Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/965/262/19924/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 18:04:29
Document Index: 342622073

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 843', '§ 846', '§ 3', '§ 3742', '§ 4', '§ 3742', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 5']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charles J. Spears, Also Known As "blackie," and Donaldmeeks, Defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Kim Curran, Defendant-appellee, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charles J. Spears, Also Known As "blackie," and Don...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charles J. Spears, Also Known As "blackie," and Donaldmeeks, Defendants-appellants.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Kim Curran, Defendant-appellee, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992)
Argued Sept. 6, 1991. Decided June 2, 1992. As Amended June 9, 1992
A federal grand jury indicted Spears, Curran, and Meeks on September 21, 1988. Count one charged all three with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Counts two and three charged Spears and Curran with distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Meeks was charged in count four with using a telephone to facilitate a drug felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), and in count five with attempt to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On April 19, 1989, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment against all three defendants containing the same charges.
Warrantless, nonconsensual searches of motor vehicles in use on public highways do not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers conducting the search have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069-70, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). The issue here, then, is whether the agents who searched Spears's car had the requisite probable cause. Our standard of review of Fourth Amendment probable cause cases, however, has become the subject of much discourse, culminating in complete confusion:
United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1992). Because the Holifield court concluded that the search in that case could withstand either deferential or plenary review, it declined to resolve the issue. Id. at 667. Although we come to the same conclusion about the search here, we will address, and announce, the correct standard of review. For the reasons that follow, today we determine that Fourth Amendment warrant and nonwarrant cases1 both are subject to review for clear error.2
Our starting point is Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). In that case the Court abandoned what it characterized as "an elaborate set of legal rules that have developed among various lower courts" when reviewing probable cause determinations in warrant cases. Id. at 229, 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28. In place of this elaborate set of legal rules, the Court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach, id. at 230, 103 S. Ct. at 2328, explaining that review of the quantum and quality of evidence purporting to establish probable cause necessarily is fact-bound. Consider: " 'In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' " Id. at 231, 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)). Further, the evidence supporting probable cause "must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id. 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)). And finally, "probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a set of legal rules." Id. Gates instructed reviewing courts on the form that review of a magistrate's probable cause determination should take, and we can have no clearer mandate: "we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit [establishing probable cause] should not take the form of de novo review." Id. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (emphasis ours). Instead, a reviewing court should review the magistrate's determination deferentially. Id. Its only duty is to ensure that the issuing magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332-33.
Nonetheless, the majority in United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990), concluded that by this language the Court created an intermediate, "substantial basis," review in warrant cases: something more deferential than de novo, but less deferential than clear error. Id. at 408-09. We think the McKinney majority misunderstood Gates. As the concurring opinion points out, Gates itself does not discuss "substantial basis" as an intermediate review between deferential and plenary. Indeed, the concurrence asks "how the Court's directive in Gates that we give 'great deference' to the magistrate's finding can be squared with a rule that gives that finding less deference than we would give an ordinary finding of fact." McKinney, 919 F.2d at 421 (Posner, J., concurring). The concurrence suggests that " ' [s]ubstantial basis' sounds like 'substantial evidence,' the formula for judicial review of administrative factfindings--a formula usually thought, if anything, more deferential than the standard of clear error is." Id. at 423.
But the Court has used the term "substantial evidence." A year after Gates, the Court commanded that "a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant." Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2085-86, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984) (per curiam). That is a factual review, plain and simple, which we conduct with deference. Unfortunately, considerably less attention has been paid to the Upton Court's use of "substantial evidence" than the Gates Court's use of "substantial basis." Nonetheless, we have been instructed, more than once, not to review a magistrate's probable cause determination de novo, but deferentially. Because, even reading between the lines, we do not discern a third standard of review announced in Gates, we conclude today that in warrant cases our review must be for clear error. Anything more would be a return to the "elaborate set of legal rules" the Court eschewed in Gates.
We move now to nonwarrant cases, which we have said raise a mixed question of law and fact. Under our former standard this mixed question would require us to review the district judge's factual findings deferentially, and conduct a de novo review of his legal conclusions. See United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1991). See also McKinney, 919 F.2d at 412. The question in both cases, however, is the same: did probable cause exist. The Court tells us that " [p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925)). It is a legal conclusion, dependent solely on a factual analysis: the facts are what the police knew and did; the finding of probable cause is a conclusion that those facts meet the legal criteria for probable cause. So the question for us is whether this finding should be reviewed deferentially, as ordinary findings of fact are, or de novo, as ordinary legal rulings are.
To answer that question, we turn once again to Gates, and repeat language we have already quoted: "probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a set of legal rules." 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. As we read Gates, we review the magistrate's probable cause determination deferentially. The McKinney concurrence notes that is a determination the magistrate makes in an ex parte proceeding. It would be anomalous to require a more searching review of a district judge's probable cause determination, made after a full adversary proceeding. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 422. Because there is little to distinguish a magistrate's probable cause determination in a warrant case and a district judge's probable cause determination in a nonwarrant case, appellate review should be the same for both. In warrant cases, the magistrate is the front-line judicial officer making the initial determination. In nonwarrant cases, it is the district judge who makes the initial determination, who asks the same question the magistrate asks in a warrant case: is there probable cause. If there is probable cause, the scope of the search without a warrant is no greater than one with a warrant: it " 'is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.' " California v. Acevedo, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172-73, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982)). In both cases, if there is probable cause, the search is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. If there is no probable cause, the factfinder at trial will not consider the evidence, either because the warrant did not issue, or the exclusionary rule operates to keep it out. It is the front-line judicial officer in both cases who conducts the initial inquiry, who concludes there is or is not probable cause, and an appellate panel should not substitute its judgment in either case.
Lest we be accused of scuttling the Fourth Amendment, we hasten to point out that although warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there are exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). The exceptions include searches based on probable cause, consent and exigent circumstances. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1984). Thus, like searches pursuant to a warrant, searches based on one of those exceptions are not presumptively unreasonable and do not violate the Fourth Amendment. All we are doing today is announcing one standard of review for all reasonable searches. This is not as big a step as it appears at first blush. We already review exigent circumstances cases for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Sewell, 942 F.2d 1209, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991). The same is true of consent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 269, 116 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1991). By our action today we simply bring probable cause-based nonwarrant cases in line with the rest of our Fourth Amendment reasonable search jurisprudence.3 And in line with three of our sister circuits, who likewise review probable cause determinations for clear error. See United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 199, 112 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1990); United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Santana, 895 F.2d 850, 852 (1st Cir. 1990).4
The district judge concluded that the confluence of all of these facts provided the agents with probable cause. As the Supreme Court wrote in Gates, "It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that ' [c]orroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of [the informant telling] a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing 'a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.' " Id. 462 U.S. at 244-45, 103 S. Ct. at 2335 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960)). Because we determine that the district judge was not clearly erroneous, the search of the Peugeot and Spears's subsequent arrest were, therefore, both lawful.
As to his claim that nondisclosure denies him his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the confidential source, United States v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), instructs us that, "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the [informer's] privilege must give way." Id. at 60-61, 77 S. Ct. at 628. We require a defendant seeking disclosure to establish a genuine need, something beyond the naked assertion of his right to confront and cross-examine. United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 842 (7th Cir. 1985). Here, Spears made no showing whatsoever of a genuine need for the identity of the confidential source. As in United States v. Rugendorf, 376 U.S. 528, 535, 84 S. Ct. 825, 829-30, 11 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1964). Spears has failed to develop the necessary criteria for disclosure. And, as in that case, we cannot say that on the record before us the identity of the informant was essential, relevant, or helpful to his case. Id.
Spears raises three challenges to his sentence: the judge erred in his (1) calculation of the amount of cocaine for which Spears was responsible under the Sentencing Guidelines's relevant conduct provisions; (2) failure to reduce Spears's adjusted offense level for acceptance of responsibility; and (3) four point increase in Spears's base offense level because of his role in the offense. Initially, we note that these challenges are to the district court's factual determinations, which we will disturb only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1479 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cagle, 922 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1991). Spears's challenges can succeed only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Cagle, 922 F.2d at 406. We note that in each instance of controverted facts, the district judge adopted the Presentence Report's ("PR") findings as his own, making his reasons clear on the record, as well as attaching a written Statement of Reasons to the PR. See Rec. Doc. 149. This is permissible. United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1308 (7th Cir. 1991).
Finally, Spears challenges the district court's four level increase to his base offense level for his role in the offense. The Guidelines permit a four level increase " [i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive...." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Summarizing the evidence presented during the sentencing hearing, the judge stated
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1700, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988). Our review of the district court's decision to remove Meeks's counsel is thus deferential--we will reverse only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
We begin our inquiry, however, by examining for clear error the district court's factual findings that a conflict existed. Id. During the course of pretrial discovery, Halliday became aware that Linda Rupp, one of the government's witnesses, made statements to an FBI agent concerning Meeks's involvement in drug trafficking that were inconsistent with statements she made to him. Faced with the possibility of having to testify in order to impeach the witness, Halliday notified the judge of the potential conflict. He explained that he discussed the situation with Meeks, who nonetheless insisted he wanted Halliday to continue as his attorney. After exploring the nature of Rupp's testimony, the judge addressed the defendant, cautioning him that his insistence that Halliday continue "could effectively significantly limit [ ] your ability to impeach the testimony of a witness who may well be--in terms of your case--the most important prosecution witness." Tr. Apr. 6, 1989 at 4-5. The judge asked both counsel to assess the importance of Rupp's testimony. The prosecutor stated that she "probably is the government's most important witness at this point." Id. at 10. Halliday acknowledged that Rupp's statement to the FBI "is very damaging to the defendant." Id. at 11. As a result, the judge stated,
Meeks argues that the district court's refusal to allow him to waive his right to conflict-free counsel impinged his constitutional right to counsel of his choice. He overlooks, however, that "while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S. Ct. at 1697. Further, the Court stated "where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt it may decline a proffer of waiver...." Id. at 162, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. In view of the conflict here, the seriousness of which was not lost on the district court, we do not believe it abused its discretion when it disqualified Halliday as Meeks's trial counsel.7
Meeks claims that the affidavit fails to establish probable cause because it lacks any indicia of reliability of the information provided by the federal and state law enforcement officers, or the basis of their knowledge. Meeks complains that the affidavit fails to set out the agents identities, their training and experience in drug cases, or that they were participating in a joint investigation with the affiant. Meeks's argument, however, is an effort to engage us in a technical review of the supporting affidavit, rather than the practical, common sense approach Gates dictates. In determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is entitled to regard an affiant's fellow law enforcement officers as reliable sources. See United States v. Griffin, 827 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909, 108 S. Ct. 1085, 99 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1988); United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1984). Considering the "totality of the circumstances" recited above, there is nothing clearly erroneous here about the magistrate's determination that probable cause existed to support the issuance of a search warrant for Meeks's apartment.
The second prong of Meeks's attack on the warrant is that it is overbroad and permits seizure of items unrelated to violations of the drug abuse prevention laws with which he was charged. He maintains the warrant's language is open-ended and, therefore, prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Unquestionably, the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures proscribes general or open-ended warrants. United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S. Ct. 1084, 99 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1988) (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1692, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979)). The officers executing the warrant must be able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty. Id. A catch-all phrase will not invalidate a warrant "as long as it sufficiently limits the discretion of the officers in executing the warrant." Id.
The warrant here permitted a search for, and seizure of, "controlled substances and other drug related paraphernalia, and materials for packaging controlled substances." Search Warrant, Rec.Doc. No. 61. The terms "controlled substances" and "materials for packaging controlled substances" are sufficiently specific on their face. The catch-all term "other drug related paraphernalia" also passes constitutional muster in that such items are easily identifiable and quickly found by drug law enforcement officers. A search warrant delineating those items generally, in combination with named contraband, sufficiently limits an officer's discretion to execute the warrant. Cf. United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1984) (search for any other papers indicating "proof of residency" not unconstitutional when coupled with a search for other named contraband, and when "easily recognizable, quickly found, and does not authorize a general search of personal papers."). The warrant, therefore, does not fail; Meeks's arguments do.C. Upward Departure from Sentencing Guidelines
Upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines is permissible if, after a proper calculation of a defendant's base criminal history category, the district court concludes that the base level does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or his potential for future criminal conduct. United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 1990). In reviewing a trial court's departure from the Guidelines, we begin with a de novo review of the court's stated grounds to ascertain that they are of a kind that may be relied on to justify a departure. United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1396 (7th Cir. 1992). If they are, we then review the facts underlying the departure, and will reverse the district court only if its factual findings were clearly erroneous. Id. Finally, we review the degree of departure to determine if it was reasonable, giving "considerable leeway to a sentencing court's determination of what Criminal History category most accurately reflects the defendant's actual criminal history." Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 901 F.2d 1394, 1396-97 (7th Cir. 1990)). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3). When a defendant's criminal history category is, as here, Category VI (the highest level), the amount of the departure must be related to the structure of the Guidelines. Scott, 914 F.2d at 963.
Sen.Tr. at 50. The district court could not label Meeks a career criminal because he did not meet the third requirement under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines: he did not have at least two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance within the applicable fifteen year time period. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 & 4A1.2(e) (3). And the only reason Meeks doesn't have two felony convictions for violent crimes is because he had the good fortune to appear before a judge who consolidated for sentencing purposes two assaults with intent to kill with malice against two separate women in two separate incidents.8 See Presentence Report at 19. But for that consolidation, Meeks would be a career offender. Consequently, we think the trial court's determination to increase Meeks's offense level to a point midway between his base level and that of a career offender was eminently reasonable, and was related to the structure of the Guidelines. We, therefore, affirm the district court's upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (3).
Meeks raises a plethora of additional arguments, which are all meritless. For that reason, we will address them in summary fashion. First, he maintains that count one of the superseding indictment is insufficient because it fails to allege how or when he became a member of the conspiracy, or any overt acts attributable to him in furtherance of it. An indictment is sufficient if it adequately apprises the defendant of the charge against him so that he can prepare a defense and plead any judgment which may be rendered as a bar to further prosecution. United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981). If the indictment is brought under 21 U.S.C. § 846, as here, it is sufficient if it alleges a conspiracy to distribute drugs, the time during which the conspiracy was operative, and the statute allegedly violated. United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982). It need not allege any overt acts. United States v. Dempsey, 806 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S. Ct. 1889, 95 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1987). The superseding indictment here does allege overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, which occurred within a specific time frame, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Superseding Indictment, Rec., Doc. 84. The indictment, therefore, is sufficient.
As an alternative argument to the sufficiency of the superseding indictment, Meeks argues that the grand jury that returned the indictment did not hear any evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy before the ending date of August 31, 1988. Because he failed to raise this argument in the trial court, it is waived here. See Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S. Ct. 533, 54 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1977).
Next, Meeks claims the government failed to prove him guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt as charged in count one of the superseding indictment. Defendant acknowledges that to be successful in his sufficiency of the evidence argument, he has a high hurdle to overcome: we review the evidence to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The government need only show the existence of a conspiracy and substantial evidence of defendant's connection to that conspiracy. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir. 1990). Meeks fails to clear the hurdle. The trial transcript is replete with sufficient evidence of Meeks's involvement in the conspiracy from which the jury could (and did) conclude he was guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. See Meeks's Trial Transcript, Vol. I at 58-70, Vol. II at 16-35, 72-91, 97-118, and 170-196.
Meeks adopts as his own the arguments of co-defendant Spears to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of the black Peugeot on August 31, 1988. Because Meeks has no privacy interest in the Peugeot, he has no standing to challenge the search. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 172, 89 S. Ct. 961, 965-66, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969).
Finally, Meeks appeals the district court's refusal to reduce his base offense level. At his sentencing hearing, he argued for a two-level reduction under § 3B1.2(b), claiming he was a minor participant in the offense. The district court refused. We will reverse a district court's findings and conclusions under § 3B1.2 only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Brick, 905 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990). We are mindful, however, that when the record supports two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice of one view over the other cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. Moreover, the determination of whether § 3B1.2 is applicable in a particular case is heavily dependent on the facts of that case. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, Commentary.
At Curran's sentencing hearing, the judge calculated her total offense level as 24 with a criminal history category of II, which resulted in a sentence range of from 57 to 71 months. Without a motion from the government pursuant to either 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)9 or section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines,10 the judge afforded Curran a downward departure for "substantial assistance" to the government, and sentenced her to 48 months. From the bench, and in a later written Memorandum Opinion, the judge found both provisions unconstitutional as violative of substantive and procedural due process. 724 F. Supp. 1239. The government appeals.
We begin by noting that we "regularly treat sections 3553(e) and 5K1.1 as parallels for purpose of analysis." United States v. Hayes, 939 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1991). We end by noting that the substantial and growing body of case law in this circuit firmly establishes that these provisions do not violate either a defendant's procedural or substantive due process. See United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Spillman, 924 F.2d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Donatiu, 922 F.2d 1331, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1990). Unless and until a higher authority rejects our analysis, that is the law of this circuit.
Absent a § 3553(e) or § 5K1.1 motion by the government, the district court is without authority sua sponte to reduce a defendant's statutory minimum sentence. Smith, 953 F.2d at 1064; United States v. Rosa, 946 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1991). The district court's downward departure, therefore, is reversed. The case is remanded for resentencing Curran under the Guidelines.
United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990), covers, in three opinions, the range of concerns. Judge Flaum there argues for a de novo standard in nonwarrant cases, a standard that he has recognized "can vary from relatively deferential review to comprehensive review." Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 940 (7th Cir. 1989). Emphasizing that constitutional rights are implicated, he questioned the feasibility of a "chameleonic 'clearly erroneous' standard" and expressed concerns that adoption of that standard could lead to excessive deference. McKinney, at 411 and 415. Judge Posner pointed out that the scope of review under the clearly erroneous standard is affected by the institutional context and that the review of the legal significance ascribed to conceded facts is necessarily more searching than the review of credibility determinations. He urged that one standard, applied with varying rigor in varying contexts, was more comprehensible than a multiplicity of somewhat amorphous concepts. Id. at 422-423. And Judge Will, while agreeing that appellate review of the application of law to fact should be deferential, contended that reliance upon a clearly erroneous standard denigrated, psychologically and therefore in practice, the importance of appellate review of determinations implicating constitutional rights. Id. at 425.
I also agree, although somewhat reluctantly, that it has become the law of this circuit, particularly in light of United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1992), that a government motion is required for a "substantial assistance" downward departure, and that such a requirement does not violate substantive or procedural due process.
I would grant an en banc hearing, and regret that the panel, in its rush to extinguish United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990), has decided to reach an issue of importance without urging by the parties and without the benefit of either briefing or argument. The majority opinion in McKinney sets out in detail the justification for employing an intermediate "substantial basis" standard of review; I therefore add only a few thoughts here.
Although my intention is not to analyze the panel's opinion point-by-point, several matters deserve attention. First, the panel laments the fact that "considerably less attention has been paid" to the Court's use of the term "substantial evidence" in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2085-86, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984), than to its use of "substantial basis" in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Op. at 270. This should come as no surprise. Gates was the watershed fourth amendment probable cause case, one in which the Court articulated its doctrine with the utmost precision; Upton, in contrast, was a brief and unargued per curiam decision that sought only to correct a state supreme court's misapplication of Gates. There is also the matter that Upton used the term "substantial basis" as well, see Upton, 466 U.S. at 733, 104 S. Ct. at 2088, a detail that the panel apparently chose to disregard, but one which might explain the nearly universal reliance upon the Gates "substantial basis" formulation.
Also worth noting is the panel's claim that employing the McKinney standard would "return to the 'elaborate set of legal rules' the Court eschewed in Gates." Op. at 270. In my view this criticism misfires. What the Court eschewed was the pre-Gates substantive standard that informed a magistrate's probable cause determination, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (criticizing "the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in ... Spinelli " [v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969) ], not an "elaborate" (if one can fairly call an intermediate standard of review elaborate) standard of appellate review. Gates said that the standard of review should not be de novo, id. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331, but conspicuously did not say it should be clear error; as appellate judges we should not presume that the Court meant to say something (significant) that it quite easily could have said but did not. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 409-10.
At a more fundamental level, I suggest that the clear error standard serves to undermine, rather than preserve, the structure established in Gates and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). This structure actually has two levels, corresponding to different strata of legal authority in the warrant process. At the first level, police officers take legal direction from magistrates; at the second, magistrates take legal direction from us, for we are--in effect, because the Supreme Court necessarily speaks in generalities in this area--the ultimate expositors of the nitty-gritty features of the fourth amendment. Leon 's good faith exception works at the first level by giving the government an appropriate break when police officers reasonably rely upon warrants erroneously approved by magistrates. The panel, however, does Leon one better by adopting what can only be dubbed a "super" good faith rule at the second level to cover magistrates that err reasonably, but not egregiously. The problem is that Leon was premised at least in part upon the notion that magistrates, in approving warrants, will comply with the substantive dictates of Gates in most instances. Were it any other way, why employ magistrates as front-line judicial officers? (Also, why continue to maintain, Justice Scalia's lonely view in California v. Acevedo, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring), notwithstanding, that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional?) And recall that we ultimately determine whether the magistrates are complying with Gates, and correct them when they do not.
It is this dialogue--conveyed via meaningful appellate review of the magistrates' probable cause determinations--that serves Leon by promoting accuracy and uniformity among magistrates as to their application of the fourth amendment. One of today's decision's more unfortunate consequences will be its severe curtailment of this dialogue, and potentially adverse effect upon the thoroughness of justice meted out by magistrates. One could argue, I suppose, that the panel's decision may well serve what I see as the design of Leon and Gates: in the new "unregulated" marketplace of probable cause that the clear error standard may herald, more magistrates will inevitably comply with the dictates of the fourth amendment. There is, however, a catch. The compliance rate will rise not necessarily because magistrates will make decisions that comport with the substantive law of the circuit, but rather because of grade inflation; in other words, what would pass under the clear error standard might not under the McKinney standard. I doubt that is what Justice White had in mind in Leon. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1098-99, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986) (White, J.) ("It is true that in an ideal system an unreasonable request for a warrant would be harmless, because no judge would approve it. But ours is not an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressure, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.").
I respectfully and regretfully suggest that today's decision does not enhance the status of this Circuit's fourth amendment jurisprudence. Those who now scuttle more searching appellate review in this crucial area deem it an extravagance and "needlessly complex." See, e.g., McKinney, 919 F.2d at 420-21 (Posner, J., concurring). It might be more prudent, however, to heed Justice Stewart's caveat: " [i]n times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).
Language in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987), suggests to us that all cases involving exceptions to the presumed unreasonable rule should be reviewed under the same fact-intensive analysis: "It follows from what we have said that the determination whether it was objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given [warrantless] search was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require examination of the information possessed by the searching officials." Id. at 641, 107 S. Ct. at 3039-40 (emphasis ours)
Although we hesitate to call this a trend, we note that the remaining circuits now review one or the other of the exceptions cases for clear error: United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1991) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Antoon, 933 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 300, 116 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1991) (consent); United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 423, 116 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1991) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Vasquez, 953 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1992) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 709, 112 L. Ed. 2d 698 (1991) (consent); United States v. Preciado-Robles, 954 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1992) (consent); United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1451 (11th Cir. 1991) (consent); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (consent)
We also note that other, mixed questions equally as fact-dependent, such as whether certain conduct amounts to negligence, or a pleading is frivolous under Rule 11, are reviewed for clear error. See McKinney, 919 F.2d at 419 (Posner, J., concurring) and United States v. Malin, 908 F.2d 163, 169 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).