Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/374/1035/505864/
Timestamp: 2017-09-25 18:53:21
Document Index: 282946894

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1401', '§ 1401', '§ 1401', '§ 1401', '§ 10', '§ 1401', '§ 1401']

Trustees of the Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wolf Crane Service, Incorporated, a Florida Corporation, Defendant-counter Claimant-appellant, 374 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2004) :: Justia
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Trustees of the Central Pension Fund of the International Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wolf Crane Service, Incorporated, a Florida Corporation, Defendant-counter Claimant-appellant, 374 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2004)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 374 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2004)
The district court, when reviewing the arbitrator's award on Count I, the withdrawal liability issue, employed the standard of review found in the Federal Arbitration Act. The court stated that it would only disturb the arbitrator's findings of fact if it was "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed." Order at 6 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985)). Conclusions of law, the court held, should also be given great deference and only reversed if there was manifest disregard for the law. Id. at 7. We hold that the district court applied an incorrect standard of review with regard to the legal conclusions of the arbitrator.
For cases brought under the MPPAA, the standard of review by the district court for factual findings made by the arbitrator is set out at 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c). This subsection states that "there shall be a presumption, rebuttable only by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that the findings of fact made by the arbitrator were correct." 29 U.S.C. § 1401(c). The Seventh Circuit labeled this standard "unique" and noted that it conflated "`clear and convincing evidence' with `preponderance of the evidence' to yield `clear preponderance of the evidence,'" a result which "would be bad enough if it referred to the finder of fact." Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan, 3 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 1993). The court then "repaired" the standard, holding that the standard of review for facts would be that typically used in the arbitration setting: the reviewing court would inquire as to whether the fact-finding was clearly erroneous. Id. at 999 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S. Ct. at 1511). With regard to the standard of review of the arbitrator's findings of fact, we agree with the Seventh Circuit and hold that the standard is clearly erroneous.
The question of what standard is to be applied to legal conclusions of the arbitrator is less clear. However, other courts have agreed upon a standard: all of the circuits that have considered this issue have determined that the review of legal issues should be de novo. Crown Cork & Seal v. Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 982 F.2d 857, 860 (3d Cir. 1992); Trustees of Colo. Pipe Indus. Pension Trust v. Howard Elec. & Mech., Inc., 909 F.2d 1379, 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Trustees of Iron Workers Local 473 Pension Trust v. Allied Prod. Corp., 872 F.2d 208, 211-12 (7th Cir. 1989)3 ; Union Asphalts and Roadoils, Inc. v. MO-KAN Teamsters Pension Fund, 857 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1988); Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. Geltman Indus., 784 F.2d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 1986); Bd. of Trustees of the W. Conf. v. Thompson Bldg. Mats., 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984); I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan C v. Stockton Tri Indus., 727 F.2d 1204, 1207 n. 7, 1210-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension, 158 F.3d 387, 393 (6th Cir. 1998) (focusing primarily on review of the arbitrator's findings of fact but also noting that the "arbitrator's application of the appropriate burden of evidence is a question of law we review de novo"); Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 27 F.3d 800, 804 (2d. Cir. 1994) (assuming "as do all the other circuits that have considered the issue" that de novo is the correct standard of review, but not deciding the issue); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Va. Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 641 (4th Cir. 1983) (without expressly elaborating on the fullness of judicial review of the arbitrator's legal rulings, the court rejected the Federal Arbitration Act's deferential standard, holding that 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2) prevails and provides "effective judicial review of ... legal rulings").
In reaching this conclusion, courts have cited 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (3), which states that the MPPAA incorporates the Arbitration Act to the extent that it is consistent with other parts of this subchapter. These courts have reasoned that "the limited review of the Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 10) is inconsistent with § 1401(b) (2)'s broad mandate allowing courts to `enforce, vacate, or modify the arbitrator's award.'" Iron Workers, 872 F.2d at 212 (citing Union Asphalts, 857 F.2d at 1234-35; Republic Indus., 718 F.2d at 641); see also Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 784 F.2d at 928. Several courts, including the Seventh Circuit in Iron Workers, have also relied upon the fact that the MPPAA statutorily mandates arbitration of withdrawal liability,4 in contrast to the contractually agreed upon arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, noting that in the latter, deference was appropriate because it was the parties' agreed upon method of dispute resolution. 872 F.2d at 212; accord Huber v. Casablanca Indus., Inc., 916 F.2d 85, 89 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414, 115 S. Ct. 981, 130 L. Ed. 2d 932 (1995). The parties' lack of choice was thought to warrant less deference.
We now turn to Wolf Crane's argument with respect to Count II — that the district court erred in granting summary judgment by default because of the district court's perception that Wolf Crane did not respond to the Pension Fund's motion for summary judgment. In United States v. One Piece of Property, 5800 S.W. 4th Ave., Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 2004), this court was confronted with a district court's grant of summary judgment by default because the motion was unopposed. We held that " [t]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion." Id. at 1101. We also held that in that context " [i]f a local rule purports to allow summary judgment to be granted by default, the rule is impermissible" because it would be inconsistent with the Federal Rules. Id. at 1102. The court noted that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that where "`the adverse party does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.'" Id. at 1101 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in the original). The court then held that summary judgment would be appropriate "where the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). After so holding, the court in One Piece of Property reviewed the summary judgment record, concluded that the record did reveal a genuine issue of material fact, and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
In reaching this decision, the One Piece of Property court relied upon dicta in Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co., 858 F.2d 629, 632 (11th Cir. 1988), and upon Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1989). One Piece of Property, 363 F.3d at 1101-02 (quoting Jaroma, 873 F.2d at 20 (" [T]he district court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment merely for lack of any response by the opposing party, since the district court must review the motion and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.")); accord Anchorage Assoc. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1990).
We note that Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan, 3 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1993), while recognizing that legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, adopts a somewhat modified standard of review for interpretations of the relevant contract. In the instant case, however, it is clear that there are crucial issues which involve legal conclusions of the arbitrator, which the district court should review de novo.
29 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1) provides: "Any dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor of a multiemployer plan concerning a determination made under sections 1381 through 1399 of this title shall be resolved through arbitration."
In denying Wolf Crane's motion for reconsideration, the district court used language suggesting that the court may have been influenced in denying reconsideration by factors other than, or in addition to, its perception that Wolf Crane did not respond to the Pension Fund's motion for summary judgment. Although we do not foreclose consideration on remand that default may be appropriate for other reasons, we decline for several reasons to affirm the district court's judgment on such other grounds (e.g., it is clear that the default was granted on August 9, 2002 because of the perceived failure to file a response; it does not appear that Wolf Crane was given notice that default was being considered,see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; the district court's explanation is inadequate and does not indicate that default was a measure of last resort, see Graves v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 528 F.2d 1360, 1361 (5th Cir. 1976) ("This court has recognized that a dismissal with prejudice is a serious remedy that may be resorted to only in extreme situations where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.")).