Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/FCC_v_ATT_Inc_131_S_Ct_1177_179_L_Ed_2d_132_2011_Court_Opinion
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 04:38:58
Document Index: 658177092

Matched Legal Cases: ['§552', '§ 552', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 1', '§ 552', '§ 652', '§ 97', '§ 112', '§ 117', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 179 L. Ed. 2d 132, 2011 ILRC 1401, 39 Med. L. Rptr. 1368, 52 CR 689 (2011), Court Opinion
FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 179 L. Ed. 2d 132, 2011 ILRC 1401, 39 Med. L. Rptr. 1368, 52 CR 689 (2011) [2011 BL 51345]
No. 09-1279.
Argued January 19, 2011.
[**135] Hide Headnotes
[1] Freedom of Information Act requests; personal privacy exemption; corporations. ►APA.552(F) [Show Topic Path]
Corporations do not have “personal privacy”
for the purposes of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 7(C), which exempts law enforcement records the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. “Personal” is not defined in the statute, so the Court gives the word its ordinary meaning. People normally use “personal”
to refer to individuals and often to refer to the opposite of something that is business-related. Moreover, Exemption 7(C) uses the phrase “personal privacy,” which suggests that the concern is human privacy, not the sort of privacy usually associated with corporations. No instance has been cited in which a court or statute has expressly referred to a corporation's “personal privacy.” Finally, FOIA Exemption 6 also uses the term “personal privacy”
and the Court has regularly referred to that exemption as involving an “individual's right of privacy.” Exemption 4, by contrast, clearly applies to corporations, and Congress did not use in Exemption 7(C) any language similar to the language in Exemption 4. Therefore, the Third Circuit's holding in AT&T v. FCC [48 CR 838] that Exemption 7(C) extends to the privacy rights of corporations is reversed.
[2] Corporations lack 'personal privacy' protected by FOIA, Supreme Court rules. ►PR.5.4 [Show Topic Path]
The Freedom of Information Act's protection against unwarranted invasion of "personal privacy" does not extend to corporations.
[3] Access to records — Administrative — In general ►38.1401 [Show Topic Path]
Statutory right of access — Freedom of Information Act — Exemptions ►44.1005 [Show Topic Path]
Restraints on access to information — Privacy ►50.15 [Show Topic Path]
Corporations lack “personal privacy” as protected by Freedom of Information Act's Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(C), which exempts from disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” even though “person” is defined in Administrative Procedure Act to include individuals, corporations, and other entities, since adjectives do not always reflect meaning of their corresponding nouns, since “personal” is not defined in statute, and thus must be given its ordinary meaning, since “personal” ordinarily refers to individuals, and word is often used to describe something that is specifically not business-related, since “person” often refers to artificial entities in legal context, but “personal” does not have corresponding legal meaning, since, when words “personal” and “privacy” are used together as phrase, it suggests type of privacy evocative of human concerns, not company concerns, since decisions recognizing “privacy” interests of corporations in Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy contexts overreach scope of question of whether Congress used term “personal privacy” to refer to privacy of artificial persons in Exemption 7(C) context, since Exemption 7(C)'s language should be interpreted like that of Exemption 6, enacted prior to 7(C), which exempts personnel files and other such records, “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and has been found to involve individuals' rights of privacy, since Exemption 7(C) does not use language similar to that in Exemption 4, which exempts trade secrets and financial information and clearly applies to corporations, and since attorney general's memorandum, issued after enactment of Exemption 7(C), stated that exemption “does not seem applicable to corporations or other entities.”
The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make
records and documents publicly available upon request, subject to
several statutory exemptions. One of those exemptions, Exemption
7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure of which "could
personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). CompTel, a trade
association, submitted a FOIA request for documents AT&T had
provided to the Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau
during an investigation of that company. The Bureau found
that Exemption 7(C) applied to individuals identified in AT&T's
submissions but not to the company itself, concluding
that corporations do not have "personal privacy" interests as
required by the exemption. The FCC agreed with the Bureau, but the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not. It held
that Exemption 7(C) extends to the "personal privacy" of
corporations, reasoning that "personal" is the adjective form of the
term "person," which Congress has defined, as applicable here, to
include corporations, § 551(2).
Held: Corporations do not have "personal privacy" for the
purposes of Exemption 7(C). Pp. 3-12.
(a) AT&T argues that the word "personal" in Exemption 7(C)
incorporates the statutory definition of "person," which includes
corporations, § 551(2). But adjectives do not always reflect the
meaning of corresponding nouns. "Person" is a defined term in the
statute; "personal" is not. When a statute does not define a term,
the Court typically "give[s] the phrase its ordinary meaning."
Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___. "Personal"
ordinarily refers to individuals. People do not generally use terms
such as personal characteristics or
personal correspondence to describe the characteristics or
correspondence of corporations. In fact, "personal" is often used to
mean precisely the opposite of business-related: We speak of
personal expenses and business expenses, personal life
and work life, personal opinion and a company's view. Dictionary
definitions also suggest that "personal" does not ordinarily relate
to artificial "persons" like corporations.
AT&T contends that its reading of "personal" is supported by the
common legal usage of the word "person." Yet while "person," in a
legal setting, often refers to artificial entities, AT&T's effort to
ascribe a corresponding legal meaning to "personal" again elides the
difference between "person" and "personal." AT&T provides scant
support for the proposition that "personal" denotes corporations,
even in a legal context.
Regardless of whether "personal" can carry a legal meaning
apart from its ordinary one, statutory language should be construed
"in light of the terms surrounding it." Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9. Exemption 7(C) refers not just to the
word "personal," but to the term "personal privacy." "Personal" in
that phrase conveys more than just "of a person"; it suggests [***2] a type
of privacy evocative of human con-cerns — not the sort usually
associated with an entity like AT&T. AT&T does not cite any
other instance in which a court has expressly referred to a
corporation's "personal privacy." Nor does it identify any other
statute that does so. While AT&T argues that [**136] this Court has
recognized "privacy" interests of corporations in the
Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy contexts, this case does not
call for the Court to pass on the scope of a corporation's "privacy"
interests as a matter of constitutional or common law. AT&T contends
that the FCC has not demonstrated that the phrase "personal privacy"
necessarily excludes corporations' privacy. But construing statutory
language is not merely an exercise in ascertaining "the outer limits
of [a word's] definitional possibilities," Dolan v. Postal
Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486, and AT&T has provided no sound
reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the ordinary
meaning of the phrase. Pp. 3-9.
(b) The meaning of "personal privacy" in Exemption 7(C) is further
clarified by two pre-existing FOIA exemptions. Exemption 6, which
Congress enacted eight years before Exemption 7(C), covers
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
privacy." § 552(b)(6). This Court has regularly referred to
Exemption 6 as involving an "individual's right of privacy,"
Department of State v. Ray, 502 U. S. 164, 175, and
Congress used in Exemption 7(C) the same phrase — "personal
privacy" — used in Exemption 6. In contrast, FOIA
Exemption 4, which protects "trade secrets and commercial or
confidential," § 552(b)(4), clearly applies to corporations.
Congress did not use any language similar to that in Exemption 4 in
Exemption 7(C). Pp. 9-11.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except KAGAN, J., who took no part in the
records and documents publicly available upon request, unless they
fall within one of several statutory exemptions. One of those
exemptions covers law enforcement records, the disclosure of which
"could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). The question
presented is whether corporations have "personal privacy" for the
purposes of this exemption.
The Freedom of Information Act request at issue in this
case relates to an investigation of respondent AT&T Inc., conducted
by the Federal Communications Commission. AT&T participated in an
FCC-administered program — the E-Rate (or Education-Rate)
program — that was created to enhance access for schools and
libraries to advanced telecommunications and information services.
In August 2004, AT&T voluntarily reported to the FCC that it might
have overcharged the Government for services it provided as part of
[**137] The FCC's Enforcement Bureau launched an investigation. As part of
that [***3] investigation, AT&T provided the Bureau various documents,
including responses to interrogatories, invoices, emails with
pricing and billing information, names and job descriptions of
employees involved, and AT&T's assessment of whether those employees
had violated the company's code of
conduct. 582 F. 3d 490, 492-493 (CA3 2009). The FCC and AT&T
resolved the matter in December 2004 through a consent decree in
which AT&T — without conceding liability — agreed to pay the
Government $500,000 and to institute a plan to ensure compliance
with the program. See 19 FCC Rcd. 24014, 24016-24019.
Several months later, CompTel — "a trade association representing
some of AT&T's competitors" — submitted a FOIA request seeking
"`[a]ll pleadings and correspondence'" in the Bureau's file on
the AT&T investigation. 582 F. 3d, at 493. AT&T opposed CompTel's
request, and the Bureau issued a letter-ruling in response.
The Bureau concluded that some of the information AT&T had
provided (including cost and pricing data, billing-related
information, and identifying information about staff, contractors,
and customer representatives) should be protected from disclosure
under FOIA Exemption 4, which relates to "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). App.
to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a. The Bureau also decided to withhold other
information under FOIA Exemption 7(C). Exemption 7(C) exempts
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes"
that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." § 552(b)(7)(C). The Bureau concluded
that "individuals identified in [AT&T's] submissions" have "privacy
rights" that warrant protection under Exemption 7(C).
Id., at 43a. The Bureau did not, however, apply that exemption
to the corporation itself, reasoning that "businesses do not possess
`personal [*1181] privacy' interests as required" by the exemption.
Id., at 42a-43a.
On review the FCC agreed with the Bureau. The Commission
found AT&T's position that it is "a `private corporate citizen' with
personal privacy rights that should be protected from disclosure
that would `embarrass' it . . . within the meaning of Exemption 7(C)
. . . at odds with established [FCC] and judicial precedent."
23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (2008). It therefore concluded that "Exemption
7(C) has no applicability to corporations such as [AT&T]."
Id., at 13710.
AT&T sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
and that court rejected the FCC's reasoning. Noting that Congress
had defined the word "person" to include corporations as well as
individuals, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2), the court held that Exemption 7(C)
extends to the "personal privacy" of corporations, since "the root
from which the statutory word [personal] . . . is derived" is the
defined term "person." 582 F. 3d, at 497. As the court explained,
"[i]t would be very odd indeed for an adjectival form of a defined
term not to refer back to that defined term." Ibid. The court
accordingly ruled "that FOIA's text unambiguously indicates that a
corporation may have a `personal privacy' interest within the
meaning of Exemption 7(C)." Id., at 498.
The FCC petitioned this Court for review of the Third Circuit's
decision [**138] and CompTel filed as a respondent supporting [***4] petitioners.
We granted certiorari, 561 U. S. ___ (2010), and now reverse.
Like the Court of Appeals below, AT&T relies on the argument
that the word "personal" in Exemption 7(C) incorporates the
statutory definition of the word "person."
See Brief for Respondent AT&T 8-9, 14-15 (AT&T Brief);
582 F. 3d, at 497. The Administrative Procedure Act defines "person"
to include "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
public or private organization other than an agency."
5 U.S.C. § 551(2). Because that definition applies here, the
argument goes, "personal" must mean relating to those "person[s]":
namely, corporations and other entities as well as individuals. This
reading, we are told, is dictated by a "basic principle of grammar
and usage." AT&T Brief 8; see id., at 14-15; see also
582 F. 3d, at 497 (citing Delaware River Stevedores v.
DiFidelto, 440 F. 3d 615, 623 (CA3 2006) (Fisher, J.,
concurring), for "[t]he grammatical imperativ[e]" that "a statute
which defines a noun has thereby defined the adjectival form of
that noun"). According to AT&T, "[b]y expressly defining the noun
`person' to include corporations, Congress necessarily defined
the adjective form of that noun — `personal' — also to include
corporations." AT&T Brief 14 (emphasis added).
[3] We disagree. Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of
corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct
meanings of their own. The noun "crab" refers variously to a
crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective
"crabbed" can refer to handwriting that is "difficult to read,"
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002); "corny" can
mean "using familiar and stereotyped formulas believed to appeal to
the unsophisticated," id., at 509, which has little to do with
"corn," id., at 507 ("the seeds of any of the cereal grasses
used for food"); and while "crank" is "a part of an axis
bent at right angles," "cranky" can mean "given to fretful
fussiness," id., at 530.
Even in cases such as these there may well be a link between the
noun and the [*1182] adjective. "Cranky" describes a person with a "wayward"
or "capricious" temper, see
3 Oxford English Dictionary 1117 (2d ed. 1989) (OED),
which might bear some relation to the distorted or crooked angular
shape from which a "crank" takes its name. That is not the point.
What is significant is that, in ordinary usage, a noun and its
adjective form may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated
words. The FCC's argument that "personal" does not, in fact, derive
from the English word "person," but instead developed along its own
etymological path, Reply Brief for Petitioners 6, simply highlights
the shortcomings of AT&T's proposed rule.
"Person" is a defined term in the statute; "personal" is not. [1] When
a statute does not define a term, we typically "give the phrase its
ordinary meaning." Johnson v. United States,
559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4). "Personal" ordinarily
refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal
characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal
influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other
artificial entities. This is not to say that corporations do not
have correspondence, influence, [**139] or tragedies of their own, only
that we do not use the [***5] word "personal" to describe them.
approached the chief financial officer and said, "I have something
personal to tell you," we would not assume the CEO was about to
discuss company business. Responding to a request for information,
an individual might say, "that's personal." A company spokesman,
when asked for information about the company, would not. In fact, we
often use the word "personal" to mean precisely the
opposite of business-related: We speak of personal expenses and
business expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and
a company's view.
relate to artificial "persons" such as corporations. See,
e.g., 7 OED 726 (1933) ("[1] [o]f, pertaining to . . . the
individual person or self," "individual; private; one's own," "[3]
[o]f or pertaining to one's person, body, or figure," "[5]
[o]f, pertaining to, or characteristic of a person or self-conscious
being, as opposed to a thing or abstraction");
11 OED at 599-600 (2d ed. 1989) (same); Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1686 (1976) ("[3] relating to the
person or body"; "[4] relating to an individual, his character,
conduct, motives, or private affairs"; "[5] relating to or
characteristic of human beings as distinct from things");
ibid. (2002) (same).
AT&T dismisses these definitions, correctly noting
that "personal" — at its most basic level — simply means "[o]f or
pertaining to a particular person." Webster's New International
Dictionary 1828 (2d ed. 1954). The company acknowledges that "in
non-legal usage, where a `person' is a human being, it is entirely
unsurprising that the word `personal' is used to refer to human
beings." AT&T Brief 8. But in a watered-down version of the
"grammatical imperative" argument, AT&T contends
that "person" — in common legal usage — is understood to
include a corporation. "Personal" in the same context therefore can
and should have the same scope, especially here in light of the
statutory definition. See id., at 8-9, 16.
The construction of statutory language often turns on context,
see, e.g., Johnson, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5), which
certainly may include the definitions of related words. But here the
context to which AT&T points does not dissuade us from the ordinary
meaning of "personal." We have no doubt that "person," in a legal
setting, often refers to artificial entities. [*1183] The Dictionary Act
makes that clear. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (defining "person" to include
"corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals").
But AT&T's effort to ascribe a corresponding legal meaning to
"personal" again elides the difference between "person" and
When it comes to the word "personal," there is little support for
the notion that it denotes corporations, even in
the legal context. AT&T notes that corporations are "protected by
the doctrine of `personal' jurisdiction," AT&T Brief 19, but
that phrase refers to jurisdiction in personam, as opposed to
in rem, not the jurisdiction "of a person." The only other
example AT&T cites is an 1896 case that referred to the "`personal
privilege'" of a corporation. Ibid.[***6] (quoting Mercantile
Bank v. Tennessee ex rel. Memphis,
161 U. S. 161, 171 ([**140] 1896) (emphasis deleted)). These examples fall
far short of establishing that "personal" here has a legal meaning
apart from its ordinary one, even if "person"
does. Cf. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,
559 U. S. ___, ___-___ (2010) (slip op., at 8-10) (noting
that "`discovery' is often used as a term of art in connection with
the `discovery rule'" and describing the judicial and legislative
codification of that meaning over time); Molzof v. United
States, 502 U. S. 301, 306 (1992) ("`Punitive damages' is a legal
term of art that has a widely accepted common-law meaning . . . this
Court's decisions make clear that the concept . . . has a long
pedigree in the law").
Regardless of whether "personal" can carry a special meaning in
legal usage, "when interpreting a statute . . . we construe language
. . . in light of the terms surrounding it." Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004). Exemption 7(C) refers not just
to the word "personal," but to the term "personal
privacy." § 552(b)(7)(C); cf. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating
Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. Automobile Workers,
523 U. S. 653, 657 (1998) ("It is not the meaning of `for' we are
seeking here, but the meaning of `[s]uits for violation of
contracts'"). AT&T's effort to attribute a special legal meaning to
the word "personal" in this particular context is wholly
AT&T's argument treats the term "personal privacy" as simply the
sum of its two words: the privacy of a person. Under that view, the
defined meaning of the noun "person," or the asserted specialized
legal meaning, takes on
greater significance. But two words together may assume a more
particular meaning than those words in isolation. We understand a
golden cup to be a cup made of or resembling gold. A golden boy, on
the other hand, is one who is charming, lucky, and talented. A
golden opportunity is one not to be missed. "Personal" in the phrase
"personal privacy" conveys more than just "of a person." It suggests
a type of privacy evocative of human concerns — not the sort usually
associated with an entity like, say, AT&T.
Despite its contention that "[c]ommon legal usage" of the word
"person" supports its reading of the term "personal
privacy," AT&T Brief 9, 13, 18, AT&T does not cite a single instance
in which this Court or any other
(aside from the Court of Appeals below) has expressly referred to a
statute that does so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. On the contrary,
treatises in print around the time that Congress drafted the
exemptions at hand reflect the understanding that the specific
concept of "personal privacy," at least as a matter of common law,
did not [*1184] apply to corporations. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652I, Comment c (1976) ("A corporation, partnership or
unincorporated association has no personal right of privacy"); W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 97, pp. 641-642 (2d ed. 1955) ("A
corporation or a partnership as such can have no personal privacy,
although it seems clear that it may have an exclusive right to its
name and its business prestige" (footnotes omitted)); cf.
id., § 112, at 843-844 (3d ed. 1964) ("It seems to be generally
agreed that the right of privacy is one pertaining only to
individuals, and that a corporation or a partnership cannot claim [***7] it
as such" ([**141] footnotes omitted));
id., § 117, at 815 (4th ed. 1971) (same).
AT&T contends that this Court has recognized "privacy" interests
of corporations in the Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy
contexts, and that the term should be similarly construed here.
See AT&T Brief 20-25. But this
case does not call upon us to pass on the scope of a corporation's
"privacy" interests as a matter of constitutional or common law. The
discrete question before us is instead whether Congress used the
term "personal privacy" to refer to the privacy of artificial
persons in FOIA Exemption 7(C); the cases AT&T cites are too far
afield to be of help here.
AT&T concludes that the FCC has simply failed to demonstrate
that the phrase "personal privacy" "necessarily excludes the
privacy of corporations." Id., at 31-32 (emphasis added). [2] But
construing statutory language is not merely an exercise in
ascertaining "the outer limits of [a word's] definitional
possibilities," Dolan v. Postal Service,
546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). AT&T has given us no sound reason in the
statutory text or context to disregard the ordinary meaning of the
phrase "personal privacy."
The meaning of "personal privacy" in Exemption 7(C) is further
clarified by the rest of the statute. [3] Congress enacted Exemption
7(C) against the backdrop of pre-existing FOIA exemptions, and the
purpose and scope of Exemption 7(C) becomes even more apparent when
viewed in this context. See Nken v. Holder,
556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 6) ("statutory
interpretation turns on `the language itself, the specific
context of the statute as a whole'" (quoting Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997))). Two of those other
exemptions are particularly relevant here.
The phrase "personal privacy" first appeared in the FOIA
exemptions in Exemption 6, enacted in 1966, eight years before
Congress enacted Exemption 7(C). See 80 Stat. 250, codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 6 covers "personnel and
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." § 552(b)(6). Not only did Congress choose the same term in
drafting Exemption 7(C), it also used the term in a nearly identical
Although the question whether Exemption 6 is limited to
individuals has not come to us directly, we have regularly referred
to that exemption as involving an "individual's right of privacy."
Department of State v. Ray,
502 U. S. 164, 175 (1991) (quoting Department of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 372 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Department of State v. Washington Post
Co., 456 U. S. 595, 599 (1982).
[*1185] [4] AT&T does not dispute that "identical words and phrases within the
same statute should normally be given the same meaning," Powerex
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.,
551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007), but contends that "if Exemption 6 does
not protect corporations, it is because [it] applies [**142] only to
`personnel and medical files and similar files,'" not because of the
term "personal privacy." AT&T Brief 36 (quoting § 552(b)(6)). Yet
the significance of the pertinent phrase — "the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy," § 552(b)(6) — cannot be so readily dismissed.
Without it, Exemption 6 would categorically [***8] exempt "personnel and
medical files" as well as any "similar" file. Even if the scope of
Exemption 6 is also limited by the types of files it protects, the
"personal privacy" phrase importantly defines the particular subset
of that information Congress sought to exempt. See Washington Post
Co., supra, at 599. And because Congress used the same
phrase in Exemption 7(C), the reach of that phrase in Exemption 6 is
pertinent in construing Exemption 7(C).
In drafting Exemption 7(C), Congress did not, on the other hand,
use language similar to that in Exemption 4. Exemption 4 pertains to
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged
or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). This clearly applies to
corporations — it uses the defined term "person" to describe the
source of the information — and we far more readily think of
corporations as having "privileged or confidential" documents than
personally private ones. So at the time Congress enacted Exemption
7(C), it had in place an exemption that plainly covered a
corporation's commercial and financial information, and another
that we have described as relating to "individuals." The language of
Exemption 7(C) tracks the latter.
The Government has long interpreted the phrase "personal privacy"
in Exemption 7(C) accordingly. Shortly after Congress passed the
1974 amendments that enacted Exemption 7(C), the Attorney General
issued a memorandum to executive departments and agencies explaining
that "personal privacy" in that exemption "pertains to the privacy
interests of individuals." U. S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney
General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act 9, reprinted in House Committee on Government
Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of
Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P. L. 93-502), 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 507, 579 (Jt. Comm. Print 1975). The exemption,
the Attorney General noted, "does not seem applicable to
corporations or other entities." Ibid. We have previously
viewed this Memorandum as a reliable guide in interpreting FOIA, see
National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish,
541 U. S. 157, 169 (2004); FBI v. Abramson,
456 U. S. 615, 622, n. 5 (1982), and we agree with its conclusion
[5] We reject the argument that because "person" is defined for
purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrase "personal
privacy" in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The
protection in FOIA against disclosure of law
enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to
corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally. [*1186] The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.[**143] JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of