Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96431/james-vs-dravo-contracting-co
Timestamp: 2018-02-22 05:23:10
Document Index: 250543668

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 4', 'Art. 1', '§ 4', '§ 1227', '§ 519', 'art, 163', 'art, 163']

James Vs Dravo Contracting Co - Citation 96431 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
James Vs. Dravo Contracting Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96431
Case Number 302 U.S. 134
Respondent Dravo Contracting Co.
james v. dravo contracting co. - 302 u.s. 134 (1937) u.s. supreme court james v. dravo contracting co., 302 u.s. 134 (1937) james v. dravo contracting co. no. 3 argued april 26, 27, 1937 reargued october 12, 1937 decided december 6, 1937 302 u.s. 134 appeal from the district court of the united states for the souther district of west virginia syllabus 1. a state cannot lay a gross receipts tax on business carried on in another state. p. 302 u. s. 138 . 2. a state has no power to tax in a place within the state over which the united states has acquired exclusive jurisdiction. p. 302 u. s. 140 . 3. the title to beds of navigable streams within a state is vested in the state, subject to.....
U.S. Supreme Court James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937)
1. A State cannot lay a gross receipts tax on business carried on in another State. P. 302 U. S. 138 .
2. A State has no power to tax in a place within the State over which the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction. P. 302 U. S. 140 .
3. The title to beds of navigable streams within a State is vested in the State, subject to the right of the United States to use the land for the improvement of navigation. P. 302 U. S. 140 .
4. Locks and dams erected by the United States for the improvement of navigation are "needful buildings" within the meaning of the Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17. P. 302 U. S. 141 .
(1) The provision as to concurrent jurisdiction qualifies the provision giving consent, and applies to lands acquired by purchase or condemnation, as well as to lands given by municipalities. P. 302 U. S. 143 .
(2) The provision reserving merely the right to execute process, repeated from an earlier statute, does not derogate from the broader reservation of jurisdiction in the statute as amended. P. 302 U. S. 145 .
6. When a State gives the legislative consent as contemplated by the Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17, to purchase of land by the United States for "needful buildings," as when, after prior purchase or condemnation by the United States, it cedes jurisdiction, it may reserve such a concurrent jurisdiction as will not operate to deprive the United States of the enjoyment of the property for the purposes for which it is acquired. P. 302 U. S. 146 .
7. An independent contractor engaged under his contract with the Government in the construction of locks and dams for the improvement of navigation is not an instrumentality of the Government. P. 302 U. S. 149 .
tax laid on the contract itself, or as otherwise directly burdening the Government. P. 302 U. S. 149 .
9. Application of the principle that governmental instrumentalities of the United States are immune from taxation by the States, and vice-versa, requires close distinctions in order to maintain the essential freedom of government in performing its functions without unduly limiting the taxing power which is equally essential to both Nation and State under our dual system. P. 302 U. S. 150 .
Decisions on immunity of government bonds and of government purchases of commodities held inapplicable in case of tax on earnings of independent contractor rendering services to the Government. Pp. 302 U. S. 150 -153.
10. The question of the taxability of a contractor upon the fruits of his services to the Government is closely analogous to that of the taxability of his property used in performing the services. His earnings flow from his work; his property is employed in securing them. In both cases, the taxes increase the cost of the work, and diminish his profits. P. 302 U. S. 153 .
11. The fact that the tax in this case was on gross, rather than net, receipts does not prove it an unconstitutional burden on the Government. P. 302 U. S. 157 .
12. Assuming (what is not necessarily so) that a state tax on contractor's gross receipts may increase cost of service to the Government, that fact would not invalidate the tax any more than it would a tax on the contractor's property equipment used in the performance of the contract. P. 302 U. S. 159 .
13. Semble that Congress has power to prevent interference with the operations of the Government through state taxation laid on receipts of those who render it services under contracts. P. 302 U. S. 160 .
Respondent, the Dravo Contracting Company, is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the general contracting business, with its principal office and plant at Pittsburgh in that state, and is admitted to do business in the state of West Virginia. In the years 1932 and 1933, respondent entered into four contracts with the United States for the construction of locks and dams in the Kanawha river and locks in the Ohio river, both navigable streams. [ Footnote 1 ] The State Tax Commissioner assessed respondent for the years 1933 and 1934 in the sum of $135,761.51 (taxes and penalties) upon the gross amounts received from the United States under these contracts.
"Upon every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business of contracting, the tax shall be equal to two percent of the gross income of the business. [ Footnote 2 ]"
First. As to territorial jurisdiction. Unless the activities which are the subject of the tax were carried on within the territorial limits of West Virginia, the state had no jurisdiction to impose the tax. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 , 283 U. S. 133 -134; Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U. S. 37 , 252 U. S. 57 ; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647 . The question has two aspects: (1) as to work alleged to have been done outside the exterior limits of West Virginia, and (2) as to work done within those limits, but (a) in the bed of the rivers, (b) on property acquired by the federal government on the banks of the rivers, and (c) on property leased by respondent and used for the accommodation of his equipment.
(a) As to the beds of the Kanawha and Ohio rivers. The present question is not one of the paramount authority of the Federal Government to have the work performed for purposes within the federal province ( Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141 , 179 U. S. 163 ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 , 229 U. S. 61 -62; Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82 , 229 U. S. 88 ), or whether the tax lays a burden upon governmental operations; it is simply one of territorial jurisdiction.
The title to the beds of the rivers was in the state. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 44 U. S. 230 ; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 , 152 U. S. 26 ; Port of Seattle v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., 255 U. S. 56 , 255 U. S. 63 ; Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10 , 296 U. S. 15 -16. It was subject to the power of Congress to use the lands under the streams "for any structure which the interest of navigation, in its judgment, may require." Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, supra. But, although burdened by that servitude, the state held the title. Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269 , 166 U. S. 271 -272; Port of Seattle v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., supra; Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, supra. There does not appear to have been any acquisition by the United States of title to those lands unless, as respondent urges, the occupation of the beds for the purpose of the improvements constituted an acquisition of title. But, as the occupation was simply the exercise of the dominant
right of the Federal Government ( Gibson v. United States, supra, p. 166 U. S. 276 ), the servient title continued as before. No transfer of that title appears. The Solicitor General conceded in his argument at bar that the state of West Virginia retained its territorial jurisdiction over the river beds, and we are of the opinion that this is the correct view.
(b) As to lands acquired by the United States by purchase or condemnation for the purposes of the improvements. Lands were thus acquired on the banks of the rivers from individual owners, and the United States obtained title in fee simple. Respondent contends that, by virtue of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Federal Constitution, the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction. [ Footnote 3 ]
"Exclusive legislation" is consistent only with exclusive jurisdiction. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, supra, p. 281 U. S. 652 . As we said in that case, it is not unusual for the United States to own within a state lands which are set apart and used for public purposes. Such ownership and use, without more, do not withdraw the lands from the jurisdiction of the state. They lands
Id., p. 281 U. S. 650 . Clause 17 governs those cases where the United States acquires lands with the consent of the Legislature of the state for the purposes there described. If lands are otherwise acquired, and jurisdiction is ceded by the state to the United States, the terms of the cession, to the extent that they may lawfully be prescribed -- that is, consistently with the carrying out of the purpose of the acquisition -- determine the extent of the federal jurisdiction. Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 , 114 U. S. 527 , 114 U. S. 538 -539; Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 , 162 U. S. 402 -403; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439 , 278 U. S. 451 ; United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138 , 281 U. S. 142 ; Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, supra.
In Sharon v. Hill, 24 F. 726, 730, 731, Justice Field (sitting with Judge Sawyer) considered the provision to be applicable to a court building and custom house on land which had been purchased with the consent of the state. In Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36 , 209 U. S. 37 , we held that "post offices are among the other needful
The Legislature of West Virginia, by general statute, had given its consent to the acquisition by the United States, but questions are presented as to the construction and effect of the consent. The provision is found in § 3 of Chapter 1, Article 1, of the Code of West Virginia of 1931. The full text is set out in the margin. [ Footnote 4 ] By the first paragraph, the consent of the state is given
By a further provision in § 4, [ Footnote 5 ] the state reserves the right to execute process within the limits of the land acquired
was a part of the former statute (1923), and cannot be taken as derogating from the force of the explicit amendment by the later addition in the third paragraph of the present § 3. And, apparently to prevent misunderstanding, there was an amendment at the same time of the provision now in § 4 by the addition of the last clause [ Footnote 6 ] in order to make the reservation of the state's jurisdiction "more comprehensive." Code of West Virginia, 1931, c. 1, Art. 1, § 4, Revisers' Note.
It is not questioned that the state may refuse its consent and retain jurisdiction consistent with the governmental purposes for which the property was acquired. The right of eminent domain inheres in the federal government by virtue of its sovereignty, and thus it may, regardless of the wishes either of the owners or of the states, acquire the lands which it needs within their borders. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 , 91 U. S. 371 -372. In that event, as in cases of acquisition by purchase without consent of the state, jurisdiction is dependent upon cession by the state, and the state may qualify its cession by reservations not inconsistent with the governmental uses. Story on the Constitution, volume 2, § 1227; Kohl v. United States, supra, p. 91 U. S. 374 ; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra; Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, supra; United States v. Unzeuta, supra. The result to the federal government is the same whether consent is refused and cession is qualified by a reservation of concurrent jurisdiction, or consent to the acquisition is granted with a like
Normally, where governmental consent is essential, the consent may be granted upon terms appropriate to the subject and transgressing no constitutional limitation. Thus, as a state may not be sued without its consent and "permission is altogether voluntary," it follows "that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued." Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 61 U. S. 529 ; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 , 178 U. S. 441 -442. Treaties of the United States are to be made with the advice and consent of the Senate, but it is familiar practice for the Senate to accompany the exercise of this authority with reservations. Hyde, International Law, volume 2, § 519. The Constitution provides that no state, without the consent of Congress, shall enter into a compact with another state. It can hardly be doubted that, in giving consent, Congress may impose conditions. See Arizona v. California, 292 U. S. 341 , 292 U. S. 345 .
The tax is not laid upon the government, its property, or officers. Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, 41 U. S. 449 -450.
The tax is not laid upon an instrumentality of the government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 ; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 ; Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 ; New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401 . Respondent is an independent contractor. The tax is nondiscriminatory.
The tax is not laid upon the contract of the government. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, supra, p. 22 U. S. 867 ; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 27 U. S. 468 , 27 U. S. 475 ; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 , 157 U. S. 581 -582, 157 U. S. 586 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 , 105 U. S. 464 -466;
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 , 127 U. S. 646 ; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 , 226 U. S. 418 -419; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, supra; Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 , 277 U. S. 222 ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 , 283 U. S. 574 ; Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 , 298 U. S. 401 . The application of the principle which denies validity to such a tax has required the observing of close distinctions in order to maintain the essential freedom of government in performing its functions, without unduly limiting the taxing power which is equally essential to both nation and state under our dual system. In Weston v. Charleston, supra, and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra, taxes on interest from government securities were held to be laid on the government's contract, upon the power to borrow money, and hence were invalid. But we held in Willcuts v. Bunn, supra, that the immunity from taxation does not extend to the profits derived by their owners upon the sale of government bonds. We said ( id. at 282 U. S. 225 ):
In Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, supra, and Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, supra, the taxes were held to be invalid as laid on the sales to the respective governments, the one being a state tax on a sale to the United States and the other a federal tax on the sale to a municipal corporation of Massachusetts. A similar result was reached in Graves v. Texas Co., supra. These cases have been distinguished, and must be deemed to be limited to their particular facts. Thus, in Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572 , 281 U. S. 579 , the federal tax on transportation, as applied to lumber which the vendor had engaged to sell to a county for public bridges and to deliver f.o.b. at the place of destination at a stated price, was held to be laid not on the sale, but on the transportation. Although the transportation was with a view to a definite sale, it was held to be not part of the sale, but preliminary to it, and
"wholly the vendor's affair." In Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383 , the federal tax, as applied to tobacco purchased by a state for use in a state hospital, was sustained as a tax upon the manufacture of the tobacco, and not upon the sale. Hence, the Court said, "the effect upon the purchaser was indirect, and imposed no prohibited burden."
In Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 , 282 U. S. 514 , the Court sustained a state tax upon the gross receipts of an independent contractor carrying the mails. The taxpayer operated an automotive stage line. Two-thirds of his gross receipts, upon the whole of which he was taxed, were derived from carriage of United States mails, and the remainder from carriage of passengers and freight. The Court found that the property used in earning these receipts was devoted chiefly to carrying the mails, and that, without his contract with the government, the stage line could not be operated profitably. In upholding the tax upon his gross receipts, we distinguished Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, supra, saying:
"There was no tax upon the contract for such carriage; the burden laid upon the property employed affected operations of the Federal Government only remotely. . . . The facts in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 , and New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338 , were held to establish direct interference with or burden upon the exercise of a federal right. The principles there applied are not controlling here."
That doctrine recognizes the direct effect of a tax which "would operate on the power to borrow before it is exercised" ( Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra ), and which would directly affect the government's obligation as a continuing security. Vital considerations are there involved respecting the permanent relations of the government to investors in its securities and its ability to maintain its credit; considerations which are not found in connection with contracts made from time to time for the services of independent contractors. And, in dealing with the question of the taxability of such contractors upon the fruits of their work, we are not bound to consider or decide how far immunity from taxation is to be deemed essential to the protection of government in relation to its purchases of commodities, or whether the doctrine announced in the cases of that character which we have cited deserves revision or restriction.
The question of the taxability of a contractor upon the fruits of his services is closely analogous to that of the taxability of the property of the contractor which is used in performing the services. His earnings flow from his work; his property is employed in securing them. In both cases, the taxes increase the cost of the work and diminish his profits. Many years ago, the Court recognized and enforced the distinction between a tax laid directly upon a government contract or an instrumentality of the United States and a tax upon the property employed by an agent or contractor in performing services for the United States. "Taxation of the agency is taxation of the means; taxation of the property of the agent is not always, or generally, taxation of the means." Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579, 76 U. S. 591 . In expounding the grounds for the conclusion that the property of the contractor was taxable, the Court envisaged the serious consequences which would follow if immunity
were maintained. In Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 85 U. S. 33 , 85 U. S. 36 , the Court said:
The dissenting opinion of Justice Bradley (with whom Justice Field concurred), while considering that the state tax was invalid as applied to property of the Union Pacific Railroad because of its special relation to the government which had chartered it, emphasized the distinction between such a situation as he conceived it and one where the government has entered into a contract for services to aid in the discharge of governmental functions. His observations are strikingly pertinent here ( id., pp. 85 U. S. 41 -42):
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, supra, pp. 269 U. S. 523 -524.
was prohibited. We concluded that a nondiscriminatory tax upon the earnings of an independent contractor derived from services rendered to the government could not be said to be imposed "upon an agency of government in any technical sense," and could not "be deemed to be an interference with government, or an impairment of the efficiency of its agencies in any substantial way." Id. at 269 U. S. 524 -525.
net earnings, is not a controlling distinction. Respondent invokes our decisions in the field of interstate commerce, where a tax upon the gross income of the taxpayer derived from interstate commerce has long been held to be an unconstitutional burden. Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 ; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 , 245 U. S. 297 ; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 , 247 U. S. 328 -329; Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650 , 297 U. S. 655 -656.
But the difference is plain. Persons have a constitutional right to engage in interstate commerce free from burdens imposed by a state tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the privilege of engaging in it or the receipts as such derived from it. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 400 . Interstate commerce is not an abstraction; it connotes the transactions of those engaged in it, and they enjoy the described immunity in their own right. Here, respondent's activities at the dam sites are local, and not in interstate commerce. Respondent has no constitutional right to immunity from nondiscriminatory local taxation, and the mere fact that the tax in question burdens respondent is no defense. The defense is that the tax burdens the government, and respondent's right is at best, a derivative one. He asserts an immunity which, if it exists, pertains to the government, and which the government disclaims.
Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 , 272 U. S. 509 -510.
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319 , we sustained the tax upon the gross premiums received by a company as surety upon bonds running to the United States for "internal revenue, customs, United States government officials, United States government contracts, and banks for United States deposits," and "bonds given in courts of the United States in litigation there pending." While the challenged tax was "an exaction for the privilege of doing business," we held it to be valid, as
Id., pp. 240 U. S. 320 -323. The premiums, of course, were paid by those who were required to obtain the bonds, but the facts that the contracts were with the United States, and that the tax was laid upon gross receipts from the writing of such contracts, did not make the tax an invalid exaction.
But, if it be assumed that the gross receipts tax may increase the cost to the government, that fact would not invalidate the tax. With respect to that effect, a tax on the contractor's gross receipts would not differ from a tax on the contractor's property and equipment necessarily used in the performance of the contract. Concededly such a tax may validly be laid. Property taxes are naturally, as in this case, reckoned as a part of the expense of doing the work. Taxes may validly be laid not only on the contractor's machinery, but on the fuel used to operate it. In Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 , the taxpayer entered into a contract with the federal government for the construction of levies in aid of navigation, and gasoline was used to supply power for taxpayer's machinery. A state excise tax on the gasoline so used was sustained. The Court said that, if the payment of the state taxes imposed on the property and operations of the taxpayer
See Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573, 70 U. S. 585 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra.
common law exemption of the sovereign from regulation or taxation. It springs from the necessity of maintaining our dual system of government. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
"The attempt to use it [the power of taxation] on the means employed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single state cannot give. We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right [of the states] to tax the means employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers. [ Footnote 2/2 ]"
"The immunity is derived from the Constitution in the same sense and upon the same principle that it would be if expressed in so many words." [ Footnote 2/3 ]
This immunity was defined by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 436 :
In its application, the principle forbids taxation by a state of property of the federal government, [ Footnote 2/4 ] or of the office or salary of any of its officers. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
The government need not perform all its functions by the use of its property and the activity of its officers, but may establish agencies to these ends. Such an agency, created not for private gain but wholly devoted to governmental purposes and wholly owned by the United States, is as free from state taxation on its property and its activities as the government itself, and the exemption extends to the salaries of its officers. [ Footnote 2/6 ] In the exertion of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the United States may, in its discretion, erect corporations for private gain and employ them as its instrumentalities. [ Footnote 2/7 ] No tax can be laid upon their franchises or operations, [ Footnote 2/8 ] but their local property [ Footnote 2/9 ] is subject to nondiscriminating state taxation. In contrast, the bestowal of benefits, rights, privileges, or immunities, or the imposition of duties by federal law upon a natural person or a corporation, does not convert him or it into a federal agency exempt from uniform state excise or
property taxes. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Where the United States, by contract, constitutes a person or corporation its agent to fulfill a governmental obligation, a state tax upon such an agent is forbidden if it falls upon the avails of the operation in which the government has an interest, or is an excise or privilege tax upon the agent's operations; [ Footnote 2/11 ] but a general and uniform state property tax which falls only upon the agent's property used in the performance of the contract is valid. [ Footnote 2/12 ] The opinion of the court adverts to these distinctions, but, since admittedly the appellee is not an agency or instrumentality of the United States, a discussion of taxes laid upon the operations, as contrasted with those imposed upon the property of such an agency or instrumentality, is beside the point upon which the case turns. [ Footnote 2/13 ]
is an independent contractor, the tax is nondiscriminatory, or that it is not excessive in amount cannot serve to exculpate the statute from the charge that it transgresses the rule. These considerations, as repeatedly held, are irrelevant where the tax falls directly, immediately, and palpably upon an operation of the federal government or a means chosen for the exercise of its powers. Many illustrations are available of exactions which plainly burden and impede in some degree the lawful operations of the United States. As the opinion of the court indicates, a tax in terms laid upon the contract would do so; such as an excise for the privilege of making the contract or performing it, [ Footnote 2/14 ] a stamp tax upon the documents evidencing the contract, or a requirement that the contract be recorded and a tax be paid upon its recordation. [ Footnote 2/15 ]
The court has, moreover, repeatedly held a tax nominally upon one who contracts with the government was in effect and in fact imposed upon the operations of the latter. Thus, an excise upon a telegraph company which, under contract with the United States, transmits government messages, whether the tax be at a given sum per message [ Footnote 2/16 ] or in the form of a license tax upon all business, private and governmental, [ Footnote 2/17 ] is prohibited because it imposes a burden upon the operations of the United States. The cases so holding are sought to be distinguished by the circumstance that the telegraph companies carrying the messages of the United States were by federal statute given the privilege of using the post roads, and it is said that this in some way gave them a peculiar status which rendered their gross receipts untaxable.
But that was not the basis of decision. The ground of immunity was that the tax was, in effect, on the government's transactions in the exertion of its lawful powers. Thus, in Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. at 105 U. S. 465 , it was said,
That the privileges granted telegraph companies by federal law, had no bearing upon the validity of the tax is shown by Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 , and Massachusetts v. Western Telegraph Co., 141 U. S. 40 , in which state taxes on the property and franchises of companies, operating under the same statute as the Telegraph Company in the Texas case, were sustained because not on the transactions between the carrier and the United States.
Stock issued by the United States evidencing indebtedness to the holder cannot be taxed ad valorem by a state. [ Footnote 2/18 ] A tax upon the assets of a corporation is bad if obligations of the United States are included in the assessment. [ Footnote 2/19 ] A gross income tax is invalid to the extent
that it is laid on income from federal securities. [ Footnote 2/20 ] The reason is that
Certificates of indebtedness issued by the United States, payable at a future date, with interest, issued to creditors for supplies furnished by them to the nation, cannot be taxed by a state. They differ from the gross receipts here taxed only in the respect that they were issued to secure payment of past-due contractual obligations, whereas the cash paid the appellee was in solution of a present obligation of like nature. Of the taxability of these certificates, it was said: [ Footnote 2/21 ]
So, a franchise or privilege tax measured by assets or by income is not rendered void by the circumstance that the taxpayer's assets or income include federal securities or interest thereon. [ Footnote 2/22 ] And a law which imposes an excise upon the privilege of transmission of property at death may include federal securities in the estate by which the tax is measured. [ Footnote 2/23 ] Upon the like reasoning, a tax upon moneys and credits in the assessment of which uncollected government checks are included is valid. [ Footnote 2/24 ]
There can be no difference in reason, or in practical effect, between taxation of government contracts to repay borrowed funds or written promises to pay for goods previously furnished and a contract to pay for goods and services as furnished, or any other form of contract whereby the government exercises its granted powers. The federal power to contract for supplies or services is as necessary and as fundamental as the power to borrow money. Thus, it has been said, speaking of a tax upon government obligations: [ Footnote 2/25 ]
leased land before any sale or segregation of the equitable interests of the government as guardian, is void as burdening and impeding an operation of the government. [ Footnote 2/26 ] A sales tax on commodities sold to the government, though laid upon the seller at a given rate per unit sold, is also bad as directly burdening the government's transactions. [ Footnote 2/27 ] A tax on storage or withdrawal from storage essential to the sale of a commodity contracted to be delivered to the United States is in the same class as a tax on sales to the government. [ Footnote 2/28 ] On the other hand, a sales tax upon articles purchased by a government contractor, [ Footnote 2/29 ] or a net income tax laid upon his income, is valid. [ Footnote 2/30 ] The reason is that exactions of the latter sort do not impinge upon or directly affect the transaction between him and the government; do not affect the government's choice of means for executing its powers.
While a gross income tax upon receipts derived from a government contract would, in itself, be bad, if the exaction is in lieu of all property taxes and intended as a property tax, measured by receipts of the property, it is valid. [ Footnote 2/31 ]
Over a century ago, the Court said: [ Footnote 2/32 ]
There is no distinction between a sales tax on goods sold to the federal government and a gross receipts tax upon the furnishing of goods and services under a contract with the government. As was said in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 , 277 U. S. 221 :
the execution of its powers. That test is whether the taxing statute discriminates against the government and in favor of other taxpayers. He frankly admits that, if the proposed criterion be adopted, we must overrule Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, supra, and Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 . He professes himself, as I am, unable to distinguish a sales tax or a tax upon storage preliminary to sale to the United States from a gross receipts tax upon goods and services furnished the government. In a brief filed as amicus curiae in Graves v. Texas Co., supra, he urged the court to hold such a tax imposed on gasoline under contract to the United States invalid as an unconstitutional impediment and burden upon the operations of the government. [ Footnote 2/33 ] It is said that these cases have been distinguished. But, in the cases distinguished from them, the tax was found to be one on the property of a contractor with the United States, or on its net income, not on the gross receipts of his contract with the government. To distinguish them from the present case is not to rely upon any principle, but upon the mere name or label given to a tax. Such distinctions only serve to confuse.
Thus, it appears that, in his view, a nondiscriminatory state tax is to be judged not by the "burden" it imposes, but by the extent of its "interference" with the functioning of government. If this be the test, no tax, however great, can prevent such functioning, so long as the United States' taxing and borrowing powers remain adequate to meet the ordinary expenses of its operations and the added cost of state taxes thereon. The adoption of any such theory would require the overruling not only of the three decisions the Solicitor General singles out for deletion, but literally scores of others, beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland and ending with Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 , decided at the 1935 term in accordance with the views then earnestly pressed upon us by the Solicitor General.
The cases on which the opinion especially relies do not justify sustaining this tax. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 , throws no light upon the problem presented. A contractor employed to advise a state and its municipal subdivisions sought exemption from a federal tax upon net income. The law imposing the tax did not discriminate against the receipts from the contract, but treated them as part of the gross income upon which
The decision in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319 , relied on as sustaining the instant exaction, neither rules nor aids in the decision of the present cause. There, a foreign surety company was required by law to pay an annual fee equal to 2 percent of its gross premiums in order to be admitted to do business in Pennsylvania. Under a federal statute surety companies desiring to execute bonds running to the United States were required to obtain written authority from the Attorney General so to do. The Fidelity Company obtained such authority and became surety in Pennsylvania on a number of bonds insuring the faithful performance of official duties by federal employees. It challenged so much of the state tax as was laid upon the premiums received for writing these bonds. The challenge was not sustained. The claim that the company, by obtaining leave to execute bonds running to the United States, had become a federal instrumentality, was properly overruled. [ Footnote 2/34 ] But it is said that, in sustaining the tax, the court held that an exaction on the gross receipts of government contracts is valid. A moment's reflection will show that this is incorrect. The premiums received by the surety company were received from its clients; those for whom it wrote the bonds. It received no compensation from the United States and its transactions, in essence, were with
citizens of the state of Pennsylvania as such. They did not differ from transactions with federal officers and employees whereby the latter procured any other sort of goods or service. [ Footnote 2/35 ] Of course, the mere fact that a contractual relation, that of suretyship, was created between the Fidelity Company and the United States, was not, in and of itself, sufficient to relieve the company of the burden of paying a local tax for the privilege of doing business with its customers.
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 , is cited as an instance where a gross receipts tax incident upon the consideration paid the contractor by the United States was sustained. Examination of the case demonstrates that the contrary is true. Alward was engaged in operating an automotive stage line between points in California. In his business, he employed automotive property and used the state highways. In classifying property for taxation the state separately classified property of persons carrying on such a business as his and laid a tax on this class of property, in lieu of all other taxes at the rate of 4 1/2 percent of gross receipts. Other classes of property were taxed at a percentage of value. As the major portion of Alward's gross receipts arose from a contract for carrying United States mails, he insisted that the tax was invalid because, by virtue of his contract with the government, he became a federal agency immune from taxation upon his gross receipts.
under the commerce clause in which the intrastate property of an interstate carrier was either directly taxed or was taxed by use of a percentage of gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes, including property taxes, in order to reach a fair measure of the taxable value of the carrier's intrastate property. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 ; Hopkins v. Southern California Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 393 . It was pointed out that the tax was not on gross receipts as such, and did not bear upon the contract between the taxpayer and the government. In the instant case, the tax is admittedly an excise for revenue imposed in addition to property taxes and foreign corporation fees paid by the appellee.
Much stress is laid by the Solicitor General upon the decision in Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383 , and he suggests that the views therein stated be adopted in the present case in preference to those embodied in the Panhandle Oil case, supra. The suggestion implies, contrary to the fact, that the two decisions are contradictory. The Liggett & Myers Company, a manufacturer of tobacco, sold a portion of its product to a state. The company resisted the collection of a federal internal revenue tax laid
It may be conceded that often it is difficult to determine whether a tax is laid upon the local operations of a manufacturer or contractor or upon the actual sale of his product. But such distinctions must be made. Indeed, the court itself is required to make such a one in the instant case in determining that payment for what the appellee manufactured for the government in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, did not constitute a gross receipt in West Virginia under the contract. The court has repeatedly been confronted with the problem whether a tax was in fact on the sale of a commodity or upon some prior dealing with it by the producer or supplier. While the distinctions drawn may seem somewhat nice, examination of the facts carries conviction that the distinctions are substantial. [ Footnote 2/36 ]
with the government. If the fact that the taxpayer is an independent contractor were significant, it would have validated every tax laid upon the ownership of government obligations or upon the interest received therefrom. [ Footnote 2/37 ] It has been held that ores produced by an independent contractor for the government, though still in his possession, cannot be taxed by a state; [ Footnote 2/38 ] and that a license tax upon an independent contractor cannot be measured by the gross receipts from his transactions with the government. [ Footnote 2/39 ]
What was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting in Railroad Company v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 85 U. S. 38 , when read in the light of its context, has no bearing upon the issue here presented. In McCulloch v. Maryland, in holding that a tax upon the operations of the United States Bank invaded the federal immunity, Chief Justice Marshall said: "It [the immunity] does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the state."
Taxes condemned by the court's decisions which were imposed upon the principal and interest of federal securities, upon the product of mining lessees in which the government had an interest, upon storage and sale of property sold to the government, upon the operation and franchises of federal instrumentalities such as national banks, were nondiscriminatory. They bore equally and alike upon property and operations in which the government was interested and those which were alien to it, but they were voided as illegally burdening the operations of the United States. The fact that taxes upon government property and upon property of wholly owned government corporations were nondiscriminatory did not suffice to save them. Taxes on franchises granted by the federal government, taxes upon the office or salary of a federal official, though nondiscriminatory, nevertheless fell under the ban. It was said in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 , 254 U. S. 55 :
As we have seen, the Solicitor General suggests that the tax should be sustained, although it lays a burden on the United States, because the burden is a "normal tax burden," and the United States can bear it. The opinion of the Court suggests the same thought, and adds that, if West Virginia ever imposes a gross receipts tax uniform in its incidence, but inordinately heavy, Congress has power to relieve the government from such interference. Both suggestions are in the teeth of all that has been said by the Court on the subject of federal immunity. The necessity for enforcement of the doctrine was embodied in the phrase of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." As was said in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 , 178 U. S. 60 :
"The decision in that case was not put upon any consideration of degree, but upon the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way at least, the instrumentalities of the United States; 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 429, 17 U. S. 430 , and that is the law today. [ Footnote 2/40 ]"
"It is obvious that the same power which imposes a light duty can impose a very heavy one, one which amounts to a prohibition. Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed. If the tax may be levied in this form by a state, it may be levied to an extent which will defeat the revenue by impost, so far as it is drawn from importations into the particular state. [ Footnote 2/41 ]"
"Where the principle applies it is not affected by the amount of the particular tax or the extent of the resulting interference, but is absolute. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 430 ; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 17 Wall. 322, 84 U. S. 327 ; Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 , 254 U. S. 55 -56; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 , 257 U. S. 505 ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 44 -46. [ Footnote 2/42 ]"
No one denies the competence of the Congress to waive the immunity in whole or in part. [ Footnote 2/43 ] But his is the
Such a tax upon gross receipts has been contrasted in all the decisions, including those dealing with burdens upon commerce, with a tax upon net income, the one being held a forbidden burden and the other a permissible exaction. Despite the fact that the Court has repeatedly applied the same tests of validity to taxes alleged to burden interstate commerce as it has to exactions said to burden the operations of the federal government, [ Footnote 2/44 ] it is said in the opinion:
"The rule as to instrumentalities of the United States on the other hand is absolute in form and at least stricter in substance. [ Footnote 2/45 ]"
States, so in the case of a private corporation engaged in interstate commerce, the states are free to lay a uniform and nondiscriminatory tax upon the property employed in the business within their jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2/46 ]
A tax upon the gross receipts of corporations derived both from intrastate and interstate commerce is bad because it burdens the latter. [ Footnote 2/47 ] A franchise tax upon a corporation transacting an interstate business, measured by its interstate business or its property without the state, is void, on the same principle that a tax laid upon the franchise of a corporation which is a federal agency or instrumentality is void. [ Footnote 2/48 ]
A sales tax on gasoline sold within a state is invalid as it affects gasoline purchased outside the state for use therein, for the same reason a sales tax upon sales to the United States in invalid. [ Footnote 2/49 ] A tax upon the gross receipts of one engaged in interstate commerce is bad because
a direct burden on that commerce in the same sense that a tax on the gross receipts of business done with the United States is a direct burden on the transaction with the federal government. [ Footnote 2/50 ] In contrast, a tax on the net income of one engaged in interstate commerce is not upon his transactions in that commerce, but so remote therefrom as not to burden it, just as a net income tax upon one who contracts with the federal government is inoffensive to the rule of federal immunity. [ Footnote 2/51 ]
A state may not lay an occupation tax upon the act of engaging in interstate commerce, for the same reason that it may not lay a similar tax upon the employment of an officer of the United States. [ Footnote 2/52 ] The same considerations of remoteness sustain taxes upon the mere purchase of articles intended for use in interstate commerce or for the fulfillment of government contracts. [ Footnote 2/53 ]
Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 , 283 U. S. 575 ; Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 , 289 U. S. 59 ; Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 , 293 U. S. 225 .
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 430 ; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 27 U. S. 467 .
Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 , 263 U. S. 344 .
McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23, 76 U. S. 27 ; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527, 89 U. S. 572 ; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 ; Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496 , 133 U. S. 504 ; Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219 , 258 U. S. 228 . But property acquired from the Government, upon its severance, loses the immunity in the hands of the transferee. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762 ; Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279 ; Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, 288 U. S. 325 .
Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341 ; New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547 ; New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401 . For the same reason, a state tax which burdens the fiscal operations of a territory must fall: Farmers' & Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516 .
Interstate railroad: Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; National banks: McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 .
Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664 .
Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, 288 U. S. 325 , 288 U. S. 327 -328.
Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 ; Massachusetts v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40 ; Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 ; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319 ; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531 ; Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U. S. 291 ; Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 ; Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17 .
Choctaw, O. & Gulf R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 ; Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609 .
Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, 288 U. S. 325 ; Taber v. Indian Territory Oil Co., 300 U. S. 1 .
Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 867 .
Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 .
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 ; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 .
Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620; Bank Tax case, 2 Wall. 200; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26; Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503 ; Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313 .
Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 ; National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 . And no form of words or subterfuge can save an act the intent of which is to reach the income from federal bonds. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713 ; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 , 279 U. S. 629 .
The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16, 74 U. S. 25 .
Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U. S. 129 ; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 .
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 ; Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384 .
Hibernia Savings Society v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310 .
Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 27 U. S. 465 .
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609 .
Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 ; Grayburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U.S. 582; 3 S.W.2d 427. Compare 25 U. S. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 25 U. S. 440 .
Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 .
Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 .
General Construction Co. v. Fisher, 295 U.S. 715; 149 Or. 84, 39 P.2d 358; Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508 .
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 .
Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418 ; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 ; Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572 . The same problem arises in connection with taxation alleged to burden interstate commerce. See American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 .
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 ; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404 ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 ; Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 .
Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 , 254 U. S. 55 .
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 25 U. S. 439 .
Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 , 283 U. S. 575 .
Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 , 105 U. S. 465 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 , 163 U. S. 14 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 , 216 U. S. 32 ; U.S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 , 223 U. S. 344 ; Choctaw, O. & G.R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 , 235 U. S. 299 ; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. v. Botkin, 240 U. S. 227 , 240 U. S. 232 ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 , 257 U. S. 504 -505; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136 , 275 U. S. 140 ; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 , 279 U. S. 627 ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 , 283 U. S. 575 ; Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. So. Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U. S. 147 , 285 U. S. 152 ; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 , 286 U. S. 126 ; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 383 , 299 U. S. 387 .
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 , 257 U. S. 505 .
Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1 ; Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 ; United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 ; Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 . And, as in the case of agents of the federal government or contractors with it, a state may measure the value of the property within its borders by a receipts tax in lieu of all property taxes. Compare United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 ; Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330 , with Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 .
Philadelphia & Southern S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 ; Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 ; Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 .
Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 , and Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 , with California v. Central Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 ; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664 ; Third National Bank v. Stone, 174 U. S. 432 , and Louisville v. Third National Bank, 174 U. S. 435 .
Compare Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 , and Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 , with Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 .
Compare Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 ; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 ; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 ; New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338 ; Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650 ; Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 90 , with Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 .
Compare Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 ; United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 , and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413 , with General Construction Co. v. Fisher, 295 U.S. 715; 149 Or. 84, 39 P.2d 358, and Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508 . But see Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 , and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 .
Compare East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U. S. 465 , with 41 U. S. Erie County Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435, and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401 .
Compare Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285 U. S. 147 , with Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 , and Tirrell v. Johnston, 293 U.S. 533.