Source: https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/comfort-v-hoang-petition-appendix
Timestamp: 2019-03-26 20:48:17
Document Index: 203881831

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 1252', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 1226', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 8', '§ 244', '§ 8', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236']

Comfort v. Hoang - Petition Appendix | OSG | Department of Justice
Comfort v. Hoang - Petition Appendix
No. 01-1616
PHU CHAN HOANG, THANH QUOC NGUYEN, AND
Whether respondents' mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, where each respondent was convicted of an aggravated felony after his admission into the United States.
The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a-23a) is reported at 282 F.3d 1247. The orders of the district court (App., infra, 24a-25a, 26a-27a, 28a) are unreported.
(D)	is inadmissible under section 1182(a) (3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
1.	The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., to streamline procedures for removing certain criminal aliens from the United States. As the House Report on IIRIRA explained, Congress concluded that "our immigration laws should enable the prompt admission of those who are entitled to be admitted, the prompt exclusion or removal of those who are not so entitled, and the clear distinction between these categories." H.R. Rep. No. 469, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. I, at 111 (1996). Congress further determined that "[a]liens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of our law are effectively taking immigration opportunities that might otherwise be extended to others, potential legal immigrants whose presence would be more consistent with the judgment of the elected government of this country about what is in the national interest." S. Rep. No. 249, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1996).
The provision of IIRIRA that is at issue in this case is Section 236(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). Section 1226(c)(1) requires the Attorney General to take into custody aliens who are inadmissible to or deportable from the United States because they have committed specified crimes. In the case of deportable aliens, Section 1226(c)(1) applies if the alien has been convicted of any of certain specified crimes, including an aggravated felony (as defined in INA Section 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)), two or more crimes involving moral turpitude or a crime of moral turpitude that resulted in a sentence of at least one year's imprisonment, a controlled-substance offense (other than simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana), a firearms offense, a specified immigration offense, or espionage, sabotage, treason, or threatening the President, see 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1)(B) and (C), 1227(a)(2)(A)-(D), or if the alien has engaged in terrorist activities, see 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1)(D), 1227(a)(4)(B). Section 1226(c)(2) prohibits release of those aliens during the pendency of administrative proceedings instituted to remove them from the United States, except in very limited circumstances involving witness protection. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(2).
2.	Respondents are natives and citizens of Vietnam who are lawful permanent residents of the United States. Each has been charged by the INS with being removable for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43).
a.	Respondent Hoang entered the United States in 1979. In 1993, at the age of 16, Hoang pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery involving use of a firearm. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years' imprisonment on each count. In November 2000, after serving more than eight years of his sentence, Hoang was released from state prison. The INS charged him with being removable based on his aggravated robbery convictions and took him into custody under Section 1226(c). Hoang filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Hoang argued that Section 1226(c) violates due process and is unconstitutional as applied to him. In January 2001, the district court granted the habeas corpus petition and ordered the INS to provide Hoang a bond hearing. After the hearing, Hoang was released on $20,000 bond. See App., infra, 6a, 24a-25a.
b.	Respondent Nguyen entered the United States in 1991 at the age of 15. In 1999, Nguyen pleaded guilty to the state-law misdemeanor offense of using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon during a fight. He was sentenced to 365 days' imprisonment. In June 2000, the INS charged Nguyen with being removable for having committed an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining "aggravated felony" to include a crime of violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year). In November 2000, the INS took Nguyen into custody under Section 1226(c). Nguyen filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, arguing that Section 1226(c) violates due process. In February 2001, the district court granted a permanent injunction and ordered the INS to provide Nguyen a bond hearing, after which Nguyen was released on $8,000 bond. See App., infra, 5a, 26a-27a.
c.	Respondent Trung entered the United States in 1987 at the age of 15. In 2000, Trung pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery. He was sentenced to a term of up to five years' imprisonment, with a minimum term of 30 days. In February 2001, the INS charged Trung with being removable as an aggravated felon, see 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), and also for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). In March 2001, Trung was transferred from state prison to INS custody pursuant to Section 1226(c). Trung filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and an application for a temporary restraining order, asserting that Section 1226(c) violates due process and is unconstitutional as applied to him. In May 2001, the district court granted a temporary restraining order and directed the INS to provide Trung a bond hearing. After the hearing, the INS released Trung on $7,500 bond. See App., infra, 6-7a, 28a.
3.	The court of appeals consolidated the three cases and affirmed on the ground that Section 1226(c) violates substantive due process as applied to respondents. App., infra, 1a-23a. The court of appeals first held, in relevant part, that as lawful permanent residents, respondents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being free from detention, which constitutes a fundamental right. Id. at 10a-15a. The court of appeals specifically disagreed (id. at 11a-12a) with Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (1999), in which the Seventh Circuit-holding that a lawful permanent resident who conceded that he was removable had forfeited his legal entitlement to remain in the United States-rejected a due process challenge to Section 1226(c).
Relying in part on Zadvydas v. Davis, supra, the court of appeals in this case next held that Congress's plenary power over immigration matters does not insulate Section 1226(c) from due process review and that Section 1226(c), as a non-punitive provision, is constitutional only if supported by "special justifications which outweigh the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." App., infra, 19a; see id. at 15a-19a. Applying that test, the court of appeals acknowledged that "the government has a compelling interest" in ensuring criminal aliens' attendance at their removal proceedings. Id. at 19a. But the court stated that Section 1226(c) is not narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest, because "[t]he risk of flight posed by some criminal aliens is insufficient to justify the mandatory detention of all aliens who meet the criteria under [Section 1226(c)]." Id. at 21a.
The court of appeals concluded that the government also has a compelling interest in protecting the public from dangerous aliens. App., infra, 21a. The court determined, however, that Section 1226(c) requires detention of aliens who do not pose a danger to the public because it can be triggered by an alien's commission of "not only dangerous offenses such as mur-ders, rapes, crimes of terrorist activity, violations of the controlled substances and firearms laws, and crimes committed by repeat offenders, but also less dangerous offenses" such as crimes of moral turpitude, theft, or fraud. Ibid.
The court of appeals therefore held that the government had failed to establish "special justifications" for mandatory detention of criminal aliens under Section 1226(c) that outweigh the liberty interest of lawful permanent resident aliens such as respondents. App., infra, 22a. After determining that Section 1226(c) cannot be construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty that the court perceived, id. at 22a-23a, the court held that Section 1226(c) violates substantive due process as applied to respondents as lawful permanent resident aliens, id. at 23a.
The question in this case is whether the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) satisfy the requirements of due process as applied to criminal aliens who are lawful permanent residents of the United States. A petition presenting the same question is pending before the Court in DeMore v. Kim, No. 01-1491 (petition filed Apr. 9, 2002), a case that arises from the Ninth Circuit. The question of whether Section 1226(c) satisfies due process requirements as applied to an alien who entered the United States unlawfully, without inspection, is pending before the Court in Elwood v. Radoncic, No. 01-1459 (petition filed Apr. 4, 2002), which arises from the Third Circuit. The Solicitor General has suggested that the petitions in both Kim and Elwood should be granted and the cases should be set for oral argument in tandem with each other, or consolidated for argument. See Kim Pet. 19.
As the petitions in Radoncic (at 19-22) and Kim (at 19) explain, the government has sought review in both of those cases for two reasons. First, granting certiorari in a case that involves a lawful permanent resident as well as in a case that involves an alien unlawfully present in the United States-who is entitled to lesser due process protection in this context2-will enable the Court to address the constitutionality of Section 1226(c) in a wider range of applications and therefore reduce the likelihood of future disagreements in the lower courts about the constitutionality of applying Section 1226(c) to particular classes of aliens. Second, granting review in two cases, rather than just one, is appropriate in light of the unusual potential for mootness in habeas corpus challenges to Section 1226(c). See Radoncic Pet. 20-21.3 Because the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kim presents a live case that also involves a lawful permanent resident, however, we do not recommend hearing oral argument in this case, as well as in Kim.4 The petition in this case therefore should be held pending the Court's disposition of Kim and Radoncic and disposed of in accordance with the Court's decisions in those cases.
2	See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[O]nce
an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.").
3	This case is not moot. Respondents' administrative removal proceedings are pending before immigration judges and none of the respondents is subject to a final order of removal at this time.
4	Should the Court determine-when considering the petition in Kim or after that petition has been granted-that Kim is an unsuitable vehicle for considering the constitutionality of Section 1226(c) in the context of a lawful permanent resident alien, this case could provide an appropriate alternative vehicle for resolving that question.
5	The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Nos. 01-1136, 01-1180, 01-1343
PHAM QUA TRUNG, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES
CITIZENS AND IMMIGRANTS FOR EQUAL JUSTICE;
ASSOCIATION, AMICI CURIAE
Before: BRISCOE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District Judge. 5
However, a majority of federal district courts addressing the issue found the mandatory detention provision of the ADAA unconstitutional. See Martinez v. Greene, 28 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1279 (D. Colo. 1998), and cases cited therein. As a result, Congress amended the mandatory detention statute in 1990 and 1991 to permit the release of aggravated felons who were lawfully admitted to the United States and who could demonstrate they were not a threat to the community and were likely to appear for their hearings. Id.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA created automatic mandatory detention without bond for aggravated felons and other non-citizens with criminal convictions. INA § 242(a)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Martinez, 28 F.Supp.2d at 1280. However, the AEDPA's amendment was almost immediately replaced with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 1570, which amended the INA to include § 236(c), the provision at issue here.
The Attorney General shall take into custody an alien who-
(C)	is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been [sentenced] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
In all three appeals, we are asked to review the district court's ruling that § 236(c) is unconstitutional. Although § 236(e) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), provides that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of [§ 236] shall not be subject to review," courts retain jurisdiction over habeas petitions which include constitutional challenges. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1999). See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. See United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2001). This court reviews challenges to the constitutionality of a statute under a de novo standard. Id.
The constitutionality of § 236(c) in the face of a due process challenge has been addressed by numerous courts, with conflicting results. The Seventh Circuit has held that § 236(c) does not violate either substantive or procedural due process. See Parra, 172 F.3d at 958. The Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have held that § 236(c) does violate substantive due process. See Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 2001); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002).
First, a petitioner's detention during the period required for the exhaustion of remedies may infringe upon his or her rights, especially where the issue sought to be raised, the constitutionality of § 236(c), is one which does not implicate the discretion or the expertise of the agency involved. See Welch v. Reno, 101 F.Supp.2d 347, 351-52 (D. Md. 2000). Second, the agency involved, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), does not have the power to reach constitutional arguments, and thus is not empowered to grant effective relief. See Yanez v. Holder, 149 F.Supp.2d 485, 489-90 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Welch, 101 F.Supp.2d at 351-52. Third, the BIA has previously ruled that it is barred by § 236(c) from granting bond, and therefore any attempt by a petitioner to exhaust would be futile. See Galvez v. Lewis, 56 F.Supp.2d 637, 644 (E.D. Va. 1999).
[p]ersons subject to [§ 236(c)] have forfeited any legal entitlement to remain in the United States and have little hope of clemency. . . . Before the IIRIRA bail was available to persons in Parra's position as a corollary to the possibility of discretionary relief from deportation; now that this possibility is so remote, so too is any reason for release pending removal. Parra's legal right to remain in the United States has come to an end. An alien in Parra's position can withdraw his defense of the removal proceeding and return to his native land, thus ending his detention immediately. He has the keys in his pocket. A criminal alien who insists on postponing the inevitable has no constitutional right to remain at large during the ensuing delay, and the United States has a powerful interest in maintaining the detention in order to ensure that removal actually occurs.
We do not agree with the Seventh Circuit's determination that an alien who is subject to § 236(c) has somehow forfeited his or her right to liberty during deportation proceedings. A similar argument was recently rejected in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2501, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). In Zadvydas, the Court held that even an alien who had already been ordered to be deported retained a liberty interest strong enough to raise a due process challenge concerning his or her indefinite and possibly permanent detention resulting from the inability to carry out the deportation order. In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the government's position that "whatever liberty interest the aliens possess, it is 'greatly diminished' by their lack of a legal right to 'liv[e] at large in this country.'" Id. at 2502. In the wake of the Court's ruling in Zadvydas, the vitality of the Seventh Circuit's holding in Parra is greatly diminished, as is the government's argument which relies upon Parra.
"Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). "In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is a carefully limited exception." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Even in the context of aliens, government detention violates the Due Process Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or in "certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances . . . where a special justification . . . outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." Zadvydas, 121 S.Ct. at 2499 (internal citations omitted). In Salerno, the Court recognized that a person who is detained pending trial has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from restraint. See 481 U.S. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The liberty interest of a person who is detained pending deportation proceedings is no less fundamental. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981) (analogizing detention pending trial with detention pending deportation proceedings). As a result, we conclude that the petitioners have a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from detention pending deportation proceedings that may only be infringed upon in certain limited circumstances.
Congress has plenary authority over substantive immigration decisions under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). "'[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 29 S.Ct. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909)). This power is of a political character which is subject only to narrow judicial review. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473. However, statutes which implement this plenary authority are subject to the limits of the Constitution. See Zadvydas, 121 S.Ct. at 2501; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41, 103 S.Ct. 2764. Thus, while aliens are subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them, Congress' implementation of this authority must comport with the Constitution. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534-37, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952).
In Chadha, the Court rejected the argument that the plenary power of Congress required courts to uphold the constitutionality of INA § 244(c)(2), which gave either house of Congress a veto over decisions by the Attorney General to suspend deportation proceedings. In concluding that this statute was subject to due process review, the Court stated: "The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power." 462 U.S. at 940-41, 103 S.Ct. 2764. Similarly, in Zadvydas, the Court rejected the Government's argument that Congress' plenary power over immigration gave it the power to indefinitely detain aliens who had been found to be removable but could not be removed because their home countries would not take them. The Court noted:
The question before us is not one of "confer[ring] on those admitted the right to remain against the national will" or "sufferance of aliens" who should be removed. Rather, the issue we address is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned to an indefinite term or [sic] imprisonment within the United States.
Our analysis of the statute leads us to conclude that § 236(c) is non-punitive. Nothing in the legislative history of § 236(c) suggests that mandatory detention was intended by Congress as a punishment for aliens. Rather, a review of the legislative history indicates that the mandatory detention provision was designed to serve two legitimate nonpunitive purposes: ensuring removal by preventing the alien from fleeing, and protecting the community from further criminal acts or other dangers. See S. Rep. No. 104-48, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) at 23-27, 31-32; 63 Fed. Reg. 27441, 27442 (May 19, 1998). The detention imposed by § 236(c) is rationally related to these two purposes. Further, the detention imposed is not so excessive in relation to the two purposes of the statute as to constitute punishment.
We turn to the second part of the analysis-whether the purposes espoused for the mandatory detention provision, flight prevention and crime prevention, constitute special justifications which outweigh the individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint. See Zadvydas, 121 S.Ct. at 2499. Our analysis of this issue entails a determination of whether the government's interest is compelling and whether the statute is narrowly tailored such that the government's interest outweighs that of the individual. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095.
The Senate Report which spawned the creation of § 236(c) found that over 20% of non-detained aliens did not appear for their deportation proceedings. S. Rep. No. 104-48 at 23-24. Presumably, however, this means that somewhere near 80% of non-detained aliens in that time period did in fact appear. It is true that the more likely a person is to be removed, the less likely it is that the person will appear for removal proceedings. Nevertheless, a risk of flight cannot be imputed to all who fit the broad category of persons affected by § 236(c). The fallacy in such a blanket assumption is especially pertinent as applied to the petitioners here. All three petitioners are currently pursuing avenues which, if successful, would lessen the probability that they will be deported or removed. Thus, they have a significant incentive to attend deportation proceedings.
Civil Action No. 01-B-139
PHU CHAN HOANG, PETITIONER
JOSEPH R. GREENE, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DENVER, COLORADO, RESPONDENT
[Filed: Jan. 29, 2001]
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Chief Judge.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Phu Chan Hoang's motion for temporary restraining order. At the January 30, 2001 hearing, the government moved to consolidate the hearing with trial on the merits for a final injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). After consideration of the motion, the facts and circumstances concerning Petitioner, counsels' argument, and for the reasons stated on the record during the hearing, which are incorporated into this Order, consistent with SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991), IT IS ORDERED that:
1.	this case SHALL BE TRANSFERRED to my caseload and REDESIGNATED as Case No. 01-B-139;
2.	the government's oral motion to convert this hearing to a final injunction hearing is GRANTED;
3.	Petitioners's motion for final injunction is GRANTED;
4.	the Defendant SHALL CONDUCT a forthwith bond hearing in accordance with Martinez v. Greene, 28 F.Supp.2d 1275 (D.Colo. 1998); and
5.	the Clerk of the Court SHALL ENTER final judgment consistent with the Orders contained herein.
Dated: January 30, 2001, at Denver, Colorado.
Civil Action No. 01-K-256
THAHN QUOC NGUYEN, PLAINTIFF
JOSEPH R. GREENE, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DENVER, COLORADO, DEFENDANT
Consistent with the findings and conclusions of the February 13, 2001 hearing, it is
1.	That the hearing on temporary restraining order is converted to a final injunction hearing.
2.	Petitioner's motion for final injunction is GRANTED.
3.	The Defendant shall conduct a FORTHWITH BOND HEARING in accordance with Martinez v. Greene, 28 F. Supp.2d 1275 (D. Colo. 1998).
4.	The Order to Show Cause is VACATED.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 13th day of February, 2001.
Civil Action No. 01-D-787
PHAM QUA TRUNG, PETITIONERS
MICHAEL COMFORT, ACTING DISTRICT DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DENVER, COLORADO, DEFENDANT
In consideration of the Application for Temporary Restraining Order, filed May 1, 2001, it is
ORDERED that the application is GRANTED. The Defendant shall conduct a bond hearing in accordance with Martinez v. Greene, 28 F. Supp.2d 1275 (D. Colo. 1998).
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 1st day of May, 2001.
2001-1616.pet.aa.pdf