Source: https://casetext.com/case/barrett-v-hamby
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Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 | Casetext Search + Citator
DeKalb County v. Blalock Machinery c. Co.
1. The appellee's constitutional attack on the R-150 zoning classification before the Board of Commissioners,…
Where a property owner adduces evidence that establishes a down turn in viability of a property under its…
Full title:BARRETT et al. v. HAMBY
219 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1975)
finding that zoning is a subject to the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without just compensation where “[a]s the individual's right to the unfettered use of his property confronts the police power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is that a zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare. Lacking such justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or unreasonable.”
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 1975. REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 30, 1975.
The zoning giving rise to this dispute is designated R-20 under the Cobb County Zoning Ordinance. R-20 property may be used for little else than free standing single family homes on half-acre lots. The property measures some 26 1/2 acres and is owned by the estate of Mack C. Hamby. The estate's executor applied for rezoning to classification PSC — planned shopping center. After notice, a public hearing was held before the Cobb County Board of Commissioners at which proponents and opponents of the rezoning appeared. The application was subsequently denied. The executor then filed a complaint in equity in Cobb Superior Court alleging that R-20 classification deprived him of his property under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III of the Georgia Constitution of 1945 (Code Ann. § 2-103) and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court agreed with the executor that the R-20 designation was unconstitutional as to the Hamby property, and ordered the board to reclassify the property consistent with the owner's constitutional rights. The board brings this appeal.
In favor of the requested rezoning, the following evidence was presented by the executor. He testified that he had received numerous offers from prospective purchasers who desired the land for commercial purposes and none from residential developers. Carl J. Tschappat, president of an economic analysis and land planning firm, testified that he had analyzed this land for a prospective commercial purchaser; that the traffic count through the adjoining intersection was some 18,000 vehicles daily; that the property as residential land was not competitive with nearby residential developments because of the heavy traffic and lack of trees; that traffic maneuvers into and out of numerous residential driveways would be dangerous, whereas a commercial development could consolidate its traffic routes; that residential traffic would increase the traffic flow at the same time the school generated its maximum traffic flow, whereas commercial use with businesses which opened later and closed later than the school would spread the traffic load; that these same considerations argued against multi-family or apartment usage for the property; that the property's low visibility from long distance driving routes made it undesirable for an office park; that the property would have a good prognosis as a shopping center; that the highest and best use of the land was commercial; that nearby wooded subdivision lots were priced at approximately $5,000 to $8,000 and that this land would not be able to command a comparable price in a similar use because of its residential disadvantages. Mr. Charles Wilson, a real estate broker, then testified that he would not attempt to develop this property for residential use because of the cemetery, the traffic, the nearness of the school and the absence of trees; that its best use was commercial; and that "there are hundreds of [residential] lots that are fully developed within a mile of this area that are much, much more desirable than this could ever be made"; that he would not pay $2,000 per lot for this land for residences, whereas for commercial use this tract was more desirable than one estimated at $35,000 an acre. Mr. Leak, the Cobb County Zoning Administrator, testified that he recommended to the Planning Commission that they approve the rezoning application; that he concluded the best use was as a shopping center; and that there were no public utility problems envisioned for commercial development.
The board's argument here on appeal is that zoning is a legislative matter and judicial review is not appropriate unless the zoning decision, as in Tuggle v. Manning, 224 Ga. 29 ( 159 S.E.2d 703), approaches total deprivation of use of the land. The board additionally argues that the owner's economic considerations should not control, and that the action of the board here should be upheld because motivated by concern for the community's safety, morality and welfare.
We agree that zoning is a quasi-legislative matter ( Olley Valley Estates v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 781 ( 208 S.E.2d 801)). However, zoning is subject to the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without just compensation. Tuggle v. Manning, supra; Glynn County Comrs. v. Cato, 183 Ga. 111 ( 187 S.E. 636); City of Thomson v. Davis, 92 Ga. App. 216, 220 ( 88 S.E.2d 300). For example, a sister state has ruled on similar facts that a zoning ordinance restricting an area to residential use is void as to property located in the area but so situated in relation to a commercial zone as to be peculiarly unattractive, if at all salable, for residential uses. Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill.2d 104 ( 133 N.E.2d 1). As the individual's right to the unfettered use of his property confronts the police power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is that a zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare. Lacking such justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or unreasonable. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); City of Thomson v. Davis, supra, p. 221.
Though following its pronouncement in Nectow of a "substantial" relation test the Supreme Court has not further construed this term, it appears that "substantial" is more or less synonymous with "reasonable" (because the reasonableness of zoning on all the facts is the ultimate enquiry), and is clearly more than "any" evidence. See Nectow, supra, p. 187; 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Ch. 5, p. 5-1 (1974); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 25.42-25.44 (3d Ed. 1965); 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 2.22 (1968); 3 Anderson, § 21.17.
As these critical interests are balanced, if the zoning regulation results in relatively little gain or benefit to the public while inflicting serious injury or loss on the owner, such regulation is confiscatory and void. City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 ( 139 So.2d 660); Weitling v. DuPage County, 26 Ill.2d 196 ( 186 N.E.2d 291). Moreover, we specifically rule that for such unlawful confiscation to occur, requiring that the zoning be voided, it is not necessary that the property be totally useless for the purposes classified. Accord, Weitling v. DuPage County, supra. It suffices to void it that the damage to the owner is significant and is not justified by the benefit to the public. See generally 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 25.42-25.45 (1965); 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning Planning, Chs. 5 6 (1974).
In determining whether the zoning is justified, we must reject the board's argument that its construction, if done in good faith, is conclusive on the issue of what will serve the community's interest. See City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 767 ( 158 S.E.2d 392). Instead, we require that the board justify its determination, and sufficient justification here is missing. See Morrow v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 228 ( 133 SE 345); Smith v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 769 ( 132 S.E. 66).
SUBMITTED JUNE 4, 1975 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 1975 — REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 30, 1975.
With respect to zoning, the Georgia Constitution provides: "The General Assembly of the State shall have authority to grant the governing authorities of the municipalities and counties authority to pass zoning and planning laws whereby such cities or counties may be zoned or districted for various uses and other or different uses prohibited therein, and regulating the use for which said zones or districts may be set apart, and regulating the plans for development and improvements on real estate therein." Code Ann. § 2-1923. The statutory grant of power by the General Assembly to the municipalities and counties to enact zoning regulations is contained in Code Ann. § 69-1207. A portion of this statutory grant of power reads as follows: "Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, of the character of a district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to promoting desirable living conditions and the sustained stability of neighborhoods, protecting property against blight and depreciation, securing economy in governmental expenditures, conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land and other buildings and structures throughout such municipality or county or both."
The majority opinion is a sharp departure from the view taken historically by this court in reviewing zoning cases. I believe this decision invades the constitutional province of the county governing (zoning) authority. What the court in effect is holding is that it will now review any local zoning decision based on conflicting evidence to determine whether "it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare." This is an awesome task, — far beyond the traditional court review in Georgia, and far beyond even the majority opinion of the 4 to 3 decision of this court in Tuggle v. Manning, 224 Ga. 29 ( 159 S.E.2d 703).
Since this decision moves the final exercise of zoning power out of its constitutional resting place into the hands of the judiciary, I must dissent to it. The courts will not be able to handle the floodtide of litigation which could well result from this far-reaching decision. My view of the court's role in zoning matters is summarized in Olley Valley Estates v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 786 ( 208 S.E.2d 801). I adhere to the understanding expressed there of the Georgia cases which I think are sagacious and should continue to be followed by this court.
striking zoning ordinance on Fourteenth Amendment and Georgia constitutional due process grounds
Summary of this case from Fields v. Rockdale County Georgia
In Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 S.E.2d 399) (1975), we held that in considering a zoning application a balancing of the benefit of the present zoning to the public against the detriment to the landowner was constitutionally required.
Summary of this case from Sellars v. Cherokee County
In Barrett, supra, the governing authority attempted to justify the denial of an application to rezone on the ground that the county had a sufficiency of commercially zoned property.
Summary of this case from Bobo v. Cherokee County
In Barrett, the evidence showed that the property was virtually unusable for residential purposes for which it was zoned, that its value for residential purposes was under $53,000 (under $2,000 per acre) whereas its value for commercial development was about $927,500 (about $35,000 per acre).
Summary of this case from DeKalb County v. Blalock Machinery c. Co.
In Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 S.E.2d 399) (1975) we carefully outlined that the "substantial relation to public health, safety, morality or general welfare" which the governing body must show to justify its zoning once the landowner has made out his case, must be shown by "clearly more than `any' evidence."
Summary of this case from DeAlb County v. Flynn
In Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 S.E.2d 399) (1975) the board's evidence supporting its refusal to rezone the land in question was so minimal as to amount to no evidence.
In Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 265 (219 S.E.2d 399) (1975) we stated, "As the individual's right to the unfettered use of his property confronts the police power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is that a zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare.
Summary of this case from Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp.
In Barrett the property owner showed that the county planning commission had recommended denial of the rezoning application.
Summary of this case from Guhl v. Par-3 Golf Club, Inc.
In Barrett the residential property was bordered by land zoned commercial; this property and the property surrounding it are zoned M for industrial development.
In Barrett there was evidence of numerous advantages to use of the land commercially and serious disadvantages to residential use; here there is evidence that the use of the land as a par 3 golf course was abandoned because of flooding, but this is not a taking due to the M zoning classification.
In Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 S.E.2d 399) (1976), we held that the judiciary had the power to declare void on constitutional grounds, a decision of a governing authority refusing a rezoning application where the unsuccessful rezoning applicant proved in court that the existing zoning significantly damaged his property, and the governing authority failed to justify his decision refusing to rezone the property.
Summary of this case from Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County