Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/488/235
Timestamp: 2015-01-29 10:01:37
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Javan OWENS and Daniel G. Lessard, Petitioners v. Tom U.U. OKURE. | LII / Legal Information Institute
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488 U.S. 235 (109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594)
[HTML] Syllabus Twenty-two months after respondent was allegedly unlawfully arrested and beaten by petitioners, two State University of New York police officers, he brought suit against them in the Federal District Court, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the ground that he had sustained personal injuries, mental anguish, shame, humiliation, legal expenses, and the deprivation of his constitutional rights. In denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the suit as time barred, the court rejected their contention that § 1983 actions were governed by New York's 1-year statute of limitations covering assault, battery, false imprisonment, and five other intentional torts. The court concluded instead that the State's 3-year residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims not embraced by specific statutes of limitations was applicable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
(a) Although Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 held that 42 U.S.C. 1988 requires courts to borrow and apply to all § 1983 claims a State's personal injury statute of limitations, Wilson did not indicate which statute of limitations applies in States with multiple personal injury statutes. Pp. 239-242.
In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), we held that courts entertaining claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 should borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. This case raises the question of what limitations period should apply to a § 1983 action where a State has one or more statutes of limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts, and a residual statute for all other personal injury actions. We hold that the residual or general personal injury statute of limitations applies.
* On November 13, 1985, respondent Tom U.U. Okure brought suit in the District Court for the Northern District of New York, seeking damages under § 1983 from petitioners Javan Owens and Daniel G. Lessard, two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers. Okure alleged that, on January 27, 1984, the officers unlawfully arrested him on the SUNY campus in Albany and charged him with disorderly conduct. The complaint stated that Okure was "forcibly transported" to a police detention center, "battered and beaten by the police officers and forced to endure great emotional distress, physical harm, and embarrassment." App. 5-6. As a result of the arrest and beating, Okure claimed, he "sustained personal injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger, mental anguish, shame, humiliation, legal expenses and the deprivation of his constitutional rights." Id., at 6.
The officers moved to dismiss the complaint, which had been filed 22 months after the alleged incident, as time barred. They contended that § 1983 actions were governed by New York's 1-year statute of limitations covering eight intentional torts: "assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, and a violation of the right of privacy." N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. 625 F.Supp. 1568 (1986). Borrowing "a narrowly drawn statute which is applicable only to certain intentional torts," id., at 1570, the court stated, was inconsistent with this Court's endorsement of "a simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims." Ibid. (citing Wilson, supra, 471 U.S., at 272, 105 S.Ct., at 1945). Moreover, a 1-year statute of limitations on § 1983 claims "would improperly restrict the scope of § 1983 and controvert federal policy." 625 F.Supp., at 1571. The court concluded that New York's 3-year residual statute of limitations for claims of personal injury not embraced by specific statutes of limitations, N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 214(5) (McKinney Supp.1988),
was applicable to § 1983 actions, and that Okure's complaint was therefore timely. The court then certified an interlocutory appeal on this question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) and Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted permission for the appeal and affirmed. 816 F.2d 45 (1987). It stated that Wilson's description of § 1983 claims as general personal injury actions required a statute of limitations "expansive enough to accommodate the diverse personal injury torts that section 1983 has come to embrace." Id., at 48. As between the two New York statutes of limitations, the court observed: "By nature, section 214(5) is general; section 215(3) is more specific and exceptional. This dichotomy survives no matter how many similar intentional torts are judicially added to those enumerated in section 215(3)." Ibid. The Court of Appeals favored § 214(5) for another reason: its 3-year period of limitations "more faithfully represents the federal interest in providing an effective remedy for violations of civil rights than does the restrictive one year limit." Id., at 49. Injuries to personal rights are not "necessarily apparent to the victim at the time they are inflicted," the court explained, and "even where the injury itself is obvious, the constitutional dimensions of the tort may not be." Id., at 48.
In this case, we again confront the consequences of Congress' failure to provide a specific statute of limitations to govern § 1983 actions. Title 42 U.S.C. 1988 endorses the borrowing of state-law limitations provisions where doing so is consistent with federal law; § 1988 does not, however, offer any guidance as to which state provision to borrow.
To fill this void, for years we urged courts to select the state statute of limitations "most analogous," Board of Regents, Univ. of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1797, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), and "most appropriate," Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), to the particular § 1983 action, so long as the chosen limitations period was consistent with federal law and policy. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977); Johnson, supra, 421 U.S., at 465, 95 S.Ct., at 1722.
The practice of seeking state-law analogies for particular § 1983 claims bred confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts and generated time-consuming litigation. Some courts found analogies in common-law tort, others in contract law, and still others in statutory law.
Often the result had less to do with the general nature of § 1983 relief than with counsel's artful pleading and ability to persuade the court that the facts and legal theories of a particular § 1983 claim resembled a particular common-law or statutory cause of action. Consequently, plaintiffs and defendants often had no idea whether a federal civil rights claim was barred until a court ruled on their case. Predictability, a primary goal of statutes of limitations, was thereby frustrated.
In Wilson, we sought to end this "conflict, confusion and uncertainty." 471 U.S., at 266, 105 S.Ct., at 1941. Recognizing the problems inherent in the case-by-case approach, we determined that 42 U.S.C. 1988 requires courts to borrow and apply to all § 1983 claims the one most analogous state statute of limitations. Ibid. See id., at 275, 105 S.Ct., at 1946 ("Federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored this simple approach"); see also id., at 272, 105 S.Ct., at 1945 ("A simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial purpose"). We concluded, based upon the legislative history of § 1983 and the wide array of claims now embraced by that provision, that § 1983 "confers a general remedy for injuries to personal rights." Id., at 278, 105 S.Ct., at 1948. Because "§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions," we held that a State's personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims. Id., at 280, 105 S.Ct., at 1949.
As the instant case indicates, Wilson has not completely eliminated the confusion over the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 claims. In States where one statute of limitations applies to all personal injury claims, Wilson supplies a clear answer. Courts considering § 1983 claims in States with multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, however, have differed over how to determine which statute applies.
Several Courts of Appeals have held that the appropriate period is that which the State assigns to certain enumerated intentional torts. These courts have reasoned that intentional torts are most closely analogous to the claims Congress envisioned being brought under the Civil Rights Act, and to the paradigmatic claims brought today under § 1983.
Other Courts of Appeals, by contrast, have endorsed the use of the state residuary statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. These courts have observed that § 1983 embraces a broad array of actions for injury to personal rights, and that the intentional tort is therefore too narrow an analogy to a § 1983 claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed this second approach when it concluded that New York's statute of limitations for certain enumerated intentional torts did not reflect the diversity of § 1983 claims.
In choosing between the two alternatives endorsed by the Courts of Appealsthe intentional torts approach and the general or residual personal injury approachwe are mindful that ours is essentially a practical inquiry. Wilson, 471 U.S., at 272, 105 S.Ct., at 1945. Our decision in Wilson that one "simple broad characterization" of all § 1983 actions was appropriate under § 1988 was, after all, grounded in the realization that the potential applicability of different state statutes of limitations had bred chaos and uncertainty. Id., at 275, 105 S.Ct., at 1946; see also Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2930, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) (courts selecting a state statute of limitations for § 1983 actions must "take into account practicalities that are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims"); accord, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). Thus, our task today is to provide courts with a rule for determining the appropriate personal injury limitations statute that can be applied with ease and predictability in all 50 States.
A rule endorsing the choice of the state statute of limitations for intentional torts would be manifestly inappropriate. Every State has multiple intentional tort limitations provisions, carving up the universe of intentional torts into different configurations. In New York, for example, § 215(3), the intentional tort statute endorsed by petitioners, covers eight enumerated torts. See supra, at 237. But different provisions cover other specified intentional torts. Malpractice actions are governed by one provision; certain veterans' claims by another.
In Michigan, separate statutes of limitations govern "assault, battery, or false imprisonment," Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5805(2) (1979), "malicious prosecution," § 600.5805(3), "libel or slander," § 600.5805(7), and "all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person or for injury to a person . . .," § 600.5805(8). In Ohio, separate provisions govern "bodily injury," Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Supp.1987), "libel, slander, malicious prosecution, or false imprisonment," § 2305.11, and "assault or battery," § 2305.111. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, separate provisions govern "libel, slander or invasion of privacy," 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5523(1) (1988), "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process," § 5524(1), "injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another," § 5524(2), and "any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct." § 5524(7). Were we to call upon courts to apply the state statute of limitations governing intentional torts, we would succeed only in transferring the present confusion over the choice among multiple personal injury provisions to a choice among multiple intentional tort provisions.
In marked contrast to the multiplicity of state intentional tort statutes of limitations, every State has one general or residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions. Some States have a general provision which applies to all personal injury actions with certain specific exceptions.
Others have a residual provision which applies to all actions not specifically provided for, including personal injury actions.
Whichever form they take, these provisions are easily identifiable by language or application. Indeed, the very idea of a general or residual statute suggests that each State would have no more than one. Potential § 1983 plaintiffs and defendants therefore can readily ascertain, with little risk of confusion or unpredictability, the applicable limitations period in advance of filing a § 1983 action.
"a unique remedy making it appropriate to accord the statute 'a sweep as broad as its language.' Because the § 1983 remedy is one that can 'override certain kinds of state laws,' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173, 81 S.Ct. 473, 477, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), and is, in all events, 'supplementary to any remedy any State might have,' McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 672, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1435, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963), it can have no precise counterpart in state law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S., at 196, n. 5, 81 S.Ct., at 488, n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring). Therefore, it is 'the purest coincidence,' ibid., when state statutes or the common law provide for equivalent remedies; any analogies to those causes of action are bound to be imperfect." Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
See also id., at 273, n. 31, 105 S.Ct., at 1945 n. 31; Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 19-20 (1985). Many of these claims bear little if any resemblance to the common-law intentional tort. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S., at 146, n. 3, 108 S.Ct., at 2311, n. 3. Even where intent is an element of a constitutional claim or defense, the necessary intent is often different from the intent requirement of a related common-law tort. E.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (distinguishing constitutional "malice" in the First Amendment context from common-law "malice"). Given that so many claims brought under § 1983 have no precise state-law analog, applying the statute of limitations for the limited category of intentional torts would be inconsistent with § 1983's broad scope.
We accordingly hold that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.
Our decision in Wilson promised an end to the confusion over what statute of limitations to apply to § 1983 actions; with today's decision, we hope to fulfill Wilson § promise. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
"The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title 'CIVIL RIGHTS,' and of Title 'CRIMES,' for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . . ." 42 U.S.C. 1988.
"While one main scourge of the evilperhaps the leading one was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created [§ 1983] was not a remedy against it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-176, 81 S.Ct. 473, 477-78, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).