Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/891/63/175723/
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 07:59:18
Document Index: 615268962

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 33', '§ 1447', '§ 1447', '§ 1447']

Air-shields, Inc., Petitioner, v. Honorable John P. Fullam, Chief Judge, United Statesdistrict Court for the Eastern District Ofpennsylvania, Nominal Respondent,andneomed Corporation, Respondent, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1989 › Air-shields, Inc., Petitioner, v. Honorable John P. Fullam, Chief Judge, United Statesdistrict Court...
Air-shields, Inc., Petitioner, v. Honorable John P. Fullam, Chief Judge, United Statesdistrict Court for the Eastern District Ofpennsylvania, Nominal Respondent,andneomed Corporation, Respondent, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989)
Submitted Under Rule 12(6)Oct. 3, 1989
Decided Dec. 7, 1989
The Removal Statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452, govern the removal of a state court case to a federal district court. The Removal Statutes were recently revised under the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act ("Judicial Improvements Act"). Judicial Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act on November 19, 1988.
Although most revisions under the Judicial Improvements Act were given explicit effective dates, the amendments made in §§ 1441, 1446, and 1447 of the Removal Statutes have no stated effective date. Absent provisions to the contrary, federal legislation becomes effective on the day of enactment. United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1987); 2 Sutherland's Statutory Construction § 33.06 (4th ed. Sands Rev.1986). Therefore, the amendments to the foregoing sections of the Removal Statutes became effective on November 19, 1988.
In the case of United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 2 L. Ed. 49 (1801), Chief Justice Marshall authored the simple but now famous doctrine that a "court must decide according to existing laws." Id. at 110. Courts are sometimes, however, faced with a situation where, as here, the law changes while a case is pending. In Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S. Ct. 2006, 40 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1973), the Supreme Court held that "even where the intervening law does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied in pending cases, it is to be given recognition and effect." Id. at 715, 94 S. Ct. at 2018 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S. Ct. 518, 21 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1969)).
In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346, 96 S. Ct. 584, 590, 46 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1975), the United States Supreme Court explained that "only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein ... are immune from review under § 1447(d)." In the Court's view, Congress did not intend to "extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute." Id. at 351, 96 S. Ct. at 593 (emphasis supplied). In Thermtron, the district court remanded a case to the state court solely on the ground that its heavy docket would unjustly delay the plaintiffs from proceeding to trial on the merits.
Because the district court's remand decision in this case also was not based on the "controlling statute," our review is not limited by subsection (d) of Section 1447. See Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1985); Levy v. Weissman, 671 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1982). By remanding the case for procedural defects after the thirty day limit imposed by the revised Section 1447(c) had expired, the district court "exceeded [its] statutorily defined power." Thermtron, supra, at 351, 96 S. Ct. at 593. Therefore, the "issuance of the writ of mandamus [is] not barred by § 1447(d)." Id.
Because the district court sua sponte issued its remand order, the petitioner did not have the opportunity to raise the issue of the revised remand statute before the district court. The petitioner's failure to raise that issue in this court is not as excusable. However, the matter is one affecting our jurisdiction and therefore we are free to consider it. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1975)