Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/455/225/569648/
Timestamp: 2019-07-20 23:54:08
Document Index: 456471407

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19838', '§ 621', '§ 951', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 46141', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 46029', '§ 46142', '§ 46101', '§ 46007', '§ 630']

Keith A. Hill, Appellant v. Borough of Kutztown and Gennaro Marino, Mayor of Kutztown, in His Individual and Official Capacity, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 2006 › Keith A. Hill, Appellant v. Borough of Kutztown and Gennaro Marino, Mayor of Kutztown, in His Indivi...
Keith A. Hill, Appellant v. Borough of Kutztown and Gennaro Marino, Mayor of Kutztown, in His Individual and Official Capacity, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006)
Argued May 15, 2006
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED William P. Murphy, Esq., (Argued), Murphy & Goldstein, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Timothy T. Myers, Esq., (Argued), Raymond J. Santarelli, Esq., John G. Dean, Esq., Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C., Blue Bell, PA, Paul J. Dellasega, Esq., Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellee Gennaro Marino, Mayor of Kutztown.
Robyn F. McGrath, Esq., (Argued), Sweeney & Sheehan, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Michael T. Sellers, Esq., Kardos, Rickles, Sellers & Hand, Newtown, PA, for Appellee Borough of Kutztown.
Appellant Hill, a licensed professional engineer, was appointed Borough Manager of Kutztown in early 1991. ¶¶ 4, 7.1 In this capacity, he reported to the Borough Council (which consisted of six elected members) and, "in respect to some subjects," to Gennaro Marino, the elected Mayor of the Borough. As Borough Manager, Hill was responsible for the administration of all departments within the Borough. ¶¶10-11.
In short, Hill's complaint alleges that Mayor Marino harassed him and other Borough employees. When he reported the Mayor's harassment to the Borough Council, the Mayor intensified his attacks on Hill as retaliation for this reporting (and for positions Hill took that were contrary to the Mayor's positions). As a result of the Mayor's conduct, Hill's workplace became so intolerable that he had no choice but to resign.2
Another way Mr. Marino has hurt the borough is in the manner in which he has conducted himself in the bars, clubs and community with talk smearing the reputation of good people. He has made many statements in those places of how he is going to get rid of certain council members and plans to have this or that borough employee replaced . . . His statements concerning these individuals are hurting the borough because they. . . are based on false opinions . . . [T]hose statements are hurting the good reputation of our hard-working employees.
Marino's conduct and behavior nevertheless continued. He told the Chief of Police that he "would make life difficult for him as a means to get him to resign as chief." ¶37. Further, he behaved in a hostile and intimidating manner toward several other Borough employees, each of whom approached Hill and told him about this treatment at the hands of the Mayor. ¶¶ 24-27, 30-35.
In addition to his threats to "get rid of" — and his hostile treatment of — Borough employees, Mayor Marino also made several false accusations against Hill. At a meeting of the Borough Council on April 23, 2002, Mayor Marino "demanded [Hill's] resignation, purportedly because of his involvement in certain appointments by [the] Council which the Mayor described as a `plot' that was corrupt and criminal." ¶ 22. Mayor Marino also told Borough employee Frank Caruso that Hill was "illegally moving funds to confuse everyone." ¶28.
" [A]s part of his duties as Manager," Hill reported Mayor Marino's conduct towards him and towards the other Borough employees to the Borough Council. ¶36.
As retaliation (1) for Hill's reporting the Mayor's conduct to the Borough Council, (2) for Hill's advocacy in support of the telecommunications project, and (3) for Hill's support of other unspecified positions that were associated with the previous mayor, Mayor Marino continued his persecution of Hill. ¶¶ 43, 110. Specifically, the Mayor engaged in a series of "harassing, intimidating and oppressive confrontations with [Hill] at his workplace and at Council meetings," and defamed Hill to Borough employees, and to consultants present at Hill's workplace, and to the public. ¶44.
The Mayor's conduct, and the Borough Council's failure to stop it, made life so intolerable for Hill that he eventually had no choice but to resign. ¶ 55.3 Hill submitted a letter of resignation on August 29, 2002, which stated that he would cease work on October 12, 2002. ¶ 57.4
The Borough Council continued to be upset about Mayor Marino's conduct, and the effect it was having.5 It asked Hill to reconsider and stay on as Borough Manager. Hill refused, but did agree to postpone his departure until October 27, 2002. ¶¶66-67.
Hill then accepted a position with "the engineering consulting firm that had for years served in the role of Borough engineer." The Borough Council (by unanimous vote) initiated and worked out a part-time emergency "consulting" arrangement with that firm so that Hill could be made available to assist with certain urgent Borough tasks, such as budget preparation, in the period of transition to the new Manager. ¶¶ 68-73. Hill worked in this capacity, without receiving any additional salary for it, until January 2003, when the Borough hired a replacement. ¶¶ 74-76. The replacement was twenty-seven years old, ¶ 76, some fifteen or sixteen years younger than Hill, who was over 40 years of age when he left the Borough's employ. ¶ 4.6
Hill brought this lawsuit against Mayor Marino (in his individual and official capacities) and the Borough of Kutztown. The complaint alleged that the Mayor's campaign of harassment, defamation and retaliation deprived Hill of his job (through constructive discharge7 ), and did damage to his reputation and his ability to earn a living as a licensed professional engineer and a public servant See, e.g., ¶ ¶ 14, 58, 106. He further alleged that the Borough Council "did not halt, reverse or lessen or otherwise materially affect the alleged offending conduct of the Mayor." See, e.g., ¶16.
Hill's complaint asserted § 19838 claims against both the Mayor and the Borough for violation of his (1) procedural due process rights, (2) substantive due process rights, (3) equal protection rights and (4) First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. The complaint also asserted against the Borough (5) a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and state law claims for (6) violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations. Act ("PHRA"), 43 PA. CONS.STAT. § 951, et seq. and (7) indemnification and restitution. Finally, the complaint asserted against the Mayor a(8) state law malicious prosecution claim.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), the District Court dismissed all of the federal claims against both the Mayor and the Borough, and the PHRA claim against the Borough. It then declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining pendent state common law claims.
Our review of the District Court's dismissal of the complaint is plenary. "When considering an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations. We examine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Delaware Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 415 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
We first address Hill's § 1983 claims against Mayor Marino,9 and Marino's immunity defenses.
The District Court properly concluded that Hill failed to state a claim for deprivation of his right to retain his job without due process because Hill's interest in retaining his job was not "encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property." "To have a property interest in a job . . . a person must have more than a unilateral expectation of continued employment; rather, she must have a legitimate entitlement to such continued employment." Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)). Whether a person has a legitimate entitlement to — and hence a property interest in — his government job is a question answered by state law. Id.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, Hill was an at-will employee.11 "The decisional law is clear that an at-will employee does not have a legitimate entitlement to continued employment because [he] serves solely at the pleasure of [his] employer." Elmore, 399 F.3d at 282. Hill thus lacked a property interest in retaining his position as Borough Manager that was "sufficient to trigger due process concerns." Id.12 We therefore need not consider whether the procedures available to him provided due process in order to conclude that the District Court should be affirmed on Hill's claim that he was deprived of employment without due process.
Relying on Satterfield v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, 12 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433-434 (E.D. Pa. 1998), the District Court held that defamation such as that with which Hill charges Marino, does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the due process clause unless it "occurs in the course of or is accompanied by . . . extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by law or the Constitution." Because Hill lacked a property interest in retaining his job under state law, the District Court held, Hill was not deprived of such a right or status when he was constructively discharged. Accordingly, Hill's due process claim failed.
This court has yet to decide the question of whether a public employee who is defamed in the course of being discharged, fails to state a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest merely because he lacked a property interest in continued employment that is independently protected by the due process clause. See Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 402 F.3d 139, 142 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2005) ("we have not yet decided this issue"); Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Fortunately, we need not reach this difficult question here.").13 Hill's appeal now presents that issue squarely.
The Supreme Court held in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1971) that an individual has a protectable interest in reputation. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 437, 91 S. Ct. 507.
Courts have subsequently clarified, however, that "reputation alone is not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Versarge v. Township of Clinton, New Jersey, 984 F.2d 1359, 1371 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-712, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)) (emphasis added).14 Rather, to make out a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). Accord, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233-234, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); Edwards v. California Univ. of Pennsylvania, 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 1998); Kelly v. Borough of Sayreville, 107 F.3d 1073, 1077-1078 (3d Cir. 1997); Ersek, 102 F.3d at 83 n. 5; Clark v. Township of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619-620 (3d Cir. 1989); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012-1013 (3d Cir. 1987). We have referred to this as the "stigma-plus" test. See, e.g., Graham, 402 F.3d at 142 n. 2; Ersek, 102 F.3d at 83 n. 5.
In the public employment context, the "stigma-plus" test has been applied to mean that when an employer "creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination," it deprives the employee of a protected liberty interest. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S. Ct. 882, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977). The creation and dissemination of a false and defamatory impression is the "stigma," and the termination is the "plus." When such a deprivation occurs, the employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing.15
To satisfy the "stigma" prong of the test, it must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were made publicly, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976); Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1223-1224 (3d Cir. 1988); Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir. 1988), and (2) were false. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627-629, 97 S. Ct. 882; Fraternal Order of Police v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1989).
Hill has clearly alleged that Marino defamed him by accusing him of wrongdoing. He alleges that the accusations were made publicly — before his colleagues and before the general public (at Borough Council meetings and in newspaper articles). He alleges that the accusations were false, and that they tarnished his reputation and "subjected [him] to scorn and ridicule."16 His complaint thus adequately alleges the "stigma" prong of the "stigma-plus" test.
In Paul v. Davis, the Court stated, somewhat enigmatically, that the "plus" had to be an alteration or extinguishment of "a right or status previously recognized by state law." 424 U.S. at 711, 96 S. Ct. 1155. That Court's treatment of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) suggests that, under this standard, a person's loss of employment to which he did not hold a state law-created property interest is a sufficient "plus."
In Roth, a non-tenured professor who had not been reappointed after his initial one-year term ended claimed he had been deprived of a right to continued employment without due process. The Court denied his claim, finding that the professor, because he was not tenured, did not have a property right to continued employment. It noted, however, that had the University defamed the professor in the course of declining to rehire him, it would have deprived the professor of a liberty interest. Id. at 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701. It came to this conclusion despite the fact that the professor lacked a property interest in his job. The Court in Paul v. Davis — and then in later opinions — impliedly endorsed this conclusion. 424 U.S. at 709-710, 96 S. Ct. 1155.17 See also Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233, 111 S. Ct. 1789; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 n. 13, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980).
Though it has never again taken this issue on directly, the Court in subsequent opinions has reiterated that the "plus" in "stigma-plus" claims arising out of public employment decisions, may be loss of a job in which the plaintiff held no property interest under state law. In Owen, the Eighth Circuit had held that the police chief petitioner "possessed no property interest in continued employment," but that allegedly false accusations the city made incident to his discharge "had blackened petitioner's name and reputation, thus depriving him of liberty without due process of law." 445 U.S. at 631, 100 S. Ct. 1398. Citing Roth and Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that it had "no doubt that the Court of Appeals" was correct in this conclusion. Id. at 633 n. 13, 100 S. Ct. 1398. Similarly, in Codd v. Velger, the Court stated that "where a non-tenured employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment," he is entitled to a name-clearing hearing. 429 U.S. at 627, 97 S. Ct. 882.18
We note that other courts have come to this conclusion, mostly based on Supreme Court language in Paul v. Davis. See, e.g., Doe v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104-1112 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Dennis v. S & S Consol. Rural High Sch. Dist., 577 F.2d 338, 342-343 (5th Cir. 1978); Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1976).
equate the interests protected by the property clause of the [fourteenth] amendment with those protected by the liberty clause . . . [T]he liberty clause would be stripped of any independent meaning in the context of government defamation. Government employees who enjoy an independent property interest in continued employment, of course, must be afforded due process upon termination regardless of whether they are discharged in connection with stigmatizing allegations. That process will ordinarily afford those employees an opportunity to refute stigmatizing allegations. The liberty clause, by contrast, protects reputation, not job tenure, in the government employment context. Although Paul requires the alteration of some governmentally recognized status in addition to defamation, the Paul court plainly declined to equate that additional component with an independent, constitutionally protected property interest.
Hill has thus alleged deprivation of a liberty interest protectible under the due process clause. Hill was not given the process he was due — a name-clearing hearing.19 He has consequently stated a claim for deprivation of his liberty interest in his reputation without the process the U.S. constitution requires.
Hill also claims that his rights under the Equal Protection clause were violated when Marino constructively discharged him. ¶ 103. He invokes the "class of one" theory announced in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam). According to that theory, a plaintiff states a claim for violation of the Equal Protection clause when he "alleges that he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Id. at 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073. The District Court dismissed this claim, and we will affirm, but on a different basis.
If it were true that Marino could not constructively discharge Hill because he lacked the power to fire Hill outright, all of Hill's claims against Marino would fail for this reason because they are all premised on Marino's constructive discharge of Hill. However, Marino could constructively discharge Hill even though he lacked the statutory authority to fire Hill outright. A supervisor who lacks the power to terminate a subordinate's employment may nonetheless abuse his power with respect to that subordinate, and may even constructively discharge the subordinate, provided he (the supervisor) exercises some power over the employee. Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 23-25 (3d Cir. 1997).20
In Bonenberger, a police officer who worked as a dispatcher sued a Sergeant whose repeated sexual harassment of the officer drove her to resign. The Sergeant "had no authority to hire, fire or make any employment decision [s] regarding" the dispatcher, but he did outrank her, and did sometimes supervise her work. Id. at 22-23. When the Sergeant supervised the dispatcher's work, he "had sole control over her work environment, determining when she . . . might take a break and which tasks [she] would perform." Id. at 22. He "could alter her workload whenever he supervised her shift." Id. at 24. If she "failed to follow his orders, the police department would view that failure as insubordination for which [she] properly could begin a disciplinary process that might result in her discharge." Id.
The District Court (in the context of "color of state law") granted summary judgment for the Sergeant on the ground that he did not have the power to make employment decisions regarding the police officer.21 This court reversed, noting
Pennsylvania statutes are not all that informative about the powers mayors have over employees holding the position of Borough Manager — the position that Hill held.22 Discovery will reveal whether Marino had sufficient supervisory power over Hill day-to-day, that he could constructively discharge Hill under the authority of Bonenberger. For now, Hill's allegations about the manner in which Marino exercised his mayoral powers are more than sufficient to withstand dismissal of Hill's complaint under 12(b) (6). Hence we are satisfied that pursuant to Hill's allegations, which we must credit, Marino had the "power" to constructively discharge Hill.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege two things: (1) that the activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action. See, e.g., Phyllis Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005).23 The first factor is a question of law; the second factor is a question of fact. Curinga v. City of Clairton, 357 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2004).
A public employee's statement is protected activity when (1) in making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have "an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public" as a result of the statement he made. Garcetti v. Ceballos, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689, ___ (2006). A public employee does not speak "as a citizen" when he makes a statement "pursuant to [his] official duties." Id. at 1960. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 97 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1987) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1983)).
Hill's complaint states that " [h]aving received complaints from employees [of the Borough] about hostile, intimidating, oppressive and harassing actions by Defendant Marino, Plaintiff as part of his duties as Manager and otherwise duly reported them, as well as his own complaints about the same kind of behavior, to Borough Council." ¶ 36 (emphasis added). In his brief, Hill states that he "relayed his and other workers' complaints [to the Borough Council] in fulfillment of his responsibilities as manager and appointed enforcer of the Borough's Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Policy and Program." Brief at 3.
Insofar as it is based on this report to the Borough Council, Hill's First Amendment claim must fail because, as Hill himself concedes, he reported Marino's conduct and harassing actions to the Borough Counsel "pursuant to his official duties." Under Garcetti, then, he was not speaking "as a citizen" when he made these reports, and, thus, as a matter of law, the reports are not protected speech.24
First, the complaint does not indicate that when Hill expressed support for the telecommunications project — as when he complained to the Borough Council — he was speaking pursuant to his official duties, so we read the complaint to allege that Hill was speaking "as a citizen." See Delaware Nation, 446 F.3d at 415 (on a 12(b) (6) motion, the court examines "whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.") (emphasis added).
Second, we cannot determine in this procedural posture whether the speech involved a matter of public concern.25 That determination must be made after an examination of "the content, form, and context of [the] statement, as revealed by the whole record." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384, 107 S. Ct. 2891.
Nor can we resolve at this stage of this case the question of whether Marino had "an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public" by restricting his speech. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
Hill also bases his First Amendment retaliation claim on his support for "the policies and programs of the previous mayor." To make out a claim of discrimination based on political association, a public employee must allege (1) that the employee works for a public employer in a position that does not require a political affiliation, (2) that the employee maintained a political affiliation, and (3) that the employee's political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. Goodman v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Com'n, 293 F.3d 655, 663-664 (3d Cir. 2002).26 We need not spend time analyzing this issue because Hill's allegations in his complaint cannot support such a claim.
First, we hold that the absolute immunity which shields local officials from liability for their legislative activities, see Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998), does not shield Marino because the conduct with which he is charged — constructive discharge through harassment, defamation, and accusations of illegality — was not "legislative activities." See Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 839-840 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing the scope of what constitutes "legislative activities").
Finally, we turn to Marino's asserted qualified immunity defense. " [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity and are `shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.'" Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). "A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity `must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'" Id. (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 143 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1999)).
We hold that Marino is not entitled to qualified immunity on Hill's "stigma-plus" due process claim to the extent that claim requests a name-clearing hearing, because the defense of qualified immunity is available only for damages claims — not for claims requesting prospective injunctive relief. Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1091 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2003); Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 957 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, J.). See also Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 448 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that if the District Court determined on remand that plaintiffs, who sought damages and an injunction, had abandoned their damages claim, "the District Court will have no occasion to devote. . . efforts to resolving the question of whether defendants . . . are entitled to qualified immunity.").27
Hill brings against the Borough all the § 1983 claims he brought against the Mayor. Because we will affirm the dismissal of the claims against the Mayor alleging deprivation of a property right without due process, violation of substantive due process rights and violation of equal protection rights, we dismiss those claims against the Borough as well. "There cannot be an `award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact . . . the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.'" Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986)).
A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its employees by virtue of respondeat superior. Rather, a municipality may be held liable for the conduct of an individual employee or officer only when that conduct implements an official policy or practice. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 2005).
An individual's conduct implements official policy or practice under several types of circumstances, including when (1) the individual acted pursuant to a formal government policy or a standard operating procedure long accepted within the government entity, (2) the individual himself has final policy-making authority such that his conduct represents official policy, or (3) a final policy-maker renders the individual's conduct official for liability purposes by having delegated to him authority to act or speak for the government, or by ratifying the conduct or speech after it has occurred. See generally Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-484, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986); McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 367; LaVerdure v. County of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125-126 (3d Cir. 2003).
Here, it is number (2) above that is most relevant. Only if Mayor Marino was a final policy-maker was his constructive discharge of Hill effectively official Borough policy such that the Borough may be held liable for it. Hill has alleged explicitly that Mayor Marino was a final policymaker. See, e.g., ¶¶97, 101, 108, 115.
In order to ascertain if an official has final policy-making authority, and can thus bind the municipality by his conduct, a court must determine (1) whether, as a matter of state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the particular area of municipal business in question, McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997) and City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. 915, 924, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988), and (2) whether the official's authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S. Ct. at 926; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S. Ct. 1292; McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 369; Brennan, 350 F.3d at 428 ("if a municipal employee's decision is subject to review . . . it is not final and that employee is therefore not a policymaker for purposes of imposing municipal liability under § 1983").
Here, Hill alleges that Marino constructively discharged him. As Hill points out, as a matter of state law, no government employee or body is permitted to constructively discharge an employee by making his working environment intolerable. As we discussed, however, Hill has alleged that the Mayor had the power to constructively discharge him, though he (Marino) lacked the power as Mayor to fire him outright. Moreover, Marino's constructive discharge of Hill was final in the sense that it was not reviewable by any other person or any other body or agency in the Borough. That is, there was no one "above" the Mayor who had the power to curtail his conduct or prevent him from harassing Hill to the point where Hill had no alternative but to leave his position.28 In this sense, Marino was a final policy-maker for the purpose of constructively discharging Hill.
Hill claims that Mayor Marino constructively discharged him because of his age, and that this constitutes an ADEA violation for which the Borough should be held liable.29 The ADEA provides, in pertinent part,
We have already (in the context of Hill's First Amendment claims) explained why Marino could, in fact, constructively discharge Hill. The Borough may be held liable for the alleged discharge because a plaintiff may bring an ADEA claim against a political subdivision of a state30 based on the actions of its employee(s).31 It does not matter that one entity within the Borough (the Council) may have supported Hill; the Council's alleged support of Hill does not "counteract" nor cure the Mayor's alleged harassment, with the result of immunizing the Borough of Kutztown from liability.
To state a claim for age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is over forty, (2) he is qualified for the position in question, (3) he suffered from an adverse employment decision,32 and (4) his replacement was sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age discrimination. Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2004).
Hill's allegations satisfy these requirements. See ¶ 127. Among other things, Hill was over forty when he was discharged, and his replacement was 27. Hill has therefore stated an ADEA claim that survives dismissal under 12(b) (6). The same legal standard applies to a claim under the PHRA as applies to an ADEA claim. Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2005).
All paragraph citations in this opinion refer to the complaint
Hill's employment was the responsibility of the Borough Council. He could only be appointed and fired by the Borough Council. 53 PA. CONS.STAT. § 46141
The Mayor apparently acknowledged the connection between the Mayor's conduct and Hill's resignation. At a September 17, 2002 meeting of the Borough Council, Mayor Marino stated that he deserved "credit" for Hill's departure. ¶ 62
Hill's brief makes reference to an August 2004 report that the Borough Council commissioned a Special Counsel to write. The report apparently corroborates and adds further detail to Hill's allegations about the way Mayor Marino behaved toward him
Two newspaper articles from September 2002 report Council President Ely as saying that "the false accusations made (by Marino) are detrimental to residents and the borough as a whole," and " [f]or the council the biggest thing is the misinformation given out by [Mayor Marino] . . . It's hard to deal with. I've been on (council) for 27 years and I've never seen anything like it." ¶¶ 63-64
"Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes."Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 159 L. Ed. 2d 204 (2004) (discussing constructive discharge in the context of a Title VII sexual harassment suit). "The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?" Id.
The District Court did not address the question of whether Hill has alleged conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign, i.e., whether he, in fact, was constructively discharged. It would have been inappropriate for the District Court to decide that fact-intensive question in the context of a 12(b) (6) motion. Thus, for the purpose of this opinion, we credit all allegations of Hill's complaint and accept what Hill alleges: that he was constructively discharged.
"Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mayor Marino does not dispute that he was acting under color of state law when he engaged in the conduct at issue here.
Hill brings claims against Mayor Marino "in his individual and official capacity." Section IIIA of this opinion addresses the § 1983 individual capacity claims against Marino. The § 1983 official capacity claims against Marino are, effectively, identical to the § 1983 claims against the Borough, which are addressed in Section IIIB(1) of this opinion See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) ("Official-capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent") (quotation and citation omitted); A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 581 (3d Cir. 2004) ("A suit against a governmental official in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity itself.").
We have held that a resignation will be deemed involuntary (i.e., deemed a constructive discharge) and will thus trigger the protections of the due process clause, and form the basis of a § 1983 due process claim, under only two circumstances: (1) when the employer forces the employee's resignation or retirement by coercion or duress, or (2) when the employer obtains the resignation or retirement by deceiving or misrepresenting a material fact to the employee Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 1999). At least one other court that applied this Leheny standard has recently held that the less strict constructive discharge standard the Supreme Court articulated in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 159 L. Ed. 2d 204 (2004), see footnote 7, is now "equally applicable" in the context of a due process claim, see Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2005).
The district court in Satterfield v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, itself recognized that. 12 F. Supp. 2d 423, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("the Third Circuit has not decided whether something less than a true property interest, independently protected by the Due Process Clause, can satisfy the requirement of a `right or status' guaranteed by the Constitution") (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976)).
According to the Supreme Court, damage to reputation alone is best vindicated with a state defamation claim Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). We recognize, however, that state law immunity doctrines often prevent such claims from being brought against government actors. See, e.g., Lindner v. Mollan, 544 Pa. 487, 677 A.2d 1194, 1195-1196 (1996) (doctrine of absolute privilege exempts a high public official from all civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory statements provided the statements are made in the course of the official's duties or powers and within the scope of his authority).
Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627, 97 S. Ct. 882, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977); Graham, 402 F.3d at 144; Ersek, 102 F.3d at 84; Doe v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1112-1114 (D.C. Cir. 1985). We have not in the past decided — and do not have occasion to decide here — whether a plaintiff who prevails on a "stigma-plus" claim may be entitled to remedies other than a name-clearing hearing. See Ersek, 102 F.3d at 84 n. 6.
The Mayor suggests that his statements about which Hill complains could not be sufficiently stigmatizing because they addressed "matters of public concern" (a phrase of art relevant in the First Amendment context), or because they were one public servant's statements about another public servant's performance of his public job. The statements about which Hill complains are not statements of opinion about the issues of the day, however, or standard comments made among politicians in the rough-and-tumble that is local politics. He complains about factual allegations of illegal conduct, that allegedly were false,see, e.g., ¶ 28, and that the Mayor allegedly knew were false. See, e.g., ¶ 51. They are not protected as a matter of law by any exception for "matters of public concern" or "public servant" exception.
In Codd v. Velger, the Court denied the claim of the petitioner — a probationary employee who lacked a property interest in his job — not because he was probationary, but because he failed to allege that the information that had been disclosed was false. 429 U.S. at 627-628, 97 S. Ct. 882.
It is not clear from the complaint whether Hill requested any sort of name-clearing hearing, but we have not held that he was required to do so See Ersek, 102 F.3d at 84 n. 8.
The court articulated its holding in terms of state power: it held that because the Sergeant lacked sufficient power over the police officer, he could not meet the "color of state law" requirement of § 1983. However, its holding was essentially the same as the District Court's holding in this case, even though here the district court articulates its holding in terms of the "authority over employment status." Both district courts found that a plaintiff could not sue a defendant for constructive discharge where the defendant lacked the power to terminate the plaintiff outright
The Pennsylvania statute listing the duties of a Borough Mayor states that "it shall be the duty of the mayor . . . to exact a faithful performance of the duties of the officers appointed." 53 PA. CONS.STAT. § 46029(1). Pursuant to 53 PA. CONS.STAT. § 46142, "the mayor may delegate to the borough manager any of his nonlegislative and nonjudicial powers and duties," with the approval of the Borough Council. It is the Borough Council — and not the Mayor — however, which sets the Borough Manager's' hours and compensation. 53 PA. CONS.STAT. § 46101. But the Mayor works as a member of the Borough Council under certain circumstances See, e.g., 53 PA. CONS.STAT. §§ 46007 ("Passage, approval and veto of ordinances") and 46003 ("When the mayor may preside over council and vote; [providing for] attendance of mayor at council meetings; breaking tie votes").
A defendant may defeat the plaintiff's claim by demonstrating that the defendant would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of plaintiff's protected conduct See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).
Hill appears to allege that his report to the Borough Council could be protected by the First Amendment not only as expressive speech, but also as "petitioning activity." ¶ 110. When a public employee's activity qualifies as "petitioning the government" — such as filing a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, or suing his employer — it is protected activity so long as the petition was not frivolous, or a "sham," regardless of whether the petition involved a matter of public concern Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 417 (3d Cir. 2003); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434-443 (3d Cir. 1994). We have never held, however, that a report of a superior's misconduct to a legislative body when the legislative body is also the reporter's employer constitutes "petitioning activity."
"A public employee's speech involves a matter of public concern if it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the community."Brennan, 350 F.3d at 412. It seems likely that advocacy and support for ideas, principles and projects a Borough Mayor disfavored would involve a matter of public concern under this standard.
In our cases in this area, "political affiliation" usually refers to party affiliation, but sometimes refers to affiliation with a particular politician or candidate
As we noted in footnote 15, we do not here decide whether a plaintiff who is successful on a "stigma-plus" due process claim is entitled to damages in addition to or instead of a name-clearing hearing. Assuming for the sake of argument that he is so entitled, Marino would be protected by qualified immunity on Hill's "stigma-plus" claim to the extent that Hill requests damages
While, as explained above, a violation of a constitutional right may have occurred here, that right was not clearly established in this Circuit before this opinion. Before today, the law in this Circuit had been unclear on the question of whether a public employee who was defamed in the process of being discharged may state a "stigma-plus" due process claim, though he lacked a property interest in continued employment. We had referred to this lack of clarity on two occasions. Graham v. City of Philadelphia, 402 F.3d 139, 142 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2005); Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1997). The lack of clarity was further evident from the fact that district courts within this Circuit had decided the question in both ways. Compare, e.g., Farber v. City of Paterson, 327 F. Supp. 2d 401, 412 n. 14 (D.N.J. 2004) (rev'd on other grounds) and Graham v. Johnson, 249 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565-568 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (both answering the question "yes") with Satterfield v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, 12 F. Supp. 2d 423, 433-434 (E.D. Pa. 1998) and the district court opinion in this case (both answering the question "no"). For this reason, the question was a question of first impression in this Circuit. No matter what further fact development reveals, then, the law was not clearly established on the point in question, and, if damages were in question, Marino would be entitled to qualified immunity.
Indeed, the Borough notes in its brief that the "Borough Council has no more power to silence the mayor than it does to silence a private citizen."Brief at 26.
Hill did not bring an ADEA claim against Mayor Marino himself, nor could he have because the ADEA does not provide for individual liability See Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 610 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2001); Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995) (all holding that there is no individual liability under the ADEA). See also Kachmar v. Sun-Gard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII, which is parallel to the ADEA in many ways).
The ADEA includes in its definition of employer "a State or political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2). The Supreme Court held in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522 (2000) that in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals. It does not follow, however, that sovereign immunity protects political subdivisions of states from suit by individuals. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401, 99 S. Ct. 1171, 59 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1979) ("the Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a `slice of state power.'").
Constructive discharge is an adverse employment decision that may form the basis of an ADEA claim Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001).