Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/412/1/case.html
Timestamp: 2020-01-24 14:02:11
Document Index: 785041494

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 412', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 411', '§ 101', '§ 14', '§ 78', '§ 401', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 35', '§ 1117', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 102', '§ 35', '§ 102', '§ 412', '§ 102', '§ 201', '§ 431', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102']

HALL V. COLE, 412 U. S. 1 - Volume 412 - 1973 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 412 > HALL V. COLE, 412 U. S. 1 (1973) > Full Text
This case requires us to consider the propriety of an award of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 412. [Footnote 1] On August 6, 1962, at a regular meeting of the membership of petitioner Seafarers International Union of North America -- Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, respondent introduced a set of resolutions alleging various instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies on the part of union officers.
The resolutions were defeated and, on November 26, 1962, respondent was expelled from the union on the ground that his presentation of the resolutions violated a union rule proscribing "deliberate or malicious vilification with regard to the execution or the duties of any office or job." After exhausting his intra-union remedies, respondent filed this suit under § 102 of the LMRDA, claiming that his expulsion under these circumstances violated his right of free speech as secured by § 101(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). [Footnote 2]
On May 27, 1964, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a temporary injunction restoring respondent's membership in the union, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 339 F.2d 881 (1965). Some five years later, the case came on for trial and the District Court, finding a violation of respondent's rights under § 101-(a)(2), ordered him permanently reinstated to membership in the union and, although denying respondent's damages claims, [Footnote 3] granted him counsel fees in the sum of $5,500 against the union. The Court of
Although the traditional American [Footnote 4] rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory [Footnote 5] or contractual authorization, [Footnote 6] federal courts,
in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the power to award such fees "is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation," Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 307 U. S. 166 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever "overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 396 U. S. 391-392 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 386 U. S. 718 (1967).
Thus, it is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice � 54.77[2], p. 1709 (2d ed.1972); see, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 390 U. S. 402 n. 4 (1968); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527 (1962); Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (CA4 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (CA4 1951). In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of "fee-shifting" is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of "bad faith" on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, supra, at 396 U. S. 393-394. [Footnote 7] "Fee shifting"
Id. at 396 U. S. 392; see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra, at 386 U. S. 719; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 105 U. S. 532 (1882). Thus, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lit Co., supra, we approved an award of attorneys' fees to successful shareholder plaintiffs in
a suit brought to set aside a corporate merger accomplished through the use of a misleading proxy statement in violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 Stat. 895, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a). In reaching this result, we reasoned that, since the dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations jeopardized important interests of both the corporation and "the stockholders as a group,'" [Footnote 8] the successful enforcement of the statutory policy necessarily "rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 396 U. S. 396. Under these circumstances, reimbursement of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees out of the corporate treasury simply shifted the costs of litigation to "the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit." Id. at 396 U. S. 397.
29 U.S.C. § 401(b). In an effort to eliminate these abuses, Congress recognized that it was imperative that all union members be guaranteed at least "minimum standards of democratic process. . . ." [Footnote 9] Thus, Title I [Footnote 10] of the LMRDA -- the "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations" as specifically designed to promote the "full and active participation
by the rank and file in the affairs of the union," [Footnote 11] and, as the Court of Appeals noted, the rights enumerated in Title I [Footnote 12] were deemed
Viewed in this context, there can be no doubt that, by vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by § 101(a)(2) of Title I of the LMRDA, respondent necessarily rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution, and to all of its members. When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any of the rights protected by Title I, the rights of all members of the union are threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast upon the rights of others. Indeed, to the extent that such lawsuits contribute to the preservation of union democracy, they frequently prove beneficial "not only in the immediate impact of the results achieved, but in their implications for the future conduct of the union's affairs." Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 260, 466 F.2d 424, 431 (1972). Thus, as in Mills, reimbursement of respondent's attorneys' fees
out of the union treasury [Footnote 13] simply shifts the costs of litigation to "the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 396 U. S. 397. See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra; Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F.Supp. 525 (SDNY 1971); Cefalo v. International Union of District 50 United Mine Workers, 311 F.Supp. 946 (DC 1970); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F.Supp. 677 (SDNY 1968). We must therefore conclude that an award of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in an action under § 102 of the LMRDA falls squarely within the traditional equitable power of federal courts to award such fees whenever "overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 396 U. S. 391-392.
This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where "fee-shifting" would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra, for example, we held that § 35 of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 439, 15 U.S.C. § 1117, precluded an award of attorneys' fees as a separate element of recovery in a suit for deliberate infringement of a trademark. In reaching that result, we reasoned that, since § 35 "meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff
who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed," Congress must have intended the express remedial provisions of § 35 "to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act." Id. at 719, 721. Petitioners contend that this reasoning dictates a similar conclusion with respect to § 102 of the LMRDA. We do not agree. Unlike § 35 of the Lanham Act, which specifically "provided not only for injunctive relief but also for compensatory recovery measured by the profits that accrued to the defendant by virtue of his infringement, the costs of the action, and damages which may be trebled," [Footnote 14] § 102 of the LMRDA broadly authorizes the courts to grant "such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 412. Thus, § 102 does not "meticulously detail the remedies available to a plaintiff," and we cannot fairly infer from the language of that provision an intent to deny to the courts the traditional equitable power to grant counsel fees in "appropriate" situations.
Petitioners argue further, however, that, because Congress expressly authorized the recovery of counsel fees in §§ 201(c) and 501(b) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(c), 501(b), the absence of a similar express provision in § 102 indicates an intent to preclude "fee-shifting" in suits brought under that section. Sections 201(c) and 501(b), which are not a part of Title I, deal with narrowly defined problems under the Act, and specifically authorize such limited remedies as an examination of the union's books and records and an accounting. [Footnote 15] By contrast, § 102 was premised upon the fact
that Title I litigation necessarily demands that remedies "be tailored to fit facts and circumstances admitting of almost infinite variety," [Footnote 16] and § 102 was therefore cast as a broad mandate to the courts to fashion "appropriate" relief. Indeed, any attempt on the part of Congress to spell out all of the remedies available under § 102 would create the
Finally, petitioners call our attention to two isolated comments in the legislative history of Title I -- one by Senator Goldwater in his testimony before a House Committee [Footnote 18]
and the other contained in a dissenting statement to a House Committee Report [Footnote 19] -- expressing the fear that, in the absence of a specific provision for the award of counsel fees, such relief would be unavailable in suits brought under § 102. Although these statements plainly indicate
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150 U.S.App.D.C. at 258, 46 F.2d at 429. See Gartner v. Soloner, supra, at 352. Indeed, both of these comments expressly favored the allowance of counsel fees in Title I litigation, and there is no suggestion anywhere in the
legislative history that even a single member of Congress was opposed to such relief or desired the words "such relief . . . as may be appropriate" to restrict the historic equity powers of the federal courts. On the contrary, there are numerous expressions by sponsors and other supporters of the Act indicating that § 102 was intended to afford the courts "a wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case," [Footnote 20] and "to give such relief as [the court] deems equitable under all the circumstances." [Footnote 21]
Finally, petitioners maintain that the award of counsel fees to respondent under the facts of this case constituted an abuse of the District Court's discretion. Specifically, petitioners argue that the District Court's finding that some of respondent's actions "were, in part, motivated by [his] political ambitions for union office" represents a finding of "bad faith" on the part of respondent. The District Court clearly rejected the "logic" of this contention, and we agree. Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member's right to seek higher office within the union, [Footnote 22] and we can hardly accept the proposition that the exercise of that right is tantamount to "bad faith." See Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, at 259-260, 466 F.2d at 430-431.