Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96955/l-singer-sons-vs-union-pacific-r-co
Timestamp: 2018-03-23 20:18:53
Document Index: 666725423

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 13', '§ 13']

L Singer and Sons Vs Union Pacific R Co - Citation 96955 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
L. Singer and Sons Vs. Union Pacific R. Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96955
Case Number 311 U.S. 295
Appellant L. Singer and Sons
l. singer & sons v. union pacific r. co. - 311 u.s. 295 (1940) u.s. supreme court l. singer & sons v. union pacific r. co., 311 u.s. 295 (1940) l. singer & sons v. union pacific railroad co. no. 34 argued november 14, 15, 1940 decided december 16, 1940 * 311 u.s. 295 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit syllabus 1. in order that one may sue as a "party in interest" under paragraph 20, § 402 of the transportation act of 1920, to enjoin the construction of a railroad extension not authorized by the interstate commerce commission, he must show that the extension will page 311 u. s. 296 bring about a change in the transportation system by which his own special and peculiar.....
L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co. - 311 U.S. 295 (1940)
U.S. Supreme Court L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940)
Decided December 16, 1940 *
bring about a change in the transportation system by which his own special and peculiar interest may be directly and materially affected. P. 311 U. S. 303 .
(2) That the city in which the existing market is located was properly denied leave to intervene as a party plaintiff. P. 311 U. S. 305 .
Certiorari, 30 U. S. 653 , to review the affirmance of a decree dismissing a bill praying for an injunction against the construction and operation of an alleged extension of the lines of the defendant railroad company.
Undertaking to proceed under Paragraphs 18, 20 and 21, Section 402, Transportation Act, 1920, ** 41 Statutes 456, 477, U.S.C. Title 49, § 1, petitioners, by bill filed December 30, 1938, in the United States District Court, Western District of Missouri, asked a decree enjoining respondent from constructing or operating an alleged extension, 26 F.Supp. 721.
It declared that the question whether petitioners were "parties in interest" within Paragraph 20 must be determined upon consideration of Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific, 284 U. S. 47 , and concluded --
The purpose and effect of paragraphs 18, 20, and 21 were much considered in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 , and Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47 .
"If, as the court below seems to have assumed, a 'party in interest' must possess some clear legal right for which it might ask protection under the rules commonly accepted by courts of equity, the paragraphs under consideration would not materially aid the Congressional plan for promoting transportation. On the other hand, there was no purpose to permit any individual so inclined to institute such a proceeding. The complaint must possess something more than a common concern for obedience to law. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , 262 U. S. 488 . It will suffice, we think, if the bill discloses that some definite legal right possessed by complainant is seriously threatened, or that the unauthorized and therefore unlawful action of the defendant carrier may directly and adversely affect the complainant's welfare by bringing about some material change in the transportation situation."
The Transportation Act, 1920, was designed to protect the public against action which might endanger its interest. In order to aid that general purpose, Paragraph 20, Section 402, provides that suit for an injunction may be instituted by the United States, the Commission (I.C.C.), any Commission or Regulative Body of the state or states affected, or any "party in interest." Such
a suit cannot be instituted by an individual unless he "possesses something more than a common concern for obedience to law." The general or common interest finds protection in the permission to sue granted to public authorities. An individual may have some special and peculiar interest which may be directly and materially affected by alleged unlawful action. See Detroit & M. Ry. Co. v. Boyne City, G. & A. R. Co., 286 F. 540. If such circumstances are shown, he may sue; he is then "party in interest" within the meaning of the statute. In the absence of these circumstances, he is not such a party.
A city deeming itself adversely affected by a proposed illegal extension would naturally turn to its state commission to assert its interests. If, for any reason, the state agency does not employ its power under § 1(20) on behalf of the city's claims, the latter can invoke the law enforcing authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission and also enlist the power of the Attorney General to initiate litigation. It is reading § 1(20)
Who, then, is a "party in interest"? As a part of the very system through which the national policy is to be achieved, a railroad has been deemed by this Court a "party in interest" to effectuate the railroad policy introduced
by the licensing system of the Transportation Act. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 , 270 U. S. 277 ; Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U. S. 47 . And one who in a proceeding initiated before the Interstate Commerce Commission has been treated by it as a party to the litigation, cf. Los Angeles Passenger Terminal Cases, 100 I.C.C. 421; id., 142 I.C.C. 489; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U. S. 380 , 283 U. S. 393 -394, may perhaps be deemed a "party in interest" in the further pursuit of claims before a court after adverse action by the Commission. Compare Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., 288 U. S. 14 , and Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 . But to allow any private interest to thresh out the complicated questions that arise out of § 1 (18-22) [ Footnote 1 ] -- as, for instance, whether a proposed construction is an "extension" or a "spur," compare Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 -- is to invite dislocation of the scheme which Congress has devised for the expert conduct of the litigation of such issues. [ Footnote 2 ] It also would put upon the district courts the task of drawing fine lines in determining when a private claim is so special that it may be set apart from the general public interest and give the claimant power to litigate a public controversy. These inquiries are so harassing and unprofitable as to be avoided, unless Congress has explicitly cast the duty upon the courts. Against any such implication, in the absence of rather plain language, the whole course of
Section 1 (18) of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 474, 477, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (18), forbids the extension of its line by a railroad without a certificate of the Interstate Commerce Commission that "the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require" the construction of the extension. Similarly, it prohibits the abandonment of any portion of a line of railroad without a like certificate permitting the abandonment.
The interest of petitioners in maintaining the suit, as shown by the pleadings, is derived from the injury to the public which, it is specifically alleged, will result from the proposed extension through the injury to the community in Kansas City, Missouri, and vicinity, of which community petitioners are a part and in which they are property owners, and the consequent injury alleged to affect them individually. The public injury, it is alleged, will be caused by (a) the loss or serious impairment in utility of the Kansas City public produce market and the destruction or serious diminution of values of property and business and of financial investments in and about the market, which will be brought about by the extension, through the creation of a rival market and the diversion of traffic to it at a point in Kansas City, Kansas, far removed from the center of population of Kansas City, Missouri, and to the inconvenience of the great majority of the citizens of both cities who are served by the existing market, which is adequate to the needs of the community; (b) by the
The statute does not define the "parties in interest" whom it permits to sue to restrain an unauthorized extension. It cannot be assumed that the phrase is meaningless or that the statute should be read as though the words were omitted. Obviously the parties intended must have, as do petitioners, an interest in the outcome of the litigation other than the "common concern for obedience to law." See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , 262 U. S. 488 . And, as the language of the statute plainly indicates and as we have held, they may be, as are petitioners, others than the public bodies named in the statute as appropriate plaintiffs. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U. S. 380 , 283 U. S. 393 -394. And they may maintain the suit although the injury which they allege is not strictly an actionable wrong independently of the paragraphs in question.
Western Pacific R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284 U. S. 47 .
The statute draws no distinction between direct and indirect injury as the test of plaintiff's interest. Nor is any reason advanced for saying that his interest is more significant because the injury which he suffers is labeled "direct," rather than "indirect." In any case, that suffered by petitioners does not seem to be any the less direct than that which an extension may inflict upon a competing railroad which admittedly may sue to enjoin it. Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; cf. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382 . If the statute imposes any requirements other than those indicated by the phrase "party in interest," they must be implied from the purposes of the statute, its context, and from the reasons for permitting others than the public bodies named in it to bring the suit. Cf. New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 , 287 U. S. 24 . On the other hand, if maintenance of the present suit by petitioners is consistent with those purposes and aids them and is in harmony with the reasons for allowing any party in interest to sue, the conclusion would seem inescapable that petitioners are proper plaintiffs.
It is not denied that the statutory language and the legislative history of the paragraphs in question require consideration by the Commission of the interests of cities, towns, and communities which are adversely affected by a proposed extension of a line of railroad, in order to determine whether "public convenience and necessity" require the extension. The phrase "public convenience and necessity" has long been used to signify the final result of the balancing of the consequences which flow from the proposed action to all those matters of public concern which are affected by it. Cf. 283 U. S. S. 312Ă & O. Ry. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35 , 283 U. S. 42 ; United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225 . And we have held that, in the administration of the cognate provision relating to abandonment of railroad lines, the Commission must consider as a part of the public convenience and necessity the interests of local communities affected by the proposed abandonment. Colorado v. United States,@ 271 U. S. 153 , 271 U. S. 168 . A community may suffer injury through the loss of railroad service and diversion of traffic resulting from the construction and operation of a railroad extension without any compensating public advantage which is comparable in kind and amount with injury sustained by the abandonment of a line of railroad. One as well as the other should receive the consideration of the Commission in determining whether it should grant or withhold a certificate. Such appears to be its settled practice on applications for a certificate authorizing extension. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
If the proposed construction is an extension, the injunction must issue as of right, but its only affect is to compel the railroad before proceeding further to apply to the Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity which is the public purpose of the Act.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266 , 270 U. S. 273 . The court is thus called on to decide no administrative issue which must be submitted to the Commission in advance of suit, and any decree which it may render involves no embarrassment to the Commission or otherwise in the administration of the Act. While the Commission itself may bring the suit, it is under no statutory duty to do so, and its only other authority in the premises is to grant or withhold the certificate when applied for. One injured by an unauthorized extension and opposed to its construction, whether a state commission, a competing railroad or any other injured party, is not authorized to initiate any proceeding before the Commission, and its only protection as of right from the consequences of the threatened public wrong is that afforded by suit authorized by § 1(20). See Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S.R. Ry. Co., supra, 270 U. S. 272 -274.
In considering the scope of the application of the statute, this Court has recognized that the public interest which the Commission is to protect includes the public interest in the maintenance of an adequate transportation system, and that a railroad whose welfare, although not its legal right, is adversely affected by an unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, extension of the line of another is a "party in interest" entitled to maintain suit to enjoin the extension. Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; cf. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, supra. And it has held that one other than a carrier (a municipality), who has "a proper interest in the subject matter," may institute a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 1, paragraphs 18 to 22, to obtain a certificate of public convenience, so as to enable a railroad to build an extension to a new station which a state commission has ordered it to build. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.
Railroad Commission, supra, 283 U. S. 393 -394. Compare Detroit & M. Ry. Co. v. Boyne City, G. & A. R. Co., 286 F. 540.
If the statute permits some protection through commission action of the public interest in the preservation of communities adversely affected by the construction of railroad extensions, no plausible reason has been advanced for saying that an individual member of such a community whose property or financial interests are adversely affected by the proposed unauthorized extension, and who would be a proper party to the proceeding before the Commission on application for a certificate, [ Footnote 2/2 ]
True, the statute is concerned with the protection of the public interest, but, in order that the public interest might not suffer, and that private injury might not be inflicted through a public wrong, the construction of an unlawful extension, Congress did not restrict the authority to bring suit to public agencies -- the United States, the Commission, or state commissions. Congress, by providing that applications for certificates of convenience need not be made for local spur or side tracks, recognized that such constructions are too trivial to require a proceeding before the Commission. Instead, it gave authority to bring the suit to private parties in interest, who, because of the injury especially inflicted upon them through the adverse effect of the unlawful extension on the public, have a peculiar incentive to protect the public interest with which the statute is concerned, see Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 , 309 U. S. 477 , and who, by restraining an unauthorized "extension," insure the expert consideration by the Commission in the situation in which Congress required it.
Just as Congress gave authority to a railroad to sue to enjoin an unauthorized extension by its competitor in order to effect the railroad policy of the Act, it gave like authority to complainants to effect its public policy with respect to a community injuriously affected by an
It is settled policy of the Interstate Commerce Act and related statutes to permit shippers, cities, commercial organizations, and other interested parties to participate in proceedings before the Commission and in those before the courts where the application of the statute is involved. § 9, 24 Stat. 382, 49 U.S.C. § 9, permits any person "claiming to be damaged" by a carrier to make complaint to the Commission or to bring suit in a district court. Communities, shippers, and associations may make complaint to the Commission under § 13(1), 49 U.S.C. § 13(1), 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 36 Stat. 550. See United States v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Traffic Assn., 242 U. S. 178 . Section 42 provides that, in actions to stop rebates and concessions, "all persons interested in or affected by the rate, regulation, or practice" may be made parties. Sections 212 and 213 of the Judicial Code provide that "communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals who are interested in the controversy or question" before the Commission or in any suit which may be brought under the Act may intervene.