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CDL-AD(2016)012
Strasbourg, 13 June 2016
Opinion No. 839/ 2016
ON THE ACT OF 15 JANUARY 2016
AMENDING THE POLICE ACT AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS
at its 107th Plenary Session
(Venice, 10-11 June 2016)
Mr Iain CAMERON (Member, Sweden)
Mr Ben VERMEULEN (Member, the Netherlands)
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 4
II. Scope of the analysis...................................................................................................... 4
Background to the amendments to the Police Act and other Acts ....................... 5
Short description of the Police Act .......................................................................... 6
V.To what extent measures provided by Articles 19 and 20c of the Act amount to an
interference with privacy? ................................................................................................. 8
VI. Substantive and procedural safeguards against abusive surveillance............... 11
A. International standards .................................................................................................. 11
B. Circumstances in which public authorities are empowered to resort to secret surveillance
and metadata collection ........................................................................................................ 12
Substantive grounds for ordering surveillance under Article 19.................................. 13
a. Which crimes may justify secret surveillance? The proportionality principle in the
context of secret surveillance ......................................................................................... 13
The need for factual substantiation......................................................................... 13
Probability that important information may be obtained through surveillance ......... 14
Subsidiarity ............................................................................................................. 14
Evidentiary value of information.............................................................................. 14
Substantive grounds for metadata collection under Article 20c of the Police Act ....... 15
Which crimes may justify metadata collection? ...................................................... 15
Probability that important information may be obtained through metadata collection
Subsidiarity ............................................................................................................. 16
The notion of metadata under Article 20c............................................................. 17
Who may be subjected to surveillance and metadata collection? .................................. 18
Large groups of people .............................................................................................. 18
Non-suspected bystanders ...................................................................................... 20
Lawyers, priests, and other persons covered by professional privilege ...................... 20
Procedural safeguards................................................................................................... 23
Duration of the surveillance measures and metadata collection................................. 23
2. Judicial control ex-ante and ex-post, complaints mechanisms and oversight by an
independent body .............................................................................................................. 23
Authorisation and oversight of the surveillance operations under Article 19 ........... 24
Authorisation .......................................................................................................... 24
Ex-post oversight .................................................................................................... 25
Authorisation and oversight of metadata collection under Article 20ca ................... 28
Authorisation .......................................................................................................... 28
Ex-post oversight .................................................................................................... 28
Direct access to metadata ...................................................................................... 30
Recording obligation ............................................................................................... 31
Liability of State officials ................................................................................................. 31
1. By letter of 29 January 2016, the Chair of the Parliamentary Assemblys Monitoring
Committee1 requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on the law of Poland called Act
of 15 January 2016 amending the Police Act and certain other acts. According to its Article 17,
the Amendments came into force on 7 February 2016.
2. Mr Iain Cameron, Ms Regina Kiener and Mr Ben Vermeulen were invited to act as
rapporteurs on this opinion. On 28 and 29 April 2015, a delegation of the Venice Commission
visited Warsaw and held meetings with the State authorities, politicians, lawyers and NGO
representatives. The Venice Commission expresses its gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Poland for the excellent organisation of the visit.
3. The present opinion was prepared on the basis of the comments submitted by the
rapporteurs based on the English translation of the Police Act and other relevant legislation
(see CDL-REF(2016)036). This translation may not always accurately reflect the original
version in Polish on all points; therefore, certain issues raised may be due to problems of
4. This opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission at its 107th Plenary Session (Venice,
10-11 June 2016).
5. The purpose of the 2016 amendments was to regulate various methods of secret
surveillance2 employed by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. State agencies may
obtain information by many means: through witnesses or informants, by searching premises,
conducting classical surveillance (following a person on the street), etc. However, the main
reason why the amendments attracted so much public attention and criticism3 was the power of
State agencies to obtain information by monitoring the means of communication and other tools
including: computers, telephones, databases, e-mails, social networks, etc. Hence, in analysing
the amendments the Venice Commission will concentrate on the legislative provisions
regulating those methods of surveillance.4
6. The focus of the present opinion will be on the regular law-enforcement action which
involves surveillance for the purposes of combatting crime within the country. The Venice
Commission will not analyse surveillance by the external intelligence services, military counterintelligence and alike. The Venice Commission is aware that the line between classical lawenforcement surveillance and intelligence gathering conducted for national security purposes is
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Parliamentary Assembly of
The term surveillance is used in this opinion in two meanings: as a general term denoting all kinds of secret
information gathering, and in a more narrow sense, as covert monitoring of the content of private communications (as
opposed to the metadata collection about this distinction see paragraphs 14 et seq. below).
Within Poland, the amendments to the Police Act and other acts were strongly criticised by, among others, the
Polish Ombudsman, the Inspector General for Data Protection, the National Council for the Judiciary, the Polish Bar
Council as well as members of the parliamentary opposition. Some authoritative civil society organisations claimed
that while the purpose of the new legislation ostensibly was to implement the Constitutional Court judgment from July
2014, it further expands surveillance powers in many areas and conflicts with Polands international human rights
obligations. On 13 January 2016, the European Union expressed its will to launch a Structured Dialogue with Polish
authorities under the Rule of Law Framework in order to assess the necessity of making use of Article 7 TEU to
safeguard European values and standards, with regard to several laws recently adopted in Poland, including, among
others, the amendments to the Police Act. The Venice Commission observes, however, the Poland is not alone to
attract criticism concerning its surveillance laws see, for example, the UN Human Rights Committee Concluding
observations on the seventh periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 2015,
point 24; Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of France of 2015, point 12; Concluding observations
on the fourth periodic report of the United States of America of 2014, point 22.
In addition, the opinion will also touch upon the covert interception of live conversations see the analysis of Article
19 of the Police Act below (paragraphs 13 and 14 below).
blurred.5 However, the latter remains a very complex and delicate sphere which deserves a
separate analysis.6
7. The 2016 amendments modified several laws regulating activities of different lawenforcement and intelligence agencies.7 All those laws basically employ the same model of
surveillance (with some minor exceptions).8 The Venice Commission will concentrate on the
Police Act, which may serve, mutatis mutandis, as an illustration of regulations concerning
other agencies.9
8. Finally, the Venice Commission observes that following an application lodged by Mr Bodnar,
the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland is now examining
the constitutionality of the 2016 amendments (case no. K 9/16). In deference to the
Constitutional Tribunal the Venice Commission will avoid commenting on the compatibility of
the 2016 amendments with the Polish Constitution. Instead, it will base its analysis on the
international standards applicable in this area and on the examples from other countries
illustrating these international standards.
9. In sum, this opinion is not a comprehensive evaluation of all aspects of the amendments. It
outlines a number of problematic areas, which attracted attention both domestically and
internationally, and which, in the opinion of the Venice Commission, need a revision by the
Polish legislator as a matter of priority.10
III. Background to the amendments to the Police Act and other Acts
10. The amendments aimed to amend the Polish legal system according to the judgement of
the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of 30 July 2014 (No. K 23/11). In that judgement the
Constitutional Tribunal concluded that certain provisions of the original Police Act of 1990 (and
several other acts) were incompatible with the Polish Constitution. The Constitutional Tribunal
proceeded to a careful and convincing analysis of the domestic constitutional framework and of
the international norms regulating surveillance.11 There is no need to reproduce the reasoning
of the Tribunal in detail. It suffices to recall the most essential principles formulated in para. 5.3
of the judgment, which had to be reflected in the process of revision of the legislation on secret
surveillance. These principles may be summarised as follows:
See CDL-AD(2015)011, Report on the Democratic Oversight of signals intelligence agencies, 33 (hereinafter the
See the analysis of the EU law by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency Report of 2015 on Surveillance by intelligence
services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU; Mapping Member States legal frameworks, paras.
Similarly, the Venice Commission will not touch upon such issues as extraterritorial surveillance and information
exchanges between security services of different countries (see, in the Polish context, Article 20 para. 2ab of the Act).
The Venice Commission is aware that these are amongst the techniques which are sometimes used to circumvent
domestic rules on surveillance; however, these issues do not appear to be at the heart of the domestic discussion
over the recent amendments and will not be analysed.
(1) The Act of 6 April 1990 on Police; (2) the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard, (3) the Act of 28
September 1991 on Fiscal Controls, (4) the Act of 21 August 1997 on the Military Court System, (5) the Act of 27 July
2001 on the Common Court System, (6) the Act of 24 August 2001 on the Military Police and Military Law
Enforcement Units, (7) the Act of 24 May 2002 on the National Security Agency and the Intelligence Agency, (8) the
Act of 18 July 2002 on the provision of services supplied by electronic means, (9) the Telecommunications Act of 16
July 2004, (10) the Act of 9 June 2006 on the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service,
(11) the Act of 9 June 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and (12) the Act of 27 August 2009 on the
The Act not only amends those acts that relate to the different agencies which may implement covert surveillance,
but also several other acts relating to the implementation of surveillance measures.
Namely the Police, the Border Guard, the Fiscal Control Service, the Military Police, the National Security Agency
and the Intelligence Agency, the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service, the Central
Anticorruption Bureau, and the Customs Office.
On 7 June 2016, the Polish authorities submitted their position on the questions discussed in the present opinion.
An English translation of the judgment can be found on the web-site of the Constitutional Tribunal:
http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/judgments/art/7004-okreslenie-katalogu-zbieranych-informacji-o-jednostce-zapomoca-srodkow-technicznych-w-dzialani/
The law should contain explicit and precise provisions with regard to its material
scope, and define which bodies are entitled to collect and process information
through secret surveillance;
The law should determine the types of offences which may warrant the use of
such measure of information gathering as secret surveillance; those offences
should be serious enough to warrant the use of the secret surveillance;
The law should define the maximum duration of surveillance measures and,
where possible, the definition of technical means envisaged to obtain
information; 12
The law should define the procedure for authorisation of such measures by an
independent authority, and provide for independent oversight of the process of
obtaining and handling of data related to individuals;
The law should include an obligation to destroy material which is immaterial or
inadmissible and describe a procedure for it; there should be safeguards against
unauthorised access to the information collected through secret surveillance;
The law should provide for the right of the monitored person to be informed,
within reasonable time, about surveillance once it is finished, and the right to
initiate the judicial review thereof; however, in exceptional circumstances the
departure from the notification rule should be possible;
The relevant services should disclose statistical data on secret surveillance, in
order to enable the analysis of its intensity;
The law may introduce specific rules regulating secret surveillance by the State
security and intelligence services (as opposed to the police) and collecting data
in respect of non-Polish citizens.
11. In order not to create a legal vacuum, the Constitutional Tribunal gave the legislator
18 months to amend the relevant laws (that is until 7 February 2016). However, the previous
legislature was unable to pass the necessary amendments. The new Parliament was formed in
November 2015 and thus had limited time to implement the judgement of 30 July 2014.
Eventually, the amendments were voted by means of accelerated procedure.
IV. Short description of the Police Act
12. In the following paragraphs the relevant provisions of the amended Police Act are briefly
summarised. The Venice Commission will focus on two provisions of the Act: Article 19 (which
regulates classical surveillance measures) and Article 20c (which describes collection of
metadata the meaning of this term is explained in paragraph 15 below).
13. Article 19 sets out the rules for secret surveillance (named in the official English translation
of the Police Act operational control) ordered in case of preliminary investigation with regard
to crimes (including potential crimes) listed in para. 1, sub-paras. (1) to (8). As was explained to
the rapporteurs of the Venice Commission in Warsaw, secret surveillance under Article 19 is
not governed by the formal rules of evidence gathering set by the Criminal Procedure Code
these are two different legal regimes.13 Secret surveillance often precedes the opening of a
criminal case, providing justification to initiate it. However, not every secret surveillance
operation results in the opening of a criminal case.14 On the other hand, materials obtained
The relevant part of para. 5.3 states that it is desirable to indicate those technical means; it follows that this is not
a strict requirement but rather a recommendation.
The Criminal Procedure Code contains Chapter 26 which governs the process of gathering evidence through
secret surveillance for the purposes of conducting criminal proceedings which are already in place.
In his petition of 18 February 2016 before the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland with regard to the unconstitutionality
of the amendments to the Police Act, the Commissioner for Human Rights described the situation as follows (on pp. 7
and 8): [] [The] discussed provisions [Article 19 et al.] do not apply to the issue of operational and investigative
activities conducted in the framework of criminal proceedings, in the manner laid down in the Code of Criminal
Procedure []. [The] provisions that are the subject of this application govern activities outside of the scope of
criminal procedure, which could lead to criminal proceedings, but do not involve such a necessity. The literature
emphasizes that operational surveillance plays a subsidiary role in relation to criminal proceedings, they precede
preparatory proceedings, providing justification to initiate preparatory proceedings [].
through secret surveillance may be introduced in evidence in criminal proceedings.15 Secret
surveillance shall be ordered for a period not exceeding 3 months (para. 8); it may, however, be
prolonged to a maximum of 18 months (para. 9).
14. According to Article 19 para. 6, secret surveillance includes such measures as listening to
and recording of the contents of telephone conversations and correspondence conducted via
telecommunications networks (e-mails, messengers, etc.), in ordinary letters, recording live
conversations with listening devices, etc. Therefore, classical secret surveillance under
Article 19 allows the police to know the content of communications which were supposed by the
interlocutors to be private.16
15. Article 20c of the Police Act deals with metadata. Simply put, metadata is all data
connected to and regarding a (tele-)communication. It may include information about phone
calls placed or received, numbers dialled, duration of calls, geographical location of mobile
devices at a given moment, web-sites visited, log-ins, personal settings, addresses of e-mail
correspondence, etc. Access to metadata does not reveal the content of private
communications (Article 20c para. 1), at least not in the same way as the classical
surveillance under Article 19 does. At the same time, as explained further below, the
content/form distinction is no longer so clear, and metadata may reveal considerable
information about a persons private life. The meaning of metadata is further developed in the
relevant legislation (Telecommunications Act, Act on Electronic Services, and Postal Act).17
16. Secret surveillance under Article 19 and metadata collection under Article 20c are ordered
on different grounds and implemented within different procedures. As to the grounds, Article 19
contains a closed list of crimes which may warrant surveillance.18 The legal framework for
collecting metadata under Article 20c is much wider. It is done in order to prevent or detect
crimes or in order to save human life and health, or in order to support rescue and find
missions. In essence, police may collect metadata for any useful purpose related to the very
broad mandate of the police to maintain peace and order.
17. As to the procedure, secret surveillance governed by Article 19 is performed, as a rule, with
the prior consent of a district court (see paras. 1 and 2). However, in cases of the utmost
urgency, where any delay could result in the loss of information or the obliteration or destruction
of the evidence of a crime, police may start surveillance without prior consent of the court but
with the authorisation of a prosecutor. If consent is not granted within the following 5 days,
surveillance must be suspended and the material gained must be destroyed (para. 3).
18. By contrast, under Article 20c metadata may be obtained without prior consent of a court.
Article 20ca only establishes a system of ex-post review: every six months the police are
obliged to pass to a competent court for review a generalised report on metadata collection
(para. 2). Finally, Article 20cb sets out the rules for processing and obtaining certain data, that
is not subject to any controls, even ex-post. In sum, the Police Act establishes two separate,
fundamentally different legal regimes: one for the classical secret surveillance of
communications, and another for the metadata collection.
19. It appears that metadata collection on the basis of Article 20c is a widely used method of
investigation, while classical secret surveillance of communications is much rarer. According
to the figures provided by the Ministry of Interior, in 2015 the police was investigating 833,361
cases, out of which 215,561 cases related to the crimes mentioned in Article 19 para. 1. In
respect of that group of cases secret surveillance was ordered on 8,000 occasions (which
See, for example, Article 19 para. 15g, which describes conditions in which materials containing privileged
communications may be used in criminal proceedings.
The Venice Commission stresses that Article 19 of Act speaks of the secret access to the content of the
correspondence, letters, e-mails etc. In many jurisdictions law-enforcement bodies may also implement open
monitoring of communications in respect of some groups of persons, most often prisoners. The present opinion will
not discuss limitations to privacy which may result from that type of monitoring.
See CDL-REF(2016)036 which contains the extracts from the relevant legislation in English.
This list is very long to be quoted in its entirety; for more details see CDL-REF(2016)036.
represents 0,9% of the overall amount of all pending cases, and 3,7% of the number of listed
cases, i.e. cases referred to in Article 19 p. 1). Prosecutor refused police requests for
surveillance in 178 cases, while the courts refused such requests in 19 cases.
20. As to metadata monitoring, in 2015 various law-enforcement agencies made 1,497,174
queries, of which about 1,3 million related to telecommunications data and 0,2 million to Internet
data. In the latter category the law-enforcement agencies requested information inter alia on
www addresses and email addresses, internet communicators, blogs, chats (902 and 4,913
times respectively). Itemized billings (that is information on numbers dialled, date, hour and
length of the connections) are the main type of information requested (703,819 queries in
2015). About 330,000 requests related to the less sensitive data (i.e. the subscriber data name and address of the user of the communication device).19 The Venice Commission recalls
that the population of Poland is over 38 million people.
21. Before passing to a more detailed examination of the Police Act, the Venice Commission
would like to stress that the 2016 amendments involve several improvements, if compared to
the previously existing system. Thus, for example, the Act now specifies more precisely the
means of secret surveillance (Article 19, para. 6),20 regulates the equipment interference, and
sets time-limits for the duration of the continued secret surveillance (see Article 19 para. 9); the
Police Act requires the police to keep registers describing secret surveillance operations
(Article 19 para. 16a and para. 16b); there is a procedure for ex-post judicial control of
metadata collection (Article 20ca); the Act provides for the destruction/limited use of materials
covered by the professional privilege obtained as a result of surveillance (see Article 19 paras.
15f et seq.); it describes in more details the powers of the relevant services in the sphere of
internet metadata collection (Article 20c et seq.), and it imposes the obligation to destroy
irrelevant data (Article 20c para. 7).21
V. To what extent measures provided by Articles 19 and 20c of the Act amount
to an interference with privacy?
22. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention or the ECHR)
protects, inter alia, private life and secrecy of communications. Over the years, the notion of
private life has been developed by the European Court on Human Rights (the ECtHR or the
Court); it now includes the right to keep secret certain information of personal character.22
23. There can hardly be a simple and comprehensive definition of what sort of information is
private. Privacy is a complex social construct which develops over time and varies from
country to country.23 It is clear, however, that the content of private communications was
originally and remains at the core of the protection provided by Article 8 of the Convention.
Moreover, some of the secret surveillance measures described in the Act may also involve
According to the Polish authorities, the figures referred to above are partially explained by the fact that there is no
central database of mobile phone subscribers which results in the necessity to refer queries regarding the same
person to different operators. Similarly, considerable number of requests of access to other sorts of metadata may
Before, Article 19 para. 6 (3) allowed the use of technical measures, which facilitate obtaining information and
evidence in secret as well as recording thereof, especially the content of telephone conversations and other
information submitted via the telecommunications networks. This formula was given a broad interpretation in the
judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 30 July 2014, para. 6.1.2: [The] Tribunal assumes that the challenged
provisions as this arises from the linguistic interpretation thereof make it possible inter alia: to conduct audio
surveillance of persons and premises, which includes the interception of conversations held via landline, mobile and
Internet telephony; to intercept text and multimedia messages sent via telephone devices as well as other equipment
used for distant communication; to apply devices that register the location of persons and objects and which rely on
satellite navigation; or to intercept electromagnetic emanations.
Special rules apply to the surveillance measures implemented by the Military Counter-intelligence and the Internal
See also the UN CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), in particular points 10 and 11
(adopted at the Thirty-second Session of the Human Rights Committee, on 8 April 1988).
In Uzun v. Germany the European Court of Human Rights held as follows: Private life is a broad term not
susceptible to exhaustive definition (no. 35623/05, 43, ECHR 2010 (extracts)).
interference with the home (see Article 19 para. 6 (2) which speaks of obtaining and recording
image or sound of persons from rooms, which clearly involves bugging of living premises).
Consequently, surveillance measures set out in Article 19 the Act constitute an interference
with Article 8 rights.24
24. As to the metadata collection, the situation is less clear. Until relatively recently, metadata
was regarded as being of less sensitivity from the perspective of personal integrity as compared
to the content of a communication.25
25. However, the advent of the internet, smartphones and other mobile devices changed the
perception of metadata. The digital footprint one leaves often results in a great deal of personal
information being obtainable by collecting metadata, and by the combined analysis of
communications patterns. Oversight bodies have in fact noted a decrease in police agencies
use of intrusive methods of intelligence collection (telephone tapping, etc.) because the same
type of information can now be obtained by accessing social media.26 In addition, there is a
zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the
scope of private life;27 thus, for example, information about the circle of close friends may be
26. One may try to distinguish between different types of metadata, depending on their
potential to interfere with privacy. A less sensitive type of metadata is, for example, subscriber
data, i.e. information which simply indicates which person has which telephone number. Other
types of metadata are very close to the information about content of private communications,
and can be called content-related metadata (for example, the information which reveals the
websites a person has visited). Information about geographical location of mobile devices may
be more or less sensitive, depending on the circumstances. Thus, the physical location of a
person at a given moment of time may sometimes be established by merely observing that
person in a public place, which arguably reduces the privacy expectation attached to this
information. At the same time systematic tracking of all movements of a particular person
during a certain period of time, or even real-time, constitutes a much deeper penetration into his
or her private life.28
27. That being said, the Venice Commission observes that the continuous technological
innovations in the field probably argue against making too many distinctions based on the
category of data. It is in any event clear that combining different types of metadata (for
example, comparing content-related data, such as the web-logs, with continuous location data)
allows a relatively full picture to be built of a persons habits, interests, connections etc., as was
shown by an experiment when a German politician installed spyware on his own phone for a
In addition, surveillance measures might also indirectly affect other human rights the realisation of which depends
on the right to privacy, notably the freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention in particular in relation to the
right of the journalists not to disclose their sources; see Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others
v. the Netherlands, no. 39315/06, 22 November 2012). As far as surveillance practices lead to the interception of
confidential communications with lawyers or priests, the Act might also infringe upon the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of
the Convention) and freedom of religion (Article 9 of the Convention).
See the 2007 Report 202, and the Report on the Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies (CDLAD(2015)011), 41 (hereinafter the 2015 Report). See also the ECtHR judgment in PG and JH v. UK, No. 44787/98,
25 September 2001. In this case the Court noted, in particular, as follows: The information obtained concerned the
telephone numbers called from B.s flat between two specific dates. It did not include any information about the
contents of those calls, or who made or received them. The data obtained, and the use that could be made of them,
were therefore strictly limited ( 46).
See e.g. the Annual Report of the UK Chief Surveillance Commissioner to the Prime Minister and to Scottish
Ministers for 2011-2012, at 5.17. A frequent response to my Inspectors enquiries regarding a reduction in directed
surveillance is that overt investigations using the Internet suffice. My Commissioners have expressed concern that
some research using the Internet may meet the criteria of directed surveillance. This is particularly true if a profile is
built by processing data about a specific individual or group of individuals without their knowledge.
Uzun v. Germany, cited above, 43
See the ECtHR reasoning in Uzun v. Germany, cited above, where the Court analysed the effects of the secret
surveillance of movements of a person by a GPS-tracker in-built in a car he was regularly using.
See https://www.bof.nl/2014/07/30/how-your-innocent-smartphone-passes-on-almost-your-entire-life-to-the-secretservice/
28. In Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications & Others,30 the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) examined the compatibility of the European Directive on data
retention with Article 7 (Respect for private and family life) and Article 8 (Protection of
personal data) of the EU Charter of fundamental rights. The CJEU held as follows:
26. [] [The] data which [Internet or telephone providers] must retain, pursuant to
Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 2006/24, include data necessary to trace and identify the
source of a communication and its destination, to identify the date, time, duration and
type of a communication, to identify users communication equipment, and to identify the
location of mobile communication equipment, data which consist, inter alia, of the name
and address of the subscriber or registered user, the calling telephone number, the
number called and an IP address for Internet services. Those data make it possible, in
particular, to know the identity of the person with whom a subscriber or registered user
has communicated and by what means, and to identify the time of the communication as
well as the place from which that communication took place. They also make it possible
to know the frequency of the communications of the subscriber or registered user with
certain persons during a given period.
27. Those data, taken as a whole [emphasis added] may allow very precise conclusions
to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained,
such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or
other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and
the social environments frequented by them.
29. Thus, according to the CJEU the disclosure of that kind of information, given its cumulative
effect, clearly constitutes an interference with privacy, protected by Article 7 of the Charter. In
that case the CJEU annulled the EU Directive on data retention, and several courts in the EU
countries have followed, stressing the need for improved controls over metadata collection.31
30. The ECtHR also interprets the applicability of Article 8 of the ECHR to such kind of data
quite broadly. The use of information relating to the date and length of telephone conversations
and in particular the numbers dialled can give rise to an issue under Article 8 as such
information constitutes an integral element of the communications made by telephone.32
Furthermore, systematic collection and storing of data by security services on particular
individuals, even without the use of covert surveillance methods, constituted an interference
with these persons private lives.33
31. Turning to Poland, the Venice Commission observes that the data collected under
Article 20c of the Act34 may disclose social connections of the person, his or her habits,
preferences and interests. Combined analysis of various types of metadata (which is not
excluded by the law) and processing of large volumes of information derived from it may be
even more intrusive and give insight into very intimate aspects of the persons private life. Such
data are collected secretly by law-enforcement agencies and may be used against this person
Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 8 April 2014
See, e.g. Austrian Constitutional Court, decision G 47/2012 and others of 27 June 2014. In some cases, the
negative judgments preceded that of the CJEU; see in particular, the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional
Court in 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 of 2 March 2010 regarding the data retention directive.
Copland v. the United Kingdom, no. 62617/00, 43, ECHR 2007-I; see also Malone v. the United Kingdom,
2 August 1984, 84, Series A no. 82; see also the separate opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the case of
Brbulescu v. Romania, no. 61496/08, 12 January 2016, where he concluded that protection provided by Article 8
includes not only the content of the communications, but also the metadata resulting from the collection and retention
of communications data, which may provide an insight into an individuals way of life, religious beliefs, political
convictions, private preferences and social relations.
See Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, 43-44, ECHR 2000-V; Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95,
65-67, ECHR 2000-II, where the storing of information about the applicant on a card in a file was found to be an
interference with private life, even though it contained no sensitive information and had probably never been
On the exact description of what falls into the concept of metadata under the Polish law see in the CDLREF(2016)036; see also the analysis in paragraphs 60 et seq. of the present opinion.
in criminal proceedings, or against other individuals. In such circumstances it would be more
plausible if the Polish legislator started from the assumption that the collection of most of the
types of metadata under Article 20c of the Act must be seen as an interference with the privacy
of the persons concerned.35
VI. Substantive and procedural safeguards against abusive surveillance
32. According to international human rights standards, and in particular the ECHR, any
measures aimed at obtaining private information should pursue legitimate aims, should be
lawful and necessary in a democratic society (Article 8 2 of the ECHR). As to the first prong
of the test (legitimate aim), there is no doubt that the aims of secret surveillance under
Article 19 and of the collection of metadata under Article 20c of the Police Act are in compliance
with Article 8 2 in this respect.36
33. Next, any interference should be lawful (provided by law). The lawfulness requirement
implicitly contains the criteria of clarity and foreseeability of the law.37 In its Grand Chamber
judgement in the case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia,38 the Court summarised its jurisprudence
on the notion of foreseeability in the context of interception of communications as follows:
The domestic law must be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication as to the
circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort
to any such measures. Moreover, the Court held that since the implementation in practice of
measures of secret surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals
concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the discretion granted
to the executive or to a judge to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently,
the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities
and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference (see 229 and 230).
34. Finally, the most complex test under Article 8 is that of necessity. The analysis of
necessity includes inter alia the examination of the procedure in which particular surveillance
measures are ordered, implemented and the way in which data so obtained is used. Those
procedural safeguards will vary depending on the type and intensity of the interference. Yet,
any procedural safeguards should be sufficiently effective to prevent possible abuses of the
system. The ECtHR in its Klass judgement has laid down the following test: The Court must be
satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate and effective
guarantees against abuse. This assessment has only a relative character: it depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures,
the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out
and supervise such measures and the kind of remedy provided by the national law.39 In a later
judgement on surveillance measures the Court indicated that the law should specify [the]
nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories
of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration [of telephone tapping];
the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the
precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances
in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.40
See, as an example, Copland, cited above, 41-44.
Such measures should be in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
See, for example, Heglas v. Czech Republic, No. 5935/02, 1 March 2007, 74. In addition, the ECtHR
jurisprudence also discusses the question of accessibility of the legislation to the persons concerned; however, it
doesnt seem to be an issue in casu.
Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, ECHR 2015
Klass and others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, 50, Series A no. 28.
See, inter alia, Prado Bugallo v. Spain, no. 58496/00, 30, 18 February 2003; Liberty and others v. United
Kingdom, no. 58243/00, 62, 1 July 2008.
35. In the above-cited Roman Zakharov case, the Grand Chamber of the Court summarised
the ECtHR case-law on the question whether an interference was necessary in a democratic
society in the following way:41
[The] Court has acknowledged that, when balancing the interest of the respondent State in
protecting its national security through secret surveillance measures against the seriousness
of the interference with an applicants right to respect for his or her private life, the national
authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the
legitimate aim of protecting national security. However, this margin is subject to European
supervision embracing both legislation and decisions applying it. In view of the risk that a
system of secret surveillance set up to protect national security may undermine or even
destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it, the Court must be satisfied that there are
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. The assessment depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise,
carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law. The
Court has to determine whether the procedures for supervising the ordering and
implementation of the restrictive measures are such as to keep the interference to what is
36. The CJEU, in the above-cited case of Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others held,
in particular, that Directive 2006/24 on data retention did not set out clear and precise rules
regarding the extent of the interference, that it did not require a relationship between the data
retained and the seriousness of the crime or public security issue. The CJEU criticised the
Directive in that it did not set substantive or procedural conditions (like the review by an
administrative authority or a court prior to access) which would determine the limits of access to
and use of the data retained by competent national authorities. Nor did the Directive determine
the time period for which data are retained on the basis of objective criteria. Not least, the
Directive did not set out clear safeguards for the protection of retained data (see 56 et seq.).
37. The argument can be made that the judgment should be interpreted so as to forbid totally
the blanket retention of data. Even if such an extensive interpretation is not followed, it is clear
that the blanket retention of data is a major contributor to public concerns. These can only be
balanced by the creation of a strong independent oversight system (see further below,
paragraphs 98 et seq. and 112 et seq.)
Circumstances in which public authorities are empowered to
resort to secret surveillance and metadata collection
38. The first question is whether the material scope of Articles 19 and 20c is defined clearly
and whether it is foreseeable in which circumstances the police may put in place secret
surveillance measures or obtain metadata.42
Roman Zakharov, 232
The foreseeability requirement covers not only the material scope of application of the law, but also procedural
guarantees. Thus, in Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, 95, 29 June 2006, the ECtHR formulated
minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law to avoid abuses of power: the nature of the offences which
may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a
limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which
recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed. At the universal level similar principles apply; thus, the UN
report on the oversight of intelligence services (entitled Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional
frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism,
including on their oversight, by Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin, prepared at the request of the Human Rights
Council), in practice 21 recommends that national law outlines the types of collection measures available to
intelligence services; the permissible objectives of intelligence collection; the categories of persons and activities
which may be subject to intelligence collection; the threshold of suspicion required to justify the use of collection
measures; the limitations on the duration for which collection measures may be used; and the procedures for
authorizing, overseeing and reviewing the use of intelligence collection measures.
- 13 1.
Substantive grounds for ordering surveillance under Article 19
context of secret surveillance
39. Article 19 of the Act establishes a closed list of offences which may be investigated by
means of secret surveillance, which adds clarity to the material scope of application of this
article. The catalogue of crimes, contained in Article 19 para. 1 is, however, quite broad. The
Venice Commission recalls that the proportionality analysis under Article 8 of the Convention
involves a substantive aspect; in other words, given its very intrusive character, secret
surveillance of the content of private communications may be justified only in order to
investigate serious crimes. Turning back to the Act, the Venice Commission doubts whether, for
instance, telephone interception would be necessary to investigate some cases of illegal
possession of psychotropic substances (see Article 19 para. 1 (5)), where it is evident from the
outset that the case concerns a very small amount of such substances destined for personal
use.43
40. Moreover, the Venice Commission reiterates that some of the surveillance measures
provided by Article 19 para. 6 not only involve an interference with the secrecy of private
communications but also an interference with the home (to the extent that the Act permits
bugging of offices44 or living premises). Such types of surveillance need particularly good
justification and should be permissible only to investigate the most dangerous crimes. The
Venice Commission recalls that in the case of Iordachi and Others v. Moldova, the ECtHR
criticised the national law for allowing telephone interception in relation to more than a half of all
the offences provided for in the Criminal Code.45
41. That being said the Venice Commission acknowledges that the Polish authorities have a
large margin of appreciation in defining what crimes should be on that list, since this question
relates to a large extent to setting priorities of the national penal policy.
42. What is more important, the law should explicitly incorporate the principle of proportionality.
Indeed, some elements of the proportionality test are already contained in the Act for
example, Article 19 defines surveillance measures as a subsidiary tool of investigation (see
paragraph 46 below), and sets a closed catalogue of crimes where surveillance may be
ordered. However, the proportionality cannot be reduced to that.46 In addition, all the actors
involved the police as well as the courts should be explicitly required to assess, in each
particular case, whether the seriousness of the crime (even from the catalogue contained in
Article 19 para. 1) and the difficulty of the investigation necessitate any of the surveillance
measures. While for some most serious crimes the answer may be self-evident, not all crimes
from the catalogue would automatically require surveillance measures (especially those
involving interference with the home), and that should clearly follow from the text of the Act.
b. The need for factual substantiation
43. The list contained in Article 19 para. 1 of the Act explains what types of crimes the police
may investigate by means of secret surveillance. This is, however, a purely formal criterion
which relates to the qualification given by the police to a factual situation which gives rise to an
investigation. The police may assess the facts wrongly, or deliberately give to the facts a legal
characterisation which would bring it within the scope of Article 19 para. 1 see, as an
At least, the Act does not contain any qualifier related to the purpose and scale of possession.
See Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, 27-33, Series A no. 251-B
Iordachi and Others v. Moldova, no. 25198/02, 44, 10 February 2009
The Polish authorities explained that the court is not bound by the legislator with an obligation to order secret
surveillance even in case of occurrence of substantive and formal premises for advancing of such request. This is
positive; however, as it will be explained below, the law itself should describe in more detail the test to be applied by
the judge when deciding whether or not the surveillance should be ordered in relation to the criminal investigations
listed in Article 19 para. 1.
example, the situation described in the ECtHR case of Lind v. Russia.47 Hence, in addition to
verifying whether the crime referred to by the police is on the list set by Article 19 para. 1, the
courts, while examining requests under Article 19 para. 2, should also assess the factual
evidence which is already available, and decide on this basis whether secret surveillance would
be justified.48
44. The ECtHR stressed in Roman Zahkarov, cited above, that the national court must be
capable of verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in
particular, whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning,
committing or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret
surveillance measures, such as, for example, acts endangering national security. It must also
ascertain whether the requested interception meets the requirement of necessity in a
democratic society, as provided by Article 8 2 of the Convention, including whether it is
proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued ( 260). Of course, the very purpose of secret
surveillance is to obtain more evidence, when the existing evidence is not sufficient to open a
criminal case. However, the law should be clear that in order to conduct surveillance the police
and the prosecutor must have at least some prima facie evidence of a criminal activity, and that
the court must examine such evidence before authorising the surveillance.49
c. Probability that important information may be obtained through surveillance
45. Furthermore, the police should have sufficient reasons to believe that the surveillance of
the targeted person or group could produce information which is important for further
investigation. The usefulness of the information sought by the police is yet another
manifestation of the more general principle of proportionality mentioned above. Again, it is not
required that the police are certain about it; it suffices to demonstrate some probability that the
surveillance is likely to lead to the disclosure of such information. However, any such assertion
should be supported by reference to some factual circumstances and evidence.
d. Subsidiarity
46. The last criterion set by the Act is the subsidiarity requirement (see the last sentence of
Article 19 para. 1): secret surveillance may be ordered only where other means appeared
ineffective or there is significant probability of the means being ineffective or useless. Again,
this requirement is essential to make such measures proportionate: secret surveillance should
be a measure of last resort.50
e. Evidentiary value of information
47. Finally, the Police Act is silent as to the evidentiary value of information, obtained by means
of secret surveillance which turned out to have been ordered without sufficient justification. It is
unclear whether materials obtained as a result of such surveillance (recordings, images etc.)
may be used in criminal proceedings.51 The ECHR does not, generally speaking, regulate the
admissibility of evidence. There is no requirement made in the ECHR of unconditional exclusion
Lind v. Russia, no. 25664/05, 6 December 2007, 77 and 78; it must be noted, however, that the case of Lind
concerned authorisation of pre-trial detention and not surveillance.
The requirement to examine factual evidence, to a certain extent, follows from Article 19 para. 1a, which stipulates
that the police have to provide the court with materials that justify the need for operational control.
When speaking of evidence the Venice Commission does not mean that this should be the evidence obtained,
recorded and tested according to the formal rules of criminal procedure.
The Venice Commission observes that a similar three-steps test is set in e.g. the Danish legislation; surveillance
measures in Denmark may be ordered where (1) there are specific grounds for suspicion that information is being
transferred from/to the subject of the surveillance; (2) the coercive measure is strictly required for the investigation; (3)
the investigation is conducted in relation to a crime punishable with a minimum of six years of imprisonment, or for the
prevention and investigation of certain specifically enumerated crimes, e.g. terrorism (see the 2015 Guidebook
prepared by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on Surveillance by intelligence services:
fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU Mapping Member States legal frameworks, p. 20).
As direct evidence, or whether it is possible to introduce other evidence obtained as a result of such irregular
of all unlawfully obtained evidence.52 Where there are adequate controls in law and practice
against abuse of investigative powers by the police or security agencies, then a rigid rule on
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is less necessary. In the context of the Polish law it is
clear that materials obtained without the prior authorisation by the court (or, in the case of an
urgent procedure without ex-post authorization required under Article 19 para. 3) should not
be introduced in criminal proceedings.
48. However, it is open to doubt to what extent such materials may be used where such
authorisation has been obtained, but on insufficient grounds. The Venice Commission recalls
that the authorisation procedure, in most cases, will take place behind the closed doors and
neither the public nor the person concerned will know whether the court in that procedure had
seriously considered the privacy interest involved. In such condition, the court examining the
merits of the case where the materials obtained through secret surveillance are presented by
the prosecution in evidence should have the discretion to exclude them, if they have been
obtained in gross and flagrant disregard of the law, in order to combat abusive surveillance.
Substantive grounds for metadata collection under Article 20c of
a. Which crimes may justify metadata collection?
49. The police enjoy a much wider discretion when collecting metadata; it is permitted in order
to prevent or detect crimes or in order to save human life and health, or in order to support
rescue and find missions (Article 20c para. 1 Police Act). The question is whether this formula
satisfies the requirement of foreseeability of the law enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.53
50. The first point to make here is that prevention involves making a different, forwardlooking, type of assessment as compared to past, or on-going offences. Admittedly, the dividing
line is not hard and fast, especially in relation to inchoate offences generally, and terrorism and
organised crime specifically. Nonetheless, the greater uncertainty involved in making an
assessment of future events increases the scope for abuse, or overuse, of this investigative
51. The Venice Commission recalls that in Szab and Vissy v. Hungary,54 the ECtHR stressed
that the requirement of foreseeability of the law does not go so far as to compel States to
enact legal provisions listing in detail all situations that may prompt a decision to launch secret
surveillance operations. The reference to terrorist threats or rescue operations can be seen in
principle as giving citizens the requisite indication []. The Court further contrasted the
situation in Hungary with the situation in Moldova, examined earlier in the case of Iordachi and
Others, cited above. In the latter case the national law had been criticised by the Court because
it allowed wiretapping in a very large spectrum of criminal investigations. The question is
whether the same logic applies in respect of the metadata collection.
52. In Uzun, cited above, which concerned GPS-tracking of a car used by a supposed terrorist,
the ECtHR defined, first of all, whether the law allowing for such measures was foreseeable.
While the Court, in its own words, is not barred from gaining inspiration from the principles
developed in the sphere of classical surveillance of telecommunications, these principles are
not applicable directly to cases concerning surveillance by GPS-tracking, because such
measure must be considered to interfere less with the private life of the person concerned than
the interception of his or her telephone conversation ( 66).
With few exceptions which concern evidence obtained under torture, etc. see, for example, Harutyunyan v.
Armenia, no. 36549/03, 58 et seq., ECHR 2007-III
The Venice Commission considers that the reference to the rescue and find missions is sufficiently precise to
outline situations where the police may collect metadata.
No. 37138/14, 64, 12 January 2016 (not yet final)
53. That being said, in the Uzun case the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 8 of the
ECHR in particular because the GPS-tracking could have been ordered in respect of a person
suspected of a criminal offence of considerable gravity ( 70). In other words, the German law
narrowed down the possibility of using such technique to the most serious cases. This element
is absent from Article 20c of the Police Act: it allows metadata gathering in the investigations
concerning all crimes. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the metadata collection
under Article 20c of the Act may, on occasions, lead to a more serious interference with the
privacy, compared to a relatively short-term GPS-tracking of movements of a car for example,
where content-related metadata is analysed (such as the web-logs, for example).55
54. In its 2015 report on the Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies56 the
Venice Commission formulated its approach as follows: how broadly or narrowly drafted the
agencys mandate is, is a crucial part of limiting the scope for abuse. It is doubtful that the
broad formula used in Article 20c (namely that metadata collection may be used by the police
in order to prevent or detect crimes) satisfies the foreseeability requirement of Article 8 of the
ECHR. One means of limiting the scope of abuse of this investigative method is to provide that
metadata collection may only be used to investigate offences punishable by a certain minimum
penalty. This can be supplemented by a shorter list of offences which may not attract this
minimum penalty, but where metadata collection is, or is part of, the primary evidence for
prosecution, e.g. certain cyber-crimes. So, better methods exist to avoid the risks caused by the
broad formula used by the Act. The Venice Commission invites the Polish legislator to reflect on
how to narrow down the rule currently contained in Article 20c of the Act.57
b. Probability that important information may be obtained through metadata
55. The next question is the level of probability which needs to be demonstrated, with
reference to the relevant facts, in order to start metadata collection. This is a difficult question,
partly because metadata collection, contrary to classical surveillance, often is not targeted
(see 66 et seq. below, the discussion about the untargeted information gathering). Hence,
it is not always possible to link metadata collection to a specific person who is suspected of a
particular crime, or a group of such persons.
56. That being said, Article 20c contains no probability test the police have to meet in order to
start collecting metadata. In the opinion of the Venice Commission it is crucial that the police
should have specific reasons to believe that:
a crime has been committed or a criminal activity is going on or being prepared; and
monitoring is likely to contribute to finding more about it.
In other words, the police should be able to explain, with reference to the facts, in which way
collection of metadata would promote the investigation into a particular criminal activity.58
57. The Venice Commission observes that, unlike the secret surveillance under Article 19 of
the Act, metadata collection, according to the Polish law, is not supposed to be a subsidiary
58. Metadata collection is, indeed, very useful for contact-chaining, i.e. identifying a suspects
network of contacts, and as such it often comes into play at a relatively early stage of
In Uzun the GPS surveillance lasted for some three months, whereas the Act does not contain any limitation in time
on the collection of metadata under Article 20c.
CDL-AD(2015)011, 70
The Venice Commission understands that the powers of other State agencies to collect metadata under the Act are
linked to their respective remit.
To a certain extent the question of the level of probability refers to the same criteria, which has been earlier used
for analysing the classical surveillance: need for some factual substantiation, a minimal probability that important
information may be so obtained, etc.
investigations. However, the general principle of proportionality applies to metadata collection
as well, as with all other coercive measures, and a balance must always be drawn between
effectiveness and intrusion into privacy. The fact that the legislation does not require that other
methods have first been tried and failed, or would be fruitless, is a factor which operates to
strengthen the need for other safeguards to avoid overuse by law enforcement and security
agencies. The procedural safeguards which may prevent abusive metadata collection will be
discussed in paragraphs 110 et seq. below.
59. In addition, the law should contain a substantive rule which gives to the police an indication
as to when to make recourse to this method. As has already been mentioned in paragraph 58
above, even when collecting the least sensitive kind of metadata, the police should do it only if
it is justified in the circumstances. The essential question is what standard of review the courts
should apply when defining whether the police acted lawfully and remained within its discretion.
This standard should be stricter when it comes to the content-related secret surveillance: the
police will have to demonstrate convincingly the impossibility of obtaining information by other
means, and prove the essential value of the information it seeks to obtain. By contrast, when it
comes to the metadata collection, the court may be satisfied by the fact that this method of
obtaining information is the easiest one in the circumstances, and that it is reasonably related to
the goals of a specific investigative activity. It belongs to the Polish legislator to formulate the
rule which would show the distinction between the proportionality tests applied in the context of
the secret surveillance and the metadata collection.
d. The notion of metadata under Article 20c
60. The remaining question is what sort of information may be collected under Article 20c. The
Act itself does not describe precisely what metadata is. Instead, it refers to several other acts
which regulate telecommunications, internet and postal services (see CDL-REF(2016)036). It is
up to the specialists in the relevant fields to assess whether the technical terms used in those
other acts describe metadata with sufficient precision. However, certain elements attract
attention even of non-specialists.
61. At the outset, the Venice Commission observes that under the Act metadata does not
constitute a telecommunications message (Article 20c para. 1 of the Police Act). The Venice
Commission understands that the metadata, in the logic of the Police Act, may not reveal the
content of the communication stricto sensu. However, at the meetings in Warsaw the
rapporteurs received conflicting answers as to whether metadata, under the Polish law, also
includes content-related information: web-logs, Internet cookies, content of research requests,
headings of e-mails, etc. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, either the Act should
associate that kind of metadata with the content of communications, access to which is
regulated by Article 19, or exclude it from the notion of metadata in explicit terms.59 It is
important to make this distinction in order to decide whether more or less stringent procedural
guarantees and substantive rules apply to the content-related metadata.
62. Second, pursuant to Article 180c para. 2 of the Telecommunications Act, it belongs to the
competent ministers, including the Minister of Interior, to specify, by means of an ordinance, a
detailed list of data which is mentioned in Article 180c para. 1 and which may be collected by
the police pursuant to Article 20c. It is very important to make sure that the power to issue
ordinances in this sphere does not result in an uncontrolled expansion of the notion of
metadata. The Venice Commission recalls its position expressed in the 2015 Report that
case-law, even where it lays down detailed standards and comes from the Supreme, or
According to a briefing paper of 29 April 2016 given to the rapporteurs at the meeting in the Chancellery of the
Committee of Ministers, para. 5, metadata does not include logins and passwords, as well as addresses of the websites visited. However, other interlocutors the rapporteurs met in Warsaw had different views on this point.
Furthermore, the information received from the Ministry of Interior of Poland suggested that the police may collect
such information as a part of the metadata monitoring; thus, statistical information on metadata collection included
such positions as, for example, www addresses and chats, which are clearly content-related.
Constitutional Court, is in itself not sufficient to regulate the area [of secret surveillance] and nor
is subordinate legislation.60
63. Third, Article 20c also refers to Article 180d of the Telecommunications Act, which, in turn,
refers to Article 161.1 thereof. The latter stipulates that the provider of publicly available ICT61
services may, with the consent of a user who is a natural person, process other data [emphasis
added] of such user in connection with the service rendered. This formula seems to imply that
the metadata may include any information which a user of a popular ICT service agrees to
share with the provider. However, it is well-known that few users really read the small print
privacy agreements which define the information they voluntarily share with the ICT providers
in order to get access to their services. Thus, this provision, when read in conjunction with
Article 20c of the Act, may lead to a virtually uncontrolled expansion of the notion of metadata
which may be collected by the ICT providers and ultimately by the government. Nor is this
approach compatible with the idea behind informational self-determination which forms a part
of the concept of privacy, i.e. that the individual himself or herself determines to what extent he
or she shares personal information with different actors.
64. The Venice Commission recognises that the quick development of modern technologies
calls for some flexibility in regulating metadata collection. However, State agencies should not
be allowed to expand the notion of metadata beyond its original meaning and include there
completely new types of information. If there is a need to regulate access to new types of
information and introduce new forms of surveillance, only the legislator should have the power
to define which data may be collected, on which grounds and in which procedure.
65. In sum, the Venice Commission recommends that the Polish legislator reviews, if
necessary with the help of ICT professionals and the lawyers working in the relevant field,
whether the description of metadata in the relevant legislation sufficiently defines categories of
information which may be collected pursuant to Article 20c. Special attention should be paid to
the definition of content-related data. In doing so the Venice Commission recommends
avoiding open-ended formulas, which refer to the regulations adopted by the executive or to the
data policies of the ICT companies.
Who may be subjected to surveillance and metadata collection?
66. Classical covert surveillance allows for obtaining information about a specific person,
group or organisation. However, modern surveillance measures, and especially metadata
collection sometimes start without a specific target. The targeted person is only defined after
the collection and filtration of data so obtained.
67. Thus, for example, by emptying a mobile relay station one can discover the mobile
phones in the area during a particular time period, helping the police identify whether e.g.
mobiles belonging to known members of organized crime were present in the area when a
bank robbery occurred. At the same time this technique may help identifying who was in the
area when a large demonstration was going on against the government. It is easy to see how
this can chill freedom of association or assembly protected by Article 11 of the Convention.
Herein lies both the value [such monitoring] can have for security operations, and the risk it can
pose for individual rights.62 And even where such non-individualised monitoring is used for
legitimate purposes (for example, to prevent a terrorist attack, or for a search and rescue
See CDL-AD(2015)011, 93. That being said, it is not excluded that subordinate legislation may regulate some
highly technical or very secret elements of the metadata collection.
ICT refers to information and communications technologies; it is an umbrella term that includes any
communication device or application, encompassing: radio, television, cellular phones, computer and network
hardware and software, satellite systems and so on, as well as the various services and applications associated with
them, such as videoconferencing and distance learning.
2015 Report, CDL-AD(2015)011, 3
mission), and is cheaper than other methods, the main problem with this type of surveillance is
that it inevitably affects a large number of innocent/unconcerned people.
68. The first question is whether the Act permits broadly targeted surveillance. Article 19
para. 7 of the Act requires that the police should indicate data of a person or other data
facilitating unambiguous determination of the entity or object of surveillance. It is unclear to
what extent the reference to the object of surveillance may relate to a large group of people
(for example, residents of a neighbourhood, or a group of protesters or worshippers at church).
However, the reference to unambiguous determination, if narrowly interpreted, ensures that
surveillance under Article 19 cannot be ordered without at least some individualisation,63 even if
it targets a group of people. So, classical surveillance by the police in Poland should always
be targeted.64
69. By contrast, as to the collection of metadata under Article 20c, nothing in the Act seems to
prevent the police from collecting such information without having a specific target. The Venice
Commission recalls in this respect that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) in its Resolution 2045 (2015)65 urged the Council of Europe member States, inter alia,
to ensure that their national laws only allow for the collection and analysis of personal data
(including metadata) following a court order granted on the basis of reasonable suspicion of
the target being involved in criminal activity.
70. The Venice Commission is reluctant to be so categorical. The Assembly seems to question
the very idea of strategic surveillance, because it is not based on a targeted court order. The
ECtHR in its case-law, by contrast, seems to accept broadly targeted collection of information.66
In the opinion of the Venice Commission, broadly targeted surveillance without a court order
may be accepted if the law contains sufficient safeguards against indiscriminate capturing of
vast amounts of communications. To reduce that risk, the law should describe the situations
where broadly targeted monitoring is permitted, and define categories of persons liable to have
their communications monitored. The threshold requirement for permitting such monitoring
should be set high for example, it may be linked to investigation of specific serious crimes
which have occurred in the past. Exceptionally, it might be possible to allow this to concrete
future dangers, such as terrorist threats.67
71. Where it is allowed, oversight must be particularly strong. There should be an efficient
system of oversight of such measures, implemented by an independent body (or bodies)
external to the police.68 That body should have access to the materials justifying such
monitoring, and to the results of such monitoring. Its task should be to ensure, in particular, that
such broadly targeted monitoring is reasonably connected to the needs of the specific
investigations, that it is not based on discriminatory grounds (i.e. that it does not target
categories of population which are usual suspects for certain categories of crimes), that it is
never used for purposes not related to the mandate of the police or another respective lawenforcement body, and that strict destruction requirements are applied to all material not
necessary for the specific investigation involved.
When speaking of individualisation, the Venice Commission does not imply that the police must always know
exactly the identity of the person under surveillance; sometimes a surveillance order may concern an anonymous
user of a certain suspicious telephone number or a certain computer etc.
The Polish authorities confirmed in their written submissions that the Police Act does not allow for application of
secret surveillance to an indefinite group of individuals or anonymous individuals it should always target a person or
a strictly defined telecommunications terminal equipment.
Mass surveillance; adopted on 21 April 2015, para. 19.1
See, for example, the case of Weber and Saravia v. Germany, cited above, where the ECtHR analysed strategic
intelligence system employed in Germany (i.e. non-targeted interception of communications and their analysis with
the use of the system of key words) and found it compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.
In Weber and Saravia, 96 and 97, cited above, the ECtHR stressed that in the German system the law
enumerated [] the exact offences for the prevention of which the strategic interception of telecommunications could
be ordered. The amended [Act] therefore defined in a clear and precise manner the offences which could give rise to
an interception order. Furthermore, the law indicated which categories of persons were liable to have their telephone
tapped and the persons concerned either had to have used catchwords capable of triggering an investigation into
the dangers listed in the law or had be foreign nationals or companies.
See Roman Zakharov, cited above, 275
- 20 2.
Non-suspected bystanders
72. The Act is not entirely clear as to who may be subjected to classical secret surveillance or
to metadata collection. It appears that those measures may target any person or any group
(including friends, family members etc. of the primary targeted person), provided that these
measures are likely to disclose information which may eventually contribute to achieving the
goals of the surveillance or of metadata collection set in Articles 19 para. 1 and in Article 20c
para. 1 respectively.
73. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, the principle of foreseeability requires that the Act
should define the extent of connection of people/groups in question to the criminal activity under
investigation. Obviously this includes people suspected of the specified offences. In addition,
the Act may also specify that other persons in contact with such people may, under certain
circumstances, be subjected to surveillance.69 With regards to the standards set in Article 8 2
of the ECHR, it is very important to describe in the Act the circumstances in which persons not
involved directly in the criminal activity (at least on an arguable basis) may be targeted. For
example, the Act might allow such measures only in respect of certain particularly grave crimes
(such as terrorism, large-scale drug-trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
etc.), and put in place strengthened justification requirements (a higher threshold of probability
that such surveillance may help obtaining crucial information) and procedural safeguards (such
as the involvement of a privacy advocate).70
74. During the visit to Warsaw the rapporteurs have been informed that in April 2016 the
Criminal Procedure Code has been amended, and paras. 15a-15e of Article 19 of the Police
Act have been repealed. Those amendments seem to give to the prosecutor a discretion to
decide whether the information about non-targeted third persons obtained by accident in the
course of the surveillance should be introduced in the criminal proceedings against them as
evidence. The Venice Commission considers that the use of incriminating information about
non-targeted third persons so obtained may only be permissible in exceptional circumstances,
and should be decided by a court. It is doubtful whether such materials should be allowed as
evidence in prosecutions concerning relatively insignificant crimes. The Venice Commission
also considers that the law must specify clearly when such materials cannot be used in
evidence for example, when conversations accidentally captured on tapes concern privileged
communications.71
Lawyers, priests, and other persons covered by professional
75. Article 19 of the Police Act defines what to do with the information covered by the
professional privilege. The competent officials of the police are required to:
destroy this information if it is protected by the absolute privilege enjoyed by defence
lawyers and priests (see Article 19 para. 15f (1) of the Act, read in conjunction with
Article 178 of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code),72 or
pass this information to the prosecutor and ultimately to the court, which should decide
what to do with it, if this information is covered by a weaker professional privilege which
covers notaries, advocates and legal advisors (who do not act as defence lawyers), tax
advisors, doctors, mediators or journalists (see Article 19 paras. 15f (2) and 15g-j of the
See the 2015 Report, 98
The above said is not relevant for broadly targeted monitoring, which necessarily concerns a large majority of
purely innocent people which have nothing to do with the subject-matter of the investigation. As it was stressed above
(see paragraphs 66 et seq.), broadly targeted monitoring may be allowed provided that an efficient oversight
The Polish authorities explained to the Venice Commission that it belongs ultimately to the trial judge to decide on
the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of the secret surveillance. If it is so, it should be stated clearly in the
law; in addition, the law should define circumstances in which the judge may disqualify materials obtained as a result
Article 178 provides that it is not permitted to examine as witnesses (1) a defence counsel or advocate acting
pursuant to Article 245 1 with regard to facts learned while giving legal advice or conducting a case; (2) a clergyman
with regard to facts learned during confession.
Act, read in conjunction with Article 178a and Articles 180(2) and 180(3) of the Polish
76. At the outset, the Venice Commission notes that the lawyer-client confidentiality is
protected not only by virtue of Article 8 of the Convention (as any other private communication),
but also, implicitly, under Article 6 3 (c) thereof. The seal of confession, is, in turn, protected
by Article 9 of the Convention. It is possible to say that those two types of communications have
a particular status even within Article 8 of the Convention; at least, in respect of the secrecy of
the lawyer-client communications the ECtHR expressed a view that they require special
measures of protection, since where a lawyer is involved, an encroachment on professional
secrecy may have repercussions on the proper administration of justice and hence on the rights
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.73
77. The Venice Commission detects two major flaws in the provisions regulating surveillance of
privileged communications. The first relates to the lawyer-client privilege. While the Act defines
what to do with the information already obtained through the secret surveillance and covered by
such privilege, it does not appear to prohibit the surveillance of lawyers communications as
such. Nothing prevents the police from secretly listening to the conversations between a
defence lawyer and his or her client. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, this is
inadmissible, for the reasons set out below.
78. The fact that the information obtained in breach of a professional privilege may not be used
as evidence in criminal proceedings against the suspect and should be destroyed pursuant to
Article 15f is not sufficient. By listening to the conversations between the lawyer and his/her
client the police may obtain important information which may lead to the discovery of other
inculpatory evidence, which may, in turn, be introduced in criminal proceedings. And even if in
the Polish criminal procedure evidence which is the fruit of the poisonous tree74 is
inadmissible, listening to the conversations between the lawyer and the client gives the police a
tactical advantage and undermines the trust which must exist between the defence lawyer and
79. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, the Act should distinguish between deliberate
and accidental interference with the lawyer-client privilege. The first should be, as a general
rule, prohibited. There are certain evident situations where the police should presume that a
conversation is covered by the privilege for example, it concerns conversations of a lawyer
with his/her client in the prison or in the courtroom, consultations by telephone, etc. Such
communications should be, as a rule, exempt from any eavesdropping.75 In the Netherlands, for
example, the option is discussed whether the law firms should provide the Ministry of Interior
with their privileged phone numbers, and these numbers will then automatically be filtered out
from any kind of surveillance operations.
80. This presumption is not absolute. The ECtHR case-law indicates that the Convention does
not require member-States to abstain totally from engaging in surveillance of privileged
communications.76 However, the presumption may only be departed from in exceptional cases
for example, where there is strong evidence of the personal and conscious involvement of the
lawyer in a particularly grave crime, which cannot be investigated further by any other means
than by listening to his/her conversations with a client. Any such derogation should be, in
addition, accompanied by strengthened procedural safeguards (like entrusting the power to
Smirnov v. Russia, no. 71362/01, 48, 7 June 2007, with further references.
The theory of the fruit of the poisonous tree proclaims that evidence, obtained as a result of information which had
been obtained in breach of law, should also be declared inadmissible. For a detailed analysis of this theory see the
ECtHR case Gfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, ECHR 2010.
The Venice Commission observes in this respect that Article 15 para. 1 (4a) of the Act allows the police to record
conversations in the rooms for arrested persons; such interception is seemingly exempted from the general regime
provided by Article 19 para.1. Moreover, Article 19 para. 6 (2) permits the police to obtain and record image or sound
of persons from rooms which may be interpreted as permitting eavesdropping in the meeting rooms.
Erdem v. Germany, no. 38321/97, 65, ECHR 2001-VII (extracts)
monitor communications to an independent judge unconnected with the investigation, who is
under a duty to keep the information thus obtained confidential if it is irrelevant).77
81. The second issue relates to the interception of communications of other professionals who
also have the duty of confidentiality vis--vis their clients (such as doctors and mediators). The
Venice Commission observes that, as in the case with lawyers and priests, nothing in the Polish
law prevents the police from listening to such conversations, even if later the recordings cannot
be introduced in evidence. Furthermore, under Article 19 para. 15h the court must allow
recordings of such conversations as evidence if it is necessary from the viewpoint of the justice
system and if no other means of establishing the facts of the case were available.
82. The second part of this test (subsidiarity) is sound; however, the first part the necessity
for the justice is problematic. Any useful information shedding light on the circumstances of a
case may be seen as necessary from the viewpoint of the justice system. However, if the
usefulness of a wiretapped conversation is the only criteria for introducing it as evidence,
professional privilege becomes an empty word.
83. This is particularly important where the surveillance targets a journalist, since it may easily
reveal his or her sources. The Venice Commission recalls that protection of journalistic sources
is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. As transpires from the case of Telegraaf Media
Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands,78 the ECtHR is ready to
subject disclosure orders which may lead to the identification of the journalistic sources to the
strictest scrutiny. Thus, there should be some form of heightened internal decision-making
standard in such cases, where the journalistic freedom may be at issue. The Venice
Commission, in its 2015 Report, cited above, stressed that methods must be devised to
provide lawyers and other privileged communicants and journalists with some form of
protection, such as requiring a high, or very high, threshold before approving signals
intelligence operations against them, combined with procedural safeguards and strict external
oversight (18).
84. The Venice Commission considers that, in addition to preventing targeted interception of
protected communications, the law should contain safeguards which give extra protection to
such communications even when they have been accidentally intercepted. In Weber and
Saravia, cited above, the journalist complained that her communications with the sources of
information could be revealed as a result of the strategic monitoring conducted by the Federal
Intelligence Service. In that case the ECtHR decided that the safeguards in place in Germany
were adequate and effective for keeping the disclosure of journalistic sources to an unavoidable
minimum, and thus satisfied the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR (151).
85. In sum, the Venice Commission recommends that the Polish legislator reflects on a more
stringent rule which would, while respecting international human rights standards, describe the
circumstances in which privileged professional communications could be secretly recorded and
then introduced as evidence.
86. Any substantive rule concerning accessing professional communications of lawyers would
remain dead letter if not supported by a proper system of oversight. In Chapter D (see, in
particular, paragraphs 91 et seq. and 112 et seq. below) the Venice Commission will discuss
various procedural mechanisms of oversight of the police and other services and verification of
the lawfulness of the specific surveillance operations. In particular, the national legislator may
put in place a mechanism which would allow preserving materials protected by the professional
secrecy from the police knowledge - see, as a possible solution, the Dutch system described in
Mulders v. the Netherlands, or the rules regulating seizures of the lawyers documents analysed
Erdem, cited above, 67
Cited above, 127
in Tamosius v. the United Kingdom (dec.); cf. to Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v.
Austria.79
Duration of the surveillance measures and metadata collection
87. According to the Act, secret surveillance shall be ordered for a period not exceeding
3 months (Article 19 para. 8); a prolongation is permitted by a courts decision taken upon the
motion of the competent entity, which should be authorised in writing by the prosecutor, for a
further period not exceeding 3 months, if the reasons which justified secret surveillance still
exist. Finally, in justified cases (when new circumstances important to prevent or detect crime
or establish perpetrators and obtain evidence of crime appear) the surveillance may be
prolonged by a higher court for several consecutive periods, determined by the court, not
exceeding in toto 12 months (Article 19 para. 9). The overall duration of surveillance measures
may not exceed 18 months.80
88. The Venice Commission observes that the maximum length of the surveillance set by the
Act is quite long by itself. However, the most important issue relates to the possibility of an
indeterminate duration of metadata collection (see Article 20ca). The Act does not explain how
much historic data the police may retrieve from the ITC service providers, although the 12
month retention period will usually set a limit in practice on this.81 Nor does the Act specify for
how long the police may monitor live metadata flows. In the light of the proportionality principle,
this should be specified in the law. That being said, the Venice Commission understands that
periods of retention of historic data and periods of continuous retrieval of on-going (live)
exchange of metadata (in particular in the form of strategic surveillance) may be relatively long.
Judicial control ex-ante and ex-post, complaints mechanisms and
89. The Venice Commission acknowledges that the Act cannot avoid some catch-all
formulations when outlining situations where surveillance is necessary. A law which is
somewhat imprecise may nonetheless be corrected by a procedural safeguard (which
compensates for the risk of abuse caused by the imprecision). For this reason it is important to
ensure that the body which would apply the rule is professional, independent and has all the
necessary legal tools to fulfil its controlling functions.
90. As the Venice Commission noted in the 2015 Report ( 105), it is apparent that the two
most significant safeguards are the authorisation process (of collection and of access to the
collected data) and the follow-up (oversight) process. That the latter must be performed by an
independent, external body is apparent from the [ECtHR] case-law. The question which arises
here is whether even the authorisation process should be independent.
Mulders v. the Netherlands, no. 23231/94, Commission decision of 6 April 1995; Tamosius v. the United Kingdom
(dec.), no. 62002/00, ECHR 2002VIII; Wieser and Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, no. 74336/01, ECHR 2007
This reading of Article 19 paras. 8 and 9 is confirmed by an outline of the Act prepared on 29 April 2016 by the
Chancellery of the Committee of Ministers of Poland, page 4.
From the explanations given by the Polish authorities it follows that the period of storing the data depends on the
significance it has for the proceedings and not on a specified fixed term. The data has to be destroyed without delay
when it does not contain evidence which may give rise to launching a criminal case or evidence which may be useful
for an on-going criminal case.
a. Authorisation and oversight of the surveillance operations under Article 19
91. Under Article 19, secret surveillance is to be performed with the prior consent of a district
court. As an exception, in cases of utmost urgency, police may perform surveillance without
such prior consent; however, if consent is not granted within 5 days, surveillance must be
suspended and the material gained from it must be destroyed (see para. 3).
92. Even though for the ECtHR the judicial authorisation for surveillance is not a conditio sine
qua non,82 the Court sees it as an important procedural guarantee.83 Thus, Article 19 para. 1 of
the Act which establishes such mechanism is welcomed. In addition, it would be desirable to
extend judicial pre-authorisation to the collection of content-related metadata which is, as noted
above (see paragraph 26 above), by its nature, very close to the interception of
communications regulated by Article 19.
93. The urgency exception, contained in para. 3 of Article 19, is known to other jurisdictions
as well. In Latvia, for instance, when there is a need to act without delay to prevent a threat to
vital public interests, such as an act of terrorism or subversive activity, a murder or other
serious crime, or if there is an actual threat to the life, health, or property of a person,
surveillance can be initiated without the judges approval. In its stead, a prosecutor must be
notified within 24 hours and the judges approval must be received within 72 hours.84 That being
said, the Venice Commission notes that in Poland the urgency exception is not conditioned
upon the gravity or type of the crime under investigation, but only by the risk of the loss of
evidence. Furthermore, it is unclear what happens if the urgent interception is discontinued by
the police before the 5-days period; this provision, if broadly interpreted, may allow the police to
make relatively short interceptions free from any judicial control.85 That should be
reconsidered.86
94. Judicial authorisation of surveillance constitutes an important safeguard against abuses;
however, there are two factors which may undermine the efficiency of this legal mechanism.
The first consists in the risk of the overburdening of judges with such requests. Judicial control
over surveillance operations should be seen as a part of the essential work of a judge, and
should be counted in the judicial statistics. Furthermore, the judge should have appropriate
assistance by staff members who have adequate insight into the technology and practice of
surveillance operations. Otherwise the judge would tend to minimise the effort and limit
him/herself to a purely formal review.
95. The second factor is the lack of adversarial proceedings. As follows from the Act, the courts
examine the requests of the police ex parte, without the participation of the person targeted by
the surveillance. As such this is understandable: the very nature and logic of secret
surveillance dictate that not only the surveillance itself but also the accompanying review should
Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, 18 May 2010
See the case of Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, no. 62540/00,
81 and 84, 28 June 2007, where the Court approved the system of judicial authorisation of the secret surveillance
measures. See also the judgment in the case of Klass and others v. Germany, cited above, 55, where the ECtHR
stated that the rule of law implies, inter alia that an interference by the executive authorities with an individual's rights
should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least in the last resort,
judicial control offering the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure.
See the FRA guidebook, p. 54
The Polish authorities assured the Venice Commission that the possibility to use secret surveillance over short
periods, e.g. 2 or 3 [days] is not allowed without any supervision. If this is so, it should be stated clearly in the law.
See Roman Zakharov, cited above, 266: The domestic law does not limit the use of the urgency procedure to
cases involving an immediate serious danger to national, military, economic or ecological security. It leaves the
authorities an unlimited degree of discretion in determining in which situations it is justified to use the non-judicial
urgent procedure, thereby creating possibilities for abusive recourse to it (see, by contrast, Association for European
Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev [] 16).
be effected without the individuals knowledge.87 However, in the absence of a real adversarial
debate, judges tend to be less critical to the position of the police. Moreover, if the judge turns
down the request, there is a risk of appeal, which is absent when the judge accepts a request
by the police and orders the surveillance. In such circumstances the prior judicial authorisation
of the surveillance measures may become a simple formality.
96. The participation of a prosecutor in the process of authorisation of surveillance, provided by
the Act, is welcomed, but in view of the close relations between the prosecution service and the
police in the Polish system, the involvement of the prosecutor cannot be considered as a
sufficient procedural safeguard.88
97. To increase the effectiveness of the preliminary judicial control, the ex parte judicial review
could be supplemented by introducing in the authorisation proceedings a figure of a privacy
advocate an independent legal professional, having necessary technical skills and the
security clearance, who is not institutionally related to the police and the prosecutors office.89
The function of such advocate would be to defend the interests of the person under
surveillance in his/her stead.90
ii. Ex-post oversight
98. There are several other ways of remedying the limitations of the authorisation procedure.
Occasionally, the material obtained as a result of surveillance would be used as evidence in the
criminal proceedings. In this case the accused may, at least in theory, contest the lawfulness of
the surveillance in the proceedings on the merits of his/her case.91 Several questions remain,
99. First, if such review is possible, the only consequence for the accused would be the
disqualification of the evidence obtained as a result of the surveillance. In other words, such
review would not be appropriate if the accused, for example, seeks compensation for the
allegedly unlawful interference with his or her privacy. In addition, such remedy would be
accessible only to the accused, but not to a third person whose privacy has been violated by
the unlawful interception simply because such person would not have the standing necessary
to claim the exclusion of the evidence.
100. Second, it is unclear whether the court reviewing a surveillance warrant in the
proceedings on the merits would have full jurisdiction in this matter and whether the accused
would have full access to the materials which justified the warrant. As the rapporteurs
understood, materials of the operational control are, as a general rule, treated as secret in
Poland.92 Hence, there is a risk that the court reviewing the surveillance warrant in the
Roman Zakharov v. Russia, cited above, 233. See also Klass and Others v. Germany, cited above, 55 and 56.
Thus, in Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (no. 2), no. 71525/01, 26 April 2007, 78, the Court considered that the
Romanian authority which ordered the surveillance namely the prosecutor was not independent from the
executive. The rapporteurs were informed that a special prosecutors office has been recently created to follow more
closely the investigative activities of the security and intelligence services. This is also to be welcomed, but for the
same reasons it cannot be seen as a sufficient procedural safeguard.
See a description of the position of such advocate in the UK, in the 2007 Report, 215-216.
Participation of such privacy advocate may take different forms. In Austria, for example, a Legal Protection
Commissioner (Rechtsschutzbeauftragter, RSB) was established to afford citizens another level of protection in the
context of secret investigations carried out without their knowledge. The RSB needs to approve covert investigations
(verdeckte Ermittlung), or covert audio and video recording, in the context of the observation of groups thought to
present a serious danger to public security through acts of religiously or ideologically motivated violence. The Federal
Minister of the Interior seeks the RSBs opinion during operative and strategic analyses of personal data. This type of
analysis is performed in the defence against criminal organisations or to prevent dangers emanating from the
preparation or commission of criminal offences. The RSB has to provide an opinion on each surveillance measure.
Once the opinion has been provided, the analysis can be conducted (see FRA guidebook, p. 53).
It is unclear whether the court examining the case on the merits will be able to review and annul a decision of
another court which authorised a surveillance measure. The rapporteurs were informed that the recent changes to the
Criminal Procedure Code, which are not the subject-matter of the present opinion, seriously curtailed the power of the
court to disqualify unlawfully obtained evidence.
To a certain extent it is confirmed by Article 19 para. 16 which stipulates that the person subject to operational
control shall not be provided with materials collected during the control. Furthermore, Article 20b of the Act stipulates
proceedings on the merits would refuse to disclose to the defence the materials relevant to the
authorisation of the wiretapping. 93 Exclusion of such materials from the adversarial examination
may put the defence into a significant disadvantage vis--vis the prosecution and be contrary to
the principle of fair trial.94
101. Finally, and most importantly, this remedy would be available only in a fraction of all
cases, only where the fact of the surveillance has become known in the criminal proceedings.
In the vast majority of situations, the surveillance would remain secret.
102. For such cases the Act might provide for a system of posterior complaints by the persons
targeted by the surveillance measure. To realise this right the person has to be aware of the
surveillance. In the context of classical surveillance, a standard requirement in many countries
is that the target is notified of course, when the surveillance has ceased about the fact of
the surveillance and the reasons thereof (if this can be done without imperilling investigation
methods or sources).95 In this respect the Venice Commission notes that, as it seems, the Act
does not contain any requirement to notify the target, even after a lapse of time.
103. The Venice Commission acknowledges that the notification may jeopardise confidential
methods or on-going operations. Therefore, notification of the target is not an absolute rule and
in certain cases the authorities may legitimately deviate from it. Nevertheless, it is important to
set in the Act a general obligation of the relevant authorities to notify the target ex-post, and
formulate exceptions from this rule. When the person learns about the surveillance, ex parte
proceedings before the court issuing the surveillance warrant may be supplemented by fully
adversarial proceedings in which the court would examine the lawfulness of the surveillance de
novo.96 An alternative is to create a standing non-judicial mechanism to which persons
concerned about possible surveillance can apply.
104. In addition to that, it would be desirable explicitly to allow the judge who issued the
surveillance warrant to regularly review the materials obtained by the police as a result of the
surveillance. It will, first, permit the judge to assess whether the police remained within the
original mandate, issued under Article 19 para. 1, and, second, it will allow him or her to
understand better the usefulness and the intrusive effect of such measures. It would appear,
from the Act, that the judge may request materials obtained as a result of surveillance only in
the cases of prolongation of the wiretapping warrant, or in the cases of retroactive authorisation
of the urgent surveillance which has been ordered without pre-authorisation (see Article 19
paras. 3, 9 and 10).97
105. Another option would be to put in place a system of ex-post oversight of the surveillance
operations by some independent body acting on its own initiative.98 The Venice Commission
observes that under Article 19 of the Act, the Minister of Interior has to present before the
that disclosure of information about detailed form, principles and organisation of preliminary investigation, activities
being carried out, as well as applied measures and methods of their implementation shall be allowed only in the case
of justified suspicion that a crime prosecuted on indictment has been committed in relation to performance of these
activities. In other words, in trivial cases of unjustified requests for surveillance, which do not amount to a criminal
behaviour, materials justifying the surveillance may be seen as confidential, since they may arguably contain
elements related to the organisation of preliminary investigation etc.
See Mirilashvili v. Russia, no. 6293/04, 200 et seq., 11 December 2008; Roman Zakharov, cited above, 261
The Polish authorities explained that the provisions of the Polish Criminal Procedure Code in Article 156 1 and 4
guarantee the parties at the stage of judicial proceedings full access to the files of the court case, including classified
See the 2015 Report, 39 and 126
The courts are not the only institution which may be entrusted with the examination of such complaints; in addition,
the States are free to establish other complaints and oversight mechanisms as long as these are effective: the
ombudsman, the national human rights commission, the national audit office, the parliamentary oversight body, the
inspector general, the specialized intelligence oversight body and the complaints commission for intelligence services
(see the national examples of such complaints mechanisms in the UN Report of the oversight of intelligence services,
p. 11). That being said, the Venice Commission considers that the judicial or quasi-judicial examination of complaints
provides for stronger guarantees.
Under Article 19 para. 14 the supervision over the secret surveillance is exercised by the prosecutor.
In contrast to a complaints mechanism, such body would review surveillance operations ex officio, on the regular
basis and not necessarily at the initiative of the targeted individuals.
Parliament, every year, a report on the surveillance activities conducted by the police. Yet, the
Ministers role under Article 19 is to give a general overview of the surveillance activities, not to
justify the necessity of specific operations. This mechanism, therefore, cannot replace the
oversight of the specific surveillance operations by an independent body, which has an insight
into the practice of surveillance and interception, but which is not institutionally linked with the
police and which is not too close to the executive, to the law-enforcement or intelligence
services.99
106. The Venice Commission emphasises that this independent body should be able to review
all aspects of the operations (with due deference to the reasonable operational discretion of the
relevant agencies), to have access to all materials (even classified),100 and to be able to apply
legal remedies which are appropriate in the situation.101
107. The Venice Commission stresses that the judicial authorisation of the surveillance
measures, presently provided by Article 19, is the key element of the system guaranteeing the
respect for privacy and other fundamental rights of persons targeted by those measures.102
However, it should be supplemented by other procedural safeguards. Amongst them are the
possibility to review the lawfulness and necessity of surveillance in the course of the ensuing
criminal proceedings, or the possibility to lodge a complaint for judicial review of surveillance
when it did not result in any criminal prosecution. The independent oversight body may
intervene in the situations where there were no ensuing criminal proceedings and where the
complaints mechanism cannot be used since the person targeted by the surveillance has not
been notified, for valid reasons, about the fact of the surveillance. The independent oversight
body should be able to look into that category of individual cases and formulate
recommendations and reports. At the same time, this body does not need to play the role of the
court of appeal vis--vis the courts which delivered the original surveillance warrant.
108. The Venice Commission is aware that the creation of a totally new body in Poland, and
the delimitation of its competence vis--vis the police/prosecutors on the one hand and the
courts on the other, can take time. Bearing in mind the limited amount of time the Polish
legislature had, it is not surprising that no such body was created in December 2015. However,
at least in the light of how the present system of metadata access under Article 20c is
constructed (see paragraphs 110 et seq. below), and taking into account the weaknesses in the
general oversight of more intrusive secret surveillance (provided by Article 19) such a body
does seem to be necessary.
109. In sum, prior judicial authorisation, provided by Article 19, is a very important procedural
safeguard; however, by itself it is not sufficient to ensure the accountability of the police (and
other law-enforcement agencies which may be involved) in relation to the secret surveillance
operations. The Polish authorities are free to design a model which would ensure effective
control of the surveillance operations, provided that it involves an independent body which
conducts effective review of specific operations and has the necessary legal tools to detect and
The UN report on the oversight of intelligence services, cited above, indicates as follows: An effective system of
intelligence oversight includes at least one civilian institution that is independent of both the intelligence services and
the executive (practice 6).
The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, in the 2015 issue paper entitled Democratic and
effective oversight of national security services (para. 14) noted as follows: [A]ll bodies responsible for overseeing
security services [should] have access to all information, regardless of its level of classification, which they deem to be
relevant to the fulfilment of their mandates. Access to information by oversight bodies should be enshrined in law and
supported by recourse to investigative powers and tools which ensure such access. Any attempts to restrict oversight
bodies access to classified information should be prohibited and subject to sanction where appropriate.
The Venice Commission only describes the powers of the independent oversight body which relate to the
verification of the lawfulness and necessity of the particular surveillance operations. However, the mandate of such
body may be much broader, and include powers related to the more strategic control of the activities of the relevant
State agencies. Thus, for example, an idea to explore would be to get such body involved in the allocation of budgets
by the Parliament related to the surveillance operations; by giving such powers to this body the law might give it an
additional and very powerful tool of responding to the abusive surveillance requests.
According to the Polish authorities, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal pointed out that the judicial review of the
operational activities is the optimal solution (Section 5.2.5. of the Judgment).
combat abuses (or several such bodies).103 Individuals concerned by the surveillance should be
notified ex-post about the measures in order to be involved in the process of review, or, when it
is impossible, other mechanisms should be put in place which would permit looking at the case
from the point of view of the privacy interest of those concerned by the surveillance, or enable
an effective oversight of the reasonableness and lawfulness of such measures.
b. Authorisation and oversight of metadata collection under Article 20ca
110. The Act does not provide for a judicial authorisation of metadata monitoring operations
under Article 20c: in the logic of the Polish law, metadata collection is regarded as a less
intrusive method of information gathering, which does not necessitate the same level of
procedural guarantees as classical surveillance under Article 19. The Venice Commission
admits that even though judicial pre-authorisation of each operation of metadata collection
would be desirable, in some cases such procedure may be too cumbersome for the police. The
police (and the rescue services) need this type of data very often, and providing for a system of
prior independent authorization for accessing it is neither practicable, nor necessary at least,
as regards the less sensitive kind of metadata (such as subscriber information). In these cases
ex-post notification to a court (or another independent oversight body see paragraph 114
below) would suffice.
111. The main exception from this rule may be the content-related metadata: the Venice
Commission recommends the Polish authorities to consider including it (if it is not already the
case) into the scope of Article 19, with all the procedural guarantees which may accompany
access to it (i.e. essentially judicial pre-authorisation). Ex-ante authorisation could also be
considered for measures of broadly targeted metadata collection (where a geographical area at
a given time is the target). However, for the collection of most types of metadata ex-post
oversight of specific operations should be an adequate safeguard against abuses.
112. Article 20ca requires the police to submit, to a competent regional court, a semi-annual
report containing generalised information about the metadata monitoring during the past
period.104
113. The Venice Commission considers that this reporting obligation is insufficient to ensure
the accountability of the police in respect of the operations related to metadata collection. First,
such reports contain only summarised information, which does not give insight into the
particulars of each specific case. It is unclear what sort of conclusions a judge may draw from
reading such report. Indeed, under Article 20ca para. 3, a judge may take an initiative and
request the materials that justify disclosure of metadata to the police; however, it is unclear
what would incite him or her to entertain such individualised analysis. In the unlikely event that
a judge is pro-active, examines the materials of a specific case and detects any irregularity in
them, such finding may entail criminal or disciplinary proceedings against the police officers
In Weber and Saravia the ECtHR was satisfied with the German system of supervision of strategic (i.e. nontargeted) surveillance which included a Parliamentary Supervisory Board, which consisted of 9 MPs, including
members of the opposition, the Federal Minister, and an independent Commission, which had to authorise
surveillance measures and had substantial power in relation to all stages of interception. In Kennedy v. UK, cited
above, the ECtHR approved the system by which the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), an independent body
composed of persons who held or had held high judicial office and experienced lawyers which had the power, among
other things, to quash interception orders, interacted with the Interception of Communications Commissioner, likewise
a functionary who held or had held high judicial office and who had access to all interception warrants and
applications for interception warrants (see also Telegraaf Media, cited above, 98).
Namely (1) the number of cases of obtaining telecommunications, postal, or on-line data in the reporting period,
quoting the type of the data; 2) legal qualifications, with connection with which the requests for the
telecommunications, postal, or on-line data were filed, or the information on obtaining the data in order to save human
health or life, or to support rescue and find missions.
114. The question is whether the ex-post oversight should be entrusted to a court or to another
independent body. In some countries, the solution is to give this function to the prosecutor, who
is one step further away from the investigation from the police. In theory, the culture of the
prosecutor should be more dominated by the law than the police culture, but the degree of
formal/institutional independence of the prosecution service from the executive varies
depending on the country.105 And, as already noted above, the ECtHR has been reluctant to
accept a prosecutor as an independent official who can be entrusted with the supervision of
the police operations.106
115. A possible solution would be to involve the courts more deeply into the oversight of the
specific metadata monitoring operations. This is possible if the courts are given sufficient
resources (time, access to technical expertise, specialist competence etc.). However, the
problem is that metadata interception is difficult to separate from other aspects of police
investigative work. It may be difficult for the ordinary courts to exert a sort of standing control
function over the police.107
116. A better alternative is expert bodies which can serve as either a supplement or a
replacement for judicial accountability. The Venice Commission refers to its 2007 report (see
218 et seq.) which describes composition and mandate of such bodies, where it stressed, in
particular, that where an expert body [] operates only as a substitute for judicial authorisation
and not simply as a complement to it, it is especially important that the body in question is
sufficiently capable and independent to exercise a real control ( 240).
117. Be it as it may, any system of ex-post oversight should involve a genuinely independent
body having the necessary expertise and powers to adequately review specific operations of
metadata monitoring. As in the case of secret surveillance under Article 19, the Polish
authorities have considerable freedom to design a system involving an independent body,
which would ensure that the police have to go outside of the house and convince an
independent observer of the need for the measure.108 The law should require that the oversight
body conducts proactive and continuous control of all operations and has necessary powers
vis--vis the police/prosecutors. The Act may also provide for a qualified notification obligation
and a complaints mechanism (before a court or before an independent oversight body).109
118. The Venice Commission reiterates that the existence of an ex-post control does not
exclude the possibility of a judicial pre-authorisation of certain most intrusive surveillance
measures, including those in the field of metadata collection. In some countries (for example, in
Sweden) judicial control ex ante is supplemented by the post hoc control by an independent
organ. The experience of other states shows that this does not involve an interference with
judicial independence. An important advantage of such a body is that it could be given a special
mandate to monitor (and so deter abuse of) metadata collection in more controversial
situations: i.e. interception of privileged communications, interception of geographical targets,
content-related metadata, preventive (of crime or security dangers) access to metadata, etc.
See CDL-AD(2010)040, Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part
II - the Prosecution Service, 23 et seq.
See Dumitru Popescu v. Romania (no. 2), cited above, Iordachi and Others, cited above, 47, Roman Zakharov,
277 et seq.
See the 2007 Report (see 201 et seq.), where the Venice Commission concluded (see 212 and 213) that
control by the ordinary courts does not appear as the best instrument of accountability for or redress against security
In Klass and Others, cited above, 56, the ECtHR held that although it is in principle desirable to entrust
supervisory control to a judge, supervision by non-judicial bodies may be considered compatible with the Convention,
provided that the supervisory body is independent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and is vested with
sufficient powers and competence to exercise an effective and continuous control.
According to the FRA guidebook of 2015, parliamentary oversight bodies of several EU Member States, namely
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania and Romania, also function as complaints-handling bodies. Oversight bodies other than
parliamentary committees, such as those entailing executive and expert oversight, may also provide remedies, as is
the case in Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (p. 70).
119. To simplify the task of the police and reduce the burden of the courts, it should be
possible for the Polish legislator to remove even from the scope of ex-post control operations
related to the police accessing the subscriber data. If the Polish legislator decides to do so,
such operations will not be scrutinised by the courts (or other independent body) on a regular
basis; however, in this scenario a system of logging should be in place, combined with some
sort of posterior, sampling testing of the appropriateness of such selected operations. That
being said, beyond that least intrusive kind of metadata, all other operations of the police
should be susceptible to a comprehensive and effective ex-post control.
c. Direct access to metadata
120. Article 20c para. 3 provides for direct access of the police to metadata without
participation of the employees of the ICT service provider, if it is provided for in the agreement
concluded by and between the Police Commander in Chief and that entity. Thus, the police
may have permanent and direct access to the metadata.
121. In Roman Zakharov, cited above, the ECtHR held as follows: [A] system, such as the
Russian one, which enables the [] police to intercept directly the communications of each and
every citizen without requiring them to show an interception authorisation to the
communications service provider, or to anyone else, is particularly prone to abuse. The need
for safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse appears therefore to be particularly great
( 270). So, such direct access is not per se forbidden by the ECtHR, but because it is
particularly prone to abuse, any State having such a system must provide for particularly strong
122. Indeed, direct access to metadata has its practical advantages. Furthermore, at the
meetings in Warsaw the authorities assured the rapporteurs that only certain designated
officers of the police have direct access to metadata of the ICT providers,110 and that the police
keep record of all log-ins by those officers. These are minimal safeguards, which should be
preserved. However, the fact that law-enforcement agencies can access data without the
telecommunications companies knowing they have done so, in unlimited quantities, without
significant costs (which has been a major factor limiting overuse of this method in other
countries, but which does not appear to be an important consideration in Poland) obviously
involves a much greater scope for abuse. Furthermore, these specially designated officers,
while being specialists, do not appear to function as gatekeepers, filtering away unjustified
applications (which is the case in some other states, like UK or Sweden), but rather only as
facilitators (i.e. communication channels). However, Article 20c para. 4 of the Act provides for
the full identification of a police officer who gets access to metadata, which is positive.
123. The Venice Commission stresses that, under the current Act, there is no effective
oversight of the metadata collection by an independent body, which might verify whether the
police uses its powers in a reasonable manner, in accordance with good investigative practices
(see above, the discussion about authorisation and oversight of metadata collection in
paragraphs 110 et seq.).
124. Furthermore, as understood by the rapporteurs, in the case of the real-time direct access
there may be difficulties in separating, technically, content from metadata. If this is the case,
then it is necessary to build in blocks into the system, which would ensure that the content is
clearly distinct from metadata, and that the police have no access to the former.
125. In any event, and in sum, direct access strengthens even more the argument for putting in
place an efficient mechanism of supervision.
Thus, as the rapporteurs learned, there are about 102,000 police officers, but only a few hundred are authorized
to access metadata. At regional, city and national levels the police appoint single points of contact between the police
and telecommunications/internet companies.
d. Recording obligation
126. The ECtHR has found that an obligation on the intercepting agencies to keep records of
interceptions is particularly important to ensure that the supervisory body had effective access
to details of surveillance activities undertaken.111 This is a fortiori true for metadata collection,
since the Act, in its current form, does not provide for prior control of such operations by the
courts. Such records should explain, at least briefly, the reasons for such monitoring, and refer
to specific facts. The reasons given should be detailed enough to enable the oversight body to
assess the reasonableness of the actions of the police.
127. Furthermore, those recordings should always be available for independent examination.
Technical protocol of access to metadata (in case of direct access) should guarantee that the
competent officer would not be able to get access to it without leaving traces. Oversight bodies
should be able to conduct surprise controls in situ, obtain all necessary documents, obtain
testimony of the agents under oath, etc. Finally, the absence of the records or their inaccuracy
should be defined in the law as serious professional faults, if not crimes.
128. Principles 15, 16 and 17 of the UN report on the oversight of intelligence services,112
stress the importance of regulating criminal, civil and other liability of the officials involved in the
surveillance operations for violations of domestic law and breaches of the international human
rights obligations. The Venice Commission fully subscribes to these principles. The rapporteurs
understood that criminal liability for abusive surveillance may be covered by other statutes
(such as the Criminal Code). However, it is important to ensure if necessary by referring in the
Act to relevant provisions in other legislation that deliberate and gross breach of privacy or
misuse of official powers in collecting metadata or conducting secret surveillance is clearly
defined as a criminal offence.
129. The Venice Commission also recommends attaching liability not only to material violations
of somebodys privacy, but also to more formal breaches of the procedure (such as the failure
to record properly the results of the surveillance operation, failure to destroy the materials in
time, or their transmission to unauthorised persons), even if it may be sometime difficult to link
such infringements to a violation of somebodys privacy.
130. The Venice Commission welcomes the effort made by the Polish legislator to implement
the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of 30 July 2014. The amendments to the
Act introduced in 2016 followed many of the recommendations contained in that judgement.
131. The Venice Commission notes that many states now face very real threats from terrorism
and organized crime. Under the ECHR, states have a margin of appreciation in deciding how to
draw the balance between security and liberty. The Polish legislator is by no means alone in
having attracted considerable criticism as to how this balance has been drawn. Nor is the
Polish government alone in reacting slowly to changed public conceptions, and to the
judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR, which indicate that metadata monitoring involves a
larger interference with privacy.
132. Having said this, procedural safeguards and material conditions set in the Police Act for
implementing secret surveillance are still insufficient to prevent its excessive use and unjustified
interference with the privacy of individuals.
Kennedy, cited above, 165; Roman Zakharov, cited above, 272.
See the UN report, entitled Compilation of good practices etc., by M. Scheinin, quoted above.
133. In order to improve the Act, the Venice Commission recommends that the following most
important amendments be adopted (in addition to other recommendations contained in the text
of the opinion):
to strengthen the proportionality principle, by elaborating the test applicable to the
secret surveillance ordered under Article 19 and by introducing this test in relation to
obtaining of metadata under Article 20c, in order to ensure that secret
surveillance/metadata collection are to be ordered only in the most serious cases,
especially under the urgent procedure (Article 19 para. 3);
to prohibit in the Act surveillance of communications which are on the face covered by a
lawyer-client privilege; to define precisely when this presumption can be overturned,
and to do so also in respect of other privileged communications;
to limit the duration of the metadata monitoring; to require the police to keep proper
records which should enable effective ex-post control of the monitoring operations,
especially implemented through direct access,
to complement the system of judicial pre-authorisation of the classical surveillance
under Article 19 with additional procedural safeguards (a privacy advocate, a
complaints mechanism, a system of ex-post automatic oversight of such operations by
an independent body, etc.);
to provide, in respect of metadata collection under Article 20c, an effective mechanism
of oversight of specific operations by an independent body; such body should have
necessary investigative powers and expertise and be able to use appropriate legal
134. The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Polish authorities for any further
assistance they may need in case of the revision of the legislation analysed in the present
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