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Timestamp: 2020-02-17 10:42:18
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 1531', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 1531', '§ 1538', '§ 17', '§ 1538', '§ 1532', '§ 17', '§ 144', '§ 455', '§ 455']

18 ELR 21199 -- Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources
18 ELR 21199 | Environmental Law Reporter | copyright © 1988 | All rights reserved
No. 87-2188 (9th Cir. July 22, 1988)
The court holds that Hawaii's introduction of mouflon sheep into critical habitat of the endangered palila bird is an unlawful taking under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The state introduced the sheep into the area for sport hunting, but the sheep feed on trees that provide critical habitat for the palila. The court first holds that the definition of "harm" in the federal ESA regulations includes habitat degradation that could result in extinction. The district court's ruling was consistent with the Secretary of the Interior's definition, which is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of Congress. The court holds that the Secretary's definition is consistent with the plain language and legislative history of the ESA. The court holds that permitting mouflon sheep to remain in palila habitat is an unlawful taking under ESA § 9. The court holds that the district court's findings that the palila could not coexist even with a huntable number of mouflon sheep and that mouflon sheep destroy the palila's habitat were not clearly erroneous. The court does not address the question of whether harm under the ESA includes habitat degradation that merely retards recovery.
[The district court's decision is published at 17 ELR 20514. Related opinions are published at 9 ELR 20426, 11 ELR 20446, and 16 ELR 20669.]
Edwin P. Watson, Deputy Attorney General
State Capitol, Honolulu HI 96813
Before Schroeder & Noonan, JJ
[18 ELR 21189]
O'Scannlain (before Schroeder & Noonan, JJ.):
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act ("Act"), 16 U.S.C. § 1531-43 (1982), the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, [18 ELR 21200] also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned the right to be capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is represented by attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties who obtained an order directing the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources ("Department") to remove mouflon sheep from its critical habitat. Sports hunters, represented by the Hawaii Rifle Association, among others, had intervened to dispute the contention that the Palila was "harmed" by the presence of mouflon sheep. Hence, these appeals. But, first, some history.
In 1978 the Sierra Club and others brought an action under the Act on behalf of the Palila, claiming that the Department's practice of maintaining feral goats and sheep (animals that originally were domesticated but were allowed to run wild) in the Palila's critical habitat[1] constituted an unlawful "taking" under the Act. The district court agreed and ordered the Department to remove the animals because it found that the goats and sheep destroyed the mamane-naio woodlands upon which the Palila depend.[2] Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources ("Palila I"), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979). This court affirmed. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. Land & Natural Resources ("Palila II"), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
In November 1986 the district court ruled in favor of the Sierra Club. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources ("Palila III"), 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986). It found that presence of mouflon sheep "harmed" the Palila within the meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3's definition of "harm" in two ways:[3] (1) the eating habits of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland and thus caused habitat degradation that could result in extinction; (2) were the mouflon to continue eating the mamane, the woodland would not regenerate and the Palila population would not recover to a point where it could be removed from the Endangered Species list.
The Department argues that the district court construed the definition of "harm" in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 too broadly.[4] The scope of the definition of harm is important because it in part sets the limit on what acts or omissions violate the Act's prohibition against "taking" an endangered species.[5]
We inquire whether the district court's interpretation is consistent with the Secretary's construction of the statute since he is charged with enforcing the Act, and entitled to deference if his regulation is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of Congress. See United States v. Riverside Bayview, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
While promulgating a revised definition of harm, the Secretary noted that harm includes not only direct physical injury, but also injury caused by impairment of essential behavior patterns via habitat modification that can have significant and permanent effects on a listed species. 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750(1981) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3). Moreover, in that same promulgation notice, the Secretary let stand the district court's construction of harm in Palila I. Id. at 54749-50. In Palila I, the district court construed harm to include habitat destruction that could result in the extinction of the Palila -- exactly the same type of injury at issue here. See generally Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 985. We conclude that the district court's inclusion within the definition of "harm" of habitat destruction that could drive the Palila to extinction falls within the Secretary's interpretation.
The Secretary's inclusion of habitat destruction that could result in extinction follows the plain language of the statute because it serves the overall purpose of the Act, which is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). The definition serves the overall purpose of the Act since it conserves the Palila's threatened ecosystem (the mamane-naio woodland).
The Secretary's construction of harm is also consistent with the policy of Congress evidenced by the legislative history. For example, in the Senate Report on the Act: "'Take' is defined in . . . the broadest possible manner to include every [18 ELR 21201] conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2989, 2995. The House Report said that the "harassment" form of taking would "allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young." H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 4 House Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973). If the "harassment" form of taking includes activities so remote from actual injury to the bird as birdwatching, then the "harm" form of taking should include more direct activities, such as the mouflon sheep preventing any mamane from growing to maturity.[6]
The Department contends that the district court erred when it found an unlawful "taking" within the meaning of section 9 of the Act. (Section 9 -- codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1538 -- lists the conduct prohibited by the Act). The Department argues that no taking exists because the evidence shows that (1) a huntable number of sheep (a flock large enough to sustain sports hunting) could co-exist with the Palila; and (2) the Palila are doing poorly because of the recently removed feral sheep and goats, not the mouflon sheep. Our review is for clear error. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Sierra Club's witnesses controverted the Department's thesis of co-existence. First, although regeneration (new mamane seedlings and sprouts) has occurred in many areas, it takes twenty-five years for the mamane seedlings and sprouts to become mature trees capable of providing food and shelter for the Palila. However, for the first ten to fifteen years of this growth period, the mouflon sheep can kill the mamane trees and no significant regeneration would occur, at least not sufficient tosustain the Palila unless the trees survive to twenty-five years of age. Second, the Sierra Club's witnesses showed that the Department's additional programs as an alternative to removal of the mouflon sheep would not work. Third, they disagreed with the premise that the mouflon sheep population could co-exist with the Palila if the Department controlled their density. Fourth, the Sierra Club witnesses stated that the Palila's population, despite short-term fluctuations, has been static over the long term.
On the question of which animals -- the feral sheep and goats or the mouflon -- damage the mamane, the district court again gave more credibility to the Sierra Club's witnesses; this preference cannot be clearly erroneous where the Sierra Club's witnesses were not contradicted by documentary evidence. Indeed, the testimony given by the Sierra Club witnesses -- noticeable regeneration has occurred only where the feral animals have been removed and no mouflon sheep have appeared -- is both plausible and consistent.
We affirm the district court's finding that the Department's permitting mouflon sheep in the area constitutes a "taking" of the Palila's habitat. The district court made its findings based on the testimony of the Sierra Club witnesses, which was not contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the district court's findings should not be held clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("When a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error").
Under this resolution of the appeal, we do not reach the issue of whether harm includes habitat degradation that merely retards recovery. The district court's (and the Secretary's) [18 ELR 21202] interpretation of harm as including habitat destruction that could result in extinction, and findings to that effect are enough to sustain an order for the removal of the mouflon sheep.[7]
1. The Palila's critical habitat is within land owned by the State of Hawaii.
2. The Palila is totally dependent on the mamane-naio woodlands. Its preferred food is the pods of the mamane tree, but the bird will also eat mamane flowers, buds, and leaves, and the berries of the naio tree. The Palila also relies on the mamane for shelter and nesting sites.
3. The Secretary's definition of harm reads:
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1987).
4. The Department also joins the United States' argument that the district court erred when it defined harm as including habitat modification that would prevent or delay the recovery of the Palila. We address this issue in section III.
5. The Act's section on taking reads in relevant part: "[I]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to -- . . . (B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States. . . ." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). In the definition section of the Act, "[t]he term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)(1982) (emphasis added).
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 defines harm, as well as other terms in the Act.
6. In addition, the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the presumption that Congress is "aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and [adopts] that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change." Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985).
7. The Department also contends that the district court acted with a bias in favor of the Sierra Club but, curiously, does not request that the matter be reassigned to another judge for retrial.
A federal judge can be removed from a case for personal bias under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 144; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 455; or (3) the common law of reassignment -- see, e.g., Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987). Here, none of these three mechanisms entitles the Department to relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, it is unsettled in this circuit whether a claim must be timely. See United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 869 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 879, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); In re Manoa Fin. Co., 781 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 948 (1987); Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1045-46 n.9 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that the Department's bias claim is timely, we conclude that no section 455 claim exists because the questioned acts do not demonstrate personal bias; instead, they fall within the district court's authority to facilitate by direct participation the orderly progress of a trial. Hansen v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, we find that our standard for reassignment has not been met. See Cintron v. United States Pac. R.R. Co., 813 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 1987).