Source: https://patents.google.com/patent/JP5869580B2/en
Timestamp: 2020-02-16 21:42:21
Document Index: 136195054

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 632', 'art 1630', 'art 629', 'art 402', 'art 403', 'art 404', 'art 405']

JP5869580B2 - Terminal device, verification device, key distribution device, content reproduction method, key distribution method, and computer program - Google Patents
Terminal device, verification device, key distribution device, content reproduction method, key distribution method, and computer program Download PDF
JP5869580B2
JP5869580B2 JP2013531052A JP2013531052A JP5869580B2 JP 5869580 B2 JP5869580 B2 JP 5869580B2 JP 2013531052 A JP2013531052 A JP 2013531052A JP 2013531052 A JP2013531052 A JP 2013531052A JP 5869580 B2 JP5869580 B2 JP 5869580B2
JP2013531052A
JPWO2013031124A1 (en
山口　高弘
2011-08-26 Priority to US201161527854P priority Critical
2011-08-26 Priority to US61/527,854 priority
2012-08-17 Application filed by パナソニック株式会社 filed Critical パナソニック株式会社
2012-08-17 Priority to PCT/JP2012/005183 priority patent/WO2013031124A1/en
2015-03-23 Publication of JPWO2013031124A1 publication Critical patent/JPWO2013031124A1/en
2016-02-24 Publication of JP5869580B2 publication Critical patent/JP5869580B2/en
The present invention relates to a technique for recording a digital work distributed via a network on a recording medium device and reproducing the digital work recorded on the recording medium device.
In recent years, systems for distributing digital works (hereinafter referred to as “contents”) such as movies and music via a network are becoming widespread. This is, for example, a system in which a user's personal computer (hereinafter referred to as “PC”) receives content from a content server and records the received content on an SD memory card or the like purchased by the user.
Since content distributed over the network is high-quality and high-quality digital data, it is necessary to take copyright protection measures to prevent unauthorized copying.
One of the content copyright protection standards is AACS (Advanced Access Content System). AACS is a copyright protection standard used in BD (Blu-ray Disc (registered trademark)). One of copyright protection technologies defined by AACS is “content signature” (Patent Document 1).
The content creator collects hash values of the partial contents obtained by dividing the content to construct a hash list, and sends the hash list to a reliable third party. The third party gives a digital signature to the received hash list and generates a content signature composed of the hash list and the digital signature. The content creator records the content and the content signature on the BD and sells them to the user. Here, the content signature is not connected to the network and is generated by using a signature device that ensures security. Therefore, the risk that the signature key is leaked is low, and the content signature is ensured to have high reliability.
The regular playback device partially compares the hash value calculated from the content with the hash list included in the content signature at the time of playback. Furthermore, the playback device verifies the digital signature included in the content signature. As a result, it is possible to confirm whether the content is legitimate or whether the content has been illegally replaced. If the playback device detects that the content is not legitimate or has been illegally replaced, the playback device stops playback of the content.
Japanese Patent No. 4084827
Currently, the use of AACS is being studied as a copyright protection measure for contents recorded on a next-generation SD memory card composed of a controller and a flash memory. In this case, it is assumed that the content signature is generated by the content server.
However, since the content server is connected to the network, unlike the current third-party signing device, there is a high risk of the signature key leaking. If the signature key is leaked, there is a possibility that the leaked signature key is illegally used and the content is illegally used.
Therefore, the present invention has been made in view of the above-described problems, and in a system for recording content distributed over a network on a recording medium device such as an SD memory card, content of the content that uses a leaked signature key illegally. It is an object to provide a terminal device, a verification device, a key distribution device, a content reproduction method, a key distribution method, and a computer program that suppress unauthorized use.
Therefore, the terminal device according to one aspect of the present invention reads the encrypted content and the content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content from the recording medium device, and from the protected area of the recording medium device. A reading unit that reads a converted title key obtained by converting a title key using a content signature generated by a legitimate signature device, and a reverse conversion of the converted title key using the content signature read by the reading unit, and a restored title A title key restoring unit that generates a key, and a reproducing unit that decrypts the encrypted content using the restored title key and reproduces the decrypted content.
According to the above configuration, the converted title key obtained by converting the title key using the content signature generated by the regular signature device is recorded in the protected area of the recording medium device. For this reason, even if the content signature generated using the leaked signature key and the illegally encrypted content are recorded in the recording medium device, the terminal device can read the converted title read from the recording medium device. The correct title key cannot be restored from the key. If the correct title key cannot be restored, the terminal device cannot correctly decrypt the illegal encrypted content. Therefore, the unauthorized use of content can be suppressed by suppressing the reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
Configuration diagram of content distribution system 1 Block diagram of the key issuing device 100 The figure which shows the data structure of the certificate which the key issuing apparatus 100 produces | generates The figure which shows the data structure of the revocation list | wrist 160 which the key issuing apparatus 100 produces | generates. Flow chart showing operation of key issuing process Block diagram of content production apparatus 200 The figure which shows the data structure of UR210 Flow chart showing operation of content production process Block diagram of content distribution apparatus 300 The figure for demonstrating the production | generation method of the content identification information 311 Flow chart showing operation of content distribution processing Block diagram of key distribution device 400 The figure which shows the data structure of the content signature 510 The figure which shows the data structure of processed UR420 and processed UR430 Flow chart showing operation of mutual authentication processing Flow chart showing operation of mutual authentication processing Flow chart showing operation of key distribution processing Block diagram of signature apparatus 500 Flow chart showing operation of content signature generation processing Block diagram of terminal device 600 Block diagram of terminal device 600 Flow chart showing operation of content recording processing Flow chart showing operation of content reproduction processing Flow chart showing operation of content reproduction processing Block diagram of recording medium device 700 Block diagram of verification apparatus 1600 The figure which shows the data structure of the content signature 1510 with a signature.
Here, the content distribution system 1 which is one aspect of the present invention will be described.
FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of the content distribution system 1.
The content distribution system 1 includes a key issuing device 100, a content production device 200, a content distribution device 300, a key distribution device 400, a signature device 500, a terminal device 600, and a recording medium device 700.
The key issuing device 100 is a device held by a legitimate organization that is the security basis of the content distribution system 1. The key issuing device 100 generates and issues a valid private key and public key certificate to each device constituting the content distribution system 1.
The content production apparatus 200 generates content and usage conditions for the content. The content production device 200 transmits the generated content to the content distribution device 300, and transmits the generated usage conditions to the key distribution device 400.
The content distribution device 300 generates a title key, encrypts content with the generated title key, and generates encrypted content. Furthermore, the content distribution device 300 generates content identification information based on the encrypted content. The content distribution device 300 transmits the generated title key and content identification information to the key distribution device 400.
The key distribution device 400 transmits the received content identification information to the signature device 500 and requests generation of a content signature. The signature device 500 signs the content identification information using the signature key, generates a content signature, and transmits the generated content signature to the key distribution device 400.
The key distribution device 400 performs a predetermined operation on the title key received from the content distribution device 300 using the content signature received from the signature device 500 and the usage conditions received from the content production device 200, and obtains the calculated title key. Generate. The key distribution device 400 transmits the calculated title key to the recording medium device 700 via the terminal device 600.
The terminal device 600 is, for example, a PC installed at the user's home. The terminal device 600 can be connected to the content distribution device 300 and the key distribution device 400 via a network such as the Internet. The terminal device 600 can be loaded with a recording medium device 700 such as an SD memory card.
The terminal device 600 receives the encrypted content from the content distribution device 300 via the network, and writes the received encrypted content to the attached recording medium device 700. Also, the terminal device 600 receives information necessary for content reproduction, such as a calculated title key, usage conditions, and content signature, from the key distribution device 400 via the network, and writes the information in the recording medium device 700. At this time, the calculated title key is written in a protected area of the recording medium device 700. Data written in the “protected area” can be read from the outside, but the contents cannot be rewritten.
The terminal device 600 has a function of playing back content recorded on the recording medium device 700. At this time, the terminal device 600 restores the title key from the calculated title key using the content signature recorded in the recording medium device 700 and the use conditions. Then, the terminal device 600 decrypts the encrypted content using the restored title key and reproduces it.
Here, when the signature key held in the signature device 500 is leaked, a content signature is generated for the illegally encrypted content using the leaked signature key, and the illegally encrypted content is treated as if it were a legitimate content. Thus, there is a possibility that an illegal act of recording in the recording medium device 700 is performed.
However, as described above, in the protected area of the recording medium device 700, the calculated title key obtained by calculating the title key using the content signature generated by the signature device 500 and the use conditions is recorded.
Therefore, even if a content signature is generated using the leaked signature key and an illegally encrypted content is impersonated as a legitimate content and recorded in the recording medium device 700, the terminal device 600 is correct from the calculated title key. Since the title key cannot be restored, it is possible to suppress reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content.
Hereinafter, the detailed configuration of each apparatus and the operation of each process will be described.
<2. Key issuing device 100>
Here, details of the key issuing device 100 will be described. The key issuing device 100 issues a valid private key and public key certificate to each device constituting the content distribution system 1, and issues a revocation list in which the ID of the device having the leaked private key is registered. Perform key issue processing.
<2-1. Configuration of Key Issuing Device 100>
FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the key issuing device 100. As shown in FIG. 2, the key issuing device 100 includes a root key pair generation unit 101, a root key pair storage unit 102, a root public key transmission unit 103, a key pair generation unit 104, a certificate generation unit 105, a secret key / certification. A certificate storage unit 106, a secret key / certificate transmission unit 107, an invalidation information input unit 108, an invalidation information storage unit 109, a signature generation unit 110, and an invalidation list transmission unit 111.
The key issuing device 100 includes a processor, a RAM (Random Access Memory), a ROM (Read Only Memory), and a hard disk (not shown). Each functional block of the key issuing device 100 is configured as hardware, or realized by a processor executing a computer program stored in a ROM or a hard disk.
The root key pair generation unit 101 generates a root key pair of the key issuing device 100 that is the basis of security in the content distribution system 1. The root key pair includes a root public key and a root secret key.
The root key pair storage unit 102 stores the root key pair generated by the root key pair generation unit 101.
The route public key transmission unit 103 transmits the route public key stored in the route key pair storage unit 102 to the key distribution device 400, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700. The root public key is used when the key distribution device 400, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700 verify the signature generated by the key issuing device 100.
The key pair generation unit 104 generates key pairs for the key distribution device 400, the signature device 500, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700.
Specifically, the key pair generation unit 104 generates a key distribution device key pair including a key distribution device public key and a key distribution device secret key embedded in the key distribution device 400. Further, the key pair generation unit 104 generates a signature device key pair including a signature device public key and a signature device private key embedded in the signature device 500. In addition, the key pair generation unit 104 generates a terminal device key pair including a terminal device public key and a terminal device secret key embedded in the terminal device 600. In addition, the key pair generation unit 104 generates a recording medium device key pair composed of a recording medium device public key and a recording medium device private key embedded in the recording medium device 700.
The certificate generation unit 105 generates a public key certificate embedded in the key distribution device 400, the signature device 500, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700.
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a public key certificate generated by the certificate generation unit 105.
FIG. 3A shows the key distribution device certificate 120 distributed to the key distribution device 400. The key distribution device certificate 120 includes a key distribution device ID, a key distribution device public key, and a signature. The key distribution device certificate 120 uses, as signature target data, data obtained by adding the key distribution device public key generated by the key pair generation unit 104 to the key distribution device ID that is the identifier of the key distribution device 400. The certificate generation unit 105 generates a signature by applying a signature verification algorithm to signature target data using the root secret key as a signature generation key. Then, a key distribution device certificate 120 including a key distribution device ID, a key distribution device public key, and a signature is generated.
FIG. 3B shows a signature device certificate 130 distributed to the signature device 500. FIG. 3C shows a terminal device certificate 140 distributed to the terminal device 600. FIG. 3D shows a recording medium device certificate 150 distributed to the recording medium device 700. These public key certificates are also generated in the same manner as the key distribution device certificate 120.
The private key / certificate storage unit 106 stores the private key of each device generated by the key pair generation unit 104 and the public key certificate of each device generated by the certificate generation unit 105 as a pair.
The private key / certificate transmission unit 107 transmits a pair of the private key and public key certificate stored in the private key / certificate storage unit 106 to each device. Specifically, the key distribution device certificate 120 is transmitted to the key distribution device 400, the signature device certificate 130 is transmitted to the signature device 500, the terminal device certificate 140 is transmitted to the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device certificate 150 is transmitted to the recording medium device 700.
The invalidation information input unit 108 is illegally used when it is confirmed that the secret key has been leaked from the device that has issued the secret key and certificate from the key issuing device 100 and has been illegally used. The input of the device ID of the device that has issued the secret key is accepted. Further, the invalidation information input unit 108 receives an input of a date on which the unauthorized use of the secret key is confirmed.
The invalidation information storage unit 109 accumulates and stores invalidation information in which the input device ID and date are paired.
The signature generation unit 110 generates a list by collecting a plurality of pieces of invalidation information stored in the invalidation information storage unit 109, and uses the root secret key stored in the root key pair storage unit 102 as a signature generation key. A signature generation algorithm is applied to the generated list to generate a signature. The signature generation unit 110 generates a revocation list by adding a signature to the list.
FIG. 4 shows an example of the invalidation list. As shown in the figure, the invalidation list 160 is composed of invalidation information areas 161, 162,... 163 and a signature area 164. Each invalidation information area includes an ID area and a revoke date / time area. As an example, the ID “165” of the revoked signature device is described in the ID area 165 of the revocation information area 161, and the revocation date “August 15, 2011” is displayed in the revoke date area 166. Is described. In the present embodiment, by including the revoke date / time area in the revocation list, the private key can be revoked only after the unauthorized use of the private key is confirmed. When leakage and unauthorized use of the private key are confirmed, invalidation information is sequentially added and the invalidation list is updated.
The revocation list transmission unit 111 transmits the revocation list generated by the signature generation unit 110 to the key distribution device 400 and the terminal device 600.
<2-2. Operation of key issuing process>
FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the operation of the key issuing process performed by the key issuing device 100.
The key issuing device 100 generates a root key pair including a root public key and a root secret key (step S1) and stores the root key pair in the root key pair storage unit 102. Then, the route public key transmission unit 103 transmits the route public key to the key distribution device 400, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700 (step S2).
The key pair generation unit 104 generates a key pair for the signature device 500 (step S3). The certificate generation unit 105 generates a signature device certificate 130 (step S4). The private key / certificate transmission unit 107 transmits the signature device private key and the signature device certificate 130 to the signature device 500 (step S5).
The key pair generation unit 104 generates a key pair for the key distribution device 400 (step S6). The certificate generation unit 105 generates a key distribution device certificate 120 (step S7). The private key / certificate transmission unit 107 transmits the key distribution device private key and the key distribution device certificate 120 to the key distribution device 400 (step S8).
The key pair generation unit 104 generates a key pair for the terminal device 600 (step S9). The certificate generation unit 105 generates a terminal device certificate 140 (step S10). The private key / certificate transmission unit 107 transmits the terminal device private key and the terminal device certificate 140 to the device that manufactures the terminal device 600 (step S11).
The key pair generation unit 104 generates a key pair for the recording medium device 700 (step S12). The certificate generation unit 105 generates the recording medium device certificate 150 (step S13). The private key / certificate transmission unit 107 transmits the recording medium device private key and the recording medium device certificate 150 to the device that manufactures the recording medium device 700 (step S14).
The invalidation information input unit 108 receives input of invalidation information (device ID and revoke date and time) (step S15).
The signature generation unit 110 generates a signature using a root secret key for a list including a plurality of pieces of invalidation information (step S16), and adds a signature to the list to generate an invalidation list.
The revocation list transmission unit 111 transmits the generated revocation list to the key distribution device 400 and the terminal device 600.
<3. Content Production Device 200>
Here, details of the content production apparatus 200 will be described. The content production apparatus 200 performs content production processing for generating and encrypting content.
<3-1. Configuration of Content Production Device 200>
FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the content production apparatus 200. As shown in FIG. 6, the content production apparatus 200 includes a material storage unit 201, an editing unit 202, a content storage unit 203, a content registration unit 204, a UR input unit 205, a UR storage unit 206, and a UR registration unit 207. .
The content production apparatus 200 includes a processor, RAM, ROM, and hard disk not shown. In addition, each functional block of the content production device 200 is configured as hardware, or realized by a processor executing a computer program stored in a ROM or a hard disk.
The material storage unit 201 stores a plurality of material data (video data such as movies and audio data).
The editing unit 202 creates a content such as a movie by combining a plurality of material data stored in the material storage unit 201.
The content storage unit 203 stores the content produced by the editing unit 202.
The content registration unit 204 registers the content stored in the content storage unit 203 in the content distribution device 300.
The UR input unit 205 includes input devices such as a keyboard and a mouse. The UR input unit 205 is a UsageRule (hereinafter referred to as “UR”), which is a condition related to the use of content, such as the number of times content can be played back and whether or not it can be moved when the input device is operated by the content creator. Accepts input.
The UR storage unit 206 stores the UR received by the UR input unit 205.
FIG. 7 shows the data structure of the UR. As shown in the figure, the UR 210 includes an output control information area 211 and an other information area 212. In the output control information area 211, for example, control information relating to reproduction and movement, such as a reproducible period, a reproduction start date / time, a reproduction end date / time, a reproducible number of times, an analog output possibility information, a move possibility information, and a moveable number, are described. .
In the other information area 212, for example, information other than control information related to reproduction and movement, such as the URL of the server in which the content is recorded, the name and address of the content creator, and the name and address of the content copyright holder, are described. .
The UR registration unit 207 registers the UR stored in the UR storage unit 206 in the key distribution device 400.
<3-2. Operation of content production processing>
FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing an operation of content production processing by the content production device 200.
The editing unit 202 generates content such as a movie by combining the material data stored in the material storage unit 201 (step S21). The generated content is stored in the content storage unit 203.
The content registration unit 204 transmits to the content distribution device 300 (step S22).
Subsequently, the UR input unit 205 receives an UR input from the content creator (step S23). The input UR is stored in the UR storage unit 206.
The UR registration unit 207 transmits the UR to the key distribution device 400 (step S24).
<4. Content Distribution Device 300>
Here, details of the content distribution apparatus 300 will be described. The content distribution device 300 receives content from the content production device 200 and encrypts the received content with a title key. In addition, the content distribution device 300 performs content distribution processing for distributing content to the terminal device 600 connected via the network.
<4-1. Configuration of Content Distribution Device 300>
FIG. 9 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration of the content distribution apparatus 300. As shown in FIG. 9, the content distribution apparatus 300 includes a content receiving unit 301, a title key generating unit 302, an encryption unit 303, a content storing unit 304, a content identification information generating unit 305, a title key / content identification information transmitting unit 306, The distribution request receiving unit 307 and the content distribution unit 308 are configured.
The content distribution apparatus 300 includes a processor, RAM, ROM, and hard disk not shown. Each functional block of the content distribution device 300 is configured as hardware, or is realized by a processor executing a computer program stored in a ROM or a hard disk.
The content receiving unit 301 receives content from the content production device 200.
The title key generation unit 302 generates a title key that is an encryption key for encrypting content. As an example, the title key is a 128-bit random number.
The encryption unit 303 uses the title key as an encryption key, encrypts the content by applying an encryption algorithm E, and generates encrypted content. Hereinafter, unless otherwise noted, content encrypted with a title key is simply referred to as “content”. An example of the encryption algorithm D is AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).
The content storage unit 304 stores the content encrypted by the encryption unit 303.
The content identification information generation unit 305 generates content identification information for uniquely identifying the content from the content stored in the content storage unit 304.
FIG. 10 is a diagram for explaining a method of generating content identification information. As illustrated in FIG. 10, the content identification information generation unit 305 divides the content 310 into N partial contents. Then, the hash value of each partial content is calculated. The content identification information generation unit 305 sets the hash table describing these N hash values as the content identification information 311.
The title key / content identification information transmission unit 306 transmits the title key generated by the title key generation unit 302 and the content identification information generated by the content identification information generation unit 305 to the key distribution device 400.
Upon receiving the distribution request data from the terminal device 600, the distribution request receiving unit 307 instructs the content distribution unit 308 to distribute the content.
When the content distribution unit 308 is instructed to distribute the content from the distribution request receiving unit 307, the content distribution unit 308 searches the content storage unit 304 for the content specified by the distribution request data. When the corresponding content is found, the content is read from the content storage unit 3024 and distributed to the terminal device 600. The distribution request data includes information specifying content, and the content distribution unit 308 can search for content to be distributed based on the distribution request data.
<4-2. Operation of content distribution processing>
FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an operation of content distribution processing by the content distribution apparatus 300.
The content reception unit 301 receives content from the content production device 200 (step S31), and outputs the received content to the encryption unit 303.
The title key generation unit 302 generates a title key (step S32), and outputs the generated title key to the encryption unit 303 and the title key / content identification information transmission unit 306.
The encryption unit 303 encrypts the content with the title key and generates encrypted content (step S33). The encryption unit 303 stores the encrypted content in the content storage unit 304 (step S34).
The content identification information generation unit 305 generates content identification information from the content encrypted by the encryption unit 303 (step S35), and outputs the generated content identification information to the title key / content identification information transmission unit 306.
The title key / content identification information transmission unit 306 transmits the title key and the content identification information to the key distribution apparatus 400 (step S36).
The distribution request receiving unit 307 receives distribution request data from the terminal device 600 (step S37). The distribution request receiving unit 307 instructs the content distribution unit 308 to distribute the content.
The content distribution unit 308 searches the content storage unit 304 for content based on the distribution request data (step S38). When the corresponding content is found, the content distribution unit 308 distributes the content to the requesting terminal device 600 (step S39). If the corresponding content cannot be found, the content distribution unit 308 may notify the requesting terminal device 600 that it has not been found.
<5. Key Distribution Device 400>
Here, details of the key distribution device 400 will be described. The key distribution device 400 performs key distribution processing for transmitting a title key, UR, content signature, and the like necessary for content reproduction to the recording medium device 700 via the terminal device 600.
<5-1. Configuration of Key Distribution Device 400>
FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the key distribution apparatus 400. As shown in FIG. 12, the key distribution device 400 includes a root public key reception unit 401, a root public key storage unit 402, a private key / certificate reception unit 403, a private key / certificate storage unit 404, a title key / content identification. Information receiving unit 405, content identification information transmitting unit 406, UR receiving unit 407, content signature receiving unit 408, revocation list receiving unit 409, UR processing unit 410, title key calculation unit 411, mutual authentication unit 412 and encryption / decryption unit 413 , A recording medium device ID receiving unit 414 and a MAC calculating unit 415.
The key distribution device 400 includes a processor, RAM, ROM, and hard disk not shown. Each functional block of the key distribution device 400 is configured as hardware, or is realized by a processor executing a computer program stored in a ROM or a hard disk.
The root public key receiving unit 401 receives a root public key from the key issuing device 100.
The route public key storage unit 402 stores the route public key received by the route public key reception unit 401.
The private key / certificate receiving unit 403 receives the key distribution device private key and the key distribution device certificate from the key issuing device 100.
The private key / certificate storage unit 404 stores the key distribution device private key and key distribution device certificate received by the private key / certificate reception unit 403.
The title key / content identification information receiving unit 405 receives the title key and the content identification information from the content distribution device 300.
The content identification information transmission unit 406 transmits the content identification information received from the content distribution device 300 to the signature device 500. This is for receiving a signature for the content identification information from the signature device 500.
The UR receiving unit 407 receives a UR from the content production apparatus 200.
The content signature receiving unit 408 receives a content signature from the signature device 500. The content signature is data to which the signature of the signature device 500 is attached to the content identification information.
When the content signature receiving unit 408 receives the content signature from the signature device 500, the content signature receiving unit 408 determines whether the received content signature is valid or invalid using the invalidation list held in the invalidation list receiving unit 409. To do. If it is determined that the received content signature is invalid, the key distribution apparatus 400 ends the process. If it is determined that the received content signature is valid, the content signature receiving unit 408 outputs the received content signature to the UR processing unit 410. Further, the content signature receiving unit 408 transmits the received content signature to the terminal device 600.
FIG. 13 shows an example of a content signature. As shown in the figure, the content signature 510 includes a content identification information area 511, a signature data area 512, a signature date / time area 513, and a signature device certificate area 514.
In the content identification information area 511, content identification information 311 transmitted from the content identification information transmission unit 406 to the signature device 500 is recorded. In the signature data area 512, signature data generated by the signature apparatus 500 using the signature apparatus private key with respect to the content identification information 311 described in the content identification information area 511 is described. The signature date and time area 513 describes the date and time when the signature device 500 signed. In the signature device certificate area 514, the signature device certificate 130 (FIG. 3) is described.
The revocation list receiving unit 409 receives the revocation list from the key issuing device 100 and holds it inside.
The UR processing unit 410 uses the content signature received by the content signature receiving unit 408 to add data to the UR received by the UR receiving unit 407 to generate a processed UR. The UR processing unit 410 outputs the generated processed UR to the title key calculation unit 411. Further, the UR processing unit 410 transmits the generated processed UR to the terminal device 600.
A specific example of the processed UR will be described with reference to FIG.
The processed UR 420 shown in FIG. 14A includes a UR 210 and a content signature specifying information area 421. As described with reference to FIG. 7, the UR 210 includes an output control information area 211 and other information areas 212. The content signature specifying information area 421 is an area for storing information capable of uniquely specifying the content such as the content signature, the hash value of the entire content signature, the hash value of the content identification information, and a part of the content identification information. It is.
The processed UR 430 illustrated in FIG. 14B includes a UR 210, a signature data area 431, a signature date / time area 432, and a content signature hash value area 433. As described with reference to FIG. 7, the UR 210 includes an output control information area 211 and other information areas 212. The signature data area 431, the signature date / time area 432, and the content signature hash value area 433 are specific examples of the content signature specifying information area 421 of the processed UR 420. In the signature data area 431, the signature data described in the signature data area 512 of the content signature 510 is described. In the signature date / time area 432, the date / time described in the signature date / time area 513 of the content signature 510 is described. In the content signature hash value area 433, a hash value for the entire content signature 510 is described. Note that the UR processing unit 410 calculates a hash value for the entire content signature 510. In the following description, it is assumed that the UR processing unit 410 has generated the processed UR 430 illustrated in FIG.
The title key calculation unit 411 acquires a title key from the title key / content identification information reception unit 405 and acquires a processed UR from the UR processing unit 410. Then, the title key calculation unit 411 calculates a hash value of the processed UR. The title key calculation unit 411 performs a reversible calculation using the hash value of the processed UR and the title key, and generates a calculated title key that is a converted title key according to the present invention. Here, as an example, the title key calculation unit 411 generates an calculated title key (XORed title key) by calculating an exclusive OR (XOR) of the hash value of the processed UR and the title key. The calculated title key generated by the title key calculation unit 411 is transferred to the encryption / decryption unit 413, and is encrypted by the encryption / decryption unit 413 after being encrypted with the common key shared with the recording medium device 700.
The mutual authentication unit 412 is a Diffie-Hellman method that is a key exchange method based on the complexity of prime factorization with the terminal device 600, or an EC that is a key exchange method based on the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve. -Mutual authentication is performed using an DH (Electric Curve Diffie-Hellman) method, and a common key is shared. Similarly, the mutual authentication unit 412 performs mutual authentication with the recording medium device 700 and shares a common key with the recording medium device 700.
The encryption / decryption unit 413 encrypts or decrypts data transmitted / received to / from the terminal device 600 using a common key shared with the terminal device 600. In addition, the encryption / decryption unit 413 encrypts the calculated title key generated by the title key calculation unit 411 using the common key shared with the recording medium device 700 and transmits the encrypted key to the recording medium device 700.
The recording medium device ID receiving unit 414 receives a recording medium device ID for identifying the recording medium device to which content is written from the terminal device 600 via the encryption / decryption unit 413. Note that “via the encryption / decryption unit 413” means that the encryption / decryption unit 413 receives the recording medium device ID encrypted with the common key and outputs the encrypted recording medium device ID to the recording medium device ID reception unit 414. This means that the converted recording medium device ID is decrypted using a common key.
The MAC calculation unit 415 calculates a MAC (Message Authentication Code) from the title key received by the title key / content identification information reception unit 405 and the recording medium device ID received by the recording medium device ID reception unit 414. As an example, the MAC calculation unit 415 generates a MAC for verifying the integrity of the title key by applying a MAC generation algorithm using the title key as an authentication message and the recording medium device ID as a key. The MAC calculation unit 415 transmits the generated MAC to the terminal device 600.
In the present embodiment, the MAC is used as information for associating the content and title key recorded in the recording medium device 700 with the recording medium device 700 (media binding). That is, by writing the MAC generated from the title key and the recording medium device ID in the recording medium device 700, the content to be reproduced is properly registered in the recording medium device 700 by verifying the MAC when reproducing the content. It can be determined whether or not it is recorded. When the content is illegally copied to another recording medium device with a different recording medium device ID, the terminal device 600 fails to verify the MAC when reproducing the content, and cannot reproduce the illegally copied content. .
<5-2. Operation of mutual authentication processing>
Here, an example of the mutual authentication process executed by the mutual authentication unit 412 will be described using the flowcharts of FIGS. 15 and 16. Here, as an example, a mutual authentication process executed between the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700 will be described.
The mutual authentication unit 412 of the key distribution device 400 generates a 160-bit random value Hn (Host nonce) (step S41). Here, since an EC-DSA (Electric Curve-Digital Signature Algorithm) having a key length of 160 bits is used, a random value of 160 bits is generated. However, when another algorithm is used, it is generated here. It goes without saying that the random value is not 160 bits.
The mutual authentication unit 412 concatenates the key distribution device certificate stored in the private key / certificate storage unit 404 to the 160-bit random value Hn generated in step S41. This is transmitted as challenge data to the recording medium device 700 (step S42). In FIG. 13, the key distribution device certificate is described as “Hcert (Host Certificate)”. Further, “||” is a symbol that means data concatenation.
When receiving the challenge data from the key distribution device 400, the recording medium device 700 performs verification processing of the key distribution device certificate Hcert included in the challenge data received in step S42, using the root public key (step S43). If the verification process of the key distribution device certificate Hcert fails (NO in step S44), the recording medium device 700 stops the processing. If the verification process of the key distribution device certificate Hcert is successful (YES in step S44), the recording medium device 700 generates a 160-bit random value Mn (Media nonce) (step S45).
The recording medium device 700 concatenates the recording medium device certificate to the 160-bit random value Mn generated in step S45. This is transmitted to the key distribution apparatus 400 as challenge data (step S46). In FIG. 13, the recording medium device certificate is described as “Mcert (Media Certificate)”.
Upon receiving the challenge data from the recording medium device 700, the key distribution device 400 performs verification processing of the recording medium device certificate Mcert included in the challenge data received in step S46, using the root public key (step S47). If the verification process of the recording medium apparatus certificate Mcert fails (NO in step S48), the key distribution apparatus 400 stops the process. If the verification process of the recording medium device certificate Mcert is successful (YES in step S48), the mutual authentication unit 412 of the key distribution device 400 proceeds to step S53.
After transmitting the challenge data in step S46, the recording medium device 700 generates a 160-bit random value Mk (Media Key) (step S49). When using an algorithm other than EC-DH, the random value generated in step S49 is not necessarily 160 bits.
The recording medium device 700 calculates Mv = Mk · G for the random value Mk generated in step S49, using the base point G which is a parameter of the elliptic encryption predetermined in this system (step S50). ).
Furthermore, the recording medium device 700 uses a recording medium device secret key (Mpriv) for Hn || Mv, which is data obtained by concatenating the Hn included in the challenge data received in step S42 and the Mv calculated in step S50. Is used to generate a digital signature (Sign (Mpriv, Hn || Mv)) (step S51).
The recording medium device 700 transmits, as response data, data obtained by concatenating the Mv calculated in step S50 and the digital signature Sign (Mpriv, Hn || Mv) generated in step S51 to the key distribution device 400 (step S52). ).
The mutual authentication unit 412 of the key distribution device 400 receives response data from the recording medium device 700. The mutual authentication unit 412 verifies the digital signature Sign (Mpriv, Hn || Mv) included in the received response data (step S53). Specifically, the mutual authentication unit 412 extracts Mv from the response data, and uses the recording medium device public key included in the recording medium device certificate Mcert for the data obtained by concatenating Hn and Mv generated in step S41. Verify the digital signature.
If the verification of the digital signature fails (NO in step 54), the key distribution apparatus 400 stops the process. If the verification of the digital signature is successful (YES in step S54), the mutual authentication unit 412 generates a 160-bit random value Hk (Host Key) (step S55).
The mutual authentication unit 412 calculates Hv = Hk · G with respect to the random value Hk generated in step S55, using the base point G which is a parameter of the elliptic encryption predetermined in the present system (step S56). ).
Further, the mutual authentication unit 412 applies a key distribution device secret key (Hpriv) to Mn || Hv, which is data obtained by concatenating Mn included in the challenge data received in step S46 and Hv calculated in step S56. Is used to generate a digital signature (Sign (Hpriv, Mn || Hv)) (step S57).
The mutual authentication unit 412 transmits, as response data, data obtained by concatenating the Hv calculated in Step S56 and the digital signature Sign (Hpriv, Mn || Hv) generated in Step S57 to the recording medium device 700 (Step S58). ).
The recording medium device 700 receives response data from the key distribution device 400. The recording medium device 700 verifies the digital signature Sign (Hpriv, Mn || Hv) included in the received response data (step S59). Specifically, the recording medium device 700 extracts Hv from the response data, and publicizes the key distribution device included in the public key certificate Hcert of the key distribution device 400 in the data obtained by concatenating Mn and Hv generated in step S45. Use the key to verify the digital signature.
If the verification of the digital signature fails (NO in step S60), the recording medium device 700 stops the process. If verification of the digital signature is successful (YES in step S60), the recording medium device 700 sets BK = Mk · Hv from the random value Mk generated in step S49 and the Hv included in the response data received in step S58. The common key BK (Bus Key) is generated by calculation (step S61).
On the other hand, the mutual authentication unit 412 of the key distribution device 400 calculates BK = Hk · Mv from the random value Hk generated in step S55 and the Mv included in the response data received in step S52, and the common key BK Is generated (step S62).
By performing the above processing, the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700 can confirm each other's validity and share the common key BK that the terminal device 600 cannot know. Then, the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700 establish a secure communication path (session) using the common key BK, and securely transmit and receive communication data without being known to the terminal device 600.
Here, the mutual authentication process executed between the key distribution apparatus 400 and the recording medium apparatus 700 has been described. However, the mutual authentication process executed between the key distribution apparatus 400 and the terminal apparatus 600, and the terminal apparatus 600 and the recording medium. The procedure of the mutual authentication process executed between the apparatuses 700 is the same as this. Note that the procedure of the mutual authentication processing shown here is an example, and other methods may be used.
<5-3. Operation of key distribution processing>
FIG. 17 is a flowchart showing the operation of key distribution processing by the key distribution apparatus 400.
Prior to the key distribution processing, the key distribution device 400 receives and stores the root public key, the key distribution device private key, the key distribution device certificate 120, and the revocation list 160 from the key issuing device 100. Further, the key distribution device 400 receives the UR 210 from the content production device 200 and stores it.
The following processing is executed when the key distribution device 400 receives a title key transmission request from the terminal device 600 or the recording medium device 700.
The title key / content identification information receiving unit 405 receives the title key and the content identification information 311 from the content distribution device 300 (step S71).
The content identification information transmission unit 406 transmits the content identification information 311 received in step S71 to the signature device 500 (step S72).
The content signature receiving unit 408 receives the content signature 510 from the signature device 500 (step S73). The content signature 510 received here is data obtained by adding signature data from the signature device 500 to the content identification information 311 transmitted to the signature device 500 in step S72.
The content signature receiving unit 408 verifies the content signature 510 received in step S73 (step S74). Specifically, the content signature receiving unit 408 extracts the signature device ID from the signature device certificate 130 included in the received content signature 510. Then, the content signature receiving unit 408 refers to the invalidation list 160 already held in the invalidation list receiving unit 409, and determines whether or not the signature device ID is described in the invalidation list.
When the signature device ID is described in the invalidation list 160, that is, when the signature device 500 is a revocation target, the content signature receiving unit 408 determines that the received content signature is invalid (NG in step S74), The key distribution device 400 ends the process.
If the signature device ID is not listed in the invalidation list 160, that is, if the signature device 500 is not a revocation target, the content signature receiving unit 408 determines that the received content signature 510 is valid (OK in step S74), The data is output to the UR processing unit 410 and further transmitted to the terminal device 600.
The UR processing unit 410 generates a processed UR 430 by using the UR 210 already received and held by the UR receiving unit 407 and the content signature 510 received from the content signature receiving unit 408 (step S75).
Specifically, the UR processing unit 410 calculates the entire hash value of the content signature 510. Then, the UR processing unit 410 adds the data described in the signature data area 512 of the content signature 510, the data described in the signature date / time area 513, and the calculated hash value to the UR 210, thereby processing the processed UR 430. Is generated.
The UR processing unit 410 outputs the generated processed UR 430 to the title key calculation unit 411.
Upon receiving the processed UR 430, the title key calculation unit 411 calculates a hash value of the received processed UR 430 (Step S76). Further, the title key calculation unit 411 receives the title key from the title key / content identification information receiving unit 405. The title key calculation unit 411 calculates an exclusive OR (XOR) of the hash value of the processed UR 430 and the title key to generate a calculated title key (step S77).
The mutual authentication unit 412 performs mutual authentication with each of the terminal device 600 and the recording medium device 700 (step S78). In the mutual authentication processing in step S78, the mutual authentication unit 412 confirms the validity of the terminal device 600 and shares the common key BK1 with the terminal device 600. Similarly, the mutual authentication unit 412 confirms the validity of the recording medium device 700 and shares the common key BK2 with the recording medium device 700.
The encryption / decryption unit 413 encrypts the calculated title key generated in step S77 with the common key BK2, and transmits it to the recording medium device 700 (step S79).
Subsequently, the encryption / decryption unit 413 receives the recording medium device ID encrypted with the common key BK1 from the terminal device 600 (step S73), and decrypts it with the common key BK1 (step S80). The encryption / decryption unit 413 outputs the decrypted recording medium device ID to the recording medium device ID receiving unit 414. Then, the recording medium device ID receiving unit 414 outputs the received recording medium device ID to the MAC computing unit 415.
The MAC calculation unit 415 receives the title key from the title key / content identification information receiving unit 405. Further, the MAC calculation unit 415 receives the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device ID receiving unit 414. The MAC calculation unit 415 calculates the MAC from the title key and the recording medium device ID (step S81). The MAC calculation unit 415 transmits the MAC to the terminal device 600 (step S82).
Next, the UR processing unit 410 transmits the processed UR 430 to the terminal device 600 (step S83). Finally, the content signature receiving unit 408 transmits the content signature to the terminal device 600 (step S84).
<6. Signature Device 500>
Here, details of the signature device 500 will be described. The signature device 500 receives the content identification information from the key distribution device 400, generates a content signature by signing the content identification information with a valid signature key, and returns the generated content signature to the key distribution device 400. Perform content signature generation processing.
<6-1. Configuration of Signature Device 500>
FIG. 18 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration of the signature device 500. As shown in FIG. 18, the signature device 500 includes a private key / certificate receiving unit 501, a private key / certificate storage unit 502, a content identification information receiving unit 503, a signature unit 504, and a content signature transmitting unit 505. .
The signature device 500 includes a processor, a RAM, a ROM, and a hard disk not shown. Each functional block of the signature device 500 is configured as hardware, or realized by a processor executing a computer program stored in a ROM or a hard disk.
The private key / certificate receiving unit 501 receives the signature device private key and the signature device certificate from the key issuing device 100.
The private key / certificate storage unit 502 stores the signature device private key and the signature device certificate.
The content identification information receiving unit 503 receives content identification information from the key distribution device 400.
The signature unit 504 holds therein a clock that measures the date and time. The signature unit 504 receives the content identification information from the content identification information receiving unit 503, adds signature data or the like to the received content identification information, and generates a content signature. The signature unit 504 outputs the generated content signature to the content signature transmission unit 505.
The content signature transmission unit 505 receives the content signature from the signature unit 504 and transmits the received content signature to the key distribution device 400 that is the transmission source of the content identification information.
<6-2. Operation of content signature generation processing>
FIG. 19 is a flowchart showing an operation of content signature generation processing by the signature device 500.
Prior to the content signature generation process, the signature device 500 receives the signature device private key and the signature device certificate 130 from the key issuing device 100 and stores them.
The content identification information receiving unit 503 receives the content identification information 311 from the key distribution device 400 (step S91).
The signature unit 504 generates signature data by applying a signature generation algorithm S to the content identification information 311 using the signature device private key as a signature key (step S92). An example of the signature generation algorithm S is DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm).
The signature unit 504 describes the content identification information 311 received in step S91 in the content identification information area 511, and describes the signature data generated in step S92 in the signature data area 512.
Next, the signature device 500 acquires the current date and time from the clock held therein, and describes the current date and time in the signature date and time area 513 (step S93).
Finally, the signature device 500 describes the signature device certificate 130 in the signature device certificate area 514 and generates the content signature 510 (step S94).
The content signature transmission unit 505 transmits the content signature 510 generated in step S94 to the key distribution device 400 (step S95).
<7. Terminal device 600>
Here, details of the terminal device 600 will be described.
The terminal device 600 is a PC including a processor, a ROM, a RAM, a hard disk, a keyboard and mouse as input devices, a monitor as a display device, a card slot for inserting the recording medium device 700, a network connection unit, and the like. A computer program is recorded in the ROM, RAM, or hard disk, and some functions of the terminal device 600 can be realized by the processor executing the computer program.
The terminal device 600 receives content from the content distribution device 300 via a network such as the Internet or digital broadcasting, and also receives a content signature, UR, MAC, and an operation title key from the key distribution device 400. The terminal device 600 performs content recording processing for recording the received content or the like in the recording medium device 700.
In addition, the terminal device 600 performs content reproduction processing for reading and reproducing the content from the recording medium device 700 in which the content, content signature, UR, MAC, and operation title key are recorded.
<7-1. Configuration of Terminal Device 600>
20 and 21 are block diagrams illustrating a functional configuration of the terminal device 600.
Here, FIG. 20 shows a functional configuration when the terminal device 600 performs content recording processing. FIG. 21 shows a functional configuration when the terminal device 600 performs content reproduction processing.
As shown in FIGS. 20 and 21, the terminal device 600 includes a root public key storage unit 601, a private key / certificate storage unit 602, a content receiving unit 603, a content writing unit 604, a mutual authentication unit 605, a recording medium device. ID acquisition unit 606, recording medium device ID transmission unit 607, encryption / decryption unit 608, MAC / UR / content signature reception unit 609, MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610, operation title key transmission unit 611, operation title key reception Unit 620, UR reading unit 621, content signature reading unit 622, title key recalculation unit 623, MAC reading unit 624, first reproduction determination unit 625, invalidation list reception / storage unit 626, content signature verification unit 627, content reading Unit 628, second reproduction determination unit 629, third reproduction determination unit 630, content decryption unit 631, and content reproduction unit Consisting of part 632.
The root public key storage unit 601 stores the root public key generated by the key issuing device 100.
The private key / certificate storage unit 602 stores the terminal device private key and the terminal device certificate 140 generated by the key issuing device 100.
The root public key, terminal device private key, and terminal device certificate 140 are embedded in the terminal device 600 by the device that manufactures the terminal device 600 when the terminal device 600 is manufactured.
The content receiving unit 603 receives content from the content distribution device 300.
The content writing unit 604 writes the content received by the content receiving unit 603 in the normal area of the recording medium device 700.
The mutual authentication unit 605 performs mutual authentication with the key distribution device 400, confirms the validity of the key distribution device 400, and shares the common key BK1 with the key distribution device 400. Further, the mutual authentication unit 605 performs mutual authentication with the recording medium device 700, confirms the validity of the recording medium device 700, and shares the common key BK3 with the recording medium device 700. Since the mutual authentication process has already been described with reference to FIGS. 15 and 16, the description thereof is omitted here.
In the content recording process, the recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606 acquires the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device certificate 150 received during the mutual authentication processing by the mutual authentication unit 605, and uses the acquired recording medium device ID. And output to the recording medium device ID transmission unit 607.
The recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606 acquires the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device certificate 150 received during the mutual authentication process by the mutual authentication unit 605 in the content reproduction process, and uses the acquired recording medium device ID. And output to the first reproduction determination unit 625.
The recording medium device ID transmission unit 607 receives the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606, and transmits the received recording medium device ID to the key distribution device 400 via the encryption / decryption unit 608.
The encryption / decryption unit 608 encrypts or decrypts data transmitted / received to / from the key distribution device 400 using the common key BK1 shared with the key distribution device 400. Similarly, the encryption / decryption unit 608 encrypts or decrypts data transmitted / received to / from the recording medium device 700 using the common key BK3 shared with the recording medium device 700.
The MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609 receives the MAC, the processed UR 430, and the content signature 510 from the key distribution apparatus 400. The MAC received here is the title key used to encrypt the content written by the content writing unit 604 to the recording medium device 700, and the recording medium device transmitted by the recording medium device ID transmission unit 607 to the key distribution device 400. The MAC is calculated from the ID. The MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609 outputs the received MAC, processed UR 430 and content signature 510 to the MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610.
The MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610 receives the MAC, processed UR 430, and content signature 510 from the MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609, and stores the received MAC, processed UR 430, and content signature 510 in the recording medium device. Write to 700 normal area.
The calculated title key transmission unit 611 transmits communication data transmitted / received between the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700. The communication data transmitted here is specifically an encrypted operation title key encrypted using the common key BK2 shared by the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700 by mutual authentication.
When the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700 establish a session through mutual authentication, the operation title key transmission unit 611 notifies the start of communication, the end of communication, and the like for the communication data transmitted over the session. Except for the control data to be transmitted, only the transmission is performed without judging the contents or changing the data. Further, since the terminal device 600 does not know the value of the common key BK2 shared by the distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700, the encryption operation title key cannot be decrypted.
The calculated title key receiving unit 620 receives a calculated title key generated from the title key used for encrypting the content to be played back from the recording medium device 700 via the encryption / decryption unit 608 during content playback processing. Receive. The calculated title key receiving unit 620 outputs the received calculated title key to the title key recalculating unit 623.
The UR reading unit 621 reads the processed UR 430 corresponding to the content to be reproduced from the recording medium device 700. The UR reading unit 621 outputs the read processed UR 430 to the title key recalculation unit 623, the content signature verification unit 627, and the third reproduction determination unit 630.
The content signature reading unit 622 reads the content signature 510 corresponding to the content to be reproduced from the recording medium device 700. The content signature reading unit 622 outputs the read content signature 510 to the title key recalculation unit 623, the content signature verification unit 627, the second reproduction determination unit 629, and the third reproduction determination unit 630.
The title key recalculation unit 623 receives the processed UR 430 from the UR reading unit 621, receives the calculated title key from the calculated title key receiving unit 620, and receives the content signature 510 from the content signature reading unit 622. The title key recalculation unit 623 performs an operation using these pieces of information to generate a title key. The title key recalculation unit 623 outputs the generated title key to the first reproduction determination unit 625 and the content decryption unit 631.
The calculation executed by the title key recalculation unit 623 corresponds to the reverse calculation of the calculation executed by the title key calculation unit 411 of the key distribution device 400. Therefore, if the processed UR 430 and the content signature 510 are valid, the title key recalculation unit 623 can restore the title key generated by the title key calculation unit 411.
The MAC reading unit 624 reads the MAC corresponding to the content to be played from the recording medium device 700. The MAC reading unit 624 outputs the read MAC to the first reproduction determining unit 625.
The first reproduction determination unit 625 receives the title key from the title key recalculation unit 623, receives the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606, and receives the MAC from the MAC reading unit 624. The first reproduction determination unit 625 calculates the MAC from the received title key and recording medium identification ID. Then, the first reproduction determination unit 625 determines whether the calculated MAC and the MAC read by the MAC reading unit 624 from the recording medium device 700 match. If the two MACs do not match, the first reproduction determination unit 625 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631.
The revocation list receiving / storage unit 626 receives the revocation list 160 from the key issuing device 100 and stores it inside.
The content signature verification unit 627 refers to the invalidation list 160 and confirms whether or not the signature device 500 that generated the content signature received from the content signature reading unit 622 is a revocation target. When the signature device 500 is a revocation target, the content signature verification unit 627 outputs an instruction to cancel the decryption to the content decryption unit 631.
Also, the content signature verification unit 627 matches the signature data described in the signature data area 431 of the processed UR 430 received from the UR reading unit 621 with the signature data described in the signature data area 512 of the content signature 510. Confirm whether or not to do. If they do not match, the content signature verification unit 627 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631.
The content reading unit 628 reads content to be reproduced from the recording medium device 700. The content reading unit 628 outputs the read content to the second reproduction determining unit 629 and the content decrypting unit 631.
Second reproduction determining unit 629 receives content signature 510 from content signature reading unit 622 and receives content from content reading unit 628. The second playback determination unit 629 uses the content signature 510 to confirm the validity of the content. When it is determined that the content is illegal, the second playback determination unit 629 outputs an instruction to stop decoding to the content decoding unit 631.
Third reproduction determining unit 630 receives processed UR 430 from UR reading unit 621 and content signature 510 from content signature reading unit 622. The third reproduction determining unit 630 calculates the hash value of the entire content signature 510 and confirms whether the calculated hash value matches the hash value described in the content signature hash value area 433 of the processed UR 430. If the hash values do not match, the third reproduction determination unit 630 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631.
The content decryption unit 631 receives the title key restored by the title key recalculation unit 623 from the title key recalculation unit 623 and receives the content from the content reading unit 628. The content decryption unit 631 decrypts the content by applying the decryption algorithm D to the content using the title key as the decryption key. The decryption algorithm D is an algorithm for decrypting the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption algorithm E into plaintext. The content decryption unit 631 outputs the decrypted content to the content reproduction unit 632.
The content decryption unit 631 decrypts the content when receiving a signal indicating that the decryption is stopped from the first reproduction determination unit 625, the content signature verification unit 627, the second reproduction determination unit 629, or the third reproduction determination unit 630. Cancel.
The content playback unit 632 receives and decodes the content decrypted from the content decryption unit 631. Then, the content reproduction unit 632 outputs the decoded content to a display device (not shown).
<7-2. Operation of content recording processing>
FIG. 22 is a flowchart showing an operation of content recording processing by the terminal device 600.
The terminal device 600 stores a root public key, a terminal device secret key, and a terminal device certificate 140 in advance.
The mutual authentication unit 605 performs mutual authentication with the recording medium device 700 and confirms the validity of the recording medium device 700. The recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606 acquires the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device certificate 150 received during the mutual authentication process (step S101).
The content receiving unit 603 receives content from the content distribution device 300 (step S102). The content writing unit 604 writes the content received in step S102 into the recording medium device 700 (step S103).
Subsequently, the mutual authentication unit 605 performs mutual authentication with the key distribution device 400, confirms the validity of the key distribution device 400, and shares the common key BK1 with the key distribution device 400 (step S104). The encryption / decryption unit 608 encrypts the recording medium device ID acquired in step S101 with the common key BK1, and transmits the encrypted information to the key distribution device 400 (step S105).
Next, the MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609 receives the MAC from the key distribution device 400 (step S106), and the MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610 transfers the received MAC to the recording medium device 700. Write (step S107).
Further, the MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609 receives the processed UR 430 from the key distribution device 400 (step S108), and the MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610 stores the received processed UR 430 on the recording medium. Writing to the device 700 (step S109).
Further, the MAC / UR / content signature receiving unit 609 receives the content signature 510 from the key distribution apparatus 400 (step S110), and the MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610 stores the received content signature 510 on the recording medium. Write to the device 700 (step S111).
Subsequently, the calculated title key transmission unit 611 transmits the calculated title key received from the key distribution device 400 to the recording medium device 700 (step S112). Note that the calculated title key transmitted in step S112 is encrypted with the common key BK3 shared between the key distribution device 400 and the recording medium device 700, which the terminal device 600 cannot know.
<7-3. Operation of content playback processing>
FIG. 23 is a flowchart showing an operation of content reproduction processing by the terminal device 600. Note that the recording medium device 700 has already stored the content, the calculated title key, the MAC, the processed UR, the content signature, and the like through the content recording process described above.
The mutual authentication unit 605 performs mutual authentication processing with the recording medium device 700 to generate a common key BK3. Also, the recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606 acquires the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device certificate 150 received during the mutual authentication process (step S201). The recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606 outputs the acquired recording medium device ID to the first reproduction determination unit 625.
Subsequently, the encryption / decryption unit 608 receives the operation title key encrypted with the common key BK3 from the recording medium device 700, and decrypts it using the common key BK3 (step S202). The encryption / decryption unit 608 outputs the decrypted computed title key to the computed title key receiving unit 620. The calculated title key receiving unit 620 receives the calculated title key and outputs it to the title key recalculating unit 623.
Next, the UR reading unit 621 reads the processed UR 430 from the recording medium device 700, and outputs the read processed UR 430 to the title key recalculation unit 623 and the third reproduction determination unit 630. The content signature reading unit 622 reads the content signature 510 from the recording medium device 700, and reads the read content signature 510 from the title key recalculation unit 623, the content signature verification unit 627, the second reproduction determination unit 629, and the third reproduction determination. To the unit 630. The MAC reading unit 624 reads the MAC from the recording medium device 700, and outputs the read MAC to the first reproduction determining unit 625 (step S203).
The title key recalculation unit 623 calculates the hash value of the processed UR 430 (step S205). Then, the title key recalculation unit 623 calculates an exclusive OR (XOR) from the hash value of the processed UR 430 and the calculated title key to calculate the title key (step S206). The title key recalculation unit 623 outputs the calculated title key to the first reproduction determination unit 625 and the content decryption unit 631.
Subsequently, the first reproduction determination unit 625 calculates the MAC from the title key and the recording medium device ID (step S207). The first reproduction determination unit 625 determines whether or not the MAC calculated in step S207 matches the MAC read from the recording medium device 700 in step S203.
If the two MACs do not match (NO in step S208), the first reproduction determination unit 625 outputs an instruction to stop decoding to the content decoding unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process.
If both MACs match (YES in step S208), the content signature verification unit 627 extracts the signature device ID from the signature device certificate 130 described in the signature device certificate area 514 of the content signature 510 (step S208). S209). The content signature verification unit 627 checks whether or not the signature device ID extracted in step S209 is described in the invalidation list 160 stored in the invalidation list reception / storage unit 626 (step S210).
If the signature device ID is not described in the invalidation list 160 (NO in step S211), the process proceeds to step S215. When the signature device ID is described in the invalidation list 160 (YES in step S211), the content signature verification unit 627 extracts the signature date / time from the signature date / time area 513 of the content signature 510 (step S212). The content signature verification unit 627 checks the revoke date and time described in association with the signature device ID in the invalidation list 160 (step S213).
If the revoke date is older than the signature date (YES in step S214), the content signature verification unit 627 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process. In the present embodiment, the content signature verification unit 627 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631 even when the revoke date and time and the signature date and time are the same.
If the revoke date and time is newer than the signature date and time (NO in step S214), content reading unit 628 reads the content from recording medium device 700 (step S215). The content reading unit 628 outputs the read content to the second reproduction determining unit 629 and the content decrypting unit 631.
Second reproduction determining unit 629 divides the content received from content reading unit 628 into N partial contents. Then, arbitrary seven partial contents are selected, and a hash value of the selected partial contents is calculated.
Second reproduction determining unit 629 reads out hash values corresponding to the selected seven partial contents from content identification information (hash table) 311 included in content signature 510 received from content signature reading unit 622. Then, by comparing the calculated hash value with the hash value read from the content identification information 311, it is verified whether the content read from the recording medium device 700 is valid content (step S 216).
If at least one of the seven hash values does not match (NG in step S217), the second reproduction determination unit 629 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process.
If all the seven hash values match (OK in step S217), the second reproduction determination unit 629 uses a hash value (N-7) other than the seven hash values calculated from the content read from the recording medium device 700. Number of hash values) is read from the content identification information 311. The second reproduction determination unit 629 generates a verification hash table by combining the N-7 hash values read from the content identification information 311 and the seven hash values calculated from the content.
Second reproduction determination unit 629 extracts the signature device public key from signature device certificate area 514 of content signature 510. The second reproduction determination unit 629 generates verification data by applying the signature verification algorithm V to the verification hash table using the signature device public key as a verification key. The signature verification algorithm V is an algorithm for verifying the signature data generated by the signature generation algorithm S.
The second reproduction determination unit 629 confirms whether the generated verification data matches the signature data described in the signature data area 512 of the content signature 510 (step S218).
If the verification data and the signature data do not match (NG in step S219), the second reproduction determination unit 629 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process.
If the verification data and the signature data match (OK in step S219), the third playback determination unit 630 is a result of processing the processed UR 430 read from the recording medium device 700 using the regular content signature 510. Check if it exists.
Specifically, the third playback determination unit 630 calculates the hash value of the content signature 510 (step S220), and the calculated hash value and the hash value described in the content signature hash value area 433 of the processed UR 430 Are compared (step S221).
If the hash values do not match (NO in step S222), third reproduction determining unit 630 outputs an instruction to stop decoding to content decoding unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process.
If the hash values match (YES in step S222), the content decryption unit 631 decrypts the content by applying the decryption algorithm D to the content using the title key as the decryption key (step S223).
The content playback unit 632 decodes the content and outputs it to the display device (step S224).
<8. Recording Medium Device 700>
Here, details of the recording medium device 700 will be described. The recording medium device 700 is an SD memory card used by being attached to the terminal device 600.
<8-1. Configuration of Recording Medium Device 700>
FIG. 25 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the recording medium device 700. As shown in FIG.
As shown in FIG. 25, the recording medium device 700 includes a controller 701 and a storage unit 702.
The controller 701 is an LSI device manufactured by a controller manufacturer. Internal processing is securely protected and information cannot be read from the outside.
The storage unit 702 is a flash memory manufactured by a flash manufacturer. Writing data to the storage unit 702 and reading data from the storage unit 702 are performed via the controller 701. Specifically, the storage unit 702 includes a system area 706, an authentication area 707, and a normal area 708. The system area 706 is an area that can be accessed (reading and writing data) only from the controller 701 and cannot be accessed from outside the controller 701. The authentication area 707 is an area that requires an authentication process via the controller 701 for access. The normal area 708 is an area that does not require authentication processing and can be freely accessed from the outside via the controller 701.
The controller 701 includes a mutual authentication unit 703, an encryption / decryption unit 704, and a read / write unit 705.
The mutual authentication unit 703 performs mutual authentication with the key distribution device 400 and shares the common key BK2. The mutual authentication unit 703 performs mutual authentication with the terminal device 600 and shares the common key BK3. Since the mutual authentication process and the key exchange process have already been described with reference to FIGS. 15 and 16, the description thereof is omitted here.
The encryption / decryption unit 704 encrypts or decrypts data transmitted / received to / from the key distribution device 400 using the common key BK2 shared with the key distribution device 400. Similarly, the encryption / decryption unit 704 encrypts or decrypts data transmitted / received to / from the terminal device 600 using the common key BK3 shared with the terminal device 600.
Specifically, at the time of content recording, the encryption / decryption unit 704 receives the encrypted operation title key transmitted from the key distribution device 400 via the operation title key transmission unit 611 of the terminal device 600. Then, the encryption / decryption unit 704 decrypts the received encrypted operation title key and writes it in the storage unit 702.
At the time of content playback, the encryption / decryption unit 704 reads and encrypts the calculated title key stored in the storage unit 702 and transmits it to the terminal device 600.
The read / write unit 705 reads data from the normal area 708 and writes data to the normal area 708.
The system area 706 includes a private key / certificate storage unit 711 and a root public key storage unit 712.
The private key / certificate storage unit 711 stores the recording medium device private key generated by the key issuing device 100 and the recording medium device certificate 150.
The root public key storage unit 712 stores the root public key generated by the key issuing device 100.
The root public key, the recording medium device private key, and the recording medium device certificate are embedded in the storage unit 702 by the device that manufactures the recording medium device 700 when the recording medium device 700 is manufactured.
The authentication area 707 includes a calculated title key storage unit 713 and stores a calculated title key therein. As described above, in order to access the authentication area 707, authentication processing by the controller 701 is necessary. Therefore, writing and reading of the calculated title key is always performed via the mutual authentication unit 703 and the encryption / decryption unit 704.
The normal area 708 includes a content storage unit 714, a content signature storage unit 715, a UR storage unit 716, and a MAC storage unit 717.
The content storage unit 714 stores content. The content signature storage unit 715 stores the content signature 510. The UR storage unit 716 stores the processed UR 430. The MAC storage unit 717 stores the MAC.
The content, content signature 510, processed UR 430, and MAC are received by the reading / writing unit 705 from the terminal device 600 when the content is recorded, and the reading / writing unit 705 stores the content storage unit 714 and the content signature storage, respectively. The data is written in the unit 715, the UR storage unit 716, and the MAC storage unit 717.
In addition, the content, content signature 510, processed UR 430, and MAC receive a read request from the terminal device 600 during content reproduction, and the read / write unit 705 causes the content storage unit 714 and the content signature storage unit 715, respectively. , Read from the UR storage unit 716 and the MAC storage unit 717. Then, it is transmitted to the terminal device 600.
Although the embodiment of the present invention has been described above, the exemplified content distribution system can be modified as follows, and the present invention is limited to the content distribution system as described in the above embodiment. Of course not.
(1) In the above embodiment, the key distribution device 400 and the signature device 500 are two independent devices, but may be realized by one device.
(2) In the above embodiment, the content production device 200 and the content distribution device 300 are two independent devices, but may be realized by one device.
In addition, the title key generation unit 302, the encryption unit 303, the content identification information generation unit 305, and the title key / content identification information transmission unit 306 included in the content distribution device 300 illustrated in FIG. A configuration in which the functions by these functional blocks are included in the production apparatus 200 and realized by the content production apparatus 200 may be used.
(3) In the above embodiment, the SD memory card is used as a specific example as the recording medium device 700. However, the recording medium device 700 is not limited to an SD memory card. The recording medium device 700 may be a device composed of a storage device such as an HDD and a control LSI. Further, the recording medium device 700 is not limited to a removable device such as an SD memory card. A device including a built-in memory and a control LSI built in a mobile phone, eBook, NetBook, or the like may be used.
(4) In the above-described embodiment, the terminal device 600 is described using a PC as a specific example. However, the terminal device 600 is not limited to a PC. For example, the terminal device 600 may be a mobile terminal such as a smartphone or a tablet terminal. The terminal device 600 may be a so-called KIOSK terminal installed in a store such as a convenience store. The terminal device 600 may be a receiving device that receives digital television broadcasts. The terminal device 600 is a device that can be connected to at least a network such as the Internet or a television broadcasting network, and has a function of acquiring content, a title key, a content signature, UR, and the like via the network and recording them in the recording medium device 700. If you do.
(5) In the above embodiment, the terminal device 600 has a configuration for acquiring the recording medium device ID while performing mutual authentication with the recording medium device 700. However, the method for acquiring the recording medium device ID is not limited to this.
For example, a recording medium device ID for uniquely identifying the recording medium device 700 may be stored in the authentication area 707 of the recording medium device 700. In this case, the terminal apparatus 600 performs mutual authentication with the recording medium apparatus 700, shares the common key BK3, and then encrypts the recording medium apparatus ID from the recording medium apparatus 700 with the common key BK3. Receive the ID. The terminal device 600 may be configured to decrypt the received encrypted recording medium device ID with the common key BK3 and acquire the recording medium device ID.
(6) The following processing may be added to the mutual authentication processing described in the above embodiment.
The key distribution device 400, the terminal device 600, and the recording medium device 700 obtain in advance the revocation list 160 in which the device ID of the device to which the secret key has been exposed (revoked device) is described from the key issuing device 100. Keep it. Each device extracts the device ID from the public key certificate of the counterpart device received during the mutual authentication process, and determines whether or not the extracted device ID is listed in the revocation list. When the device ID extracted from the public key certificate is described in the revocation list, that is, when the counterpart device is revoked, the mutual authentication process is interrupted.
(7) A verification device 1600, which is a modification of the terminal device 600, will be described with reference to FIG. As shown in FIG. 26, the verification device 1600 includes a root public key storage unit 601, a private key / certificate storage unit 602, a mutual authentication unit 605, a recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606, an encryption / decryption unit 608, and an operation title key reception. Unit 620, UR reading unit 621, content signature reading unit 622, title key recalculation unit 623, MAC reading unit 624, first determination unit 1625, invalidation list reception / storage unit 626, content signature verification unit 627, and third determination Part 1630. Here, constituent elements having the same functions as constituent elements included in the terminal device 600 are denoted by the same reference numerals as those shown in FIGS.
The verification apparatus 1600 does not have functions related to content decryption and content playback.
Similar to the first reproduction determination unit 625, the first determination unit 1625 receives the title key from the title key recalculation unit 623, receives the recording medium device ID from the recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606, and receives the recording medium device ID from the MAC reading unit 624. Receive MAC. The first determination unit 1625 calculates the MAC from the received title key and recording medium identification ID. Then, the first determination unit 1625 determines whether the calculated MAC and the MAC read by the MAC reading unit 624 from the recording medium device 700 match. The first determination unit 1625 outputs a determination result.
The third determination unit 1630 receives the processed UR 430 from the UR reading unit 621 and the content signature from the content signature reading unit 622, similarly to the third reproduction determination unit 630. The third determination unit 1630 calculates the hash value of the entire content signature, and determines whether the calculated hash value matches the hash value described in the content signature hash value area of the processed UR 430. Third determination unit 1630 outputs the determination result.
As described above, a verification apparatus 1600 that does not have functions related to content decoding and content reproduction is also included in one aspect of the present invention.
The verification device according to one aspect of the present invention reads an encrypted content and a content signature from a recording medium device, and obtains a content signature generated by a legitimate signature device from a protected area of the recording medium device. A reading unit that reads the converted title key using the converted title key, the content signature read by the reading unit, and the content signature generated by the regular signature device used to generate the converted title key. You may comprise so that it may be provided with the content signature verification part which judges whether it corresponds.
Here, the content signature verification unit of the verification device may output the determination result to the outside. The verification device may be connected to a control device that receives the determination result output from the content signature verification unit and performs processing according to the received determination result. Specifically, the control device performs decryption of encrypted content, movement of encrypted content, and the like according to the received determination result. That is, if the content signature does not match, the control device does not decrypt the encrypted content or moves the encrypted content, but only decrypts the encrypted content or moves the encrypted content only if the content signature matches. And so on.
(8) The content signature receiving unit 408 of the key distribution device 400 in the above embodiment may verify the content signature 510 received from the signature device 500 as follows.
The content signature receiving unit 408 refers to the invalidation list 160 held in the invalidation list receiving unit 409 and determines whether or not the signature device ID is described in the invalidation list. When the signature device ID is described in the invalidation list 160, the content signature receiving unit 408 compares the signature date and time described in the content signature 510 with the revoke date and time described in the invalidation list. If the signature date and time described in the content signature 510 is newer than the revoke date and time described in the invalidation list 160, the content signature receiving unit 408 determines that the content signature 510 is invalid.
When the signature date and time described in the content signature 510 is older than the revoke date and time described in the invalidation list 160, the content signature receiving unit 408 further receives the content signature 510 as the signature date and time of the content signature 510. Make sure that the date and time are not significantly different.
As an example, it is confirmed whether there is a gap of 48 hours or more between the signature date and time and the current date and time. As a result of the confirmation, if there is a gap of 48 hours or more between the signature date and time and the current date and time, the content signature receiving unit 408 determines that the received content signature 510 is invalid.
(9) In the above embodiment, the UR processing unit 410 calculates the hash value of the content signature 510 received by the content signature receiving unit 408, and adds the hash value of the content signature 510 to the UR 210 received by the UR receiving unit 407. Had a configuration to add.
The key distribution device 400 may modify the above configuration as follows, for example.
The key distribution device 400 may be configured to include an additional signature unit instead of the UR processing unit 410. The additional signature unit generates a signed content signature 1510 shown in FIG. 27 from the content signature 510 received by the content signature receiving unit 408.
The additional signature unit stores a private key / certificate for the content signature 510 (data obtained by concatenating data described in the content identification information area 511, the signature data area 512, the signature date / time area 513, and the signature device certificate area 514). Using the key distribution device private key stored in unit 404 as a signature key, a signature generation algorithm is applied to generate signature data. Then, the additional signature unit describes the generated signature data in the signature data area 1511 by the secret key of the key distribution apparatus of the signed content signature 1510. Further, the additional signature unit describes the key distribution device certificate 120 stored in the private key / certificate storage unit 404 in the key distribution device certificate area 1512.
As described above, the additional signature unit modifies the content signature 510 received by the content signature receiving unit 408 and generates a signed content signature 1510. Instead of transmitting the content signature 510 to the terminal device 600, the key distribution device 400 transmits the signed content signature 1510 generated by the additional signature unit to the terminal device 600.
Upon receiving the signed content signature 1510 from the key distribution device 400, the terminal device 600 records it in the normal area 708 of the recording medium device 700.
When the signed content signature 1510 is used instead of the processed UR, the terminal device 600 does not perform the determination process by the third reproduction determination unit 630 described above during the content reproduction process. Instead, the second reproduction determination unit 629 performs the following processing in addition.
The second reproduction determination unit 629 connects the data described in the content identification information area 511, the signature data area 512, the signature date / time area 513, and the signature apparatus certificate area 514 to the key distribution apparatus certificate area 1512. A signature verification algorithm is applied using a key distribution device public key included in the described key distribution device certificate 120 as a verification key, and verification data is generated. The second reproduction determining unit 629 confirms whether or not the generated verification data matches the signature data described in the signature data area 1511 by the secret key of the key distribution device.
If the signature verification is successful, the terminal device 600 continues the content reproduction process. If the signature verification fails, the second playback determination unit 629 outputs a decryption stop instruction to the content decryption unit 631. Then, the terminal device 600 ends the content reproduction process.
(10) In the above embodiment, the first reproduction determination unit 625 of the terminal device 600 determines whether or not the content can be reproduced using the MAC generated based on the ID of the recording medium device 700. However, the information used for determining whether playback is possible is not limited to the MAC. For example, an XOR of the operation title key and the recording medium device identification information may be used. Further, an XOR of the operation title key and the hash value of the identification information of the recording medium device may be used. Further, for example, information obtained by adding the signature of the key issuing device 100 to the identification information of the recording medium device 700 may be used. In this case, the terminal device 600 can determine whether or not the content can be reproduced by calculating XOR or performing signature verification.
(11) In the above embodiment, the second reproduction determining unit 629 of the terminal device 600 selects any seven partial contents from the N partial contents, and uses the hash values of the selected seven partial contents. Had a configuration to calculate. With this configuration, the calculation amount of the second reproduction determination unit 629 can be reduced.
However, the second reproduction determination unit 629 may be configured to calculate a hash value from more than seven partial contents in order to increase the accuracy of content validity verification. Further, the second playback determination unit 629 may be configured to calculate a hash value from less than 7 partial contents in order to further reduce the calculation amount.
(12) In the above embodiment, the third reproduction determining unit 630 of the terminal device 600 calculates the hash value of the content signature 510 and describes the calculated hash value and the content signature hash value area of the processed UR. It has the structure which compares with the hash value made.
However, this configuration is an example. The third playback determination unit 630 only needs to confirm that the information for specifying the content signature 510 is correctly embedded in the processed UR 430.
For example, the third reproduction determination unit 630 reads the signature data described in the signature data area 431 of the processed UR 430 read by the UR reading unit 621 and the signature data area 512 of the content signature 510 read by the content signature reading unit 622. It may be configured to confirm whether or not the signature data described in FIG.
(13) In the above embodiment, the first reproduction determining unit 625, the content signature verifying unit 627, the second reproduction determining unit 629, and the third reproduction determining unit 630 are connected to the content decrypting unit 631 according to the determination result. Therefore, the decoding stop instruction is output. However, this configuration is an example. In order to suppress the reproduction of the content, the first reproduction determination unit 625, the content signature verification unit 627, the second reproduction determination unit 629, and the third reproduction determination unit 630, with respect to the content reproduction unit 632 according to the determination result. An instruction to stop decoding may be output. Further, first reproduction determination unit 625 may output an instruction to stop reading to content reading unit 628 according to the determination result.
(14) In the above embodiment, an example of content is described as a movie composed of video data and audio data. However, the content is not limited to movies. The content may be a still image such as JPEG data, a computer program, a computer game, music content not including video data, text data, or the like.
(15) From a machine language or high-level language program code for causing the key distribution device and the terminal device processor and the various circuits connected to the processor to execute the key distribution processing and content reproduction processing shown in the embodiment. The control program can be recorded on a recording medium, or can be distributed and distributed via various communication paths. Such a recording medium includes an IC card, a hard disk, an optical disk, a flexible disk, a ROM, a flash memory, and the like. The distributed and distributed control program is used by being stored in a memory or the like that can be read by the processor, and each function as shown in the above embodiment is executed by the processor executing the control program. Will be realized. In addition to directly executing the control program, the processor may be compiled and executed or executed by an interpreter.
(16) Functional components of each device described in the embodiment (for example, a root public key storage unit 601, a private key / certificate storage unit 602, a content receiving unit 603, a content writing unit 604, a mutual authentication unit 605, recording medium device ID acquisition unit 606, recording medium device ID transmission unit 607, encryption / decryption unit 608, MAC / UR / content signature reception unit 609, MAC / UR / content signature writing unit 610, operation title key transmission unit 611 , Computed title key receiving unit 620, UR reading unit 621, content signature reading unit 622, title key recalculation unit 623, MAC reading unit 624, first reproduction determining unit 625, invalidation list receiving / storage unit 626, content signature verification Unit 627, content reading unit 628, second reproduction determining unit 629, third reproduction determining unit 630, content decoding unit 631 and Such as content reproduction section 632) may be implemented as a circuit that performs that function may be realized by executing a program by one or more processors. In addition, the key distribution device and the terminal device described in the embodiments may be configured as a package of an IC, an LSI, or another integrated circuit. This package is incorporated into various devices for use, whereby the various devices realize the functions as described in the above embodiments.
(17) You may combine said embodiment and said modification suitably suitably.
<10. Supplement>
Hereinafter, the configuration of the terminal device, the verification device, and the key distribution device as one embodiment of the present invention, and modifications and effects thereof will be described.
(A) A terminal device according to an aspect of the present invention reads an encrypted content and a content signature from a recording medium device, and generates a content signature generated by a legitimate signature device from a protected area of the recording medium device. A reading unit that reads the converted title key obtained by converting the title key using the title key, a title key restoring unit that reversely converts the converted title key using the content signature read by the reading unit, and generates a restored title key; And a playback unit that decrypts the encrypted content using the restored title key and plays back the decrypted content.
According to this configuration, a converted title key obtained by converting a title key using a content signature generated by a regular signature device is recorded in the protected area of the recording medium device. For this reason, even if the content signature generated using the leaked signature key and the illegally encrypted content are recorded in the recording medium device, the terminal device can read the converted title read from the recording medium device. The correct title key cannot be restored from the key. If the correct title key cannot be restored, the terminal device cannot correctly decrypt the illegal encrypted content. Therefore, the unauthorized use of content can be suppressed by suppressing the reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
Also, since it is meaningless to distribute illegal content that cannot be played back on the terminal device side, the leaked signature key is illegally used, and the illegal content is impersonated as a legitimate content. There is a possibility that fraud to be recorded itself can be suppressed.
(B) Here, the converted title key is generated from the content signature generated by the regular signature device, the usage condition of the content, and the title key, and the reading unit further includes the recording medium The usage condition is read from the device, and the title key restoration unit reversely converts the converted title key using the content signature read by the reading unit and the usage condition, and generates the restored title key. And
According to this configuration, when an unauthorized user records an unauthorized usage condition on the recording medium device, the terminal device cannot restore the correct title key from the converted title key. Therefore, the unauthorized use of content can be suppressed by suppressing the reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
(C) Here, the converted title key is generated by performing a predetermined operation on the title key and the first combined data obtained by combining the content signature generated by the regular signature device and the usage conditions. The title key restoration unit generates second combined data from the content signature read by the reading unit and the read usage conditions, and generates the predetermined combination for the generated second combined data and the converted title key. The restored title key is generated by performing an inverse operation of the operation.
According to this configuration, if the usage condition and the content signature recorded by the unauthorized user on the recording medium device differ from the regular usage condition and the content signature even by one bit, the terminal device restores the correct title key from the converted title key. I can't. Therefore, since unauthorized reproduction of encrypted content by the terminal device is suppressed, unauthorized use of the content can be suppressed.
(D) Here, the terminal device further determines whether or not the content signature read by the reading unit matches the content signature generated by a regular signature device used for generating the converted title key. And a content signature verification unit (third reproduction determination unit 630 in the embodiment) that suppresses the processing of the reproduction unit when the determination result does not match.
When the content signature recorded on the recording medium device is different from the regular content signature, it is highly possible that the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium device is illegal content. Therefore, reproduction of unauthorized content can be suppressed by providing the above configuration.
In addition, when illegal content is reproduced on the terminal device, a reproduction error unexpected by the user may occur. If the user does not know that the content recorded in the recording medium device is illegal content, it is expected that the user will be confused when a playback error occurs in the terminal device. Therefore, it is possible to eliminate in advance the possibility of a playback error occurring in the terminal device by providing the above-described configuration and suppressing the playback of illegal content.
(E) Here, the terminal device further verifies the validity of the encrypted content using the content signature, and determines that the encrypted content is illegal. The content verification part (2nd reproduction | regeneration judgment part 629 of embodiment) which suppresses is provided, It is characterized by the above-mentioned.
According to this configuration, when the encrypted content recorded on the recording medium device and the content signature do not match, the reproduction of the content can be suppressed.
(F) Here, the content signature includes identification information of the signature device that generated the content signature, and the terminal device further includes an invalidation list in which identification information of the device to be invalidated is described. And confirming whether or not the signature device is an invalidation target by using the received invalidation list, and determining that the signature device is an invalidation target, An invalidation confirmation unit (content signature verification unit 627 of the embodiment) that suppresses processing is provided.
According to this configuration, even if an illegal act of recording the content signature generated using the leaked secret key and the illegally encrypted content on the recording medium device is generated, the leaked secret key is generated. Since the reproduction of the content with the content signature is suppressed, unauthorized use of the content can be suppressed.
(G) Here, the content signature further includes first date information indicating a date when the signature device generates the content signature, and the invalidation list further identifies an invalidation target device. The invalidation confirmation unit includes second date information indicating a date to be invalidated in association with the information, and the invalidation confirmation unit includes identification information of the signature device described in the invalidation list, and When the date indicated by the 1st date information is newer than the date indicated by the 2nd date information, it is determined that the signature device is an invalidation target, and the identification information of the signature device is described in the invalidation list, In addition, when the date indicated by the first date information is older than the date indicated by the second date information, the signature device is determined not to be invalidated.
According to this configuration, the playback unit of the terminal device can play back the content with the content signature generated before the secret key of the signature device is leaked. Therefore, the right of the user who has downloaded the content can be protected.
(H) A verification device according to an aspect of the present invention reads an encrypted content and a content signature from a recording medium device, and generates a content signature generated by a legitimate signature device from a protected area of the recording medium device A reading unit that reads the converted title key obtained by converting the title key using the content key, the content signature read by the reading unit, and the content signature generated by the regular signature device used to generate the converted title key; And a content signature verification unit (third determination unit 1630 in the embodiment) for determining whether or not the two match.
According to this configuration, when a fraudulent act is performed in which a leaked signature key is used to generate a content signature from unauthorized encrypted content, and the content signature and the unauthorized encrypted content are recorded in the recording medium device In the verification by the content signature verification unit, it is determined that there is a mismatch, and the subsequent processing may not be executed. Therefore, since processing using unauthorized encrypted content is suppressed, unauthorized use of content can be suppressed.
(I) A key distribution device according to an aspect of the present invention includes a content holding unit that holds encrypted content in which content is encrypted with a title key, and a content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content. A content signature holding unit to hold, a title key holding unit to hold the title key, a key generation unit that converts the title key using the content signature and generates a converted title key, and the encrypted content; A recording unit that records the content signature and the converted title key on a recording medium device.
According to this configuration, even if a fraud that records a content signature generated using a leaked signature key and an illegal encrypted content in the recording medium device is performed, the terminal device that reproduces the encrypted content, The correct title key cannot be restored from the converted title key read from the recording medium device. If the correct title key cannot be restored, the terminal device cannot correctly decrypt the illegal encrypted content. Therefore, the unauthorized use of content can be suppressed by suppressing the reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
(J) Here, the key distribution device further includes a usage condition holding unit that holds usage conditions of the content, and the key generation unit converts the content signature, the usage conditions, and the title key from the conversion. A title key is generated.
According to this configuration, when an unauthorized user records an unauthorized usage condition on the recording medium device, the terminal device that reproduces the encrypted content cannot restore the correct title key from the converted title key. Therefore, the unauthorized use of content can be suppressed by suppressing the reproduction of unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
(K) Here, the key generation unit performs a predetermined operation on the combined data obtained by combining the content signature and the use condition and the title key to generate the converted title key.
The present invention is generated by using a leaked signature key in an industry that manufactures and sells a terminal device that records content distributed over a network, content signature, UR, title key, etc. on a recording medium device such as an SD memory card. Even if an unauthorized act of recording a content signature and an unauthorized encrypted content on the recording medium device is performed, it can be used as a technique for suppressing reproduction of the unauthorized encrypted content by the terminal device.
DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Content distribution system 100 Key issuing apparatus 200 Content production apparatus 300 Content distribution apparatus 400 Key distribution apparatus 401 Root public key receiving part 402 Root public key storage part 403 Private key / certificate receiving part 404 Private key / certificate storage part 405 Title Key / content identification information reception unit 406 Content identification information transmission unit 407 UR reception unit 408 Content signature reception unit 409 Invalidation list reception unit 410 UR processing unit 411 Title key calculation unit 412 Mutual authentication unit 413 Encryption / decryption unit 414 Recording medium device ID Reception unit 415 MAC operation unit 500 Signature device 501 Private key / certificate reception unit 502 Private key / certificate storage unit 503 Content identification information reception unit 504 Signature unit 505 Content signature transmission unit 600 Terminal device 601 Route public key storage unit 602 Secret Key / proof Document storage unit 603 Content reception unit 604 Content writing unit 605 Mutual authentication unit 606 Recording medium device ID acquisition unit 607 Recording medium device ID transmission unit 608 Encryption / decryption unit 609 MAC / UR / content signature reception unit 610 MAC / UR / content signature Writing unit 611 Calculated title key transmission unit 620 Calculated title key receiving unit 621 UR reading unit 622 Content signature reading unit 623 Title key recalculation unit 624 MAC reading unit 625 First reproduction determining unit 626 Invalidation list receiving / storage unit 627 Content Signature verification unit 628 Content reading unit 629 Second playback determination unit 630 Third playback determination unit 631 Content decryption unit 632 Content playback unit 700 Recording medium device 1600 Verification device
Read the encrypted content and the content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content from the recording medium device, and use the content signature generated by the authorized signature device from the protected area of the recording medium device A reading unit for reading out the converted title key obtained by converting the title key by
A title key restoring unit that reversely converts the converted title key using the content signature read by the reading unit and generates a restored title key;
A terminal device comprising: a reproduction unit that decrypts the encrypted content using the restored title key and reproduces the decrypted content.
The converted title key is generated from the content signature generated by the regular signature device, the usage condition of the content, and the title key,
The reading unit further reads a use condition from the recording medium device,
The title key restoration unit reversely transforms the converted title key using the content signature read by the reading unit and the use condition, and generates the restored title key. Terminal equipment.
The converted title key is generated by performing a predetermined operation on the title key and the first combined data obtained by combining the content signature generated by the regular signature device and the use conditions,
The title key restoration unit generates second combined data from the content signature read by the reading unit and the read usage conditions, and performs the predetermined operation on the generated second combined data and the converted title key. The terminal device according to claim 2, wherein the restored title key is generated by performing an inverse operation of the above.
It is determined whether the content signature read by the reading unit matches the content signature generated by the legitimate signature device used to generate the converted title key. The terminal device according to claim 3, further comprising a content signature verification unit that suppresses processing of the reproduction unit.
A content verification unit is provided that verifies the validity of the encrypted content using the content signature and suppresses the processing of the reproduction unit when the encrypted content is determined to be illegal. The terminal device according to claim 3.
The content signature includes identification information of the signature device that generated the content signature,
A receiving unit that receives an invalidation list in which identification information of a device to be invalidated is described;
Using the received invalidation list, it is confirmed whether or not the signature device is an invalidation target, and if it is determined that the signature device is an invalidation target, an invalidation confirmation that suppresses the processing of the reproduction unit The terminal device according to claim 3, further comprising: a unit.
The content signature further includes first date information indicating a date on which the signature device generated the content signature,
The invalidation list further includes second date information indicating the date of invalidation in association with the identification information of the device to be invalidated,
The invalidation confirmation unit
If the identification information of the signature device is described in the invalidation list and the date indicated by the first date information is newer than the date indicated by the second date information, the signature device is an invalidation target. And
When the identification information of the signature device is described in the invalidation list and the date indicated by the first date information is older than the date indicated by the second date information, the signature device is not an invalidation target. The terminal device according to claim 6, wherein the terminal device is determined.
Reading out the encrypted content and the content signature from the recording medium device, and reading out the converted title key obtained by converting the title key using the content signature generated by the legitimate signature device from the protected area of the recording medium device And
A content signature verifying unit that determines whether or not the content signature read by the reading unit matches the content signature generated by the regular signature device used to generate the converted title key. Feature verification device.
A content holding unit for holding encrypted content in which the content is encrypted with a title key;
A content signature holding unit for holding a content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content;
A title key holding unit for holding the title key;
A key generation unit that converts the title key using the content signature and generates a converted title key;
A key distribution device comprising: a recording unit that records the encrypted content and the content signature on a recording medium device, and records the converted title key in a protected area of the recording medium device.
The key distribution device further includes:
A use condition holding unit for holding the use condition of the content;
The key generation unit
The key distribution device according to claim 9, wherein the converted title key is generated from the content signature, the use condition, and the title key.
The key according to claim 10, wherein the key generation unit generates the converted title key by performing a predetermined operation on the combined data obtained by combining the content signature and the use condition and the title key. Distribution device.
A content playback method used in a terminal device,
Read the encrypted content and the content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content from the recording medium device, and use the content signature generated by the authorized signature device from the protected area of the recording medium device A reading step of reading out the converted title key obtained by converting the title key using
A title key restoring step for reversely converting the converted title key using the read content signature and generating a restored title key;
A content playback method comprising: a playback step of decrypting the encrypted content using the restored title key restored in the title key restoration step and playing back the decrypted content.
A computer program used in a terminal device,
A computer program that causes the terminal device to execute a reproduction step of decrypting the encrypted content using the restored title key restored in the title key restoration step and reproducing the decrypted content.
A key distribution method used in a key distribution apparatus,
The key distribution device holds encrypted content in which content is encrypted with a title key, a content signature for verifying the validity of the encrypted content, and the title key,
The key distribution method is:
A key generation step of converting the title key using the content signature and generating a converted title key;
Recording the encrypted content and the content signature on a recording medium device, and recording the converted title key in a protected area of the recording medium device .
A computer program used in a key distribution device,
Recording the encrypted content and the content signature on a recording medium device, and recording the converted title key in a protected area of the recording medium device. Computer program.
JP2013531052A 2011-08-26 2012-08-17 Terminal device, verification device, key distribution device, content reproduction method, key distribution method, and computer program Active JP5869580B2 (en)
US201161527854P true 2011-08-26 2011-08-26
US61/527,854 2011-08-26
PCT/JP2012/005183 WO2013031124A1 (en) 2011-08-26 2012-08-17 Terminal device, verification device, key distribution device, content playback method, key distribution method, and computer program
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