Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/974/1346/438072/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 21:16:03
Document Index: 47832733

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 846', '§ 924', '§ 843']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Almetra Renee Edwards, and Anita Louise Maxey, Defendants-appellants, 974 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Almetra Renee Edwards, and Anita Louise Maxey, Defendants-appellants, 974 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 974 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1992) Sept. 9, 1992
In count one of an eight-count indictment, Edwards alone was charged with the unlawful distribution on February 12, 1991, of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). In counts two and three, both Edwards and Maxey were charged with the unlawful distribution on February 14 and 15, 1991, respectively, of cocaine base, a Schedule II controlled sbustance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. In count four, both Edwards and Maxey were charged with unlawfully attempting on April 16, 1991, to possess with intent to distribute sixteen ounces of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In count five, both Edwards and Maxey were charged with possession of firearms during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In counts six, seven, and eight, Edwards alone was charged with using a telephone to facilitate a felony drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 843(b).
Counsel argues that Morrow's testimony concerning drug deals with the two defendants other than the transactions alleged in the indictment violates Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). A trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989). Recent cases would seem to indicate that such testimony is admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1991). See also, United States v. Record, supra. Be that as it may, in the instant case any error in this regard would, in our view, be only harmless error. Morrow testified in detail as to his dealings with Edwards on February 12, 1991, and his dealings with Edwards and Maxey on February 14 and 15, 1991, and April 16, 1991. Those meetings were monitored by DEA agents whose testimony corroborated that of Morrow's in all essentials. Neither of the defendants testified, and no defense witnesses were called. The trial court also provided the jury with a limiting instruction explaining that the evidence was only relevant in determining state of mind or intent or motive.1 It is on this state of the record that we conclude that any error arising out of Morrow's testimony concerning other acts was harmless.
An "attempt" occurs when there is an unlawful intent plus an overt act which constitutes a "substantial step" towards the crime's commission. United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1985). In United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1986), we defined a "substantial step" as one which is "strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent." Here there certainly was the requisite intent, and the actions of the two defendants in driving to Morrow's place of business, each carrying a loaded firearm, and then displaying to Morrow $8,000 in the brown sack with which they were to purchase cocaine, is an overt act sufficient to sustain a conviction for an attempt charge. Such acts "strongly corroborate" the defendants' criminal intent.
We regard the judge's statement as being "neutral." The judge was simply outlining the procedure to be followed. We note that there was no contemporaneous objection to the court's statement to the jury concerning how long they would be permitted to deliberate prior to adjourning until the following morning. A district court's determination regarding the length of time a jury will be kept together for deliberation is generally reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. See Barker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970) and Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 847 (1963). We find no abuse of discretion in the instant case, let alone plain error.
See United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1991) (admission of bad acts considered harmless error where purpose of admission is appparent from record and decision to admit correct); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142 (1991) (evidence of uncharged offense with no limiting instruction admissible when alleged error had no effect on defendant's substantial rights); United States v. Hosford, 782 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118 (1986) (in light of overwhelming evidence against defendant, admission of evidence of several prior bad acts unrelated to crime for which defendant was charged was at most harmless error)