Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/783/1356/41711/
Timestamp: 2020-06-05 23:20:53
Document Index: 773499863

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 412', '§ 413', '§ 524', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 401', '§ 501', '§ 411', '§ 529', '§ 412', '§ 413', '§ 523', 'art:\n29', '§ 524', '§ 524', '§ 523']

Warren Bloom, Plaintiff/appellant, v. General Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local952; William Montgomery; Donald Cochran; Manuellopez; Gerold Scott, Defendants/appellees,andinternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant, 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1986 › Warren Bloom, Plaintiff/appellant, v. General Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local95...
Warren Bloom, Plaintiff/appellant, v. General Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, Local952; William Montgomery; Donald Cochran; Manuellopez; Gerold Scott, Defendants/appellees,andinternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant, 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 783 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986) Argued and Submitted Oct. 10, 1985. Decided Feb. 28, 1986
Appellant Warren Bloom seeks reversal of summary judgments against him in his action against his former union and its officers alleging wrongful discharge, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of his rights as a union member under section 101(a) (1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or the Act) (29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982)). On appeal, Bloom argues that his complaint states a claim under the Act, that he may maintain a cause of action under state law, and that the individual defendants should be held liable for their actions. We affirm.
On April 25, 1983, Bloom filed the initial complaint in the current action. On January 13, 1984, pursuant to stipulation, Bloom filed a first amended complaint, naming the Local, the Teamsters, Montgomery, Cochran, Lopez, and Scott as defendants. On September 25, 1984, the district court granted summary judgments to defendants Local, Montgomery, Cochran, Lopez, and Scott on the grounds that Bloom had failed to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412 and that the pendant state wrongful discharge action was preempted.
This court reviews the district court's grant of a summary judgment de novo. See e.g., Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Arizona Laborers Local 395 Health & Welfare Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Appellant Bloom asserts in his brief that the expenditure of $300 on the luncheon when the Local membership had voted only $150 violated his rights to free speech and participation as a union member under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982),1 giving him a cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).2 Notwithstanding the posture of his brief, however, Bloom actually bases his complaint on his firing as business agent for the Local, not on the expenditure of the $300. All the relief requested in his first amended complaint relates to the loss of his job; none of it deals with the alleged $150 excess donation. (Indeed, any harm from that donation was remedied at the Executive Board meeting following the donation, when the entire Board voted to donate the additional $150.) In short, the relief sought would do nothing to remedy the "infringement" that Bloom argues is the substance of his LMRDA claim.
Bloom frames his argument around the "excess" donation in an attempt to fall within the terms of the LMRDA; the action he actually complains of (his discharge) was not intended to be prohibited by the Act. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 436-37 & n. 7, 102 S. Ct. 1867, 1870-71 & n. 7, 72 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1982) (citing legislative history). A union employee who is discharged in a way that does not affect his rights as a union member has no cause of action under section 412. Id. at 440-42, 102 S. Ct. at 1872-74.3 Bloom's discharge from union employment does not alone affect those rights. After his discharge, he retained all the rights and privileges of union membership he had had before. An indirect burden on membership rights, such as a forced choice between expressing one's opinion and losing one's job, is insufficient to state an LMRDA claim. See Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-42, 102 S. Ct. at 1872-74; Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W., 710 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1983). Without some infringement on his rights as a union member, Bloom does not state an action under sections 411 and 412, despite his artful pleading.4
Bloom first argues that his wrongful discharge action cannot be preempted by the LMRDA because it is specifically "saved" from preemption by the Act itself. He cites 29 U.S.C. §§ 413, 523, and 524, which he asserts "save" his state claim.6 Sections 413 and 523(a), however, save causes of action enjoyed by union members, and, as discussed above, Bloom is not bringing this action as a union member but as a union employee. Just as he is not entitled to the substantive protections of the LMRDA as an employee, so he cannot enjoy its savings clauses. The remaining section, 29 U.S.C. § 524, saves only state criminal laws and thus cannot directly save appellant's civil action.7
Federal labor law preemption of state law is a complex and difficult area of the law. Because the statutes are largely silent as to what aspects of state law Congress intended to preempt, we have developed a preemption doctrine "based on legislative history and judicial conceptions of what federal labor policy requires." Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984). Preemption questions clearly require us to balance state and federal interests, although the relative importance attached to each interest is unclear.8 Id.; Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 2319, 85 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1985).
In the present case, the state's interest is strong. Bloom asserts in his complaint that he was fired for refusing to alter the minutes of a union meeting to cover up an unapproved expenditure (in effect an embezzlement) of union funds by other union officers. California law prohibits embezzlement. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Secs. 503, 504, 506 & 508 (West 1970); see also People v. Swanson, 174 Cal. App. 2d 453, 344 P.2d 832 (1959) (embezzlement of union funds). California has a strong interest in preventing this crime, and consequently in seeing that employees are not coerced by threat of discharge into committing or abetting the crime. A state cause of action for wrongful discharge based on refusal to submit to such coercion is a necessary deterrent to both the coercion and the crime itself. See Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959).9 If federal labor law preempts such a cause of action, the deterrent effect is lost and nothing prevents unscrupulous employers from forcing employees to choose between committing crimes and losing their jobs.10
The LMRDA addresses various aspects of the abuse of power by union leaders. Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1982), provides, among other things, equal rights, freedom of speech and assembly, and safeguards against improper disciplinary action for union members. See 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982). These rights clearly aim at promoting union democracy and at making democratically elected union leaders responsive to the wishes of their memberships. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441-42, 102 S. Ct. 1867, 1873-74, 72 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1982); see Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W., 710 F.2d 234, 239 n. 9 (6th Cir. 1983); see also 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (congressional statement of purpose and policy). This responsiveness requires a degree of power and autonomy, and "the ability of an elected union president to select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the mandate of the union election." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441, 102 S. Ct. at 1873. The federal interest in promoting union democracy and the rights of union members, therefore, includes an interest in allowing union leaders to discharge incumbent administrators.13
We need not decide, however, whether allowing a state cause of action for wrongful discharge would generally undermine this federal interest and rob the union leader of discretion needed to serve the wishes of the membership and thus the purposes of the Act. See Tyra v. Kearney, 153 Cal. App. 3d 921, 926-27, 200 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719-20 (1984) (holding that a state claim for wrongful discharge was preempted by the LMRDA and the Supreme Court's decision in Finnegan).14 In the present case, Bloom alleges that he was fired, not for political reasons, or for no reason at all, but rather because he refused to illegally alter the minutes of a union meeting. Not only is the state's interest in allowing the wrongful discharge action here strong, as discussed above, but the federal interest is much lessened under these circumstances. The kind of discharge alleged, retaliation for refusal to commit a crime and breach a trust, is not the kind sanctioned by the Act, or by the courts in Finnegan and Tyra. Protecting such a discharge by preempting a state cause of action based on it does nothing to serve union democracy or the rights of union members; it serves only to encourage and conceal such criminal acts and coercion by union leaders.
In Tyra and Finnegan, the discharge of the employee was central to the concerns of federal labor policy, and a state cause of action would have interfered with the federal regulatory scheme. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S. Ct. 773, 779, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1959); Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 305, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 1066, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977). The subject of the suit here is merely peripheral to the concerns of the Act, see, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 59-63, 86 S. Ct. 657, 661-663, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966) (charge of libel not central to NLRA concerns), and a state cause of action would not interfere with federal policy at all.15
Furthermore, the state cause of action actually advances the purpose of the Act. Title V of the Act prohibits the very acts of embezzlement and imposes the very fiduciary duties addressed by state law and alleged here by Bloom. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1982). The Act, however, lacks any mechanism for preventing the coercive firings that might aid violation of those provisions. The state cause of action for wrongful discharge for refusing to violate the provisions is therefore a useful adjunct to federal as well as state law.
Although the state wrongful discharge action is not preempted, the appellees are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because Bloom has raised no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Arizona Laborers Local 395 Health & Welfare Fund v. Conquer Cartage Co., 753 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although the district court judge did not specifically make this finding, her statement of uncontroverted facts justifies such a conclusion.16
Bloom contends that there is a legitimate dispute about the reason for his discharge. This assertion is not sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, however. The evidence in the record and the declaration offered by the defendants compel Bloom to come forward with some support for his assertions. Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1979); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a) reads in relevant part:
We need not decide whether the retaliatory discharge of a union member from union office--even though not 'discipline' under Sec. 609 [29 U.S.C. § 529]--might ever give rise to a cause of action under Sec. 102 [29 U.S.C. § 412].
Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-41, 102 S. Ct. at 1872-73. A careful reading of Finnegan, however, reveals that this reservation is limited to certain personnel:
Id. at 441, n. 11, 102 S. Ct. at 1873, n. 11 (emphasis added).
The Finnegan holding is clearly applicable to business agents like Bloom; the plaintiffs in Finnegan were themselves Teamsters local business agents. See also Cehaich v. International Union, U.A.W., 710 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the critical question is "whether the employee can correctly be considered an instrumental part of the union administration").
29 U.S.C. § 413 (1982) provides:
29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982) provides in relevant part:
29 U.S.C. § 524 (1982) provides:
As this court has noted before, see Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1984), the most effective suggested approach appears in Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 Ohio St. L.J. 277 (1980). Under this approach, federal labor law preempts only state laws specifically regulating collective activity, not laws of general applicability with only incidental effect on the employment relationship. See id. at 281-82. This approach has been adopted only by a plurality of the Supreme Court. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 & n. 7 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 99 S. Ct. 1328, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1979)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 2319, 85 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1985)
Appellant relies heavily on Petermann, a seminal case in the area of wrongful discharge. In Petermann, a union business agent asserted that his discharge resulted from his refusal to commit perjury before a state legislative committee. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 344 P.2d at 26. The court held this assertion sufficient to state a claim of wrongful discharge, despite the at-will nature of the employment contract, because of the public policy against the retaliatory firing. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27
See 29 U.S.C. § 524 (set out in full supra note 6)
See 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (set out in full supra note 6)
This court may affirm on any ground supported by the record below. Davis v. United States, 589 F.2d 446, 448 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1979)