Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/87205/united-states-vs-rodgers
Timestamp: 2016-10-24 07:11:05
Document Index: 121215910

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 26', '§ 155', '§ 205', '§ 182', 'art. 11', '§ 42', '§ 190', 'art. 2', 'art. 6', '§ 205', '§ 30', '§ 5346']

United States Vs Rodgers - Citation 87205 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. Rodgers - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/87205CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-20-1893Case Number150 U.S. 249AppellantUnited StatesRespondentRodgersExcerpt:
united states v. rodgers - 150 u.s. 249 (1893)
"every person who, upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the united states, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, on board any vessel belonging in whole or part to the united states, or any citizen thereof, with a dangerous weapon, or with intent to.....Judgment:
for the Eastern District of Michigan for assaulting, in August, 1887, with a dangerous weapon, one James Downs, on board of the steamer
a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, and then being within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and not within the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States,
within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada.
"The defendant in this cause was indicted on the twenty-fourth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, together with John Gustave Beyers and others, charged, under section 5346 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, with having made an assault with dangerous weapons upon one James Downs, the assault having taken place on the steamer
a vessel owned by citizens of the United States, while such vessel was in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada, and the said Robert S. Rodgers, and the others indicted with him, having first, after
"Howell E. Jackson,
"Henry B. Brown,
"The sea is either that which lies within the body of a county or without. That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the
fauces terrae,
where a man may reasonably discern between shore and shore, is, or at least may be, within the body of a county, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
sheriff or coroner. That part of the sea which lies not within the body of a county is called the 'main sea' or 'ocean.' De Jure Maris c. iv. By the 'main sea,' Hale here means the same thing expressed by the term 'high sea,' -- '
mare altum,
le haut meer.
5 How. 440,
46 U. S. 452
, this Court said that it had been frequently adjudicated in the English common law courts, since the restraining statutes of Richard II. and Henry IV., "that "high seas" mean the portion of the sea which washes the open coast." In
United States v. Grush,
5 Mason 290, it was held by Mr. Justice Story in the United States circuit court that the term "high seas," in its usual sense, expresses the unenclosed ocean, or that portion of the sea which is without the
on the seacoast, in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories. It was the open, unenclosed waters of the ocean, or the open, unenclosed waters of the sea, which constituted the "high seas" in his judgment. There was no distinction made by him between the ocean and the sea, and there was no occasion for any such distinction. The question in issue was whether the alleged offenses were committed within a County of Massachusetts on the seacoast, or without it, for in the latter case they were committed upon the high seas, and within the statute. It was held that they were committed in the County of Suffolk, and thus were not covered by the statute.
on the coast. This distinction was observed by Latin writers between the ports and havens of the Mediterranean and its open waters, the latter being termed the "high seas." [
] In that sense, the term may also be properly used in reference to the open waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea, both of which are inland seas, finding their way to the ocean by a narrow and distant channel. Indeed, wherever there are seas in fact free to the navigation of all nations and people on their borders, their open waters outside of the portion "surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories" on the coast, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, or "without the body of a county," as declared by Sir Matthew Hale, are properly characterized as "high seas," by whatever name the bodies of water of which they are a part may be designated. Their names do not determine their character. There are, as said above, high seas on the Mediterranean (meaning outside of the enclosed waters along its coast) upon which the principal commerce of the ancient world was conducted, and its great naval battles fought. To hold that on such seas there are no high seas within the true meaning of that term -- that is, no open, unenclosed waters, free to the navigation of all nations and people on their borders -- would be to place upon that term a narrow and contracted meaning. We prefer to use it in its true sense, as applicable to the open unenclosed waters of all seas, than to adhere to the common meaning of the term two centuries ago, when it was generally limited to the open waters of the ocean, and of seas surrounding Great Britain, the freedom of which was then the principal subject of discussion. If it be conceded, as we think it must be, that the open unenclosed waters of the Mediterranean are high seas, that concession is a sufficient answer to the claim that the "high seas" always denote the open waters of the ocean.
The Genesee Chief Case,
12 How. 443, this Court, in considering whether the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extended to the Great Lakes, and speaking through Chief Justice Taney of the general character of those lakes, said:
53 U. S. 453
The character of these lakes as seas was recognized by this Court in the recent
Chicago Lake Front Case,
The language of section 5346, immediately following the term "high seas," declaring the penalty for violent assaults when committed on board of a vessel in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, equally as when committed on board of a vessel on the high seas, lends force to the construction given to that term. The language used must be read in conjunction with that term, and as referring to navigable waters out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, but connecting with the high seas mentioned. The Detroit River, upon which was the steamer
at the time the assault was committed, connects the waters of Lake Huron (with which, as stated above, the waters of Lake Superior and Lake Michigan join) with the waters of Lake Erie, and separates the Dominion of Canada from the United States, constituting the boundary between them; the dividing line running nearly midway between its banks, as established by commissioners pursuant to the treaty between the two countries. 8 Stat. 276. The river is about 22 miles in length, and from one to three miles in width, and is navigable at all seasons of the year by vessels of the largest size. The number of vessels passing through it each year is immense. Between the years 1880 and 1892, inclusive, they averaged from thirty-one to forty thousand a year, having a tonnage varying from sixteen to twenty-four
millions. [
] In traversing the river, they are constantly passing from the territorial jurisdiction of the one nation to that of the other. All of them, however, so far as transactions had on board are concerned, are deemed to be within the country of their owners. Constructively they constitute a part of the territory of the nation to which the owners belong. While they are on the navigable waters of the river, they are within the admiralty jurisdiction of that country. This jurisdiction is not changed by the fact that each of the neighboring nations may in some cases assert its own authority over persons on such vessels, in relation to acts committed by them within its territorial limits. In what cases jurisdiction by each country will be thus asserted, and to what extent, it is not necessary to inquire, for no question on that point is presented for our consideration. The general rule is that the country to which the vessel belongs will exercise jurisdiction over all matters affecting the vessel, or those belonging to her, without interference of the local government unless they involve its peace, dignity, or tranquility, in which case it may assert its authority.
120 U. S. 12
; Halleck on International Law, c. vii, § 26, p. 172. The admiralty jurisdiction of the country of the owners of the steamer upon which the offense charged was committed is not denied. They being citizens of
We are not unmindful of the fact that it was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan in
People v. Tyler,
7 Mich. 161, that the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts did not extend to offenses committed upon vessels on the lakes. The judges who rendered that decision were able and distinguished, but that fact, while it justly calls for a careful consideration of their reasoning, does not render their conclusion
"Efficit objectu laterum, quibus omnis ab
Lib. 1, v. 159-161"
The first Crimes Act of the United States provided, in section 8, for the punishment of murder or other capital offense committed "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," and, in section 12, for the punishment of any person who should "commit manslaughter upon the high seas," but not mentioning in that section any other waters. Act April 30, 1790, c. 9, 1 Stat. 113, 115. In
decided by this Court in 1820, it was adjudged that manslaughter committed by the master upon one of the seamen on board a merchant vessel of the United States,below low water mark of a river flowing into the sea in China was not "manslaughter upon the high seas," nor within the act of 1970, and Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering judgment, said:
Wheat. 76,
18 U. S. 94
this Court held that the words, "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," in section 8 of the act of 1790, meant a State of the union, and not a foreign state, and that a ship lying at anchor in an open roadstead, within a marine league of a foreign shore, and not in a river, haven, basin, or bay, might be found by a jury to be on the high seas. 5 Wheat.
decision had been previously made by Mr. Justice Story.
1 Gallison 624.
Mr. Justice Story held that larceny in an enclosed dock within the ebb and flow of the tide in a foreign port was not larceny "upon the high seas," under section 16 of the act of 1790. 1 Mason 152. In
United States v. Morel,
it was held by Mr. Justice Baldwin and Judge Hopkinson that an indictment on the same section was not sustained by proof of stealing in a landlocked harbor of one of the Bahama Islands, the court saying:
13 American Jurist 279, 282. And in
a like decision was made by Mr. Justice Thompson and Judge Betts as to larceny in the harbor of Vera Cruz, because "the high seas were, properly speaking, within the territory of no state or country." 2 N.Y.Leg.Obs. 3, 4.
4 Mason 307, which was an indictment on the Act of March 26, 1804, c. 40, 2 Stat. 290, for destroying a vessel "on the high seas" with intent to defraud the underwriters, Mr. Justice Story held that a landlocked bay in Bermuda could not be considered as the high seas. And, under the same statute, Mr. Justice Nelson and Judge Betts held that a vessel in the East River or western extremity of Long Island Sound was not upon the high seas.
3 Blatchford 435.
5 Mason 290, which was an indictment on the provision of section 22 of the act of 1825, reenacted in the very section of the Revised Statutes now in question, for an assault with a dangerous weapon and with intent to kill, Mr. Justice Story, in deciding that a place in Boston harbor within the body of a county was a bay or haven or arm of the sea, but was not the high seas, said:
"There cannot, I think, be any doubt as to what is the true meaning of the words 'high seas' in this statute. Mr. Justice Blackstone, in his Commentaries, 1 Com. 110, uses the words 'high sea' and 'main sea' (
le haut meer
) as synonymous, and he adds 'that the main sea begins at the low water mark.' But though this may be one sense of the terms, to distinguish the divided empire which the admiralty possesses between high water and low water mark, when it is full sea, from that which the common law possesses when it is ebb sea, yet the more common sense is to express the open unenclosed ocean, or that portion of the sea which is without the
on the seacoast, in contradistinction to that which is surrounded or enclosed between narrow headlands or promontories."
And, after referring to
above cited, and other authorities, he concluded:
"The 'high seas' mean the waters of the ocean without the boundary of any county, and they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty, up to high water mark when the tide is full. The 'open ocean, which washes the seacoast' is used in contradistinction to arms of the sea enclosed within the
or narrow headlands and promontories, and under this head are included rivers, harbors, creeks, basins, bays, etc., where the tide ebbs and flows."
If we turn to the principal American dictionaries, we find the following definitions of "high seas:" "In Worcester,
the open ocean." In Webster, "
high seas (law),
the open sea; the part of the ocean not in the territorial waters of any particular sovereignty, usually distant three miles or more from the coast line." In the Century Dictionary,
are defined as "the open sea or ocean; the highway of waters;" and, in law, either (1) the waters of the ocean to high water mark or (2) those
A fortnight after the passage of the act of 1825, this Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, decided that the general admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States was limited to tidewaters.
10 Wheat. 428. That decision was followed, in 1833, in
7 Pet. 324; in 1827, in
11 Pet. 175, and in 1847, in
5 How. 441. For more than half a century after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress took no step towards extending the admiralty jurisdiction beyond such waters. In the Act of February 26, 1845, c. 20, extending that jurisdiction, in matters of contract and tort, "upon the lakes and the navigable waters connecting the same," Congress clearly treated those lakes and waters as distinct from, and not included within "the high seas or tidewaters." 5 Stat. 726.
The judgment of this Court, in 1851, in
12 How. 443, overruling
and the cases which followed it and holding the act of 1845 to be constitutional did not proceed upon any assumption that the Great Lakes were high seas, but upon the broad ground that "the lakes and the waters connecting them are undoubtedly public waters," and therefore "within the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United States." 12 How.
. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering that judgment, clearly distinguishes the Great Lakes from the high seas. This appears in his statement of the question whether
as well as in his pregnant observations, "these lakes are, in truth, inland seas. Different states border on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other." 12 How.
53 U. S. 452
8 Wall. 15, in which it was decided that the admiralty jurisdiction over all navigable waters, having been declared in
to depend upon the Constitution, and not upon any act of Congress, extended to the British side of the Detroit River, Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for this Court, observed the same distinction, saying that the district courts could take cognizance of
75 U. S. 21
state has exclusive force, but all are equal." Bradley, J., in
105 U. S. 29
The Twee Gebroeders,
3 C. Rob. 336, 339.
and he distinguished the waters of the river, common to the two nations between whose dominions it flowed, from "the ocean, the common highway of all nations."
22 U. S. 369
And he proceeds to show that the rights of other nations than Turkey and Russia to navigate the Black Sea from the Mediterranean rest upon treaties, only. 1 Phillimore's International Law (3d ed.) c, 5, § 155; c. 8, §§ 205, 205A.
also Wheaton § 182, and note; Treaty of 1826 of the United States with the Ottoman Empire, art. 11, 12 Stat. 1216.
been recognized and considered by all nations for centuries as part of the high seas, free to all mankind. Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 42; Wheaton § 190. And it was the one sea familiarly known to the ancients as "
altum mare,
" the deep sea, or "high sea," or simply "
" the deep.
As to the Great Lakes of North America, there has never been any doubt. They are in the heart of the continent, far above the flow of the tide from the sea. Lake Michigan is wholly within the limits and dominion of the United States and of those states of the union which surround it.
; 6 Opinions of Attorneys General 172. The middle line of Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario and of the waters connecting them forms part of the boundary between the United States and the State of Michigan and other states of the union, on the one hand, and the British possessions in Canada, on the other. Treaties of Paris in 1783, art. 2, and of Ghent in 1814, art. 6, and decision of commissioners under this article, 8 Stat. 81, 221, 274; Charters and Constitutions, 994, 1453, 2026. No other nation has the right to navigate them except by the permission and subject to the laws, of the United States and Great Britain, respectively. The controversy between the United States and Great Britain as to the right of navigating the River St.Lawrence turned upon the effect to be given to the fact that one side of the Great Lakes, and of the waters connecting them, belonged to each country, as against the fact that both shores of the St.Lawrence below belonged to Great Britain, and it was never suggested that any third nation had a free and common right of navigation of the lakes and their connecting waters. On the contrary, the exclusive right of the United States and Great Britain to navigate the lakes was
Congressional Documents, 1827-28, No. 43, p. 19; Wheaton § 205. The right of citizens of the United States to navigate the St.Lawrence, as well as a right to British subjects to navigate Lake Michigan, was secured by treaties between the two countries in 1854 and 1871. 10 Stat. 1091; 17 Stat. 872.
Act July 26, 1892, c. 248, 27 Stat. 267; 1 Wharton's International Digest §§ 30, 31.
The place in the Detroit River within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada where this offense is alleged to have been committed was doubtless "within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States" under the decision in
and was "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" under the decision in
5 Wheat. 184, already cited. Nor is there any doubt of the power of Congress to punish crimes committed on American vessels, wherever they may be afloat.
18 U. S. 194
83 U. S. 624
Upon this part of the case, the decision of this Court in
3 Wheat. 336, is much in point. That was an indictment for a murder committed by a marine upon another enlisted man on a ship of war of the United States lying in the harbor of Boston, and so within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts, and therefore, as the Court held, not coming within the description in section 8 of the Act of April 30, 1790, c. 9, "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state." But the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States was also sought to be maintained under the provision of section 7 of the same act, for the punishment of murder committed "within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or other place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 1 Stat. 113. It was argued that a ship of war of the United States was "a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," and therefore within the act. But this Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, held otherwise, and, while waiving a decision of the question whether any court of Massachusetts would have jurisdiction of the offense, and recognizing as unquestionable the power of Congress to punish an offense committed by a marine on board a ship of war, wherever she may be, nevertheless held that Congress had not exercised that power by the provision last quoted, because the objects with which the word "place" was associated -- "fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine," and "district of country" -- being all fixed and territorial in their character,
to have been fixed on territorial objects of a similar character." 3 Wheat.
Applying the same rule of construction,
to the enactment now before the Court, the conclusion seems irresistible that as the preceding words, "upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea," as well as the succeeding words, "haven, creek, basin or bay," designate tidewaters of or adjoining the ocean, the words "any river" must be held to designate waters of a similar character -- that is to say those rivers only where the tide ebbs and flows and which are immediately connected with the sea, or with one of the other waters enumerated, and cannot be extended to a fresh-water river in the interior of the continent, because the context shows the mind of the legislature to have been fixed on tidewaters.
cited at the beginning of this opinion, in which, as in
just cited, and in the case at bar, the question was of the meaning of words, not defining the elements of the crime itself, but only describing the place of its commission, Chief Justice Marshall expounded the rule of construction of penal statutes as follows:
-96. And in answer to the suggestion made in that case (which has been repeated in this) of "the extreme improbability that Congress could have intended to make those differences with respect to place, which their words import," the Chief Justice said:
18 U. S. 105
I had supposed that in criminal cases the accused was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt, not only with regard to the evidence of guilt, but with regard to the jurisdiction of the court -- in other words, that penal statutes should be construed strictly -- and that the facts that the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a very carefully considered case, some thirty years ago,
7 Mich. 161, had decided that the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts did not
extend to the lakes; that the same question had been decided the same way by Judge Wilkins in
Miller's Case,
Brown Adm. 156; that the federal courts upon the lakes had uniformly acquiesced in these decisions, and that no case is reported to the contrary, would, of itself, make a case of reasonable doubt, to the benefit of which the prisoner would be entitled.
My own views on this question were so fully set forth in the case of
32 F. 404, that I can add but little to what was there said. Rev.Stat. § 5346, under which this indictment was framed, limits the jurisdiction of the district court to
"cases arising upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States,
and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.
The term "high seas" has never been regarded by any public writer, or held by any court, to be applicable to territorial waters, and, like the word "highways," presupposes the right of the public to make free use of them, and excludes the idea of private ownership. Of the sea, Lord Hale says (
De Jure Maribus,
c. 4):
"The sea is either that which lies within the body of the county, or without. That arm or branch of the sea which lies within the
From time immemorial, the term "high seas" has been used to import the unenclosed and open ocean without the
fauces terrae.
3 Wheat. 336, a homicide had been committed upon an American man-of-war lying at anchor in the main channel of Boston harbor, to which there is at all times a free and unobstructed passage to the open ocean. The language of the statute was practically the same as in this case, but it was held by this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, that to bring the defendants within the jurisdiction of the courts of the union, the murder must have been committed in a river, etc.,
out of the jurisdiction of any state,
and that, as the jurisdiction of a state was coextensive with its territory and with its legislative power, the courts of Massachusetts had exclusive jurisdiction of the crime. It was further held that whatever might be the constitutional power of Congress, it was clear that this power had not been exercised so as to confer upon its courts jurisdiction over any offenses committed within the jurisdiction of any particular state. In
5 Wheat. 76, it was held that the courts of the United States had no jurisdiction of a manslaughter committed on a merchant vessel of the United States lying in the River Tigris, in the Empire of China. It
1 Black 484, it was said by this Court that to give a circuit court of the United States jurisdiction of an offense not committed within its district, it must appear that the offense was committed
and not within any other district of the United States. This was applied to an offense committed in Long Island Sound, one and one-half miles from the Connecticut shore at low water mark.
1 Brown's Adm. 156, it was held by Judge Wilkins, of Michigan, that while it was within the constitutional competency of Congress to define and punish offenses, when committed upon other waters than the high seas, it had not done so, and that Lake Erie was not a part of the high seas. This was applied to a shocking case of an attempt to burn a passenger steamer upon Lake Erie.
But it seems to me, without going further into the authorities, that the term "high seas" is accurately defined by the statute under which this indictment is framed as "waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and
out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.
upon the lakes in their own courts, whenever it is able to lay hands upon the offender. It would also follow that other nations than England and America would have the right to navigate these seas without any local restrictions, and even to send their fleets there, and perhaps to engage in hostilities upon its waters. In the case of
12 How. 443, this Court did not hold that the lakes were high seas, but that the limitation of the admiralty jurisdiction in civil cases to tidewaters did not apply to this country, or to the interior lakes -- a doctrine in which I fully concur, and one that has met with the practically unanimous approval of the profession.
As the western half of the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers is within the territorial jurisdiction of Michigan, it only remains to consider whether the fact that the eastern half of these rivers is within the territorial jurisdiction of Canada meets the requirements of the statute. I may say that this question was elaborately considered by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of
7 Mich. 161, which was also the case of an assault committed on the Canadian side of the boundary line, in which the federal court, without an investigation of the question, had convicted Tyler. The Supreme Court of Michigan were unanimous in the opinion that the jurisdiction did not exist. Separate opinions were delivered by three of the judges in which every possible case bearing upon the question was cited and criticized. I have no doubt whatever of the power of Congress to extend its jurisdiction to crimes committed upon navigable waters. Indeed, since the decision in
Byers' Case,
and on September 4, 1890, Congress did pass an act providing for the punishment of crimes committed anywhere upon the lakes. 1 Supp.Rev.Stat. 799.
But, considering that at the time the act of Congress in question was passed,
in 1790, the lakes were far beyond the bounds of civilization, and possessed no commerce except such as was carried on in canoes, it seems impossible to say that Congress could have intended that the words "arm of the sea, or river, haven, creek, basin, or bay" should apply to the lakes, when the word "lakes" might just as well have been used had the interior waters of the country been included. It seems to me entirely clear that the words alluded to, following immediately the words "high seas," apply only to such waters as are connected immediately with the high seas, and have no application to the Great Lakes. This was evidently the view taken by Congress in the enactment of 1890.