Source: http://martinned.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 19:33:32
Document Index: 683508686

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 17', 'art. 17', 'art. 247', 'art. 247', 'art. 12', 'art. 219', 'art. 17', 'art. 217', 'art. 247', 'art. 17', 'CJEU ', 'art. 9', 'art. 24', 'art. 9', 'art. 83', 'art. 263', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 47', 'art. 53', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 11', 'art. 14', 'art. 6', 'art. 6']

Martinned: October 2012
Posted by martinned at Monday, October 29, 2012 0 comments
Posted by martinned at Tuesday, October 23, 2012 0 comments
Now that Commissioner Dalli suddenly appears to have un-resigned, the question is what to do. As far as I can see, under the Treaties there are two ways to get rid of a Commssioner. On the one hand, there is the approach that President Barroso has taken so far, which is codified in art. 17(6) TEU:
Contrary to what one might think, this does not seem to be optional. "Shall" usually indicates a positive obligation in European law, meaning that the resignation of a Commissioner is only a formality once the President of the Commission has asked for it pursuant to art. 17(6) TEU. The second approach is a forced resignation under art. 247 TFEU:
I think the explanation for this seeming redundancy is in the history of the Treaties. On the one hand, we have art. 247 TFEU, which already appears in identical form as art. 12(2) of the Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community. Clearly, this was traditionally the way to get rid of Commissioners like Mr. Dalli. On the other hand, as the number of Commissioners grew, a more Presidential system started to emerge, where in successive Treaty amendments the position of the President of the College was strengthened relative to his colleagues. Thus, as of the Treaty of Maastricht the President is selected first, and then consulted on the selection of his colleagues. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduces the proposition that "The Commission shall work under the political guidance of its President." (art. 219 EC) And finally the current rule of art. 17(6) TEU was introduced in the Treaty of Nice, as art. 217(4) EC.
In this way, the old rule has become ever less important, and there is a decent chance that it was only maintained unamended because no one thought to get rid of it. However, the current crisis does show a potential use for the provision. As it happens, Mr. Dalli seems to accept that if President Barroso formally asks for his resignation, that he is required to give it, regardless of whether the President has a good reason for asking. In this case, for example, it is highly doubtful that it can be proven that Mr. Dalli is "guilty of serious misconduct", although the Commission might be able to persuade the Court that Mr. Dalli "no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties" on the grounds that his reputation is too tarnished for him to function. But what if Mr. Dalli refused to go? Of course, the President could bar him from the building, but it would be nice if there were a more formal way of resolving the dispute. In this cases where it is able, the Commission should want to have the opportunity of proving in open court that its black sheep really should go. Deleting art. 247 TFEU would remove the possibility of removing, once and for all, all doubt about whether the President of the Commission was right to ask a Commissioner to go. For this reason, I would certainly suggest that it should be maintained, although possibly in amended form.
In the case of Mr. Dalli, however, his letter to President Barroso suggests that all of this can be solved by having President Barroso send him a letter formally invoking art. 17(6) TEU. I am not sure why Mr. Dalli thinks that the President has to ask for his resignation in writing, or why he thinks he is entitled to "defend himself" or "to consult with [his] lawyer", but he seems to be prepared to resign if and when he is formally asked. So let's just ask him again and get it over with.
UPDATE OCT 24: Apparently President Barroso is also wondering what Mr. Dalli is talking about. In a letter published today, he writes: "Under the Treaty, no written form is required for a declaration of resignation, and it is irrevocable. As a consequence, no further question arises about the effectiveness of your resignation."
Posted by martinned at Monday, October 22, 2012 0 comments
Posted by martinned at Thursday, October 18, 2012 0 comments
This has to be some kind of conspiracy: No sooner had I advocated for the greater use of EPICs than the CJEU declared them unlawful. On September 20, the 6th Chamber of the General Court, with Judge Wahl acting as rapporteur, upheld the Commission's State Aid Decision again France over La Poste, the French Postal Services.
Well, maybe the problem is already here:
(155) The Commission concludes that:
— unlike the creditors of undertakings governed by commercial law, creditors of La Poste (which is not subject to the ordinary law rules governing the compulsory administration and winding up of firms in difficulty) are not in danger of seeing their claim cancelled in whole or in part following court liqui­dation proceedings;
— the fact that La Poste has legal personality is no bar to a state guarantee to La Poste; and
— in the absence of any express limitation on the State’s liability in respect of La Poste, La Poste’s creditors may legitimately act on the principle that the State will bear the debts of La Poste, even though La Poste possesses legal personality
Then again, it is hard to argue against these findings of fact.
The better view is probably that the problem is here:
(308) Lastly, the unlimited state guarantee in favour of La Poste cannot be considered to be compatible on the basis of Article 106(2) TFEU. This exemption provides that undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly are to be subject to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.
(309) French law has imposed public service obligations on La Poste. On that basis, the postal operator may receive financial compensation or enjoy certain prerogatives derogating from certain generally applicable rules of law. However, such financial measures or prerogatives must be limited to what is necessary to offset the addi­tional costs incurred by La Poste by virtue of its public service obligations.
(310) The Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation sets out the conditions under which the Commission considers such compen­sation to be compatible under Article 106(2) TFEU. In particular, the compensation paid cannot exceed the cost of providing the public service, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.
(311) In the present case, such an analysis would presuppose a market valuation of the unlimited state guarantee in favour of La Poste in order to verify that its value does not exceed the net cost of providing the universal postal service. However, this analysis is impossible to carry out, which rules out application of the exemption provided for in Article 106(2) TFEU.
Let me see if I got this: The Commission spends a great deal of time talking about the interest rate advantage La Poste supposedly obtains because of this state guarantee, including a detailed discussion of the various ratings agencies' methodologies (par. 263 - 274, in particular), but they think it is too much trouble to estimate the Euro value of this advantage in annual interest expense terms? If so, how can we know whether this advantage is even big enough not to be de minimis? Much as I agree that there is an advantage, I am far from convinced that the transformation of La Poste from an EPIC to a private-law SA has made a difference of more than a few basis points. At the very least, such a difference seems like the kind of thing the Commission would have to prove. And I don't see why this calculation should be so "impossible" to carry out, at least not once the Commission, in its infinite wisdom, has estimated the number of basis points that La Poste would pay extra if it were a private law company. (Not a private company, mind. Either way it will be state-owned.)
The non-banking part of La Poste had a total debt at the end of 2011 of € 4,5 bn, so each basis point of additional interest expense corresponds to an additional interest expenditure of € 450.000. If the Commission cannot say how many basis points, approximately, we are talking about, they have no business bringing this case. And if they can put a number on it, it should be fairly easy to compare this number to the value of the Public Service Obligation imposed on the company. (As it happens, the net financing costs of the company are up 4,3%, from € 166 million in 2010 to € 173 million in 2011, while total debt is down from € 4,8 bn to € 4,5 bn, implying an increase in average borrowing costs of 39 bp. But that could be for a variety of reasons.)
The French government does not seem to have taken this particular approach, either in its communications with the Commission or in its arguments before the Court. Instead, it argued mostly about the existence of a guarantee and the existence of an advantage in general, without pressing particulars. The General Court, predictably, replied that the Commission had adduced sufficient evidence to show an advantage (par. 121-123).
Then there is another question that the French do not seem to have asked. Why did the Commission find it necessary to order France to turn La Poste into a Société Anonyme instead of permitting France to resolve the problem through less drastic means? Why not let France enact an explicit denial of guarantee? The answer is probably that France was already planning to convert La Poste into an SA anyway (cf. par. 318-323 of the Commission's Decision).
For the future, however, this is a possibility worth considering. After all, I am told that it is highly likely that this precedent will be applied to SNCF, the French railways. If so, the French might consider asking the Commission to do their job more carefully.
Posted by martinned at Wednesday, October 17, 2012 0 comments
Labels: EU, Rail
As part of her ongoing fight over the EU's agreement with the US over the exchange SWIFT data, MEP Sophie in 't Veld is trying to get her hands on the full version of this Europol inspection report. The problem is that it is classified UE SECRET, which predictably led to Ms. In 't Veld's Access to Documents request being denied. (Cf. art. 9 of Regulation 1049/2001.) One way to solve this problem, the solution she is currently considering, is to appeal the denial of access in the usual way. As far as I know, no one has ever tried to do this for a document classified at level UE SECRET, and even for the next lowest level, UE RESTREINT, such a case has never been won. (Cf. Case C-266/05, Sison v. Council.) So I started thinking about a way to get around this, for example by having Europol produce it under art. 24 Statute.
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of (...) acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.
I think we can all agree that the first two requirements are met in the case of a decision to classify a document at the level UE SECRET. The question is whether the third condition is. While the level of classification obviously has consequences for the staff of the European institutions and agencies, they do not count as "third parties". So which other possible legal effects are there?
Firstly, there is access to documents law. Unfortunately, there is art. 9(2) of Europol's Access to Documents Decision:
Given that the EU only rarely does substantive criminal law - cf. art. 83 TFEU - it is unsurprising that the EU has no Official Secrets Act. The Member States do, but those acts don't usually refer to the EU's classification scheme, and even if they did it would probably be insufficient to satsify art. 263 TFEU.
That leaves the overall obligation generated by the classification decision for all "holders" of such information - regardless of whether the are EU staff - to make sure it doesn't get lost. (Cf. art. 4(2) of the Council's Decision on the security rules for protecting EU classified information.) To be sure, that's a little thin, but then again "the Treaty established a complete system of legal remedies" (Les Verts, par. 23), and it is difficult to explain how the EU authorities can have an obligation to declassify information whenever possible without a corresponding means for anyone to sue them if they don't. So I say go for it. If you end up with the right panel, you may well win.
In the case of Ms. In 't Veld, specifically, it should of course be noted that such an action needs to be brought by the Parliament, since an individual MEP probably doesn't have standing under Plaumann. But that is not necessarily a bad thing. Especially when the case is a bit dubious and political, it helps if it is brought by the entire Parliament instead of by an individual MEP.
Posted by martinned at Tuesday, October 16, 2012 0 comments
In Finnair v. Lassooy and Rodríguez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor v. Iberia, the Court (per Judge Šváby) followed the opinion of AG Bot and interpreted the compensation provisions of Regulation 261/2004 widely to include cases of “denied boarding” due to a strike of airport staff. Cf. Recent Developments in European Consumer Law Blog
Austria’s reduced fares scheme for students in public transport, which is limited to students whose parents are in receipt of family allowances in Austria, violates free movement law. Commission v. Austria (per Judge Ó Caoimh)
While Bulgaria is allowed to ban tax debtors from leaving the country (cf. Aladzhov), the same does not go for strictly private debts. In this regard, the Court (per Judge Ó Caoimh) seems significantly more certain than AG Mengozzi, who left some room for exceptions. Byankov v. Glaven sekretar na Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti
For completeness sake, we should also mention the latest appeal of Evropaïki Dynamiki, who lost on appeal (per Judge von Danwitz) in their attempt to get an even more complete explanation as to why their tender bid was unsuccessful. Evropaïki Dynamiki ­– Proigmena Systimata Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v. Commission Cf. European Law Blog
AG Bot has an opinion on the European Arrest Warrant as applied to in absentia trials. His primary answer simply tracks the 2009 amendment to the EAW Decision, which inserted a new art. 4a which deals expressly with this issue, and the doctrine of primacy. Moreover, the AG argued that this approach is consistent with the right to a fair trial of art. 47 Charter and, more interestingly, with the art. 53 Charter guarantee that the Charter does not detract from the level of protection offered by national Constitutional law and by the ECHR.
In a case that perhaps suggests some shortcomings to the prejudicial question procedure, AG Bot approves of a Spanish scheme to combat money laundering which happens to be focused on Gibraltar, as long as it is justified for overriding reasons in the public interest, is such as to ensure the attainment of its aims and not go beyond that which is necessary to attain those aims, and applies in a non-discriminatory manner, which is for the national, i.e. Spanish, court to verify. Cf. Directive 2005/60. Jyske Bank Gibraltar v. Administración del Estado
AG Mazák hands the Region of Flanders a resounding defeat in its attempts to make sure that in certain areas people can only buy real estate if they show they have a sufficient connection to the municipality in question, as well as its attempts to attach various public service obligations to construction projects of a certain size. Libert et al. v. Flanders and All Projects & Developments NV et al. v. Flanders (NL, DE, FR)
In one of the more fascinating access to documents cases imaginable, Mr. Ivan Jurašinović achieved a partial victory in his suit to obtain access to certain documents exchanged between the Council and the Yugoslavia Tribunal regarding the prosecution of Ante Gotovina and the massacre in Knin. Jurašinović v. Council (FR 1, FR 2) Both judgements are by the Slovakian Judge Schwarcz. The exception of art. 4(2)(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 also applies to legal proceedings like the Yugoslavia Tribunal, but it was the application of that rule to the documents requested that was partially flawed.
Posted by martinned at Monday, October 08, 2012 0 comments
Now that I've finally had the chance to read the five opinions on railway infringement cases that Advocate-General Jääskinen published on September 6, I have to say that I find some of the Commission's claims distinctly odd. They seem to have tried to get in Luxembourg what they couldn't get in Brussels.
The cases against Hungary, Spain and particularly Portugal are fairly straightforward. In those cases, the Commission argued for a generally accepted reading of Directive 91/440 and the 1st Railway Package while the Member States in question either admitted wrongdoing (Portugal) or were advocating a reading of the legislation that was distinctly implausible.
In the case of Portugal, the country was in the process of abolishing the requirement that the incumbent rail operator should get prior authorisation from the Minister for Transport before taking certain decisions, just like it was in the process of setting up a system to make sure the accounts of the infrastructure manager balance. It just had not finished doing those things yet by the end of the period established in the Commission's reasoned opinion. That happens all the time in infringement proceedings. The Member State gets a slap on the wrist, but ultimately there is no real dispute between it and the Commission.
Spain tried to argue that the access charges that are paid by the transport companies for access to the railway system, being levied by a public company, were something akin to a tax and therefore needed to be established by law or by Ministerial decree. That may well be as a matter of philosophy, but it is not the approach taken in art. 4 of Directive 2001/14, which establishes a more nuanced division of power between the Ministry and the Infrastructure Manager. Likewise, Spain seems to have overlooked art. 11 of that Directive, which requires that the infrastructure charging scheme include certain performance incentives, and the requirement of art. 14 that capacity allocation should be done by the infrastructure manager and not by the Ministry.
The Hungarian case is already more tricky. That country still lost on the question of the financial viability of the infrastructure manager, just like Portugal, on the absence of performance incentives in the access charging system, like Spain, as well as on the question of whether the access charges are always high enough to cover the direct costs attributable to the transport in question. However, the Commission went on its face in the area of capacity allocation and access charge levying, where it tried to push for a more drastic approach to independence, just like in the German and Austrian cases.
What these three cases have in common is that the Commission is trying to get the Court to say that a holding model does not make the infrastructure company sufficiently independent, even though such a model, whereby the infrastructure company and one or more passenger transport companies are both owned by a holding company, is expressly permitted by art. 6 of Directive 91/440, as amended by Directive 2001/12:
In its evaluation of the 1st Railway Package, specifically in Annex 5 to the evaluation, the Commission outlined exactly what it thought was necessary in order for the infrastructure manager to be sufficiently independent that it could be entrusted with the responsibility to establish access charges and allocate capacity. However, unfortunately for the Commission, annexes to Commission Staff Working Documents are not binding EU law.
So the long and the short of it is that the Advocate-General observes that the requirements of Annex 5 go beyond what is required by binding EU law, and declines the invitation to read these additional requirements into the law. Much as AG Jääskinen was willing to use his idea of the best interests of passengers to read a pro-liberalisation agenda into an ambiguous law in Westbahn v. ÖBB, he is hardly going to do that when the legislation is as clear as here.
Which brings me to my ultimate question: What is the Commission trying to achieve here? This is a sensitive area of the law, with potential ramification for the Member States that amount to billions of euros, never mind national prestige and control over a service of undoubted general interest. In three railway packages, the Commission hasn't been able to persuade the Member States to require complete unbundling. Even in the Recast Directive, which is so new that it hasn't even been formally adopted yet, the holding company model is still permitted. Perhaps the Commission would say that it is not really trying to get the Court to force Germany, France, Italy and many other Member States to abolish their holding models, because they have the alternative under art. 6(3) of Directive 2001/12 of creating an independent body for access charging and capacity allocation. But realistically, I don't see how that is any more palatable, since that would imply creating a wholly new governance model for the industry, one that doesn't exist anywhere else. (Although in Switzerland they have Trasse Schweiz to take care of the capacity allocation process.)
Then again, the Court hasn't spoken yet.
UPDATE: In a highly non-official response, a Commission official emphasised that the Commission is not bringing infringement proceedings against all countries that have a holding company model, but only those where it objects to the specific form in which this model is cast. To be continued...
Posted by martinned at Wednesday, October 03, 2012 0 comments