Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102936/one-lot-emerald-cut-stones-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 19:49:35
Document Index: 28008680

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1497', '§ 545', '§ 545', '§ 545', '§ 545', '§ 497', '§ 1497', '§ 545', '§ 1497', '§ 545', '§ 1497', '§ 1497', '§ 545', '§ 1497', '§ 1497', '§ 497', '§ 593', '§ 545', '§ 1497', '§ 1497', '§ 1497', '§ 1497', '§ 545']

One Lot Emerald Cut Stones Vs United States - Citation 102936 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102936
Case Number 409 U.S. 232
Appellant One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
.....in 19 u.s.c. § 1497 is not barred by a prior acquittal under 18 u.s.c. § 545, which (unlike the civil forfeiture proceeding) requires proof of an intent to defraud; nor is the forfeiture action barred by the double jeopardy clause, since congress may impose both a criminal and civil sanction respecting the same act or omission. certiorari granted; 461 f.2d 1189, affirmed. per curiam. on june 5, 1969, francisco farkac klementova entered the united states without declaring to united states customs one lot of emerald cut stones and one ring. klementova was indicted, tried, and acquitted of charges of violating 18 u.s.c. § 545 [ footnote 1 ] by willfully and knowingly, page 409 u. s. 233 with intent to defraud the united states, smuggling the articles into the.....
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States - 409 U.S. 232 (1972)
U.S. Supreme Court One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972)
On June 5, 1969, Francisco Farkac Klementova entered the United States without declaring to United States Customs one lot of emerald cut stones and one ring. Klementova was indicted, tried, and acquitted of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 [ Footnote 1 ] by willfully and knowingly,
with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling the articles into the United States without submitting to the required customs procedures. Following the acquittal, the Government instituted a forfeiture action in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, under 18 U.S.C. § 545 and § 497 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 728, 19 U.S.C. § 1497. [ Footnote 2 ] Klementova intervened in the proceeding and argued that his acquittal of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 barred the forfeiture. The District Court held that the forfeiture was barred by collateral estoppel and the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a forfeiture action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1497 was not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 545. We grant certiorari, affirm, and thereby resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether a forfeiture is barred in these circumstances. [ Footnote 3 ]
Collateral estoppel would bar a forfeiture under § 1497 if, in the earlier criminal proceeding, the elements of a § 1497 forfeiture had been resolved against the Government. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 , 397 U. S. 443 (1970). But, in this case, acquittal on the criminal charge did not necessarily resolve the issues in the forfeiture action. For the Government to secure a conviction under § 545, it must prove the physical act of unlawful importation as well as a knowing and willful intent to defraud the United States. An acquittal on the criminal charge may have involved a finding that the physical act was not done with the requisite intent. Indeed, the court that tried the criminal charge specifically found that the Government had failed to establish intent. [ Footnote 4 ] To succeed in a forfeiture action under § 1497, on the other hand, the Government need only prove that the property was brought into the United States without the required declaration; the Government bears no burden with respect to intent. Thus, the criminal acquittal may not be regarded as a determination that the property was not unlawfully brought into the United States, and the forfeiture
proceeding will not involve an issue previously litigated and finally determined between these parties. [ Footnote 5 ]
Moreover, the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented " an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.'" Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 , 303 U. S. 397 (1938). As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance of the evidence burden applicable in civil proceedings. See Murphy v. United States, 272 U. S. 630 (1926); Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897).
Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 303 U. S. 399 . See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943). [ Footnote 6 ] Forfeiture under § 1497 is a civil sanction. The provision was originally enacted as § 497 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 964. The Tariff Act of 1930 reenacted the forfeiture remedy, 46 Stat. 728, and added § 593, 46 Stat. 751, which became 18 U.S.C. § 545. The forfeiture provision fell within Title IV of the Act, which contained the "Administrative Provisions." Part III of that title, of which § 1497 was a part, dealt with "Ascertainment, Collection, and Recovery of Duties." Section 545, on the other hand, was part of the "Enforcement Provisions," and became part of the Criminal Code of the United States. The fact that the sanctions were separate and distinct and were contained in different parts of the statutory scheme is relevant in determining the character of the forfeiture. Congress could and did order both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing them. There is no
reason for frustrating that design. See Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 303 U. S. 404 .
The § 1497 forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts, we have recognized that such purposes characterize remedial, rather than punitive, sanctions. See id. at 303 U. S. 401 ; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, at 317 U. S. 549 -550; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148 , 350 U. S. 151 -154 (1956). Moreover, it cannot be said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in § 1497 is so unreasonable or excessive that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, supra, at 350 U. S. 154 . See Murphy v. United States, supra; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra.
Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 303 U. S. 400 .
The question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory construction. Id. at 303 U. S. 399 . It appears that the § 1497 forfeiture is civil and remedial, and, as a result, its imposition is not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating § 545.
Id. at 116 U. S. 442 . The Court specifically distinguished the situation where "a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to support the civil action." Id. at 116 U. S. 443 . See also Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897).
The District Court relied upon the following language in United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715 , 401 U. S. 718 (1971):
"But, as Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 634 (1886), makes clear, 'proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal' for Fifth Amendment purposes."
(Emphasis in United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency. ) Section 1497 does not result in a forfeiture by reason of the commission of a criminal offense. A forfeiture results from the act of importation without following customs procedures; no criminal offense, much less a criminal conviction, is required. Cf. id. at 401 U. S. 718 -722.
One 1968 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693 (1965), is likewise inapposite, for it dealt with a forfeiture that could not be had without a "determination that the criminal law has been violated." Id. at 380 U. S. 701 .