Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-solomon-30
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:18:08
Document Index: 507150020

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 144', '§ 144', '§ 455', '§ 144', '§ 455', '§ 455', '§ 144', '§ 455']

United States v. Solomon, 2:05-cr-00385 | Casetext
2:05-cr-00385 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2013)
United Statesv.Solomon
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIAFeb 7, 2013
2:05-cr-00385
Presently before the Court for disposition is the MOTION FOR RECUSAL OR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE DUE TO BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND/OR IMPARTIALITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH FED. RULES CIVIL PRO. SEC. 455(A) & 144 (ECF No. 841) and the Response in opposition filed by the government (ECF No. 885). After a careful and deliberate review of Defendant's motion and, for the following reasons, the Motion will be denied.
By way of background, on March 28, 2006, a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a nine-count superseding indictment against Jelani Solomon and two co-defendants, Wanda Solomon (his mother) and Claron Hanner (his sister's boyfriend), which charged the defendants with various narcotics and firearms offenses. Defendant Jelani Solomon was charged in seven (7) counts as follows: at Count One with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess With Intent to Distribute 5 Kilograms or More of a Mixture and Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Cocaine, from in and around 1999 and continuing to in and around November 2004, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, § 846; at Count Two with Receipt of a Firearm By a Person Under Indictment, in and around 2003; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 922(n); at Count Three with Carrying and Using a Firearm in Relation to a Drug-Trafficking Crime, in and around 2003, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, §§ 924(c)(1)(A); at Count Four with Possession of a Firearm By a Convicted Felon, in and around 2003 to January 2004, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, § 922(g)(1); at Count Six with Using a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime and Causing the Death of a Person Through the Use of Said Firearm, on or about January 19, 2004, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 924(j) and 2; at Count Seven with Possession With Intent to Distribute and Distribute Less Than 500 Grams of Cocaine, on January 19 and 20, 2004, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, United States Code, §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and at Count 8 with Possession With Intent to Distribute and Distribute 500 Grams or More of Cocaine, on January 19 and 20, 2004, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, § § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). As to Count Six, the government sought the death penalty against both Defendant Jelani Solomon and Defendant Hanner.
Prior to trial, both Defendant Wanda Solomon and Defendant Hanner pled guilty. Wanda Solomon was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment at Count One and Defendant Hanner was sentenced to120 months imprisonment at Count One and 300 months imprisonment at Count Six all terms to run concurrently.
The decision of whether to recuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1985). There are two federal statutes that dictate the circumstances under which a federal judge should recuse. First, 28 U.S.C. § 144, applicable to federal district court judges, provides that a judge should recuse if the party seeking recusal submits a "timely and sufficient affidavit" which illustrates that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice towards a party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Similar to section 144, section 455(b)(1) of the same title, applicable to all justices, judges and magistrates of the United States, provides that a judge should recuse if the judge has a personal bias or prejudice towards a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). However, unlike section 144, section 455(b)(1) does not include the requirement of a timely and sufficient affidavit. Furthermore, section 455(a) states that "a judge should no longer preside over a case when 'a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned'." United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, -- U.S. ---, 133 S.Ct. 674 (Nov. 26, 2012) (quoting United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007)) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). Thus, these statutory provisions provide that there are two reasons for granting a motion for recusal: (i) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice towards a party, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(b)(1); or (ii) the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
Solomon mistakenly identifies both § 455(a) and § 144 as rules of civil procedure.
"[T]he hypothetical reasonable person . . . must be someone outside the judicial system because judicial insiders . . . may regard asserted conflicts to be more innocuous than an outsider would." Bergrin, 682 F.3d at 282, n. 26 (quoting In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 303 (3d Cir. 2004).
"To warrant reassignment under § 455(a), a case generally must involve apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source, meaning something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions formed in presiding over the case." Bergrin, 682 F.3d at 282. However, the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, that "[i]t is wrong in theory, though it may not be too far off the mark as a practical matter, to suggest, as many opinions have, that 'extrajudicial source' is the only basis for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice." Id. at 551. When a party does not cite to extrajudicial sources, the Judge's opinions and remarks must reveal a "deep-seated" or "high degree" of "favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. at 555-56. "Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . [They] can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal." Wecht, 484 F.3d at 218 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
Solomon makes no allegations of "extrajudicial" bias, but instead his allegations relate solely to the Court's conduct during the legal proceedings. The Court finds that Solomon has by no means demonstrated the type of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would justify disqualification under the facts and circumstances of this case.
v. JELANI SOLOMON, Defendant.
cc: Jelani Solomon
08820-068
Laura Schleich Irwin,
Email: Laura.Irwin@usdoj.gov
Troy Rivetti,
Email: Troy.Rivetti@usdoj.gov
Stephen R. Kaufman,
Email: Steve.Kaufman@usdoj.gov