Source: http://tulanelink.com/legal/reply_00a.htm
Timestamp: 2017-03-28 13:44:36
Document Index: 707039723

Matched Legal Cases: ['§455', '§455', '§455', '§455', '§455', '§144', '§144', '§455', '§455', '§455']

Reply Brief, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Case No. 00-30704
(Case No. 00-30704, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, December 7, 2000)
00-30704
Civil Action No. 98-1792 c/w 98-2102,
The Honorable Ginger Berrigan, Judge, Presiding
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
RECUSE ITSELF
A. THE GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
MANDATES RECUSAL BY THE DISTRICT COURT
B. TITLE 28 U.S.C. SECTION 455(A) REQUIRES RECUSAL
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE RETALIATION CLAIM
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NEGATIVE REFERENCE LETTER IS NOT AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
B. BERNOFSKY HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION AND HAS ESTABLISHED THE ULTIMATE "BUT FOR" ISSUE OF UNLAWFUL RETALIATION
C. BERNOFSKY PROVES PRETEXT BY SHOWING THAT THE BEAL REFERENCE LETTER WAS NEGATIVE
D. BERNOFSKY'S RETALIATION CLAIM IS STRENGTHENED BY HIS EVIDENCE OF A PATTERN OF RETALIATION BY TULANE AND ITS AGENTS
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DEFAMATION CLAIM
Carter v. West Publishing Company, No. 99-11959-EE, 1999 WL 994997 (llth Cir. November 1, 1999)
Carter v. West Publishing Company No. 99-11959 (llth Cir. September 7, 2000)
Cortese v. United States, 782 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1986)
In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)
Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994) at 548, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127
L.Ed.2d 474
Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 305, n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996)
Martin v. Lincoln General Hospital, 588 So.2d 1329, 1332-33
(La.App. 2d Cir. 1991)
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company, 104 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 1997)
Potashnick v. Port City Contr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980)
Republic of Panama v. The American Tobacco Company. Inc., No. 99-30685 (5th Cir. July 17, 2000)
Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997)
Trust Co. v. N.N.P., 104 F.3d 1478, 1491 (5th Cir. 1997)
United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 1999)
United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 497 F.2d
107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)
5, 6, 11,
28 U.S.C. Section 455(a)
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 16
1974 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 6351, 6354-55
Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, 1999 Ed., Vol II,
Chapter V, Section 3.4-3(a)
Judicial Conduct and Ethics, 2 Ed., Shaman, J.M., Lubet, S., Alfini, J.J.; Michie Law Pub., Charlottesville, VA (1995), p. 146
Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745 (1973)
Top TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:
Dr. Carl Bernofsky ("Bernofsky") replies to the legal and
factual arguments presented in the Brief of the Administrators of
the Tulane Educational Fund ("Tulane") as follows:
I. The district court abused its discretion in refusing to recuse
Defendant misstates the financial arrangement between Tulane
and Judge Berrigan. She received a stipend of $5,000.00 to be
spent any way she desired. She could take advantage of the
prearranged group rates for transportation and lodging and have
money left over to use as she pleased. This was not an
arrangement that they would only reimburse expenses, with a cap
of $5,500.00. Judge Berrigan was given $5,500.00.
A. The Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures mandates recusal by the district court.
Defendant acknowledges on page 17 of its Brief that the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, 1999 Ed., Vol II,
Chapter V, Section 3.4-3(a) at page V-39 states that a judge who
teaches at a law school should recuse himself from all cases
involving that institution as a party. [Record Excerpts, Exhibit
11]. The Defendant also acknowledges that Bernofsky's position is
that this judiciary policy mandates that Judge Berrigan recuse
herself. [Original Brief, page 20]. After acknowledging
Bernofsky's argument, Defendant states that it will address this
argument [Tulane Brief, page 17] but then fails to address it other than to say that the standard for Section 3.4-3(a) is the
same as the standard for Section 455(a). This is not the case.
Section 3.4-3(a) specifically states that a judge who teaches at
a law school should recuse himself from all cases involving that
institution as a party. There is no mention in Section 455(a) of
a judge teaching at a law school.
Although the Defendant in its Brief ignores this specific
language of Section 3.4-3(a), the district court concluded that the rule does not provide clear guidance. [Record Excerpts
Exhibit 5, page 4]. The district court noted that the Code of
Conduct for Judges did not distinguish between a paid and an
unpaid position. That distinction became irrelevant when Judge
Berrigan accepted the stipend.
After discussing the ambiguities of Section 3.4-3(a), the
district court stated that it would welcome clear guidance from a
higher court on this issue.
The language of 3.4-3(a) is clear. When Judge Berrigan
taught a law school class for a stipend, she clearly taught at a
law school. The Code of Conduct states that if she teaches at a
law school, she should recuse herself from all cases involving
that institution as a party. The institution, Tulane, is a party
in this case; therefore, the district court judge abused her
discretion in not recusing herself in this case.
Tulane, at page 18 of its Brief, cites the case of
Potashnick v. Port City Contr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.
1980) as if it states that the standard for interpreting Section
455(a) is the same as the standard for interpreting 3.4-3(a) of
the Code of Conduct for Judges. However, the Potashnick case does
not even mention Paragraph 3.4-3(a) of the Code of Conduct for Judges.
The Potashnick case does provide guidance of how Section
455(a) is an objective standard that is different from the prior
provision, which was a subjective standard.
"Section 455(a) provides that a judge shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which 'his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.' This language sets up an objective
standard rather than the subjective standard set forth in the
prior statute through use of the phrase 'in his opinion.' According to the report of the House Judiciary Committee, the
general standard of section 455(a) was designed to promote the
public's confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the
judicial process by saying, in effect, that if any reasonable
factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality exists, the
judge 'shall' disqualify himself and let another judge preside.
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 6351, 6354-55." Id.
"Clearly, the goal of the judicial disqualification statute
is to foster the appearance of impartiality... This overriding
concern with appearances, which also pervades the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial
system in which the public has unwavering confidence. As this
court has noted, 'the protection of the integrity and dignity of
the judicial process from any hint or appearance of bias is the
palladium of our judicial system.' United States v. Columbia
Broadcasting System Inc., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974). Any question of a judge's impartiality threatens the purity of the
judicial process and its institutions." Id.
"Because 28 U.S.C. §455(a) focuses on the appearance of
impartiality, as opposed to the existence in fact of any bias or
prejudice, a judge faced with a potential ground for
disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a
given case looks to the average person on the street. Use of the
word 'might' in the statute was intended to indicate that
disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to
know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality. Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in
the Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745 (1973)." Id.
B. Title 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a) requires recusal.
Using the standard for interpreting Section 455(a) set by
the Fifth Circuit in the Potashnick case, the district court
abused its discretion in not recusing itself. In the case cited
in Tulane's Brief on page 18, United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d
152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit stated that the Court
should view the question of recusal through the eyes of a well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, which is an objective standard. However, the Court further cited language that indicates that judges have problems being objective because they are reluctant to impugn themselves. Judge Berrigan was not objective when she concluded that she is impartial in this case.
"The Seventh Circuit (in the case of In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)), recognized the problem with
implementing this objective standard. Id. Judges must ascertain
how a reasonable person would react to the facts. Problematic is
the fact that Judges do not stand outside of the judicial system;
they are intimately involved in the process of obtaining justice.
Judges who are asked to recuse themselves are reluctant to impugn
their own standards. Likewise, Judges sitting in review of others
do not like to cast aspersions. 'Yet drawing all inferences
favorable to the honesty and care of the Judge whose conduct has
been questioned could collapse the appearance of impropriety
standard under §455(a) into a demand for proof of actual
impropriety.' Id. Accordingly, we are mindful that an observer of
our judicial system is less likely to credit Judges' impartiality
than the judiciary." Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156.
The Fifth Circuit in Jordan held that the reasonable person
would harbor doubts about the trial judge's impartiality. It
further held that the trial judge abused his discretion in not
granting the motion to recuse. The Fifth Circuit in Jordan
clearly follows the average person on the street objective
standard for examining whether the conduct of the judge has the
appearance of partiality. The standard is not whether the judge
thinks his or her conduct presents the appearance of partiality,
but whether the average person on the street thinks so.
Tulane invents a new standard in viewing the trial
judge's impartiality, the reasonable plaintiff. Tulane argues that, because, according to Tulane, Bernofsky is not a
stereotypical reasonable man, the trial judge does not have to
recuse herself. [Tulane Brief at 19-21]. Under this newly
invented theory of Tulane, it doesn't matter if Tulane gives the
trial judge $5,500.00 or $5,500,000.00. Because Bernofsky is not
a reasonable man, the trial judge is not obligated to recuse
herself. Tulane, under its unique and inventive theory, examines
the conduct of the plaintiff to decide if the judge should recuse
herself. Apparently, under Tulane's reasonable plaintiff theory,
the more reasonable the conduct of the plaintiff, the greater the
obligation of the trial judge to recuse herself.
Tulane incorrectly states, on page 19 of its Brief, that
Bernofsky contends that the trial judge bartered her
impartiality, betrayed her oath of office, and jeopardized her
very young judicial career in exchange for two weeks in Greece.
In the first place, it was three weeks in Greece. More
importantly, Bernofsky does not have to prove that the trial
judge was partial to Tulane when she dismissed Bernofsky's case.
Bernofsky merely has to establish that the average person on the
street would view the judge's conduct of accepting a stipend of
$5,500.00 to teach a three-week course in Greece, paid for by the
defendant in the case she is litigating, as having the appearance
of partiality.
Tulane then examines the reason for Bernofsky's former
counsel for withdrawing from the case. [Tulane Brief, page 20].
This is totally irrelevant, and the information comes from
outside of the record in this case.
Tulane next examines Bernofsky's Web site and pronounces it
an evolving manifesto on the evils of Tulane and of Judge
Berrigan. This is totally irrelevant, and the information comes
from outside of the record in this case.
Apparently, under Tulane's recusal theory, the factors to be
considered in determining if the trial judge should recuse
herself are: reasons for the withdrawal of plaintiff's
counsel and the characteristics of plaintiff's Web site.
The argument by Tulane that Bernofsky is "judge shopping" because he didn't seek recusal until after Judge Berrigan granted
summary judgment in the 1995 discrimination case is spurious.
Bernofsky did not know of Judge Berrigan's ties to Tulane until
after he had filed his appeal in the earlier case. The reason
Bernofsky didn't know of Judge Berrigan's ties to Tulane is
because Judge Berrigan did not disclose her association with
Tulane. Contrary to the allegation of Tulane, Judge Berrigan's
association with Tulane was not readily ascertainable.
Whether Judge Berrigan's association with Tulane was readily
ascertainable is not the issue. Judge Berrigan had a duty to
disclose to Bernofsky and his counsel her association with Tulane
because Tulane is the defendant in the case. According to the
treatise Judicial Conduct and Ethics:
"...it is the obligation of a judge to disclose all
facts that might be grounds for disqualification."
"It is not the duty of the parties to search out
disqualifying facts about the judge . . . it is the
judge's obligation to disclose all possibly
disqualifying facts."
Judicial Conduct and Ethics, 2 Ed., Shaman, J.M., Lubet, S.,
Alfini, J.J.; Michie Law Pub., Charlottesville, VA (1995), p. 146.
Justice Scalia in Liteky, in discussing the revision of §455 stated:
...[T]wo paragraphs of the [most recent] revision
[of §455] brought into §455 elements of general 'bias
and prejudice' recusal that had previously been
addressed only by §144. Specifically, paragraph (b)(1)
entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in
§144 ('bias or prejudice'), but (1) made them
applicable to all justices, judges and magistrates (and
not just district judges), and (2) placed the
obligation to identify the existence of those grounds
upon the judge himself, rather than requiring recusal
only in response to a party affidavit. (Emphasis
Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540 (1994) at 548, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474.
Again, Tulane is looking at the conduct of Bernofsky and not
the conduct of the trial judge in addressing the recusal issue.
Tulane claims that Bernofsky was judge shopping because he did
not request recusal until after summary judgment was granted in
the first case. Bernofsky did not know of the judge's ties to
Tulane at that time, and in the absence of any evidence that
Bernofsky knew of the judge's ties to Tulane, Tulane states that
the judge's ties to Tulane were readily ascertainable. The duty
is on the judge to disclose the ties to the defendant that may be
grounds for recusal. It is not the litigant's duty to investigate
the judge to try to find ties to the defendant that may be
grounds for recusal. Whether these grounds are readily
ascertainable or not is irrelevant.
Bernofsky was not judge shopping. He just wants a judge who
is not being paid by the defendant. Judge Lemelle and Magistrate
Judges Wilkinson and Africk all recused themselves from this case
because of their ties to Tulane. Judge Schwartz recused himself
from the Rubinstein case because of his ties to Tulane. [Original
Brief, pages 25-26]. It is not judge shopping to request that the
trial judge have no ties to the defendant in the case.
Tulane next states that the case law cited by Bernofsky is
inapplicable. Not so. Bernofsky cites a recent Fifth Circuit
case, Republic of Panama v. The American Tobacco Company, Inc.,
No. 99-30685 (5th Cir., July 17, 2000) that demonstrates
circumstances that the Fifth Circuit considers to be sufficient
for the recusal of the trial judge. [Original Brief, pages 22-23]. In addition, the Fifth Circuit in the Republic of Panama
case clearly states the following analysis in which this Court
reviews a denial by the trial judge of a motion to recuse for
"28 U.S.C. §455(a) states that a judge should recuse
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. In order to determine whether a court's
impartiality is reasonably in question, the objective inquiry is
whether a well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer would
question the court's impartiality." Trust Co. v. N.N.P., 104 F.3d
1478, 1491 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Jordan, 49
F.3d 152, 155-58 (5th Cir.1995)). The review of a recusal order
under §455(a) is "extremely fact intensive and fact bound;"
thus, a close recitation of the factual basis for the appellant's
recusal motion is necessary. As this court has previously pointed
out, the purpose of Section 455(a) and the principle of recusal
itself is not just to prevent actual partiality, but to "avoid
even the appearance of partiality." Jordan, 49 F.3d at 155. "The analysis of a Section 455(a) claim must be guided, not by
comparison to similar situations addressed by prior
jurisprudence, but rather by an independent examination of the
facts and circumstances of the particular claim. United States v.
Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Jordan, 49
F.3d at 157)." Republic of Panama v. The American Tobacco Company
Inc. at Paragraph 19.
Although the Fifth Circuit stated that a §455(a) claim
must not be guided by comparison to similar situations addressed
by prior jurisprudence, Tulane offers the case of Carter v. West
Publishing Company, No. 99-11959-EE, 1999 WL 994997 (llth Cir.
November 1, 1999) (Tjoflat, J.), as being closely analogous to
the case at bar. There are many differences between Carter and
the case at bar that explain why the Circuit Judge opined that he
should not recuse himself, and why this Honorable Court should
hold that Judge Berrigan should recuse herself.
The first difference is the relationship to the case of the
judge whose recusal is sought. In Carter, the plaintiff
attempted to have Circuit Judges Tjoflat and Birch of the
Eleventh Circuit recused from the case, not the trial judge.
These two circuit judges were not even on the Eleventh Circuit
panel that heard the appeal of the denial of class certification. The class certification issue was decided ten months later by a
different panel of Eleventh Circuit judges. Carter v. West
Publishing Company No. 99-11959 (llth Cir. September 7, 2000).
The judges that plaintiff attempted to recuse were on the
Eleventh Circuit panel that granted defendant's petition
to appeal the class certification under FRCP 23(f). Judge
Berrigan is the district court trial judge who was in position
to rule on the merits of Bernofsky's case and did, in fact, dismiss Bernofsky's case on summary judgment.
The second difference is the timing of the payment to the
judges in relation to when they took action in the case. Judge
Berrigan was awarded the stipend to travel to Greece during the
litigation and shortly before she granted summary judgment for
Tulane. On the other hand, the trips by Circuit Judge Tjoflat to
California occurred in 1983, 1984, and 1987. He participated in
the decision to permit an appeal of the decision to grant class
certification under FRCP 23(f) in June, 1999, 12 to 16 years
The third difference is that Judge Berrigan was given a
stipend of $5,500.00 to spend as she saw fit. Circuit Judge
Tjoflat was only provided food and lodging and reimbursed for his
other travel expenses.
The fourth difference is that Judge Berrigan was sent to
Thessaloniki, Greece for three weeks to teach a one hour class
daily. Circuit Judge Tjoflat was sent to Palm Springs, California
for three meetings in three different years to decide the
recipient of the Devitt Award. There is more of a holiday flare
to the three week trip to Greece. Not many people ever travel to
Greece; even fewer get to spend three weeks in Greece, and fewer still receive a stipend to travel to Greece for three weeks. Judge
Berrigan was generously given this rare trip to Greece in the
middle of proceedings against the defendant, who was footing the
bill for the trip.
Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
cited on page 23 of Defendant's Brief, allows judges to receive reimbursement of expenses for the teaching at seminars "if the
source of such payments does not give the appearance of
influencing the judge in the judge's judicial duties or otherwise
give the appearance of impropriety." (emphasis added) It was improper for Tulane to offer the Greece teaching assignment in
the midst of Judge Berrigan presiding over a case against Tulane.
It was improper for Judge Berrigan to accept the stipend because
of the appearance of impropriety. It was improper for Judge
Berrigan not to disclose the trip and stipend to the parties in
this case, and it was improper for Judge Berrigan, having decided
to accept the trip and the stipend, not to recuse herself.
Defendant cites the case of Cortese v. United States, 782
F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1986) as authority for the proposition that
recusal is not mandatory when the U.S. Marines, while a defendant
in the case, treats the trial judge like a "Marine for a day"
during the litigation. Although the Ninth Circuit in 1986 did not
mandate recusal, it stated that, because the case was subject to
further hearing below, "the trial judge might prefer, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, to reassign the case to a
different judge in light of the concerns we have expressed." The
Ninth Circuit stated that the government acted improperly in
presenting the judge dramatic and unnecessary hospitalities. Id.
There is no comparison between "Marine for a day" and a three week trip to Greece with stipend. The judge in Cortese did
not accept a stipend. The hospitalities bestowed upon the judge
in Cortese for one day do not come close to the desirability of a
trip to Greece. All of the hospitalities were related to viewing
property from a fighter jet. The physical exam., parachute and
safety training, and briefings were all necessary to fly in a
fighter jet. There was a rationale for having the judge fly in
the jet. One issue was jet traffic over a piece of property.
Defendant states that the conduct was far more egregious in
Cortese than Judge Berrigan's conduct because it occurred during
the course of litigation. However, the case at bar was also in
the course of litigation when Judge Berrigan chose to accept and
not disclose Tulane's generous offer.
Contrary to the statements of the Defendant, Bernofsky is
not attempting to restrict Judge Berrigan from being involved in
civic organizations. However, if the association with any particular organization gets too close, then she should not
preside over a case with that organization as a party to the
Contrary to the statements of the Defendant, Bernofsky is not manipulating the system for strategic reasons. There is no proof of this. This is mere conjecture or wild speculation. If the Court denies recusal on this unfounded basis, there would never be an occasion for recusal.
Finally, the Defendant is misguided when it states that
there is a strong policy presumption against recusal. While it is
true that historically there used to be a traditional "duty to
sit," the legislative history of Section 455(a) indicates that
this Section was meant to lessen this traditional "duty to sit"
and to require avoidance of even the appearance of partiality.
[Original Brief, page 24].
Therefore, Title 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a) requires that the
district court recuse itself in this case.
II. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the
A. The district court erred in concluding that the negative
reference letter is not an adverse employment action.
The district court clearly holds that a negative reference
letter is not an adverse employment action. [Record Excerpts,
Exhibit 3, page 14]. The district court went on to state that the
adverse employment action is the failure of the prospective
employer to hire Bernofsky. Because of this conclusion
by the district court, the district court then concluded that
Bernofsky offered no proof that the negative reference letter was
a determinative factor in Bernofsky not being hired. This is not
true. Bernofsky did offer evidence that he would have made the
short list of candidates at the University of Houston but for the
negative reference letter. [Original Brief, page 37].
The point is that the district court concluded that the
negative reference letter is not an adverse employment action
because it went on to the issue of whether or not the negative
reference letter was a determinative factor in not getting hired.
If the district court had correctly concluded that a negative
reference letter is an adverse employment action, it would not be
necessary to prove that the Bernofsky was not hired because of
The district court invites this Court to revisit its
minority position of adverse employment actions stated in Mattern
v Eastman Kodak Company, 104 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 1997). [Record
Excerpts, Exhibit 3, page 13]. Using the restrictive language in
Mattern, the district court hesitantly concluded that a negative
reference letter was not an adverse employment action. That
conclusion was error by the district court. There have been no
holdings on this issue that agree with the district court. On the contrary, there is legal precedent on this issue that concludes
that a negative reference letter is an adverse employment action
from the Ninth Circuit, several district courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337 (1997). [Original Brief, pages 32-36].
This Court should reverse the district court's holding that
the negative reference letter is not an adverse employment action because an employee would never be able to prove
retaliation by an ex-employer in the form of a negative reference
if that employee had to prove that he didn't get the job because
of the negative reference. This is because the reference is used
at the initial stage of the hiring process. After the reference
stage is the interview stage. There is usually more than one
candidate being interviewed. The final hiring decision is made
after the interview of candidates. If the negative reference
prevents the interview, it would be impossible to compare the
interview results with the candidate that is ultimately hired. Such a scenario would allow an ex-employer to give retaliatory
negative reference letters without being accountable for its
actions. This result is contrary to the holding in Robinson,
which decision this Court is bound to follow.
B. Bernofsky has established a prima facie case of retaliation and has established the ultimate "but for" issue of unlawful retaliation.
Bernofsky engaged in protected activity by filing a lawsuit alleging discrimination protected by Title VII. Tulane took
adverse action against him by giving him a negative reference
letter. There is a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. The causal connection
is stated in the letter, namely that the letter was written
because of the pending litigation.
This statement in the Beal letter, in addition to establishing the causal connection element of the prima facie case, also establishes the "but for" cause that Tulane identifies as the ultimate issue of unlawful retaliation. Long v. Eastfield
College, 88 F.3d 300, 305, n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996). There is no doubt
that, but for the pending litigation, Mr. Beal would not have
written his letter. It says so in the letter.
C. Bernofsky proves pretext by showing that the Beal reference
letter was negative.
Tulane's alleged legitimate nonretaliatory explanation for
the Beal letter is that it was not negative. Bernofsky has
evidence of pretext, namely that the Beal letter is negative in
the context of academia.
Tulane misquotes the district court in stating that the
district court found that the statements in the Beal letter, that
Bernofsky had sued Dr. Karam personally and that Bernofsky no
longer had any research funds to support his position, were
"substantially true." The district court actually said that the
statements were substantially true, and even if technically
inaccurate, they were not retaliatory. Thus, the district court
admitted that these statements were inaccurate.
The district court erred in ignoring Bernofsky's evidence
that the Beal letter, as written, was negative in the specific
context of academia. Tulane and the district court contend that the letter is not negative because it could have been worse.
The issue is whether the letter, as it exists, is negative. The
answer is: yes, it is negative.
According to Wolinsky, the false statement that Bernofsky had sued the head of the department was the "kiss of death" for
any effort by Wolinsky to help Bernofsky find work. According to
Stjernholm, the false statement that Bernofsky had sued the head of the department personally was a "red flag," and he would
immediately "throw out" Bernofsky's application with such a
statement. [Original Brief, page 46]. This is clearly a negative
statement in the context of academia, where heads of departments
have the final say in hiring for their department.
The false statement that Bernofsky no longer had any
research funds to support his position is also a negative
statement in the context of academia, especially when referring
to a research professor. Dr. Dalton, in his expert report, states that this statement casts doubt on Bernofsky's ability to contribute to the support of his research. Dr. Dalton concludes
that, to protect the integrity of his department's programs and
the university's reputation, he would recommend "rejecting any
application that included a letter such as Mr. Beal's." [Record
Excerpts, Exhibit 24, page 2]. The above evidence that the Beal
letter is negative proves that the reason offered for the adverse
action is a pretext for retaliation.
D. Bernofsky's retaliation claim is strengthened by his evidence
of a pattern of retaliation by Tulane and its agents.
Tulane claims to be confused as to why Bernofsky has
presented evidence of a pattern of retaliation to the Court.
[Tulane Brief, page 46]. Bernofsky presented this series of
retaliatory acts by Tulane to show the fact finder that it is
more probable that Tulane was retaliating when Beal wrote his
letter than if the prior retaliatory acts had not occurred.
Bernofsky has no desire to relitigate his prior claims. Bernofsky
is claiming no damages for the retaliatory acts stated at pages
40 to 44 of his Brief.
III. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the
The false statements in the Beal letter are
both false and defamatory. The fact that Bernofsky had the grant money when he was fired makes the statement that he didn't have any funds false. The statement that Bernofsky no longer had any research funds harmed his reputation in the academic community. Bernofsky was a research professor, and a statement that he no longer had any research funds would lower the opinion of others in the academic community of the ability of Bernofsky to do his job.
The second false statement, that Bernofsky sued the head of
his department personally, is also defamatory in the context of
academia. Professors are granted or denied tenure based on three areas, teaching, research, and collegiality. Obviously, it
is damaging to Bernofsky's reputation in the area of collegiality
if a false statement is made that he sued the head of his
department personally.
Both Tulane and the district court used an incorrect
measurement to determine if the false statements were defamatory.
They both used the standard of the average person, who is not
familiar with academia. The definition of defamatory in the case
of Martin v. Lincoln General Hospital, 588 So.2d 1329, 1332-33
(La.App. 2d Cir. 1991) included those statements that injure one
in his occupation. Tulane's two false statements injure Bernofsky
in his occupation.
There was obviously publication to Dr. Wolinsky and
resulting injury to Bernofsky. The only other element of
defamation is that the statement was made with fault (negligence
or greater) on the part of Mr. Beal. Trentecosta v. Beck, 703
So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997). Fault is proven by the fact that Mr.
Beal knew about the research funds when he wrote the letter.
Also, as an attorney, Mr. Beal knew that the head of the
department was not sued personally. These facts are sufficient to
show fault on the part of Mr. Beal.
Therefore, Bernofsky has presented sufficient evidence of
defamation to survive summary judgment.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment, and
this Court should reverse and remand for trial or reverse and
render and remand for damages.
Top CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 7th day of December, 2000, I served
copies of the above Brief in both paper and electronic form by
U.S. Mail, properly addressed and postage prepaid, on the following counsel of record:
s/ Victor R. Farrugia Victor R. Farrugia
REVISED CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 32.2 and .3, the undersigned certifies
this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7).
1. EXCLUSIVE OF THE EXEMPTED PORTIONS IN 5TH CIR. R. 32.2, THE
BRIEF CONTAINS (select one):
A. 5,289 words, OR
B. _____________ lines of text in monospaced typeface.
Software Name and Version: WordPerfect 8.0 in (Typeface Name and Font Size): Courier Regular , OR
___________________________________________ 3. THE UNDERSIGNED UNDERSTANDS A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN
COMPLETING THIS CERTIFICATE, OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TYPE-VOLUME
LIMITS IN FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7), MAY RESULT IN THE COURT'S
STRIKING THE BRIEF AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PERSON
SIGNING THE BRIEF.
s/ Victor R. Farrugia Signature of filing party