Source: http://www.preslaw.info/state-ex-rel-elvis-presley-intl-meml-found-v-crowell-1987.html
Timestamp: 2017-08-22 05:32:51
Document Index: 512932963

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 652', '§ 652', '§ 652', '§ 47', '§ 19', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 28']

Elvis' Estate intervenes on behalf of defendant in case where a not-for-profit corporation (Elvis Presley Intl. Meml. Found.) was seeking to dissolve a similarly named corporation set up by the Estate (Elvis Presley Meml. Found.) and to prevent its use of Elvis' name. The case discusses the Right of Publicity as compared to the Right of Privacy, the Right of Publicity as Property and its descendibility, the defense of Laches, and the right of the Estate to intervene on behalf of the defendants.
The plaintiff corporation has appealed. Its primary assertion is that there is no descendible right of publicity in Tennessee and that Elvis Presley's name and image entered into the public domain when he died. It also asserts that the trial court should not have granted a summary judgment because there are disputed factual issues and that the trial court should not have permitted the corporation representing Elvis Presley's estate to intervene. We concur with the trial court's determination that Elvis Presley's right of publicity is descendible under Tennessee law. However, for the reasons stated herein, we vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Elvis Presley was aware of this recognition and sought to capitalize on it during his lifetime. He and his business advisors entered into agreements granting exclusive commercial licenses throughout the world to use his name and likeness in connection with the marketing and sale of numerous consumer items. As early as 1956, Elvis Presley's name and likeness could be found on bubble gum cards, clothing, jewelry and numerous other items. The sale of Elvis Presley memorabilia has been described as the greatest barrage of merchandise ever aimed at the teenage set.1 It earned millions of dollars for Elvis Presley, his licensees and business associates.
Lawyers representing the group of fans and the Presley estate met to discuss the group's use of Elvis Presley's name following the Secretary of State's rejection of the charter application. In December, 1980, the Presley estate and its trademark counsel formally declined to give the group the unrestricted right to use Elvis Presley's name and likeness. However, the Presley estate offered the group a royalty-free license to use Elvis Presley's name and likeness if the group agreed to abide by eight conditions limiting the group's activities. The group declined the offer of a royalty-free license.
Elvis Presley's Right of Publicity
The confusion between the right of privacy and the right of publicity has caused one court to characterize the state of the law as a "haystack in a hurricane." Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.1956). This confusion will not retard our recognition of the right of publicity because Tennessee's common law tradition, far from being static, continues to grow and to accommodate the emerging needs of modern society. Powell v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 217 Tenn. 503, 509-10, 398 S.W.2d 727, 730-31 (1966); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 407, 79 S.W. 1042, 1045 (1904); and Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493, 515 (1842). See also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.1941) (Holmes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823, 62 S.Ct. 917, 86 L.Ed. 1220 (1942) and Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 195 (1890).
There are few every day activities that have not been touched by celebrity merchandising. This, of course, should come as no surprise. Celebrity endorsements are extremely valuable in the promotion of goods and services. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.1983). They increase audience appeal and thus make the commodity or service more sellable. Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277, 1278 (D.Minn. 1970). These endorsements are of great economic value to celebrities and are now economic reality.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted Prosser's analytic conception of the scope of the right of privacy. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1976) embodies his four right of privacy categories. However, the American Law Institute recognized that the nexus between the right of publicity and the other three categories is tenuous. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) comm. b (1976). Based upon this difference, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652I (1976) recognizes that the right of publicity may be descendible even if the other categories are not.
The legal experts have consistently called for the recognition of the right of publicity as a separate and independent right.2 In 1977, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the right of publicity was distinct from the right of privacy. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571-74, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2855-56, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977). Now, courts in other jurisdictions uniformly hold that the right of publicity should be considered as a free standing right independent from the right of privacy. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 805 F.2d 663, 677-78 n. 26 (7th Cir.1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.1983); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 674-75 (11th Cir.1983); Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1982); and House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn.App. 1984).
The status of Elvis Presley's right of publicity since his death has been the subject of four proceedings in the Federal courts. The conflicting decisions in these cases mirror the difficulty other courts have experienced in dealing with the right of publicity.3
The first case originated in Tennessee and involved the sale of pewter statuettes of Elvis Presley without the exclusive licensee's permission. The United States District Court recognized Elvis Presley's independent right of publicity and held that it had descended to the Presley estate under Tennessee law. Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc. Inc., 441 F.Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D.Tenn. 1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Apparently without considering Tennessee law, the court held that Tennessee courts would find that the right of publicity would not survive a celebrity's death. Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980).
The second and third cases originated in New York and were originally decided under New York law. On two successive days, Judge Charles H. Tenney recognized Elvis Presley's right of publicity and held that it descended at death like any other intangible property right. Factors Etc. Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.Supp. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F.Supp. 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Pro Arts, Inc. appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying New York law, agreed that Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his death and remanded the case. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that Tennessee law controlled the case. While it expressly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., it concluded that it was required to accept the Sixth Circuit's decision as controlling authority. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 1973, 72 L.Ed.2d 442 (1982).4
The fourth case originated in New Jersey and involved an Elvis Presley impersonator. Applying New Jersey law, the United States District Court recognized Elvis Presley's right of publicity and held that it would be descendible under New Jersey law. Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1354-55 (D.N.J. 1981).
The courts in each of these cases recognized the existence of Elvis Presley's right of publicity. All the courts, except one, also recognized that this right was descendible upon Elvis Presley's death. The reasoning employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to deny the descendibility of Elvis Presley's right of publicity has not been widely followed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit specifically disagreed with it. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir.1981). It has also been consistently criticized in the legal literature.5
What remains to be decided by the courts in Tennessee is whether a celebrity's right of publicity is descendible at death under Tennessee law. Only the law of this State controls this question. Hartman v. Duke, 160 Tenn. 134, 137, 22 S.W.2d 221-22 (1929) and Jones v. Marable, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 116, 118 (1845). The only reported opinion holding that Tennessee law does not recognize a postmortem right of publicity is Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953, 101 S.Ct. 358, 66 L.Ed.2d 217 (1980). We have carefully reviewed this opinion and have determined that it is based upon an incorrect construction of Tennessee law and is inconsistent with the better reasoned decisions in this field.
We have also concluded that recognizing that the right of publicity is descendible promotes several important policies that are deeply ingrained in Tennessee's jurisprudence. First, it is consistent with our recognition that an individual's right of testamentary distribution is an essential right. If a celebrity's right of publicity is treated as an intangible property right in life, it is no less a property right at death. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Second, it recognizes one of the basic principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence that "one may not reap where another has sown nor gather where another has strewn." M.M. Newcomer Co. v. Newcomer's New Store, 142 Tenn. 108, 118, 217 S.W. 822, 825 (1919). See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 580 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2860 n. 2, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir.1985); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir.1983); and Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wisc.2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1979).6 This unjust enrichment principle argues against granting a windfall to an advertiser who has no colorable claim to a celebrity's interest in the right of publicity. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979) and Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982).7
Third, recognizing that the right of publicity is descendible is consistent with a celebrity's expectation that he is creating a valuable capital asset that will benefit his heirs and assigns after his death. See McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 Cal. W.L.Rev. 415, 421 (1983) and Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 212-13 (1983). It is now common for celebrities to include their interest in the exploitation of their right of publicity in their estate.8 While a celebrity's expectation that his heirs will benefit from his right of publicity might not, by itself, provide a basis to recognize that the right of publicity is descendible, it does recognize the effort and financial commitment celebrities make in their careers. This investment deserves no less recognition and protection than investments celebrities might make in the stock market or in other tangible assets. See Hoffman, The Right of Publicity — Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DePaul L.Rev. 1, 27-28 (1981) and Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 Yale L.J. 1125, 1128-29 (1980).
Fourth, concluding that the right of publicity is descendible recognizes the value of the contract rights of persons who have acquired the right to use a celebrity's name and likeness. The value of this interest stems from its duration and its exclusivity. If a celebrity's name and likeness were to enter the public domain at death, the value of any existing contract made while the celebrity was alive would be greatly diminished. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979) and Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982).9
Fifth, recognizing that the right of publicity can be descendible will further the public's interest in being free from deception with regard to the sponsorship, approval or certification of goods and services. Falsely claiming that a living celebrity endorses a product or service violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(2), (3) and (5). It should likewise be discouraged after a celebrity has died.10
Finally, recognizing that the right of publicity can be descendible is consistent with the policy against unfair competition through the use of deceptively similar corporate names. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.Supp. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F.Supp. 1323, 1327-28 (W.D.Tenn. 1977); and Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277, 1282 (D.Minn. 1970).
The legal literature has consistently argued that the right of publicity should be descendible. A majority of the courts considering this question agree. Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (11th Cir.1983); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.1983); Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1215, 59 L.Ed.2d 455 (1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d 813, 823-24, 160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 329, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (1979); and Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1982). We find this authority convincing and consistent with Tennessee's common law and, therefore, conclude that Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his death and remains enforceable by his estate and those holding licenses from the estate.11
Our finding that Elvis Presley's estate has retained the exclusive right to control the commercial exploitation of his name and likeness does not end our inquiry. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. sought relief through a Tenn.R.Civ.P. 56 motion for summary judgment. It was entitled to this relief only if there are no disputes of material fact and if it satisfied the trial court that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. must carry two burdens to be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. First, it must satisfy the trial court that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on one of its four alternative causes of action.12 Second, it must also demonstrate that the International Foundation's defenses to its claims based upon estoppel by laches, acquiescence by estoppel and waiver are without merit.
We have determined that Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. has made out a claim based upon the descendibility of Elvis Presley's common law right of publicity and upon its unfair competition claim.13 However, viewing the proof in a light most favorable to the International Foundation, we have determined that Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. has not demonstrated that the International Foundation's laches defense is without merit as a matter of law.
This finding indicates that the trial court intermingled the legal elements of the International Foundation's unfair competition cause of action, its estoppel by laches defense and the Presley estate's four causes of action. It is based upon two erroneous premises: first, that the International Foundation's laches defense somehow depends upon the exclusivity of its right to use Elvis Presley's name and second, that the International Foundation's laches defense can succeed only if it can show that the Presley estate has abandoned its right to control Elvis Presley's name and likeness. Neither premise is correct. The International Foundation has never asserted that it has the exclusive right to use Elvis Presley's name and likeness and, in fact, neither its unfair competition claim nor its laches defense requires it to do so. The concept of "abandonment" envisions an affirmative act by the owner to relinquish its rights. The doctrine of laches involves a owner's negligent, inexcusable delay in protecting its rights. 3 R. Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 19.64 (4th ed. 1983).
The defense of laches is available in cases such as this one even if it is not rigidly enforced. C.F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 93 Tenn. 84, 146-47, 23 S.W. 165, 182 (1893) and Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 2 Tenn.Civ.App. (Higgins) 429, 441 (1911). See also Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1124 (M.D.Tenn. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.1985).14 This record does not support finding that the International Foundation has carried its burden of proof with regard to its laches defense. However, it does not support finding that Elvis Presley Estate, Inc. is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
1. R. Cranor, Elvis Collectibles 4 (1983).
2. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1199, 1249 (1986); Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 254 (1983); Hoffman, The Right of Publicity — Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare, 31 DePaul L.Rev. 1, 44 (1981); Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.L.Rev. 553, 611 (1960); and Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 216 (1954).
3. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1199, 1223-29 (1986).
4. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit continued to acquiesce in its decision after conflicting unreported decisions by Tennessee trial courts were brought to its attention. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1983).
5. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1199, 1225 (1986); McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 Cal.W.L.Rev. 415, 420-22 (1984); Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 212-14 (1983); Hoffman, The Right of Publicity-Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DePaul L.Rev. 1, 37-38 (1981); Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 Yale L.J. 1125, 1132 (1980); Comment, Inheritability of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the Famous, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 1251, 1261 (1980); and Comment, Torts-Right of Publicity-Descendibility of a Celebrity's Right to Benefit from Fame, 47 Tenn.L.Rev. 886, 898-99 (1980).
6. See also Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 213 (1983) and Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L.Rev. 553, 613 (1960).
7. See also Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1199, 1236-37 (1986); Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 213 (1983); and Hoffman, The Right of Publicity — Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DePaul L.Rev. 1, 29 (1981).
8. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.Supp. 836, 838-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
9. See also Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D.L.Rev. 191, 213 (1983) and Hoffman, The Right of Publicity — Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DePaul L.Rev. 1, 28 (1981).
10. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1199, 1241 (1986).
11. There is some dispute concerning whether the right of publicity must be exercised while a celebrity is alive in order to render it descendible. We need not decide this question in this case. There is no dispute in this record that Elvis Presley commercially exploited his right of publicity while he was alive.
12. Its amended answer and countercomplaint contains four theories of recovery: (1) the statutory protection of personal rights embodied in Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1101 et seq., (2) the common law right of publicity, (3) unfair competition, and (4) the trademark law at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-501 et seq.
13. It is unnecessary to reach Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc.'s claim based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1101 et seq. in light of our finding that Elvis Presley's common law right of publicity was descendible. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc.'s trademark claim is based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-501 et seq., not the common law. Kirk v. Big Apple Supermarket of Cleveland, 42 Tenn. App. 502, 504, 304 S.W.2d 511, 513 (1957). The factual proof in this record does not make out a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-511 as a matter of law.
14. This reversal was predicated upon the fact that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet run. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 provides that the applicable statute of limitations in cases such as this one is three years. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. asserted its claim over four years after the International Foundation received its corporate charter in which Elvis Presley's name was included in its corporate name.