Source: http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/?q=judges-info/opinions&field_opinion_date_value%5Bvalue%5D=&field_judge_nid=All&page=21
Timestamp: 2017-05-30 01:29:29
Document Index: 75415501

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 212', '§ 238', '§ 240', '§ 2241', '§ 405', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1367']

3:01-cv-0317 McAndrew v. Mercy Health Partners 12/03/2003 Presently before the Court is Defendant Mercy Health’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion will be denied because there are material issues of fact as to whether McAndrew was disabled, whether she was a qualified individual, and whether Mercy Health discriminated and/or retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Because the Court will not grant summary judgment for the Americans with Disabilities Act claims, I will also continue to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the state Workers’ Compensation retaliation claim.
4:03-cv-1184 Canales-Martinez v. Thomas Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. 11/06/2003 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Jose Cristobal Canales-Martinez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus requesting a stay of removal and challenging the removal order. I will deny Petitioner’s petition. I find that Petitioner was never eligible for INA § 212(c) relief, thus there can be no impermissible retroactive effect under INS v. St. Cyr. I also find that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is not precluded from initiating INA § 238 removal proceedings while an INA § 240 removal proceeding is pending because the bases for removal under each section are independent from one another. The Court has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
3:03-cv-0749 Leslie v. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 11/26/2003 The plaintiff has brought this civil action under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying the claim of the plaintiff for Social Security disability insurance benefits.
3:03-cv-1090 Roskos v. Sugarloaf Twp., et al. 11/26/2003 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and for a More Specific Complaint, (Doc. 6), filed on September 29, 2003. On June 30, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting five counts against Defendants: Count I - Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985; Count II - Abuse of Process; Count III - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count IV - Slander and Defamation; Count V - Negligence. (Doc. 1.) Federal jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction of the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction of the common law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
3:02-V-673 Selective Insurance Co. of America v. Jaskoloka 11/25/2003 On April 18, 2001 d ecedent L inda Jaskoloka, an em ployee of Tobyhanna Township Department of Public works, was working on the highway clearing brush alongside the road and loading it into her truck. See Police Report, Defendant’s Exhib. B. She sustained fatal injuries when a driver, Matthew Ferrell, struck her and crushed her between his automobile and the back o f the dump truck she was using . Id.; Compl. ¶ 5; Answer ¶ 4.
3:00-V-1142 Brominsky v. Luzerne County, et al. 11/04/2003 In August 1992, Luzerne County hired the plaintiff to serve as its Chief Clerk of Assessment. Complaint ¶ 12. During his employment, plaintiff supervised 40-50 employees in the County’s Tax Assessor’s office. See Defendants’ Exhib. 3, p. 22-23. In December 1999, as part of its annual budgeting process, the County finalized the 2000 fiscal year budget. See id. Exhib. 1B. In order to meet the parameters of the budget and the total amount of salaries that were allowed, the county realigned certain departments and eliminated certain positions from the budget, including three (3) full-time positions in the County Assessor’s office. See id. Exhib. 2. After the budget was adopted on December 30, 1999, the plaintiff was notified of the elimination of his position and his termination. See id. Exhib. 3, p. 36.
3:01-V-1998 Rader v. WEA Manufacturing, Inc. 10/27/2003 On January 18, 1993, WEA Manufacturing, Inc. (“WEA”) hired plaintiff as a full-time Mechanical Designer in its Research and Development (“R&D”) Department. Complaint ¶ 6. Plaintiff was fifty-three years of age at the time he was hired. Id. ¶ 5-6. WEA operates a manufacturing facility that produces various multimedia products, including Compact Discs (“CDs”), information CDs (“CD-ROMs”) and Digital Versatile Discs (“DVDs”). Jeffrey Raider Aff. ¶ 3.
1: 03-CV-1481 Countess v. Pool Fact, Inc. 11/07/2003 According to Plaintiff’s complaint, on December 7, 2001, Commerce Bank (“Commerce”) lent PoolPak, Inc. (“PoolPak”) $250,000. On December 24, 2001, Commerce lent PoolPak an additional $250,000. In exchange for these loans totaling $500,000, Commerce held a security interest in any and all outstanding accounts receivable due to PoolPak. On June 6, 2003, Commerce assigned its interest in PoolPak’s accounts receivable to Plaintiffs Frank H. and Rebecca K. Countess. Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to recover $470,806.00 from Defendant Pool Fact, Inc. for goods PoolPak delivered to Defendant, for which Defendant refused to pay.
1:02-CV-1500 Clarendon National Insurance Company v. City of York, Pennsylvania 11/06/2003 This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Plaintiff Clarendon National Insurance Company against the City of York, Pennsylvania to disclaim coverage for the civil action against the City and several York police officers filed in this Court and docketed as civil action number 03-169 (the “underlying action” or the “Allen case”).
1:03-CR-129 USA v. Lynch 10/30/2003 Defendant has moved to suppress all of the evidence seized and to suppress his identification by the officers as “tainted.” Defendant argues (1) it was unreasonable for Officer Fry to stop Defendant’s vehicle, (2) the officers’ identification of Defendant as the driver of the vehicle was unnecessarily suggestive and therefore unreliable, (3) the search of Defendant’s vehicle and the seizure of its contents were unlawful and not justified under the inventory or plain view exceptions.