Source: http://docplayer.net/1045605-Mhl-article-81-and-related-matters-collected-cases-current-through-august-3-2015-mental-hygiene-legal-service-second-judicial-department.html
Timestamp: 2017-08-20 04:37:04
Document Index: 467224205

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 79', 'Art. 12', 'Art 83', 'Art. 81', 'art 36', 'art 81', 'Art. 81', 'Art 77', 'Art.77', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 78', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 77', 'Art 81', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 17', 'Art 81', 'Art 81', 'Art 10', 'Art 81', 'Art 17', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 81', 'Art 10', 'Art. 12', 'Art 81', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 81', 'Art. 81']

MHL ARTICLE 81. and related matters. COLLECTED CASES (Current through August 3, 2015) Mental Hygiene Legal Service. Second Judicial Department - PDF
MHL ARTICLE 81. and related matters. COLLECTED CASES (Current through August 3, 2015) Mental Hygiene Legal Service. Second Judicial Department
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1 MHL ARTICLE 81 and related matters COLLECTED CASES (Current through August 3, 2015) Mental Hygiene Legal Service Second Judicial Department Michael D. Neville, Director Felicia B. Rosen, Principal Attorney
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 81 & OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW A. MHL Article B. SCPA 17-A and SCPA 17 (and other matters involving minors) C. Guardian ad litem (i) Generally a. Compensation of GAL (ii) Does not have authority to consent to settlement of behalf of Ward (iii) Does have authority to consent to settlement on behalf of Ward D. Powers of attorney/health care agents/trustees E. Testamentary capacity/revocation of Wills F. Matrimonial Matters G. Habeas corpus H. MHL Art 79 (Guardianship for Veterans) I. Collections Matters J. Assisted Outpatient Treatment (Kendra s Law) K. Comparison to CPLR Art. 12 Infant Compromise II. FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS/ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES/BEST INTERESTS OF IP III. EFFECT OF GUARDIANSHIP ON RIGHTS OF AIP A. Transfer to nursing home B. Consent to psychiatric hospitalization and treatment b
3 C. Voiding questionable marriages and other contracts D. Use of AIP s funds E. AIP s and Guardian s right to sue or be sued (i) Effect of Guardianship on Running of Filing Deadlines (ii) Generally F. Limitations on Guardian s powers G. Power to do Estate and Medicaid planning (i) Substituted judgment (ii) Medicaid Planning trusts: Supplemental Needs/Pooled Trusts a. Funds that can be placed into trust (i) Personal injury awards/own funds (ii) Inheritances (iii) Income and benefits b. Proper trustees c. Pooled trusts d. Notice to and Involvement of local DSS e. Creation of SNT/Proper petitions and petitioners f. Proper Court g. Reformation of Trusts to SNTs h. Trustee Compensation/Legal Fees i. Court supervision of trusts j. Termination of trust c
4 k. Particular Terms of Trust (i) Attorneys Fees Subject to Review by Court (ii) Amendment of Trust Only Upon Court Approval (iii) Reversal of Gifts and Planning Devices (iv) Dispensing with Annual Accounting (v) Accounting Required Under Article 81 Methods (vi) Terms Against the Best Interest of the Beneficiary and/or Against Public Policy (vii) Requirement of Bond l. Retroactive Establishment m. Payback to State n. Calculation of NAMI o. SNT as Alternative to Guardianship p. Duties of Trustee H. Voiding previously executed legal instruments including Wills, Conveyances, Contracts, Health Care Proxies and Powers of Attorney I. Guardian may waive professional privileges on behalf of ward J. Guardian's power to protect ward's assets K. Least restrictive alternative/deprivation of liberty L. Major medical/end of life decisions (i) Pre-Family Health Care Decisions Act (ii) Family Health Care Decisions Act a. Legislative Intent b. Honoring Preferences of Person Facing Death d
5 c. Retroactivity d. Burden of Proof/Clear and Convincing Evidence e. Appeals M. AIP As Incapacitated Fiduciary N. Change of IP s domicile O. Right/Obligation to Testify P. Landlord/Tenant Issues IV. GUARDIANS A. Proper guardians (i) Preference for Family Members Unless Unfit or Conflict (ii) Public agencies (iii) Out of State/Foreign guardians (iv) Counsel or court evaluator as guardian (v) Creditors as Guardians (vi) Conflict of Interest, Generally (vii) Non-Citizens B. Temporary guardians C. Special Guardians D. Protective Arrangements/Single Transactions E. Nomination of guardians F. Breach of fiduciary duty/removal/sanctions G. Discharge/Termination/Resignation e
6 H. Multiple wards I. Compensation J. Co-Guardians K. Defacto Guardians L. Whether a Power is a Personal or Property Power M. Rights and Immunity of Guardians V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS A. Petitions and petitioners B. Service and Returns of Petitions and Orders to Show Cause (i) Proper and timely Service (ii) Notice of Petition a. Validity of Constitutionality and statutory arguments b. Who is entitled to the Petition? (iii) Withdrawal of Petition C. Jurisdiction and Venue (i) Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (MHL Art 83) Issues D. Consolidation with the Guardianship Proceeding E. Counsel (i) Appointment and disqualification (ii) Counsel and other fees a. Responsibility for payment of counsel fees (i) AIP s funds f
7 (ii) Petitioner (iii) Payment of fees pursuant to County Law 18-B (iv) Public agencies (v) Non-petitioning Nursing home (vi) Non-party intervenor (vii) The bar in general b. To whom fees paid (i) Retained counsel (ii) Counsel for Cross - petitioners (iii) Counsel for Public agencies and MHLS (iv) Counsel for guardians/conservators (v) Counsel for Guardian s surety (vi) Counsel for non - party c. Reasonableness of fee requested d. Proper Court to award fees Surrogate s or Supreme e. Fees set by other courts (i) Foreign courts not binding (ii) Other New York Courts F. Court Evaluators (i) Role (ii) Appointment (iii) Compensation a. Enforcement of Fee Awards g
8 (iv) Report as evidence G. Hearings (i) Hearing required a. Presence of AIP at hearing / Bedside hearings b. Findings of Foreign Courts (ii) Medical Testimony not required (iii) Applicability of rules of evidence (iv) Clear and convincing evidence (v) Confidentiality issues a. Physician-patient privilege b. Social Worker - Client Privilege c. Access to DSS records d. Sealing of Courtroom/Court records e. Fifth amendment f. Information Subpoenas g. Judicial Proceeding Privilege (vi) Jury trials (vii) Court's consideration of best interest and wishes of AIP (viii) Burden of proof (ix) Appointment of Independent Psychiatrist (x) Findings (xi) Inferences g
9 (xii) Consent to Appointment of Guardian H. Intervenors I. Sanctions (i) Frivolous Petitions (ii) Discovery J. Discontinuance K. Death of AIP L. Payment of Rent or hospital charges during pendency of Art. 81 proceeding - stay of evictions M. Appeals N. Part 36 Rules O. Secondary Appointments (i) Counsel P. Filing fees Q. Parties / Non -parties (i) Court Evaluator (ii) Individuals entitled to notice under MHL 81.07(e) R. Accounting Proceedings S. Contempt T. Annual Reports/Court Examiners U. Order to Gain Access V. Commission and Bond h
10 Case Summaries I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE 81 & OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW A. MHL Article 78 Will of Josephine Brucato, 7/17/09 N.Y.L.J. 28, (col. 3) (Surr Ct. Kings Cty.)(Surr. Johnson) SCPA 1402 has not been amended to reflect the fact that committees and conservators have been replaced by guardians under Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law. Nonetheless, a guardian of a legatee has standing to petition to probate a will. Matter of Dennis Diaz, NYLJ, 7/6/04, p. 21 (Sup. Ct, Queens Cty.)(Taylor, J.) After an Article 81 hearing, a disabled man was found to be in need of a guardian of the person and property. He was found, among other things, to have the functional level of approximately a 5 th grader and specifically to be in need of assistance in handling his own finances. Before a guardian could be bonded and qualified, he retained counsel and entered into a contract of sale to purchase a tavern with his own funds. Under pre-art 81 law, contracts entered into by persons adjudicated incompetent and who have committees or conservators are presumptively void. Contracts with persons who do not have committees or conservators but are of unsound mind and unable to appreciate the consequences of their own actions were considered voidable. Article 81 does not result in a finding of incompetence but rather only findings of specific functional limitations and guardianship powers tailored to be the least restrictive form of intervention. This AIP was found to lack the ability to handle his own finances so here, the Court does void and revoke the contract. Matter of D.S., NYLJ, 10/31/01, (Sup. Ct., Suff. Cty.) (Berler, J.) Although CPLR 1201 refers to service of legal papers on incompetents and conservatees and it should also be construed to include incapacitated persons for whom Art. 81 guardians have been appointed. Matter of Stephen D., 190 Misc2d 760, 739 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct., Bronx Cty. 2000) (Hotzman, Surr.) Where MHL Art 77 conservator dies after date of repeal of MHL Art.77, court can fill the vacancy by appointing an Art. 81 guardian and it is at the discretion of the court whether to hold a hearing under MHL Matter of Lois "F" (Ruth "F"), 209 A.D.2d 856; 618 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept., 1994) Where committee was properly appointed under MHL Art. 78, appointment survived repeal of Article 78 and enactment of MHL Article 81. Legislature plainly intended to give full force and 1
11 effect to prior determinations. Matter of Beritely (Luberoff), NYLJ, 12/8/95, p. 25 col. 1 (Sup. Ct., Suff. Cty.)(Luciano, J.) Conservator sought to convert MHL Art. 78 conservatorship into guardianship. Court found petition deficient for not describing functional level of man, who had bi-polar disorder. Court evaluator's testimony and report, however, proved guardian was needed. Court named co-guardians for property and allowed AIP's elderly mother to resign as co-conservator and become co-guardian of personal needs. Matter of Shea (Buckner), 157 Misc.2d 23, 595 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (Surr. Ct., NY Cty., 1993) Art. 81 empowers courts to grant broader powers to guardians than Art. 77 and 78 authorized for conservators and committees. B. SCPA 17-A and SCPA 17 (and other matters involving minors) Should We Be Talking? Beginning a Dialogue on Guardianship for the Developmentally Disabled in New York, Rose Mary Bailey and Charis B. Nick-Torok, 75 Alb. L. Rev Excellent discussion of the differences and similarities between the two forms of guardianship and the arguments for and against merging them or importing aspects of Article 81 into 17-A. In a series of decisions, all related to the same individual, various Surrogate's grapple with the issue whether a 17-A guardian may engage in gift giving in furtherance of Medicaid/tax planning with different conclusions. See, Matter of Schulze, NYJL, 9/3/96 pg. 1, col. 1 (Surr. Ct. NY Cty. 1996)(Surr. Preminger)(Court allows 17-A guardians to make gifts for estate tax planning purposes under same test that applies to Art 81 guardians. In this case, it allowed the gift giving since it would not leave the ward with an estate so depleted that she could not cover the cost of her own care and further her immediate family, which was wealthy in its own right pledged to provide for her care should there be a change in circumstances; Matter of Schulze, 23 Misc. 3d 215, 869 NYS 2d 896 (Surr. Ct., NY Cty. 2008)(Surr. Roth) (There is no express provision in SCPA Art. 17-A empowering a 17-A guardian to make gifts as contrasted with such an express grant of power to MHL Art. 81 guardians under MHL The court holds that despite the absence of such express language, Art. 17-A guardians do have such power and do not need to petition a court to be converted to Art. 81 guardians to make such gifts. The court noted that intra-family tax savings ad maximization of gifts to charities are among the objectives that have ben recognized as supporting guardians' exercise of such authority to make such gifts.) ; Matter of Joyce G. S., 30 Misc. 3d 765; 913 NYS 2d 910 (Surr. Ct., Bronx Cty., 2010) (Surr. Holzman); (Surrogate Holzman expressly rejected Surrogate Glen's holding in Matter of John J.H. In doing so, Surrogate Holzman held that "under the law as it presently exists, it has the power to invoke the equitable doctrine of substituted judgment to approve gifts or tax saving transactions on behalf of article 17-A wards. The court explained that in enacting the SCPA, the Legislature afforded the Surrogate's Court full equity jurisdiction as to any action, 2
12 proceeding or other matter over which jurisdiction is or may be conferred" (see SCPA 201[2]), and provided that the proceedings enumerated in the SCPA are not exclusive (see SCPA 202). The Legislature further provided that after the appointment of a 17-A guardian, the Surrogate's court "may entertain and adjudicate such steps and proceedings...as may be deemed necessary or proper for the welfare of such mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person" (see SCPA 1758). Accordingly, Surrogate Holzman concluded that there appears to be no reason why the Surrogate's Court cannot utilize the common law or the criterial set forth in MHL (d) to approve a gift on behalf of an article 17-A ward. Matter of Barbara Kobloth, Sup Ct, Westchester Cty, Unpublished Decision and Order, Index # 10236/10 (July 7, 2010) (Di Bella, J.) and Matter of Phillip Morris, Sup Ct, Westchester Cty, Unpublished Decision and Order, Index # 10236/10 (July 7, 2010) (Di Bella, J.) These are companion cases each involving an individual described as profoundly mentally retarded and unable to read or write or manage any property. Each case was brought by the Consumer Advisory Board by Order to Show Cause ( OSC ) seeking appointment of an Article 81 guardian and for the establishment of a Supplemental Needs Trust ( SNT ). In each case the court declined to sign the OSC stating:... the Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme, Surrogate Court Procedure Act [ SCPA ] 1750 et seq., specifically designed to meet the needs of the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled. An application for the appointment of a guardian of the property and establishment of an [SNT} is more properly commenced in Surrogate s Court under Article 1750 of the [SCPA] Matter of Yvette A., 27 Misc.3d 945; 898 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Surr. Ct. NY Cty., 2010)(Surr. Webber) A father who had not had any contact with his severely mentally retarded Willowbrook class daughter for over 16 years sought to be appointed as her 17-A guardian. MHLS, NYLPI, NYCLU and the guardian ad litem opposed his appointment and NYLPI and NYCLU requested that the matter be referred to Supreme Court for an Article 81 proceeding. The father was unclear about her condition and prognosis and had no plan in mind for her continued care. The objectants raised concerns about his motives and commitment to his daughter in light of his past history and were concerned about his suggestion that he would want to remove her from the only group home she had been in for the past 33 years and possibly sue them in relation to their past care of his daughter.. The Surrogate declined to transfer the case to Supreme Court reasoning that Art 81 and SCPA are not alternatives for one another and stating: although Article 17- A does not specifically provide for the tailoring of a guardian s powers or for the reporting requirements similar to Article 81, the court s authority to impose terms and restrictions that best meet the need of the ward is implicit in the provisions of 1758 of the SCPA,... (emphasis added). The Court therefore concluded that it did have the authority, both at the inception of a 17-A decree and upon modification of an original decree, to tailor the order to meet the needs of the ward. The court thus decreed that the father could be appointed but included very detailed reporting requirement similar to those in Article 81 and further decreed that the CAB should continue its oversight of the ward. 3
13 Matter of John J.H., 27 Misc. 3d 705; 896 N.Y.S.2d 662 (NY Cty, 2010) (Surr. Glen) Parents of a 22 year old autistic man with artistic talent petitioned under SCPA 17-A to become his guardians with, inter alia, the specific power to sell his artwork and to make charitable gifts on his behalf from the proceeds. The court, while acknowledging that the parents objective was laudable, indicated that it was constrained by both the language of 17-A and its common law roots, to order a plenary guardianship over the property and that it could neither tailor the guardianship to the proposed ward s particular needs nor issue gift giving powers to the proposed guardians. The court explained that there was a presumption against applying substituted judgement in a 17-A guardianship where the assumption is that the ward never had capacity to formulate a judgment of his own. The Surrogate calls for reform of 17-A to a more nuanced and protective system of guardianship for persons with developmental disabilities. In the end, the petitioners withdrew their 17-A petition and re-filed under Article 81. But see, Matter of Joyce G. S., 30 Misc3d 765; 913 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Surr. Ct., Bronx Cty., 2010) (Surr. Holzman) Matter of Chaim A.K., 26 Misc.3d 837; 855 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Surr. Ct., NY Cty., 2009) (Surr. Glenn) Court denied an application by parents for!7-a guardianship of their son without prejudice to file an application for an Art 81 guardian in Supreme Court, finding that the proposed ward, although mildly mentally retarded, also has along history of psychological problems that may change over time and that he was in need of the more tailored and more carefully monitored supervision of an Art 81 Guardian. Ths opinion is especially well written and thoughtful and discusses the difference between the two types of guardianship and when each is most appropriate. Matter of Mueller, 25 Misc.3d 164; 887 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Surr. Ct. Dutchess Cty)(Surr. Pagones) Parents of a young man whose father had been appointed as his guardian by the Surrogate s Court years earlier under Art 81 (81.04(b)) now petitioned for a 17-A guardianship before the same court at the expiration of the term of the Article 81 guardianship. He explained that the cost of proceeding under Art 81 was too great so they were proceeding under Art 17-A. Noting that there are different standards for appointment under both statutes, the court found that the instant petition was properly supported by certificates establishing the necessary criteria under 17-A. The court granted the 17-A on the condition that the father be discharged under Art 81 and his final accounting be approved. Matter of Schulze, 23 Misc. 3d 215; 869 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (Surr. Ct., NY Cty., 2008)(Surr. Roth) Article 81 was designed to replace Conservatorships (Article 77) and Committees (Article 78) with a more flexible and less intrusive system for protecting the rights of incapacitated persons. Accordingly, when Article 81 was enacted, Articles 77 and 78 were repealed. By contrast, Article 81 did not purport to repeal Article 17A. Moreover, the legislative history of Art 81 does not suggest that its enactment was intended to withdraw or alter any aspect of the protections and authority accorded by Article 17A. 4
14 Matter of Farah P., 11/7/08 NYLJ 27, col 1, Family Ct, Kings Cty., 2008) In a proceeding under Art 10 or 10 A of the Family Court Act, where a child over the age of 18 is, by reason of mental illness or a developmental disability, incapable of understanding the proceedings, assisting counsel and protecting his rights, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for the young adult pursuant to CPLR 1201 and While a law guardian may substitute his judgement for a minor, once the child reaches his or her 18th birthday, the law guardian functions merely as the attorney for the young adult and may not substitute his judgement. Matter of Addo, 2001 NY MISC LEXIS 1349, 218 NYLJ 64 (Sup.Ct., Bronx Cty 1997) Parents petitioned under Article 81 for guardianship of their disabled son and further sought to make withdrawal from the infant's funds to pay for the infant's necessities and for other extraordinary expenses; including, but not limited to the purchase of a house, the payment of an annual salary to the mother for care giver services rendered to the infant, and withdrawal of an amount to provide medical insurance for petitioners and their family. In analyzing the requests, the court held that the purpose of Article 81 was to create a guardianship law to meet the needs of elderly persons but that nothing in the statute precludes its use for the young. It noted that Article 81 is silent with respect to the parental obligations and responsibilities of the parents to provide support for the incapacitated child. The court looked to CPLR Article 12 caselaw to find that parents with the ability to do so are obligated to support a child, even if the child has an estate of his or her own. Stating that [p]etitioners could have chosen to seek the relief they requested either under MHL Article 81 or CPLR Article As regards to an infant, neither the obligations of parental support nor the protective mantle of the court is swept aside or in any way diminished by the election of Article 81, as the vehicle for the appointment of a guardian and the application for withdrawals from the infant's account. The provisions of Article 81 and of CPLR Article 12 must be brought into logical harmony where an infant becomes the subject of an Article 81 proceeding, since the child's right to parental support is not thereby forfeited, nor as a result is public policy to protect the welfare of children cast aside. Ianazzi v. Seckin, NYLJ, 12/9/02 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty.)(Pesche,J) Although not the issue in this case, this is an example of a case in which there is an Art 81 guardian for a minor. Matter of Guardianship of B., 190 Misc. 2d 581;738 N.Y.S. 2d 528 (Sup. Ct., Tompkins Cty. 2002)(Peckham, A.J.) There would be no rational basis, and, therefore, a denial of equal protection of the laws for saying that the ability of a guardian for a mentally retarded person to consent to medical treatment of the ward should differ if the guardian is appointed under Article 81 rather than Art 17-A. Therefore an Art. 81 guardian can consent to a tubal ligation for an IP. 5
15 Matter of Forcella, 188 Misc. 2d 135; 726 N.Y.S. 2d 243 (Sup. Ct., Suff Cty. 2001) (See also, NYLJ story concerning Matter of Forcella and Matter of Rooney, NYLJ, May 24, 2001, p.1) "Article 81 does not expressly preclude it application to infants suffering from disabilities. Nevertheless, in its formulation there appears to have been a consensus that Article 81 was intended for proceedings involving adults, not infants." Court reasons that infants are provided for in SCPA 17 and disabled infants are provided for in SCPA 17-A. Matter of Cruz, 2001 Slip Op U; 2001 NY Misc LEXIS 546 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty.) (Lebedeff, J.); See also, NYLJ 7/26/01 p. 1. col. 5 (NYLJ story). Where child, disabled by a birth trauma had profoundly disability expected to continue through adulthood, court find that Article 81 is appropriate for minors stating: "There is... language in the statute which supports it application to minors and no language that precludes such application." Matter of La Vecchia, 170 Misc. 2d 211; 650 N.Y.S. 2d 955 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Cty., 1996) Article 81 applies to disabled adults, not minors (SCPA Art. 17) or mentally retarded/developmentally disabled adults (SCPA 17-A). Contrast In re: DOE, 181 Misc. 2d 787; 696 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty., 1999) Art. 81 applies to persons of any age, and does not necessarily exclude minors. Matter of Marmol (Pineda), 168 Misc. 2d 845; 640 N.Y.S. 2d 969 (Sup. Ct., NY Cty., 1996) Art. 81 may be utilized in lieu of CPLR Article 12 to authorize appointment of guardian for incapacitated infant to withdraw funds from infant's personal injury settlement. Funds may be used to pay for "unusual circumstances" necessitated by child's disability irrespective of parents' ability to pay for them, and for expenses reasonably necessary for infant's maintenance, if justified by financial circumstances of family. Matter of Daniel K. Le and Young, 168 Misc. 2d 384; 637 N.Y.S. 2d 614 (Sup. Ct., Queens Cty., 1995) Court appoints guardian for 10 year old boy. 6
16 C. Guardian ad litem (i) Generally Tower Insurance Co. of NY v. Estate of Decosta, 113 AD3d; 979 N.Y.S. 324 ; 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 574 (1st Dept. 2014) The Appellate Division upheld a trial court's denial of a GAL without prejudice to petition for an Article 81 guardian. The court held that affidavits from counsel and family members describing an elderly man having difficulties managing a multiple dwelling, which did not allege that he was incapable of defending his rights, was insufficient to establish the need for a GAL, particularly where affidavits from his physicians contradicted that position. Fiduciary Trust Co., Intl. v Mehta, 40 Misc.3d 1227(A) (Civ. Ct., NYCL/T)(Kraus., J.) Months after entry of a judgment and issuance of a warrant of eviction, the housing court denied the tenant s attorney s motion for the appointment of a GAL to facilitate the tenant s move from the subject apartment, noting that such was not the function of a GAL appointed pursuant to CPLR Article 12. However, the Court stayed execution of the warrant so as to afford counsel, or the tenant, an opportunity to seek the appointment of an Article 81 guardian in Supreme Court. Riverside Park Community v. Stubbs, 39 Misc3d 1219(A), 972 N.Y.S.2d 146; 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1737 (NY County 2013)(Kraus, JHC) Citing CPLR 1201, the court vacated a default judgment in a landlord tenant proceeding and appointed a GAL to protect a disabled tenant s interests holding that when a party s defacto incapacity is perceived, an interested person, including the petitioner or the court, should apply for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to ensure the effectiveness of proceedings that are adverse to the party who is incapable of adequately prosecuting or defending his or her rights because if this is not done, neither a default judgement nor any other proceedings that prejudice the defendant will be effective. James v. State of New York, 2013 U. S. Dist. LEXIS (EDNY)(2013) (Pohorelsky, M.J.) Plaintiff, who had been adjudicated incapacitated in an Article 81 proceeding in State court filed a pro se complaint in Federal court challenging the State court proceedings, including the results of unsuccessful appeals taken through the state court system that had failed to establish her theory that the guardianship was part of a conspiracy to deprive her of certain property. She filed the matter in Federal Court pro se because her Article 81 guardians declined to prosecute the case on her behalf. The Federal Court held that: (1) this was in effect another appeal of the state court determinations and as such is prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) it was not obliged to appoint a guardian ad litem for her in Federal court since there was no substantial claim that could be brought in Federal Court which lacked subject- matter jurisdiction; and, (3) because she already had been 7
17 adjudicated incapacitated and a guardian had been appointed, and there was no evidence that this guardian was violating any duty toward her, the plaintiff may not initiate or prosecute a civil action on her own. The Court added that if she wished to challenge the actions of her guardian as violative of their duty toward her, she could still do so in the State court. NYC Housing Auth (Amsterdam Houses) v Richardson, 27 Misc. 3d 1204A; 910 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct, NY Cty., 2010) (Lebovitz, J.) In a holdover eviction proceeding, the Court denied the respondent s claim that his GAL had been ineffective because the GAL had failed to advise him to submit written opposition to the Housing Authority s motion for summary judgment. In holding that the GAL had adequately protected the respondent s interests, the Court noted that it had appointed a GAL for the respondent because he complained of a physical disability rather than an inability to understand the nature and consequences of summary judgment, and that the respondent had appeared in Court together with his GAL, and had received the opportunity to be heard and discuss the merits of his position. The Court added that a GAL in Housing Court, appointed when an individual is incapable of defending his own interests in a legal proceeding, differs from both a guardian appointed under MHL Article 81, which requires a judicial determination of incompetence, and from a guardian appointed under SCPA Article 17-A, which requires a judicial certification that an individual is incapable of managing him or herself and/or his affairs by reason of mental retardation or developmental disability. Estate of Macinnes, 4/6/2009 NYLJ 36, (col. 3) Surr, Ct, Queens Cty. (Surr. Nahman) The Surrogate declined to find the beneficiary of an estate to be an incapacitated person under a disability pursuant to SCPA 103 and therefore declined to appoint a GAL. Reasoning that a although a ward s desires are relevant, they are not determinative and a GAL may substitute his judgment for that of the ward s if the GAL determines that it is in the ward s best interest. The Surrogate thus concluded that appointment of a GAL curtails the ward s autonomy and since the proposed ward had not consented to anyone stepping in to make decisions for him, whose services he may be obligated to pay for, that curtailment of his freedom must be sufficiently justified. The Surrogate found that the individual in question was idiosyncratic but not lacking in understanding of the purpose of the proceeding such that he could not adequately protect his own rights. He had retained counsel, has cooperated with his counsel and has filed Objections to the Petition. He appeared before the Court, demonstrated that he understood the purpose of the pending proceeding, and sufficiently voiced his opposition thereto. The Surrogate then referenced Rule 1.14 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (effective April 1, 2009), quoting: when a lawyer reasonably believes that his client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 8
18 Matter of Farah P., 11/7/08 NYLJ 27, col 1, Family Ct, Kings Cty., 2008) In a proceeding under Art 10 or 10 A of the Family Court Act, where a child over the age of 18 is, by reason of mental illness or a developmental disability, incapable of understanding the proceedings, assisting counsel and protecting his rights, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for the young adult pursuant to CPLR 1201 and While a law guardian may substitute his judgement for a minor, once the child reaches his or her 18th birthday, the law guardian functions merely as the attorney for the young adult and may not substitute his judgement. Blatch v. Martinez, NYLJ 10/21/08 (SDNY 2008) (Swain, J.) The settlement in this case permanently bars the NYC Housing Authority from proceeding with a tenancy termination proceeding unless an incompetent resident is represented by a guardian ad litem paid by the NYCHA. The settlement also obligates the NYCHA to advise the court in any proceeding against residential tenants in housing court of any information that the Housing Authority may have that suggests that the tenant MAY be incompetent. NYC Housing Authority v. Jackson, 13 Misc. 3d 141A; 831 N.Y.S. 2d 360 (App. Term, 2nd Dept. 2006), aff d, 48 AD3d 818; 2008 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1746 (2 nd Dept 2008) Appellate Term reversed the denial of a guardian s motion to vacate a stipulation of settlement entered into by a GAL in a holdover proceeding before the guardian had been appointed for the tenant. The Appellate Term stated that the guardian s motion should have been granted because the GAL had entered into the stipulation inadvisably and had waived arguably meritorious defenses available to its ward, the tenant. The court cited its continuing obligation to oversee the work of the GAL and also settlements involving those who are unable to defend themselves. BML Realty Group v. Jack Samuels, 15 Misc. 3d 30; 833 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (Appellate Term, First Dept., 2007) GAL was appointed for a blind and mentally ill tenant who was the subject of an eviction proceeding (nuisance holdover). GAL did not meet with the tenant or visit the apartment. Although GAL was aware that APS was imminently filing a petition under Article 81, he nevertheless stipulated to tenant s eviction and judgment in favor of the landlord. The tenant moved to have the stipulation vacated and the trial court denied the motion. The tenant appealed from the order denying the motion to vacate. Appellate Term, citing its authority to supervise the GAL, out of its obligation to defend those unable to defend themselves, reversed and remanded and vacated the stipulation of final judgment. Estate of Murray, 14 Misc. 3d 591; 824 N.Y.S. 2d 864 (Surr. Ct., Erie Cty. 2006) Although many Surrogate's Courts in this State, as a policy, have been interpreting SCPA 401, 402 and 403 to mean that a validly appointed attorney-in-fact may not appear on behalf of a disabled 9
19 individual in an estate administration proceeding because the statutes do not enumerate them in the list of parties who may appear, the court revisited, and changed that policy in light of the public policy behind Article 81 that there be liberal use and recognition of the efficacy of powers of attorney. The court stated that a formal plan for handling the incapacitated person's property interests validly established by her should not be lightly set aside or disregarded by the courts. Estate of Lucy Lovito, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5206; 236 NYLJ 70 (Surr Ct,Westchester Cty) (Surr. Scarpino) When seeking appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem ( GAL ) the issue to be adjudicated is not whether the proposed ward is mentally incompetent, but whether he is a 'person under disability' within the meaning of SCPA 103(40) for whom a GAL must be appointed under SCPA 403[2]. A 'person under disability' includes an 'incapacitated person', which is defined as '[a]ny person who for any cause is incapable adequately to protect his or her rights... (SCPA 103[25]). The fact that a party has appeared by an attorney-in-fact or retained counsel is not dispositive of this issue. Appointment of a GAL is not governed by either CPLR Article 12 or MHL Article 81. Instead, the issue is governed by SCPA 403(2), which provides that any 'person under disability' who does not appear by his guardian, committee or conservator pursuant to SCPA 402 shall appear by a GAL, unless certain circumstances set forth in SCPA 403(3) are present. Beach Haven Apartments, Assoc. LLC v. Riggs, NYLJ, July 20, 2005, p.20 col. 1 (Civ Ct, Kings Cty) (Finkelstein, J.) Motion to appoint GAL in eviction proceeding denied because there was no proof of proper service upon the proposed respondent. The Court states in the context of this decision that lack of service would be especially serious because the appointment of a GAL carries with it a loss of liberty merely by the imposition of a stranger in the proposed ward s life. Taylor v. Martorella, 192 Misc. 2d 214; 745 N.Y.S. 2d 901(Sup. Ct., Kings Cty. 2002) An Article 81 was found not to be equivalent to a guardian ad litem for the purposes of establishing venue pursuant to CPLR 503 (b). Court holds that under CPLR Art. 12, a GAL s only function is to protect the interests of the party in a particular action or proceeding. where as an Art 81 guardian acts in an array of legal proceedings as fiduciaries who can sue and be sued in their respective representative capacities and made parties to a case. Since a Guardian ad Litem is not a real party in interest, his or her residence can not control the choice of venue. 124 MacDougal St. Assoc. v. Hurd, NYLJ, 2/2/00, p. 25 (Civ. Ct., NYCL/T)(Scheckowitz, J.) Default judgment was entered against mentally ill tenant, who had no Art. 81 guardian and no GAL. Balancing needs of her neighbors to be free of nuisance against need to protect her civil rights, default judgment and warrant of eviction were vacated due to respondent s inability to defend herself in the earlier proceedings. 10
20 Matter of Saks, NYLJ, 9/15/97, p. 25, col.1 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.)(Rossetti, J.) While marshaling his mother s assets, guardian (son) discovered that most were in out-of-state banks and that his estranged brother, a Michigan resident, had access to them under power-of-attorney. Because of bad relationship between guardian and his brother, court appointed an independent guardian ad litem to investigate funds and any possible wrongdoing. Once guardian ad litem found potential misappropriation of over $400,000 of the funds, court issued order authorizing Article 81 guardian to commence proceedings in Michigan to set address invalid transfers by his brother. Court also ordered Article 81 guardian to pay guardian ad litem with funds from guardianship account. T.W. by Enk v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893 (7 th Cir., 1997) FRCP Rule 17(c) distinguishes between guardian or other "duly-appointed representative," on the one hand--in short, a general representative--and a guardian ad litem or a next friend, on the other hand--a special representative. If general representative has conflict of interest (for example because he is named as the defendant in the child's suit), or fails without reason to sue or defend (as the case may be), child may, with court's permission, sue by another next friend, or court may appoint a guardian ad litem for child. Querubin Parras v. Anna Ricciardi, 185 Misc. 2d 209; 710 N.Y.S. 2d 792 (City Court, City of NY 2000) Plaintiff landlord did not have to commence Art. 81 proceeding before suing elderly, possibly incapacitated woman, so long as she was properly served at nursing home. Court can appoint GAL if needed. Kings 28 Assoc. v. Raff, 167 Misc. 2d 351; 636 N.Y.S. 2d 257 (Civ. Ct., Cty. of NY, 1995) Housing court judge can appoint GAL to protect tenants rights without going through full Art. 81 proceeding. a. Compensation of GAL Albroon v. Gurwin, 2012 NY Slip Op 31534U; 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2735 (Sup. Ct. Nass. Cty, 2012) (Mahon, J.) Citing the interests of justice and fairness and the court s heavy obligation to protect a litigant who may be incapacitated but who has not yet been so adjudicated, the Court declined to vacate its earlier order directing defendant to establish an escrow account to pay a GAL who was appointed to determine the need to apply for an Art. 81 guardian for a possibly incapacitated person despite defendant s argument that plaintiff should not bear the cost of plaintiff s counsel s failure to first obtain an Article 81 guardian before commencing this tort claim proceeding. 11