Source: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2015/20150911en.html
Timestamp: 2020-04-07 08:11:42
Document Index: 156818347

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 21', 'ART-21', 'art 21', 'art-21', 'art 21', 'ART 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21', 'art 21']

NRC: Event Notification Report for September 11, 2015
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Event Notification Report for September 11, 2015
09/10/2015 - 09/11/2015
51153 51309 51362 51365 51366 51367 51385 51386
Power Reactor Event Number: 51153
"On June 12, 2015 at 1030 CDT, the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to the time to drain the Turbine Exhaust Drain Pot after running the system for periodic testing. The concern is that the turbine may be partially flooded after shutting down and a subsequent restart could cause a water hammer event, possibly damaging the system. This issue was previously analyzed by Engineering as acceptable, but the time to drain the pot after the latest test indicates more water in the exhaust than the maximum amount used in the analysis.
"Technical Specification 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition C, was entered as a result of the inoperable HPCI system. This constitutes an unplanned HPCI system inoperability and requires an 8-hour NRC notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the failure of a single train system affecting accident mitigation, and a 60 day written report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)
The Technical Specification Action statement allows 14 days to restore the HPCI system to operable status.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MATTHEW SLOUKA TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1623 EDT ON 9/10/15 * * *
"Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is retracting the 8-hour NRC notification (EN# 51153) made on June 12, 2015 at 1030 CDT.
"The notification on June 12, 2015, reported a condition where the HPCI system was declared inoperable due to the time to drain the Turbine Exhaust Drain Pot after running the system for periodic testing. The concern was that the turbine may be partially flooded which could cause water hammer and damage the HPCI system.
"Subsequent evaluation concluded that the HPCI system under the identified flooded turbine conditions will not produce a transient that exceeds design values, therefore, HPCI system operability was maintained and no reportable condition existed during this time.
Part 21 Event Number: 51309
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ Notification Date: 08/11/2015
PART-21 NOTIFICATION - MICRO SWITCH INTERMITTENT VARIATION IN RESISTANCE
"On June 4, 2015, Rotork Controls Inc. opened a formal Part 21 [10 CFR 21.21] investigation into a self-identified anomaly relating to a basic micro switch - Pt No N69-921, description 'V12'. The anomaly is intermittent variation in electrical contact resistance and was first observed during the factory acceptance test of a Rotork safety related NA Range Electric Actuator; also referred to as an electric Valve Operator.
"Rotork and the switch manufacturer are currently characterizing switch population contact resistance to establish whether an unsafe condition could exist as defined under 10 CFR 21."
* * * UPDATE AT 0958 EDT ON 9/10/2015 FROM PATRICK SHAW TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Rotork has concluded the investigation and based on test data determine an unsafe condition can exist as defined under 10CFR21. Testing has established that a small percentage of the switches supplied against Rotork purchase order P0116932 may exhibit an open circuit condition when operated. A slightly larger percentage of the population may exhibit high contact resistance ranging from 0.5 Ohm to open circuit. The anomaly affects the normally open and normally closed contacts equally. Contact resistance anomalies are random, not permanent, and appear to be unaffected by accumulated cycles. Additionally when a switch is operated its electrical state remains constant until the next operation.
"Probabilities have been established by resistance measurements and by dynamic testing using voltages representative of customer applications. The dynamic evaluation predicts an open circuit probability of 0.0008% per operation. To date, no switch failures have been reported from any customer sites. Below are listed all orders provided to customers containing V12 switches from the defect batch. Report ER791 provides full details of Rotork's technical investigation."
Notified the R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Pelke), R4DO (Drake), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).
Agreement State Event Number: 51362
Licensee: LETICA-MAUI CUP DIVISION
License #: GL 910
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GAUGE SHUTTER BROKEN AND TAPED SHUT
"On September 2, 2015, inspectors from the Nashville Field Office [Tennessee Division of Radiological Health] went to Letica-Maui Cup Division in Clarksville, Tennessee to inspect their generally licensed devices. It was discovered during the inspection that one of their gauges was broken. On May 6, 2011, the shutter on the NDC model 102X (serial number 12571) broke off. The shutter was taped back into the closed position at that time and the gauge was removed from the manufacturing line. No notification was made to the Division. The gauge contains an 80 mCi Americium 241 source."
Tennessee Event: TN-15-129
Agreement State Event Number: 51365
License #: 0314-19
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA Notification Date: 09/03/2015
BARRY WRAY (EMAIL) (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO RADIOACTIVE ZIRCONIUM METAL CYLINDERS DISCOVERED AT METAL RECYLING CENTER
The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch via email:
"On November 11, 2014, an individual associated with the Orange County Science Education Center obtained two small metal cylinders that had caught his eye that were on a shelf at a metal recycling center (DBW Metals Recycling, Anaheim, CA). The metal recycler's analysis of a cylinder showed 96.76% Zirconium with 2% Nb and some Mo, Cr, Pd, Mn, BI, FE, Ni, & Cd.
"On August 14, 2015, the member of the public donated one of the Zirconium metal cylinders to the Geology Department at the California Institute of Technology. The location of the second Zirconium metal cylinder is unknown at this time. On August 21, 2015, the California Institute of Technology determined the zirconium metal cylinder was radioactive. The cylindrical metal item measured 3.3 cm D x 5 cm L and weighed 290 gm.
"The [State of California] Radiation Safety Office subsequently analyzed the item using a Germanium detector and determined it contained approximately 20 gm of U-238 and 8 gm of U-235 (28.6% enrichment). No fission products were detected, and only minor surface contamination was found (removable surface contamination <30 DPM over entire item. GM [Geiger Muller] meter survey results are as follows: 48,000 cpm on contact (mostly beta); 1 mrem/hr on contact; and 0.03 mR/hr at 1 foot (background of 0.02 mR/h). The Radiation Safety office believes the item is a portion of an unirradiated uranium fuel element.
"The Brea Office [State of California Radiation Health Branch] will follow-up under this 5010 to investigate the current location of the 2nd similar item and to ensure it is properly possessed, and will also investigate from whom the metal recycler received the two SNM [special nuclear material] items (what licensee apparently lost control of these SNM items).
"LA County also has a 5010 (090215) associated with this event to ensure that CalTech properly possesses the SNM and makes required reports."
California 5010 Number: 090315
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED VIA EMAIL FROM ROBERT GREGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1919 EDT ON 09/03/2015 * * *
"After a discussion with the private party who received the SNM item from the local metal recycling facility, it appears that there is no second similar item. Rather the second item had significantly different visual characteristics. The individual indicated he no longer has the second item. [State of California] will attempt to verify the metal composition of the 2nd item with the metal recycling facility.
"The private party who received the SNM item from the recycling facility is associated with the Science Education Center of California, not the Orange County Science Education Center.
"The SNM item is not clad in zirconium or anything else, rather the SNM item is a mixture of zirconium and enriched uranium, with some other metals in significantly smaller amounts, and perhaps additional non-metals.
"The Caltech RSO indicated that he had not performed as good of an analysis as he would have liked to have done, and emphasized that the values he provided for the U-238 and U-235 weights were both approximate values, leaving the U-235 enrichment better represented as between 21-28 percent."
Notified the R4DO (Warnick), ILTAB (English) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ROBERT GREGER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1544 EDT ON 09/09/2015 * * *
"Personnel from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) were contacted to assist in evaluation of the apparent SNM item recovered from a metal recycler. The LANL personnel determined that the item did not contain SNM. Rather the item contained approximately 30-35 grams of unenriched processed uranium.
Notified the R4DO (Drake), ILTAB (English), CNSNS (Mexico) and NMSS Events Notification group via email.
Agreement State Event Number: 51366
License #: L-00087
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE RETRACTION FAILURE
"On September 3, 2015, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received a report from the licensee that a radiography source retraction failure occurred at a temporary field site in Borger, Texas. A mount fell on the guide tube, crimping the tube. The source was retrieved according to license conditions and the damaged equipment was removed from service. The camera was a SPEC-150 and the source was 78 curies of Iridium-192. No exposure to the public occurred. Further information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9336
Agreement State Event Number: 51367
Licensee: HEART MEDICINE, LLC
City: EATONTOWN/TINTON FALLS State: NJ
License #: NJ PI ID#: 4
NEW JERSEY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF CS-137 DOSE CALIBRATOR VIAL SOURCE
"At approximately 1145 [EDT] on Thursday, September 3, 2015, the licensee's Administrator/Radiation Safety Officer was contacted [by the State of New Jersey] to discuss several issues related to the re-location of their office. One of the issues raised was the location of several dose calibrator vial sources and gamma-camera flood sources that were last known to be in the possession of the licensee. The licensee had not provided confirmation that the sources had been moved during their office re-location or had been disposed of properly. The licensee stated that their consulting physicist was taking care of the sources. When informed that the consultant had been contacted and did not know the location of the sources, the licensee stated then they did not know where they were either. As such, the sources are considered lost.
"Of the sources unaccounted for, only the above listed Cs-137 vial source was of sufficient activity to warrant a report. The vial source in question is a North American Scientific, Inc., model MED 3550, serial # 28809, 205.6 microCi as calibrated on 10/1/02."
Power Reactor Event Number: 51385
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA Notification Date: 09/10/2015
"A contract supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
Part 21 Event Number: 51386
NRC Notified By: DALE E PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER Notification Date: 09/10/2015
PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FAILURE OF ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE CUTOUT SWITCHES
The following information was excerpted from an Interim Part 21 Report, received from GE-Hitachi (GEH) via email:
"[This GEH Report #MFN-15-042 R2, is a closure of a Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification, containing] information concerning an evaluation of the failure during bench testing of Electromatic Relief Valve Actuators (ERV - GEH Part number 352B2632G001) caused by the failure of a cutout switch to determine applicability to components previously supplied to and accepted by licensees. GEH has performed component testing but has been unable to complete the evaluation to determine if a Reportable Condition, in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 exists.
"Testing was unable to model plant conditions with sufficient accuracy to draw conclusions based on the results. As such, in accordance with discussions with the sites previously identified as potentially applicable to this concern, GEH will close this 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation with a 10 CFR 21.21(b) Transfer of Information to the Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2 sites."
1. 60-Day Interim Report Notification, Titled: Potential Failure of Electromatic Relief Valve Cutout Switch, Numbered: MFN 15-042 R0, Dated: June 12, 2015.
2. 60-Day Interim Report Notification, Titled: Potential Failure of Electromatic Relief Valve Cutout Switch, Numbered: MFN 15-042 R1, Dated: June 22, 2015.
The original notification was reported on June 12, 2015. Because there was a proprietary information disclaimer at the top of that page, GEH revised the original report and submitted that revised letter on June 17, 2015. The revision 1 letter was posted in ADAMS with the following accession numbers as the original report.
- ML15169A007 - Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Potential Failure of Electromatic Relief Valve Cutout Switch. (2 page(s), 6/17/2015)
- ML15169A008 - Attachment 1 - US Plants Potentially Affected. (1 page(s), 6/18/2015)
- ML15169A009 - Attachment 2 - 60-Day Interim Report Notification Information per 21.21(a)(2). (2 page(s), 6/18/2015)
- ML15169A010 - Enclosure 1 - MFN 15-042 R0 - Description of Evaluation. (6 page(s), 6/18/2015)
Ph: (910) 819-4491.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, September 11, 2015