Source: http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/federal-circuit-review-attorneys-fees-09721/
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 16:27:04
Document Index: 456098372

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 1295', '§ 314']

Federal Circuit Review - Attorney's Fees, FRAND-encumbered Patents, and IPRs (May 2014) | Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP - JDSupra
Highmark sued Allcare seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-infringement. After the District Court granted summary judgment of non-infringement to Highmark, Highmark moved for fees under § 285. The district court found the case to be “exceptional” and granted Highmark’s motion. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s determination de novo and reversed in part. The Federal Circuit held that its de novo review was justified because whether a claim is “objectively baseless” under Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005), is a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court considered Highmark alongside Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. and applied its reasoning in Octane to vacate and remand Highmark. The main issue considered by the Court in Highmark was the appropriate standard of review for a determination of exceptionality under § 285. The Court held that § 285 commits the determination of exceptionality to the discretion of the district court and that the district court is better positioned to decide whether a case is exceptional because it lives with the case over a prolonged time period. Therefore, all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination must be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.
St. Jude appealed the PTO’s decision not to institute an inter partes review (IPR). St. Jude argued that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), which authorizes the Federal Circuit to hear “an appeal from a decision” of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) with respect to an IPR. The patentee, Volcano, and the PTO, an intervenor in the appeal, filed motions to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, relying on 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), which states the PTO’s decision whether to institute an IPR “shall be final and nonappealable.” The Federal Circuit granted the motion, interpreting the statutes as precluding the Federal Circuit from hearing an appeal of a PTO decision whether to institute an IPR. Dominion and Procter & Gamble each involves a petition to the Federal Circuit seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the PTO to change a decision regarding the institution of IPR petitions. In Dominion, the PTAB denied five IPR petitions, and Dominion, the accused infringer, sought a writ directing the PTO to institute the five IPRs. In Procter & Gamble, the PTAB granted three IPR petitions, and Procter & Gamble, the patentee, sought a writ directing the PTO to withdraw the orders instituting the IPRs. In both Dominion and Proctor & Gamble, the Federal Circuit denied the writ petitions. The Federal Circuit applied the same reasoning it used to grant the motion to dismiss in the St. Jude case, namely that the statutory framework does not allow the Federal Circuit to review PTO decisions whether to institute IPRs. At a minimum, under the statutory framework neither Dominion nor Procter & Gamble could show a “clear and indisputable” right to relief, as is required for the remedy of mandamus.
In VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & CO., Appeal No. 13-1408, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal due to lack of a cause of action, holding that a patent owner alone can appeal a final decision in an inter partes reexamination.