Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-natanel
Timestamp: 2019-10-18 14:08:22
Document Index: 783387674

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 843', '§ 846', '§ 841']

U.S. v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302 | Casetext
U.S. v. Natanel
938 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1991)
U.S.v.Natanel
United States Court of Appeals, First CircuitJul 9, 1991
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Their importunements implicate Rules 8(b) and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the Court…
U.S. v. Huddleston
Once past this barrier, however, the trial court's application of the correct legal standard to the facts of…
holding that counsel's decision not to make a closing argument on one charged count, “while admittedly a gamble,” was a “reasonable strategic choice” and therefore did not constitute deficient performance even if “in retrospect, [it was] unsuccessful or even unwise”
Summary of this case from JesúS v. United States
holding that counsel's waiver of closing argument on count submitted to jury independently, “while admittedly a gamble,” was reasonable strategic choice where jury had acquitted defendant on all other counts
holding that a denial of severance will only be reversed for a "manifest abuse of discretion"
Francis K. Morris, with whom Morris Howard, was on brief, Framingham, Mass., for defendant, appellant.
Defendant-appellant Efraim Natanel, sometimes described in the record as Efriam Natanel, having dodged several of the government's legal bullets, was convicted on the last remaining count of a multicount indictment. Natanel labors mightily in an effort to show that his conviction was unlawful. He does not succeed.
Fourteen persons, Natanel included, were indicted by a federal grand jury for a variety of drug-related offenses. In final form, the indictment contained twenty-seven counts, only four of which involved Natanel. Count 2 alleged that Natanel and eleven others (including several supposed members of an earlier conspiracy charged in count 1, see infra), conspired to possess and distribute cocaine from March to April of 1988 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 18 charged Natanel with distributing more than five hundred grams of cocaine to one Uri Ben'Hanan in May 1987 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) (ii)(II) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 22 and 23 charged Natanel with unlawful use of the telephone during the life of the count 2 conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
Natanel and five other defendants were tried together. Early on, Natanel moved for a severance in respect to count 18. His motion was denied. Undaunted, he persisted in asserting his position. His perseverance finally paid a small dividend: after the evidence was in, the judge proposed that counsel separately argue, and the jury separately ponder, count 18. Natanel acquiesced, though making clear that he did not feel this modicum of relief was an adequate remedy for what he still perceived to be a prejudicial misjoinder. The government also acquiesced.
The quintet included David, Eliahu Abramson, Jaime Toro Aristizibal, Amparo Toro Aristizibal, and Yehuda Yarden. Abramson was acquitted. The other four were convicted on an assortment of charges. Their appeals were consolidated with Natanel's and argued as a group. Because Natanel was convicted only on count 18 — a charge arising in the course of David's CCE but not implicating in so many words defendants other than Natanel — and because his appeal, though emerging from a shared background, presents a distinctive set of issues, we limit this opinion to Natanel's case. The codefendants' appeals will be addressed separately.
In a case involving multiple defendants, Rule 8(b) governs joinder of defendants and offenses. Under the rule, the government may charge serial transactions, and indict persons jointly, on the basis of what it reasonably anticipates being able to prove against the defendants, collectively, measured as of the time the indictment is handed up. See United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 245 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990); United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973). In the ordinary case, a rational basis for joinder of multiple counts should be discernible from the face of the indictment. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 245; United States v. Arruda, 715 F.2d 671, 678 (1st Cir. 1983). A defendant challenging such joinder must carry the devoir of persuading the trial court that a misjoinder has taken place. See United States v. Luna, 585 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 160, 58 L.Ed.2d 157 (1978). The remedy for misjoinder is severance. See United States v. Williams, 711 F.2d 748, 750 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 433, 78 L.Ed.2d 365 (1983).
Here, the government's theory was that the entire indictment, including count 18, constituted a single "series of acts or transactions" within the ambit of Rule 8(b). More specifically, the prosecution contended that codefendant David's continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), charged in count 17, adequately linked all the other counts together. The defense, relying heavily on the fact that the incident undergirding count 18 took place almost a year before the count 2 conspiracy allegedly began, thought differently: in its view, count 18 charged Natanel with an isolated sale of cocaine, unrelated to the other activities set out in the indictment, and thus, not reasonably classifiable as part of a series. We afford the trial court's resolution of this issue plenary review, see, e.g., United States v. MacDonald Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 58-59 (1st Cir. 1991), mindful that mere similarity of acts, without more, cannot justify joinder. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 245; King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966). Should we find both misjoinder and actual prejudice, we must vacate the conviction. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 732, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986).
In this instance, joinder was proper. We think that a CCE count can be a sufficient link between multiple codefendants and multiple offenses to warrant joinder when the CCE ties in the remaining counts in the indictment. Accord United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 108 S.Ct. 1108, 99 L.Ed.2d 269 (1988). A CCE count is, after all, strikingly similar to a conspiracy count, cf. United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1991) (where 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy is used to show a CCE, cumulative punishment for both conspiracy and CCE charges constitutes double jeopardy), and it is settled that a conspiracy count can forge the needed linkage. See Arruda, 715 F.2d at 678; cf. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 245 (joinder deemed appropriate where RICO count "embrace[s] all of the acts or transactions upon which the other . . . counts [are] based"). While the tie would perhaps be more easily visualized in this case if the substantive act charged in count 18 had been listed in the indictment as a predicate for the CCE count, we do not believe such an explicit cross-reference is required. Cf., e.g., MacDonald Watson, 933 F.2d at 60 (joinder appropriate, even absent allegation of a conspiracy, "where a corporation and its employees are alleged to have committed the same illegal acts involving the same corporate site on several occasions"); Pacelli v. United States, 588 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1978) (joinder can be supported by conspiratorial activity even if the conspiracy is not charged in the indictment), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 2001, 60 L.Ed.2d 378 (1979); United States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1969) (similar), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006, 90 S.Ct. 560, 24 L.Ed.2d 498 (1970).
We know that, at times, the evidence adduced at trial can validate a conclusion of relatedness, serving as an ex post assurance that joinder was a step founded on a reasonable, good faith basis in fact and not the result of prosecutorial bad faith. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 245. So here, concerning the joinder of count 18 with the other charges. From early 1986 to the middle of 1987, one Jackie Amouyal received cocaine in the course of David's CCE operations. On two occasions in March and April of 1987, Ben'Hanan bought cocaine from Amouyal in Brookline, Massachusetts. Natanel was present during the latter sale. At that time, Amouyal told Ben'Hanan that he would be in Israel for a spell and that Natanel would be available as an understudy if Ben'Hanan needed drugs. A short while later, Ben'Hanan contacted Natanel for exactly that purpose — a contact which resulted in the count 18 transaction. Thus, though the sale was not explicitly referenced as part of the CCE, a reasonable prosecutor could have thought the two to be sufficiently interconnected to justify their inclusion in the same indictment.
Natanel has another string to his bow. Even though the remedy associated with misjoinder is the same as that associated with prejudicial joinder — severance — the rules which govern the two phenomena are analytically distinct and procedurally distinguishable. Pursuing this theme, Natanel posits that, even if joinder was allowable under Rule 8(b), count 18 nevertheless should have been severed pursuant to Rule 14. Under the best of circumstances, "[t]his is a difficult battle for a defendant to win." Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. Assuming lawful joinder, the nisi prius court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to sever counts for trial and its resolution of severance questions will be overturned only if that wide discretion is plainly abused. See id.; Arruda, 715 F.2d at 679. Moreover, when the district judge's discretion has been exercised to refuse severance, an appellant must "make a strong showing of prejudice" to gain a new trial. United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985).
Since Natanel was acquitted on all counts save count 18, it is hard to envision how the joinder of counts might have prejudiced him. The appellant speculates that he was hurt by evidentiary spillover — but the jury's demonstrated selectivity affords a reasonably good assurance that no injurious spillover effect occurred. The introduction of evidence against other defendants cannot realistically be viewed as having jeopardized Natanel's chances on count 18 when the jury proved willing to treat the case against Natanel on its own merits by acquitting him on the other counts. Accord, e.g., United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 834 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 681, 70 L.Ed.2d 646 (1981).
On June 1, the jurors reported to court. The judge sent them to the jury room to consider count 18, without pausing for either supplemental instruction or further arguments by the lawyers. Natanel's attorney was present when this was done and did not object. Indeed, the lawyers agreed, at an unrecorded conference with the trial judge, that additional closing arguments concerning count 18 were unnecessary.
The agreement is evidenced by a stipulation on appeal. The stipulation also recites that the participants cannot recall whether anything was said at the chambers conference regarding the need for supplementary instructions on count 18.
The benchmark for determining whether a trial lawyer's performance has been constitutionally deficient is whether "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. In order to obtain a reversal on this ground, a criminal defendant must show both that counsel fell short of the applicable performance standard and that prejudice resulted. See id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 1988). The performance standard is to be applied not in hindsight, but based on what the lawyer knew, or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented. See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978).
Given the odd situation which developed below, trial counsel's decision to waive a separate closing statement on count 18 strikes us as "a strategy choice . . . well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments." Id. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-96, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3125-27, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Doucette v. Vose, 842 F.2d 538, 543 (1st Cir. 1988). After the jury acquitted Natanel on the other counts, counsel likely suspected that the jury was won over and that additional arguments could only impair his client's seemingly secure position. It was, therefore, reasonable for him to conclude that the sooner the jurors received count 18, the less new information was imparted, the better Natanel's interests would be served. By foregoing an additional summation, the lawyer precluded the prosecutor, who had fallen demonstrably flat in his initial attempt, from exercising a renewed opportunity to convince the jury of Natanel's guilt.
In litigation as in life, there is much to be said for maxims such as "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" and "quit while you're ahead." Viewed in such a light, the decision not to give a separate closing argument on count 18, while admittedly a gamble, was a reasonable strategic choice. That counsel's selection of a stratagem may, in retrospect, have proved unsuccessful, or even unwise, is not the issue. See Chappee, 843 F.2d at 33; Bosch, 584 F.2d at 1121. Under the circumstances, Natanel's legal representation was not constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (given adequate investigation, a lawyer's "strategic choices . . . relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable" on sixth amendment grounds); Jackson, 918 F.2d at 243 (no inadequate representation if the attorney's conduct can be viewed as "a reasonable tactical decision" under the attendant circumstances); United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 772 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar).
In light of our conclusion that counsel's tactical choice was a professionally acceptable one, characterized by a reasonable degree of lawyerly proficiency, we need not address the second prong of the Strickland test.
The plain error hurdle is high. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (plain errors are limited to those which "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial"); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936) (plain errors are restricted to those which "are obvious, or . . . seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"). It follows, unsurprisingly, that the plain error exception is to be used "sparingly," only to prevent justice from miscarrying. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Inasmuch as plain error "gives a defendant a free second bite at the cherry, [it] is to be narrowly limited." United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 71, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989).
To be sure, a trial court's failure to charge on the essential elements of an offense can constitute plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1167 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976); United States v. King, 521 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1975). It understates matters to say that the doctrine will only apply if the asserted error "would likely have affected the outcome." United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 71, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989). In the last analysis, the plain error doctrine, even in the context of jury instructions, is "not . . . concerned with technical error or with prejudicial error," McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031, 88 S.Ct. 1424, 20 L.Ed.2d 288 (1968), but is concerned only with "those errors so shocking that they seriously affect the fundamental fairness and basic integrity of the proceedings conducted below." Griffin, 818 F.2d at 100.
In the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that there was no plain error. Having found no similar situations in the case law, we turn to first principles. The purpose of requiring instructions on the elements of an offense is to ensure that, if the jury convicts, it will be convicting a defendant for the crime with which he is charged. Even if the jury has the indictment before it or hears a rote recital of the statutory language, instructions may be required; after all, the language used in statutes may not be familiar to lay jurors, or common words may take on unaccustomed meanings in particular legal settings. See, e.g., United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 415-16 (4th Cir. 1986) (plain error found where jury was given indictment, but their "attention was never called to the . . . allegations . . . they were never read to the jury nor were they explained"); United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. United States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 1990) (court need not explain statutory phraseology to jury where words were such that "the jury could not reasonably have doubted the[ir] tenor"). The necessity for instruction, then, flows from the fundamental principle that the jury must understand what it is that it is sworn to do.
Our conclusion that the plain error hurdle was not vaulted in this instance is further fortified in that Natanel's defense centered around the credibility of a single government witness, rather than around any particular element of the offense. Cf., e.g., United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 127 (1st Cir. 1976) (jury instructions not deficient to the point of plain error where, inter alia, the case "did not involve `a particularly sensitive defense,' nor were `the facts adduced at trial . . . so complex and confusing that an understanding of the issues would be beyond the grasp of the jury'" (citations omitted)). The fact that the jury's verdict came down to a judgment call on credibility renders it highly unlikely that the failure to reinstruct tilted the outcome, caused justice to miscarry, or adversely affected the integrity of the trial process.
The verdict on count 18 necessitated proof that the quantity of drugs distributed by Natanel was in excess of 500 grams. Before us, Natanel contends that the only evidence presented at trial concerning drug weight was Ben'Hanan's testimony — and Ben'Hanan, according to Natanel, was not credible. Inasmuch as Natanel did not raise this issue in his motion for judgment of acquittal in the district court, we can only grant relief if doing so is necessary to avert a clear and gross injustice. See United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167, 1171 (1st Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435, 441 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1175, 51 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977).
The statute of conviction provides a stiff penalty for any person who knowingly or intentionally distributes "500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of . . . (II) cocaine. . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
The district judge denied the appellant's motion. He stated that, to grant it, he would have to be convinced that Ben'Hanan's testimony about the Blazer was deliberately false — and the judge was not so persuaded. Natanel argues that the district court misapprehended the law and misapplied the relevant standard, thus arriving at the wrong ruling. We agree with the appellant's premise but not with his conclusion.
In cases where newly discovered evidence is offered to impeach the credibility of a witness, we have observed that it may sometimes be appropriate to substitute a less stringent criterion for the "probability of reversal" factor (the fourth of the Wright factors). In particular, if satisfied that testimony at trial was deliberately false, it is only necessary that the district court find that "without the false testimony the jury ` might have reached a different conclusion.'" Wright, 625 F.2d at 1020 (quoting Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928)). But here, the court went astray. It did not merely consider interchanging the two possible versions of the fourth Wright factor. Rather, having determined that the challenged testimony was not deliberately false, the court rejected Natanel's motion outright. This was error: a defendant's failure to show that testimony was deliberately false when given does not automatically slam the door on a Rule 33 motion; it only means that the movant cannot substitute a relatively more relaxed criterion for the "probability of reversal" criterion.
The information fares no better on the fourth prong of Wright. It seems highly unlikely that the evidence would have had the slightest effect on the trial's outcome. At the most, the proffer could be expected to do service as but another of a series of impeachment efforts mounted by the defense. If the jury was not convinced by the others — some of which possessed considerably more impeaching force than the "Blazer" evidence — it is Panglossian to speculate that the new tidbit would have swayed the balance. For newly discovered evidence to warrant a retrial in a criminal case, the existence of the required probability of reversal must be gauged by an objectively reasonable appraisal of the record as a whole, not on the basis of wishful thinking, rank conjecture, or unsupportable surmise.
Wright itself offers a usable parallel. There, we found no probability of reversal where the newly discovered evidence represented, at best, a fourth attempt to impeach a witness. We stated: "Since the jury chose to believe [the witness] in spite of the testimony of three defense witnesses (including appellant) that directly contradicted her, we do not see how the addition of [one more witness'] testimony would `probably produce an acquittal.'" Id. at 1020 (citation omitted). The situation at bar is analogous. The appellant has not demonstrated the requisite probability of reversal.