Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-guevara-5
Timestamp: 2019-10-19 04:43:07
Document Index: 605330220

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 876', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 4', '§ 876', '§ 4', '§ 876', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2332', '§ 3553', '§ 3742', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2332', '§ 2332']

U.S. v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 252 | Casetext
U.S. v. Guevara
408 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2005)
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U.S.v.Guevara
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth CircuitMay 2, 2005
"Characterizing an offense as a crime of violence is a purely legal determination," which we review de novo.…
U.S. v. Rodriguez-Jaimes
Whether a defendant's prior conviction can be classified as a crime of violence under the Sentencing…
holding that "[c]areer offender status is not a sentencing judge's determination of fact other than a prior conviction"
holding for section 2332a purposes, the "threat need not be credible"
Summary of this case from U.S. v. McMorrow
finding prior convictions are a question of law
Summary of this case from Pena v. U.S.
Frank Guevara challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a of threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction ("WMD"). He also appeals his classification as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. Finally, he challenges his sentence in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The presentence report ("PSR") classified Guevara as a career offender under the guidelines because he was over eighteen years of age at the time of the crime, he had at least two convictions for crimes of violence, and the probation officer characterized the § 2332a conviction as a crime of violence. Guevara objected to the career offender classification, arguing that the instant WMD conviction was not a crime of violence. The district court overruled his objection and, based on this classification, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
Guevara does not challenge his conviction under § 876. Given the statutory maximum punishment of life in prison under § 2332a, Guevara's offense level was raised from 27 to 37, and his criminal history category was raised from V to VI. These adjustments dictated a sentencing range of 360 months to life.
A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts or conspires to use, a weapon of mass destruction . . . (2) against any person within the United States, and the results of such use affect interstate or foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign commerce . . . shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. . . .
Guevara contends that to secure a conviction under § 2332a, the government must establish both that he made a "threat" and that it encompassed the "use" of a weapon of mass destruction. Guevara makes arguments that would, in the absence of preclusive authority, make closer the issue of whether "to threaten to use" requires an expression of intent to act in the future. There are plain-language and legislative history arguments that, in a vacuum, might lend credence to Guevara's interpretation.
Guevara points to legislative materials that suggest Congress perceived anthrax hoaxes to remain uncovered by existing laws. Those materials include (1) the fact that Congress recently enacted a law to punish them and (2) the fact that, except in very limited circumstances, the maximum punishment in that legislation is five years in prison.
These arguments are nonetheless unavailing in light of United States v. Reynolds, 381 F.3d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 922, 160 L.Ed.2d 810 (2005), in which we construed § 2332a to contain no requirement of future action:
On appeal Reynolds argued that he had not "threatened" to use a WMD because the statement in question conveyed only the completion of a past act. Citing United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997), we held that § 2332a's threat language does not require reference to a future act. There is no reason able way to distinguish that ruling here.
A person who, without lawful authority, uses, threatens, or attempts to use, a weapon of mass destruction . . . (2) against any person within the United States, and the results of such use affect interstate or foreign commerce or, in the case of a threat, attempt, or conspiracy, would have affected interstate or foreign commerce . . . shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. . . .
That construction, however, is probably superior to the alternative, which is to decline to distribute "to use" upstream. This alternative construction would leave the statute an unintelligible law punishing any "person who, without lawful authority . . . threatens . . . a weapon of mass destruction." We are faced with the unenticing choice, on the basis of the "to use" language, between a construction that reads "uses . . . to use" and a construction that leaves the statute without a direct object. We therefore decline to refocus intensely on the "to use" language where Reynolds would seem to foreclose the question in any event. See Reynolds, 381 F.3d at 406 (explicitly contemplating the phrase "threaten to use").
In United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1999), the court held that where a misstated element is included in the jury instruction, but not in the indictment, the misstated element does not necessarily become law of the case. Our court has held as much, albeit in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Munoz-Hernandez, 94 Fed.Appx. 243, 245 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 999, 160 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2005). We now adopt the First Circuit rule, to the effect that the "substantially affected" language does not become law of the case. Consistent with the foregoing authorities, the jury instruction may not become law of the case if both (1) it is patently erroneous and (2) the issue is not misstated in the indictment.
Guevara also argues that the "substantially affected" language is invited error. We are uncertain precisely what to make of this argument. The district court issued the jury instruction, and the government merely failed to object. Moreover, the government does not "complain" of the error.
Guevara argues that his WMD conviction was incorrectly classified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Before Booker, we reviewed a district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Because these are questions of law, the same standard should control in the wake of Booker. "[W]hen a district court has imposed a sentence under the Guidelines, this court continues after Booker to review the district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo." United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Other circuits have determined that mailing a threatening communication under § 876 constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1). In United States v. Left Hand Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1990), the court reasoned that, because of § 876's requirement that the communication threaten to injure the addressee or another third party, § 4B1.2(a)(1) was satisfied.
Reaching the contrary conclusion, moreover, would require us to say that the use of WMD's does not involve physical force. Guevara addresses this argument in a single sentence of his opening brief: "Here, none of the offenses speak to the use of `force' or even threatened attempted force." We reject that illogical reasoning and conclude, categorically, that the WMD's at issue here involved physical force within the meaning of § 4B1.2(a)(1).
We decline to engage in the more complicated analysis under § 4B1.2(a)(2), which under the "otherwise clause" would require us to consider risk posed by hypothetical conduct.
Based solely on the facts adduced in the jury findings, the maximum sentence the district court could assess against Guevara was seventy-eight months. Guevara asserts that the court should not have increased the sentence by deciding that he (1) committed a crime of violence; (2) substantially disrupted governmental functions; and (3) chose his victim on account of her governmental status. On the basis of those circumstances, the court increased Guevara's maximum available sentence under the guidelines to life imprisonment for the § 2332a violation; the court then proceeded to impose that maximum sentence.
Guevara's pre-adjustment maximum pursuant to the guidelines is calculated using the base offense level of 20 as found in the PSR. Coupled with a criminal history Category V, this offense level yields a range of 63-78 months.
In Booker, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 746. Based on facts the court found by a preponderance of the evidence at a post-trial sentencing hearing, it imposed a sentence exceeding that which it could have imposed on the basis of the facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
Having heard evidence that he had distributed 92.5 grams of crack, the jury found Booker guilty of a statutory offense carrying a penalty of 10 years to life in prison. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 746. Based on his criminal history and the quantity of drugs found by the jury, the guidelines stipulate a sentencing range of 210-262 months. See id. In a post-conviction sentencing hearing the court found, according to a preponderance of the evidence, that Booker had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and was guilty of obstructing justice. See id. That additional factfinding yielded, according to the guidelines, a sentence of 360 months to life in prison. See id. The court imposed a 30-year sentence, compared to d to the 21 years and 10 months that could have been meted on the basis of facts proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
The Court made several key holdings in Booker. First, it found that mandatory sentencing based on facts not found by the jury violates the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 749-50. Second, it severed and excised the provisions that rendered the guidelines unconstitutional, specifically those making them mandatory. See id. at 759-61. Finally, it instructed lower courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines in determining whether the imposed sentence requires a vacatur and remand. See id. at 769.
Specifically, the decision severs and excises 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) and § 3742(e) (main ed. and Supp. 2004).
Thus, Booker explicitly excepts from Sixth Amendment analysis the third component of the crime of violence determination, the fact of two prior convictions. The remaining determination necessary to classify a defendant as a career offender, then, is whether the current conviction constitutes a "crime of violence." That determination is in turn made pursuant to § 4B1.2(a)-(b). Because Guevara's career offender status depends only on crime-of-violence (rather than controlled substance) convictions, we focus exclusively on § 4B1.2(a).
Section 4B1.2(a)(2) instructs courts to consider the instant offense a crime of violence if it is "burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Our caselaw interpreting that provision has categorically forbidden courts from looking beyond the statute and the indictment in making this decision. Therefore, as is the case with § 4B1.2(a)(1), under § 4B1.2(a)(2) the sentencing court cannot base its crime-of-violence determination on anything beyond what is present in the statute or alleged in the indictment, elements as to which, to convict, the jury must have found evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in any event. As a consequence, the crime-of-violence determination is made exclusively pursuant to facts found by a jury, and Guevara's classification as a career offender is not in violation of the Sixth Amendment under Booker.
See, e.g., United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 932, 160 L.Ed.2d 817 (2005).
In United States v. Rios-Quintero, 204 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000), we addressed what standard of review to apply where a party briefed a claim on appeal but had not raised it in the district court because the Supreme Court had not yet issued the decision underlying the claim itself. We concluded that the plain error standard of review was nonetheless appropriate for claims first raised on appeal where the relevant Supreme Court case was decided during the pendency of that appeal. Id. at 215. We thus apply a plain error standard to Guevara's Sixth Amendment claim.
The Supreme Court case at the heart of the tardy party's claim in Rios-Quintero was Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999).
Under plain error review, to correct an error not properly preserved, we must find (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) affects substantial rights. "If all three conditions are met an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). See also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005) (reiterating that this is the applicable standard in Booker cases where the error is not preserved), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 31, 2005) (No. 04-9517).
Finally, because the district court sentenced Guevara to the maximum allowable punishment (life) under both the guidelines and § 2332a, and because the maximum sentence the court can impose, even post- Booker, remains limited to life by the terms of § 2332a, there is no reason to believe that the sentencing court would sentence Guevara any differently merely because the guidelines are advisory.
This analysis is reinforced by Mares, which states that "the pertinent question is whether [the defendant] demonstrated that the sentencing judge — sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one — would have reached a significantly different result." Mares, 402 F.3d at 521. "[T]he defendant rather than the government bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice" in these determinations. Id. Here, as in Mares,
Id. at 522. And again, as in Mares, "the defendant cannot carry his burden of demonstrating that the result would have likely been different had the judge been sentencing under the Booker advisory regime rather than the pre- Booker mandatory regime[, so] the defendant cannot satisfy the third prong of the plain error test." Id. We need not address Guevara's arguments regarding the other two enhancements, because he points to nothing in the record suggesting that they created a prejudicial Booker error.