Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/18/469/531036/
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 23:38:29
Document Index: 623868581

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 201', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1001', '§ 1001']

Valli Moser, Defendant-appellant, v. United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1994 › Valli Moser, Defendant-appellant, v. United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee
Valli Moser, Defendant-appellant, v. United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 18 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994) Argued Jan. 11, 1994. Decided March 9, 1994
In the district court, the appellant, Valli M. Moser, was charged in a two-count indictment. The appellant was charged in Count I with bribing an IRS employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1) (A); and in Count II with making false statements to an IRS inspector in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Specifically, the indictment charged the appellant as follows:
(All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sec. 201(b) (1) (A)).
The appellant raises overlapping contentions with regard to the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, and argues further that the appellant's motion to dismiss Count II at the conclusion of the government's case in chief should have been sustained. It appears that the appellant has preserved the so-called "exculpatory no" argument with a motion to dismiss Count II pretrial, motion in limine, and a motion for judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 at the end of all the evidence. Precisely the same argument which was made in all these motions and the district court denied same in all instances.
The standard of review here is de novo review of a question of law. United States v. Church, 970 F.2d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1990). This is a case where one might be tempted to speculate and surmise about subjects that are beyond the formal record. That subject was broached during oral argument and this court will stay faithfully within the formal record of this case.
While the jury found the defendant not guilty of Count I, a bribery charge, it found the defendant guilty of Count II, which purported to assert a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001:
The appellant attempts to argue in her brief that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the "exculpatory no" doctrine in addition to failing to dismiss on that basis. However, no error was preserved on this question by either objecting to instructions given or objecting to the failure to give instructions that may have been tendered. During the trial, there were extensive discussions between Chief Judge Crabb and counsel on this precise subject outside the presence of the jury with regard to the content of instructions on the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine. The district judge complied with the mandates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 in regard to the formulation of instructions.
In her brief, and then on oral argument, appellant's counsel has attempted to argue for the first time that the allegedly false statements were not material. This issue was not raised in the district court and will not be considered for the first time here. It is not here contended that such is plain error. United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). See also United States v. Livingston, 936 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1991).
Materiality inheres in a violation of Sec. 1001. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1546, 99 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1988). Materiality is a question of law for the district court. See United States v. Bullock, 857 F.2d 367, 370-71 (7th Cir. 1988).
"Congress intentionally drafted section 1001 in an expansive fashion in order that it be accorded the broadest possible interpretation regarding the situations in which it would come into play." United States v. Steele, 896 F.2d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 1990).
United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1990). Likewise, the Supreme Court has given a generous construction to this and similar statutes in United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484, 104 S. Ct. 1942, 1948, 80 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1984), and Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70, 90 S. Ct. 355, 359, 24 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1969). No error is here preserved on the issue of materiality.
This court took a passing glance at the doctrine in United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980), holding there that it did not apply. Most recently, this court, speaking through Judge Ripple, has opined that "the scope of this exculpatory denial doctrine has been read quite narrowly by the Illinois courts" in United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). A district court has also provided insightful assistance on this subject in United States v. Russo, 699 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 prohibits knowingly and willfully making a false statement which is material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the department or agency of the United States. The exculpatory denial or "exculpatory no" exception to Sec. 1001 is the judicial expression of the view that the statute is generally not applicable to false statements which are essentially exculpatory denials of criminal activity. "The exculpatory denial exception is rooted in two separate but complementary concerns which courts have employed to create the exception and to define its scope." Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Statements Fall Within Exculpatory Denial Exception to Prohibition, under 18 USCS Sec. 1001, against Knowingly and Willfully Making False Statement which is Material to Matter within Jurisdiction of Department or Agency of United States, 102 A.L.R.Fed. 742, 748-49 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas, 102 A.L.R.Fed. 742]. The first is the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; the second is the "concern for Fifth Amendment values implicated by the application of Sec. 1001 to a mere false denial of criminal wrongdoing." Id.
The "exculpatory no" doctrine represents a judicial gloss on 18 U.S.C. § 1001. A careful examination of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with Section 1001 reveals that this concept has not found favor there. In a very narrow and limited fashion, it has found favor here. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980). It therefore becomes our obligation to examine this record under the concept of "exculpatory no" which has evolved in this circuit. United States v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1993).
The courts have conceded that a person questioned about that person's criminal activity may avoid violating the statute by either telling the truth or declining to speak altogether. See United States v. Russo, 699 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1988). However, tension between the statute and the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination has been recognized by many courts. The scope of the application of the exception has been restricted by courts to varying degrees:
No argument has been here advanced as to inconsistent or irreconcilable verdicts. See United States v. Walker, 9 F.3d 1245, 1248 (7th Cir. 1993)