Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-3102/
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 07:53:27
Document Index: 129197020

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3102', '§ 3102', '§ 3102', '§ 3102', '§\n3102', '§ 3102', '§ 3102', '§ 3101', '§ 3102', '§ 3101', '§ 3101', '§ 3102', '§ 3101']

Category: CPLR § 3102
Discovery in aid of arb CPLR 3102(c)
Matter of Matter of Progressive N. Ins. Co. v Foss, 2012 NY Slip Op 04757 (2nd Dept. 2012)
The petitioner commenced this proceeding to temporarily stay arbitration of a claim for supplementary uninsured/underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) benefits pending the completion of certain discovery permitted by the subject insurance policy. The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the petition to the extent of staying the arbitration pending the completion of certain discovery, and denying the appellants' motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner had ample time to seek the desired discovery before commencing the proceeding, and unjustifiably failed to do so (see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Mendoza, 69 AD3d 623, 624-625; Matter of State-Wide Ins. Co. v Womble, 25 AD3d 713, 713-714; Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Gershovich, 1 AD3d 364, 365; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Rosenfarb, 306 AD2d 478, 478-479).
Matter of Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v Alexis, 90 AD3d 933 (2nd Dept., 2011)
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the petition which was to direct disclosure in aid of arbitration pursuant to CPLR 3102 (c), as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that "extraordinary circumstances" existed such that this relief would be absolutely necessary for the protection of its rights (De Sapio v Kohlmeyer, 35 NY2d 402, 406 [1974] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Morris, 83 AD3d 709, 710 [2011]; Matter of Travelers Indem. Co. v United Diagnostic Imaging, P.C., 73 AD3d 791, 791-792 [2010]).
Author DMGPosted on July 10, 2012 Categories CPLR § 3102, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Discovery in aid of arb CPLR 3102(c)
Author DMGPosted on February 27, 2010 Categories CPLR § 3102, [App Div 1st Dept]Leave a comment on 3102 Pre-Action Discovery
The Google blogger case; CPLR § 3102(c) pre-suit discovery
This case has been in the headlines in the past few weeks. For those that don't know, an anonymous blogger posted some less than nice things on her blog. Petitioner found those posts, was hurt and angry, and wanted to find out who said those things. And of course she wanted to sue for defamation. But to sue, she would need to know the anonymous blogger's identity. So she used New York's procedural device to receive pre-suit discovery: CPLR §
3102(c). She requested that the Court order Google to give up information as to the blogger's identity. Prior to the action, Google refused to divulge any information without a court order. And, it objected to petitioner's request as being overbroad, vague, etc. We'll get to the decision in a minute.
While all of us (me) here at the CPLR blog are interested in the procedural niceties of the decision, there is more at stake. The decision and its implications have been discussed in detail all over the interweb. Check out Simple Justice and Concurring Opinions for some discussion of this case as it relates to the big picture: the First Amendment.
Matter of Cohen v Google Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 29369 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 2009)
In opposing petitioner's application, the Anonymous Blogger contends
that petitioner is not entitled to pre-action discovery because she
cannot demonstrate a meritorious claim for defamation. The Anonymous
Blogger asserts that the statements on the Blog, which appear as
captions to provocative photographs which the Blogger alleges were
posted by petitioner herself,[FN4] [*3]are
"non-actionable opinion and/or hyperbole," and that no reasonable
viewer of the Blog would conclude that the statements referring to
petitioner purport to convey verifiable statements of fact. The Blogger
argues that the words "skank" and "ho" are not statements of objective
fact which can be proven true or false; rather, the words are used in a
"loose hyperbolic" manner, and "have become a popular form of trash
talk' ubiquitous across the Internet as well as network television and
should be treated no differently than jerk' or any other form of loose
and vague insults that the Constitution protects." The Blogger further
argues that even if the words are capable of a defamatory meaning, "the
context here negates any impression that a verifiable factual assertion
was intended," since blogs "have evolved as the modern day soapbox for
one's personal opinions," by "providing an excessively popular medium
not only for conveying ideas, but also for mere venting purposes,
affording the less outspoken, a protected forum for voicing gripes,
leveling invective, and ranting about anything at all."
The law in New York governing pre-action discovery is well
settled. CPLR 3102(c) requires a court order for pre-action disclosure
to aid in bringing an action or to preserve information. See Matter of Uddin v. New York City Transit Authority,
27 AD3d 265, 266 (1st Dept 2006). When a party seeks pre-action
disclosure to secure additional information necessary to frame a
complaint or to identify the proper defendant with respect to a known
cause of action, "courts traditionally require a strong showing that a
cause of action exists." Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries,
McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 3102:5 at 92. " A petition
for pre-action discovery should only be granted when the petitioner
demonstrates that he or she has a meritorious cause of action and that
the information sought is material and necessary to the actionable
wrong.'" Matter of Uddin v. New York City Transit Authority, supra at 266 (quoting Holzman v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 271 AD2d 346, 347 [1st Dept 2000]); accord Matter of Peters v. Southeby's Inc., 34 AD3d 29, 34 (1st Dept 2006), lv app den 8 NY3d 809 (2007); Matter of Bliss v. Jaffin, 176 AD2d 106, 108 (1st Dept 1991); Matter of Stewart v. New York City Transit Authority, 112 AD2d 939 (2nd Dept 1985). "As a general rule, the adequacy of merit rests within the sound discretion of the court.'" Matter of Peters v. Southeby's Inc., supra (quoting Mediavilla v. Gurman, 272 AD2d 146, 148 [1st Dept 2000]).[FN5]
Here, petitioner is entitled to pre-action disclosure of information as
to the identity of the Anonymous Blogger, as she has sufficiently
established the merits of her proposed cause of action for defamation
against that person or persons, and that the information sought is
material and necessary to identify the potential defendant or
defendants. See Matter of Uddin v. New York City Transit Authority, supra ; Matter of Stewart v. New York City Transit Authority, supra .
The elements of a cause of action for defamation "are a false
statement, published without privilege or authorization to a
third-party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a
negligence standard, and, it must either cause special harm or
constitute defamation per se." Dillon v. City of New York , 261 AD2d 34, 38 (1st Dept 1999); accord Salvatore v. Kumar, 45 AD3d 560, 563 (2nd Dept 2007), lv app den 10 NY3d 703 (2008). The Anonymous Blogger's contention that the statements about petitioner
on the Blog are protected opinion or hyperbole which is not actionable,
raises an issue as to the first element which requires a statement of
fact as opposed to opinion.
The Court found that the the words used "can be understood to describe the petitioner as sexually promiscuous; that the statements are facts that can be proven true or false; and that the words used can be "reasonably susceptible to a defamatory connotation, as opposed to a word like "jerk."
The court also rejects the Anonymous Blogger's argument that this
court should find as a matter of law that Internet blogs serve as a
modern day forum for conveying personal opinions, including invective
and ranting, and that the statements in this action when considered in
that context, cannot be reasonably understood as factual assertions. To
the contrary, as one court in Virginia has articulated: "In that the
Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and almost
immediate means of communication with tens, if not hundreds, of
millions of people, the dangers of its misuse cannot be ignored. The
protection of the right to communicate anonymously must be balanced
against the need to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the
opportunities presented by this medium can be made to answer for such
transgressions. Those who suffer damages as a result of tortious or
other actionable communications on the Internet should be able to seek
appropriate redress by preventing the wrongdoers from hiding behind an
illusory shield of purported First Amendment rights." In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 (Va Cir Ct), revd on other gds, 261 Va 350, 542 SE2d 377 (Va Sup Ct 2001) (quoted in Public Relations Society of America, Inc. v. Road Runner High Speed Online, supra ).
Thus, in light of the merits of petitioner's proposed cause of
action for defamation, and the materiality and necessity of the
requested information, petitioner is entitled to an order pursuant to
CPLR 3102(c) directing respondent Google to disclose the information as
to the identity of the Anonymous Blogger. See Matter of Uddin v. New York City Transit Authority, supra ; Matter of Stewart v. New York City Transit Authority, supra .
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition is granted and respondent
Google, Inc. and/or its subsidiary Blogger.Com, shall forthwith provide
petitioner with information as to the identity of the Anonymous
Blogger(s), specifically that person's or persons' name(s),
address(es), email address(es), IP address(es), telephone number(s),
and all other information that would assist in ascertaining the
identity of that person or persons.
Footnote No. 5 offers an interesting comparison between New York and New Jersey law as to when the "identity of an anonymous Internet speaker should be disclosed to a potential plaintiff."
The blogger was outed soon after the decision. There was no appeal.
Author DMGPosted on September 10, 2009 Categories CPLR § 3102Leave a comment on The Google blogger case; CPLR § 3102(c) pre-suit discovery
CPLR § 3101(a)
Rivera v NYP Holdings Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 04706 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
We conclude that the denial of defendants' motion to compel constituted
an improvident exercise of discretion. Full disclosure is required of
"all matter material and necessary" to the defense of an action (CPLR
3101[a]), and the words "material and necessary" are "to be interpreted
liberally to require disclosure . . . of any facts bearing on the
controversy" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403,
406 [1968]). Defendants are entitled to the discovery they seek in
their efforts both to establish their defense of truth to plaintiff's
defamation claims (see Wright v Snow, 175 AD2d 451 [1991], lv dismissed 79 NY2d 822 [1991]), and to defend against plaintiff's assertion of damage to his reputation (cf. Burdick v Shearson Am. Express, 160 AD2d 642 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 706 [1990]). Moreover, defendants are entitled to the opportunity to demonstrate the truth of the articles as a wholesee Miller v Journal News,
211 AD2d 626, 627 [1995]), warranting disclosure even as to assertions
in those articles that are not directly challenged in plaintiff's
complaint. Therefore, the inquiries related to grand jury testimony by
plaintiff, information sought from or provided by plaintiff to the
Commission on [*2]Judicial Conduct, and
plaintiff's arrest record, if any, seek information sufficiently
material and relevant to the defense of the action to warrant
disclosure. (
Laguna v Mario's Express Serv., Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 04869 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the
Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated November 21, 2007, as
granted the defendants' motion for renewal and reargument of their
prior oral application for access to the plaintiff's medical records
"beyond a 3 year period," which was denied by order of the same court
(Ambrosio, J.) dated June 28, 2007, and upon renewal and reargument
granted the defendants access to "the complete medical records relating
the plaintiffs' initial diagnosis & follow up treatment to present
for cerebral palsy."
ORDERED that the order dated November 21, 2007, is reversed
insofar as appealed from, on the facts and in the exercise of
discretion, with costs, and the motion is denied.
The evidence submitted by the defendants upon their motion for
renewal and reargument was insufficient to justify a new determination.
The defendants failed to establish that the additional disclosure was
material and necessary to the defense of the action (see Cynthia B. v New Rochelle Hosp. Med Ctr, 60 NY2d 452, 465, 457; Chevrin v Macura, 28 AD3d 600; DeStrange v Lind, 277
AD2d 344), nor did they demonstrate that "access to earlier medical
records would result in the discovery of admissible or relevant
evidence" (DeStrange v Lind, 277 AD2d at 345).
Author DMGPosted on June 14, 2009 Categories CPLR § 3102, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on CPLR § 3101(a)
CPLR § 3101(d) Trial Preparation
Ryan v St. Francis Hosp., 2009 NY Slip Op 04045, (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding
the testimony of the plaintiffs' proposed expert on the subject of
whether the defendant Andrew E. Lituchy was the attending physician of
record and in charge of the injured plaintiff's care during the entire
hospitalization on the ground that there were no facts in the record to
support the expert's opinion (see Cassano v Hagstrom, 5 NY2d 643, 646; Martinez v Mullarkey, 41 AD3d 666, 670; Simo v New York City Tr. Auth., 13 AD3d 609, 611).
Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court also providently
exercised its discretion in precluding the testimony of the plaintiffs'
proposed expert as to purported departures from the [*2]standard
of care by certain nonparty physicians. The plaintiffs failed to give
notice prior to trial of the specific subject matter of the expert's
testimony setting forth a different theory of recovery not readily
discernable from the plaintiffs' bill of particulars and the statements
in their CPLR 3101(d) responses (see Durant v Shuren, 33 AD3d 843, 844; Dalrymple v Koka, 2 AD3d 769, 771).
Author DMGPosted on June 11, 2009 Categories CPLR § 3102Leave a comment on CPLR § 3101(d)