Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/207/261/545126/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 16:34:36
Document Index: 403111661

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Miguel De Santiago-gonzalez, Defendant-appellant, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2000 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Miguel De Santiago-gonzalez, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Miguel De Santiago-gonzalez, Defendant-appellant, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000)
Before JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and DOWD* , District Judge.
In the PSR, the probation officer recommended that DeSantiago's base offense level be increased by four levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) (1) (B), because he had previously been convicted of three misdemeanor crimes of violence. DeSantiago objected to the PSR, claiming that the misdemeanor DWI violations were not "crimes of violence." The district court overruled his objections, stating that drunk driving creates a serious risk of physical injury to another and therefore, is a crime of violence making DeSantiago eligible for the § 2L1.2(b) (1) (B) enhancement. The district court sentenced DeSantiago to a 20-month term of imprisonment, followed by a one-year term of supervised release, and DeSantiago has timely appealed.
According to application note 1 to this guideline section, the term "crime of violence" is defined according to the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and for purposes of § 2L1.2(b) (1) (B), the term includes offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or less. The applicable definition of a "crime of violence" for the purposes of DeSantiago's sentence is thus found at § 4B1.2(a), which provides as follows:
Consequently, while we agree with DeSantiago that Camacho does not control the outcome of this case, we find persuasive the reasoning of Rutherford, that the very nature of the crime of DWI presents a "serious risk of physical injury" to others, and makes DWI a crime of violence. In effect, sub-paragraph (2) of § 4B1.2(a) expands the definition of "crime of violence" so as to encompass such reckless and negligent conduct as driving while intoxicated. As noted above, we take a categorical approach in determining whether a particular crime is violent "by its nature." See Valazquez-Overa, 10 F.3d at 420. As the Rutherford court noted, that drunk driving is inherently dangerous, is "well-known and well documented." Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 376. Thus, as a result of the inherent risk of physical injury associated with drunk driving in general and without regard to the circumstances of any particular case, we join the Seventh Circuit in holding that by its very nature, the crime of driving while intoxicated is a crime of violence as that term is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that the misdemeanor crime of DWI constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a) (2). And since DeSantiago had thrice been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of violence at the time of his attempted unlawful reentry into the United States, the four-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b) (1) (B) was appropriate.