Source: https://m.openjurist.org/329/us/211
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 17:53:54
Document Index: 471209722

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 451', '§ 451', '§ 37', '§ 88', '§ 88', '§ 37', '§ 269', '§ 391', '§ 391', '§ 155', '§ 155', '§ 707', '§ 707', '§ 1', '§ 37', '§ 20', '§ 4067', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 335', '§ 541', '§ 541']

329 US 211 Fiswick v. United States | OpenJurist
329 U.S. 211 - Fiswick v. United States
329 US 211 Fiswick v. United States
The Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 8 U.S.C. § 451 et seq., 8 U.S.C.A. § 451 et seq., required aliens, with certain exceptions, to register pursuant to regulations of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.1 Among the disclosures required was whether during the preceding five years th alien had been 'affiliated with or active in (a member of, official of, a worker for) organizations, devoted in whole or in part to influencing or furthering the political activities, public relations, or public policy of a foreign government.'2
Petitioners are German nationals who registered under the Act, the last of the three, Mayer, registering on December 23, 1940. Each stated when he registered that he was not affiliated with or active in such an organization. Each failed to disclose in answer to another question pertaining to 'memberships or activities in clubs, organizations, or societies' that he was in any way connected with the Nazi party. They were indicted in 1944 with 28 others for conspiring to defraud the United States in the exercise of its governmental functions (see Curley v. United States, 1 Cir., 130 F. 1, 4) in violation of § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 88, 18 U.S.C.A. § 88.
Of the 31 indicted, only the three petitioners were convicted after a jury trial.3 Fiswick and Rudolph were sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months each. Mayer was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day. The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. 3 Cir., 153 F.2d 176. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because the rulings of the lower courts on the continuing nature of the conspiracy were apparently in conflict with decisions of this Court. See United States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450, 25 L.Ed. 193; United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 31 S.Ct. 124, 54 L.Ed. 1168.
The Solicitor General now rightly concedes that that ruling was erroneous. Though the result of a conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy does not thereby become a continuing one. See United States v. Irvine, supra. Continuity of action to produce the unlawful result, or as stated in United States v. Kissel, supra, page 607 of 218 U.S., at page 126 of 31 S.Ct., 54 L.Ed. 1168, 'continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up' is necessary. A conspiracy is a partnership in crime. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253, 60 S.Ct. 811, 858, 84 L.Ed. 1129. Under § 37 of the Criminal Code, the basis of the present indictment, an overt act is necessary to complete the offense.4 The statute of limitations, unless suspended,5 runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 401, 32 S.Ct. 812, 815, 56 L.Ed. 1136. The overt acts averred and proved may thus mark the duration, as well as the scope, of the conspiracy.
It is earnestly argued, however, that the error was harmless. The 'harmless error' statute, Judicial Code, § 269, 28 U.S.C. § 391, 28 U.S.C.A. § 391, provides that 'On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, * * * or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' We have recently reviewed the history of this statute and the function it was designed to serve in criminal cases. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239. The Court there stated, page 1248 of 66 S.Ct.: 'If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. * * * But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.'
The prosecutor's case, apart from the admissions, may be briefly summarized. Draeger and Vogel were active in the affairs of the Nazi party in this country. Their stenographer, a government witness, testified that applications for membership in the party were received at their office. Dues were paid there. A car file of members of the party and of applicants for membership was kept there. The name of each petitioner was on the list. A letter was sent to all on the list in August or September, 1940, over Draeger's signature, requesting them to discuss a matter with Draeger. Those who appeared in response to the letter were told to conceal their Nazi party membership or affiliation when they registered under the Act. Another witness for the government—a defendant in the case who was granted a severance—also testified that Vogel gave instructions to party members not to disclose their affiliation with the Nazi party. And a clerk in Draeger's office testified for the government that the party members who came to the cons late were told to say in their registration statement that they were members of an innocuous sounding association of German nationals. There was no evidence that petitioners came to the consulate seeking advice. There was no direct evidence that petitioners had received the instructions from the consulate to conceal their party membership. There was no direct evidence that petitioners came to the consulate in response to the letter which was sent. They were not identified as being with any group which called there. There was no evidence that they conferred with Draeger or Vogel or with each other.
The situation here is different. Fiswick is an alien. An alien sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more 'because of conviction in this country of any crime involving moral turpitude' is, unless pardoned, subject to deportation if the crime was committed within five years after the alien's entry into the United States. 39 Stat. 874, 889, 8 U.S.C. § 155, 8 U.S.C.A. § 155. The conspiracy with which Fiswick is charged was formed and executed within that five year period, as his last entry was in 1937. The conspiracy of whic he was convicted was one to impede the government in one of its lawful functions, to prevent it from obtaining information which the Executive and Congress deemed vital to our internal security, to conceal by fraud, deceit, and perjury6 the ramifications of an organization in our midst bent on our undoing. We need not determine in this collateral way whether conviction for such a crime would involve 'moral turpitude' within the meaning of the deportation laws.7 But the judgment, if undisturbed, stands as unimpeachable evidence that Fiswick committed the crime charged. The hazards of deportation because of that fact are real.8 To leave him to defend a deportation order on the ground that the crime of which he was convicted did not involve 'moral turpitude' is to add to his burdens by depriving him of his best defense—that he was not properly convicted.
Moreover, other disabilities or burdens may flow from the judgment, improperly obtained, if we dismiss this cases as moot and let the conviction stand. If Fiswick seeks naturalization, he must establish that during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition for naturalization he 'has been and still is a person of good moral character.' 54 Stat. 1137, 1142, 8 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 707(a)(3). An outstanding judgment of conviction for this crime stands as ominous proof that he did what was charged and puts beyond his reach any showing of ameliorating circumstances or explanatory matter that might remove part or all of the curse. And even though he succeeded in being naturalized, he would, unless pardoned, carry through life the disability of a felon;9 and by reason of that fact he might lose certain civil rights.10 Thus Fiswick has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him. In no practical sense, therefore, can Fiswick's case be said to be moot.
At common law it was not necessary to aver or prove an overt act. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359, 32 S.Ct. 793, 799, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614. The same is true under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1—7, 15 note. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378, 33 S.Ct. 780, 782, 57 L.Ed. 1232; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, at page 252 of 310 U.S., at page 857 of 60 S.Ct., 84 L.Ed. 1129. But § 37 of the Criminal Code requires not only an agreement to do the unlawful act but also the doing of 'any act to effect the object of the conspiracy'. See Hyde v. United States, supra, at page 359, of 225 U.S., at page 799 of 32 S.Ct., 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614.
Convictions for perjury, Kaneda v. United States, 9 Cir., 278 F. 694, for frauds on the revenues, Guarneri v. Kessler, 5 Cir., 98 F.2d 580, United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 429, for frauds with respect to property, United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 8 Cir., 24 F.2d 57, have been held by the lower courts to meet that test. And counterfeiting was so classified by the Court in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 53 S.Ct. 665, 77 L.Ed. 1298. As to deportation for violations of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 see § 20(b)(4) and (5). See also Alien Enemy Act of 1798, Rev.Stat. §§ 4067—4070, as amended 40 Stat. 531, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21 24, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 21—24; Presidential Proclamation No. 2655, 10 Fed.Reg. 8947.
'All offenses which may be punished by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, shall be deemed felonies.' Criminal Code § 335, 18 U.S.C. § 541, 18 U.S.C.A. § 541.