Source: https://frederickleatherman.wordpress.com/category/crime/dui/hgn-test/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:26:40
Document Index: 518354054

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 5', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 2', 'art 1']

HGN Test | Frederick Leatherman Law Blog
23 Comments	| Crime Labs, DUI, HGN Test	| Tagged: CRIME LAB FRAUD, CRIME LAB TECHS TESTIFYING AS CLINICAL EXPERTS, FAKE FORENSIC SCIENCE, FRAUD IN TOXICOLOGY SECTION OF CRIME LAB, MASSACHUSETTS CRIME LAB SCANDAL, Wrongful Convictions	| Permalink
The Decision From Hell (Part 1)
Asking someone if they are willing to sell two barrels is not criminal activity. (The barrels were made out of oak and split in half across the middle so they could be placed on a deck and used as planters) In addition, the statement does not mention heroin or any other drug. Finally, the description he provided and the conclusion that she appeared to be high on something falls far short of “sufficient articulable objective facts and circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person in concluding that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.”
Also, since the caller provided the statement after he knew about the arrest, his perspective would have necessarily changed and we cannot know whether he would have said the same thing, if he had been interviewed before the stop. The bottom line is this information should not have been considered.
Additional information that came to light at subsequent pretrial hearings or the trial itself would, of course, also be irrelevant on the issue of reasonable suspicion because it would have been after-acquired. Therefore, to the extent that the Circuit Court and later the Court of Appeals relied on such information to enter findings of fact, such findings are necessarily invalid, as a matter of law under Hensley.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ignored Hensley. Ignored Crane’s argument that the HGN should not have been considered because it was improperly administered. Concluded that despite “not driving erratically or weaving” and passing a portable breath test, the invalid HGN, when considered together with nervousness, glassy eyes, her admission that she was taking prescribed Clonazepam, and other unspecified “odd behavior,” the deputy had probable cause to arrest. Apparently, despite quoting the product insert warning for Conazepam, which does not say that people who take the drug should never operate machinery or a motor vehicle the Court of Appeals believes that, as a matter of law, a police officer has probable cause to arrest anyone who takes the drug and operates a motor vehicle whether they drive properly or not. The Court also ignored federal and state cases cited by Crane’s lawyer, which hold that nervousness is not a valid or reliable indicator of impairment because people who are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol typically also exhibit nervousness when stopped. They require additional evidence of evasive behavior to establish probable cause to arrest and there was no evidence of that in Crane’s case.
So, did the judges on the Court of Appeals read her briefs?
Leave a Comment »	| Clearly Erroneous, Court of Appeals Opinion, De Novo, DUI, exculpatory blood tests, Fourth Amendment, Frog Gravy Legal Case, HGN Test, Investigatory Stops, Judicial Mendacity, Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, Standards of Review	| Tagged: Appeal, Criminal Case, FROG GRAVY LEGAL CASE, Investigatory Stop, Judicial Mendacity, Law, Probable Cause to Arrest, Reasonable Suspicion	| Permalink
The Art of Cross Examination (Part 5) The Killer Cross That Never Happened
Author’s Note: This is a continuation of the Killer Cross that never happened because Crane Station’s lawyer, Chris McNeill, refused to use it. If you have missed the first two parts of the cross, which are in Part 3 and Part 4 of this series, follow the links. I recommend reading them before reading this post, for the sake of continuity.
All rise. Court is again in session.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. You may be seated.
Deputy McGuire, you may return to the witness stand. I remind you that you are still under oath.
Counsel, you may proceed with your cross examination.
40. Q: On the way to the hospital, you never detected any movement in the back seat that caused you to believe that Mrs. Leatherman was attempting to hide anything, did you?
Transcript Suppression, page 24, lines 15-18
41. Q: But you testified under oath to the grand jury that on the way to Lourdes Hospital “Of course, she’s cuffed behind her back, and she is trying to work it — work it down into the seat, and she dropped her watch with it,” didn’t you?
Transcript Grand Jury, pages 4-5, lines 23-1
42. Q: You didn’t see anything that would suggest she did that, did you?
43. You told another lie, didn’t you?
44. Q: You also testified to the grand jury that the Kentucky State Crime Laboratory result of the alcohol content in Mrs. Leatherman’s blood wasn’t back yet, didn’t you?
Transcript Grand Jury, page 5, lines 17-18.
45. Q: Please take a look at Defendant’s Exhibit A. It has been identified as a copy of the laboratory analysis of the alcohol content in Mrs. Leatherman’s blood by Examiner Neil K. Vowels. Do you recognize it?
46. Q: He did not detect any alcohol in her blood, did he?
47. Q: Please take a look at the bottom left corner of the exhibit. There is a notation that reads, “Date Completed.” What date appears next to these words?
A: 7/14/2006.
48. Q: You testified before the grand jury on July 28, 2006, didn’t you?
49. Q: So, you testified 14 days after Examiner Vowels completed his report, correct?
50. Q: Now take a look at the top line. It indicates that the report was faxed to the prosecutor’s office at 12:32 PM on July 24, 2006, doesn’t it?
51. Q: That was 4 days before you testified before the grand jury, correct?
52. Q: Now at the grand jury when the Commonwealth’s Attorney said, “We don’t have the blood results back?” and you answered, “I don’t believe so, blood or lab, yeah,” can you explain why you and the Commonwealth Attorney did not know the result of the alcohol analysis of Mrs. Leatherman’s blood sample — a test completed two weeks before and faxed to the Commonwealth’s Attorney four days before you testified before the grand jury?
53. Q: You have testified that Mrs. Leatherman failed all six clues on the HGN test. You did not document the basis for your conclusion in your narrative report, did you?
54. Q: We only have your word for that, don’t we? Just as only have your word that she told you that she was on all of her prescription medication?
55. Q: For the sake of argument, let’s assume you did tell the truth when you testified that she failed all six clues. As a police officer certified to give the HGN test, you must know that NHTSA, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration, recommends that the test be administered to a suspect facing away from the police cruiser because the strobing lights will cause a false nystagmus, don’t you?
Q: Yet, you positioned her facing your strobing police cruiser when you administered the HGN, didn’t you?
56. Q: Metoprolol is one of the prescription drugs that Mrs. Leatherman had in her car when you pulled her over, correct?
57. Q: Metoprolol is a drug used to control hypertension, or high blood pressure, correct?
58. Q: As a police officer certified to administer the HGN test, you know that hypertension can cause nystagmus, don’t you?
59. Q: You, Deputy Walters, and Officer Dawes thoroughly searched Mrs. Leatherman’s vehicle, including the trunk, her purse, and her personal belongings, correct?
60. Q: Other than the three prescription drugs, you didn’t find any drugs, drug residue, or paraphernalia, did you?
61. And Officer Dawes thoroughly searched Mrs. Leatherman by the side of the road before you placed her in the back seat of your police cruiser, didn’t she?
62. Q: The search included a visual examination of her genital area, correct?
63. Q: She also reached into Mrs. Leatherman’s back pockets, correct?
64. Q: And before the search, you ordered Mrs. Leatherman to empty her front pockets by turning them inside out, didn’t you?
65. Q: And Officer Dawes checked Mrs. Leatherman’s breasts to see if she might have hidden something in her bra, didn’t she?
66. Q: She also checked around Mrs. Leatherman’s waist to see if she might have hidden something there, correct? And shoes?
67. Q: No drugs, drug residue, or paraphernalia were found, right?
The answers to questions 59-67 can be verified by the in-dash video.
68. Q: You didn’t arrest her for DUI Alcohol, did you?
A: No, I did not arrest her for DUI alcohol.
69. Q: You didn’t arrest her for possession of a controlled substance at that point either, correct?
70. Q: You arrested her for DUI Drugs, didn’t you?
Transcript Preliminary Hearing, page 8, lines 4-6.
71. Q: You didn’t advise Mrs. Leatherman that she was under arrest, did you?
72. Q: You told her that you were taking her to Lourdes Hospital for a blood test, didn’t you?
73. Q: A blood test that she offered to take, correct?
74. Q: You didn’t tell her you were taking her to jail, did you?
A: Correct, I didn’t tell her I was taking her to jail.
Author’s Note: Questions 71-74 set up a point to be made during final argument; namely, that Crane-Station had no reason to attempt to slough a rock of crack behind his seat during the ride to the hospital. Assuming for the sake of argument that she had somehow hidden it so well that Officer Dawes could not find it and, given that we know that Crane-Station knew her blood test would come back negative for alcohol and drugs, we can reasonably conclude that she would have had no reason to think she would be searched again. Therefore, why risk attracting attention attempting to slough drug?
This illustrates another important point about cross examining effectively. Use it to set-up your final arguments during summation.
Judge: Excuse me Counsel. Let’s break for the day. Court will be in recess.
3 Comments	| Assholes, Crime, cross examination, DUI, Fourth Amendment, Frog Gravy Legal Case, Grand Jury, HGN Test, Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Investigatory Stops, Perjury	| Tagged: Criminal Trial, cross examination, Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Law, Malpractice	| Permalink
The Curious Case of the Three Suppression Orders (Part 2)
Author’s note: In case y’all missed it or want to refresh your recollection, Part 1 is here.
Deputy McGuire testified at the suppression hearing that he was dispatched by 911 to investigate a call by a citizen who reported that, “There’s this lady walking around in my neighbor’s yard talking to my neighbor and writing stuff down in a notebook and she mentioned something about tar heroin and all that stuff.”
The caller identified himself and described the woman and her vehicle. He also reported that the vehicle had a WA license and provided the number. He did not indicate if he had spoken with the woman; if he was present when the conversation took place; who told him about it if he was not present; or what she was writing down.
When he arrived in the area, the deputy searched for but he did not find the woman or the vehicle and he cleared the call without talking to the 911 caller. As he was approaching the traffic-controlled Cairo Road intersection in the passing lane on Highway 60, he noticed that he was passing a vehicle with its left turn signal blinking. The vehicle had WA plates and both the driver and the vehicle matched the description provided by the caller. He decided to pull her over and investigate.
He slowed down, allowing her to move ahead, and then he fell in directly behind her. She reacted by activating her right turn signal and moved over into the emergency lane along the right shoulder of the highway. As she did, he activated his emergency lights, moved over with her, and stopped behind her.
Upon request, she produced her license, registration, and proof of insurance without difficulty.
When he ordered her to get out of her vehicle, she did so without stumbling, and she followed his instructions without exhibiting any confusion or mental impairment. Other than “glassy” eyes and nervousness, he saw no signs of possible impairment. He administered a portable breath test (PBT) that she passed, effectively ruling out alcohol intoxication. Although she “failed all six clues” on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN), he administered the test improperly, according to the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) because he positioned her facing the headlights of oncoming traffic and his patrol cruiser’s emergency lights. NHTSA, which developed the test, warns police not to do that because the lights produce a false nystagmus.
The deputy conceded that he did not witness any bad driving and her blinking left-turn signal could have been due to her intending to move into the left lane, but his approaching vehicle in that lane prevented her from doing so.
After he placed her under arrest for DUI, he transported her to a hospital for a blood draw and discovered an apparent rock of crack next to her watch in the seatbelt crack of his back seat next to where she was sitting.
Author’s note: In another post we discussed his prior testimony under oath at the preliminary hearing and the grand jury in which he said he found her watch and the rock of crack under his back seat. In other words, he did not find it in plain view on the seat beside her. He said he pulled the back seat forward to look for her watch after she told him that it had fallen off and slipped behind the seat. She asked him to retrieve it because she was handcuffed and could not do it herself.
The trial judge entered three suppression orders.
1.	The First Order.
On January 11, 2007, Judge Clymer issued his first order denying the motion to suppress evidence. Although all of the material findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly erroneous, one finding of fact and its corresponding conclusion of law merit special consideration. In Finding of Fact 5, Judge Clymer wrote,
When Defendant first exited the [her] vehicle the Deputy observed a wristwatch in close proximity to a baggie with apparent controlled substance inside the car. Defendant denied the apparent controlled substance was hers but acknowledged the wristwatch was hers.
This did not inspire confidence as one can only wonder how the judge forgot or became confused and thought that the rock of crack was discovered in her vehicle rather than the police cruiser.
Not to worry, we thought. We pointed out that and other errors and asked him to reconsider his order, which he agreed to do.
2.	The Second Order
On January 18, 2008, Judge Clymer entered his second order concerning the defense suppression motion. He found that while driving “in a right hand traffic lane with her left turn signal activated, [the appellant] did not turn but pulled to the right side of the roadway and stopped.” (Finding of Fact 3) “The deputy pulled in behind the stopped vehicle and activated his emergency lights.” (Finding of Fact 4) He concluded that the arresting officer “did not conduct a stop of the appellant’s vehicle” because she “pulled off the roadway and stopped” before “he pulled in behind her and turned on his emergency lights so as to investigate.” (Conclusion of Law 1)
Author’s note: We have already discussed whether this was an investigatory stop initiated by a police officer or a voluntary citizen initiated contact with a police officer. This was an investigatory stop.
Judge Clymer also concluded that “[t]he combination of a report of an unknown person, driving a Washington state licensed vehicle in a Paducah, Kentucky residential area, asking about tar heroin, later observed to signal a left turn but pull off the roadway to the right, constitutes reasonable suspicion to investigate and possibly cite for improper signal.” (Conclusion of Law 2)
Author’s note: A person who calls 911 to report a possible crime is presumed to have provided reliable information if he identifies himself and provides a current address. Since the caller in this case provided the requisite information, he would be presumed to have provided reliable information. However, even if one assumes that his information was accurate and reliable, he did not describe criminal activity. In addition, the judge’s findings of fact conflict with the information provided by the caller and the deputy’s testimony, which described an alert driver operating her motor vehicle in compliance with the traffic laws. He could not have cited her for “improper signal” because no such statute exists. Since the information provided by the presumptively reliable caller and the deputy described lawful activity, the judge erroneously concluded that the deputy had a reasonable suspicion “to investigate and possibly cite for improper signal.”
Regarding the appellant’s arrest, he found as fact that the appellant admitted that she had taken several prescription medications, including Clonazepam. (Finding of Fact 6) He also found that “[t]he maker of Clonazepam warns that it should not be used when driving a vehicle and that the drug causes abnormal eye movements.” (Finding of Fact 7) He concluded, “[d]efendants inquiring about heroin, failing an HGN test, signaling a left turn and pulling off the road to the right, and stating she was taking medication that would cause her to fail the test, constitutes probable cause to arrest for DUI.” (Conclusion of Law 4).
Author’s note: We have already discussed the HGN and Clonazepam issues noting that the product insert does not warn “that it should not be used when driving a vehicle and that the drug causes abnormal eye movements.” It advises physicians to warn their patients for whom they first prescribe Clonazepam to be careful because the drug might cause drowsiness and impair their ability to operate a motor vehicle or other machinery. If that happens, the dosage can be lowered to avoid impairment. This is actually a common warning given for many drugs that are prescribed to improve functioning. Clonazepam is such a drug and it is prescribed to enhance function by reducing anxiety and to control seizures. Dosage is critical. Assuming the judge was honest, the rest of the finding establishes that he was thinking of a different case when he crafted this effort.
Leave a Comment »	| Assholes, Fourth Amendment, HGN Test, Investigatory Stops, Judicial Mendacity, Suppression Hearing, Uncategorized	| Tagged: CRIME, Criminal Case, Law, SUPPRESSION HEARING	| Permalink
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) And The Frog Gravy Legal Case
Leave a Comment »	| Crime, DUI, HGN Test, Probable Cause	| Tagged: CRIME, Criminal Law, DUI, DWI, FROG GRAVY LEGAL CASE, HGN, HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS, Law, PROBABLE CAUSE	| Permalink
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