Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/296/188
Timestamp: 2016-07-24 17:05:57
Document Index: 592807653

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 270', '§ 682', '§ 682', '§ 242', '§ 243', '§ 243', '§ 252', '§ 252', '§ 254', '§ 254', '§ 255', '§ 255', '§ 256', '§ 256', '§ 29', '§ 269', '§ 241']

UNITED STATES v. HASTINGS. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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296 U.S. 188 (56 S.Ct. 218, 80 L.Ed. 148)
[HTML] Syllabus from pages 188-190 intentionally omitted
Defendant was indicted in the District Court of the United States for violation of the United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. 270 (7 USCA § 270). The indictment contained three counts, each charging the 'removal and stealing' of a numbered bale of cotton from a licensed warehouse contrary to the statute and regulations.
A demurrer was sustained and the government brings this appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act. 18 U.S.C. 682 (18 USCA § 682).
1. The juridiction of this Court. If the first four grounds of the decision, as stated in the certificate of the District Judge, are to be taken as wholly independent of the questions of the construction and validity of the United States Warehouse Act, those grouns may not be challenged on this appeal. The statute conferring jurisdiction on appeal by the government in criminal prosecutions confines that jurisdiction to cases where the decision of the District Court, on demurrer, motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment, 'is based upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded,' or where the District Court has sustained 'a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.' 18 U.S.C. 682 (18 USCA § 682). The proposal to confer a broader jurisdiction was considered by the Congress and rejected.
Thus the construction of the indictment and its sufficiency merely as a pleading, as distinguished from the construction of the statute, are questions for the District Court. We must accept the construction of the indictment as that court gives it. And where that court has rested its decision upon the invalidity or construction of the statute which underlies the indictment, this Court will not go beyond those grounds and consider other objections to the indictment. United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370, 397, 398, 29 S.Ct. 123, 53 L.Ed. 230; United States v. Miller, 223 U.S. 599, 602, 32 S.Ct. 323, 56 L.Ed. 568; United States v. Carter, 231 U.S. 492, 493, 34 S.Ct. 173, 58 L.Ed. 330; United States v. Moist, 231 U.S. 701, 702, 34 S.Ct. 255, 58 L.Ed. 444; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 301, 302, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 443; United States v. A. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85, 98, 40 S.Ct. 251, 64 L.Ed. 471; United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450, 461, 41 S.Ct. 551, 65 L.Ed. 1043.
In his fifth ground, the District Judge expressly deals with the constitutionality of the provision, holding that Congress is without authority 'to make it an offense against the laws of the United States to remove agricultural products from a federal licensed warehouse as alleged in the indictment.' The concluding words challenge attention to the absence from the indictment of an allegation that the cotton was stored for interstate or foreign commerce. The statement of the District Judge may be taken to be a construction of the indictment as charging simply the removal of the cotton from a federal licensed warehouse which had issued a receipt, without alleging that the cotton was stored for interstate or foreign commerce and that the receipt was issued accordingly. We are not at liberty to construe the indictment otherwise. While in this view, the present appeal does not bring up the questions broadly discussed at the bar as to products stored for interstate or foreign commercequestions which must await a different and appropriate recordthe appeal does present a narrower but still important question as to the scope of the penal provision. That is, whether Congress sought to exert and, if so, could validly exert, such a measure of control over warehouses operating under federal licenses, as to penalize the removal of products deposited in such warehouses, and receipted for, regardless of the purpose, or the nature of the commerce, for which the deposit was made.
defines the term 'warehouse' as 'every building, structure, or other protected inclosure in which any agricultural product is or may be stored for interstate or foreign commerce, or, if located within any place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, in which any agricultural product is or may be stored.' 7 U.S.C. 242 (7 USCA § 242). The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to make investigations and classifications, to issue licenses, and to prescribe the duties of licensed warehousemen, who must give bond for the faithful performance of their obligations. Id., §§ 243247 (7 USCA §§ 243 247). The Secretary is also authorized to issue licenses to competent persons to inspect, sample, classify, and weigh agricultural products stored or to be stored in licensed warehouses, and to give certificates accordingly. Id., § 252 (7 USCA § 252). Those conducting licensed warehouses are required to receive for storage, within their capacity, agricultural products of the kind customarily stored by them if such products are tendered 'in a suitable condition for warehousing' and 'in the usual manner' according to the ordinary course of business, 'without making any discrimination between persons desiring to avail themselves of warehouse facilities.' Id., § 254 (7 USCA § 254). Persons who deposit agricultural products for storage in licensed warehouses are to be deemed to have made the deposit subject to the statute and the regulations it authorizes. Id., § 255 (7 USCA § 255). It is then provided that 'any fungible agricultural product stored for interstate or foreign commerce, or in any place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States' in a licensed warehouse must be inspected and graded by a person licensed for that purpose. Id., § 256 (7 USCA § 256).
In the original act of 1916 it was provided that nothing therein should 'be construed to conflict with, or to authorize any conflict with, or in any way to impair or limit the effect or operation of the laws of any State relating to warehouses, warehousemen, weighers, graders, or classifiers,' but the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized 'to co-operate' with state officials and 'through such co-operation to secure the enforcement' of the provisions of the act. Act of August 11, 1916, p. C, § 29, 39 Stat. 490. This section was amended in 1931, so as to provide for co-operation with state officials in the 'discretion' of the Secretary, and with the addition that 'the power, jurisdiction, and authority' conferred upon the Secretary should be 'exclusive with respect to all persons securing a license,' so long as the license remains in effect. Act of March 2, 1931, 46 Stat. 1465, 7 U.S.C. 269 (7 USCA § 269).
The instant case relates to cotton, and the government emphasizes the salient facts as to the customary movement and marketing of cotton. But the act is not limited to cotton. Originally, the act defined 'agricultural products' as embracing 'cotton, wool, grains, tobacco, and flaxseed.
By regulations under the act, as amended, it has been extended to a variety of products.
Act of August 11, 1916, c. 313, p. C, 39 Stat. 486, amended by Acts of February 23, 1923, c. 106, 42 Stat. 1282, and March 2, 1931, c. 366, 46 Stat. 1463, 7 U.S.C. 241273 (7 U.S.C.A. §§ 241273).