Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/07/98-7063a.htm
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 20:19:06
Document Index: 310791210

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1566', '§ 404', '§ 200', '§ 404', '§ 1566', '§ 1566']

98-7063a -- Haddock v. Apfel -- 07/13/1999
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (37005 bytes) (38907 bytes)
Upon consideration, appellee's petition for rehearing is denied. However, the court on its own motion has determined that the opinion filed on July 13, 1999, should be modified. A modified opinion is attached.
The agency uses the Dictionary, among other publications listed in § 1566(d), as source material when it formulates the grids for use at step five. See Social Security Ruling 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *3 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)); see also 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.00(b). The agency has also stated in a number of its rulings that an ALJ may use the Dictionary or other "authoritative" publications, rather than an expert, to provide vocational evidence at step five in some cases in which the grids may not be employed. Social Security Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *9; see also Social Security Ruling 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *3; Social Security Ruling 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *4; Social Security Ruling 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *2; Social Security Ruling 82-41, 1982 WL 31389, at *2, *7. Most importantly, the agency accepts the Dictionary's definitions as reliable evidence at step four of "the functional demands and job duties" of a claimant's past job "as it is usually performed in the national economy." Social Security Ruling 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2; see also Andrade v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993). Determining "the functional demands and job duties" of specific jobs and matching those requirements to a claimant's limitations is the very task the ALJ must undertake at step five. It would be anomalous to read the agency's regulations to allow an ALJ to disregard the Dictionary at step five--where the ALJ bears the burden­when the ALJ is allowed to rely conclusively on essentially the same information from the Dictionary at step four.
Second, "[i]t is well established that a Social Security disability hearing is a nonadversarial proceeding." Id. (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). Claimants have a right to cross-examine vocational experts as a part of procedural due process. See Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Perales, 402 U.S. at 402, 410). Cross-examination is nevertheless an adversarial procedure. See, e.g., Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)), cert. denied, 1999 WL 319436 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999) (No. 98-9420). Social security claimants may be unrepresented or represented by someone who is unfamiliar with social security law. But cross-examining a vocational expert with a publication such as the Dictionary of Occupational Titles is clearly a matter for someone well versed in social security law, not a layman. For these reasons, we believe the role of cross-examination in disability proceedings should remain limited.(2) Cf. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In such a beneficial structure [as the nonadversarial system of awarding veterans' benefits] there is no room for such adversarial concepts as cross examination, best evidence rule, hearsay evidence exclusion, or strict adherence to burden of proof." (quotation omitted)).
Finally, we note that our decision on this issue is consistent with the majority of circuits to have considered it. See Porch v. Chater, 115 F.3d 567, 571-72 (8th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995); English v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 1080, 1085 (4th Cir. 1993); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1985); Mimms v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1984). The Eleventh Circuit has held that a vocational expert's testimony "trumps" the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in the event of a conflict, but it did so in the context of a claim in which there was no conflict. Jones v. Apfel, No. 98-6797, 1999 WL 770701, at *5-*6 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 1999). Only the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ may unreservedly accept a VE's testimony at step five even if it contradicts the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See Conn v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 51 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 1995). We are unpersuaded that the Sixth Circuit's approach is consistent with the broader principles that govern these nonadversarial proceedings.
We do not mean by our holding that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles "trumps" a VE's testimony when there is a conflict about the nature of a job. We hold merely that the ALJ must investigate and elicit a reasonable explanation for any conflict between the Dictionary and expert testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert's testimony as substantial evidence to support a determination of nondisability. One reasonable explanation would be that the job the VE is testifying about is not included in the Dictionary, but is documented in some other acceptable source. See Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 (noting Dictionary states that it is not comprehensive); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Another valid explanation would be that a specified number or percentage of a particular job is performed at a lower RFC level than the Dictionary shows the job generally to require. See, e.g., Fenton v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining that Dictionary gives maximum requirements of job as generally performed, not range of requirements as job is performed in various particular settings); Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
2. It may be argued that we suggested in Gay v. Sullivan that the claimant bears the burden to cross-examine a vocational expert concerning information in a publication, because we stated that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d) and (e) "offer alternative avenues of proof" and that "sources of expert testimony . . . may be tested by cross-examination." 986 F.2d 1336, 1340 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1993). The issue in Gay, however, was the legitimacy of a vocational expert relying on a publication not specifically listed in § 1566(d), not an alleged inconsistency between the VE's conclusions and information in a listed publication. Read in context of the issue it decided, Gay holds that a vocational expert is not limited to the sources named in § 1566(d), but that expert vocational testimony may be used to "reach beyond matters already established through administrative (or judicial) notice" of information provided by those recognized publications. 986 F.2d at 1340. In other words, expert testimony may be used to verify, clarify, and supplement information available in publications the agency has deemed reliable. The claimant's failure in that case to cross-examine the vocational expert about her non-listed source publication made it impossible for this court to assess on appeal whether the VE's testimony was unreliable. See id. at 1340 & n.2.
Gay has been given a broader interpretation than that in two cases that dealt with an alleged inconsistency between an expert's testimony and information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See Adams v. Apfel, No. 97-5140, 1998 WL 99030, at **2 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 1998) (order and judgment); Prince v. Apfel, No. 97-5176, 1998 WL 317525, at **3 (10th Cir. June 11, 1998) (order and judgment). Those cases are unpublished, however, and this panel is not bound by them. Nothing in Gay precludes us from concluding now that the ALJ has the burden to investigate whether a vocational expert's opinion conflicts with information provided in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and elicit an explanation for any inconsistency.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/07/98-7063a.htm.