Source: https://casetext.com/case/brady-v-heckler
Timestamp: 2019-02-23 09:52:23
Document Index: 311643043

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914 | Casetext
Brady v. Heckler
724 F.2d 914 (11th Cir. 1984)
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Bradyv.Heckler
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh CircuitFeb 9, 1984
…of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citations omitted).There is…
James v. Michael Astrue
…Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28. The regulations provide: (b) Basic Work Activities. When we talk about…
holding ALJ&apos;s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and remanding for full evaluation of all the evidence, including the VA&apos;s disability rating
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No. 82-6087. Non-Argument Calendar.
Following an adverse decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Thomas A. Brady sought review of that decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The district court, after a hearing before a magistrate, upheld the Secretary's denial of benefits; Brady now appeals to this court. We hold that the Secretary's decision that Brady does not suffer from a severe physical impairment is not supported by substantial evidence and remand the case to the Secretary for a full evaluation of all the evidence, and for a complete development of the record consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
After entry of the magistrate's review and recommendation, Brady filed Plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration of the Review and Recommendation, requesting consideration of the deposition of Brady's treating physician, Dr. Andres Martorell. The magistrate thereafter entered a supplemental review and recommendation, setting out an analysis of the deposition testimony of Dr. Martorell, and concluding that, "the plaintiff's submissions for reconsideration are not persuasive. There is little in Dr. Martorell's deposition that was not present also in the record before the administrative law judge and available for his consideration." Dr. Martorell stated, in his deposition, that "my final impression is that this man [Brady] has hypoglycemia, vertebro vascular insufficiency, pericarditis, and mild emphysema. All this conditions together make him dizzy, shortness of breath and occasional chest pain, and this make him unable to work." Dr. Martorell was asked to comment on the initial test of Brady regarding the emphysema which indicated negative findings. Dr. Martorell stated:
A chest x-ray done in November 2, 1977, the impression was of the cardiologist, Dr. Albert Dunn, was not of this pathology. The lung field appeared somewhat emphysematic. The pulmonary function test done at Broward General Medical Center was within normal limits. This doesn't mean that the patient doesn't have emphysema. He was evaluated by Dr. Richard Lippman, internal medicine, Miami. The x-ray at that time showed fibrotic changes and Dr. Lippman agreed with the diagnosis of chronic obstructive lung disease.
The administrative law judge concluded that Brady has no severe mental or physical impairment hindering his ability to perform basic work related functions. "Under the applicable regulations of the Secretary, such a finding is sufficient to support a denial of Social Security disability benefits even though no specific inquiry is made concerning a claimant's ability to perform his past relevant work." Lofton v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Secretary's regulations governing determinations of disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act set forth a specific sequential process of evaluation to be employed in assessing disability claims. The regulations provide that `in determining whether an individual is disabled, a sequential evaluation process shall be followed whereby current work activity, severity of the impairment(s), and vocational factors are assessed in that order.' 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(a) (1980). Specifically, the regulations provide that in making a determination of disability or no disability, the first inquiry shall be whether the individual is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the individual is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the inquiry then focuses on the question whether the individual has any `severe impairment.' If a finding is made that the claimant does not have any severe impairment, i.e., one `which significantly limits his or her physical or mental capacity to perform basic work related functions,' the regulations direct that `a finding shall be made that he or she does not have a severe impairment and therefore is not under a disability without consideration of the vocational factors.' [Emphasis in original.]
It is clear that in reviewing an administrative determination that a claimant's disability is not severe, this court must apply the substantial evidence test . . . . The substantial evidence test is, of course, a familiar one, requiring that the decision under review be supported by evidence sufficient to justify a reasoning mind in accepting it; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.
Jones v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 205 (D.Md. 1982).
We are straitly confined by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to determining, upon careful review of the entire record, whether it contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary's findings. This does not mean we affirm on gossamer. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Anderson v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1981).
In an action seeking disability benefits, the burden is upon the claimant to demonstrate existence of a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1980). The key point then becomes what is meant by a severe impairment.
In Lofton, the court stated that a disability determination is made on the basis of medical evidence alone, without consideration of vocational factors where the medical evidence indicates that claimant does not have a severe impairment. In the amended regulations of 1968, the Secretary stated: "Medical considerations alone can justify a finding that the individual is not under a disability where the only impairment is a sight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1968). In the 1978 regulations, the Secretary stated:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(c). The 1978 regulations were modified in 1980 to state:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
(b) Basic Work Activities. When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include —
In the 1978 regulations, the Secretary stated that the definition "a medically determinable impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit an individual's physical or mental capacity to perform basic work related functions" is a clarification of the previous regulation's terms "a slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities." It is a clarification, not a change, in the definition of severe impairment. The court, in Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1983), reinforced the fact that the definition of severe impairment has not changed over the years.
The Secretary's preamble in the Federal Register reveals that the `severity' regulation, as originally promulgated in 1978, was meant to clarify the 1968 regulation's terms `a slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormality or combination of slight abnormalities' but was not intended `to alter the levels of severity for a finding of . . . [`] not disabled ['] on the basis of medical considerations alone,' 43 F.R. 55358. The recodification in 1980 evinced no change in this expression of the Secretary's intent, 45 F.R. 55574.
The Appeals Council, therefore, specifically considered the issue of when an impairment(s) should be considered as `not severe' within the meaning of these regulations. The Council concluded in a minute that the definition contained in regulations 404.1503(c) and 416.903(c) was not intended to change, but was merely a clarification of the previous regulatory terms `slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities . . . ' In other words, an impairment can be considered as `not severe' only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.
The 1980 recodification stated that impairment is not considered severe if it does not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Though the regulation adds new language to the definition of severe impairment, the key point is that which was raised by the court in Chico; the recodification in 1980 evinced no change in expression of the Secretary's intent as to the levels of severity needed for finding of not disabled on the basis of medical considerations alone. Chico, 710 F.2d at 955. The court in Jones defined the 1980 term "significant" limitation as (1) having a meaning, (2) deserving to be considered, and (3) not meaningless. Jones, 555 F. Supp. at 208. The limitation must not be meaningless. This approach is, thus, identical to the 1968 language which states that the impairment must not be slight. From Chico and Jones it is clear that the 1980 regulations follow the 1968 and 1978 definition of a severe impairment.
Brady is receiving an award of disability benefits from the Veteran's Administration (100 percent disabled). "Although the V.A.'s disability rating is not binding on the Secretary of Health and Human Services, it is evidence that should be given great weight." Olson v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1981), citing to Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 1981).