Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104854/nlrb-vs-yeshiva-univ
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Nlrb Vs Yeshiva Univ - Citation 104854 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Nlrb Vs. Yeshiva Univ. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104854
Case Number 444 U.S. 672
Respondent Yeshiva Univ.
nlrb v. yeshiva univ. - 444 u.s. 672 (1980) u.s. supreme court nlrb v. yeshiva univ., 444 u.s. 672 (1980) national labor relations board v. yeshiva university no. 78-857 argued october 10, 1979 decided february 20, 1980 * 444 u.s. 672 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus yeshiva university faculty association (union) filed a representation petition with the national labor relations board (board), seeking certification as bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members of certain schools of yeshiva university, a private university. the university opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory personnel, and hence not.....
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ. - 444 U.S. 672 (1980)
U.S. Supreme Court NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980)
Held: The University's full-time faculty members are managerial employees excluded from the Act's coverage. Pp. 444 U. S. 679 -691.
(a) The authority structure of a university does not fit neatly into the statutory scheme, because authority in the typical "mature" private university is divided between a central administration and one or more collegial bodies. The absence of explicit congressional direction does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of employment, and the Board has approved the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty members on the ground that they are "professional employees" under § 2(12) of the Act. Nevertheless professionals may be exempted from coverage under the judicially implied exclusion for "managerial employees" when they are involved in developing and implementing employer policy. Pp. 444 U. S. 679 -682.
(b) Here, application of the managerial exclusion to the University's faculty members is not precluded on the theory that they are not aligned with management because they are expected to exercise "independent professional judgment" while participating in academic governance and to pursue professional values, rather than institutional interests. The controlling consideration is that the faculty exercises authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial, its authority in academic matters being absolute. The faculty's professional interests -- as applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva which depends on the professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply policies -- cannot be separated from those of the institution, and thus it cannot be said that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest, and does not represent the interest of his employer. Pp. 444 U. S. 682 -690.
(c) The deference ordinarily due the Board's expertise does not require reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision. This Court respects the Board's expertise when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act, but here the Board's decision satisfies neither criterion. P. 444 U. S. 691 .
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 691 .
Supervisors and managerial employees are excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. [ Footnote 1 ] The question presented is whether the full-time faculty of Yeshiva University fall within those exclusions.
schools. [ Footnote 2 ] The University opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory personnel, and hence not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). A Board-appointed hearing officer held hearings over a period of five months, generating a voluminous record.
University-wide policies are formulated by the central administration with the approval of the Board of Trustees, and include general guidelines dealing with teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and fringe benefits. The budget for each school is drafted by its Dean or Director, subject to approval by the President after consultation with a committee of administrators. [ Footnote 3 ] The faculty participate
The individual schools within the University are substantially autonomous. Each is headed by a Dean or Director, and faculty members at each school meet formally and informally to discuss and decide matters of institutional and professional concern. At four schools, formal meetings are convened regularly pursuant to written bylaws. The remaining faculties meet when convened by the Dean or Director. Most of the schools also have faculty committees concerned with special areas of educational policy. Faculty welfare committees negotiate with administrators concerning salary and conditions of employment. Through these meetings and committees, the faculty at each school effectively determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules. [ Footnote 4 ]
Faculty power at Yeshiva's schools extends beyond strictly academic concerns. The faculty at each school make recommendations to the Dean or Director in every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. Although the final decision is reached by the central administration on the advice of the Dean or Director, the overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are implemented. [ Footnote 5 ] Even when financial problems in the early 1970's restricted Yeshiva's budget, faculty recommendations still largely controlled personnel decisions made within the constraints imposed by the administration. Indeed, the faculty of one school recently drew up new and binding policies expanding their own role in these matters. In addition, some faculties make final decisions regarding the admission, expulsion, and graduation of individual students. Others have decided questions involving teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a school. [ Footnote 6 ]
A three-member panel of the Board granted the Union's petition in December 1975, and directed an election in a bargaining unit consisting of all full-time faculty members at the affected schools. 221 N.L.R.B. 1053. The unit included Assistant Deans, senior professors, and department chairmen, as well as associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors. [ Footnote 7 ] Deans and Directors were excluded. The Board summarily rejected the University's contention that its entire faculty are managerial, viewing the claim as a request for reconsideration of previous Board decisions on the issue. Instead of making findings of fact as to Yeshiva, the Board referred generally to the record and found no "significan[t]" difference between this faculty and others it had considered. The Board concluded that the faculty are professional employees entitled to the protection of the Act because
Id. at 1054 (footnote omitted). [ Footnote 8 ]
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 , 440 U. S. 504 -505 (1979). [ Footnote 9 ] Moreover, the authority structure of a university does not fit neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to interpret. The Board itself has noted that the concept of collegiality "does not square with the traditional authority structures with which th[e] Act was designed to cope in the typical organizations of the commercial world." Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972)
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. Ibid. In contrast, authority in the typical "mature" private university is divided between a central administration and one or more collegial bodies. See J. Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University 114 (1971). This system of "shared authority" evolved from the medieval model of collegial decisionmaking, in which guilds of scholars were responsible only to themselves. See N. Fehl, The Idea of a University in East and West 366 (1962); D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 164-168 (1962). At early universities, the faculty were the school. Although faculties have been subject to external control in the United States since colonial times, J. Brubacher & W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1976, pp. 25-30 (3d ed.1976), traditions of collegiality continue to play a significant role at many universities, including Yeshiva. [ Footnote 10 ] For these reasons, the Board has
The absence of explicit congressional direction, of course, does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of employment. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 , 322 U. S. 124 -131 (1944). Acting under its responsibility for adapting the broad provisions of the Act to differing workplaces, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a university for the first time in 1970. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Within a year, it had approved the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty members. C. W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971). [ Footnote 11 ] The Board reasoned that faculty members are "professional employees" within the meaning of § 2(12) of the Act, and therefore are entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. 189 N.L.R.B. at 905; 29 U.S.C. § 152(12). [ Footnote 12 ]
for "supervisors" who use independent judgment in overseeing other employees in the interest of the employer, [ Footnote 13 ] or under the judicially implied exclusion for "managerial employees" who are involved in developing and enforcing employer policy. [ Footnote 14 ] Both exemptions grow out of the same concern: that an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, 416 U. S. 653 , 416 U. S. 661 -662 (1974); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 , 416 U. S. 281 -282 (1974). Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to be managerial employees, it did not decide the question of their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with that court's application of the managerial exclusion, we also need not resolve that issue of statutory interpretation.
Managerial employees are defined as those who " formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.'" NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 416 U. S. 288 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323, n. 4 (1947)). These employees are "much higher in the managerial structure" than those explicitly mentioned by Congress, which "regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary." 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 283 .
Managerial employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management. See id. at 286-28 (citing cases). Although the Board has established no firm criteria for determining when an employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy. [ Footnote 15 ]
The Board does not contend that the Yeshiva faculty's decisionmaking is too insignificant to be deemed managerial. [ Footnote 16 ] Nor does it suggest that the role of the faculty is merely advisory, and thus not managerial. [ Footnote 17 ] Instead, it contends that the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees
This "independent professional judgment" test was not applied in the decision we are asked to uphold. The Board's opinion relies exclusively on its previous faculty decisions for both legal and factual analysis. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054. But those decisions only dimly foreshadow the reasoning now proffered to the Court. Without explanation, the Board initially announced two different rationales for faculty cases, [ Footnote 18 ]
then quickly transformed them into a litany to be repeated in case after case: (i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the faculty's own interest, rather than in the interest of the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of trustees. Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634 (1974); see Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 30 (1972). [ Footnote 19 ] In their arguments in this case, the Board's lawyers have abandoned the first and third branches of this analysis, [ Footnote 20 ] which in any event were flatly inconsistent with its precedents, [ Footnote 21 ] and have transformed the second into a theory that does not appear clearly in any Board opinion. [ Footnote 22 ]
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which, in any other context, unquestionably would be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion, their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served. [ Footnote 23 ]
propose in this case. [ Footnote 24 ] Outside the university context, the Board routinely has applied the managerial and supervisory exclusions to professionals in executive positions without inquiring whether their decisions were based on management policy, rather than professional expertise. [ Footnote 25 ] Indeed, the Board has twice implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on professional judgment cannot be managerial. [ Footnote 26 ] Since the Board does not suggest that the "independent professional judgment" test is to be limited to university faculty, its new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of Board precedent, and could result in the indiscriminate recharacteriation as covered employees of professionals working in supervisory and managerial capacities.
In such a university, the predominant policy normally is to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits of its financial resources. The "business" of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance decisions. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 23-24 (1978). Faculty members enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission by ensuring that the university's objectives are met. But there can be no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and institutional distinction is a "policy" to which the administration expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an employee is "expected to conform" to one goal or another when the two are essentially the same. [ Footnote 27 ] See NLRB v. Scott Paper Co.,
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a university like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only by necessarily general institutional goals. The university requires faculty participation in governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic policy. [ Footnote 28 ] It may appear, as the Board contends, that the professor performing governance functions is less "accountable" for departures from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial manager whose discretion is more confined. Moreover, traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the professor from some of the sanctions applied to an industrial manager who fails to adhere to company policy. But the analogy of the university to industry need not, and indeed cannot, be complete. It is clear that Yeshiva and like universities must rely on their faculties to participate in the making and implementation of their policies. [ Footnote 29 ] The large measure of independence
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress' expressed intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. [ Footnote 30 ] Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with management. We think these decisions accurately capture the intent of Congress, and that they provide an appropriate starting point for analysis in cases involving professionals alleged to be managerial. [ Footnote 31 ]
Finally, the Board contends that the deference due its expertise in these matters requires us to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The question we decide today is a mixed one of fact and law. But the Board's opinion may be searched in vain for relevant findings of fact. The absence of factual analysis apparently reflects the Board's view that the managerial status of particular faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory rationales, rather than examination of the facts of each case. The Court of Appeals took a different view, and determined that the faculty of Yeshiva University, "in effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the enterprise." 582 F.2d at 698. We find no reason to reject this conclusion. As our decisions consistently show, we accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483 , 437 U. S. 501 (1978). In this case, we hold that the Board's decision satisfies neither criterion.
Identical language had been employed in at least two other Board decisions. See infra at 444 U. S. 684 -685. In this case, it was not supported by a single citation to the record. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent relies on this language, post at 444 U. S. 696 , and adds that a faculty's "primary concerns are academic, and relate solely to its own professional reputation," post at 444 U. S. 701 . The view that faculty governance authority "is exercised in the faculty's own interest," rather than that of the University, assumes a lack of responsibility that certainly is not reflected in this record.
See the inaugural address of Williams College President Paul Ansel Chadbourne, quoted in Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L.Rev. 63, 70, n. 16 (1973) (" Professors are sometimes spoken of as working for the college. They are the college'") (emphasis in original); Davis, Unions and Higher Education: Another View, 49 Ed. Record 139, 143 (1968) ("The president . . . is not the faculty's master. He is as much the faculty's administrator as he is the board [of trustees']"); n 4, supra.
E.g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, supra at 193; Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385-386 (1975) (on remand); General Dynamics Corp., supra at 857; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra at 416 U. S. 274 , 416 U. S. 286 -289.
We do not, of course, substitute counsel's post hoc rationale for the reasoning supplied by the Board itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 , 332 U. S. 196 (1947). Because the first and third branches of the Board's analysis are insupportable, the Board's only colorable theory is the "interest of the employer" branch. The argument presented to us is an expanded and considerably refined version of that notion.
The record shows that faculty members at Yeshiva also play a predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. See supra at 444 U. S. 677 , and n. 5. These decisions clearly have both managerial and supervisory characteristics. Since we do not reach the question of supervisory status, we need not rely primarily on these features of faculty authority.
See American Association for Higher Education, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance 22-24 (1967); Bornheimer, Burns, & Dumke, supra at 149-150; Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P.Bull. 120, 121 (1972). The extent to which Yeshiva faculty recommendations are implemented is no "mere coincidence," as MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN s dissent suggests. Post at 444 U. S. 701 . Rather, this is an inevitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by universities like Yeshiva.
The dissent concludes, citing several secondary authorities, that the modern university has undergone changes that have shifted "the task of operating the university enterprise" from faculty to administration. Post at 444 U. S. 703 . The shift, if it exists, is neither universal nor complete. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 27-28, 15 162, 164-165 (1978). In any event, our decision must be based on the record before us. Nor can we decide this case by weighing the probable benefits and burdens of faculty collective bargaining. See post at 444 U. S. 702 -705. That, after all, is a matter for Congress, not this Court.
entrusted to the Board, not to the judiciary. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251 , 420 U. S. 266 (1975). The Court has often admonished that
NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87 , 353 U. S. 96 (1957). Accord, Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483 , 437 U. S. 501 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221 , 373 U. S. 235 -236 (1963). Through its cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management relations in a variety of industrial and nonindustrial settings, it is the Board that has developed the expertise to determine whether coverage of a particular category of employees would further the objectives of the Act. [ Footnote 2/1 ] And through its continuous oversight of industrial conditions, it is the Board that is best able to formulate and adjust national labor policy to conform to the realities of industrial life. Accordingly, the judicial role is limited; a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. The Board's decision may be reviewed for its rationality and its consistency with the
Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order must be enforced. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, supra, at 437 U. S. 501 .
In any event, I believe the Board reached the correct result in determining that Yeshiva's full-time faculty is covered under the NLRA. The Court does not dispute that the faculty members are "professional employees" for the purposes of collective bargaining under § 2(12), but nevertheless finds them excluded from coverage under the implied exclusion for "managerial employees." [ Footnote 2/2 ] The Court explains that
Ante at 444 U. S. 686 . But the academic community is simply not "any other context." The Court purports to recognize that there are fundamental differences between the authority structures of the typical industrial and academic institutions which preclude the blind transplanting of principles developed in one arena onto the other; yet it nevertheless ignores those very differences in concluding that Yeshiva's faculty is excluded from the Act's coverage.
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d.1169, 1178 (CA2 1968). In addition, Congress wanted to ensure that employers would not be deprived of the undivided loyalty of their supervisory foremen. Congress was concerned that, if supervisors were allowed to affiliate with labor organizations that represented the rank and file, they might become accountable to the workers, thus interfering with the supervisors' ability to discipline and control the employees in the interest of the employer. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Identical considerations underlie the exclusion of managerial employees. See ante at 444 U. S. 682 . Although a variety of verbal formulations have received judicial approval over the years, see Retail Clerks International Assn. v. NLRB, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 63, 65-66, 366 F.2d 642, 644-645 (1966), this Court has recently sanctioned a definition of "managerial employee" that comprises those who " formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.'" See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 288 . The touchstone of managerial status is thus an alliance with management, and the pivotal inquiry is whether the employee, in performing his
duties represents his own interests or those of his employer. [ Footnote 2/4 ] If his actions are undertaken for the purpose of implementing the employer's policies, then he is accountable to management, and may be subject to conflicting; loyalties. But if the employee is acting only on his own behalf and in his own interest, he is covered under the Act, and is entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining.
After examining the voluminous record in this case, [ Footnote 2/5 ] the Board determined that the faculty at Yeshiva exercised its decisionmaking authority in its own interest, rather than "in the interest of the employer." 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (175). The Court, in contrast, can perceive "no justification for this distinction," and concludes that the faculty's interests "cannot be separated from those of the institution." Ante at 444 U. S. 688 . [ Footnote 2/6 ] But the Court's vision is clouded by its failure fully to discern and comprehend the nature of the faculty's role in university governance.
What the Board realized -- and what the Court fails to apprehend -- is that whatever influence the faculty wields in university decisionmaking is attributable solely to its collective expertise as professional educators, and not to any managerial or supervisory prerogatives. Although the administration may look to the faculty for advice on matters of professional and academic concern, the faculty offers its recommendations in order to serve its own independent interest in creating the most effective environment for learning, teaching, and scholarship. [ Footnote 2/7 ] And while the administration may attempt to defer to the faculty's competence whenever possible, it must and does apply its own distinct perspective to those recommendations, a perspective that is based on fiscal
and other managerial policies which the faculty has no part in developing. The University always retains the ultimate decisionmaking authority, see ante at 444 U. S. 675 -676, and the administration gives what weight and import to the faculty's collective judgment as it chooses and deems consistent with its own perception of the institution's needs and objectives. [ Footnote 2/8 ] The premise of a finding of managerial status is a determination that the excluded employee is acting on behalf of management and is answerable to a higher authority in the exercise of his responsibilities. The Board has consistently implemented this requirement -- both for professional and nonprofessional employees -- by conferring managerial status only upon those employees "whose interests are closely aligned with management as true representatives of management. " (Emphasis added.) E.g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); Bell Aerospace,
219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974). [ Footnote 2/9 ] Only if the employee is expected to conform to management policies and is judged by his effectiveness in executing those policies does the danger of divided loyalties exist.
Yeshiva's faculty, however, is not accountable to the administration in its governance function, nor is any individual faculty member subject to personal sanction or control based on the administration's assessment of the worth of his recommendations. When the faculty, through the schools' advisory committees, participates in university decisionmaking on subjects of academic policy, it does not serve as the "representative of management." [ Footnote 2/10 ] Unlike industrial supervisors
It is no answer to say, as does the Court, that Yeshiva's faculty and administration are one and the same because their interests tend to coincide. In the first place, the National Labor Relations Act does not condition its coverage on an antagonism of interests between the employer and the employee. [ Footnote 2/11 ]
academic standards and credits, departmental budgets, and even the faculty's choice of its own departmental representative. [ Footnote 2/12 ] The very fact that Yeshiva's faculty has voted for the Union to serve as its representative in future negotiations with the administration indicates that the faculty does not perceive its interests to be aligned with those of management. Indeed, on the precise topics which are specified as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining -- wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment [ Footnote 2/13 ] -- the interests of teacher and administrator are often diametrically opposed.
Finally, the Court's perception of the Yeshiva faculty's status is distorted by the rose-colored lens through which it views the governance structure of the modern-day university. The Court's conclusion that the faculty's professional interests are indistinguishable from those of the administration is bottomed on an idealized model of collegial decisionmaking that is a vestige of the great medieval university. But the university of today bears little resemblance to the "community of scholars" of yesteryear. [ Footnote 2/14 ] Education has become
"big business," and the task of operating the university enterprise has been transferred from the faculty to an autonomous administration, which faces the same pressures to cut costs and increase efficiencies that confront any large industrial organization. [ Footnote 2/15 ] The past decade of budgetary cutbacks, declining enrollments, reductions in faculty appointments, curtailment of academic programs, and increasing calls for accountability to alumni and other special interest groups has only added to the erosion of the faculty's role in the institution's decisionmaking process. [ Footnote 2/16 ]
These economic exigencies have also exacerbated the tensions in university labor relations, as the faculty and administration more and more frequently find themselves advocating conflicting positions not only on issues of compensation, job security, and working conditions, but even on subjects formerly thought to be the faculty's prerogative. In response to this friction, and in an attempt to avoid the strikes and work stoppages that have disrupted several major universities in recent years, many faculties have entered into collective bargaining relationships with their administrations and governing boards. [ Footnote 2/17 ] An even greater number of schools -- Yeshiva among them -- have endeavored to negotiate and compromise their differences informally, by establishing avenues for faculty input into university decisions on matters of professional concern.
Today's decision, however, threatens to eliminate much of the administration's incentive to resolve its disputes with the faculty through open discussion and mutual agreement. By its overbroad and unwarranted interpretation of the managerial exclusion, the Court denies the faculty the protections of the NLRA and, in so doing, removes whatever deterrent value the Act's availability may offer against unreasonable administrative conduct. [ Footnote 2/18 ] Rather than promoting the Act's objective of funneling dissension between employers and employees into collective bargaining, the Court's decision undermines that goal and contributes to the possibility that "recurring disputes [will] fester outside the negotiation process until strikes or other forms of economic warfare occur." Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 , 441 U. S. 499 (1979).
In sum, the Board analyzed both the essential purposes underlying the supervisory and managerial exclusions and the nature of the governance structure at Yeshiva University. Relying on three factors that attempt to encapsulate the fine distinction between those professional employees who are entitled to the NLRA's protections and those whose managerial responsibilities require their exclusion, [ Footnote 2/19 ] the Board concluded
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 , 322 U. S. 130 (1944). Accord, NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344 , 344 U. S. 349 (1953).
Because the Court concludes that Yeshiva's full-time faculty are managerial employees, it finds it unnecessary to reach the University's contention that the faculty are also excluded as "supervisors" under § 2(11). Ante at 444 U. S. 682 . My discussion therefore focuses on the question of the faculty's managerial status, but I would resolve the issue of their supervisory status in a similar fashion.
As the Board has recognized, due to the unique nature of their work, professional employees will often make recommendations on matters that are of great importance to management. But their desire to exert influence in these areas stems from the need to maintain their own professional standards, and this factor -- common to all professionals -- should not, by itself, preclude their inclusion in a bargaining unit. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337, 339-340 (1955). In fact, Congress clearly recognized both that professional employees consistently exercise independent judgment and discretion in the performance of their duties, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), and that they have a significant interest in maintaining certain professional standards, see S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1947). Yet Congress specifically included professionals within the Act's coverage. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 , 416 U. S. 298 (1974) (WHITE, J., dissenting in part).
Where faculty members actually do serve as management's representatives, the Board has not hesitated to exclude them from the Act's coverage as managerial or supervisory personnel. Compare University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976) (excluding department chairmen as supervisors), and University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974) (excluding deans as supervisors), with Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975) (department chairmen included within bargaining unit because they act primarily as instruments of the faculty), and Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971) (including department chairmen because they are considered to be representatives of the faculty, rather than of the administration). In fact, the bargaining unit approved by the Board in the present case excluded deans, acting deans, directors, and principal investigators of research and training grants, all of whom were deemed to exercise supervisory or managerial authority. See ante at 444 U. S. 678 , n. 7.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, see ante at 444 U. S. 685 , the Board has not abandoned the "collective authority" and "ultimate authority" branches of its analysis. See Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78-857, pp. 11-12, n. 8. Although the "interest/alignment analysis" rationale goes to the heart of the basis for the managerial and supervisory exclusions, and therefore provides the strongest support for the Board's determination, the other two rationales are significant because they highlight two aspects of the university decisionmaking process relevant to the Board's decision: that the faculty's influence is exercised collectively -- and only collectively -- indicates that the faculty's recommendations embody the views of the rank and file, rather than those of a select group of persons charged with formulating and implementing management policies. Similarly, that the administration retains ultimate authority merely indicates that a true system of collegiality is simply not the mode of governance at Yeshiva University.