Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/557/607/272934/
Timestamp: 2019-10-20 06:04:29
Document Index: 2468446

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 654', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 654', '§ 701', '§ 659', '§ 655', '§ 667', '§ 662', '§ 666']

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,agricultural Implement Workers of America (uaw)and Its Local 588, Petitioners, v. United States Occupational Safety and Health Reviewcommission, Respondent, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
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International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,agricultural Implement Workers of America (uaw)and Its Local 588, Petitioners, v. United States Occupational Safety and Health Reviewcommission, Respondent, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977) Argued Feb. 7, 1977
On March 6, 1973, the Secretary of Labor issued a citation charging Ford with violating Section 5(a) (2) of the Act2 and the pertinent regulation thereunder.3 Ford was given 60 days to submit an abatement plan, but this date was extended until October 15, 1973.
On May 25, 1976, the Commission rendered its decision. Chairman Barnako and Commissioner Moran held that the Administrative Law Judge had correctly concluded that the June 1, 1974, time period for abatement was unreasonably short. However, they faulted him for not prescribing a reasonable abatement time himself on the basis of the evidence before him. After reviewing the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge, the majority concluded that Ford must implement "feasible administrative or engineering controls" to comply with the noise regulation (note 3 supra) . Ford was given two years to accomplish this goal from the date the Commission's order became final. "Because the clear language of the statute limits employee contests to the reasonableness of the period of time which is fixed in the citation for abatement," the majority held the sufficiency of the abatement plan could not be directly contested by the Union. (Emphasis in original.) The Commission agreed that evidence could be adduced to show the employer's abatement plan does not include all presently available feasible abatement methods or controls since such specific methods and controls and their implementation time are determinative of reasonable abatement time. However, the Commission held that such evidence in this case demonstrated the abatement period to be unreasonably brief. Dissenting Commissioner Cleary concluded that the Ford August 31 abatement plan, which had been submitted to the Administrative Law Judge on September 4, 1973, was inadequate, although the Secretary of Labor had approved it. This Commissioner also thought that the two-year period for compliance was too lengthy. We agree with the Commission's majority decision and therefore affirm.
In the interim, the employees are not left exposed to excessive levels of noise. Ford's abatement plan requires them to wear protective equipment such as ear plugs and ear muffs until "feasible administrative or engineering controls" can be utilized, as provided in 29 C.F.R. 1910.95(b) (1), the applicable noise standard promulgated by the Secretary (note 3 supra) .
Item 81 of the citation charged the employer with violating 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2) by failing to utilize feasible administrative or engineering controls to protect its employees from excessive sound levels in contravention of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b) (1). That standard provides in pertinent part that:
Accordingly, the employer is ordered to implement feasible administrative or engineering controls to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b) (1) within two years of the date this order becomes enforceable.
The essential difficulty is that the Act does not plainly address the troublesome problem of abatement in these situations. The problem may be appropriately resolved by asking, as Justice Cardozo once did "which choice is it the more likely that Congress would have made," Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285, 53 S. Ct. 369, 370, 77 L. Ed. 748 (1933), should the use of the plans be permitted or not. Given the strong remedial objectives of the Act, I agree with my colleagues that section 9(a) should be read to permit the use of abatement plans in these engineering cases.
To the extent that Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, 2 OSAHRC 1243, 1244-1245 (1973) and Detroit Printing Pressmen Local No. 13, International Printing Pressmen v. Secretary, 1 OSAHRC 1015 (1972), may support the majority's position they should be reversed because they would deal inadequately with providing a remedy for review upon contest by employees of citations requiring extensive engineering changes. Stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision when adherence involves collision with an approach that is intrinsically sounder. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940). In any event reliance upon Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, 1 BNA OSHC 1104, 1971-73 CCH OSHD para. 15,447 (No. 562, 1973) is misplaced. That case concerned an employee contest under section 10(c) after the abatement date had elapsed. It involved an attempt to raise under section 10(c) what is properly the subject of an action concerning failure to correct a violation. Here, the abatement date has not passed, and a section 10(c) contest is the proper means of raising the abatement issue.
Under the majority's opinion, the Secretary's approval of an abatement plan would appear to be a final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act itself. Cf. Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 949, 91 S. Ct. 237, 27 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1970). This would be reviewable by a Federal district court. See, for example, Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). That such review would be outside the mainstream of judicial review by the Courts of Appeals of Commission decisions under section 11 of OSHA is an indication that the majority's result is at odds with the essential statutory scheme of having expeditious Commission review of the Secretary's actions before there would be resort to the courts. See Staff of Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Legislative History of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 463 (Comm. Print 1971).
Section 5(a) (2) provides that each employer subject to the Act shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated thereunder (29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2))
"When employees are subjected to sound (levels) exceeding those listed in Table G-16, feasible administrative or engineering controls shall be utilized. If such controls fail to reduce sound levels within the levels of Table G-16, personal protective equipment shall be provided and used to reduce sound levels within the levels of the table." (29 C.F.R. 1910.95(b) (1)).
Because the Act provides only for review by the courts of appeals and we are not reviewing a district court's disposition here, we do not pass on the Union's contention that the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706) permits the district courts to review the Secretary of Labor's approval of abatement plans. In opposition to this contention, it might be urged that Congress referred to the Administrative Procedure Act in this Act when it saw fit (29 U.S.C. § 659(c)) and provided that the courts of appeals review standards promulgated by the Secretary (29 U.S.C. § 655(f)) and state plans (29 U.S.C. § 667(g)). See generally, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192. The district courts are only empowered to grant injunctions and writs of mandamus in circumstances not relevant here (29 U.S.C. § 662) and to impose fines and imprisonment (29 U.S.C. § 666)