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BrowseUploadSign inJoinBooksAudiobooksComicsSheet MusicWelcome to Scribd! Start your free trial and access books, documents and more.Find out moreWhite Paper: Recommendations for Improving Offshore SafetyJoint Industry Task Force to Address Offshore Operating Procedures and Equipment
The Joint Industry Task Force has been formed to make recommendations in response to the request of the Secretary of the Interior, and recommendations will be formulated based on limited information and in advance of any investigative findings in relation to the current incident in the Gulf of Mexico. The contributing joint industry task force companies and trade associations express no views regarding the cause, fault or liability of the incident or regarding any mechanisms of prevention, nor should any recommendations be interpreted as a representation of any such views. The oil and natural gas industry is committed to working with this Department and the Administration as we move forward in efforts to improve offshore safety.
In response to the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) incident, the oil and gas industry, with the assistance of the American Petroleum Institute (API), has assembled two task forces to focus on critical areas of GOM offshore activity: the Offshore Operating Procedures Task Force and the Offshore Equipment Task Force. Task force sessions began on 10 May and participants are working expeditiously to provide recommendations to the U.S. Department of the Interior Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board. The task forces are not involved in the review of the incident, but bring together industry experts to identify best practices in offshore drilling operations and equipment, with the ultimate goal of enhancing safety and environmental protection. Estimated production from the GOM federal waters as of October 2009 represents about 30 percent of domestic oil production and about 11 percent of domestic natural gas production. Approximately 35,000 workers and 90 rigs are currently active in Gulf of Mexico federal waters, including 68 mobile offshore drilling units and 22 platform rigs. There are about 3,500 production platforms in federal waters in the GOM; 978 of those are manned.
Short-term (by May 28, 2010) • • Prepare immediately actionable recommendations concerning GOM deepwater drilling operations. These recommendations should 1) close any identified gaps in current blowout preventer (BOP) operating practices; and 2) align industry standards for well drilling and completion practices/procedures with recognized industry best practices.
Long Term (within one year) • Provide a plan to apply findings from the GOM Incident Root Cause Analysis to revise existing API standards and MMS rule making processes to reflect any identified improvements.
Respective Task Force Goals • The Offshore Operating Procedures Task Force is reviewing critical processes associated with drilling and completing deepwater wells to identify gaps between existing practices and regulations and industry best practices. Their recommendations are intended to move industry standards to a higher level of safety and operational performance and approach or achieve industry best practice.
develop work plan and charter for phase 2 of study. Cameron. IADC. Statoil.
. Identify critical processes (3-5) associated with Drilling & Completion of deepwater wells based on risk/exposure to safe and reliable operations. Marathon. ExxonMobil. National Oilwell Varco. ExxonMobil. Murphy Oil. Statoil. GE Oil & Gas. Identify Drilling & Completion processes that may have been related to the incident. Identify opportunities to move “recommended practices” to industry best practices. Provide weekly progress reports to the Governance Review Board on progress. specifically associated with BOP system (including ROV interface). and documentation and will make recommendations to close any gaps or capture any improvements. Transocean Offshore Equipment Anadarko. Noble Drilling. Based on industry experience. Review information available from recent GOM incident. BP. regulations. Oceaneering.
Offshore Operating Procedures Anadarko. Frontier. Noble Energy. Provide weekly progress reports to the Governance Review Board on progress Issue final report at end of Phase 1. testing protocols. IADC. Diamond Offshore. regulations. etc. make recommendations that can improve safety and reliability of BOP systems. Atwood. Shell. Schlumberger. Transocean. West Engineering
Schedule and Work Plans
Offshore Operating Procedures: Phase 1 Deliverables Deliver early recommendations and conclusions by May 28. Offshore Equipment: Work Plan • • Review industry data associated with operation and testing of BOPs with the objective of identifying issues. ConocoPhillips. API. develop work plan and charter for Phase 2 of study. Offshore Operating Procedures: Continuing Work Plan • • • • • • Review findings from GOM incident. etc. Review existing testing and inspection requirements. areas of concern. Based on findings in Phase 1. Ensco. Shell. API. Benchmark practices against best-in-class practices and against existing “recommended practices” and regulations. 2010. Chevron. incident data.•
The Offshore Equipment Task Force is reviewing current BOP equipment designs. protocols for BOPs. Issue final report at end of Phase 1. Based on findings in Phase 1. ConocoPhillips. Murphy. Seadrill. Chevron. Pride International.
Offshore Equipment: Phase 1 Deliverables Deliver 1st set of recommendations by May 28 (Phase 1). and overlaying current regulations and requirements. potential failures in equipment. Halliburton. BP.
The recommendations summarized in the table below are detailed in later sections of this document.
.Key Areas of Focus
The Joint Industry Task Forces have initially identified six key areas of focus for Gulf of Mexico deepwater operations.
Develop Well Construction Interfacing Document (WCID) to manage well construction activities and mitigate unexpected events that impact health. Variables affecting the cementing operation design.. Form API subcommittee to study physical loads. for each flow path prior to displacement to underbalanced fluid columns. Barriers. Cementing Practices.
Well displacement procedures.
. Ensure BOP can automatically close blind/shear ram(s) and close choke/kill line valves. Close blowout preventers during displacement to underbalanced fluid columns. Drilling Contractor) and reviewed by a competent and independent regulator who may prohibit activities if there are significant shortcomings in the safety case. safety and the environment.e. Upon release.
Procedures Related to Mechanical Loads. Perform separate displacement operations for riser and casing. and Well Displacement Procedures
Independent barriers across potential flow paths during well completion / abandonment activities. “Health. conduct subsea testing of hydraulic function of rams and valves downstream of the trigger to simulate 1) unintended disconnect of lower marine riser package (LMRP).
Secondary BOP Control Systems
Reliable function in the event of unintended disconnect of the lower marine riser package (LMRP) or loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack. Perform negative tests to a differential pressure ≥ anticipated pressure after displacement. well conditions and execution practices related to cementing casing strings. Provide two independent barriers. design practices for subsea well completions and completion configurations that provide maximum reliability. placement techniques. Verify proper operation of the system by testing to MMS-approved Application for Permit
Health. Perform full surface function / pressure testing prior to running of the BOP stack to simulate 1) unintended disconnect of lower marine riser package.Focus Area
Summary of Recommendation(s) A safety case is produced by the owner of the deepwater mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) (i. including one mechanical barrier. and 2) loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack. Monitor displacement volumes in and out. adopt API RP 65 Part 2: Isolating Potential Flow Zones during Well Construction. Positively test each casing barrier to a pressure exceeding the highest estimated integrity of casing shoes below that barrier. The IADC has developed a guideline. Safety & Environment Case
Safety case methodology designed to reduce risks to the health and safety of the workforce and limit environmental impact associated with offshore drilling and completion operations using a subsea BOP. and 2) loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack. Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units. Ensure shearable drillstring components are positioned in the shear rams during displacement. Engage casing hanger latching mechanisms when casing is installed in the subsea wellhead.” to provide a sound basis for drilling contractors to initiate Safety Case requirements in the OCS. At prescribed intervals.
Load and resistance conditions during casing string installation.
Arm the system when BOP stack is latched on the wellhead. Develop capability to function within prescribed closing times. Develop visual reference capability to confirm ram closure (position indicator). Standardize ROV hot stab and receptacle per API Spec 17H. Establish Phase 2 work group to develop a matrix showing system combinations and capabilities under various conditions. Engage national research facilities to assess major acoustic system manufacturers’ signal processing technologies.
Improvement and potential expansion of ROV capabilities and functions. Evaluate processing in acoustic systems to remove ambient noise and to prevent inadvertent activation. Disarm and rearm only if approved through a formalized Management of Change process. Availability of nonindustry systems. Surface test ROV functionality and ROV pump and verify closure visually. casing shear rams.Focus Area
Summary of Recommendation(s) to Drill (APD) casing pressure below blind / shear rams after system activation. Ensure ROV can unlatch the lower marine riser package.
BOP Testing and Test Data Acoustic Systems and Other Secondary Control Systems
Frequency and type of testing.. Evaluate these options and recommend systems to be adopted. Standardize hot stab designs between drilling and production operations. forward test charts and function test work sheets to the District MMS office that approves the well permit. Identify methods for testing without introducing detrimental effects of seawater in BOP system. Ensure ROV can close blind shear rams. Stage ROV tooling / external hydraulic power supplies strategically in Gulf of Mexico for rapid mobilization.
Reliability of acoustic systems in ultradeepwater environments. pipe rams. Upon completion of the testing. BOP test data retention. and choke and kill valves.
Safety and Environment International Association of Drilling Contractors Lower Marine Riser Package Minerals Management Service Management of Change Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Multiplex Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Installation Manager Remote Operated Vehicle Recommended Practice Safety Management System Well Construction Interfacing Document
.White Paper: Recommendations for Improving Offshore Safety Joint Industry Task Force Acronyms
ALARP APD API BOP DOI EDS HSE IADC LMRP MMS MOC MODU MUX OCS OIM ROV RP SMS WCID As Low As Reasonably Practicable Application for Permit to Drill American Petroleum Institute Blowout Preventer Department of the Interior Emergency Disconnect System Health.
risk assessment and personnel competency requirements that would be implemented to improve risk recognition and response when executing critical well operations. The process would incorporate well-specific Management of Change (MOC). with clear linkage to the Safety Management System (SMS) Defines appropriate performance standards for the operation of the safety critical aspects
. Drilling Contractor) and reviewed by a competent and independent regulator who may prohibit activities if there are significant shortcomings in the safety case.Offshore Operating Procedures Task Force 1. Health. systems and operating parameters are capable of providing a safe working environment for personnel and that there are sufficient barriers to reduce identified hazards and risks to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).S. Principle features of a safety case are as follows:
Identifies the safety critical aspects of the installation. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). well basis of design. The primary purposes of a safety case are to reduce risks to the health and safety of the workforce and limit environmental impact associated with offshore facilities.e.
A safety case demonstrates that the facility and the operation are sufficiently described in order to verify that the design. both technical and managerial.. well execution plan and critical risk assessments for all operations using a subsea blowout preventer (BOP) stack on the U.
Lease Operator’s Safety Management System Drilling Contractor’s Safety Management System Drilling Contractor’s Safety Case Drilling ’ Critical Well Activity Risk Assessments
Well Construction Interfacing Document
Risk Analysis & Mitigation Management of Change Personnel Competency
Well Basis of Design
Well Execution Plan
The Well Construction Interfacing Document (WCID) addresses the management of well construction activities and mitigates unexpected events that impact HSE. Safety and Environment (HSE) Case
This task force recommends the adoption of a process that includes a safety case methodology. The safety case is produced by the owner of the deepwater mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) (i.
In addition. the well execution plan and critical risk assessment. A one-way valve (casing shoe) located at the bottom of the casing string holds the cement in place outside the casing and prevents formation fluids from entering the casing. This guideline effectively addresses the focus areas described above and will provide a sound basis to initiate Safety Case requirements in the OCS.
Requires workforce involvement
The International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) has developed a guideline.”1 to help drilling contractors meet regulatory requirements in the countries that operate under a Safety Case regime. testing is conducted to verify both cement and casing integrity.org/hsecase/index. A properly sized and pressure-rated blowout preventer stack (BOP) is then attached (latched) onto the wellhead/casing string. The casing is suspended (hung) inside the wellhead located on the seafloor. This task force recommends that casing hanger latching and/or lock down mechanisms shall be engaged at the time the casing is installed in the subsea wellhead. It will describe how management of change and risk assessment processes will apply during well construction activities and ensure personnel competency. Following casing installation. This document will link the safety case with the lease operator’s Safety Management System (SMS). After cementing operations are completed.
Load and Resistance. The WCID will assign or delineate specific responsibilities for the operator's personnel as well as provide a vehicle for the contractor to intervene in the case that unsafe acts are identified. The BOP stack is connected to the wellhead and provides a sealable barrier between the wellhead and the riser (pipe connecting the floating rig to the well). The casing string reaches from the bottom of the drilled section to the surface of the well (wellhead). well-specific information such as the basis of design. case and cement each successive hole section before proceeding to the next section. “Health.iadc. Subsequent to the successful testing of all system equipment. Attachment: Health.html
. The WCID will also provide alignment between the parties to ensure that their health. cement is pumped through the drillstring to create a solid barrier between the exterior of the casing and the exposed wellbore formations. safety and environment (HSE) standards are not compromised while undertaking shared activities. Barriers and Mechanical Loads
Standard drilling practices call for steel casing (pipe) to be installed within a drilled wellbore hole section at predetermined intervals. safety and the environment. Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
www. Safety and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units. A Well Construction Interfacing Document (WCID) will be developed to manage the well construction activities and mitigate unexpected events that impact health. the blowout preventers (BOP) shall be closed during displacement to underbalanced fluid columns to prevent gas entry into the riser should a seal failure occur during displacement. drilling of the next wellbore section can proceed. The well is drilled to total depth by continuing to drill.
If the shoe track (the cement plug and check valves that remain inside the bottom of casing after cementing) is to be used as one of these barriers. gas) into the wellbore while drilling. Attachment: API RP 65 Part 2: Isolating Potential Flow Zones during Well Construction. should be in place for each flow path (i. The subcommittee will complete this activity and provide recommendation to industry by end of year 2010. This task force recommends that two independent barriers. the Industry will consider the information and determine whether additional recommendations can be made.g. weighted drilling fluid. A negative test should also be performed prior to setting the surface plug. prior to the displacement of kill-weight drilling fluid from the wellbore.An American Petroleum Institute (API) subcommittee will be formed to study the physical loads and design practices used in subsea well completions with long strings and liner/tieback wellbore configurations. volumes in and out must be accurately monitored. BOPs should be closed on the drillstring and circulation established through the choke line to isolate the riser. The fluid circulates back to the surface via the annulus (the space between the outside of the drillstring and the wellbore wall). This task force recommends that API RP 65 Part 2 be adopted by industry. Cementing. Drillstring components positioned in the shear rams during displacement must be shearable. The success of any cement job is a function of design. well conditions and execution.e. the well is checked to confirm it is secure and will not flow when the pressure is removed (negative test). RP 65 Part 2 is currently being released and addresses the gaps in primary cementing practices that have been identified in recent years. During displacement. Displacement of the riser and casing to fluid columns that are underbalanced to the formation pressure in the wellbore should be conducted in separate operations.
Fluid Displacement Overview
Each well section is drilled with a specialized. prior to removing the BOP stack from the well the drilling fluid is replaced with seawater. In both cases. it must be negatively tested prior to the setting of the subsequent casing barrier. The purpose is to further understand the relative merits of each configuration and provide operators a framework to select the completion configuration that provides the highest overall system reliability. placement techniques. Each casing barrier should be positively tested to a pressure that exceeds the highest estimated integrity of the casing shoes below that barrier. Negative tests will be made to a differential pressure equal to or greater than the anticipated pressure after displacement. casing and annulus). Once the specifics of the investigation of the Gulf of Mexico incident are made available. When drilling operations are completed and the production casing is in place. including at least one mechanical barrier. Positive testing is conducted on the barriers and casing. Before this displacement is performed..
Abandonment and Wellbore Barriers.. This fluid is pumped down the drillstring and exits through the bit at the bottom of the drillstring. which is not a rated barrier. A primary function of the drilling fluid is to overbalance formation pressure to prevent the uncontrolled intrusion of formation fluids (e.
This should be done after initial running and latching of the BOP stack. A typical deepwater BOP stack is rated to 15. The annular BOP and pipe ram(s) are designed to seal around the drillstring should it become necessary to shut-in the well to control an influx of formation fluid.
1. including loss of surface control or unintended disconnect of the riser.000 psi. When activated. Unintended disconnect of the lower marine riser package (LMRP).Offshore Equipment Task Force
Blowout Preventer Overview
A typical offshore BOP stack contains annular blowout preventer(s). or every six months minimum if the BOP stack is not recovered to surface between wells. 2. In order to ensure that the BOP stack functions properly under a wide range of emergency conditions. the BOP must automatically perform the following functions as a minimum: • • Close the blind / shear ram(s). and 2) loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack. secondary control systems are in place on every rig. and 2) loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack. Ensure closure of choke / kill line valves. conduct testing of hydraulic function of rams and valves downstream of the secondary BOP activation mechanism to simulate 1) unintended disconnect of lower marine riser package (LMRP). Activation of the shear ram(s) severs the drillstring at the sea floor. Loss of surface control of the subsea BOP stack.
The secondary BOP system is to be tested at the following frequency: • Conduct full surface function and pressure testing prior to running of the BOP stack to simulate 1) unintended disconnect of lower marine riser package. the shear ram(s) are generally considered a measure of last resort. Secondary BOP control systems (often referred to as Deadman / Auto Shear) are to be required for all floating drilling rigs. With the BOP subsea. Therefore. The ability to control (“kill”) the influx of formation fluid is facilitated by the capability to pump kill-weight drilling fluid to the bottom of the well via the drillstring. These recommendations are in addition to testing requirements currently in place for primary BOP control systems. pipe ram(s) and shear ram(s). other secondary control options such as acoustic systems are being evaluated for application in ultra deep water operations. Secondary BOP Control Systems
The recommendations below are designed to ensure that secondary BOP systems are verified and functioning as designed. These systems are to be automatically activated if either of the situations below occurs: 1. At present. The BOP system and related components are regularly tested for functionality and their ability to seal under rated pressures within a prescribed amount of response time.
. Activation of secondary control systems can be executed with remotely operated vehicles (ROV).
Use existing industry alliances with national research facilities to evaluate major acoustic system manufacturers’ signal processing technologies. 2. Industry proactively proposes that all test charts and function test work sheets be forwarded to the District MMS office that originally approved the well permit. BOP Testing It is recommended that Industry submit all BOP test charts and forms (stump test. These recommendations should be initiated as soon as possible. Disarming and rearming the system shall only be performed through a formalized Management of Change approval process. The current method of retention for these test charts is to file them onboard the MODU after review and sign off by the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and Lease Operator’s Representative.
The secondary BOP system shall be armed when BOP stack is latched on the wellhead. Minimum Functionality for ROV Intervention Panel a. b. These test charts remain filed onboard and are witnessed by MMS inspectors during periodic inspections on offshore MODUs. The goal of the work group is to evaluate these options and make recommendations concerning the safest and most reliable systems to be adopted. Evaluate the status of processing to remove ambient noise and to prevent inadvertent activation. It is recommended that the following options be included in the scope of work: 1. Close blind shear rams
. It will provide greater transparency and a retention component that is currently not in place. It will also ensure there is a copy of all tests at a secure shore base facility should the records become damaged or lost on an offshore facility. Reliability of Acoustic Controls a. This will allow easier access for the MMS to review and verify test data immediately after each test period and at any subsequent time. We recommend the establishment of a Phase Two work group to evaluate possible secondary system combinations and capabilities under various conditions. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) Our recommendation for improvement of ROV capabilities is as follows: 1. with implementation completed no later than 1 May 2011 on all rigs with subsea BOP equipment operating in the GOM region. function test and pressure test) to District MMS offices for verification and retention. 4. Acoustic Systems and Other Secondary BOP Activation Systems The addition of acoustic or other secondary BOP activation systems may provide additional redundancy for the systems currently used to ensure proper operation of critical BOP functions.•
Confirm the system has operated as designed and is able to contain pressure by testing to the MMS-approved Application for Permit to Drill (APD) casing pressure below the blind / shear rams after system activation. 3. The goal is to determine if better acoustic systems are available outside industry.
c. Among the items to be explored are the following: • • • • Standardized stabs and receptacles between drilling and production. Develop ROV capabilities to perform the functions listed above within API Spec 16D requirements for BOP closing times.
Emergency Disconnect System (EDS): A BOP control system when armed and initiated that sequentially operates specific BOP functions to secure the well and disconnect the LMRP from the wellhead. 3. Develop visual reference capability to confirm ram closure (position indicator).b. ROV Testing Requirements a. Test ROV on surface using flying lead to demonstrate functionality. Unlatch LMRP 2. using fluid volume count and visual observation to verify closure. Close pipe rams c. It is recommended that when possible. b. Test ROV pump on surface with test fixture using hot stab to verify flow rate and pressure. Implementation Schedule Implementation of these recommendations should begin as soon as possible. The EDS can be a subsystem of the control pods or a stand alone alternate control system. Close choke and kill valves e. Minimum Requirements for ROV Pump and Associated Equipment a. b. Further ROV Improvements Our recommendation is to form a Phase Two work group to develop further improvements to ROV operating capabilities. and should be completed no later than December 2012. Require industry standardization of hot stab and receptacle in accordance with API Spec 17H. a time/date stamped record be made of ROV test(s) performed to verify closing capability. 5. Methods of subsea testing without introducing detrimental effects of seawater in BOP system (example: ROV with external hydraulic supply). Close casing shear rams (if equipped) d. Require staging of ROV tooling and external hydraulic power supplies at strategic locations across Gulf of Mexico to allow rapid mobilization. 4.
Deadman Circuit: A BOP control sub-system when armed and initiated that sequentially operates a series of BOP functions to secure the well. Passive Deadman (MUX Only): Manual function that is hard wired and bypasses the normal pod communication system to activate a series of functions to secure the well. Auto Shear: An automatic function that when armed is triggered by separation of the LMRP from the lower stack and activates a series of functions to secure the well. no human interaction is necessary. 3. MUX System: Initiated by the loss of electrical AND hydraulic supply to the pod to activate a series of functions to secure the well. b. No human interaction is required. Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV) Intervention: An interface that when activated allows an ROV to connect to and control specific functions or systems on the BOP to secure the well and may include non-emergency functions. ROV Active Function: A function or series of functions that is both activated by an operating fluid supplied by the ROV through a stab to complete the function(s). that activates functions on the control pod which are supplied operating fluid from stack mounted accumulators to secure the well. Conventional Piloted System: Initiated by the loss of pilot pressure AND the loss of hydraulic supply to activate a series of functions to secure the well. ROV Piloted Function: A function or series of functions piloted by the ROV. Active Deadman a. Applies to both MUX and conventionally piloted systems.1. 2. Applies to both MUX & Conventionally Piloted Systems 1. 1. Requires human activation. Applies to both MUX and conventionally piloted systems. Used if software communications are lost with the pods. 2. Acoustic Controls (MUX & Conventional): A stand alone alternate control system that is manually triggered by encoded acoustic sound waves which activate a series of functions through a dedicated pod to secure the well. ROV Passive Function: A function or series of functions lined up by the ROV and supplied with a “flying lead” and stab from stack mounted accumulators or external accumulator banks to secure the well. Active EDS: An active EDS system is initiated when the rig moves a predetermined distance from well center and is computer controlled – no human interaction is necessary.
. 2. Passive EDS: A manually activated system usually corresponds or triggers when a Red Alert is issued for station keeping. no human interaction is necessary. through a stab. Activation is from permanent and/or self contained portable control units on the surface. Applies to both MUX and conventionally piloted systems.
Tech Spec Adsorbent Type DryerLecture 12-06-2008 Surge Analysis by DynaflowIntroduction to Pressure Surge in LiquidLire-xvrfz (FEED Deliverables) Technip EditionsPMP Certification HandbookDSG-MP-3DSG-MP-2DSG-MP-2DGS-HT-840 Common Exchanger MaterialsDSG-HT-640DSG-HT-810DSG-HT-830DSG-HT-820DSG-RE-210Westfall 3000 Flow ConditionerRheology of Heavy Oil EmulsionsHB Tech Paper 18441Peerless Tib 29_selecting Mechanical SealsBasic Instrumentation Measuring Devices and Basic Pid ControlMarine Crude Oil Measurement Systems 2240Vf ASP GT E13 Integridad MecanicaM-IN-102Handbook of Chem Hazard Analysis ProceduresDSG-HT-820
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