Source: http://openjurist.org/192/f3d/322/laurance-tewksbury-v-ottaway-newspapers
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 03:51:50
Document Index: 378817414

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 12101', '§ 621', '§ 296', '§ 1367', '§ 12117', '§ 2000']

192 F3d 322 Laurance Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers | OpenJurist
192 F. 3d 322 - Laurance Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers	Home192 f3d 322 laurance tewksbury v. ottaway newspapers
192 F3d 322 Laurance Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers 192 F.3d 322 (2nd Cir. 1999)
LAURANCE A. TEWKSBURY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.OTTAWAY NEWSPAPERS, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No. 98-9667August Term, 1998
Argued: July 13, 1999Decided: September 22, 1999
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge) dismissing appellant's complaint because his charges of age and disability discrimination were time-barred. We reverse and hold that appellant complied with the sequential filing requirements of Section 706(e)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because, upon filing his charges at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts, appellant's charges were also deemed filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights.
STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Law Offices of Michael H. Sussman, Goshen, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
CHRISTOPHER P. REYNOLDS, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Robert J. Cicero, Betsy J. Floman, of counsel), New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.
Laurance A. Tewksbury appeals from Judge McMahon's dismissal of his complaint. Judge McMahon held that appellant's discrimination claims against his former employer, Ottaway Newspapers ("Ottaway"), were time-barred under Section 706(e)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), because he filed his charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory acts, without first having filed with a state agency. Appellant argues that the district court erred in applying a 180-day limitations period to his charges. He contends that his disability discrimination charge was subject to a 300-day limitations period because he must be deemed to have complied with the sequential filing requirement in Section 706(e)(1) when the EEOC, on his behalf, instituted proceedings with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") pursuant to a work-sharing agreement. Appellant further argues that his charge of age discrimination was timely under the applicable limitations period. We agree with both contentions and reverse.
Tewksbury formerly worked as a salesperson for Tri-States Publishing Co., a division of Ottaway, in Port Jervis, New York. Ottaway terminated Tewksbury on January 5, 1996, for "performance problems." On either August 27 or 28, 1996 -- more than 180 days but less than 300 days after he was terminated -- Tewksbury submitted charges to the EEOC alleging that Ottaway discriminated against him on the basis of a disability and his age. The EEOC characterized Tewksbury's charges as arising under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Tewksbury never undertook to file these charges directly with the NYSDHR, the New York State agency empowered to remedy unlawful discrimination. However, pursuant to a "Work-Sharing Agreement," the EEOC later transmitted Tewksbury's charges to the NYSDHR.
Appellant received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on March 17, 1997. About one month later, he filed the instant complaint in the Southern District, claiming that Ottaway terminated him because of his age and an alleged disability in violation of the ADA, ADEA, and N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296-297. Appellee moved to dismiss the ADA and ADEA claims as time-barred pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the pendent state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Judge McMahon initially denied appellee's motion, but, after reconsideration, granted it. See Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 2904 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1998); Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 2904 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1998). This appeal followed.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.1 See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
The material facts are not in dispute. The parties agree that Tewksbury filed his charges with the EEOC more than 180 days and less than 300 days after he was terminated and that Tewksbury did not file these charges directly with the NYSDHR. They also agree that the EEOC transmitted Tewksbury's charges to the NYSDHR and that, at all relevant times, the NYSDHR and the EEOC were parties to a "Work-Sharing Agreement." The dispute between the parties arises over the legal consequences of these facts.
a) ADA Charge
Tewksbury's ADA charge is subject to the time limitations set forth in Section 706(e)(1). See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (providing that the procedures set forth in Section 706 apply to claims arising under the ADA). That Section requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, unless the "person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State . . . agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice," in which case the claimant has 300 days to file his charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The NYSDHR has authority to remedy employment discrimination, rendering New York a so-called deferral state under Section 706(e)(1). See Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247-48 n.2 No. 98-7614, (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 1999