Source: https://casebook.icrc.org/print/21152
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:17:41
Document Index: 572995284

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'in fine', 'Art. 44', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 45', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 45', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 82', 'Art. 146', 'Art. 43', 'Art. 147', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 109', 'Art. 132', 'ART/470', 'ART/375', 'ART/470', 'ART/380', 'ART/470', 'ART/380']

Home > Eastern Ukraine: Disputed POW Status
[Source: “Ukrainian ex-military navigator Savchenko sentenced to 22 years in prison”, RAPSI: Russian Legal Information Agency, 22 March 2016. Available at http://www.rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20160322/275674213.html [1]]
[Source: “Kiev court convicts two Russian soldiers of terrorism”, The Guardian, 18 April 2016. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/kiev-court-convicts-two-russian-soldiers-of-terrorism [2]]
[Source: “Ukraine’s ‘Russian terrorists’: How Kiev captured Yerofeev and Aleksandrov”, Meduza, 18 April 2016. Available at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/04/18/ukraine-s-russian-terrorists [3]]
[Source: “Ukraine’s Supreme Administrative Court: captured GRU officers not "prisoners of war"”, UNIAN, 24 November 2015. Available at http://www.unian.info/society/1192249-ukraines-supreme-administrative-court-captured-gru-officers-not-prisoners-of-war.html [4]]
[Source: “Russia and Ukraine exchange Savchenko for Yerofeyev and Aleksandrov”, RAPSI: Russian Legal Information Agency, 25 May 2016. Available at http://rapsinews.com/news/20160525/276191239.html [5]]
a. How would you classify the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine? Would you consider that there is one conflict or several parallel conflicts to be analysed separately? Who are the parties to the conflict(s)? (GC I-IV, Art. 2 [6] and 3 [7]; P I, Art. 1 [8]; P II, Art. 1 [9])
b. How could you argue that the entire conflict is an international armed conflict (IAC)? What degree of control is necessary in order to attribute the forces of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) to Russia? To render their hostilities against Ukrainian forces subject to IHL of IACs? Does such degree of control seem to be exercised in the present case? (GC I-IV, Art. 2 [6]; P I, Art. 1 [8])
c. How could you argue that the entire conflict is a NIAC? Would it satisfy the criteria of both Art. 3 common and Additional Protocol II? (GC I-IV, Art. 3 [7]; P II, Art. 1 [9])
d.If you consider that there are parallel conflicts, how would you qualify the fighting between the LPR and the Ukrainian forces? Between the LPR and the pro-government paramilitary units? Between the Russian forces, if any, and the Ukrainian forces? Between the Russian forces, if any, and the pro-government paramilitary units? (GC I-IV, Art. 2 [6] and 3 [7]; P I, Art. 1 [8]; P II, Art. 1 [9])
2. What is, in your opinion, the law applicable to the conflict? If there are parallel armed conflicts, how would you determine which body of law applies to each particular situation? (GC I-IV, Art. 2 [6] and 3 [7]; P I, Art. 1 [8]; P II, Art. 1 [9])
a. Depending on your classification of the conflict(s), how would you qualify LPR fighters? Members of pro-government paramilitary groups? Russian volunteers? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
b. Assuming that there were Russian soldiers in Eastern Ukraine that were formally discharged, but in practice continued to receive instructions from Russia, how would you classify them? Is attribution under the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 8 [12], sufficient to make them combatants and POWs? At least if they distinguished themselves from the civilian population? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
4. a. What are the conditions a person needs to satisfy in order to be entitled to the POW status? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
b. (Document C, para. [2] in fine) Did Mr. Yerofeyev and Mr. Alexandrov properly distinguish themselves in the present case? Does the obligation to distinguish require the person to wear a distinctive sign indicating his or her affiliation to the armed forces of a certain country or is it sufficient that the person wears a recognizable piece of clothing (for ex. a uniform) which distinguishes himself or herself from civilians? (P I, Art. 44(3) [13])
5. a. (Document C, paras [1] - [2]) Is there a presumption of POW status? When is it triggered? Were Mr. Yerofeyev and Mr. Alexandrov committing a belligerent act when captured? Are sabotage or reconnaissance missions belligerent acts? (GC III, Art. 5 [14]; P I, Art. 45 [15])
b. (Document B, para. [3]; Document C, paras [4] - [5]; Document D, paras [1] - [3]) In what cases is there an obligation to assess entitlement to POW status by a competent tribunal? To this effect, does the fact that Mr. Yerofeyev and Mr. Alexandrov subsequently denied their status as Russian officers release Ukraine from the obligation to assess their status? Does Russia’s refusal to recognize its two citizens as serving officers play any role? (GC III, Art. 5 [14]; P I, Art. 45 [15])
6. (Document D, paras [1] - [3]) Were Mr. Alexandrov and Mr. Yerofeyev POWs? On what basis could they have been considered so? Under what conditions would the pair’s membership with the LPR forces have made them POWs? What would you argue if you were their defence attorney in the present case? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
a. Was Ms. Savchenko a POW? On what basis could she have been considered as one? Was the Russian court’s reasoning correct whereby crossing the border disguised as a refugee to plot attacks stripped her of POW status? Does it mean that she would otherwise have been entitled to such status? Is this consistent with Russia’s classification of the conflict as a NIAC? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
b. Assuming that the conflict was an IAC, would the fact that Ms. Savchenko was volunteering with pro-government military groups while on leave have a bearing on her POW status? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
c. Assuming that the conflict was an IAC, would the fact that Ms. Savchenko was dressed as a civilian when captured suffice to deny her the POW status? Does a combatant have to distinguish him- or herself at all times? Would illegal border-crossing somehow affect a combatant’s POW status? (GC III, Art. 4 [10]; P I, Art. 43-44 [11])
9. a. (Document A, para. [1]; Document B, para. [1]) For what offences and in what courts can the detaining power prosecute POWs? What courts were involved in both cases under analysis? What was the basis of jurisdiction for trying Ms. Savchenko? That for trying Mr. Yerofeyev and Mr. Alexandrov? (GC III, Art. 82-86) [16]
b. (Document A, para. [3]) Under international law, could Russia have established its jurisdiction over the alleged killings of Ukrainian civilians? Under IHL of NIACs? Under IHL of IACs? In what case would there be an obligation to prosecute? (GC IV, Art. 146(2) [17] and 147 [18]; CIHL, Rule 157 [19])
10. a. (Document A, para. [2]) Did Ms. Savchenko’s acts, including alleged directing of mortar fire against a roadblock resulting in the killing of two Russian journalists, necessarily violate IHL? Could these acts be covered by combatant immunity? (P I, Art. 43(2) [20])
b. (Document A, para. [2]) Were the LPR militia legitimate targets? Even if there were also civilians at the roadblock? If so, what would render the killing of the civilians unlawful? Is direct attack against civilians a war crime? Is failure to adequately assess the extent of civilian losses a war crime? (GC IV, Art. 147 [21]; P I, Art. 51 [22] and 85 [23]; ICC Rome Statute, Art. 8 [24])
11. (Document A, paras [2] and [4]) Assuming that the conflict between the LPR and the Ukrainian government is a NIAC, would the rebels have had the authority to intern Savchenko? To transfer her to Russia? Is there a legal basis for internment under IHL of NIACs? For the government? For the rebels? (GC I-IV, Art. 3 [7]; P II, Art. 17 [25]; CIHL Rule 129 [26])
13. a. (Document B, para. [2]; Document D, para. [1]) Is the Ukrainian court legally consistent in its finding that Mr. Yerofeyev and Mr. Alexandrov were serving Russian officers, while at the same time ruling they were captured in the context of a ‘terrorist operation’ rather than an IAC and denying them POW status? Does any belligerent act committed by agents of a State against another State trigger an IAC? Does it depend on whether the belligerent acts were committed in the exercise of official functions or in a private capacity? (GC I-IV, Art. 2 [6])
14. (Document E, paras [1] - [2]) What does IHL say about repatriation of interned POWs and civilians? Can a party refuse to repatriate if the person is serving a sentence? Why do you think that Russia and Ukraine proceeded with the exchange even though all three persons were convicted? Is such an exchange of convicted POWs lawful under IHL? (GC III, Art. 109-119 [27]; GC IV, Art. 132-133 [28]; CIHL, Rule 128 [29])
Source URL: https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/eastern-ukraine-disputed-pow-status
[1] http://www.rapsinews.com/judicial_news/20160322/275674213.html
[2] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/kiev-court-convicts-two-russian-soldiers-of-terrorism
[3] https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/04/18/ukraine-s-russian-terrorists
[4] http://www.unian.info/society/1192249-ukraines-supreme-administrative-court-captured-gru-officers-not-prisoners-of-war.html
[5] http://rapsinews.com/news/20160525/276191239.html
[7] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=BAA341028EBFF1E8C12563CD00519E66
[10] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=2F681B08868538C2C12563CD0051AA8D
[12] https://casebook.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/ilc-state-responsability-case-study.htm
[13] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/470-750054?OpenDocument
[14] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/375-590008?OpenDocument
[15] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/470-750055?OpenDocument
[16] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=FE7BF8F4BF13CAFBC12563CD0051B18E
[17] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=6F96EE4C7D1E72CAC12563CD0051C63A
[18] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/380-600169?OpenDocument
[19] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule157
[20] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/470-750053?OpenDocument
[21] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/380-600169?OpenDocument
[22] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E
[23] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=73D05A98B6CEB566C12563CD0051E1A0
[24] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=E4C44E2F1347B99D412566900046EACB
[25] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=D1E091435298F4C2C12563CD0051E8F5
[26] https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule129
[27] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=634B1B4A45B67C30C12563CD0051B3CD
[28] https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&amp;documentId=E38B4DDC5409DC9FC12563CD0051C517
[29] https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule128