Source: http://openjurist.org/636/f2d/893/hankerson-v-harris
Timestamp: 2017-01-19 15:08:38
Document Index: 385563559

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1382', '§ 405', '§ 1382', '§ 1383', '§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 1383', '§ 423', '§ 1382']

636 F2d 893 Hankerson v. Harris | OpenJurist
636 F. 2d 893 - Hankerson v. Harris HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 636 F.2d.
636 F2d 893 Hankerson v. Harris 636 F.2d 893
Willie H. HANKERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Patricia HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services,Defendant-Appellee.
No. 435, Docket 80-6066.
Argued Nov. 6, 1980.Decided Dec. 17, 1980.
* In April 1978, plaintiff applied for SSI disability benefits claiming total and complete disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff was then 48 years old. The application was denied initially in May 1978, and on reconsideration in July 1978. The following month, plaintiff requested a hearing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). The hearing was held before the ALJ in March 1979. Although plaintiff was notified in advance that he had a right to have a lawyer present, plaintiff appeared pro se, explaining that he "was in favor of getting" a lawyer but that he had not had time to do so because of deaths in the family. The ALJ decided to allow the hearing to proceed. The hearing was quite brief; the transcript consumes only 16 pages. Plaintiff was the only witness and testified that he had been employed "off and on" as a moving man for approximately 15 years prior to 1978. In addition, around 1977, plaintiff worked as a security guard until he "took sick." The record before the ALJ also included a determination by the Veterans Administration (VA) that plaintiff was 60% disabled as a result of arteriosclerotic heart disease with a history of hypertension, cirrhosis, and degenerative arthritis with myositis ossificans. The record also contained reports from several doctors who had examined plaintiff during the two years prior to his application for SSI benefits, indicating that plaintiff suffers from a variety of ailments including hypertensive cardiovascular disease, an enlarged heart, discogenic disease, and angina pectoris. A six-line note from plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Zelman, stated that plaintiff was under treatment for arteriosclerotic heart disease and hypertension, and that "he is unable to work because of his illness."1 However, the record also contained evidence from another physician that plaintiff could stand for two hours, sit, bend, grasp, and manipulate virtually without problem, and lift as much as 60 pounds.
To be eligible for SSI disability payments, an applicant must demonstrate that "his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy...." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).2 A court reviewing the decision of the Secretary is limited by statute to determining whether the Secretary's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); see also Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1980). In addition, a reviewing court must be satisfied that the claimant has had "a full hearing under the Secretary's regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Act." Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972).
This standard is virtually identical to the definition of disability used in disability insurance benefits cases under 42 U.S.C. § 423. Consequently, since the standard for judicial review is also identical, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (3), cases under 42 U.S.C. § 423 are cited interchangeably with cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). See Rivera v. Harris, 623 F.2d 212, 216 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980)
In Cutler v. Weinberger, supra, 516 F.2d at 1286-87, we held that a medical opinion did not necessarily have to be supported by "objective" clinical or laboratory findings. However, if a treating physician's opinion is not supported by such findings, the ALJ may not be required to accept it "uncritically and without evaluation," particularly where the record contains substantial contrary evidence. See Reyes v. Harris, 482 F.Supp. 638, 641 (S.D.N.Y.1979). Here, a strong argument can be made that there was sufficient clinical evidence from other sources to support plaintiff's treating physician's conclusion of disability. See Alvarado v. Califano, 605 F.2d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1980). In light of our disposition of this case, however, it is not necessary to decide how much weight should be given to a conclusory statement from a treating physician under these circumstances