Source: https://it.b-ok.org/book/4979388/058ddf
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 11:39:35
Document Index: 639948295

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 140', 'Art. 3', 'Art.\n141', '§ 136', '§ 136', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 50', 'Art.\n54', '§ 156', '§ 156', 'Art. 141', 'art. 139', '§ 1', 'art. 141', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 10', 'in dubio', 'art. 10', 'art. 139', 'art. 306', 'art. 343', 'Art. 6', '§ 9', 'art. 6', 'art. 10', 'art. 10', 'art. 6', 'art. 10', 'art. 29', 'art. 3', 'art. 139', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 6', 'art. 4', 'art. 107', 'art. 2', 'art. 69', 'art. 5', 'art. 10', 'art. 113', 'art. 147', 'art. 127', 'art. 132', 'art. 3', 'art. 140', 'art. 107', 'art. 149', 'art. 6', 'art. 3', '§ 6', 'art. 3', '§ 6', 'art.\n6', 'art. 159', '§ 6', 'art. 3', 'Art. 141', 'Art. 158', 'Art. 131', 'Art. 147', 'Art. 140', 'Art. 141', 'art. 393', 'Art. 196', 'art. 197', 'art. 221', 'art. 352', 'art. 352', 'art. 354', 'Art. 354', 'Art. 358', 'Art. 139', 'art. 358', 'Art. 306', 'Art. 306', 'Art. 307', '§ 2', 'art. 308', 'Art. 318', 'art. 352', 'Art. 355', 'Art. 354', 'Art. 343', '§ 2', 'art. 343', 'Art. 330', 'Art. 343', 'Art. 241', 'Art. 10', 'Art. 351', 'art. 84', '§ 16', 'art. 389', 'art. 141', 'Art. 306', 'Art. 307', 'Art. 307', 'Art. 16', 'Art. 310', 'Art. 352', 'art. 5', 'art. 6', '§ 3', 'Art. 354', 'Art. 307', 'art. 302', 'Art. 308', 'art. 311', 'art. 312', 'Art. 56', 'art. 343', 'Art. 393', 'art. 140', 'Art. 398', 'Art. 80', 'art. 301', 'art. 6', 'art. 3', 'art. 141', 'Art. 107', 'art. 6', 'art. 139', 'art. 318', 'art. 139', 'art.\n318', 'Art. 318', 'art. 331', 'Art. 101', 'art. 352']

Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules | Sabine Gless | download
Pagina principale Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?: A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary Rules
This Book discusses exclusionary rules in different criminal justice systems. It is based on the findings of a research project in comparative law with a focus on the question of whether or not a fair trial can be secured through evidence exclusion. Part I explains the legal framework in which exclusionary rules function in six legal systems: Germany, Switzerland, People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States. Part II is dedicated to selected issues identified as crucial for the assessment of exclusionary rules. These chapters highlight the delicate balance of interests required in the exclusion of potentially relevant information from a criminal trial and discusses possible approaches to alleviate the legal hurdles involved.
ISBN 13: 9783030125196
ISBN: 303012519X
Series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice Vol.74
Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 74
Thomas Richter Editors
Do Exclusionary
Rules Ensure a
Mortimer Sellers, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA
James Maxeiner, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA
Myroslava Antonovych, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine
Nadia de Araújo, Pontiﬁcal Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro,
Jasna Bakšic-Muftic, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
David L. Carey Miller, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
Loussia P. Musse Félix, University of Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil
Emanuel Gross, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
James E. Hickey Jr., Hofstra University, South Hempstead, NY, USA
Jan Klabbers, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
Cláudia Lima Marques, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul,
Aniceto Masferrer, University of Valencia, Valencia, Valencia, Spain
Eric Millard, West Paris University, Nanterre Cedex, France
Gabriël A. Moens, Curtin University, Perth WA, Australia
Raul C. Pangalangan, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines
Ricardo Leite Pinto, Lusíada University of Lisbon, Lisboa, Portugal
Mizanur Rahman, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Keita Sato, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan
Poonam Saxena, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India
Gerry Simpson, London School of Economics, London, UK
Eduard Somers, University of Ghent, Gent, Belgium
Xinqiang Sun, Shandong University, Shandong, China
Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland
Jaap de Zwaan, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland,
Sabine Gless Thomas Richter
Do Exclusionary Rules
Ensure a Fair Trial?
A Comparative Perspective on Evidentiary
ISBN 978-3-030-12519-6
ISBN 978-3-030-12520-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12520-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019930360
We are grateful to all contributors or their work, commitment, and passion for this
project. We studied how exclusionary rules are established in the respective procedural codes and how they are applied in practice, with a focus on case law, and
conducted interviews in almost all relevant jurisdictions. We explored the potential
of alternative and supplementary means of compelling law enforcement to respect
human rights, including criminal sanctions, disciplinary action, and civil liability.
Throughout the project, we learned a great deal from each other.
National issues and legal solutions, as well as comparative issues and basic
principles, were discussed at two workshops and conferences. The ﬁrst meeting
took place in March 2016 in Taipei, Taiwan, and was co-organized by the Taiwan
Ministry of Justice. We are especially grateful to Pauline Tsai for her exceptional
support. The second meeting occurred in May 2017 in Basel, Switzerland, and
received remarkable ﬁnancial support from the Sino-Swiss Science and Technology
Cooperation Program of the Swiss National Research Foundation.
Major ﬁnancial funds for this project, including the publication of its results,
have been provided by the Swiss National Research Foundation and without it, the
project could never have been realized. We are very grateful for the Foundation’s
generous assistance and enduring support.
Last but not least, we wish to thank MLaw Laura Macula for her meticulous
planning and monitoring throughout the project and all her precious advice, stud.
iur. Lia Börlin for the time and energy she dedicated to checking references and
material, and Claudine Abt for her support in ﬁnalizing all the papers for
Sabine Gless and Thomas Richter
The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence Exclusion:
A Swiss Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A German Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regulating Interrogations and Excluding Confessions in the United
States: Balancing Individual Rights and the Search for the Truth . . . . .
A Taiwanese Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Yu-Hsiung Lin, Shih-Fan Wang, Chung-Yen Chen, Tsai-Chen Tsai
and Chiou-Ming Tsai
A Chinese Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Criminal Justice and the Exclusion of Incriminating Statements
in Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Exclusionary Rules—Quo Vadis
The Purposes and Functions of Exclusionary Rules:
A Comparative Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Jenia Iontcheva Turner and Thomas Weigend
The Fair Trial Rationale for Excluding Wrongfully Obtained
Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Exclusionary Rule of Illegal Evidence in China: Observation
from Historical and Empirical Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Weimin Zuo and Rongjie Lan
Securing a Fair Trial Through Exclusionary Rules: Do Theory
and Practice Form a Well-Balanced Whole? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Exclusionary Rules—Is It Time for Change? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Sabine Gless and Laura Macula
Sabine Gless teaches criminal law, criminal procedure, and international criminal
law at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Her research includes comparative
work in evidence law and international cooperation with a focus on human rights
issues and exclusionary rules.
Thomas Richter served as the Head of the East Asian Department of the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Law in Freiburg, Germany. In this
capacity, he analyzed the criminal law and criminal procedure law of the People’s
Republic of China and co-directed a comparative study on non-prosecution policies
in Germany and the People’s Republic of China. In cooperation with the German
Institute for Human Rights (DIMR), he evaluated the Human Rights Dialogue
between the People’s Republic of China and Switzerland (2006/2007). Most
recently, Thomas Richter assessed the Rule of Law Programme for Asia instituted
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (2013). His research interests include criminal
law, human rights law, and environmental law in East and Southeast Asia, especially in China.
Chung-Yen Chen University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
Sabine Gless Faculty of Law, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
Hock Lai Ho Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (NUS),
Na Jiang College for Criminal Law Science, Beijing Normal University (BNU 北
京师范大学), Beijing, China
Susanne Knickmeier Department of Criminology, Max Planck Institute for
Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany
Rongjie Lan Law School, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,
Yu-Hsiung Lin National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
Laura Macula MLaw, Faculty of Law, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
Thomas Richter Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
Chiou-Ming Tsai Department of International and Cross-Strait Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Justice, Taipei, Taiwan
Tsai-Chen Tsai Shihlin District Court, Taipei, Taiwan
Jenia Iontcheva Turner SMU Dedman School of Law, Dallas, USA
Shih-Fan Wang National Taipei University, New Taipei City, Taiwan
Thomas Weigend Faculty of Law, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Weimin Zuo Law School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
African Charter of Human Rights of 1981
Aktiengesellschaft (=stock corporation)
Bundesgerichtsentscheid (=Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court)
Bundesgericht (=Swiss Supreme Court)
Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht (=Federal Court Act of 17
June 2005, SR 173.110)
Bundesgerichtshof (=German Federal Court of Justice)
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen (=Decisions
of the German Federal Court of Justice in criminal matters)
Basic Peoples’ Courts (China)
Bundesverfassungsgericht (=German Federal Constitutional Court)
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheid (=Decision of the German
Federal Constitutional Court)
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984
Criminal Case Resolution
Swiss/Switzerland
Criminal Law of 1979, revised in 1997 (China)
e.g./eg
Ger./Germ
Column/columns
Criminal Procedure Code/Communist Party of China
Criminal Procedure Law of 1979, revised 1996 and 2012 (China)
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989
Communication Security and Surveillance Act of 2018
Central Task Force of Deepening Reforms
Evidence Act (Singapore)
Grosser Senat in Strafsachen (Germany)
High Peoples’ Court (China)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December
Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the
sec./secs.
Taiw/TW
Singapore Human Rights NGO
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (German journal)
Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (German journal)
Neue Zücher Zeitung (Swiss newspaper)
Police Force Act of 2004, revised 2006
People’s Police Law
People’s Procuratorates
Republik of China (Taiwan)
Supreme People’s Court (China)
Systematische Rechtssammlung (=classiﬁed compilation of swiss
law; https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/federal-law/classiﬁedcompilation.html)
Strafprozessordnung (Swiss Criminal Procedure Code of 5 October
2007 (Status as of 1 October 2016), SR 312.0/German Code of
Criminal Procedure of 7 April 1987 (Status as of 17 August 2017))
Strafverteidiger (german journal)
v./vs.
Criminal procedure • Comparative criminal law • Exclusionary rules •
Fair trial • Torture • Right to silence • Right against self-incrimination
Evidence law • Defense rights
Abstract Criminal justice systems are barometers of social development. This
claim, put forward by German criminal law scholars, alludes to the fact that inherent
in the criminal justice process are conflicting interests between the need to ensure
comprehensive fact-ﬁnding on the one hand, and the wish to safeguard individual
rights, especially those of defendants, on the other hand. In all criminal justice
systems, there exists a strong public interest in determining the truth due to the
assertion that a determination of innocence or guilt is based upon “true” facts. This
pursuit of “the truth” has led to procedural rules that expose both suspects and
witnesses to coercive measures that often interfere with individual rights.
In recent decades, human rights have come to the forefront in criminal justice
systems around the world, but at the same time more and more jurisdictions have
adopted exclusionary rules. Country reports on Germany, Switzerland, P.R. China,
Taiwan, Singapore, and the U.S., along with contributions discussing the rationales
behind exclusionary rules, legal practices, or potential alternatives, all address the
question of whether, and under what circumstances, the use of exclusionary rules
can be an effective means for protecting human rights in criminal proceedings.
1 Criminal Justice as a Barometer of Social Developments
Criminal justice systems are barometers of social development. This claim, put
forward by German criminal law scholars,1 alludes to the fact that inherent in the
criminal justice process are conflicting interests between the need to ensure com1
Roxin, 2014 at 9.
S. Gless (&)
Faculty of Law, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: Sabine.Gless@unibas.ch
Attorney-at-Law, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
e-mail: info@sinojus.eu
S. Gless and T. Richter (eds.), Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?
Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 74,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12520-2_1
S. Gless and T. Richter
prehensive fact-ﬁnding on the one hand, and the wish to safeguard individual rights,
especially those of defendants, on the other hand. In all criminal justice systems,
there exists a strong public interest in determining the truth due to the assertion that
a determination of innocence or guilt is based upon “true” facts. This pursuit of “the
truth” has led to procedural rules that expose both suspects and witnesses to
coercive measures that often interfere with individual rights.
Modern day criminal justice systems are designed to not only ensure comprehensive fact-ﬁnding, but also protect the human rights of defendants, victims, and
witnesses. Individual rights applicable to criminal proceedings include the right to
have one’s dignity respected, protection from physical force and torture, the right
against self-incrimination, and the right to privacy of person and property. Because
these rights run counter to authorities’ fact ﬁnding, they are regularly at risk of
being disregarded. As such, preventing human rights violations remains a challenge
within criminal procedure law worldwide and the means to do so are limited.
A promising method of reducing human rights violations is the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from trial. The rationale behind these so-called exclusionary rules is the expectation that law enforcement ofﬁcers will refrain from
engaging in unlawful evidence-gathering techniques if they are aware that the
physical or testimonial evidence produced will be inadmissible at trial.
Based on the hypothesis that excluding unlawfully obtained evidence is an
effective tool for safeguarding human rights in criminal proceedings, the core
question of this comparative project is twofold: How can criminal procedure law
ensure respect for human rights and what role does the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence actually play in this regard? In order to answer this question in a
global context, we investigated three European jurisdictions (Switzerland,
Germany, England), three Asian jurisdictions (People’s Republic of China [PRC],
Taiwan/Republic of China [ROC], Singapore), and the United States. The aim of
the study was not to ﬁnd a single universally applicable model of human rights
protection, but to determine features that are conducive to enhancing respect for
individual rights in different criminal justice systems.
2 Criminal Trials and Human Rights
In recent decades, human rights have become more prominent in criminal justice
systems around the world. This was especially the case following the end of World
War II, and, more recently, the Cold War, which essentially divided the world into
The East and The West. The right to preserve one’s dignity and privacy, to be free
from physical coercion and torture, and the right to avoid self-incrimination are
paramount in the criminal process. At the same time, these human rights are
especially vulnerable to abuse because they tend to conflict with law enforcement’s
primary goal of obtaining information about potential crimes and because the
source of such information is primarily human (suspects, victims, and witnesses).
For that reason, human rights require special protection in criminal proceedings.
The current project starts with the hypothesis that a potentially promising way of
providing human rights protections is the exclusion of evidence obtained through
violation of a procedural right. This hypothesis is tested by analyzing exclusionary
rules and, as far as possible, their practical application in different legal and cultural
contexts. It is our goal to determine whether the existence and application of
exclusionary rules are an effective means to safeguard human rights in the criminal
process and, if so, under what circumstances. In order to test our hypothesis, we
considered several aspects of criminal procedure: Under what conditions does a
given legal system recognize exclusionary rules? What additional or alternative
ways does a system provide to hold authorities accountable? Who may challenge
the admission of evidence, and, at what stage of the proceedings? The role of
defense attorneys is also addressed, along with the extent and means by which a
system separates judicial and executive powers in the context of criminal
Starting with the adoption of the “Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen” by the leaders of the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, the
concept of human rights has continued to be a part of the identity of European
countries.2 In North America, libertarian ideals and the notion of inherent human
rights led to the independence movement, culminating with the adoption of the
United States Constitution and its ﬁrst ten amendments (The Bill of Rights). Based
on the philosophical views of the Enlightenment and the idealism of the early 19th
century, the Western concept of human rights emphasized the applicability of such
rights to every human being regardless of the law in the person’s state of residence.
The promise of human rights, the propagation of the rule of law, and progress in the
area of civil liberties is a recurring theme in modern criminal justice systems.
That said, East Asian and Western states have not yet developed a similar
understanding of what basic individual human rights entails. Based, amongst other
things, on Confucian traditions of thinking, the emphasis in Asian states has been
on the collective (family and state) rather than the autonomy and rights of the
individual. In the past, Chinese politicians have denounced the Western concept of
protecting human rights as an ideological tool for justifying intervention in the
internal affairs of East Asian states.3 In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the
traditional priority of collective interests was reinforced by the influence of Marxist
political thought, which simultaneously minimized the importance of individual
interests relative to those of the collective.4 Recent research suggests that the
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has referred to human rights as the value system common to
all EU member states, ECJ judgment of 13 December 1979, Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, C-44/
79, § 15.
For the implications on the understanding of human rights in criminal proceedings, see, for
example, Jiang, 2013 at 745 et seq.
Information Ofﬁce of the State or China’s Cabinet, White Paper on Progress in China’s Human
Rights in 2012, Beijing May 2013 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/14/c_
132380706.htm>, accessed 19 November 2018; Freeman/Geeraerts, BICCS at 7 et seq.
Chinese public still holds this view.5 Similarly, in Singapore, former Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the importance of Asian values, including the notion
that the individual cannot claim individual rights separate from the family, which is
considered to be an integral part of the society.6
This difference between the East and the West in the understanding of individual
rights, and in particular human rights, has long been observed by legal scholars.7 In
recent years, however, there has been a distinct trend toward a universalization of
certain human rights as well as globally recognized standards for the protection of
human rights.8
Many Asian states, including the PRC, have joined major international human
rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) which grants speciﬁc procedural rights in criminal proceedings.
Additionally, the Member States of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) executed a regional human rights instrument in 2012.9 As a consequence
of the growing prominence of human rights, the domestic laws of some jurisdictions, including Vietnam10 and the Republic of China (ROC),11 have been amended
to expressly guarantee such rights. Despite this trend, while the PRC signed the
ICCPR, it has neither ratiﬁed the Covenant nor incorporated it into national law.
After a long debate, Art. 33 para. 3 of the PRC Constitution was amended in 2004
to read that “the State respects and protects human rights.” In 2012, a similar
reference to the “respect and protection of human rights” was inserted in Art. 2 of
the PRC Criminal Procedure Code (PRC-CPC) and described to be one of several
reasons for the newly revised Code. Although these changes to written law may not
have a discernible effect upon daily law enforcement in the PRC, they represent a
major shift towards ofﬁcial recognition of individual human rights. They may also
signify a move away from the strict adherence to Eastern values, which, historically, have afforded limited protections for individuals.
Freeman/Geeraerts, 2011 at 25–26.
See Zakaria, Fareed, A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Affairs March/April 1994. See
also Elgin, 2010 at 138.
See, for example, Steiner/Alston/Goodman, 2008.
See Parlett, 2011; Klabbers/Peters/Ulfstein, 2012; Peters, 2006.
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was adopted by Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam on 18 November 2012;
<https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/>, accessed 19 November 2018.
For Vietnam, see Nguyen, 2009 at 1 et seq.
Human rights law in Taiwan is primarily domestic law because the United Nations has decided
to recognize the representatives of the Government of the PRC as “the only lawful representatives
of China to the UN” (UN Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 1971) and have thus excluded the ROC from
ofﬁcial participation in UN organizations.
3 Exclusionary Rules as Safeguards
Inherent in criminal procedure is the conflict between the state’s interest in determining the facts relevant to a suspect’s guilt (and potential sentence) and the
interests of the other parties (i.e. the accused, witnesses, victims). The state’s pursuit
of “the truth” has led to the adoption of procedural rules that expose suspects and
witnesses to coercive measures. In some jurisdictions this takes the form of a legal
obligation to tell the truth when questioned. The recognition of human rights for
suspects and witnesses, particularly the right to remain silent, clearly conflicts with
the state’s interest in fact ﬁnding. Therefore, the potential for state agents to disregard individual human rights in pursuit of “the truth” is a real risk. Preventing
human rights violations in the context of criminal procedure thus remains an
ongoing challenge and the means available for preventing such violations are
limited. Legal prohibitions on torture and other human rights violations, as well as
the threat of criminal sanctions and disciplinary measures, may help but are often
ineffective due to issues of evidentiary proof and enforcement. The same problem is
true where civil damages are offered as a potential remedy.
A more promising means of preventing human rights violations is the exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence at trial. If, for example, a police ofﬁcer has unlawfully
coerced a suspect’s confession, the confession and, if the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is followed, subsequent evidence found on the basis of this confession, all
become inadmissible at trial. The rationale behind this rule is the expectation that
law enforcement will refrain from engaging in such methods if they know that the
resulting physical and testimonial evidence will be excluded. The effectiveness of
this incentive-based approach has been challenged on the basis of limited applicability. For example, in cases where a defendant pleads to a charge and is convicted without a trial, as is the case in many jurisdictions, the opportunity to exclude
illegally obtained evidence may be limited. Moreover, using the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for human rights violations raises other important questions. Is it
acceptable to release an offender who would otherwise be convicted because a
police ofﬁcer has violated a procedural rule? What about the interests of the
community and, in particular, of the victim(s)? Should the exclusionary rule also be
applied where there was a violation, but the ofﬁcer acted in good faith? And what
should the rule be if illegally obtained evidence, such as a confession obtained
under the threat of torture, leads to crucial evidence, like the body of a victim? All
of these questions are difﬁcult to answer, particularly where the underlying rationale
of the exclusionary rule is not clear: Is the exclusion of evidence meant to discipline
police and prosecutors? Is it a means of protecting the integrity of court proceedings? Does exclusion ensure that the trial court does not consider inherently
unreliable evidence? Or is the purpose to protect human rights?
In spite of these controversial issues, many Western legal systems have followed
the United States and adopted a variant of the exclusionary rule with the hope of
curbing procedural violations intended to protect individual human rights. Some
East Asian jurisdictions have also followed suit and enacted legislation requiring
courts to reject evidence obtained through torture or other illicit means.
4 Comparative Perspectives on Exclusionary Rules
The ﬁrst part of this project entails a comparison of exclusionary rules and their
application in three Asian jurisdictions (PRC, JIANG Na, see also ZUO Weimin/
LAN Rongjie; Taiwan, LIN Yu-Hsiung/WANG Shih-Fan/CHEN Chung-Yen/
TSAI Tsai-Chen/TSAI Chiou-Ming; Singapore, HO Hock Lai) and three Western
jurisdictions (Switzerland, Laura MACULA; Germany, Thomas WEIGEND; U.S.
Jenia Iontcheva TURNER). The jurisdictions tend to diverge, not along geographical lines, but rather by legal heritage. There is the common law tradition of
the adversarial system (e.g., Singapore, the U.S., England and Wales), the European
continental “inquisitorial” system (e.g., Germany, Switzerland, and France), and
“mixed systems” (PRC, ROC) all represented in our sample. The project covers a
broad selection of legal systems where we can see exclusionary rules at work, and
from which we can learn about the possibilities of alternative mechanisms for
ensuring compliance with legal rules.
The six country reports cover the relevant legal framework. While each legal
system provides for the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of certain rules,
each has its own distinct approach. The two continental European jurisdictions
differ in legislative technique: Switzerland has adopted a blanket statute calling for
the exclusion of some (but not all) illegally obtained evidence in a single
stand-alone provision.12 By contrast, Germany’s procedural code contains few
explicit rules, which leaves the decision of exclusion to be made on a case-by-case
basis, and primarily by the courts.13 While England has adopted a statute governing
The Swiss Criminal Procedure Code outlaws torture in Art. 140 para 1 and requires all
authorities to treat fairly everyone involved in criminal proceedings (Art. 3 para 2). Art.
141 CH-CPC declares in absolute terms that any evidence acquired through torture or other undue
coercion is inadmissible, but grants the trial court discretion when other procedural rules have been
German criminal procedural law recognizes the right to a fair trial and prohibits the use of torture
and coercion in any interrogation of a suspect or witness (§§ 136a, 69 sec. 3 Code of Criminal
Procedure, DE-CCP). There is no general rule prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence,
but statements made after prohibited means of interrogation have been used cannot be used as
evidence (§ 136a sec. Art. 3 DE-CCP). With respect to most other violations of procedural rules or
human rights, the DE-CCP does not explicitly provide for exclusion and courts follow a
case-by-case approach. In recent years, the Federal Constitutional Court has shown an increased
readiness to exclude illegally obtained evidence, especially where law enforcement authorities had
intentionally violated the suspect’s rights or applicable procedural rules. See, for example, German
Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12/04/2005–2 BvR 1027/02, 113 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts 29 (2005).
the exclusion of certain evidence, it is not comprehensive.14 The assumption across
European states is that every legal system seeks to protect human rights in criminal
proceedings. It is this common attitude that is the reason there has not been an
in-depth analysis of the impact of these legislative differences to date.15
The Criminal Procedure Code of the PRC (PRC-CPC, 中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) dates back to 1979 but underwent a major reform in 1996. After proclamation
of the People’s Republic in 1949 and rejection of all former legislation of the
Republic of China (founded in 1911), it was the ﬁrst code of criminal procedure in
its history. The original version of the Code emphasized strict enforcement of the
law and the language alluded to a strong stance against crime. Confronted with
frequent international and domestic criticism of illegally coerced confessions and
torture in criminal proceedings,16 the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security adopted the Rules
Concerning Questions about Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal
Cases (2010 Exclusionary Rules).17 A thorough revision of the PRC-CPC culminated in an amended version of the Code, which was passed in 2012. This updated
version of the Code was intended to better protect the human rights of defendants.
For example, Art. 50 PRC-CPC grants the right against self-incrimination and Art.
54 PRC-CPC provides for the exclusion of statements obtained by illegal means,
particularly by torture. However, the PRC-CPC does not acknowledge the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine and, as a result, secondary evidence obtained through
torture or other illegal means remains admissible at trial.18 The breadth of this
exclusionary rule as interpreted by Chinese prosecutors and courts has yet to be
Taiwan’s Code of Criminal Procedure (TW-CCP, 刑事訴訟法)19 dates back to a
statute of the Republic of China (ROC) adopted in 1928 and has been revised many
Torture is implicitly barred by Code of Practice C for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning
of Persons by Police Ofﬁcers made under s. 66 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE),
which sets minimum standards of treatment and speciﬁes procedural and welfare rights. Under s.
76(2)(a) PACE, the court must exclude a confession if the defendant asserts that it was obtained by
oppression and the prosecution fails to demonstrate that this was not the case. Oppression is
partially deﬁned as including “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment”. Although the English
courts are tolerant of the enhanced psychological pressure experienced by a suspect under interrogation (Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] A.C. 437; Fulling [1987] 2 All E.R. 65; Heaton
[1993] Crim L.R. 593), extensive hectoring or bullying of a suspect will be treated as oppression
(Paris, Abdullahi, Miller) [1992], 97 Cr.App.R. 99). Additionally, under s. 78 PACE, the court has
discretionary power to exclude any prosecution evidence where, having regard to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have an adverse
effect on the fairness of the trial.
Thaman, 2013; Jackson/Summers, 2012.
See He/He, 2013 at 73 et seq.
Rosenzweig et al., 2013 at 466–467.
Jiang, 2013 at 746.
For an English translation (dating from 2007) see: <http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/
LawContent.aspx?PCODE=C0010001>, accessed 19 November 2018.
times.20 In 2003, a number of Western ideas were integrated into Taiwanese
criminal procedure21 and an increase in awareness of human rights has shaped the
rules around evidence gathering. For example, section 156 para. 1 TW-CCP22
stipulates that only confessions “of an accused not extracted by violence, threat,
inducement, fraud, exhausting interrogation, unlawful detention or other improper
means and consistent with facts may be admitted as evidence.” The protection
against involuntary self-incrimination is guaranteed through provisions on the
admissibility of confessions.23 In 2009, Taiwan incorporated the ICCPR into
domestic law,24 thus requiring all law enforcement personnel to adhere to international standards. Some new rules, such as the rules on exclusion of evidence,25
mirror those found in continental Europe.26
By contrast, in Singapore there is no explicit constitutional prohibition of torture,
nor is there a constitutional provision on the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. However, Section 258(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, read together
with Explanation 1, renders inadmissible any statement by an accused obtained
through “inducement, threat or promise” or by oppression. Section 258(3) does not
cover all cases of illegally obtained evidence and it does not apply where the
evidence is anything other than a statement (i.e. physical evidence). Whether the
judicial power of exclusion extends beyond cases covered by Section 258(3)
remains a contentious matter. However, in recent years the Singapore courts have
narrowed the scope of exclusionary discretion,27 thus sacriﬁcing the protection of
individual liberties for the state’s interest in convicting wrongdoers.
See He, 2011 at 172 et seq.
See Lin, 2003 at 224 et seq.
See Lin, 2013 at 190–195.
See, for example, § 156 para 3–4 TW-CCP.
See Liao, 2009 at 223 et seq.
§§ 156, 158–2, 158–4 TW-CCP.
See Art. 141 CH-CCP.
In 1964, the majority in Cheng Swee Tiang v PP acknowledged the existence of a broad and
general discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence. This discretion was to be exercised on
a case-by-case basis by balancing “the interest of the individual to be protected from illegal
invasions of his liberties” against “the interest of the State to secure evidence bearing upon the
commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from the
courts on any merely technical ground”. The existence of this exclusionary power was put in doubt
by the decision in the 2007 case of Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis. In
Muhammad bin Kadar v PP, the Court clariﬁed that a general discretion does exist but held that the
discretion was available only where the prejudicial effect of the wrongfully obtained evidence
exceeds its probative value.
5 Core Issues Surrounding the Effectiveness
of Exclusionary Rules
The reports included in this publication address the question whether, and under
what circumstances, the use of exclusionary rules is an effective means for protecting human rights in criminal proceedings. We started with the hypothesis that
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence could potentially be an effective tool for
ensuring that certain human rights are respected in criminal proceedings. Given that
the starting point for any legal comparison is the law itself,28 an analysis of the
existing legal rules in the selected jurisdictions was needed to test our hypothesis,
which was done via individual country reports.
In the interest of comprehensiveness, our study sought to look beyond the law to
its application. If the primary goal is the protection of human rights, states need not
only establish the corresponding legal framework, but also incentivize law
enforcement to abide by such provisions. Cultural values appear to heavily influence a number of criminal justice systems, particularly those that place a strong
emphasis on confessions, presumably as a result of the societal belief in the
importance of admitting wrongdoing and experiencing regret. In such systems, the
desire to extract a suspect’s confession may override any concern that the confession could later be deemed inadmissible.29 Importantly, the efﬁciency of criminal
justice systems is affected by aspects outside the law, including tolerance of abuse
by state authorities and support of state authority over civil rights. In the current
study an effort was made to consider relevant cultural norms, as well as the social
roles of the police, prosecutors, and the courts.
One deﬁning feature of our project is its emphasis on social and inter-cultural
discourse, which are directly linked to the overarching debate of whether human
rights are universal or culturally-relative. By studying human rights protections in
criminal procedure within selected European, American, and Asian jurisdictions,
we sought to highlight the extent to which the effective protection of suspect and
witnesses’ rights has been recognized as a necessity in both the East and the West,
and how it is linked to the implementation of exclusionary rules. This analysis is
covered in ﬁve topical chapters: The Purposes and Functions of Exclusionary
Rules: A Comparative Overview (Jenia Iontcheva TURNER and Thomas
WEIGEND), Exclusionary Rule of Illegal Evidence in China: Observation from
Historical and Empirical Perspectives (ZUO Weimin and LAN Rongjie), The Fair
Trial Rationale for Excluding Wrongfully Obtained Evidence (HO Hock Lai),
Securing a fair trial through exclusionary rules: Do theory and practice form a
well-balance whole? (Susanne KNICKMEIER) and Exclusionary Rules—Is it Time
for Change? (Sabine GLESS and Laura MACULA).
See, for example, Ellis, 2011 at 971.
Jackson, John D. / Summers, Sarah J., The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence, Beyond the
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, Cambridge 2012. [Jackson/Summers, 2012]
Klabbers, Jan / Peters, Anne / Ulfstein, Geir, The Constitutionalization of International Law,
Oxford 2012. [Klabbers/Peters/Ulfstein, 2012]
(Criminal Procedure Law (I)) 7th edition, Taipei 2013.
Lin, Yu-Hsiung (林鈺雄),
Parlett, Kate, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in
International Law, Cambridge 2011. [Parlett, 2011]
Roxin, Claus/Schünemann, Bernd, Strafverfahrensrecht, 28. Aufl., München 2014. [Roxin, 2014]
Steiner, Henry J. / Alston, Philip / Goodman, Ryan, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals, 3rd ed., Oxford 2008. [Steiner/Alston/Goodman, 2008]
Elgin, Molly, ‘Asian Values: A New Model for Development?’, (2010) Southeast Asia, 135–145
[Elgin, 2010]
Freeman, Duncan / Geeraerts, Gustaaf, ‘Europe, China and Expectations for Human Rights’,
(2011) 4 The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 179–203 [Freeman/Geeraerts, 2011]
Freeman, Duncan / Geeraerts, Gustaaf, ‘Europe, China and the expectations for human rights’,
Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS) Asia Paper Vol. 5 (1), 7–31.
[Freeman/Geeraerts, BICCS]
He, Lai-Jier (何賴傑), 論刑事訴訟法之傳承與變革–從我國與德國晚近刑事訴訟法修法談起
(‘Continuity and Reform in Criminal Procedure–Discussion about recent revisions of Criminal
Procedure Law in Taiwan and Germany’), (2011) 100 Taiwan Jurist, 172–183. [He, 2011]
Jiang, Na ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Illegally Obtained Evidence: Lessons from
Wrongful Convictions in China?’, (2013) 43 Hong Kong Law Journal, 745–769. [Jiang, 2013]
Peters, Anne, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism. The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law, 579–610.
[Peters, 2006]
Ellis, Jaye, ‘General Principles and Comparative Law’, (2011) 20 European Journal of
International Law, 949–971. [Ellis, 2011]
He, Jiahong / He, Ran, ‘Wrongful Convictions and Tortured Confessions: Empirical Studies in
Mainland China’, in: McConville, M. / Pils E. (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Criminal
Justice in China, Cheltenham 2013, 73–90. [He/He, 2013]
Liao, Fu-Te (廖福特), 批准聯合國兩個人權公約及制訂施行法之評論 (‘Comments on the Two
Ratiﬁed United Nations Covenants on Human Rights and the Enforcement Act’), (2009) 174
The Taiwan Law Review, 223–229. [Liao, 2009]
Lin, Yu-Hsiung (林鈺雄), 鳥瞰2003年1月刑事訴訟法之修法, (‘A Summary about the Code of
Criminal Procedure Amendment in January 2003’), (2003) 45 Taiwan Law Journal
), 224–246. [Lin, 2003]
Nguyen, Thi Thuy, ‘Criminal Justice Reform in Viet Nam. Achievement and Lesson’ in: (2009)
ASEAN Law Association 10th General Assembly, 1–5. [Nguyen, 2009]
Rosenzweig, Joshua / Sapio, Flora / Jiang, Jue / Teng, Biao / Pils, Eva ‘The 2012 Revision of the
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law: (Mostly) Old Wine in New Bottles’, in: McConville, M. /
Pils E. (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Criminal Justice in China, Cheltenham 2013, 405–
503. [Rosenzweig et al., 2013]
Thaman, Stephen C., ‘Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary
Rules’, in: Thaman, St. C. (ed.), Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law, Heidelberg 2013,
403–443. [Thaman, 2013]
Sabine Gless holds a chair for criminal law, criminal procedure, and international criminal law at
the University of Basel, Switzerland. Her research includes comparative work in evidence law and
international cooperation with a focus on human rights issues, procedural safeguards, and in
particular exclusionary rules.
Thomas Richter served as the Head of the East Asian Department of the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign and International Law in Freiburg, Germany. In this capacity, he analyzed the criminal law
and criminal procedure law of the People’s Republic of China and co-directed a comparative study
on non-prosecution policies in Germany and the People’s Republic of China. In cooperation with
the German Institute for Human Rights (DIMR), he evaluated the Human Rights Dialogue
between the People’s Republic of China and Switzerland (2006/2007). Most recently, Thomas
Richter assessed the Rule of Law Programme for Asia instituted by the Konrad Adenauer
Foundation (2013). His research interests include criminal law, human rights law, and
environmental law in East and South-East Asia, especially in China.
The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial
Through Evidence Exclusion: A Swiss
Abstract Swiss criminal procedure has a strong inquisitorial tradition and its
primary purpose is the search for the “material truth.” However, authorities are
neither obliged nor allowed to search for this truth at any cost and are limited by
procedural rules, which also serve to protect a defendant from the authorities. One
possible means of enforcing such procedural rules is the exclusion of improperly
obtained evidence. In Switzerland, the legislature established explicit provisions
around the collection of evidence and its admissibility in criminal proceedings by
adopting art. 139–141 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 2011. This is a comprehensive statutory regulation that is unique in Europe. Nevertheless, the Swiss
Supreme Court continues to ﬁnd ways to preserve its own power over the admission
of evidence and often errs on the side of admitting evidence. With a focus on this
tension between the legal framework and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,
the Swiss country report describes the relevant legal framework, phases of the
criminal process, and the relevant parties to criminal proceedings. Also discussed in
detail are the current regulations as well as the Supreme Court’s case law on
exclusionary rules. An assessment of the potential for such rules to safeguard
individual rights and prevent improper evidence acquisition is a focus of the paper.
It was not until 2011 that a uniﬁed Swiss criminal procedure code amalgamated the
legal framework for criminal trials in the 26 cantons of Switzerland. Bringing
together different legal traditions of continental Europe, Swiss criminal procedure is
characterized by legal scholars as inquisitorial. This assessment corresponds with a
traditional focus on searching for the “material truth” (or, what actually happened)1
Schmid, 2017 at § 1 no. 7.
L. Macula (&)
MLaw, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: Laura.Macula@unibas.ch
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12520-2_2
L. Macula
as the primary aim of criminal proceedings.2 Today, however, the search for truth is
neither an absolute goal in the Swiss criminal justice system nor do police, prosecutors, or courts have unlimited powers.3 Rather, present-day legislation
acknowledges the competing interests of the State and the individuals involved and
appreciates a need for them to be balanced on a case-by-case basis via legislation
and, more speciﬁcally, law enforcement authorities and courts. Accordingly, Swiss
criminal proceedings are characterised by formal requirements that seek to ensure a
fair trial while also safeguarding individual rights and preventing abuses of power
by the authorities.4 According to the theory espoused in legal texts, exclusionary
rules play an important role in establishing this balance by banning the use of
illegally obtained evidence and enforcing limitations in criminal proceedings.5
However, the exclusion of evidence also poses a constraint on the establishment of
the material truth.6 Thus, by deﬁning formal requirements and individual rights in
criminal procedure, the legislature determines the cost of ﬁnding the material
truth7—at least in theory.
The ﬁrst Swiss Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)8 explicitly stipulates exclusionary rules in art. 141, which establishes a far-reaching and relatively comprehensive legal regime.9 These largely clear-cut rules represent a new approach since
they have signiﬁcantly reduced the amount of judicial discretion allowed relative to
the prior cantonal regime. Before the advent of the CPC, the Swiss Supreme Court
(SSC) made decisions around the admissibility of evidence by balancing competing
interests on a case-by-case basis10 and often admitted illegally obtained evidence in
pursuit of the material truth.11 In a 2007 case (prior to the implementation of the
CPC), the Court rejected strict exclusion of indirect evidence on the ground that the
acquittal of an obviously guilty defendant would be “disturbing” (“stossend”).12
See e.g., Gless/Martin, 2015 at 164 with further references.
Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 6 no. 2 with further references.
Keller, 2011 at 231.
Oberholzer, 2012 at no. 695.
Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 6 no. 2.
Keller, 2011 at 231 et seq.
Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung (StPO), ofﬁcially translated as Swiss Criminal Procedure
Code (CPC) of 5 October 2007 (Status as of 1 October 2016), SR 312.0, available online at
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classiﬁed-compilation/20052319/index.html>, accessed 22 November
With exceptions, see below 3.1.3.
Wohlers/Bläsi, 2015 at 160.
Keller, 2011 at 234 with further references; see also below 3.1.3 and 3.2.5.2.
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (BGE) 133 IV 329, consideration
(consid.) 4.5; the decisions of the Swiss Supreme Court are available online at <http://www.bger.
ch/index/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht.htm>, accessed 22 November
The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence …
Even after the CPC was put into place, the Supreme Court has continued to rule in
favor of admitting illegally obtained evidence.13
With a focus on this tension between the legal framework in the CPC and the
jurisprudence of the Swiss Supreme Court, this report seeks to:
– explain the fundamental principles, stages, and actors in Swiss criminal
– detail the present regulation in the CPC as well as the Swiss Supreme Court’s
case law on exclusionary rules;
– assess the potential of those exclusionary rules to safeguard individual rights and
to prevent torture and improper compulsion in particular.
2 Establishing Facts in Swiss Criminal Proceedings
Legal Framework and Relevant Actors
Until 2011, Switzerland, a country of approximately eight million inhabitants, had
26 diverse14 cantonal criminal procedure codes, three federal codes of military
law,15 laws around administrative criminal procedure,16 and laws around federal
criminal procedure.17 The different cantonal codes, as well as the Swiss legal
system in general, were signiﬁcantly influenced by the German and the French legal
systems due to the various German-speaking and Francophone parts of the country.
The Swiss cantonal codes thus embodied diverse components of continental
European legal traditions.18
This fragmented regulation of criminal procedure necessitated the criminal
justice system be flexible enough to accommodate the various legal regimes. The
cantonal and federal legislature assured this flexibility by leaving considerable
discretion to law enforcement authorities.19 The Federal CPC, which came into
Schweizerisches Bundesgericht (Swiss Supreme Court, BGer) 6B_684/2012 of 15 May 2013;
BGE 138 IV 169; Wohlers/Bläsi, 2015 at 169.
Ruckstuhl et al., 2011 at no. 59.
Militärstrafgesetz of 13 June 1927 (Status as of 1 January 2017), SR 321.0, available online at
<https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁed-compilation/19270018/index.html>, accessed 22 November
Bundesgesetz über die Bundesstrafrechtspflege of 15 June 1934, SR 312.0, invalidated.
Bundesgesetz über das Verwaltungsstrafrecht of 22 March 1974 (Status as of 1 Oktober 2016),
SR 313.0, available online at <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁed-compilation/19740066/
index.html>; accessed 22 November 2018.
Gless/Martin, 2015 at 160.
effect in January 2011, represents the effort to unify and harmonize all of the
different cantonal criminal procedure codes. Its primary goal is not to accommodate
different regional traditions, rather it is to create nation-wide consistency in criminal
law and procedure, and promote uniform and efﬁcient enforcement of those laws.20
Accordingly, the CPC of 2011 established a stricter legal framework compared to
the former cantonal procedure codes, and particularly so for exclusionary rules.21
Currently, a further reform of selected articles of the CPC is being planned.22
Duties in Criminal Investigations
Swiss criminal procedure is rooted in the inquisitorial tradition with the primary
purpose of searching for the material truth. At least in theory, the proceedings aim
to create a “precise reproduction of the historical incidents”23 and convict and
punish defendants only for the acts or omissions for which he or she is responsible.24 The inquisitorial principle, explicitly laid out in art. 6 CPC, commits all
prosecution authorities (police, public prosecution),25 as well as the courts26 to
establish all relevant facts in the assessment of an alleged criminal offense in
addition to an evaluation of the accused’s personal situation. Different from
adversarial systems, authorities in Swiss criminal proceedings act ex ofﬁcio—regardless of the parties’ conduct and requests.27 As art. 6 (2) CPC stipulates, the
authorities must investigate all circumstances—exculpatory and incriminatory—
with equal care, requiring them to keep an open mind throughout the investigation.
If prosecution authorities fail to comply with art. 6 CPC, the relevant evidence
must be “re-taken” and presented to the appellate court where possible. If this is not
feasible, the failure to do so cannot be interpreted to the detriment of the defendant.28 On the contrary, the presumption of innocence (art. 10 (1) CPC) and the
principle in dubio pro reo (“when in doubt, for the accused,” art. 10 (3) CPC)
impose the burden of proof on the prosecution. It is their duty not only to investigate, but to prove all circumstances creating criminal liability. This duty is limited
by art. 139 (2) CPC, which states that “no evidence shall be led on matters that are
irrelevant, obvious, known to the criminal justice authority or already adequately
Keller, 2011 at 230.
Gless/Martin, 2015 at 161.
<https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/aenderungstpo.html>, accessed
Spelled out in detail in art. 306 et seq. and 308 et seq. CPC; see below 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.4.
Spelled out in detail in art. 343 CPC; see below 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.4.
Art. 6 (1) CPC; Schmid, 2017 at § 9 no. 154.
Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 6 no. 10 et seq.
proven in law.”29 Where this evidentiary duty cannot be fulﬁlled or insurmountable
doubts as to the defendant’s guilt persist, the court must base its decision on the
circumstances that are most favorable to the defendant and, where necessary,
acquit.30 The court, however, has wide discretion in this regard; art. 10 (2) CPC
provides that the court shall assess all available evidence in accordance with the
opinions it has formed throughout the entire course of the proceedings. Consequently,
in Swiss criminal proceedings, there is no ranking order for evidence; as long as all
evidence is gathered lawfully, each piece can be relevant. The weight of any one
piece of evidence depends on how persuasive the court ﬁnds it to be.31 Importantly,
the court’s decision, including the assessment of evidence, has to be objective,
transparent and comprehensible.32 Indeed, the aim of art. 10 (2) CPC is to avoid the
arbitrary assessment of evidence while simultaneously fulﬁlling the principles of the
inquisitorial system. The rationale behind this provision is that judgments are more
likely to be based on the material truth if the court is not bound by rigid evidentiary
rules and is free to form an opinion based on the entire proceeding.33
The general principle of a fair trial, both in Swiss law and elsewhere, ﬁnds its origin
in a variety of legal principles. Firstly, it is binding as a general principle of
international law imposed by art. 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR)34 and art. 10 and 14 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Part II35 (ICCPR II).36 Second, it has been expressly codiﬁed in
Swiss law in art. 29 (1) of the new Federal Constitution of 199937 and in art. 3 (2)
lit. c of the new CPC.38 Article 3 (2) lit. c CPC explicitly stipulates that all persons
involved in criminal proceedings should be treated equally and fairly and should be
granted the right to be heard.
Gless in Niggli et al., 2014 at art. 139 no. 31; see below 2.1.4.
Pieth, 2016 at 55 et seq.; also BGE 124 IV 88 consid. 2.a.
Schmid, 2017 at § 13 no. 229; Pieth, 2016 at 186.
Pieth, 2016 at 186 with further references.
Schmid, 2017 at § 13 no. 225.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4
November 1950, available online at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf>,
accessed 22 November 2018.
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16
December 1966, available online at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/ccpr.
pdf>, accessed 22 November 2018.
Brun, 2015 at 55 with further references.
Swiss Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 (Status as of 12 February 2017), SR 101, available
online at <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁed-compilation/19995395/index.html>, accessed
Schmid, 2017 at § 6 no. 95.
The principle of a fair trial does not ensure that the outcome of the proceedings
reflects what actually happened (i.e. the material truth), but it attempts to safeguard
the fairness of the procedure itself. Although this may result in the ﬁnding of the
material truth, that is not always the case.39 The concept of a “fair trial” is broad
and, as a result, its core meaning can be difﬁcult to grasp.40 In practice, however,
the principle of a fair trial encompasses a number of speciﬁc objectives. It addresses
compliance with procedural rules41 (which is of particular importance in criminal
proceedings)42 and requires that the parties to the proceedings be treated as “subjects rather than objects.” In other words, the right to a fair trial guarantees that the
parties be given the opportunity to influence the proceedings (and, therefore, the
outcome), and to be able to effectively exercise their individual rights. The principle
can be understood more concretely through the individual procedural rights of the
parties, although it represents more than just a summation of those rights.43
The individual rights and procedural guarantees that comprise the general
principle of a fair trial are detailed in different provisions of the CPC, namely the
right to an independent and impartial tribunal (cf. art. 4 CPC), the right to be heard
(cf. art. 107 CPC and 109 et seq. CPC), formal requirements for criminal proceedings (cf. art. 2 CPC), the right to a public (cf. art. 69 (1) CPC) and expeditious
proceeding (cf. art. 5 CPC), the presumption of innocence (cf. art. 10 (1) CPC), the
right against self-incrimination (art. 113 (1) CPC), the right to be present and
participate in the proceedings (cf. art. 147 CPC), and the right to defense counsel
(cf. art. 127 et seq., particularly art. 132 et seq. CPC). The CPC also explicitly
prohibits the obtainment of evidence through torture and other methods that violate
human dignity (cf. art. 3 (2) lit. d and art. 140 CPC).44 Other aspects of a fair trial
include the requirement that the authorities inform parties to the proceeding of their
rights (cf. for instance art. 107 (2) and 143 (1) lit. c CPC) and the authorities’ duty
of care. The duty of care seeks to prevent scenarios where parties lose their rights
simply because they are unfamiliar with the law, or are otherwise in a compromised
position (see, for instance, the protective measures in art. 149–156 CPC).45
Furthermore, art. 6 (2) CPC obliges the prosecution authorities to investigate ex
ofﬁcio, and with equal care, both incriminating and exculpating circumstances
related to the criminal act and the accused. The provision itself speciﬁes the principle of a fair trial with regard to the establishment of facts.46 The principle of a fair
Demko, 2007 at 356 et seq.
Demko, 2007 at 359.
Thommen, 2013 at 301.
Vetterli, 2012 at 451.
Demko, 2007 at 360 et seq. with further references.
Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 3 no. 22; see in detail 2.1.1.2, 2.1.3.1, 2.1.4., 2.2.2.,
3.2.1., 3.2.2.
Schmid, 2017 at § 6 no. 102; also Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 3 no. 22 and BGE 124
I 185 consid. 3.
Schmid, 2017 at § 6 no. 99.
trial is also closely related to the so-called “principle of equality of arms,” which
states that the defense and the prosecution should have equal means at their disposal
to pursue and safeguard their respective interests.47 That said, absolute equality is
generally not feasible in criminal proceedings, which is why the defendant’s
opportunity to influence the proceedings is of the utmost importance.48
Balancing Fact-Finding and Individual Rights
A court must strive to establish the truth to give a just and correct judgment.49 This
belief has been a cornerstone of the inquisitorial model and is a primary reason that
Swiss criminal proceedings place a strong emphasis on the search for the material
truth. However, according to current law, authorities are neither obliged nor
allowed to search for the truth at any cost. Instead, there are limitations created
through procedural rules designed to protect a defendant from the authorities while
also preventing abuse of power, arbitrariness, and legal inequality50 in an environment that still promotes efﬁcient law enforcement.51 Not surprisingly, Swiss
scholars argue that criminal proceedings today are only required to lead to the
forensic truth.52 The forensic truth is the result of a truth-seeking process in which
the authorities abide by the formal rules of criminal procedure and seek what may
be, depending on the circumstances, a limited version of the material truth.53 Thus,
a fair criminal judgment is not necessarily based on the material truth, but is the
outcome of fair and lawful proceedings.54 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in
mind that the formal procedural rules are not an end in and of themselves and that
complying with them is not a reason to lose sight of the main objective to ﬁnd the
material truth and arrive at a fair and just decision.55
Despite the importance of the search for the material truth (reflected in art.
6 CPC), the Swiss legal framework prioritizes the forensic truth in many ways,
especially in its efforts to ensure fair trials. According to art. 159 CPC, for instance,
an accused can briefly consult a defense attorney before the ﬁrst police interrogation. The defense attorney is also allowed to attend the interrogations.56 This is a
big step forward in the protection of procedural rights in criminal trials for
Schmid, 2017 at § 6 no. 97.
Wohlers in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 3 no. 24.
Keller, 2011 at 232.
See to the tension between material truth and justice Fornito, 2000 at 40 et seq.; Trechsel, 2000 at
6 et seq.
Demko, 2007 at 352 et seq. with further references.
In detail however, there are some enforcement problems, Pieth, 2016 at 96 et seq.
Switzerland; prior to the adoption of the CPC, only a few cantons allowed an
accused such rights.57 On the other hand, these procedural protections introduce the
possibility that an accused will be advised by his or her counsel to remain silent or
deny the truth, and may even be coached as to what to say. Naturally, this can
hinder the search for the material truth.58
It is also the case that the establishment of numerous strict exclusionary rules
have placed greater emphasis on the forensic truth.59 For example, evidence is to be
excluded in cases of incomplete or omitted warnings to the accused informing them
of the proceedings against them and their legal rights (similar to the Miranda
warning in the US),60 denial of an essential defense,61 procurement of evidence
without regard for all parties’ participation rights,62 use of coercion to obtain evidence,63 or indirect evidence gathered as a result of previously tainted evidence.64
Art. 141 (2) CPC addresses evidence obtained through a criminal offense or the
violation of so-called “regulations on admissibility” and does not establish a strict
exclusionary rule, but stipulates a discretionary approach where the search for
evidence and the infringement of the defendant’s rights are balanced.65 The new
CPC has formalized the police’s investigative procedures and provides for a right to
appeal actions by the police and prosecution.66 Additionally, regulations around the
use of compulsory measures67 (i.e. those that give coercive power to the authorities
and restrict individuals’ personal freedom in order to secure the establishment of the
material truth) still require that the interest in ﬁnding the truth is balanced with the
individual rights at risk. To achieve this balance, the CPC implemented the use of
the proportionality principle,68 which requires that a sufﬁcient, respectively strong,
suspicion for wrongdoing must exist.69 Taken together, all of these aspects of the
CPC place limitations on the search for the material, objective truth to safeguard the
Changes to the commitment to searching for the material truth are also related to
efﬁciency.70 Resource management and cost saving were of great importance to the
Jackson/Summers, 2013 at 127; Bundesblatt 2006 at 1193.
Keller, 2011 at 237.
Keller, 2011 at 246.
Art. 158 (2) CPC; Keller, 2011 at 239.
Art. 131 (3) CPC; Keller, 2011 at 241 et seq.
Art. 147 (4) CPC; Keller, 2011 at 243.
Art. 140 (1) and 141 (1) CPC, see in detail below 3.2.4.
Art. 141 (4) CPC, see in detail below 3.2.5.
See below 3.1.2.3.
Keller, 2011 at 247 et seq.; art. 393 (1) lit. a CPC.
Art. 196 et seq. CPC.
Spelled out for instance by art. 197 (1) lit. c CPC (principle of necessity), and art. 221 (1) CPC
(exclusion of custody for minor offences), Pieth, 2016 at 132.
Pieth, 2016 at 132 et seq.
in detail Thommen, 2013 at 249 et seq.
drafters of the CPC.71 The underlying rationale of the legislation is that not every
investigation can be conducted with the same degree of effort and penal authorities
must comply with the demands of efﬁciency in law enforcement, including the need
for quick and effective methods that are also economical.72 As a consequence, in
modern Swiss criminal procedure there is a strong tendency to utilize summary
proceedings.73 In fact today, 90–99% of all cases that go forward conclude with a
summary penalty order (“Strafbefehl”),74 a decision taken by the public prosecutor in
a special procedure. Such penalty orders can be issued without prior criminal
investigation, including without even interviewing an accused, and can thus be based
on insufﬁcient evidence.75 However, in theory, art. 352 (1) CPC requires a confession
or an otherwise sufﬁcient establishment of the facts for a summary penalty order to be
appropriate. If a defendant does not agree with the “offered” order, he or she has the
right to object (or “reject”) within ten days.76 That said, defendants rarely object,
often out of a lack of awareness of their right to do so.77 Taken together, all of these
issues can make summary penalty orders susceptible to error. This was conﬁrmed by
a study on miscarriages of justice,78 although it should be noted that a large portion of
summary penalty orders involve petty offenses with minor penalties.79
Another way in which the law places limitations on the establishment of the
material truth in order to promote efﬁciency is through accelerated proceedings
(“abgekürztes Verfahren”).80 In these proceedings—arising, for instance, in a
complicated ﬁnancial crime case where facts are difﬁcult to establish—the defendant is allowed to contest the facts and the penalty. The truth then becomes a matter
Brun, 2015 at 105.
Brun, 2015 at 98 et seq.
Pieth, 2016 at 249 and 251 with further references; also Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 381 who speak
of 76% according to a study from 2002 and Schweizer, 2013 at 1388 who speaks of 95%.
Keller, 2011 at 249; also Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 389. However, recent reform efforts plan to
introduce the mandatory interrogation of the defendant in some cases, e.g. before issuing a penalty
order for over 4 months of imprisonment, see art. 352a of the preliminary draft regarding a reform
of the CPC submitted by the Swiss Federal Council in December 2017, available online at <https://
www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/aenderungstpo/vorentw-d.pdf>, accessed
However, recent reform efforts plan to extend this period to 20 days in cases where the prosecution did not hand over the penalty order personally, see art. 354 (1ter) of the preliminary draft
regarding a reform of the CPC submitted by the Swiss Federal Council in December 2017,
available online at <https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/aenderungstpo/
vorentw-d.pdf>, accessed 22 November 2018.
Art. 354 et seq. CPC; Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 390 et seq.
67.5 % of all discovered miscarriages of justice between 1995 and 2004 concerned wrong
summary penalty orders, see Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 378 et seq.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 388 et seq.
Art. 358 et seq. CPC; Keller, 2011 at 254.
of negotiation.81 Summary proceedings have, therefore, been criticized as adversely
affecting the establishment of the material truth and, in turn, legal equality.82 Some
scholars have even claimed that the quest to establish the material truth becomes an
illusion in summary proceedings83 and this should be compensated for to justify a
proscribed penalty.84 The CPC, however, signiﬁcantly limits procedural safeguards
in summary proceedings.85
Establishing the Facts, Procedural Rules, and Stages
Criminal proceedings are typically initiated by the police at the instruction of the
public prosecutor or following observations made by police ofﬁcers and other
authorities.86 Preliminary investigations (i.e. securing the crime scene; searching for
evidence; interviewing witnesses; stopping, arresting or searching for suspects, etc.)
fall within the scope of police duties.87
Art. 139 CPC enumerates potential types of evidence:
– testimony provided by witnesses or
(“Auskunftspersonen”);
– reports by experts;
– statements by an accused;
– documents and (judicial) inspections.88
Although the police handle preliminary investigations, the public prosecutor
may provide instructions because such investigations are part of the preliminary
proceedings, which fall under the direction of the prosecution.89 After the preliminary investigations conclude, the public prosecutor must assess the evidence
and make a decision to either investigate further, ﬁle charges, make an offer for a
summary penalty order, or stop the proceedings altogether. For each of those
decisions, the public prosecutor must have sufﬁcient evidence to establish the
necessary facts.90
Brun, 2015 at 100 et seq. with further references; dissenting as far as fact bargaining is concerned
Schwarzenegger in Donatsch et al., 2014 at art. 358 no. 6 et seq. with further references.
Brun, 2015 at 107 et seq.
Thommen, 2013 at 250, 309.
Thommen, 2013 at 292 et seq., which the CPC neglects to do, Thommen, 2013 at 81 (as to the
summary penalty order).
Thommen, 2013 at 224 et seq.
Art. 306 (1) CPC.
Art. 306 (2) CPC.
Pieth, 2016 at 187 et seq. with further explanations to the question of whether means of evidence
other than those mentioned in the CPC are admissible or not.
Art. 307 (2) CPC.
Schmid, 2017 at § 2 no. 15; art. 308 et seq. CPC.
Traditionally, public prosecutors in inquisitorial systems choose to either prosecute a case (and go to trial) or dismiss it altogether. They are required to give
written notice of the decision to the parties involved and provide a deadline for the
submission of a request for further investigation,91 which supposedly satisﬁes an
accused’s right to participation (and thus, a fair trial). Today, however, most cases that
could be prosecuted (half of which are trafﬁc offences),92 conclude with the prosecution
issuing a summary penalty order.93 These decisions are made without a public hearing94 and often without even interviewing the defendant (who, most likely, is not
represented by defense counsel).95 This does not satisfy the four-eye principle (or its
equivalent)96 and in most cases evidence will never be presented to a court for evaluation and a formal judgement. Only where a party raises an objection to the summary
penalty order does an action for additional fact-ﬁnding begin.97 Where the summary
penalty order is accepted, it becomes binding as a ﬁnal judgment.98
Even where a public prosecutor decides to take a case to trial, the deciding
judges may not hear all relevant evidence in the main hearing because the principle
of immediacy is quite flexible under the CPC.99 During public main hearings,
which are the centerpiece of the main proceedings,100 the court ideally takes and
directly examines all evidence relevant to the case (e.g., statements of the parties,
documents etc.) to form an opinion. The CPC, however, leaves it to the discretion
of the court to decide if direct knowledge of the evidence is necessary to reach a
decision.101 Apart from direct evidence, the court can make a decision based on an
accused’s criminal ﬁle, which is circulated to all judges involved.102 As the CPC
states, the court shall only take directly new evidence, supplemental evidence that
was previously incomplete, and re-take evidence that was improperly obtained
during the preliminary proceedings.103 Nevertheless, during the main public
Art. 318 (1) CPC.
Riklin, 2016 at 477.
See above 2.1.2.
Pieth, 2016 at 218; critical Brun, 2015 at 98 et seq.; Riklin, 2016 at 493 et seq.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 394 et seq. However, recent reform efforts plan to introduce the mandatory
interrogation of the defendant in some cases, e.g. before issuing a penalty order for over 4 months of
imprisonment, see art. 352a of the preliminary draft regarding a reform of the CPC submitted by the
Swiss Federal Council in December 2017, available online at <https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/
sicherheit/gesetzgebung/aenderungstpo/vorentw-d.pdf>, accessed 22 November 2018.
Riklin, 2016 at 495 who is critical of the fact that the prosecution is the sole issuing authority,
acting without participation of an independent court. As to the problems concerning the supervision of the prosecution, see below 2.1.3.2.
Art. 355 CPC.
Art. 354 (3) CPC.
Art. 343 CPC.
Schmid, 2017 at § 2 no. 18.
Critical Pieth, 2016 at 51 et seq.; art. 343 (3) CPC.
Art. 330 (2) CPC; critical Pieth, 2016 at 51 et seq.
Art. 343 (1 and 2) CPC.
hearing the accused is always questioned directly by the judge overseeing the
proceedings.104
After the main hearing and the presentation of all relevant evidence before the
court, the evidence is considered in accordance with the opinions the court has
formed throughout the entire course of the proceedings105 and a decision to either
convict or acquit the accused is made. The judgment is ﬁrst pronounced orally to
the parties with a short explanation (unless the parties waive their right to have the
judgment issued publicly) and is later handed down in writing.106 Where an appeal
is ﬁled against the court of ﬁrst instance, the appellate court generally bases its
decision on the evidence already documented in the criminal ﬁle. As a result, the
appellate court does not directly take evidence.107
In all procedural stages, exclusionary rules are formally binding on authorities.108 However, according to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Supreme Court, it is
the judge of fact who has the power to enforce exclusionary rules, and who also
decides the outcome of a case.109
Establishing the Facts: Actors and Accountability
The main actors involved in establishing the facts of a criminal case are the police,
prosecution and judges. The accused and his or her defense counsel have a limited
role in influencing the fact-ﬁnding process. Those that do play a role in fact-ﬁnding
have different interests and views around what the search for truth should look like.
On the one hand, police and prosecutors aim to establish the material truth. Their
actions must be efﬁcient and consistent with the principles of urgency, economy and
effectiveness.110 To them, extensive formal requirements around evidence gathering,
participation rights, and exclusionary rules are a hindrance to the search for the
material truth.111 The Supreme Court also appears to fall on the side of pursuing the
material truth, particularly in cases where it clearly went to great lengths to admit and
consider illegally obtained evidence.112 On the other hand, the defense is typically in
favor of rigid, formal rules around the taking of evidence, as well as extensive
participation rights, and strict exclusionary rules in case of violations. They do not
Art. 241 (3) CPC.
Art. 10 (2) CPC.
Art. 351 (3) and art. 84 (1–3) CPC.
Schmid, 2017 at § 16 no. 308; also art. 389 (1) CPC.
Gless in Niggli et al., 2014 at art. 141 no. 35.
See below 3.1.4.
Keller, 2011 at 233 et seq.
Keller, 2011 at 234, see also below 3.1.3, 3.2.4.2, 3.2.5.2.
necessarily have an incentive to ﬁnd the material truth and instead tend to look for a
version of the facts that is the most favorable to the defendant.113
In some cantonal procedure codes, the police were traditionally tasked with
making only the ﬁrst (and urgent) inquiries autonomously. In practice, however, they
did much more.114 The new Swiss CPC explicitly states that the police are to
establish facts relevant to the criminal offense in question.115 The police can autonomously take any evidence; search for, observe, and arrest suspects; and, in emergency cases, search persons and seize property.116 Only in the case of severe criminal
offenses and other serious matters are the police obliged to immediately inform the
prosecution.117 Typically, they procure all necessary evidence independently and
prepare the entire criminal ﬁle (thereby concluding the preliminary investigation) for
the prosecution.118 Additionally, summary penalty orders and potential judgments are
often based entirely on police reports.119 Thus, the police play a signiﬁcant role
during preliminary proceedings. This can lead to problems, as individual procedural
rights may be circumvented at this less formalized stage of the proceedings,120 a stage
where the defendant is rarely interviewed or represented by counsel.121
The prosecution occupies a powerful place in criminal proceedings in both
statutory text and practical application. The new CPC conferred a number of duties
and powers upon the prosecution; they are tasked with consistently applying the duty
to prosecute, conducting the preliminary proceedings, pursuing criminal offenses
within the scope of an investigation, bringing charges, and obtaining favorable plea
agreements.122 Furthermore, the prosecution can also discontinue criminal proceedings123 or chose to issue a summary penalty order, which carries up to six months’
imprisonment.124 These powers, in addition to others, lead to a concentration of
authority within the prosecution, who, in fact, act as lead investigator, judge, and
Keller, 2011 at 233.
Pieth, 2016 at 67 et seq.
Art. 306 (1 and 2) CPC.
Pieth, 2016 at 68 et seq.
Art. 307 (1) CPC.
Art. 307 (3) CPC.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 383 with further references. However, recent reform efforts plan to
Pieth, 2016 at 68.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 394 et seq.
Art. 16 (1 and 2) CPC.
Art. 310, 319 et seq. CPC.
Art. 352 (1) CPC.
prosecutor. While this may be efﬁcient, it can compromise the accused’s right to an
impartial judgment.125
Despite the powerful positions occupied by the police and prosecution in
criminal investigations, the CPC does set limits in an effort to protect individual
rights that fall within the scope of art. 5 (3) ECHR and art. 6 ECHR, including the
right to an impartial judgment. The CPC also reserves certain powers for judicial
authorities. For example, compulsory measures affecting the personal freedoms of a
defendant or third party in a serious way (e.g., custody, preventive detention, bank
account monitoring, mass DNA tests, surveillance of post and telecommunications,
surveillance using technical devices and undercover investigations) cannot be
applied without consent of a special “compulsory measures court”
(Zwangsmassnahmengericht).126 Furthermore, in all matters that exceed the
authority of the prosecution to issue summary penalty orders, the prosecution
merely provides the charges while the courts of ﬁrst instance and the appellate
courts decide the substantive issues of the case.127 It remains, however, that where
summary penalty orders can be issued, a defendant retains the right to object and to
ask for a court trial reviewing the punishment order.128
The CPC grants full participation rights to the accused with particular attention
paid to the right to be heard, including the right to counsel prior to the ﬁrst police
interrogation, the right to access the case ﬁle, and the right to request that evidence
be taken.129 These rights are unfortunately not strictly enforced in practice,130
which weakens the role of the accused and the ability of the defense to influence the
proceedings. If the defense seeks to exclude a piece of evidence, he or she must
submit a removal request to the person overseeing the proceedings.131 This is also
the case in proceedings before the compulsory measures court. Where the request is
rejected, the defense can ﬁle an appeal with the court of second instance and, if
necessary, the Swiss Supreme Court.132
Supervision of Judicial Authorities and Legal Remedies
Swiss law only partially regulates the supervision of prosecution authorities; it is,
therefore, up to the cantons to decide how to “guard the guardians.” Supervision of
Pieth, 2016 at 70 et seq.
Custody, preventive detention and bank account monitoring can only be ordered by the court;
the other measures simply need an approval by the court; Pieth, 2016 at 73 with further references.
Schmid, 2017 at § 3 no. 18 et seq.
Art. 354 et seq. CPC.
Pieth, 2016 at 57 et seq.
See below 2.1.4.
“Verfahrensleitung”, in the ofﬁcial English translation of the CPC the “director of the
See generally Wohlers/Bläsi, 2015 at 173 et seq.
police in routine operations is also under the auspices of cantonal law.133 Cases of
alleged police misconduct can be reported to the supervisory authority134 and, where
the suspicion that a crime occurred can be substantiated, police will be prosecuted.
The prosecution also exercises control over the police when conducting criminal
investigations. It may instruct the police in a particular way or take control of the
proceedings at any time.135 Nevertheless, in practice it is difﬁcult for prosecutorial
authorities to adequately supervise police work because the CPC does not provide
efﬁcient tools to do so.136 It is clear, however, that if prosecution authorities observe
a police ofﬁcer improperly eliciting a confession, the ofﬁcer must be reported to the
appropriate authorities.137 In order to enable the prosecution and the courts to
consider whether evidence has been obtained improperly, the police are obliged to
continually record their ﬁndings and the means by which they have gathered evidence in a written report provided to the prosecution.138 If evidence has been
obtained improperly, the public prosecutor will re-take it personally or instruct the
police to do so.139 The defendant may also submit an application requesting that the
ofﬁcial(s) in question be recused from future proceedings.140 If the case goes to
court, the judges must examine whether the evidence was obtained improperly.
Where the court decides to exclude certain evidence, it must re-take it.141
Theoretically, in doing this, the courts control not only the ﬁnal result of the
investigation, but also the police and the prosecution.
The supervision of the prosecution is regulated by cantonal law and varies
widely across Switzerland. Many questions remain unanswered due to the fragmentary character of the cantonal regulations.142 The supervision of judicial
authorities, like the prosecution, is difﬁcult because the supervisory body is generally not authorized to intervene in cases; rather its role is limited to administrative
and technical supervision. There is one exception in the case of signiﬁcant violations of the law,143 such as police abuse or the improper use of compulsory measures. Additionally, certain cantons have a Chief Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce that has
the authority to issue instructions on a case-by-case basis.144 Supervisory bodies
Depending on the canton, the supervisory authority is the superordinate department or the
cantonal governing council; see Künzli et al., 2014 at 26.
See Künzli et al., 2014 at 26 et seq.
Art. 307 (2), 312 CPC.
Ruckstuhl et al., 2011 at no. 62; as to the possible legal remedies for misconduct by police see
Künzli et al., 2014 at 19 et seq. in detail.
Pursuant to art. 302 CPC, Committee Against Torture (CAT) Report, 2016 at 2.
Art. 308 (1), art. 311 (1), art. 312 (1) CPC.
Art. 56 et seq. CPC; CAT Report, 2016 at 1.
BGer 6B_690/2015 of 25 November 2015, consid. 3.4.; art. 343 (2) CPC.
Schweizer, 2013 at 1381 et seq.
Schweizer, 2013 at 1381.
can also initiate an administrative investigation into alleged misconduct of individual ofﬁcials and determine the appropriateness of disciplinary measures where
necessary.145 Overall, there is a risk that prosecutorial authorities will remain largely unsupervised, especially in cantons where the supervision is conducted by
executive authorities with limited judicial expertise.146
The courts, as judicial authorities, also have supervisory powers, but they are
limited to administrative and technical aspects unless there is a severe violation of
the law. Aside from that, the errors of judicial authorities can only be challenged
through legal remedies.147 Accordingly, a defendant has the right to appeal decisions, lodge complaints against the police and the prosecution,148 and appeal ﬁnal
judgments.149 Where the cantonal remedies have been exhausted, a defendant may
appeal to the Swiss Supreme Court.150 However, according to the case law on this
matter, it is not possible for a defendant to ask that his or her request for an
assessment of allegedly illegally obtained evidence (and its potential exclusion) be
completed before the court has received the evidence.151 This is particularly
problematic as the court deciding the admissibility of the evidence will have already
seen it and is also the court deciding the substantive matters of the case.
Liability of the State and Legal Ofﬁcials for Improper Compulsion
Apart from accountability in a disciplinary proceeding, an ofﬁcial that has
improperly used compulsory measures against a defendant (for example, during an
interrogation) is also subject to criminal liability. In such a case, the defendant may
report the offense directly to the prosecution.152 He or she may also request compensation for damages, including mental suffering. Such claims following alleged
misconduct by ofﬁcials are subject to cantonal law. That said, all cantons have
adopted the concept of exclusive state liability for such claims. Accordingly, they
Schweizer, 2013 at 1383 with further references; as to disciplinary measures against police
ofﬁcers in particular, see Künzli et al., 2014 at 57 et seq.; see also CAT Report, 2016 at 3.
Schweizer, 2013 at 1389.
Schweizer, 2013 at 1384.
Art. 393 (1) lit. a CPC. However, this possibility is of little practical relevance so far; Künzli
et al., 2014 at 65 et seq.; see also Gless in Niggli et al., 2014 at art. 140 no. 74.
Art. 398 (1) CPC.
Art. 80 (1) Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht (BGG) of 17 June 2005 (Status as of 1
January 2017), SR 173.110, available online at <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁedcompilation/20010204/index.html>, accessed 22 November 2018.
Pursuant to art. 301 CPC; CAT Report, 2016 at 1 et seq.; as to criminal liability of police
ofﬁcers in detail see Künzli et al., 2014 at 32 et seq.
may only be brought against the state, not the individual ofﬁcial.153 Along the same
lines, several cantons have created speciﬁc procedures for dealing with cases of
criminal complaints alleging police misconduct. This involves a hearing conducted
exclusively by representatives of the prosecution, police ofﬁcers from outside the
unit in question, or ofﬁcers from a special police corps addressing such matters.154
In addition to these procedures, many cantons and respective municipalities provide
for alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as a mediator bureau and/or
ombudsman.155
Establishing the Facts: Institutional Safeguards
In Swiss criminal investigations various institutional safeguards are in place to
ensure the objectivity of investigative authorities and the transparency of proceedings. First, art. 6 (2) CPC156 stipulates that authorities must investigate all
circumstances—exculpatory and incriminatory—with equal care. Second, art. 3 (2)
lit. c and 107 CPC codify the right to be heard, which preserves important participation rights such as access to the criminal ﬁle, the opportunity to take part in
procedural activities, the right to counsel, the right to comment on the facts and
proceedings, and the right to request that further evidence be taken.157 The right to
be heard also includes the right to be informed about the charge(s) as well as one’s
own rights.158 All of these aspects are institutional safeguards that allow the parties
to influence the fact-ﬁnding process through participation should they wish to do
so.159 Hence, the “truth” is not only constructed by the prosecution authorities, but
also the defense, each of whom enter into this “open process” with their own biases.
In an effort to promote objectivity, art. 141 (5) CPC mandates that authorities keep
an open, unbiased view of the case even where illegally obtained evidence
incriminating the defendant exists. The provision states that records of inadmissible
evidence shall be removed from the criminal ﬁles, kept separately until a ﬁnal
judgment has been reached, and then destroyed.
In addition to the principles and rights explicitly granted in the CPC, the code
also provides for some degree of flexibility in certain provisions, which has led to a
more lenient application of the legal framework around individual rights. Using the
example of participation rights, the following three issues have arisen: First,
Künzli et al., 2014 at 70 et seq. Thus, those claims cannot be asserted directly in the criminal
proceedings against the ofﬁcial either which is incorrectly stated in CAT Report, 2016 at 3.
Zürich, Vaud, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Zug, Bern, Luzern, Sankt-Gallen, Rapperswil-Jona,
Wallisellen, Winterthur; see CAT Report, 2016 at 2.
CAT Report, 2016 at 2; also Künzli et al., 2014 at 28 et seq.
See above 2.1.1.1.
Art. 107 (1) CPC. All of these rights are spelled out in detail in other provisions of the CPC.
Demko, 2007 at 360.
according to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the prosecution and the court
hearing the case may reject the defense’s request that further evidence be taken
(Beweisantrag) by providing a brief reasoning as soon as the competent body is
convinced that no further evidence is needed to decide the case (subject to a review
for arbitrariness).160 The defendant has no formal remedy, but can submit a new
request for additional evidence during the preparation of the main hearing and again
during the main hearing.161 Second, the defense’s access to the ﬁle can be suspended until the ﬁrst interrogation of the accused has taken place and other
important evidence has been taken.162 Therefore, up to that point, the case ﬁle is
built upon facts only from the police perspective. Third, in cases of summary
penalty orders, the defendant often does not participate in the proceedings at all163;
instead he or she receives a sentencing offer by mail without a hearing and without
the assistance of a defense lawyer.164 The prosecution’s “offer” frequently is difﬁcult for a layperson to understand165 and only in a few speciﬁc cases does it
provide a rationale (albeit brief) for the decision.166 The summary penalty order is
thus criticized as problematic for many reasons167 and is deemed compatible with
art. 6 ECHR only because a defendant theoretically168 has the option to reject the
“offer” and request a trial.169
This is called “anticipated assessment of evidence” (antizipierte Beweiswürdigung), BGE 134 I
140, consid. 5.3. et seq. with further references; also art. 139 (2) and art. 318 (2) CPC as well as
Bundesblatt 2006 at 1182; critical Pieth, 2016 at 44, 108 et seq. and 188 et seq. with further
references; see also Gless in Niggli et al., 2014 at art. 139 no. 48 et seq., stating that apart from art.
318 (2) CPC requests for additional evidence cannot be rejected due to anticipated assessment of
Art. 318 (2) CPC; art. 331 (2 and 3) CPC.
Art. 101 (1) CPC; critical Pieth, 2016 at 93 et seq.
Schweizer, 2013 at 1388.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 394 et seq. However, recent reform efforts plan to introduce the
mandatory interrogation of the defendant in some cases, e.g. before issuing a penalty order for over
4 months of imprisonment, see art. 352a of the preliminary draft regarding a reform of the CPC
submitted by the Swiss Federal Council in December 2017, available online at <https://www.bj.
admin.ch/dam/data/bj/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/aenderungstpo/vorentw-d.pdf>, accessed 22 November
And thus, only rarely “rejected”, Riklin, 2016 at 486 et seq.; Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 390 et
Riklin, 2016 at 485; Thommen, 2013 at 94 et seq.
See the enumeration in Riklin, 2016 at 495 et seq.; see also the references on critical scholars in
Schweizer, 2013 at 1387 fn. 84.
Only in 5 % of the cases does the summary penalty order not become a legally binding
judgment, but the case will go to court, see Schweizer, 2013 at 1380.
Gilliéron/Killias, 2007 at 383 et seq. and 390 et seq.; critical Riklin, 2016 at 485.
Relevance of the Truth and Individual Rights
Public Interest in Determining the Truth
In continental Europe, the public traditionally expects the truth to be established
following a criminal trial. Due to widespread interest in criminal proceedings,
prosecution authorities are under considerable public pressure to establish the truth170
and prosecute, particularly in high-proﬁle cases. In contrast, the idea that the alleged
perpetrator has human rights that could potentially restrict the search for truth
receives little public support.171 This is also reflected in the skeptical, and sometimes
disapproving, portrayal of criminal procedures in the media, especially where relevant
evidence is excluded. This can be observed in even the most well-reputed Swiss
newspapers, such as the NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung). For example, in a case where a
defendant was acquitted after illegally obtained evidence was excluded, the NZZ
reported that the accused was “proﬁting” from faulty procedure.172 The public
emphasis on the importance of ﬁnding the truth is also illustrated by the growing
discontent with public prosecutors “acting like judges” and routinely issuing summary penalty orders without the scrutiny of a formal, transparent procedure. The same
goes for accelerated proceedings (a form of negotiated justice173) which carry with
them an elevated risk of a miscarriage of justice given that a defendant might confess
solely to ensure a particular outcome.174
Presenting the “Truth” to the Public
In Switzerland, the fact-ﬁnding process prior to a trial is not public175 and the
investigative work and its results are not ofﬁcially published by the authorities.
Instead, information is published by the media, which tend to be motivated by
sensationalist news and are often inadequately informed.
Thommen/Samadi, 2016 at 84.
Vetterli, 2012 at 450.
NZZ online 5 August 2002, Ausschlaggebender Beweis darf nicht verwertet werden. Freispruch
für Polizisten trotz Tatverdacht, available online at <https://www.nzz.ch/article8BGKE-1.41