Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/338/75/333572/
Timestamp: 2018-03-17 16:40:48
Document Index: 199406727

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 152', '§ 2255', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 2255', '§ 5841', '§ 152']

Robert Harris, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1964 › Robert Harris, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee
Robert Harris, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 338 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1964)
Sidney I. Lezak, Acting U. S. Atty., Roger G. Rose, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellee.
Appellant is a federal prisoner, presently incarcerated at the Federal Penitentiary located at Steilacoom, Washington. He appeals from an order of the District Court entered on October 3, 1963, denying his amended motion made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed upon him on October 19, 1962.
The record discloses that on August 29, 1962, he pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 5 of a six count indictment, all counts charging violations of Title 18, § 152.
Prior to entry of the plea defendant was presented with and signed a statement that he had received a copy of the indictment and read the same; that he had discussed it with his attorney and fully understood the charges made against him; that he had told his attorney all of the facts surrounding and concerning the matters set forth in the indictment, and that he had advised him that the maximum punishment for the offenses charged in Counts 2 and 5 of the indictment was ten years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000; that no official or anyone else had advised appellant that he would receive a lighter sentence or probation if he would plead guilty; that he wanted to plead guilty to Counts 2 and 5 of the indictment because he was guilty; and that his offer to plead guilty was freely and voluntarily made with full knowledge of all of the circumstances. The same answers were given by the appellant when asked substantially the same questions by Judge Solomon. The court further inquired if any promises had been made to appellant other than the fact that if he entered pleas of guilty to Counts 2 and 5 the United States Attorney would move to dismiss the other Counts. Appellant stated that no other promises had been made to him. The Court then inquired of appellant if he knew that the court was the only one who could determine if the remaining counts should be dismissed, to which appellant replied that he did. Thereupon the Court inquired: "Are you pleading guilty solely because of the fact the Government is going to dismiss these other Counts or because of the fact that you are guilty of these offenses charged in 2 and 5?", to which appellant replied: "Because I am guilty of 2 and 5, sir." Whereupon defendant entered his plea of guilty to Counts 2 and 5. The Court thereupon referred the matter for a presentence investigation, and again inquired of appellant if he wanted some other Judge to impose sentence because of his relationship to the trustee.
Appellant filed a motion to vacate and set aside his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on May 31, 1963. The petition alleged that the appellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated by reason of the bankruptcy court causing appellant to become a witness against himself (§ 5), that appellant's wife was compelled to testify without being warned of her rights under the Fifth Amendment (§ 6), that the United States had obtained illegal evidence by reason of the self-incriminating testimony (§ 7), and that counsel retained by appellant during his bankruptcy was incompetent (§ 8). On the same date appellant moved for appointment of counsel and for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum. The application to file in forma pauperis was granted and James A. Larpenteur, Jr., was appointed counsel in the post-conviction proceedings.
The only ground of disqualification asserted by appellant is that a "conflict of interest" existed between appellant and his trustee in bankruptcy which might be prejudicial to appellant in the criminal proceedings since Judge Solomon might favor the trustee's testimony over appellant's because of the brother-in-law relationship existing between Judge Solomon and the trustee. Appellant points to no fact other than the relationship to support his contention. No objection was ever made to Judge Solomon's qualifications in the criminal proceedings. To the contrary, as above shown, Judge Solomon made appellant fully aware of the relationship at all stages of the criminal proceedings. Appellant was expressly satisfied to have Judge Solomon remain on the case. In these circumstances the matter of disqualification rested within the sound discretion of Judge Solomon. We see no abuse of such discretion. Furthermore, appellant waived any later objections as to Judge Solomon's qualification. See Neil v. United States, 205 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1953); Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962).
"By his plea of guilty appellant foreclosed his right to raise objections to the manner in which evidence upon which he was indicted was obtained. This evidence, because of his guilty plea, was not used against him. Had he stood trial his objection to its introduction, if made and overruled by the trial court, could have been raised on appeal. Under the circumstances he may not belatedly raise the contention under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Eberhart v. United States, 9 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 421. * * * The conviction and sentence which follow a plea of guilty are based solely and entirely upon said plea and not upon any evidence which may have been improperly acquired by the prosecuting authorities. United States v. French, 7 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 297; United States v. Sturm, 7 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 413; Kinney v. United States, 10 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 895."
Appellant's reliance upon Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1962) is misplaced. Russell involved the constitutionality of the compulsory registration provisions of Title 26 U.S.C. § 5841, a firearms law. Since the mere act of registration compelled incrimination this court held the statute unconstitutional. That statute is in nowise analogous to the Bankruptcy Act. The mere filing of a statement of affairs is not incriminating. Unlike the registration statutes the Bankruptcy Act does not deprive the bankrupt from asserting the privilege in response to any question, the answer to which the bankrupt considers incriminating. The Act specifically provides a privilege for incriminating testimony which is non-perjurous, and imposes no criminal sanctions for failure to file schedules.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 152, in relevant part provides:
"Whoever knowingly and fraudulently conceals from the receiver, custodian, trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or from creditors in any bankruptcy proceeding, any property belonging to the estate of a bankrupt; or
"Whoever knowingly and fraudulently makes a false oath or account in or in relation to any bankruptcy proceeding;