Source: https://casetext.com/case/mcdermott-v-marcus-errico-emmer-brooks
Timestamp: 2020-07-02 17:57:12
Document Index: 571895157

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 9', '§ 1692', '§ 1331', '§ 1328', '§ 1367', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 9', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1692', '§ 45', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692']

McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 775 F.3d 109 | Casetext Search + Citator
Zotbelle, Inc. v. Kryolan Corp.
Lannan v. Levy & White, 186 F. Supp. 3d 77, 97 (D. Mass. 2016) (quoting Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Bos. Univ.,…
We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo, but we conduct that review based on the facts as…
Full title:William M. McDERMOTT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MARCUS, ERRICO, EMMER …
775 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2014)
concluding that "where the Massachusetts appellate courts have found per se Chapter 93A liability based on a statutory violation, such conclusion, ... was grounded on explicit statutory language" and that " ‘ consumer asserting a claim under [Chapter] 93A, § 9, may recover for violations of [ Chapter] 176D, § 3, cl. 9, without regard to whether the violation was unlawful under [ Chapter] 93A, § 2, because of the explicit statement to that effect in [Chapter 93A,] § 9’ " (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co. , 414 Mass. 747, 610 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1993) )
Summary of this case from Goldsmith v. Marsh U.S., Inc. (In re Glasshouse Techns., Inc.)
Philip H. Cahalin, for appellant. Stephen J. Duggan and Edmund A. Allcock, with whom Lynch & Lynch and Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C. were on brief, for appellee.
Before THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, SOUTER, Associate Justice, and STAHL, Circuit Judge. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
We are, once again, called upon to interpret and apply the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (“Chapter 93A”). This case has humble origins: a seemingly-simple dispute over several $25 late fees the Pondview Condominium trustees charged to one of their residents, appellant William McDermott (“McDermott”), after he didn't pay his condominium fees on time. Unable to resolve the matter with McDermott, the trustees hired law firm appellee Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. (“MEEB”), to collect from McDermott. Soon enough, what began as a low-stakes disagreement quickly blossomed into wide-ranging litigation in the state and federal courts. We are concerned here with the two-count complaint McDermott filed against MEEB in the federal district court. McDermott alleged that MEEB's collections activities violated both Chapter 93A and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”).
The magistrate judge issued a 203–page written decision following a six-day bench trial. See McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 911 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Mass.2012). We have no need to fully detail the extensive factual background in order to decide the narrow issues before us, and we commend the magistrate judge's thorough decision to the reader seeking a full run-down. We need only sketch a rough outline of the goings-on, which we do based on the magistrate judge's factual findings, the vast majority of which are unchallenged on appeal.
At the outset of the case, the parties mutually agreed to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge over all proceedings, including trial.
McDermott owned two units—104 and 105—at the Pondview Condominiums, a 19–unit condominium in Lynn, Massachusetts. Pondview's trustees (from now on collectively referred to as “Pondview”), as permitted by the condominium documents, required all unit owners to pay monthly assessments for the upkeep of common areas and facilities, along with several other types of monthly fees. Any assessments not paid on time incurred a late payment fee, which acted as a lien against the owner's unit. If Pondview had to turn the matter over to collections, the condominium documents allowed for the assessment of attorney's fees, late charges, and collection costs against the offending owner.
Monthly fees included a loan payback charge, which was “either part of a special assessment or a line item in [Pondview's] budget.”
On December 18, Pondview sent McDermott a letter detailing how much he owed for unit 105. The letter also told McDermott that, pursuant to the condominium documents, he was being charged $25 late fees for payments received after the 15th of the month during which each of the payments were due. According to Pondview, by the end of 2004 McDermott owed, including late payment fees, $346.62 on unit 105 and $380.33 for unit 104. McDermott, however, let Pondview know that he disagreed with the late fee assessments and would not pay them. By the time March 2005 rolled around, McDermott had not paid condominium fees, loan payback charges, or late fees for either unit for January, February, and March.
The magistrate judge found that MEEB “was not involved in the decision to impose a $25.00 charge for delinquent loan payback charges or to change any policy to impose late fees.”
Over the approximately three-and-a-half years between April 2005 and September 2008, MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against McDermott. McDermott retained counsel somewhere along the way (the exact date is not important here). Five of MEEB's collection suits related to unit 105, and four related to unit 104. Only two reached trial, but MEEB won them both and was awarded attorney's fees to boot.
In one of these cases the state court awarded $14,000 in attorney's fees, approximately half of what MEEB had sought.
Displeased with MEEB's collection activities, McDermott filed suit against the firm in the federal district court for Massachusetts on February 3, 2009. His two-count complaint alleged a variety of violations of federal (the FDCPA) and state (Chapter 93A) law.
McDermott's complaint grounded federal jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as his was an action “arising under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States.” He also invoked the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to decide his state-law-based Chapter 93A claims. Although in an apparent typographical error McDermott's complaint cited the wrong statute for supplemental jurisdiction (the non-existent “28 U.S.C. § 1328” instead of 28 U.S.C. § 1367), MEEB has never asked the federal courts to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
After trial, the magistrate judge found that although MEEB acted at all times in good faith and that none of its actions were deceptive, it nevertheless committed numerous violations of the FDCPA. The details of each FDCPA violation are not important for our purposes, other than that the judge found none of them were in bad faith. The magistrate judge further determined that, pursuant to regulations issued by the Massachusetts Attorney General, MEEB's FDCPA violations served as a basis for imposing liability under Chapter 93A, even though MEEB had not committed any unfair or deceptive acts. In other words, she found the FDCPA violations constituted “per se” violations of Chapter 93A. She also found, however, that MEEB did not commit any unfair or deceptive acts that could give rise to Chapter 93A liability independent of the per se violations. Ultimately, the magistrate judge awarded McDermott $800 under the FDCPA, and $10,400 for the Chapter 93A violations.
The magistrate judge also found some of McDermott's FDCPA claims, having been brought outside of the FDCPA's one-year limitations period, were barred as untimely.
MEEB subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The magistrate judge reviewed a newly-decided case from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) interpreting Chapter 93A, Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 987 N.E.2d 1247 (2013), determined her finding of per se Chapter 93A violations was incorrect as a matter of law, and vacated the judgment on that count. See McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks, P.C., 969 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.Mass.2013). She did not disturb her findings with respect to MEEB's FDCPA violations. As a result of the magistrate judge's reconsideration, McDermott saw his recovery slashed from $11,200 to $800.
McDermott filed one too, but we need not discuss it as McDermott does not appeal its denial.
Because McDermott's Chapter 93A arguments implicate matters of state law, we apply the substantive law of Massachusetts. See Dykes v. DePuy, Inc., 140 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir.1998) (“When facing a claim that does not arise under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, a federal court must apply the substantive law of the forum in which it sits....”); see also O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531, 94 S.Ct. 740, 38 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) (recognizing that it is not the function of a federal court “to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State”). This is so even where we are dealing with “a state-law claim brought under supplemental jurisdiction,” such as McDermott's Chapter 93A claim. Dykes, 140 F.3d at 39.
The Massachusetts statute at issue here, Chapter 93A, straightforwardly declares that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are ... unlawful.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(a). “[T]he intent of the legislature” is that a court hearing a Chapter 93A claim will be “guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. [§ ] 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(b). The statute permits the Massachusetts Attorney General to implement “rules and regulations interpreting the provisions” of Chapter 93A, but these “shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts interpreting the provisions of the” Federal Trade Commission Act, “as from time to time amended.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(c).
Although Chapter 93A broadly prohibits “unfair” and “deceptive” conduct in trade or commerce, the statute does not spell out what specific actions make the grade. Doing so would not be feasible anyway because, as the SJC has observed, “[t]here is no limit to human inventiveness in this field.” Kattar v. Demoulas, 433 Mass. 1, 739 N.E.2d 246, 257 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, whether or not particular conduct violates Chapter 93A is generally determined on a case-by-case basis. See id.
Neither does the statute define “trade or commerce.”
Nevertheless, Massachusetts courts have recognized that violations of a limited number of statutes automatically give rise to liability under Chapter 93A. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 414 Mass. 747, 610 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1993) (violation of state unfair claims settlement act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, constitutes violation of Chapter 93A); Reddish v. Bowen, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 621, 849 N.E.2d 901, 906 (2006) (same with respect to a home improvement contractor's violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 142A). This automatic liability, which the parties refer to as per se liability, could be thought of as a species of strict liability. In the instances where the Massachusetts appellate courts have found per se Chapter 93A liability based on a statutory violation, such conclusion, as we discuss hereafter, was grounded on explicit statutory language.
With respect to unfair claims settlement act violations like those addressed in Polaroid, per se Chapter 93A liability arises directly from the consumer protection act itself. Chapter 93A provides that “[a]ny person ... whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D [i.e., the unfair claims settlement act] may bring an action in the superior court.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(1). In accordance with this statutory text, the SJC has recognized that “[a] consumer asserting a claim under [Chapter] 93A, § 9, may recover for violations of [Chapter] 176D, § 3, cl. 9, without regard to whether the violation was unlawful under [Chapter] 93A, § 2, because of the explicit statement to that effect in [Chapter 93A,] § 9.” Polaroid, 610 N.E.2d at 917. Thus, Chapter 93A itself established that an act that violates the unfair claims settlement act violates Chapter 93A as well. Voilà, per se liability.
We proceed to the parties' particular arguments about MEEB's per se Chapter 93A liability. The question they have placed before us is narrow: although Chapter 93A is a statute of broad applicability, Kattar, 739 N.E.2d at 257, in the wake of what they both consider to be the key case, Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 987 N.E.2d 1247 (2013), do FDCPA violations give rise to so-called per se liability under Chapter 93A, § 2? Because the parties have relied so extensively on Klairmont, an extended discussion of it is required in order to place the parties' arguments in context. And, although the magistrate judge interpreted and applied Klairmont, we consider its import de novo. See Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 952 N.E.2d 908, 912 (2011) (finding that “the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter 93A] violation is a question of law”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Some years ago, we noted that a violation of the FDCPA is a per se violation of Chapter 93A. French v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 489 F.3d 402, 403 n. 1 (1st Cir.2007). And before that, we stated that a violation of a federal consumer protection statute “constitutes a per se violation of Chapter 93A, § 2(a).” Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 176 (1st Cir.2004). These conclusory statements, devoid of substantive analysis or explanation, are not particularly helpful to our analysis here. Further, these cases were decided prior to Klairmont, which controls our interpretation of state law.
Klairmont involved the alleged wrongful death of a college student who, while in the midst of a cell phone conversation, fell down a flight of steps at a bar. 987 N.E.2d at 1251. The stairway, it turned out, was a bad stairway. Not only was the very “presence of the stairs ... obscured with hanging vinyl strips,” id., the stairs themselves violated the Massachusetts building code in multiple respects. For example, the stairway was not equipped with a self-closing “fire-rated” door and landing at the top, there were no hand rails, and the riser and tread dimensions did not meet the building code's dimensional requirements. Id. at 1253. Furthermore, the defendants had rebuilt the stairs years before the decedent's fall, yet when they did so they “failed to acquire a building permit or to comply with the building code.” Id. at 1253–54. Moreover, “the defendants knew that building permits and a change in use permit were required, as evidenced by the fact that the defendants filed, and then abandoned, multiple building permit and change in use permit applications.” Id. at 1254.
The bar itself and trustees of the legal entity that owned the real estate on which it was located.
The plaintiffs (decedent's parents) brought a Chapter 93A count premised solely on the defendant's noncompliance with the Massachusetts building code. See id. at 1252. They grounded their Chapter 93A theory on the interplay between Chapter 93A, § 2 and 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(3)—an Attorney General regulation declaring that a violation of a state statute providing for public health, safety, or welfare is itself a Chapter 93A violation. See id. In essence, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants were liable under Chapter 93A because they knew about the building code violations but failed to do anything about them.
They also brought general negligence claims, but those are not germane here.
an act or practice is a violation of [Chapter 93A], § 2 if:
Yet, that the building code is embraced by the “unquestionably broad” ambit of 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(3) does not by itself render its violation a per se violation of Chapter 93A. Id. The reach of the regulation—emanating as it does from the Attorney General rather than the Legislature—is “bound by the scope of [ Chapter] 93A, § 2(a).” Id. This means that “under 940 [C.M.R.] § 3.16(3) a violation of a law or regulation ... will be a violation of [ Chapter] 93A, § 2(a), only if the conduct leading to the violation is both unfair or deceptive and occurs in trade or commerce.” Id. By making this pronouncement, the SJC sharply limited the occasions on which an unlawful act will lead to liability under Chapter 93A through operation of the Attorney General's regulations.
Indeed, the SJC noted in no uncertain terms that the trial judge “misstated the law when she said that ‘the defendants' [b]uilding [c]ode violations were per se deceptive and unfair acts or practices.’ ” Id. at 1255 n. 16 (emphasis added).
The regulation McDermott relies upon states that conduct which violates a federal consumer protection statute, like the FDCPA, also violates Chapter 93A. For our purposes, the only relevant substantive difference between Klairmont's regulation, 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(3), and McDermott's, 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(4), is the source of law: § 3.16(3) looks to state consumer protection law, while § 3.16(4) refers to federal consumer protection law. Compare 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(3) (referring to Massachusetts statutes “intended to provide the consumers of this Commonwealth protection”) with 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(4) (referring to “Federal consumer protection statutes within the purview of [Chapter 93A], § 2”).
The parties take it for granted that the FDCPA is a “Federal consumer protection statute[ ] within the purview of” Chapter 93A, § 2, as required by the Attorney General regulation. 940 C.M.R. § 3.16(4). The district courts that have considered the issue have concluded that it is. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F.Supp.2d 20, 84 (D.Mass.2007); Dean v. Compass Receivables Mgmt. Corp., 148 F.Supp.2d 116, 119 (D.Mass.2001). The correctness of these holdings is confirmed by the text of the FDCPA itself, which sets forth one of its purposes as “to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). Thus, we agree the FDCPA is a consumer protection statute for the purposes of Chapter 93A.
As it turns out, the FTC Act is quite similar to Chapter 93A. Like Chapter 93A, it provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce[ ] are ... unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(a) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”). Chapter 93A's echo of the FTC Act's language, along with the legislative directive that courts interpreting Chapter 93A are to be guided by the federal courts' interpretation of this statute, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2(b), are important indications that McDermott is on the right track.
Decades ago, the SJC addressed the connection between federal consumer protection law and Chapter 93A. The SJC announced with striking clarity that Massachusetts has “wholly incorporated” the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), into Chapter 93A. Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768, 773 n. 8 (1975). Chapter 93A, it explained on another occasion, “was enacted in 1967, partly in response to [a Federal Trade Commission] policy to stop unfair practices on a State level before they become interstate problems.” Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 380 Mass. 762, 407 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1980). To effectuate this underlying motivation, Chapter 93A “incorporates the extensive body of Federal administrative and decisional law under the FTC Act, at least in so far as it relates to definitions of ‘unfair’ and ‘deceptive.’ ” Id. (internal citation omitted). Lest there be any doubt that the SJC has changed its thinking over the years, it recently stated that Chapter 93A “defines unfair acts or practices by reference to interpretations of those terms in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006), in which [Chapter] 93A has its roots.” Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 464 Mass. 145, 981 N.E.2d 671, 683 (2013). It follows that, because Massachusetts has folded the FTC Act into Chapter 93A, unfair or deceptive conduct that violates the FTC Act also violates Chapter 93A.
Here, the magistrate judge found that MEEB violated the FDCPA by, among other things, contacting McDermott despite its awareness that he was represented by counsel. Although McDermott has not advanced any claims under the state debt collection statute, it is clear that this particular FDCPA violation would have violated state debt collection law as well. And, by virtue of Chapter 93's clear language, it would have constituted an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” for Chapter 93A purposes. That MEEB's direct contact of McDermott would have led to per se Chapter 93A liability under the state debt collection statute provides yet another reason for interpreting the similar language in the FTC Act and the FDCPA in the same way.
At first blush, Chapter 93 may not appear to provide for per se Chapter 93A liability because it does not address the trade or commerce requirement. Yet, Chapter 93 applies specifically to debt collectors. And a debt collector's business is, by definition, collecting debts. Although we need not decide the issue here, we would be hard-pressed to imagine why a debt collector who violates Chapter 93 would not be acting in trade or commerce with respect to the particular debtor.
Summing up, and although our analysis differs markedly from the magistrate judge's, we conclude MEEB's violations of the FDCPA constitute per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the FTC Act. The SJC's Klairmont opinion does nothing to alter this reasoning, as Klairmont determined only that Attorney General regulations are bound by the scope of Chapter 93A. Klairmont simply did not address per se Chapter 93A liability arising through an independent statute. The magistrate judge, therefore, committed an error of law when she concluded that Klairmont required a separate “trade or commerce” finding in these circumstances. Accordingly, to the extent that the magistrate judge vacated the judgment in favor of McDermott on his Chapter 93A claim, we reverse.
Before moving on, we note MEEB's contention that because certain FDCPA violations found by the magistrate judge occurred outside of the FDCPA's one-year limitations period, these “untimely” claims can not serve as the basis for Chapter 93A liability. The Massachusetts appellate courts have unambiguously held that a Chapter 93A claim is subject to Chapter 93A's four-year limitations period. See Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & Assocs., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 397, 783 N.E.2d 842, 849 (2003) (A Chapter 93A claim “need only be dismissed if, under [Chapter] 93A's four-year limitations period and the accrual date applicable to the particular [Chapter] 93A claim, it was not timely filed.”). We, too, recognized this more than twenty years ago. See Tagliente v. Himmer, 949 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1991) (distinguishing between statute of limitations applicable to claim of fraudulent concealment and Chapter 93A claim based upon the same underlying conduct). MEEB does not argue that any of its FDCPA violations are untimely under Chapter 93A. Accordingly, its statute of limitations defense is without merit.
McDermott next argues that the magistrate judge should have found that MEEB violated the FDCPA by charging and attempting to collect from him “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary attorney fees.” Appellant Br. at 23. To get to this conclusion, McDermott first cites several Massachusetts cases for the proposition that charging excessive fees violates Massachusetts law. Working from this premise, he directs our attention to language in the FDCPA which includes in its definition of unfair debt collection practices the “collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
McDermott also argues that collection of excessive, redundant, and unnecessary fees “wrongfully cause[s] [a] debtor to incur avoidable costs” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5). Appellant Br. at 24. That section, however, renders it unlawful for a debt collector to “[c]aus[e] charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the communication.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(5). McDermott makes no attempt to explain how this section applies to his avoidable costs theory. Accordingly, we do not consider it further.
MEEB makes several responses to these arguments. The only one with which we need concern ourselves is MEEB's position that McDermott is attempting to raise a new legal theory on appeal. MEEB says that McDermott's theory at trial was consistent with the allegations in his Verified Complaint that MEEB was responsible for causing an “unreasonable, unfair, unlawful, unexplained, and retroactive change in Pondview's policy for the specific purpose of precipitating a dispute with McDermott in order to generate legal fees for MEEB.” Appellee Br. at 25. Having failed to make those allegations stick, MEEB says McDermott is now impermissibly “attempt[ing] to ‘recast’ his theory of liability solely under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, previously having asserted that the alleged underlying conduct violated various other provisions of the FDCPA.” Id. at 27.
it engaged in a convoluted collection procedure which inevitably caused miscommunication, lack of communication, confusion, and acrimony that escalated litigation costs and served as a pretext for MEEB to evade its obligation under 15 U.S.C. § 1692h to apply payments of McDermott's debt as he directed and not to debts he disputed ... and for MEEB to provide McDermott with communications which were illegible, deceptive, and incomprehensible in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, and 1692f.
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), however, is aimed at something else entirely. The statute prohibits attempts to collect any amount “unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Although McDermott successfully asserted claims that MEEB violated other provisions of the FDCPA, nowhere in his post-trial brief does he take the position that the amount of his debts were not authorized by the condominium agreement. Further, he did not even hint at the multi-step pathway to a § 1692f(1) violation that he advances in this appeal. Instead, following trial McDermott focused his arguments on MEEB's alleged bad faith and intentional violations of federal and state law.
As the magistrate judge noted in addressing one of McDermott's other arguments, “[i]t is not abusive to collect or charge the costs of an ordinary collection action where, as here, the condominium documents gave Pondview the ability to charge those costs to [McDermott].” McDermott, 911 F.Supp.2d at 77.
When any portion of the unit owner's share of the common expenses has been delinquent for at least sixty days ... the organization of unit owners shall send a notice stating the amount of the delinquency to the unit owner by certified and first class mail. The organization of unit owners shall also send a notice stating the amount of the delinquency to the first mortgagee by certified and first class mail, provided, that the first mortgagee has informed the organization of unit owners of its name and mailing address.
McDermott, without providing any convincing reason to do so, asks us to simply ignore this requirement and pick and choose to apply only that statutory language which benefits him. But where, as here, a Massachusetts “statute is unambiguous, our function is to enforce the statute according to its terms.” Reading Co–Op. Bank v. Suffolk Constr. Co., Inc., 464 Mass. 543, 984 N.E.2d 776, 780 (2013). We therefore decline McDermott's invitation to rewrite the statute to facilitate the outcome he desires.
McDermott is now left with his argument that the magistrate judge clearly erred when she found that MEEB did not intentionally violate Chapter 93A and that its actions were not motivated by bad faith, and again when she declined to award multiple damages. “Ultimately, [Chapter] 93A ties liability for multiple damages to the degree of the defendant's culpability.” Kattar, 739 N.E.2d at 259. A reviewing court will only overturn a trial judge's finding in this regard if it was “clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Clegg v. Butler, 424 Mass. 413, 676 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (1997)); see also Smith, 76 F.3d at 420 (Where a trial judge's finding as to “an actor's motivation” following a bench trial is “plausible, appellate review is at an end.”). McDermott faces an uphill climb on this claim, and he is unable to reach the summit.
The magistrate judge had a front-row seat to each witness's testimony on direct and cross-examination over the course of the six-day bench trial. Her 203–page written decision summarized the testimony and set forth her credibility determinations. She concluded MEEB did not conduct itself in such a manner as to intentionally pump up its legal fees, and that it was instead motivated by its desire to zealously represent Pondview's interests. The magistrate judge further noted that in at least one instance, MEEB's incorrect statement about the amount owed by McDermott went in McDermott's favor (i.e., MEEB said he owed less than he really did), which supports her finding that MEEB was not simply trying to increase its legal fees.
The magistrate judge made multiple findings in this regard. For example, she found McDermott's testimony about why he refused to pay certain assessments was “self serving” and “not credible,” and that his testimony that he did not receive a letter MEEB sent to him by certified and first-class mail was “not credible” too. The magistrate judge later commented that McDermott's “demeanor ... markedly changed on cross examination.”
At the end of the day, the magistrate judge found that MEEB acted in good faith, that it did not willfully or knowingly violate Chapter 93A, and that its “conduct was neither unfair nor deceptive.” On this record, we are unable to say the magistrate judge's findings were clearly erroneous. And in the absence of intentional or bad faith violations of Chapter 93A, MEEB is not liable for double or treble damages.
noting that "Massachusetts courts have recognized" that a violation of Chapter 176D "automatically give rise to liability under Chapter 93A"
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