Source: http://openjurist.org/944/f2d/638
Timestamp: 2013-05-19 13:28:34
Document Index: 422068086

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1251', '§ 1182', '§ 1105', '§ 8', '§ 1251', '§ 1251', '§ 1182']

944 F2d 638 Ayala-Chavez v. US Immigration and Naturalization Service | OpenJurist
944 F. 2d 638 - Ayala-Chavez v. US Immigration and Naturalization Service	Home944 f2d 638 ayala-chavez v. us immigration and naturalization service
944 F2d 638 Ayala-Chavez v. US Immigration and Naturalization Service 944 F.2d 638
Jesus Jorge AYALA-CHAVEZ, Petitioner,v.U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 90-70657.
Submitted Sept. 12, 1991.*Decided Sept. 19, 1991.
Shortly after his conviction, the INS charged him with deportability under section 241(a)(11) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11).1 The immigration judge found him deportable and denied his application for a waiver of deportation under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).2 The BIA affirmed. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.
The INS responds that this court lacks jurisdiction over the issue because Ayala did not raise it before the BIA. See Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir.1987). We disagree. In his brief to the Board, Ayala argued, "A non-violent possessory drug offense, together with minor infractions and problems, should not by themselves require that an alien should show unusual or outstanding equities to merit relief under section 212(c)." We find this adequately raised the issue to the BIA.
We review de novo the legal standard applied by the BIA. Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir.1988). Because section 212(c) is silent on the applicable legal standard, we must determine whether the administrative agency's standard is based on a permissible reading of the statute. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). "The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it could permissibly have adopted ... or even the reading the court would have reached if the question had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 11. We show considerable deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statutes it administers. Mahini v. INS, 779 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir.1986).
The BIA requires a showing of outstanding equities by applicants for discretionary relief who have been convicted of serious drug offenses, particularly trafficking. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 586 n. 4 (1978). Outstanding equities must also be demonstrated where the applicant's record reflects a pattern of serious criminal activity. Matter of Buscemi, Interim Decision 3058 (BIA 1984).3 Other circuits have recognized such a heightened standard but have not considered the precise argument made here. See, e.g., Blackwood v. INS, 803 F.2d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir.1988); Mantell v. INS, 798 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir.1986).
In determining whether the BIA's construction of the statute was permissible, we first note that courts have always interpreted broadly the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant or deny waiver of deportation. E.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353-54, 76 S.Ct. 919, 924, 100 L.Ed. 1242 (1956) (interpreting the then-current statute allowing suspension of deportation as giving the Attorney General "unfettered discretion"). Inherent in this discretion is the authority of the Attorney General and his subordinates to establish general standards that govern the exercise of such discretion, as long as these standards are rationally related to the statutory scheme. See C. Gordon, H. Rosenfield, S. Mailman, 3 Immigration Law and Procedure § 8.15a at 8-128 & n. 13.
The outstanding equities standard is rationally related to the statutory scheme. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that "the immigration laws clearly reflect strong Congressional policy against lenient treatment of drug offenders." Blackwood v. INS, 803 F.2d 1165, 1167 (11th Cir.1988); cf. Mason v. Brooks, 862 F.2d 190, 194-95 (9th Cir.1988) ("Congress has forcefully expressed our national policy against persons who possess controlled substances by enacting laws ... to exclude them from the United States if they are aliens.") The Act itself distinguishes between drug offenders and persons convicted of other crimes. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (judicial recommendations against deportation are not permitted in the case of aliens convicted of narcotics violations).
Ayala contends that, even if the outstanding equities standard is generally valid, the BIA erred by applying it to his case. He argues that the BIA did not state clearly its rationale for imposing the higher standard. This argument is meritless. The BIA clearly stated that "[Ayala's] drug conviction and the earlier lesser offenses are negative factors which ... compel a heightened showing of outstanding equities." Clearly there may be circumstances in which a petitioner's criminal activity is of such a slight nature that application of the higher standard would not be supported by substantial evidence. Ayala's criminal record is serious enough to justify application of the higher standard.
We review the BIA's balancing of the equities for section 212(c) relief for an abuse of discretion. Vargas v. Dep't of Immigration and Naturalization, 831 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1987). We may set aside the BIA's denial of section 212(c) relief "only if the Board failed to support its conclusions with a reasoned explanation based upon legitimate concerns." Id.
Section 241(a)(11) reads:
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11). Ayala concedes that he is deportable under this provision.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). On its face, this provision seems to apply only to exclusion proceedings, but we have found it applicable to deportation proceedings as well. See Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 224 (9th Cir.1981). We have also held it applicable to deportation proceedings regardless of whether the resident ever left the United States. Id. at 225.
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