Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/485/693
Timestamp: 2013-05-21 23:06:16
Document Index: 201678472

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 547', '§ 518', '§ 1', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 516', '§ 518', '§ 9', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 169', '§ 117', '§ 518', '§ 601', '§ 518']

UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY and Charles M. Hauser. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY and Charles M. Hauser.
485 U.S. 693 (108 S.Ct. 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 785)
UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY and Charles M. Hauser.
[HTML] Syllabus Respondents, a newspaper and its executive editor, violated a temporary restraining order issued by the District Court in a civil suit brought to enjoin dissemination of surveillance logs and memoranda concerning the plaintiff's deceased father. Although the court subsequently vacated the order, it nevertheless appointed a private attorney to prosecute respondents for criminal contempt of the order, declining to ask the United States Attorney to pursue the matter because of his representation of the federal defendants in the underlying civil action. The court ultimately found respondents in criminal contempt, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the order was "transparently invalid" under the First Amendment. Although the Solicitor General denied the special prosecutor authority to represent the United States in this Court in seeking reinstatement of the contempt judgment, the prosecutor nevertheless filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, and briefed and argued the case.
(b) This case is one "in which the United States is interested," within the plain meaning of § 518(a). The action was initiated, and continues to be litigated here, in order to further the United States' unique sovereign interest in vindicating the authority of its Judiciary. The rationale underlying Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740which affirmed the inherent authority of federal courts to appoint private attorneys to prosecute disobedience of court orders in order to assure the Judiciary an independent means of vindicating its authoritydoes not necessitate the special prosecutor's appearance before this Court. Nor does Young create an exception to 28 U.S.C. 516 and 547, and therefore to the similar provisions of § 518(a). Unlike § 518(a), both § 516 and § 547 give the Attorney General exclusive control over litigation involving the United States "except as otherwise provided or authorized by law." Young simply acknowledges an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of the statutory provisos. Pp. 700-705.
(c) If a judicially initiated contempt citation were not a case "in which the United States is interested," the policies underlying § 518(a)that the United States speak with one voice before this Court, and that that voice reflect the common interest of the Government and the people in the development of the law, rather than a variety of parochial, inconsistent interests shaped by the immediate demands of the case sub judice could be undermined by, and anomalous consequences could result from, a deluge of unauthorized certiorari petitions filed by United States Attorneys or by special prosecutors at the behest of district judges. Pp. 706-707.
* On November 8, 1985, Raymond J. Patriarca, son of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, by then deceased, filed suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), its Director, the Department of Justice, the Attorney General of the United States, the Providence Journal Company (Journal), and WJAR Television Ten (WJAR), seeking to enjoin further dissemination of logs and memoranda compiled from 1962 to 1965 during the course of illegal electronic surveillance, see Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F.2d 1010, 1013 (CA1 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071, 100 S.Ct. 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 752 (1980), of the plaintiff's father. The complaint, as amended, was based on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), and the Fourth Amendment, and alleged that the FBI had improperly released the logs and memoranda to the Journal and WJAR pursuant to a FOIA request following the death of the senior Patriarca. The summons, complaint, and a motion for a temporary restraining order were served on the Journal on November 12, 1985. The next day counsel for the various parties gathered for a conference with the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. During that conference, of which, apparently, there is no transcript, the Chief Judge entered a temporary restraining order barring publication of the logs and memoranda and set a hearing for Friday, November 15.
Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), the District Court appointed William A. Curran of the Rhode Island Bar as "prosecuting attorney with full authority to prosecute" the pending contempt motion. App. 237-238. On Curran's application, the District Court then ordered respondents to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt. Id., at 31-32.
Before we can decide whether respondents could properly be held in contempt for violating the District Court's subsequently invalidated restraining order, we must consider respondents' motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari. It appears that the manner in which this unusual case reached us departed significantly from established practice. After the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of contempt and, sitting en banc, modified the panel's opinion, the special prosecutor sought authorization from the Solicitor General to file a petition here for a writ of certiorari. By letter dated July 2, 1987, the Solicitor General denied that authorization. See App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 1a-2a (SG Letter). Respondents argue that, without this permission, the special prosecutor cannot proceed before this Court. While denying authorization to the special prosecutor to file or to appear on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General questioned whether our recent decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987), rendered such authorization unnecessary in a case concerning a criminal contempt charge prosecuted by private counsel appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). See SG Letter. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2. We find no such implication in our decision in Young, and we conclude that the special prosecutor lacks the authority to represent the United States before this Court. Because he is not a party entitled to petition for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1), we must dismiss the heretofore-granted writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction.
The present case clearly is one "in which the United States is interested." The action was initiated in vindication of the "judicial Power of the United States," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1 (emphasis added), and it is that interest, unique to the sovereign, that continues now to be litigated in this Court. The special prosecutor seeks to reinstate a judgment of criminal contempt in a federal court, including a possible prison sentence for the individual defendant and a substantial fine for the newspaper defendant. The fact that the allegedly criminal conduct concerns the violation of a court order instead of common law or a statutory prohibition does not render the prosecution any less an exercise of the sovereign power of the United States. Indeed, just last Term, in a case much like the present one, involving a prosecution for criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. 401(3),
we flatly stated: "Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the United States. . . ." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S., at 804, 107 S.Ct., at 2136 (emphasis added). See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911) ("Proceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant . . .").
But that disagreement does not interfere with the Judiciary's power to protect itself. In this very case, before the consent of the Solicitor General ever became relevant, members of the Judiciary had decided that the District Judge erred in adjudging the defendants in contempt. Where the majority of a panel of a court of appeals or perhaps, as here, a majority of an en banc court, itself has decided in favor of the alleged contemner, the necessity that required the appointment of an independent prosecutor has faded and, indeed, is no longer present.
The Solicitor General argues that § 518(a) does not apply to a contempt proceeding that is initiated unilaterally by a federal court, because in Young this Court sustained the power of the court to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt charge, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. 516, in language certainly somewhat similar to that of § 518(a), requires such litigation to be conducted by a Government attorney:
Also, 28 U.S.C. 547 requires: "Except as otherwise provided by law, each United States attorney, within his district, shall . . . prosecute for all offenses against the United States." The Solicitor General concludes that Young necessarily implies that these broadly worded reservations of litigating authority, including § 518(a), do not apply to the case at hand.
Young neither expressed nor implied any such special consideration for a judicially initiated contempt proceeding. Both statutes implicated but not discussed in Young provide for the Attorney General's exclusive control over specified litigation except as otherwise provided or authorized by law. A fair reading of Young indicates that a federal court's inherent authority to punish disobedience and vindicate its authority is an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of §§ 516 and 547. The " 'power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts,' " and was not first recognized by this Court in Young; rather, it " 'has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.' " Young, 481 U.S., at 795, 107 S.Ct., at 2131, quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P. M., & O.R. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66, 45 S.Ct. 18, 19-20, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924). Thus, contrary to the Solicitor General's intimation, Young did not read an exception into §§ 516 and 547; instead, Young is consistent with the plain language of the provisos to those sections. Section 518(a), by way of vivid contrast, contains no such proviso.
Under the procedures set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the United States Attorney. See 481 U.S., at 801, 107 S.Ct., at 2134. Under the special prosecutor's interpretation of § 518(a), whereby a contempt citation initiated by a district court is not a case "in which the United States is interested," the United States Attorney would be free to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court without the authorization of the Solicitor General. We need not speculate how a United States Attorney would resolve the conflict between his duty "to the preservation of respect for judicial authority," United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-39.318 (1984), and his duty to his superiors at the Department of Justice,
because we reject out of hand the interpretation of § 518(a) that creates the potential for such a conflict. Similarly, if the United States Attorney concluded that a court of appeals' decision reversing a judgment of contempt did not merit further review and declined to file a petition with this Court, it would seem to follow from the Solicitor General's interpretation, that the district judge could then appoint another special prosecutor solely for purposes of seeking certiorari and, if the writ were granted, litigating the case before this Court. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 9, n. 7. But, surely, neither the force of historical practice, nor the necessity of protecting the dignity of the district courtwhose judgment of contempt has been reversed on appealwarrants attributing such power to the district judge.
We conclude that a criminal contempt prosecution brought to vindicate the authority of the Judiciary and to punish disobedience of a court order is a suit "in which the United States is interested," within the meaning of § 518(a), regardless of who is appointed by the district court to prosecute the action.
I join the opinion of the Court, which ably demonstrates that according 28 U.S.C. 518(a) its plain meaning is fully consistent with the opinion of the Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). I continue to believe, however, that district courts possess no power, inherent or otherwise, to prosecute contemners for disobedience of court judgments and no derivative power to appoint an attorney to conduct contempt prosecutions. See id., at 825, 107 S.Ct., at 2147 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
The 1789 Act has been amended to make it clear that the Solicitor General has essentially the same authority to conduct litigation in this Court as does the Attorney General and that such authority may be delegated to others. See ante, at 1506-1507. In substance, however, the provision has remained unaltered for nearly 200 years; the Attorney Generaland now the Solicitor General as wellis charged with conducting all litigation before this Court in which the United States is "concerned" or "interested."
Most litigation in which the United States is interested is, of course, conducted by the Executive Branch of the Government. Orderly administration requires that such litigation be conducted under the supervision and direction of a single office. Congress therefore wisely granted the Attorney General broad enough authority to accomplish that mission. It is unlikely, however, that when this statute was enacted Congress foresaw the possibility that matters such as judicial contempts, see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987), legislative contempts, see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927), or the need to defend a legislative veto, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), would present justiciable controversies in which the Congress or the Judiciary might have interests that diverge from those of the Executive Branch of the Government, but nevertheless be cases "in which the United States shall be concerned." It is equally unlikely that Congress, through amendment and more recent consideration of the provision, has perceived, much less endorsed, the view that § 518(a) should be read to place control of such litigation exclusively in the hands of the Executive Branch. Although the texts of the statutes that Congress enacted can be read to foreclose either the Congress or the Judiciary from appointing counsel to participate in litigation in this Court, we have long held that in construing a statute, we are not bound to follow the literal language of the statute"however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination' "when doing so leads to "absurd," or even "unreasonable," results. United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063-1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940) (citation omitted); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 107 S.Ct. 347, 93 L.Ed.2d 206 (1986); California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284, 107 S.Ct. 683, 691, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 108 S.Ct. 1179, 99 L.Ed.2d 368 (1988).
Both history and common sense make clear that Congress never intended to grant the Executive Branch exclusive authority to control all litigation before this Court in which a coequal branch of government maintains a substantial, justiciable interest. As early as 1818, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution directing the Speaker of the House "to employ such counsel, as he may think proper to defend the suit brought by John Anderson against the said Thomas Dunn, and that the expenses be defrayed out of the contingent fund of the House." 33 Annals of Cong. 434 (1818). The Speaker retained William Wirt to defend the suit, which established the congressional power of legislative contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, supra. Although Wirt was then serving as Attorney General, Congress nonetheless deemed it necessary to retain Wirt in his private capacity and to pay him $500 to defend the suit. See American State Papers, Misc. Vol. 2, p. 932 (1834) ("A statement of the sums paid to William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States, beyond his salary, for services not required of him by law"). Had Congress read "in which the United States shall be concerned" to extend beyond the interests of the Executive Branch, the Attorney General would already have been obliged to "prosecute" or "conduct" the suit in the Supreme Court, and no separate retainer agreement would have been necessary. Indeed, the House Committee on the Judiciary later explained that payment above and beyond the Attorney General's salary was proper because it was provided "for services rendered which did not belong to his office, which he was in no manner bound to perform, and for which, therefore, if he did perform them, he was entitled to be paid as any other professional man would be."
Id., at 931.
On numerous occasions since Anderson v. Dunn, Congress has seen fit to retain private counsel to represent its interests. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 168, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1881); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 49 S.Ct. 463, 73 L.Ed. 894 (1929); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). Similarly, the interests of the Federal Judiciary, which are certainly interests of the United States as well, have been represented in litigation in this Court by private counsel on several occasions. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S.Ct. 1648, 26 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). Yet, from the time of Anderson v. Dunn until today, we have heard argument in these cases without bothering to determine whether or not the Solicitor General approved of their participation in the litigation. In addition, we have frequently appointed counselsometimes designated as "amicus curiae," but nevertheless fully authorized to argue cases in which the United States is interested, see, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926); Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1965, 72 L.Ed.2d 437 (1982) (appointing counsel), 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983)without asking for the approval of the Solicitor General before taking such action. Moreover, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. 516 contains language similar to that found in § 518(a),
we have confirmed the power of the Judiciary to appoint counsel to conduct litigation in which the United States is interested. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., supra.
This long and previously unquestioned practice comports well with common sense. Section 518(a) directs that "except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested." The language is mandatory. In any case in which the United States is interested, the Solicitor General shall argue an appeal in the Supreme Court. Of course, and quite properly so, the Solicitor General does not seek certiorari in every case adversely affecting an interest of the United States. Instead, the Solicitor General acts strategically, choosing the most important cases and the cases in which the United States is most likely to prevail. In thus separating the wheat from the chaff, the Solicitor General makes a series of judgments as to what is in the United States' interest. As an executive officer,
Moreover, and even more compellingly so, it is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to abdicate to the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice the function of determining what is in the interest of the Congress or the Judiciary. Certainly, Congress did not intend that these executive offices be charged with weighing competing executive and congressional or Judicial interests, with authorityabsent further legislation
to deny Congress and the Judiciary access to this Court.
Not only is our prior practice consistent with a common-sense reading of § 518, but it is also significant that the officer most interested in a correct interpretation of that provisionthe Solicitor Generalplaces this interpretation on its text. In his brief in this case, he submits:
"Title 28 U.S.C. 518(a), like the other statutes that vest the Attorney General with exclusive control over litigation, applies to cases in which the United States is 'interested' by virtue of the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Executive Branchthe Branch in which the Attorney General serves. Cf. ICC v. Southern Ry., Co., 543 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir.1976) (Section 516 'not only centralizes responsibility for the conduct of public litigation but enables the President, through the Attorney General, to supervise the various policies of the executive branch')." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 13.
The fact that § 518(a) admits of no exception, of course, does not mean that Congress, if it so chooses, cannot exempt litigation from the otherwise blanket coverage of the statute. It does mean, however, that any such alleged exception must be scrutinized and subjected to the ordinary tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to supersede § 518(a). Indeed, Congress has enacted some provisions that suggest exceptions to the blanket coverage of § 518(a). See, e.g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 169, 96 Stat. 27, 51 (preserving existing authority of the Tennessee Valley Authority "to represent itself by attorneys of its choosing," while adding, see § 117, 96 Stat. 32, the United States Claims Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to the courts named in § 518(a)); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, § 601(a) as amended, 28 U.S.C. 594(a)(9) (authorizing independent counsel to initiate and conduct prosecutions "in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . in the name of the United States"). See, as to the last cited Act, In re Sealed Case, 267 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 838 F.2d 476, prob. juris. noted sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 484 U.S. 1058, 108 S.Ct. 1010, 98 L.Ed.2d 976 (1988). See also Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 759 (1951) (discussing independent litigating authority of Interstate Commerce Commission). Without pausing here to construe the effect of any of these enactments, we note that there is no similar indication that Congress intended any such exception for a special prosecutor appointed by a court to prosecute a contempt charge, despite the fact that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) reflects a longstanding practiceof which we assume Congress is awareof private prosecutions of contempt actions. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S., at 793-796, 107 S.Ct., at 2130-2132.
Similarly, nothing in § 518(a) precludes Members of Congress or the Judiciary from adding their views in litigation before this Court as intervenors or amici curiae, a practice we have long recognized, see, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986), and which in some instances is directly authorized by statute, see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. 288e(a).
"Where such occasional aid can be afforded by the Attorney General without interference with his proper duties, . . . there is no objection to his being employed upon the ordinary professional footingof receiving a compensation for the service required. It was not the design of the office, as has already appeared, that he should render any other than the stated duties for the stated compensation or salary; and it was never understood or intended that the office was to deprive the officer of the right to employ his professional talents and learning for his own benefit, where that could be done without prejudice to the faithful performance of his stated duties. . . .
Title 28 U.S.C. 516 provides:
Title 28 U.S.C. 501 provides that "[t]he Department of Justice is an executive department of the United States. . . ." Section 505, in turn, provides that "[t]he President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties."
In 1978, legislation was enacted creating the Office of Senate Legal Counsel. See 92 Stat. 1875, 2 U.S.C. 288 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Title 2 U.S.C. 288e(a) provides: "When directed to do so . . ., the Counsel