Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20090720_0010596.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 10:17:04
Document Index: 300304491

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Vasquez v. Schwarzenegger
Vasquez v. Schwarzenegger
LUIS VASQUEZ PLAINTIFF,v.ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is before the undersigned pursuant to plaintiff's consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636; see also E.D. Cal. Local Rules, Appx. A, at (k)(1)-(2). Court records indicate that plaintiff has paid the $350.00 filing fee in full.
Though plaintiff has paid the filing fee, he has also requested authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow the court to direct the U.S. Marshal's Office to serve the complaint rather than plaintiff being entirely responsible for service of process. However, the amount of plaintiff's earnings shows that plaintiff is able to pay the filing fee and costs. Thus, plaintiff has made an inadequate showing of indigency. See Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Carson Adult High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff alleges that he was recently reclassified as eligible for a transfer to an out of state prison. While it does not appear that plaintiff has a pending transfer date in the immediate future, he seeks an injunction regarding the reclassification and any potential transfer. Plaintiff contends that the reclassification is in violation of prison and state regulations that prevent prisoners from being transferred who have frequent visits from family members. Plaintiff states he has frequent visits from close family. Plaintiff also argues that he has a heart condition that doctors refuse to recognize, which should also prevent him from being transferred out of state. However, plaintiff has provided no specific details regarding the medical issue. Plaintiff also argues that he will not have access to California legal materials if he is incarcerated at an out of state prison. Finally, plaintiff claims that the appeals officials have improperly screened out his appeals.
In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that a prisoner does not have a due process right against a transfer: "[t]hat life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules." Meachum, at 225, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. Generally, prison officials' housing and classification decisions do not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1985) (prison authorities may change a prisoner's "place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another" without violating the prisoner's due process rights). While in Meachum, the U.S. Supreme Court is explicitly addressing transfers of inmates within the state prison system, the high court has made clear that the reasoning of, inter alia, Meachum, applies beyond the intrastate context and "compels the conclusion that an interstate prison transfer ... does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause in and of itself." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 & n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976) (even "substantially burdensome consequences," such as separation from home and family due to a prison transfer, does not implicate due process). Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim regarding his reclassification for out of state transfer.
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance procedures). This right requires prison officials to "assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right, however, only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n. 3 & 354-55. Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354-55.
As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. "Actual injury" is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2007).
Delays in providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are "not of constitutional significance" if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362.
Here, plaintiff's claims are speculative at best. As plaintiff has yet to be transferred, he has no actual knowledge regarding the material available in the out of state prison law library to which he may be transferred. As plaintiff's claims are speculative and he cannot show any actual injury, his complaint fails to state a claim for denial of access to the courts
In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is "deliberate indifference." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998 (1992).
A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900 F. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1989). McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Plaintiff has not stated any specific details regarding his medical claim.
Prisoners do not have a "separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Even the non-existence of, or the failure of prison officials to properly implement, an administrative appeals process within the prison system does not raise constitutional concerns. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). See also, Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D.Ill. 1982) ("[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment"). Specifically, a failure to process a grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, supra. State regulations give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution only if those regulations pertain to "freedom from restraint" that "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995).*fn1
Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend, within thirty (30) days of service of this order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.
1. Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is denied
2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for the reasons discussed above, with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this Order. Failure to file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of this action.