Source: http://www.swarb.co.uk/lisc/Land19961996.php
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Document Index: 446129003

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Land - 1996 Land Law. Now includes Easements, Restrictive Covenants, occupier's liability. See also Land Charges, Registered Land, Landlord & Tenant, Housing
This page lists 78 cases, and was prepared on 28 October 2012.
Targett and Targett -v- Ferguson and Diver (1996) 72 P & CR 114
1996Sir John Balcombe
The common intention of the parties to a contract is to be construed objectively. The objective test to be satisfied is, what would the reasonable layman think he was buying?
Brown -v- Heathlands Mental Health National Service Trust [1996] 1 All ER 133
Millman -v- Ellis [1996] 71 P & CR 158;
1996CASir Thomas Bingham MR
The defendant had sold part of his land to the claimant. A right of way was granted over a lane. The purchaser asserted that he had the use of a lay-by on the lane which would otherwise be dangerous. The vendor said the plan did not include a right over the lay-by. Held: The criteria for establishing a quasi-easement were satisfied. Both lane and layby were covered in one unbroken tarmac surace, and the use was therefore continuous and apparent. The contrasting safety with and without the use of the layby was significant. The absence of any specific mention of the layby was not inconsistent with an implied grant. The wording of the grant did not exclude such an implied right.
Country and Metropolitan Homes Surrey Ltd -v- Topclaim Ltd [1996] Ch 307
1996Timothy Lloyd QC
The issue was the proper construction and effect of condition 6.8 of the Standard Conditions of Sale, 2nd edition, in relation to the giving of a notice to complete a contract for the sale of land. Held: The condition provided exclusively for the circumstances in which a notice to complete could be given in respect of a contract which incorporated the terms of the Standard Conditions of Sale, 2nd edition, and that any right at common law to serve a notice to complete was thereby excluded.
The contract also purported to exclude section 49(2). The vendor failed to complete, but sought not to return the deposit. The judge said: "It is a startling proposition that, by excluding that section in relation to the contract, the purchaser has prevented itself from obtaining repayment of the deposit even if the vendor has been flagrantly in breach of the contract and the purchaser has not. It also seems curious, in relation to that submission, that under the contract in this case the vendor's solicitors hold the deposit as stakeholder, since that clearly implies that there could be circumstances in which they would have to pay the deposit back to the purchaser rather than account for it to their client the vendor.The answer to this contention is to be found in the judgment of Mr. Gerald Godfrey Q.C. in Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. De Haan, 47 P. & C.R. 1. He held that the vendor's notice to complete was validly served but, despite that, the purchaser sought the return of the deposit under section 49(2). He therefore had to consider the ambit of the subsection in the light of a number of decided cases. Before doing that he made the following observations of general relevance: "It is to be observed that a purchaser has no need to pray this subsection in aid when it is not he but the vendor who is the defaulter. The subsection is needed only to enable a purchaser who is himself in default to recover his deposit."He consideralso circumstances in which the court might conclude that even though the purchaser was in default the justice of the case might require that the deposit be repaid to the purchaser. It is that jurisdiction which, it seems to me, is excluded by the special condition in this contract."
Law of Property Act 1925 49(2) Klein -v- London Underground [1996] RVR 94
On the compulsory purchase of a hairdresser's business, the tribunal adopted a three years' purchase basis.
Habermehl -v- Attorney General [1996] EGCS 148
1996Rimer J
Land, limitation
Land was granted for use as a school for the education of poor persons in accordance with the principles of the National Society. In 1876 the school had become a "provided school" run by a School Board under the Education Act 1870. That meant that, by virtue of section 14(2) of the Act, no "religious catechism or religious formulary distinctive of any particular denomination" could be taught in the school. Teaching could therefore no longer be in accordance with the Anglican principles of the National Society. Counsel agreed that Warrington J had decided that the purposes mentioned in the Act meant the purposes mentioned in the deed. Held: A reverter had taken place in 1876.
Payne -v- Inwood (1996) 74 P & CR 42
1996CARoch LJ
A claim for an easement based upon section 62 of the 1925 Act failed. There had not been regular use of the path in question with the putative dominant tenement to gain access to it. Roch LJ said: "Section 62 of the 1925 Act cannot create new rights where there has been no actual enjoyment of a facility, call it a liberty, privilege, advantage, easement or quasi-easement, by the owner or occupier of the dominant tenement over the servient tenement. If there is a quasi-easement, in that there is evidence of user or a physical state of affairs which indicates the existence of a quasi-easement, then section 62 can operate to convert that into an easement."
Law of Property Act 1925 62 Re Lee's Application (1996) 72 P & CR 439
1996LTMr Clarke QC
There was a proposal to erect a detached in house in the grounds of a property subject to a 'one house per plot' restriction. The tribunal considered the issue of disturbance: "I do not think that the prevention of a short term interference with the enjoyment of [the neighbouring house] by the stopping of adjoining building works can be a benefit of substantial value or advantage in relation to the long term enjoyment of the property (see Re Kershaw)"
Briggs -v- McCusker [1996] 2 EGLR 197
1996Judge Rich QC
Where one of the plots subject to a building scheme had been sub-divided, the benefit of the covenant in the scheme which originally burdened the whole plot did not pass to the owner of one of the subdivided plots so as to enable that owner to enforce the covenant against an owner of one of the other subdivided plots.
Robins -v- Berkeley Homes (Kent) Ltd [1996] 2 EGLR
A building scheme applied to land. A development was challenged as being in breach. Held: The defences both of change of character of the neighbourhood and acquiescence both failed, and a final injunction was granted.
Porter -v- Secretary of State for Transport [1996] 3 All ER 693
1996CAStuart Smith LJ
Land, Damages, Estoppel
Land had been compulsorily acquired for a road. The plaintiff was granted on appeal under section 18 of the 1961 Act a certificate of appropriate alternative development in respect of the land acquired, namely that the land acquired would have been suitable for residential development. Held. On a valuation on a compulsory purchase of land, the value is not dependent on findings on probabilities or even that "it could reasonably have been expected that planning permission would be granted".
Stuart Smith LJ set out the four elements for an issue estoppel: "It is common ground that four matters have to be established if there is to be an issue estoppel. "(1) The issue in question must have been decided by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.(2) The issue must be one which arises between parties who are parties to the decision. This also is accepted.(3) The issue must have been decided finally and must be of a type to which an issue estoppel can apply.(4) The issue in respect of which the estoppel is said to operate must be the same as that previously decided." and �Where a court or tribunal has to decide what would have happened in a hypothetical situation which does not exist, it usually has to approach the matter on the basis of assessing what were the chances or prospect of it happening. The chance may be almost a certainty at one end to a mere speculative hope at the other. The value will depend on how good this chance is. Where, however, the court or tribunal has to decide what in fact has happened as an historical fact, it does so on balance of probability; and once it decides that it is more probable than not, then the fact is found and is established as a certainty. This distinction is well illustrated by Davies v Taylor [1972] 3 All ER 836, [1974] AC 207 and Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 907, [1995] 1 WLR 1602.,br />It would be unnecessary for the Secretary of State to evaluate the chance of the eastern route being the preferred alternative route in the event that the actual route was not chosen, provided it was more than 50%; but the Lands Tribunal would be concerned in assessing value to evaluate the chances of this happening more precisely.�
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 United Bank of Kuwait Plc -v- Sahib and Others [1997] Ch 107; [1996] EWCA Civ 1308; [1996] 3 WLR 372; [1996] 3 All ER 215
2 Feb 1996CAPeter Gibson, Leggatt, Phillips LJJ
Land, Banking
The bank appealed against a decision that the simple deposit of deeds with a bank did not take effect as an equitable charge. Held: Depositing deeds with a bank is not sufficient to create a charge over them. The old law as to the creation of an equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds had been akin to part performance, and was therefore equally inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1989 Act. The rule was in essence that the deposit implied that contract had been created: "The deposit by way of security is treated both as prima facie evidence of a contract to mortgage, and as part performance of that contract." Phillips LJ said: "The clear intent of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 is to introduce certainty in relation to contracts for the disposition of interests in land where uncertainty existed before. Section 2(5) contains a list of contracts expressly excluded from the operation of the section. I can see no basis for implying a further exclusion in respect of contracts for the grant of a mortgage which are secured by a deposit of title deeds."
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2 - Statute of Frauds 1677 4 - Law of Property Act 1925 40 Link[s] omitted Sledmore -v- Dalby [1996] 72 P & CR 196; [1996] CLY 4949; [1996] EWCA Civ 1305
8 Feb 1996CARoch LJ, Hobhouse LJ
Land, Equity
The plaintiff sought possession of a house. She had owned it with her late husband. The defendant lived in and had done much work on the house, but the deceased left it all to the plaintiff and the defendant's wife who had since also died. She sought possession after the defendant paid no rent. At first instance it was held that D had acquired an equitable interest in the house for the repairs and the expectation under the wills. Held: The will created no sufficient legitimate expectation to justify the claim. The plaintiff's and defendants needs had to be balanced, and an equitable remedy should not be used to create an injustice. The plaintiff's need was more pressing. D had lived in the house for 20 years rent free and the equity created by his expenditure had expired.
Link[s] omitted Barclays Bank Plc -v- Weeks Legg and Dean 26 Feb 1996ChDMoseley J QC
Legal Professions, Land
The failure by a conveyancer to disclose a right of way either to his lay client or to the lender was not a breach of his undertaking to acquire a good and marketable title. The Solicitor had applied the money in accordance with the undertaking even though, through no fault of his own, no title was obtained. The action was dismissed.
Homsy -v- Murphy [1996] 73 P&CR 26; (1996) EGCS 43
27 Feb 1996CABeldam, Hobhouse, Aldous LJJ
Damages, Land
The plaintiff held a right of pre-emption over the freehold reversion on the building containing his flat. He appealed the award of �5.00 damages for its breach. The judge had discounted an offer received by the plaintiff of �100,000 for the grant of a lease of another part of the building. The judge had made allowance for the general fall in property prices, but in doing so mis-stated the date of the Gulf War. Held: The loss had been miscalculated. The loss would be the value at the time, less the price set to be paid on exercise of the right.
Thomas -v- Secretary of State for Wales and Another 13 Mar 1996QBDustice Macpherson of Cluny
Local Authority need not show intention to build on all parts of land being compulsorily purchased under the Act. The object of section 89 was to allow a local authority to purchase land which was unsightly, neglected or derelict to put it to use. The authority's proposed use was to clear and stabilise the area and make it a heritage site. The section allowed them to buy the land to execute 'such works on that land or any other land as appears to them expedient'.
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 89 Barclays Bank Plc -v- Estates & Commercial Ltd and Another [1997] 1 WLR 415
20 Mar 1996CAMillett LJ
An unpaid vendor's lien was not subordinated to the plaintiff's charge without clear consent.Millett LJ said: "As soon as a binding contract for sale of land is entered into the vendor has a lien on the property for the purchase money and a right to remain in possession of the property until payment is made. The lien does not arise on completion but on exchange of contracts. It is discharged on completion to the extent that the purchase money is paid: In re Birmingham, decd.; Savage v. Stannard [1959] Ch. 523, cited with approval in London and Cheshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laplagrene Property Co. Ltd. [1971] Ch. 499, 514. Even if the vendor executes an outright conveyance of the legal estate in favour of the purchaser and delivers the title deeds to him, he still retains an equitable lien on the property to secure the payment of any part of the purchase money which remains unpaid. The lien is not excluded by the fact that the conveyance contains an express receipt for the purchase money.The lien arises by operation of law and independently of the agreement between the parties. It does not depend in any way upon the parties' subjective intentions. It is excluded where its retention would be inconsistent with the provisions of the contract for sale or with the true nature of the transaction as disclosed by the documents. It is also excluded where, on completion, the vendor receives all that he bargained for: Capital Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stokes [1969] 1 Ch. 261 and Congresbury Motors Ltd. v. Anglo-Belge Finance Co. Ltd. [1971] Ch. 81. In each of those cases the vendor took a legal charge to secure payment. The unpaid vendor's lien was held to be excluded notwithstanding that the charge later became void for want of registration."
Hall -v- Dorling & Another Unreported, 26 March 1996
26 Mar 1996Beldam LJ
Land once conveyed by the owner, could not be again conveyed. "� if the trustees had specifically conveyed land delineated on a plan to the defendant they could not subsequently in law transfer it to the plaintiff�.
Lloyds Bank Plc -v- Carrick and Another [1996] 4 All ER 630
17 Apr 1996CAMorritt LJ, Beldam LJ and Sir Ralph Gibson
Mrs Carrick was a widow who orally agreed with her brother in law, a builder, to sell her house and pay him the proceeds, for which he would provide her with a new house. She did so and moved into the new house, which remained in the brother-in-law�s name; later he mortgaged it to the bank. Mrs Carrick�s rights were postponed to the bank because they had not been registered as an estate contract. Held: A beneficial owner under a bare trust had no defence against a mortagee in possession. "In this case there was a trust of the maisonette for the benefit of Mrs Carrick precisely because there had been an agreement between her and Mr Carrick which, for her part, she had substantially if not wholly performed. As between her and Mr Carrick such trust subsisted at all times after November 1982. I agree with counsel for the bank that there is no room in those circumstances for the implication or imposition of any further trust of the maisonette for the benefit of Mrs Carrick. In Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset there was no contract which conferred any interest in the house on the wife. As with all statements of principle the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich must be read by reference to the facts of the case. So read there is nothing in it to suggest that where there is a specifically enforceable contract the court is entitled to superimpose a further constructive trust on the vendor in favour of the purchaser over that which already exists in consequence of the contractual relationship. It is true that on this footing the ultimate position of Mrs Carrick with the benefit of a specifically enforceable contract may be worse than it would have been if there had been no contract. But that is because she failed to do that which Parliament has ordained must be done if her interest is to prevail over that of the bank, namely to register the estate contract. Her failure in that respect cannot, in my view, justify the implication or imposition of a trust after the execution of the charge when the dealings between Mr Carrick and Mrs Carrick before such execution did not."
Land Charges Act 1972 4(6) Dean -v- George Doyle Walker [1996] EWCA Civ 505
10 May 1996CA
The appellant sought to challenge an order granting his neighbour access across his land in order to maintain a gable end wall. Held: The judge was plainly correct to make the order. The appellant's fear that this would prejudice any future issues was unfounded.
Access to Neighbouring Land Act 1992 Link[s] omitted Bibby and others -v- Sumintra Partap and others [1996] UKPC 13; [1996] 1 WLR 931
Link[s] omitted Porter and Another -v- Secretary of State for Transport [1996] 3 All ER 693
3 Jun 1996CA
No issue estoppel on land value arose from a previous Secretary's finding on Lands Tribunal.
Land Compensation Act 1961 18 Shaikh -v- Bolton Metropolitan District Council 11 Jun 1996CA
The owner-occupier compensation supplement payable on a compulsory purchase carries interest.
Housing Act 1969 68 Sch 5 McCausland and Another -v- Duncan Lawrie Ltd and Another [1996] 4 All ER 995; [1997] 1 WLR 38
18 Jun 1996CANeill LJ, Morritt LJ
The parties entered into a written contract for the sale of land which, in error, provided for completion on a Sunday. The parties varied the date to the Friday but did not execute a new contract which would comply with section 2(1) of the 1989 Act. Time was not initially of the essence of the contract. Held: The variation was invalid, but the original contract, as unvaried, remained in force. A variation of a contract for the sale of land under the new Act must itself comply with the formalities of the Act if it is to be applied. Section 2 is an entirely new provision which marks a radical change in the law.
Morritt LJ said that estoppel may be available. The contractual date for completion was a material term, if only because it specified the time from which one or other party was entitled to serve a notice to complete and make time of the essence: "the choice lies between permitting a variation, however fundamental, to be made without any formality at all and requiring it to satisfy Section 2. In my view it is evident that Parliament intended the latter. There would be little point in requiring that the original contract comply with Section 2 if it might be varied wholly informally. Further the respect in which the Act differs from the Bill proposed by the Law Commission indicates that Parliament intended more, rather than less, formality than that recommended by the Law Commission." and "The reasons for the recommendation were to avoid the uncertainties arising from the doctrine of part performance, to ensure mutuality between both parties to the contract and to avoid the continuing uncertainty surrounding the operation of Section 40 Law of Property Act 1925 notwithstanding its long history"
Neill LJ said: "It seems to me to be clear that Parliament intended to introduce new and strict requirements as to the formalities to be observed for the creation of a valid disposition of an interest in land. Under Section 2 all the terms of the contract have to be incorporated in the signed document. Counsel for the plaintiffs was correct when he submitted that the formalities prescribed by Section 2 have to be applied to the contract as varied. "
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 2 Regina -v- Secretary of State for Wales Ex Parte Emery 24 Jun 1996QBD
A public enquiry is necessary where there is a real dispute over the existence of a public right of way.
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 Sch 14 Regina -v- City of London Corporation and Another Ex Parte Mystery of the Barbers of London [1996] 2 EGLR 128
28 Jun 1996QBDDyson J
The authority acquired several plots of land at different times, some compulsorily, and others pursuant to purchase notice. It granted a lease to the second respondent who built on it. In 1969 the Council granted the applicants an area of adjoining land and by the transfer covenanted not to interfere with light or air passing through any windows of the Hall thereon built. Subsequently, the building leased to the Second Respondents was demolished and planning permission was granted for a redevelopment of the site. The Council contended that interference with the rights of light and air granted to the Hall by the transfer in 1969 were overridden by section 237 by virtue of the acquisition of the land between 1954 and 1959, despite the lack of apparent connection between the original acquisition and the proposed redevelopment. Held: The Council was correct. The words "for planning purposes" do not require the redevelopment to be linked to the initial purpose of the acquisition or appropriation. The words were quite general distinguished the case from one where an acquisition was made for other purposes. The concept of initial development followed by a cyclical redevelopment of the site was hardly esoteric and if Parliament had intended to apply a restriction to section 237 to the first development, then very different language would have been required. It must have been intended that a Local Authority should be able to develop a site which it had acquired for planning purposes from time to time whenever an occasion for redevelopment arose. There was no rational basis for restricting the operation to the first development after acquisition or appropriation, as buildings become obsolete and have to be redeveloped from time to time, thus requiring the Local Authority to retain a power to override third party rights from time to time. The Local Authority could rely on section 237 to override rights which had arisen after the first redevelopment and which were not connected to it.
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 237(1) Regina -v- Oxfordshire County Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council [1996] EWHC Admin 28
11 Jul 1996Admn
Commons Registration Act 1965 13(b) Link[s] omitted E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd -v- Nsr Ltd 24 Jul 1996PC
Graham Charles Botham and others -v- TSB Bank Plc [1996] EWCA Civ 549
30 Jul 1996CASir Richard Scott VC, Roch LJ, Henry LJ
A flat had been repossessed by the bank. The parties disputed whether items were fixtures and charged with the land or not. Held: The judge had correctly analysed and applied the law of fixtures and fittings. The appeal failed save to a limited extent. "The tests, in the case of an item which has been attached to the building in some way other than simply by its own weight, seem to be the purpose of the item and the purpose of the link between the item and the building. If the item viewed objectively, is, intended to be permanent and to afford a lasting improvement to the building, the thing will have become a fixture. If the attachment is temporary and is no more than is necessary for the item to be used and enjoyed, then it will remain a chattel. Some indicators can be identified. For example, if the item is ornamental and the attachment is simply to enable the item to be displayed and enjoyed as an adornment that will often indicate that this item is a chattel. Obvious examples are pictures. But this will not be the result in every case; for example ornamental tiles on the walls of kitchens and bathrooms. The ability to remove an item or its attachment from the building without damaging the fabric of the building is another indicator. The same item may in some areas be a chattel and in others a fixture. For example a cooker will, if free standing and connected to the building only by an electric flex, be a chattel But it may be otherwise if the cooker is a split level cooker with the hob set into a work surface and the oven forming part of one of the cabinets in the kitchen. " As to fitted carpets attached by grippers, they were not fixtures, and nor were white goods in the kitchen. Though part of a decoraive scheme of they wre not sufficiently attached.
Sir Richard Scott VC: There is, I think, some danger in applying too literally tests formulated for the purpose of decisions regarding machinery in factories to cases regarding articles in residences. There is a danger, also, in applying too literally tests formulated for the purpose of decisions regarding articles of ornamental value only to cases regarding articles whose prime function is utilitarian.
Link[s] omitted Secretary of State for the Environment -v- Beresford Trustees Unreported, 31 July 1996
31 Jul 1996CAHobhouse LJ, Staughton LJ and Millett LJ
Hobhouse LJ, adopted at least part of Denning LJ's approach in Fairey, holding that the absence of intention to dedicate had to be "objectively established by overt acts of the landowner", and that "This is not a subjective test. The absence of intention must be objectively established by overt acts of the landowner." It was for the objectors to persuade the Inspector that the owners of the land had during the material period sufficiently demonstrated an intention not to dedicate the footpath."
Highways Act 1980 31(1) 31(2) Regina -v- Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Steed and Another (1996) 75 P & CR 102
2 Aug 1996CAPill J
Customary rights over land not defeated by failure to register as common. "As of right" meant that the right must be exercised in the belief that it is a right enjoyed by the inhabitants of the village to the exclusion of all other people. "it is no trivial matter for a landowner to have land, whether in public or private ownership, registered as a town green . ." The meaning of the expression that land "becomes" a Green is that the land "becomes registrable" as a Green.
Commons Registration Act 1965 1(2)(a) 22 - Commons Registration (Time Limits) Order 1996 (SI 1966/1470) Nationwide Building Society -v- Rogers [1996] EWCA Civ 572
8 Aug 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Ezekiel -v- Orakpo [1997] 1 WLR 340
16 Sep 1996CAMillett LJ
Litigation Practice, Land, Limitation
A charging order was made in 1982 to secure �20,000 under a judgment given in 1979. The judgment creditor did not seek to enforce the charging order until almost 12 years had elapsed since the making of the charging order. An order for possession was made so as to enforce the order. The debtor tendered a sum sufficient to pay the principal debt but not interest on it. The parties appealed a finding that the creditor was entitled to interest, but only for six years. Held: The creditor was entitled to interest not limited to six years. A charging order carries a charge to secure interest, whether or not interest is specifically mentioned. Enforcement of a foreign currency judgment by means of a charging order required the judgment debt first to be converted to Sterling before completion of the enforcement by the making of the charging order. Enforcement of a judgment debt by means of a charging order under the Charging Orders Act 1979 is completed when the charging order is made final.
Millett LJ said that, for a judgement to carry judgment interest it is not necessary to say so specifically. Therefore it is also not necessary to mention interest in any Charging Order carrying the judgement into effect for such interest to be added to the security. He continued:- "Section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides that the Charging Order takes effect as an equitable charge created by the judgment debtor by writing under his hand. It must therefore be given the same effect unless the Act itself provides otherwise as would an equitable charge on the land in question to secure a stated principle sum but with no mention of interest. Such a charge would carry interest even though there were no words allowing interest on the charge itself. That was decided at first instance in re Drax... which was followed . . in Stoker v Elwell . . The defendant invited us to over rule Stoker . . and re Drax although they have stood unchallenged for nearly a century.His submission was founded on the well established principle that a Charging Order cannot be given except for an ascertained sum . . It is clear Law for example that a Charging Order cannot be made for untaxed costs. In the present case, of course, the costs were taxed. But it is said by parity of reasoning that it cannot be made to secure future interest since the amount of such interest cannot be ascertained in advance. However, the Charging Orders Act 1979 itself entitles the Court to make a Charging Order for monies due or to become due, and it appears to me that future interest at an ascertained rate (albeit a variable rate) from the date of judgment to the date of payment is an ascertained or at least an ascertainable sum for the purpose of the rule in question.So far as the costs of enforcing the security are concerned, it is of course perfectly true that at the date of the Charging Order, or indeed subsequently, it was quite impossible to ascertain them. The Judge came to the conclusion that the Charging Order must, by the provisions of the statute, be given the same effect as if it were an equitable charge under hand only. If it were, the chargee would have the right in equity to add the costs of enforcing the security to the security. He considered that that should be implied into the Charging Order by virtue of section 3(4). I agree with him and do not think it necessary to add anything further on the matter."
Judgments Act 1938 17 Hypo-Mortgage Services Ltd -v- Robinson and Robinson [1996] EWCA Civ 627
2 Oct 1996CA
Appeal against possession order.
Link[s] omitted Naughton -v- Jackson [1996] EWCA Civ 630
Application for leave to appeal - refused.
Link[s] omitted Alliance and Leicester Building Society -v- Axworthy [1996] EWCA Civ 635
3 Oct 1996CA
Application for leave to appeal out of time against possession order.
Link[s] omitted Noreen Anne Haigh Andrew Haigh -v- Rotherham Borough Council [1996] EWCA Civ 651
Link[s] omitted Kenneth Wright; Jennifer Wright -v- Graham Frederick Kane and Angela Mary Kane [1996] EWCA Civ 679
8 Oct 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Chattey and Another -v- Farndale Holdings Inc and others [1996] EWCA Civ 696
11 Oct 1996CA
Land, Contract, Registered Land
The plaintiffs had paid deposits for apartments which were to be built. After the developer became insolvent the plaintiffs sought recovery of the deposits, saying they had a lien which preceded the claims of chargees. Held: The one appeal failed and another succeeded. "the circumstances in which a purchaser's lien will arise are not limited to those in which the contract is or has been specifically enforceable but include those in which there is or has been a right to call for the legal estate whether presently, in the future or conditionally so as to give rise to the equitable interest or estate. . . " and "It is not disputed that the purchaser's lien arises by operation of law from the contract unless it is modified or excluded by express agreement of the parties or by necessary implication from the contractual arrangements the parties have entered into. The lien so arising is an unqualified equitable right. In common with all other equitable rights it is capable of being subordinated to the rights of a subsequent purchaser for value of a legal estate without notice of the equitable right. But that inherent weakness is no reason to modify the nature of the right itself. "
Land Registration Act 1925 70(2) Link[s] omitted Redland Aggregates Limited -v- Dace, Pallett, Ellick and Mahoney [1996] EWCA Civ 708
Prescription Act 1832 Link[s] omitted David Lawrence Headon Owen Barbara Nesta Owen -v- Secretary of State for Transport [1996] EWCA Civ 712
14 Oct 1996CA
Land, Damages, Transport
Highways Act 1980 Link[s] omitted Regina -v- Leeds City Council ex parte Leeds Industrial Co-Operative Society Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 734
15 Oct 1996CA
Local Government, Land, Planning
Link[s] omitted Midland Bank Plc -v- Campbell and others [1996] EWCA Civ 732
Mortgage possession action - application for leave to appeal out of time.
Link[s] omitted Persey -v- J H Halsey [1996] EWCA Civ 756
17 Oct 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society -v- Aaron Krausz and Rebecca Krausz [1996] EWCA Civ 780; [1997] 1 WLR 1558
22 Oct 1996CA
The County court may not suspend a possession order pending an application to the High Court for an order for sale. The court considered the protection given by s15(1) of the 1970 Act, and found the protection to be limited, but nevertheless of considerable value to mortgagors who are in default.
Law of Property Act 1925 91(2) - Administration of Justice Act 1970 15(1) Link[s] omitted Davies -v- Secretary of State for Wales and Anr [1996] EWCA Civ 809
25 Oct 1996CA
Application for extension of time to appeal against order refusing footpath diversion.
National Westminster Bank Plc -v- El-Ashckar [1996] EWCA Civ 817
28 Oct 1996CA
Appeal against possession order under charge on land.
Link[s] omitted Turner and Another -v- Individual Homes Limited [1996] EWCA Civ 819
Appeal against orders for possession of land
Link[s] omitted Sorensen -v- Secretary of State for Environment -v- Cheshire County Council [1996] EWHC Admin 161
28 Oct 1996Admn
Downgrading of public right of way.
Link[s] omitted State of India -v- Sardul Singh Sood; Baljit Singh Sood; Parmjit Singh Sood; Daman Sood; Raksha Sood; Kamaljit Singh Sood and Renu Sood [1996] EWCA Civ 835
30 Oct 1996CA
Beneficial equitable interests in land were overreached by a mortgage despite no the fact that no capital was actually advanced under the charge.
Law of Property Act 1925 2(1)(ii) Link[s] omitted UCB Bank Plc -v- Muhamid Sharif [1996] EWCA Civ 870
1 Nov 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Thomas Joseph Billington and Edith Annie Warburton (As Executors of Edith Annie Billington) -v- Joan Elizabeth Blackshaw [1996] EWCA Civ 876
4 Nov 1996CA
Family, Land
Link[s] omitted Christine Pardoe (Now Christine Vermuelen) -v- John Pennington and Another [1996] EWCA Civ 895
7 Nov 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Regina -v- Suffolk County Council Ex Parte Speed and Another 11 Nov 1996CA
A failure to register town green did not defeat existing customary rights over it.
Commons Registration Act 1965 1(2)(a) Cook -v- South West Water Services Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 924
11 Nov 1996CA
Land, Utilities, Damages
Link[s] omitted Paul Louis and Paula Louis -v- Mohammed Sadiq [1996] EWCA Civ 935; [1997] 1 EGLR 1996
12 Nov 1996CAEvans LJ
There was a two-storey end of terrace house in North London owned by Mr Sadiq and his neighbours, Mr and Mrs Louis. The appellant had commenced substantial works to his house, which caused damage to the party wall. The appellant had not complied with his obligations under the 1939 Act. Held. The works carried out could never have been approved retrospectively. Evans LJ discussed the 1939 Act: "So the statutory scheme is clear. The building owner has certain express rights but these can only be exercised (i) with the adjoining owner's written consent or (ii) in accordance with a valid award by the surveyor or surveyors appointed under s.55."Evans LJ reviewed the authorities and said: "The adjoining owner's common law rights are supplanted when the statute is invoked which can have the effect of safeguarding the building owner from common law liabilities when he complies with the statutory procedures . . But if he commits an actionable nuisance without giving notice and without obtaining consent he cannot rely upon a statutory defence under procedures with which ex hypothesi he has failed to comply. If he does then give notice he will in due course acquire statutory authority for whatever works are approved or agreed but in my judgment this does not relieve him from liability for the continuing nuisance which he has unlawfully committed until such time as, and to the extent that such authority is obtained." As to the particular case: "So it cannot be said in my judgment that the works which created the nuisance were subsequently authorised whether by agreement or by surveyors under the statutory procedure."
London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 [ Bailii ] Pourdanay -v- Barclays Bank Plc 12 Nov 1996ChD
Landlord and Tenant, Housing, Land
Statutory tenancy after contractual one binding on mortgagee is also binding.
Amsprop Trading Ltd -v- Harris Distribution Ltd and Another 13 Nov 1996ChD
A non-party to a deed cannot take the benefit of a covenant even though he had been named as such in the deed.
Law of Property Act 1925 56 Highland Council (Formerly Ross and Cromarty District Council) -v- Patience and Others (Scotland) [1996] UKHL 7
14 Nov 1996HLLord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Griffiths, Lord Mustill, Lord Steyn, Lord Clyde
Housing, Scotland, Local Government, Land, Registered Land
Local Authority tenants sought to exercise their statutory right to purchase their council house. The third defendant had registered against the title a right of pre-emption protecting a feu charter registered in the Registry of Sasines. Held: A Local Authority could sell a house to a secure tenant despite a feu charter on the title giving a right of pre-emption. The right to buy was akin to a compulsory purchase. The procedure involved clearly suggested that the tenant's right to buy must be unimpeded.
Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 Link[s] omitted Cheltenham & Gloucester Plc (Formerly Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society) -v- Robert Charles Booker and Susan Jane Booker [1996] EWCA Civ 957
14 Nov 1996CA
The case asked whether the court has jurisdiction, and if so in what circumstances should it exercise such jurisdiction, to give conduct of a sale to a mortgagee while at the same time postponing the execution of a warrant for possession until completion of the sale.
Link[s] omitted Anthony Paul Stanton; Juliet Louise Stanton -v- Paul Simon Hare; Helene Deanna Hare and John Hare [1996] EWCA Civ 995
19 Nov 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Berryman -v- Hounslow London Borough Council [1996] EWCA Civ 1001
20 Nov 1996CA
Landlord and Tenant, Land, Housing, Personal Injury
No damages were to be awarded for a tenant's injury suffered whilst climbing the stairs when the lift had not been repaired.
Link[s] omitted Cheltenham and Gloucester Plc -v- Booker and Another 20 Nov 1996CA
The lender may be given the conduct of a sale of mortgaged property, even though the warrant for possession had been suspended.
Administration of Justice Act 1970 - Administration of Justice Act 1973 Louis -v- Sadiq 22 Nov 1996CA
Land, Damages, Construction
A neighbour doing work on a party wall without complying with the requirements of the Act was creating a nuisance, and he made himself liable for special damages, including some financial losses. He could not rely upon a defence in the Act, having later complied with it, to excuse his earlier wrong.
London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 Staghold Limited -v- London and Strategic Estates Limited [1996] EWCA Civ 1072
29 Nov 1996CA
Link[s] omitted John Landray -v- Shannon Witte [1996] EWCA Civ 1084
3 Dec 1996CA
Order by consent for possession.
Link[s] omitted Mitchem and Edmunds -v- Magnus Homes South West Limited [1996] EWCA Civ 1111
5 Dec 1996CA
The defendant company appealed orders for the dicharge of its class C(iv) charges against the plaintiff's land, which it said represented a contract for the purchase of the land. An option had been given to the appellant, but it had expired.
Link[s] omitted Boldack (Suing By the Official Solicitor) -v- East Lindsey District Council [1996] EWCA Civ 1168
11 Dec 1996CA
Personal Injury, Land
Defective Premises Act 1972 4 Link[s] omitted Richard Alexander Martin; Linda Ann Martin -v- Henry Butcher; Patricia Ann Butcher; Donald Frederick Perrin and Audrey May Perrin [1996] EWCA Civ 1184
Link[s] omitted Blue Circle Industries Plc -v- Ministry of Defence 11 Dec 1996ChD
Damages for escape of nuclear waste to include diminution of land value. Radioactive pollution of land following such an overflow is physical damage.
Nuclear Installations Act 1965 Bristol and West Building Society -v- Baden Barnes and Groves Unreported, 13 December 1996
13 Dec 1996QBD
Professional Negligence, Legal Professions, Land, Limitation
cw Proposed amendments to a plaintiff's pleadings were insufficient to prevent a striking out. The amendments either sought to advance by a different route the earlier claim which was bound to fail, or to introduce a new cause of action which was statute barred and did not derive from the same, or substantially the same, facts.
Attorney General of Hong Kong -v- Fairfax Limited [1996] UKPC Hong Kong 52; [1996] UKPC 55; [1997] 1 WLR 149
Link[s] omitted Regina -v- Norfolk County Council ex parte Perry [1996] EWHC Admin 385; (1996) 74 P&CR 1
19 Dec 1996AdmnDyson J
The period of twenty years required to establish a common under the Act was the period up to the date of the application.
Commons Registration Act 1965 Link[s] omitted Regina -v- Nicholson and Another, Secretary of State for Environment and others [1996] EWHC Admin 393
20 Dec 1996Admn
Land, Road Traffic
Challenges to compulsory purchase orders to allow construction of Avon Ring Road, Stage II.
Acquisition of Land Act 1981 19(1)(a) Link[s] omitted Marlborough (West End) Ltd -v- Wilks Head & Eve Unreported, 20 December 1996
20 Dec 1996ChDLightman J
The nature of restrictive covenants was discussed. The judge also drew attention to the difference between acquisition by grant at the date of the disposition and acquisition by prescription based on actual enjoyment after that date. He said: "Whether or not a document constitutes such a consent or agreement is a question of construction. In this context, care must be taken to distinguish between provisions designed to protect the servient owner by negativing the implication of a grant of an easement or the grant of analogous rights under the doctrine of non-derogation from grant or to establish by agreement the existing legal rights of the parties; and provisions designed to authorise the servient owner at a future date to carry out works or build as he pleases unrestricted by any easement of light in favour of the dominant land and notwithstanding any resultant injury to the light enjoyed. Provisions of the former character do not constitute either consents or agreements by the servient owner licensing or consenting to the future enjoyment of the access to light and accordingly do not prevent acquisition of light by prescription (see Mitchell v Cantrill (1887) 37 Ch D 36); but provisions of the latter character may be construed as consents or agreements permitting the enjoyment of light during the interim period and accordingly (as provided in Section 3) preclude any easement arising by prescription under the Act (see Willoughby v Eckstein [1937] Ch 167)."
Leonard Edward Scruton Mary Teresa Pluck -v- Alan Street [1996] EWCA Civ 1275
20 Dec 1996CA
Link[s] omitted Telegraph Service Stations Ltd -v- Trafford Borough Council & Another ACQ/162-3/1996
31 Dec 1996LT