Source: https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2011/04/06/rescission-motion-for-stay-pending-appeal/
Timestamp: 2015-11-29 01:33:57
Document Index: 184237763

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 541', '§ 1689', '§ 476', '§ 384', '§ 65', '§ 4']

RESCISSION: MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL | Livinglies's Weblog
RESCISSION: MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
Posted on April 6, 2011 by Neil Garfield	KENNETH S. TAYLOR ETAL [PRO SE]
18/2011 – **CASE COSTED THRU 3/18/11 – PENDING. No Image
03/18/2011 – #2010-2098 ORDER OF SALE RETD. ENDR. AND I MAKE THIS RETURN BY ORDER OF PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY. SCSO Document 1
Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud « FED POLICY FAVORS MEGA BANKS AND IS ANTICOMPETITIVE ADDING TO TRAIN WRECK WELLS/WACHOVIA: NO CONSCIENCE, NO MORALS, NO REGULATION —- FRAUD »
uralie, on February 17, 2013 at 8:06 pm said:	the real cut and paste job has been done by the prentend lenders attorneys a vextation litigators using Docx ,LPS and Convicted Loraine Brown
DyingTruth, on April 6, 2011 at 2:52 pm said:	See Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F. 2d 860, at *861 (9th Cir. 1974)(“Section 1635(a) provides that an obligor exercises his right of rescission solely by notifying the creditor within prescribed time limits of his intention to rescind.”) Id.; (“[T]hat voids the mortgage absolutely and unconditionally, regardless of whether either the debtor or the creditor does any of the things that section 125 requires be done subsequent to the giving of notice of intention to rescind. This would be true even where the original creditor had meanwhile negotiated the paper to some third party. In this connection, I might point out that a lender who disburses funds, or a contractor who performs under his contract, would ordinarily be taking a risk if he did so before the contract and all the required information had been in the hands of the debtor for three full business days.”) 114 Cong.Rec. H4118-38 (1968) (statement of Rep. Sullivan (D-MO)); (“The objection that the notice of rescission was [ineffective when exercised] is without force. … The result claimed could be produced only by a statutory provision to that effect.” Pence v. Langdon, 99 US 578, at * 580 (1879) “[T]he wrong-doer cannot make extreme vigilance and promptitude conditions of rescission. It does not lie in his mouth to complain of delay unaccompanied by acts of ownership, and by which he has not been affected. The election to rescind or not to rescind, once made, is final and conclusive.”) Id. at *581-582.; (“In the instant case, A[ppellant]’s alleged []failure to perform … is unrelated to the issue of whether A[ppellant] is entitled to rescind the [] agreement. … A[ppellant] had the right to rescind the [] agreement immediately upon its execution. Therefore, any subsequent nonperformance … did not affect A[ppellant]’s right to rescission. Accordingly, A[ppellant]’s rescission claim is not barred”.) Dollar Systems, Inc. v. Avcar Leasing Systems, Inc., 890 F.2d 165, at *173 (9th Cir. 1989). Doty v. Superior Court, Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, at *9 (2009)(“The trial court erred in concluding that rescission is only a remedy and is not an “independent cause[] of action.” While the equitable action for a rescission was abolished in 1961, there is now a “legal action for restitution based on a completed unilateral rescission. [Citations, inter alia to Civil Code section 1688 et seq.]” (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 541, p. 668.)”.); Paularena v. Superior Court, 231 Cal.App.2d 906, at *913 (1965)(“[A]fter rescinding a contract, a party may seek any form of relief warranted under the circumstances, whether legal or equitable. As all such actions will be to enforce a rescission, the right of the parties to a jury and the court in which the action must be brought will be determined by the nature of the substantive relief requested and not by the form of the complaint.” Id.); Palmer v. Wilson, supra, 502 F.2d at *861(“Although tender of consideration received [was] an equitable prerequisite to rescission, the requirement was abolished by the Truth in Lending Act.” Id.).
And there is a host of precedent both State and Federal which support that the rule has changed and allegations of tender, showing of ability or offer to make tender thereof are no longer requisites and make no mention of such requirement at either State or Federal level. Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 304 (1970) (“This method contemplated a rescission by the individual act of one of the parties to the contract and has been referred to as a unilateral rescission. Having rescinded the contract by his own act, the rescinding party then brought an action to enforce the out-of-court rescission. Such action was considered to be one at law brought on the implied promise on the part of the nonrescinding party to repay or return the consideration received. In reality, it is an action in which the law, in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendants from the property of plaintiff, itself implies a promise to repay the sum demanded. In other words, it is an action in assumpsit upon a promise implied by law.” Id. at *311-312. (internal quatations and citations omitted). “The rescission statutes should make plain that, after rescinding a contract, a party may seek any form of relief warranted under the circumstances, whether legal or equitable. As all such actions will be to enforce a rescission, the right of the parties to a jury and the court in which the action must be brought will be determined by the nature of the substantive relief requested and not by the form of the complaint.” Id. at *313. “[I]n such actions the court should do complete equity between the parties and to that end may grant any monetary relief necessary to do so. It is the purpose of rescission to restore both parties to their former position as far as possible and to bring about substantial justice by adjusting the equities between the parties despite the fact that the status quo cannot be exactly reproduced.” Id. at *316. “[The] general principles of equity have recognized that the restoration to the rescinding party of the consideration with which he originally parted does not necessarily in all instances restore him to his former position and bring about substantial justice. The rescinding vendee of land who in reliance upon the contract has placed improvements on the property must invariably be compensated for them if he is to be afforded complete relief. In instances such an adjustment may be compelled so as to forestall unjust enrichment of the nonrescinding party through whose fault the grounds of rescission have arisen.” Id. at *317. (internal quotations and citations omitted)); (“The effect of a rescission is to void the contract ab initio. In other words, the effect of the election of plaintiff’s [exercise] to avoid the contract … for the fraud practiced upon him is, that, as between the parties there has never existed any [agreement]”.) Weltman v. Kaye, 334 P. 2d 917. at *614 Cal App, 2nd Dist., Div. 1 (1959); (“[U]nilateral rescission was justified and declared that title to the house was vested in appellant[]…. [I]n this state a contract may be rescinded by a contracting party unilaterally if his consent to be bound by the agreement was induced either by a material misrepresentation, though innocently made, or a mistake. (Civ. Code, § 1689; Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank v. Kuchman, 224 Cal. App.2d 490, 495-497 [36 Cal. Rptr. 806]; Evans v. Spatt, 131 Cal. App.2d 47, 48-49 [279 P.2d 1026]; Rest., Contracts, § 476.)”) Wood v. Kalbaugh, 39 Cal. App. 3d 926, at *929-930 (1974); (“[A] person suing to rescind a contract, as a rule, is not required to restore the consideration at the very outset of the litigation. See 3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra, § 384, and Comment b; Restatement of Restitution § 65, Comment d (1936); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.8, p. 294 (1973).”) Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 US 422, at *426 (1998)
tnharry, on April 6, 2011 at 12:58 pm said:	i’m sorry but this is just pro se nonsense that doesn’t belong on the site with the other informative pieces. it’s a cut and paste of a motion filed by the borrower, not an actual court order that would have some real value