Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150508_0001010.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 08:13:35
Document Index: 406726613

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 2254', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

| Agyemang v. City of Aurora Municipal Court
Agyemang v. City of Aurora Municipal Court
RICHARD AGYEMANG, Plaintiff,v.CITY OF AURORA MUNICIPAL COURT, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff, Richard Agyemang, currently is in the custody of the Arapahoe County Detention Facility in Centennial, Colorado. Plaintiff initiated this action by filing pro se a Prisoner Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Prisoner's Motion and Affidavit for Leave to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915.
Plaintiff is considered a "prisoner" as that term is defined under the PLRA, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(h); 1915A(c), and he has been granted leave to proceed IFP in this action (ECF No. 8). Moreover, Defendants are employees of a governmental entity. Thus, his Complaint must be reviewed under the authority set forth above.
For the reasons stated below, the Complaint and the action will be dismissed pursuant to the screening authority set forth above.
B. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff's claims concern his arrest and conviction for resisting arrest in the City of Aurora, Colorado. Resolution of these claims is dictated by the teachings of the United States Supreme Court as stated in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973), and subsequent cases interpreting that opinion. In Preiser, the plaintiffs were state prisoners who were deprived of good-time credits as a result of disciplinary proceedings; they sought injunctive relief restoring their good-time credits, which would have resulted in their immediate release from confinement. In making its ruling in Preiser, the Court was called upon to determine the proper relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Despite the admitted "literal applicability" of § 1983 to the action before it, the Court concluded that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Id., 411 U.S. at 500.
Over two decades later, the Supreme Court again examined the relationship between the federal civil rights law and habeas corpus actions in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing his wife. While his direct appeal was pending in the state courts, Heck filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prosecutors in his criminal action and various members of the state police department. The complaint alleged that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful investigation and had knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages but did not seek injunctive relief or release from custody. After reviewing its origin and history, the Court determined that the civil rights law was not meant to provide a means for collaterally challenging the validity of a conviction through the pursuit of money damages. In so concluding, the Court announced the following rule.
Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). "The purpose behind Heck is to prevent litigants from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient pleading rules, to challenge their conviction or sentence without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for habeas actions." Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52 (2004).
Plaintiff contends that the police used excessive force in arresting him by using a taser. He further complains that his conviction of resisting arrest was based on insufficient evidence, he was denied his right to confront his accuser and he was arrested without probable cause. In order to succeed on these claims, this Court necessarily must conclude that Plaintiff's criminal conviction for resisting arrest is unlawful. To the extent that he still is serving any portion of that sentence and is seeking immediate release from prison because of Defendants' actions, he is precluded from seeking such relief through a civil rights complaint because, under Preiser, a federal habeas corpus petition is his only available avenue for immediate release. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for the length of time he has been "unlawfully incarcerated, " he is precluded from seeking such relief under the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Heck because a judgment in his favor necessarily would implicate the validity of his resisting arrest conviction. As such, Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is not cognizable. See Adams v. Dyer, 223 F.App'x 757, 761 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that Heck barred excessive force claim because excessive force is an affirmative defense to resisting arrest; thus, to find in plaintiff's favor, the district court would have been required to nullify the jury's rejection of his excessive force defense); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2005) ( Heck barred plaintiff's excessive force claim where he had been convicted of assaulting a police officer in state court and the events giving rise to both the conviction and the civil claim were "inextricably intertwined"). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and this action are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he must also pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.