Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/88/661/486787/
Timestamp: 2020-06-03 04:25:23
Document Index: 604284213

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3572', '§ 5', '§ 5861', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 453', '§ 5', '§ 841', '§ 5', '§ 3572', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 207']

United States of America, Plaintiff--appellee, v. Robert E. Hines, Defendant--appellant, 88 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1996 › United States of America, Plaintiff--appellee, v. Robert E. Hines, Defendant--appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff--appellee, v. Robert E. Hines, Defendant--appellant, 88 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1996)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 88 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1996) Submitted Feb. 13, 1996. Decided July 10, 1996
Robert E. Hines pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses. The district court sentenced him to ninety months in prison and three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a fine of approximately $300,000, based upon the fact that Hines will receive $1,550,000 in personal injury settlement payments over the next thirty-five years. Hines appeals this fine. We conclude that, while the fine is not constitutionally excessive, the district court erred in refusing to consider "the burden that the fine will impose upon ... any person who is financially dependent on the defendant," namely, Hines's new wife and stepson. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (2); see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d) (3). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Hines was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and (b) (1) (C), and use of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On November 27, 1993, two days before his arrest on those charges, Hines married, acquiring a stepson in the process. He pleaded guilty to all three counts in February 1994 and was sentenced in August 1995.
February 12, 1997--$ 25,000 February 12, 1999--$ 25,000 2002--$ 50,000 2004--$ 50,000 2007--$ 50,000 2009--$ 50,000 2012--$105,000 2014--$105,000 2017--$105,000 2019--$105,000 2022--$220,000 2024--$220,000 2027--$220,000 2029--$220,000
" [T]he Guidelines require that ' [t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.' U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a)." United States v. Aguilera, 48 F.3d 327, 329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 117, 133 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1995). The Guidelines further require that, " [i]n determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider" a number of factors, including "the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative punishments." U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d) (3). Hines has a legal obligation to support his wife and stepson. See Tryon v. Casey, 416 S.W.2d 252, 260 (Mo.App.1967) (husband must support his wife); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 453.400(1) (stepparent must support stepchild living in the home to the same extent as a natural or adoptive parent). The Guidelines make no distinction based upon when dependents were acquired, nor the length of the dependent relationship.3 The district court erred in ignoring this mandatory sentencing factor. See Aguilera, 48 F.3d at 328 (application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo) ; United States v. Bauer, 19 F.3d 409, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1994).
Finally, we reject Hines's contention that the fine imposed violates the Eighth Amendment command that " [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed...." There are few cases interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause. Supreme Court decisions suggest that the determination of excessiveness should be based, at least in part, on whether the fine is disproportionate to the crime. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 557-58, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775, 125 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1993); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). We require proof of "gross disproportionality," an excessiveness so great that "the punishment is more criminal than the crime." United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1235, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994). See United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 1876, 135 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1996).
The above cases involved forfeitures, not monetary fines. Proportionality is likely to be the most important issue in a forfeiture case, since the claimant-defendant is able to pay by forfeiting the disputed asset. In imposing a fine, on the other hand, ability to pay becomes a critical factor. But the Guidelines mandate that this factor be considered, see § 5E1.2(d) (2) and (f), and if the sentencing court complies with these provisions, any constitutional ability-to-pay limitation will necessarily be met. Here, for example, the amount of the fine, $150,000, is well within the statutory maximum of $1 million. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C). It is consistent with the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c) (4), and the additional fine for Hines's costs of incarceration is specifically authorized and clearly proportional to his crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) (6); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i); United States v. Price, 65 F.3d 903, 908 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 2547, --- L. Ed. 2d ---- (1996). Thus, when the district court properly considers the factors prescribed in § 5E1.2(d) on remand, the fine it imposes will not be constitutionally excessive.
These limitations were repealed by section 207 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for convictions after the effective date of that Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 207, 110 Stat. 1214, 1236-39 (1996)
A defendant may not constitutionally be incarcerated solely because he cannot pay a fine through no fault of his own. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2072-73, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983); Lincoln v. United States, 12 F.3d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)