Source: https://casetext.com/case/ah-bull-ss-v-seafarers-internatl-union
Timestamp: 2019-01-17 09:20:56
Document Index: 57011875

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 186', '§ 13', '§ 4', '§ 301', '§ 4', '§ 104', '§ 8', '§ 108', '§ 7', '§ 107', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 101', '§ 160']

A.H. Bull S.S. v. Seafarers&apos; Internat&apos;l Union, 250 F.2d 326 | Casetext
A.H. Bull S.S. v. Seafarers&apos; Internat&apos;l Union
250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957)
A.H. Bull S.S.
Seafarers&apos; Internat&apos;l Union
United States Court of Appeals, Second CircuitNov 21, 1957
A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. National Marine Eng. B
…Except to the limited extent discussed below, we find it unnecessary to ascertain whether or not the strikes…
Moses v. Ammond
…In 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e) "Congress expressly lifted the bar of the Norris-La-Guardia Act to vest certain…
No. 123, Docket 24840.
A.H. Bull Steamship Co. brought suit below against the defendant Union seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for the defendant's alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. Bull then moved for a preliminary injunction restraining the Union from continuing the peaceful strike then in progress, which constituted the alleged breach of contract. The trial court heard the motion on affidavits and briefs and entered an injunction pendente lite of substantial scope against continuance of the strike. Its opinion is reported in D.C.E.D.N.Y., 155 F. Supp. 739. This appeal from the order of injunction followed.
"Ordered that, effective on October 1, 1957, at 5 P.M., Eastern Daylight Savings Time, defendant, Seafarers' International Union of North America, Atlantic and Gulf District, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, members, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, who shall or may receive actual notice of this Order, be and the same hereby are enjoined and restrained, during the pendency of this action, from picketing, striking, or inciting, causing, inducing, or, in any manner, directly or indirectly, supporting any work stoppage aboard any of the vessels owned or operated by plaintiff, A.H. Bull Steamship Co., or any of its subsidiaries, wherever any such vessels may be situate or, during the pendency of this action, may call; and it is
This case involves an impasse in renegotiation of wages. The Union maintains that the no-strike clause has no application to a strike for this purpose. Bull contends otherwise. But the basic controversy concerns wages — terms or conditions of employment — and thus, under § 13(c), this is a labor dispute. Nothing in the Act makes its provisions inapplicable where, after a labor dispute arises, one party takes action which constitutes a breach of a contract between them. It is immaterial that the strike might be a breach of the Union's duty under the collective bargaining agreement or that the controversy itself might be determined by reference to it. W.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 1 Cir., 217 F.2d 6; In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 2 Cir., 192 F.2d 971; Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 81 F. Supp. 541, affirmed 2 Cir., 173 F.2d 567, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65, 94 L.Ed. 498. Hence under § 4 of the Act, if still applicable, the trial court would lack jurisdiction to issue its preliminary injunction in the present labor dispute.
But this case does not say that § 301 authorizes federal courts to issue injunctions when that remedy is clearly prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court does hold, after an analysis of legislative history, to reach the conclusion just quoted, that the issuance of an order compelling arbitration was not prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court reasoned that refusal to arbitrate is not protected conduct under § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104, and is not the kind of conduct which had given rise to abuse of the power to enjoin. Indeed the Court found that § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108, indicates a congressional policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration. The Court next dealt with § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107. This section, in addition to § 4, deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in cases involving labor disputes unless the court makes specific findings of fact and follows prescribed procedural requirements. Citing Judge Magruder in Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) v. General Elec. Co., 1 Cir., 233 F.2d 85, 92, affirmed General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (U.E.), 353 U.S. 547, 77 S.Ct. 921, 1 L.Ed.2d 1028, the Court found these procedures "inapposite" and concluded that: "The congressional policy in favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes being clear, there is no reason to submit them to the requirements of § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 353 U.S. 448, 458, 77 S.Ct. 912, 919.
In the case at bar the Union's conduct comes squarely within § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This is a lawful and peaceful strike which Congress said a federal court may not enjoin. The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills was concerned with a refusal to arbitrate — conduct not protected by § 4 and at odds with congressional policy. It did not involve a strike — the issue here. The ultimate question in Lincoln Mills was whether or not Congress by § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the federal courts to compel arbitration. The question here is whether or not Congress by that same provision intended to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act pro tanto. This is not the question which was before the Supreme Court.
Thus the California Supreme Court, per Judge Traynor, recently concluded in a post-Lincoln Mills decision that § 301 did not repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, Cal. 1957, 315 P.2d 322.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills both this Circuit and the First Circuit had agreed that § 301 did not impliedly repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, supra, 2 Cir., 173 F.2d 567, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65, 94 L.Ed. 498; W.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, supra, 1 Cir., 217 F.2d 6; Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) v. General Elec. Co., supra, 1 Cir., 233 F.2d 85, affirmed General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (U.E.), 353 U.S. 547, 77 S.Ct. 921. Two reasons for this conclusion were stressed. First, Congress in enacting § 301 did not expressly withdraw the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and such withdrawal cannot be implied, particularly since in other sections of the same Act, viz., §§ 101(h), 208(b), and 302(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h), 178(b), and 186(e), Congress expressly lifted the bar of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to vest certain injunction powers in the courts when the National Labor Relations Board initiated the court proceedings. Thus, see Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, supra, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 81 F. Supp. 541, 543, affirmed 2 Cir., 173 F.2d 567, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65; and see also McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, Cal. 1957, 315 P.2d 322. Second, it is an accepted canon of construction that repeals by implication are not favored, especially where the previous statute (the Norris-LaGuardia Act) is not stale or forgotten, but is a "significant and tremendously important piece of legislation which the Congress evidently had specifically in mind when it came to enact the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947." W.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, supra, 1 Cir., 217 F.2d 6, 9.