Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/43577.98-43579.98-en-20040226/view/
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 17:45:37
Document Index: 39100320

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 146', '§ 194', '§ 171', '§ 181', '§ 186', '§ 192', '§ 193', '§ 2', '§ 196', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 146', '§ 192', '§ 87', '§ 80', '§ 202', '§ 161', '§ 105', '§ 86', '§ 63', '§ 139', '§ 81', '§ 91', '§ 83', '§ 111', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 82', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 44', '§ 90', '§ 161', '§ 32', '§ 109', '§ 272', '§ 154', '§ 44', '§ 97', '§ 87', '§ 61', '§ 94', '§ 168', '§ 120', '§ 294']

4. The applications were transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11). Following the former Fourth Section's decision of 22 March 2001 to join the applications (Rule 43 § 1) and the Court's decision of 1 November 2001 to change the composition of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1), the present case was assigned to the newly composed First Section (Rule 52 § 1). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
5. The applications were declared partly admissible on 28 February 2002. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). In addition, third-party comments were received from the European Roma Rights Centre, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 61 § 3)
62. Article 192 provides that proceedings concerning publicly prosecuted crimes may only be initiated by a prosecutor or an investigator, acting on a complaint or ex officio. Under Article 237 § 6, as worded until 1 January 2000, the victim had a right of appeal to a higher ranking prosecutor against a decision not to proceed with pending criminal proceedings. The victim had no other means of challenging a refusal to prosecute.
72. In its decision of 21 November 2002, the Committee, examining Complaint No. 161/2000 submitted by Hajrizi Dzemajl and others against Yugoslavia, found that a mob action by non-Roma residents of Danilovgrad, Montenegro, who destroyed a Roma settlement on 14 April 1995 in the presence of police officers, was “committed with a significant level of racial motivation”. That fact aggravated the violation of Article 16 § 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment found in the case.
79. The applicants complained that Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were deprived of their life in violation of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. They had died – so it was alleged – as a result of deficient law and practice which permitted the use of lethal force without absolute necessity and thus violated Article 2 § 1 per se. The applicants also complained that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the deaths.
95. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether the operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force. The authorities must take appropriate care to ensure that any risk to life is minimised. The Court must also examine whether the authorities were not negligent in their choice of action (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, pp. 45-46, §§ 146-50 and p. 57, § 194, Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, judgment of 9 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI, pp. 2097-98, § 171, p. 2102, § 181, p. 2104, § 186, p. 2107, § 192 and p. 2108, § 193 and Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/95, ECHR 2001-III).
97. It follows that the complaints must be examined under Article 2 § 2 (b) of the Convention.
103. The Court considers that, balanced against the imperative need to preserve life as a fundamental value, the legitimate aim of effecting a lawful arrest cannot justify putting human life at risk where the fugitive has committed a non-violent offence and does not pose a threat to anyone. Any other approach would be incompatible with the basic principles of democratic societies, as universally accepted today (see the relevant provisions of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials in paragraphs 67-70 above and, mutatis mutandis, the Court's reasoning in Öcalan v. Turkey, no. 46221/99, § 196, 12 March 2003).
104. It is only in subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 2 § 2 that violence (in the form of unlawful violence, a riot or an insurrection) is expressly made a condition that will justify the use of potentially lethal force. However, the principle of strict proportionality as enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention cannot be read in dissociation from the purpose of that provision: the protection of the right to life. This implies that a similar condition applies to cases under subparagraph (b).
105. The use of potentially lethal firearms inevitably exposes human life to danger even when there are rules designed to minimise the risks. Accordingly, the Court considers that it can in no circumstances be “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of the Convention to use such firearms to arrest a person suspected of a non-violent offence who is known not to pose a threat to life or limb, even where a failure to do so may result in the opportunity to arrest the fugitive being lost (see the following cases in which the use of firearms was found to have been justified – all of them concerned situations where the State agents involved acted in the belief that there was a threat of violence or in order to apprehend fugitives suspected of violent offences: W. v. Germany, no. 11257/84, Commission decision of 6 October 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) 49, p. 213; Kelly v. the United Kingdom, no. 17579/90, Commission decision of 13 January 1993, DR 74, p. 139; M.D. v. Turkey, no. 28518/95, Commission decision of 30 June 1997, unreported, Laginha de Matos v. Portugal, no. 28955/95, Commission decision of 7 April 1997, DR 89, p. 98; Andronicou and Constantinou, cited above and Caraher v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24520/94, ECHR 2000-I; see also the Court's approach in McCann and Others, cited above, pp. 45-46, §§ 146-50 and pp. 56-62, §§ 192-214; see also the Court's condemnation of the use of firearms against unarmed and non-violent persons trying to leave the former German Democratic Republic in Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, §§ 87, 96 and 97, ECHR 2001-II).
109. It is not the Court's task to determine whether Major G. had an intention to kill, as it does not fulfil the functions of a criminal court as regards the allocation of degree of individual fault (see Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93, § 80, 14 December 2000). The allegation that the use of excessive force revealed a racial motive on the part of Major G. is to be assessed in the light of the applicant's complaint under Article 14 of the Convention.
110. The Court considers that, in keeping with the State's obligation to protect life, a crucial element in the planning of an arrest operation that may potentially result in the use of firearms must be the analysis of all the available information about the surrounding circumstances, including, as an absolute minimum, the nature of the offence committed by the person to be arrested and the degree of danger – if any – posed by that person. The question whether and in what circumstances, recourse to firearms should be envisaged if the person to be arrested tries to escape must be decided on the basis of clear legal rules, adequate training and in the light of that information (see McCann and Others, cited above, pp. 59-62, §§ 202-14, analysing in detail whether or not all circumstances relevant to the use of force were taken into account in the planning of the operation).
116. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force. The investigation must be, inter alia, thorough, impartial and careful (see McCann and Others, cited above, p. 49, §§ 161-63; Kaya v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I, p. 329, § 105 and Çakici v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 86, ECHR 1999-IV).
117. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see, mutatis mutandis, İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 63, ECHR 2000-VII). The investigation must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of the required effectiveness standard (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 139, ECHR 2002-IV).
118. Also, for an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events (see Güleç v. Turkey, judgment of 27 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, p. 1733, §§ 81-82 and Öğur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21954/93, §§ 91-92, ECHR 1999-III). This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Ergı v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp. 1778-79, §§ 83-84).
119. There must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities' adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, §§ 111-15, ECHR 2001-III).
122. In the present case, the authorities did not bring charges as they considered that the relevant regulations on the use of force had been complied with. That conclusion was based essentially on the findings that: (i) Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov were fugitives who had to be arrested; (ii) Major G. had given all required warnings but the two men had continued to make their escape; (iii) Major G. would probably have lost sight of them had he not fired; and (iv) Major G. had aimed at their feet, thus trying to avoid fatal injury (see paragraphs 46-50 above).
123. The Court has already found above that some of these findings are questionable (see paragraph 107 above).
128. The Court thus considers that the investigation into the deaths of Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov was flawed in that it did not apply a standard comparable to the “no more than absolutely necessary” standard required by Article 2 § 2 of the Convention.
131. The Court considers that the State's obligation under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation arises independently of the position taken by the victim's relatives. The fact that there has been no request for particular lines of inquiry to be pursued or items of evidence obtained cannot relieve the authorities of their duty to take all possible steps to establish the truth and ensure accountability for deaths caused by agents of the State. Furthermore, an investigation will not be effective unless all the evidence is properly analysed and the conclusions are consistent and reasoned.
137. The Court has held that it regards as particularly serious cases where indispensable and obvious investigative steps that could have elucidated acts of deprivation of life by State agents were not taken and the respondent Government failed to provide a plausible explanation about the reasons why that was not done (Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 82, ECHR 2000-VI).
141. There has been, therefore, a violation of the respondent State's obligation under Article 2 § 1 of the Convention to investigate deprivations of life effectively.
152. The European Roma Rights Centre, which was given leave to intervene pursuant to Rule 61 § 3 of the Rules of Court, submitted that there was a pressing need for the Court to re-evaluate its approach to interpreting Article 14 of the Convention in cases of alleged discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity and, in particular, to revise its stand on the applicable standard and burden of proof in such cases.
158. The Court considers that when investigating violent incidents and, in particular, deaths at the hands of State agents, State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. Failing to do so and treating racially induced violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IV). In order to maintain public confidence in their law enforcement machinery, contracting States must ensure that in the investigation of incidents involving the use of force a distinction is made both in their legal systems and in practice between cases of excessive use of force and of racist killing.
159. Admittedly, proving racial motivation will often be extremely difficult in practice. The respondent State's obligation to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours and not absolute (see, mutatis mutandis, Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, § 90, ECHR 2001-III, setting out the same standard with regard to the general obligation to investigate). The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of a racially induced violence.
166. The Court has held on many occasions that the standard of proof it applies is that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”, but it has made it clear that that standard should not be interpreted as requiring such a high degree of probability as in criminal trials. It has ruled that proof may follow from the co-existence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. It has been the Court's practice to allow flexibility, taking into consideration the nature of the substantive right at stake and any evidentiary difficulties involved. It has resisted suggestions to establish rigid evidentiary rules and has adhered to the principle of free assessment of all evidence. The Court has also acknowledged that its task is to rule on State responsibility under international law and not on guilt under criminal law. In its approach to questions of evidence and proof, it will have regard to its task under Article 19 of the Convention to “ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”, but without losing sight of the fact that it is a serious matter for a Contracting State to be found to be in breach of a fundamental right (see, among others, the following judgments: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64-65, § 161; Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, p. 24, § 32; Tanli v. Turkey, no. 26129/95, §§ 109-11, ECHR 2001-III; Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, § 272, ECHR 2003-V (extracts)).
167. The Court has already recognised that specific approaches to the issue of proof may be needed in cases of alleged discriminatory acts of violence. In one such case, it held that it is not excluded that a measure may be considered as discriminatory on the basis of evidence of its impact (disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group), notwithstanding that the measure is not specifically aimed or directed at that group (see Hugh Jordan, cited above, § 154).
168. In addition, it has become an established view in Europe that effective implementation of the prohibition of discrimination requires the use of specific measures that take into account the difficulties involved in proving discrimination (see paragraphs 74-76 above concerning anti-discrimination legislation, including evidentiary rules tailored to deal with the specific difficulties inherent in proving discrimination). The Court has also emphasised the need for a broad interpretation of the protection provided by Article 14 of the Convention (see Thlimmenos, cited above, § 44). Member States have expressed their resolve to secure better protection against discrimination by opening for ratification Protocol No. 12 to the Convention.
169. In the light of the above, the Court considers that in cases where the authorities have not pursued lines of inquiry that were clearly warranted in their investigation into acts of violence by State agents and have disregarded evidence of possible discrimination, it may, when examining complaints under Article 14 of the Convention, draw negative inferences or shift the burden of proof to the respondent Government, as it has previously done in situations involving evidential difficulties (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 97, ECHR 2000-VII, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V and Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 61, ECHR 2002-I).
173. The Court considers it highly relevant that this is not the first case against Bulgaria in which it has found that law enforcement officers had subjected Roma to violence resulting in death. In its Velikova and Anguelova judgments, the Court noted that the complaints of racial motivation in the killing of two Roma in police custody in separate incidents were based on “serious arguments” (see Velikova, cited above, § 94 and Anguelova, cited above, § 168).
183. As to the amount, in some cases, such as the present one, a precise calculation of the sums necessary to make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect of the pecuniary losses suffered by applicants may be prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violation. An award may still be made notwithstanding the large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of future losses. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction, which is a matter to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 120, ECHR 2001-V).
4. That is precisely what the Court does when dealing with Article 2 and 3 issues, and I believe the same template should equally be used when the analysis goes to Article 14 taken together with Articles 2 or 3. In those cases the Court investigates the state's responsibility in the death or inhuman treatment etc, and, separately, whether the state has discharged its responsibility in investigating properly a death or an allegation of conduct contrary to Article 3 (vide, e.g., Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, ECHR 2003-V (extracts), §§ 294, 295, 307, 308, 319, 320, 322 and 323).