Source: http://taiwankey.net/dc/axoverv6.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 14:18:45
Document Index: 697236650

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art. 47', 'art. 6', 'art. 23', 'art. 53', 'art. 13', 'art. 5', 'art. 49', 'art. 59', 'art. 23', 'art. 51', 'art. 23', 'art. 52']

In relation to the military occupation of a particular area, we are faced with three central questions, (which all must be answered based on the customary laws of warfare):
When does the military occupation begin?
In order to sort out the answers to these questions, we have to do a thorough overview the customary laws regarding military occupation. Surprisingly, even a thorough overview of the Hague and Geneva Conventions fails to uncover any sort of exacting and precise methodology for determining the answers to these questions.
We can do a brief overview of what information is available.
In the HR, we can look at SECTION III: MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE HOSTILE STATE
This HR 42 is quoted in US Army Field Manual, FM 27-10, para. 351, as being the definition of "military occupation," as well as being some sort of gauge for marking the point in time when the military occupation begins.
In regard to when the military occupation ends, in the GC we can look at Part 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
This GC 6 is also quoted in FM 27-10, para. 361.
Is this a good definition? Merely looking at the situation of Northern Cyprus, which came under military occupation by Turkish troops in 1974, and continues under military occupation even up to the present day, clearly shows that this GC 6 type of definition is not helpful in clearly defining the facts of the matter. Notably, Northern Cyprus declared its independence in 1984 under the name of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Is that valid or not? Certainly, the specifications of GC 6 are not helpful in sorting out the details of the matter. (At the present time, there is only one country in the world that recognizes the legitimacy of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," and that is Turkey.)
After reviewing a large number of military occupation situations in the modern era, and with particular attention to territorial cession issues, numerous essays and commentaries by Hartzell & Lin provide the necessary points of reference to clarify the answers to the above mentioned three questions. In addition, these essays and commentaries provide valuable information in regard to what is going on (legally speaking) during the period of military occupation, and how the peace treaty specifications must be understood in regard to the disposition of the territory.
Nevertheless, our particular concern at the present moment is Taiwan (aka "Formosa and the Pescadores"). In relation to the military occupation of Taiwan after the close of fighting in WWII in the Pacific, we are faced with three central questions:
When did the military occupation of Taiwan begin?
Who is "the occupying power," as spoken of in the customary laws of warfare?
When did the military occupation of Taiwan end?
We can answer these questions fairly straightforwardly as follows:
The beginning of military occupation in Taiwan can conveniently be designated as the date on which the Japanese troops surrendered. That date was Oct. 25, 1945.
The occupying power is the United States.
The military occupation of Taiwan has not yet ended.
The following paragraphs of FM 27-10 are of reference in understanding the true nature of military occupation:
Paragraph 351 has already been discussed above.
353. Subjugation or Conquest Distinguished
Here is paragraph 353 rewritten for the Taiwan status.
Belligerent occupation in a foreign war, being based upon the possession of enemy territory (Taiwan as Japanese territory under belligerent occupation during the period of 1945-52), necessarily implies that the sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying power (USMG of metropolitan Japan and USMG of the Japanese dependency of Taiwan). Occupation is essentially provisional.
On the other hand, subjugation or conquest (international law principle of conquest which is confirmed by peace treaty) implies a transfer of sovereignty, which generally takes the form of annexation and is normally effected by a treaty of peace (SFPT effects the full transfer of plenum dominium). When sovereignty passes (peace treaty cession for territory acquired under the legal principle of conquest), belligerent occupation (US military occupation of enemy territory), as such, of course ceases, although the (SFPT-ceded Taiwan) territory may and usually does, for an (interim but indefinite) period at least, continue to be governed through military agencies (USMG in SFPT).
If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the enemy, military government may be established in the area as a provisional and interim measure (see para. 12 b & c). A civil affairs agreement should, however, be concluded with the lawful government at the earliest possible opportunity.
Here is paragraph 354 rewritten for the Taiwan status.
Civil affairs administration is that form of administration established in friendly territory (after peace treaty conversion from enemy territory via full transfer of plenum dominium in SFPT) whereby a foreign government (US Military Government tentatively disclaiming but not officially relinquishing any plenum dominium) pursuant to a (Shanghai Communique as an executive) agreement, expressed or implied, with the (PRC) government of the (Taiwan) area concerned, may (allow the the ROC administrative authorities (aka "Chinese rebels") on Taiwan to) exercise certain (SFPT administrative) authority normally the function of the local government.
Such administration is often established in (Taiwan) areas which are freed from enemy (sovereignty and/or) occupation (by SFPT cession from Japan). It is normally required when the (PRC) government of the (Taiwan) area concerned is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for its (SFPT) administration (until a final political status can be achieved). (Taiwan) Territory subject to civil affairs administration (of US Military Government) is not considered to be (belligerently) occupied. (After treaty cession, it is friendly territory and not a legal condition of belligerent occupation of enemy territory).
If circumstances have precluded the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement with the lawful government of allied territory recovered from enemy occupation or of other territory liberated from the (Japanese) enemy, (US/ROC) military government may be established in the (Taiwan) area as a provisional and interim measure (see para. 12 b & c). A (Shanghai Communique and a PRC-ROC bilateral) civil affairs agreement should, however, be concluded with the (intended) (PRC) lawful government at the earliest possible opportunity.
It is therefore unlawful for a belligerent occupant to annex occupied territory or to create a new State therein while hostilities are still in progress. (See GC, art. 47; para. 365 herein.)
The law of belligerent occupation generally ceases to be applicable under the conditions set forth in paragraphs 353 and 360. However, with respect to the provisions of GC alone, Article 6 of that Convention provides:
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention; 1-12, 27, 29-34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61-77, 143.
Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention. (GC, art. 6, 3d and 4th pars.)
Comments on paragraph 366 in relation to the Taiwan status issue
1. In the Treaty of Paris after the Spanish American War, Spain ceded the sovereignty of Cuba, but it was not given to any other country. The United States was the (principal) occupying power. Hence, as summarized above, the situation of Cuba after the Spanish American War provides good comparative analysis for Taiwan.
1b. Article 1 of the treaty provided that: "Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is upon the evacuation by Spain to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, and for the protection of life and property."
2. In their concurring opinion in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Justices White, Shiras, and McKenna stated:
It cannot, it is submitted, be questioned that, under this provision of the treaty, as long as the occupation of the United States lasts, the benign sovereignty of the United States extends over and dominates the island of Cuba.... Considering the provisions of this treaty, and reviewing the pledges of this government extraneous to that instrument, by which the sovereignty of Cuba is to be held by the United States for the benefit of the people of Cuba and for their account, to be relinquished to them when the conditions justify its accomplishment, this court unanimously held in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, ante, 302, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302, that Cuba was not incorporated into the United States, and was a foreign country.
So long as Congress has not incorporated the territory into the United States, neither military occupation nor cession by treaty makes the conquered territory domestic territory, in the sense of the revenue laws; but those laws concerning 'foreign countries' remain applicable to the conquered territory until changed by Congress. Such was the unanimous opinion of this Court, as declared by Chief Justice Taney in Fleming v. Page, (1850).
3. In a similar situation to Cuba after April 11, 1899, Taiwan is "foreign territory under the dominion of the United States." The Taiwan Relations Act does not treat Taiwan as a sovereign independent nation, but rather as a "sub-sovereign foreign state equivalent." The TRA contains a "foreign state equivalency" clause.
Fiduciary Relationships as discussed in President McKinley's 3rd Annual Message, (Dec. 5, 1899)
Note: Two facts must be remembered -- (1) the United States was not opposed to Cuban independence, (2) the United States did indeed exercise sovereignty over Cuba from the date of the surrender of Spanish troops in Cuba (July 17, 1898), past the date when the Treaty of Paris came into effect (April 11, 1899), up until the end of USMG and the proclamation of the Republic of Cuba on May 20, 1902.
The concept of occupied territory being held in trust is further clarified on page 44 of Military Government and Martial Law by William E. Birkhimer, 3rd edition (1914), Chapter VI "Effect of Occupation on Local Administration," Section 63 "Instance occupation of Cuba" --
Also see Section 74 on page 49, which discusses the case of Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) --
After years of agitation and demands by indigenous governments, some changes have been realized in this relationship, resulting in relatively greater control of decisions on Indian reservations. Nevertheless, the federal government continues to insist that it, and not native peoples, is the ultimate arbiter of the degree of sovereignty exercised by indigenous nations. The importance of the exercise of U.S. control in India affairs becomes increasingly clear when one understands the considerable natural resource reserves found within the territories of indigenous nations -- many of which are considered strategic by the United States. In this respect, native peoples of the U.S. experience similar economic invasions and controls as other indigenous peoples -- be they the Yanomamis of Brazil, the Crees of Alberta, or the Penans of Sarawak. States consistently claim that it is their prerogative to exploit indigenous natural resources for the "national security," and such matters are purely domestic in nature, beyond the scope of international scrutiny or rebuke.
What makes the economic condition of indigenous peoples in the U.S. somewhat unique is the judicially-created "trust relationship" that requires the U.S. to hold native lands and resources for the benefit of indigenous nations. ..... [S]ome legally enforceable rights for indigenous peoples do exist if the U.S. breaches its fiduciary obligation to them. Even more interesting is the fact that the United States is a fiduciary under two trust obligations: one to the indigenous people it has colonized and how now live within territory claimed by the U.S., and one to the peoples of the Pacific Trust Territory, whose territories were placed in trust by the United Nations, with the U.S. as trustee. A significant difference between these two trust arrangements is that the peoples of the Pacific Trust Territory did possess the absolute right to exercise self-determination when and if they choose to do so. No such right currently exists under international law for indigenous nations within the U.S., and the main difference in the attachment of international rights and status has to do with geographical separation from the colonizing power.
Fiduciary Relationships, (Part E)
Fiduciary Relationships and the Situation of Kosovo (which are relevant to a discussion of Taiwan):
The basic concept of trustee-occupant in international law dovetails nicely with the powers of a trustee under the common law and under civil law analogies.
Within this analytical framework, Kosovo itself -- or the property comprising Kosovo -- is the res that the United Nations holds in trust. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to UN Security Resolution 1244 is akin to placing Kosovo in trust voluntarily. A trustee has the power to transfer trust property, even when a transfer cuts off reversionary interests, as long as the trustee exercises the power consistently with the terms of the trust and its purpose.
The United Nations, as trustee, has fiduciary duties to the beneficiary -- the peoples of Kosovo.
Under trust law, it is not necessary that the beneficiary be known at the creation of the trust.
The beneficiary must be ascertainable when the trust is created, but that includes a beneficiary who is not yet ascertained or in existence at the time the trust is created.
The identity of the beneficiary/reversioner is an open question accompanied by a duty in the trustee to resolve the question, much like when a court holds property in trust until it can determine the property's rightful owner.
Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure [299 U.S. 304, 317] without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense.
-- quoted from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) http://laws.findlaw.com/us/299/304.html
Note: There is much discussion in Taiwan and in overseas Taiwanese communities in regard to the Montevideo Convention. In the view of many people, the ROC on Taiwan meets that Convention's criteria for statehood of (a) permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) government, and (d) the ability to conduct foreign relations. Hence, in their view, it is totally unreasonable to deny Taiwan a seat in the United Nations.
However, all of these armchair experts overlook that facts that Oct. 25, 1945 is only the beginning of the military occupation of Taiwan, and international law specifies that "Military occupation does not transfer sovereignty." The territorial title of "Formosa and the Pescadores" has never been transferred to the Republic of China or the Taiwan governing authorities. Therefore, at the most basic level, the ROC on Taiwan cannot be considered to have the ownership of "Formosa & the Pescadores" (aka Taiwan) because it is not in possession of the territorial title to these areas.
Importantly however, there is no doctrine under international law whereby the territorial title (or territorial sovereignty) of such a populated area as Taiwan can disappear. Hence, if the ROC or the Taiwan governing authorities do not have it, then some other government, somewhere in the world must have it. From the perpective of the laws of war, it can be maintained that the principal occupying power of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is currently holding Taiwan's territorial sovereignty.
Sovereignty is not a "plant" which may wither away to nothing and then be reborn. Sovereignty is always there. In other words, since two major components of sovereignty (a) permanent population and (b) defined territory are still present, Taiwan's sovereignty cannot have disappeared. Hence, the key issue for the Taiwanese people is to locate that sovereignty. If indeed this sovereignty is being held by USMG, then the Taiwanese people can demand their fundamental rights under the US Constitution.
See Taiwanese should seek US Constitutional rights
The Force of Treaties under US Law
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI) provides that treaties, no less than acts of Congress or the Constitution itself, are "the Supreme Law of the Land."
Regarding customary international law, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed nearly a century ago: "International law is part of our law."
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of eivilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 , 164 S., 214, 215, 40 L. ed. 95, 108, 125, 126, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139.
Wheaton places among the principal sourees international law 'text -- writers of authority, showing what is the approved usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual conduct, with the definitions and modifications introduced by general consent.' As to these he forcibly observes: 'Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers, or to substitute, in any case, their authority for the principles of reason, it may be affirmed that they are gen- [175 U.S. 677, 701] erally impartial in their judgment. They are witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight of their testimony increases every time that their authority is invoked by statesmen, and every year that passes without the rules laid down in their works being impugned by the avowal of contrary principles.' Wheaton, International Law ( 8th ed.), 15.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
For how courts decide whether a principle has become part of customary international law, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ?102(2), 103(2) (1986) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"]; Cynthia R.L. Fairweather, Obstacles to Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT' L L. & POL' Y 119, 124-27 (1998). For a list of norms considered to be customary international law, see RESTATEMENT, supra, 702.
See Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States
Additional References from FM 27-10
b. Allied territory recovered from enemy occupation, when that territory has not been made the subject of a civil affairs agreement (see para. 354).
A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the war. (HR, art. 23 (h), 2nd sentence)
The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. Devastation as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy's army. Thus the rule requiring respect for private property is not violated through damage resulting from operations, movements, or combat activity of the army; that is, real estate may be used for marches, camp sites, construction of field fortifications, etc. Buildings may be destroyed for sanitary purposes or used for shelter for troops, the wounded and sick and vehicles and for reconnaissance, cover, and defense. Fences, woods, crops, buildings, etc., may be demolished, cut down, and removed to clear a field of fire, to clear the ground for landing fields, or to furnish building materials or fuel if imperatively needed for the army. (See GC, art. 53; para. 393b; herein, concerning the permissible extent of destruction in occupied areas.)
b. Interpretation. Subject to qualifications set forth in para. 248, those protected by GC also include all persons who have engaged in hostile or belligerent conduct but who are not entitled to treatment as prisoners of war.
c. Wider Scope of Certain Articles. Part II, GC (sec. II of this chapter), has a broader scope than the rest of GC. (See GC, art. 13; para. 252 herein.)
In each case such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in ease of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be. (GC, art. 5.) (See also para. 73.)
c. Acts Punishable. The foregoing provisions impliedly recognize the power of a Party to the conflict to impose the death penalty and lesser punishments on spies, saboteurs, and other persons not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, except to the extent that that power has been limited or taken away by Article 68, GC (para. 438).
382. Deportations, Transfers, Evacuations
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. (GC, art. 49.)
A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the Occupying Power. (GC, art. 59.)
It is especially forbidden to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. (HR, art. 23 (g))
In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a mobilization of workers in an organization of a military or semi-military character. (GC, art. 51.) (See also HR, art. 23 (h), 2nd sentence, para. 32 herein.)
421. Protection of Workers
All measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restricting the opportunities offered to workers in an occupied territory; in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are prohibited. (GC, art. 52.)
HR: Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, 18 October 1907, embodying the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
GC: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949