Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/563/396/31493/
Timestamp: 2019-11-11 20:14:53
Document Index: 792108359

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1552', '§ 723', '§ 1553', '§ 724', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41']

Staff Sergeant Agustin Correa, Appellant, v. Honorable William Graham Clayton, Jr.,*secretary of the Navy, et al., Appellees, 563 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1977 › Staff Sergeant Agustin Correa, Appellant, v. Honorable William Graham Clayton, Jr.,*secretary of the...
Staff Sergeant Agustin Correa, Appellant, v. Honorable William Graham Clayton, Jr.,*secretary of the Navy, et al., Appellees, 563 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1977)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 563 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1977) Oct. 19, 1977
This case presents difficult questions concerning the application of procedural due process to military administrative proceedings. Although the Constitution clearly provides servicemen some protection from arbitrary or unfair administrative discharges, Covington v. Anderson, 487 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1973); Arnheiter v. Ignatius, 292 F. Supp. 911, 920 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970), the contours of due process in the military community are far from clear. See generally Middendorff v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S. Ct. 433, 2 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1958); Denton v. Secretary of Air Force, 483 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1974); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961); Lunding, supra note 1. There is a second problem. Correa did not resort to two post-discharge administrative remedies, remedies from either the Board for Correction of Naval Records, see 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 723 (1976), or the Navy Discharge Review Board, see 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 724 (1976). This is explicable upon the basis that the relief available from those bodies is generally available only after discharge, and Correa was resisting his discharge only until the brief remaining period necessary for the fixing of his rights had elapsed. Numerous courts have held that exhaustion of military administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial relief. E. g., Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); Pickell v. Reed, 446 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946, 92 S. Ct. 301, 30 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1971); McCurdy v. Zuckert, 359 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1966). Although the exhaustion issue was not raised on appeal, it is quasi-jurisdictional in nature, and thus the court may consider it sua sponte. Champagne, supra, 506 F.2d at 982.
In reaching our conclusion, we are guided by the traditional principle that "a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 39 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1974); see Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 80 S. Ct. 785, 4 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1960) (per curiam); Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 67 S. Ct. 231, 91 L. Ed. 128 (1946). This rule against unnecessary constitutional adjudication applies even when neither the trial court nor the parties have considered the nonconstitutional basis for decision. Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77, 76 S. Ct. 131, 100 L. Ed. 60 (1955); Allen v. Aytch, 535 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1976).
There are three types of discharges that may result from administrative proceedings, honorable, general, or undesirable. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(1) (1976). A general discharge is appropriate "when a member's military record is not sufficiently meritorius (sic) to warrant an Honorable characterization, as prescribed by the regulations of the Service concerned." Id. § 41.9(a) (2). Because the vast majority of servicemen receive honorable discharges, a general discharge severely stigmatizes its recipient and significantly disadvantages him in the job market. See Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943, 953 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921, 86 S. Ct. 923, 15 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1966); Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 Yale L.J. 33, 35 (1973)
Moreover, Correa complains that he was given permission to appeal to the ultimate Discharge Authority only if he waived the presentation of a defense. Cf. Robinson v. Resor, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 469 F.2d 944 (1972); Cole v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 178 (1965); Middleton v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 36 (1965); Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226, 148 Ct. Cl. 404 (1960)
Only the Commandant, as the Discharge Authority authorized to take "final action" with respect to the Administrative Discharge Board, 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(i) (1976), could grant probation to Correa. Id. § 41.4(a) (4)
More specifically, either the doctrine of estoppel or the doctrine of waiver might prevent the Marine Corps officials from denying retirement benefits to Correa. While courts generally have granted the Government, as distinguished from individual representatives of the Government and from Government agencies, immunity from waiver and estoppel, see, e. g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947), some courts have recently denied immunity, even to the Government, when the interests of justice seem so to require. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970) (Government not immune when seeking specific performance of contract); Dana Corp. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1032, 1045, 200 Ct. Cl. 200 (1972) (detailed hearing appropriate to determine whether elements of estoppel were present); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 757, 766, 120 Ct. Cl. 72 (1951) (Government estopped to deny validity of governmental contracting officer's modification of contract)