Source: http://patentsusa.blogspot.com/2007/02/in-re-grams-1989.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 12:07:08
Document Index: 510868198

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101']

Deepak Malhotra's History of Software Patents in the U.S.: In re Grams, 1989
The invention in this case related to a method of testing a complex system to determine whether the system condition is normal or abnormal and, if it is abnormal, to determine the cause of the abnormality. As disclosed in the specification, the invention is applicable to any complex system, whether it be electrical, mechanical, chemical, biological, or combinations thereof.The Federal Circuit stated that, intuitively, one might conclude that § 101's "any...process" would include the diagnostic method claimed by the applicants. Indeed, even without physical step present in the claims, application of the algorithm in other steps of the claim seemed to be a type of "process" that the Supreme Court recognized as much in Flook.The Federal Circuit stated that Flook made clear, however, as did its forerunner, Benson, that even though the application of an algorithm to data is a "process" in the literal sense, it is not one that is contemplated by § 101, i.e., it is "nonstatutory subject matter." Thus, mathematical algorithms join the list of non-patentable subject matter not within the scope of § 101, including methods of doing business, naturally occurring phenomenon [sic], and laws of nature. Construing § 101 as excluding mathematical algorithms seems somewhat at odds with the liberal view of that section expressed in a more recent Supreme Court opinion, Diamond v. Chakrabarty. There, the Court decided that a living man-made microorganism fell within the terms manufacture" or "composition of matter" in § 101. In choosing such "expansive terms," stated the Court, "modified by the comprehensive word 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." The Court went so far as to note that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include "anything under the sun that is made by man."Chakrabarty expressly rejects the argument that patentability in a new area, "microorganisms, cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress expressly authorizes such protection." Although the Court distinguished Flook in its opinion, the court's rejection of this argument seems to reflect a change from Flook's admonition that "we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress."The Federal Circuit noted that another case, Diehr, repeats the "anything under the sun" statement of Chakrabarty but then went on to say that notwithstanding those statements in Diehr and Chakrabarty, Benson remains the law. Indeed, it is cited in both Diehr and Chakrabarty, with no apparent attempt to overrule or disapprove of it. Thus, "an algorithm, or mathematical formula ... like a law of nature ... cannot be the subject of a patent."The Federal Circuit stated that on the other hand, the mere presence of a mathematical exercise, as a step or steps in a process involving nonmathematical steps, should not slam the door of the PTO upon an applicant. Thus, if there are physical steps included in the claim in addition to the algorithm, the claim might be eligible for patent protection. As stated in In re Walter:Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101.Though satisfaction of the Walter test necessarily depicts statutory subject matter, failure to meet that test does not necessarily doom the claim. As stated in Abele, "Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the algorithm be ‘applied in any manner to elements or process steps,'" That statement is followed by this proviso: "provided that its application is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution activity." Thus, if the claim would be "otherwise statutory," albeit inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents statutory subject matter when the algorithm is included.In all instances, this critical question must be answered: "What did applicants invent?" And in answering this inquiry:Each invention must be evaluated as claimed: yet semantogenic considerations preclude a determination based solely on words appearing in the claims. In the final analysis under § 101, the claimed invention, as a whole must be evaluated for what it is. Hence, the analysis requires careful interpretation of each claim in light of its supporting disclosure.The Court stated that, though that analysis can be difficult, it is facilitated somewhat if, as here, the only physical step involves merely gathering data for the algorithm. As stated in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (CCPA 1973): Given that the method of solving a mathematical equation may not be the subject of patent protection, it follows that the addition of the old and necessary antecedent steps of establishing values for the variables in the equation cannot convert the unpatentable method to patentable subject matter.The reason for this was explained in In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d at 1335: No mathematical equation can be used, as a practical matter, without establishing and substituting values for the variables expressed therein. Substitution of values dictated by the formula has thus been viewed as a form of mathematical step. If the steps of gathering and substituting values were alone sufficient, every mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm having any practical use would be per se subject to patenting as a "process" under § 101. Consideration of whether the substitution of specific values is enough to convert the disembodied ideas present in the formula into an embodiment of those ideas, or into an application of the formula, is foreclosed by the current state of the law.Whether § 101 precludes patentability in every case where the physical step of obtaining data for the algorithm is the only other significant element in mathematical algorithm–containing claims is a question we need not answer. Analysis in that area depends on the claims as a whole and the circumstances of each case. Rather, we address only the claims and other circumstances involved here.The sole physical process step in Grams' claim 1 is step [a], i.e., performing clinical tests on individuals to obtain data. The specification does not bulge with disclosure on those tests. To the contrary, it focuses on the algorithm itself, although it briefly refers to, without describing, the clinical tests that provide data. Thus, it states: "The [computer] program was written to analyze the results of up to eighteen clinical laboratory tests produced by a standard chemical analyzer that measures the levels of the chemical and biological components listed." The specification also states that "[t]he invention is applicable to any complex system, whether it be electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or combinations thereof." From the specification and the claim, it is clear to us that applicants are, in essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which they cannot do under Benson. The presence of a physical step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.The Court then distinguished Abele. Allowed claim 6 in Abele required operation of an algorithm on X-ray attenuation data, with a subsequent display. The data were available for the algorithm only after the production and detection steps, i.e., after an X-ray beam was passed through an object using a CAT scanner, and detected upon exit. The court concluded that in the absence of the algorithm, "the production, detection, and display steps would still be present and would result in a conventional CAT-scan process." Thus, the production and detection steps were not viewed as mere antecedent steps to obtain values to solve the algorithm. In Abele, therefore, the algorithm served to improve the CAT-scan process. As such, the algorithm satisfied the Walter guideline of "refining a step in a process that is otherwise statutory," and hence, it presented statutory subject matter. In this case, because algorithm steps [b]-[e] do not operate to change any aspect of the physical process of step [a], the claim does not satisfy the Walter guideline. Though this by itself is not dispositive (see discussion of Walter, supra), patentability here is precluded by the fact that physical step [a] merely provides data for the algorithm.
semantogenic,