Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2009/09/08/E9-21389/biweekly-notice-applications-and-amendments-to-facility-operating-licenses-involving-no-significant
Timestamp: 2018-02-20 09:57:57
Document Index: 631848546

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 26', 'art 26', 'art 26', 'art 26', 'art 26', 'art 26', 'art 26']

46239-46247 (9 pages)
NRC-2009-0388
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/E9-21389 https://www.federalregister.gov/d/E9-21389
Start Preamble Start Printed Page 46239
This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from August 13, 2009, to August 26, 2009. The last biweekly notice was published on August 25, 2009 (74 FR 42926).
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to Start Printed Page 46240participate fully in the conduct of the hearing.
For further details with respect to this license amendment application, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/​reading-rm/​adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.Start Printed Page 46241
Date of amendment request: July 13, 2007, as supplemented July 13, September 12, November 19, December 13, and December 17, 2007; January 10 (4 letters), January 11 (4 letters), January 14, January 18 (5 letters), January 31, February 25 (2 letters), March 5, and September 30, 2008; March 5 and March 23, 2009.
Description of amendment request: The proposed license amendment request would revise the Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 3 (MPS3) spent fuel pool (SFP) storage requirements.
The July 13, 2007 license amendment request proposed a stretch power uprate (SPU) of MPS3. Included in a supplement dated July 13, 2007, was a request to amend the MPS3 SFP storage requirements. The July 13, 2007 request was noticed in the Federal Register on January 15, 2008 (73 FR 2549). By letter dated March 5, 2008, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) separated the MPS3 SFP storage requirements request from the MPS3 SPU request.
The request to revise the MPS3 SFP storage requirements is being re-noticed using the original significant hazards consideration, specific to the request to revise the SFP storage requirements, as provided by DNC in the July 13, 2007 license amendment request.
6.1.11.1 [Do the proposed changes] [i]nvolve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated[?]
[Response: No]
As discussed in LR [license report] Section 2.8.6.2 [Spent Fuel Storage] and Westinghouse report WCAP-16721-NP “Spent Fuel Criticality Safety Analysis,” revised spent fuel pool criticality analyses were performed to take into account the potential for more reactive fuel at SPU conditions. There are three different regions defined in the MPS3 spent fuel pool.
Region 1—350 storage locations
Region 2—673 storage locations
Region 3—756 storage locations
Because of the potential for requiring more fresh assemblies to be loaded in the core every cycle, some of the assemblies to be discharged to the spent fuel pool may not have sufficient burnup to meet the requirements of Region 2. It may be necessary to temporarily store the discharge assemblies in Region 1. To limit the time that these assemblies need to be stored in Region 1, additional curves have been added to TS [technical specification] Figure 3.9-3 that specify the burnup limits as a function of enrichment, burnup, and decay time. These decay time curves provide assurance that all spent fuel pool criticality limits will be met.
The spent fuel pool criticality analysis also shows that more limiting burnup requirements are necessary for Region 3 for the assemblies used at the uprate power level. Thus, a new curve is being added to address these requirements for Region 3.
With these changes, the spent fuel pool criticality analysis documented in LR Section 2.8.6.2 and WCAP-16721-NP, shows that the changes do not increase the consequences of any accident.
The new TS limitations provide assurance that the spent fuel pool will remain subcritical for all future cycles at the SPU condition and there is no increase in the probability of a criticality accident. Thus, the changes do not significantly increase the probability of any analyzed accident.
6.1.11.2 [Do the proposed changes] [c]reate the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated[?]
The changes will be implemented with existing spent pool racks. Thus, no new failure modes are introduced. The proposed additional requirements and the SPU fuel criticality analysis provide assurance that the spent fuel pool will remain subcritical for all uprate cycles. Thus, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different accident.
6.1.11.3 [Do the proposed changes] [i]nvolve a significant reduction in a margin of safety[?]
The analysis documented in LR Section 2.8.6.2 and WCAP-16721-NP shows that all spent fuel criticality limits are met and that there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety for the spent fuel pool.
Date of amendment request: June 30, 2009.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.9, “Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS),” to add additional essential service water (SX) cooling tower fan requirements as a function of SX pump discharge temperature to reflect the results of a revised analysis for the UHS.
The proposed change does not result in any physical changes to safety related structures, systems, or components. The UHS itself is not an accident initiator; rather, the UHS performs functions to mitigate accidents by serving as the heat sink for safety related equipment. Consequently, the proposed change does not increase the probability of occurrence for any accident previously evaluated.
The UHS plays a vital role in mitigating the consequences of any accident or transient. The proposed changes will ensure that the minimum conditions necessary for the UHS to perform its design functions will always be met. Engineering calculations demonstrate that the SX pump discharge design temperature limit of 100 °F, which was assumed as an initial input for the accident analyses, is preserved. Consequently, the proposed changes to cooling tower fan requirements, relative to the SX pump discharge temperature, do not increase the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
The supporting analyses for the proposed change do not involve a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed limits on maximum SX pump discharge temperature, and the proposed fan requirements, are within the design capabilities of the UHS and ensure that the UHS will always be in a condition to perform its design function in the event of an accident or transient. New and revised analyses that support the requested TS changes ensure the full qualification of the UHS. No changes are being made to the physical design of the UHS such that the possibility of a new or different kind of accident would be created. Consequently, these changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?Start Printed Page 46242
The proposed limits on SX pump discharge maximum temperature are based on the results of new and revised design analyses that ensure that the margin of safety is not reduced. The new limits on temperature will ensure that, under the most limiting accident or transient scenario, cooling water will meet the accident analyses SX design temperature limit of 100 °F.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise the technical specification (TS) 3.5.1, “Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Operating,” to delete the existing allowance associated with the automatic depressurization system (ADS) accumulator backup compressed gas system that currently allows a completion time of 72 hours to restore bottle pressure to ≥ 500 psig.
The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system is designed to maintain the availability of a mitigation system. It is not recognized as the initiator of any accident. The failure of the ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system will not propagate into the onset of an analyzed event. As such, this proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.
This proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Deleting the existing allowance associated with the inoperability of the ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system provides assurance that the design function of the ADS SRVs [safety relief valves] assumed in the safety analyses will be achieved under all postulated conditions. The change that deletes the existing allowable completion time for an inoperable ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system is in the conservative direction and will revise the existing non-conservative TS to be consistent with existing licensing requirements for multiple inoperable ADS valves. Therefore, this proposed change will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR [updated final safety analysis report].
The proposed change does not affect the control parameters governing unit operation or the response of plant equipment to transient conditions. The proposed change does involve the addition of a reserve nitrogen bottle that can be valved in during bottle replacement, however, during the short duration the reserve nitrogen bottle will be valved in the required minimum bottle pressure will be maintained at 1100 psig. The reserve bottle pressure requirement for this short duration ensures that the safety function of the ADS SRVs continues to be met.
Deleting the existing allowance associated with the inoperability of the ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system does not introduce any new or different modes of plant operation, nor does it affect the operational characteristics of any safety-related equipment or systems; as such, no new failure modes are being introduced. The proposed action provides assurance that the design function of the ADS SRVs assumed in the safety analyses will be achieved; and, therefore the LCO [limiting condition for operation] will be met. The change that deletes the existing allowable completion time for an inoperable ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system is in the conservative direction and will revise the existing non-conservative TS to be consistent with existing licensing requirements for multiple inoperable ADS valves.
The margin of safety is determined by the design and qualification of the plant equipment, the operation of the plant within analyzed limits, and the point at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated. The modified TS and TRM [Technical Requirements Manual] will ensure sufficient nitrogen supply exists to support both the LLS [low-low setpoint] and ADS function of the SRVs plus assumed design leakage with no operator action.
The change that deletes the existing allowable completion time for an inoperable ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system is in the conservative direction and will revise the existing non-conservative TS to be consistent with existing licensing requirements for multiple inoperable ADS valves.
Date of amendment request: November 6, 2008, as revised by letter dated August 4, 2009.
Description of amendments request: The proposed change would revise the Crystal River Unit 3 Improved Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements (SRs); SR 3.8.1.2, SR 3.8.1.6, and SR 3.8.1.10 to restrict the voltage and frequency limits for all emergency diesel generator (EDG) starts. The steady state voltage limits would be revised to be more restrictive (plus or minus 2 percent of the nominal voltage) to accurately reflect the appropriate calculation and the way the plant is operated and tested. The steady state frequency limits will be revised to be more restrictive (plus or minus 1 percent for all EDG starts) to ensure compliance with the plant design bases and the way the plant is operated. Additionally, SR 3.8.1.6 will be revised to clarify that the 10-second start verifies the capability of the EDG to pick up load, and is not the steady state condition. These changes will ensure that the EDGs are capable of supplying power, with the correct voltage and frequency, to the required electrical loads.
Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the Start Printed Page 46243issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:
The LAR [license amendment request] proposes to provide more restrictive voltage and frequency limits for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) steady state operation. The voltage band is going from a range of greater than or equal to 3933 V [volts] but less than or equal to 4400 V, to greater than or equal to 4077 V but less than or equal to 4243 V. The proposed limits are plus or minus 2% [percent] around the nominal safety-related bus voltage of 4160 V. The Frequency Limits are going from a 2% tolerance band to a 1% tolerance band around the nominal frequency of 60 Hz [hertz] (59.4 Hz to 60.6 Hz) for all starts of the EDGs, at steady state conditions. For fast starts, the voltage and frequency limits at less than or equal to ten seconds will be consistent with the EDG ready matrix setpoints (90.8% voltage and 98% frequency) to allow for the overshoot and undershoot condition that exists while the voltage and frequency values converge on steady state conditions.
The EDGs are a safety-related system that functions to mitigate the impact of an accident with a concurrent loss of offsite power. A loss of offsite power is typically a significant contributor to postulated plant risk and, as such, onsite AC generators have to be maintained available and reliable in the event of a loss of offsite power event. The EDGs are not initiators for any analyzed accident, therefore; the probability for an accident that was previously evaluated is not increased by this change. The revised, voltage and frequency limits will ensure the EDGs will remain capable of performing their design function.
The consequences of an accident refer to the impact on both plant personnel and the public from any radiological release associated with the accident. The EDG supports equipment that is supposed to preclude any radiological release. More restrictive voltage and frequency limits for the output of the EDG restores design margin, and provides assurance that the equipment supplied by the EDG will operate correctly and within the assumed timeframe to perform their mitigating functions.
Until the proposed Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) EDG voltage and frequency limits are approved by the NRC, administratively controlled limits have been established in accordance with NRC Administrative Letter 98-10 to ensure all EDG mitigation functions will be performed, per design, in the event of a loss of offsite power. These administrative limits have been determined as acceptable and have been incorporated into the surveillance test procedures under the provisions of'10 CFR 50.59. Periodic testing has been performed with acceptable results. Since EDGs are mitigating components and are not initiators for any analyzed accident, no increased probability of an accident can occur. Since administrative limits will ensure the EDGs will perform as designed, consequences will not be significantly affected.
The proposed amendment will place the administrative limits into the CR-3 ITS. The more restrictive voltage and frequency limits will provide additional assurance that the EDG can provide the necessary power to supply the required safety-related loads during an analyzed accident. The proposed ITS voltage and frequency limits restore the EDG capability to those analyzed by Engineering calculation. No new configuration is established. Therefore, no new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated can be created.
The LAR proposes to provide more restrictive steady state voltage and frequency limits for the EDGs. The change in the acceptance criteria for specific surveillance testing provides assurance that the EDGs will be capable of performing their design function. Previous test history has shown that the new limits are well within the capability of the EDGs and are repeatable. The “as-left” settings for voltage and frequency will be adjusted such that they remain within a tight band and this ensures that the “as-found” settings will be in an acceptable tolerance band.
The proposed ITS limits on voltage and frequency will ensure that the EDG will be able to perform all design functions assumed in the accident analyses. Administrative limits are in place to ensure these parameters remain within analyzed limits. As such, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Date of amendment request: June 24, 2009.
Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would modify Technical Specification (TS) requirements related to control room envelope (CRE) habitability in accordance with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-448 Revision 3, “Control Room Habitability,” per the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075), on possible amendments concerning this CLIIP, including a model safety evaluation and a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022), as part of the CLIIP. In its application dated June 24, 2009, the licensee affirmed the applicability of the following determination.
The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the Start Printed Page 46244CRE emergency ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee and based on its review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
Brief description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would permanently revise Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.9, “Steam Generator (SG) Program,” to exclude portions of the tube below the top of the SG tubesheet from periodic SG tube inspections and plugging or repair. In addition, this amendment would revise the wording of reporting requirements in TS 5.6.9, “Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Report.” The proposed changes only affect Byron, Unit No. 2, and Braidwood, Unit 2; however, this action is docketed for both Byron and Braidwood units because the TS are common to Units 1 and 2.
Date of publication of individual notice in Federal Register : July 31, 2009 (74 FR 38234).
Expiration date of individual notice: August 30, 2009 (public comment); September 29, 2009 (hearing requests).
For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/​reading-rm/​adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Date of application for amendment: August 29, 2008, as supplemented by letters dated March 5 and August 7, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: The amendments modified Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.5, “Core Operating Limits Report (COLR),” by updating the list of references in TS 5.6.5.b to reflect the current analytical methods used to determine the core Start Printed Page 46245operating limits for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3.
Date of issuance: August 26, 2009.
Amendment No.: Unit 1-174; Unit 2-174; Unit 3-174.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : November 4, 2008 (73 FR 65688). The supplemental letters dated March 5 and August 7, 2009, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 26, 2009.
Date of application for amendments: August 21, 2008.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments implement Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Changes Travelers TSTF-479, Revision 0, “Changes to Reflect Revision of [Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations] 10 CFR 50.55a,” and TSTF-497, Revision 0, “Limit Inservice Testing [IST] Program SR [Surveillance Requirements] 3.0.2 Application to Frequencies of 2 Years or Less.” TSTF-479 and TSTF-497 revise the technical specification's Administrative Controls section pertaining to requirements for the IST Program, consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(4) for pumps and valves which are classified as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3.
Date of issuance: August 17, 2009.
Amendment Nos.: 252 and 232.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : April 3, 2009 (74 FR 18253).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 17, 2009.
Date of application for amendment: September 9, 2008, as supplemented by letter dated April 24, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: This amendment modified Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, “Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation,” to lower the Group 1 isolation valves reactor water level isolation signal from Level 2 to Level 1.
Date of issuance: August 18, 2009.
Effective date: As of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to entry into Mode 2 during startup from refueling outage 20.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : December 2, 2008 (73 FR 73353). The supplemental letter dated April 24, 2009, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 18, 2009.
Date of application for amendment: March 5, 2009, as supplemented by letters dated April 17 and June 22, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment updates the reactor vessel heatup and cooldown limit curves and the low-temperature over-pressure protection curves.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : May 19, 2009 (74 FR 23443). The April 17 and June 22, 2009, supplements provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 17, 2009.
Description of amendment request: This amendment changes the name of the Licensee and Co-owner from “FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC” to “NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC.”
Date of issuance: August 21, 2009.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-86: The amendment revised the License, Appendix B—Environmental Protection Plan, and Appendix C—Additional Conditions.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : June 2, 2009 (74 FR 26434).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 21, 2009.
Date of application for amendment: March 9, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specification (TS) testing frequency for the Surveillance Requirement (SR) in TS 3.1.4, “Control Rod Scram Times,” by extending the frequency of SR 3.1.4.2, from “120 days cumulative operation in Mode 1” to “200 days cumulative operation in Mode 1.” This change is based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved TS Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler, TSTF-460-A, Revision 0, “Control Rod Scram Time Testing Frequency.” These changes were described in a Notice of Availability for Consolidated Line Item Start Printed Page 46246Improvement Process published in the Federal Register on August 23, 2004 (69 FR 51864).
Date of issuance: August 19, 2009.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : May 19, 2009 (74 FR 23447).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 19, 2009.
Date of application for amendment: April 15, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the MNGP Technical Specifications (TS), deleting paragraph d (regarding limitation of working hours of personnel who perform safety-related functions) of TS 5.2.2, “Unit Staff.”
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : June 16, 2009 (74 FR 28578).
Date of application for amendments: April 15, 2009.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments delete those portions of the Technical Specifications superseded by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 26, Subpart I.
Amendment Nos.: 193, 182.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 19, 2009.
Date of application for amendments: May 5, 2009.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the DCPP Technical Specification (TS) 5.2.2, “Unit Staff,” to eliminate working hour restrictions in paragraph d of TS 5.2.2 to support compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 26. The change is consistent with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Revision 0 to TS Task Force (TSTF) Improved Technical Specification change traveler, TSTF-511, “Eliminate Working Hour Restrictions from TS 5.2.2 to Support Compliance with 10 CFR Part 26.” The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on December 30, 2008 (73 FR 79923), as part of the consolidated line item improvement process.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1-206; Unit 2-207.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : June 16, 2009 (74 FR 28579).
Date of application for amendment: December 4, 2008.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to allow refueling operations with both containment personnel interlock doors to be open under administrative control consistent with Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Travelers TSTF-68 and TSTF-312. In support of this amendment request, the licensee recalculated the fuel gas gap fractions for its design-basis fuel handling accident and has justified a shorter decay time of 72 hours utilizing the alternative source term methodology.
Date of issuance: August 12, 2009
Amendment No.: 107
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : March 10, 2009 (74 FR 10311)
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 12, 2009.
Date of application for amendment: March 23, 2009.
Brief description of amendment: The amendment deletes paragraph d of Technical Specification (TS) 5.2.2, “Plant Staff.” The amendment is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved Revision 0 to the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-511, “Eliminate Working Hour Restrictions from TS 5.2.2 to Support Compliance with 10 CFR [Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations] Part 26.” The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on December 30, 2008 (73 FR 79923) as part of the consolidated line item improvement process.
Date of issuance: August 12, 2009.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented with the implementation of the new 10 CFR Part 26, Subpart I requirements.
No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.Start Printed Page 46247
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the Technical Specifications (TS) to eliminate working hour restrictions from TS 6.2.2 to support compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 26. The request is consistent with the guidance contained in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specification change traveler, TSTF-511, Revision 0, “Eliminate Working Hour Restrictions from TS 5.2.2 to Support Compliance with 10 CFR Part 26.” The availability of this improvement was announced in the Federal Register on December 30, 2008 (73 FR 79923), as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process.
Amendment Nos.: Unit 1-192; Unit 2-180.
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 18, 2009.
Date of application for amendments: March 27, 2008, as supplemented by letters dated December 19, 2008, February 9, April 24, and May 26, 2009.
Description of amendment request: The amendments revised the technical specifications (TSs) to adopt the content of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF448, Revision 3, “Control Room Habitability.” Specifically, the amendments revised TS 3.7.3, “Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System,” and added TS 5.5.13, “Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.” The amendments also added a new license condition regarding initial performance of the new surveillance and assessment requirements of the revised TSs.
Amendment Nos.: 275, 302, and 261.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : August 26, 2008 (73 FR 50362) and revised on January 27, 2009 (74 FR 4775). The supplements dated February 9, April 24, and May 26, 2009, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
Date of application for amendments: October 21, 2008.
Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to require an inspection of each ice condenser within 24 hours of experiencing a seismic event greater than or equal to an operating basis earthquake (i.e., 1/2 of a safe shutdown earthquake) within the 5-week period after ice basket replenishment is completed. This will confirm that ice condenser lower inlet doors have not been blocked by ice fallout.
The proposed amendments provided a procedural requirement to confirm the ice condenser maintains the ice condenser generic qualification as set forth in the UFSAR. Justification for the use of the proposed procedural requirement is based on reasonable assurance that the ice condenser lower inlet doors will open following a seismic event during the 5-week period and the low probability of a seismic event occurring coincident with or subsequently followed by a design basis accident.
Date of issuance: August 14, 2009.
Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance. The UFSAR changes shall be implemented in the next periodic update made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
Amendment Nos.: 325 and 317.
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79: Amendments changed the licenses.
Date of initial notice in Federal Register : January 13, 2009 (74 FR 1715).
The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 14, 2009.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of August, 2009.
[FR Doc. E9-21389 Filed 9-4-09; 8:45 am]