Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/797/508/104986/
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 15:33:23
Document Index: 748361937

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 402', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 416']

14 Soc.sec.rep.ser. 349, Unempl.ins.rep. Cch 16,934nia J. Imani, on Behalf of Terron Hayes, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Margaret Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health and Humanservices, Defendant-appellee, 797 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1986 › 14 Soc.sec.rep.ser. 349, Unempl.ins.rep. Cch 16,934nia J. Imani, on Behalf of Terron Hayes, Plaintif...
14 Soc.sec.rep.ser. 349, Unempl.ins.rep. Cch 16,934nia J. Imani, on Behalf of Terron Hayes, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Margaret Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health and Humanservices, Defendant-appellee, 797 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 797 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986) Argued Oct. 25, 1985. Decided July 31, 1986
1. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner under Missouri State law as required by Section 216(h) (2) (A) of the Social Security Act.
2. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner pursuant to Section 216(h) (2) (B) of the Social Security Act as his mother and the wage earner never went through a marriage ceremony.
3. Terron Hayes is not the "child" of the wage earner pursuant to Section 216(h) (3) (C) of the Social Security Act as the evidence of record does not establish that the wage earner was ever decreed by a court to be his father, was ever ordered by a court to contribute to his support, or ever acknowledged him in writing. Furthermore, the evidence of record does not establish that the wage earner was his biological father or that the wage earner was either living with him or contributing to his support at the time of his death.
Imani commenced the instant action in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of the Secretary's decision. The case was referred to a magistrate, who stated in his extensive "report and recommended entry" that there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the Secretary, as the "totality of evidence" confirmed the administrative determination that Terron Hayes was not the "child" of Terry Williams within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The district court adopted the magistrate's report. This appeal followed.
Before turning to the substantive questions presented in this appeal, we must first articulate the applicable standard of review. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Secretary's findings are conclusive if they are supported by "substantial evidence." This standard applies to the district court's review of the Secretary's decision as well as this court's review of the district court's decision. Schaefer v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence" is defined as that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). We are not allowed to reappraise the record. Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 1979). The "clearly erroneous" standard for review of a trial court's factual findings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) does not apply, because the findings under consideration are those of the Secretary, not of the district court. Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980). The Secretary's conclusions of law are not entitled to such deference, however, and if the Secretary committed an error of law, reversal is required without regard to the volume of the evidence in support of the factual findings. Id.
Section 202(d) (1) of the Social Security Act ("Act"), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1), establishes the criteria for entitlement to child's insurance benefits. It provides that every "child," as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), of an individual who dies fully or currently insured under the Act is entitled to these benefits if the child has applied for the benefits, is unmarried, under 18 years of age, and was dependent on the deceased individual at the time of the latter's death.
Dependency is presumed for certain classes of children. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (3). 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) sets forth the rules for the determination of family status. Under Sec. 416(h) (2) (A), benefits are available to those children who, under the substantive law of the insured decedent's domicile, would be considered a child of the insured for the purposes of intestate succession. If the applicant fails to meet that requirement, he can under Sec. 416(h) (2) (B) still demonstrate that he is entitled to benefits by showing that the insured participated in a marriage ceremony that would be valid but for a nonobvious defect. If the applicant cannot satisfy this requirement, he may under Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (i) prevail nonetheless if he shows that the insured had acknowledged in writing that the applicant was his child, that the insured had been decreed by a court to be the parent of the applicant, or that the insured had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was the child of the insured. Finally, the applicant is entitled to benefits under Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) if he shows "by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary" that the insured was the applicant's parent and was either living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time of death.
It is undisputed that Imani and Williams never married and that Williams did not acknowledge in writing that Terron was his child, was not found to be his father in paternity proceedings, and did not contribute to Terron's support pursuant to a court order. Thus, Imani failed to demonstrate that her son was entitled to benefits under either Sec. 416(h) (2) (B) or Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (i). Nonetheless, Imani argues that Terron is entitled to benefits under Sec. 416(h) (2) (A) (intestate succession) or Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) (satisfactory evidence of paternity and proof of support from deceased).
Terry Williams was domiciled in the state of Missouri at the time of his death. Thus, under Sec. 416(h) (2) (A), the Secretary must apply that state's law of intestate succession to determine whether the applicant was the child of Williams. The pertinent statute is Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 474.060(2) (1985),1 which provides in relevant part:
"Clear and convincing proof" has been defined in the context of establishing illegitimacy as that which "leaves no room for doubt" and as requiring "a quantum of evidence such that no conclusion other than that of illegitimacy can be reached." B.S.H. v. J.J.H., 613 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo.App.1981). The burden of persuasion does not seem to be so severe when one seeks to establish paternity. Nonetheless, a recent Missouri decision suggests that the burden remains high under Sec. 474.060(2), certainly higher than the preponderance standard. Estate of Pope v. Hook, 670 S.W.2d 943 (Mo.App.1984); see also Greer by Greer v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1985).2
Imani also argues that she presented "evidence satisfactory to the Secretary" to show paternity and that she demonstrated that Williams was living with or contributing to the support of Terron at the time of death, so that the requirements of Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) were satisfied. Our discussion above regarding the failure of proof on the question of paternity under Missouri law should apply here also, because the ALJ indicated that, with reference to Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), the record failed to show that Williams was the biological father. Thus, he apparently did not believe enough of Imani's story to meet the less stringent burden of persuasion of Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii).3 As we noted above, we perceive no reason to disturb that credibility determination.
We do note that Imani takes issue with the requirements of Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), and argues that they invest the Secretary with "unbridled discretion." An objection to the latitude accorded an agency by statute, as opposed to regulation, is best addressed to the legislature. In any event, we need not extensively discuss the standard for determining paternity under that provision, because there is simply nothing in the record to support the second requirement of Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii), i.e., that Williams was either living with or contributing to the support of Terron at the time of his death.
It is true that some adjustment to the manner of proving support should be made when the applicant is an illegitimate child born after his alleged father (especially one who was not regularly employed) dies. In such a case, the attention and support conferred upon the mother inures to the benefit of the fetus, and the Secretary should consider whether the alleged aid is commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's demise. See Schaefer v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81, 85-87 (7th Cir. 1986).
Nonetheless, as we noted in Schaefer, "in cases involving children born after or shortly before the wage earner's death some tangible support is still required ...; a mere expectation of support from the insured wage earner is not enough." Id., at 86. That conclusion is controlling here. Imani did not show that during the course of their brief relationship Williams was living with her or that he was supporting her. He apparently spent some money on beer and food when they were together, but to say that these expenditures satisfy Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) means that courtship is tantamount to support, which, in view of the purposes of the Act, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2763, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976), cannot be correct. Imani and Williams broke off their relationship and never saw each other again because Williams refused to take Imani out on a "regular" date and to pay for their entertainment. There was no statement in the record that he was unable on that occasion to provide the funds; the clear implication was that he simply did not want to.
Of course, that the father feels animosity or indifference towards the mother does not necessarily mean that he harbors similar feelings for the unborn child, and he could provide the mother with support that will indirectly benefit the fetus. However, according to Imani's own testimony, Williams knew that she might be pregnant for two weeks before he died. Still, he did nothing for her, except (perhaps) provide, through a mutual friend, $10 for a pregnancy test. This ambiguous admission by conduct, especially in view of the other evidence in the record, cannot persuade us that the ALJ was wrong in concluding that Williams, at the time of his death, was not supporting Terron. Thus, we affirm the finding that the support requirement of Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) was not met.
One issue remains for our consideration. Imani argues that, because Sec. 416(h) requires that certain illegitimate children affirmatively establish dependency while it affords other illegitimate children a presumption of dependency, the provision creates classifications that violate the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due-process clause. This claim, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1976), and merits no further discussion here.
It is obvious to us (and there is no reason to conclude that the ALJ was not also aware of this) that as a matter of logic the burden of proof under Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) must be less than that of Sec. 416(h) (2) (A). The latter provision, which must be considered first in the sequence of tests to determine family status, requires proof of paternity under the appropriate state law, while the former requires proof of paternity and support. Thus, if paternity is not shown under Sec. 416(h) (2) (A) and the burden of proof is the same under both provisions, then the question of support is irrelevant and Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) serves no function whatsoever. To be of any practical value, then, Sec. 416(h) (3) (C) (ii) must be read as relaxing the burden of proof on the requirement of paternity while adding the requirement of proof of support. There, however, is no need for us to discuss the interactions between these two requirements, because of the failure of proof of support in this case