Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-williams-178
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 14:23:08
Document Index: 427398964

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 111', '§ 111', '§ 111', '§ 111', '§ 111', '§ 485']

United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 277 | Casetext
604 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1979)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth CircuitJul 25, 1979
Argued March 9, 1979.
Dwight F. Drake, Columbia, S.C., for appellant.
Thomas P. Simpson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C. (Thomas E. Lydon, Jr., U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before WIDENER and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and DUMBAULD, Senior District Judge.
United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
The defendant, Hubert H. Williams, Jr., was convicted by a jury of assaulting a Deputy United States Marshal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. At trial, the defendant sought a jury instruction that knowledge that the victim was a federal officer is a necessary element of the offense without which he might not be convicted. The district court denied the defendant's request, and instead charged the jury that knowledge was irrelevant for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111. The defendant appeals, charging that the district court erred in its charge that knowledge of the victim's identity was irrelevant. We affirm.
The defendant was being sought by the United States Marshal in Columbia, South Carolina, who was attempting to serve a civil summons and complaint upon him. Numerous unsuccessful attempts had been made to serve the papers on the defendant. On Saturday, December 4, 1976, Deputy Marshal Walen L. Lamb sought to serve the defendant by going to the defendant's home in Columbia. Although he had previously heard noises in the house, Lamb received no response upon approaching the house and identifying himself. Lamb then went to the home of the defendant's parents, where he learned that the defendant worked out of the state during the week and that he was only in Columbia on weekends. Lamb also learned that the defendant would be flying out of Columbia the following day.
The defendant along with his father, Hubert H. Williams, Sr., were being sued civilly by the Small Business Administration. Both complaints and summons were issued on October 15, 1976. Hubert Williams, Sr., was served in October.
The next day, December 5, 1976, the defendant learned from his wife of the events that transpired the previous evening. As a result, the defendant sent a telegram to the U.S. Marshal advising him to stop being belligerent to his parents and his family. Shortly thereafter, the defendant proceeded to the Columbia airport to catch his flight out of town.
420 U.S. at 686, 95 S.Ct. at 1264.
See also the pre- Feola cases of United States v. Perkins, 488 F.2d 652, 654-55 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Goodwin, 440 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir. 1971); and United States v. Ulan, 421 F.2d 787, 789 90 (2d Cir. 1970).
18 U.S.C. § 111 was not enacted only as a counterpart to state laws requiring increased punishment for assaulting a peace officer where a defendant must know that his victim is an officer. Instead § 111 was also designed to provide a federal forum for the trial of offenses involving federal officers. Requiring knowledge as an element of the crime, for example, would provide no protection for federal agents acting under cover. This offense was designed to protect both the federal officer and the law enforcement activities in which he is involved.
For a discussion of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 111, see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677-84, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541.
Unlikely as it may seem in view of the record in this case, the jury could have believed from the defendant's acts (as described by the marshal), in contrast to the defendant's testimony, that the officer failed to identify himself and that the officer used unlawful force on the defendant, which force the defendant instinctively or justifiably resisted. Therefore, had the case been tried on that theory, an instruction would have been proper taken from the above quoted language from Feola. But the defendant did not choose that as an alternate theory of defense. Rather, he chose to defend the case on the theory that the entire occurrence was an accident and that he did not strike the officer at all. This was also a perfectly tenable theory from the testimony of the defendant.
In his testimony, the defendant denied striking the officer. Instead, he testified that the whole incident was an accident resulting from his losing his balance and falling into the officer. The defendant's mother also testified that she did not see her son strike the officer, as did two other witnesses called by the defendant. The inference sought to be drawn, of course, was that Williams did not strike the marshal.
Thus, on the theory of the case adopted by the defendant, that the whole affair was accidental, the instruction of the district court is not erroneous for it complies with the holding in Feola that knowledge of the identity of the officer is irrelevant.
We had held prior to Feola, in United States v. Wallace, 368 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1966), that knowledge was not an essential element of the crime.
While the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury on all of the elements of an offense in a criminal trial, it is certainly not required to instruct the jury on a defense the theory of which is not even supported by the testimony of the defendant adduced at trial. Wright Miller, 2 Fed. Prac. Proc. § 485 (1969); United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1965).
Because the testimony of the defendant in United States v. Young, 464 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1972), was consistent with mistake, we do not think that case, holding it plain error to omit a knowledge instruction, is inconsistent with our holding. So far as the two cases may be read as inconsistent, however, with respect, we simply disagree.