Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120822_0001029.ENY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 20:56:37
Document Index: 388208053

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1441', '§ 1602', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 254', 'Art. 1', '§ 254', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 41', 'Art. 18', 'Art. 1', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1915']

| Joao Carlos Salvador Gomes, Pro Se v. Angop
Joao Carlos Salvador Gomes, Pro Se v. Angop
JOAO CARLOS SALVADOR GOMES, PRO SE, PLAINTIFF,v.ANGOP, ANGOLA PRESS AGENCY, ET AL.,DEFENDANTS.
On December 29, 2010, pro se*fn1 plaintiff Joao Carlos Salvador Gomes ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against ANGOP, Angola Press Agency ("ANGOP"), the Republic of Angola, owner of ANGOP ("Angola"), Embassy of the Republic of Angola in the United States of America (the "Embassy"), Ministry of Social Communication, Angola ("Ministry of Communication"), Ministry of Finance, Republic of Angola ("Ministry of Finance"), Ministry of External Relations (Foreign Affairs), Angola ("Ministry of Foreign Affairs," together with Ministry of Communication and Ministry of Finance, the "Ministries"), Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola ("President dos Santos"), Mrs. Josefina Pitra Diakite, Ambassador of the Republic of Angola in the United States of America ("Ambassador Diakite" or the "Ambassador"), Ms. Carolina Cerqueira, Minister of Social Communication of the Republic of Angola ("Cerqueira"), Mr. Carlos Alberto Lopes, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Angola ("Lopes"), Mr. George Chicoty, Minister of External Relations (Foreign Affairs), Angola ("Chicoty," together with Cerqueira and Lopes, the "Ministers"), Mr. Manuel da Conceicao, Director of ANGOP ("Conceicao") and ANGOP Editorial Staff (collectively, "Defendants"), by filing a Summons with Notice in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County, alleging Defendants defamed and otherwise injured Plaintiff when, on multiple occasions, ANGOP published on its website a photograph of Plaintiff with a caption identifying him as Jose Americo "Bubo" Na Tchuto, Head of the Navy of Guinea-Bissau (the "Na Tchuto Photograph"), who at the time of the publication was allegedly wanted internationally for, inter alia, "drugs trafficking . . . money laundering, attempted murder of a Head-of-state and, desertion[.]" (See Doc. Entry No. 1, Ex. A ("Summons with Notice") at 5.) On February 4, 2011, Defendants properly removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (d). (See Doc. Entry No. 1, Notice of Removal.)
Defendants now move, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint as to: (1) President dos Santos and Ambassador Diakite under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) ("Rule 12(b)(2)"), pursuant to head-of-state and diplomatic immunities; (2) Angola, the Embassy, the Ministries and ANGOP under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ("Rule 12(b)(1)"), pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.; and (3) the Ministers, Conceicao, and ANGOP Editorial Staff, because they have been sued only in their official capacities and they are not the real parties in interest. (See Defs.' Mem of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem."),Doc Entry No. 12.) Plaintiff cross-moves, by way of a 505- page memorandum (the "Omnibus Memorandum"), consisting of 103 single-spaced pages of argument and 402 pages of exhibits: (1) opposing Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint; (2) requesting the Court "Rescind the Notice of Removal" and remand the case back to the Queens County Supreme Court; and (3) seeking an Order lifting the stay of discovery imposed in this case by U.S. Magistrate Judge James Orenstein. (See Doc. Entry No. 34 ("Pl.'s Omnibus Mem.").) Defendants oppose Plaintiff's cross-motions. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and Plaintiff's motions are denied. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
I.Factual Allegations*fn2
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 10, 2010, at a dinner party, he informed Ambassador Diakite of the Na Tchuto Photograph. (Id. at 31.) According to Plaintiff, Ambassador Diakite told him: "If the site in question is that of ANGOP, the government of the Republic of Angola will assume its responsibilities." (Id.) Plaintiff additionally asserts that Ambassador Diakite informed Plaintiff that the publications of the Na Tchuto Photograph may have been the action of an individual inside ANGOP who has a personal vendetta against Plaintiff. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that during a phone conversation with Ambassador Diakite on June 11, 2010, she blamed the publications on "pirates." (Id.)
II.Initiation of the State Action and Removal to Federal Court
On December 29, 2010, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants by filing a Summons with Notice in the Queens County Supreme Court. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants by sending a copy of the Summons with Notice to the Embassy via Federal Express ("FedEx"). (See Doc. Entry No. 1, Ex. B.) In the Summons with Notice, Plaintiff alleges: defamation (libel); violation of right to privacy; harassment; negligence; threat to personal safety and life, through the unauthorized and multiple publication -- by ANGOP (Angola Press Agency, the official news agency of the government of Angola) -- of plaintiff's photographs and, false words, carried out with reckless disregard for its truth or actual malice on the internet, for commercial purposes (causing special damages).
III.Proceedings Before the Magistrate Judge
Defendants represented that to the best of their knowledge they sent the Notice of Removal to Plaintiff, and that while they could not account for why it was not received, Defendants were in possession of an Affidavit of Service in their office file. (Id. at 8-9.) The magistrate judge directed Defendants to file the Affidavit of Service on the Court's CM/ECF System and to provide a copy to Plaintiff. (Id. at 40.) On March 18, 2011, pursuant to the magistrate judge's Order, Defendants filed a copy of their Affidavit of Service. (Doc. Entry No. 7.) Defendants now acknowledge that they made a typographical error in Plaintiff's address on the Affidavit of Service. Defendants suggest this explains why Plaintiff never received the Notice of Removal in the mail. (See Berman June Affirmation ¶ 10,Ex. C.) On the same date, Defendants e-mailed the Affidavit of Service to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. E; see also Sept. 16, 2011 Affirmation of Marjorie E. Berman ("Berman Sept. Affirmation") ¶ 3, annexed as Ex. 1 to Defs.' Reply in Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Rep. Mem."), Doc. Entry No. 38.) Plaintiff asserts he never received that e-mail. (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 14.)
I.Motion to Rescind the Notice of Removal
Plaintiff seeks remand on the ground that Defendants failed to complete the removal process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 because they did not serve Plaintiff with a written Notice of Removal or with Proof of Service and, thus did not comply with the thirty-day deadline in which to complete the removal process.*fn3 (See Pl.'s Affirmation in Supp. of the Mot. to Rescind ("Pl.'s Mot. to Rescind") ¶¶ 1, 7, Doc. Entry No. 23; see also Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 9, 16.)
Plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.
Here, there is no dispute that Defendants listed Plaintiff's address
incorrectly on the Affidavit of Service, and, accordingly, that they
probably served the Notice of Removal on the wrong address.*fn4
But there is nothing to suggest this typographical error was
made in bad faith. Moreover, as Plaintiff concedes, he was notified of
the removal by way of the magistrate judge's February 14, 2011
Scheduling Order, which is dated only ten days after the Notice of
Removal was filed. Accordingly, the Court finds taht Plaintiff's
receipt of the magistrate judge's Scheduling Order within days after
the Notice of Removal was filed, constitutes constructive notice that
the instant matter was removed to this Court, in satisfaction of the
promptness requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). See Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 1998 WL 865626, at *2 (finding that plaintiff received
constructive notice of removal shortly after the notice was filed when
she received an order from the federal court directing the parties to
appear for an initial conference).
II.Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as to President dos Santos and Ambassador Diakite under Rule 12(b)(2) on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Specifically, Defendants argue: (1) President dos Santos is immune from the jurisdiction of this Court under the common law doctrine of head-of-state immunity; and (2) Ambassador Diakite is immune pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ("VCDR") and the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 ("DRA"), 22 U.S.C. § 254d. Plaintiff argues Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity. As set forth below, the Court finds President dos Santos and Ambassador Diakite are immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Accordingly, this action is dismissed against them.
A.Rule 12(b)(2) Legal Standard "A court is obligated to dismiss an action against a defendant over which it has no personal jurisdiction upon motion by that defendant." TAGC Mgt., LLC v. Lehman, 2011 WL 3796350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011) (internal quotations omitted). "A plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. (internal quotations omitted). When, as here, "a court relies on pleadings and affidavits, rather than conducting a full-blown evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the court possesses personal jurisdiction over the defendant." DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001). "Although a plaintiff's allegations are ordinarily accepted as true at the pleadings stage, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, where [a] 'defendant rebuts [a] plaintiff['s] unsupported allegations with direct, highly specific, testimonial evidence regarding a fact essential to jurisdiction-and plaintiff[ ] do[es] not counter that evidence-the allegation may be deemed refuted." Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 402, 420 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Schenker v. Assicurazioni Genereali S.p.A ., Consol., 2002 WL 1560788, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002)).
B.President dos Santos
C.Ambassador Diakite
Defendants next assert that Ambassador Diakite is immune from the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to the VCDR and the DRA. (Defs.' Mem. at 14-15.) Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that, because Ambassador Diakite acted outside her official functions by engaging in actions for commercial and personal profit, an exception to diplomatic immunity under the VCDR applies, making her subject to the jurisdiction in this Court. (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 89-90.) The Court finds that Ambassador Diakite is immune from the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, this action against her is dismissed.
Article 31 of the VCDR, to which the United States is a party, grants diplomatic agents full immunity subject to certain limited exceptions that are not applicable here. See The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 13, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3227; see also Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F. 3d 123, 137 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Sitting diplomats are accorded near-absolute immunity in the receiving state to avoid interference with the diplomat's service for his or her government."). As Plaintiff acknowledges, Ambassador Diakite was head of Angola's principal mission to the United States, the Embassy of Angola in Washington D.C., at the time this suit was commenced. (See Pl. Omnibus Mem. at 31, 42.) As such, she qualifies as a diplomatic agent under to the VCDR and is entitled to absolute immunity. See VCDR, Art. 1(e) ("a 'diplomatic agent' is the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission"). Moreover, under the DRA, "[a]ny action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . shall be dismissed." 22 U.S.C. § 254d. Accordingly, pursuant to the DRA, as no exceptions to immunity under the VCDR are applicable to Ambassador Diakite, the instant suit against her must be dismissed. See Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F. 3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S.Ct. 151 (2010) (The DRA "makes pellucid that American courts must dismiss a suit against anyone who is entitled to immunity under. . . the VCDR[.]").
Plaintiff argues that Ambassador Diakite is not entitled to immunity, pursuant to VCDR Art. 31(1)(c), which provides an exception to diplomatic immunity in the case of, inter alia, "an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions." (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 89 (citing VCDR, Art. 31(1)(c).) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the Ambassador took actions outside her official function because she: (1) unduly used her "official position to engage in activities such as money laundering"; (2) disseminated material from the official news agency of Angola; and (3) "has been directly involved, representing the defendants in all aspects of the proceedings involving this case, with respect to all discussion, correspondence, hiring of the counsels, the actual legal proceedings, etc." (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 90.) These assertions are speculative and do not provide any support for the claim that Ambassador Diakite engaged in acts outside of her official capacity.
Plaintiff's first argument, that Ambassador Diakite engaged in money laundering is wholly conclusory, not supported by any factual allegations in the record, and is entirely unrelated to the narrow action at issue, viz., the publications of the Na Tchuto Photograph. As such, even assuming, arguendo, such money laundering did occur, Plaintiff has not pled any facts connecting the alleged criminal act with the instant action, thereby warranting an application of the exception to sovereign immunity under the VCDR. Moreover, Plaintiff pleads no facts and provides no argument tending to show that Ambassador Diakite's alleged actions of disseminating material from the official news agency of Angola is not in accord with her official function as "the representative of the government of Angola in the United States[.]" (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 31.) Similarly, Plaintiff also has provided no evidence to support his contention that Ambassador Diakite's action of "hiring the counsels and overseeing all aspects of this legal action . . . are outside her official obligations." (Id. at 90.) To the contrary, the Court finds it hard to imagine that Ambassador Diakite's supervision of this litigation on behalf of the country and institutions she represents, in the location where she represents them, can be construed as anything other than a core aspect of her official function.
Plaintiff also asserts that Ambassador Diakite should not be granted immunity under VCDR, Art. 41(3), which states: "The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission[.]" According to Plaintiff, "[i]t is possible that the articles which are the subject of this legal action were written and published by an ANGOP staff member based in the United Sates, including possibly, at the Embassy of Angola[.]" (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 89.) This assertion does not rise above bald speculation and is insufficient to meet Plaintiff's burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction over Ambassador Diakite.
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Ambassador Diakite is not entitled to immunity under the VCDR. Accordingly, pursuant to the mandates of the DRA, this action is dismissed as to her. See Brzak, 597 F. 3d at 113.
III.Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A.Rule 12(b)(1) Legal Standard in the Context of the FSIA
In determining whether a court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to the FSIA, the defendant has the burden to "present a prima facie case that it is a foreign sovereign." Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Repub. of South Africa, 300 F. 3d 230, 241 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Once the defendant meets that initial burden, "the plaintiff has the burden of going forward with evidence showing that, under exceptions to the FSIA, immunity should not be granted." Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F. 3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F. 3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff may meet his burden through the allegations contained in the complaint and the undisputed facts placed before the court by the parties. See Virtual Countries, 300 F. 3d at 241 (citation omitted). "Where the plaintiff satisfies [his or] her burden that an FSIA exception applies, the foreign sovereign then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that the FSIA exception does not apply." Swarna, 622 F. 3d at 143 (citation omitted).
B.The FSIA Defendants' Prima Facie Case
The Ministries are political organs of Angola that also are entitled
to the presumption of immunity under the FSIA. Pursuant to
Presidential Decree Legislative Act No. 1/10 ("Decree 1/10") issued on
March 5, 2010, President dos Santos set forth the organizational
structure and functions of the organs necessary for the exercise of
his powers under the 2010 Angola
Constitution. (See Decree 1/10, annexed as Ex. B to Defs.' Mot. to
Dismiss.) As Plaintiff readily concedes, under Decree 1/10, the
Ministries are all defined as "auxiliary organs of the President of
the Republic and Head of the Executive in governance and
administration functions of their respective sectors, which correspond
to specific areas of activity, in accordance with delegated powers."
(Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 37-38 (citing Decree 1/10, Art. 18(1)).)
Furthermore, as set forth in Decree 1/10, the core functions of the
Ministries are exclusively governmental in purpose.*fn5
(See Decree 1/10, Arts. 22, 26, 32, 34.) For purposes of the
FSIA, the Ministries, as organs of the state with core governmental
functions, are considered the foreign state itself and are entitled to
the presumption of immunity. See Garb, 440 F. 3d at 594-95, 598 (Since
the core function of Poland's Ministry of the Treasury is
governmental, rather than commercial, it is treated as the part of the
sovereign itself and not as the sovereigns' agency or
instrumentality.); see also Compagnie Noga D'Importation et
D'Exportation, S.A. v. Russian Fed'n, 361 F. 3d 676, 688 (2d Cir.
2004) (Finding "no meaningful legal distinction can be drawn between a
sovereign and one of its political organs."); Bennett v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D.D.C. 2007) (Iran's
Ministry of Information and Security "is considered to be a division
of state of Iran, and is treated as a member of the state of Iran
itself" for purposes of the FSIA.). Accordingly, Angola, the Embassy,
and the Ministries are foreign states under the
FSIA that are entitled to the presumption of sovereign immunity.
(b) An 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' means any entity-
(1) Which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) Which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
Plaintiff apparently concedes that ANGOP meets the requirements under Sections 1603(b)(2) and (3). Indeed, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Angola is the sole owner of ANGOP, "a component of the state media." (See, e.g., Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 34, 38.) Furthermore, as set forth in the sworn statement of Manuel da Conceicao, President of the Board of Directors of ANGOP, the Government of Angola created ANGOP as a state media organ in 1975 for the national purpose of collecting, preparing and distributing current national and international news on the basis of objective information in line with the national interest. (See April 6, 2011 Sworn Statement of Manuel da Conceicao, President, ANGOP Board of Directors ("Conceicao April Statement") ¶ 2, annexed as Ex. C to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss; see also Decree No. 208/10 of the 24th of September 2010 ("Decree 208/10"), Arts. 4(1)(a)-(d), attached as Ex. A to Conceicao April Statement.) As such, the requirements of Section 1603(b)(2) are met. Defendants also affirm, by way of Conceicao's sworn statement, that ANGOP is neither a citizen of a State of the United States nor is it created under the laws of any third country, as it is created under Angola law. (See Conceicao April Statement ¶ 6.) Plaintiff does not challenge this representation. Accordingly, the requirements of Section 1603(b)(3) also are met.
The parties contest whether Section 1603(b)(1) has been satisfied. Defendants maintain that Section 1603(b)(1) is met because, as Conceicao affirms, ANGOP is a separate legal person. (See Conceicao April Statement ¶ 3 ("ANGOP has its own legal (juridical) personality separate from the Government of Angola. It has an autonomous administration and management, and it owns and controls its own assets. It can sue and be sued in its own name, and it can sign and perform contracts in its own name."); see also Decree 208/10, Art. 1 ("ANGOP, is a public enterprise of great dimension and public interest, endowed with juridical personality[.]").) Plaintiff argues ANGOP is not a legal person separate from Angola because: (1) Angola gives ANGOP political direction; and (2) ANGOP receives funding increases only by approval of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State for Economic Coordination. (See Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 81-84.)
C.Exceptions to the Presumption of Sovereignty of the FSIA Defendants Defendants have met their prima facie burden of establishing they are entitled to the presumption of sovereign immunity, as such Plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence showing that an the exception to the immunity applies. See Rogers, 673 F. 3d at 136.Plaintiff argues that there are three exceptions to the FSIA Defendants' presumption of sovereign immunity applicable here: (1) Ambassador Diakite implicitly waived the FSIA Defendants' immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1); (2) the FSIA Defendants are not immune under the "commercial activities exception," 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); and (3) the FSIA Defendants are not immune under the "tortious activity exception," 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). As set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show the applicability of an exception to the FSIA Defendants' immunity.
i. Ambassador Diakite's Implicit Waiver
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), a foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States where "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication[.]" Plaintiff argues Ambassador Diakite implicitly waived the FSIA Defendants' immunity during a dinner party on June 10, 2010. (See Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 31, 49, 54-56.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts, that during the dinner party, he informed Ambassador Diakite about the publications of the Na Tchuto Photograph on the ANGOP website. In response, Ambassador Diakite allegedly told Plaintiff: "If the website in question is that of ANGOP the government of the Republic of Angola will assume its responsibilities." (Id. at 55.) Plaintiff also claims that Ambassador Diakite gave him her business card and "instructed Plaintiff not to discuss the case with anyone else and to send all documentation related to the case, directly to her." (Id.) Plaintiff's waiver argument is meritless.
Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence or legal authority in support of his claim that the Ambassador's purported statement constituted an implicit waiver of the FSIA Defendants' immunity to suit. Assuming, arguendo, the Ambassador even made the purported statement, it was nevertheless uttered more than six months before Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit.*fn6 Indeed, the statement, even if uttered, "contains no express or indirect reference to a waiver of sovereign immunity" and it "does not bear such a close relationship to litigation as to support an implied waiver." Socialist People's, 101 F. 3d at 245-56. Accordingly, the Court finds Ambassador Diakite did not implicitly waive the FSIA Defendants' sovereign immunity.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). "As is plain from the language of the section, each of its three clauses describes different categories of conduct for which the foreign state is denied immunity." Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F. 3d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2010). For the first or second clause of the commercial activities exception to apply, Plaintiff must show the commercial activity itself, or an act connected with the commercial activity, took place within the United States. Throughout his Omnibus Memorandum Plaintiff speculates that the articles with the Na Tchuto Photograph might have been published in the United States, because ANGOP has some personnel deployed around the world as "Press Attaches" and because, according to Plaintiff, ANGOP's web server is located in Dallas, Texas. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 57, 89.) Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this speculative assertion. Moreover, while Plaintiff includes among his exhibits a printout from a website called "9rank.com" purporting to show ANGOP's website is hosted in Dallas, Texas, (See Ex. K, annexed to Pl.'s Omnibus Mem.), Plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest the articles in question were posted through the alleged server in Dallas. In addition, in a supplemental sworn statement, Conceicao affirms that "ANGOP's website is not hosted by any person or entity in the United States or elsewhere outside of Angola." (September 16, 2011 Supplemental Sworn Statement of Manuel da Conceicao, President, ANGOP Board of Directors ("Conceicao Sept. Statement") ¶ 4, annexed as Attachment 2 to Defs.' Rep. Mem.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that either the first or second clause of the commercial activities exception is applicable to the FSIA Defendants.
For the third clause of the commercial activities exception to apply, "the lawsuit for which jurisdiction is sought must be (1) based upon an act outside the territory of the United States; (2) that was taken in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state outside this country; and (3) that caused a direct effect in the United States." Virtual Countries, 300 F. 3d at 236 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. ("Weltover"), 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992)). To be a direct effect within the meaning of the third clause of the commercial activity exception, "[t]he effect need not be substantial or foreseeable . . . but it must be something more than trivial or incidental." Kensington Int'l, 505 F. 3d at 157; accord Virtual Countries, 300 F. 3d at 236("Congress did not intend to provide jurisdiction whenever the ripples caused by an overseas transaction manage eventually to reach the shores of the United States."). An effect is direct where "it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity." Guirlando,602 F. 3d at 74 (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618) (internal citation, quotation marks, and alteration removed). The required "immediacy is lacking where the alleged effect depends crucially on variables independent of the conduct of the foreign state." Id. at 75 (quoting Virtual Countries, 300 F. 3d at 238) (internal quotation marks, and alteration removed).
Plaintiff asserts the publications of the Na Tchuto Photograph caused nineteen "direct effects" on him in the United States. (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 59-64.) However, many of the purported direct effects are speculative in nature. Indeed, Plaintiff's list of direct effects contains a description of future and potential harms that "plaintiff believes he will suffer" as direct effects of Defendants' actions. (Id. at 59.) By definition, these future or potential harms have not yet occurred; a fortiori they cannot "follow as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity.'" Guirlando,602 F. 3d at 74 (quoting Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618). As such, Plaintiff's speculative future harms are not direct effects of the FSIA Defendants' actions.
Plaintiff also purports, inter alia, that the direct effects of the FSIA Defendants' actions include: (1) Plaintiff reliving the memories of an airplane explosion that occurred in 1998; (2) Plaintiff living "with the consequences of having been removed [by Angola] from his position as Spokesman of the United Nations in Angola" in the mid-1990s; (3) the theft by Ambassador Diakite of an idea Plaintiff communicated to her for a new media project "a few years ago"; and (4) Plaintiff no longer receiving invitations to "major" events in Washington D.C. (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 60-64.) Plaintiff fails to show how these alleged harms, many of which occurred well before the publication of the Na Tchuto photographs, are the immediate consequences of the FSIA Defendants' activities or how they have had any impact in the United States. As such, the commercial activities exception, premised upon these events, is inapplicable to the FSIA Defendants.
defamation (libel); violation of right to privacy; harassment; negligence; threat to personal safety and life, through the unauthorized and multiple publication -- by ANGOP (Angola Press Agency, the official news agency of the government of Angola) -- of plaintiff's photographs and, false words, carried out with reckless disregard for its truth or actual malice on the internet, for commercial purposes (causing special damages). (Summons with Notice at 5.) As a threshold matter, the tortious activity exception does not apply to the libel claim, as it is expressly barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). Moreover, while Plaintiff does allege that he suffered injury in the United States, as discussed supra, Part II.C.ii, Plaintiff fails to show that any of the FSIA Defendants' actions, tortious or otherwise, took place within the United States. Accordingly, the tortious activities exception is inapplicable. See Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 108 (D.D.C. 2005) (tortious activity exception inapplicable where plaintiff alleges she suffered emotional distress when she learned, from a television report she watched in the United States, that her family members were killed in the West Bank but where plaintiff fails to suggest defendants committed a tort on United States soil).
D.The Minsters, Conceicao, and ANGOP Editorial Staff
Defendants argue that the action must be dismissed against the Ministers, Conceicao, and ANGOP Editorial Staff (collectively, the "Individual Defendants") because the Individual Defendants have been sued in their official capacities and are not the real parties in interest in this case. (Defs.' Mem. at 16-17.) Plaintiff argues that, even though the Individual Defendants were sued in their official capacities, they nevertheless are amenable to suit and are the real parties in interest because of the corrupt political structure within Angola and the Individual Defendants are "enablers" of ANGOP's activities. (Pl.'s Omnibus Mem. at 91-92.) The Court finds the Individual Defendants are not the real parties in interest in this case and, as such, the case against them is dismissed.
While a foreign official sued in his official capacity for actions taken on behalf of a foreign state is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA, "some actions against an official in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in interest." Samantar v. Yousuf, ------ U.S. --------, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2289, 2292 (2010). Indeed, "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity." Id. at 2292 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
IV.Dismissal with Prejudice
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss this case for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction is granted in its entirety. Plaintiff's cross-motions are denied, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444--45 (1962).