Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-steel-corp-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-10-18 07:29:38
Document Index: 278688501

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 125', '§ 1516', '§ 1516', '§ 1516', '§ 1516', '§ 1516']

U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465 | Casetext
U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States
730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
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United States Court of Appeals, Federal CircuitMar 23, 1984
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Interlocutory appeal on a certified question arising from a decision of the Court of International Trade (CIT) denying U.S. Steel's (USS) corporate in-house counsel access to confidential information. We vacate and return.
Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 275 (C.I.T. 1983).
In Republic Steel Corp., supra, note 1, an action involving a negative preliminary injury determination by the International Trade Commission (ITC), the CIT denied a motion for access by USS' in-house counsel to certain confidential information while granting access to counsel retained by other parties. Relying on an earlier decision in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 870 (C.I.T. 1983), vacated on other grounds, slip op. 84-12 (C.I.T. Feb. 24, 1984), the court reiterated its view that the possibility of inadvertent disclosure by in-house counsel warranted denial of access. 572 F. Supp. at 276. That earlier decision, specifically incorporated into the decision on appeal here, acknowledged USS's need for the information but said that the information's nature and volume required a focus on the possibility of inadvertent disclosure. Though it accepted representations that the present in-house counsel are not involved in competitive decisions, the CIT nonetheless denied access to in-house counsel because of their "general position" and "reasonable assumptions that they will move into other roles."
The CIT certified the access question in its decision. 572 F. Supp. at 277. This court granted USS's petition for review of that question on November 10, 1983, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), as amended by Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-164, § 125(a), 96 Stat. 25, 36 (1982).
The ITC takes no position on the present court-denial of access, but seeks to preserve its right to deny access by in-house counsel at the administrative level. Intervenors Companhia Siderurgica Paulista, S.A. (COSIPA) and Usinas Siderurgicas de Minas Gerais, S.A., of Brazil and Companhia Siderurgica National are exporters of steel products seeking affirmance of the present denial. European exporters filed a brief amici curiae urging affirmance. Bethlehem Steel Corporation filed a brief amicus curiae in support of reversal.
The authority of the CIT under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) to control access to confidential information in cases before it is not in dispute. In exercising that control in this case, the CIT carefully reviewed Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust.Ct. 133, C.R.D. 80-18 (1980) and available authorities dealing with access in other fields of law, made clear that its rationale carried no reflection on the unquestioned integrity and unblemished record of USS' in-house counsel in adhering to protective orders, and indicated that retention of outside counsel was a reasonable way for USS to satisfy its recognized need for the requested information. Serving the interest of early and just resolution, the CIT certified to this court the question of whether access may be denied solely because of counsel's in-house status.
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) provides:
Confidential or privileged material. — The confidential or privileged status accorded to any documents, comments, or information shall be preserved in any action under this section. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the court may examine, in camera, the confidential or privileged material, and may disclose such material under such terms and conditions as it may order.
The CIT distinguished in-house from retained counsel because, as it said, "a clear and more sustained relationship can be presumed as an outgrowth of the employer-employee relationship". It therefore saw exclusion of in-house counsel as providing "a meaningful increment of protection". Like retained counsel, however, in-house counsel are officers of the court, are bound by the same Code of Professional Responsibility, and are subject to the same sanctions. In-house counsel provide the same services and are subject to the same types of pressures as retained counsel. The problem and importance of avoiding inadvertent disclosure is the same for both. Inadvertence, like the thief-in-the-night, is no respecter of its victims. Inadvertent or accidental disclosure may or may not be predictable. To the extent that it may be predicted, and cannot be adequately forestalled in the design of a protective order, it may be a factor in the access decision. Whether an unacceptable opportunity for inadvertent disclosure exists, however, must be determined, as above indicated, by the facts on a counsel-by-counsel basis, and cannot be determined solely by giving controlling weight to the classification of counsel as in-house rather than retained.
The parties have referred to involvement in "competitive decisionmaking" as a basis for denial of access. The phrase would appear serviceable as shorthand for a counsel's activities, association, and relationship with a client that are such as to involve counsel's advice and participation in any or all of the client's decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made in light of similar or corresponding information about a competitor.
We have considered and find it unnecessary to discuss the arguments: that the CIT was here creating a per se rule requiring denial to all in-house counsel of access to any confidential information in all future cases; that the denial of access here constituted a violation of USS' right to choice of counsel or a disenfranchising of counsel without due process; that Rule 26, Fed.R.Civ.P., rather than 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B), should have been applied; and that the "staleness" of the information sought should dictate access.
[27] NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Under all the circumstances, Judge Watson well may have thought whatever faults his disposition might suffer from — and hardly could he have imagined it was faultless — alternatives were worse. Factual inquiry into the relationship of in-house counsel with the makers of business policy in their companies, has an appearance, it cannot be denied, of greater fairness. One hopes, but does not much believe, it will not degenerate in practice into an invidious effort to throw doubt on the ability — if not the willingness — of certain members in good standing of the CIT bar, who happen to be currently employed as in-house counsel, to resist pressures to violate protective orders or not to yield "inadvertently." Not in this case, perhaps, but in cases for which this will be a precedent. At best a way is found to prolong the litigation and make it more costly. The CIT judge will have to lay out a pretty rigid method of trial of this issue, one that will keep things within seemly limits and not take forever to implement, thus limiting the damage to what is endurable.
I would be, on remand, inclined to consider seriously adoption of a simple alternative rule which our court majority also seems not to exclude, i.e., if a document is too sensitive to disclose to any counsel of record, in good standing as a member of the CIT bar, it is too sensitive to disclose to any or all other such counsel. This is, I suppose, rejected by the CIT on its theory, as explained by Judge Watson, that the second sentence of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) nullifies the first once the court has examined the material in camera. Apparently the effect of the two sentences is believed to be to achieve practically nothing different from what Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 would effectuate if the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 had said nothing. The court majority here implies something different possibly to be the rule inasmuch as nothing in the second sentence requires grant of access to anyone. The supposed necessity of discriminating between retained and in-house counsel is, or may be, somewhat of a self-created dilemma. While the general rule is that sufficient necessity on the part of the discovering litigant will override any degree of sensitivity, this may not be so where § 1516a(b)(2)(B) is applicable. Such an interpretation would recognize the differences in litigation where foreign traders and governments are so strongly interested in the procedure as well as the outcome, and relieves Congress of the imputation of having enacted futile "weasel" words. The matter has not been briefed and I do not wish to seem to rule upon it, even if, writing as a minority, I could. It seems to me that, without discriminating among counsel or having to decide who is trustworthy, a court might find some other way of dealing with the problem. For example, a court appointed expert, acceptable to both sides for expertise and impartiality, might examine the documents and advise the court as to what they reveal, in sanitized terms sufficient to support a legal conclusion, yet not divulging business or trade secrets.