Source: https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2016_11_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 06:23:21
Document Index: 797103103

Matched Legal Cases: ['§205', '§205', '§207', '§205', '§205', '§207', '§207', '§207', '§207', '§207', '§207', '§207', '§205', '§205', '§205', '§207', '§71', '§207', '§207', '§3020', '§3020', '§3020', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§913', '§3020', '§3020']

Locust Valley Central School District v Benstock, 2016 NY Slip Op 07299, Appellate Division, Second Department [Matter #1]
Locust Valley Central School District v Locust Valley Teachers' Association 2016 NY Slip Op 07299, Appellate Division, Second Department [Matter #2]
The relevant collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between Locust Valley Teachers' Association [LVTA] and the Locust Valley Central School District [School District] provided that either party had the right to submit a grievance to arbitration in the event the grievance was not resolved by the School District. The CBA defined a "grievance" as "a claimed violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application [of a] provision of th[e] Agreement."
LVTA filed a grievance against the School District concerning the School Districts commencing a plenary action* against a teacher formerly employed by the School District. The former teacher was a member of the LVTA and presumably in the collective bargaining unit represented by LVTA.
In the plenary action, the School District sought, under a "faithless servant" theory,**the forfeiture of all compensation earned by the former teacher pursuant to the CBA during a period of time in which the teacher allegedly engaged in certain criminal conduct. That conduct ultimately resulted in the teacher's plea of guilty to several criminal charges.
In an action (Matter #1) and a related proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of a grievance (Matter #2), the School District in Matter #2 appealed from an order of the Supreme Court which denied its petition seeking a stay of arbitration and granted LVTA’s motion to compel arbitration of the grievance.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matter #2.
The court explained that the determination of whether a dispute between a public sector employer and employee is arbitrable is subject to a two-prong test.
The court must first if there is any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance. In the event it finds no such prohibition, the court must review the relevant collective bargaining agreement between the parties and determine if they, in fact, agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute.
Citing Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Waterman Edu. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132, the Appellate Division said that in examining the collective bargaining agreement, must "merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the [agreement]." If there is such a relationship, said the Appellate Division, "the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the . . . provisions of the [collective bargaining agreement], and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them."
In determining whether a matter is arbitrable, however, the court may not "consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
Finding that the School District had not identified any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. In the words of the Appellate Division, the fact that “the grievance concerns the right of the School District to bring a plenary action seeking the equitable forfeiture of compensation paid to the teacher under the CBA establishes “a reasonable relationship between the grievance and the CBA.”
* A lawsuit where the merits are fully investigated and discussed and the decision is not based on another lawsuit.
** The "faithless servant doctrine" states that an individual owing a duty of fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the performance of his or her services generally cannot recover his or her compensation or other consideration that would be otherwise available to that individual [Murray v Beard, 102 NY 505]. See, also, http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/02/applying-faithless-servant-doctrine.html
The decisions in Matter #1 and Matter #2 are posted on the Internet at:
General Municipal Law §205-e gives a “Right of action to certain injured or representatives of certain deceased police officers.”
In pertinent part, subdivision 1 of §205-e provides that “In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law, in the event any accident, causing injury, death or a disease which results in death, occurs directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments or of any and all their departments, divisions and bureaus, the person or persons guilty of said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence at the time of such injury or death … provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to expand or restrict any right afforded to or limitation imposed upon an employer, an employee or his or her representative by virtue of any provisions of the workers' compensation law.”
The question presented in this appeal: Is a police officer who is entitled to receive benefits under General Municipal Law §207-c for a duty-related injury is barred from bringing a claim against his or her employer under General Municipal Law §205-e?
The Court of Appeal’s response: “We conclude that, where the municipal employer has elected not to provide coverage pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Law, a police officer who suffers a line-of-duty injury caused by the employer's statutory or regulatory violations may pursue a §205-e claim.”
James R. Diegelman, a City of Buffalo police officer from 1968 until 1995, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. The alleged genesis of Diegelman’s mesothelioma: exposure to asbestos during his employment at properties owned by the City and the Buffalo Board of Education and used by the Police Department.
The Court of Appeals noted that the City of Buffalo, like many other large municipalities, elected not to provide workers' compensation benefits to its police officers and contended that General Municipal Law §207-c "is essentially a super workers' compensation scheme for police officers" and, thus, “workers' compensation exclusivity rules should apply to police officers who receive section 207-c benefits, regardless of whether they are entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law.”
However, said the court, Workers’ Compensation Law and General Municipal Law §207-c are independent of each other and, “contrary to the City's argument that §207-c is essentially a super workers' compensation scheme,” the Workers' Compensation Law "features a more lenient and more inclusive standard of covered activity than is intended to be covered and compensated in a General Municipal Law §207-c benefits universe."
The Court of Appeals explained that "the Legislature chose different eligibility standards — 'arising out of and in the course of employment' for workers' compensation benefits [in contrast to the] 'in the performance of his [or her] duties' [standard] for section 207-c benefits."
Under these differing standards, "police … officers may be eligible for Workers' Compensation benefits as a result of circumstances that might not entitle them to General Municipal Law §207-c benefits." Indeed, said the court, "[w]orkers' compensation benefits are intended to be dispensed regardless of fault, for any injury arising out of and in the course of one's employment . . .[,] [while] [s]ection 207-c benefits . . . are more expansive, but apply to a narrower class of work-related injury, relative to the performance of law enforcement duties." Further, as "the issue involving the entitlement to benefits in the General Municipal Law setting is not . . . the same one decided in a Workers' Compensation determination" a finding by the Workers' Compensation Board that an injury is work-related cannot be given collateral estoppel effect against a municipality that denies an application for §207-c benefits.
Rejecting the City's argument General Municipal Law §207-c benefits can be equated to workers' compensation benefits for purposes of interpreting language contained in General Municipal Law §205-e, the Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he language of §205-e prohibits only recipients of workers' compensation benefits from commencing suit against their employers; it does not, by its terms, bar the commencement of suits by recipients of section 207-c benefits— which we have repeatedly recognized to be separate and distinct from workers' compensation benefits.”
The court said that it concluded that “General Municipal Law §205-e, when construed ‘in an unforced and natural manner,’ cannot be read to bar suits by recipients of General Municipal Law §207-c benefits when those police officers are employed by municipalities that have elected not to provide workers' compensation coverage.”
The Disability Benefits E-book – 2016 Edition: This 814 page electronic book [e-book] focuses on disability benefits available to officers and employees in public service pursuant to Civil Service Law §§71, 72 and 73, General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c, the Retirement and Social Security Law, the Workers’ Compensation Law, and similar provisions of law. For more information concerning this e-book click on: http://section207.blogspot.com/
Education Law §3020-a(5) provides for judicial review of an arbitrator's disciplinary determination, made in the course of a disciplinary arbitration as set out in CPLR 7511. The grounds for vacating an award pursuant to Article 75 include a finding of an arbitrator’s misconduct, his or her abuse of power or procedural irregularities.
However, where the parties are subject to compulsory arbitration, review of the award by the courts must satisfy an additional layer of judicial scrutiny — the arbitration decision must have “evidentiary support,” may not be arbitrary and capricious and it must have been made by the arbitrator in accordance with administrative due process.
In an Article 75 proceeding seeking to vacate a disciplinary arbitration award made pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, Monique Powell challenged the arbitrator's sustaining certain charges of misconduct against her and terminating her employment. Supreme Court denied Powell’s petition.
In sustaining the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the arbitrator’s determination, the Appellate Division, noting that Education Law §3020-a provides for compulsory arbitration, explained that Powell did not demonstrate any basis for vacating the arbitration award.
In other words, said the court, Powell did not demonstrate that the arbitration award was the result of the arbitrator’s misconduct, abuse of power, and procedural irregularities. Further, said the Appellate Division, the arbitration award satisfied the additional layer of judicial scrutiny required in situations involving compulsory arbitration as it had evidentiary support, was not arbitrary and capricious, and was in accord with administrative due process.
As to the penalty imposed, dismissal, in the words of the court, “the determination to terminate [Powell’s] employment did not shock the conscience, as the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that [Powell] requested to be paid for work that she did not perform and attempted to conceal her misdeeds through intentional and deceptive conduct, which included enlisting a student and two business owners to write false letters on her behalf.”
The Appellate Division also noted that “despite the overwhelming evidence of misconduct,” Powell refused to accept responsibility for her actions.
Soon after being relocated to a basement office at new school [School 1], Educator complained of “congestion, chronic sinus headaches, shortness of breath, chest pressure, a sore throat, red burning eyes, dry cough and fatigue.” Educator also claimed that she observed “visible mold and other unknown substances on the walls of her building, in classrooms and offices.” Attributing her discomfort to the location of her office in School 1’s basement, Educator requested an “upstairs office” in School 1.
The School District, instead, provided Educator with an office at a different school and employed a private contractor to perform a visual inspection and air quality testing on the classrooms and offices at School 1.
The contractor reported that there is no set exposure limit for exposure to mold spores, thus indoor testing was conducted and compared to outdoor testing. On both testing dates some indoor mold spores were detected. However, the reports for both testing dates stated that “the presence of a few spores found indoors but not found outdoors should not be a concern.” The reports also recommended that a better ventilation system be installed.
Educator was subsequently counseled regarding her complaints about the condition of the basement classrooms and offices at School 1 and was given a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) form to sign, authorizing the release of her medical records.
The superintendent notified Educator that the School Board voted to direct her to submit to a medical examination in accordance with Education Law §913 to determine her “physical and/or mental capacity to continue her duties.” Attached to the notice were two authorizations for release of medical information, one for referenced psychotherapy notes and the other referenced medical records. The letter directed Educator to fill out the release forms “for each prior physician and/or other health care provider who has such records from the last three years.” The records demanded were to be provided to the School District’s doctor who was to “serve as the District’s initial medical inspector for this case.”
Educator returned two releases prepared for two doctors under protest and crossed out the section on the releases that stated that information “may be subject to redisclosure”, changed the date of expiration of the authorization from December 31, 2014 to June 30, 2013 (approximately five months after signing the release), and clarified that the release pertained to “[r]ecords for the past three (3) years.”
The School District did not accept these releases and, “under threat of insubordination,” Educator submitted the forms with only the change of dates retained; June 30, 2013 rather than December 31, 2014.*
Educator filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education contending that her right to privacy and confidentiality was breached [1] by being ordered to be examined under Education Law §913 and [2] to sign medical releases that authorize the re-disclosure of her medical records. As redress, Educator asked the Commissioner to direct the School District to limit the release of medical records to those of P.P.’s allergist, expunge the Education Law §913 medical examination from her file and to destroy or return to her any medical records provided to the School District.
The School District contended that [1] Educator factual and legal analysis is incorrect, [2] that it acted within its authority under Education Law §913 to require an examination of an employee to determine the employee’s capacity to perform the duties of his or her position, and [3] that the medical authorizations they required Educator to execute are consistent with federal regulations.
The School District also argued that Educator constitutional claims were brought in an inappropriate forum and that Educator failed to meet her burden of establishing a clear legal right to the relief requested.
The Commissioner said that Education Law §913 provides, in pertinent part, that “In order to safeguard the health of children attending the public schools, the board of education or trustees of any school district … shall be empowered to require any person employed by the board of education or trustees … to submit to a medical examination by a physician or other health care provider of his or her choice or the director of school health services of the board of education or trustees … in order to determine the physical or mental capacity of such person to perform his or her duties.”
Noting that in an appeal to the Commissioner the Educator has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which the Educator seeks relief, the Commissioner found that Educator “failed to meet her burden of proof.” The Commissioner said that a board of education has a statutory right to order an employee to submit to a medical examination pursuant to Education Law §913 “in order to determine the employee’s capacity to perform the duties of his or her position.”
The Commissioner said that in light of Educator’s numerous health complaints, which she claimed were caused by the conditions at School 1, her absences and the School District’s need to have an individual in the position at School 1 who can perform the duties of Educator’s position, it was reasonable for the School District to require that Educator submit to a medical examination in order to determine her physical and/or mental capacity and whether it affects her ability to perform her job duties satisfactorily.
As to Educator’s assertion that her right to privacy and confidentiality was breached by being subject to an Education Law §913 medical examination, the Commissioner, citing Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., 70 NY2d 57, said that it is well-settled that “teachers in this State are generally required to submit to an examination to determine their physical and mental fitness to perform their duties,” and that teachers “therefore have a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to State inquiries into their physical fitness to perform as teachers.”
The Commissioner explained that considering this “diminished expectation of privacy,” Educator ongoing health complaints and her belief that they were caused by conditions at School 1, any additional explanation by the School District as to why it was requiring Educator to submit to an Education Law §913 examination was unnecessary. Further, said the Commissioner, P.P., herself, placed her capacity to continue to perform her duties at issue by asserting that she has numerous debilitating health issues and, as a consequence, the School District had reason to suspect that her health issues may affect her ability to perform her duties as principal.
As to the School District’s request for Educator medical records, in Strong v. Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 902 F2d 208, the court held that “Legitimate requests for medical information by those responsible for the health of the community do not rise to an impermissible invasion of privacy.”
Agreeing with Educator’s assertion that a school district does not have “unfettered discretion to compel the production of medical records,” the Commissioner said that the School District’s request for three years of medical records in this case for the purpose of assessing Educator’s physical and mental capacity to perform her duties was not an abuse of its discretion.
The Commissioner, ruling that Educator failed to meet her burden of establishing that School District had improperly required her to be subject to an examination in accordance with Education Law §913 and to sign HIPAA release forms for medical information to be used in conjunction with the medical examination, declined to declare the School District’s actions to be null and void or order the expungement of the records of such actions from her personnel file, “on this record.”
* Educator was examined by the District’s physician and, according to Educator the physician said that he only needed to see her medical records from her allergist. Educator’s attorney then sent a letter to the School District’s attorney revoking Educator’s consent for the release of medical records except for medical records from her allergist.
Noel v Bianco, 2016 NY Slip Op 07398, Appellate Division, First Department
Supreme Court denied the petition filed by Lesly Noel seeking a court order vacating an arbitration award terminating his employment with the New York City Transit Authority for misconduct. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
The decision indicates that the arbitration award was promulgated pursuant to a “voluntarily-entered collective bargaining agreement” and thus was not subject to a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. Citing New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332, the Appellate Division said that in such situations “courts are not permitted to review an arbitrator's findings of fact, including credibility determinations.”
In contrast, where the parties are forced to engage in compulsory arbitration, as was the situation in Hamilton v Alley, 137 AD3d 1564,the court ruled that judicial review under CPLR Article 75 requires that the "award be in accord with due process and supported by adequate evidence in the record."
In Bernstein [Norwich City School Dist. Bd. Of Education], 282 AD2d 70, which involved a challenge to an Education Law §3020-a disciplinary proceeding, the Appellate Division concluded that the applicable standard for review of the arbitration award in Bernstein's case was whether there was substantial evidence in the record to establish the employee's guilt with respect to the disciplinary charges levied against him.
The Bernstein court also pointed to CPLR Section 7803 as authority to adopt a "substantial evidence" standard in appeals from a §3020-a determination. In the words of the court: “[W]e must determine "whether there is a rational basis in [the whole record] for the findings of fact supporting the [Hearing Panel's recommendation]."
The Noel decision is posted on the Internet at:
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits and reports were issued during the week ending November 12, 2016
Town of Cincinnatus – Financial Operations
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2016/cincinnatus.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Clarence Fire District – Purchasing
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/firedists/2016/clarence.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Town of East Hampton – Budget Review
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2016/easthampton_br.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Town of Elmira – Audit Follow-Up
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2016/elmirafollowup.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Town of Hancock – Transfer Station Operations
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2016/hancock.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Hudson Housing Authority – Board Oversight
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/publicauth/2016/hudsonhousing.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Ithaca Area Wastewater Treatment Facility – Energy Cost Savings
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/jointacts/2016/ithacawastewater.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
City of Lockport -- Budget Review
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/cities/2016/lockport_br.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Saratoga Youth Recreation – Financial Activities
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/jointacts/2016/saratogayouth.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
City of Troy – Budget Review
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/cities/2016/troy_br.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Vischer Ferry Volunteer Fire Company – Cash Disbursements
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/firedists/2016/vischerferry.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=municipal+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
School District - BOCES Audits
Depew Union Free School District – Financial Condition
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/depew.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Erie 1 Board of Cooperative Educational Services – Special Aid Fund
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/erie1boces.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Norwood-Norfolk Central School District – Claims Auditing
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/norwoodnorfolk.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Oceanside Union Free School District – Professional Services
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/oceanside.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Orange-Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Services – Fixed Assets
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/orangeulsterboces.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Seaford Union Free School District – Extra-Classroom Activities
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/seaford.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight
Sewanhaka Central High School District – Student Fees
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2016/sewanhaka.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=school+audit&utm_content=20161113&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight