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Timestamp: 2016-10-20 21:31:18
Document Index: 119771779

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 1952', '§ 7201', '§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 1952', '§ 7201', '§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 1951', '§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 371', '§ 371', '§ 1962']

| United States v. Marren
United States v. Marren
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.JOSEPH MARREN AND MICHAEL RUSSO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 87 CR 501--Ann Claire Williams, Judge.
Cudahy, Flaum, Circuit Judges, and Grant, Senior District Judge.*fn*
Michael Russo and Joseph Marren, along with three others, were charged in a 27-count indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (count 1), conspiracy to commit tax evasion (count 24), use of the telephone to promote a prostitution business (counts 2-23), and filing false federal income tax returns (counts 25-27), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), § 371 and § 1952, and 26 U.S.C. § 7201, respectively. Marren was named only in the two conspiracy counts while Russo was named in each of the counts. Following a joint jury trial, appellants and their three co-defendants were convicted on all counts. Russo was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for eleven years on count 1 and five years on counts 2-22 and 24-27, to be followed by five years of probation on count 23. In addition, the court assessed a $100,000 fine on the tax counts. Marren was sentenced to imprisonment for five years on count 1 and five years probation on count 24. We affirm on all counts.
Michael's Magic Touch resumed credit card transactions within days after the search and seizure. On August 21, Damron and Transeth made what was to be their final visit to Michael's Magic Touch as undercover officers. The conversation with Michael Russo centered around the undeclared income from the credit card transactions. Michael Russo asked for and received a detailed explanation of Damron's collection and payment procedure. Transeth suggested that in the future the income derived from the NCS checks should be recorded and used to pay legitimate club expenses. Michael Russo rejected that idea. Transeth asked, Are you gonna still keep doing, what you were doing?" Michael Russo replied, "Yeah."
Shortly thereafter the undercover operation came to an end. Marren and Russo, along with three co-defendants, were indicted by the 1986 Grand Jury. The 27-count indictment charged the five defendants with conspiracy to violate RICO (count 1), conspiracy to commit tax evasion (count 24), use of the telephone to promote a prostitution business (counts 2-23), and filing false federal income tax returns (counts 25-27), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), § 371 and § 1952, and 26 U.S.C. § 7201, respectively. Marren was named only in the two conspiracy counts while Russo was named in each of the counts. Following a joint jury trial, the five defendants were convicted on all counts. Russo was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for eleven years on count 1 and five years on counts 2-22 and 24-27, to be followed by five years of probation on count 23. In addition, the court assessed a $100,000 fine on the tax counts. Marren was sentenced to imprisonment for five years on count 1 and five years of probation on count 24.
Michael Russo's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment.*fn1 At trial, Russo's sole theory of defense was that he was entrapped by the government into violating federal laws. In his view, the credit card scheme, which required the use of interstate phone facilities, expanded his admittedly criminal conduct from purely local violations to federal offenses. He argued that but for the government's conduct (through its involvement in NCS) in allegedly inducing him to begin accepting credit cards, he would not have agreed to engage in the conduct that made him subject to federal prosecution.
In examining Russo's argument, we note that this Court has adopted a four-part test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a particular theory of defense instruction. In United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1987), we held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of defense if: (1) the defendant proposes a correct statement of the law; (2) the defendant's theory is supported by the evidence; (3) the defendant's theory of defense is not part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include an instruction on the defendant's theory of defense in the jury charge would deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. at 1320-21. Applying this test to the case at bar, we find that for the reasons stated below, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment because the defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of Douglas : his requested instruction was not supported by the evidence.
A valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of pre-disposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54, 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988); United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1987). A defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever "there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 61; United States v. Fusko, 869 F.2d 1048, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Williams, 877 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1989). The defendant's burden to warrant an entrapment instruction, therefore, is to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find both a lack of predisposition and inducement by the government. Instructions on the entrapment defense are not required if the defendant has not met his threshold responsibility. See United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Nicosia, 638 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1980). We must examine the record de novo to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a lack of predisposition and government inducement. Hawkins, 823 F.2d at 1025. We find that there was not.
Predisposition is defined as a defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983). A predisposed defendant is "one who is ready and willing to commit an offense apart from government encouragement, and not an innocent person in whose mind the government implanted a disposition to commit an offense." United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 637 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The factors which we have held to be relevant in determining whether a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime include: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense, overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the government. Fusko, 869 F.2d at 1052; United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 831, 88 L. Ed. 2d 80, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985); Kaminiski, 703 F.2d at 1008. The most important factor in determining a defendant's predisposition is whether the defendant evidenced a "reluctance to engage in the criminal activity that was overcome only by repeated government inducement." Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 871.
We also reject Russo's contention that taped conversations between Russo and Agent Damron after the government raid on the club demonstrate his lack of predisposition. These conversations discuss problems with Russo's failure to report the credit card transaction income on his federal tax returns and not his willingness to participate in the credit card scheme. The taped comments can only be properly construed as expressions of concern that the evidence seized by federal agents would lead to the discovery of tax violations. Moreover, predisposition is defined as a defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983). "The principle focus . . . of necessity must be on the first transaction." Fusko, 869 F.2d at 1052 (quoting United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1984)). Evidence of comments made more than two years after the credit card activity began simply is too remote to have any reasonable bearing upon predisposition.
An analysis of these five factors demonstrates that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to believe that Russo was not predisposed to violate federal laws. Russo was not an "unwary innocent" but instead an "unwary criminal." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. He was a comfortable veteran of the underworld who knowingly entered into a relationship to turn an illegal profit that, in the end, backfired.
Turning to the second element of the entrapment defense, government inducement, we find that the defendant similarly failed to meet his burden. To prove inducement the defendant must put forth evidence showing that he or she would not have committed the crime had the particular attraction or lure that the government held out not existed. United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986). We find that the record is devoid of any evidence of government inducement. In fact, what the record does show is that if Russo was induced into violating federal laws, he was induced by Marren and not by the government. Marren stated to Agent Damron that "I have really been trying to talk 'em (Michael's Magic Touch) into it you know," and later, "Yeah, I talked 'em into it last night." Moreover, it was Marren who was responsible for the initial meeting between Russo and the government agents. No claim of entrapment can be premised upon the instigations of a co-defendant who was not serving as an agent or informant for the government. See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1986). The record clearly fails to establish any credible basis for a belief that the government induced Russo into violating federal law.
In sum, we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence on the record upon which a jury could reasonably find a lack of predisposition and government inducement. Russo failed to meet his burden to warrant a jury instruction. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment.*fn2
Defendant Marren raises three claims on appeal. First, he contends that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of a conspiracy to violate RICO pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Second, he similarly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction for conspiring to defraud the Internal Revenue Service of income taxes due to be paid by Michael's Magic Touch pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 371. Finally, he contends that his sentence for the RICO and tax fraud conspiracies was excessive, multiplicious and violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment.
Marren contends that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the RICO conspiracy pursuant to § 1962(d). He insists that there was no connection between his "nebulous" activities as a doorman and the conduct of the enterprise, but instead, that the evidence showed only that he worked for himself as an entrepreneur, earning money by stealing from the enterprise. Relying on the government's failure to prove that he executed any of the credit card slips or any other incriminating documents, he maintains that he was "merely associated" with the conspiracy and did not embrace its objectives or participate in the racketeering activities.
Before we examine the record to determine whether the government met its burden at trial, it is important to note that Marren bears a heavy burden in trying to reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence. Our standard of review is well-established. If the reviewing court, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, finds that " any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," it must affirm the conviction. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) (emphasis in original); United States v. Marrinson, 832 F.2d 1465, 1469 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Conley, 826 F.2d 551, 556 (7th Cir. 1987). We can reverse Marren's conviction only if the record contains no evidence from which a rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 792 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gaddis, 877 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1989). We find that Marren has not met his burden in this case.
To prove a violation of § 1962(d), the government must show that a defendant (1) agreed to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise and (2) agreed to the commission of two predicate acts. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986). In essence, Marren's assertion that he was merely associated with the conspiracy is a claim that he was not part of the agreement to participate in the activities of the conspiracy.
Marren challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction for conspiring to defraud the Internal Revenue Service of income taxes due to be paid by Michael's Magic Touch in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Marren does not challenge the adequacy of the proof that a conspiracy existed or that at least one overt act was committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. Instead, his contention focuses on the adequacy of the proof of his knowledge of a tax-related conspiracy as he claims that the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that the goal of the RICO conspiracy was the avoidance of federal tax liability. Marren argues that the evidence established only that he was employed at a prostitution shop from which he stole credit card slips which he sold for cash to an undercover FBI agent and not that he was a knowing participant in the tax fraud scheme.
The crime of conspiring to defraud the United States is set out in § 371, which provides in pertinent part:
In order to convict Marren of conspiracy under § 371, the government needed to prove at trial: (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective against the United States; (2) one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and (3) the intent to commit the substantive offense. United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gaddis, 877 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1989). In Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 79 S. Ct. 1314 (1959), the Supreme Court interpreted the third element of a § 371 offense. In evaluating a § 371 conspiracy to evade taxes, the Court found that the government need not prove "that the conspirators were aware of the criminality of their objectives" but it must show that they knew of the liability for federal taxes. "Conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself." Id. (footnote omitted).
As we noted in Hooks, because a conspiracy is by its nature secret, its existence and common purpose must often be proved by circumstantial evidence. "The government need not establish that there existed a formal agreement to conspire; circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom concerning the relationship of the parties, their overt acts, and the totality of their conduct may serve as proof." Hooks, 848 F.2d at 792; See also United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 320 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 81 L. Ed. 2d 367, 104 S. Ct. 2661 (1984). "Once the government proves the existence of the conspiracy, it need only offer 'slight evidence' to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy." United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Castillo, 814 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 1987)).
As discussed earlier, our standard of review for a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well established. We must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and can reverse only if we find that a reasonable fact-finder could not have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Colonia, 870 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1287 (7th Cir. 1988). We can "reverse a jury's verdict of conviction only if the defendant can establish that 'the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Goudy, 792 F.2d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 1986)).
Marren's contention that the government failed to establish at trial that he was a knowing participant in the tax fraud scheme finds no support in the evidence. The record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find his knowing involvement in the conspiracy. The government proved at trial that Marren instituted the process of accepting credit cards at Michael's Magic Touch and was present when the procedure was initially explained. Marren often accepted payments in cash or credit cards from the waitresses and doormen and then placed those payments in the club's office rather than in the cash register from which the income reflected in the daily reported receipts was derived. The government also provided evidence that he received a portion of the credit card income at the outset as he complained loudly and frequently to Agent Damron when his commissions came to an end. The fact that he at one time received a portion of the proceeds could lead the jury to reasonably infer that he had a stake in the successful outcome of the scheme. See Hooks, 848 F.2d at 793; United States v. Collazo, 815 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir. 1987). Marren also knew that Damron was making weekly collections and that upon the week's take of credit card slips, Damron customarily gave one of the Russos a check made payable to cash. Finally, Marren asked Damron to explain to Russo a money laundering process which would aid in the evasion of taxes that Damron had evidently previously mentioned to Marren. We believe that the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Marren was knowingly involved in the tax conspiracy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual from a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969). Marren invokes the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent being sentenced cumulatively to the sentence imposed in a previous conviction (No. 85 CR 555) because he believes that the RICO conspiracy alleged in the present indictment (No. 87 CR 501) and the RICO conspiracy to which he pled guilty in No. 85 CR 555 were portions of a single, overall RICO conspiracy. We disagree.
To properly address Marren's claim that the previous RICO conspiracy and the present one were portions of an overall RICO conspiracy, we must examine the prior charge and conviction. From the limited record before us, it appears that in No. 85 CR 555 Marren and five police officers employed by the Office of the Sheriff of Cook County were charged with RICO conspiracy and a number of substantive offenses, most of which alleged violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The indictment alleged that the RICO conspiracy was in operation as early as 1977. The pattern of racketeering involved 26 payoffs to the law enforcement officers to permit certain business establishments to operate as houses of prostitution and to allow certain bookmakers to operate. Paragraph 2 of the indictment stated that in July 1980, co-defendants Bruce Frasch (commander of the Vice Control Unit) and Robert Napora received a $10,000 bribe from Tom Gervais so that he could operate a house of prostitution known as "Delilah's Retreat." Paragraph 12 alleged that Frasch received $300 from Gervais to allow him to operate the Palatine Sporting Fans Club, an illegal off-track book-making business. Paragraph 13 alleged that on or about April 23, 1982, Marren received $1,000 from Frasch and James Keating (commander of the Intelligence Unit) for the purpose of influencing the disposition of criminal charges against one Sharon Raye in the local court and that the source of the money was undercover FBI Agent Larry Damron. Paragraphs 14-20 and 22 alleged that on various dates between May 4, 1982, and January 20, 1983, Keating, Frasch, and Marren received bribe money to allow Damron to operate the Palatine Sporting Fans Club apparently inherited from Gervais.
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. This Court has not yet addressed the issue of when separate indictments for RICO conspiracy violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but four others have done so. The Eighth, Second, Eleventh and Third Circuits have adopted a five-factor test for determining whether separate RICO charges violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The five factors are: (1) the time of the various activities charged as separate patterns of racketeering; (2) the identity of the persons involved in the activities under each charge; (3) the statutory offenses charged as racketeering activities in each charge; (4) the nature and scope of the activity the government seeks to punish under each charge; and (5) the places where the corrupt activity took place under each charge. United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 788 (8th Cir. 1981), modified en banc on other grounds, 667 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006, 102 S. Ct. 2296, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1300 (1982); United States v. Langella, 804 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 932 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 1137, 86 L. Ed. 2d 277, 105 S. Ct. 2661 (1985). United States v. Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923, 927-29 (3d Cir. 1988) (adopting a "totality of the circumstances test" which focused on and applied the same five factors).
Marren next contends that the consecutive sentences imposed on him as a result of his conviction on the RICO conspiracy and the tax conspiracy counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause which "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969). Marren argues that the two conspiracies arose out of the same set of facts and thus he has been unconstitutionally sentenced twice for the same acts.
In general, an agreement to commit several unlawful acts must be charged as a single conspiracy. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 87 L. Ed. 23, 63 S. Ct. 99 (1942). An exception, however, exists where Congress has manifested an intent to authorize multiple punishments for conduct that violates two statutory provisions. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275, 101 S. Ct. 1137 (1981); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 90 L. Ed. 1575, 66 S. Ct. 1125 (1946). When such legislative intent is not readily discernible, courts use the test established by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932), to determine whether Congress intended to authorize multiple punishments. United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1986). Under Blockburger, two offenses are considered separately punishable if each statutory provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; United States v. Patterson, 782 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dunigan, 884 F.2d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1989).
The only appellate court to have addressed whether a defendant can be charged under both § 1962(d) and § 371 is the Second Circuit. In United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit examined the legislative intent behind RICO and § 371 and found that "we are equally convinced that Congress intended that a court be able to impose cumulative sentences for violations of those sections." Id. The court noted that a ruling prohibiting joinder of a general conspiracy charge with RICO conspiracy would be inconsistent with the stated legislative purpose of RICO to expand criminal punishment. The court concluded that "to hold that cumulative sentences could not be imposed . . . in this case would plainly defeat Congress's intention to enhance the penalties imposed on those who conspire to engage in racketeering." Id. at 238. See P.L. 91-452, 88 Stat. 922 (Oct. 15, 1970); H.R.Rep. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4007, 4033. We agree. In the instant case, if Marren could only be charged under § 371 for a conspiracy to violate § 1962(d), the maximum sentence would be reduced from a $25,000 fine and imprisonment for twenty years, to a $10,000 fine and imprisonment for five years. And if a penalty could be imposed only under § 1962(d), the conspiracy to defraud the I.R.S. would not be punished at all. To so hold would be contrary to the legislature's stated intent in enacting the RICO statute.*fn3
We believe that the reasoning of Barton is sound and should be followed here. It is evident that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments under § 1962(d) and § 371. Accordingly, we hold that the government did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by charging and sentencing the defendant under both § 371 and § 1962(d). See United States v. Finley, 705 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
Marren's final contention is that his sentence was excessive because it was more severe than the one imposed upon Thomas and Frank Russo despite the fact that the Russo brothers were convicted on more counts and shared in the profits of Michael's Magic Touch. Our standard of review for sentences within the maximum term provided by Congress is for a "manifest abuse of discretion." United States v. Threw, 861 F.2d 1046, 1049 (7th Cir. 1988). A mere showing of disparity in sentences among codefendants does not, without more, demonstrate any abuse of discretion. Id.; United States v. Neyens, 831 F.2d 156, 159 (7th Cir. 1987). In the instant case, the sentencing judge discussed the reasons for imposing different punishments. She expressed her disturbance with Marren's prior criminal record and the fact that he was on probation when he committed the offense charged in this indictment. She also took note of his crucial role in establishing the credit card operation and overseeing its smooth functioning at the outset. Therefore, it is apparent that the sentencing judge properly considered accurate information regarding Marren's role in the scheme and had a principled basis for sentencing Marren to a stiffer penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.