Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/461/293/400410/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 09:48:19
Document Index: 652185306

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§ 135', '§ 556', '§ 135', '§ 135', '§ 342', '§ 343', '§ 135', '§ 135']

Stearns Electric Paste Company, Petitioner, v. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1972 › Stearns Electric Paste Company, Petitioner, v. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent
Stearns Electric Paste Company, Petitioner, v. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972) May 11, 1972. Argued Dec. 10, 1971. Decided May 11, 1972
Petitioner's challenge to the cancellations raises both procedural and substantive questions of first impression.6 At the heart of the controversy is the question whether FIFRA includes a "substantive standard of product safety7 ," and if so, what that standard is. Because of the novelty and importance of the issues, we shall state the facts in some detail, then review the statute, and finally test the findings against it.
In 1964 the statute was amended to give the Secretary the power to refuse to register a new product, or to cancel an existing registration, if he found that the product was either adulterated or misbranded. The House Report on the 1964 changes and what little floor discussion there was indicate quite clearly that the only major change31 contemplated was elimination of the registration under protest procedure. The change was made for two basic reasons: (1) to settle the question of compliance with the act before the economic poison could be marketed and (2) to place the burden of proof of safety and effectiveness on the applicant for registration.32 The concern remained with efficacy and safety "when used as directed."33 No changes were made in the language of 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (c), (d) and (g). the provisions with which we are primarily concerned.
61 Stat. 163, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k
7 U.S.C. § 135b. The administration of FIFRA, which was initially entrusted to the Secretary of Agriculture, is now committed to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency by virtue of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed.Reg. 15623, 84 Stat. 2086, 5 U.S.C. App., p. 609 (1970 ed.) (effective December 2, 1970)
7 U.S.C. § 135b(c). The statute authorizes the Administrator to refuse registration if it does not appear "that the article is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it or if the article and its labeling and other material required to be submitted do not comply with the [Act]. . . ."
7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) provides that any economic poison shall be considered misbranded:
The Administrator may suspend the registration during a cancellation proceeding if he finds that the insecticide presents an "imminent hazard" to the public. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c).
The government argues (Br. p. 16) that " [t]he testimony of several witnesses also bears out [the Judicial Officer's] findings concerning the ready availability of a number of alternative, safer, and effective products and, therefore, establishes the absence of any significant benefit from the use of phosphorus paste [transcript cites]."
In violation of 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (c)
In violation of 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (d)
In violation of 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (g)
There is little legislative history on the 1947 Act. The Senate Report merely reprinted the short House Report (6 pages in U.S.Code Cong.Serv.) and the floor consideration in both houses was perfunctory. The legislative history thus sheds no more light on the meaning of the crucial sections, 7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (c), (d) and (g), than the words of the statute itself. There were some changes made in the Act in 1959, but those changes are not relevant for our purposes
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) provides:
Furthermore, even if 5 U.S.C. § 553 did apply, Sec. 553(c) does not require a hearing but only "an opportunity to participate . . . through submission of written data, views, or arguments." That opportunity was afforded registrant here. We note that the section authorizes, but does not require, an opportunity for oral presentation.
Actually, there are three separate points in the registration process at which the burden of proof question could arise: (1) the initial registration, (2) cancellation or refusal to reregister at the end of the initial or a subsequent 5-year registration period, and (3) cancellation during the term of a registration. Even petitioner concedes that the burden at the time of initial registration is upon the registrant-given the legislative history it could hardly be argued otherwise. See notes 32 and 37, supra. The statute, 7 U.S.C. § 135b(f), provides for the cancellation in situation (2) above "unless the registrant . . . requests . . . that such registration be continued in effect." The fact that the statute requires the registrant to request reregistration clearly implies that the burden in situation (2) is the same as in (1). If a presumption of proper use at the end of a 5-year period does not shift the burden of proof in situation (2), we think there is even less reason to shift the burden in the middle of a 5-year term if the Administrator should then become aware of previously unknown risks associated with the use of a product. Since we see no reason why the location of the burden of proof should depend on the timing of the Administrator's first awareness of a compliance problem, we are satisfied that the problem in situation (3) is comparable to (1) and (2)
Petitioner argues that in a cancellation rather than registration proceeding, the Administrator is the proponent of the order sought for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) and that the regulation, supra, note 34, naming the registrant as the "proponent" is therefore invalid. Section 556(d) provides:
Even if the Administrator is the "proponent" of a cancellation order, the location of this burden is "otherwise provided by statute." Specifically, we read FIFRA itself as requiring that the burden of proof be on the registrant whether in a proceeding for initial registration or in a cancellation proceeding. The statutory language of 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c), taken with the clear intent to shift the pre-1964 burden of proof, cannot properly be read as providing for any distinction between registration and cancellation. The advisory committee, hearing and review provisions apply to both situations, and the concern with safety when used as directed expressed by Congress cannot be reconciled with a theory which would place the burden of proof on the government. Whether the Administrator discovers the hazard at the time of registration or later, Congress intended that the registrant have the burden of proving compliance with the provisions of the statute. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckleshaus, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 439 F.2d 584, 593 (1971).
"The term 'economic poison' means (1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant or animal life or viruses, except viruses on or in living man or other animals, which the Secretary shall declare to be a pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant or desiccant." 7 U.S.C. § 135(a)
Compare, for example, the language of Sec. 135(z) (2) of FIFRA with the definitions of adulteration in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 342 and 351, and the misbranding provisions of the same statute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343 and 352
7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (d) (emphasis added). See also Sec. 135(z) (2) (c), supra, note 3
7 U.S.C. § 135(z) (2) (g) (emphasis added)
See also separate opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657, 672, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233. He said at p. 657, 91 S. Ct. at p. 1715:
"In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop." 62 Cases More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam, etc. v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600, 71 S. Ct. 515, 520, 95 L. Ed. 645.