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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', 'art 2', '§ 8', '§ 46', '§ 1606', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 441', '§ 46']

Sporhase Vs Nebraska Ex Rel Douglas - Citation 105169 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Sporhase Vs. Nebraska Ex Rel. Douglas - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105169CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJul-02-1982Case Number458 U.S. 941AppellantSporhaseRespondentNebraska Ex Rel. DouglasExcerpt:
sporhase v. nebraska ex rel. douglas - 458 u.s. 941 (1982)
a nebraska statute provides that any person who intends to withdraw groundwater from any well located in the state and transport it for use in an adjoining state must obtain a permit from the nebraska department of water resources. if the director of water resources finds that such withdrawal is reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he will grant the permit.....Judgment:
1. Ground water is an article of commerce, and therefore subject to congressional regulation. Pp.
458 U. S. 945
(a) Although appellee's claimed greater ownership interest in groundwater than in certain other natural resources may not be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis, it does not remove Nebraska groundwater from such scrutiny, since appellee's argument is still based on the legal fiction of state ownership. Pp.
(b) The States' interests in conserving and preserving scarce water resources in the arid Western States clearly have an interstate dimension. The agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms provide the archtypical example of commerce among the States for which the Framers of the Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation. Here, the multistate character of the aquifer underlying appellants' tracts of land, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas, demonstrates that there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of diminishing water resources. Pp.
458 U. S. 952
commerce. While the first three conditions set forth in the statute for granting a permit -- that the withdrawal of the groundwater be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare -- do not, on their faces, impermissibly burden interstate commerce, the reciprocity provision operates as an explicit barrier to commerce between Nebraska and its adjoining States. Nebraska therefore has the initial burden of demonstrating a close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose. Such requirement, when superimposed on the first three restrictions, fails to clear this initial hurdle, since there is no evidence that it is narrowly tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale. Thus, it does not survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially discriminatory legislation. Pp.
458 U. S. 954
3. Congress has not granted the States permission to engage in groundwater regulation that would otherwise be impermissible. Although there are 37 federal statutes and a number of interstate compacts demonstrating Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional restraints on such state law. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal water projects nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights through mutual agreement constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. Pp.
458 U. S. 959
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined,
458 U. S. 961
Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a Nebraska statutory restriction on the withdrawal of groundwater from any well within Nebraska intended for use in an adjoining State. The challenge presents three questions under the Commerce Clause: [
] (1) whether groundwater is an article of commerce and therefore subject to congressional regulation; (2) whether the Nebraska restriction on the interstate transfer of groundwater imposes an impermissible burden on commerce; and (3) whether Congress has granted the States permission to engage in groundwater regulation that otherwise would be impermissible.
Appellee brought this action to enjoin appellants from transferring the water across the border without a permit. [
] The trial court rejected the defense that the statute imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce and granted the injunction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981). It held that, under Nebraska law, groundwater is not "a market item freely transferable for value among private parties, and therefore [is] not an article of commerce."
at 705, 305 N.W.2d at
] The Chief Justice, while agreeing that the statutory criteria governing the transfer of water to an adjoining State did not violate the Commerce Clause, dissented on the narrow ground that appellee violated both the Federal and Nebraska Constitutions by attempting
at 713, 305 N.W.2d at 20.
In holding that groundwater is not an article of commerce, the Nebraska Supreme Court and appellee cite as controlling precedent
(1908). In that case, a New Jersey statute prohibited the interstate transfer of any surface water located within the State. [
] The Hudson County Water Co. nevertheless contracted with New York City to supply one of its boroughs with water from the Passaic River in New Jersey. The State Attorney General sought from the New Jersey courts an injunction against fulfillment of the contract. Over the water company's objections that the statute impaired the obligation of contract, took property without just compensation, interfered with interstate commerce, denied New York citizens the privileges afforded New Jersey citizens, and denied New York citizens the equal protection of the laws, the injunction was granted. This Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, affirmed.
Most of the Court's opinion addresses the just compensation claim. Justice Holmes refused to ground the Court's holding, as did the New Jersey state courts, [
] on "the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the State may be said to possess."
. For the statute was justified as a regulatory measure that, on balance, did not amount to a taking of property that required just compensation. Putting aside the "problems of irrigation," the State's interest in preserving its waters was well within its police power. [
] That interest was not dependent on any demonstration that the State's water resources were inadequate for present or future use. The State "finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will."
"A man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited and qualified right to the same end. The case is covered in this respect by
[(1896)]."
While appellee relies upon Hudson County, appellants rest on our summary affirmance of a three-judge District Court judgment in
City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F.Supp. 828 (WD Tex.),
385 U. S. 35
(1966). The city of Altus is located near the southern border of Oklahoma. Large population increases rendered inadequate its source of municipal water. It consequently obtained from the owners of land in an adjoining Texas county the contractual right to pump the groundwater underlying that land and to transport it across the border. The Texas Legislature thereafter enacted a statute that forbade the interstate exportation of groundwater without the approval of that body. [
] The city filed suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the statute violated the Commerce Clause.
The city relied upon
(1911), which invalidated an Oklahoma statute that prevented the interstate transfer of natural gas produced within the State, [
(1923), which invalidated a West Virginia statute
that accorded a preference to the citizens of that State in the purchase of natural gas produced therein. [
] The Texas Attorney General defended the statute on two grounds. First, he asserted that its purpose was to conserve and protect the State's water resources by regulating the withdrawal of groundwater. The District Court rejected that defense because similar conservation claims had met defeat in
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra,
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra.
] Second, the State argued that the statute regulated groundwater, and that groundwater is not an article of commerce, citing
(1908). The court rejected this argument, since the statute directly regulated the interstate transportation of
water that had been pumped from the ground, and, under Texas law, such water was an article of commerce. The court then had little difficulty in concluding that the statute imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. [
In summarily affirming the District Court in
we did not necessarily adopt the court's reasoning. Our affirmance indicates only our agreement with the result reached by the District Court.
453 U. S. 499
(1981). That result is not necessarily inconsistent with the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding in this case. For Texas law differs significantly from Nebraska law regarding the rights of a surface owner to groundwater that he has withdrawn. According to the District Court in
208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617 (quoting
Olson v. City of Wahoo,
124 Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933)).
however, is inconsistent with
For in the latter case, the Court found
to be controlling on the Commerce Clause issue.
which sustained a Connecticut ban on the interstate transportation of game birds captured in that State, was premised on the theory that the State owned its wild animals, and therefore was free to qualify any ownership interest it might recognize in the persons who capture them. One such restriction is a prohibition against interstate transfer of the captured animals. This theory of public ownership was advanced as a defense in
City of Altus.
The State argued that it owned all subterranean water, and therefore could recognize ownership in the surface owner who withdraws the water, but restrict that ownership to use of the water within the State. That theory, upon which the Commerce Clause issue in
was decided, was rejected by the District Court in
] In expressly
three years ago, this Court traced the demise of the public ownership theory and definitively recast it as
441 U. S. 334
See also Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n,
436 U. S. 384
-387 (1978);
-285 (1977). In
the Court found the State's interests insufficient to sustain a ban on the interstate transfer of natural minnows seined from waters within the State.
Appellee insists, however, that Nebraska water is distinguishable from other natural resources. The surface owner who withdraws Nebraska groundwater enjoys a lesser ownership interest in the water than the captor of game birds in Connecticut or minnows in Oklahoma or groundwater in Texas, for in
Geer, Hughes,
the States permitted intrastate trade in the natural resources once they were captured. Although appellee's greater ownership interest may not be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis, it does not absolutely remove Nebraska groundwater from such scrutiny. For appellee's argument is still based on the legal fiction of state ownership. The fiction is illustrated by municipal water supply arrangements pursuant to which groundwater is withdrawn from rural areas and transferred to urban areas. Such arrangements are permitted in Nebraska,
see Metropolitan Utilities District v. Merritt Beach Co.,
179 Neb. 783, 140 N.W.2d 626 (1966), but the Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished them on the ground that the
transferor was only permitted to charge as a price for the water his costs of distribution and not the value of the water itself. 208 Neb. at 708, 305 N.W.2d at 618. Unless demand is greater than supply, however, this reasoning does not distinguish minnows, the price of which presumably is derived from the costs of seining and of transporting the catch to market. Even in cases of shortage, in which the seller of the natural resource can demand a price that exceeds his costs, the State's rate structure that requires the price to be cost-justified is economically comparable to price regulation. A State's power to regulate prices or rates has never been thought to depend on public ownership of the controlled commodity. It would be anomalous if federal power to regulate economic transactions in natural resources depended on the characterization of the payment as compensation for distribution services, on the one hand, or as the price of goods, on the other.
Cf. In re Rahrer,
140 U. S. 558
The second asserted distinction is that water, unlike other natural resources, is essential for human survival. Appellee, and the
that are vitally interested in conserving and preserving scarce water resources in the arid Western States, have convincingly demonstrated the desirability of state and local management of groundwater. [
But the States' interests clearly have an interstate dimension. Although water is indeed essential for human survival, studies indicate that over 80% of our water supplies is used for agricultural purposes. [
] The agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They provide the archtypical example of commerce among the several States for which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize federal regulation. The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer -- underlying appellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas [
] -- confirms the view that there is a significant federal interest in conservation, as well as in fair allocation, of this diminishing resource.
The Western States' interests, and their asserted superior competence, in conserving and preserving scarce water resources are not irrelevant in the Commerce Clause inquiry. Nor is appellee's claim to public ownership without significance. Like Congress' deference to state water law,
458 U. S. 958
-960, these factors inform the determination whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state groundwater regulation are reasonable or unreasonable. But appellee's claim that Nebraska groundwater is not an article of commerce goes too far: it would not only exempt Nebraska groundwater regulation from burden-on-commerce analysis, it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such regulation.
-623 (1978). If Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas and States with similar property laws.
Our conclusion that water is an article of commerce raises, but does not answer, the question whether the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional. For the existence of unexercised federal regulatory power does not foreclose state regulation of its water resources, of the uses of water within the State, or indeed, of interstate commerce in water.
-767 (1945);
322 U. S. 548
-549 (1944);
(1852). Determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce requires a more careful inquiry:
The only purpose that appellee advances for § 46-613.01 is to conserve and preserve diminishing sources of groundwater. The purpose is unquestionably legitimate and highly important, [
] and the other aspects of Nebraska's groundwater
regulation demonstrate that it is genuine. Appellants' land in Nebraska is located within the boundaries of the Upper Republican Ground Water Control Area, which was designated as such by the Director of the Nebraska Department of Water Resources based upon a determination that there is "[a]n inadequate groundwater supply to meet present or reasonably foreseeable needs for beneficial use of such water supply." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-658(1) (Supp.1981);
App. 56-60. Pursuant to § 46-666(1), the Upper Republican Natural Resources District has promulgated special rules and regulations governing groundwater withdrawal and use.
App. 61-82. The rules and regulations define as "critical" those townships in the control area in which the annual decline of the groundwater table exceeds a fixed percentage; appellants' Nebraska tract is located within a critical township. The rules and regulations require the installation of flow meters on every well within the control area, specify the amount of water per acre that may be used for irrigation, and set the spacing that is required between wells. They also strictly limit the intrastate transfer of groundwater: transfers are only permitted between lands controlled by the same groundwater user, and all transfers must be approved by the District Board of Directors.
at 68-69.
Moreover, in the absence of a contrary view expressed by Congress, we are reluctant to condemn, as unreasonable, measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage. Our reluctance stems from the "confluence of [several] realities."
437 U. S. 534
(1978). First, a State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens -- and not simply the health of its economy -- is at the core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other.
(1949). Second, the legal expectation that, under certain circumstances, each State may restrict water within its borders has been fostered over the years not only by our equitable apportionment decrees,
see, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado,
353 U. S. 953
(1957), but also by the negotiation and enforcement of interstate compacts. Our law therefore has recognized the relevance of state boundaries in the allocation of scarce water resources. Third, although appellee's claim to public ownership of Nebraska groundwater cannot justify a total denial of federal regulatory power, it may support a limited preference for its own citizens in the utilization of the resource.
See Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra,
437 U. S. 533
-534. In this regard, it is relevant that appellee's claim is logically
more substantial than claims to public ownership of other natural resources.
458 U. S. 950
-951. Finally, given appellee's conservation efforts, the continuing availability of groundwater in Nebraska is not simply happenstance; the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage.
cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
-628, and n. 6;
(1978). A facial examination of the first three conditions set forth in § 46-613.01 does not, therefore, indicate that they impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Appellants, indeed, seem to concede their reasonableness.
-- the reciprocity provision that troubled the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court. Because Colorado forbids the exportation of its groundwater, [
] the reciprocity provision operates as an explicit barrier to commerce between the two States. The State therefore bears the initial burden of demonstrating a close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
tailored to the conservation and preservation rationale. Even though the supply of water in a particular well may be abundant, or perhaps even excessive, and even though the most beneficial use of that water might be in another State, such water may not be shipped into a neighboring State that does not permit its water to be used in Nebraska. If it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers a water shortage, that the intrastate transportation of water from areas of abundance to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the importation of water from adjoining States would roughly compensate for any exportation to those States, then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity provision. A demonstrably arid State conceivably might be able to marshal evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve water. Appellee, however, does not claim that such evidence exists. We therefore are not persuaded that the reciprocity requirement -- when superimposed on the first three restrictions in the statute -- significantly advances the State's legitimate conservation and preservation interest; it surely is not narrowly tailored to serve that purpose. The reciprocity requirement does not survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially discriminatory legislation.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra,
Such language defines the extent of the federal legislation's preemptive effect on state law.
(1980). The second part provides that "the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws." Such language mandates that questions of water rights that arise in relation to a federal project are to be determined in accordance with state law.
438 U. S. 645
The interstate compacts to which appellee refers are agreements among States regarding rights to surface water.
The Council of State Governments, Interstate Compacts and Agencies 25-29, 31-32 (1979). Appellee emphasizes a compact between Nebraska and Colorado involving water rights to the South Platte River,
44 Stat. (part 2) 195, and a compact among Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas involving water rights to the Republican River,
57 Stat. 86.
Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate Congress' deference to state water law, [
] they do not
indicate that Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to which Congress has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their differences over water rights through mutual agreement, [
] constitutes persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce. In the instances in which we have found such consent, Congress' "
intent and policy' to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause" was "`expressly stated.'"
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, supra,
455 U. S. 343
328 U. S. 427
(1946)). [
Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
455 U. S. 155
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." For general explanations of Commerce Clause analysis,
see, e.g., Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
Because of the reciprocity requirement of § 46-613.01, appellants would not have been granted a permit had they applied for one. Their failure to submit an application therefore does not deprive them of standing to challenge the legality of the reciprocity requirement.
Cf. Larson v. Valente,
209 U. S. 353
209 U. S. 354
Justice Holmes, the author of the Court's opinion in
noted his dissent.
Justice Holmes dissented, expressing the view that the Court's decision was inconsistent with
262 U. S. 603
"Considering the statute in question only with regard to whether it regulates the transportation and use of water after it has been withdrawn from a well and becomes personal property, such statute constitutes an unreasonable burden upon, and interference with, interstate commerce. Moreover, on the facts of this case, it appear[s] to us that [the Texas statute] does not have for its purpose, nor does it operate, to conserve water resources of the State of Texas except in the sense that it does so for her own benefit, to the detriment of her sister States, as in the case of
In the name of conservation, the statute seeks to prohibit interstate shipments of water while indulging in the substantial discrimination of permitting the unrestricted intrastate production and transportation of water between points within the State, no matter how distant; for example, from Wilbarger County to El Paso County, Texas. Obviously, the statute had little relation to the cause of conservation."
438 U. S. 648
(1978), we explained some of the circumstances that support a general policy of local water management under differing legal systems:
See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,
The reciprocity requirement cannot, of course, be justified as a response to another State's unreasonable burden on commerce.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U. S. 379
438 U. S. 653
Similarly, this Court has encouraged States to resolve their water disputes through interstate compacts, rather than by equitable apportionment adjudication.
See Colorado v. Kansas,
320 U. S. 392
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
(1946) (McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33);
(1945) (§ 1606(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. 1391);
(1936) (Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084);
(1891) (Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313).
That these two questions are quite distinct leaves no room for doubt. Congress may regulate not only the stream of commerce itself, but also activities which affect interstate commerce, including wholly intrastate activities.
(1914). The activity upon which the regulatory effect of the congressional statute falls in many of these cases does not directly involve articles of commerce at all. For example, in
the employees were engaged in the operation and maintenance of a loft building in which large quantities of goods for interstate commerce were produced; no one contended that these employees themselves, or the work which they actually performed, dealt with articles of commerce. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act were applied to them because Congress extended the terms of the Act not only to those who were "engaged in commerce" but also to those who were engaged "in the production of goods for commerce." 316 U.S. at
the mere negative impact of the Commerce Clause in the absence of any action by Congress. Upon a showing that groundwater overdraft has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, for example, Congress arguably could regulate groundwater overdraft, even if groundwater is not an "article of commerce" itself.
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn.,
452 U. S. 281
-283 (1981);
452 U. S. 310
-313 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment);
(1942). It is therefore wholly unnecessary to decide whether Congress could regulate groundwater overdraft in order to decide this case; since Congress has not undertaken such a regulation, I would leave the determination of its validity until such time as it is necessary to decide that question.
The question actually involved in this case is whether Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-613.01 (1978) runs afoul of the unexercised authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. While the Court apparently agrees that our equitable apportionment decrees in cases such as
(1957), and the execution and approval of interstate compacts apportioning water have given rise to "the legal expectation that, under certain circumstances, each State may restrict water within its borders,"
458 U. S. 956
, it insists on an elaborate balancing process in which the State's "interest" is weighed under traditional Commerce Clause analysis.
I think that, in more than one of our cases in which a State has invoked our original jurisdiction, the unsoundness of the Court's approach is manifest. For example, in
"This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
-sovereign. In that capacity, the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. "
Five years earlier, in
Of course, a State may not discriminate against interstate commerce when it regulates even such a resource. If the State allows indiscriminate intrastate commercial dealings in a particular resource, it may have a difficult task proving that an outright prohibition on interstate commercial dealings is not such a discrimination. I had thought that this was the basis for this Court's decisions in
(1911). In each case, the State permitted a natural resource to be reduced to private possession, permitted an intrastate market to exist in that resource, and either barred interstate commerce entirely or granted its residents a commercial preference. [
By contrast, Nebraska so regulates groundwater that it cannot be said that the State permits any "commerce," intrastate or interstate, to exist in this natural resource. As with almost all of the Western States, Nebraska does not recognize an absolute ownership interest in groundwater, but grants landowners only a right to
use groundwater on the land from which it has been extracted.
Moreover, the landowner's right to use groundwater is limited. Nebraska landowners may not extract groundwater
124 Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933). With the exception of municipal water systems, Nebraska forbids any transportation of groundwater off the land owned or controlled by the person who has appropriated the water from its subterranean source. 208 Neb. 703, 710, 305 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981).
App. 68-69.
additional acreage may be placed under irrigation. The amount of groundwater that may be extracted is strictly limited on an acre-inch-per-irrigated-acre basis. There are also detailed regulations as to the spacing of wells and the use and operation of flow meters.
at 71-82.
Since Nebraska recognizes only a limited right to use groundwater on land owned by the appropriator, it cannot be said that "commerce" in groundwater exists as far as Nebraska is concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46 613.01 (1978) either discriminates against, or "burdens," interstate commerce. Section 46 613.01 is simply a regulation of the landowner's
groundwater extracted from lands he owns within Nebraska. [
] Unlike the Court, I cannot agree that Nebraska's limitation upon a landowner's right to extract water from his land situated in Nebraska
on land he owns in an adjoining State runs afoul of Congress' unexercised authority to regulate interstate commerce. [
(1966), Texas placed no restrictions upon the use or the intrastate sale of groundwater. The
255 F.Supp. at 833, n. 8. Texas' absolute ownership rule is an anomaly among the Western States.
5 R. Clark, Waters and Water Rights § 441 (1972 and 1978 Supp.). In Nebraska, as in most of the Western States, groundwater is not treated as "any other species of property. "
Unlike several other Western States, Nebraska does not entirely forbid groundwater extracted in Nebraska to be used in other States.
Brief for City of El Paso as
2, n. 3. As noted by the Court, Nebraska merely places conditions on such a use of the State's groundwater. A permit must be obtained from the Nebraska Department of Water Resources. If the requested withdrawal of groundwater is determined to be "reasonable, . . . not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and . . . not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare," a permit will be issued so long as the
The Court today invalidates only the reciprocity provision in § 46 613.01.
458 U. S. 957
-958. Appellants, however, have never applied for the permit required by the Nebraska statute. I see nothing in the Court's opinion that would preclude the Nebraska Department of Water Resources from prohibiting appellants from transporting groundwater into the Colorado portion of their land until they obtain the permit required by the statute. I also see nothing in the Court's opinion that would preclude the Department of Water Resources from denying appellants a permit because of a failure to satisfy the remaining conditions in the statute.