Source: http://openjurist.org/892/f2d/1554/in-re-diane-m-dillon
Timestamp: 2015-03-05 22:31:57
Document Index: 24141634

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 103', '§ 103', '§ 103', 'art, 531', '§ 103', '§ 103']

892 F2d 1554 In Re Diane M Dillon | OpenJurist
892 F. 2d 1554 - In Re Diane M Dillon	Home892 f2d 1554 in re diane m dillon
892 F2d 1554 In Re Diane M Dillon 892 F.2d 1554
58 USLW 2447, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337
Dec. 29, 1989.Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc Accepted and JudgmentVacated May 21, 1990.
Archer, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Richard E. Schafer, Associate Sol. and Joseph F. Nakamura.
Before NEWMAN and ARCHER, Circuit Judges, and COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Diane M. Dillon, assignor to Union Oil Company of California, appeals the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("Board") of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), November 25, 1987, rejecting claims 2 through 14, 16 through 22, and 24 through 37, all the remaining claims of patent application Serial No. 06/671,570 entitled "Hydrocarbon Fuel Composition". We reverse.
Dillon's patent application describes and claims her discovery that the inclusion of certain tetra-orthoester compounds in hydrocarbon fuel compositions will reduce the emission of solid particulates (i.e., soot) during combustion of the fuel. In this appeal Dillon presents claims to hydrocarbon fuel compositions containing these tetra-orthoesters, and to the method of use of these compositions to reduce particulate emissions during combustion. Claim 2 is the broadest composition claim:
wherein R sub5 , R sub6 , R sub7 and R sub8 are the same or different mono-valent organic radical comprising 1 to about 20 carbon atoms.
The other claims are narrower in scope and/or contain additional limitations. In view of our decision, the other claims need not be separately considered.
The Board held all of the claims to be unpatentable on the ground of obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103, in view of certain primary and secondary references. As primary references the Board relied on two Sweeney United States Patents, Nos. 4,390,417 and 4,395,267. Sweeney '417 describes hydrocarbon fuel compositions containing specified chemical compounds, i.e., ketals, acetals, and tri-orthoesters,1 used for "dewatering" the fuels. Sweeney '267 describes three-component compositions of hydrocarbon fuels heavier than gasoline, immiscible alcohols, and tri-orthoesters, wherein the tri-orthoesters serve as co-solvents to prevent phase separation between fuel and alcohol. The Board explicitly found: "The Sweeney patents do not teach the use of the orthoesters recited in appellant's claims."
The Board cited Elliott et al. United States Patent No. 3,903,006 (and certain other patents, not here significant) as secondary references. Elliott describes tri-orthoesters and tetra-orthesters for use as water scavengers in hydraulic (non-hydrocarbon) fluids. The Board stated that the Elliott reference shows equivalence between tetra-orthoesters and tri-orthoesters, and that "it is clear from the combined teachings of these references that [Dillon's tetra-orthoesters] would operate to remove water from non-aqueous liquids by the same mechanism as the orthoesters of Sweeney".
The Board stated that there was a "reasonable expectation" that the tri- and tetra-orthoesters would have similar properties, based on "close structural and chemical similarity" and the fact that both the prior art and Dillon use these compounds as "fuel additives". The Board stated that since the tetra-orthoesters were known to serve as water scavengers in hydraulic fluids, "there is a reasonable expectation that the prior art compositions will have properties similar to the claim compositions"; that is, that the tri-orthoesters would be expected to reduce particulate emissions. Although no reference was cited as suggesting the use of any orthoester to reduce particulate emissions,2 or to show a relationship between the property of water scavenging and the property of reducing particulate emissions from combustion, the Board concluded, and the Solicitor argues on appeal, that the claimed composition and method "would have been prima facie obvious from the combined teachings of the references." On this reasoning, the Board held that unless Dillon showed some unexpected advantage or superiority of her claimed tetra-orthoester fuel compositions as compared with tri-orthoester fuel compositions, Dillon's new compositions as well as their new use to reduce particulate emissions were unpatentable for obviousness.
The Board then analyzed Dillon's specification, wherein Dillon had disclosed that both tri- and tetra-orthoesters are effective in reducing particulate emissions from combustion of hydrocarbon fuels, and presented data to illustrate this property. The Board held that because these data do not show the unexpected particulate-reduction superiority of the tetra-orthoester compositions as compared with the tri-orthoester compositions, Dillon had not overcome the prima facie case of obviousness.
The Solicitor maintains that it is not of controlling weight, or even pertinent, that there is no prior art suggesting Dillon's use of reducing particulate emissions, for any compositions similar to those claimed by Dillon. The Solicitor maintains that the existence of the tri-orthoester compositions of Sweeney, which are taught to have an entirely unrelated property and use, suffice to make a prima facie case of obviousness as to Dillon's method as well as her composition claims.
The issue is the patentability in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims to Dillon's new composition and claims to its new method of use, when the components of the new composition are deemed to be structurally similar to components of known compositions, but the new use discovered by Dillon for her new composition is neither taught nor suggested in the prior art. The threshold question is whether, under such circumstances, a prima facie case of unpatentability for obviousness is deemed made.3
* The Composition Claims
The facts as to the prior art are not in dispute; only the conclusions drawn therefrom are at issue. Sweeney shows compositions of tri-orthoesters in hydrocarbon fuels for the purpose of scavenging water in the fuels; Elliott shows that both tri- and tetra-orthoesters have the property of scavenging water in hydraulic liquids. No reference shows compositions of tetra-orthoesters in hydrocarbon fuels for any purpose, and no reference shows any orthoester fuel composition having the property and utility of reducing particulate emissions from combustion of fuels.
The Board held that a prima facie case of obviousness was made despite the fact that Dillon's compositions were new, and despite the absence of any suggestion in the prior art that these compositions would have the property and use discovered by Dillon. In view of this retrenchment by the Board from the weight of precedent, we have undertaken to review the history of this jurisprudence.
* The variety of factual situations that have arisen, in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims, and in the Federal Circuit, has produced a rich body of precedent, as the courts sought to identify unifying criteria and apply consistent reasoning to determinations of the question of obviousness of composition and compound claims. Procedural as well as substantive rules were established, to facilitate the uniform application of 35 U.S.C. § 103 despite great diversity in technological facts and in the relationship of the prior art to the inventions at issue.
Thus, as the first step in the examination process, the PTO determines whether a prima facie case of obviousness is deemed made, based on the specification, the prior art, and any other evidence before the examiner. If a prima facie case is made, the applicant may adduce evidence and present argument in rebuttal, following which the determination of obviousness is made on all the evidence. If a prima facie case is not made, no rebuttal is necessary. See the discussion in In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (Fed.Cir.1984); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 189 USPQ 143 (CCPA 1976); and cases cited therein.
As we will discuss, some early CCPA cases held that a prima facie case of obviousness could be made based solely on similarity of structure, independent of properties and use; but by the 1960's, and thereafter, the weight of CCPA and Federal Circuit authority is that the chemical structure and the properties or utility must all be considered in determining whether a prima facie case of obviousness has been made. The early status was explained in In re Lunsford, 357 F.2d 380, 382 n. 2, 148 USPQ 716, 718 n. 2 (CCPA 1966):
Just how one finds the compounds "obvious" in the first instance, the examiner does not say, but apparently he envisions a comparison of structures only. That such an approach is not sanctioned by this court, although concededly the law was less well-defined in June 1961, the date of the Examiner's Answer, can be seen, e.g., in In re Krazinski, 347 F.2d 656, 146 USPQ 25 [ (CCPA 1965) ]; In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 145 USPQ 274 [ (CCPA 1965) ]; In re Ward, 329 F.2d 1021, 141 USPQ 227 [ (CCPA 1964) ]; In re Lunsford, 327 F.2d 526, 140 USPQ 425 [ (CCPA 1964) ]; In re Riden, Jr., 318 F.2d 761, 138 USPQ 112 [ (CCPA 1963) ]; In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 137 USPQ 43 [ (CCPA 1963) ]; In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 133 USPQ 275 [ (CCPA 1962) ]; In re Lambooy, 300 F.2d 950, 133 USPQ 270 [ (CCPA 1962) ]. [Emphasis in original.]
It behooves the PTO, in the first step of patent examination, to ascertain the similarities and differences in structure and properties or utility, and any other pertinent evidence before the examiner, to determine whether in any particular case a prima facie case of obviousness is made. See Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472, 223 USPQ at 788 (prima facie obviousness is but a legal inference drawn from uncontradicted evidence).
In determining whether an invention would have been obvious under section 103, based either on the application as filed (i.e., prima facie ) or with additional evidence if such is adduced, the statute is applied in view of the record and the prior art. As illustrated in precedent, appropriate weight is given to considerations such as the closeness to the field of the invention of the arts from which the cited references are drawn, the motivation or suggestion in the prior art to combine the cited references, the problem confronting the inventor, the nature of the improvement as compared with the prior art, and a variety of other criteria, all as may arise in any particular case. No single case may involve all these issues, but when present, they can not be ignored.
The Commissioner's position in this case is that it is immaterial, in determining whether a prima facie case of obviousness has been made as to Dillon's composition claims, that no reference shows any relationship between use as a dewatering agent and use to reduce soot formation during combustion. Thus the Commissioner would hold Dillon's invention unpatentable because Dillon did not prove that her tetra-orthoester fuel compositions were superior in soot-reduction to the tri-orthoesters, although there is no suggestion in the prior art that either compound would have any soot-reducing properties at all. That idea comes solely from Dillon's specification, wherein she disclosed that both tri- and tetra-orthoesters are useful to reduce soot-formation from combustion of hydrocarbon fuels.
There is extensive precedent on these points. We review this precedent in light of the Board's decision and the Commissioner's arguments.
In determining whether a prima facie case of obviousness is made by the teachings of the prior art, the weight of precedent of the Federal Circuit and our predecessor courts requires that consideration be given to the properties and utility, as well as the structure, of a claimed new chemical compound or composition.4 This precedent simply implements the requirement of section 103 that the invention be viewed as a whole, and of section 101 that the invention be "new and useful".
This requirement has been consistently upheld in the precedent of this court. For example, in Lunsford the examiner had taken the position that:
The argument that the 'subject matter as a whole' under 35 U.S.C. § 103 includes the compound and its utility is considered to be without merit.
357 F.2d at 391, 148 USPQ at 725. The CCPA responded:
Appellant was entitled to have differences between the claimed invention, the subject matter as a whole, and the prior art references of record evaluated. [Emphases in original.]
Id. (citing In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 137 USPQ 43 (CCPA 1963)). See also Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462, 221 USPQ 481, 488 (Fed.Cir.1984) (it is error to focus inquiry " 'solely on the product created, rather than on the obviousness or nonobviousness of its creation' ") (quoting General Motors Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 687 F.2d 476, 482-83, 215 USPQ 484, 489 (CCPA 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983)).
The Board required Dillon to show not only that her discovered utility was unobvious in light of what was taught or suggested in the prior art, but also that her new tetra-orthoester compositions possessed differences or advantages that were not possessed by the prior art compositions, irrespective of whether the prior art itself would lead one to expect that the prior art compositions would have the properties and use discovered by Dillon. That is, the Board required Dillon to show, by comparative experimental data, that the tri-orthoester fuel compositions did not have the property of reducing particulates in combustion--although the prior art itself is silent as to this property or any suggestion thereof, for either tri- or tetra-orthoester compositions.
Review of precedent shows that while specific factual situations may have justified requiring this type of showing, as discussed infra, in general the CCPA and the Federal Circuit have declined to establish such a requirement as a general basis for patentability of new compounds and compositions. The weight of precedent is to the effect that when the claimed subject matter is a new chemical compound or composition, a prima facie case of obviousness is not deemed made unless both (1) the new compound or composition is structurally similar to the reference compound or composition and (2) there is some suggestion or expectation in the prior art that the new compound or composition will have the same or a similar utility as that discovered by the applicant. In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729, 731, 226 USPQ 870, 871 (Fed.Cir.1985):
In re Rosselet, 347 F.2d 847, 850, 146 USPQ 183, 185 (CCPA 1965):
[W]e think appellants have failed to present adequate evidence to overcome a prima facie showing of obviousness by reason of the admitted "gross structural similarities" of the art compounds, coupled with the fact that those compounds are shown to have utility in the same area of pharmacological activity. [Emphasis in original.]
The question of whether a prima facie case of obviousness has been made by the prior art turns on the specific technological similarities and differences, as to both structure and properties or utility, between the claimed compounds or compositions and those taught in the prior art. See, e.g., In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646, 2 USPQ2d 1437, 1439 (Fed.Cir.1987) (new compound useful as herbicide was prima facie obvious from structurally similar prior art compounds useful as herbicides); Grabiak, 769 F.2d at 731-32, 226 USPQ at 871-72 (although similar utility was disclosed for prior art compounds and claimed compounds, structural similarity was insufficient to make prima facie case); In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 314, 203 USPQ 245, 254-55 (CCPA 1979) (new compounds useful as pesticides were prima facie obvious from structurally similar prior art compounds known as pesticides).
This precedent has evolved on analysis of a diversity of factual situations. One way that the courts have explained their reasoning is by pointing out that there must be a suggestion in the prior art that would have led a person of ordinary skill to the same solution of the problem facing the applicant: the prior art must provide a motivation whereby one of ordinary skill would be led to do that which the applicant has done. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1535, 218 USPQ 871, 876 (Fed.Cir.1983):
The scope of the prior art has been defined as that "reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved."
(quoting In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036, 202 USPQ 171, 174 (CCPA 1979)). Payne, 606 F.2d at 314, 203 USPQ at 255:
When prior art compounds essentially "bracketing" the claimed compounds in structural similarity are all known as pesticides, one of ordinary skill in the art would clearly be motivated to make those same compounds in searching for new pesticides.
In re Swan Wood, 582 F.2d 638, 641, 199 USPQ 137, 139 (CCPA 1978):
In view of the close structural similarity [and disclosed] antimicrobial activity, we believe that one skilled in the art would have been, prima facie, motivated to make the claimed compounds in the expectation that they, too, would possess antimicrobial activity.
These are simply other ways of explaining that the decision-maker must consider the problem confronting the applicant in order to ascertain how a person of ordinary skill would view the problem and its solution. In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012, 1018, 201 USPQ 552, 557 (CCPA 1979):
An element in determining obviousness of a new chemical compound is the motivation of one having ordinary skill in the art to make it. That motivation is not abstract, but practical, and is always related to the properties or uses one skilled in the art would expect the compound to have, if made.
In re Cable, 347 F.2d 872, 874, 146 USPQ 175, 177 (CCPA 1965):
Patentability of appellant's invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must be evaluated against the background of the highly developed and specific art to which it relates and this background includes an understanding of those unsolved problems persisting in the art which appellant asserts have been solved by his invention. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct. 322, 67 L.Ed. 523 (1923).
Although the Solicitor appears unenthusiastic about this criterion,5 it is well established, and has been expressed in various ways. E.g., In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 443, 230 USPQ 313, 316 (Fed.Cir.1986):
[The prior art] does not address Deminski's problem of how to remove a large and heavy assembly as a unit.... There was no suggestion in the prior art to provide Deminski with the motivation to design the valve assembly [for this reason]. [Emphasis in original.]
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556, 225 USPQ 26, 31 (Fed.Cir.1985):
The critical inquiry is whether "there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination." [Emphasis in original.]
(quoting Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH, 730 F.2d at 1462, 221 USPQ at 488); In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703, 707, 223 USPQ 1257, 1260 (Fed.Cir.1984) (obviousness analysis requires inquiry as to whether the known uses of the prior art compounds as intermediates provide adequate motivation to one of ordinary skill to investigate these compounds "with an expectation of arriving at" appellants' compounds for the uses described by appellants); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075-76, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1600 (Fed.Cir.1988) (although the applicant's temperature range overlaps the range shown in a reference, the applicant's purpose in using the claimed temperature range was not taught or appreciated in the prior art); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688, 2 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (Fed.Cir.1987) (although the prior art disclosed the components of the claimed composition for different uses, prima facie case not established "absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the combination"); In re Donovan, 509 F.2d 554, 562, 184 USPQ 414, 421 (CCPA 1975):
That [the prior art] might incorporate elements which could be used in appellants' system does not render appellants' claims obvious when there is no suggestion of using these elements in substantially the same manner as appellants use them.
In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813, 123 USPQ 349, 352 (CCPA 1959) (the prior art did not teach "how to solve the problems" faced by the inventor); In re Hortman, 264 F.2d 911, 913, 121 USPQ 218, 219 (CCPA 1959):
For, though the structure may be a simple expedient when the novel concept is realized, that structure may not be obvious to the skilled worker in the art where the prior art has failed to suggest the problem or conceive of the idea for its elimination.
These are not abstract criteria. They have often been applied to determinations of the question of unobviousness in the common situation illustrated herein, where Dillon's claimed