Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/409/418/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 04:41:02
Document Index: 357210383

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1982', '§ 1982', '§ 1982', '§ 1983', '§ 1982', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 8', 'sui generis', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 5']

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. CARTER, 409 U. S. 418 - Volume 409 - 1973 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 409 > DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. CARTER, 409 U. S. 418 (1973) > Full Text
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. CARTER, 409 U. S. 418 (1973)
The District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Court of Appeals therefore erred insofar as that court sustained respondent's claims for deprivation of civil rights pursuant to that statute. Pp. 409 U. S. 420-433.
a common law theory of tort liability and an action for deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides: [Footnote 1]
The District Court dismissed the complaint against all defendants without opinion. [Footnote 2] On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state causes of action under both the common law and federal statutory theories of liability. Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 447 F.2d 358 (1971). In sustaining respondent's claims under § 1983, the court held that "[a]cts under color of the law of the District of Columbia are under color of the law of a State or Territory' for the purpose of § 1983." Id. at 391 n. 3, 447 F.2d at 361 n. 3. We granted certiorari. 404 U.S. 1014. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as that judgment sustained respondent's claims under § 1983. [Footnote 3]
Whether the District of Columbia constitutes a "State or Territory" within the meaning of any particular statutory or constitutional provision depends upon the character and aim of the specific provision involved. [Footnote 4] Indeed, such
Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co. (P. R.), Ltd., 302 U. S. 253, 302 U. S. 258 (1937); see Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 293 U. S. 86, 293 U. S. 87-88 (1934); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 286 U. S. 433 (1932).
U.S. 24, 334 U. S. 31 (1948). [Footnote 5] At first glance, it might seem logical simply to assume, as did the Court of Appeals, that identical words used in two related statutes were intended to have the same effect. Nevertheless,
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, supra, at 286 U. S. 433. And the logic underlying the Court of Appeals' assumption breaks down completely where, as here,
This provision was enacted as a means to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's proclamation that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 392 U. S. 437-438 (1968).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 109 U. S. 20 (1883); see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 403 U. S. 105 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 392 U. S. 437-440; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 197 U. S. 216, 197 U. S. 218 (1905). Thus, it cannot be doubted that the power vested in Congress to enforce this Amendment includes the power to enact laws of nationwide application.
Moreover, like the Amendment upon which it is based, § 1982 is not a "mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding" racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property but, rather, an "absolute" bar to all such discrimination, private as well as public, federal as well as state. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 392 U. S. 413, 392 U. S. 437. With this in mind, it would be anomalous indeed if Congress chose to carve out the District of Columbia as the sole exception to an act of otherwise universal application. And this is all the more true where, as here, the legislative purposes underlying § 1982 support its applicability in the District. The dangers of private discrimination, for example, that provided a focal point of Congress' concern in enacting the legislation, [Footnote 6] were, and are, as present in the District of Columbia as in the States, and the same considerations that led Congress to extend the prohibitions of § 1982 to the Federal Government apply with equal force to the District, which is a mere instrumentality of that Government. Thus, in the absence of some express indication of legislative intent to the contrary, [Footnote 7] there was
The situation is wholly different, however, with respect to § 1983. Unlike § 1982, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1983 has its roots in § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Act of Apr 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. This distinction has great significance, for, unlike the 1866 Act, which was passed as a means to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, the primary purpose of the 1871 Act was "to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." 17 Stat. 13; see, e.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 405 U. S. 545 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 365 U. S. 171 (1961); see also Cong.Globe, 42 Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 80, 83-85. And it has long been recognized that
"[d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional sources. See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. Compare 341 U. S. Williams, [341 U.S. 70], with Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91."
Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 365 U. S. 205-206 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
In contrast to the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment has only limited applicability; the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting under color of its authority. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, supra; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876). The Fourteenth Amendment itself "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." [Footnote 8]
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 334 U. S. 13 (1948); see also United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966); Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1 (1906). Similarly, actions of the Federal Government and its officers are beyond the purview of the Amendment. And since the District of Columbia is not a "State" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 347 U. S. 499 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 334 U. S. 8; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 181 U. S. 384 (1901), neither the District nor its officers are subject to its restrictions. [Footnote 9]
Like the Amendment upon which it based, § 1983 is of only limited scope. The statute deals only with those deprivations of rights that are accomplished under the color of the law of "any State or Territory." [Footnote 10] It does not reach purely private conduct and, with the exception of the Territories, [Footnote 11] actions of the Federal Government
Any analysis of the purposes and scope of § 1983 must take cognizance of the events and passions of the time at which it was enacted. [Footnote 12] After the Civil War ended in 1865, race relations in the South became increasingly turbulent. The Ku Klux Klan was organized by southern whites in 1866, and a wave of murders and assaults was launched against both blacks and Union sympathizers. [Footnote 13] Thus, at the opening of the 42d Congress, considerable apprehension was expressed by Republicans about the insecurity of life and property in the South, [Footnote 14]
and on March 23, 1871, President Grant sent a message to Congress requesting additional federal legislation to curb this rising tide of violence. Such legislation was deemed essential in light of the inability of the state governments to control the situation. [Footnote 15] Five days later, Congressman Shellabarger of Ohio introduced the bill that eventually was to become the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. [Footnote 16]
Although there are threads of many thoughts running through the debates on the 1871 Act, it seems clear that § 1 of the Act, with which we are here concerned, was designed primarily in response to the unwillingness or inability of the state governments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil rights of others. [Footnote 17] Thus, while the Klan itself provided the principal catalyst for the legislation, the remedy created in § 1 "was not a remedy against [the Klan] or its members but against those who, representing a State in some capacity, were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 175-176 (emphasis in original). Senator Pratt of Indiana summarized this concern when he said: [Footnote 18]
Similarly, Congressman Hoar of Massachusetts stated: [Footnote 19]
To the Reconstruction Congress, the need for some form of federal intervention was clear. It was equally clear, however, that Congress had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct control, on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials. The solution chosen was to involve the federal judiciary. At the time this Act was adopted, it must be remembered, there existed no general federal question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. [Footnote 20] Rather, "Congress relied on the
state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws." [Footnote 21] Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 389 U. S. 245 (1967). With the growing awareness that this reliance had been misplaced, however, Congress recognized the need for original federal court jurisdiction as a means to provide at least indirect federal control over the unconstitutional actions of state officials. [Footnote 22] Congressman Coburn explained: [Footnote 23]
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 180.
There was no need, however, to create federal court jurisdiction for the District of Columbia. Even prior to 1871, the courts of the District possessed general jurisdiction over both federal and local matters. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, c. 91, 12 Stat. 762. Thus, the jurisdictional aspects of § 1 of the 1871 Act were entirely superfluous with respect to the District. Moreover, while Congress was unable to exert any direct control over the actions of state officials, it was authorized under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution to exercise plenary power over the District of Columbia and its officers. [Footnote 24] Indeed, "[t]he power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs." Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 348 U. S. 31 (1954); see District of Columbia v. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100, 346 U. S. 108 (1953); National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U. S. 582, 337 U. S. 602 (1949); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 37 U. S. 619 (1838). And since the District is itself the seat of the National Government, Congress was in a position to observe and, to a large extent, supervise the activities of local officials. [Footnote 25] Thus, the rationale underlying Congress'
It is true, of course, that Congress also possessed plenary power over the Territories. [Footnote 26] For practical reasons, however, effective federal control over the activities of territorial officials was virtually impossible. Indeed,
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 370 U. S. 546 (1962); see also E. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States 1861-1890, p. 92 (1947); H.R.Rep. No. 440, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884); S.Rep. No. 1249, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). Thus, although the Constitution vested control over the Territories in the Congress, its practical control was both "confused and ineffective," [Footnote 27] making the problem of enforcement of civil rights in the Territories more similar to the problem as it existed in the States than in the District of Columbia. [Footnote 28]
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 289 U. S. 537 (1933); see McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 141 U. S. 188 (1891). Thus, in light of the transitory nature of the territorial condition, Congress could reasonably treat the Territories as inchoate States, quite similar in many respects to the States themselves, to whose status they would inevitably ascend.
The District of Columbia, on the other hand, "is an exceptional community . . . established under the Constitution as the seat of the National Government." District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. S. 441, 314 U. S. 452 (1941). As such, it "is as lasting as the States from which it was carved or the union whose permanent capital it became." O'Donoghue v. United States, supra, at 289 U. S. 538. Indeed, it is
Id. at 289 U. S. 539. Unlike either the States or Territories, the District is truly sui generis in our governmental structure.
With this unique status of the District of Columbia in mind, and in the absence of any indication in the language, purposes, or history of § 1983 of a legislative intent to include the District within the scope of its coverage, the conclusion is compelled that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the District of Columbia constitutes a "State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983. Just as "[w]e are not at liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments" to avoid giving a congressional enactment the broad scope its language and origins may require, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 801, so too are we not at liberty to recast this statute to expand its application beyond the limited reach Congress gave it. This is not to say, of course, that a claim,
See Jones v. Alfred N. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 392 U. S. 422-436 (1968).
Although the legislative debate over the 1866 Act did not focus specifically on the District, there are numerous indications that the Act was designed to "extend to all parts of the country." Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (Sen. Trumbull); see, e.g., id. at 392 U. S. 426, 392 U. S. 474.
This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 383 U. S. 762 (1966)(Clark, J., concurring); id. at 383 U. S. 782-784 (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966).
Powered by Justia US Supreme Court Center: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. CARTER, 409 U. S. 418 (1973)