Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/335/345
Timestamp: 2016-07-25 04:25:20
Document Index: 352888391

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 201', '§ 301', '§ 201', '§ 55', '§ 201', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 701', '§ 201', '§ 12', '§ 133']

KORDEL v. UNITED STATES. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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335 U.S. 345 (69 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed. 52)
Decided: Nov. 22, 1948.
dissent, BLACK, FRANKFURTER, MURPHY, JACKSON
[HTML] See 335 U.S. 900, 69 S.Ct. 298.
This case and United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 69 S.Ct. 112, decided this day, are here on certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits in the construction of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of June 25, 1938. 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq., 21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.
It is undisputed that petitioner shipped or caused to be shipped in interstate commerce both the drugs and the lite ature. Seven of the counts charged that the drugs and literature were shipped in the same cartons. The literature involved in the other counts was shipped separately from the drugs and at different timesboth before and after the shipments of the drugs with which they were associated. The question whether the separate shipment of the literature saved the drugs from being misbranded within the meaning of the Act presents the main issue in the case.
Section 301(a) of the Act prohibits the introduction into interstate commerce of any drug that is adulterated or misbranded.
It is misbranded according to § 502(a) if its 'labeling is false or misleading in any particular' and unless the labeling bears 'adequate directions for use'. § 502(f). The term labeling is defined in § 201(m) to mean 'all labels
and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.' Section 303 makes the violation of any of the provisions of § 301 a crime.
It would, indeed, create an obviously wide loophole to hold that these drugs would be misbranded if the literature had been shipped in the same container but not misbranded if the literature left in the next or in the preceding mail. The high purpose of the Act to protect consumers who under present conditions are largely unable to protect themselves in this field
would then be easily defeated. The administrative agency charged with its enforcement
has not given the Act any such restricted construction.
The textual structure of the Act is not agreeable to it. Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase 'accompanying such article' is not restricted to labels that are on or in the article on package that is transported.
The first clause of § 201(m)all labels 'upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers'clearly embraces advertising. or descriptive matter that goes with the package in which the articles are transported. The second clause 'accompanying such article'has no specific reference to packages, containers or their contents as did a predecessor statute. See Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 513, 515, 36 S.Ct. 190, 191, 192, 60 L.Ed. 411, %.l.r.a./ 1916D, 164. It plainly includes what is contained within the package whether or not it is 'upon' the article or its wrapper or container. But the second clause does not say 'accompanying such article in the package or container,' and we see no reason for reading the additional words into the text.
Petitioner points out that in t e evolution of the Act the ban on false advertising was eliminated, the control over it being transferred to the Federal Trade Commission. 52 Stat. 114, 15 U.S.C. 55(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 55(a). We have searched the legislative history in vain, however, to find any indication that Congress had the purpose to eliminate from the Act advertising which performs the function of labeling. Every labeling is in a sense an advertisement. The advertising which we have here performs the same function as it would if it were on the article or on the containers or wrappers. As we have said, physical attachment or contiguity is unnecessary under § 201(m)(2).
There is a suggestion that the offense in this case falls under § 301(k) of the Act which includes misbranding of a drug while it is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.
Since the informations contain no such charge, it is therefore claimed that the judgment must be reversed. We do not agree. Section 301(k) has a broad sweep, not restricted to those who introduce or deliver for introduction drugs in interstate commerce.
See United States v. Sullivan, supra. Nor is it confined to adulteration or misbranding as is § 301(a). Id. It is, however, restricted to cases where the article is held for sale after shipment in interstate commerce; and, unlike § 301(a), it does not reach situations where the manufacturer sells directly to the consumer. Cf. United States v. Urbuteit, supra. Hence we conclude that we do not disturb the statutory scheme when we refuse to take from § 301(a) what is fairly included in it in order to leave the matter wholly to the service of § 301(k). The reach of § 301(a) is in this respect longer. Such a transfer to § 301(k) would create a new hiatus in the Act and thus disturb the pattern which we discern in it.
See § 701 and § 201(c); 1940 Reorg. Plan No. IV, § 12, 54 Stat. 231, 5 U.S.C. 133u, 5 U.S.C.A. § 133u.