Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=785
Timestamp: 2020-04-03 16:50:23
Document Index: 70332615

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\t31', 'Art. 191', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 191', 'Art. 191', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 154', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166', 'Art. 166']

GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO & ORS versus ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORTCORPORATION & ANR
1959 AIR 308	1959 SCR Supl. (1) 319
GULLAPALLI NAGESWARA RAO & ORS V. ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORTCORPORATION & ANR [1958] RD-SC 110 (5 November 1958)
05/11/1958 SUBBARAO, K.
CITATION: 1959 AIR 308	1959 SCR Supl. (1) 319
R	1959 SC1376	(2,4) R	1960 SC1073	(13) RF	1961 SC 82	(8,12) RF	1961 SC1361	(8) F	1961 SC1575	(6) F	1962 SC1110	(8) R	1962 SC1183	(10) R	1962 SC1621	(79,118) F	1963 SC 416	(7) RF	1964 SC 381	(75) R 1964 SC 436	(8,10) R	1965 SC1017	(16) RF	1966 SC 81	(5) R	1966 SC1571	(8) RF	1967 SC1507	(6) RF	1967 SC1815	(10) D	1970 SC1095	(3,8) F	1971 SC1594	(9) R	1972 SC1863	(12) F	1973 SC 974	(8) RF	1973 SC2237	(3) D	1974 SC 669	(12) R	1976 SC2428	(9) RF	1979 SC 777	(31) C	1981 SC 660	(4,8) E	1990 SC1402 (20) OPN	1990 SC1744	(6) RF	1991 SC 933	(10)
Road Transport-Nationalisation-Scheme proposed	by State Trans-port Undertaking approved by Government-Procedure, if violative of fundamental rights-Scheme, if ultra vires-State Government, if must act judicially in approving the scheme Colourable legislation', Meaning of-Motor Vehicles Act	(IV Of 1939), as amended by Act 100 of 1956, Ch. IVA, ss. 68C, 68D-Constitution of India, Art. 31.
With a view to nationalise the road transport services under Ch. IV	A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV Of 1939), inserted into	it by the amending Act	100 of 1956,	the General	Manager of Andhra State Transport	Undertaking published a scheme under s. 68C of the Act in the Official Gazette and invited objections thereto.	By an order of	the Chief Minister the objections were received and heard by the Secretary to the Home Department, who was in charge of Transport, but	were decided by the Chief Minister.	The State Government approved of the scheme and published it in the Official Gazette.	The petitioners, who were plying their buses on various routes in the Krishna	District as permit-holders under the Act, apprehending that their routes would	be taken over	by the newly	established State Corporation in implementation of the scheme, applied to this Court for the protection of their fundamental rights to carry on their business. It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf, (i) that Ch. IVA of the Act was a piece of colourable legislation whose real object was to take	over their business, under cover of cancellation of permits, in contravention of Art. 31 of the Constitution, (2) that	the scheme	itself	was ultra vires the Act, for	the reason, amongst others, that the State Government whose duty it	was to act judicially in approving the scheme, had	transgressed certain fundamental principles of natural justice.
Held (Per curiam), that the question of	colourable legislation was, in substance, really one of	legislative competence of	the legislature that	enacted it.	The legislature could only make laws within its	legislative competence. Its legislative field might be circumscribed by specific legislative entries	or limited by	fundamental rights	created by the Constitution. The legislature could not over-step	the field of its competency,	directly or indirectly. It would be for the Court to scrutinize if	the legislature in purporting to make a law within its sphere, in effect and substance, 320 reached	beyond it, it had infact the power to the law,	its motive in making it would be irrelevant.
The power vested in the Regional' Transport Authority by s.
68F of	the Act involved no transfer of business of	the- ,existing permit-holders to the State Transport Undertaking- nor could the latter be said thereunder to take over	any assets	of the former.	Section 68G of the Act in providing for compensation for un expired period of the permit did not imply that CH. IVA of the Act involved any	transfer of property or possession so as to entitle the permit-holder to any compensation under Art. 31(2) Of the Constitution.
Chapter	1VA of the Act did not, therefore infringe	the fundamental right of the petitioners under' Art. 31 Of	the Constitution.
Per Das, C. J., Bhagwati, and Subba	Rao, jj.-While	the purpose	of s.	68C of the Act was no doubt to provide a scheme of road transport service on the lines prescribed by it, the scheme proposed might affect the	rights	of individual permit holders by excluding them, partially or completely, from the business in any particular route or routes,	and the procedure prescribed by s. 68D and Rules 8 and 10 framed under the Act, required that the Government should	hear both the objectors and the State Transport Undertaking before approving or modifying the scheme. There was no doubt, therefore, that the State was deciding a	lis and it was to do so judicially.
It was a fundamental principle of natural justice that	the authority empowered to decide a matter must have no bias in it and another, no less fundamental, was that where the	Act provided for a personal hearing the authority that heard the matter	must also decide it. The procedure followed in	the instant	case whereby	the Home Secretary, in charge of Transport, himself a	party to the	dispute, heard	the objections and	the Chief Minister decided them, violated those principles, and the order of the State Government approving the scheme, therefore,must be quashed.
Per Sinha and Wanchoo, jj.-The sole object of Ch. IVA, of the Act was to nationalise the road, transport services	and the inquiry envisaged by it was of a	limited character.
That inquiry 321 was meant to find out whether the scheme propounded was in public interest as required by s. 68C of the Act, and not to adjudicate rival claim of permit-holder on the one hand	and the State Transport Undertaking on the other	; for, on approval of the scheme, exclusion of private transport as proposed by the scheme was bound to follow as a matter of course. There	could,	therefore, be	no lis, and	the Government in approving or modifying the scheme under	Ch.
IVA and the Rules framed thereunder must be held to act in its normal administrative capacity. No objections could be taken, in the instant case, to the procedure adopted by	the Government in empowering the Secretary to hear objections while the Chief Minister decided them, and the Secretary could in no sense be a party to any dispute.
Petition under Article 32	of the	Constitution	for enforcement of fundamental rights.
M. K.	Nambyar, K. Mangachari, G. Suryanarayana and P. V.
R. Patachari, for the petitioners and intervener.
M. C.	Setalvad, Attorney General for India, R. Ganapathi lyer, P. R. Ramachandra Rao	and T. M. Sen, for	the respondents.
1958. November 5. The Judgment of Das, C. J., Bhagwati	and Subba Rao, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J. Sinha	and Wanchoo, JJ., delivered separate judgments.
SUBBA RAO, J.-This is an application under Art. 32 of	the Constitution for the	enforcement of the	petitioners fundamental right to	carry on the	business of motor transport in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh, and	for prohibiting the respondents from taking over the routes on which	the petitioners have	been plying their stage carriages.
41 322 The petitioners have	been carrying	on motor transport business in Krishna District for several years past by obtaining permits under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), as amended by Act 100 of 1956, hereinafter called the Act, in respect of various routes. They estimate the value of their investment in the -business at a	sum of	Rs.
The amending Act inserted a new Chapter IV-A	in the	Act providing for the State Transport Undertaking	running	the business to the exclusion, complete or partial, of all other persons doing business in the State. Chapter IV-A provided for a	machinery called the State Transport	Undertaking, defined	under s. 68-A(b) as an undertaking providing	road transport service, to run the transport business in	the State.	In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68-C of the Act, one	Shri Guru Pershad, styled as	the General Manager	of the State Transport Undertaking of	the Andhra Pradesh	Road Transport, published a scheme for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated transport service in public interest to operate the transport service mentioned therein with effect from the date notified by the State Government.	Objections were	in- vited within 30 days from the date of the publication of the proposal in the Official Gazette, viz., November 14, 1957.
138 objections	were received. Individual notices	were issued by the State Government by registered post to all the objectors. On December 26,	1957,	the Secretary	to Government, Home Department, in charge of transport, heard the objections. 88 of the objectors represented their cases through	their advocates ; three of them represented their cases personally and the rest were not present at the	time of hearing. After considering all the objections and after giving	an opportunity to	the objectors, their representatives	and the representatives of	the State Transport Undertaking the State Government found that	the objections to the scheme were devoid of substance. On	that finding, the State Government approved of the scheme in G.O.
Ms. 58, Home (Transport IV), dated January 7, 1958, and	the approved scheme was published in the 323 Andhra	Pradesh Gazette dated January 9, 1958.	The scheme was ordered to come into force with effect from January	10, 1958.	The Government of Andhra Pradesh also established a Road Transport Corporation under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (LXIV of 1950), called the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, with effect from January I I,'	1958, and by its order dated January 11, 1958, the said Corporation was empowered to take over the management of the	erstwhile Road Transport Department. The	said Transport Corporation	is now implementing the scheme of nationalisation	of bus transport under a phased programme.
The petitioners, who	are plying their buses	on various routes	in Krishna District, apprehending that their routes would be taken over by the Corporation pursuant to	the aforesaid scheme, seek the aid of this Court	to protect their fundamental right to carry on their business against the action of the State Corporation on various grounds.
Mr. M.K. Nambiar, appearing for the petitioners, contends that the scheme, in pursuance of which the	bus routes operated by the petitioners are sought to be taken over by the State Road Transport Corporation, is ultra vires	and illegal	on two grounds, viz., (a) that the provisions of Chapter	IV-A of the Act violates the	fundamental rights secured to the citizens by the Constitution and (b) that the scheme frained under the, Act is ultra vires the Act.
The first ground is sought to be supported by the contention that Chapter IV-A of the Act, in substance	and effect, authorizes the State to acquire the undertakings of citizens without	providing for compensation	for	the entire undertakings and therefore	it is	a fraud on	the Constitution, particularly on Art. 31 thereof. Shortly stated,	his argument	is that under Art.	31 of	the Constitution no law shall be made for the	transfer of ownership or right to possession of any property to	the State or to a Corporation without fixing the amount of compensation or specifying	the principles	on which compensation is to be determined and given, and that Chapter IV-A of the Act is a colourable legislation enabling such a transfer of ownership without providing 324 for compensation for the property transferred, under	the guise of cancellation of a permit.
To appreciate this argument it would be convenient, at	this stage,	to read the relevant provisions of the	Articles of the Constitution, omitting the words unnecessary for	the purpose of this case.
Art. 191 : All citizens shall have the right- (g) to	practise any	profession, or	to carry on	any occupation, trade or business.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the	said clause shall affect	the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of	the general	public,	reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by	the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the	said sub-clause, shall affect the operation of any existing	law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to-- (i).........................................................
(2) No	property shall be	compulsorily acquired	or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save	by authority of a law which provides for compensation for	the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes	the amount	of the compensation or specifies the principles on which,	and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and	given; and no such law shall be called in question in any 'Court on the ground that the	compensation provided by that law is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of	the ownership or right to possession of any property to	the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to 325 provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property." The Constitution (First) Amendment Act of 1951, which came into force on June 18, 1951, amended cl. (6) of Art. 19 by adding	sub-cl.	(ii) to that	clause, along	with other amendments. Clause (2) of Art. 31 has been amended, and cl.
(2A) has been inserted by	the Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955. Clause (2A) has been inserted with a view to supersede the majority decisions of this Court in the cases of State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose	(1), Dwarkadas Shriniwas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning	and Weaving Co. Ltd. (2) and Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. (3).
Clauses	(1) and (2)	of Art. 31 are	thus not mutually exclusive in scope and content, but should in my view, be read together and understood as dealing with the	same subject, namely, the protection of the right to property by means of the limitations on the State	power	referred to above,	the deprivation contemplated in clause (1) being no other than the acquisition or taking possession of property referred to in clause (2)." In Dwarkadas's case (1),this Court,	while confirming the aforesaid principle, held	that the word 'acquisition' has quite a wide concept, meaning the procuring of property or the taking of it permanently or temporarily and need not be confined to the acquisition of legal title by the State in the property taken possession of In Saghir Ahmed's case (3) applying the said	principles, this Court held (at p. 728):
" If the effect of prohibition of the trade or business of the appellants	(citizens) by	the impugned	legislation amounts to deprivation of their property or interest in a commercial undertaking within the meaning of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, does not the legislation offend against the provision of that clause inasmuch as no provision	for compensation has been made in the Act? " (1) [1954] S.C.R. 587, 608.
326 It may	be noted that though the said	decision was given after the Constitution (First) Amendment Act 195 1, amending Art. 19 (6), it dealt with a matter that arose	before	the said amendment came into force.	In the aforesaid decisions, this Court by	a majority broadly laid down the	two principles: (a) that both cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 dealt with the doctrine of 'eminent domain'; they dealt with	the topic of 'compulsory acquisition of property'; and (b)	that the word `acquisition' does not	necessarily imply acquisition of	legal title by the State in the property taken possession of, but may comprehend cases where	the citizen	has been 'substantially dispossessed' of the right to onion the property, with the result that the right to enjoy property has been seriously' impaired or the value of the property has been 'materially' reduced by the impugned State legislation.
The Constitution (Fourth) Amendment Act, 1955, amended	cl.
(2) of Art. 31 and inserted cl. (2A) in that Article.	The amendments, in so far as they are relevant to	the present purpose, substitute in place of the words 'taken possession of or	acquired' the	words	'compulsorily acquired	or requisitioned'	and provide an explanation of the words `acquired and	requisitioned' in cl. (2A). The result is that unless the law depriving any person of his property provides for the transfer of the ownership or right to	the possession of any property to the State, the law does	not relate	to 'acqtuisition or requisition' of property	and therefore the limitations placed upon the legislature under cl. (2) will not apply to such law. While realising	this legal position brought about by the amendment to the	Con- stitution, the learned counsel contends that the right to do business is property as held in Saghir Ahmad's case(1)	and that Chapter IV-A of the Act in effect transfers ownership of that business to the Corporation, owned or controlled by the State, though not directly but by the dual	process of preventing the citizen from doing the business and enabling the Corporation to do the same business in his place	and that that result is effected by a device with	a view to avoid payment of (1) [1955] i S.C.R. 707, 728.
327 compensation for the entire business so transferred.	The colourable nature of the legislation, the argument proceeds, lies in its device or contrivance to evade	limitations imposed under Art. 31 (2). To solve the problem presented, it is necessary to have a correct appreciation of the phrase `colourable legislation'. This Court considered	this question in The State of Bihar v.	Maharajadhiraja	Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga(l). In that	case	the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms Act,	1950 (Bihar	30 of 1950), was questioned. In the context of	the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar 30 of 1950), it	was contended that the impugned Act was a fraud on the Constitu- tion and therefore void. It -was stated that the Act, while pretending to comply with the Constitutional provisions when it provided for the payment of compensation, in effect produced a scheme for non-payment of compensation by shift or contrivance. Mahajan, J., as he then was, in rejecting the argument observed at p. 947, thus:
It is by no means easy to impute a dishonest motive to	the legislature of a State and hold that it acted mala fide	and maliciously in passing the Bihar Land Reforms Act or that it perpetrated a	fraud on the Constitution by enacting	this law. It may be that some of the provisions of the Act	may operate harshly on certain persons or a few of the zamindars and may be bad if they are in excess	of the	legislative power of the Bihar Legislature but from that circumstance it does not follow that the whole enactment is a fraud on	the Constitution. From the premises that the estates of half-a- dozen zamindars may be expropriated	without	payment of compensation, one cannot jump to the conclusion that	the whole of the enactment is a, fraud on the Constitution or that all the provisions as to payment of compensation	are illusory." The aforesaid observations lend support to the argument that the doctrine of colourable legislation imputes dishonest motive or mala fides to the State (1) [1952] S.C.R. 889.
328 making	the law. But, Mukherjea, J., as he then	was, clarified the legal position in K. C. Gajapati Narayan	Deo v. The State of Orissa (1). It was contended in that	case that the Orissa Estates Abolition	Act, 1952, was a colourable legislation and as such void. Adverting to	that argument, Mukherjea, J., as he then was, says at p. 10 thus:
" It may be made clear at the outset that the	doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature.	The whole	doctrine resolves itself into the question	of competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it	to act	are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at	all.
Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power......... ...... If the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies,	which have to act within their	respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, or if there	are limitations on	the legislative authority in the shape of fundamedtal rights, questions do arise as to	whether	the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in respect to the	subject matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers.	Such	transgression may be patent,	manifest or direct,	but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression 'colourable legislation' has	been applied	in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea	conveyed by	the expression is	that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of	its powers, yet in substance and in reality it	transgressed these powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears on proper examination, to be a mere presence or disguise.
As was said by Duff, J., in Attorney-General for Ontario v.
Reciprocal Insurers (1924 A. C. 328 at p. 337):
" Where the law making authority is of a	limited or qualified character it may be necessary to examine (1) [1954] S.C.R. i.
329 with some strictness the substance of the legislation	for the purpose of determining what is that the legislature is really doing.' In other words, it is the substance of the Act that is material and not merely the form or outward appearance,	and if the subject-matter in substance is, something which is beyond the powers of that legislature to legislate upon, the form in which the law is clothed would not save it	from condemnation.	The legislature cannot violate	the constitutional	prohibitions by employing an indirect method." We have quoted the observations in extensor as they neatly summarise the law on the subject. The legal position may be briefly	stated	thus: The legislature can only make	laws within it legislative competence. Its legislative field may be circumscribed by specific legislative entries or limited by fundamental	rights created by the	Constitution.	The legislature cannot over-step the field of its	competency, directly or indirectly. The Court will scrutinize the	law to ascertain whether the legislature by device put-ports to make a law which, though in form appears to be	within	its sphere,	in effect and substance, reaches beyond it. If, in fact, it has power to make the law, its motives in making the law are irrelevant.
The learned counsel for the petitioners can only succeed if he can	establish' that the provisions of Chapter	IV-A constitute colourable legislation within the meaning of	the aforesaid definition. To test the validity of the argument, it may be summarised thus : Business is I property' within the meaning of Art. 191 (g) of the Constitution. Chapter IV-A of the Act transfers the business to the	Corporation controlled. by the State Government. Such a law should have provided for payment	of compensation for the business transferred to the State Corporation ; instead, it adopted the device of	cancelling the permit of the	citizen and giving	it to the Corporation and providing compensation to the citizen only for tile unexpired period of the permit.
42 330 We shall now	proceed	to ascertain whether	any of	the aforesaid ingredients	of device or contrivance	are established in this case. Does Chapter IV-A, in effect	and substance, authorize, in law or fact, the transfer of	the business of the citizens to the State	or a	Corporation, owned or controlled by the State ? Under Art. 191 of the Constitution, every citizen has a fundamental right to carry on any business subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State under cl. (6) of Art. 19 in the interest of the general	public. The Constitution (First) Amendment	Act, 1951, reserved	to the State the right to make law	for carrying on by the State or by a Corporation, owned or controlled by	the State, any business	to the exclusion, complete or partial, of the citizens	or otherwise.	The Constitution, therefore, enables the State to make a	law placing reasonable restrictions on the right of a citizen to do business or to create a monopoly or to	make a	law empowering the State to carry on business to the exclusion of a citizen.	The right to carry on business in transport vehicles on public pathways	is certainly one of	the fundamental rights recognized under	Art. 19 of	the Constitution.	The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), regulates the	right of a citizen to	carry on the	said business for protecting the rights of the public generally.
'Permit' is defined under cl. (20) of s. 2 of the Act to mean the document issued by the Commission or a State or Regional Transport Authority	authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage or stage carriage, or authorising	the owner as a private	carrier or public carrier	to use such	vehicle. Section 57	of the	Act prescribes the	procedure for applying for and granting permits	to carry on the business in transport	vehicles on public	highways. Section 47 lays down the matters to be considered by	the Regional Transport Authority in	the disposal of applications for	such transport carriers.
Section	59 gives the conditions of every permit and	also prohibits the transfer of permit. from one person to another except	with the permission of the Transport Authority.
Under s. 60, the Transport Authority which granted permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for 331 such period as it thinks fit for any of	the reasons mentioned therein. Section 61 provides for cases where, a permit-holder dies. That section enables the success-.	sor to use the permit for a period of three months and to	get the permit transferred to him subject to the conditions laid down therein.	Section 68-F	authorises the Regional Transport Authority, for the purpose of giving effect to an approved scheme in respect of a notified area	or notified route,	to refuse to entertain any application for	the renewal of any other permit, to cancel any existing permit, to modify the terms of any existing permit so as to render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date, and to reduce	the number of vehicles authorised to be	used under the permit. It is manifest from the aforesaid provisions that the Regional Transport Authority can, in	exercise of its regulatory power conferred on it in the interest of	the public,	issue	a permit to a 'person in regard to a stage carriage authorising him to use the same in a particular route for a particular period subject to the conditions laid down in the permit,	suspend or cancel the	same under specified conditions, and renew or refuse to renew the	same after the expiry of the period subject to the conditions laid down in the Act. Under Ch. IV-A, if a scheme has been promulgated empowering the State Transport Undertaking to take on hand the transport service in relation to any area, route or portion thereof to the exclusion of any person, who has been carrying on	the business in that	route,	the Transport Authority is empowered to cancel the existing permit	and issue a	permit	to the State Transport Undertaking. It cannot be said that if the Transport Authority cancels the permit of a person carrying on	his transport business in a route and gives it to another,	the process in. volves a transfer of business or undertaking of the quondam permit-holder to the new entrant.	Indeed	the process does not involve even a transfer of the permit	from one to another. The true position is that one permit comes to an end and another permit comes into being.	The power of cancellation of a permit in favour of one and issuing a	new permit to another are 332 necessary steps in the regulatory jurisdiction entrusted to the Regional Transport Authority. The business of one	has nothing	to do with the business of another; they are	two independent businesses carried on under two different licences. If that be the true legal position in the case of issue of permits -before -Chapter IV-A was inserted in	the Act, we cannot see that the power of	cancellation of an existing permit and issuing one to the State Transport Undertaking should involve a	transfer of the previous permit-holder's business to the State Transport Undertaking.
The argument that the process contemplated by s. 68-F of the Act involves two integrated steps, viz., cancelling	the existing permit and preventing the previous permit-holder from doing the business and then issuing a permit to a nominee	of the State to enable it to do the same business and thereby, in effect and substance, transferring	the business of the existing permit-holder to the State or	its nominee, appears to be attractive, but, in our view, it is fallacious. It may be that by the said process the existing permit-holder is precluded from doing his business and it may also be that the State Transport Undertaking carries on a similar business; but by no stretch of	language or extension of legal fiction can it be said that the State Transport Undertaking is doing the same business which	the previous permit- holder was doing. If there is no transfer in the case of cancellation of a permit in favour of one and issue of a new permit to another, equally there cannot be any such transfer in the case of issue of a permit to	the State Transport Undertaking. Looking at the business	not simply	from the standpoint of the right to do	it or	the activity involved in it, but also from the standpoint of its assets,	it becomes clear that no assets pertaining to	the business of the quondam permit-holder are transferred to the State Transport Undertaking. Though the cancellation of the permit has the effect of crippling his business, none of the assets of the business is taken over by the State Transport Undertaking; he is left in the possession of	the entire assets	of the business. It is no doubt true that in	the context of the scheme of nationalisation he may not be	able to make 333 use of his assets in other routes or dispose of them at a great advantage to himself; but, it cannot be said that by cancelling the permit, what is left with him is only the ' husk'.	In fact the entire assets of the business are	left with him and the State Transport Undertaking has not taken over the same.
Lastly	it is said that ss. 68-G of the Act which provides for payment of compensation to the holder of	the permit, indicates that the legislature proceeded on the basis	that the cancellation of a permit involved a transfer	of property' from the previous permit-holder to the State.	In our view, no such irresistible conclusion flows from	the said provision; as the permit is cancelled before the expiry of the term fixed therein, the legislature thought it	fit and proper to give some compensation to the permit-holder who is prevented from doing his business for the unexpired period	of the	permit. Whether it is enacted by way of abundant caution, as the learned Attorney General says, or the provision	is made by the legislature to mitigate the hardship that	is caused to	the permit-holder by	the premature cancellation of the permit, we find it difficult to draw the inference from the said	provision that	the legislature assumed that a transfer of the	business is involved in the process laid down in	Chapter IV-A.	We therefore bold that Chapter IV-A of the Act does not provide for the transfer of ownership or the right to possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation, Owned or controlled by the State. Under Art. 31 of the	Constitution unless there is such a transfer, the law shall be deemed not to provide for compulsory acquisition	or requisition of property ; and therefore, in such a case, no	compensation need be provided for under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
We therefore hold that Chapter IV-A of the Act does	not infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners under Art.
The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even if Chapter 1V-A of the Act is constitutionally valid, the petitioners could be deprived of their rights only in accordance with the law enacted for the purpose	and in the manner provided 334 therein, and that in the present case, the	scheme	was promulgated in	derogation of the provision of the	said Chapter. The learned counsel contends that the provisions of Bs. 68-C and 68-D have not been complied with in framing the scheme. The learned counsel's contentions in	this regard fall under different sub-heads, and we shall proceed to consider them seriatim.
The first contention is that no State Transport	Undertaking is constituted	under	the Central Act	and therefore	the scheme	initiated by	the said Transport	Undertaking constituted under the Motor Vehicles (Hyderabad Amendment) Act, 1956, ",as bad. To appreciate this argument some of the facts may be stated. Before the State of Andhra Pradesh was formed in November 1956,	eight districts, popularly called	the Telengana, which are now in the Andhra Pradesh State,	were formerly	part of	the Hyderabad	State.	On September 29, 1956, the Motor Vehicles (Hyderabad Amendment) Act, 1956, became law, whereunder Chapter IV-A was inserted in the	Central Act in its application to the State of Hyderabad. Under s. 68_ A of Chapter IV-A of that Act, the State Transport Undertaking was defined to mean the	Road Transport Department of the State providing road service.
Under that Act, therefore, the Road Transport Department of the Hyderabad	State	was functioning as a statutory authority. After the States Reorganisation Act came	into force,	the said eight districts of the Hyderabad State became part of the State of Andhra Pradesh; with the result that the Road Transport Department of the Hyderabad State became the Road Transport Department of the State of Andhra Pradesh, though it was exercising its powers only in respect of that part of the Andhra Pradesh State, popularly known as Telengana. After the Andhra Pradesh State was formed,	Sri Guru Pershad, styled as the General Manager of	the Andhra Pradesh	Road Transport Undertaking, published	the scheme under s. 68-C of the Act. The argument is that the State Transport Authority constituted under Chapter IV-A of	the Hyderabad (Amendment) Act was not legally 335 constituted as	the State Transport Undertaking under	the Central Act and, therefore, the initiation of the scheme by the Hyderabad	State Transport Undertaking, which has no legal status under the Central Act was bad.	It is	also pointed	out that the State Transport Authority under the Hyderabad Act differs from that under the Central Act in the following three, respects: (1) statutory parentage;	(2) character and	constitution	; and (3)	territorial jurisdiction; and therefore the authority constituted under the Hyderabad	Act cannot function under the Central	Act.
This argument has no relevancy to the facts of the present case.	We are not concerned in this case with	a statutory authority created under one Act and pressed into service for the purpose of another Act, when the latter has adopted	the said statutory authority as one constituted under that	Act.
Here there is the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Department providing road transport service in Telengana, which is a part of that State, and that Department, when it was a	part of the	Hyderabad State was functioning as part of	the Hyderabad State Secretariat. The mere fact that the	Road Transport Department of the	Andhra	Pradesh	State	was originally part of a department of another State and	came under the definition of the State Transport Undertaking of the Hyderabad Act could not make the said department any the less the Road Transport Department of the Andhra Pradesh State.	Assuming. for a moment that the Hyderabad Act is still in force in the Telengatia area, there is nothing in law which prevents a department coming under the definition of two	statutes. Under the	Act, the State Transport Undertaking means an Undertaking providing road trasport service where	such undertaking is carried on	by a State Government. This section does not prescribe the parentage of the undertaking or impose a condition	that	the undertaking should be providing transport service throughout the State. The State Government maintained the department for providing	road transport service	and therefore	the department clearly falls within the definition of State Transport Undertaking.	The citation from Salmond on, 336 Jurisprudence to the. effect that the law in creating legal persons always does so by personifying some real thing	does not touch the question that falls to be decided in	this case; for, the real thing, viz., the department, falls under the definition	of both the Acts and therefore it	can function as a statutory authority under both the -Acts.	We therefore hold	that the Road Transport Department of	the Andhra	Pradesh Government is a State Transport	Undertaking under the Central Act and therefore it was within its legal competence to initiate the scheme.
The next objection raised is that the scheme was published by Sri	Guru Pershad, the General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking and that it has not been	established that he had been legally authorized to represent the State Transport Undertaking, the statutory authority	constituted under the Act. We have already held	that the Transport Department of the disintegrated Hyderabad State continued to function as the Transport Department of the Andhra Pradesh State after the merger of Telengana areas with	the Andhra State.	In the affidavit filed by the petitioners, it is stated that Sri Guru Pershad was the General Manager of	the Road Transport Department of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, that he was never appointed as the General Manager of	the State Transport Undertaking of the Andhra Pradesh State	and that, therefore, he had no legal authority	whatever to publish the scheme.	In the counter	affidavit filed on behalf	of the	first respondent, it is averred that	the General Manager of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport, which was a State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of s.
68-B of the Act, prepared a scheme and that was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on November 14, 1957. It is therefore a common case that Sri Guru Pershad was	the General	Manager of the Road Transport Undertaking of	the erstwhile Hyderabad State. It is not denied that Sri	Guru Pershad	continued to	be the	General Manager of	that Department functioning in Andhra Pradesh. We have already held that the same department was the	statutory authority functioning under 337 the Central Act. Sri Guru Pershad was also	the General Manager of that undertaking. In the circumstances, there is no substance in the contention that Sri Guru Pershad should have been appointed	as the	-General Manager of	the Undertaking under the	Central Act.	This is the first argument under	a different garb. The preexisting	Road Transport Department of the erstwhile Hyderabad State, with its General Manager, Sri Guru Pershad, continued to function as a statutory authority under the Central Act and therefore he had the legal authority to represent the State Transport Undertaking, which was a statutory authority. lie published the scheme and subscribed it as Guru Pershad,	the General Manager	of the State Transport Undertaking (Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport). The notification, therefore, must be held to have been issued by the State Transport	Undertaking functioning under the Central Act.
The learned counsel then contends that the scheme published does not disclose that the State Transport Undertaking	was of the opinion that	the scheme was necessary in	the interests of the public and, therefore, -is the necessary condition for the initiation of the scheme was not complied with, the scheme could not be enforced. Section 68-C	says that where any State Transport Undertaking is	of opinion that for specified reasons it is necessary in	the public interest that road port service should be run or operated by the Transport Undertaking, it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of	the scheme and publish it in the Official Gazette. An express recital of the formation of the opinion by the Undertaking in the scheme is not made a condition of the validity of the scheme. The scheme published in terms of the section shall give particulars of the nature of	the service proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto.
It is	true that the preparation of the scheme is made to depend upon the subjective opinion of the State	Undertaking as regards the necessity for such a scheme. The 43 338 only question,	therefore, is whether the State Transport Undertaking formed the opinion before preparing the scheme and causing it to be published in the Official Gazette.	The scheme	published, as already noticed, was signed by	Guru Pershad, General Manager, State Transport	Undertaking, Andhra	Pradesh Road Transport.	The preamble to the scheme reads :
" In exercise of the powers conferred by section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles	Act, 1939, it is hereby proposed, for	the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical	and properly coordinated road transport service	in public interest, to operate the following transport services as per the particulars given below with effect from a date to be notified by the Government." We have already held that Guru Pershad represented the State Transport Undertaking.	The scheme was proposed by the	said Undertaking in exercise of the powers under s. 68-C of	the Act for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service in public interest.	Except for the fact that the	word 'opinion' is omitted, the first part of the section 68-C is incorporated in the preamble	of the	scheme	; and, in addition, it also discloses that the scheme is proposed in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Transport Undertaking under s. 68-C of the Act.	The State Transport Authority can frame a scheme only if it is of opinion	that it is necessary in public interest that the road transport service should be run or operated by the Road Transport	Un- dertaking. When it proposes, for the reasons mentioned in the section, a scheme providing for such	a transport undertaking, it is a manifest expression of its opinion in that regard. We gather from a reading of the	scheme	that the State Transport Undertaking formed the necessary opinion before preparing the scheme and publishing it.	The argument of the learned counsel carries technicality to	a breaking point and for the aforesaid reasons, we reject it.
The next attack of the learned counsel centres round	the provisions of	s. 68-D (2) of the	Act. It would be convenient, before adverting to his argument, to read 339 s. 68-D and the relevant rules made under the Act.	They read :
Sec. 68-D : (1) Any person affected by the scheme published under s. 68-C may, within thirty days from the date of	the publication of	the scheme in the Official Gazette,	file objections thereto before the State Government.
(2) The State Government may, after considering	the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme.
(3) The scheme as approved or modified under	sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by	the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified	area or notified route.
Provided that	no such scheme which relates to	any inter- State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with previous approval of the Central Government.
Rule 8 : Filing of objections (procedure) Any person, concern or authority aggrieved by	the scheme published under s. 68-C may, within the specified period, file before the Secretary to Government in charge of Transport Department,	objections and representations in writing	setting forth	concisely the	reasons	in support thereof Rule 9 : Conditions for submission of objections No representation or objection in respect of	any scheme published in the Official Gazette shall be considered by the Government unless it is made in accordance with rule 8.
Rule 10 : Consideration of scheme (Procedure regarding) :- After the receipt of the objections referred to above,	the Government may, after fixing the date, time and place	for holding	an enquiry and after giving if they so	desire, at least seven clear days' notice of 340 such time and place to the persons who filed objections under rule 8, proceed to consider the objections and	pass such orders as they may deem fit after giving an Opportunity to the person of,being heard in person or through authorised representatives." Under the section, the procedure prescribed for the approval of a scheme may be summarized thus : The State Transport Undertaking prepares a scheme providing for road transport service in relation to an area, to be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking,	whether	to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons, and publishes it in the Official Gazette. Any person affected by the scheme may, within	thirty days from the date of its publication,	file before	the Secretary to Government in charge of Transport Department objections and representations in writing	with reasons in support thereof. After receiving the objections and representations, the Government fixes a date for	the hearing	and after giving an opportunity to the	persons of being heard in person or by	authorized representatives, considers the objections and then modifies or	approves of the scheme.
The following	procedure was	in fact followed by	the Government in this case: After the scheme was prepared	and published in the Official Gazette, the petitioners	and others	filed objections before the Secretary to Government Transport Department, within	the time prescribed.	138 objections were received and individual notices were issued by the Government by registered post to all. the objectors fixing	the date of the hearing for December 26, 1957.	The Secretary to Government, Home Department, in charge of Transport, heard the representations made by the objectors, some in person and others through their advocates, and also the representation is made by the General Manager of	the Road Transport Undertaking. The Secretary, after hearing the objections, prepared notes and placed the entire matter, with his notes, before the Chief Minister, who considered the matter and passed orders rejecting the objections	and approving the scheme; and the approved scheme was thereafter issued in the name of the Governor.
341 On the aforesaid facts, the first contention raised is	that the State Government in approving the scheme was discharging a quasi-judicial act and therefore the Government should have given a personal hearing to the objectors	instead of entrusting that duty to its Secretary. Secondly, it is stated that a judicial hearing implies that the same -person hears and gives the decision. But in this case the hearing is given by the Secretary and the decision by the Chief Minister. Thirdly, it is contended on the same	hypothesis, that even if the hearing given by the Secretary be deemed to be a hearing given by the State Government, the hearing is vitiated by the fact that the Secretary who gave the hearing is the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department.	The Transport Department, it is stated, in effect was made	the judge of its	own cause, and	this offends	one of	the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.	Lastly, it was pointed out that though the enquiry was	posted	for hearing	on December 26, 1957, even before the	enquiry	was commenced, the	Chief Secretary to the Government gave an interview to the 'Deccan Chronicle' and the	I Golconda Patrika' to the effect that the Government bad already taken a decision to nationalize the road transport	in Krishna District and some routes had been chosen, including	the Guntur-Vijayawada route, thereby indicating	that	the Government has	prejudged the	case before holding	the enquiry. The	learned Attorney General counters the	said argument by stating that the	State	Government strictly followed the procedure prescribed under s. 68-C of the	Act, that the said Government, being an impersonal	body, (gave the hearing through the machinery prescribed by law,	that the said Government was discharging only an administrative act and not a judicial act in the matter of approving	the scheme, that even if it did perform a judicial act, the Home Secretary in charge of Transport Department had	only collected the material and the final orders were made	only by the	Chief	Minister and that the Secretary's press interview was	nothing more than a mere indication of	the factum of the proposed scheme.
342 At the	outset	it would be convenient to consider	the question whether the State Government acts quasijudicially in discharging its functions under s. 68-C of the Act.	The criteria to ascertain whether a particular act is a judicial act or	an administrative one, have been laid down	with clarity	by Lord Justice Atkin 'in	Rex v.	Electricity Commissioners,	Ex Parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1) elaborated by Lord Justice Scrutton in Rex v. London County	Council, Ex	Parte	Entertainments Protection Association Ltd. (2) and authoritatively re-stated by	this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani (3) .
They laid down the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and (c) they should have a duty to act	judicially.
In the last of the cases cited supra, Das, J., as he	then was, analysed the scope of the third condition thus at	page 725:
" (i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising	out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights	of the contesting parties who are opposed to	each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority	to act judicially and the decision of	the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii)that if a statutory authority has power to do any	act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and	the contest	is between the authority proposing to the act	and the subject opposing it, the final determination of	the authority will	yet be a quasi. judicial act provided	the authority is required by the statute to act judicially." In the	case In re Banwarilal Roy (4) Das, J., as he	then was, said much to the same effect at page 800:
" A judicial	or quasi-judicial act, on the	other hand, implies more than mere application of the mind (1) [1924] 1 K.B. 171.
343 or the formation of the opinion. It has reference to	the mode or manner in which that opinion is formed.	It implies a proposal and an opposition' and a decision on the issue.
It vaguely connotes 'hearing evidence and opposition' as Scrutton, L. J., expressed it.	The degree of formality of the procedure as to receiving or hearing evidence may be more or less according to the requirements of the particular statute, but there is an indefinable	yet an	appreciable difference between the method of doing an administrative or executive act and a judicial or quasi-judicial act." This statement	is practically in accord with the first proposition extracted above. This Court again, in Nagendra Nath Bora v.	Commissioner of Hills Division	(1) in	the context of the provisions of Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 (I of 1910), considered the scope of the concept of 'judicial act'. Sinha, J., who delivered the. judgment of the Court, made the following observations at page 408:
" Whether or	not an	administrative	body or authority functions as a purely administrative one or in a quasi- judicial capacity, must be determined in each case, on an examination of	the relevant statute and the rules framed thereunder." In Express Newspapers Ltd. v. The Union of India (2)	this Court again reviewed the law on the subject to ascertain whether	the Wage Board functioning	under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service)	and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) was only	discharging administrative	functions or	quasijudicial	functions.
" If the functions performed by the Wage Board	would	thus consist	of the determination of the issues as between a proposition and an opposition on data and materials gathered by the Board in answers to the questionnaire issued to	all parties interested and the evidence led before it, there is no doubt that there would be imported in the proceedings of the Wage Board a duty to act judicially and the functions (1) A.I.R. 1958 S. C. 398.
344 performed by the Wage Board would be quasi-judicial in character." The aforesaid	three decisions lay down that	whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the	particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express	the view that if	an authority is called upon	to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act	judicially.
Applying the	aforesaid test, let us scrutinize	the provisions of ss. 68-C and 68-D and the relevant rules	made under the Act to ascertain whether under the said provisions the State Government	performs a judicial	act or	an administrative one. Section 68-C may be divided into three parts: (1) The State Transport Undertaking should come to an opinion	that it is necessary in public interest that	the road transport service in general or any particular. class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof	should	be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise ; (ii) it forms that opinion for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service;
and (iii) after it comes to that opinion, it	prepares a scheme	giving	particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed and causes it to be published in the Official Gazette. The section, therefore, makes a clear	distinction between	the purpose for which a scheme is framed and	the particulars of the scheme. To state it differently, though the purpose is to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and coordinated road transport service in public interest, the scheme proposed may affect individual rights such as the exclusion, complete or partial, of	other	persons	or otherwise, from the business in any particular route or routes.	Under	s. 68-C, therefore, the State Transport Undertaking may propose a scheme affecting the	proprietary rights 345 of individual permit-holders doing transport business in a particular route or routes.. The said proposal threatens the proprietary right of that individual or individuals. Under s. 68-D read with Rules 8 and 10 made under the Act,	any person	affected by the aforesaid proposed, scheme may	file objections within the -prescribed time before the Secretary of the Transport' Department. Under the said	provisions,.
the State Government is enjoined to approve or	modify	the scheme	after holding	an enquiry and after	giving	an opportunity to the objectors or their	representatives	and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the	matter in person or	through	authorised representatives. Therefore, the, proceeding prescribed is closely approximated to that obtaining in courts of justice.
There are two parties to the dispute.	The State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory authority under the	Act, threatens to infringe the rights of a, citizen.	The citizen may object to the scheme on public grounds or	on personal grounds. He may oppose the scheme, on the ground that it is not in the interest of the public or on the ground that	the route which he is exploiting should be excluded from	the scheme for various reasons., There is, therefore, a proposal and an opposition and the third party, the State Government is to	decide	that lis and prima facie it	must do so judicially. The position is put beyond any doubt by	the provision in the Act and the Rules which expressly require that the State Government must decide the dispute according to the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, viz., after considering the objections and after hearing. both the parties. It therefore appears to us	that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on	the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying	the scheme proposed	by the Transport Undertaking.
The learned Attorney General argues that ss. 68-C and	68-D do not contemplate the enquiry in regard to the rights of any parties, that the scheme proposed is 44 346 only for the purpose of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated bus transport service	and should relate only to that purpose and that, therefore, the enquiry contemplated under s. 68-D, though assimilated to a judicial procedure, does not make the approval of the scheme any	the less an administrative act.	To put it shortly, his contention is	that the Government is discharging only an administrative	duty in approving the scheme in public interest and no rights of the parties are involved in	the process. There is some plausibility and attraction in	the argument, but we cannot accept either the premises or	the conclusions. The scheme proposed may exclude persons,	who have proprietary rights in a route or routes.	As we	have pointed	out, the purpose must be distinguished from	the particulars in	the scheme.	The scheme propounded	may exclude	persons from a route or routes and the affected party is given a remedy to apply to the Government and	the Government is	enjoined to decide the dispute	between	the contesting parties. The statute clearly, therefore, imposes a duty upon the Government to act judicially.	Even if	the grounds	of attack against the scheme are confined only to the purpose mentioned in s. 68-C-we cannot agree with	this contention-the position will not be different, for, even in that case there is a dispute between the State Transport Undertaking and the person excluded	in respect of	the scheme, though the objections are limited to the purpose of the scheme. In either view the said two provisions, ss. 68- C and 68-D, comply with the three criteria of a judicial act laid down by this Court.
Support	is sought to be drawn for this contention from	the decision of the House of Lords in Franklin v.	Minister of Town and Country Planning (1).	As strong reliance is placed on this decision, it is necessary to consider the same in some detail. The facts of that case are: On August 3, 1946, the respondent, Lewis	Silkin, as Minister of Town	and Country	Planning, prepared the draft	Stevenage New	Town (Designation) Order, 1946, under para. 1 of Schedule 1 to the New (1) [1948] A.C. 87.
347 Towns Act, 1946, and on or about August 6, 1946, he caused the same to be published and notices to be given as prescribed by	paragraph 2 of Schedule I to the	Act.
Thereafter objections	were received	from a	number	of persons, including the appellants.	Accordingly,	the respondent instructed Mr. Arnold Morris, an Inspector of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, to hold a public local inquiry	as prescribed by paragraph 3 of the	said Schedule. Mr.	Morris held the inquiry at the	Town Hall, Stevenage, on October 7 and 8, 1946, and on October 25, made a report to the respondent in which he set out a summary of the sub. missions made and the evidence given	by and on behalf	of the objectors and attached	thereto	a complete transcript of the proceedings, which began with an opening statement by Mr. Morris giving a brief recapitulation of the reasons that had led to the designation of Stevenage as	the site of a New Town. On November 11, 1946, the respondent made the order in terms of paragraph 4 of Schedule I to	the Act. The appellants applied to the High Court to have	the order quashed.. It was contended, inter alia, that the	said order was not within the powers of the New Towns Act, 1946, or alternatively, that the requirements of the said Act have not been complied with; that the Minister who made the order had stated, before the Bill was made into law, that he would make the said order, and therefore he was biassed in	any consideration of the said objections.	The House of Lords held that the respondent's functions under the Act were only administrative and that he had complied with the provisions of the	statute. In that view, the order of the Court of Appeal	dismissing the applications filed by the appellants was confirmed.	Lord Thankerton in his speech at page	102, observed thus:
The respondent's duties under s. 1 of the Act and sch. 1 thereto	are, in my opinion, purely administrative, but	the Act prescribes certain methods of or steps in, discharge of that duty.................... it 348 seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objections, and, where they are not Withdrawn I of having a public inquiry, to be held by someone other than the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent in order to the final consideration of	the Soundness of	the	scheme'	of	the designation...................	I am of opinion that no judicial duty	is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only	question is whether	he has complied With the Statutory directions to appoint a person to hold the public inquiry, and to consider that person's report.
At first sight the facts of this case may appear to	have some analogy to those in the present case, but on "a deeper scrutiny of the facts and the provisions of the New Towns Act, 1946, and Chapter IV-A of the	Act, they disclose essential differences in fundamentals.	Under the New Towns Act, 1946, the following steps for developing a new	town have been laid down: (1) It is left	to the Minister's Subjective satisfaction, after consulting local authorities, who appear to	him to be concerned, to make an order designating. a particular area as the site of the proposed new town ; (2) when he proposes to	make an order, he prepares a draft of that order giving the necessary parti- culars	and publishes it in the London Gazette	calling	for objections to the, proposed order within a prescribed time;
(3) if any objection is made to the proposed order, he shall cause a public local enquiry to be held and shall consider the report of the person by whom the enquiry was held;	and (4) any person desiring to challenge the validity of	that order may apply to the High Court and he can get that order set aside only if he satisfies the Court that the order is not within the powers of that Act or that his interests have been substantially prejudiced by any requirements of	that Act not having been complied with. The steps to be taken for nationalising the Road Transport under the Act are as follows: (1) The State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory authority under the Act, proposes a	scheme;	(2) the scheme may provide that the road transport services 349 should	-be run or operated	by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion of a person or persons; (3) any Person, affected may file	objections before	the Government;(4)	the Government following the rules	of judicial procedure decides	the dispute between	the Undertaking and -the person or persons affected; (5)the dispute	is not necessarily confined only to the question- whether the 'statutory requirements have been complied with, but may also relate to the question whether a particular person	or persons should not. be excluded;	and (6) a personal hearing should be given to both the parties by the Government..
A comparison of the procedural steps under both the	Acts brings	out in	bold relief the nature of the enquiries contemplated under the two statutes.	There, there is no lis, no personal hearing and even	the public enquiry contemplated by a third party is presumably confined to	the question of statutory requirements, or at any rate was	for eliciting further information for the Minister.	Here, there is a clear dispute between the two parties.	The dispute comprehends not only objections raised on public grounds, but also in vindication of private rights and-it is required to be	decided	by the State	Government after giving a personal' hearing and	following the	rules	of judicial procedure. Though there may be some justification	for holding, on the facts of the case before the House of Lords that that Act did not contemplate a judicial	act-on	that question we do not propose to express our opinion-there is absolutely none for holding in the present case that	the Government is	not performing a judicial act.	Robson in 'Justice and Administrative Law', commenting upon	the aforesaid decision, makes the following observation at	page 533:
" It should have been obvious from a cursory glance at	the New Towns Act that the rules of natural justice could	not apply to the Minister's action in making an order, for	the simple reason that the initiative lies wholly with him.	His role is not to consider whether an order made by a local authority should be confirmed, nor does he have to determine a controversy	between a, public authority	and private interests.
350 The responsibility of seeing that	the intention	of Parliament is carried out is placed on him." The aforesaid observations explain the principle underlying that decision and that principle cannot have any application to the facts of this case. In	I Principles	of Administrative	Law by Griffith and Street, the following comment	is found on	the aforesaid	decision : After considering the provisions of s. 1 of the New	Towns	Act, 1946, the authors say- " Like the town-planning legislation, this differs from	the Housing	Acts in that the Minister is a party	throughout.
Further, the Minister	is not statutorily required	to consider the objections. It is obvious, as	the statute itself states, that the creation of new towns is of national interest." At page 176, the authors proceed to state:
Lord Thankerton did not analyse the meanings of I judicial' and I	administrative	nor did he specify the particular factors	which	motivated his classification. It	is permissible to	conclude that he looked at the Act as a whole,	applying a theory of interpretation similar to	the rule in Heydon's Case (1584, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b)." At page 178, they conclude thus:
" It	is submitted, however, that the thoroughness	with which the Courts analysed the statutes in the Errington, Robinson, Johnson and Franklin Cases and the emphasis which they have placed on the fact that their decisions have	been based solely on the statute under consideration makes	such an approach inevitable." It is therefore clear that Franklin's Case is based upon the interpretation of the provisions of that Act	and particularly on the ground that the object of the enquiry is to further inform the mind of the Minister	and not to consider any issue between the Minister and the objectors.
The decision in that case is not of any help to decide	the present	case,	which turns upon the construction of	the provisions of the Act.	For the aforesaid reasons, we	hold that the State Government's	order under s.	68-D is a judicial act.
351 The next question is whether the State Government disposed of the	objections of the petitioners	judicially in	the manner prescribed by the Act. It is said that under the Act and rules framed thereunder, the State Government should hear the dispute, but in this case the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department, who is not	the State Government, gave the hearing. The State Government is an impersonal body and it can	only function	through	the machinery and in the manner prescribed by law.	Clause	(60) of s. 2 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, defines I State Government' as respects anything done or to be	done after the commencement of the Constitution (VII Amendment) Act, 1956, to mean, in a State, the Governor, and	in a Union Territory, the Central Government. Under Art. 154(1) of the Constitution, I the executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him	in accordance with this Constitution'. Article 163 enacts that ' there shall	be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in	the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions -or any of them in his discretion'. Article 166(1) enjoins that I	all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor'.
Sub-clause (2) of that Article says that 'orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor'. And under sub-cl.	(3), 'the Governor	shall make rules for tile more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which	the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion	'. In exercise of the powers conferred by cls. (2) and	(3) of Art. 166	of the Constitution, the Government of	Madras	made rules styled as	'The Madras Government Business Rules and	Secretariat Instructions'.
Rule 9 thereof prescribes 352 that without prejudice to the provisions of r. 7, the Minister in charge of a. department shall be primarily responsible for,the disposal of the business appertaining to that department. Rule 21 enacts that except as otherwise provided by any other Rule,	cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the	Minister in charge	who may, by means of standing	orders, give	such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the department. Copies of such standing orders shall be sent to the Governor and the Chief Minister. Rule 11 says that I all orders or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of the Government of the State shall be expressed to be made or executed in the name of the Governor'. Under r.	12, every order or instrument of the Government of the State shall be signed either by a Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a	Joint Secretary, a draftsman, a Deputy Secretary, an, Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary to the Government of the State or such other officers as may be specially empowered in that behalf and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument'.
After the formation of the Andhra State on, October 3, 1953, the rules made by the Governor of	Madras, under	the provisions of the States Reorganization Act, Continue to be the rules of	the Andhra State till they are	amended in accordance with', such law. The Governor of Andhra State, in exercise of the powers conferred by cls. (2) and (3) of Art. 166 of the Constitution directed that	until other provisions are	made in this regard, 'the business of	the Government of Andhra be transacted in accordance with	the Madras	Government Business	Rules.	and	Secretariat Instructions in force on the first day of October, 1953'.
On October 26, 1956, after the formation of	the Andhra Pradesh State, as the Andhra Pradesh was not a new State but a continuation of the Andhra State, though there is change, in its name, the business rules of the Andhra state continue to govern the Secretariat of the AndhraPradesh	Government.
The effect of the aforesaid provisions may be stated thus: A State Government 353 means the Governor; the executive power of the State vests in the	Governor; it is exercised by him directly or by officers subordinate	to him	in accordance	with	the provisions of the Constitution; the Ministers headed by	the Chief Minister advise him in the exercise of his functions;
the Governor made rules enabling the Minister in charge of particular department	to dispose of cases before him	and also authorizing him, by means of standing orders, to	give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of	the cases in the department. Pursuant to the rule, the record discloses, the	Chief	Minister, who	was in	charge	of Transport, had	made an order directing the Secretary to Government, Home Department, to hear the objections filed against	the scheme proposed by the State Transport Autho- rity.
The aforesaid	machinery evolved by	the rules for	the disposal of cases by the State Government has been followed in this case.	The petitioners and others filed objections to the proposed scheme before the	Secretary to	the Government Transport Department. He gave a personal hearing to the parties-some of them appeared in person and others by representatives; the entire material recorded by him	was placed before the Chief Minister in charge of Transport, who made his order approving the scheme; and the order	was issued	in the name of the Governor, authenticated by	the Secretary in charge of the Transport Department. It	may therefore be said that the State Government gave the hearing to the	petitioners in the manner prescribed by the rules made by the Governor.
At this state, the argument hinted at	but not seriously pressed, may be noticed. The Rules the Governor	is authorised to	make, the argument proceeds, are only to regulate the acts of the Governor or his subordinates in discharge of the executive power of the State	Government, and therefore will not govern the quasi-judicial functions entrusted to it. There is a fallacy in this argument.	The concept	of a quasijudicial act implies that the act is	not wholly judicial;
45 354 it describes only a duty cast on the	executive body or authority to conform	to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power.
The procedural rules made by the Governor for the convenient transaction of business of the State Government apply	also to quasi-judicial acts, provided those 'Rules conform to the principles of judicial procedure.
The mode of performing quasi-judicial acts by administrative tribunals has	been the subject of judicial decisions in England as well as in India. The House of Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1) in the context of	the Housing, Town Planning Etc., Act, 1909, made the following observations at page 132:
" My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act	judicially.
They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must	give to	each of the	parties	the opportunity of	adequately presenting the case	made.	The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility	of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete	out justice. But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same." In New Prakash Transport Co., Ltd. v. New Swarna Transport Co., Ltd. (2)	this Court reviewed the case	law on	the subject and came to	the conclusion	that the rules of natural,-justice vary	with	varying	constitutions	of statutory bodies, and the	rules prescribed by	the legislature under which they have to act, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in	the light of the provisions of	the relevant	Act.
This Court re-affirmed the principle in Nagendra Nath	Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division (supra) (3).
With this background	we shall proceed to consider	the validity of the three alleged deviations of the State Government from the fundamental judicial procedure. In	the present case, the officer who received (1) [1915] A.C. 120.	(2) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398.
355 the objections of the parties and heard them personally or through	their	representatives, was the Secretary of	the Transport Department. Under the 'Madras Government Business Rules and Secretariat Instructions' made by the Governor under Art. 166 of the Constitution, the Secretary of a department is its head. One of the parties to the dispute before	the State Government was the Transport Department functioning as	a statutory authority under the Act.	The head of that department received the objections, heard	the parties, recorded the entire	proceedings and presumably discussed the	matter with the Chief Minister before	the latter	approved the scheme. Though the formal orders	were made by the Chief Minister, in effect and substance,	the enquiry was conducted and personal hearing was given by	one of the	parties to the dispute itself.	It is	one of	the fundamental principles of judicial procedure that the person or persons who are entrusted with the duty of hearing a case judicially should be those who have no personal bias in	the matter.	In Ranger v. Great	Western Ry.	Co.(1)	Lord Cranworth, L.C., says:
'A judge ought to be, and is supposed to be,	indifferent between	the parties.	He has, or is supposed to have, no bias inducing him to lean to the one side rather than to the other In ordinary cases it is just ground of exception to a judge that he is not indifferent, and the fact that he is himself	a party, or interested as a	party,	affords	the strongest proof that he cannot be indifferent." In Rex v. Sussex Justices Ex Parte McCarthy (2) Lord Hewart, C. J., observed:
" It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when that gentleman retired in the usual way with the justices, taking with	him the notes of the evidence in case the justices might desire to consult him, the justices came to a	conclusion without consulting him, and that he scrupulously abstained	from referring to the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of	cases shows that it is not merely of	some importance (1) [1854] 5 H.L.C. 72, 89; 10 E.R. 824, 827.
356 but is	of fundamental importance that justice	should	not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be	seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether in	this case the deputy clerk made any observation or	offered	any criticism which he might not properly have made or offered;
the question is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspects as to be unfit to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter.	The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done, but upon what might appear to be done." This was followed in	Rex v. Essex	Justices Ex Parte Perkins(1).In Franklin's Case (2), though on a	construction of the provisions of that Act under consideration in	that case it was held that the Minister was not acting judicially in discharging	his duties, his Lordship accepted	the aforesaid principle and expressd his view on the doctrine of 'bias' thus, at page 103:
" My Lords, I could wish that the use of the	word 'bias' should	be confined to its proper sphere.	Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure	from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who	are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office,	such as an	arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in	the dispute." The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural	justice that	in the case	of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between	opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or other in the dispute. It is also a matter of fundamental importance that a person interested in one party or the	other should not, even formally, take part in	the proceedings though in fact he does not influence the mind of the person, who finally decides the case. This is on	the principle that (1) [1927] 2 K.B. 475.
357 justice should riot only be done, but should manifestly	and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The hearing given by	the Secretary, Transport Department, certainly offends the	said principle of natural justice and the	proceeding and	the hearing given, in violation of that principle, are bad.
The second objection is that while the Act and	the' Rules framed	thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by	the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide.	This divided	responsibility	is destructive of	the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing	enables the authority concerned to	watch	the demeanour of the witnesses and clear-up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party- appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept	his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal	hearing	becomes an empty formality. We therefore hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure.
The learned counsel further contends that the mind of	the State Government was foreclosed before the hearing was given and therefore no real enquiry was held by it as contemplated by the	Act.	This argument is based upon	the reports published on 27-12-1957 in the 'Deccan Chronicle'	and 'Golconda Patrika'. Therein	it was	stated	under	date December, 26, as follows :
" The Chief Secretary, Mr. M. P. Pai, told pressmen today that the Government has already taken a decision	to nationalize the road transport in Krishna District and	some routes	had been chosen. The Guntur-Vijayawada	route	also comes under the nationalisation scheme. About 65 buses would be plying oil these routes." The Chief Secretary was giving this information on December 6, 1957, even before the enquiry was	commenced. On	the basis of this	publication, it is contended, that	the Government had already taken a decision to nationalize	the road transport before the scheme 358 was approved by the Government and that the entire procedure was put through to implement the decision already taken to meet the requirements of the technicalities of law. In	the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent it is stated that the scheme was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 24-12-1957 and	that the alleged statement	only referred to the said proposal under s. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act.	Though	the wording of the	information published speaks of the decision of the Government,	the Chief Secretary obviously must have been referring to	the contents of the notification published two days earlier, on 24-12-1957. We cannot from	this publication in	the newspapers come to the conclusion that the Government having finally	decided to reject all	possible objections, went through	a farce of an enquiry.	We therefore hold, for	the first two reasons, that the quasi-judicial enquiry held by the State Government was vitiated by the, violation of	the aforesaid fundamental principles of natural justice.
The last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Road Transport Corporation, i.e., the first respondent, cannot implement the scheme proposed by	the defunct	State Transport Undertaking. Some of the relevant facts are as	follows The State Transport	Undertaking published the	scheme in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated November 14,	1957.	It also appeared through	its representative,	the	General	Manager, who	made	his representation to the Secretary of the Transport Department on 26-12-1957.	The State Government approved of the scheme on 7-1-1958 and the approved scheme was published in	the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 9-1-1958 and it was directed to come into force with effect from 10-1-1958. The Government of Andhra Pradesh established a Road Transport	Corporation under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Act LXIV of 1950), for the State of Andhra Pradesh, with effect from 11 - 1- 1958. The State Government transferred the business of the Road Transport Department to the said Corporation	for management. Thereafter, the said Corporation	was taking subsequent steps to implement the scheme.
359 The argument is that the Road Transport Corporation has no power under the Road Transport Corporations Act to take over the business of the State Transport	Undertaking and to implement the	scheme initiated by that Undertaking.	The said Corporation admittedly comes under the definition of 'State	Transport, Authority'	under the Act. But	the question is whether-'	the said Corporation	is also a successor to the State Transport Authority that initiated the scheme. It would certainly be the successor if	the Corporation was legally entrusted with the duty of carrying on the	business the Road Transport Department was doing before.	On January 9, 1958, in exercise of	the powers conferred by s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporations	Act, 1950, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh established with effect from January 11, 1958, a Road Transport Corporation called the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation for the State of Andhra Pradesh. In exercise of the power conferred by s.
34 of	the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950,	the Governor of Andhra Pradesh made an order dated 11th January, 1958, for the following administrative arrangements to	come into force "(I) The Andhra Pradesh Road Transport	Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) shall take over the management of the existing Road Transport Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
(2)All land and all stores, articles and other goods of	the Road Transport Department shall pass to the Corporation.
The other clauses need not be read	as they are	only consequential to the aforesaid clauses. It is therefore clear from the said order that the Government entrusted	the management of	the Road Transport Department to the	Road Transport Corporation and directed the transfer of	all assets and liabilities to the said Corporation.	The effect of the said order is that the State 360 Corporation carries on the Road Transport business in	the place	of the State	Transport Department	which	was functioning as the State Transport Undertaking under the Act before the said order.	If there was no legal impediment in the Government transferring the business carried on by	one of its departments and its assets to the Corporation,	the Corporation would be a successor to the pre-existing State Transport Undertaking.	The petitioners contest the position that the Government has any such power under s. 34 of	the Road Transport Corporations. Act, 1950. Section 34 reads:
"(1) The State Government may, after consultation with a Corporation established by such Government, give to	the Corporation general instructions to be followed by	the Corporation, and such instructions may	include directions relating to the recruitment,, conditions of	service	and training of its employees, wages to be paid to	the employees, reserves to be maintained by it and disposal of its profits and stocks.
(2) In	the exercise of its powers and performance of	its duties under this Act, the Corporation shall not depart from any general instructions issued under subsection (1) except with the previous permission of the State Government." The Road Transport Corporation Was constituted for extending and improving the facilities of the road transport in	the Andhra	Pradesh area.	The Government transferred	the Undertaking and its assets to that Corporation and gave it directions under s. 34	of the Road Transport	Corporations Act, 1950, to take over the	management of	the	said undertaking.The fact that under the Road Transport Corpora- tions Act the Corporation can acquire an undertaking after paying	compensation is not of much relevancy for, in	this case, the Corporation	does not purport to	acquire	any transport undertaking of the petitioners. It has not	been brought	to our notice that the said direction is inconsistent with any	of the provisions of the	Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. We, therefore, hold	that the first respondent is the successor to the State Transport Undertaking which 361 proposed the scheme and as admittedly it satisfied	the requirements of the	definition of	I Road Transport Authority' under the Act, it is within its rights in implementing the scheme approved by the Government.
In the result, for the reason that the State Government	did not make the	enquiry consistent with	the principles of natural justice in approving the scheme, the order approving the scheme is hereby quashed and a direction issued to	the first respondent to forbear from taking over	any of	the routes	in which the petitioners are engaged in transport business. This judgment will not preclude	the State Government from making the necessary enquiry in regard to the objections filed by the petitioners in accordance	with law. The petitioners will have liberty to file additional objections if	any. As the petitioners have failed on substantive points in the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
WANCHOO, J.-This petition under Article 32 of	the Constitution challenges the	scheme	of road transport introduced in the Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh.	The petitioners raise two main contentions, namely, (1) that the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, violate	their	fundamental rights guaranteed	under	the Constitution, and (2) that the scheme introduced is ultra vires Chapter IV-A.
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my brother Subba Rao, J. I agree with what he has said on the first contention and therefore do not propose to repeat the facts and the reasons given by him. I have, however, been unable, with utmost respect, to	persuade myself to agree	fully with what has	been said on	the second contention. I, therefore, proceed to deal with that only.
The second contention of the petitioners is that the scheme of road transport, which is sought to -be put into effect, is ultra vires Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,	(IV of 1939), (hereinafter called the Act), inasmuch as	the provisions of that Chapter have not 46 362 been strictly followed.	Before I deal with the	contentions of the petitioners in this matter, I may indicate briefly the steps required to be taken before a scheme of	road transport is finalised under Chapter IV-A of the Act.	The first step is the preparation of the Scheme under s.	68C, which lays down that where any -State Transport	Undertaking is of	opinion that for the	purpose of providing	an efficient, adequate, economical and properly	coordinated road transport	service, it is necessary in	the public interest that	road transport services in general or	any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by	the State Transport Undertaking,	whether	to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons	or otherwise,	the State Transport Undertaking may prepare a scheme for	the purpose. After the scheme is prepared, it	has to be published in the Official Gazette and also in	such other manner as the State Government may direct. The next step is that any person affected by the scheme published under s.
68C may, within thirty days from the date of	publication, file objections thereto before the State Government;	[s.
68D(l)]. The third step is that the State Government has to consider the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objectors or	their	representatives	and	the representatives	of the State Transport Undertaking to be heard in the matter, to approve or modify the	scheme;	(s.
68D (2)). Finally, the scheme as approved or	modified is published in the Official Gazette as the approved scheme;
(s. 68D(3)). Then comes the provisions for putting.	this approved scheme into effect. Section 68F provides that	the Regional Transport Authority shall thereupon issue permits to the	State Transport Undertaking on its application in pursuance of the approved scheme. The	Regional Transport Authority is also given power to cancel or	modify	any existing permit or refuse to renew any existing permit	for this purpose.	Section 68G provides for compensation where any existing permit is cancelled or its terms are modified.
The main attack of the petitioners is that sections 363 68C and 68D were not complied with. The particulars of	the attack may be summarised as below:- (1) There was no State Transport Undertaking in existence which could have published the scheme (68C) (2) Even if a State Transport Undertaking was there, it did not form an opinion as required by s. 68C and in particular, the General Manager,	who acted for the State Transport Undertaking, had no authority to do so;
(3)S. 68D(2) contemplates a hearing by the State Government of the objections filed. There was no such hearing, as	the Home Secretary in-charge of Transport Department, who heard the objectors must be deemed to be one of the	parties	who have to be heard by the State Government, and in any case, the hearing by the Secretary was no hearing by the State Government.
(4)There was no real	bearing at all and	no genuine consideration of the objections by the State Government as the issue bad already been prejudged, (vide speech of	the Chief Secretary on the 26th of December, 1957); and (5)The	scheme could not be enforced by the Road Transport Corporation, which replaced the Road Transport Department soon after the scheme had been approved by the State Government.
It is necessary in order to appreciate and decide the point raised	on behalf of the petitioners to mention briefly	the facts relating to the preparation of the	scheme	and subsequent steps taken for its approval and	enforcement.
The scheme was published on November 14, 1957, under	the authority of Shri Guru Pershad, General Manager of the State Transport Undertaking Andhra Pradesh Road Transport. Chap- ter IV-A of the Act had come into force from the 15th of February, 1957. Before that Hyderabad State, as it	then was, had passed Act XLV of 1956, amending the Motor Vehicles Act locally and incorporating in it provisions	similar to the present Chapter IV-A. Under the	Hyderabad Act,	the State	Transport Undertaking	was defined as the	Road Transport 364 Department of the State providing road transport services.
When the Hyderabad State came to end and what was known as the Telengana area of that State was merged in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh	took over the road	transport services in	the Telengana area which were being run by the former Hyderabad State.	The present scheme was published, as already stated, on the	14th of November, 1957, by Shri Guru	Pershad on behalf	of the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh.
The objections to the scheme were received by the Secretary to Government in charge of the Road Transport	Department, and the objectors were heard by the Home Secretary in charge of the	Transport Department	on the	26th and 27th of December, 1957. The scheme was finally approved by	the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 7th of January, 1958,	and was to come into force from the 10th of January, 1958.	The approved scheme was published in the Gazette on January 9, 1958.	In the meantime, the Government of Andhra Pradesh decided to establish a Road Transport Corporation under	the Road Transport Corporations Act, No. LXIV of 1950, for	the State of Andhra Pradesh. This decision was published on the 20th of December, 1957, and the Road Transport Corporation was to come in existence from the 11th of January, 1958. It was to	take over the business of	the Road Transport Department of the State. The members of the Road Transport Corporation were appointed on the 9th of January, 1958,	and the Corporation was established with effect from the 11th of January, 1958.	It was this Corporation, which took over the duty of implementing the approved	scheme,	which	was published on the 9th of January, 1958, and was to come	into effect from the 10th of January, 1958. The steps necessary under sections 68F, 68G and 68H of the Act to put the scheme into force were taken by this Corporation.
Re. (1). The argument of the petitioners under this head is put thus: There was a State Transport Undertaking under Hyderabad Act, which was operating in the present Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh.	This 365 was the Road Transport Department of the Hyderabad State, which became the statutory body under the Hyderabad	Act.
When, however,	the Hyderabad State came to end and	the Telengana area was merged in Andhra Pradesh on the 1st of November, 1956, the State Transport	Undertaking of	the Hyderabad State continued to function as such for	the Telengana area of Andhra Pradesh. There was no extension of the Hyderabad	Act to the rest of Andhra Pradesh, and	the present	scheme relates to Krishna District which is not in the Telengana	area; consequently, it was not open to	the State Transport Undertaking which was existing under	the Hyderabad Act to frame this scheme for an area which was not in Telengana.	It was also urged that no State Transport Undertaking was formed as such after the coming into force of Chapter IV-A of the Act in February, 1957.	I am of	the opinion that there is no force in this argument. It is true that tinder the Hyderabad Act, the State Transport Undertaking was defined as " the Road Transport Department of the	State	providing road	transport service ".	When Hyderabad State came to end on the 1st of November, 1956, the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh became	the State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of	the Hyderabad Act, though, as that Act was in force only in	the Telengana area, road transport services could only be run in that area. When, however, Chapter IV-A of the Act came into force from the 15th of February, 1957, and applied to	the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Hyderabad Act must be deemed to have been repealed by necessary implication, as Chapter	IV-A of the Act covered exactly the same field as was covered by the Hyderabad Act. On the 15th of February, 1957, there was only Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh, which	was in existence and which was providing transport services in certain areas of the State.	Now, under s. 68A, a State transport undertaking is	defined as any undertaking providing road transport service, where such undertaking is carried on by the Central Government or	the State Government..." The Road Transport Department 366 of Andhra Pradesh was obviously an undertaking providing road transport service though only in a part of the State, and was carried on by the State Government of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh	became	the State Transport Undertaking under	the definition in Is. 68A.	The fact that this undertaking which came in existence by virtue of the definition on the 15th of February, 1957, was at that time providing road transport services only in a part of the State, would not make it	any the less a State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of that term and	there is nothing in	Chapter.IV-A, which precludes a State Transport Undertaking, which is for	the time being providing transport services in a part of	the State,	from extending its activities and framing a scheme for other parts of the State.	I am, therefore, of opinion that a	State	Transport Undertaking was in existence in November, 1957, when the scheme was prepared and published, and it was the Road Transport Department of Andhra Pradesh.
Re. (2). The contentions on this head are two-fold. In the first place, it is urged that the General Manager, who acted for the State Transport Undertaking had no authority to do so on its behalf This is a question of fact and should	have been specifically raised in	the petition.	All that, however, is said about the authority of Shri Guru Pershad is to be	found in paragraph 11 (e) of the petition in these words:
"Mr. Guru Pershad was the General Manager of the	Road Transport Department of the erstwhile Hyderabad State.	He was never appointed as Manager of the State Transport Undertaking of	Andhra Pradesh, and therefore,	he has no legal authority whatever to publish a scheme ".
Now, it is obvious that this objection was only confined to one point, namely, that Shri Guru Pershad had no authority to act for the State Transport Undertaking of Andhra Pradesh, as he was -never appointed as manager of	that undertaking. It was not the case of the petitioners	that even if he had been appointed as Manager of	the Andhra Pradesh State Transport 367 Undertaking, he would have no authority to frame and publish a scheme on behalf of that undertaking. It appears	that Shri Guru Pershad, who was the Manager of the road transport services when they were run by the former Hyderabad State, continued to be such	after the Telengana area of	the Hyderabad State was merged in Andhra Pradesh. It is unthinkable that Shri Guru Pershad should have issued a notification in the Gazette on the 14th of November, 1957, styling	himself as "	General Manager, State Transport Undertaking, Andhra Pradesh Road Transport ", if he was	not in fact the General Manager of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport. It	must,	therefore, be held that Shri	Guru Pershad	was the General Manager of the Andhra Pradesh	Road Transport, and, therefore,	of the State Transport Undertaking. His authority to publish the scheme, if he was the Manager of Andhra Pradesh State Transport	Undertaking, has not been attacked.	The scheme was published on the 14th of November, 1957, by Shri Guru Pershad as such Manager.
The petitioners cannot at this stage be allowed to challenge his authority to do so, when they did not specifically raise this point in their petitions.	When, therefore, he prepared and published the scheme, it must be held that he did so on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking.
The second part of this contention is that the	notification of the	14th November, 1957, does not say that the State Transport Undertaking was of opinion that it was necessary in the	public interest that the road	transport services should	be run and operated	by the State Transport Undertaking. The actual words used in the notification	are these:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, it is hereby proposed, for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service in public interest, to operate	the following transport service as per	the particulars given below with effect from a	date to be notified by the Government." No doubt, the words " that the State Transport	Undertaking is of	opinion	" are not expressly to	be found in	this notification ; but at the same time it is impossible that a proposal like	this should be prepared and published on behalf	of the	State	Transport Undertaking	without	its forming	an opinion that it was necessary in	the public interest to do so. I am of opinion that the State Transport Undertaking must have formed the opinion necessary under s.
68C before it published its proposal and invited objections to the same. There 175 no exact form of words provided	for this purpose, and it would be quite in order to draw	the inference from the words used in the notification that it was published	after the State	Transport Undertaking	had formed	the opinion necessary	under	s. 68C. In	this connexion, reference may be made to paragraph 2 of	the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of	the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, where it is said that	the General	Manager of the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport which was the State Transport Undertaking, was of opinion that the transport services in the Krishna District of Andhra Pradesh should	be operated in the public interest by	the Andhra Pradesh Road Transport.	It was, however, urged on behalf of the petitioners that this only disclosed the opinion of	the General Manager and not of the State Transport	Undertaking;
but, as I have already said above, the authority of	the General	Manager to speak on behalf of the State Transport Undertaking was never specifically	challenged in	the petition. There is, therefore, no force in this contention, and it must be rejected.
Re. (3). This contention relates to the hearing by	the State Government under s. 68-D(2). In order to determine this question, it is necessary to consider whether the State Government, when it gives a hearing under s.	68-D(2), is acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal or is merely performing administrative functions. If the State Government acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal certain considerations apply to	the nature	of the hearing granted ; if, on the other hand,	the State Government acts administratively, certain other 369 considerations	apply in determining the propriety of	the hearing	in fact given in this case.	The contention on behalf	of the petitioners is that the hearing	contemplated is as	a quasi-judicial tribunal. The learned Attorney General, on the other hand,	contends that	the State Government merely acts administratively when	it gives a hearing	under	this provision.	What constitutes a quasi- judicial act has been considered by this Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani (1). The principle has been summarised by Das J. (as he then was) at p. 725, in these words:
(i)that	if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising	out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights	of the contesting parties who are opposed to	each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority	to act judicially and the decision of	the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii)that if a statutory authority has power to do any	act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and	the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of	the authority will	yet be a quasi-judicial act provided	the authority is required by the statute to act judicially.
In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is	not decisive in taking the act of the authority	out of	the category of quasi-judicial act if	the authority	is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially." Now, it may be mentioned that the statute is not likely to provide in so many words that the authority (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621.
47 370 giving	the hearing is required to act judicially; that	can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute.
In the present case, it is urged by Mr. Nambiar appearing for the petitioners that there were two parties before	the State Government, which was the deciding authority under s.
68D(2), namely, the objectors and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking. Therefore, according to	him, prima facie, there would be a duty to act judicially	and there is no other factor which would take away the inference to be deduced from the presence of two parties	before	the State Government, which has to decide the matter. Whether there is any other factor will, however, depend upon	the circumstances of each case, and the nature of	the matter under hearing	and the scope of the hearing. The learned Attorney General contends that if one looks at the nature of the matter to	be heard and considers	the scope of the hearing	before the State Government in this case the	only conclusion possible is that	the State Government	acts administratively when	it gives a hearing under section 68(2).
What then is the nature of the hearing before the State Government ?	Article	19(6)(ii) is	of help in	this connection. It provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of article 19(1), which deals among other things with the right to carry on trade or business shall prevent the State	from making	any law relating to the carrying on by the State or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of	any trade,	or business, whether to the exclusion,	complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Chapter IV-A has	been inserted in the Act to carry out this purpose, so that	the State may operate transport services	to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens. The scheme which has been published provides that there will be a complete exclusion of citizens when the scheme is enforced in the area to which it relates. Now, the question is whether the exclusion of citizens as a whole is also an issue to be decided by	the State Government when it hears objections.	Mr. Nambiar submits	that the most important thing for	the State Government to	decide is whether there should	be complete exclusion of citizens 371 on the	enforcement of the scheme. The learned Attorney General	on the other hand contends that all that the State Government has to do is to see whether the scheme published is in the interest of the public and also whether it	will provide	an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service. The argument continues that if the State Government comes to that conclusion, the complete exclusion which the scheme provides	ipso facto follows, and the State Government has not to	decide	the matter of exclusion as a separate issue. In other words, the argument is that the State Government is not to decide between the competing claims of citizens providing transport privately and	the State Transport Undertaking providing transport to the exclusion of citizens, and there	is, therefore, no real lis in this case. It is also pointed out that objection can not only be filed by the bus operators of that area who are to be excluded but also by anybody who is affected by the scheme, including the members of	the travelling public. Giving, my best consideration to	the arguments on either side on this aspect of the matter, I have come to the conclusion that the scope of	the hearing before	the State Government is of a	limited character, though the decision may affect citizens providing transport, the question whether private citizens should or should	not be allowed to provide transport is really not a matter in issue before the State Government. What is	in dispute before the State Government is only whether the scheme	that is proposed by the State Transport	Undertaking is an efficient, adequate, economical and properly	coordinated scheme	for road transport service and whether it is in	the interest of the public. If the State Government comes to the conclusion that it is so, a complete exclusion proposed automatically follows and the question of exclusion is	not to be	determined as	a separate issue as	between	the objectors and the State Transport Undertaking.	It is	true that the State Government has the right to modify the scheme and in so doing it may drop a part of the scheme; but	here again it is not modifying the scheme because of any right of a 372 private	citizen to carry on road transport service in a particular area but because it considers that the scheme so far as that particular area is concerned is not efficient, adequate, economical or properly coordinated	or in	the public	interest. Unless it comes to that conclusion	with respect to any part of the area. comprised in-the scheme and modifies it, the consequence of complete exclusion	ipso facto follows.	What I wish to emphasise is that the State Government is	not determining whether there should be Statemonopoly or private enterprise when it is	considering objections under s. 68D(2); it is only deciding whether	the scheme put forward before it is such as can be approved with or without modifications within the four corners of the	law laid down under s. 68C.	If it comes to that conclusion, the complete or partial exclusion follows. If on the other hand it modifies any part of the scheme, exclusion fails to	that extent.	Considering, therefore, the nature and the scope of the hearing under s. 68D(2) it seems to me that there is really no lis.	Even though there may be two parties before the State Government at the bearing, there is	no determination of the rights of the parties before it.	The determination is only of the efficiency etc. of the scheme.
proposed and	whether	it is	in the public interest.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the nature of the hearing in this case makes the State Government a quasi-judicial tribunal and the decision a quasijudicial act	within	the meaning of the principles laid down in Advani's Case(1).
I may	in this connexion refer to Franklin v.	Minister of Town and Country Planning (2).	The facts there were these:
Under the New Towns Act, 1946, the Minister prepared a draft order for a new town and caused it to	be published,	and notices were given to the persons affected.	Thereafter objections were received from a number of persons who	were the owners and occupiers of dwelling-houses and lands in the affected area.	The Act provided that on receipt of	the objections, an inspector was to hold a public local inquiry into the objections and make a report to (I) [1950] S.C.R. 621.
373 the Minister. Thereupon, the Minister made the order under the Act. These proceedings, as provided by the Act,	were taken with respect to a place called Stevenage in 1946	and the Minister passed the necessary order eventually. Some of the owners and occupiers of	dwelling-houses and lands situate at Stevenage applied to the Court to have the order quashed, on the ground, among others, that the	requirements of the said Act had not been complied with and the interests of the appellants had been substantially	prejudiced.
According to them, the New Towns Act, 1946, impliedly required that	the objections of the appellants should be fairly and properly considered by the Minister and that	the Minister should give fair and proper effect to the result of such consideration in deciding whether the said order should be made and that such implied requirements were not complied with.	It was held in that case that the Minister of	Town and Country Planning had no judicial or -quasi-judicial duty imposed	on him and the procedure followed was according to the requirements of the Act.
Now, substitute in the place of the New Towns	Act, 1946, Chapter	IV-A of the Act; substitute in the place of	the draft order of the Minister, the draft scheme of the State Transport Undertaking ; and substitute in place of the final order,	the final approval of the State Government after hearing the objections.	It would seem, therefore, that	the parallel between the present case and Franklin's case (1) is complete. There a draft order was published,	followed by objections and	an inquiry and hearing and a final order.
Here also a draft scheme is published, followed by objec- tions and hearing, and final approval.	There the interest of persons occupying lands and houses in the area proposed to be	affected by the order were involved. Here also	the interests of the bus-operators at least, if not also of	the travelling public, are involved. In spite of that it	was held that the Minister had no judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on him by the Act, and the reason was that he was merely considering whether the scheme should go through.
Once he came	to that conclusion after following	the procedure (1) [1948] A.C. 87.
374 provided in the Act, the' effect on those occupying lands and dwelling	houses	would follow,	according to	the provisions of the Act.	Here also once the State Government decides that the scheme should be approved, the effect would be complete or partial exclusion of the bus operators of that area, as	envisaged in	the scheme. To my mind, therefore, the present case is parallel to Franklin's	case (1) and on a parity of reasoning I would hold that	the function of the State Government was administrative when it considered the	objections under s. 68D(2) and	not quasi- judicial. The only difference that I see between the	two cases is that the New Towns Act provided specifically	for hearing	of the objections by an Inspector and not by	the Minister while this is not so in the present case. I shall consider the effect of this later; but this	has in my opinion, little, if any, bearing on the question whether the State Government was acting quasi-judicially when deciding objections under s. 68D(2).
I may also in this connexion refer to Nagendra Nath Bora v.
Commissioner of Hills Division (2), where it was held by this Court that the question whether or not	an administrative body or authority functions	as purely administrative	or in a quasi-judicial	capacity, must be determined in each case on an examination of the relevant statute	and rules framed thereunder. Similar was the	view expressed by this Court in Express Newspapers Ltd. v.	The Union of India (3), when considering the functions performed by a wage Board, and it was observed that whether the	wage Board exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions is to be determined	by the relevant provisions of	the statute incorporating it and it would be impossible to lay down	any universal rule which would help in the determination of this question. Applying, therefore, the principles laid down by this Court in	these cases and taking into	account	the express provisions contained in Chapter IV-A and the Rules framed thereunder, the conclusion at which I arrive is	that the hearing under s. 68D(2) was not before a quasi-judicial tribunal and the decision was not a quasi-judicial act and (I) [1948] A.C. 87.	(2) A. I.R. 1958 S.C. 398.
Having	reached	this decision, let me	see what actually happened in this case. The matter pertains to the	Road Transport Department which was in charge of the Chief Minister. The Home Secretary works under the Chief Minister and was in charge of the Road Transport Department.	The Chief Minister	ordered, when the objections were put up before	him, that the representation should be heard by	the Home Secretary, and thereupon, the Home Secretary heard	the objectors and a note of the hearing was placed before	the Chief Minister for orders. The Chief Minister then passed the order approving the scheme. The main attack on this kind of hearing is two-fold. It is urged in the first place that rule 10 framed under Chapter IV-A of the Act provides that the objectors will be given an opportunity of being heard in person or through authorised representatives.	It is said that in view of this rule it was not open to	the Chief Minister	to direct the Home Secretary to bear	the objections when the decision was to be made by the Chief Minister. It	is pointed out that in Franklin's case	(1) there was a specific provision that an Inspector will	hold an inquiry and hear the objections and make his report,	and thereafter the	Minister will pass the final order on	the report	of the	Inspector. There is	no such specific provision in the Act	or the Rules in this case,	and, therefore, the	hearing by the Home	Secretary in these circumstances cannot be said to be a hearing by the State Government or	the Chief Minister who had to	decide	the objections. The learned Attorney General relies in	this connexion on the Rules of Business framed under article 166(3) of the Constitution which provides for the making of rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, a copy of which was shown to us. It is said in paragraph 13(1) of the counter-affidavit that these Rules do not provide for personal hearing; but it is open to the Minister to pass a standing order as he thinks	fit for the disposal of business in his Ministry.
376 Chief Minister	passed	an order that	the Home Secretary should	hear these representations in order to	comply	with the provision of Chapter IV-A and Rule 10, even though there is no provision in the Rules of Business for oral hearing by the Minister or the Secretary.	It is urged by Mr. Nambiar that the order passed by the Chief Minister in this	case that the hearing should be given by the Home Secretary	was not a standing order but an order in this particular case.
That seems to	me to be correct ; but the	question is whether, when an administrative hearing of this nature is being given under a rule which provides that the State Government should give a hearing to objectors, it is necessary that the Minister who decides must also hear.	It seems to me that where the hearing is administrative, it is not essential	that the Minister must hear, so	long as a hearing is given by an officer of the Government. I may in this connexion	refer to article 154 of the Constitution, which provides that the executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by	him either	directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. This being an	ad- ministrative hearing comes within the executive power of the State and there would be no infirmity if the Governor,	who in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, is the State Government, authorised through the Chief	Minister a subordinate officer to give the hearing. Reference in	this connection may	also be made to Local Government Board v.
Arlidge	(1), which dealt with the manner of hearing of an appeal by the Local Government Board under the Housing, Town Planning &c., Act, 1909. The following observations of Lord Haldane at p. 132 are apposite in this context :- " In the case of a Court of Law tradition in this country has prescribed certain principles to which in the main	the procedure must conform.	But what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of the tribunal. In modern times it has become increasingly common for Parliament to give an appeal (1) [1915] A.C. 120, 132.
377 in matters which really pertain to administration, rather than to the exercise	of the	judicial functions of an ordinary Court, to	authorities whose functions	are administrative and not in the ordinary sense judicial.	Such a body	as the local Government Board has the duty of enforcing obligations on the individual which are imposed in the interest of the community. Its, character is that of an organization with, executive	functions. In this	it resembles other great	departments of the State. When, therefore, Parliament	entrusts it with judicial duties, Parliament must be taken, in the absence of any declaration to the contrary, to have intended it to follow the procedure which is its own, and is necessary if it is to be capable of doing its work efficiently." These observations show that when one is dealing with a body like the State Government one has to take into account	the procedure usually followed by the State Government in matters that come before it. In these circumstances if	the Minister ordered, in the absence of specific rules on	the point, that the hearing should be by the Secretary, he	was, in my	opinion, complying with the essential	requirement, namely,	that there should be an oral hearing by the State Government before the	decision of the objections.	The bifurcation of the function of hearing from the function of deciding cannot in the circumstances, when the hearing	was administrative,	be said to be improper or against rule	10, and was necessary in order that the Government may function efficiently. Therefore, I am of opinion that the hearing by the Secretary was sufficient compliance of rule 10, which required a personal hearing before the decision of	the objections.
The second ground of attack under this head is that in	any case the Home Secretary who was also in charge of the	Road Transport Department was not the right person to hear	the objections on the ground that the scheme was put forward by his department.	Here again the fact that the hearing was of an administrative nature has to be borne in mind. Bearing that in 48 378 mind and also considering that it was the Chief Minister who finally	decided the matter and approved the	scheme, it cannot	be said that the Home Secretary in charge of	the Transport Department was an improper person to give	the hearing. After all,	the scheme was	put forward as a proposal. It	was open to approval or	modification after hearing	the objections. The body which put	forward	the scheme was the State Transport Undertaking which was a	limb of the	Government. The Government has in a case of	this kind to hear objections against a scheme prepared by one of its own limbs.	In these circumstances, if the Head of the Department, namely, the Secretary hears the oral objections on a scheme prepared by some one in that department	who would necessarily be under him, like the General Manager of the Road Transport Department, it does not follow that	the Secretary is an improper person to give the hearing because he hears his subordinate who put forward the scheme also, along with the objectors. Further, the Secretary in	this case is not the deciding authority which is the Chief Minister' He made notes of the hearing and conveyed	the arguments to the Chief Minister, and as the	matter	was purely	administrative, the procedure cannot be said to be improper. I am, therefore, of opinion that the	contentions under this head must be rejected.
Re. (4). It is said that there was no real hearing at	all and no genuine consideration of the objections as the issue had already been pre-judged, and reliance in this connexion is placed on the statement of the Chief Secretary dated	the 26th of December, 1957. It appears that the Chief Secretary said that the Government had already taken a	decision to nationalise transport in Krishna District and	some routes had been chosen. Learned Attorney General contends	that this only refers to the scheme which had already	been published on the 14th of November, 1957. Mr. Nambiar on the other hand contends that it goes much further and shows that the Government had already made up their mind to nationalise road transport in Krishna District and therefore the hearing which the State Government gave to the objectors to	the scheme was 370 a farce. Now, taking into account what I have	said above about the scope of the hearing under s. 68D(2), it would be clear that there was no prejudging of the issue so far as the scheme was concerned. It is true that the Chief Secretary said	that there would be	nationalisation in Krishna	District, which meant of course complete exclusion of the private bus operators;' but I have already said	that the scope of the hearing under s. 68D(2) is	to consider whether	the scheme is efficient, etc., and is in public interest. If the answer is yes, complete exclusion follows.
Therefore, when the Chief Secretary said that the Government had decided to nationalise road transport	in Krishna District, he was certainly not saying that the Government was wedded to the scheme which was published and to which objections had been invited. The speech merely emphasises the aspect of complete exclusion; but it nowhere says	that the scheme which was to bring about	the exclusion	into effect	had already been approved. I may again in	this connection refer to Franklin's case (ibid), where also an argument was raised that the Minister was biased so far as any consideration of the draft order was concerned, as he had said in an earlier speech that he would make the	said order.	It was held that as the Minister had no judicial or quasi-judicial duty imposed on him, consideration of bias in the execution of this duty was irrelevant, the sole question being whether or not he genuinely considered the report	and the objections.	In the present case also, the sole question was whether the objections to the scheme were genuinely considered. If after	genuine consideration	they	were approved, complete exclusion would follow. Simply because the Chief Secretary said that the Government had decided to nationalise road transport in Krishna District, it did	not follow	that the Government was not prepared	to consider fairly the objections to the scheme on the approval of which nationalisation	would	follow through	complete exclusion.
380 Re. (5). It is urged that the scheme was proposed by	the Andhra	Pradesh	Road Transport Department as the State Transport Undertaking within the meaning of s. 68A and	was approved while that undertaking was still in existence.	But immediately after -the scheme was approved the	Undertaking came to an end and the Road Transport Corporation came	into existence and	that Corporation could not carry out	the scheme	which	had been approved before it	came	into existence. The argument seems to be that the body which prepared the scheme and got it approved is the	body which can enforce it, and as the	Road Transport	Corporation neither	prepared it nor got it approved, it cannot enforce it. I	am of	opinion that there is	no force in	this contention. The Road	Transport Corporation	came	into existence oil the 11th of January, 1958. On the same	date the State Government passed an order under s. 34 of the Road Transport Corporation	Act No. LIV of	1950 by which it directed that the Corporation shall take the management of the Road Transport Department of the Government of Andhra, Pradesh	and all assets and liabilities of the Department shall pass to	the Corporation. The	staff of the	Road Transport Department were given option to serve under the Corporation and direction was given that those who opt to serve the Corporation shall be employed by the	Corporation subject to the regulations made under the Act and	the assurance given by the Government to the employees.
Section	34, however, gives very wide powers to the State Government to give directions to the Corporation, including directions relating to the recruitment, condition of service and training of its employees, wages to be paid to	the employee, reserve to be maintained by it and disposal of its profits or stocks. In the circumstances, it was open to the State Government, under the wide powers Conferred by s. 34 of the Road	Transport Corporation	Act, to ask	the Corporation which was being created to take over the assets, liabilities and the employees of the Road Transport 381 Department which was being wound up.	Now, the effect of this order was to make the Road Transport Corporation a successor of the Road Transport Department. It is true that there is nothing in Chapter IV-A of the Act which provides for succession of one kind of undertaking as defined in s.
68A(b)	by another kind of undertaking as defined therein, but when in fact it	happens that	the Road Transport Corporation is	ordered under s. 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act to take over everything from the Road Trans- port Department, there is no reason why it should not be considered to	be the	successor of	the Road Transport Department which was	at that time the State Transport Undertaking. If the Road Transport Corporation is thus a successor of the State Transport Undertaking from the	11th of January, 1958, I do not see why it cannot	enforce	the scheme	which had already been approved at the	instance of its predecessor. I can see no sense in requiring the	Road Transport Corporation to go through all these	steps which had been gone through by its predecessor, except that it would delay the coming into force of the scheme ; probably, the argument has been raised merely for the sake of delay.
But I am of opinion that the Road Transport Corporation in this case being the	successor of the State Transport Undertaking which got the Scheme prepared and	approved is en-titled to enforce it under s. 68-F of Chapter IV-A in the absence	of any provision to the contrary in the Chapter.
In view of what I have said above on the second	contention, the petition fails and I would dismiss it with costs.
SINHA, J.-I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments prepared by our brothers, Subba Rao and Wanchoo, JJ. After giving my best consideration to the opinions expressed in the two judgments, I have come to the conclusion that I am not in a position to agree with all the conclusions arrived at by	our brother Subba Rao.
Two main controversies were	raised	on behalf of	the petitioners, namely, (1) that the provisions of Chapter 382 IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (which will be referred to in the course of this judgment as the Act), violate	the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens of India under the Constitution, and (2) that the scheme framed under the	Act, was ultra vires the Act. I agree with my brother Subba	Rao that the said Chapter IVA of the Act does not infringe	any fundamental rights of	the petitioners, and	that those provisions are constitutionally valid.	I also	agree	with him in	holding that the Road Transport Department of	the Andhra Pradesh Government, is a State Transport	Undertaking under the Central Act; that the Notification publishing	the scheme	had been validly done, and that the conditions precedent to the initiation	of the	scheme, had	been fulfilled. But I do not agree with him in his conclusion that the State Government, in approving the published scheme,	was discharging any	judicial or quasi-judicial function. On	the other hand, I agree with	my brother Wanchoo	in his conclusion that in so doing, the State Government was	only performing its normal administrative function.
As my learned brothers aforesaid have stated the relevant facts in detail, it is not necessary for me to repeat them, but as I differ from my learned brother Subba Rao, with whom some of my colleagues on the Constitution Bench have agreed, and for whose opinions, I have the greatest	respect, I should	state my reasons for differing from them and	for agreeing with our brother Wanchoo. It may be taken as	the settled	view of this Court that the	question whether a certain	decision envisaged in a statute, is	judicial or quasijudicial or only administrative in character, must	de- pend upon the terms of the statute law itself,	apart from any pre-conceived notions about the functions of a court or other tribunals vested with the duty and jurisdiction to decide controversies as a judicial body, vide	Province of Bombay	v. Kusaldas S. Advani (1), Nagendra Nath Bora v.
Commissioner of Hills Division(2) and	Express Newspapers Limited	v. Union of India (3). Now, let us see what	has been envisaged by the im- (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621.	(2) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398.
(3) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 578.
383 pugned provisions of Chapter IVA of the Act. The first step in the	process is the preparation of	a scheme of	road transport service by a State Transport Undertaking "for	the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical	and properly coordinated road transport service." Such a scheme may be	to the exclusion, complete or	partial, of other persons	or otherwise.	The second step would be to publish such a scheme in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner	as the State Government may direct, giving particulars of	the nature of the service proposed to be rendered, area	or route proposed to be covered and other prescribed particulars-(s. 68-C). The third step in	that process	is the filing of objections to the scheme by	any person	affected by the scheme so	published. Those objections have to be filed before the State Government within	thirty days from the date of the publication of	the scheme-(s. 68-D (1)). The fourth step is to be taken by the State Government, of considering the objections after giving an opportunity to the objectors or their representatives and the representatives of the State Transport Undertaking, to be heard-(s. 68-D(2) ). And the last step is	that after hearing	all concerned, the State Government may approve or modify the scheme. It is noteworthy that this section	does not contemplate an outright rejection of the scheme but only a modification, if it is necessary. The scheme as approved or modified, has then to be	published in the Official Gazette, and thereupon, the scheme becomes final. Such a scheme	is called the "approved scheme ", and the area or route to which it relate,,;, is called the "notified area" or "notified route"-Is. 68-D(3) ). The approved scheme	may at any time be cancelled, or modified by the State Transport Undertaking, according to the procedure already indicated, as contained in S. 68-C and s. 68-D, if it is	proposed to modify it-(s. 68-E). The provisions of Chapter IV, relating to the	grant of stage carriage permits, etc., have	been abrogated so as to make it obligatory on the Regional Trans- port Authority	to issue permits applied for	by a State Transport Undertaking, in pursuance of the approved scheme.
Not only that, with a view to giving effect 384 to the	approved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route, the Regional Transport Authority has	been authorized to refuse renewal of any permit, to	cancel	any existing permit, or to modify the terms of any existing permit-(s. 68-F). The provisions of s. 64,	relating to appeals	by aggrieved persons against orders of	refusal to grant a permit, or of revocation or suspension of a permit, or of refusal to renew a permit, etc., have been abrogated in so far as those orders have been passed under s. 68-F.
A review of the provisions aforesaid, contained in ss.	68-C to 68-F in	Chapter	IV-A,	leads	to the following conclusions:- (1)A State Transport Undertaking has	been authorized to determine whether or not it is in the public interest	that road transport services in general, or any particular class of service, should be run and operated by the State Undertaking, in relation to any area or route or a portion thereof, keeping in view the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly	coordinated road transport	service. It is for the State Transport Undertaking to	prepare a scheme in	furtherance of	its determination in favour of such a service, and	to publish the same in the Official Gazette and elsewhere, with a	view to informing the public, including those who may be affected by such a scheme.
(2) Objections	to such a scheme may be taken	by parties interested, but such objections are not claims.
(3) The State	Government is	authorized to	decide	the question whether the proposed scheme should be approved or modified, after hearing the parties or their representatives in support of	their objections to the scheme. As	the objections have to be directed to the merits of the scheme proposed by the State Transport Undertaking, there is	no question of any	lis between conflicting claims.
(4) No	particular person or	body of persons in	the Governmental hierarchy of officers, has been designated as the Authority to hear the objections and to pronounce	upon them, unlike the provisions in Chapter IV.	Neither	the provisions in Chapter IV-A nor the rules made in pursuance of s. 68-1, contemplate 385 adducing evidence or calling witnesses in support of or in opposition to the proposed scheme.
(5)The	right of appeal as contemplated by s. 64 in Chapter IV, has been expressly abrogated by s. 68-F(3). Nor is there any provision in Chapter IV-A, requiring reasons to be given in writing for	an order. passed by	a Regional Transport Authority under s. 68-F(1) and (2), as contrasted with s. 57(7) in Chapter IV, which requires the Authority to give its reasons in writing for refusing an application	for a permit of any kind, because such an order	is open to appeal, revision or review.
The question now arises whether, in view of the provisions of Chapter IV-A, summarized above, and the conclusions as indicated above, the determination by the State Government is judicial or quasi-judicial in character, as contended for the petitioners, or only of an administrative character, as contended on behalf of the respondents. In order that a determination may be characterized as judicial or quasi- judicial, it is essential that it should be objective, based on evidence pro and con (not necessarily given in accordance with the strict rules of evidence)	by a	determinate authority who should not have the right to delegate such a function of a judicial character. Section 68-D(2) authori- zes the State	Government to decide whether	or not	the proposed scheme should be approved or modified.' The "State Government" may mean the Governor himself or	any of	his Ministers or Deputy Ministers or any officers in	the Secretariat, according to the rules of business	promulgated under Art. 166 of the Constitution. Section 68-D(2) could not have meant that the Governor himself or	any of	his Ministers should personally hear the objections-that would be throwing too great a burden on them.	The objections	may be heard by any one who has been delegated that power.	If that is correct, the function to be performed under s.	68- D(2), does not satisfy the test of a judicial hearing.
Under that section, the objections may be heard by 'A'	and the decision arrived at by 'B'.	If that is 49 386 a regular procedure under that section, that is not an index of a judicial process.
Another	very	important consideration pointing to	the conclusion that the determination under s. 68-D(2) is not of a judicial character (using it in the comprehensive sense, including 'quasi-judicial', which expression has not	been approved by high judicial authorities), is that no objective tests have been laid down in Chapter IV-A with reference to which,	the determination has	to be	arrived at.	The expressions "efficient", "adequate", "economical", "properly coordinated" and "public interest", are matters of opinion and policy as s. 68-C itself indicates, and do not lay	down any objective	tests.	If I am right in that	conclusion, there cannot be any question of evidence forthcoming in proof of something which is subjective to the authority determining that matter.
A very	fundamental consideration in this connection, is whether	ss. 68-C and 68-D contemplate any lis. In other words, what is the proper scope and ambit of	the inquiry envisaged by those sections ? The scheme prepared	and published in accordance with s. 68-C, by a State Transport Undertaking, is placed before the public only after	the Undertaking has reached the conclusion that it is necessary in the public interest.	After the scheme has been prepared and published as aforesaid, the objections to be filed under s. 68-D have reference to the basic question whether or	not the scheme as	published, was in public interest. Such objections are open to any person or organization, e.g., an Automobile Association, and are not limited only to persons who are providing road transport services. In my opinion, it is a mistake to suppose that the objections	contemplated by s. 68-D(l), could be on grounds personal to the objectors who are engaged in the business of providing road transport services. It	is not open to	any particular individual carrying on the business of	providing road transport services, to claim that his route should be excluded	from the operation	of the published scheme. I am led to	that conclusion by	the effective words of s. 68-D(l), namely, "file objections thereto", that is, to the scheme published under s. 68-C.
387 The objections	have to be limited to the merits of	the scheme as propounded by the State Transport Undertaking. It will, therefore, be opening the gates too wide to hold	that the objections	have reference to particular routes or portions of routes covered by private	transport services.
The underlying	purpose of inviting objections, is not to invite	"claims" by individual businessmen	engaged	in providing road transport services, but to bring out useful information bearing on the feasibility and soundness of	the scheme,	as propounded by the Undertaking.	Once,	the Government has decided upon a policy of nationalization of road transport facilities, the question of safeguarding	the interest of individual businessmen in that line, is no	more relevant. What is relevant. for the purpose of the inquiry by the Government, on receipt of objections, is whether	the published scheme is in the interest of the public. In my opinion, therefore, it is erroneous to suppose that	the object	of s. 68-D(l) is to afford any remedy to a private individual in	his personal interest.	Particulars of	the scheme required to be published under s. 68C, are meant	for the information of the public, so that persons feeling interested in	a public venture like that,	may offer intelligent and constructive criticism with reference to the merits	of the scheme.	It is equally erroneous	to suppose that there are two	parties-one, represented by	the Undertaking, and the other, represented by persons who	are engaged	in the business of	providing road transport services-and that the Government is the third party, which is the arbitrator between the two contesting parties. That, in my opinion, is not a correct reading of the provisions of Chapter	IV-A of the Act. The whole aim and object of	that Chapter is to replace individual businessmen engaged in that trade,	by nationalised road transport services which	are meant to be run in the interest of the community as a whole, and thus to serve the best public interest. The Government is as much interested in the scheme as the Road Transport Undertaking which is	a creature and a limb of	the Government, brought	into existence	with a view	to implementing the policy of the Government	to provide nationalised 388 road transport services. That being the whole scheme of the policy of nationalisation, it is not correct to represent the State Transport Undertaking as entering into competition with other individuals or incorporated bodies whose business it is	to provide the same kind of transport	facilities.
That is made clear by the provisions of s. 68-F, which, as indicated above, make it obligatory on the Regional Transport Authority to issue permits as applied for by	the State Transport Undertaking. It follows from the foregoing observations that there is no question of the Government functioning as	an adjudicating authority as	between	the rival claims of the Undertaking and private persons engaged in the	same kind of activity, or that the Secretary to Government in	the Department of Road	Transport, when he personally heard the objections, was functioning as a judge, or that he was disqualified, by any bias, from hearing those objections. If we carry this line of reasoning to	its logical conclusion, then even the Minister in-charge of	the Department, may be said to be equally interested,	and therefore, equally biased, and thus, disqualified	from hearing	those	objections and coming to his	own determination,	as contemplated in s. 68-D(2). In	my opinion, the concept that a person should not be a judge in his own cause, is wholly foreign to the	scheme	and provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act.
The scheme as prepared and published, may have proposed, as it did	in the instant case, completely to exclude other persons from providing road	transport service in	the notified area	by the	notified routes. But the State Government is not concerned with determining whether any or some or all of the objectors could be permitted to provide or continue to provide their own road	transport service.
The State Government under s. 68-D(2) has only to decide whether	or not the proposed scheme should be	approved or modified in any way. The decision to be arrived at by	the State Government, is confined to the scheme,	and is	not concerned with	rival	claims	by persons providing	road transport service in the same area or by the same routes.
That, in my opinion, is the reason why under that section, the State Government has not been authorized altogether to.
389 cancel	the scheme, but only to approve or modify it.	The State Government has	to examine the soundness of	the declaration made by the Road Transport Undertaking that	the proposed scheme is in public interest. The stage of cancellation comes, if at all, later under s.	68-E, when experience gained in working the approved scheme,	may lead the State Transport Undertaking to the conclusion	that it should be cancelled or modified.But at the initial stage, that is to say, under s. 68-D, the	proposed scheme is already	there only to be approved or modified in the light of the objections raised, if any. It has been held and it may be taken	as well-settled that	when there is a competition between a number of applicants for a particular route for supplying road transport service, the Regional Transport Authority or any other Authority deciding between those conflicting claims, has to determine the matter in a quasijudicial way, because they are determining questions affecting the rights of individuals. But in the proceeding before	the State Government, no such rival -claims have to be decided upon. What has to be determined is whether	the proposed scheme will	serve public interest. Thus, in proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act, individual claims have to be decided upon, whereas under Chapter IVA, it is the collective interest of the community as a whole, which is the subjectmatter	of determination by	the State Government. In other words, the proposed scheme is	the outcome of the decision by a limb of the State Government (State	Transport Undertaking), which has come to the	con- clusion	that it is in the public interest that road trans- port service should be run and operated by the State.	The calling of objections by persons affected by the scheme, is not with a view to deciding between the rival claims of	the State Undertaking and individuals providing road transport services in the areas or routes proposed to be covered.	The State Transport Undertaking has not made any claim at	this stage.	Such a claim arises after the determination by	the State Government Under s. 68D(2). That stage	is reached when the State Transport Undertaking applies	for permits under s. 68F. Such a claim for a permit, once 390 made by the Undertaking, is no more a rival claim to be treated along with the claims of other individuals providing such road transport services, but an absolute	claim which under that section shall be	granted by the Regional Transport Authority which is authorized even to cancel an existing permit or modify the terms of an existing permit, or to refuse renewal of permits, with a view to implementing the approved scheme. In my opinion, therefore, it is	not correct to view the proceedings under Chapter IVA before the State Government as a lis between any rival claims, unlike proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. In view of these considerations,	I would hold that there is no	lis between rival claims, no determinate tribunal to determine any	lis, and no procedure prescribed in Chapter IVA approximating or even simulating judicial procedure. That being so, there is no question of any bias, because there can be	none in a determination which is come to by officers of the Government in the discharge of their administrative duties.
As already indicated, the question now under consideration, does not admit of a general answer. The answer must depend upon the relevant statutory provisions, and one case decided on its own basic statutory	provisions, cannot be a controlling authority for another;	but, by way	of illustration, reported cases dealing with similar questions, have been referred to.	My learned brother Wanchoo, J.,	has referred in detail to Franklin's case, hence, I need not add any observations with reference to that case. But another case, namely,	Robinson v. Minister of Town	and Country Planning (1), perhaps, not referred to at the bar, seems to me to be instructive in so far as it has discussed this very question with reference to the provisions of s. 1(1) of	the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which is in these terms:- :- " Where the Minister of Town and Country Planning (in	this Act referred to as 'the Minister') is satisfied that it is requisite, for the purpose of dealing	satisfactorily	with extensive war damage	in the area of a local planning authority, that a part or parts of their (I) [1947] 1 All E.R. 851, 853, 854.
391 area, consisting of land shown to his satisfaction to	have sustained war	damage or of such land together	with other land contiguous or adjacent thereto, should be laid	out afresh and redeveloped as a whole, an order declaring all or any of	the land in such a part of their area	to be	land subject	to compulsory purchase for dealing with war damage may be made by the Minister if an application in that behalf is made to him by the authority before the expiration of five years from such date as the Minister may by order appoint	as being the date	when the making of	such applications has become practicable. A part of the area of a local planning authority as to which the	Minister is satisfied as aforesaid is in this Act referred to as an 'area of extensive war damage'." Lord Greene, M. R., who delivered the leading	judgment of the Court of Appeal, reversing that of Henn Collins, J. thus summarized the procedure laid down in the Act :- " The procedural provisions in connection with the obtaining of an order under the sub-section may, so far as relevant, be summarised as follows: (a) Under sub-s. (4) at least	two months before	the application is made the authority	must publish a notice in a local newspaper; (b) under sub-s.	(5) the application must	'designate' the land to which	the application relates by reference to a map with	or without descriptive matter ; (c) under sub-s. (6) the a	application must be accompanied by a statement illustrated by a map, for indicating the manner in which it is intended that the	land in the area of extensive war damage should be laid out as respects its internal arrangement and in relation to	the existing or intended lay-out of the surrounding locality, and the manner in which it is intended that such land should be used whether for purposes requiring the carrying out of development or	otherwise'; (d) under sub-s.	(7) if	the Minister is satisfied that these particulars are adequate for enabling the expediency of the making of an order' to be properly considered, he notifies the authority who must then advertise for	objections; (e) under sched. I	unless	the Minister, apart from an objection (which must be accompanied by a 392 written	statement of its grounds) decides to	refuse	the application or to make an agreed modification to meet	the objection, he must 'consider the grounds of the objection as set out in the statement' and may call for a further statement. Under para. 4 of the schedule the Minister,	'if satisfied that he is sufficiently informed, 'for the purpose of his deciding as aforesaid (sc. whether or not to make the order applied for), as to the matters to which the objection relates' he may decide to make the order without further investigation.	Subject, to this, the Minister (para. 5) must give the objector an opportunity of appearing before a person nominated by the Minister and, if the objector avails himself	of this, a similar opportunity to the authority.
Under para. 6, if it appears to the	Minister that	the matters	to which the objection	relates	call	for investigation by a public inquiry, he must cause such an inquiry to be held, in which case, the requirements of para.
5 as to a private hearing need not be complied with;	(f) under s. 1(8), subject to the provisions of sched. 1,	the Minister may make the order with or without modification, except	that he cannot extend the area unless	all persons interested consent." In the case of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. v.	Minister of Town and Country Planning (1), Henn Collins, J. considered the nature of the order to be passed under s. I (I) of	the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, and came to	the conclusion that the Minister's function was of a quasi- judicial character. He followed that decision in the	case which came up before the Court of Appeal in	Robinson v.
Minister of Town and, Country Planning (2). The Court of Appeal	reversed the decision of the learned Judge, and	did not approve of his decision in Phoenix Assurance Co.,	Ltd.
v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (1). In the course of his judgment, Lord Greene, M. R., observed as follows at page 859:- " It is the case of an original order to be made by	the Minister as an executive authority who is at liberty to base his opinion on whatever material he thinks fit, (I) [1947] 1 All E.R. 454.
393 whether	obtained in the ordinary course of his executive functions or derived from what is brought out at a public inquiry if there is one. To say that, in coming to	his decision, he is in any sense acting in a quasi-judicial capacity is to misunderstand the nature of	the process altogether. I am not concerned to dispute that the inquiry itself must be conducted on what may be described as quasi- judicial principles, but this is quite a different thing from saying that any such principles are applicable to	the doing of the executive act itself, i.e. , the making of	the order.	The inquiry is only a step in	the process which leads to that	result, and there is,	in my	opinion, no justification for saying that the executive decision to make the order can be controlled by the courts by reference to the evidence or lack of evidence at the inquiry which is here relied on. Such a theory treats the executive act as though	it were a judicial decision (or, if the phrase is preferred, a quasi-judicial decision) which it most emphati- cally is not." I have	devoted considerable space to the decision of	the Court of Appeal, (supra), to show the close	resemblance between	the procedure envisaged in the Act of	the British Parliament, and the law as laid down in Chapter IV-A of	the Act. In the reported case also, there had to be an inquiry if objections	were raised to the notified scheme of	town planning, and the Minister concerned had to consider all the evidence led on behalf of the objectors. In	that case, unlike the instant case, there was a provision for receiving evidence pro and con, but even then, the Court of Appeal did not hold that the function of the Minister was of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, chiefly on the ground that no objective tests were possible in coming to his	conclusions before	passing the order under the relevant section of	the Act of Parliament.
For the reasons given above, I have come to the	conclusion, in agreement	with my brother Wanchoo, J., that	the Government or the Minister concerned, when passing an order under s. 68-D(2), had not to	discharge a quasi-judicial function, but was acting only in its or 50 394 his administrative capacity.	It follows from this	con- clusion that all considerations flowing from the basic	idea of the proceedings before the State Government being of a quasi-judicial	character, are wholly out of the way.	It must, therefore, be held that the order of the State Government, impugned in this case, is not open to	any interference by the courts. I would, therefore, dismiss the petition with costs.
ORDER In view of the opinion of the majority the order approving the scheme is hereby quashed and a direction issued to	the first respondent to forbear from taking over	any of	the routes	in which the petitioners are engaged in transport business. This will not preclude the State Government	from making	the necessary enquiry in regard to the objections filed by the	petitioners in	accordance with law.	The petitioners will have liberty to file additional objections, if any.	The parties to bear their own costs.