Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98131/american-stevedores-inc-vs-porello
Timestamp: 2020-02-20 11:41:26
Document Index: 449254870

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 19', '§ 781', '§ 901', '§ 14', '§ 901', '§ 19', '§ 33', '§ 781', '§ 33', '§ 33', '§ 1', '§ 781', '§ 130', '§ 781', '§ 130']

American Stevedores Inc Vs Porello - Citation 98131 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
American Stevedores, Inc. Vs. Porello - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98131
Case Number 330 U.S. 446
Appellant American Stevedores, Inc.
Respondent Porello
american stevedores, inc. v. porello - 330 u.s. 446 (1947) u.s. supreme court american stevedores, inc. v. porello, 330 u.s. 446 (1947) american stevedores, inc. v. porello no. 69 argued december 11, 12, 1946 decided march 10, 1947 * 330 u.s. 446 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus 1. the public vessels act, 43 stat. 1112, which provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the united states . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the united states," authorizes a libel against the united states to recover damages for death or personal injuries caused by a public vessel of the united states. pp. 330 u. s. 450 -454, 330 u. s......
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello - 330 U.S. 446 (1947)
U.S. Supreme Court American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947)
1. The Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, which provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States," authorizes a libel against the United States to recover damages for death or personal injuries caused by a public vessel of the United States. Pp. 330 U. S. 450 -454, 330 U. S. 458 -460.
2. Mere acceptance by an injured longshoreman of compensation from his employer pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, without an award by a deputy commissioner under § 19, does not preclude the longshoreman from thereafter electing to sue a third-party tortfeasor for injuries suffered while working on a vessel. Pp. 330 U. S. 454 -456.
3. A stevedoring contract being a maritime contract, an admiralty court has jurisdiction to grant indemnity under an indemnity provision thereof. P. 330 U. S. 456 .
4. A district court awarded indemnity to the extent of half of the damages under an ambiguous indemnity provision of a stevedoring contract without admitting evidence as to the intention of the parties or making any clear finding as to the meaning of the contract. On appeal, the circuit court of appeals held that the stevedoring contractor should indemnify the owner completely. On review in this Court, the case is remanded to the district court for determination of the meaning of the contract, since the district court may have the benefit of such evidence as there is upon the intention of the parties. Pp. 330 U. S. 457 -458.
Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. The District Court overruled the Government's exceptions to the libel. 53 F.Supp. 569. The Government then impleaded the stevedoring contractor charging it with fault and setting forth an indemnity provision of the contract. The contractor answered the libel, denying fault and asserting as an affirmative defense that, by accepting compensation payments under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, the longshoreman had lost his right to sue a third-party tortfeasor. The District Court held that the longshoreman was not barred from maintaining the action, and that both the United States and the contractor were negligent, awarded damages from the United States, and awarded the United States contribution from the contractor as a joint tortfeasor to the extent of half the damages less the compensation payments received by the longshoreman. On cross-appeals by the United States and the contractor, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the contractor was bound by the indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract to make the United States completely whole, and affirmed the decree with that modification. 153 F.2d 605. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 827. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, p. 330 U. S. 458 .
P. 330 U. S. 460 .
Porello, a longshoreman, was injured in 1942 while working in the hold of the U.S.S. Thomas Stone, a public vessel of the United States. His employer, American Stevedores, Inc. (called American hereinafter), was engaged in loading the vessel under a stevedoring contract with the United States. Within two weeks of the accident which caused the injuries, American's insurance carrier, in compliance with § 14 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, [ Footnote 1 ] 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, and without the compulsion of an award of compensation by a deputy commissioner under § 19, began compensation payments to Porello, who negotiated the checks he received. In March of 1943, Porello gave notice in accordance with § 33(a) of election to sue the United States as a third-party tortfeasor, rather than to receive compensation. In the same month, he filed a libel, amended in November, 1943, to recover damages from the United States under the Public Vessels Act of 1925, [ Footnote 2 ] 46
U.S.C. § 781 et seq., for the injuries to his person sustained in the accident. Exceptions to the libel being overruled, the United States answered, denying fault on its part and claiming sovereign immunity from suit. Later, by a petition charging American with fault and setting forth an indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract, the United States impleaded American. [ Footnote 3 ] American then answered the libel, denying fault and asserting as an affirmative defense that, by accepting compensation payments, Porello had lost his right to sue a third party tortfeasor.
The District Court held that Porello was not barred from maintaining the action. At trial, it appeared that a beam lying athwart a hatch had fallen into he hold and struck Porello, causing the injuries complained of. The court held that the United States was negligent in not providing a locking device on the end of the beam, and held that American was negligent through its foreman, whose orders to the operator of a cargo boom caused the beam to be dislodged. Porello was awarded damages from the United States, the United States to receive contribution from American as a joint tortfeasor to the extent of half the damage less the compensation payments received by Porello. On cross-appeals by the United States and American, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that American was bound by the indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract to make the United States completely whole. With that modification, it affirmed the decree below. 153 F.2d 605. The important issue in this proceeding is whether the Public Vessels Act makes the United States liable for damages on account of personal injuries. The Circuit Court of Appeals thought that this question was decided by the Canadian Aviator case, [ Footnote 4 ] but, since the
The Public Vessels Act provides that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States. . . ." [ Footnote 5 ] Petitioner argues that the Act only provides a remedy for damage to property. "Damages," however, have historically been awarded both for injury to property and injury to the person -- a fact too well known to have been overlooked by the Congress in enacting this statute. [ Footnote 6 ] Nor is it easy to conceive any reason, absent intent to the contrary, not to have inserted the word "property" in the statute, an obvious method of imposing the limitation for which the petitioner here contends. Petitioner nonetheless argues that the legislative history of the statute conclusively shows that the congressional intent was to limit redress to property damage.
The history of the Act may be briefly detailed. Starting in 1920, various bills were introduced which provided for liability of the Government to suit for damages caused by its vessels. [ Footnote 7 ] We need only consider, however, the bills that were pending in the 68th Congress by which the present act was passed: H.R. 6989, H.R. 9075 and H.R. 9535. The first provided for suits against the United States "for damages caused by collision by a public vessel." The second, designed as an amendment to the Suits in Admiralty
Act, and supported by the Maritime Law Association of the United States, [ Footnote 8 ] would have amended that act so that it would not be limited to vessels operated by the Government as merchant vessels, and would thus have made the United States unquestionably liable to suit for personal injuries caused by public vessels. [ Footnote 9 ] This bill never reached the floor of Congress. The third bill, H.R. 9535, was enacted and became the present Public Vessels Act. Although "designed as a substitute for H.R. 6989," [ Footnote 10 ] it omitted the words "by collision" which would have limited the liability of the United States to damages resulting from collisions by public vessels. The only discussion of any significance to the present inquiry related to the last of these bills. It is true, as petitioner points out, that the proponent of the bill in the House, Mr. Underhill, said, when the bill was introduced:
and Government agents. [ Footnote 11 ]"
Further, on inquiry as to whether suit could be brought only where blame was charged to the Government, he answered: "Not entirely; where a man's property is damaged, he can bring a suit." [ Footnote 12 ] These statements were not, however, answers to questions whether the Act would provide a remedy for injury to the person as well as to property, nor does it appear that the speaker was at the time attentive to such possible distinctions. It is also true that the Committee report said that
"the chief purpose of this bill is to grant private owners of vessels and of merchandise a right of action when their vessels or goods have been damaged as the result of a collision with any Government-owned vessel. [ Footnote 13 ]"
that the Act would provide a remedy to persons suffering personal injuries, as well as property damage. [ Footnote 14 ] Moreover, when the bill reached the floor of the Senate, there was not the least indication that the members of that body believed that the Act limited relief to owners of damaged property. [ Footnote 15 ]
The passage of the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Public Vessels Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act [ Footnote 16 ] attests to the growing feeling of Congress that the United States should put aside its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees have tortiously caused personal injury or property damage. To hold now that the Public Vessels
Act does not provide a remedy against the United States for personal injuries would in the future only throw this form of maritime action under the Federal Tort Claims Act; for that Act excepts from its coverage "Any claim for which a remedy is provided by the Act . . . of March 3, 1925 [The Public Vessels Act] (U.S.C. title 46, secs. 781-790, inclusive). . . ." [ Footnote 17 ] We cannot believe that the Public Vessels Act, read in the light of its legislative history, evinces a Congressional intent only to provide a remedy to the owners of damaged property.
This determination does not dispose of all the issues raised by the Porello case. When impleaded by the United States in the trial court, American, the petitioner here, pleaded as an affirmative defense that Porello, having accepted compensation payments from American, lost whatever right of action he had against the United States as a third party tortfeasor. The petitioner admits that § 33(b) of the Longshoremen's Act was amended in 1938 so that mere acceptance of compensation, without an award, does not operate as an assignment to the employer of the injured employee's cause of action against a third party tortfeasor, a conclusion which courts had reached under the former wording of the Act. [ Footnote 18 ] But it contends that the amendment did no more, and that acceptance of compensation still operates as a conclusive election
not to sue. It is quite clear that mere acceptance of compensation is not the kind of election for which provision is made by § 33(a) of the Act, which provides for notice of intention to the deputy commissioner, [ Footnote 19 ] so the argument is technically imperfect. But, in any event, election not to sue a third party and assignment of the cause of action are two sides of the same coin. Surely the Act was never intended, and has never been held, to provide that, after acceptance of compensation and until an award, neither employer nor employee could sue the third party tortfeasor. If so held, an employer who was not responsible over to the third party might lose his chance to recoup compensation payments from the third party, while the third party might escape all liability. American, in the unusual circumstances of this case, could have protected itself by controverting the employee's right to receive compensation. [ Footnote 20 ] In this way, it could probably have forced an award and the consequent assignment of the right of action to itself.
he must begin payments within two weeks of the injury. [ Footnote 21 ] The employee thus receives compensation payments quite soon after his injury by force of the Act. Yet the Act does not put a time limitation upon the period during which an employee must elect to receive compensation or to sue, save the general limitation of one year upon the time to make a claim for compensation. [ Footnote 22 ] The apparent purpose of the Act is to provide payments during the period while the employee is unable to earn, when they are sorely needed, without compelling him to give up his right to sue a third party when he is least fit to make a judgment of election. For these reasons, we think that mere acceptance of compensation payments does not preclude an injured employee from thereafter electing to sue a third-party tortfeasor.
American further argues that the court below, as an admiralty court, did not have jurisdiction of the indemnity provision of the stevedoring contract, and that therefore the decree granting full indemnity to the United States from American was beyond its power. A stevedoring contract is maritime. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 , 234 U. S. 62 ; The Muskegon, 275 F. 348. And although admiralty jurisdiction over contracts partly maritime and partly nonmaritime in nature is doubtful, the cases raising such doubts are concerned only with contracts for the performance of partly nonmaritime activities. See The Richard Winslow, 71 F. 426; Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. v. Interlake S.S. Co., 40 F.2d 439. To sever a contract provision for indemnity for damages arising out of the performance of wholly maritime activities would only needlessly multiply litigation. Such a provision is a normal clause in contracts to act for others, and no more determines the nature of a contract than do conditions on the time and place of payment.
American, however, insists that the clause merely stated existing law. On this record, we cannot answer the contention of either party. As it stands, the clause is ambiguous. Evidence might well have been taken as to the intention of the parties, but was not. [ Footnote 23 ] It may be that the parties only meant American to indemnify the United States should the Government be held liable for damages solely caused by American's negligence. It may be that the intention was that American should fully reimburse the United States for all damages caused
in any part by American's negligence. Finally, the parties may have intended that American, in case of the joint negligence of the parties, should be responsible for that proportion of the damages which its fault bore to the total fault. Although the usual rule in admiralty, in the absence of contract, is for each joint tortfeasor to pay the injured party a moiety of the damages, The Alabama, 92 U. S. 695 ; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302 ; Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.2d 553, we do not believe that the last alternative, which provides for a measure of comparative negligence, is necessarily beyond the intent of the parties. Comparative negligence is not unknown to our maritime law. The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1 ; The Henry S. Grove, 22 F.2d 444; see Robinson on Admiralty, p. 91. From the record, it is not clear whether the District Court made any finding as to the meaning of the contract. We believe its interpretation should be left in the first instance to that court, which shall have the benefit of such evidence as there is upon the intention of the parties. If the District Court interprets the contract not to apply to the facts of this case, the court would, of course, be free to adjudge the responsibility of the parties to the contract under applicable rules of admiralty law.
The case of United States v. Lauro, No. 514, is here on certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The certificate is quoted in full in the note. [ Footnote 24 ] The only question posed by the case is whether a suit for
within a State whose statutes give a right of action on account of death," the admiralty will entertain a libel for damages sustained by those to whom the right is given. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 . See discussion in Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383 , 312 U. S. 388 -391. Here, the death occurred on navigable waters of New York, which has a statute granting a right of action for damages on account of wrongful death. Nor can damages suffered on account of death be distinguished from damages on account of personal injuries. Death is the supreme personal injury. For the reasons stated in the Porello case, we conclude that the word "damages" in the Public Vessels Act, § 1, 46 U.S.C. § 781, means damages under §§ 130-134 of the New York Decedent Estate Law. Accordingly, we answer the certificate as follows: the word "damages" as used in 46 U.S.C. § 781, includes damages under §§ 130-134 of the Decedent Estate Law of the New York recoverable by a personal representative because of the death of a human being.
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U. S. 215 .
Johnson v. Fleet Corporation, 280 U. S. 320 ; Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U. S. 575 .
Without disregarding the significance which we have heretofore attached to legislative history, I cannot give the Public Vessels Act [ Footnote 2/1 ] the scope given it by the Court.
problem for construction is not whether the term "damages" may be applied to money compensation for hurt to person or property. What is to be construed is "damages caused by a public vessel." Standing by itself, that phrase, spontaneously read, may well mean damage inflicted by a public vessel, rather than "damages" incurred in connection with its operation. All we held in Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U. S. 215 , was that its personnel was part of the public vessel for purposes of "causing" damage to another vessel.
We cannot escape the conclusion that there was no jurisdiction for this libel in the District Court. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
S.Rep. No.941, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. The Court's opinion finds overriding significance in a letter by the Attorney General commenting on the Bill, in which he stated that it "intends to give the same relief against the Government for damages caused . . . by its public vessels" as was given by the Suits in Admiralty Act. That Act did afford the right to sue for personal injuries. To prefer the Attorney General's view to that expressed by those in charge of a measure would, in itself, be not the normal choice. And this letter of the Attorney General antedated the Report of the Committee and the statement of Representative Underhill. Compare United States v. Durkee Famous Foods, 306 U. S. 68 , 306 U. S. 71 , where the Committee Report "stated that the purpose of the bill was set out in a letter from the Attorney General which it quoted." To reject the subsequent authoritative statements of the Congressional proponents of the legislation and to accept the view of the Attorney General to which the Government now does not even refer is to discard in favor of dim remote light what heretofore has been deemed controlling illumination.