Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100804/aptheker-vs-secretary-state
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 18:05:27
Document Index: 784635071

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 781', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 9', '§ 159', '§ 6', '§ 9', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Aptheker Vs Secretary of State - Citation 100804 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Aptheker Vs. Secretary of State - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100804
Case Number 378 U.S. 500
Appellant Aptheker
aptheker v. secretary of state - 378 u.s. 500 (1964) u.s. supreme court aptheker v. secretary of state, 378 u.s. 500 (1964) aptheker v. secretary of state no. 461 argued april 21, 1964 decided june 22, 1964 378 u.s. 500 appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia syllabus appellants, native-born citizens and residents of the united states, are ranking officials of the communist party of the united states. after hearings under state department regulations, appellants' passports were revoked under § 6 of the subversive activities control act of 1950, which provides that, when a communist organization is registered, or under final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member.....
Aptheker v. Secretary of State - 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
U.S. Supreme Court Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
1. Section 6 is unconstitutional on its face, for it too broadly and indiscriminately transgresses the liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 378 U. S. 505 -514.
(a) The right to travel at home and abroad is an important aspect of liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 , followed. P. 378 U. S. 505 .
(b) Under existing laws, denial of a passport effectively prohibits travel anywhere in the world outside the Western Hemisphere. P. 378 U. S. 507 .
(c) Though the underlying purpose of § 6 is the protection of national security, the attainment of that end cannot be realized by unduly infringing upon constitutional freedoms. Pp. 378 U. S. 508 -509.
(d) Section 6 applies to every member of a "Communist action" or "Communist front" organization whether or not he believes or knows that he is associated with such an organization or that the organization seeks to further the aims of world Communism. Pp. 378 U. S. 509 -510.
(e) Also irrelevant under § 6 is the member's degree of activity and his commitment to the organization's purposes. P. 378 U. S. 510 .
(f) Section 6 creates an irrebuttable presumption that all members of Communist organizations will engage in activities endangering our security if given passports. P. 378 U. S. 511 .
(g) The proscription of § 6 applies regardless of the traveler's purpose or destination. Pp. 378 U. S. 511 -512.
(h) Congress could have chosen less drastic means of achieving the national security objective without such sweeping abridgment of liberty. Pp. 378 U. S. 512 -514.
2. Section 6 cannot be held constitutional as applied to these appellants, for such a "construction" would require substantial rewriting of the statute and would inject an element of vagueness into its scope. Since freedom of travel is closely akin to freedom of speech and association, appellants should not be required to demonstrate that Congress could not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting their travel. Pp. 378 U. S. 515 -517.
"(a) When a Communist organization [ Footnote 1 ] . . . is registered, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall
"(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport. [ Footnote 2 ]"
Section 6 became effective, with respect to appellants, on October 20, 1961, when a final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board issued directing the Communist Party of the United States to register under § 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act. The registration order had been upheld earlier in 1961 by this Court's decision in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 . Prior to issuance of the final registration order, both appellants, who are native-born citizens and residents of the United States, had held valid passports. Subsequently, on January 22, 1962, the Acting Director of the Passport Office notified appellants that their passports were revoked because the Department of State believed that their use of the passports would violate § 6. Appellants were also
On the basis of this conclusion, the examiners recommended that the passport revocations be sustained. [ Footnote 3 ] Both appellants appealed to the Board of Passport Appeals, which recommended affirmance of the revocations. The Secretary of State subsequently approved the recommendations of the Board. The Secretary stated that he "relied solely on the evidence in the record," and that, as the basis of his decision, he:
of plaintiff's constitutional liberty to travel abroad, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." [ Footnote 4 ] Appellants conceded that the Secretary of State had an adequate basis for finding that they were members of the Communist Party of the United States, and that the action revoking their passports was proper if § 6 was constitutional. The parties agreed that all administrative remedies had been exhausted, and that it would be futile, and indeed a criminal offense, for either appellant to apply for a passport while remaining a member of the Communist Party.
In 1958, in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 , 357 U. S. 127 , this Court declared that the right to travel abroad is "an important aspect of the citizen's liberty'" guaranteed in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated that:
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. [ Footnote 5 ]"
Id. at 357 U. S. 125 -126. In Kent, however, the Court concluded that Congress had not conferred authority upon the Secretary of State to deny passports because of alleged Communist beliefs and associations. Therefore, although the decision protected the constitutional right to travel, the Court did not examine "the extent to which it can be curtailed." Id. at 357 U. S. 127 . The Court, referring to § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, noted that
Id. at 357 U. S. 130 . Two years later, in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra, this Court reviewed and upheld the registration requirement of § 7 of the Control Act. The Court, however, did not pass upon the "various consequences of the Party's registration for its individual members," id. at 367 U. S. 70 , because:
Id. at 367 U. S. 79 . (Emphasis added.) The present case, therefore, is the first in which his Court has been called upon to consider the constitutionality of the restrictions which § 6 imposes on the right to travel.
The substantiality of the restrictions cannot be doubted. The denial of a passport, given existing domestic and foreign laws, is a severe restriction upon, and, in effect, a prohibition against, world-wide foreign travel. Present laws and regulations make it a crime for a United States citizen to travel outside the Western Hemisphere or to Cuba without a passport. By its plain import, § 6 of the Control Act effectively prohibits travel anywhere in the world outside the Western Hemisphere by members of any "Communist organization" -- including "Communist action" and "Communist front" organizations. [ Footnote 6 ] The restrictive effect of the legislation cannot be gainsaid by emphasizing, as the Government seems to do, that a member of a registering organization could recapture his freedom to travel by simply in good faith abandoning his membership in the organization. Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, [ Footnote 7 ] restrictions imposed upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be fully exercised if the individual would first yield up his membership in a given association.
abroad, there are well established principles by which to test whether the restrictions here imposed are consistent with the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. It is a familiar and basic principle, recently reaffirmed in NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288 , 377 U. S. 307 , that
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 , 371 U. S. 438 ; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 , 364 U. S. 488 ; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 , 353 U. S. 239 ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S. 146 -149; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 304 -307; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 , 308 U. S. 161 , 308 U. S. 165 . In applying this principle the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, referred to the criteria enunciated in Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 364 U. S. 488 :
This principle requires that we consider the congressional purpose underlying § 6 of the Control Act. [ Footnote 8 ]
The Government emphasizes that the legislation in question flows, as the statute itself declares, from the congressional desire to protect our national security. That Congress under the Constitution has power to safeguard our Nation's security is obvious and unarguable. Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 , 372 U. S. 159 -160. As we said in Mendoza-Martinez, "while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact." Id. at 372 U. S. 160 . At the same time, the Constitution requires that the powers of government "must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe" a constitutionally protected freedom. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 310 U. S. 304 .
The section also applies whether or not one knows or believes that he is associated with an organization operating to further aims of the world Communist movement, and "to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world. . . ." 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781(1). The provision therefore sweeps within its prohibition both knowing and unknowing members. In related contexts, this Court has had occasion to consider the substantiality of the relationship between an individual and a group where, as here, the fact of membership in that group has been made the sole criterion for limiting the individual's freedom. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 , the Court held that the due process guarantee of the Constitution was violated when a State, in an attempt to bar disloyal individuals from its employ, excluded persons solely on the basis of organizational memberships without regard to their knowledge concerning the organizations to which they had belonged. The Court concluded that: "Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power." Id. at 344 U. S. 191 .
Cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 136 . It was in this vein that the Court, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 246 , stated that, even
Section 6, however, establishes an irrebuttable presumption that individuals who are members of the specified organizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States. [ Footnote 9 ]
In addition to the absence of criteria linking the bare fact of membership to the individual's knowledge, activity or commitment, § 6 also excludes other considerations which might more closely relate the denial of passports to the stated purpose of the legislation. The prohibition of § 6 applies regardless of the purposes for which an individual wishes to travel. Under the statute, it is a crime for a notified member of a registered organization to apply for a passport to travel abroad to visit a sick relative, to receive medical treatment, or for any other wholly innocent purpose. [ Footnote 10 ] In determining whether
Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290 , 367 U. S. 299 -300; Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 , 367 U. S. 229 -230. In addition, it must be noted that § 6 applies to a member regardless of the security-sensitivity of the areas in which he wishes to travel. As a result, if a notified member of a registered organization were to apply for a passport to visit a relative in Ireland, or to read rare manuscripts in the Bodleian Library of Oxford University, the applicant would be guilty of a crime, whereas, if he were to travel to Canada or Latin America to carry on criminal activities directed against the United States, he could do so free from the prohibitive reach of § 6.
In determining the constitutionality of § 6, it is also important to consider that Congress has within its power "less drastic" [ Footnote 11 ] means of achieving the congressional objective
of safeguarding our national security. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 488 . The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, which was before this Court in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 , provides an example. Under Executive Order No. 9835, membership in a Communist organization is not considered conclusive, but only as one factor to be weighed in determining the loyalty of an applicant or employee. [ Footnote 12 ]
In our view, the foregoing considerations compel the conclusion that § 6 of the Control Act is unconstitutional on its face. The section, judged by its plain import and by the substantive evil which Congress sought to control, sweeps too widely and too indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe. The broad and enveloping prohibition indiscriminately excludes plainly relevant considerations such as the individual's knowledge, activity, commitment, and purposes in and places for travel. The section therefore is patently not a regulation "narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil," cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 310 U. S. 307 ; yet here, as elsewhere, precision must be the touchstone of legislation so affecting basic freedoms, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 438 .
The Government alternatively urges that, if § 6 cannot be sustained on its face, the prohibition should nevertheless be held constitutional as applied to these particular appellants. The Government argues that "surely Section 6 was reasonable as applied to the top-ranking Party leaders involved here." [ Footnote 13 ] It is not disputed that appellants are top-ranking leaders: appellant Aptheker is editor of Political Affairs, the "theoretical organ" of the Party in this country, and appellant Flynn is chairman of the Party. [ Footnote 14 ]
or judicially rewriting it. Scales v. United States, supra, at 367 U. S. 211 . To put the matter another way, this Court will not consider the abstract question of whether Congress might have enacted a valid statute, but, instead, must ask whether the statute that Congress did enact will permissibly bear a construction rendering it free from constitutional defects.
The clarity and preciseness of the provision in question make it impossible to narrow its indiscriminately cast and overly broad scope without substantial rewriting. The situation here is different from that in cases such as United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29 , where the Court is called upon to consider the content
Since this case involves a personal liberty protected by the Bill of Rights, we believe that the proper approach to legislation curtailing that liberty must be that adopted by this Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 , and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 . In NAACP v. Button, the Court stated that:
"[I]n appraising a statute's inhibitory effect upon such rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into account possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at bar. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 , 310 U. S. 97 -98; Winters v. New York [333 U.S. 507], 518-520. Cf. 355 U. S. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 . . . . The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 , 367 U. S. 733 . These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions."
371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 432 -433.
310 U.S. at 310 U. S. 98 . [ Footnote 15 ] Similarly, since freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and association, we believe that appellants in this case should not be required to assume the burden of demonstrating that Congress could not have written a statute constitutionally prohibiting their travel. [ Footnote 16 ]
Appellants do not question that the hearings afforded them procedural due process of law. Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 .
In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 , 347 U. S. 499 -500, this Court stated that:
E.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1 ; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539 ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 ; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 .
The provision in question cannot, as the Government admits, be limited by adopting an interpretation analogous to this Court's interpretation of the so-called "membership clause" in the Smith Act. In Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 , the Smith Act, which imposes criminal penalties for membership, was interpreted to include only " active' members having also a guilty knowledge and intent." Id.. at 367 U. S. 228 . The membership clause in that case, however, explicitly required "that a defendant must have knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy." Id. at 367 U. S. 221 . That requirement was intimately connected with the construction limiting membership to "active" members. With regard to the Control Act, however, as the Government concedes, "neither the words nor history of Section 6 suggests limiting its application to `active' members."
The abridgment of liberty involved in this case is more "drastic" than, and distinguishable from, that involved in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 . In Douds, the Court upheld § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h), which conditions trade union access to the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board upon the submission of non-Communist affidavits by officers of the union. Although the requirement undoubtedly discouraged unions from choosing officers with Communist affiliations, it did not prohibit their election, and did not affect basic individual rights to work and to union membership.
abroad. I concur in the Court's holding that this section of the Act is unconstitutional, but not on the ground that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, standing alone, confers on all our people a constitutional liberty to travel abroad at will. Without reference to other constitutional provisions, Congress has, in my judgment, broad powers to regulate the issuance of passports under its specific power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do mean to me, however, that neither the Secretary of State nor any other government agent can deny people in this country their liberty to travel or their liberty to do anything else except in accordance with the "law of the land" as declared by the Constitution or by valid laws made pursuant to it. For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1 , 367 U. S. 137 , I think the whole Act, including § 6, is not a valid law, that it sets up a comprehensive statutory plan which violates the Federal Constitution because (1) it constitutes a "Bill of Attainder," which Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution forbids Congress to pass; (2) it penalizes and punishes appellants and restricts their liberty on legislative and administrative factfindings that they are subversives, and, in effect, traitors to their country without giving them the benefit of a trial according to due process, which requires a trial by jury before an independent judge, after an indictment, and in accordance with all the other procedural protections of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, and (3) it denies appellants the freedom of speech, press, and association which the First Amendment guarantees.
We noted in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 , 357 U. S. 126 , that "freedom of movement," both internally and abroad, is "deeply engrained" in our history. I would not suppose that a Communist, any more than an indigent, could be barred from traveling interstate. I think that a Communist, the same as anyone else, has this right. Being a Communist certainly is not a crime, and, while traveling may increase the likelihood of illegal events' happening, so does being alive. If, as I think, the right to move freely from State to State is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship ( see Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 , 314 U. S. 178 ), none can be barred from exercising it, though anyone who uses it as an occasion to commit a crime can, of course, be punished. But the right remains sacrosanct, only illegal conduct being punishable.
Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly, and to the right of association. These rights may not be abridged, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 , 357 U. S. 460 -462, only illegal conduct being within the purview of crime in the constitutional sense.
War may be the occasion for serious curtailment of liberty. Absent war, I see no way to keep a citizen from traveling within or without the country unless there is power to detain him. Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 . And no authority to detain exists except under extreme conditions, e.g., unless he has been convicted of a crime or unless there is probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest by standards of the Fourth Amendment. This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart. Like the right of assembly and the right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful -- knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and even thinking. Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, just as when curfew or home detention is placed on a person.
The Court refuses to consider the constitutionality of § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act as applied to the appellants in this case, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States, and Herbert Aptheker, the editor of the Party's "theoretical organ," Political Affairs. Instead, the Court declares the section invalid on its face under the Fifth Amendment. This is contrary to the long-prevailing practice of this Court. As we said in United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 , 362 U. S. 20 -21 (1960):
"The very foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before them. This was made patent in the first case here exercising that power -- 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.' [Holmes, J., in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 , 275 U. S. 148 .] Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177 -180. This Court, as is the case with all federal courts,"
" Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33 , 113 U. S. 39 . Kindred to these rules is the rule that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that, impliedly, it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 ; Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U. S. 114 , 259 U. S. 123 ; Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217 ; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288 , 223 U. S. 295 -296; New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 , 204 U. S. 160 -161. Cf. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U. S. 531 , 311 U. S. 537 ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 , 301 U. S. 513 ; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 , 300 U. S. 558 ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 , 284 U. S. 442 ; Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50 , 271 U. S. 54 -55; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571 , 235 U. S. 576 ; Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405 ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 347 -348 (concurring opinion)."
Indeed, only last Term, we specifically held in United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29 , 372 U. S. 36 (1963):
The Court says that National Dairy is not apposite, citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 , and NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 . But Thornhill and Button are First Amendment cases, while the holding of this case is based on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of the right to travel abroad. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 , 357 U. S. 127 (1958). Consequently they are not apposite here.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S. 590 . They are the product of extensive investigation by Committees of Congress over more than a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 , 291 U. S. 516 , 291 U. S. 530 . We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfounded or irrational imaginings. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 , 347 U. S. 529 ; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 339 U. S. 388 -389."
At 367 U. S. 94 -95. It is, therefore, difficult for me to see how it can be said rationally that these appellants -- top Party functionaries who testified on behalf of the Party in the registration proceeding involved in Communist Party v. Control Board, supra -- did not know that they were
related to the national security. As we said in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109 , 360 U. S. 127 -128 (1959):
"That Congress has wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity in this Country, and to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof, is hardly debatable. The existence of such power has never been questioned by this Court. . . . In the last analysis, this power rests on the right of self-preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society,' Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 , 341 U. S. 509 ."
The remedy adopted by the Congress is reasonably tailored to accomplish the purpose. It may be true that not every member of the Party would endanger our national security by traveling abroad, but which Communist Party member is worthy of trust? Since the Party is a secret, conspiratorial organization subject to rigid discipline by Moscow, the Congress merely determined that it was not wise to take the risk which foreign travel by Communists entailed. The fact that all persons in a class may not engage in harmful conduct does not, of itself, make the classification invalid. Westfall v. United States, 274 U. S. 256 , 274 U. S. 259 (1927); North American Co. v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, 327 U. S. 686 , 327 U. S. 710 -711 (1946); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 339 U. S. 406 (1950). In Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 132 , 320 U. S. 163 , 320 U. S. 172 (1943), this Court indicated that Congress might exclude all Communists from entering this country. And in Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898), the Court upheld a state statute preventing all felons from practicing medicine; similarly, all aliens may be barred from operating pool halls, Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 , 274 U. S. 396 -397 (1927). More onerous burdens than those found in § 6 were placed on all union officers (whose organization was enjoying privileges under the National Labor Relations Act), who were barred from their offices (and livelihood in that regard) if they were Communist Party members. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra. Likewise, this
Court approved the action of the Congress in authorizing deportation of all aliens who had been members of the Party. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S. 590 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954). We also upheld the vesting of power in the Attorney General to hold all Communist Party members without bail pending determination as to their deportability. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 (1952). In the realm of state power, Maryland was permitted to require all candidates to take an oath that they were not engaged in any attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence, Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951); Los Angeles was allowed to require all employees to take a non-Communist oath on penalty of discharge, Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); New York exercised similar powers over public school employees with our approval, Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); the States were permitted to discharge all teachers and "security agency" employees who refused to answer questions concerning their Communist affiliations, Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468 (1958), and California and Illinois were permitted to deny admission to the practice of law of all applicants who refused to answer questions as to their Communist affiliations, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36 (1961), and In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82 (1961).
367 U. S. 228 . But that was a criminal prosecution under the Smith Act, which, of course, carried stricter standards. And, in addition, this requirement, as laid down in Scales, was not held to be a constitutional mandate. The Court was merely interpreting a criminal statute which directly prohibits membership in organizations that come within its terms. The Act here does not prohibit membership, but merely restricts members in a field in which the Congress has found danger to our security. Nor is Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), cited by the majority, apposite here. That case dealt with an oath based on membership in organizations on the Attorney General's list of subversive groups. The Act condemned the employee who was a member of any listed organization regardless of whether he actually knew the organization was so listed; furthermore, the statute proscribed past membership in the listed organizations. Here, proof of actual membership is necessary, and notice of registration or entry of a final order directing registration under the Act is required. Finally, the member of the Party here can avoid the Act's sanctions by terminating his membership, which was not possible in Wieman. Appellants also depend on Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952), which upheld a statute with a rebuttable presumption that members of the Party supported Communist objectives. The Court did not hold that the opportunity to rebut was constitutionally required in the circumstances of that case, but even if it had, Adler would not control here. The evidence before Congress as to the danger to national security was of such strength that it warranted the denial of passports, a much less onerous disability than loss of employment.