Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-r-3120/
Timestamp: 2020-07-05 23:24:57
Document Index: 789349960

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4504', '§ 73', '§ 69', '§ 69', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3101', '§ 3126', '§ 4504', '§ 4503', '§ 1320', '§ 4503', '§ 4504', '§ 4504', '§ 4503', '§ 3126', '§ 3126', '§ 3126']

Category: CPLR R. 3120
Disclosure, lots of it
CPLR § 4504. Physician, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor and nurse
CPLR R. 3120 Discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, testing, copying or photographing
Congel v Malfitano, 2011 NY Slip Op 04406 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of his cross motion which was for leave to amend his answer to assert counterclaims pursuant to Partnership Law §§ 73 and 74. Although leave to amend should be freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party (see CPLR 3025[b]), the motion should be denied where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Brooks v Robinson, 56 AD3d 406, 407; Scofield v DeGroodt, 54 AD3d 1017, 1018; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 227). Here, the defendant's proposed amended counterclaims were patently devoid of merit.
CPLR 3101(a) provides for, inter alia, "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." Although the phrase "material and necessary" must be "interpreted liberally" in favor of disclosure so long as the information sought meets the test of "usefulness and reason" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406; see Scalone v Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 184 AD2d 65, 69-70), a party does not have the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (see Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v Sharf, 59 AD3d 408, 410; Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531, 531). Further, the Supreme Court has broad discretion over the supervision of disclosure, and its determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see Spodek v Neiss, 70 AD3d 810, 810; Reilly Green Mtn. Platform Tennis v Cortese, 59 AD3d 694, 695; Cabellero v City of New York, 48 AD3d 727, 728).
On the defendant's prior appeal, this Court remitted the matter to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for, inter alia, further proceedings on the issue of damages caused to the plaintiffs by the defendant's wrongful dissolution of the Poughkeepsie Galleria Company Partnership, as well as a determination of the value of the defendant's interest in that partnership at the time of the wrongful dissolution (see Congel v Malfitano, 61 AD3d 810; Partnership Law § 69[2][c][II]). Given that the remaining issues to be resolved in this matter are narrow (see Partnership Law § 69[2][c][II]), the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the scope of discovery and providing for an expedited discovery schedule.
Thompson v Dallas BBQ, 2011 NY Slip Op 04451 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
Pursuant to CPLR 3126, "[a] court may strike an answer as a sanction if a defendant refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed'" (Mazza v Seneca, 72 AD3d 754, 754, quoting CPLR 3126). The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (see CPLR 3126[3]; Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122-123; Bernal v Singh, 72 AD3d 716). The drastic remedy of striking a pleading is not appropriate absent a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery demands is willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126[3]; Kyung Soo Kim v Goldmine Realty, Inc., 73 AD3d 709; Moray v City of Yonkers, 72 AD3d 766).
Here, there was no such clear showing that the defendants' conduct was willful and contumacious (see Dank v Sears Holding Mgt. Corp., 69 AD3d 557). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' answer.
Gille v Long Beach City School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 04202 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
While it is unclear whether the school district negligently lost or intentionally destroyed key evidence (see Denoyelles v Gallagher, 40 AD3d 1027; Baglio v St. John's Queens Hosp., 303 AD2d 341, 342-343), it is uncontested that the school district is unable to locate the window shade, the very instrumentality giving rise to the infant plaintiff's injuries. However, because the determination of spoliation sanctions is within the broad discretion of the trial court (see Iamiceli v General Motors Corp., 51 AD3d 635; Barnes v Paulin, 52 AD3d 754; Dennis v City of New York, 18 AD3d 599), the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for its determination of the cross motion on the merits (see American Fed. of School Adm'rs, AFL-CIO v Council of Adm'rs & Supervisors, 266 AD2d 417, 418; Polera Bldg. Corp. v New York School Constr. Auth., 262 AD2d 295).
Lopez v Retail Prop. Trust, 2011 NY Slip Op 04008 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The Supreme Court, in its discretion, may grant permission to conduct additional discovery after the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness where the moving party demonstrates that "unusual or unanticipated circumstances" developed subsequent to the filing requiring additional pretrial proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice (22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; see Wigand v Modlin, 82 AD3d 1213; Owen v Lester, 79 AD3d 992; Audiovox Corp. v Benyamini, 265 AD2d 135, 140). The compliance conference order dated February 17, 2010, warning the plaintiff that failure to file a note of issue within 90 days would result in dismissal of the action, did not mandate that all discovery be complete prior to the filing of the note of issue. Even though the defendant Kone, Inc. (hereinafter the defendant), was impeding discovery, the plaintiff filed a conditional note of issue as directed by the compliance conference order. It was not until after the filing of the conditional note of issue that the defendant moved for a protective order with respect to the plaintiff's discovery requests, on the ground that they were untimely. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's cross motion to compel the defendant to comply with outstanding discovery should have been granted (see Karakostas v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 306 AD2d 381, 382; Schmitt v Carl Meyer's Hof, Inc., 86 AD2d 985).
Olkovetsy v Friedwald Ctr. for Rehabilitation & Nursing, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 04015 (App. Div. 2nd 2011)
Pursuant to CPLR 4504(a), information obtained by, among others, professional nursing personnel in attending to a patient in a professional capacity and "which [is] necessary to enable him [or her] to act in that capacity" is privileged. As a general rule, disclosure of the name and address of a nonparty patient who may have been a witness to an alleged act of negligence or malpractice does not violate the patient's privilege of confidentiality of treatment (see Rabinowitz v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 24 AD3d 530; Hirsch v Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, 91 AD2d 1033, 1034; see also Matter of Grand Jury Investigation in N.Y. County, 98 NY2d 525, 530-531), provided that the requesting party "is not seeking to identify the patient by reference to the medical treatment he [or she] received" (Matter of Seymour, 288 AD2d 894, 894).
Contrary to the defendants' contention, in light of the broad range of services provided in a nursing home, the information requested by the plaintiff did not fall within the ambit of CPLR 4504(a) (see generally Rabinowitz v St. John's Episcopal Hosp., 24 AD3d 530; cf. Gunn v Sound Shore Med. Ctr. of Westchester, 5 AD3d 435, 437). Additionally, the information demanded by the plaintiff was necessary to the prosecution of the action and, as limited by the Supreme Court to the period from January 1, 2005, through February 28, 2005, and to only the residents of the decedent's particular unit of residency, the demand was not overly broad or unduly burdensome (see Grant v PALJR, LLC, 64 AD3d 750, 751).
Trueforge Global Mach. Corp. v Viraj Group., 2011 NY Slip Op 04040 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10). "[I]n a contract action[,] a memorandum sufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds must contain expressly or by reasonable implication all the material terms of the agreement, including the rate of compensation if there has been agreement on that matter" (Morris Cohon & Co. v Russell, 23 NY2d 569, 575; see Intercontinental Planning v Daystrom, Inc., 24 NY2d 372, 378-379). "If an agreement is not reasonably certain in its material terms, there can be no legally enforceable contract" (Cobble Hill Nursing Home v Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482, cert denied 498 US 816; see Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109). Thus, "a mere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable" (Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY2d at 109; see 2004 McDonald Ave. Realty, LLC v 2004 McDonald Ave. Corp., 50 AD3d 1021; Andor Group v Benninghoff, 219 AD2d 573). Further, while General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10) applies to contracts implied in law to pay reasonable compensation (see Snyder v Bronfman, 13 NY3d 504), in an action to recover reasonable compensation, "a sufficient memorandum need only evidence the fact of plaintiff's employment by defendant to render the alleged services" (Morris Cohon & Co. v Russell, 23 NY2d at 575-576)."The obligation of the defendant to pay reasonable compensation for the services is then implied" (id. at 576). Contrary to the defendants' contention, they failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the statute of frauds, as certain e-mail correspondence (see General Obligations Law § 5-701[b][4]; Newmark & Co. Real Estate Inc. v 2615 E. 17 St. Realty LLC, 80 AD3d 476, 477; see also Intercontinental Planning v Daystrom, Inc., 24 NY2d at 379; Aloisi v Coin Phones, 157 AD2d 688) was sufficient to set forth an objective standard for determining the compensation to be paid to the plaintiff as a finder's fee, since it was tied to an extrinsic event, i.e., it was expressed as a percentage of the price paid by the defendants for the located acquisition opportunity, thus rendering the terms definite and enforceable (see Tonkery v Martina, 78 NY2d 893; Novello v 215 Rockaway, LLC, 70 AD3d 909; Edge Mgt. Corp. v Crossborder Exch. Corp., 304 AD2d 422; cf. MP Innovations, Inc. v Atlantic Horizon Intl., Inc., 72 AD3d 571).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting, upon reargument, the plaintiff's motion to compel a deposition of nonparty Neeraj Kochhar. "[A] corporation has the right in the first instance to determine which of its representatives will appear for an examination before trial" (Barone v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 260 AD2d 417, 417-418; see Aronson v Im, 81 AD3d 577, 577; Nunez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 71 AD3d 967; Mercado v Alexander, 227 AD2d 391). The moving party that is seeking additional depositions has the burden of demonstrating "(1) that the representatives already deposed had insufficient knowledge, or were otherwise inadequate, and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the persons sought for depositions possess information which is material and necessary to the prosecution of the case" (Zollner v City of New York, 204 AD2d 626, 627; see Thristino v County of Suffolk, 78 AD3d 927; Spohn-Konen v Town of Brookhaven, 74 AD3d 1049; Seattle Pac. Indus., Inc. v Golden Val. Realty Assoc., 54 AD3d 930, 932-933; Nazario v City of New York, 27 AD3d 439; Barone v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 260 AD2d at 418). Here, the plaintiff satisfied this burden by demonstrating that the representative produced by the defendants for deposition did not have sufficient knowledge of the events giving rise to the complaint (see Nunez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 71 AD3d 967), and that there was a substantial likelihood that Neeraj Kochhar possessed information which was material and necessary to the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to payment of a finder's fee (see Nazario v City of New York, 27 AD3d 439; cf. Seattle Pac. Indus., Inc. v Golden Val. Realty Assoc., 54 AD3d at 932-933).
Fernandez v City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 04111 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
Plaintiff has waived her claim that defendants' failure to produce "legible" photographs of the underside of the desk after the accident required an adverse inference that such photographs would have provided notice. The record shows that she was aware of the photographs yet filed a note of issue certifying that discovery was complete (see Escourse v City of New York, 27 AD3d 319 [2006]). In any event, the photographs would not have been probative as to notice, since the track was not visible until after the drawer fell.
Author DMGPosted on June 4, 2011 Categories 22 NYCRR 202.21, CPLR § 3101, CPLR § 3126, CPLR R. 3120, CPLR R. 3124, Statute of Frauds, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Disclosure, lots of it
CPLR R. 3124; CPLR R. 3120; CPLR § 4504(a); CPLR § 4503(a); Privilege
(a) Confidential information privileged
Jackson v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2009 NY Slip Op 02712 (App. Div., 3rd, 2009)
[P]laintiff commenced this second fraud action against defendants in
Clinton County, again alleging that certain purported inconsistencies
between other official documents and defendant's medical records for
the victim, which plaintiff claims were [*2]fraudulently
made, deprived him of the ability to present a viable defense at his
criminal trial. Plaintiff filed an amended notice of discovery (see
CPLR 3120) seeking limited "non-medical information" in defendants'
medical records regarding the victim, relating strictly to "time data"
for the date of the victim's death, namely "time of all calls" to
Jamaica Hospital, "time of arrival" at its emergency room and "time of
death." Plaintiff requested that all confidential and privileged
material be redacted (see CPLR 4504 [a]).
Defendants did not respond to plaintiff's discovery demand, so plaintiff moved to compel a response (see
CPLR 3124). Jamaica Hospital cross-moved to deny that relief. Supreme
Court (Dawson, J.) granted plaintiff's motion and denied Jamaica
Hospital's cross motion. Jamaica Hospital now appeals.
Jamaica Hospital has not demonstrated that res judicata applies
to this motion. Under that doctrine, a prior valid final judgment on
the merits precludes litigation between the same parties of any claim
that was or could have been raised in the prior action (see Landau, P.C. v LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 11 NY3d 8, 12 [2008]; Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]; Kinsman v Turetsky, 21 AD3d 1246, 1246-1247 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 702 [2005]). Supreme Court, Queens County merely denied plaintiff's unopposed motion to compel disclosure [FN1] due to lack of standing, which is not a determination "on the merits" (see Landau, P.C. v LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross,
11 NY3d at 13-14 and n 3). Likewise, the record does not indicate that
there has been a "final judgment" rendered in the Queens County matter (Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co.,
93 NY2d at 347). Thus, Jamaica Hospital has not shown that the Queens
County order precludes plaintiff's present motion to compel discovery.
The documents that plaintiff seeks, as redacted, are not
privileged and must be disclosed. Jamaica Hospital, as the party
objecting to disclosure, bore the burden of proving its assertion that
the material sought is privileged under CPLR 4504 (a) and the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (42 USC § 1320d et seq. [hereinafter HIPAA]; see Koump v Smith, 25 NY2d 287, 294 [1969]; see also Dillenbeck v Hess,
73 NY2d 278, 287 [1989]). The physician-patient privilege "prohibits
disclosure of any information acquired by a physician 'in attending a
patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable
[the physician] to act in that capacity'" (Dillenbeck v Hess, 73 NY2d at 284, quoting CPLR 4504 [a]; see State of New York v General Elec. Co.,
201 AD2d 802, 802-803 [1994]). The very narrow information sought by
plaintiff regarding when certain events occurred, as documented in the
victim's medical records on the date of his death was not information
necessary to the victim's medical treatment; it was merely documented
facts regarding time data that would be obvious to a layperson (see Williams v Roosevelt Hosp., 66 NY2d 391, 396 [1985]; Henry v Lewis, 102 AD2d 430, 437 [1984] [dates and times of treatment not privileged]; see also Matter of Grand Jury Investigation in N.Y. County, 98 NY2d 525, 530 [2002]; People v Elysee, 49 AD3d 33, 37-39 [2007], affd 12 NY3d 100 [2009]; Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Dec. 14, 1984, 113 AD2d 49, 55 [1985], affd 69 NY2d 232 [1987], cert denied 482 US 928 [1987]). Hence, the information was not privileged under state law.
HIPAA regulates disclosure of
"protected health information," which includes "individually
identifiable health information," defined as health information that
"[i]s created or received by a health care provider . . . and [r]elates
to past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual[,] the provision of health care to an individual [or
payment therefor]," and identifies the patient or which reasonably
could be so used (45 CFR 160.103; see 42 USC 1320d [6] [B]; Arons v Jutkowitz, 9 NY3d 393,
413 [2007]). The time data sought by plaintiff cannot be characterized
as protected health information, as it has no apparent connection to
the victim's physical condition or medical care. As Jamaica Hospital
failed to demonstrate that the circumscribed redacted time data is
privileged, Supreme Court properly denied its cross motion and granted
plaintiff's motion to compel a response to his amended notice for
(a) 1 Confidential communication privileged
Straus v Ambinder, 2009 NY Slip Op 02772 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
The plaintiff met his burden of proving that the subpoenaed documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege (see CPLR 3101[b], 4503[a]; Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51
NY2d 62, 69). While a court is not bound by the conclusory
characterizations of a client or his attorney, here, there was no
reason to disregard the attorney's sworn statement regarding the nature
of the engagement of the accounting firm (see Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 379-380).
In any event, the plaintiff also established that the requested
documents were protected as material prepared by the accountants for
his attorneys in anticipation of litigation (see CPLR 3101[d][2]; Carrafiello v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266
AD2d 117 ). Where, as here, the party seeking to prevent disclosure
makes the required showing that the documents were prepared [*2]solely
for litigation, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to
establish that there is a substantial need for the materials and they
cannot be obtained elsewhere without undue hardship (see Volpicelli v Westchester County, 102 AD2d 853; Zimmerman v Nassau Hosp., 76
AD2d 921). Inasmuch as the defendant failed to show that he could not
obtain the requested documents without undue hardship, the Supreme
Court properly issued the protective order.
Author DMGPosted on April 11, 2009 Categories CPLR § 4503, CPLR § 4504, CPLR R. 3120, CPLR R. 3124Leave a comment on CPLR R. 3124; CPLR R. 3120; CPLR § 4504(a); CPLR § 4503(a); Privilege
CPLR § 3126; R. 3120(1)(i)
After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party
a notice or on any other person a subpoena duces tecum:
to produce and permit the party seeking discovery, or someone acting on
his or her behalf, to inspect, copy, test or photograph any designated
documents or any things which are in the possession, custody or control
of the party or person served
Argo v Queens Surface Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 00320 (App. Div., 2nd)
A court may, inter alia, issue an order "striking out pleadings or . .
. rendering a judgment by default" as a sanction against a party who
"refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose
information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed" (CPLR
3126[3]; see Carabello v Luna, 49 AD3d 679).
Striking a defendant's answer is a drastic remedy which is
"inappropriate absent a clear showing that failure to comply with
discovery demands was willful and contumacious" (Paca v City of New York, 51 AD3d 991, 993, quoting Brandes v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 22 AD3d 778; see Jenkins v City of New York, 13 AD3d 342).
The plaintiff did not show that the defendants engaged in willful or
contumacious conduct by failing to provide items "which are in [their]
possession, custody or [*2]control" (CPLR
3120[1][i]). Indeed, the defendants demonstrated that the records and
reports that the plaintiff sought with respect to the defendant Queens
Surface Corp. — a bus company no longer in existence — were now in the
possession of its successor, the MTA Bus Co., which company was not
under their control. Accordingly, the defendants cannot be compelled to
produce or be sanctioned for failing to produce information which they
do not possess or which does not exist (see Carabello v Luna, 49 AD3d at 680; Tolz v Valente, 39 AD3d 737, 738; Corriel v Volkswagen of Am., 127 AD2d 729, 731).
Author DMGPosted on January 24, 2009 Categories CPLR § 3126, CPLR R. 3120Leave a comment on CPLR § 3126; R. 3120(1)(i)