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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1162', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1441', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1441', '§ 2210', '§ 1441', '§ 2210', '§ 1441', '§ 1983', '§ 1301', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

NEVADA ET AL. v. HICKS ET AL. 533 U.S. 353 - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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NEVADA ET AL. v. HICKS ET AL. 533 U.S. 353
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(c) Tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the off-reservation violation of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations. The State's interest incralaw
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SouTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 375. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 386. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS and BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 387. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined, post, p. 401.
S. James Anaya argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent Hicks. Kim Jerome Gottschalkcralaw
1 Hereinafter, Hicks will be referred to as "respondent." The Tribal Court and Judge are also respondents, however, and are included when the term "respondents" is used.cralaw
Respondent, claiming that his sheep heads had been damaged, and that the second search exceeded the bounds of the warrant, brought suit against the Tribal Judge, the tribal officers, the state wardens in their individual and official capacities, and the State of Nevada in the Tribal Court in and for the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes. (His claims against all defendants except the state wardens and the State of Nevada were dismissed by directed verdict and are not at issue here.) Respondent's causes of action included trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civilcralaw
The principle of Indian law central to this aspect of the case is our holding in Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 453 (1997): "As to nonmembers ... a tribe's adjudicativecralaw
2 In National Farmers Union Ins. Coso v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, 855-856 (1985), we avoided the question whether tribes may generally adjudicate against nonmembers claims arising from on-reservation transactions, and we have never held that a tribal court had jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant. Typically, our cases have involved claims brought against tribal defendants. See, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959). In Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 453 (1997), however, we assumed that "where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising out of such activities presumably lies in the tribal courts," without distinguishing between nonmember plaintiffs and nonmember defendants. See also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U. S. 9, 18 (1987). Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.cralaw
3 Montana recognized an exception to this rule for tribal regulation of "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 450 U. S., at 565. Though the wardens in this case "consensually" obtained a warrant from the Tribal Court before searching respondent's home and yard, we do not think this qualifies as an "other arrangement" within the meaning of this passage. Read in context, an "other arrangement" is clearly another private consensual relationship, from which the official actions at issue in this case are far removed.cralaw
In Strate, we explained that what is necessary to protect tribal self-government and control internal relations can be understood by looking at the examples of tribal power tocralaw
4 Our holding in Worcester must be considered in light of the fact that "[t]he 1828 treaty with the Cherokee Nation ... guaranteed the Indians their lands would never be subjected to the jurisdiction of any State orcralaw
Territory." Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71 (1962); cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 221-222 (comparing Navajo treaty to the Cherokee treaty in Worcester).cralaw
5 Though Utah & Northern R. Co. did not state what it meant by a "reservation of this kind," the context makes clear that it meant a reservation not excluded from the territory of a State by treaty. See, e. g., Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476, 478 (1879); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737,739-741 (1867).cralaw
6 That this risk is not purely hypothetical is demonstrated by Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (CA9 1969), a case in which the Navajo Tribal Court refused to extradite a member to Oklahoma because tribal law forbade extradition except to three neighboring States. The Ninth Circuit held that Arizona (where the reservation was located) could not enter the reservation to seize the suspect for extradition since (among other reasons) this would interfere with tribal self-government, id., at 685-686.cralaw
The States' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course be stripped by Congress, see Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 242-243 (1896). But with regard to the jurisdiction at issue here that has not occurred. The Government's assertion that "[a]s a general matter, although state officials have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes on a reservation that exclusively involve non-Indians, ... they do not have jurisdiction with respect to crimes involving Indian perpetrators or Indian victims," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12-13, n.7, is misleading. The statutes upon which it relies, see id., at 18-19, show that the last half of the statement, like the first, is limited to "crimes on a reservation." Sections 1152 and 1153 of Title 18, which give United States and tribal criminal law generally exclusive application, apply only to crimes committed in Indian country; Public Law 280, codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1162, which permits some state jurisdiction as an exception to this rule, is similarly limited. And 25 U. S. C.cralaw
7 JUSTICE STEVENS questions why it is necessary to consider tribalcourt jurisdiction over § 1983 claims, since we have already determined that "tribal courts lack ... jurisdiction over 'state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime,'" post, at 402, n. 1 (opinion concurring in judgment). It is because the latter determination is based upon Strate's holding that tribal-court jurisdiction does not exceed tribal regulatory jurisdiction; and because that holding contained a significant qualifier: "[a]bsent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction," 520 U. S., at 453. We conclude (as we must) that § 1983 is not such an enlargement.cralaw
8 JUSTICE STEVENS argues that "[a]bsent federal law to the contrary, the question whether tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction is fundamentally one of tribal law." Post, at 402 (emphasis deleted). The point of our earlier discussion is that Strate is "federal law to the contrary." JUSTICE STEVENS thinks Strate cannot fill that role, because it "merely concerned the circumstances under which tribal courts can exert jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers," post, at 403, n. 3. But Strate's limitation on jurisdiction over nonmembers pertains to subjectmatter, rather than merely personal, jurisdiction, since it turns upon whether the actions at issue in the litigation are regulable by the tribe. One can of course say that even courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction have general jurisdiction over those subjects that they can adjudicate (in the present case, jurisdiction over claims pertaining to activities by nonmembers that can be regulated)-but that makes the concept of general jurisdiction meaningless, and is assuredly not the criterion that would determine whether these courts received authority to adjudicate § 1983 actions.cralaw
Furthermore, tribal-court jurisdiction would create serious anomalies, as the Government recognizes, because the general federal-question removal statute refers only to removal from state court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1441. Were § 1983 claims cognizable in tribal court, defendants would inexplicably lack the right available to state-court § 1983 defendants to seek a federal forum. The Government thinks the omISSIOn of reference to tribal courts in § 1441 unproblematic. Since, it argues, "[i]t is doubtful ... that Congress intended to deny tribal court defendants the right given state court defendants to elect a federal forum for the adjudication of causes of action under federal law," we should feel free to create that right by permitting the tribalcourt defendant to obtain a federal-court injunction against the action, effectively forcing it to be refiled in federal court. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25-26. The sole support for devising this extraordinary remedy is El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473 (1999), where we approved a similar procedure with regard to claims under the Price-Anderson Act brought in tribal court. In Neztsosie, however, the claims were not initially federal claims, but Navajo tort claims that the Price-Anderson Act provided "shall be deemed to be ... action[s] arising under" 42 U. S. C. § 2210; there was little doubt that the tribal court had jurisdiction over such tort claims, see 526 U. S., at 482, n. 4. And for the propriety of the injunction in Neztsosie, we relied not on § 1441, but on the removal provision of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2210(n)(2). Although, like § 1441, that provision referred only to removal from state courts, in light of the Act's detailed and distinctive provisions for the handling of "nuclear incident" cases in federal court, see 526 U. S., at 486, we thought it clear Congress envisioned the defendant's ability to get into federal court in all in-cralaw
The last question before us is whether petitioners were required to exhaust their jurisdictional claims in Tribal Court before bringing them in Federal District Court. See National Farmers Union Ins. Coso v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, 856-857 (1985). In National Farmers Union we recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, where "an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, ... or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction," id., at 856, n. 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these exceptions seems applicable to this case, but we added a broader exception in Strate: "[w]hen ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule," so the exhaustion requirement "would serve no purpose other than delay." 520 U. S., at 459-460, and n.14. Though this exception too is technically inapplicable, the reasoning behind it is not. Since it is clear, as we have discussed, that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over state officials for causes of action relating to their performance of official duties, adherence to the tribal exhaustion requirement in such cases "would serve no purpose other than delay," and is therefore unnecessary.cralaw
9 JUSTICE O'CONNOR claims we have gone beyond the scope of the questions presented in this case by determining whether the Tribes could regulate the state game warden's actions on tribal land, because this is a case about tribal "civil adjudicatory jurisdiction." See post, at 397 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But the third question presented, see Pet. for Writ of Cert. i, is as follows: "Is the rule of [M ontanaJ, creating a presumption against tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers, limited to cases in which a cause of action against a nonmember arises on lands within a reservation which are not controlled by the tribe?" Montana dealt only with regulatory authority, and is tied to adjudicatory authority by Strate, which held that the latter at best tracks the former. As is made clear in the merits briefing, petitioners' argument is that the Tribes lacked adjudicatory authority because they lacked regulatory authority over the game wardens. See Brief for Petitioners 36-44.cralaw
Another exaggeration is the concurrence's contention that we "give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribalcralaw
We must comment upon the final paragraphs of Part II of the concurrence's opinion-which bring on stage, in classic fashion, a deus ex machina to extract, from the seemingly insoluble difficulties that the prior writing has created, a happy ending. The concurrence manages to have its cake and eat it too-to hand over state law enforcement officers to the jurisdiction of tribal courts and yet still assure that the officers' traditional immunity (and hence the State's law enforcement interest) will be protected-by simply announcing "that in order to protect government officials, immunity claims should be considered in reviewing tribal court jurisdiction." Post, at 401 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). What wonderful magic. Without so much as a citation (none is available) the concurrence declares the qualified immunity inquiry to be part of the jurisdictional inquiry, thus bringing it within the ken of the federal court at the outset of the case. There are two problems with this declaration. The first is that it is not true. There is no authority whatever for the proposition that absolute- and qualified-immunity defenses pertain to the court's jurisdiction-much less to the tribe's regulatory jurisdiction, which is what is at issue here. (If they did pertain to the court's jurisdiction, they would presumably be nonwaivable. Cf. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 267 (1997).) And the secondcralaw
Because the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative authority to hear respondent's claim that those officials violated tribal law in the performance of their duties. Nor can the Tribes identify any authority to adjudicate respondent's § 1983 claim. And since the lack of authority is clear, there is no need to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court. State officials operating on a reservation to investigate offreservation violations of state law are properly held accountable for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in either state or federal court, but not in tribal court.cralaw
1 The virtue of the Court's approach is in laying down a rule that would be unquestionably applicable even if in a future case the state officials issuing and executing state process happened to be tribal members (which they apparently are not here).cralaw
Petitioners are certainly correct that "[t]ribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers is ... ill-defined," Reply Brief for Petitioners 16, since this Court's own pronouncements on the issue have pointed in seemingly opposite directions. Compare, e. g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 65 (1978) ("Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians"), and United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975) ("Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory"), with, e. g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 209 (1978) (" '[T]he limitation upon [tribes'] sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every person within their limits except themselves'" (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 (1810))). Oliphant, however, clarified tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction (in holding that they had none as to non-Indians), and that decision is now seen as a significant step on the way to Montana, "the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers," Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 445 (1997). The path marked best is the rulecralaw
2The Court in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), referred to "nonmembers" and "non-Indians" interchangeably. In response to our decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676 (1990), in which we extended the rule of Oliphant to deny tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians (i. e., Indians who are members of other tribes), Congress passed a statute expressly granting tribal courts such jurisdiction, see 105 Stat. 646, 25 U. S. C. § 1301(2). Because, here, we are concerned with the extent of tribes' inherent authority, and not with the jurisdiction statutorily conferred on them by Congress, the relevant distinction, as we implicitly acknowledged in Strate, is between members and nonmembers of the tribe. In this case, nonmembership means freedom from tribal-court jurisdiction, since none of the petitioning state officers is identified as an Indian of any tribe.cralaw
The emphasis in these passages (supplied by the Montana Court, not by me) underscores the distinction between tribal members and nonmembers, and seems clearly to indicate, without restriction to the criminal law, that the inherent authority of the tribes has been preserved over the former but not the latter. In fact, after quoting Wheeler, the Court invoked Oliphant, supra, which (as already noted) had imposed a per se bar to tribal-court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even with respect to conduct occurring on tribal land. The Montana Court remarked that, "[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied" support a more "general proposition" applicable in civil cases as well, namely, that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." 450 U. S., at 565. Accordingly, the Court in Montana repeatedly pressed the member-nonmember distinction, reiter-cralaw
3 Thus, it is true that tribal courts' "civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indians ... is not automatically foreclosed, as an extension of Oliphant would require." National Farmers Union Ins. Coso v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845, 855 (1985). "Montana did not extend the full Oliphant rationale to the civil jurisdictional question-which would have completely prohibited civil jurisdiction over nonmembers." A-l Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 937 (CA8 1996). Instead, "the [Montana] Court found that the tribe retained some civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, which the Court went on to describe in the Montana exceptions." Ibid.cralaw
The Strate petitioners fastened upon the statement that "civil jurisdiction over" the activities of nonmembers on reservation lands "presumptively lies in the tribal courts." But we resisted the overbreadth of the Iowa Mutual dictum.cralaw
After Strate, it is undeniable that a tribe's remaining inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims arising out of acts committed on a reservation depends in the first instance on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, not on the title to the soil on which he acted. The principle on which Montana and Strate were decided (like Oliphant before them) looks first to human relationships, not land records, and it should make no difference per se whether acts committed on a reservationcralaw
4 Thus, it is not that land status is irrelevant to a proper Montana calculus, only that it is not determinative in the first instance. Land status, for instance, might well have an impact under one (or perhaps both) of the Montana exceptions. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U. S. 645, 659-660 (2001) (SOUTER, J., concurring); cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 151 (1980) ("[T]here is a significant geographic component to tribal sovereignty").cralaw
The ability of nonmembers to know where tribal jurisdiction begins and ends, it should be stressed, is a matter of real, practical consequence given "[t]he special nature of [Indian] tribunals," Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676, 693 (1990), which differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant respects. To start with the most obvious one, it has been understood for more than a century that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 382-385 (1896); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal In-cralaw
5 See also Cohen 667 ("Many significant constitutional limitations on federal and state governments are not included in the [ICRA]").cralaw
There is one loose end. The panel majority in the Ninth Circuit held that "the Montana presumption against tribal court jurisdiction does not apply in this case." 196 F.3d 1020, 1028 (1999). Since we have held otherwise, should we now remand for application of the correct law? There is room for reasonable disagreement on this point, see post, at 396 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but on balance I think a remand is unnecessary. The Court's analysis of opposing state and tribal interests answers the opinion of the Ninth Circuit majority; in substance, the issues subject to the Court of Appeals's principal concern have been considered here. My own focus on the Montana presumption was, of course, addressed by the panel (albeit unsympathetically), and the only question thatcralaw
I write separately only to emphasize that Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 (1997), similarly deferred larger issues. Strate concerned a highway accident on a rightof-way over tribal land. For nonmember governance purposes, the accident site was equivalent to alienated, nonIndian land. Id., at 456. We held that the nonmember charged with negligent driving in Strate was not amenable to the Tribe's legislative or adjudicatory authority. But we "express[ed] no view on the governing law or proper forum" for cases arising out of nonmember conduct on tribal land. Id., at 442. The Court's opinion, as I understand it, does not reach out definitively to answer the jurisdictional questions left open in Strate.cralaw
Given the facts of Montana, it was not clear whether the status of the persons being regulated, or the status of the land where the hunting and fishing occurred, led the Court to develop Montana's jurisdictional rule and its exceptions. In subsequent cases, we indicated that the nonmember status of the person being regulated determined Montana'scralaw
At issue in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 (1989), was whether Tribescralaw
had the authority to zone particular tracts of land within the boundaries of the reservation owned by nonmembers. Although no opinion garnered a majority, Members of the Court determined the Tribes' zoning authority by considering the Tribes' power to exclude and the Tribes' sovereign interests in preserving the Tribes' political integrity, economic security, and health and welfare. Id., at 423-425, 428-432 (White, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ.); id., at 433-435, 443-444 (STEVENS, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J.); id., at 454-455 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.). In the end, the Tribes' power to zone each parcel of land turned on the extent to which the Tribes maintained ownership and control over the areas in which the parcels were located. Id., at 438-444, 444-447 (STEVENS, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J.).
We have also applied Montana to decide whether a tribal court had civil jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit arising out of a traffic accident on a state highway that passed through a reservation. Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 (1997). We explained that "Montana delineated-in a main rule and exceptions-the bounds of the power tribes retain to exercise 'forms of civil jurisdiction'" over nonmembers. Because our prior cases did not involve jurisdiction of tribalcralaw
Montana and our other cases concerning tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers occupy a middle ground between our cases that provide for nearly absolute tribal sovereignty over tribe members, see generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 218-223, and our rule that tribes have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, see Oliphant v. Suqua-cralaw
The majority provides no support for this assertion. The Court's decision in Montana did not and could not have resolved the complete scope of the first exception. We could only apply the first exception to the activities presented in that case, namely, hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land owned in fee simple by nonmembers. 450 U. S., at 557. To be sure, Montana is "an opinion ... not a statute," and therefore it seems inappropriate to speak of what the M on-cralaw
Whether a consensual relationship between the Tribes and the State existed in this case is debatable, compare Brief for Petitioners 36-38 with Brief for Respondents Tribal Courtcralaw
None of "these prior statements," however, "accord[s]" with the majority's conclusion that "tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to [an offreservation violation of state law] is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations." Ante, at 364. Our prior decisions are informed by the understanding that tribal, Federal, and State Governments share authority over tribal lands. See, e. g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 176-187 (1989) (concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal governments to impose severance taxescralaw
The Tribes' sovereign interests with respect to nonmember activities on its land are not extinguished simply because the nonmembers in this case are state officials enforcing state law. Our cases concerning tribal power often involve the competing interests of state, federal, and tribal governments. See, e. g., Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra; Confederated Tribes, supra; Rehner, supra. The actions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect tribal sovereign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than thecralaw
The Court's reasoning does not reflect a faithful application of Montana and its progeny. Our case law does not support a broad per se rule prohibiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal land whenever the nonmembers are state officials. If the Court were to remain true to the principles that have governed in prior cases, the Court would reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a proper application of Montana to determine whether there is tribal jurisdiction. Compare 196 F. 3d, at 1032-1034 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no jurisdiction under Montana), with 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (Nev. 1996) (assuming, arguendo, that Montana applies and concluding that there is jurisdiction). See also Bourland, 508 U. S., at 695-696.cralaw
The state officials raised immunity defenses to Hicks' claims in Tribal Court. The Tribal Court acknowledged the officials' claims, but did not consider the immunity defenses in determining its jurisdiction. App. to Pet. for Cert. C1-C8. The Federal District Court ruled that because the Tribal Court had not decided the immunity issues, the fed-cralaw
We refused to foreclose entirely the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over nonmembers as we had foreclosed inherentcralaw
Later, in Strate, "we reiterate[d] that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual enunciate only an exhaustion requirement, a prudential rule, based on comity." 520 U. S., at 453 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 482-487cralaw
In this case, the state officials raised their immunity defenses in Tribal Court as they challenged that court's subject matter jurisdiction. App. to Pet. for Cert. J5-J6, K8, K11-K13; 196 F. 3d, at 1029-1031. Thus the Tribal Court and the Appellate Tribal Court had a full opportunity to address the immunity claims. These defendants, like othercralaw
While I join the Court's disposition of the case for the reasons stated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, I do not agree with the Court's conclusion that tribal courts may not exercise their jurisdiction over claims seeking the relief authorized by 42cralaw
1 As an initial matter, it is not at all clear to me that the Court's discussion of the § 1983 issue is necessary to the disposition of this case. Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 (1997), discusses the question whether a tribal court can exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers, irrespective of the type of claim being raised. See id., at 459, n. 14 ("When ... it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by [the main rule in] Montana [v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981)], ... it will be equally evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such conduct"). Cf. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 482, n. 4 (1999) ("Strate dealt with claims against nonmembers arising on state highways, and 'express[ed] no view on the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation' "). Given the majority's determination in Part II that tribal courts lack such jurisdiction over "state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime," ante, at 357, I fail to see why the Court needs to reach out to discuss the seemingly hypothetical question whether, if the tribal courts had jurisdiction over claims against "state wardens executing a search warrant," they could hear § 1983 claims against those wardens.cralaw
Of course, if the majority, as it suggests, is merely holding that § 1983 does not enlarge tribal jurisdiction beyond what is permitted by Strate, its decision today is far more limited than it might first appear from the Court's sometimes sweeping language. Compare ante, at 369 ("[T]ribal courts cannot entertain § 1983 suits"), with ante, at 366, n. 7 ("We conclude (as we must) that § 1983 is not ... an enlargement [of tribal-court jurisdiction]"). Mter all, if the Court's holding is that § 1983 merely fails to "enlarg[e]" tribal-court jurisdiction, then nothing would prevent tribal courts from deciding § 1983 claims in cases in which they properly exercise jurisdiction under Strate.cralaw