Source: http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-superior-court-27476
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 16:47:07
Document Index: 657901307

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 67', '§ 118', '§ 1538', '§ 1538', '§ 2', '§ 21', '§ 1']

People v. Superior Court - 70 Cal.2d 123 - Mon, 01/20/1969 | California Supreme Court Resources	Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library
Home > Opinions > People v. Superior Court	Citation 70 Cal.2d 123
People v. Superior Court , 70 Cal.2d 123
On December 28, 1967, Smith was charged by indictment with five counts of bribery of public officers and employees (§ 67 1/2) and five counts of perjury committed before a grand jury (§ 118).pursuant to section 1538.5 he moved to suppress certain evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of, and was therefore inadmissible under, former section 653j. [70 Cal.2d 126]
It is undisputed that the above tape recordings were made without any request or direction of any law enforcement agency or officer. Some months later, however, Bynon delivered [70 Cal.2d 127] to law enforcement officers a copy of the tape. This was subsequently used by representatives of the district attorney to refresh the memories of those persons taking part in the conversation, who were later called before the grand jury and testified as to such conversation had with Smith. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was stipulated that without having their memories refreshed by the tape, none of the witnesses would have any independent recollection of the tape recorded conversation. fn. 4
[1a] At the outset we face a procedural question. Although both the People and defendant apparently have assumed that section 1538.5 provides a proper avenue toward the exclusion of the evidence here in controversy, we must [70 Cal.2d 128] decide whether or not the section is available to effect suppression where, as here, the evidence has not been obtained as the result of a search or seizure by a government agent. We have concluded that in the light of its plain language and legislative history the section is not applicable.
As to both subdivisions (1) and (2) recent United States Supreme Court cases hold that unless the state standard for reasonableness of a search is higher than the federal standard, the standard or test of reasonableness is that required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See, e. g., Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 61-62 [17 L.Ed.2d 730, 733-734, 87 S.Ct. 788].) Settled principles of constitutional law make the Fourth Amemdment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." [3] The conduct of a person not acting under the authority of a state is not proscribed by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. [70 Cal.2d 129] [4] There are no state standards for "search and seizure" by a private citizen who is not acting as an agent of the state or other governmental unit. [2b] Therefore, acquisition of property by a private citizen from another person cannot be deemed reasonable or unreasonable (People v. Randazzo (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 768, 775-776 [34 Cal.Rptr. 65], cert. den. 377 U.S. 1000 [12 L.Ed.2d 1050, 84 S.Ct. 1933]; People v. Johnson (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 870, 873-878 [315 P.2d 468]), and a motion to suppress evidence so obtained cannot be made on the ground that its acquisition constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under section 1538.5.
[1b] Accordingly, we conclude that the procedures afforded by section 1538.5 are not available where, as in the instant case, the evidence sought to be suppressed has not been "obtained as a result of a search or seizure." (§ 1538.5; [70 Cal.2d 130] see fn. 5, ante.) In such circumstances, Smith was not entitled to invoke the section by moving to suppress evidence and the trial court abused its discretion by ordering suppression and granting relief in a situation where the section was not applicable. The People properly seek mandate to review the trial court's action in granting Smith's motion (§ 1538.5, subd. (o); see fn. 5, ante). In view of our above conclusions that the section was not applicable and that there was no basis on which suppression of evidence could be ordered pursuant to its provisions, we order issuance of a writ of mandate to annul the proceeding below.
However, for the guidance of the trial court we make the following observations on the question of the admissibility of evidence involved. Simply stated the issue is this: Were the tape recordings obtained in violation of former section 653j [70 Cal.2d 131] which we have set forth in pertinent part in the margin? fn. 7 If, in obtaining the recordings, Bynon committed the offense proscribed by subdivision (a) of that section, then clearly, with exceptions not here applicable, by virtue of subdivision (d) none of the evidence obtained by him "shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding."
[6] To establish the offense proscribed by subdivision (a) of former section 653j it must be shown that (1) a person as defined in subdivision (b) not a party to the communication (2) intentionally and (3) without the consent of any party to the communication (4) eavesdropped upon or recorded (5) a confidential communication as defined in subdivision (c). On the record now before us, the parties appear to agree and the trial court found, that each of the two conversations occurring in Smith's office on November 10 and 11, 1965, constituted a confidential communication and that each was recorded on tape by Bynon. It is also undisputed that Bynon was not a party to either communication and seems to be assumed that he is a person falling within the definition of subdivision (b). The only elements of the five enumerated above which now [70 Cal.2d 132] seem to be in controversy are No. 2 and No. 3. On the present record at least, the question which remains for the trial court's determination is this: Did Bynon intentionally and without the consent of any party thereto record the confidential communications. fn. 8
Defendant contends that the word "intentionally" as used in subdivision (a) (see fn. 7, ante) goes only to the act of putting the recording equipment in operation. In other words, he argues, a mere intention to start the equipment without more satisfies the requirement of intent and makes the person involved in the act criminally liable. This reading of the statute seems to us to slight if not ignore the prevailing trend "away from the imposition of criminal sanctions in the absence of culpability where the governing statute, by implication or otherwise, expresses no legislative intent or policy to be served by imposing strict liability." (People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 533 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092]; compare People v. Gory (1946) 28 Cal.2d 450, 453-454 [170 P.2d 433].) Eavesdropping is not one of that class of crimes that affects public health, welfare or safety for which strict liability is most often imposed without any ingredient of intent (see Morissette v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 253- 254 [96 L.Ed. 288, 295-296, 72 S.Ct. 240]; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2 [299 P.2d 850]), and there is no other indication that the Legislature intended to impose criminal sanctions in the absence of criminal intent.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the word "intentionally" advanced by defendant would produce results at once unreasonable and inconsistent with legislative purpose. [7] "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672], and cases there cited; East Bay Garbage Co. v. Washington Township Sanitation Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 708, 713 [344 P.2d 289].) Statutes should be construed so as to be given a reasonable result consistent with the legislative purpose. (Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 620 [7 Cal.Rptr. [70 Cal.2d 133] 129, 354 P.2d 657]; County of Alameda v. Kuchel (1948) 32 Cal.2d 193, 199 [195 P.2d 17].) [8] In the interpretation of particular words, phrases or clauses in a statute, the entire substance of the statute or that portion relating to the subject under review should be examined in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision containing such words, phrases or clauses. (Wallace v. Payne (1925) 197 Cal. 539, 544 [241 P. 879].) Words used in a statute "must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute. ..." (Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46 [229 P.2d 9].)
[10] As we have already stated, the trial court found that each of the conversations in Smith's office was a confidential communication within the meaning of the statute and that each had been recorded on tape without the consent of any party to the conversation. However, on the issue of Bynon's state of mind, the only pertinent finding is that "the recordings were made by chance, during testing normally incident to the installation. ..." (Italics added.) We think this finding is too vague, as the element of chance may have reference [70 Cal.2d 134] either to the circumstances bringing Smith and his conferees within the range of the microphones or to Bynon's intentions in activating the recording equipment. The trial court must more specifically determine whether Bynon "intentionally" recorded a confidential communication.
As the definition of a degree of culpability, the word "intentional" has been the subject of widely differing interpretations, depending on context and apparent legislative intent. (See 46 C.J.S. Intentional, Intentionally, 1106-1107; Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's (1954) 42 Cal.2d 460, 473 [267 P.2d 777]; People v. McCree (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 196, 202 [275 P.2d 95].) For purposes of former section 653j, the recording of a confidential conversation is intentional if the person using the recording equipment does so with the purpose or desire of recording a confidential conversation, or with the knowledge to a substantial certainty that his use of the equipment will result in the recordation of a confidential conversation. (See Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed. 1961), 34-42; Coffman v. Godsoe (1960) 142 Colo. 575, 588 [351 P.2d 808]. Compare Model Penal Code, § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft) 25-28.) Such a reading of the statute provides effective protection against "eavesdroppers" without penalizing the innocent use of recording equipment. Whether in any instance a person possessed the requisite intent is "a question of fact which may be proved like any other fact, by acts, conduct and circumstances connected with the offense." (People v. Fewkes (1931) 214 Cal. 142, 148 [4 P.2d 538]; see § 21; People v. Richardson (1911) 161 Cal. 552, 558-559 [120 P. 20].)
[11] We make one further observation. Under subdivision (b) the term "person" as used in former section 653j does not include "an individual acting under the direction of a party to the confidential communication." In deciding the question of admissibility when it arises in due course at trial, the respondent court may have to determine whether Bynon acted under the "direction" of Smith in recording the confidential conversations. "Direction" is defined as "guidance or supervision of action, conduct or operation" or "an explicit command." (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961).) It would seem that the Legislature sought to exclude from criminal liability one who recorded a confidential communication at the explicit command of one of the parties. The logic is clear; in terms of its effect on confidentiality, there is little distinction between recordation of a conversation by one of the parties personally, or by a third person acting at his command. [70 Cal.2d 135] In order to come within the exclusion, however, the person recording a conversation must do so in response to a specific command to record the particular conversation. In other words, it must be within the knowledge of the "directing" party that the conversation is being recorded, and he must have intended to record the particular conversation. If at trial the court determines that Bynon in making the recordings was "acting under the direction" of Smith, then clearly it would follow that Bynon's conduct was not violative of the statute and that the evidence in question would not be inadmissible under subdivision (d).
­FN 1. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Penal Code.
­FN 2. The criminal action is entitled People v. Harvey Keith Smith, Los Angeles Superior Court No. A-228399.
­FN 3. The system could also be activated manually by placing the proper switch on the manual mode.
­FN 4. It would appear from the record now before us that without the testimony of these witnesses the People will be unable to make a prima facie case on the perjury counts since the People's theory on these counts is that Smith, while under oath before the grand jury, knowingly and falsely denied that he engaged in the conversations which were tape recorded. At the same time, it would appear that suppression of the tape and the testimony will significantly impair the prosecution of Smith on the bribery counts since the tapes constitute damaging evidence in support of such counts.
­FN 5. Section 1538.5 in pertinent part provides: "A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on the ground that:
­FN 6. Section 1538.5 was added by Stats. 1967, ch. 1537, § 1, in effect November 7, 1967.
­FN 7. Former section 653j was added to the code by Stats. 1963, ch. 1886, section 1 and repealed by Stats. 1967 ch. 1509, section 9. Its subject matter is now covered by section 632. Former section 653j provided in pertinent part as follows:
­FN 8. The People contend that Bynon "did not violate subdivision (a) because two essential elements to this crime were absent, namely: (1) he did not intentionally record a confidential communication, and (2) he did not act without consent because Smith's acts in ordering the installation amounted, by law, to consent or authorization, at least to the extent of relieving the person who made the recordings from criminal liability for so doing."
Date:Citation:Category:Status:	Mon, 01/20/196970 Cal.2d 123Review - Criminal AppealOpinion issued	Parties
1THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Respondent)2; HARVEY KEITH SMITH, Real Party in Interest. (; HARVEY KEITH SMITH)3THE PEOPLE (Petitioner)4THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Respondent)5; HARVEY KEITH SMITH, Real Party in Interest. (; HARVEY KEITH SMITH) Disposition
Jan 20 1969Writ Issued	Cite This Case
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