Source: https://m.openjurist.org/453/us/1/middlesex-county-sewerage-authority-v-national-sea-clammers-association-joint-meeting-of-essex-and-u
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 00:38:16
Document Index: 657999133

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 509', '§ 1369', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1251', '§ 1401', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1365', '§ 105', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 13', '§ 407', '§ 4321', '§ 740', '§ 1346', '§ 505', '§ 1415', '§ 1415', '§ 1346', '§ 50', '§ 59', '§ 1412', '§ 1346', '§ 1362', '§ 1362', '§ 505', '§ 505', '§ 509', '§ 505', '§ 505', '§ 7604', '§ 1983', '§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 105', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 505', '§ 1983', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1251', '§ 1401']

453 U.S. 1 - Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SEWERAGE AUTHORITY et al., Petitioners,
NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION et al. JOINT MEETING OF ESSEX AND UNION COUNTIES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION et al. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION et al. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Petitioners, v. NATIONAL SEA CLAMMERS ASSOCIATION et al.
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plaintiffs in this litigation who claim a right to sue under the Acts, not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under the language of the saving clauses. In fact, it is clear that the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "injured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See S.Conf.Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "noneconomic" and probably noncompensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations.
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the rest of the enforcement scheme expressly provided by Congress including the opportunity for "any interested person" to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 90 days, § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b). See supra, at 13-14.
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private remedies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). Although they do not expressly limit citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations.
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Court identified several factors that are relevant to the question of implied private remedies. These include the legislative history. See ibid. ("Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?") This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the Reports and debates provide affirmative support for the view that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these Acts.27 Thus, both the structure of the Acts and their legislative history lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not be implied.28 Where, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a possible alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), the Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among the petitioners29 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action created by § 1983.
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of respondents to raise it here or below. This litigation began long before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument would obviate the need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize private suits to enforce these particularly federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under § 1983. Id., at 28, 101 S.Ct., at 1545. In the present cases, because we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under these Acts, we need not reach the second question whether these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983.
When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. As Justice STEWART, who later joined the majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 673, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1945, n. 2, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983."30 As discussed above, the FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions.31 See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F.Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federalism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the existence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980).
The remaining two issues on which we grant certiorari relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the federal common-law issues raised by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage commissions, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In these cases, we need not decide whether a cause of action may be brought under federal common law by a private plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court has now held that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981).
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal common-law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this litigation involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the FWPCA.32
When should a person injured by a violation of federal law be allowed to recover his damages in a federal court? This seemingly simple question has recently presented the Court with more difficulty than most substantive questions that come before us.1 During most of our history, however, a simple presumption usually provided the answer. Although criminal laws and legislation enacted for the benefit of the public at large were expected to be enforced by public officials, a statute enacted for the benefit of a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members of that class injured by violations of the statute. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874.2 Applying that presumption, our truly conservative federal judges—men like Justice Harlan,3 Justice Clark,4 Justice Frankfurter,5 and Judge Kirkpatrick6—readily concluded that it was appropriate to allow private parties who had been injured by a violation of statute enacted for their special benefit to obtain judicial relief. For rules are meant to be obeyed, and those who violate them should be held responsible for their misdeeds. See Rigsby, supra, 241 U.S., at 39, 36 S.Ct., at 484. Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs.7
In recent years, however, a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, the Court cut back on the simple common-law presumption by fashioning a four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in that case.8 Although multifactor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative answers, more recently some Members of the Court have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod to the Cort v. Ash factors. See, e. g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1783, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). The touchstone now is congressional intent. See ante, at 13. Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention,9 that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private remedies.
Although I agree with the Court's disposition of the implied-private-right-of-action question in these cases, I write separately to emphasize that the Court's current approach to the judicial task of fashioning appropriate remedies for violations of federal statutes is out of step with the Court's own history and tradition. More importantly, I believe that the Court's appraisal of the intent expressed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), with respect to the availability of private remedies under other federal statutes or the federal common law is palpably wrong.
In the present context of these cases, we of course know nothing about the ultimate merits of the claims asserted by respondents. As the cases come to us, however, we must make certain assumptions in analyzing the questions presented. First, we must assume that the complaint speaks the truth when it alleges that the petitioners have dumped large quantities of sewage and toxic waste in the Atlantic Ocean and its tributaries, and that these dumping operations have violated the substantive provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 80, n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1575, n. 3, 67 L.Ed.2d 750. Second, we must also assume that these illegal operations have caused an injury to respondents' commercial interests. Third, because some of the petitioners are "persons" who allegedly acted under color of state law, as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 19, and n. 29, we must assume that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III)10 provides an express remedy for their violations of these two federal statutes, unless Congress has expressly withdrawn that remedy. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555. Finally we must assume that, apart from these two statutes, the dumping operations of petitioners would constitute a common-law nuisance for which respondents would have a federal remedy. The net effect of the Court's analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclusion that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately deprived respondents of effective federal remedies that would otherwise have been available to them. In my judgment, the language of both statutes, as well as their legislative history, belies this improbable conclusion.
* The Court's holding that Congress decided in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to withdraw the express remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III) seems to rest on nothing more than the fact that these statutes provide other express remedies and do not mention § 1983. Because the enforcement mechanisms provided in the statutes are "quite comprehensive," the Court finds it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action. . . ." Ante, at 20. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. First, the question is not whether Congress "intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action," but rather whether Congress intended to withdraw that right of action.11 Second, I find it not at all hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve, or, more precisely, did not intend to withdraw, the § 1983 remedy because Congress made this intention explicit in the language of both statutes and in the relevant legislative history.
I agree with the Court that the remedial provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA are "quite comprehensive." I cannot agree, however, with the Court's implicit conclusion that this determination ends the inquiry under Maine v. Thiboutot, supra. The question that must be answered in determining whether respondents may pursue their claims under § 1983 is whether Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statutes be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694. Because Congress did not expressly address this question in the statutes, the Court looks elsewhere for an answer and finds it in the comprehensive character of the express statutory remedies. I have no quarrel as a general matter with the proposition that a comprehensive remedial scheme can evidence a congressional decision to preclude other remedies. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 93-94, 101 S.Ct., at 1581-1582. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that our evaluation of a statute's express remedies is merely a tool used to discern congressional intent; it is not an end in itself. No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial avenues open. Express statutory language or clear references in the legislative history will rebut whatever presumption of exclusivity arises from comprehensive remedial provisions. In my judgment, in these cases we are presented with both express statutory language and clear references in the legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend the express remedies in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to be exclusive.
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
And, § 105(g)(5) of the MPRSA states:
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5).
Respondents' right to proceed under § 1983 in light of these statutory provisions could have been made more plain only had Congress substituted the citation "42 U.S.C. § 1983" for the words "any statute" in the saving clauses.
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S.Rep.No.92-414, p. 81 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 3746.
See also H.R.Rep.No.92-911, p. 134 (1972). And the corresponding report on the MPRSA similarly states that the authorization of citizen suits shall not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law." S.Rep.No.92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 4250. See also H.R.Rep.No.92-361, p. 23 (1971).
The Court, of course, discusses the saving clauses and this legislative history elsewhere in its opinion. See ante, at 15-17, and n. 26. In rejecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion, based in part on the saving clauses, that respondents may invoke implied rights of action under the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, the Court finds it "doubtful" that the phrase "any statute" in the saving clauses refers to the very statutes in which the clauses appear. See ante, at 15-16. The Court's doubt is reinforced by use of the word "other" in the passages from the Senate Reports quoted above. See ante, at 16, n. 26. Thus, the Court holds that the statutory phrase "any statute" does not refer to the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA; the Court apparently also holds that it does not refer to § 1983, even though that statute clearly qualifies as "any other statute" or "any other law," within the meaning of the legislative history.12
In my judgment, the Court has failed to uncover "a clear congressional mandate"13 to withdraw the § 1983 remedy otherwise available to the respondents. Moreover, the statutory language and the legislative history reveal the exact opposite: a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies, including a private right of action under § 1983. I therefore respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court's decision.
The effect of the Court's holding in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114, was to make the city of Milwaukee's compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act a complete defense to a federal common-law nuisance action for pollution damage. It was, and still is, difficult for me to reconcile that holding with the excerpts from the statutes and the Senate Reports quoted above—particularly the statement:
"Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S.Rep.No.92-414, at 81 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 3746.
Today, the Court pursues the pre-emption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois to its inexorable conclusion and holds that even noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA is a defense to a federal common-law nuisance claim.14 Because Justice BLACKMUN has already exposed in detail the flaws in the Court's treatment of this issue, see Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 333-347, 101 S.Ct., at 1800-1808 (dissenting opinion), I merely note that the reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Milwaukee applies with special force in this case.15
Although I agree with the Court's holding that neither of these statutes implicitly authorizes a private damages remedy, I reach that conclusion by a different route. Under the traditional common-law analysis discussed supra, at 23-24, the primary question is whether the statute was enacted for the special benefit of a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S., at 39-40, 36 S.Ct., at 484. As we have held in the past, "[t]hat question is answered by looking to the language of the statute itself." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L.Ed.2d 560.
The language of neither the Clean Water Act nor the MPRSA defines any such special class. Both the substantive provisions of these statutes and the breadth of their authorizations of citizen suits indicate that they were "enacted for the protection of the general public." Cannon, supra, at 690, 99 S.Ct., at 1954.16 Thus, even under the more liberal approach to implied rights of action represented by Rigsby and its antecedents, respondents cannot invoke implied private remedies under these statutes. See generally California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S., at 294-296, 101 S.Ct., at 1779-1780.
The conclusion required by the statutory language is fortified by the legislative history on which the Court relies. I agree that the legislative deliberations about civil remedies under the Clean Air Act, see ante, at 17-18, n. 27, illuminate the meaning of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA—since these statutes were enacted only a short time later and had similar environmental objectives—and that those deliberations reveal a conscious congressional choice not to authorize a new statutory damages remedy. Accordingly, I agree with the conclusion reached by the Court in Part II-A of its opinion, but I respectfully dissent from the remainder of its judgment.
The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint ¶ 35, App. 25a. Respondents' brief in this Court states that when
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4.
Complaint ¶ 39, App. 26a.
Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the MPRSA; federal common law; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 46 U.S.C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; and state tort law.
The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law claims was without prejudice.
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
"(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section—
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
"(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation."
In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice requirement is inapplicable because of the "saving clause" in § 505(e), which states:
The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part:
"(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchapter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be.
"(2) No action may be commenced—
"(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or
"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under subsection (f) of this section; or
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a violation of this subchapter." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1415(g)(1), (2).
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)." § 1415(g)(5).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law §§ 50-e, 50-i (McKinney 1977 and Supp.1980-1981); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 59:1-1 et seq. (West Supp.1981-1982). The District Court noted that respondents had given timely notice to one defendant—New York City.
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975).
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sovereign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F.2d, at 1231 (footnote omitted).
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages, could not have been too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(a) (1976 ed., Supp.III), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 1981.
The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. 616 F.2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against federal defendants, 616 F.2d, at 1237, although it did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on state law," id., at 1236.
See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 also named in the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cross-claims filed in the District Court.
The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(7), (12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel or other floating craft", into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, §§ 1362(9), (10), (12). See S.Rep.No.92-414, p. 75 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1971, p. 3668.
The Court of Appeals did state that the saving clause in § 505(e) of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties unburdened by the notice requirements of section 505(b)." 616 F.2d, at 1227. But the court did not conclude that the saving clause is itself an express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the saving clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the Act, in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505(b). The court went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies preserved by the saving clause.
In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 741-742, 99 S.Ct., at 1980 (Powell, J., dissenting).
This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions of § 509 are open to "[a]ny person," S.Rep.No.92-414, p. 85 (1971), and thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seeking to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505. See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 87-88 (1977).
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S.Rep.No.92-414, p. 81 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 3746 (emphasis added).
See also S.Rep.No.92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 4234 (Report on the MPRSA) (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law").
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" in § 505(e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. The phrase, also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance.
The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S.Rep.No.92-451,
at 23; S.Rep.No.92-414, at 81. In addition, the citizen-suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976 ed., Supp.III). See S.Rep.No.92-414, at 79. And the legislative history of the latter Act contains explicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for example, stated:
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this consequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this bill." 116 Cong.Rec. 33104 (1970).
He placed in the Record a staff memorandum stating that the availability of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against industries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927, 96 S.Ct. 1141, 47 L.Ed.2d 337 (1976).
See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025, 100 S.Ct. 689, 62 L.Ed.2d 659 (1980).
These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F.Supp. 859, 864 (Ariz. 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act").
Justice STEVENS in dissent finds contrary indications of congressional intent in the saving clauses—§ 505(e) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and § 105(g)(5) of the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5). The language of these clauses, see nn. 10, 11, supra, does not, however, support the view that Congress expressly preserved § 1983 remedies for violations of these statutes. As noted, supra, at 15-16, there is little reason to believe that Congress intended to do this when it made reference in § 505(e) to "any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law or to seek . . . any other relief." The legislative history makes clear Congress' intent to allow further enforcement of antipollution standards arising under other statutes or state common law. See n. 26, supra. A suit for damages asserting a substantive violation of the FWPCA or the MPRSA is far different, even if the remedy asserted is based on the separate right of action created in § 1983. We are convinced that the saving clauses do not refer at all to a suit for redress of a violation of these statutes—regardless of the source of the right of action asserted.
Even if this were not the correct interpretation of the saving clauses, we recently held that the saving clause in the FWPCA relates only to the effect of the accompanying citizen-suit provision. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1798, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981) (the section "means only that the provision of [a citizen] suit does not revoke other remedies"). The parallel provision of the MPRSA is equally limited. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5) ("The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law") (emphasis added). We therefore, are not persuaded that the saving clauses limit the effect of the overall remedial schemes provided expressly in the Acts. In sum, we think it clear that those express remedies preclude suits for damages under § 1983, and that the saving clauses do not require a contrary conclusion.
In so holding, we also note that, contrary to Justice STEVENS' argument, post, at 27-28, n. 11, we do not suggest that the burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve § 1983 remedies.
Indeed, as noted in n. 14, supra, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this represents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like petitioners to adjust to the coming change.
Indeed, in recent Terms a significant portion of our docket has been occupied by cases presenting this question with respect to a variety of federal statutes. See, e. g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 68 L.Ed.2d 101; Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 67 L.Ed.2d 662; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560; Cf. Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750.
"A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law. . . . This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium." 241 U.S., at 39-40, 36 S.Ct., at 484.
As the Rigsby Court noted, the presumption was firmly established at common law, see California v. Sierra Club, supra, 451 U.S., at 299-300, 101 S.Ct., at 1782 (STEVENS, J., concurring), and it had been recognized on numerous prior occasions by this Court. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (" '[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded' "); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 623, 9 L.Ed. 1181 ("[T]he power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist"); Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, 527, 22 L.Ed. 376 ("A general liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by an appropriate common-law action"); Hayes v. Michigan Central R. Co., 111 U.S. 228, 240, 4 S.Ct. 369, 374, 28 L.Ed. 410 ("[E]ach person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual compensation, and to an action for its recovery"); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 176-177, 21 S.Ct. 743, 745, 45 L.Ed. 1041 ("If there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply an adequate remedy").
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2008, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (concurring in judgment) ("[I]n suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute").
See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 ("[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose").
See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261, 71 S.Ct. 692, 700, 95 L.Ed. 912 (dissenting opinion) ("If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because is it not specifically authorized").
See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 513-514 (ED Pa. 1946) ("The disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. . . . [T]he right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute . . . is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly").
Although the federal courts do not possess the full common-law powers of their state counterparts, see, e. g., Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 95, 101 S.Ct., at 1582, the cases cited in n. 2, supra, nonetheless indicate that the fashioning of remedies for wrongs has traditionally been a part of the business of the federal courts.
The unanimous opinion in Cort v. Ash adopted the single-factor test of Rigsby, see n. 2, supra, and combined it with three additional inquiries:
"In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'—that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of the action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely of federal law?" 422 U.S., at 78, 95 S.Ct., at 2088 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
See Cannon, supra, 441 U.S., at 694, 99 S.Ct., at 1956; Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 94, 101 S.Ct., at 1582.
This is more than merely a semantic dispute. As the Court formulates the inquiry, the burden is placed on the § 1983 plaintiff to show an explicit or implicit congressional intention that violations of the substantive statute at issue be redressed in private § 1983 actions. The correct formulation, however, places the burden on the defendant to show that Congress intended to foreclose access to the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing the substantive statute. Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express private remedy that is, on its face, applicable any time a violation of a federal statute is alleged, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555, the burden is properly placed on the defendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive statute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A defendant may carry this burden by identifying express statutory language or legislative history revealing Congress' intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694.
"The question before us is whether the phrase 'and laws,' as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act." Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S., at 4, 100 S.Ct., at 2504.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15.
I recognize, of course, that under the pre-emption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois, a defendant's compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA is technically irrelevant. However, I point out that the petitioners in these cases allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of the statutes merely to emphasize the anomalous nature of the Court's holdings today and in Milwaukee, particularly in light of the statutory language and legislative history discussed in the text.
"The plain language of the savings clause of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(e), indicates Congress' intent to preserve all common law remedies, and the legislative history makes clear that Congress understood that the federal common law would be preserved as well." Brief for Federal Petitioners 37.
In support of this conclusion, the Solicitor General cites a statement in the legislative history by Congressman Dingell, one of the cosponsors of the Clean Water Act in the House, specifically referring to nuisance litigation under the federal common law. See 118 Cong. Rec. 33757 (1972), I Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. 93-1, p. 252 (1973). In his statement, Congressman Dingell cited H.R.Rep.No.92-1401, pp. 31-33 (1972), which quoted with approval from Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 and discussed two federal common-law nuisance actions then being pursued by the Department of Justice against alleged polluters. See also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S., at 343-344, 101 S.Ct., at 1806 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
Both statutes contain general statements of policy that indicate that they were enacted to serve a broad range of interests. Section 101(a) of the Clean Water Act, as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), provides, in part:
"The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities." 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b).