Source: https://casetext.com/case/jones-v-city-of-memphis-tenn
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 13:20:15
Document Index: 407560378

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1292', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 | Casetext
The law is clear that liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the right to…
Thomas v. Shipka
Nevertheless, the cases involving constitutional claims against municipalities discuss many of the same…
Full title:JOHN E. JONES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE ET AL.,…
Date published: Sep 19, 1978
586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978)
In Jones v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914, 99 S.Ct. 1230, 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979), the court held that the tort doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions against a municipality directly under the fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Summary of this case from Mathis v. Parks
Decided September 19, 1978.
In a memorandum decision on a motion to dismiss the complaint published at 444 F. Supp. 27 (1977), the district court found initially that a municipal corporation can be held liable on a claim based directly on the fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court concluded, although with "considerable doubt", that the City could be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the issue of the applicability of respondeat superior "presents a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation." In an unpublished order, this court granted leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, (1978), that Court held that municipalities were immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part by Monell, the Supreme Court held that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983]." Specifically, the court in Monroe held that the word "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include municipalities. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), the Court reaffirmed the Monroe ruling but remanded the case to the district court to consider "the availability of [28 U.S.C.] § 1331 jurisdiction. . . ." 412 U.S. at 514, 93 S.Ct. at 2227.
[T]hat the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees. 436 U.S. at 663, 98 S.Ct. at 2022, n. 7.
Although Monroe barred litigants from bringing actions against municipalities under § 1983, many courts interpreted this language in Kenosha as support for the position that jurisdiction over municipalities in civil rights actions could be obtained under § 1331. See, e.g., Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1977); Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963, 96 S.Ct. 1748, 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District, 520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975); Bosely v. City of Euclid, 496 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1974).
At least six other circuits have reached this conclusion, based upon the teachings of Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). See Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932-34 (8th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. pending; McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966, 98 S.Ct. 508, 54 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977); Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 873 (5th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50-51 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Gray v. Union County Intermediate Education District, supra, 520 F.2d at 805. Cf. Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 114-16 (3rd Cir. 1977), petition for cert. pending; Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1977).
[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.
Even if we were without the guidance of Monell concerning the scope of municipal liability for deprivation of civil rights, we would hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in the present case. The day before Monell was rendered, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the application of respondeat superior in fourteenth amendment actions against municipalities. In Turpin v. Mailet, supra, 579 F.2d at 164, the court stated: "The clear intendment of Bivens [ Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)] is that those directly responsible for unconstitutional behavior may be called to task for their wrongful acts." The court reasoned that to impose liability on a municipality under the theory of respondeat superior would be "fundamentally inconsistent with the import of Bivens." 579 F.2d at 166.
This opinion likewise was not available to the district judge at the time of his decision.
We recognize that the scope of municipal liability enunciated by the Second Circuit in Turpin may not be identical to the extent of municipal liability indicated by the Supreme Court in Monell. We express no views in this opinion as to the "full contours of municipal liability." Monell, 436 U.S. at 695, 98 S.Ct. 2038. In Monell, the Supreme Court said: "[W]e expressly leave further development of this action to another day." Id.
In Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914, 99 S.Ct. 1230, 59 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979), the Sixth Circuit held that despite Monell a direct action under the Fourteenth Amendment can still be brought against a municipality.
Summary of this case from Edmonds v. Dillin
In Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of respondeat superior could not be invoked in an action brought against a municipality under this rationale.
Summary of this case from Randle v. Gokey