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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 602', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1979', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 193', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 3701', '§ 3742']

MAINE V. THIBOUTOT, 448 U. S. 1 - Volume 448 - 1980 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 448 > MAINE V. THIBOUTOT, 448 U. S. 1 (1980) > Full Text
Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel's by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), exhausted their state administrative remedies, and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court's judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. [Footnote 2] The court, however, denied respondents' motion for attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 675 (1974). Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 436 U. S. 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, reasoned that
In the face of the plain language of § 1983 and our consistent treatment of that provision, petitioners nevertheless persist in suggesting that the phrase "and laws" should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws. [Footnote 4] Petitioners suggest that, when § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which accorded jurisdiction and a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States," was divided by the 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev.Stat. § 1979, and jurisdictional
Id. at 448 U. S. 637 (POWELL, J., concurring). On the other hand, there are no indications that that was the only purpose, and Congress' attention was specifically directed to this new language. Representative Lawrence, in a speech to the House of Representatives that began by observing that the revisers had very often changed the meaning of existing statutes, 2 Cong.Rec. 825 (1874), referred to the civil rights statutes as "possibly [showing] verbal
Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that, even if § 1988 applies to § 1983 claims alleging deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument. [Footnote 11] As we have said above, Martinez
The Court asserts that "the phrase and laws' . . . means what it says," because "Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase. . . ." Ante at 448 U. S. 4. Finding no "definitive" contrary indications in the legislative history of § 1983, the Court concludes that that statute provides a
The origins of the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 were discussed in detail in two concurring opinions last Term. Compare
441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 637. Careful study of the available materials leaves no serious doubt that the Court's contrary conclusion is completely at odds with the intent of Congress in 1874. Id. at 441 U. S. 640.
Ibid. [Footnote 2/5]
Id. at 828. Observing that "[t]his mode of classifying . . . to some extent duplicates in the revision portions of statutes" that previously were one, Lawrence praised "the general accuracy" of the revision. Ibid. Nothing in this sequence of remarks supports the decision of the Court today. There was no mention of the addition of "and laws," nor any hint that the reach of § 1983 was to be extended. If Lawrence had any such intention, his statement to the House was
We have stated, for example, that a major purpose of the Civil Rights Acts was to "involve the federal judiciary" in the effort to exert federal control over state officials who refused to enforce the law. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 427. Congress did so, in part, because it thought the state courts at the time would not provide an impartial forum. See id. at 409 U. S. 426-429. See generally 365 U. S. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 365 U. S. 174-183 (1961); Developments in the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1133, 1150-1153 (1977). Thus, Congress elected to afford a "uniquely federal remedy," Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 407 U. S. 239 (1972), that is, a "federal right in federal courts,'" District of Columbia v. Carter, supra at 409 U. S. 428, quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra at 365 U. S. 180 (emphasis added). Four Terms ago, we considered the origins of § 1343(3) and § 1983 and concluded that "the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary." Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 583; see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 543, n. 7.
The Court ignores these perceptions and dismisses without explanation the proposition, explicitly accepted in Flores, that § 193 and § 1343(3) are coextensive. The Court cites no evidence that Congress ever intended to alter so fundamentally its original remedial plan, and I am aware of none. [Footnote 2/8] Nearly every commentator who has considered the question has concluded that § 1343(3) was intended to supply federal jurisdiction in all § 1983 actions. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra at 441 U. S. 637, n.19 (POWELL, J., concurring) (collecting citations). [Footnote 2/9] Since § 1343(3) covers statutory
Even a cursory survey of the United States Code reveals that literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and social welfare enactments may be affected. [Footnote 2/12] The States now participate
Even when a cause of action against federal officials is available, litigants are likely to focus efforts upon state defendants in order to obtain attorney's fees under the liberal standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where "civil rights" of any kind are, at best, an afterthought. In this case, for example, the respondents added a § 1983 count to their complaint some years after the action was initiated, apparently in response to the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. See also United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 525, 529 (CA9 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). The uses of this technique have not been explored fully. But the rules of pendent jurisdiction are quite liberal, and plaintiffs who prevail on pendent claims may win awards under § 1988. Maher v. Gagne, post, p. 448 U. S. 122. Consequently, ingenious pleaders may find ways to recover attorney's fees in almost any suit against a state defendant. [Footnote 2/13] Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 suggests that Congress intended
Today's decision confers upon the courts unprecedented authority to oversee state actions that have little or nothing to do with the individual rights defined and enforced by the civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era. [Footnote 2/15] This result cannot be reconciled with the purposes for which § 1983 was enacted. It also imposes unequal burdens on state and federal officials in the joint administration of federal programs, and may expose state defendants to liability for attorney's fees in virtually every case. If any Member of the 43d Congress had suggested legislation embodying these results, the proposal certainly would have been hotly debated. It is simply
Commentators have chronicled the tortuous path of judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts enacted after the Civil War. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 1323 (1952); Note, Developments in the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
Although constitutional claims under § 1983 generally were limited to "personal" rights in the wake of Holt and Mr. Justice Stone's influential opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 307 U. S. 531 (1939), [Footnote 2/17] purely statutory claims remained virtually unrecognized. When the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a statutory claim nearly half a century after Holt, it found no case whatever "in which the right or privilege at stake was secured by a law' of the United States." Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 139, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947). The plaintiff in Bomar was a public school teacher who alleged that the school board had discharged her because of absences incurred while exercising her statutory right to serve on a federal jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint stated a claim under § 1983. 162 F.2d at 139.
The opinion in Bomar, which cited no authority and reviewed no legislative history, provoked widespread commentary. See generally Note, The Propriety of Granting a Federal Hearing for Statutorily Based Actions under the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights Acts: Blue v. Craig, 43 Geo. Wash.L.Rev. 143, 1363-1364, and n. 169 (1975). But it appears to have had little practical effect. [Footnote 2/18] The issue did not arise with any frequency until the late 1960's, when challenges to state administration of federal social welfare legislation became commonplace. The lower courts responded to these
The courts and commentators who debated the issue during this period were singularly obtuse if, as the Court now asserts, all doubt as to the meaning of "and laws" had been resolved by a long line of consistent authority going back to 1939. Ante at 448 U. S. 5. I know of no court or commentator who has
Rosado is not the only case to have assumed sub silentio that welfare claimants have a cause of action to challenge the adequacy of state programs under the Social Security Act. As the Court observes, many of our recent decisions construing the Act made the same unspoken assumption. Ante at 448 U. S. 6. It does not necessarily follow that the Court in those cases assumed that the cause of action was provided by § 1983, rather than the Social Security Act itself. [Footnote 2/24] But even if it
The Court also relies upon "numerous and specific" dicta in prior decisions. Ante at 448 U. S. 5. But none of the cited cases contains anything more than a bare assertion of the proposition that is to be proved. Most say much less than that. For example, the Court occasionally has referred to § 1983 as a remedy for violations of "federally protected rights" or of "the Federal Constitution and statutes." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra at 436 U. S. 700-701; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 445 U. S. 649, 445 U. S. 650 (1980). These generalized references merely restate the language of the statute. They shed no light on the question whether all or
The only remaining decisions in the Court's "consistent" line of precedents are Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 384 U. S. 829-830 (1966), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 675. In each case, the Court asserted -- without discussion and in the course of disposing of other issues -- that § 1983's coverage of statutory rights extended beyond federal equal rights laws. Neither contains any discussion of the question; neither cites relevant authority. [Footnote 2/28] Nor has this Court always uncritically assumed the proposition for which Greenwood and Edelman
9. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1167, 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III); see, e.g., §§ 3742, 3744(c).
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