Source: https://m.openjurist.org/485/us/568
Timestamp: 2020-01-18 12:56:11
Document Index: 363225703

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

485 U.S. 568 - Edward Corp v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council
485 US 568 Edward Corp v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council
FLORIDA GULF COAST BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL and National Labor Relations Board.
Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop, supra, 440 U.S., at 499-501, 504, 99 S.Ct., at 1318-1319, 1320-1321. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. E.g., Catholic Bishop, supra, 440 U.S., at 500-501, 99 S.Ct., at 1318-1319; Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-750, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1790, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296-297, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577, 49 S.Ct. 426, 428, 73 L.Ed. 851 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390, 44 S.Ct. 391, 395, 68 L.Ed. 748 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 535-536, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830) (Story, J.). As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 211, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895), "[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. See Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269, 5 S.Ct. 125, 129, 28 L.Ed. 704 (1884).
That examination of the legislative history failed to yield the requisite "clearest indication." Similarly, in NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 63, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1066, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964) (Tree Fruits ), we disagreed with the Board's determination that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all consumer picketing at a secondary establishment, no matter the economic consequences of that picketing, because our examination of the legislative history led us to "conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited, as here, to persuading" customers not to purchase a specific product of the secondary establishment. We once more looked for the "isolated evils" that Congress had focused on because "[b]oth the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment." Id., at 62-63, 84 S.Ct., at 1066; see id., at 67, 71, 84 S.Ct., at 1068-1069, 1070-1071. Because there was not the required "clearest indication in the legislative history," we rejected the Board's interpretation that limited expressive activities. Again, in Catholic Bishop, we independently determined whether the Board's jurisdiction extended to parochial schools in the face of a substantial First Amendment challenge, although the Board itself had previously considered the First Amendment challenge and presumably interpreted the statute cognizable of those limits. 440 U.S., at 497-499, 99 S.Ct., at 1317-1318.
The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" to cease doing business with another, within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). We note first that "induc[ing] or encourag[ing]" employees of the secondary employer to strike is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(i). But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those words, we have said, are "nonspecific, indeed vague," and should be interpreted with "caution" and not given a "broad sweep," Drivers, supra, 362 U.S., at 290, 80 S.Ct., at 715; and in applying § 8(b)(1)(A) they were not to be construed to reach peaceful recognitional picketing. Neither is there any necessity to construe such language to reach the handbills involved in this case. There is no suggestion that the leaflets had any coercive effect on customers of the mall. There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to persuade customers not to shop in the mall.
The Board nevertheless found that the handbilling "coerced" mall tenants and explained in a footnote that "[a]ppealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business. As the case law makes clear, such appeals constitute 'economic retaliation' and are therefore a form of coercion." 273 N.L.R.B., at 1432, n. 6.3 Our decision in Tree Fruits, however, makes untenable the notion that any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeals to a secondary employer to cease doing business with the employer involved in the labor dispute is "coercion" within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it has some economic impact on the neutral. In that case, the union picketed a secondary employer, a retailer, asking the public not to buy a product produced by the primary employer. We held that the impact of this picketing was not coercion within the meaning of § 8(b)(4) even though, if the appeal succeeded, the retailer would lose revenue.4
The Board argues that our first DeBartolo case goes far to dispose of this case because there we said that the only nonpicketing publicity "exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer's product is 'distributed by' the secondary employer." 463 U.S., at 155, 103 S.Ct., at 2932. We also indicated that if the handbilling were protected by the proviso, the distribution requirement would be without substantial practical effect. Id., at 157, 103 S.Ct., at 2933. But we obviously did not there conclude or indicate that the handbills were covered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), for we remanded the case on this very issue. Id., at 157-158, 103 S.Ct., at 2933.5
This approach treats the proviso as establishing an exception to a prohibition that would otherwise reach the conduct excepted. But this proviso has a different ring to it. It states that § 8(b)(4) "shall not be construed" to forbid certain described nonpicketing publicity. That language need not be read as an exception. It may indicate only that without the proviso, the particular nonpicketing communication the proviso protects might have been considered to be coercive, even if other forms of publicity would not be. Section 8(b)(4), with its proviso, may thus be read as not covering nonpicketing publicity, including appeals to customers of a retailer as they approach the store, urging a complete boycott of the retailer because he handles products produced by nonunion shops.6
The Board's reading of § 8(b)(4) would make an unfair labor practice out of any kind of publicity or communication to the public urging a consumer boycott of employers other than those the proviso specifically deals with.7 On the facts of this case, newspaper, radio, and television appeals not to patronize the mall would be prohibited; and it would be an unfair labor practice for unions in their own meetings to urge their members not to shop in the mall. Nor could a union's handbills simply urge not shopping at a department store because it is using a nonunion contractor, although the union could safely ask the store's customers not to buy there because it is selling mattresses not carrying the union label. It is difficult, to say the least, to fathom why Congress would consider appeals urging a boycott of a distributor of a nonunion product to be more deserving of protection than nonpicketing persuasion of customers of other neutral employers such as that involved in this case.
Second, the only suggestions that the ban against coercing secondary employers would forbid peaceful persuasion of customers by means other than picketing came from the opponents of any proposals to close the perceived loopholes in § 8(b)(4). Among their arguments in both the House and the Senate was that picketing and handbilling a neutral employer to force him to cease dealing in the products of an employer engaged in labor disputes, appeals which were then said to be legal, would be forbidden by the proposal that became § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The prohibition, it was said, "reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with freedom of speech." 105 Cong.Rec. 15540, 2 Leg.Hist. 1576.8 The views of opponents of a bill with respect to its meaning, however, are not persuasive:
"[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. 'The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.' " Tree Fruits, 377 U.S., at 66, 84 S.Ct., at 1068 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395, 71 S.Ct. 745, 750-751, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951)).
Third, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was one of the amendments agreed upon by a House-Senate Conference on the House's Landrum-Griffin bill and the Senate's Kennedy-Ervin bill. An analysis of the Conference bill was presented in the House by Representative Griffin and in the Senate by Senator Goldwater. With respect to appeals to consumers, the summary said that the House provision prohibiting secondary consumer picketing was adopted but "with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited." 105 Cong.Rec. 18706, Leg.Hist. 1454 (Sen. Goldwater); 105 Cong.Rec. 18022, Leg.Hist. 1712 (Rep. Griffin).9 The clarification referred to was the second proviso to § 8(b)(4). See supra, at 581—582. The Court of Appeals held that although the proviso was itself confined to advising the customers of an employer that the latter was distributing a product of another employer with whom the union had a labor dispute, the legislative history did not foreclose understanding the proviso as a clarification of the meaning of § 8(b)(4) rather than an exception to a general ban on consumer publicity. We agree with this view.
In addition to the summary presented by Senator Goldwater and Representative Griffin, Senator Kennedy, the Chairman of the Conference Committee, in presenting the Conference Report on the Senate floor, 105 Cong.Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg.Hist. 1431-1432, stated that under the amendments as reported by the Conference Committee, a "union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site." And he assured Senator Goldwater that union buy-American campaigns—that is, publicity requesting that consumers not buy foreign-made products, even though there is no ongoing labor dispute with the actual producer—would not be prohibited by the section.
"We are appealing only to the public—the consumer. We are not seeking to induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries."
"(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
The Board's reliance on pre-1959 cases interpreting the phrase "restrain or coerce" in § 8(b)(1)—and similar wording in § 8(a)(1)—to support its interpretation of the phrase "threaten, coerce, or restrain" in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is misplaced. The Board had interpreted "restrain or coerce" to prohibit peaceful picketing calling attention to a labor dispute, but this Court held in NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290, 80 S.Ct. 706, 715, 4 L.Ed.2d 710 (1960), that those words, as used in § 8(b)(1)(A), reached only violent conduct and did not even include peaceful picketing. See supra, at 577. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had rejected the Board's holding that the circulation of "We Do Not Patronize" lists was coercive. NLRB v. International Assn. of Machinists, 263 F.2d 796 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940, 80 S.Ct. 803, 4 L.Ed.2d 769 (1960). The Board suggests that NLRB v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 269 F.2d 694, 701 (CA4 1959), rev'd 362 U.S. 329, 80 S.Ct. 759, 4 L.Ed.2d 768 (1960), is to the contrary, but the opinion in that case focused on handbilling combined with picketing; and it was the Ninth Circuit case that was later referred to on the Senate floor in reference to nonpicketing appeals. See n. 8, infra.