Source: http://www.ipsofactoj.com/DecidedCases/international/2012/part11/int2012(11)-001.htm
Timestamp: 2019-02-16 16:00:53
Document Index: 209336646

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 11', 'UKHL ', 'EWCA ', 'UKHL ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

The Catholic Child Welfare Society vs Various Claimants [UKSC]
IpsofactoJ.com: International Cases [2012] Part 11 Case 1 [UKSC]
Catholic Child Welfare Society
Various Claimants & The
of the Christian Schools
they should make it their chief care to teach children, especially poor children, those things which pertain to a good and Christian life.
whether the Institute is responsible in law for the alleged acts of sexual and physical abuse of children at St William's committed by its members.
It is possible for an unincorporated association to be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of one or more of its members: Heaton's Transport (St Helens) Ltd v Transport and General Workers' Union [1973] AC 15, 99; Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South Wales Area) [1986] Ch 20, 66-7; Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48; [2003] 2 AC 366.
D2 may be vicariously liable for the tortious act of D1 even though the act in question constitutes a violation of the duty owed to D2 by D1 and even if the act in question is a criminal offence: Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; Dubai Aluminium; Brink's Global Services v Igrox [2010] EWCA Civ 1207; [2011] IRLR 343.
Vicarious liability can even extend to liability for a criminal act of sexual assault: Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 AC 215.
It is possible for two different defendants, D2 and D3, each to be vicariously liable for the single tortious act of D1: Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151; [2006] QB 510.
The first stage is to consider the relationship of D1 and D2 to see whether it is one that is capable of giving rise to vicarious liability.
Hughes LJ identified the second stage as requiring examination of the connection between D2 and the act or omission of D1. This is not entirely correct. What is critical at the second stage is the connection that links the relationship between D1 and D2 and the act or omission of D1, hence the synthesis of the two stages.
members of the English Province or the Great Britain Province
responsible for the supervision management or direction of brothers carrying on the work of the England Province or the Great Britain Province, or
Trustees of the 1947 trust before 14 July 1992.
a situation where the employee in question, at any rate for relevant purposes, is so much a part of the work, business or organisation of both employers that it is just to make both employers answer for his negligence.
The institute was subdivided into a hierarchical structure and conducted its activities as if it were a corporate body.
The teaching activity of the brothers was undertaken because the Provincial directed the brothers to undertake it. True it is that the brothers entered into contracts of employment with the Middlesbrough Defendants, but they did so because the Provincial required them to do so.
The teaching activity undertaken by the brothers was in furtherance of the objective, or mission, of the Institute.
The manner in which the brother teachers were obliged to conduct themselves as teachers was dictated by the Institute's rules.
The brothers were bound to the Institute not by contract, but by their vows.
Far from the Institute paying the brothers, the brothers entered into deeds under which they were obliged to transfer all their earnings to the Institute. The Institute catered for their needs from these funds.
…there must be a strong connection between what the employer was asking the employee to do (the risk created by the employer's enterprise) and the wrongful act. It must be possible to say that the employer significantly increased the risk of the harm by putting the employee in his or her position and requiring him to perform the assigned tasks.
are not to be read as confining the doctrine to cases where the employer is carrying on business for profit. They are based on the more general idea that a person who employs another for his own ends inevitably creates a risk that the employee will commit a legal wrong. If the employer's objectives cannot be achieved without a serious risk of the employee committing the kind of wrong which he has in fact committed, the employer ought to be liable. The fact that his employment gave the employee the opportunity to commit the wrong is not enough to make the employer liable. He is liable only if the risk is one which experience shows is inherent in the nature of the business.
Experience shows that in the case of boarding schools, prisons, nursing homes, old people's homes, geriatric wards, and other residential homes for the young or vulnerable, there is an inherent risk that indecent assaults on the residents will be committed by those placed in authority over them, particularly if they are in close proximity to them and occupying a position of trust.
is based on the recognition that carrying on a business enterprise necessarily involves risks to others. It involves the risk that others will be harmed by wrongful acts committed by the agents through whom the business is carried on. When those risks ripen into loss, it is just that the business should be responsible for compensating the person who has been wronged.
Maga v Archbishop of Birmingham [2010] EWCA Civ 256; [2010] 1 WLR 1441 is a case that bears a factual resemblance to JGE. The difference is that employment was conceded. A claim was brought against the Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church in respect of sexual abuse that had been committed by a priest, "employed" by the Archdiocese, upon the claimant when a boy. The claimant was not a Catholic and the "grooming" that preceded the sexual abuse occurred in the course of youth work carried on by the priest for the benefit of Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Nonetheless the Court of Appeal unanimously held that vicarious liability was established. Giving the leading judgment Lord Neuberger MR applied the "close connection" test, identifying a number of factors that led to the test being satisfied. He further held that the "material increase of risk" test applied in the Canadian cases was also satisfied.
George Leggatt QC &	Nicholas Fewtrell (instructed by Hill Dickinson LLP) for appellant.
Patricia Leonard (instructed by Jordans Solicitors) for respondent.
Lord Faulks QC &	Alastair Hammerton (instructed by Wedlake Bell LLP) for respondent.