Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/630/120/238098/
Timestamp: 2017-09-26 00:22:15
Document Index: 527137370

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 103', '§ 103', '§ 103', '§ 8', '§ 154']

Eli Lilly and Company, v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Federal Pharmacal,inc., Seymour N. Blackman, Steven Blackman, Johnblackman, Appellants, v. Richard D. Wood, C. Harvey Bradley, Jr., Earl B. Herr, Jr.,cornelius W. Pettinga, Eugene L. Step and Arthurr. Whale, Additional Defendants on Thecounterclaim, 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1980 › Eli Lilly and Company, v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Federal Pharmacal,inc., Seymour N...
Eli Lilly and Company, v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., Federal Pharmacal,inc., Seymour N. Blackman, Steven Blackman, Johnblackman, Appellants, v. Richard D. Wood, C. Harvey Bradley, Jr., Earl B. Herr, Jr.,cornelius W. Pettinga, Eugene L. Step and Arthurr. Whale, Additional Defendants on Thecounterclaim, 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980)
Argued Feb. 14, 1980. Decided July 11, 1980
After conducting an extensive hearing, the trial court entered an order on July 24, 1979 preliminarily enjoining Premo from infringing the patent by "the manufacture, use, sale, offering for sale, or promoting or inducing the sale in the United States, its territories or possessions, of cephalexin."4 In its opinion, the court held that (1) the creation of cephalexin was not merely an obvious extension of the prior art, because the drug yielded the unexpected property of being almost 100% absorbable into the bloodstream; (2) Eli Lilly adequately disclosed this characteristic in its patent application; (3) Eli Lilly established a sufficiently high probability that it would succeed on the merits of its claim to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction; and (4) Eli Lilly would be irreparably harmed if Premo were permitted, even temporarily, to sell cephalexin.5 Premo filed a timely appeal.6 B. The Development of Cephalexin
The validity of both the '656 and '861 patents was the subject of an earlier suit for declaratory relief brought against Eli Lilly by Zenith Laboratories, Inc. The case was settled after the district court granted Eli Lilly's application for a preliminary injunction that enjoined Zenith from selling dense form cephalexin in violation of the '656 patent. Much of part I of today's opinion is drawn from Judge Meanor's extensive and detailed description of the structure and development of cephalexin and its precursors that is set forth in the opinion in the Zenith case. Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 460 F. Supp. 812 (D.N.J. 1978).
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1976)
Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 460 F. Supp. 812, 816-17 (D.N.J. 1978)
Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 460 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D.N.J. 1978)
35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 102 (1976). For a discussion of the historical development of the novelty and utility requirements, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12, 86 S. Ct. 684, 687-691, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966); Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293, 303-30.
Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 797, ch. 950. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 13 L. Ed. 683 (1851), the Supreme Court formulated a definition of the "new" requirement of § 101 that has been recognized as the forerunner of the nonobviousness requirement. In striking down a patent that involved a mere substitution of materials-porcelain or clay for wood or metal in door knobs-the Court held:
Following the enactment in 1952 of § 103, there was an extensive academic debate on the question whether Congress intended to make the patentability standard less stringent than the Hotchkiss test. Compare, e. g., Note, The Standard of Patentability-Judicial Interpretation of Section 103 of the Patent Act, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 306, 310-12 (1963), with e. g., Note, Patent Law-Test of Invention, 1956 Wisc.L.Rev. 513, 514-17. The Supreme Court put an end to this debate in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966), in which it held that Congress intended § 103 to codify the "judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, with . . . directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability." Id. at 17, 86 S. Ct. at 693.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 71 S. Ct. 127, 95 L. Ed. 162 (1950)
383 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966)
Id. at 17, 86 S. Ct. at 694
Id. at 17-18, 86 S. Ct. at 694
315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963)
Id. at 382. "A homologue is a member of a series of compounds in which each member differs from the next member by a constant number of atoms." Commissioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-Und-Silber-Scheideanstalt Vormals Roessler, 397 F.2d 656, 661 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See R. Morrison & R. Boyd, Organic Chemistry 101 (2d ed. 1966)
E.g., In re Petering and Fall, 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Lamboody, 300 F.2d 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955 (C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Larsen, 292 F.2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936, 82 S. Ct. 1580, 8 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1962)
444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
In re Hess, 141 F.2d 122, 125 (C.C.P.A. 1944)
In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196, 201 (C.C.P.A. 1950)
444 F.2d 1172 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
Id. at 1176. In re Merchant, 575 F.2d 865 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Accord, In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Langer, 465 F.2d 896 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Murch, 464 F.2d 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
Note, Standards of Obviousness and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 607, 612 (1974)
397 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Id. at 662 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 86 S. Ct. at 693)
Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has twice been presented with the question regarding structural obviousness and § 103, but has elected both times to dispose of the cases on alternative grounds. See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chemical Co., Inc., 497 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968, 95 S. Ct. 232, 42 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1974); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973). In a recent extensive opinion, Judge Weinfeld appeared to adopt the Papesch rule. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 477 F. Supp. 371, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (upholding patentability because "the essential unpredictability of the most important properties negates the claim of obviousness"). Two other district courts have specifically rejected Papesch. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1303, 1333-35 (E.D.N.Y.) (dicta), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973); Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (dicta) aff'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). Judge Dooling's opinion in Carter-Wallace has met with considerable criticism. One group of commentators has even suggested that should the Carter-Wallace dictum become law, "it would literally sound the death-knell to patents on chemical compounds." 1 D. Dunner, J. Gambrell & I. Kayton, Patent Law Perspectives § A.1(1), at text accompanying note 190 (1980)
Cf: Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1303, 1333-35 (E.D.N.Y.) (denying patentability in part because the pharmacological properties of the claimed compounds were not significant enhancements of the prior art), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973)
474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973)
479 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113, 94 S. Ct. 843, 38 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1973)
514 F.2d 1041 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (per curiam)
Id. (citing Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (per curiam))
497 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968, 95 S. Ct. 232, 42 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1974)
Acquiescence in the owner's patent rights in a commercially successful product by other members of the industry is generally recognized as circumstantial evidence that the patent is valid. Evidence that other firms paid royalties to the patent owner is a particularly strong indicium of validity. See, e. g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 403 U.S. 942, 91 S. Ct. 2270, 29 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1971); cf: Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 870-75 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929, 93 S. Ct. 2753, 37 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1973) (industry acquiescence is a prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction)
573 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3rd Cir. 1978) (citations and footnotes omitted). Accord, Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356-57 (3rd Cir. 1980); Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 600-01 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 100 S. Ct. 2927, 64 L. Ed. 2d ----, 48 U.S.L.W. 3746 (U.S. May 20, 1980); A. O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3rd Cir. 1976); Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3rd Cir. 1974)
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 86 S. Ct. 684, 689, 15 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1966). The Constitution provides Congress the power "(t)o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The current patent laws accord the patentee, his heirs, or assigns, the exclusive right to manufacture, to use, or to sell the patented items for a period of seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976)