Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19820521_0000221.SNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-23 00:55:14
Document Index: 651592374

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 10', '§ 78', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14']

| LEWIS v. BYRNES
Robert F. Byrnes, et al., Defendants
HAIGHT, District Judge: Plaintiff, a shareholder of defendant Horn & Hardart Company ("H&H") brings this derivative action asserting that H&H, various of its directors and officers, and several others violated § 14 and § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78n and 78j [1976]). Plaintiff alleges that defendants, through the means of a false and misleading proxy statement issued by H&H, fraudulently obtained shareholder approval of the acquisition of a hotel and casino from a corporation largely owned by defendant David J. Korman. As part of this purchase, H&H issued certain securities, some of which were received by Korman and subsequently sold by him to the other individual defendants. Plaintiff asserts that these transactions were part of a scheme by which the defendants undertook to defraud H&H shareholders for their own pecuniary benefit. Korman now moves, pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 12, to dismiss plaintiff's complaint against him. The crux of his argument with regard to each of the plaintiff's individual causes of action is that he was insufficiently connected with any of the underlying transactions to warrant liability under the securities laws. He describes himself as "at most a tangential or miscellaneous actor in the scenario giving rise to this lawsuit." (Brief at 11). Korman also moves to strike certain of plaintiff's prayers for relief. For the reasons stated, Korman's motions are denied. THE COMPLAINT The allegations of the complaint, taken as true for the purpose of this motion only, describe the following scheme to defraud H&H. By an agreement dated November 1, 1979, H&H acquired, subject to shareholder approval, the Royal Inn Hotel, two adjacent motels and other related property in Las Vegas, Nevada ("Hotel/Casino Acquisition"). This agreement was reached with University Development Corp. ("UDC"), a Nevada corporation 75% owned by Korman and 25% owned by Neb-Vegas Corp. ("Neb-Vegas"). The acquisition took the form of a merger between H&H and RCI, a corporation owned by Korman and UDC.
As part of this merger, H&H issued 115,000 shares of common stock to Neb-Vegas and 20,000 shares to Korman. Plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 1979, in anticipation of the November 1 agreement, various of the individual defendants ("Purchasers") arranged with Neb-Vegas and Korman to purchase these 135,000 shares of H&H stock for $13.60 per share, slightly less than the then market price of $13.75 per share. In connection with this sale, the complaint alleges that the purchasers, for no additional consideration, were issued warrants to purchase an additional 135,000 shares on or before December 17, 1983 at $21.33 per share. On December 17, 1979 the Hotel/Casino Acquisition was consummated and the market price of H&H common stock reached $25.50. On March 7, 1980, H&H common stock split two for one. On November 29, 1979, H&H issued a proxy statement for a Special Meeting of Shareholders to be held on December 14, 1979 to obtain the necessary shareholder approval of the Hotel/Casino Acquisition. The complaint alleges numerous false and misleading statements and omissions in this proxy statement which, plaintiff asserts, was intentionally designed to conceal from the shareholders the actual cost to H&H of the Hotel/Casino Acquisition and that directors, officers and other persons affiliated with them were going to personally benefit from the Acquisition. Plaintiff alleges that the deficiencies in the proxy statement were material and that the proxy statement was issued in furtherance of a conspiracy among the defendants to benefit the Purchasers at the expense of H&H. The complaint also alleges that the issuance of warrants by H&H to the Purchasers, and the payment of consulting and finder's fees in connection with the Hotel/Casino Acquisition were a waste of corporate assets. Among his prayers for relief, plaintiff asks that the Hotel/Casino Acquisition be declared null and void. SECTION 14 Korman argues that the complaint fails to allege a proxy violation under § 14 because there is no allegation of any misstatement or omission by Korman in connection with H&H's proxy materials. He contends that because he was not an officer or director of H&H and had no part in the preparation or the issuance of the proxy materials, he cannot be held liable for any misstatements contained in them. In short, Korman argues that the only connection he is alleged to have with the proxy statement is that his name appears in it, and that this is insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain any liability under § 14. Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act forbids "any person... to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy" in violation of Commission rules."
The mere appearance of one's name in a proxy statement does not create liability for any misstatements which appear in the proxy materials. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 203 U.S. App. D.C. 28, 629 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom Kalmanovitz v. SEC, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S. Ct. 569, 66 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1980); Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1977). Liability can attach only if there is "a substantial connection between the use of a person's name and the solicitation effort." Yamamoto v. Omiya, supra, 564 F.2d at 1323; SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra, 629 F.2d at 68; Lewis v. Dansker, 68 F.R.D. 184, 194 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The "substantial connection" standard is derived from the express language of the statute which applies not only to one who himself solicits proxies, but also to one who "permit[s] the use of his name to solicit" any proxy. The "substantial connection" standard was first articulated in Yamamoto v. Omiya, supra, which Korman relies on here. There, the Court declined to hold the purchaser of a building liable for errors in a proxy statement sent to the seller's shareholders seeking their approval of the sale. Observing that the purchaser's name was mentioned only twice and confined to a single paragraph of the proxy materials, 564 F.2d at 1322 n. 7, the court explained, "It is hardly conceivable that the mere revelation that [the defendant] was the proposed purchaser could have been an inducing factor in the granting of a shareholder's proxy." Id. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Falstaff, supra, by contrast, the court rejected an argument, similar to that made here by Korman, which was premised on the holding in Yamamoto. The proxy solicitation in question sought shareholder approval of a transaction transferring a majority interest in the Falstaff Brewing Company to a Paul Kalmanowitz. The court held Kalmanowitz liable under § 14 (a) and explained that "Kalmanowitz' reputation as a businessman, his plans for Falstaff, and his other dealings that could create conflicts of interest were important to the existing shareholders, who were being asked to transfer control of the company to him." 629 F.2d at 69. A review of the proxy material at issue here evidences Korman's extensive involvement in the transactions underlying the proxy solicitation. The Hotel/Casino Acquisition took the form of a merger between H&H and RCI, a corporation owned by Korman and UDC, which was itself 75% owned by Korman. In consideration for the merger, Korman was to receive 90,000 shares of H&H common stock. H&H agreed to permit either public or private sale by Korman of 20,000 of these shares, while the remaining 70,000 were to be held by H&H in a voting trust. Korman was also to receive stock options to purchase approximately 80,000 additional shares of H&H common stock over a three-year period. H&H also agreed to arrange a bank loan of $1,000,000 to Korman, to itself lend Korman money to assist him in servicing this bank loan, and to advance him approximately $180,000. 40,000 of the voting trust shares were to be held as collateral on the bank loan and the advance was subject to offset. H&H agreed that its Board of Directors would elect Korman as a director of H&H to serve until the next annual meeting, and would use its best efforts to cause Korman to be elected a ...