Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2011cv02113/652064/45
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 13:29:51
Document Index: 693413590

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 6', 'art, 191', '§ 6', '§ 6', 'art, 191', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 47']

ORDER re 7 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Wright Medical Group Incorporated, Wright Medical Technology Incorporated for Welch v. Wright Medical Technology Incorporated et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Welch v. Wright Medical Technology Incorporated et al
ORDER re 7 MOTION to Dismiss Case filed by Wright Medical Group Incorporated, Wright Medical Technology Incorporated. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before 10/19/2012. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 10/3/2012. (NVO)
No. CV-11-2113-PHX-DGC
Virginia M. Welch,
Wright Medical Technology, Inc., a
Delaware corporation; and Wright Medical
Plaintiff Virginia M. Welch filed her initial complaint on October 27, 2011,
alleging claims of strict liability for failure to warn, strict liability for design defects,
strict liability for manufacturing defects, breach of express warranty, negligence, and
punitive damages. Doc. 1. Defendants Wright Medical Technology, Inc. and Wright
Medical Group, Inc. (collectively “the Wright Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 7. Plaintiff filed a
response to the Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 16. For the reasons that follow, the Court will
grant in part and deny in part the Wright Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. Plaintiff is a citizen of the State
of Arizona. Doc. 1, ¶ 1. On or about February 2, 2006, Plaintiff underwent a right total
hip arthroplasty. Doc. 1, ¶ 10. In the course of this procedure, Plaintiff received a
Wright Medical PROFEMUR Z hip implant (“Wright Implant”). Doc. 1, ¶¶ 10, 11. On
or about November 4, 2009, Plaintiff was evaluated by Tina M. Horton, PA-C, in the
office of Danton S. Dungy, M.D. for continuing right hip pain. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. In this
evaluation, radiographs revealed that an acetabular cup, right arthoplasty, had rotated
approximately 90 degrees clockwise. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. Because of this evaluation, Plaintiff
became aware that the Wright Implant was defective. Doc. 1, ¶ 13. On or about
November 16, 2009, Plaintiff had the Wright Implant surgically removed. Doc. 1, ¶ 14.
Plaintiff makes the following claims against the Wright Defendants: (1) strict
liability for failure to warn, (2) strict liability for design defect, (3) strict liability for
manufacturing defect, (4) breach express warranty, (5) negligence, and (6) punitive
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts
Wright Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The Wright Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for strict liability for
failure to warn, strict liability for design defect, breach of express warranty, and punitive
A. Strict Liability for Failure to Warn.
To establish a prima facie case of strict liability, Arizona Law requires plaintiffs to
show that the defective product “is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Dole
Food Co., Inc. v. North Carolina Foam Industries, Inc., 935 P.2d 876, 879 (App. 1996)
(citing Piper v. Bear Medical Systems, Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 410 (App. 1993)); accord
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 376, 379 (1987) (superseded by
statute on other grounds). To prove proximate cause in a failure to warn case, “[w]hat is
required is ‘evidence that had a proper warning been given, [the plaintiff] would not have
used the product in the manner which resulted in his injury, or by evidence that certain
precautions would have been taken that would have avoided the accident.’” Dole Food
Co., 935 P.2d 876 at 883 (citing Gosewisch, 737 P.2d at 397); see also Gebhardt v.
Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 184-85 (D. Ariz. 1999) (granting summary judgment to
defendant on a failure to warn claim when plaintiff failed to show that a doctor would not
have used a medical device on plaintiff if alternative warnings were given); Mills v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., CV 11-00968-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4708850, at *3 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 7, 2011) (dismissing a failure to warn claim because plaintiff had not pled facts
sufficient to show that a doctor would not have prescribed a drug if an appropriate
warning was given).
The Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to advance any allegation that her
doctor would not have recommended the Wright Implant if a warning had been given.
Plaintiff argues that alleging that failure to warn was one of the causes of Plaintiff’s
injury is sufficient to avoid a dismissal, but Arizona law requires evidence that Plaintiff
would have acted differently if a warning had been given. See Dole Food Co., 935 P.2d
876 at 883. Plaintiff makes no such allegation. See Doc. 1. The Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim.
B. Strict Liability for Design Defects.
For a plaintiff to make a strict liability design defect claim, Arizona law requires
that the product either “‘fai[l] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonable manner’ (the consumer expectation test), or ‘the
benefits of a challenged design . . . outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design’
(risk/benefit analysis).” Stillwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir.
2007) (citing Golonka v. General Motors Corp., 63 P.3d 956, 963 (App. 2003)). This
standard is analogous to the standard proposed by the Third Restatement of Torts, see
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2(b) (1998) (stating that a design is defective
“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design”), but the Restatement adopts
a different standard for design defect claims against manufacturers of prescription drugs
and medical devices. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 6(c). This standard
requires that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-
care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.” Id. Arizona courts have
not formally adopted this test for prescription drugs and medical devices, but it has been
followed by other judges of this district. See Gebhart, 191 F.R.D. 180, 185; see also
Mills, 2011 WL 4708850, at **2-3 (applying the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 6(c)
absent guidance from Arizona courts); Harrison v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., CV-06-
0745-PHX-RCB, 2008 WL 906585, at **21-22 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2008) (applying the
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 6(c) standard absent guidance from Arizona courts).
“Arizona has demonstrated a willingness to look to” the Restatement “as the current
statement of the law[.]” Gebhart, 191 F.R.D. at 185 (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 904 P.2d 861, 867 (1995)). This Court will apply the Restatement § 6(c) standard.
Under this standard, the Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim because she has not alleged that the Wright Implant would not be prescribed by a
reasonable healthcare provider to any class of patients.
Plaintiff clearly has pled a design defect claim. The facts that must be proved to establish
that claim under § 6(c) need not be pled in every detail in the complaint. The Court will
not dismiss this claim
C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of Express Warranty.
Under Arizona law, to create an express warranty, a seller must provide an
“affirmation of fact or promise,” “a description of the goods,” or “a sample or model”
that becomes “part of the basis of the bargain.” A.R.S. § 47-2313(A). Thus, to avoid a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, Plaintiff must allege that the seller has provided an affirmation
of fact, a promise, a description of the goods, a sample, or a model.
The Wright Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim is
“vague and conclusory” and fails to provide specifics of when and how the warranty was
communicated. Doc. 7, at 6. Plaintiff argues that alleging that the Wright Defendants
“warranted to Plaintiff’s healthcare provider and to the ultimate consumers of the
products, including Plaintiff Virginia Welch, that the Wright [Implant] would safely and
efficiently act as a comprehensive component in a hip implant system for patient
undergoing total hip arthroplasty” is sufficient to avoid a dismissal. Doc. 1, ¶ 35. But
Plaintiff fails to allege the affirmation of fact, promise, description of the goods, sample,
or model that gave rise to this warranty. See Doc. 1. This is a critical defect in the
pleading, because Defendants are given no notice of the actions that allegedly created the
warranty at issue.
The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for breach of express
Arizona law allows punitive damages when the defendant has an “evil mind.”
Volz v. Coleman Co., Inc., 748 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Ariz. 1987). See also Gurule v. Illinois
Mut. Life and Cas. Co., 734 P.2d 85, 86 (Ariz. 1987); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 578 (Ariz. 1986). An evil mind is established with “evidence that defendant either
(1) ‘intended to injure the plaintiff [or (2)] consciously pursued a course of conduct
knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.’” Gurule, 734
P.2d at 87 (citing Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578-79).
Plaintiff argues that the allegations of paragraphs 52-57 of the complaint meet the
standard of punitive damages. See Doc 13, at 13-14. There, Plaintiff alleges that her
injuries resulted from “intentional wrongdoing, reckless disregard and/or gross
negligence.” Doc. 1, ¶ 52. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the Wright Defendants’ conduct
“involved an extreme degree of risk” and that the Wright Defendants had a “subjective
awareness of the risk involved.” Doc. 1, ¶¶ 53-54. These facts meet the Arizona
standard of “consciously pursu[ing] a course of conduct knowing that it create[s] a
substantial risk of significant harm to others.” Gurule, 734 P.2d at 87 (citing Rawlings,
726 P.2d at 578-79).
The Wright Defendants argue that the Arizona Supreme Court has “expressly
rejected awarding punitive damages based on gross negligence or mere reckless disregard
of the circumstances.” Doc. 7, at 7 (citing Volz, 748 P.2d at 1194). But when reckless
disregard rises to the level of the Arizona standard, a standard the Wright Defendants
themselves propose, punitive damages can be awarded. See Doc. 7, at 7. Further, the
Wright Defendants fail to address Plaintiff’s claim of “intentional wrongdoing,” a claim
that can also meet the Arizona standard. Doc. 1, ¶ 52. The Court will deny the Wright
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.
Plaintiff requests leave to file an amended complaint in the event any portion of
Defendants’ motion is granted. Doc. 16, at 17. The Wright Defendants do not oppose
The Court will grant the Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint by
The Wright Defendants motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is granted and part and
denied in part as set forth above.
Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on or before October 19, 2012.