Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2005_documents/05me123th.htm
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 19:47:13
Document Index: 201203516

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4055', '§ 4050', '§ 4038', '§ 4055', '§ 4001', '§ 4038', '§ 4050', '§\n4038', '§ 4050', '§ 4038', '§ 4055', '§ 4003', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 4050', '§ 4064', 'art:\n1', '§ 4064', '§ 4055', '§\n4038', '§ 9', '§ 9']

IN RE THOMAS H. et al.
Decision: 2005 ME 123
Docket: Yor-05-89
C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
RE THOMAS H. et al.
[¶1] The Department of Health and Human
Services appeals from the judgment of the District Court (Springvale,
Foster, J.) denying a petition to terminate
the parental rights of Thomas H. and Holly L. to their two children pursuant to
22 M.R.S.A. § 4055 (2004). Although the court found the parents unfit, it concluded that it was not
in the best interests of the children to terminate the parents' parental
rights. The Department contends
that the court abused its discretion by not giving sufficient weight to the
statutory policy of permanency in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (2004). The mother cross-appeals, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence as to the court's finding of her unfitness. We conclude that the court's parental
unfitness findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and,
accordingly, we deny the mother's cross-appeal and affirm those findings of the
court. Because we agree with the
Department's contention that the court's best interest determination failed to
give sufficient weight to the statutory policy favoring permanency, we vacate
the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
[¶2] Thomas H. and Holly L. are the parents
of a boy, Thomas, Jr., who is now seven years old, and a girl, Rose, who is
five. The Department filed a
petition for a child protection order five years ago. Jeopardy was found as to the father based on his history of
substance abuse and domestic violence. The court found no jeopardy as to the mother, and she was awarded
custody of the children. The
father was given the right to have contact with the children but only under the
direction of the Department. [¶3] Some time later, the mother left the
children with the father, who took them to the Department. In June 2001, the Department requested
and obtained a preliminary protection order granting it custody of the children,
who were placed in foster homes. Thomas
resided in a foster home until the Department placed him with his maternal
grandmother, where he remained for approximately one year before the Department
placed him in the same foster home with Rose.
[¶4] A determination of jeopardy as to the
mother was not made until April 2002, when the parties agreed that there
was jeopardy based on the mother's "past child protective history as well as
her ongoing mental health issues," which the court found she appeared to be
addressing appropriately at that time. The court ordered reunification efforts with the mother and
the father to continue. In March
2003, the court allowed the Department to cease reunification with the father
but not the mother.
[¶5] The Department later filed a petition
to terminate the parental rights of both parents, and a two-day hearing on the
petition was held in June 2004. The hearing on the petition was consolidated with a judicial review and
a permanency planning hearing. The
court heard from numerous witnesses, including the mother and father; two
Department caseworkers; two visitation supervisors; the foster mother; the
mother's psychiatrist; and three licensed clinical social workers: the mother's
counselor, the father's counselor, and the boy's counselor. The guardian ad litem submitted a
written report and participated in the examination of witnesses, but did not
[¶6] The court issued extensive written
findings, utilizing a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. It found that both parents were unable
to protect the children from jeopardy. With regard to the father, the court found that he had done nothing to
resolve his issues of substance abuse and domestic violence. He had refused to participate in the
Violence No More program, he had stopped taking his medication for depression,
and on a number of occasions he cancelled or failed to appear at his counseling
sessions. As of the fall of 2003,
when he was jailed for violating probation, he was possibly still abusing
drugs, although he denied any substance abuse since that time. He did complete a parenting
program. The father was not
requesting that the children be placed with him, but only that he continue to
have contact with them.
[¶7] With regard to the mother, the court
detailed the mother's propensity to become involved in relationships with men
who either abused her or were known substance abusers. It also discussed the mother's
relationship with an older son, now an adult, who had been removed from her
home when he was twelve. The
mother knew that the older son had been in jail as an adult and had abused
drugs, but she saw no problem with her younger children having contact with
him. [¶8] In other respects, the mother had shown
substantial improvements. She had
maintained a relationship with the children. They visited with her all day every Saturday and Sunday,
with a supervisor checking in periodically on Saturdays. She had learned to set and enforce
limits for the children and had become more adept at addressing their needs. She attempted to establish a support
network and obtained a part-time job. The court found that she had engaged in virtually every service that the
Department had offered her. Other
than a finding that the mother's mood was more stable, the court made no
findings about the mother's mental health issues that had led to the original
[¶9] It was the mother's inability to
identify individuals that presented a risk of harm to her children or to take
steps to avoid involvement with them, even at a time while she had the benefit
of a therapeutic setting, that led the court to conclude that she was unable to
protect the children from jeopardy. The court also concluded that there were no further efforts, other than
those already made, "that could reasonably be expended to address the risks
which each parent presents." Based
on that assessment, the court found that the parents would not be able to
protect the children from jeopardy within a time reasonably calculated to meet
[¶10] Concerning the best interests of the
children, the court discussed Thomas's situation in detail. His counselor, whom he had been seeing
since June 2003, testified that he had recently been diagnosed with Attention
Deficient Hyperactive Disorder and that a major transition would be very
difficult for him. The court found
that Thomas and Rose spend all day Saturday and Sunday with their mother, and that
a substantial part of that time is also spent with the maternal
grandmother. The court reported
that the counselor did not support termination of the mother's parental rights.[1]
The court found that Thomas
thrives in the foster home, where he has been since October 2002, and that the
foster parents want to adopt both children.
[¶11] The court's findings regarding Rose were
more limited. There was very
little evidence presented about her except that she was a normal baby when she
first came into the current foster home at age eleven months and that she has
not needed any special assistance.
[¶12] The court had numerous guardian ad
litem reports that had been filed throughout the case, with the last one dated
a day before the termination hearing. The current guardian ad litem, who
replaced the first guardian, began recommending termination of parental rights
with her first report in 2003. In
her final report, the guardian again recommended termination of the rights of
both parents, reporting that "Holly is apt to substitute her own judgment for
professional judgment regarding the children and [is] not . . . able to work
with the children's counselor . . . [and] continues to involve Tommy in
deciding where he is to live, despite being told [of] the burden this places on
him." With respect to the
children's foster family, the guardian noted: "Clearly the children are bonded
and a part of this family which wants to adopt them." [¶13] The court concluded that the Department
had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
the parents' parental rights was in the children's best interest because it
found the children's needs were being met by their foster home placement and
continued contact with their mother and maternal grandmother: [I]t is not clear that termination of [the mother's]
rights is in the best interest of [the children]. Perhaps in spite of this process, those children have
reached equilibrium. They are
cared for in a loving home that meets their physical and emotional needs,
ensures their safety, and provides them with security sufficient to deal with
the world as it is currently constituted, including ongoing and extended
visitation with their mother. Neither child is in need of special services or presents, at this time,
with behaviors that could be attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the
impermanence of foster care. They
enjoy a continued connection with their family of origin, including their
maternal grandmother, even as they benefit from the care and support which that
family is unable to provide. I[n]
what way could terminating this balance be in [the children's] best interest?
The Court is fully aware that such balance could be
disrupted in short order and with a vengeance. Any one of the adult participants could opt out of this
construct, or change his or her behavior. As is pointed out so often in cases of this nature, there are virtually
no guarantees one can offer to children in foster care absent a termination of
parental rights. However, in this
case, at this time, the value of such a guarantee is outweighed by the benefits
of sustaining, if at all possible, the current state of affairs.
[¶14] The court denied the petition for termination of parental rights. It relieved the Department of its reunification obligation to both parents. It ordered that the children remain in the custody of the Department, and it requested that the children remain in the current foster home. The court ordered the Department to continue to make visitation available to the mother and to the father, and stated that "it is imperative that every effort be made to continue and support the strong connection between [the mother] and the children[.]" The permanent plan for the children ordered by the court was continued custody with the Department and placement in the current foster home. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038(7-A)(B)(1)(d) (2004). In addition, the court encouraged the Department and the foster family to explore the possibility of the foster family accepting custody or legal guardianship of the children in order “to enhance the stability of the placement and normalize the lives of the children.”
[¶15] The Department appeals the judgment
denying its petition for termination of parental rights, and the mother
cross-appeals from the finding that she is unable or unwilling to protect the
children from jeopardy, or assume responsibility for them, within a time
reasonably calculated to meet the children's needs.
[¶16] The Department does not challenge the
court's factual findings, but does challenge the court's conclusion made,
pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), regarding the children's best
interest. Although our
articulation of the standard by which we review best interest determinations
has not been entirely uniform, the standard is twofold: We review the court's factual findings
related to the child's best interest for clear error, but its ultimate
conclusion regarding the child's best interest for abuse of discretion. See In re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 24, 809 A.2d 1245, 1252
(concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the
termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child); In
re Misty Lee H., 529 A.2d 331, 333 (Me.
1987) (explaining that the trial court's best interest decision was "'entitled
to very substantial deference'" because the court heard from the parties and
their experts, and it exercised broad discretion in carrying out the "'weighty
responsibility[] to determine the particularly sensitive question of a child's
best interests'") (quoting Cooley v. St. Andre's Child Placing Agency, 415 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Me. 1980)); Harmon
v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 984-85 (Me. 1981)
(stating that the "'delicate balancing'" of the factors as well as the
first-hand opportunity to view the people involved meant that appellate review
was for abuse of discretion) (quoting Costigan v. Costigan, 418 A.2d 1144, 1147 (Me. 1980)).
[¶17] In reviewing the court's exercise of
its discretion, "we view the facts, and the weight to be given individual
facts, through the trial court's lens." In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125,
¶ 13, 861 A.2d 1277, 1280. Furthermore, we afford substantial deference to the trial court's
determination. In re
Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 27, 809 A.2d at
1253; In re Misty Lee H., 529
A.2d at 333.
[¶18] With regard to the mother's
cross-appeal, which is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the
court's unfitness finding, our standard of review is "whether the court 'could
have reasonably been persuaded on the basis of the evidence in the record that
the required factual findings were highly probable.'" In re Kayla M., 2001 ME 166, ¶ 6, 785 A.2d 330, 332 (citing In
re Breauna N., 1999 ME 191, ¶ 19, 742 A.2d
911, 915).
B. The Mother's
[¶19] We address the mother's cross-appeal
first because if she is correct in her contention that the evidence was
insufficient to establish her unfitness, we would not reach the issue of the
best interest of the children.[2] See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 19, 775 A.2d 1144, 1150-51 (stating
that a court must find parental unfitness before it considers the child's best
[¶20] The court found that the mother was
unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that the circumstances were
not likely to change within a time period calculated to meet the children's
needs. The court's finding was
premised primarily on the mother's inability to identify men who present a risk
of harm to herself and the children. The court's findings included descriptions of Aaron and Bill, men with
whom the mother had relationships and who had drug problems. Aaron seriously assaulted the mother on
at least two occasions and was jailed for six months, but she dismissed the
concerns of others about him. The
mother was not forthcoming to her counselor or Department caseworkers about
Aaron's drug use or her encounter with Bill. Furthermore, there was her continuing relationship with the
children's father, for whom jeopardy was found in 2001 due to his history of
substance abuse and domestic violence. The court also identified the mother's failure to recognize, despite her
knowledge of his criminal record and drug use, that her older son might pose a
risk to the other children as more evidence of her inability to either identify
people who might be dangerous to the children or to take steps to avoid
[¶21] Keeping in mind the superior
perspective of the trial court to view and weigh the evidence, we conclude that
the court could have reasonably been persuaded that it is highly probable that
the mother is unable to protect the children from jeopardy. Furthermore, based on the evidence of
the length of time that the mother has been in counseling and her continuing difficulty
in recognizing when a person is unsuitable for a relationship with her, and
thereby with the children, the trial court could have been reasonably persuaded
that it is highly probable that the mother's inability to protect the children
from jeopardy is unlikely to change within a time that would meet the
C. The Children's
[¶22] Because we affirm the conclusions
regarding the mother's unfitness, we now review the court's conclusion that the
Department had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination
is in the best interest of the children. The Department does not question the fact-finding of the
court and agrees that the evidence is sufficient to support the facts found by
the court. Rather, the Department
contends that the court exceeded its discretion in reaching its conclusion that
the termination of parental rights was not in the children's best interest by
disregarding or giving inadequate weight to the statutory policy of permanency
for children. We address this
contention by considering (1) the role of permanency in defining the bounds of
judicial discretion; and (2) the application of permanency to the circumstances
1. Permanency and
the Bounds of Judicial Discretion
[¶23] A central tenet of Maine's Child and
Family Services and Child Protection Act (the Act), 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4001-4099-C
(2004 & Supp. 2004), is that children subject to on-going judicial and
departmental involvement in their lives should benefit from permanency.[3] Once a child has been found to be in circumstances
of jeopardy, the District Court must develop a permanency plan for the child
within twelve months from when the child is considered to have entered foster
care, and then conduct what amounts to annual reviews. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038(7-A) (2004).[4] Permanency planning was embraced by
Congress in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No.
105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A.), in direct response to the documented inability of state child
welfare systems to bring about stable and final outcomes for children within a
timeframe reasonably designed to meet their needs:
advocates conceived of permanence in the 1970s as a way of tackling the problem
of "foster care drift," a term used to describe the shepherding of children
through a series of foster homes, sometimes for years, while state agencies
attempt to provide the services necessary to enable safe family
reunification. Child welfare
advocates condemn "foster care drift" as insensitive to children's sense of
time and threatening to their future ability to form attachments. The emphasis on permanence was a direct
Libby S. Adler, The
Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 2 (2001) (footnotes omitted).[5] [¶24] Even before the codification of
permanence as a central tenet of ASFA and the corresponding amendments to Maine
child protective laws that took effect in 1998,[6]
the Legislature had declared that "instability and impermanency are contrary to
the welfare of children," 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (1992),[7]
and our decisions recognized that placing a child in a "permanent home" is the
preferred outcome in child protective proceedings. See,
e.g., In re Serena C., 650 A.2d 1343, 1345 (Me. 1994) (noting that need
for permanence was established and termination was in best interest of child); In
re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282, 286 (Me. 1993)
(noting that consideration can be given to "the preference for placing children
in permanent homes"); In re Justin S., 595 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Me. 1991) (affirming trial court's holding that
termination was in best interest of child where only alternative was "more
temporary foster care"); In re Amanda D., 549 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Me. 1988) (noting that "the District Court could
consider the preference for placing children in permanent homes"); In
re Cassandra B., 531 A.2d 1274, 1275 (Me.
1987) (holding that consideration can be given to "the preference for placing
children in permanent homes"); In re Misty Lee H., 529 A.2d at 333 (observing "the express statutory
policy of placing children in a permanent environment where reunification is
not possible").
[¶25] Any remaining doubt about the
centrality of permanency in child protective proceedings was eliminated with
the enactment of ASFA in 1997 and the Maine Legislature's corresponding
amendments to Title 22. Pursuant
to the 1997 amendments, a court can only adopt a permanency plan that will
result in the child remaining in foster care if:
documented . . . a compelling reason for
determining that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be
returned home, be referred for termination of parental rights or be placed for
adoption, be placed with a fit and willing relative, or be placed with a legal
guardian. 22 M.R.S.A. §
4038(7-A)(B)(1)(d) (emphasis added).[8]
This provision indicates that
the Legislature regarded long-term foster care as inherently impermanent and,
absent a compelling reason, contrary to the welfare of children. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050(3) (2004) (stating that it is the Legislature's
intent to "[p]romote the adoption of children into stable families rather than
allowing children to remain in the impermanency of foster care") (emphasis added).
[¶26] Our decisions also reflect these
principles. As recently as 2002,
we held, in affirming a termination of parental rights, that "the Child and
Family Services and Child Protection Act . . . has a clearly stated policy favoring
permanency for children." In re
Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, ¶ 28, 809 A.2d at
1253. We noted that:
If the District
Court had adopted long-term kinship or foster care as Michaela's permanency
plan, it would have been authorized to enter and periodically review orders
designed to address actions by Michaela's noncustodial relatives that impact
upon her well-being. The utility
of this authority, however, must be considered in light of the practical limits
on the court's ability to control familial relationships and behaviors. In view of the high level of family
conflict demonstrated during the pendency of this case, the District Court was
justified in concluding that its indefinite supervision of Michaela's family
relationships would have effectively placed Michaela "in limbo," and would not
have achieved the Act's goals of certainty and stability.
¶ 29, 809 A.2d at 1253. See
also Adoption of Michaela C., 2004 ME 153,
¶ 15, 863 A.2d 270, 274 (noting that the child was "entitled to the implementation
of the best permanency plan available").
[¶27] Similarly, in In re Alana S., we recognized, in affirming a termination of
parental rights, that:
[t]he purpose
statement of the termination of parental rights law includes the Legislature's
statement of intent to "[e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable
periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their
return to the family," and to "[p]romote the adoption of children into stable
families rather than allowing children to remain in the impermanency of foster
care[.]"
2002 ME 126, ¶
21, 802 A.2d 976, 981 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, in In re Kafia M., we noted, in holding that the child should not be
forced to wait indefinitely in an impermanent foster care arrangement, that
"[f]or all children, permanency and stability are legislatively mandated goals,
and the impermanency of foster care is to be avoided." 1999 ME 195, ¶ 15, 742 A.2d 919, 925.
[¶28] The 1997 legislative amendments to the
Act bear directly on the scope of judicial discretion associated with a best
interest determination made in a parental termination case. A court-approved permanency plan is a
required part of the statutory framework. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038(7-A). Because the statute directs that the
court "shall determine a permanency plan" it is not sufficient for the
Department to prepare a plan and for the court's permanency planning order to
merely memorialize the parties' positions regarding the permanency plan for the
child or children. Id.[9]
Permanency planning and the best
interest determination made in a termination proceeding cannot be divorced from
one another because a best interest decision necessarily requires the court to
consider the long-term living arrangement that will best serve a child's
needs. The court's permanency plan
for the child is an inextricable part of that decision.
[¶29] Logic dictates that the public policy
favoring permanency is not only vitally important at the permanency planning
stage, but also at the termination stage. Indeed, as a matter of practicality, many termination hearings,
including this one, are consolidated for hearing with permanency planning
hearings. As a result, the court considers
a single body of evidence in making both its termination related best interest
decision and in crafting its permanency plan. The Act, our decisions, and practice all reinforce the
fundamental principle that the strong public policy favoring permanency for
children must inform the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion
associated with determining a child's best interest, as well as any subsequent
appellate review. See Andrew M. Mead, Abuse of Discretion:
Maine's Application of a Malleable Appellate Standard, 57 Me. L.
Rev. 519, 527 (2005) (observing that trial court "decisions concerning
wide-ranging policy issues are accorded significantly less deference" on
[¶30] For these reasons, courts must consider
the statutorily mandated concept of permanency when making best interest
determinations pursuant to section 4055, and, as established in section
4038(7-A)(B)(1)(d), must specifically determine whether a compelling reason
exists that supports a disposition that will result in long-term foster care.[10] The compelling reason requirement
ensures compliance with the favored policy of permanency. This approach is critical because the
best interest determination does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is part of
an ultimate disposition that must account for the congruence of the judicial
decisions—including the permanency planning order—associated with
it. See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 12, 775 A.2d at 1149 (recognizing
that child protection cases are in essence a unified proceeding when the same
judge has heard the evidence at prior stages, and noting that if a different
judge presides at a later proceeding, the judge can rely on prior conclusions
of law and findings of fact).
2. Permanency as
Applied to Thomas and Rose [¶31] The court's best interest analysis
regarding Thomas and Rose focused on the positive attributes of their current
foster placement and continued contacts with their family of origin. The court emphasized that the
children's needs are being met in a loving foster home; that they are not
exhibiting problem "behaviors that could be attributed, rightly or wrongly, to
the impermanence of foster care[;]" and that "[t]hey enjoy a continued
connection with their family of origin." In essence, the court found that the children were currently safe and having their needs met, but that they could
not be returned to the care of either parent because both are incapable of
protecting the children from jeopardy. This analysis did not also weigh, however, the
farther-reaching consequences of long-term foster care. [¶32] Maintaining the status quo because
"children have reached equilibrium" or because they do not currently need
special services is not, without more, a compelling reason sufficient to
warrant long-term foster care. As previously noted, section 4038(7-A)(B)(1)(d)
provides that a permanency plan adopting foster care as the child's permanent
placement must document that "a compelling reason" exists for concluding "that
it would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned home, be
referred for termination of parental rights or be placed for adoption, be
placed with a fit and willing relative, or be placed with a legal guardian." Accordingly, when a court applies the
factors set forth in section 4055(2)[11]
to determine the best interest of a child for whom the court is considering the
alternative of long-term foster care, it must address whether a compelling
reason supports its conclusion that long-term foster care will serve the
child's best interest over both the short and long-term. Here, the best interest analysis did
not address the long-term consequences impermanence might have for Thomas and
Rose, and did not identify a compelling reason supporting long-term foster
care. Nor was a compelling reason
identified in the permanency plan portion of the court's judgment.[12]
[¶33] One certain consequence of long-term
foster care is that the court will retain continued supervisory responsibility
for major decisions affecting the children, and that the exercise of that
responsibility will be subject to the procedures and pace of the judicial
process. Here, approximately
sixteen months passed between the time the State petitioned to terminate the
parents' parental rights and the time the court determined that the petition
should be denied. Approximately
ten months have passed between the filing of the first notice of appeal and the
issuance of this opinion. This is
not an unusually long period of time as measured by the pace of complex
litigation. In the lives of pre-adolescent
children, however, twenty-six months, or more than two years, is an
eternity. See In re Hope M., 1998 ME 170, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 152, 154 (noting that the child's
needs govern the timeframe for evaluation of best interest). Uncertainty as to the outcome of
protracted litigation can be detrimental to children, and can interfere with
the ability of the child's custodians and caregivers to assist the child.[13] The limitations inherent in the
indefinite judicial supervision of a child's life provide additional support
for requiring that a compelling reason should be identified before long-term
foster care is adopted as the child's permanent placement. [¶34] The court's best interest findings
acknowledged that its permanency plan for the children—foster
care—"could be disrupted in short order and with a vengeance . . . [and
that] there are virtually no guarantees one can offer to children in foster
care absent a termination of parental rights." Nonetheless, the court concluded "the value of such a
guarantee is outweighed by the benefits of sustaining, if at all possible, the
current state of affairs." The
"guarantee" the analysis refers to is the promise of permanence and the
stability and continuity that flow from it. The record does not support a conclusion that the court
implicitly found that the benefits of long-term foster care so outweighed the
value of other, more permanent, alternatives in this case as to constitute a
compelling reason to maintain the status quo. III. CONCLUSION
[¶35] A best interest determination involving
young children who have already spent years living in foster care, and cannot
return home, should not rest primarily on how well they are doing in foster
care at the current time, but rather on the broader question of their short-
and long-term needs to establish stable relationships and a permanent place for
themselves in the world. Where, as
here, parents are found to be incapable of protecting their children from
jeopardy after more than four years of services by the State, a reason more
compelling than a finding that the children are currently doing well in foster
care and enjoying a continued connection with their family of origin is required
before the children are consigned to the instability and impermanence of
long-term foster care. [¶36] Because we have not previously
articulated the need for courts to address the compelling reason standard when
rendering best interest findings in a case such as this, the court could not
have anticipated the requirement in this case.[14] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment as
it relates to the court's best interest determination, and remand for the court
to reconsider whether a compelling reason establishes that the continued
impermanence of long-term foster care is in the best interests of Thomas and
Rose. In light of the passage of
time, the court may, in its discretion, receive additional evidence regarding
this issue on an expedited basis. The
affirmed with respect to the mother's cross-appeal. The judgment is otherwise vacated and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CALKINS, J., with whom DANA, J.,
[¶37] I respectfully dissent. I write separately because I would
affirm the judgment. In my view,
the trial court followed the statute as enacted by the Legislature, its
decision is supported by the evidence, and it did not abuse the discretion
granted to it. [¶38] Although I agree with that portion of
the Court's opinion regarding the standard of review, I disagree with the new
requirement that the Court has engrafted onto the parental rights termination
statute, effectively amending the statute. The new requirement provides that a court, when "considering
the alternative of long-term foster care, [] must address whether a compelling
child's best interest over both the short and long-term." While I understand the reasons for the
Court's creation of the new requirement, I believe it is up to the Legislature
to determine whether the new requirement is warranted.
[¶39] Furthermore, even assuming that the new
requirement is encompassed by the existing statutory language, I believe that
the trial court addressed the issue and concluded that a compelling reason
supported its decision to place the children in long-term foster care.
[¶40] The Court discusses the history of the
policy of permanency and the statutory requirement of permanency planning, and
I agree that there is no question that the federal and state statutes place an
emphasis on permanency. The trial
court acknowledged that permanency is a goal, but it also recognized that it is
not the only goal of the child protection statutes. Although there is a policy favoring permanency, and although
a child's need for permanency and stability is a factor to be taken into
consideration in determining the child's best interest, neither the statutes
nor our precedent make it the only factor. In fact, section 4055(2) lists the "[p]rimary considerations"
that a court must consider: "the best interest of the child, the needs of the
child, including the child's age, the child's attachments to relevant persons,
periods of attachments and separation, the child's ability to integrate into a
substitute placement or back into the parent's home and the child's physical
and emotional needs." 22 M.R.S.A.
§ 4055(2) (2004). Permanency is
not listed among the "primary considerations," but the Court would have
permanency trump these other factors. [¶41] There is no statutory presumption that
termination is in the child's best interest when reunification with the family
of origin is no longer possible or appropriate and an adoptive parent has been
identified. The Legislature did
not create such a presumption. Instead,
it listed factors for a court to consider and weigh in making a determination
regarding termination. If it had
intended permanency to be the only factor for a court to consider, it would not
have listed the factors in section 4055(2).
[¶42] By requiring a court to articulate the
compelling reason or reasons that long-term foster care is in the child's best
interest, the Court is creating a presumption that termination of parental
rights is in a child's best interest when reunification with the family of
origin is no longer possible or appropriate and a potential adoptive parent has
been identified. Under the Court's
decision today, it is not clear how or when the court would apply the factors
listed in section 4055(2). The new
requirement, and the presumption it creates, has the effect of putting the cart
before the horse—that is, determining whether adoption is appropriate
before determining whether parental rights should be terminated. This is in contrast to the statutory
scheme, which makes termination of parental rights a totally separate
proceeding from the adoption process.[15]
[¶43] In this case the trial court took the
factors listed in section 4055(2) into consideration. With regard to the children's needs, it noted that Thomas's
counselor had testified that a major transition for Thomas would be difficult
at this point. Neither child
needed special treatment caused by the impermanence of foster care and neither
exhibited behaviors that could be attributed to such. The court noted the ages of the children but did not make
any particular findings as to how their ages may have figured into the
equation. [¶44] Concerning the factor in section
4055(2) of "the child's attachments to relevant persons," the court discussed
the children's, and in particular Thomas's, relationship with their
mother. It noted that Thomas's
counselor said he appeared happier after the visits with his mother became
longer. The counselor recommended
against termination and felt that Thomas's ties with his mother should be
maintained. The court also found
that Thomas had a comfortable, loving, relationship with his foster family and
considered himself to be a part of that family.
[¶45] With regard to the factor of "the
child's ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the
parent's home," the court properly did not consider placement with the mother
as the court had found that she could not protect the children from
jeopardy. There was no suggestion
of any other placement for the children other than the current foster family.
[¶46] It is apparent throughout its finding
that the trial court was concerned with, and took into consideration, the
children's "physical and emotional needs." In particular, the court was concerned about Thomas's ties
to the mother, and the emotional disruption that could be caused by severing
those ties. [¶47] The court did not neglect permanency
and was troubled by the impermanence that the current situation allows. Nonetheless, it weighed that
impermanence with the benefits of the current situation. Maine does not have an "open adoption"
option, see In re Melanie S., 1998 ME
132, 712 A.2d 1036,[16]
and thus the court did not have the ability to terminate parental rights and at
the same time require the adoptive parents to allow the children to retain
their visits and communication with their mother. The court recognized that adoption is more permanent than
foster care, but in weighing the permanency that could come with termination of
parental rights and adoption by the foster family with the benefits of
maintaining the children's relationship with the mother, it found that the
latter was more beneficial to the children. The court also realistically acknowledged that a permanency
plan for adoption may be an illusion in some cases.
[¶48] Although the evidence in this case
would allow a court to come to the opposite result and conclude that
termination is in the children's best interest, the evidence also allows for
the result reached by the trial court. I cannot say that either result, given the record in this case, lay
outside the court's discretion. We
should not substitute our views of the record for the court's decision. Decisions as to the best interest of a
child are among the most difficult that any court is called upon to make,
whether in the context of private custody disputes or child protection
actions. Our standard of review
and the deference we give to such decisions is an acknowledgement of the
difficult task, and the range of discretion reflects the difficulty. In this case the court properly took
into consideration the goal of permanency, and it did not go outside of the
bounds of its discretion in reaching its conclusion that termination of the
parents' rights was not in the best interest of the children. For these reasons, I would affirm the
Matthew E. Pollack, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally)
Lise Wagner, Asst. Atty. Gen.
Joseph M. Wrobleski
Jr., Esq. (orally)
Glenda Lovell, Esq. (orally)
Although the counselor testified that Thomas's ties to the mother should be maintained, she was not directly asked to give an opinion regarding Thomas's long-term permanency needs. Rather, in response to the court's questions, she testified that she could find "no written authority . . . to figure out what to do with the kids in limbo" and that Tommy's relationship with the mother was "very positive" and that he says "he loves his visits with her." The counselor then testified as follows:
COURT: Well, you talked about, uh, Tommy being
in--in limbo. I mean, he is in a,
what you have described as, apparently, a nurturing, appropriate foster
WITNESS: He does [sic].
COURT: He enjoys contact with--
WITNESS: Yuh.
COURT: --his mother?
COURT: And so, I guess the natural question
is, why not continue that indefinitely until that system doesn't work any
longer for him?
WITNESS: There's an idea. I don't--I don't have a problem with
COURT: Well, are you--is there any sort of immediacy,
from Tommy's viewpoint, about getting this resolved in some fashion?
WITNESS: You're strictly talking about the
child's viewpoint?
WITNESS: Um, probably not. I think Tommy is very happy with the
COURT: Do you have any sense that he sees this
as something that is impermanent?
WITNESS: He's been very anxious, um,
that--he--he knows a little bit about, um, what was--what is happening. Um,--
COURT: Do you know how he knows that?
WITNESS: Uh, some of it, I did tell him I was
going to court. Um--um, and some
of it's he's, um, been asked by people, you know, where he would like to live,
and I think, um, people have talked to him about that. Um--(PAUSE)--from Tommy's perspective,
I think Tommy is happy with the current arrangements.
The father was found to be unfit, but he does not challenge this finding.
The importance of permanency is reflected in section 4003, which provides, in pertinent part:
that the health and safety of children must be of paramount concern and that
the right to family integrity is limited by the right of children to be
protected from abuse and neglect and recognizing also that uncertainty and
instability are possible in extended foster home or institutional living, it is the intent of the Legislature that
1. Authorization. Authorize the department to protect and
assist abused and neglected children, children in circumstances which present a
substantial risk of abuse and neglect, and their families;
2. Removal from parental custody. Provide that children will be taken from the custody of their
parents only where failure to do so would jeopardize their health or welfare;
3. Reunification as a priority. Give family rehabilitation and reunification priority as a means
for protecting the welfare of children, but prevent needless delay for
permanent plans for children when rehabilitation and reunification is not
possible; [and]
4. Permanent plans for care and custody. Promote
the early establishment of permanent plans for the care and custody of children
who cannot be returned to their family. It is the intent of the Legislature that the department reduce the
number of children receiving assistance under the United States Social Security
Act, Title IV-E, who have been in foster care more than 24 months, by 10% each
year beginning with the federal fiscal year that starts on October 1, 1983; . . . .
22 M.R.S.A. § 4003 (2004) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
The clear intent of the Legislature
expressed in section 4003 is that children who cannot be returned to their
families should be removed from the instability of foster care and placed in a
more permanent environment as soon as the court determines that reunification
with their natural parents is no longer safely possible. Section 4003 has recently been
amended. See P.L. 2005, ch. 374, § 1 (effective Sept. 17, 2005).
Section 4038(7-A) has recently been repealed and replaced. See P.L. 2005, ch. 372, § 4 (effective Sept. 17, 2005). The new requirements for permanency plans are now set forth in the newly enacted section 4038-B. See P.L. 2005, ch. 372, § 6 (effective Sept. 17, 2005). [5]
The Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means noted that:
[T]oo many children
are subjected to long spells of foster care or are returned to families that
reabuse them. . . . [W]hat is
needed is a measured response to allow States to adjust their statutes and
practices so that in some circumstances States will be able to move more
efficiently toward terminating parental rights and placing children for
adoption. H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 8 (1997). The Committee also stated that one "barrier to adoption has
been that States often move slowly in moving children toward permanent
settings." Id.
See P.L. 1997, ch. 715, §§ A-1-A-12, B-1-B-15, C-1 (effective June 30, 1998) (amending the Act to add, among other sections, section 4038(7-A) to add provisions on permanency planning).
Section 4050, which sets forth the goals of the Act's termination subchapter, currently provides:
that instability and impermanency are contrary to the welfare of children, it
is the intent of the Legislature that this subchapter:
1. Termination of parental rights. Allow for the termination of parental rights at the earliest possible
time after rehabilitation and reunification efforts have been discontinued and
termination is in the best interest of the child;
2. Return to family. Eliminate the
need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to
correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family;
3. Adoption. Promote the adoption of children into
stable families rather than allowing children to remain in the impermanency of
4. Protect interests of child. Be
liberally construed to serve and protect the best interests of the child. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (2004) (emphasis added). The legislative history is also consistent with this statutory policy:
The purpose of this section is to stress the movement
toward freeing children for adoption as soon as it is clear that the children
will not be able to return to their parents. The section further indicates that the subchapter on
termination of parental rights should be liberally construed to serve and
protect the best interests of the children involved.
2166, Statement of Fact (111th Legis. 1984). The purpose of the 1984 legislation "is to assure that
children whose lives have been disrupted are provided safe permanent homes
as soon as possible." Id. (emphasis added).
Section 4038(7-A) reads:
Planning Hearing. The court shall conduct a permanency
planning hearing and shall determine a permanency plan within 12 months of the
time a child is considered to have entered foster care and every 12 months
thereafter, unless subsequent reviews are no longer required pursuant to
subsection 1-A. If the court's
jeopardy ruling includes a finding of an aggravating factor, the court may
order the department to cease reunification, in which case a permanency
planning hearing must commence within 30 days of the order to cease
A. A child is considered to have entered foster care on
the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to
child abuse or neglect or on the 60th day after removal of the child from home,
B. The permanency plan for the child must contain
determinations on the following issues.
(1) The permanency plan must determine whether and when,
if applicable, the child will be:
(a) Returned to the parent. Before the court may enter an order returning the custody of
the child to a parent, the parent must show that the parent has carried out the
responsibilities set forth in section 4041, subsection 1-A, paragraph B; that
to the court's satisfaction the parent has rectified and resolved the problems
that caused the removal of the child from home and any subsequent problems that
would interfere with the parent's ability to care for and protect the child
from jeopardy; and that the parent can protect the child from jeopardy;
(b) Placed for adoption, in which case the department
shall file a petition for termination of parental rights;
(c) Referred for legal guardianship; or
(d) Placed in another planned permanent living
arrangement when the department has documented to the court a compelling reason
for determining that it would not be in the best interests of the child to be
(2) In the case of a child placed in foster care outside
the state in which the parents of the child live, the permanency plan must
determine whether the out-of-state placement continues to be appropriate and in
(3) In the case of a child who is 16 years of age or
older, the permanency plan must determine the services needed to assist the
C. The court shall consider, but is not bound by, the
wishes of the child in making a determination under this subsection if the
child is 12 years of age or older.
Here, however, the permanency planning order entered in September 2003, which preceded the termination hearing, only memorialized the Department's position, stating: "The Department intends that the permanency plan be adoption and has filed a petition to terminate parental rights." [10]
Requiring the trial court to consider permanency and whether a compelling reason exists as to support long-term foster care is further supported by 22 M.R.S.A. § 4064 (2004). Section 4064 provides in pertinent part:
1. Defined. "Long-term foster care"
means a foster family placement for a child in the custody of the department in
which the department retains custody of the child while delegating to the
foster parents the duty and authority to make certain decisions. The placement is intended to continue
until the child becomes 18 years old, unless altered or terminated in the best
2. Authority for placement. The
department may place in long-term foster care a child in its
custody, if:
A. The child had been in foster
care for 6 months or parental rights have been terminated;
B. The department has
decided that it is not likely that the child can be returned to his parents and
has so notified the parents; [and]
C. In the judgment of the
department, it is not likely that the child can be placed in an adoptive home;
22 M.R.S.A. § 4064 (emphasis
added). In this case, the
Department, had it sought to do so, would not have been able to place Thomas
and Rose in long-term foster care because the third prong would not have been
met. In an order after Judicial
Review and Permanency Planning dated September 19, 2003, the court noted that
the Department intended the permanency plan to be adoption.
The statutorily mandated factors that a court must consider, which are called "[p]rimary considerations," are "the best interest of the child, the needs of the child, including the child's age, the child's attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the child's ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into the parent's home and the child's physical and emotional needs." 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(2).
[p]ursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. §
4038(7-A), the Court makes the following determinations:
(1) The children shall not
[be] returned to either parent;
(2) The children shall not
(3) The children shall not,
at this time, be referred for legal guardianship;
(4) The children
shall, at this time, be placed in another planned permanent living arrangement,
specifically, remain in the custody of the Department and placed in the current
foster home. [13]
Here, for example, Thomas's counselor testified that she was hampered during this period in her ability to counsel and assist Thomas because of the uncertainty associated with where and with whom he would ultimately be living. She also testified that the uncertainty was making him "very anxious."
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, the requirement that the court articulate the compelling reason to continue an impermanent permanency plan does not create a "presumption."
It is the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over adoptions. Before an adoption can be finalized, the Probate Court is required to find that the adoption is in the best interests of the adoptee. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-308(a)(5) (1998). The factors to be considered in making that determination are listed in 18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-308(b) (1998 & Supp. 2004).
Some jurisdictions have statutes addressing contact or communication by adoptive parents or the child with the birth parents. See Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 n.3 (Nev. 2002) (citing several state statutes).