Source: http://www.epa.gov/aljhomep/orders/rhone-po.htm
Timestamp: 2015-07-02 01:18:35
Document Index: 750638967

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 22', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§11023', '§ 372', '§ 372', '§ 313', '§ 2462', '§ 313', '§313', '§ 2462', '§ 2462', '§ 372', '§ 313', '§ 313', '§ 2462', '§ 313', '§ 2462', '§ 313']

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Orders 1998
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR
IN THE MATTER OF         )
Rhone-Poulenc Basic      )    Docket No. 5-EPCRA-97-053
Chemicals Division,  )
Respondent       )
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Emergency Planning, Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA") of 1986. On
November 24, 1997, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Certain Counts of the 81 count
Complaint pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 22.20 of the Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the
Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits. Respondent filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss on March 23, 1998, based on the affirmative defense that Complainant is barred by the statute of limitations from prosecuting
those counts in the Complaint relating to § 313 of EPCRA. Held: Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss Counts 1, 3 and 4 through 13 for 1990 violations of EPCRA § 313 is Granted;
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Counts 29 through 38 and 41 for 1991 violations of EPCRA § 313 is Denied. Before: Stephen J. McGuire
Date: April 27, 1998
For Complainant:
Roger Grimes, Esq.
Assistant Regional Counsel U.S. EPA
77 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago, IL 60604-6595
For Respondent:
Dixie L. Laswell, Esq.
Philip L. Comella, Esq.
Susannah A. Smetana, Esq.
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson
55 E. Monroe Street, Suite 4200
Chicago, IL 60603-5803
On June 30, 1997, EPA filed an 81 count Complaint charging Respondent, Rhone-Poulenc, a New York corporation, with violating the reporting and recordkeeping requirements
of the Emergency Planning, Community Right-to- Know Act ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §11023(1)
and the applicable regulations in 40 C.F.R. § 372.10 and 40 C.F.R. § 372.30. These counts
allege that Respondent failed to submit Form Rs, for the years 1990 and 1991, required by
EPCRA § 313, and further, failed to comply with EPCRA's three year recordkeeping
requirements. EPA had inspected Respondent's facility, located in Hammond, Indiana, on
January 19, 1994, at which time Respondent had been unable to produce these records. The
Complaint assessed a total proposed penalty of $638,400. On November 24, 1997, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Certain Counts of the
Complaint. This Motion requested dismissal of counts 23, 39, 40, 49, 50, 56, 59, 60, 61, 69, 75,
77, 78, 79, and 80, based upon EPA's failure to allege exceedance of the threshold quantities of each chemical subject to the Complaint. These counts were subsequently dismissed in the
February 9, 1998, Order Granting Joint Motion for Extension of Time and Granting Motion to
Amend Complaint, along with counts 2, 16, 18-22, 24-27, 43, 47, 48, 51-55, 57, 58, and 62 for a
total of thirty-seven counts dismissed from the original Complaint. The total proposed penalty
was amended from $638,400 to $272,300. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss also requested dismissal of counts 4-13, and remaining
counts 29-38 and 41 as barred by the statute of limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2462, held applicable to
administrative proceedings by the Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 3M v.
Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (1994).(2) Complainant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Certain Counts of the Complaint on December 18, 1997. Respondent filed its Reply Memorandum on December 29, 1997. On March 23, 1998, Respondent filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Counts I and
III, and a Memorandum in Support Thereof, wherein Respondent sought to add Counts I and III
to its original Motion to Dismiss, and set forth further arguments in support of its Motion to
Dismiss. This Order addresses whether the 1990 EPCRA § 313 violations, counts 1, 3 and 4
through 13, and the 1991 EPCRA §313 violations, counts 29 through 38 and 41, are barred by
the five-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462, where the Complaint was filed on June
30, 1997. II. Positions of the Parties
In its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argues that counts 4 through 13, the 1990 Form R
reporting violations, and counts 29 through 38 and 41, the 1991 Form R reporting violations, are
barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Respondent asserts that the "Form R reporting year under EPCRA
is the calendar year and thus ends December 31." Thus, it is Respondent's position, that forms
not filed during 1990 and 1991 are beyond the five-year statute of limitations period and are
therefore barred by law, from enforcement. Complainant argues that the continuing violations doctrine extends the date of accrual
until the end of the three year recordkeeping requirement under 40 C.F.R. § 372.10. Thus, the
Form Rs for the 1990 calendar year reporting period were due on July 1, 1991; and the Form Rs
for the 1991 calendar year reporting period were due on July 1, 1992, plus the three year record-keeping retention requirement, which EPA claims should toll the statute of limitations until July
1, 1994, and July 1, 1995 respectively. Thus, according to Complainant, the June 30, 1997
Complaint was timely filed. In its Reply and Supplemental Motion, Respondent argues that the EPCRA § 313
reporting and maintaining records requirement is triggered annually. Thus, it argues that any
claim by EPA that Respondent violated EPCRA's regulatory requirement to maintain records
accrues at the conclusion of the reporting period and is not continuing in nature. Respondent asserts that its position is analogous to the Environmental Appeals Board
(EAB) decision In the Matter of Lazarus, Docket No. TSCA-V-C-32-93, TSCA Appeal No. 95-2, 1997 EPA LEXIS 27 (Final Decision and Order, September 30, 1997), in which the EAB held
that the failure to file annual reports and maintain records under the TSCA PCB records
requirement was not a continuing violation and actions not brought within five years of the
reporting period were barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent argues that the provisions
at issue in Lazarus under TSCA are similar to the issues here, involving EPCRA § 313. Further,
Respondent distinguishes this case from In the Matter of Harmon Electronics, Docket No. VII-91-H-0037, Appeal No. 94-4, 1997 RCRA LEXIS 2 (Final Order, March 24, 1997), in which the
EAB held that the obligation to have a RCRA permit for the operation of a facility, the obligation
to conduct groundwater monitoring, and the obligation under the Act's financial responsibility
provision are continuing violations. III. Discussion As noted, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the general five-year statute of
limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 should be applied to administrative cases. 3M v. Browner, 17
F.3d 1453 (1994). In the aftermath of this decision, the issue as to whether environmental
violations are continuous violations, effectively tolling the five-year statute of limitations, has
been a source of ongoing contention between EPA and the regulated community. Accordingly,
the issue here, is whether an EPCRA § 313 reporting violation is, by law, a continuous violation. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned concludes that it is not. The doctrine of continuing violations provides a special rule for determining when a
violation first accrues. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). The phrase "first
accrued" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, refers to the point in time at which a violation is complete
for purposes of maintaining an action by the plaintiff against a defendant. Generally, a cause of
action accrues when a defendant commits an act that injures the plaintiff. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971). The continuing violations doctrine is an
exception to this general rule of accrual. The effect of a continuing violation is to restart the
statute of limitations. Airweld, Inc. v. Airco., Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1984). Various circuit court decisions have attempted to describe a continuing violation. "A
continuing violation accrues when the course of illegal conduct is complete, not when an action
to enforce the violation can first be maintained. "A 'continuing offense' is, in general, one that
involves a prolonged course of conduct; its commission is not complete until the conduct has run
its course...the limitations period for a continuing offense does not begin until the offense is
complete..." United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995). "'Continuing
wrongs,' however, are repeated instances or continuing acts of the same nature...", Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 895 F.2d 588, 597 (9th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S.
824 (1990).
The 7th Circuit has held that "The continuing violation doctrine does not apply 'where
the harm is definite and discoverable, and nothing prevented the plaintiff from coming forward
and seeking redress' at any earlier time." Further, "The exception as to continuing, ongoing acts
does not apply where the alleged tortious acts...caused direct damages that occurred at a certain
point in time--resulting in immediate and direct injury...with consequential effects." S. Speiser,
C. Krause & A. Gans, The American Law of Torts, @ 5:27 at 890 (1983) cited in Wilson v.
Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1992); 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1958.
The Supreme Court in Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, recognized that the continuing
violations doctrine should be applied only in limited circumstances because "...for all practical
purposes, [the continuing violation doctrine] extends the statute beyond its stated term." As an
exception to the general rule, it should be used only in circumstances which are best suited to the
violation through analysis of the statute and Congressional intent. "The language of the statute
of limitations must be interpreted in the light of the general purposes of the statute and its other
provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served by any limitation
of the time within which an action must be brought." U.S. v. Core Labs, 759 F.2d 480, 481 (5th
Cir. 1985), citing Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926). From an environmental perspective, the EAB in Harmon, addressed the issue of
whether violations of various RCRA provisions were deemed to be continuing in nature. The
EAB's analysis involved examinations of 1) the language of the overall statute; 2) the language
of the provision(s) at issue; 3) the regulations and preamble; 4) the legislative history; and 5) an
examination of words and phrases connoting continuity as an indication of congressional intent. The EAB similarly employed this methodology in Lazarus to determine whether Congress
intended various provisions of TSCA to be continuing violations.
This analytical approach is particularly useful for purposes of addressing the instant case
and to determine whether the alleged EPCRA § 313 violations are continuing in nature. A
discussion of the language of EPCRA follows. Analysis of EPCRA EPCRA is Title III of the "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986"
(SARA). Title III of SARA is a free standing statute titled "The Emerge