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SURE-TAN, INC. V. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883 (1984) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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SURE-TAN, INC. V. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883 (1984)
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A certain union was elected as the collective bargaining representative of employees of petitioners, two small firms that constitute a single integrated employer for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Petitioners then filed objections to the election with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), asserting that six of the seven eligible voters were illegal aliens. After being notified that their objections were overruled, petitioners' president sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) asking that it check into the status of a number of petitioners' employees. As a result of the INS's investigation, five employees voluntarily left the country to avoid deportation. Subsequently, the Board held that petitioners had committed an unfair labor practice, in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, by reporting their employees, known to be undocumented aliens, to the INS in retaliation for the employees' union activities. Concluding that petitioners' conduct constituted a "constructive discharge" of the employees, the Board entered a cease-and-desist order, and directed the "conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay," thereby leaving until subsequent compliance proceedings the determination whether the employees had in fact been available for work so as not to toll petitioners' backpay liability. On appeal, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order as modified by the court to require that petitioners' reinstatement offers to the employees be left open for a period of four years to allow them a reasonable time to make arrangements for legal reentry, and that the offers be written in Spanish and delivered so as to allow for verification of receipt. Although recognizing that the employees would not be entitled to backpay for the period when they were not legally entitled to be present and employed in the United States, the court decided that it would serve the NLRA's policies to set a minimum amount of backpay that petitioners must pay in any event, and suggested that the Board consider whether six months' backpay would be an appropriate amount. The Board accepted the suggestion, and its final order, approved by the court, included the minimum award of six months' backpay. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. The Court of Appeals properly held that petitioners committed an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by constructively discharging their undocumented alien employees through reporting the employees to the INS in retaliation for participating in union activities. There is no merit in petitioners' contention that, although they acted with "anti-union animus," nevertheless their conduct did not force the undocumented alien workers' departure from the country, and that the employees' status as illegal aliens instead was the "proximate cause" of their departure. The evidence showed that the letter of petitioners' president to the INS was the sole cause of the investigation that resulted in the employees' departure, and that the president foresaw precisely this result. Although the reporting of any violation of the criminal laws ordinarily should be encouraged, not penalized, the Board's view that § 8(a)(3) is violated only when the evidence establishes that the reporting of the presence of an illegal alien employee is in retaliation for the employee's protected union activity is consistent with the policies of both the INA and the NLRA. Nor is there merit in petitioners' claim that their request for enforcement of the federal immigration laws was an aspect of their First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," and therefore could not be burdened under the guise of enforcing the NLRA. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, distinguished. Pp. 467 U. S. 894-898. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
672 F.2d 592, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Two hours after the election, petitioners' president, John Surak, addressed a group of employees, including some of the undocumented aliens involved in this case. He asked the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The unfair labor practice charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose findings and conclusions as to the merits of the complaints were affirmed and adopted by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the Board. Specifically, the Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that petitioners had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) [Footnote 1] by requesting the INS to investigate the status of their Mexican employees "solely because the employees supported the Union" and "with full knowledge that the employees in question had no papers or work permits." Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1978). The Board, therefore, agreed with the ALJ's finding that
As a remedy for the § 8(a)(3) violations, the Board adopted the ALJ's recommendation that petitioners be ordered to cease and desist from their various unfair labor practices, including notifying the INS of their employees' status because of the employees' support of the Union. However, the Board declined to adopt the ALJ's specific recommendations as to the appropriate remedy. The ALJ had recommended that petitioners be ordered to offer the discharged employees reinstatement and that the offers be held open for six months. In addition, the ALJ had concluded that since, under past Board precedent, backpay is normally tolled during chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. 672 F.2d 592 (CA7 1982). The court fully agreed that petitioners had violated the NLRA by constructively discharging their undocumented alien employees. It also concurred in the Board's judgment that the usual remedies of reinstatement and backpay were appropriate in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals did, however, modify the Board's order in several significant respects. First, it concluded that reinstatement would be proper only if the discharged employees were legally present and free to be employed in the United States when they presented themselves for reinstatement. The court also decided that the reinstatement offers in their present form were deficient, since they chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 606. Believing that six months' backpay would be the minimum amount appropriate for this purpose, the court suggested that the Board consider this remedy. The Board accepted the court's suggestion, and the final judgment order approved by the court included the minimum award of six months' backpay. [Footnote 4] We granted certiorari, 460 U.S. 1021 (1983). We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it determined that petitioners violated the Act by constructively discharging their undocumented alien employees, but reverse the judgment as to some of the remedies ordered and direct that the case be remanded to the Board. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The terms and policies of the Act fully support the Board's interpretation in this case. The breadth of § 2(3)'s definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to "any employee." The only limitations are specific exemptions for agricultural laborers, domestic workers, individuals employed by their spouses or parents, individuals employed as independent contractors or supervisors, and individuals employed by a person who is not an employer under the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 359. The INA evinces "at best, evidence of a peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants." Id. at 424 U. S. 360. For whatever reason, Congress has not adopted provisions in the INA making chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien who is present or working in the United States without appropriate authorization. While it is unlawful to "concea[l], harbo[r], or shiel[d] from detection" any alien not lawfully entitled to enter or reside in the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3), an explicit proviso to the statute explains that
We find persuasive the Board's argument that enforcement of the NLRA with respect to undocumented alien employees is compatible with the policies of the INA. A primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers; immigrant aliens are therefore admitted to work in this country only if they "will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). See S.Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1965). Application of the NLRA helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment. If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In turn, if the demand for undocumented aliens declines, there may then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners do not dispute that the antiunion animus element of this test was, as expressed by the lower court, "flagrantly met." 672 F.2d 601.
Id. at 601-602. Petitioners contend, however, that their chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
conduct in reporting the undocumented alien workers did not force the workers' departure from the country; instead, they argue, it was the employees' status as illegal aliens that was the actual "proximate cause" of their departure. See Brief for Petitioners 13-15.
This argument is unavailing. According to testimony by an INS agent before the ALJ, petitioners' letter was the sole cause of the investigation during which the employees were taken into custody. This evidence was undisputed by petitioners, and amply supports the ALJ's conclusion that "but for [petitioners'] letter to Immigration, the discriminatees would have continued to work indefinitely." 234 N.L.R.B. at 1191. And there can be little doubt that Surak foresaw precisely this result when, having known about the employees' illegal status for some months, he notified the INS only after the Union's electoral victory was assured. See supra at 467 U. S. 887; 672 F.2d 601.
We observe that the Board quite properly does not contend that an employer may never report the presence of an illegal alien employee to the INS. See, e.g., Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 766 (1976) (no violation of Act for employer to discharge illegal alien who was a union activist where the evidence showed that the reason for the discharge was not the employee's protected collective activities, but the employer's concern that employment of the undocumented worker violated state law). The reporting of any violation of the criminal laws is conduct which ordinarily should be encouraged, not penalized. See In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 158 U. S. 535 (1895). [Footnote 6] It is only when the evidence establishes chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
that the reporting of the presence of an illegal alien employee is in retaliation for the employee's protected union activity that the Board finds a violation of § 8(a)(3). Absent this specific finding of antiunion animus, it would not be an unfair labor practice to report or discharge an undocumented alien employee. See Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., supra. Such a holding is consistent with the policies of both the INA and the NLRA.
Finally, petitioners claim that this Court's recent decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731 (1983), mandates the conclusion that their request for enforcement of the federal immigration laws is an aspect of their First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," and therefore may not be burdened under the guise of enforcing the NLRA. [Footnote 7] In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court held that an employer's filing of a state court suit against its employees seeking damages and injunctive relief for libelous statements and injury to its business is not an enjoinable unfair labor practice unless the suit is filed for retaliatory purposes and lacks a reasonable basis. The Court stressed that the right of access to courts for redress chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government, concluding that the NLRA must be construed in such a way as to be "sensitive" to these First Amendment values. Id. at 461 U. S. 741. The Court also noted that the States had a compelling interest in maintaining domestic peace by providing employers with such civil remedies for tortious conduct during labor disputes. If the Board were allowed to enjoin a state lawsuit simply because of retaliatory motive, the employer would "be totally deprived of a remedy for an actual injury," and the strong state interest in providing for such redress would therefore be undermined. Id. at 461 U. S. 742.
Finally, Bill Johnson's Restaurants was concerned about whether the Board's interpretation of the NLRA would work to preempt the State from providing civil remedies for conduct touching interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.'" 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 741 (quoting 359 U. S. 244 (1959)). Here, where there is no conflict between the Board's unfair labor practice finding and any asserted state interest, such federalism concerns are simply not at stake. In short, Bill Johnson's [email protected] will not support petitioners' efforts to avoid their obligations under the NLRA by reporting their employees to the INS.
of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). The Court has repeatedly interpreted this statutory command as vesting in the Board the primary responsibility and broad discretion to devise remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act, subject only to limited judicial chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
review. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258, 396 U. S. 262-263 (1969); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 379 U. S. 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 313 U. S. 194 (1941). Although the courts of appeals have power under the Act "to make and enter a decree . . . modifying, and enforcing as so modified" the orders of the Board, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f), they should not substitute their judgment for that of the Board in determining how best to undo the effects of unfair labor practices:
672 F.2d 606. We agree with petitioners that this remedy ordered by the Court of Appeals exceeds the limits imposed by the NLRA. [Footnote 9] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Not only did the court overstep the limits of its own reviewing authority, see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at 344 U. S. 346-347, [Footnote 10] but it also effectively compelled the Board to take action that simply does not lie within the Board's own powers. Under § 10(c), the Board's authority to remedy unfair labor practices is expressly limited by the requirement that its orders "effectuate the policies of the Act." Although this rather vague statutory command obviously permits the Board broad discretion, at a minimum, it encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress. Quite early on, the Court established that "the relief which the statute empowers the Board to grant is to be adapted to the situation which calls for redress." NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 304 U. S. 348 (1938). See D. McDowell & K. Huhn, NLRB Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices 8-15 (1976). Of course, the general legitimacy of the backpay order as a means to restore the situation "as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination," Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 313 U. S. 194, is by now beyond dispute. Yet it remains a cardinal, albeit frequently unarticulated, assumption that a backpay remedy must be sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor practices. Id. at 313 U. S. 198 ("[O]nly actual losses should be made chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
good. . ."). To this end, we have, for example, required that the Board give due consideration to the employee's responsibility to mitigate damages in fashioning an equitable backpay award. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at 344 U. S. 346; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 313 U. S. 198. Likewise, the Board's own longstanding practice has been to deduct from the backpay award any wages earned in the interim in another job, see Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935), enf'd, 91 F.2d 178 (CA3 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 303 U. S. 261 (1938).
By contrast, the Court of Appeals' award of a minimum amount of backpay in this case is not sufficiently tailored to the actual, compensable injuries suffered by the discharged employees. The court itself admitted that, although it sought to recompense the discharged employees for their lost wages, the actual 6-month period selected was "obviously conjectural." 672 F.2d 606. The court's imposition of this minimum backpay award in the total absence of record evidence as to the circumstances of the individual employees constitutes pure speculation, and does not comport with the general reparative policies of the NLRA. [Footnote 11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the implementation of the Board's traditional remedies at the compliance chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
proceedings must be conditioned upon the employees' legal readmittance to the United States. In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obliged to take into account another "equally important Congressional objectiv[e]," Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 316 U. S. 47 (1942) -- to-wit, the objective of deterring unauthorized immigration that is embodied in the INA. By conditioning the offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry, a potential conflict with the INA is thus avoided. Similarly, in computing backpay, the employees must be deemed "unavailable" for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States. Cf. 3 NLRB Casehandling Manual §§ 10612, 10656.9 (1977). [Footnote 12]
The Court of Appeals assumed that, under these circumstances, the employees would receive no backpay, and so chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
awarded a minimum amount of backpay that would effectuate the underlying purposes of the Act by providing some relief to the employees, as well as a financial disincentive against the repetition of similar discriminatory acts in the future. 672 F.2d 606. We share the Court of Appeals' uncertainty concerning whether any of the discharged employees will be able either to enter the country lawfully to accept the reinstatement offers or to establish at the compliance proceedings that they were lawfully available for employment during the backpay period. The probable unavailability of the Act's more effective remedies in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws, however, simply cannot justify the judicial arrogation of remedial authority not fairly encompassed within the Act. Any perceived deficiencies in the NLRA's existing remedial arsenal can only be addressed by congressional action. [Footnote 13] By directing the Board to impose a minimum backpay award without regard to the employees' actual economic losses or legal availability for work, the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Court of Appeals plainly exceeded its limited authority under the Act. [Footnote 14]
The court's requirement that the reinstatement offers be held open for four years is vulnerable to similar attack. The court simply had no justifiable basis for displacing the Board's discretionary judgment about the proper time period for acceptance of the reinstatement offers. Rather than enlarging the Board's remedial order in this fashion, the court was required to remand for the Board to consider the alternative chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
grounds on which the court believed the offers to have been deficient, and to decide upon new forms for the reinstatement offers. NLRB v. Food Store Employees, supra.
Conditioning the offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry and deeming the employees "unavailable" during any period when they were not lawfully present are requirements that were, in fact, imposed by the Court of Appeals in this case, and hence fully accepted by the Board. See 672 F.2d 606 ("Consistent with our requirement that there be reinstatement only if the discriminatees are legally present and permitted by law to be employed in the United States, we modify the Board's order so as to make clear (1) that [except for the minimum backpay award], in computing backpay, discriminatees will be deemed unavailable for work during any period when not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States . . ."); App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a (modified order). Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN's assertion, see post at 467 U. S. 910, the Board does not argue that it would exempt these employees from its "unavailability" policy because their unavailability is directly attributable to the employer's own unfair labor practice. The Board refers to this limited exception to its normal rule solely to counter petitioners' suggestion that the minimum backpay award is somehow logically "inconsistent" with normal Board policies in calculating backpay. See Brief for Respondent 45, n. 44. The Board has clearly indicated its agreement with these portions of the Court of Appeals' remedial order by specifically noting that petitioners do not challenge these parts of the order, see id. at 43, by limiting its own argument to the minimum backpay award issue alone, see id. at 43-46, and, most importantly, by asking that the judgment below be affirmed in its entirety.
The Court's first mistake is to ignore the fact that the Board, rather than seeking a remand, has expressly urged that we affirm the 6-month backpay and reinstatement remedy provided in the Court of Appeals' enforcement order, because it is fully satisfied that the court's order "effectuates the purposes of the NLRA." Brief for Respondent 11. Of course, it is generally true, as the Court observes, ante at 467 U. S. 900, n. 10, that the proper course for a reviewing court that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
finds a Board remedy inadequate is to remand to the Board, rather than attempting in the first instance to fashion its own remedy. Such a rule protects the Board's congressionally delegated power "to fashion remedies that will effectuate national labor policy" from usurpation by the courts. NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U. S. 1, 417 U. S. 10 (1974). In this case, however, the Board has fully acquiesced in the remedy developed by the Court of Appeals and, consequently, no purpose would be served by remanding to the Board for further consideration of the remedy question. We should instead approach this case as if the Board had developed the remedial order on its own motion and the Court of Appeals had simply enforced that order.
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 344 U. S. 346-347 (1953) (emphasis added) (quoting chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U. S. 533, 319 U. S. 540 (1943)). And we have repeatedly emphasized that a court has only limited authority to review remedial orders developed by the Board to effectuate the purposes of the Act. See NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258, 396 U. S. 262-263 (1969); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at 344 U. S. 346; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 313 U. S. 194 (1941). Because of that consistent pattern of deference, our cases have never before considered whether a particular remedy is "sufficiently tailored" to the harm it seeks to cure.
If the appropriate standard of review is applied to this case, it is clear that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed in its entirety, as the Board urges. It is undisputed that, absent petitioners' illegal conduct, the five employees involved here would certainly have continued working for and receiving wages from petitioners for some period of time beyond February 18, 1977 -- the date on which they were discriminatorily discharged. It is equally clear, therefore, that each of these employees suffered some loss of income that was directly attributable to petitioners' unfair labor practices. Accordingly, given such circumstances, it is perfectly reasonable that the Board should, in the exercise of its broad remedial powers under § 10(c) of the Act, fashion a remedy designed to restore those employees "as nearly as possible [to the situation] that . . . would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination," Phelps Dodge, supra, at 313 U. S. 194, including reinstatement and an award of appropriate backpay. Such a remedial order is in no sense "punitive," since it serves the dual purposes of making whole those employees who were injured by petitioners' conduct and of vindicating the important public purposes of the NLRA. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 319 U. S. 543. The reinstatement order and the award of a minimum of six months' backpay ordered by the Court of Appeals and supported here by the Board reflect, in my view, a wholly reasonable effort to effectuate those purposes. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
With respect to the Court's first assertion, it is clear that the Board's decision to support the backpay award ordered by the Court of Appeals rests squarely upon its own judgment that this award estimates with a fair degree of precision the period that these employees would have continued working for petitioners had petitioners not reported them to the INS. Indeed, as the Board points out, such an award is no more speculative or conjectural than those developed in other situations commonly confronted by the Board in which it is not clear how long an employment relationship would have continued in the absence of an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787, 789-790 (CA3 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969); NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., 460 F.2d 1240, 1241 (CA9 1972); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 572-573 (CA5 1966). [Footnote 2/1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As to the second assertion, the Court provides no explanation for its conclusion that these employees were "unavailable" for work, as a matter of law, following their return to Mexico, and that any entitlement to backpay that might otherwise have accrued during that period is therefore tolled. In the first place, such a holding overlooks the Board's longstanding practice of forgiving periods of unavailability that are due to the employer's own illegal conduct. See, e.g., Graves Trucking Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 344, 345 (1979), enf'd as modified, 692 F.2d 470, 474-477 (CA7 1982); Moss Planning Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, enf'd, 206 F.2d 557 (CA4 1953); cf. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U. S. 557, 451 U. S. 566-567 (1981) ("[I]t does not come with very good grace for the wrongdoer to insist upon specific and certain proof of the injury . . . it has itself inflicted"). In this case, as the Board explains, see Brief for Respondent 45, n. 44, these employees would not necessarily have been found unavailable, because their immediate departure from the country was plainly and directly attributable to petitioners' illegal conduct. Thus, by presuming to foreclose a remedy that the Board itself is prepared to grant, the Court today is far more guilty of usurping the remedial functions of the Board than was the Court of Appeals. [Footnote 2/2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, with respect to the Court of Appeals' requirement that the offers of reinstatement remain open for four years to permit the discharged alien employees a reasonable time to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
seek legal reentry to the United States, that these offers be drafted in Spanish, and that receipt of the offers be verified, it should be noted that all of these remedies serve, in the judgment of the Board, "reasonably [to] effectuate the purposes of the Act in the circumstances of this case." Brief for Respondent 47. Although, as I have said, I generally agree with the Court that reviewing courts should remand to the Board, rather than unilaterally imposing modifications of this sort, see ante at 467 U. S. 905-906, it seems clear that, in this case, the Board has fully accepted these requirements as measures that further national labor policy and accommodate the competing purposes of the INA. Under those circumstances, I see no reason to require a remand. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals expressed concern that some of the discharged alien employees might not be able to establish -- because of their undocumented immigration status -- that they were lawfully available for reemployment during the normal backpay period between their illegal discharge and acceptance of reinstatement, and would therefore not be entitled to claim backpay. See 672 F.2d 592, 606 (CA7 1982); App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. But, in order to ensure that petitioners bore some responsibility for the "discriminatory act[s] which caused these employees to lose their jobs," the court concluded that a minimum backpay award was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the NLRA. 672 F.2d 606; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. As the Board explains in its brief, such a backpay award is wholly consistent with its own longstanding policy that