Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/986/1/101880/
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 03:05:11
Document Index: 705336343

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 510', '§ 2', '§ 510', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 45', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael W. Beauchamp, Defendant, Appellant, 986 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael W. Beauchamp, Defendant, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael W. Beauchamp, Defendant, Appellant, 986 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 986 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993)
Heard Jan. 8, 1993. Decided Feb. 16, 1993
Defendant/appellant, Michael W. Beauchamp, appeals from his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island for uttering and publishing a forged United States Treasury check and for aiding and abetting others in uttering and publishing the check in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2) and 2. Defendant raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to present testimony impeaching the credibility of a witness; and (2) the district court clearly erred in concluding that the offense involved more than minimal planning under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A). Finding no error, we affirm.
On December 4, 1991, defendant was indicted and charged with uttering and publishing a forged treasury check and aiding and abetting others in uttering and publishing the check in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2) and 2. After defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial, the case proceeded to trial again on May 18, 1992.
Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion when it precluded Mrs. Amaral from taking the stand to contradict Massey's testimony that he lived at 101 Carpenter Street. Defendant points to Supreme Court authority that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a witness as to his or her name and address. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S. Ct. 748, 749, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693, 51 S. Ct. 218, 220, 75 L. Ed. 624 (1931). Defendant concedes, as he must, that the district court permitted him to cross-examine Massey on his address. Defendant contends, however, that the value of his right to ask Massey where he lives for the purpose of "exposing falsehood" is vastly diminished if defendant cannot also present extrinsic evidence demonstrating that Massey has lied. Defendant additionally argues that, quite apart from the value of Mrs. Amaral's testimony to impeach Massey by contradiction, the proffered testimony was relevant to expose Massey's motive to testify falsely. We find neither argument persuasive.
It is well established that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction on a collateral matter.1 E.g., United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 855, 859 (1st Cir. 1981); 1 McCormack on Evidence § 45, at 169 (4th ed. 1992). Thus, it is often said that when a witness testifies to a collateral matter, the examiner "must take [the] answer," i.e., the examiner may not disprove it by extrinsic evidence. E.g., United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 823, 121 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1992); United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1991); 1 McCormack on Evidence § 45, at 170. A matter is considered collateral if "the matter itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness." 1 McCormack on Evidence § 45, at 169. Stated another way, extrinsic evidence to disprove a fact testified to by a witness is admissible when it satisfies the Rule 403 balancing test and is not barred by any other rule of evidence. See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C. Cir.) ("The 'specific contradiction' rule ... is a particular instance of the trial court's general power under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to exclude evidence 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by considerations of undue delay, [or] waste of time.' "), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S. Ct. 174, 102 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1988); Pisari, 636 F.2d at 858; 3 Weinstein's Evidence, 607, at 607-79, -80 (1992). To the extent Mrs. Amaral's testimony merely went to Massey's credibility by demonstrating a contradiction on an immaterial matter, it was clearly excludible.
But while a witness's self-interest or motive to testify falsely is generally considered to be a non-collateral issue, United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1978) (bias); United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1021 (11th Cir. 1987) (self-interest in testifying), we think the district court was entitled to conclude that the "marginal relevance" of Mrs. Amaral's proposed testimony was outweighed by the "time and effort" it would entail to present this testimony. As noted by the district judge, who presided over defendant's first trial, Mrs. Amaral's testimony was inconclusive. She testified that she occasionally saw Massey, a truck driver, at 101 Carpenter Street, but that his brother and sister paid the rent. Moreover, as the district court noted, Pawtucket is adjacent to Central Falls; therefore, whether Massey lived at his siblings' house in Pawtucket or his wife's house in Central Falls said little about Massey's personal involvement in the crime, particularly since there had already been testimony that Massey spent at least some time at both locations. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Mrs. Amaral's proposed testimony concerning whether Massey lived at 101 Carpenter Street.
Defendant next argues that the district court clearly erred when it increased defendant's offense level by two levels, having determined that his offense involved more than minimal planning under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A). Section 2F1.1(b) (2) (A), which governs offenses involving fraud or deceit, states that if an offense involves more than minimal planning, the offense level should be increased by two levels. Application Note 1(f) of the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 defines what constitutes more than minimal planning. It states, in part, the following:
Relying on the above-quoted passage, the district court enhanced defendant's offense level for more than minimal planning on the basis of defendant's attempts to mislead investigators with his false story--which he got Massey to corroborate--about a Hispanic man. We review the district court's enhancement for more than minimal planning only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 343 (1st Cir. 1992).
On appeal, both parties focus their arguments on whether the "significant affirmative steps" to conceal mentioned in § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(f), must take place before a defendant commits an offense for an enhancement under § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A) to apply. Defendant argues that in order for the more than minimal planning enhancement to be applied based on significant affirmative steps of concealment, there must be evidence that the steps were planned or at least contemplated prior to the commission of the offense. The government, on the other hand, contends that significant steps to conceal an offense after it has been committed will warrant an enhancement for more than minimal planning.
In arguing that there must be some pre-offense planning, defendant relies primarily on United States v. Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1992). In Maciaga, a bank security guard stole a bag of cash from the bank's night deposit safe. To deflect suspicion from himself, the guard told investigating authorities that he had been having problems with night deposit bags becoming stuck in the chute. The sentencing judge enhanced the guard's sentence for more than minimal planning, finding that the false statements to investigators constituted significant affirmative steps to conceal the larceny. In reversing the enhancement, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[w]hen the enhancement has been applied because a defendant has taken significant steps to conceal the offense, evidence of some pre-offense planning of the concealment has been present." Id. at 407. The court then held that the guard's false story to investigators amounted to no more than the " 'logical' step of discouraging an investigation," and did not constitute more than minimal planning. Id. at 408.
We are unwilling to go so far as the Seventh Circuit in requiring direct evidence of pre-offense planning of the concealment. It is true that U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A) indicates that the offense itself must "involve" more than minimal planning. We recognize there may be situations where a defendant's subsequent cover-up activity is so disassociated from the earlier crime as to make it unreasonable to find that the crime itself "involved" more than minimal planning. But we believe the determination is essentially one of fact for the district court. Crimes of fraud and deceit by their very nature may, and often do, compel, quite predictably, later efforts at a cover-up. Thus defendant here, having put his name and address on the check, knew that he would probably be later questioned by authorities, at which time he would necessarily have to offer some innocent explanation. It is not unreasonable to view the false story he eventually told, and the elaborate steps he took to support it, as integral to the original offense itself, so that the offense can properly be said to have "involved" this later cover-up activity. That interpretation is the one most consistent with Application Note 1(f), which expressly includes within "[m]ore than minimal planning ... significant affirmative steps ... taken to conceal the offense." The application notes, while not conclusive, demand considerable deference. United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 1992). We are less ready, therefore, than the Maciaga court to require direct proof of "some pre-offense planning of the concealment" where, as here, the necessity to conceal was so integral to the entire scheme. Maciaga, 965 F.2d at 407 (emphasis deleted).
A sentencing increase for "more than minimal planning" under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) based upon post-offense conduct is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Previously, when we have found more than minimal planning for purposes of approving a sentencing increase, the offense itself involved significant planning. See, e.g., United States v. Resurreccion, 978 F.2d 759, 763 (1st Cir. 1992) (transporting forged securities into the United States); United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1992) (falsifying many travel vouchers submitted for reimbursement to the State of Massachusetts over a four year period); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (1st Cir. 1992) (falsifying financial records for several years to hide losses in investment pool); United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341, 343-44 (1st Cir. 1992) (filing false residential mortgage loan documents with a federally insured bank); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1989) (obtaining two fraudulent bank loans). In this case, neither the district court nor the majority found that the defendant's offense, forging the payees' names on a stolen check and then writing his own name and address on the check in order to deposit it in a newly-created bank account, required more than minimal planning.3 The district court enhanced the defendant's offense level based on his attempts to mislead investigators long after the offense had been committed.
The guideline provides for a two-level increase "[i]f the offense involved (A) more than minimal planning[.]" U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2). The application notes following the guideline refer to the Commentary to § 1B1.1, General Application Principles, for the definition of "more than minimal planning." As the majority noted, the commentary explains that, " 'More than minimal planning' also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense, other than conduct to which § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) applies." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, Application Note 1(f). Reading the definition into the guideline, it seems clear to me that the focus remains on conduct preceding and involving the offense. Attempts to conceal the offense, which are planned and occur after the offense, fall within the definition of obstructing justice, and should not be considered for purposes of a sentencing increase for "more than minimal planning."4 The majority points out correctly that in this case the defendant's concocted story did not significantly impede or obstruct the official investigation or prosecution of the case and, therefore, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 would not apply. This, however, does not justify imposing a two-level increase by distorting the meaning of the "more than minimal planning" guideline.
I do not think we should disregard common sense, logic, and the plain meaning of words when we enter the labyrinth of the sentencing guidelines. "Plan" is defined in the dictionary as "a scheme or method of acting, doing, proceeding, making, etc., developed in advance." Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1480 (2nd Ed.Unabridged 1987) (emphasis added). I agree with the Seventh Circuit that a story concocted after the offense, false as it may be, should not be included within the term "more than minimal planning," unless there is some evidence that the story was fabricated as part of the pre-offense planning. United States v. Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1992).
The government argues that Mrs. Amaral's testimony is barred by Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which expressly precludes the use of extrinsic evidence solely to impeach a witness's credibility. The rule states in relevant part: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence." Like the general rule barring the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on a collateral matter through contradiction, the purpose of Rule 608(b)'s prohibition of extrinsic evidence is to avoid holding mini-trials on irrelevant or collateral matters. E.g., United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 641-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 365, 66 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1980); United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 823, 121 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1992). In the present context, however, it is difficult to conceptualize the actual location of Massey's residence as being a "specific instance of conduct" within the meaning of Rule 608(b). See United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C. Cir.) (Rule 608(b) addresses conduct indicative of untruthfulness, such as fraudulent and dishonest behavior), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S. Ct. 174, 102 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1988); United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1979) (same). Like the district court, we think guidance is to be found in the more general rule as to collateral matters
This conclusion is further buttressed by the reference in Application Note 1(f) to the obstruction of justice enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Application Note 1(f) expressly provides that significant affirmative steps to conceal will not constitute more than minimal planning when § 3C1.1 applies to the conduct. We think this reference to § 3C1.1 reflects implicit recognition that significant affirmative post-offense steps to conceal can, in certain circumstances, constitute either more than minimal planning under § 2F1.1(b) (2) (A) or an obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1. As the district court recognized, the exclusion in Application Note 1(f) of conduct to which § 3C1.1 applies is intended to avoid the double counting that would result if courts treated the same post-offense concealment as both more than minimal planning and obstruction of justice. See United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendant's attempt to recruit co-workers to tell false story to auditors of bank constituted further attempts to conceal his embezzlement and, therefore, could not constitute an obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1)
The presentence report prepared by the Rhode Island probation department recommended the two-level increase for "more than minimal planning" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2) based on conduct of the offense: opening a bank account to deposit the stolen check, depositing the check, withdrawing all of the funds, and never using the account again. Defense counsel objected, and the district court agreed that the conduct relied upon in the presentence report did not constitute "more than minimal planning." The court went on to find, however, that the defendant's false story after the offense involved "more than minimal planning" and imposed the two-level increase based on that finding