Source: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1943/oct1943/gr_l-48976_1943.html
Timestamp: 2014-03-08 19:25:34
Document Index: 104715168

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 13', 'art. 12', 'art. 13', 'art. 13', 'art. 13', 'art. 13', 'Art. 13', 'art. 13', 'art. 11', 'art. 13', 'art. 11', 'art. 11', 'art. 13', 'art. 13', 'art. 9']

G.R. No. L-48976
G.R. No. L-48976 October 11, 1943
MORO MACBUL, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Madamba for appellee.
Appellant pleaded guilty to an information for theft of two sacks of papers valued at P10 belong to the Provincial Government of Sulu, alleged to have been committed on March 9, 1943, in the municipality of Jolo; it being also alleged that he was a habitual delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same crime on November 14, 1928, and August 20, 1942. The trial court sentenced him to suffer one month and one day of arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as additional penalty for habitual delinquency.
The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the consideration by the trial court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel contending that recidivism should not have been taken into account because it is inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct, as we have decided in the case of People vs. Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point here because the error committed by the trial court lies not so much in its having considered recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of penalizing habitual delinquency, as in its having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the information that his two previous convictions were more than ten years apart. "A person shall be deems to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener." (See last paragraph, article 62, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.) Therefore, appellant's first conviction, which took place in November, 1928, cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August, 1942, or fourteen years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has only one previous conviction against him, namely, that of 1942.
Yulo, C.J., Moran and Paras, JJ., concur.
BOCOBO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. In view of the far-reaching significance of the doctrine enunciated in the foregoing opinion � that extreme poverty is a mitigating circumstance � and of the fact that such a rule deviates from established precedents, I deem it appropriate to set forth my reasons for subscribing to the new principle.
I believe that extreme poverty and necessity is a mitigating circumstance, not only because it is analogous mitigating circumstance under No. 10 of art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, as stated in the above opinion, but also for the reason that it is an incomplete exempting circumstance contemplated in No. 1 of said article 13, in relation to Nos. 5 (irresistable force) and 6 (uncontrollable fear) of art. 12. The trial court found that the accused committed the crime of theft "por extrema pobreza y necesidad," and considered this as an analogous mitigating circumstance within the meaning of No. 10, art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Such a finding is based on the fact that on March 9, 1943, the accused took the two sacks of papers and sold the same for P2.50 because he is the father of several minor children and they and he had nothing to eat on that day.
The Supreme Tribunal of Spain has refused to recognize extreme poverty as a mitigating circumstance by analogy in cases of robbery and theft. (See sentences of April 20, 1871; July 12, 1904; April 18, 1907; and July 9, 1907).lawphil.net
In spite of precedents and widespread belief to the contrary, I do not hesitate to hold the proposition that extreme poverty and need is a mitigating circumstance analogous to two of the circumstances enumerated in art. 13. These two are:
It will be noted that there is a common idea underlying these two mitigating circumstances, namely, that the offender either by a powerful impulse or through illness had no effective control over himself at the time he committed the crime. Was this the state of mind of the defendant herein when he took the papers? I believe so because the thought that his little children would starve on that day must have temporarily dulled his conscience and driven him to steal. The spectre of hunger of his loved ones terrified him into stealing. The reason for Nos. 6 and 9 of art. 13, above quoted, being the same as in the instant case, the rule of analogy authorized in No. 10 of that article should be applied. The ancient principle upheld by the Roman jurists, Eadem dispositio, ubi eadem ratio is a puissant logic and is eminently just.
Furthermore, the facts of this case come within the purview of No. 1 of art. 13, which provides:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. � The following are mitigating circumstances:
The first question in this aspect of the case is whether No. 1 of art. 13 refers only to those exempting circumstances which contain two or more requisites (self-defense, defense of relatives or of stranger, and avoidance of an evil or injury in Nos. 1 to 4, art. 11.) The answer is negative because No. 1 of art. 13 refers to the preceding chapter relative to justifying and exempting circumstances, and the preceding chapter, which consists of art. 11 and 12, includes circumstances which are not composed of several requisites. In People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, (July 27, 1943) we held that improper performance of a duty (No. 5, art. 11) is mitigating circumstance.
I am not unmindful of the possible objection that the doctrine herein enunciated may encourage theft and robbery and undermines the right of property, and is therefore revolutionary. But so long as extreme poverty and need is not declared an exempting but only a mitigating circumstance, the rule herein announced is fully warranted. The crime itself is condemned, though the punishment is tempered. It can not be successfully contended that a mitigating circumstance fosters crime. It is easy to understand the conservatism of the precedents and of the attitude of the legal profession, but considerable water has flowed under the bridge during the last two decades. Governments and peoples all over the world have visualized more clearly the sufferings and hardships of the poor. Humanitarian ideas have loomed larger on the horizon. More and more, legislation in all countries has been removing from the bending backs of the underprivileged the unbearable burdens which had been crushing and overwhelming their existence. More and more, lawmaking bodies throughout the world have seen to it that the toiling masses participate, as much as possible, in the good things of life. More and more, legislatures have realized that extreme poverty is brought about by general social conditions and through no fault of the poor. More and more, legislation has remedied the sinister state of affairs which seemed to consider poverty a crime.
Therefore, the original interpretation of laws must give way to a new one, which should be attuned to the spirit of the age all over the earth. Although the wording of the articles of the Penal Code under discussion has not been changed, their interpretation may be changed in order that they may not become anachronistic. Considering that social conditions often unfold faster than legislation, it is a salutary function of old laws as to adjust them to contemporary exigencies of the public weal. This is not judicial legislation at all because the lawmakers intended that the law which they approved should govern for many years to come, and that therefore it should be interpreted by the courts in such a way as to meet new problems, provided the fundamental objectives of the law are distinctly kept in view. In the instant case, theft is punished, so the principle of crime repression is carried out; and the penalty is moderated because of extreme poverty and need, so the idea of punishment according to the circumstances of each case is also recognized.
The foregoing considerations are strengthened by the leeway given to the courts in determining what in each case constitutes a mitigating circumstance by analogy. The lawmaker, fully aware of the impossibility of laying down an exhaustive enumeration of circumstances that would extenuate crime, has formulated a general statement in No. 10 of art. 13. It is thus that each case must be judged by the courts on its own merits, the only condition being that there must be similarity or analogy to one or more of the nine circumstances specifically mentioned in said art. 13. Commenting on a similar provision of the Spanish Penal Code (No. 8, art. 9), Groizard makes these observations:
Recuerdense una por una las siete circunstancias atenuantes que ya llevamos examinadas, y se advertira la exactitud de lo que venimos diciendo. Todas y cada una son generalizaciones y en todas se hallara que la libertad, o la inteligencia, o la intencion aparecen mutiladas en bastante grado para influir en la responsabilidad de los actos humanos. Descender a demostrar esta verdad, lo tenemos por inutil: su evidencia no han de ponerla en duda los que recuerden el texto de los numeros y el espiritu que las vivifica.
Pero ese estudio amplio, vastisimo; estudio en el cual parece que se pierde el hombre dentro de la humanidad; esas grandes corrientes, puntos cardinales, moldes en que todos se funden, aunque el legislador crea que lo abarcan todo, podria suceder que se equivocase, y logico en su aspiracion de ser un reflejo de la justicia moral, al trazar el circulo en que queda a salvo el principio de que parte, en prevision de que algun caso quedase sin definir y fuera de las clasificaciones hechas, que ni por su generalidad, ni por su alcance, pudiera engendrar una regla de aplicacion constante, un canon, fue preciso establecer el unico criterio que pudiera apreciarle con entera conciencia: aludimos al criterio de los Tribunales.
De aqui la circunstancia 8.a, que, en rigor, no es mas que una regla generica para todo lo que hallandose fuera del cuadro de las anteriormente formuladas pudiera correr igual suerte que estas, cuando lo exigieran igual identidad y analogia, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Concordado y Comentado, Vol. 1, p. 401. (Emphasis supplied).
Although perhaps many decades will have to elapse before penal codes of the world recognize extreme poverty and need as an exempting circumstance, yet I believe that in the meantime it is in keeping with the humanitarian ideas of this generation to recognize the cruel pangs of hunger as a factor that mitigates the penalty. Possibly the growing atmosphere favorable to the submerged classes will eventually uphold the stand of Judge Paul Magnaud who about fifty years ago became popularly known in France as the "bon judge" because of his significant decisions acquitting those who had been impelled to steal on account of the excruciating tortures of hunger. Be that as it may, I am convinced that the doctrine herein declared responds to the heart-throbs of mankind.
All in all, I am persuaded that the principal penalty fixed by the trial court, one month and one day of arresto mayor, extreme poverty and need having been considered as a mitigating circumstance by analogy, fits the facts of the instant case.