Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/112-f-3d-818-598490622
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 10:48:25
Document Index: 121050074

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 2255', '§ 101', '§ 2244']

112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997), 96-41003, Carson v. Johnson - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 598490622
112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997), 96-41003, Carson v. Johnson
Docket Nº: 96-41003.
Party Name: Arthur X. CARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Defendant-Appellee.
112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997)
Arthur X. CARSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Justice, Institutional Division, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 96-41003.
Carson filed in the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his placement in administrative segregation violates the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. The district court, adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, held that Carson's complaint was properly characterized as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and dismissed it as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 1 The court then sanctioned Carson $250 for his frequent filing of frivolous complaints and barred him from further filings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The district court granted Carson leave to proceed IFP on appeal. Pursuant to Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136-37 (5th Cir.1996), Carson has paid the partial filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b), as amended by the PLRA.
Section 804(c) of the PLRA added § 1915(g), which prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP if he has had three actions or appeals dismissed for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385 (5th Cir.1996). This provision often is referred to as the " 'three strikes' provision." Id. It states:
The PLRA requirements do not apply to habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Cole, 101 F.3d 1076, 1077 (5th Cir.1996). We gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, "habeas proceedings are often determined to be outside the reach of the phrase 'civil action.' " Id. (quoting Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 754-55 (3d Cir.1996)) (some internal quotations marks omitted).
Second, we noted that Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, §§ 101-108, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244-2266; FED. R.APP. P. 22), which became effective two days before the PLRA did, contained separate procedures for addressing abuses of the habeas process. We held that this fact strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the PLRA to apply to habeas petitions. See Cole, 101 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir.1996)).
Finally, we recognized that applying the three strikes provision to habeas petitions "would be contrary to a long tradition of ready access of prisoners to federal habeas corpus...." Id. (quoting Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855-56 (7th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We were reluctant to find that Congress...
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