Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/591/1019/369214/
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 01:31:59
Document Index: 621421011

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 844', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 844', '§ 841', '§ 2421', '§ 2113', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 844', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 201', '§ 844', '§ 841']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Pete Hernandez, Defendant-appellant, 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1979 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Pete Hernandez, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Pete Hernandez, Defendant-appellant, 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1979) March 20, 1979
The panel followed United States v. Costello, 5 Cir. 1973, 483 F.2d 1366, as applied in United States v. Horsley, 5 Cir. 1975, 519 F.2d 1264, Cert. denied, 1976, 424 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1413, 47 L. Ed. 2d 350. In Costello, separate convictions for possession of LSD under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) were affirmed. The Costello court found that, under the "different evidence" test,3 the facts showed that the possession and distribution of LSD were separate offenses. In Horsley, the court cited Costello to support its holding that the offenses of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of hashish oil did not merge under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). The panel declined to limit Costello and Horsley to the propriety of separate convictions rather than separate sentences because the issue was not raised in those cases.
The present case requires us solely to consider the intent of Congress in enacting this provision: did it intend to make a single delivery of narcotics punishable as two separate offenses one, possession with intent to distribute and the other, the actual distribution or did it define alternative offenses, one requiring proof of fewer facts than the other? The legislative history is silent on this point. The other circuits that have considered this problem have uniformly refused to permit double punishment for violation of these two phrases of Section 841(a) (1) in a single transaction. The Fourth4 and Ninth5 Circuits have proscribed consecutive sentences in cases where the possession with intent to distribute and distribution of the controlled substance were both proved by evidence of a single transaction. The Sixth6 and Tenth7 Circuits have even proscribed separate concurrent sentences. The Eighth Circuit, while not faced with exactly the same issue as the other courts, has held that simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) is a lesser included offense of distribution under § 841(a) (1).8 No case has been cited to indicate that any court has taken the same approach as this circuit.
The divination of congressional intent begins with cases involving other offenses. In Bell v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905, the Court reversed the defendant's consecutive sentences on two counts of violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, where two women had been transported at one time. The Court recognized that separate convictions would be proper if Congress so intended, but found that the congressional purpose was left unclear in this regard. A principle of lenity was declared:
349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S. Ct. at 622, 99 L. Ed. at 910-11.
In Prince v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed. 2d 370 the Court held that consecutive sentences were improper on separate counts brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 of bank robbery and entering a bank with intent to commit a felony. The Court relied in part on the congressional history showing the reason for adding an additional offense to the bank robbery statute and the absence of any evidence of an intention to pyramid the penalties. See also Heflin v. United States, 1959, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S. Ct. 451, 3 L. Ed. 2d 407 (applying the principle of lenity). Compare Milanovich v. United States, 1961, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S. Ct. 728, 5 L. Ed. 2d 773.9 No historical clues, however, can be found with respect to the controlled substances statute.
However, we are guided by the policies set forth in Bell, supra, and, at least to some degree renewed in Prince, supra. The sentence for possession with intent to distribute combined with the consecutive sentence for distribution imposes double punishment for conduct that, under the facts of this case, merges into a single offense. The evidence of the sale was relied upon to prove both Hernandez's constructive possession of the heroin and his intention to distribute it. There was no evidence of Pete's possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute it apart from the evidence of the actual sale. When the intent to distribute was executed by a successful sale, the possession with intent to do so merged into the completed offense. See United States v. Curry, 4 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 1299, 1306, Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S. Ct. 55, 46 L. Ed. 2d 50.
Pete Hernandez was convicted both of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin in violation of the same statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and received consecutive sentences of imprisonment of ten years, a total of twenty years' imprisonment, and special parole terms of twenty years on each of a two-count indictment, a total of forty years' special parole term.1
(1) (A) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than $25,000. or both.
(3) Appellants contend that the offenses of possession with intent to distribute and distribution should have been merged, because possession with intent to distribute is a lesser included offense of distribution. Both offenses were violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), which provides:(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
This Circuit applies the "different evidence" test, according to which "convictions for separate offenses arising from a single fact pattern are upheld if each statute proscribing the conduct requires proof of different facts and different elements as to each separate offense." United States v. Hill, 5 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 733, 740 (use of common carrier for carriage of obscene films in interstate commerce and transporting obscene films for purpose of sale or distribution do not merge). In United States v. Costello, 5 Cir., 1973, 483 F.2d 1366, we held that possession of LSD under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and distribution under § 841(a) (1) were separate offenses, since the former was complete on receipt of the drugs from a third party, whereas the latter required transfer to a third party. 483 F.2d at 1368.
The different evidence test referred to is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), in which the Court affirmed convictions with consecutive sentences for the offenses of selling prohibitive drugs not in their original stamped package, and of selling such drugs without a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, which grew out of one sale. In Blockburger the Court held:
The literal disjunctive provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), the section involved here, on their face show the creation of distinct and separate offenses for possession with intent to distribute and distribution. The manifest intent here is expressed in the words of the statute itself whose literal meaning does not offend against a finding of multiple offenses growing out of the criminal activity in this case. Under the specific facts the jury, pursuant to the court's instructions, found the defendant, Hernandez, guilty of separate counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution. The original panel opinion agreed that these convictions and sentences should be affirmed, but disagreed with the court's prior line of authority in Horsley and Costello, supra, and United States v. Young, 5 Cir., 1973, 482 F.2d 993, and suggested that these cases not be followed in this case. En banc consideration followed. It is implicit in the panel opinion's holding, however, that the evidence was sufficient to show both possession and distribution on the part of defendant; otherwise, the convictions should have been reversed by the panel for insufficiency of the evidence, as appellant, Pete Hernandez, in his original brief to the panel, contended.
But in a speculation as to congressional intent concerning the statutory provision herein, the majority relies on Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955), a Mann act case, where the Supreme Court held that ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, 349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S. Ct. at 622. However, the majority opinion concludes that "(n)o historical clues, however, can be found with respect to the controlled substances statute." We differ somewhat with this conclusion since there are pertinent historical aspects of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 of which section 841(a) (1) is a part. In the House Report No. 91-1444, Part I, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 4566, 4575, there is an approving reference to the Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse, the Prettyman Commission, which states the Commission's general philosophy, that "(t)he illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the Federal Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should be made too dangerous to be attractive." If the precise congressional intent is susceptible of ascertainment, which is very doubtful, the House Report referred to may be considered as supporting an intention to exact strict compliance with the drug abuse laws. The Supreme Court indicated as much as to prior narcotics laws in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405 (1958), where the Court on the authority of its prior Blockburger decision, rejected the merger of offenses in a single transaction theory (put forth here) and held that one transaction could produce multiple infractions of the law. The Court significantly said (357 U.S. at 390, 78 S. Ct. at 1283):
The Court observed that its holding in the Gore case was completely (Toto coelo) different from its decision in Bell, and continued (357 U.S. at 391-392, 78 S. Ct. at 1283-1284):Both in the unfolding of the substantive provisions of law and in the scale of punishments, Congress has manifested an attitude not of lenity but of severity toward violation of the narcotics laws. Nor need we be detained by two other cases relied on, United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 73 S. Ct. 227, 231, 97 L. Ed. 260, and Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed. 2d 370. In the former we construed the record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., as punishing "a course of conduct." Of the Prince case, it suffices to say that the Court was dealing there "with a unique statute of limited purpose." 352 U.S. at page 325, 77 S. Ct. at page 405.3
The different evidence test was defined by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 1932, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306, 309:
Accord, Gore v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405; Hattaway v. United States, 5 Cir. 1968, 399 F.2d 431.
United States v. Curry, 4 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 1299, Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S. Ct. 55, 46 L. Ed. 2d 50; United States v. Atkinson, 4 Cir. 1974, 512 F.2d 1235
United States v. Oropeza, 9 Cir. 1977, 564 F.2d 316, Cert. denied, 1978, 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S. Ct. 1276, 55 L. Ed. 2d 788
United States v. Stevens, 6 Cir. 1975, 521 F.2d 334. See also the excellent discussion by Judge Feikens in United States v. Nichols, E.D. Mich. 1975, 401 F. Supp. 1377
United States v. Olivas, 10 Cir. 1977, 558 F.2d 1366, Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S. Ct. 203, 54 L. Ed. 2d 142
We do not deal here with the violation of separate statutes, the issue involved in Blockburger v. United States, 1932, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 and in Gore v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405, but with the interpretation of two phrases in one sentence of a single law. In Gore the Court said, in distinguishing Bell v. United States, 1955, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905:
357 U.S. at 391, 78 S. Ct. at 1284, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1409.
Nor does this opinion reach a simultaneous prosecution for simple possession, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and distribution, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). See Notes 3 and 9, Supra
That on or about January 8, 1975, within the Corpus Christi Division of the Southern District of Texas, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, PEPE ACOSTA HERNANDEZ and PETE HERNANDEZ, defendants, did unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, to-wit: approximately Twenty-Four (24) grams of heroin. (Violation: Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a) (1))
That on or about January 8, 1975, within the Corpus Christi Division of the Southern District of Texas, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, PEPE ACOSTA HERNANDEZ and PETE HERNANDEZ, defendants, unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally did distribute approximately Twenty-Four (24) grams of heroin, a controlled substance under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. (Violation: Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a) (1))