Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/581/215/279529/
Timestamp: 2020-02-16 20:11:19
Document Index: 287443829

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., D/b/a the Catalyst, Respondent, 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1978 › National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., D/b/a the Catalyst, Respondent
National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Randall P. Kane, Inc., D/b/a the Catalyst, Respondent, 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 581 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1978) Aug. 28, 1978
Respondent was charged with fourteen violations of §§ 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 Et seq. Subsequent to a hearing held in January, 1977, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that respondent had, in nine instances, violated the provisions of the Act, as charged. His decision was affirmed by the Board in June, 1977.
The general standard of review of Board decisions is clear. If the Board's decision rests on findings of fact for which there is substantial evidence in the record, we must affirm. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238 at 240 (9 Cir. 1978).
1. Section 8(a) (1) violations.
Threats, intimidation, interrogation, and surveillance of union sympathizers demonstrate the clearest form of conduct in violation of § 8(a) (1). Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1131 (CA9 1978); NLRB v. Squire Shops, Inc., 559 F.2d 486, 487 (CA9 1977). Here there is substantial evidence that Kane and his supervisors, McShan and Widin, repeatedly violated § 8(a) (1) both during and after the Union card solicitation campaign. McShan questioned both Puhl and Ryerson during the first week of authorization card collection and threatened to hire alien labor if the Union was successful. McShan also told three employees that working conditions and benefits would be changed to the detriment of the employees if the Union was victorious. Widin asked a number of "The Catalyst" employees if they planned to attend a Union organizational meeting. He also informed Ryerson and Montoya that employee acceptance of the Union would mean significantly harsher working conditions and lower overall compensation. Of course, to some degree, the ALJ's findings were based on his assessment of the credibility of various witnesses. The ALJ was in the position to be able to observe the witnesses' demeanor and conduct on the stand, and thus, we may only reverse his credibility findings if a clear preponderance of the evidence shows that he was wrong. NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., supra, at 241; NLRB v. Western Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 571 F.2d 457, 459 (CA9 1978). We believe that the record supports the ALJ's findings here.
The ALJ found and the Board affirmed that Puhl had been fired in violation of § 8(a) (3). We must determine whether "the business reason or the protected union activity is the moving cause behind the discharge." NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 50 (CA9 1970). From our review of the circumstances surrounding the firing there was indeed substantial evidence for the Board to find that the firing was motivated by Puhl's union efforts, and thus respondent did violate § 8(a) (3). Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251 at 254 (9 Cir. 1978).
3. Section 8(a) (5) violations.
The validity of union authorization cards in calculating a card majority is determined by the rule announced in Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 NLRB 1268 (1963), Enf'd. 351 F.2d 917 (CA6 1965). The Supreme Court adopted the Cumberland Shoe doctrine in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 584, 85 S. Ct. 1918, 23 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1969). The rule states that an authorization card counts toward the 50% Majority unless the employer can demonstrate that the solicitors told the employees that the sole purpose of the card was to obtain a union election.
Our court has faced similar questions regarding authorization cards. In NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 365-67 (CA9 1969), Cert. denied 397 U.S. 915, 90 S. Ct. 919, 25 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1970), the court examined Cumberland Shoe's applicability in two instances: the first card signer was told that his card was to be used only for purposes of securing a union election the card was rejected by the court; the second signer was not told that the card would be used only to achieve an election, however, he did testify that his sole intent in signing the card was to bring about an election the card was counted by the court toward a union majority.
We believe that the facts surrounding those 15 employees who either testified or stipulated their testimony before the ALJ are arguably like those presented by the signer whose card was rejected in South Bay Daily Breeze. Here, as there, the evidence shows that the prospective signers were told that the cards would result in an election. Their intent was not at issue. The degree to which those signing the cards were influenced by this election argument is for the Board to consider; however, we caution the Board that they should not engage in a "mechanical application" of Cumberland Shoe. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at 608, 85 S. Ct. 1918. It is the totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation rather than the use of specific words that determines if a union agent effectively negated the card's language through his solicitation.3
In light of our decision that the Board must receive evidence on signing of the challenged cards, and again examine the issue on the union card majority, we decline to approve a bargaining order. Respondent's unfair labor practices do not rise to the level of "outrageous" and "pervasive" such as to allow issuance of a bargaining order when there is no union majority. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 613-14, 85 S. Ct. 1918.
The petition of the NLRB seeking enforcement of its order is granted with respect to violations of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act. That portion of the petition seeking enforcement of alleged § 8(a) (5) violations is denied and the cause remanded to the Board with instructions to receive evidence and make findings consistent with this opinion.