Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/496/310
Timestamp: 2016-07-26 14:10:57
Document Index: 781441023

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 700', '§ 700', '§ 42', '§ 700', '§ 700', '§ 173']

United States v. Eichman | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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Argued: May 14, 1990
After this Court held, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, that a Texas statute criminalizing desecration of the United States flag in a way that the actor knew would seriously offend onlookers was unconstitutional as applied to an individual who had burned a flag during a political protest, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. The Act criminalizes the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon" a United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a "worn or soiled" flag. Subsequently, appellees were prosecuted in the District Courts for violating the Act: some for knowingly burning several flags while protesting various aspects of the Government's policies and others, in a separate incident, for knowingly burning a flag while protesting the Act's passage. In each case, appellees moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the Act violates the First Amendment. Both District Courts, following Johnson, supra, held the Act unconstitutional as applied, and dismissed the charges.
Held: Appellees' prosecution for burning a flag in violation of the Act is inconsistent with the First Amendment. The Government concedes, as it must, that appellees' flag-burning constituted expressive conduct, and this Court declines to reconsider its rejection in Johnson of the claim that flag-burning as a mode of expression does not enjoy the First Amendment's full protection. It is true that this Act, unlike the Texas law, contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Government's asserted interest in protecting the "physical integrity" of a privately owned flag in order to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of the Nation and certain national ideals is related to the suppression, and concerned with the content, of free expression. The mere destruction or disfigurement of a symbol's physical manifestation does not diminish or otherwise affect the symbol itself. The Government's interest is implicated only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates a message to others that is inconsistent with the identified ideals. The precise language of the Act's [p311]
prohibitions confirms Congress' interest in the communicative impact of flag destruction, since each of the specified terms -- with the possible exception of "burns" -- unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag's symbolic value, and since the explicit exemption for disposal of "worn or soiled" flags protects certain acts traditionally associated with patriotic respect for the flag. Thus, the Act suffers from the same fundamental flaw as the Texas law, and its restriction on expression cannot "‘be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,'" Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320. It must therefore be subjected to "the most exacting scrutiny," id. at 321, and, for the reasons stated in Johnson, supra, at 413-415, the Government's interest cannot justify its infringement on First Amendment rights. This conclusion will not be reassessed in light of Congress' recent recognition of a purported "national consensus" favoring a prohibition on flag-burning, since any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment. While flag desecration -- like virulent ethnic and religious epithets, vulgar repudiations of the draft, and scurrilous caricatures -- is deeply offensive to many, the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Pp. 313-319.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p.319. [p312]
In No. 89-1433, the United States prosecuted certain appellees for violating the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 777, 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp.1990), by knowingly setting fire to several United States flags on the steps of the United States Capitol while protesting various aspects of the Government's domestic and foreign policy. In No. 89-1434, the United States prosecuted other appellees for violating the Act by knowingly setting fire to a United States flag while protesting the Act's passage. In each case, the respective appellees moved to dismiss the flag-burning charge on the ground that the Act, both on its face and as applied, violates the First Amendment. Both the [p313]
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, 731 F.Supp. 415 (1990), and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 731 F.Supp. 1123 (1990), following Johnson, supra, held the Act unconstitutional as applied to appellees and dismissed the charges.
The United States appealed both decisions directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(d) (Supp.1990).
We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the two cases. 494 U.S. 1063 (1990).
Last Term, in Johnson, we held that a Texas statute criminalizing the desecration of venerated objects, including the United States flag, was unconstitutional as applied to an individual who had set such a flag on fire during a political demonstration. The Texas statute provided that "[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates . . . [a] national flag," where "desecrate" meant to "deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989). We first held that Johnson's flag-burning was "conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment.'" 491 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted). We next considered and rejected the State's contention that, under United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), we ought to apply the deferential standard with which we have reviewed Government regulations of conduct containing both speech and nonspeech elements where "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. at 377. We reasoned that the State's asserted interest "in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity" was an interest "related ‘to the suppression of free expression' within the meaning of O'Brien" because the State's concern with protecting the flag's symbolic meaning is implicated "only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message." Johnson, supra, at 410. We therefore subjected the statute to "‘the most exacting scrutiny,'" id. at 412, quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988), and we concluded that the State's asserted interests could not justify the infringement on the demonstrator's First Amendment rights.
The Government concedes in this case, as it must, that appellees' flag-burning constituted expressive conduct, Brief for United States 28; see Johnson, supra, at 405-406, but invites us to reconsider our rejection in Johnson of the claim that flag-burning as a mode of expression, like obscenity or "fighting words," does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). This we decline to do.
Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is "related ‘to the suppression of free expression,'" 491 U.S. at 410, and concerned with the content of such expression. The Government's interest in protecting the "physical integrity" [p316]
Moreover, the precise language of the Act's prohibitions confirms Congress' interest in the communicative impact of flag destruction. The Act criminalizes the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag." 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a)(1) (Supp.1990). Each of the specified terms -- with the possible exception of "burns" -- unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag's symbolic value.
And the explicit exemption in § 700(a)(2) for disposal of "worn or soiled" flags protects certain acts traditionally associated with patriotic respect for the flag.
Although Congress cast the Flag Protection Act in somewhat broader terms than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from the same fundamental flaw: it suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact. Despite the Act's wider scope, [p318]
its restriction on expression cannot be "‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'" Boos, 485 U.S. at 320 (citation omitted); see Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414, nn. 8, 9 (1974) (State's interest in protecting flag's symbolic value is directly related to suppression of expression and thus O'Brien test is inapplicable even where statute declared "simply . . . that nothing may be affixed to or superimposed on a United States flag"). The Act therefore must be subjected to "the most exacting scrutiny," Boos, supra, at 321 and for the reasons stated in Johnson, supra, at 413-415, the Government's interest cannot justify its infringement on First Amendment rights. We decline the Government's invitation to reassess this conclusion in light of Congress' recent recognition of a purported "national consensus" favoring a prohibition on flag-burning. Brief for United States 27. Even assuming such a consensus exists, any suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment.
"‘National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question.'" Johnson, supra, at 418, quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943). Government may create national symbols, promote them, and encourage their respectful treatment.
But the Flag Protection Act goes well beyond this by criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative impact.
We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic and religious epithets, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), vulgar repudiations of the draft, see
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and scurrilous caricatures, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
We deal here with concededly political speech, and have no occasion to pass on the validity of laws regulating commercial exploitation of the image of the United States flag. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415-416, n. 10 (1989); cf. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
Today's decision does not affect the extent to which the Government's interest in protecting publicly owned flags might justify special measures on their behalf. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-409 (1974); cf. Johnson, supra, at 412-413, n. 8.
36 U.S.C. §§ 173-177 (suggesting manner in which flag ought to be displayed).
Contrary to the position taken by counsel for the flag burners in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), it is now conceded that the Federal Government has a legitimate interest in protecting the symbolic value of the American flag. Obviously that value cannot be measured, or even described, with any precision. It has at least these two components: in times of national crisis, it inspires and motivates the average citizen to make personal sacrifices in order to achieve societal goals of overriding importance; at all times, it serves as a reminder [p320]
The idea expressed by a particular act of flag burning is necessarily dependent on the temporal and political context in which it occurs. In the 1960's, it may have expressed opposition to the country's Vietnam policies, or at least to the [p321]
Thus, the Government may -- indeed, it should -- protect the symbolic value of the flag without regard to the specific content of the flag burners' speech. The prosecution in this [p322]
Given all these considerations, plus the fact that the Court today is really doing nothing more than reconfirming what it has already decided, it might be appropriate to defer to the judgment of the majority and merely apply the doctrine of [p324]