Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020131227I54/HALL%20v.%20STATE
Timestamp: 2017-06-29 02:09:00
Document Index: 445201374

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19834', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 13', '§ 5']

HALL v. LOUISIANA | 974 F.Supp.2d 964 (2013) | Leagle.com
974 F.Supp.2d 964 (2013)
Citing Case 974 F.Supp.2d 964 (2013)
Ronald Ray Johnson , Ron Johnson and Associates, Stephen M. Irving , Steve Irving LLC, Joel Gerard Porter , Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff.
Patricia Hill Wilton , Angelique Duhon Freel , Jessica Marie Field Thornhill , Louisiana Department of Justice, William P. Bryan, III , Katherine Krupa Green , Douglas Gist Swenson , Attorney General's Office, Edmond Wade Shows , Elizabeth Everett , Grant Joseph Guillot , John Carroll Walsh , Shows, Cali, Berthelot & Walsh, LLP, Christina Berthelot Peck , Roedel, Parsons , Koch, Blache, Balhoff & McCollister, James L. Hilburn , Parish Attorney's Office, Paul H. Spaht , Kantrow, Spaht, Weaver & Blitzer, Mary E, Roper , Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 99), filed by Defendants Judge Laura Davis, Judge Suzan Ponder, and Judge Alex Wall (the "Defendant-Judges"), seeking an order from this Court dismissing Plaintiff Kenneth Hall's ("Hall") claims against them, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).1 Hall opposes the motion. (Doc. 103.) The Defendant-Judges were granted leave to file a memorandum in response to Hall's memorandum in opposition. (Doc. 120.) The motion was heard with oral argument. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331.
Hall2 filed this lawsuit3 pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19834 ("Section 1983"), 1986; Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973; Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 19655, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. I; the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and "the democratic principles of majority rule and individualist egalitarianism of the United States Constitution"6 against Defendants the State of Louisiana, Governor Piyush Jindal7, Attorney General James Caldwell8, Secretary of State Tom Schedler9, the City of Baton Rouge, the Parish of East Baton Rouge, the City Court of Baton Rouge, Mayor Melvin Holden10, the Louisiana House of Representatives11, the Louisiana Senate12, Judge Laura Davis, Judge Suzan Ponder, and Judge Alex Wall. (Docs. 1, 13, 74, and 76.) Hall alleges that the current judicial election plan, enacted by the Louisiana State Legislature in 1993, dilutes and diminishes the voting rights of African American voters in the City of Baton Rouge, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Hall further alleges that the judicial election plan, codified at La. R.S. § 1(4)(a)(b)(c), which divides the City of Baton Rouge into two election Sections (Sections 1 and 2) and five election Divisions (Divisions A, B, C, D, and E)13, impermissibly dilutes the votes of African Americans, who now make up 54.3% of the total City population.14
As to the instant motion, the Defendant-Judges seek an order from this Court dismissing Hall's claims against them, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Defendant-Judges contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought against them, as they are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. In the alternative, they argue that they are protected by judicial immunity and qualified immunity. The Defendant-Judges further contend that Hall has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because his Section 1983 claims are proscribed. They further argue that Hall has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because their alleged actions constitute free speech, which is protected by the First Amendment. In the alternative, the Defendant-Judges argue that Hall has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Voting Rights Act because the "one-man, one-vote" principle does not apply to judicial elections, and because the Defendant-Judges are incapable of granting the relief he seeks.
Hall opposes the motion and argues that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, as the Defendant-Judges are not immune from suit. He further contends that his Section 1983 claims are not proscribed. Hall also argues that he has sufficiently pled claims upon which relief can be granted, as the Defendant-Judges' actions are not protected by the First Amendment, and that the "one-man, one-vote" principle was codified into law by the Louisiana Legislature. Thus, Hall argues that his claims against the Defendant-Judges should not be dismissed.
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, however, "the court is permitted to look at evidence in the record beyond simply those facts alleged in the complaint and its proper attachments." Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1111, 130 S.Ct. 1054, 175 L.Ed.2d 883 (2010); Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (stating that a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may evaluate "(1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.)"15 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief. Wagstaff v. United States Dep't of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir.2007).
However, "[t]he burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction." Celestine v. TransWood, Inc., 467 Fed. Appx. 317, 318 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). "Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Id. (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161). A pleading stating a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]" Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)). In federal question cases, the party must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim based on federal law. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111 (1939). When a district court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its determination is not on the merits of the case, and does not bar the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in a proper jurisdiction. Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Defendant-Judges were originally sued in their individual and official capacities as Judges of the City Court of Baton Rouge. However, during the May 31, 2013 hearing on the instant motion, the Court dismissed Hall's Section 1983 and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act claims against the Defendant-Judges in their individual capacities, after finding that the facts alleged were insufficient to destroy judicial immunity. (Doc. 137.) Thus, the Court's analysis on the motion sub judice shall be limited to: (1) all claims against the Defendant-Judges in their official capacities; and (2) Hall's claims against the Defendant-Judges in their individual capacities under the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
In support of their motion, the Defendant-Judges contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, judicial immunity, and qualified immunity.
A state's immunity from suit is not absolute, however, and the Supreme Court has recognized several situations in which an individual may sue a state in federal court. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir.2011). First, Congress may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). Second, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily invoking federal court jurisdiction, or by making a "clear declaration" that it intends to submit itself to federal court jurisdiction. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670, 119 S.Ct. 2219. Third, an individual may sue a state under the doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).17
First, the Court notes that Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity for claims arising under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398-99 (6th Cir.1999); Reaves v. United States DOJ, 355 F.Supp.2d 510, 515 (D.D.C.2005) ("it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in passing the Voting Rights Act, effected a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity."); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has "concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States.") (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 803). Thus, Hall's Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act claims against the Defendant-Judges are not proscribed by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
It is also uncontested that the State of Louisiana has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)); La. R.S. § 13:5106(a). Thus, the remaining question is whether the Ex parte Young doctrine applies to Hall's Section 1983 claims against the Defendant-Judges.
Hall's Original Complaint alleges that the Defendant-Judges "actively campaigned and testified in opposition to Louisiana House Bill 1013 in Regular Session 2004 ... [and] actively opposed Louisiana House Bill 985 of Regular Session 2006 to reapportion, redistrict and reallot City Court judgships...." (Doc. 1, ¶ 77.) According to Hall, such Bills would have "partially or fully negated the disparate and now consequential adverse impact on the Black citizens and voters in Baton Rouge and remedied the complaints alleged herein and legally salvaged the current Judicial Election Plan." (Doc. 1, ¶ 76.) In his Second Amending and Supplemental Complaint, Hall alleges that the Defendant-Judges have:
acted individually and in concert with others in the intentional defiance of the Plaintiff's right of suffrage, right to majority rule, and right of freedom from discrimination as asserted heretofore and herein in their invidious opposition to the Plaintiff's claims individually, and as a group of individuals, who are acting and have acted as State of Louisiana judicial officers and agents, endowed by the State with the powers and functions of government....
(Doc. 74, ¶ 13.) Hall further alleges that Defendant-Judges have "personally benefitted [from] and politically supported maintenance thereof and continuance of the [Judicial Election Plan]...." (Doc. 74, ¶ 14.) Further, as alleged by Hall, the Defendant-Judges' "actions helped to prevent the successful outcome of the remedial actions of state representatives and the legislative bills filed in 2004 and 2006 before the Louisiana Legislature to ameliorate the disparate impacts of the Judicial Election Plan...." (Doc. 74, ¶ 15.)
Even when accepting all well-pled facts as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to Hall, it cannot be said that he has sufficiently alleged that the Defendant-Judges have some connection with the enforcement of the 1993 Judicial Election Plan, or that they are specifically charged with the duty to enforce the Plan and are threatening to exercise that duty. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441 ("[i]n making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional ... such officer must have some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party."). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply, and that Hall's Section 1983 claims against the Defendant-Judges are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In support of their motion, the Defendant-Judges also contend that they are protected by absolute judicial immunity. Thus, Hall's remaining claims against them must be dismissed. They argue that their testimony before the Louisiana Legislature were judicial acts. Thus, they are immune from suit.
In opposition, Hall argues that the Defendant-Judges' actions were nonjudicial because their testimony before the Louisiana Legislature was not a normal judicial function and because their actions took place outside of the City Court building.18
It is well settled that, generally, a judge is immune from suit for any action taken within the scope of the judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (citations omitted). As opined by the Supreme Court:
Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, `it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)). Further, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages. Id. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 36 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).
There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may be overcome. Davis v. Tarrant County Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir.2009). "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286). "Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286). Allegations of bad faith or malice are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286 ("judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.")).
"[W]hether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Davis, 565 F.3d at 222 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 286). "[T]he relevant inquiry is the `nature' and `function' of the act, not the `act itself.' In other words, [a court should] look to the particular act's relation to a general function normally performed by a judge...." Davis, 565 F.3d at 222 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. 286).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge's actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge's chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Id. at 222-23 (citing Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)). These factors are broadly construed in favor of immunity. Id. at 223 (citing Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515).
Here, the Defendant-Judges do not contest that they testified to the Louisiana Legislature in 2004 regarding House Bill 1013, and in 2006 regarding House Bill 985. Instead, they contend that Cannon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct19 permits state judges to appear in public hearings before a legislative body on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
Hall does not allege that the Defendant-Judges' testimony before the Louisiana Legislature were acts not normally performed by a judge. Rather, Hall merely alleges that the Defendant-Judges did so for their own personal benefit. Such allegations, however, are insufficient to establish a plausible claim that the Defendant-Judges' acts were not a normal judicial function. Indeed, Canon 4 of Louisiana's Code of Judicial Conduct suggests that the complained of actions are generally permitted and normally performed by state and local judges.
It is not clear from Hall's Complaint exactly where the complained of acts took place. Nor is the Court aware of the specific content of the Defendant-Judges' testimony. However, nothing in Hall's Complaint suggests that the Defendant-Judges' testimony took place in an inappropriate location, or was outside of the scope of the then pending House Bills or the issues permitted by Canon 4 of Louisiana's Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, Hall has failed to point to any law or case to support his contention that the complained of acts were nonjudicial. The Court broadly construes "matter concerning the administration of justice" to include how judicial election Sections and Divisions should be drawn. The likelihood that the Defendant-Judges' testimony was self-serving does not require the Court to conclude that such testimony was not "concerning the administration of justice." Thus, the Court concludes that the Defendant-Judges' actions were judicial in nature.
Hall's Complaint is also void of any allegations that the Louisiana Legislature did not deal with the Defendant-Judges in their judicial capacities. Further, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to Hall, the Court finds that Hall's Complaint does not sufficiently allege that the Defendant-Judges' actions were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (emphasizing that the scope of a judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir.1985).
While it may be true that the Defendant-Judges' actions were taken for their own personal benefit, and not for the benefit of the citizens of Baton Rouge generally, allegations of bad faith or malice are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Davis, 565 F.3d at 221 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. 286). Moreover, "disagreement with the action taken by a judge ... does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity," nor does the fact that "tragic consequences" may ensue from the judge's action deprive him of his absolute immunity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 363-64, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Indeed, judges have absolute judicial immunity for all acts performed in the exercise of judicial functions, no matter the alleged magnitude or mendacity of the acts. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir.1994).
In sum, the Court concludes that Hall has not sufficiently alleged facts that would destroy the Defendant-Judges' absolute judicial immunity. Therefore, Hall has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and his remaining claims against the Defendant-Judges in their respective individual and official capacities must be dismissed.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Judge Laura Davis, Judge Suzan Ponder, and Judge Alex Wall's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 99) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Kenneth Hall's remaining claims against Judge Laura Davis, Judge Suzan Ponder, and Judge Alex Wall are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
FootNotes 1. Since the filing of the instant motions to dismiss, Hall filed a Second Amending and Supplemental Complaint and a Third Amending and Supplemental Complaint. (Docs. 74 and 76.) Where, as here, the plaintiff's subsequent complaints refer to, adopt, and incorporate the original complaint, it cannot be said that the subsequent complaints superceded the original complaint. Stewart v. City of Houston Police Dep't, 372 Fed.Appx. 475, 478 (5th Cir.2010) (citing King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994)). Thus, in considering the instant motions, the Court shall analyze Hall's Original Complaint (Doc. 1), First Amending and Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 13), Second Amending and Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 74), and Third Amending and Supplemental Complaint (Doc. 76).
13. Under the current Judicial Election Plan, the City of Baton Rouge is divided into two judicial election Sections: Section 1 and Section 2. Each Section then divided into multiple Divisions. Section 1 is divided into Divisions B and D, and Section 2 is divided into Divisions A, C, and E. Each Division elects one judge to the City Court of Baton Rouge.
14. Hall also points the Court to the United States Census Data, which indicates that the total population of Whites, not Hispanic or Latino, in the City of Baton Rouge decreased from 118, 429 or 53.9% in the year 1990 to 86,679 or 37.8% in the year 2010. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 19-21.)
15. Here, none of the parties have submitted affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials. Thus, the Court's review is limited to whether the allegations in Hall's Original Complaint and subsequent Amending and Supplemental Complaints are sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]f the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true. If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient the complaint stands.").
16. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003), the Supreme Court held that although the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting states, Congress may abrogate such immunity in federal court "if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power [to enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process] under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972. Congress has "parallel power" to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment as well. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966)).
17. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby permitting suits against state officials in their official capacity in order to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 411 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441).
18. Hall further contends that "[t]he Defendant Judges, when questioned in 2004 by a minority member of the House Committee, testified their actions equated to no less than judicial politics designed to benefit them politically [based on their race] and to preserve themselves in office." (Doc. 103, p. 12.) Hall fails to identify, however, where in his Original Complaint or subsequent Amending and Supplemental Complaints he made this allegation, and fails to point to any evidence in the record to substantiate this contention. Thus, it will not be considered by the Court.
19. Canon 4 of the Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct states:
Code of Judicial Conduct, http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/cjc.asp (September 30, 2013) (emphasis in original).