Source: http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/13045.htm
Timestamp: 2016-10-23 23:50:05
Document Index: 231742080

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1401', '§89', '§89', '§86', '§87', '§87']

FOIL-AO-13045
November 14, 2001 The staff of the Committee on Open Government is authorized to issue advisory opinions. The ensuing staff advisory opinion is based solely upon the information presented in your correspondence.
I have received your letter of October 15, which reached this office on October 22. You wrote that you "have experienced a brazen disregard" for the Freedom of Information Law in your efforts to obtain records from the Town of Southampton. Based on a review of the materials attached to your letter, it appears that requests directed to various Town officials were not answered, and that disclosure of numerous records has been delayed because the records were sent to the Town's consultant.
In this regard, first, since requests were made to several Town officials, I note that the regulations promulgated by the Committee on Open Government (21 NYCRR Part 1401) require that each agency designate one or more persons as "records access officer." The records access officer has the duty to coordinate an agency's response to requests for records, and requests should ordinarily be made to that person. If a request is made to a Town officer or employee other than the records access officer, I believe that the recipient of the request must either respond directly in a manner consistent with law or forward the request to the records access officer.
Second, in a related vein, the Freedom of Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agencies must respond to requests. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states in part that:
If neither a response to a request nor an acknowledgement of the receipt of a request is given within five business days, or if an agency delays responding for an unreasonable time after it acknowledges that a request has been received, a request may, in my opinion, be considered to have been constructively denied [see DeCorse v. City of Buffalo, 239 AD2d 949, 950 (1997)]. In such a circumstance, I believe that the denial may be appealed in accordance with §89(4)(a) of the Freedom of Information Law. That provision states in relevant part that: "...any person denied access to a record may within thirty days appeal in writing such denial to the head, chief executive, or governing body, who shall within ten business days of the receipt of such appeal fully explain in writing to the person requesting the record the reasons for further denial, or provide access to the record sought."
Third, the Freedom of Information Law is applicable to all agency records, and §86(4) defines the term "record" expansively to include:
More recently, the Court of Appeals found that materials received by a corporation providing services for a branch of the State University that were kept on behalf of the University constituted "records" falling with the coverage of the Freedom of Information Law. I point out that the Court rejected "SUNY's contention that disclosure turns on whether the requested information is in the physical possession of the agency", for such a view "ignores the plain language of the FOIL definition of 'records' as information kept or held 'by, with or for an agency'" [see Encore College Bookstores, Inc. v. Auxiliary Services Corporation of the State University of New York at Farmingdale, 87 NY2d 410, 417 (1995)]. Therefore, if documents are kept or produced for an agency, as in the case of the records ordinarily maintained at town offices that have been sent to a consultant, or records that are typically filed with an agency are sent directly to the agency's consultant, they constitute agency records, even if they are not in the physical possession of the agency.
From my perspective, insofar as Town records are in the physical possession of the Town's consultant, in response to a request for any such records, I believe that the records access officer, in carrying out his or her duty to "coordinate" the Town's response to requests, must either direct the consultant to make the records available in a manner consistent with law, or acquire the records in order that they may be disclosed in accordance with law.
Next, as a general matter, the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law.
In my view, records submitted by an applicant, either to the Town or its agent, would, in the context of the information that you provided, ordinarily be available under the law, for none of the grounds for denial would appear to be pertinent or applicable.
I note that Xerox Corporation v. Town of Webster [65 NY2d 131 (1985)] dealt with reports prepared by "outside consultants retained by agencies" (id. 133). In such cases, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the records prepared by consultants should be treated as if they were prepared by agency staff and should, therefore, be considered intra-agency materials that fall within the scope of §87(2)(g).
Although that provision potentially serves as a basis for a denial of access, due to its structure it often requires disclosure. Section 87(2)(g) permits an agency to withhold records that:
cc: Town Board David Gilmartin, Jr.