Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/257/506/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-05-05 22:09:44
Document Index: 470047696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 2581', '§ 25', '§ 3097', '§ 2799', '§ 3100', '§ 161', '§ 1764', '§ 1', '§ 1790', '§ 161']

International Railway Company v. Davidson :: 257 U.S. 506 (1922) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› International Railway Company v. Davidson
International Railway Company v. Davidson 257 U.S. 506 (1922)
U.S. Supreme CourtInternational Railway Company v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506 (1922)International Railway Company v. DavidsonNo. 340Argued January 3, 4, 1922Decided January 30, 1922257 U.S. 506APPEAL FROM AND CERTIORARI TO THE
1. The Act of February 13, 1911, c. 46, 36 Stat. 899, authorizing special permits for immediate lading and unlading of vessels and other conveyances, and empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to fix extra compensation to be paid customs officials at the expense of the licensees for Sunday and holiday service in such lading or unlading, was not applicable to an international toll bridge nor to the operation thereon of a line of passenger trolley cars; nor was it made so by the amendment of February, 7, 1920, c. 61, 41 Page 257 U. S. 507 Stat. 402, by which the extra compensation was extended to cover overtime "in connection with the unlading, receiving, or examination of passengers' baggage," this provision being given full effect if confined to baggage of passengers on vessels for the immediate lading or unlading of whose cargoes special license may issue under the original act. P. 257 U. S. 512.
Review of a decree of the circuit court of appeals affirming the action of the district court in dismissing, for want of equity, a bill filed by the present petitioner to restrain the respondent collector of customs from putting into effect measures affecting the customs inspection at the terminus of petitioner's toll bridge. Page 257 U. S. 508
The International Railway Company owns and operates two public toll bridges across the Niagara River between the United States and Canada. One is at Niagara Falls, the other at Lewiston, a short distance below. Over each bridge the company operates regularly its passenger cars, and over each there is a heavy passenger travel also in other vehicles and on foot. For more than 20 years prior to June, 1920, the government had, at its own expense, maintained at the American end of these bridges customs inspectors continuously, day and night, including Sundays and holidays. Then the collector of customs of the port of Buffalo notified the company that, on Sundays and holidays thereafter, no vehicle (except trolley cars) would be permitted to enter the United States; that no passenger would be allowed to enter except after surrender to the customs guard of all personal baggage, even the smallest handbag, and that all vehicles (except trolley cars) and all baggage surrendered would be held by the collector, at the owner's risk, for examination on the next following working day. The company was further advised that continued service of customs inspectors on Sundays and holidays could be secured if it would make application for a special license under the Act of February 13, 1911, c. 46, § 5, 36 Stat. 899, as amended by the Act of February 7, 1920, c. 61, 41 Stat. 402. Day and night customs service on ordinary week days was to be continued at the expense of the government, as theretofore. Page 257 U. S. 509 The collector acted throughout under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The company brought this suit in the Federal District Court for Western New York against the collector to enjoin the threatened action, insisting that the provisions of these statutes are not applicable to a toll bridge, and that the collector is without power to exact, as a condition of continuing the service, that the company take a license with the attendant burdens. The district court Page 257 U. S. 510 dismissed the bill for want of equity, 271 F. 313, and its decree was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, 273 F. 153. The case was brought here by appeal, and a petition for a writ of certiorari was also filed, consideration of which was postponed until the hearing on the merits. Whether the action taken and threatened exceeds the powers conferred by law is the main question presented.
The Act of 1911 contained no reference whatsoever to passengers or to their baggage or personal effects. It dealt exclusively with the grant of special permits for the immediate lading or unlading of vessels and other conveyances. It consists of five sections and a repealing clause. The first four prescribe the conditions under which such license shall issue and the proceedings to be taken thereunder. The fifth section gives the Secretary of the Treasury power to fix extra compensation to be paid customs officials serving at night, on Sundays, or on holidays in connection with lading or unlading under such special permit, and it provides that an amount equal to the extra compensation shall be paid to the collector by the licensee. The amendatory act of February 7, 1920, made no change whatsoever in the first four sections of the Act of 1911. It dealt solely with the extra compensation, merely substituting the new § 5, shown in the margin. [Footnote 1] This Page 257 U. S. 511 substituted section defines what shall be deemed overtime, how the rate of extra pay shall be fixed, and what the work is, for which extra compensation shall be paid. In Page 257 U. S. 512 this work it includes that "in connection with the unlading, receiving or examination of passengers' baggage." The contention of the government is that the mere insertion of these words in § 5 has the effect of establishing a system of special licenses applicable to toll bridges, which are not vessels or other conveyances, and on which there is neither cargo, lading, or unlading, but passengers who pass on foot or in trolleys or automobiles.
The contention is at variance with the language of the act and with its history. Obviously the words "vessel or other conveyance" are not appropriate to describe the plant of a toll bridge. Other provisions, also, of the Act of 1911, like the requirement "of entry of vessels and due report of other conveyances" before issue of the special license show that it was not the purpose of Congress to make it applicable to the conduct of a toll bridge or the operation thereon of a line of passenger trolley cars. The clause in the amendment of 1920 by which the extra compensation payable under § 5 is extended to cover overtime "in connection with the unlading, receiving or examination of passengers' baggage" is given full effect, if applied to the baggage of passengers on those vessels for the immediate lading and unlading of whose cargoes special license may issue under the first four sections of the Act of 1911. That these were the only overtime services in connection with passengers for which the amendment made provision is confirmed by its history. The injustice of denying to customs officials compensation for such overtime services was obvious. But the Secretary of the Treasury had been advised, after the passage of the Act of 1911, as well as before, that he was without power to make -- or to require the vessel owner to make -- any payment therefor, since passengers' baggage is not "cargo." 30 Op.Atty.Gen. 123. To remedy this and other defects in the provision for extra pay, the amendment was introduced at the instance of the Treasury Department, Page 257 U. S. 513 with the approval of the United States Shipping Board and of the American Steamship Association. [Footnote 2]
Congress created two distinct systems for the examination of articles coming from foreign countries. One dealt with articles imported as merchandise, the other with passengers' baggage and personal effects. That distinction, established by the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, has been preserved in all later legislation. One Pearl Chain v. United States, 123 F. 371, 374. For merchandise, there are elaborate provisions concerning entry, manifests, unloading, invoices, consular certificates, and bills of lading. Revised Statutes, §§ 2581, 2867, 2962 and 2872, as amended by Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 25, 23 Stat. 53, 59. There are special provisions affecting importations from Canada and Mexico. Revised Statutes, §§ 3097, 3098, 3099. Compliance with these requirements necessarily involves delays. Concerning passengers' baggage and effects, the provisions are much simpler. They are designed to secure expeditious entry. Revised Statutes, §§ 2799, 2800, 2801, and 2802, deal with articles from foreign ports. There are additional provisions concerning Page 257 U. S. 514 articles coming from contiguous countries. Revised Statutes, §§ 3100, 3101, 3102. That Congress intended by the Act of 1920 to abandon this distinction between merchandise and passengers' baggage, which had been carefully preserved in the Act of 1911, is not to be assumed.
It is also insisted that the Secretary of the Treasury has authority, independently of the power specially conferred by the Act of 1911 as amended, to issue the instruction complained of. The contention is that his instruction to the collector was not to compel the bridge company to pay the cost of the inspection service, but merely to withdraw the service unless the company would agree to pay the cost; that, since customs officials cannot be maintained at every point where merchandise may conceivably enter from contiguous countries, discretion must rest in the Secretary to determine whether the character and extent of the movement at a particular place justifies maintaining them there, and that the instruction given was a regulation under § 161 of the Revised Statutes, which had the force of law. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 216 U. S. 480. To this contention it is perhaps a sufficient answer to say that the instruction given was obviously not a determination by the Secretary that the travel over these bridges on Sundays and holidays was not such as to justify the government in maintaining the inspection service. The travel was heavier on those days than on any other, and the service had been maintained continuously for more than 20 years. But there are other conclusive answers. Section 161 does not confer upon the Secretary any legislative power. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466; United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14. A regulation, to be valid, must be reasonable and must be consistent with law. The instruction given lacks both of these essentials. To collect the cost of customs service from vessel owners or other is virtually laying a tax upon them. This cannot be done except by specific authorization of Congress. Page 257 U. S. 515 Moreover, unless so authorized, no official or employee may receive from the government pay for extra services. Revised Statutes, § 1764; United States v. Garlinger, 169 U. S. 316. Nor may he receive in connection with his services pay from any private source. Act of March 3, 1917, c. 163, § 1, 39 Stat. 1106. Customs officials especially are forbidden to receive such payment. Revised Statutes, § 1790. Furthermore, to impose upon the company the obligation of furnishing an indemnity bond covering losses which may accrue to the government from the action not of the bridge company or of its employees, but of any passenger who crosses the bridge, was clearly unreasonable. It was this lack of power in the Secretary to impose upon others any part of the cost of the customs service unless specially authorized by Congress which led to the enactment also of the earlier legislation concerning special licenses for lading and unlading of cargoes. [Footnote 3] The instructions here attacked profess to rest not upon Revised Statutes, § 161, but upon the Act of 1911, as amended by that of 1920. T.D. 38290; T.D. 38429. The claim of such authority by virtue of the power to establish regulations for the Department was apparently first made in this suit.
It is further contended that the petitioner has no standing to question the regulation, which applies not to it, but to the owners of private conveyances and of personal baggage brought over the bridge. While these also might be entitled to seek redress, it is clear that the instructions given threaten vital interests of the bridge company to which a court of equity should afford protection. The Page 257 U. S. 516 jurisdiction of this Court on appeal was also questioned. In support of the jurisdiction, it is urged that the bill invoked rights under the Constitution, as well as under the revenue laws, and treaty rights are also pressed upon us. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 192 U. S. 407; Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publishing Co., 237 U. S. 618, 237 U. S. 621. Whether the appeal lies we need not decide. A writ of certiorari was also applied for, and the question presented is of sufficient importance to require determination by this Court. Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 204 U. S. 204, 204 U. S. 213.