Source: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/precedent-decisions-volume-19
Timestamp: 2018-08-15 19:52:02
Document Index: 105167959

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1481', '§ 1255', '§ 1101', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1182', '§ 1101', '§ 1151', '§ 1153', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 292', '§ 292', '§ 1101', '§ 1254', '§ 656', '§ 1157', '§ 1182', '§ 1101', '§ 9', '§ 1253', '§ 1101', '§ 1153', '§ 1253', '§ 1158', '§ 1155', '§ 205', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 1255', '§ 1154', '§ 1255', '§1101', '§ 3', '§ 1101', '§ 1251', '§ 1101', '§ 1182', '§ 1255', '§ 1255']

Volume 19 | EOIR | Department of Justice
LAUREANO, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983)
ID 2951 (PDF)
(1) A marriage entered into for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws, commonly referred to as a fraudulent or sham marriage, is not recognized for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.
ID 2952 (PDF)
ID 2953 (PDF)
(2) When the country where the beneficiary was born and resides eliminates all legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children, all natural children are deemed to be the legitimate offspring of their natural father from the time that the country's laws are changed.
(3) If the status of a legitimate child arises after the child is born, the requirements of 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(b)(1)(C)(1982), must be met; therefore, the status of a legitimate child must arise prior to the beneficiary's 18th birthday to qualify the beneficiary for immigration benefits.
TORRE, 19 I&N Dec. 18 (BIA 1984)
ID 2954 (PDF)
BENNETT, 19 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 1984)
ID 2955 (PDF)
(1) An alien who is admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor, who without permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service engages in purely religious activities on behalf of a church, and who is compensated for those activities, is deportable for failure to maintain status even if he now qualifies as a special immigrant minister and intends to work for the same church which has been employing him.
CHERISMO, 19 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1984)
ID 2956 (PDF)
MANGASER, 19 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1984)
ID 2957 (PDF)
SHIRDEL, 19 I&N Dec. 33 (BIA 1984)
ID 2958 (PDF)
(1) Afghan nationals who arrived in the United States with fraudulent Turkish passports astransit without visa ("TRWOV") aliens in order to submit applications for asylum are excludable under the second clause of section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(19)(1982), for attempting to enter the United States by fraud or material misrepresentation.
(3) Afghan nationals who came here from a foreign port in order to submit applications forasylum attempted an "entry" into the United States within the meaning of section 101(a)(13) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(13)(1982).
BRENINZON, 19 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 1984)
ID 2959 (PDF)
MATTI, 19 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 1984)
ID 2960 (PDF)
(1) The Board of Immigration Appeals denied an application for a waiver of deportation undersection 241(f)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(f)(1)(1982), on the ground of statutory ineligibility as well as in the exercise of administrative discretion, concluding that an alien who is excludable under section 212(a)(19) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(19)(1982), for having entered the United States with an immigrant visa predicated upon a marriage fraud may not rely upon that fraud in order to obtain a waiver of deportation as a spouse of a United States citizen.
KAZEMI, 19 I&N Dec. 49 (BIA 1984)
ID 2961 (PDF)
DILLA, 19 I&N Dec. 54 (BIA 1984)
ID 2962 (PDF)
FEDORENKO, 19 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1984)
ID 2963 (PDF)
ALEJANDRO, 19 I&N Dec. 75 (BIA 1984)
ID 2964 (PDF)
CARRILLO, 19 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1984)
ID 2965 (PDF)
CHU, 19 I&N Dec. 81 (BIA 1984)
ID 2966 (PDF)
McMULLEN, 19 I&N Dec. 90 (BIA 1984)
ID 2967 (PDF)
VILLANUEVA, 19 I&N Dec. 101 (BIA 1984)
ID 296 (PDF)
SANTOS, 19 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 1984)
ID 2969 (PDF)
CHICAS, 19 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1984)
ID 2970 (PDF)
REPUYAN, 19 I&N Dec. 119 (BIA 1984)
ID 2971 (PDF)
ALLIED FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, 19 I&N Dec. 124 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2972 (PDF)
CORREA, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984)
ID 2973 (PDF)
(1) Although an immigration judge's decision granting a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is an interlocutory order, the Board of Immigration Appeals will entertain an appeal from that decision where a pattern of improper handling of motions by the immigration judge has developed.
LEON-OROSCO AND RODRIGUEZ-COLAS, 19 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1984; AG 1984)
ID 2974 (PDF)
(2) Notwithstanding a clear showing of prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought, a motion to reopen proceedings can be denied for discretionary reasons where, for example, the record reflects little likelihood of success on the merits if reopening is permitted.
(3) Notwithstanding the submission of extensive documentation in support of the motion to reopen proceedings and assuming arguendo, that as a Mariel participant, the applicant is a member of a "particular social group," he has not made a prima facie showing that his life or freedom would be threatened or that he will be persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Cuba based on that membership.
(4) The refusal of a country to accept the return of its nationals does not, by itself, provide the basis for an asylum claim.
(5) Recognizing that a failure to address the effect of a stipulation between the parties is not a rejection of it, the Attorney General found nothing in the Board of Immigration Appeals' statement which precluded the parties from abiding by the stipulation and permitting it to govern their conduct; inasmuch as the stipulation dealt with the subsequent effect of test cases on other parties not presently before the Board, the Attorney General determined that it was not necessary for the Board to discuss the stipulation's effect and not inappropriate to defer doing so until it was faced with a case in which the terms of the stipulation were material to the resolution of a controversy.
KHATOON, 19 I&N Dec. 153 (BIA 1984)
ID 2975 (PDF)
(1) In order for an adoption to be valid for immigration purposes, it first must be shown that the adoption conformed with and is recognized by the applicable law of the jurisdiction where it occurred.
(2) Under the Indian Muslim Personal Law Application Act, which applies to Moslems in India, adoption among Moslems is not legally recognized or valid; therefore, Moslem adoptions in India are invalid for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Matter of Irani, 15 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1976), distinguished.
CONNELLY, 19 I&N Dec. 156 (BIA 1984)
ID 2976 (PDF)
SHUEN, 19 I&N Dec. 161 (BIA 1984)
ID 2977 (PDF)
PEREIRA, 19 I&N Dec. 169 (BIA 1984)
ID 2978 (PDF)
BENITEZ, 19 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1984)
ID 2979 (PDF)
WADUD, 19 I&N Dec. 182 (BIA 1984)
ID 2980 (PDF)
WALDEI, 19 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 1984)
ID 2981 (PDF)
(3) Where the applicant is a stowaway and thus not entitled to an exclusion or deportation hearing, the immigration judge is without authority to consider his renewed application for asylum.
(4) The Board of Immigration Appeals, by adopting the position that Congress intended a distinct and disparate treatment under the Act for illegal crewman and stowaways, declines to follow the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1983), and thus concludes that an alien stowaway is not entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge for the purpose of adjudicating a renewed asylum application.
PORTUGUES DO ATLANTICO INFORMATION BUREAU, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 194 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2982 (PDF)
(2) Individuals lacking the particular degrees normally prerequisite to professional practice in their fields of endeavor may be classified as professionals in rare instances where they occupy clearly professional positions, have substantially completed normal educational requirements for the position they occupy, are recognized and permitted to practice as professionals. Case law also accommodates those instances where individuals attain professional standing through directed experience and specialized instruction recognized by appropriate professional bodies as a form of preparation for the practice of particular professions, e.g., "reading" law.
(3) A professional position is one which requires a standard and at least baccalaureate level of university education for practice, in which that education is applied, and which requires extensive autonomous application of individual professional knowledge to particular fact situations.
KEKICH, 19 I&N Dec. 198 (BIA 1984)
ID 2983 (PDF)
(1) Where expatriation is in issue, commission of any of the acts specified in section 349(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1982), may be viewed as highly persuasive evidence of an intent to abandon United States citizenship; and under section 349(c), the Government satisfies its evidentiary burden by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the citizen has committed an intentional expatriating act. Matter of Wayne, 16 I&N Dec. 248 (BIA 1977), overruled (as to evidentiary standard to be applied).
CHING AND CHEN, 19 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 1984)
ID 2984 (PDF)
Aliens who were refused admission and subsequently escaped from carrier custody while awaiting removal thereby "entered" the United States and so are subject only to deportation proceedings. Matter of A-, 9 I&N Dec. 356 (BIA 1961), followed. Matter of Lin, 18 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 1982), distinguished.
RODRIGUEZ-COTO, 19 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 1985)
ID 2985 (PDF)
ACOSTA, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)
ID 2986 (PDF)
(1) Construction of the provisions the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status ofRefugees, Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268, is left by that agreement to each state that is party to the Protocol; accordingly, the various international interpretations of the Protocol, including the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, are useful tools in construing our obligations under the Protocol, but they are neither binding upon the United States nor controlling as to construction of the Refugee Act of 1980.
GOLDEN DRAGON CHINESE RESTAURANT, 19 I&N Dec. 238 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2987 (PDF)
CANTEC REPRESENTATIVES, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 241 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2988 (PDF)
(3) Similarly, despite the fact that the incumbent need not meet the express minimum job qualifications, it must be established that the incumbent is classifiable as a professional forpurposes of section 203(a)(3) of the Act.
NGAI, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2989 (PDF)
UNITED INVESTMENT GROUP, 19 I&N Dec. 248 (Comm. 1984)
ID 2990 (PDF)
VIADO, 19 I&N Dec. 252 (Comm. 1985)
ID 2991 (PDF)
(1) Receipt of Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") constitutes receipt of public assistance and is sufficient cause to breach a public charge bond, even in theabsence of a demand for repayment.
BAROCIO, 19 I&N Dec. 255 (Comm. 1985)
ID 2992 (PDF)
(3) The unsupported claim that the respondents' failure to depart voluntarily was due to their unawareness of the Board's decision does not demonstrate a compelling reason to warrantreinstatement of voluntary departure where the record reflects that notice of the decision was sent to counsel.
PATEL, 19 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 1985)
ID 2993 (PDF)
(4) The immigration judge properly conducted the respondent's hearing in absentia where no reasonable cause was offered for the respondent's absence and counsel's own failure toappear.
TAYABJI, 19 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1985)
ID 2994 (PDF)
(3) An alien's adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982), is properly rescinded where his application for a section 212(e) waiver, upon which such adjustment had been premised, was approved in error due to the absence of the required favorable recommendation of the Secretary of State.
(4) A district director's approval of an alien's section 212(e) waiver application in excess of his authority does not operate to estop the Government from enforcing the congressionally imposed residency requirements of sections 212(e) and 245 of the Act.
GARCIA, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985)
ID 2995 (PDF)
(1) Although Article 42.12, section 3d of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is not a firstoffender statute, a person sentenced to probation under that statute has not been convicted for immigration purposes because adjudication of guilt has been withheld by the trial court.
(2) Where there has been no affirmative showing that the trial judge lacked authority underTexas law to order a new trial and resentence the respondent, the Board of Immigration Appeals will not question the judge's jurisdiction to so act.
SANCHEZ AND ESCOBAR, 19 I&N Dec. 276 (BIA 1985)
ID 2996 (PDF)
(3) The term "persecution" as it appears in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982), requires that the alien demonstrate awell-founded fear that he would be targeted for harm or suffering on the basis of one of the enumerated grounds within the Act for which asylum may be granted.
KUMAH, 19 I&N Dec. 290 (BIA 1985)
ID 2997 (PDF)
(2) A Ghanaian court decree which either grants or confirms a Ghanaian customary divorce is an essential element of proof in substantiating a claimed customary divorce in that if the petitioner is unable to persuade Ghanaian court officials that the decree should be issued because the questions relating to the tribal affiliations of the parties concerned, the customary divorce law of that tribe, or the conformance to the pertinent ceremonial procedures, then that petitioner cannot satisfy his burden of proving the claimed customary divorce for purposes of the United States immigration laws. Matter of DaBaase, 16 I&N Dec. 720 (BIA 1979), aff'd, DaBaase v. INS, 627 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Matter of DaBaase, 16 I&N Dec. 39 (BIA 1976); and Matter of Akinola, 15 I&N Dec. 359 (BIA 1975), modified.
(3) A Ghanaian court decree confirming a nonjudicial divorce under Ghanaian customary law is not deemed to be conclusive proof of the facts certified therein because of the potential for fraud or error in their issuance: fraud or mistake may be reasonably suspected where the facts recited on the decree of confirmation are contradicted by other evidence and the discrepancies have not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner or where there is an absence of sufficient corroborating evidence.
ZAIDAN, 19 I&N Dec. 297 (BIA 1985)
ID 2998 (PDF)
SANO, 19 I&N Dec. 299 (BIA 1985)
ID 2999 (PDF)
(5) The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c) (1985), which grants the Board power to certify cases, permits certification only to matters within the Board's appellate jurisdiction as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985).
(6) Since the Board lacks authority to review an appeal by a beneficiary from the denial of a visa petition, such an appeal also may not be reviewed upon certification. Matter of Arteaga-Godoy, 14 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 1972), overruled.
LINNAS, 19 I&N Dec. 302 (BIA 1985)
ID 3000 (PDF)
GHARADAGHI, 19 I&N Dec. 311 (BIA 1985)
ID 3001 (PDF)
(1) An alien who circumvents the orderly procedures for obtaining refugee status abroad may be granted asylum as a matter of discretion if he establishes sufficient countervailingequities.
(2) Generally, it will be necessary to balance the positive and negative factors in each case where an alien's circumvention of the orderly refugee procedures does not involve a finding of fraud under section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982). Matter of Shirdel, 19 I&N Dec. 33 (BIA 1984); and Matter of Salim, 18 I&N Dec. 311 (BIA 1982), clarified.
KULLE, 19 I&N Dec. 318 (BIA 1985)
ID 3002 (PDF)
GRAVES, 19 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1985)
ID 3003 (PDF)
TUAKOI, 19 I&N Dec. 341 (BIA 1985)
ID 3004 (PDF)
NAULU, 19 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 1985)
ID 3005 (PDF)
VALENCIA, 19 I&N Dec. 354 (BIA 1986)
ID 3006 (PDF)
CARBALLE, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986)
ID 3007 (PDF)
(1) An alien is barred from the relief of withholding of deportation if he, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of theUnited States.
(3) Because the proper focus is on the serious nature of the crime and not on the likelihood of future serious misconduct on the part of the alien, the contention that the statute requires twoseparate and distinct findings as to "seriousness of the crime" and "danger to the community" is rejected.
(4) If an applicant is statutorily ineligible for withholding of deportation because he is a danger to the community of the United States, having been finally convicted of an inherently particularlyserious crime, e.g., armed robbery, background evidence including the circumstances of the crime is not relevant to the determination of statutory eligibility.
SIEMENS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm. 1986)
ID 3008 (PDF)
(1) Where each of two corporations (parents) owns and controls 50 percent of a third corporation (joint venture), the joint venture is a subsidiary of each of the parents for purposes ofsection 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (1982). Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982) clarified.
(2) Each parent, through ownership and control of 50 percent of the voting shares of the joint venture, has the power to prevent action by that company through exercise of its veto power;hence, each parent "negatively" controls that company.
(3) All agreements between the parents relating to voting of the shares, distribution of profits, management and direction of the subsidiary, and similar factors which affect actual control over50 percent of the subsidiary must be identified. Unless such agreements restrict the actual control of one parent, the 50-percent ownership will be deemed per se control.
AMORNVOOTISKUL, 19 I&N Dec. 366 (BIA 1986)
ID 3009 (PDF)
(1) Under the pertinent provisions of section 19 of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat. 1611 [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982)], analien is not subject to the numerical limitations of the Act if he was present in the United States on or before June 1, 1978, and was qualified as a nonpreference immigrant under section203(a)(8) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (1982); was exempt from the labor certification requirement of section 212(a)(14) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982), as a qualifiedinvestor; and properly filed an application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, which is still pending.
(2) Section 19 of the 1981 Amendments to the Act has been interpreted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in its regulations to mean that an application for adjustment of status maybe approved after June 1, 1978, provided that the applicant has a priority date on or before June 1, 1978, and meets the other requirements of section 19.
TORRES, 19 I&N Dec. 371 (BIA 1986)
ID 3010 (PDF)
(1) In holding that an applicant for adjustment of status who is returning to the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(2) (1986) is properly placed inexclusion proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals specifically declined to follow Joshi v. District Director, INS, 720 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1983), and Patel v. Landon, 739 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir.1984), outside of the courts' respective circuits.
ID 3011 (PDF)
(1) There is a strong presumption that an attorney's decision to concede an alien's deportability in a motion for change of venue was a reasonable tactical decision, and, absent a showing ofegregious circumstances, such a concession is binding upon the alien as an admission.
(2) It is immaterial whether an alien actually authorized his attorney to concede deportability in a motion for change of venue, for so long as the motion was prepared and filed by an attorney ofrecord on behalf of his alien client, it is prima facie regarded as authorized by the alien and is admissible as evidence.
(3) An allegation that an attorney was authorized to represent an alien only to the extent necessary to secure a reduction in the amount of bond does not render inadmissible theattorney's concession of deportability in a pleading filed in regard to another matter, for there is no "limited" appearance of counsel in immigration proceedings.
AMERICAN PARALEGAL ACADEMY, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 386 (BIA 1986)
ID 3012 (PDF)
(1) "Nominal charges," as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (1986), are not defined in terms of specific dollar amounts but have been interpreted to mean a very small quantity or somethingexisting in name only as distinguished from something real or actual.
(2) The applicant, whose charges for services exceed amounts which can be construed as "nominal," may not rely upon the notion that its fees are substantially less than those charged bylaw firms or that its fees are one of the means by which it is able to fund itself.
(3) The applicant's detailed fee schedule and its statement that it will provide free services as funds become available from contributions suggest that payment is in fact a prerequisite toservice; therefore, the applicant's characterization of the amounts it requests in payment for services as "donations" is not persuasive in a determination of "nominal charges."
(4) "Nominal charges," as contemplated by 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (1986), were not intended as a means by which those who are able to pay for assistance help offset the expenses of those whocannot.
A. DOW STEAM SPECIALITIES, LTD., 19 I&N Dec. 389 (Comm. 1986)
ID 3013 (PDF)
In occupational preference visa petition proceedings a petitioner, having no location in the United States, is not an employer and, therefore, cannot offer to permanently employ an alien inthe United States. Only a U.S.-based branch office, affiliate, or subsidiary of the foreign organization may file such a petition.
FAITH ASSEMBLY CHURCH, 19 I&N Dec. 391 (Comm. 1986)
ID 3014 (PDF)
(1) An alien classifiable as a special immigrant pursuant to section 101(a)(27)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(i) (1982), may not be accordedSchedule A, Group III labor certification.
(2) Any minister, who for the previous 2 years has been or will be engaged in part-time ministerial employment involving more than 50 percent of his or her working time, may qualify forSchedule A, Group III labor certification but is precluded from special immigrant classification, which requires the minister to have been and intend to be engaged solely as a minister of areligious denomination.
PATEL, 19 I&N Dec. 394 (BIA 1986)
ID 3015 (PDF)
(2) To the extent that Matter of Chouliaris requires a further order granting voluntary departure in appeals determined to be frivolous or filed solely for the purpose of delay, it is disapproved and ismodified to preclude a further grant of voluntary departure where the original grant has expired.
MARTINEZ-ANGUIANO, 19 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1986)
ID 3016 (PDF)
(2) The Supreme Court held in INS v. Phinpathya that the continuous physical presence requirement of section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982),must be literally construed and that any absence from the United States during the 7-year period, however brief, casual, or innocent, breaks the continuity of physical presence required forsuspension of deportation; therefore, the Court's decision is not limited to cases where the alien engaged in fraud in order to reenter the United States following a departure.
SILVER DRAGON CHINESE RESTAURANT, 19 I&N Dec. 401 (Comm. 1986)
ID 3017 (PDF)
(1) An occupational preference petition may be filed on behalf of a prospective employee who is a shareholder in the corporation. The prospective employee's interest in the corporation,however, is a material fact to be considered in determining whether the job being offered was really open to all qualified applicants.
(2) A shareholder's concealment, in labor certification proceedings, of his or her interest in the petitioning corporation constitutes willful misrepresentation of a material fact and is a ground forinvalidation of an approved labor certification under 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(d) (1986).
GARCIA-ALZUGARAY, 19 I&N Dec. 407 (BIA 1986)
ID 3018 (PDF)
(1) An alien conditionally admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982), has not been paroled pursuant tosection 212(d)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982).
(2) The sole basis for terminating the status of an alien admitted to the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act is a determination that he was not a refugee within themeaning of section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982), at the time of his admission.
(3) Absent the proper termination of his status, an alien who has been admitted as a refugee under section 207 of the Act may not be placed in exclusion proceedings until there has been aprior determination that such alien is inadmissible, following his examination under oath by an immigration officer.
HARRY BAILEN BUILDERS, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 412 (Comm. 1986)
ID 3019 (PDF)
A labor certification issued by the Department of Labor applies only to a specific job opportunity. When the job offer is filled by the arrival of an alien or for any other reason, the job offer ceasesto exist. Therefore, an alien who abandons residence after being admitted for permanent residence to take up the certified job offer cannot use the same labor certification again.
GARCIA, 19 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 1986)
ID 3020 (PDF)
(2) Under the New Jersey Parentage Act, effective May 21, 1983, all children and parents have equal rights with respect to each other regardless of the marital status of the parents. N.J. Stat.Ann. §§ 9:17-38 to -59 (West 1983). Matter of Clarke, 18 I&N Dec. 369 (BIA 1983), modified.
(4) Where the petitioner seeks to establish that the beneficiary was legitimated under the New Jersey Parentage Act within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Act, he must prove thathe had a residence or domicile in New Jersey prior to the beneficiary's 18th birthday.
PRADIEU, 19 I&N Dec. 419 (BIA 1986)
ID 3021 (PDF)
Where a spouse visa petition is filed in the New York District Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, it must be adjudicated in compliance with the procedures set forth underthe final consent judgment entered in Stokes v. INS, No. 74 Civ. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1976), regardless of whether the visa petition has been submitted individually or simultaneously filedwith an application for adjustment of status.
GARCIA-GARROCHO, 19 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 1986)
ID 3022 (PDF)
(1) Section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1982), provides that withholding of deportation shall not apply to analien who, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community.
(4) A New York State conviction for residential burglary in the first degree is per se a "particularly serious" crime because the statute involves one or more aggravating circumstances includingphysical injury or potentially life threatening acts.
ATEMBE, 19 I&N Dec. 427 (BIA 1986)
ID 3023 (PDF)
Notwithstanding the fact that an illegitimate child may qualify for immigration purposes as the "child" of his or her natural father following the amendment on November 6, 1986, of section101(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1982), provided paternity is established and the father "has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship" with thechild, a visa petition filed prior to the effective date of the amendment may not be used to obtain preference status for the beneficiary under section 203(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1982),because approval of the visa petition would give the beneficiary a priority date to which he or she was not entitled at the time the visa petition was filed. Matter of Drigo, 18 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA1982); and Matter of Bardouille, 18 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981), followed.
NAFI, 19 I&N Dec. 430 (BIA 1987)
ID 3024 (PDF)
When an applicant for admission has notice of his exclusion hearing and fails to appear, the immigration judge may, in his discretion, find that the applicant has failed to establish hisadmissibility and has abandoned any application for asylum and order him excluded and deported.
PEREZ-ANDRADE, 19 I&N Dec. 433 (BIA 1987)
ID 3025 (PDF)
LIN LEE, 19 I&N Dec. 435 (BIA 1987)
ID 3026 (PDF)
TEKLAY, 19 I&N Dec. 437 (BIA 1987)
ID 3027 (PDF)
Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals which provided that applications for legalization would have to be "filed within 30 days of the date designated by the Attorney General for the initialacceptance of applications" are clarified to provide that the 30-day filing period is only required as specifically mandated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service's final rules.
MOGARRABI, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)
ID 3028 (PDF)
(1) In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the "clear probability" of persecution standard employed for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), does not converge with, and may not be equated with, the "well-founded fear" of persecution standard used for asylum under section 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), is therefore overruled insofar as it held that the two standards were not meaningfullydifferent, and in practical application converged.
ESTIME, 19 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 1987)
ID 3029 (PDF)
(1) Pursuant to section 205 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (1982), a notice of intention to revoke approval of a visa petition is not properly issued unless there is"good and sufficient cause" and the notice includes a specific statement not only of the facts underlying the proposed action, but also of the supporting evidence.
(3) There is "good and sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 205 of the Act to revoke approval of a visa petition if the evidence of record at the time of the decision, including anyexplanation or rebuttal submitted by the petitioner, warrants a denial based on the petitioner's failure to meet his or her burden of proof.
(5) A decision to revoke approval of a visa petition will be sustained where a petitioner fails to make a timely explanation or submission of evidence to the Immigration and NaturalizationService after receipt of a properly issued notice of intention to revoke.
HOSSEINIAN, 19 I&N Dec. 453 (BIA 1987)
ID 3030 (PDF)
AURELIO, 19 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1987)
ID 3031 (PDF)
(1) The immigration judges and the Board lack jurisdiction in exclusion and deportation proceedings to review a decision by the district director that revocation of a visa petition pursuantto 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3) (1987) is appropriate following the death of the petitioner.
(2) An application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(k) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(k) (1982), may be adjudicated by an immigration judge inexclusion proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 212.10 (1987) without adjournment of the proceedings for consideration of the application by the district director.
(3) A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(k) of the Act was properly denied where the applicant knew about her father's death prior to issuance of her visa and failed to exercisereasonable diligence in ascertaining its effect on her immigration status.
TOMAS, 19 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1987)
ID 3032 (PDF)
(1) The respondents, who have the burden of showing a well-founded fear of persecution to qualify for asylum or withholding of deportation, must be given a reasonable opportunity topresent evidence on their own behalf, including their testimony.
(2) Where the respondents cannot speak English fluently, the presence of a competent interpreter is essential for their meaningful participation in certain phases of the hearing and toinsure the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
(3) A remand is ordered by the Board of Immigration Appeals for the purpose of conducting a new hearing and obtaining the services of a professional interpreter fluent in the Kanjoballanguage of Guatemala where the respondents, who spoke no English and little or no Spanish, could not adequately present their case through a Spanish interpreter.
PULA, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987)
ID 3033 (PDF)
(2) The circumvention of orderly refugee procedures can be a serious adverse factor in determining whether to grant asylum; however, it should not be considered in such a way thatthe practical effect is to deny relief in all cases.
(3) The circumvention of the immigration laws is only one of a number of factors which should be balanced in exercising discretion, and the weight accorded to this factor may vary dependingon the facts of a particular case.
(4) The circumvention of orderly refugee procedures alone is insufficient to require the most unusual showing of countervailing equities. Matter of Salim, 18 I&N Dec. 311 (BIA 1982)modified.
EGBUNINE, 19 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 1987)
ID 3034 (PDF)
(1) Pursuant to sections 245(e)(1) and (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(1) and (2) (Supp. IV 1986), an alien may not adjust his status if he seeks to receive animmigrant visa on the basis of a marriage which was entered into while the alien is facing administrative or judicial proceedings regarding his right to enter or remain in the United States.
(3) Under section 204(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(h) (Supp. IV 1986), an alien may not be granted immediate relative status by reason of a marriage which was entered into while the alienis facing administrative or judicial proceedings regarding his right to enter or remain in the United States, unless the alien resides outside of the United States for a 2-year period beginning afterthe date of the marriage.
(4) An application for a waiver of excludability should not be submitted by an alien subject to the 2-year residence requirement under section 204(h) of the Act, until the respondent becomeseligible for immediate relative status.
DIAL AUTO REPAIR SHOP, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm. 1987)
ID 3035 (PDF)
(1) In a third- or sixth-preference visa petition involving an individual labor certification, successorship in interest will be recognized only where the Department of Labor has formallyacknowledged the continuing validity of the certification for the employment proposed by the successor entity.
(2) Where a successorship in interest is recognized, the petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish eligibility in all respects as of the date the application for labor certification as originallyaccepted for processing by the Department of Labor.
BATTISTA, 19 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1987)
ID 3036 (PDF)
(1) The immigration judge erred in denying the respondent's application for adjustment of status on the ground that he had a preconceived intent to remain in the United States at the time of hisentry as a nonimmigrant where the respondent was eligible for an immigrant visa and his uncontroverted testimony was that he had only intended to visit his family in this country for ashort period at the time of his arrival.
(2) The immigration judge also erred by not weighing the respondent's significant family ties since preconceived intent is only one factor to be considered in the exercise of administrativediscretion.
(3) In accordance with an interim rule promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Board of Immigration Appeals will limit its application of the bar of section 245(c)(2)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2) (1982), as amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which precludes adjustment of status to any alien,other than an immediate relative, who is not in legal status on the date of filing, to aliens who filed adjustment applications on or after November 6, 1986.
ANDRADE, 19 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 1987)
ID 3037 (PDF)
(1) In bond redetermination proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals may consider the respondent's extensive and recent criminal record in determining the necessity for a bond or theappropriate amount of a bond.
(3) In setting a substantial bond, the Board took into consideration the respondent's disrespect for the law, his poor character, and the effect of his crimes upon his eligibility for relief fromdeportation.
(4) An alien's early release from prison and transition to a parole status do not necessarily reflect rehabilitation, and, therefore, such facts do not carry significant weight in determiningwhether he is a good bail risk for immigration purposes.
DUCKETT, 19 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1987)
ID 3038 (PDF)
A Canadian citizen railroad clerk employed by a Canadian railroad who seeks to enter the United States on a daily basis for a portion of his shift in order to clear his employer's railroadcars for transport from the United States to Canada is admissible to the United States as a visitor for business under section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(B) (1982), as the function he performs is a necessary incident to international trade or commerce. Matter of L-, 3 I&N Dec. 857 (C.O., BIA 1950), distinguished.
LODGE, 19 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 1987)
ID 3039 (PDF)
(2) The appealing party is not relieved of the responsibility for meaningfully informing the Board of the reasons for the appeal simply by requesting oral argument in the Notice of Appeal (FormI-290A).
(3) Where the Notice of Appeal is conclusory and does not meaningfully apprise the Board of the issues on appeal, the appeal may be summarily dismissed under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a)(i)(1987) even in cases where oral argument has been requested.
A-G-, 19 I&N Dec. 502 (BIA 1987)
ID 3040 (PDF)
(1) The respondent's government has the same right as other governments to require military service and to enforce that requirement with reasonable penalities; and, therefore, the exerciseof that sovereign right does not constitute persecution.
(2) Persecution for failure to serve in the military may be established in those rare cases wherea disproportionately severe punishment would result on account of one of the five groundsenumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982), or where the alien, as a result of military service required by hisgovernment, would necessarily be required to engage in inhuman conduct condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct.
(3) The case of Matter of Salim, 18 I&N Dec. 311 (BIA 1982), is distinguishable from the present case because the claimant in that case was refusing to serve, not in an army controlled by hisown government, but in one which was "under Soviet command."
MALDONADO-CRUZ, 19 I&N Dec. 509 (BIA 1988)
ID 3041 (PDF)
(1) A threat to harm or kill a deserter from a guerrilla organization operating in a country does not constitute persecution under the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.(2) In analyzing a claim of persecution made in the context of a civil war, it is necessary to examine the motivation of the group threatening harm.
(3) The threat to harm a deserter from the guerrilla organization is part of a military policy of that group, inherent in the nature of the organization, and a tool of discipline; thus, the threat is neitheran act of persecution nor evidence of persecution by the guerrilla organization on account of political opinion, or any other ground set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980.
OBAIGBENA, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988)
ID 3042 (PDF)
(1) A petitioner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to rebut the derogatory evidence cited in a notice of intention to deny his visa petition and to present evidence in his behalf before the district director's decision is rendered.
(2) Reasonable and timely requests for an extension of time tosubmit a rebuttal to the notice of intention to deny a visa petition should be dealt with by the district director in a reasonable andfair manner, particularly when a petition has been pending for a prolonged period or where the notice of intention to deny contains extensive investigative findings or factual allegations.
(3) To be considered "reasonable," a request for an extension of time to submit a rebuttal must state with specificity the reasons for the request and be limited to a finite period, and it must notbe for the purpose of obtaining documents which should have initially been submitted with the petition by regulation.
(4) Where a petitioner fails to timely and substantively respond to the notice of intention to deny or to make a reasonable request for an extension, the Board of Immigration Appeals will notconsider any evidence first proffered on appeal as its review is limited to the record of proceeding before the district director; for further consideration, a new visa petition must be filed.
NOLAN, 19 I&N Dec. 539 (BIA 1988)
ID 3043 (PDF)
(2) The availability or unavailability of a pardon under state or federal law, or the existence or nonexistence of a qualifying pardoning authority, is not determinative of whether an offenseconstitutes a "crime" within the ambit of section 241(a)(4) of the Act. Matter of Cevallos, 12 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1968), overruled.
OZKOK, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988)
ID 3044 (PDF)
(1) A conviction exists for immigration purposes where an alien has had a formal judgment of guilt entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where all of the followingelements are present: (1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty, (2) thejudge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person's liberty to be imposed, and (3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates theterms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court's order, without availability of further proceedings regarding his guilt or innocence of the original charge. Matter ofGarcia, 19 I&N Dec. 270 (BIA 1985); Matter of Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981); Matter of Seda, 17 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 1980); Matter of Robinson, 16 I&N Dec. 762 (BIA 1979); Matter ofVaragianis, 16 I&N Dec. 48 (BIA 1976); Matter of Pikkarainen, 10 I&N Dec. 401 (BIA 1963); and Matter of L-R-, 8 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1959), overruled in part.
(4) The respondent, whose adjudication of guilt was stayed and whose proceedings were deferred after his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine and who was ordered to complete 3 years of probation and 100 hours of volunteer community service pursuant to a state statute which allowed the court to enter judgment and proceed with disposition of the person upon viola-tion of probation as if probation had not been ordered, has a final conviction sufficient to support an order of deportation under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(a)(11) (1982).
ENRIQUEZ, 19 I&N Dec. 554 (BIA 1988)
ID 3045 (PDF)
MICHAEL HERTZ ASSOCIATES, 19 I&N Dec. 558 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3046 (PDF)
ID 3047 (PDF)
HILAIRE, 19 I&N Dec. 566 (BIA 1988)
ID 3048 (PDF)
ARIAS, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988)
ID 3049 (PDF)
VIGIL, 19 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1987)
ID 3050 (PDF)
HO, 19 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1988)
ID 3051 (PDF)
CHURCH SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3052 (PDF)
(2) In view of congressional intent that the "L-1" provisions be used for personnel transferred by international businesses, any religious personnel who are able to meet all the same "L-1"requirements which apply to business or other personnel may be granted "L-1" visas or Schedule A, Group IV, labor certifications.
BALIBUNDI, 19 I&N Dec. 606 (BIA 1988)
ID 3053 (PDF)
BARCENAS, 19 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 1988)
ID 3054 (PDF)
HERNANDEZ-PONCE, , 19 I&N Dec. 613 (BIA 1988)
ID 3055 (PDF)
AWWAL, 19 I&N Dec. 617 (BIA 1988)
ID 3056 (PDF)
BADALAMENTI, 19 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 1988)
ID 3057 (PDF)
BUSCEMI, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988)
ID 3058 (PDF)
LOZADA, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988)
ID 3059 (PDF)
HAIM, 19 I&N Dec. 641 (BIA 1988)
ID 3060 (PDF)
VIZCAINO, 19 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1988)
ID 3061 (PDF)
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 19 I&N Dec. 650 (Comm. 1987)
ID 3062 (PDF)
AMICO, 19 I&N Dec. 652 (BIA 1988)
ID 3063 (PDF)
ROSALES, 19 I&N Dec. 655 (BIA 1988)
ID 3064 (PDF)
FUENTES, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 1988)
ID 3065 (PDF)
JUAREZ, 19 I&N Dec. 664 (BIA 1988)
ID 3066 (PDF)
SANDOZ CROP PROTECTION CORPORATION, 19 I&N Dec. 666 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3067 (PDF)
DANESH, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988)
ID 3068 (PDF)
DIAZ-CHAMBROT, 19 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 1988)
ID 3069 (PDF)
JALIL, 19 I&N Dec. 679 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3070 (PDF)
GONZALEZ, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988)
ID 3071 (PDF)
RIVERA, 19 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 1988)
ID 3072 (PDF)
CASTRO, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988)
ID 3073 (PDF)
CANAS, 19 I&N Dec. 697 (BIA 1988)
ID 3074 (PDF)
(6) Absent a showing that his government enacted its conscription laws with the intent of persecuting members of a certain religion, or that the laws are carried out in a persecutorymanner against persons with particular religious beliefs, an alien with religious objections to military service does not establish eligibility for asylum although he may be prosecuted for a refusal to perform military service.
ID 3075 (PDF)
PATRICK, 19 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 1988)
ID 3076 (PDF)
CESPEDES, 19 I&N Dec. 730 (BIA 1988)
ID 3077 (PDF)
(2) The mere statement on a Notice of Appeal (Form I-290A) that a brief will be filed upon receipt of a transcript of the proceeding does not absolve the appealing party of the responsibility of adequately identifying the reasons for appeal on the Notice of Appeal.
(3) Where a motion for summary dismissal of an appeal has been made, the appellant can respond in various manners: (1) argument can be made that the statements in the Notice of Appeal adequately set forth the reasons for the appeal; (2) the statement on appeal can be elaborated upon to meaningfully identify the reasons for appeal; (3) a brief in support of the appeal can be submitted; or, (4) if there are unusual reasons why a more explicit statement of the reasons for appeal cannot be provided until a transcript is prepared, they should be clearly identified. (4) Absent a meaningful statement of the reasons for an appeal or an adequate explanation of why a transcript of the proceedings is necessary before such reasons can be set forth, there is no appropriate reason to extend appellate briefing time beyond the period fixed by regulation.
MEDINA, 19 I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 1988)
ID 3078 (PDF)
HUANG, 19 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 1988)
ID 3079 (PDF)
(2) An alien acquires lawful permanent resident status at the time of his initial admission to the United States as a lawful permanent resident, as at that point he attains "the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws," and is thus an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" pursuant to section 101(a)(20) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1982).
(3) For purposes of determining whether the applicant has abandoned her lawful permanent resident status, an applicant's absence from the United States due to her husband's having a contract to work and study at a Japanese university cannot be said to be a temporary visit abroad fixed by some early event, where the record does not show a clear demarcation as to when her husband's relationship with the university would end.
N-, 19 I&N Dec. 760 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3080 (PDF)
(2) Such student's situation is analogous to that of an alien in the United States illegally who departed and was subsequently admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant. The Service has held that such alien, if he can demonstrate he reentered to resume his unlawful residence, may qualify for legalization benefits.
(3) Acquisition of reinstatement by fraud renders an alien excludable pursuant to section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982). A waiver of excludability is provided by 245A(d)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1986), to assure family unity.
SORIANO, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988)
ID 3081 (PDF)
IBERIA AIRLINES FLIGHT #IB 951, 19 I&N Dec. 768 (BIA 1988)
ID 3082 (PDF)
PATEL, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988)
ID 3083 (PDF)
COPELAND, 19 I&N Dec. 788 (BIA 1988)
ID 3084 (PDF)
CARON INTERNATIONAL, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3085 (PDF)
KAHY, 19 I&N Dec. 803 (BIA 1988)
ID 3086 (PDF)
C-, 19 I&N Dec. 808 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3087 (PDF)
RODRIGUEZ-MAJANO, 19 I&N Dec. 811 (BIA 1988)
ID 3088 (PDF)
SEA, INC., 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3089 (PDF)
P-, 19 I&N Dec. 823 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3090 (PDF)
GARCIA-REYES, 19 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA 1988)
ID 3091 (PDF)
RIVERA-RIOSECO, 19 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1988)
ID 3092 (PDF)
BARRERA, 19 I&N Dec. 837 (BIA 1988)
ID 3093 (PDF)
S-, 19 I&N Dec. 851 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3094 (PDF)
ROMAN, 19 I&N Dec. 855 (BIA 1988)
ID 3095 (PDF)
M-, 19 I&N Dec. 861 (Comm. 1989)
ID 3096 (PDF)
(1) A conviction exists pursuant to section 245A(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1986), where (1) a judge or a jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment or penalty, including but not limited to a fine or probation.
(2) An alien who pled guilty to a felony and, as a result, was fined $1,000 and placed on probation for 3 years is an alien who has been convicted of a felony within the purview of section 245A(a)(4)(B) of the Act.
A-, 19 I&N Dec. 867 (Comm. 1988)
ID 3097 (PDF)
O-, 19 I&N Dec. 871 (Comm. 1989)
ID 3098 (PDF)
TIWARI, 19 I&N Dec. 875 (BIA 1989)
ID 3099 (PDF)
PAZANDEH, 19 I&N Dec. 884 (BIA 1989)
ID 3100 (PDF)