Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/3:2013cv08281/822505/20
Timestamp: 2017-05-30 05:36:12
Document Index: 546323195

Matched Legal Cases: ['art,\n464', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§\n416']

ORDER, the decision of the ALJ and the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court for Coley v. Colvin :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Coley v. Colvin
ORDER, the decision of the ALJ and the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed; the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly; the judgment will serve as the mandate of this Court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michelle H Burns on 3/20/15. (REW)
Larry Wayne Coley,
CIV 13-8281-PCT-MHB
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Larry Wayne Coley’s appeal from the Social
Security Administration’s final decision to deny his claim for disability insurance benefits
Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income alleging disability beginning February 1, 2010. (Transcript of Administrative Record
(“Tr.”) at 12, 164-81.) His applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr.
at 12, 60-107.) Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge.
(Tr. at 129-30.) A hearing was held on August 29, 2012, (Tr. at 31-59), and the ALJ issued
a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. at 9-24). The Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. at 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did engage in substantial gainful
activity since February 1, 2010 – the alleged onset date. (Tr. at 14.) However, the ALJ
found that there has been a continuous 12-month period during which Plaintiff did not
engage in substantial gainful activity. The ALJ clarified that the findings set forth in her
decision address the period of time wherein Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful
activity. (Tr. at 14.) At step two, she found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: coronary artery disease, cardiomyopathy, chronic pulmonary insufficiency
(COPD)/emphysema, and lumbar spine degenerative joint disease. (Tr. at 15.) At step three,
1 of the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. at 15.) After consideration of the entire record,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained “the residual functional capacity to perform medium
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except he can frequently climb ramps
and stairs. He can occasionally climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. He can frequently crawl.
He must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation.”1
(Tr. at 15-19.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant
work as a night manager and roofing salesperson. (Tr. at 19-20.) Therefore, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability from February 1, 2010, through the
date of her decision. (Tr. at 20.)
In his brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to properly consider
his subjective complaints, and (2) failing to find that Plaintiff’s alleged cervical radiculopathy
and coronary conditions met a Listing.2
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his subjective complaints.
Plaintiff appears to assert an additional claim stating, generally as the heading of his
argument, that the ALJ “misinterpreted evidence to the detriment of the claimant.” Further,
under this heading, Plaintiff states, “[b]y not citing the cervical problems as a severe
impairment, one must assume that the ALJ did not understand the medical evidence in its
entirety.” Then, in the next paragraph, Plaintiff states that the ALJ “has misrepresented the
evidence/opinion of Dr. Ostrowski as representing the entirety of the record, but clearly it
does not.” The Court finds this claim conclusory, non-specific, and difficult to follow. Thus,
to the extent Plaintiff has intended to assert a claim under the heading the ALJ
“misinterpreted evidence to the detriment of the claimant,” Plaintiff’s claim fails.
F.3d 625, 637-39 (9th Cir. 2007).3 The ALJ also considers “the claimant’s work record and
Plaintiff and his attorney appeared at an August 2012 hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. at
31-59.) Plaintiff admitted that he worked full-time from September 2011 through April
2012, driving a haul truck at a goldmine. (Tr. at 35, 40.) He testified that his employer laid
him off on May 4, 2012, because the company was having some problems. (Tr. at 40-42.)
Plaintiff admitted that he was not having any medical problems at that time. (Tr. at 41.)
Plaintiff testified that he could not work due to pain and heaviness in his chest. (Tr.
at 38.) He said that the C5, C6, and C7 vertebrae “exploded in my back from roofing over
the years.” (Tr. at 38.) He indicated that he had numbness all the way down his right arm
and hand. (Tr. at 38.) However, he admitted that he had no problems driving the haul truck
at the goldmine. (Tr. at 40-41.) Plaintiff also said stairs took his breath away, but admitted
that he smoked cigarettes. (Tr. at 40.) He further admitted that he drank four to five beers
with his son every few days. (Tr. at 40.)
Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly asked him if he felt he could work full-time. (Tr. at
42-49.) Plaintiff indicated that, “... I wouldn’t have taken the mining job if I wasn’t flat
broke and about to lose my house.” (Tr. at 43; Tr. at 45 (“It was either [drive a truck] or lose
my house.”), Tr. at 45 (“I needed money.” ), Tr. at 46 (“I wouldn’t have returned [to work]
if I didn’t need the money.”).) Plaintiff testified that he had always performed very heavy
physical work and he did not believe he had the energy to perform other kinds of work. (Tr.
at 49.)
symptoms were not fully credible. (Tr. at 15-19.)
The ALJ explicitly outlined multiple inconsistencies that supported a finding that
Plaintiff’s claims were not entirely credible. First, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s
allegations were inconsistent with treatment notes showing that Plaintiff’s conditions were
controlled with medications; Plaintiff denied symptoms to treating physicians and described
few, if any, complaints of difficulty with mobility or use of his extremities; heart studies
demonstrated good exercise tolerance; physical examination findings consistently showed
no neurological deficits; and Plaintiff did not demonstrate a good will effort to comply with
recommended medical treatment as he continued to smoke and drink. See Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (adverse credibility determination was adequately
supported where the ALJ found the claimant’s allegations were undermined by her daily
activities, demeanor and presentation to doctors, medical evidence, and evidence that her
impairment responded to treatment). Second, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s allegations were
inconsistent with the medical source opinions of record. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004) (ALJ reasonably discounted the claimant’s
allegations where it was contradicted by the opinion of a consultative physician). Third, the
ALJ found that, after his alleged onset of disability, Plaintiff worked full-time for eight
months as a haul truck driver and admitted that he stopped working due to a business-related
layoff rather than because of the allegedly disabling impairments. See Greger v. Barnhart,
464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) (ALJ reasonably rejected claimant’s testimony where the
claimant reported that he did carpentry work “under the table” until a date well after his date
last insured); Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding adverse
credibility finding where claimant “stated at the administrative hearing and to at least one of
his doctors that he left his job because he was laid off, rather than because he was injured”);
Elletson v. Astrue, 319 F. App’x 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (ALJ reasonably
rejecting claimant’s testimony where she previously worked at a physically demanding job
and left that job for reasons unrelated to her impairment). Lastly, the ALJ analyzed
Plaintiff’s daily activities finding that said activities also reduced Plaintiff’s credibility. “[I]f
the claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred
to the workplace, an adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making
specific findings relating to the claimant’s daily activities.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603); see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228,
1234-35 (9th Cir. 2010) (claimant’s activities suggested a greater functional capacity than
alleged). The ALJ stated:
[t]he records show that [Plaintiff’s] symptoms do not occur on a frequent basis
and the claimant has not complained of an inability to perform daily activities
to his treating sources. Indeed, the claimant reported to his cardiologist he
could perform “moderate activities without difficulty” ... . The undersigned
notes that the claimant continues to care for himself, lift without problems,
perform household chores, spend time with others, and engage in work activity
that, at times, has been substantial ... .
The ALJ’s Step Three Determination
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in her step three determination by failing to find
that his alleged impairments – cervical radiculopathy and coronary conditions – met a
The Listings describe specific impairments of each of the major body systems which
are considered “severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity, regardless
of his or her age, education, or work experience” and designate “the objective medical and
other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a), (c)(3),
416.925(a), (c)(3). A mere diagnosis is insufficient to meet or equal a listed impairment; a
claimant must establish that he or she “satisfies all of the criteria of that listing ... .” Id. at
§§ 404.1525(c)(3), (d), 416.925(c)(3), (d).
To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must establish symptoms, signs, and
laboratory findings “at least equal in severity and duration” to the characteristics of a relevant
listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1526 (explaining medical equivalence); 416.926
(same). Medical equivalence can be found for a listed impairment, an unlisted impairment,
or a combination of impairments. See id. §§ 404.1526(b), 416.926(b).
The ALJ is obligated to consider the relevant evidence to determine whether a
claimant’s impairment or impairments meet or equal one of the specified impairments set
forth in the Listings. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(iii). Generally, a “boilerplate finding is insufficient to support a conclusion
that a claimant’s impairment does not [meet or equal a Listing].” Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512;
see Marcia, 900 F.2d at 176 (noting that the ALJ’s unexplained finding at step three was
reversible error). The Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that the ALJ need not recite
the reasons for his or her step three determination so long as the evidence is discussed in the
ALJ’s decision. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 513. Moreover, a boilerplate finding may be
appropriate where a claimant fails to set forth any evidence for the ALJ to conclude that an
impairment could meet or equal a Listing. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201
Here, the ALJ found that:
The claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal any of the relevant immune
or musculoskeletal listings including, but not limited to, listing 4.04 (entitled
Ischemic heart disease), listing 4.02 (entitled Chronic heart failure), 3.02
(entitled Chronic pulmonary insufficiency) or 1.04 (entitled Disorders of the
spine). Although the claimant has symptoms of shortness of breath and
fatigue, he has nonetheless demonstrated clear lungs on examination, only
mild pulmonary obstruction, and good exercise tolerance ... . The claimant has
not experienced three separate ischemic episodes requiring coronary artery
Moreover, the claimant’s ejection fraction on
echocardiogram is greater than 30% and his left ventricular end diastolic
diameter is less than 6 centimeters ... .
The Court, having reviewed the evidence of record and the ALJ’s findings regarding
the Listings at issue (1.04 – Disorders of the spine; 4.04 – Ischemic heart disease), finds that
the ALJ adequately stated the foundations on which her ultimate conclusions were based,
discussing at length, the objective medical evidence supporting her findings. (Tr. at 15-19.)
Substantial evidence supports the determination that Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet
Listing 1.04 or Listing 4.04.
Listing 1.04 requires, among other things, evidence of nerve root compression
characterized by findings of neuro-anatomic distribution of pain; limitation of motion of the
spine; and motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness)
accompanied by sensory or reflex loss. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 1.04.
In this case, physical examinations repeatedly demonstrated that Plaintiff generally had
normal and full muscle strength, normal gait and coordination, full range of motion, intact
sensation, and normal grip strength. (Tr. at 265, 276, 324, 413-15, 428, 476, 478, 479, 480,
483.) Although Plaintiff complained of neck pain and radicular right arm symptoms in late
2010, his radicular right arm symptoms resolved by February 2011 and his neck pain was
nonexistent by June 2011. (Tr. at 472-78.) Plaintiff admitted no medical problems interfered
with his job driving a haul truck at the goldmine from September 2011 through April 2012.
(Tr. at 40-41.) In sum, the record does not contain the objective medical findings required
by Listing 1.04 and, thus, the ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s condition did not satisfy
the criteria of Listing 1.04.
As to Listing 4.04, the ALJ properly discussed the evidence that was relevant
according to the Listing (discussing exercise test results, examination findings, and ejection
fraction), and reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s condition did not satisfy the criteria of
Listing 4.04. (Tr. at 15.) Furthermore, Listing 4.04 requires that a claimant demonstrate that
his coronary artery disease “[r]esults in very serious limitations in the ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 4.04. However, the record evidence here demonstrated that Plaintiff
could – and did in fact – work full-time from September 2011 through April 2012.
Accordingly, the Court finds no error.
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Consequently, the ALJ’s