Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2007/08/06-5201.htm
Timestamp: 2019-02-20 16:06:28
Document Index: 303341553

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7206', '§2', '§2', '§ 3553', '§ 2253', '§ 3231']

06-5201 -- U.S. v. Maynor -- 08/14/2007
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (35303 bytes) (26400 bytes)
RICHARD MAYNOR BLACKSTOCK,
TERENCE C. KERN, United States District Court,
No. 06-5201
(D.C. No. 06-CR-62-K)
NO. 06-5198
(D.C. No. 06-CV-497-K)
A jury found Richard Maynor Blackstock guilty of thirty-two counts of aiding and assisting the preparation of fraudulent tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Blackstock has filed a direct criminal appeal and a habeas petition claiming numerous errors.(1) We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
The court proceeded to sentence Blackstock. Over Blackstock's objection, the court applied USSG §§2T1.4 and 2T4.1, setting the base offense level at 20 based on a total loss of $827,587. This total included both actual and intended losses. The court also applied a 2-level increase under §2T1.4(b)(1) because Blackstock was in the business of preparing or assisting in the preparation of tax returns. The adjusted offense level was 22. Based on a criminal history category of I, the guideline range was 41 to 51 months. Recognizing the guidelines are advisory and considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Blackstock to 36 months imprisonment on Count 1 and 12 months each on all of the other counts. The court directed these latter sentences to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentence for count 1, resulting in a total of 48 months imprisonment.
As we have noted, the district court dismissed Blackstock's habeas petition without prejudice, citing the rule that district courts should not normally consider collateral proceedings while the underlying criminal case is on direct appeal. See United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006). Although the parties have not raised the issue, "a federal court must, sua sponte, satisfy itself of its power to adjudicate in every case and at every stage of the proceedings." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez, 149 F.3d 1269, 1270 -1271 (10th Cir. 1998). 28 U.S.C. § 2253, the jurisdictional statute governing habeas appeals, requires a "final order" before it vests the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction. The district court made it clear in its order dismissing the petition that Blackstock would have the ability to re-file his habeas petition after the disposition of his direct appeal; therefore, the district court's disposition was without prejudice, and consequently non-final. Because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, we dismiss Blackstock's habeas appeal and proceed to consider Blackstock's direct appeal.
Blackstock alleges the indictment is void because it did not allege "the ultimate facts" to be presented to the jury and because it failed to charge "'crimes' or 'offenses' cognizable in a court of the United States . . . ." (Appellant's Br. at 8.) We review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. United States. v. Todd, 446 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006).
We need not spend much time on this frivolous claim. In United States v. Lussier, the court rejected the defendant's "'silly claim'" that the district court
lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction because he was arrested on land not actually owned and administered by the federal government. 929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1991). The court stated:
It is well settled that a district court has personal jurisdiction over any party who appears before it, regardless of how his appearance was obtained. 18 U.S.C. § 3231, moreover, gives the district court subject matter jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United States." This category of offenses obviously includes the [tax] crimes defined in Title 26.
Id. (citations omitted). It simply "defies credulity to argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the government's case against defendant." United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1990).
Blackstock argues the district court should have determined whether there was a "known legal duty" as a matter of law instead of submitting the matter to a jury.(2)
"The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991). "Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption [that every person knew the law] by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses." Id. at 200. Thus, the Supreme Court has held the "willfulness" element requires "the 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'" Id. at 201. To make this showing, "the Government [must] prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Id.
The Cheek court made clear that "[k]nowledge and belief are characteristically questions for the factfinder . . . ." Id. at 203. Indeed, the Court disapproved of the Seventh Circuit's "[c]haracteriz[ation] of a particular belief as not objectively reasonable [because it] transforms the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from considering it." We have applied the Cheek wilfulness standard to the same statute under which Blackstock was convicted. See United States v. Ambort, 405 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, it seems plain the district court properly submitted the question of Blackstock's knowledge to the jury.
Blackstock points to a pair of Fourth Circuit cases for the rule that "when the law is vague or highly debateable, a defendant ­ actually or imputedly ­ lacks the requisite intent to violate it." United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974); accord United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Criminal prosecution for the violation of an unclear duty itself violates the clear constitutional duty of the government to warn citizens whether particular conduct is legal or illegal."). However, Blackstock fails to recognize the defendants in these cases were charged based on conduct that presented difficult questions of tax law: Mallas dealt with "[w]hether annual advance minimum royalties that are recoupable from warranted coal reserves acquired after execution of a lease but before payment of the royalty may be deducted from gross income," Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363, and Critzer dealt with whether the defendant was required to report income derived from land held by the government in trust for the Eastern Cherokee Indians, a point upon which different branches of government disagreed. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1161.
Blackstock argues the district court committed "constitutional Booker error" by using judge found facts to enhance his sentence. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
126 S.Ct. 495 (2005). Blackstock fails to recognize, however, that a court commits constitutional Booker error only when the court uses judge found facts to enhance a sentence under a mandatory guidelines system. Id. In this case, the district court clearly recognized the guidelines were "advisory and not mandatory." (R. Vol. XI at 38.) Thus, the judge's sentencing could not have constituted constitutional Booker error.
1. Blackstock proceeds pro se on appeal. Thus, we will construe his pleadings liberally. Freeman v. Watkins, 479 F.3d 1257, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. We are intrigued that a defendant would argue the question is a matter for the judge instead of the jury. Were he successful in his argument, Blackstock would have ceded a matter from the jury of his peers to a judicial official.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2007/08/06-5201.htm.