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TRAILMOBILE CO. V. WHIRLS, 331 U. S. 40 (1947) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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TRAILMOBILE CO. V. WHIRLS, 331 U. S. 40 (1947)
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Trailmobile Company
331 U.S. 40
Respondent brought suit in the District Court against his employer, asserting rights under the Selective Training & Service Act of 1940. A labor organization was permitted to intervene. The District Court gave judgment for respondent. 64 F.Supp. 713. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 154 F.2d 866. This Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 831. Reversed, p. 331 U. S. 61. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 41
This case, like Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, presents a problem in the seniority standing of a reemployed veteran. It arises under § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. [Footnote 1] The Fishgold case held that, under the Act, a veteran is entitled to be restored to his former position plus seniority which would have accumulated but for his induction into the armed forces. [Footnote 2] Here, the question concerns the duration of the veteran's restored statutory seniority standing. The petitioners maintain that it ends with the first year of his reemployment. Respondent's position is that it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 42
lasts as long as the employment continues. [Footnote 3] A suggestion has also been made that occurrences taking place since the decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals may have rendered the cause moot.
The case is an aftermath of a general controversy over seniority rights which arose among the employees of two corporations following their consolidation on January 1, 1944. Because of the relation of the general controversy to this litigation, a detailed statement of the facts becomes necessary. Prior to their consolidation, the Highland Body Manufacturing Company had been a wholly owned subsidiary of the petitioner, the Trailmobile Company. The two corporations manufactured the same commodities in separate plants in Cincinnati, Ohio. [Footnote 4] During 1943, under the plan of consolidation, the supplies and equipment and personnel of Highland were transferred gradually to the plant of Trailmobile. It took over the assets and business of Highland, and assumed all its obligations. The employees of Highland were transferred to the payroll of Trailmobile as of January 1, 1944, when the consolidation became fully effective. [Footnote 5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 43
Respondent Whirls had been in Highland's employ from 1935 to 1942, when he entered military service. He was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 44
honorably discharged and returned to his work with Highland in May, 1943. [Footnote 7] He was thus among the employees transferred from Highland to Trailmobile as of January 1, 1944, whose seniority was reduced so as to start as of that date by the July, 1944, collective agreement with the CIO
The theory of the class suit was that, although the plaintiffs were not then members of the CIO, the collective bargaining agent was the representative of all employees in the unit, and hence could not legally deprive a minority of the employees which it represented of their accrued seniority and other rights by any collective agreement with the company. [Footnote 8] The petition alleged that the collective agreement arbitrarily and unlawfully deprived the plaintiffs of their "vested individual rights," and asked mandatory injunctive relief restoring each to seniority status as of the date of his employment by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 45
Highland. The company and the collective agent stood upon the terms of the collective agreement and the agent's authority as certified representative to make it as justifying the action taken under it.
The record is not entirely clear concerning the exact character and sequence of events between July 15, 1944, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 46
when Whirls and other former Highland employees were notified that their seniority status would be changed, and September 18, 1945, when the present suit was filed in the District Court. Apparently, after the notice was given, Selective Service officials intervened in behalf of Whirls and other veterans, [Footnote 13] although his allegation that his seniority was restored as a result of that intervention was denied both by the company and by the union. There is ambiguity also concerning whether the closed shop provision appeared in the 1944 agreement or only in the 1945 one between the company and the CIO. The facts of record, however, are more consistent with the view that it was not introduced until the latter year.
Whether or not the threatened reductions actually took effect is not clear from the record, for, not long afterward, Whirls was transferred again, to a position paying $1.18 per hour in another department. But, before this was done, represented by the United States chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 47
Attorney, [Footnote 14] he brought this suit in the District Court under the Selective Training and Service Act. He sought to enjoin the threatened decrease in pay and change in seniority status. He also asked for restoration to his former position in the painting department and to his seniority as fixed by his original employment with Highland. The employer answered, and the local CIO union intervened in support of the employer's position. However, since Whirls had been transferred again before the case came on for hearing, the parties agreed at the hearing to limit the issues to those affecting the question of seniority. This was presented in two forms: (1) on the merits, the facts being substantially stipulated; (2) on the question whether the state court proceeding in the class suit had determined the seniority rights of Whirls, making the issue now raised res judicata for this suit. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183.
Taking respondent's view in both respects, the District Court rendered judgment in his favor. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. 154 F.2d 866. Besides holding res judicata inapplicable, both courts took the view, contrary to that later reached here in the Fishgold case, that the reemployed veteran was entitled to "superseniority" for one year following his reemployment, [Footnote 15] and went on to hold that his statutory preferred status with respect to seniority and other incidents of his employment did not end with the expiration of that year. Because of the bearing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 48
of the Fishgold decision upon the problem and the importance of the question presented, we granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 831.
It is suggested and not denied that, under date of April 10, 1946, respondent was notified by the collective agent that he had been charged with conduct unbecoming a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 49
member of the union, namely, in bringing this suit without exhausting the remedies provided by its constitution and bylaws; in thereby violating the collective agreement; in negotiating with the employer through others than the union, and in conducting himself in a manner harmful to its interests and those of its members. Accordingly, on April 15, 1946, the union requested Trailmobile to suspend Whirls from work. In consequence, the company directed him not to report for duty. Since then, however, it has continued to keep him on the payroll, on leave of absence with full pay. Although the Government urges that Whirls thus continues in the company's employ, and consequently the case is not moot, its suggestion of the facts has overlaid the only issue brought here by the petition for certiorari with questions of unlawful discrimination allegedly arising out of the suggested facts, under the decisions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, and Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248. [Footnote 16]
The facts thus put forward have no proper bearing in this case otherwise than to suggest the question of mootness and to require that any decision which is made upon the merits here be made without prejudice to the future assertion of any rights of respondent which may have been violated by the conduct set forth. We agree that, in the circumstances related, he remains an employee of the company, and the cause is not moot. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 50
Wholly aside from any question of power, this disclaimer on behalf of the party affected is a sufficient reason to justify refusal to inject such an issue here or to volunteer aid not sought. We therefore are required to say no more concerning the matter now than that, if respondent has been unlawfully expelled, suspended, or otherwise dealt with by the union for asserting his legal rights, the law has provided remedies for such injuries, and they may be redressed in appropriate proceedings designed for that purpose upon proof of the facts constituting the wrong and due consideration of the legal issues they present. To assure this possibility, however, the remand which becomes chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 51
necessary in this cause on the merits will be so framed as to preclude any foreclosure of such rights by possible future application of the doctrine of res judicata arising from this determination.
"Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been
Page 331 U. S. 52
on furlough or leave of absence during his period of active military service, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was ordered into such service, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration."
The Government argues on respondent's behalf that the correct meaning of § 8, and particularly of subsection (c), is that, upon reemployment, the veteran is entitled to retain indefinitely his prewar plus service-accumulated seniority. [Footnote 20] Under the statute, it says, this seniority cannot chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 53
be taken away by a collective bargaining agreement or by the employer, [Footnote 21] either during the year in which the statute insures the veteran against discharge without cause or thereafter while the employment continues. [Footnote 22] Support for this view is thought to be derived from the syntax of the statutory language and from the legislative history.
It is argued that, grammatically, the "within one year" provision applies only to the last clause of subsection (c), relating to discharge without cause, and does not refer to the "other rights" [Footnote 23] given by subsections (b) and (c), including restored statutory seniority. Because the "within one year" provision appears most proximately in connection with the prohibition against discharge, the Government seeks to give that prohibition, including its temporal term, effect as a command wholly distinct from chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 54
and unrelated to anything preceding. It treats the clause as a grammatically independent sentence and a substantively unrelated provision, although it is separated from the earlier ones only by a comma followed by the conjunction "and."
Difficulties arise in connection with this construction, both in its premise and in its conclusions. One is that the conclusion of indefinite duration would not follow necessarily if the premise of complete severability were acceptable. On that basis, "indefinite duration," as the Government conceives it, would not be the only tenable period or even the most probably contemplated one. Several alternatives would be presented. However, the statutory year would not be among them, since it is implicit in the premise of severability that the Act does not apply the concluding clause of § 8(c) to "other rights" to secure their extension either during or after that time. On the other hand, the Government's view ignores the usual rule of construction where time is not expressly prescribed, but is evidently to be implied. For generally in such cases, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 55
duration for a reasonable period is the term accepted by the law, rather than permanency or indefinite extension. [Footnote 24] And this, in varying circumstances, might be found to be longer or shorter than the statutory year prescribed for the job itself.
To tear the concluding clause from its context is therefore impossible. It is conjunctive with all that precedes. Nor is it any the more permissible to disconnect its constituent temporal term. There can be no doubt whatever that Congress intended by § 8(c) to secure the "other chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 56
rights" guaranteed by it for at least the minimum term of the prescribed one-year period. This, indeed, was a specific ruling of the Fishgold case.
That § 8(c) applies to secure the protection of "other rights" for at least the statutory year was therefore inherent in the rationalization of the Fishgold decision. To that extent, at any rate, the concluding clause was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 57
applicable, not severable, concerning them. This, of course, destroys the Government's basic premise of the complete severability of that clause and its resulting nonapplicability to "other rights." While the reemployed veteran did not acquire "superseniority," § 8(c) gave him the restored standing for the minimum duration of the prescribed year.
We do not think Congress had in mind such far-reaching consequence for the nationwide system of employment, both public and private, when making the statutory provisions for the veteran's benefit. At the time it acted, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 58
we had not declared war and the men who were called to service were being inducted for a year's training, with the idea, if not the assurance, that they would return to civilian life and occupations at the end of that year without prejudice because of their service. Visionary as this notion proved to be, it hardly can be taken to support the view that Congress contemplated "freezing" the specified incidents of restored employment indefinitely.
The Fishgold case, it is true, concerned only events taking place within the statutory year. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in distinguishing this case, 154 F.2d 871, the issues there involved no question of the reemployed veteran's standing after the statutory year. But, as we have said, the decision did hold that § 8(c) applies to "other rights" for the year. And the rationalization was wholly inconsistent with the idea that those restored rights continued indefinitely after the year, unaffected by its termination. The restored veteran, it was held, could not be disadvantaged by his service to the nation. He "was not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from his civilian job." 328 U.S. at 328 U. S. 284. He was to be restored and kept, for the year at least, in the same situation as if he had not gone to war but had remained continuously employed or had been "on furlough or leave of absence." It is clear, of course, that this statutory addition to the veteran's seniority status is not automatically deducted from it at the end of his first year of reemployment. But the Fishgold decision also ruled expressly that he was not to gain advantage beyond such restoration, by virtue of the Act's provisions, so as to acquire
For the statutory year, indeed, this meant that the restored rights could not be altered adversely by the usual chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 59
processes of collective bargaining or of the employer's administration of general business policy. [Footnote 25] But, if this extraordinary statutory security were to be extended beyond the statutory year, the restored veteran would acquire not simply equality with nonveteran employees having identical status as of the time he returned to work. He would acquire indefinite statutory priority over nonveteran employees, a preferred status which we think not only inharmonious with the basic Fishgold rationalization, but beyond the protection contemplated by Congress.
We are unable, therefore, to accept the Government's position. Aside from the events taking place after the Court of Appeals' decision, which, as we have said, are not properly here for consideration except upon the question of mootness, Whirls was treated exactly as were other employees in his group having the same seniority and status as he had on the date of his reemployment. There was no discrimination against him as a veteran or otherwise than as a member of that group. Both groups, the former Trailmobile employees and the former Highland employees, who composed his group contained veterans and nonveterans in large numbers. Both contained veterans in active service and reemployed veterans when the collective agreement was made. Whirls was treated exactly as all other members of his group, the ex-Highland employees, veterans and nonveterans alike. Whether or not the collective agreement was valid, or infringed rights chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 60
of Whirls and other members of that group apart from rights given by § 8(c), is not before us, for reasons we have stated. The only question here, and the only one we decide, is that § 8(c), although giving the reemployed veteran a special statutory standing in relation to "other rights," as defined in the Fishgold case, during the statutory year, and creating to that extent a preference for him over nonveterans, did not extend that preference for a longer time.
These reasons, founded in the literal construction of the statute and the policy clearly evident on its face, are sufficient for disposition of the case. They are not weakened by the Government's strained and unconvincing citation of the Act's legislative history. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 61
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This, however will be without prejudice from the decision here to respondent's assertion in the future of any rights he may have against Trailmobile or the collective chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 62
agent on account of their acts not presented on this record or involved in the issues determined by this decision.
Congress thus dealt with two very different aspects of employment. It gave all wage earners the assurance of having their old jobs for a year. It further made imperative that wage earners who, by virtue of employment contracts, normally union contracts, had preferred positions should have the same preferred positions as those enjoyed by their fellows who had their status but remained behind. Congress limited the right to have a job to a year. But Congress, having assured a veteran the priority chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 63
status he would have had had he remained at work, did not take away that status at the end of twelve months. Accordingly, because of the Congressionally assured status, whereby a veteran had a priority right that he would have had had he never left, he has whatever rights that status gave an employee under the general law of contract, and, more particularly, as in this case, under the National Labor Relations Act.
In assuring not merely the retention of seniority status but its progression during the years in the service, Congress aimed to insure that the years which the veteran gave to his country should not retard his economic advancement. It is not likely that, in furthering this policy, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 64
Congress would say that an employee, because he is a veteran, should suffer the consequences of having been to war after a year's return. The equality of treatment which Congress designed as between employees who went and employees who stayed could not be achieved by delaying for one year the disadvantages of having been away and then letting them affect the veteran.
The bigger group revolted. They demanded their own seniority, and demanded that the smaller group coming into the consolidation be treated as entirely new employees. They reorganized as a CIO unit, demanded recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of the whole enterprise and, of course, won the election. They then demanded and obtained a contract allowing their own seniority and establishing a closed shop. To keep his job at all, Whirls was obliged thereby to join the CIO union, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 65
and, with others, suffered reduction of pay and loss of seniority rights.
"must do one of two things, (a) either discriminate against the Trailmobile veterans and allow the Highland veterans to supersede them on the seniority list, or, (b) in fairness to the Trailmobile veterans, negotiate for the discharge of Highland
Page 331 U. S. 66
veterans at the end of one year's guaranteed employment."
Section 8(b)(B) refers to the job to which the veteran is entitled to be restored -- i.e., simply the same job which he left, or its equivalent. Section 8(c) specifies what rights he shall have in that job. He is to have the seniority which would have accumulated while he was in service, and he is to be assured against discharge for one year, regardless of what his or others' seniority rights are. Such assurance against discharge certainly does not terminate seniority rights after one year. Section 8(b)(B), together with the provision against arbitrary discharge, is enough to assure that the veteran will remain in the same chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 67
job for one year without diminution of its incidents. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U. S. 275, 328 U. S. 286, in which this Court said,
It is to be noted that the seniority rights of Whirls were bargained away from him by a union which, under the National Labor Relations Act, was entitled to bargain as his representative. The Act makes the majority union "the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit" for bargaining. 49 Stat. 453, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 68
§ 159(a). We have held that this not only precludes the individual from being represented by others, but also prevents him from bargaining for himself. J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332. While the individual is thus placed wholly in the power of the union, it does not follow that union powers have no limit. Courts, from time immemorial, have held that those who undertake to act for others are held to good faith and fair dealing, and may not favor themselves at the cost of those they have assumed to represent. The National Labor Relations Act, in authorizing union organizations "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," 49 Stat. 452, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, indicates no purpose to excuse unions from these wholesome principles of trusteeship.
"It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and
Page 331 U. S. 69
that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed."
This action is equitable in character, and equity traditionally adapts its remedies to the facts as developed by trial, rather than to the form of pleadings. There could be no objection if the Court would remand the case for development of a more complete record. But I could not agree that it should be done with the suggestion that Whirls was not treated with discrimination because all in the Highland group were treated alike. If the Trailmobile Company had absorbed the wholly owned Highland Company chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 331 U. S. 70
before Whirls returned and used the consolidation as an excuse to deny Whirls reemployment rights, this Court would hardly have approved so transparent a scheme. The union has no more right to rely on the consolidation to justify deprivation of seniority rights.