Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100908_0057277.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 22:04:17
Document Index: 728539838

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 2244', 'art, 251', '§ 2244']

WARDEN KEN CLARK,*FN1 RESPONDENT.
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is before the undersigned pursuant to the parties' consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Pending before the court is respondent's motion to dismiss this action on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations. As explained below, this action is untimely and respondent's motion to dismiss must therefore be granted.
On December 5, 2006, the Trinity County Superior Court sentenced petitioner to a determinate state prison term of ten years for his convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and discharging a firearm with gross negligence. Mot., Docs. Lodged in Supp. Thereof ("Lodg. Doc.") 1. On December 6, 2007, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. Lodg. Doc. 2. Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on February 13, 2008. Lodg. Doc. 3-4. On May 20, 2008,*fn2 petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state superior court.*fn3 That petition was denied on August 7, 2008. Pet'r's Opp'n to Mot., Exhibit (Trinity County Superior Court Ruling Re Habeas Corpus).
In this case, the statute of limitations began to run when petitioner's conviction became final on direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The California Supreme Court denied review on February 13, 2008. Lodg. Doc. 4. The conviction became "final" within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired ninety days later, on May 13, 2008. Supreme Ct. R. 13; Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). The one-year limitations period commenced running the following day. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, petitioner had until May 13, 2009 to file his federal habeas petition. He did not file the petition until August 17, 2009. Dckt. No. 1. Absent tolling, the petition was filed over three months after the limitation period ended. However, petitioner is entitle to statutory tolling for the period his state court petition was pending.
With the benefit of 80 days of statutory tolling while petitioner's superior court petition was pending (May 20, 2008 though August 7, 2008), petitioner had until August 3, 2009 to file his federal petition.*fn4 Since petitioner did not file the instant petition until August 17, 2009, he exceeded the one-year allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) by fourteen days, unless petitioner can show he is entitled to equitable tolling. This he cannot do.
Equitable tolling is only appropriate if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Petitioner argues that he meets this tolling requirement because his counsel misinformed him that he had eighteen months after the California Supreme Court denied his petition within which to file a federal petition. See Dckt. No. 18 at 3-4; Dckt. No. 1, Ex. 1 (March 21, 2008 letter from attorney to petitioner). Unfortunately, counsel's incorrect advice with respect to when petitioner's federal habeas petition was due does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2564, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4946, at *34-35 (U.S. June 14, 2010) (gross attorney misconduct might justify equitable tolling, but not "garden variety" miscalculation of deadlines); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007) ("Attorney miscalculation [of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's limitations period] is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the post-conviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel."); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (attorney miscalculation and "negligence in general" not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling). Here, petitioner has not made a showing of serious attorney misconduct, as he has presented only a "garden variety" miscalculation, which cannot serve to equitably toll the limitations period. Further, while petitioner is a pro se litigant, his ignorance of the law does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that respondent's February 12, 2010 motion to dismiss is granted and the Clerk ...