Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/641/1093/1482917/
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 03:48:22
Document Index: 513667313

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 52', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1981', '§ 46', '§ 31', '§ 46', '§ 31']

Banerjee v. Roberts, 641 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Conn. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › District Courts › Connecticut › District of Connecticut › 1986 › Banerjee v. Roberts
Banerjee v. Roberts, 641 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Conn. 1986)
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut - 641 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Conn. 1986)
As the Court of Appeals observed in Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113, 105 S. Ct. 796, 83 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1985), "[t]he great majority of cases addressing the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity for public colleges and universities have found such institutions to be arms of their respective state governments and thus immune from suit." See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 556-560 (5th Cir.1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349-1350 (9th Cir.1981), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1983); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287, 1290-1291 (10th Cir.1971); Walstad v. University of Minnesota Hospitals, 442 F.2d 634, 641-642 (8th Cir.1971).
It is conceded that such service was effective against the trustee defendants in their official capacities. A state or governmental entity thereof may be served with process "in the manner prescribed by the law of that state," see Rule 4(d) (6), Fed.R. Civ.P., and Connecticut law authorizes the Attorney General to accept service on behalf of the state and "any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state ..., as such." C.G.S. § 52-64 (emphasis added). However, the trustee defendants were not served with process in their individual capacities by any of the methods authorized by Rules 4(d) (1), (6) and (7), Fed.R.Civ.P.
There is only one exception to this rule: A suit seeking prospective relief from a state official for a violation of federal constitutional rights is not considered to be a suit against the state. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-103, 104 S. Ct. 900, 909, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) ("Pennhurst"), citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). Consequently, "when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official's future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief." Pennhurst, supra, 465 U.S. at 102-103, 104 S. Ct. at 909, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974).
The plaintiff's state law claims against the defendants in their official capacities stand on a different footing than his claims under federal law. That is because the exception to the Eleventh Amendment immunity of state officials applies only to claims of conduct contrary to "the supreme authority of the United States." Pennhurst, supra, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S. Ct. at 909. In contrast,
Id. at 106, 104 S. Ct. at 911. Accordingly, because "neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment," id. at 121, 104 S. Ct. at 919, the plaintiff's state law claims against the trustee defendants (and defendant Roberts) in their official capacities must be dismissed.
Pennhurst, supra, 465 U.S. at 119-120, 104 S. Ct. at 918-19 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court can find no basis for departing from the dictates of Pennhurst simply because the plaintiff has raised claims that otherwise would be within the scope of Article III's grant of diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, as the Supreme Court held in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 618, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1979), "§ 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all" but merely "authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Congress." It is therefore evident that "one cannot go into court and claim a `violation of § 1983' for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Id. at 617, 99 S. Ct. at 1916.
The defendants have raised the same argument in opposition to the plaintiff's Section 1981 claim as they previously raised with respect to his equal protection claim namely, that the plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite purposeful discrimination. See General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1982) (holding that "§ 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be violated only by purposeful discrimination"). Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Part IV-A, supra, the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's Section 1981 claim is hereby denied.[5]
*1108 The only laws invoked in these counts that have not been specifically invoked elsewhere in the amended complaint are the prohibitions against employment discrimination of C.G.S. §§ 46a-58(a) and 46a-60 (a) (1) and the "anti-blacklisting" provisions of C.G.S. § 31-51. However, a plaintiff cannot bring suit directly for a violation of C.G.S. §§ 46a-58(a) and 46a-60(a) (1) without having first exhausted his administrative remedies in proceedings before the Connecticut Human Rights Commission. See Sullivan v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Waterbury, 196 Conn. 208, 215-216, 491 A.2d 1096 (1985). Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that the plaintiff's dismissal itself involved any violation of C.G.S. § 31-51, inasmuch as the plaintiff contends that he was "blacklisted" only after his dismissal when he began to apply to other neurosurgery residency programs. See Banerjee Affidavit ¶¶ 43-47.