Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/535/434/23511/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 00:52:37
Document Index: 76727194

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2518', '§ 1963', '§ 1962', '§ 1341', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1341', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Anthony v. Daly, Appellant, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1976) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1976 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Anthony v. Daly, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Anthony v. Daly, Appellant, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1976)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1976) Submitted March 10, 1976. Decided May 5, 1976
18 U.S.C. § 2518 sets forth the procedure for interception of wire and oral communications. Section 2518(1) (c) requires that each application include the following information:
Section 2518(3) (c) provides that the judge may authorize interception of wire or oral communications if, inter alia, he finds the following:
We recognize that Congress intended these sections to restrict wiretaps to those which are necessary as well as reasonable. But Congress did not require the exhaustion of "specific" or "all possible" investigative techniques before wiretap orders could be issued. United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1975). Congress prohibited wiretapping only when normal investigative techniques are likely to succeed and are not too dangerous. "Merely because a normal investigative technique is theoretically possible it does not follow that it is likely." S.Rep. 90-1097, U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp. 2112, 2190 (1968). Sections 2518(1) (c) and 2518(3) (c) are only designed to ensure that wiretapping is "not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1826, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 353 (1974), and " * * * to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime." United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153, 94 S. Ct. 977, 983, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225, 236, n.12 (1974). The government's showing must, of course, be tested in a "practical and commonsense fashion." United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, at 1274, (8th Cir., filed April 22, 1976); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 224 n.14 (8th Cir. 1974), quoting, S.Rep. 90-1097, supra, at p. 2190. And as in other suppression matters, considerable discretion rests with the judge to whom the wiretap application is made. United States v. Smith, supra, 519 F.2d at 518.
Section 2516, as amended in 1970, includes within the list of specific offenses for which interception of wire communications is permitted, the activities penalized by 18 U.S.C. § 1963. H.Rep. 91-1549, U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp. 4007, 4036 (1970). Section 1963 penalizes any pattern of racketeering activity affecting interstate commerce proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Section 1961(1) (B), which defines the activities subject to the racketeering provisions, specifically refers to the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b), "(a)ny objections to the validity of the indictment were waived when they were not presented by motion before trial." United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 901-902 (8th Cir. 1975). Failure to raise this issue in the court below, and the inadequacy of the record before us, forecloses review. United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 962, 95 S. Ct. 1948, 44 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1975).6
See also United States v. Quintana, supra, 508 F.2d at 874. If at the outset the agents have no way of identifying innocent calls either by person or subject matter, comprehensive monitoring may be justified. United States v. Scott, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 516 F.2d 751, 755 n.7 (1975). On the other hand, if a pattern of innocent conversation develops listening and recording should cease during such conversations. Greater monitoring may be justified where, as in this case, the coconspirators employ specialized jargon which appears innocent to the lay ear yet is relevant to the criminal activity. United States v. Quintana, supra, 508 F.2d at 874 n.6.
Daly's final attack on the wiretaps concerns the failure of the agents to record all communications to which they listened. He claims that this failure violates 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a) and requires suppression of the conversations. With the exception of certain de minimus conversations monitored by Inspector Maki, discussed supra, the monitoring agents failed to record only when they made spot-checks of innocent conversations.
Section 2518(8) (a) requires, if possible, that the contents of any intercepted conversations be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The Senate Report states that any interception must be recorded if practicable. S.Rep. 90-1097, supra, at p. 2193. The Report indicates that the purpose of § 2518(8) (a) is to ensure the admissibility of intercepted communications at trial. Id.
Even assuming, without deciding, that § 2518(8) (a) requires even innocent conversations to be recorded in spot-checking situations,9 we fail to see how Daly was prejudiced by the failure to record. Defendant does not allege, and has not shown, that any incriminating conversations were recorded out of context. The minimization requirement was met. Suppression is not required under these circumstances.10
Even assuming that this issue was properly presented for review, defendant would not be entitled to dismissal of the indictment and reversal of his conviction. Judge Regan's order authorized interception of wire communications over three telephones used by Daly in carrying on racketeering activities relating to mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962(c), 1962(d), and 1963. Daly's insurance fraud enterprise was also mail fraud under § 1341 since the mail was an essential part of the operation. Mail fraud under § 1341 is subject to the racketeering provisions by virtue of § 1961(1) (B). Since at least three instances of such fraud were involved, the scheme constituted a pattern of racketeering under § 1961(5). Thus the insurance fraud operation fell within the offenses specified in the court order and a disclosure order was not required
Whether § 2518(8) (a) requires recording all spot-checks is a question we need not decide here. We find nothing in the legislative history which requires this result. Recordation is required only "if possible" or "if practical." Complete recording is a result which we find inconsistent, and possibly in conflict with, the minimization provision of § 2518(5)