Source: http://openjurist.org/108/f3d/224/torres-v-city-of-santa-ana
Timestamp: 2016-02-11 23:48:06
Document Index: 512928913

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 340', '§ 945', '§ 945', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 945', '§ 853', '§ 945']

108 F3d 224 Torres v. City Of Santa Ana | OpenJurist
108 F. 3d 224 - Torres v. City Of Santa Ana HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series108 F.3d
108 F3d 224 Torres v. City Of Santa Ana 108 F.3d 224
97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1593, 97 Daily JournalD.A.R. 3071David C. TORRES, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.CITY OF SANTA ANA; Paul Walters; Ernesto Conde; EricRimat; Judith Stanbra; Mark Bishop; RichardBouchard; Michael Kuplast, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 95-56642.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 6, 1997.Decided March 4, 1997.
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of an action on statute of limitations grounds. Harding v. Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 907 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082, 111 S.Ct. 951, 112 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1991). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is determined by state law. Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir.1995); Galceran, 889 F.2d at 907. Section 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585. In California, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is one year. See Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 340(3); Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir.1994).
State law also governs the application of tolling doctrines. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44, 109 S.Ct. 1998, 2002-03, 104 L.Ed.2d 582 (1989). "In California, the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is tolled by Cal.Gov't Code § 945.3 while criminal charges are pending." Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585. Section 945.3 reads:
Cal.Gov't Code § 945.3. Under this section, "criminal charges are 'pending' until the date of judgment." McAlpine v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 1, 3, 257 Cal.Rptr. 32 (Cal.Ct.App.1989).
A. The Notice to Appear
This conclusion is supported by a plain reading of the statutory provisions governing notices to appear. In the case of a misdemeanor, a notice to appear "shall be filed with the magistrate if the prosecuting attorney has previously directed the officer to do so," Cal.Penal Code § 853.6(e)(2), or "with the prosecuting attorney" if he or she has not directed the officer to file the notice with the magistrate. Cal.Penal Code § 853.6(e)(3). If the prosecuting attorney has not directed the officer to file the notice with the magistrate, "he or she, within his or her discretion, may initiate prosecution by filing the notice or a formal complaint with the magistrate ... within 25 days from the time of arrest." Cal.Penal Code § 853.6(e). Notably, "[t]he failure by the prosecutor to file the notice or formal complaint within 25 days of the time of the arrest shall not bar further prosecution of the misdemeanor charged in the notice to appear. However, any further prosecution shall be preceded by a new and separate citation or an arrest warrant." Id. (emphasis added). The complaint against Torres was not filed within 25 days of his arrest. Accordingly, his prosecution technically could not have been based upon the March 3 notice to appear. Strictly speaking, the charges against him were not pending before a court until Officer Conde filed the May 17 complaint.
Torres's policy argument ignores this court's decision in Galceran. Torres emphasizes that § 945.3 was enacted by the California legislature "to eliminate the use of civil damage complaints as plea bargaining levers." Mohlmann v. City of Burbank, 179 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1042, 225 Cal.Rptr. 109 (Cal.Ct.App.1986). Certainly, an arrestee might initiate a civil complaint upon receipt of a notice to appear in order to deter the prosecutor from "initiat[ing] prosecution by filing the notice [to appear] or a formal complaint with the magistrate." Cal.Penal Code § 853.6(e). In order to effectuate the policy behind § 945.3, Torres argues, this court should treat the notice to appear as an accusatory pleading that has been filed with a court.
Torres's civil complaint is not related to the petition for arraignment because Torres's probation pertains to his 1991 robbery conviction, and not to his 1994 arrest. In Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 920, 111 S.Ct. 2021, 114 L.Ed.2d 107 (1991), the California Supreme Court considered the analogous issue of whether collateral estoppel bars the state from prosecuting a defendant for behavior that triggered a probation revocation hearing where the state had failed to prove a probation violation at that hearing. The court held that collateral estoppel does not apply in such a context. Drawing a distinction between a probation revocation hearing and a criminal trial, the Lucido court noted that a "[probation] revocation hearing arises as a continuing consequence of the probationer's original conviction; any sanction imposed at the hearing follows from that crime, not from the substance of new criminal allegations against the probationer." Id. at 348, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223. The Lucido court also explained that a subsequent criminal trial does not place the defendant twice in jeopardy where a probation violation hearing has already been conducted: "[B]ecause the hearing ... neither threatens the probationer with the stigma of a new conviction nor with punishment other than that to which he was already exposed as a result of his earlier offense, it does not place the probationer in jeopardy." Id. These dicta indicate that although probation violation proceedings may be triggered by a new offense, those proceedings relate only to the original offense for which probation was first imposed.