Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/265/418/63048/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 03:01:34
Document Index: 4931525

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17322', '§ 374', '§ 81', '§ 3', '§ 1303', '§ 1732']

Toho Bussan Kaisha, Limited, Plaintiff-appellant, v. American President Lines, Limited, Defendant-appellee, 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959) :: Justia
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Toho Bussan Kaisha, Limited, Plaintiff-appellant, v. American President Lines, Limited, Defendant-appellee, 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959)
Argued October 10, 1958
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Lazaar Henkin, New York City (John A. Sullivan, George M. Vetter, Jr., Isaac C. Donner and Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
The photostats which plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence were copies of books of account kept in the ordinary course of business. The original books themselves would be admissible, but the photostats, prepared specially for the litigation, are not within either the federal or New York State business entry statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 17322 (1952); New York Civil Practice Act, §§ 374-a, 374-b,3 and therefore were properly excluded. The provisions of those acts permitting use of photostats refer only to situations where photostats, microfilms, or the like, have been made in the ordinary course of business and not in preparation for trial. No sufficient foundation was laid for their admission on this ground.
"And if it appear, as it does here, that what is called secondary evidence is clearly equal in probative value to what is called the primary proof, and that fraud or imposition, reasonably, is not to be feared, the reason upon which the best evidence rule rests ceases, with the consequence that in that situation the rule itself must cease to be applicable, in consonance with the well established maxim — cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
Our holding that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove its loss, if any, disposes of the appellant's appeal from the orders denying its motions for summary judgment. Obviously the matter of loss had to await proof at the trial. Judge Walsh correctly denied summary judgment and we affirm his orders. D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1957, 155 F. Supp. 886.
The disposition of the appeal makes it unnecessary to pass on the other defenses raised by the appellee that the plaintiff's losses, if any, were not due to the fraudulent issuance of the bills of lading, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 39 Stat. 538-545 (1916), 49 U.S. C.A. §§ 81-124 and that the action was time-barred under § 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1303.
Although perhaps we might be able to compute the damage, I think it entirely proper to remand this case for further proceedings below, particularly as certain defenses of illegality were never reached. But elementary considerations of fairness and equity require at least a remand, and not a final judgment for the defaulting defendant. And if there is any question as to the authenticity of the photostats — none is really indicated — it can be settled with exactitude and justice on such remand. It is to be noted that the trial judge rejected the photostats not in the exercise of some "discretion" as to their falsity, as the opinion suggests, but because he held copies inadmissible — a decision erroneous according to modern standards, as the opinion concedes. I would reverse and remand.
28 U.S.C. § 1732 provides:
"(a) In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. * * *
"(b) If any business, institution, member of a profession or calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of the same to be recorded, copied, or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless held in a custodial or fiduciary capacity or unless its preservation is required by law. Such reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not and an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evidence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement, or facsimile does not preclude admission of the original. This subsection shall not be construed to exclude from evidence any document or copy thereof which is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence."