Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/331/132
Timestamp: 2020-04-10 06:24:26
Document Index: 488552393

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 212', '§ 266', '§ 380', '§ 45', '§ 238', '§ 345', '§ 29', '§ 380']

AYRSHIRE COLLIERIES CORPORATION et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
331 U.S. 132 (67 S.Ct. 1168, 91 L.Ed. 1391)
Argued: and Submitted April 7, 8, 1947.
Decided: April 28, 1947.
The complaints requested that the court convene a specially constituted court of three judges, as required by the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 220, 28 U.S.C. 47, 28 U.S.C.A. § 47, to hear the motions 'for a temporary or interlocutory injunction and for final hearing in this proceeding.' Circuit Judge Evans and District Judge Igoe were then assigned to sit with District Judge Baltzell to hear and determine these applictions, and the cases were consolidated for all purposes. The applications for a temporary stay and an interlocutory injunction were assigned for hearing on January 3, 1946. But on that day, it appearing that the Commission had postponed the effective date of its order to April 8, 1946, the court ordered that 'the hearing upon the petitioners' application for an interlocutoryinjunction and temporary stay heretofore assigned and set for January 3, 1946, be and the same hereby is, continued to the day of final hearing herein and that said final hearing shall be had on March 25, 1946 * * *.' The Commission made a further postponement of the effective date of its order to July 8, 1946, in order that the carriers subject to the order might avoid the necessity of preparing and filing new tariffs prior to the termination of the court proceeding. It also appeared that the illness of Judge Baltzell made it impossible for the court to convene as scheduled on March 25. And so that court reassigned the case for trial on April 22, with Judge Baltzell being replaced by Circuit Judge Major.
The applicable provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 220, 28 U.S.C. 47, 28 U.S.C.A. § 47, state: '* * * No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order made or entered by the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be issued or granted by any district court of the United States, or by any judge thereof, or by any circuit Judge acting as district judge, unless the application for the same shall be presented to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur in granting such application. When such application as aforesaid is presented to a judge, he shall immediately call to his assistance to hear and determine the application two other judges. * * * Provided, That in cases where irreparable damage would othrwise ensu e to the petitioner, a majority of said three judges concurring, may, on hearing, * * * allow a temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, of the operation of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for not more than sixty days * * * and upon the final hearing of any suit brought to suspend or set aside, in whole or in part, any order of said commission the same requirement as to judges and the same procedure as to expedition and appeal shall apply. * * *'
It is significant that this Act makes no provision for a quorum of less than three judges. Two judges of a three-judge circuit court of appeals, on the other hand, ordinarily constitute a statutory quorum for the hearing and determination of cases.428 U.S.C. 212, 28 U.S.C.A. § 212. The absence of such a quorum provision as to three-judge district courts is a strong corroborating indication that participation by all three judges is necessary to render a valid decision. The Act provides, it is true, that a decision may be reached by a three-judge court if a 'majority of said three judges' concur. But that means only that the decision of the three judges need not be unanimous; it does not imply that two judges alone may hear and determine the case.
It is suggested, however, that the three-judge requirement applies only to applications for interlocutory injunctions against the enforcement of Interstate Commerce Commission orders; and since the decision in this case was one denying a permanent injunction, no complaint can be made that the decision was rendered by less than three judges. Reference is made in this respect to § 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 380, 28 U.S.C.A. § 380, which deals with injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes or state administrative orders on the ground of unconstitutionality of the statute involved. Prior to 1925, that section indicated that a three-judge court was necessary only to pass upon applications for interlocutory injunctions. A single judge had jurisdiction to hear the cause on final hearing and to grant or deny a permanent injunction, thereby permitting him to reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by the three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction. To end that anomalous situation, an amendment was added by the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 938, to the effect that 'The requirement respecting the presence of three judges shall also apply to the final hearing in such suit in the district court.' The problem then arose as to whether the words 'such suit' in this amendment referred only to a suit in which an interlocutory injunction was in fact sought or to a suit in which it might have been, but was not, requested. A series of decisions by this Court has made it clear that the former interpretation is the correct one. A three-judge court must be convened for final hearings on applications for permanent injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes only where an interlocutory injunction has been sought and pressed to a hearing. Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U.S. 317, 47 S.Ct. 105, 71 L.Ed. 273; Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388, 47 S.Ct. 385, 71 L.Ed. 699; Public Service Commission of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 289 U.S. 67, 53 S.Ct. 514, 77 L.Ed. 1036; McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 324, 82 L.Ed. 336. Where an interlocutory injunction is not sought and pressed, a single judge may hear and determine the application for a permanent injunction.
Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219, 220, 28 U.S.C. 45 and 47a, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 47a; Judicial Code § 238, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 938, 28 U.S.C. 345, 28 U.S.C.A. § 345.
But see 32 Stat. 823, as amended by 58 Stat. 272, 15 U.S.C. 29, 15 U.S.C.A. § 29, which provides that the senior circuit judge and the two circuit judges next in order of seniority shall 'hear and determine' appeals from district court judgments in antitrust cases where this Court is unable to consider the appeals because of a lack of a quorum. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 416.
See also 50 Stat. 752, 28 U.S.C. 380a, 28 U.S.C.A. § 380a, providing that no interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of, or setting aside, any Act of Congress on the ground of unconstitutionality shall be issued by a district court, unless the application shall be presented to a circuit or district judge and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge.
ABERDEEN AND ROCKFISH RAILROAD COMPANY et al., Appellants, v. STUDENTS CHALLENGING REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEDURES (S.C.R.A.P.) et al. UNITED STATES et al., Appellants, v. STUDENTS CHALLENGING REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEDURES (S.C.R.A.P.) et al.