Source: http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=09-12-00293-CV&s=TX&d=57834
Timestamp: 2013-05-20 04:57:08
Document Index: 201764207

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 74', '§ 51', '§ 74', '§74', '§ 74', '§ 74']

Silsbee Oaks Health Care, L.L.P. v. Cathy Melancon
Case Style: Silsbee Oaks Health Care, L.L.P. v. Cathy Melancon
Case Number: 09-12-00293-CV
Plaintiff's Attorney: Marian Rosen
Defendant's Attorney: Gail N. Friend
Description: This interlocutory appeal concerns whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a health care provider’s motion to dismiss a health care liability claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74.001-74.507 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012) (Texas Medical Liability Act); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(9) (West Supp. 2012). In its appeal, the health care provider, Silsbee Oaks Health Care, L.L.P., contends that a report of a pathologist filed to support the claimants’ wrongful death and survival claims did not constitute an “expert” report as defined by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(5) (West 2011). In response, the claimants, David Boggan, John Boggan, Bruce Boggan, Susan Rye, Carol Nash, and Cathy Melancon, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of Muriel Boggan,1 argue that Silsbee’s appeal is untimely. If the appeal is deemed to have been timely, Silsbee argues in the alternative that the reports fail to meet the requirements of the TMLA with respect to several of the theories of liability that are raised in the Boggans’ petition. We conclude that Silsbee’s appeal is timely. We also conclude that the reports, with respect to one of the theories in the Boggans’ petition, complies with the requirements of the TMLA; therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Silsbee’s motion to dismiss.
Only subpart (b) provides for dismissal and fees. Subpart (l) provides for challenges to inadequate reports, but says nothing about dismissal or fees. That is because some challenges--specifically those filed within the first 120 days--cannot seek dismissal or fees until the 120-day window has closed. Only when that window has closed and no report has been filed can a defendant move for dismissal and fees under subpart (b).
The trial court’s silence in its September 2011 order regarding Silsbee’s request for dismissal does not, in our opinion, imply that the trial court intended to rule on Silsbee’s request for attorney’s fees, costs, or to dismiss. Additional reports could still be filed within the 120 day period provided by section 74.351(a). In our view, the trial court’s silence regarding Silsbee’s request to dismiss, as well as its request for attorney’s fees and costs, was a non-ruling on those aspects of Silsbee’s “Objections.”
We conclude the order of September 2011 was not an appealable order because it did not deny any of the types of relief that are the subject of an interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §74.351(b). The order of June 2012 is appealable, as that order expressly denied Silsbee’s request to dismiss and the trial court signed it at a time it could grant an order of dismissal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(b). We conclude Silsbee timely perfected its appeal from the trial court’s June 2012 order; it was not required or authorized to appeal from the September 2011 order because the trial court did not rule on the request to dismiss at that time. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b).
The recorded weight was 97 pounds. Assessment is hard to read, charting lined through, no information regarding medications, labs, diet order, percent of intake, type of supplements, clinical physical nutritional assessment, family conferences and meetings with care team were noted. Risks for aspiration and nutritional status were not noted. Ms. Boggan aspirated and died on December 28, 2009. She had been given a doughnut which was not to be served on a pureed diet. To do so was clearly below the standard of care. She was to eat with supervision only. According to Berube, Silsbee breached the standard of care because “[w]hen the tube feeding regime was changed, [Muriel] was given numerous oral liquid supplements that were not thickened to the pudding consistence recommended by the Speech Language Pathologist.” The doughnut, according to the dietician’s report, should not have been provided to Muriel “based on her dietary orders and clinical condition.”
Dr. Brown, the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Muriel, provided an expert report on the cause of Muriel’s death. According to Dr. Brown, Muriel “died as a result of asphyxia due to choking on food.” Dr. Brown also noted that no other immediate causes of death were identifiable through the autopsy or the medical records. The live pleading filed by the Boggans asserts claims for negligence and wrongful death.3 Silsbee moved to dismiss the Boggans’ direct liability claims for wrongful death and survival and the Boggans’ vicarious liability survival claims, claiming that the reports did not sufficiently address causation as to those claims. When Silsbee filed the present appeal, it did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent opinion addressing whether a trial court was required to dismiss some claims when others are supported by adequate expert reports. See Schrapps v. Pham, No. 09-12-00080-CV, 2012 WL 4017768 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sep. 13, 2012, no pet. h.). That case concerned allegations of negligent performance of a surgery and negligent post-operative care against the surgeon, who operated on the patient, and his professional association, who the plaintiffs sought to make vicariously liable. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs alleged that the surgeon committed multiple acts of negligence while treating the patient, but their allegations concerned a single group of operative facts that had resulted in the patient’s death. Id. Under those facts, we concluded that the pleadings alleged a single cause of action. Id. at *4. We held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the doctor’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *5.
The Boggans allege Silsbee “did not provide adequate care, treatments, medications, assistive devices, and sufficient nursing observation and examination of the responses, symptoms and progress in the physical condition of [Muriel].” The facts set forth in the live pleading filed by the Boggans concern negligent acts that were allegedly committed in the course of providing Muriel’s diet, culminating in feeding her a doughnut she could not swallow, which led to her death. The Boggans alleged that as a direct result of improper and neglectful treatment, Muriel suffered “severe physical injuries, mental and emotional trauma, extreme humiliation, and loss of dignity and respect during her lifetime.” The Boggans also alleged that Muriel died as a direct result of the injuries she suffered due to Silsbee’s negligence. Although the description of Muriel’s injuries in the live pleading is somewhat vague, the trial court could reasonably determine from the pleadings that the Boggans complaints asserted a claim for Muriel’s suffering and death due to choking on the doughnut, and not claims for unrelated facts that had caused some separate injury.4 The expert report requirements serve to deter frivolous claims, not to dispose of cases regardless of their merits. Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. 2011). At this preliminary stage of the proceedings, a trial court need only determine whether the reports at issue represent a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory definition of expert reports. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001).
When it denied the motion to dismiss, the trial court impliedly found the reports from Berube and Dr. Brown sufficiently apprised Silsbee of the applicable standards of care for the treatment of Muriel’s condition, the manner in which the care provided by Silsbee failed to meet the standard of care, and the causal relationship between that failure and Muriel’s injury from choking and death by asphyxiation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(r); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880. To the extent that Silsbee is liable for the conduct of its employees, a report implicating the conduct of its employees also suffices as a good-faith effort to comply with the TMLA as to Silsbee. See Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 669, 671-72 (Tex. 2008).
As in Schrapps, the allegedly negligent care leading up to the choking incident and the fatal accident arose out of the same course of treatment, or a single group of operative facts that resulted in a single injury, Muriel’s asphyxiation and resulting death. See Schrapps, 2012 WL 4017768 at *2. Because the reports were adequate and are not challenged as being inadequate with respect to the claim that Silsbee negligently fed Muriel a doughnut resulting in her death, the trial court had discretion to allow the other theories concerning the Boggans’ wrongful death and survival claims to proceed to discovery. Id. at *4. We overrule Silsbee’s issue and affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss.
See: http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=9c027a59-0cb9-4e52-8e10-f0efebafe606&MediaID=a88743e4-1d7d-4e17-a2d1-a8f0b8afc1bf&coa=coa09&DT=Opinion