Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19751029_0040099.C07.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 12:38:03
Document Index: 723512524

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 402', '§ 423']

| Johnson v. Weinberger
PEARL R. JOHNSON, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,v.CASPAR WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division; No. 73 C 1290 WILLIAM J. BAUER, Judge.
On November 5, 1965, appellant filed for survivor benefits on her own account. This claim was treated as a surviving divorced wife claim and was initially disallowed because appellant did not meet the statutory definition of a surviving divorced wife. Under 42 U.S.C. § 416 (d) (2), the term "surviving divorced wife" means a woman divorced from an individual who had died, but only if she had been married to that individual for a period of 20 years immediately before the divorce became effective. Appellant was so notified on January 7, 1966.
Reconsideration of this claim was granted on the additional grounds that appellant was the mother of Steve Johnson's two minor sons and that she had received support from him prior to his death. Upon reconsideration, her claim was treated as one for surviving divorced mother benefits. Although appellant came within the definition of a "surviving divorced mother," as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 416 (d) (3), her claim was again disallowed because she did not meet the support requirements of the then applicable statute, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (g) (1) (F). These requirements were that claimant had been receiving at least one-half of her support from the deceased worker, or had been receiving substantial contributions from him pursuant to a written agreement or that there have been a court order in effect for substantial contributions from him at the time of his death. Appellant was informed of the decision on August 18, 1967. A hearing was held at her request. The hearing examiner denied the claim, and the Appeals Council affirmed his decision on May 7, 1968. Appellant took no further action at that time.
On May 21, 1973, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), Mrs. Johnson filed this action for review of the Secretary's decision in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the Honorable William J. Bauer, Judge, presiding. Under the rules of the district court, this cause was assigned to Magistrate Olga Jurco for a report and recommendation.
An individual claiming disability insurance benefit payments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1) is required to be "under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this section)." The term "disability" is defined in subsection (d) (1) (A) as meaning "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Under subsection (d) (3) such impairment is defined as one "that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Finally, under subsection (d) (5) it is further provided than an "individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require."
Appellant asserts that there is not sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the Secretary's modified finding that the Appeals Council did not err in limiting her disability entitlements to a period beginning March 9, 1971, and not earlier. She asserts that, because of her medically established history of chronic emphysema and whiplash injuries, her physical impairments came within the statutory status of "disability" in April 1966.
Review of agency decisions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 423 is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence is contained in the record as a whole to support the Secretary's decision. We may not make our own appraisal of the evidence. Lahr v. Richardson, 7 Cir., 476 F.2d 1088, 1090 (1973), affirming Lahr v. Richardson, N.D. Ill., 328 F. Supp. 996, 997 (1971); Chandler v. Celebrezze, S.D. Ill., 225 F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (1964). If there is a conflict on the evidence, as in the case at bar, the burden is on the applicant to prove that she meets the requirements of eligibility. Degner v. Celebrezze, 7 Cir., 317 F.2d 819, 820-821 (1963). This is particularly so since the 1968 amendments to the Act.*fn1
We have carefully reviewed appellant's medical history prior to March 9, 1971, which showed a spontaneous pneumothorax of the right lung with lung collapse. We have reviewed the findings of the Appeals Council, the Secretary, the report and recommendations of Magistrate Jurco and the memorandum opinion of Judge Bauer. Under the limited scope of our review and upon consideration of the record as a whole, we cannot say that the district court erred in finding and holding that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion in deciding that appellant was not so severely disabled as to be precluded from engaging in any substantial gainful occupation prior to March 9, 1971. In any event, we find and hold that there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Secretary's decision. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 7 Cir., 445 F.2d 36, 38-39 (1971).
As set out in his memorandum opinion, Judge Bauer considered the proper elements of proof to determine whether or not appellant qualified for statutory disability status under 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d). The following were the guidelines the court considered:
"1. clinical findings of treating and examining physicians on the existence of medically determinable physical or mental impairment;
"2. opinions of treating or examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fact relating to the severity of the medically determinable impairment;
"3. testimony of the claimant, corroborated by his family and neighbors concerning the effect of the medically determinable impairment;
"4. evidence of the claimant's educational background, work history and present age."*fn2
After considering each element of appellant's proof, the Secretary concluded, and the district court agreed, that prior to March 9, 1971, appellant had not demonstrated by the objective medical and clinical evidence required by the Act that her various ailments were medically determinable impairments of sufficient disabling severity to entitle her to disability benefits under the Act. Compare e.g., Stark v. Weinberger, 7 Cir., 497 F.2d 1092 (1974), with Bledsoe v. Richardson, 7 Cir., 469 F.2d 1288 (1972).*fn3