Source: http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0606/chapter2.htm
Timestamp: 2015-03-06 11:07:17
Document Index: 265231943

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1801', '§ 1801', '§ 1804', '§ 1823', '§ 1804', '§ 1823']

II. The FBI�s organizational structure with respect to international terrorism
As mentioned above, when the FBI conducts intelligence investigations, a significant tool for uncovering information is the FISA statute. The FBI obtains an order from the FISA Court authorizing electronic surveillance and searches with the assistance of Department attorneys in the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR is under the direction of the Counsel for Intelligence Policy.30 III. The wall between intelligence and criminal terrorism investigations
The wall separating intelligence and criminal investigations affected both the Moussaoui case and the Hazmi and Mihdhar case. As we discuss in detail in Chapter Four, in the Moussaoui case FBI Headquarters believed that the Minneapolis agents should not contact the local U.S. Attorney�s Office to seek a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui�s possessions because, under the standards prior to September 11, 2001, contact with the local prosecutor would undermine any later attempt to obtain a FISA warrant. And as we discuss in detail in Chapter Five, because of the wall � and beliefs about what the wall required � an FBI analyst did not share important intelligence information about Hazmi and Mihdhar with criminal investigators. In addition, also because of the wall, in August 2001 when the New York FBI learned that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the United States, criminal investigators were not allowed to participate in the search for them. Because the wall between intelligence and criminal investigations affected these two cases, we provide in this section a description of how the wall was created and evolved in response to the 1978 FISA statute. We also describe the unwritten policy separating criminal and intelligence investigations in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 1995 Procedures that codified the wall, the FISA Court procedures in 2000 that required written certification that the Department had adhered to the wall between criminal and intelligence investigations, and the changes to the wall after the September 11 attacks.
IV. The process for obtaining a FISA warrant
“Foreign power” as defined in the FISA statute has several meanings, most of which pertain to the governance of a foreign nation, such as “a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States” and “an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1) & (2). The definition most applicable in the Moussaoui investigation is “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4). With respect to terrorism, before September 11, 2001, foreign powers that were used in requests for FISA warrants to the FISA Court included foreign governments as well as terrorist organizations not controlled by any foreign government, such as al Qaeda and Hizbollah. Whether a terrorist organization qualified as a �foreign power� under the FISA statute depended upon the intelligence developed about the group and its activities, and whether the FISA Court was convinced that the government had proven that the entity existed and was engaged in international terrorist activities. In practice, once the FBI developed the necessary intelligence about the existence of a terrorist organization, a particular subject was used as a �test subject� for pleading to the FISA Court that the organization was a foreign power. Although not dispositive, FISA applications might reference the fact that the State Department had designated an entity as a �foreign terrorist organization� (FTO).48 An �agent� of a foreign power also has several definitions in the statute. An agent can be a person who has an official connection to a foreign power, such as an employee of a foreign government or an official member of a terrorist organization. With respect to terrorism, an agent can be anyone who engages in international terrorism (or in activities that are in preparation for international terrorism) �for or on behalf of a foreign power.� 50 U.S.C. � 1801(b)(2)(C).
To obtain an order from the FISA Court authorizing either electronic surveillance or a physical search, the FBI – through DOJ OIPR – submits to the FISA Court an application containing three documents. The first document, labeled “application,” is a court pleading that contains the government’s specific request for a FISA warrant and includes the required approval by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (electronic surveillance) and § 1823(a) (physical search). The second document is a certification by the FBI Director or other Executive Branch official that the information sought is foreign intelligence information and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques. At the time of the Moussaoui investigation, as discussed above, the certification also had to contain a statement that the purpose of the search or surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.49 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (electronic surveillance) and § 1823(a)(7) (physical search).
At the time of the Moussaoui investigation in August 2001, once the LHM was received in FBI Headquarters by the appropriate SSA, that SSA was responsible for ensuring that the FISA request was adequately supported and complete before it was presented to OIPR. To do this, the SSA � working in conjunction with the assigned IOS � reviewed the documentation to assess whether it contained sufficient information for a FISA or whether there were questions that would have to be answered before the request could be completed. The SSA also assessed whether the appropriate foreign power was being pled and whether there was sufficient information connecting the subject to the foreign power. The SSA and the IOS communicated with the field office directly about any problems or for additional information. In problematic cases, the SSA would consult with an NSLU attorney for advice and suggestions.
At the time of the Moussaoui investigation, the SSA would normally review the edited version of the LHM with the field office to ensure the factual accuracy of the LHM.53 Once the field office and the SSA agreed on the final version of the LHM, the SSA sought review and approval by an NSLU attorney and finally obtained the appropriate signatures within FBI Headquarters management, such as the signatures of the Unit and Section Chiefs. This editing process could last from several days to several months. Role of NSLU attorneys
At the time of the Moussaoui investigation in August 2001, two attorneys in the National Security Law Unit (NSLU) of the FBI�s Office of the General Counsel were assigned full-time to counterterrorism matters.54 No attorney was assigned responsibility for a particular FISA request from beginning to end. The two NSLU attorneys assigned to counterterrorism matters had two functions with respect to FISA requests submitted by field offices. First, they functioned in an advisory capacity. The SSA would consult with an NSLU attorney if a question or problem arose or if the SSA needed legal advice. NSLU attorneys also were consulted when there was a disagreement between the field office and FBI Headquarters about a particular issue, such as whether there was sufficient support for a FISA warrant. SSAs often discussed with NSLU attorneys whether the threshold of probable cause had been met for supporting that a subject was an agent of a foreign power. The former head of the NSLU told the OIG, however, that in �slam dunk� cases, FBI Headquarters would deal directly with OIPR without consulting an NSLU attorney.