Source: https://casetext.com/brief/1d45feb6-marc-a-nicometi-appellant-respondentvthe-vineyards-of-fredonia-llc-et-al-respondents-appellants-et-al-defendants-scott-pfohl-et-al-third-party-plaintiffs-v-western-new-york-plumbing-ellicott-plumbing-and-remodeling-co-inc-third-party-respond-3
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 14:52:43
Document Index: 785980450

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 141', '§ 240', '§ 141', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 200', '§ 241']

0 0 To be Argued by: LAURENCE D. BEHR, ESQ. Time Requested for Argument: (30 Minutes) STATE OF NEW YORK Court of Appeals APL-2013-00280 MARC A. NICOMETI, Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, vs. THE VINEYARDS OF FREDONIA, LLC, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Defendants-Respondents-Appellants, THOMAS WHITNEY and SCOTT PFOHL, Defendants. Erie County Index No. 2008-3306. SCOTT PFOHL, Third-Party Plaintiff, WINTER-PFOHL, INC., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellant, vs. WESTERN NEW YORK PLUMBING-ELLICOTT PLUMBING AND REMODELING CO., INC., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent-Appellant. Erie County Index No.: 2008-3306-TP3. Appellate Division Docket No. CA 12-01962. REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-APPELLANT THE VINEYARDS OF FREDONIA, LLC BARTH SULLIVAN BEHR Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent- Appellant The Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC 43 Court Street, Suite 600 Buffalo, New York 14202-3101 Telephone: (716) 856-1300 Facsimile: (716) 856-1494 LAURENCE D. BEHR, ESQ. Of Counsel Date of Completion: July 27, 2014 BATAVIA LEGAL PRINTING, INC.— Telephone (866) 768-2100 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ........................................................................ ii ARGUMENT: POINT I The Plaintiff’s Fall Resulted From a Slippery Floor, Like Many Slip-And-Fall Accidents, Not From An Elevation-Related Risk, And Melber Requires Dismissal Of His Section 240(1) Claim. ................................................................... 1 1. This Court’s Melber decision is correct, and requires dismissal of the section 240(1) claim......................................... 1 2. “Placement” is not an issue in regard to a worker’s fall while working from stilts. ................ 2 3. The “Baker’s scaffold” that the plaintiff argues ought to have been used also would not have prevented the risk that the plaintiff might fall due to ice on the floor. ...................................................................... 4 POINT II Alternatively, the Lower Court Correctly Ruled There Is a Question Of Fact as to Whether the Plaintiff’s Culpable Conduct Was So Great As To Constitute the Sole Proximate Cause Of His Accident. .......................................................................... 6 CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 8 ADDENDUM ............................................................................................... 9 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES: Andrews v Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 AD3d 1197 (4 Dept. 2006). ................ 7th Klein v. City of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 833 (1996)...................................... 2 Medical Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. New York State Dept. of Health, 83 N.Y.2d 447 (1994)........................................................................... 3 Melber v. 6333 Main Street, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 759 (1998). ..................... 1,2,3,5 Senese v. J. Kokolakis Contracting, Inc., Index No. 5709/10 (S. Ct. Queens Co. 1-16-2013), 2013 NY Slip Op 30220(U). ................................................................ 4 Thome v. Benchmark Main Trans. Assoc., 86 A.D.3d 938 (4th Dept 2011) . .......................................................... 7 Wonderling v. CSX Transporation, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 1244 (4th Dept 2006). ......................................................... 7 STATUTES: Labor Law § 200. ............................................................................................ 5 Labor Law § 240(1). ................................................................................. 3,4,5 Labor Law § 241(6). ....................................................................................... 5 OTHER AUTHORITIES: McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 141. ............................... 3 http://www.scaffoldingdepot.com/rollingscaffold.htm. .................................. 4 -ii- ARGUMENT POINT I The Plaintiff’s Fall Resulted From A Slippery Floor, Like Many Slip-And-Fall Accidents, Not From An Elevation-Related Risk, And Melber Requires Dismissal Of His Section 240(1) Claim. This reply brief submitted on behalf of the respondent-appellant Vineyards of Fredonia LLC (“Vineyards”), refutes the first of the two contentions advanced in the plaintiff's reply brief, served in opposition to the appeals of Vineyards and the respondent-appellant Winter-Pfohl, Inc. (“WPI”). 1. This Court’s Melber decision is correct, and requires dismissal of the section 240(1) claim. The plaintiff's first contention, boiled down, is that a slip-and-fall caused by ice on a floor should be deemed to have resulted from an “elevation-related risk,” simply because the worker was walking on stilts at the time. This contention simply defies the explicit teaching of this Court’s unanimous, and correctly decided, Melber v. 6333 Main Street, Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 759 (1998): The stilts, moreover, performed the function Labor Law § 240(1) required of them: allowing plaintiff to safely complete his work at a height. Had they failed while plaintiff was installing the metal studs in the top of the drywall — work requiring the statute's special protections — a different case would be presented. But here, as was 2 the case in Ross, injury resulted from a separate hazard — electrical conduit protruding from the floor. Even if the stilts failed to avoid that pitfall, "plaintiff's injuries allegedly flowed from a deficiency in the device that was ‘wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about its need in the first instance'" and did not interfere with or increase the danger of injury in the performance of his elevation-related task (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec, 81 N.Y.2d, at 501, supra, quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec., 180 A.D.2d 385, 394 [Mercure, J., dissenting in part]). Thus, plaintiff must look elsewhere for his remedy. .91 N.Y.2d at 763-764 (emphasis added). The plaintiff's insistence that his stilts “failed” is misplaced, because his stilts, while they failed to prevent him from slipping on ice, did not fail in the sense “failed” is used in Melber, i.e., they did not fail to protect him from an elevation- related risk. 2. “Placement” is not an issue in regard to a worker’s fall while working from stilts. The plaintiff's continued effort to assimilate his case to Klein v. City of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 833 (1996), in which the plaintiff fell because his ladder was placed on a slippery floor, is unavailing because such placement ran afoul of the statute’s language specifically requiring proper “placement” of the enumerated 3 devices. When a worker is using stilts neither the owner nor the general contractor can possibly place each of his steps. So in Melber, where if the worker’s stilts had been “placed” as he walked so as not to encounter the conduit protruding from the floor, he would not have fallen, the ill-placement of the worker’s steps could not be laid at the door of owner and general contractor. This is proper because the Scaffold Law is not to be construed as requiring such an absurd and unjust outcome, and Melber properly avoided doing so. [A]n interpretation [that] leads to a patently absurd result . . . contravenes basic principles of statutory construction (see, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 141 ["the construction to be adopted is the one which will not cause objectionable results, or cause inconvenience * * * or absurdity"]). Medical Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. New York State Dept. of Health, 83 N.Y.2d 447,451 – 452 (1994). In the same section of 1 McKinney’s Consol. Laws, Statutes, this Court cited in the above case, at page 283, it is stated: “The court will not interpret a statute to require impossibility.” (Footnote omitted.) To interpret Labor Law § 240(1) to require owners and general contractors to place each step of a worker on stilts so that he avoids any floor-level hazards—or for that matter even to require the complete elimination of all possible floor-level hazards at a construction site, would be to require an impossibility, as well as an absurdity. 4 3. The “baker’s scaffold” that the plaintiff argues ought to have been used also would not have prevented the risk that the plaintiff might fall due to ice on the floor. The plaintiff argues, at page 6 of his reply brief, that the owner and general contractor, instead of stilts, should have furnished a “baker’s scaffold” for his work, supposedly as required by the Industrial Code. However, such a scaffold, which is nothing more than an elevated work platform on wheels (see http://www.scaffoldingdepot.com/rollingscaffold.htm), would not have protected him any more than stilts from the risk of slipping on the ice and falling. The plaintiff, using a baker’s scaffold, would have been forced to mount and dismount the scaffold many times in the course of installing ceiling insulation, and he might easily have slipped on the ice when either getting off or onto the scaffold, and sustained the same or a worse injury. The section 240(1) claim of a worker who injured himself by misstepping when he dismounted from a baker’s scaffold, allegedly due to the lack of lighting, was dismissed in Senese v. J. Kokolakis Contracting, Inc., Index No. 5709/10 (S. Ct. Queens Co. 1-16-2013), 2013 NY Slip Op 30220(U) 1 , the court stating: 1 Pertinent portions of this lengthy unreported slip opinion are reproduced in the Addendum hereto. 5 "The extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) extend only to a narrow class of special hazards, and do `not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity'" (Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., 93 NY2d 914, 915-916 [1999], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). "Where an injury results from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first instance, no section 240 (1) liability exists" (Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., supra at 915, citing Melber v 6333 Main St., 91 NY2d 759, 763-764 [1998]). Here, the undisputed evidence indicates that the fall resulted from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the danger that brought about the need for the scaffold in the first instance (see Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., supra at 916; see also Melber v 6333 Main St., supra; Aquilino v E.W. Howell Co., Inc., 7 AD3d 739 [2004]; Masullo v City of New York, 253 AD2d 541 [1998]). Slip Opinion 6 (emphasis added). This plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Melber, is not without a remedy, having still intact his claims under N.Y. Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). However, this Court’s solidly reasoned, unanimous Melber decision bars him from the absolute liability protections of section 240(1). 6 POINT II Alternatively, the Lower Court Correctly Ruled There Is a Question Of Fact as to Whether the Plaintiff's Culpable Conduct Was So Great As To Constitute the Sole Proximate Cause Of His Accident. Regarding the plaintiff's arguments that neither the issuing of an instruction to avoid the ice, nor his prior admitted awareness of the ice’s presence, nor both together, should be deemed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of his accident, were amply addressed, and refuted, in Point II(A) and (B) Vineyards’ initial brief. To sum up: The presence of a section 240(1) violation does not eliminate the potential for a plaintiff's conduct to be deemed the “sole proximate cause,” but is in instead a precondition for consideration of such question. See Vineyards’ prior brief, Point II(A). Both the a warning to avoid an unsafe practice or condition, and a worker’s awareness of a dangerous condition, or either alone, may constitute evidence of the extent of the plaintiff's negligence, and whether it is completely to blame for the accident so as to be found its sole proximate cause. See Vineyards’ prior brief, Point II(B). Indeed, as previously briefed, three of the lower court’s own prior decisions held there to be questions of 7 fact as to “sole proximate cause,” where the plaintiff had been instructed to avoid an unsafe practice or condition, and was fully aware of same. Thome v. Benchmark Main Trans. Assoc., 86 A.D.3d 938 (4th Dept 2011); Wonderling v. CSX Transporation, Inc., 34 A.D.3d 1244 (4th Dept 2006); Andrews v Ryan Homes, Inc., 27 AD3d 1197 (4 th Dept. 2006). All three cases are very similar to this case factually, the closest being perhaps Thome, in which the lower court stated: We agree, however, with the further contention of defendants that they raised a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries. In opposition to the motion, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiff was aware that holes had been cut into the concrete floor of the building in which he was working and that, on the morning of his accident, plaintiff had been specifically directed not to operate the scissor lift in the area where the holes had been cut. Further, defendants submitted evidence that plaintiff drove the raised lift into that area while looking at the ceiling rather than where the lift was going. Consequently, "[u]nlike those situations in which a safety device fails for no apparent reason, thereby raising the presumption that the device did not provide proper protection within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 (1), here there is a question of fact [concerning] whether the injured plaintiff's fall [resulted from] his own misuse of the safety device and whether such conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries" (Bahrman v Holtsville Fire Dist., 270 AD2d 438, 439 [2000]). 86 A.D.3d at 939-940 (emphasis added). 8 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and in accord with the authorities cited and discussed herein and in the prior briefs of all defendants, the respondent-appellant Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, respectfully requests that this court issue an order reversing the order appealed from and dismissing the plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim; or, alternatively, affirming the lower court’s order to the extent that it held there to be a question of fact regarding whether the plaintiff's conduct was the “sole proximate cause” of his accident. July 27, 2014 Laurence D. Behr, Esq. ADDENDUM SENESE v. J. KOKOLAKIS CONTRACTING, INC., ET AL., 5709/10 (1-16-2013) 2013 NY Slip Op 30220(U) Supreme Court of the State of New York, Queens County. January 16, 2013 [EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] JANICE A. TAYLOR, Judge. Page-2 Upon the foregoing papers it is ordered that the motions and cross-motions are considered together and decided as follows: Plaintiffs in this negligence/labor law case seek damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Kenneth Senese on July 28, 2008, while employed as a union carpenter with Pabco. It is alleged that plaintiff Kenneth Senese fell off a baker's scaffold while performing construction work at premises located at 80-45 Winchester Blvd., Queens, New York. The facility is known as Creedmoor Psychiatric Facility. The construction project was known as the Bernard Fineson Project. The project entailed the construction of nine buildings identified as buildings numbered "1" through "8", and the "Program Building" or "Administration Building". At the time of the accident, plaintiff was working on a scaffold in the basement of building "4", installing sheetrock on the ceiling. As plaintiff Kenneth Senese stepped down from the scaffold, the temporary lights went out inside the building. As a result, plaintiffs alleges that plaintiff Kenneth Senese mis-stepped from the scaffold and sustained injuries to his knee. DASNY owns the premises. DASNY entered into a prime contract with Kokolakis to act as contractor for general construction of the project. DASNY also entered into a prime Page-3 contract with Laws for Laws to perform site work and utilities work. This contract required Laws, as it relates to electric work, to install temporary power around the perimeter of the site, which terminated approximately fifteen (15) feet away from each structure to be built. Laws then entered into a sub-contract agreement with Hellman to install this temporary electric power. This temporary power has been referred to as the "temporary power loop". Hellman also maintained the temporary power loop, which included poles with electrical panels that went around the campus. The temporary power loop was installed so that the contractors could have power for the individual buildings. The power source for the temporary power loop came from an on-site power plant that distributed the power throughout the entire facility. Eldor provided and distributed both the permanent and temporary electricity to buildings "1" through "8" The temporary power came from the temporary power loop. The parties each move, or cross-move, for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against it on the ground that it did not cause, or contribute to, the temporary lighting failure which caused or contributed to the subject accident. Facts Paul Goncalves testified in July 2008, as follows: he was employed as the Project Manager for DASNY at the Creedmoor project. DASNY performs design and construction as well as financing of public benefits projects. Goncalves explained that the duties of a Project Manager include managing the job in terms of 9 completion of the scope of the work and time parameters, gathering information, receiving day-to-day reports from the Construction Manager and his physical presence at the site on a daily basis. The Creedmoor project entailed the replacement of a campus facility consisting of nine (9) buildings on the Creedmoor campus in Queens Village. Hellman was an electrical subcontractor that performed the site work that pertained to the temporary electric and permanent electric installations. Hellman installed the temporary power loop that provided temporary power to the buildings under construction. Specifically, Hellman installed poles with transformers along the perimeter of the site to support the construction activities, and had a daily presence following the installation of the power loop. The power loop was the responsibility of Hellman to install and maintain. Goncalves further testified that Eldor was responsible for the distribution of the temporary power within each building; and that Kokolakis was responsible for the general construction of Buildings 1-6. Although Goncalves testified that he did not Page-4 know the cause of the outage, he stated that based upon the facts as relayed by certain incident reports, the power outage was caused either by an interruption of service from the temporary power loop or an interruption of service from the source of the power. Goncalves testified that Creedmoor was the owner of the power plant, not DASNY. Ken Jeffries testified on behalf of Pabco as follows: at the time of the accident, he was employed by Pabco as a carpenter foreman, and Pabco is in the business of carpentry which includes performing finishing work, sheetrock framing and installation. As a foreman, Jeffries would be assigned to a construction project and remain on the site all day. Jeffries further testified that there were two accepted methods by which a worker dismounts from a Baker's scaffold and they are either by climbing down the bars at either end of the scaffold, or by using a ladder and not by stepping off the middle without holding on to the supports. If a Pabco worker required a ladder to dismount from a Baker's scaffold, ladders are "absolutely" available at the site; they were maintained in building #4 on either the first floor or the basement where plaintiff had been working. Joseph Russo testified on behalf of Eldor as follows: in July 2008, he was employed by Eldor as a journeyman electrician and worked as a "sub foreman" on the Creedmoor project. The scope of work for Eldor was to supply the temporary power and lighting to buildings #1-8, during the construction project. Hellman, the site electrician, installed poles around the perimeter of the project to carry the temporary power from the existing main feed of the site. Hellman also installed poles that attached temporary breaker panels that provided the power for the residential buildings. Eldor used the panels to carry the power by underground conduit to the individual buildings, which had a temporary panel box in each building; the Hellman panel on the poles was five feet off the ground. Russo further testified that he believes the outage occurred on the entire project site. Thus, the outage was not related to Eldor's equipment since it had to do with the entire power loop installed by Hellman. Additionally, Russo testified that, with regard to the July 28, 2008 incident, the power was out for about one hour and then, Russo testified, he and his crew left at 2:30 p.m. The power was restored when he returned with his crew the next morning. Daniel Bindus testified on behalf of Hellman. He stated that he was the Project Manager for Hellman on the Creedmoor project. Bindus testified that Hellman was responsible for the installation and maintenance of the temporary power system, and that there was a system in 10 place for the provision of temporary power, which provided lighting and power for the workers to perform construction. Bindus identified Eldor as the company which installed its own breakers and feeders within the ones supplied by Hellman, to supply the power to individual buildings. Finally, Bindus testified that Hellman's power supply "stops at Page-5 the pole" (outside), which houses Hellman's electric breaker boxes; Eldor then brings the power into the buildings. William Gray (a non-party) testified that he is employed as a plant utilities engineer III at Creedmoor. His job responsibilities include overseeing the electric, plumbing and carpentry shops, their supervisors at the facility and assisting the "power plant" as needed. Gray testified that the power to the power plant originated from the street from Con Edison facilities. Gray identified a plant logbook, which was the power plant operator's logbook for Creedmoor, documenting events of significance associated with the daily operations of the power plant. Gray specifically reviewed the logbook for the date of the accident and found that there was no indication of a power outage anywhere in the logbook for July 28, 2008. As such, Gray testified, the power outage could not have been a total outage at Creedmoor, but rather the power outage [had to be] confined to the temporary power supply installed by Hellman. Non-party Consolidated Edison submitted an affidavit by Gale D. Dakers, dated January 12, 2012, stating that a search was made and Consolidated Edison has no record of any electric power outages or electrical service interruptions which occurred on July 28, 2008 for Creedmoor. * * * Page-6 * * * Motion by Pabco The branch of the motion by Pabco which is to dismiss plaintiffs' claim under Labor Law § 240(1), is granted as unopposed, and otherwise on the merits. "To recover under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a violation of the statute and that the violation was a proximate cause of the accident" (Marin v Levin Props., LP., 28 AD3d 525 [2006], citing Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 287 [2003]). "The extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) extend only to a narrow class of special hazards, and do `not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity'" (Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., 93 NY2d 914, 915-916 [1999], quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro- Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). "Where an injury results from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the risk which brought about the need for the safety device in the first instance, no section 240 (1) liability exists" (Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., supra at 915, citing Melber v 6333 Main St., 91 NY2d 759, 763-764 [1998]). Here, the undisputed evidence indicates that the fall resulted from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the danger that brought about the need for the scaffold in the first instance (see Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig. Corp., supra at 916; see also Melber v 6333 Main St., supra; Aquilino v E.W. Howell Co., Inc., 7 AD3d 739 [2004]; Masullo v City of New York, 253 AD2d 541 [1998]). * * * Page-14 * * * 11 Conclusion Defendant/third-party defendant/second third- party defendant Laws' motion for summary judgment is granted. The complaint and all cross- claims are hereby dismissed as against this defendant. The branch of the motion by Pabco which is to dismiss plaintiff's claim under Labor Law § 240(1), is granted. The branches of Pabco's motion which are to dismiss certain aspects of plaintiff's claim under Labor Law 241 (6), based upon violations of sections 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and (e), 23-1.21 and 23-2.1, are granted. The branch of the motion by Pabco which is to dismiss the causes of action by DASNY and Kokolakis for breach of contract for allegedly failing to procure insurance naming those parties as additional insureds, is granted. The branch of the motion by Pabco which is to dismiss DASNY's claims for contractual indemnification and defense costs, is granted. The branch of the motion by defendant/third- party plaintiff DASNY which is to dismiss plaintiff's claim under Labor Law § 241(6), based upon a violation of section 23-1.30, is denied. The branches of the motion which seek contractual indemnification for defense costs from Eldor, Hellman and Kokolakis, are granted. The branch of the motion by DASNY which is to dismiss plaintiff Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claim against it is denied. The branches of the motion by DASNY which seek a conditional judgment on the issue of contractual indemnification from Eldor and Kokolakis are granted. The branches of the motion by DASNY which seek contractual indemnification and defense costs from Pabco and Laws are denied. The branches of the motion by DASNY which seek contractual indemnification for defense costs from Eldor, Hellman and Kokolakis, are granted. Defendant Eldor's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant Hellman's motion to renew its prior motion for summary judgment is granted. Upon renewal, defendant Hellman's motion for summary judgment is denied. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on their claim pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6), predicated upon a violation of 23-1.30, is denied. Defendant/third-party plaintiff Kokolakis' motion for defense costs and contractual indemnification from Pabco is denied. Copyright © 2014 CCH Incorporated or its affiliates 12