Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/712/924/415316/
Timestamp: 2020-08-03 09:52:20
Document Index: 505170275

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 91', '§ 91', '§ 91', '§ 416', '§ 91']

Albert A. Jones, a Minor Child; Bridget Jones, a Minorchild, by Their Mother and Next Friend, Albertinejones; Barbara L. Jones, Appellants, v. Margaret H. Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health Andhuman Services, Appellee.marcia Simms, a Minor by Her Next Friend, Sheila Simms, Appellant, v. Margaret H. Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health Andhuman Services, Appellee, 712 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1983 › Albert A. Jones, a Minor Child; Bridget Jones, a Minorchild, by Their Mother and Next Friend, Albert...
Albert A. Jones, a Minor Child; Bridget Jones, a Minorchild, by Their Mother and Next Friend, Albertinejones; Barbara L. Jones, Appellants, v. Margaret H. Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health Andhuman Services, Appellee.marcia Simms, a Minor by Her Next Friend, Sheila Simms, Appellant, v. Margaret H. Heckler, Secretary, Department of Health Andhuman Services, Appellee, 712 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 712 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1983) Submitted June 15, 1983. Decided July 14, 1983
In Jones v. Schweiker, 668 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nomine Jones v. Heckler, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 1763, 76 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1983), we had for decision the question of whether a child whose parents were not married would, under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A), qualify as a dependent entitled to certain social security benefits. The statute establishes that one is qualified if, for the purposes of taking in intestacy, he would be entitled to share according to "such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State ... in which he [the wage earner parent] was domiciled at the time of his death...."
As of the time of our decision we were unaware of any decision ruling on the constitutionality of the two statutes. Nevertheless, we proceeded on the assumption that, in light of the decision in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977), the West Virginia and Mississippi statutes were each unconstitutional because of the denial of the equal protection mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
We decided that unconstitutionality because of a provision of the federal basic law would not convert a state statute into one actually providing the opposite of what its language required, in order to eliminate the unconstitutional inequality. We reached that result on the theory that 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A) was intended to allow anyone determined by the legislature1 to be entitled to inherit under the state's intestacy laws to qualify for social security benefits, assuming, as is the case for the Simms and Jones children, that all other requirements are met.
The social security act, in various provisions contained in 42 U.S.C. § 416, has qualified a child whose parents were not married if (a) the marriage of the parents had taken place but was inadvertently invalid, (b) the parent had acknowledged parental status in writing, (c) there had been a support order or paternity decree, (d) the parent had contributed to the child's support, or (e) the parent and child had had common residence in the same household. Regrettably the Simms and Jones children met none of those qualifying criteria under the social security act, nor, in our view, did 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A) come to their assistance. A federally compelled result, based on a determination that the purpose unequivocally set forth by the state's legislative enactments should not, because unconstitutional, be permitted to take effect, would not reverse that legislatively stated purpose to the point of having the state law read to declare the very opposite of what it unambiguously expressed. The mandates emanating from the Federal Constitution would not amount to "such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ... [emanating from] the courts of the State."
Hence, with the decision in Adkins v. McEldowney, Simms, whose rights derive from West Virginia law, clearly has met the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A). For Mississippi, unfortunately, things are not so straightforward. The authority we have been asked by the United States Supreme Court to consider is an amendment, effective from and after July 1, 1981, to § 91-1-15 of the Mississippi Code, Trust and Estates Title, Descent and Distribution Chapter. The provisions therein contained for inheritance from an unwed parent are as follows:
The child of married parents, or even of an unwed mother (§ 91-1-15, supra), is not required, in order to inherit, to meet one of those three conditions. Miss.Code §§ 91-1-3, 91-1-11.
First, there arises the question of whether the recently enacted statute could be complied with by the Jones children, bringing them in that way into the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A). No adjudication of paternity was sought or obtained before the father's death. None has yet been instituted. If it were, one year after the death of the father in 1975 has now long since elapsed.2 While the recent Mississippi statute permits a pre-July 1, 1981 claim to be brought until June 30, 1984, it is a claim "concerning the estate," i.e., one seeking to establish a right to inherit, not a paternity establishment action to which reference appears to have been made. At least unless and until a suit is commenced which achieves identification of the Jones children as persons entitled to share in intestacy, we do not see how a direct reliance on § 91-1-15 can achieve a result favorable for them under the social security act.
The Mississippi law, in its present state, gives little basis for us, a court from another jurisdiction, to make an initial decision as to what a Mississippi court would do, if confronted with the issue. The Mississippi Constitution in Article 3, Section 14 of its Bill of Rights does guarantee due process of law. No equal protection guarantee is explicitly spelled out. Whether the approach of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S. Ct. 693, 98 L. Ed. 884 (1954) would be adopted is problematic.
In Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737 (Miss.1977), the court struck down, as violative of the Federal Constitution, a law restricting support for a child of an unwed father to age 16, although for other children the obligation to provide support was not so restricted, and, in appropriate circumstances, such as those of a child who was a college student where the father could afford the expense, might continue beyond the attainment of majority. No suggestion is made that the Mississippi constitution also would interdict unequal treatment, depending on whether or not the child's parents were married.3
In Estate of Miller v. Miller, 409 So. 2d 715, 717-18 (Miss.1982), the Supreme Court of Mississippi declined on pleading grounds to uphold an adjudication of unconstitutionality of the law of intestate succession because children whose parents were married were treated more favorably than children of unwed parents. The point to observe is that only federal grounds appear to have been relied on in the lower court adjudication of unconstitutionality. While that does not positively foreclose the existence of neutral extension applicable under Mississippi law in such circumstances as those with which we are here confronted, it does nothing to encourage one to believe that a Mississippi court would apply the concept.
With sincere deference to my brothers, I must disagree with the majority's sua sponte determination to ask the Mississippi Supreme Court to interpret this statute, for I discern no lack of clarity in its directions. To me, this enactment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-776, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1463-1468, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1977). On its face, the statute impermissibly exacts obligations of the illegitimate to qualify for inheritance from the father that are not imposed on the legitimate. Pickett v. Brown, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S. Ct. 1549, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982).
If Pickett v. Brown, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 76 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1983) nullifies the effectiveness of the limitations provisions of the Mississippi statute, it does so on federal constitutional grounds, not on grounds of state law determining the devolution of intestate personal property
Mississippi has a profound and constitutionally sound reason for classifying legitimates differently from illegitimates in the laws of descent and distribution of property of a person who dies intestate. Some of these reasons are mentioned in Labine [v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S. Ct. 1017, 28 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1971) ] and Weber [v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972) ]. Our decision in the present case does not weaken the authority of this State to provide for exclusion of illegitimates from inheriting property from intestate natural fathers.