Source: http://www.narf.org/icwa/state/alaska/case/cj.html
Timestamp: 2015-01-30 23:14:00
Document Index: 261790609

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1901', '§ 2', '§ 1901', '§ 1912', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 1901']

ICWA Guide Online | Alaska Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 18 P.3d 1214)
S-9518.
the superior court's factual findings in a parental rights termination
case comport with the requirements of the child in need
of aid statutes or the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
are questions of law that the Supreme Court will review
de novo. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, §§ 2-113,
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1923;
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to termination of non-Indian father's
rights, as children were Indian children as defined by ICWA,
based on tribal affiliation of their mother. Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, §§ 2-
113, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1923.
Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) requirement that the court find
"beyond a reasonable doubt" that placement with the parents is
the children does not conflict with the findings required under
the state statute governing terminations of parental rights, which generally
requires "clear and convincing evidence," because the ICWA and the
state statute assess different considerations. Indian Child Welfare Act of
25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(f);
proceedings to terminate parental rights to children covered by the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the parent does not have
the burden to show that he would be a fit
parent; instead, the Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS)
has the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
failure to terminate parental rights is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical harm to the children. Indian Child
testimony in proceedings to terminate father's parental rights to children
covered by Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was insufficient to
show beyond reasonable doubt that placement with father was likely
to result in serious physical or emotional damage to children;
expert received all information about case from reading file given
to her by Division of Family and Youth
Services (DFYS) and never met or spoke with either father
or children prior to hearing, and her conclusions were little
more than generalizations about harms resulting from parent's absence, and
provided little discussion of particular facts of instant case. Indian
evidence regarding father's current living situation was insufficient to show
beyond reasonable doubt that placement with father was likely to
result in serious physical or emotional damage to children, for
purposes of proceedings to terminate father's parental rights to children
covered by Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); there was unrebutted
evidence in record that father was successfully parenting his older
child, as well as evidence that he wished to parent
children in question and had taken steps to put himself
in position to do so, and, while state relied on
Florida social worker to investigate appropriateness of father's living situation,
state failed to produce any direct evidence from Florida officials
or any documents from Florida setting out what Florida officials
had done. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 102(f),
decision to terminate parental rights to children covered by the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) will be reversed if sufficient
evidence does not exist to support the conclusion that the
parental conduct which resulted in the determination that the children
were in need of aid was likely to continue. Indian
in proceedings to terminate father's parental rights to children covered
by Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was insufficient to show
that state engaged in active efforts to prevent breakup of
family; state's efforts to work with father toward reunification were
minimal, as it appeared that state was satisfied with allowing
Florida officials to investigate case and make reports on
their efforts, but it was not clear that Florida officials
understood that high standards of ICWA applied or that active
efforts were required. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 102(d),
respect to requirement in parental rights termination proceedings under Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that state engage in active efforts
to prevent breakup of family, "active efforts" generally require that
the state caseworker take the parent through the steps of
the plan for reunification of the family. Indian Child Welfare
Thom F. Janidlo, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Vennie E. Nemecek, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M.
Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, and Robert R. Polley, Assistant Public
Advocate, Anchorage, *1216
and Brant McGee, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for Appellee.
C.J. appeals the decision of the superior court to terminate
his parental rights. The superior court found that C.J.'s children
were in need of aid, that the state had made
active efforts to reunify C.J. with his children, and that
placement with C.J. was likely to result in serious physical
or emotional damage to the children. Because the state did
not produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that placement of
the children with C.J. is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the children, and because the
state did not make active efforts to reunify C.J. with
his children, we reverse the termination of C.J.'s parental rights.
J.J. (mother) and C.J. (father) are the biological parents of
T.J. and K.J. Until February 1998 the children lived with
their mother in Anchorage, while C.J. resided in Florida with
another of his children, R.J., who is not involved in
this case. T.J. and K.J. are Indian children as defined
by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
[FN1] based on the tribal affiliation of their mother.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23
On February 22, 1998, Anchorage police took T.J. and K.J.,
then four and two years of age, into protective custody
after strangers found them wandering unsupervised in the street, dressed
only in underclothes in thirty-two degree weather. Their mother had
left the children alone between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., and
did not return home until after 10:00 p.m., at which
time she was extremely intoxicated. She was arrested and charged
with child abuse or neglect.
The Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family
and Youth Services (DFYS) assumed custody of the children and
subsequently filed a Petition for Adjudication of Children in Need
of Aid. After a probable cause finding was made in
March, the children were placed into foster care. At a
full adjudication in August, the court found that the children
were in need of aid.
At the request of the parties and pursuant to the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC),
[FN2] the superior court ordered "the Compact Administrator for the
State of Florida" on three different occasions to conduct an
expedited home study of C.J.'s living situation. DFYS social worker
Larry Overholser testified that he received two letters from the
assigned coordinator in Florida in response to these requests. The
first letter, dated April 15, allegedly
indicated that C.J. claimed to be unable to care for
the children at that time. No further explanation was provided
by Mr. Overholser. For his part, C.J. testified that when
he was first contacted about taking his children, he was
unable to do so because of travel required by his
work. The second letter, dated October 12, stated that C.J.
had failed to respond to requests for basic personal and
employment information and had not been able to establish a
stable home after several months, but also stated that he
wished to take his children. C.J. testified that he had
quit his job in order to be able to take
his children, and that a home study of his house
by the Florida social worker was favorable: "She said that
she thought it would be fine, and a good place
for the kids." Nonetheless, placement of the children with C.J.
was denied by Florida authorities.
AS 47.70.010.
C.J. maintained telephone contact with the children at the foster
home approximately once or twice a month during 1998. However,
his phone calls ceased after Christmas of 1998. Attempts by
the foster parent to contact C.J. a few months later
failed. C.J. testified that "there is no excuse for me
not contacting them for that period of time," but he
also said that he "really fell apart after I was
told I'm--I wasn't going to get them, period." In April
the court ruled that DFYS need not take further steps
to return the children to the home. The social worker
was able to contact C.J. in October of 1999, *1217
at which time C.J. expressed an interest in taking custody
A trial to terminate parental rights was held on November
8, 1999. J.J. appeared in person, and C.J. participated telephonically.
After hearing the evidence, the superior court terminated the parental
rights of both parents. With respect to C.J., the court
found: (1) C.J. had abandoned his children as defined by
statute, (2) C.J.'s conduct caused the children to be children
in need of aid, which would continue unless parental rights
were terminated, (3) active and reasonable efforts had been made
to reunify C.J. and his children, and (4) return of
the children to C.J. was likely to cause serious emotional
and/or physical damage.
A.B. v. State, Dep't of Health & Social Servs.,
7 P.3d 946, 950 (Alaska 2000); A.A.
v. State, Dep't of Family and Youth Servs.,
7 P.3d at 950.
id.; A.A.,
The decision to terminate parental rights in this case is
governed by both state and federal statutes. Alaska standards for
terminating parental rights are provided in AS 47.10.088, which requires
that the court find (1) by clear and convincing evidence
that the child is in need of aid,
[FN6] (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
has not remedied the circumstances that put the child in
need of aid,
[FN7] and (3) by a preponderance of the evidence that
reasonable efforts were made by DFYS to support reunification of
[FN8] In making these findings, the court
can also consider any factor that relates to the best
ICWA applies even though this case concerns termination of the
rights of a non-Indian parent. See
In re Adoption of T.N.F.,
781 P.2d 973, 978 (Alaska 1989), cert.
494 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 1480, 108 L.Ed.2d 616 (1990).
ICWA's requirement that this element be established "beyond a reasonable
doubt" does not conflict with the findings required under AS
47.10.088, which generally require "clear and convincing evidence," because ICWA
and the state statute assess different considerations. See
In re J.R.B.,
The superior court found that all the requirements of both
statutes had been satisfied in this case. C.J. argues that
the court erred in each of those findings.
State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence to Support a Finding
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that Placement with C.J. Is Likely
to Result in Serious Physical or Emotional Damage to the
C.J. argues that the court erred in finding that serious
physical or emotional damage *1218
was likely to result from placement with him. C.J. claims
that evidence that he is capable of being a good
father to the children creates a reasonable doubt. The state
counters that the testimony of its expert, Dr. Sheila Clarson,
provides sufficient support for the court's finding on this point.
Despite the fact that C.J. communicated his renewed interest in
being a parent to the children a month before the
termination hearing, this last-minute position is weakened by evidence that
for several months C.J. did not show an interest in
caring for his children. He had been completely out of
contact with his children for over ten months prior to
the hearing, had not been in contact with his attorney
in this matter, had not responded to requests for information
from Florida representatives, and had not personally participated in several
previous hearings regarding the children. For a substantial period, it
can accurately be said that C.J. made no effort to
demonstrate his fitness as a parent.
testimony of the state's expert was insufficient to meet its
The expert presented by DFYS, Dr. Clarson, testified that previous
experiences of intermittent contact with their father had been traumatic
for the children. In addition, Dr. Clarson expressed concerns that
additional similar experiences in the future could lead to serious
However, the conclusions of Dr. Clarson are considerably weakened by
the fact that she received all information about this case
from reading the file given to her by DFYS and
never met or spoke with either C.J. or the children
prior to the hearing. In addition, her conclusions appear to
be little more than generalizations about the harms resulting from
a parent's absence and provide little discussion of the particular
facts of this case. We do not hold that a
meeting between the expert and the parties to the termination
proceeding is required in every case. But the expert opinion
should be based on the particular facts and issues of
the case to a greater extent than occurred here, in
order to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
serious physical or emotional harm will result. Moreover, the insufficiency
of the expert's testimony becomes even more apparent when the
evidence of C.J.'s current living situation is considered in detail.
state's evidence regarding C.J.'s current living situation was insufficient.
921 P.2d 604, 607 (Alaska 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case there is unrebutted evidence in the record
that C.J. was successfully parenting his older child, as well
as evidence that he wished to parent T.J. and K.J.
had taken steps to put himself in a position to
He testified that, because the state had made it a
condition of gaining custody of his children that he quit
his job that required travel, he did so and was
in the process of relocating. He testified that he obtained
steady employment with one company that provided insurance coverage for
his children, that he had a good home for the
children that the social worker had approved, and that he
had been led to believe by the social worker in
Florida that he would get custody of the children. While
the superior court is not required to credit C.J.'s testimony
or weigh it more heavily than contrary testimony, we are
struck by the paucity of contrary evidence regarding these points
in the record. It consists only of Larry Overholser's testimony
as to the conclusory statements of unnamed Florida officials to
the effect that C.J. was not approved for placement of
The state relied on the Florida social worker to investigate
the appropriateness of C.J.'s living situation for placement of the
children. However, the only evidence of this investigation that the
state presented at trial
was the testimony of DFYS social worker Larry Overholser who
reported the content of communications with Florida officials. The state
failed to produce any direct evidence from Florida officials or
any documents from Florida setting out what Florida officials had
done. In addition, according to Overholser's testimony, the denial of
placement by Florida officials was based on the bare assertion
that C.J. failed to respond to requests for information and
a statement from C.J. that he was unable to care
for the children at the time that he was first
contacted. But as discussed above, there was substantial and detailed
evidence to the contrary in the record. We conclude that
the evidence in this case was insufficient to show, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that placement of the children with C.J.
to the children. In short, the evidence was insufficient to
support termination of C.J.'s parental rights.
State Did Not Show that It Had Made Active Efforts
Craig J. Dorsay, The
Indian Child Welfare Act and Laws Affecting Indian Juveniles Manual
157-58 (1984) (citation omitted), quoted
with approval in A.A.,
982 P.2d at 261; see
also A.M. v. State,
945 P.2d 296, 306 (Alaska 1997).
As noted, ICWA requires that a court be able to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that placement of the children
with the parent is likely to result in serious damage.
[FN18] The evidence in this case leaves so much uncertainty
about C.J.'s present circumstances that such a finding cannot be
sustained. And ICWA requires that the state make "active efforts
... to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family." [FN19]
Again, there is insufficient evidence here to sustain that finding.
DFYS did not present the superior court sufficient evidence for
it to find that the *1220
demanding standards of ICWA had been met in this case.
We are left with the firm conviction that it was
a mistake for the superior court to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the children are likely to suffer serious
physical or emotional damage if returned to the care of
their father. Therefore we REVERSE the decision to terminate C.J.'s