Source: https://ti-defence.org/gdi/countries/qatar/?risk=political&single-question=7286
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 20:08:10
Document Index: 223323751

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 10', 'Art. 7', 'Art. 196', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 192', 'Art. 119', 'Art. 187', 'Art. 118']

Qatar - Government Defence Integrity Index
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
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17a. Activity
Qatar score: 0/100
There is little to no external audit of defence ministry expenditure.
The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, but does not do so regularly or in much depth. There may be regular deviation from formalised processes.
The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and audits military defence spending on a semi-regular, formal basis. Only financial and compliance audits are performed.
The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and regularly audits military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. Review consists of primarily financial audits, rather than performance audits.
The external audit unit has the mandate to review the defence sector, and regularly audits military defence spending in a formal, in-depth process. Both financial audits and performance audits (value for money) of defence spending are conducted.
Research has revealed that there are external bodies that could potentially be mandated with auditing military and defence in Qatar, such as the State’s Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority (ACTA) [1,2,3,4]. However, ACTA has no mandate over the MoD and the armed forces. According to our sources, there is no law that gives ACTA the capacity and authority to audit military and defence expenditures, which leave the military and defence expenditures without any external auditing body [1].
(1)Interview, Researcher, NA, May 5-7, 2019.
(2)Interview, Qatari Military Officer, Doha, Qatar, May 7-9, 2019.
(3)Interview, Qatar Military Officer, Doha, Qatar, May 11-12, 2019.
(4)The Administrative Control and Transparency Authority (ACTA), accessed October 2, 2018, https://bit.ly/2EwY8fK.
17b. Independence
Qatar score: NA/100
The scrutiny of the external audit unit is regularly undermined (e.g. by military and/or the executive) and this might be due to significant influence from the Defence Ministry or lack of control of its own budget.
The external audit unit is independent of the Defence Ministry but reports to the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. passed by parliament rather than government), and there are legal protections in place for this budget not to be altered during the budget year.
The external audit unit is independent of the executive. It has its own budget (e.g. passed by parliament rather than government), and there are legal protections in place for this budget not to be altered during the budget year.
This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, and external audit bodies do not have the formal rights to audit the defence sector. [1,2,3].
17c. Transparency
External audit reports are rarely published online and are not provided upon request.
External audit reports are published online (e.g. reports on audited accounts, oral briefings, expert advice, investigative work), but with some redactions, in summary form, or only with a superficial treatment of the issue, and may not be made available within a reasonable timeline.
External audit information is published online proactively (in accordance with existing FoIA regulations), within a reasonable timeline and in detail (e.g. including analysis on audited accounts, oral briefings, expert advice, investigative work).
This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure, and external audit bodies do not have the formal rights to audit the defence sector at all [1,2,3].
17d. Institutional outcomes
The ministry fails to address audit findings in its practices, or only incorporates minor changes.
The ministry sometimes addresses audit findings in its practices, but not regularly.
The ministry regularly addresses audit findings in its practices.
There is evidence that there is little external auditing of military defence expenditures, although the audit unit has a formal mandate to review all defence expenditures.
Formally, the Court of Auditors (La Cour des Comptes, sometimes also referred to as the Supreme Audit Institution, SAI) provides audits of military defence expenditures. According to law No. 80-05 of March 1980 establishing it, the SAI is responsible for post-auditing: state finances, local authority finances, public services and market capital of the state (1). According to Art. 10 of Presidential Decree No. 95-377 of November 20, 1995, the SAI’s field of intervention broadly includes public authorities and national institutions (“Authorité publique et institutions nationales”) (2). Art. 7 of Law no. 95-20, July 17, 1995, states that the following institutions are subject to audit by the Court of Auditors: government departments, local authorities, institutions, establishments and public bodies of all kinds (3). Another order of January 16, 1996, specifies the areas of intervention of the Court of Auditors and includes the Ministries of National Defence and the Interior as two subdivisions as areas of intervention (4)
Although the Court of Auditors is formally independent according to the Algerian constitution (Art. 196), (1), its independence is limited. Law No. 80-05/1980 puts it under the authority of the President of the Republic (Art. 3) (2). Former President Bouteflika was also Minister of Defence which is why SAI cannot be considered to be independent of the Ministry of Defence. The Court of Auditors’ formal discretion to undertake audits is further undermined by the fact that its head is not appointed by the legislature or judiciary. According to the Open Budget Survey, the Court of Auditors only provides weak budget oversight. (3).
The annual reports of the Court of Auditors for the years 2015-2018 could not be found online (1). Only the annual reports of 1995 to 1997 are made available on the website. The contents of the two reports do not suggest that they contain information from the ministry of defence (2) (3). According to Art. 192 of the Algerian Constitution (as of 2016), the annual reports are sent to the President of the Republic, the President of the Council of the Nation, the President of the APN and the Prime Minister (4). In 2017, there was a report, that the SAI annual report had been leaked to the press (5).
There are strong indications that the Ministry of Defence fails to address the audit findings. According to media reports on the annual report, the Ministry of National Defence was not very cooperative in providing information to the auditors in 2015. When judges responsible for examining the state’s finances asked specific questions about the destinations of a particular budget, the Ministry of Defence simply answered with generalisations (1). Another newspaper noted that the Ministry of Defence provided just two pages to the auditors although it received the largest budget. It also did not provide any justification for why they did not respond, unlike other ministries (2).
The Audit Court has the legal mandate to review public procurement contracts and their execution, to review the state accounts, conduct audits and publish annual state account reports when requested by Parliament (1). However, only two Audit Court opinions on procurement contracts for the Ministry of Defence have been published (2). Under the 2016 Public Procurement Law, arms and military logistics procurement contracts are withheld as state secrets. Additionally, the Audit Court’s reviews are limited in scope. The court focuses on compliance with public procurement and state budget legislation and issues recommendations (2), (3); in rare cases, sign-off is denied.
The audit court is not independent. The president appoints all (currently) nine audit court justices including its president (2010 Constitution, Art. 119) [2], the court is not accountable to parliament and has in the past rarely recommended prosecution [1].
Furthermore, the former audit court president, Julião António, remained in office for 17 years until he stepped down in 2017, contrary to the constitution that allows only one mandate of seven years [3].
The law establishing the audit court’s mandate is available online (1). But there is no evidence online where the court’s audit reports on defence expenditure are published.
A U.S. Department of State 2017 report states, “Angola’s supreme audit institution, Tribunal de Contas, is responsible for auditing SOEs. However, the Tribunal de Contas does not make its reports publicly available. Angola’s fiscal transparency would be improved by ensuring its supreme audit institution audits SOEs as well as the government’s annual financial accounts and makes public its findings within a reasonable timeframe. This would improve the transparency of contracts between private companies and SOEs” (2).
There is a clear power asymmetry between the MoD and the SAI, leading to insufficient addressing by the MoD.
As stated in some opinions, the Audit Court in a first-round denied sign-off to some procurement contracts that had been submitted by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. Contracts that were submitted by the President’s Security Bureau are mainly construction and services contracts.
For example, the Audit Court in 2015 first denied sign-off to the helicopter deal with Augusta Westland. In a second appearance in the Audit Court in 2016, the Audit Court questioned the justification for the direct award procedure, but still approved the contract. In May 2016, the Audit Court noted that 13 construction contracts for the modernization of the Angolan Armed Forces, celebrated by Simportex on behalf of the Defense Ministry, were already being implemented when submitted to Audit Court pre-review. The contracts were nevertheless signed off on; taking into consideration the alleged urgency and apology by the minister (1).
Article 127 of the Constitution mandates the Court of Accounts to regularly perform audits on the spending of government institutions. The ASCE-LC was recently given the mandate to conduct a general audit in government institutions, with full powers of investigation and prosecution. Additionally, the Constitutions authorizes the Parliament to “control the actions of the government” (Article 84) (1), (2). Very little evidence of active audits of the defence and security sectors is reported in the audit report of the Court of Audit (3).
The Court of Accounts, the Parliament and recently the ASCE- LC, as external institutions, perform audit activities on the military defence expenditure. Over the years, the independence of both the Court of Accounts and the Parliament has been undermined by the government, which does not facilitate their work (1), (2). The government can utilize the Parliament as long as it has the majority therein. The 30 and 31 October 2014 political and social uprising resulted in the manipulation of members of the Parliament, intending to modify article 37 of the Constitution, to enable the former president to run for office for a third term (KnowYourCountry 2018) (3). The legislative is not independent being overpowered by the executive, which decides what it should do. The government appoints and removes the Head of the Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC anytime it wants, without being asked any explanations, even though the state general controller continues to claim that his institution is independent, as it has a constitutional right to directly investigate and prosecute state institutions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5
The Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC reports are online and hard copies are available and do contain information about the MoD in summary form (1), (2). Both external audit institutions transmit a hard copy of their annual report to the president and other key institutions. Most of the time, the Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC hold public conferences on their annual reports for accountability purposes. At these events, they produce summaries of these reports but do not go into details (3).
When they point out some irregularities in government expenditure, the Court of Accounts and the ASCE-LC make key audit findings available and provide some recommendations to improve practices in public spending at audited institutions (1), (2). Article 127 of the Constitution authorises the Court of Accounts to audit finances status in government institutions, and to realease any necessary findings or commendations, to help them improve internal public spendings (3). Similarly, the ASCE-LC has a constitutional right to undertake audit sessions at government institutions (1). The ASCE-LC releases key findings and recommendations as well. However, in practice, no evidence shows the MoD addressing these findings and recommendations.
The Ministry of the Supreme State Audit is mandated to carry out external audits of government ministries [1]. However, according to the Open Budget Partnership (Jan 2018), “the head of the institution is not appointed by the legislature or judiciary and can be removed without legislative or judicial approval, which undermines its independence … the supreme audit institution is provided with insufficient resources to fulfill its mandate and its audit processes are not reviewed by an independent agency” [2]. In addition, the 2015 GI Index found that the defence and security sectors in Cameroon are not subjected to external audit, and no evidence exists to suggest that this has changed since the last review [3]. The Constitution places matters of defence and security under the purview of the government, with scrutiny of these institutions at the government’s discretion (Article 35) [4], and the Procurement Code exempts defence and security procurement from oversight (Articles 31 & 32) [5].
The Appropriation Committee, which is in charge of controlling the budget of the different ministries at the National Assembly, does not have access to information related to the Ministry of Defence [1]. No other recent evidence could be found that the defence and security sectors, including military defence expenditure, are subject to external audit. Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
IIn theory, the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) is tasked with oversight of MoD expenditure via amendment procedures to the annual Budget Law (Loi de Finances).
According to the 2016 Constitution, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors) has in principle the right and competencies to audit the accounts and the management of the MoD (1).
Article 118 states, “The Parliament settles the accounts of the Nation according to the modalities envisaged by the budget law. The settlement bill must be submitted to Parliament no later than one year after the implementation of the budget. The Court of Auditors assists the Parliament and the Government in the control of the execution of the budget laws and in all other fields for which it is responsible.”
Article 152 states, “The Court of Auditors is the Supreme Audit Institution. It has jurisdictional, controlling and consultation powers. The Court of Auditors supervises the management of the accounts of state agencies, national institutions, local authorities, independent administrative authorities and any other body receiving financial assistance from the State or another legal entity, as well as any organization receiving financial support from public enterprises and their subsidiaries.”
However, according to the 2018 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2018), the Cour des Comptes is ineffective as an external auditor and rarely publishes an annual report (2).
In theory, the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) is tasked with oversight of MoD expenditure via amendment procedures to the annual Budget Law (Loi de Finances). According to the 2016 Constitution, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors) has the authority to audit public finances. It is nominally independent. There is no evidence that MoD expenditure has been effectively or transparently audited by any external unit since 2017.
According to the 2016 Constitution, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors) has the authority to audit public finances including MoD expenditure (1). The Cour des Comptes (Audit Court) tasked with publishing annual reports and handing them to the president. However, there is no evidence that MoD expenditure has been effectively or transparently audited by any external unit since 2017. In theory, the NA Commission de Sécurité et de Défense (CSD) is tasked with oversight of MoD expenditure via amendment procedures to the annual Budget Law (Loi de Finances).
President Ouattara asked his cabinet ministers to address issues that are raised by the reports submitted to him by the Court des Comptes, but they are not always addressed. There there is no evidence that MoD expenditure has been effectively or transparently audited by any external unit since Hamed Bakayoko was appointed the minister of defence on July 19, 2017.
There is no external scrutiny of the MoD or the armed forces. The CAA theoretically has the power to commit oversight and scrutinize the MoD, but it has never happened (1), (2). It is very unclear the extent to which military defence expenditure is subject to external audits, but the complaints of the former chief auditor Hisham Geneina shows that whatever legal powers the CAA might have over the defence sector, it does not translate to effective power (3). Geneina in April 2013 before the military takeover said: “the economic projects, companies, social clubs and hospital of the ‘sovereign entities’ are not subject to the scrutiny of the CAA” (4). This statement was given in 2013 before the current reporting period, but all the developments since indicate that the CAA has fewer powers in auditing military defence expenditure, especially with the increasing power of the president and the executive over the CAA, which manifested in the law passed by al-Sisi granting himself the power to remove the head of the CAA (5).
This sub-indicator has been marked Not Applicable because, despite the possible existence of some unclear formal powers, the CAA has no real powers to audit the expenditure of the MoD.
The Audit Service has the mandate to review and regularly audit the defence sector’s spending. According to the Constitution, the Audit Service reports its findings to Parliament within six months of the end of the FY (Art. 187). In addition to financial audits, following the adoption of the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), the Audit Service also conducts performance audits (i.e. value for money) (1), (2).
The audits are carried out regularly and are in-depth, however, they focus on financial aspects rather than performance. They are also not comprehensive since the Ministry of Defence does not share all financial information (2), (3).
The Auditor-General is appointed by, and also reports to the executive rather than Parliament, a fact that has raised concerns over its independence (1). Parliament approves the Audit Service’s budget, which follows the standard procedure as the other MDAs (2). The Auditor-General has the right to audit military expenditure (3), (4). For this purpose, two auditors, cleared by the military authorities for security purposes, are appointed to audit defence spending (5).
When the 2018 budget was submitted, seven out of the eight audit reports for the financial year that ended on the 31st of December 2016 had been completed and submitted to Parliament. These reports were derived from the execution of 2,790 out of the planned 3,478 audits (1). Reports from the Audit Service are published online proactively and in detail, although with delays. For instance, the 2016 Annual Report of the Auditor-General was published in August 2017, and the 2017 report has not yet been published.
There is limited evidence that the Ministry of Defence implements recommendations from audits (1), (2). The Audit Report Implementation Committee (ARIC), established under section 30(1) of the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584), is the office responsible for the implementation of the recommendations of the internal audit reports (3).
Once the Auditor-General’s report has been approved by Parliament, the law requires the ARIC to submit an outline of the actions to be taken to address the issues raised (4). The MOD’s ARIC met four times in 2017 and therefore complied with the law (5). However, its reports are not publicly available, and therefore it is not possible to verify if the recommendations are effectively implemented.
There is no evidence that any external auditing organisations have included the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence in their activities [1,2,3]. There is a lack of any up-to-date, reliable information on external audits of the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence.
This sub indicator has been marked as Not Applicable as there is no evidence of external audits to defence ministry expenditure [1,2].
At least two auditing bodies follow the military’s spending: the SAB, and Parliament’s defence committee. The SAB’s authority stems from Law no. 30 of 1964 (1), among other laws and Parliament’s the constitution’s article 112, 101 and 102 (2) and the internal laws of Parliament article 76 and 147 (3).
On paper, both have access to all defence data, regardless of its sensitivity. But in practice, they are often left in the dark, and these bodies lack the strength to fight back since the Emir favours the military over other Government agencies (as is the case in other authoritarian countries), according to several officials and activists (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).
This makes most of the audits superficial, because auditors sometimes lack key information, but it generally has no effect on the frequency of the audits, which take place on an annual basis.
The SAB generally only focuses on the finances of the military, but they often can comment on the soundness of decisions, and they can assess progress in various projects, which they do sometimes.
Sometimes SAB auditors are prevented from auditing up to 50 percent of the spending of the security agencies, based on orders from the head of the body, who is enabled to do so by article 78 of the SAB’s law, officials said. But they take the records from the ministry anyway so as not to let them know that they are not being checked, officials said. This means that the security agencies always work under the impression that their spending is being monitored (1).
Parliament has the right to do that and also to assess and criticise performance, but that rarely happens because most MPs lack independence and are pro-government.
Then there is the ACA, empowered by Law no. 2 of 2016 (11), which can audit the finances and performance of the Defence Ministry, and other Government agencies, when concern over corruption in any given case arises. Their auditors receive the worst treatment because they are new and they are almost completely ignored, the auditing officials said.
The ACA is the body tasked with inspecting the financial disclosures of all officials, and it has the power to refer suspicious cases to the prosecution.
The SAB’s head and the head of Parliament set the SAB’s budget, according to article 75 of the SAB’s law. If they can’t agree, they can put up for a vote in Parliament (1).
The ACA sets its own budget but it must be approved by the Finance Minister or the Prime Minister, before it goes to Parliament with the rest of the budget, according to article 18 of the ACA’s law (2).
All three bodies are independent of the Defence Ministry, but they are under the influence of the powerful executive branch, whose supporters control Parliament, which is unsurprisingly compliant with the executive branch.
Even if it weren’t, the Emir can dissolve it at will, according to article 141 of the constitution, and this has always been a sword over the neck of lawmakers in Kuwait (3).
Both Parliament and the Government must come to an agreement regarding the Parliament’s budget every year, according to article 172 of the PIL. The law does not explain exactly how the budget of the defence committee is set (4).
There are no legal protections for any of these budgets, however.
The executive branch does not usually force the auditors to produce a positive assessment as much as it limits their access to information and ignores their complaints, criticism, and requests for more information, auditors, activists and a journalist said (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12).
On rare occasions, an executive official could threaten the auditors with reprisals if they seem adamant on getting to the bottom of something.
Annual audit reports are released by the SAB, but only in summary form and they do not divulge any or much information about the purchases of the security and defence sector, or their financial violations (1, 2 and 3). Auditors said there is a general understanding inside the SAB and in the Government in general that the security and defence agencies’ “business is off limits,” as one SAB official put it.The ACA does not publish reports. Both bodies do not respond to requests for information on the defence and security sector, officials, activists and journalists said (4, 5, 6, 7. 8, 9, 10 and 11).
The Ministry almost never incorporates the recommendations of any auditor; auditors, a member of the royal family and activists said (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). This is why the SAB continues to renew its complaint year after year. (9, 10 and 11). These ministries are mostly responsive with the recommendations of the CSC, which is mainly concerned with streamlining the internal administration of these ministries, along with other Government bodies; this includes their pay policy, and offering them logistical training, among other things — activities that mostly concern their civilian personnel, officials said. Since only extremely small changes are allowed, a zero is warranted.
The Court of Audit (CoA) is Lebanon’s highest financial court. It is an administrative court with a financial and judicial role to monitor public accounts including auditing the government’s proposed expenditure for the upcoming year and the government’s spending from the previous year (1). However, in practice, this does not occur regularly. From 2005 till 2017, Lebanon did not have a budget which means it was unable to attempt closure of accounts for the state’s spending (3). According to the LAF, tender operations and procurement are audited by the CoA (4). A source confirmed that the LAF command coordinated with the court of audits for its spending and bidding operation (5). The CoA is responsible for auditing (pre and post) all Lebanese public funds including at the MoD. Although the closure of accounts of public spending did not occur for several years, the MoD public accounts are audited by CoA (6).
The Court of Audit is independent of the Ministry of Defence. However, the court is tied and reports to the executive branch it is supposed to audit (1). The Court’s budget is included in the state budget (2). According to PAL Art. 118, the Minister of Finance has the right to propose that the CoM to stop using allocated expenditure of the State Budget if deemed necessary. The CoM then decides to approve or reject based on the situation (3).
The CoA’s reports are not published regularly, as it suffers from being understaffed (1). However, some reports on the approval of transfer of credits and expert opinions are published online in a summarized bullet points format (2). Furthermore, it does not respond to requests for information, according to the Al Gherbal Initiative report (3).
Generally, the CoA’s reports are not issued on time. One of the main problem that the court faces as a result of being understaffed (1). According to the Directorate of Orientation, the LAF refers to the CoA for its bids and requests to transfer of credits (2). During an event hosted by the LAF, audit institutions including the CoA and the Central Inspection Board (CIB) indicated the level of transparency and specificity that the LAF conducts with its finances (3). However, no clear evidence was found on whether or not the LAF or the MoD addresses the CoA’s recommendations (4). However, based on the statement of the CoA and CIB, it could be inferred that the LAF does cooperate well with the audit institutions (3).
As noted in Q16, Mali’s military and internal security forces are in practice not subject to external oversight. All of the external monitoring bodies avoid using their oversight powers for issues related to the security forces. The executive frequently cites the vague and broad concept of ‘national security’ to justify maintaining secrecy over defence spending.
The accounts section of Mali’s Supreme Court is responsible for assessing accounts maintained by the government accountants and determining whether they conform to the country’s finance laws. The office is understaffed, with only 13 counsellors for more than 1,000 accounts per year.¹ Moreover, personnel in the accounts section do not have the status of a judge and the wages are not attractive.
The US Department of State notes that the supreme audit institution audited the government’s annual financial statements, and audit reports were publicly available within a reasonable period of time.⁷
However, as the World Bank points out, the accounts section has not specifically reviewed Ministry of Defence accounts, and only an aggregate administrative account is transmitted by the Ministry of Finance to the court when the finance law is examined.¹ Similarly, the BVG, which has 17 agents and is tasked with monitoring the accountants and administrators, has not conducted a comprehensive audit of the finances of the military or internal security forces in recent years.³ ⁴
Meanwhile, parliamentary oversight is very weak, with only one auditing staff assistant available to help the DSP.¹
Mali’s military and internal security forces are in practice not subject to external oversight. All of the external monitoring bodies avoid using their oversight powers for issues related to the security forces.¹ Therefore, this indicator has been marked Not Applicable.
Mali’s military and internal security forces are in practice not subject to external oversight. All of the external monitoring bodies avoid using their oversight powers for issues related to the security forces.¹ Therefore, this indicator has been marked
No evidence about external audit of defence ministry expenditure was found: Moroccan authorities in general do not disclose this information. Moreover, institutions in charge of auditing public expenditures such as the National Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) do not audit military expenditures. (1)(2)(3).
Neither CSOs nor the media are given access to information about external audit of defence ministry expenditure either directly/indirectly or officially/unofficially (4)(5)(6)(7).
Based on these elements, it appears that there is no external audit of defence ministry expenditure.
As there is no internal audit of the defence ministry’s expenditure, this sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable.
External auditing falls under the mandate of the National Audit Office, which also includes security spending reviews, particularly the verification of the accounting terminology and fiscal discipline (1). However, various challenges hinder the activity of the Audit Office (2). For example, it was only in June 2017 that the Audit Office presented its general report for 2014 (3), and it is unclear to what extent the report included an audit of the Ministry of Defence expenditure.
Another body that has a mandate to conduct the external audit of military expenditure is the State Inspectorate General. According to interviews, the last audit was conducted in 2016. It covered a broad spectrum of services, evaluated the conduct of special military operations which is usually, according to an interviewee, not subject to audit. However, due to an insufficient budget, the Inspectorate could not lead missions in the field units. According to him, there was close collaboration with military officers on the ground through correspondence and analysis of different reports (4, 5).
For the security forces, there is no external control mechanism for the police. In theory, the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) could investigate cases of abuse committed by the police, but its capacity and its means of operation are weak. The IDDH is a Danish NGO that sometimes conducts investigations together with the IGSS, to strengthen internal control mechanisms and develop external control mechanisms (6,7).
Both the National Audit Office and the State Inspectorate General are legally independent entities from the Defence Ministry.
Article 141 of the Constitution (1) establishes the National Audit Office as the highest court of auditing public finances. It lays out the mission of the Supreme Audit Commission in Niger and refers to a procedural regulation (Loi n°2012-08 of 26 March 2012) that governs its activities. However, there is no mention in Article 141 regarding its independence. The National Audit Office has a jurisdictional mission, a mission of control and an advisory mission (2). It has its own budget (3).
As per Article 115 of the Constitution, the National Assembly (NA) can require the Supreme Audit Court (Cour des Comptes) to carry out audits of government expenditure. It is unclear whether this also includes defence expenditure.
Contrary to the National Audit Office, the State Inspectorate General depends on the executive and responds to the Presidency, it does not have its own budget (4).
The internal reports are not published (1,2,3) and are not accessible to the public.
The assessor found no evidence of the precise institutional outcomes as a result of the internal audit. However, it is plausible to suggest that some changes did take place, but they could not be clearly identified during interviews (1,2,3) .
There is a great deal of respect for the military and in practice, this leads to a disproportionate amount of deference given to security institutions which translates into weak oversight (1), (2).
External audits in this context are performed by the Office of the Auditor-General. Significant delays are noted as a feature of the process. Further, there has been inconsistency in the timing of the reviews. In the past reviews were carried out infrequently (3).
“More ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) have refused to submit their accounts for review since President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office, an official report shows. The poor compliance of MDAs to Nigerian laws on submission of accounts is worse in each of Mr Buhari’s first two years in office than any previous year since Nigeria returned to democracy from military dictatorship in 1999. According to the Auditor-General of the Federation, 324 MDAs failed to submit their accounts for audit in 2016, while 215 MDAs failed to submit in 2015. In each of the 22 previous years before that, the highest number of non-submissions was 148, in 2014” (4).
As noted above, external audits of the MoD are performed by the Office of the Auditor-General for the Federation, which submits its reports directly to the Public Accounts Committee of the
National Assembly. Although, the Auditor-General is, by law, independent and has secured
tenure guaranteed by the constitution, it is not well resourced, lacks expertise and, therefore, cannot be viewed as fully independent. This prevents the effective scrutiny of defence spending. Outdated audit laws also prevents the effectivenss of the office. In February 2018, the 8th National Assembly passed the Federal Audit Service Commission Bill to provide extensive powers to the Auditor General of the Federation. The bill did not receive presidential assent, which is necessary if it is to become law [1,2,3] (The tenure of the 8th Assembly ended on June 9). With the commencement of the 9th Assembly, the Bill has to be resubmitted to the Assembly and go through all the different legislative processes and passed by the Assembly again. As of September 2019, the Bill was awaiting reintroduction in the 9th Assembly.
There is no evidence suggesting that the MoD addresses recommedations from audit findings.The Nigerian Audit Act of 1956, which is the statutory provision for auditing and reporting on Federal Government financial transactions is weightless both in fighting corruption and preventing the waste of public resources (1), (2). The Auditor-General is unable to take any action to reduce waste or corruption because it does not have powers to take any effective action even where waste or corruption is identified.The power of the Auditor-General’s Office, the external institution in charge of auditing public finance is ineffective and weak. The Office is not ‘fully empowered’ in that it does not have the legal powers necessary to effectively discharge the duties of that office. The Federal Audit Commission bill if passed into law would address this weakness and has the potential to affect institutional outcomes as a result of audits. The proposed bill would also expand the powers of the Auditor-General to conduct an audit of all revenues and expenditure, except the constitution provides otherwise (1), (2).
There is no external audit scrutinizing defence ministry expenditure. The State Audit Institute’s work is not inclusive of the defence ministry, and no reference is made to defence on the official website (1). The Association of Chartered Certificated Accountants and Grant Thornton consultancy focus upon strengthening auditing in the business sector (2), (3). However, their reports highlight “the need for more consolidated reporting was also cited, with a greater emphasis needed on building key relationships and links with governmental bodies and agencies to reduce the regulatory burden that businesses currently face” (2). There were no media reports found on external auditing of defence ministry expenditure, which reflects the wider trend of scarce reporting on defence (4), (5).
This sub-indicator has been marked as Not Applicable, as there is no evidence of an external audit of defence ministry expenditures in Oman.
The external audit unit has the mandate to review the national forces but does not do so regularly or in detail. There may be regular deviations from formalized processes because of political influence (1).
The external audit unit is independent of the National Forces, but reports to the executive. The budget of the external audit is linked to the executive; therefore, the executive can influence their decisions. The budget is always open and can change as there is no legislative branch to discuss and legalize any budget. It can be altered anytime by the executive. Furthermore, the external audits are not protected by law, which put them in fragile situations sometimes where the corruption occur on a powerful level (1).
Reports are rarely found on the internet or are available for journalists or CSOs (1). Policy briefs and news outlets can be found on AlShabaka when discussing the security Apparatus in Palestine in general (2). Some news websites have written a few pieces in the last five years (3).
As the reports are not published, and no one follows up with recommendations security agencies and national forces do not alter their policies or practices (1). Recommendations and reports are regularly ignored (1), (2).
The General Auditing Bureau (GAB) is responsible for auditing the state’s revenues, expenditures and assets, and technically has purview over all ministries and government departments. According to its charter, this includes the auditing of military sector accounts (1). According to our sources, audits are not carried out rigorously and diligently. Given the tight control exercised over the Ministry of Defence by its head, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (2), external audits of military expenditure would likely be highly superficial, if they take place at all (3), (4).
According to a Gulf scholar who focuses on the political economy of the GCC, “external auditing is not something I would expect in any case” in Saudi defence expenditure (5).
This sub-indicator is marked as Not Applicable as there is little to no external audit of defence ministry expenditure.
According to our sources, there are no external audits with a focus on the defense sector. Therefore, this sub-indicator is irrelevant (1), (2).
Three entities are tasked with ensuring external auditing of public expenditure in Tunisia: Public Services General Control (Presidency of Government), Finances General Control (Ministry of Finance) and the General Control of the Ministry of State’s assets and Land affairs (1). Also, the Court of Audit ensures an audit mission. The three control entities mentioned above do not publish their reports (2). Only the Court of Audit publishes its findings. The reports of the Court of Audit do not mention activities within the Ministry of National Defence (3). Expenses for Defence Procurement are subject to the audit and approval of the High Committee of Procurement, the Ministerial Committee of Control of Procurement and the Special Committee of Procurement (4,5). All types of defence expenses have to be approved by the services of Control of Public Expenditure including the secret expenses (6).
The Court of Auditors issues an annual report that deals with the results of its inspections conducted on ministries (Public Expense Control Services). There is no exemption for the defence sector from the parliamentary scrutiny or the judiciary and administrative control (7).
According to our sources, the oversight and external entities that have the mandate to scrutinise the MoD are independent however, they are not financially independent and they are headed by the executive (1,2). Public Services General Control is independent from the Ministry of Defence and depends on the Presidency of Government (3). The Decree does not provide for the financial independance of these services (4). The 2016’s report of this audit unit shows that it has performed 164 evaluation reports within the Ministry of Defence. The number of files related to Ministry of Defence and handled by this unit in 2016 is 375 representing 22.57% of the total files handled by this unit (5). Generally, audit and control services lack human and material ressources. According to the President of an assossiation representing officials from control, inspection and audit services (ACCIA) there are only 600 controllers in charge of the control of 700,000 civil servants and 3000 budgets (5).
According to our sources, the reports of the external auditing of the MoD are not published for security reasons due to the confidentiality of the information they contain (1,2). External audit reports concerning the defence sector could not be found online (3). Only annual reports for the years 2015 and 2016 of the Public Services General Control could be found online (4).
According to our sources, the MoD tried to meet the recommendations of the external and internal audits but did so irregularly. It is based on the charisma and power of the head of the internal/ external auditing units/ entities(1,2).
The SAI is mandated to audit all ministries including the defence and security sectors. Although the SAI is an “independent authority reporting to the FNC,” it has no power whatsoever over the Ministry of Defence (1). The SAI has never audited the Ministry of Defence. According to our sources, there is no external body that has the authority and power to audit the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence (2), (3), (4).
This sub-indicator is marked Not Applicable as there is no evidence to support that external audits of the military and the defence sector take place (1), (2), (3), this sub-indicator has been marked as not applicable. Within the context of the UAE, it is not feasible to assess the independence of external audits, since external audits do not seem to take place.