Source: http://openjurist.org/654/f2d/1271/alber-v-norfolk-and-western-railway-company
Timestamp: 2016-12-02 20:30:32
Document Index: 704259904

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 3031', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021', '§ 2021']

Although the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed to the trial court's discretion, its decision is not "unfettered by appropriate standards or shielded from thorough appellate review." Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches.
The operative provision of VEVRA is 38 U.S.C. § 2021. In Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 100 S.Ct. 2100, 65 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980), the Supreme Court stated:
The Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (Act), 38 U.S.C. § 2021 et seq., requires that returning veterans be reinstated to the jobs they left for military service "or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay." § 2021(a)(B)(i). The Act further provides that the veteran be reinstated "without loss of seniority." § 2021(b)(1). We interpreted the predecessor of § 2021 to mean that the returning veteran "does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war." Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-285 (66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L.Ed. 1230) (1946). Congress incorporated this principle into the present statute by providing that any person reinstated under the Act should be given "such status in the person's employment as the person would have enjoyed if such person had continued in such employment continuously" during the period of military service. § 3031(b)(2). The statute is to be liberally construed for the benefit of the returning veteran.
Id. at 195-196, 100 S.Ct. at 2104 (citation and footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
The majority of cases construing this section turn on whether a particular type of benefit is a "perquisite of seniority" to which a returning veteran is entitled under VEVRA. Coffy ruled that the test for determining whether a benefit is a "perquisite of seniority" under VEVRA is two-pronged. First, there must be a reasonable certainty that the benefit would have accrued if the employee had not gone into military service. Second, the nature of the benefit must be a reward for length of service rather than a form of short-term compensation for services rendered. 447 U.S. at 197-198, 100 S.Ct. at 2105. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 589, 97 S.Ct. 2002, 2007, 52 L.Ed.2d 595 (1977).
Most factually similar to the instant appeal is McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 357 U.S. 265, 78 S.Ct. 1222, 2 L.Ed.2d 1305 (1958). There, employees were divided into three distinct seniority groups. The relevant collective bargaining agreement required the employer to bulletin vacant positions in order to allow employees to bid on those positions. It also provided that promotions would be confined to each seniority group, except that "group two" employees would be given preference over nonemployees for assignments to "group one" positions based on fitness and ability. Finally, the collective bargaining agreement expressly allowed an employee returning from a leave of absence to exercise seniority rights on any position bulletined during such absence.
357 U.S. at 267-268, 78 S.Ct. at 1224-1225 (emphasis added).
The Court held that McKinney was not entitled to either of the two earlier seniority dates because both "group one" positions depended "not simply on seniority or some other form of automatic progression, but on the exercise of discretion on the part of the employer." Id. at 272, 78 S.Ct. at 1227. The Court, however, granted McKinney leave to amend his complaint to show, if possible, that by custom and practice under the collective bargaining agreement "he would necessarily have been assigned to the group 1 position of bill clerk or assistant cashier had he remained continuously in respondent's employ." Id. at 273, 78 S.Ct. at 1227.6
Finally, and despite the district court's contrary declarations, it is clear that cross-craft orders (position changes between entirely separate labor crafts) and transfer orders (opportunities to transfer from one position to another) are proper remedial devices under VEVRA. Barrett v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., 581 F.2d 132, 137 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1423, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979). As a result, the fact that the Interline Clerk position was transferred to Virginia does not automatically defeat Alber's claims. In Barrett, the Seventh Circuit recognized that while it may be difficult to determine "what would have been," VEVRA simply requires that there be a reasonable certainty that the veteran would have enjoyed the status he claims but for his military service. This is the proper legal standard and the district court did not apply it.
This Court finds that under the VEVRA "escalator principle," 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(2), the right to bid upon bulletined positions was not a status of seniority to which plaintiff was entitled upon return from the service. The bulletins posted pursuant to Contract Rule 17 are neither direct offers for promotion nor company solicitation of employee applicants * * *. The act in this case of bidding upon a position is to be distinguished from cases where an employee has already taken affirmative steps toward promotion and the remaining steps occur automatically, * * * or cases where a benefit accrues without affirmative steps by the employee * * *. While there was persuasive testimony that seniority is a decisive factor in selecting the successful bidder for a position, there was no evidence that seniority in any way governs submission of a bid or that Norfolk plays any role in soliciting bidders for a bulletin. * * * Thus, this Court finds that the right to bid upon bulletins is a right separate and distinct from the benefits of seniority, and that plaintiff is not seeking a status within VEVRA.
Although it is true that the contract is silent with regard to these two situations, the court's focus was errant. First, no practice of employers or agreements between employers and unions can diminish the service adjustment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under VEVRA. See Hembree v. Georgia Power Co., 637 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); accord, Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 383 U.S. 225, 229, 86 S.Ct. 768, 771, 15 L.Ed.2d 717 (1966) (predecessor statute). Therefore, a particular contract interpretation cannot defeat the veteran's statutory rights under VEVRA. Moreover, as noted earlier, the district court erred by failing to apply the "reasonable certainty" test to Alber's claims of "what would have been" but for his military absence.
At this juncture, we simply cannot determine whether Alber's claim for the Interline Clerk position, or any other position, satisfied the "reasonable certainty" test. N & W logically argues that Alber should not be allowed to use hindsight to pick a particular position out of the sixteen positions bulletined during his absence. While McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., supra, 357 U.S. 265, 78 S.Ct. 1222, 2 L.Ed.2d 1305, may be considered contrary to N & W's argument, only two positions opened during the veteran's absence in that case. As a result, the hindsight selection possibilities there were less complex. The facts in the instant case are particularly complicated, but the district court must nevertheless apply them to the proper legal framework before it may pass on the merits of Alber's claims.
I believe that the record and the district court's factual findings conclusively establish that Alber failed to demonstrate "a reasonable certainty that the benefit (of the Interline Clerk position) would have accrued if the employee had not gone into military service." Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 197, 100 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 65 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980); see Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 589, 97 S.Ct. 2002, 2007, 52 L.Ed.2d 595 (1977). I therefore dissent.
In order to establish that the Interline Clerk position was a perquisite of employment under 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(1)(2) (1976), Alber must demonstrate with a "reasonable certainty" that the following sequence of events would have occurred had he not been drafted into military service: 1) that he would have bid on the Interline Clerk position when it opened up in 1967; 2) that Norfolk & Western would have promoted him to that position; 3) that he would have turned down the transfer to Virginia in 1967 and thus obtained "utility" status; and 4) that he would have resigned prior to May 31, 1976, and thus obtained a lump-sum separation allowance. The district court made the following factual findings with regard to this question:
This Court must find for plaintiff if his progression to Interline Switching Clerk would have been a reasonably foreseeable event had he not entered the Armed Forces. Alabama Power v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 97 S.Ct. 2002, 52 L.Ed.2d 595 (1977). The foreseeability of plaintiff's progression is, under the Contract bid system, largely a question of Alber's subjective intent to take the affirmative steps necessary to bid for the position and to remain in St. Louis after the position was transferred. Alber's delay has reduced his claim to a swearing contest inasmuch as these crucial issues must be decided without corroborating witnesses or evidence. It is not at all clear from the record that Alber would have bid upon the position of Interline Clerk, or that if he had bid upon and accepted the Position he would have remained in St. Louis rather than transfer to Virginia. Plaintiff's self-serving assertions that he would have bid upon the Position and have remained in St. Louis are no more helpful than Norfolk's evidence that Alber did not bid upon certain qualitatively unknown bulletins prior to military service.
Alber v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 489 F.Supp. 654, 656-57 (E.D.Mo.1980).
The majority opinion, however, overlooks these factual findings and reverses the district court on the ground that it failed to apply the legal test of "whether it would have been reasonably certain that Alber would have obtained the claimed status but for his military absence." Ante at 13. The district court opinion, as quoted above, ante at 16, clearly reveals that the district court did apply this test. The district court, however, erred in relying upon these findings in concluding that Alber's claim was barred by the doctrine of laches. Alber v. Norfolk & Western, 489 F.Supp. at 657; ante at 1275. The findings, nonetheless, bar Alber's claim on the merits.1 The crucial decisions by Alber would have had to be made by him long prior to the establishment of the lump-sum separation allowance in May 1976.
I also dissent from the majority's conclusion that the railroad "had an affirmative contractual duty to inform Alber of all positions bulletined during his absence." Ante at 8 (footnote omitted). Neither the contract nor VEVRA requires such an extraordinary duty. In large corporations or in the federal government, the paperwork involved in developing and maintaining a nationwide list would be titanic. See Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 662 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1504, 67 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981). VEVRA does not require employers to affirmatively provide preferential treatment for veterans. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981) (construing 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3)).
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court subsequently lessened the veteran's burden of proof under the Act. In Tilton v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 376 U.S. 169, 84 S.Ct. 595, 11 L.Ed.2d 590 (1964), the Court noted that McKinney did not establish a requirement of absolute foreseeability of automatic advancement. Rather, the veteran need only show that it was reasonably certain that advancement would have occurred by virtue of continued employment but for his military absence. Id. at 179-181, 84 S.Ct. at 601-602; see Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 197-198, 100 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 65 L.Ed.2d 53 (1980)
In McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, 357 U.S. 265, 271-72, 78 S.Ct. 1222, 1226-1227, 2 L.Ed.2d 1305 (1958), the Supreme Court in a similar case involving a predecessor statute to 38 U.S.C. § 2021, stated the following: