Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100614/sanders-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-10-21 14:05:58
Document Index: 157722114

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2113', '§ 2255', '§ 386', '§ 55', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2243', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 389', '§ 14', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2244', '§ 2244']

Sanders Vs United States - Citation 100614 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Sanders Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/100614CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-29-1963Case Number373 U.S. 1AppellantSandersRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
sanders v. united states - 373 u.s. 1 (1963)
arrested on a charge of robbing a federally insured bank in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113 (a) and brought into a federal district court, petitioner declined assistance of counsel, signed a waiver of indictment, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to imprisonment. subsequently, he filed in the sentencing court a motion under 28 u.s.c. § 2255 for his release, alleging that the "indictment" was invalid, that he had been denied assistance of.....Judgment:
The Court should have granted a hearing on the second motion. Pp.
373 U. S. 2
in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. Pp.
373 U. S. 15
(b) No matter how many prior applications for relief under § 2255 a prisoner has made, controlling weight may not be given to denial of prior applications if they were not adjudicated on the merits or if a different ground is presented by the new application. In such circumstances, consideration of the merits of the new application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the remedy, and this must be pleaded by the Government. Pp.
(c) In this case, the Court should have granted a hearing on the second application, because the first application was not adjudicated on the merits and the facts on which the second application was predicated were outside the record. Pp.
373 U. S. 19
(d) On remand, a hearing will be required, but it will not automatically become necessary to produce petitioner at the hearing to enable him to testify. The Court will have discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing, and it will be open to respondent to attempt to to show that petitioner's failure to claim mental incompetency in his first motion was an abuse of the motion remedy. Pp.
373 U. S. 20
We consider here the standards which should guide a federal court in deciding whether to grant a hearing on a motion of a federal prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [
The petitioner is serving a 15-year sentence for robbery of a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He filed two motions under § 2255. The first alleged no facts, but only bare conclusions in support of his claim. The second, filed eight months after the first, alleged facts which, if true, might entitle him to relief. Both motions were denied, without hearing, by the District Court for the Northern District of California. On appeal from the denial of the second motion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 297 F.2d 735. We granted leave to proceed
and certiorari. 370 U.S. 936.
On January 19 , 1959, petitioner was brought before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, and was handed a copy of a proposed information charging him with the robbery. He appeared without counsel. In response to inquiries of the trial judge, petitioner stated that he wished to waive assistance of counsel and to proceed by information, rather than indictment; [
] he signed a waiver of indictment, and then pleaded guilty to the charge in the information. On February 10, he was sentenced. Before sentence was pronounced, petitioner said to the judge: "If possible, your Honor, I would like to go to Springfield or Lexington for addiction cure. I have been using narcotics off and on for quite a while." The judge replied that he was "willing to recommend that."
On January 4, 1960, petitioner, appearing
filed his first motion. He alleged no facts, but merely the conclusions that (1) the "Indictment" was invalid, (2) "Appellant was denied adequate assistance of Counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment," and (3) the sentencing court had "allowed the Appellant to be intimidated and coerced into intering [
] a plea without Counsel, and any knowledge of the charges lodged against the Appellant." He filed with the motion an application for a writ of habeas corpus
requiring the prison authorities to produce him before the court to testify in support of his motion. On February 3, the District Court denied both the motion and the application. In a memorandum accompanying the denial, the court explained that the motion,
On September 8 petitioner, again appearing
filed his second motion. This time, he alleged that at the time of his trial and sentence, he was mentally incompetent as a result of narcotics administered to him while he was held in the Sacramento County Jail pending trial. He stated in a supporting affidavit that he had been confined in the jail from on or about January 16, 1959, to February 18, 1959; that, during this period and during the period of his "trial," he had been intermittently under the influence of narcotics; and that the narcotics had been administered to him by the medical authorities in attendance at the jail because of his being a known addict. The District Court
see Bistram v. United States,
180 F.Supp. 501 (D.C.D.N.Dak.),
283 F.2d 1 (C.A.8th Cir. 1960), and has provoked a conflict between circuits:
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the instant case,
compare, e.g., Juelich v. United States,
300 F.2d 381 (C.A.5th Cir. 1962);
106 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 270 F.2d 921 (1959). We think guidelines to the proper construction of the provision are to be found in its history.
At common law, the denial by a court or judge of an application for habeas corpus was not
King v. Suddis,
1 East 306, 102 Eng.Rep. 119 (K.B.1801);
Burdett v. Abbot,
14 East 1, 90, 104 Eng.Rep. 501, 535 (K.B.1811);
Ex parte Partington,
13 M. & W. 679, 153 Eng.Rep. 284 (Ex.1845); Church, Habeas Corpus (1884), § 386; Ferris and Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1926), § 55. [
] "A person detained in custody might thus proceed from court to court until he obtained his liberty."
Cox v. Hakes,
15 A.C. 506, 527 (H.L., 1890). [
] That this was a principle of our law of habeas corpus as well as the English was assumed to be the case from the earliest days of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
7 U. S.
3 Cranch 448 (Chief Justice Marshall). Since then, it has become settled in an unbroken line of decisions.
Ex parte Kaine,
3 Blatchf. 1, 5-6 (Mr. Justice Nelson in
Chambers);
In re Kaine,
14 How. 103;
Ex parte Cuddy,
40 F. 62, 65 (Cir.Ct.S.D.Cal.1889) (Mr. Justice Field);
Waley v. Johnston,
316 U. S. 101
347 U. S. 263
, n. 4;
358 U. S. 420
(opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart) (dictum);
Powell v. Sacks,
303 F.2d 808 (C.A.6th Cir. 1962). Indeed, only the other day, we remarked upon "the familiar principle that
is inapplicable in habeas proceedings."
see Salinger v. Loisel, supra,
-231, that this principle derives from the fact that at common law habeas corpus judgments were not appealable. But its roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged. If "government [is] always [to] be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment,"
372 U. S. 402
, access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded. The inapplicability of
to habeas, then, is inherent in the very role and function of the writ.
A prisoner whose motion under § 2255 is denied will often file another, sometimes many successive motions. We are aware that, in consequence, the question whether to grant a hearing on a successive motion can be troublesome -- particularly when the motion is prepared without the assistance of counsel and contains matter extraneous to the prisoner's case. But the problem is not new, and our decisions under habeas corpus have identified situations where denial without hearing is proper even though a second or successive application states a claim for relief. One such situation is that involved in
Salinger v. Loisel, supra.
There, a first application for habeas corpus had been denied, after hearing, by one District Court, and the
denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The prisoner then filed subsequent applications, all identical to the first, in a different District Court. We indicated that the subsequent applications might properly have been denied simply on the basis that the first denial had followed a full hearing on the merits. We there announced a governing principle; while reaffirming the inapplicability of
to habeas, we said:
265 U.S. at
. The Court quoted approvingly from Mr. Justice Field's opinion in
Ex parte Cuddy, supra,
40 F. at 66:
-232. The petitioner's successive applications were properly denied because he sought to retry a claim previously fully considered and decided against him. Similarly, nothing in § 2255 requires that a sentencing court grant a hearing on a successive motion alleging a ground for relief already fully considered on a prior motion and decided against the prisoner.
Another such situation is that which was presented in
265 U. S. 239
Wong Doo,
the prisoner, in his first application for habeas corpus, tendered two grounds in support of his position. A hearing was held, but the petitioner offered no proof of his second ground, even though the return to the writ had put it in issue. Relief was denied, and the denial affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Later, he filed a second application relying exclusively on the second ground.
265 U. S. 241
. Similarly, the prisoner who, on a prior motion under § 2255, has deliberately withheld a ground for relief need not be heard if he asserts that ground in a successive motion; his action is inequitable -- an abuse of the remedy -- and the court may, in its discretion, deny him a hearing.
The interaction of these two principles -- a successive application on a ground heard and denied on a prior application, and abuse of the writ -- was elaborated in
334 U. S. 287
-293. The petitioner had, for the first time in his fourth application, alleged the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution. But the Court held that, regardless of the number of prior applications, the governing principle announced in
could not come into play, because the fourth application relied on a ground not previously heard and determined.
was distinguished on the ground that there, the proof had been "accessible at all times" to the petitioner, which demonstrated his bad faith, 334 U.S. at
334 U. S. 289
by contrast, for aught the record disclosed, petitioner might have been justifiably ignorant of newly alleged facts or unaware of their legal significance. The case also decided an important procedural question with regard to abuse of remedy as justification for denial of a hearing, namely, that the burden is on the Government
334 U. S. 292
. The Court reasoned that it would be unfair to compel the habeas applicant, typically unlearned in the law and unable to procure legal assistance in drafting his application, to plead an elaborate negative.
Very shortly after the
decision, as part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the Court's statement in
of the governing principle in the treatment of a successive application was given statutory form. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. [
] There are several things to be observed about this codification.
First, it plainly was not intended to change the law as judicially evolved. Not only does the Reviser's Note disclaim any such intention, but language in the original bill which would have injected
into federal habeas corpus was deliberately eliminated from the Act as finally passed.
S.Rep.No.1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9; Moore, Commentary on the United States Judicial Code (1949), 436-438. Moreover, if construed to derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ of habeas corpus,
373 U. S. 7
§ 2244 might raise serious constitutional questions. [
Cf. Fay v. Noia, supra,
372 U. S. 406
Second, even with respect to successive applications on which hearings may be denied because the ground asserted was previously heard and decided, as in
§ 2244 is faithful to the Court's phrasing of the principle in
and does not enact a rigid rule. The judge is permitted, not compelled, to decline to entertain such an application, and then only if he "is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served" by inquiring into the merits.
Third, § 2244 is addressed only to the problem of successive applications based on grounds previously heard and decided. It does not cover a second or successive application containing a ground "not theretofore presented and determined," and so does not touch the problem of abuse of the writ. In
petitioner's second ground had been presented but not determined on his prior application; § 2244 would be inapplicable in such a situation. On the other hand, § 2244 was obviously not intended to foreclose judicial application of the "abuse of writ" principle as developed in
merits, that the prisoner is seeking "similar relief" for the second time. This language might seem to empower the sentencing court to apply
virtually at will, since, even if a second motion is predicated on a completely different ground from the first, the prisoner ordinarily will be seeking the same "relief." Note, 59 Yale L.J. 1183, 1188, n. 24 (1950). But the language cannot be taken literally. In
, the prisoner vigorously contended that § 2255 was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. [
] The Court avoided the constitutional question by holding that § 2255 was as broad as habeas corpus:
"This review of the history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording
in another and more convenient forum."
Accord, United States v. Morgan,
346 U. S. 502
346 U. S. 511
88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950);
358 U. S. 421
(opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart).
Plainly, were the prisoner invoking § 2255 faced with the bar of
he would not enjoy the "same rights" as the habeas corpus applicant, or "a remedy exactly commensurate with" habeas. Indeed, if he were subject to any substantial procedural hurdles which made his remedy under § 2255 less swift and imperative than federal habeas corpus, the gravest constitutional doubts would be engendered, as the Court in
implicitly recognized.
373 U. S. 11
We therefore hold that the "similar relief" provision of § 2255 is to be deemed the material equivalent of § 2244.
See Smith v. United States,
106 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 173, 270 F.2d 921, 925 (1959); Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407, 424 (1953). We are helped to this conclusion by two further considerations.
Second, even assuming the constitutionality of incorporating
in § 2255, such a provision would probably prove to be completely ineffectual, in light of the further provision in the section that habeas corpus remains available to a federal prisoner if the remedy by motion is "inadequate or ineffective." A prisoner barred by
would seem as a consequence to have an
"inadequate or ineffective" remedy under § 2255, and thus be entitled to proceed in federal habeas corpus -- where, of course, § 2244 applies.
See Smith v. United States, supra,
106 U.S.App.D.C. at 174, 270 F.2d at 926.
We think the judicial and statutory evolution of the principles governing successive applications for federal habeas corpus and motions under § 2255 has reached the point at which the formulation of basic rules to guide the lower federal courts is both feasible and desirable.
Compare Townsend v. Sain,
372 U. S. 310
. Since the motion procedure is the substantial equivalent of federal habeas corpus, we see no need to differentiate the two for present purposes. It should be noted that these rules are not operative in cases where the second or successive application is shown, on the basis of the application, files, and records of the case alone, conclusively to be without merit. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2255. In such a case, the application should be denied without a hearing.
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief [
] only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.
(1) By "ground," we mean simply a sufficient legal basis for granting the relief sought by the applicant. For example, the contention that an involuntary confession was admitted in evidence against him is a distinct ground for federal collateral relief. But a claim of involuntary confession predicated on alleged psychological coercion does not raise a different "ground" than does one predicated on alleged physical coercion. In other words, identical grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations. So also, identical grounds may often be supported by different legal arguments,
cf. Wilson v. Cook,
327 U. S. 481
, or be couched in different language,
194 F.Supp. 421 (D.C.D.Kan.1961) (dictum),
297 F.2d 835 (C.A.10th Cir. 1962), or vary in immaterial respects,
Stilwell v. United States Marshals,
192 F.2d 853 (C.A.4th Cir. 1951) (per curiam). Should doubts arise in particular cases as to whether two grounds are different or the same, they should be resolved in favor of the applicant.
(2) The prior denial must have rested on an adjudication of the merits of the ground presented in the subsequent application.
See Hobbs v. Pepersack,
301 F.2d 875 (C.A.4th Cir. 1962). This means that, if factual issues were raised in the prior application, and it was not denied on the basis that the files and records conclusively resolved these issues, an evidentiary hearing was held.
See Motley v. United States,
230 F.2d 110 (C.A.5th Cir. 1956);
197 F.2d 926 (C.A.5th Cir. 1952).
was not full and fair; we canvassed the criteria of a full and fair evidentiary hearing recently in
and that discussion need not be repeated here. If purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law or some other justification for having failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior application. Two further points should be noted. first, the foregoing enumeration is not intended to be exhaustive; the test is "the ends of justice" and it cannot be too finely particularized. Second, the burden is on the applicant to show that, although the ground of the new application was determined against him on the merits on a prior application, the ends of justice would be served by a redetermination of the ground.
No matter how many prior applications for federal collateral relief a prisoner has made, the principle elaborated in Subpart A,
cannot apply if a different ground is presented by the new application. So too, it cannot apply if the same ground was earlier presented but not adjudicated on the merits. In either case, full consideration of the merits of the new application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the writ or motion remedy; and this the Government has the burden of pleading.
"habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles.
344 U. S. 561
344 U. S. 573
(dissenting opinion). Among them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he seeks. Narrowly circumscribed, in
. Thus, for example, if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings, rather than one, or for some other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld ground. The same may be true if, as in
the prisoner deliberately abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the traditions of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless piecemeal litigation, to entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
We need not pause over the test governing whether a second or successive application may be deemed an abuse by the prisoner of the writ or motion remedy. The Court's recent opinions in
-440, and
372 U. S. 317
, deal at length with the circumstances under which a prisoner may be foreclosed from federal collateral relief. The principles developed in those decisions govern equally here.
Cf. Townsend v. Sain, supra,
. We are confident that this power will be soundly applied.
Application of the foregoing principles to the instant case presents no difficulties. Petitioner's first motion under § 2255 was denied because it stated only bald legal conclusions, with no supporting factual allegations. The court had the power to deny the motion on this ground,
see Wilkins v. United States,
103 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 258 F.2d 416 (1958), although the better course might have been to direct petitioner to amend his motion,
see Stephens v. United States,
246 F.2d 607 (C.A.10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam). But the denial, thus based, was not on the merits. It was merely a ruling that petitioner's pleading was deficient. To be sure, the district judge stated in a footnote to his memorandum:
waiver of his constitutional rights.
See Machibroda v. United States,
193 F.2d 411 (C.A. 10th Cir. 1952).
Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies,
. For the facts on which petitioner's claim in his second application is predicated are outside the record. This is so even though the judge who passed on the two motions was the same judge who presided at the hearing at which petitioner made the waivers, and the later hearing at which he was sentenced. Whether or not petitioner was under the influence of narcotics would not necessarily have been apparent to the trial judge. Petitioner appeared before him without counsel, and but briefly. That the judge may have thought that he acted with intelligence and understanding in responding to the judge's inquiries cannot "conclusively show," as the statute requires, that there is no merit in his present claim.
Cf. Machibroda v. United States, supra,
. If anything, his request before sentence that the judge send him to a hospital "for addiction cure" cuts the other way. Moreover, we are advised in the Government's brief that the probation officer's report made to the judge before sentence (the report is not part of the record in this Court) disclosed that petitioner received medical treatment for withdrawal symptoms while he was in jail prior to sentencing.
the production of the prisoner at the hearing." This does not mean that a prisoner can be prevented from testifying in support of a substantial claim where his testimony would be material. However, we think it clear that the sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing. In this connection, the sentencing court might find it useful to appoint counsel to represent the applicant.
Cf. Coppedge v. United States,
. Also, it will be open to the respondent to attempt to show that petitioner's failure to claim mental incompetency in his first motion was an abuse of the motion remedy, within the principles of
disentitling him to a hearing on the merits. We leave to the District Court, in its sound discretion, the question whether the issue of abuse of the motion remedy, if advanced by respondent, or the issue on the merits, can under the circumstances be tried without having the prisoner present. As we said only last Term:
Machibroda v. United States, supra,
-496. (Footnote omitted.)
Ex parte Partington, supra,
13 M. & W. at 683-684, 153 Eng.Rep. at 286.
Church, supra, § 389. The traditional English practice has recently been curtailed by statute. Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. II, c. 65, § 14(2).
had held § 2255 unconstitutional. 187 F.2d 456 (C.A.9th Cir. 1950), amended,
at 471 (1951). The same position had been taken in a Note in the Yale Law Journal, "Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas Corpus," 59 Yale L.J. 1183 (1950). In this Court, a powerful constitutional attack was mounted by respondent's assigned counsel, Mr. Paul A. Freund.
The discussion in this opinion relates, of course, solely to the problem of successive applications for federal collateral relief. For the principles which govern where the prior application is not for federal collateral relief,
see Fay v. Noia, supra,
Townsend v. Sain, supra.
This case, together with
, form a trilogy of "guideline" decisions in which the Court has undertaken to restate the responsibilities of the federal courts in federal post-conviction proceedings.
relate to federal habeas corpus proceedings arising out of state criminal convictions. The present case involves successive § 2255 applications (and similar habeas corpus proceedings under § 2244, which the Court finds sets the pattern for § 2255) arising out of federal convictions.
shown by the record, the more serious aspect of the Court's opinion is the impact it is likely to have in curbing the ability of the Federal District Courts to cope efficiently, as well as fairly, with successive applications by federal prisoners, [
] the number of which will doubtless increase as a result of what is said today. The net of it is that the Court has come forth with a new § 2255 of its own which bears little resemblance to the statute enacted by Congress. And, in the process, the Court has even gone so far as to suggest that any tampering with its new composition may run afoul of the Constitution.
At the outset, there is one straw man that should be removed from this case. The Court is at great pains to develop the theme that denial of a prisoner's application for collateral relief is not
But the Government recognizes, as indeed it must in view of the decisions, that strict doctrines of
do not apply in this field. The consequences of injustice -- loss of liberty and sometimes loss of life -- are far too great to permit the automatic application of an entire body of technical rules whose primary relevance lies in the area of civil litigation.
This is not to suggest, however, that finality, as distinguished from the particular rules of
is without significance in the criminal law. Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in
Thus it has long been recognized that not every error that may have occurred at a criminal trial may be raised in collateral proceedings. For many years after the Constitution was adopted, and even down to the present century, such proceedings were generally confined to matters of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
372 U. S. 450
-455 (dissenting opinion of this writer). And while the scope of collateral review has expanded to cover questions of the kind raised by petitioner here, the Court has consistently held that neither habeas corpus nor its present federal counterpart § 2255 is a substitute for an appeal.
See, e.g., Sunal v. Large,
see also, e.g., Franano v. United States,
303 F.2d 470.
Similarly, the Court has held that not all questions that were or could have been raised in an initial application for collateral relief must necessarily be entertained if raised in a successive application. A District Court, for example, has discretion to deny a successive application if the claim asserted was heard and determined on a prior application,
. Indeed, the Court has stated that it would be an abuse of discretion to entertain a second application if the claim raised had been raised before, a hearing had been held, and no proof in support of the claim had been offered at the hearing.
. And, in the same year that § 2255 was adopted, the decision in
, made it clear that a successive application could be denied for abuse of the remedy even if the prisoner's claim had not been raised in any prior application, unless there were some acceptable excuse for the failure to do so.
It is in light of this history that § 2255, and the related § 2244, dealing with successive applications for writs of habeas corpus, must be considered. Concern with existing and potential abuse of the remedy by prisoners who made a pastime of filing collateral proceedings led to proposals that successive applications for habeas corpus on grounds previously available would be wholly barred, except in the form of petitions for rehearing to the same judge, and that applications under what became § 2255 would have to be submitted within one year after discovery of the facts or a change in the law.
H.R. 4232, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 6723, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. These proposals were rejected in favor of the traditional discretion exercised by courts with respect to successive applications, and it was made clear that this discretion extended to a case in which an applicant asserted for the first time a ground that could have been raised before. Thus, the final wording of § 2244 provided that the court shall not be required to entertain a petition
". . . if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined . . . on a prior application . . . and the petition presents no
ground not theretofore presented and determined. . . ."
provision were "to compel petitioner to state in his petition all of the grounds for the writ then known to him" and "to afford unlimited opportunity to present any grounds which petitioner may
thereafter discover
at any time." (Emphasis added.) This latter purpose was "brought about by allowing presentation of a subsequent petition based upon
new' grounds `not theretofore presented and determined.'" [
] Thus, a "new ground," within the meaning of § 2244, is one that has not previously been asserted and had not previously been known. The Court is manifestly in error in its conclusion,
-13, that the discretion provided for in § 2244 is limited to petitions relying on grounds previously heard and decided.
to deny a second motion, on grounds of abuse, on its own initiative and without waiting for the Government to raise the point in its return. The provision, to this extent, departed from the rule of pleading declared in the year of its adoption in
Price v. Johnston, supra,
-- that in habeas corpus applications, "it rests with the Government to make that claim (of abuse) with clarity and particularity in its return to the order to show cause." Such a departure was amply justified by the fact that on a § 2255 motion, unlike a habeas corpus application, the prisoner's claim is presented to the sentencing court (usually the trial judge himself), which has ready access to the record of the original conviction and of the prior motions. Moreover, Congress could certainly have reasonably concluded, as did the dissenters in
334 U. S. 294
held only that the burden is on the Government to plead abuse of the writ; the burden of proving an adequate excuse was explicitly placed on the prisoner:
The Court today, however, leaves the crucial question of burden of proof up in the air. If it means to suggest that this burden also rests with the Government, then it is going far beyond the holding of the sharply divided Court in
The relevant facts on the question of abuse would almost always lie within the exclusive possession of the prisoner, and any evidentiary burden placed on the Government would therefore be one that it could seldom meet.
It is startling enough that the Government may now be required to establish, in a collateral attack on a prior conviction, that a successive application is an abuse of the remedy. It is at least equally startling to learn that the question whether or not there has been abuse of the remedy may turn on whether the prisoner had "deliberately" withheld the ground now urged or had "deliberately" abandoned it at some earlier stage.
373 U. S. 18
. The established concept of inexcusable neglect is apparently in the process of being entirely eliminated from the criminal law,
, and the standard that seems to be taking its place will, I am afraid, prove wholly inadequate and in the long run wholly unsatisfactory.
I must also protest the implication in the Court's opinion that every decision of this Court in the field of habeas corpus -- even one like
dealing with a purely procedural question on which reasonable men surely may differ -- has become enshrined in the Constitution because of the guarantee in Article I against suspension of the writ. This matter may perhaps be brought back into proper perspective by noting again that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and for many years afterward, a claim of the kind asserted by Price, or asserted here by petitioner, was not cognizable in habeas corpus at all.
373 U. S. 25
Sentencing followed some three weeks after, and about one year later, Sanders filed a § 2255 motion alleging,
that the court had allowed him to be "intimidated and coerced into intering [
] a plea without Counsel, and any knowledge of the charges." This motion was denied on the merits, not simply for insufficiency, the trial judge correctly stating that the charges were "completely refuted by the files and records of this case."
I seriously doubt the wisdom of these "guideline" decisions. They suffer the danger of pitfalls that usually go with judging in a vacuum. However carefully written, they are apt in their application to carry unintended consequences which once accomplished are not always easy to repair. Rules respecting matters daily arising in the federal courts are ultimately likely to find more solid formulation if left to focused adjudication on a case-by-case basis, or to the normal rulemaking processes of the Judicial Conference, rather than to
pronouncements by this Court, which is remote from the arena.
According to the reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 538 § 2255 proceedings were commenced in 1960, 560 in 1961, and 546 in 1962. Annual Report of the Director, 1960, p. 231;
1961, p. 239; Preliminary Annual Report of the Director, 1962, Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, p. 23. The Government, in referring to these figures in its brief, has stated that even they "do not . . . appear to be complete in light of the Department's experience with petitions for writs of certiorari in this Court."
The memorandum of Circuit Judge Stone was written at a time when the proposal was to bar successive applications except in the form of petitions for rehearing to the same judge that had passed on the prior application. But the language in issue here, defining those applications considered to be successive,
those presenting "no new ground not theretofore presented and determined," was the same as that contained in § 2244 as ultimately enacted.
It seems clear that the actual decision in
could not have entered into Congress' deliberations on §§ 2244 and 2255, since the decision was handed down only one month before formal enactment, and well after study and formulation of the proposals.