Source: http://docketreport.blogspot.co.uk/2015/
Timestamp: 2018-02-21 13:17:29
Document Index: 503065789

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 285', '§ 285', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 285', '§ 33', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101']

Patent Infringement Blog: 2015
Last Minute Amendment of Infringement Contentions Supports § 285 Fee Award
Following summary judgment of invalidity, the court granted defendant's motion for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 because plaintiff's litigation tactics weighed in favor of a fee award. "[Plaintiff] has never provided an explanation of its failure to allege infringement of the additional [seven] products prior to the last minute before the close of fact discovery. . . . Although [plaintiff] did serve its amended contentions just before the close of fact discovery, its assertion that the amendments were made 'as soon as reasonably possible based on the information available' does not hold up under scrutiny. . . . [Plaintiff's] amended contentions were principally 'based on publicly available information.' Additionally, five months was more than a reasonable time to amend the contentions to include information [plaintiff] itself characterized as the 'limited documentation produced to date.' The circumstances strongly support the inference that [plaintiff's] assertion of infringement by seven additional vehicles two hours before the close of fact discovery was illegitimately motivated."
Patent Claiming Remote Access Communication Portal Not Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment that its remote access communication portal patent was not invalid for lack of patentable subject matter and found that the claims were not directed toward an abstract idea. "[Defendant] . . . argues that the invention could be, and was, performed by humans when telephone operators connected one caller to a second caller at the first caller’s request. . . . [Defendant's] analogy breaks down when claim 24 is considered as a whole, as [Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)] requires. . . . [T]he purpose of claim 24 . . . in creating the private communication channel for remote access is not simply to allow people to talk with each other, but to allow direct access of data on the personal computer from the remote computer. A telephone operator cannot and does not provide the caller with direct access to data on the callee’s desk. [Defendant] oversimplifies the subject matter of the [patent] and claim 24 in an attempt to characterize the invention as an abstract idea. . . . Rather, claim 24 describes a 'particular approach' to solving problems with prior art remote access patents that could only exist in a post-Internet world, utilizing a 'location facility' that creates the private communication portal between the personal and remote computers in a specific way, even if the IP address of the personal computer is dynamic and not publicly addressable, to achieve the solution taught by the [patent-in-suit]."
Plaintiff’s Unreasonable § 101 Positions and Vexatious Litigation Strategy Justify § 285 Attorney Fees Award
The court granted defendants' motion for attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 after the court found that plaintiff's information storage patent was invalid for lack of patentable subject matter because plaintiff's litigation position was unreasonable. "The Court notes that the [patent-in-suit] is demonstrably weak on its face, despite the initial presumptions created when this patent was issued by the PTO. . . . The [patent] claims were clearly directed toward unpatentable subject matter, and no reasonable litigant could have reasonably expected success on the merits when defending against the numerous § 101 motions filed in this case. . . . However, rather than acknowledging the inherent weaknesses of the [patent], [plaintiff] proffered completely untenable arguments to the Court throughout the § 101 briefing process and at the . . . hearing. . . . This causes the Court to question whether [plaintiff] engaged in a reasonable and thorough pre-suit investigation regarding the § 101 standard and relevant authority before filing a significant number of lawsuits. In these particular and focused circumstances, the Court identifies a clear need to advance considerations of deterrence. Accordingly, [plaintiff's] unreasonable § 101 positions support an 'exceptional' case finding."
eDekka LLC v. 3balls.com, Inc., 2-15-cv-00541 (TXED December 17, 2015, Order) (Gilstrap, J.)
Defendant’s Fee Award Discounted to Account for Reasonable Duplication of Work and Unsuccessful Motions
The court reduced the lead defendant's requested attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 by 20% for billing overlap. "I know cases like this spawn big teams at big firms, and both partners and associates end up reviewing everything and commenting on everything, while multiple paralegals perform administrative tasks. I do not suggest that this is unreasonable - everyone on the team needs to familiarize himself or herself with developments, and I recognize that many different people end up making meaningful contributions to the finished product. But some duplication of work is inevitable, and when awarding sanctions, a court should make some effort to minimize the effects of that duplication, especially within a single firm. . . . I will apply a 20% discount (over and above the 12% already worked into the bill sent to the client) to the billable hours fees requested by [defendant]. That effectively takes one-third off the full value of [the defense] attorneys' billable hours. This discount will allow not only some remedy for inevitable duplication of effort, but also some remedy for the fact that much of the factual work done is attributable, not only to the Rule 285 motion on which the parties prevailed, but also to the motions on which they did not prevail."
In Deciding Motion to Transfer Venue, Judicial Economy Does Not Override Convenience Factors
The court granted defendant's motion to transfer venue from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California even though judicial economy weighed against transfer. "Given that this Court is the only court with substantive experience with some of the patents-in-suit, and currently has twenty-six pending cases involving all four asserted patents, and six cases involving two asserted patents — all assigned to the same judge — there were at least some apparent judicial economy benefits at the time of the filing that favor this action remaining in this District. . . . In this situation, where [defendant] has made a strong showing in favor of transfer on factors such as the location of sources of proof and the convenience of witnesses, the benefits of judicial economy do not outweigh [defendant's] showing that the Northern District of California is clearly more convenient. Simply put, where [defendant] has shown the Northern District of California is a clearly more convenient forum, the considerations of judicial economy involving this Court’s prior experience with an overlapping patent do not override that showing to warrant a denial of transfer."
Patent Claiming a Human “Viewer” is Not Invalid for Claiming a Human Organism
The Commission affirmed the ALJ's final initial determination that no violation of section 337 occurred with respect to complainant's vehicle accessory patents and rejected respondent's argument that the claims were directed to unpatentable subject matter because they were directed to a human organism. "[Respondent] contends that [certain claims of a patent-in-suit] claim[s] 'a viewer' and [complainant's] expert . . . testified the claimed viewer is a person; therefore, under the America Invents Act ("AIA") § 33(a) . . . [the claims] are invalid. . . . The Commission finds that a person is not a limitation of the claims, and therefore the claims are not invalid on this basis. The specification discloses 'a substantially opaque black-out frit to mask the presence of such members when viewed from outside the vehicle through the front windshield.' The use of the word 'when' illustrates that the patent does not require a person to actually be looking through the windshield from outside the automobile."
Plaintiff’s Reprehensible Conduct Justifies Recovery of Defendant’s Expert Witness Fees
The court granted in part defendant's motion for expert witness fees as sanctions under the court's inherent power because of plaintiff's reprehensible conduct. "The conduct was more reprehensible than the typical frivolous claim asserted to extract a cost of litigation settlement. . . . Instead of inventing something novel deserving of patent protection, [plaintiff] applied for a patent on its competitor's product with the intention of suing for infringement. . . . Selective information was provided to an expert in order to obtain a misleading declaration used to convince the examiner. Examples provided in the patent claimed experiments that were never conducted. . . . From beginning to end, this was a pernicious scheme to use the patent system and the judicial process for an improper purpose. It was not the first time [plaintiff] had employed such a scheme. This misconduct merits recovery of expert witness fees and expenses, at least for. . . a testifying expert, in the amount of $173,193.19. I decline to award fees for [an expert], who did not testify but was retained as a rebuttal expert on damages."
The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, with prejudice, all claims and counterclaims regarding four patents that were no longer at issue after plaintiff was ordered to reduce the number of its asserted claims. "[Plaintiff] had the absolute right to assert a claim in each of the now unasserted patents by reducing the number of claims asserted in other patents, and . . . had the right to increase the number of claims through a motion showing 'that the additional claims present[ed] unique issues.'. . . [Plaintiff] chose neither of these options and now seeks to preserve the unasserted patents and claims for a separate suit. . . . The Court is well within its discretion under the plain reading of the rule to dismiss all unasserted claims and counterclaims with prejudice for two related reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to prosecute by not seeking to increase the number of claims in a timely fashion under the Court’s permissible due process procedure; and (2) to the extent Plaintiff wanted to assert claims regarding the four (now unasserted) patents, Plaintiff failed to timely comply with the order that directed it to submit a motion to include those additional patents and claims. . . . For [plaintiff] to now claim that due process would be offended by such a result is not persuasive. With an army of resources and lawyers, [plaintiff] clearly could have used the 'efficient and fair' procedure the Court provided to preserve its due process rights."
The magistrate judge recommended denying without prejudice defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings that plaintiff's in-store discount patents were invalid for lack of patentable subject matter because defendants did not establish, prior to claim construction, that the claims were directed toward an abstract idea. "Defendants ask the Court to invalidate the asserted claims on the basis that they are directed to the abstract idea of 'offering, tracking, and processing discounts'—a concept Defendants contend is a longstanding commercial practice. . . . [A] review of the asserted claims does not clearly show that they 'recite[] an abstraction—an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form.' The discount vehicle claims, for example, include physical structures such as a discount vehicle with information identifying products and their associated discounts, and a select code that can be selectively deactivated as to certain discounts, while remaining active for future use as to others. The data processing system claims recite . . . a data processor connected to memory that is capable of selectively deactivating the select code for redeemed discounts, while leaving the select code active for unused discounts. The presence of these structures counsels away from summarily concluding that the asserted claims are directed to an abstract idea. Consequently, it is impossible to make a final determination before claim construction that the claims are simply 'a drafting effort designed to monopolize [an] abstract idea,' rather than a patent-eligible application of the idea."
Purchase of Accused Product Through Amazon.com Sufficient to Establish Personal Jurisdiction
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's infringement action for lack of personal jurisdiction because plaintiff's employees' purchase of the accused product through Amazon was sufficient to establish jurisdiction. "It is undisputed that two Massachusetts residents purchased [defendant's] allegedly infringing product; that they purchased the product through Amazon.com; and that both individuals were employees of [plaintiff]. . . . At least in the context of interpreting state long-arm statutes, the Federal Circuit has consistently held that a patent infringer is subject to personal jurisdiction where it sells the allegedly infringing product. . . . Taking [plaintiff's] allegations as true, [defendant] offered the allegedly infringing product for sale in Massachusetts, at least two Massachusetts residents purchased the product, and [plaintiff] suffered 'economic loss' in Massachusetts because it 'los[t] business' here. . . . [Defendant] misconstrues the nature of its own activities in Massachusetts by comparing them with the actions of the defendants in the 'manipulative purchase' line of cases. In [those cases], the defendants sold their products only on their own websites; they did not place their products into the national stream of commerce through online retailers."
Real Estate Information Sharing Patent Claims Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment that the asserted claims of plaintiff's patent for sharing information among real estate agents and clients were invalid for lack of patentable subject matter and found that the claims were directed to an abstract idea. "[Plaintiff's] patent specification confirms that real estate agents 'conventionally' connect to a database of real estate information 'to locate properties of interest for their clients.' They then contact each client to determine whether the client is interested in any of the resulting properties and whether the client has found any properties of interest from other sources, such as print advertisements or the Internet. Through this interaction, the agent and clients have exchanged information and collaborated in the real estate search process. [Plaintiff's] invention simply places the interaction online. . . . The fact that [plaintiff's] method is performed online—rather than in an office, over the phone, or through email—does not change the Court’s conclusion that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea."
Listingbook, LLC v. Market Leader, Inc., 1-13-cv-00583 (NCMD November 13, 2015, Order) (Biggs, J.)
Evidence of "General Association" Insufficient to Justify Real Party in Interest Discovery
The Board denied the patent owner's motion for additional discovery regarding whether the petitioner failed to name a real party in interest. "We deny Patent Owner’s request because Patent Owner’s request amounts to no more than a mere allegation of some kind of general association between Petitioner and [named company]. For example, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has an equity stake in [the company], that counsel for Petitioner allegedly represents [the company], and that publicly available documents supposedly imply a connection between Petitioner and [the company]. The alleged facts presented by Patent Owner during the conference call do not show more than a mere possibility that something useful will be discovered and are therefore insufficient to show beyond mere speculation that discovery would be in the interests of justice."
Petition for Inter Partes Review by The Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd., IPR2015-01046 (PTAB November 12, 2015, Order) (Siu, APJ)
Multi-Player Gaming Patent Not Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the asserted claims of plaintiff’s multi-player gaming patent for unpatentable subject matter and found that defendant failed to establish that the claims were directed toward an abstract idea. "[T]he [patent-in-suit] is directed to the 'idea of multi-player gaming using a hand-held controller that has a display screen where the players are also in front of a shared display.' Defendant has not pointed to any authority compelling the conclusion that such an idea, which is by definition limited to the field of multi-player gaming and which requires the use of multiple hardware components . . . is 'abstract' within the meaning of Section 101. Moreover, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff 'does not actually explain how any of the components identified by [Defendant] are not generic, let alone why any of those components actually make the claim less abstract under Step One' misreads Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, which make clear that 'recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible,' but do not broadly hold that courts must 'strip away' each claim element that recites hardware containing computing elements, such as a video game controller, when performing step one of the Alice/Mayo test."
Patent For Searching and Unifying Data Invalid Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings that plaintiff's patent for searching and unifying data was invalid for lack of patentable subject matter and found that the claims lacked an inventive concept. "[P]laintiff’s proffered improvements, i.e., the solutions to 'data overload,' 'costs for organizing data,' 'data permissions,' and 'downstream proliferation of data,' are not 'necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.' Rather, these are common problems generally associated with large amounts of data, not computer networks. 'Data overload,' which plaintiff describes as 'the proliferation of different data sources' has been around for ages and is a problem that undoubtedly affects noncomputerized data storage."
Following the Board's request for additional briefing, the Board found that the petitioner was estopped under Section 325(e)(1) from asserting unpatentability of certain claims under Section 101, but denied the patent owner's request to file a motion to terminate the proceeding based on that estoppel. "[Patent owner] requests 'leave to file a Motion to Terminate CBM2015-00015 and -00016 with respect to claim 1 in light of this estoppel.' We deny [patent owner] authorization to file a motion to terminate these cases with respect to these claims. Section 325(e)(1) speaks to actions that may not be undertaken by Petitioner (or its real party in interest or privy) – '[t]he Petitioner . . . may not request or maintain a proceeding before the Office'. The statutory provision, however, does not proscribe actions that we may take. . . . There is a public interest in resolving the issues raised by these challenges because the record is fully developed. Moreover, we are making determinations in related cases involving similar issues and argument. Administrative resources will be conserved by resolving all the similar issues at once."
Petition for Covered Business Method Patent Review by Apple Inc., CBM2015-00015 (PTAB November 5, 2015, Order) (Elluru, APJ)
Expert Testimony on “Transition Damages” From Inventory Buy-Back Excluded
The court granted defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of plaintiff's damages expert regarding transition damages as unreliable. "[Plaintiff's expert] asserts Plaintiff rolled out 'the Everbilt private label dryer venting and air distribution products for Home Depot' in 2014 and the cost for this transition included 'an inventory buy-back cost of about $1,114,000.' [Plaintiff's expert] concludes that 'but for [defendant's] infringing competition, [plaintiff] would have been able to manage its [product] launch in a way that would have avoided the inventory buy-back cost.' However, Plaintiff must establish why damages are legally available. Here, Plaintiff cites no legal authority under which it is entitled to 'transition damages.'"
Amazon Not Liable for Infringement of Third Party Products Offered for Sale Via Amazon’s Website
Following an advisory jury trial to answer underlying factual questions, the court found that Amazon did not offer to sell the accused products via its website and was not liable for infringement. "[T]his Court is not aware of any Federal Circuit case directly addressing the central issue before this Court – that is, who made the alleged 'offer to sell.'. . . [T]he Court can only conclude that Amazon did not offer to sell the alleged infringing products because there was no manifestation of the willingness of Amazon to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. However, the Court is troubled by its conclusion and the impact it may have on the many small retail sellers in circumstances similar to the Plaintiffs. There is no doubt that we now live in a time where the law lags behind technology. This case illustrates that point. . . . Amazon enables and fosters a market place reaching millions of customers, where anyone can sell anything, while at the same time taking little responsibility for 'offering to sell' or 'selling' the products. Indeed, under the current case law, Amazon has been able to disavow itself from any responsibility for 'offering to sell' the products at all. . . . [T]he purpose of 'adding "offer [ ] to sell" to section 271(a) was to prevent . . . generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.' In this instance, the Court is not convinced that such purpose has been fulfilled. However, that is a subject which must be addressed to Congress and not the courts."
Cost Impact Methodology for Calculating Damages Must Apportion Value of Patented Feature
The court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider an earlier order excluding the testimony of plaintiff's damages expert and rejected plaintiff's argument that there was clear error or manifest injustice. "[Plaintiff's] primary contention is that the cost impact approach utilized by the excluded expert involves a 'reliable damages methodology.' And, indeed, on this point and to that extent, they are correct. . . . [Plaintiff's expert] analyzes the ex-post value of the patent by considering the inventory that [defendant] acquired after infringement began. Essentially, his analysis considers the value of the inventory that [defendant] would be left holding, but unable to sell, because of the patent enforcement -- and as such, the amount that [defendant] would be willing to pay for a license so that it is able to sell this acquired inventory. Herein lies the problem. [Plaintiff's expert] values this inventory in terms of whole product units, rather than the patented component features. While this makes general sense as part of an ex-post valuation, it does not adequately isolate the value of the patented feature itself."
Litigation Counsel Barred From Serving as Prosecution Counsel In Lieu of Disqualification
The court granted in part defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel who served as both prosecution counsel and litigation counsel and barred counsel from resuming service as prosecution counsel for a year following the conclusion of the case. "[Plaintiff's] removal of [its counsel] as its patent prosecutor appears to resolve [defendant's] arguments that [counsel] should be disqualified as counsel in this case due to his access to [defendant's] trade secrets in this case. . . . [A]s [counsel] is no longer prosecuting patents for [plaintiff], barring him from viewing confidential information and trade secrets disclosed by [defendant] would not be appropriate. It is appropriate, however, to bar [plaintiff] or its successor from reinstating [counsel] – for a period of one year after the final resolution of this case, including appeals – as its patent prosecutor in patent applications that claim priority to the patent in suit here."