Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19770307_0040176.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 00:47:06
Document Index: 211932403

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6002', '§ 1826', '§ 1826', 'art, 427', '§ 2', '§ 1826', '§ 6002', '§ 6002', '§ 6002', '§ 6002', '§ 6002', '§ 3532']

filed as amended march 18 1977.: March 7, 1977.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE,v.ROCCO FRUMENTO, ANDREW T. MILLHOUSE, GEORGE W. COLLITT, JOHN R. SILLS, VITO N. PISCIOTTA IN RE: SUBPOENA TO VITO N. PISCIOTTA, VITO N. PISCIOTTA, APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. Criminal No. 75-322.
Seitz, Chief Judge, Rosenn, and Garth, Circuit Judges. Seitz, Chief Judge, Van Dusen, Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Rosenn, Hunter, Weis and Garth, Circuit Judges. Rosenn, Circuit Judge Adams, joins in this opinion. Hunter, Circuit Judge,
Another defendant (Collitt) was tried separately and acquitted. The trial of the three remaining defendants, Frumento, Millhouse and Sills commenced March 1, 1976. Pisciotta, who at that time had not been sentenced and whose post-trial motions were still pending, was subpoenaed by the government to testify on March 3, 1976 at the trial of his three codefendants. After his motion to quash the subpoena was denied, Pisciotta invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. The district court, on motion of the government, thereupon granted Pisciotta immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002*fn1 and directed him to answer. Pisciotta, after consulting with his attorney, still refused to answer the questions put to him. Upon his continued refusal, the district court found Pisciotta in contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)*fn2 and ordered him confined in the custody of the United States Marshal until the proceedings terminated or until he purged himself of the contempt by complying with the court's order.
While Pisciotta's motion for in banc consideration, along with his direct appeal of the district court's March 3, 1976 order, was before this Court, the trial of Pisciotta's former codefendants ended.*fn3 Therefore, on March 23, 1976, the Court, acting in banc, dismissed as moot the motion for a stay of custody. Thus only the direct appeal remained.
The end of the trial of Pisciotta's codefendants and Pisciotta's consequent release from custody (see 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(1) note 2 supra) prompted the panel hearing Pisciotta's direct appeal to require briefing on the issue of mootness. The direct appeal was argued to the panel on March 23, 1976. Subsequently, and before filing of the panel opinion, it was ordered pursuant to this Court's Internal Operating Procedure N. 4 that the case be listed for rehearing in banc.*fn4
In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42, 87 L. Ed. 1199, 63 S. Ct. 910 (1943) the Court held moot an appeal from a conviction for criminal contempt stating that "the case is moot because, after petitioner's service of his sentence and its expiration, there was no longer a subject matter on which the judgment of this Court could operate." While superficially it would appear that this holding controls the present case, the exceptions to the St. Pierre mootness rule have, to a large extent, dissipated its vitality.
The Court in St. Pierre recognized that the petitioner there could have had his case reviewed before the expiration of his sentence, but no stay or supersedeas had been sought. The Court thereby implied an exception to the mootness rule - that an appeal is not moot even though the appellant has been released from custody or has served his sentence if he has taken all possible steps to have the order of confinement promptly reviewed prior to his release.
In commenting on this aspect of the St. Pierre holding, the Supreme Court in Sibron v. New York*fn5 said, "This was a plain recognition of the vital importance of keeping open avenues of judicial review of deprivations of constitutional right." In so stating, the Sibron Court recognized the importance of the principle that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.*fn6 In Sibron, the Court held that petitioner's appeal was not moot even though he had completed service of the six month sentence imposed upon him as a result of his conviction for possession of drugs. In emphasizing the exception to the St. Pierr rule, the Court noted that "there was no way for Sibron to bring his case here [the Supreme Court] before his six month sentence expired . . . despite the fact that he took all steps to perfect his appeal in a prompt, diligent and timely manner." 392 U.S. at 52.*fn7
We recognize that the most traditional of exceptions to the mootness doctrine has been characterized as "capable of repetition yet evading review," Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 S. Ct. 279 (1911); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1974); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976); Super Tire Engineering Corp. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125, 40 L. Ed. 2d 1, 94 S. Ct. 1694 (1974); Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board, 429 U.S. 60, 97 S. Ct. 342, 50 L. Ed. 2d 218, 45 U.S.L.W. 4009, 4011-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This Court applied that standard, despite its seeming inapplicability, in United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.) (in banc) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S. Ct. 690, 42 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1974), where we considered the merits of a press "silence order" although the trial to which the order pertained had been completed. This Court held that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot even though there no longer existed any restraints upon the newspapers and reporter. We said in Schiavo that the dispute was "capable of repetition yet evading review" because
Schiavo reflects an application of the standards of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), the Supreme Court's abortion decision, where the Court observed:
The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 95 L. Ed. 36, 71 S. Ct. 104 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113, 89 S. Ct. 956, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 30 L. Ed. 2d 560, 92 S. Ct. 577 (1972).
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 S. Ct. 279 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, 89 S. Ct. 1493 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325, 89 S. Ct. 347 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-633, 97 L. Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953).
410 U.S. at 125. In Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 40 L. Ed. 2d 1, 94 S. Ct. 1694 (1974), the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion of mootness despite the fact that the underlying labor dispute giving rise to petitioner's claims had ended by the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement and the return to work of the strikers. Although economic concerns were involved, rather than the personal interest (pregnancy) at stake in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court applied the same criteria:
Certainly, the pregnant appellants in Roe v. Wade, supra, and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973), had long since outlasted their pregnancies by the time their cases reached this Court. Yet we had no difficulty in rejecting suggestions of mootness, 410 U.S., at 125 and 410 U.S. at 187. Similar and consistent results were reached in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8, 39 L. Ed. 2d 714, 94 S. Ct. 1274 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5, 36 L. Ed. 2d 1, 93 S. Ct. 1245 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995 n. 2 (1972); and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, 89 S. Ct. 1493 (1969), cases concerning various challenges to state election laws. The important ingredient in these cases was governmental action directly affecting, and continuing to affect, the behavior of citizens in our society.
The issues here are no different. Economic strikes are of comparatively short duration. There are exceptions, of course. See, for example, Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 107, 300 F.2d 699, cert. denied sub nom. Kohler Co. v. Local 833, UAW, 370 U.S. 911, 82 S. Ct. 1258, 8 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1962). But the great majority of economic strikes do not last long enough for complete judicial review of the controversies they engender. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Analysis of Work Stoppages 1971, Table A-3, p. 16 (1973). A strike that lasts six weeks, as this one did, may seem long, but its termination, like pregnancy at nine months and elections spaced at year-long or biennial intervals, should not preclude challenge to state policies that have had their impact and that continue in force, unabated and unreviewed. The judiciary must not close the door to the resolution of the important questions these concrete disputes present.
Id. at 546. Still the court ruled that the merits would be reached:
Our jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution extends only to actual cases and controversies. Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 95 S. Ct. 848, 43 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975). The Court has recognized, however, that jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 55 L. Ed. 310, 31 S. Ct. 279 (1911).
The controversy between the parties to this case is "capable of repetition" in two senses. First, if Simants' conviction is reversed by the Nebraska Supreme Court and a new trial ordered, the District Court may enter another restrictive order to prevent a resurgence of prejudicial publicity before Simants' retrial. Second, the State of Nebraska is a party to this case; the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision authorizes state prosecutors to seek restrictive orders in appropriate cases. The dispute between the State and the petitioners who cover events throughout the State is thus "capable of repetition." Yet, if we decline to address the issues in this case on grounds of mootness, the dispute will evade review, or at least considered plenary review in this Court, since these orders are by nature short-lived. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350, 96 S. Ct. 347 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, supra; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1, 89 S. Ct. 1493 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-179, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325, 89 S. Ct. 347 (1968). We therefore conclude that this case is not moot, and proceed to the merits.
For example, we perceive no difference between Pisciotta's exposure to future grand jury or court proceedings and the circumstances foreseen by the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press in the event a new trial was ordered and a new gag order imposed. Indeed, we need not speculate with respect to Pisciotta's future grand jury involvements, for the government has already subpoenaed Pisciotta once to give grand jury testimony, and has indicated an intention to call him again.*fn8 Further, we are mindful that appeals may be taken by Pisciotta's codefendants, which may result in new trial proceedings at which Pisciotta's testimony will be required. Hence, the circumstances giving rise to Pisciotta's confinement are at least as "capable of repetition" as those circumstances which have satisfied the Supreme Court's mootness requirements in cases involving other interests.*fn9
While in each of the instances discussed, the Supreme Court has determined that "capability of repetition" existed, we are of the view that such capability was perceived so as to satisfy the true governing consideration behind the Court's decision - that of having review available when significant interests are at stake. We are satisfied that Pisciotta's confinement pursuant to an order of contempt, whether or not it is capable of repetition within the exact same framework, must not escape desired review any more than should "gag orders" where the reason for the "gag" no longer exists; pregnancies, where the pregnancies have terminated; or strikes, where the dispute has been settled. Indeed, conceding the importance of the economic, First Amendment, and personal interests discussed, we believe that even more weighty and deliberate consideration should be given to instances where personal liberty has been deprived. Hence, even if the "capable of repetition" criterion could not be satisfied here, we nevertheless could not countenance dismissing Pisciotta's appeal as moot.
We are aware that Pisciotta's confinement resulted from an order of civil contempt rather than from criminal charges which were the subject of the appeals in both St. Pierre and Sibron. However, when fundamental personal liberties are at issue and review of an order of confinement as a practical matter is not available, there is little logic and no basis for distinguishing between the character of the underlying events which have caused the defendant to be imprisoned. C ompare Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1972) (appeal from contempt order under 28 U.S.C. § 1826 for refusal to testify before grand jury not moot even though the term of the grand jury expired) with United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 842, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1974) (appeal from criminal contempt order not moot even though confinement for two hours had terminated.).
Pisciotta claims a constitutional right not to testify, despite the grant of immunity.*fn10 He argues that due regard for his Fifth Amendment rights requires reversal of the district court's order of contempt. He bases his argument on an alleged disparity between the scope of protection guaranteed by the privilege against self-incrimination and that afforded by the immunity provided by 18 U.S.C. § 6002. (See note 1 supra). We must determine whether § 6002 immunity is coextensive with Pisciotta's Fifth Amendment privilege or whether it results in the dilemma posed by Pisciotta which Pisciotta claims he would not confront if his Fifth Amendment privilege remained available.
If the witness commits perjury in giving the compelled testimony, the grant of immunity will not protect him from a perjury prosecution since no immunity attaches to false testimony given pursuant to the immunity order.
United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1976).*fn11 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that "the immunity granted by the Constitution does not confer upon the witness the right to perjure himself or to withhold testimony." United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 42 L. Ed. 2d 673, 95 S. Ct. 667 (1974). Cf. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 56 L. Ed. 128, 32 S. Ct. 71 (1911).
We conclude that § 6002 immunity offers the witness the same protection against a prosecution for perjury that the Fifth Amendment would provide - which is to say, none at all. See In re Bonk, 527 F.2d 120, 125 (7th Cir. 1975). Pisciotta's fear of a perjury prosecution for any untruthful statements which he might make under oath is thus well-founded.
Whatever merit Pisciotta's argument may have had prior to 1972*fn12 was lost when the Supreme Court held in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972), that:
Kastigar establishes, therefore, that use and derivative use immunity under § 6002 is a satisfactory substitute for the guaranties of the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the Kastigar Court conceded that contumacy would be justified if only a lesser protection was offered, for "if the immunity granted is not as comprehensive as the protection afforded by the privilege, petitioners were justified in refusing to answer, and the judgments of contempt must be vacated." Id. at 449.
Here, no one claims that Pisciotta's responses could be used in the government's case in chief against him at a subsequent trial.*fn13 Clearly, such use would contravene Kastigar, and would be exposed in a Kastigar hearing.*fn14 At such a hearing, the burden upon the government to show that its evidence was derived from sources other than the immunized witness's testimony is a heavy one. Kastigar v. United States, supra, 406 U.S. at 460, 461; Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154 (D.R.I. 1972).
Pisciotta's fear - a fear which is justified in part in light of the position taken by the government*fn15 - is that the government could use his immunized testimony for the purpose of impeaching him should he testify in his own defense at a subsequent trial.
In United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973), the government urged this Court to adopt a rule permitting the use of immunized testimony "for the purpose of impeaching the immunized witness or an immunized defendant when . . . he chooses to testify on his own behalf." Id. at 249 n. 1. We responded that to
474 F.2d at 249-50. We reiterate our adherence to this principle; except as the basis for a prosecution for perjury a witness's immunized testimony may not be used against him.*fn16
Finally, we note, as we did in Hockenberry,*fn17 that Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971), does not bear upon this discussion. Harris held that statements inadmissible in the government's case in chief because of Miranda deficiencies could be used to impeach. Harris does not govern the use of statements obtained through a grant of immunity.
Statements obtained under a grant of immunity are compelled - in essence, coerced. The compulsion, which under other circumstances would amount to a violation of Fifth Amendment rights, is permitted because of the substitution of use and derivative use immunity.
Harris offers no such safeguards, and is thus restricted to cases where coercion is not a factor. The Harris Court qualified its rule permitting impeachment as follows: "Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary." 401 U.S. at 224. We cannot conceive of any instance in which a witness given immunity could not claim that his testimony is both coerced and involuntary. The Harris rule, therefore, does not govern the use of such testimony.
Pisciotta's dilemma, then, is illusory. His testimony could be used against him only in the event of a prosecution for perjury, but in no other way and for no other reason. Pisciotta is fully protected by § 6002 immunity from having any truthful testimony he may give - even though inculpatory - used against him.
I concur in the opinion of the majority, with the exception of the dictum that incapability of repetition would not render this appeal moot. See majority op. slip op. at 12-13.
I concur in the majority's affirmance of the district court's order of contempt and confinement. I concur also in Part II of the majority opinion to the extent that it finds the legality of Pisciotta's confinement justiciable; persons in Pisciotta's position can, I think, present problems "capable of repetition, yet evading review." I do not believe, however, that in reviewing the legality of Pisciotta's confinement it is either necessary or proper for this court to decide the question of statutory and constitutional*fn1 interpretation that Pisciotta raises. I would affirm the order of the court below simply because neither here nor in the district court did Pisciotta raise any legal issue that could have had any bearing on the legality of his refusal to testify; that refusal, remaining legally unjustified, was therefore punishable by a contempt order.
By claiming that his uncertainty about the meaning of section 6002 with respect to future impeachment uses justified his refusal to testify, Pisciotta in effect asks this court to render an advisory opinion: no matter how we resolve the statutory and constitutional question Pisciotta raises, our resolution can have no impact on the outcome of the only issue before us, which is the legality of Pisciotta's refusal to testify. That is, if we follow the excellent (but, I think, abstract) analysis of the majority opinion and hold that section 6002 forbids future impeachment uses, then we must conclude that Pisciotta had no fifth amendment claim at all; therefore, his refusal to testify was illegal. If, on the other hand, we hold that section 6002 and the fifth amendment permit future impeachment uses, then again we must conclude that Pisciotta had no fifth amendment claim and that his refusal to testify was illegal. In short, diametrically opposed results on the merits of the statutory and constitutional question raised by Pisciotta would not differ in their effect upon his rights in this case.*fn2
The only possible conclusion, then, is that Pisciotta has failed to raise any legal argument that has any bearing on the decision of the issue before us - the legality of his refusal to testify. That failure leaves his refusal unjustified and therefore punishable. It is unnecessary for us to decide the irrelevant issue that Pisciotta did raise; indeed, because it entails the rendering of an advisory opinion, decision of that issue is improper. See, e.g., Local No. 8-6, Oil Workers Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 371, 4 L. Ed. 2d 373, 80 S. Ct. 391 (1960) (issue not properly justiciable where decision either way cannot effect rights of parties).
Moreover, even if the argument raised by Pisciotta could in some abstruse way be considered part of this case, it could in no sense be considered ripe for judicial resolution. Whether Pisciotta wins a retrial, whether he will testify at that retrial, whether that testimony will diverge from the inculpatory, immunized testimony he apparently would have given at his confederates' trial and - ultimately - whether the Government would have attempted to introduce that immunized testimony to impeach him at his retrial, were all conjectural matters when Pisciotta refused to testify. They remain conjectural. I see no reason to decide the statutory and constitutional question until the occurrence of those contingencies renders its resolution necessary to the disposition of a case. See, e.g., 13 C. Wright § A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (1975). Had Pisciotta testified as ordered, and had the Government later attempted to impeach him with the compelled testimony, the decision of the statutory and constitutional question he raises here would, of course, have been essential to the disposition of his objection to the Government's action. Until such a case is presented, the question raised here will not be ripe.