Source: http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afe
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 05:06:20
Document Index: 427336784

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§5', '§ 19']

Brief for Appellee re Application of Attorney-Client Privilege | Lexington Public Library v Clark | Robert L. Abell - JDSupra
Lexington Public Library v ClarkBrief for Appellee re Application of Attorney-Client Privilege
The case considered the application of the attorney-client privilege to communications between an employer and an outside counsel regarding a personnel issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the lawyer was acting in a non-lawyer capacity and the privilege did not apply. See Lexington Public Library v Clark, 98 SW3d 53 (Ky 2002). Download PDF COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT SC-000531-MR LEXINGTON PUBLIC LIBRARY APPELLANT v. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTION NO. 2001-CA-00531-OA HON. THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE, APPELLEE FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION EIGHT AND DIANA KOONCE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE ***************************** BRIEF FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE SUBMITTED BY: ROBERT L. ABELL 271 W. SHORT STREET, SUITE 500 P.O. BOX 983 LEXINGTON, KY 40588-0983 254-7076 Required by CR 76.12(6) undersigned does hereby certify that copies of brief were served upon the following named individuals mail, postage prepaid, on this ___ of _______ Hon. Thomas L. Clark, Fayette Circuit Court, 215 W. Main Lexington, KY Richard G. Griffith, Jeffrey J. Chapuran, Stites & Harbison, 2300 Lexington Financial Center, Lexington, KY 40507; and, Hon. George M. Geogehan, III, Clerk, Kentucky Court of Appeals, 360 Democrat Drive, KY undersigned does also certify the record on appeal has not been removed from the of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. _____________________________ L. Abell 1 OF COURT NO. 2001-SC-000531-MR LIBRARY FROM COURT APPEALS NO. CA-00531-OA THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE, COURT, DIVISION EIGHT KOONCE INTEREST/APPELLEE ** FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE L. ABELL SHORT SUITE O. BOX KY 0983 859/254-7076 Certificate Required by CR 76.12 ( The undersigned does hereby certify that copies of this brief were served upon the following named individuals by mail, postage prepaid, on this day of 2001: Thomas L. Clark, Fayette Circuit Court, Main Street, Lexington, KY 40507; Richard G. Griffith, Jeffrey Chapuran, Stites & Harbison, Financial Lexington, KY and, Hon. George M. Geogehan, Clerk, Kentucky Court of Appeals, Drive, Frankfort, KY 40601. The undersigned does also certify that the record on appeal has not been removed from the Office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Robert L. Abell 1 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeSTATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT case presents an issue – the scope and of the attorney-client privilege as regards a party – that has not been addressed by the Court. this issue will have application to many cases this one, it is necessary to respectfully disagree appellant and suggest that oral argument may prove to the Court. 2 ORAL ARGUMENT This case presents an issue -the scope and application of the attorney-client privilege as regards a corporate party -that has not been addressed by the Court. Because this issue will have application to many cases besides this one, it is necessary to respectfully disagree with appellant and suggest that oral argument may prove helpful to the Court. 2 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeSTATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Page No. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ……………………………………………………. 1 …………………………………………………………………………………………….. of the Facts …………………………………………………. ARGUMENT ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3 POINT 1 …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 WHERE NON-PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS WERE ORDERED PRODUCED AND A COMMUNICATION SETTING FORTH THE LAWYER’S LEGAL ADVICE WAS DEEMED PRIVILEGED, THE APPELLEE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege be Strictly Construed ………………………………. 503 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. Kentucky Evidence Law (3d ed. 1993) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2. The Involvement of a Lawyer In a Process Reviewing the Job Performance and Behavior a Client’s Employee, Which is an Ordinary Business Personnel Matter, Does Render Privileged All Communications Information Made and Developed in Process ……………………………………………………………………. Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198 (E.D.N.Y 1988) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 Hardy v. New York News, 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 SCM v. Xerox, R.D. 508 (Conn. ………………. 5 Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Doctrine (ed. ……………………………………. 5-6 3 OF POINTS OF CASE Introduction 1 Counterstatement of the Facts 1 ... DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCED AND A THE LAWYER'S LEGAL ADVICE WAS DEEMED THE APPELLEE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT HIS DISCRETION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS BE 1. The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege Must be Strictly Construed 4 KRE 4 Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 (ed. 4 Involvement of a Lawyer In a Process the Job Performance and Behavior of a Client's Employee, Which is an Business Personnel Matter, Does Not Render Privileged All Communications and Information Made and Developed in that Process 4 Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., R.D. (D.N.Y Hardy v. New York News, R.D. (D.N.Y. 1987) SCM v. Xerox, 70 F.R.D. (D.Conn. 1976) The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (3d ed. 1997) 6 3 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeKentucky Evidence Law (3d ed. 1993) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 3. 503(a)(2)(B) Requires that a Communication from a “Representative of the Client” Occur in the Ordinary Course of the Employee’s Employment and Regard the Matter of the Employee’s Employment 6 Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Arizona, 2d (9th Cir. ………………. 503(a)(2)(……………………………………………………………………………………. 7 Kentucky Evidence Law (ed. . 7 Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Apply Communications from the Client to the Adverse Party or from the Adverse Party the Client …………………………………………………………………….. Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Doctrine (ed. …………………………….. Kentucky Evidence Law (ed. . 5. Court Employs Here a Very Deferential “Abuse of Discretion” Standard of Review .. Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., W. (………………………………………………………………………………….. 8 6. Where the Documents Set Forth Whose “Primary Purpose” Was Service to the Ordinary Business Function Reviewing an Employee’s “Job Performance and Behavior,” There Was No Showing By that the Communications Regarded Ordinary Subject Matter of the Employees’ Employment and There Communications Between Appellant, the Appellee Trial Judge Nor the of Appeals Abused Their Discretion In Ordering These Documents Produced ………… 8 4 Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 (ed. KRE 503 (a) (2) (Requires that a Confidential Communication from a "Representative of the Client" Occur the Ordinary Course of the Employee's Employment and Regard the Subject Matter of the Employee's Employment Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of 881 F.2d 1486 ( Cir. 1989) 7 KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) 6-7 Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 (3d ed. 1993) 6-7 4. The Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Apply to Communications from the Client to the Party or from the Adverse Party to the Client 7 The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (3d ed. 1997) 7 Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 (3d ed. 1993) 7 This Court Employs Here a Very Deferential "Abuse of Discretion" Standard of Review 7 Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W. 2d 195 (1997) the Documents Set Forth Communications Whose "Primary Purpose" to the Ordinary Business Function of Reviewing an Employee's "Job Performance Behavior," There Was No Showing By Appellant that the Communications Regarded the Ordinary Subject Matter of the Employees' Employment and There Were Communications Between Appellant, Neither the Appellee Trial Judge Nor the Court of Appeals Abused Their Discretion Ordering These Documents Produced 4 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeCarter v. Cornell University, R.D. (D. Y. …………………………………………………………………………………….. Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198 (E.D.N.Y ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10,13 First Chicago Intern. v. United Exchange Co., Ltd., R.D. 55 (D.N.Y. ……………………………………. Hardy v. New York News, 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. …………………………………………………………………………………………………..10-11,13 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 922 Supp. (D. Mo. …………………………………………. Shobe v. EPI Corp., Ky., W.2d 395 (……… 9 State ex rel Oregon Health Sciences University v. Haas, 2d (……………………………….. 16 Upjohn v. United States, S. 383 (…………… 503(a)(2)(………………………………………………………………………………….. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Doctrine (ed. ……………………………….. 10,11 Kentucky Evidence Law (ed. . ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. APPENDIX 5 v. Cornell University, 173 F.R.D. 92 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) 14 Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., R.D. (D.N.Y 1988) First Chicago Intern. v. United Exchange Co., Ltd., 125 F.R.D. (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 15 Hardy v. New York News, R.D. (D.N.Y. 1987) 11,13 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, F.Supp. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 16 v. EPI Corp., Ky., 815 S.W.2d (1991) State ex rel Oregon Health Sciences University v. 942 P.2d 261 (Ore. 1997) 15-16 v. United States, 449 U.S. (1981) 13 KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) 9,11,14 Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine (3d ed. 1997) Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 (3d ed. 1993) 12,14 CONCLUSION 16 5 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeCOUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE this case, as the affidavit submitted by appellant a lawyer was engaged to direct an investigation an employee’s “behavior and performance as Marketing Director.” (Appellant’s Brief, Appendix, of Susan Brothers ¶ 4). claims that all communications made in the personnel review process are from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer advised as to the legal aspects at the of the process. Because the subject communications are privileged and because production of the sole setting forth the legal advice was deemed the appellee trial judge did not abuse his and the Court of Appeals, denied appellant’s petition for a writ of prohibition, should be AFFIRMED. of the Facts moved for a protective order regarding related to the personnel review process and investigation. The appellee trial judge, Hon. Thomas L. of the Fayette Circuit Court, reviewed in camera the documents and overruled the motion in part and it in part. was sustained as to a document 6 OF CASE Introduction In this case, as the affidavit submitted by appellant indicates, a lawyer was engaged to direct an investigation regarding an employee's "behavior and performance as Director." (Appellant's Affidavit of Susan Brothers 1 4) Appellant claims that all made in the personnel review process are insulated from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, because the lawyer advised as to the legal aspects at the end of the process. Because the subject communications are not privileged and because production of the sole communication setting forth the legal advice was deemed privileged, the appellee trial judge did not abuse his discretion and the Court of Appeals, which denied appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition, should be Counterstatement of the Facts Appellant moved for a protective order regarding documents related to the personnel review process and appellee trial judge, Hon. Thomas L. Clark of the Fayette Circuit Court, reviewed in camera the relevant documents and overruled the motion in part and sustained it in part. It was sustained as to a document 6 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afethe lawyers legal advice but overruled regarding that “do not purport to give legal advice or any confidential communication between the client counsel[.]”1 sought and the Court of Appeals denied a writ prohibiting enforcement of appellee’s order that the were not privileged and must be produced. (43). has identified and numbered the relevant numbers 9 not issue. Appellant’s numerical references will be used in brief. documents are of three types. first is are documents generated by of appellant’s regarding the job actions and behavior of the adverse party, the employee being investigated, Bob Patrick, along with are notes of conversations with the that generated documents second consists of documents 8, are or communications between appellant’s representatives 1 trial judge’s order was attached to appellant’s for Writ of Prohibition (– 26). addition being in the record, the order is included in the hereto. 7 stating the lawyers legal advice but overruled regarding documents that "do not purport to give legal advice or reveal any confidential communication between the client and counsel [.]"1 Appellant sought and the Court of Appeals denied a prohibiting enforcement of appellee's order that the documents were not privileged and must be produced. (R. 35-43)Appellant has identified and numbered the relevant documents 1 through 14. Document numbers and 13 are not at issue. Appellant's numerical references will be used in this brief. The documents are of three types. The first is documents 1 through 7, which are documents generated by various of appellant's employees regarding the job performance, actions and behavior of the adverse party, the being investigated, Bob Patrick, along with document 11, which are notes of conversations with the employees that generated documents 1 through 7. The second type consists of documents 10, and 14, which are or regard communications between appellant's representatives 1 The trial judge's order was attached to appellant's Petition for Writ of Prohibition (R. 4 -26) In addition to being in the record, the order is included in the appendix hereto. 7 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afethe adverse party, Patrick. The third type is document which apparently reflects direction regarding conduct the investigation into the employee’s “job performance behavior as Marketing Director.” ARGUMENT POINT 1 WHERE NON-PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS WERE ORDERED PRODUCED AND A COMMUNICATION SETTING FORTH THE LAWYER’S LEGAL ADVICE WAS DEEMED PRIVILEGED, THE APPELLEE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. scope of the attorney-client privilege must be construed. The involvement of a lawyer in the business process of reviewing an employee’s “job and behavior” does not render privileged all and information generated in that process. facts leading to a business personnel decision are not merely because some legal aspects are also 503(a)(2)(by a “representative of the client” as those in the ordinary course of an employee’s and regarding the subject matter of the employee’s employment. The attorney-client privilege does apply to communications from a client to the adverse or from the adverse party to the client. Because the 8 and the adverse party, Patrick. The third type is document 12, which apparently reflects direction regarding conduct of the investigation into the employee's "job performance and behavior as Marketing Director." DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCED AND A THE LAWYER'S LEGAL ADVICE WAS DEEMED THE APPELLEE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT HIS DISCRETION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS BE The scope of the attorney-client privilege must be strictly construed. The involvement of a lawyer in the ordinary business process of reviewing an employee's "job performance and behavior" does not render privileged all communications and information generated in that process. The facts leading to a business personnel decision are not privileged merely because some legal aspects are also involved. KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) defines confidential communications by a "representative of the client" as those occurring in the ordinary course of an employee's employment and regarding the subject matter of the employee's employment. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications from a client to the adverse party or from the adverse party to the client. Because the 8 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afetrial judge conducted an in camera review and privileged communications, the scope and purpose of the client privilege was honored. the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of prohibition should be AFFIRMED. 5. Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege Must Strictly Construed. case involves the scope of the attorney-client privilege set forth in KRE 503. “[C]ourts have universally that it must be strictly construed and given no application than is necessary to further its objectives.” Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law 6. The Involvement of a Lawyer In the Ordinary Process of Reviewing an Employee’s Job Performance and Behavior Does Not Render All Communications and Information and Developed in that Process. fundamentally errs by urging that the of a lawyer in the ordinary business process of reviewing an employee’s “job performance and behavior” that process and all information developed in it to the attorney-client privilege. “Nothing seems to more frequent in the modern litigation-prone world than sophisticated client who tries to involve a lawyer in fact-finding process and thus make privileged both the 9 appellee trial judge conducted an in camera review and properly distinguished between non-privileged and privileged communications, the scope and purpose of the attorney-client privilege was honored. Accordingly, the of Appeals' decision denying a writ of prohibition be AFFIRMED. The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege Must be Strictly Construed. This case involves the scope of the attorney-client set forth in KRE "[C]ourts have universally held that it must be strictly construed and given no greater application than is necessary to further its objectives." Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 at 232. Involvement of a Lawyer In the Ordinary Business Process of Reviewing an Employee's Job Behavior Privileged All Communications and Information Made and Developed in that Process. Appellant fundamentally errs by urging that the involvement of a lawyer in the ordinary business process of an employee's "job performance and behavior" renders that process and all information developed in it subject to the attorney-client privilege. "Nothing seems to be more frequent in the modern litigation-prone world than a sophisticated client who tries to involve a lawyer in some fact-finding process and thus make privileged both the 9 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeof that process and the information gathered.” The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product (B.A. 3rd ed. 1997). “Communications to a acting as a general agent for the performance of that any nonlawyer could also perform are not privileged.” Id. at 99. “When the lawyer performs such the lawyer is not necessarily ‘as a lawyer.’” Id. “Communications made to a lawyer by a client seeking judgment or advice rather than legal advice are privileged.” Id. at “No litmus test for what constitutes ‘advice’ ‘services’ has ever been formulated[,]” and a case-by-case is required. Lawson, supra, at “When the ultimate corporate decision is based on a business policy and a legal evaluation, the business of the decision are not protected simply because considerations are also involved.” Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), citing SCM v. Xerox, R.D. 508, (Conn. 1976). the Court of Appeals observed in quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., R.D. 204 (D.N.Y. 1988): The attorney-client privilege does not nonlegal communications based on business advice given by a lawyer. Where a lawyer mixes and business advice the communication is privileged unless “the communication is 10 fact of that process and the information gathered." Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 116 (A.B.A. ed. 1997) "Communications to a lawyer acting as a general agent for the performance of functions that any nonlawyer could also perform are not privileged." at "When the lawyer performs such acts, the lawyer is not necessarily `acting as a lawyer."' "Communications made to a lawyer by a client seeking business judgment or advice rather than legal advice are not privileged." 97. "No litmus test for determining what constitutes `legal advice' or `legal services' has ever been formulated[,]" and a case-by-case analysis is required. Lawson, supra, at 234. "When the ultimate corporate decision is based on both a business policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision are not protected simply because legal considerations are also involved." Hardy v. New York News, Inc., R.D. 44 (D.N.Y. citing Xerox, 70 F.R.D. 517 (D.Conn. 1976) As the of Appeals observed in quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall 121 F.R.D. 198, 203-204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) : attorney-client privilege protect nonlegal communications based on business given by a lawyer. a lawyer mixes legal and business advice the communication is not privileged unless "the communication is 10 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeto meet problems which can fairly be as predominantly legal.” J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, 503(a)(a)(at 22. course, advice about the legal consequences of the various options is generally privileged. Epstein, supra, at 98. 7. 503(a)(2)(B) Requires that a Confidential from a “Representative of the Client” Occur in the Ordinary Course of the Employee’s Employment and Regard the Subject of the Employee’s Employment. grounds its argument in KRE 503 errs by KRE 503(a)(2)(B)’s of “representative the client,” which is as follows: Any employee or representative of the client a communication: (the course and scope of his or her employment; (ii) Concerning the subject matter of his or her employment; and, (effectuate legal representation the client. foregoing establishes limits on the scope of the recognized by KRE “[c]overage depends … whether or not ‘the communications concern matter within scope of the employee’s duties and [or not] the employee is aware that the information is being furnished enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.’” Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law 11 designed to meet problems which can fairly be characterized as predominantly legal." 2 & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, para. 503 (a) (a) (01) at 503-22. Of course, advice about the legal consequences of the options is generally privileged. supra, KRE 503 (a) (2) (that a Confidential Communication from a "Representative of the Client" Occur in the Ordinary Course of the Employee's Employment and Regard the Subject Matter of the Employee's Employment. Appellant grounds its argument in KRE but errs by omitting KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) ' definition of "representative of the client," which is as follows: employee or representative of the client who makes or receives confidential (i) In the course and scope of his or her (the subject matter of his her employment; and, (iii) To effectuate legal representation for the client. The foregoing establishes limits on the scope of the privilege recognized by KRE 503: "[c]overage depends upon or not `communications concern matter within the scope of the employee's duties and [whether or not] the is aware that the information is being furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation."' Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law § 5.10 at 247 11 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afe(ed. quoting Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 2d (9th Cir. 1989). communication that occurs in the workplace by a of the client is not privileged merely it took place at work. This point was illustrated the drafters of KRE 503: in a suit for personal injuries sustained when the client’s truck entering the client’s loading yard struck a pedestrian, the for the client interviews the driver of truck and secretary who happened to be look out the window when the accident occurred. interview with the driver would be privileged but not so the interview with the secretary the accident was not a matter within the and scope of her employment. supra, at quoting Study Committee at Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Apply to from the Client to the Adverse or from the Adverse Party to the Client. client to communications between the client and its “A client is one who is the intended beneficiary of services.” The Attorney-Client Privilege the Work-Product Doctrine at (ed. 1997). client to between lawyer and client. Lawson, supra, Court Employs Here a Very Deferential 12 (3d ed. 1993), quoting Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Arizona, 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 ( Cir. 1989) A communication that occurs in the workplace by a representative of the client is not privileged merely because it took place at work. This point was illustrated by the drafters of KRE Suppose, in a suit for personal injuries when the client's truck entering the client's loading yard struck a pedestrian, the lawyer for the client interviews the driver of the truck and secretary who happened to be look it out the window when the accident occurred. The interview with the driver would be privileged not so the interview with the secretary because the accident was not a matter within the course and scope of her employment. Lawson, supra, at 247, quoting Study Committee at 41. 4. The Attorney-Client Privilege Does Not Apply to Communications from the Client to the Adverse Party or from the Adverse Party to the Client. The attorney-client privilege applies only confidential communications between the client and its lawyer. "A client is one who is the intended beneficiary of legal services." Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine at 72 (ABA 3d. ed. 1997) The attorney-client privilege applies only communications between lawyer and client. Lawson, supra, §5.10 at 233. 5. This Court Employs Here a Very Deferential 12 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afe“Abuse of Discretion” Standard of Review This Court reviews this matter from a very deferential of discretion standard. A writ of prohibition should be issued “upon a showing that the challenged action an abuse of discretion.” Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., W.(1997). “Where the challenge involves matters of fact, of law to facts, abuse of should be found only where the factual for application of an articulated legal rule so wanting as to equal, in reality, a distortion of the rule.” Id. at 200. 6. the Documents Set Forth Communications Whose “Primary Purpose” Was Service to the Ordinary Business Function of Reviewing an Employee’s “Job Performance and Behavior,” There Regarded the Ordinary Subject of the Employees’ Employment and There Communications Between Appellant, Neither Appellee Trial Judge Nor the Court of Appeals Abused Their Discretion In Ordering These Produced. Court of Appeals should be affirmed: there has no abuse of discretion by the appellee trial judge, correctly distinguished between privileged and nonprivileged communications. the documents should be produced because the “primary purpose” of their creation was the ordinary 13 "Abuse of Discretion" Standard of Review Court reviews this matter from a very deferential abuse of discretion standard. A writ of prohibition should only be issued "upon a showing that the challenged action reflects an abuse of discretion." Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 195, 199 (1997) "Where the challenge involves matters of fact, or application of law to facts, however, an abuse of discretion should be found only where the factual underpinning for application of an articulated legal rule is so wanting as to equal, in reality, a distortion of the legal rule." Id. at 199-200. Where the Documents Set Forth Communications "Primary Purpose" Was Service to the Business Function of Reviewing an Employee's "Job Performance and Behavior," There Was No Showing By Appellant that the Communications Regarded the Ordinary Subject Matter of the Employees' Employment and There Were Communications Between Appellant, Neither the Appellee Trial Judge Nor the Court of Appeals Their Discretion These Documents Produced. The Court of Appeals should be affirmed: there has been no abuse of discretion by the appellee trial judge, who correctly distinguished between privileged and nonprivileged communications. First, the documents should be produced because the "primary purpose" of their creation was the ordinary 13 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afefunction of personnel review: Patrick’s “job and behavior as Marketing Director.” regarding such ordinary business matters are privileged, even where legal aspects are involved, the do not include confidential communications from production by KRE 503. documents be confidential communications because there has no showing by appellant that they regard the ordinary subject employees’ “confidential communication” from a “representative of the corporation” must regard the ordinary subject matter of the employee’s employment. KRE 503(a)(2)(B). the of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground as well. documents 8, possibly be between appellant and the adverse party, attorney-client privilege applies only to between attorney and client, not between the client and an adverse party. Accordingly, the Court of should be affirmed on this ground as well. The appellee trial judge reviewed in camera the documents in accordance with Shobe v. EPI Corp., W.2d 395, 398 (1991). trial judge’s review 14 business function of personnel review: Patrick's "job performance and behavior as Marketing Director." Because communications regarding such ordinary business matters are not privileged, even where legal aspects are involved, the documents do not include confidential communications insulated from production by KRE Second, documents 1 through 7 and 11 cannot be considered confidential communications because there has been no showing by appellant that they regard the ordinary matter of the employees' employment. A "confidential communication" from a "representative of the corporation" must regard the ordinary subject matter of the employee's employment. KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground as well. Third, documents 10 and 14 cannot possibly be considered confidential communications: they are communications between appellant and the adverse party, Patrick. The attorney-client privilege applies only to communications between attorney and client, not between the and an adverse party. the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground as well. appellee trial judge reviewed in camera the relevant documents in accordance with Shobe v. EPI Corp., Ky., 815 S.W.2d (1991) The trial judge's review 14 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afethat production of the documents would not any “confidential communication.” That ruling is by the Court of Appeals’ determination that the “primary purpose” of the documents was to “investigate ‘Patrick’s as Director.’” (42). contrary to the conclusory of appellant’s arguments, but in accord with the submitted by appellant, both the appellee trial and the Court of Appeals have determined correctly the primary function served by the communications was the ordinary business process of reviewing Patrick’s “job and behavior as Marketing Director.” “Communications made to a lawyer seeking business or advice rather than legal advice are not privileged.” Epstein, supra, at “When the ultimate decision is based on both a business policy and a evaluation, the business aspects of the decision are protected simply because legal considerations are also involved.” Hardy v. New York News, R.D. at 44. “Where a lawyer mixes legal and business advice the is not privileged unless ‘communication to meet problems which can fairly be as predominantly legal.’” Cuno, Inc., R.D. at 204. 15 indicated that production of the documents would not disclose any "confidential communication." That ruling is supported by the Court of Appeals' determination that the "primary purpose" of the documents was to "investigate `Patrick's behavior and performance Marketing Director."' (R. 42) Thus, contrary to the conclusory assertions of appellant's arguments, but in accord with the affidavit submitted by appellant, both the appellee trial judge and the Court of Appeals have determined correctly that the primary function served by the communications was ordinary business process of reviewing Patrick's "job performance and behavior as Marketing Director." "Communications made to a lawyer seeking business judgment or advice rather than legal advice are not privileged." Epstein, supra, at 97. "When the ultimate corporate decision is based on both a business policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision are not protected simply because legal considerations are also involved." Hardy v. New York News, 114 F.R.D. at 643-44. "Where a lawyer mixes legal and business advice the communication is not privileged unless `the communication is designed to meet problems which can fairly be characterized as predominantly legal."' Cuno, Inc., 121 F.R.D. at 203-204. 15 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeCourt of Appeals and the appellee trial judge have privileged documents. “[T]he business aspects of the because are also involved.” Hardy v. New York News, supra. advice about the various options is, of privileged. Epstein, supra, at 98. business of the decision, which appear to include a number of reports concerning Patrick’s “job and behavior” and resulted in Patrick’s from the appellant’s employ, have been ordered At the same time the legal advice regarding that has been shielded from discovery. The case-by-case that these issues require has been conducted and correctly. Appellant has made no showing of of discretion or that the applicable legal rule has distorted. the Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED. record indicates that documents communications from a number of appellant’s regarding Patrick’s job performance and behavior. there has been no showing by appellant that the subject matter of these employees’ employment was Patrick’s job performance and behavior. 503(a)(2)(16 The Court of Appeals and the appellee trial judge have correctly distinguished between non-privileged and privileged documents. "[T]he business aspects of the decision are not protected simply legal considerations are also involved." Hardy v. New York News, Legal advice about the various options is, of course, privileged. Epstein, supra, at The business aspects of the decision, which appear to include a substantial number of reports concerning Patrick's "job performance and behavior" and resulted in Patrick's separation from the appellant's employ, have been ordered produced. At the same time the legal advice regarding that decision has been shielded from discovery. The case-by-case review that these issues require has been conducted carefully and correctly. Appellant has made no showing of abuse of discretion or that the applicable legal rule has been distorted. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should AFFIRMED. The record indicates that documents 1 through 7 and 11 reflect communications from a number of appellant's employees regarding Patrick's job performance and behavior. However, there has been no showing by appellant that the ordinary subject matter of these employees' employment was Patrick's job performance and behavior. KRE 503 (a) (2) (B) 16 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afethat a “confidential communication” from a “representative of a corporation” regard the subject matter the employee’s employment. a confidential does not occur merely because it was made at See Lawson, supra, at quoting Study Committee because documents not constitute a confidential communication under KRE 503, appellee trial judge correctly ordered their and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on ground too. record also indicates that documents 8, appellant’s and the adverse party, the employee being investigated, Patrick. The attorney-client privilege only to communications between lawyer and client. supra, § attorney-client does not apply to communications between client the adverse party. because documents 8, or regard communications between appellant’s and the adverse party, the appellee trial correctly concluded that they did not include should be produced. the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this too. 17 requires that a "confidential communication" from a "representative of a corporation" regard the subject matter of the employee's employment. Such a confidential communication does not occur merely because it was made at work. See Lawson, supra, at 247, quoting Study Committee at 41. Accordingly, because documents 1 through 7 and 11 do not constitute a confidential communication under KRE the appellee trial judge correctly ordered their production and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground too. The record also indicates that documents 10 and 14 are or regard communications between appellant's representatives and the adverse party, the employee being attorney-client privilege applies only to communications between lawyer and client. Lawson, supra, 5.10 at 233. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications between client and the adverse party. Accordingly, because documents 10 and 14 are or regard communications between appellant's representatives and the adverse party, the appellee trial judge correctly concluded that they did not include confidential communications and should be produced. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground too. 17 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8aferelies correctly on Upjohn v. United States, S. 383 (but errs by misstating its holding.2 Upjohn does not establish a categorical set of rules cautions that attorney-client privilege issues must be on a case-by-case basis. S. at 396. by the representatives at issue in Upjohn were within the ordinary of the employee’s duties. S. at documents at issue in Upjohn regarded the legality of made to foreign government officials, not the business issue of an employee’s job performance. ruling by the appellee trial judge and the Court Appeals is consistent with Upjohn. the primary of the investigation in Upjohn was “possibly illegal” payments made to foreign governments. by the primary purpose of the investigation was of an employee’s “job performance and behavior,” very ordinary business function. made to this ordinary business procedure do not become merely because some legal aspects exist as well. Hardy v. New York News, supra; Cuno, Inc., supra. Second, communications at issue in Upjohn regarded the ordinary 2 503 Upjohn’s analysis “for the basis parameters of the lawyer-client privilege for the corporate 18 Appellee relies correctly on Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. (1981), but errs by misstating its holding.2 First, Upjohn does not establish a categorical set of rules but cautions that attorney-client privilege issues must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 449 U.S. Second, the communications made by the corporate at issue in Upjohn were within the ordinary scope of the employee's duties. 449 U.S. at 394. Third, the documents at issue in Upjohn regarded the legality of payments made to foreign government officials, not the ordinary business issue of an employee's job performance. The ruling by the appellee trial judge and the Court of Appeals is consistent with Upjohn. First, the primary purpose of the investigation in Upjohn was "possibly illegal" payments made to foreign governments. Here, by contrast, the primary purpose of the investigation was assessment of an employee's "job performance and behavior," a very ordinary business function. Communications made pursuant to this ordinary business procedure do not become privileged merely because some legal aspects exist as well. Hardy v. New York News, supra; Cuno, Inc., supra. the communications at issue in Upjohn regarded the ordinary 2 KRE incorporates Upjohn's analysis "for the basis of the lawyer-client privilege for the corporate 18 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afematter of the employees' employment. has made no such showing. For communications by employees to become privileged KRE 503(a)(2)(B) that they regard ordinary subject matter of the employees’ employment. case-by-case analysis that Upjohn directs must occur has been completed correctly; has been no abuse of discretion by the appellee trial or the Court of Appeals. the Court of should be affirmed. Appellant’s reliance on Carter v. Cornell University, 173 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), is misplaced. First, the at issue in Carter were trial preparation case, by contrast, does not include any that the documents at issue are trial preparation while here the documents at issue were during a process whose “primary purpose” was the of Patrick’s “job performance,” the documents at in Carter were created specifically to aid in the of a lawsuit. Thus, the Carter court conducted the by-case analysis that must be done and found the differences material. The ruling of the appellee judge and the Court of Appeals is not contrary to Carter: the documents here are not trial preparation context.” Lawson, supra, § 19 subject matter of the employees' employment. Here, appellant has made no such showing. For communications by corporate employees to become privileged KRE 503 (a) (2) (requires that they regard ordinary subject matter of the employees' employment. The case-by-case analysis that Upjohn directs must occur has been completed correctly; there has been no abuse of discretion by the appellee trial judge or the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Appellant's reliance on Carter v. Cornell University, R.D. (D.N.Y. misplaced. the documents at issue in Carter were trial preparation materials. This case, by contrast, does not include any claim that the documents at issue are trial preparation materials. Second, while here the documents at issue were created during a process whose "primary purpose" was the assessment of Patrick's "job performance," the documents at issue in Carter were created specifically to aid in the defense of a lawsuit. Thus, the Carter court conducted the case-by-case analysis that must be done and found the foregoing differences material. The ruling of the appellee trial judge and the Court of Appeals is not contrary to Carter: the documents here are not trial preparation context." Lawson, supra, 5.10 at 245. 19 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afeand were created by a process whose “primary purpose” was the ordinary business process of reviewing and an employee’s “job performance.” Appellant’s reliance on First Chicago Intern. v. United Exchange Co., Ltd., 125 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), similarly misplaced. The court in that case, unlike the trial judge and Court of Appeals here, made the that legal considerations were predominant therefore the attorney-client privilege required the be shielded from discovery. however, appellee trial judge and the Court of Appeals have that the “primary purpose” of the communications issue here was the ordinary business procedure of reviewing an employee’s job performance. That the court in First Chicago reached a different conclusion based on facts does not indicate that the appellee trial or the Court of Appeals abused their discretion or the legal rule. court’s decision in State ex rel Oregon Health Sciences University v. Haas, 2d (has application here because that case a of Oregon evidence law. the Court in Haas pointed out that the definition of “representative of client” at issue therein was “not patterned after any 20 materials and were created by a process whose "primary purpose" was the ordinary business process of reviewing and assessing an employee's "job performance." Appellant's reliance on First Chicago Intern. V. United Exchange Co., Ltd., R.D. (D.N.Y. is similarly misplaced. The court in that case, unlike the appellee trial judge and Court of Appeals here, made the determination that legal considerations were predominant and therefore the attorney-client privilege required the communications be shielded from discovery. Here, however, the appellee trial judge and the Court of Appeals have determined that the "primary purpose" of the communications at issue here was the ordinary business procedure of an employee's job performance. That the court in Chicago reached a different conclusion based on different facts does not indicate that the appellee trial judge or the Court of Appeals abused their discretion or distorted the legal rule. The court's decision in State ex rel Oregon Health Sciences University v. Haas, 942 P.2d 261 (Ore. 1997), has no application here because that case involved a peculiarity of Oregon evidence law. Indeed, the Court in Haas pointed out that the definition of "representative of the client" at issue therein was "not patterned after any 20 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afestate’s definition” and that “no other state’s of that term is instructive.” 2d at Haas is very specifically limited to issues of Oregon not at all present in this case. Appellant’s citation to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 922 F.Supp. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1996), is similarly without merit. issue in that case was whether certain documents were from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act. The attorney-client privilege must be strictly privilege does not insulate from discovery regarding ordinary business processes, such as employee’s “job performance and behavior,” merely legal considerations are also present. privilege applies only to communications by corporate that regard the subject matter of their employment. The privilege does not apply to communications appellant to the adverse party. Because the appellee judge followed the appropriate procedure of in camera and correctly distinguished between privileged and documents, there has been no abuse of 21 other state's definition" and that "no other state's interpretation of that term is instructive." 942 P.2d at 269. Haas is very specifically limited to issues of Oregon law not at all present in this case. Appellant's citation to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Supp. (D. similarly without merit. At issue in that case was whether certain documents were exempt from disclosure under the federal Freedom of Act. CONCLUSION client must be construed. The privilege does not insulate from discovery information regarding ordinary business processes, such as an employee's "job performance and behavior," merely because legal considerations are also present. The applies only to communications by corporate employees that regard the subject matter of their The privilege does not apply to communications from appellant to the adverse party. Because the appellee trial judge followed the appropriate procedure of in camera review and correctly distinguished between privileged and nonprivileged documents, there has been no abuse of 21 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afe22 nor distortion of the legal rule. the Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED. submitted, __________________________________ L. Abell 271 W. Short Street, Suite 500 O. Box 983 KY 0983 254-7076 ATTORNEY FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE discretion nor distortion of the legal rule. Accordingly, Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED. Respectfully submitted, Robert L. Abell Short Street, Suite P.O. Box Lexington, KY 40588-0983 859-254-7076 PARTY INTEREST/APPELLEE Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=576b7b69-19f6-4030-8882-1c617d5e8afe
Reference Info: Appellate Brief | State, 6th Circuit, Kentucky | United States Send