Source: https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/april-2020/the-eu-court-of-justice-confirms-the-limitations-that-apply-before-courts-are
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 05:38:30
Document Index: 78204731

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 101', 'Art 101', 'Art. 267', 'Art 101', 'Art. 106', 'Art. 267']

The EU Court of Justice confirms the limitations that apply before courts are able to classify anticompetitive agreements as a restriction of competition by object under Art 101 TFEU in a multilateral interchange fee credit card transaction (Budapest Bank) - Concurrences
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The EU Court of Justice confirms the limitations that apply before courts (...)
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The EU Court of Justice confirms the limitations that apply before courts are able to classify anticompetitive agreements as a restriction of competition by object under Art 101 TFEU in a multilateral interchange fee credit card transaction (Budapest Bank)
Preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU)
Anticompetitive object / effect
Effect on competition
EU Court of Justice, Budapest Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2020:265, C‑228/18, 2 April 2020 (Hungarian)
On 2 April 2020, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") delivered its judgment in Budapest Bank on a reference for a preliminary ruling from Hungary's highest court. The judgment confirms the important limitations that apply before competition authorities and courts are able classify anticompetitive agreements as a restriction of competition "by object" under Article 101 TFEU. The background to the case arises from a 2009 finding by the Hungarian competition authority that 22 banks, as well as Visa and Mastercard, had breached Article 101 TFEU by entering into an anticompetitive agreement to establish a uniform interchange fee for card payments (the "MIF Agreement"). The national competition authority ("NCA") found that the agreement had both the object and effect of restricting
Duncan Liddell
Ashurst (London)
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Alexi Dimitriou
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Donald Slater
Ashurst (Brussels)
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Denis Fosselard
Belgium 27 contributions 38036 visits
Duncan Liddell, Alexi Dimitriou, Donald Slater, Denis Fosselard, The EU Court of Justice confirms the limitations that apply before courts are able to classify anticompetitive agreements as a restriction of competition by object under Art 101 TFEU in a multilateral interchange fee credit card transaction (Budapest Bank), 2 April 2020, e-Competitions April 2020, Art. N° 94633
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