Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-hayes-30901
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 01:32:27
Document Index: 547451649

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 791', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 11550', '§ 11364', '§ 459', '§ 2030', '§ 801', '§ 473', '§ 94', '§ 189', '§ 707', '§ 487', '§ 245', '§ 190', '§ 190', '§ 654', '§ 459', '§ 352', '§ 1101', '§ 190']

People v. Hayes - 52 Cal.3d 577 S004421 - Mon, 12/31/1990 | California Supreme Court Resources
Citation 52 Cal.3d 577
People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 874; 802 P.2d 376
[No. S004421.
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edmund D. McMurray and William G. Prahl, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. [52 Cal.3d 597]
Bearla Mae Wyatt, another resident of the Rice Motel, went to the motel office about 9:30 a.m. There she saw defendant complaining to Patel about a [52 Cal.3d 598] problem with "water going everywhere" in the bathroom. Patel did not seem to understand defendant's explanation; he invited defendant to demonstrate what he meant in Patel's own living quarters. Wyatt left the office; when she returned 10 to 15 minutes later, defendant and Patel were coming out of Patel's bathroom area. Patel told defendant he would come to defendant's room later.
James drove defendant to his mother's house and helped him unload the cigarettes onto the front porch. James drove straight back to the motel, noticing as he arrived that the door of the motel office was open. He looked in and saw cigarettes on the floor. James left again in the car with Gebert; later that day, after hearing news reports on the radio, they contacted the police to report their observations. [52 Cal.3d 599]
Defendant was arrested in Oregon a few weeks later. When interviewed there by Sergeant Wingo on January 23, 1980, defendant said he had left his sister's room at the Rice Motel between 3 and 3:30 a.m. on January 1 and had not returned. [52 Cal.3d 600]
On the morning of January 1, defendant went to the manager's office and told Patel that the water would not shut off in the sink in his sister's room. Patel asked defendant to turn the water off underneath the sink and said he would come later that day to fix it. After purchasing a bottle of wine, defendant returned to his sister's room, took a few drinks of wine, and went to sleep. Defendant was awakened when his face was slapped. Defendant struck back and opened his eyes. He saw Patel with a knife in his hand. Defendant recognized the knife as having been in the room in a sheath inside a leather pouch. The pouch did not belong to defendant and may have belonged to his brother. Defendant reached for Patel, who swung the knife and cut defendant across the hand. Defendant grabbed Patel and they wrestled. [52 Cal.3d 601]
James Cross returned to his room at the Flamingo Motel in Stockton about 2:30 a.m. on January 5, 1980. Hearing a thumping noise coming from the room above, he yelled: "Would you quiet down?" The noise continued, so he went upstairs. Defendant met him in the upstairs hallway and said, "You're going to apologize to my lady." Defendant pushed him into room 20 where Cross saw a woman lying on a bed. Defendant shoved Cross and hit him with a pistol across the face, on the side of the head, and in the body. Cross sat down at the corner of the bed. Defendant asked if Cross had any money. Cross pulled 10 to 15 $1 bills from his shirt pocket and placed them on the bed. Defendant told the woman to give him coat hangers, and she complied. Defendant bound Cross's hands with one of the coat hangers, then proceeded to search his pockets, removing $150 in cash. Defendant [52 Cal.3d 602] also removed Cross's boots, searched them, and bound Cross's feet with another coat hanger.
In July 1979, after an argument with defendant over money, Melvin Lee Smith was attacked by defendant and two other men. Smith was hit in the head with a brick, transported in a car, kicked in the chest, dumped out of the car, and cut on the left arm and hand. His wounds required approximately 50 stitches and he was hospitalized overnight. In September of the same year, defendant and two companions accosted Elroy Green. Defendant [52 Cal.3d 603] held a knife to Green's throat, robbed him of personal possessions, and threatened to kill him for showing disrespect to defendant's family. Green was taken in a car to a levee, where he fought defendant and took away the knife, which he threw into the water. Defendant then hit Green in the head and arm with a tire jack, breaking Green's arm and inflicting a cut to Green's head that required 32 stitches.
During voir dire, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was improperly exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of presumed group bias. (See People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) Defense counsel made these objections (hereafter Wheeler objections) to seven of the first twelve peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution. The court noted the objections but deferred ruling until each side had exercised 12 peremptory challenges. At that point, the court held a hearing outside the presence of the prospective jurors. Defense counsel explained that six of the prospective jurors peremptorily challenged by the prosecution had expressed reservations about the death penalty and that one prospective juror so challenged, Ms. Harris, was Black. The prosecutor maintained that it was permissible to exercise peremptory challenges on the basis of attitudes toward the death penalty, and he requested a ruling on this point. The trial court stated it would take this issue under submission. The court then asked the prosecutor to explain his reasons for challenging Ms. Harris. After hearing the prosecutor's explanation, the court overruled the Wheeler objection as to Ms. Harris.
Another hearing was held after the defense had made three additional Wheeler objections. Defense counsel explained that all three of the challenged jurors had expressed scruples regarding the death penalty and that one, Ms. Johnson, was also Black. In response to the court's invitation, the prosecutor explained that Ms. Johnson was challenged because she had [52 Cal.3d 604] expressed strong reservations about the death penalty. The court overruled the Wheeler objection insofar as it related to race and reserved ruling insofar as it related to death penalty views.
[2] Both the federal and California Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors because they belong to a cognizable racial group. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Neither, however, prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of specific juror attitudes toward the death penalty. (People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1222 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1061 [251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680].) Accordingly, here the trial court did not err in denying defendant's Wheeler objections to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of death penalty attitudes.
[3] A party that believes the opposing party is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose must raise a timely challenge [52 Cal.3d 605] and make a prima facie case. (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1216.) Once a prima facie case has been shown, the burden shifts to the other party to demonstrate that the peremptory challenges were exercised on a neutral basis related to the particular case to be tried. (Ibid.)
[1b] Defendant did raise timely Wheeler objections to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges against Black jurors. [5] By requesting the prosecutor to explain his reasons for these challenges, the trial court impliedly found that defendant had established a prima facie case. (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1217; People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 718-719 [230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102].)fn. 2 Accordingly, we proceed to evaluate the prosecutor's explanations.
[1c] The prosecutor stated that he had challenged Ms. Harris because there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest as a result of her failure to appear on three or four traffic tickets and he was concerned that if the warrant was served during the trial it could affect Ms. Harris's judgment. The prosecutor also said that Ms. Harris was in the process of dissolving her marriage to a person who worked for law enforcement, and he was [52 Cal.3d 606] concerned that Ms. Harris might feel resentment toward her husband and that this resentment could cause her to be biased against law enforcement agencies in general.
We give great deference to the trial court's determination that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges was not improperly based on class or group bias. (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221.) Here the trial court was well aware of its duty under People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, to carefully scrutinize the prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges in light of the court's personal observation of the voir dire of the challenged jurors. The prosecutor's stated reasons were facially proper and are supported by the record of voir dire. We find no basis to reject the trial court's conclusion that the prosecution's peremptory challenges of Black jurors were genuinely exercised for the reasons stated rather than on the basis of group bias. We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's Wheeler objections.
[6a] Defendant maintains that the trial court improperly barred the defense from introducing evidence that James was on probation at the time of his testimony or, in the alternative, that if the trial court did not so rule, [52 Cal.3d 607] defendant's trial counsel rendered constitutionally defective assistance in failing to introduce such evidence.
[7] A defendant seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates, [52 Cal.3d 608] and that it is reasonably probable a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence of counsel's failings. (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; see also, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) If the defendant fails to establish the prejudice component of the ineffectiveness claim, a reviewing court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].)
[8a] Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in ruling admissible, under the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements (Evid. Code, §§ 791, subd. (b), & 1236), a statement James had made to law enforcement officers on January 6, 1980. Defendant argues that the statement did not qualify as a prior consistent statement because James already had motives to fabricate when he made the statement and because the prior [52 Cal.3d 609] statement included material information not mentioned by James during his trial testimony.
The issue defendant raises is whether, when a witness's testimony may have been influenced by multiple biases or motives to fabricate, a prior consistent statement is admissible if made before the existence of any one or more of the alleged biases or motives to fabricate or only if made before the existence of all such biases and motives. We addressed this issue in People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 210-211 [260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]. In Andrews, a witness's prior statement, consistent with his trial testimony, was admitted to rebut a charge that the witness's testimony was influenced by a "deal" he had made with the prosecution four years after the prior statement. We rejected the defendant's contention that admission of the statement was error because the witness had a motive to fabricate when he made the prior statement. We decided, in effect, that a prior consistent statement is admissible if it was made before the existence of any one or more of the biases or motives that, according to the opposing party's express or implied charge, may have influenced the witness's testimony. (See also, People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 388 [105 Cal.Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585]; People v. Duvall (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 417, 421 [68 Cal.Rptr. 708].) We conclude, accordingly, that in this case the statement given by James on January 6, 1980, was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement.
Defendant also claims that the prior consistent statement included material not mentioned in James's testimony. Specifically, in the prior statement [52 Cal.3d 610] James related that defendant had said he "used something" so as not to leave fingerprints in the motel office. During his direct examination, James did not mention this damaging admission by defendant.
[9] A ruling on a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. (People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 113 [249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569].) [8b] Applying that standard, we find no abuse of discretion. When evidence of James's prior consistent statement was received, defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection that the portion of it now challenged was inadmissible. Moreover, as the trial court concluded, any error could have been cured by having James testify to this damaging admission by defendant. To avoid placing undue emphasis on this inculpatory evidence, defense counsel reasonably elected not to insist that James give such testimony to the jury.
[10] Defendant also contends that admission of James's prior consistent statement violated defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution. We disagree. The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses does not forbid the use of prior out-of-court statements by a declarant who testifies at trial and is subject to full cross-examination in regard to the prior statement. (California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 153-164 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 494-500, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; see People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 349-361 [161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401].)
[11a] When he testified at defendant's trial, James had charges pending against him in two cases. The first case involved two counts of petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction (§ 666); in both counts the offense, which [52 Cal.3d 611] could be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor, was charged as a felony. [12] In the second case, James was originally charged with petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction (§ 666), charged as a misdemeanor, and with the misdemeanor offenses of being under the influence of heroin or morphine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550) and possession of narcotics paraphernalia (id., § 11364); this complaint was amended, however, on the day it was filed, to elevate the petty theft charge to a felony and to add a count, as an alternative to the petty theft count, charging the felony offense of burglary (§ 459).fn. 3
[13] Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the prosecution has a duty to disclose all substantial material evidence favorable to an accused, including evidence bearing on the credibility of a prosecution witness; the duty exists whether or not the evidence has been requested, and it is violated whether or not the failure to disclose is intentional. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 29-30 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843].)
[11c] The record in this case does not indicate whether the prosecution disclosed the amended complaint to the defense, although an inference that [52 Cal.3d 612] defense counsel was aware of the amended complaint might be drawn from a question that defense counsel put to James ("Isn't it a fact that you've got three felony petty thefts with a prior charge[s] pending in Municipal Court right now?" [italics added]), and from defense counsel's reference to these charges in closing argument ("[James] exercised what he knew was his carte blanc [sic] to commit ... three felonies and a couple of high misdemeanors after he went and talked to the police."). Nevertheless, we may assume for purposes of argument that the prosecution should have noticed that the exhibit introduced by the defense was a superseded complaint and that it should have directed defense counsel's attention to the amended complaint.
Failure to disclose evidence relevant to the impeachment of a prosecution witness requires reversal "only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." (United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 678 [87 L.Ed.2d 481, 491, 105 S.Ct. 3375].) Otherwise stated, reversal is required "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." (Id. at p. 682 [87 L.Ed.2d at p. 494].)
[14] As noted above, James had charges pending against him at the time of his testimony in this case. Those charges were filed in January and [52 Cal.3d 613] February of 1980, but proceedings to arraign James on the charges were continued repeatedly during the pendency of this case; within days after the jury returned its verdict of death against defendant, the prosecution requested and obtained dismissal of all James's pending charges. Despite the prosecutor's representations in this case that no promises had been made to James regarding the disposition of his pending charges, and despite James's testimony to that effect, defendant now argues that the prosecutor must have somehow communicated to James or his attorney that the charges would be dismissed, and that the prosecutor's failure to disclose this communication to the defense was misconduct.fn. 4 In the alternative, defendant contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to discover the alleged inducement.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to discover the existence of the prosecution's agreement or understanding with James as to the disposition of James's pending charges. But, as we have seen, the appellate record does not establish the [52 Cal.3d 614] existence of any such agreement or understanding. We therefore reject the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as factually unsupported.
Defendant maintains that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to offer evidence to establish beyond doubt that each of James's three prior convictions was a felony conviction. We agree that reasonably competent counsel, performing as a diligent advocate, would have offered evidence, or obtained a stipulation or instruction, that the convictions in question were felony convictions. There could be no valid tactical basis for not doing so. We are not persuaded, however, that counsel's omission was [52 Cal.3d 615] prejudicial. The jury did learn of each of James's three prior convictions and knew at least that they might be felony convictions. As we discussed earlier, James's testimony was not of critical importance to the prosecution's case and his credibility was substantially attacked by the defense.
Defendant contends his counsel should have objected to all questions about the reasons for placing James in the State Witness Protection program, because the jury could have construed the testimony regarding "the word ... in the street" as evidence that defendant had threatened James and thereby demonstrated consciousness of guilt. Counsel's decision not to object was a reasonable tactical decision. Evidence that James was receiving government funds and other assistance had significant impeachment value, and the evidence regarding the motive for placing James in the program permitted the defense to bring out on cross-examination that James was acquainted with another murder suspect and had apparently stolen that individual's clothing. In exchange for this valuable impeachment evidence, the damage to the defense case was slight and speculative. The reference to the "word ... in the street" was fleeting and ambiguous and was not tied to defendant. Although defendant characterizes the testimony as the "street threat" evidence, there was no testimony regarding any threat. The "word ... in the street" could refer merely to common knowledge in the community that James was testifying as a prosecution witness in a murder case. This knowledge would be sufficient to make life uncomfortable and dangerous for James in the culture of drug use and property offense to which he evidently belonged. Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. [52 Cal.3d 616]
Generally, pretrial rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not binding on a trial court. (See People v. Superior Court (Zolnay) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 729, 734 [125 Cal.Rptr. 798, 542 P.2d 1390]; People v. Beasley (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 71, 77 [58 Cal.Rptr. 485].) Defendant has advanced no persuasive reason, and has submitted no persuasive authority, for establishing an exception under which a ruling granting severance would deprive a trial court of authority to determine the admissibility of evidence of offenses charged in severed counts. Moreover, even if the court that ruled on the severance motion in this case had possessed authority to make a binding determination on the admissibility of evidence, the record shows that the court did not do so. When it granted the severance motion, the court expressly stated that it was not determining whether evidence of the Cross incident would be admissible in the trial of the capital charges. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the ruling on the severance motion did not determine the admissibility of evidence of the Cross offenses.
[18] Evidence that a defendant committed crimes other than those for which the defendant is then being tried is barred by Evidence Code section [52 Cal.3d 617] 1101 (see fn. 7, ante) if it is offered to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but not if it is offered to prove a material disputed issue such as motive or intent. (People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 510 [268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].) The admissibility of other-crimes evidence depends upon "(1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence." (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], italics omitted.)
A trial court's ruling admitting evidence of other crimes is reviewable for abuse of discretion. (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1239 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) [17b] Here, the prosecution offered evidence of the Cross offenses to establish that defendant intended to rob Patel when he assaulted and killed him. Defendant concedes that his intent was a material and disputed issue, and he fails to identify any rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence. Basing his argument on the second of the three factors mentioned above, defendant maintains that evidence of the Cross offenses had little or no tendency to prove the relevant facts regarding his intent at the time he killed Patel. We disagree.
[19] In addition, defendant argues that, in denying his motion to exclude the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 (see fn. 6, ante), the trial court erroneously failed to make an express finding that the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Although such an express finding is not required, the record must affirmatively show that the trial court did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value. (People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 21-22 [252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]; People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 582 [217 Cal.Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106]; [52 Cal.3d 618] People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 25 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) A close review of the record in this case shows, however, that the trial court never ruled on defendant's motion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of the Cross offenses.
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel made statements, set forth in the margin,fn. 8 which the trial court could reasonably interpret as meaning that the defense was then seeking a ruling only as to the first step, the admissibility of the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. After reviewing the evidentiary materials regarding the Cross offenses, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101. ("And the Court is going to find that the Cross evidence would have substantial probative value in the issues under 1101, motive, intent and possibly identity of the defendant as it relates to the Patel homicide.") Nothing in the record indicates that the court ruled on an objection under Evidence Code section 352 or that defense counsel then requested a ruling on such an objection. The court might reasonably have concluded that the defense was reserving this objection until after it had presented its case, when the court would be [52 Cal.3d 619] in a better position to balance potential prejudice against probative value. In any event, assuming defense counsel made an objection under Evidence Code section 352, counsel's failure to obtain a ruling is fatal to defendant's appellate contention, for a party objecting to the admission of evidence must press for an actual ruling or the point is not preserved for appeal. (People v. Jacobs (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1636, 1650-1651 [241 Cal.Rptr. 550]; People v. Alaniz (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 903, 907 [227 Cal.Rptr. 575]; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 2030, pp. 1992-1993.)
During jury selection the defense moved to exclude Cross's testimony. It was agreed that the evidence would be admissible, if at all, only during rebuttal. The trial court ruled the evidence admissible shortly before the prosecution rested its case-in-chief. Defendant contends trial counsel should have insisted that the evidence be received during the case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal so that it would not be the last evidence the jury heard. [52 Cal.3d 620]
[21] Bearla Mae Wyatt testified to a conversation she had overheard between defendant and Patel in the motel office on the morning that Patel was killed. On direct examination she said there had been no argument and [52 Cal.3d 621] no harsh words. Defense counsel asked on cross-examination whether Patel had said to defendant, "You're not even supposed to be here, you don't have a room." Wyatt answered that Patel had not said anything like this, but that he did tell defendant it was defendant's sister's room. During a hearing in chambers, counsel said Wyatt had told him, during an interview that morning, that Patel had said to defendant, "It's your sister's room, you're not supposed to be here." Wyatt again denied that Patel had said this. According to her in-chambers testimony, Patel said, "It's not your room, it's your sister's room." Wyatt reaffirmed there had been no harsh words, and said that what Patel had probably meant was, "why are you worried about it [the sink] being fixed, ... you don't live here." Defense counsel did not pursue the matter further when proceedings resumed before the jury.
Whether to object to inadmissible evidence is a tactical decision; because trial counsel's tactical decisions are accorded substantial deference (In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180 [249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]), failure to object seldom establishes counsel's incompetence. (People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 951 [258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330]; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 261 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that [52 Cal.3d 622] counsel's actions "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (People v. Ledesma, supra, at p. 216, internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted.)
To be admissible, an expert's opinion must be based on matter "that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates." (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).) Here, the officer conceded that needle marks do not reveal the strength of the drug being injected, and for this reason it is difficult to determine from needle marks alone whether a heroin user is addicted and, if so, the quantity of heroin the user needs to take to avoid withdrawal symptoms. Defendant contends that this concession establishes the inadmissibility of the officer's opinion that defendant was a heroin addict with a habit costing $100 daily. (Cf. People v. Thomas (1977) 19 Cal.3d 630, 635 [139 Cal.Rptr. 594, 566 P.2d 228].) But the officer's opinion may not have been based on the needle marks alone: defendant was under the influence when the officer observed him and his general condition may have furnished [52 Cal.3d 623] additional and sufficient grounds for the officer's opinion. (Cf. People v. Benedict (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 400, 404-405 [82 Cal.Rptr. 759].)
In any event, we need not determine whether the officer's opinion testimony would have been admissible had an objection been made. As we have observed, reviewing courts accord substantial deference to a tactical decision by trial counsel not to object to the admission of evidence. (People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d 935, 951; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216.) Here, the defense strategy was to use evidence of defendant's heroin and Ritalin ingestion to explain his conduct in fatally wounding and binding Patel. Although the strategy did not require proof that defendant was addicted to heroin, or that maintaining his habit cost $100 daily, defense counsel could reasonably determine that evidence of these facts could not be excluded. Had these facts not been proven by the officer's expert testimony, the prosecution might have been able to prove them by other means. On the present record, we are unable to say that defense counsel's failure to object was not a tactical decision within the reasonable range of effective representation.
We note initially that defense counsel's strategy was not precluded by defendant's testimony that he was "feeling normal." Defendant gave that [52 Cal.3d 624] testimony in answer to questions by the prosecutor about defendant's heroin use and whether he was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. The testimony did not address the effects of Ritalin or lack of sleep, nor was it intended as a general characterization of defendant's mental condition when he killed Patel.
The instruction as given stated that the jury could consider the other-crimes evidence for the limited purposes of showing "the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged" and "[a] motive for the [52 Cal.3d 625] commission of the crime charged." Further, the instruction warned the jury not to consider the other-crimes evidence to prove that defendant was a person of bad character or had a disposition to commit crimes.
Although an instruction more clearly stating the permissible use of the other-crimes evidence would have been helpful (see People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1010 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]), defendant has not established that the instruction as given was erroneous, inadequate, or prejudicial. We must assume, contrary to defendant's theory of prejudice, that the jury obeyed the express language of the instruction not to use the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant's character or his disposition to commit crimes. The instruction permitted the jury to consider the evidence only in determining defendant's intent and motive; as we have concluded, the evidence was admissible for these purposes.
We rejected an identical contention in People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642-643 [244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836], holding that [52 Cal.3d 626] CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.10 "adequately cover the issue of the time of the formation of the intent to steal." Those same instructions were given in this case.fn. 9 Because defendant's proposed instructions would merely have elaborated on these general instructions, the trial court's refusal to give them was not error. (People v. Hendricks, supra, at p. 643.)
Defendant does not challenge the first sentence of the special instruction, which is taken almost verbatim from this court's opinion in People v. Risenhoover (1968) 70 Cal.2d 39, 50 [73 Cal.Rptr. 533, 447 P.2d 925]. But he maintains that the balance of the special instruction is prejudicially erroneous. We agree.
The generally accepted definition of immediate presence, as stated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, is that " '[a] thing is in the [immediate] [52 Cal.3d 627] presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.' " (Commonwealth v. Homer (1920) 235 Mass. 526, 533 [127 N.E. 517]; accord, United States v. Dixon (D.C. Cir. 1972) 469 F.2d 940, 944; Spencer v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1940) 116 F.2d 801, 802 [73 App.D.C. 98]; People v. Bartowsheski (Colo. 1983) 661 P.2d 235, 244; State v. Campbell (1941) 41 Del. 342 [22 A.2d 390, 392]; Head v. United States (D.C.App. 1982) 451 A.2d 615, 624; State v. Glymph (1977) 222 Kan. 73 [563 P.2d 422, 424]; Foster v. State (1983) 297 Md. 191 [464 A.2d 986, 998]; Robertson v. Sheriff, Clark County (1977) 93 Nev. 300 [565 P.2d 647, 648]; State v. Carcerano (1964) 238 Ore. 208 [390 P.2d 923, 928]; State v. Deso (1938) 110 Vt. 1 [1 A.2d 710, 712]; State v. Mosley (1981) 102 Wis.2d 636 [307 N.W.2d 200, 208]; LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) p. 696, fn. 24; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 347.) Thus, the Court of Appeal stated in People v. Bauer (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 632, 642 [50 Cal.Rptr. 687], that immediate presence " 'must mean at least an area within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over [her] property.' " (Quoting from Spencer v. United States, supra, at p. 802.) Under this definition, property may be found to be in the victim's immediate presence "even though it is located in another room of the house, or in another building on [the] premises." (4 Wharton's Criminal Law (14th ed. 1981) § 473, p. 52, fns. omitted; see also, LaFave & Scott, op. cit. supra, § 94, p. 696.)
[27b] As previously stated, the trial court in this case gave a special instruction in response to the jury's request for clarification of the meaning of immediate presence. In relevant part, the instruction stated: "An act of [52 Cal.3d 628] robbery can be said to have occurred in the victim's immediate presence as long as the victim perceived any overt act connected with the commission of the offense." This instruction permitted the jury to find the "immediate presence" element of robbery if any of the acts mentioned in the general definition of robbery occurred in the victim's presence. In this case, defendant assaulted and killed the victim. The jury could reasonably conclude from the special instruction that the "immediate presence" element was satisfied because the fatal assault was an "overt act connected with the commission of the" robbery and because the fatal assault unquestionably occurred in the victim's presence. The special instruction thus rendered the "immediate presence" element devoid of all independent meaning, making it redundant with the "force or fear" element. For this reason, the special instruction was erroneous.fn. 10
Because the jury was misinstructed on an element of the offense of robbery, reversal of the robbery conviction is required unless we are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 210 [249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414-415 [247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184].) We are unable to so conclude. This is not a case in which defendant conceded immediate presence at trial, or in which the jury resolved the same issue against defendant in another context (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]). Nor does the evidence establish immediate presence as a matter of law. The room in which Patel [52 Cal.3d 629] was assaulted and killed was stipulated to be 107 feet from the stolen property's location, namely, the motel office and living quarters, and both were on the same motel premises. Under these circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude either that the property was not so distant as to be beyond the victim's control and protection, or that it was too distant to be in the victim's immediate presence at the time the force was used. Because the issue of immediate presence could reasonably have been decided either way, we are unable to declare that the misinstruction on this element of robbery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This conclusion requires the reversal of both the robbery conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance. But because the jury convicted defendant of burglary and found true the burglary-murder special circumstance, we are able to determine from the record that the jurors agreed that defendant was guilty of felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 351 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289]; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1015-1016 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017].) Therefore, the validity of the first degree murder conviction is not affected by the misinstruction on one of the elements of robbery.
[29] As we have seen, the instructions given in regard to the offenses of robbery and felony murder in the commission of robbery or burglary (fn. 9, ante) adequately instructed the jury on the issue of after-formed intent as to the offense of robbery. In particular, the felony-murder instruction stated that a killing was murder of the first degree if it occurred "as a result of the commission of the crimes of robbery and burglary and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime." (Italics added.) A reasonable juror would necessarily understand from this instruction that defendant was guilty of robbery-murder only if the intent to steal was formed before the fatal blow was struck. We likewise conclude that this same felony-murder instruction, in conjunction with the instruction [52 Cal.3d 630] defining burglary,fn. 11 adequately informed the jury that defendant was guilty of burglary-murder only if the intent to steal was formed before the fatal blow was struck.
[30a] Defendant raises two issues about the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He contends there was no substantial evidence to establish the "immediate presence" element of robbery or to establish that the killing occurred as a result of a burglary for purposes of felony murder [52 Cal.3d 631] and the burglary-murder special circumstance. Although we have concluded that the robbery conviction must be reversed for instructional error, we must nonetheless assess the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether defendant may again be tried for this offense. (Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 16-18 [57 L.Ed.2d 1, 12-14, 98 S.Ct. 2141]; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 690 [214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446].) [31] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1199-1200 [264 Cal.Rptr. 852, 783 P.2d 211]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].)
[32a] We also reject defendant's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of felony murder in the commission of burglary or the finding of the burglary-murder special circumstance. Defendant's argument is based on the erroneous premise that both the felony-murder offense and the special circumstance require proof that the killing occurred during or after the entry into the burglarized premises. [33] A murder is of the first degree if "committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate" any of certain enumerated felonies, one of which is burglary. (§ 189.) Under this provision, a killing is committed in the perpetration of an enumerated felony if the killing and the felony "are parts of one continuous transaction." (People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d 984, 1016; People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 118 [104 Cal.Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225].) We have indicated that the reach of the felony-murder special circumstance is [52 Cal.3d 632] equally broad.fn. 12 (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 176 [266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 949-952 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]; see also, People v. Sellers (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1054 [250 Cal.Rptr. 345].) [32b] Here, therefore, defendant was guilty of murder in the perpetration of burglary, and the burglary-murder special circumstance was properly found if (1) defendant intended to commit the burglary when he killed Patel, and (2) the killing and the burglary of the motel office and adjoining living quarters were part of one continuous transaction. A rational trier of fact could have so found.
[34] Defendant's crimes were committed and his trial occurred before this court's decision in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], holding that proof of intent to kill or aid a killing was essential to a finding of a felony-murder special circumstance under the 1978 death penalty law. Relying on Carlos, defendant contends that the trial court in this case erred in failing to instruct on intent to kill. As defendant now recognizes, we overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, holding that a first degree felony murderer who did the actual killing is subject to the death penalty regardless of intent to kill. We have also held that retroactive application of our decision in Anderson does not violate defendant's right to due process under the federal Constitution. (People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 25; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-327 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) Here, it was undisputed that defendant was the actual killer; an instruction on intent to kill was therefore not required.
Based on the undisputed evidence presented at trial, we conclude that defendant was the actual killer of Patel, thereby establishing a degree of culpability sufficient under the Eighth Amendment to permit defendant's execution. (People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1037 [258 Cal.Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172], and cases cited therein.)
[35] Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his admission in juvenile court proceedings that he had committed the [52 Cal.3d 633] offense of voluntary manslaughter as alleged in a juvenile court wardship petition. He maintains that the evidence was not relevant to any statutory factor in aggravation.
Juvenile court adjudications under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are not criminal convictions, and thus are not admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), as prior felony convictions. (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 862 [258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) Here, the evidence of defendant's admission in juvenile court was not offered under factor (c), and the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it was not to be so considered. Rather, the evidence was offered under section 190.3, factor (b), as evidence of "criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence."
Defendant argues that the evidence was inadmissible under factor (b) of section 190.3 because acts by a juvenile are not "criminal activity" unless the juvenile has been shown to be unfit for treatment through the juvenile court system. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.) We rejected essentially the same argument in People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 862, concluding that evidence of violent criminal misconduct while a juvenile is admissible under factor (b).
Defendant contends that various statements made by the prosecutor during his penalty phase argument constituted misconduct. Defendant did not object to any of these statements, nor did he request a curative admonition. [36] As defendant recognizes, the failure to object is normally deemed a waiver of the claim of misconduct. (People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 650 [253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) He argues, however, that the various misconduct claims should not be deemed waived because the resulting harm could not have been cured by an admonition (People v. Green, supra, at p. 34), and because [52 Cal.3d 634] defense counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The prosecutor also said during argument that defendant "was chasing Mr. Soriano with the intent to assault or commit another robbery." Defendant contends this constituted misconduct because there was no substantial evidence that defendant intended to rob Mr. Soriano. [52 Cal.3d 635]
[39] Defendant contends next that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing there was no evidence showing the existence of various factors in mitigation. It is not misconduct to point out in argument that various potentially mitigating factors are not present. (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 154-155 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32].)
[40] Finally, defendant contends it was misconduct for the prosecutor to argue that the death penalty was appropriate and necessary to prevent defendant from committing further acts of violence, and that the prosecutor's argument invited the jury to speculate that defendant might eventually be released if not sentenced to death. There was no misconduct: we have held that argument directed to a defendant's future dangerousness, when based on evidence of the defendant's past conduct rather than expert [52 Cal.3d 636] opinion, is proper and does not invite speculation as to the defendant's possible release. (People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1110, fn. 35; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 951 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996]; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1123 [248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].)
We must reject this argument on the present record, as it rests on speculation. The record fails to disclose what investigation defense counsel performed regarding the circumstances of the crimes against Cross, Jones, Thurston, Soriano, or Smith, or what evidence might have been presented regarding drug use in connection with those offenses, or whether, on balance, that evidence would have been more helpful than prejudicial to the defense.fn. 13 (See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].)
[42] Defense counsel challenged the validity of defendant's prior conviction for grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd. 2) of Thurston, on the ground that defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. (See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) Out of the jury's presence, the trial court held a hearing, at which a transcript of the plea proceedings was received in evidence. After some discussion about the adequacy of the advisement regarding the penal consequences of the plea, [52 Cal.3d 637] the court ruled that the conviction was valid. Defendant now contends his trial counsel should have argued that the conviction was invalid because defendant had not been told that by pleading guilty he would be giving up his right of confrontation.
Although we have not directly so held, we have indicated that an advisement to a defendant that he or she has the "right to cross-examine" serves as an adequate advisement of the right of confrontation. (In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 323 [137 Cal.Rptr. 781, 562 P.2d 684].) In any event, even assuming for argument's sake that the advisement was inadequate, defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel failed to act in a reasonably competent manner. To collaterally attack a judgment of conviction on Boykin-Tahl grounds, it is not enough to show an incomplete or otherwise defective advisement; defendants must also allege and prove that, when the plea was entered, they lacked knowledge of, or did not intelligently waive, their constitutional rights. (People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 914 [206 Cal.Rptr. 707, 687 P.2d 904]; In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283, fn. 1 [193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 666 P.2d 980]; In re Ronald E., supra, at p. 325, fn. 8; People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 503 [219 Cal.Rptr. 85].) The present record provides no basis on which to conclude that defendant could have made such a showing. Because it rests on speculation, we must reject this claim of ineffective assistance. (People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)
Defendant also contends that trial counsel should have challenged on various grounds the admissibility of defendant's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245) on Crawford. As defendant points out, this conviction followed the commission of the capital offense and thus did not qualify under factor (c) of section 190.3 as a prior felony conviction. (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-203 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) We have previously noted that a defendant seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance and prejudice. Here the jury received uncontradicted evidence, in the form of Crawford's testimony, of the offense against Crawford, and this evidence was properly received under factor (b) of section 190.3. The additional fact that defendant was convicted of the offense "could have added very little to [52 Cal.3d 638] the total picture considered by the jury." (People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 567 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) Therefore, defendant suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to object to evidence of the conviction.
The jurors observed defendant during his guilt phase testimony and were able to form an impression of his intelligence; expert testimony on this issue would have been of doubtful benefit. Evidence of the criminality of a defendant's family is extremely risky, as its persuasive value in mitigation is questionable and cross-examination may reveal further criminal acts by the defendant. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 118-123 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) As for Andrew James, he was a convicted felon and an admitted drug user; it is unlikely that his opinion of defendant's character would have materially assisted the defense, and cross-examination regarding his past dealings with defendant might well have introduced prejudicial material. Moreover, the present record fails to reveal what instructions defendant may have given counsel in regard to penalty phase evidence (see People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]), or what justification counsel may have had for presenting only the two witnesses. On the present record, we cannot say that counsel's decision was outside the range of reasonably competent assistance.
[43] Finally, defendant faults trial counsel for failing to make a persuasive penalty phase argument. Although relatively brief, counsel's argument does not demonstrate incompetent assistance. Counsel argued that the death penalty was the most extreme penalty; that it should not be imposed to achieve revenge; that it was not an effective deterrent; that defendant's past crimes were committed as a consequence of his involvement with drugs and alcohol; that evidence had been introduced to show that defendant was a "personable individual," a "constructive force," and "a leader" who had "blossomed" when placed in a structured setting away from drugs; that defendant would adapt to life in prison and would possibly help someone else there; that a sentence of life without parole would mean that defendant [52 Cal.3d 639] would spend the rest of his life "in a cage, away from society"; and, finally, that a sentence of life without parole would show that the jury had "tempered justice with mercy."
[44] In accordance with People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], the jury was instructed that before it could consider evidence of prior criminal activity involving violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)) "each element of such additional criminal act must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence related to it alone." Defendant contends the court erred in failing to add sua sponte that the instruction applied to evidence of the Cross offenses. Defendant contends the instruction was necessary because otherwise the jury might conclude that the reasonable doubt standard applied only to factor (b) evidence received at the penalty phase, and not to such evidence received at the guilt phase.
The instruction was clear on its face and clarification was not required. A reasonable juror would have understood that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to all evidence of criminal activity offered under section 190.3, factor (b). Moreover, Cross's testimony was direct evidence of the elements of the offenses of assault and robbery, and his testimony was uncontradicted and unimpeached. The omission of a clarifying instruction did not prejudice defendant. (See People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 566; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 783 [251 Cal.Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].)
[46] In determining whether instructional error has been established, we review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 780 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].) [45b] Here, the trial court instructed the jury to "consider, take into account, and be guided by" the [52 Cal.3d 640] statutory factors. A reasonable juror would understand from this instruction that evidence received at the guilt and penalty phases was to be considered only if it tended to prove one or more of the statutory factors. Further, the trial court instructed the jury that under factor (b) of section 190.3 it could consider "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence." A reasonable juror would understand that, by negative implication, criminal activity not meeting these requirements was not to be considered in determining penalty. No further clarification was required.
[47] The final factor that the jury was instructed to consider in making its penalty determination was "Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." Because this case was tried before People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], the jury was not instructed that factor (k) of section 190.3 includes also any aspect of defendant's character or background offered by the defense in support of a verdict other than death, nor was this subject addressed by any supplemental ameliorative instruction. For this reason, defendant contends the instructions failed to inform the jury that it could give mitigating weight to his penalty phase evidence that he would adjust satisfactorily to prison life. Defendant's contention requires that we examine the record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, ___ [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190]; see People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1182 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730]; People v. Murtishaw, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1032; People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 899-901 [258 Cal.Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294].)
During argument to the jury, the prosecutor, immediately after quoting the language of section 190.3, factor (k), said it was right that the jury should consider sympathy for the defendant in determining penalty, provided this was balanced with consideration of the aggravating factors. The prosecutor then proceeded to discuss defendant's character, and in particular the testimony of defendant's penalty phase witnesses. He argued, in substance, that the evidence was not significantly mitigating because it showed that defendant "has the basic physical and mental ability to be a productive person in this society" and yet, "[f]or whatever reason, he chooses not to." The argument of defense counsel, as previously noted, urged the jury to consider the same evidence as tending to show that defendant's problems were caused by drugs and that he would adjust well to [52 Cal.3d 641] prison. Thus both arguments proceeded on the assumption that the defense evidence was properly before the jury and could be considered to determine whether there were aspects of his character or background warranting imposition of a sentence less than death. We therefore conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the omission of an expanded factor (k) instruction prevented the jury's consideration of evidence about defendant's character and background.
[48] Defendant contends it was error to instruct the jury on potentially mitigating factors not shown by the evidence. We have consistently rejected this contention. (E.g., People v. Allison, supra, 48 Cal.3d 879, 906-907; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 854 [254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776-777 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) Defendant provides no persuasive reason to reconsider our conclusion on this issue.
[49] Defendant contends the trial court had to instruct the jury that the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances should be considered together as only one aggravating circumstance. We have previously rejected this contention. (E.g., People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 989-990 [251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475]; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 520 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 765-767 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) We reject it here also.
[50] The trial court gave this instruction, in the language of CALJIC No. 8.84.2: "After having heard all the evidence and after having heard and considering the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating [52 Cal.3d 642] circumstances upon which you have been instructed. If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole."
This instruction significantly reduced the risk of juror misapprehension. First, it expressly told the jury that penalty was not to be determined by a mechanical process of counting, but rather that the jurors were to decide the weight to be assigned to each individual factor and that their considered judgment regarding the weights of the various factors would be the "final test." Second, as we have observed in previous cases, "when jurors are informed that they have discretion to assign whatever value they deem appropriate to the factors listed, they necessarily understand they have discretion to determine the appropriate penalty." (People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 253 [250 Cal.Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25], affd. sub nom. Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316]; accord, People v. Lang, [52 Cal.3d 643] supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1034; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 987 [264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608]; People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 873.)
[51] We have consistently rejected the contention that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies to the process of penalty determination (e.g., People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 936 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 553 [262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, 232); it therefore requires no further discussion here.
[52] The remaining contention is that the trial court should have told the jury what to do if it found the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation to be precisely equal in weight. The contention is based on a misapprehension of the nature of the penalty determination process. At the penalty phase, each juror must determine, through the weighing process, which of the two alternative penalties is the more appropriate. Because the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]), and therefore different in kind from the determination of guilt, there is no burden of proof or burden of persuasion. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 960 [245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) The jurors cannot escape the responsibility of making the choice by finding the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation to be equally balanced and then relying on a rule of law to decide the penalty issue. The jury itself must, by determining what weight to give the various relevant factors, decide which penalty is more appropriate. We find no infirmity in the instructions given.
[53] Defendant contends it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury in these words: "Both the People and the defendant have a right to expect you'll conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case and that you will reach a just verdict as to penalty regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be." [52 Cal.3d 644]
At the penalty stage of a capital case, an instruction that the jurors should not consider the consequences of their verdict is potentially confusing and should not be given. (People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 537, fn. 7 [220 Cal.Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440].) The error will seldom be prejudicial, however, and we do not find it prejudicial here, for these reasons: "Viewed in context, the instruction can only have been understood to relate to the jurors' duty to render a just verdict without regard to public response. Moreover, as we have explained, the instructions and arguments, viewed as a whole, adequately apprised the jury of its duty to consider all mitigating evidence, and to impose death only if that was deemed the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances." (People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 518; see also, People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963, 991; People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 998-999 [244 Cal.Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794].)
[54] We further conclude that defendant was not prejudiced at the penalty phase by the guilt phase instructional error that resulted in the invalidity of the robbery conviction and robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. The jury was well aware of the circumstances under which the murder was committed, and nothing occurred during the penalty phase that would have led the jury to place undue emphasis on the invalid conviction or special circumstance finding in reaching its penalty determination. (See People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 633 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].)
[55] The trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion for modification of the verdict of death (§ 190.4, subd. (e)). After listening to arguments from the defense and the prosecution, the court ruled from the bench, denying the motion and giving a detailed statement of reasons for the ruling. A 12-page statement of reasons, substantially identical to the oral statement, was filed on the same day. Defendant argues that these facts compel an inference that the trial court had prepared its written statement of reasons before the hearing, and that the trial court therefore had already decided, before hearing argument, that it would deny the motion. [52 Cal.3d 645] Defendant contends he was thereby denied the right to meaningful argument on the modification motion.
[56] We are not constitutionally required to conduct intercase proportionality review (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 51-54 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-43, 104 S.Ct. 871]), and we have consistently declined to do so. (See, e.g., People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 112 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 285 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892].)
[57] We do, however, examine the circumstances of cases in which death sentences have been imposed to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to a defendant's individual culpability. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963, 995.) Having conducted such an examination in this case, we conclude that the death penalty is not disproportionate. To steal money and cigarettes, defendant took the life of another human being in a deliberate, callous, and brutal fashion; both the trial court and the jury found defendant's claims of provocation not credible; and, finally, the crime was not an isolated incident, but part of an escalating pattern of violence. [52 Cal.3d 646]
In addition to the sentence of death for the capital offense, defendant was sentenced to prison terms for the burglary and robbery offenses. To avoid imposing multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct (see § 654; People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376 [82 Cal.Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637, 37 A.L.R.3d 1398]), the trial court stayed the sentence on the burglary count, but it declined to stay the sentence on the robbery count. As the Attorney General concedes, this was error. (See People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 196-197 [107 Cal.Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956]; People v. Lowe (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 792, 795 [119 Cal.Rptr. 699]; People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 547-548 [88 Cal.Rptr. 235].) Because we are reversing the conviction and sentence for robbery, we need not determine the effect of this error.
First, we judicially noticed the court record attached to the appellate brief because of the specific facts of the case. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 611, fn. 3.) Normally, issues based upon facts or documents outside the appellate record must be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding, not on appeal. (E.g., People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35 [171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].) This opinion should not be read as blurring the difference between habeas corpus and appeal, or as generally allowing the attachment to appellate briefs of exhibits not part of the appellate record.
Second, I have grave doubts defense counsel was incompetent in his treatment of James's prior convictions. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 614.) Competent counsel could have reasonably believed that as a practical matter he had sufficiently made his point to the jury. Appellate courts should not second guess the dynamics between jury and counsel. The finding of incompetence is unnecessary since we find no prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 699-700, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1068 [275 Cal.Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862].) [52 Cal.3d 647]
Third, I agree there was no error in giving CALJIC No. 2.50. I am not convinced, however, that an instruction expanding upon the standard instruction "would have been helpful." (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 625.) In People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1010 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1], cited by the majority, the trial court instructed on how the evidence could not be used, but not on how it could be used. That is quite different from this case. Since there is no sua sponte duty to give any instruction on other-crimes evidence (People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534]), there is certainly no sua sponte duty to rewrite the standard instruction.
­FN 1. During the trial the Black alternate replaced a regular juror, resulting in a jury on which three of twelve jurors, or 25 percent, were Black.
­FN 2. In People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092 [259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659], we concluded that the trial court had not found a prima facie case even though it had afforded the prosecution an opportunity to comment on the defendant's Wheeler motion. We pointed out that the trial court "did not call upon the prosecutor to explain his challenges, but to respond to the defense motion," and that when the trial court denied the Wheeler motion, it did so "on the ground that the defense had not made out a prima facie showing of group bias, not that the prosecutor had not rebutted such a showing." (Ibid.)
In determining whether to infer a trial court's finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court's remarks in context. Certainly we will not infer such a finding when, as in Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092, the trial court has expressly found that the defense has failed to make a prima facie case. But when nothing in the record suggests the contrary, a trial court's statement requesting the prosecution to explain its challenges or to comment on the defendant's motion will be construed as a finding of a prima facie case. We again urge trial courts to make express findings on the existence of a prima facie case, so that reviewing courts need not determine this important question on the basis of implication. (People v. Turner, supra, 42 Cal.3d 711, 719, fn. 3.)
­FN 3. The amended complaint is not part of the appellate record, but defendant has furnished us with a copy, as an exhibit to his appellate brief, and has requested that we take judicial notice of it. (See Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) & 452, subd. (d).) The People have questioned the relevance of the document but do not dispute that it is authentic or that it is a proper subject of judicial notice. Because the amended complaint is a proper subject of judicial notice and pertinent to an issue raised an appeal, we grant the request for judicial notice. (See People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 94, fn. 2 [113 Cal.Rptr. 1, 520 P.2d 385]; People v. Jurado (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 470, 482 [171 Cal.Rptr. 509]; People v. Terry (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 432, 439 [113 Cal.Rptr. 233].)
­FN 4. The prosecution's failure to disclose an alleged deal with James concerning his pending charges was one of the issues raised by defendant in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause on this and other issues raised by the petition. On May 18, 1989, however, we vacated the order as improvidently granted and denied the petition on the merits.
­FN 5. "Q. Well, do you remember a petty theft with a prior conviction of petty theft that you were convicted of in 1979? You pled guilty to it in 1979.
­FN 6. "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, § 352.)
­FN 7. "(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. [¶] (b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. [¶] (c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness." (Evid. Code, § 1101.)
­FN 8. As the court was discussing a case in which evidence was ruled inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, defense counsel interjected: "Exactly, and that's what I'm asking for as a preliminary ruling in this case. In other words, after the Court reads the Cross case, is it relevant to prove intent in this case based on the circumstances of this case?" The court stated it intended to read the materials regarding the Cross offenses "to see if the circumstances I know so far from this case from the testimony and the circumstances of the Cross case would meet that-that's only one of the requirements for admissibility, is similarity of the offenses to show the intent is the same at both times." Defense counsel responded, "Right, but it's a threshold requirement .... In other words, if the Court says they haven't met that, then the 352 problem never arises." The court answered, "That's correct."
­FN 9. CALJIC No. 8.21, as given, reads: "The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as a result of the commission of the crimes of robbery and burglary and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime, is murder of the first degree. [¶] The specific intent to commit the robbery and/or burglary and the commission of such crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
­FN 10. Statements in the following cases inconsistent with this holding are disapproved: People v. Brown (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1409, 1419 [261 Cal.Rptr. 262]; People v. Martinez (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 579, 604 [198 Cal.Rptr. 565]; People v. Miramon (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 118, 124 [189 Cal.Rptr. 432]; and People v. Wiley (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 149, 160-161 [129 Cal.Rptr. 13].
Although language similar to that used in the trial court's special instruction appears also in People v. Lavender (1934) 137 Cal.App. 582, 591 [31 P.2d 439], it was there used to define the commencement of the offense of robbery (an issue not presented here), rather than the meaning of immediate presence.
­FN 11. CALJIC No. 14.50, as given, reads: "Defendant is charged in Count 3 of the information, with the commission of the crime of burglary, a violation of Section 459 of the Penal Code. [¶] Every person who enters any structure of the type shown by the evidence in this case with the specific intent to steal, take and carry away the personal property of another of any value and with the further specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of such property is guilty of the crime of burglary. [¶] It is immaterial whether the intent with which the entry was made was thereafter carried out. [¶] In order to prove the commission of the crime of burglary, each of the following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. That a person entered a structure of the type shown by the evidence in this case without consent of the person in possession, [¶] 2. That at the time of the entry, such person had the specific intent to steal and take away someone else's property, and intended to deprive the owner permanently of such property."
­FN 12. The felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) requires proof that the murder was committed "while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit" certain enumerated felonies, one of which is burglary.
­FN 13. The most obvious source of such evidence was defendant himself, but defense counsel might reasonably have concluded that the risk of putting defendant on the stand outweighed the benefits.
Mon, 12/31/1990 52 Cal.3d 577 S004421 Automatic Appeal closed; remittitur issued
HAYES (BLUFFORD) ON H.C. (S039415)
3 Hayes, Blufford (Appellant)
2150 Oberlin Street
Jan 22 1982 Judgment of death
Feb 11 1982 Filed certified copy of Judgment of Death Rendered
Feb 18 1982 Application for Extension of Time filed
By County Clerk to Complete Clerk's Transcript. Order filed 3-3-82 Grtg Reporter to 3-4-82 to Complete Transcripts.
Mar 9 1982 Record on appeal filed
C: 5 (808); C: 1 (Conf. 6); R: 14 (3618) (record subsequently refiled after corrections)
Apr 6 1982 Counsel appointment order filed
Apr 23 1982 Application for Extension of Time filed
By Applt to correct Record
Apr 26 1982 Order filed:
Reporter granted to 6-14-82 to Complete Transcript
May 7 1982 Application for Extension of Time filed
Applt to correct & Decert Record
May 13 1982 Order filed:
Crt's Order 4-26-82 Vacated. Order of S Joaquin Co S Crt Cert Rec Is Vacted,Rec remanded to S Crt. AP Plt Grted to 6-14-82 to correct Record.
May 13 1982 Returned record
To Superior Crt
Jun 24 1982 Compensation awarded counsel
Sep 11 1982 Compensation awarded counsel
Nov 10 1982 Compensation awarded counsel
May 20 1985 Application for Extension of Time filed
By Reptr (Herman Spalinger) to correct Record
May 22 1985 Order filed:
Grtg Applt to 6-3-85 to correct Record (See Text)
Jun 10 1985 Order filed:
Rptr granted to 6-18-85 (See Text)
Aug 9 1985 Record on appeal filed
C-5 (808 Pp.); R-14 (3,810 Pp.)
Aug 9 1985 Exhibits Lodged:
Sep 9 1985 Application for Extension of Time filed
Sep 12 1985 Order filed:
Applt Grted to 10-9-85 to file AOB
Oct 23 1985 Supplemental record/transcript filed
one volume supplemental Clerk's Transcript (43 pp.)
Nov 12 1985 Supplemental Reporter's/Clerk's Transcript
Suppl Aug C: 1 (151) & Lodged Confid Rpts.
Nov 18 1985 Application for Extension of Time filed
Relief from Default.
Nov 19 1985 Appellant's opening brief filed
(264) w/Perm
To file Resp's Brf
Dec 20 1985 Order filed:
Resp granted to 1-26-86 to file Rob
Feb 3 1986 Order filed:
Resp Grted to 2-25-86 to file Rob
Feb 27 1986 Order filed:
Resp Grted to 3-11-86 to file Rob
Mar 14 1986 Application for Extension of Time filed
Mar 28 1986 Respondent's brief filed
W/Perm (164)
Apr 17 1986 Habeas funds request filed (confidential)
Apr 17 1986 Application filed to:
Applt Grtd to 5-19-86 to file Arb
Applt Grtd to 5-29-86 to file Arb
Jun 3 1986 Appellant's reply brief filed
W/Perm (113)
Jun 26 1986 Order filed:
The "Application for Order for Discovery in Aid of Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" is referred to the San Joaquin County Superior Court. That court is ordered to schedule a hearing at which the District Attorney shall be required to produce his files in the case of People v. Andrew James, San Joaquin County Municipal Court Nos. F27028 and F27175. Counsel for appellant/petitioner shall be present at the hearing, but appellant/petitioner's presence shall not be required. The court shall then conduct an in camera review of the files and determine whether they contain any documents relating to an alleged agreement between the District Attorney and James or any of James' counsel to testify or aid in any way in the case of People v. Blufford Hayes, San Joaquin County Superior Court No. 30924. If such information exists and the court sustains no claim of privilege under Evidence Code section 1040, the court shall permit counsel for appellant/petitioner to inspect such documents and/or to make copies thereof. The request for an order requiring the San Joaquin County District Attorney to transmit the original negatives of the crime scene to the Criminalistics Laboratory of the Institute of Forensic Science is denied without prejudice to a more specific showing as to trial counsel's omissions in failing to investigate the particular defense which counsel for appellant/petitioner asserts may be revealed by an examination of the negatives. (votes: Bird, C.J., Broussard, Reynoso and Grodin, JJ.)
Applt's to Crt's letter request of 7-25-86
Aug 15 1986 Application for Extension of Time filed
To file Resp's Suppl letter brief
Sep 17 1986 Filed:
Rt: 1 (Sealed)
Sep 26 1986 Habeas funds request filed (confidential)
appellant's first renewed application.
Sep 26 1986 Filed:
Appellant/petitioner's first renewed application for order for discovery in aid of petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Nov 12 1986 Application filed to:
For Order For Exam by Questioned Documents Examnr
Nov 20 1986 Order filed re habeas funds request (confidential)
Nov 20 1986 Order filed
Good cause appearing, the Attorney General is hereby ordered to transmit, within 20 days of this order, enlargements of the crime-scene photographs to Stephen Shaffer, Forensic Analytical Specialities, 3777 Depot Road #410, Hayward, CA 94545. (votes: Bird, C.J., Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, Lucas and Panelli, JJ.)
Dec 31 1986 Order filed re habeas funds request (confidential)
'Supplemental."
Jan 15 1987 Order filed:
The application for an order permitting examination of documents by an expert, filed 11-12-86, is denied.
Mar 26 1987 Order filed re habeas funds request (confidential)
Oct 30 1987 Motion filed
for consolidation of appeal w/habeas corpus (Crim. 25356) & Continuance of oral argument.
Dec 4 1987 Opposition filed
To Applt's motion of 10-30-87
Jan 7 1988 Order filed:
Dirtr/correct OSC before this Crt Why Petnr's Cnsl Was Ineffect in Presnt Avail Mitig Evid At Pen Trial Etc (See Text)
Resp Grtd to 2-24-88 to file return to OSC
Feb 26 1988 Application for Extension of Time filed
Mar 31 1988 Written return filed
Resp's to OSC w/Perm (59)
Apr 1 1988 Filed document entitled:
Applt's Applic. for Order for Discovery, for Ext. of time to file Traverse & for Authorization for Expenditure of Investigative Funds (5 Pp.).
Aug 18 1988 Order filed:
It is hereby ordered that the Attorney General disclose forthwith the present address and telephone number of Andrew James, Jr. to Richard Such, court-appointed counsel for petitioner. It is further ordered that the written traverse, if any, shall be served and filed on or before 20 days after completion of counsel's interview of Andrew James, Jr., but in no event later than 10-21-88.
Aug 18 1988 Order filed re habeas funds request (confidential)
re: request filed 4-1-88.
Oct 25 1988 Traverse to return filed
(41 Pp., Excluding Exhibits). (Perm).
Oct 25 1988 Exhibits Lodged:
Exhibit "O" to Traverse -- (Tape-Recorded Statement of Andrew James).
Jan 5 1989 Received:
Exhibits Q, R and S to Petnr's Traverse to return to Osc.
May 18 1989 Order filed:
OSC is vacated as improvidently issued. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied on the merits.
Jun 2 1989 Filed:
Petnr's motion to Vacate, or in the Alternative, Petn for Rhrg of Order Vacating OSC & denying H.C. Petn. (4 Pp.)
The motion to vacate this court's order of 5-18-89 is denied. Because the California Rules of Court do not authorize the filing of a petition for rehearing of such an order, the alternate request to consider the matter as a petition for rehearing is denied.
Sep 20 1989 Received:
Letter from Atty Richard Such requesting Pre-Argument Supplemental briefing Schedule.
Apr 16 1990 Letter sent to:
Counsel Advising that Court Is now Reviewing case for Assignment to Future Calendar. Any Necessary Suppl briefs Due 5-16-90; Any Replies Due 6-5-90.
May 10 1990 Application for Extension of Time filed
May 10 1990 Letter sent to:
Counsel Advising Ext. granted to 6-4-90 to file Suppl briefing. Any Responses Due 6-25-90.
Jun 11 1990 Supplemental Brief filed by:
Applt (Perm.) (62 Pp.)
Jul 20 1990 Received:
Letter dated 7-17-90 from Atty Such, Advising Court of His Vacation (Sept. 21 Through Oct. 8, 1990).
Tuesdy, 12/4/90, 9 A.M. S.F.
Letter dated 12-5-90 from Atty Richard Such Re Oral Argument (4 Pp.)
Conviction & sentence for robbery, and robbery-murder special circumstance, are reversed; In all other respects, judgment affirmed. Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by Lucas C.J., Mosk, Broussard, Panelli & Eagleson JJ. Concurring Opinion by Arabian, J.
By Applt (39 Pp.)
Jan 16 1991 Time extended to consider modification or rehearing
Mar 20 1991 Order filed (150 day statement)
Notice from U.S.S.C. of filing Petn for Cert. on 7-11-91, No. 91-5082.
Aug 28 1991 Exhibits Returned to:
San Joaquin County Clerk.
Sep 3 1991 Received:
Cert. copy of Order from U.S.S.C. denying Cert. on 11-12-91.
Jan 27 1993 Compensation awarded counsel
Apr 22 1994 Note:
Related Post-affirmance Habeas Petition filed this Date: case No. S039415.
Jul 1 1994 Motion filed
To recall Remittitur, Reinstate Appeal, & Reverse Judgment Pursuant To People V. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707.
Aug 31 1994 Note:
Opposition to recall Remittitur filed as Part of Informal response in Habeas #S039415.
Sep 19 1994 Received:
Copy of Petn for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in U.S.District Court (June 22,1993).
Nov 23 1994 Filed:
Reply to Resp's Opposition to motion to recall Remittitur, Reinstate Appeal Etc. (3 Pp.)
Jan 24 1995 Habeas funds request filed (confidential)
Apr 26 1995 Order filed re habeas funds request (confidential)
(confidential order)
W. Richard Such (2150 Oberlin Street)
SCOCAL, People v. Hayes , 52 Cal.3d 577 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-hayes-30901) (last visited Tuesday September 17, 2019).