Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105731/heckler-vs-edwards
Timestamp: 2020-06-07 09:08:10
Document Index: 221153759

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 211', '§ 411', '§ 411', '§ 1291', '§ 1252', '§ 1291', '§ 1254', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 2101', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 519', '§ 211', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252']

Heckler Vs Edwards - Citation 105731 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Heckler Vs. Edwards - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105731
Case Number 465 U.S. 870
heckler v. edwards - 465 u.s. 870 (1984) u.s. supreme court heckler v. edwards, 465 u.s. 870 (1984) heckler v. edwards no. 82-874 argued november 30, 1983 decided march 21, 1984 465 u.s. 870 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus title 28 u.s.c. § 1291 grants federal courts of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of district courts, "except where a direct review may be had in the supreme court." title 28 u.s.c. § 1252 provides in its first paragraph for such a direct appeal from a district court judgment holding an act of congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the united states or any of its agencies, or an officer or employee thereof,.....
Heckler v. Edwards - 465 U.S. 870 (1984)
U.S. Supreme Court Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870 (1984)
Held: A party does not have a right to direct review in this Court under § 1252 unless the district court's holding of federal statutory unconstitutionality is in issue, and hence here the Court of Appeals improperly dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, since only the District Court's remedy was challenged. Pp. 465 U. S. 876 -885.
natural sense of § 1252 is that the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, not other issues such as attorney's fees, remedy, or related state law claims, is what Congress wished this Court to review in the first instance. Pp. 465 U. S. 877 -879.
(b) Section 1252's structure supports this view. The conclusion inherent in that structure is that not all appeals in a case in which an Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional must be taken directly to this Court, the necessary corollary to the second paragraph of § 1252 being that, in the absence of a notice of appeal under § 1252, other appeals in the case will follow the normal route for appellate review. Because direct review is linked to a court's holding a federal statute unconstitutional, the logical test of which appeals from a judgment must be brought directly to this Court and which, standing alone, must follow the normal route of appellate review, is whether the issue on appeal is the holding of statutory unconstitutionality. Pp. 465 U. S. 879 -880.
(c) The legislative history also supports the view that Congress considered the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory review by this Court to be appeal from the constitutional holding. Congress' concerns in enacting § 1252's predecessor about the separation of powers and the need for certainty and uniformity in the administration of federal law are not implicated in cases in which the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court's judgment. The only justification for exerting this Court's mandatory jurisdiction in a case such as this might be the considerable ramifications of district court orders, but serious consequences alone cannot support the exercise of such jurisdiction. Although remedial aspects of a case are important, the touchstone of direct appeal under § 1252 is not a party's or this Court's own judgment of the significance of a decision. In § 1252, Congress mandated direct review not simply for decisions with impact, but rather for decisions whose impact was predicated upon a potentially incorrect exercise of judicial review. A construction of § 1252 that would require this Court to review collateral issues as independent matters, rather than as pendent to the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, would undermine the effectiveness of the direct appeal provision. Pp. 465 U. S. 880 -885.
Respondent filed this suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in October, 1980. On behalf of a nationwide class of Social Security applicants and recipients, respondent challenged the constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act, 64 Stat. 502, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A), which established a gender-based presumption concerning the allocation of income from family businesses in community property States, [ Footnote 1 ]
In pretrial proceedings, the Secretary argued that the constitutional ruling sought by the class was unnecessary, because the Secretary acquiesced in judicial precedents holding the challenged provision unconstitutional. [ Footnote 2 ] Indeed, shortly after respondent's complaint was filed, the Attorney General formally notified Congress that the Executive would not defend the constitutionality of the section. [ Footnote 3 ] The District Court
nevertheless rejected the Secretary's claim of mootness, and granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. [ Footnote 4 ] According to the court, although the Secretary "essentially conceded the unconstitutionality of § 411(a)(5)(A)," a ruling on the merits was necessary because the Department was still applying the challenged statutory section. [ Footnote 5 ]
Having held the statute unconstitutional, the District Court turned to the issue of relief. The unconstitutional provision had provided that all gross income and deductions derived from a nonpartnership trade or business in community property jurisdictions should be attributed to the husband unless the wife could establish that she exercised substantially all of the management and control of the business, in which case all income would be treated as the wife's. Having struck down this gender-based presumption, the court found the respondent class entitled to an allocation of co-proprietor income between the spouses' earnings accounts on the basis of the relative amount of labor contributed by each. Finding that retroactive application of its holding was appropriate under the tests of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 , 404 U. S. 106 -107 (1971), the court found that class members "are entitled to a recomputation of their earnings records, extending back to the beginning of Social Security if necessary." Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Jan. 22, 1982). The court entered judgment March 23, 1982.
The following week, the Secretary filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. [ Footnote 6 ] In the Secretary's docketing statement, filed on May 5, 1982, the Secretary listed only matters concerning the remedy ordered by the District Court, noting that the Government conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute. [ Footnote 7 ] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Secretary's appeal, contending that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 "where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Respondent argued that the Secretary had such a right to direct review to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, because the District Court had held a statute unconstitutional in a civil action to which a United States officer was a party. In a one-sentence order dated July 27,
In the normal course, a party dissatisfied with the judgment of a United States district court must first appeal to the court of appeals, and may then petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Recourse to the court of appeals is a matter of right, 28 U.S.C. § 1291; writs of certiorari are granted at the discretion of the Supreme Court, § 1254(1). The general rule of discretionary Supreme Court review is not without exceptions. Although this Court's mandatory jurisdiction has been minimized through legislation such as the Judge's Bill of 1925 [ Footnote 8 ] and the 1976 repeal of most of the Three Judge District Court Act, [ Footnote 9 ] Congress has identified a narrow group of cases that merit the immediate and mandatory attention of this Court. Section 1252 is such a direct appeal provision.
When a party has a right to pursue a direct appeal to this Court under § 1252, the normal route for appellate review is blocked, and a court of appeals is without jurisdiction. Donovan v. Richland County Assn. for Retarded Citizens, supra, at 454 U. S. 389 -390. Thus, the consequence of an erroneous choice of forum can be to preclude any court's review, because by the time a party discovers its error, appeal to the correct forum may be untimely. To avoid that consequence, litigants ought to be able to apply a clear test to determine whether, as an exception to the general rule of appellate review, they must perfect an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Such a test, of course, must be crafted "with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes" in the jurisdictional statute. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206 , 392 U. S. 212 (1968).
The Secretary and respondent offer different tests. Respondent's position is that, when the "literal requirements of § 1252 are satisfied," only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358 , 448 U. S. 366 (1980); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 , 462 U. S. 929 (1983) ("express requisites for an appeal under § 1252 . . . have been met"). Section 1252 establishes four prerequisites for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court: the order appealed from must issue from an enumerated court; the United States or an agency or officer must be a party; the proceeding must be civil; and the order must hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Those prerequisites are met in the present case. Therefore, respondent argues, the Secretary's sole avenue for appellate review of the judgment was by direct appeal to this Court. Because the Secretary did not file a notice of appeal to this Court within 30 days of the District Court's order, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(a), respondent contends that the Secretary has lost her right to appellate review of any aspect of the District Court's orders.
gains support from the fact that Congress has not limited our review under § 1252 to the federal constitutional issue, but has mandated that, when we have properly asserted jurisdiction under § 1252, the whole case is to come before us. [ Footnote 10 ]
"to give the surface literal meaning to a jurisdictional provision . . . would not be consistent with the 'sense of the thing' and would confer upon this Court a jurisdiction beyond what 'naturally and properly belongs to it.' [ Footnote 11 ] When Congress created the exceptional right to bypass the court of appeals, it directly linked that right to a lower court's invalidation of an Act of Congress. Although it is in the nature of cases and controversies that the court's judgment may address not only the issue of statutory constitutionality, but other issues as well, such as attorney's fees, remedy, or related state law claims, the natural sense of the jurisdictional provision is that the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, not these other issues, is what Congress wished this Court to review in the first instance. Thus, the sense of the statute and the literal language are at loggerheads."
The structure of § 1252 helps resolve this tension, and leads us towards the common-sense view that the constitutional holding must be at issue for direct review in this Court to lie. The first paragraph of § 1252 grants the right of direct appeal from the judgment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional; the second paragraph brings before us the whole case, including appeals filed before and after the constitutional appeal. [ Footnote 12 ] The clear implication of the second paragraph is that
The history of the enactment of § 1252's statutory predecessor [ Footnote 13 ] also guides us to a conclusion that Congress considered
the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory direct review by the Supreme Court to be appeal from the constitutional holding. [ Footnote 14 ] Three interrelated justifications for expediting final determinations of the constitutionality of federal statutes recur in discussions of the direct appeal provision. First, when a federal judge strikes down an act of a coequal branch of government, the decision implicates separation of powers, [ Footnote 15 ] not only through the original exercise of judicial review, but also through this Court's exercise of discretion to hear such a case. By mandating direct review, Congress asserted its prerogative to define a category of important cases that the Court is not free to ignore. [ Footnote 16 ] Second, Congress justified
imposing mandatory jurisdiction on the Supreme Court because of the need for certainty and uniformity in federal government when an Act may have been declared unconstitutional. It is significant that the first paragraph of § 1252 authorizes a direct appeal to this Court only in civil actions "to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, . . . is a party"; no direct appeal lies if there are only nonfederal parties to the suit. That language reveals a congressional purpose to assure an expeditious means of affirming or removing the restraint on the Federal Government's administration of the law when it would be bound by a holding that the law in question is unconstitutional. [ Footnote 17 ]
Finally, Congress expressed its sense that declarations of unconstitutionality have ramifications beyond the interests of litigants in the particular case. For this reason, the predecessor statute created the right of intervention by the Attorney General in cases between private parties when the constitutionality of an Act of Congress was drawn into question, [ Footnote 18 ] as well as the right to direct appeal from a holding
S.Rep. No. 963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937). [ Footnote 19 ]
The first two of these concerns are not implicated in cases in which the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court's judgment. Such cases raise no separation of powers issue, nor do they implicate the need for certainty and uniformity in the administration of federal law. In the present case, for example, the Attorney General, charged with enforcing federal laws, informed the Congress that he agreed with the courts that the challenged provision in the Social Security Act was unconstitutional. [ Footnote 20 ] Furthermore, prior to seeking review of the District Court's judgment, the Secretary had agreed not to enforce the statute anywhere
Executive Communication 4772, 126 Cong.Rec. 29377 (1980) (notice that Solicitor General would not take an appeal from the District Court's holding in Becker v. Harris, supra ); Executive Communication 5587, 126 Cong.Rec. 29295 (1980) (same). Congress has required the Attorney General to notify both Houses of Congress in any case in which the Attorney General considers an enacted law, at issue in the case, to be unconstitutional. See note following 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1982 ed.).
In July, 1981, the agency's concession that § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Act is unconstitutional was published as Social Security Ruling 81-17c (C.E.1981) (acquiescing in Becker v. Harris, supra ).
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3969 (ND Cal., May 22, 1981). Petitioner did not file an appeal challenging the ruling that the statute was unconstitutional. The jurisdictional statute at issue in this case permits, but does not require, an interlocutory appeal from a holding of unconstitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 1252; see United States v. Clark, 45 U. S. 23 , 46 U. S. 26 -27, n. 2 (1980) (Government need not appeal before final judgment is entered).
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employee Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 , 419 U. S. 98 , and n. 16 (1974).
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 , 362 U. S. 94 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491 , 224 U. S. 495 (1912)).
For cases discussing our jurisdiction over the whole case when a direct appeal is properly filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, see United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7 , 419 U. S. 12 , n. 7 (1974) (per curiam); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 , 362 U. S. 27 , n. 7 (1960). When we consider the whole case, we are not only implementing Congress' jurisdictional intent expressed in paragraph two of 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We are also exercising judicial discretion to administer our caseload to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1. But neither paragraph two of § 1252 nor our principle of case management should come into play unless we have established first that the Court has appellate jurisdiction.
See, e.g., McLuca v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21 , 421 U. S. 31 (1975) (§ 1252 language permits appeal where the Government has participated in litigation "and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality").