Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/427/160/
Timestamp: 2020-02-22 11:22:37
Document Index: 275805381

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 2', '§1981', '§ 1981', '§1988']

RUNYON V. MCCRARY, 427 U. S. 160 - Volume 427 - 1976 - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 427 > RUNYON V. MCCRARY, 427 U. S. 160 (1976)
RUNYON V. MCCRARY, 427 U. S. 160 (1976)
Decided June 25, 1976*
1. Section 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes. Pp. 427 U. S. 168-175.
(a) Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 is derived, prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of private contracts. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 421 U. S. 459-460; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U. S. 431, 410 U. S. 439-440. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 392 U. S. 441-443, n. 78. Pp. 427 U. S. 168-172.
(b) The racial discrimination practiced by petitioner schools amounts to a classic violation of § 1981: Respondents' parents sought to enter into a contractual relationship with petitioner schools, but neither school offered services on an equal basis to white and nonwhite students. Pp. 427 U. S. 172-173.
2. Section 1981, as applied in this case, does not violate constitutionally protected rights of free association and privacy, or a parent's right to direct the education of his children. Pp. 427 U. S. 175-179.
(a) While, under the principle that there is a First Amendment right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 460, it may be assumed that parents have a right to send their children to schools that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the children have a right to attend such schools, it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such schools is also protected by the same principle. The Constitution places no value on discrimination, and while
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 413 U. S. 470. Pp. 427 U. S. 175-176.
(b) The application of § 1981 in this case infringed no parental right such as was recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205; or Norwood v. Harrison, supra, since no challenge is made to petitioner schools' right to operate, to parents' right to send their children to a particular private school rather than a public school, or to the subject matter that is taught at any private school. Pp. 427 U. S. 176-177.
children to private schools and to select private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation. Section 1981, as applied to the conduct at issue here, constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment "to enforce [that Amendment] by appropriate legislation," fully consistent with Meyer v. Nebraska, supra; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, and the cases that followed in their wake, such power including "the power to enact laws direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.'" Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 392 U. S. 438. Pp. 427 U. S. 177-179.
3. Absent a federal statute of limitations for §1981 actions or a Virginia statute of limitations specifically governing civil rights actions, the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate statute of limitations to bar the damages claim in question, particularly where it appears that the Court of Appeals, as well as the Federal District Courts in Virginia, had considered the question in previous federal civil rights litigation, and that the phrase "personal injuries" in the Virginia two-year statute of limitations can reasonably be construed to apply to the sort of injuries claimed here and not only to "physical injuries" as one respondent's parents contend. Pp. 427 U. S. 179-182.
4. Absent any federal statute expressly providing for attorneys' fees in § 1981 cases or any bad faith on petitioner schools' part in contesting the actions, the Court of Appeals properly reversed the award of such fees. Nor is implied authority for such an award furnished by the generalized command of 42 U. S. C. §1988 "to furnish suitable remedies" to vindicate the rights conferred by the various Civil Rights Acts. Pp. 427 U. S. 182-186.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., post, p. 427 U. S. 186, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 427 U. S. 189, filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 192
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