Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/138/252/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 09:44:04
Document Index: 793870983

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4884', '§ 4898', '§ 4919', '§ 4921', '§ 287', '§ 1030', '§ 4919']

WATERMAN V. MACKENZIE, 138 U. S. 252 - Volume 138 - 1891 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 138 > WATERMAN V. MACKENZIE, 138 U. S. 252 (1891) > Full Text
WATERMAN V. MACKENZIE, 138 U. S. 252 (1891)
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891)
Rev.Stat. § 4884. The monopoly thus granted is one entire thing, and cannot be divided into parts except as authorized by those laws. The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States, or, 2d, an undivided part or share of that exclusive right, or, 3d, the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States. Rev.Stat. § 4898. A transfer of either of these three kinds of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers; in the second case, jointly with the assignor. In the first and third cases, in the name of the assignee alone. Any assignment or transfer short of one of these is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in the patent and no right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement. Rev.Stat. § 4919; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 51 U. S. 494-495; Moore v. Marsh, 7 Wall. 515. In equity, as at law, when the transfer amounts to a license only, the title remains in the owner of the patent, and suit must be brought in his name, and never in the name of the licensee alone unless that is necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice, as where the patentee is the infringer, and cannot sue himself. Any rights of the licensee must be enforced through or in the name of the owner of the patent, and perhaps, if necessary to protect the rights of all parties, joining the licensee with him as a plaintiff. Rev.Stat. § 4921; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205, 88 U. S. 223; Paper Bag Cases, 105 U. S. 766, 105 U. S. 771; Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U. S. 485, 112 U. S. 487, and see Renard v. Levinstein, 2 Hem. & M. 628.
Whether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions. For instance, a grant of an exclusive right to make, use, and vend two patented machines within a certain district is an assignment, and gives the grantee the right to sue in his own name for an infringement within the district, because the right, although limited to making, using, and vending two machines, excludes all other persons, even the patentee, from making, using, or vending like machines within the district. Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 45 U. S. 686. On the other hand, the grant of an exclusive right under the patent within a certain district which does not include the right to make and the right to use and the right to sell is not a grant of a title in the whole patent right within the district, and is therefore only a license. Such, for instance, is a grant of "the full and exclusive right to make and vend" within a certain district, reserving to the grantor the right to make within the district, to be sold outside of it. Gayler v. Wilder, above cited. So is a grant of "the exclusive right to make and use," but not to sell, patented machines within a certain district. Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544. So is an instrument granting "the sole right and privilege of manufacturing and selling" patented articles, and not expressly authorizing their use, because, though this might carry by implication the right to use articles made under the patent by the licensee, it certainly would not authorize him to use such articles made by others. Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U. S. 672. See also Oliver v. Chemical Works, 109 U. S. 75.
The next instrument in order of date is the "license agreement" between them of November 20, 1884, by which she granted to him "the sole and exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell fountain pen-holders containing the said patented improvement throughout the United States." This did not include the right to use such pen-holders, at least if manufactured by third persons, and was therefore a mere license, and not an assignment of any title, and did not give the licensee the right to sue alone, at law or in equity, for an infringement of the patent. Gayler v. Wilder, Paper Bag Cases, and Hayward v. Andrews, above cited. The plaintiff not having amended his bill, pursuant to the leave granted by the circuit court, by joining the licensor as a plaintiff, this point requires no further notice. Nor is it doubted that the circuit court rightly held that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover only for infringements occurring between February 12 and November 25, 1884, his remedy was at law. Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189.
express provision that the assignment should be null and void if she and her husband, or either of them, should pay at maturity a certain promissory note of the same date made by them, and payable to the grantees. This instrument, being a conveyance made to secure the payment of a debt, upon condition that it should be avoided by the subsequent payment of that debt at a time fixed, was a mortgage, in apt terms, and in legal effect. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 26 U. S. 446-447. On the same day, the mortgagees assigned by deed to Asa L. Shipman all their title under the mortgage, and the promissory note thereby secured. Both assignments were recorded in the Patent Office within three months after their date, and the title thereby acquired by Shipman was outstanding in him at the times of the subsequent assignment of the patent right by Mrs. Waterman to the plaintiff, and of the filing of this bill. This last assignment was therefore subject to the mortgage, though not in terms so expressed.
By a mortgage of personal property, differing in this respect from a pledge, it is not merely the possession or a special property that passes, but, both at law and in equity, the whole title is transferred to the mortgagee, as security for the debt, subject only to be defeated by performance of the condition or by redemption on bill in equity within a reasonable time, and the right of possession, when there is no express stipulation to the contrary, goes with the right of property. Story on Bailments § 287; 2 Story, Eq.Jur. §§ 1030, 1031; Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 26 U. S. 441; Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467, 96 U. S. 477; Boise v. Knox, 10 Met. 40, 43; Brackett v. Bullard, 12 Met. 308, 310.
necessary for the protection of the mortgagee, and to give him the full benefit of his security. Stelle v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 201; Van Ness v. Hyatt, 13 Pet. 294; Hutchins v. King, 1 Wall. 53, 68 U. S. 58; Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519, 77 U. S. 529-530. After the mortgagee has taken possession, the mortgagor has no power to lease, and the mortgagee is entitled to have, and is bound to account for, the accruing rents and profits, damages against trespassers, timber cut on the premises, and growing crops. Keech v. Hall, 1 Doug. 21; Turner v. Coal Co., 5 Exch. 932; Dawson v. Johnson, 1 Fost. & Finl. 656; Fairclough v. Marshall, 4 Ex.D. 37, 47-49; Scruggs v. Memphis &c. Railroad, 108 U. S. 368, 108 U. S. 375; Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242; Hutchins v. King, above cited; Gore v. Jenness, 19 Me. 53; Bagnall v. Villar, 12 Ch.D. 812. Even against a mortgagor in possession, the mortgagee may obtain an injunction or damages for such cutting of timber as tends to impair the value of the mortgage security, or as is not allowed by good husbandry or by express or implied license from the mortgagee. Robinson v. Litton, 3 Atk. 209, 210; Farrant v. Lovel, 3 Atk. 723; Hampton v. Hodges, 8 Ves. 105; Humphreys v. Harrison, 1 Jac. & Walk. 581; King v. Smith, 2 Hare, 239; Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 107 U. S. 395; Verner v. Betz, 46 N.J.Eq. 256, 267-268; Page v. Robinson, 10 Cush. 99; Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491; Waterman v. Matteson, 4 R.I. 539.
N.Y. 539, and 28 N.Y. 585; Woodside v. Adams, 40 N.J.Law 417, 421-422. And when the right of possession, as well as the general right of property, is in the mortgage, the suit must be brought by the mortgagee, and not by the mortgagor or anyone claiming under a subsequent conveyance from him. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386; Wood v. Weimar, 104 U. S. 786; Clapp v. Campbell, 124 Mass. 50; Watson v. Macquire, 5 C.B. 836, 844. When it is provided by statute that a mortgage of personal property shall not be valid against third persons unless the mortgage is recorded, a recording of the mortgage is a substitute for, and (unless in case of actual fraud) equivalent to, a delivery of possession, and makes the title and the possession of the mortgagee good against all the world. Aldrich v. Aetna Ins. Co., 8 Wall. 491, 75 U. S. 497; Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513, 89 U. S. 521; Bullock v. Williams, 16 Pick. 33; Coles v. Clark, 3 Cush. 399, 401.
compensate the plaintiff, and has the same power to treble the damages as in an action at law, should not be brought by the same person. Rev.Stat. §§ 4919, 4921; Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 105 U. S. 212.
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