Source: https://www.patentofficetrials.com/?m=201112
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 03:47:15
Document Index: 91143420

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 3', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 3', '§ 102', '§ 112', '§ 321', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 273', '§ 273', '§ 273', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102']

December | 2011 | Patent Office Trials Blog
Secret Prior Invention as Prior Art under the America Invents Act
Posted by Ken Burchfiel / Post-grant review
The America Invents Act provides that current § 102(g) continues to apply to each claim of a patent or application that contains a specific reference to a pre-Act application, in uncodified § 3(n)(2).
Although § 102(g)(2) provides the basis for the US first-to-invent system, it is also a statutory novelty provision, outside the context of any interference proceeding. A third party’s prior undisclosed actual reduction to practice of a later-claimed invention in the United States is secret prior art that can be raised to invalidate that claim in litigation. Nothing in the 2011 Act appears to limit the scope of § 102(g)(2) that continues in effect for many post-Act applications and patents.
Unlike the general expanded worldwide novelty provisions of § 102(a)(1), which apply to all claims of a post-Act patent that contains even a single claim that is not entitled to an earlier filing date, §§ 102(g) and 135 will be applied to applications and patents that contain a single claim having a pre-Act filing date, as discussed in a previous post. The issue of benefit will be critical to determining not only whether a patent claim is patentable in view of prior art, but also to establish the universe of prior art that is applicable to a patent or application.
The Act creates a disparity in prior art with respect to three classes of post-Act applications and patents. Applications with all claims having pre-Act effective dates will not be subject to the new novelty provisions, but will remain subject to existing prior art, including § 102(g)(2) secret prior art. Applications with no reference to any pre-Act application will not be subject to § 102(g) prior art, but will be subject to the new prior art categories established by § 102(a). Applications with even one claim having a pre-Act effective filing date, and another claim not entitled to such benefit, will be subject to the worldwide novelty provisions of § 102(a), and also § 102(g) prior art. For example, continuation-in-part applications filed after the effective date by definition will disclose new subject matter, and will likely contain some claims that are fully supported by pre-Act disclosure, and other claims that are not entitled to a pre-Act filing date. It seems likely that all of the claims will be subject to the new worldwide “first-to-file” absolute novelty standard of § 102(a) (under § 3(n)(1)). In addition, the statute evidently requires that each claim will also be subject to existing § 102(g)(2) prior invention art.
With respect to benefit, determination of the US effective filing date of a claim can be elusive, even if a prior application contains identical disclosure. This problem will be acute for patents claiming benefit of earlier foreign national or EPO applications that are not identical in scope, such as applications that are combined for US filing, or US applications that contain added disclosure not present in foreign counterparts. This disclosure may be essential, for example, to provide a written description under § 112, ¶ 1, of inventions that are more narrowly disclosed and claimed in foreign counterparts. Such benefit issues are commonly litigated in USPTO interference proceedings.
Under § 321(b), post-grant review can be based on any statutory defense of invalidity, which in some cases may include § 102(g)(2) prior invention, whether by the petitioner or a third party, as discussed in a previous post. The proof of prior invention in a post-grant review proceeding should closely resemble the proof required in an interference, but without the requirement that the petitioner actually claim “interfering” subject matter. This critical requirement has limited the scope of interferences, in contrast to post-grant review proceedings which do not require the petitioner to have any US patent application at all. The result may well be that although an applicant cannot use secret prior invention to obtain a patent, as a post-grant review petitioner it can defeat the right of an applicant who was the first to file a US application.
If this turns out to be the case, foreign owners of US patents will be subject to two very significant disadvantages. Their patents will be subject to attack in the USPTO and in litigation based on the prior secret invention of another in the United States. If the inventions claimed were made outside the United States, the prior inventions will not be effective as prior art under § 102(g)(2) against other US patents. As discussed in an earlier post, the status of § 102(g)(1), which refers to interference proceedings, is unclear in view of other amendments made by the Act.
The second disadvantage of foreign-based US patent owners is that they generally will not be able to claim the prior commercial user’s right to avoid infringement that is established by § 273 of the Act. Secret, noninforming prior commercial use of a product or process in the United States now establishes a defense to infringement by the prior user, but not a novelty defense under § 273(g). This benefit is denied to prior commercial users of later-claimed subject matter who employ the subsequently-patented technology outside the United States, by § 273(a)(1). Secret, prior US commercial users of patented technology may also be able to assert such uses as novelty-defeating prior art under § 102(g)(2) in some cases.
In these two respects, the new law is truly an America Invents Act, which may be subject to criticism under TRIPS (an issue which I have not considered).
This is the third in a series of comments on the status of current § 102(g) under the America Invents Act. These comments are at most speculative, until the USPTO issues regulations governing the effect of § 102(g) under the America Invents Act, and the courts definitively construe the uncodified interference provisions.