Source: http://www.sabrinadamast.com/journal/?offset=1543106659717
Timestamp: 2019-01-23 14:46:17
Document Index: 108583883

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1952', '§ 841', '§ 1227', '§ 1229', '§ 1229', '§ 1255', '§ 274', '§ 1245', '§ 1255', '§ 1252']

Eleventh Circuit Construes Stop-Time Rule for Lawful Permanent Residents
The Eleventh Circuit has determined that a lawful permanent resident not seeking admission can still trigger the stop-time rule (which stops the accrual of continuous residence required for cancellation of removal) if he is convicted of an offense that renders him inadmissible. In so doing, the court joined the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, while diverging from the Ninth Circuit.
The full text of Barton v. Attorney General can be found here:
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201713055.pdf
Ninth Circuit Analyzes Travel Act under Categorical Approach
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) concluded that Myers is removable based on his felony conviction under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), for traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate an unlawful activity. The unlawful activity facilitated by Myers was identified as “possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).” The BIA held that Myers is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) because he had been convicted of a controlled substance offense. “Although not all convictions under the Travel Act represent violations related to controlled substances, meaning that the statute is not a categorical match to the removal statute, we conclude that the Travel Act is divisible in that respect. We further conclude that Myers’s conviction qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the modified categorical approach.” The court noted that In the Ninth Circuit, a specific “unlawful activity” is an element of a Travel Act offense.
Myers also sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. The BIA concluded that Myers is ineligible for that relief because he had not been present in the United States prior to the initiation of the removal proceedings against him for the number of years required under the statute. The court noted that the statute states that the relevant time period ends “when the alien is served a notice to appear.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The BIA used the date on which the notice to appear was issued, not the date when it was served on Myers.
The full text of Myers v. Sessions can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/25/17-71416.pdf
Ninth Circuit Finds H-1B Holder Ineligible for Adjustment of Status
Ma’s employer filed for an extension of his H-1B visa, but it was denied, and his employer failed to file an application for status adjustment within 180 days of the expiration of his H-1B visa. Because the application to extend the H-1B visa was denied, Ma was without lawful status in this country for 331 days before he applied to adjust his status—well over the 180 days permitted by 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2)(A), which would have otherwise protected him from removal. He was, however, legally authorized to work in the country during the months between the expiration of his H-1B visa and the denial of his application for an H-1B extension pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(20). Nonetheless, because 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(d) does not recognize regulatory employment authorization as conferring lawful immigration status for purposes of status adjustment under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k)(2)(A), the court concluded that Ma is ineligible for status adjustment.
“While nonimmigrant workers like Ma may legally continue working in this country for up to 240 days while they wait to hear back from the USCIS on their extension applications, they do not have lawful status during this period of time for purposes of status adjustment.
The full text of Ma v. Sessions can be found here:
Ninth Circuit Denies Petition for Rehearing En Banc on the CIMT Vagueness Case
The Ninth Circuit has declined a request for rehearing on the issue as of whether the term “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague. In so doing, the Court also confirmed that a federal conviction for bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute requires a “corrupt mind.”
The full text of Martinez de Ryan v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/11/16/15-70759.pdf
Ninth Circuit Remands Rodriguez Case to District Court
The Ninth Circuit has remanded its seminal prolonged detention case, Rodriguez v. Marin, to the District Court for further proceedings. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit from the Supreme Court, who reversed the Ninth Circuit’s statutory construction, but who left open the possibility that the Constitution compels regular bond hearing for immigration detainees.
On remand, the District Court must address:: (1) whether the class certified by the district court should remain certified for consideration of the constitutional issue and available class remedies; (2) whether classwide injunctive relief is available under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class action (a) remains the appropriate vehicle in light of Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), and (b) whether such a class action is appropriate for resolving Petitioners’ due process claims; (4) whether composition of the previously identified subclasses should be reconsidered; (5) the minimum requirements of due process to be accorded to all claimants that will ensure a meaningful time and manner of opportunity to be heard; and (6) a reassessment and reconsideration of both the clear and convincing evidence standard and the six-month bond hearing requirement.
The full text of Rodriguez v. Marin can be found here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/11/19/13-56706.pdf
Eighth Circuit Determines that Missouri Second-Degree Domestic Assault is not a Crime of Violence
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a Missouri second-degree domestic assault conviction that criminalizes recklessly causing injury to a household member does not qualify as a crime of violence. The court noted that the statute encompassed reckless driving, which is outside the scope of a crime of violence under the federal sentencing guidelines. Given the similar definitions of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines and the immigration law, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of US v. Harris can be found here:
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/11/172868P.pdf
Eighth Circuit finds that North Dakota Aggravated Assault Statute is not a Crime of Violence
The Eighth Circuit has determined that a North Dakota conviction for aggravated assault is overbroad and divisible with respect to the definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. The court determined that subsection (a) of the statute includes reckless driving, which is outside the definition of a crime of violence. Given the similarity between the definition of a crime of violence in the immigration context and the sentencing guidelines, this case could have persuasive value in the immigration context.
The full text of United States v. Schneider can be found here:
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/173034P.pdf
Sixth Circuit Upholds Habitual Drunkard Good Moral Character Bar
The Sixth Circuit has determined that the bar to good moral character for being a “habitual drunkard” does not violate equal protection. However, the court also determined that suffering from alcoholism alone does not constitute being a habitual drunkard. Instead, a court must examine if the individual’s alcoholism is also associated with harmful conduct.
The full text of Tomasczcuk v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0254p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit Denies Motion to Reopen for Petitioner who Failed to Correct his Address
The petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear bearing an incorrect address - the name of his street was misspelled. The petitioner did not file a change of address form to correct the misspelling, though he claimed that he had provided the correct address to the immigration official. The Immigration Court mailed a notice of hearing to the misspelled address, the petitioner did not attend his hearing, and he was order removed in absentia. He later moved to reopen his proceedings, and his motion was denied.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the agency’s decision. “An alien’s statutory obligation to keep the immigration court apprised of his current mailing address includes an obligation to correct any errors in that address listed on the NTA.”
The full text of Mauricio-Benitez v. Sessions can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60792-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit Applies Addition of Drug to CSA Prospectively Only
The petitioner was arrested for possession of AB-CHMINACA. While his criminal case pending, AB-CHMINACA was added to the federal controlled substance schedules. The petitioner subsequently pled guilty. He was later charged with inadmissibility for the conviction. He challenged that finding, arguing that penalizing him for conduct involving the substance prior to the addition of the substance to the CSA was impermissible retroactive. The Fifth Circuit agreed.
The full text of Lopez Ventura v. Sessions can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60529-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit Prohibits Use of Convictions Entered after Naturalization as Basis for Removal
Okpala was a naturalized US citizen when he was convicted of various drug offense. He was subsequently denaturalized, and the Department of Homeland Security sought to use the drug convictions as a basis for removing him. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the convictions were entered while Okpala was a US citizen, and as such, could not be used as predicate offenses to remove him. The court focused on the language of the aggravated felony statute as requiring “an alien” to be convicted after admission..
The full text of Okpala v. Whitaker can be found here:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60391-CV0.pdf
Third Circuit Examines New Jersey Drug Trafficking Convictions
The Third Circuit has determined that a New Jersey convictions for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, distributing cocaine, and conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute all qualify as drug trafficking aggravated felonies. In so doing, the court held that New Jersey attempt law is coextensive with federal law in that both require a substantial step that strongly corroborates the actor’s criminal purpose, and both hold that solicitation can count as a substantial step. The court recognized that its decision created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit on the definition of attempt under the Controlled Substances Act.
The full text of Martinez v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1827&context=thirdcircuit_2018
Third Circuit Requires Notice and an Opportunity to Present Corroboration
The Third Circuit has reaffirmed that an applicant for asylum, withholding of removal, and/or protection under the Convention Against Torture must be given notice of corroborating documentation required and the opportunity to present it. The court came to this conclusion, despite the contrary conclusion reached by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of L-A-C-.
The full text of Saravia v. Attorney General can be found here:
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1785&context=thirdcircuit_2018