Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2010cv02769/575033/138
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 02:38:12
Document Index: 394417947

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1631', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

ORDER that Plaintiff's 107 "Motion for Request for Stay[]" is DENIED; Plaintiff's 122 "Notice of Appeal", is OVERRULED; and the Magistrate Judge's order denying plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice for Jones v. Corrections Corporation of America :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
No. CIV 10-2769-PHX-RCB (JRI)
This is a prisoner civil rights action brought pursuant to
before the court in this action.
denoted “Notice of Appeal” filed by plaintiff pro se Darin Jones
(Doc. 122).
Jay R. Irwin, United States Magistrate Judge (“the Magistrate
Judge”),
Appointment of Counsel[.]” Ord. (Doc. 110) at 12:2-3.
pending is plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[,]” filed
simultaneous with his “Notice of Appeal.”
Currently there are several matters pending
The first is a document
Plaintiff is “appealing” the order of the Honorable
S:\CLR\prisoners\appealaptcounsel
Mot. (Doc. 123).
(“CCA”)
filed a “Request to Strike Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal[,]” as
well as opposing that motion for a stay.
Judge’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of
Physical and Mental Examinations[] Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35[.]”
Mot. (Doc. 107) at 1.
Lastly, even before the issuance of the Magistrate
Resp. (Doc. 126) at
“consider[ing]
Counsel[.]”
due to his “mental incompetence, the complexity and merits of
the case, and his inability to secure counsel.”
Stressing that plaintiff “founds his request upon due process
protections[,]” the Magistrate Judge devoted the bulk of his
Ord. (Doc. 110) at 2:8.
Plaintiff sought counsel
Id. at 2:9-11.
Id. at 3:9-10.
As the starting point for his analysis, the Magistrate
Judge recited the established rule that there is no “general
constitutional right for an indigent to have appointed counsel
in a civil case[]” in this Circuit.
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he
loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty interest.’”
Id. at 2:13-14 (citing
‘presumption
Id. at 2:23-24 (quoting Lassister v. Department of Social Servs.
of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640
(1981)) (emphasis added).
explained that “[a]bsent such a deprivation of physical liberty,
a constitutional right to appointment of counsel must be found
as a corollary to other general constitutional principles.”
at 2:25-27.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge
constitutional principles of “right of access” and “procedural
due process[.]” Id. at 2:28 and at 3:9 (emphasis omitted).
soundly reasoned that “Plaintiff’s right of access it not at
issue, and therefore cannot justify appointment of counsel[]”
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 892,
47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976),” i.e., a balancing test.
discussing each, the Magistrate Judge found that plaintiff could
not “overcome the presumption against appointed counsel.”
(Doc. 110) at 10:13-14.
“Plaintiff will not be denied procedural due process in the
absence of appointed counsel.”
Id. at 3:7-8.
Next, the Magistrate Judge
See Hernandez
The Magistrate Judge thus found that
Id. at 10:15-16.
Prior to the transfer of this action, 1 the United States
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1631, this case was transferred here
because it “should have been brought in the District of Arizona, where the events
at issue occurred.” Ord. (Doc. 73) at 1.
application for “in forma pauperis” (“IFP”) status pursuant to
statute allows, the court waived plaintiff’s prepayment of the
$350.00 filing fee, but it assessed him an initial partial
filing fee, and required monthly installment payments of the
remainder from plaintiff’s prisoner trust account.
Despite having been previously granted IFP status, plaintiff did
not mention section 1915 in his motion, let alone subsection
Doc. 12 (3:10-cv-00054-TMB) at 1.
“request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
Nonetheless, undoubtedly adhering to the well-recognized
rule that “in general, courts must construe pro se pleadings
liberally[,]” Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 893 (9 th Cir.
2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), the
Magistrate Judge addressed a “statutory request for counsel
under” section 1915(e)(1).
Ord. (Doc. 110) at 10:17 (emphasis
After careful consideration, the Magistrate Judge found
that plaintiff could show “neither the likelihood of success nor
“‘exceptional circumstances’” standard necessary “to support a
request for counsel under” that particular statute.
Magistrate Judge denied without prejudice to renew plaintiff’s
Two days prior to the issuance of that order, plaintiff
filed a motion for a stay pending resolution of his motion for
Judge’s order plaintiff filed a “Notice of Appeal[]” in this
district court, “chall[e]ng[ing] [the Magistrate] Judge’s denial
Simultaneous with the filing of that Notice, plaintiff filed a
second motion for a stay essentially reiterating his reasons for
seeking appointment of counsel.
After the issuance of the Magistrate
Defendant CCA did not address the merits of plaintiff’s
“appeal” or his second motion for a stay.
counsel “is not immediately appealable[,]” and hence “there is
no viable reason to stay this case.”
Court . . . strike the notice of appeal.”
Instead, CCA is
Resp. (Doc. 126) at 2:4;
CCA thus reasons that the court should deny plaintiff’s
CCA also specifically “requests that the
Id. at 2:8.
As to plaintiff’s first filed motion for a stay, CCA does
not object to a brief extension “to allow the parties to submit
their Joint Case Management Plan.”
CCA is opposing “the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion” on two
motion is “premature[.]” Id. at 1:23.
plaintiff cannot invoke Rule 35 as “a weapon” to “be used to
force CCA to pay for Plaintiff’s expert.”
Id. at 1:22.
Resp. (Doc. 118) at 1:20-21.
First, CCA asserts that that
Second, CCA contends that
Id. at 1:24.
Evidently the parties are operating under the misconception
that plaintiff filed his “appeal” in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 2
Judge’s denial of counsel is an “interlocutory order” which
“must fit within the ‘collateral order exception to the final
judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291” misses the mark.
(Doc. 126) at 1:21-23 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528
to review “final decisions” of the district courts.
He did not; plaintiff filed his “appeal” in this
Therefore, CCA’s argument that the Magistrate
Section 1291 confers jurisdiction upon circuit courts
U.S.C. § 1291; see also Ortiz v. Jordan, --- U.S. ---, 131 S.Ct.
omitted) (“The jurisdiction of a Court of Appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 extends only to appeals from . . . final decisions
jurisdictional grant does not come into play in the present
Judge’s order fits within the collateral order exception to
section 1291 is irrelevant at this juncture.
its designation as a “Notice of Appeal,” given the statutory
framework for a magistrate judge’s authority discussed below,
the court will be treating that “Notice” as objections under
courts.”)
1291's
Hence, despite what the CCA urges, whether the Magistrate
Moreover, despite
The CCA expressly declares that it is opposing “Plaintiff’s motion to
stay this case while this Ninth Circuit considers his appeal[.]” Resp. (Doc. 126)
at 1:16-18 (emphasis added).
Further, the CCA reasons that because plaintiff’s
“appeal” does not “confer jurisdiction on the Ninth Circuit,” the court should
strike his “notice of appeal” and deny his motion for a stay. Id. at 2:5-6.
Likewise, plaintiff mistakenly relies upon Fed. R. App. 4, governing appeals
as of right to a circuit court from a judgment or order of a district court. See
Not. (Doc. 122) at 1.
Moreover, plaintiff concludes his motion for a stay
asserting that “[t]here should be no further actions taken or decided [until] the
9 th Circu[i]t[] [C]ourt of [A]ppeals has made a decision and if denied in the 9 th
[C]irc[i]t[] [he] [i]ntend[s] to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals [sic].”
to address such objections.
Clearly, this court has the authority
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
28 U.S.C. § 636 delineates the powers of federal magistrate
pursuant to section 636(b)(1).
of review differs depending upon whether a magistrate judge’s
636(b)(1)(A), with the exception of eight types of motions, 3
Under that statute, the standard
matter[s]” subject to “reconsider[ation] thereunder “where it
has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.”
also Estate of Conners by Meredith v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658
(9 th Cir. 1993) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district
nondispositive pretrial matter pending before the court.”) In
discussing “nondispositive matters[,]” Rule 72(a) explains that
“[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party’s claim or
defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see
That Rule allows a party
Specifically excluded from that grant of authority are motions “for
injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss
or quash an indictment or information. . . , to suppress evidence in a criminal
case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can by granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an
action.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
magistrate judge’s order.
findings of fact and recommendations to the district court on
the excepted motions listed in section 636(b)(1)(A).
objections are filed, the district court conducts a de novo
review of those proposed findings of fact and recommendations.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
636(b)(1)(B),
Correspondingly, 28 U.S.C.
To determine the scope of the magistrate judge’s authority
and, in turn, the standard of review, it is not enough to
636(b)(1)(A).
1064, 1068 (9 th Cir. 2004).
language of that statute because the eight listed motions “are
not an exhaustive list of all the pretrial matters that are
excepted from the magistrate judge’s authority.”
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “any motion not listed,
nor analogous to a motion listed in this category, falls within
the non-dispositive group of matters which a magistrate may
by Rivera-Guerrero Court).
Thus, a court also “must look to the
properly characterized as dispositive or non-dispositive of a
See United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 377 F.3d
The court must look beyond the plain
Id. at 1067-68 (citation omitted) (emphasis added
A motion for appointment of counsel is not among those
excepted from section 636(b)(1)(A).
As just explained
though, that does not necessarily mean that such a motion is
appointment of counsel to be nondispositive, subject to review
under the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard.
e.g., Tremblay v. Lapier, 2010 WL 3187456 (D.Mont. Aug. 10,
(W.D.Wash. Feb. 6, 2009) (finding that a magistrate judge’s
“non-dispositive
appointment of counsel . . . was neither clearly erroneous nor
contrary to law[]”); and Nash v. Waddington, 2007 WL 2461774
(W.D.Wash. Aug. 27, 2007) (same).
such motions are not dispositive of a party’s claim or defense.
Cf. Jones v. Vanderville, 2009 WL 4572880, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Dec.
1, 2009) (magistrate judge’s order dismissing the complaint with
leave to amend was non-dispositive).
Indeed, courts routinely deem orders denying
302279,
prisoner’s]
*2-*3
That is logical given that
Based upon the foregoing, this court, too, considers the
Magistrate Judge’s order denying plaintiff Jones’ motion for
appointment of counsel to be non-dispositive.
conclusion is the fact that the Magistrate Judge explicitly
denied that motion “without prejudice.”
with prejudice “in the sense that” the former “does not preclude
a subsequent motion based on the same argument.”
(D.Ariz. Oct. 14, 2008).
order also is non-dispositive “in the sense” that it does not
counsel at another point during this litigation.
Bolstering this
Ord. (Doc. 110) at
A denial without prejudice is different than a denial
4567229,
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s
The determination that the Magistrate Judge’s order is non-
dispositive means that it is subject to the clearly erroneous
or contrary to law standard of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a) (a district court “must consider timely
objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law[]”).
findings of fact, is significantly deferential, requiring a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Patterson v. Ryan, 2010 WL 4136097, at *2 (D.Ariz. Oct. 13,
contrast, the contrary to law standard . . . permits independent
review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.”
these standards in mind, the court will consider plaintiff's
objections to the order denying his motion for appointment of
“The clearly
Those objections consist of a list of 13 statements, mostly
pertaining to plaintiff’s complaint, although a few are germane
to his motion for counsel.
Further, plaintiff asserts that the
Plaintiff has utterly failed to show that any of the Magistrate
Judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.
shown that any of the Magistrate Judge’s legal conclusions were
careful review of plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel,
Plaintiff would be hard pressed to make
the applicable law, and the relevant facts.
absolutely no basis for this court to reconsider any aspect of
plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the
court overrules plaintiff’s objections and affirms
plaintiff’s “Notice of Appeal.”
that order. 4
defendant’s motion to strike (Doc. 126).
The court thus denies as moot
Prior to the Magistrate Judge issuing the subject order,
enforce a Judgement Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 62 Physical and Mental
Examinations[] Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35[.]” Mot. (Doc. 107).
The court is well aware that in this Circuit a magistrate judge has no
authority to issue a dispositive order denying in forma pauperis status unless
there has been written consent pursuant to section 636(c). Tripati v. Rison, 847
F.2d 548, 549 (9 th Cir. 1988); see also Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113,
1114 (9 th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“[A]n application to proceed in forma
pauperis is not a nondispositive matter under Rule 72(a).”); and LRCiv 72.2(a)(4)
(“[A] Magistrate Judge may not deny a request for in forma pauperis status unless
the person requesting such status has expressly consented in writing to Magistrate
Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).”) There was no written consent
The Magistrate Judge’s order did invoke the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
Therefore, at first glance it might appear that the
Magistrate Judge exceeded the scope of his statutory authority in denying
plaintiff’s request for counsel based upon subsection (e)(1) of that statute.
However, the Magistrate Judge clearly had the authority, as he did, to consider
whether plaintiff’s request for counsel should be granted under that particular
statute. The Magistrate Judge had that authority because in contrast to the denial
of informa pauperis status, as explained above, the denial of a request to appoint
counsel is non-dispositive.
Moreover, as noted at the outset, the transfer of this action from the United
States District Court, District of Alaska, that court granted plaintiff’s
application for IFP status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Especially
given that history, it is obvious that the issue of plaintiff’s IFP status was not
before Magistrate Judge Irwin. Rather, he only properly considered the discrete
issue of whether the court should “request an attorney to represent” plaintiff
under section 1915(e)(1) because plaintiff is “unable to afford counsel.” See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
April 20, 2011, the Magistrate Judge withdrew the referral order
as to that particular motion, so that motion is now properly
Insofar as the court is able to discern, plaintiff’s motion
actually seeks three separate forms of relief.
for counsel is ‘resolved[.]’”
Second, if his motion for appointment of counsel is denied,
plaintiff “asks this court for reconsideration of that denial.”
seeking a “stay [of] all proceedings[] until[] the motion
Mot. (Doc. 107) at 1, ¶ 1).
plaintiff is seeking a “private examination” as to his “mental
status” pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 35.
defendant[’]s
expense[,]”
Id. at 2, ¶ 7).
Given the limited scope of the stay which plaintiff is
seeking, i.e., “until[] the motion for counsel is resolved[,]’”
his motion is moot because this court has resolved that issue.
“reconsideration of th[e] denial” of his motion for appointment
See id. at 1, ¶ 2).
As to plaintiff’s request for a private mental examination
at defendant’s expense, Rule 35 simply does not encompass such
the discretion “under appropriate circumstances, [to] order a
party to submit to a physical examination at the request of an
opposing party[.]”
(N.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 2011).
court with authority to appoint an expert to examine a party
To be sure, pursuant to Rule 35 a district court has
Callegari v. Lee, 2011 WL 175927, at *7
However, “Rule 35 ‘does not vest the
Carroll, 602 F.Supp.2d 521, 526 (D.Del. 2009); see, e.g., Baker
v. Hatch, 2010 WL 3212859 at *3 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (finding no
authority under Rule 35(a) to grant pro se prisoner plaintiff's
request for medical examination); Adams v. Epps, 2008 WL 4861926
at *1 (S.D.Miss. 2008) (same); Cabrera v. Williams, 2007 WL
2682163 at *2 (D.Neb. Sept.7, 2007) (same)).
court denies plaintiff’s motion insofar as he is seeking a
court-ordered physical examination at defendant’s expense.
In short, the court denies in its entirety plaintiff’s
motion for a stay (Doc. 107).
Simultaneously with the filing of his “Notice of Appeal”
plaintiff filed a “Motion for Request for Stay[] Under Rule 24 5
Circu[i]t[] Court of Appeals Rules on Appeal from the Court’s
Decision” (Doc. 123) at 1 (footnote added).
sponte withdraws the reference to the Magistrate Judge as to
this motion, and denies it as premature given that currently
there is nothing pending in the Ninth Circuit.
April Motion
Proceeding[]s
[U]ntil[]
The court sua
(1) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[]” (Doc. 107)
OVERRULED; and the Magistrate Judge’s order denying plaintiff’s
motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice (Doc. 110)
Plaintiff’s reliance upon F ED .R.C IV .P. 24 as the basis for this motion
That Rule governs intervention in an action and has no relevance
whatsoever to this stay motion.
is AFFIRMED;
(3) Plaintiff’s “Motion for Request for Stay[]” (Doc. 123)
(4) Defendant’s “Request to Strike Notice of Appeal” (Doc.
126) is DENIED.
DATED this 5 th day of May, 2011.
copies to plaintiff pro se and all counsel of record