Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/court-of-appeals/2008/34665.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 12:25:44
Document Index: 363363778

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 32', '§ 84']

Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. DOT :: 2008 :: Wisconsin Court of Appeals Decisions :: Wisconsin Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. DOTDownload as PDF
2008 WI APP 187 COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 2008AP439
LAMAR CENTRAL OUTDOOR, LLC D/B/A LAMAR ADVERTISING OF CENTRAL WISCONSIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,†
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.
Opinion Filed: Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: JUDGES: Concurred: Dissented: Appellant ATTORNEYS: November 20, 2008 September 8, 2008
On behalf of the petitioner-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Thomas S. Hornig and Kraig A. Byron of Brennan, Steil & Bastings, S.C., Madison.
On behalf of the respondent-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Kathleen M. Batha, asst. attorney general, and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
2008 WI App 187
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 20, 2008
2008AP439
Cir. Ct. No. 2006CV438
LAMAR CENTRAL OUTDOOR, LLC D/B/A LAMAR ADVERTISING OF CENTRAL WISCONSIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Portage County: THOMAS T. FLUGAUR, Judge. Affirmed. Before Higginbotham, P.J., Vergeront and Bridge, JJ. ¶1 VERGERONT, J. Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC, seeks
compensation for an outdoor advertising sign that was removed by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) after DOT issued a removal order asserting the sign was unlawful. The primary issue on appeal is whether the administrative
No. 2008AP439
and judicial review provided in WIS. STAT. § 84.30(18) (2005-06)1 is the exclusive procedure for determining the legality of the sign after a removal order has issued, even if DOT has already removed the sign. The circuit court concluded this was the exclusive procedure and dismissed this action because Lamar had not exhausted this procedure. We agree with the circuit court. We conclude the administrative and judicial review provided in § 84.30(18) is the exclusive procedure for challenging the legality of Lamar’s sign after issuance of the removal order, even though DOT removed the sign. We also conclude that a determination under § 84.30(18) that Lamar’s sign is legal is a necessary predicate to just compensation for the sign under the statutory scheme. Because Lamar did not exhaust the administrative and judicial review procedure in § 84.30(18) before bringing this action for just compensation and because we conclude no exception from the exhaustion doctrine is warranted, we affirm. BACKGROUND2 ¶2 The sign at issue, owned by Lamar, was located on the side of
interstate Highway 39 as of March 18, 1972, the effective date of WIS. STAT. § 84.30 (“Regulation of outdoor advertising”). See 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 197. By letter dated February 13, 2006, DOT notified Lamar that the sign was a
noted. The facts in paragraphs 2-6 are taken from the submissions of DOT and have not been disputed by Lamar, either by opposing submissions or in argument. However, as we discuss in paragraphs 13-15, Lamar contends that DOT’s submissions were not properly before the court. Because we conclude that DOT’s submissions establishing the facts in paragraphs 2-6 were properly before the court, see infra paragraph 15, we rely on them to set forth the background facts.
nonconforming sign under § 84.30, it had been rebuilt illegally, and it was therefore noncompliant with WIS. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 201.10 (Feb. 2005).3 The letter stated that it constituted a sixty-day removal notice, with the sixty days beginning on the date of the letter. The letter also informed Lamar that within sixty days of the letter it could request a formal hearing conducted by the Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) under WIS. STAT. ch. 227. ¶3 On April 6, 2006, Lamar requested that DHA schedule a hearing on
DOT’s removal order, asserting that the order was based on incorrect facts and an incorrect interpretation of the law. DHA scheduled a hearing for July 31, 2006, to address the issues “set forth in the Department of Transportation’s removal order … [s]pecifically, whether the subject sign lost its legal, nonconforming status either [sic] because it was substantially changed in violation of WIS. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 201.10(2)(e).” ¶4 On May 18, 2006, DOT removed the sign in connection with a
highway improvement project.4 Lamar filed a motion to dismiss its case before DHA, contending that, with the removal of the sign, the issue to be decided at the hearing was moot. According to Lamar, the issue had become whether Lamar was “entitled to compensation for the removal of its sign because of a highway
All references to the Wisconsin Administrative Code are to the February 2005 version unless otherwise noted. Lamar appears to believe that DOT is disputing this fact, but we do not see this argument in DOT’s brief and the record shows this fact is not disputed. Lamar alleges in its petition that the sign was removed for the purpose of facilitating a highway improvement project and DOT admits this in its answer. In addition, submissions of both DOT and Lamar establish this fact. Therefore we treat this as an undisputed fact for purposes of this appeal.
improvement project pursuant to either Section 84.30 or Chapter 32” and “[t]hose issues [were] more properly, if not exclusively, handled by the Circuit Court.” ¶5 DOT objected to dismissal on the ground that the issue of the
lawfulness of its removal order was not moot because, if DOT was correct that the sign was illegal, Lamar would not be entitled to compensation for the sign. DOT contended that the hearing before DHA was the only means to challenge DOT’s finding that the sign was illegal and, if DHA did dismiss the matter pursuant to Lamar’s request, the unchallenged removal order would preclude Lamar from litigating the issue of the legality of the sign in a subsequent action. ¶6 The DHA hearing examiner entered an order dismissing the matter In a letter
pursuant to Lamar’s withdrawal of its request for a hearing.5
accompanying the order, the examiner explained that, while in his view DHA still had the authority to decide the issue of the legality of the sign, he had no basis for preventing Lamar from voluntarily withdrawing its request for a hearing on that issue. Because the examiner found it unnecessary to do so, he did not resolve the parties’ dispute over whether DHA had the exclusive authority to decide the issue of the sign’s legality. The examiner stated that he was not aware of a reason the sign’s legality could not be decided by a circuit court as part of an action seeking compensation for the sign’s removal. However, the examiner also cautioned that, if DOT was correct that DHA must decide the issue of legality, “then Lamar by withdrawing its request for a hearing to review the [DOT]’s removal order has
The hearing examiner explained in the letter accompanying the order that he viewed Lamar’s “motion to dismiss” as a simple withdrawal of its request for a hearing.
assumed the risk that it may be precluded from seeking compensation for the sign.” ¶7 Several months later, Lamar filed this action seeking compensation
for the sign under either WIS. STAT. § 84.30 or WIS. STAT. § 32.10 (“Condemnation proceedings instituted by property owner”). In its petition Lamar alleged that DOT had failed to follow statutory condemnation procedures with respect to removal of the sign. The petition did not refer to the removal order or Lamar’s request for a hearing before DHA, stating only that “DOT threatened to remove said sign structure and faces promptly after April 13, 2006 and then removed said sign structure on or about May 23, 2006.” ¶8 DOT filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that WIS. STAT. § 84.30(18)
provided the exclusive procedure for challenging an order for removal of an uncompensated sign and that Lamar had failed to exhaust these administrative and judicial remedies.6 The motion also asserted that the petition failed to state a
DOT formulates its argument on the exclusivity of the administrative and judicial review procedures in terms of the court’s “competency” to hear this action. DOT is correct not to use the term “jurisdiction” in this context. Although in older cases the exclusivity of administrative remedies is frequently couched in terms of “exclusive jurisdiction” of the administrative agency, more recent cases have recognized that, because