Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100950/boire-vs-greyhound-corp
Timestamp: 2017-05-23 00:17:55
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Boire Vs Greyhound Corp - Citation 100950 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Boire Vs. Greyhound Corp. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/100950CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-23-1964Case Number376 U.S. 473AppellantBoireRespondentGreyhound Corp.Excerpt:.....reviewable in the courts. this court held as long ago as
, that the "final order[s]" made reviewable by §§ 10(e) and (f) [
] in the courts of
appeals do not include board decisions in certification proceedings. such decisions, rather, are normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the correctness of the certification eventuates in a finding by the board that an unfair labor practice has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit. in such a case, § 9(d) of the act makes full provision for judicial review of the..... Judgment:
Boire v. Greyhound Corp. - 376 U.S. 473 (1964)
The NLRB's orders in certification proceedings under § 9(c) of the Act are not final orders made reviewable by §§ 10(e) and (f).
, distinguished. They can, however, become reviewable where an employer's refusal to bargain with a certified unit results in an unfair labor act charge's being brought, in which case § 9(d) of the Act indirectly provides for full judicial review of the underlying certification order. Pp.
376 U. S. 474
The Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed an amended petition with the National Labor Relations Board pursuant to § 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act [
] requesting a representation election among the porters, janitors and maids working at four Florida bus terminals operated by the respondent (Greyhound). The amended petition designated the "employer" of the employees sought to be represented
Shortly before the election was schedule to take place, Greyhound filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking to set aside the decision of the Board and to enjoin the pending election. After a hearing, the court entered an order permanently restraining the election. 205 F.Supp. 686. Concluding that it had jurisdiction on the basis of this Court's decision in
, the court held on the merits that the Board's findings were insufficient as a matter of law to establish a joint employer relationship, that those findings established, as a matter of law, that Floors was the sole employer of the employees in question, and that the Board had therefore violated the National Labor Relations Act by attempting to conduct a representation election where no employment relationship existed between the employees and the purported employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 309 F.2d 397, and we granted certiorari to consider a seemingly important question of federal labor law. 372 U.S. 964. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Both parties agree that, in the normal course of events, Board orders in certification proceedings under § 9(c) are not directly reviewable in the courts. This Court held as long ago as
Appeals do not include Board decisions in certification proceedings. Such decisions, rather, are normally reviewable only where the dispute concerning the correctness of the certification eventuates in a finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice has been committed as, for example, where an employer refuses to bargain with a certified representative on the ground that the election was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit. In such a case, § 9(d) of the Act makes full provision for judicial review of the underlying certification order by providing that "such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed" in the Court of Appeals. [
"When an employee organization has built up its membership to a point where it is entitled to be recognized as the representative of the employees for collective bargaining, and the employer refuses to accord such recognition, the union, unless an election can promptly be held to determine the choice of representation, runs the risk of impairment of strength by attrition and delay while the case is dragging on through the courts, or else is forced to call a strike to achieve recognition by its own economic power. Such strikes have been called when election orders of the National Labor Relations Board have been held up by court review. [
And both the House [
] and the Senate Reports [
] spelled out the thesis, repeated on the floor, that the purpose of
Congressional determination to restrict judicial review in such situations was reaffirmed in 1947 at the time that the Taft-Hartley amendments were under consideration, when a conference committee rejected a House amendment which would have permitted any interested person to obtain review immediately after a certification [
] because, as Senator Taft noted, "such provision would permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings." [
In light of the clear import of this history, this Court has consistently refused to allow direct review of such orders in the Courts of Appeals.
American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, supra.
In two cases, however, each characterized by extraordinary circumstances, our decisions have permitted district court review of orders
entered in certification proceedings. In
, despite the injunction of § 9(b)(1) of the Act that
the Board -- without polling the professional employees -- approved as appropriate a unit containing both types of employees. The Board conceded in the Court of Appeals that it "had acted in excess of its powers, and had thereby worked injury to the statutory rights of the professional employees." 358 U.S. at
358 U. S. 187
. We pointed out there that the District Court suit was
. Upon these grounds, we affirmed the District Court's judgment setting aside the Board's "attempted exercise of (a) power that had been specifically withheld." 358 U.S. at
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineras de Honduras,
, in which District Court jurisdiction was upheld in a situation involving the question of application of the laws of the United States to foreign-flag ships and their crews, the Court was careful to note that
"the presence of public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest because of their international complexion is a uniquely compelling justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the Board's power. No question of remotely comparable urgency was involved in
which was a purely domestic adversary situation. The exception recognized today is therefore not to be taken as an enlargement of the exception in
The respondent makes no claim that this case is akin to
The argument is, rather, that the present case is one which falls within the narrow limits of
as the District Court and the Court of Appeals held. The respondent points out that Congress has specifically excluded an independent contractor from the definition of "employee" in § 2(3) of the Act. [
] It is said that the Board's finding that Greyhound is an employer of employees who are hired, paid, transferred and promoted by an independent contractor is, therefore, plainly in excess of the statutory powers delegated to it by Congress. This argument, we think, misconceives both the import of the substantive federal law and the painstakingly delineated procedural boundaries of
Whether Greyhound, as the Board held, possessed sufficient control over the work of the employees to qualify as a joint employer with Floors is a question which is unaffected by any possible determination as to Floors' status as an independent contractor, since Greyhound has never suggested that the employees themselves occupy an independent contractor status. And whether Greyhound possessed sufficient indicia of control to be an "employer" is essentially a factual issue, unlike the question in
which depended solely upon construction of the statute. The
exception is a narrow one, not to be extended to permit plenary district court review of Board orders in certification proceedings whenever it can be said that an erroneous assessment of the particular facts before the Board has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law. Judicial review in such a situation has been limited by Congress to the courts of appeals, and
H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 43; H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 56-57.
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). The effect of this provision was to overrule