Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120622_0008442.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 16:56:10
Document Index: 153621543

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3041', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 3041', '§ 3041', '§ 3041', '§ 3041', '§ 2254']

| Jose Beltran v. Gary Swarthout
Jose Beltran v. Gary Swarthout
JOSE BELTRAN, PETITIONER,v.GARY SWARTHOUT,RESPONDENT.
Petitioner challenges the September 2010 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings ("Board") finding him unsuitable for parole. He also alleges that delaying his next parole hearing for three years pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b) ("Marsy's Law") violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the court must conduct a preliminary review of § 2254 habeas petitions and dismiss any petition where it plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to relief in this court. For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that the petition be dismissed for failing to state a federal habeas claim.
In Claim 1, petitioner asserts that the Board's decision to deny parole was not supported by a "preponderance of the evidence," in violation of his constitutional right to due process. (Dkt. No. 1 ("Ptn.") at 5-23.)*fn2 He claims that the evidence relied upon by the Board in its decision "failed to establish . . . that Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society[.]" (Id. at 16.)
Here, the record establishes that petitioner was represented by counsel at the 2010 hearing, had an English language interpreter at the hearing, received a packet of written material in advance of the hearing, and had the opportunity to examine it prior to the hearing. (Ptn. at 51-52.) The record also establishes that petitioner was heard at the hearing and received a statement of reasons why the Board panel decided to deny him parole. (See id. at 121-136.) Petitioner thus received all the process due him under the Constitution. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. 862. His due process claim must be dismissed.
In Claim 2, petitioner asserts that the Board's three-year denial of parole pursuant to Marsy's Law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Petitioner asserts that Marsy's Law retroactively increased the punishment he received when he was sentenced in 1997. (Ptn. at 23-32.)
California voters passed the "Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008," otherwise known as "Marsy's Law." Under California law as it existed prior to the enactment of Marsy's Law, indeterminately-sentenced inmates, such as petitioner, were denied parole for one year unless the parole hearing panel found it unreasonable to expect that parole could be granted the following year, in which case the subsequent hearing could be delayed up to five years. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). At his 2010 parole hearing, petitioner was subject to the terms of Marsy's Law, which authorizes denial of a subsequent parole hearing for a period of up to fifteen years. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3). The shortest interval that the parole hearing panel may set is three years, applied to petitioner herein, based on a finding that petitioner "does not require a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . than seven additional years." Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(3)(c).
Petitioner states that he presented his Ex Post Facto claim to all three levels of California's courts, and all three denied it.*fn3 (Ptn. at 3-4.) Section 2254(d)(1) bars federal habeas relief unless the state courts' decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Clearly established federal law, as determined by Supreme Court, is as follows with respect to petitioner's ex post facto claims. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it: (1) punishes as criminal an act that was not criminal when it was committed; (2) makes a crime's punishment greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a person of a defense available at the time the crime was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). A court may find an ex post facto violation if a change in the law "produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes." California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995). The Court has not articulated a specific formula for "identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on . . . punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition on [ex post facto laws]." Id. However, the court has found that changes that create only the most "speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect" of increasing punishment do not run afoul of the ex post facto clause. Id.; See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251 (2000) (legislative change to parole rules must at minimum create "significant risk of prolonging . . . incarceration" to constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
On the record in this case, we cannot conclude the change in
Georgia law lengthened respondent's time of actual imprisonment. Georgia law vests broad discretion with the Board, and our analysis rests upon the premise that the Board exercises its discretion in accordance with its assessment of each inmate's likelihood of release between reconsideration dates. If the assessment later turns out not to hold true for particular inmates, they may invoke the policy the Parole Board has adopted to permit expedited consideration in the event of a change in circumstances.
Here, as indicated above, the changes to the frequency of parole hearings are more extensive than in Morales and Garner and can potentially result in subsequent parole hearings occurring as much as fifteen years after the prior hearing.*fn4 However, as in Morales and Garner, the parole board concerned, in this case the California Board of Parole Hearings post-Marsy's Law, has the ability to advance a parole suitability hearing when "a change in circumstances or new information" essentially establishes a reasonable likelihood that an inmate will be found suitable for parole. Cal. Pen. Code, § 3041.5(b)(4).
After reviewing the facts applicable to petitioner's ex post facto claim, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, and California statutes and regulations related to the frequency with which parole hearings occurring after the first parole hearing must be held, the court finds that the state courts' decision rejecting petitioner's Ex Post Facto claim is not contrary to, nor does it involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Its conclusion is not out of line with decisions reached by the Supreme Court in both Morales and Garner, especially in light of the fact that, as in Morales and Garner, the parole board concerned can expedite a suitability hearing if the board believes it is reasonable to assume that the inmate in question will be paroled.*fn5
Petitioner also argues that Marsy's Law violates provisions of California's Constitution and/or California law. (Ptn. at 26-31.) However, violations of state law do not provide a basis for federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) ("federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for error in state law."). Thus, Claim 2 should be dismissed.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this petition be summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 4.