Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97495/noble-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-06-23 14:03:12
Document Index: 484794934

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 301', '§ 209', '§ 206', '§ 207', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 209']

Noble Vs United States - Citation 97495 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Noble Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97495
Case Number 319 U.S. 88
noble v. united states - 319 u.s. 88 (1943) u.s. supreme court noble v. united states, 319 u.s. 88 (1943) noble v. united states no. 511 argued april 6, 7, 1943 decided may 3, 1943 319 u.s. 88 appeal from the district court of the united states for the district of minnesota syllabus in a permit to operate as a contract carrier under the "grandfather" clause of § 209(a) of the motor carrier act of 1935, it is within the authority of the interstate commerce commission -- under § 209(b), requiring that the commission specify in such permit "the business of the carrier covered thereby and the scope thereof" -- to specify the shippers or types of shippers for whom the carrier may haul designated commodities. p. 319.....
Noble v. United States - 319 U.S. 88 (1943)
U.S. Supreme Court Noble v. United States, 319 U.S. 88 (1943)
In a permit to operate as a contract carrier under the "grandfather" clause of § 209(a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, it is within the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission -- under § 209(b), requiring that the Commission specify in such permit "the business of the carrier covered thereby and the scope thereof" -- to specify the shippers or types of shippers for whom the carrier may haul designated commodities. P. 319 U. S. 91 .
This is an appeal [ Footnote 1 ] from the judgment of a three-judge court (45 F.Supp. 793) which dismissed a complaint filed by appellant to review and annul certain restrictive provisions of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (28 M.C.C. 653) granting appellant a permit to operate as a contract carrier by motor vehicle under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. ), now designated as Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. 54 Stat. 919.
shall be granted a permit without more. And § 209(b) provides that the Commission "shall specify in the permit the business of the contract carrier covered thereby and the scope thereof." [ Footnote 2 ]
The Commission found that appellant was not a common carrier of general commodities, but a contract carrier [ Footnote 3 ] of specified commodities. It found in that connection that, on and after July 1, 1935, appellant had been "in bona fide operation as a contract carrier" by motor vehicle "under individual contracts" with persons who
definition frequently can be made only in terms of the type or class of shippers served. Unless the words of the Act are given that interpretation, permits under the "grandfather" clause may greatly distort the prior activities of the carrier. He who was in substance a highly specialized carrier for a select few would be treated as a carrier of general commodities for all comers merely because he had carried a wide variety of articles. That would make a basic alteration in the characteristics of the enterprise of the contract carrier -- a change as fundamental as we thought was effected by a disregard of the nature and scope of the holding out of the common carrier in United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475 . If the business of the contract carrier were not defined in terms of the type or class of shippers served, that "substantial parity between future operations and prior bona fide operations" which is contemplated by the Act ( Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15 , 315 U. S. 22 ) would be frequently disregarded. The "grandfather" clause would be utilized not to preserve the position which the carrier had obtained in the nation's transportation system, but to enlarge and expand the business beyond the pattern which it had acquired prior to July 1, 1935. The result in the present case would be a conversion, for all practical purposes, of this contract carrier into a common carrier -- a step which would tend to nullify a distinction which Congress has preserved throughout the Act. If such a metamorphosis is to be effected, or if the appellant is to obtain a permit broader than the actual scope of his established business, the showing required by other provisions of the Act must be made. See § 206(a), § 207, and § 209(b).
scope, [ Footnote 4 ] our function is at an end. The precise delineation of an enterprise which seeks the protection of the "grandfather" clause has been reserved for the Commission. United States v. Maher, 307 U. S. 148 ; Alton R. Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., supra.
We do not accede to the suggestion that the permit specification clause in § 209(b) is applicable only to new operators, not to "grandfather" applicants. The Commission has consistently taken the view that it covers both. Motor Convoy, Inc., 2 M.C.C.197, 200; Wray Wible, 7 M.C.C. 165, 168; James P. Hunter, 13 M.C.C. 109, 112-113; Marine Trucking Co., Inc., 17 M.C.C. 615. That interpretation is entitled to "great weight." United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534 , 310 U. S. 549 . It is consistent with the wording of § 209. Paragraph (a) requires a contract carrier to have a "permit" in order to operate as such, and it requires the Commission to issue the permit "without further proceedings, if application for such permit is made to the Commission as provided in paragraph (b)" within the prescribed time limitation.