Source: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2004.07.27_Deisl_v_Austria.htm
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 05:13:30
Document Index: 284307493

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application no. 74262', 'Application No. 29800', 'Application No. 30160', 'Application No. 16717', 'Application No. 11681', 'Application No. 10256', 'Application No. 9132', 'Application No. 29800', 'Application No. 30160', 'Application No. 37323', 'Application No. 57652', 'Application No. 11681', 'Application No. 10256', 'Application No. 9132', 'Application No. 8130', 'Application No. 23459', 'Application No. 30160', 'Application No. 37323', 'Application No. 42032', 'Application No. 74159']

Deisl and Deisl v. Austria, Comm. 1060/2002, U.N. Doc. A/59/40, Vol. II, at 283 (HRC 2004)
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1060/2002
Franz Deisl and Maria Deisl
PermaLink: http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2004.07.27_Deisl_v_Austria.htm
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/59/40, Annex IX, sect. CC, at 283 (Oct. 1, 2004)
Represented By: Alexander Morawa
1. The authors of the communication are Franz Deisl and his wife, Maria Deisl, Austrian citizens, born on 10 July 1920 and 21 January 1932. They claim to be victims of a violation by Austria [FN1] of articles 14, paragraph 1, and 26 of the Covenant. They are represented by counsel.
FN1] The Covenant and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant entered into force for the State party respectively on 10 December 1978 and 10 March 1988. Upon ratification of the Covenant, the State party entered a reservation, which reads, in pertinent parts:
"[...] 2. Article 9 and article 14 of the Covenant will be applied provided that legal regulations governing the proceedings and measures of deprivation of liberty as provided for in the Administrative Procedure Acts and in the Financial Penal Act remain permissible within the framework of the judicial review by the Federal Administrative Court or the Federal Constitutional Court as provided by the Austrian Federal Constitution. 3. [...].
4. Article 14 of the Covenant will be applied provided that the principles governing the publicity of trials as set forth in article 90 of the Federal Constitutional Law as amended in 1929 are in no way prejudiced [...]."
2.19 On 25 September 2001, after the Regional Administrative Authority for the District of Salzburg-Umgebung had rejected their request for an extension of the deadline for settling the modalities of the demolition of their buildings, the authors submitted an application to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging a breach of their right to property (article 1 of the first Additional Protocol to the European Convention). At the same time, they applied for interim measures to prevent the imminent demolition of their buildings. On 26 September 2001, the European Court registered the authors' application but rejected their request for interim measures, and on 29 January 2002, it declared the application inadmissible, as it had been lodged more than six months after the date of the final domestic decision, i.e. the decision of the Administrative Court of 3 November 1999. [FN2]
[FN2] See European Court of Human Rights, Decision on the admissibility of Application no. 74262/01 (Franz and Maria Deisl against Austria), 29 January 2002.
3.3 The authors submit that none of the authorities or administrative courts conducted a public hearing, as required by article 14, paragraph 1. Their right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal was violated, because the authorities demonstrated by their conduct that they would decide against the authors, irrespective of the facts put before them. [FN3]
[FN3] The authors refer to Communication No. 387/1989, Karttunen v. Finland, Views adopted on 23 October 1992, at para. 7.2.
3.4 The authors claim a violation of their right to an expeditious procedure, an integral element of the right to a fair hearing guaranteed by article 14, paragraph 1, [FN4] as the proceedings relating to their application for an exception took more than 30 years, despite the simplicity of the matter, which required only little factual research and legal analysis. Given that this duration was prima facie unreasonable, the burden was on the State party to prove that its organs were not responsible for the delays. While the authors exercised due diligence throughout the proceedings and submitted all required information within short deadlines, the authorities kept them uninformed about the status of the proceedings for some 15 years (1967 until 1982), failed to take a single decision that survived even the most rudimentary scrutiny on appeal for 24 years (1969 until 1993) and twice failed to take any decision at all for approximately 13 years. Even the Administrative and Constitutional Courts remained inactive for considerable periods of time before setting aside a decision of the Provincial Government in October 1995 (after 11 months) or dismissing the authors' constitutional complaints in November 1994 (after one year) and in September 1998 (after two years and nine moths). The authors consider that the fact that they consistently appealed against obviously flawed decisions cannot be held against them.
[FN4] Reference is made to Communication No. 207/1986, Yves Morael v. France, Views adopted on 28 July 1989, at para. 9.3.
4.3 By reference to the Committee's jurisprudence, [FN5] the State party argues that the communication is inadmissible ratione temporis, insofar as it relates to decisions and delays that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party on 10 March 1988. This particularly concerns the alleged difference in treatment between the authors and Mr. X., whose request for an exemption from the zoning regulations was granted in 1977, and the State party's alleged failure to decide within a reasonable time frame on the authors' request of 18 September 1969 for an exception from the zoning regulations (denied on 1 February 1982) as well as on their appeal dated 30 July 1974 against the mayor's demolition order of 17 July 1974 (dismissed on 11 May 1987).
[FN5] The State party refers to Communication No. 490/1992, A.S. and L.S. v. Australia, Decision on admissibility of 30 March 1993; Communication No. 646/1995, Leonard John Lindon v. Australia, Decision on admissibility of 20 October 1998; Communication No. 754/1997, A. v. New Zealand, Views of 15 July 1999.
5.1 On 12 June 2002, the authors requested the Committee to issue a request for interim measures, under Rule 86 of its rules of procedure, asking the State party to suspend proceedings to enforce the demolition order. They informed the Committee that, on 23 May 2002, the Regional Administrative Authority for the District of Salzburg Umgebung had rejected their petition to suspend the enforcement proceedings until the Committee's final decision, at the same time ordering them to transfer a down payment of � 4.447,67 by 1 August 2002 for implementing the demolition order, and that an appeal against that decision had no suspensive effect.
5.3 On 18 September 2002, the authors noted that the matter was no longer being examined by the European Court, after the Court had declared their application inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule on 29 January 2002. Given the purely formal nature of the six-month rule, the Court was precluded from examining the substance of the application. [FN6] The Austrian reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol was consequently inapplicable, as the same matter had never been examined by the European Court, within the meaning of that provision.
[FN6] The authors refer to Communication No. 158/1983, O. F. v. Norway, Decision on admissibility of 26 October 1984, at para. 5.2; Communication No. 441/1990, Robert Casanovas v. France, Views of 19 July 1994, at para. 5.1.
5.4 The authors reject the State party's contention that their communication is inadmissible ratione temporis. At least the decisions which finally determined their legal position and constituted a violation of their Covenant rights, in particular the decisions of the Constitutional and Administrative Courts, were taken after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Austria. [FN7] Moreover, the Committee had repeatedly asserted its competence to consider alleged violations of the Covenant which, despite having their origin prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol, either continue or have effects which themselves constitute violations after that date. This was particularly true for cases where a certain status of the authors affecting their rights is confirmed by administrative and judicial decisions after the date of entry into force. [FN8] Moreover, the Committee was competent to determine whether violations of the Covenant occur after the date of entry into force as a consequence of acts or omissions related to the continued application of laws or decisions affecting the rights of the authors. [FN9]
[FN7] Reference is made to Communication No. 72/1980, K. L. v. Denmark, Decision on admissibility of 31 July 1980; Communication No. 75/1980, Duilio Fanali v. Italy, Views of 31 March 1983.
[FN8] The authors refer to Communication No. 24/1977, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Views of 30 July 1981.
[FN9] Reference is made to Communication No. 196/1985, Ibrahima Gueye et al. v. France, Views of 3 April 1989, at para. 5.3.
6.2 Regarding the duration of the proceedings, the State party submits that the authors did not exhaust domestic remedies, as they could have alleged a procedural delay by filing a request for transfer of competence (Devolutionsantrag), enabling individuals to bring a case before the competent higher authority if no decision is taken within six months, or by lodging a complaint about the administration's failure to take a decision within due time (Säumnisbeschwerde) with the Administrative Court, to speed up the proceedings. According to the European Court of Human Rights, such complaints constituted "effective remedies" in cases where an undue delay of the proceedings is alleged. [FN10] Moreover, the authors' failure to expedite proceedings by challenging the inactivity of the authorities seemed to indicate that a postponement of the final removal order was in their interest.
[FN10] Reference is made to Application No. 29800/96, Basic v. Austria, and Application No. 30160/96, Pallanich v. Austria.
6.4 Insofar as the authors claim that none of the authorities were properly constituted tribunals within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, and that no public hearing was conducted in their case, the State party invokes its reservation to article 14 of the Covenant, which had the objective of maintaining "the Austrian organisation of administrative authorities under the judicial control of the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court." These claims also lacked sufficient substantiation in the light of the European Court's jurisprudence that: (a) The right to a fair trial does not oblige States parties to have a decision on civil rights issued by tribunals at all stages of the proceedings [FN11]; (b) the Administrative Court is a tribunal within the meaning of article 6 of the European Convention [FN12]; and (c) the absence of an oral hearing does not violate the right to a fair trial, if complainants do not avail themselves of the possibility to request a hearing (Section 39 of the Austrian Administrative Court Act), thereby waiving their right to an oral hearing. [FN13]
[FN11] The State party refers to the European Court's judgment of 23 June 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, Series A 43, at para. 51.
[FN12] European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 21 September 1993, Zumtobel v. Austria, Series A 268-A, at paras. 31 et seq.
[FN13] European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 25 April 1997, Pauger v. Austria, Application No. 16717/90, at paras. 59 et seq.
6.6 Subsidiarily and on the merits, the State party submits that the length of proceedings was justified by the complexity of the matter, the proper conduct of the authorities as well as the authors' own conduct. Thus, proceedings with an impact on regional planning were frequently highly complex because of the numerous interests at stake, e.g. the need to protect the environment, to ensure that the population density is in line with an area's economic and ecological capacity, to create the basic prerequisites for sustainable development of the economy, infrastructure and housing, and to secure a viable agriculture and forestry. While the authorities complied with their duty to conduct several rounds of proceedings in order to determine the authors' requests and appeals, the authors themselves failed to meet their procedural responsibility to combat delays with all procedural means, [FN14] such as the above request for transfer of competence or complaint about the administration's inactivity.
[FN14] The State party refers to European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Unión Alimentaria Sanders v. Spain, Application No. 11681/85, at para. 35.
6.7 As to the allegedly excessive delays in the proceedings before the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, the State party argues that the authors would have been free to seize both courts simultaneously rather than successively in order to avoid a loss of time. Moreover, between 1994 and 1996, the Constitutional Court had to give priority to consideration of some 5.000 cases in the field of alien law, which had mainly resulted from the crisis in the Balkans. In 1996 and 1997, the Court was faced with mass proceedings comprising more than 11.000 complaints about the minimum corporate tax. The temporary backlog resulting from the sudden increase in the Court's workload could not be attributed to the State party, considering that prompt remedial action had been taken, with pending cases being prioritized on the basis of importance. [FN15]
[FN15] Reference is made to the European Court's judgment of 25 June 1987, Baggetta v. Italy, Application No. 10256/83, at para. 23, as well as to the Report of the European Commission of Human Rights of 12 December 1983, Application No. 9132/80, at para. 125.
7.3 Regarding domestic remedies, the authors submit that they were not required actively to pursue, or even accelerate, a set of proceedings that could result in a legal consequence detrimental to their interests and property rights, [FN16] such as the demolition of their buildings.
[FN16] By way of analogy, the authors refer to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in Eckle v. Germany, Judgment of 23 June 1982, Series A, No. 51, at para. 82; Corigliano v. Italy, Judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A, No. 57, at para. 42; Dobbertin v. France, Judgment of 28 January 1993, Series A, No. 256-D, at para. 44; Francesco Lombardo v. Italy, Judgment of 26 November 1992, Series A, No. 249-B, at para. 23.
8.2 The State party submits that it was irrelevant for the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies whether proceedings are directed against an author. Thus, the European Court of Human Rights considered that even an accused in criminal proceedings must make use of legal remedies to expedite proceedings in order to exhaust domestic remedies in cases where a violation of the right to have one's case determined without undue delay is alleged. [FN17] In any event, this right had not been violated in the present case, taking into account the authors' counterproductive conduct, i.e. their request to suspend the proceedings during a four-month absence in 1987. [FN18]
[FN17] The State party refers to Application No. 29800/96, Basic v. Austria; Application No. 30160/96, Pallanich v. Austria; Application No. 37323/97, Talirz v. Austria; Application No. 57652/00, Lore Wurm v. Austria.
[FN18] The State party refers to European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Unión Alimentaria Sanders v. Spain, Application No. 11681/85, at para. 35.
8.3 The State party reiterates that it follows from the far reaching similarity between articles 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention and article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant [FN19] that the latter is inapplicable to the authors' case. Moreover, the authors were never entitled to construct a building on their plot of land. In the absence of such a right, the present proceedings did not relate to the "determination of rights" within the meaning of article 14 of the Covenant.
[FN19] Reference is made to the European Court's judgment of 25 June 1987, Baggetta v. Italy, Application No. 10256/83, at para. 23, as well as to the Report of the European Commission of Human Rights of 12 December 1983, Application No. 9132/80, at para. 125.
9.2 Regarding the length of proceedings, the authors consider it appropriate to follow the traditional approach of the European Court of Human Rights [FN20] of not requiring individuals to actively cooperate with the prosecuting authorities. Even if the Committee were to prefer the Court's recent jurisprudence, requiring applicants to avail themselves of legal remedies to complain about the excessive length of proceedings also in criminal cases, this requirement had so far only been applied by the European Court to cases with a single set of proceedings within which a remedy to accelerate the same existed but was not used by the applicants. [FN21] The present communication had to be distinguished from these cases in that it involved numerous administrative and judicial review proceedings.
[FN20] The authors refer to the European Court's judgment of 23 June 1982, Eckle v. Germany, Application No. 8130/78, Series A, No. 51, at para. 82.
[FN21] Reference is made to, inter alia, Application No. 23459/94, Holzinger v. Austria (No.1); Application No. 30160/96, Pallanich v. Austria; Application No. 37323/97, Talirz v. Austria.
9.4 The authors submit that no remedy to accelerate proceedings exists before the Constitutional and Administrative Courts. The part of the communication relating to the delays before these courts, totaling five years and nine months, was therefore admissible in any event. [FN22]
[FN22] The authors refer to the European Court's decision of 6 June 2002 on Application No. 42032/98, Widmann v. Austria.
9.6 Lastly, the authors submit that the European Court's case law was unequivocal in declaring article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention applicable to proceedings concerning building permits and demolition orders. [FN23]
[FN23] Reference is made, respectively, to Application No. 74159/01, Egger v. Austria, decision of 9 October 2003, and to the Court's judgment of 22 November 1995, Bryan v. The United Kingdom, Series A, No. 335-A, at para. 31.
10.2 Irrespective of whether the State party has invoked its reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol or not, the Committee recalls that when the European Court has based a declaration of inadmissibility solely on procedural grounds, rather than on reasons that include a certain consideration of the merits of the case, then the same matter has not been "examined" within the meaning of the Austrian reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol. [FN24] The Committee notes that the European Court declared the authors' application inadmissible for failure to comply with the six-month rule (article 35, paragraph 4, of the European Convention), and that no such procedural requirement exists under the Optional Protocol. In the absence of an "examination" of the same matter by the European Court, the Committee concludes that it is not precluded from considering the authors' communication by virtue of the Austrian reservation to article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol.
[FN24] See Communication No. 716/1996, Pauger v. Austria, Views adopted on 25 March 1999, at para. 6.4.
10.3 The Committee takes note of the State party's objection that the communication is inadmissible ratione temporis, insofar as it relates to events which occurred prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Austria on 10 March 1988. It recalls that it cannot consider alleged violations of the Covenant which occurred before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party, unless these violations continue after that date or continue to have effects which in themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant. [FN25] It notes that the 13-year delay in informing the authors about the Provincial Government's decision of 17 October 1969, which disapproved the Municipality's decision to grant their application for an exemption from the zoning regulations, as well as in deciding on the authors' appeal of 30 July 1974 against the mayor's demolition order of 17 July 1974, both predate the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party. The Committee does not consider that these alleged violations continued to have effects after 10 March 1988, which would in themselves have constituted violations of the authors' Covenant rights. The communication is therefore inadmissible ratione temporis under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, insofar as it relates to the above mentioned delays.
[FN25] See Communication No. 520/1992, Könye and Könye v. Hungary, Decision on admissibility adopted on 7 April 1994, at para. 6.4; Communication No. 24/1977, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Views adopted on 30 July 1981, at para. 7.3.
11.1 The Committee recalls, at the outset, that the concept of a "suit at law" in article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant is based on the nature of the right and obligations in question rather than on the status of the parties. FN26 It notes that the proceedings concerning the authors' request for an exemption from the zoning regulations, as well as the orders to demolish their buildings, relate to the determination of their rights and obligations in a suit at law, in particular their right to freedom from unlawful interference with their privacy and home, their rights and interests relating to their property, and their obligation to comply with the demolition orders. It follows that article 14, paragraph 1, is applicable to these proceedings.
[FN26] See Communication No. 207/1986, Yves Morael v. France, Views adopted on 28 July 1989, at para. 9.3.
11.2 The Committee further recalls that the right to a fair hearing under article 14, paragraph 1, entails a number of requirements, including the condition that the procedure before the national tribunals must be conducted expeditiously. [FN27] The issue before the Committee is therefore whether the delays complained of violated this requirement, to the extent that they occurred or continued after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party.
[FN27] See Communication No. 441/1990, Robert Casanovas v. France, at para. 7.3; Communication No. 238/1987, Floresmilo Bolaños v. Ecuador, at para. 8.4; Communication No. 207/1986, Yves Morael v. France, at para. 9.3.
11.6 The Committee notes that the length of the proceedings as a whole, counted from the date of entry into force of the Optional Protocol for Austria (10 March 1988) to the date of the Administrative Court's final decision (3 November 1999), totaled eleven years and eight months. In assessing the reasonableness of this delay, the Committee bases itself on the following considerations: (a) the length of each individual stage of the proceedings [FN28]; (b) the fact that the suspensive effect of the proceedings vis-à-vis the demolition orders was beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the authors legal position; (c) the fact that the authors did not avail themselves of possibilities to accelerate administrative proceedings or to file complaints simultaneously; (d) the considerable complexity of the matter; and (e) the fact that, during this time, the Provincial Government twice, and the Administrative Court once, set aside negative decisions on appeal by the authors. The Committee considers that these factors outweigh any detrimental effects which the legal uncertainty during the protracted proceedings may have caused to the authors. It concludes, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that their right to have their case determined without undue delay has not been violated.
[FN28] See above paras. 11.4-11.6.