Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0448_0056_ZO.html
Timestamp: 2013-06-19 13:33:33
Document Index: 525889012

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2945', '§ 2945', '§ 244', '§ 252', '§ 252', '§1367']

A county grand jury subsequently indicted respondent for forgery, for receiving stolen property (including the credit cards), and for possession of heroin. The attorney who represented respondent at the preliminary hearing withdrew upon [p59] becoming a Municipal Court Judge, and new counsel was appointed for Roberts.
Between November, 1975, and March, 1976, five subpoenas for four different trial dates [n1] were issued to Anita at her parents' Ohio residence. The last three carried a written instruction that Anita should "call before appearing." She was not at the residence when these were executed. She did not telephone, and she did not appear at trial.
In March, 1976, the case went to trial before a jury in the Court of Common Pleas. Respondent took the stand and testified that Anita Isaacs had given him her parents' checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he could use them. Tr. 231-232. Relying on Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2945.49 (1975), [n2] which permits the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who "cannot for any reason be produced at the ;trial," the State, on rebuttal, offered the transcript of Anita's testimony. Tr. 273-274.
Asserting a violation of the Confrontation Clause and, indeed, the unconstitutionality thereunder of § 2945.49, the defense objected to the use of the transcript. The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing as to its admissibility. Tr.194-199. Amy Isaacs, the sole witness at voir dire, was questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel concerning her daughter's whereabouts. Anita, according to her mother, left home for Tucson, Ariz., soon after the preliminary [p60] hearing. About a year before the trial, a San Francisco social worker was in communication with the Isaacs about a welfare application Anita had filed there. Through the social worker, the Isaacs reached their daughter once by telephone. Since then, however, Anita had called her parents only one other time, and had not been in touch with her two sisters. When Anita called, some seven or eight months before trial, she told her parents that she "was traveling" outside Ohio, but did not reveal the place from which she called. Mrs. Isaacs stated that she knew of no way to reach Anita in case of an emergency. App. 9. Nor did she "know of anybody who knows where she is." Id. at 11. The trial court admitted the transcript into evidence. Respondent was convicted on all counts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a 4-3 vote, affirmed, but did so on other grounds. 55 Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). It first held that the Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that Anita was not unavailable. Barber v. Page was distinguished as a case in which "the government knew where [p61] the absent witness was," whereas Anita's "whereabouts were entirely unknown." 55 Ohio St.2d at 194, 378 N.E.2d at 495.
The court, nonetheless, held that the transcript was inadmissible. Reasoning that normally there is little incentive to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing, where the "ultimate issue" is only probable cause, id. at 196, 378 N.E.2d at 496, and citing the dissenting opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 (1970), the court held that the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial. See 55 Ohio St.2d at 191, 378 N.E.2d at 493 (court syllabus). [n3] The court distinguished Green, where this Court had ruled admissible the preliminary hearing testimony of a declarant who was present at trial but claimed forgetfulness. The Ohio court perceived a "dictum" in Green that suggested that the mere opportunity to cross-examine renders preliminary hearing testimony admissible. 55 Ohio St.2d at 198, and n. 2, 378 N.E.2d at 497, and n. 2, citing 399 U.S. at 165-166. But the court concluded that Green
55 Ohio St.2d at 199, 378 N.E.2d at 497 (emphasis in original). Since Anita had not been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing and was absent at trial, the introduction of the transcript of her testimony was held to have violated respondent's confrontation [p62] right. The three dissenting justices would have ruled that "‘the test is the opportunity for full and complete cross-examination, rather than the use which is made of that opportunity'" (citing United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611, 613 (CA10 1969)). 55 Ohio St.2d at 200, 378 N.E.2d at 498.
The Court here is called upon to consider once again the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, with its many exceptions. The basic rule against hearsay, of course, is riddled with exceptions developed over three centuries. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 244 (2d ed.1972) (McCormick) (history of rule); id. §§ 252-324 (exceptions). [n4] These exceptions vary among jurisdictions as to number, nature, and detail. See, e.g., Fed.Rules Evid. 803, 804 (over 20 specified exceptions). But every set of exceptions seems to fit an apt description offered more than 40 years ago: "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 921 (1937).
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-405 (1965); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974), provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted [p63] with the witnesses against him." If one were to read this language literally, it would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant not present at trial. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("[T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provision in question than the admission of dying declarations"). But, if thus applied, the Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.
The historical evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 156-157, and nn. 9 and 10; see also McCormick § 252, p. 606. Moreover, underlying policies support the same conclusion. The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, [n5] and that "a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). [n6] In short, the Clause envisions
a personal examination an cross-examination of the [p64] witness in which the accused has an opportunity not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
This Court, in a series of cases, has sought to accommodate these competing interests. True to the common law tradition, the process has been gradual, building on past decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court has not sought to "map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity [p65] of all . . . hearsay ‘exceptions.'" California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 162. But a general approach to the problem is discernible.
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 161-162, 165, 167, n. 16. [n7]
Dutton v. Evans, supra at 89, and to "afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating [p66] the truth of the prior statement," California v. Green, supra, at 161. It is clear from these statements, and from numerous prior decisions of this Court, that, even though the witness be unavailable, his prior testimony must bear some of these "indicia of reliability."
The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability" requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the "substance of the constitutional protection." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. at 244. [n8] This reflects the truism that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values," California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 155, and "stem from the same roots," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). It also responds to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. [n9] [p67]
We turn first to that aspect of confrontation analysis deemed dispositive by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and [p68] answered by it in the negative -- whether Anita Isaacs' prior testimony at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient "indicia of reliability." Resolution of this issue requires a careful comparison of this case to California v. Green, supra.
In Green, at the preliminary hearing, a youth named Porter identified Green as a drug supplier. When called to the stand at Green's trial, however, Porter professes a lapse of memory. Frustrated in its attempt to adduce live testimony, the prosecution offered Porter's prior statements. The trial judge ruled the evidence admissible, and substantial portions of the preliminary hearing transcript were read to the jury. This Court found no error. Citing the established rule that prior trial testimony is admissible upon retrial if the declarant becomes unavailable, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), and recent dicta suggesting the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony under proper circumstances, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 725-726; [p69] Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 407, the Court rejected Green's Confrontation Clause attack. It reasoned:
399 U.S. at 165. These factors, the Court concluded, provided all that the Sixth Amendment demands: "substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement." Id. at 166. [n10] [p70]
Counsel's questioning clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form. His presentation was replete with leading questions, [n11] the principal tool and hallmark of cross-examination. [p71] In addition, counsel's questioning comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination: to challenge
Respondent argues that, because defense counsel never asked the court to declare Anita hostile, his questioning necessarily occurred on direct examination. See State v. Minneker, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 271 N.E.2d 821 (1971). But however state law might formally characterize the questioning of Anita, it afforded "substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement," Green, 399 U.S. at 166, no less so than classic cross-examination. Although Ohio law may have authorized objection by the prosecutor or intervention by the court, this did not happen. As in Green, respondent's counsel was not "significantly limited in any way in the scope or nature of his cross-examination." Ibid. [p72]
In making this argument, respondent, in effect, asks us to disassociate preliminary hearing testimony previously subjected to cross-examination from previously cross-examined [p73] prior-trial testimony, which the Court has deemed generally immune from subsequent confrontation attack. Precedent requires us to decline this invitation. In Green, the Court found guarantees of trustworthiness in the accouterments of the preliminary hearing itself; there was no mention of the inherent reliability or unreliability of Porter and his story. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 216.
408 U.S. at 216. [n12] [p74]
Although it might be said that the Court's prior cases provide no further refinement of this statement of the rule, certain general propositions safely emerge. The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness' intervening death), "good faith" demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 189, n. 22 (concurring opinion, citing Barber v. Page, supra). The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness. As with other evidentiary [p75] proponents, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing this predicate.
Given these facts, the prosecution did not breach its duty of good faith effort. To be sure, the prosecutor might have tried to locate by telephone the San Francisco social worker with whom Mrs. Isaacs had spoken many months before, and might have undertaken other steps in an effort to find Anita. One, in hindsight, may always think of other things. Nevertheless, [p76] the great improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their execution. We accept as a general rule, of course, the proposition that "the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 724, quoting from the dissenting opinion in that case in the Court of Appeals (381 F.2d 479, 481 (CA10 1966)). But the service and ineffectiveness of the five subpoenas and the conversation with Anita's mother were far more than mere reluctance to face the possibility of a refusal. It was investigation at the last-known real address, and it was conversation with a parent who was concerned about her daughter's whereabouts.
Barber and Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra, are the cases in which this Court has explored the issue of constitutional unavailability. Although each is factually distinguishable from this case, Mancusi provides significant support for a conclusion of good faith effort here, [n13] and Barber has no contrary significance. Insofar as this record discloses no basis for concluding that Anita was abroad, the case is factually weaker than Mancusi; but it is stronger than Mancusi in the sense that the Ohio prosecutor, unlike the prosecutor in Mancusi, had no clear indication, if any at all, of Anita's whereabouts. In Barber, the Court found an absence of good faith effort where [p77] the prosecution made no attempt to secure the presence of a declarant incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in a neighboring State. There, the prosecution knew where the witness was, procedures existed whereby the witness could be brought to the trial, and the witness was not in a position to frustrate efforts to secure his production. Here, Anita's whereabouts were not known, and there was no assurance that she would be found in a place from which she could be forced to return to Ohio.
1. A number of continuances were granted for reasons unrelated to Anita's absence.
2. The statute reads:
3. The Ohio "syllabus rule" is stated in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baillie, 112 Ohio St. 567, 570, 148 N.E. 233, 234 (1925). See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977).
4. With the caveat, "[s]implification has a measure of falsification," McCormick defines hearsay evidence as
5. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) ("it is this literal right to ‘confront' the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause"); id. at 172-189 (concurring opinion); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
6. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-407 (1965); California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (cross-examination is the "‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,'" quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1367 (3d ed.1940)). Of course, these purposes are interrelated, since one critical goal of cross-examination is to draw out discrediting demeanor to be viewed by the factfinder. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (CA3 1967).
7. A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), for example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available witness. Cf. Read, The New Confrontation -- Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1, 43, 49 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3, 194-195, 197-198 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 407 (dying declarations); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. at 243-244 (same); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-216 (1972) (cross-examined prior-trial testimony); Comment, 30 La.L.Rev. 651, 668 (1970) ("Properly administered, the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the hearsay exceptions").
9. The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules has triggered an outpouring of scholarly commentary. Few observers have commented without proposing, roughly or in detail, a basic approach. Some have advanced theories that would shift the general mode of analysis in favor of the criminal defendant. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 105 (1951); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 76, 91-92 (1971) (all hearsay should be excluded except, perhaps, when prosecution shows absolute necessity, high degree of trustworthiness, and "total absence" of motive to falsify); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 63, 237 (1968); Note, 31 Vand.L.Rev. 682, 694 (1978).
10. This reasoning appears in Part III of Green, the only section of that opinion directly relevant to the issue raised here. The Ohio court in the present case appears to have dismissed Part III as "dictum." 55 Ohio St.2d at 198, 378 N.E.2d at 497. The United States has suggested that Part III properly is viewed as an "alternative holding." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24, n. 15. Either view, perhaps, would diminish Green's precedential significance. We accept neither.
11. No less than 17 plainly leading questions were asked, as indicated by phrases in counsel's inquiries: "is[n't] it a fact . . . that"; "is it to your knowledge, then, that . . ."; "is[n't] that correct"; "you never gave them . . ."; "this wasn't then in the pack . . ."; "you have never [not] seen [discussed; talked] . . ."; "you never gave. . . ."
12. We need not consider whether defense counsel's questioning at the preliminary hearing surmounts some inevitably nebulous threshold of "effectiveness." In Mancusi, to be sure, the Court explored to some extent the adequacy of counsel's cross-examination at the earlier proceeding. See 408 U.S. at 214-215. That discussion, however, must be read in light of the fact that the defendant's representation at the earlier proceeding, provided by counsel who had been appointed only four days prior thereto, already had been held to be ineffective. See id. at 209. Under those unusual circumstances, it was necessary to explore the character of the actual cross-examination to ensure that an adequate opportunity for full cross-examination had been afforded to the defendant. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 407. We hold that, in all but such extraordinary cases, no inquiry into "effectiveness" is required. A holding that every case involving prior testimony requires such an inquiry would frustrate the principal objective of generally validating the prior-testimony exception in the first place -- increasing certainty and consistency in the application of the Confrontation Clause.
13. In Mancusi, the declarant,