Source: http://legaliq.com/Case/Johnson_V_Avery
Timestamp: 2018-02-22 01:13:54
Document Index: 692119695

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2242', '§ 1915', '§ 2242', '§ 2241', '§ 2242', '§ 2255']

Johnson v. Avery (393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718)
Case Name: Johnson v. Avery
Citations: 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718, 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2442
Docket #: 40
Judges: Fortas
In July 1965 petitioner filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee a "motion for law books and a typewriter," in which he sought relief from his confinement in the maximum security building. The District Court treated this motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing, ordered him released from disciplinary confinement and restored to the status of an ordinary prisoner. The District Court held that the regulation was void because it in effect barred illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus and conflicted with 28 U. S. C. § 2242.[1] 252 F. Supp. 783.
The State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the regulation did not unlawfully conflict with the federal right of habeas corpus. According to the Sixth Circuit, the interest of the State in preserving prison discipline and in limiting the practice of law to licensed attorneys justified whatever burden the regulation might place on access to federal habeas corpus. 382 F. 2d 353.
This Court has constantly emphasized the fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme,[2] and the Congress has demonstrated its solicitude for the vigor of the Great Writ.[3] The Court has steadfastly insisted that "there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired." Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 26 (1939).
Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed. For example, the Court has held that a State may not validly make the writ available *486 only to prisoners who could pay a $4 filing fee. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961). And it has insisted that, for the indigent as well as for the affluent prisoner, post-conviction proceedings must be more than a formality. For instance, the State is obligated to furnish prisoners not otherwise able to obtain it, with a transcript or equivalent recordation of prior habeas corpus hearings for use in further proceedings. Long v. District Court, 385 U. S. 192 (1966). Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
For example, in Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968), the practice of racial segregation of prisoners was justified by the State as necessary to maintain good order and discipline. We held, however, that the practice was constitutionally prohibited, although we were careful to point out that the order of the District Court, which we affirmed, made allowance for "the necessities of prison security and discipline." Id., at 334. And in Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941), this Court invalidated a state regulation which required that habeas corpus petitions first be submitted to prison authorities and then approved by the "legal investigator" to the parole board as "properly drawn" before being transmitted to the court. Here again, the State urged that the requirement was necessary to maintain prison discipline. But this Court held that the regulation violated the principle that "the state and its officers may not *487 abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus." 312 U. S., at 549. Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255, 257 (1942).
In most federal courts, it is the practice to appoint counsel in post-conviction proceedings only after a petition for post-conviction relief passes initial judicial evaluation and the court has determined that issues are presented calling for an evidentiary hearing. E. g., Taylor v. Pegelow, 335 F. 2d 147 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F. 2d 404 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1964). See 28 U. S. C. § 1915 (d); R. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus 71-73 (1965).[6]
*488 It has not been held that there is any general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate, without more, that they wish to seek post-conviction relief. See, e. g., Barker v. Ohio, 330 F. 2d 594 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1964). Accordingly, the initial burden of presenting a claim to post-conviction relief usually rests upon the indigent prisoner himself with such help as he can obtain within the prison walls or the prison system. In the case of all except those who are able to help themselvesusually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisonersthe prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.
Even in the absence of such alternatives, the State may impose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon the acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse both the giving and the seeking of assistance in the preparation of applications for relief: for example, by limitations on the time and location of such activities and the imposition of punishment for the giving or receipt of consideration in connection with such activities. Cf. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F. 2d 632 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961) (sustaining as reasonable regulations on the time and location of prisoner work on their own petitions). But unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.[11]
"[I]n any legal assistance corporation, supported by Federal antipoverty funds, the executive staff, and those with the responsibility to hire and discharge staff from the very top to the lowest lay *492 echelon must be lawyers." Matter of Action for Legal Services, 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 360, 274 N. Y. S. 2d 779, 787 (1966).
[1] 28 U. S. C. § 2242 provides in part: "Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf."
[2] E. g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963).
[3] 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241-2255.
[11] In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals relied on the power of the State to restrict the practice of law to licensed attorneys as a source of authority for the prison regulation. The power of the States to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U. S. 379 (1963). In any event, the type of activity involved herepreparation of petitions for post-conviction reliefthough historically and traditionally one which may benefit from the services of a trained and dedicated lawyer, is a function often, perhaps generally, performed by laymen. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2242 apparently contemplates that in many situations petitions for federal habeas corpus relief will be prepared by laymen.
[1] The New York program that is funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and which as noted was first rejected by the New York courts, is called Community Action for Legal Services. It was finally approved by the New York courts with a board of directors of 20 lawyers and 10 laymen. 158 N. Y. L. J. No. 72, pp. 1, 5 (1967).
[6] L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts: A Preliminary Summary (Amer. Bar Foundation 1964); Note, Legal Services for the Poor, 49 Mass. L. Q. 293 (1964); O. E. O. and Legal ServicesA Symposium, 14 Catholic Law. 92-174 (1968); Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 514; Uelmen, Post-Conviction Relief for Federal Prisoners Under 28 U. S. C. § 2255: A Survey and a Suggestion, 69 W. Va. L. Rev. 277 (1967).
[9] See, e. g., People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 397 P. 2d 993 (1965). Note, Indigent's Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings in California: People v. Shipman, 13 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 446 (1966).
[15] Barkin, Impact of Changing Law Upon Prison Policy, 47 Prison J. 3, 8 (1969). And see Matter of Cornell Legal Aid Clinic, 26 App. Div. 2d 790, 273 N. Y. S. 2d 444.
[24] "Reasonable access to the courts is . . . a right [secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States], being guaranteed as against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so far as access by state prisoners to federal courts is concerned, this right was recognized in Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546, 549. . . . The right of access by state prisoners to state courts was recognized in White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 762, n. [1]." Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F. 2d 632, 636 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1961).
Did you want to cite the JOHNSON V. AVERY court case? Copy and paste the below to your blog or Web page or create a forum post.