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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1202', '§ 924', '§ 1202', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 924', '§ 1202', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 924', '§ 902', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 1202', '§ 922']

UNITED STATES V. BATCHELDER, 442 U. S. 114 - Volume 442 - 1979 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 442 > UNITED STATES V. BATCHELDER, 442 U. S. 114 (1979) > Full Text
(b) The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on three principles of statutory interpretation in construing § 1202(a) to override the penalties authorized by § 924(a). The doctrine that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity is not applicable here, since there is no ambiguity to resolve. Nor can § 1202(a) be interpreted as implicitly repealing § 924(a) whenever a defendant's conduct might violate both sections. Legislative intent to repeal must be manifest in the "positive repugnancy between the provisions.'" United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 308 U. S. 199. In this case, the penalty provisions are fully capable of coexisting because they apply to convictions under different statutes. Finally, the maxim that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions offers no assistance here, since this principle applies only when an alternative interpretation is fairly possible from the language of the statute. There is simply no basis in
At issue in this case are two overlapping provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but, by a divided vote, remanded for resentencing. 581 F.2d 626 (CA7 1978). The majority recognized that respondent had been indicted and convicted under § 922(h), and that § 924(a) permits five years' imprisonment for such violations. 581 F.2d at 629. However, noting that the substantive elements
of § 922(h) and 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) are identical as applied to a convicted felon who unlawfully receives a firearm, the court interpreted the Omnibus Act to allow no more than the 2-year maximum sentence provided by § 1202(a). 581 F.2d at 629. [Footnote 4] In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on three principles of statutory construction. Because, in its view, the "arguably contradict[ory]" penalty provisions for similar conduct and the "inconclusive" legislative history raised doubt whether Congress had intended the two penalty provisions to coexist, the court first applied the doctrine that ambiguities in criminal legislation are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 630. Second, the court determined that, since § 1202(a) was "Congress' last word on the issue of penalty," it may have implicitly repealed the punishment provisions of § 924(a). 581 F.2d at 630. Acknowledging that the "first two principles cannot be applied to these facts without some difficulty," the majority also invoked the maxim that a court should, if possible, interpret a statute to avoid constitutional questions. Id. at 630-631. Here, the court reasoned, the "prosecutor's power to select one of two statutes that are identical except for their penalty provisions" implicated "important constitutional protections." Id. at 631.
The dissent found no basis in the Omnibus Act or its legislative history for engrafting the penalty provisions of § 1202(a) onto §§ 922(h) and 924(a). 581 F.2d at 638-639. Relying on
Section 922(h), contained in Title IV of the Omnibus Act, prohibits four categories of individuals from receiving "any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." See n 2, supra. Persons who violate Title IV are subject to the penalties provided by § 924(a), which authorizes a maximum fine of $5,000 and imprisonment for up to five years. See n 3, supra. Section 1202(a), located in Title VII of the Omnibus Act, forbids five categories of individuals from "receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm." This same section authorizes a maximum fine of
That Congress intended to enact two independent gun control statutes, each fully enforceable on its own terms, is confirmed by the legislative history of the Omnibus Act. Section 922(h) derived from § 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act of
1938, 442 U. S. 52 Stat. 1251, and § 5 of that Act, 52 Stat. 1252, authorized the same maximum prison term as § 924(a). Title IV of the Omnibus Act merely recodified with some modification this "carefully constructed package of gun control legislation," which had been in existence for many years. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 431 U. S. 570 (1977); see United States v. Bass, supra at 404 U. S. 343 n. 10; 15 U.S.C. §§ 902, 905 (1964 ed.). By contrast, Title VII was a "last-minute" floor amendment, "hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report." United States v. Bass, supra, at 404 U. S. 344, and n. 11; see Scarborough v. United States, supra at 431 U. S. 569-570, and n. 9. And the meager legislative debates involving that amendment demonstrate no intention to alter the terms of Title IV. Immediately before the Senate passed Title VII, Senator Dodd inquired whether it would substitute for Title IV. 114 Cong.Rec. 14774 (1968). Senator Long, the sponsor of the amendment, replied that § 1202 would "take nothing from," but merely "add to," Title IV. 114 Cong.Rec. 14774 (1968). Similarly, although Title VII received only passing mention in House discussions of the bill, Representative Machen made clear that the amendment would "complement . . . the gun control legislation contained in title IV." Id. at 16286. Had these legislators intended to preempt Title IV in cases of overlap, they presumably would not have indicated that the purpose of Title VII was to complement Title IV. See Scarborough v. United States, supra, at 431 U. S. 573. [Footnote 6]
In construing § 1202(a) to override the penalties authorized by § 924(a), the Court of Appeals relied, we believe erroneously, on three principles of statutory interpretation. First, the court invoked the well established doctrine that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity. E.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 401 U. S. 812 (1971); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 347; United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 435 U. S. 379 (1978); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 441 U. S. 778-779 (1979); Dunn v. United States, ante at 442 U. S. 112-113. Although this principle of construction applies to sentencing as well as substantive provisions, see Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 435 U. S. 14-15 (1978), in the instant case, there is no ambiguity to resolve. Respondent unquestionably violated § 922(h), and § 924(a) unquestionably permits five years' imprisonment for such a violation. That § 1202(a) provides different penalties for essentially the same conduct is no justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory
In resolving the statutory question, the majority below expressed "serious doubts about the constitutionality of two statutes that provide different penalties for identical conduct." 581 F.2d at 633-634 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the court suggested that the statutes might (1) be void for vagueness, (2) implicate "due process and [equal protection interests] in avoiding excessive prosecutorial discretion and in
This Court has long recognized that, when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. See United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. 43, 344 U. S. 456 (1952); Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 346 U. S. 294 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring, joined by five Members of the Court); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 368 U. S. 456 (1962); SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 393 U. S. 468 (1969); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 778. Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion. See Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (1869); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 418 U. S. 693 (1974); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 434 U. S. 364 (1978).
The Court of Appeals acknowledged this "settled rule" allowing prosecutorial choice. 581 F.2d at 632. Nevertheless, relying on the dissenting opinion in Berra v. United States, 351 U. S. 131 (1956), [Footnote 8] the court distinguished overlapping statutes with identical standards of proof from provisions that vary in some particular. 581 F.2d at 632-633. In the court's view, when two statutes prohibit "exactly the same conduct," the prosecutor's "selection of which of two penalties to apply" would be "unfettered." Id. at 633, and n. 11. Because such prosecutorial discretion could produce "unequal justice," the court expressed doubt that this form of legislative redundancy was constitutional. Id. at 631. We find this analysis factually and legally unsound.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' assertions, a prosecutor's discretion to choose between §§ 922(h) and 1202(a) is not
Approaching the problem of prosecutorial discretion from a slightly different perspective, the Court of Appeals postulated that the statutes might impermissibly delegate to the Executive Branch the Legislature's responsibility to fix criminal penalties.
See United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 11 U. S. 34 (1812); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 220 U. S. 516-517, 220 U. S. 519 (1911); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 486. We do not agree. The provisions at issue plainly demarcate the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and impose. In light of that specificity, the power that Congress has delegated to those officials is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal laws. Having informed the courts, prosecutors, and defendants of the permissible punishment alternatives available under each Title, Congress has fulfilled its duty. See United States v. Evans, supra at 333 U. S. 486, 333 U. S. 492, 333 U. S. 495.
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