Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v38/38-048.html
Timestamp: 2017-06-25 00:19:15
Document Index: 416221274

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 46', '§ 47']

38:0506(48)CA - - NLRB and NLRB Union, Local 6 - - 1990 FLRAdec CA - - v38 p506 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 38 FLRA No. 48 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Respondent) and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD UNION LOCAL 6 (Charging Party) 2-CA-50471 32 FLRA 305 (1988) 26 FLRA 108 (1987) DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND November 28, 1990 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing to furnish the Union with
information requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. In 32 FLRA 305, the Authority remanded this case to the Judge to
determine whether the document sought by the Union was "necessary" within the
meaning of section 7114(b)(4)(B), and whether it constituted "guidance, advice,
counsel, or training . . . relating to collective bargaining" under section
7114(b)(4)(C). The Judge found that, with the exception of one part, the
document (1) was necessary for the Union to perform its representational duties
on behalf of a unit employee and (2) did not constitute guidance, advice,
counsel or training for management officials or supervisors under section
7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute. Accordingly, the Judge found that the Respondent
violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute by refusing to furnish
the document, with one part deleted, to the Union. Pursuant to section 2423.29 of our Rules and Regulations, we have
below, which differ from those of the Judge, we find that the Respondent
violated section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by refusing to furnish
the requested document to the Union. II. Background A. Facts An employee in the Respondent's Pittsburgh Office requested a part-time
work schedule pursuant to Article 22 of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement, which sets forth various provisions concerning requests for,
consideration of, and granting or denying requests for, part-time employment.
Judge's Decision at 5. By memorandum dated January 25, 1985, the Pittsburgh Regional Director
transmitted a copy of the employee's request to the Associate General Counsel
and the Assistant General Counsel in Washington, D.C. In the memorandum, the
Regional Director set forth the reasons why the employee sought part-time
employment, the contents of his discussion with the employee, the problems
experienced where part-time schedules have been implemented, the staff
complement, case intake, workload factors, and staffing problems in the
regional office. The Regional Director concluded the memorandum with his
recommendation. Respondent's Exhibit 1. After review of the employee's request and the Regional Director's
memorandum, the Assistant General Counsel advised the Regional Director by
memorandum dated March 8, 1985, that the employee's request for part-time
employment was denied. A copy of the March 8 memorandum was sent to the
employee. In the March 8 memorandum, the Assistant General Counsel discussed:
(1) the staff ceiling and current staffing of the region; (2) the recent case
intake and productivity levels of the region; (3) the projected increase in
case intake and workload in 1985; and (4) the denial of recent requests for
part-time employment from two other attorneys in the office. In the memorandum,
the Associate General Counsel noted that the Regional Director had proposed to
the employee several alternative part-time schedules, which were unacceptable
to the employee. He also noted that the Regional Director recommended that the
employee's request be denied. The Assistant General Counsel concluded that
staffing considerations and the operational needs of the region precluded the
approval of the part-time schedule requested. Accordingly, the Assistant
General Counsel denied the request. By memorandum dated March 15, 1985, the Union requested from the
Respondent information on the workload of the Pittsburgh Regional office and a
copy of the Regional Director's recommendation concerning the employee's
part-time schedule request. The Union stated that "the information was sought
in order to evaluate the merits of a prospective grievance." Judge's Decision
at 6. The Respondent furnished the workload information, but refused to
furnish the memorandum. The Union filed a grievance under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement over the Respondent's denial of the employee's
request for part-time employment and renewed its request for the memorandum.
The Respondent continued to refuse to furnish the memorandum and denied the
grievance. The parties subsequently agreed to extend the time for referring the
grievance to arbitration until the instant case was decided by the
Authority. B. Authority's Decision On March 10, 1987, based on a stipulated record, the Authority issued
National Labor Relations Board, 26 FLRA 108 (1987) (NLRB). The
Authority held that disclosure of the memorandum to the Union was prohibited by
internal deliberative process concerning the exercise of management's right to
assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, the Authority concluded
that the Respondent's failure to furnish the Union with the memorandum did not
violate section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. C. Court's Decision In National Labor Relations Board Union, Local 6 v. FLRA, 842
F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that section 7106 does not bar the disclosure of
Authority's decision in NLRB and remanded the case to the Authority for
consideration of the Respondent's other arguments. D. Authority's Decision and Order on Remand In 32 FLRA 305, the Authority concluded, pursuant to the remand from
the court, that the parties' stipulation did not provide sufficient evidence to
determine whether the memorandum sought by the Union was "necessary" within the
(ALJ) based on hearing testimony and, if deemed necessary by the ALJ, by
examination of the memorandum in camera. Accordingly, the case was
remanded for findings of fact and consideration by an ALJ. III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision A. Judge's Rulings on Motions and Requests Prior to the hearing before the ALJ, the General Counsel issued a
Regulations, requiring the production of the memorandum. The Respondent did not
comply with the subpoena, but, rather, filed a Motion to Quash the Subpoena
Duces Tecum or in the Alternative for Protective Order with the Authority's
Regional Director under 2429.7(e) of the Rules and Regulations. The Regional
Director referred the motion to the Chief Administrative Law Judge, who
referred it to the Judge in this case for ruling. At the hearing, the Judge concluded that the memorandum should be made
available to counsel for the parties for use at the hearing, and that "a
protective order would issue that it not be disclosed to the Union." Judge's
Decision at 3. The Judge denied the Respondent's Motion to Quash the Subpoena
and directed the Respondent to make the memorandum available under a protective
order. The Respondent took the position that the Decision and Order on Remand
from the Authority precluded the issuance of a protective order and refused to
produce the memorandum under a protective order. However, the Respondent
offered to furnish the memorandum to the Judge for an in camera
inspection. The Judge accepted the memorandum for his in camera examination.
The Judge denied the requests of the General Counsel and the Union that he
impose sanctions against the Respondent and draw adverse references from the
Respondent's refusal to comply with the protective order. The Judge recited for
the record the general nature of the memorandum to enable the parties to
litigate and brief the issues. The General Counsel advised the Judge that she
"was not going to seek enforcement of the subpoena order." Transcript at 28.
The General Counsel also told the Judge that she had decided to rely on the
Judge's record description of the document. At the close of the hearing, the
Judge forwarded the memorandum to the Authority under seal. B. Judge's Decision First, the Judge rejected the Respondent's contention that the Regional
Director's recommendation was not necessary for the Union to process the
employee's grievance because the Respondent disclosed to the employee the facts
underlying its decision. The Judge noted that the Union alleged that the
Regional Director was hostile toward part-time schedules for attorneys. In the
Judge's view, the memorandum was necessary for the Union to determine what
considerations influenced the Regional Director's recommendation and were
included in his memorandum. The Judge concluded that the Union was entitled to
the memorandum, unless it was otherwise privileged from disclosure under
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, "to evaluate its significance and determine
whether to proceed with the grievance." Id. at 8-9. Next, the Judge addressed the issue of whether the Regional Director's
memorandum constituted guidance, advice, counsel or training under
7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute. The Judge rejected the General Counsel's
contention that section 7114(b)(4)(C) applies only to data which directly
relates to the actual process of collective bargaining or to the written
deliberations of management labor relations advisors in the context of contract
negotiations, grievances or similar labor management exchanges. According to
the Judge, this interpretation of section 7114(b)(4) was previously rejected by
the Authority in Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
127 (1987) (National Weather Service). In the Judge's view, under the
Authority's decision in National Weather Service: in order to conclude that a document is privileged from disclosure
under 7114(b)(4)(C) as guidance, advice or counsel, it must reflect the written
deliberation or thought process and his recommendations. Judge Decision at 10. Based on his examination of the Regional Director's memorandum, the
Judge concluded that the memorandum was "essentially a factual recitation of
the staff attorneys, the number of complaints issued, cases tried or to be
tried, and the considerations discussed with [the employee]." Id. In the
Judge's view, while those facts formed the basis for the Regional Director's
ultimate recommendation, "the memorandum [did] not set forth [the Regional
Director's] deliberations or thought processes which might be described as, or
form the basis of, guidance, advice or counsel by him to management."
Id. The Judge further determined that the memorandum did not "present
any in-depth assessment of the request with clear labor-management relations
implication." Id. The Judge noted, however, that the last sentence of the memorandum and
the footnote contained the recommendation of the Regional Director. The Judge
concluded that the memorandum, except for the last sentence and its attendant
footnote, did not constitute guidance, advice, counsel or training for
management officials or supervisors under section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute.
Accordingly, the Judge found that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the
memorandum, with the last sentence and footnote deleted, was violative of
section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute. IV. General Counsel's Exceptions First, the General Counsel excepts to the Judge's denial of its request
that sanctions, particularly the drawing of adverse inferences, be imposed
against the Respondent for its refusal to permit the parties to review the
memorandum under the Judge's protective order. The General Counsel argues that
the Judge should have drawn an inference that the document did not fall within
the section 7114(b)(4)(C) exception to disclosure. According to the General
Counsel, the parties at the hearing should be permitted access to the document
for litigation purposes, "particularly where precautions can be taken to avoid
disclosure or use of the document in the underlying grievance." General
Counsel's Exceptions at 6. The General Counsel contends that without the
document it "could not fully analyze the significance of the last sentence and
footnote . . . ." Id. at 5-6. The General Counsel notes that the
Authority approved of the use of sanctions and adverse inferences in
National Weather Service at 138-140. Second, the General Counsel argues that the Judge incorrectly
interpreted section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute and the Authority's decision
in National Weather Service. The General Counsel asserts that the Judge
"gave too broad a sweep to the terms of section 7114(b)(4)(C) and the
Authority's language interpreting it in [National Weather Service]."
Id. at 2. The General Counsel contends that, under the Judge's
interpretation of section 7114(b)(4)(C), "any document generated by a
supervisor or management official which contains deliberations or reflects the
thought process and recommendation of the management representative would be
exempt from disclosure." Id. The General Counsel argues that section
7114(b)(4)(C) "protects from disclosure [management] documents reflecting
advice, counsel or guidance on how the collective bargaining
process--bargaining, grievances, etc.--should be pursued." Id. at 2.
According to the General Counsel: where, as here, a line manager is recommending a course of action in
response to an employee['s] request and where the matter is not
currently the subject of either bargaining, the grievance procedure or some
other management/union interaction, section 7114(b)(4)(C) should not prevent
the release of the recommendation . . . . Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original). In the General Counsel's view,
interpreting section 7114(b)(4)(C) in the manner it suggests: allows management to protect its views on the process of collective
bargaining - once it has been initiated - but permits the Union access to other
management generated documents from the day-to-day operation of the agency that
may impact on the terms and conditions of employment of unit employees . . .
and which are necessary to representing employees in such matters as grievances
or contract bargaining. Id. at 3. According to the General Counsel, National Weather Service
supports its contention that section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute applies only
to documents produced in the context of the "collective bargaining process."
Id. at 2. The General Counsel notes that in National Weather
Service, the Authority found that a labor relations officer's deliberations
and recommendation concerning how management should deal with the discipline of
a union representative was exempt from disclosure under section 7114(b)(4)(C)
of the Statute. The General Counsel argues that the instant case is
distinguishable from National Weather Service because it does not
involve the recommendation of a labor relations officer concerning a matter
with "obvious labor-management relations implications." Id. at 4
(quoting National Weather Service at 143). The General Counsel asserts
that the memorandum in this case "involves no labor-management interaction[,]"
but "deals with a management response to an employee request." Id. at 3.
V. Respondent's Exceptions The Respondent contends that the Regional Director's memorandum
constitutes guidance, advice, or counsel within the meaning of section
7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute and should not be disclosed to the Union. The
Respondent asserts that the Regional Director's memorandum "is not a recitation
of facts by a witness to an event or incident." Respondent's Exceptions at 11.
Rather, the Respondent maintains that the Regional Director's memorandum is a
"deliberative process document." Id. at 10. In this regard, the
Respondent asserts that, in order for the Regional Director to make his
recommendation on the employee's part-time employment request, the Regional
Director "had to collect all the facts, then choose those he believed to be
entitled to significant weight in support of his recommendation." Id. at
14. Further, according to the Respondent, the Regional Director "analyze[d] the
request in terms of its human relations, EEO and labor relations impact."
Id. at 12-13. The Respondent argues: This very process of selecting specific facts out of a larger group of
facts, distilling the significant ones from the less significant is a
deliberative process. It requires judgment, takes thought and was essential for
[the Regional Director] to formulate an appropriate recommendation on an
obvious labor[-]management relations issue. Id. at 14. The Respondent also excepts to the Judge's conclusion that the Regional
Director's memorandum was "necessary" within the meaning of section
7114(b)(4)(B) of the Statute. Id. at 18. The Respondent argues that the
memorandum "is . . . neither relevant to nor necessary to the Union's grievance
over [the Respondent's] decision to deny [the employee's] request to convert to
part-time status." Id. The Respondent claims that the memorandum "is
merely a recommendation which has no force and effect." Id. According to
the Respondent, "[t]here was absolutely nothing for the Union to grieve until
the [Assistant General Counsel] made his decision. Id. The Respondent
maintains that the Union must grieve the Assistant General Counsel's March 8
decision denying the employee's request, "not the recommendation of [the]
Regional Director[.]" Id. The Respondent argues that "the [Respondent's]
decision to deny the [employee's] request for a 3-day workweek will stand or
fall on [the Assistant General Counsel's] rationale." Id. at 19. Further, the Respondent objects to the Judge's conclusion that the
memorandum was necessary for the Union to determine what considerations
influenced the Regional Director's recommendation. The Respondent argues that:
even if [the Regional Director's] memorandum did include evidence of
disparate treatment or "details concerning [the employee's] behavior, work
record and history of employment," those details would be totally irrelevant
and unnecessary to the Union's grievance unless and until they were adopted by
the decision maker. Id. at 19. VI. Analysis and Conclusions A. Judge's Rulings on Motions and Requests We have carefully reviewed the rulings of the Judge made at the
hearing. We conclude that the Judge was not required to impose the sanctions
requested by the General Counsel against the Respondent for its refusal to
produce the disputed memorandum, under a protective order. Rather, we find that
it was within the discretion of the Judge to deny the General Counsel's request
for sanctions and to permit the Respondent to provide the memorandum for his
in camera examination. The record in this case reveals that at the beginning of the hearing,
the Judge denied the Respondent's Motion to Quash the Subpoena and ruled that
the Respondent should make the memorandum available under a protective order.
See Transcript at 12-13. The Respondent objected to the Judge's ruling,
arguing that the Authority's decision on remand protected the memorandum from
disclosure, except for in camera review by the Judge. The Respondent
advised the Judge that it would not provide the memorandum under a protective
order. The Respondent requested permission to make a special appeal to the
Authority on the issue. The Judge denied the Respondent's request. See
Transcript at 17-18. Immediately following the Judge's denial of the Respondent's request,
the General Counsel requested that the Judge impose sanctions against the
Respondent for its failure to comply with the protective order. Specifically,
the General Counsel requested that the Judge infer that the document did not
constitute advice, guidance, training or counsel within the meaning of
7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute. See Transcript at 18. Prior to ruling on the General Counsel's motion, the Judge asked the
Respondent whether it was willing to give the document to the Judge for an
in camera examination, after which the document would be submitted to
the Authority under seal. The Respondent stated that it was willing to produce
the memorandum for an in camera examination and offered it into evidence
for the Judge's in camera inspection. The Judge ruled that the
memorandum would be accepted into evidence to be reviewed by him in
camera. See Transcript at 18-20. The Judge inquired as to whether
any party had any objections. At this point, the General Counsel informed the
Judge that it was not going to seek enforcement of the subpoena. Rather, it was
"going to rely on the direct reading into the record of those comments and the
offering of the document sealed." Transcript at 28. As the Authority held in National Weather Service, the matter of
sanctions, including adverse inferences for a party's refusal to produce
requested documents, is within the discretion of the Administrative Law Judge.
In the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Judge did
not abuse his discretion by deciding not to impose sanctions against the
Respondent, but, instead, permitting the Respondent to furnish the disputed
memorandum for his in camera examination. We further conclude that the
content of memorandum was adequately and accurately described by the Judge so
as to provide for meaningful, direct and cross- examination and argument for
counsel for the General Counsel and the Union. Therefore, we find that the
Judge's denial of the General Counsel's request for sanctions did not
request of the General Counsel for sanctions. B. The Requested Memorandum Was Necessary for the Union to
Perform its Statutory Obligations We note, at the outset, that there is no contention by the Respondent
that the requested information is not normally maintained and reasonably
available. We also note that the Respondent does not contend that disclosure of
the requested document is prohibited by law. Therefore, we find that the
requested information is normally maintained and reasonably available within
the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, and that disclosure of the
memorandum is not prohibited by law. With respect to the issue before us, the Respondent argues that the
Regional Director's memorandum was not necessary for the Union to process the
grievance because the memorandum was "merely a recommendation[,]" and not the
decision denying the employee's request. Respondent's Exceptions at 18. We
reject the Respondent's argument. As relevant here, section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute requires an agency
to furnish a union, upon request, with information which is (1) normally
representative is entitled to information that is necessary to enable it to
carry out effectively its representational responsibilities, including
(1990) (Portsmouth), application for enforcement filed sub nom.
FLRA v. U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, No. 90-1949 (1st Cir. Oct. 1, 1990). See also,
for example, U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics
California, 37 FLRA No. 82, slip op. at 9 (1990) (Sacramento Air
Logistics Center); Department of the Army, Headquarters, XVIII
Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 34 FLRA 461, 462
(1990) (Dep't of Army, Hq. and Fort Bragg). Under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, the Union is entitled to
information which enables it to realistically assess the strengths or
weaknesses of the employee's position. See, for example, U.S.
Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and
Management, 26 FLRA 943, 950 (1987) (D0L). There is no requirement
that information requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute actually be
used in a grievance, however. The union may decide not to file a grievance
after it obtains and evaluates the information. Moreover, an agency's
contention that the union is aware of the information contained in a requested
document does not relieve an agency of its obligation to furnish the requested
document. See, for example, Department of Health and Human
Service, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, Maryland and Social
Massachusetts, 37 FLRA No. 108 (1990) (SSA, New Bedford District
Office). Further, an agency's contention that it did not rely on requested
information as a basis for its action does not relieve an agency of its
obligation to furnish the requested information. See, for
Service, Border Patrol, El Paso, Texas, 37 FLRA No. 110 (1990). In this case, the Union requested a copy of the Regional Director's
recommendation concerning the employee's request for part-time employment in
order to evaluate the merits of a prospective grievance. The Judge noted that
there were allegations that the Regional Director was hostile towards part-time
schedules for attorneys. The Judge further noted that, in making decisions on
matters which affect a regional office, the Respondent's Washington D.C. office
relies on and utilizes the report and recommendation of the Regional Director.
The Judge concluded that the Regional Director's memorandum was necessary for
the Union to determine whether other considerations, which were not included in
the Respondent's written decision to the employee, may have influenced the
decision. In these circumstances, we conclude that the Regional Director's
recommendation was necessary for the Union to fully know and understand the
basis underlying the Respondent's position on the employee's request and to
determine the most appropriate course of action to take in the matter.
Therefore, we find, in agreement with the Judge, that the Regional Director's
memorandum was necessary within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the
Statute for the Union to fulfill its representational responsibilities. C. The Requested Memorandum Does Not Constitute Guidance,
Statute For the reasons which follow, which differ from those of the Judge, we
find that the requested memorandum does not constitute guidance, advice,
counsel, or training provided for management officials relating to collective
bargaining. The Statute establishes a framework of rights and obligations for
Federal employees, labor organizations and agencies and provides mechanisms for
the enforcement of those rights and obligations. Under section 7114(a) of the
Statute, a labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is
entitled to negotiate a "collective bargaining agreement" covering all
employees in a unit of exclusive representation. The Statute defines a
"collective bargaining agreement" as "an agreement entered into as a result of
collective bargaining" under the Statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(8).
"Collective bargaining" is defined as: the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an
agency and the exclusive representative . . . to consult and bargain in a
good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of
employment affecting [unit] employees and to execute . . . a written document
incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached[.] 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12). Section 7114(b) provides that an agency's duty to "negotiate in good
faith" includes the following obligation: (4) . . . to furnish to the exclusive representative involved, or its
authorized representative, upon request and, to the extent not prohibited by
law, data-- (A) which is normally maintained by the agency in the regular
collective bargaining . . . . In examining and interpreting the relationship among subsections (A),
(B), and (C) of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, we first note, as relevant
to this case, that subsection (B) describes the nature and extent of an
agency's obligation to furnish data to the exclusive representative. Section
7114(b)(4)(B) requires an agency to furnish the exclusive representative with
data which is "necessary" for . . . discussion, understanding and
negotiation of subjects within the scope of collective bargaining."
(Emphasis added.) We further note that section 7114(b)(4)(C) sets forth a
limitation on an agency's obligation to furnish data, under section 7114(b)(4)
of the Statute. Section 7114(b)(4)(C) exempts from disclosure to the exclusive
representative "guidance, advice, counsel, or training provided for management
officials or supervisors, relating to collective bargaining[.]"
(Emphasis added.) As stated previously, the term "collective bargaining" is defined as
the "performance" of the parties' "mutual obligation" to "consult and bargain .
. . with respect to the conditions of employment affecting [unit] employees . .
. ." 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12). The term "conditions of employment" is
defined as "personnel policies, practices, and matters . . . affecting working
conditions[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14). We conclude, based on the ordinary
meaning of the words used in the statutory definition, that collective
bargaining means the process wherein the agency and the exclusive
representative are engaged in the performance of their mutual obligation to
bargain concerning the conditions of employment affecting unit employees. The
collective bargaining process includes the negotiations conducted by the agency
and the exclusive representative as well as the administration of the
collective bargaining agreement. Contract administration by the agency and the
exclusive representative encompasses those circumstances and situations where
the parties are: (1) engaged in discussions concerning the application and
interpretation of contract provisions; (2) involved in third-party dispute
resolution procedures to resolve disagreements concerning the application and
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; (3) processing
grievances filed under the negotiated grievance procedure; (4) involved in the
processing of unfair labor practice charges, negotiability appeals, exceptions
to arbitral awards and petitions filed under the Statute; and (5) engaged in
other labor-management relations activities and interactions which affect the
conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees or have an impact on the
union's status as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.
Under general rules of statutory construction, there is a presumption
that the same words used twice in the same statute have the same meaning.
See, for example, Sutherland on Stat Const § 46.06, at 104
(4th Ed. 1984). It is also a widely recognized rule of statutory construction
that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void or
insignificant. See, for example, id. Further, as a general
rule, where there is doubt concerning the extent of the application of a
proviso on the scope of another provision's operation, the proviso is strictly
construed. See, for example, id. § 47.08, at 135.
Based on these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the
term "collective bargaining" has the same meaning in subsections (B) and (C) of
section 7114(b)(4). Therefore, we find that section 7114(b)(4)(B) obligates an
agency to furnish to the exclusive representative data which is "necessary for
the scope of" the collective bargaining process. Similarly, we find that
section 7114(b)(4)(C) exempts from disclosure to the exclusive representative
"guidance, advice, counsel or training for management officials relating to"
the collective bargaining process. We conclude also that section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute constitutes
a narrow exception to an agency's duty to furnish data under section 7114(b)(4)
of the Statute. First, we note that this conclusion is consistent with the
general rule of statutory construction, noted above, that a proviso is strictly
construed. See also Legislative History of the Federal Service
of 1978, Subcommittee on Postal Personnel and Modernization of the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Committee Print
No. 96-7, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, at 995. In addition, the courts have interpreted section 7114(b)(4)(B) as
encompassing information needed by an exclusive representative to perform the
full range of its representational responsibilities under the Statute. In
AFGE, Local 1345 v. FLRA, 793 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1986), for example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the Authority's decision and concluded that
information concerning the disciplinary separation of two employees was
necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding and negotiation of
subjects within the scope of collective bargaining. The court concluded that
the Authority's construction of section 7114(b)(4)(B) was "far narrower than
the terms of the statute itself." Id. at 1363. The court reviewed the
wording of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute and stated that "[t]his statutory
mandate is perfectly consistent with the well-understood principle that, in
collective bargaining, '[t]he duty to request and supply information is part
and parcel of the fundamental duty to bargain. . . .'" Id. (quoting
Saginaw Township Board of Education, 1970 MERC Lab. Op. 127 (Mich. Empl.
Relations Comm'n)). The court stated that it was well-settled in both private
and public sector labor law that an agency's obligation applied "not only to
information needed to negotiate an agreement, but also to data relevant to its
administration." Id. (citation omitted). The court further stated that
an agency's obligation to furnish data "must be evaluated in the context of the
full range of union responsibilities in both the negotiation and the
administration of a labor agreement." Id. at 1364 (emphasis in
original). The court considered the agency's obligation to furnish data in light
of the Union's representational responsibility. The court noted that the union
represented potentially aggrieved employees. The court concluded that this
obligation created a duty for an agency to provide information that would
enable a union to process a grievance or to determine whether or not to file a
grievance. Further, the court noted that a union represents all the members of
the bargaining unit. The court concluded that this obligation created a duty
for the agency to provide information to enable a union to understand the
application of policies affecting unit members. Finally, the court recognized
that the union had legitimate concerns with its own status as exclusive
representative. The court stated that a union was entitled to information when
the agency takes an action which affects its role as the exclusive
representative. In summary, the court concluded that a union could not fulfill
its obligation to fully represent all employees in the unit if it lacked
information necessary to assess its representational rights and
responsibilities. Consistent with the views expressed by the court in AFGE, Local 1345
v. FLRA, the Authority has interpreted section 7114(b)(4)(B) as requiring
an agency to release data which will enable a union to carry out effectively
its representational functions and responsibilities. See, for
example, SSA, New Bedford District Office, 37 FLRA No. 108, slip op.
at 10-11 (requiring disclosure of sanitized performance appraisals and copies
of documents and reports prepared by other employees in order to determine
whether a potential grievant's appraisal was inconsistent with the appraisal's
of other employees); Sacramento Air Logistics Center, 37 FLRA No. 82,
slip op. at 8-9 (requiring the release of data concerning the temporary duty
assignment of military personnel in order for the union to pursue an activity
grievance filed on behalf of all bargaining unit employees); Portsmouth,
37 FLRA at 527-528 (requiring the release of the names and home addresses of
bargaining unit employees in order, among other things, to assist the union in
performing its representational functions under the Statute). In National Weather Service, the Authority concluded that a
memorandum reflecting a Labor Relations Officer's assessment and
recommendations to management concerning an incident involving the discipline
of a union representative constituted guidance, advice, and counsel for
management officials relating to collective bargaining. In reaching the
conclusion that the memorandum was exempt from disclosure under section
7114(b)(4)(C), the Authority emphasized that the Labor Relations Officer's
recommendation related to a situation with "obvious labor-management relations
implications." National Weather Service, 30 FLRA at 143. However, in
that same case, the Authority also concluded that two other memoranda, one from
the manager of the facility where the incident occurred and the other from the
Chief of the Personnel Branch, to the union representative's supervisor which
described the incident, were necessary for the union to determine the most
effective representational course of action and effectively represent the union
representative. In light of the legislative history and established precedent
concerning the scope of the agency's obligation to furnish data under section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute, we conclude that section 7114(b)(4)(C) exempts from
disclosure to the exclusive representative information which contains guidance,
advice, counsel, or training for management officials relating specifically to
the collective bargaining process, such as: (1) courses of action agency
management should take in negotiations with the union; (2) how a provision of
the collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted and applied; (3) how
a grievance or an unfair labor practice charge should be handled; and (4) other
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. We further conclude that
section 7114(b)(4)(C) does not exempt from disclosure guidance, advice, or
counsel to management officials concerning the conditions of employment of a
bargaining unit employee, for example: the personnel, policies and practices
and other matters affecting the employee's working conditions that are not
specifically related to the collective bargaining process. Applying the foregoing interpretation of section 7114(b)(4)(C) to the
facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude that the Regional Director's
memorandum did not constitute guidance, advice, or counsel relating to
Statute. In so concluding, we reject the Respondent's argument that the
Regional Director's recommendation pertains to collective bargaining because it
involved the administration of the contractual provisions governing part-time
employment. The Regional Director's recommendation was not made in a context where
Regional Director's recommendation was not guidance, advice, or counsel to
management concerning the handling of a grievance or unfair labor practice
charge. Rather, his recommendation was made in the context of and in response
to a specific request of a unit employee for part-time employment. Therefore,
we conclude that the Regional Director's recommendation did not constitute
guidance, advice, counsel or training for management relating to collective
bargaining within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4)(C). In our view,
interpreting section 7114(b)(4)(C) in this manner gives meaning to the
exclusive representative's right under section 7114(b)(4) to obtain data which
will enable it to effectively carry out its representational functions. VII. Summary Section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute requires an agency to furnish the
available and normally maintained and that disclosure of the information was
not prohibited by law. In addition, we have concluded that the Regional
Director's recommendation was necessary for the Union to process the employee's
grievance and that the recommendation did not constitute guidance, advice,
counsel or training for management officials relating to collective bargaining
within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4)(C) of the Statute. Therefore, we find that the Respondent was required by section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish the requested memorandum, in its entirety,
to the Union and its failure to do so violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8)
of the Statute. Accordingly, we will direct the Respondent to cease and desist
from its violation of the Statute and to furnish the requested memorandum. VIII. Order Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
National Labor Relations Board, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to furnish the National Labor Relations Board
Union, Local 6, the representative of a portion of a consolidated nationwide
unit of certain employees, a copy of the January 25, 1985, memorandum from
Regional Director Gerald Kobell to Joseph E. Desio, Associate General Counsel
and John P. Falcone, Assistant General Counsel, concerning a unit employee's
request for part-time employment. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
Statute: (a) Upon request, furnish the National Labor Relations Board Union,
Local 6, the representative of a portion of a consolidated nationwide unit of
certain employees, a copy of the January 25, 1985, memorandum from Regional
Director Gerald Kobell to Joseph E. Desio, Associate General Counsel and John
P. Falcone, Assistant General Counsel, concerning a unit employee's request for
part-time employment. (b) Post at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Regional Office, copies of the
Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania Regional Director and shall be posted and maintained for 60
steps have been taken to comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE WE NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to furnish the National Labor Relations
Board Union, Local 6, the representative of a portion of a consolidated
nationwide unit of certain employees, a copy of the January 25, 1985,
memorandum from Regional Director Gerald Kobell to Joseph E. Desio, Associate
General Counsel and John P. Falcone, Assistant General Counsel, concerning a
unit employee's request for part-time employment. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL furnish the National Labor Relations Board Union, Local 6, the
representative of a portion of a consolidated nationwide unit of certain
employees, a copy of the January 25, 1985, memorandum from Regional Director
Gerald Kobell to Joseph E. Desio, Associate General Counsel and John P.
Falcone, Assistant General Counsel, concerning a unit employee's request for
part-time employment. __________________________(Activity) Dated:________By:__________________________ (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of
Plaza, Room 3700, New York, NY 10278, and whose telephone number is: (212)
264-4934.