Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19760715-665074
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 09:09:14+00:00
Document Index: 260125673

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', '§ 2', '§ 4', "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 154", "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 42", '§ 2', "l'article 467", '§ 4', '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 3', "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 467", '§ 4', '§ 4', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 467", '§ 4', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 467", "l'article 6", '§ 2', "l'article 26", "l'article 467", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", '§ 2']

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Non-violation de l'Art. 11 ; Non-violation de l'Art. 14+11Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 6650/74Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1976-07-15;6650.74 Analyses : (Art. 10-1) LIBERTE D'EXPRESSION, (Art. 10-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 10-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 10-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 10-2) PREVUE PAR LA LOI, (Art. 11) LIBERTE DE REUNION ET D'ASSOCIATION, (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 17) DESTRUCTION DES DROITS ET LIBERTES, (Art. 18) RESTRICTIONS DANS UN BUT NON PREVU, (Art. 5-1) ARRESTATION OU DETENTION REGULIERE, (Art. 5-1) LIBERTE PHYSIQUE, (Art. 5-1) VOIES LEGALES, (Art. 5-4) INTRODUIRE UN RECOURS, (Art. 6-1) ACCUSATION EN MATIERE PENALE, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVIL, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL IMPARTIAL, (Art. 6-1) TRIBUNAL INDEPENDANT, (Art. 6-2) PRESOMPTION D'INNOCENCE, (Art. 6-3-b) FACILITES NECESSAIRES, (Art. 6-3-b) TEMPS NECESSAIRE, (Art. 6-3-c) SE DEFENDRE SOI-MEME, (Art. 6-3-d) INTERROGATION DES TEMOINSParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 6650/74 Rainer LIEBIG v/FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Rainer LIEBIG c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 15 July 1976 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 15 juillet 1976 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention : Is the principle of presumption of innocence disregarded if a judge, when deciding on costs of proceedings after their discontinuance, expresses an opinion relating to the discharged person's guilt 7 Articie 6 paragraphe 2, de la Convention : Le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence est-il mÃ©connu lorsque, dans une dÃ©cision portant sur les frais aprÃ©s non-lieu, le juge Ã©met une apprÃ©ciation touchant Ã la culpabilitÃ© ? (English : see p. 63 )
Les faits de la cause peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, resso rt issant allemand nÃ© en 1950, est a rtiste . Il rÃ©side Ã Sandkurg . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par Maitre Klaus Seemann, avocat Ã Oldenburg . Le 25 avril 1972, le parquet d'Oldenburg dÃ©posa contre le requÃ©rant un acte d'accusation l'inculpant de a . complicitÃ© de trafic de stupÃ©fiants ; b . achat de stupÃ©fiants pour usage pe rsonnel . Sur cette double inculpation le tribunal cantonal d'Oldenburg rendit le 15 aoÃ»t 1973 une dÃ©cision de non-lieu provisoire (vorlÃ ufige Einstellung des Verfahrens) conformÃ©ment Ã© l'a rt icle 154, Â§ 2 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, compte tenu de ce qu'une inculpation de banditisme prononcÃ©e le 14 aoÃ»t 1973 dans une autre affaire par le procureur d'Oldenburg enlevait Ã la premiÃ©re inculpation toute son impo rt ance . Ce tte derniÃ©re procÃ©dure aboutit Ã la condamnation du requÃ©rant Ã une peine de trois mois d'emprisonnement, asso rt ie d'un sursis de trois ans . Le jugement est dÃ©finitif depuis le 5 octobre 1973 . Le non-lieu dans l'affaire de stupÃ©fiants est Ã© son tour devenu dÃ©finitif, trois mois aprÃ¨s que la condamnation pour banditisme eut acquis force de chose jugÃ©e, le procureur n'ayant pas dans ce dÃ©lai demandÃ© la rÃ©ouve rt ure de la procÃ©dure ( a rticle 154, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale ) . Les frais de justice affÃ©rents Ã cette procÃ©dure sont demeurÃ©s en consÃ©quence Ã© la charge de l'Etat . Cependant, par dÃ©cision du 20 mars 1974 ,
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le tribunal cantonal rejeta une demande du requÃ©rant visant Ã se faire rembourser par le TrÃ©sor public ses dÃ©bours personnels . Cette dÃ©cision relevait notamment que : a . . .la question des dÃ©bours personnels doit Ã©tre tranchÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . La dÃ©cision rendue s'imposait et une solution contraire eut Ã©tÃ© inÃ©quitable . Il ressort en effet de l'instruction qui avait Ã©tÃ© faite, en particulier sur la base des dÃ©clarations du tÃ©moin S . et des propres dÃ©clarations de l'ex-inculpÃ©, que l'accusÃ© aurait normalement Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© (denn eine Verurteilung des Angeklagten wÃ©re . . erfolgt) Â» . Contre cette dÃ©cision, le requÃ©rant forma un recours immÃ©diat fondÃ© notamment sur l'article 6, Â§ 2, de la Convention . Le tribunal rÃ©gional d'Oldenburg rejeta ce recours le 22 avril 1974, en dÃ©cisant que le tribunal cantonal avait fait une application correcte de l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale .
Dans sa dÃ©cision, le tribunal rappelait en premier lieu qu e Â« le non-lieu prÃ©vu Ã l'article 154 du code relÃ©ve du pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire du juge . La liquidation des dÃ©bours est dÃ©s lors rÃ©gis par l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code . Il appartient donc au juge de statuer en Ã©quitÃ© sur ce point . Â»
Il constatait que la seule solution Ã©quitable en l'espÃ©ce Ã©tait de laisser au requÃ©rant la charge de ses dÃ©bours personnels . AprÃ¨s avoir notÃ© que la participation du requÃ©rant Ã un trafic de stupÃ©fiant s (premier chef d'inculpation) avait donnÃ© lieu, au cours de l'instruction, Ã des temoignages contradictoires, le tribunal concluait : a Il se peut que, lors du procÃ¨s, l'administration de la preuve effectuÃ©e par l'accusation n'Ã©tait pas satisfaisante . Contrairement Ã ce que soutient l'appelant, ce fait ne nous permet cependant pas, en lui-mÃªme, de traiter l'ex-inculpÃ© comme un aquittÃ© avec les consÃ©quences qui s'y attachent en matiÃ¨re de dÃ©bours . Un vÃ©ritable acquittement paraissait en effet impossible, pour les raisons que l'on a dÃ©jÃ© citÃ©es .
L'ex-inculpÃ© a par ailleurs admis avoir achetÃ© de la drogue pour son usage personnel, en sorte qu'un acquittement sur ce point paraissait hautement invraisemblable . Â» Les griefs du requÃ©rant peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant estime que l'article 6, Â§ 2, se trouve violÃ© en l'espÃ©ce, tant par la dÃ©cision du tribunal cantonal que par l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . a . Concernant l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, le requÃ©rant fait valoir que celui-ci laisse au juge un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire dans l'imputation des dÃ©bours personnels . Ceci aurait pour consÃ©quence qu'une personne relaxÃ©e peut encourir les mÃªmes frais qu'une personne condamnÃ©e . b . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'en Ã©mettant une apprÃ©ciation sur son Ã©ventuelle culpabilitÃ© et en y attachant des consÃ©quences financiÃ©res, le tribunal a violÃ© le principe selon lequel toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction est prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente jusqu'Ã© ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . PROCEDURE Le 30 mai 1975, la Commission procÃ©de Ã un premier examen de la recevabilit Ã© de la requÃ©te . Elle constate que celle-ci soulÃ©ve des problÃ¨mes analogues Ã ceu x
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soulevÃ©s par la requÃªte NÂ° 6281/73, Neubecker c/la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne' et dÃ©cide en consÃ©quence d'ajourner l'examen de la requÃ©te jusqu'Ã sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te NÂ° 6281/73 prÃ©citÃ©e . Le 5 mars 1976, la Commission reprend l'examen de la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te . Elle dÃ©cide, en application de l'article 42, Â§ 2(b ) , de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur, de donner connaissance de la requÃªte qu Gouvernement de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne et d'inviter ce dernier Ã lui prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de ladite requÃªte . Le 12 avril 1976, le SecrÃ©taire de la Commission reqoit les observations du Gouvernement de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne datÃ©es du 5 avril 1976 .
Les observations sont transmises Ã© l'avocat du requÃ©rant qui est invitÃ© Ã faire parvenir qu SecrÃ©taire de la Commission ses observations en rÃ©ponse . Le 3 mai 1976, le SecrÃ©taire de la Commission reÃ§oit les observations en rÃ©ponse datÃ©es du 28 avril 1976, et les communique au Gouvernement de la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne pour information .
Le Rapporteur procÃ¨de le 17 mai 1976 Ã un nouvel examen de la requÃªte Ã la lumiÃ©re des observations des parties, et encore une fois aprÃ©s l'audience contradictoire sur le bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte NÂ° 6281/73, Neubecker c/la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne susmentionnÃ©e, en date du 7 juillet 1976 .
ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S A . Quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recour s Selon le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes car il a omis d'introduire un recours devant la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale . Toutefois, le Gouvernement ajoute aussitÃ´t que, dans une affaire similaire, un comitÃ© de trois juges de cette Cour a rejetÃ© le 15 mars 1973 un tel pourvoi au motif qu'il n'offrait pas de perspective suffisante de succÃ©s . Dans une dÃ©cision antÃ©rieure, la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale avait conclu que le refus de rembourser Ã un ex-inculpÃ© ses dÃ©bours personnels conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, n'affectait nullement la prÃ©somption d'innocence qui est immanente au prin . cipe de constitutionnalitÃ© IdÃ©cision du 19 juillet 1967, Recueil 22 pp . 254 126511 . Le requÃ©rant avait initialement soutenu qu'un recours constitutionnel n'Ã©tait pas ouvert en l'espÃ©ce, un principe similaire Ã celui de l'anicle 6, Â§ 2, de la Convention ne figurant pas dans la Constitution fÃ©dÃ©rale . Il n'a pas dÃ©veloppÃ© son argumentation sur ce point dans ses observations en rÃ©ponse . B . Quant Ã une Ã©ventuelle violation de l'article 6, Â§ 2, de la Conventio n Se rÃ©fÃ©rant d'abord Ã ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de l'affaire NÂ° 6281/73, Neubecker c/la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, le Gouvernement soutient que l'article 6, Â§ 2, garantit Ã l'individu un droit fondamental, mais uniquement lorsque celui-ci est impliquÃ© dans une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Il ne confÃ©re pas une prÃ©somption gÃ©nÃ©rale d'innocence indÃ©pendante de toute procÃ©dure pÃ©nale concrÃ©te .
Voir p . 13
II rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard la jurisprudence antÃ©rieure de la Commission (affaire Autriche c/Italie - Annuaire VI, p . 7851 selon laquelle cette disposition u . . . concerne au premier chef l'Ã©tat d'esprit dans lequel les juges s'acquittent de leur tiche . . . Â» et n . . . exige en premier lieu que les membres du tribunal, en remplissant leur fonction, ne partent pas de la conviction ou de la supposition que le prÃ©venu a commis l'acte incriminÃ© n .
De cette Ã©troite subordination de la prÃ©somption d'innocence Ã l'existence d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, le Gouvernement dÃ©duit que l'article 6 .Â§ 2, devient sans objet et est inapplicable dÃ¨s le moment oÃ¹ cette procÃ©dure prend fin . AprÃ©s avoir soulevÃ© cette exception gÃ©nÃ©rale, le Gouvernement expose qu'en toute hypothÃ©se le fait pour le tribunal de renoncer Ã mettre les dÃ©bours du requÃ©rant Ã la charge de l'Etat, dans le cadre d'un pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire confÃ©rÃ© par la loi, ne saurait Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme une violation de l'article 6, Â§ 2 . Il dÃ©veloppe Ã© cet Ã©gard les considÃ©rations suivantes : a . la dÃ©cision qui a mis fin au procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant ne fait apparaitre aucune prÃ©somption de culpabilitÃ© . Aucune condamnation n'a Ã©tÃ© infligÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant est incontestablement innocent au sens de l'article 6, Â§ 2 ; b . on ne peut dÃ©duire de l'article 6, Â§ 2, qu'il oblige les Hautes Parties Contractantes, en cas de discontinuation de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, Ã exempter l'accusÃ© de tous les frais qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© occasionnÃ©s par sa dÃ©fense . Si certaines dispositions de la Convention (par exemple, l'article 6, Â§ 3, lettres (c) et (e) et l'article 5, 5 5) contiennent des normes positives concernant des demandes en rÃ©paration dirigÃ©es contre l'Etat, il n'en va pas de mÃ©me pour le paragraphe 2 de l'article 6, ce qui confirme que les Hautes Parties Contractantes n'ont pas voulu lier Ã© la prÃ©somption d'innocence des consÃ©quences sur le plan des frais . Selon le texte ancien du paragraphe 467 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, l'accusÃ© devait supporter les frais de sa dÃ©fense mÃ©me s'il Ã©tait acquittÃ© : ce n'Ã©tait qu'au cas oÃ¹ son acquittement avait Ã©tÃ© prononcÃ© Ã raison du fait que son innocence avait Ã©tÃ© prouvÃ©e, que les frais devaient Ã©tre mis Ã la charge du TrÃ©sor . La Cour constitutionnelle a estimÃ© que cette disposition Ã©tait conforme au principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence que l'on peut dÃ©duire du principe de Â« l'Etat fondÃ© sur la primautÃ© du droit (Rechtstaatsprinzipl instituÃ© par la Loi fondamentale (dÃ©cision du 19 juillet 1967, BVerfGE 22, 254 126511 .
c . L'argument du requÃ©rant selon lequel l'article 467, Â§ 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale aurait pour effet de faire supporter par le bÃ©nÃ©ficiaire d'un non-lieu les mPmes frais qu'un condamnÃ© est faux, puisqu'un condamnÃ© doit supporter Ã©galement les frais de justice . Les Â« dÃ©penses nÃ©cessaires n(notwendige Auslage) que le juge peut dÃ©cider de ne pas mettre Ã la charge de l'Etat en cas de non-lieu judiciaire (article 467, Â§ 4, StPOI sont essentiellement les frais d'avocat et de courrier ainsi que l'indemnisation pour perte de temps, frais qui ne lui sont pas directement imposÃ©s par l'Etat contre son grÃ© . Encore une fois, une obligation faite au TrÃ©sor d'indemniser l'inculpÃ© pour ses dÃ©bours personnels constituerait une obligation de compensation qui ne peut Ptre dÃ©duite du principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence visÃ© Ã l'article 6,Â§ 2 . d . Le tribunal cantonal et le tribunal rÃ©gional ont, en l'espÃ¨ce, correctement interprÃ©tÃ© l'article 467, Â§ 4, comme visant Ã© permettre une satisfaction Ã©qui-
table des intÃ©rÃ©ts en prÃ©sence . Il rÃ©sultait de l'instruction, en l'Ã©tat, que l'on pouvait s'attendre Ã une condamnation du requÃ©rant . Il aurait dÃ©s lors Ã©t Ã la charge de l'Etat . Ã©inqutabledmrsÃ©oupenl Le Gouvernement conclut dÃ¨s lors au dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Le requÃ©rant affirme pour sa part que l'article 6, Â§ 2, de la Convention Ã©nonce un principe de portÃ©e trÃ¨s gÃ©nÃ©rale, qui ne tolÃ¨re aucune exception ou restriction : Â« Toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction est prÃ©sumÃ©e innocente jusqu'Ã ce que sa culpabilitÃ© ait Ã©tÃ© lÃ©galement Ã©tablie . n DÃ©s lors, si la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale n'aboutit pas Ã renverser cette prÃ©somption d'innocence, celle-ci demeure . Il s'ensuit, assure-t-il, que la personne qui bÃ©nÃ©ficie d'un acquittement ou celle contre qui la procÃ©dure a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©finitivement close par un non-lieu, quel qu'en soit le motif, doit Ã©tre traitÃ©e comme innocente et ce aussi par rapport Ã la question de l'imputation de ses dÃ©bours personnels .
La disposition du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale qui abandonne au juge en cas de non-lieu le pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire de laisser ou non Ã la charge de l'ex-inculpÃ© ses frais personnels issus de la procÃ©dure est donc contraire Ã l'article 6, Â§ 2 . Par ailleurs, les considÃ©rations que le juge Ã©met sur les perspectives d'acquittement existant au moment du non-lieu, pour justifier sa dÃ©cision sur la liquidation des dÃ©bours, violent Ã©galement le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence . Le requÃ©rant indique que sa thÃ©se est Ã©tayÃ©e par les travaux prÃ©paratoires de la loi ayant amendÃ© en 1969 le texte de l'article 467 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint que le tribunal cantonal d'Oldenburg, aprÃ¨s l'avoir mis au bÃ©nÃ©fice du non-lieu, a dÃ©cidÃ© de ne pas lui rembourser ses dÃ©bours personnels . Ceci aurait pour effet, selon lui, de le traiter en qualitÃ© de condamnÃ© eu Ã©gard aux frais mis Ã sa charge . II se plaint en outre que, dans sa dÃ©cision de liquidation des dÃ©bours personnels, le juge a portÃ© une apprÃ©ciation sur le caractÃ¨re plus ou moins vraisemblable de sa culpabilitÃ© . Le requÃ©rant invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 6, Â§ 2, de la Convention . 1. Il se pose toutefois Ã la Commission la question prÃ©alable de savoir si les conditions Ã©noncÃ©es Ã l'article 26 de la Convention sont rÃ©unies . Sans doute la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale a-t-elle dÃ©cidÃ© que le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence est inhÃ©rente au principe de constitutionnalitÃ© (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) et peut Ãªtre invoquÃ© devant elle . Mais, ainsi que le Gouvernement le confirme, sur un recours dÃ©taillÃ© portant devant elle des questions similaires, la Cour a conclu que le refus de rembourser Ã un ex-inculpÃ© ses dÃ©bours personnels conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 467, 3 4, du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale n'affectait nullement le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence . Il ne semble donc pas que le requÃ©rant aurait pu invoquer devant cette juridiction un quelconque point de droit sur la base duquel la dÃ©cision rendues par le tribunal cantonal aurait pu Ãªtre infirmÃ©e et le tort prÃ©tendument subi redressÃ© .
2 . Les griefs du requÃ©rant ont trait Ã la motivation ainsi qu'au dispositif d'une dÃ©cision portant sur la charge des dÃ©bours pe rsonnels distincte, en l'espÃ¨ce, de la dÃ©cisionayant mis un terme Ã la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale .
Dans sa dÃ©cision accessoire relative Ã la charge des dÃ©bours personnels, le juge a estimA que, sur la base du dossier existant au moment oÃ¹ fut prise la dÃ©cision de nonlieu, l'accusÃ© aurait normalement Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© Irs denn eine Verurteilung des Angeklagten wÃ re . . . erfolgt Â») . De mime, le tribunal rÃ©gional a-t-il constatÃ© qu'un acquittement paraissait invraisemblable Ir ( so dass . . . ein Freispruch . . . unwahrscheinlich war n) s'il n'y avait pas eu clÃ´ture de la procÃ©dure au moyen d'un non-lieu . Or, la question se pose de savoir si l'article 6, 4 2 protÃ©ge la personne non condamnÃ©e par un jugement dÃ©finitif contre toute constatation formelle de sa culpabilitÃ© sous quelque forme que ce soit . Il est Ã©vident que la constatation par le juge d'une culpabilitÃ© rt vraisemblabe a, comme dans le cas d'espÃ¨ce, est susceptible d'entrainer des consÃ©quences pour l'individu accusÃ© d'une infraction . La Commission estime, par consÃ©quent, que cette requAte pose des problÃ¨mes complexes par rapport, d'une part, Ã l'interprÃ©tation et la portÃ©e exacte du paragraphe 2 de l'article 6 de la Convention, par rapport, d'autre part et subsidiairement, au domaine d'application de l'article 6, notamment dans les procÃ©dures aboutissant Ã un non-lieu . La Commission est d'avis que ces questions se rÃ©vÃ©lent suffisamment complexes et importantes pour que leur solution doivent relever de l'examen du fond de l'affaire . Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, Â§ 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARE LA REQUETE RECEVABLE . I TqANSL AT/ON I
THE FACT S The facts of the case may be summarised as follows : The applicant, a German national born in 1950, is an artist living at Sandkurg . He is represented before the Commission by Mr Klaus Seemann, solicitor at Oldenburg . On 25 April 1972 the Oldenburg Public Prosecutor's Office charged the applican t with : a . aiding and abetting in narcotics traffickin g
b . buying narcotics for his own use . Proceedings of these two courts were provisionally discontinued Ivorldufige Einstellung des Verfahrens) by the District Court on 15 August 1973 in accordance with Article 154, paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of the fact that a charge of armed robbery filed by the Oldenburg Public Prosecutor on 14 August 1973 in another case had rendered the earlier charges unsignificant . The proceedings concerning this subsequent charge resulted in the applicant's being sentenced to three months' imprisonment, suspended for 3 years . The judgment became final on 5 October 1973 . The applicant's discharge in the narcotics case became final, in turn, 3 months after his conviction of armed robbery had become res judicata, as the Public Prosecutor had not in the meantime asked the proceedings to be reopened (Article 154, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure) . Consequently, the legal expenses pertaining to these proceedings were payable by the State . However, on 20 March 1974, the Distric t
Court rejected a request by the applicant for the reimbursement of his personal expenses out of public funds . In its decision The Court state, inter alia, that : . . . the question of pe rsonal expenses should be settled in accordance with Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The decision taken was necessary, and any other arrangement would have been inequitable . It is clear from the preliminary investigation of the case, particularly from the statements by witness S . and the former defendant's own statements, that the accused would normally have been convicted Idenn eine Verurteilung des Angeklagten wg re . . . erfolgtl" .
Against this decision the applicant lodged an immediate appeal based, inter alia, on Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention . The Oldenburg Regional Court rejected this appeal on 22 April 1974, deciding that the District Court had properly applied Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure . In its decision, the Court pointed out first of all that : "the discharge provided for in Article 154 of the Code is a matter for the judge's discretion . The payment of expenses is therefore governed by Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code . It therefore lies with the judge to rule on this point ex aequo et bono . " It then observed that the only equitable arrangement in the matter was to leave the applicant to pay his personal expenses .
After noting that the applicant's participation in narcotics trafficking (first charge) had given rise to contradictory statements during the preliminary investigation, the Court concluded : "It is possible that the administration of evidence by the Prosecution at the trial was not satisfactory . Contrary to the appellant's assertion, however, this does not in itself enable us to treat the ex-defendant as an acquitted person with the consequences attaching thereto as regards expenses . A genuine acquittal seemed impossible, for the reasons already mentioned . Moreover, the ex-defendant admitted having bought drugs for his personal use , so that an acquittal on this point seemed highly improbable . " The complaints of the applicant may be summarised as follow s The applicant considers that Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention has been violated in his case both by the District Court's decision and by Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure . a . With regard to Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant points out that this provision allows the judge to exercise discretion in deciding who shall pay personal expenses . This would mean that a person discharged may incur the same expenses as a person convicted . b . The applicant considers that by expressing an opinion on whether or not he was guilty and by attaching financial consequences thereto, the Court violated the principle that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law .
PROCEDURE On 30 May 1975 the Commission made a first examination of the admissibility o f the application . It observed that the application raised problems similar to those raise d
by Application No . 6281/73, Neubecker v . the Federal Republic of Germanyâ¢, and accordingly decided to postpone fu rt her examination of the application until it had decided on the admissibility of Application No . 6281/73 . On 5 March 1976 the Commission resumed consideration of the application's admissibility . It decided, under Rule 42, paragraph 2(b ) , of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and invite them to submit written observations on the application's admissibility . On 12 April 1976 the Secreta ry of the Commission received the observations from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated 5 April 1976 . The observations were forwarded to the applicant's lawyer with an invitation to send the Secreta ry of the Commission observations in reply . On 3 May 1976 the Secreta ry of the Commission received the lawyer' observations in reply, dated 28 April 1976, and communicated them to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for information .
On 17 May 1976 the rappo rt eur made a fu rt her examination of the application in the light of the parties' observations and again after the hearing on the merits of the above-mentioned Application No . 6281/73, Neubecker v . the Federal Republic of Germany on 7 July 1976 . ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIE S A . As regards the exhaustion of remedie s According to the respondent Government, the applicant did not exhaust all domestic remedies as he tailed to lodge an appeal with the Federal Constitutional Court . However, the Government immediately adds that, in a similar case, a committee of 3 judges of the Federal Constitutional Court rejected such an appeal on 15 March 1973 on the ground that it did not have sufficient prospects of success . In a previous decision, the Court found that the refusal to refund a former defendant's personal expenses in accordance with Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in no way affected the presumption of innocence inherent in the "constitutionality principlÃ©" (Decision of 19 July 1967, Collection of Decisions 22, p . 254 (265)) .
The applicant originally maintained that no constitutional remedy was available in his case, as the Basic Law did not include any principle similar to the one in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention . He did not pursue this argument any further in his observations in reply . B . As regards a possible violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Conventio n Referring first of all to its observations on the admissibility of Application No . 6281 /73, Neubecker v . the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government maintains that Article 6, paragraph 2, guarantees a fundamental right only in connection with criminal proceedings and does not confer any general presumption of innocence independent of specific criminal proceedings . In this regard they refer to a previous ruling by the Commission IAustria v . Italy, Yearbook 6, pp . 782 and 7841 to the effect that Article 6, paragraph 1, "is . . . primaril y See p . 13
concerned with the spirit in which the judges must carry out their task . . ." and 11 . . . requires firstly that court judges in fulfilling their duties should not start with the conviction or assumption that the accused committed the act with which he is charged" . From this close link between a presumption of innocence and the existence of criminal proceedings the Government deduces that Article 6, paragraph 2, becomes irrelevant and inapplicable as soon as the proceedings end . After advancing this general argument, the Government claims that in any event the court's decision, based on a statutory discretionary power, not to charge the applicant's expenses to the State cannot be regarded as a violation ot Article 6, paragraph 2 .
In this connection they make the following points : a . The decision by which the applicant's trial was brought to an end shows no presumption of guilt . No sentence was imposed . The applicant is undoubtedly innocent within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 2 .
b . It cannot be inferred from Article 6, paragraph 2, that h requires the High Contracting Parties in the event of criminal proceedings being discontinued to relieve the accused of all the costs pertaining to his defence . Although some of the Convention's provisions Ifor example, Article 6, paragraph 3 (c) and (e), and Article 5, paragraph 5) contain substantive rules concerning compensation claims against the State, such is not the case with Article 6, paragraph 2 ; this shows that the High Contracting Parties did not wish to give presumption of innocence any implications in terms of expenses .
Under the old text of paragraph 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused had to bear his defence costs even if he was acquitted ; only if he was acquitted as a result of his innocence being established were his costs chargeable to public funds . The Constitutional Court considered that this provision was compatible with the principle of presumption of innocence deducible from the "principle of the Rule of Law" (decision of 19 July 1967, BVerfGE 22, 254 (265)) . c . The applicant's argument that Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure has the effect of making a discharged defendant bear the same expenses as a convicted person is wrong as such person has to bear legal costs as well . The "necessary expenses" (notwendige Auslage) which a judge may decide not to make the State pay in the event of the defendant being discharged (Article 467 (4) StPO) mainly include lawyer's expenses and postage as well as compensation for loss of time, expenses which are not directly imposed on the defendant by the State against his will . One more, an obligation on the State to refund a defendant's personal expenses would be an obligation to compensate that could not be deduced from the principle of presumption of innocence in Article 6, paragraph 2 . d . In the present case, the District and Regional Courts properly interpreted the purpose of Article 467, paragraph 4, as being to enable the various interests involved to be equitably satisfied . The preliminary investigation of the case showed that the applicant was likely to be convicted . It would therefore have been inequitable to charge his personal expenses to the State . The Government concludes that the application is manifestly ill-founde d
The applicant for his part, claims that Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention lays down a very general principle allowing of no exception or restriction, namely : "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law" . Consequently, if the criminal proceedings do not result in a reversal of the presumption of innocence, that presumption stands . It follows that a defendant who is acquitted or permanently discharged for any reason whatever must be treated as innocent, which also applies to the question of the payment of his personal expenses . The provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which confers on a judge in the event of a defendant being discharged a discretionary power to decide whether or not the latter shall pay the personal expenses incurred by him as a result of the proceedings is therefore contrary to Article 6, paragraph 2 .
Moreover, any views which the judge expresses on the prospects for an acquittal as the time of the defendant's discharge in order to justify his decision on the payment of expenses also constitute a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence . The applicant points out that his argument is supported by the preparation works of the Act which amended in 1969 the text of Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . THE LA W The applicant complains that the Oldenburg District Court, after discharging him, decided not to refund his personal expenses . This, he claims, put him on the same footing as a convicted person as regards the costs he was made to pay . He also complains that an opinion on the probability of his guilt was expressed by the judge in his decision on the payment of personal expenses . In this connection the applicant relies on Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention .
1 . The Commission has, however, to consider the premiminary question of whether the conditions laid down in Article 26 of the Convention are satisfied . The Federal Constitutional Court may well have decided that the principle of presumption of innocence is inherent in the constitutionality principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) and may be invoked in proceedings before it . But, as stated by the Government, after considering a detailed appeal involving similar matters the Court concluded that a refusal to refund a former defendant's personal expenses in accordance with Article 467, paragraph 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure in no way affected the principle of presumption of innocence . It does not therefore seem that the applicant could have invoked before the Constitutional Court any point of law which would have provided a ground for setting aside the District Court's decision and redressing the injury allegedly sustained . 2 . The applicant's complaints relate to the preamble and operative part of a decision on the payment of personal expenses which, in his case, was separate from the decision terminating the criminal proceedings . In his incidental decision on the payment of personal expenses, the judge expressed the view that, as the case stood at the time when the defendant was charged, the latter would normally have been convicted 1"denn eine Verurteilung des Angeklagten v/Are . . . erfolgt") . Similarly, the Regional Court observed that an acquitta l
seemed improbable ("so dass . . . ein Freispruch . . . unwahrscheinlich war") if the proceedings had not been brought to an end by the defendant's discharge . There arises the question of whether Article 6, paragraphe 2, of the Convention protects a person who has not been convicted by a final judgment against any formal acknowledgement of his guilt in any form whatever . Clearly, an acknowledgement of "probable" guilt by a judge, as in the present case, is liable to have consequences for the accused . The Commission therefore considers that this application raises complex problems in relation to the interpretation and exact purport of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention and, incidentally, in relation to the scope of Article 6, particularly in proceedings resulting in the discharge of the defendant .
The Commission believes these issues to be sufficiently complex and important to warrant an examination of the merits of the case . It follows that the application may not be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
_6B-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 15/07/1976Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page