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Teamsters Local v. Labor Board (full text) :: 365 U.S. 667 (1961) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Teamsters Local v. Labor Board
Teamsters Local v. Labor Board 365 U.S. 667 (1961)
U.S. Supreme CourtTeamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U.S. 667 (1961)Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Americav. National Labor Relations BoardNo. 64Argued February 28, 1961Decided April 17, 1961*365 U.S. 667CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
107 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 275 F.2d 646, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Page 365 U. S. 668
"Discharge of any employee by any employer shall be grounds for removal of any employee from seniority status. No casual employee shall be employed by any employer who is a party to this Agreement in violation of seniority status if such employees are available and if the dispatching service for such employees is available. The employer shall first call the Union or the dispatching hall designated Page 365 U. S. 669 by the Union for such help. In the event the employer is notified that such help is not available, or in the event the employees called for do not appear for work at the time designated by the employer, the employer may hire from any other available source."
Slater made charges against the union and the employer. Though, as plain from the terms of the contract, there was an express provision that employees would not be discriminated against because they were or were not union members, the Board found that the hiring hall provision was unlawful per se and that the discharge of Slater on the union's request constituted a violation by the employer of § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) and a violation by the union of § 8(b)(2) and § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140141, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158. [Footnote 1] The Page 365 U. S. 670 Board ordered, inter alia, that the company and the union cease giving any effect to the hiring hall agreement; that they jointly and severally reimburse Slater for any loss sustained by him as a result of his discharge; and that they jointly and severally reimburse all casual employees for fees and dues paid by them to the union beginning six months prior to the date of the filing of the charge. 121 N.L.R.B. 1629.
Our decision in Local 60 v. Labor Board, decided this day, ante, p. 365 U. S. 651, is dispositive of the petition Page 365 U. S. 671 of the Board that asks us to direct enforcement of the order of reimbursement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals on that phase of the matter is affirmed.
"We believe, however, that the inherent and unlawful encouragement of union membership that stems from unfettered union control over the hiring process Page 365 U. S. 672 would be negated, and we would find an agreement to be nondiscriminatory on its face only if the agreement explicitly provided that:"
Id., 896, n. 8. The hiring hall at times has been a useful adjunct to the closed shop. [Footnote 3] But Congress may have thought that it need not serve that cause, that, in fact, it has served well both labor and management -- particularly in the maritime field and in the building and construction industry. [Footnote 4] In the latter, the contractor, who frequently is a stranger to the area where the work is done, requires a "central source" for his employment needs, [Footnote 5] and a man Page 365 U. S. 673 looking for a job finds in the hiring hall "at least a minimum guarantee of continued employment." [Footnote 6]
"In order to make clear the real intention of Congress, it should be clearly stated that the hiring hall is not necessarily illegal. The employer should be able to make a contract with the union as an employment agency. The union frequently is the best employment agency. The employer should be able Page 365 U. S. 674 to give notice of vacancies, and, in the normal course of events, to accept men sent to him by the hiring hall. He should not be able to find himself, however, to reject nonunion men if they apply to him; nor should he be able to contract to accept men on a rotary-hiring basis. . . ."
"* * * *" ". . . The National Labor Relations Board and the courts did not find hiring halls as such illegal, but merely certain practices under them. The Board and the court found that the manner in which the hiring halls operated created in effect a closed shop in violation of the law. Neither the law nor these decisions forbid hiring halls, even hiring halls operated by the unions, as long as they are not so operated as to create a closed shop, with all of the abuses possible under such an arrangement, including discrimination against employees, prospective employees, members of union minority groups, and operation of a closed union."
There being no express ban of hiring halls in any provisions of the Act, those who add one, whether it be the Board or the courts, engage in a legislative act. The Act deals with discrimination either by the employers or unions that encourages or discourages union membership. [Footnote 8] As respects § 8(a)(3), we said in Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 347 U. S. 4243:
"The language of § 8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. Thus, this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished Page 365 U. S. 675 by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed."
It may be that the very existence of the hiring hall encourages union membership. We may assume that it does. The very existence of the union has the same influence. When a union engages in collective bargaining and obtains increased wages and improved working conditions, its prestige doubtless rises, and, one may assume, more workers are drawn to it. When a union negotiates collective bargaining agreements that include arbitration clauses and supervises the functioning of those provisions so as to get equitable adjustments of grievances, union membership may also be encouraged. The truth is that the union is a service agency that probably encourages Page 365 U. S. 676 membership whenever it does its job well. But, as we said in Radio Officers v. Labor Board, supra, the only encouragement or discouragement of union membership banned by the Act is that which is "accomplished by discrimination." P. 347 U. S. 43.
It may be that hiring halls need more regulation than the Act presently affords. As we have seen, the Act aims at every practice, act, source, or institution which, in fact, is used to encourage and discourage union membership by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure, term, or condition of employment. Perhaps the conditions which the Board attaches to hiring hall arrangements will, in time, appeal to the Congress. Yet, where Congress has adopted a selective system for dealing with evils, the Board is confined to that system. Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 362 U. S. 284290. Where, as here, Congress has aimed its sanctions only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board cannot go farther and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme.
Moreover, the hiring hall, under the law as it stands, is a matter of negotiation between the parties. The Board has no power to compel directly or indirectly that the hiring hall be included or excluded in collective agreements. Page 365 U. S. 677 Cf. Labor Board v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 343 U. S. 404. Its power, so far as here relevant, is restricted to the elimination of discrimination. Since the present agreement contains such a prohibition, the Board is confined to determining whether discrimination has, in fact, been practiced. If hiring halls are to be subjected to regulation that is less selective and more pervasive, Congress, not the Board, is the agency to do it.
"* * * *" "(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . ."
"* * * *" "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents --"
Cf. id. at 507. For expression of such view, see S.Rep. No. 1827, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 48; Goldberg, The Maritime Story (1958), pp. 277282.
The Board's condemnation of these union "hiring hall" procedures as violative of §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1), and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, [Footnote 2/1] ultimately rests on a now well established line of circuit court cases to the effect that a clause in a collective bargaining agreement may, without more, constitute forbidden discrimination. See, e.g., Red Star Express Lines v. Labor Board, 196 F.2d 78. While seeming to recognize the validity of the proposition that contract terms which are equivocal on their face should ordinarily await an independent evaluation of their actual meaning and effect [Footnote 2/2] before being Page 365 U. S. 678 deemed to give rise to an unfair labor practice, such cases have justified short-circuiting that course upon these considerations: the mere existence of a clause that, on its face, appears to declare preferential rights for union members encourages union membership among employees or job applicants, persons not privy to the undisclosed intent of the parties, yet affected by the apparent meaning of the contract. Hence, the mere possibility that such a clause may actually turn out not to have been administered by the parties so as to favor union members is not enough to save it from condemnation as an unlawful discrimination.
I think this rationale may have validity under certain circumstances, but that it does not carry the day for the Board in these cases. The Board recognizes, as it must, that something more than simply actual encouragement or discouragement of union members must be shown to make out an unfair labor practice, whether the action involved be that of agreeing to a contract term or discharging an employee, or anything else. In this regard, it contends that the action of agreeing to the union "hiring" clause should be treated like any other employer or union action, and that, on this premise, all that the Board must show in the light of Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, is that the tendency to encourage or discourage union membership was foreseeable to the employer or union. Since one is presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of his acts, and since acting in order to encourage or discourage union membership is forbidden, the Board's case is said to be made by a simple showing that such encouragement or discouragement is the foreseeable result of employer or union action. The Board then concludes with a showing that encouragement of union membership is a foreseeable consequence of the acts of agreeing to or operating a union-run hiring hall. Page 365 U. S. 679
What, in my view, is wrong with the Board's position in these cases is that a mere showing of foreseeable encouragement of union status is not a sufficient basis for a finding of violation of the statute. It has long been recognized that an employer can make reasonable business decisions, unmotivated by an intent to discourage union membership or protected concerted activities, although the foreseeable effect of these decisions may be to discourage what the act protects. For example, an employer may discharge an employee because he is not performing his work adequately, whether or not the employee happens to be a union organizer. See Labor Board v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429. Yet a court could hardly reverse a Board finding that such firing would foreseeably tend to discourage union activity. Again, an employer can properly make the existence or amount of a year-end bonus depend upon the productivity of a unit of the plant, although this will foreseeably tend to discourage the protected activity of striking. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Labor Board, 284 F.2d 74. A Page 365 U. S. 680 union, too, is privileged to make decisions which are reasonably calculated to further the welfare of all the employees it represents, nonunion as well as union, even though a foreseeable result of the decision may be to encourage union membership.
This Court's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions has recognized that Congress did not mean to limit the range of either employer or union decision to those possible actions which had no foreseeable tendency to encourage or discourage union membership or concerted activities. In general, this Court has assumed that a finding of a violation of § 8(a)(3) or § 8(b)(2) requires an affirmative showing of a motivation of encouraging or discouraging union status or activity. See, e.g., Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Co., 301 U. S. 1, 301 U. S. 4546; Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. There have, to be sure, been exceptions to this requirement, but they have been narrow ones, usually analogous to the exceptions made to the requirements for a showing of discrimination in other contexts. For example, in Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, the Court affirmed a Board decision that a company "no solicitation" rule was over-broadly applied to prevent solicitation of union membership on company property during periods when employees were otherwise free to do as they pleased. A finding of a motivation to discourage union membership was there held unnecessary because there was no employer showing of a nondiscriminatory purpose for applying the rule to union solicitation during the employees' free time. A similar absence of a significant business justification for the employer's acts which tended to discourage union activity explains the dispensability of proof of discriminatory motivation in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 162 F.2d 435, Cusano v. Labor Board, 190 F.2d 898, and Labor Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87. Page 365 U. S. 681
There is no reason to decide now whether there are other contexts in which a showing of an actual motivation of encouraging or discouraging union activity might be unnecessary to a finding of a union or employer unfair Page 365 U. S. 682 labor practice. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that what is involved in the general requirement of finding of forbidden motivation, as well as in the limited scope of the heretofore recognized exceptions to this general requirement, is a realization that the Act was not intended to interfere significantly with those activities of employer and union which are justified by nondiscriminatory business purposes, or by nondiscriminatory attempts to benefit all the represented employees. It is against this policy that we should measure the Board's action in finding forbidden the incorporation in collective bargaining contracts of the "hiring hall" clause. We must determine whether the Board's action is consistent with the balance struck by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts between protection of employee freedom with respect to union activity and the privilege of employer and union to make such nondiscriminatory decisions as seem to them to satisfy best the needs of the business and the employees.
"The fourth unfair labor practice [then § 8(3)] is a corollary of the first unfair labor practice. An employer, of course, need not hire an incompetent man, and is free to discharge an employee who lacks skill or ability. But if the right to join or not to join a labor organization is to have any real meaning for an employee, the employer ought not to be free to discharge an employee merely because he joins an organization, or to refuse to hire him merely because of his membership in an organization. Nor should an employer be free to pay a man a higher Page 365 U. S. 683 or lower wage solely because of his membership or nonmembership in a labor organization. The language of the bill creates safeguards against these possible dangers."
Statement of Senator Walsh, 79 Cong.Rec. 7658. (Emphasis added.) Page 365 U. S. 684 And further, the House Report on the bill stated:
Considered in this light, I do not think we can sustain the Board's holding that the "hiring hall" clause is forbidden by the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board has not found that this clause was without substantial justification in terms of legitimate employer or union purposes. Cf. Republic Aviation v. Labor Board, supra; Gaynor News Co. Inc. v. Labor Board, supra. Whether or not such a finding would have been supported by the record is not for us now to decide. The Board has not, in my view, made the type of showing of an actual motive of encouraging union membership that is required by Universal Camera v. Labor Board, supra. All it has shown is that the clause will tend to encourage union membership, and that, without substantial difficulty, the parties to the agreement could have taken additional steps to isolate the valid employer or union purposes from the discriminatory effects of the clause. [Footnote 2/3] I do not think Page 365 U. S. 685 that these two elements alone can justify a Board holding of an unfair labor practice unless we are to approve a broad expansion of the power of the Board to supervise nondiscriminatory decisions made by employer or union. Whether or not such an expansion would be desirable, it does not seem to me consistent with the balance the labor acts have struck between freedom of choice of management and union ends by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement and the freedom of employees from restraint or coercion in their exercise of rights granted by § 7 of the Act. [Footnote 2/4]
Set forth in note 1 of the Court's opinion ante, p. 669670.
Set forth in note 1 of the Court's opinion, ante, p. 365 U. S. 669670.
Lester Slater, the complainant, became a "casual employee" in the truck freight business in 1953 or early Page 365 U. S. 686 1954. He approached an employer, but was referred to the union hiring hall. There, the dispatcher told him to see Barney Volkoff, an official of the union, whose office in the union headquarters building was some three miles away. Describing his visit to Volkoff, Slater stated that
However, this was but the beginning of Slater's trouble with the hall. After some difficulty with one of his temporary employers (Pacific Intermountain Express), the hall refused to refer Slater to other employers. In order to keep employed despite the union hall's failure to dispatch him, Salter relied on a letter from John Annand, an International Representative of the union, stating that "you may seek work wherever you can find it in the freight industry without working through the hiring hall." It was this letter that obtained Slater his employment with Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, where he was characterized by its dock foreman as being "a good worker." After a few months employment, the Business Agent of the union (Victor Karaty) called on the Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, advising that it could not hire Slater "any longer here without a referral card"; that the company would "have to get rid of Slater, and, if [it] . . . didn't, that he was going to tie the place up in a knot, [that he] would pull the men off." Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express fired Slater, telling him that "[We] . . . can't use you now until you get this straightened out with the union. Then come back; we will put you to work." He then went to the union, and was again referred to Volkoff, who advised, "I can't do anything for you, because you are out. You are not qualified for this job." Upon being shown the Annand letter, Volkoff declared "I am the union." On later occasions when Slater attempted to get clearance Page 365 U. S. 687 from Volkoff, he was asked "How come you weren't out on that -- didn't go out on the picket line?" (Apparently the union had been on a strike.) Slater testified,
I do not doubt for a moment that men hired through such arrangements are saved the expense and delay of making the rounds of prospective employers on their own. Nor do I doubt their utility to employers with varying Page 365 U. S. 688 employee demands. And I accept the fact that Congress has outlawed only closed shops, and allowed hiring halls to remain in operation. But just as those observations are not, in the final analysis, relied upon by the Court today in reaching its decision, my acquiescence in them is only a prologue to my dissent from the remaining considerations upon which its decision actually rests. These considerations are dependent upon the construction given § 8(a)(3), and I therefore first turn to that section.
The word "discrimination" in the section, as the Board points out and I agree, includes not only distinctions contingent upon "the presence or absence of union membership," ante, p. 365 U. S. 675, but all differences in treatment, regardless of their basis. This is the "cause" portion of the section . But § 8(a)(3) also includes an "effect" clause, which provides that the intended or inherent effect of the discrimination must be "to encourage or discourage [union] membership." The section has, therefore, a divided structure. Not all discriminations violate the section, but only those the effect of which is encouragement or discouragement of union membership. Cf. 347 U. S. S. 689Á Officers v. Labor Board,@ 347 U. S. 17, at 347 U. S. 43:
"The unfair labor practice is for an employer (1) to encourage or discourage membership (2) by means Page 365 U. S. 690 of discrimination. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations -- only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such -- only (1) such discrimination (2) as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed."
At 347 U. S. 4243. (Emphasis added.) The Court's conclusion is in patent conflict with that reasoning.
I begin with the premise that the Congress has outlawed the closed shop, and that, as the Court pointed out, "[t]he policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights," Radio Officers, supra, 347 U. S. 40. To test the contract here, I look to probable and anticipated "employee response" to it, id., at 347 U. S. 46, recognizing that "[e]ncouragement and discouragement are subtle things' requiring `a high degree of introspective Page 365 U. S. 691 perception.'" Id. at p. 347 U. S. 51. Just as in cases of his interference with protected activities, the escape value of the employer's "true purpose" and "real motive" is to be tested by the "natural consequences" and "foreseeable result" of his resort, however justifiably taken, to an institution so closely allied to the closed shop. I believe, as this Court has recognized, that "the desire of employees to unionize is directly proportional to the advantages thought to be obtained. . . ." Radio Officers, supra, at 347 U. S. 46. (Emphasis added.) I therefore ask,
"that a union to which an employer has so delegated hiring powers will exercise its power with a view to securing compliance with membership Page 365 U. S. 692 obligations and union rules."
However, I need not go so far as to presume that the union has set itself upon an illegal course, conditioning referral on the unlawful criterion of union membership in good standing (which inference the majority today says cannot be drawn), to reach the same result. I need only assume that, by thousands of common workers like Slater, the contract and its conditioning of casual employment upon union referral will work a misunderstanding as to the significance of union affiliation unless the employer's abdication of his role be made less than total and some note of the true function of the hiring hall be posted where all may see and read. The tide of encouragement may not be turned, but it will in part at least be stemmed. As an added dividend, the inherent probability of the free-wheeling operation of the union hiring Page 365 U. S. 693 hall resulting in arbitrary dispatching of job seekers would to some significant extent be diminished.
"Perhaps [the closed shop] is best exemplified by the so-called hiring halls on the west coast, where shipowners cannot employ anyone unless the union sends him to them. . . . Such an arrangement gives the Page 365 U. S. 694 union tremendous power over the employees; furthermore, it abolishes a free labor market. A man cannot get a job where he wants to get it. He has to go to the union first; and if the union says that he cannot get in, then he is out of that particular labor field."