Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v52/52-127.html
Timestamp: 2015-01-29 16:23:17
Document Index: 690154612

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2302', '§ 1221', '§ 1221', '§ 1221', '§ 1221', '§ 1209', '§ 621', '§\n1221']

52:1354(127)AR - - NTEU Chapter 168 and Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, New Orleans District - - 1997 FLRAdec AR - - v52 p1354 | FLRA.GOV
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The decision of the Authority follows: 52 FLRA No. 127 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION CHAPTER 168 (Union) and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT (Agency) 0-AR-2751 _____ DECISION April 30, 1997 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; and Donald S.
Union's exceptions. The Arbitrator sustained, in part, a grievance alleging that the
Grievant's involuntary reassignment from Lake Charles, Louisiana to New
Orleans was disciplinary and not implemented in accordance with the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. As a remedy, he directed that the reassignment
be rescinded and any record of the action be expunged. The Arbitrator denied
the remainder of the grievance, including, as relevant here, claims that the
Grievant was reassigned in retaliation for a sexual harassment complaint and
whistleblower complaints filed by the Grievant against his immediate
supervisor. For the following reasons, we conclude that the Union has failed to
Accordingly, we deny the Union's exceptions. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award Prior to 1990, the Grievant's "employment with the Agency was
uneventful, with no indication of significant problems." Award at 2. The
Grievant's employment difficulties began in 1990 when the individual who would
later become the Grievant's immediate supervisor was selected to fill a vacancy
for which the Grievant also applied. The Grievant "was angered by his
non-selection." Id. In May 1994, the Grievant reported to Agency officials two instances of
his supervisor's alleged violations of law and Agency policy and rules. Neither
"whistleblowing" allegation resulted in action against the supervisor. The
Grievant also telephoned the Agency's Sexual Harassment Hotline complaining of
an ongoing series of unwanted sexual touchings by his supervisor, culminating
in an incident on May 26, 1994. In response to the Grievant's Hotline
call, the Agency's Office of Internal Affairs investigated the complaint and
concluded that it was without merit. Following these events, the Grievant advised the supervisor, on several
occasions, that he did not trust and could not work with him. The Grievant also
informed the supervisor that he wanted him discharged. At this time, Agency
officials held conversations with the Grievant during which the Grievant
asserted that he would no longer work with his supervisor because he distrusted
him, and reasserted that he wanted the supervisor fired. Because of "the ongoing problems in the Lake Charles office, a decision
was made in September 1994 to reassign [the Grievant] to the port of New
Orleans, Louisiana." Id. at 5. In the letter effecting the involuntary
reassignment, the District Director stated that she was ordering the action
because of the work relationship between the Grievant and his immediate
supervisor. A grievance was filed contesting the reassignment. Among other
remedies, the grievance sought discipline for those management officials "who
retaliated against [the Grievant.]" Id. at 7. When the grievance could
not be resolved, it was submitted to arbitration for resolution of the
following general issue stipulated by the parties: Did the Agency comply with the National Agreement and existing law in
the reassignment of [the Grievant]? As relevant here, the parties also stipulated to the following related
sub-issues: 1. Was the reassignment of [the Grievant] effected in retaliation for
protected activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and/or the
National Agreement? 2. Was the reassignment of [the Grievant] in retaliation for
protected whistle-blowing conduct in violation of 5 U.S.C. [§] 2302
and/or the National Agreement? 3. If any violation of relevant law, rule, regulation or the National
Agreement occurred, what is the proper remedy? Id. at 7-8. The Arbitrator found that the Grievant was involuntarily reassigned for
disciplinary reasons, and that the reassignment was not effected in accordance
with Article 20, Section 3.C(1) and Article 28, Section 8.A (2) of the National Agreement. However, the Arbitrator rejected
the Grievant's claim that he was reassigned in retaliation for his sexual
harassment complaint. The Arbitrator noted, with regard to the elapsed time
between management's becoming aware of the Grievant's complaint and his
involuntary reassignment, that the "passage of three months time would not in
all cases preclude the finding of a nexus[]" between the complaint and the
reassignment. Id. at 41. The Arbitrator stated that, "[d]uring the
months in question[,] the relationship between [the Grievant] and [his
immediate supervisor] deteriorated markedly." Id. The Arbitrator
characterized the Grievant's conduct during this period as "disruptive,
confrontational and disrespectful." Id. The Arbitrator concluded that
these factors, coupled with "the meager probative evidence of a retaliatory
motive" on the part of the District Director, precluded his finding "a
sufficiently clear nexus" to sustain the Grievant's claim of retaliation.
Id. at 42. The Arbitrator also rejected the Grievant's claim that he was
reassigned in reprisal for whistleblowing complaints protected by 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302 and/or the National Agreement. In this connection, the
Arbitrator noted that: the employee claiming retaliation for protected whistleblowing must
prove that activity actually triggered the challenged personnel action. Under
the present statutory scheme for protecting whistle-blowing federal employees
from retaliation, the employee alleging same need establish only that his
protected disclosure activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action
he takes issue with. Id. at 43. In the Arbitrator's view, the Union offered "no
probative evidence" showing that the Grievant's allegations against his
supervisor "in any way prompted the decision to reassign him." Id. He
noted that the complaints did not result in any action against the supervisor,
and that shortly following the first complaint, the same supervisor gave the
Grievant an "excellent" summary performance rating. The Arbitrator also found
that the "mere coincidence in time between [the Grievant's allegations] and the
challenged personnel action does not alone prove that an illegal act of
retaliation occurred." Id. The Arbitrator concluded that, based on the
facts and circumstances, "the Union has not satisfactorily proven that [the
Grievant's] whistle-blowing activity was a factor contributing to the decision
to reassign him." Id. at 44. As his remedy for the Agency's failure to follow the disciplinary
provisions of the negotiated agreement, the Arbitrator directed the Agency to
rescind the Grievant's reassignment and reinstate him to his former position.
The Arbitrator also ordered that evidence of the reassignment be expunged from
the Grievant's personnel file and any other Agency records. III. Union's Exceptions The Union filed four exceptions to the Arbitrator's award. First, the Union argues that the Arbitrator's "central finding" that
3 months elapsed between the Grievant's sexual harassment complaint and
the forced reassignment "is based on a gross mistake of fact, but for which the
Arbitrator would have reached a different conclusion regarding proof of the
nexus element." Exceptions at 16. In this regard, the Union argues that
the Arbitrator's reliance on the Grievant's alleged "disruptive,
confrontational[,] and disrespectful" conduct during the 3 months
following the filing of the sexual harassment complaint is contrary to law
because that conduct constituted protected activity. Id. at 20.
According to the Union, the "unrebutted fact of record" is that only 1 day
after the District Director learned of the sexual harassment complaint, she
decided to reassign the Grievant. Id. at 18. Second, the Union argues that the Arbitrator's failure to find that it
established a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is "contrary to law." Id. at
11. The Union asserts that to establish such a prima facie case
of retaliation, an employee must show, among other things, a causal connection
between the employee's protected activity and the disputed personnel action.
The Union asserts that, under applicable Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission case law, the required causal connection "may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence such as the employer's knowledge of the protected
activity and the proximity in time between the protected activity and the
adverse personnel action." Id. at 13. The Union contends that it
presented probative evidence that demonstrated an unlawful retaliatory motive
in management's reassignment of the Grievant, and that the Agency failed to
show a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for reassigning the Grievant. Third, the Union argues that the Arbitrator erroneously determined that
it presented no probative evidence that the Grievant's whistleblowing
disclosures were a contributing factor in the involuntary reassignment. That
determination, according to the Union, was "a gross mistake of fact, but for
which the Arbitrator would have reached a different conclusion." Id. at
37. Noting that the Whistleblowers Protection Act (WPA) permits consideration
of circumstantial evidence as probative, the Union argues that it "offered into
evidence a wealth of circumstantial evidence on the issue of contributing
factor."(3) Id. Finally, the Union argues that, under the WPA, the Union satisfied its
burden of proof, "[a]s a matter of law," by demonstrating that the official
directing the involuntary reassignment knew of the Grievant's whistleblowing
complaints, and that the reassignment occurred within a time frame that could
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the complaints were a "contributing
factor" in the Agency's decision to reassign him involuntarily.(4) Id. at 27. In the
Union's view, the Arbitrator applied an incorrect standard of proof in holding
that an employee claiming retaliation for protected activity "'must prove that
the activity actually triggered the challenged personnel action'" and
must demonstrate that the protected disclosure "'prompted'" the action.
Id. at 27-28 (quoting Award at 43, emphasis added by Union). IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. The Award As It Concerns Alleged Violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Is Not Based on a Nonfact To establish that an award is based on a nonfact, the party making the
the arbitrator. E.g., U.S. Department of the Air Force, Lowry Air
Local 1497, 48 FLRA 589, 593-94 (1993). The "causal connection component of the prima facie case"
of retaliation for a sexual harassment complaint "may be established by showing
that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that
the adverse personnel action took place shortly after that activity."
Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Mitchell) (footnote omitted). Although the Union argues that the
"unrebutted fact of record" is that 1 day after the District Director
learned of the filing of the complaint, she decided to reassign the Grievant,
it provides no support for that claim. Exceptions at 18. In particular,
the Union provided no transcript of the hearing and no other basis on which to
conclude that this alleged "fact" exists. The Union also provides no support
for its argument that the Arbitrator erred in finding that, during the 3 months
following the filing of the sexual harassment complaint, the Grievant engaged
in "a course of conduct . . . that can reasonably be described as disruptive,
confrontational and disrespectful." Award at 41. As such, this Union assertion
does not establish that the finding was clearly erroneous. The Arbitrator determined that 3 months elapsed between the complaint
and the imposition of the involuntary reassignment. The Union has not
established that this determination is clearly erroneous. As such, the Union
has not demonstrated that the award is based on a nonfact. National Air
Traffic Controllers Association and U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, Western-Pacific Region, John Wayne Air Traffic
Control Tower, Costa Mesa, California, 52 FLRA 860, 864 (1997)
(FAA). B. The Award Is Not Contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 The Authority's review of the Union's exception that the award is
inconsistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is de
novo. E.g., Social Security Administration and American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 3342, 51 FLRA 1700, 1705
(1996) (SSA). In McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(McKenna), the court applied the framework governing Title VII disparate
treatment cases set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) to a retaliation claim under Title VII. The D.C. Circuit stated that, to
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show: "1) that she engaged in a statutorily protected
activity; 2) that the employer took an adverse personnel action; and 3) that a
causal connection existed between the two." McKenna, 729 F.2d at 790
(footnote omitted). As relevant here, "[t]he causal connection component of the
prima facie case may be established by showing that the employer
had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the adverse
personnel action took place shortly after that activity." Mitchell,
759 F.2d at 86. However, "once a Title VII case has been 'fully tried on
the merits,' the question whether the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case 'is no longer relevant.'" Id. at 83 (quoting United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
714-15 (1983) (Aikens)). In Health Care Financing Administration, Department of Health and
35 FLRA 274 (1990) (HCFA), the union contended that an award was
deficient because the arbitrator failed to find that the grievant had
established a prima facie case of discrimination. The arbitrator
neither recited the applicable legal standard for establishing a prima
facie case nor specifically stated a conclusion as to whether the
grievant had established a prima facie case.(5) The arbitrator did, however,
discuss the evidence upon which he relied in arriving at his findings, and
based upon those findings, concluded that "the evidence as to the allegation of
age discrimination was 'insufficient and unconvincing.'" Id. at 292. On
review, the Authority found that the arbitrator's findings constituted his
determination that the agency did not unlawfully discriminate against the
grievant on the basis of age. The Authority stated that "[a]lthough the
[a]rbitrator did not discuss whether the grievant had established a
prima facie case or any of the other . . . burdens in an age
discrimination case," it could find "no basis on which to conclude that he was
required to do so." Id. at 293 (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at
715). The Arbitrator in this case did not expressly state whether the
Grievant had established a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation. However, the Arbitrator stated that the Union presented "meager
probative evidence of a retaliatory motive" and that the Agency's evidence
showed that the Grievant, during the period between the complaint and the
notice of reassignment, "engaged in a course of conduct directed toward [his
supervisor] that can reasonably be described as disruptive, confrontational and
disrespectful."(6) Award at 41, 42. The Arbitrator found that the evidence
presented by the parties "preclude[d] [him] from identifying a sufficiently
clear nexus between the Grievant's protected Title VII . . . activity and the
decision to reassign him." Id. at 42. In so finding, the Arbitrator
determined that management did not unlawfully retaliate against the Grievant
for his sexual harassment complaint. As such, consistent with Mitchell,
759 F.2d at 83, determining whether the Union established a prima facie case
"'is no longer relevant.'" The record does not support a conclusion that the Arbitrator failed to
apply the appropriate legal standard or that his conclusion was otherwise
contrary to law. Accordingly, consistent with HCFA, this exception
provides no basis for finding the award deficient. E.g., American
33 (1995). C. The Award As It Concerns Alleged Retaliation For Whistleblowing
Disclosures Is Not Based on a Nonfact The Arbitrator reviewed the Union's evidence concerning retaliation and
determined that it was not probative. The determination that the Grievant
presented no probative evidence that the whistleblowing disclosures contributed
to his reassignment is not a nonfact, but, rather, constitutes a determination
based on the facts presented. The Union's argument that the facts support a
contrary conclusion does not establish that the Arbitrator's conclusion was
clearly erroneous. As such, this exception provides no basis for finding the
award deficient. See FAA, 52 FLRA at 864;
U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren,
Virginia and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2096,
44 FLRA 1118, 1122-23 (1992). D. The Award Is Not Contrary to the Whistleblowers Protection
Act As set forth above, the Authority's review of the Union's exception
that the award is inconsistent with the WPA is de novo.
See SSA, 51 FLRA at 1705. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation
for a disclosure under the WPA, an employee must demonstrate, inter
alia, that the disclosure was a "contributing factor" to the adverse
personnel action taken against him or her.(7) The employee may prove that the disclosure was a contributing
factor through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official
taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure, and that the personnel
action occurred within a time frame such that a reasonable person could
conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the adverse personnel
action. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)(A) and (B). In this regard, the court in
Clark v. Department of Army, 997 F.2d 1466, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Clark), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1091 (1994), acknowledged that
the WPA "simplified the nexus standard for employees by providing that the
employee need only show that the whistleblowing disclosure was a 'contributing
factor,' rather than a significant or predominant factor[]" in an adverse
personnel action. As the Union asserts, the Arbitrator stated that the Grievant must
demonstrate that the disclosure "actually triggered" and/or "prompted" the
reassignment, rather than merely showing that it was a contributing factor in
the action. However, the Union fails to add that, immediately following his use
of the term "actually triggered," the Arbitrator stated that an employee
alleging unlawful retaliation "need establish only that his protected
disclosure activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action he takes
issue with." Award at 43. Moreover, following his determination that the
Union "offered no probative evidence to show that [the Grievant's complaints]
in any way prompted the decision to reassign him[,]" the Arbitrator concluded
that "the Union has not satisfactorily proven that [the Grievant's]
whistleblowing activity was a factor contributing to the decision to reassign
him." Id. at 43, 44. We conclude that, when read in context, the Arbitrator's use of the
terms "actually triggered" and "prompted" does not reflect a failure to apply
the "contributing factor" standard required by 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(e)(1). The award clearly articulates the correct legal
standard and plainly states that the Grievant has not met that standard.
Consequently, the Arbitrator did not apply the wrong legal standard in
determining that the reassignment did not violate the WPA. The Arbitrator concluded that the "mere coincidence in time between
[the whistleblower complaints] and the challenged personnel action does not
alone prove that an illegal act of retaliation occurred." Award at 43. He
prefaced that conclusion with the statement that the Grievant "offered no
probative evidence to show that [the Grievant's complaints] in any way prompted
the decision to reassign him[]" and determined that "[s]everal factors indicate
otherwise." Id. We determine, based on this statement, that the
Arbitrator found that the proximity in time, when weighed against other
evidence, was insufficient to establish the requisite contributing factor. The
Arbitrator's finding is consistent with the second step of the 3-step framework
set forth in Clark for analyzing an employee's whistleblower defense to
an adverse personnel action: the plaintiff must establish the contributing
factor element by a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant may counter
that evidence with any relevant and competent evidence.(8) Clark, 997 F.2d at
1473. In Caddell v. Department of Justice, 66 MSPR 347, 350
(1995) (Caddell III),(9) aff'd, 96 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996), involving the
WPA, the MSPB found that the administrative judge's failure to make findings
concerning the timing of management's reassignment of the appellant was not
reversible error where he determined that the agency proved that it would have
reassigned appellant absent whistleblowing disclosures. Here, the Arbitrator
determined that the Union proffered insufficient evidence to show that the
whistleblower complaints were a contributing factor in the reassignment, and
that management introduced evidence showing that the Grievant was reassigned
for other reasons. Accordingly, based on Caddell II, Caddell III,
and Clark, the award is consistent with the WPA. As noted above, a grievant may establish that a whistleblowing
complaint was a contributing factor in an adverse personnel action "through
circumstantial evidence[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). However, the Union
does not identify the basis for its allegation that the Arbitrator did not
"allow" the Grievant to meet his burden by presenting circumstantial evidence,
and such action by the Arbitrator is not otherwise apparent from the record.
Exceptions at 46. The record shows that the Arbitrator evaluated the
evidence presented on the Grievant's behalf and determined that it was not
"probative." Award at 43. That finding neither reflects that the Arbitrator
excluded any evidence because it was circumstantial nor shows that he failed to
consider circumstantial evidence in reaching his determination. Consistent with the forgoing, the award is not deficient as contrary to
the WPA. V. Decision The Union's exceptions are denied. FOOTNOTES: 1. Article 20, Section 3.C of the
National Agreement provides, in pertinent part: Directed Reassignments: The Employer retains the right to
identify and direct the reassignment of an Employee based on the needs of the
Service, including but not limited to the following: (1) . . . . (2) for disciplinary reasons. When such reassignments are made for disciplinary reasons, the
provisions of Article 28 will govern. Award at 35-36. 2. Article 28, Section 8.A of the
National Agreement provides: Section 8.A. An employee will, in any disciplinary action, be
furnished a copy of those portions of all written documents which contain
information or evidence relied upon by the Employer as the basis for the
disciplinary action. The Employer will also provide the employee with a copy of
those portions of written documents that are favorable to the employee and
related to the disciplinary action. If the discipline is based upon an
investigative report, relevant portions of that report shall also be furnished
to the employee, including portions which are favorable to the
employee. Award at 15. 3. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) provides,
as relevant that: [t]he employee may demonstrate that the [whistleblowing] disclosure
was a contributing factor in the personnel action through circumstantial
evidence, such as evidence that-- (A) the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure;
and (B) the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor
in the personnel action. 4. In support, the Union cites 5 C.F.R.
§ 1209.4(c), which defines "contributing factor" as "any disclosure that
affects an agency's decision to . . . take . . . a personnel action with
respect to the individual making the disclosure." 5. HCFA was an age
discrimination case, involving the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982). 6. Although the quoted part of the
award does not identify the source of the evidence concerning the grievant's
conduct, it is clear that this information was proffered by management.
See Award at 28-35 (discussing evidence under the heading "Position of
the Agency"). 7. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. §
1221(e) provides, as relevant here: (e)(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any case
involving an alleged prohibited personnel practice as described under section
2302(b)(8), the Board shall order such corrective action as the Board considers
appropriate if the employee . . . has demonstrated that a disclosure described
under section 2302(b)(8) was a contributing factor in the personnel action
which was taken or is to be taken against such employee . . . . The
employee may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that-- (A) the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure;
in the personnel action. (2) Corrective action under paragraph (1) may not be ordered if the
agency demonstrate