Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/642/367/136749/
Timestamp: 2020-05-25 01:29:12
Document Index: 367273542

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 33', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 33', '§ 1983', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Peggy Jane O'neil, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Lake Oswego, a Municipal Corporation et al., Defendants,andwilliam C. Martin and Robert M. Coleman, Defendants-appellees.peggy Jane O'neil, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Lake Oswego, a Municipal Corporation et al., Defendants,andwilliam C. Martin, Defendant-appellant, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1981 › Peggy Jane O'neil, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Lake Oswego, a Municipal Corporation et al., Defe...
Peggy Jane O'neil, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Lake Oswego, a Municipal Corporation et al., Defendants,andwilliam C. Martin and Robert M. Coleman, Defendants-appellees.peggy Jane O'neil, Plaintiff-appellee, v. City of Lake Oswego, a Municipal Corporation et al., Defendants,andwilliam C. Martin, Defendant-appellant, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981) Argued and Submitted Jan. 7, 1981. Decided April 20, 1981
Under Oregon law, a court cannot find a defendant guilty of contempt committed outside the court's immediate view in the absence of an affidavit outlining the facts of the contempt. Or.Rev.Stat. § 33.040; State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or. 477, 405 P.2d 510, 512 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943, 86 S. Ct. 1460, 16 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1966). See Utley v. City of Independence, 240 Or. 384, 402 P.2d 91, 94 (1965).1 Martin concedes that no affidavit existed; accordingly, he acted in excess of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, he claims that judicial immunity2 protects him from liability for his actions under § 1983.3
Our jurisprudence has long recognized that "a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice (is) that a judicial officer (should) be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335, 347, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978) (citing other checks on malicious actions by judges). Though judicial prerogative is broad, two rules circumscribe it. First, the immunity covers only those acts which are "judicial" in nature. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360-64, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1106-08, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). Second, "(a) judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' " Id. at 356-57, 98 S. Ct. at 1104-05. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974).
435 U.S. at 357 n.7, 98 S. Ct. at 1105 n.7, quoting Bradley v. Fisher, supra. Martin's action in convicting O'Neil of contempt, an offense within his court's jurisdiction, although without the requisite papers to confer jurisdiction over this particular commission of the offense, is more analogous to a criminal court convicting for a nonexistent offense than to a probate court hearing a criminal case. It is the sort of "grave procedural error" that does not pierce the cloak of immunity. See Sparkman, supra, at 359, 98 S. Ct. at 1106.
Other circuits have found immunity in parallel contexts. See Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913, 913 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("... Judge Sepe failed to comply with the procedure for prosecuting an indirect contempt."); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S. Ct. 529, 34 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1972). In McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972), the judge was immunized although he may "have violated state and/or federal procedural requirements regarding contempt citations." Sparkman, supra, 435 U.S. at 361, 98 S. Ct. at 1107. Martin must be accorded similar protection.
The distinction between these two situations arises from a consideration of the basis underlying judicial immunity "principled and fearless decision-making." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967). Such fearless decision-making is fostered by granting judges immunity when they rule on matters belonging to categories within their court's jurisdiction, even when they fail to comport with procedural niceties necessary to give the court power over the particular matter. On the other hand, immunizing judges from liability when they rule on matters belonging to categories which the law has expressly placed beyond their purview can lead only to unprincipled decisions. Martin's actions are of the former variety; accordingly, they fall within the realm judicial immunity protects.
Intent, it should be noted, plays no role in the foregoing analysis. Evil intent is not a sufficient element for piercing judicial immunity: "(a) judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took ... was done maliciously ...." Stump v. Sparkman, supra, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S. Ct. at 1104. Further, neither is state-of-mind a necessary element. The Sparkman footnote quoted above states that a probate judge who tries a criminal case will not be immune from liability for his action. 435 U.S. at 357 n.7, 98 S. Ct. at 1105 n.7. That language is in no way contingent upon the probate judge's absence of good faith, nor does any reason appear in the opinion for interpolating such a requirement.5
Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "the (trial) court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party (in a civil rights suit) a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." This court will not disturb an award of attorney's fees under the Act unless the district court abused its discretion. See Gluck v. American Protection Industries, Inc., 619 F.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir. 1980). An abuse of discretion occurs unless the court considers twelve specified guidelines in setting the amount of the award. Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 1978); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S. Ct. 1726, 48 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1976).6
Utley holds that an Oregon judge who issued a warrant without the sworn complaint required by Or.Rev.Stat. § 33.040 enjoys no immunity in a state tort action for false arrest. Although the parties vigorously debate its application to the present case, we need not consider Utley. Apart from the fact that Utley arose under a different provision of Oregon law, a federal court hearing a § 1983 action is not concerned with the immunity defense that defendant would enjoy in a comparable state action. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 198, 100 S. Ct. 402, 406, 62 L. Ed. 2d 355 (1979)
Martin may invoke judicial immunity despite his status as a pro tem municipal court judge. Oregon law confers powers on pro tem judges equivalent to those permanent judges enjoy. See Or.Const. art. VII, § 2(a) (2); Or.Rev.Stat. § 1.270. Moreover, judicial immunity extends to all judges. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) (justice of the peace)
Judicial immunity is applicable to § 1983 suits. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1980)
Sparkman, supra, seems to draw the same distinction. In the course of holding immune an Indiana judge who ordered an unconsented sterilization, it implied that had an Indiana statute or case prohibited the trial court from considering a sterilization petition, immunity would have been denied. 435 U.S. at 358, 98 S. Ct. at 1105
A judge's assertion that he acted in good faith can operate on two levels. We hold that it does not enter into whether a judge is immunized from liability. We express no view as to what role a judge's good faith defense can play in a § 1983 action, once the judge's immunity is pierced. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1219, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967) (allowing police officers to assert good faith as defense in § 1983 action); Gilker v. Baker, 576 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1978); Handverger v. Harvill, 479 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 586, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1973) (same applied to university officials)