Source: http://vicalexander.com/blog/2011/04/
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 19:43:45
Document Index: 357477493

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 34', '§ 34', '§ 34', '§ 34', '§ 15', '§ 34', '§ 34', '§34', '§ 34', '§ 34', '§ 34']

April 2011 Archives - Victor Alexander - Atlanta Workers Compensation and Atlanta Personal Injury Attorney Victor Alexander – Atlanta Workers Compensation and Atlanta Personal Injury Attorney
Trial Notebook : Appeals – Court’s Interpretation of Statute
The Court’s duty is to find meaning in all portions of the statutory provision in a manner which avoids, if practical, any conclusion that the provisions are inconsistent or contradictory. See Houston v. Lows of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975); Boyles v. Steine, 224 Ga. 392, 162 S.E.2d 324 (1968); Polleson Lumber Company v. Kirk, 200 Ga. App. 689, 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991); Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Company, 114 Ga. App. 739, 152 S.E.2d 768 (1966); Undercofler v. Capital Auto Company, 111 Ga. App. 709, 143 S.E.2d 206 (1965).
On appeal of an award, or denial of workers’ compensation benefits, the Superior Court may not substitute its findings for the appellate division’s findings of fact, and when sitting as an appellate body, it is bound by the “any evidence” standard of review and is not authorized to substitute its judgment as to weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Owens-Brockway Packaging v. Hathorn, 227 Ga. App. 110, 488 S.E.2d 495 (1997).
“Further, in reviewing a workers’ compensation award, we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Hallsey v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 268 Ga. 57, 484 S.E.2d 653 (1997).
“In reviewing a workers’ compensation award, both this Court and the Superior Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing for the appellate division. It is axiomatic that the findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding, and that neither the Superior Court nor this Court has any authority to substitute itself as a fact-finding body in lieu of the Board.” Logan v. St. Joseph Hospital, 227 Ga. App. 853, 490 S.E.2d 483 (1997).
Tags: appellate division, Georgia Attorney, Georgia Superior Court, Georgia workers' compensation award, Logan v. St. Joseph Hospital, statutory provision, Victor Alexander
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Trial Notebook : Appeals – Any Evidence
It is axiomatic that the findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding, and that neither the Superior Court nor the Court of Appeals has any authority to substitute itself as a fact-finding body in lieu of the Board. See Milliken and Co. v. Porthress, 257 Ga. App. 586, 571 S.E.2d 569 (2002).
Given any evidence rule. Whether non-compliance with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221 is without reasonable grounds is, again, an issue of fact for board determination, and this court will affirm whether there is any evidence to support it. Carr v. A.P. & Harry Jones Logging, 198 Ga. App. 698, 402 S.E.2d 538 (1991).
In reviewing a workers’ compensation award, ALJ and the Superior Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the Appellate Division [Full Board]. It is axiomatic that the findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, were found by any evidence, or conclusive and binding, and that neither the Superior Court nor this Court has any authority to substitute itself as a fact finding body in lieu of the Board. Atlas Automotive v. Wilson, 225 Ga. App. 631, 44 S.E.2d 669 (1997).
“In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation must be affirmed by the Superior Court and by the Court of Appeals and supported by any evidence in the administrative record. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Wilson, 240 Ga. App. 123, 522 S.E.2d 700 (1999). However, erroneous applications of law to undisputed fact, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law, are subject to the de novo standard of review. Mansfield Enterprises v. Warren, 154 Ga. App. 853, 270 S.E.2d 72 (1980).
The Any Evidence Rule—the Superior Court is bound by the ruling of the full board. See Harris v. Seaboard Farms of Elbert, 207 Ga. App. 147, 427 S.E.2d 524 (1993).
“A finding of fact by an administration law judge or the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding.” Roy v. Norman, 261 Ga. 303, 404 S.E.2d 117 (1991).
Tags: administration law judge, any evidence, Atlas Automotive v. Wilson, Georgia Appeals, Georgia Appeals Attorney, Georgia Attorney, Georgia full board, Georgia Superior Court, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Wilson, State Board of Workers Compensation, Victor Alexander
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Trial Notebook : Appeals – Acquiescence to Erroneous Ruling
“No matter how erroneous the ruling might have been …, a litigant cannot submit to a ruling, acquiesce in the ruling, and still complain of same.” See Maddox v. Elbert County Chamber of Commerce, 199 Ga. App. 478, 382 S.E.2d 150 (1989). All cited in Dallas v. Flying J, Inc, 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
Appeals/Evidence
On appeal, courts required to view evidence in light most favorable to party that prevailed before the State Board. See High Voltage Vending v. Odom, 266 Ga. App. 537, 597 S.E.2d 428 (2004).
Tags: Acquiescence to Erroneous Ruling, Appeals/Evidence, attorney Georgia, Georgia accident attorney, Maddox v. Elbert County Chamber of Commerce, trial notebook
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Trial Notebook : Appeal – Court of Appeals
Appeal to the Superior Court and Court of Appeals
“Once the case is appealed from the Appellate Division, both this Court and the Superior Court must view the evidence in a light favorable to the party prevailing before that Division. If any evidence supports the Appellate Division’s findings, those findings are binding and conclusive, and we may not ‘substitute [ourselves] as a fact-finding body in lieu of the Board.’” See Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
Court of Appeal Construction
On appeal, we [the Court of Appeals] construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before the Board, and “every presumption in favor of the Board’s Award is indulged.” Footstar v. Stevens, 275 Ga. App. 329, 620 S.E.2d 588 (2005).
“If any evidence supports the [Board’s] findings, those findings are binding and conclusive, and we must not substitute ourselves as a fact finding body in lieu of the Board.” Dallas v. Flying J, 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
Court of Appeals Duty for Review
“When reviewing an ALJ’s findings that are accepted by the Board, he cannot disturb those findings “as long as there is any evidence to support [them], because neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court hath the power to find facts.”” See Hallsey v. Fort Howard Paper Company, 268 Ga. 57, 487 S.E.2d 653 (1997). We must construe the evidence in favor of the party prevailing before the Board and treat the Board/ALJ’s findings as conclusive and binding when supported by any evidence. Jones County Board of Education v. Patterson, 255 Ga. App. 166, 564 S.E.2d 777 (2002).
Court of Appeals: Error of Law
If the Court of Appeals is deciding an error of law or a question or law, the Court of Appeals will review it de novo. See Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822, 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000).
Tags: Appeal to the Superior Court, Attorney At Law, Court of Appeal Construction, Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Duty for Review, Court of Appeals: Error of Law, Georgia Appeals, Georgia Court of Appeals, Victor Alexander
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Trial Notebook : Appeals – Superior Court
On an appeal in a workers’ compensation case, the Superior Court has authority and jurisdiction only to affirm or reverse as a matter of law and to sometimes give directions. See State of Ga. v. Mitchell, 177 Ga. App. 333, 339 S.E.2d 384 (1985).
The court may only set aside the Board’s decision where the Board members acted without or in excess of their powers, the decision was procured by fraud, the facts found do not support the decision, there is not sufficient competent evidence to warrant the decision, or the decision is contrary to law. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c).
The Superior Court may not substitute itself as the fact-finding body in lieu of the Board. Atkinson v. Home Indemnity Company, 141 Ga. App. 687, 199 S.E.2d 910 (1977).
The Superior Court Judge has no fact-finding power, in where the Board neither adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings nor made its own findings of fact, there is nothing on which a Superior Court Judge could base a final judgment awarding compensation. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. West, 213 Ga. 296, 339 S.E.2d 384 (1957).
“It is law of this State that if there is any evidence to support the finding of a Workers’ Compensation Board, the Superior Court may not reverse the Award unless errors of law were committed. Moreover, in determining whether evidence in the case meets the ‘any evidence’ rule, the evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the [B]oard and every presumption in favor of the Board’s Award is indulged. Calhoun v. Mergentine/KVN & Horn Fruin-Colnon, 165 Ga. App. 610, 302 S.E.2d 401 (1983). All cited in Footstar, Inc. d/b/a Meldisco Shoe-Mart et al. v. Stevens, 275 Ga. App. 329, 620 S.E.2d 588 (2005). All cited in Sears v. Macon Water Authority, 276 Ga. App. 194, 622 S.E.2d 867 (2005).
A request for change of physician may be appealed to the Superior Court. See Columbus Foundries v. Moore, 175 Ga. App. 387, 333 S.E.2d 212 (1985).
When the findings of the trial and appellate divisions are supported by some competent evidence, they were binding and conclusive on the Superior Court. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105; Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 GA. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006). The Court of Appeals held that evidence supported determination that claimant’s back injury had resolved itself and ceased to be the cause of her back-related disability in Big Lots, et al. v. Kiker, 304 Ga. App. 190, 695 S.E.2d 710 (2010).
Issue not raised before the ALJ will not be considered at appellate level. See Georgia Power Co. v. Safford, 171 Ga. App. 387, 319 S.E.2d 537 (1984).
Duty of Superior Court
The Superior Court has substantially limited its power to overturn a decision of the Board. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c)(1) – (5). “Absent a legal error, review by Superior Court is confined. Determination of whether any evidence supporting the decision of the appellate division.” See, McCarty v. Delta Pride, 247 Ga. App. 734, 535 S.E.2d 107 (2001).
Failure of Superior Court to Send Order to Parties
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(c) requires the trial judge to file his decision with the clerk of court in which the cases are pending and to notify the attorney or attorneys of the losing party of his or her decision. This is axiomatic in a case and the court’s failure to do so will toll the time for appeal. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et al v. Parker, 283 Ga. App. 708, 642 S.E.2d 387 (2007).
Remanding by the Superior Court to the Full Board
A remand by the Superior Court without a formal set-aside is “in effect” a set-aside. See, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) and see, Fulton County Board of Education v. Nathaniel Taylor, Jr., 262 Ga. App. 512, 586 S.E.2d 51 (2003).
The Issue on Appeal to the Superior Court in a Workers’ Compensation Case is Whether there is “Any Evidence” to Authorize a Finding in Accordance with the Contentions of the Prevailing Party to The Full Board
Moreover, “[w]hile the Superior Court does have the authority to set aside the Board’s decision and remand; it can do so only for one of the five statutory grounds. They do not need an assertion of newly discovered evidence as such.” Jones County Board of Education v. Patterson, 255 Ga. App. 166, 564 S.E.2d 777 (2002). Action Staffing v. Spaulding Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 198 Ga. App. 764, 403 S.E.2d 61 (1991). See, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-405(c) & (d).
Superior Court Powers
The superior court can normally only have power to affirm, reverse or remand an Award of the Board, but where the Award is based on an erroneous interpretation of a law, the superior court is authorized to amend the Award to conform to the Act. Watkins Memorial Hospital v. Chadwick, 171 Ga. App. 446, 319 S.E.2d 876 (1984).
Tags: Appeal to the Superior Court, Court of Appeals, Duty of Superior Court, Failure of Superior Court, failure to Send Order to Parties, Remanding by the Superior Court to the Full Board, Superior Court Powers
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Trial Notebook : Appeals – Full Board
Appeals: Full Board
“Findings of Fact made by an Administrative Law Judge must be accepted by the Appellate Division for such findings are supported by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence contained within the records. Thus, the Appellate Division must weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses and if it determines that the Award of the ALJ is supported by a preponderance of admissible evidence, it will be accepted. But, if after assessing the evidence of record, the Appellate Division concludes that the Award does not meet the statutes’ evidentiary standards, the Appellate Division may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an Award accordingly.” Bankhead Enterprises v. Beaver, 267 Ga. 506, 480 S.E.2d 840 (1997).
On appeal to the full board, the full board cannot change a ruling unless it is to fix an obvious error in the record. See O.C.G. A. §34-9-103(b). Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Gibson, 204 Ga. App. 853, 420 S.E.2d 797 (1992).
Appeals to Full Board: Findings of Administrative Law Judge
The administrative law judge was, in this case, in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the evidence of the record. See Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 231 Ga. App. 627, 499 S.E.2d 912 (1998); Metro Interiors, Inc. v. Cox, 218 Ga. App. 396, 461 S.E.2d 570 (1995) and Coats & Clark, Inc. v. Thompson, 166 Ga. App. 669, 305 S.E.2d 415 (1983)
Board Appeal Authorization
The Board’s Appellate Division is authorized to review the evidence adduced before the ALJ, weigh that evidence, and assess witness credibility. If the Appellate Division determines that the preponderance of evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, it will accept and affirm the Award. “But, if … the Appellate Division concludes that the Award does not meet [the applicable] evidentiary standards, [it] may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an Award accordingly. The Appellate Division may “substitute its findings for those of the ALJ only when its alternative findings are supported by some evidence in the record.” See Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
Duty of Full Board
“The Board’s Appellate Division is authorized to review the evidence adduced before the ALJ, weigh that evidence, and assess witness credibility. If the Appellate Division determines that the preponderance of evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, it will accept and affirm that Award. ‘But, if … the Appellate Division concludes that the Award does not meet [the applicable] evidentiary standards, {it] may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ and enter an Award accordingly.’ The Appellate Division may ‘substitute its findings for those of the ALJ only when its alternative findings are supported by some evidence in the record.’” Dallas v. Flying J, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006). See also O.C.G.A § 34-9-103(a); Bankhead Enterprises v. Beavers, 267 Ga. 506, 507, 480 S.E.2d 840 (1997) and Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath, 269 Ga. App. 339, 606 S.E.2d 567 (2004).
Full Board Decision Duties (Misstatement of Fact)
If an Award contains an “undisputed misstatement of fact … which we cannot say is immaterial as a matter of law, the case should be and is remanded to the [B]oard to correct its finding … and make an Award with the correct finding taking into consideration.” Assurance Co. of America v. Shepherd, 155 Ga. App. 36, 270 S.E.2d 268 (1980). All cited in The Home Depot, et al. v. McCreary, 306 Ga. App. 805, 703 S.E.2d 392 (2010).
“The Board is presumed to be expert in its field and it has extensive experience in analyzing the circumstances of employment, the duties of employees, and the scope of coverage under the applicable statutes. We defer to their opinion on all issues of fact.” Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Stevens, 271 Ga. App. 137, 608 S.E.2d 748 (2004).
Interlocutory Appeal and Interlocutory Order
An appeal of an interlocutory order is unauthorized under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Nowhere in our workers’ compensation statute is there a provision for an interlocutory appeal. The statute plainly, clearly, and unambiguously prescribes that only a final award, order, judgment or decision of the board is subject to appeal of the Superior Court. The Workers’ Compensation Act makes no provision for appeal to the Superior Court from a decision by the full board other than one which grants or denies compensation. See, GAC, Mfg./Processing v. Busbin, 233 Ga. App. 406, 504 S.E.2d 270 (1998). See, also, Augusta Coca-Cola, et al. v. Smalls, 260 Ga. App. 465, 579 S.E.2d 873 (2003).
Power and Duty of Full Board on Appeal from the Administrative Law Judge
In 1994 the legislature re-wrote O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) to remove the provision allowing the Division to hear additional evidence, and to provide that “the findings of fact made by the administrative law Judge in the trial division shall be accepted by the appellate division where such findings are supported by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence contained within the records.” Clinical Arts & C. v. Smith, 218 Ga. App. 681, 462 S.E.2d 757 (1995). This puts the responsibility on the appellate division to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses and if it determines that the Award of the ALJ is supported by a preponderance of admissible evidence, it will be accepted. But, if after assessing the evidence of record, the appellate division concludes that the Award does not meet the statutes’ evidentiary standards, the appellate division may substitute its own alternative findings for those of the ALJ, and enter an Award accordingly. All cited above in Bankhead Enters. v. Beavers, 267 Ga. 506, 480 S.E.2d 840 (1997). All cited in The Home Depot, et al. v. McCreary, 306 Ga. App. 805, 703 S.E.2d 392(2010).
Accordingly, under the 1994 revisions of scope of review of the appellate division, the appellate division has subject matter jurisdiction to reconsider all of the ALJ’s findings. Once done, upon a timely application, the superior court also has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal. All cited in The Home Depot, et al. v. McCreary, 306 Ga. App. 805, 703 S.E.2d 392(2010).
Tags: admistrative law judge, appeal, appeal from administrative law judge, board appeal authorization, duty of full board, full board appeals, full board decision duties, good language, interlocutory order, interlocutrory appeal, misstatement of fact, remanding by the superior court to full board
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Worker’s Compensation – Back Injury
In McEwen v. Bremen Bowden Investment Company, Case No. A11A0555 recently decided on April 8, 2011 in the Court of Appeals of Georgia, the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (full board) revered the decision of the law judge or Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the woman worked for a military uniform manufacturer and injured her back. She reported a back problem to her Employer through the supervisor. She missed a day or two in 2008 and then on January 23, 2009 she was terminated for excess absenteeism as she missed more time from work because of her back. Of course, the supervisor comes in and says there was never anything said about an on‑the‑job back injury even though the client came crying about it and the supervisor told her to go to a doctor.
Despite the evidence, the Full Board finds a different preponderance of evidence as they seemed to be allowed to do and reversed. However, the Full Board indicated that they were persuaded by the Employee’s own testimony that at no time while she was working with the Employer did she allege a job injury. Unfortunately, this particular case does not discuss a whole lawn of over cases from the Georgia Court of Appeals that actually says that an employee is not required to report an on‑the‑job injury. The Employee is simply required to give enough information about an injury so that the Employer can ask an investigator. This seems to be missed. In any event, in this case the Georgia Court of Appeals reverses challenging the statement by the Full Board about the Employee’s own testimony which they contend was an admission even though the Employee is adamant that she told the supervisor that she hurt herself on the job. The case talks about uncertainty from the face of an Award on the consideration of the evidence and states in particular that what it is uncertain from the face of the Award whether the Board has considered certain evidence, the proper remedy is to remand to the Board for further consideration.
Tags: back aching workers comp, back injury, court of appeals of Georgia, injury attorney, workers compensation
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Trial Notebook : Allergies
Where employee is injured or cannot work because of an allergic reaction, this does not constitute a work related injury when she can do normal work elsewhere. There is no duty to pay compensation. See Herrington v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 140 Ga. App 319 (1976). Willis v. Employers Fire Ins. Co. 153 Ga. App. 445, 265 S.E.2d 356 (1980). Garner v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container 134 Ga. App. 917, 216 S.E.2d 709 (1975). Shore v. Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. 102 Ga. App. 431, 116 S.E.2d 526 (1960). Griffith v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 100 Ga. App. 157, 110 S.E.2d 539 (1959). Rittenhouse v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 96 Ga. App. 407, 100 S.E.2d 145 (1957).
Tags: allergic reaction, Allergies, Victor Alexander, work related injury, workers compensation
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Trial Notebook : Aggravation of Pre-Existing Condition
Aggravation of a pre-existing condition which arises out of and in the course of employment is compensable: Only for so long as the aggravation of the pre-existing condition continues to be the cause of the disability; the pre-existing condition shall no longer meet this criteria when the aggravation ceases to be the cause of the disability. Worthington Industries v. Sanks, 228 Ga. App. 782, 1292 S.E. 2d 755 (1997).
It is well-established that an employee need not be in perfect health or free from disease at the time he received the injury to recover under the Act; the employer takes his employee as it finds him and assumes the risk of a disease condition aggravated by injury. Colonial Stores v. Hambrick, 176 Ga. App. 544, 336 S.E.2d 617 (1985); Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada Group, General Motors Corporation v. Millar, 182 Ga. App. 889, 357 S.E.2d 598 (1987).
It is settled that the aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity is compensable. Nash v. The Trust Company of Georgia, 131 Ga. App. 684, 206 S.E.2d 566 (1974); West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Gordon, 163 Ga. App. 837, 357 S.E.2d 598 (1982). “Injury” and “personal injury” under the Act shall include the aggravation of a pre-existing condition of an accident arising out and in the course of employment, but only for so long as the aggravation of the pre-existing condition continues to be the cause of disability. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4).
It has now been held that there may be a recovery of compensation due to an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. “Compensable Accident” or “accidental injury” have been used repeatedly to encompass the concept of pre-existing condition. Even where the employee has a pre-existing ailment, of which the over exertion or strain caused a flare up and became aggravated, it was properly ruled to have been an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. In this case the ALJ and board found that the claimant’s disability arose from the normal aging process and intervening automobile accident and an arthritic condition which affected the claimant’s knee, spine and other parts of his body. Therefore, the claim was not compensable. See St. Regis Packaging Corp v. Helm, 172 Ga. App 251, 322 S.E.2d 549 (1984).
Claimant was injured in 1975 and received compensation for three years until it was suspended based upon a change in condition. In 1983 he fell and required surgery, it was a close issue but the doctor felt that the problem was more than likely congenital and the fall did not help an aggravated back. The Board and the Courts held the injury was not compensable. Randall & Lewis Lumber Co. v. Randall, 177 Ga. App. 665, 340 S.E.2d 644 (1986).
Tags: aggravation of pre-existing condition, Atlanta attorney, compensable condition, employee health, trial notebook
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Trial Notebook : Admissions
In death cases (heart attack) the employee was not the claimant so the admission had a misnomer. This was meant to be introduced. See Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Washington, 181 Ga. App. 730, 353 S.E.2d 847 (1987). Carrollton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mozley
186 Ga. App. 730, 368 S.E.2d 371 (1988).
Tags: admissions, Coca-Cola Bottling, Mozley, Vic Alexander
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