Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20120802_0010648.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 10:20:35
Document Index: 361546573

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 636', '§ 1914', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Davon E. Mccoy v. J. Stratton
Davon E. Mccoy v. J. Stratton
DAVON E. MCCOY, PLAINTIFF,v.J. STRATTON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee will be assessed by this order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's prison trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's prison trust account. These payments will be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
In his complaint, plaintiff has named CSP-Sacramento Officers Stratton, Epp, Barnes, Hughes, Ding Felder, Jacinto, Sweeney, Salazar, Armstrong, Grinde, and John Does 1-8 as the defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he was temporarily transferred from Salinas Valley State Prison to CSP-Sacramento because he had a court appearance that he needed to attend. He further alleges that, as the defendants were escorting him, defendants Stratton and Epp pushed him against the cages face first, and defendants Stratton, Epp, and Ding Felder then body slammed him face-first into the concrete. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Barnes, Hughes, and Sweeney also joined in the attack and kicked, punched, and choked him until plaintiff lost consciousness. According to plaintiff, the defendants eventually carried him to the emergency medical unit where defendant Grinde questioned him about the events that had just taken place. Plaintiff notes that he never saw or spoke to an actual doctor regarding the injuries he sustained during the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently placed in a cell without running water and issued a prison rules violation report for Battery on a Peace Officer. Plaintiff claims that the named defendants have violated his constitutional rights because they used excessive force against him, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, retaliated against him, and illegally placed him in administrative segregation pending his hearing on the prison rules violation report. (Compl. at 11 & Attachs.)
Plaintiff's complaint appears to state cognizable claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Specifically, the court finds that plaintiff's complaint appears to state an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim against defendants Stratton, Epp, Ding Felder, Barnes, Hughes, and Sweeney. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1992) ("whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."); see also El -Shaddai v. Wheeler, No. CIV S-06-1898 KJM EFB P, 2011 WL 1332044 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2011) (finding that an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim is not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because "a judgment for plaintiff on his Eighth Amendment claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction" for willfully resisting a peace officer); Gipbsin v. Kernan, No. CIV S-07-0157 MCE EFB P, 2011 WL 533701 at *5-*7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (finding that an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim is not Heck-barred because success on plaintiff's claim would not necessarily negate his disciplinary conviction for battery on a peace officer or his criminal conviction in state court for battery); Meadows v. Porter, No. S-07-0475 HDM RAM, 2009 WL 3233902 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009) (finding that an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim is not Heck-barred because a finding that an officer "responded to the attempted battery with excessive force would not negate any of the elements of attempted battery. And although the two incidents are closely related and occurred one right after the other, they are separate and distinct events."); Candler v. Woodford, No. C 04-5453 MMC (PR), 2007 WL 3232435 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (finding that an Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claim is not Heck-barred because "defendants have not shown that if plaintiff were to prevail on his excessive force claims the validity of the finding that he committed battery on a peace officer necessarily would be implicated"). If the allegations of the complaint are proven, plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits of this action.
However, the court also finds that plaintiff's complaint fails to state cognizable claims for relief for inadequate medical care and retaliation, and with respect to his allegedly illegal placement in administrative segregation. In this regard, the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court is unable to determine whether these claims are frivolous or fail to state a claim for relief. It is well established that a complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his claims. Id.
Under the circumstances of this case, the court will allow plaintiff to either proceed on his excessive use of force claim against defendants Stratton, Epp, Ding Felder, Barnes, Hughes, and Sweeney or file an amended complaint to re-assert his excessive use of force claims and attempt to cure the defects with respect to his remaining claims.
If plaintiff chooses to proceed with this action by filing an amended complaint, he is advised of the following legal standards that govern his remaining claims. First, as to plaintiff's claim for inadequate medical care, he is advised that in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the Supreme Court held that inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 1983 unless the mistreatment rose to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Deliberate indifference is "a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence" and "requires 'more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Under the deliberate indifference standard, a person may be found liable for denying adequate medical care if he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety." Id. at 837. See also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). However, "mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). Likewise, a mere disagreement between plaintiff and defendants as to how defendants provided him with medical care fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. See Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). To state a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care, plaintiff needs to allege facts demonstrating how each defendant's actions rose to the level of "deliberate indifference."
As to his retaliation claim, plaintiff is advised that under the First Amendment, prisoners have a constitutional right to file prison grievances. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). Prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for doing so. See id. at 568. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has explained:
Id. at 567-68. To state a cognizable retaliation claim, plaintiff must allege facts establishing that the defendants' conduct was substantially motivated by, or because of, plaintiff's engagement in protected conduct. A retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, "after this, therefore because of this." See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).
Finally, as to plaintiff's claim that he was illegally placed in administrative segregation after being charged with a prison rule violation for Battery on a Peace Officer, he is advised that when prison officials determine that they need to segregate a prisoner for administrative reasons, due process requires the following minimal procedures:
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986). To state a cognizable due process claim, plaintiff will need to allege facts explaining how defendants' conduct failed to satisfy these Fourteenth Amendment standards.
1. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. Nos. 2 & 9) is granted.
3. Within thirty days of the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file either
(1) a notice informing the court he wishes to proceed solely on his excessive use of force claims against defendants Stratton, Epp, Ding Felder, Barnes, Hughes, and Sweeney in which case the court will send plaintiff the necessary documents for service, or (2) an amended complaint that re-asserts his excessive use of force claims and attempts to cure the defects of his remaining claims. Any amended complaint must comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice.
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court's form for filing a civil rights action.