Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99606/union-pacific-r-co-vs-price
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 41', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 16', '§ 1009', '§ 3', '§ 3']

Union Pacific R Co Vs Price - Citation 99606 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Union Pacific R. Co. Vs. Price - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/99606
Case Number 360 U.S. 601
union pacific r. co. v. price - 360 u.s. 601 (1959) u.s. supreme court union pacific r. co. v. price, 360 u.s. 601 (1959) union pacific railroad co. v. price no. 414 argued march 31, 1959 decided june 29, 1959 360 u.s. 601 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus claiming that respondent had been discharged by petitioner railroad in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, his union, acting on his behalf and with his consent, submitted the grievance to the national railroad adjustment board, which found that his dismissal was justified. thereafter, respondent sued the railroad in a federal district court to recover damages for wrongful dismissal. held: .....
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price - 360 U.S. 601 (1959)
U.S. Supreme Court Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959)
Held: respondent's submission of his grievances as to the validity of his dismissal to be Board precludes him from seeking damages for that dismissal in a common law action. Pp. 360 U. S. 602 -617.
(b) The clear language of § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act, the scheme of the Act, and its legislative history compel the conclusion that an award by the Board, holding that an employee was properly discharged, precludes him from relitigating the same issue in a common law damage suit. Pp. 360 U. S. 608 -614.
(c) Although an enforcement proceeding against a noncomplying carrier under § 3 First (p) affords a defeated carrier some opportunity to relitigate issues decided by the Board, Congress did not provide a similar opportunity for a defeated employee. Pp. 360 U. S. 614 -617.
This is a diversity common-law action brought by the respondent, a former employee of petitioner railroad, in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to recover damages from the railroad for allegedly wrongfully discharging him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The validity of the discharge was previously challenged upon the same grounds before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, in a proceeding brought by the Brotherhood on respondent's behalf under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act [ Footnote 1 ] seeking the respondent's reinstatement with back pay. The Board rendered an award in favor of the petitioner. The question for decision here is whether the respondent may pursue a common law remedy for damages for his allegedly wrongful dismissal after having chosen to pursue the statutory remedy which resulted in a determination by the National Adjustment Board that his dismissal was justified.
The Brotherhood processed respondent's grievance through the required management levels, and, when settlement could not be reached nor agreement arrived at for a joint submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Brotherhood, in January, 1951, filed an ex parte submission with the Board's First Division. [ Footnote 2 ] Hearing was waived by the parties, and the submission was considered on the papers filed by them. The Adjustment Board, on June 25, 1952, rendered its award "Claim denied," with supporting findings. [ Footnote 3 ]
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the Board's award was based solely on its decision that Article 33(a) was not violated by the railroad because respondent's dismissal followed a "thorough investigation." Rather, we think the award also reflects the Board's determination that respondent was discharged for good cause. Thus, we agree with Judge Healy, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that, on the face of the customarily brief findings of the Board, [ Footnote 4 ] it appears
255 F.2d at 667-668. Since the discharge could be set aside by the Board if either ground of the submission was sustained, the unqualified denial of the claim necessarily implied, we think, that the Board decided both grounds submitted adversely to the respondent. Even if the procedure followed by the railroad constituted a proper investigation, the Board's outright denial of the claim is explicable only on the ground that the Board also held that Article 32(b) did not justify the respondent in disobeying the dispatcher's instruction to remain at Nipton. We conclude that both issues were decided by the Board against the respondent, [ Footnote 5 ] and therefore reach the question whether the respondent, despite the adverse determination of the Adjustment Board, could pursue the common law remedy for damages in the District Court. [ Footnote 6 ]
Congress has said in § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act [ Footnote 7 ] that the Adjustment Board's "awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award." Respondent does not argue that a "money award" is anything other than an award directing the payment of money. Indeed, it would distort the English language to interpret that term as including a refusal to award a money payment. Thus, the plain language of § 3 First (m), on its face, imports that Congress intended that the Board's disposition of a grievance should preclude a subsequent court action by the losing party. Furthermore, we have said of the Railway Labor Act that "the specification of one remedy normally excludes another." Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 , 320 U. S. 301 . Thus, our duty to give effect to the congressional purpose compels us to hold that the instant common law action is precluded unless the over-all scheme established by the Railway Labor Act and the legislative history clearly indicate a congressional intention contrary to that which the plain meaning of the words imports. Our understanding of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, reinforces what the statutory language already makes clear, namely, that Congress barred the employee's subsequent resort to the common
law remedy after an adverse determination of his grievance by the Adjustment Board. [ Footnote 8 ]
Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 , were thus to be established by voluntary agreement. Congress, even in 1926 however, recognized that the boards would not be useful in bringing about industrial peace unless their decisions were binding on the parties. Thus, the 1926 Act required that agreements creating adjustment boards must stipulate
But the 1926 Act provided no sanctions to force the carriers and their employees to make agreements establishing adjustment boards and many railroads refused to participate on such boards or so limited their participation that the boards were ineffectual. [ Footnote 9 ] Moreover, the boards which were created were composed of equal numbers of management and labor representatives, and deadlocks over particular cases became commonplace. Since no procedure for breaking such deadlocks was provided, many disputes remained unsettled. As reported to Congress in 1934 by Mr. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation:
Hearings before the House Rules Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25; see also p. 14; see also Hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17; and see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 , 325 U. S. 725 -726.
The railroad labor organizations were particularly dissatisfied. They urged that effective adjustment of grievances could be attained only by amendments to the 1926 Act that would establish a National Adjustment Board in which both carriers and employees would be required to participate, that would permit an employee to compel a carrier to submit a grievance to the Board, that would provide for a neutral person to break deadlocks occurring when the labor and management representatives divided equally, and, finally, that would make awards binding on the parties and enforceable in the courts, when favorable to the employees. [ Footnote 10 ] These views prevailed in the Congress,
and resulted in the 1934 amendments, which drastically changed the scheme of the Act. Act of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185. [ Footnote 11 ] The National Railroad Adjustment Board was created, and the carriers were required to participate through representatives selected by them, § 3 First (a) through (g). The Board is composed of four divisions, each having jurisdiction over different employees and whose proceedings are independent of one another, § 3 First (h). Disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements must be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officers of the carrier designated to handle such disputes, but, failing adjustment, the disputes may be referred by the parties or by either party to the appropriate division, § 3 First (i). Upon failure of a division to agree upon an award because of a deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote of the division members, the division must appoint a neutral referee to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award, § 3 First (l). Awards are final and binding except insofar as they contain a money award; in case of dispute involving an interpretation of the award either party may request the division to interpret the award in the light of the dispute, § 3 First (m). In case of an award favorable to the petitioner, the division shall make an order, directed to the carrier, to make the award effective,
Despite the conclusion compelled by the over-all scheme of the Railway Labor Act and its legislative history, it is suggested that, because an enforcement proceeding against a noncomplying carrier under § 3 First (p) affords the defeated carrier some opportunity to relitigate the issues decided by the Adjustment Board, [ Footnote 12 ] unfairness results if
§ 3 First (m) is construed so as to deny the employee the right to maintain this common law action. We are referred to the emphasis upon the consideration of avoiding unfairness expressed in United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U. S. 426 , which held that a denial by the Interstate Commerce Commission of a claim of a shipper for money reparations is reviewable in the federal courts, pointing out that a Commission award favorable to a shipper was not final and binding upon the railroad. But that holding rested upon an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 41(28), providing that
Plainly the statutory scheme, as revised by the 1934 amendments, was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily, principally as matters of the administration and application of the provisions of collective bargaining agreements. This grist of labor relations is such that the statutory scheme cannot realistically be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board, past the action under § 3 First (p) authorized against the noncomplying carrier, see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 124 F.2d 235, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 319 U.S. 732, or the review sought of an award claimed to result from a denial of due process of law, see Ellerd v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 241 F.2d 541; Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F.2d 579, 582. So far as appears, all of the Court of Appeals [ Footnote 13 ] and District Courts [ Footnote 14 ] which have
Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 , 325 U. S. 720 -721.
It is conceded that respondent authorized the Brotherhood to bring his claim before the Adjustment Board. Compare Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 ; aff'd on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 .
Since respondent, instead of bringing his claim in court as was his right under Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 , chose to pursue that claim before the Adjustment Board, he does not even argue that a holding that the Railway Labor Act precludes a relitigation of that claim in the courts would deprive him of any constitutional right to a jury trial.
Despite the clear import of the statutory language and the legislative history, the respondent argues that this Court's holding in Moore v. Illinois R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 , requires us to hold that the instant suit is not precluded. However, the holding in Moore was simply that a common law remedy for damages might be pursued by a discharged employee who did not resort to the statutory remedy before the Board to challenge the validity of his dismissal. A different question arises here where the employee obtained a determination from the Board, and, having lost, is seeking to relitigate in the courts the same issue as to the validity of his discharge.
Provision for judicial enforcement of awards against employees was thought to be unnecessary, since grievances are usually asserted by employees challenging some action by the carrier, and, if the grievance is not sustained by the Board, the award simply denies the claim, and requires no affirmative action by the employee. If an unfavorable award results in a strike, the carrier may obtain injunctive relief. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 ; see also Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 58-65.
For discussion of the statutory scheme enacted in the Railway Labor Act and the 1934 amendments thereto, see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 ; Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 124 F.2d 235, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 319 U.S. 732.
The basic question in this case is the one reserved in Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 , 325 U. S. 719 -720. It is whether an award that denies a claim for money damages comes within the exception of § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act which provides that "the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award."
It was pointed out in the dissent in that case (325 U.S. at 325 U. S. 760 -761) that the provision for finality of these awards
"Since both Acts came out of the same Congressional Committees one finds, naturally enough, that the provisions for enforcement and review of the Adjustment Board's awards were based on those for reparation orders by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Compare Railway Labor Act, § 3, First (p) with Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by § 5 of the Hepburn Act, 34 Stat. 584, 590, 49 U.S.C. § 16(1), (2). If a carrier fails to comply with a reparation order, as is true of noncompliance with an Adjustment Board award, the complainant may sue in court for enforcement; the Commission's order and findings and evidence then become prima facie evidence of the facts stated. But a denial of a money claim by the Interstate Commerce Commission bar the door to redress in the courts. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448 ; ICC v. United States, 289 U. S. 385 , 289 U. S. 388 ; Terminal Warehouse v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U. S. 500 , 297 U. S. 507 ."
Since the decision in the Burley case the situation described in the dissenting opinion has changed. Subsequently, United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U. S. 426 , was decided; and it held, contrary to earlier precedents cited in the dissent in the Burley case, that orders in reparations cases which denied the claims of shippers were reviewable in the federal courts. It pointed out that the "negative order" doctrine, which we abandoned in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 , had greatly influenced those prior decisions.
Tolerance of judicial review has been more and more the rule as against the claim of administrative finality. [ Footnote 2/1 ] See Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177 , 305 U. S. 183 ; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 , 321 U. S. 309 -310; Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 , 355 U. S. 581 -582; Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184 , 358 U. S. 190 . The weight of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009, is on the side of judicial review, the finality of administrative action being sanctioned only where it is clear from the statutory scheme that judicial review is precluded.
It is true that the Act does not provide the method of review in a case of this kind. Section 3 First (p) only covers the case where an award has been granted an employee and the carrier "does not comply." In that case, the order of the Board "shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." § 3 First (p). But this action is properly maintainable if the District Court otherwise has jurisdiction. No question of election of remedies is involved, because of the express provision in the Act that the award of the Board is not final. Since there is no provision in the Act that specifies what judicial review may be obtained, there are preserved whatever judicial remedies are available. One of those is a suit for damages for wrongful discharge. In three separate decisions, we have said that actions for wrongful discharge can be maintained in the courts by the employee. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 ; Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 , 339 U. S. 244 ; Transcontinental & Western Air v. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653 , 345 U. S. 661 . We stated in the Slocum case that "A common law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differs from any remedy which the Board has power to provide. . . ." The Board has power to reinstate the discharged employee and award back pay, and that was the relief which this employee sought before the Board. But the common law action for wrongful discharge may include other items of damages as well. Here, the employee claimed not only lost earnings, but future earnings, seniority rights, retirement rights, hospitalization rights, and transportation rights. Whether Nevada law that governs this contract would grant as much is not now important. The point is that the measure of the recovery in a suit for damages is not necessarily the same, and may in fact be greater, including an
award of attorney fees. [ Footnote 2/2 ] It is difficult to believe that this cause of action triable before a jury is lost, wiped out, or abolished merely because the employee loses out when he pursues the lesser or more restrictive remedy before the Board. If there is to be equality between employer and employee in the assertion of rights and the assumption of duties under the Act, the employee cannot be held to have merely one chance if he proceeds before the Board, while the employer has a remedy first before the Board, and, if he loses there, another one before the court.
In my view, the Court's contrary reading of § 3 raises questions of constitutional magnitude. For if an employee is to be denied any review of the Board's decision when the railroad prevails, while the latter can obtain judicial review with a jury trial before complying with a Board order, there would appear to be an unjustifiable discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is not the usual practice in this country to permit one party to a lawsuit two chances to prevail, while the other has only one, nor to permit one party, but not the other, to get a jury determination of his case. See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U. S. 548 , 360 U. S. 554 (dissent.)
Cases like Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 , and General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 , are no true exception, for those cases involved mediation, not adjudication -- mediation being "the antithesis of justiciability." 320 U.S. at 320 U. S. 337 .