Source: http://circuit6.blogspot.com/2017/09/
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 07:34:25
Document Index: 737668867

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 111', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 111', '§ 2', '§ 111', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3']

Sixth Circuit Blog: September 2017
Whittling away Johnson: Assault with weapon or serious bodily harm are crimes of violence
The Sixth Circuit yesterday, in United States v. Verwiebe, held that two federal crimes—assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury—constitute “crimes of violence” under the “elements clause” in the career-offender guideline.
According to the court, even though simple common law “assault” by itself may not be a crime of violence, once you add “use of a dangerous weapon” or a resulting “serious bodily injury,” it does. In the court’s view, it’s impossible to commit an assault with a weapon or that results in serious bodily injury without using or threatening violent physical force.
The court scoffed at the idea that these forms of assault could be committed without violent force because an offender could use poison:
The “use of physical force” is not the drop of liquid in the victim’s drink; it is employing poison to cause serious bodily harm. See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014). Under Verwiebe’s theory, tripping somebody into oncoming traffic, or for that matter perpetrating a sarin gas attack, would not be a crime of violence. Creative minds, once unhinged from common sense, might even suggest that pulling the trigger of a gun is not a sufficiently direct use of physical force. Sentencing law does not turn on such fine, reality-defying distinctions.
The court also rejected its prior precedent holding offenses are not crimes of violence if “a mental state of recklessness suffices for conviction,” reasoning that this prior precedent was overruled by Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2280 (2016).
Posted by Benton Martin, E.D. Mich. at 12:27 PM No comments:
The Court today denied a defendant's right to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. section 2255 petition, confirming that the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243 (2016) did not create a new rule of law, but rather, was compelled by over 25 years of prior precedent. The Court further found that United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016) did not support any successive filing, as it was not Supreme Court precedent made explicitly retroactive.
Today's ruling in In re Conzelmann can be found here.
Posted by Colleen Fitzharris, E.D. Mich. at 3:53 PM No comments:
Posted by Colleen Fitzharris, E.D. Mich. at 9:24 PM No comments:
Sixth Circuit Vacates Convictions Because of District Court's Failure to Hold Remmer Hearing to Determine Scope and Impact of Juror Misconduct
After jury deliberations had commenced a juror contacted a state prosecutor, who was not involved in the case, and expressed concern about the way the deliberations were going. The state prosecutor informed the juror that they could not discuss the matter and later contacted the district court to report the juror's call. The juror never raised any issue with the court or any of its personnel. The jury returned guilty verdicts not long after the juror's call to the state prosecutor, and a report from a court officer that the jury was "very clearly divided into two groups this morning and they're angry with each other." The district court denied the defendants' post-trial motions including motions to interview jurors. The case is United States v. Lanier, Nos. 16-6655/6657.
The Supreme Court's decision in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), Established for District Court's a duty to "investigate a colorable claim of external influence on the jury to determine whether any external influence occurred and, if so, whether it was prejudicial." Nevertheless, a district court's decision as to whether or not to hold a Remmer hearing is a matter of discretion.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court abused its discretion in declining to hold a Remmer hearing. First, the juror initiated the contact with the state prosecutor and did so, it appears, to obtain input – an external influence – as to the jury deliberations. Second, the district court should have determined the scope and impact of the juror's misconduct: "because no one has ever questioned any member of the jury, we do not know the extent of the juror's misconduct in contacting third parties and discussing the case with outsiders or what impact the juror's misconduct involving extraneous communications had on the rest of the jury." Third, the juror did not inform the district court of the Of either the issue that prompted the call to the state prosecutor or the fact that the call had occurred. Finally, the jury returned its verdict shortly after a report that it was divided into two opposing and angry groups, another fact that suggest the possibility of external influence.
The Sixth Circuit vacated the defendants' convictions and remanded the case to the district court to hold a Remmer hearing and make findings as to the scope and impact of the juror's misconduct.
Posted by Robert L. Abell at 11:10 AM No comments:
Sixth Circuit holds that a table can be a “dangerous weapon.”
In United States v. Duke, the Sixth Circuit considered the defendant’s challenge to several sentencing enhancements.
When Ronnie Duke was arraigned on a charge of failing to surrender for a sentence, his attorney proposed that he be held at one of two sites while he was awaiting trial. The Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) objected and sought detention in another facility. With that, Mr. Duke cursed the AUSA, ran toward her, grabbed her by the back of the head, hit her several times with his fist, and repeatedly smashed her head into a table. Her legs were bruised when they were pushed into the table during the assault and she had an abrasion on her temple. Mr. Duke was subsequently charged with assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain government officers or employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b).
The district court applied a sentence enhancement based on its finding that the table was a “dangerous weapon” under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2). The court applied several other enhancements as well. Mr. Duke challenged all of the enhancements on appeal but the Sixth Circuit rejected his arguments.
The Sixth Circuit uses a “functional approach” to determine what constitutes a “dangerous weapon” under § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(D). That “functional approach” requires “looking at the circumstances in which the [instrument] was used.” The Sixth Circuit previously noted that “in the proper circumstances, almost anything can count as a dangerous weapon[.]” Here, the district court found that the table as used by Mr. Duke was capable of inflicting death or serious bodily harm. In addition, the AUSA’s bruises and abrasion showed that the table was used “in a dangerous manner.” The Sixth Circuit held that those findings supported the conclusion that the table was a “dangerous weapon” pursuant to § 2A2.2. The Sixth Circuit also held that a table met the definitions of “object” and “instrument” in § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(D).
The Sixth Circuit also addressed several double counting arguments made by Mr. Duke. Guideline Amendment 614 provides that the base offense level for aggravated assault (§ 2B2.2) and the weapon use enhancement in § 2B2.2(b)(2) shall apply to aggravated assaults that involve a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily harm. Relying on Amendment 614, the Sixth Circuit held that it is permissible double counting to consider the use of a dangerous weapon in calculating the base offense level under § 2A2.2(a) and a § 2A2.2(b)(2) enhancement.
Next, the Court rejected Mr. Duke’s argument that impermissible double counting occurred by using the victim’s bodily injury for enhancements under § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A) and § 2A2.2(b)(7). The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that both enhancements were based on the infliction of bodily harm but two enhancements can stem from the same conduct if they “penalize distinct aspects of [a defendant’s] conduct and distinct harms.” In the Court’s view, they did so here because § 2A2.2(b)(3)(A) enhances the defendant’s offense level if “the victim sustained bodily injury.” Section 2A2.2(b)(7), on the other hand, ensures “punishment at or near the maximum penalty for the most egregious conduct covered by 18 U.S.C. § 111[.]” See 2A2.2 cmt. There was no impermissible double counting because the assault of the AUSA “is distinct from general infliction of bodily harm[.]”
Lastly, Mr. Duke’s base offense level was calculated under § 2A2.2 because he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111 which prohibits assaulting government officers or employees. He also received a sentence enhancement under § 3A1.2(b) because the victim was a government officer or employee. There was no impermissible double counting because the Sentencing Commission intended to attach multiple penalties to the same conduct. The Sixth Circuit noted that under § 2A2.2 cmt. n.4, if § 2A2.2(b)(7) applies then § 3A1.2 also applies. The Court reasoned that if those guidelines were intended to apply to the same conduct, then it followed that the Commission intended “§§ 3A1.2 and 2A2.2 as a whole to apply with respect to the same conduct as well.”
United States v. Duke,
Posted by Frank Heft at 12:10 PM No comments: