Source: http://caccp.blogspot.com/2014/07/
Timestamp: 2018-06-18 17:08:26
Document Index: 243955049

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 437', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 425', '§ 631', '§ 1033', '§ 2020', '§ 1033', '§ 526']

111 North Hill Street: July 2014
Every once in a while, it’s nice to see confirmation that you’re right. As I noted in my write up of the Ottovich case, the opinion seemed to be inconsistent with the very recently decided Paramount Petroleum case. Paramount Petroleum holds that under Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(f), a plaintiff can’t get summary adjudication on liability when the amount of damages is still in dispute. In Ottovich, the trial court did just that. Mr. Ottovich moved for rehearing on exactly that ground, citing Paramount Petroleum, which the court addresses here. Unfortunately, he didn’t raise the point in his trial court or appellate briefing, so the point was forfeited on appeal.
Labels: 437c(f), DFEH, ottovich, paramount petroleum, rehearing
Peake v. Underwood, No. D061267 (D4d1 July 17, 2014)
In the published part of this opinion, the court affirms an order granting terminating sanctions and awarding attorney’s fees because plaintiff and her attorney for maintained a frivolous case. Not too much new here, although the case provides a useful overview of the various legal standards that go into a Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 motion. The court is very deferential to the trial court’s findings that the case lacked legal or factual merit. (I must say, on more than one occasion, I’ve seen summary judgment motions denied based on much weaker factual showings than plaintiff’s here.)
One interesting point: As required by § 128.7(c)(1), the defendant served plaintiff with the motion twenty-one days before it was filed. Instead of withdrawing the challenged claims to avoid a sanction, the plaintiff added a few more. When the court ruled, it dismissed as frivolous the claims addressed in the original motion as well as the new claims. It did not require the defendant to serve a new motion addressing the new claims too and afford the plaintiff another safe harbor period. Although the court recognizes that “the statutory language does appear to support the need for an additional safe harbor period after an amended pleading is filed,” it nonetheless affirms. Because the new claims were “flawed for the same essential reason” as the original ones, an additional safe harbor would have been futile.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 1:24 PM No comments:
Labels: 128.7, frivolous claims, futility, peake, sanctions, underwood
Posted by Michael Shipley at 1:18 PM No comments:
The ABA Journal puts out a Blawg 100. Their compliance program is too effective to permit me to self-nominate. (Or to have my firm’s marketing folks do it on my behalf.) But were you so inclined, I can tell you to go here.
Labels: aba journal, blawg 100, hype, self-promotion
Ulkarim v. Westfield LLC, No. B247174 (July 14, 2014)
A commercial landlord brought and won an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict a tenant. Thereafter, tenant sued landlord for breach of contract and various and sundry torts arising from alleged breaches of the lease and wrongful eviction. Landlord filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Its theory was that the case arose from the service of the notice of termination for the UD case, which is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e). The trial court agreed but the court here reverses.
As the court explains, “a tenant’s complaint against a landlord filed after the service of a notice of termination and the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer does not arise from those particular activities if the gravamen of the tenant’s complaint challenges the decision to terminate the tenancy or other conduct in connection with the termination apart from the service of a notice of termination or filing of an unlawful detainer complaint.” The fact that the eviction process entails some court-related activity does not mean that a landlord’s decision to evict is protected petitioning under the First Amendment. The weight of the authority—exhaustively canvassed in the opinion—supports this proposition. To the extent that two cases can be read to suggest otherwise, they are wrong.
Labels: 425.16, protected activity, SLAPP, ulkarim, unlawful detainer, westfield
Singh v. Lipworth, No. C073177 (July 3, 2014)
Ouch! Plaintiff in this case got himself sanctioned and declared a vexatious litigant. (Note to those readers seeking to avoid the imposition of such status: Probably best to limit use of bold, underlined, all caps, especially when calling a prior order of the court “ROBBERY AND TERRORISM.”) Anyway, the court here finds that plaintiff forfeited his appeal because his brief “is a rambling and disjointed series of accusations, much of which was lifted word for word from pleadings filed by [plaintiff] in the trial court, and none of which can be considered ‘meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.’” For good measure, it further sanctions plaintiff and his attorney (called out by name in the opinion) for bringing a frivolous appeal. In addition to $7,478.75 in defendant’s attorneys’ fees, plaintiff and lawyer are jointly and severally ordered to pay $7,500 to the clerk of court to compensate for the public resources wasted in processing the appeal.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 3:26 PM No comments:
Labels: appellate sanctions, lipworth, sanctions, singh, vexations litigants
DFEH v. Ottovich, No. A136607 (D1d4 June 30, 2014)
This case is an appeal of a damages award entered after the trial court struck the defendant’s answer as a discovery sanction. Interestingly, the propriatey of the sanction is not a contention on appeal.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 3:05 PM No comments:
Labels: 425.10, 425.11, 437c, 55, default, DFEH, ex parte, ottovich, prove up
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, No. S206874 (Cal. June 30, 2014)
Yet again, a trial court gets reversed for denying cert in a wage and hour case. This time, the case involves newspaper delivery persons who claim to have been misclassified as independent contractors, which deprived them of overtime and other employee protections. The trial court focused on the degree of control the paper actually exerted over the workers performance of their duties. Based on the disparate results of its analysis—some were micromanaged while others left to their own devices—it found that common issues didn’t predominate so it declined to certify the class.
Labels: antelope valley newspapers, ayala, class certification, control, predominate, wage and hour
Posted by Michael Shipley at 9:51 AM No comments:
A Deposition Is a Business Records Subpoena Is a Deposition
Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club, No. A138353 (D1d5 June 27, 2014)
Losing plaintiff appeals denial of motion to tax costs. The court decides two issues: First, jury fees are recoverable costs even if the case doesn’t make it to jury trial. Code of Civil Procedure § 631, as recently amended, requires a non-refundable deposit of $150 in jury fees on before the first CMC. Since there’s no chance for a refund even if, for instance, the defendant wins on summary judgment, the fee that can be recovered as cost under § 1033.5(a)(1). Second, the defendant can recover the cost of subpoenaing documents under the provision that allows recovery of deposition costs. Somewhat anomalously, the Discovery Act calls a third party document subpoena where no testimony is sought a “deposition” subpoena. See § 2020.010. So, although it seems semantically wacky, costs incurred in issuing and enforcing such a subpoena are thus costs of “[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions including . . . travel expenses to attend depositions” under § 1033(a)(3).
Posted by Michael Shipley at 9:43 AM No comments:
Labels: 1033, 2020.010, 631, california code of civil procedure, civil discovery act, costs, depositions, jury fees, subpoena
Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary School Dist., No. D064035 (June 24, 2014)
A student who brought a writ of mandate against his school graduated while the litigation was pending. The trial court granted the school’s motion to dismiss for mootness and lack of standing. But state standing isn’t like federal Article III standing. In the mandamus context, longstanding California precedent recognizes the standing of citizens to litigate public rights in the public interest, so long it does not short-circuit important processes of governing meant to occur outside of litigation. Furthermore, Code of Civil Procedure § 526a gives taxpayers standing to sue to enjoin unlawful expenditures of public funds. That right has been construed broadly to include unlawful governmental actions with only incidental costs.
Labels: 526a, article III, associational standing, california code of civil procedure, el centro elementary school district, hector f., mandamus, standing, taxpayer standing
Iskanian v. CLS Transp., No. S204032 (Cal., as modified, June 26, 2014)
This is yet another arbitration preemption decision in the wake of AT&T v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011). The California Supreme Court holds that its prior opinion in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007)—which says class action waivers in employment agreements are generally unenforceable—is preempted under the FAA. But the court goes on to decide that the FAA does not preempt state law that prohibits waiver of representative actions under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 2:47 PM No comments:
Labels: arbitration, california code of civil procedure, cls transportation, concepcion, FAA, iskanian, motion to compel, preemption, sonic calabasas, waiver