Source: https://dominicdesaulles.wordpress.com/2017/08/07/access-to-justice-r-on-the-application-of-unison-v-lord-chancellor-2017-uksc-51/
Timestamp: 2018-07-20 14:29:13
Document Index: 339606743

Matched Legal Cases: ['UKSC ', 'UKSC ', 'art 2', 'UKHL ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

Access to Justice: R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 | Dominic De Saulles on Law and Litigation
Access to Justice: R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51
A very important case UK Supreme Court case on the right of access to a court. Offers a quick overview of many important English and Welsh authorities on this topic.
[Law and Politics]
[Important Cases]
69. Access to the courts is not, therefore, of value only to the particular individuals involved. That is most obviously true of cases which establish principles of general importance…
[The Wider Public Interest].
[Key Summary]
74. In English law, the right of access to the courts has long been recognised. The central idea is expressed in chapter 40 of the Magna Carta of 1215…, which remains on the statute book in the closing words of chapter 29 of the version issued by Edward I in 1297:
75. The significance of that guarantee was emphasised by Sir Edward Coke inPart 2 of his Institutes of the Laws of England…. Citing chapter 29 of the 1297 charter, he commented:
“And therefore, every Subject of this Realme, for injury done to him … [in goods, in lands, or in person], by any other Subject … may take his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay. Hereby it appeareth, that Justice must have three qualities, it must be …[Free, because nothing is more iniquitous than saleable justice; full, because justice ought not to limp; and speedy, because delay is in effect a denial]; and then it is both Justice and Right.” (1809 ed, pp 55-56).
More than a century later, Blackstone cited Coke in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769), and stated: “A … right of every [man] is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein.” (Book I, Chapter 1,“Absolute Rights of Individuals”).
[Clear Words are Needed]
76. In more modern times, many examples can be found of judicial recognition of the constitutional right of unimpeded access to the courts (as Lord Diplock described it…) which can only be curtailed by clear statutory enactment…
As Viscount Simonds observed in Pyx Granite Co Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1960] AC 260, 286:
77. Another important general statement was made by Lord Diplock in Attorney
General v Times Newspapers Ltd at p 309:
78. Most of the cases so far mentioned were concerned with barriers to the bringing of proceedings. But impediments to the right of access to the courts can constitute a serious hindrance even if they do not make access completely impossible. More recent authorities make it clear that any hindrance or impediment by the executive requires clear authorisation by Parliament….
[So That There is Clear Authorisation]
[And must be reasonably necessary to fulfil the objective behind the Act]
80. Even where a statutory power authorises an intrusion upon the right of access to the courts, it is interpreted as authorising only such a degree of intrusion as is reasonably necessary to fulfil the objective of the provision in question.
[For which there is a self-evident and pressing need]
This principle was developed in a series of cases concerned with prisoners. The first was R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Leech [1994] QB 198, which concerned a prison rule under which letters between a prisoner and a solicitor could be read, and stopped if they were of inordinate length or otherwise objectionable.
The rule did not apply where the letter related to proceedings already commenced, but the Court of Appeal accepted that it nevertheless created an impediment to the exercise of the right of access to justice in so far as it applied to prisoners who were seeking legal advice in connection with possible future proceedings. The question was whether the rule was authorised by a statutory power to make rules for the regulation of prisons. That depended on whether an objective need for such a rule, in the interests of the regulation of prisons, could be demonstrated. As Steyn LJ, giving the judgment of the court, stated at p 212:
[Clear and express words. To the extent reasonably necessary]
82. A similar approach was adopted in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532, which concerned a policy that prisoners must be absent from their cells when legal correspondence kept there was examined. Lord Bingham of Cornhill…:
[Implied limitation upon power conferred by statute in order to protect access to justice]
83. Finally, in this overview of the common law authorities, it is necessary to note two cases concerned with court fees. First, the case of R v Lord Chancellor, Ex p Witham [1998] QB 575 concerned court fees prescribed by the Lord Chancellor under a statutory power. The order in question repealed a power to reduce or remit the fees on grounds of undue financial hardship in exceptional circumstances. The order had been made with the concurrence of all four Heads of Division, as well as the Treasury. It had also been laid before Parliament. The applicant was in receipt of income support of £58 per week, and wished to bring proceedings. The prescribed fee was either £120 or £500, depending on the amount claimed. The applicant said that he could not afford to pay a fee of either amount. There was also evidence that a person on income support could not afford the £10 fee to set aside a default judgment in debt proceedings, and that another person on income support who was facing eviction could not afford the £20 fee to be joined in possession proceedings.
Laws J, with whom Rose LJ agreed, said that he saw no reason not to accept what was said, and concluded that there was a variety of situations in which persons on very low incomes were in practice denied access to the courts.
[Court looks at the real world]
Edited for ease of reading. Headings in square brackets added. There are other detailed authorities to be found under Constitutional category on this blog.
QOCS recovery from Claimant’s damages: Jeffrey Cartwright v Venduct Engineering Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 1654
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[Fundamental] Dishonesty: Kearsley v Klarfeld [2005] EWCA Civ 1510
Fundamental Dishonesty: Molodi v Cambridge Vibration and Aviva Insurance [2018] EWHC 1288 (QB)
Keefe v The Isle of Man Steam Packet Company Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 683
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