Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1246355.html
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u20021983', '§\u20021331', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u20021983', '§\u200280', '§\u200223', '§\u200223', '§\u200223', '§\u20021', '§\u20022']

Jim Gordon; George Gallinger; Maureen Petranchik; Mariam D'Alessio; Thomas D'Amico, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SANTOS | FindLaw
Jim Gordon; George Gallinger; Maureen Petranchik; Mariam D'Alessio; Thomas D'Amico, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SANTOS
William G. CARLOS; Salvatore Ardisi; Michael Armistead; Paul Caccia; Michael Christiansen; William Frattarola; Russell Infantino; Raymond Nikisher; Vito Rizzi; Peter Farrell; Roger Schreader; Lisa Carlucci; Katherine Brown; William Bujarski; Gary Cerrone; Joseph Dusavage; Richard Hatfield; Thomas Johanson; David Orce; David Ryan; Michael Gibbons; Margaret Bradley; Virginia Irwin; Mary Jane Fredeman; Ann Marie Repanti, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, Jim Gordon; George Gallinger; Maureen Petranchik; Mariam D'Alessio; Thomas D'Amico, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Carmelo J. SANTOS; Charles Ferrante, Sr.; Samuel R. Gambino; Town of Putnam Valley, New York, Town of Putnam Valley; the Town Board of the Town of Putnam Valley, New York, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 2337, 2338 and 2339, Dockets 97-7523, 97-7619 and 97-7631.
Before: OAKES and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and NICKERSON, District Judge.* Jonathan Lovett, White Plains, NY (Lovett & Gould, White Plains, NY, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. William J. Madonna, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Julius W. Cohn, White Plains, NY (Sweeney Cohn Stahl & Vaccaro, White Plains, NY, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant Gambino. David O. Wright, Shrub Oak, NY, for Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant Ferrante, Sr. (William H. Bave, Jr., Wilson, Bave, Conboy & Bave, White Plains, NY, of counsel and on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
Members of the Putnam Valley, New York, police force brought three suits against certain members of the town board of Putnam Valley and against the Town of Putnam Valley itself (the “Town”). The plaintiffs alleged that the board members planned to vote to abolish their police department as a means of retaliating against the Chief of Police (the “Chief”) for exercising First Amendment rights. They sought a permanent injunction and damages. The district court (Charles L. Brieant, Judge ), consolidated the three actions, severed the claims for monetary damages, and held a bench trial on the equity issues. The court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants, denied the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, but required the defendants to wait 120 days before implementing any abolition of the force. The court then granted a stay pending appeal. We affirm all aspects of the district court's opinion except the 120-day waiting period, which we vacate, and one of the findings of fact made by the court, which we also vacate.
In September and October 1996, Carlos and other members of the police force brought three separate lawsuits against the defendants, alleging that the defendants were depriving them of property and retaliating against them for exercise of political speech, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Jurisdiction was premised on the presence of a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The three actions were consolidated by the district court.
A. Liability of the Individual Defendants
(1) Before Santos took office, he met with Carlos in order to convince Carlos to retire;
(2) the defendants conducted secret meetings in order to further their retaliatory plan;
(3) the defendants provided scurrilous information to the FBI, which caused Carlos's application to participate in training at the FBI Academy to be rejected;
(4) the defendants hired a consultant to review the police department and produce a negative report;
(5) the defendants held a televised town board meeting “solely for the purpose of staging vicious personal attacks on the Chief of Police”;
(6) the defendants encouraged a third party (one Olsen) to institute state litigation designed to embarrass the Chief;
(7) Ferrante, “purportedly acting as ‘private citizen Charles Ferrante,’ ” made false allegations of police misconduct after commencement of this litigation.
Following trial, Judge Brieant made findings regarding these allegations. He found that Santos had indeed met with Carlos in order to convince him to retire. He did not, however, credit the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendants provided scurrilous information to the FBI: he stated that “[t]he source or names of persons conveying the adverse information cannot be identified, but it did not necessarily come from the defendants, as others in law enforcement and politics have come to dislike the Chief over the years.” He found that the defendants did hire a consultant, but that the consultant's report was not particularly derogatory. He found that there was insufficient information to resolve the allegation that Ferrante had made false allegations of police misconduct. Finally, he found that all three defendants' motivation for their actions was essentially to save money for the taxpayers.
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judge Brieant disagreed, and dismissed all claims against the individual defendants on the ground of legislative immunity. He stated the following:
It is clear that the individual members of the Town Board are absolutely immune from personal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for making legislative decisions of the sort present here, including budgetary allocations and the decision of whether or not any town department or position should be maintained and continued, or abolished.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that their complaints against the defendants in their individual capacities should not have been dismissed, because the alleged wrongdoings included conduct that was “non-legislative in nature” and that occurred “outside of the legislative forum.” Therefore, they argue, the conduct does not come within the legislative immunity doctrine.
1. Under Color of Law
Section 1983 provides a right of action against any person who “under color of” state law subjects another person to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether the actions alleged by the plaintiffs come within the definition of “under color of” law.
“ ‘The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” ’ ” Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941))), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155, 117 S.Ct. 1335, 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997). Santos's meeting with Carlos was not a “misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law.” Santos had not yet even taken office: he possessed no power by virtue of state law to misuse. Nor did state authority enable the defendants to conduct their secret meetings, encourage a third party to sue, or, in Ferrante's case, bring a police complaint in his own name. Any citizen may perform these acts: they were not “made possible only because the wrongdoer[s] [were] clothed with the authority of state law.” Thus, plaintiffs' allegations (1), (2), (6) and (7) concern acts that were not undertaken “under color of law.” Whether true or not, they could not form the basis of liability under § 1983.
Allegations (4) and (5), however, do relate to actions taken under color of law. The defendants were able to hire a consultant to review the police force (allegation (4)), and were able to hold a public hearing (allegation (5)), solely because they were “clothed with the authority of state law,” i.e., the authority vested in them as town board members.
Thus, all of the allegations except (4) and (5) relate to actions that were not taken under color of law. Therefore, they may not form the basis of a claim under § 1983. They were properly dismissed.
2. Legislative Immunity
Having determined that the plaintiffs' allegation (4) and (5) were performed under color of state law, our next inquiry is whether these alleged misdeeds come within the legislative immunity exception to § 1983. There has long been recognized an absolute legislative immunity exception to § 1983 liability for individuals. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). In Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1992), and United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir.1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 110 S.Ct. 625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990), we noted in dicta that at least nine other federal circuit courts have held that the absolute legislative immunity doctrine applies to local legislators, see Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72; City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 456, and in Orange Lake Associates, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir.1994), we assumed that it did, see id at 1224. We therefore now explicitly hold that the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity under § 1983 applies to local legislators.
We next ask whether acts (4) and (5) specifically come within the protection of that doctrine. “In determining whether absolute immunity obtains, we apply a ‘functional approach,’ looking to the function being performed rather than to the office or identity of the defendant.” Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir.1995); accord Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542-43, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1147 (2d Cir.1995). The facts of Tenney are quite similar to plaintiffs' allegation (5). In Tenney, the plaintiff alleged that members of a committee of the California Legislature, the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, had held a hearing “not for a legislative purpose,” but in order to “intimidate and silence” the plaintiff. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 370, 71 S.Ct. at 785. The Court held that legislative immunity protected the legislators from the plaintiff's suit and stated that “[i]nvestigations, whether by standing or special committees, are an established part of representative government.” Id. at 377-78, 71 S.Ct. at 789. Because of the close parallel between the allegation here----that legislators held a hearing for the purpose of traducing the plaintiff----and the allegation in Tenney----that legislators held a hearing for the purpose of intimidating the plaintiff----we hold that the defendants' decision to hold the hearing is protected by absolute legislative immunity. Therefore, we need not inquire as to whether the defendants' purpose in holding the hearing was actually as the plaintiffs allege.
Thus, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants in their individual capacities were properly dismissed. A viable § 1983 claim against a town legislator in his individual capacity must allege acts taken under color of state law, but not acts that were legislative in nature. Whether they are true or not, the plaintiffs' allegations do not concern acts that fall into this category. Therefore, the defendants in their individual capacities were properly dismissed from the suit.
B. Permanent Injunction Against the Town
Unlike the individual defendants, the Town cannot avail itself of legislative immunity in defending against a § 1983 claim. Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 74. Below, the defendants sought an injunction against the Town, preventing the town from abolishing its police force. Judge Brieant denied this request. He stated that the plaintiffs could look to the damages trial for redress, and that the plaintiffs retained their rights under N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 80 et seq. to reinstatement if, for example, the defendants subsequently hired a new police force. He stated that an adequate remedy at law could be had, and that “it would be absurd to require a municipality to continue indefinitely and fund and [sic] activity which it wishes to abandon, simply on the ground that the decision to do so was a product of mixed motives.”
We review a denial of a request for a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. See Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir.1993). “Abuse of discretion can be found if the district court relied upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact or incorrectly applied the law.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir.1992)). Moreover, “injunctive relief where an adequate remedy at law exists is inappropriate.” Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169, 1185 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119, 116 S.Ct. 1351, 134 L.Ed.2d 520 (1996).
C. State Law Issues
1. New York Municipal Home Rule Law § 23
First, the plaintiffs point out that the members of Putnam Valley's town board are statutorily vested with the power to appoint a chief of police and subordinate police officers and the power to create or abolish a board of police commissioners or to act as commissioners themselves. They also point out that New York law provides that “a local law shall be subject to mandatory referendum if it ․ [a]bolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer.” See N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 23(2)(f). They argue that abolishing the police force of Putnam Valley will abolish the appointment powers of the town board members (i.e., elective officers within § 23), and so must be put to a referendum.
The power referred to [by the plaintiffs] apparently is the power to vote on filling vacancies in the Department. This power itself will not have been “abolished” and certainly it has not been transferred․ [T]his Town Board and its successors retain in full their powers of appointment of any police officers who are to be appointed, as well as the power to establish or abolish any town department in the future. The statute cited simply protects the powers of the office, which will remain the same the day after the proposed local law is adopted.
2. The Putnam County Police Act
The plaintiffs also relied on the Putnam County Police Act in the court below, and renew their arguments relating to it here. The Act provides, in pertinent part, the following:
§ 1. Establishment, organization and operation of police departments in all towns in the county of Putnam. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the establishment, organization and operation and all matters concerning police or police departments in all towns in the county of Putnam shall be governed by the provisions of this act.
§ 2. Establishment of town police department. The town board of any town in Putnam county which now has a police force or police department, or employs a police officer or police officers ․ or which hereafter employs such police officer or police officers ․ shall establish a police department and may appoint a chief of police, and such lieutenants, sergeants and patrolmen as may be needed and fix their compensation.
This act uses the phrase “employs a police officer” distinctly from the phrase “establishes a police department,” yet the plaintiffs' interpretation would equate the two phrases. We read the statute as stating that if a town in Putnam County has a police force of any sort, then it must have a police department, i.e., a division of local government dedicated to the policing function. If the town Board passes the threatened bill, there will be no police employed by the Town of Putnam Valley, and so the Putnam Valley Police Act will not apply to Putnam Valley. We therefore reject the plaintiffs' argument that the Putnam County Police Act is an obstacle to the defendants' threatened action.
3. Other State Law Claims
D. The 120-Day Waiting Period
The Judge did not specify what state law claim he was subjecting to supplemental jurisdiction. The Judge's use of the terms “arbitrary and capricious” and “administrative” suggests an Article 78 proceeding, a New York procedure in which administrative implementations of legislative acts are reviewed. However, “[i]t is well established that an article 78 proceeding is not the proper vehicle to test the validity of a legislative act,” Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 141 A.D.2d 607, 608, 529 N.Y.S.2d 528, 529 (2d Dep't 1988), and the term “legislative act,” for purposes of Article 78, “applies where ․ the dispute centers upon a rule of general applicability rather than an ad hoc determination of an individual party's particular rights,” Costantakos v. Board of Educ., 105 A.D.2d 825, 825, 482 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (2d Dep't 1984) (citing Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 231-32, 401 N.E.2d 190, 194-95, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72-73 (1980)). The effective date of the proposed action would be a “rule of general applicability” and so would not be subject to review in an Article 78 proceeding. The proper vehicle for an attack on the threatened action would be a declaratory judgment action, see Kamhi, 141 A.D.2d at 609, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 530, but, as we have seen above, the district court properly rejected the arguments that might have supported a request for a declaratory judgment.
E. Plaintiffs' Proposed Finding of Fact ¶ 31
Finally, the defendants argue that the court below committed clear error when it adopted the plaintiffs' proposed finding of fact ¶ 31, which stated the following:
31. Thereafter and in October of 1996, Gambino and Santos met with senior citizens' groups in Putnam Valley at which time the Supervisor advised those citizens that after abolition of the Police Department, police coverage in the Town would be “sporadic at best.” While Gambino and Santos were engaged in meetings with the seniors, Ferrante was advising town residents that the Putnam Valley Police headquarters would be used as a sub-station by the Sheriff's Department.
The district court's ruling is affirmed, except insofar as it imposed a 120-day waiting period on the defendants, and insofar as it adopted the final sentence of plaintiffs' proposed finding of fact ¶ 31. In these latter respects, the court's ruling is vacated.