Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/07-6114/07-6114-2012-03-02.html
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Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj
Justia.com Opinion Summary: Plaintiffs are among the world’s largest purchasers of air conditioning and refrigeration copper tubing. Defendants imported ACR copper into the U.S. In 2003 the Commission of the European Communities found that defendants and other conspired on prices targets and other terms for industrial tubes and allocated customers and market shares in violation of European law. The findings did not identify any conspiratorial agreements with respect to U.S. markets. In 2004, another EC decision found violation in the market for plumbing tubes. Plaintiff claimed that the European conspiracy was also directed at the U.S. market for ACR industrial tubes, violating the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act. Two similar cases, involving different plaintiffs, had been dismissed. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the complaint adequately stated a claim under the Sherman Act and was not barred by the Act's limitations period, 15 U.S.C. 15b and that the court had personal jurisdiction. The fact that the complaint borrows its substance from the EC decision and then builds on the EC’s findings does not render its allegations any less valid.
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File Name: 12a0065p.06
CARRIER CORPORATION; CARRIER SA;
CARRIER ITALIA S.P.A.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, -Nos. 07-6052/6114
OUTOKUMPU OYJ; OUTOKUMPU COPPER
PRODUCTS OY; OUTOKUMPU COPPER
FRANKLIN, INC.; OUTOKUMPU COPPER
(U.S.A.), INC.,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, MUELLER INDUSTRIES, INC.; MUELLER
EUROPE LTD; EUROPA METALLI SPA;
TREFIMETAUX SA,
Defendants. N
No. 06-02186â��Bernice Bouie Donald, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: March 2, 2012
Before: MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges; LUDINGTON, District Judge.*
ARGUED: David M. Schnorrenberg, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants. William H. Rooney, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, New
York, New York, Eric Mahr, WILMER HALE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: David M. Schnorrenberg, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. William H. Rooney, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP,
New York, New York, Eric Mahr, Caroline T. Nguyen, WILMER HALE, Washington,
The Honorable Thomas L. Ludington, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
Nos. 07-6052/6114
Carrier Corp. et al. v. Oyj et al.
D.C., Robert L. Crawford, WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP, Memphis,
Tennessee, for Appellees.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Carrier
Corporation, Carrier SA, and Carrier Italia S.p.A. (collectively â��Carrierâ��) appeal the
district courtâ��s dismissal of their claims under the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade
Practices Act for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
Defendants-Appellees Outokumpu Oyj (â��OTOâ��), Outokumpu Copper Products Oy
(â��OCPâ��), Outokumpu Copper (U.S.A.), Inc. (â��Outokumpu U.S.A.â��), and Outokumpu
Copper Franklin, Inc. (â��Outokumpu Franklinâ��) (collectively â��Outokumpuâ��), and Mueller
Industries, Inc. and Mueller Europe LTD cross-appealed, arguing that the district courtâ��s
ruling can be affirmed on the alternative bases that Carrierâ��s complaint is time-barred
and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mueller Europe, OTO, and
OCP. Carrier has since settled its claims with the two Mueller entities, and those
defendants have been dismissed from this appeal. As to the remaining parties, we
conclude that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the present dispute
and that Carrierâ��s complaint is not time-barred. We further conclude that Carrierâ��s
complaint adequately states a Sherman Act claim against all of the Outokumpu
Defendants and that the district court had personal jurisdiction over OTO and OCP
individually. We therefore REVERSE district courtâ��s judgment as to all Outokumpu
Defendants and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A. The Copper Tubing Market
Copper tubing normally is â��divided into two main product groups.â�� Joint
Appendix (â��J.A.â��) at 0036 (Am. Compl. Â¶ 41). First, there are â��plumbing tubes . . .
which are used for water, oil, gas, and heating installations.â�� Id. Second, there are
â��higher value-added industrial tubes.â�� Id. The latter category is divided into several
subgroups, the â��most significant [of which] in terms of volume is tubing for airconditioning and refrigeration (â��ACRâ��) applications.â�� Id. The present litigation
concerns the market for ACR copper tubing.
Plaintiff Carrier Corporation is a Delaware corporation and Plaintiffs Carrier
France SA and Carrier Italia S.p.A. are both subsidiaries of Carrier. Carrier, along with
its affiliates, is â��the worldâ��s largest manufacturer of air-conditioning and commercial
refrigeration equipmentâ�� and consequently, one of the worldâ��s largest purchasers of ACR
copper tubing. Id. Â¶ 1. According to Carrierâ��s complaint, Defendant OTO and its wholly
owned subsidiary OCP are two Finnish companies that, during the relevant time period,
produced or sold ACR copper tubing and, either directly or through their subsidiaries,
imported it into the United States to sell to U.S. customers. Id. Â¶Â¶ 22, 26. Carrierâ��s
complaint further states that Defendants Outokumpu U.S.A. and Outokumpu Franklin,
both American subsidiaries of OCP, were â��engaged in the production or sale of ACR
Copper Tubing in the United States.â�� Id. Â¶ 23â��24. And Outokumpu Franklin in
particular allegedly sold â��substantial quantities of ACR Copper Tubing to Carrier in the
United States.â�� Id. Â¶ 24. The complaint further alleges that OTO â��had effective control
over the commercial policy and business decisions of its subsidiaries, and did business
through its subsidiaries.â�� Id. Â¶ 25.1
B. The European Commissionâ��s 2003 and 2004 Decisions
Much of this lawsuit revolves around two decisions issued by the Commission
of the European Communities (â��ECâ��). The first came in December 2003, when the EC
found that OTO and OCP, along with several other companies, participated in a
conspiracy in which they â��agreed on price targets and other commercial terms for
industrial tubes, coordinated price increases, [and] allocated customers and market
As this case was pending, Carrier reached a settlement agreement with both of the Mueller
entities. Thus, in accordance with Sixth Circuit Rule 33(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b),
Mueller Industries, Inc. and Mueller Europe LTD have been dismissed from this appeal. Carrier Corp.
v. Outokumpu Oyj, Nos. 07-6052, 07-6114 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2011) (unpublished orders). Cases Nos. 076115 and 07-6116 have also been dismissed. (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011) (unpublished order).
sharesâ�� in violation of European law. J.A. at 0283 (EC ACR Decision Â¶ 2). The EC
determined that this conspiracy lasted from at least May 3, 1988 to March 22, 2001. The
ECâ��s findings, however, do not identify any conspiratorial agreements with respect to
In September 2004, a separate EC decision found a similar violation of European
law in the market for plumbing tubes. The EC again found OTO and OCP liable, this
time along with with Mueller Industries and Mueller Europe. J.A. at 0072 (EC Plumbing
Decision Â¶Â¶ 1â��2). The EC decision emphasized, however, that â��the arrangements
pertaining to plumbing tubes on the one hand and those relating to industrial tubes on the
other hand involved different companies (and employees), and were organised in a
different way.â�� Id. Â¶ 5. Once again, the decision did not address any whether any
conspiracy extended beyond the European markets.
In its amended complaint, Carrier essentially alleges that the European
conspiracy uncovered by the EC was also directed at the U.S. market for ACR industrial
tubes, thereby violating the Sherman Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act. Carrier
is not the first plaintiff to make this allegationâ��the district judge in this case has also
dismissed two similar cases involving essentially the same defendants. See Am. Copper
& Brass, Inc. v. Boliden AB, No. 04-2771 DV (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished
opinion); In re ACR Copper Tubing Litig., No. 06-2207 (W.D. Tenn. July 26, 2007)
Carrier specifically alleges that between 1988 and 2001, the Defendants
conspired to raise the price for ACR tubing by developing â��a customer and market
allocation schemeâ�� under which â��Carrierâ��s business in the United States was allocated
to the Outokumpu defendants.â�� J.A. at 21 (Am. Compl. Â¶ 4). The other conspirators,
including Wieland-Werke AG (â��Wielandâ��) and KM Europa Metal AG (â��KMEâ��),
â��agreed not to pursueâ�� Carrierâ��s U.S. business. Id. In return, Wieland and KME
received Carrierâ��s European business and the Outokumpu Defendants agreed not to
aggressively pursue it. As a result of these agreements, Carrier maintains that it â��paid
artificially inflated and supra-competitive prices for ACR Copper Tubing in the United
States, Europe and elsewhere.â�� Id. Â¶ 2.2 Outokumpu, Wieland, and KME were able to
do this, Carrier alleges, because â��they were the three largest producers of ACR Copper
Tubing in the world,â�� which resulted in â��circumstances [that] facilitated the conspiracy.â��
Id. Â¶ 5. Carrier also explains that Outokumpu, Wieland, and KME were eager to
preempt alternative suppliers that could undercut their prices. To that end, â��[t]hey
enlisted the support of others in the conspiracy,â�� including Mueller Industries and
Mueller Europe. Id. Â¶ 6. The Mueller entities agreed not to pursue Carrierâ��s business
in the ACR tubing market, and in return, the other conspirators allocated different
markets to Mueller.
Carrier substantiates these claims in part by drawing from details found in the EC
industrial-tubes decision. For instance, like the EC decision, the complaint alleges that
Outokumpu and the other co-conspirators coordinated their conspiracy through the
biannual meetings of the trade association known as the Cuproclima Quality Association.
In doing so, the complaint quotes various incriminating documents uncovered by the EC
investigation, details the time and place of specific meetings, and also describes specific
price targets set by the alleged conspirators.
Carrierâ��s complaint also includes allegations that were not drawn from the EC
decisions. Carrier argues that these allegations provide circumstantial evidence that the
market-allocation scheme reached beyond the European markets and into the United
States. Indeed, Carrier maintains that the market for ACR copper tubing was global in
scope and, as further evidence of such an arrangement, points to an Outokumpu
document uncovered in the EC investigation that references a â��Global Agreementâ��
between the co-conspirators. Along these lines, Carrier also reasons that any successful
conspiracy must have involved the United States so as to prevent a multinational
corporation like Carrier from â��purchas[ing] all of the corporationâ��s world-wide demand
for ACR Copper Tubing in the United States and then ship[ping] those products to
On appeal, Carrier has limited its claims to purchases made within the United States. Carrier
Br. 1 at 23 n.2.
facilities world-wide.â�� Id. Â¶ 59. Thus, Carrier maintains that â��Defendants and their coconspirators singled out Carrier and other similarly situated companies by devising a
unique global approach for fixing the prices of ACR Copper Tubing offered to Carrier.â��
Id. Â¶ 61. In support of this global conspiracy, Carrier further contends that Outokumpu
scheduled yearly contract negotiations with U.S. customers that occurred after the fall
Cuproclima meetings and during which the target prices and market allocations were set.
Carrier also alleges that prices in the U.S. remained similar to those in other regions,
which facilitated consistent pricing levels across the relevant markets. Likewise, Carrier
claims that during the period between 1988 and 2001, none of Outokumpuâ��s coconspirators aggressively pursued business in one anotherâ��s markets. But around 2003,
after the cartel disbanded, Wieland and KME suddenly began soliciting Carrierâ��s U.S.
In December 2006, Outokumpu moved to dismiss the amended complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). The district court
granted the motions on the basis that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Carrierâ��s
Sherman Act claims. The district court justified the dismissal by observing that the
complaint merely â��â��cut-and-pasted,â��â�� J.A. at 926 (July 27, 2006 Dist. Ct. Order at 6),
facts from the EC decisions in a manner that rendered it â��â��wholly insubstantial.â��â�� Id.
at 928. The district court was also troubled by the complaintâ��s use of â��facts from the
plumbing tubing and ACR tubing investigations as if they described a single
conspiracy,â�� which the district court concluded â��undermined any credibility the
complaint otherwise possessed.â�� Id. at 927. According to the district court, the plaintiffs
did â��further injury to their argumentâ�� by drawing facts from the ECâ��s decisions when
they supported Carrierâ��s claims while disregarding contradictory information, such as
the fact that â��the EC findings were limited to European conduct.â�� Id. Apparently for the
same reasons that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court also concluded
that the case â��lack[ed] a legitimate factual foundationâ�� and therefore warranted dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 931. Carrier appealed, and the
Defendants cross-appealed, raising additional grounds on which to uphold the district
courtâ��s judgment.
A. Jurisdictional Prerequisites
Outokumpu first argues that the district court correctly found subject-matter
jurisdiction lacking because Carrierâ��s complaint was â��wholly insubstantial.â�� See
Outokumpu Br. at 26. Although the district courtâ��s reasoning was premised on its
determination that the complaint had no substance of its own, Outokumpuâ��s argument
extends that focus and also maintains that Carrier fails to allege any substantial
U.S.-market involvement, a required element for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act.3 We conclude that under either theory, Carrierâ��s allegations were
sufficient to demonstrate the courtâ��s jurisdiction for purposes of a motion to dismiss.
1. Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act
Since Judge Learned Handâ��s leading opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945), which proposed the need for
practical limitations on the Sherman Act that would avoid global overreaching, it has
been generally established that the so-called â��effects testâ�� limits the Sherman Act â��to
those acts (1) that â��significantlyâ�� or â��directlyâ�� affect United States commerce, or (2) that
are intended to have an effect, or (3) that are both intended to have and do have such an
effect.â�� IB Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law Â¶ 272d, at 279â��80 (3d
Outokumpu also argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the
alleged conspiracy did not have a â��direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effectâ�� on United States
commerce as is required under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1992 (â��FTAIAâ��).
15 U.S.C. Â§ 6a. The FTAIA, however, specifically exempts from its reach â��import commerceâ�� with
foreign entities. Id. According to F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004),
the FTAIA â��initially lays down a general rule placing all (non-import) activity involving foreign commerce
outside the Sherman Actâ��s reachâ�� and then selectively brings some categories of that excluded conduct
back within the Sherman Actâ��s strictures. See also IB Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law Â¶ 272i4, at 307â��08 (3d ed. 2006). Areeda and Hovenkamp, in turn, have indicated that â��[f]oreign
import commerce involves transactions in which the seller is located abroad while the buyer is domestic
and the goods flow into the United States.â�� Id. at 290.
Carrierâ��s claim here is limited to its domestic purchases, and thus, does not involve the type of
foreign commerce that would be implicated by the FTAIA. As a result, even if the FTAIA does present
a jurisdictional limitationâ��a question that we do not decide hereâ��it does not apply to this case. Cf. DeeK Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding, in a case involving
mainly foreign producers selling rubber thread in the United States and elsewhere, that the FTAIA did not
apply â��[b]ecause this case involves importation of foreign-made goods, . . . conduct Congress expressly
exempted from FTAIA coverage as â��involving . . . import trade or import commerce . . . with foreign
nationsâ��â�� (third and fourth alterations in original)), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
ed. 2006) (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443â��44). These standards have since been widely
incorporated into U.S. jurisprudence. Indeed, â��it is well established by now that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.â�� Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). The Supreme Court, however, has not delineated
the precise bounds of the effects test, and lower courts are not in agreement as to its
exact scope. Cf. generally Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 299 F.3d 281, 286
(4th Cir. 2002) (addressing the scope of the effects test and discussing the complexities
inherent in applying the test in cases such as this one, which involve a â��mixture of
foreign and domestic elementsâ��). Nonetheless, we need not undertake that task at
present because, regardless of the precise standard, Carrier has sufficiently alleged any
threshold effect on U.S. commerce necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.
Hartford Fire involved Sherman Act claims by U.S. states and private domestic
insurers alleging that a group of mainly foreign reinsurers conspired to limit coverage
of certain casualty risks in a manner that would effectively prevent the domestic insurers
from offering coverage for those risks in certain state markets. 509 U.S. at 795. Without
laying out its reasoning, the Court accepted the reinsurersâ�� concession that jurisdiction
existed under the Sherman Act, even though the claims plainly involved â��foreign
conduct.â�� Id. at 796â��97.4 The alleged impact on U.S. markets in this case is equally,
We note that there is some confusion whether the Sherman Actâ��s requirements in fact speak to
subject-matter jurisdiction. The genesis of this confusion arises from the Supreme Courtâ��s description of
the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 794, 796
n.22 (1993), as relating to â��jurisdiction.â�� At the time, Justice Scaliaâ��s dissent disputed that characterization
and sought to clarify that the term did not refer to the courtâ��s subject-matter jurisdiction and instead
referenced the prerequisites for stating a claim on the merits. See id. at 813 (Scalia, J. dissenting); cf.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law Â§ 401 cmt. c (1987) (indicating that the term â��subject matter
jurisdictionâ�� may be used both in the context of Congressâ��s power to prescribe legislation and in the
context of a courtâ��s â��jurisdiction to adjudicateâ��). Although Hartford did not squarely address the issue,
many lower courts nonetheless continue to treat the Sherman Actâ��s extraterritorial limitations as
jurisdictional rather than as elements of a federal antitrust claim. See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1268â��69 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006);
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 677â��79 (9th Cir. 2004); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v.
Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003). Recent Supreme
Court decisions, however, raise significant questions about the wisdom of that approach.
After Hartford, the Supreme Court has been much more wary of labeling statutory requirements
as â��jurisdictional.â�� Seeking to create a â��readily administrable bright line,â�� the Court has since set out the
general rule that â��when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.â�� Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516
(2006); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010). Moreover, in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010), the Court determined that questions
if not more, direct. Carrier alleges that the U.S. market was intertwined in the
conspiratorsâ�� allocation efforts and that the result of that agreement was to raise prices
artificially for ACR copper tubing for transactions between the co-conspirators and
buyers in the United States. J.A. at 0039â��40 (Am. Compl. Â¶Â¶ 51, 54). Taking those
allegations as true, as we must do at this stage in the litigation, we have no hesitation in
concluding that Carrierâ��s complaint meets any threshold jurisdictional requirement
imposed by the Sherman Act on claims involving foreign conduct.
Because Carrier has met any required threshold for stating a claim against a
foreign entity under the Sherman Act, we proceed to consider whether the complaint can
survive Outokumpuâ��s and the district courtâ��s assertion that the allegations were
insufficient to survive Outokumpuâ��s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenge.
Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) â��come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack.â�� Gentek Bldg. Prod.,
Inc. v. Steel Peel Litig. Trust, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
578 (2008). Under a facial attack, all of the allegations in the complaint must be taken
as true, much as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. When the district court relies on a
facial analysis, we review its findings de novo. Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778,
781 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1054 (2010). Under a factual attack,
however, the court can actually weigh evidence to confirm the existence of the factual
predicates for subject-matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996); see also 2 James Wm. Moore, Mooreâ��s
Federal Practice Â§ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2000) (â��[W]hen a court reviews a complaint under
a factual attack, the allegations have no presumptive truthfulness, and the court that must
concerning the extraterritorial application of Â§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has
language that somewhat mirrors that in the Sherman Act, were not jurisdictional. These decisions have
thus questioned the precedential value of the types of â��drive-by jurisdictional rulings,â�� Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted), seen in cases like Hartford. Cf. generally Howard M.
Wasserman, Colloquy Essay, The Demise of â��Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,â�� 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947
(2011). Nonetheless, because the parties have not addressed this issue directly, and because our decision
does not hinge on further elucidation of the meaning of â��jurisdictionâ�� in this context, we will save the
resolution of this issue for another day.
weigh the evidence has discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even a limited
evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.â��). When the district court
does so, we review its findings for clear error. Lovely, 570 F.3d at 781â��82. Outokumpu
has presented arguments for both a facial and factual challenge to subject-matter
jurisdiction, and we address each in turn.
a. Outokumpuâ��s Facial Attack
In order for Carrierâ��s complaint to allege jurisdiction adequately, it must contain
non-conclusory facts which, if true, establish that the district court had jurisdiction over
the dispute. Oâ��Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 375â��76 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 361 (2009). The district court dismissed Carrierâ��s complaint on the basis that it is
â��wholly insubstantial.â�� J.A. at 0930 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 10). We, however, disagree that
this case presents one of the rare instances that permit a district court to dismiss a
complaint because â��the plaintiffâ��s claims are clearly immaterial, made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or are wholly unsubstantiated and frivolous.â�� Gentek,
491 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Carrierâ��s complaint describes, in some detail, an elaborate worldwide conspiracy
in which the U.S. market for ACR copper tubing was assigned to Outokumpu.
Furthermore, Carrier alleges that this conspiracy caused the price of goods purchased
within the United States to increase, which in turn caused a direct antitrust injury. In
support of these allegations, the complaint references numerous specific dates during
which the Cuproclima cartel met and the various agreements its members entered into.
Assuming that these allegations are true, as we must, we conclude that Carrier has met
any applicable requirement that it allege a non-conclusory effect on U.S. commerce. Cf.
Hartford, 509 U.S. at 795â��97 (finding jurisdictional requirements easily satisfied when
complaint alleged that â��London reinsurers . . . conspired to coerce primary insurers in
the United States to offerâ�� certain forms of coverageâ��a claim that alleged both an
impact on the U.S. insurance market and that the reinsurersâ�� â��conduct in fact produced
substantial effectâ��).
Outokumpu, which attached the full EC decision to its motion to dismiss,
counters that many of the details contained in the complaint are drawn from the EC
industrial-tube decision that found no evidence that the cartelâ��s focus extended beyond
Europe. Like the district court, Outokumpu argues that Carrierâ��s complaint includes
misleading quotes from the EC decision and omits language explaining that the
conspiracy applied only to European markets. As a consequence, Outokumpu argues
that any details regarding specific meetings and agreements occurring during the
Cuproclima meetings are of no assistance to Carrier because they relate only to a
European conspiracy. Furthermore, when those portions of the complaint are excluded,
as Outokumpu insists they must be, Carrier is left with nothing more than conclusory
We are unpersuaded by this argument. Initially, Outokumpu overstates the
degree to which Carrierâ��s complaint conflicts with the EC decision. For instance, as
Carrier points out, the EC industrial-tubes decision clearly states that â��[i]nsofar as the
activities of the cartel relate[] to sales in countries that are not members of the
Community . . . they lie outside the scope of this Decision.â�� J.A. at 0332 (EC ACR
Decision Â¶ 229). Thus, any silence on the part of the EC decision as to U.S. markets may
simply reflect the limited scope of the decision. Outokumpu responds that â��even a
cursory review of the ECâ��s cartel decisions makes clear that Commission decisions
addressing cartels that extend beyond Europe regularly describe the entire geographic
scope of the cartel.â�� Outokumpu Br. 2 at 47. But the mere fact that the EC does at times
look beyond Europe should not trump its otherwise explicit statement that it is not
concerned with outside markets.5
In addition, to the extent that there is a conflict between Carrierâ��s allegations and
the EC decision, we do not agree that Carrier is bound by the ECâ��s findings.
Ordinarily,â��[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered
The Defendants further argue that, in any event, the EC decision provides no â��positiveâ�� support
for a finding of a U.S. conspiracy. Outokumpu Br. 4 at 10. But Carrier need not provide any additional
support for its assertions. Carrier has directly alleged that the Defendants engaged in an unlawful U.S.focused market-allocation scheme; it need not offer any additional evidentiary support at the pleading
part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffâ��s complaint and are central to
her claim.â�� Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The general rule is that â��[i]f inconsistent
with the allegations of the complaint, the exhibit controls.â�� Mengel Co. v. Nashville
Paper Prod. & Specialty Workers Union, No. 513, 221 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1955).
We have recognized, however, that it is not always appropriate to â��assume everything
[in an exhibit] is true.â�� Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 909 (2009). In particular, although â��[a] blanket adoption rule
makes sense in the context of an attached contract or loan agreement because the
contract represents an agreement between two or more parties to which the law binds
them,â�� the rule makes much less sense when, as is the case here, the exhibit is not a
legally dispositive document. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend,
163 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1998). When an exhibit is a contract, it is reasonable to
consider the entire document because the contract has independent legal significance.
Here, however, Outokumpu is citing the ECâ��s findings not merely to prove their
existence but rather to prove the truth of the matters asserted within them. See Jones,
521 F.3d at 561 (finding that transcripts of an interview attached to the plaintiffâ��s
complaint could be considered as an allegation that those statements were made, but the
truth of those statements could not be considered on a motion to dismiss). To permit
such a tactic would allow Outokumpu impermissibly to question the evidentiary
foundation of Carrierâ��s complaint, thereby depriving Carrier of the presumption of truth
to which it is entitled at this stage of litigation. Indeed, Carrier should be free to draw
facts from the EC decision to provide a â��starting pointâ�� and then use those facts to
construct a theory that differs from or even contradicts that of the EC. Carrier Br. 3 at
10 (emphasis omitted).6
The Defendants maintain that the district court was permitted to take judicial notice of the EC
decisions. They also argue that judicial notice is a permissible basis for considering a letter submitted by
EC Director Kirtikumar Mehta, which reiterated that the scope of the EC industrial-tubes decision was
â��limited to the European territory.â�� J.A. at 0919 (Mehta Letter at 1). But here again, judicial notice would
be appropriate only to prove the fact that the decisions and the letter existed, not the truth of the matters
stated therein. Scottyâ��s Contracting & Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785, 790 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003)
(â��[J]udicial notice of a fact is generally only appropriate when there is no dispute regarding the fact.â��).
Furthermore, Carrier offers additional circumstantial allegations that corroborate
its claim that the market-allocation scheme extended to the United States. Although
Carrierâ��s complaint provides numerous circumstantial allegations, of particular interest
is its claim that Wieland and KME initially refrained from aggressively competing for
Carrierâ��s U.S. business until 2003, and then suddenly began doing so at that time. It is
true that the mere fact that competitors do not intrude upon one anotherâ��s markets does
not necessarily mean that an illegal market-allocation scheme is taking place. See Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567â��78 (2007). When two companies refrain
from entering a market and then suddenly do so after a cartel dissolves, however, there
are good grounds for suspicion. Defendants question why it is that KME and Weiland
waited until two years after the Cuproclima conspiracy dissolved to enter the United
States if all that was stopping them was a supposed allocation conspiracy. It is certainly
plausible, however, that these two companies would require time to reconfigure their
operations so as to enable themselves to enter a new market. Similarly, 2003 is the year
in which the ECâ��s industrial-tubes investigation came to a close, and it is plausible for
KME and Weiland to wait until that moment before engaging in what could be viewed
as suspicious activity.
This analysis demonstrates that, contrary to Outokumpuâ��s argumentâ��and the
district courtâ��s conclusionâ��Carrierâ��s complaint does not fall within the rare exception
created by Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682â��83 (1946), which permits district courts to
dismiss complaints that are â��wholly insubstantial and frivolous.â�� See also Musson
Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that â��[w]hen a 12(b)(1) motion attacks the face of a complaint . . . [t]he plaintiff must
show only that the complaint alleges a claim under federal law, and that the complaint
is â��substantial,â�� and defining â��substantialâ�� as â��non-frivolousâ�� ). The exception on which
Outokumpu and the district court relied is quite narrow and ordinarily reserved for
extremely weak claims. See, e.g., Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 444
(6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the rule from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), should
apply â��only where the plaintiffâ��s claim has no plausible foundation or is clearly
foreclosed by a prior Supreme Court decisionâ�� (internal quotation marks omitted));
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 478â��79 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1198
(2000) (affirming dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction in a case in which the plaintiff
â��sued Senator John Glenn, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and other top government
officials, claiming that the defendants violated his First Amendment right to petition the
government because they did not answer his many letters or take the action requested in
those letters.â��).
The district court concluded that Carrierâ��s complaint falls within the exception
because it â��cut-and-pastedâ�� many sections of the EC decisions. As explained above,
however, the mere fact that the complaint borrows its substance from the EC decision
and then builds on the ECâ��s findings does not render its allegations any less valid.
Furthermore, even if all of the facts taken from the EC decisions were stripped from the
complaint, Carrierâ��s complaint still offers additional allegations, such as its claims
regarding KME and Weilandâ��s sudden entry into the U.S. market. As even the district
court noted, portions of Carrierâ��s complaint â��create[d] a close approximation of [the]
factual predicateâ�� needed to establish its claim. J.A. at 927 (Dist. Ct. Order at 7). Under
such circumstances, Carrierâ��s complaint comes nowhere near the level of frivolity
required by the â��wholly insubstantial and frivolousâ�� exception, and the district court
erred in dismissing the case on that basis.
b. Outokumpuâ��s Factual Attack
Outokumpu further argues that, even if Carrierâ��s complaint facially appears to
plead a U.S.-focused conspiracy, to the extent that the district court made factual
findings in applying the â��wholly insubstantialâ�� standard and making its determination
that the allegations lacked the requisite â��U.S. nexus,â�� we should review that analysis
using the standards for a factual attack. Outokumpu Br. 2 at 55 n.17.
We first note that it is unclear whether the district court here made any findings
of fact. Indeed, the court never explicitly stated that it was doing so. The court did,
however, assess the complaintâ��s â��credibility,â�� J.A. at 927 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 7), and
referenced its own power to â��mak[e] reasonable inquiry into the facts,â�� id. at 929 (Op.
at 9). Therefore, we assume that the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the
conspiracy alleged in Carrierâ��s complaint did not target U.S. markets.
â��[A] district court engages in a factual inquiry regarding the complaintâ��s
allegations only when the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction do not implicate the
merits of the plaintiffâ��s claim.â�� Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330. In other words, the district
court is prohibited from making factual findings with respect to a jurisdictional issue
when such a finding would adversely affect the merits of the plaintiffâ��s case. Id. at 331.
When â��an attack on subject-matter jurisdiction also implicates an element of the cause
of action, then the district court should find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the
objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiffâ��s claim.â�� Id. at 330 (internal
In the context of Sherman Act claims against foreign defendants, the extent of
U.S.-market impact affects more than a courtâ��s jurisdiction; it also speaks to whether
there is â��sufficient injury or anticompetitive effect to establish liability.â�� Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law Â§ 415, reporterâ��s note 3 (1987). Thus, as Areeda and
Hovenkamp have observed, the â��â��jurisdictionalâ�� and â��substantiveâ�� inquiries are not
wholly independent.â�� IB Areeda & Hovenkamp Â¶ 273, at 326. That being the case, to
the extent that the district court did render a factual finding, any such finding was
improper. Cf. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 796 n.21 (explaining that the court was â��bound to
creditâ�� allegations that foreign defendants conspired to coerce American insurers, the
very conduct upon which the court found the requisite â��substantial effectâ�� to be based).
In conclusion, we hold that the district court did not lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over Carrierâ��s complaint. We therefore proceed to an evaluation of the
merits of Outokumpuâ��s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
B. The Outokumpu Defendantsâ�� Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
The Defendants next argue that Carrierâ��s complaint fails to state a claim. We
review de novo a district courtâ��s decision to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Watson
Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir.
2011). â��We â��construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept
its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.â�� Id.
at 456 (quoting In re Travel Agent Commâ��n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 896 (2011)).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need only
contain â��a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.â�� Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, however, the
Supreme Court emphasized that it is not enough merely to plead a set of facts â��consistent
withâ�� a claim to relief; there must also be enough â��factual enhancementâ�� to â��nudge [the]
claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible.â�� 550 U.S. at 557, 570. To conduct
this analysis, a court should first identify factual allegations that are entitled to a
presumption of truthâ��that is, those allegations that are more than just legal conclusions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950â��51 (2009). Then the court should
â��consider the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief.â�� Id. at 1951.
Carrierâ��s claim falls under Â§ 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits conspiracies
â��in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.â��
15 U.S.C. Â§ 1. Here, the parties focus on the existence of a conspiracy impacting U.S.
markets. Carrierâ��s complaint attempts to establish a Sherman Act violation by alleging
â��an explicit agreement to restrain trade,â�� and therefore must â��â��plausibly suggest[],â��
rather than be â��merely consistent with,â�� an agreement to restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.â�� Watson, 648 F.3d at 457 (quoting In re Travel Agent Commâ��n Antitrust
Litig., 583 F.3d at 908). To survive a motion to dismiss, these allegations must be
specific enough to establish the relevant â��who, what, where, when, how or why.â�� Total
Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 437
(6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, they must â��specify how
[each] defendant [was] involved in the alleged conspiracy.â�� In re Travel Agent Commâ��n
Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d at 905.
Outokumpu first reiterates its previous argument that the alleged conspiracy had
no effect on the United States. That argument, however, fails for the same reasons as did
Outokumpuâ��s challenge to this courtâ��s subject-matter jurisdiction under the Sherman
Actâ��s effects test. Furthermore, as was also detailed above, the allegations extend well
beyond the conclusory â��if it happened there, it could have happened hereâ�� argument that
has been rejected in other courts. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
Outokumpuâ��s U.S. entitiesâ��Outokumpu U.S.A. and Outokumpu Copper
Franklinâ��then argue that there are insufficient allegations as to their specific
involvement in the conspiracy. The two U.S. entitiesâ�� argument stems from Carrierâ��s
frequent use of blanket references to the â��Outokumpu defendants,â�� without always
specifying the role that each corporate entity played in the conspiracy. Outokumpu
U.S.A. and Outokumpu Copper Franklin further note that neither EC decision mentions
their involvement. In addition, the complaint does not specifically identify either
company as a member of the Cuproclima conspiracy.
Even in the absence of direct allegations that Outokumpuâ��s U.S. entities were coconspirators at Cuproclima, however, the court may look beyond those entitiesâ��
corporate forms if the complaint presents facts to support a determination that the
subsidiaries were alter egos of the parent corporation. Cf. Opdyke Inv. Co. v. City of
Detroit, 883 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1989) (â��It is true that the parent and subsidiary
companies . . . were separately incorporated, but they must be treated as a single entity
under the antitrust laws.â�� (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp, 467
U.S. 752 (1984))); Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers v. Interstate Commerce Commâ��n, 909
F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 1990) (indicating that a wholly controlled subsidiary may be an
â��alter egoâ�� of the parent company depending on the facts of a particular case). Thus, the
question becomes whether OTO and OCPâ��s control over the U.S. entities was
sufficiently extensive to permit imputation of the conspiracy to the U.S. entities.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, Carrierâ��s allegations are sufficient to
support such a determination. The complaint identifies that the U.S. entities are
responsible for selling the overpriced tubing directly to Carrier, stating, for instance, that
â��[d]uring the Relevant Period, [Outokumpu Copper Franklin] sold substantial quantities
of ACR Copper Tubing to Carrier in the United States.â�� J.A. at 0028 (Am. Compl.
Â¶ 24). The complaint also identifies Outokumpu U.S.A. as â��engaged in the production
or sale of ACR Copper Tubing in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, directly
and/or through its affiliates and/or wholly-owned subsidiaries during the Relevant
Period.â�� Id. Â¶ 23. More importantly, however, Carrier has alleged that the various
Outokumpu entities were operated and deliberately portrayed to the outside world as a
â��single global enterpriseâ�� in which key executives overlapped between the U.S. and
European entities and vital management personnel rotated through positions on both
sides of the Atlantic. Id. Â¶Â¶ 27â��30. Under such circumstances, requiring Carrier to
delineate in the complaint the role each subsidiary played in the conspiracy is
unnecessary,7 and Carrierâ��s allegations against Outokumpuâ��s U.S. entities are sufficient
to survive the motion to dismiss.
C. Statute of Limitations and Personal Jurisdiction
Turning to the cross-appeal, Outokumpu next argues that Carrierâ��s complaint is
time-barred and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over OTO and OCP.
Because it decided the case on other grounds, the district court did not address either of
these issues in its dismissal order.
Outokumpu again reiterates its argument that Carrierâ��s allegations are inconsistent with the
findings in the EC decision. Specifically, Outokumpu points to statements limiting the Cuproclima cartel
to European customers. As discussed above, this is unsurprising given that the scope of the ECâ��s decision
was limited to Europe and therefore did not implicate Outokumpuâ��s U.S. entities. Thus, as stated in
Section II.A.1, our review is not constrained by the ECâ��s decision to refrain from considering the existence
of agreements beyond the European markets.
As an initial matter, â��[i]t is the general rule . . . that a federal appellate court does
not consider an issue not passed upon below.â�� Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690, 695 (6th
Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)).
We make an exception, however, for cases such as this one in which â��the issue[s are]
presented with sufficient clarity and completeness and [their] resolution will materially
advance the progress of . . . already protracted litigation.â�� Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). This litigation has been ongoing since 2006, and both Outokumpu and Carrier
have fully briefed the statute-of-limitations and personal-jurisdiction issues. We
therefore think it appropriate to address Outokumpuâ��s arguments.
A Sherman Act claim must be brought â��within four years after the cause of action
accrued.â�� 15 U.S.C. Â§ 15b. The Amended Complaint indicates that the conspiracy
ended in 2001. Carrier did not file its first complaint, however, until March 2006.
Nonetheless, Carrier argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment.
â��Three elements must be pleaded in order to establish fraudulent concealment:
(1) wrongful concealment of their actions by the defendants; (2) failure of the plaintiff
to discover the operative facts that are the basis of his cause of action within the
limitations period; and (3) plaintiffâ��s due diligence until discovery of the facts.â�� Dayco
Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975). A plaintiff
must plead the factual allegations underlying a claim of fraudulent concealment with
particularity. Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1991). With
regard to the â��wrongful concealmentâ�� element the plaintiff must point to â��affirmative
acts of concealment.â�� Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Commâ��rs v. Natâ��l Football League, 491
F.3d 310, 319 (6th Cir. 2007). â��[M]ere silence or unwillingness to divulge wrongful
activities is not sufficient.â�� Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 770 (6th Cir. 2002).
Instead, there must be some â��â��trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and
prevent inquiry.â��â�� Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445,
1467 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S.
(11 Otto) 135, 143 (1879)). Furthermore, in evaluating the due-diligence element, the
court should evaluate such acts of active concealment as a factor in determining whether
the plaintiffâ��s investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982). Thus â��[a]ctions such as would
deceive a reasonably diligent plaintiff will toll the statute; but those plaintiffs who delay
unreasonably in investigating circumstances that should put them on notice will be
foreclosed from filing, once the statute has run.â�� Id.
Here, Carrierâ��s complaint points to numerous instances in which the
conspirators8 actively tried to hide their conduct. Some of these allegations lack any
specificity, and therefore fall short of meeting the standard required to support a claim
of fraudulent concealment. For instance, the complaint alleges that in 2001, after the EC
began investigating Outokumpu, Outokumpu denied any wrongdoing. As stated above,
however, an unwillingness to provide information is not an â��affirmative act.â��
Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the Defendants â��utiliz[ed] covert meetingsâ�� and
â��[gave] false and pretextual reasons for the pricing of ACR Copper Tubing sold . . .
during the Relevant Period and [described] such pricing falsely as being the result of
competitive factors rather than collusion.â�� J.A at 0051â��52 (Am. Compl. Â¶ 104(a), (c)).
This also lacks the requisite particularity, as it fails to specify â��the time, place, and
content of the allegedâ�� fraudulent acts. U.S. ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc.,
501 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Other portions of the complaint, however, provide specific details regarding the
nature of the alleged cover-up. For example, the complaint quotes the ECâ��s findings that
the conspirators â��â��established security rules to prevent a paper trail . . . and used a
coding-system to hide the identity of the producers in their documents and
spreadsheets.â��â�� J.A. at 0052 (Am. Compl. Â¶ 105). In contrast to those discussed above,
these allegationsâ��especially when coupled with the details referenced in the cited
Although Carrier does not always specify whether Outokumpu engaged in the relevant
concealment, this is irrelevant because â��[f]raudulent concealment . . . may be established through the acts
of co-conspirators.â�� In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 538 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1673 (2009).
portion of the EC decision and associated cross-referencesâ��are sufficiently particular
to meet the pleading standard for fraudulent concealment. See J.A. at 0330 (EC ACR
Dec. Â¶ 218); In re Elec. Carbon Prods. Antitrust Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 303, 316 (D.N.J.
2004) (concluding that a plaintiff â��injected precisionâ�� into its fraudulent-concealment
claim â��by pleading the findings of the United States Department of Justice and the
European Commissionâ�� (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, such conduct
is sufficiently affirmative for purposes of satisfying the â��wrongful concealmentâ�� element
because the alleged actions involved taking active steps to hide evidence, as opposed to
simply meeting in secret. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d
883, 891 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that â��hiding evidenceâ�� can constitute affirmative
concealment). Finally, Carrier alleges that because of the co-conspiratorsâ�� misstatements
and attempts at suppressing evidence of illegal conduct, it had no knowledge of the
Defendantsâ�� conspiracy until the release of the EC decision on December 16, 2003.
Taken as true, these actions would have both concealed from Carrier the very â��means
of discovering [its] cause of action,â�� Campbell, 676 F.2d at 1127, and prevented Carrier
from discovering the basis for its antitrust claim within the limitations period. Carrier
has thus adequately pleaded the first two prongs of a fraudulent-concealment claim.
As for the third prong of Daycoâ��Carrierâ��s due diligenceâ��Carrierâ��s complaint
acknowledges that it was aware that the EC was investigating Outokumpu for antitrust
violations as early as 2001. This would appear to be enough to place Carrier on inquiry
notice, which in turn would require Carrier diligently to investigate its possible claim.
Dayco, 523 F.2d at 394 (holding that government investigation into alleged antitrust
violations prompted duty to investigate). Despite Carrierâ��s failure to uncover the cartel,
however, Carrierâ��s complaint sufficiently alleges â��reasonable diligenceâ�� in the
investigation it undertook upon learning of the possible conspiracy. Indeed, this is not
a instance in which the plaintiff presented a â��mere allegation of due diligence without
asserting what steps were taken.â�� Id. Rather, Carrier alleges that prior to December
2003, an employee with the Global Purchasing Department named Fred Benedict
contacted several copper tubing suppliers to ask them about the alleged conspiracy, but
was unable to procure any information. Carrierâ��s examination of the defendantsâ�� public
statements and filings also turned up no information relating to a possible cartel or other
anticompetitive conduct. Later, after acquiring additional information from the EC
decision, which Carrier asserts â��provided the first means for beginning an analysis of
cartel behavior and its effect on Carrier,â�� Carrier alleges that it retained both outside
counsel and an economic consultant to conduct a more thorough investigation. J.A. at
0055 (Am. Compl. Â¶ 111). We are not prepared to conclude that such efforts were
insufficient to satisfy Daycoâ��s â��due diligenceâ�� requirement at such an early stage of
litigation and without the benefit of discovery. Cf. Jones v. TransOhio Sav. Assâ��n, 747
F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting the panelâ��s reluctance to dismiss fraudulentconcealment allegations prior to discovery); Duncan v. Leeds, 742 F.2d 989, 993 (6th
Cir. 1984) (addressing the need to construe allegations of fraudulent concealment
liberally and in the plaintiffâ��s favor at such an early stage in the litigation). Although we
may dismiss a claim of fraudulent concealment when it is obvious from the complaint
that the plaintiff conducted absolutely no investigation, see, e.g., Ruth v. Unifund CCR
Partners, 604 F.3d 908, 911â��14 (6th Cir. 2010), when there is some question as to the
depth and scope of that investigation, a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed forward.9
We therefore conclude that, taking the allegations in Carrierâ��s favor as we must at this
stage in the litigation, Carrier has adequately pleaded its fraudulent-concealment claim,
and its cause of action should not be dismissed as time-barred.
Outokumpu argues that the panelâ��s decision in Gumbus v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Intâ��l Union, Nos. 93-5113, 93-5235, 1995 WL 5935 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 811
(1995), is to the contrary. We are not bound by Gumbus, however, as it is an unpublished decision.
Moreover, our previous casesâ��including Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982), which
Gumbus cites in support of the proposition that inquiry to company officials is insufficient to constitute
due diligenceâ��have not suggested that reliance on company assurances as a matter of law always falls
short of demonstrating the requisite due diligence. Campbell instead utilizes a more fact-based approach
to the question whether reliance on oral assurances was a reasonable investigation under the circumstances.
Although we determined that such reliance was not reasonable in that case given that the plaintiff already
knew that he had substantial cause to mistrust the words and intentions of the officers on whose assurances
he claimed to rely, id. at 1128, that conclusion does not compel recognition of a per se rule barring the use
of direct inquiries to a company as a reasonable means of investigation.
Finally, we address OTO and OCPâ��s argument concerning personal jurisdiction.
â��To comply with due process, a courtâ��s exercise of its power over an out-of-state
defendant must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.â�� Indah
v. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commâ��n, 661 F.3d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Intâ��l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Personal jurisdiction comes in two varieties: specific jurisdiction, which â��â��is confined
to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction,â��â�� and â��â��general, all-purpose jurisdiction.â��â��
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, ---U.S.----, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
â��The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that [personal] jurisdiction exists.â��
Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). â��[I]n the face of a
properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his pleading but
must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has
jurisdiction.â�� Id. A district court, in its discretion â��may decide the motion upon the
affidavits alone; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion; or it may conduct
an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.â�� Id. Given that the
district court here never addressed personal jurisdiction, only the first option is available
on appeal. Thus, Carrierâ��s burden is â��relatively slight,â�� Third Natâ��l Bank in Nashville
v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990), and we must â��construe the facts in a light
most favorableâ�� to Carrier, Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In addition, because weighing any controverted facts is
inappropriate at this stage, dismissal is proper only if Carrierâ��s alleged facts â��collectively
fail[] to state a prima facie case for jurisdiction.â�� Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459.
For Sherman Act claims, 15 U.S.C. Â§ 22 authorizes service of process over an
antitrust defendant â��wherever it may be found.â�� When Congress has enacted such
nationwide service of process statutes, personal jurisdiction exists whenever the
defendant has â��sufficient minimum contacts with the United Statesâ�� to satisfy the due
process requirements under the Fifth Amendment. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245
F.3d 561, 566â��67 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp.,
643 F.2d 1229, 1237â��39 (6th Cir. 1981) (indicating without expressly deciding that 15
U.S.C. Â§ 22 permits nationwide process). This inquiry parallels the more traditional
personal-jurisdiction analysis under which a defendant must have â��â��minimum contactsâ��â��
with the forum state pursuant to the stateâ��s long-arm statute. See Med. Mut. of Ohio, 245
F.3d at 566â��67.
Because Carrier appears to assert only specific jurisdiction, our minimumcontacts analysis is likewise limited to that issue. Thus, to establish personal jurisdiction
in this case, Carrier must adequately show the following elements in accordance with the
well-established test set forth in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401
F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968):
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendantâ��s activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of juri