Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/480/572/case.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 22:59:33
Document Index: 327842026

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 22', '§ 26', '§ 30000', '§ 30106', '§ 1264', '§ 601', '§ 612', '§ 551', '§ 228', '§ 30004', '§ 1712', 'art 228', '§ 228', '§ 930', '§ 3809', '§ 551', '§ 228', '§ 478', '§ 228', '§ 551', '§ 30604', '§ 30511', '§ 30213', '§ 30221', '§ 30222', '§ 30222', '§ 30234', '§ 30241', '§ 30242', '§ 30243', '§ 30252', '§ 30255', '§ 30260', '§ 30600', '§ 1600', '§ 1701', '§ 30600']

CAL. COASTAL COMM'N V. GRANITE ROCK CO., 480 U. S. 572 - Volume 480 - 1987 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 480 > CAL. COASTAL COMM'N V. GRANITE ROCK CO., 480 U. S. 572 (1987) > Full Text
1. The case is not moot, even though Granite Rock's 6-year plan of operations expired during the course of the litigation. Because the Commission asserts that Granite Rock needed a Commission permit for work undertaken after the date of the Commission's letter, the Commission may require reclamation efforts to prevent river pollution resulting from the mining that has already occurred. Granite Rock disputes the Commission's authority to require such reclamation. Also, it is likely that
(c) There is no merit to the contention that federal land management statutes -- the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the National Forest Management Act -- demonstrate a legislative intent to limit States to a purely advisory role in federal land management decisions, and that the Commission permit requirement is therefore preempted as an impermissible state land use regulation. Even if it is assumed (without deciding the issue) that the combination of those federal Acts preempts the extension of state land use plans to unpatented mining claims in national forest lands, the Commission asserts that it will use permit conditions to impose environmental regulation, not land use planning. Congress has indicated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as distinct activities, and thus it is anomalous to maintain that Congress intended any state environmental regulation
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which POWELL and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 594. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 607.
Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone. Under the Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq., a private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federal land, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant "shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations," 30 U.S.C. § 26, although the United States retains title to the land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a patent to the land by complying
Under the California Coastal Act (CCA), Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West 1986), any person undertaking any development, including mining, in the State's coastal zone must secure a permit from the California Coastal Commission. §§ 30106, 30600. According to the CCA, the Coastal Commission exercises the State's police power and constitutes the State's coastal zone management program for purposes of the federal CZMA, described infra at 480 U. S. 589-590. In 1983, the Coastal Commission instructed Granite Rock to apply for a coastal development permit for any mining undertaken after the date of the Commission's letter. [Footnote 1]
First, we address two jurisdictional issues. In the course of this litigation, Granite Rock's 6-year plan of operations
The second jurisdictional issue we must consider is whether this case is properly within our authority, under 28 U.S.C. § 1264(2), to review the decision of a federal court
Granite Rock does not argue that the Coastal Commission has placed any particular conditions on the issuance of a permit that conflict with federal statutes or regulations. Indeed, the record does not disclose what conditions the
Granite Rock and the United States as amicus have made basically three arguments in support of a finding that any possible state permit requirement would be preempted. First, Granite Rock alleges that the Federal Government's environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national
Granite Rock concedes that the Mining Act of 1872, as originally passed, expressed no legislative intent on the as-yet rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation. Brief for Appellee 31-32. In 1955, however, Congress passed the Multiple Use Mining Act, 69 Stat. 367, 30 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., which provided that the Federal Government would retain and manage the surface resources of subsequently located unpatented mining claims. 30 U.S.C. § 612(b). Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to make "rules and regulations" to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U.S.C. § 551. Through this delegation of authority, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service has promulgated regulations so that "use of the surface of National Forest System lands" by those such as Granite Rock, who have unpatented mining claims authorized by the Mining Act of 1872, "shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National Forest System surface resources." 36 CFR §§ 228.1, 228.3(d) (1986). It was pursuant to these regulations that the Forest Service approved the Plan of Operations submitted by Granite Rock. If, as Granite Rock claims, it is the federal intent that Granite Rock conduct its mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation,
The second argument proposed by Granite Rock is that federal land management statutes demonstrate a legislative intent to limit States to a purely advisory role in federal land management decisions, and that the Coastal Commission permit requirement is therefore preempted as an impermissible state land use regulation.
For purposes of this discussion, and without deciding this issue, we may assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA preempts the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands. The Coastal Commission [Footnote 2] asserts that it will use permit conditions
While the CCA gives land use as well as environmental regulatory authority to the Coastal Commission, the state statute also gives the Coastal Commission the ability to limit the requirements it will place on the permit. The CCA declares that the Coastal Commission will "provide maximum state involvement in federal activities allowable under federal law or regulations. . . ." Cal.Pub.Res.Code Ann. § 30004 (West 1986). Since the state statute does not detail exactly what state standards will and will not apply in connection with various federal activities, the statute must be understood to allow the Coastal Commission to limit the regulations it will impose in those circumstances. In the present case, the Coastal Commission has consistently maintained that it does not seek to prohibit mining of the unpatented claim on national forest land. See 768 F.2d at 1080 ("The Coastal Commission also argues that the Mining Act does not preempt state environmental regulation of federal land unless the regulation prohibits mining altogether . . .") (emphasis supplied); 590 F.Supp. at 1373 ("The [Coastal Commission] seeks not to prohibit or veto,' but to regulate [Granite Rock's] mining activity in accordance with the detailed requirements of the CCA. . . . There is no reason to find that the [Coastal Commission] will apply the CCA's regulations so as to deprive [Granite Rock] of its rights under the Mining Act"); Defendants' Memorandum of Points
§ 1712(c)(8). Congress has also illustrated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as distinct activities by delegating the authority to regulate these activities to different agencies. The stated purpose of part 228, subpart A of the Forest Service regulations, 36 CFR § 228.1
Granite Rock suggests that the Coastal Commission's true purpose in enforcing a permit requirement is to prohibit Granite Rock's mining entirely. By choosing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief against the permit requirement before discovering what conditions the Coastal Commission would have placed on the permit, Granite Rock has lost the possibility of making this argument in this litigation. Granite Rock's case must stand or fall on the question whether any possible set of conditions attached to the Coastal Commission's permit requirement would be preempted. As noted in the previous section, the Forest Service regulations do not indicate a federal intent to preempt all state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests. Whether or not state land use planning over unpatented mining claims in national forests is preempted, the Coastal Commission
In order for an activity to be subject to CZMA consistency review, the activity must be on a list that the State provides federal agencies, which describes the type of federal permit and license applications the State wishes to review. 16 CFR § 930.53 (1986). If the activity is unlisted, the State must, within 30 days of receiving notice of the federal permit application,
S.Rep. No. 92-753, supra, at 1 (emphasis supplied).
Following an examination of the "almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant legislation," post at 480 U. S. 606, JUSTICE POWELL concludes that "[i]n view of the Property Clause . . . as well as common sense, federal authority must control. . . ." Ibid. As noted above, the Property Clause gives Congress plenary power over the federal land at issue; however, even within the sphere of the Property Clause, state law is preempted only when it conflicts with the operation or objectives of federal law, or when Congress "evidences an intent to occupy a given field," Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at 464 U. S. 248. The suggestion that traditional preemption analysis is inapt in this context can be
The second area of federal law important to this case concerns the management of federal lands. In response to the increasing commercial importance of federal lands, as well as the awareness of the environmental values of these lands,
The surface management provisions of the FLPMA do not apply to national forest lands. 43 CFR § 3809.0-5(c) (1986). Congress first provided for management of these lands in the Organic Administration Act of 1897. The current version of that statute delegates to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U.S.C. § 551. The Forest Service, as the Secretary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the "use" of national forests. 36 CFR § 228.1 et seq. (1986). Persons wishing to mine in the national forests submit plans of operation detailing their anticipated activities. If the Forest
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the Nation's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the
16 U.S.C. § 478. [Footnote 2/2] Forest Service materials
The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provisions of the federal statutes and regulations to the exclusion of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory context. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them. Because these regulations explicitly require the federal permits to comply with specified state environmental standards, the Court assumes that Congress intended to allow state enforcement of any and all state environmental standards. Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regulations specifically require compliance with only three types of
The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante at 480 U. S. 585, that these statutes "preemp[t] the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands." But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before conducting mining operations in a national forest. This conclusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning"
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclusion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply with all state environmental regulations. As I have explained supra, at 480 U. S. 599-600, other federal statutes require compliance with the listed standards. [Footnote 2/4] Also, because the
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinction between environmental regulation and land use planning is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Service's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral resources," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental regulation, but does not engage in land use planning. This conclusion misunderstands the division of authority between the BLM and the Forest Service. As explained supra at 480 U. S. 597-598, the BLM's management of minerals does not entail management of surface resources or the evaluation of surface impacts. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that the Forest Service is "responsible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on federal forest lands." Ante at 480 U. S. 585. The Forest Planning Act and the NFMA direct the Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest Service to develop comprehensive plans for the use of forest resources. Similarly, the Organic Administration Act commands the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the "occupancy and use" of national forests, 16 U.S.C. § 551. These regulations are integral to the Forest Service's management of national forests. To view them as limited to environmental concerns ignores both the Forest Service's broader responsibility to manage the use of forest resources and the federal policy of making mineral resources accessible to
The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cautions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental regulation, and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it necessarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these operations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a state authority -- here the Coastal Commission -- the power to prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive because it takes the form of a separate, and duplicative, permit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit requirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal authority, because they effectively give the State the power to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v.
Page 480 U. S. 605
Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 479 U. S. 495 (1987); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 328 U. S. 164 (1946). Although the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit systems may not lead to a finding of preemption in all cases, it certainly is relevant to a careful preemption analysis.
Furthermore, as discussed supra at 480 U. S. 595-597, Congress already has provided that affected States must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regulators charged with deciding how federal lands should be used. [Footnote 2/7] Because Congress has ensured that any federal decision
Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict in decisionmaking. [Footnote 2/8] In view of the Property Clause of the Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority must control with respect to land "belonging to the United States." Yet the Court's opinion today approves a system of two-fold authority with respect to environmental matters. The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with respect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized by the Forest Service. I dissent.
I agree with the Court that this case is live because of continuing dispute over California's ability to assert a reclamation claim, ante at 480 U. S. 578. [Footnote 3/1] In my view, however, the merits of this case must be decided on simpler and narrower grounds than those addressed by the Court's opinion. It seems to me ultimately irrelevant whether state environmental regulation has been preempted with respect to federal lands, since the exercise of state power at issue here is not environmental regulation, but land use control. The Court errs in entertaining the Coastal Commission's contention that "its permit requirement is an exercise of environmental regulation," ante at 480 U. S. 589, and mischaracterizes the issue when it describes it to be whether "any state permit requirement, whatever its conditions, [is] per se preempted by federal law," ante at 480 U. S. 593. We need not speculate as to what the nature of this permit requirement was. We are not dealing with permits in the abstract, but with a specific permit, purporting to require application of particular criteria, mandated by a numbered section of a known California law. That law is plainly a land use statute, and the permit that statute requires Granite Rock to obtain is a land use control device. Its character
§ 30604. The "local coastal programs" to which these provisions refer consist of two parts: (1) a land use plan, and (2) zoning ordinances, zoning maps, and other implementing actions. §§ 30511(b), 30512, 30513. Chapter 3 of the Act, with which these local coastal programs must comply, consists largely of land use prescriptions -- for example, that developments providing public recreational opportunities shall be preferred, § 30213; that oceanfront land suitable for recreational use shall be protected for recreational use and development, § 30221; that commercial recreational facilities shall have priority over private residential, general industrial, or general commercial development, but not over agriculture or coastal-dependent industry, § 30222; that oceanfront land suitable for coastal-dependent aquaculture shall be protected for that use,
§ 30222.5; that facilities serving the commercial fishing and recreational boating industries shall be protected and, where feasible, upgraded, § 30234; that the maximum amount of prime agricultural land shall be maintained in agricultural production, § 30241; that all other lands suitable for agricultural use shall not be converted to nonagricultural use except in specified circumstances, § 30242; that conversions of coastal commercial timberlands in units of commercial size to other uses shall be limited to providing for necessary timber processing and related facilities, § 30243; that the location and amount of new development should maintain and enhance public access to the coast, § 30252; that coastal-dependent developments shall have priority over other developments on or near the shoreline, § 30255; and that coastal-dependent industrial facilities shall be encouraged to locate or expand within existing sites, § 30260. [Footnote 3/2]
The § 30600 permit requirement, of course, is one of those means of control -- and, whenever a permit application is evaluated pursuant to the statutory standards, land (or water) use management is afoot. Even if, as the State has argued before us and as the Court has been willing to postulate, California intended to employ the land use permit in this case only as a device for exacting environmental assurances, the power to demand that permit nevertheless hinges upon the State's power to do what the statutory permitting requirements authorize: to control land use. The legal status of the matter is that Granite Rock, having received land use approval from the Federal Government, has been requested to obtain land use approval from the State of California. If state land use regulation is in fact preempted in this location, there is no justification for requiring Granite Rock to go through the motions of complying with that ultra vires request on the chance that permission will be granted with no more than environmental limitations. It is inconceivable
On any analysis, therefore, the validity of California's demand for permit application, and the lawfulness of Granite Rock's refusal, depend entirely upon whether California has authority to regulate land use at Pico Blanco. The Court is willing to assume that California lacks such authority on account of the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Ante at 480 U. S. 585. I believe that assumption is correct. Those statutes, as well as the CZMA, require federal officials to coordinate and consult with the States regarding use of federal
Any competent lawyer, faced with a demand from the California Coastal Commission that Granite Rock obtain a § 30600 coastal development permit for its Pico Blanco operations, would have responded precisely as Granite Rock's lawyers essentially did: Our use of federal land has been approved by the Federal Government, thank you, and does not require the approval of the State. We should not allow California to claim, in the teeth of the plain language of its legislation, and in violation of the assurance it gave to the Federal Government
Powered by Justia US Supreme Court Center: CAL. COASTAL COMM'N V. GRANITE ROCK CO., 480 U. S. 572 (1987)