Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170403_0000400.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-12-11 05:54:30
Document Index: 489245040

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

RICHARD L. HOWARD, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner's successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 56]. Petitioner bases his request for relief on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. Respondent agrees Petitioner is entitled to relief [Doc. 60], and both parties urge that the court grant immediate release [Docs. 56, 60]. For the reasons stated below, the successive § 2255 petition will be GRANTED; Petitioner's term of incarceration will be reduced to time served.
In 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) [Doc. 21]. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner stipulated that he was an armed career criminal under § 924(e) and thus subject to that provision's enhanced fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence [Doc. 22 ¶ 1]. In turn, the United States agreed to dismiss the seven remaining counts in the indictment, including a violation of § 924(c) with a consecutive statutory mandatory minimum sentence [Id. ¶ 1(c); Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 92].
Based on Petitioner's prior Arizona convictions for escape, second-degree burglary, and two aggravated assaults, as well as a prior federal conviction for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, the United States Probation Office deemed Petitioner to be an armed career criminal subject to the enhancement stipulated in his plea agreement [Id. ¶¶ 45-48]. This Court sentenced Petitioner to 200 months' imprisonment on January 15, 2008 [Doc. 31]. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
On December 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence [Doc. 35]. This Court denied that petition on the merits in a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Order entered January 19, 2012 [Docs. 44, 45]. The Supreme Court issued the Johnson decision on June 26, 2015. The Sixth Circuit authorized this Court to consider the instant successive petition on October 27, 2016 [Docs. 54, 56]. The United States supports relief.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
Here, three of the five convictions used to designate Petitioner an armed career criminal-the escape offense, the second-degree burglary offense, and the 1985 aggravated assault offense, no longer qualify as violent felonies after the Johnson decision because they neither have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force against another, see Untied States v. Barnett, 540 F. App'x 532, 536-37 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Descamps and explaining a statute only meets the first subcategory of violent felony under the ACCA where violations categorically require the use or attempted use of violent physical force), nor fall within one of the enumerated categories of violent felony listed in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because all three of the convictions only qualified as violent felonies by way of the now-defunct residual clause, none can be used to designate for purposes of ACCA designation. As a result, Petitioner's 200 month term of imprisonment and five years' supervised release [Doc. 31] exceed his maximum authorized sentence as a non-ACCA offender under § 922(g)(1) by 80 months' incarceration and two years' supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be . . . imprisoned not more than 10 years.”). The Court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated a clear entitlement to the requested collateral relief.
Where a § 2255 claim has merit, district courts have the discretion to choose between discharging the petitioner, resentencing the petitioner, correcting the petitioner's sentence, or granting the petitioner a new trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Here, the Court finds correction of sentence to be the most appropriate form of relief. United States v. Torres-Otero, 232 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[I]n cases were the sentence (but not the conviction) is infirm, only the ‘resentenc[ing]' or ‘correct[ing] the sentence' options are open to the district court, since a prisoner should never be ‘discharge[d]' or ‘grant[ed] a new trial' based solely on a defective sentence.”).