Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/418/
Timestamp: 2019-09-23 13:23:18
Document Index: 771356856

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1252', '§1229', '§1240', '§1101', '§1241', '§1231', '§1241', '§1252', '§1252', '§1252', '§1252']

Nken v. Holder :: 556 U.S. 418 (2009) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 556 › Nken v. Holder
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)
No. 08–681. Argued January 21, 2009—Decided April 22, 2009
(d) Section 1252(f) does not refer to “stays,” but rather to authority to “enjoin the removal of any alien.” An injunction and a stay serve different purposes. The former is the means by which a court tells someone what to do or not to do. While in a general sense many orders may be considered injunctions, the term is typically used to refer to orders that operate in personam. By contrast, a stay operates upon the judicial proceeding itself, either by halting or postponing some portion of it, or by temporarily divesting an order of enforceability. An alien seeking a stay of removal pending adjudication of a petition for review does not ask for a coercive order against the government, but instead asks to temporarily set aside the removal order. That kind of stay, “relat[ing] only to the conduct or progress of litigation before th[e] court[,] ordinarily is not considered an injunction.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 279. That §1252(f)(2) does not comfortably cover stays is evident in Congress’s use of the word “stay” in subsection (b)(3)(B) but not subsection (f)(2), particularly since those subsections were enacted as part of a unified overhaul of judicial review. The statute’s structure also clearly supports petitioner’s reading: Because subsection (b)(3)(B) changed the basic rules covering stays of removal, the natural place to locate an amendment to the standard governing stays would have been subsection (b)(3)(B), not a provision four subsections later that makes no mention of stays. Pp. 8–12.
(f) The parties dispute what the traditional four-factor standard entails. A stay is not a matter of right, and its issuance depends on the circumstances of a particular case. The first factor, a strong showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, requires more than a mere possibility that relief will be granted. Similarly, simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the second factor. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. ___, ___. Although removal is a serious burden for many aliens, that burden alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable injury. An alien who has been removed may continue to pursue a petition for review, and those aliens who prevail can be afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the immigration status they had upon removal. The third and fourth factors, harm to the opposing party and the public interest, merge when the Government is the opposing party. In considering them, courts must be mindful that the Government’s role as the respondent in every removal proceeding does not make its interest in each one negligible. There is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders, see AAADC, supra, at 490, and that interest may be heightened by circumstances such as a particularly dangerous alien, or an alien who has substantially prolonged his stay by abusing the processes provided to him. A court asked to stay removal cannot simply assume that the balance of hardships will weigh heavily in the applicant’s favor. Pp. 13–16.
Subsection (f)(2) does not by its terms refer to “stays” but instead to the authority to “enjoin the removal of any alien.” The parties accordingly begin by disputing whether a stay is simply a type of injunction, covered by the term “enjoin,” or a different form of relief. An injunction and a stay have typically been understood to serve different purposes. The former is a means by which a court tells someone what to do or not to do. When a court employs “the extraordinary remedy of injunction,” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982), it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers. See Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “injunction” as “[a] court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury”).
The dissent would distinguish Scripps-Howard on the ground that Nken does not really seek to stay a final order of removal, but instead seeks “to enjoin the Executive Branch from enforcing his removal order pending judicial review of an entirely separate order [denying a motion to reopen].” Post, at 4, n. But a determination that the BIA should have granted Nken’s motion to reopen would necessarily extinguish the finality of the removal order. See Tr. of Oral Arg. for Respondent 42 (“[I]f the motion to reopen is granted, that vacates the final order of removal and, therefore, there is no longer a final order of removal pursuant to which the alien could be removed”). The relief sought here is properly termed a “stay” because it suspends the effect of the removal order.
It seems appropriate to underscore that in most cases the debate about which standard should apply will have little practical effect provided the court considering the stay application adheres to the demanding standard set forth. A stay of removal is an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted in the ordinary case, much less awarded as of right. Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 672–673 (1926); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 14).
When an alien is charged with being removable from the United States, an Immigration Judge (IJ) conducts a hearing, receives and considers evidence, and determines whether the alien is removable. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(a); 8 CFR §§1240.1(a)(1)(i), (c) (2008). If the IJ enters an order of removal, that order becomes final when the alien’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) is unsuccessful or the alien declines to appeal to the Board. See 8 U. S. C. §1101(47)(B); 8 CFR §§1241.1, 1241.31. Once an order of removal has become final, it may be executed at any time. See 8 U. S. C. §§1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1252(b)(8)(C); 8 CFR §1241.33. Removal orders “are self-executing orders, not dependent upon judicial enforcement.” Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 398 (1995).
First, a stay is “a kind of injunction,” Black’s 1413, as even the Court grudgingly concedes, see ante, at 10 (an order blocking an alien’s removal pending judicial review “might technically be called an injunction”). See also Teshome-Gebreegziabher v. Mukasey, 528 F. 3d 330, 333 (CA4 2008) (the term “stay” “is a subset of the broader term ‘enjoin,’ ”); Kijowska v. Haines, 463 F. 3d 583, 589 (CA7 2006) (a stay “is a form of injunction”); Weng v. United States Atty. Gen., 287 F. 3d 1335, 1338 (CA11 2002) (“[T]he plain meaning of enjoin includes the grant of a stay”).
More important, if §1252(f)(2) does not set the standard for blocking removal pending judicial review, then, as the Court concedes, “the exact role of subsection (f)(2) . . . is not easy to explain.” Ante, at 12. “In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979). We should not lightly conclude that Congress enacted a provision that serves no function, and the Court’s hyper-technical distinction between an injunction and a stay does not provide a sufficient justification for adopting an interpretation that renders §1252(f)(2) meaningless. That result is particularly anomalous in the context of §1252(f)(2), which Congress said should apply “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”
Third, if stays and injunctions really are two entirely distinct concepts, the order that petitioner sought here is best viewed as an injunction. Insofar as there is a difference between the two concepts, I agree with the Court that it boils down to this: “A stay ‘simply suspend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo,’ ” whereas an injunction “ ‘grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.’ ” Ante, at 9 (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers)). See also Black’s 1413 (defining a stay as an “act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the order of a court”). Here, petitioner did not seek an order “suspend[ing] judicial alteration of the status quo.” Instead, he sought an order barring Executive branch officials from removing him from the country. Such an order is best viewed as an injunction. See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U. S. 1317, 1317, n. 1 (1976) (Powell, J., in chambers) (although applicants claimed to seek a “stay,” the court granted an “injunction” because “the applicants actually [sought] affirmative relief” against executive officials).
In the present case, however, petitioner did not seek to block his removal pending judicial review of his final order of removal. That review concluded long ago. What petitioner asked for was an order barring the Executive Branch from removing him pending judicial review of an entirely different order, the Board’s order denying his third motion to reopen the proceedings. Petitioner’s current petition for review does not contest the correctness of the removal order. Rather, he argues that the Board should have set aside that order due to alleged changes in conditions in his home country. A motion to reopen an administrative proceeding that is no longer subject to direct judicial review surely seeks “ ‘an order altering the status quo.’ ” Ante, at 9 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 507 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers)). Consequently, the relief that petitioner sought here is best categorized as an injunction.
The Court argues that applying 8 U. S. C. §1252(f)(2) would “deprive” us of our “ ‘customary’ stay power.” Ante, at 13. As noted above, however, restricting judicial discretion was “the theme” of IIRIRA, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S., at 486. And Congress is free to regulate or eliminate the relief that federal courts may award, within constitutional limits that the Court does not invoke here. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 299–300 (2001).
Thus, it is unremarkable that we have used the word “stay” to describe an injunction blocking an administrative order pending judicial review. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); ante, at 9–10, n. Indeed, our decision in Scripps-Howard, supra, at 11—like the Court’s decision today, ante, at 7, 14—relied heavily on Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926), the latter of which referred to “stays” as a subset of “injunctions.” See id., at 669 (noting that the power to issue a “stay” “to preserve the status quo pending appeal” is “an incident” of the power “to enjoin” an administrative order); see also id., at 671–672 (referring interchangeably to a three-judge district court’s power to issue “injunctions” and “stays”). In any event, both Scripps-Howard and Virginian are inapposite because petitioner here did not seek to “stay” his removal order pending judicial review of that order; rather, he sought to enjoin the Executive Branch from enforcing his removal order pending judicial review of an entirely separate order. See Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 395 (1995) (holding that the IJ’s removal order and the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen are “two separate final orders”); Bak v. INS, 682 F. 2d 441, 442 (CA3 1982) (per curiam) (“The general rule is that a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is a new, independently reviewable order”); Brief for Respondent 51–52 (differentiating petitioner’s challenge to the IJ’s removal order, which “became final well over a year ago,” from “petitioner’s latest challenge[, which] is currently pending” before the Court of Appeals); id., at 13–14, 36–37 (similar).