Source: https://openjurist.org/663/f2d/315/geoffroy-v-secretary-of-health-and-human-services
Timestamp: 2017-10-17 00:45:18
Document Index: 166562343

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 1382', '§ 202', '§ 423', '§ 405']

663 F2d 315 Geoffroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services | OpenJurist
663 F. 2d 315 - Geoffroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
663 F2d 315 Geoffroy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
663 F.2d 315
William P. GEOFFROY, Plaintiff, Appellant,
Submitted April 10, 1981.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) and (d)(2) once it was accepted that Geoffroy could not perform his previous work the critical question became whether "(c) onsidering his age, education, and work experience, (he could) engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." § 423(d)(2)(A). See also § 1382c(a)(3)(B). While we acknowledge that the new regulations which the Secretary uses to assess a claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, where he or she can no longer perform at their past employment, have been the subject of much recent litigation,3 in the present case we can discern no reason why the notice taken, and the role these regulations played in the taking of such notice, were improper.
On a different point, appellant complains that the ALJ did not list any specific jobs which he could perform. While we agree this is so, we do not consider this shortcoming fatal. Had this case presented a more complex medical-vocational record or less specific factual findings, the ALJ's failure to list specific types of jobs might perhaps have led to a different result. The ALJ's decision assumed without further elaboration, that it automatically followed that Geoffroy, and indeed any claimant who can engage in light or sedentary activity, was capable of performing all 1600 occupations noticed in App. 2, § 202.00(a). It is questionable whether the Secretary's burden under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) is correctly sustained under such a mechanical interpretation. Cf. Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291, 297-99 (2d Cir. 1981) (despite use of "Medical-Vocational Guidelines" the Secretary must still show particular jobs which a claimant can perform); Hall v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1375-77 (9th Cir. 1979) (Secretary must show a claimant can engage in a specified job). We need not, however, decide whether in a case such as Geoffroy's (i. e., where the only impairment asserted does not appear to be severe) an ALJ must ritualistically list specific light jobs when the Secretary has by regulation defined what characteristics are entailed in this category. Cf. O'Banner v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) ("It is well established in this circuit that the Secretary may take administrative notice that light work exists in the national economy. Floyd v. Finch, 441 F.2d (6th Cir. 1971) citing Breaux v. Finch, 421 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1970.)") Despite the ALJ's omission the record does list several alternative types of employment which appellant was thought capable of performing. Whether or not these listed occupations accurately reflect the Secretary's ultimate decision8 we see no prejudice to the claimant in the ALJ's failure to repeat these occupations, or list others like them, in his decision. They are a fair example of the type of light work the record shows Geoffroy can engage in.
Lastly, we find no procedural error in the district court's adjudication of the appeal upon the Secretary's "Motion For Order Affirming the Decision of the Secretary." Appellant complains that in deciding the appeal upon such a motion the district court violated the summary judgment provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 by filing to extend to him an opportunity to introduce supporting affidavits or other supplementary materials or set a hearing on the motion. However, appellant has never indicated the nature of this supplementary evidence or that such further evidence does in fact exist. In any event, whatever label the parties or the court ascribe to the procedure used to review the Secretary's decision, statute and long established case law make clear that the court's function is a narrow one limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary's findings and whether the decision conformed to statutory requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Lizotte v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 1981). Because the court does not sit to make de novo determinations and appellant in his opposition to the Secretary's motion presented no indication whatsoever that "good cause" existed to remand the matter for the taking of any additional evidence-which was in effect the most that appellant could have expected-the court correctly proceeded to rule on the appeal on the basis of the record before it.
No reported decision of an appeals court has yet explicitly determined the validity, or the propriety of the Secretary's use of these regulations. In general they have been assumed to be valid without discussion on this point. E. g., Thomas v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 659 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981); Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1981); Vega v. Harris, 636 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1981); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1980); Warncke v. Harris, 619 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1980); Hicks v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1979). Most lower courts have found them valid e. g., Stallings v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 956 (W.D.Tenn.1980); Boyce v. Harris, 492 F.Supp. 751 (D.S.C.1980); Crowe v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 683 (E.D.Tenn.1980), although at least two lower courts have disapproved their use, Santise v. Harris, 501 F.Supp. 274 (D.N.J.1981); Philips v. Harris, 488 F.Supp. 1161 (W.D.Va.1980)