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Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 | Casetext
81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996)
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Crowderv.Kitagawa
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth CircuitApr 30, 1996
Argued and Submitted November 6, 1995.
Michael A. Lilly, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Heidi M. Rian and Sonia Faust, Deputy Attorneys General, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the defendants-appellees.
Jessica Dunsay Silver and Rebecca K. Troth, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae United States of America.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-93-00213-DAE.
Opinion by Judge Thompson; Dissent by Judge O'Scannlain.
Pursuant to section 142-2, the Hawaii Department of Agriculture established a 120-day quarantine in a quarantine station for dogs, cats and other carnivorous animals entering Hawaii from the United States mainland or from any other country that is not considered rabies free. Haw. Admin. R. § 4-29-9(a).
After an initial 10-day observation period, a guide dog may train with its owner on the station grounds, Haw. Admin. R. § 4-29-15(b)(1)-(2), and may train off the station grounds for up to four hours a day, three days a week, if accompanied by a department inspector. Haw. Admin. R. § 4-29-15-(b)(3). During the time a guide dog is outside the quarantine station, however, it may have no contact with other animals or humans. Haw. Admin. R. § 4-29-15(b)(5). After the 120-day quarantine period, if the guide dog is found not to have rabies, the dog is released to its owner.
The ADA was enacted by Congress in 1990 "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Congress found that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
The linchpin of the district court's summary judgment on the ADA claim, and the state's argument, is that"[t]he quarantine requirement is a public health measure, and not a `service' or benefit furnished by the state to eligible participants." Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1267 (D. Hawaii 1994). Because, according to the district court, the quarantine requirement is not a service or benefit provided by the state, the quarantine does not deny the plaintiffs any benefits, and as a result they have no claim under the ADA.
[1] The flaw in this analysis is the assumption that no violation of the ADA occurs unless a service or benefit of the state is provided in a manner that discriminates against disabled individuals. This simply is not so.
[2] Section 12132 of the ADA precludes (1) exclusion from/denial of benefits of public services, as well as (2) discrimination by a public entity. Due to the insertion of "or" between exclusion from/denial of benefits on the one hand and discrimination by a public entity on the other, we conclude Congress intended to prohibit two different phenomena. Congress intended to prohibit outright discrimination, as well as those forms of discrimination which deny disabled persons public services disproportionately due to their disability.
[3] In section 12101(a)(5), Congress declared its intent to address "outright intentional exclusion" as well as "the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices." It is thus clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover at least some so-called disparate impact cases of discrimination, for the barriers to full participation listed above are almost all facially neutral but may work to effectuate discrimination against disabled persons.
[4] Few would argue that architectural barriers to disabled persons such as stairs, or communication barriers such as the preference for the spoken word, are intentionally discriminatory. Yet, stairs can deny the wheelchair-bound access to services provided on the second floor of a government building; and communicating only by the spoken word can deny deaf persons the ability to find out that it is the second floor where they must go to obtain the services they seek.
[5] These and other types of barriers to participation by the disabled in public life do not provide any benefits themselves. Neither stairs nor the spoken word is a "service, program, or activit[y]" of a public entity, yet each can effectively deny disabled persons the benefits of state services, programs or activities.
[6] A further indication of Congress' intent to cover both intentional discrimination and discrimination as a result of facially neutral laws is the explicit mandate in the ADA that federal regulations adopted to enforce the statute be consistent with the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, an earlier congressional effort to combat discrimination against disabled persons by public entities receiving federal financial assistance. Section 12133 of the ADA provides that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights" applicable to section 12132 discrimination claims. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. See also Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when interpreting the ADA.").
[7] The Supreme Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). In Choate, the Court concluded that Congress intended to protect disabled persons from discrimination arising out of both discriminatory animus and "thoughtlessness," "indifference," or "benign neglect." Id. at 295. The Court held, however, that judicial review over each and every instance of disparate impact discrimination would be overly burdensome. Rather than attempt to classify a type of discrimination as either "deliberate" or "disparate impact," the Court determined it more useful to assess whether disabled persons were denied "meaningful access" to state-provided services. Id. at 302; see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied by Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare v. Idell S., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 64 (1995) ("Congress could not have intended to limit the [ADA's] protections and prohibitions to circumstances involving deliberate discrimination. . . . Rather, the ADA attempts to eliminate the effects of . . . benign neglect, apathy, and indifference.") (internal quotations omitted).
[8] Although Hawaii's quarantine requirement applies equally to all persons entering the state with a dog, its enforcement burdens visually-impaired persons in a manner different and greater than it burdens others. Because of the unique dependence upon guide dogs among many of the visually-impaired, Hawaii's quarantine effectively denies these persons — the plaintiffs in this case — meaningful access to state services, programs, and activities while such services, programs, and activities remain open and easily accessible by others. The quarantine, therefore, discriminates against the plaintiffs by reason of their disability.
In his dissent, Judge O'Scannlain argues that if the quarantine discriminates or denies state services "by reason of blindness, then all people who are blind could" assert this ADA claim. Dissent at 5177 (emphasis omitted). Judge O'Scannlain explains that "the quarantine does nothing by reason of blindness; it affects the plaintiffs only because of their use of guide dogs." Id. (emphasis omitted). We respectfully disagree.
[9] During the four days of each week of the quarantine period when guide dogs must remain in the quarantine station this denial is especially acute. On the other three days when the dogs are allowed out of the quarantine station grounds, the negative impact of the regulation is only slightly alleviated, because during these days the regulations require that the guide dogs avoid all physical contact with other humans or animals. Haw. Admin. R. § 4-29-15(b)(5). This effectively precludes visually-impaired persons from using a variety of public services, such as public transportation, public parks, government buildings and facilities, and tourist attractions, where humans or animals are inevitably present.
[10] It is no response to assert that the visually-impaired, like anyone else, can leave their dogs in quarantine and enjoy the public services they desire. As the Department of Justice has noted in related regulations, "the general intent of Congress" was "to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not separated from their service animals," such as guide dogs. See 28 C.F.R. § 36, Appendix B, at 616 (service animals in public accommodations); 135 Cong. Rec. D956 (Statement of Sen. Simon) ("As an auxiliary aid, the use of assistive animals is protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act, in public accommodations as well as public services (including schools).").
[11] When a state's policies, practices or procedures discriminate against the disabled in violation of the ADA, Department of Justice regulations require reasonable modifications in such policies, practices or procedures "when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
[12] There is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs' proposed modifications to Hawaii's quarantine amount to "reasonable modifications" which should be implemented, or "fundamental alter[ations]," which the state may reject. The district court refused to consider this question because
Crowder, 842 F. Supp at 1267.
[13] The district court concluded it could not assess the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' proposed modifications in light of the legislature's own consideration of the issue. Yet in virtually all controversies involving the ADA and state policies that discriminate against disabled persons, courts will be faced with legislative (or executive agency) deliberation over relevant statutes, rules and regulations.
[14] The court's obligation under the ADA and accompanying regulations is to ensure that the decision reached by the state authority is appropriate under the law and in light of proposed alternatives. Otherwise, any state could adopt requirements imposing unreasonable obstacles to the disabled, and when haled into court could evade the antidiscrimination mandate of the ADA merely by explaining that the state authority considered possible modifications and rejected them.
[15] We are mindful of the general principle that courts will not second-guess the public health and safety decisions of state legislatures acting within their traditional police powers. See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946). However, when Congress has passed antidiscrimination laws such as the ADA which require reasonable modifications to public health and safety policies, it is incumbent upon the courts to insure that the mandate of federal law is achieved.
[16] Whether the plaintiffs' proposed alternatives to Hawaii's quarantine for guide dogs constitute reasonable modifications or fundamental alterations cannot be determined as a matter of law on the record before us. Once again turning to the Rehabilitation Act, we have held that the determination of what constitutes reasonable modification is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case inquiry. Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1988). Moreover, inquiry into reasonable modification would necessitate findings of fact regarding the nature of the rabies disease, the extent of the risk posed by the disease, and the probability that the infected animals would spread it. Cf. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (such findings necessary in determining if tuberculosis-infected school teacher is "otherwise qualified" to teach under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
This analysis is particularly important when, as here, there is evidence that the risk of rabies being imported by guide dogs is low, vaccine-based alternatives may be equally or more effective in preventing the importation of rabies, and the quarantine has not once in over 75 years detected a single case of rabies among imported dogs.
Hawaii asks us to find the evidence submitted by the plaintiffs in support of their proposed alternatives does not amount to reliable, relevant scientific evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). We decline to do so. The district court did not address this issue of scientific reliability, and we will not consider it in this appeal. Hawaii may present its Daubert objection to the district court in the course of further proceedings following remand.
[17] We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hawaii. We remand this case to the district court for determination of the factual dispute whether the plaintiffs' proposed modifications to Hawaii's quarantine are reasonable under the ADA.
We do not address the plaintiffs' constitutional claims because if the plaintiffs prevail on their ADA claim resolution of their constitutional claims will be unnecessary. It is "a fundamental rule of judicial restraint" that federal courts "ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (internal quotations omitted); Hospital Service Employees Union v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 1417, 1427 (9th Cir. 1984). In the event the plaintiffs do not prevail on their ADA claim, this panel of the court will then consider, upon request to do so, the district court's summary judgment on the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
[43] O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
To state a claim under section 202 of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving: (1) that he is a "qualified individual with a disability" as defined in section 12131(2); (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Kan. 1994) (citation omitted); Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F. Supp. 986, 990 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
As to the first requirement, the blind plaintiffs in this case are clearly disabled. However, it is not clear whether they meet the "qualified" prong because, as noted infra, they have failed to identify a specific program, activity, or benefit for which they are "qualified," i.e. for which they "meet the essential eligibility requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Unless the plaintiffs identify such a program, activity, or benefit, this court cannot even determine what the "essential eligibility requirements" are, much less whether the plaintiffs have met them. I need not address this first requirement, however, because in my view the plaintiffs have clearly failed to raise an issue of material fact with regard to either of the last two elements. These two requirements will be discussed in turn.
To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that they have been denied access to "public transportation" and "public parks," see ante at 5161, they, like the rest of the general public, clearly meet the "essential eligibility requirements" for receipt of such services.
Although the district court did not reach the third requirement, its judgment may be affirmed on any grounds supported by the record. Herring v. FDIC, 72 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1995).
The record discloses that the plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that Hawaii's quarantine has excluded them from participation in, or denied them the benefits of, any specific public entity's services, programs, or activities. As the district court noted, Hawaii's quarantine is a public health measure, and it does not provide any "benefits" to which the plaintiffs could be denied. In addition, to the extent that the quarantine is a "service, program or activity," it is clear that they have been allowed to "participate." The plaintiffs therefore must prove that they have been excluded from, or denied the benefits of, some particular state service, program or activity other than the quarantine.
In opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs filed at least 15 declarations in the district court. One searches these declarations in vain for even a solitary reference to a specific program, activity, or service to which the plaintiffs have been denied access or benefits. The plaintiffs have thus failed to meet their burden of proof. See Lincoln Cercpac v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 1996 WL 128087 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) ("[P]laintiffs here have not defined a service available to the non-disabled that they are being denied by reason of their disability. Accordingly, we find plaintiffs have no substantial likelihood of success on their ADA claims."); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1569, 1585 (D. Ariz. 1993) (plaintiffs failed to establish Rehabilitation Act claim in part because they "did not identify particular programs from which any of the handicapped inmates were excluded because of their handicaps").
In spite of plaintiffs' failure of proof, the majority concludes that "[t]he evidence produced in support of the parties' motions for summary judgment established that the state's quarantine requirement denies visually-impaired persons the ability to make meaningful use of services the state provides." Op. at 5156. There are at least two immediate problems with this conclusion.
First, undoubtedly because the plaintiffs have failed to do so, the majority does not identify a particular state service, program, or activity to which the plaintiffs have been denied benefits or access. Instead, the opinion makes only a broad reference to "a variety of public services, such as public transportation, public parks, government buildings and facilities, and tourist attractions . . . ." Op. at 5161. The court's conclusion that the blind have been denied access to such services is simply unsupported by the record.
It is no response to assert that the visually-impaired, like anyone else, can leave their dogs in quarantine and enjoy the public services they desire. As the Department of Justice has noted in related regulations, "the general intent of Congress" was "to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not separated from their service animals," such as guide dogs. See 28 C.F.R. § 36, Appendix B, at 616 . . .
[ 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1)] reflects the general intent of Congress that public accommodations take the necessary steps to accommodate service animals and to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not separated from their service animals.
Title III and its regulations govern discrimination in public accommodations. Section 12181(7) of the ADA defines "public accommodations" to cover [certain] private entities . . . . The definition of "private entity" in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) specifically excludes any public entity such as the State of Hawaii. Accordingly, neither title III of the ADA nor its regulations concerning service animals apply to the Hawaii quarantine system.
Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1267 (D. Haw. 1994).
Plaintiffs' entire argument on appeal, therefore, boils down to the assertion that the quarantine, by depriving them of access to their guide dogs, deprives them of the ability to travel, and because they cannot travel they are excluded from virtually all public programs provided to the blind. Even assuming that the plaintiffs may use such an argument to overcome their otherwise clear obligation to identify a particular program from which they have been excluded or denied benefits, it is entirely undermined by their admissions that they have traveled, albeit at times with difficulty, without guide dogs. Accordingly, their only argument on this point, i.e. that the quarantine excludes them from participation in or denies them the benefits of all state services, programs, or activities provided to the blind because it makes them unable to travel, simply fails.
Significantly, plaintiffs do not allege that any particular state "public park," "government building," or "tourist attraction," ante at 5161, forbids them from using a guide dog once that dog successfully passes through quarantine.
See Declarations of Patricia Blum, ¶ 5 ("I travel to the mainland on business at least 4 times a year. I am put back on a cane and all the stress is back."); Charles Crawford, ¶ 6 ("On those few occasions where I have had to use a cane instead of the dog, I have had to move much slower with almost full concentration on how I was getting to where I needed to be."); Vernon Crowder, ¶ 5 ("For pleasure, I have travelled to Western Europe, Mexico, Canada, and, on two occasions, Hawaii. With the exception of the trips to Hawaii and two or three trips elsewhere, I have always travelled with my guide dog.") (emphasis added); Stephanie Good, ¶ 4 ("I have travelled to the mainland of the United States and to Australia without a guide dog."); Stanley Greenberg, ¶ 3 ("For thirty years, I travelled with a cane and so am able to testify about the difference between travelling with a cane and with a guide dog."); Jeanne-Marie Moore, ¶ 3 ("Before I ever had a guide dog, I had travelled to Hawaii as a cane user."); and Judith Weymouth, ¶ 20 ("In April, 1991, I was required to fly to Washington, D.C., to represent the Aloha Council of the Blind. If I had a guide dog, a trip like this would have been a routine thing. Without a guide dog, there was nothing routine about it."), and ¶ 25 (describing a trip to Australia to pick up a guide dog that was apparently undertaken without a guide dog).
The majority, relying in large part on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), states that "[i]t is . . . clear that Congress intended the ADA to cover at least some so-called disparate impact cases of discrimination . . . ." Op. at 5159. Applying disparate impact analysis, the majority concludes that "Hawaii's quarantine requirement is a policy, practice or procedure which discriminates against visually-impaired individuals by denying them meaningful access to state services, programs or activities in violation of the ADA." Op. at 5162.
I respectfully disagree both with the majority's application of Choate and also with its finding of discrimination in this case. In Choate, the State of Tennessee proposed to cut back the number of annual inpatient hospital days that the state Medicaid program would pay on behalf of Medicaid recipients. Disabled recipients alleged that the proposal would have a disproportionate effect on the disabled, and that it therefore discriminated against them in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Supreme Court stated that"[w]hile we reject the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute prima facie cases under section 504, we assume without deciding that section 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped." Id. at 299 (emphasis added). Proceeding from that assumption, the Court then stated that"[t]o determine which disparate impacts § 504 might make actionable, the proper starting point is Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)." Id. at 299-300. "The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers." Id. at 301.
The 14-day rule challenged in this case is neutral on its face, is not alleged to rest on a discriminatory motive, and does not deny the handicapped access to or exclude them from the particular package of Medicaid services Tennessee has chosen to provide. The State has made the same benefit — 14 days of coverage — equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, and the State is not required to assure the handicapped "adequate health care" by providing them with more coverage than the nonhandicapped.
It is worth noting that Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1996 WL 67209 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 1996) also suggests that the ADA does not apply here. In Patton, the plaintiff claimed that a Kansas law placing a cap on punitive damage awards was void as superseded by section 202. Applying Choate, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the ADA did not apply to the claim:
Interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court has held that a facially neutral governmental restriction does not deny "meaningful access" to the disabled simply because disabled persons are more likely to be affected by it. Even if the burden of the . . . . damage cap falls disproportionately on the disabled, [ Choate] requires only that Patton have the same access to a jury determination of damages as everyone else. He did. Because the damages limitation applies to all victorious plaintiffs, Patton was not denied access to a jury determination of damages by reason of disability.
Id. at 1245 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This reasoning suggests that even if the burden of Hawaii's quarantine is found to fall disproportionately on the blind (a proposition which I discuss in Part III), the ADA is not violated so long as the blind have equal access to their animals as everyone else. This condition is clearly met here. Accordingly, I am persuaded that the ADA does not reach the plaintiffs' discrimination claim.
Cf. Lincoln Cercpac v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 1996 WL 128087 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) ("the disabled are not entitled to more public services than the abled receive, even if the disabled need them") (citing Choate).
The Plaintiff Vernon Crowder class shall be defined as non-residents of Hawaii who are blind and who desire to freely travel to Hawaii for business and/or pleasure with their certified guide dogs . . . The Plaintiff Stephanie Good class shall be defined as residents of Hawaii who are blind and who desire to freely travel for business and/or pleasure from Hawaii to the mainland United States and/or foreign countries and return to Hawaii with their certified guide dogs . . . .
(Emphasis added). The members of the plaintiff classes thus have two distinguishing characteristics: (1) they are blind, and (2) they desire to travel with their guide dogs. Even assuming arguendo that the quarantine has a disparate impact on the plaintiffs, it does so only because of the latter characteristic. However, in order to state a claim under Title II, the plaintiffs must show that the disparate impact occurred because of the former characteristic; only the former is a "disability" under Title II.
This fact is implicitly acknowledged by the plaintiffs and their supporting amici. For example, the United States argues that "[t]he [district] court also claimed, ignoring the record, that plaintiffs failed to show that they had been denied state services as a result of the quarantine. Plaintiffs, however, submitted affidavits that because the quarantine deprives them of their guide dogs, they are denied meaningful access to almost all state services — services for which they are clearly eligible." Brief of United States as amicus curiae, at 11 (emphasis added).
This conclusion is supported by Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1995). The plaintiff in Flight, who suffered from multiple sclerosis and was restricted to a wheelchair, was a client of the New York State Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities ("VESID"). The plaintiff decided to purchase a van, and he petitioned VESID for financial assistance to make necessary modifications to the van. VESID's policies allowed it to spend $10,500 to modify a van for a client who was to able to drive, but only $4,000 if the client planned to be a passenger. VESID found that the plaintiff was too severely disabled to drive, and thus authorized allocation of only $4,000. The plaintiff sued, alleging a violation of both section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and section 202 of the ADA.
The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim. After noting that the Rehabilitation Act "does not require all handicapped persons to be provided with identical benefits" but "mandates only that services provided nonhandicapped individuals not be denied [to a disabled person] because he is handicapped," id. at 63-64 (quoting P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added), the court stated that "Flight was not denied the additional subsidy `solely by reason of . . . his disability' within the meaning of § 504." Id. at 64. The court noted that "[t]he denial of the increased allowance was not based upon Flight's classification as a victim of multiple sclerosis, but rather upon the type of modification that he requested." Id.
Flight contends that his disability is not multiple sclerosis, but rather an inability to drive, but this argument is unpersuasive. A disability is a "physical or mental impairment," . . . i.e., "any physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting" the neurological system. Clearly, an inability to drive is not a physiological condition, but rather a result of a physiological condition, viz., Flight's neurological disorder.
[The ADA] is inapplicable because the distinction in the present case is not based upon Flight's disability, multiple sclerosis, but rather upon his inability to drive. Thus, VESID does not provide varying services or benefits "on the basis of disability" within the meaning of § 35.130(b)(1) . . . .
The fact that the quarantine does not discriminate on the basis of blindness is also borne out by the fact that the record is devoid of any allegation or evidence that the quarantine discriminates against blind people generally. Indeed, the plaintiff class members represent only a tiny portion of the blind; reports in various newspapers indicate that only somewhere between 1-5% of the blind use guide dogs. If the quarantine does, as the plaintiffs allege, discriminate or deny state services by reason of blindness, then all people who are blind could constitute members of the plaintiff class and could assert ADA claims. The fact that the plaintiffs have chosen to file suit while other blind individuals have not simply points out that the quarantine does nothing by reason of blindness; it affects the plaintiffs only because of their use of guide dogs.
Indeed, Hawaii seems to have made a concerted effort to ensure that state services are available to the blind. See H.R.S. § 347-20, stating that "it is the policy of this State to encourage and enable the blind . . . to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment. . . . [T]he blind . . . have the same right as the able-bodied to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities, and other public places."
This court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts appearing in newspapers. See Fed.R.Evid. 201; Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 1995); Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 16 F.3d 1346, 1356 n. 12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 62 (1994).
See, e.g., U.S. News World Report, March 11, 1996 (Vol. 120, No. 10), at 14 (reporting, on the basis of data provided by the American Foundation for the Blind, that 1 percent of blind people use guide dogs); Cathryn Creno, "Experts Hope to Make More Canine Help Available," The Arizona Republic, July 17, 1994, at F1 (reporting that "[o]nly 3 to 5 percent of blind Americans use guide dogs," and quoting Jim LaMay, executive director of the Arizona Center for the Blind and Visually Impaired, as stating that "[i]t's definitely only a small percentage of the blind that use seeing-eye dogs."); Laura Randall, "Guide Dogs a Rare Breed Among Blind," Chicago Tribune, June 1, 1993, at 8 (reporting that Ed Eames, author of a book about guide dog schools and a column in Dog World magazine, "estimates that only about 1.5 percent of [blind Americans] rely on dogs"); Martha Sherrill, "It's a Guide Dog's Life," The Washington Post Magazine, January 13, 1991, at W17 ("There are an estimated 10,000 guide dogs working in this country used by 5 percent of the blind."); and Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, "Guide Dogs, a Blue and White Kind," The Jerusalem Post, January 5, 1990, at 7 ("In most developed countries, two to three percent of the blind have guide dogs . . . .").
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs' ADA claim.
In light of the majority's decision to remand the case for further findings on the issue of "reasonable modifications," I need not address the plaintiffs' constitutional claims here.