Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/415/361/case.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-05 06:45:26
Document Index: 799777188

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1652', '§ 101', '§ 1661', '§ 101', '§ 211', '§ 211', '§ 211', '§ 1652', '§ 211', '§ 211']

Johnson v. Robison - 415 U.S. 361 (1974) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Case	U.S. Supreme CourtJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)Johnson v. RobisonNo. 72-1297Argued December 11, 1973Decided March 4, 1974415 U.S. 361APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
(a) The quantitative and qualitative distinctions between the disruption caused by military service and that caused by alternative civilian service -- military service involving a six-year commitment and far greater loss of personal freedom, and alternative civilian service involving only a two-year obligation and no requirement to leave civilian life -- form a rational basis for Congress' classification limiting educational benefits to military service veterans Page 415 U. S. 362 as a means of helping them to readjust to civilian life. Pp. 415 U. S. 378-382.
A draftee accorded Class I-O conscientious objector status and completing performance of required alternative Page 415 U. S. 363 civilian service [Footnote 1] does not qualify under 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) as a "veteran who . . . served on active duty" (defined in 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) as "full-time duty in the Armed Forces"), and is therefore not an "eligible veteran" entitled under 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) to veterans' educational benefits provided by the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. [Footnote 2] Appellants, the Veterans' Page 415 U. S. 364 Administration and the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, for that reason, denied the application for educational assistance of appellee Robison, a conscientious objector who filed his application after he satisfactorily completed two years of alternative civilian service at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston. Robison thereafter commenced this class action [Footnote 3] in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking a declaratory judgment that 38 U.S.C. §§ 101 (21), 1652(a)(1), and 1661(a), read together, violated the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. [Footnote 4] Appellants moved to dismiss the action on the Page 415 U. S. 365 ground, among others, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because of 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), which prohibits judicial review of decisions of the Administrator. [Footnote 5] The District Court denied the motion, and, on the merits, rejected appellee's First Amendment claim, but sustained the equal protection claim and entered a judgment declaring
352 F.Supp. 848, 862 (1973). [Footnote 6] We postponed Page 415 U. S. 366 consideration of the question of jurisdiction in light of § 211(a) to the hearing on the merits, and set the case for oral argument with No. 72-700, Hernandez v. Veterans' Administration, post, p. 415 U. S. 391. 411 U.S. 981 (1973). [Footnote 7] We hold, in agreement with the District Court, that § 211(a) is inapplicable to this action, and therefore that appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter was properly denied. On the merits, we agree that appellee's First Amendment claim is without merit, but disagree that §§ 1652(a)(1), 1661(a), and 101(21) violate the Fifth Amendment, and therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court.
"it is a Page 415 U. S. 367 cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question[s] may be avoided."
"When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the Page 415 U. S. 368 statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration."
Nor does the legislative history accompanying the 1970 amendment of § 211(a) demonstrate a congressional intention to bar judicial review even of constitutional questions. No-review clauses similar to § 211(a) have been a part of veterans' benefits legislation since 1933. [Footnote 9] While Page 415 U. S. 369 the legislative history accompanying these precursor no-review clauses is almost nonexistent, [Footnote 10] the Administrator, in a letter written in 1952 in connection with a revision Page 415 U. S. 370 of the clause under consideration by the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, comprehensively explained the policies necessitating the no review clause and identified two primary purposes: (1) to insure that veterans' benefits claims will not burden the courts and the Veterans' Administration with expensive and time-consuming litigation, [Footnote 11] and (2) to insure that the technical and complex determinations and applications of Veterans' Administration policy connected with veterans' benefits decision will be adequately and uniformly made. [Footnote 12] Page 415 U. S. 371
"The Wellman, Thompson, and Tracy decisions have not been followed in any of the other 10 Federal judicial circuits throughout the country. Page 415 U. S. 372 Nevertheless, soon after the Tracy decision, suits in the nature of mandamus or for declaratory judgment commenced to be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in constantly increasing numbers by plaintiffs seeking resumption of terminated benefits. As of March 8, 1970, 353 suits of this type had been filed in the District of Columbia circuit."
"* * * *" "The scope of the Tracy decision and the decisions upon which it is based is so broad that it could well afford a basis for judicial review of millions of decisions terminating or reducing many types of benefits provided under laws administered by the Veterans' Administration. Such review might even extend to the decisions of predecessor agencies made many years ago."
"involve a large variety of matters -- a 1930's termination of a widow's pension payments under a statute then extant, because of her open and notorious adulterous cohabitation; invalid marriage to a veteran; severance of a veteran's service connection for disability compensation; reduction of such compensation because of lessened disability . . . [and] suits . . . brought by [Filipino] widows of World War II servicemen seeking restoration of death compensation or pension benefits terminated after the Administrator raised a presumption of their remarriage on the basis of evidence gathered through Page 415 U. S. 373 field examination. Notwithstanding the 1962 endorsement by the Congress of the Veterans' Administrations [sic] administrative presumption of remarriage rule, most of [the suits brought by Filipino widows] have resulted in judgments adverse to the Government."