Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/73474860/EU-Banks-Funding-Structures-Policies
Timestamp: 2017-02-27 00:28:45
Document Index: 94252252

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art.\n3', 'art 1', 'art 4', 'art 3', 'art 3', 'art 2', 'art 5', 'art 2', 'art 4', 'art 5', 'art 6', 'art 6', 'art 6', 'art 8', 'art 8', 'art 7', 'art 9', 'art 10', 'art 9', 'art 10', 'art 9', 'art 12', 'art 11', 'art 11', 'art 14', 'art 14', 'art 13', 'art 12', 'art 14', 'art 13', 'art 15', 'art 16', 'art 16', 'art 15', 'art 17', 'art 17', 'art 18', 'art 18']

EU Banks Funding Structures Policies | Securitization
BrowseInterestsBiography & MemoirBusiness & LeadershipFiction & LiteraturePolitics & EconomyHealth & WellnessSociety & CultureHappiness & Self-HelpMystery, Thriller & CrimeHistoryYoung AdultBrowse byBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinEU BANKS’ FUNDING STRUCTURES AND POLICIESm Ay 2 0 0 9
© European Central Bank, 2009 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Website http://www.ecb.europa.eu Fax +49 69 1344 6000 All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. Unless otherwise stated, this document uses data available as at end of March 2009. ISBN 978-92-899-0448-3 (online)
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 PROJECT BACKGROUND 3 FUNDING SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 3.1 General trends: funding sources 3.2 Consequences of the crisis for banks’ funding strategies 3.3 Action by public authorities to restore banks’ access to funding 4 BANK DEBT COMPOSITION AND INVESTORS 4.1 Developments in the issuance of bank debt securities 4.2 Debt investors 5 COLLATERAL AND ITS MANAGEMENT 5.1 Constraints on collateral use 5.2 Central banks’ responses on collateral 5.3 Responses in the way banks manage their collateral 6 INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING 6.1 The main parameters of an internal pricing system 6.2 Shortcomings in banks’ internal transfer pricing policies 6.3 Need for rules relative to internal transfer pricing policy 7 THE FUTURE OF FUNDING MARKETS – POTENTIAL ISSUES AND HURDLES AHEAD 7.1 Immediate challenges 7.2 Restarting funding markets ANNEXES 1 Costs, limits and time horizons of government bank debt guarantee schemes, and amounts issued Internal transfer pricing: theoretical tools Internal pricing of liquidity – a future challenge for regulators and ﬁnancial stability 4 7 8 8 13 13 17 17 19 21 22 24 26 27 27 28 29 Box 2 Box 3 LIST OF BOXES: Box 1 Guaranteed versus non-guaranteed funding: pricing and implementation details Bond markets: a key ﬁnancing tool for banks Changes to the Eurosystem collateral framework
ECB EU banks’ funding structures and policies May 2009
However. In fact. and that 2009 would probably see banks’ normal issuance activities being crowded out by government-guaranteed issuance. as well as the way in which banks have managed their funding structures. and 32 had their headquarters in the euro area. Surveyed banks conﬁrm that deposits have become the preferred source of funding. certain banks stated that government measures had altered the level playing ﬁeld between healthy and less healthy banks. corporate ﬁnance activities and asset management. the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC). Given the extent of funding restrictions. In fact. the banks surveyed were relatively pessimistic about the recovery of market funding and noted that it would probably take years for market funding to normalise. or is simply being recycled in the overnight market. On an aggregate basis. In fact. Given the long-term funding constraints. 28 were single banks or parent banks of a banking group. However. This assessment.1 FUNDING SOURCES AND STRATEGIES HAVE ALTERED As the crisis has unfolded. banks’ focus has shifted to short-term funding. However. with maturities ranging from overnight to six months – and as long as one year in the case of the Bank of England. was based on both market data and data published by banks. This has made banks extremely sensitive to market developments. Banks are also seeking to strengthen their deposit base by investing more in customer relations. government packages have mostly targeted longer-term
funding through guarantee schemes. Deposits have been affected to a lesser extent and central bank money has remained available throughout the turmoil. One immediate reaction on the part of banks that previously relied mainly on wholesale funding has been to change their funding to more stable sources. albeit in increasingly competitive market conditions. renewed funding structures seem to be pointing towards building a strong domestic investor base. these temporary measures have not yet managed to unlock longer-term liquidity. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN MARKETS FOR BANK DEBT The issuance of their own debt securities is an integral part of many larger banks’ funding strategies. Since banks are more familiar with domestic markets. At the same time. The increased interest on deposits is reducing the potential market share of banks that were already reliant on retail deposits. The analysis also beneﬁted from a survey of 36 mostly medium-sized and large EU banks. this behaviour can represent a serious obstacle to the normalisation of funding. since it inhibits a long-term approach to funding. mortgage banking. The banks surveyed were mostly involved in retail banking. also giving rise to a homecountry bias.1
PROJECT BACKGROUND AND APPROACH In the light of recent developments on ﬁnancial markets. The report is based on the information available until end of March 2009. Of the 36 banks surveyed. Several of the banks surveyed conceded that government and central bank measures were key in helping to avoid a full-blown collapse of the banking system. coordinated action across central banks and governments has become necessary in order to alleviate the funding gap. decided to carry out an in-depth assessment of the impact the crisis is having on bank funding. during the current ﬁnancial
1 The 36 surveyed banks were interviewed in the period between November 2008 and early January 2009. Central bank action has focused on short-term funding. the banks surveyed are more concerned about day-to-day market developments and the impact on their funding structures.
. which covered the sources and cost of funding. This sample does not claim to be representative in either statistical terms or for the EU banking market. in some respects. part of the liquidity that has been injected has found its way into central banks’ deposit facilities in the form of precautionary hoarding of liquidity. as central banks stepped up their efforts to support funding needs at an early stage in the crisis. This crisis is. liquidity has become a scarce good and all funding sources have gradually been affected.
Most banks have increased the cost of internal liquidity supplies. the nature of the business lines and the type of internal counterpart.
Sometimes up to 100%. the loosening of eligibility
criteria and the recognition of new types of asset as eligible collateral). risk aversion has increased and investors such as money market and mutual funds have had to deal with their own liquidity difﬁculties (e. quantities and investor base will be a key factor in determining whether or not funding markets eventually reopen. redemptions). The shortcomings of internal liquidity policies included overly optimistic assumptions about the unwinding of trades. Banks’ debt issuance activities have been negatively affected. In addition. cross-subsidisation of activities and the provision of inaccurately priced backstop credit lines. This has led to concern that central banks could end up being the main holders of securitised instruments. And while covered bonds initially appeared to be a viable replacement for off-balance sheet securitisation. with government bonds more or less being the only type of collateral accepted. liquidity risk was sometimes intentionally underestimated internally. The extension of eligibility criteria allowed credit institutions to both reserve their highest quality assets for repo transactions in wholesale markets and maximise the use of collateral in central bank credit operations. These difﬁculties have also given banks a greater incentive to accelerate investment in their collateral management and monitoring infrastructure. rating or liquidity of the collateral. If funding costs are priced too cheaply internally. Following the implementation of government rescue plans. maturity. How guaranteed and non-guaranteed instruments coexist within the bond market in terms of relative pricing. the location of the subsidiaries. In this context. conﬁdence in banks as debtors has eroded. regardless of the seniority.g. banks have also shown increased interest in central bank actions with regard to collateral (i.e. given the freeze in the securitisation markets and the fact that asset-backed securities account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the collateral used by counterparties in Eurosystem credit operations. some banks have been securitising part of their loan portfolios for the sole purpose of using the senior tranches as Eurosystem collateral. preventing the asset from being used as collateral. more attention is now being paid to internal pricing policies. in order to gain market share in the context of strong competition. unsecured bonds and covered bonds now have to compete with governmentguaranteed instruments. According to the banks surveyed. Interestingly. as they are not being charged appropriately for the associated liquidity risk. investor demand for more short-term instruments such as certiﬁcates of deposit has increased.crisis. These constraints were translated into a generalised increase in haircuts 2. business units have an incentive to take risks by increasing their leverage and maximising volumes. some banks have allocated decision-making in this area to more senior management. Moreover. Some banks have increased the size of their strategic reserves of eligible assets in order to secure central bank contingency funding. their issuance has also dried up in a number of countries. using broader criteria which now include the type of funding. In parallel. Some of them have also increased the centralisation of their collateral management in order to optimise collateral and liquidity ﬂows between different entities on a cross-border basis. with both net issuance and debt instrument maturities decreasing. Banks surveyed for this report conﬁrmed that these difﬁculties reinforced their perception that collateral management was a key element of their management of liquidity and funding. RENEWED IMPORTANCE OF COLLATERAL Conditions in the repo market have tightened and become so constrained that the range of assets accepted as collateral has narrowed further. FLAWS IN INTERNAL PRICING POLICIES The tightening liquidity conditions have highlighted the ﬂaws that developed in some internal pricing practices during the period of low interest rates and low liquidity premia.
Second. Trust in the relevant bank’s governance and risk management are also essential. CHALLENGES FOR BANKS The BSC has identiﬁed two immediate challenges as regards the funding of EU banks. in turn. regardless of the type of funding. therefore. knowing investors better would enable banks to better predict what stresses these counterparties might come under. the BSC is of the opinion that it is important for banks to deﬁne their own exit strategies with a view to reducing their reliance on government support. Ultimately. in turn allowing banks to better manage their forward-looking liquidity positions. as retail deposits are generally held at sight and do not. or even very existence. The deleveraging process and the drying-up of funding markets may well also constrain banks’ balance sheet growth and thereby restrict their ability to provide credit to the economy. The successful issuance of guaranteed bonds shows that this measure has been effective to some extent. This. As regards the reopening of securitisation and covered bond markets more speciﬁcally. There is currently no sign of this happening. They emphasised the need for markets to be reassured regarding the health of the asset side of bank balance sheets before investor conﬁdence could return. increasing the share of retail deposits in order to strengthen a bank’s overall funding structure is desirable. However. One possibility would be to improve their knowledge and monitoring of their investor base for primary debt issuance. • Government-guaranteed funding was intended to help rekindle the issuance of bank debt. This investor base tends to invest for longer periods of time and in a more stable manner than traditional investors in bank debt. there is some risk of government debt itself crowding out private debt. further constraining their ability to fund themselves. it is also of vital importance to investors that liquidity be restored to these markets. In addition. Guaranteed debt appears to have been purchased by the type of investor which generally takes on exposure to government risk rather than corporate credit risk. but should not be viewed as a panacea preventing bank runs. the only real antidote to a bank run is to ensure that the quality of the asset side of the balance sheet is sufﬁcient to ensure continued investor conﬁdence. The current crisis has also shown that it could
. The lack of overlap with the usual investors in bank debt is currently preventing guaranteed issuance from crowding out non-guaranteed issuance. or how. markets might begin functioning again. Maturity risk can be mitigated by lengthening the maturity of funding wherever possible. the traditional (credit risk) investor base will need to be encouraged to begin investing in bank debt again. especially as some banks have also been able to issue non-guaranteed bonds. This would enable them to develop better relationships with large counterparties. could impact
negatively on the probability of retail and corporate customers defaulting. • First. Such deterioration in the credit quality of banks’ customer base could then feed back to banks’ balance sheets. In addition. however. protect banks from a sudden outﬂow of funds. in the long term. whose decisions on whether or not to continue funding the bank can be key in determining the bank’s funding position. The credibility of the deposit guarantee scheme is essential in avoiding deposit runs. while it is essential that simple and transparent secured structures be established. Few respondents presented views on when.HURDLES IN RESTARTING MARKETS FOR BANK FUNDING The BSC foresees a number of hurdles in restarting markets for bank funding.
Banks are also seeking simplicity in their structures. Germany. Domestic investors appear to have been less “ﬂighty” than investors from abroad. CONCLUSIONS In concluding its analysis. This results from contingency funding plans that did not fully cover the risks of maturity mismatches on and off the balance sheet. perhaps partly because they are more aware of the particular features of their local banks. as well as the scope of public authorities’ actions to restore access to funding. and Section 7 looks at the immediate challenges for banks’ funding. As a matter of fact.3 The survey was carried out by means of a questionnaire focusing on the main aspects of bank funding. Portugal. funding models based almost exclusively on wholesale sources and business structures focused on retailsecured lending or specialist lending activities). Rising cost of bank funding. as it facilitated the expansion of the funding tools available to banks. Section 6 discusses the role played by the internal pricing of liquidity within banks and its impact on incentives.
In the past few years. The report is structured as follows: Section 3 covers the changes in banks’ funding sources and strategies. Banks are becoming more domestically oriented in their activities. the BSC is of the view that banks’ restricted lending activities have led to some reshaping of the banking industry.
3 Participating countries involved in the project have been: Belgium. partly in response to the prevailing counterparty risks. 28 of which were single banks or parent banks of a banking group. Shortening of funding maturities challenges asset liability management (ALM) and
.be useful for banks to be aware of the geographical spread of their investor base. The development of asset securitisation played an important role in fostering this shift. Section 4 covers developments in bank debt. The analysis also beneﬁted from a survey of 36 mostly medium-sized and large EU banks.e. Italy. Spain and the United Kingdom. The current crisis has challenged this development and highlighted the following issues: • Decreasing availability of funding as a result of the freezing of wholesale and interbank markets. with particular pressure being placed on certain business models (i.
In the light of these issues. Section 5 discusses collateral and its management.
proﬁtability in the context of relatively ﬂat or even inverted yield curves in the euro area. including debt investors’ behaviour and composition. Hungary. • Currency mismatches in funding have occurred as funding sources in foreign currencies have become severely restricted. The report is based on the information available until end of March 2009. partly as a result of increased bank counterparty risk. France. and 32 of which had their headquarters in the euro area. The BSC does not claim that the sample is representative of the EU banking market in statistical terms. dealing with both internal developments within banks and developments or inﬂuences resulting from changes in central banks’ collateral frameworks. it appears favourable to have a certain degree of diversity in the composition of debt investors to cater for times of stress. banks have strived to reduce what they perceived to be excessive dependence on deposit-based funding by having recourse to market-based funding. The assessment was based on both market data and data published by banks. the Netherlands. but also on account of the somewhat national orientation of government support. the BSC decided to carry out an in-depth assessment of the impact that the crisis is having on bank funding. Finland. the government measures aiming at restarting funding markets. The answers received reﬂect the opinions and policies of this sample of banks.
The following sections focus on the changes that have taken place in these funding layers since the crisis began. the magnitude of lending surpassed that of deposits in several banks (see Chart 1).
BEFORE THE CRISIS: ABUNDANT SOURCES OF FUNDING FUELLED BANK LEVERAGE Before the crisis. However. which are assumed to be stable in most circumstances.5 0. The growth of loan stocks was partly offset by the growth of deposits.5 3. despite the fact that deposits were increasing.0 0. the global economy was characterised by strong economic growth.and banks’ views on how and when markets might restart.
3. Note: Box plot diagram indicating minimum value. banks resorted to other available sources for funding.0 2.5 2.0 1.3 trillion.0 H1 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 4. in some cases. For example.0 0.4
Source: Consolidated balance sheet statistics for euro area MFIs (available on the ECB’s website). The economic environment prior to the crisis favoured funding structures that were highly dependent on ample liquidity. repurchase agreements. interquartile range. low interest rates and risk premia. it was not difﬁcult for banks to raise funds from the markets. swapped foreign exchange liabilities and wholesale deposits.1
GENERAL TRENDS: FUNDING SOURCES
The funding strategies of banks have changed substantially owing to the ﬁnancial market crisis. and abundant liquidity. The ﬁnal funding layer comprises various shorter-term liabilities. banks that relied heavily on market funding were forced to make signiﬁcant adjustments. as its composition and maturity can change rapidly with cash ﬂow needs and market conditions. such as commercial paper. When that ample liquidity unexpectedly ceased to be available. to their business models.5 3. highlighting the funding conditions and sources beforehand and the main policy measures taken in order to mitigate funding restrictions in markets. not only to their funding strategies. Conceptually.5 2. rising from €14.0 3.5 1. covered bonds and interbank markets. The next layer consists of customer deposits. median and maximum value.0
Source: Bankscope. commercial banks fund their balance sheets in layers.5 1. This funding structure is usually relatively stable. At the same time. This layer is managed on a dynamic basis. The report also includes three annexes. as well as on the pricing of internal transfers and the importance of such pricing as underlined in recent supervisory initiatives. starting with a capital base comprising equity.
. plus medium and long-term senior debt. short-term bonds.
Chart 1 Ratio of loans to deposits in large EU banks (corrected for extreme outliers)
(percentages) 4. and changes in the structure are fairly sluggish. subordinated debt and hybrids of the two.6 trillion to €22. which provide additional information on government guarantee schemes. Given the availability of ample liquidity.5 0. certiﬁcates of deposit. even though they can be requested with little or no notice. but also. such as securitisation (through the “originate to distribute” model). between December 2003 and December 2007 the total balance sheet of euro area MFIs increased by 53%.0 2.0 1. banks’ leverage was expanding rapidly. This is clearly visible from the expansion of banks’ balance sheets. As banks’ stocks of deposits were not sufﬁcient to provide an adequate base for their growing business.0 3.
7% between 2003 and 2007. The expansion of covered bond markets was considerable. In 2003.
Chart 4 Interbank loan (short term)
(EUR billions (left-hand scale).000 1. At the same time. from 2003 onwards covered bonds were also used in many European countries as an additional source of funding. percentages (right-hand scale)) EU euro area growth rate in the EU (secondary axis) growth rate in the euro area (secondary axis) 12.069 billion (see Chart 3).3% and
26.com/Market_Standard/ESF_Data_ Report_Q4_2008.500 1.6% respectively in 2007.000 2.
.pdf). with the number of issuing countries increasing.
Source: European Securitisation Forum (see: http://www.500 2. rising from €1.000 4.000 1.(i) Maturity mismatches A change in the funding trends of European banks seems to have occurred in 2003. including net interbank liabilities (overall structure)
(percentages) deposits interbank liabilities money market funding 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Bankscope. on average.000 500 0
Chart 3 Covered bonds outstanding in Europe (long term)
(EUR billions) DE DK FR ES SE UK IE LU others 2.000 6. europeansecuritisation. deposits accounted.000 500 0
Source: European Covered Bond Council. with long-term funding beginning to slightly decrease and short-term funding starting to increase (see Chart 2).500 1.000 8.000 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
Chart 5 Growth of securitisation in Europe (long term)
800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: ECB.000 10.4% of total liabilities. capital market funding other liabilities equity 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2.500 2. Note: UK data do not include interbank loans outside the euro area and the United Kingdom.686 billion to €2. with capital market funding accounting for 27%. Covered bonds outstanding in Europe increased by 22. for around 42. The corresponding percentages were 39.
3 FUNDING SOURCES AND STRATEGIES
PATTERNS IN FUNDING SOURCES PRIOR TO THE CRISIS
Chart 2 European banks’ liabilities.
Bloomberg. the growing imbalance between the longer-term lending to customers and the shorter-term funding of banks’ activities created a maturity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets and exposed banks to increased funding and counterparty risks. In addition. Banks’ core activities also affect the funding structure. Off-balance sheet vehicles offered both shortterm (through asset-backed commercial paper) and long-term (through securitisation) sources of funding. It is also noteworthy that banks’ off-balance sheet items increased rapidly in the years prior to the crisis.
Between 2000 and mid-2007 European banks’ net long US dollar positions grew to around USD 800 billion. In fact. there are two main models for cross-currency liquidity management in banking. banks’ funding patterns also helped to create a dangerous currency mismatch. interbank markets became a more prominent source of short-term funding for banks. Others manage their liquidity risk exposure separately for each individual currency.e. • Some banks control the maturity proﬁle of their assets and liabilities irrespective of their currency and make up for shortages in a given currency through short-term foreign exchange swaps. commercial paper and short-term bonds) increased as a percentage of total liabilities in European banks’ balance sheets. and 2. which penalised banks which had adopted the ﬁrst approach. certiﬁcates of deposits. falling to 11% of total securitised assets in 2007.5 Signiﬁcant use was also made of commercial mortgagebacked securities (CMBSs). the two most popular types of securitised assets were residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). Source: ECB. The annual growth rate of interbank loans reached 14% in the EU in 2006. • For instance. In more open ﬁnancial markets. but which made investment decisions for which their parent companies were liable.
“Securitised issuance in Europe by type of collateral” (2007). The use of other collateral underlying securitised assets declined considerably. market-related or universal). All in all.Between 2003 and 2007 money market funding providing short-term liquidity (e. and 16% in the euro area in 2007 prior to the crisis (see Chart 4). By the end of 2007 annual issuance volumes had grown by 129% in comparison with 2003. In some cases. Such variation can be explained by the level of sophistication of ﬁnancial markets and banks’ business models. securitisation increased considerably (see Chart 5). while at the end of 2007 it accounted for 16%. countries with less mature ﬁnancial markets tend to be more reliant on deposits for their funding.1% of EU banks’ total liabilities were derived from interbank markets in 2003.
. In net terms. many banks had ﬁnancial vehicles that were not included in their balance sheets.g. (ii) Currency mismatches In the same way. This created signiﬁcant exchange rate risk and considerable dependence on the foreign exchange swap market. A general look at banks’ funding structures highlights the existence of national and institutional differences. which accounted for 52% and 27% respectively of total securitised assets. deposits constitute around 30-50% 6 of banks’ total liabilities.8% of total liabilities. In particular. JP Morgan. 0.9% came from this source in 2007. In 2003 money market funding accounted for 11. In 2007. Sources: Thomson Financial. Merrill Lynch. Traditionally. being funded in euro. The relative shares of deposits and market funding may vary considerably depending on the focus of the
banks’ activities (i. deposits account for up to 85% of banks’ total liabilities. retail. reaching €497 billion.
However. some uncertainty still remains. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 exacerbated
the loss of conﬁdence. Most major CDS indices have exceeded their March 2008 peaks. trends in CDS spreads have become more uncertain. the availability of funding sources for the European banking system. markets for covered bonds and bank bonds. Government support has allowed banks’ CDS premia to be reduced. Please note that this is intended to reﬂect the overall situation in Europe and may not reﬂect speciﬁc national situations. to illustrate. following the implementation of rescue plans (see Table 1 and Section 3. because of banks’ changing fundamentals related to asset write-downs. • White: not relevant. a severe dislocation took place in the global funding network. It distinguishes between three states: • Green: available.THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS: SCARCER AND COSTLIER SOURCES OF FUNDING The ﬁnancial turmoil that started in summer 2007.g. The ﬁrst market affected was the interbank market. such as the CDS market for ﬁnancials and non-ﬁnancials. However. valuation losses for securitised assets and the appearance of off-balance sheet commitments in banks’ balance sheets heightened counterparty risks and made banks and other investors more cautious about lending to one another. by way of a “trafﬁc light” analogy. at the various stages of the crisis. counterparty risk and the impact of the general economic downturn. A breakdown of credit and non-credit risk
Chart 6 Funding sources during the crisis
Pre-crisis August 2007 to summer 2008 Lehman Brothers’ Failure After government rescue palns 2009 outlook
Short-term ﬁnancing Interbank Certiﬁcates of deposits Deposits Central bank Long-term ﬁnancing Non-guaranteed bonds Guaranteed bonds Covered bonds Securitisation Note: This ﬁgure tries.3). Banks began to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons and to overcome ﬁre sales. triggered by the mortgage problem in the United States. receding only on speculation that the most severely affected banks would receive some kind of government assistance. Central banks provided liquidity injections to support short-term funding needs (see Chart 6). • Orange: signs of difﬁculties in gaining access. Government bond yields plunged as investors rejected risky assets and turned to the relative safety of government securities. a major liquidity breakdown had taken place. As conﬁdence deteriorated. The declining conﬁdence that resulted from the rapid deterioration of ratings. Northern Rock). strained banks’ funding sources and had a considerable impact on banks that relied heavily on wholesale funding (e. gradually affecting all funding markets. Market liquidity for mortgage-related securities and structured credit products rapidly disappeared. By then. the commercial paper market. and other long-term funding markets. Another consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis has been increasing funding costs as the cost of market-based bank ﬁnancing via bonds and equities remains at historically high levels (see Chart 6). The shock spread rapidly from the interbank market to all other markets.
. • Red: impaired.
on which they had to issue write-downs. Jan. while bank bond yield. Central banks increased and extended US dollar funding facilities both through auction facilities (i. Mar.
Source: ECB. Both components were obtained using constrained linear optimisation. Mar. money market rate and underlying deposit rates are monthly averages.1 basis point previously). Nov. as some markets were not liquid enough to roll the funding. compared with only 0.
premia shows that the non-credit component surged after September 2008 (see Chart 8). and both components must be non-negative and add up to the spread between euro area deposits and OISs. see the box entitled “A three-stage dividend discount model for the euro area” in the article “Extracting information from ﬁnancial asset prices” in the November 2004 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. European banks had to pay considerable penalty rates when funding their US dollar positions. The following restrictions were imposed: the credit component should deviate as little as possible from the CDS spread. Deposit rates are weighted averages of different maturities: time deposits as well as overnight and redeemable at notice rates are weighted using new business volumes. Nov. the ECB. These measures soothed to some extent the dislocation in the
. the Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank announced jointly in October 2008 that they would supply US dollar funding at various maturities.
The shortage of US dollars was exacerbated both by the fact that banks had major holdings in US ABS markets. right-hand scale applies to “cost of bank equity” time series only) bank bond yield overnight and redeemable at notice time deposits aggregate deposit rate (outstanding amounts) three-month money market rate cost of bank equity 10 9 8 15 7 6 5 4 3 5 2 1 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 0 10 20
Chart 8 Spread between one-month euro area deposits and OISs and its breakdown into credit and non-credit (mainly liquidity) components
(basis points) spread between one-month euro area deposits and OISs non-credit premium credit premium
0 0 July Sep. as shown by the spectacular widening of bid-ask spreads in this market (with the spread for overnight maturities widening to more than 7 basis points. and by the re-intermediation of most of the banks’ off-balance sheet vehicles. the holdings of which were mainly US dollar-denominated. the US Term Auction Facility) and through foreign exchange swaps. In order to ease tensions in the money market.e.Chart 7 Cost of funding banks through deposits and unsecured debt
(percentages. Jan. Even in cases where US dollar-denominated assets were funded in US dollars. For more information. Notes: The proxy for the credit premium was the CDS spread on the investment-grade debt of large and complex banking groups in the euro area. the Federal Reserve. which gradually broke down. banks faced funding issues where they had maturity mismatches. Cost of bank equity is calculated using the three-stage dividend discount model. May July Sep. aggregate deposit rate is weighted using outstanding amounts. Bank bond yield refers to iBoxx Euro Corporate Bank Index. 2007 2008 2009 Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations. Notes: Monthly data from January 2003 to February 2009. The cost of bank equity is based on end-of month ﬁgures. The increase in funding costs and scarcity also reached the foreign exchange swap market.
Central banks and governments (see Section 3. For instance. 3. the ECB. favouring more stable sources of funding. comprehensive and global central bank and government action to provide short-term liquidity and ensure the availability of sufﬁcient medium-term funding for the banking system. competition for more traditional sources of funding. Being reliant on wholesale funding. This would suggest that banks are more concerned about daily developments and the impact on their funding structures. The focus has been shifted to short-term funding. After reaching a peak in October 2008. this has entailed certain costs. Around 25 of the 36 banks surveyed have changed their ALM policy. Overall. clients using these deposit products were not always sufﬁciently aware of the conditions of the applicable deposit guarantee schemes. dramatically changed their business models. They explain that in general. However. Indeed. Banks tried to adjust their funding proﬁle. hedge funds and other leveraged investors). the Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank supplied US dollar funding at various maturities to ease tensions in the money market. for instance. However. although conditions have not returned to their pre-crisis levels. This source of funding is considered constrained by certain banks. such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. investment banks. Most
banks have increased the frequency of their liquidity reporting. which has increased the attention paid to collateral management. banks are monitoring market developments more closely. Also.3) were forced to step up their efforts in order to restore conﬁdence and support the increasing funding needs.2 CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS FOR BANKS’ FUNDING STRATEGIES
The intensity of the problems forced banks to adopt more comprehensive measures. such as retail deposits. the Federal Reserve. The banks surveyed for this report conﬁrm the adoption of more active funding strategies. has increased in the banking system.3 ACTION BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE BANKS’ ACCESS TO FUNDING
ACTIONS BY CENTRAL BANKS AND GOVERNMENTS Central banks initially sought to stabilise overnight rates. Funding plans (which are usually annual) are not easy to pursue given the uncertain market conditions. In fact. foreign exchange swap spreads decreased markedly and conditions on the foreign exchange swap market eased towards the end of 2008. euro area countries made coordinated announcements of guarantees and equity injections with the aim
. It became obvious to authorities that uncoordinated policy action had to be replaced by coordinated. it is surprising that only a small proportion of banks indicated that they were implementing their contingency funding plans. Indeed. as well as cross-border funding for ﬁnancial institutions in emerging markets. as the growth rate of retail funding can face limits. but given the depth of the liquidity retrenchment.foreign exchange swap market. banks did not have enough time to carry out a comprehensive review of their funding structures and needed help from central banks and governments. Some banks that were already heavily reliant on deposits have chosen to strengthen their retail client base. Given the breakdown in market funding. However. there has been an increase in demand for central bank liquidity. the focus quickly shifted towards bridging the breakdown of market funding through concerted action intended to strengthen liquidity conditions. Banks were forced to reduce their exposures across business lines (affecting. 3. banks have raised the quality of their liquidity risk management and have become more sensitive to the current funding conditions. support from public authorities has become important in ﬁlling the funding gap and trying to reduce the uncertainty surrounding counterparty risk. The crisis revealed that some banks with extreme reliance on retail funding were competing by means of high interest rates or by making use of internet banking in order to attract more deposits.
however. the actual deposit protection limit remains €100.000 €50.000 €50.000 €50. central banks have substantially extended their list of eligible collateral.2 and Box 3). Banks merged with government support. +) An additional measure in Greece involves government bonds made available to banks against collateral.067 Unlimited €189.000 €100.000 *) 100% insurance for all deposits up to €100.000 HUF 13 million €45.000 Unlimited***) €103.000 No scheme €212. while in other cases banks had to undergo wholesale nationalisation. law-based deposit guarantee scheme. or received capital injections. Notes: A tick mark indicates whether the indicated support measures have already been activated by banks in the respective country. This new eligible collateral is.000 €100. authorities had to take decisive action in support of key ﬁnancial institutions with liquidity
problems. Owing to the intense problems in market funding during the crisis. law-based deposit guarantee scheme limit from €20.000**) Unlimited*) €100. *) Political commitment to guarantee deposits by the government on an unlimited basis over the threshold given by the formal.000 €100.38 €100.291. generally subject to additional haircuts (see Section 5. the column “assets protection scheme” encompasses schemes with different types of assets (for example asset purchase swaps with high – as in Spain – or low quality assets).673 GBP 50.000 for companies €45. The scope and magnitude of the bank rescue packages also meant that signiﬁcant risks were transferred onto government balance sheets.000 €50.000 €100.of restarting interbank lending and replenishing banks’ capital positions. central bank action had to be
Table 1 Overview of government support for banks during the crisis
Country AT BE CY DE ES FI FR GR+) IE IT LU MT NL PT SI SK BG CZ DK EE HU LT LV PL RO ✓ Capital injection ✓ ✓ ✓ Guaranteed issuance of bonds ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Asset protection scheme Deposit insurance limit Unlimited €100.000.000 for individuals and €20.782
SE UK CH NO AU US
Source: Ofﬁcial publications by the governments and press releases. In addition. ***) While some deposits receive unlimited protection as a result of the guarantee scheme.000 Unlimited €50.000 €50.000. **) Political commitment to raise the threshold of the formal. in more and more countries.000 Unlimited €50.
.000 to up to €100. Additionally.000 €100.000 €70.
Source: Dealogic. Adjustments are being made to the conditions governing these schemes in order to maximise their impact (e. while government packages have mostly targeted longer term-funding through guarantee schemes. Government measures were absolutely necessary and avoided a systemic crisis. Additionally. Several banks were pessimistic about the prospects of funding normalisation. Unfortunately. In fact. 2009
150 100 50 0 Apr. It would take time to reverse this situation. European banks were able to end 2008 without signiﬁcant funding problems. the measures altered the level playing ﬁeld between healthy and less healthy banks. banks and other industries. BANKS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC INITIATIVES The banks surveyed outlined the beneﬁts and challenges of government support. Central bank action has focused on short-term funding. one bank pointed out that the credit market. given the evolving
. However. UK adjustment and NL proposal to improve the effectiveness of the
guarantee scheme by increasing maturity). Government support through capital injections and guarantees has increased since their implementation (Chart 9 and Chart 10). More generally. which was ﬁrm-based and operated on a “sole” name. Mar. Nov. However. since higher capital ratios improve banks’ solvency and image. and private sector funding should gradually regain its share. the BSC notes that. Feb. banks that have not accessed government capital may be forced to increase their capital ratios to avoid being penalised in the markets.
complemented with additional government action (see Table 1). Many considered this would be a long process given the leverage levels of consumers. part of the liquidity that has been injected into markets has found its way to the central bank deposit facilities for precautionary reasons. Capital injections can also facilitate banks’ access to funding.g. 2008 Jan. Government support in the form of deposit and credit guarantees should help to stimulate funding across markets by halting the deterioration of conﬁdence in the institutions and possibly the sector. funding guarantees should facilitate new debt issuance from banks that may not otherwise have taken place. these temporary measures have not yet managed to unlock markets. 2008
300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Oct. In fact.Chart 9 Cumulated amount of guaranteed issues by banks in the EU
Chart 10 Capital injections in European banks by type
(EUR billions) preferred shares common shares government rights issues others 125 100 75 50 25 0 2007 Source: BIS. has become a “sovereign” market. while deposit guarantees may prevent an unexpected outﬂow of funds from banks dealing with conﬁdence problems. Concerns have been expressed regarding the crowding-out of private sector investments as a result of the large volume of government debt issuance. perhaps requiring a few years. In any case. Dec. Despite the acute liquidity conditions. these actions are meant to be temporary.
The banks surveyed concluded that even if liquidity became available. given the international dimension of funding problems. and 50 basis points plus the median ﬁve year CDS spread between 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2008 for issues with more than one year maturity. the implementation of these measures should avoid crowding out borrowers and should seek to maintain a level playing ﬁeld across countries. by beginning of April 2009 the total volume of stateBNP Paribas Lloyds Société Générale guaranteed bonds in Europe had grown to Sources: Banque de France and Bank of England. This suggests that the banks’ outlook is still somewhat sombre.
However. Furthermore as more funding is required for different banks in different countries. they are converging towards a fee of 50 basis points for issues of less than one year.
GUARANTEED VERSUS NON-GUARANTEED FUNDING: PRICING AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS Since autumn 2008 EU governments designed recapitalisation and guarantee schemes for their respective banking sectors. Excluding Ireland and Denmark (which guarantee all outstanding and newly issued bank debt). Furthermore. Interestingly. in particular. since government support is meant to be only temporary. The comparison of the guaranteed versus the unsecured issuance conditions in Chart might not be fully appropriate to. The coordination process at EU level ensured that. demonstrating the ongoing structural adjustment within the banking system. but banks have succeeded in issuing larger amounts with longer maturities without guarantee. different guarantee schemes and seniorities of the issuance.
. in some cases funding becomes more expensive with time.
Comparison of guaranteed versus unsecured bank bond issuance prices since October 2008
(spread in basis points over mid-swap rate) government guaranteed bond unsecured senior bond 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
According to Dealogic. different maturities.650 billion (see Annex 1). It should be noted that there is an important gap between the cost of guaranteed and non-guaranteed issuance (about 100 basis points). but should also take into account the implications for cross-border funding. nearly €250 billion since issuance began in October 2008 (see Chart 9). it is still uncertain if structural effects will materialise. during the same period a few EU banks have issued on an unsecured basis. although the costs differ for the various European guarantee schemes. potential structural effects 7 on the banking system would not be seen immediately. the measures should not only focus on “national interest”. funding costs could also rise.
Overall. but it nevertheless provides an insight into the price differences currently observable in ﬁnancial markets. but rather in the medium to long term. As governments seek to enforce exit strategies. the overall potential volume of European state-guaranteed bank debt amounts to more than €1. future funding costs would be much higher than in the past.nature of government support as the crisis deepens.
conﬁdence in banks as debtors has eroded and. The issuance of short-term debt securities continued to be more robust than that of long-term securities until October 2008. However.000
0 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 Source: DCM Analytics. quantitative limits and. gross bond issuance by large EU banks decreased signiﬁcantly in 2007 and 2008 from a relatively high level of issuance in 2006 (a decrease of nearly 33%). so that the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers cannot be identiﬁed in our statistics. the issuance of own debt is deemed to be an integral part of their funding strategy.000 50. Debt investors.000 200. Although this approach could be partially validated by the fact that.000 100. They do not grant the holder any ownership rights in the issuing unit. Also. which in the past provided sufﬁcient demand for bank debt. maturity and price limits. Based on quantitative data and the results of the survey conducted among banks.000 150.10 An analysis of the maturity composition of new issuances from May 2008 shows that there was a strong decrease in terms of the proportion of long-term issuances (see Chart 12). euro area level security statistics are used in some cases as there is insufﬁcient information on security issuances by MFIs at EU level. Statistics on issuance of euro area MFI debt securities 9 show that. Net issuance turned slightly negative again in December 2008.000 250. The banking sectors of Denmark.4
BANK DEBT COMPOSITION AND INVESTORS
For many larger banks. Debt securities are negotiable and may be traded on secondary markets. the debt securities issuance activity of the entire banking sector has been negatively affected.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISSUANCE OF BANK DEBT SECURITIES 8
maturing in September 2008. Before the crisis. 10 It is worth mentioning that statistics for the fourth quarter of 2008 are not available. in non-euro area central and eastern European (CEE) member states.
4 BANK DEBT COMPOSITION AND INVESTORS
As Chart 11 illustrates.
. There are two types of constraint with regard to new issuances: ﬁrst. thus EU Member States outside the euro area are not covered. have changed their behaviour and instead sought out safe-haven debt. at the end of the third quarter of 2008.
According to MFI data deﬁnitions. although this can be partly attributed to the government guarantee schemes. during the current ﬁnancial turmoil. giving impetus to banks to make adjustments by shortening the maturities of debt securities.000 200.000 150. second. debt securities are securities other than shares. Statistics on euro area MFI debt securities conﬁrms the shortening of debt securities.000 50. the net issuance of debt securities by euro area MFIs was slightly positive in October and November 2008. and the more independent banks of CEE countries are not covered. the net issuance of debt securities turned negative. indicating that gross issuance was less than the outstanding amount
Chart 11 Bond issues by large EU banks
(EUR millions) 300. 4. such as government securities.000 300. This adjustment led to a relatively smaller increase in the cost of funding.000 100. the maturity of debt securities shortened owing to the decrease in quantitative limits for issuing long-term securities. as a consequence. but caused higher funding liquidity risks. this section provides an insight into recent developments in the issuance of bank debt. Delimited quantitative limits lead to higher than expected yields for longer-term issuances.000 250. Sweden and the United Kingdom. as well as in the role and composition of investors in banks’ debt. the individual activity of issuing debt securities could be limited to subsidiaries of foreign banks because parent banks provide funding via their own security issuances. 9 In this part of the section. However. the government guarantee schemes have had a signiﬁcant effect on new debt issuances (see Box 1 for more details).
Nov. covered bonds might be issued with favourable conditions. Mar. At the same time. this also had an impact on maturities.0 2.1 billion (Source: Dealogic CP Ware).5 15. as they provide a high degree of safety for investors. 100 80 60 40 20 0
20. which have generally shortened.0 12.Mar.
Competition among different debt instruments is. In the case of insolvency of the issuer.0 Jan.0 7.0 7. As Chart 14 shows.0 12. in 2008 the share of short-term CDs with maturities from 21 days to three months rose from 76% to 86%. to a large extent dependent on current market conditions and risk appetite. This is reﬂected in developments in Certiﬁcates of Deposits (CDs) 11 (see Chart 14). As the ﬁnancial crisis has raised uncertainty as to future developments.5 10. This shows that there was strong demand for such instruments with shorter maturities and normally ﬁxed interest rates. a gradual decrease in the proportion of long-term securities has been observed since the beginning of the ﬁnancial turmoil (see Chart 13).0 2.5 10. €8.5 0.
With regard to outstanding debt securities.0 2007 2008
90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 2009
Source: ECB. 2009 2008 2007
.Nov.0 17. the total volume of CDs issued by large EU banks grew by around 30% 12 in the same period. In normal times.May July Sep.Chart 12 Maturity composition of gross debt securities issuances and outstanding amount by euro area MFIs
(percentages) proportion of long-term issuance (left-hand scale) proportion of long-term outstanding (right-hand scale)
Chart 14 Composition of issuance of certificates of deposits by large EU banks by maturity bucket
(percentages) up to 21 days between 21 days and up to 1 month between 1 month and up to 2 months between 2 months and up to 3 months between 3 months and up to 6 months between 6 months and up to 1 year more than 1 year 100 80 60 40 20 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Dealogic CP Ware.0 12. May July Sep. of course. covered bonds holders may beneﬁt from priority utilisation of the assets
11 Mostly deﬁned as tradable money market securities issued by banks with maturities of between 30 days and ﬁve years.5 10.0 7.5 5.
Chart 13 Year-on-year changes in outstanding debt securities issued by euro area MFIs
(percentages) 15.0 15. 12 Volumes issued: in 2007.0 2. This is a natural consequence of changes in the patterns of issuance inﬂuenced by the global investment climate in 2007 and 2008. Note: Long-term means an original maturity of over one year.5 0.6 billion and in 2008.5 5. recording market growth compared with the previous year. €11. Jan.5 5.5 0. Jan.
which usually have voting rights at general meetings. Basically. the risk premia for uncovered bonds are largely dependent on the solvency position of the issuer.g. their willingness to lend money to each other has diminished. two aspects deserve to
13 In this context. They pay most attention to the solvency of the company they invest in. or at least identify the most important groups. According to the answers received. This sub-sample showed a clear trend towards domestic debt investors after the start of the ﬁnancial crisis. However. debt investors aim to fully redeem the invested capital plus an adequate yield. banks were the most important group of debt investors before the start of the ﬁnancial crisis. for example. such as pension funds or insurance groups. Differences between guarantee schemes could be responsible for the level of competition and funding cost differentials between banks with regard to issuing new debt. At the same time. Another sub-sample of 15 banks could be analysed in terms of the degree of diversiﬁcation of their debt investor base. as is the case for equity investors. and this situation changed only modestly during the crisis.ﬁnanced by these bonds. Therefore. Another interesting aspect was the split between domestic and foreign investors. been no change in the composition. members of this group are considered to be largescale investors. This could be problematic for banks when bank debt falls due and has to be reﬁnanced by other funding instruments or other investors.
. About 40% of them showed a rather diversiﬁed debt investor base before the crisis. of debt investors before and since the crisis.14 The question of inﬂuence is therefore an issue to be considered by banks when weighing the issue of new debt against the issue of new shares. The most recent data shows that the situation has remained the same since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis.2 DEBT INVESTORS
When looking at bank debt as a funding source. On the other hand. leading them to seek alternatives in the future. certiﬁcates or bank bonds on stock markets as part of their depots. Debt investors prefer that a company’s earnings are mainly used for reinvestment in order to strengthen risk buffers. A sub-sample of 14 banks provided adequate data. However. transition might be gradual as private individuals could also act as large-scale debt investors. The replies showed that banks have only very limited information about their debt investors. no overall statistics are available at either the EU or the euro area level on the composition of banks’ debt
investors (e. which must be distinguished from retail debt investors purchasing. Since many governments stand ready to provide state guarantees for new debt in the current crisis. such instruments can be seen as a source of funding for banks at a comparably lower cost. at the level of ﬁnancial accounts). e. banks were asked to report on the composition of their respective debt investors with regard to before and after the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. They were also asked to distinguish between domestic and foreign debt investors. 14 This is true at least for common stock holders. Of course. these instruments would also represent an available funding source. The group of possible investors in banks’ debt is very diverse. although there was no clear evidence for this at the time of writing (for more details see Box 1). which also means that banks still play the most important role while. Less than half of the sample could provide ﬁgures on the composition. and in particular in times of stress. Management of large banks should be very aware that debt investors play a role that is just as important as that of depositors and equity investors. followed by long-term investors. a sound diversiﬁcation in types of investors in own debt can contribute to a more stable demand for the debt instruments.g. it is important to know who are the actual or potential investors 13 in such debt securities because different types of investor behave differently under normal conditions. comprising at least ﬁve of the different groups mentioned in the survey. There has. in the survey. 4. within their wealth management strategies. At the same time – although their engagement can be on a very large scale – they cannot directly inﬂuence decisions. there are other types of equity-like preferred shares which do not include voting rights. Thus. therefore. at the same time. So.
as well as the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on this market. which meant that they were often only able to give sub-optimal responses to the questions in the survey. government-guaranteed bonds and covered bonds. traditional bonds issued by banks in order to fund their long-term ﬁnancial needs without recourse to collateral) now share the market with a governmentguaranteed segment that has appeared since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. this is not a valid argument with regard to the time of issuance. Uncovered non-guaranteed bonds (e. three types of instrument are issued by banks: uncovered non-guaranteed bonds. one of the main consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis was the rapid slump in conﬁdence. However.be mentioned: ﬁrst. Nowadays. The three large banks are the same as those mentioned in footnote 15 above. However. In order to help banks to secure long-term funding. second. Currently.17 At least half of the banks surveyed demonstrated that improvements are needed in this regard. each with its own
. three large). Indeed. 18 Generally. the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis had led to staff restrictions. three large). among the banks 16 which mentioned sovereign wealth funds as debt investors. a time limit of at least two weeks was set for all banks in the survey to collect the information. currently their share in the debt investor base is still relatively low. banks have more incentive to attract retail debt investors (in parallel with retail deposit investors) and. owing to the ﬁnancial crisis and to statements by many of the banks surveyed. knowledge of the identity of debt investors after ﬁrst issuance is naturally limited. targeted issuance of debt securities is more and more important and this could favour private placements over open issuances (see Box 2). 16 These were four banks from three EU-15 countries (one mediumsized. some banks 15 noted their decreasing importance as bank debt investors and even deemed this investor type to have no relevance in their forecasts. with regard to hedge funds.
BOND MARKETS: A KEY FINANCING TOOL FOR BANKS This Box reviews the functioning of and recent trends in the primary and secondary markets in respect of bond issuance by banks. The primary market The primary market is the part of the bond market that deals with the issuance of new securities. It can be concluded that it is important for banks to have information on the composition of own debt investors for their funding strategy. as they were unable to deliver this kind of important management information 18 on request. sovereign wealth funds could also play an increased role in terms of debt securities.
15 These were four banks from three EU-15 countries (one mediumsized. as bank debt is mostly
tradable on secondary markets.g. However. which resulted in a fall in bond issuance. However. in the global playing ﬁeld. as better knowledge can lead to more accurate forecasts of the development of the funding situation. most governments decided to guarantee new debt securities issued by banks within the scope of national rescue plans. the majority of them deemed them to be slightly growing in importance. This is certainly due to the fact that many hedge funds have experienced problems when affected by a large demand for repayment from their own investors. refer to Section 7. As institutional investors became more risk-averse. 17 For more details.
However. In Europe.g. However. It was reopened very modestly in January 2009 with two jumbo issues by BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole.speciﬁc features (see Annex 1).1 Despite the more difﬁcult conditions prevailing since the crisis started. the ﬁnancial crisis also seems to have had an impact on the way banks place their bonds. From mid-September 2008. Although it remains to be conﬁrmed. has had a direct impact on the collateral basis
of European banks. the maintenance of
. In addition to changes in the type of bond issuance. with a near halt in issuance in the last quarter of 2008.This has had a positive effect insofar as state-guaranteed bonds have often been several times oversubscribed and have allowed participating banks to raise substantial amounts. are negotiated with those investors.
5 COLLATERAL AND ITS MANAGEMENT
COLLATERAL AND ITS MANAGEMENT
As discussed in Section 2. Since the beginning of the crisis. by securing funding on long maturities and hence facilitating asset liability management. the euro covered bond market has seen rising issuance volumes in several countries. it has been severely impacted by the crisis. However. some action taken by central banks since the beginning of the crisis. Bank and corporate bonds are traditionally less liquid than government bonds and.
1 Although the US bond market is also OTC. Indeed. In recent years. The securities are offered directly to a limited number of selected investors. This often guarantees better conditions than in the public market and eliminates the risk of undersubscription that arranging banks are no longer willing to assume. in normal circumstances. The collateral basis of a credit institution constitutes a key element of its funding and liquidity management strategy. the bond market remains a key ﬁnancing tool for banks. The structure covenants. leading to increased transparency. only jumbo issues (more than €1 billion) trade frequently. covered bonds). An orderly restarting of this market – including in its non-guaranteed and covered bond formats – is very closely tied with exit strategies from the crisis and the long-term prospects for bank funding. state-guaranteed issuance may also have had a positive feedback effect on non-guaranteed bonds: a few banks have succeeded in issuing non-guaranteed bonds since December 2008 (see Box 1). liquidity conditions deteriorated markedly both on non-guaranteed bonds and on covered bond markets. which involves recourse to a pool of assets that secures or “covers” the bond if the issuing bank becomes insolvent. many banks have shifted to private placements and the “book building technique”. a system called TRACE was created in 2002 that allows for the tracking of transactions. after September 2008. The secondary market The secondary market is the part of the bond market where previously issued securities are exchanged between investors. as well as the price. The bank bond market also includes covered bonds. valuations became scarce and purely indicative because investors were increasingly risk-averse and market-making arrangements were either absent (in contrast to the government bond market) or stopped functioning altogether (e. the pure over-the-counter nature of the bond market may have further complicated the tracking of transactions. namely the modiﬁcation of eligibility criteria. except for the period shortly after issuance. a strong basis of high quality and liquid collateral can be used to attract funding.
the appetite for transactions based on higher quality collateral also decreased. which nevertheless had an especially
Table 2 Typical haircut or initial margin
(percentages) April 2007 US Treasuries Investment-grade bonds High-yield bonds Equities Investment-grade corporate CDS Senior leveraged loans Mezzanine leveraged loans ABSs CDOs: AAA AA A BBB Equity AAA CLO Prime MBS ABSs 0.
. Sudden pullbacks were observed as cash lenders became exposed to important liquidity risks and were wary of the difﬁculties involved in selling their collateral if necessary. implying the exclusion of the asset as collateral.
19 Sometimes up to 100%. 20 See also for example Hördal P. regardless of seniority. JP Morgan Daily Liquidity Update of 19 November 2008. RMBS: residential mortgage-backed security. tighter constraints on the type of collateral used in bilateral and tri-party repos could already be observed before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. in particular. to be able to optimise their collateral management. These tightened conditions resulted from the fact that borrowers were ready to bid cash more aggressively to complement their central bank funding. These constraints translated into a generalised increase in haircuts 19.25 0-3 10-15 15 1 10-12 18-25 2-4 4-7 8-15 10-20 50 4 2-4 3-5 August 2008 3 8-12 25-40 20 5 15-20 35+ 95*) 95*) 95*) 95*) 100*) 10-20 10-20 50-60
Sources: Global Financial Stability Report. December. and IMF staff estimates. IMF.a collateral basis is costly for credit institutions. Indeed. 21 See. which may thus have an incentive to reduce it. Morgan Stanley Prime Brokerage. conditions in the repo market became even more severe and the range of assets no longer accepted as collateral broadened. following the failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008.
The tightening of conditions in the repo market had already started well before the peak of the crisis from September to October 2008. BIS Quarterly Review. CDO: collateralised debt obligation. for example. so that. pages 38-53 for a detailed analysis and comparison of the US. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. credit institutions may have to develop dedicated tools that allow them to track collateral throughout the organisation. maturity. MBS: mortgage-backed security. this exclusion concerned illiquid assets for which liquidity premia had dramatically increased. euro area and UK repo markets and their dynamics during the crisis. In addition. Citigroup. October 2008. in practice. Remarkably. the only type of collateral still accepted in repo transactions was almost limited to government bonds only. rating or liquidity of the collateral. according to JP Morgan 21. and M.1 CONSTRAINTS ON COLLATERAL USE
important effect on illiquid assets and lower credit quality assets (see Table 2). This section describes the main changes observed in this area of liquidity management in recent months. *) Theoretical haircuts as CDOs are no longer accepted as collateral.20 Initially. Indeed. 5. King (2008). “Developments in repo markets during the ﬁnancial turmoil”. Notes: ABS: asset-backed security.
Since then.9 13.6 38. rightly or not.7 27. Similar constraints were also observed in derivative markets. as well as in terms of amount per transaction. combined with the increase in haircuts. Indeed. The importance given to counterparty risk in transactions may explain why anonymous trades on Eurepo through electronic trading systems were very limited in number.4 41.4 22. Note that the fact some banks did not experience constraints on a particular type of collateral may be due to the composition of the sample.8 19. have found it increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnance themselves.1 30. have experienced additional constraints on their collateral in interbank operations since the beginning of the crisis. have affected institutions that faced a downgrade and. in the euro credit repo market. Lower rated banks.2 27.3 No (or not active) 52. volumes remained low and. they were 80-90% below the levels prior to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.8 36. followed by Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.8 41. Table 3 presents summary statistics on the number of banks which. Note: Percentage of total surveyed banks. as a consequence. even on the repo market.Table 3 Summary statistics on constraints on collateral in interbank operations
(percentages) Did your institution experience constraints for a speciﬁc type of collateral? Yes Central government debt instruments Local and regional government debt instruments Jumbo and traditional covered bank bonds Agency debt instruments Supranational debt instruments Credit institution debt instruments Debt instruments issued by corporate and other issuers Asset-backed securities Source: BSC survey. in mid-November 2008.8 25.0 27. exposures on derivative markets are collateralised thanks to the maintenance of a margin. some counterparties have also been excluded. Actually. 19.9 2. in addition.7 41. the decrease in the value of collateral.7 41. A magnifying effect may. has triggered additional margin calls that may have been challenging to meet for some credit institutions. Margin calls are thus inversely related to the nominal value of the collateral. in parallel with the exclusion of some assets as collateral.8 No answer 27. had to simultaneously
.4 16. regardless of the quality of the assets given as collateral. as the management of the collateral basis also plays a crucial role in these markets. In recent months. as weaker. additional collateral is called (margin call). On the other hand.9 41. The events related to Bear Stearns. the short maturity that characterises the repo market allows the cash lender to rapidly use
initial margins and higher haircuts to exclude a counterparty from the market. have increased the perception of counterparty credit risk in repo markets. some cash lenders have been reluctant to lend funds to a counterparty that they consider.3 33. according to the BSC questionnaire. The results showed that. the volumes in this market have remained steady in Europe.8 33.0 Number of banks which mentioned an increase in haircuts
volumes in the government repo market increased substantially immediately after Lehman Brothers’ failure. which comprises banks that are not active in all collateral segments. This collateralisation allows credit institutions to minimise their counterparty risk.7 44.1 22.2 27.8 25. Despite the fact that the lending of funds is collateralised.7 41. as well as banks facing temporary difﬁculties.8 5.7 38.6 13.9 11. When the margin posted in the margin account is below the minimal margin requirements.7 27.
In this context. which summarises the successive changes in the Eurosystem collateral framework. This type of extension is illustrated in Box 3. as credit institutions have substituted their money market activities with central banks. provides prompt settlement of transactions if a party to a contract defaults and proceeds to realise the collateral. it may be extended to EU credit institutions that satisfy requirements similar to those established for Italian participants. the possibility of carrying out trades in euro anonymously and with protection from credit risk. but its life could be extended should market conditions warrant. Further.
. in order to foster the recovery of the interbank market. 23 The Banca d’Italia. The new market segment is scheduled to remain operational until 31 December 2009. for example. some central banks have put in place mechanisms to swap illiquid for liquid collateral.22 In addition. All of these elements combined have placed additional strains on collateral management.
22 This is. central banks in Europe have aimed to alleviate potential funding shortages of credit institutions. following the major disruptions that occurred in ﬁnancial markets. In reality. alongside the existing types of contract. In the future. The date of entry into effect as well as further technical details on these measures were communicated in the course of October and November 2008. together with the Italian Banking Association and e-MID SIM. the other market participants jointly make up the difference within the limit of 10% of the collateral contributed at the time of their accession to the new market segment.meet additional margin requirements. 5. See Banca d’Italia. part of their action was focused on banks’ collateral management. one central bank 23 has designed a trading scheme to offer participants. as well as the recognition of new types of eligible assets. central banks have increasingly acted as deposit-taker and cash lender. 24 The scheme envisages a partial mutual sharing of default risk: where the collateral provided is insufﬁcient. the objective of the Special Liquidity Scheme set up by the Bank of England through which credit institutions can temporarily swap some of their high quality mortgage-backed and other securities for UK Treasury Bills. which evaluates the collateral provided by the participating banks. ensuring the performance of contracts.2 CENTRAL BANKS’ RESPONSES ON COLLATERAL
Through their interventions. These are generally subject to additional haircuts and their use is closely monitored to avoid abuses. The anonymity of
bilateral contracts is made possible by the role performed by the central bank.24 The difﬁculties experienced on money markets have highlighted the exceptional role played by central banks in ﬁnancial intermediation during a crisis. subject to an understanding with their home country authorities. These extensions reﬂect both the widening of the eligibility criteria. The collateralised market is reserved for Italian banks. The recent increases in central banks’ balance sheets. highlighting that the expansion of the eligibility criteria was to be combined with vigilant monitoring of the use of the framework. as well as in the risks taken. Economic Bulletin. and the resulting need to mobilise higher quality collateral in transactions with private counterparties in ﬁnancial markets. some central banks have substantially extended their list of eligible collateral. January 2009. on 15 October 2008 the Governing Council of the Eurosystem announced the temporary expansion of assets eligible as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations until the end of 2009. Indeed. are two consequences of this substitution.
CHANGES TO THE EUROSYSTEM COLLATERAL FRAMEWORK In the wake of the autumn 2008 bout of market disruption. given the constraints on the type of collateral accepted in the repo markets.
These instruments are subject to a uniform haircut add-on of 8%.2 of the General Documentation. the underlying pool should not consist.2. provided that they are issued and held/settled in the euro area. a marketable debt instrument denominated in a foreign currency and rated below A.
. the issuer is established in the European Economic Area and all other eligibility criteria are fulﬁlled (as of 12 November 2008).2 In contrast to this expansion of the type of eligible assets.
1 The Eurosystem considers a probability of default (PD) over a one-year horizon of 0.3 of the General Documentation. for ABSs issued as of 1 March 2009. including certiﬁcates of deposits. 2 For example. pound sterling or Japanese yen). or any entity with which this issuer has close links as deﬁned in Chapter 6. unless the market value of the assets referred to above does not exceed €50 million. Restrictions on the use of uncovered bank bonds As of 1 March 2009.Rating criteria As of 22 October 2008. with a 5% haircut add-on being applicable (as of 22 October 2008). A haircut add-on of 10% and a further 5% valuation markdown in case of theoretical valuation are applied in such cases. the value assigned to uncovered bank bonds issued by an issuer. of tranches of other ABSs. the Eurosystem accepts in its credit operations subordinated marketable debt instruments. must – unless guaranteed by a public sector entity with the right to levy taxes – be less than a share of 10% in the value of the collateral pool of a counterparty. Instruments with a rating in Step 3 of the Eurosystem harmonised credit quality rating scale are thus temporarily accepted. with haircut add-ons being applicable cumulatively. ABSs issued before 1 March 2009 will be exempt from this requirement until 1 March 2010. for which the credit quality threshold of “A-” remained into force. in whole or in part. New types of assets Eligible assets now include: (i) debt instruments issued by credit institutions.40% as equivalent to the “BBB-” credit assessment. with the exception of asset-backed securities (ABSs). otherwise fulﬁlling all other eligibility criteria. protected by an acceptable guarantee as speciﬁed in Section 6.3. Seniority criteria Also as of 22 October 2008.will be subject to a total haircut add-on of 13% (8% due to the denomination in a foreign currency and 5% due to the rating below A-). which are traded on certain non-regulated markets as speciﬁed by the ECB and which fulﬁl all other eligibility criteria. A haircut add-on of 5% is applied to all assets rated below “A-”. and (ii) marketable debt instruments denominated in some currencies other than the euro (namely US dollar. the credit threshold for marketable and non-marketable assets was lowered from “A-” to “BBB-” 1.
as shown by the replies to the BSC questionnaire.400 1.5.800 1. 27 A precondition for an IRB system to be accepted for the Eurosystem credit assessment framework (ECAF) is that it must be recognised by the relevant EU-established supervisory authority under the Capital Requirements Directive (see section 6. as well as for margin calls. Therefore.800 1.600 1. Indeed. some banks have also been securitising their loan
25 Some 23 banks have. as collateral in central bank operations.
several banks indicated that they have tested the procedures put in place by central banks (including the ECB. Moreover.26 The increasing levels of central bank funding have also had operational implications. In order to increase their collateral basis. while prior to the crisis banks used to consider that being able to track and manage collateral on a global basis was important. banks have also shown a marked interest in the expansion of the list of eligible collateral as it allows them to reserve their highest quality collateral for repo transactions on markets.3 of the “General Documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy instruments and procedures” under http://www. the possibility to use non-marketable assets. they now view this risk management function as essential 25. In this context.200 1. Therefore.
Chart 15 Securitisation issuance in Europe by month: public versus non-public issuance
(EUR billions) private/retained issuance publicly-placed issuance
Chart 16 Composition of collateral posted or used for Eurosystem credit operations expressed as a share of total (yearly averages)
(EUR billions) central government regional government uncovered bank bonds covered bank bonds corporate bonds ABS other marketable assets non-marketable 1.eu/pub/pdf/other/gendoc2008en.europa.pdf).000 800 600 400 200 0
. may have created additional incentives for some banks to see their internal ratings systems assessed by their central bank 27 (the “Internal Ratings-Based Approach”. 2006 2007 2008
1. some anecdotal evidence shows that. for example. For instance.200 1. some banks have accelerated their IT investments to further develop their ability to manage their collateral basis. 2005 2006 2007 2008
120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2005 Source: Citi. especially as collateral mobilised by transactions on the market can quickly lose its liquidity value and require substitution by higher quality collateral. such as loans to non-rated ﬁrms.400 1. and at the same time maximise the use of collateral in central banks’ credit operations.ecb. 26 The responses to the BSC questionnaire indicate for instance that the eligibility of assets has become one of the criteria considered in an investment decision.000 800 600 400 200 0 2004 Source: ECB. in the light of recent events. banks have attached growing importance to the eligibility criteria. Federal Reserve and Bank of England) to access funding as part of their contingency plan. indicated that they have changed the way in which they manage their collateral since the beginning of the crisis. recognised in Basel II to calculate capital requirements to cover credit risk).600 1.3
RESPONSES IN THE WAY BANKS MANAGE THEIR COLLATERAL
The ﬂight to quality and liquidity that led to disruptions on repo markets has exerted some pressures on collateral management and risk assessment by banks.
this trend towards centralisation may have been counterbalanced. liquidity was abundant and its price was underestimated. as is the case of the Eurosystem (see Chart 16). In order to optimise collateral and liquidity ﬂows between different entities on a cross-border basis. mainly as a result of the crisis. In addition. González-Páramo (2008). 30 See Adam. Finally.
The mis-pricing of risk (and liquidity risk in particular) is considered to be one of the main causes of the ﬁnancial crisis.30 Banks surveyed by the
28 This trend could already be observed before the failure of Lehman Brothers. collateral management. Committee of European Banking Supervisors and Institute of International Finance). Alexandre (2007) “Handbook of asset and liability management: From models to optimal return strategies”. Senior Supervisors Group. internal transfer pricing – mostly implemented once a year by the Treasurer or AL manager of the bank – has to reﬂect the economic reality of the operations that have to be funded. Adam describes the internal transfer price as the “ﬁctitious price of the ﬁctitious micro hedging of this operation on the market”. However. 29 Depending on the internal organisation of banks. Before the crisis. some credit institutions may have increased the degree of centralisation of their collateral management. Internal transfer pricing refers to the liquidity invoicing policy by the Treasury Department 29 of a ﬁnancial institution to its business units. in certain cases. as part of the liquidity management strategy of a credit institution. It is a major parameter of the day-to-day and long-term liquidity management of the bank and has to be determined by respecting some guiding theoretical parameters. this issue is currently under discussion in various international fora (see Annex 3 for discussions by the Basel Committee.portfolios for the sole purpose of using the securitised tranches for ECB collateral. Chart 15 shows that since the beginning of the turmoil. speech at the Global ABS Conference 2008.28 For instance. “Financial turmoil. securitisation and liquidity”. This issue also has a larger dimension: it can refer to the liquidity invoicing by a banking group to its branches abroad. the current crisis may also have forced some banks to increase the centralisation of their collateral management. Because its role is strategic. by the domestic approach to crisis management followed by certain states. 6. Indeed. See. central banks have also observed an increased use of ABSs and uncovered bank bonds in central banks operations. can also be more or less centralised or decentralised. these local entities may have seen an increase in their importance. Section 6 focuses on the internal pricing of liquidity and its different business units within the parent bank. As such. Therefore. In countries where rescue plans set up by the authorities were focused on domestic banks. The crisis revealed that banks used to manage liquidity without the appropriate risk management both towards their customers (external liquidity pricing) and towards their business units (internal liquidity pricing)
. business units have an incentive to adopt less risk-averse behaviour by increasing their leverage and maximising volumes.1 THE MAIN PARAMETERS OF AN INTERNAL PRICING SYSTEM
6 INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING
Internal transfer pricing plays a part in proﬁt allocation within the bank and can indirectly inﬂuence business units’ activities and appetite for risk: if funding costs are too cheap internally. most issuance of securitised products are private/retained issuances and are no longer intended to be publicly placed. for example J. Measures devised exclusively for domestic banks in certain countries may have given an advantage over local subsidiaries of non-domestic banks. the internal transfer pricing of banks has become of paramount importance. business units become risk-averse and limit their activity. internal transfer pricing can also sometimes be deﬁned and implemented by the ALM Department.M.
(see Annex 2). This trend may have increased the importance of the parent company in collateral management relative to before the crisis. if internal funding costs are too high.
In order to measure this variable part. if a loan is callable. Traditionally. in order to encourage business units to attract more deposits. the quality and liquidity of the assets and their central bank eligibility should be studied to determine the internal transfer price. the internal transfer price increasing with the country risk. Therefore. the internal transfer price should take into account the maturity of the transaction: for a traditional yield curve. Unlike other business units. liquidity. for universal banks conducting a myriad of activities (retail bank. which were insigniﬁcant in an abundant liquidity environment.e. The same applies to other contingent commitments (e. it is necessary to take account of the following parameters. which has had an impact on the cost of internal liquidity for business units. the trading desk funds marketable instruments. the report shows that the principles and methods used by the parent bank contributed to increasing the sub-prime exposures of the bank. Finally. For example. on which a liquidity assumption has to be made. this provides an option to the borrower to redeem the loan at
pre-speciﬁed time windows. This would imply that those business units generating deposits fund at a lower net cost than those not generating deposits. investment bank. as the optional cost is included in the internal transfer price and therefore transferred to the ALM. bonds. the trading unit generally has direct access to the interbank market and is not required to go to the ALM desk to match every transaction. For instance. country and exchange risks. internal pricing of funds has to reﬂect these differences in risk proﬁles (own characteristics of the different operations). UBS took an inventory of the main causes of the losses and writedowns: weaknesses in risk assessment and risk control. the country risk must be taken into account for banks with subsidiaries abroad. Indeed. As a result. these should be included in the transfer price. revolvers. credit. overoptimistic audit process and inappropriate assetliabilities management. to know the index type in order to index the internal transfer price as well. but became unsustainable in the new environment.BSC explained that they more often base their internal pricing on market prices plus liquidity add-on. In addition. One of the solutions is to make the business unit sensitive to the implicit optional cost. It can be measured either via the swap curve (i. the business unit is not encouraged to limit the exercise of the options. calls and puts).g. in contrast to retail units which fund illiquid term loans.32 TRADING ACTIVITIES For example.31 Finally. Moreover. liquidity lines. bills). It is important to know whether the interest rate applied to the client is ﬁxed or indexed and. investment banks fund themselves at a premium in the market compared with commercial banks. This option has to be priced and incorporated in the internal funding cost of the loan. specialised lending).
. Libor or Euribor rates and swap rates) or via the sovereign curve (i. in that case. 6. it should vary with the risk proﬁle of the business unit. implementing a rigorous and safe internal pricing policy implies that the Treasurer/ AL manager has to assess and to invoice the interest. Focusing on the internal transfer pricing. it can be interesting to measure and integrate the net contribution of the business unit to the bank’s funding position. trading activities beneﬁted from a special position in terms of funding.2 SHORTCOMINGS IN BANKS’ INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING POLICIES
One of the major characteristics of the current crisis was a very abrupt change in the cost and availability of liquidity on most markets.
31 It is often complicated to assign a price to these secondary commitments insofar as options may cause arbitrage opportunities for the business unit. This tightening of funding conditions exposed a number of shortcomings in banks’ internal funding policies. Therefore. signiﬁcant information asymmetries exist between the trading desk and the ALM department. the cost should increase with the maturity of the transaction.e. because a loan can include explicit or implicit commitments. Second. First. The credit risk cost can be indexed over the swap rate or over the risk free rate. 32 The case of UBS is enlightening: in a detailed report to shareholders in April 2008. dysfunction in methods of valuation of assets. such as bonds. Moreover.
Yet.3 NEED FOR RULES RELATIVE TO INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING POLICY
objectives: ﬁrst. In addition. they differ according to division. In essence. there was a larger increase in the cost of funding for retail banking inside the country than for retail banking outside the country (partly owing to regulation). COMPETITION PRESSURES Finally. second. 6. some trading desks – sometimes in agreement with their ALM department – overestimated the liquidity of some bonds or structured instruments in the markets. ﬁnally.some trading desks were funding long-term transactions. as competition to gain market share in lending activities was intense. followed by the location of subsidiaries and the nature of business lines respectively and. those desks were cross-subsidised by the bank’s other activities. and. INCREASE IN THE INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING The majority of banks interviewed have increased their internal funding prices. which is what ﬁnally occurred. Other trading desks were beneﬁting from very cheap funding – sometimes below market rates – from the Treasury desk. these changes apply to all divisions. banks provided backstop credit lines to off-balance sheet vehicles. and hence undertook transactions that ended up being grossly unproﬁtable. They have done so according to various criteria: the most commonly applied criteria is the type of funding. in some banks. Others banks are in the process of including an additional charge that reﬂects the intrinsic credit risk of each subsidiary based upon its standalone basis funding cost. they had been applying internal prices within the bank which did not reﬂect the real price of funding. before the crisis. For example. something which became impossible once the turmoil had started. and that the transfer pricing model had led ofﬁces to pay more for their internal lending. which were matched to short maturity buckets (a few days) within the ALM framework. For some banks. They also explained that they are now trying to review their rules on internal transfer pricing (and are at different stages in this process) with two
. to conform to the current market reality. pages 34-36.
33 See Risk Magazine (December 2007) “A question of funding”. some isolated replies revealed that the cost of funding increased more for the corporate network than for the retail network. but this “contingent guarantee” was priced neither to the clients nor internally by the ALM desk. but also to receive more interest for their long-term deposits. retail banking) have been offered a lower cost of funding than those which do not generate deposits. business lines generating deposits (e.g.
Most of the banks surveyed by the BSC recognised that before the peak of the crisis in September 2008. to put an end to inappropriate practices which create new sources of risk. without declaring it to the ALM desk. Finally. CONTINGENT LIQUIDITY LINES In addition. internal pricing of liquidity for some retail or specialised lending activities was sometimes underestimated so as not to penalise them compared to competitors. executive board level) or by holding more frequent meetings (weekly rather than quarterly). The assumption behind this was that the trade could be unwound rapidly if need be. when it actually took several weeks or months to liquidate these positions in stressed markets. sometimes the type of internal counterparty. by overnight funding 33. there was a risk of drawings of those lines. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISIONS ON GROUP INTERNAL LENDING A few banks changed the way in which they take decisions about internal transfer pricing either by assigning responsibility for decisions to a higher management level (for example. notably by taking into account the increase in funding costs and passing this on to the relevant business units. while for other banks. This policy became unsustainable after the crisis. such as Negative Basis Trades.
both externally (funding liquidity: how easy the bank funds its position. repayment schedule. with some business models coming under particular pressure – namely those based solely on wholesale sources and business structures relying mainly on retail secured lending or specialised lending activities.). discusses the government measures aiming at restarting funding markets and presents the views of banks concerning how and when markets might restart as well as the impact of the current situation to the macroeconomy. They are now trying to reﬂect more precisely: • the market conditions: the internal transfer price is computed using market prices (Euribor is often used for funding up to one year and a reference funding cost curve can be used for funding above one year). the country risk: pricing depends on the location of the intra-group borrower. the daily clearing of the liquidity pool and the trading portfolio). “above three years”). “up to three years”. It had also developed an internal rating of
The BSC is of the view that banks restricted funding activities have somewhat entailed a reshaping of the banking industry. the currency of deals. internal pricing is a proxy of marginal cost of market funding for the bank in different time buckets (“up to one year”. etc. which should be adequately priced by ﬁnancial institutions.
. The crisis has made it clear that liquidity has a cost. and have also analysed how banks have attempted to respond. 7. This ﬁnal section looks at the immediate challenges for banks’ funding.
THE FUTURE OF FUNDING MARKETS – POTENTIAL ISSUES AND HURDLES AHEAD
The preceding sections have taken an in-depth look at the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on various aspects of funding. the maturity of deals: maturity.REVIEW OF KEY PARAMETERS OF THE INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING Overall.1 IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES
Some banks already had sophisticated systems that could serve as benchmarks. For instance. the liquidity and the central bank eligibility of the assets.
business units. the business units (granting loans. one major bank interviewed was already implementing the following high quality internal transfer pricing system. the second relates to how banks monitor their debt investor base. ranging from collateral to internal pricing. A “liquidity pool” is located between the Treasury (responsible for the operating liquidity. The BSC has identiﬁed two immediate challenges to the way banks are responding to the drying-up of funding sources: the ﬁrst concerns the current focus on increasing retail deposits as a source of funding. allowing rational discrimination between the business units and avoiding discretionary decisions (linked with competitive pressures. and acquiring securities on markets). For one bank. the liquidity risk: assessment of the nature. M&A. and the secured or unsecured nature of the funding. collecting deposits. addressing the liquidity pool for their funding needs and putting their liquidity excess) and the ﬁnancial management (dealing repos with central banks and money markets. around one bank out of three said that they had changed the list of criteria they applied for internal transfer pricing compared with the pre-crisis situation. fringe beneﬁts such as underwriting. and market liquidity: the ability to sell assets with immediacy at fair value) and internally (between business units of the same ﬁnancial group).
even a bank which is 100% funded by deposits is not shielded from a run if these funds are at call. In that respect.
7 THE FUTURE OF FUNDING MARKETS – POTENTIAL ISSUES AND HURDLES AHEAD
. Trust in the bank’s governance and risk management are also essential. as some EU countries have seen very low levels of savings over the past few years (although there may be scope for EU banks to seek funding from sources abroad). rather than on the wholesale funding markets. To some degree. But the BSC suggests that it is possible for banks to improve their knowledge and monitoring of their primary
34 Most of the subsidiaries in some new Member States relied. can put pressure on the bank to act on speciﬁc issues. banks’ limited knowledge about their debt investors is the direct result of operating in an environment of dis-intermediated markets: ultimately. Whilst deposit guarantee schemes should. then the institution will not be protected from a sudden outﬂow of funds. in principle. should be the subject of a critical review. the mix of investors in their primary debt issuance. the poor implementation of governance structures. it was apparent from the questionnaire responses submitted to the BSC that only a minority of banks 36 were able to quantify. there is no guarantee that they would really do so. Equity holders have the obvious leverage of being able to sell the bank’s shares and thus reduce the value of the ﬁrm’s market capitalisation should they come to disapprove of its management. if the maturity of this funding is very short or at call. stop bank runs. it is not possible for them to know who holds their debt. In recent years. there may be limited scope for raising funds via this route. it will not shield a bank from the risk it takes in its maturity transformation role. First. banks have also started to develop a better monitoring of their debt investor base. whilst raising the level of retail deposits is beneﬁcial to some degree. Finally. to a great extent. as such. whilst retail funding is viewed generally as more “sticky” than wholesale sources of funding. Whilst this is generally viewed as more stable than wholesale funding – in that it is perhaps less likely to dry up quickly – there are some challenges and pitfalls associated with this. So. which has played a role in shaping the current crisis. To a large extent. the increased competition for funds over the past year is leading banks to increase rates paid out to customers on deposits and savings products. 36 A total of 15 (nine medium-sized and six large banks) out of the 36 surveyed banks provided ﬁgures or some qualitative assessment on their debt investor base. Increasing retail sources of funding will not in itself act as a substitute for sensible lending policies. 35 For example.35 IMPROVING OWN KNOWLEDGE OF BANKS’ DEBT INVESTOR BASE Banks have long monitored their equity investor base because shareholders own the bank and. banks which formerly relied heavily on wholesale funding have been attempting to re-balance their funding structure towards more retail-based funding. But maturity risk can be mitigated through lengthening the maturity of funding where possible. To the extent that banks do not pass on these increased funding costs to their lending customers. on retail deposits as a source of funding. Put differently.USING RETAIL DEPOSITS TO STRENGTHEN BANKS’ FUNDING STRUCTURES 34 Over the past year. this is intrinsic to the bank’s primary function as ﬁnancial intermediary and removing this risk would amount to the bank not serving its purpose within the ﬁnancial system. net interest margins will be eroded. depositors may remain concerned about the speed of pay-off under the guarantee scheme and still prefer to take out their savings from a bank that is viewed as being at risk of failing. even broadly. the only real way for a bank to avoid a wholesale or retail run is
to ensure that the quality of the asset side of its balance sheet is sufﬁciently high to ensure continued investor conﬁdence. even in times of stress. However. Second. regardless of the source of funding. More fundamentally though. regardless of the type of funding.
because gaining a better knowledge of their debt investors would enable banks to develop better relationships with their largest counterparties. Third. perhaps partly because they are more aware of the particular features of each of their local banks. the current crisis has also shown that it could be useful for banks to be aware of the geographical spread of their investors. there are a number of concerns surrounding the growing reliance of banks on this type of funding. it is important for regulators and policy makers to know beforehand which funding counterparties would be affected. have tended to give rise to a dependence on foreign funding. From an individual institution’s point of view. Money market funds have provided a striking example of this in the current crisis: following the failure of Lehman Brothers. so far they have been less likely to cultivate such relationships with their debt investors. Indeed.issuance investor base. holders of bank debt may themselves come under funding pressure in market-wide stress events. if a ﬁnancial institution were to fail. There are also implications from a systemic point of view: indeed. whilst this provides immediate relief for banks as their main funding markets remain closed. Second. Understanding the main drivers of such counterparties’ behaviour could help banks to anticipate pressures on their own debt funding. domestic investors have appeared to be less “ﬂighty” than those from abroad in the past
few months. and that this has become particularly relevant today. Thus. they reduced the maturity of their lending to banks very signiﬁcantly. In a sense. which become increasingly likely the longer such a stress event lasts. Being able to anticipate this type of feedback to their own funding would help banks better manage their forward-looking liquidity position. However. Therefore keeping up the commitment could be beneﬁcial for parent banks and home countries as well. together with substantial foreign exchange lending. especially as a “home bias” tends to reappear during times of crisis. closer ties with its investor base are important because when market liquidity is scarce this allows for a better targeting of fund raising efforts. government-guaranteed funding represents both too little and too much: too
. it remains to be assessed whether this support will continue as the crisis deepens further. Whilst banks maintain close relationships with interbank market counterparties. because some of them are key participants in the ﬁnancial system. or they wanted to ensure they were prepared for the likelihood of these occurring. it is therefore important that parent banks show commitment to their subsidiaries. It is important to emphasise that potential problems at subsidiaries can have a negative effect on the valuation of the banking group. 7. where high credit growth. In the current environment. the actions of which could be key in starting or avoiding a run should the bank start experiencing funding outﬂows. some funds either experienced large withdrawals after markets were struck by a general “ﬂight to quality” reaction. There are three reasons why banks might want to improve their monitoring: • First. This phenomenon poses an additional risk in the new EU Member States in central and eastern Europe. a large number of governments have attempted to restart issuance of bank debt via the application of a state guarantee. the removal of funding lines from large counterparties can be a key trigger of bank runs. While parent banks have shown such support in the ﬁrst phase of the turmoil. Indeed.2 RESTARTING FUNDING MARKETS
THE PITFALLS OF GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED FUNDING As examined in Section 3 of this report.
which enables investors to buy securities which meet their credit risk appetite. Very tentatively. while giving them the option
37 TALF: Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. because the fact that it is issued by a speciﬁc bank makes it a “credit” product. and too much. they are investors which specialise in taking on and managing the credit risk of various corporates. market contacts have highlighted the apparent segmentation of the investor base between secured and unsecured issues: traditional investors in banks’ debt are “credit” investors. but the existence of the government backing encourages comparisons with government or agency debt – “rates” investments. As such. Interbank markets may reopen last. some participants indicated that they prefer to invest in non-guaranteed issuance as they would rather pick up the extra yield than invest in debt subject to a (sometimes rather expensive) government fee. On the whole. central
banks). not credit investors. because ultimately markets can only be deemed to have reopened when private investor conﬁdence has returned in some form.
. This segmentation matters because the investor base for guaranteed issuance is therefore separate from that of nonguaranteed issuance – with limited crossover likely. the application of a state guarantee to some banks’ issuance was perceived as providing the institution with a “shadow guarantee” on the rest of its debt. Instead. restoring liquidity in those markets was also viewed as vital.little. the demand which currently exists for guaranteed issuance is unlikely to switch to non-guaranteed issuance if/when this restarts. which are not interested in gaining exposure to name-speciﬁc credit risk. Initially. i. This leaves the question of what. but rather want to gain exposure to the general level of interest rates. in the longer term. However. while simple and transparent secured structures were viewed as essential going forward.e. This differentiates them from investors in government debt (“rates” investors). might encourage markets to restart? BANKS’ VIEWS ON HOW AND WHEN MARKETS MIGHT RESTART The questionnaire responses received indicate that government support for bank issuance cannot replace the key ingredient of smooth functioning markets – investor conﬁdence. Issuance under government guarantee schemes could fall under either category.g. then. Indications so far are that government-backed debt is being purchased by rates investors. It was therefore hoped that state guarantees would generally act as a positive externality on participating banks’ funding needs. This points to a solution along the lines of the US-designed TALF 37. responses indicate that debt markets may reopen ﬁrst (provided the positive externality from state guarantees occurs). this can be viewed positively. and the market segmentation insures that non-guaranteed issuance is not being crowded out by guaranteed issuance. However. because it cannot cover all EU banks’ funding needs over the medium term. appetite for this shadow guarantee does not yet appear to have materialised to a large extent. it is somewhat difﬁcult to gain any clear idea of respondents’ views on this topic. With regard to restarting securitisation and covered bond markets more speciﬁcally. In the short term. as it ensures that a stable investor base is available for banks’ funding (e. To some extent. followed by secured markets. A number of respondent banks did not attempt to answer this part of the questionnaire. but those that did highlighted the simple fact that banks’ balance sheets need to be freed up of bad assets before investor conﬁdence can return. the scarcity of responses also simply reﬂects the great uncertainty in which ﬁnancial institutions are currently operating. and therefore guaranteed issuance does not appear to help banks onto a transition path back to “normal” conditions for their debt issuance activity.
banks could see the quality of their own assets deteriorate as arrears increase. the closure of funding markets could impact on the macroeconomic environment through its impact on consumer and corporate conﬁdence. thus helping to restore liquidity in the markets. So the restriction in bank’s funding ability could well feed on itself through the deterioration in banks’ asset quality. were this to contribute to a slowdown in consumption or investment. In addition.to repo these securities should they be unable to ﬁnd a buyer. NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOP TO THE MACROECONOMY The drying-up of funding markets has constrained the ability of banks to offer credit to their customers. As the credit quality of their customer base deteriorates. this might result in an increased likelihood of default by both retail and corporate customers. Ultimately.
Banks will contribute up to DKK 35 billion over two years
Guarantee limit (in EUR 1) billions) 2) to be determined on a bank-bybank basis by the government 400
Amounts issued (in EUR 1) billions) Currently +/. For longer maturities. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + bank-speciﬁc premium correlated with ﬁve-year CDS rates 1 Jan. an additional fee based on bank CDS spreads is charged For issues maturing in less than one year. the commission is equal to 50 basis points over the median of the issuing bank’s 5-year CDS between 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2008 or the median within the same rating category issuing bank’s 5-year CDS between 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2008. 25 basis points for a guarantee between 3 and 12 months with collateral and 50 basis points without collateral. covering new issues of up to three years
Until December 2009. When no CDS data were available the second calculation will apply when the institution is rated. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + ﬁve-year CDS rates 1 Jan. The median for AA institutions is 0. AND AMOUNTS ISSUED
Costs Maturities below one year: 50 basis points. whatever the lower. 2008. Cost of issuance for the Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF) 3) (~ cost of public debt + α basis points) + median of CDS rates between 1 January 2007 and 31 August 2008 + 20 basis points
1.10% annual. 2007-31 Aug.0
Until December 2009. the commission is 50 basis points.ANNEX I ANNEXES 1 COSTS. maturities of up to three years
6.365% annual and for A institutions 0. maturities of up to three years. in exceptional cases and for a maximum amount of one third of total guarantees: maturities over three years up to a maximum of ﬁve years.0
16. maturities of up to ﬁve years
Sources: Ofﬁcial government publications and press releases. will be the 0.448% annual. 1) Or other currency as indicated. 2008 Maturities below one year: 50 basis points.e. For the rest of issuers the reference.2
Until December 2009. LIMITS AND TIME HORIZONS OF GOVERNMENT BANK DEBT GUARANTEE SCHEMES. in addition to the 50 basis points.448% annual plus an additional 0. 2007-31 Aug. Note: The cut-off date for this information was end of March 2009. maturities of up to three years (ﬁve years in exceptional cases)
39. For issues maturing after a year. there is also a 10 basis point commitment commission for the undrawn part of the guarantee.4
The costs (commission) depend on duration an availability of collateral. Initially until 30 September 2010 (the guarantee has since been extended to 2013) Up until Dec 2009. 2) Limit on guaranteed amounts as laid down by law. i. 3) The SFEF is a special entity granting loans to banks and funding itself by issuing state guaranteed bonds on markets.3
Time horizon Until 31 October 2009.
A 43 basis points.50 basis points) for transactions with a maturity of up to one year. 3) €376 billion has been given as an indicative maximum amount. Remuneration for the provision of guarantees consists of a credit risk margin based on ﬁveyear CDS spreads of largest euro area banks with rating A .0
Until December 2009.Country IE
Costs Fee equal to ca. 2008 Maturities below one year: 50 basis points. interbank deposits. maturities of up to ﬁve years
Sources: Ofﬁcial government publications and press releases.3
Time horizon The Guarantee scheme extends to deposits.1%
0. The covered liabilities of covered institutions are guaranteed under law until 29 September 2010.0
Until 31 December 2009. maturities of between three months and ﬁve years
Until December 2009.6
2. as well as new debt with maturity of no less than six months and no more than three years. 10% GDP
0. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + ﬁve-year CDS rates 1 Jan. and subordinated debt. 2007-31 Aug. Note: The cut-off date for this information was end of March 2009. maturities of up to ﬁve years
Costs will be determined following the recommendations and communications of the ECB and the European Commission. 2008. including asset covered securities.0.0. for issued debt with a residual maturity of between three months and ﬁve years
The state guarantees carry a ﬁxed cost (.e. AA 38 basis points. covering existing debt with residual maturity of no more than three years. the cost reﬂects the issuer risk. 2) Limit on guaranteed amounts as laid down by law.5
Until 31 December 2010. CDS spread AAA 23 basis points.
HUF 0. €0. a processing fee . Until December 2009.5% and an annual servicing fee . until 29 Sept. 2008 Maturities from three months to one year: 50 basis points. for transactions with a longer maturity. 2010)
Guarantee limit (in EUR 1) billions) 2) Unlimited 3)
Amounts issued (in EUR 1) billions) 9.448%.0.
. derived from the spread on ﬁve-year credit default swaps.0
16. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + 25 basis points (AAA long-term rating of Standard and Poor’s. maturities of up to three years (ﬁve years in exceptional cases)
4. senior unsecured debt. covered bonds. Until December 2009. others 63 basis points Maturities below one year: 50 basis points.5 billion per year for the two years (i. 2007-31 Aug. stateguaranteed debt can have a maturity of between two and ﬁve years Until December 2009. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + ﬁve-year CDS rates 1 Jan. FitchRatings or Moody’s) or 40 basis points (AA rating) or 45 basis points (A rating) or 50 basis points (BBB rating) or 55 basis points (BB or below BB rating). Maturities of below one year: 50 basis points. 2007-31 Aug. 1) Or other currency as indicated. which is issued for reﬁnancing of existing debt. maturities above one year: 50 basis points + ﬁve-year CDS rates 1 Jan.
50 basis points + median ﬁve-year CDS rate July 2007-July 2008 (previously 12 months to 7 Oct 2008) Guarantee limit (in EUR 1) billions) 2) 50 Amounts issued (in EUR 1) billions) 0. there is a supplement of 50 basis points. 2) Limit on guaranteed amounts as laid down by law. credit rating charge: AAA 0. but has been extended until 31 December 2009. 1) Or other currency as indicated. covered bonds 25 basis points. The supplement for covered bonds is 0. as Finnish covered bond issuers have no applicable CDS spreads Maturities below one year: senior 50 basis points.25%. In addition. A 0.45%. can be extended until December 2009 (guarantee runs until June 2014). maturities above one year: senior 50 basis points (covered bonds: 25 basis points) + median ﬁve-year CDS 1 Jan. maturities of between 90 days and ﬁve years
SEK 9. AA 0. Note: The cut-off date for this information was end of March 2009. 2007-31 Aug. 2008.ANNEX I
Country FI Costs Fixed fee is 50 basis points for unsecured debt and 25 basis points for covered bonds.3
Until 30 April 2009.24%.9
Initially until April 2009. maturities of between three months and three years (ﬁve years for mortgage-backed bonds)
SEK 1.0 Time horizon Until December 2009 (to be reviewed in April 2009). plus an additional individual fee based on the credit rating of the issuer. maturities of up to three years (can be extended to ﬁve years)
Sources: Ofﬁcial government publications and press releases.
which lacks the skills to manage this risk. However. generally the ALM funding desk. The ALM desk is the bank’s only interface with the interbank market. where it clears the net position of the bank (i. This process is based on the following prerequisites: • A business unit wanting to hedge some ﬁnancial risks transfers them to the ALM desk. this would mean a spread of 7% being booked as proﬁt. this solution leaves the management of the entire interest rate risk to the retail unit. The business unit gives all of its deposits to the ALM desk to be invested at market rates and goes to the ALM desk for all of its funding requirements if it wishes to grant loans. a transfer-pricing framework is needed in order to recognise the true value created by business units and to concentrate risks in one single unit. For instance. as a net borrower or a net lender). and the other linked to risk management. These terms and conditions should mirror market conditions (i. In addition. with prices and conditions for this market determined by the Treasury/ALM department. the American commercial bank Bank of America realised that it had two difﬁculties regarding asset liability management (ALM): one linked to proﬁt allocation. This is recorded in terms of capital consumption or in terms of margin reduction. If we take the example in Chart 17. if the market rate for ﬁve-year ﬁxed ﬁnancing is 12%. be the same as would be agreed between the bank and an external counterparty).2
INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING: THEORETICAL TOOLS
THE NEED FOR INTERNAL PRICING RULES At the end of the 1970s. This is basically the equivalent of setting up an “internal market” for funds within the bank. the funding requirements for all transactions are considered to go through the ALM desk. To avoid these problems. not proﬁt.
GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNAL TRANSFER PRICING In a pricing system for fund transfers.
Chart 17 Example 1
4% Bank T Three-month fixed d
11% Five-year fixed
Source: ECB. Retail banking units would book as proﬁt the spread between the rate at which they originated loans to customers and the rate at which they remunerated customer deposits.e. regardless of market rates and maturities. this risks overestimating or underestimating the contribution the retail unit makes to the bank’s proﬁt. the loan actually generates losses. This process is illustrated in the Chart 18. The ALM desk deﬁnes the terms and conditions governing its charging/ remuneration of business units for their loans/deposits. Business units could not have constant commercial margins. They are calculated for each operation booked in the balance sheet and for the entire life of the contract in order to get a constant margin.
This a balancing out method.
.e. The interest rate associated with the stock is the internal transfer price. ti). CF (t0. because if a lower internal transfer price is proﬁtable for the business unit in question. In our example.e. The total proﬁt of the business unit is then reduced to 6% (instead of 7% in the simple example) and can be broken down into a proﬁt on loans (4%) and a proﬁt on deposits (2%). valid for a pool of operations such as liabilities or assets without maturity or products correlated imperfectly with ﬁnancial market indices). 6-4%) for the business unit.e. in order to achieve commercial objectives (e. in some cases.2 Sometimes. leaving a proﬁt of 4% on loans (i. deﬁned as the “sum-product” of the cash ﬂows and their interest rates. where an operation has a minimal impact on the balance sheet. IR (t0. i. where the ALM department does not have enough time to spend on the calculations.g. S (ti). to maintain or strengthen a market share without changing the commercial policy). Most of the time.ANNEX 2
Chart 18 Example 2
4% Deposit business unit of bank Three m h Three-month fixed 6% 7% Lending business unit of bank Five y fixed Five-year Five y fixed Five-year 11%
ALM funding desk
Three m h fixed Three-month
Source: ECB. 11-7%) for the business unit. A stock. the internal transfer price given to the business unit is lower than it should be. and an interest rate. The proﬁtability of business units is thus insulated from any impact of interest rate movements during the life of the loan.7%. are ﬁxed. IMPACT ON INTERNAL PRICING AND PROFITABILITY The internal transfer price is a decisive factor when computing analytically the proﬁtability of the business. the gap between what the internal
transfer price should be in the light of market conditions and the terms of the transaction and what it is for the business unit has a cost (which is usually passed on in other products).
For example.g. affecting a whole stock of operations) or on the ﬂows (e. etc. the internal transfer pricing is computed on a contract-by-contract basis. The 1% difference in proﬁt goes to the ALM desk. In practice.g.
The ALM desk centralises the interest rate risk for the entire bank and is responsible for hedging this risk. i. it can be calculated on a “pool” basis: where it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd the contract-by-contract information in the database. leaving a proﬁt on deposits of 2% (i.e. the ALM department charges the business unit the rate that it would cost to borrow the money in the interbank market for ﬁve years at a ﬁxed rate. cash ﬂows. ti). Likewise. this means that the AL manager provides some conventional schedule rules based either on the stock 1 (e. the internal transfer price is calculated using the average for ten-year swap rates. the ALM desk remunerates deposits at the rate that it would cost to lend the money in the interbank market for three months. 6%. However.
The prices charged to the business units for their individual transactions are thus notional prices. By deﬁning an internal transfer price. a credit risk proﬁt centre and an equity risk proﬁt centre. only using the external market to borrow or lend the net amount.As regards the ALM desk.
. a currency risk proﬁt centre. The proﬁt of the ALM department is the difference between the internal transfer pricing and the ﬁnancial market conditions. Some economists recommend splitting ALM departments into different proﬁt centres: an interest rate risk proﬁt centre. a liquidity risk proﬁt centre. Thus. it would be impractical and costly to implement a structure in which every individual deposit was lent separately into the market and every loan required funds to be borrowed separately from the market. the ALM department (or the Treasury department) is transformed into a proﬁt centre. the ALM department aggregates all the individual transactions from the different business units. an inﬂation risk proﬁt centre.
This mechanism should incorporate all costs of liquidity (from short to long term. Institute of International Finance (2008) “Final Report on Market Best Practices for Financial Institutions and Products”. typically the front ofﬁce and treasury functions. before the market turmoil began. This allocation of costs should reﬂect not only the liquidity needs of the various business units but also the liquidity risk that they generate. Recommendation 2 provides general guidance on how to address the observed shortcomings of internal allocation of funding costs. THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE In August 2008 the Institute of International Finance published a report 7 recommending that banks “ensure that they have in place effective internal transfer pricing policies to reﬂect implied or incurred actual or potential costs related to reasonably anticipated liquidity demands from both on and off-balance sheet
Supervisors have recently identiﬁed the relevance of this issue and have put it on the regulatory agenda for the reform of liquidity practices.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008 a) “Liquidity Risk: Management and Supervisory Challenges”. stressing the need for banks to incorporate liquidity costs. in order to align the risktaking incentives of individual business lines with the liquidity risk exposures their activities create for the bank as a whole. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION – FEBRUARY AND SEPTEMBER 2008 In February 2008 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a report 3 underlining the importance of close coordination between treasury functions and business lines “to ensure a full appreciation of potential contingent liquidity risks and to reduce the extent to which ﬁrms’ internal transfer pricing systems [assess] business lines for building contingent liquidity exposures”.
.ANNEX 3 3 INTERNAL PRICING OF LIQUIDITY – A FUTURE CHALLENGE FOR REGULATORS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY [had] no priced contingent liquidity internally or externally to reﬂect the ex post assessment of the nature and risk proﬁle of these liabilities”. The attention of senior management was also drawn to the potential adverse incentives for some of the units in charge of the liquidity management. beneﬁts and risks in their internal pricing for all signiﬁcant business activities (both on and off the balance-sheet). including the beneﬁts of having access to relatively stable sources of funding. THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS – SEPTEMBER 2008 In September 2008. such as some types of retail deposit. THE SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP – MARCH 2008 In March 2008 the Senior Supervisors Group also noted in a report 5 that the “[banks] that experienced the most signiﬁcant challenges in meeting their funding liquidity needs were those that. CEBS recommends that institutions “have in place an adequate internal mechanism – supported where appropriate by a transfer pricing mechanism – which provides appropriate incentives regarding the contribution to liquidity risk of the different business activities. their market liquidity risk characteristics and any other relevant factors. Senior Supervisors Group (2008) “Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence”. the Committee of European Banking Supervisors laid down 30 Recommendations 6 for the management and supervision of liquidity risk. Finally. Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2008) “Technical Advice to the European Commission on Liquidity Risk Management” (Second part). A number of recommendations have been made since the beginning of the crisis. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008 b) “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervisions”. In September 2008 the Basel Committee published another paper 4. Detailed guidance will be provided by CEBS over the course of 2009. it suggests that the analytical framework should be reviewed as appropriate to reﬂect changing business and ﬁnancial market conditions and so maintain the appropriate alignment of incentives. The paper also recommends taking into account the anticipated holding periods of assets and liabilities. recognising the importance of internal pricing policies. including contingent risk)”.
. Regulatory authorities and ﬁnancial institutions now agree on the diagnosis: managing internal transfer pricing is key for ﬁnancial stability. It also urged banks to take into account “the liquidity of relevant underlying assets. Furthermore. regulators need to encourage – and banks need to implement – new rules that will reﬂect all the dimensions of liquidity. the report insists on the need for internal transfer pricing policies that “ensure that lines of business within the ﬁrm that create liquidity exposures are proportionally charged for the cost to the ﬁrm of maintaining corresponding liquidity positions”. the structure of underlying liabilities and any legal or reasonably anticipated reputational contingent liquidity exposures”.business”.
More From This UserSkip carouselThe Liquidity Premium for Illiquid AnnuitiesSage Reference ManualCDS HandbookFATCA-SSRN-id1645527Modelling Counter Party Exposure and CVAOecd Tax Agenda 2011Analysis of the Solvency II Standard ModelOecd_thinking Beyond Basel IIIPricing CDOs With a SmileNomura Fixed Income ResearchTheseDanielTotouom Dynamic Copulas
Sign up to vote on this titleUsefulNot usefulEU Banks Funding Structures Policies by eric__box0.0 (0)EmbedDownloadRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)List price: $0.00Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentMore informationShow less
RelatedIlliquidity and All Its Friendsby LianMaQibrunby joseffthomas3433996by Hassan SaleemDB-High Yield Bondsby Javier EscribaAsset Lawsby Sreejith RajagopalHBS.docxby Ajitha PrashantSecuritisation Companies and Reconstruction Companies (SCRC) DRby SK MishraFinsia Leadership Luncheon Series 22 March 2013.pdfby Heidi Taylorproject_IOBby Prashant K. SinghR-Waseemby Waseem RajaOccupy the SEC Letter to House Committee on Financial Services, Re: “Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, Businesses, Investors and Job Creation”by occupytheSECRisk Management in Banksby Manoj TarteBasel 3 Framwork for Liquidity Standard and Monetary Policy Implementationby Paulami BhattacharjeeSub-prime Crisis and Consequencesby 李木子What is Shadow Bankingby lazaruz6666Basel IIIby Rahul WaniBasel-II Final_CBB.pptxby Rajat PaniAssignment 4_Tee Chin Min Benjaminby Benjamin Tee95(2)by Carine ThérèseUnderstanding Banking System – Basel Norms and Banking Stability _ INSIGHTSby aksjsimrwp2009-28by jfs0Nouriel-RegulationSupervisionMarch08by mengdetarullo_20100917by FRASER: Federal Reserve ArchiveFinancial Health in Terms Ofby Madhuresh Guptabrainard_20150709.pdfby FRASER: Federal Reserve ArchiveGreenspan_19980507by FRASER: Federal Reserve ArchiveTutorial Solution Week 5by Angelyn SohPresentation 1by Prateek SaxenaSimilar to EU Banks Funding Structures PoliciesSkip carouselIlliquidity and All Its Friendsbrun3433996DB-High Yield BondsAsset LawsHBS.docxSecuritisation Companies and Reconstruction Companies (SCRC) DRFinsia Leadership Luncheon Series 22 March 2013.pdfproject_IOBR-WaseemOccupy the SEC Letter to House Committee on Financial Services, ReRisk Management in BanksBasel 3 Framwork for Liquidity Standard and Monetary Policy ImplementationSub-prime Crisis and ConsequencesWhat is Shadow BankingBasel IIIBasel-II Final_CBB.pptxAssignment 4_Tee Chin Min Benjamin95(2)Understanding Banking System – Basel Norms and Banking Stability _ INSIGHTSwp2009-28Nouriel-RegulationSupervisionMarch08tarullo_20100917Financial Health in Terms Ofbrainard_20150709.pdfGreenspan_19980507Tutorial Solution Week 5Presentation 1The Impact of Basel III on Intraday Liquidity ManagementEuropean Bank Stress Test Results 2010EU Banks Funding Structures Policies