Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/128/789/525121/
Timestamp: 2019-11-22 08:21:40
Document Index: 595704815

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 4301', '§ 4301', '§ 2000', '§ 4301', '§ 4301', '§ 4311', '§ 4301']

Gabriel I. Preda, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Nissho Iwai American Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 128 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1997 › Gabriel I. Preda, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Nissho Iwai American Corporation, Defendant-appellee
Gabriel I. Preda, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Nissho Iwai American Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 128 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1997)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 128 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 1997) Argued March 10, 1997. Decided Nov. 10, 1997
Gabriel I. Preda appeals from the grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Martin, J.) in favor of Nissho Iwai American Corporation ("Nissho"). His complaint alleged, in part, that (1) Nissho took adverse employment action against him motivated by discrimination on the basis of race and national origin and in retaliation for his complaints of race and national origin bias, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); and (2) Nissho failed to reinstate him following his honorable discharge from military service in violation of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. (1993) (the "VRRA").1 The district court dismissed Preda's Title VII claims, concluding that Preda had failed to show adverse employment action. Preda v. Nissho Iwai American Corp., No. 94 Civ. 6773, 1996 WL 109064, at * 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.12, 1996). It dismissed the VRRA claim based on a finding that Preda had not resigned his position at Nissho in order to enter military service and that Preda's vitriolic resignation letter to the president of Nissho rendered him no longer qualified to perform the duties of his prior position under 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2) (B) (i) (1993). Id. at * 6-7.
On October 12, 1990, Preda enlisted in the Army. On November 2, he resigned his employment with NISA in an eight-page letter to the president of Nissho. Preda's letter included a long discussion of "THE SYSTEM" of "Japan, Inc.," and its use of "suppressive means." Preda compared aspects of Japanese society to Nazi Germany and Communist-era Romania; he described the Japanese educational system as "early stage brain washing." He went on to criticize the politics, bureaucracy, language, media, judicial system, and culture of Japan. Preda's letter concluded with a warning to Nissho's president that the "exponents of THE SYSTEM" were working overtime at Nissho "to bend the will of citizens of USA." Preda asserted that " [t]he exodus of the disappointed and disgruntled local staff [of Nissho] should signal to management the same ideas as it did to the communist dictatorships."
The district court believed Preda had not shown an issue of material fact as to whether he suffered adverse employment action, which is necessary to establish a claim of discrimination. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1083, 137 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1997). We respectfully disagree. Preda asserts that after he made complaints of bias he was excluded from all departmental meetings and client outings. He asserts that his job duties and responsibilities were downgraded in retaliation, and his position was reduced to largely clerical tasks.
Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1). The prohibition against discrimination is not limited to "pecuniary emoluments," but includes discriminatorily-motivated diminution of duties. See de la Cruz v. New York City Human Resources Admin. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Board of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980). On the current record, we believe Preda has raised a material question of fact about whether the terms of his employment were adversely affected in retaliation for protected activity. We therefore vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment on Preda's claim under Title VII to the extent that the ruling was based on his failure to show genuine issues of material fact with respect to adverse employment action.2
Under the VRRA, an employee who leaves his job "in order to perform" active duty in the armed forces is entitled to reinstatement after honorable discharge "if still qualified to perform the duties of such position." See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301(a), 4301(a) (2) (B) (i), 4304(a) (1993).
Courts have unanimously held that in order for a veteran to be "qualified" to return to a prior position, under the meaning of the VRRA and predecessor laws which protected veterans' re-employment rights, the veteran must be not only physically capable of returning to the job but also temperamentally willing and able to work harmoniously with co-workers and supervisors. See, e.g., Green v. Tho-Ro Prods., Inc., 232 F.2d 172, 174-76 (3d Cir. 1956); Trusteed Funds, Inc. v. Dacey, 160 F.2d 413, 420-21 (1st Cir. 1947); Winfree v. Morrison Inc., 762 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
Job-related behavior inconsistent with loyalty to the employment relationship is a basis for terminating a veteran's employment. Cf. Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The VRRA should not be interpreted to forbid consideration of the same factors in determining whether the former employee is still qualified for employment. The statute is not intended to protect veterans' jobs in any and all circumstances; "protection ... is based upon the veteran's compliance with the reasonable and ordinarily accepted standards of personal conduct and performance of duty of all employees." McCormick v. Carnett-Partsnett Sys., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 251, 256 (M.D. Fla .1975).
Preda's resignation letter, both in its content and tone, precluded harmonious future relations with co-workers and managers at Nissho. His letter reflected disgust and contempt for his former employer. His expressed antipathy towards Japan and Japanese culture and language would inevitably be disruptive in light of the large numbers of employees of Nissho who are Japanese nationals or of Japanese origin. We agree with the district court that Preda's resignation letter made him no longer qualified to work for Nissho within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2) (B) (i). We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nissho on the VRRA claim.
The reemployment provisions of the VRRA were amended by enactment of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act in 1994, and were recodified at 38 U.S.C. § 4311 et seq. See Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149, 3153 (1994). However, the VRRA continues to govern the treatment of claims arising with respect to reemployment initiated before the end of the 60-day period beginning on Oct. 13, 1994, the day the new Act went into effect. See 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (1997) (revision note)