Source: https://en.b-ok.org/book/610763/1a4014
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 05:08:24
Document Index: 111736274

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 2', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 23', 'Art. 27', 'Art. 24', 'Art. 92', 'Art. 93', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 84', 'Art. 3', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 29', 'Art. 65', 'Art. 96', 'Art. 96', 'art. 38', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 28', 'art. 26', 'art. 66', 'Art. 66', 'Art. 2', 'art. 20', 'Art. 19', 'art. 24']

International environmental law | Elli Louka | download
Main International environmental law
ISBN 10: 0521868122
ISBN 13: 9780511250699
convention1838
pollution587
fisheries482
regime428
supra note428
treaty370
conservation358
wastes338
liability313
agreements271
annex264
implementation223
basin219
radioactive210
ilm206
seas202
hazardous196
transboundary191
equitable189
international environmental188
provisions177
genetic resources172
enclosure164
reprinted162
ozone160
coastal160
treaties158
pacific157
declaration154
environmental law153
disposal150
dispute141
regimes140
river basin137
dumping132
international environmental law126
cooperation125
This book analyzes the law and policy for the management of global common resources. As
competing demands on the global commons are increasing, the protection of the environment and the pursuit of growth give rise to all sorts of conflicts. The book analyzes issues in
the protection of the global commons from fairness, effectiveness, and world order perspectives. The author examines whether current policy making and future trends point to a fair
allocation of global common resources that will be effective in protecting the environment
and in the pursuit of sustainable development. The author looks at the cost effectiveness of
international environmental law and applies theories of national environmental law to international environmental problems. Chapters include analysis of areas such as marine pollution,
air pollution, fisheries management, transboundary water resources, biodiversity, hazardous
and radioactive waste management, state responsibility, and liability.
Elli Louka is the founder of Alphabetics Development & Investment (ADI), a company
devoted to environment and development. Louka was a Senior Fellow at the Orville H. Schell
Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School and a Ford Foundation Fellow at
New York University School of Law. Dr. Louka is currently the recipient of a Marie Curie
Fellowship provided by the European Commission of the European Union. Other selected
publications by Dr. Louka include Conflicting Integration: The Environmental Law of the European
Union (2004), Biodiversity and Human Rights (2002), and Overcoming National Barriers to International Waste Trade (1994).
Fairness, Effectiveness, and
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521868129
© Elli Louka 2006
978-0-511-24967-9 eBook (EBL)
0-511-24967-5 eBook (EBL)
978-0-521-86812-9 hardback
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978-0-521-68759-1paperback
0-521-68759-4 paperback
Chapter 1. Introduction to International Environmental Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1 The World Community and International Law
1.2.1 Sovereignty
1.2.2 Wealth
1.2.3 Cooperation
1.4 Nongovernmental Actors
2 International Lawmaking Process
2.3 Principles of Law
3.1 Developed Countries
4.3 Johannesburg
4.4 From Stockholm to Johannesburg
5 Globalization and International Law
6.1 Sovereignty over Natural Resources
6.2 Obligation Not to Cause Damage
6.3 Principles of Preventive Action and Precaution
6.4 Polluter Pays Principle and Equitable Sharing of Cost
6.5 Sustainable Development
6.6 Equitable Utilization
6.7 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
8 Monitoring and Enforcement
Chapter 2. Foundations of International Environmental Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1 Functions of Law
2.3 Effectiveness as Equity
3 Regulation of Natural Resources
4 Enclosure of National Commons
5 Enclosure of Global Commons
5.2 Deep Sea-Bed Resources
5.3 Germplasm and Related Knowledge
5.4 Freshwater Resources
5.6 Seas
5.8 National Biodiversity Resources
6 Enclosure of Global Commons and Global Welfare
7 International Instruments
Chapter 3. Compliance and Governance Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
1 Environmental and Strategic Impact Assessment
2.4 Reporting/Monitoring
3 Verification and Compliance
4 Right to Information and Participation and Access to Justice
4.1 International Instruments
4.2 Application of Right to Information
Chapter 4. Marine Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
1 State of Marine Environment
2 Integrated Coastal Zone Management
3 Evolution of International Instruments
3.1 Law of the Sea Convention
3.2 Pollution from Dumping
3.4 Pollution from Ships
3.5 Emergency Situations
3.6 Safety Regulations
4 Selected Regional Instruments
4.1 Protection of the Northeast Atlantic
4.2 Protection of the Baltic Sea
4.3 UNEP Regional Seas Program
Chapter 5. Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
1 State of Water Resources
2 Issues in Water Management
2.1 Allocation and Equity
2.1.1 Substantive Equity
2.1.2 Procedural Equity and Institutional Development
2.1.3 Principled Equitable Utilization or Ad Hoc Regionalism?
2.2 Efficiency and Quality
2.3 Integrated Water Resources Management
5.4.1 Suprabasin Instruments
5.4.2 Basin-Specific Instruments
5.5 American Region
5.5.1 United States–Canada
5.5.2 United States–Mexico
Chapter 6. Fisheries Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
1 State of World Fisheries
2 National Management of Fisheries Resources
3 International Management of Fisheries Resources
3.3 International Instruments
3.3.1 Agreement on Fisheries Management
3.3.2 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
3.4 Regional Agreements
3.5.1 South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO)
3.5.2 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (SPFFA) and Western
and Central Pacific Commission (WCPC)
3.5.3 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)
3.5.4 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)
3.5.5 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
3.5.6 General Fisheries Commission of the Mediterranean (GFCM)
3.5.7 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR)
Chapter 7. Biodiversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288
1 Biodiversity Management
1.1 State of Biodiversity Resources
1.2 National and Transnational Protected Areas
1.3 Gene Banks
2.1 Biodiversity Convention
2.1.1 Biodiversity Protection
2.1.2 Resource Allocation
2.1.2.1 Market Value of Biodiversity
2.1.2.2 Bilateral Redistribution
2.1.2.3 Transnational Redistribution
2.1.2.4 Institutionalized Redistribution
2.2 Trade and Biodiversity
3 Protection of Habitats
4 Regional Instruments
4.5 Other Regional Instruments
5 Protection of Species
5.1 Protection of Migratory Species
5.2 Protection of Whales
5.3 Protection of Seals
5.4 Other Agreements
Chapter 8. Air Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
1 Ozone Depletion
1.1 Negotiating Process
1.2 Legislative Instruments
1.2.1 Protection of Ozone Layer
1.2.2 Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Substances
2.1 Negotiating Process
2.2 Legislative Instruments
2.2.1 Convention on Climate Change
2.2.2 Regulation of Greenhouse Gases
2.2.3 Market-Based Regulation of Greenhouse Gases
3 Transfrontier Air Pollution
3.1 Legislative Instruments
3.1.1 Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution
3.1.2 Regulation of Air Pollutants
Chapter 9. Trade and Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
1 World Trade Institutions
3 Dispute Settlement
3.1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
4 Intellectual Property Rights and Trade
4.1 Intellectual Property Rights Institutions and Trade
4.2 Intellectual Property Rights and Pharmaceuticals
4.3 Intellectual Property Rights and Genetic Resources
4.3.1 Letter of TRIPs
4.3.2 State Practice
4.3.3 Seed Wars
4.3.4 TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge
4.3.5 TRIPs and Farmers’ Rights
Chapter 10. Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
1 State of International Waste Trade
2 State of Waste Management
2.1 Landfill/Geologic Disposal
2.2 Marine Disposal
2.4 Incineration
2.5 Recycling and Reprocessing
3 International Instruments
3.1 Hazardous Wastes
3.2 Radioactive Wastes
4 National Regulatory Dilemmas
4.1.1 Management of Hazardous Wastes
4.1.2 Management of Radioactive Wastes
4.1.3 Management of Waste Trade
4.2.1 Management of Hazardous Wastes
4.2.2 Management of Radioactive Wastes
4.2.3 Management of Waste Trade
Chapter 11. Liability and State Responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .448
2 Hazardous Materials Trade
2.1 CRTD Convention
2.2 HNS Convention
2.3 Liability for Waste Trade
4 Liability for Damage to the Environment
5 State Responsibility
6 International Liability
International Treaties and Other Instruments
Law, as Dr. Elli Louka vividly demonstrates in this extraordinary book, is most usefully conceived as a process of clarifying and implementing the common interests
of politically relevant actors. This conception is indispensable for understanding the
development of international environmental law. The spread of industrialization,
with its ever more intensive uses of the resources of the planet, followed by the
evolution of a global civilization of science and technology and, in part as a consequence of those developments, the explosion of the population of the planet from
1.6 billion people in 1900 to 2.5 billion in 1950 and to more than 6 billion in
2000, have combined to put unprecedented and unrelenting stress on the ecological
systems on which the life of our species depends. No other area of lawmaking and
law-applying makes so clearly and vividly manifest the indispensable functions of all
law: the maintenance of minimum order, the allocation and regulation of the use of
scarce resources, and the conservation and allocation of the benefits and burdens of
the world’s resources in ways consistent with shared conceptions of equity.
Approaching this subject as if it could be studied as a body of static rules would be
sterile. Instead, Dr. Louka presents a dynamic picture, in which the diverse actors in
the international lawmaking process clarify key principles such as sovereignty over
national resources, precautionary principles with respect to equitable cost-sharing
of environmental externalities, principles of sustainable development, and common
as well as differentiated responsibilities. Dr. Louka then shows how those principles
are being applied in each of the major areas of international environmental law. Nor
can general international law be excluded from such an examination, for the legal
focus on the environment also has driven major changes in general international law,
which has acknowledged the “tragedy of commons” and in response has authorized
an increasing enclosure and nationalization of resources that for centuries had been
part of the res communis omnium.
Using as a framework this dynamic process in which international environmental
law is clarified, prescribed, and implemented, Dr. Louka reviews and synthesizes
past trends and projections of probable future trends with respect to (1) the marine
environment; (2) shared water resources; (3) fisheries resources; (4) the conservation
of biodiversity; (5) air; (6) trade and environment; and (7) the disposal of hazardous
and radioactive waste. Cutting across all of these trends and projection studies are
the international efforts to establish and police reporting and information-sharing
regimes, many now driven by the daunting challenge of prescribing for some measure
of liability in circumstances in which acts with the potential for causing significant
transnational damage are not prohibited by international law. One of the many
strengths of Dr. Louka’s book is that it presents in extraordinarily rich detail the
entire spectrum of the modern process of international environmental law.
Much of the writing in contemporary international environmental law is passionately and uncritically advocative. Although Dr. Louka’s book is plainly animated
by a deep concern for the preservation of the environment of the planet and the
realization that in the context of a global civilization of science and technology, it
can be protected only by effective international efforts, the stance adopted is not
uncritical and Dr. Louka never surrenders the scholarly role. Precisely because some
of the areas that Louka treats are – good intentions notwithstanding – marked by missteps or – serious efforts notwithstanding – have registered no significant successes,
Dr. Louka’s book will be important for the practitioner in the vineyard of international environmental law no less than for the political leaders who are charged with
Dr. Louka has produced a remarkable book that will be of great value to the
AAUs/assigned amount units (of
ACCOBAMS/Agreement on the
Conservation of Cetaceans of the
Mediterranean and the Black Seas
ACP/African, Caribbean and Pacific
ACTO/Amazon Cooperation Treaty
AIA/Advanced Informed Agreement
APFIC/Asia Pacific Fishery
ASCIs/Areas of Special Conservation
ASCOBANS/Agreement on the
Conservation of Small Cetaceans of
the Baltic and North Seas
ASEAN/Association of South East
ATS/Antarctic Treaty System
BAT/best available technique
BATNEEC/best available technology
not entailing excessive costs
BEP/best environmental practice
CAMPs/Coastal Areas Management
CBD/Convention on Biological
CBNRM/community-based natural
CCAMLR/Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine
CCAS/Convention on the
CCRF/Code of Conduct for
CDM/Clean Development Mechanism
CDS/Catch Documentation Scheme
CECAF/Committee of the Eastern
Central Atlantic Fisheries
CERCLA/Comprehensive
CERs/certified emissions reductions
CFCs/chlorofluorocarbons
CGIAR/Consultative Group on
CIAT/International Center for Tropical
CIFOR/Center for International
CIMMYT/Center for the
Improvement of Maize and Wheat
CIP/International Potato Center
CITES/Convention on International
CLRTAP/Convention on Long-Range
COP/Conference of the Parties
CRTD/Convention on Civil Liability
for Damage Caused During Carriage
of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail
and Inland Navigation Vessels
CSC/Convention on Supplementary
CSD/Commission on Sustainable
CTE/Committee on Trade and
DSB/Dispute Settlement Body
DWFS/distant water fishing states
EBRD/European Bank for
EC/European Community
ECE/Economic Commission for
ECJ/European Court of Justice
ECOSOC/Economic and Social
EEA/European Environment Agency
EEC/European Economic Community
EEZ/Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA/Environmental Impact Assessment
EMEP/Cooperative Programme for
Long-Range Transmission of Air
EPA/Environmental Protection
ERUs/Emission Reduction Units
ESCWA/Economic and Social
ETS/European Treaties Series
EUROBATS/Agreement on the
Conservation of Bats in Europe
FAO/Food and Agriculture
FFA/Forum Fisheries Agency
FFVs/foreign fishing vessels
FOC/flag of convenience
GAO/General Accounting Office
GATS/General Agreement on Trade in
GATT/General Agreement on Tariffs
GEF/Global Environment Facility
GESAMP/Joint Group of Experts on
the Scientific Aspects of Marine
GFCM/General Fisheries Council of
GPA/Global Programme of Action
HELCOM/Helsinki Convention for
IAEA/International Atomic Energy
IARCs/International Agricultural
IATP/Institute for Agriculture and
IATTC/Inter-American Tropical Tuna
IBPGR/International Board for Plant
IBRD/International Bank for
ICARDA/International Center for
ICARM/Integrated Coastal and River
ICCAT/International Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
ICDM/Integrated Conservation and
ICJ/International Court of Justice
ICNAF/International Convention for
ICPDR/International Commission for
the Protection of the Danube River
ICPR/International Commission for
the Protection of the Rhine
ICRAF/International Center for
ICRISAT/International Crops
ICZM/Integrated Coastal Zone
IDPs/internally displaced persons
IFPRI/International Food Policy
IITA/International Institute for Tropical
ILC/International Law Commission
ILO/International Labor Organization
ILRI/International Livestock Research
IMDG/International Maritime
Dangerous Goods (Code)
IMF/International Monetary Fund
IMO/International Maritime
INBO/International Network of Basin
IOFC/Indian Ocean Fishery
IOTC/Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IPCC/Intergovernmental Panel on
IPF/Intergovernmental Panel on Forests
IPGRI/International Plant Genetic
IRBM/Integrated River Basin
IRBO/International River Basin
IRRI/International Rice Research
ISA/International Seabed Authority
ISNAR/International Service for
ITLOS/International Tribunal for the
ITP/individual tradable permit
ITQs/individual transferable quotas
ITTA/International Tropical Timber
ITTO/International Tropical Timber
IUCN/International Union for the
IUU/illegal, unreported, and
IWC/International Whaling
IWIC/International Waste
IWRM/Integrated Water Resources
LDC/London Dumping Convention
LLRWA/Low-Level Radioactive Waste
LULUCF/land-use, land-use change,
MAP/Mediterranean Action Plan
MDBC/Murray-Darling Basin
MPAs/Marine Protected Areas
MTAs/Material Transfer Agreements
NAFC/Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
NAFO/Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
NAFTA/North American Free Trade
NAMMCO/North Atlantic Marine
Mammals Commission
NASCO/North Atlantic Salmon
NATO/North Atlantic Treaty
NEA/OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency
of the Organization for Economic
NEAFC/North East Atlantic Fisheries
NEPA/National Environmental Policy
NGOs/nongovernmental
NIMBY/not in my backyard
NPAFC/North Pacific Anadromous
NPFSC/North Pacific Fur Seals
NWPA/Nuclear Waste Policy Act
OAS/Organization of American States
OAU/Organization of African Unity
ODA/Official Development Assistance
ODS/Ozone Depleting Substances
OECD/Organization for Economic
OPRC/Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response, and Co-operation
OSPAR/Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment of the
TACs/total allowable catches
TBNRM/transboundary natural
TDPs/tradable discharge permits
TRIPs/Trade-Related Intellectual
TURFs/Territorial Use Rights in
TVA/Tennessee Valley Authority
PCA/Permanent Court of Arbitration
PCIJ/Permanent Court of International
UNCED/United Nations Conference
PGR/Plant Genetic Resources
PIC/prior informed consent
UNCLOS/United Nations Convention
POPs/persistent organic pollutants
PRTRs/pollutant release and transfer
UNCTAD/United Nations Conference
RAC/Regional Activity Centre
UNDP/United Nations Development
RBAs/River Basin Authorities
RBMP/River Basin Management Plan
UN/ECE/United Nations Economic
RBOs/River Basin Organizations
RCRA/Resource Conservation and
UNESCAP/United Nations Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and
RFOs/Regional Fisheries
SAARC/South Asian Association for
SADC/Southern African Development UNFF/United Nations Forum on
UPOV/Union for the Protection of
SARA/Superfund Amendment and
SBSTA/Subsidiary Body for Scientific
VMS/Vessel Monitoring System
VOCs/volatile organic compounds
SEAFO/South East Atlantic Fisheries
WCPFC/Western and Central Pacific
SEA/Strategic Environmental
WECAFC/Western Central Atlantic
SOLAS/International Convention for
WFD/Water Framework Directive
SPFFA/South Pacific Forum Fisheries
WIPO/World Intellectual Property
SPREP/South Pacific Regional
WSSD/World Summit on Sustainable
SPS/Sanitary and Phytosanitary
WTO/World Trade Organization
This study examines the rules of international law governing the global commons.
Because global common resources are shared among states, competition for the use of
such resources and the sharing of externalities from resource use are bound to increase
in the future. The book examines how the quest for a minimum order, fairness, and
effectiveness has guided the development of international environmental law and
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to international law and international environmental law. It provides an overview of the actors of international lawmaking, the
international lawmaking process, and the historical evolution of international environmental law. Concepts of international environmental law, such as sovereignty
over national resources, the “polluter pays” principle, the precautionary principle, equitable cost-sharing of environmental externalities, sustainable development,
and common but differentiated responsibilities are explored. The chapter examines
human rights as the threshold principles of international environmental lawmaking.
Issues of monitoring and enforcement in international law are also introduced.
Chapter 2 examines the foundations of international environmental law. The pursuit of minimum order, equity, and effectiveness in international law is analyzed and
the interconnection among the foundations of international environmental law is
explored. The chapter examines how issues of distributive equity often determine the
effectiveness of international environmental lawmaking. Issues of cost-effectiveness
as they influence the success of international environmental regimes are also examined. The enclosure of national common pool resources is introduced and analyzed.
More specifically, it is examined how many national/local common pool resource
systems could acquire differing forms of governance ranging from common property
and state property to private property. The “Tragedy of Commons” rationale that
precipitated the enclosure of common pool resources in national systems is driving
the enclosure of global common resources. The gradual enclosure of global common resources – as it is taking place in fisheries, germplasm resources and related
knowledge, freshwater resources, air, sea, waste management, and national biodiversity resources – is analyzed. Chapter 2 examines the interrelationship between
the nature of different enclosures and the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. The inclusionary or exclusionary nature of enclosures as they affect
perceptions of distributive equity is analyzed.
Chapter 3 examines the compliance and governance mechanisms of international
environmental lawmaking such as environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental assessment, exchange of information, notification, consultation, the right
to participation, and the right to information. The chapter examines whether such
instruments have been effective in the pursuit of international environmental law
objectives. The application of these instruments by international institutions and
states is particularly emphasized. Reporting, monitoring, and compliance procedures as they are developing in different international environmental law regimes are
The seas are a common pool resource that has become an open-access resource
in terms of pollution that states are putting into the seas. Chapter 4 examines the
different regulatory efforts that states have engaged in so as to diminish the openaccess character of the resource including the Law of the Sea Convention, the
MARPOL Convention, various regional conventions, and safety regulations. The
chapter concludes that – despite the efforts of states to enclose the global resources of
the seas under national or international regulatory regimes – the seas have remained
more or less an open-access resource in terms of pollution inputs.
Chapter 5 examines the problems associated with the management of shared water
resources. Water resources are not global resources like the seas but often are shared
among a number of states. As such, they are common pool resources that present the
collective action problems encountered in other common pool resource systems. The
chapter examines in detail the UN Watercourses Convention and its influence on the
articulation of regional instruments on the allocation and protection of freshwater
resources. Issues of equity in water allocation, efficiency, demand-led management,
and water quality are examined as they have been elaborated in different regional
fora, namely – Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the American region.
Integrated water management, as it incorporates issues of water quantity and quality
at the river basin level, the establishment of Regional Basin Organizations (RBOs),
and their role in equitable and sound water management are explored in depth.
Fisheries are a typical example of global common resources. Fisheries are by
nature mobile resources, as they straddle sea areas under national jurisdiction and
the high seas. The management of fisheries has been a highly contentious issue in
international fora. Chapter 6 provides an overview of national regulatory systems for
fisheries resources ranging from the typical command-and-control measures to privatization through Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The enclosure of national
fisheries resources has reverberated in international fora where states have been eager
to enclose global fisheries resources. The enclosure movement with regard to fisheries resources has been mostly exclusionary because the establishment of Regional
Fisheries Organizations, which increasingly assume rights beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of states, is rarely accommodating to new entrants. There are
even disputes among the states that are regime-insiders as they vie for the apportionment of fisheries resources. Chapter 6 examines the international instruments for the
regulation of fisheries resources, including the 1995 Fisheries Agreement. Regional
efforts for the enclosure of fisheries resources are examined for the purposes of
revealing the degree of effectiveness of regional enclosure movements.
Most biodiversity resources, especially terrestrial biodiversity resources, are under
a state’s jurisdiction or are shared among a number of states in a region. Therefore,
many biodiversity resources could not be characterized as the classic example of
global common resources. The biodiversity loss that is witnessed today worldwide, however, has put biodiversity on the international agenda with a new sense
of urgency. The international management of biodiversity is characterized by two
trends. One trend has to do with the assertion of state sovereignty over germplasm
resources situated in nature or in gene banks. The other trend has to do with the
attempts of the international community to regulate national and local biodiversity
protection systems so as to implement an international enclosure of national commons. As many states do not have adequate resources to protect and manage their
biodiversity resources, such resources often become open-access resources and are
degraded. National and transnational protected areas and regional and international
gene banks are methods that have been used for the protection of biodiversity. The
international system has attempted to regulate the national management of biodiversity through trade mechanisms, which prohibit or restrict the trade in endangered
species, and through a number of conventions that address regional biodiversity issues
or species-specific conservation issues. The effectiveness and equity of national and
international mechanisms for the protection of biodiversity resources are examined
The Convention on Biological Diversity was the first convention to address biodiversity as a global common pool resource. The convention, in addition to dealing
with issues of protection of biodiversity, addresses distributive issues with regard to the
allocation of benefits from the exploitation of germplasm resources. Although “raw”
germplasm resources have been, for all practical purposes, open-access resources,
“worked” germplasm resources have been protected under various intellectual property rights systems, such as breeders’ rights and biotechnology patent rights. The
disparity in the treatment of germplasm resources has led developing countries to
assert their jurisdiction over “raw” germplasm resources located within their territory and to demand fees from legal entities wishing to access such resources. It was
believed that the market value of biodiversity, as it is used in pharmaceuticals and
other biotechnology devices, would lead developed countries and companies to share
the benefits from the commercialization of germplasm resources with developing
countries. Chapter 7 analyzes the bilateral redistribution, transnational redistribution, and institutionalized redistribution of germplasm resources. The effectiveness
of distributional mechanisms in terms of bringing wealth to developing countries
and indigenous peoples and farmers is scrutinized.
Air quality is a global common pool resource as air pollution by some industries
affects the quality of the air for the rest of users. The enclosure of global air resources
has been inclusionary as countries quickly realized that control of air pollution by
some states will not do much to improve air quality as long as other states continue
to pollute. In the ozone and climate change regimes, developed countries have
been willing to provide side-payments to developing countries for joining in for
the outlawing of ozone-depleting substances and the reduction of greenhouse gases.
Chapter 8 explores the regime for the protection of the ozone, the climate change
regime, and transboundary air pollution regime. Issues of equity and effectiveness in
the elaboration and possible future articulation of the regimes are further examined.
Market-based instruments and their repercussions for the “privatization” of the air
Chapter 9 examines international environmental issues as they intersect with
trade issues. The case law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is examined in
the various cases in which free trade stumbles over regulatory measures that states
have enacted for the protection of species or of human health. Chapter 9 analyzes
the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) system and its interaction
with the world intellectual property rights system. The development of the TRIPs
Agreement and its influence on intellectual property rights over pharmaceuticals
and germplasm resources are analyzed. The issue of intellectual property rights over
germplasm resources, concerns regarding the “enclosure of intellectual commons,”
and perceptions of fairness, as they have been articulated in related human rights
instruments, are analyzed in depth.
Waste is not prima facie a global common resource. Generally, wastes are looked
on as a negative resource in the sense that no value is assigned to them. Wastes are
generally viewed as an externality produced by industries and households, and the
question has been how to assign the costs associated with such an externality. The
transfer of wastes from developed to developing countries with no infrastructure and
lenient environmental laws brought the waste issue to the international arena and
made imperative the development of a transnational system for the management of
wastes. States have dealt with the waste issue as a forced enclosure issue. Generators
are forced to own their wastes and, thus, bear the costs of the externalities produced
by their wastes. Because wastes are perceived as a negative resource, unless ownership
is forced, they could be found disposed of on common pool resources polluting
the land, water, and air. The international instruments that regulate international
waste shipments have imposed state self-sufficiency and safeguards on waste transfers
based primarily on the prior notification and informed consent of the importing
country before a waste transfer is realized. Chapter 10 examines the effectiveness
and fairness of arrangements for the management and transfer of hazardous and
radioactive wastes. The question that is examined is whether the forced enclosure of
wastes, a so-called negative resource, has worked and whether the equity principles
implied in the notion of self-sufficiency are the only principles that should guide
the future international management of hazardous and radioactive wastes. National
regulatory systems are examined, as it is the management and often mismanagement
of wastes in national fora that has led to transnational waste shipments.
Chapter 11 explores the private liability regimes that have been developed to
address issues of oil pollution, hazardous materials trade, nuclear energy, and liability
for damage to the environment. The issue of state responsibility and associated case
law are analyzed. The issue of international liability for acts not prohibited by international law (e.g., pollution that is not prohibited by international instruments), as it
has been elaborated by the International Law Commission, is specifically scrutinized.
A question addressed is whether state practice indicates liability of states for polluting
activities originating within their territory or whether the principle that emerges is
that of equitable sharing of costs of externalities caused by polluting activities.
Modern international law has emerged from the ruins of two world wars. Before
World War I, public international law regulated the conduct of war. During that
period, states had the freedom to choose between war and peace. States had the right
to pursue their goals by war. The distinction between just wars and unjust wars was
not legally pertinent.1
The reorientation of international law came with the establishment of the League
of Nations following World War I. The League condemned external aggression
against the territorial integrity and political independence of League members.2
Another important development during this period was the establishment of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, these developments did not prevent the eruption of World
In the aftermath of World War II, one of the most important developments was
the establishment of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter outlawed
war as a general means for the resolution of disputes among states.3 After two world
wars, states realized that some institutional framework must be established and some
rules promulgated that would provide procedural and substantive safeguards to avert
future wars. The United Nations was to serve primarily that purpose: preservation
of peace among states.
International law is the law that states make to regulate matters among them:
first and foremost, war and peace and, after the attainment of a minimum peace
order, other matters including economic development, exchange rates, trade, the
L. Oppenheim, International Law 177–78 (vol. 2, 7th ed., 1952). The issue of morality of war has
preoccupied commentators, though. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations 3–13 (1977). See also Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Law, Freedom and Welfare
52 (1963).
2 See also D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions 15–16 (1963).
3 See infra notes 13–15.
environment, and intellectual property rights. A number of organizations have
been developed to deal with such matters, including the World Trade Organization
(WTO) with regard to matters that affect trade and the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) with regard to matters that affect the environment.
It would be wrong, however, to perceive international law as only the regulatory
instrument of interstate relations. In order to prevent future egregious atrocities
against human beings – prevailing especially during war – the international system
developed a number of instruments that focus on the protection of the rights of the
individual. These human rights instruments launched by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights present the order that the international system aspires to achieve.
In addition to what could be called traditional human rights4 (such as the right
to life, the right to property, and the right to be free from discrimination), other
rights have been proposed more or less persuasively. Such rights include the right to
development,5 the right to a decent environment,6 and the right not to be forcibly
displaced.7
Human rights articulate the demands for a maximum order of law. This order
goes beyond the achievement of elementary peace and incorporates the aspiration
for a better quality of life. Human rights shape the notion of human dignity, which
gives direction for the future development of international law. The ultimate goal
of the international law process is the protection of human dignity.8
The United Nations Charter is based on the principle of sovereignty of states.
According to the Charter, each state is sovereign and no state is to violate the
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents on Human
Rights 106 (Ian Brownlie, ed., 1971).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 999 UNTS 171, entered into force Mar. 23,
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 993 UNTS 3, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976.
See also African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, reprinted
in 21 ILM 58 (1982); Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, April 2, 1993, A/CONF.157/ASRM/8.
Initially controversial, this right is now more or less accepted as a legitimate right. For an articulation of
the right in the Rio Declaration, see infra note 149.
The right to live in a decent or a healthy environment has been the subject of debate, see, e.g., Dinah
Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment, 28 Stanford Journal of
International Law 103 (1991). See also Günther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly “Revisionist” View, in Human Rights, Sustainable Development and the Environment
117 (Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade, ed., 1992).
Maria Stavropoulou, The Right not to Be Displaced, 9 American University Journal of International
Law & Policy 689 (1994). For the right not to be displaced, see also infra note 290.
See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 American Journal of International Law 1 (1959).
The World Community and International Law
sovereignty of another state.9 This principle of legal equality based on the sovereignty
of states should not be confused with an assumption of equal power. In fact, the
concept of sovereignty is fairly new in international affairs. Historically, sovereignty
was not a given. Instead, states had to obtain the right to be called sovereign.10
Sovereignty denotes the ability to self-govern, and many states today do not really
possess that ability. In fact, some states are weaker than corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their capacity to run their own affairs.
As the reality of international politics indicates, certain states have more power,
self-government, and control and, thus, yield more influence in the configuration of
international relations than other states. The imbalance in the actual power of states
is enshrined into the UN Charter. The Security Council of the United Nations, the
body that makes decisions regarding war and peace, was formed by the victors of
World War II.11 The structure of power in the Security Council may be anachronistic
but, nevertheless, reflects that even the constitutive organs of the international system
could not have afforded to be oblivious of the importance of power in the making
of international relations. Sometimes this power is authoritative. In other cases, it
lacks legitimacy but, nevertheless, could still be effective in shaping the future of
international order.12
The principle of sovereignty implies that states “shall refrain in their international
independence of any state.”13 But, as explored later in this book, this principle
contains its own antinomy in the UN Charter, as well as in the way that the Charter
has been interpreted including the cases of use of force, self-defense,14 or anticipatory
self-defense.15
It is provided that the United Nations must not intervene “in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . . . ”16 The International
Court of Justice, however, in the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees case,17 ruled that
the scope of a state’s domestic jurisdiction is relative and depends on the development
of international law. The mere inclusion of a matter in the agenda of the General
Assembly or the Security Council does not in itself constitute intervention within the
meaning of article 2(7). The United Nations has engaged in activities considered
Art. 2(1) & (4), United Nations Charter, June 26, 1945 available online at http://www.un.org/
aboutun/charter [hereinafter UN Charter].
B. Buzan, National Security in the Post Cold War Third World, Paper presented at the Conference on
National Security in Developing Countries, Jan. 26, 1994, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of
Art. 23, UN Charter, supra note 9. Permanent members of the Security Council are China, France,
W. Michael Reisman, Law from the Policy Perspective, reprinted in International Law Essays 1, 7 (Myres
S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds., 1982).
Art. 2(4), UN Charter, supra note 9.
Art. 51, id.
Myres S. Mc Dougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and the Minimum World Public Order: The Legal
Regulation of Coercion 231–41 (1961). See also Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 166–67
(1948); Oscar Schachter, The Rights of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Michigan Law Review 1620,
1633–35 (1984).
Art. 2(7), UN Charter, supra note 9.
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, Feb. 2, 1923, (1923) PCIJ, Ser.B, no.4, at 24.
traditionally to be the prerogative of a nation-state, for example, in cases of selfdetermination,18 racial discrimination,19 mass starvation,20 and environmental regulation.
The unequal distribution of power is a constitutive element of international law
from the creation of international regimes that formalize the division between haves
and haves-not to the development of customary international law. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on the presumption that it is legitimate for some
countries to possess nuclear weapons, whereas for others it is not.21 And customary
international law often is based on the practice of states that happen to be able to
shape international developments in an area. Space law has been developed by states
with the technology to explore space.22 The development of the Antarctic Treaty
system is based on an alliance of states that were the first to be able to enunciate
rights over the natural resources of Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty regime could
be characterized as a kind of trusteeship arrangement developed by the acquiescence
of excluded states rather than by their willful consent.23
During the Cold War, the common reference to the United States and the Soviet
Union as the world’s superpowers, which mutually constrained each other, is well
known. In today’s world, a world in which one superpower has remained, the question for other states has been how to constrain that power. A potential contender –
the European Union – has yet to acquire an independent voice and to amass military resources that would match its economic breakthroughs. There are regionally
powerful states as well, such as India and China, which exert significant authority in
regional circles and, as a consequence, in international circles.
After the wars of decolonization were fought, new states became members of the
international community. There was, therefore, the danger of a potential clash
between the new states and those states that are, so to speak, the founders of most
international law. New states generally have not adopted an outlook of international
law that fundamentally undermines the traditional view of such law by Western
states. The new states, however, came into international fora with a new set of
interests and demands. Developing states have pursued the right to development, for
instance, as a fundamental human right that is a precursor of other human rights.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Advisory Opinion), June 21, 1971, (1971) ICJ Reports 16.
E.S. Reddy, United Nations and Apartheid: Forty Years (1987).
The United Nations and Somalia – 1992–1996, Blue Book Series, Vol. VIII (UN Publication Sales No.
E.96.1.8).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, reprinted in 729 UNTS 161. See
also Edward L. Miles, Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945 to 1995, in Environmental Regime Effectiveness:
Confronting Theory with Evidence 273 (Edward L. Miles et al., eds., 2002).
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 66 (1986).
Some view the Antarctic Treaty regime as a sectoral res communis, a property that is held in trust by
the few for the benefit of many, something like an international trusteeship system. However, there
have been skirmishes in the development of the regime as some excluded countries have sought to be
included as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. Efforts to make the area a true res communis have been
rejected by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International
Law and Institutions 402–04 (1997).
Developing states often espouse the view that environmental protection should not
jeopardize their pursuit of wealth and development.
As new states came to the fore of the international arena, the economic gap
between developed states and developing countries became a permanent feature
of international relations. This division between developed states and developing
states intensified the challenge against some rules of international law developed
by the economically prosperous Western states. The division between developed
and less developed states created demands for a new international economic order
(NIEO) based on notions of sharing in wealth creation by all states. Ideas for the
development of a new international economic order eventually faded. Demands for
sharing prosperity, however, have not ceased to present themselves under different
disguises in various international fora, including that of environmental lawmaking.
Distinctions between developed and developing states (the North-South division)
are made in most international instruments and are prevalent in the international
discourse. Most recent distinctions are those made between newly industrialized
states (including mostly the southeast Asian states) and least-developed states (certain
states in Africa). There is also the addition of states with economies in transition,
states that came about after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Because developing states do not have the same economic power as developed
states,24 they have formed the group G-77 (which now includes more than seventyseven states) to confront the power of the elite with the power of numbers. This
cluster of developing countries presenting a unified façade against developed states
should not obfuscate the fact that there are divisions and disagreements among
developing states as well. Sometimes developing states remain unified – under the
umbrella of G-77 – both in appearances and in substance. Frequently, however,
although appearances remain, the substance crumbles under the reality of different
interests. An example in the environmental field involves the climate change negotiations. During these negotiations, small island-states fought for a strong normative
treaty as a means to protect their islands from the real danger of flooding. By contrast, other developing states (including those perceived to be regional powers, such
as China and India) pursued the usual path in international environment negotiations, reiterating their right to development and putting the blame on industrialized
The gap between developed and developing states continues to be wide. Although
citizens of a minority of states are quite affluent, the citizens of the majority of states
live under conditions of abject poverty. Citizens of the majority of states, for instance,
have an income of less than $1 per day. Although some states have been able to break
through the barrier between them and developed states, such is not the case for all
states, especially certain states located in vulnerable regions including sub-Saharan
Despite the absence of a global war, states frequently engage regional conflicts that
involve violations of human rights. Furthermore, even developed democratic states –
which could be considered founders of human rights instruments – often engage in
The GNP of a developing state may be less than the revenues of a multinational corporation.
Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 Yale Journal
of International Law 451 (1993).
human rights violations.26 States that are more powerful mingle in the affairs of –
and even invade – less powerful states under the real threat or the pretext of a threat
to their national security27 or by simply pursuing the appropriation of other states’
resources.28 Many states are ravaged by a number of diseases, including AIDS and
malaria. Under these global circumstances, the question that emerges is what the
role of international law is, and, more specifically, what the role of international
environmental law is. This is a question that Chapter 2 will attempt to answer.
States are not equal in their power and authority.29 Whereas in decisions affecting
war and peace, the hegemonic power of some states is obvious, in the everyday affairs
of state interaction hegemonic tendencies tend to be subtler. Because war is not an
option for most societies under normal conditions, states have tried to cooperate
to achieve desirable outcomes. Even hegemonic states find it costly to affirm their
position constantly through the use of force. Often, therefore, they engage in some
sort of cooperative behavior with other states.
In game theory parlance, states find themselves captured in repeated games in
which the number of players is limited. Such players usually possess quite substantial
information about the past performance of other players. The international community is comprised of a small number of states; this community becomes even
smaller if one only counts states actively participating in most international matters.
States are avid collectors of information about the performance and general circumstances of other states, especially that of states that affect their interests. Thus, one
could conceive state interaction as one in which cooperation is the expected norm
rather than the exception.30 The reluctance to use force, the absence of a centralized
enforcement authority, reciprocity, and cooperative patterns of behavior make the
international arena look like alternating from hierarchy to coarchy and vice versa.31
A result of cooperation is the establishment of networks or clubs among certain
states. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was, in effect, a trade
club among industrialized states. Various security regimes connect allies that happen
to possess similar ideological outlook and development orientation, for instance,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such organizations often lack
transparency, but the lack of open and transparent procedures is viewed as the key
to organizational effectiveness. This lack of transparency gives freedom to officials
See U.S.: Abu Ghraib only the “Tip of the Iceberg,” Human Rights Watch, Apr. 27, 2005. See also
David Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, in 97 American Journal of International Law 842 (2003) (on
the law of occupation and the potential liability of occupying states).
See General Assembly Resolution 38/7, The Situation in Grenada, A/RES/38/7, Nov. 3, 1983. See
also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), (Merits),
June 27, 1986, (1986) ICJ Reports 14. See also John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq,
97 American Journal of International Law 563 (2003). But see Richard Falk, What Future for the UN
Charter System of War Prevention, 97 American Journal of International Law 590 (2003).
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was allegedly performed to take over Kuwait’s oil resources. See also Security
Council Resolution 661, S/RES/661, Aug. 6, 1990.
See Reisman, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
W. Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, reprinted in International Law Essays 381, 405 (Myres
S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, eds., 1981).
involved in these organizations to put together package deals without being constantly scrutinized by the media and the public.32
The club model of international cooperation has been challenged by the excluded
states. Developing countries have engaged in efforts to participate in the clubs of
developed states so as to obtain advantages previously not available to them. India
and China engaged in substantial lobbying to enter the World Trade Organization
(WTO) club. Eastern European countries have engaged in efforts to participate in
the NATO and the European Community (EC) clubs.
Environmental problems have, as a general rule, transboundary effects. Therefore,
states realized early that cooperation, common rules, and standards are better than
unilateral action. The outcome of cooperation in the environmental field can be
seen in the number and quality of treaties and other instruments that have been put
in place for the protection of environment. Not all these treaties are well monitored
and enforced.33 Nevertheless, treaties affirm the will of states to cooperate for the
achievement of desirable outcomes. In the environmental field, developed states have
been willing to compensate developing states for their participation in cooperative
arrangements that are to have global beneficial environmental effects but that may,
at the same time, slow the pace of growth.
1.3. International Organizations
The Security Council of the United Nations is comprised of the victor states of
World War II (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and China)34
as permanent members, and ten nonpermanent members selected by the General
Assembly. The permanent members of the Security Council have the power to veto
any decision of the Security Council,35 reflecting the importance of authoritative
power in the making of the international order.
The Security Council is the primary organ of the United Nations, which deals
with matters of war and peace.36 The Security Council is not generally involved in
environmental matters. However, in exceptional cases, for instance, with regard to
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it held Iraq liable for various damages inflicted on Kuwait
including the damage to the environment.37 The decisions of the Security Council
are binding38 and the powers of the Council are very extensive.39
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 2, KSG Working Paper
No. 01-004, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Feb. 2001 available online
http://ssrn.com/abstract=262175 (Social Science Research Network).
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored
(GAO-RCED-92–43, 1992).
Art. 23, UN Charter, supra note 9.
Art. 27(3), id.
Arts. 39 & 41, id.
Para. 16, Security Council Resolution 687, S/RES/687, April 3, 1991.
See arts. 25 & 103, UN Charter, supra note 9.
Art. 24. “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on
the Security Council primary [not exclusive, though] responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security . . . ” Id.
If the Security Council reflects some of the power elite of the world community,
the General Assembly is the democratic institution comprised of all members of
the United Nations.40 In the General Assembly, each member state has one vote.41
The General Assembly issues resolutions and recommendations that are not binding
but are frequently influential in the shaping of international relations and, when
adopted unanimously, could be considered sources of customary international law.
The General Assembly can consider a variety of matters, such as economic, social,
educational, cultural, health-related, or human rights–centered issues.
Given the broad scope of powers accorded to it, the General Assembly has been
involved in various environmental issues. The General Assembly convened the 1972
UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference), the 1992
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio Conference)
and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD, Johannesburg
Conference). All of these conferences are considered landmarks in the development
of international environmental law.
The General Assembly has created two organs of the United Nations that have
played an essential role in international environmental developments, namely, the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The Commission on Sustainable Development, a product
of the UNCED Conference, functions under the auspices of the General Assembly.
The General Assembly has taken bold steps in asking the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) to give its opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.42
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) or World Court is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations.43 All member states of the UN become ipso facto
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.44 Only a state party to
the Court’s Statute may be party to a contentious case.45 The jurisdiction of the
Court in contentious cases is based on the consent of states.
Consent may be given:
• ad hoc under article 36(1); States can submit a dispute to the Court by virtue of
an agreement usually called compromis;
• by prior agreement in a treaty under article 36(1);
• by accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court through a declaration
under article 36(2).
Compulsory jurisdiction is conferred to the Court by a declaration of a concerned country.46 Declarations are usually not retroactive and include reservations.
There are have been claims, however, that votes should be weighted based on the population of each
state. See Shaw, supra note 22, at 597.
Art. 92, UN Charter, supra note 9.
Art. 93, id.
Arts. 34 & 36(2), Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 available online at
Art. 36(2)–(5), id.
Declarations may include the possibility of dispute settlement by other means and
may provide that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction in matters falling under domestic jurisdiction (“self-judging” clause).47 Several declarations exclude disputes arising
under multilateral treaties unless all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are
also parties to the case before the Court. A few declarations exclude disputes arising out of hostilities in which the declarant state is entangled or disputes that have
to do with national security issues. An increasing number of states have included
clauses in their declarations designed to avoid surprise lawsuits by states that accept
the Court’s jurisdiction and, immediately after that, bring a case against another
state. Some states have excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court any dispute that
was brought by a state less than twelve months after that state had accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court. In order to further protect themselves, many states have
reserved the right to modify or terminate a declaration peremptorily by means of
notification to the Secretary General of the UN with effect from the moment of
notification.48
A few treaties give the Court appellate jurisdiction. The 1944 Convention on
International Civil Aviation, for example, provides for appeal to the Court of decisions of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.49
The International Court of Justice is comprised of a body of fifteen independent
judges elected, regardless of their nationality, although no two of these judges can
be nationals of the same state.50 Judges are persons of high moral character who
possess qualifications for appointment in the highest judicial offices of their respective
countries.51 Members of the Court are elected by the Security Council and the
General Assembly, each body voting separately.52 Nominations are made by national
groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.53 An informal agreement among
members of the United Nations generally governs the distribution of seats among
the various regions of the world. Judges serve for nine years, with five judges rotating
every three years.54 Judges may be reelected and this is often the case. If a party in
a case does not have a judge of its nationality sitting at the bench, it may designate
an ad hoc such judge.55 The Court generally has decided cases by full bench. It
may, however, form chambers composed of three or more judges to deal with a
particular case or a category of cases.56 The ICJ has established a chamber devoted
to environmental matters.
The principle of stare decisis does not apply to the decisions of the ICJ. As mentioned in article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “The decision
of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.” However, the Court frequently refers to its own decisions and to
those of other tribunals.
Shaw, supra note 22, at 530.
Art. 84, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, reprinted in 15 UNTS 295.
Art. 3(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 45.
Art. 2, id.
Arts. 4(1) & 8, id.
Art. 4(1), id.
Art. 13(1), id.
Art. 31, id.
Art. 29, id.
In addition to its function as a dispute settlement mechanism, the Court provides
advisory opinions on any legal question at the request “of whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such
request.”57 The General Assembly has the authority to ask the ICJ to give an advisory
opinion on any legal matter.58 Other organs of the UN and specialized agencies may
request advisory opinions of the Court on “legal questions arising within the scope
of their activities.”59 Based on this provision, the Court has been able to answer the
General Assembly’s request regarding the legality of nuclear weapons considering,
inter alia, environmental matters.60 The ICJ declared that it had no jurisdiction
to give advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons to the World Health
Organization (WHO) because the legality of nuclear weapons did not arise within
the scope of activities of WHO.61
International institutions play multiple roles in the development of international
environmental law. They provide the coordinating fora under which most environmental issues are discussed and decided. International organizations have some
lawmaking function because they issue recommendations, resolutions, and other socalled soft law instruments that, although not binding on states, exert varying levels
of influence on the development of international environmental law.62
UNEP has provided the forum for the discussion of many international treaties,
such as the Basel Convention on the control of waste movements and the Biodiversity
Convention. UNEP has taken a leadership role in the regional seas programs. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been instrumental in the production
of the regulatory framework for the control of pollution from ships. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has generated a number of guidelines on the
protection of public health from nuclear materials, and also has been instrumental
in the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, generating rules for
the disposal of radioactive waste. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
has played a role in the climate change discussions. The World Health Organization
(WHO) has been involved in a number of environmental issues including the control
of pesticides and the trade in chemicals. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) is primarily involved in fisheries, agricultural and forestry development and
agrobiodiversity issues. The International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs)
have been involved in gene bank development. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is involved in trade matters, but its broad jurisdiction over trade regulation
intersects often with environmental matters. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the UNDP have been taking into consideration environmental
concerns as they affect socioeconomic decisions. Various other permanent and ad hoc
Art. 65(1), id.
Art. 96(1), UN Charter, supra note 9.
Art. 96(2), id.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
International Organization 421 (2000).
institutions (e.g., various working groups, committees) have assisted in the growth
Environmental considerations have had an impact on the agenda of many international organizations. Environmental considerations affect various areas of the
economy including all sorts of development projects, agriculture and forestry. The
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]), for
instance, in its pursuit of development (that may involve construction of dams, roads,
or the development of protected areas) has found itself entangled in environmental and human rights matters. Similarly, the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
finances many development projects in which environmental considerations are
Other organizations that have been involved in the development of international environmental law include the International Tropical Timber Organization
(ITTO), which has been proactive in the sustainable management of tropical forests.
Regional organizations – such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the Organization of African Union (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian
Development Bank and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
(SAARC) – have played an influential role in the development of international
Some institutions have monitoring character, such as the EMEP system (Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-range Transmission of
Air Pollutants in Europe), which was developed under the UN/ECE regime regarding transboundary pollution in Europe. The Conference of the Parties (COP) –
an institution provided for in most international environmental law treaties – has
acquired increasing monitoring and enforcement powers in recent environmental
conventions. State parties to a convention have to report to the COP of that convention on measures they have taken to implement that convention. Failure to report –
depending on the will of other state parties – may trigger sanctions.63 Some conventions establish dispute settlement mechanisms that may be optional or obligatory.64
The ICJ is the primary judiciary organ, but other international tribunals have been
established, such as the ITLOS (International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea) and
the Appellate Body of the WTO.
A plethora of international institutions with overlapping capacities and responsibilities has generated demands to rationalize the international system and, more
specifically, the international system for the protection of environment. Such rationalization may be needed depending on advantages/disadvantages of redundancy
in the administration of international law. Given that some institutions are more
competent or resilient than others allowing for some form of institutional competition by tolerating some redundancy in the international system may not be
ill-advised. Completely streamlined institutional systems could be susceptible to
failure in case of a challenge. Allowing for some jurisdictional overlap among
See Chapter 3, Section 2.4.
See Chapter 3, Section 3.
institutions that are not strictly identical yields more diversity and more flexibility in responses.65
One could claim, for instance, that the International Whaling Commission is a
redundant organization and its responsibilities should fall under the CITES secretariat. A total bureaucratic streamlining would mandate to do away with the Commission and devote its resources to the CITES Secretariat. To many environmentalists, such an outcome would not be the most effective outcome for the protection
of whales. It is questionable whether the CITES Secretariat would have the will
to defend the ban on whale hunting as forcefully as the Whaling Commission has
Another example involves the jurisdictional overlap between the FAO and the
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Biodiversity Convention. The institutions
have separate yet also overlapping jurisdiction, as the FAO is responsible for agrobiodiversity, whereas the COP is concerned with the general protection of biodiversity.
In practice, the separation of jurisdictional reach has not worked well and there
has been friction in the cooperation between the two institutions.66 One could
conclude, however, that the jurisdictional overlap has had some positive outcomes.
The FAO has been able to broker a multilateral treaty on the dissemination of
agricultural resources that is a first step in creating some predictability with regard
to property rights over such resources. The Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture is now contributing in the development of the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the manipulation of food and agricultural
1.4. Nongovernmental Actors
There are roughly two broad categories of actors in the environmental movement:
the mainstream environmentalists and the deep ecologists.
According to the official line of mainstream environmentalism, development has
to be sought, but standards must be developed so that environmental deterioration
is minimized for the benefit of public health and quality of life.
At the other end of the spectrum, deep ecologists have argued for a “protection
of environment for the sake of environment” approach based on the belief that the
“the interests of nature” override or, at least, are at the same footing as the interests
See Bobbi Low et al., Redundancy and Diversity in Governing and Managing Common-Pool Resources,
Paper Presented at the 8th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common
Property 7, Bloomington, Indiana, May 31–June 4, 2002. See generally Jonathan B. Bendor, Parallel
Systems (1985); See also Herbert A. Simon, The Proverbs of Administration, 6 Public Administration
Review 53 (1946), reprinted in Classics of Organization Theory (Jay M. Shafritz & J. Steven Ott, eds.,
1992). For the role of administrative redundancy in fighting corruption and promoting accountability
in developing countries, see Stephen B. Peterson, Another Path to Customs Reform: Mexico’s Second
Inspection, Discussion Paper No. 632, Harvard Institute for International Development, April 1998.
The author argues that the system of double inspection in customs administration is designed to fight
corruption by building overlapping layers of administration that would be pitted against each other.
66 Chapter 7, Section 2.1.2.3.
67 Chapter 7, Section 2.1.2.4.
of humans. According to these advocates, the current paradigm for development,
one that is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition, views human life as the center of all creation. According to deep ecologists, life must be reconsidered under
an ecological-ethical perspective allowing for the creation of small communities68
and survival through hunting, gathering, and gardening.69 An offshoot of the deepecology approach is the animal rights movement, which has made its impact on
international instruments, for instance, the instruments that prohibit whale hunting.
Deep ecology is a result of the resentment against globalization – and what is implied
by globalization, free markets. Some strands of deep ecology, it could be argued, have
assumed the role of an alternative ideology to that supported by free markets.
The deep–ecology approach is based on different philosophical assumptions than
those shared by the majority of people in the world today. As long as the assumptions
differ, the chances for achieving a common ground are substantially reduced. Deep
ecology stands against technological innovation and the model of industrialization
as we experience it. It is tempting to point out, however, that pursuing “what is
good for nature” will not be helpful in prescribing standards to manage and protect
the environment. Only by attaching values – a human artifact – can the course of
action be determined that is appropriate for the protection of the environment and
human health.70
That the deep-ecology approach has been developed and has juxtaposed itself to
the current model of development is not surprising. A quest of modern civilizations
has been for a return to an unadulterated mythical past, one that probably never
existed.71 What is most striking is how deep ecology has affected some of the outputs of the mainstream environmental movement and international environmental
law and policy. The influence of the deep-ecology approach on the mainstream
environmental movement can be seen in the propagation of policies that favor strict
preservation72 and the establishment of exclusionary protected biodiversity areas
through the forcible exclusion of people.73 The effects of deep ecology can be seen
on policies that ban animal hunting even when such hunting provides the sole source
of income for certain indigenous societies.74 A deep-ecology slant can be detected
in the pursuit of self-sufficiency in the markets for the transfers of hazardous waste75
and the articulation of policies that exhibit zero tolerance for pollution.76
See, e.g., Fritz Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (1993).
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (1993).
For a critique of the deep–ecology approach, see Luc Ferry, Le Nouvel Ordre Ecologique (1995). See
also James J. Kay, On the Nature of Ecological Integrity, in Ecological Integrity and the Management
of Ecosystems 210 (Stephen Woodley et at., eds., 1990).
Western civilization has been presented as corrupt, for instance, by the Romanticism movement that
urged a return to nature.
See, generally, Donald Show, Inside the Environmental Movement (1992).
Chapter 7, Section 1.2.
For instance, the campaign against trade in natural furs coming from certain species, without making
clear distinctions between endangered and nonendangered species, has harmed indigenous groups that
live in the Arctic regions and for which hunting is the only possible source of income.
Chapter 10, Section 3.1.
David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen Domestically, in
Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords 19, 24
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, eds., 1998).
The environmental movement had its birth in the developed world and has acted
as an opposition to untrammeled development by emphasizing the importance of
quality of life based on a clean environment. Environmental groups have lobbied
governments in developed countries to adopt stringent regulations for the reduction
of pollution and protection of natural resources. Although not always as successful
as intended, these efforts have borne fruits and have improved the quality of life in
many areas of the developed world.
Because many environmental problems have global dimensions, environmental
groups have tried to spread their activities in the developing world. Environmental
issues have received mixed response in the developing world. Sometimes governments support exclusionary protected areas for ecotourism or for achieving better
control over ethnic minorities. But, in most cases, developing countries’ governments balk at taking decisive action on other problems, such as marine pollution or
the supply of clean drinking water.
The NGOs of developing countries have been overwhelmed by the more prosperous NGOs of developed countries. In fact, much of the funding for developing
countries’ NGOs comes from developed countries’ foundations. Some economists
have claimed that developed countries’ NGOs have been able to set the agenda
of the developing countries’ NGOs and that, accordingly, such agendas have little
to do with the problems that developing countries face.77 Specific environmental
problems prevalent in developing countries, such as dwindling supplies of drinkable
water and malnutrition, are not adequately addressed.
Because of allegations of transposing developed world ideals to developing countries, many environmental organizations have changed their discourse and have proposed that the management of environmental problems has to be executed with the
participation of local people. The participation of local communities, however, is
not always applied in practice.
To be fair, environmental NGOs in developed countries are not always monolithic. Whereas for some members of these organizations, local participation is a simple switch in discourse to please new audiences, others view public participation as
the means to change the substance of environmental policies. Community-oriented
participation discourses, even if they do not end up in substantial public participation, are an important means of defining and legitimizing local interests. Community
participation dialogues provide room for maneuverability to local groups who view
the management of environmental problems as a way to address their economic and
social needs.78
Environmental NGOs have challenged further the club model of interstate relations and have sought to become involved in intergovernmental fora. Environmental
NGOs have had significant influence in the shaping of some environmental regimes.
The evolution of the London Convention, the Whaling Convention, the Basel
Convention, the CITES, and the World Heritage Convention has been influenced
substantially by the actions of environmental NGOs.
Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 47 (2004).
Sally Jeanrenaud, People Oriented Approaches in Global Conservation: Is the Leopard Changing its
Spots? (International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) & Institute for Development
Studies (IDS), 2002).
In other cases, the impact of environmental groups has been weaker but, nevertheless, has remained influential. NGOs have attempted to infiltrate international
organizations that are not prima facie confronted with environmental issues, such as
the WTO, with less success. Interestingly, developing states, which are now entering
these club-type organizations, are less prone to welcome NGOs than their developed
countries’ counterparts.79
Industry NGOs are not as visible as environmental NGOs, but they are not less
powerful. Actually, in some fora, where expert advice is needed, industry could
appear more credible because it has the resources to put together the expertise and,
thus, provide an authoritative analysis of an environmental issue. It has been claimed,
for instance, that industry NGOs are successful in the European Commission –
the initiator of legislative proposals within the European Union.
Industry NGOs are generally perceived as reluctant to provide leadership for the
abatement of environmental problems for which industries are responsible. Industry
has attempted to delay or to curtail environmental action when such action is perceived as too costly. Industry has claimed frequently that scientific uncertainty is a
valid reason for inaction. The standards that some industries apply for the protection
of environment in developing countries often lag behind those adopted in developed
Having said that, it would be wrong to classify all industries as culprits of environmental deterioration. Some industries have been innovators and are at the forefront
of environmental engineering. Within an industry or a company are often dissenting
voices that attempt to reorient discourse to corporate responsible solutions and to
redefine the allegiance of corporations not strictly to shareholders but to a broader
category of stakeholders that includes employees, the surrounding communities, and
the general public. Industry has learned the hard way that environmentally irresponsible behavior is not only costly in terms of liability but also in terms of reputation.
The role of science has been prominent in the development of international environmental law.80 Scientists, however, rarely agree on the definition of an environmental
problem or the prescriptions for its solution. Sometimes the disagreement is the
result of the use of different data (for instance, in fisheries) or of the application of
different models (climate change). Given the lack of scientific certainty, most decisions on environmental matters have to be made based on political considerations.
However, scientific communities and informal networks among scientists81 often
frame the environmental discourse. UNEP, WMO, and national scientific institutions
(such as the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA])
have executed the research on ozone depletion. The Intergovernmental Panel on
See Keohane, supra note 32, at 6–8.
Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Atmospheric
Ozone, in Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Organization, 46(1) International Organization
201 (1992).
81 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International
Regulatory Agreements 171–72 (1995).
Climate Change (IPCC) was organized by UNEP and WMO to provide insights
on the climate change debate.
The positions of scientists are used often by proponents or opponents of an
environmental action to advance their own view. The climate change discourse
has been influenced by the inability of scientists to reach consensus on whether
climate change really exists and its possible repercussions. The lack of scientific
consensus has provided some countries with justification to delay purposive action
for the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions, the main culprit of climate change.
By contrast, scientific consensus on the ozone hole over Antarctica precipitated
decisive action to phase out ozone-depleting substances.
Environmental law could be conceived as a series of dialectic interactions between
what are perceived as opposing trends: one devoted to development as usual and the
other to the injection of ecodevelopment as “new” paradigm for development. The
role of science in these series of dialectic interactions is the role of facilitator.
The Indigenous Peoples Forum is an informal network of indigenous groups that
seeks to bring to prominence issues that affect indigenous peoples. The Indigenous
Peoples Forum lacks a clear legal personality. However, it has been able, through a
series of gradual steps, to establish itself as an influential international institutional
Indigenous peoples have asserted their fundamental human rights through the
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.82 A number of ILO standards,83 which are currently in force, are not considered sufficient to guarantee
indigenous peoples rights. The interaction of indigenous peoples with environmental organizations has been ambivalent. Indigenous peoples have occasionally colluded
with the environmental movement against corporations whose pollution adversely
affects their traditional livelihoods. Other times, however, the indigenous people
movement has collided with the environmental movement, especially, with regard
to land-use rights. Environmental groups prefer state control over land, especially
forested land. Environmentalists are not convinced that indigenous groups, if left
to their own devices, would opt for environmentally sound solutions. Indigenous
peoples prefer to exercise control over the land through property rights and, thus,
to retain discretionary control over its use. The preference of environmental groups
for state control perpetuates, as should be expected, a rift between the indigenous
peoples’ movement and the environmental movement.
2. INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING PROCESS
International law develops as states get together to calibrate their interaction and formalize their relationships. States frequently enter into agreements with one another
about matters of mutual concern. This way, states explicitly set the law that would
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Aug. 26, 1994, reprinted in 34
ILM 541 (1995).
83 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989,
reprinted in 28 ILM 1382 (1989).
regulate their behavior. Other times, states engage in practice under the perception
that such practice constitutes or should constitute law. If such practice is general and
is exercised under the opinion that it constitutes law, it is considered general custom
and, thus, a source of international law. Law could be derived from what are called
general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the teachings of the “most highly
qualified publicists.”84
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is cited most often
as the authoritative text on sources of law. According to that article:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 1.international conventions, whether general
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 2.international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law; 3.the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations; 4.subject to provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as
subsidiary for the determination of the rules of law.
International agreements, called “treaties,” “conventions,” “covenants,” and “charters,” could be bilateral or multilateral. Usually, multilateral treaties signed by a
number of states are deemed to have lawmaking effects, whereas bilateral treaties are
viewed more or less the way contracts are viewed in domestic law (as having effect
between the parties that signed them).85 The process of multilateral treaty creation
involves a number of states that wish to resolve an issue of international importance.
These states usually request an international organization with authority on the subject matter (for instance, the World Health Organization, in matters of public health,
the International Labor Organization on labor matters) to establish a working group
to draft a treaty. This initiates a process of treaty negotiation and bargaining until
a consensus is established. Usually, states attempt to reach consensus during treaty
negotiations, which often results in the adoption of the lowest common denominator. Instances exist, however, in which states would adopt a convention without
a consensus. Lack of a consensus in the adoption of a convention is likely to affect
the lawmaking character of the convention. This is particularly the case if countries
explicitly refuse to sign or ratify the convention.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties86 is the document used
frequently to interpret the text of many international treaties. The Vienna Convention has codified some of the general principles that are enshrined in the law
of the treaties such as pacta sunt servanda87 and that treaties must not in principle
have retroactive character.88 The Vienna Convention demonstrates a preference for
the peaceful settlement of disputes89 and requires parties to perform their treaty
See art. 38(d), Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 45.
See J.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law 78–81 (1963).
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969).
Art. 26, id.
Art. 28, id.
See article 65 of the Vienna Convention, which refers to article 33 of the UN Charter, id.
obligations “in good faith.”90 The Vienna Convention provides for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission in case a disagreement arises during treaty
performance,91 but the decisions of the Conciliation Commission are not binding.
The convention provides for the possibility of reference of a dispute to the ICJ or
arbitration.92
States are free to make reservations to specific articles of a convention.93 This
creates in effect an à la carte convention system. Too many reservations on the
text of a convention undermine the authoritative character of the convention. For
this reason, certain treaties prohibit reservations.94 Many environmental and human
rights treaties do so. The prohibition of reservations enhances the consistency and
uniformity of treaties but, at the same time, restricting the possibility of reservations
implies less state participation in the treaty regime. If reservations are allowed, without
any restriction, state participation is facilitated but the lawmaking attributes of a treaty
After a convention is signed, it enters into a process of ratification. This means that
states must ask their legislative organs (e.g., a parliament) to adopt the convention and
to incorporate it into the domestic legal order. Unless a state ratifies a convention,
the convention does not have binding effects on that state (provided that the rules
included in the convention have not become a rule of customary law).
A convention specifies in one of its articles the number of states that are required
for ratification. After this prespecified number of states ratify the convention, it is
said that “the convention enters into force,”95 that is, it has become binding law
among the states that ratified it. The number of states required to ratify a convention
varies depending on the reach of the convention. The Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS), which is considered the constitutive instrument of the law of the seas,
required sixty ratifications.96 Because of its wide reach, it took fourteen years for the
UNCLOS to enter into force.97 For some conventions, ratification by certain states
is important because nonratification by these states would risk depriving these conventions of a convincing legal authority. For instance, the civil liability instruments
for oil pollution attempt to ensure the participation of states where major carriers
of oil reside. The climate change instruments attempt to ensure the participation of
countries that are major emitters of carbon dioxide.
Many international environmental treaties are umbrella framework treaties – setting the parameters of international environmental action – followed by protocols
defining the specific standards of state behavior. The model of a framework convention followed by specific protocols has been adopted as the regulatory archetype
for a number of environmental problems, such as ozone depletion, acid rain, and
climate change. The rationale behind the framework-protocol approach is for states
to commit to engage, initially, in cooperative behavior to manage what seems to be
For the element of good faith, see art. 26, Vienna Convention, id.
See art. 66 and Annex to the Vienna Convention, id.
Art. 66, id.
Art. 2(d), id. See also art. 20, id.
Art. 19, id.
See art. 24, id.
See Chapter 4, Section 3.1.
an emerging environmental problem through a framework convention. As scientific evidence accumulates or the political will manifests to tackle the problem more
decisively, further specific regulatory protocols can be adopted.
The framework/protocol legislative approach is not the only regulatory process for
the management of environmental problems. In the case of marine pollution, specific
conventions, such as the 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1973 MARPOL Convention, preceded the 1982 UNCLOS. The UNCLOS is the framework
convention that has established the basic rules that govern the oceans. The process
of adopting a constitutional convention that attempts to address environmental and
other issues presented in the exploitation and protection of a medium (for instance,
seas, water, air) can be time-consuming, however. In the case of the UNCLOS, it
took more than ten years to adopt a coherent text for the protection of the oceans.
The relevance of custom as a source of international law has been debated. Some
scholars maintain that custom is an authoritative source of international law,98
whereas others purport that custom is anachronistic and even hard to prove in an
international environment rich in bilateral and multilateral agreements among states.
According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there are
two elements that are needed for the establishment of international custom: general
practice and opinio juris (opinio juris sive necessitatis). General practice could be derived
from a number of material acts, for instance, domestic law, newspaper reports, and
government statements. Opinio juris requires that states behave in a certain way under
the stated belief, which does not have to be a genuine belief, that their behavior
is law or is becoming law.99 The International Court of Justice has established that
some degree of uniformity is required for custom to become law.100 However, it is
possible for custom to develop if a number of states follow consistently a practice that
has had an impact on international relations because of the authoritative influence
of these states. The role of maritime powers in the establishment of the law of the
sea, and the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the development
of space law are indisputable.101 Thus, even in the creation of international custom
that, according to article 38, must be based on general practice, one can decipher the
role of authoritative power in lawmaking. For the practice of a state to develop into
custom, it is not necessary for that state to believe that its behavior constitutes law.
What is necessary is that its behavior remains unchallenged by other states.102 For a
state not to be bound by customary international law it has to have objected consistently to the creation of such law (the doctrine of persistent objector).103 Opposition
Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971).
Shaw, supra note 22, at 71–73.
Id. at 66–67.
Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 British Yearbook of International Law
1 (1974–75).
103 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 10 (1998).
expressed for the first time after a rule has been established firmly will not generally
prevent a state from being bound.104
Eventually, one can never prove a rule of customary law in an absolu