Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/04/index.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 03:39:40
Document Index: 571330548

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 40', '§ 9', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 9', '§ 1983']

inversecondemnation.com: April 2019 posts
Arizona: Eminent Domain Isn't Voluntary (Even A "Friendly" Condemnation)
The Arizona Corporations Commission has authority to regulate the sale, lease, assigning, mortgage of a public utility's assets, including when those assets are "otherwise dispose[d] of." These transactions need the Commission's approval.
The city intended to exercise eminent domain to take the assets of a water utility. This sure looked like a "friendly" condemnation: the city and the utility entered into a letter of intent "documenting the City's intent to condemn substantially all the assets" of the utility, and "negotiations between the City and [the utility] were intended to result in condemnation, not a sale."
But the city and the utility did not seek Commission approval. A developer objected, asserting the municipality's condemnation of the utility was covered by the "otherwise dispose of" language. The Commission agreed, concluding that it could regulate the condemnation, and ordered it to be halted until the Commission approved it.
In City of Surprise v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, No. CV-18-0137-SA (Mar. 28, 2019), the Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the Commission's jurisdictional statute does not authorize it to regulate a condemnation action. An exercise of eminent domain -- even one where it appears the parties don't have much disagreement -- is not a voluntary transaction. Slip op. at 6. The court concluded that all of the actions which are expressly covered by the statute (sell, lease, assign, and mortgage) are voluntary transactions. Consequently, it read the "otherwise dispose of " language in the statute the same way, holding that "[e]ven a so-called 'friendly' condemnation is ultimately not voluntary because [the utility] has no choice but to acced to the taking of its assets pursuant to court order." Slip op. at 6. "Agreeing on just compensation rather than litigating it makes the condemnation no less coercive." Id.
Justice Clint Bolick concurred in the reasoning that the Commission has no authority under the statute, but argued that this wasn't really an involuntary taking, but rather "a voluntary transaction dressed up as an exercise of eminent domain."
If the City and Circle City voluntarily entered into eminent domain proceedings in order to divest the developer of valuable water rights, there could be a collision between the City’s eminent domain powers, which are beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and the Commission’s broad authority under § 40-285(A) that ensures that customers’ service rights are protected in a voluntary transfer of assets. In such circumstances, the remedy of approving a new CC&N under § 9-516(D) may prove illusory because no other provider might exist to provide such services; only the remedy of disapproval would preserve the customers’ rights. See Babe Invs., 189 Ariz. at 151 (noting § 40-285 “prevent[s] . . . impairment of service to the public”). And the “public use” requirement of eminent domain, Bailey v. Myers, 206 Ariz. 224, 230 ¶ 23 (App. 2003), is not a substitute for the public-interest objectives served by § 40-285(A). Reading the statutes to permit a municipality and a water company to extinguish contracted water services by agreeing to proceed through eminent domain rather than a sale of assets would defeat the important consumer protection purpose of § 40-285(A).
Slip op. at 15 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bolick also concluded that this wasn't simply a situation where the parties agreed on the condemnation's terms, but is the "far more troubling situation where the parties agree to invoke eminent domain to divest the Commission of its duty and authority to protect utility consumers’ water rights." Id. at 16.
The majority, not surprisingly (did you think we were going to get through this post without a pun on the city's name?) did not agree, concluding instead that "the dissent would give the Commission power over the condemnation proceeding itself." Slip op. at 10.
But by drawing a line between contested and uncontested condemnations, giving the Commission authority over the latter but not the former, the dissent misconstrues the power of eminent domain. The government has the right to condemn property for public use irrespective of the condemnee’s mindset. And this makes sense: why should a condemnee’s willingness to sell his property limit the government’s inherent power (and here, the City’s express statutory right, see § 9-516(B)) to condemn it? Such a rule would “turn on serendipity,” Saban v. Ariz. Dep’t of Trans., No. CV-18-0080, 2019 WL 905192, at *3 ¶ 15 (Ariz. Feb. 25, 2019), not on law.
Posted on April 30, 2019 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Public Use | Kelo | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on April 29, 2019 in ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Nothing really can be done: the harsh reality is that CAFO's (concentrated animal feeding operations) stink. But many state legislatures have concluded that farming and ranching are so important that the consequences ("externalities") that naturally occur have to be accepted.
Right to Farm Acts, Indiana's included, generally deprive neighboring property owners of their common law tort nuisance claims for the smell and noise, and other effects of having a nearby agricultural operation, often subject to certain conditions. One Indiana court summed up Right to Farm Acts as well as anyone when it noted, "so long as the human race consumes pork, someone must tolerate the smell." Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. App. 1987).
In Himsel v. Himsel, No. 18A-PL-645 (Apr. 22, 2019), that same court has now concluded that depriving neighboring landowners of their nuisance tort claims is not a taking. The opinion noted that this was a regulatory takings claim and not a physical invasion (see slip op. at 21 & n.10), and concluded that the neighbors have not been deprived of all use of their land. Yes, they have lost value, but "[t]he designated evidence reveals that the Plaintiff's properties have retained significant economic value." Slip op. at 22.
The court also applied the other two Penn Central factors, and held:
Moreover, they continue to reside in their residences, making valuable use of their properties, and have alleged no distinct, investment-backed expectations that have been frustrated by the CAFO. Finally, with respect to the character of the governmental action, we do not agree with the Plaintiffs that the RTFA has permitted a physical invasion of their property. While their property rights are clearly affected by application of the RTFA, the Plaintiffs cannot dispute that the regulation is reasonably related to the promotion of the common good. In sum, we conclude that the odorous emissions from 4/9 Livestock’s CAFO do not effect a taking.
Posted on April 26, 2019 in ▪ Agriculture, ▪ Penn Central, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on April 23, 2019 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Regulatory takings | Permalink | 0 Comments
Posted on April 19, 2019 in ▪ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | Civil Rights | Permalink | 0 Comments