Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/449/539/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-06-19 10:19:27
Document Index: 672094297

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

On direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, respondent claimed for the first time that the pretrial photographic identification employed by the state police violated chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On December 9, 1977, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and again raised the pretrial identification issue. On May 23, 1978, the District Court denied the petition, and respondent chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court, employing the same standard used by the California state courts, concluded "the photographic identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 611 F.2d 759. This conclusion was based, inter alia, on the court's finding that (1) the circumstances surrounding the witnesses' observation of the crime were such that there was a grave likelihood of misidentification; (2) the witnesses had failed to give sufficiently detailed descriptions of the assailant; and (3) considerable pressure from both prison officials and prison factions had been brought to bear on the witnesses. Id. at 758-759.
It has long been established, as to those constitutional issues which may properly be raised under § 2254, that even a single chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is obvious from a literal reading of the above that § 2254(d) is applicable to the present situation, although it has been contended that this should not be the case where a state appellate court, as opposed to a trial court, makes the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 2254(d) applies to cases in which a state court of competent jurisdiction has made "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue." It makes no distinction between the factual determinations of a state trial court and those of a state appellate court. Nor does it specify any procedural requirements that must be satisfied for there to be a "hearing on the merits of a factual issue," other than that the habeas applicant and the State or its agent be parties to the state proceeding, and that the state court determination be evidenced by "a written finding, written chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Given the applicability of § 2254(d) to the present case, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not apply the "presumption of correctness" which is mandated by the statute to the factual determinations made by the California state courts. Indeed, the court did not even refer in its opinion to § 2254(d). [Footnote 2] Last Term, we denied chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
611 F.2d 755. From this statement, its opinion went directly to a discussion of the "facts" and constitutional merits of the respondent's claims.
Undoubtedly, a court need not elaborate or give reasons for rejecting claims which it regards as frivolous or totally without merit. This, however, was not the situation presented here. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals reached a conclusion which was in conflict with the conclusion reached by every other state and federal judge after reviewing the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Obviously, if the Court of Appeals in this case or any other court of appeals had simply inserted a boilerplate paragraph in its opinion that it had considered the state record as a whole and concluded that the state appellate court's factual determinations were not fairly supported by the record, this objection to the judgment of the Court of Appeals could not as easily be made. Just as obviously, this would be a frustration of the intent of Congress in enacting 2254(d). Reference can be made to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a United States district court following a bench trial to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ." It is a matter of common knowledge that, on some occasions, a district judge will simply take findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by the party whom the judge has indicated at the close of trial shall prevail and, without alteration, adopt them as his own. However, a requirement such as is imposed by Rule 52 undoubtedly makes a judge more aware that it is his own imprimatur that is placed on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, whoever may prepare them. When Congress provided in § 2254(d) that a habeas court could not dispense with the "presumption of correctness" embodied therein unless it concluded that the factual determinations were not supported by the record, it contemplated at least some reasoned written references to § 2254(d) and the state court findings. State judges, as well as federal judges, swear allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and there is no reason to think that, because of their frequent differences of opinions as to how that document should be interpreted, all are not doing their mortal best to discharge their oath of office. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis supplied.) [Footnote 3] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When it enacted the 1966 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Congress specified that, in the absence of the previously enumerated factors one through eight, the burden shall rest on the habeas petitioner, whose case by that time had run the entire gamut of a state judicial system, to establish "by convincing evidence that the factual determination of the State court was erroneous." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, Congress meant to insure that a state finding not be overturned merely on the basis of the usual "preponderance of the evidence" standard in such a situation. In order to ensure that this mandate of Congress is enforced, we now hold that a habeas court should include in its opinion granting the writ the reasoning which led it to conclude that any of the first seven factors were present, or the reasoning which led it to conclude that the state finding was "not fairly supported by the record." Such a statement tying the generalities of § 2254(d) to the particular facts of the case at hand will not, we think, unduly burden federal habeas courts even though it will prevent the use of the "boilerplate" language to which we chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court holds today that an order of a federal habeas court requiring release or retrial of a state prisoner because of constitutional violations at his trial must be vacated if the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. Instead, he raised the pretrial identification issue in state habeas corpus proceedings, where his petitions were denied without opinion. Finally, he filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, again raising the pretrial identification issue. In his return in opposition to respondent's petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argued that the District Court was precluded from reexamining the issue by virtue of § 2254(d), which accords a presumption of correctness to state court factual findings, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. [Footnote 2/1] The District Court denied the petition on its merits, without referring to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, I cannot agree that today's holding will "ensure that this mandate of Congress [§ 2254(d)] is enforced," ante at 449 U. S. 551; rather, it is more likely to be seen as an invitation to lower federal courts to "inser[t] a boilerplate paragraph" in their opinions acknowledging their awareness of § 2254(d). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's disposition of the instant case is all the more perplexing because § 2254(d) plainly constitutes no bar to the Court of Appeals' holding that the pretrial identification procedure employed by the police violated respondent's due process rights. Section 2254(d) requires a federal habeas court to defer to "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court. . . ." 28 U.S. . § 2254(d) (emphasis supplied). The factual issues to which § 2254(d) applies are "basic, primary, or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . .'" Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 446 U. S. 342 (1980) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 372 U. S. 309, n. 6 (1963)). Section 2254(d) does not bar a federal court from reviewing "a mixed determination of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the historical facts of this case." 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 342; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 430 U. S. 403-404 (1977). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The treatment of the pretrial identification issue by the California court was brief, and contained little in the way of formal factual findings. Its relevant findings were that "the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to view the crime"; that "there is no showing of influence by the investigating officers"; and that the witnesses' "descriptions are accurate." App. to Pet. for Cert. C-4 to C-5. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly agreed that the witnesses had "an opportunity . . . to observe the perpetrators of the crime," 611 F.2d 758, but disagreed with the California court's legal conclusion that the opportunity for observation was constitutionally adequate, because of the "diversion of the witnesses' attention at the time the crime was committed." Id. at 759. Similarly, the Court of Appeals' description of the facts concerning the photographic lineup procedure differs in no significant detail from that offered by the California court. Compare id. at 756, with App. to Pet. for Cert. C-3 to C-4. The California court, however, concluded that "[t]he circumstances thus indicate the inherent fairness of the procedure," id. at C-5, while the Court of Appeals reached the opposite legal conclusion. The Court of Appeals, like the California court, did not dispute the accuracy of the witnesses' identifications, but only their degree of detail. 611 F.2d 758. Finally the Court of Appeals considered whether using a photo array procedure, rather than a lineup, was necessary, a consideration not deemed relevant by the California court. Id. at 757.
Plainly, the disagreement between the courts is over the constitutional significance of the facts of the case, and not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Biggers, the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying the "totality of the circumstances" test of Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377 (1968), both concluded that pretrial identification procedures had violated a state prisoner's due process rights. This Court reversed, over a dissent claiming that the Court was violating its "long-established practice not to reverse findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts unless shown to be clearly erroneous." Neil v. Biggers, supra, at 409 U. S. 202 (BRENNAN, J., joined by Douglas and STEWART, JJ., dissenting). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Brief for Petitioner 49 (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 14. [Footnote 2/3] Thus, petitioner's very argument reveals that the difference between the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the California Court of Appeal was over the applicable legal standard, and not over the particular facts of the case. And § 2254(d) surely does not detract from the well-established duty of federal courts "to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court does not challenge the correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the pretrial identification procedure employed by the state police in this case was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 611 F.2d 759. It is therefore not necessary to review the portions of the record and the precedents of this Court that support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, today's decision denies respondent the relief to which that court found that he is entitled. Since petitioner did not raise the § 2254(d) issue in the Court of Appeals, and since § 2254(d) is plainly inapplicable to the mixed question of law and fact at issue in this case, I can see no justice in this result. I therefore respectfully dissent.
606 F.2d 375. On the basis of this statement, we no more know whether the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly applied § 2254(d) in Taylor than we know whether the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly applied it in the instant case. Admittedly, the Second Circuit opinion manifested "full awareness" of the existence of § 2254(d), see ante at 449 U. S. 548, but it nevertheless "left [us] to guess as to [its] reasons for granting relief notwithstanding the provisions of § 2254(d)." See ante at 449 U. S. 552. I would be content to presume that federal judges are fully aware of so prominent a statute as § 2254(d), and to leave them free to devote their energies to writing opinions concerning contested issues.
In particular, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's consideration of the necessity for using pretrial photo displays was in conflict with this Court's precedents. Brief for Petitioner 31. The Court of Appeals has held that the necessity for the use of a photographic display is an important factor in judging the validity of pretrial identification procedures, though lack of necessity is not a per se ground for rejecting the identification. 611 F.2d 757; see United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1104 (CA9 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1064 (1977). The California Court of Appeal did not consider the necessity for the use of the photographic displays, and thus did not apply the same legal standard to the pretrial identification question. App. to Pet. for Cert. C-4 to C-5; see People v. Suttle, 90 Cal.App.3d 572, 580-581, 153 Cal.Rptr. 409, 414-415 (1979).