Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/947/682/153995/
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 04:58:58
Document Index: 185876991

Matched Legal Cases: ['art:\n16', '§ 1333', '§ 78', '§ 301', 'art:\n23', '§ 3209', '§ 6', '§ 1925', '§ 3209', '§ 3209', '§ 3214']

947 F.2d 682: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,reproductive Health and Counseling Center Women's Healthservices, Inc., Women's Suburban Clinic, Allentown Women'scenter, Northeast Women's Center, Allen, Thomas, M.d., Onbehalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Casey, Robert P., Richards, N. Mark, Preate, Ernest,personally and in Their Official Capacities, and Marino,michael D., Personally and in His Official Capacity,together with All Others Similarly Situated.robert P. Casey, N. Mark Richards and Ernest D. Preate, Jr.,appellants :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
Justia > US Law > US Case Law > US Federal Case Law > US Courts of Appeals Cases > F.2d > Volume 947 > 947 F.2d 682 - Planned Parenthood of Southeastern ...	NEW - Receive Justia's FREE Daily Newsletters of Opinion Summaries for the US Supreme Court, all US Federal Appellate Courts & the 50 US State Supreme Courts and Weekly Practice Area Opinion Summaries Newsletters. Subscribe Now
947 F.2d 682: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania,reproductive Health and Counseling Center Women's Healthservices, Inc., Women's Suburban Clinic, Allentown Women'scenter, Northeast Women's Center, Allen, Thomas, M.d., Onbehalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Casey, Robert P., Richards, N. Mark, Preate, Ernest,personally and in Their Official Capacities, and Marino,michael D., Personally and in His Official Capacity,together with All Others Similarly Situated.robert P. Casey, N. Mark Richards and Ernest D. Preate, Jr.,appellantsUnited States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. - 947 F.2d 682
Argued Feb. 25, 1991.Decided Oct. 21, 1991
1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. xiv. Though the Due Process Clause, read literally, is a guarantee only of fair procedures when the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, the Supreme Court has held under the "substantive due process" doctrine that there is more to the Due Process Clause than this guarantee of procedural fairness. Government interference with personal rights within the scope of the life, liberty, or property umbrella of the Due Process Clauses must be justified by a legitimate state interest; government interference with a "fundamental right" may be justified only by the most important of state interests
2 The Roe dissenters argued that only those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are fundamental rights and that the right to an abortion does not meet that standard. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 174, 93 S.Ct. at 737 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 793, 106 S.Ct. at 2196 (White, J., dissenting). The Roe majority stated that there is a fundamental right to privacy. This right includes "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972)
3 In the abortion context, the pedigree of the undue burden standard can be traced to Justice Powell's opinion for the majority in Maher v. Roe, a government funding case:
4 As we read Justice O'Connor's explications of the concept of "undue burden," they are all consistent with the view that the right to elect not to carry to term is a constitutional right of each individual woman. Where it is clear that a governmental regulation will restrict the ability of some women to choose an abortion, we believe the issue of whether there is an undue burden turns on the degree of restriction that the affected women will experience. Accordingly, whether the adversely affected group is but a small fraction of the universe of pregnant women desiring an abortion seems to us irrelevant to that issue
5 For almost every constitutional provision in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has adopted a standard or test, usually known afterwards by the name of the case adopting it, to flesh out the constitutional language and guide future resolution of cases that arise under those provisions. A brief and inexhaustive list includes: Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), for the Establishment Clause; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), for libel; Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), for Free Exercise claims; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969), for threatening speech; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), for First Amendment expressive conduct; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), for drug testing; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989), for state affirmative action; Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990) for federal affirmative action; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), for procedural due process; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and now Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), for double jeopardy
6 The lower courts in constitutional matters universally follow both the Supreme Court's choice of legal standard and the specific results the Court has reached by applying that legal standard. See, e.g., Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 714-18 (4th Cir.1991) (applying New York Times actual malice standard in defamation case); Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education, 925 F.2d 927, 931-34 (6th Cir.1991) (applying Smith Free Exercise Clause standard); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1109-1112 (3d Cir.1990) (applying Grady v. Corbin double jeopardy test); United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (3d Cir.1990) (applying Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, test for adequacy of Miranda warnings); United States v. American Investors of Pittsburgh, Inc., 879 F.2d 1087, 1106-07 (3d Cir.1989) (applying Leon standard for defective search warrants)
7 When six or more Justices join in the judgment and they issue three or more opinions, the situation is slightly more complex. In those cases, the idea is to locate the opinion of the Justice or Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majority. In other words, a lower court should not follow an opinion that, though part of the majority in that case, was unnecessary to secure a five-Justice majority. Thus, if three Justices issue the broadest opinion, two Justices concur on narrower grounds, and one Justice concurs on still-narrower grounds, the two-Justice opinion is binding because that was the narrowest of the opinions necessary to secure a majority
8 In rare cases, no common denominator exists beyond agreement on the result in that particular case. See United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1990) (finding no common denominator and thus no binding opinion in Baldasar v. United States, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980)); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1983) (same)
9 Four Justices dissented over the interpretation of the Missouri statute. The dissenters agreed, however, that the statute as interpreted by the majority survived strict scrutiny review. Thus, all nine members of the Court concluded that the statute as interpreted by the majority was constitutional, but for four different reasons. In any event, five Justices rejected strict scrutiny, and the narrowest opinion of those five Justices was that of Justice O'Connor
10 Although Justice O'Connor's discussion in Webster did not end with her analysis under the undue burden standard, it did rely on and adhere to her undue burden approach for abortion regulations. Interpreting Justice O'Connor's opinion as agreeing with the Akron strict scrutiny standard for reviewing all abortion regulations would not only be inconsistent with that portion of her opinion that we have quoted in the text, but would also be plainly incompatible with her consistent approach in cases before and after Webster: that the undue burden approach is the proper analysis for review of abortion regulations
11 We say variation because the Court in Brown actually seemed to rest its decision on the context--schools--rather than a blanket principle about the Equal Protection Clause. For our example here, we will assume that the latter had occurred
12 While results reached under a discarded standard are no longer binding, that does not mean that the old results are necessarily wrong; it simply means that the fact patterns producing those results must be analyzed under the new standard. That is why, though we conclude that the strict scrutiny standard applied in Akron and Thornburgh is no longer governing and the results no longer binding, the provisions held unconstitutional there are not necessarily constitutional; we must instead analyze the provisions under the newly minted undue burden standard
13 We are of course mindful that only the Supreme Court "may overrule one of its precedents." Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K. Rand Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). The Court rejected anticipatory overruling in Rodriguez. A lower court may not disregard a result reached under a controlling standard, even when that result is inconsistent with other results reached under the same standard. Similarly, a lower court may not reject a governing standard unless a majority of the Justices in a single case declines to apply it. Thus, while a regulation must constitute an undue burden to trigger strict scrutiny, the trimester framework is still binding when strict scrutiny is triggered. Although five sitting Justices of the Supreme Court have criticized or rejected the Roe trimester framework, they have not rejected it in a single case. Cf. Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F.Supp. 930 (E.D.La.1991) (invalidating criminal prohibition on abortion)
14 We have held that the undue burden standard adopted by Justice O'Connor in Webster and Hodgson is the binding standard. The definition of that standard--"absolute obstacle or severe limitation"--used by Justice O'Connor in those cases is binding, as is her application of that standard to the viability testing provision and two-parent notification provision. However, her application of that standard in past dissents--the results she would have reached in those cases--is not binding on us. Nonetheless, we will often refer to her application of the undue burden standard in past dissents as evidence (though not conclusive) of how the undue burden standard might apply here. As we stated earlier, lower courts cannot read the tea leaves in overruling precedent, but lower courts can do so with respect to open issues or new areas; and that, in effect, is what we confront here, since for most of the provisions involved in this case, the Court has never applied the undue burden standard
15 Section 3205 of the Act states in relevant part:
16 The district court stressed that a woman who has decided upon an abortion has no need to know about the risk of carrying to term. This misses what we perceive to be the relevant point. The state may rationally require that a woman not move forward on a decision to abort without evaluating that decision on an informed basis
17 Section 3205(a)(3) requires that a copy of these printed materials be available if the woman chooses to see them
18 The clinics' reliance on Riley v. National Federation for the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988), is misplaced. The Court there distinguished its case, which did not involve commercial speech, from other cases, and stated that "[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements." Id. at 796 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. at 2675 n. 9
19 The disclosure required by the Pennsylvania Act is similar to a long list of regulations by state and federal governments designed to protect the public. For example, the federal government requires warnings on all cigarette packages, advertisements, and billboards. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). Federal law requires disclosure in the context of securities transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Pennsylvania requires financial institutions to disclose rates, terms, definitions, and other information in residential mortgage applications. 41 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 301(e) (Supp.1991)
20 In Akron, the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio statute that required a 24-hour delay so that the "woman's decision [would] be informed." 462 U.S. at 450, 103 S.Ct. at 2503. The Court reached this result applying strict scrutiny, however, and as we have explained, we are not bound by the result in Akron if, as we conclude, the Commonwealth's 24-hour waiting period imposes no undue burden. While Justices Stevens and O'Connor in Hodgson viewed Akron's 24-hour waiting period for an adult as less justified by the state's interest than a 48-hour waiting period for a minor after notification of a parent, 110 S.Ct. at 2944 n. 35, nothing said in Hodgson suggests to us that the Commonwealth's 24-hour waiting period is an undue burden. As Justice O'Connor stressed in Hodgson, the Court has consistently viewed judicial bypass provisions as a means of avoiding an undue burden and, it necessarily follows that the time required to pursue such a bypass cannot constitute one. That time varies depending on the statute involved, but necessarily involves at least several days. The judicial bypass approved in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 477 n. 4, 491 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 2519 n. 4, 2525 n. 16, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983), could require 17 calendar days; the bypass approved in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 2980-81, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990), could require 14 days
21 The Court in Akron in striking down a similar 24-hour waiting period occasionally used language similar to that of rational basis review in considering the relationship between a waiting period and maternal health. However, we believe that the Court's level of review in Akron for all abortion regulations was strict scrutiny. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 428-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2491-93 (outlining Roe standard); Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2952 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Akron in stating, "we have subjected state laws limiting that right to the most exacting scrutiny, requiring a State to show that such a law is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest")
22 Section 3206 of the Act provides in part:
23 The district court held that the requirement of "informed" parental consent would necessitate in-person parental consent. We need not decide whether that is correct, for any burden caused by one-parent, in-person consent is surely no more than that caused by two-parent consent, cf. Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2970; and the Supreme Court has held that a judicial bypass option alleviates the undue burden caused by two-parent consent requirements
24 Section 3209 of the Act states:
25 Judge Alito disagrees with our interpretation of Justice O'Connor's application of the undue burden standard in Hodgson. We agree with Judge Alito that Part I of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hodgson is ambiguous; however, Part II clarifies her reasoning. As we noted above, Justice O'Connor in Part II of her opinion in Hodgson explained that the Court often had approved parental consent and notice provisions that contained a bypass option because a bypass option tailors a consent or notice statute "so as to avoid unduly burdening" the abortion right. Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor thus found constitutional the Minnesota statute that contained the bypass option. If a bypass procedure renders a parental notice provision constitutional because it alleviates the undue burden of the notice requirement, we think it follows that a parental notice requirement without the bypass option constitutes an undue burden
26 The district court's list of situations in which spousal notification is likely to cause dire consequences for the women include, inter alia: women who reasonably fear retaliatory psychological abuse; women who reasonably fear retaliatory physical or psychological abuse of their children; women who are separated following a failed marriage relationship and for whom renewal of contact may produce severe emotional distress; women whose husbands have serious health problems and who reasonably fear that notification will be health threatening; and women whose marriages are severely troubled and who reasonably fear that notice will precipitate the demise of the marital relationship. 744 F.Supp. at 1386 n. 42
27 Our conclusion that § 3209 is unconstitutional does not prevent the Commonwealth from putting into effect the rest of the Act's provisions. The Act contains a broad severability provision. "The provisions of this act are severable. If any word, phrase or provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect any other word, phrase or provision or application of this act which can be given effect without the invalid word, phrase, provision or application." Act of November 17, 1989, 1989 Pa.Laws 592, No. 64, § 6. In addition, Pennsylvania has a general severability statute. 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1925 (Supp.1991). Severability is a question of state law. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1509, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). Because the remainder of the Act may be given effect without § 3209, we conclude that § 3209 may be severed from the Act in accordance with Pennsylvania law
28 The relevant text of § 3214 provides:
29 The Court in Thornburgh struck down similar reporting requirements because they were not confidential, 476 U.S. at 765-68, 106 S.Ct. at 2181-83; in that case, the report could unduly burden the abortion right by making public both information about the women who obtain abortions and information about the doctors who perform them
30 Section 3207(b) provides:
31 Section 3214(f) provides:
32 The Supreme Court's abortion funding cases exemplify the second major element of an unconstitutional conditions case: the state may fund activities as it pleases, may refuse to fund other activities, and may prevent recipients of government funds from using those funds in ways the government does not permit; however, the government may not restrict a recipient of government funds from constitutionally-protected activities it chooses to perform with its own or private funds. See Rust v. Sullivan, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991)