Source: http://openjurist.org/330/f3d/1158
Timestamp: 2015-08-03 22:08:14
Document Index: 681674918

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 41', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

330 F3d 1158 Webb v. Sloan 1-10 | OpenJurist
330 F. 3d 1158 - Webb v. Sloan 1-10 Home
330 F3d 1158 Webb v. Sloan 1-10 330 F.3d 1158
David Q. WEBB, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,v.Darrin SLOAN, Robert Guimont, Rod Banister, Defendants, andCarson City, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, andDoes 1-10 inclusive, Defendants.
No. 01-16855.
No. 02-16253.
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2003.*
Resubmitted April 21, 2003.
Mark Forsberg, Deputy District Attorney, Carson City, Nevada, for the Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Robert W. Story, Cooke Story, Ltd., Reno, Nevada, for the Plaintiff-Appellee; David Q. Webb, pro se, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant.
Brent Kolvet, Thorndal, Armstrong, Delk, Balkenbush & Eisinger, Reno, Nevada, for the amicus curiae.
Appeals from the United States District Court, for the District of Nevada; Edward C. Reed, Jr., District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-00673-ECR.
Before: KOZINSKI, GRABER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff David Q. Webb obtained an $80,000 jury verdict in this civil rights action against Carson City, Nevada, after he was prosecuted without probable cause for obstruction of justice. His lawyers were awarded fees. In this opinion, we resolve two appeals: Defendant Carson City's appeal from the adverse verdict, and the separate appeal resulting from a challenge to the fee award by Plaintiff's counsel.
In Carson City's appeal, we hold that deputy district attorneys are final policymakers in Nevada for purposes of establishing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As a result of our holding, we affirm the jury's verdict.
We reverse and remand on the appeal by Plaintiff's lawyers because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in computing the fee.1
On June 27, 1997, Deputy Darrin Sloan chased a car into the parking lot of the Carson City Inn. At the time of the pursuit, radio traffic identified the owner of the car as Freddy Little. The driver, who was African American, got out of the car, and Deputy Sloan continued the chase on foot. After leaping over several fences in pursuit, Deputy Sloan lost track of the suspect. He then returned to the abandoned car and began an inventory.
During the next 20 minutes or so, the police received several reports that an African American man was running through areas near the Inn. Sloan's supervisor, Sergeant Moltz, saw an African American man suddenly jump from some bushes and run through the parking lot of the Nevada Appeal newspaper's offices. Shortly thereafter, another officer, Deputy Guimont, found Plaintiff David Q. Webb, an African American man, lying on the ground behind a vehicle parked in an adjoining parking lot. Deputy Guimont detained Plaintiff at gunpoint and waited for Deputy Sloan's arrival.
Deputy Sloan arrived at the location where Deputy Guimont had detained Plaintiff. He noticed that Plaintiffs clothing did not match that of the man whom he had been chasing, but that Plaintiff did have a similar black bag. Sloan asked Plaintiff, "Why were you driving Freddy Little's car?" Plaintiff responded that he did not know who Freddy Little was. The deputies arrested Plaintiff for various traffic offenses and for obstructing police officers.
On July 3, 1997, another police officer told Sloan that Freddy Little had been bragging that he had outrun the cops on June 27, 1997. Either the next day or the next business day, Sloan informed District Attorney Melanie Bruketta that he no longer believed that Plaintiff was the person whom he had been chasing on June 27. In a supplemental report, Sloan likewise wrote that he no longer believed that Plaintiff was the person who was driving the car that he had been chasing.
Despite Sloan's timely advisement, Plaintiff was not released from jail until July 16. Nor did the district attorney's office drop any of the charges. On August 15, 1997, Plaintiff met with a deputy district attorney, Ray Oster. Oster told Plaintiff that, if he pleaded guilty to the obstruction charge, Oster would drop the traffic charges. Plaintiff refused. A week later, the district attorney's office dropped the traffic charges anyhow but proceeded with the obstruction charge.
Chief Deputy District Attorney Anne Langer took over prosecution of the obstruction charge. On September 3, 1997, Langer offered to drop the obstruction charge if Plaintiff signed a waiver of civil liability. Plaintiff again refused. In a later chance meeting, Langer assured Plaintiff that she would prosecute him to conviction on the obstruction charge. Plaintiff later testified that Langer had told his lawyer that she was prosecuting him because he refused to sign the waiver.
In October of 1997, Plaintiff went to al on the obstruction charge. At the trial, Deputy Sloan testified that Plaintiff had done nothing to delay him in performing his duties. Deputy Guimont similarly testified that Plaintiff had not obstructed the police. Plaintiff was acquitted.
Shortly after his acquittal, Plaintiff filed a complaint containing nine claims for relief under both federal and state law.3 Defendants moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The motion was denied for all claims but one. Defendants appealed, seeking review on the issue of qualified immunity. Plaintiff responded to the appeal and filed a motion to certify the appeal as frivolous. The district court denied certification, and this court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff's motion for interim fees was also denied.
Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment, which was denied. The case proceeded to trial when settlement efforts failed.
The jury found in favor of Deputy Sloan on all counts, but in favor of Plaintiff as against Carson City. In special interrogatories, the jury found that Defendant Carson City had a custom, policy, or practice that violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional right not to be prosecuted without probable cause, and that Carson City has a "custom, policy, or practice to falsely imprison individuals." The jury found that Deputy Sloan did not falsely arrest Plaintiff but that Carson City falsely imprisoned, maliciously prosecuted, and committed abuse of process against Plaintiff under state law. The jury awarded Plaintiff $80,000 without apportionment among the separate claims.
Plaintiff's counsel, the law firm of Cooke Story, Ltd., moved for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $188,115.66. The district court awarded fees but determined that the total amount should be $95,507.25: $78,450 for work performed by Cooke Story and $17,057 for work performed by Plaintiff's previous lawyer, Terri Keyser-Cooper.
Carson City timely appeals the decision that municipal liability may attach for the actions of deputy district attorneys. Carson City also argues that it enjoys sovereign immunity for the discretionary decisions of district attorneys under Nevada Revised Statute ("NRS") § 41.032(2).
Cooke Story timely appeals the district court's decision to award a lower fee than it requested. Keyser Cooper does not appeal her portion of the fee award, however.
A. Municipal liability under § 1983 is proper in this case because the deputy district attorneys were acting as final policymakers for Carson City in deciding whether to prosecute Plaintiff.4
1. There are two ways to establish municipal liability under § 1983, in addition to express adoption of an unconstitutional policy.
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Congress intended the term `person' to include municipalities," such as Carson City. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.1999).
Nevertheless, municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be founded on a theory of respondeat superior. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 123 S.Ct. 872, 154 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003). "Congress intended to hold municipalities liable only when `action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.'" Christie, 176 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Generally, then, the actions of individual employees can support liability against a municipality under § 1983 only if those employees were acting pursuant to an official municipal policy. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (stating that "[t]he `official policy' requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality").