Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/60052586/Consolidated-Complaint-Class-7-08
Timestamp: 2018-11-13 19:01:41
Document Index: 111427345

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 26', '§ 1', '§ 15', '§ 349', '§ 1331', '§ 1367', '§ 1391', '§\n22', '§ 1', '§ 349', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 349', '§\n103', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349']

Consolidated Complaint Class 7-08 | Title Insurance | Class Action
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BRENDAN DOLAN, BRIAN MCHALE, THOMAS PERRY, JONATHAN RAPAPORT, MBSF ALABAMA LLC, JOSEPH RAGUSA, KRSTEN RAGUSA, MARSHALL COOK, DOUGLAS BROWN, REBECCA BROWN, ALEX WINTNER, TUTTNAUER USA CO., L TD., LAWRENCE FISHER, RlGOBERTO CAPELLAN, VALERIO GONZALEZ, MARA ELENA OCHOA, LENNY GONZALEZ, CHRISTOPHER P. AJEMIAN, SARA JULI, VINCENT BARBIERI, TERESA TANNAZZO BARBIERI, MICHAEL LOLLO, MAEGHAN LOLLO, BRANDON RAYMAR, MELINDA RAYMAR, AND JOHN SHERIDAN, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated,
Case No. 2:08-cv-00466
(TCP)(WDW)
CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL, INC., FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMP ANY OF NEW YORK UNITED GENERAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION, COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURACE COMP ANY, LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, LANDAMERICA FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., STEWART TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, MONROE TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, STEWART INFORMATION SERVICES CORPORATION, AND TITLE INSURANCE RATE SERVICE ASSOCIATION,INC.,
105271.
Plaintiffs Brendan Dolan, Brian McHale, Thomas Perry, Jonathan Rapaport, MBSF
Alabama LLC, Joseph Ragusa, Krsten Ragusa, Marshall Cook, Douglas Brown, Rebecca
Brown, Alex Wintner, Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd., Lawrence Fisher, Rigoberto Capellan, Valerio
Gonzalez, Mara Elena Ochoa, Lenny Gonzalez, Chrstopher P. Ajemian, Sara Juli, Vincent
Barbieri, Teresa Tannazzo Barbieri, Michael Lollo, Maeghan Lollo, Brandon Raymar, Melinda
Raymar, and John Sheridan, on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated, upon
knowledge with respect to their own acts and upon information and belief
other matters, allege as follows:
1. This case challenges as a per se ilegal price-fixing agreement the collective
setting by defendants -- which include the country's four largest title insurance companies -- of
the rates that consumers pay for title insurance in New York.
2. Under the New York State Insurance Law ("Insurance Law"), title insurance rates
may be set by an insurer through a rate service organization comprised of the state's title insurers.
Pursuant to the Insurance Law, defendants (along with other title insurers) formed Title
Insurance Rate Service Association, Inc. ("TIRSA") in 1991. TIRSA collects from defendants
and TIRSA's other members revenue and cost information and annually submits it in aggregate
form along with collectively set title insurance rates to the New York Insurance Department
("Insurance Department"). Under this rate setting scheme, defendants have charged identical and
collectively fixed rates to consumers since TIRSA's inception.
3. The Insurance Department is supposed to carefully review the title rates that
defendants (through TIRSA) collectively fix. However, defendants have made this impossible
by manipulating the rates so that they are principally based on costs that the Insurance
Department has neither the authority nor the ability to assess. These costs are referred to as so-
called "agency commissions." They chiefly cover kickbacks and other costs unelated to the
issuance of title insurance. These supposed costs are funneled to and through title agents to
increase defendants' overall revenues and get them more business. The Insurance Department
does not have regulatory authority over title agents or their activities.
4. So, with respect to the rate setting activity the Insurance Department has
authorized, defendants have acted outside of
this authority. They have done so by improperly
including unregulated and unauthorized costs within their collectively set rates. And, they have
embedded these supposed costs within the agency commissions paid to title agents who are not
licensed or otherwise subject to regulatory review by the Insurance Department. Indeed, the
Insurance Deparment has unequivocally recognized and publicly stated that it does not and
cannot evaluate these agency commissions. Since these payments typically account for roughly
85 percent of
the total costs that go into TIRSA's rate calculation, defendants have effectively
precluded the Insurance Department from actively supervising or conducting any kind of
meaningful review ofTIRSA's collective rate setting activity.
5. Unchecked by competition or regulatory oversight, defendants have been able to
collectively fix and maintain their title insurance rates in New York at supracompetitive levels.
These rates -- which for the average home or property purchaser are in the thousands of dollars -bear no reasonable relationship to the cost or expense of
providing the insurance. And, they have
been imposed on consumers who lack the knowledge and opportunity to challenge them.
6. Plaintiffs, on behalf ofthemselves and a putative Class of all those similarly
situated, bring this action to enjoin defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise
unlawful conduct and recover damages for the ilegal overcharges the Class has paid.
7. Plaintiffs bring this action under Section 16 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, to
prevent and restrain violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and for damages
under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. Plaintiffs also bring this action under New
York General Business Law § 349, and the common law. This Court has jurisdiction over the
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. This Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law
the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This Court also has
claims under 28 U.S.C. § i
332(d)(2).
8. Venue is proper in this
judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and 15 U.S.C. §
22 because each defendant is a corporation that is found or transacts business in this district, and because a substantial portion of the affected trade and commerce described herein has been
carred out in this district.
9. The violations of antitrust law alleged herein have substantially affected interstate
commerce. Defendants sell title insurance throughout the United States collecting bilions of
dollars in premiums anually.
10. Brendan Dolan is a resident of
Woodside, New York. On October 6,2004, Mr.
Dolan purchased title insurance from defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company ("Chicago
Title") in connection with his purchase of a property located in Maspeth, New York. Mr. Dolan
paid $2,252 for the insurance. This price was arificially high because of defendants'
anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct. On June 17, 2005, Mr. Dolan also
purchased title insurance from defendant Chicago Title in connection with his purchase of a
property located in Woodside, New York. Mr. Dolan paid $2,518 for the insurance on this
second property. This price was artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive,
deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
11. Brian McHale is a resident of
Massapequa, New York. On September 28,2007,
Mr. McHale purchased title insurance from defendant Stewar Title Insurance Company
("Stewart Title") in connection with his purchase of a property located in Massapequa, New
York. Mr. McHale paid $2,064 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because of
defendants' anti
competitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
12. Thomas Perry is a resident ofIslip Terrace, New York. On July 30,2007, Mr.
Perry purchased title insurance from defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
("Fidelity Title") in connection with his purchase of a property located in Islip Terrace, New
York. Mr. Perry paid $2,322 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because of
defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
13. Jonathan Rapaport is a resident of
New York, New York. On April 30,2007, Mr.
Rapaport purchased title insurance from defendant Chicago Title in connection with his purchase
of a property located in New York, New York. Mr. Rapaport paid $3,479 for the insurance.
This price was artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise
14. MBSF Alabama LLC ("MBSF") is located in Brooklyn, New York. On March 2,
2005, MBSF purchased title insurance from defendant United General Title Insurance Company
("United General Title") in connection with its purchase of
properties located in Brooklyn, New
York. MBSF paid $18,085 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because of
15. Joseph and Krstin Ragusa are residents ofIslip Terrace, New York. On March 2,
2005, the Ragusas purchased title insurance from defendant First American Title Insurance
New York ("First American Title") in connection with their purchase of a property
located in Islip Terrace, New York. The Ragusas paid $1,846 for the insurance. This price was
artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful
16. Marshall Cook is a resident of
East Hils, New York. On August 8, 2007, Mr.
Cook purchased title insurance from defendant Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company
("Commonwealth") in connection with his purchase of a property located in East Hils, New
York. Mr. Cook paid $3,251 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because of
17. Douglas Brown and Rebecca Brown are residents of
Plainview, New York. On
June 7, 2006, the Browns purchased title insurance from defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") in connection with their purchase of a property located in
Plainview, New York. The Browns paid $2,474 for the insurance. This price was artificially
high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
18. Alex Wintner is a resident of
Woodmere, New York. On November 16,2004,
Mr. Wintner purchased title insurance from defendant Commonwealth in connection with his
purchase of a property located in Woodmere, N ew York. Mr. Wintner paid $2,669 for the
insurance. This price was arificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and
otherwise unlawful conduct.
19. Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd. ("Tuttnauer") is located in Smithtown, New York. On
January 11, 2007, Tuttnauer purchased title insurance from defendant Chicago Title in
connection with its purchase of a property located in Smithtown, New York. Tuttnauer paid
$2,606 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive,
20. Lawrence Fisher is a resident of
Chappaqua, New York. On July 15, 2005, Mr.
Fisher purchased title insurance from defendant Stewart Title in connection with his purchase of
a property located in Chappaqua, New York. Mr. Fisher paid $8,248 for the insurance. This
price was artificially high because of defendants' anti
competitive, deceptive, and otherwise
21. Rigoberto Capellan is a resident of
Massapequa, New York. On May 5,2006,
Mr. Capellan purchased title insurance from defendant Commonwealth in connection with his
purchase of a property located in Massapequa, New York. Mr. Capellan paid $2,170 for the
insurance. This price was artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and
22. Valerio Gonzalez, Maria Elena Ochoa, and Lenny Gonzalez are residents of
Shirley, New York. On September 14,2004, Messrs. Gonzalez and Ms. Ochoa purchased title
insurance from defendant Lawyers Title in connection with their purchase of a property located
in Shirley, New York. Messrs. Gonzalez and Ms. Ochoa paid $3,357 for the insurance. This
price was artificially high because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise
23. Chrstopher P. Ajemian and Sara Juli are residents of
Brooklyn, New York. On
November 14,2007, Mr. Ajemian and Ms. JulI purchased title insurance from defendant
Lawyers Title in connection with their purchase of a property located in Brooklyn, New York.
Mr. Ajemian and Ms. Juli paid $3,357 for the insurance. This price was artificially high because
of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
24. Vincent Barbieri and Theresa Tannazzo Barbieri are residents of Seaford, New
York. On December 18, 2007, the Barbieris purchased title insurance from defendant
Commonwealth in connection with their purchase of a property located in Seaford, New York.
The Barbieris paid $3,422 for the insurance. This price was arificially high because of
25. Michael Lollo and Maeghan Lollo are residents of
Medford, New York. On
August 16, 2006, the Lollos purchased title insurance from defendant Fidelity Title in connection
with their purchase of a property located in Medford, New York. The Lollos paid $1,595 for the
26. Brandon and MelInda Raymar are residents of
Merrck, New York. On May 23,
2006, the Raymars purchased title insurance from defendant Commonwealth in connection with
their purchase of a property located in Merrck, New York. The Raymars paid $2,158 for the
27. John Sheridan is a resident of
Huntington Station, New York. On March 6,2007,
Mr. Sheridan purchased title insurance from defendant Chicago Title in connection with his
purchase of a property located in Huntington Station, New York. This price was artificially high
because of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and otherwise unlawful conduct.
28. The Fidelity family of
title insurance companies (collectively, "Fidelity") -- which
includes defendant Fidelity Title, defendant Chicago Title, defendant Ticor Title Insurance
Company ("Ticor Title"), and their affliates -- is engaged in sellng title insurance to purchasers
of commercial and residential real estate throughout the United States, including New York.
Fidelity accounts for roughly 31 percent of
the title insurance premiums consumers pay in New
York, which in 2006 amounted to roughly $361 milion. Nationally, Fidelity accounts for
approximately 27 percent of
title premiums, which in 2006 amounted to roughly $4.6 bilion.
Fidelity Title, Chicago Title, and Ticor Title were founding members of TIRSA and since
TIRSA's inception have in agreement with the other defendants charged title insurance rates in
New York that TIRSA collectively sets.
29. Fidelity Title, Chicago Title, Ticor Title, and their affliates are wholly-owned and
controlled by defendant Fidelity National Financial, Inc. ("Fidelity National"), a Delaware
corporation headquarered in Jacksonvile, Florida. Through its subsidiaries, Fidelity National is
a provider of title insurance, specialty insurance, and claims management services. Fidelity
National had 2006 revenues of
roughly $9.4 bilion. Fidelity engaged in the conduct challenged
herein with the approval and assent of Fidelity NationaL.
30. The First American family of
title insurance companies (collectively, "First
American") -- which includes defendant First American Title, defendant United General Title,
and their afflIates -- is engaged in selling title insurance to purchasers of commercial and
residential real estate throughout the United States, including New York. First American
accounts for roughly 25 percent of
the title insurance premiums consumers pay in New York,
which in 2006 amounted to roughly $290 million. Nationally, First American accounts for
approximately 29 percent of
title premiums, which in 2006 amounted to roughly $4.8 bilion.
First American Title and United General Title were founding members of TIRSA and since
TIRSA's inception have in agreement with the other the defendants charged title insurance rates
105271.1
in New York that TIRSA collectively sets.
31. First American Title, United General Title, and their affilIates are wholly-owned
and controlled by defendant First American Corporation ("F AC"), a California corporation
headquartered in Santa Ana, California. Through its subsidiaries, FAC is a provider oftitle
insurance, business information, and related products and services. F AC had 2006 revenues of
roughly $8.5 bilion. First American engaged in the conduct challenged herein with the approval
and assent ofFAC.
32. The LandAmerica family oftitle insurance companies (collectively,
"LandAmerica") -- which includes defendant Commonwealth, defendant Lawyers Title, and their
affliates -- is engaged in sellng title insurance to purchasers of commercial and residential real
estate throughout the United States, including New York. LandAmerica accounts for roughly 22
title insurance premiums consumers pay in New York, which in 2006 amounted to
roughly $258 milion. Nationally, LandAmerica accounts for approximately 19 percent oftitle
premiums, which in 2006 amounted to roughly $3.15 bilion. Commonwealth and Lawyers Title
were founding members ofTIRSA and since TIRSA's inception have in agreement with the
other defendants charged title insurance rates in New York that TIRSA collectively sets.
33. Commonwealth, Lawyers Title, and their affliates, are wholly-owned and
controlled by defendant LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. ("LAFG"), a Virginia corporation
headquartered in Glen Allen, Virginia. Through its subsidiaries, LAFG is a provider of
insurance and other products and services that faciltate the purchase, sale, transfer, and
financing of residential and commercial real estate. LAFG had 2006 revenues of roughly $4
billon. LandAmerica engaged in the conduct challenged herein with the approval and assent of
LAFG.
34. The Stewart family of
title insurance companies (collectively, "Stewart") -- which
includes defendant Stewart Title, defendant Stewar Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart
Guaranty"), defendant Monroe Title Insurance Corporation ("Monroe Title"), and their affliates
-- is engaged in sellng title insurance to purchasers of commercial or residential real estate
throughout the United States, including New York. Stewart accounts for roughly 14 percent of
the title insurance premiums consumers pay in New York, which in 2006 amounted to roughly
$168 milion. Nationally, Stewart accounts for approximately 12 percent of
which in 2006 amounted to roughly $2 bilion. Stewar Title, Stewart Guaranty, and Monroe
Title were founding members of TIRSA and since TIRSA's inception have in agreement with the
35. Stewart Title, Stewar Guaranty, Monroe Title, and their affiiates are wholly-
owned and controlled by defendant Stewart Information Services Corporation ("SISC"), a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Houston, Texas. Through its subsidiaries, SISC is a provider of title insurance and related information and post-closing lender services. SISC had
2006 revenues of
roughly $2.5 bilion. Stewar engaged in the conduct challenged herein with
the approval and assent of SISCo
36. Together, FidelIty, First American, LandAmerica and Stewart account for more
than 90 percent of
the title premiums consumers pay in New York, which in 2006 amounted to
title premiums, which
roughly $1.1 bilion. Nationally, they account for more than 85 percent of
in 2006 amounted to roughly $14.5 bilion. Throughout the relevant damages period, defendants
charged New York consumers identical title insurance rates that they collectively set through
TIRSA.
Defendant TIRSA is a voluntary association oftitle insurers licensed as a rate
service organization pursuant to Aricle 23 of
the Insurance Law. TIRSA maintains its offices in
New York City, which until recently were located at the same New York address as defendant
Fidelity Title.
38. TIRSA anually compiles from its members statistical data relating to their title
insurance premiums, losses and expenses and submits this information in aggregate form to the
Insurance Deparment. TIRSA also prepares and submits the New York Title Insurance Rate
Manual which sets forth the title rates to be charged and rules to be followed by TIRSA's
members. The Insurance Department has never objected to any of
the rates TIRSA has
collectively set.
39. TIRSA's membership is comprised of defendant insurers and all other title
insurers that are licensed to issue policies in New York. Currently, Fidelity, First American,
LandAmerica, and Stewart collectively represent a majority ofTIRSA's members. As such, they
comprise a majority voting block which, according to TIRSA's by-laws, allows them to control
the operations ofTIRSA and, in particular, TIRSA's collective rate setting activity.
A. The Fuzzy World of
the most costly items associated with the closing of a real
40. Title insurance is one of
estate transaction. In New York, TIRSA's collectively fixed rates for title insurance are based on
a percentage of the total value of
the property being insured. For residential properties, this price
ranges from about $1,200 (for a $250,000 property) to $3,700 (for a $1 milion property). For
more expensive homes and commercial properties, these prices are significantly higher and can
reach the tens of
thousands of dollars. In 2006 alone, New York consumers paid roughly $1.2
bilion for title insurance, most of
which went to defendants and their affliates. This amount has
risen dramatically over the past decade, more than quadrupling the roughly $260 milion in
insurance premiums that New York consumers paid in 1996.
41. Title insurance protects the purchaser of a property from any unidentified defects
in the title that would in any way interfere with the full and complete ownership and use of the
property and with the ultimate right to resell the property. In New York, title insurance is
required by lenders in most residential and commercial real estate transactions.
42. Despite the importance and high cost oftitle insurance, consumers have little
understanding of the product, the purpose it serves, and the reasonableness of the price they pay
for it. They also have little discretion in choosing the title insurer from which they purchase the
insurance. That decision is typically made for them by their lawyer, mortgage broker, lender, or
realtor. Consequently, for most purchasers, the cost of
title insurance is largely overlooked and
seldom, if ever, challenged. Most consumers do not even become aware of
the price they wil
pay and to which insurer they wil pay it until the actual closing of
There is no shopping around. There is no negotiation of price.
43. This dynamic basically removes the sale of
title insurance from the normal
competitive process. Unlike the regular forces of supply and demand that keep most industries
and their pricing in check, the title insurance industry is not subject to any real competitive
constraints. The purchasers of
the insurance, in most instances, are not the ones making the
purchasing decisions. And, they are certainly in no position to question the price. Title insurers
thus have little incentive to maintain fair and reasonable pricing. Indeed, they have just the
opposite incentive.
44. The most effective way for a particular title insurer to get business is to encourage
those making the purchasing decisions -- the lawyers, brokers, lenders -- to steer business to that
insurer. The best way to so motivate these third-party representatives is not through lower prices
(that they are not even paying). Rather, it is through kickbacks in the form of
finder's fees, gifts,
and other financial enticements. Therefore, it is higher pricing (which allows for these third-
pary payments), not lower pricing, that provides the best way for title insurers to compete and
45. This form of "reverse competition" that characterizes the title insurance industry,
coupled with the particular vulnerability of
most title insurance consumers, is exactly the reason
why most states have seen it fit to regulate the industry. However, New York is only one of a
very small number of states in which the leading title insurers collectively fix their prices
through a rate-setting organization like TIRSA. And, it may be the only state in which the
collectively set rates include "agency commissions" that are neither authorized nor regulated, and
which make up the lion's share of the title insurance rates.
B. Agency Commissions
46. There are two principal cost components that go into TIRSA's rate calculation.
One comprises the risk associated with issuing the title policy. The other comprises the "agency
commissions" paid to title agents.
47. The risk component covers the risk the title insurer bears for any undiscovered
defects in the title. Unlike property insurance, title insurance carres with it a very limited risk of
loss to the insurer. That is because title insurance protects against prior events that cause defects
in title. With a proper search and examination of prior ownership records, any such defects can
and almost always are readily identified and excluded from the policy's coverage. Consequently,
the average claim payout on a title insurance policy amounts to only about 5 percent of the total
premium collected. It is even lower in New York. This is very different from property coverage
(such as auto and home insurance) -- which protects against future occurrences over which the
insurer has little to no control -- where the average claim payout amounts to about 80 percent of
the total premium.
48. The "agency commissions" component of
the title insurance rate covers payments
made to title agents. Defendants have an ownership or management stake in many of the title
agencies to which these payments are made. A small portion of these payments is for the search
and exam of prior ownership records of the property being purchased to identify any liens,
encumbrances, burdens, exclusions, or other defects in the title. The search and exam fuction
does not involve the spreading or underwriting of
risk and title insurers typically outsource this
task to title agents.
49. The remainder, and by far the bulk, of
the agency commissions is comprised of
costs unrelated to the issuance of title insurance. These costs include kickbacks and other
financial inducements title insurers provide to title agents and indirectly (through title agents) to the lawyers, brokers, and lenders who, in reality, are the ones deciding which title insurer to use.
These payments have nothing to do with the issuance of title insurance and are made by title
insurers merely to inflate their revenues and steer business their way.
50. Under TIRSA's collective rate setting regime, roughly 85 percent of
the total title
insurance premium is based on the so-called "costs" associated with the payment of agency
commissions. Only 15 percent is based on costs associated with the risk of loss.
51. TIRSA publishes its final calculated title rates in the New York Title Insurance
Rate ManuaL. These rates are tied to the value of the property being insured. This is so despite
the fact that the costs associated with agency commissions are entirely unelated to the value of
the property. Indeed, agency kickbacks and enticements have little to do with producing a
particular title policy and provide no value -- proportional to property value or otherwise -- to the
consumer. Even search and exam costs are unrelated to property value. They instead depend on
the age of the property, the complexity of the ownership history, and the accessibilIty of
ownership records.
C. TIRSA's Formation
52. Prior to TIRSA, the New York Board of
Title Underwters ("NYBTU") served as
the title insurance rate-setting body in New York. NYTU, along with the title insurance rate
setting bureaus in many other states, was disbanded in the mid-1980s in the wake of a Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") challenge to the collective rate setting activity of many of
associations. The FTC's challenge culminated in FTC v. ricor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621
(1992), where the Supreme Cour held that to avoid per se ilegal price fixing lIability, the rate
setting activity of these rating bureaus must be actively supervised by the state.
53. In Ticor, like here, the FTC focused its challenge on agency commissions. The
FTC contended that the respective state insurance departments merely rubber-stamped this
portion of the collectively fixed rates without any independent review or analysis of their
reasonableness or cost justification. The Supreme Court agreed with the FTC that this kind of
limited state oversight was not suffcient. Rather, to avoid ilegal price-fixing liability, the state
insurance department has to "exercise(J sufficient independent judgment and control so that the
details of the rates or prices have been establIshed as a product of deliberate state intervention,
not simply by agreement among private parties." ricor, 504 U.S. at 634-35.
54. Following the Supreme Court's instruction in ricor, the Third Circuit on remand
in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 998 F.2d 1129 (3d Cir. 1993), upheld the FTC's finding that the
collective rate-setting of certain state rating bureaus was improper because it was not actively
supervised by the state. According to the circuit cour, "(t)he Supreme Court plainly instructed
us that a state's rubber stamp is not enough. Active supervision requires the state regulatory
authorities' independent review and approvaL" Id. at 1139.
55. Defendants formulated TIRSA's first rate manual and procedure soon after the
Supreme Cour's Ticor decision. Through TIRSA, defendants have set up a rate-setting scheme
to get around the rigors of state oversight required by ricor. They have done so by calculating a
single rate that comprises both risk and agency commission costs and by outsourcing to title
agents the agency commission costs. In this way, defendants avoid providing the Insurance
Department with any detailed breakout or backup for the bulk of the costs that make up their
collectively fixed rates.
56. TIRSA merely submits an aggregated figure that is supposed to represent the
total agency commission costs. Embedded within this figure is the vast quantity of dollars that
are funneled to and through the title agencies as kickbacks, financial inducements and other costs
unrelated to the issuance of title insurance. Defendants' design in all of
this has been to
effectively hide the cost basis for their artificially high and collectively fixed title insurance premiums from the regulatory scrutiny that Ticor demands.
D. Lack of Regulatory Supervision and Authority
57. There is no provision under the Insurance Law for TIRSA to include in its
collectively fixed rates kickbacks and other agency commission payments unrelated to the
title insurance. Indeed, the Insurance Department has openly acknowledged that it
lacks the authority to review any agency commission payments. It has likewise recognized that
defendants' outsourcing of agency commission costs has prevented it from performing a
meaningful review ofTIRSA's calculated rates. This was made clear at a November 2006 public
hearng the Insurance Department held -- the first in 15 years -- where it questioned TIRSA and
its members on TIRSA's failure to provide the Insurance Department with any backup or detail
for agency commissions.
58. Through this questioning, the head ofTIRSA admitted that neither TIRSA nor its
members have any idea of
what their agency commission costs actually cover:
Q. At the same time you've also testified that your members really don't know what the title agents are doing with the money that they're getting, in other words, they give them 85 percent and as far as they know they have no input
or no knowledge of what's being done with the money, I just want to make sure, is that correct? (Mark Presser, Assistant Deputy Superintendent of Ins.
Dept. )
knowing . . . what their (the title agents') expenses are, what their overheads are, what they pay in salaries, what they pay in administrative costs, what they pay in rent and what they pay with every other
A. I have no way of aspect of their overhead, I have no way of
knowing that. (David Skidikman,
Executive Director ofTIRSA)
revenue and expenses that are outside the control of
Q. I'm just getting at the point that a large portion of the data represents the (insurer) and outside of the control ofTIRSA and you have no specific knowledge as to how those
just said? (Assistant Deputy
dollars are being expended, as you
Superintendent of Ins. Dept.)
A. That's correct. (Executive Director of TIRSA)
59. The head ofTIRSA further admitted that TIRSA does not even know the actual
search and exam costs incured by title agents on behalf of TIRSA's members:
Q. What are the actual costs to title insurers to the agents to do the necessary searches and all the other things that they need to do in connection with a title search? (Howard Mils, Superintendent of Ins. Dept.)
A. We do not get the agents' statistics because that is between the (insurer) and the agent. (Executive Director ofTIRSA)
60. From this and other testimony at the hearing, the Insurance Department conceded
that it could not properly evaluate TIRSA's collectively set rates, and that it could only do so if it
obtained the detailed cost information on agency commissions that TIRSA does not provide:
Q. It seems to me that looking at costs, since this piece is such a significant what the rate is and that's part of what goes into the rate, it seems like that is really an area of inquiry that we should be making to understand what goes into that cost factor. I think that's really an area we need to explore. I don't know how to do that. It seems like it's a significant piece and it doesn't seem lIke anyone is really tellng us what goes into that. Would you agree
the rates? (Joseph Risi, Deputy Superintendent and General Counsel of Ins. Dept.)
that that's something we need to explore as part of
A. Now, TIRSA, as an organization, has no control or no dealing with the agents, we deal only with the (insurers). So we have no way of knowing what
the cost basis is certainly for the agents. . .. (Executive Director ofTIRSA).
61. Even defendant LAFG of
the LandAmerica family echoed this recognition that
there can be no meaningful review of TIRSA's calculated rates without first understanding the
agency commission costs that make up roughly 85 percent of
Q. If you don't look at the expenses of the agents, if you don't really do an
their costs. . ., how do you know the profit they're making is reasonable. . . if you or no one else delves into what they're actually spending the 85 percent on? (Assistant Deputy Superintendent of Ins. Dept.)
A. That's a good question. . .. (Bruce Wright, Senior Vice President of
LAFG)
62. The Insurance Department's recognition that it is not actively supervising
TIRSA's rate-setting activity is consistent with the April 2007 findings ofthe U.S. Governent
Accountability Offce ("GAO") that the title insurance industry is in dire need of greater state
regulation and oversight. The GAO studied the industry conditions of several states, including
New York, and concluded that "state regulators have not collected the type of data, primarily on
title agents' costs and operations, needed to analyze premium prices and underlying costs."
63. To remedy this failing, the GAO has proposed, among other things: 1)
strengthening the regulation of title agents through means such as establIshing meaningful
requirements of capitalization, lIcensing, and continuing education; and 2) improving the
oversight of title agents through more detailed audits and the collection of data that would allow
in-depth analyses of agents' costs and revenues.
64. The Insurance Deparment has recently tried to take its first steps in this direction
of providing some active oversight by proposing legislation that would impose a licensing
requirement on title agents. This legislation is currently pending before the New York
legislature. If enacted, it would bring title agents under the regulatory authority of the Insurance
Deparment for the first time. This would seemingly provide some assistance in filling the
regulatory vacuum that currently exists with regard to title agency costs.
65. However, even if
the legislature expands the Insurance Department's authority in
this way, this alone wil not be enough to solve the problem. As the GAO report found, there are
significant regulatory lapses even in those states that have lIcensing requirements for title agents:
the six regulators we reviewed collected financial and operational data on title agents, and regulatory offcials in both those states said that the data that they currently collect was insuffcient to analyze the appropriateness of (title) rates.
only two of
66. In any event, the Insurance Department's call for legislative assistance in
regulating title agents and reviewing their agency commissions further highlights the fact that it
currently has neither the authority nor the ability to properly assess defendants' collectively fixed
67. Unchecked by regulatory review and insulated from competition, defendants have
thus been able to collectively fix title insurance rates at supracompetitive levels and earn profits
that vastly exceed those contemplated by the Insurance Department or that would have resulted
10527 1.
E. Defendants' Inflated Rates and Excess Profits
68. At the time ofTIRSA's formation, the Insurance Department established 5 percent
the total premium) as the level of
profit to which title insurers are entitled. The Insurance
Deparment is supposed to carefully analyze TIRSA's rate calculations, and in particular, its
revenue and cost information, to ensure that this 5 percent profit level is maintained and based on
a reasonable premium. However, without the authority or ability to scrutinize agency commission costs, the Insurance Department has been unable to perform this function. As a
result, defendants (through TIRSA) have been able to set artificially high title premiums and
secure title profits far in excess of
the 5 percent threshold.
69. Through an independent investigation it conducted over the past several years, the
New York State Attorney General confirmed defendants' excess profits in this regard. It found
that for every dollar of insurance premium defendants collect, of the roughly 15 cents that
supposedly accounts for the risk of loss, only 3 cents is paid out in claims. And, of the roughly
85 cents that supposedly covers agency commissions, only between 8 and 11 cents goes to costs
actually incurred by title agents in producing the title policy. These numbers show that TIRSA's
collectively fixed rates have resulted in profits that vastly exceed the 5 percent profit level the
Insurance Department prescribed.
70. The Attorney General's investigation further revealed that what was largely
driving these bloated numbers were the kickbacks and other financial inducements defendants
were funneling to and through title agents to secure more business. As reported at the Insurance
Department's 2006 hearing, one title agency's financial statements revealed that it spent more
than $1 milion of
these so-called "agency commissions" on items identified as "Chrstmas,"
"automobile expenses," "polItical contributions," "promotional expenses," and "travel and
entertainment." These expenses are not even remotely related to the issuance of title insurance.
71. As one Assistant Attorney General involved in the investigation explained at the
hearing: "In essence, what is really happening is that the title insurance companies are paying the
title agent for referrng business to them." The Attorney General's offce concluded that "all this
excess money paid to the title agents by the title insurance company is a referral fee in violation
New York's Anti-kickback Law."
72. Numerous industry participants involved in the hearing corroborated the Attorney
General's findings of rampant kickbacks and inflated premiums. As one title agent for defendant
Chicago Title conceded: "Right now the title companies and some agents use the fees as a
marketing tool to get business. Long gone are the days of a lunch and round of golf. Today it is
40, 50, 60, 70 percent of a title premium for little or no work being performed."
73. Another title agent for Chicago Title (as well as for defendants Fidelity Title,
Ticor Title, First American Title, and Commonwealth) described the industry as having a
"rampant culture of ilegal kickbacks."
74. The former President of
the New York State Land Title Association summed it up
in this way. "Let's face it: there are no 'rules' governing title agencies in New York. Steering, kickbacks and referrals are open and notorious -- often aided and abetted by underwriters (the
title insurers)."
75. All of
this "excess money" paid to title agents not only works to steer business to
defendants. It also serves to boost defendants' own profits through the inflated revenues they
obtain to cover these agency payments and through their ownership or management stake in
many of these agencies.
76. At the Insurance Department Hearing, the Assistant Attorney General rhetorically
questioned how defendants could have accomplished such a regulatory run-around: "how could
this happen. . . why (are) the title insurance companies and the title agents in New York able to
reap such large profits?" The answer lies in defendants' scheme to set up a veritable "black box"
of inflated costs and revenues into which the Insurance Department has neither the authority nor
the ability to penetrate.
77. Defendants are competitors in the sale of
title insurance to consumers in New
York. Through TIRSA, these title insurers have agreed and engaged in concerted efforts to (i)
collectively set and charge uniform and supracompetitive rates for title insurance in New York, (ii) include in their calculated rates agency commission costs, (iii) embed within these costs
payoffs, kickbacks, and other charges that are unrelated to the issuance of
title insurance, and (iv)
hide these supposed "costs" from regulatory scrutiny by funneling them to and through title
agents which the Insurance Department has no abilIty or authority to regulate.
78. In the absence of
proper regulatory authority and oversight, defendants' conduct
title insurance in New
constitutes a horizontal agreement to fix the form, structure, and prices of
York and is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
79. Defendants' price-fixing activity has been continuous throughout the relevant
damages period and has been renewed and reinforced annually through TIRSA's submissions to
the Insurance Department of supposed cost and revenue information and its periodic submissions
of rate changes.
80. Through their collective price-fixing, deception, and manipulation of
regulatory process, defendants have harmed competition by charging consumers
supracompetitive prices for title insurance in New York.
81. New York's title insurance rates are among the highest in the country. According
to rate comparisons made by Bankrate.com, one of the country's leading aggregators of
rate information, New York title rates (based on insuring a property with a $200,000 mortgage)
are roughly 67 percent higher than the national average. The New York pricing gap is even
greater relative to the significantly lower pricing of many of
New York's Northeast neighbors
including Massachusetts (70%), Maryland (76%), Vermont (81 %), Delaware (83%), Maine
(85%), Washington D.C. (87%), and New Hampshire (111 %).
82. Defendant First American's own rate comparisons further confirm the vastly
inflated title rates in New York compared to the rest of
the country. First American's
calculations (based on a $200,000 mortgage) show that New York title rates are roughly 45%
higher than the national average. First American's calculations show that this gap is even greater
-- approaching or exceeding 100% -- as compared to the rates for many of
New York's neighbors
(including Massachusetts, Maryland, Vermont, Maine and New Hampshire).
83. Absent defendants' anticompetitive and deceptive conduct, New York consumers
would have paid significantly less for title insurance. These prices would have been more in line
with the significantly lower prices charged by title insurers in these other states where the
challenged price-fixing activity has not occurred.
84. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of
Civil Procedure for violations of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, New
York Business Law § 349, and the common law. The Rule (b)(3) Class is comprised of
consumers who purchased title insurance in New York from defendants or TIRSA's other
members during the fullest period permitted by the applicable statute of limitations.
85. Plaintiffs, along with all other members ofthe Rule (b)(3) Class, were injured as a
paying supracompetitive prices for title insurance in New York. These
supracompetitive prices were achieved as a result of defendants' anticompetitive, deceptive, and
otherwise unlawful conduct. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the ilegal pricefixing activities of all members ofTIRSA.
86. Members of the (b)(3) Class include hundreds of thousands, if
not milions, of
consumers. They are so numerous that their joinder would be impracticable.
87. Plaintiffs also bring this action as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of
Civil Procedure, for violations of
Section i of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and
Section 349 of
New York's General Business Law. The Rule (b)(2) Class includes all members
the (b)(3) Class, and all consumers who are threatened with injury by the anticompetitive and
deceptive conduct detailed herein.
88. Defendants have acted, continued to act, refused to act and continued to refuse to
act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b )(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final
with respect to the Rule (b)(2) Class as a whole.
the Rule (b)(2) Class include hundreds of
89. Members of
thousands, ifnot milions,
of consumers. They
are so numerous that their joinder would be impracticable.
90. Common questions of law and fact exist with respect to all Class members and
predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members. Among the
questions of law or fact common to the class are the following:
. Whether defendants have engaged in the alleged ilegal price-fixing activity.
. The duration and scope of defendants' alleged ilegal price-fixing activity.
· Whether defendants' alleged ilegal price-fixing has caused higher prices to plaintiffs and other purchasers of title insurance in New York.
· Whether the Insurance Department has actively supervised defendants' collective rate-setting activity.
· Whether defendants have engaged in the alleged consumer-oriented deceptive conduct.
91. Plaintiffs do not have any conflct of
interest with other Class members. Their
claims are typical of
the claims ofthe Class and they wil fairly and adequately reflect the
interests of the Class. Counsel competent and experienced in federal class action and federal
antitrust litigation has been retained to represent the Class.
92. This action is superior to any other method forthe fair and effcient adjudication
of this legal dispute since joinder of all members is not only impracticable, but impossible. The
damages suffered by certain members of the Class are small in relation to the expense and
burden of individual
litigation and therefore it is highly impractical for such Class members to
seek redress for damages resulting from defendants' anticompetitive and deceptive conduct.
93. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would also
impose heavy burdens upon the courts and defendants, and would create a risk of inconsistent or
varying adjudications of the question of law and fact common to the class. A class action, on the
other hand, would achieve substantial economies of time, effort and expense, and would assure
uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
94. There wil be no extraordinary diffculty in the management of the class action.
(Sherman Act Section I - Horizontal Price-Fixing)
95. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of
96. Defendants have entered into a continuing ilegal contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade, the purpose and effect of
which is to fix and maintain
supracompetitive prices to consumers for title insurance in New York. This contract,
combination, and conspiracy is ilegal per se under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
97. Defendants' contract, combination, or conspiracy is comprised of defendants'
efforts and agreement to (i) collectively fix uniform and supracompetitive rates for title insurance
in New York, (ii) include in their calculated rates agency commission costs, (iii) embed within
these costs payoffs, kickbacks, and other charges to title agents that are unelated to the issuance
title insurance, and (iv) hide these supposed costs from regulatory scrutiny by funnelIng them
to and through title agents.
98. Defendants' contract, combination, or conspiracy has caused substantial
competitive effects in the title insurance market. It has done so by causing plaintiffs, and
title insurance in New York, to pay significantly more for title insurance than
other purchasers of
they would have in the absence of defendants' ilegal activity.
99. As a result of these violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiffs and the
purorted Class have been injured in their business and property in an amount not presently
known, but which is, at a minimum, hundreds of milions of dollars, prior to trebling.
100. Such violations and the effects thereof are continuing and wil continue unless
injunctive relIef is granted. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
(New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349)
101. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of
102. Defendants' efforts to conceal the artificially high cost basis for their collectively
fixed title insurance premiums by (i) including unregulated and unauthorized costs in these premiums, and (ii) embedding these supposed costs within the agency commissions paid to title
agents who are not subject to regulatory review, constitute materially misleading and deceptive
consumer-oriented acts and practices in the conduct of a business trade or commerce and in the
furnishing of a service in New York, within the meaning of
New York General Business Law §
103. Plaintiffs and the Class have been injured as the direct and proximate result of
defendants' deceptive and misleading acts and practices. Through this conduct, defendants have
been able to escape regulatory oversight and thereby collectively set supracompetitive prices for
title insurance premiums in New York.
104. Defendants' deceptive and misleading acts and practices have had a broad impact
on, and have caused substantial injuries to, consumers in New York.
105. Without prejudice to their contention that defendants' unlawful conduct was
willing and knowing, plaintiffs and the Class do not seek at this time to have those damages trebled pursuant to New York General Business Law § 349(h).
(Unjust Enrchment)
106. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of
107. Defendants have been unjustly enrched through the overpayments they have
caused plaintiffs and the Class to pay for title insurance in New York.
108. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to have returned to each of
them the amount of
these overpayments as damages or restitution.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs and the Class request the following relief:
A. That the Cour declare, adjudge, and decree that defendants have committed the
violations of federal, New York state and common law alleged herein;
B. That defendants, their directors, offcers, employees, agents, successors, and
assigns be permanently enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, directly
indirectly (i) unlawfully fixing their New York title insurance rates, and
committing any other violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or of other
statutes having a similar purpose and effect, and (ii) engaging in any deceptive
acts or practices in the setting of
New York title insurance rates, and committing New York General Business Law § 349 or of other statutes
any other violations of
having a similar purpose and effect;
C. That the Court award damages sustained by plaintiffs and the Class from
defendants' violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in an amount to be proven
at trial, to be trebled according to law, plus interest (including prejudgment
interest), to compensate them for the overcharges they incurred;
D. That the Court award actual damages sustained by plaintiffs and the Class from
defendants' violations of
New York General Business Law § 349 in an amount to
be determined at triaL. Plaintiffs and the Class do not seek treble damages under
New York General Business Law § 349.
E. That the Court return to plaintiffs and the Class all overpayments they made to,
and which have unjustly enriched, defendants; and
F. That the Court award plaintiffs and the Class attorneys' fees and costs of suit, and
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues triable by jury.
CONST ANTINE CANNON LLP
Gordon Schnell (GS-2567)
Jean Kim (JK-8235) Gerard 1. Britton (GB-4423) Sam Rikkers (SR-1330)
New Y ork, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 350-2700
Interim Lead Counsel for all EDNY
Plaintif and the Putative Class Counsel;
Counsel for Brendan Dolan, Brian McHale,
Thomas Perry and Jonathan Rapaport
Jeffrey F. Keller Denise Diaz Kathleen R. Scanlan
425 Second Street, Suite 500
Of Counsel for Brendan Dolan, Brian McHale, Thomas Perry and Jonathan Rapaport
Holls L. Salzman (HS-5994)
Morissa Robin Falk (MF-2418) 140 Broadway New York, NY 10005
Facsimile: 212-818-0477
Counsel for MBSF Alabama LLC
Daniel Hume (DH 1358) Alice McInerney (AM 5484) David Kovel (DK 4760) David Bishop (DB 7476) 830 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022
Telephone: 212-371-6600
Facsimile: 212-751-2540
Counsel for Joseph Ragusa and Kristin
Miler Law LLC
Marvin A. Miler Lori A. Fanning
115 S. LaSalle Street Suite 2910 Chicago, IL 60603
Telephone: 312-332-3400
Facsimile: 312-676-2676
Counsel for Marshall Cook
The Law Offces of Allen L. Rothenberg
Harry Rothenberg (HR6795)
450 Seventh Ave, 11 th Floor
Telephone: 212-563-0100
Facsimile: 212-629-6813
Krauss Law Firm
David B. Krauss (DK8666)
Telephone: 212-965-1161
Counsel for Douglas Brown and Rebecca Brown
Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, PC
Eugene A. Spector Wiliam G. Caldes 1818 Market Street, Suite 2500 Philadelphia, P A 19103
Telephone: 215-496-0300
Facsimile: 215-496-6611
Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman &
Gross LLP
J. Douglas Richards Michael M. Buchman 100 Park Avenue, 26th Floor New York, NY 10119
Telephone: 212-661-1100
Facsimile: 212-661-8665
Counsel for Alex Wintner
Bernstein Nackman & Feinberg, LLP
Roger J. Bernstein (RB 9501) 233 Broadway, Suite 2701 New York, NY 10279
Telephone: 212-748-4800
Facsimile: 646-417-7890
Counsel for Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd.
Shepherd, Finkelman, Miler & Shah LLC
NatalIe Finkelman 35 East State Street Media, P A 19063
Telephone: 610-891-9880
Facsimile: 610-891-9883
Mager & Goldstein LLP
Jayne A. Goldstein 1640 Town Center Circle, Suite 216 Weston, FL 33326
Telephone: 954-515-0123
Facsimile: 954-515-0124
Counsellor Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd.
Girard Gibbs LLP Jonathan K. Levine (JL-8390) Daniel C. Girard
601 California Street, 14th Floor San Francisco, CA 94108
Telephone: 415-981-4800
Facsimile: 415-981-4846
Counsel lor Lawrence Fisher
Kaplan, Fox & Kilsheimer LLP
Robert N. Kaplan (RK-31 00)
Gregory K. Arenson (GA-2426) 850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY 10022
105271. i
Counsel for Lawrence Fisher
Meredith Cohen Greenfogel & Skirnick,
P.C. Robert A. Skirnick (RS-2636) Maria A. Skirnick One Liberty Plaza, 35th Floor New York, NY 10006
Telephone: 212-240-0020 Facsimile: 212-240-0021
Joel C. Meredith Steven J. Greefogel Daniel B. Allannoff
Telephone: 215-564-5182
Facsimile: 215-569-0958
for Rigoberto Capellan, Valerio
Gonzalez, Maria Elena Ochoa and Lenny Gonzalez
Steve W. Berman Anthony D. Shapiro 1301 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 Seattle, W A 98101
Telephone: 206-623-7292
Facsimile: 206-623-0594
Counsel lor Valerio Gonzalez, Maria Elena Ochoa and Lenny Gonzalez
Law Offices of Martin A. Wein
Martin A. Wein (MW -0870) 65-12 69th Place Middle Village, NY 11379
Telephone: 718-894-5501
Counsel for Christopher P. Ajemian,
Sara Juli, Vincent Barbieri, Teresa
Tannazzo Barbieri, Michael Lollo, Maeghan
Lollo, Brandon Raymar and Melinda Raymar
Zelle, Hofmann, V oelbel, Mason & Gette
Michael E. Jacobs Aaron M. McParlan 500 Washington Avenue South, Suite 4000 Minneapolis, MN 55415
Telephone: 612-339-2020
Facsimile: 612-336-9100
Of Counsel for Christopher P. Ajemian,
Tannazzo Barbieri, Michael Lollo, Maeghan Lollo, Brandon Raymar and Melinda Raymar
Murray, Frank & Sailer LLP Brian Murray (BM 9954) 275 Madison Avenue, Suite 801 New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (212) 682-1818
Facsimile: (212) 682-1892
Counsel for John Sheridan
Reinhardt, Wendorf & Blanchfield Mark Reinhardt Garrett Blanchfield E-1250 First National Bank Building St. Paul, MN 55101
Telephone: 651-287-2100
Facsimile: 651-287-2103
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