Source: https://openjurist.org/367/f3d/882/moisa-v-b-barnhart
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 09:43:12
Document Index: 576013309

Matched Legal Cases: ['art\n367', 'art\n367', '§ 404', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 1158', '§ 423']

367 F3d 882 Moisa v. B Barnhart | OpenJurist
367 F. 3d 882 - Moisa v. B Barnhart
367 F3d 882 Moisa v. B Barnhart
367 F.3d 882
Clyde MOISA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
The ALJ noted that "[t]he claimant testified at the hearing of debilitating back pain, upper extremity and lower extremity pain ... [and] numbness in the hands and feet ... [and] that he could only sit for 20 to 30 minutes and stand/walk up to six to eight hours (with the assistance of a cane)." The ALJ rejected this testimony, stating that "[i]n the absence of medical evidence to support such allegations... I cannot accept this testimony."
We review de novo the district court's order affirming the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Morgan v. Comm'r of SSA, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999). We will overturn the Commissioner's decision if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Id.
Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted).
Here, Moisa offered evidence demonstrating — and the ALJ found — that Moisa suffered from a series of severe impairments, capable of causing pain. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996). Nevertheless, the ALJ rejected Moisa's pain testimony solely for lack of objective medical evidence corroborating it. He cited no evidence of malingering and made no findings that would allow us to conclude that he rejected the testimony on permissible grounds, such as a reputation for dishonesty, conflicts between the claimant's testimony and his conduct, or internal contradictions in the testimony. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc). His rejection of Moisa's pain testimony was therefore clear error. See Light v. SSA, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1997).
Because we must reverse the Commissioner's decision, we next consider whether we may remand with directions to award benefits. In a recent decision the Supreme Court held that when a court of appeals reverses an administrative agency determination, "the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985)); see also UOP v. United States, 99 F.3d 344, 351 (9th Cir.1996) ("The general rule is that when an administrative agency has abused its discretion or exceeded its statutory authority, a court should remand the matter to the agency for further consideration." (quoting Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.1987))).
In the usual benefits eligibility case, the claimant's subjective testimony is not the only issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (claimant must demonstrate that he is insured for disability insurance benefits, has not attained retirement age, has filed an application for disability insurance benefits, and is under a disability); § 423(d)(2)(A) (claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment or impairments and an inability to engage in any substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy). Here, however, the question of whether Moisa is eligible for benefits turns entirely on the credibility of his subjective pain testimony. It is undisputed that Moisa has met § 423's procedural requirements and presented objective medical evidence showing the existence of medical impairments which could reasonably be expected to produce his alleged pain and other symptoms. See id. § 423(d)(5)(A). The VE further established that Moisa's testimony, taken as true, demonstrates that he is unable to do his previous work or any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A). Moreover, unlike the asylum context considered in Ventura, in which the Attorney General retains ultimate discretion, an award of Social Security benefits is mandatory if Moisa's impairments rendered him disabled. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) ("The Attorney General may grant [relief] to an alien ....") with 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (every individual who establishes disability and meets three procedural requirements "shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit").
We conclude that (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Moisa's testimony, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find Moisa disabled if his testimony were credited. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. We therefore find a remand for award of benefits to be appropriate. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 & n. 13 (9th Cir.1998) (remanding for an award of benefits where testimony by claimant and VE, properly credited, established disability); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir.1989) (same); Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.1988) (same). Unlike Ventura, this case requires no further agency expertise or evaluation, and our decision does not independently create a potentially far-reaching legal precedent. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17, 123 S.Ct. 353. The Commissioner, having lost this appeal, should not have another opportunity to show that Moisa is not credible any more than Moisa, had he lost, should have an opportunity for remand and further proceedings to establish his credibility. See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir.2003).