Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/190/753/516708/
Timestamp: 2019-05-19 06:23:26
Document Index: 757696236

Matched Legal Cases: ['§207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§207', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§ 521', '§254', '§ 254', '§785', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§213', '§541', '§541', '§ 207', '§ 553', '§ 553', '§553', '§553', '§ 541']

William Russell Aiken, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, Defendant-appellee, 190 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
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William Russell Aiken, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, Defendant-appellee, 190 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 190 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis, No. 93-02023--Jerome Turner, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
This Court reviews de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. See Hartsel v. Keyes, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). We affirm "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When evaluating an appeal, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The plaintiffs argue that this practice of closing a precinct's log books violates the FLSA. The Act allows public agencies to provide, in lieu of overtime, "compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section." 29 U.S.C. §207(o) (1). The Act imposes several conditions on a public agency's ability to offer compensatory time, however. Two are relevant for the purposes of this case. First, an employer may grant compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay pursuant only to a collective bargaining agreement, or other agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2) (A). Second, an employee "shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (5).
The plaintiffs' argument focuses on the phrase "unduly disrupt" in § 207(o) (5). They begin by arguing that §207(o) (5) requires an employer to grant an employee's reasonably timed request for the use of banked compensatory time, unless the use of the time would be unduly disruptive. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.25(d) ("For an agency to turn down a request from an employee for compensatory time off requires that it should reasonably and in good faith anticipate that it would impose an unreasonable burden on the agency's ability to provide services of an acceptable quality and quantity for the public during the time requested without the employee's services."); S.Rep. No. 99-159 (1985) ("By unduly disruptive, the Committee means something more than mere inconvenience."). The city, however, acknowledges its policy is not to grant overtime pay to one officer so that another can use compensatory time on a requested date. Plaintiffs contend that the payment of overtime to an officer so that another can use banked compensatory time is not an undue disruption. See Heaton v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1176, 1181 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Moreover, the eventual payment of overtime compensation cannot be deemed 'unduly disruptive.'"); 52 Fed.Reg. 11,2017 (1987) ("The Department recognizes that situations may arise in which overtime pay may be required of one employee to permit another employee to use the compensatory time off. However, such a situation, in and of itself, would not be sufficient for an employer to claim that it is unduly disruptive."). Plaintiffs conclude, therefore, that the city violates the Act by shutting the logbooks not at the point of undue disruption, but rather at the point at which a precinct would begin having to pay replacement officers on an overtime basis.
The fundamental defect in the plaintiffs' position, however, is that it completely ignores the phrase "reasonable period," which the Act gives the parties the freedom to define. See Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(a) (1) (providing that agreements between employers and employees with regard to compensatory time are valid as long as they are not in conflict with the FLSA itself). Title 29 C.F.R. § 553.25(c) (2), specifically provides that:
52 Fed.Reg. 11,2017 (1987); see also Auer v. Robbins, --- U.S. ---; 117 S. Ct. 905, 911 (1997) (Secretary of Labor's interpretation of own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous)2 .
Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the city on plaintiffs' claim for compensation for canine commute time. Memphis maintains a "Canine Squad," of which some plaintiffs are members. The city assigns each member of the squad a dog and a vehicle to transport the animal. The city also requires that members board the dogs at their homes and that they feed, train, walk, and clean up after their four-legged partners. The parties have settled most of the issues relating to compensation for time officers spend caring for dogs while not on duty. However, as the dogs reside in squad members' homes, the city also requires each canine officer to drive his or her dogto work in the vehicles that the city provides. Plaintiffs contend that squad members spend a significant amount of time during their commutes "feeding, training, walking, and cleaning up after the dog [s]." Nevertheless, the city does not compensate officers for either their entire commuting time or for the time during the commute that they spend caring for dogs. Plaintiffs contend that this policy violates the Act. We disagree.
"The Portal-to-Portal Act, which amended the FLSA in 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 521 et seq., represented an attempt by Congress to delineate certain activities which did not constitute work," and which are therefore non-compensable. See Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 649 (2nd Cir. 1995). " [W]alking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform" is one example of a non-compensable activity. 29 U.S.C. §254(a) (1). Similarly, employees are not entitled to compensation under the Act for "activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity." 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2). The effect of these sections is to make ordinary commute time non-compensable under the FLSA.
Despite these provisions, an employee is entitled to payment for any work that the employer requires the employee to perform during the commute. See 29 C.F.R. §785.41. Several courts recently have addressed the issue of the compensability of canine care that occurs during commutes; the leading case is Reich. "Feeding, training, and walking [a police dog] are work" and are therefore compensable activities. Reich, 45 F.3d at 651. It follows, then, that to the extent that " [s]uch true dog-care work occurr [s] during the commute [it] is not exempted from compensation by the Portal-to-Portal Act." Id. at 652.
Plaintiffs, however, have not adduced evidence that canine officers spend more than a de minimis amount of time during their commutes engaged in such activities. See Reich, 45 F.3d at 652-53; see also Bobo v. United States, 136 F.3d 1465, 1468 (1st Cir. 1998); Andrews v. DuBois, 888 F. Supp. 213, 219 (D. Mass. 1995); Levering v. District of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 24, 29-30 (D. D.C. 1994). "When the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of working conditions or the Fair Labor Standards Act." See Anderson v. Mt. Clements Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946); see also United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enterprises, Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrate only that officers must "occasionally stop to feed the dog, let him out of the car or clean up after him while traveling to work." Although plaintiffs' affidavits also indicate that officers must "constantly" and "on a regular basis" discipline their dogs, such generalities do not create a question of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding that a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment). Even if we were inclined to conclude, which we are not, that this "evidence" indicates that, over the course of a commute, the seconds that it takes to discipline a dog -- even on a regular basis -- could add up to a significant amount of time, we are at a loss as to how Memphis could be expected to document such time. See Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1984) (setting forth factors relevant to the de minimis doctrine, including size of the aggregate claim and practical difficulty of recording the time).
On the issue of compensation for the entire commute, we likewise find that the district court did not err; monitoring a police radio does not convert commute time into compensable work. Cf. Bartholomew v. Burlington, F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1170 (D. Kan. 1998) (employer requirement that out-going officer brief in-coming officer during commute does not change nature of travel time). Plaintiffs contend that they should be compensated because they must respond to emergencies that they observe while driving to work or that are communicated by radio dispatch. They also contend that they should be compensated because the presence of marked police vehicles on the city's streets deters crime.
Plaintiffs are incorrect. As an initial matter, if an officer takes time out of his or her commute to respond to an incident, he or she is compensated if the response takes more than thirty minutes.3 Second, although the presence of marked police cars on the streets arguably deters crime, this is irrelevant for FLSA purposes. See Hellmers v. Vestal, 969 F. Supp. 837, 843 (N.D.N.Y 1997) ("Nowhere in the [FLSA] does there appear to be an exemption for commuting time spent in marked police cars."); H.R. Rep. 104-585 ("The fact that a vehicle may been modified for special purposes, displays company logos, or is specially equipped does not alter the nature of such travel."). Finally, the amount of work involved in monitoring a police radio during a commute is simply de minimis4 . Again, the district court did not err.
The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of whether the city's Location-When-Ill (LWI) policy, DR 1104, violates the FLSA. The department pays employees on leave for illness or an on-the-job injury at their normal hourly rate for their regular shifts. The department's LWI policy, however, regulates the activities of employees who are on leave. It provided, during the time period in question,5 that " [a] member reporting sick or injured shall be confined to his or her residence, clinic, or hospital, except to visit his or her personal physician or by permission of his or her supervisor."6 The policy thus placed no restrictions on an officer's activities while at home, but if an officer left home without permission, he or she was subject to discipline. The record indicates that the city enforced the policy with checks by supervisors every third day. The department made checks "at all hours." It conducted them by phone, but if there was no response, the city sent someone to the officer's residence.
Generally speaking, the FLSA requires employers to compensate an employee at a rate of pay not less than one and one-half times the employee's normal rate of pay for hours the employee works above the statute's applicable maximum workweek. See 29 U.S.C. §. 207(a). Under certain circumstances, employer restrictions on what is ostensibly an employee's free time can cause such time to count as hours worked. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(c), (d). The question confronting this Court is analogous to that posed by cases considering the compensability of "on-call" time.7 An employer must compensate an employee for time spent "predominantly for the employer's benefit." Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 968 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 553.221(c), (d). In other words, the question in on-call cases is whether the employer's restrictions on officers' time "prevent the employees from effectively using the time for personal pursuits." Martin, 968 F.2d at 611. "That some of the plaintiffs' personal activities may have been affected is not enough." Id. In making this determination, the Court examines "all the circumstances of the case." Id. at 609 (internal quotes omitted). " [A]n employee's free time must be severely restricted for off-time to be construed as work time for purposes of the FLSA." See Dade County v. Alvarez, 124 F.3d 1380, 384 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotes omitted), cert denied, --- U.S.---, 118 S. Ct. 1804 (1998).
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by ruling in favor of the city on plaintiffs' claim regarding police captains. Memphis does not pay overtime to captains because it classifies them as salaried, executive employees. The FLSA does not require employers to provide overtime pay to "bona fide executives." 29 U.S.C. §213(a) (1). The regulations implementing the FLSA provide that for an employee to fall within this exemption, that employee must be paid on a "salary basis." 29 C.F.R. §541.1(f). An employee is so paid "if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." 29 C.F.R. §541.118.
The parties agree that 29 U.S.C. § 207 (o) (5) (B) assures that, in this case, an officer shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use [comp] time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.
29 C.F.R. § 553.25(c) (2).
29 C.F.R. § 553.25(c) (1).
To me, that answer, like the district court's answer, is no answer at all. The district court made a factual finding that " [a]s a general policy, the Division declined to call in officers on an overtime basis in order to permit another officer off for compensatory time." Aiken, 985 F. Supp. at 745. In my opinion, this policy is precisely the practice the Department of Labor contemplated, and sought to forbid, when it declared that it would not be an undue disruption for an employer to ask one employee to work overtime in order to grant another employee time off. See Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments 52 C.F.R. 2012, 2017 (1987).
(1) As a condition for use of compensatory time in lieu of overtime payment in cash, section 7(o) (2) (A) of the Act requires an agreement or understanding reached prior to the performance of work. This can be accomplished pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, a memorandum of understanding or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of the employees....
We acknowledge some difficulty reconciling 29 C.F.R. §553.25(c) (2) and 29 C.F.R. §553.25(d). The Seventh Circuit, however, has recently noted the importance of private ordering in FLSA cases, even in situations in which the FLSA has not granted parties the broad freedom to contract that it has here. See Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary's Hospitals, Inc., 164 F.3d 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 1999) (" [W]e must take account of the arrangement plaintiffs themselves chose. . . . Although the FLSA overrides contracts, in close cases it makes sense to let private arrangements endure -- for the less flexible statutory approach has the potential to make everyone worse off."). We agree.
"Penalties imposed for safety rules of major significance will not affect the employee's salaried status." 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (5). Defendant apparently concedes that some of the rules in question are not "safety rules of major significance."