Source: https://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/criminal_sentencing/page/3/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 11:12:14
Document Index: 267153119

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3553', '§ 4', '§ 3582', '§ 3582', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Appellate Law & Practice: Criminal - Sentencing
CA1: proving propr convictions with computerized docket entries
US v. McKenzie, No. 07-1834 (8/21/08) holds that it was okay to use computerized docket (but attested an authenticated) entries, which had the effect of rendering the defendant ineligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). It then goes on to hold that “attested copies of electronic docket entries may be a sufficient proffer of prior conviction for sentencing proceedings before a district court”
Strangely, the initial prior convictions were for shoplifting and there the First held that “...the potential for physical confrontation made it impossible to conclude that shoplifting was ‘similar to’ certain offenses excluded from CHC calculations under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).” The First sticks by this, case, United States v. Spaulding, 339 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2003), and therefore the shoplifting cases count.
Posted by S. COTUS on August 22, 2008 at 11:08 AM in Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CA1: Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) cop "basis" issues
US v. Lipscomb, No. 07-1293 (8/21/08). Some decided a guy looked like a drug dealer and approached him. He threw a bag with some drugs and a gun and ran. Then they tackled him. Isn’t the war on drugs awesome? He moved to suppress the drugs and gun, but he kept saying that neither was his (though if he did claim that they were his, it wouldn’t be usable at trial). So, the District Court denies the motion and the First affirms.
There is a semi-interesting issue regarding whether a Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) requires disclosure of the “bases” for an expert’s opinion. Although the District Court thought the notice was barely adequate, the First jumps in and says that saying that “training and experience” is a good enough basis for an opinion. WTF. But then the First tries to say that because this was a cop, it will pass, but if it were a real expert (not a “cop” expert) then it would require more detail. This seems a tad unfair to defendants. But wait – nobody cares.
A denial of a motion to disclose the name of a confidential informant by a magistrate that wasn’t appealed to the district court is deemed waived. There are a few other issues that are waived or not supported by “Facts.” So, they don’t really create new law.
After all this, however, he gets a Kimbrough remand, because it is a crack/powder case.
Posted by S. COTUS on August 21, 2008 at 03:27 PM in Booker, Criminal - Offenses, Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CA1: super-waiver of § 3582(a) issue at sentencing
US v. Walker, No. 07-2266 holds that a defendant intentionally abandoned her objection to a sentence that considered “her need for mental health and substance abuse treatment when determining the length of her prison sentence.” Counsel had argued that “...Walker's rationale for a below-guidelines sentence was that 48 months was a sufficient length of time for her to reap the benefits of the rehabilitative services offered within the federal prison system.” The court sentenced her to 77 months. Then, the defendant argues that under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), putting her in jail wasn’t how to rehabilitate her.
The first says that this is more than waived, super-waived, or forfeited. Essentially because the defendant and the trial court agreed on the need to put her in jail for rehabilitation, but disagreed on the length of time “by affirmatively employing the same rationale to support her request for a below-guidelines sentence” she intentionally abandoned it.
I think there might be a bit more to it than this. Maybe counsel was arguing in the hypothetical.
Posted by S. COTUS on August 13, 2008 at 02:56 PM in Appellate Procedure, Criminal - Sentencing, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
US v. Beatty, No. 06-2481. While the proceedings below are pretty interesting, this comes down to a question of whether the government has discretion to move for a § 3E1.1(b) (responsibility) (as opposed to (a)) reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The defendant was a veteran, but people don’t really care.
The First holds that under the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); a reduction under (b) is contingent on the government’s filing. The First then tries to say that this view doesn’t actually restrict any rights. Whatever.
Posted by S. COTUS on August 12, 2008 at 01:56 PM in Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CA1: a further remand for time-served and parsimony issues
US v. Diaz-Fontanez, No. 06-2061 (8/8/08) (unpublished). We gotta start calling these cases “Booker Boomerangs.” Because, after being given a Booker remand, it is back. And, it is going back again. The fact that it is unpublished is somewhat disturbing.
For some reason, on the re-sentencing, the District Court “summarily” refused, under USSG § 5G1.3, to take into account time served on a related case in a state facility. The government and the plaintiff only differ about why and how the case should be remanded. The first rejects the need for a remand to determine whether his sentence was increase due to the state charge. Instead, it says that a remand is necessary to determine what the Bureau of Prisons will do about the state time, and to redo the sentence. If the BOP does nothing, then the sentence gets reduced.
A Booker-style crack/powder argum ent is rejected on plain error review. But, I guess now, depending on the facts, he could move for an additional reduction. However, this guy was sentenced in the middle, not the bottom of the guidelines.
Finally, the First notes that the District Court didn't conduct a parsimony analysis. Maybe this is why the case is unpublished. Courts of Appeal don't like doing much about parsimony issues.
Posted by S. COTUS on August 09, 2008 at 09:17 AM in Booker, Criminal - Sentencing, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Continue reading "CA1: First says that Pho withstands Kimbrough, regardless of text" »
Posted by S. COTUS on August 06, 2008 at 03:30 PM in Booker, Criminal - Sentencing, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)
Posted by S. COTUS on August 04, 2008 at 04:22 PM in Booker, Criminal - Sentencing, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CA1: Selya destroys the writs of corum nobis and audita querela and saves the government from its negligence
Trenkler v. US, No. 07-1678, 07-1679. When I started reading this case, I thought it would be an interesting discussion of corum nobis. In many jurisdictions, this writ actually is understood. But then I realized that Selya wrote it, and whatever happens the defendant is going to lose – even though the defendant used latin. What most people will want to know is at the end “the writ of error coram nobis, in its modern form, is ordinarily available only to a criminal defendant who is no longer in custody.” Selya has a special message for all poor people rotting in jail or about it:
...our criminal justice system tolerates a certain risk of error might be of concern to some, but finality is indispensable to the proper functioning of that system.
The defendant (aided by a large, and therefore, morally righteous law firm) has done his best to get around AEDPA. The First has done its best to turn back such attempts.
What is strange is that after the writ was requested, the government simply ignored an order from the District Court requesting a reply. This is strange. Usually the government likes to reply.
Then, after the government neglected to reply (or is that “elected”) the District Court granted the writ on the basis of a defect in the jury instructions, which the District Court found was "fundamental to the validity of the judgment." It cited the All Writs Act.
After figuring that it has jurisdiction, the First gets to the issue. However, the First does explain why a case, from the Supreme Court, Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 144, 148 (1833), doesn’t apply because “The Court there explicitly admonished that it was not ‘called upon to decide’ whether the case before it "was a case proper for the application of [the coram nobis] remedy." Whatever the case, the First finds a bunch of caselaw that says that corum nobis is reviewable, and the Supremes back then were talking about whether it had supervisory power over the writ. Moreover, the First says, the government has the statutory authority to appeal the grant of the writ. Looking at United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 513 (1954) which says that the writ is a "step in the criminal case and not, like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a separate civil proceeding." the First says that that footnote doesn’t really matter, but what really matters is whether the writ is criminal or civil in nature. Seyla says “civil” because it would give the government more power to appeal, and therefore it isn’t even time-barred as it under the civil, rather than crimnial deadlines.
What that in mind, Selya says that this is really a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. Selya concludes that the District Court, in excusing the government’s negligence actually went to the merits, and notes that when late filing is excused the merits are reached. Then Selya starts putting the nails in the coffin. He says since 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is so specific it practically eviscerates the All Writs Act’s ability to issue such relief-granting common law writs. And, he cautions court to “to plot, and then to patrol, the boundaries between section 2255 and the universe of old common-law writs. Otherwise, artful pleaders will tiptoe around those boundaries and frustrate Congress's discernible intent.” Therefore, Selya (or his intern) concludes that there is no way this poor (as in not a lot of money) can get relief, except for transferring it under AEDPA to the First, as there was no newly-discovered evidence.
At the end there is some pithy stuff about the “Rule of Law” and all that crap. Surprisingly, “...our criminal justice system tolerates a certain risk of error might be of concern to some, but finality is indispensable to the proper functioning of that system.”
Posted by S. COTUS on August 01, 2008 at 04:05 PM in AEDPA, Appellate Procedure, Civil Procedure, Criminal - Offenses, Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
US v. Aviles-Colon, Nos. 05-1384, 05-2039, 05-2040. In this Puerto Rican drug distribution case, the First remands on a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) issue as to one defendant. [Update: SL&P, with guest-bloggers, lives up to its ethical duty to read all cases and comments here in a post entitled First Circuit Affirms Sentences of 35 and 55 Years Imposed Due to Murder Proven by Preponderance Standard]
A year after the trial in this case, a DEA report was obtained which the defendant says is Brady material. But, the District Court used the wrong standard in denying the motion for a new trial. t said that the suppressed evidence "does not rise to the level of materiality that would be likely to cause a different result at a new trial." That isn’t the standard. The standard is “was a reasonable probability of a different outcome, which is "shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" But, the First says that none of this matters because the information in the reports on their own, could have been used for impeachment since it details a lot of the motives of the various players.
The First also goes through what needs to be shown to admit co-conspirator testimony. The First explains that under its law 1) government agents are conspirators; and 2) “informing co-conspirators of the activities of the conspiracy's members furthers the conspiracy.”
As always, the First says that prosecutors should not “appeal to the "jury's emotions and role as the conscience of the community." But, as always, it really means “go ahead and do it.” So, it finds that the prosecutor’s comments were not that bad. That is the usual stuff. Some of the other claims of prosecutorial misconduct don’t have merit (i.e. saying that they are “fortunate” to have a gang member testify).
There are a lot of other typical issues, but they don’t really create any new law. But, for those that practice in this area, this case will be of interest. Otherwise, there is a spreadsheet at the end, explaining what is up with each case.
Posted by S. COTUS on July 31, 2008 at 03:51 PM in Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, First Circuit, Sanctions | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
CA1: no plea withdrawal
US v. Bates, No. 07-1370 (7/28/08) (unpublished). A defendant really wants to withdraw his plea. He had the opportunity to withdraw it at the District Court. He did not. The First vacillates as to whether this is a waiver or forfeiture issue, but then says that there was no plain error. Regrading an Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) issue, the First says:
As defendant candidly recognizes, his challenge to consideration of his prior conviction on the ground that it was neither admitted, charged in the indictment, nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt is currently "hopeless.
But, at least they don’t call it unethical.
Posted by S. COTUS on July 30, 2008 at 10:26 AM in Criminal - Sentencing, Criminal Procedure, First Circuit | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)