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Timestamp: 2017-06-23 20:27:45
Document Index: 455113105

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 3281', '§ 3282', '§ 1201', '§ 3281', '§ 3282', '§ 690', '§ 690', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 690', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 690', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 3282', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 3282', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 3281', '§ 3282', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 3281', '§ 3282', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201']

Appellant's (Seale's) en banc reply brief | United States v. Seale | Tad Bartlett - JDSupra
United States v. SealeAppellant's (Seale's) en banc reply brief
Brief not authored by Tad Bartlett or The Bartlett Law Firm. Posted on JD Supra for access by The Bartlett Blawg for purposes of providing information to legal community on U.S. 5th Circuit's May 2009 en banc sitting. See brief for authorship.
Download PDF NO. 07-60732 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. JAMES FORD SEALE Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi Cause No. 3:07cr9-HTW-JCS _______________________________________________________ REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT EN BANC REHEARING _______________________________________________________ KATHRYN N. NESTER (MB #9418) Assistant Federal Public Defender GEORGE L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Senior Litigation Counsel S. DENNIS JOINER (MB #3176) Federal Public Defender S. and N. Districts of Mississippi 200 South Lamar Street, Suite 200-N Jackson, Mississippi 39201 Telephone: 601/948-4284 Facsimile: 601/948-5510 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 07-60732 THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT STATES OF AMERICA Appellee FORD SEALE Appellant from the United States District Court the Southern District of Mississippi 07cr9-HTW-JCS BRIEF FOR APPELLANT BANC REHEARING N. NESTER (MB #9418) Federal Public Defender L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Counsel JOINER (MB #3176) Defender of Mississippi Lamar Street, Suite 200-N 39201 601/948-4284 5510 for Defendant-Appellant Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii I. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 1 A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 B. Whether the separation of powers issue is properly preserved for en banc consideration ................................................... 2 C. Whether the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to transform a capital crime into a non-capital crime for all purposes when Congress has exercised its constitutional prerogative to classify the crime as capital and that classification is consonant with the Eighth Amendment AND Whether, consequently, federal kidnaping remained a a capital crime for statute-of-limitations purposes after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), because the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201's death penalty provisions violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments but did not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s substantive rights under the Eighth Amendment ....................................................................... 3 1. The three-judge panel’s decision does not invoke separation of powers concern ................................................... 3 2. The decision in Jackson did not run afoul of separation of powers principles because the death penalty provision of § 1201 was judicially excised on the basis of substantive unconstitutionality ............ 4 3. The Government’s argument regarding the separation of powers issue is without merit ............................................... 5 II. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 9 OF CONTENTS OF CONTENTS ... ... OF AUTHORITIES ... . ... ... the separation of powers issue is properly en banc consideration ... the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority a capital crime into a non-capital crime for when Congress has exercised its constitutional to classify the crime as capital and that is consonant with the Eighth Amendment consequently, federal kidnaping remained a crime for statute-of-limitations purposes after States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), because held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201's death penalty violated a defendant’s procedural rights under and Sixth Amendments but did not hold that the violated the defendant’s substantive rights under Amendment ... judge panel’s decision does not invoke powers concern ... in Jackson did not run afoul of powers principles because the provision of § 1201 was judicially basis of substantive unconstitutionality ... argument regarding the separation issue is without merit ... ... Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6ii CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 10 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 11 OF SERVICE ... OF COMPLIANCE ... Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases: Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984) .................................................. 4, 5 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972) ................................... 5, 7 Karageorgious v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2004) ................................... 4, 5 Parkdale Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.Supp.2d 1338 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) ........................................................................... 7 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973) ..................................................................................... 7 United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998) ............................................. 2 United States v. Hoyt, 451 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1971) ............................................... 8 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) ........................... 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) ....................................... 2 United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977) ............................................ 8 United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................ 8 United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973) ..................................... 7, 8 Statutes and Rules: 18 U.S.C. § 1201 .......................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 18 U.S.C. § 3281 ...................................................................................................... 8 18 U.S.C. § 3282 .................................................................................................. 7, 8 Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution ................................................................... 1, 4 OF AUTHORITIES v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984) ... v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972) ... v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2004) ... Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.Supp.2d Int’l Trade 2007) ... Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1278 (1973) ... States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998) ... States v. Hoyt, 451 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1971) ... States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) ... 6, 7, 8, 9 States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) ... States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977) ... States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) ... States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973) ... and Rules: S.C. § 1201 ... 6, 7, 8, 9 S.C. § 3281 ... S.C. § 3282 ... Amendment, U.S. Constitution ... Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6iv Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution .............................................................. 1, 4, 5 Eighth Amendment, U.S. Constitution ............................................................ 1, 4, 6 Miscellaneous: 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 690 (2008) ................................................. 6 Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (7th ed. 1999) .......................................................... 6 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921) ........................................ 2 Amendment, U.S. Constitution ... Amendment, U.S. Constitution ... Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 690 (2008) ... Law Dictionary 1324 (7th ed. 1999) ... The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921) ... Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb61 I. ARGUMENT A. Introduction. In a letter to counsel dated February 10, 2009 (hereinafter “February 10 letter”), this Court asked the parties to provide answers to three questions. Because Mr. Seale’s En Banc Brief was submitted to the Court before February 10, the Court offered him the opportunity to address the three questions in his Reply Brief. At the Court’s direction, this Reply Brief is limited to addressing the three following questions: 1) Whether the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to transform a capital crime into a non-capital crime for all purposes when Congress has exercised its constitutional prerogative to classify the crime as capital and that classification is consonant with the Eighth Amendment. 2) Whether, consequently, federal kidnaping remained a capital crime for statute-of-limitations purposes after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), because the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty provisions violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments but did not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s substantive rights under the Eighth Amendment. 3) Whether the separation of powers issue is properly preserved for en banc consideration. Because the answer to the third question may pretermit the need for the Court to consider the answers to the first two questions, question three is addressed first. ARGUMENT Introduction. to counsel dated February 10, 2009 (hereinafter “February 10 this Court asked the parties to provide answers to three questions. Because Seale’s En Banc Brief was submitted to the Court before February 10, the offered him the opportunity to address the three questions in his Reply Brief. the Court’s direction, this Reply Brief is limited to addressing the three questions: the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to transform a crime into a non-capital crime for all purposes when Congress has constitutional prerogative to classify the crime as capital and is consonant with the Eighth Amendment. consequently, federal kidnaping remained a capital crime for limitations purposes after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 because Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth but did not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. the separation of powers issue is properly preserved for en banc the third question may pretermit the need for the Court to answers to the first two questions, question three is addressed first. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb62 B. Whether the separation of powers issue is properly preserved for en banc consideration. In United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998), this Court faced the question of whether the en banc Court could properly consider an issue that was raised neither in district court nor before the three judge panel. The Court held, “[i]t goes without saying that we are a court of review, not of original error. Restated, we review only those issues presented to us; we do not craft new issues or otherwise search for them in the record.” Id. at 255-56 (citing United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1325 n.23 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc)(holding that this Court cannot not review an improper jury instruction issue if was neither raised in trial court nor on appeal)). As Justice Cardozo eloquently noted, “a judge ‘is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness.’” Brace, 145 F.3d at 256 (citing Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921)). Based on these principles, the Brace Court concluded that “it is not for us to decide which issues should be presented, or to otherwise try the case for the parties.” Id. Neither of the two substantive questions posed to the parties in the February 10 letter was raised in either district court or on appeal. Therefore, the questions are not properly preserved for en banc consideration. The Government agrees with this position. Appellee’s En Banc Brief, p. 30 n.14 (stating that “the separation-ofpowers issue ... is not preserved for en banc consideration....”). Nevertheless, the two remaining questions are addressed below. Because these two questions are intertwined, they are considered in a single analysis. the separation of powers issue is properly preserved for en States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998), this Court faced the whether the en banc Court could properly consider an issue that was in district court nor before the three judge panel. The Court held, i]t goes without saying that we are a court of review, not of original error. only those issues presented to us; we do not craft new issues search for them in the record.” Id. at 255-56 (citing United States v. F.2d 1317, 1325 n.23 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc)(holding that this cannot not review an improper jury instruction issue if was neither raised in court nor on appeal)). As Justice Cardozo eloquently noted, “a judge ‘is not a errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness.’” 145 F.3d at 256 (citing Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 Based on these principles, the Brace Court concluded that “it is not for us which issues should be presented, or to otherwise try the case for the Id. of the two substantive questions posed to the parties in the February was raised in either district court or on appeal. Therefore, the questions preserved for en banc consideration. The Government agrees with Appellee’s En Banc Brief, p. 30 n.14 (stating that “the separation-ofpowers is not preserved for en banc consideration....”). the two remaining questions are addressed below. Because are intertwined, they are considered in a single analysis. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb63 C. Whether the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to transform a capital crime into a non-capital crime for all purposes when Congress has exercised its constitutional prerogative to classify the crime as capital and that classification is consonant with the Eighth Amendment. AND Whether, consequently, federal kidnaping remained a capital crime for statute-of-limitations purposes after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), because the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty provisions violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments but did not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s substantive rights under the Eighth Amendment. 1. The three-judge panel’s decision does not invoke separation of powers concerns. Under the analysis presented by the three-judge panel, the separation of powers issue need not be reached. This is true because the panel’s statute of limitations conclusion was based on Congress’ enactment of the 1972 amendment to the federal kidnaping statute -18 U.S.C. § 1201. Panel Opinion at 20 (concluding “that the five-year limitations period made applicable the federal kidnaping statute by the 1972 amendment applies to this case....” (emphasis added)). Because the three-judge panel’s decision was based on Congress’ 1972 amendment to the kidnaping statute, rather than the Jackson Court’s excision of the death penalty provision of the statute, the separation of powers issue is not invoked under the analysis presented in the Panel Opinion. Accordingly, if this en banc Court agrees with the analysis presented in the Panel Opinion, the separation of powers issue need not be addressed at the en banc re-hearing. Whether the Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to transform crime into a non-capital crime for all purposes when Congress its constitutional prerogative to classify the crime as and that classification is consonant with the Eighth Amendment. consequently, federal kidnaping remained a capital crime for of-limitations purposes after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. because the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Amendments but did not hold that the provisions violated the substantive rights under the Eighth Amendment. three-judge panel’s decision does not invoke separation of concerns. the analysis presented by the three-judge panel, the separation of be reached. This is true because the panel’s statute of conclusion was based on Congress’ enactment of the 1972 amendment kidnaping statute -18 U.S.C. § 1201. Panel Opinion at 20 “that the five-year limitations period made applicable the federal statute by the 1972 amendment applies to this case....” (emphasis Because the three-judge panel’s decision was based on Congress’ 1972 the kidnaping statute, rather than the Jackson Court’s excision of the provision of the statute, the separation of powers issue is not invoked presented in the Panel Opinion. Accordingly, if this en banc agrees the analysis presented in the Panel Opinion, the separation of be addressed at the en banc re-hearing. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb61The Sixth Amendment provision in issue in Jackson was the right to trial by jury. 4 2. The decision in Jackson did not run afoul of separation of powers principles because the death penalty provision of § 1201 was judicially excised on the basis of substantive unconstitutionality. The second question presented to the parties in the February 10 letter states in part “the [Jackson] Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty provisions violated a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments but did not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s substantive rights under the Eighth Amendment.” (Emphasis added.) Through this statement, it is apparent that this Court is concerned with applying Jackson to the subject case because Jackson purportedly excised the death penalty provision of § 1201 on “procedural” rather than “substantive” grounds and, as a result, the decision had no effect on categorization of kidnaping as a capital offense. This concern is assuaged by the analysis presented below. Although the words “procedure” and “procedural” are used on a limited basis in the Jackson opinion, the Court never states that its excision of the death penalty provision of the kidnaping statute is based on procedural grounds. As this Court has recognized, in the Sixth Amendment context, substance and procedure are so intertwined that alteration of a procedural right also operates as an alteration of the associated substantive right to a jury trial.1 Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 327 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984)(holding that “[i]n some cases ... a particular procedural safeguard is part of the substantive right, as in the [S]ixth [A]mendment’s right to trial by jury.” (emphasis added)); see also Karageorgious v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d decision in Jackson did not run afoul of separation of powers because the death penalty provision of § 1201 was excised on the basis of substantive unconstitutionality. presented to the parties in the February 10 letter states “the [Jackson] Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1201’s death-penalty provisions a defendant’s procedural rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments not hold that the provisions violated the defendant’s substantive rights Amendment.” (Emphasis added.) Through this statement, it is Court is concerned with applying Jackson to the subject case excised the death penalty provision of § 1201 on rather than “substantive” grounds and, as a result, the decision had no on categorization of kidnaping as a capital offense. This concern is assuaged presented below. the words “procedure” and “procedural” are used on a limited Jackson opinion, the Court never states that its excision of the death provision of the kidnaping statute is based on procedural grounds. As this has in the Sixth Amendment context, substance and procedure that alteration of a procedural right also operates as an alteration the associated substantive right to a jury trial.1 Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 5th Cir. 1984)(holding that “[i]n some cases ... a particular procedural of the substantive right, as in the [S]ixth [A]mendment’s right to by jury.” (emphasis added)); see also Karageorgious v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d Sixth Amendment provision was the right to trial Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb65 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2004)(categorizing the “right to a jury trial” as a “substantive right[]”). Under the well-reasoned guidance provided by this Court in Augustine and by the Second Circuit in Karageorgious, the Jackson Court’s excision of the death penalty provision of § 1201 was based on the statute’s violation of a constitutionally guaranteed substantive right -the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. This erases any concern that this Court may have that the Jackson Court’s complete excision of the death penalty provision of § 1201 was based on procedural grounds. 3. The Government’s argument regarding the separation of powers issue is without merit. On page 34, footnote 15 of the Government’s En Banc Brief, it makes an abbreviated argument that in the post-Furman v. Georgia era, “courts have recognized the separation-of-powers issues that would arise if they invalidated all statutes and rules tied to the nature of a capital case, simply because the death penalty could not be constitutionally imposed.” Because the factual and legal scenarios in Furman and the Furman line of cases are distinguishable from Jackson, the Government’s argument is without merit. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), a very divided Supreme Court rendered a per curiam opinion containing no majority opinion. Through a series of five separate concurring opinions, all based on different legal rationales, the Jackson Court adjudged that the death penalty provisions of two specific Georgia state statutes and one specific Texas state statute were unconstitutional. (2d Cir. 2004)(categorizing the “right to a jury trial” as a “substantive Under the well-reasoned guidance provided by this Court in Augustine Second Circuit in Karageorgious, the Jackson Court’s excision of the provision of § 1201 was based on the statute’s violation of a guaranteed substantive right -the Sixth Amendment right to a jury This erases any concern that this Court may have that the Jackson Court’s excision of the death penalty provision of § 1201 was based on grounds. Government’s argument regarding the separation of powers merit. 15 of the Government’s En Banc Brief, it makes an argument that in the post-Furman v. Georgia era, “courts have the separation-of-powers issues that would arise if they invalidated all to the nature of a capital case, simply because the death could not be constitutionally imposed.” Because the factual and legal Furman and the Furman line of cases are distinguishable from argument is without merit. v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), a very Supreme Court rendered a per curiam opinion containing no majority Through a series of five separate concurring opinions, all based on legal rationales, the Jackson Court adjudged that the death penalty of two specific Georgia state statutes and one specific Texas state Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb62If the Court had found that the death penalty was unconstitutional under any circumstance, then the ruling would have been based on the substantive protection against “cruel and unusual punishment,” as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. 3Substantive right” is further defined as “[a] right that can be protected or enforced by law, a right of substance rather than form.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (7th ed. 1999). As discussed 6 Only two of the five Justices who filed concurring opinions intimated that the death penalty is unconstitutional under any circumstance.2 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). The other three Justices found that the three state capital punishment statutes, which involved purely procedural defects, were unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring)(finding the state statutes “unconstitutional in their operation”); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)(finding the state death penalty provisions unconstitutional as capriciously and randomly imposed); id. at 312-13 (White, J., concurring)(finding the state statutes unconstitutional as they were “administered”). In summary, these three Justices found that the state statutes were procedurally unsound because there was no justifiable reason for when the death penalty was or was not applied under the statutes. This is distinguishable from the ruling in Jackson because as discussed above in section I.C.2., the right to a jury trial is a fundamental constitutional right, and the structure of § 1201 denied that right, or at least unconstitutionally quelled the right. See 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 690 (2008)(stating that “[t]he right to a jury trial, where it exists, is a substantive right, not a procedural one”). Thus, the Jackson Court struck the death penalty in § 1201 based on a substantive defect -the denial of a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial.3 two of the five Justices who filed concurring opinions intimated that is unconstitutional under any circumstance.2 Id. at 305 (Brennan, id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). The other three Justices found state capital punishment statutes, which involved purely procedural unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., finding the state statutes “unconstitutional in their operation”); id. at (Stewart, J., concurring)(finding the state death penalty provisions as capriciously and randomly imposed); id. at 312-13 (White, J., finding the state statutes unconstitutional as they were In summary, these three Justices found that the state statutes were unsound because there was no justifiable reason for when the death was or was not applied under the statutes. This is distinguishable from the in Jackson because as discussed above in section I.C.2., the right to a jury is a fundamental constitutional right, and the structure of § 1201 denied that or at least unconstitutionally quelled the right. See 16B Am. Jur. 2d Law § 690 (2008)(stating that “[t]he right to a jury trial, where it a right, not a procedural one”). Thus, the Jackson Court the death penalty in § 1201 based on a substantive defect -the denial of a guaranteed right to a jury trial.3 would have been right” that can rather than form.” 1324 7th As discussed Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6above, the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right that is protected and enforced by the foundation of all laws of our country -the United States Constitution. 7 The difference in striking a statute on substantive grounds and striking it on procedural grounds is important to resolving the subject issue. A “law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the Constitution is ... presumptively invalid....” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973). Such a facial challenge attacks a statute’s consistency with existing laws or the Constitution. See Parkdale Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1347 n.5 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007). “A facially invalid ... law therefore cannot be justified under any potential application, and is void.” Id. (emphasis added). The death penalty provision of § 1201 was stricken down by the Jackson Court on substantive grounds, because it was facially invalid. Based on the divided nature of the Furman opinion, it is difficult to pinpoint a generally applicable holding with which to provide guidance in other cases. However, as recognized in United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1973), Furman neither invalidated any federal statute calling for the death penalty, nor constitutionally foreclosed imposition of the death penalty in the federal criminal justice system. In contrast, the Jackson Court judicially excised the death penalty provision of § 1201, and the result was that the crime was no longer a capital crime. This, in turn, triggered application of the five-year statute of limitations set forth in § 3282. Finally, four years later in 1972, Congress completely clarified its in striking a statute on substantive grounds and striking it on grounds is important to resolving the subject issue. A “law that upon a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by the is ... presumptively invalid....” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S.Ct. 1278 (1973). Such a facial challenge attacks a with existing laws or the Constitution. See Parkdale Int’l, Ltd. States, 508 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1347 n.5 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007). “A facially ... law therefore cannot be justified under any potential application, and is Id. (emphasis added). provision of § 1201 was stricken down by the Jackson on substantive grounds, because it was facially invalid. Based on the nature of the Furman opinion, it is difficult to pinpoint a generally holding with which to provide guidance in other cases. However, as in United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1973), neither invalidated any federal statute calling for the death penalty, nor foreclosed imposition of the death penalty in the federal criminal system. In contrast, the Jackson Court judicially excised the death penalty of § 1201, and the result was that the crime was no longer a capital This, in turn, triggered application of the five-year statute of limitations set in § 3282. Finally, four years later in 1972, Congress completely clarified its is a that is protected our country -the States Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb64In United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 1995), two cases that form the foundation of the Government’s argument in this case, the statutes in issue still contained capital punishment provisions. Therefore, the Watson and Manning courts were able to justifiably conclude that the crimes remained “capital offenses.” The subject case is distinguishable because the capital punishment provision of § 1201 was judicially excised, and later written out of the statute by Congress. 8 intent to render § 1201 non-capital by re-writing the statute without a death penalty provision.4 In conclusion, the Government’s separation of powers argument is without merit. The Jackson Court was within its constitutional power to judicially excise the death penalty provision of § 1201 as facially invalid, rendering it null and void. As this Court properly recognized in United States v. Hoyt, 451 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1971) and United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977), this rendered the statute non-capital for all purposes. The effect was to shift the applicable statute of limitations from § 3281 (unlimited) to § 3282 (five-years). Congress could have immediately amended § 1201 to clarify that it remained a capital offense, or it could have re-written the statutes pertaining to the statute of limitations. It did neither. Rather, four years later Congress amended the statute to exclude the death penalty. This series of events was not only constitutionally proper, but also it evinces the intent of both the Supreme Court and Congress to render § 1201 a noncapital offense during the applicable time frame. to render § 1201 non-capital by re-writing the statute without a death penalty 4 the Government’s separation of powers argument is without The Jackson Court was within its constitutional power to judicially excise provision of § 1201 as facially invalid, rendering it null and void. Court properly recognized in United States v. Hoyt, 451 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. United States v. Kaiser, 545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977), this rendered the for all purposes. The effect was to shift the applicable statute of from § 3281 (unlimited) to § 3282 (five-years). Congress could have amended § 1201 to clarify that it remained a capital offense, or it have re-written the statutes pertaining to the statute of limitations. It did Rather, four years later Congress amended the statute to exclude the death This series of events was not only constitutionally proper, but also it of both the Supreme Court and Congress to render § 1201 a noncapital offense during the applicable time frame. 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. cases the statutes in issue still contained capital punishment provisions. Manning to justifiably The subject case capital provision excised, out of the statute Congress. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb69 II. CONCLUSION Based on the arguments presented above, the Jackson Court’s excision of the death penalty provision of § 1201, and the resulting re-classification of the crime as non-capital, did not violate the separation of powers provisions of the Constitution. JAMES FORD SEALE, DEFENDANTAPPELLANT BY:__________________________ KATHRYN N. NESTER (MB #9418) Assistant Federal Public Defender GEORGE L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Senior Litigation Counsel S. DENNIS JOINER (MB #3176) Federal Public Defender Southern District of Mississippi 200 South Lamar Street, Suite 200-N Jackson, Mississippi 39201 Telephone: 601/948-4284 Facsimile: 601/948-5510 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant CONCLUSION presented above, the Jackson Court’s excision of provision of § 1201, and the resulting re-classification of the as capital, did not violate the separation of powers provisions of the FORD SEALE, DEFENDANTAPPELLANT N. NESTER (MB #9418) Federal Public Defender L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Counsel JOINER (MB #3176) Defender of Mississippi Lamar Street, Suite 200-N 39201 601/948-4284 5510 for Defendant-Appellant Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb610 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Kathryn N. Nester, certify that today, April 24, 2009, a copy of the Reply Brief for Appellant En Banc Rehearing, together with a diskette in PDF format, were served upon Tovah R. Calderon, Esq., via electronic mail and United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, P.O. Box 14403, Washington, D.C. 20044-4403, Stan Harris, Acting United States Attorney, via United States Mail, postage prepaid, and a copy was delivered via United States Mail, postage prepaid to James Ford Seale, Inmate No. 09193-043-043, c/o FCI Terre Haute, Federal Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 33, Terre Haute, Indiana 47808. _______________________________ KATHRYN N. NESTER (MB #9418) Assistant Federal Public Defender GEORGE L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Senior Litigation Counsel S. DENNIS JOINER (MB #3176) Federal Public Defender Southern District of Mississippi 200 South Lamar Street, Suite 200-N Jackson, Mississippi 39201 Telephone: 601/948-4284 Facsimile: 601/948-5510 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant OF SERVICE N. Nester, certify that today, April 24, 2009, a copy of the Reply for Appellant En Banc Rehearing, together with a diskette in PDF format, Tovah R. Calderon, Esq., via electronic mail and United States postage prepaid, to the U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Section, P.O. Box 14403, Washington, D.C. 20044-4403, Stan Harris, United States Attorney, via United States Mail, postage prepaid, and a copy via United States Mail, postage prepaid to James Ford Seale, Inmate 043-043, c/o FCI Terre Haute, Federal Correctional Institution, P.O. 33, Terre Haute, Indiana 47808. N. NESTER (MB #9418) Federal Public Defender L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Counsel JOINER (MB #3176) Defender of Mississippi Lamar Street, Suite 200-N 39201 601/948-4284 5510 for Defendant-Appellant Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb611 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitations, Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Recommendations 1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 3065 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using WordPerfect X3, in fourteen point font size and Times New Roman type style. ______________________________ KATHRYN N. NESTER (MB #9418) Assistant Federal Public Defender GEORGE L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Senior Litigation Counsel S. DENNIS JOINER (MB #3176) Federal Public Defender Southern District of Mississippi 200 South Lamar Street, Suite 200-N Jackson, Mississippi 39201 Telephone: 601/948-4284 Facsimile: 601/948-5510 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitations, Requirements, and Type Style Recommendations brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. B) because this brief contains 3065 words, excluding the parts of exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. P. 32(a)(6) has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface X3, in fourteen point font size and Times New Roman N. NESTER (MB #9418) Federal Public Defender L. LUCAS (MB #1476) Counsel JOINER (MB #3176) Defender of Mississippi Lamar Street, Suite 200-N 39201 601/948-4284 5510 for Defendant-Appellant Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=bae2cd4b-fc07-47c1-962c-4e74ff0f9eb6
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