Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2013cv00838/776807/21
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 20:48:07
Document Index: 396853714

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 416', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 427', '§ 404']

ORDER that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion for Mendez v. Colvin :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall terminate this case. Signed by Judge Neil V Wake on 9/25/14. (LSP)
Brenda S. Mendez,
No. CV-13-00838-PHX-NVW
Plaintiff Brenda S. Mendez seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final
Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is based on legal error,
the Commissioner’s decision will be vacated and the matter remanded for further
Plaintiff was born in October 1975. She previously worked as a fast food worker
and stock clerk. Among other impairments, she suffers from anxiety and panic attacks.
She last worked in 2009 for a temporary employment service, which stopped calling her
because she declined work due to panic attacks.
occasions to both the emergency room and her primary care provider for chest pain,
which has been diagnosed as likely caused by anxiety.
She has presented on numerous
On July 21, 2010, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging
disability beginning May 1, 2009. On April 5, 2012, she appeared with her attorney and
testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified.
On May 14, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within
decision. On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff sought review by this Court.
the Social Security Act through September 30, 2013, and that she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2009. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has the following severe impairments: obesity, diabetes mellitus (controlled by diet),
panic disorder, mood disorder, and borderline personality disorder. The ALJ found that
the record included numerous references to and diagnoses of chest pain due to anxiety,
but no actual cardiac impairment.
complained of chest pain, typically during episodes of panic, as early as October 2006.
Similar assessments were made in December 2008 and April 2010.
The ALJ observed that Plaintiff has repeatedly
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20
restriction in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, and
moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace. The ALJ noted that some
difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace often accompany Plaintiff’s diagnoses.
The ALJ found Plaintiff has moderate
At step four, the ALJ considered the objective medical record, Plaintiff’s
subjective symptom testimony, a third-party function report, and medical source opinion
The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony and prior statements to the Social
Security Administration regarding her alleged impairments and resulting functional
limitations not fully credible.
statements of Plaintiff’s father.
statements and the opinions of two consultative examiners, but gave significant weight to
the opinions of non-examining State agency psychological consultants.
The ALJ afforded partial weight to the third-party
The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s treating physician’s
has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) with additional mental limitations
in that she is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks involving only
occasional interaction with the public, co-workers and supervisors. She
needs to be employed in a low-stress job, with low-stress being defined as a
job with few, if any, simple decisions made, only occasional changes in the
work setting, and no fast-paced assembly line work.
The vocational expert testified that “the restriction of only occasional contact with the
public as well as the fast-paced nature of fast food work and the semi-skilled nature of the
stocker work would preclude the successful performance of same” by a hypothetical
individual with Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. To reach this conclusion,
the ALJ relied on the impartial vocational expert’s opinion that an individual with
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity would be
able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as “kitchen helper”
(DOT #318.687-010),1 “cook helper” (DOT #317.687-010), and “maids/housecleaners”
(DOT #323.687-014).
Both the hearing transcript and the ALJ’s hearing decision incorrectly identify
the DOT number for “kitchen helper” as 318.387-010, instead of 318.687-010. To avoid
confusion, only the correct DOT number is used in this Order.
The ALJ Erred in Weighing Medical Source Opinion Evidence.
In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit
distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat
the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and
(3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v.
Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must give weight to the
treating physician’s subjective judgments in addition to his clinical findings and
interpretation of test results. Id. at 832-33. Generally, more weight should be given to
the opinion of a treating physician than to the opinions of non-treating physicians. Id. at
830. Where a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it
may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted, it
may not be rejected without “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Id.; Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.
than that of a non-examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. As with a treating
physician, there must be clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted
opinion of an examining physician, and specific and legitimate reasons, supported by
substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting an examining physician’s contradicted
opinion. Id. at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining physician is not itself substantial
evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either a treating physician or an
examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.
“Even if a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted, the ALJ may not simply
disregard it.” Ghanim v. Colvin, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 4056530, at * 5 (9th Cir. Aug. 18,
2014). Unless the ALJ gives a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must
consider all of the factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6): length of the
treatment relationship, frequency of examination, nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, supportability of the source’s opinion with medical evidence, consistency of
the source’s opinion with the record as a whole, and specialization. Id.
Generally, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating physician than
to the opinions of physicians who do not treat the claimant, and the weight afforded a
non-examining physician’s opinion depends on the extent to which he provides
supporting explanations for his opinions. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th
Cir. July 14, 2014).
The ALJ’s Hearing Decision
The ALJ rejected the opinions of treating physician Dr. Houlihan and consultative
examiners Drs. Kahane and Geary without identifying any medical opinions that
contradicted them. The ALJ gave “significant weight” to the opinions of non-examining
State agency consultants, both of whom gave “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Geary.
The ALJ did not say she gave some weight or any weight to Dr. Houlihan’s
opinions; she rejected them entirely. The ALJ stated the following reasons for rejecting
Dr. Houlihan’s opinions:
significant limitations; his cursory treatment records either did not document the
limitations or contained only Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and diagnoses; he found
physical limitations although he identified only “severe anxiety” as her impairment; and
there were “no objective clinical or diagnostic findings supportive of the claimant’s
limitations.” However, the medical records show that Plaintiff suffers from anxiety and
panic attacks, which cause chest pain, heart palpitation, and shortness of breath, for
which she has sought emergency room treatment and was prescribed medication.
Moreover, in rejecting treating physician Dr. Houlihan’s opinion, the ALJ was required
to and did not expressly consider all of the factors set out in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). Yet, despite expressly rejecting Dr. Houlihan’s opinions, the ALJ
found Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity required both physical and significant
mental limitations and appears to have given Dr. Houlihan’s opinions some degree of
some of his statements were conclusory while imposing
The ALJ stated she rejected Dr. Kahane’s opinion because it relied almost
completely on Plaintiff’s subjective reported symptoms and functioning, and some of the
conclusions regarding limitations were contradicted by Dr. Kahane’s observation notes.
For example, the ALJ said that Dr. Kahane opined that Plaintiff currently is unable to
complete simple or repetitive tasks, but “had good concentration for the interview.” In
fact, Dr. Kahane said Plaintiff “had difficulty with concentration due to anxiety and had
some mild panic while here, so she had difficulty focusing.” But then Dr. Kahane’s next
statements were: “Her concentration seems to be clear. Limited to the anxiety and panic
The ALJ stated she rejected Dr. Geary’s opinion because its wording was vague
and imprecise, it failed to give specific work-related limitations, and it was largely based
on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, even though it was more consistent with the limited
treatment evidence of record than was Dr. Kahane’s.
evaluation and findings were of limited value because he found that Plaintiff “gave
‘obviously poor effort’ on the mental status examination and maintained an exaggerated
demeanor throughout the evaluation.” In fact, Dr. Geary’s opinion was not vague and
imprecise, did give work-related limitations, and included observations as well as
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
The ALJ said Dr. Geary’s
Ms. Mendez does not seem limited in her ability to understand or
remember information. She appears to be moderately limited in her ability
to sustain concentration and persist at tasks. She seems distractible and her
pace would be interrupted by anxiety. Brenda would require monitoring
and supervision on a job. Ms. Mendez seems moderately limited in social
interaction. She apparently has trouble getting along with other people, she
is clearly self-centered, and she has a poorly controlled temper. Ms.
Mendez also seems moderately limited in adaptation. She is diminished in
her ability to cope with customary work stress and it appears unlikely that
Brenda is motivated to maintain regular attendance. The prognosis in this
case is guarded, though it might improve if Brenda learns and practices
anxiety management techniques in her counseling. Ms. Mendez seems
marginally capable of independently managing benefits.
Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff “is limited to simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks involving only occasional interaction with the public, co-workers and
supervisors,” and needs “only occasional changes in the work setting” is consistent with,
and likely derived from, Dr. Geary’s opinion.
The ALJ stated she gave “significant weight to the opinions of the State agency
psychological consultants, as both are generally consistent with the residual functional
capacity found above, as well as the treatment records in evidence.” But the ALJ did not
identify the State agency psychological consultants, the substance of their opinions, the
explanations supporting their opinions, or whether their opinions contradicted those of
Drs. Houlihan, Kahane, and Geary. Moreover, both opinions gave “great weight” to Dr.
Geary’s opinion, which the ALJ rejected.
Since the State agency psychological consultants were the only sources to which
the ALJ gave any weight at all, their opinions and “the limited treatment record” were the
only evidence the ALJ acknowledged considering to determine Plaintiff’s residual
significant weight because they were consistent with the ALJ’s residual functional
Yet the ALJ gave the non-examining consultants’ opinions
Thus, the ALJ’s explanation of her weighing of medical source evidence makes it
impossible to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, but it is plainly
not free from legal error.
in Social Security cases.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). Further, the claimant is not required to
produce objective medical evidence of the symptom or its severity. Id. at 1014.
The ALJ stated that Plaintiff testified she stopped working because she could not
control her panic attacks and that the attacks were exacerbated by unexpected changes
throughout the day, including the on-call nature of her last position. The ALJ also stated
that Plaintiff testified she has frequent, daily headaches, which her doctor opined likely
were caused by stress and anxiety. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff testified she takes Xanax
to relieve her symptoms of panic and anxiety, but it makes her sleepy and unable to
But the ALJ did not find Plaintiff to be malingering. The ALJ stated she found
Plaintiff’s statements not credible because she was not hospitalized for her anxiety, she
sought sporadic treatment for her panic symptoms at the emergency room, her primary
care provider did not refer her for a psychiatric evaluation until months after her alleged
date of disability, she missed some of her therapy appointments, and some panic attacks
were triggered by “increased life stressors.” The ALJ also noted some inconsistencies in
Plaintiff’s testimony, such as alternate explanations for why she had not participated in
treatment and whether or not she ever spends time alone, which may not be inconsistent
if Plaintiff was referring to different time periods.
The ALJ found “a number of non-medical related issues further impugn her
limited credibility in this matter.” First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had applied for and
received unemployment benefits, which ended in April 2010 and does not disqualify
Plaintiff from receiving Social Security disability benefits. Second, the ALJ observed
that on several occasions Plaintiff reported she had stopped using methamphetamines
about 2000 and at other times she said she stopped around 2003 or 2004. In 2010, she
reported that her children were dysfunctional, her daughter smoked marijuana daily, and
she had tried to get Plaintiff to use marijuana to calm her anxiety.
The ALJ may have had specific, clear, and convincing reasons for finding that
Plaintiff exaggerated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. In
passing, the ALJ notes that Plaintiff’s “testimony regarding lying down ‘all day,’ having
panic attacks ‘all day,’ and becoming angry ‘all day’ is extreme and simply impossible.”
Defendant has identified record evidence contradicting this testimony, but the ALJ did
not. The ALJ said only that she found Plaintiff’s statements not credible to the extent
they were inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment—not that they
were inconsistent with other evidence of record. Further, the ALJ did not identify which
statements she found not credible. As with weighing medical source evidence, the ALJ’s
rambling explanation of her credibility determination is not free from legal error and fails
to show that it is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ Erred in Weighing a Third-Party Function Report.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed legal error by giving little weight to a
third-party report by Plaintiff’s father, Albert Mendez. When an ALJ discounts the
testimony of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.
Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 574 F.3d 685, 693-94 (9th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ said she gave only partial weight to Mr. Mendez’s statements “because
of their inconsistency with the objective medical record” and because “it is also likely
that his statements are biased given his close relationship with the claimant.” Social
Security Regulations identify parents as among the non-medical sources whose
statements may show the severity of a claimant’s impairment and how it affects the
claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(4). It would render the regulation
meaningless if every parent’s opinion was discounted merely because it is likely to be
The ALJ may discount Mr. Mendez’s statements because of their inconsistency
with the objective medical record, but must give reasons germane to Mr. Mendez. At the
very least, the ALJ must identify which of Mr. Mendez’s statements are inconsistent with
other evidence of record and therefore were not given any weight.
The ALJ Failed to Obtain Reliable Vocational Information.
At step five, after determining that Plaintiff’s disabilities prevent her from doing
her past relevant work, the ALJ was required to decide whether Plaintiff’s impairments
prevent her from performing other work that exists in the national economy, considering
her residual functional capacity together with the “vocational factors” of age, education,
and work experience. Social Security Policy Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p (12/4/00). Work is
considered as existing in the national economy when both (1) its requirements can be met
by the claimant with his or her physical or mental abilities and vocational qualifications,
and (2) it exists in significant numbers either in the region where the claimant lives or in
several other regions of the country. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(a), (b).
The Commissioner will take administrative notice of reliable job information from
various governmental and other publications, but relies primarily on the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”), published by the Department of Labor and its companion
publication, the Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Revised
Commissioner also may use the services of a vocational expert or other specialist to
determine whether a claimant’s work skills can be used in other work and the specific
occupations in which they can be used. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). “An ALJ may take
administrative notice of any reliable job information, including information provided by a
[vocational expert].” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d); SSR 00-4p.
An ALJ may not rely on a vocational expert’s testimony regarding the
requirements of a particular job without first inquiring whether the testimony conflicts
with the DOT. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007). When a
vocational expert provides evidence about the requirements of a job, the ALJ “has an
affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict” between the expert evidence
and information provided in the DOT. SSR 00-4p. When there is an apparent conflict
between occupational evidence provided by a vocational expert and the DOT, the ALJ
“must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the [vocational
expert] evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is
disabled.” Id. Neither source of evidence “automatically ‘trumps’ when there is a
conflict.” Id. The ALJ must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation given
by the vocational expert is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the vocational
expert’s testimony rather than on the DOT.
occupational information not listed in the DOT. Id.
A vocational expert may have
During the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert questions about a
hypothetical individual who “is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; tasks
involving only occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors; and
she needs to be employed in a low-stress job, and by that I mean a job with few, if any,
simple decisions made; only occasional changes in the work setting; and no fast-paced
assembly line work.” (Tr. 21, Doc. 12-3 at 57.) The vocational expert opined that such
an individual could not perform Plaintiff’s past work because stocking shelves at Wal-
Mart is semiskilled work, the fast food worker job requires constant public contact, and
“there’s quite a bit of stress in those jobs.” (Tr. 22, Doc. 12-3 at 58.) He further opined
that such an individual could perform jobs such as “kitchen helper” (DOT #318.687-010),
“cook helper” (DOT #317.687-010), and “maids/housecleaners” (DOT #323.687-014).
The ALJ erred by failing to ask whether the vocational expert’s opinion conflicted
with the DOT and, if so, whether there was an explanation for the conflict. Instead, the
ALJ wrote in her decision that she:
has determined that the vocational expert’s testimony is consistent with the
information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles with respect
to all issues. However, it is noted that his testimony regarding the issues of
“off task” and “absenteeism” are not addressed by the DOT but are instead
based upon his vast knowledge, expertise, and years of experience in the
field of vocational rehabilitation.
(Doc. 12-3 at 27.) The ALJ did not explain how she had determined that the vocational
expert’s testimony was consistent with the DOT “with respect to all issues.” The ALJ’s
determination may be supported by substantial evidence, but the ALJ did not disclose
The ALJ also stated that “the vocational expert opined (numerous times) that each
of these representative occupations were ‘low stress’ and do not contain the fast-paced
requirements common with fast food type work.”
admittedly did not have knowledge or experience to render these opinions. When asked
whether he considered the representative jobs to be “low-stress and not high, fast-paced,”
the vocational expert responded that being a kitchen helper is different from a fast-food
job because “that’s a completely different work environment.” (Id.) When probed
further, the vocational expert testified, “You know, to be honest, I don’t—I can’t answer
that question honestly because I’ve never observed people doing this kind of work.” (Id.
at 63.) He also stated that he had never observed people doing the cook helper job either.
(Id.) He reasoned that these jobs would be “low-stress and not high, fast-paced” only
because they were simple, routine, and repetitive and involved minimal contact with
supervisors and coworkers. (Id.) When asked about the hotel maid job, the vocational
expert testified that over many years of staying in hotels, he had “run into the maids a
handful of times,” and he believed that the job was simple, routine, and repetitive. (Id. at
64.) He provided no basis for his assumption that simple, routine, and repetitive tasks are
But the vocational expert
necessarily low-stress and not fast-paced. The expert had no occupational information
from outside the DOT, other than running into hotel maids a few times, that supported
finding that “kitchen helper,” “cook helper,” and “maids/housecleaners” jobs are “low-
stress and not high, fast-paced.”
The DOT describes “kitchen helper” (DOT #318.687-010), “cook helper” (DOT
#317.687-010), and “maids/housecleaners” (DOT #323.687-014) as continuously
performing repetitive or short-cycle work and involving a combination of duties. It does
not offer any basis for finding these jobs to be “low stress” and “not fast-paced,” much
less as involving no more than a few simple decisions, only occasional changes in the
work setting, and only occasional interaction with supervisors.
The ALJ committed legal error by failing to obtain reliable job information
required to decide whether Plaintiff’s impairments prevent her from performing other
work that exists in the national economy, considering her residual functional capacity,
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292).
To remand for immediate award of benefits, the Court must find:
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Here, the record is not fully developed regarding Plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity and whether jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff can perform. Therefore, the case will be remanded for further