Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190513_0001201.ETX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-07 04:25:44
Document Index: 265570680

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 1951', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 16']

FindACase™ | Gasaway v. United States
Gasaway v. United States
Movant, Edmon Gasaway, an inmate currently confined at FCI Victorville, proceeding pro se, filed this motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
On May 16, 1996, a federal grand jury returned a seventeen-count indictment against movant and four co-defendants. Count 1 charged movant with interference of commerce by threats or violence (Hobbs Act conspiracy), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Count 14 charged him with interference with commerce by threats and violence (Hobbs Act robbery), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and Count 15 charged him with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The grand jury later returned a second superseding indictment in which the basic charges against movant did not change, but added two additional counts against him: Count 16, which charged movant with interference with commerce by threats and violence (Hobbs Act robbery), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and Count 17, which charged movant with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). A third superseding indictment was returned on October 18, 1996, but the essential charges against movant did not change. Movant went to trial on the third superseding indictment, and on November 8, 1996, the jury convicted him on all five counts.
The PSR calculated movant's total offense level for the Hobbs Act conspiracy and robberies (Counts 1, 14, and 16) to be 24 under the 1996 version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. There were no adjustments under the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, or the armed career criminal guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. The mandatory statutory sentence for movant's first § 924(c) count (Count 15) was a five year term of imprisonment. Movant's second § 924(c) count (Count 17) carried a mandatory statutory term of imprisonment for twenty years.
Movant's criminal history category was II. At level 24, this yielded a guideline sentencing range of a 57-71 month term of imprisonment for the Hobbs Act counts. The guideline range for the first § 924(c) count was five years, which was required to be served consecutively. The range for the second § 924(c) count was twenty years, which was also required to be consecutive.
On March 3, 1997, the Court sentenced movant to an 87 month term of imprisonment for the Hobbs Act counts; a 60 month term of imprisonment for the first § 924(c) count, to be served consecutively; and a 240 month term of imprisonment for the second § 924(c) count, also to be served consecutively. The Court entered judgment on March 5, 1997. Movant appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.
On June 3, 2002, movant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was assigned No. 1:02-CV-403. This first motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence was denied. Movant filed three additional § 2255 motions in 2013, which were denied.
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, in which it held that the “residual clause” definition for “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S.Ct. at 2563. After obtaining permission from the Fifth Circuit to file another Section 2255 based on Johnson, movant filed the present § 2255 motion on June 13, 2016. Specifically, movant claims that Johnson rendered his Section 924(c) convictions invalid, arguing that the Hobbs Act conspiracy offense for which he was convicted is no longer a crime of violence under the definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
On September 2, 2016, this Court ordered the Government to show cause. The Government filed a Response on November 3, 2016, arguing movant's claims were not cognizable on collateral review as the Supreme Court had not yet addressed whether Johnson applied to § 924(c) or, if so, whether it may be applied on collateral review. The Government noted that the Supreme Court would be deciding whether Johnson applied to career offenders under the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and, if so, whether it applied retroactively on collateral review in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544 (June 27, 2016).
On November 29, 2016, movant filed a motion to stay and reconsider pending the Supreme Court rulings in Beckles and Dimaya. Movant filed a Reply to the Government's Response on January 23, 2017, arguing his motion should be granted in light of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). On September 18, 2017, this Court denied movant's motion to stay as it appeared neither Beckles nor Dimaya would provide movant any relief.[1]
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Movant then filed a Supplemental Response on May 29, 2018, arguing the Supreme Court in Dimaya did not limit its holding to § 16(b) and ...