Source: http://openjurist.org/382/f2d/208/united-states-v-norfolk-baltimore-and-carolina-line-incorporated
Timestamp: 2017-06-23 03:00:30
Document Index: 56961945

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 526', '§ 526', '§ 526', '§ 526', '§ 526', '§ 526', '§ 526']

382 F2d 208 United States v. Norfolk Baltimore and Carolina Line Incorporated | OpenJurist
382 F. 2d 208 - United States v. Norfolk Baltimore and Carolina Line Incorporated HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 382 F.2d.
382 F2d 208 United States v. Norfolk Baltimore and Carolina Line Incorporated 382 F.2d 208
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.NORFOLK, BALTIMORE AND CAROLINA LINE, INCORPORATED, Appellant.
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the United States, which had proceeded by libel in personam against the Norfolk, Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc., to collect a statutory penalty of $100 for the negligent operation of its tug MARYLAND in violation of 46 U.S. C. §§ 526l and 526o.
The action was brought in accordance with 46 U.S.C. § 526l, which provides that "No person shall operate any motorboat or any vessel in a reckless or negligent manner * * *," and § 526o, which declares:
The appellant's principal contention is that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to sit as an admiralty court. It argues that the penalties imposed by Section 526o are criminal in nature, and thus the proceeding was in reality a criminal prosecution, entitling the defendant to the customary safeguards of a criminal trial. We disagree.
That Congress may in its legislative discretion subject the same conduct to either civil or criminal penalties, or both, is a proposition well established. Our income tax laws provide a familiar example. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). Whether a sanction is civil or criminal is a question of statutory construction. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, supra; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 29 S.Ct. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909). There is ample evidence of a congressional purpose to impose a civil penalty under this particular section, and not a criminal punishment. This is shown by the fact that elsewhere in the same statute, Congress provided for criminal sanctions.2 In addition to the structure of the statute, the legislative history also supports this conclusion.3
Appellant also ascribes error to the District Court's finding of negligence in the operation of the tug. Upon consideration of the entire record, however, we are unable to declare the finding "clearly erroneous." Indeed, this court has heretofore held that when, in the absence of adverse weather conditions, a vessel, in control of a pilot in waters with which he is familiar, runs into a clearly visible stationary object, a presumption of negligence arises, requiring at least some explanation on the part of the vessel. The Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied sub nom. Stone v. Diamond S. S. Transp. Corp., 328 U.S. 853, 66 S.Ct. 1344, 90 L.Ed. 1626 (1946); accord, United States v. South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't, 171 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948). In the present case, the appellant called no witnesses and offered no explanation for the collision.
The Senate Report states that § 526o
"Authorize[s] a civil penalty of up to $100 fine, in addition to the present criminal penalty, for the operation of a motorboat or vessel not carrying passengers for hire in a reckless or negligent manner, so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person. In the case of motorboats or vessels carrying passengers for hire, the civil penalty assessed may be up to $200."
Also of significance in determining that § 526o was meant to impose a civil penalty is the fact that this section authorizes a libel proceeding as a method for collecting the penalty, indicating that Congress did not intend actions instituted under this section to be criminal in nature. Furthermore, § 526p authorizes the Coast Guard to "remit or mitigate any fine, penalty, or forfeiture" incurred under the Act, except the criminal sanctions provided by § 526m.