Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/682/256/278376/
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 10:03:10
Document Index: 35228741

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 355', '§ 312', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

James T. Campbell, Appellant, v. Department of Health and Human Services and Eli Lilly and Company, 682 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1982 › James T. Campbell, Appellant, v. Department of Health and Human Services and Eli Lilly and Company
James T. Campbell, Appellant, v. Department of Health and Human Services and Eli Lilly and Company, 682 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 682 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1982) Argued Feb. 2, 1982. Decided June 25, 1982
Exemption 7(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (A), permits an agency to withhold from public disclosure "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would ... interfere with enforcement proceedings." This case presents the novel question whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may rely upon Exemption 7(A) in justification of a blanket refusal to release to a third party any information submitted by a potential target of an FDA enforcement action. The district court answered that question in the affirmative. 518 F. Supp. 1114 (D.D.C. 1981). We conclude that the district court's response was too quick and categorical to comport with the congressional directive. That directive, we hold, requires a more particularized showing by the government and a more precise examination by the district court before a judgment may be made that the production sought would "interfere with enforcement proceedings."
On August 14, 1980, the FDA notified Campbell that it had no records responsive to category 1 of his request and invoked Exemptions 44 and 7(A)-(C)5 as grounds for withholding information in the other categories. J.A. 73-74. Campbell filed an administrative appeal. When the agency failed to resolve the appeal within twenty working days, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (A) (ii), Campbell sought injunctive relief from the district court on November 2, 1980.6
To establish that Exemption 7 permits withholding documents in its possession, an agency must show (1) that the requested documents are "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes," and (2) that release of the material would have one of the six adverse consequences specified in the Act. FBI v. Abramson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 102 S. Ct. 2054, 2059, 72 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1982). Campbell concedes that the documents he seeks satisfy the first requirement: the FDA obtained the requested information in connection with its investigation of Campbell's allegations that Lilly had failed to submit reports required by law concerning the safety of darvon, aprindine, and monensin. The controversy before us centers upon whether disclosure of these records would, as stated in Exemption 7(A), "interfere with enforcement proceedings."
Both sides press extreme positions on the showing an agency must make to establish the requisite interference. Campbell asserts that Exemption 7(A) applies "only on a document-by-document basis." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 10. The government maintains, and the district court ruled, that an agency carries its burden simply by demonstrating that "the withheld information was clearly related to (an ongoing investigation)." 518 F. Supp. at 1115. We reject both formulations. Campbell's would impose an unreasonably onerous standard upon the agency; the FDA's would automatically shield from disclosure all records relating to an ongoing investigation.9 Congress, we conclude, based on the words it employed and the relevant legislative history, did not authorize blanket exemption for such records. It required something more. We hold that, to prevail under Exemption 7(A), the government must show, by more than conclusory statement, how the particular kinds of investigatory records requested would interfere with a pending enforcement proceeding.
The legislative history of Exemption 7(A), limited as it is,12 nonetheless contains persuasive indications that the government must show something more than a direct relationship between agency records and a pending investigation in order to demonstrate that disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings. As originally enacted, Exemption 7 authorized agencies to withhold "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private party." Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251. The committee reports accompanying the bill explained that the exemption would protect "the Government's case in court," S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), reprinted in Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, Articles 36, 44 (Committee Print 1974) (hereinafter cited as 1974 Source Book), by preventing "a private party (from obtaining) indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litigation or proceedings," H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2418, 2428, reprinted in 1974 Source Book at 22, 32.13
The leading case under Exemption 7(A) is NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978). In Robbins Tire, an employer charged with committing unfair labor practices sought, in advance of the administrative hearing on those charges, to obtain copies of statements submitted to the NLRB by all prospective witnesses. The Board denied the request, claiming that prehearing disclosure would interfere with the enforcement proceedings. The employer argued that the Board had failed to show specifically that release of the particular statements would impede the investigation.
The Court, in a three-step analysis, upheld the agency's position. First, it observed that the language of Exemption 7(A), unlike the terms of other subdivisions of the investigatory records exception, "appears to contemplate that certain generic determinations might be made." Id. at 223-24, 98 S. Ct. at 2317-18.17 Second, the Court reviewed the legislative history and concluded that Exemption 7(A)
Id. at 236, 98 S. Ct. at 2324. Third, the Court examined the possible consequences of prehearing disclosure of statements of prospective witnesses and held that the Board had satisfied its burden of demonstrating that such premature revelation would interfere with enforcement proceedings. Id. at 236-42, 98 S. Ct. at 2323-27.18
Even the decisions relied upon by the FDA suggest that the district court acted with unwarranted haste in dismissing Campbell's complaint. For example, the court in Stephenson v. IRS, 629 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated a grant of summary judgment for the government because the affidavit describing the withheld documents afforded an inadequate factual basis for the decision. In contrast to this case, all of the decisions the FDA cites involved FOIA requests by actual or potential targets of concrete, prospective enforcement proceedings for materials compiled by the investigative agency or derived from third parties and to which the requester otherwise had no access. See, e.g., id. at 1143 n.5 (memoranda of IRS interviews with and records received from third parties, summonses and other documentary requests to such persons, internal memoranda and work sheets of IRS agents, and sworn statements of third parties); Barney v. IRS, 618 F.2d 1268, 1271 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (copies of all information the IRS compiled on requesters since specified date); Moorefield v. United States Secret Service, 611 F.2d 1021, 1022 (5th Cir.) (all documents concerning requester), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 909, 101 S. Ct. 283, 66 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1980); Grabinski v. IRS, 478 F. Supp. 486, 487 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (information received from and letters to and from third parties, and memoranda, notes, and work sheets prepared by IRS agents); Steinberg v. IRS, 463 F. Supp. 1272, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (internal IRS documents regarding audits and investigations, notes of agents conducting a specific investigation, correspondence between the IRS and other agencies and prospective witnesses).21
Two recent district court decisions illustrate the focused analysis of Exemption 7(A) claims contemplated under Robbins Tire. In Parker/Hunter, Inc. v. SEC, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder) Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) P 98,279, at 91,778-79 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1981), the court required the agency to supplement its initial submissions, which stated only in general terms that disclosure of the requested information could jeopardize future enforcement action by revealing the direction of the investigation and the strength of the evidence. The court pointedly observed that the proffered justification would warrant withholding any document in an open investigatory file, contrary to the holding of Robbins Tire. The supplemental affidavit, which the court found adequate to support the agency's position, "describe(d) in detail the material in the SEC files that (was) responsive to each category of plaintiff's request, and describe(d) how disclosure of the material in each category would interfere with enforcement proceedings." Id. at 91,778. Similarly, in OKC Corp. v. Williams, 489 F. Supp. 576, 583-86 (N.D. Tex. 1980), the target of an SEC investigation sought access to fourteen broad categories of agency records. The court granted summary judgment for the Commission on thirteen of the categories, which on their face called for portions of the agency's work product concerning the target company. However, the court denied summary judgment with respect to the final category, which covered some items, such as the corporation's annual Form 10K reports, that could not possibly interfere with the investigation.
Materials submitted to justify withholding the documents Campbell requested may contain information that could itself interfere with subsequent enforcement proceedings. For this reason, the district court, in its discretion, may accept in camera submissions. This court has expressed grave reservations regarding nonpublic government presentations absent sensitive national security concerns. See, e.g., Yeager v. DEA, 678 F.2d 315, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the district court should attempt to develop as complete a public record as possible. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Lilly had a legal obligation to report such data and information to the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j), 360b(l) ; 21 C.F.R. § 312.1(a) (5)-(6) (1981)
Presumably at least some of the material generated within the FDA might be exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5), which authorizes the withholding of "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
Exemption 4 authorizes the withholding of "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4). The district court did not address this issue. Campbell concedes that this case must be remanded for resolution of the Exemption 4 question even if he prevails on Exemption 7. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 9 n.2
Exemptions 7(B) and 7(C) authorize the withholding of "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would ... (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (or) (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (B)-(C). For the text of Exemption 7(A), see supra p. 257
The district court accepted the FDA's assertion that Exemptions 7(B) and 7(C) justified refusal to disclose the requested information, see 518 F. Supp. at 1115, but did not explain why it agreed with the agency. Neither the FDA nor Lilly offers substantive arguments on these provisions. Campbell discusses them only in a footnote. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 15 n.2.
See FBI v. Abramson, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S. Ct. at 2065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing legislative history of Exemption 7 as a whole as "rather sparse")
The floor debate on this provision was unenlightening. The Senate passed the original FOIA by voice vote without debate. 111 Cong.Rec. 26821 (1965). That chamber had approved a predecessor bill containing a somewhat different investigatory files exemption the previous year in similar fashion. See 1974 Source Book at 103-09. On reconsideration, the Senate substituted the language ultimately enacted in response to concern that the initial language might lead to premature disclosure of statements of agency witnesses, particularly in unfair labor practice cases. Id. at 109-13; see generally NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 225-26, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2318-19, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978). The only substantive comment on the House floor explained that "(t)he FBI would be protected under exemption No. 7 prohibiting disclosures of 'investigative files.' " 1974 Source Book at 82 (remarks of Rep. Gallagher). Other House references to Exemption 7 appear in general recitations of the FOIA exceptions. See id. at 54, 61, 74 (remarks of Reps. King, Fascell & Dole)
Two companion bills introduced in 1973, S. 1142 and H.R. 5425, which were predecessors of the legislation enacted the following year, would have substituted a new investigatory records exemption covering, in pertinent part, "investigatory records compiled for any specific law-enforcement purpose the disclosure of which is not in the public interest, except to the extent that-(A) any such investigatory records are available by law to a party other than an agency." Although the hearings on these proposals demonstrated considerable support for some alteration of Exemption 7, the committees apparently concluded that these particular changes might engender needless confusion. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 230-31 & n.11, 233 & n.14, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2321 & n.11, 2322 & n.14, 57 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978)
The decisions at issue were Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S. Ct. 2405, 40 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1974)
Campbell cites three decisions in support of his contention that release of documents to which a potential target has access cannot interfere with enforcement proceedings. Even if all potential targets of the current FDA investigation do have access to the records he seeks, a question we are not positioned to address, Campbell's reliance on these decisions is misplaced. In Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980), this court found that the government had failed to demonstrate the pendency of an investigation. Release of the documents at issue therefore could not have interfered with an enforcement proceeding. In Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971), decided under the original Exemption 7, the investigation had terminated and no enforcement action was contemplated. Under the current law, in those circumstances, the information would not be protected. Finally, in Education/Instruction, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 471 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (D. Mass. 1979), the agency had submitted the document in question to a court in another case. Accordingly, the information at issue was a matter of public record, unlike the material Campbell has requested
For this reason, we believe that Lilly exaggerates the significance of the statement in Robbins Tire that "the release of information in investigatory files prior to the completion of an actual, contemplated enforcement proceeding was precisely the kind of interference that Congress continued to want to protect against." 437 U.S. at 232, 98 S. Ct. at 2322. Similarly, Lilly's reliance upon Carson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is misplaced. Carson holds only that the pendency of a specific, prospective enforcement proceeding is a necessary condition for invocation of Exemption 7(A); the decision does not suggest that this condition, in addition to being necessary, is also sufficient
We note that the government may have to make a more specific showing of the applicability of Exemptions 7(B) and 7(C) to particular documents than it does with respect to Exemption 7(A). See Robbins Tire, supra, 437 U.S. at 223-24, 98 S. Ct. at 2317-18