Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/102/753/637524/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 15:01:34
Document Index: 324503395

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1441', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 3732', '§ 1446', '§ 3732']

John R. Yarnevic, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Brink's, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation; Thomas R.fussner, Defendants-appellees, 102 F.3d 753 (4th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1996 › John R. Yarnevic, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Brink's, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation; Thomas R.fu...
John R. Yarnevic, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Brink's, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation; Thomas R.fussner, Defendants-appellees, 102 F.3d 753 (4th Cir. 1996)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 102 F.3d 753 (4th Cir. 1996)
Argued July 17, 1996. Decided Dec. 23, 1996
A defendant may remove any action from a state court to a federal court if the action could have originally been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). A proper filing of a notice of removal immediately strips the state court of its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), State of South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir. 1971). The federal court may remand the action to the state court if the federal court finds that it has no subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Whether the court has jurisdiction is a legal question which we review de novo. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
Diversity may be created after the filing of a complaint through voluntary acts of the plaintiff. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 101, 18 S. Ct. 264, 267, 42 L. Ed. 673 (1898); Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1988); DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480, 486-87 (10th Cir. 1979). The rationale for this rule is that although a defendant should not be allowed to change his domicile after the complaint is filed for the sole purpose of effectuating removal, there is no reason to protect the plaintiff against the adverse consequences of his own voluntary acts. See DeBry, 601 F.2d at 486-87; see also, 14A Wright, Miller, & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3732 at 519-23 (1985).
Yarnevic's memorandum could be classified as either part of a "motion" or, at the very least, "other paper" supporting the motion. We do not think § 1446(b) requires that the "motion, order or other paper" be part of the state court record, especially in a case like this where diversity is created by a voluntary act of the plaintiff and the case has already been properly removed. The "motion, order or other paper" requirement is broad enough to include any information received by the defendant, "whether communicated in a formal or informal manner." Broderick v. Dellasandro, 859 F. Supp. 176, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (quoting 14A Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3732 at 520).
One of the few federal courts to address this issue reasoned that "a supplemental notice of removal, would, if granted, have the effect of removing a case that has already been removed." Nolan v. Boeing Co., 715 F. Supp. 152, 153 n. 1 (E.D. La. 1989). Similar language in earlier cases reinforces this view. The Supreme Court has noted that when reviewing a removal petition for diversity jurisdiction "it is proper to treat the removal petition as if it has been amended to include the relevant information in the later-filed affidavits." Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 n. 3, 89 S. Ct. 1813, 1816 n. 3, 23 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1969); see also, Buell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 321 F.2d 468, 471 (10th Cir. 1963) ("if there were some suggestion in the record supporting diversity jurisdiction, we might deem the petition for removal amended to comport with the proof."). While it would have been prudent for Brink's to file a supplemental petition specifying the new basis for diversity within 30 days after Yarnevic disclosed that his move from West Virginia created diversity, we conclude that it was not required. The district court properly denied Yarnevic's motion to remand the case to the state court.
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1990). The moving party must show that there is no material fact in issue, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979). However, summary judgment is proper against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
Since this case involves retaliatory discharge, Brink's underlying motivation and state of mind are important. Although it is often more difficult for the moving party to prevail on a summary judgment motion where state of mind is at issue, Charbonnages, 597 F.2d at 414, it is certainly not impossible. In Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 847 (4th Cir. 1988), this court upheld summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the defendant had used age discrimination as a motivation for terminating the plaintiff's employment. The court noted that although motivation was at issue, the plaintiff's "naked opinion, without more, is not enough to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination." Id. at 848.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Brink's has sufficiently provided nonpretextual justifications for Yarnevic's discharge. We also find that Yarnevic has not shown any evidence to the contrary. Yarnevic's allegations that Brink's management considered him "dirty" or "guilty by association" are remote inferences that do not contradict any of the nonpretextual grounds for his termination. Also unavailing is his argument that "it can be argued from all the facts that Brink's had a motive for destroying the plaintiff's career and thereby sent a message to others who might be so inclined to act as he did." Mere conclusory allegations of motivation do not preclude summary judgment. Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848. A party opposing the motion must set forth specific facts and may not rely on mere allegations contained in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).