Source: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/por/docs/v2_rul_rule102
Timestamp: 2020-05-27 16:56:30
Document Index: 328819541

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 410', '§ 0224', '§ 32', '§ 33', '§ 25', '§ 130', '§ 91', '§ 2', '§ 83', '§ 34', '§ 10', '§ 78', '§ 178', '§ 47', '§ 202', '§ 4603']

Customary IHL - Practice Relating to Rule 102. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Note: For practice concerning collective punishments, see Rule 103.
Article 33, first paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.”
Article 5(3) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights provides: “Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.”
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 5(3).
This guarantee is non-derogable under Article 27(2).
American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the OAS Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, also known as Pact of San José, Article 27(2).
Article 75(4)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provides: “No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility.”
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 75(4)(b). Article 75 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VI, CDDH/SR.43, 27 May 1977, p. 250.
Article 6(2)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II provides: “No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility.”
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 6(2)(b). Article 6 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.50, 3 June 1977, p. 97.
Article 7(2) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: “Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.”
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, Article 7(2).
Article 25(2) of the 1998 ICC Statute, entitled “Individual criminal responsibility”, provides: “A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”
Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 25(2).
Article 19(c) of the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam states: “Liability is in essence personal.”
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted at the 19th Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Res. 49/19-P, Cairo, 5 August 1990, annexed to Letter dated 19 September 1990 from the permanent representative of Egypt to the UN addressed to the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/45/421-S/21797, 20 September 1990, Article 19(c).
Article 4 of the 1994 ICTR Statute grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 4.
The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 2 (Instruction for group and patrol leaders): “No one must be held responsible for an act he has not committed.”
Central African Republic, Le Droit de la Guerre, Fascicule No. 2: Formation pour l’obtention du certificat technique No. 2 (Chef de Groupe), du certificat Inter-Armé (CIA), du certificat d’aptitude de Chef de Patrouille (CACP), Ministère de la Défense, Forces Armées Centrafricaines, 1999, Chapter I, Fundamental Rules, § 5.
Madagascar’s Military Manual (1994) provides: “Nobody shall be held responsible for an act he/she did not commit.”
Mexico’s Army and Air Force Manual (2009), in a section entitled “Basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts”, states: “Nobody can be held responsible for an act he has not committed.”
Mexico, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para el Ejército y la Fuerza Área Mexicanos, Ministry of National Defence, June 2009, § 410.
With respect to non-international armed conflict, the manual states: “Nobody may be condemned but on the basis of individual criminal responsibility.”
Netherlands, Toepassing Humanitair Oorlogsrecht, Voorschift No. 27-412/1, Koninklijke Landmacht, Ministerie van Defensie, 1993, p. XI-52.
Every human being is entitled to personal safety.
- No one may be held responsible for a deed he has not committed.
- Reprisals, collective punishments … are forbidden.
Netherlands, Humanitair Oorlogsrecht: Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Juridische Dienst, 2005, § 0224(f).
In its chapter on the protection of the civilian population, the manual states: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he has not personally committed.”
Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) states that a person charged with a criminal offence under international humanitarian law must be provided with certain guarantees, including: “individual criminal responsibility”.
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial Nº 1394-2004-DE/CCFFAA/CDIH-FFAA, Lima, 1 December 2004, § 32.n.(2).
Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) states that a person charged with a criminal offence under international humanitarian law must be provided with certain guarantees, including: “[i]ndividual criminal responsibility.”
Peru, Manual de Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos para las Fuerzas Armadas, Resolución Ministerial No. 049-2010/DE/VPD, Lima, 21 May 2010, § 33(n)(2), p. 251.
Romania’s Soldiers’ Manual (1991) provides that captured combatants and civilians “shall not be held responsible for acts which they have not committed”.
Spain’s LOAC Manual (1996) stresses that “any collective punishment for individual acts” is prohibited.
Switzerland’s Basic Military Manual (1987) states: “No one shall be punished for an act he did not personally commit.”
Switzerland, Lois et coutumes de la guerre (Extrait et commentaire), Règlement 51.7/II f, Armée Suisse, 1987, Article 153.
Burundi’s Penal Code (2009), which includes a chapter on war crimes, states: “Criminal responsibility is individual: one may only be punished for his or her own acts”.
Burundi, Penal Code, 2009, Article 18.
The Central African Republic’s Penal Code (2010), which contains a chapter on war crimes, states in its general provisions: “No one is criminally responsible but for his or her own acts.”
Central African Republic, Penal Code, 2010, Article 8.
Chile’s Code of Criminal Procedure (1906), as amended in 2007, states: “Criminal prosecution … shall only be directed against those personally responsible for the crime or negligent offences.”
Chile, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1906, as amended in 2007, Article 54.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Penal Code (2002) provides: “No one is criminally responsible but for his own acts.”
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Penal Code, 2002, Article 3.
Denmark, Military Criminal Code , 1973, as amended in 1978, § 25(1).
Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention IV, and of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, including violations of Article 75(4)(b), as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 6(2)(b), are punishable offences.
Kyrgyzstan’s Criminal Code (1997) provides: “The Criminal Code is based upon the principles of … personal criminal responsibility.”
Kyrgyzstan, Criminal Code, 1997, Article 3(1).
Peru’s Military and Police Criminal Code (2010), which includes provisions on crimes under international humanitarian law, states in the Preliminary Title: “A punishment requires the proven culpability of the perpetrator.”
Peru, Military and Police Criminal Code, 2010, Article X.
Serbia’s Criminal Code (2005) states: “Punishment and caution may be imposed only on an offender who is guilty of the committed criminal offence.”
Serbia, Criminal Code, 2005, Article 2.
In 2010, in the Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia convicted a leader of the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) of several war crimes. The Court stated:
130 … [I]n principle, individual criminal liability is individual. However, some adjustments are needed for a better understanding of this principle. Indeed, some criminalize complicity and co-perpetration; others, in particular international criminal law and military criminal law, … provide that superiors can, in certain circumstances, be convicted for crimes committed by their subordinates.
132 … [I]n the present case, … the defendant … did not individually and materially commit the various war crimes for which he is charged, as the material perpetrators are formally identified as being Ngiti combatants of the FRPI militia. [H]e was the founder, moral authority and spiritual leader [of the FRPI] and, by right, the commander and leader of the FRPI, as well as the Messiah of the Lendu people. [A]s such, he is the highest moral authority and the supreme spiritual leader. De facto, he is considered by his FRPI peers as the supreme leader of the Ngiti combatants of this political-military movement. In this capacity, together with other commanders of this political-military movement, he organized, planned or encouraged in any way the successive attacks[.]
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Garrison Court of Ituri-Bunia, Barnaba Yonga Tshopena case, Judgment, 9 July 2010, §§ 130 and 132.
In 1997, in its initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Chad stated: “In the criminal sphere, articles 22–25 of the Constitution specify that … [n]o one may be held guilty of and prosecuted for an act he has not committed.”
Chad, Initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 24 July 1997, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.50, submitted 14 January 1997, § 91.
In its judgment in the Mucić case in 1998, the ICTY Trial Chamber addressed the question of the legality of the confinement of civilians. It referred to Article 78 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV and ruled:
Internment and assigned residence, whether in the occupying power’s national territory or in the occupied territory, are exceptional measures to be taken only after careful consideration of each individual case. Such measures are never to be taken on a collective basis.
In its judgment in the Krstić case in 2001, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated:
This defendant, like all others, deserves individualised consideration and can be convicted only if the evidence presented in court shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty of acts that constitute crimes covered by the [1993 ICTY Statute].
ICTY, Krstić case, Judgment, 2 August 2001, § 2.
In its sentencing judgment in the Momir Nikolić case in 2003, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated: “[T]he Trial Chamber must remember that in this case, as in all cases before the Tribunal, it is called upon to determine a sentence for an individual, based on his particular conduct and circumstances.”
ICTY, Momir Nikolić case, Sentencing Judgment, 2 December 2003, § 83.
In the Obrenović case before the ICTY in 2002, the accused, Dragan Obrenović, an officer in the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS), was charged with complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, and persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds) and violations of the laws or customs of war (murder), for his alleged role in the events in the Srebrenica enclave in 1995.
ICTY, Obrenović case, Amended Joinder Indictment, 27 May 2002, §§ 34–59, Counts 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Following a plea agreement jointly filed by the accused and the Prosecution, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge of persecutions. The Trial Chamber accepted the plea and dismissed the remaining charges.
ICTY, Obrenović case, Sentencing Judgment, 10 December 2003, §§ 10–11.
In the sentencing judgment, the Trial Chamber stated:
It is recalled that the basis of liability for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is individual criminal responsibility. An accused shall be held liable for his actions and omissions – no more and no less. In crimes as massive as those committed following the fall of Srebrenica, the Trial Chamber finds that it must be particularly vigilant in ensuring that its consideration of the gravity of the offence focuses on those acts or omissions of the individual accused for which he is personally responsible.
ICTY, Obrenović case, Sentencing Judgment, 10 December 2003, § 78.
In the Fofana and Kondewa case before the SCSL in 2004, the accused, senior members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), were charged with collective punishments as a violation of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(b) of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
[T]his Chamber takes a view that the prohibition of collective punishments in international humanitarian law is based on one of the most fundamental principles of domestic criminal law that is reflected in national systems around the world: the principle of individual responsibility. The principle of individual responsibility requires that, whether an accused be tried singly or jointly, a determination must be made as to the penal responsibility and appropriate punishment of each individual on trial.
SCSL, Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgment, 2 August 2007, §§ 178, footnote 222.
In its judgment in A.P., M.P. and T P. v. Switzerland in 1997, the European Court of Human Rights, accepting that, “whether or not the late Mr P. was actually guilty, the applicants were subjected to a penal sanction for tax evasion allegedly committed by him”, stated: “It is a fundamental rule of criminal law that criminal liability does not survive the person who has committed the criminal act.”
European Court of Human Rights, A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland, Judgment, 29 August 1997, §§ 47–48.
To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that: “The conviction must be pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include … individual and not collective penal responsibility”.
Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 202(b).
The ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols explains with regard to Article 6(2)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II that:
This subparagraph lays down the fundamental principle of individual responsibility; a corollary of this principle is that there can be no collective penal responsibility for acts committed by one or several members of a group. This principle is contained in every national legislation. It is already expressed in Article 33 of the fourth Convention, where it is more elegantly worded as follows: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed” … The wording was modified to meet the requirement of uniformity between the texts in the different languages and, in this particular case, with the English terminology (“individual penal responsibility”). Article 75, paragraph 4 (b), of Protocol I, lays down the same principle.
According to the Commentary, this does not exclude cases of complicity or incitement, which are punishable offences in themselves and may lead to a conviction.
Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 4603.
The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University in Turku/Åbo, Finland in 1990, provides a list of the minimum judicial guarantees, including: “No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility.”
Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo, 30 November–2 December 1990, Article 9(b), IRRC, No. 282, 1991, p. 334.