Source: https://origin-www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Kastigar_v_United_States_406_US_441_92_S_Ct_1653_32_L_Ed_2d_212_1?1542134916
Timestamp: 2018-11-13 18:48:45
Document Index: 409643121

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6002', '§ 1826', '§ 2192', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 2281', '§ 2281', '§ 2281', '§ 2281', '§ 2281', '§ 2281', '§ 245', '§ 4']

Decided May 22, 1972[***214] [**1654]
The power of government to compel persons to testify in court or before grand juries and other governmental agencies is firmly established in Anglo-American jurisprudence.2 The power with respect to courts was established by statute in England as early as 1562,3 and Lord Bacon observed in 1612 that all subjects owed the King their "knowledge and discovery."4 While it is not clear when grand juries first resorted to compulsory process to secure the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the general common-law principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" was considered an "indubitable certainty" that "cannot be denied" by 1742.5 The [**1656] power to compel testimony, and the corresponding duty to testify, are recognized in the Sixth Amendment [*444] requirements that an accused be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The first Congress recognized the testimonial duty in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided for compulsory attendance of witnesses in the federal courts.6 > MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted the importance of this essential power of government in his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm, 378 U. S. 52, 93-94 (1964):
Petitioners draw a distinction between statutes that provide transactional [***220] immunity and those that provide, as does the statute before us, immunity from use and derivative use.25 They contend that a statute must at a minimum grant full transactional immunity in order to be coextensive with the scope of the privilege. In support of this contention, they rely on Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), the first case in which this Court considered a constitutional challenge to an immunity statute. The statute, a re-enactment of the Immunity Act of 1868,26 provided that no "evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial [*450] proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him . . . in any court of the United States . . . ."27 Notwithstanding a grant of immunity and order to testify under the revised 1868 Act, the witness, asserting his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, refused to testify before a federal grand jury. He was consequently adjudged in contempt of court.28 On appeal, this Court construed the statute as affording a witness protection only against the use of the specific testimony compelled from him under the grant of immunity. This construction meant that the statute "could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him."29 Since the revised 1868 Act, as construed by the Court, would permit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony, it did not protect the witness to the same extent that a claim of the privilege would protect him. Accordingly, under the principle that a grant of immunity cannot supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege, unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the privilege,30 the witness' refusal to testify was held proper. . In the course of its opinion, the Court made the following statement, on which petitioners heavily rely:
"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness [**1660] subject to prosecution [*451] after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United Sta
[The immunity statute under consideration] does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates." 142 U. S., at 585-586.
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise . . . ."
[*452] This transactional immunity statute became the basic form for the numerous federal immunity statutes35 until 1970, when, after re-examining applicable constitutional principles and the adequacy of existing law, Congress enacted the statute here under consideration.36 The [**1661] new statute, which does not "afford [the] absolute immunity against future prosecution" referred to in Counselman, was drafted to meet what Congress judged to be the conceptual basis of Counselman, as elaborated in subsequent decisions of the Court, namely, that immunity from the [*453] use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom is coextensive with the scope of the privilege.37[***222]
The statute's explicit proscription of the use in any criminal case of "testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)" is consonant with Fifth Amendment standards. We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Its sole concern is to afford protection against being "forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.'"38 Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.
Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman. The Counselman statute, as construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure to [*454] prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. . The Court repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the statute:
142 U. S., at 564;
> that it:
142 U. S., at 586.
> The basis of the Court's decision was recognized in Ullmann v. United Stat, 350 U. S. 422 (1956), in which the Court reiterated [**1662] that the Counselman statute was insufficient:
The issue before the Court in Murphy was whether New Jersey and New York could compel the witnesses, whom these States had immunized from prosecution under their laws, to give testimony that might then be used to convict them of a federal crime. Since New Jersey and New York had not purported to confer immunity from federal prosecution, the Court was [***224] faced with the question what [**1663] limitations the Fifth Amendment privilege imposed on the prosecutorial powers of the Federal Government, a nonimmunizing sovereign. After undertaking an examination of the policies and purposes of the privilege, the Court overturned the rule that one jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.42 The Court held that the privilege protects state witnesses against incrimination under federal as well as state law, and federal witnesses against incrimination [*457] under state as well as federal law. > Applying this principle to the state immunity legislation before it, the Court held the constitutional rule to be that:
"[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against hi
We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits."43 378 U. S., at 79.
This argument presupposes that the statute's prohibition [*460] will prove impossible to enforce. . The statute provides a sweeping proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom:
18 U. S. C. § 6002.
The statutory proscription is analogous to the Fifth Amendment requirement in cases of coerced confessions.52 A coerced confession, as [***227] revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity,53 is inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it does not bar prosecution.54 Moreover, a defendant against whom incriminating evidence has been obtained through a grant of immunity may be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant who asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced-confession claim. One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from [*462] legitimate independent sources.55 On the other hand, a defendant raising a coerced-confession claim under the Fifth Amendment must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing before his confession and evidence derived from it become inadmissible.56[**1666]
There can be no justification in reason or policy for holding that the Constitution requires an amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute and accompanying safegrards, testimony is compelled in exchange for immunity from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is required where the government, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into incriminating himself.
fn1 The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1826.
fn7 See Blair v. United States, supra, at 281; 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, §§ 2192 , 2197.
fn13 Soon after the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination became firmly established in law, it was recognized that the privilege did not apply when immunity, or "indemnity," in the English usage, had been granted. See L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328, 495 (1968). Parliament enacted an immunity statute in 1710 directed against illegal gambling, 9 Anne, c. 14, §§ 3-4 , which became the model for an identical immunity statute enacted in 1774 by the Colonial Legislature of New York. Law of Mar. 9, 1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 621, 623 (1894). These statutes provided that the loser could sue the winner, who was compelled to answer the loser's charges. After the winner responded and returned his ill-gotten gains, he was "acquitted, indemnified [immunized] and discharged from any further or other Punishment, Forfeiture or Penalty, which he . . . may have incurred by the playing for, and winning such Money . . . ." 9 Anne, c. 14, § 4 (1710); Law of Mar. 9, 1774, c. 1651, 5 Colonial Laws of New York, at 623.
Another notable instance of the early use of immunity legislation is the 1725 impeachment trial of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield. The Lord Chancellor was accused by the House of Commons of the sale of public offices and appointments. In order to compel the testimony of Masters in Chancery who had allegedly purchased their offices from the Lord Chancellor, and who could incriminate themselves by so testifying, Parliament enacted a statute granting immunity to persons then holding office as Masters in Chancery. Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 767, 1147 (1725). See 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, § 2281 , at 492. See also Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 604-605 (1723). The legislatures in colonial Pennsylvania and New York enacted immunity legislation in the 18th century. See, e. g., Resolution of Jan. 6, 1758, in Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania (1682-1776), 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban ed. 1935); Law of Mar. 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 351, 353-354; Law of Mar. 9, 1774, c. 1651, id., at 621, 623 ; Law of Mar. 9, 1774, c. 1655, id., at 639, 641-642 . See generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 359, 384-385, 389, 402-403 (1968). Federal immunity statutes have existed since 1857. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. For a history of the various federal immunity statutes, see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L. J. 1568 (1963) ; Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 St. Louis U. L. Rev. 327 (1966); and National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers, 1406-1411 (1970).
fn14 See, e. g., Resolution of Jan. 6, 1758, n. 13, supra , 6 Pennsylvania Archives (8th series) 4679 (C. Hoban ed. 1935); Law of Mar. 24, 1772, c. 1542, 5 Colonial Laws of New York 351, 354; Law of Mar. 9, 1774, c. 1655, id., at 639, 642 . Bishop Atterbury's Trial, supra , for which the House of Commons passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution for treasonable conspiracy. See id., at 604-605 ; 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, § 2281 , at 492 n. 2. Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, supra , for which Parliament passed immunity legislation, was a prosecution for political bribery involving the sale of public offices and appointments. See id ., at 1147. The first federal immunity statute was enacted to facilitate an investigation of charges of corruption and vote buying in the House of Representatives. See Comment, n. 13, supra , 72 Yale L. J., at 1571.
fn15 See 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, § 2281 , at 492. MR. JUSTICE WHITE noted in his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S., at 92, that immunity statutes "have for more than a century been resorted to for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those whose proof and punishment were otherwise impracticable, such as political bribery, extortion, gambling, consumer frauds, liquor violations, commercial larceny, and various forms of racketeering." Id., at 94-95. See n. 14, supra .
fn16 See Comment, n. 13, supra , 72 Yale L. J., at 1576.
fn18 For a listing of these statutes, see 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, § 2281 , at 495 n. 11.
fn19 See, e. g., 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2281 , at 501 (3d ed. 1940); 8 Wigmore, supra , n. 2, § 2281 , at 496.
fn31 Counselman was decided Jan. 11, 1892. Senator Cullom introduced the new bill on Jan. 27, 1892. 23 Cong. Rec. 573 .
fn32 23 Cong. Rec. 6333 .
fn33 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443, repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 245 , 84 Stat. 931.
fn34 See the remarks of Senator Cullom, 23 Cong. Rec. 573 , 6333, and Congressman Wise, who introduced the bill in the House. 24 Cong. Rec. 503 . See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 28-29 and n. 36 (1948).
fn37 See S. Rep. No. 91-617 , pp. 51-56, 145 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 42 (1970).
fn39 Cf. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 179 , 230 (1964). Language similar to the Counselman dictum can be found inBrown v. Walker, 161 U. S., at 594-595, and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S., at 67. Brown and Hale, however, involved statutes that were clearly sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination, as they provided full immunity from prosecution "for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence . . . ." 161 U. S., at 594; 201 U. S., at 66. The same is true of Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137, 141, 146 (1949), and United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 425, 428 (1943). In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965), some of the Counselman language urged upon us by petitioners was again quoted. But Albertson, like Counselman, involved an immunity statute that was held insufficient for failure to prohibit the use of evidence derived from compelled admissions and the use of compelled admissions as an "investigatory lead." Id., at 80.
fn45 E. g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, supra; Ullmann v. United States, supra; Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137 (1949); United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896). See also n. 35, supra .
fn55 See supra , at 460; Brief for the United States 37; Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967).
fn1 In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70, the Court was faced with a Fifth Amendment challenge to the Communist registration provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. We held that the provision violated the prospective registrant's privilege against self-incrimination, and that the registration provision was not saved by a so-called "immunity statute" (§ 4 (f)) which prohibited the introduction into evidence in any criminal prosecution of the fact of registration under the Act. The Court's analysis of this immunity provision rested solely on Counselman:
Stewart v. United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (CA9 1971)
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 93-94 (1964)
Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 42 (1924)
Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71, 73 (1920)
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 440
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 549
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 586
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52
Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487
United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F. 2d 40, 44 (CA3 1971)
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70
Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244-245
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e)
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 67
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 552 (1971)
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958)
Bivens v. Six Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 439 n. 15 (1956)
Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 769, 778 (1612)
Piemonte v. United States, 367 U. S. 556, 559 n. 2 (1961)
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896)
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964)
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40 (1924)
United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100 (1828)
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951)
Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362, 365 (1917)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 443-444 (1966)
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886)
Lord Chancellor Macclesfield's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 767, 1147 (1725)
Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323, 604-605 (1723)
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 70 (1906)
Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913)
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 585 (1892)
In re Counselman, 44 F. 268 (CCND Ill. 1890)
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 28-29 and n. 36 (1948)
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371, 380 (1958)
Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137, 141, 146 (1949)
United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 425, 428 (1943)
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U. S. 70 (1965)
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179, 182 (1954)
United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (1931)
In re Waterfront Comm'n of N. Y. Harbor, 39 N. J. 436, 189 A. 2d 36 (1963)
California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 442 n. 3 (1971)
United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, 606 n. 11 (1971)
Stevens v. Marks, 383 U. S. 234, 244-245 (1966)
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (1897)
Malloy v. Hogan, [378 U. S. 1, 7-8]
Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315
Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547
Positive 1968