demandeurs : FERRARI-BRAVODéfendeurs : l'ITALIETexte : APPIdCATION / REQIJÃTE NÂ° 9627/8 1 Luciano FERRARI-BRAV O v/ ITALY Luciano FERRARI-BRAVO c/ITALIE DECISION of 14 March 1984 on the admissibiliry of the application DÃCISION du 14 mars 1984 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artlde 5, paragraph 1(c), of the Conventfon : !t cannot be required in order to justify arrest and detention on remand that the existence and the nature of the offence of which the person concemed is suspected be established since that is the aim of the investigation the proper conduct of which is facilitated by the detention. ArtlcJe 5, paragraph 3, of the Convention : Reasonable time : the end of the period to be considered is not the date of committal for trial, but, at the earliest, the date of judgmem at first instance . Detention on remand for faur years and eleven months of a person charged with very serious offences, for which the law does not permit provisional release . Examination of the complexity of the case, the risk of absconding and the conduct of proceedings, in particular, the question of severing the applicant's case from that of his coaccused. Artlcle 6, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), of the Convent/on : The question of a violation of these provisions must be esamined having regard to the proceedings as a whole . Proceedings still undenvay in the present case .
Artlcle 5, parsgrapbe 1, lltt. e), de la Conventlon : On ne saurait exiger, pour justifier l'arrestation et la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, que la rÃ©alitÃ© et la nature de l'infraction dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© est soupÃ§onnÃ© soient Ã©tablies, puisque tel est le but de l'instruction dont la dÃ©tention doit pennettre le dÃ©roulement normal. ArtleJe 5, paragrapbe 3, de la Convenhon : DÃ©lai raisonnable : Le terme du dÃ©lai Ã prendre en consid(ration n'est pas la date du renvoi en jugement mais, au plus tÃ´t, celle du jugement rendu en premiÃ¨re instance .
DÃ©tention pendant quatre ans et onze mois d'une personne inculpÃ©e d'infractions trÃ¨s graves pour lesquelles la loi n'autorise pas la mise en libenÃ© provisoire . Ernmen de la compleritÃ© de l'affaire, du risque de fuire, de la conduite de la procÃ©dure, en particulier de la question d'une disjonction du cas du requÃ©rant de celui de ses coinculpÃ©s. Article 6, paragraphe 3, Iitt . b) et d), de /a Coavention : !a question de la violation de ces dispositions doit Ãªtre ezaminÃ©e en prenant enYonsidÃration l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure. En l'espÃ©ce, procÃ©dure encore en cours .
(English : see p. 29)
1 . Le requÃ©rant, professeur d'UniversitÃ©, est nÃ© le 18 mars 1940 Ã Venise . B est domiciliÃ© Ã Padoue . Au moment de l'introduction de la requÃªte il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Trani . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par son frÃ¨re, M . Giuliano Ferreri-Bravo . 2 . Dans le cadre de l'enquÃªte pour l'assassinat d'Aldo Moro, revendiquÃ© par les .Brigades Rougesâ¢, des poursuites furent engagÃ©es par l'autoritÃ© judiciaire de Rome, poursuites qui se soldÃ¨rent par l'Ã©mission d'un mandat d'arrÃªt, le 6 avril 1979, contre un professeur, M . Antonio Negri, du chef d'insurrection armÃ©e contre les pouvoirs de l'Etat . 3 . En mÃªme temps, d'autres poursuites Ã©taient engagÃ©es par l'autoritÃ© judiciaire de Padoue concernant les mouvements terroristes . Le 7 avril 1979, un mandat d'arrÃªt fut dÃ©cernÃ© contre le requÃ©rant (ainsi que contre diffÃ©rents autres prÃ©vÃ©nus dont M . Negri) du chef d'association subversive et constitution de bande armÃ©e . B Ã©tait reprochÃ© au requÃ©rant, notamment, d'avoir organisÃ© et dirigÃ© une organisation terroriste . Pour ces faits, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© les 20 avril et 15 mai 1979 . 4 . Pour des raisons de compÃ©tence territoriale, ces poursuites furent p ar la suite confiÃ©es Ã l'autoritÃ© judiciaire de Rome qui, le 7 juillet 1979 dÃ©cerna un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt contre le requÃ©rant (et d'autres prÃ©venus) notamment du chef d'insurrection armÃ©e (art . 284 du Code pÃ©nal) et guerre civile (art . 286 du code pÃ©nal), crimes punis de la dÃ©tention Ã perpÃ©tuitÃ© (1) .
Le 18 juillet 1979, le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© par le juge d'instruction de Rome pour les faits qui lui Ã©taient reprochÃ©s dans le mandat d'arrÃªt prÃ©citÃ© .
( 1 ) Article 284 du Code penal :â¢ Quiconque provoque une insurrenion annle conue les pouvoirs de l'Etnt est puni des tnvaua forces Ã perpdtuitd ( . . . ) . . Artlcle 286, elinEe I du Code pÃ©oal : â¢Quiconque commet un fait tendent Ã susciter la guerre civile sur le territoire de l'Eut esr puni des tnveua fnrcÃ©s Ã perpÃ©tuitÃ© . .
5 . Par dÃ©cision (Â« sentenza-ordinanza .) du 31 mars 1981 le juge d'instruction de Rome renvoya en jugement le requÃ©rant (et d'autres co-accusÃ©s) devant la cour d'assises de Rome pour avoir, avec d'autres personnes, constituÃ© et dirigÃ© une organisation politico-militaire dite .Potere OperaioÂ» visant Ã renverser les pouvoirs constituÃ©s par la guerre civile et Ã susciter l'insurrection armÃ©e avec le concours notamment des Â«Brigades RougesÂ» .
Par la mÃªme dÃ©cision, le juge d'instruction dÃ©cerna un nouveau mandat d'arrÃ©t contre le requÃ©rant - qui avait bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'une dÃ©cision de libÃ©ration pour expiration des dÃ©lais maxima de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive pour les infractions retenues dans le premier mandat d'arrÃ©t - conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 272 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, avant-dernier alinÃ©a . Le mandat d'arrÃ©t a Ã©tÃ© justifiÃ© par . la gmvitÃ© des faits, leur valeur symptomatique ainsi que (par) des motifs de prudence pour la suite de la procÃ©dureÂ» (â¢gravitÃ dei fatti, il loro valore sintomatico e motivi di cautela processuale .) . Les chefs d'accusation retenus contre le requÃ©rant ont Ã©tÃ© principalement les suivants : association subversive (art . 270 du code pÃ©nal), constitution de bande armÃ©e (art . 306), activitÃ©s visant Ã provoquer l'insurrection armÃ©e (art . 284 du code pÃ©nal) et la guerre civile (art . 286 du code pÃ©nal) . Les faits reprochÃ©s consistent en la participation Ã la direction de mouvements terroristes, aux comitÃ©s de rÃ©daction de plusieurs revues â¢subversivesâ¢, ainsi qu'en la publication d'articles qui inciteraient Ã la guerre civile et Ã l'insurrection armÃ©e . 6 . Le procÃ¨s devant la cour d'assises de Rome a commencÃ© le 7 juin 1982 . AjoumÃ© au dÃ©but de l'Ã©tÃ© 1983, il a repris le 26 septembre 1983 . 7 . Le 16 novembre 1983 la cour d'assises de Rome a rejetÃ© une demande formulÃ©e par le requÃ©rant et d'autres co-accusÃ©s tendant Ã changer la nature de la dÃ©tention, c'est-Ã -dire Ã modifier la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive en une assignation Ã rÃ©sidence (arresti domiciliari) .
8 . Cette demande a Ã©tÃ© motivÃ©e par les Ã©lÃ©ments suivants : - absence de danger de fuite dans le chef des demandeurs, la fuite de M . Negri (1) devant Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un comportement individuel qui ne peut avoir d'ingÃ©rence sur la situation des autres accusÃ©s ; - absence de danger de collusion (inquinamente delle prove), Ã©tant donnÃ© et la longueur de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et le fait que les demandeurs avaient tous dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ©s ; (1) M . Negri a ftf libÃ©rÃ© Quillet 1983) Ã la suite de son Ã©lection 9 la Chambre des DÃ©putÃ©s . Un nouveau mandat d'arrtt a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cernÃ© contm lui, aprÃ¨s que la Chambre des DÃ©putÃ©s eut votf l'auturivtion L le poursuivre . Ie mandat n'a pu ltre exÃ©cutÃ©, M . Negri s'Ã©rnnl enfui (septembre 1983 ).
- absence de Â« dangerositÃ© Â» dans les chefs des accusÃ©s dans la mesure oÃ¹ ils se seraient dissaciÃ©s politiquement de tout dessein terroriste . 9 . Ia dÃ©cision de la Cour d'assises peut Ãªtre ainsi rÃ©sumÃ©e . Elle a rappelÃ© que la mesure alternative de l'assignation Ã rÃ©sidence, objet de la demande, conceme exclusivement, dans cette phase de la procÃ©dure, le lieu de dÃ©tention . Il ne peut Ã©tre contestÃ© par ailleurs que 16 co-accusÃ©s ont choisi la fuite . Compte tenu du nombre Ã©levÃ© des accusÃ©s qui, en des pÃ©riodes diverses, ont opÃ©rÃ© ce choix, cette circonstance revÃªt un caractÃ¨re particuliÃ¨rement significatif par rapport au danger de fuite qui doit donc Ãªtre mis en relation avec un comportement rÃ©el si diffusÃ© . Cet Ã©lÃ©ment spÃ©cifique impose la pntdence, eu Ã©gard surtout aux infractions mises Ã la charge des accusÃ©s, revÃªtant en grande partie la nature d'infractions Ã auteurs multiples, ainsi qu'Ã l'insertion - selon l'accusation - des accusÃ©s, en fuite ou dÃ©tenus, dans des bandes armÃ©es articulÃ©es en diffÃ©rentes parties du territoire national, avec des rÃ©seaux logistiques Ã l'Ã©tranger pour faciliter leur sortie du territoire et leur assistance . Ces considÃ©rations se rÃ©percutent sur les exigences de sauvegarde de la collectivitÃ© auxquelles l'on doit avoir Ã©gard en l'espÃ¨ce . Cette exigence de sauvegarde de la collectivitÃ© ne peut faire abstraction de la nature et de la gravitÃ© des infractions reprochÃ©es, et des nombreux faits dÃ©lictueux visÃ©s dans les chefs d'accusation, qui s'analysent en des exÃ©cutions concrÃ¨tes et spÃ©cifiques de desseins criminels dans le but de renverser l'ordre constituÃ© . Ces considÃ©rations trouvent Ã s'appliquer particuliÃ¨rement Ã cette phase de la procÃ©dure caractÃ©risÃ©e par le commencement de l'administration des preuves auxquelles il ne peut pas Ãªtre portÃ© prÃ©judice, compte tenu aussi de leur extension Ã des activitÃ©s pour lesquelles la prÃ©sence des accusÃ©s s'avÃ¨re nÃ©cessaire .
10 . Le requÃ©rant s'est pourvu en cassation contre cette dÃ©cision de rejet . A ce jour, la Cour de cassation n'a pas encore statuÃ©. GRIEFS 11 . De faÃ§on gÃ©nÃ©rale, le requÃ©rant conteste le bien-fondÃ© des accusations portÃ©es contre lui ainsi que la procÃ©dure suivie par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires . II affirme que ces accusations ne se fondent pas sur des faits concrets, mais reposent sur une interprÃ©tation de ses Ã©crits et prises de position dans des revues ou sur les ondes d'une radio privÃ©e . II fait valoir plusieurs violations de la Convention . 12 . D'abord, il se plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© et d'Ã¨tre privÃ© de sa libe rtÃ© dans des conditions contraires Ã l'article 5, par . I(c) . Il fait valoir, en paniculier, qu'il n'y a pas eu ;
-1g-
et il n'y a pas, de â¢ raisons plausibles de soupÃ§onner . qu'il ait commis les infractions dont il est accusÃ©â¢ . Il en veut pour preuve qu'aucun Ã©lÃ©ment n'aurait Ã©tÃ© recueilli contre lui . B fait valoir encore le caractÃ¨re illÃ©gal du transfert Ã Rome de la procÃ©dure le concemant . 13 . II se plaint ensuite de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive qui ne serait pas conforme Ã l'article 5, par . 3 . B souligne Ã cet Ã©gard qu'au stade de l'instruction il n'a Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ© que trois fois, la demiÃ¨re fois le 19 juillet 1979 . Il a ensuite Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ© p ar le tri bunal au cours du procÃ¨s les 3, 4 et 5 mai 1983 . 14 . II soutient ensuite qu'il y a eu violatio n - de l'article 6, par . 2 dans la mesure oÃ¹ il aurait fait l'objet d'un procÃ¨s â¢ public . par les mÃ©dias, cette affai re ayant eu un vaste Ã© cho dans tous les moyens d'infortnation, ce qui du mÃªme coup conditionnerait la suite de la procÃ©dure et mettrait Ã mal la prÃ©somption d'innocence ; - de l'article 6, par. 3 (b), en ce que la dÃ©fense aurait disposÃ© de moins de deux mois pour prendre connaissance du dossier - 50 .000 pages - avant que le juge ne rende l'ordonnance de renvoi en jugement ;
- de l'article 6, par . 3 (d) en ce qu'il n'aurait jamais eu la possibilitÃ© d'Ãªtre confrontÃ© Iors de l'instruction avec les personnes dont les dÃ©clarations seraient Ã l'o rigine de son accusation . 15 . II se plaint encore d'une violation de l'article 7 de la Convention . En effet, une loi adoptÃ©e postÃ© ri eurement au commencement des poursuites (D .L . 15 dÃ©cembre 1979 - loi du 6 fÃ©vrier 1980) a augmentÃ© d'un tiers la durÃ©e maximum de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive pour toutes les infractions pÃ©nales conunises aux fins de terro ri sme . Cette loi, applicable aussi aux procÃ©dures en cou rs Ã la date de son entrÃ©e en vigueur, re lÃ¨verait selon le requÃ©rant du droit pÃ©nal matÃ©riel et aurait, compte tenu de son effet rÃ©troactif, violÃ© la disposition prÃ©citÃ©e de la Convention . 16 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, enfin, de ses conditions de dÃ©tention . Il affirme Ãªtre dÃ©tenu dans une prison spÃ©ciale de "haute sÃ©cu ri tÃ©" oÃ¹ sont dÃ©tenues les pe rs onnes accusÃ©es d'appa rtenir Ã l'organisation term ri ste des â¢B ri gades Rougesâ¢, mais oÃ¹ l'insÃ©curitÃ© r8gnerait . 17 . Quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, le requÃ©rant affirme avoir demandÃ© sa mise en libert Ã© avant son re nvoi en jugement, demande rejetÃ©e par le juge d'instruction le 30 juiBet 1980 et, sur recours, par la cour d'appel de Rome le 9janvier 1981 (1) . ( I) la loi du 22 mai 1975 ne pennet pas que l'on puisse accorder la mise en libenÃ© pmvisoite pour cenains crimes visant l'insuneclion armÃ©e (erticle 284) (2) et la guerre civile (article 286) (3) dont est accusÃ© le requÃ©rant . Anicle I : â¢ Pour les infractions commises postÃ©rieurement Ã l'entrÃ©e en vigueur de la prÃ©sente loi, la libenE pmvisoire n'est pas admise en ce qui conceme . . . l'insurrection annÃ©e contre les pouvoirs de l'EUt prlvue Ã l'anicle 284 du Code pÃ©nal . . ., la guene civile prÃ©vue Ã l'enicle 286 du Code pÃ©nal . . . . .
D observe que la dÃ©cision de renvoi en jugement n'est susceptible d'aucun recours en droit italien . 18 . En ce qui conceme l'augmentation des dÃ©lais maxima de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le requÃ©rant se rÃ©Rre Ã l'arrÃªt de la Cour constitutionnelle du 14 janvier 1982 qui a conclu Ã la constitutionnalitÃ© de la loi du 6 fÃ©vrier 1980 et qui a justifiÃ© les dispositions qui y sont contenues par la situation d'Ã©mergence due aux activitÃ©s terroristes, arrÃªt qui, au demeurant, rendrait inutiles tous les Ã©ventuels recours concernant les nouveaux dÃ©lais maxima de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive .
PROCÃDUR E 19 . Le 5 mars 1983, la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© de porter la requÃªte Ã la connaissance du Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur et d'inviter ce demier Ã lui prÃ©senter ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© et le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃ©te, en particulier, sur le caractÃ¨re â¢ raisonnableâ¢ de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant au regard de l'article 5, par . 3 . 20 . Le mÃ©moire du Gouvernement sur la recevabilitÃ© et le fond est datÃ© du 24 mai 1983 . Le requÃ©rant y a rÃ©pondu par un mÃ©moire datÃ© du 9 juillet 1983 . 21 . Le 15 dÃ©cembre 1983, la Commission a repris l'examen de la requÃ©te . Elle a dÃ©cidÃ© d'inviter le requÃ©rant Ã lui faire parvenir copie de l'ordonnance de la cour d'assises du 16 novembre 1983 ainsi que copie de l'Ã©ventuelle dÃ©cision de la Cour de cassation sur le pourvoi interjetÃ© contre cette ordonnance . Le 15 janvier 1984, le requÃ©rent a transmis Ã la Commission copie de la dÃ©cision du 16 novembre 1983 de la cour d'assises de Rome ainsi que des renseignements complÃ©mentaires . Le 29 fÃ©vrier 1984 le Gouvemement a prÃ©sentÃ© des commentaires sur les renseignements foumis par le requÃ©rant . RÃ©sumÃ© des observations des parties
A . Le Gouvernemen t 22 . La requÃªte est irrecevable pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours interne s et subsidiai rement pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . a) Quant d !'e.rception tirÃ©e du non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes 23 . La Convention Ã©tant entrÃ©e Ã faire partie du systÃ¨me juridique italien, le requÃ©rant aurait dÃ», pour satisfaire Ã la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, invoquer la violation de la Convention devant le juge national . 0 y a Ã©galement non -Ã©puisement Ã un autre titre . En effet, le requÃ©rant ne s'est pas pou rvu en
cassation, en invoquant au besoin l'article 5, par . 3, contre l'ordonnance de la cour d'appel rejetant sa demande de mise en libertÃ© pour expiration des dÃ©lais maxima de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive .
b) Quant au bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte 24 . Le Gouvernement limite l'examen de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant Ã la pÃ©riode comprise entre la date de son arrestation (7 avril 1979) et la date de renvoi en jugement (31 mars 1981) . Cette dÃ©tention a Ã©tÃ© lÃ©gitime au regard du droit italien, car elle n'a pas dÃ©passÃ© les dÃ©lais maxima prÃ©vus Ã cet effet par la loi . 25 . Pour ce qui est de l'anicle 5, la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention n'a pas Ã©tÃ© Â«dÃ©raisonnable - . Elle se justifie par la complexitÃ© exceptionnelle de l'affaire rÃ©sultant du nombre de co-accusÃ©s (environ 80) et de la nature des accusations qui sont d'une extrÃªme gravitÃ© . La magistrature a menÃ© des enquÃªtes trÃ¨s difficiles qui ont demandÃ© de longs dÃ©lais d'exÃ©cution . En effet, au cours de l'instmction (le dossier dÃ©passe les 56 .000 pages) on a procÃ©dÃ© Ã 231 interrogatoires d'inculpÃ©s et 79 autres interrogatoires d'inculpÃ©s pour dÃ©lits connexes ; Ã 353 examens de tÃ©moins ; Ã 8 confrontations et Ã 10 expertises .
En conclusion aucune violation de l'article 5, par . 3 ne peut Ãªtre dÃ©celÃ©e . 26. Pour ce qui est de l'article 5, par . I(c), le Gouvemement observe que tant le mandat d'arrÃ©t que l'ordonnance dc renvoi en jugement contiennent les motifs pour lesquels le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© privÃ© de libertÃ© et qu'il y a donc des raisons plausibles Ã la base de cette privation de libertÃ© . Quant au transfert de la procÃ©dure Ã Rome elle se justifie par la connexitÃ© des procÃ©dures . 27 . En ce qui concerne le grief relatif Ã la prÃ©tendue violation du principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence (article 6, par . 2) il est Ã exclure que la magistrature, qui juge sur la base des preuves recueillies conformÃ©ment aux rÃ¨gles de procÃ©dure, puisse Ãªtre influencÃ©e par des articles de presse . 28 . Quant aux griefs ayant trait aux prÃ©tendues violations de l'article 6, par . 3, litt . (b) et (d), il est Ã observer que le requÃ©rant et son dÃ©fenseur ont disposÃ© de tout le temps et de tous les moyens nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . D'autre part, le procÃ¨s est en cours et le requÃ©rant garde intacte toute possibilitÃ© de dÃ©fense . 29 . Pour ce qui est du grief selon lequel l'augmentation d'un tiers des dÃ©lais maxima de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive mÃ©me pour les procÃ©dures en cours (D .L . 15 dÃ©cembre 1979) ne serait pas conforme Ã l'article 7, il est Ã prÃ©ciser que les dispositions de ce dÃ©cret n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© appliquÃ©es au requÃ©rant et qu'il n'a subi dÃ©s lors aucu n
prÃ©judice . En effet, la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive (jusqu'au 31 mars 1981) est inscrite entiÃ¨rement dans les limites tracÃ©es par la loi (moins de deux ans jusqu'au renvoi en jugement) sans qu'il ait Ã©tÃ© besoin de faire application des dispositions indiquÃ©es par le requÃ©rant .
Par ailleurs, le principe Ã©tabli Ã l'article 7 conceme seulement le droit pÃ©nal matÃ©riel et non le droit de procÃ©dure, droit qui rÃ©git la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Le Gouvernement conclut Ã l'absence de fondement de la requbte dans son ensemble . B . Le requCranr
30. Selon le requÃ©rant, il y a Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et la requÃªte est bien fondÃ©e . a) Remarques prfliminnire s 31 . Le requÃ©rant conteste la mÃ©thode de calcul de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive adoptÃ©e par le Gouvernement . Cette durÃ©e ne doit pas Ãªtre calculÃ©e, pour les besoins de l'article 5, par. 3, comme prenant fin Ã la date du renvoi en jugement, comme le suggÃ¨re le Gouvernement, mais bien comme incluant la phase postÃ©rieure Ã l'instruction . B se base Ã cet Ã©gard tant sur la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne que sur celle de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . b) Quant Ã l'[puisemem des voies de recours intemes
32 . Le requÃ©rant a utilisÃ© toutes les voies de recours qui lui Ã©taient offertes et qui Ã©taient de nature Ã redresser la situation qu'il dÃ©nonce . Partni ces voies, ne rentre pas le pourvoi devant la Cour de cassation, cer celleci n'aurait pas pu dÃ©cider contra legem, contre le droit spÃ©cial constituÃ©e par la lÃ©gislation d'exception . En effet, en droit italien, la Convention a le rang d'une loi ordinaire (ArrÃªt 1 .2 .1982 de la Cour constimtionnelle) . Par ailleurs, les normes en mati8re de privation de libertÃ© revÃªtent toutes, actuellement, le caractÃ¨ re de Â«droit spÃ©cial . prÃ©valant donc sur tout autre droit ayant le mÃ¨me rang . 33 . B est Ã souligner, encore, que pour la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive postÃ©rieure au renvoi en jugement aucune voie de recours ne peut @tre utilisÃ©e par le requÃ©rant .
c) Quant au bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte 34 . La durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive est abusive et contraire Ã l'article 5, par . 3 . Elle s'explique en substance par l'inertie de l'autoritÃ© judiciaire Ã enquÃªter sur les faits qui sont reprochÃ©s au requÃ©rant .
En effet, il n'a Ã©tÃ© interrogÃ© que trois fois pendant l'instmction et une seule fois Ã ce jour pendant les dÃ©bats . De plus, il n'a pu Ãªtre confrontÃ© Ã aucun tÃ©moin Ã charge . 35 . Les faits qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© reprochÃ©s dans le mandat d'arrÃªt sont les mÃªmes que ceux pour lesquels il a Ã©tÃ© renvoyÃ© en jugement et qui figurent dans l'acte d'accusation : le fait d'avoir fait partie de la rÃ©daction de la revue â¢Autonomiaâ¢ - qui se publie toujours - d'avoir collaborÃ© Ã la revue â¢ Rosso â¢ et d'avoir Ã©tÃ© un des membres fondateurs d'une radio privÃ©e qui Ã©met toujours . A la lumiÃ¨re de ces faits, les Ã©lÃ©ments indiquÃ©s par le Gouvernement quant Ã la complexitÃ© de l'affaire et des enquÃªtes, ne peuvent pas Ã©tre retenus . 36 . Selon le requÃ©rant, l'argumentation du Crouvemement, en mettant l'accent sur le caractÃ¨re exceptionnel des mesures de limitation de la libertÃ© personnelle en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, caractÃ¨re qui est rappelÃ© Ã©galement par la Cour constitutionnelle, parait sous-entendre que seul ce caractÃ¨re exceptionnel puisse la justifier . Mais alors, le Gouvernement aurait dÃ» tenir informÃ© le Conseil de l'Europe en vertu de l'article 15, des mesures prises dÃ©rogeant Ã l'article 5, par . 3 . Ne l'ayant pas fait, le Gouvemement se trouve dans une situation d'illicÃ©itÃ© . 37 . Pour ce qui est du principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence (art . 6, par. 2), le requÃ©rant s'en prend au climat de â¢culpabilitÃ© prÃ©sumÃ©e- qui transparaPt des media (presse Ã©crite, radio, tÃ©lÃ©vision) . Le nouvel ordre d'arrÃ©t du 23 juin 1983 en est une preuve (1) . Il tient Ã dÃ©noncer Ã©galement la pratique des autoritÃ©s judiciaires de dÃ©cerner de nouveaux mandats d'arrÃ©ts afin de faire courir de nouveaux dÃ©lais et Ã©viter ainsi la mise en libertÃ© automatique pour expiration des dÃ©lais . 38 . Quant au grief concernant l'article 6, par . 3(d), le requÃ©rant observe qu'il n'a jamais pu faire interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge, dont les dÃ©clarations seraient Ã la base de son inculpation .
EN DROIT 1 . Le requÃ©rant, qui se trouve en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, se plaint de diverses violations de la Convention se rapportant aux poursuites pÃ©nales dont il fait l'objet et Ã la procÃ©dure suivie par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires . A l'appui de ses griefs, il invoque les articles 5 . 6 et 7 de la Convention . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, d'abord, d'avoir Ã©tÃ© et d'Ãªtre privÃ© de sa libertÃ© dans des conditions contraires Ã l'article 5, par .l, (c) . En particulier, il n'y aurait pas eu, et il n'y aurait pas, des â¢ raisons plausibles de soupÃ§onner . qu'il ait commis les infractions dont il est accusÃ© . (1) Cet ordre d'arrÃªt aurait Ã©tÃ© dÃ©livrÃ© par le parquet de Padoue .
3 . La Commission relÃ¨ve, dÃ¨s l'abord, qu'il ne ressort pas du dossier si le requÃ©rant s'est pourvu en cassation contre les mandats d'arrÃªts, en faisant valoir l'absence d'indices justifiant sa dÃ©tention comme il le prÃ©tend devant la Commission (art . 263bis CPP) (1) .
Quoi qu'il en soit, et Ã supposer mÃ¨me que l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes se trouve rÃ©alisÃ© en l'espÃ¨ce, le grief tirÃ© de l'article 5, par . 1(c) est dÃ©nuÃ© de fondement . Il rÃ©sulte, en effet, des mandats d'affÃ©ts que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir organisÃ© et dirigÃ© une organisation terroriste visant Ã provoquer une insurrection armÃ©e . La rÃ©alitÃ© de ces soupÃ§ons est corroborÃ©e par l'ordonnance de renvoi en jugement et par les considÃ©rations qui y sont contenues sur les faits reprochÃ©s au requÃ©rant . La Commission tient Ã souligner, Ã cet Ã©gard, qu'on ne saurait exiger, pourjustifier l'arrestation ou la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, que la rÃ©alitÃ© et la nature des infractions dont l'intÃ©ressÃ© est inculpÃ© soient Ã©tablies, puisque tel est le but de l'instruction dont la dÃ©tention doit permettre le dÃ©roulement normal (DÃ©c . NÂ° 8339/78, Schertenleib c/Suisse, D .R . 17, p. 180) .
Cette partie de la requÃªte doit, dÃ¨s lors, Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme Ã©tant manifestement mal fondÃ©e, par application de l'article 27, par . 2, de la Convention . 4 . Le requÃ©rant soutient que la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive a dÃ©passÃ© le . dÃ©lai raisonnableâ¢ visÃ© Ã l'article 5, par . 3, de la Convention qui dispose que toute personne arrÃªtÃ©e ou dÃ©tenue dans les conditions prÃ©vues au par . 1(c) du mÃªme article -a le droit d'Ã©tre jugÃ©e dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable ou libÃ©rÃ©e pendant la procÃ©dure . . 5 . Le Gouvernement objecte, Ã cet Ã©gard, que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours intemes dans la mesure oÃ¹ il ne s'est pas pourvu en cassation contre le rejet de sa demande de mise en libertÃ©, pour expiration des dÃ©lais de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, par la cour d'appel de Rome en date du 9 janvier 1981 . 6 . La Commission observe, Ã cet Ã©gard, que l'allÃ©gation du requÃ©rant conceme la durÃ©e actuelle de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Or, en vertu de la loi du 22 mai 1975, la mise en libertÃ© provisoire pour le s
crimes dont le requÃ©rant est accusÃ© n'est pas admise et il n'est pas contestÃ© que le requÃ©rant ne dispose pas d'une voie de recours par laquelle il puisse se plaindre de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, dÃ©tention d'ailleurs qui s'inscrit dans les dÃ©lais maxima prÃ©vus par la loi . L'objection du Gouvernement ne saurait dÃ¨s lors Ãªtre retenue . (1) Tel qu'il Ã© uit en vigueur i l'Ã©poque des faits.
7. Quant Ã la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, le Gouvernement semble partir de l'idÃ©e que la pÃ©riode Ã prendre en considÃ©ration, en l'espÃ¨ce, s'achÃ¨ve le 31 mars 1981, date du renvoien jugement . 8 . La Commission considÃ¨re, Ã ce sujet, que si le dies a quo de cette pÃ©riode est bien celui du jour de l'arrestation, le dies ad quem coÃ¯ncide, selon une jurisprvdence bien Ã©tablie, avec la condamnation en premier degrÃ©, au plus tÃ´t . En effet, le requÃ©rant, privÃ© de libertÃ© le 7 avril 1979, a Ã©tÃ© depuis cette date continuellement maintenu en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, dÃ©tention qui a durÃ© Ã ce jour, aucune condamnation en premiÃ¨re instance n'Ã©tant intervenue, quatre ans et onze mois . C'est donc cette pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention qu'il Ã©chet de prendre en considÃ©ration . 9 . La Commission relÃ¨ve dÃ¨s l'abord que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© renvoyÃ© en jugement pour des crimes contre la personnalitÃ© interne de l'Etat, crimes punis de la dÃ©tention Ã perpÃ©tuitÃ© (Code pÃ©nal, Titre 1, Chapitre U, art . 276 et ss .) . 10 . La Commission rappelle que la question de savoir si la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive a ou n'a pas dÃ©passÃ© les limites raisonnables, c'est-Ã -dire celles du sacrifice qui, dans les circonstances de la cause, pouvait raisonnablement Ãªtre infligÃ©e Ã une personne prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente (Cour eur .D .H ., Affaire Wemhoff, ArrÃªt du 27 .6 .1968 - En Droit, par . 5), doit Ãªtre examinÃ©e en fonction des circonstances particuliÃ¨res de chaque cas d'espÃ¨ce et que les circonstances susceptibles d'Ã©tre prises en considÃ©ration sont d'une extrÃªme variÃ©tÃ© (Ibidem, p. 10) . 11 . La Commission doit d'abord se prononcer sur la question de savoir si les raisons indiquÃ©es par les autoritÃ©s nationales pour justifier le maintien en dÃ©tention sont suffisamment fondÃ©es pour prouver que cette dÃ©tention ne s'est pas prolongÃ©e audelÃ des limites raisonnables, et qu'elle n'a donc pas Ã©tÃ© contraire aux dispositions de l'article 5, par . 3, de la Convention et, ensuite, sur la question de savoir si, dans l'hypothÃ¨se oÃ¹ il existait des raisons valables de ne pas mettre le requÃ©rant en libenÃ© provisoire, les autoritÃ©s judiciaires nationales ont conduit ou non l'affaire d'une manii!re qui a eu pour rÃ©sultat de prolonger la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive au-delÃ des limites raisonnables, imposant ainsi au requÃ©rant un sacrifice plus grand, dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de l'ordre public, que celui qui pouvait Ãªtre nortnalement infligÃ© Ã une personne prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente . 12 . En ce qui conceme le premier de ces points, la Commission relÃ¨ve que la particularitÃ© de cette affaire rÃ©side dans le fait qu'une mise en libertÃ© provisoire n'est pas possible . Les raisons indiquÃ©es dans le mandat d'arrÃ©t contenu dans l'ordonnance de renvoi en jugement, ont Ã©tÃ© les suivantes : gravitÃ© des faits, leur valeur symptomatique et des motifs de prudence pour la suite de la procÃ©dure . Le danger de fuite a Ã©tÃ© invoquÃ© par la cour d'assises de Rome le 16 novembre 1983 pour rejeter la demande, adressÃ©e par le requÃ©rant et d'autres co-accusÃ©s, tendant Ã remplacer la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive par une autre mesure, Ã savoir une assignation Ã rÃ©sidence (arresti domiciliari) .
13 . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait valoir que l'affaire revÃªt une complexitÃ© exceptionnelle due au grand nombre d'accusÃ©s et Ã la gravitÃ© extrÃ©me des infractions pour lesquelles le requÃ©rant et ses co-accusÃ©s sont actuellement jugÃ©s . La Commission souligne, Ã cet Ã©gard, que le requÃ©rant fait l'objet de plusieurs accusations pour lesquelles il risque, s'il est reconnu coupable, d'Ãªtre condamnÃ© Ã la dÃ©tention Ã perpÃ©tuitÃ© . Les faits sur lesquels les autoritÃ©s judiciaires, et le juge d'instruction de Rom e en particulier, ont eu Ã enquÃªter, la nature des accusations, le nombre des accusÃ©s (environ 80), de tÃ©moignages recueillis et des actes de procÃ©dure accomplis, dÃ©montrent, Ã n'en pas douter, l'extrÃªme complexitÃ© de la procÃ©dure . 14 . !a ComnÃ¹ssion considÃ¨re, encore, que le danger de fuite est un Ã©lÃ©ment inhÃ©rent Ã la nature mÃªme des infractions pÃ©nales du genre de celles qui sont reprochÃ©es au requÃ©rant, infractions qui s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'une stratÃ©gie visant Ã provoquer la guerre civile et l'insurrection armÃ©e contre les pouvoirs de l'Etat . 15 . Le danger qu'une fois mise en libertÃ©, une personne accusÃ©e de telles infmctions, se soustrtiie Ã l'action de lajustice, est d'autant plus rÃ©el qu'il n'est pas malaisÃ© pour une telle personne de gagner l'Ã©tranger . En effet, les contrÃ´les effectuÃ©s Ã la frontiÃ¨re ne font pas l'objet en Europe d'une application stricte et d'autre part nombreuses sont les possibilitÃ©s de se servir de moyens illÃ©gaux pour franchir les frontiÃ¨res . Le cas de M . Negri, un des co-accusÃ©s du requÃ©rant, est Ã cet Ã©gard extrÃªmement rÃ©vÃ©lateur . D'autre part, en raison du caractÃ¨re particulier des infractions en question, nombreux sont les pays qui refusent d'extrader les personnes accusÃ©es de telles infractions, ce qui d'ailleurs s'est produit pour des co-accusÃ©s du requÃ©rant . 16 . S'agissant d'une disposition indÃ©pendante qui produit ses effets propres quels qu'aient pÃ» Ã©tre les faits qui ont motivÃ© l'arrestation ou les circonstances qui ont causÃ© la longueur de l'instruction, l'article 5, par . 3, implique, cependant, qu'une diligence particuliÃ©re doit Ãªtre apportÃ©e, par les autoritÃ©s judicia'ves, Ã la poursuite de la procÃ©dure (Cour eur . D .H ., Affaire SttigmÃ¼ller, ArrÃªt du 10 .11 .69, En Droit, par . 5) .
17 . Sous cet aspect, la Commission souligne que le juge d'instruction d'abord et la cour d'assises ensuite se sont heurtÃ©s Ã des difficultÃ©s exceptionnelles, difficultÃ©s qui tiennent Ã l'objet des poursuites, aux stmctures des diffÃ©rentes organisations subversives et Ã la multiplicitÃ© des formes que la stratÃ©gie a revÃ©mes (actes de terrorisme et support idÃ©ologique et de liaison) . Rien dans le dossier, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© soumis Ã la Commission, ne permet d'affirmer que, compte tenu de ces difficultÃ©s exceptionnelles, les autoritÃ©s judiciaires (e n
particulier la cour d'assises de Rome) ont conduit la procÃ©dure de faÃ§on non raisonnable ; il n'apparaÃ®t pas davantage que ces autoritÃ©s aient manquÃ© Ã leur devoir de mener la procÃ©dure d'une maniÃ¨re compatible avec une bonne administration de la justice . D'autre pan, la Commission n'a pas relevÃ© que des dÃ©lais inexplicables, dus Ã une inactivitÃ© des autoritÃ©s responsables, se seraient ici produits . Elle constate ensuite que la durÃ©e, certes importante, de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du requÃ©rant ne saurait Ãªtre dissociÃ©e de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale elle-m@me . Cette durÃ©e s'explique Ã son tour principalement p ar le fait que les autoritÃ©s judiciaires ont dÃ©cidÃ© de rÃ©unir les diffÃ©rentes poursuites dans le cadre d'une procÃ©dure unique qui, par consÃ©quent, a eu des proportions considÃ©rables . A cet Ã©gard, la Commission rappelle que la Cour, saisie d'un problÃ©me voisin a estimÃ© dans l'affaire Neumeister que - la marche de l'instruction eÃ»t probablement Ã©tÃ© accÃ©lÃ©rÃ©e si la cause du requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© disjointe de celle de ses co-inculpÃ©s, mais rien n'indique qu'une telle disjonction e0t Ã©tÃ© compatible en l'espÃ¨ce avec une bonne administration de la justiceâ¢ (arrÃªt du 27 .6 .1968, par . 21) . Or, dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas dÃ©montrÃ© en quoi une bonne administration de la justice aurait demandÃ© que l'on dissociÃ t son cas de celui de ses co-accusÃ©s . la Commission rappelle, enfin, que le souci de cÃ©lÃ©ritÃ© ne peut dispenser les magistrats qui, dans le systÃ¨me de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale en vigueur sur le continent europÃ©en, ont la responsabilitÃ© de l'instruction ou de la conduite du procÃ¨s, de prendre toute mesure de nature Ã faire la lumiÃ¨re sur le bien ou le mal-fondÃ© de l'accusation (Cour eur .D .H ., Affaire Neumeister, ArrÃ©t du 27 .6 .1968, par . 21) . 18 . En prenant ces divers Ã©lÃ©ments en considÃ©ration, la Commission conclut que le sacrifice qui a Ã©tÃ© infligÃ© au requÃ©rant, du fait de son maintien en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, n'a pas Ã©tÃ© disproportionnÃ©, compte tenu Ã la fois de la gravitÃ© des accusations et de la peine Ã encourir et de la nature de ces mÃªmes accusations . la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'a, dÃ¨s lors, pas dÃ©passÃ© le â¢dÃ©lai raisonnable Â» visÃ© Ã l'article 5, par . 3 .
Ce grief doit, par consÃ©quent, Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme Ã©tant manifestement ttud fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, par . 2, de la Convention . 19 . Invoquant l'anicle 6 de la Convention, le requÃ©rant se plaint, ensuite, d'une atteinte au principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence (article 6, par . 2) ainsi que d'atteintes aux droits garantis par l'article 6, par . 3, litt . (b) et lin . (d) .
20 . Quant au respect du principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence, la Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant, qui n'a pas encore Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©, se limite Ã des considÃ©rations gÃ©nÃ©rales sur la conduite de la procÃ©dure par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires et n'indique le moindre fait qui pourrait vraisemblablement Ã©tayer ses allÃ©gations . Ces allÃ©gations sont dÃ¨s lors manifestement mal fondÃ©es . 2 1 . En ce qui conce rne les violations tirÃ©es de l'article 6, par. 3, de la Convenion, la Commission constate, d'abord, que le procÃ¨s est encore en cours et qu'aucune dÃ©cision sur le bien-fondÃ© de l'accusation n'est encore intervenue . 22 . La Commission a, Ã plusieurs reprises, estimÃ© que la question d'une Ã©ventuelle violation de l'un des droits g arantis Ã l'anicle 6, par . 3, doit Ãªtre exaniinÃ©e dans chaque cas et en prenant en considÃ©ration l'ensemble de la procÃ©dure . En tout Ã©tat de cause, quelle que puisse Ã©tre la solution Ã donner Ã cette question, la Commission est d'avis que la requÃªte est, sur les points considÃ©rÃ©s, dÃ©nuÃ©e de fondement en l'Ã©tat actuel de la procÃ©dure . Le requÃ©rant s'est plaint, dans ce contexte, que ses avocats n'ont pas dispos Ã© .23 du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense (article 6, par . 3, litt . (b)) . La Commission souligne que le requÃ©rant n'a pas indiquÃ© en quoi le fait pour ses avocats de n'avoir disposÃ© que de deux mois pour prendre connaissance du dossier avant que le juge d'instruction ne rende l'ordonnance de renvoi en jugement ait portÃ© a tteinte au droit dont il revendique le respect . A cet Ã©gard, elle remarque que le procÃ¨s est encore en cours . Rien dans le dossier ne permet donc de conclure qu'il y a eu atteinte Ã la disposition en cause . 24 . Quant Ã l'ar ti cle 6, par . 3, litt . (d), dont le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue la violation, la Commission re lÃ©ve, encore une fois, que ses griefs se rapportent, en fait, Ã la phase de l'instruction . Or, ce tt e disposition n'exige pas de confrontations de l'accusÃ© avec des tÃ©moins avant le procÃ¨s pour autant que ces m@mes tÃ©moins soient Ã nouveau entendus et puissent Ã¨tre inter rogÃ©s par la dÃ©fense pendant le procÃ¨s (cf. DÃ©c . 8414/78, X . c/R .F .A ., D .R . 17, p . 231) . Par ailleurs, le requÃ©rant n'a pas dÃ©montrÃ© qu'il aurait Ã© tÃ© portÃ© atteinte d'une faÃ§on vrÃ©mÃ©diable au droit prÃ©citÃ© au cours du dÃ©roulement de son procÃ¨s .
25 . II suit de ce qui prÃ©cÃ¨de que l'ensemble des g riefs se rapportant Ã l'article 6 de la Convention doivent Ãªtre rejetÃ©s par application de l'article 27, par . 2, de la Convention comme Ã© tant manifestement mal fondÃ©s . 26 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, encore, d'une violation de l'article 7 qui rÃ©sulterait de l'application rÃ©troactive d'une loi aggravant l'inculpation, la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention provisoire et la peine encourue ( Loi du 6 fÃ©v ri er 1980) .
Le principe de non-rÃ©troactivitÃ© de la loi pÃ©nale s'applique manifestement aux â¢condamnationsâ¢ ainsi qu'aux â¢peinesâ¢ . Or, il suffit de constater que le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã© tÃ© condamnÃ© et qu'aucune peine ne lui a Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e . Ce grief est dÃ¨s lors manifestement mal fondÃ© (article 27, par . 2, de la Convention) . 27 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, enfin, des conditions de sa dÃ©tention . La Commission a examinÃ© ce grief sous l'angle de l'a rticle 3 de la Convention . Elle relÃ¨ve que les allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant qui ne font Ã©tat d'aucun fait prÃ©cis, ne s'appuient Ã cet Ã©gard sur le moindre commencement de preuve .
Ce grief est, dÃ¨s lors, Ã© galement manifestement mal fondÃ© (article 27, par . 2, de la Convention) . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REQUÃTEiRRECEVABLE .
(IRANSU77ON) THE FACTS 1 . The applicant is a university professor, bom in Venice on 18 March 1940 and is resident in Padua . When the application was lodged, he was detained in Trani prison . He is represented before the Commission by his brother, Mr . Giuliano Ferrari-Bravo . 2 . During the investigation into the murder of Aldo Moro, for which the "Red Brigades" claimed responsibility, proceedings were brought by the judicial authorities in Rome and a warrant was issued, on 6 April 1979, for the arrest of a professor, Mr . Antonio Negri, on a charge of armed insurrection against the authorities of the State .
3 . Other proceedings were simultaneously brought by the judicial authorities in Padua concerning terrorist movements . On 7 April 1979, warrants were issued for the arrest of the applicant (and various others, including Mr . Negri) on charges of treasonable conspiracy and establishing an armed gang . The applicant was accused, specifically, of having organised and led a terrorist organisation . He was questioned on these charges on 20 April and 15 May 1979 . 4 . For reasons of territorial jurisdiction, these proceedings were subsequently taken over by the judicial authorities in Rome, who issued a further warrant for the arrest of the applicant (and others) on 7 July 1979, specifically charging him with armed insurrection (Section 284 of the Criminal Code) and promoting civil war (Section 286 of the Criminal Code), both of them offences punishable by life imprisonment (1) . On 18 July 1979, the applicant was examined by the Rome investigating judge on the charges specified in the above-mentioned warrant . 5 . In a decision ("sentenza-ordinanza") given on 31 March 1981, the Rome investigating judge committed the applicant (and others accused with him) for trial by the Rome Assize Court on charges of having helped to found and direct a politicomilitary organisation, the "Potere Operaio", for the prupose of overthrowing the constitutional authorities by civil war and provoking armed insurrection with the assistance, inter alia, of the "Red Brigades" . In the same decision, the investigating judge issued a further warrant for the arrest of the applicant - who had been released on expiry of the maximum permitted period of detention on remand for the offences specified in the first warrant - in pursuance of Section 272, penultimate paragraph, of the Code of Criminal Procedure .
The reasons given for the warrant were "the gravity of the charges, their symptomatic value and considerations of prudence in respect of the subsequent proceedings" ("gravitÃ dei fatti, il loro valore sintomatico e motivi di cautela processuale") . The main charges against the applicant were : treasonable conspiracy (Section 270 of the Criminal Code), the establishment of an armed gang (Section 306), and activities aimed at provoking armed insurrection (Section 284) and promoting civil war (Section 286) . The charges cover participating in the leadership of terrorist movements, helping to edit several "subversive" journals and publishing articles which allegedly promoted civil war and armed insurrection . (1) Section 284 of the Crimirul Code : " Anyone who provokes arrrcd insurrection against ihe authonUes of the Stete shall be punished by being sentenced io hard labour for life ( . . .)" . Senion 286 ( 1) of the Criminal Co,Y : "Anyone committing an action likely to provoke civil war on the territn ry of the Sute shall be punished by being sentenced to hard labour for life" .
6 . Proceedings began in the Rome Assize Court on 7 June 1982 . They were adjourned at the beginning of summer 1983 and were resumed on 26 September 1983 . 7 . On 16 November 1983, the Rome Assize Coun rejected an application by the applicant and other co-accused to have the nature of their detention changed from detention on remand to compulsory residence (arresti domiciliari) .
8 . The reasons given for the application were the following : - there was no danger of the applicants' absconding, since Mr . Negri's flight (1) was the action of one individual and had no bearing on the situation of the other accused ; - there was no danger of collusion (inquinamente delle prove), given the length of the applicants' detention on remand and the fact that they had all been examined already ; - the applicants did not constitute a public danger, since they had politically disavowed any terrorist intentions . 9 . The Assize Court's decision may be summarised as follows : It noted that at this stage in the proceedings, the alternative measure - compulsory residence - referred to in the application concemed the place of detention only . Moreover, it could not be denied that 16 other accused had in fact absconded . The large number of accused who had already absconded was highly relevant to the danger of the applicants' doing likewise - a danger which had to be assessed with reference to these widespread precedents . Caution was therefore necessary, particularly in view of the offences with which the accused had been charged, most of them committed in co-operation with others, and of the fact that both the accused who had absconded and those who were still in custody, had - according to the indictment - belonged to armed gangs operating on various parts of Italy, with logistical support in other countries enabling them to escape abroad and otherwise assisting them . All of this was relevant to the need - paramount in the case - to protect the public . In this connection, there could be no overlooking the nature, gravity and multiplicity of the offences listed in the charges, which involved the putting-intopractice of criminal plans to overthrow the constitutional order . These considerations were particularly relevant at this stage of the proceedings, when evidence was being brought - an operation which could not be jeopardised and when various procedural steps requiring the presence of the accused were being carried out . (1) Mr . Negri was mleased on July 1983, following his election lo the Chamber of Deputies . A further warrenl was issued for his artest, once the Chamber of Deputies had voted to amhorise his prosecution . This wernm could not be eaecuted, since he had absconded (September 1983) .
10 . The applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Cassation, which has not yet given judgment .
COMPLAINTS 11 . In general, the applicant denies the charges against him and complains of the procedure followed by the judicial authorities . He argues that the accusations are not specific, but merely interpret comments made by himself in journals or in private radio broadcasts . He alleges several breaches of the Convention . 12 . First of all, he complains that he has been, and is being deprived of his liberty in a manner incompatible with Article 5 para . 1(c) of the Convention . Specifically, he argues that there was, and is, no "reasonable suspicion" of his having commined the offences for which he was charged . In support of this claim, he states that there is no evidence against him . He further argues that the transfer to Rome of the proceedings against him was unlawful . 13 . He also complains that the length of his detention on remand was incompatible with Anicle 5 para . 3 . In this connection, he emphasizes that he was questioned on only three occasions during the preliminary investigations, the last being on 19 July 1979 . He was subsequently examined by the court during the trial on 3, 4 and 5 May 1983 . 14 . He funher maintains that there have been breache s - of Article 6 para . 2, since the wide publicity given to the case meant that he had been put on "public trial" by the media, a factor which could not fail to influence the subsequent course of the proceedings and jeopardise the presumption of innocence : - Article 6 para . 3(b), since the defence had been given less than two months to inspect the fde - 50,000 pages - before the case was sent for trial ; - Article 6 para . 3 (d), since he had been given no opportunity, during the preliminary investigations, of questioning the persons on whose statements the accusations had allegedly been bised . 15 . He also complains that Article 7 of the Convention has been violated . An act adopted after the opening of the proceedings (D .L . 15 December 1979 - Act of 6 February 1980) increased by one-third the maximum period of detention on remand for all terrorist offences . He claims that this Act, which also applied to proceedings under way when it came into force, was a criminal law, and that its retroactive effect violated Article 7 .
16 . He complains, finally, of the conditions in which he is being detained . He claims that he is being held in a "high security" prison, where persons accused of belonging to the "Red Brigades" are held, but that conditions in the prison are the very reverse of secure .
17 . Coneerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, he states that he applied to be released before he was committed for trial, and that this application was rejected by the investigating judge on 30 July 1980 and, on appeal, by the Rome Court of Appeal on 9 January 1981 (1) . He points out that decisions committing accused persons for trial are not open to appeal in Italian law . 18 . With regard to the increase in the maximum periods of detention on remand, he refers to the Constitutional Court'sjudgment of 14 January 1982, in which it concluded that the Act of 6 February 1980 was constitutionally acceptable and justified by the emergency created by terrorist activity . He adds that thisjudgment would render futile any appeals conceming the new maximum periods of detention on remand .
THE PROCEEDIN GS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 19 . On 5 March 1983, the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Goverrunent and to invite it to submit its observations on admissibility and merits, and particularly on the "reasonableness" of the duration of the applicant's detention on remand in terms of Article 5 para . 3 . 20 . The Government's memorial on the admissibility and merits of the application is dated 24 May 1983 . The applicant replied in a memorial dated 9 July 1983 . 21 . On 15 December 1983, the Commission resumed its examination of the application . It decided to ask the applicant to send it copies of the Assize Court's decision of 16 November 1983 and of any decision given by the Court of Cassation on the appeal against this earlier decision . On 15 January 1984, the applicant sent Lhe Commission a copy of the Rome Assize Court's decision of 16 November 1983, together with supplementary information . On 29 February 1984, the Government submitted comments on the information supplied by the applicant . Stunmary of the observations of the partie s A . The Govemmen r 22 . The application is inadmissible because domestic remedies have not been exhausted and also because it is manifestly ill-founded . (I) 7Te Act of 22 May 1975 does nor allow the provisional release of pÃ©rsons charged with cenain offences aiming ar armed insurrection (Section 284 (2)) and civil war (Section 286 (3)), of which the applicanl has been accused : Article 1 :
"In rhe wse of offences conunined after the coming into force of this Acr, provisional release shall not be grenled in respect of . . . anned insurrecrion against the authorities of the Stnle, .wilhin the meaning of See tion 284 of Lhe Criminal Code . . ., civil war, within the meaning of Section 286 of Lhe Crintinel Code . . ." .
a) 7he objection based on failure to exhaust domestic remedie s . Since the Convention has been incorporated into Italian law, the applicant can23 not exhaust domestic remedies until he has claimed, in a national court, that the Convention has been violated . Domestic remedies have not been exhausted for another reason also . In fact, the applicant did not appeal to the Court of Cassation - citing Article 5 para . 3 if necessary - against the Appeal Court's order rejecting his application for release on the ground that the maximum period of detention on remand had expired . b) 7he merits of the application 24 . The Govetnment restricts its discussion of the length of the applicant's detention on remand to the period between his arrest (7 April 1979) and the date on which he was committed for trial (31 March 1981) . Th is detention is lawful in Italian law, since it did not exceed the maximum period provided for in law . 25 . With regard to Article 5, the length of the applicant's detention was not "unreasonable" . It was justified by the exceptional complexity of the case, resulting from the large number of the charges, which were extremely serious . The judicial authorities had to conduct highly difficult investigations, taking a considerable tiine . In fact, during the preliminary investigations (the file consists of more than 56,000 pages), there were 231 examinations of persons accused and a further 79 examinations of persons accused of connected offences ; there were 353 examinations of wimesses ; there were 8 confrontations of accused persbns with witnesses ,
and evidence was taken from 10 expert witnesses .
In conclusion, there is no indication that Ar[icle 5 para . 3 has been violate d 26 . As for Article 5 para . I (c), the Government notes that both the arrest warrant and the order committing the applicant for trial give the reasons for his being deprived of liberty and thus that there are plausible grounds for this measure . The transfer of the proceedings to Rome wasjustified because of the connection , with other proceedings . 27 . As for the alleged violation of the principle of presumption of innocence (Article 6 para . 2) the courts give judgment on the basis of evidence collected in accordance with the procedural rules, and there is no question of their being,influence 1 . dbyarticlesnhp 28 . With regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 para . 3 (b) and (d), it should be noted that the applicant and his counsel were given all the time and facilities needed to prepare his defence . Moreover, the trial is still in progress and the applicant's defence options are still completely open .
29 . As for the complaint that the one-third increase in maximum periods of deten- .. tion on remand, even for proceedings actually in progress (D .L . 15 December 1979) , -34-
is incompatil . .ith Article 7, it should be noted that the order was not applied to the applicant, who suffered no damage on this score . In fact, his detention on remand (until 31 March 1981) was entirely within the legal limits (no more than two years prior to committal before trial) and there was no need to apply the provisions in question . Moreover, the principle laid down in Article 7 is applicable only to substantive criminal law and not to procedural law, which covers detention on remand .
The Government concludes that the application as a whole is unfounded . B . 7he applicant 30 . The applicant argues that domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the application is well founded . a) Preliminary remarks 31 . The applicant contests the method used by the Government in reckoning up the length of his detention on remand . For the purpose of Anicle 5 para . 3, detention must not be regarded as ending, as the Governement suggests, on the date of committal for trial, but as including the phase following the preliminary investigations . He based this view on the case-law both of the Italian Constitutional Court and of the European Court of Human Rights .
b) The exhaustion of domestic remedies 32 . The applicant has used all the remedies available to him against the situation of which he complains . These remedies do not include application to the Court of Cassation, since the latter would not have been able to give a decision contra legem by setting aside the special provisions of the emergency legislation . In fact, the Convention has the status of an ordinary law in Italian law (Constitutional Court judgment of I February 1982) . All the regulations governing deprivation of liberty constitute "special legislation" at the present time and thus take precedence over all other legislation having ordinary status . 33 . It must also be emphasized Ihat no remedy is open to the applicant for the period of detention on remand following his committal for trial . c) 7he merits of the applicatio n 34 . The duration of the applicant's detention on remand is unreasonable and contrary to Article 5 para . 3 . It is essentially due to the judicial authorities' lack of zeal in investigating the offences charged against him . In fact, he was questioned on only three occasionns during the preliminary investigations and has so far been examined only once during the hearings . Moreover, he has been allowed to question none of the prosecution witnesses .
35 . The offences specified in the arrest warrant are the same as those for which he was committed for trial and which are listed in the indictment : being one of the editors of the journal "Autonomia", which is still being published, having written for the journal "Rosso" and being one of the founders of a private radio station, which is still loadcasting . This being so, the Government's arguments regarding the complexity of the case and the investigations cannot be accepted . 36. The applicant argues that the Cmvernment, by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the restrictions on personal freedom involved in detention on remand - a point which is also referred to by the Constitutional Court - seems to imply that these restrictions are justified only because they are exceptional . If this is the case, the Government should, under Article 15, have given the Council of Europe notice of measures derogating from Article 5 para . 3 . Its failure to do so has placed it in an irregular position . 37 . As for the principle of presumption of innocence (Article 6 para . 2), the applicant complains of the climate of "presumed guilt" generated by the media (press, radio, television) . The further order for his affest issued on 23 June 1983 is a proof of this (1) . He also denounces the authorities' practice of using new arrest warrents to establish new time-limits, thus avoiding automatic release for expiry of the earlier time-limits . 38 . Referring to his complaint under Article 6 para . 3 (d), the applicant states that he has never been allowed to examine the prosecution witnesses on whose statements the charges are allegedly based .
THE LAW I. The applicant, who is being held in detention on remand, complains of various breaches of the Convention, resulting from the criminal proceedings b ro ught against him and fro m the procedu re followed by the judicial authori ties . He invokes A rticles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention in suppo rt of his claims . 2 . The applicant complains, first of all, that he was dep ri ved of his freedom in conditions which violated Article 5 para . 1(c) of the Convention . Specifically, he claims that the re we re - and are - no "reasonable" grounds for suspecting him of the offences with which he is charged .
3 . The Commission notes first that the file does not indicate whether the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against the artest warrants, arguing, as he does before the Commission, that the re were no indications justifying his detention (Section 263bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure) (2) . (1) He sutes that Ihis order was issued by the Public Prosecutor's Department in Padua . (2) As it stood at the meterid time of the faets of this case .
Nonetheless, and even assundng that domestic remedies have been exhausted, the complaint based on Article 5 para . I (c) is unfounded . The arrest warrants indicate that the applicant was suspected of having organised and led a terrorist organisation which sought to provoke an armed insurrection . The reality of these suspicions is confirrned by the order committing him for trial and by the comments which it contains conceming the charges brought against him . In this connection, the Commission stresses that there can be no question of regarding arrest or detention on remand as being justified only when the reality and nature of the offences charged have been proved, since this is the purpose of the preliminary investigations, which detention is intended to facilitate (Decision No . 8339/78, Schertenleib v . Switzerland, D .R . 17 p . 180) . This part of the application must thus be rejected as being manifestly illfounded, within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 4 . The applicant claims that the duration of his detention on remand exceeded the "reasonable time" specified in Anicle 5 para . 3 of theConvention, which states that everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph I (c) of that Article "shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial" . 5 . In this connection, the Government contends that the applicant has not exhausted domestic reme.dies, since he has not appealed to the Court of Cassation against the decision given by the Rome Court of Appeal on 9 January 1981, rejecting his application for release following expiry of the maximum period of detention on remand . 6 . The Commission notes here that the applicant's allegation concems the current duration of his detention on remand . The Act of 22 May 1975 states that provisional release may not be granted for the offences with which the applicant is charged and it is not contested that he has no remedy against the length of his detention on remand, a detention which falls in any case within the legal limits . The Government's contention cannot therefore be accepted . 7 . As far as the length of the applicant's detention on remand is concemed, the Govemment appears to assume that the relevant period ended in this instance on 31 March 1981, the date of his committal for trial . 8 . In this connection, the Commission considers that, while the relevant period certainly begins at the moment of arrest, it ends at the earliest, as has been ruled on many previous occasions, when judgment is given at first instance . The applicant was arrested on 7 April 1979 and has been held since then in continuous detention on rernand - a situation which still obtains, since no judgment has been given at firs t
instance - for four years and eleven months . This is therefore the period of detention which must be considered . 9 . The Commission notes first that the applicant was committed for trial for crimes against the State which are punishable by life imprisonment (Criminal Code, Part 1, Chapter II, Sections 276 ff.) . 1 0 . The Commission points out that decisions as to whether detention on remand has exceeded reasonable limits, i .e . has imposed a greater sacrifice than can, in the circumstances of a given case, reasonably be expected of a person presumed to be innocent (Eur . Court H .R ., Wemhoff case, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no . 7- The Law, para . 5), must always be taken in the light of the special features of each case and that the factors which must be considered are extremely diverse (ibid ., para . 10) . 11 . The Conunission must first decide whether the reasons given by the national authorities for the applicant's continued detention are sufficient to show that his detention did not exceed reasonable limits and was not therefore contrary to Article 5 para . 3 of the Convention . Secondly, if there were valid reasons for not releasing the applicant provisionally, it must decide whether the national authorities' conduct of the case resulted in his detention being extended beyond reasonable limits, thus imposing on him, in the interests of public order, a sacrifice greater than that which should normally be imposed on a person presumed to be innocent . On the first point, the Commission notes that the special feature of the case i s .12 that provisioinal release is impossible . The reasons given in the arrest warrant and in the order committing the applicant for trial were the following : the seriousness of the charges, their symptomatic value and considerations of pmdence applying to the subsequent proceedings . The danger of their absconding was the reason given by the Rome Assize Cour t on 16 November 1983, when it rejected applications by the applicant and other coaccused to have compulsory residence (arresti domiciliari) substituted for detention on remand . 13 . The respondent Government argues that the case is rendered exceptionally complex by the large number of persons accused and the extreme seriousness of the offences for which the applicant and his co-accused are at present being tried . In this connection, the Cottunission emphÃ¢sizes that several charges have been brought against the applicant, who, if convicted, faces a possible sentence of life 'unprisonment .
The offences which the judicial authorities, and particularly the investigating judge in Rome, had to investigate, the nature of the charges, and the number of persons accused (approximately 80), witnesses heard and procedural steps Ã¢ccomplished illustrate, beyond all doubt, the extreme complexity of the proceedings .
14 . The Commission further considers that the danger of the accused's absconding is inherent in the very nature of the offences charged against him, which form part of an overall plan to provoke civil war and armed insurrection against the authority of the State . 15 . The danger that anyone accused of such offences will seek to evade justice if released is enhanced by the fact he can leave the country without undue difficulty . Frontier formalities in Europe are not rigidly enforced, and there are also many ways of crossing frontiers Ã¼legally . The example of Mr . Negri, one of the persons accused with the applicant, is particularly revealing here . Moreover, owing to the special nature of the offences in question, many countries refuse to extradite persons accused of them - and this has happened in the case of some of the applicant's co-accused . 16 . Article 5 para . 3 is, however, an independent provision and produces iLs own effects regardless of the facts on which an arrest was grounded or the circumstances which protracted the preliminary investigations, and this means that the judicial authorities are bound to show special diligence in conducting the proceedings (Eur . Court H .R ., StiigmÃ¼ller, judgment of 10 November 1969, Series A no . 9, The Law para . 5) . 17 . In this connection, the Commission emphasizes ahat both the investigating judge and later the Assize Court encountered exceptional difficulties, owing to the nature of the proceedings, the structures of the various subversive organisations and the many fortns which their strategies took (acts of terrorism, ideological support and liaison) . Given these exceptional difficulties, nothing in the file submitted to the Commission indicates that the judicial authorities (and particularly the Rome Assize Court) conducted the proceedings in an unreasonable manner, nor is there anything to suggest that they failed in their duty to conduct the praceedings in a manner compatible with the sound administration of justice . Moreover, the Commission has not found that there were inexplicable delays, caused by the failure of the authorities to act, in this case . It also finds that the duration of detention on remand - admittedly considerable - is inextricably bound up with the duration of the criminal proceedings themselves . This in turn is largely due to the fact that the judicial authorities decided to combine the various proceedings in a single trial, which assumed substantial proportions in consequence .
In this connection, the Conunission recalls that the Court, dealing with a similar problem in the Neumeister case, considered that "the course of the investigation would probably have been accelerated had the applicant's case been severed from those of his co-accused, but nothing suggests that such a severance would have been compatible with the good administration ofjustice" (Eur .coun H .R ., judgment of 27 .6 .68, para . 21) . -39-
In this case, the applicant has failed to show why the sound adnÃ¹nistration of justice would have made it necessary to take his case separately from those of his co-accused . Finally, the Commission points out that a concem for speed dispense those judges who, in the system of criminal procedure in force on the continent of Europe, are responsible for the investigation or the conduct of the trial from taking every measure likely to throw light on the truth or falsehood of the charges (Eur . Court H .R ., Neumeister case of 27 June 1968, Series A no . 8, para . 2 1 ) .
18 . In view of all these factors, the Commission concludes that the sacrifice imposed on the applicant be keeping him in detention on remand was not unreasonable, having regard to the seriousness and nature of the charges, and the sentence which he faced . The duration of his detention on remand did not, therefore, exceed the "reasonable time" stipulated in Article 5 para . 3 of the Convention . This complaint must thus be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 19 . Referring to Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant also complains that there have been breaches of the principle of the presumption of innocence (Article 6 para . 2), and of the rights guaranteed by Anicle 6 para . 3 (b) and (d) .
20 . Conceming respect for the principle of presumption of innocence, the Commission notes that the applicant, who has not yet been judged, restricts himself to general comments on the conduct of the proceedings by the judicial authorities and cites no facts whatsoever in support of his allegations, which are therefore manifestly ill-founded . 21 . With regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 para . 3, the Commission notes first that the trial is still under way and that no decision has yet been taken on the % merits of the accusation .
22 . The ComnÃ¹ssion has stated more than once that alleged violations of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 para . 3 must be examined with reference to each specific case and to the whole of the proceedings concemed . Whatever the final answer to this question may be, the Commission considers that the application is, at this stage in the proceedings, unfounded in respect of the points at issue . 23 . In this connection, the applicant also complains that his counsel were not given the time and facflities which they needed to prepare his defence (Article 6 para . 3 (b)) . -40-
The Commission emphasizes that the applicant has not shown how the fact of his lawyers' having only two months to inspect the file before the investigating judge committed him for trial violated the right which he claims . It points out that the trial is still under way . There is thus nothing in the file to indicate that the provision in question has been violated . 24 . With regard to Article 6 para . 3 (d) of the Convention, violation of which is alleged by the applicant, the Commission again points out that his complaints actually apply to the investigation phase of the proceedings . Article 6 para . 3 (d) does not require that the accused be confronted with witnesses prior to the trial, provided tha .wthesinarghedcnbxamiythedfnc rial( . 84I4/78, X . v . Federal Republic of Germany, D .R . 17 p . 231) . Dec Moreover, the applicant has not shown that the said right was violated in any irreparable way in the course of the trial . 25 . It follows from these considerations that all of the applicant's complaints regarding Anicle 6 of the Convention must be rejected, under Article 27 para . 2, as being manifestly ill-founded .
26 . The applicant further complains that Article 7 of the Convention has been violated by the retroactive application of a law which aggravated the charge, the duration of his detention on remand and the sentence (Act of 6 February 1980) . The principle that criminal laws must not be retroactive obviously applies to "convictions" and to "sentences" . Accordingly, it need only be noted that the applicant has nÃ´t been convicted and that no sentence hes been passed on him .
This complaint is, therefore, manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 7 para . 2 of the Convention . 27 . Finally, the applicant complains of the conditions of his detention . The Commission has examined this complaint with reference to Article 3 of the Convention . It notes that there is no evidence to support the applicant's allegations, which Ã¢re entirely non-specific . It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention .
For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
-41-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 14/03/1984Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page