Source: https://m.openjurist.org/384/us/35/joseph-seagram-sons-inc-v-s-hostetter
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 09:10:16
Document Index: 388981234

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 13', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 101', '§ 1', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 11', '§ 65', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 7', '§ 101', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 11', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 3', '§ 369']

384 US 35 Joseph Seagram Sons Inc v. S Hostetter | OpenJurist
384 U.S. 35 - Joseph Seagram Sons Inc v. S Hostetter
JOSEPH E. SEAGRAM & SONS, INC., et al., Appellants,
Donald S. HOSTETTER, etc., et al.
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals observed, the regulatory procedure followed by New York is comparable to that practiced by those States, 17 in number, in which liquor is sold by the State itself and not by private enterprise. Each of these monopoly States, we are told, requires distillers to warrant that the price charged the State is no higher than the price charged in other States. In at least one of these States, the distillers are required to adjust the sales price to include all rebates and other allowances made to purchasers elsewhere, and the State has taken positive precautions to insure that the contractual commitments are fulfilled.14 In some respects the burden of gathering information for the warranties made to the monopoly States may be more onerous than that required for the affirmations under § 9, since the warranties generally cover prices in other States at the very time of sale to the monopoly State, whereas the affirmations filed under § 9 cover prices charged elsewhere during the preceding month.
We therefore conclude that the provisions of § 9 on their face place on unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
The appellants' contention that § 9 violates the command of the Supremacy Clause needs no extended discussion. The argument is based upon a claimed inconsistency between § 9 and the federal antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1—7 (1964 ed.), and § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964 ed.).
In this as in other areas of coincident federal and state regulation, the 'teaching of this Court's decisions * * * enjoin(s) seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists.' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446, 80 S.Ct. 813, 817, 4 L.Ed.2d 852. We find no such clear conflict in the present case. The bare compilation, without more, of price information on sales to wholesalers and retailers to support the affirmations filed with the State Liquor Authority would not of itself violate the Sherman Act. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582—586, 45 S.Ct. 578, 584—586, 69 L.Ed. 1093; cf. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S.Ct. 114, 66 L.Ed. 284. Section 9 imposes no irresistable economic pressure on the appellants to violate the Sherman Act in order to comply with the requirements of § 9. On the contrary, § 9 appears firmly anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any attempts by the appellants to preserve their New York price level by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the country. Nothing in the Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent enforcement of the Sherman Act against such a conspiracy. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299, 65 S.Ct. 661, 664, 89 L.Ed. 951.
Although it is possible to envision circumstances under which price discriminations proscribed by the Robinson-Patman Act might be compelled by § 9, the existence of such potential conflicts is entirely too speculative in the present posture of this case to support the conclusion that New York is foreclosed from regulating liquor prices in the manner it has chosen.15 Moreover, § 7 of Chapter 531 has amended the ABC Law by granting to the State Liquor Authority ample discretion to modify the schedule requirements.16 We cannot presume that the Authority will not exercise that discretion to alleviate any friction that might result should the ABC Law chafe against the Robinson-Patman Act or any other federal statute.
There remain for consideration the appellants' Fourteenth Amendment claims. Section 9, they say, violates the Due Process Clause in two respects, first because it imposes an 'unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious' burden upon them, and second because the statutory definition of 'related person' is so vague as to be constitutionally intolerable. And § 9 violates the Equal Protection Clause, they say, because it arbitrarily discriminates among various segments of the liquor industry.
The first contention amounts to a claim of a deprivation of due process of law, based on the argument that s 9 is not designed to promote temperance and that it is an unwise, impractical, and oppressive law. But it is not 'the province of courts to draw on their own views as to the morality, legitimacy, and usefulness of a particular business in order to decide whether a statute bears too heavily upon that business and by so doing violates due process. Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy. * * * The doctrine * * * that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely * * * has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. * * *' Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S 726, 728—730, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1030—1031, 10 L.Ed.2d 93.
Moreover, nothing in the Twenty-first Amendment or any other part of the Constitution requires that state laws regulating the liquor business be motivated exclusively by a desire to promote temperance.17 The announced purpose of the legislature was to eliminate 'discrimination against and disadvantage of consumers' in the State.18 Frustrated by years of unhappyexperience with a state-enforced mandatory resale price maintenance system that placed exclusive price-fixing power in the hands of the distillers, the legislature adopted § 9 as the core of the liquor price reform contemplated by Chapter 531. We cannot say that the legislature acted unconstitutionally when it determined that only by imposing the relatively drastic 'no higher than the lowest price' requirement of § 9 could the grip of the liquor distillers on New York liquor prices be loosened.19 In a variety of cases in areas no more sensitive than that of liquor control, this Court has upheld state maximum price legislation. See Nebbia v. People of State of New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940; Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S.Ct. 842, 81 L.Ed. 1210; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324; Gold v. DiCarlo, 380 U.S. 520, 85 S.Ct. 1332, 14 L.Ed.2d 266.
The statutory definition of 'related person,' which the appellants attack as unconstitutionally vague, includes any person 'the exclusive, principal or substantial business of which is the sale of a brand or brands of liquor purchased from such brand owner or wholesaler designated as agent * * *.' The claim of vagueness is centered upon the term 'principal or substantial.' We cannot agree that that language is so vague as to be constitutionally invalid. The Deputy Commissioner of the State Liquor Authority testified in these proceedings that where the determination of 'related persons' is unclear, the appellants will have access to the Authority for a ruling to clarify the issue.20 As the Court said in Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449, 67 S.Ct. 411, 415, 91 L.Ed. 408, '* * * we think it plain under our decisions that if substantiality is the statutory guide, the limits of administrative action are sufficiently definite or ascertainable so as to survive challenge on the grounds of unconstitutionality.' Cf. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 142—146, 61 S.Ct. 524, 531—533, 85 L.Ed. 624; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 512—516, 64 S.Ct. 641, 646—648, 88 L.Ed. 892.
Further, as the record indicates, the structure of the liquor industry is such that even the largest national distillers deal through a relatively limited number of wholesalers.21 Frequently, a wholesaler agrees with a distiller not to sell brands of competing distillers in the same price range, and the prices charged by these wholesalers are potentially subject to the influence of the distillers.22 We cannot say, therefore, that § 9 on its face imposes an unconstitutional burden on distillers or wholesalers in ascertaining the wholesalers who satisfy the 'related person' criterion or in obtaining information on prices charged by such wholesalers.
We come, then, to the appellants' argument that § 9 violates the Equal Protection Clause. That argument is based upon the claim that it was arbitrary for the legislature to except consumer sales and private label brands of liquor from the 'no higher than the lowest price' requirement of § 9, and to reduece the scope of the price affirmation required with respect to sales made to wholesalers and retailers by those who are not 'related persons.'
We do not find that these differentiations constitute invidious discrimination. The legislature could reasonably have believed that, once the prices on sales by distillers and 'related persons' were reduced, the prices of private label brands and brands sold by non-'related persons' would follow suit. Nor was it necessary for the legislature to impose the 'no higher than the lowest price' requirement on sales by retailers to consumers. The legislature might reasonably have concluded that consumer prices would adequately reflect the reductions in prices to wholesalers and retailers accomplished by § 9, even though the state fair trade statute, which permits private resale price maintenance agreements on sales to consumers, appears to have emerged unscathed by the enactment of Chapter 531.23 'A statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce.' Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 49 S.Ct. 336, 73 L.Ed. 722. '(T)he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.' Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okl., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563.
Although the appellants' primary attack is upon the constitutionality of § 9, they also challenge two minor provisions added by § 7 of Chapter 531 to the schedule requirements of the ABC Law. The first provision which requires the price schedules to cover sales to wholesalers 'irrespective of the place of sale or delivery,' is designed to bring wholesalers within the price-publicity requirement of the law, even though they take delivery of the liquor outside New York for distribution within the State. The second provision, which requires the price schedules on sales to both wholesalers and retailers to include 'the net bottle and case price paid by the seller,' tends to promote publicity of the seller's profit margins.24 There is no indication in the present record that the State Liquor Authority will require the appellants to file schedules of prices on sales unrelated to the distribution of liquor in New York. As the Court of Appeals observed with regard to these provisions, 'The statute is concerned with New York practices and, if the sales in other States have no relevancy to New York enforcement, the statute permits the Liquor Authority for good cause to waive the general prohibition against sales to wholesalers in the absence of such schedules. It would be reasonable to expect that the statute would be administered consistently with its sole purpose to regulate the intrastate sale of liquor.' 16 N.Y.2d 47, 59, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75, 82, 209 N.E.2d 701, 706. We accept this construction of the statute by New York's highest court. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432, 83 S.Ct. 328, 337, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. As so construed, these provisions serve a clear and legitimate interest of New York in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate the sale of liquor within its borders.
s 7. Section one hundred one-b of such law, as added by chapter eight hundred ninety-nine of the laws of nineteen hundred forty-two, subdivision four thereof having been amended by chapter five hundred fifty-one of the laws of nineteen hundred forty-eight, is hereby amended to read as follows:
s 101—b. Unlawful discriminations prohibited; filing of schedules; schedule listing fund
3. (a) No brand of liquor or wine shall be sold to or purchased by a wholesaler, irrespective of the place of sale or delivery, unless a schedule, as provided by this section, is filed with the liquor authority, and is then in effect. Such schedule shall be in writing duly verified, and filed in the number of copies and form as required by the authority, and shall contain, with respect to each item, the exact brand or trade name, capacity of package, nature of contents, age and proof where stated on the label, the number of bottles contained in each case, the bottle and case price to wholesalers, the net bottle and case price paid by the seller, which prices, in each instance, shall be individual for each item and not in 'combination' with any other item, the discounts for quantity, if any, and the discounts for time of payment, if any. Such brand of liquor or wine shall not be sold to wholesalers except at the price and discounts then in effect unless prior written permission of the authority is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. Such schedule shall be filed by (1) the owner of such brand, or (2) a wholesaler selling such brand and who is designated as agent for the purpose of filing such schedule if the owner of the brand is not licensed by the authority, or (3) with the approval of the authority, by a wholesaler, in the event that the owner of the brand is unable to file a schedule or designate an agent for such purpose.
(b) No brand of liquor or wine shall be sold to or purchased by a retailer unless a schedule, as provided by this section, is filed with the liquor authority, and is then in effect. Such schedule shall be in writing duly verified, and filed in the number of copies and form as required by the authority, and shall contain, with respect to each item, the exact brand or trade name, capacity of package, nature of contents, age and proof where stated on the label, the number of bottles contained in each case, the bottle and case price to retailers, the net bottle and case price paid by the seller, which prices, in each instance, shall be individual for each item and not in 'combination' with any other item, the discounts for quantity, if any, and the discounts for time of payment, if any. Such brand of liquor or wine shall not be sold to retailers except at the price and discounts then in effect unless prior written permission of the authority is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. Such schedule shall be filed by each manufacturer selling such brand to retailers and by each wholesaler selling such brand to retailers.
s 8. In enacting section eleven of this act, it is the firm intention of the legislature (a) that fundamental principles of price competition should prevail in the manufacture, sale and distribution of liquor in this state, (b) that consumers of alcoholic beverages in this state should not be discriminated against or disadvantaged by paying unjustifiably higher prices for brands of liquor than are paid by consumers in other states, and that price discrimination and favoritism are contrary to the best interests and welfare of the people of this state, and (c) that enactment of section eleven of this act will provide a basis for eliminating such discrimination against and disadvantage of consumers in this state. In order to forestall possible monopolistic and anti-competitive practices designed to frustrate the elimination of such discrimination and disadvantage, it is hereby further declared that the sale of liquor should be subjected to certain further restrictions, prohibitions and regulations, and the necessity for the enactment of the provisions of section nine of this act is, therefore, declared as a matter of legislative determination.
s 9. Subdivision three of section one hundred one-b of such law, as amended by section seven of this act, is hereby amended to add eight new paragraphs, to be paragraphs (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j) and (k), to read as follows:
(d) There shall be filed in connection with and when filed shall be deemed part of the schedule filed for a brand of liquor pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision an affirmation duly verified by the owner of such brand of liquor, or by the wholesaler designated as agent for the purpose of filing such schedule if the owner of the brand of liquor is not licensed by the authority, that the bottle and case price of liquor to wholesalers set forth in such schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold by such brand owner or such wholesaler designated as agent, or any related person, to any wholesaler anywhere in any other state of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or to any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores, at any time during the calendar month immediately preceding the month in which such schedule is filed. As used in this paragraph (d), the term 'related person' shall mean any person (1) in the business of which such brand owner or wholesaler designated as agent has an interest, direct or indirect, by stock or other security ownership, as lender or lienor, or by interlocking directors or officers, or (2) the exclusive, principal or substantial business of which is the sale of a brand or brands of liquor purchased from such brand owner or wholesaler designated as agent, or (3) which has an exclusive franchise or contract to sell such brand or brands.
(e) There shall be filed in connection with and when filed shall be deemed part of any other schedule filed for a brand of liquor pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision an affirmation duly verified by the person filing such schedule that the bottle and case price of liquor to wholesalers set forth in such schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold by such person to any wholesaler anywhere in any other state of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or to any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores, at any time during the calendar month immediately preceding the month in which such schedule is filed.
(f) There shall be filed in connection with and when filed shall be deemed part of any schedule filed for a brand of liquor pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subdivision by the owner of such brand of liquor, or by the wholesaler designated as agent for the purpose of filing such schedule if the owner of the brand of liquor is not licensed by the authority, or by a related person, an affirmation duly verified by such brand owner or such wholesaler designated as agent that the bottle and case price of liquor to retailers set forth in such schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item of liquor was sold by such brand owner of (sic) such wholesaler designated as agent, or any related person, to any retailer anywhere in any other state of the United States or in the District of Columbia, other than to any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores, at any time during the calendar month immediately preceding the month in which such schedule is filed. As used in this paragraph (f), the term 'related person' shall mean any person (1) in the business of which such brand owner or wholesaler designated as agent has an interest, direct or indirect, by stock or other security ownership, as lender or lienor, or by interlocking directors or officers, or (2) the exclusive, principal or substantial business of which is the sale of a brand or brands of liquor purchased from such brand owner or wholesaler designated as agent, or (3) who has an exclusive franchise or contract to sell such brand or brands.
(i) In determining the lowest price for which any item of liquor was sold in any other state or in the District of Columbia, or to any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores, appropriate reductions shall be made to reflect all discounts in excess of those to be in effect under such schedule, and all rebates, free goods, allowances and other inducements of any kind whatsoever offered or given to any such wholesaler, state (or state agency) or retailer, as the case may be, purchasing such item in such other state or in the District of Columbia; provided that nothing contained in paragraphs (d), (e), (f) and (g) of this subdivision shall prevent differentials in price which make only due allowance for differences in state taxes and fees, and in the actual cost of delivery. As used in this paragraph, the term 'state taxes or fees' shall mean the excise taxes imposed or the fees required by any state or the District of Columbia upon or based upon the gallon of liquor, and the term 'gallon' shall mean one hundred twenty-eight fluid ounces.
The appellants also challenged two minor provisions of § 7 of Chapter 531, 1964 Session Laws of New York. See pp. 51-52, infra. The relevant provisions of §§ 7, 8 and 9 of Chapter 531 are set out in the Appendix to this opinion.
382 U.S. 924, 86 S.Ct. 316, 15 L.Ed.2d 338.
Laws 1942, c. 899, § 1, Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 3—B, §§ 101—b, subd. 3(a)—(d) (1946 ed.).
Laws 1950, c. 689, § 1, Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, § 101—c (1964 Supp.).
See New York State Legislative Annual 401—408, 484—489, 498—500 (1964); Breuer, Moreland Act Investigations in New York: 1907—65, pp. 131—169 (1965). The Commission's Study Paper Number 5 ('Resale Price Maintenance in the Liquor Industry') and Report and Recommendations No. 3 ('Mandatory Resale Price Maintenance') are part of the record in this case.
Based upon the comparative price data it assembled, including examples of wholesale liquor prices in New York higher than retail prices elsewhere, the Commission concluded that, because of the mandatory resale price maintenance provision, New Yorkers wre subsidizing the liquor industry by $150,000,000 a year.
The mandatory resale price maintenance provision, § 101 c, was repealed by § 11 of Chapter 531.
Sellers seeking to take advantage of the milder affirmations required by paragraphs (e) and (g) must file a representation that they are not 'related persons.' See Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, Appendix, Rule 16 of the State Liquor Authority, § 65.7(e) (1965 Supp.), 9 NYCRR 65.7(e). The schedule requirements of § 101—b do not apply to sales of private label brands of liquor. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, § 101—b, subd. 3(c).
Cf. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 299, 65 S.Ct. 661, 664, 89 L.Ed. 951, where we stated that the Twenty-first Amendment 'has not given the states plenary and exclusive power to regulate the conduct of persons doing an interstate liquor business outside their boundaries.' See also Note, The Twenty-first Amendment Versus the Interstate Commerce Clause, 55 Yale L.J. 815 (1946).
The executive vice-president of one of the appellants testified that 'We and other distillers have freely entered into contracts with these monopoly states in which we warrant that the f.o.b. prices at which our brands are offered to those states are no higher than the lowest price at which we sell in other states.'
The Deputy Commissioner of the State Liquor Authority testified that '(I)n a number of other States, e.g., in the State of Pennsylvania, some of these same plaintiffs have been warranting for some time past that the price quoted to the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board is 'the lowest current price quoted to any other customer,' or 'to any purchaser, dealer, agent or agency of any nature or kind anywhere in the United States of America." The same witness later added that '(A)s part and parcel of the offerings of their products in, for example, the State of Pennsylvania, they warrant that 'if and when special cash or commodity allowances, post-offs or discounts are offered to purchasers in any other State or the District of Columbia, the same' shall also be offered the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.'
The Chairman of the Commission testified at a public hearing before a joint legislative committee that 'We have, for example, the State of Pennsylvania which is the largest purchaser of liquor in the world. I think they purchase almost $400,000,000 worth of liquor a year—one customer. They swing a very big bit of leverage, and you cannot be convinced that that Pennsylvania customer does not insist on the lowest price that the distiller offers anywhere in the country. * * * (T)he State of Pennsylvania has a contract which permits them to send accountants into any supplier's office and they do. They send corps of accountants into suppliers' offices to determine whether or not they're getting the best price. And in fact, if they were not, they would have a violation of contract * * *.'
In the monopoly States, of course, no sales to retailers by private wholesalers take place. Thus, brand owners dealing with those States are not placed in the position of vouching for sales to retailers by wholesalers occupying a 'related person' status.
Cf. State of Wisconsin v. Texaco, Inc., 14 Wis.2d 625, 630—631, 111 N.W.2d 918, 921; Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assn., 360 U.S. 334, 342, n. 7, 79 S.Ct. 1196, 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1280.
Sections 101—b, subd. 3(a) and (b) of the ABC Law, as amended by § 7 of Chapter 531, provide: '* * * Such brand of liquor * * * shall not be sold to wholesalers ('retailers' in § 101—b—3(b)) except at the price and discounts then in effect unless prior written permission of the authority is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. * * *'
See State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct. 77, 81 L.Ed. 38; Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 58 S.Ct. 952, 82 L.Ed. 1424; Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391, 59 S.Ct. 254, 83 L.Ed. 243; Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 59 S.Ct. 256, 83 L.Ed. 246; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S.Ct. 163, 84 L.Ed. 128; State of California v. State of Washington, 358 U.S. 64, 79 S.Ct. 116, 3 L.Ed.2d 106.
The intent of the legislature in enacting § 9 is expressed in § 8 of Chapter 531: '* * * In order to forestall possible monopolistic and anti-competitive practices designed to frustrate the elimination of * * * discrimination and disadvantage (to consumers), it is hereby further declared that the sale of liquor should be subjected to certain further restrictions, prohibitions and regulations, and the necessity for the enactment of the provisions of section nine of this act is, therefore, declared as a matter of legislative determination.'
The preceding portion of § 8 states the intent of the legislature in enacting § 11 of Chapter 531, which repealed § 101 c, the mandatory resale price maintenance provision. See Appendix, infra, p. 54.
We also find without merit the appellants' objection that the price computation provision, § 101—b, subd. 3(i), sweeps too broadly. That provision was intended to circumvent the established industry practice of interpreting 'price' as 'invoice price' rather than the amount actually realized by the seller on the transaction. There is no indication in the record that § 101—b, subd. 3(i) as applied will require the reflection in New York of every idiosyncratic price fluctuation elsewhere in the United States that happens to produce a 'lowest price.'
Section 101—b, subd. 4 of the ABC Law authorizes the State Liquor Authority to promulgate rules to carry out the purpose of § 101—b.
The vice-president of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., one of the largest national distillers, testified that 'Of the 330 wholesalers selling Seagram throughout the country, sixteen do 75 per cent or more of their business in the sale of our brands. Sixty-one do approximately 60 to 75 per cent in the sale of these brands; seventy-three do 40 to 60 per cent; seventy-nine, 20 to 40 per cent; sixty-four, 5 to 20 per cent; thirty-seven, 1 to 5 per cent.'
See Borregard & Glusker, The Distilled Spirits Industry: A Marketing Survey 65—104, 133—163 (Yale Law School 1950); Oxenfeldt, 'Whiskey Prices,' Industrial Pricing and Market Practices 445, 477, 483—486 (1951).
The New York fair trade statute is the Feld-Crawford Act, Laws 1940, c. 195, § 3, as amended, General Business Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 20, §§ 369-a—369-e. See National Distillers & Chemical Corp. v. Seyopp Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 12, 267 N.Y.S.2d 193, 214 N.E.2d 361; National Distillers & Chemical Corp. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 23 A.D.2d 51, 258 N.Y.S.2d 298; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 24 A.D.2d 977, 265 N.Y.S.2d 384; Victor Fischel & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., N.Y.Sup.Ct., 154 N.Y.L.J. No. 95, p. 17 (Nov. 17, 1965).