Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/658/279/50781/
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 10:54:33
Document Index: 209156469

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 841', '§ 952', '§ 848', '§ 1952', '§ 1962', '§ 841', '§ 952', '§ 1', '§ 904', '§ 904']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Raymond Eugene Hawkins, Carlos Gerdes, A/k/a Carlos Sanramon, James Louis Holland, Martin Marion Sneed,jr., Clyde E. Sneed and Clifford J.swiere, Defendants-appellants, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1981 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Raymond Eugene Hawkins, Carlos Gerdes, A/k/a Carlos...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Raymond Eugene Hawkins, Carlos Gerdes, A/k/a Carlos Sanramon, James Louis Holland, Martin Marion Sneed,jr., Clyde E. Sneed and Clifford J.swiere, Defendants-appellants, 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 658 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1981) Unit ASept. 21, 1981
In this case, six defendants appeal convictions and sentences received following a trial on a July 10, 1979 multiple-count indictment charging violations of, inter alia, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (counts 1-7); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (counts 8-11); importing a controlled substance into the United States, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960(a) (1) (counts 12, 13); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (counts 14-17); and travelling in interstate commerce with intent to promote the smuggling, possession and distribution of marijuana, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (counts 18-23).1
A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury that will render a verdict based exclusively upon the evidence presented in court and not on outside sources. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961); United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1296 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 1369, 67 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1981). Exposure to pretrial publicity, however, does not necessarily destroy a juror's impartiality. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 95 S. Ct. 1505, 47 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1976). "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence presented in court." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S. Ct. at 1643 (citations omitted).
Appellant Gerdes received consecutive sentences on his substantive RICO conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),8 and the substantive drug charges on which he was convicted.9 Because these substantive drug charges three counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and one count of importation of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(a) (1) also were alleged in the indictment as the "predicate offenses" which form the "pattern of racketeering activity" necessary to sustain his conviction under the substantive RICO count, Gerdes argues that the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences for the RICO conviction and the "predicate offenses" violated the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, and that the sentences imposed on the predicate offenses should be vacated.10
In Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980), the Supreme Court recently had occasion to readdress the double jeopardy implications of imposing multiple punishments in a single criminal proceeding. Although proceeding from the well-established principle that "(t) he Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects not only against a second trial for the same offense, but also 'against multiple punishments for the same offense,' " 100 S. Ct. at 1436, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), the Court recognized that because "the power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress," citing United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L. Ed. 259,11 "(t)he question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized." 100 S. Ct. at 1436 (citations omitted). Concluding that "(t)he Double Jeopardy Clause at the very least precludes federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so," the Court phrased the "dispositive question" as whether Congress intended to provide for multiple punishments. Id.12
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether Congress has in a given situation provided that two statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively:
52 S. Ct. at 182. In the case sub judice, Gerdes argues that because the four substantive drug charges of which he was convicted also were alleged as "predicate crimes" under the RICO count, they do not "require proof of a fact which the (substantive RICO offense) does not," id., and those predicate offenses therefore are the "same offense" as the RICO count. Consequently, Gerdes argues that, under Blockburger, the double jeopardy clause prohibits consecutive sentences for the predicate crimes and the substantive RICO offense.13
This argument cannot be sustained. Gerdes' assumption that Blockburger defines the scope of the double jeopardy clause misconceives the purpose and nature of that rule: Blockburger is not a constitutional "litmus test" for determining whether a particular sentence violates the double jeopardy clause. Rather, as the Supreme Court made clear in Whalen, Blockburger is "a rule of statutory construction ... relied on ... to determine whether Congress has in a given situation provided that two statutory offenses may be punished cumulatively." 100 S. Ct. at 1438 (footnote omitted). As noted supra, the essential inquiry is Congress' intent. See 100 S. Ct. at 1436.
After careful examination of the statutory scheme of RICO, as well as the relevant legislative history, we agree with our sister circuits that have considered the question that, in enacting RICO, Congress intended to permit cumulative sentences for substantive RICO offenses and the underlying predicate offenses. As the Ninth Circuit observed in United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979) cert. denied sub nom., 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1345, 63 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1980):
Accord United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 103, 66 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S. Ct. 1345, 63 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1980). This conclusion is supported by legislative history. In enacting RICO, Congress stated its intent as follows:
Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. 91-452 § 1 (emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit noted in Rone, a congressional intent to proscribe cumulative sentences for a RICO count and the underlying predicate offenses is fundamentally inconsistent with Congress' stated purpose to establish "new penal prohibitions" for racketeering: "If the RICO sentence must run concurrently with a sentence for any predicate crime, there would be no 'enhanced' penalties." 598 F.2d at 572.
Evidence of Congress' intent also is found in section 904(b), which provides that "(n)othing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title." Pub. L. 91-452 § 904(b). This admonition is to be read in light of section 904(a), which provides that "(t) he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. 91-452 § 904(a).
(emphasis added). As noted in United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d at 306, and United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 786-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), this language indicates that Congress intended to allow a RICO conviction to be based in part upon a predicate crime for which the defendant already has been convicted and has served a sentence. If this interpretation is correct, it does not appear likely that Congress would have intended to prohibit the imposition of cumulative punishments in the same criminal proceeding. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress has manifested in clear and unequivocal terms its intention to permit cumulative punishments in these circumstances.
Contrary to Swiere's claim, the evidence against him was sufficient to take the case to the jury. At trial, Butler identified Swiere by name as one of the persons involved in the shipment brought in on the vessel BAYOU BLUES. T. 19:1638-41. Butler also testified that he had met Swiere before at Martin Sneed's shipyard. T. 19:1638. Moreover, Butler testified that Swiere was acting in a supervisory capacity during the unloading process, and that he gave Butler and others instructions. T. 19:1640-41. Finally, at trial Butler described Swiere as "probably 5'5, maybe, has a limp, kind of stocky built." T. 19:1641. In closing argument, Swiere's attorney conceded that Swiere had a limp. T. 21:2223.
Despite the foregoing evidence of Swiere's involvement, Swiere argues that Butler's subsequent in-court identification of Swiere renders Butler's testimony insufficient as a matter of law. This argument cannot be sustained. Although it appears that the in-court identification was somewhat less than unequivocal,15 Swiere's argument overlooks the principle that although an uncertain in-court identification will not support a conviction where that identification is the only evidence offered on the issue of identity, when, as here, there is other sufficient evidence of identity, the tentative nature of the in-court identification is not fatal. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 985-86, 1000 & n.27 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S. Ct. 732, 54 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1978); United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1976). It was for the jury to weigh the credibility of Butler's testimony, and "(i)t is not the appellate function to judge the credibility of witnesses." United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d at 410-11. Butler's in-court identification of Swiere was not the only evidence of identification presented to the jury. Butler's description of Swiere and his testimony concerning Swiere's involvement were more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
In a footnote, however, the Court recognized that there are constitutional limitations upon this power. See 100 S. Ct. at 1436 n.3
Similarly, the Court in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977) stated that "(w)here consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the Court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. (citations omitted)
Gerdes does not argue that the double jeopardy clause prohibits consecutive sentences for the predicate crimes and his conviction on the RICO conspiracy count. See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 383 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975)
Justice Rehnquist has observed that "the Blockburger test, although useful in identifying statutes that define greater and lesser included offenses in the traditional sense, is less satisfactory, and perhaps even misdirected, when applied to statutes (such as RICO) defining 'compound' and 'predicate' offenses." 100 S. Ct. at 1447 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151, 97 S. Ct. 2207, 2216, 53 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1977)