Source: http://govpulse.us/entries/2001/12/11/01-30185/u-s-locational-requirement-for-dispatching-of-u-s-rail-operations
Timestamp: 2015-03-04 04:21:08
Document Index: 530888670

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 217', 'art 219', 'art 228', 'art 209', '§ 219', '§ 219', 'art 219', 'art 241', 'art 228', 'art 217', 'art 219', 'art 219', 'art 219', 'art 40', '§ 219', 'art 225']

govpulse | U.S. Locational Requirement for Dispatching of U.S. Rail Operations
This Interim Final Rule adds a new regulation that requires all dispatching of railroad operations that occur in the United States to be performed in the United States, with three minor exceptions. First, a railroad is allowed to conduct dispatching of railroad operations in the United States from a point outside the United States (“extraterritorial dispatching”) in emergency situations for the duration of the emergency if the railroad provides prompt written notification of its action to the FRA Regional Administrator of each FRA region in which the railroad operation occurs; such notification is not required before addressing the emergency situation. Second, the rule permits continued extraterritorial dispatching of the very limited track segments in the United States that were regularly being so dispatched in December 1999. This grandfathering covers the four domestic operations that are dispatched from Canada. Third, the rule would allow for extraterritorial dispatching from Canada or Mexico of fringe border operations. Such operations are acceptable provided the United States trackage being dispatched does not exceed 100 miles, each train is under the control of the same assigned crew for the entire trip over that trackage, and the rail line encompassing the trackage either both originates and terminates in either Canada or Mexico without the pick up, set out, or interchange of cars in the United States or is under the exclusive control of a single dispatching district and that portion of the line being dispatched extends no further into the United States than specified types of locations close to the border.
In addition, railroads that wish to commence additional extraterritorial dispatching may apply for a waiver under certain other provisions from the domestic locational requirement set forth in this regulation. Such a waiver may be granted if, inter alia, anapplicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of FRA a program to assure safety oversight of the dispatching function comparable to that provided by FRA regulators for dispatchers located in the United States.
FRA is interested in receiving public comments on possible benefits and costs of this Interim Final Rule and comments on whether FRA should adopt an alternative regulatory scheme under which extraterritorial dispatching of United States railroad operations would be permitted and, if so, under what conditions. The Interim Final Rule will be in effect for a period of 365 days to provide FRA with time to analyze these comments. Based on the comments, FRA may: Issue final rule amendments to the Interim Final Rule making the Interim Final Rule permanent with any substantive changes FRA determines are appropriate; issue a notice proposing a new rule (a notice of proposed rulemaking), and possibly a final rule amendment extending the deadline of the Interim Final Rule while FRA completes this new rulemaking; or decide that no Federal regulation is appropriate and issue a final rule removing the Interim Final Rule.
I. Railroad Dispatchers Are Essential to the Safety of Railroad Operations
II. Potential for Location of Dispatchers outside United States Borders
III. Dispatchers Must Comply With the Federal Railroad Safety Laws To Move Traffic Safely in the United States
A. Hours of Service, Operating Rules and Efficiency Testing, and Drug and Alcohol Testing Requirements
B. FRA's Oversight and Enforcement Activities
IV. Foreign Regulatory Jurisdiction
V. Hours of Service, Operating Rules Compliance, and Substance Abuse Concerns
VI. Security Issues
VII. Language Differences
VIII. Units of Measure
IX. Other Concerns
XI. The Interim Final Rule
Appendix A—Schedule of Civil Penalties
Appendix B—Geographic Boundaries of FRA's Regions and Addresses of FRA's Regional Headquarters
XIII. Regulatory Impact
FRA Post-Accident Toxicological Testing Results (1987-1998)
Schedule of Civil Penalties1
(1)Effective Date: This regulation is effective January 10, 2002 through January 10, 2003.
(2)Written Comments: Written comments must be received by February 11, 2002. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
(3)Public Hearing: FRA is planning to conduct at least one public hearing to be held in Washington, DC, in order to provide all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the provisions contained in the Interim Final Rule. FRA will issue a separate document in the Federal Register in the very near future to inform all interested parties as to the exact date and location where the public hearing(s) will be held.
Anyone wishing to file a comment should refer to the FRA docket and notice numbers (Docket No. FRA-2001-8728, Notice No. 1). You may submit your comments and related material by only one of the following methods:
By mail to the Docket Management System, United States Department of Transportation, room PL-401, 400 7th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001;
For technical issues related to alcohol and controlled substance matters, Lamar Allen, Alcohol and Drug Program Manager, FRA Office of Safety, RRS-11, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6313); or for other technical issues, Dennis Yachechak, Railroad Safety Specialist, FRA Office of Safety, RRS-11, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6260). For legal issues related to alcohol and controlled substance matters, Patricia Sun, Trial Attorney, FRA Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-11, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6038); or for other legal issues, John Winkle, Trial Attorney, FRA Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-12, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6067).
Table of Contents for Supplementary Information ↑
I. Railroad Dispatchers Are Essential to the Safety of Railroad Operations ↑
Proper dispatching is essential for safe railroad operations. Because trains have long stopping distances, train operations are not conducted by line of sight. Rather, the route ahead must be cleared for the train's movement. Switches must be aligned properly along the route. Potentially conflicting movements must be guarded against in order to prevent collisions. Dispatchers actually “steer” the train by remotely aligning switches. They determine whether the train should stop or move, and if so, at what speed, by operating signals and issuing train orders and other forms of movement authority or speed restriction. In addition, dispatchers protect track gangs and other roadway workers from passing trains by issuing authorities for working limits. Train crews on board locomotives carry out the dispatchers' instructions and are responsible for actually moving the train, but dispatchers make it possible to do so safely.
FRA is aware that, depending upon the “method of operation” in effect on a particular territory and the availability of computer-aided dispatching (CAD) systems, electrical or electronic systems may constitute significant checks on inadvertent dispatcher error. However, the possibility for error remains within any method of operation. For instance, there are a variety of scenarios in which dispatchers can override CAD system warnings. Even in traffic control territory, where vital signal logic nominally protects against conflicting movements, roadway workers and their equipment may lack protection due to dispatcher error; and it may be necessary to issue authorities for train movements past stop signals in a variety of circumstances. Thus, a dispatcher's judgment must be sound if railroad operations are to be conducted safely.
It is commonplace in today's railroad operations for dispatchers to be located at a significant distance from the trackage and operations they control. For example, CSX Transportation, Inc, (CSX) dispatchers in Jacksonville, Florida, control the operations of CSX, Amtrak, and commuter rail trains throughout the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic. This does not create any additional safety risk. FRA does not mean to suggest, in the discussion of dispatch locational issues, that mere distance from the physical site of rail operations poses a safety hazard.
II. Potential for Location of Dispatchers outside United States Borders ↑
Currently, dispatchers located outside the United States control only very limited train movements in the United States. Specifically, the Canadian National Railway Company (CN) uses Canadian-based dispatchers to control trains operating from Ontario, Canada, into the United States on the following trackage in the United States: 1.8 miles to Detroit, Michigan; and 3 miles to Port Huron, Michigan. CN also uses Canadian-based dispatchers located in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, to control trains operating into Minnesota on 40 miles of track on the Sprague Subdivision, which accommodates 10 trains daily.
Finally, the Eastern Maine Railway Company operates track between McAdam, New Brunswick, Canada, to Brownville Junction, Maine, 99 miles of which are in the United States. Operations on this trackage are dispatched from St. John, New Brunswick, Canada. These limited rail operations do not cover any trackage that has been designated by FRA and the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of Defense (DOD) as vital to the national defense. In addition, there is no evidence that these extremely limited operations have adversely affected safety. No dispatchers located in Mexico control railroad operations in the United States.
However, there is the prospect of increased use of dispatchers located outside the United States. Specifically, CP, which owns the Delaware and Hudson Railway Company (DH), is interested in relocating from the United States to Canada dispatching functions involving the dispatching of approximately 32 DH trains per day operating over the 546-mile DH system in the United States. CN's previous acquisitions of the Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc. (GTW) (646 miles of track operated by GTW (1998 figures)), the Illinois Central Railroad Company (2591 miles of track) and the 2,500 route miles of U.S. Class II and III railroads formerly owned by the Wisconsin Central Transportation Company raise the possibility of additional extraterritorial dispatching at some future date.
In addition, CP's earlier acquisition of the Soo Line Railroad Company also presents future exposure of the same kind. FRA is aware that the merged or consolidated railroads (other than CP in the case of DH) disclaim (or are silent regarding) any current intention to transfer dispatching work outside the country. The railroads have the discretion, however, to act in their own best interests and are under no obligation to continue to refrain from extraterritorial dispatching, and those interests may change as circumstances change.
With regard to Mexico, the Texas Mexican Railroad (TM) and Transportacion Ferroviaria Mexicana (TFM) are currently exploring the feasibility of obtaining trackage rights over trackage owned by the Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) that extends between Laredo and San Antonio and between Laredo and Houston. Finally, because of present technology, railroads operating in the United States that now dispatch their trains in the United States could dispatch these trains from anywhere in the world.
III. Dispatchers Must Comply With the Federal Railroad Safety Laws To Move Traffic Safely in the United States ↑
As noted above, proper dispatching is essential to conducting safe railroad operations. With respect to railroad dispatchers located in the United States, Federal statutes and regulations and oversight actions by FRA, as the agency charged with administering the Federal rail safety laws, together safeguard United States railroad operations when railroad dispatchers are located in the United States. 49 U.S.C. ch. 51, 201-213; 49 CFR 1.49. Examples of safety rules and laws affecting dispatchers include operating rules and efficiency testing (49 CFR part 217), drug and alcohol testing (49 CFR part 219), and hours of service (49 U.S.C. 21105 and 49 CFR part 228). (Hereinafter, references to a numbered part are to a part in title 49 of the CFR unless otherwise stated.) To promote compliance, FRA may conduct inspections and investigations and impose sanctions for violations of its safety standards against both railroads and individuals, including dispatchers, if the individual or railroad is located in the United States. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 20107; 49 U.S.C. ch. 213; and part 209, appendix A (a description of FRA's safety enforcement program and policy). However, paragraph (c) of § 219.3 currently exempts employees of a foreign railroad, including dispatchers, whose primary reporting point is located outside of the United States and who perform service in the United States covered by the hours of service laws from subparts E (identification of troubled employees), F (pre-employment testing), and G (random testing) of § 219.3. Drug and alcohol testing of such employees is addressed in detail in an FRA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published elsewhere in the Federal Register today that proposes revisions to Part 219 requiring that such employees be tested. The provisions of part 241 along with the provisions of the NPRM will ensure that dispatchers controlling the bulk of rail operations in the United States are covered by effective drug and alcohol testing regulations.
Besides enforcing the Federal railroad safety laws, FRA also can take other safety-related actions. Further, FRA may conduct investigations of railroad accidents in the United States, including those involving dispatching, and may issue reports on the agency's findings, including its determination of probable cause. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 20107, 20902; 49 CFR 225.31. In addition, FRA may conduct research and development as necessary for every area of railroad safety, including dispatching. 49 U.S.C. 20108. Moreover, FRA may issue rules and orders, as necessary, for every area of railroad safety, including dispatching. See49 U.S.C. 20103. Such orders may include emergency orders to eliminate or reduce an unsafe condition or practice, identified through testing, inspecting, investigation, or research, that causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons. See49 U.S.C. 20104. Finally, FRA has recently taken a pro-active approach in its ability to influence non-regulated aspects of dispatching operations through its Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP), through its safety advisories published in the Federal Register, and through its visits to dispatching centers to ensure that dispatching is being safely conducted whether or not specific federal standards are being violated.
A. Hours of Service, Operating Rules and Efficiency Testing, and Drug and Alcohol Testing Requirements ↑
Congress has established hours of service standards for safety-sensitive domestic railroad employees, including railroad dispatchers. In order to prevent fatigue which could adversely affect job performance, 49 U.S.C. 21105 mandates that dispatchers in the United States may not work more than nine hours during a 24-hour period in a location where two or more shifts are employed, or 12 hours during a 24-hour period where only one shift is employed. Part 228 requires railroads to retain written hours of service records for dispatchers and allows for access to those records by FRA inspectors.
In addition, domestic railroad dispatchers are subject to FRA safety standards. Under part 217, railroads operating in the United States are required to have operating rules, to periodically instruct employees (including dispatchers) on those rules, to periodically conduct operations tests and inspections on employees (including dispatchers) to determine the extent of their compliance with the rules, and to keep records of the individual tests and inspections for review by FRA.
Under part 219, dispatchers and other safety-sensitive railroad employees located in the United States are subject to random, reasonable suspicion, return-to-duty, follow-up, and post-accident drug and alcohol testing, as well as pre-employment testing for drugs.
See subparts B, C, D, F, and G of part 219. Post-accident testing is required for a dispatcher who is directly and contemporaneously involved in the circumstances of any train accident meeting FRA testing thresholds. See subpart C. A dispatcher found to have violated FRA's drug and alcohol rules, or who refuses to submit to testing, is required to be immediately removed from dispatching service for a nine-month period, and the railroad must follow specified procedures including return-to-duty and follow-up testing requirements before returning the dispatcher to dispatching service. See subpart B. Additionally, domestic-based employers must provide self-referral and co-worker reporting (self-policing) programs for their employees (subpart E), submit random alcohol and drug testing plans for approval by FRA (subpart G), conduct random testing under part 219 and DOT procedures found in part 40 (subpart H), submit annual reports (subpart I), and maintain program records (subpart J).
FRA's broad-based, multi-component alcohol and drug program has reduced alcohol and drug abuse in the railroad industry since FRA's original alcohol and drug regulations were implemented in 1986.
• In 1987, testing for cause conducted under FRA and railroad programs resulted in a 4.0 percent positive rate for alcohol and a 6.9 percent positive rate for drugs. These rates have declined each year, with the 1998 testing for cause resulting in a 0.36 percent positive rate for alcohol and a 0.95 percent rate for drugs.
• Random drug testing began in 1989. The first full year's data for 1990 indicated a 1.04 percent rate, declining to a 0.77 percent rate in 1998.
• Random alcohol testing began in 1994, with the first full year's data for 1995 resulting in a 0.42 percent rate, which has declined each year to a 0.003 percent rate for 1998.
FRA post-accident testing data provide perhaps the most stark and compelling proof of the decline in alcohol and drug abuse in the railroad industry. In its post-accident testing program, in which testing is triggered only by significant accidents, FRA may use lower drug detection levels (cutoffs) and test for more substances than those tested for in other types of FRA testing. Post-accident testing data are the most scrutinized because FRA reviews each testing event, and tests each specimen in a designated contract laboratory, which FRA inspects quarterly. Furthermore, because the program has been in effect since 1987, post-accident testing data provide the longest trend line.
An analysis of the post-accident testing data in the chart below demonstrates how positive test results have dramatically declined since FRA's program started. In 1987, the first year of the program, 42 employees produced a positive specimen, resulting in a post-accident positive rate of 0.4 percent for alcohol and 5.1 percent for drugs. By 1998, only four employees produced a positive specimen, resulting in positive rates of 0.0 percent for alcohol and 2.6 percent for drugs.
As shown in the post-accident testing chart below, in each of the fields—“Qualifying Events,” “Employees Tested,” and “Employees Positive One/More Substances [Number (A=Alcohol; D=Drug)]”—FRA has achieved a desired reduction, despite a significant increase in rail traffic. The deterrent effect of random drug testing, which was implemented in 1988-1989, most certainly influenced the dramatic reduction in post-accident positives from 41 in 1988 to only 17 in 1990. Additionally, in the eight years from 1987 through 1994, there were 20 post-accident alcohol positives, but only two post-accident alcohol positives in the succeeding four years after implementation of random alcohol testing in 1994. While some refinement of regulatory requirements over the years has reduced the class of qualifying events (cost criteria for two of the qualifying events have been increased), the remaining events are those for which higher positive rates would be expected due to a higher component of likely human factor involvement.
FRA is aware that many factors have contributed to these results and probably influenced movement in both directions. The number of employees tested has decreased due to fewer qualifying events and crew consist reductions. For other than FRA post-accident testing, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has reduced the detection cut-off level for marijuana metabolites and has increased the detection levels for opiates used in Federal workplace detection programs such as FRA's. Another factor likely to have contributed to higher industry positive rates is the constant improvement in railroad random testingprograms. Nonetheless, testing data remain the best indicator of the success that the comprehensive programs mandated by FRA have had in significantly reducing alcohol and drug abuse in the railroad industry.
FRA Post-Accident Toxicological Testing Results (1987-1998) ↑YearQualifying eventsEmployees testedEmployees positive one/more substances [number (A=Alcohol; D=Drug)]
42 (3A-39D)
41 (3A-38D)
24 (6A-18D)
17 (1A-16D)
8 (2A-6D)
7 (1A-6D)
7 (2A-5D)
2 (0A-2D)
1 (0A-1D)
3 (2A-1D)
4 (0A-4D)
Note on this chart, concerning 49 CFR 219, subpart C—Post-Accident Toxicological Testing:
The positives reflected in the chart indicate the presence of drugs or alcohol in a covered employee during the event. A positive result does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship with the accident. Causal determinations are made only after a thorough review of all factors that may have contributed to the accident.
With certain stated exceptions, post-accident toxicological tests are required to be conducted for the following events:
1. Major Train Accident (involving damage exceeding the current FRA reporting threshold ($6,600 in 1998)) involving:
(b) A release of hazardous material lading from railroad equipment resulting in either an evacuation or a reportable injury; or
(c) Damage to railroad property of $1,000,000 or more.
2. Impact Accident (as defined in § 219.5 involving damage exceeding the FRA reporting threshold) involving:
(a) A reportable injury; or
(b) Damage to railroad property of $150,000 or more.
3. Fatal Train Incident: fatality to any on-duty railroad employee involving movement of on-track equipment with damage not exceeding the reporting threshold.
4. Passenger Train Accident: passenger train involved in an accident that exceeds the reporting threshold and results in an injury reportable to FRA under 49 CFR part 225.
See49 CFR 219.201(a). Rail/highway grade crossing accidents and accidents wholly resulting from natural causes (e.g., tornado), vandalism, or trespassing are exempt from FRA post-accident testing. See49 CFR 219.201(b). For a major train accident, all train crewmembers must be tested, but any other covered employees (e.g., dispatchers, signalmen) determined not to have had a role in the cause or severity of the accident are not to be tested. See49 CFR 219.201(c)(2).
B. FRA's Oversight and Enforcement Activities ↑
In order to effectively promote safety in all areas of railroad operations, including dispatching, FRA has additional tools and programs at its disposal other than the strictly regulatory framework described above. FRA's SACP is an approach to safety that emphasizes the active partnership of FRA, rail labor representatives, and railroad management in identifying current safety problems and jointly developing effective solutions to those problems. One fundamental principle of this approach is tracing a safety problem to its root cause and attacking that root cause instead of its symptoms. Where a problem is determined to be system-wide, SACP allows for a system-wide approach rather than individual, uncoordinated actions. So far, SACP has demonstrated significant capacity for identifying and eliminating the root cause of system-wide rail safety problems, including dispatching-related problems, by enlisting those most directly affected by such problems—railroad employees and managers—in a partnership effort.
For example, in 1997, FRA effectively used SACP to address system-wide problems on the UP and Southern Pacific Transportation Company (SP) (collectively UP/SP) during the period that the two railroads were in the process of merging with each other.
Between June 22 and August 31, 1997, UP/SP experienced five major train collisions that resulted in the deaths of five UP/SP employees and two trespassers. These accidents were in addition to a series of yard switching accidents that claimed the lives of four UP/SP train service employees. On August 23, under the auspices of the SACP, FRA launched a comprehensive safety review of UP/SP's operations, including its dispatching, and in the ensuing two-week period, as many as 80 FRA and state safety inspectors were on UP/SP property to determine the magnitude and extent of safety problems and to recommend measures to address those problems. In November, following two non-fatal collisions, FRA sent a team of 87 Federal and state inspectors onto UP/SP property for one week to ensure that the safety deficiencies identified in the initial review were being dealt with at the highest levels of the organization.
As a result of the safety reviews, FRA concluded that a fundamental breakdown existed in some of the basic railroad operating procedures and practices essential to maintain a safe operation, particularly in the area of dispatching. As part of the SACP process, FRA conducted a comprehensive safety audit of UP/SP's Harriman Dispatch Center, which is the railroad's main dispatching facility and which dispatches operations on approximately 95 percent of UP/SP's territory. During the initial phase of the safety audit, FRA inspectors and safety specialists spent a total of 31 days at the dispatching center observing and analyzing UP/SP dispatching practicesand procedures. Later, FRA inspectors headquartered within a few miles of the dispatching center made frequent follow-up visits to the dispatching center. FRA observed inefficient and unsafe practices by supervisors and dispatchers at the dispatching center, and correctly attributed those practices to inadequate training and extreme work overload. FRA made specific recommendations, which UP/SP accepted, such as creating additional dispatch positions, realigning dispatchers' territories to better balance the workload, hiring new dispatchers, tripling the number of dispatching supervisors, making improvements to the software in the UP/SP's CAD system, and forming a working group consisting of representatives from FRA, rail labor, and UP/SP management to continually monitor and address dispatching issues that may arise.
As a result of FRA's SACP efforts, UP/SP's safety performance recovered rapidly. During the year following FRA's dispatching initiative, UP/SP saw fatalities due to train collisions drop by 100 percent, from seven in 1997 to none in 1998. Such an immediate response could not have been effectuated without FRA's ability to obtain access to its facilities, which would not have been guaranteed if UP/SP's dispatching facilities were located outside the United States.
Another safety tool FRA has at its disposal is the safety advisory.
Safety advisories are issued by FRA and published in the Federal Register to disseminate important information on critical safety concerns. By publishing safety advisories in the Federal Register, FRA is able to reach the entire regulated community instead of just the railroad whose actions prompted the safety advisory. Previous safety advisories have concerned problems with train control systems, train handling procedures, equipment securement procedures, and procedures for reducing the risk of damage to tracks and bridges from flash floods. For example, on December 23, 1996, FRA published a Notice of Safety Bulletin in the Federal Register(61 FR 64191) addressing recommended safety practices for Direct Train Control (DTC), an umbrella term that refers to methods of operation used by dispatchers to control train movements that are known variously as Direct Traffic Control, Track Warrant Control (TWU), Track Permit Control System (TICS), and Form D Control System (DCS), and similar means of authorizing train movements. The safety bulletin was issued as a result of FRA's investigation of a head-on collision between two freight trains operated by CSX, and included three recommended safety practices for operations in DTC territory. Although railroad compliance with safety advisories is voluntary, the effectiveness of the advisories is greatly influenced by FRA's ability to determine the nature of the railroad's responsive action through on-site inspections and the ability to issue regulations and emergency orders should the railroad refuse to abide by the safety advisory.
Another safety tool FRA utilizes to promote rail safety is the site inspection, which is more closely associated with FRA's regulatory enforcement program than either SACP or safety advisories but can be an integral element in either. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 20107. Through site inspections, FRA's safety inspectors are able to observe a railroad's practices first-hand and, if warranted, write reports and recommend that civil penalties be assessed for violations. FRA frequently conducts inspections of railroad dispatching centers to monitor operating practices and dispatching procedures. As FRA's experience during the UP/SP SACP investigations demonstrates, site inspections are invaluable in investigating and addressing safety problems and can be used to quickly improve a railroad's operating practices.
These inspections may also reveal the need for an emergency order, especially if the railroad is unwilling to take corrective action. 49 U.S.C. 20104 (superseding 45 U.S.C. 432). FRA's emergency orders provide an example of the kind of dramatic action the agency takes in response to hazards discovered during routine site inspections. FRA received the statutory authority to issue emergency orders in 1970. Of the 22 emergency orders that FRA has issued since then, at least nine have been issued primarily as a result of such routine inspections (as opposed to FRA investigations of railroad accidents or other forms of inquiry).
All of these tools, both regulatory and non-regulatory, are strengthened by FRA's ability to readily gain access to railroad facilities. Such tools as SACP activities, railroad site visits, and emergency orders depend, to a significant degree, on easy access to railroad facilities. For these tools to work, FRA must be assured of such access. FRA is not certain at this time whether access can be assured outside the borders of the United States, or whether the laws of foreign countries will adequately safeguard United States rail operations. While FRA has the power to issue an emergency order under 49 U.S.C. 20104(a) against a railroad that does not have in place a program imposing adequate safety requirements for extraterritorial persons that dispatch domestic railroad operations, FRA would need to meet the high burden of proof entailed in sustaining such an order if it is challenged.
IV. Foreign Regulatory Jurisdiction ↑
FRA may be unable to rely on foreign laws and rules governing dispatchers, in themselves, to ensure safety in accordance with FRA requirements. There can be a number of complexities in the ways foreign laws and regulations apply to dispatching. First, although dispatching can be performed from any country in the world, not every country in the world has an entity that regulates rail transportation safety. Second, even if the host country has established a transportation regulatory entity, that entity may well lack full safety jurisdiction over the railroad operations in the United States that are being dispatched from the host country.
With respect to a host country regulatory agency's level of regulatory authority over the individual dispatchers who conduct extraterritorial dispatching, there appear to be at least four different levels of jurisdiction over these dispatchers, depending on their relevant duties. For jurisdiction purposes, an extraterritorial dispatcher could likely fall into one of at least four categories:
Type 1—a dispatcher who controls both operations in the host country and operations in the United States during a single tour of duty for every tour of duty;
Type 2—a dispatcher who controls both operations in the host county and operations in the United States during a si