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Timestamp: 2017-12-17 13:53:51
Document Index: 236140153

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 12', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 18', '§ 39', '§ 42', '§ 4', '§ 5']

OCAMPO V. UNITED STATES, 234 U. S. 91 (1914) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Section 2 of Act No. 612 is not in conflict with that paragraph of § 5 of the Act of July 1, 1902, which provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation; a preliminary chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 5, 1908, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila charging plaintiffs in error, with others, as editors, proprietors, owners, directors, writers, managers, administrators, printers, and publishers of the newspaper "El Renacimiento," with publishing in that city a libel against Dean C. Worcester, then a member of the Philippine Commission. The information was subscribed and sworn to by the acting prosecuting attorney, and appended to it, and likewise sworn to by him, was the following declaration: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Both affidavits were made before the judge of the Court of First Instance, who thereupon issued warrants of arrest, pursuant to which the parties accused were on the same day brought before the court. The information was read to them, and the court allowed them until November 7th to answer. Their attorney, being present, asked that they be furnished with a copy of the information, which request was granted, and a copy was delivered to each of the accused. Thereafter, and on November 7th, before entering any demurrer or answer, they moved to vacate the order of arrest upon the ground that it was made without any preliminary investigation held by the court, and without any tribunal, was probable cause to believe the defendants having first determined that the alleged crime had been committed, and that there was provable cause to believe the defendants guilty of it; the procedure adopted being, as was claimed, in violation of §§ 12 and 13 of General Orders, No. 58, issued by the Military Governor April 23, 1910, and of paragraphs 1, 3, 11, and 18 of § 5 of the Philippines Bill, enacted by the Congress of the United States on July 1, 1902, and it was insisted that § 2 of Act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission, which took from accused persons in the City of Manila the right to a preliminary investigation, was contrary to the cited paragraphs of the Philippines Bill, because it provided that accused persons in that city might be deprived of their liberty without due process of law, denied to the inhabitants of that city the equal protection of the law, deprived persons detained there to answer for a criminal offense of the "proper judicial proceedings," and violated the guaranty against arbitrary detention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 44 provided for two justices of the peace for the City of Manila, to exercise within the city the civil jurisdiction conferred upon justices of the peace in Act No. 136, but they were debarred from exercising any criminal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction within the city being confined to courts of first instance and the municipal courts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is, however, further contended that Act No. 612 only undertakes to deny to the inhabitants of the city the right to a preliminary investigation when the prosecuting attorney sees fit to conduct an ex parte examination, and that it does not cover the subject of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, or affect the right accorded by §§ 12 and 13 of General Orders, No. 58, and by that paragraph of § 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which declares "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." In overruling this contention, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands followed its previous rulings in United States v. Wilson, 4 Phil. 317, 322; United States v. McGovern, 6 Phil. 621, 623; United States v. Raymundo, 14 Phil. 416, 436. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
etc. Here we find clear warrant for modifications of the practice and procedure, and since § 5 of the same act (quoted above) does not prescribe how "probable cause" shall be determined, it is, in our opinion, as permissible for the local legislature to confide this duty to a prosecuting chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, it is contended that the Supreme Court of the Philippines had no jurisdiction to increase the punishment of Kalaw. The court was established by Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission (June 11, 1901), with original chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and appellate jurisdiction. By § 18, it was given appellate jurisdiction over the courts of first instance, and by § 39 it was enacted that "the existing audiencia or supreme court is hereby abolished, and the supreme court provided by this act is substituted in place thereof." It is in effect conceded that, under the Spanish system, the courts of first instance were deemed examining courts, having a sort of preliminary jurisdiction, and that their judgments of conviction or acquittal were not final until the case had been passed upon in the audiencia, or supreme court. But it is contended that this was so far changed by General Orders, No. 58, §§ 42, 43, 44, and 50, and by Act No.194 of the Philippine Commission, § 4 (August 10, 1901), that the judgments of the Court of First Instance are final unless an appeal be taken. And so it was held, with respect to cases other than capital, in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 195 U. S. 121. But this does not settle the question of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Islands where an appeal is taken. In the acts referred to, the right of the government, as well as of the defendant, to appeal from the judgment in a criminal case was recognized. In the Kepner case, it was held that § 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in declaring that "no person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment," prevented an appeal by the government from a judgment of acquittal in the Court of First Instance. But in Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521, where the defendants appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, which, upon an indictment for murder, had found them guilty of the lower crime of homicide, it was held the Supreme Court of the Islands had power to reverse the judgment and find the accused guilty of the higher crime of murder, distinguishing the Kepner case. In Flemister v. United States, 207 U. S. 372, a judgment of the insular supreme court increasing the sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance was affirmed. See chanroblesvirtualawlibrary