Source: https://www.rcfp.org/privilege-compendium/delaware/
Timestamp: 2020-04-06 02:34:30
Document Index: 570276425

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4320', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4321', '§ 4320', '§ 4321', '§ 4323', '§ 4323', '§ 4323', '§ 4322', '§ 4320', '§ 4322', '§ 4323', '§ 4323', '§ 4320', '§ 4321', '§ 4320', '§ 4323', '§ 4322', '§ 4323', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4320', '§ 4324', '§ 4320', '§ 4323', '§ 4325', '§ 4325', '§ 4325', '§ 4325', '§ 9506', '§ 4301', '§ 9506', '§ 1271', '§ 4206', '§ 143', '§ 144']

Reporters’ Privilege Compendium | Delaware Shield Laws Guide - RCFP
1201 N. Orange St., 7th fl.
dfinger@delawgroup.com
Delaware has a long common law history of respecting journalistic privilege. Although a reporter may only refuse to testify by claiming a privilege expressly granted under the Reporters' Privilege Act (see Delaware Rule of Evidence 513), those privileges both originated in and continue to be shaped by case law. Both common law and statutory law presume that once a reporter's privilege has been asserted, it is valid unless and until the party seeking the information proves that the privilege should not apply. The burden of overcoming the presumption is difficult. Several issues surrounding reporters' privilege have not yet been addressed in Delaware. However, this should not be interpreted as potential weakness in the doctrine, as the case law that does exist indicates a strong commitment to the privilege.
Although Delaware's reporters' privilege has developed largely from the common law, the reporters' privilege is now codified in the Delaware Reporters' Privilege Act. The state has developed its privilege by drawing from the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg and other federal First Amendment jurisprudence, the state's constitution, and state common law.
10 Del. C. § 4320-26
4320. Definitions
At the time he obtained the information that is sought was earning his or her principal livelihood by, or in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the preceding 8 weeks had spent at least 20 hours engaged in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for the mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general public; or
Obtained the information that is sought while serving in the capacity of an agent, assistant, employee, or supervisor of an individual who qualifies as a reporter under subparagraph a.
4321. Privilege in nonadjudicative proceedings
4322. Privilege in adjudicative proceedings
4323. Exceptions to the privilege in adjudicative proceedings
4324. Determination of privilege claim
4325. Waiver
4326. Short title
Del. Const. Art. I, § 5
5. Freedom of press; evidence in libel prosecutions; jury questions
Section 5. The press shall be free to every citizen who undertakes to examine the official conduct of persons acting in a public capacity; and any citizen may print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions for publications, investigating the proceedings of officers, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels the jury may determine the facts and the law, as in other cases.
Amended by 72 L.1999, ch. 136, § 4, eff. June 24, 1999.
The Delaware free press provision has been determined to have the same scope as the First Amendment to the federal constitution. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974).
The privilege, appropriately claimed, is very strong.
The First Amendment privilege afforded to reporters is a qualified privilege; it is not absolute.
The statutory privilege is limited to information obtained within the scope of the reporter's professional activities. 10 Del. C. §§ 4321, 4322. "Professional activities" may include social gatherings, § 4320 (7), but do not include instances of intentional concealment of the reporter's identity as a reporter, or instances wherein the reporter personally witnesses or participates in acts of physical violence or property damage. Id.
A claim of privilege may be successfully challenged in several ways:
If the reporter concealed her identity, or was eyewitness to or participant in the act, the privilege does not apply. Id. But see, e.g., Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994) (applying the privilege to "out takes" of television news camera footage of a live event); State v. Hall, 16 Med. L. Rptr. 1414 (Del. Mun. Ct. Mar. 8, 1989) (quashing subpoena ad testificandum when reporters attended a rally in their official capacities and personally witnessed the disorderly conduct in question); State v. Cordrey, C.A. No. 88-07-0000A, Barbiarz, J. (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 1988) (Transcript) (finding a qualified privilege attaches "[e]ven though no confidential sources are involved").
In nonadjudicative hearings, both content and source are unequivocally protected, so long as they were obtained within the scope of professional activities. See 10 Del. C. §§ 4321, 4320 (7).
In an adjudicative context, a reporter may be required to testify to the content of information, while the sources themselves remain protected. 10 Del. C. § 4323 (a). The threshold issue is whether disclosing the content would reveal the source of the information. This appears to be the case whether the information would directly or implicitly identify the source of the information. If disclosure would not reveal the source, the judge uses a balancing test to determine whether that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. § 4323 (a).
If the untruthfulness of the reporter's claim is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence in an adjudicative hearing, the reporter must testify, disclosing both source and content. 10 Del. C. § 4323 (b); see also §§ 4322 (noting the adjudicative context and oath requirement), 4320 (6) (defining "testimony" as giving testimony, providing tangible evidence, submitting to a deposition, or answering interrogatories).
The privilege is broader in nonadjudicative proceedings than in adjudicative hearings (those proceedings determining the rights of parties, but not including grand jury proceedings). 10 Del. C. § 4320 (1). While, in either case, a reporter may decline to testify regarding either the source or content of information, the privilege applies in adjudicative proceedings only if the reporter states under oath that the disclosure of the information would violate an express or implied understanding with the source under which the information was originally obtained or would substantially hinder the reporter in the maintenance of existing source relationships or the development of new source relationships." § 4322. Even then, testimony divulging the content of information may be required, so long as it will not reveal the information's source, and the judge determines that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. § 4323 (a). If the truthfulness of a reporter's claim is challenged, the privilege may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. § 4323 (b).
To the extent that the proceeding determines the rights of parties, the privilege applies. 10 Del. C. § 4320 (1).
Case law demonstrates Delaware's commitment to a strong but qualified privilege in civil claims. In Fuester v. Conrail, the Superior Court adapted the Third Circuit's test in Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979), noting that the qualified privilege could only be overcome if the subpoenaing party proves three elements:
(1) that "an attempt was made to obtain the information from other sources";
(2) that "the only access to the information is through the journalists and the requested materials"; and
(3) that "the information is critical to the claim."
Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994) (adopting the Third Circuit's test announced in Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979), following United States v. Criden, 633 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 1980)).
Because grand jury proceedings do not determine the rights of parties, but merely investigate and/or bring charges, they are "nonadjudicative," and a reporter may decline to provide either the source or the content of information without qualification. 10 Del. C. § 4321. Grand jury proceedings are explicitly excluded from the definition of adjudicative proceedings. § 4320 (1). Even the ability to challenge the truthfulness of the reporter's statement is precluded in nonadjudicative proceedings. § 4323 (b).
In adjudicative hearings, a reporter may decline to testify regarding either the source or content of information, so long as the reporter affirms the importance of nondisclosure. 10 Del. C. § 4322; see also supra Part III.C. The threshold issue is whether disclosing the content would reveal the source of the information. This is true whether the information would directly or implicitly identify the source of the information. If disclosure would not reveal the source, the judge uses a balancing test to determine whether that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. § 4323 (a); see also Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376 (Del. Super. 1994).
Delaware makes no distinction between confidential and non-confidential information. See State v. Hall, 16 Med. L. Rptr. 1414 (Del. Super. Mar. 8, 1989). All information--regardless of confidential status--appears to be equally protected. State v. Cordrey, Del. Super., C.A. No. 88-07-0000A, Barbiarz, J. (September 28, 1988) (Transcript) (finding a qualified privilege attaches "[e]ven though no confidential sources are involved").
Delaware's privilege applies equally to published and non-published materials. See Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376 (Del. Super.1994) (quashing subpoena for both published and unpublished photographs); State v. McBride, Nos. IK-80-5-0058, IK-80-5-0059 and IK-80-06-0227, Wright, J. (Del. Super. May 6, 1981), affirmed on other grounds, 477 A.2d 174 (Del. 1984) (quashing subpoena for unpublished letters sent to a reporter).
The statute does not specify whether the privilege is different where the media is a party and where it is not. So long as an individual or agency fits the definition of a reporter," the privilege applies. See 10 Del. C. § 4320 (4).
Neither specified in the statute, nor litigated.
The statutory privilege is limited to "reporters," who are defined as any journalist, scholar, educator, polemicist, or other individual." 10 Del. C. § 4320 (4). To fall under the definition, these individuals must meet one of two additional criteria. First, at the time he obtained the information, she must either earn her "principal livelihood" through her reporting, or for 3 weeks prior, or 4 of the 8 previous weeks, worked at least 20 hours as a reporter ("obtaining or preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for the mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images"). Id. Second, one may qualify as a reporter under the statute by having received the information "while serving in the capacity of an agent, assistant, employee, or supervisor or a reporter." Id. Thus, traditional news gatherers, such as reporters, editors, news, photojournalists, and news organizations are covered by the statute. See State v. Rogers, 820 A.2d 1171 (Del. Super. 2003) (applying the privilege to a reporter); Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376 (Del. Super.1994) (applying the privilege to a photographer).
Explicitly covered. 10 Del. C. § 4320 (4)(b). The statute explicitly covers an "agent, assistant, employee, or supervisor of an individual who qualifies as a reporter." Id.
The statute covers "information," not just "news." Information is defined as "any oral, written or pictorial material and includes, but is not limited to, documents, electronic impulses, expressions of opinion, films, photographs, sound records, and statistical data." 10 Del. C. § 4320 (2). Although the expansive definition indicates a liberal attitude toward what may be considered information, the definition has not been litigated in Delaware.
Implicitly covered by the statute, and recognized by common law. 10 Del. C. § 4320 (4); Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376 (Del. Super. 1994).
Covered under the definition of "reporter." See 10 Del. C. § 4320 (4)(b).
Delaware's statute defines "person" to include individuals, corporations, business trusts, estates, trusts, partnerships or associations, governmental bodies, or any other legal entities. 10 Del. C. § 4320 (3). Furthermore, "reporters" include journalists, scholars, educators, polemicists, and other individuals meeting the requirements of the definition laid out supra, Part IV.A.1.a. See also § 4320 (4).
Although Delaware Code does not specifically address the time by which a subpoena must be served, a subpoena may be quashed for failure to provide "reasonable time for compliance." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(3)(A)(i). The Rules of Civil Procedure acknowledge that subpoenas will sometimes be issued with less than 14 days' notice. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(2)(B).
No deposits are required under Delaware law.
Delaware has no requirement of affidavits to accompany subpoenas.
The best practice is to begin the process of quashing the subpoena immediately after its service. After contacting the other party to gain information, the usual practice is to file the motion as soon as practicable. While the timing may vary depending on the circumstances and the parties, quick and comprehensive action typically serves the moving party well. Along with the motion to quash, include a notice of the motion, certification of service, a brief, affidavits both from the reporter (asserting the privilege) and the editor (describing the chilling effect of compelled testimony on freedom of the press), and a copy of the subpoena. Judges have been particularly amenable to hearing motions quickly.
The party objecting to subpoenas for the inspection and copying documents must serve its objection upon the issuing party or attorney designated in the subpoena within 14 days of the service of the subpoena. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(2)(B). Claims that documents are privileged or subject to protection must be stated "expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim." Rule 45 (d)(2).
Although the statute does not require contacting the other party prior to filing a motion to quash a subpoena for testimony, prudence and timing considerations strongly warrant doing so. By contacting the other party prior to filing the motion, one may gain access to information regarding the purpose for which the testimony is being sought. Including such information in the motion often strengthens the quality of the motion. Contacting the other party also speeds the process.
For subpoenas regarding inspection and copying of documents, the objecting party must serve its objection upon the issuing party or attorney designated in the subpoena within 14 days of service. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(2)(B). The objection must include sufficient detail to enable the opposing party to contest the claim. Id. The party issuing the subpoena must then move for an order to compel production. Id.
Motions to quash should be filed in the court where the case is pending. In nonadjudicative proceedings, the motions should be filed with the Superior Court.
Objections to subpoenas requiring inspection and copying should be made within 14 days of the issuance of the subpoena, or if production is required sooner than 14 days, before the time specified for compliance. Super. Civ. Rule 45 (c)(2)(B).
The timing requirement is unspecified for subpoenas to testify, although the Rules say that the motion should be timely. Rule 45 (c)(3)(A).
See above regarding practical considerations regarding timing. See supra, Part V.B.3.c.
The motion should make clear reference to at least one of the statutory reasons for quashing or modifying a subpoena: failure to allow reasonable time for compliance, privileged or protected materials, or undue burden, among others. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(3)(A).
Although none is required by statute, practicality and timing mandate attaching a notice of the motion, certification of service, a brief, affidavits of reporter asserting the privilege, affidavit of editor describing the chilling effect of compelled testimony on freedom of the press, and a copy of the subpoena.
Failure to obey a subpoena may be deemed a contempt of court. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45(e).
Case by case. Although briefing schedules may vary, speed is typically helpful. See above.
Amicus briefs are rarely filed in courts other than the Delaware Supreme Court.
Once asserted, the privilege is presumed applicable, and the party seeking the information is required to overcome the presumption. 10 Del. C. § 4324.
The material must be "necessary" or "critical" to civil claims and criminal claims asserted by the state. See Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994).
The material must be "relevant and material" to criminal claims when a defendant is seeking the information. State v. McBride, Nos. IK-80-5-0058, IK-80-5-0059 and IK-80-06-0227, Wright, J. (Del. Super. May 6, 1981), affirmed on other grounds, 477 A.2d 174 (Del. 1984). The lower standard reflects the concern for the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See supra, Part III.C.2.
Materials must be unavailable from other sources. Whether in a civil or criminal context, unavailability has two components. First, the party seeking to compel testimony must demonstrate that it has sought the information from other sources. Second, the party must demonstrate that the information is unavailable elsewhere. See Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994); State v. McBride, Nos. IK-80-5-0058, IK-80-5-0059 and IK-80-06-0227, Wright, J. (Del. Super. May 6, 1981), affirmed on other grounds, 477 A.2d 174 (Del. 1984).
Although the scope of searching for information has not been litigated, unavailability requires more than that the information sought provides a different perspective than available through other sources. See, e.g., Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994) (applying the privilege, in a civil case, to outtakes of television news camera footage of a live event because police were also witnesses); State v. Hall, 16 Med. L. Rptr. 1414 (March 8, 1989) (quashing subpoena ad testificandum in a criminal case when other witnesses, besides reporters, personally witnessed the disorderly conduct in question); State v. Cordrey, C.A. No. 88-07-0000A, Barbiarz, J. (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 1988) (Transcript) (quashing subpoena where reporter was not the only one present who witnessed procedural events in courtroom that may have created jeopardy).
The circumstances of a particular case will determine how exhaustive a search must be performed. For instance, in State v. Rogers the Superior Court found that sufficient efforts had been performed in a criminal case where the State had only found out about the existence of the information six days prior to trial and had tracked down another witness to the information. State v. Rogers, 820 A.2d 1171, 1181-82 (Del. Super. 2003). The Court noted, however, that under different circumstances this search might not have been sufficient. Id. at 1181. By contrast, in Fuester v. Conrail the Superior Court found the party's efforts to be insufficient where the party had access to the information from another source. Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376 (Del. Super. 1994).
Although this precise issue has not been litigated in Delaware, the Delaware Reporters' Privilege Act excludes the privilege from applying to "any situation in which the reporter is an eyewitness to or participant in an act involving physical violence or property damage." 10 Del. C. § 4320(7).
Prior to balancing interests, the Court must find that disclosing the content would not reveal the source of the information. The judge then uses a balancing test to determine whether that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in confidentiality. 10 Del. C. § 4323 (a).
In cases where a criminal defendant is seeking testimony or documents, the balance weighs more heavily on the side of disclosure. See supra, Parts III.C.2.; VI.B.1.
In addition to the first three grounds that are found within the Reporters' Privilege Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure also provide general guidance on dealing with subpoenas. Specifically, Rule 45 dictates that overbroad and unduly burdensome subpoenas will be quashed or modified. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(3). If the materials are both unduly burdensome and "necessary," the party seeking the information must compensate the other party, or the Court may specify the conditions of production or appearance. Id.
Although not a part of the Reporters' Privilege Act, the Rules of Civil Procedure enable the court to consider a person's safety as part of its decision-making process on whether the quash the subpoena. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(3)(B)(ii).
If the material or testimony will be cumulative of other materials or testimony, it does not meet the "necessary" or "critical" standard in a civil case or a criminal case where the state seeks the information, and the privilege will be maintained. See supra, Part VI.B.2. See also Fuester v. Conrail, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2376, 2378 (Del. Super. 1994).
Likewise, cumulative materials in criminal cases where the defendant seeks materials have been disallowed. See State v. Hall, 16 Med. L. Rptr. 1414 (March 8, 1989) (quashing subpoena for testimony when reporters attended a rally in their official capacities and personally witnessed the disorderly conduct in question, when other witnesses were available); State v. Cordrey, C.A. No. 88-07-0000A, Barbiarz, J. (Del. Super. Sept. 28, 1988) (Transcript) (quashing subpoena where reporter was not the only one present who witnessed procedural events in courtroom that may have created jeopardy).
The Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that overbroad and unduly burdensome subpoenas will be quashed or modified. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45 (c)(3). If the materials are both unduly burdensome and "necessary," the party seeking the information must compensate the other party, or the Court may specify the conditions of production or appearance. Id.
No additional elements have been required to overcome the privilege.
10 Del. C. § 4325 acknowledges that a reporter may waive the privilege.
Because the privilege belongs to the reporter, she may waive it. However, a reporter's decision to waive with respect to certain facts does not waive the privilege with respect to other facts for which she continues to claim the privilege. Likewise, third party disclosure does not constitute waiver. 10 Del. C. § 4325.
Third party disclosure does not constitute waiver. 10 Del. C. § 4325.
By waiving her privilege with respect to certain facts a reporter does not waive the privilege with regard to other facts for which she continues to claim the privilege. 10 Del. C. § 4325.
Newspapers and periodicals are self-authenticating. D.R.E. 902(6).
Although this issue has not been extensively litigated, at least one Delaware Court has found that an affidavit by the reporter is sufficient and indicated that "an affidavit from the reporter will, in most cases, be sufficient." State v. Rogers, 820 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. Super. 2003).
The statute does not specify a cap on the amount a reporter may be fined for refusing to comply with the court's order to testify or produce documents.
Courts are authorized, at their discretion, to issue fines for civil contempt. See, e.g., 10 Del. C. § 9506 (enabling Justices of the Peace to impose fines of up to $100 for civil contempt). In addition to fines and possible incarceration, parties who fail to comply may also be liable for damages to the aggrieved party. 10 Del. C. § 4301.
The statute does not specify a cap on the amount of jail time a judge may impose upon a reporter for refusing to testify or produce documents.
Courts are authorized to order incarceration for civil contempt at their discretion. See, e.g., 10 Del. C. § 9506 (enabling Justices of the Peace to impose jail time of up to 170 days for civil contempt).
Criminal contempt may apply for refusing to testify. 11 Del. C. § 1271. It is punishable by incarceration for a maximum of one year, or a fine not to exceed $2,300. 11 Del. C. § 4206.
Appeals must be made within 30 days of the order. Supr. Ct. R. 6; 10 Del. C. §§ 143, 145, 147, 148, 1051, 1326.
As a practical matter, appeals do not typically occur because of timing concerns.
A denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is subject to the appropriate court's appellate rules. The trial court must certify that the issue is substantial, affects a legal right, and meets additional criteria. The party requesting the appeal bears the burden of proof. See generally Supr. Ct. R. 42.
A party subject to an interlocutory order that does not appeal that order immediately does not waive its ability to appeal the issue after final judgment has been entered. 10 Del. C. § 144.
Appeals are made to the appropriate appellate court.
There is no stay unless ordered by the trial court, and the determination is discretionary, though reviewable. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 3, 62(c); Supr. Ct. R. 32.
The statute does not address any differences between forms of appeal.
It is unclear whether the determination of whether the privilege applies is a finding of fact or law. As such, the standard of review upon appeal is also unclear.
Courts have not addressed whether mootness prevents an appeal when the trial or grand jury session for which a reporter was subpoenaed has concluded.
The statute is unclear whether an appellate court would dissolve a contempt citation or whether it would remand the matter to the trial judge to reconsider. No cases have addressed this issue.
No newsroom search or seizure cases have been litigated in Delaware. Although there is no express provision under state law limiting the searches of newsrooms, the federal Privacy Protection Act would likely be invoked in the event a state agency attempted to pursue such activity.
There is no statutory or case law addressing separation orders. To the extent that circumstances that could implicate separation orders might arise, attorneys should point to the chilling effects such an order could have on the state's freedom of the press.
There is no statutory or case law addressing a media interest in fighting subpoenas issued to third parties in an attempt to discover a reporter's source.
There is no statutory or case law addressing sources intervening anonymously to halt disclosure of their identities or suing over disclosure after the fact. It is unclear whether journalists have a First Amendment or other defense to such suits.