Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/07/05-2187.htm
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 01:27:51
Document Index: 389221955

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 3553']

05-2187 -- U.S. v. Pettigrew -- 07/27/2006
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (68968 bytes) (53126 bytes)
We acknowledge that the facts upon which Elstad is based differ from those at issue here because unlike the petitioner in Elstad, Mr. Pettigrew was not warned prior to making the challenged confession. Nevertheless, we think that Elstad's underpinnings control this case. Indeed, two of our sister circuits have held that statements made without Miranda warnings but not in response to police interrogation are admissible even though they followed an earlier voluntary statement made in violation of Miranda. See Abdulla, 294 F.3d at 835; Medeiros, 889 F.2d at 823­25. Both courts relied on Elstad's conclusion that:
Mr. Pettigrew argues that the District Court erred in departing upward on the grounds that Mr. Pettigrew's conduct was excessively reckless and because his criminal history category was substantially under-represented by his criminal history score. As to Mr. Pettigrew's first contention, the Guidelines permit departure under § 5K2.0 based on circumstances present to a degree not adequately taken into account elsewhere in the Guidelines. Mr. Pettigrew contends, however, that a departure for excessive recklessness is not permitted in this instance because acting with excessive recklessness constitutes a lesser degree of culpability than that required to commit an assault.(6) We disagree. As noted above, assault is a general intent crime and "a finding of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness supports a conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury." Zunie, 444 F.3d at 1235. Accordingly, the District Court's departure based on Mr. Pettigrew's excessive recklessness was permissible.
Next, Mr. Pettigrew argues that the criminal history departure was impermissible. A district court may depart upward "[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). The District Court found that a criminal history category of III substantially under-represents Mr. Pettigrew's criminal history because one of his prior convictions was for second-degree murder and because he had several convictions in tribal court which were not taken into account at all.
Here, the District Court judge had uniquely reliable information that indicated that Mr. Pettigrew's criminal history category substantially
under-represented the seriousness of his prior crimes--he was the one who sentenced Mr. Pettigrew in 1997 for second-degree murder. Nonetheless, Mr. Pettigrew argues that this is not a permissible basis for departure because the conviction was already taken into account in determining his criminal history and because it is not one of the listed bases for departure in § 4A1.3(a)(2). As an initial matter, nothing in § 4A1.3(a)(2) suggests that the grounds listed for departure are the only permissible bases for departure for an inadequately represented criminal history category. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 724 (4th Cir. 2003) (approving of a departure not contemplated by § 4A1.3(a)(2)); United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1255 (5th Cir. 1989) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (same). Moreover, a defendant receives three criminal history points for any conviction resulting in sentence of imprisonment of one year and one month or longer. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). The score does not further distinguish between the seriousness of offenses. Thus, some crimes, like murder, are under-represented by the inflexible three-point addition. United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2005); Rivera, 879 F.2d at 1255. We are further guided on this matter by the fact that post-Booker, two of the factors that a court must take into consideration in fashioning an appropriate sentence are "the history and characteristics of the defendant" and the "need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(C). We therefore conclude that this was a permissible basis for departure.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/07/05-2187.htm.