Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105017/barrentine-vs-arkansas-best-freight-sys
Timestamp: 2018-02-23 01:20:35
Document Index: 184420227

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 392', 'Art. 50', 'Art. 44', '§ 201', '§ 159', '§ 202', '§ 216', '§ 785', '§ 216', '§ 596', '§ 254', '§ 790', '§ 202', '§ 216', '§ 216', '§ 207', '§ 6', '§ 206', '§ 16', '§ 216', '§ 201', '§ 171', '§ 108', '§ 2003']

Barrentine Vs Arkansas Best Freight Sys - Citation 105017 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Barrentine Vs. Arkansas-best Freight Sys. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105017
Decided On Apr-06-1981
Case Number 450 U.S. 728
Appellant Barrentine
Respondent Arkansas-best Freight Sys.
barrentine v. arkansas-best freight sys. - 450 u.s. 728 (1981) u.s. supreme court barrentine v. arkansas-best freight sys., 450 u.s. 728 (1981) barrentine v. arkansas-best freight system no. 79-2006 argued january 13, 1981 decided april 6, 1981 450 u.s. 728 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit syllabus petitioner truckdrivers are not paid for the time spent conducting a required pre-trip safety inspection of respondent employer motor carrier's trucks and transporting trucks that fail such inspection to the employer's on-premises repair facility. petitioners' union submitted a wage claim for petitioners' pre-trip inspection and transportation time to a joint grievance committee.....
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. - 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
Held: Petitioners' wage claims under the FLSA are not barred by the prior submission of their grievances to the contractual dispute resolution procedures. Pp. 450 U. S. 734 -746.
(a) The FLSA rights petitioners seek to assert are independent of the collective bargaining process. Such rights devolve on petitioners as individual workers, not as members of the union, and are not waivable. While courts should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute, such as the FLSA, designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . Pp. 450 U. S. 734 -741.
(b) There are two reasons why an employee's right to a minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA might be lost if submission of his wage claim to arbitration precluded him from later bringing an FLSA suit in federal court. First, even if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to support the claim vigorously in arbitration. Second, even when the union has fairly and fully presented the employee's wage claim, the employee's statutory rights might still not be adequately protected. Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights. Furthermore, not only are arbitral procedures less protective of individual statutory rights than are judicial procedures, but also arbitrators very often are powerless to grant the aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief. Under the FLSA, courts can award actual and liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs, whereas an arbitrator can award only that compensation authorized by the wage provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Pp. 450 U. S. 742 -745.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed I dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 450 U. S. 746 .
Petitioner truckdrivers are employed at the Little Rock terminal of respondent Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., an interstate motor carrier of freight. In accordance with federal regulations and Arkansas-Best's employment practices, petitioners are required to conduct a safety inspection of their trucks before commencing any trip, and to transport any truck failing such inspection to Arkansas-Best's on-premises repair facility. See 49 CFR §§ 392.7, 392.8 (1980). Petitioners are not compensated by their employer for the time spent complying with these requirements. [ Footnote 1 ]
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between Arkansas-Best and petitioners' union, respondent Local 878 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, petitioner Barrentine and another driver filed a series of grievances against Arkansas-Best. [ Footnote 2 ] They alleged that Art. 50 of the collective bargaining agreement, which requires Arkansas-Best to compensate
its drivers "for all time spent in [its] service," [ Footnote 3 ] entitled them to compensation for the pre-trip inspection and transportation time. [ Footnote 4 ] Petitioners' union presented these grievances to a joint grievance committee for final and binding decision pursuant to Art. 44 of the collective bargaining agreement. [ Footnote 5 ] The joint committee, composed of three representatives of the union and three representatives of the employer, rejected the grievances without explanation. App. 22.
In March, 1977, petitioners filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. [ Footnote 6 ]
In the first count of their complaint, petitioner alleged that the pre-trip safety inspection and transportation time was compensable under the Fair Labor Standards ct, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., [ Footnote 7 ] and that they were accordingly entitled to the
statutory remedy of actual and liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. [ Footnote 8 ] In the second count, petitioners alleged that the union and its president had breached the union's duty of fair representation,, apparently by entering into a "side deal" with Arkansas-Best regarding compensation of the pre-trip inspection and transportation time. With respect to this claim, petitioners sought to have the decision of the joint grievance committee set aside and to have proper compensation awarded under the collective bargaining agreement.
was affirmed by a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 615 F.2d 1194, 1202 (1980), and is not challenged here. [ Footnote 9 ]
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 , 388 U. S. 180 (1967), these statutes reflect Congress' determination that, to improve the economic wellbeing of workers, and thus to promote industrial peace, the interests of some employees in a bargaining unit may have to be subordinated to the collective interests of a majority of their coworkers. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 , 386 U. S. 182 (1967); 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The rights established through this system of majority rule are thus
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U. S. 50 , 420 U. S. 62 (1975). To further this policy, Congress has declared that
Thus, courts ordinarily defer to collectively bargained dispute resolution procedures when the parties' dispute arises out of the collective bargaining process. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U. S. 554 , 424 U. S. 562 -563 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368 , 414 U. S. 377 -380 (1974); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 , 379 U. S. 652 -653 (1965); Steelworker v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 , 363 U. S. 596 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 , 363 U. S. 577 -578, 363 U. S. 582 -583 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U. S. 564 , 363 U. S. 566 , 363 U. S. 568 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 , 353 U. S. 458 -59 (1957). [ Footnote 10 ]
Respondents contend that the aspect of national labor policy encouraging collective bargaining and industrial self-government requires affirmance of the Court of Appeals. They note that the collective bargaining agreement between Arkansas-Best and petitioners' union requires that "any controversy" between the parties to the agreement be resolved through the binding contractual grievance procedures. See n 5, supra. They further note that Local 878 processed petitioners' grievances in accordance with those procedures, and that the District Court made an unchallenged finding that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation in doing so. Accordingly, they conclude that petitioners should be barred from bringing the statutory component of their wage claim in federal court. [ Footnote 11 ]
equal employment opportunities that was separate and distinct from the rights created through the "majoritarian processes" of collective bargaining. Id. at 415 U. S. 51 . Moreover, because Congress had granted aggrieved employees access to the courts, and because contractual grievance and arbitration procedures provided an inadequate forum for enforcement of Title VII rights, the Court concluded that Title VII claims should be resolved by the courts de novo. [ Footnote 12 ]
Respondents would distinguish Gardner-Denver on the ground that, because petitioners' FLSA claim is based on a dispute over wages and hours, subjects at the heart of the collective bargaining process, their claim is particularly well suited to resolution through collectively bargained grievance and arbitration procedures. But this contention misperceives the nature of petitioners' FLSA claim. [ Footnote 13 ]
29 U.S.C. § 202(a). [ Footnote 14 ] In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act, which was designed to minimize industrial strife and to improve working conditions by encouraging employees to promote their interests collectively, the FLSA was designed to give specific minimum protections to individual workers and to ensure that each employee covered by the Act would receive " [a] fair day's pay for a fair day's work'" and would be protected from "the evil of `overwork' as well as `underpay.'" Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 , 316 U. S. 578 (1942), quoting 81 Cong.Rec. 4983 (1937) (message of President Roosevelt). [ Footnote 15 ]
The statutory enforcement scheme grants individual employees broad access to the courts. Section 16(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which contains the principal enforcement provisions, permits an aggrieved employee to bring his statutory wage and hour claim "in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." No exhaustion requirement or other procedural barriers are set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to or created by the statute. [ Footnote 16 ]
This Court's decisions interpreting the FLSA have frequently emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an individual employee's right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay under the Act. Thus, we have held that FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived, because this would "nullify the purposes" of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 , 324 U. S. 707 (1945); see D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 , 328 U. S. 114 -116 (1946); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37 , 323 U. S. 42 (1944); Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, supra at 316 U. S. 577 ; see 29 CFR § 785.8 (1974). [ Footnote 17 ] Moreover, we have held that congressionally granted FLSA rights take precedence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation
arrangement. See, e.g., Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173 , 327 U. S. 177 -178 (1946); Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427 , 325 U. S. 430 -432 (1945); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 325 U. S. 161 , 325 U. S. 166 -167, 325 U. S. 170 (1945). [ Footnote 18 ] As we stated in Tennessee Coal, Iron R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S. 590 , 321 U. S. 602 -603 (1944) (footnote omitted):
"The Fair Labor Standards Act was not designed to codify or perpetuate [industry] customs and contracts. . . . Congress intended, instead, to achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in by employees covered by the Act. Any custom or contract falling short of that basic policy, like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights. [ Footnote 19 ] "
There are two reasons why an employee's right to a minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA might be lost if submission of his wage claim to arbitration precluded him from later bringing an FLSA suit in federal court. First, even if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to support the claim vigorously in arbitration. Wage and hour disputes that are subject to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement are invariably processed by unions, rather than by individual employees. Since a union's objective is to maximize overall compensation of its members, not to ensure that each employee receives the best compensation deal available, cf. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 58 , n.19, a union balancing individual and collective interests might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative expenditure of resources would result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a whole. [ Footnote 20 ]
Second, even when the union has fairly and fully presented the employee's wage claim, the employee's statutory rights might still not be adequately protected; because the "specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land," id. at 415 U. S. 57 ; see Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 363 U. S. 581 -582, many arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law considerations underlying the FLSA. [ Footnote 21 ] FLSA claims typically involve complex mixed questions of fact and law -- e.g., what constitutes the "regular rate," the "workweek," or "principal," rather than "preliminary or postliminary," activities. These statutory questions must be resolved in light of volumes of legislative history and over four decades of legal interpretation and administrative rulings. Although an arbitrator may be competent to resolve many preliminary factual questions, such as whether the employee "punched in" when he said he did, he may lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue whether an employee's right to a minimum wage or to overtime pay under the statute has been violated. [ Footnote 22 ]
Moreover, even though a particular arbitrator may be competent to interpret and apply statutory law, he may not have the contractual authority to do so. An arbitrator's power is both derived from, and limited by, the collective bargaining agreement. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 53 . He "has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties." Ibid. His task is limited to construing the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement so as to effectuate the collective intent of the parties. Accordingly,
Ibid., quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 363 U. S. 597 . Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights. [ Footnote 23 ]
Gardner-Denver, supra at 415 U. S. 57 -58, but arbitrators very often are powerless to grant the aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief. Under the FLSA, courts can award actual and liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). An arbitrator, by contrast, can award only that compensation authorized by the wage provision of the collective bargaining agreement. He "is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement," and his "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra at 363 U. S. 597 . It is most unlikely that he will be authorized to award liquidated damages, costs, or attorney's fees.
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 49 -50.
As we stated in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 , 386 U. S. 184 (1967), when an employee's claim
Only if the arbitration process has been tainted, e.g., by the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, may the employee pursue his grievance in the courts. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 567 ; Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 386 U. S. 186 .
Cf. United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351 , 400 U. S. 357 (1971) (seaman may assert wage claim in federal court under the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 596, even though he had not previously pursued arbitral remedies provided by contractual grievance procedures); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 357 U. S. 265 , 357 U. S. 268 -270 (1958) (employee returning from military service need not pursue grievance and arbitration procedure prior to asserting seniority rights in federal court under Universal Military Training and Service Act).
The threshold question in this action, then, is whether petitioners were engaged in "activities which are preliminary to [their] principal activity," 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2), when they conducted the pre-trip safety inspections of their vehicles. Resolution of that question requires inquiry into whether the inspection and transportation procedures "are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which [petitioners] are employed." Steiner v. Mitchell, supra at 350 U. S. 256 (changing clothes and showering are "principal" activities of employees working with dangerously caustic and toxic materials); see Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U. S. 260 , 350 U. S. 263 (1956) (knife sharpening is "principal" activity of butchers in meatpacking plant); 29 CFR §§ 790.7, 790.8 (1980). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this is a question of statutory construction that must be resolved by the courts.
Congress enacted the FLSA under its commerce power, having found that the existence of such "detrimental" labor conditions would endanger national health and efficiency and consequently would interfere with the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. See United State v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 , 312 U. S. 109 -110 (1941); 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
To encourage employees to enforce their FLSA rights in court, and thus to further the public policies underlying the FLSA, see Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 , 324 U. S. 709 (1945), Congress has permitted individual employees to sue for back wages and liquidated damages and to receive reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In addition, Congress has empowered the Secretary of Labor to bring judicial enforcement actions under the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217.
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U. S. 446 , 334 U. S. 463 (1948).
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 167 .
It is true that the FLSA, as amended, includes a number of references to collective bargaining agreements. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Mucoda Local No. 1, 321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 602 , n. 18. Sections 7(b)(1) and (2) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(b)(1) and (2), state that an employer need not pay overtime under the Act for an employee's performance of work in excess of the statutory maximum, if the employee is employed
Cf. Humphrey v Moore, 375 U. S. 335 , 375 U. S. 349 (1964) ("we are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of one group of employees against that of another"); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 , 345 U. S. 337 -339 (1953)
We have noted that "a substantial proportion of labor arbitrators are not lawyers," Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 57 , n. 18; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198 , 350 U. S. 203 (1956), and this is particularly true with respect to most members of joint grievance committees, who are drawn from the ranks of management and union leadership .
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 60 , n. 21. Sec also n 19, supra.
415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 53 -54.
I agree, of course, that the congressionally created right of individual workers to a minimum wage under § 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, may not be waived through a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and the workers' union or through a direct agreement between an individual worker and the employer. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 , 324 U. S. 707 (1945). I also agree that the Act creates a private cause of action to vindicate the right to a minimum wage. Fair Labor Standards Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216. But it is a different -- indeed, a totally different -- proposition to say that employees and employers may not agree to a means of enforcing the employees'
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, supra at 324 U. S. 705 .
Unfortunately, neither the parties nor the United States as amicus curiae can point to a clear answer to this question in the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is hornbook law, however, that there is a strong congressional policy favoring grievance procedures and arbitration as a method of resolving labor disputes. See Labor Management Relations Act, §§ 201(b), 203(d), 20 U.S.C. §§ 171(b), 173(d); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108. This Court has acknowledged that policy in the past. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 , 363 U. S. 578 , and n. 4 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 , 363 U. S. 596 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 , 353 U. S. 458 -459 (1957). The Court today pays lipservice to that, congressional policy, ante at 450 U. S. 734 -736, but then -- paradoxically -- ignores it.
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra at 363 U. S. 581 -582. By bringing together persons actually involved in the workplace, often assisted by a neutral arbitrator experienced in such matters, dispute are resolved more swiftly and cheaply. This mechanism promotes industrial harmony and avoids strikes and conflicts; it provides a swift. fair, and inexpensive remedy.
The policy of favoring extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes is reflected in other areas as well. With federal court flooded by litigation increasing in volume, in length, and in a variety of novel forms, [ Footnote 2/1 ] the National Institute of Justice, under the leadership of Attorney General Griffin Bell, in 1979 launched a multimillion-dollar program of field studies to test whether mediation at a neighborhood level could resolve small disputes out of courts in a fashion satisfactory to the parties. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test: Final Evaluation Report 7-8 (1980). The results of this study -- and other similar studies financed by private sources [ Footnote 2/2 ] -- confirmed what many had long suspected: small disputes may be resolved more swiftly and to the satisfaction of the parties without employing the cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive processes of litigation. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The National
and women, now happily receding, [ Footnote 2/4 ] led Congress to forbid discrimination by unions as well as employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-2(c). Against a background of union discrimination, Congress was aware that, in the context of claims under the Civil Rights Act, unions sometimes had been the adversary of workers. Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens. But this case is not a discrimination case.
Even beyond the historical fact of union discrimination, we observed in Gardner-Denver that arbitrators are not likely to have the needed experience to deal with the special issues arising under the Civil Rights Act, a statute "whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts." 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 57 . Leaving resolution of discrimination claims to persons unfamiliar with the congressional policies behind that statute could have undermined enforcement of fundamental rights Congress intended to protect. But the "tension" seen by the Court in Gardner-Denver, ante at 450 U. S. 734 , is simply not present here.
A dispute over wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act arises in an entirely different historical and legal context. In that setting, the union and the employee are the traditional allies, united in enforcing wage claims of employees individually as well as collectively. The Court distorts the possibility that union leadership might fail to protect members' interests in a wage dispute. Ante at 450 U. S. 742 . If this rare exception arose, protection of the employee is abundantly
available by way of the cause of action for breach of the union's duty of fair representation. See Vaca v Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967). [ Footnote 2/5 ]
Despite the Court's contrary view, ante at 450 U. S. 743 -744, whether the time spent in the driver's inspection of a vehicle before taking to the road, as required by federal law, and in transportation of the vehicle to a repair facility when necessary constituted "compensable time" under "Federal Wage Laws," App. 21 (petitioner Barrentine's grievance), is a factual question well suited for disposition by grievance processes and arbitration. The following factors are relevant:
familiar with "the law of the shop . . . [and] the demands and norms of industrial relations." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra at 415 U. S. 57 . The Court's generalizations about the powers of arbitrators, ante at 450 U. S. 744 -745, are irrelevant; arbitrators have whatever power the parties confer upon them. Here, that power extends to " any controversy that might arise." App. 24 (emphasis added). Surely a wage claim is covered.
See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 , 443 U. S. 198 , and n. 1 (1979), and sources cited therein; id. at 443 U. S. 218 (BURGER, J., dissenting).