Source: https://openjurist.org/604/f2d/885/mcgowan-v-f-marshall
Timestamp: 2018-04-27 01:16:27
Document Index: 260281461

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 651', '§ 661', '§ 661', '§ 661', '§ 661', '§ 2200', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1910', '§ 1910', '§ 1926', '§ 1910']

604 F2d 885 McGowan v. F Marshall | OpenJurist
604 F. 2d 885 - McGowan v. F Marshall
604 F2d 885 McGowan v. F Marshall
604 F.2d 885
52 A.L.R.Fed. 855, 7 O.S.H. Cas.(BNA) 1842,
1979 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 23,948
John W. McGOWAN, Petitioner,
No. 77-3495.
The appellant, John W. McGowan, is the sole proprietor of a firm which operates oil wells, some of which are located in Madison County, Mississippi. On March 4, 1976, this property was subjected to a warrantless search by two OSHA compliance officers.1 The appellant was subsequently cited for four OSHA violations.2 The first alleged violation consisted of the employer's failure to instruct his employees in the recognition and avoidance of the unsafe practice of using gasoline for personal cleaning in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2),3 the use of a gasoline container not approved under 29 C.F.R. § 1926.152(a)(1),4 and the maintenance of a gasoline container within fifty feet of a source of ignition in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.152(f)(3).5 The second citation alleged that the appellant had violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.151(a)(2)6 by locating an internal combustion engine in such a position that its exhausts were not well away from combustible oil. The third cited violation consisted of the employer's failure to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(1), (b)(2),7 which pertain to cranes. The fourth citation charged that the employer had violated 29 C.F.R. § 1910.219(b)(1), (d)(1)8 by failing to provide and maintain guards around pulleys and flywheels. All violations were cited as being serious.9
The appellant raises two nonconstitutional claims in this appeal. First, he contends that the administrative law judge was without authority to amend the first citation,14 and, accordingly, that that citation should have been dismissed. Second, the petitioner argues that the administrative law judge's finding of the violation named in the fourth citation was not supported by the evidence. Third, the appellant raises a constitutional claim, other than his frontal attacks on the Act itself,15 which consists of the assertion that Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), requires an employer's consent to sustain a warrantless search and that no such acquiescence was obtained prior to the search in this case. As a result, the appellant argues, all evidence procured by this search should have been excluded.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission was created by the Congress to carry out the adjudicatory functions of the Act. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b)(3) (West 1975). The Commission is to be "composed of three members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among persons who by reason of training, education, or experience are qualified to carry out the functions of the Commission . . . ." Id. § 661(a). To assist the Commission in the performance of its functions, the Chairman is authorized to appoint administrative law judges, See id. § 661(d), who are directed to "hear, and make a determination upon, any proceeding instituted before the Commission and any motion in connection therewith . . . ." Id. § 661(i). The administrative law judges are further directed to "make a report of any such determination which constitutes his final disposition of the proceedings. The report of the administrative law judge shall become the final order of the Commission within thirty days after such report by the administrative law judge, unless within such period any Commission member has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Commission." Id. § 661(i). Commission regulations allow aggrieved parties to petition for such review. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91(a) (1978).
Third, when Commissioner Moran directed review of the administrative law judge's decision, the petitioner was apprised of this action and sent explicit notice that review of his case by the full Commission depended upon his submission of a brief.21 In light of the longstanding doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the appellant should have anticipated that judicial review would be precluded by his failure to employ the administrative remedies explicitly made available to him.22II.
The jurisdictional question posed by appellant's attack on the facial constitutionality of the Act whether section 660(a) precludes consideration of these claims also deserves treatment different than that accorded his nonconstitutional and fourth amendment claims, for the Commission has no power to declare unconstitutional the Act that it is authorized to administer. See Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 242, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968). We hold that Buckeye Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 587 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979), controls the disposition of this jurisdictional question, and that, as a result, we have jurisdiction to entertain these constitutional contentions of facial invalidity.
Our holding that we can entertain these constitutional claims of the appellant, however, will afford him little comfort, for we find them to be totally devoid of merit. The Act is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power. See Godwin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 540 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, its enforcement provisions do not deprive the right to jury trial provided by the sixth or seventh amendments. Brennan v. Winters Battery Manufacturing Co., 531 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991, 96 S.Ct. 2202, 48 L.Ed.2d 815 (1976); Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Commission, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), Aff'd, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977).
Appellant contends that, as a prevailing party, he is entitled to attorney's fees and costs.25 As an initial matter, we find it difficult to characterize the petitioner as a prevailing party in light of the fact that he was found to have committed two violations of the Act. At any rate, the Commission properly denied this motion, for the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the award of attorney's fees and costs to be taxed against an agency of the United States unless there is Congressional authorization. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 20, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1974); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 91, 499 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1351, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975). No authorization exists to support an award under the Occupational Safety & Health Act.
This regulation mandates that "(t)he employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) (1978)
29 C.F.R. § 1926.152(a)(1) (1978) requires that "(o)nly approved containers and portable tanks shall be used for storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids."
This regulation provides that "(f)lammable liquids may be used only where there are no open flames or other sources of ignition within 50 feet of the operation, unless conditions warrant greater clearance." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.152(f)(3) (1978)
29 C.F.R. § 1926.151(a)(2) (1978) requires that "(i)nternal combustion engine powered equipment shall be so located that the exhausts are well away from combustible materials."
29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(1) (1978) provides the following:
C.F.R. § 1926.550(b)(2) (1978) requires that "(a)ll crawler, truck, or locomotive cranes in use shall meet the applicable requirements for design, inspection, construction, testing, maintenance and operation as prescribed in the ANSI B30.5-1968, Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive and Truck Cranes."
These regulations provide, in pertinent part, that "(f)lywheels located so that any part is seven (7) feet or less above floor or platform shall be guarded in accordance with the requirements of this subparagraph . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.219(b)(1) (1978), and that "(p)ulleys, any parts of which are seven (7) feet or less from the floor or working platform, shall be guarded in accordance with the standards specified in paragraphs (m) and (o) of this section." Id. § 1910.219(d)(1)
In sustaining this portion of the first citation, the administrative law judge amended the complaint to reflect the fact that 29 C.F.R. § 1926.152(a)(1) (1978) applies only to the construction industry, of which the appellant is not a member, and that 29 C.F.R. § 1910.106(d)(2)(i) (1978) pertains to industry in general. He thus substituted the standard of § 1910.106(d)(2)(i) for that of § 1926.152(a)(1). 29 C.F.R. § 1910.106(d)(2)(i) provides that "(o)nly approved containers and portable tanks shall be used."
The short answer to the petitioner's surprise argument was provided by the Supreme Court in McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 91 S.Ct. 1565, 29 L.Ed.2d 47 (1971). Speaking of a totally judicially created exhaustion requirement, the Court made the following statement: "Nor is it tenable to say that the doctrine is inappropriate when fashioned by judicial decision rather than specific congressional command. . . . The whole rationale of the exhaustion doctrine in the present context lies in purposes intimately related to the autonomy and proper functioning of the particular administrative system Congress has constructed." Id. at 483 n.6, 91 S.Ct. at 1568 n.6. This reasoning applies A fortiori when the requirement has been fashioned by Congress