Source: http://lawsdocbox.com/Immigration/65535847-Documents-9422-1-15-12318-15-and-14734-15-drafted-by-the-eu-ctc-assessed-the-state-of-implementation-in-june-october-and-november-2015.html
Timestamp: 2019-02-18 02:20:18
Document Index: 66449037

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 36', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 22', 'Art. 22']

Documents 9422/1/15, 12318/15 and 14734/15 drafted by the EU CTC assessed the state of implementation in June, October and November PDF
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1 Council of the European Union Brussels, 1 March 2016 (OR. en) 6450/16 LIMITE JAI 123 CFSP/PESC 150 COSI 25 COPS 59 ENFOPOL 45 COTER 18 SIRIS 24 FRONT 91 CATS 8 EDUC 40 NOTE From: To: Subject: EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Delegations State of play on implementation of the statement of the Members of the European Council of 12 February 2015, the JHA Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015, and the Conclusions of the European Council of 18 December 2015 This report of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator covers progress against all of the measures set out in the conclusions on counter-terrorism agreed by the Members of the European Council on 12 February It also takes into account the conclusions of the JHA Council of 20 November 2015 (on terrorism and on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalization leading to terrorism and violent extremism) as well as the conclusions of the European Council of 17 and 18 December Documents 9422/1/15, 12318/15 and 14734/15 drafted by the EU CTC assessed the state of implementation in June, October and November /16 GdK/lwp 1 CAB LIMITE EN
2 The following recommendations can be drawn from the report: Europol: Member States should further increase secondments of counter terrorism staff to support the ECTC. The Commission is invited to increase the ECTC budget. Those Member States who do not yet contribute or who contribute relatively little to FP Travellers and other Europol FPs as well as the EIS are encouraged to increase their contributions. PNR: Member States should speed up national implementation of the PNR directive once it is adopted by the Council (and not wait two years as the directive allows) and harmonize the exploitation of the PNR data. The decision by the Commission to launch a call under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) to support to ensure interconnectivity between Passenger Information Units (PIUs) is welcome. Those Member States which have not set up PIUs yet are invited to mobilize their national part of the ISF to do so. Prüm: Those Member States who have not yet established all possible operational connections should do so as soon as possible. Eurojust: Member States should facilitate the association of Eurojust to FP Hydra so that Eurojust can provide timely and efficient support to investigations and prosecutions in Member States. Member States are encouraged to increase the use of Eurojust to exchange information and for operational cooperation. Cooperation between Eurojust and the ECTC should be strengthened. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 2 CAB LIMITE EN
3 SIS II: A search function for fingerprints in the SIS II should be implemented as soon as possible. Member States should further increase their contributions and use of SIS II. Europol should develop a systematic search function of the SIS II as soon as possible. Frontex should be granted access to SIS II to improve risk analysis and detect suspicious travel. The use of SIS II as an investigation tool has to be maximised. The work undertaken by the Netherlands Presidency to identify legal, technical and practical obstacles and good practices to the use of the SIS II should lead to recommendations for the June JHA Council. Eurodac: Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol should fully connect to Eurodac and be able to search Eurodac to prevent, detect and investigate serious crimes and terrorist offenses Interpol: Those Member States which have not yet established an electronic connection to Interpol tools on all their external border crossing points should do so as soon as possible. The Commission is invited to support Member States' efforts in ensuring SLTD data quality. Border security: Progress on implementation by Member States of the necessary systematic checks of EU citizens should be measured. Member States are invited to upgrade technology, where necessary. Registration and security checks of the relevant databases in the hotspots need to be increased as a matter of priority (technology, staffing, processes). Member States should provide additional experts to support Frontex in systematic crosschecking information in hotspots and to Europol for the second line checks. Detection of falsified blank passports should be a priority at hotspots and other migrant entry points. Systematic exchange of personal data between Europol and Frontex should take place as soon as possible 6450/16 GdK/lwp 3 CAB LIMITE EN
4 EU IRU: Member States and Europol should work together to increase the volume of referrals made by Europol's IRU. Rehabilitation Programmes Member States are invited to make use of Commission funding for the development of rehabilitation programmes Overview The report shows that while progress is being made in all areas, further urgent improvements to information sharing and border security are necessary. Information sharing and operational cooperation via Europol and Eurojust has considerably improved in 2015 compared to 2014, and also since the last JHA Council of December The connectivity of almost all Member States to the counter-terrorism configuration of Europol's SIENA network has now been established (the 3 remaining Member States should be connected in March 2016). However, information sharing still does not reflect the threat: while there are now five times more person entities in Europol's Focal Point Travellers database compared with last year, the analysis file still contains only 2,786 verified foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) entered by EU Member States. The European Information System (EIS) contains only 1,473 FTF entered by Member States. This despite well-founded estimates that around 5,000 EU citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join DAESH and other extremist groups. It should also be noted that more than 90% of the contributions by Member States regarding verified FTFs in FP Travellers in 2015 originate from just 5 Member States. Not all FTFs are systematically entered into the SIS II and the EIS of Europol. Prüm connections have increased since the December JHA Council, but further progress is needed. Moreover, enhancing quality of data (common definitions and formats) as well as uniform use of systems (in particular entering of SIS II alerts) is necessary. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 4 CAB LIMITE EN
5 Only 18 operational FTF cases were registered at Eurojust in 2015 and information on only 104 ongoing terrorism prosecutions has been shared with Eurojust. This despite the fact that, according to the relevant Council Decision, information about all prosecutions has to be shared by Member States with Eurojust. Task Force Fraternité at Europol, established at the request of the French authorities to support the investigations after the November 2015 Paris attacks, could be a blueprint for how the European Counter Terrorism Centre at Europol - launched in January can support Member States in CT investigations in the future. Several Member States have already taken the commitment to second experts to the Task Force and to the Joint Liaison Teams which support the work of the ECTC. For the time being, no additional posts are budgeted in the financial year 2016 regarding the establishment of the ECTC and its key supporting capabilities, in particular the EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) and the FIU.Net. Working towards the interoperability of relevant EU databases for the purpose of security checks, as requested by the European Council, is a priority. The changed security and threat environment, as well as improved technology and a different EU legal framework since the databases were conceived, make an in-depth reflection necessary. It will be a complex discussion, where the EU will need to define "interoperability" and the level of ambition. The revision of the relevant legal framework of the SIS II and Eurodac (where Commission proposals are expected this year) will be important. The SIS should (at national level) be used more and more as an enhanced tool supporting investigations rather than be limited to an instrument to support security checks. Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol should fully connect to Eurodac and be able to search Eurodac to prevent, detect and investigate serious crimes and terrorist offences. The Commission is preparing to implement the fingerprint functionality for identification purposes which requires establishment of an automatic fingerprint recognition system. Connectivity of Europol and Frontex to the EU databases is a priority set out in the 20 November Conclusions, but remains a challenge. In cooperation with the Commission, Europol is working to improve its access to and use of SIS II, to allow batch searches against its databases and move from manual ad-hoc to systematic use of SIS II. Europol is also developing a business concept to establish access to the Visa Information System and Eurodac (to which it is not yet connected). 6450/16 GdK/lwp 5 CAB LIMITE EN
6 Sharing of personal data between Europol and Frontex is now possible as the operational agreement has been concluded. The modalities are still being developed before sharing of personal data can be systematic. With regard to security at the external borders, by March 2016 electronic connection to the relevant Interpol databases at all external border crossing points and automatic screening of travel documents has not been achieved in all Member States. Member States are encouraged to enter systematically all FTFs into the SIS II. This is necessary in order to improve the system, including the dissemination of better quality information in the alert itself and in the supplementary data. Based on the replies by Member States to the Presidency's questionnaire, challenges currently include: the compatibility of discreet and specific check alerts with other alert categories and the information on a hit of such alerts; the incompatibility of Art. 36 alerts with Art. 26 alerts (when a European Arrest Warrant has been issued for an FTF in another MS, the service issuing an Art. 36 alert will not be informed); the different use by Member States of Art. 36 (2) and Art. 36 (3) alerts for FTFs; the possible lack of basis for arrest in case of a discrete check for FTF based on Art. 36 (3); and the lack of information surrounding the alert (which creates difficulties in distinguishing between FTFs and other crimes). In addition, the difference between figures concerning alerts in SIS II (based on Art. 36 (3) for national security purposes this came to 7,945 entries on 31 December 2015) and the number entered by EU Member States into the EIS (1,473 FTF by end of January 2016) highlights the lack of coherence between systems. All entries by Member States in the SIS II concerning FTF should also, by default, be transferred to the EIS. More sensitive additional information should be shared for analysis purposes with Europol s Focal Point Travellers (allowing for full data ownership control by the contributor). While security checks and registration in the hotspots has improved, further progress is needed. The deployment of officers under the coordination of Europol, as per the 20 November 2015 conclusions, to enhance secondary security checks is under preparation and will need support from Member States, including through the deployment of experienced staff as seconded national experts as well as the required funding for Europol. Blank passports stolen in Syria and Iraq and then used by DAESH are of serious concern. Urgent action to address this problem is needed. France has suggested to explore how special teams dedicated to the detection of these blank passports (falsified documents) could be deployed to hotspots and other migrant entry points. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 6 CAB LIMITE EN
7 Frontex advanced-level document experts (ALDOs) have already been deployed in all hotspots and are working directly with screening teams to help with identification procedures. It will also be important to measure progress towards the necessary automatic and systematic checks of the relevant databases to be carried out by Member States at the EU external borders. Progress is being made on various fronts with regard to firearms, including an increase in the number of Member States participating in the firearms priority under the EU Policy Cycle (from 13 to 20). Coordination of the various initiatives will be important. However, more Member States are needed to participate in the pilot project to create a single entry and search interface between the firearms section of the SIS II and Interpol's i-arms database (so far only two Member States are involved). The Terrorist Financing Tracking Program (TFTP) shows significant value to track terrorist financing activities. However in light of SEPA transactions being outside the scope of TFTP, an EU system complementary to the TFTP should be considered in due course, as also suggested by the Commission in the EU Action Plan on terrorist financing (released at the beginning of February 2016). While the Commission has made available funding to support Member States in the development of rehabilitation programmes inside and outside prisons, few Member States have presented applications for the first such call. These focus mainly on risk assessment methodology. Another call will be issued by the Commission in mid-2016 from which Member States could benefit. Finally, actions to counteract terrorist propaganda have increased (e.g. through the work of the EU IRU at Europol and corresponding self-regulatory measures by internet service providers). But further effort is required to increase the volume of referrals made to social media platforms. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 7 CAB LIMITE EN
8 ANNEX Detailed description of recent and planned CT/CVE related activities Table of contents I. ENSURING THE SECURITY OF CITIZENS 1. PNR Information sharing and operational cooperation (Europol; Prüm; Ensuring the interoperability of the relevant databases with regard to security checks; Structured and multilateral approach for operational cooperation on CT threats; Update of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism; Update of the Council Framework Decision on ECRIS; Eurojust) 3. External border controls (Targeted revision of the Schengen Borders Code; Solid legal basis for the contribution of Frontex to the fight against terrorism and organised crime and access to the relevant databases; Feeding and use of the SIS II; SIS II biometrics; Use of Interpol databases; Implementation of the common risk indicators (CRI); Implementation of the security aspects of the hotspots/frontex; Management of the migration crisis via the IPCR - Security and hotspots; Cooperation Frontex-Europol-Eurojust / security checks with regard to migrants) 4. Firearms and explosives Security Services Countering the financing of terrorism (EU-US TFTP; FIU.net) 7. Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive /16 GdK/lwp 8
9 8. E-evidence II. PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND SAFEGUARDING VALUES 1. Prevent - general (Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence) 2. Internet (EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU); EU Internet Forum; Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT)) 3. Criminal Justice response to radicalisation Prevent radicalisation through education, promoting tolerance and combating discrimination, racism and xenophobia (Education; Combating racism and xenophobia; Addressing the spread of online hate speech inciting to violence and hatred; Communication toolbox on communicating respect, tolerance and non-discrimination in the EU) III. COOPERATING WITH OUR INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS (MENA region and Turkey; Western Balkans; Aviation Security) /16 GdK/lwp 9
10 I. ENSURING THE SECURITY OF CITIZENS 1. PNR Four and a half years after the proposal for a PNR-directive was submitted by the Commission, on 4 December 2015 the Council approved the compromise text agreed with the European Parliament on a directive on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The LIBE Committee endorsed the text on 10 December The directive will be voted on by the European Parliament in spring and will afterwards be submitted to the Council for adoption. Once adopted, Member States will have two years to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive. Member States should speed up national implementation to be able to comply with the directive as soon as possible. Under the new directive, air carriers will be obliged to provide Member States' authorities with the PNR data for flights entering or departing from the EU. It will also allow, but not oblige, Member States to collect PNR data concerning (selected) intra-eu flights. Each Member State will be required to set up a so-called Passenger Information Unit (PIU), which will receive the PNR data from the air carriers. The Commission has supported several Member States in setting-up PIUs and is invited to support the remaining Member States. 2. Information sharing and operational cooperation Information sharing was discussed at the informal JHA Ministers meeting on 25 January 2016 in The Hague. The Dutch Presidency organises a high level meeting on Countering Terrorist Travel on 1 March 2016 on the state of play in the detection and countering of terrorist travel and information exchange, to identify obstacles to effective information exchange and proposals for improvements. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 10
11 Europol On 1 January 2016, Europol launched the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). This is a platform through which Member States can increase information sharing and operational cooperation with regard to: the monitoring and investigation of foreign terrorist fighters; the trafficking of illegal firearms; and terrorist financing and the identification of additional lines of investigations. Member States can make use of Europol s full range of capabilities in the area of organised and cyber-crime. The ECTC serves as an information hub for counter-terrorism for law enforcement authorities in EU Member States and beyond and provides operational support, coordination and expertise for Member States' investigations, as well as a strategic support capability, including in tackling the use of social media for radicalisation purposes. On 7 December 2015, at the request of the French authorities, the Task Force Fraternité was established at Europol, in long-term support of the respective investigative authorities. The overall mission of Task Force Fraternité is to support counter terrorism investigations in Europe in the wake of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris on 13 November More than 60 officers were assigned to the first response support activities (EMRT) from within Europol. Currently, 21 Europol officers are permanently working to directly support the Task Force Fraternite, which represents a blueprint case of how the ECTC could be used in future. So far, no additional posts have been budgeted yet for the financial year 2016 for the establishment of the ECTC, including EU IRU and FIU.NET. In December 2015, Europol submitted a resource proposal for the ECTC to the European Commission. Several Member States including Austria (support to Working Group Dumas), the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and France have appointed additional staff in their Europol Liaison Bureaux supporting CT work (Joint Liaison Team for an enhanced cross-border investigation response). Task Force Fraternité, set up to support the investigations into the Paris attacks, is currently supported by 4 Seconded National Experts from France (3) and Spain (1). Member States are invited to further increase secondments of counter terrorism staff to support the work of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 11
12 Considerable progress has been made by Member States to connect counter-terrorism authorities to the specific SIENA counter-terrorism configuration. While in early December 2015 only 15 EU MS were connected, 25 MS are now connected to the counter terrorism area in SIENA (the counter terrorism authorities of the remaining three MS are expected to joint shortly). Six third parties followed by the end of January SIENA will be upgraded to "EU Confidential" in 2016 (planned for Q 3). It is envisaged that the communication network of the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), at the level of EU Secret, will in the future be hosted by and integrated into Europol, thus providing for a complementary and coherent communication infrastructure of counter terrorism authorities across the EU. Based on the technical and legal assessment of the Commission, Europol has started to work towards implementation of the Council Conclusions of 20 November 2015 "to enable Europol to systematically cross-check the Europol databases against SIS II" by introducing batch searches into SIS. Europol has reviewed its work plan for 2016 to improve access to large-scale databases including SIS II, VIS and Eurodac, and the need to address issues around interoperability of systems. Currently, Europol carries out manual checks in SIS II and use of the system is limited (only 741 searches in 2015, the first year of Europol's connectivity to the SIS II). In accordance with the SIS II legal instruments, Europol cannot enter alerts into SIS II and has no access to alerts with regard to missing persons or on refusal of entry to or stay in the territory of a Member State. Moreover, Europol cannot transfer the data contained in SIS II to any computer system for data collection and processing operated by or at Europol nor download or copy any part of SIS II. SIS II should become an important source of information to complement existing criminal intelligence at Europol. For instance, data inserted in SIS II on a specific person or vehicle on the basis of Art. 36 of the SIS II Council Decision ( discrete checks ) could give Europol information about the existence of another Member State currently investigating that particular target. The possibility for Europol to cross-check information obtained through its communication channels (especially from non-sis Member States or Third Parties) against information available in the SIS II would help to support Europol s function as an EU information hub. In 2016, Europol plans to develop the capacity to perform regular batch searches in SIS II. This is especially important when it comes to cross-checking information received from non-schengen countries. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 12
13 Europol is not yet connected to the Visa Information System (VIS) nor to Eurodac (Europol plans to access this database via the Dutch National Access Point). Some time is needed to identify the optimal arrangements. In 2016, Europol will elaborate a business concept for cross-matching capabilities. Both VIS and Eurodac will be part of these considerations. Member States' contributions to and use of Europol tools have strongly increased in 2015 compared to However, they still do not reflect the extent of the threat. For example, FP Travellers includes less than half of the estimated number of European Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Further improvements are necessary. The Europol Information System (EIS) as a reference system which is directly available to all Member States now holds information concerning over 3,800 foreign fighters and related associates, including data contributed by third parties (mainly Interpol). In light of the Paris attacks in November 2015, the number of terrorism related subjects increased to in total over 7,700 meanwhile (i.e. the subjects more than doubled, considering that there were 3,732 subjects related to terrorism at the end of Q3 2015). There are now over 4,300 persons linked to terrorism in the EIS (including the above mentioned number of foreign fighters and associates). EIS queries by EU Member States increased by 63 % from 2014 (367,922) to 2015 (598,652). In 2014, only 18 FTF had been entered into the EIS by EU MS. At the end of January 2016, a total of 1,473 FTF had been entered into the EIS by EU MS. This is a strong increase, but it still does not reflect the full extent of the threat. In Focal Point (FP) Travellers, there are now 18,572 person entities. Almost one year ago, there were only 3,600. From this overall number (which also includes associates etc.), there are now 4,714 verified travelling FTFs. From these 4,714 FTFs, EU Member States contributed 2,407 verified FTFs by the end of 2015 and have reported an additional 379 FTFs in 2016 (i.e. 2,786 FTFs in total). This represents an increase of 1,023 verified FTFs since the last CTC report in November The current status is based on a number of over 1,900 distinct contributions made by Member States and associated partners to date (one year ago, there were around 600 contributions). The figures for 2016 already suggest a strong increase compared to the same period last year. However, it should be noted that more than 90% of the contributions by EU Member States regarding verified FTFs in FP Travellers in 2015 originate from just 5 Member States /16 GdK/lwp 13
14 Those Member States who do not yet contribute or who contribute to a much lesser extent to FP Travellers and other Europol FPs are encouraged to increase their contributions. In the analysis Focal Point (FP) Hydra (Islamist terrorism), there are currently over 620,000 data entities, including 64,000 person entities (including suspects, associates etc. an increase over over 3,500 entities in 2015), and over 11,000 network related and organisation entities (over 300 more than at the beginning of 2015). This data is continuously updated in cooperation with Europol s partners and is based on more than 12,800 contributions made to FP Hydra to date (12% increase on 2015). Member States have almost doubled their contributions to FP Hydra from 2014 to 2015 (increase from 543 to 1,031), the contribution of individuals to FP Hydra from Member States has almost tripled from 2014 to 2015 (1,589 to 4,398).. It is advisable that Member States facilitate the association of Eurojust to FP Hydra to ensure that Eurojust can provide timely and efficient support to the investigations and prosecutions in the Member States. Prüm Through the Prüm (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008) data exchange mechanism, Member States allow each other mutual access to their forensic biometric databases (DNA, fingerprints) as well as to their vehicle registration data for law enforcement and counter-terrorism purposes. In January 2016, 22 Member States are operational with regard to DNA data (21 in late November 2015); 21 Member States are operational with regard to fingerprint data (up from 20); and 20 are operational concerning vehicle registration data (up from 18 in late November 2015). There has been a considerable increase in the number of Prüm connections among the 22 since the JHA Council meeting in December 2015 (seven new connections to exchange DNA data; 18 new connections to exchange fingerprint data). However, four Member States which are part of Prüm are not operational at all, and most Member States are still not taking full advantage of full interconnectivity with regard to the three data types. This is mainly due to technical or organisational problems to be solved at national level. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 14
15 Ensuring the interoperability of the relevant databases with regard to security checks A first discussion on interoperability of EU databases will take place in COSI on 2/3 March It will be important to define interoperability and the level of ambition, taking into account the increased threat and technological developments. In the context of the Smart Borders Package to be released in late March, the Commission plans to issue a communication on one aspect in particular - how the consultation of border and law enforcement IT systems can be made more effective. Interoperability will also be relevant in the update of the SIS II and Eurodac regulations. Structured and multilateral approach for operational cooperation on CT threats COSI will have a first discussion on 2/3 March 2016 to examine the possibility to develop a methodology for a structured and multilateral approach for operational cooperation on countering terrorist threats. Update of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism On 2 December 2015, the Commission tabled a proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism updating the existing Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA. The proposed Directive introduces an extended criminalisation framework covering criminal behaviour related to the foreign terrorist fighters phenomenon in line with the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, signed on behalf of the EU on 22 October The transposition of the Protocol's provisions into EU law will pave the way to the final conclusion of the CoE Additional Protocol on behalf of the EU, subject to the consent of the European Parliament. Work on the proposed Directive is advancing steadily in the Working Party on Substantive Criminal Law with a view to reaching a General Approach of the Council in March /16 GdK/lwp 15
16 Update of the Council Framework Decision on ECRIS On 19 January 2016, the Commission adopted a proposal to amend and upgrade the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) that has been established in The proposal aims to facilitate the exchange of criminal records of non-eu citizens in the EU. It will ensure that ECRIS, which is already widely used for exchange of criminal records of EU citizens, will be used to its full potential. A General Approach of the Council on the proposed Directive is expected in June Eurojust While there has been a significant increase with regard to information exchange and operational cooperation in the context of Eurojust in 2015 compared to 2014, the numbers still do not reflect the extent of the threat. The number of terrorism cases registered at Eurojust in 2015 (41 cases - of these 39 are operational cases, of which 18 on FTFs) has increased considerably compared to 2014 (14 cases of which 13 operational, of which 3 on FTFs). Eurojust organised in 2015 its first coordination centre (on FTFs) and 15 coordination meetings on operational terrorism cases (of which six on FTFs). The Agency continued to provide support to Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) in terrorism cases: two JITs in 2014 with four participating Member States and three JITs in 2015 with six participating Member States. There was a significant increase in information submitted on prosecutions and convictions to Eurojust on the basis of Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. Information on ongoing prosecutions, for example, has increased more than three times (in 2014 there were 30 cases with such information, while in 2015 there were 104). Also, the number of concluded court proceedings on terrorist offences reported to Eurojust increased (from 180 in 2014 to 217 in 2015). The concluded court proceedings in 2015 concerned 513 individuals, 85 of which were female. Member States are requested to continue increasing the exchange of information concerning terrorist offences with Eurojust and to transmit all such information on a regular basis and in a timely and systematic manner. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 16
17 As required by Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, the information exchanged with Eurojust needs to include information on all prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences, as well as information on the specific circumstances surrounding those offences, links to other relevant cases, MLA requests and information on the execution of such requests. As a result, Member States would benefit more from Eurojust s capabilities to detect links between cases, as well as from Eurojust s continuing efforts to centralise and analyse challenges and best practice related to prosecutions for terrorist offences shared with the Member States, in particular via the Eurojust Terrorism Convictions Monitors (TCM) and Eurojust s contributions to the annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT). A new issue of the TCM will be issued in early March The Eurojust s contribution to the TE-SAT 2016 was submitted at the end of February Both the TCM and TE-SAT continued to also monitor developments in national legislation on terrorism. Eurojust issued its third classified report Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Eurojust s Views on the Phenomenon and the Criminal Justice Response in November It analyses different national perspectives on the criminal justice response to foreign terrorist fighters as well as lessons learned from FTF investigations and prosecutions. A summary of the main findings of this report was approved by the College on 16 February and was issued as a Eurojust LIMITED document on 16 February. The 10th meeting of the Consultative Forum of Prosecutors General and Directors of Public Prosecutions of the Member States on 11 December 2015 reached conclusions (doc. 5930/14) on three main topics, including counter-terrorism. On 25 November 2015, Eurojust hosted a meeting devoted to the establishment of a Judicial Cybercrime Network at which the experts agreed on the need to set up such a specialised network supported by Eurojust. The ECTC should cooperate closely with Eurojust to make full use of Eurojust's coordination tools and its long experience in casework, as well as its network of national correspondents for Eurojust for terrorism matters appointed in the Member States, Norway, Switzerland and USA. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 17
18 3. External border controls Targeted revision of the Schengen Borders Code In line with the mandates given by the JHA Council in November 2015 and by the European Council in December 2015, the relevant Council Working Party and JHA Counsellors have been examining as a matter of priority the Commission's proposal for a targeted amendment of the Schengen Borders Code (tabled on 15 December 2015). The main aspect of this proposal is to introduce mandatory systematic checks at external land, sea and air borders with regards to Union citizens and other persons enjoying the right of free movement, who would be checked systematically against relevant databases. The systematic checks of Union citizens in the databases are done on a "hit/no hit" basis, using the databases in such way that personal data rights are only impacted to a very limited extent justified by the security objectives. The general approach to the compromise text of the Presidency was reached at the JHA Council on 25 February Solid legal basis for the contribution of Frontex to the fight against terrorism and organised crime and access to the relevant databases On 15 December 2015, the Commission presented the proposal for a regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard (which can be understood as significant reinforcement of the mandate of Frontex and renaming the Agency). The draft, which is currently being discussed by the Council, includes provisions enabling the Agency to cover aspects of cross-border crime and terrorism in its risk analysis, by enabling it to process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism and by providing that the Agency cooperates with other Union Agencies and international organisations on the prevention of cross-border crime and terrorism. As regards access to national databases and European databases, the draft Regulation provides for an obligation for Member States to allow access to members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams to such databases. In the explanatory memorandum, the Commission stated that it would explore the possibility of giving the Agency access to European databases, such as SIS and would consider presenting proposals to modify the legal acts, if necessary, on which these databases are based. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 18
19 Feeding and use of the SIS II Effective use the Schengen Information System II (SIS II) includes systematic sharing of all relevant data under article 36 (2) and (3) as well as ensuring data quality standards. There has been a significant increase in the use of alerts and hits in the SIS under Art. 36 (2) and (3) during the past 12 months and more than half of the EU MS made use of the immediate reporting mechanism. 31 December December 2015 Number of alerts on persons for discreet or specific checks (Art. 36 (2)) Number of alerts on persons for discreet or specific checks for national security purposes (Art. 36 (3)) 44,669 alerts 61,575 alerts 1,859 alerts 7,945 alerts Number of alerts on persons for discreet or specific checks under Art. 36 (2) and (3) with the requirement for immediate reporting - This functionality was implemented in February ,189 alerts (entered by 21 EU MS) The frequency in using SIS II heavily varies among Member States and Member States apply different standards in the use of SIS II in the fight against terrorism (see doc. 5722/16 EU RESTRICTED). Moreover, it is not possible to distinguish how many alerts concern FTF/terrorists. FTF/terrorists may also appear under other alert categories such as alerts for arrest or refusal of entry. Difficulties include : the incompatibility of alerts under Art. 26 SIS II (in case a European Arrest Warrant has been issued for a FTF) and Art. 36 SIS II; lack of uniform use of the SIS II by Member States with regard to FTF; a lack of information related to an alert; difficulties in hold persons at the scene in case of a discreet check; a lack of procedures in case of a hit with regard to a person with invalid travel documents; and lack of systematic entry of all FTF into the SIS II by all Member States. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 19
20 Not all previous recommendations by the SIS/SIRENE working party have been implemented by all Member States. Suggestions by Member States include the establishment of a specific form for foreign fighters/terrorism, more uniform rules for creating Art. 36 alerts with regard to FTFs, analysis of the SIS II information at Europol. The Commission should be invited (a) to follow up on issues such as common data quality standards of the alerts based on the discussions held in the SIS/VIS Committee, the Working Party for "Schengen Matters" (SIS/SIRENE) as well as during the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) meeting that will be organized on 8 March 2016 with the participation of SIS/SIRENE experts, and (b) to facilitate practical guidance for Member States. Solutions may include introducing a specific new article in the SIS II for terrorism offenses, or agreement on the use of one existing article for terrorist offenses in order to distinguish alerts for terrorism and other crime related offenses. Combined with common criteria and standards for entering FTF alerts, including possibly a new form, this would allow a more uniform use of the SIS II with regard to FTF and other terrorist suspects. Based on these standards, training (particularly for end users) will be important and should be organized by all Member States with the support of CEPOL. The Commission should be invited to develop these standards and present them together with its report/study on the implementation of SIS II that is envisaged for April Moreover, in view of the new legislative proposals for SIS II that are envisaged by the end of 2016, a uniform common approach should be established regarding the creation of alerts and its contents. SIS II biometrics While there are fingerprints in the SIS II system, there is no search possibility yet. Access to photographs and fingerprints is possible only to confirm an identity in case of doubts (Art. 22(b) of both pertinent SIS II legal instruments 1 ). The current legal instruments already allow the use of fingerprints, as biometric identifier, to identify a person (biometric search function for fingerprints), as soon as it becomes technically feasible. The Commission presented a report on the technology on 29 February 2016 and has to consult the EP (Art. 22(c) 2 ). 1 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information system, OJ L 381, , p. 4, and Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information system, OJ L 205, , p /16 GdK/lwp 20
21 Use of Interpol databases The Council Conclusions of 20 November required electronic connection to the relevant Interpol databases at all external border crossing points and automatic screening of travel documents by March However, at least two Member States have still not established electronic connection to Interpol tools on all their external border crossings (air, land, sea). Several Member States are still manually updating the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database which results in delays in the update and is human resource intensive, if conducted in a systematic way. A number of Member States still do not carry out automatic screening of the SLTD database. The number of SLTD searches of all Member States increased from 280,749,717 in 2014 to 360,359,191 in Nevertheless, data quality is an increasing concern and should be further enhanced by Member States with support of the Interpol General Secretariat (e.g. revoking every lost or stolen travel document by the respective Member State who issued the passport). In addition, public awareness raising is necessary to demonstrate that a lost or stolen passport can be used by criminals or terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, to travel under false identity inside the EU. The Commission should be invited to support Member States efforts in ensuring data quality and promoting public awareness, in close cooperation with Interpol. Implementation of the common risk indicators (CRI) The operational plans of respective joint operations (JO) coordinated by Frontex have been amended and contains instructions for the identification of foreign terrorist fighters through crosschecking with the relevant databases, using the Common Risk Indicators. It requires the referral of potential subjects of interest for detailed second line screening and if necessary foresees onward referral to the national intelligence services. Such cases should also be reported to Frontex along with information concerning how the suspect matched the CRIs, or displayed new indicators, which may prove worthy of further dissemination. As requested by the Commission and the Council, Frontex supports the Member States with the implementation of the CRIs as part of all operations that are conducted at border crossing points (BCPs). Frontex has included this operational objective and related reporting as a distinct activity within all land and air operations taking place at BCPs. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 21
22 The planning of Frontex-coordinated BCP operations at sea borders takes place later in Reporting on detections of suspicious travel by FTFs is centralized within Risk Analysis Unit and thus separated from regular operational reporting. Frontex received the CRIs and is promoting it as well as the handbook Operationalisation of Common Risk Indicators among guest officers and seconded guest officers in advance of their deployment in JO. The handbook will be updated with information made available by Europol and those collected during Frontex-coordinated JO. The entry into force of the targeted amendment of the Schengen Borders Code will influence the use of CRI. According to the proposal, the rule for all travelers crossing the external borders (Third country nationals and EU citizens) will be the systematic check against relevant databases, subject to derogations for land and sea borders and transitional period of 6 months since the entry into force of the regulation for air borders. CRI will remain relevant for the border crossing points subject to derogations/benefiting from this transitional period. Implementation of the security aspects of the hotspots/frontex On 10 February 2015, the Commission published a comprehensive Communication 2 on the hotspot implementation in Italy and Greece and expressed recommendations. The objective is to have all arriving migrants fingerprinted and checked in the hotspots. Efforts are being carried out, in order to solve the main issues relating to the lacking infrastructure (e.g. high speed internet connections that are necessary to upload and check against all databases; infrastructures and services provided) as well as human resources (e.g. coordinators) from the host government in hotspots. The ratio of fingerprinting has increased, but fingerprints are still not systematically uploaded and checked against all databases. Current CT-related situation in Italy as concerns the hotspot approach implementation: Frontex tailored support package to Italy in the field of identification, registration, document checks, debriefing and return (deployment of 25 Frontex officers). 2 COM(2016) 85 final on 'a State of Play on the Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration', /16 GdK/lwp 22
23 Fingerprinting rates reported by the Italian authorities, the IOM and Frontex have almost reached 100% in recent disembarkations in operational hotspots (87% overall by January 2016) 3. Fingerprints are checked against national AFIS and transmitted to the Eurodac Central System. Frontex supports document checks during the identification procedure and in case of doubt, Frontex officers refer the respective suspicious document to the Italian authorities that perform an in depth check. Debriefing activities are well implemented and integrated in Italy and serve risk analysis purposes and further processing for transmission to Europol. Cooperation with Europol is done by the Italian authorities via the Europol National Unit since Frontex as a Third Operational Partner is not part of EIS user community. Direct cooperation with Interpol has not yet been established in the hotspots. Challenges include the limited capacity of the hotspots which hampers the time available for the full identification, registration and security checks. The secondment of additional experts from Member States should be considered to allow systematic cross-checks. Planning for the establishment of a mobile Hotspot team, covering other disembarkation ports, is underway. Current CT-related situation in Greece as concerns the hotspot approach implementation: Currently, only 2 out of 5 planned hotspots are fully operational (Lesvos and Chios). Still not all fingerprints are directly checked against Eurodac. The registration application that is installed on the fingerprint workstations was adapted in order for the end-users to be able to use the search option for the SIS II and Interpol SLTD databases in addition to the national database in one click, based on the name provided. In several hotspots there are still no security screenings in place. Overall cooperation with Europol is done by the Greek authorities via the Europol National Unit. 3 Annex 3 to Commission Communication COM(2016) 85 final, on 10 February /16 GdK/lwp 23
24 Management of the migration crisis via the IPCR - Security and hotspots Since the full activation of the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements on 9 November 2015, the Presidency has chaired several IPCR roundtable meetings which have examined the main shortcomings and possible solutions to the current migration and refugee crisis. Proposals supporting Council decision making have been developed. Meetings are organised around central topics, including hotspots. The setting-up and proper functioning of the hotpots, including security checks, has been a priority topic for the Presidency. A dedicated IPCR roundtable meeting took place on 18 November 2015, in the presence notably of Italy, Greece, Europol and Frontex. A common understanding was reached on the need to frontload the security at the hotspots, to address the gaps in available EURODAC stations to ensure proper registration and fingerprinting, to facilitate the deployment of National Liaison Officers at the hotpots to work with Frontex and Europol, and to ensure the systematic checks against several databases ( SIS II, EIS, national police system, VIS and SLTD) complemented as necessary by other instruments such as PRÜM and FADO 4. The Presidency suggested the quick development of a solution for allowing the exchange of fingerprints between Member States, and to accelerate the finalisation of the agreement between Frontex and Europol for the exchange of data (achieved in the meantime). The discussion was followed-up at a subsequent meeting in December to track progress in the setting-up of the hotspots. Efforts are being made to address the issue of forged documents, notably through the development by Greece of new temporary identification document with enhanced security features, and the deployment of advanced document officers in Italy and Greece. The example of the Border Support Team deployed by the Netherlands integrated into Frontex-coordinated operations for a period of six months is noteworthy. It is composed of a fully equipped multi-disciplinary team of 45 persons (marine police, military police, coast guard, document experts, etc.) able to address all aspects of border security and has started implementing the basic security checks. 4 FADO (False and Authentic Documents Online) is a classified restricted system for the exchange of information between document experts on travel and identity documents, established pursuant to Council Joint Action 98/700/JHA. Part of the information on authentic documents contained in FADO is released to the public via the PRADO system. PRADO contains technical descriptions, including descriptions of the most important security features, of travel and identity documents. This information is made available on a website of the Council of the European Union. 6450/16 GdK/lwp 24
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