Source: https://casetext.com/case/brennan-v-occup-saf-hlth-rev-comn
Timestamp: 2019-02-19 11:16:29
Document Index: 327347797

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 651', '§ 660', '§ 658', '§ 2200', '§ 654', '§ 651', '§ 660', '§ 654', '§ 666', '§ 2200']

Brennan v. Occup. Saf. Hlth. Rev. Com&apos;n, 501 F.2d 1196 | Casetext
Brennan v. Occup. Saf. Hlth. Rev. Com&apos;n
Brennanv.Occup. Saf. Hlth. Rev. Com&apos;n
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh CircuitAug 16, 1974
Brennan v. Gilles Cotting, Inc.
…Though he found that Gilles was answerable because its payroll employees had access to the zones of danger…
Three Sons v. Occupational Health
…In support of its claim, Three Sons cites cases holding that an employer cannot foresee that an employee…
Decided August 16, 1974.
The Secretary of Labor appeals from a decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, which found that the respondent Republic Creosoting Company had not committed any violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651. The underlying facts are not in dispute on appeal, these facts being either stipulated by the parties or testified to at the hearing before the administrative law judge.
Decision and Order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, OSHRC Docket No. 22, Feb. 9, 1973. Review by this court is available under 29 U.S.C. § 660(b).
Republic Creosoting Company (Republic), a division of Reilly Tar and Chemical Corporation, operated five railroad tie marshalling yards in southern Indiana, including one in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Despite its name, Republic did not at the Jeffersonville yard engage in the creosoting process but it did, upon the acquisition of newly cut or "green" ties, undertake the first step of seasoning or drying the wood for its eventual use. Republic ultimately resold the ties to railroad companies. These ties weighed approximately 150 to 235 pounds each.
On July 9, 1971, a truckload of banded ties was delivered to the Jeffersonville yard. Raymond Davis, a new employee working his fourth day for Republic, was present at the yard on that date. Davis had been hired to sort and stack ties after the completion of the unloading process. The unloader operator, James Wiseman, suggested to Davis on the day in question that he come to the unloading so that he could help sort the ties after they had been unloaded. Davis had never witnessed the unloading operation before nor had it been described to him. The field superintendent, Wallace Worley, however, when hiring Davis had told him "not to get around no trucks; the unloader done all the unloading."
On July 30, 1971, a compliance officer for the Secretary of Labor conducted an inspection of the Jeffersonville yard. On the basis of the inspection, the Secretary issued two citations to Republic for alleged violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act: a "Citation for Serious Violation" based on the Davis accident; a "Citation" based on the lack of warning signs and barricades around the piles of ties in the yard.
Issued pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 658.
Republic petitioned for discretionary review by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91 (1973). The Commission (with one Commissioner dissenting) reversed the administrative law judge and vacated the citations.
The Secretary raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission erroneously held that the employer had not violated the "general duty clause" (Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)), by failing to instruct and supervise properly an untrained employee regarding the hazards of unloading railroad ties; (2) whether the Commission erroneously held that the employer had not violated Section 5(a)(1) in permitting railroad ties to be stacked in unstable piles without warning signs or barricades.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act seeks to provide "so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). Penalties may be imposed by the Commission on employers in interstate commerce who violate the Act by failing to eliminate preventable dangers.
We note at the outset that the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission is presumed to have technical expertise and experience in the field of job safety. A court must, therefore, defer to the findings and analysis of the Commission unless such findings are without substantial basis in fact. Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463, 92 S.Ct. 637, 30 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972). The Act itself states: "The findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 29 U.S.C. § 660. In addition, the Commission's interpretations regarding the meaning of the Act should be given substantial deference by a court.
The citation issued to Republic on the basis of the Davis accident alleged a serious violation of the "general duty clause" of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), which provides:
The following "Description of alleged violation" was set forth in the citation:
"Binders on the cross tie load were released without securing with unloading lines or other unloading device. This is a serious condition which could, in fact did, cause a fatality to an employee."
"Each employer (1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. . . ."
In addition to this general duty to eliminate avoidable hazards to life, limb or health of the workers, the employer has, under the Act, the duty to conform to any health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. In the present case, the parties agree that there were no such specific standards applying to Republic at the time that the citations were issued.
A "serious violation" is present only where there is "a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violations." 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). Republic does not dispute that the cutting of the band before the unloader was in place gave rise to "a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result." The issue on appeal is whether an employer, using reasonable diligence, would have foreseen the danger in question.
The Secretary contends that where an inexperienced, untrained employee is placed at the site of a potentially dangerous operation, the employer should foresee that the employee is likely, because of his ignorance of the safe procedures, to injure himself. Davis, the Secretary points out, was a new employee, working his fourth day for Republic. He had neither seen the unloading operation nor had it described to him. Davis was, nonetheless, asked by the unloader operator to be present at the place of the unloading. Since Davis did not know what the safe procedure for unloading the ties was, it was foreseeable, the Secretary argues, that Davis would do something unsafe and, thereby, injure himself — even if the exact nature of his unsafe actions, i. e., cutting the band, could not have been foreseen. The fact that Davis was not assigned to assist in the actual unloading operation itself is irrelevant, according to the Secretary, since Davis was requested to be present at the actual unloading site. In such a situation, it is argued, the employee should be instructed in the safe procedure for the operation which is going on in his presence.
The instruction given to Davis was general but explicit and unambiguous. Worley testified: "I told him not to get around no trucks; the unloader done all the unloading." We find that, under these circumstances, this instruction was sufficient to satisfy the employer's duty under the Act. It is true that the unloading could be dangerous if the proper procedure was not followed. Davis' relationship with the trucks and the unloading, however, was very simple: he merely had to stay away from the trucks. This he was clearly told to do. The fact that he did not know the correct procedure for unloading a truck is immaterial since his own position with respect to the trucks had been stated in no uncertain terms: he was to stay away. In this situation, we agree with the Commission that a reasonably diligent employer would not have foreseen that Davis would injure himself.
The Secretary of Labor does not appear to argue that the normal unloading procedure followed by Republic was unsafe.
This is not a case where the injury and death of Davis was the result of his, despite the admonition of Worley, getting too close "around" the truck and being hit by a falling tie when, for example, a defective or stress-weakened band had snapped. Instead, the ties fell only because of the precipitous unanticipated act of Davis in chopping the band with an ax. The Secretary other than by bald statement does not indicate how this act could have been foreseen.
We also note that in his original brief the Secretary refers to Davis being ordered to assist a crew in unloading the truck, and in his reply brief he states that "Davis was actually ordered to assist a crew in unloading ties." (Emphasis in original.) These statements are without support in the record before us. Likewise the Secretary's brief references to an untrained employee being permitted "to participate in a hazardous unloading operation" are unwarranted and inconsistent with the facts before the Commission.
We would not characterize the warning given to Davis, although explicit, as "the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety regime," National Realty Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (J. Skelly Wright, J.). We are merely deciding that, in the absence of promulgated standards requiring appropriate warning signs or better training of employees, the conclusion reached by the Commission was within the scope of its discretion in interpreting the statute which it has special responsibility to enforce. Further, we agree with Judge Wright that "Congress intended to require elimination only of preventable hazards." Id.
"1. Adequate warning signs prohibiting unauthorized foot or vehicle traffic in storage yard were not posted to cover all areas.
"2. Unstable piles of cross ties are not barricaded or otherwise made safe."
This citation as issued did not propose a penalty; however, the administrative law judge modified the citation from nonserious to serious and imposed a penalty of $700.
The employer's obligation under the general duty clause is to maintain a workplace free from "recognized hazards" which are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees. A "recognized hazard" has been defined as "a condition that is known to be hazardous, and is known not necessarily by each and every individual employer but is known taking into account the standard of knowledge in the industry. . . . [W]hether or not a hazard is `recognized' is a matter for objective determination. . . ." The issue before the Commission was whether the failure to place barricades and warning signs around the windrowed piles of ties was a "recognized hazard," as this term is used in the Act.
This definition was originally offered by Congressman Daniels, 116 Cong.Rec. 38377 (1970). See also National Realty Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety Health Review Comm'n, supra at 1265 n. 32.
Upon the basis of the record, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding. At the hearing, the Secretary's compliance officer admitted that employees could tell whether a particular stack of ties was stable and that they could work safely with windrowed piles, if the employees knew what they were doing. The evidence also indicated that Republic had not had a serious accident resulting from the work with the piles in seven years.
The evidence indicated that Republic did train its employees as to the proper methods for working with the piles.
The lack of an accident could have been fortuitous but a high rate of accidents resulting in injuries from the same cause is often given some weight as being symptomatic of a dangerous situation. Conversely, we cannot say that the lack of accidents does not enter the substantial evidence picture as a factor.
Nothing that the Secretary has the burden of proving all elements of a violation, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73, we agree with the Commission that the Secretary failed to present sufficient evidence that the hazard was a "recognized hazard" in the industry.
Finally, we note that the dissenting Commissioner took the position, which is urged by the Secretary on this appeal, that the Commission erred in putting Republic in the wood treatment industry rather than material handling as to which the Secretary's representative who had made the inspection testified as an expert witness, ". . . this is a recognized hazard in materials handling, that unstable piles will cause — will fall and cause serious injury. . . ."
As the majority Commissioners point out, the windrowed piling was done for a specific purpose, i. e., that of seasoning the wood. This was not a case of employees constantly being engaged in the handling and moving in and out of materials. While no doubt any employee who is engaged in handling heavy materials for placing them in a quasi-storage basis may be injured during the course of that handling we do not conceive that Congress intended the Act to impose strict liability.