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Matched Legal Cases: ['§404', '§6030', '§127', '§2292', '§607', '§2357', '§2342', '§2341', '§8080', '§8117', '§506', '§552', '§8117', '§573']

PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly - Winter 1998
Legal Issues in Peace Operations GLENN BOWENS From Parameters, Winter 1998, pp. 51-72.
The legal paradigm in peace is significantly different
than in war. During Operation Desert Storm, the lead brigade crossing into
Iraq was not concerned in the least with passports, visas, and customs.
But in December 1995, when the lead brigade crossed into Hungary on its
way to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, these types of issues were
prominently in mind.[1] In peace operations, unlike war, the law and jurisdiction
of the host nation are not displaced. Absent an agreement with the host
nation, the military force and other US personnel are fully subject to
the laws and jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the host nation
and its courts. Political settlement, not victory on the battlefield, is the ultimate
measure of success in peace operations.[2] The purpose of this article
is to identify the strategic and legal basis for peace operations and raise
awareness of legal issues that can occur in contemporary, complex, multinational
peace operations. Policymakers and military commanders alike need to understand
the legal basis for the mission, the scope of authority for accomplishing
the mission, rules of engagement, status of forces agreements, funding
of the operation, and the applicability of the law of war. Strategic and Legal Basis for Peace Operations The legal basis for US participation in peace operations ultimately
begins with the National Security Strategy. Under the Constitution, the
President, in conjunction with the Congress, is responsible for the conduct
of foreign affairs and the national security of the United States. The
President's National Security Strategy, which is promulgated yearly in
accordance with federal law, and the National Military Strategy both provide
for the use of peace operations to achieve national security and foreign
affairs objectives.[3] In 1996 the Clinton Administration expounded on
its National Security Strategy by defining what was to be accomplished
by the enlargement element of the "engagement and enlargement"
strategy.[4] Enlargement emphasizes fundamental American values such as
individual freedom, liberal democracy, respect for human rights, and open-market
economies.[5] Participation in peace operations significantly furthers
each of these values. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) provides the context and
the answer to the fundamental question of why the United States participates
in peace operations: because it is in the national interest to do so. The
directive does this by affirming that the primary mission of the US armed
forces is to be prepared to fight and win the nation's wars, while also
recognizing that peace operations are useful tools in preventing and resolving
conflicts before they pose a direct threat to national security.[6] Participation
in peace operations fundamentally supports "US foreign policy objectives
for the peaceful resolution of conflict, reinforce[s] the collective security
efforts of the US, our allies, and the other UN Member States, and enhance[s]
regional stability."[7] PDD-25 also establishes criteria that will be considered in deciding
whether US personnel will participate in a peace operation. Participation advances US interests. Both the unique and general risks to American personnel are considered
acceptable. Personnel, funds, and other resources are available. US participation is necessary for the success of the operation. The US military's role is tied to clear objectives. There is an identifiable endpoint for US participation. There is domestic and congressional support for the operation, or such
support can be obtained. The command and control arrangements are acceptable. When the peace operation is likely to involve combat, the following
factors must also be considered: There is a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly
defined objectives. There is a plan to decisively achieve those objectives. There is a commitment to reassess and adjust the size, composition,
and disposition of US forces, as necessary, to achieve our objectives.[8]
The considerations in PDD-25 help define the applicable body of law,
the scope of the mission, and the permissible degree of coalition command
and control over US troops.[9] They also influence other matters, such
as the rules of engagement, the extent of US support to other nations,
and the overall legal arguments for the legitimacy of the operation.[10]
Once there has been a determination through PDD-25 to commit US assets
to a peace support operation, the provisions of a 1997 Presidential Decision
Directive, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex
Contingency Operations," come into play. This document, known as PDD-56,
contains policy for managing the US government's interagency process when
dealing with complex contingency operations once a decision to intervene
has been made. The interagency process is key because of the important
functions it performs. The central feature of PDD-56 is preparation of
the political-military (pol-mil) implementation plan, the primary purposes
of which are to designate a lead agency within the US government and to
coordinate all aspects of the US government's response to what has already
been identified as a complex contingency operation. Objectives of the interagency
process include identification of issues, development of strategy, integration
of all components of the US response, directing action on funding and personnel
issues, and planning and implementing the civilian aspects of the response.[11]
The United Nations Charter is the overarching international legal authority
for both the use of force and peace operations.[12] A fundamental tenet
of international law, codified in the UN Charter, is the prohibition against
intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states.[13] Contrary to
popular belief, the UN Charter does not specifically provide for the conduct
of traditional interposition-type peacekeeping operations.[14] In fact,
the word peacekeeping does not even appear in the Charter. The use of military
forces in peace operations evolved out of the Security Council's desire
to facilitate the "adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."[15] While traditional peacekeeping is based upon the consent of the parties
to the conflict,[16] Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are the generally
accepted legal authorities for the UN to deploy forces in peace operations.[17]
The Charter vests in the Security Council the legal authority to determine
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, and to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore
international peace and security.[18] The Security Council could recommend to the parties a "traditional"
Chapter VI-type peacekeeping operation (e.g. the Multinational Force and
Observers in the Sinai)[19] as a means of resolving the dispute. Traditional
peacekeeping usually does not involve a likelihood of combat and has a
high degree of consent among the parties. It also acknowledges that there
is, in fact, a "peace" to keep, which usually means there is
some form of peace agreement or cease-fire among the parties.[20] The Security Council could also determine, as it did in Bosnia,[21]
that a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation is needed. Article 42 of
the Charter is the legal authority to use military force to maintain or
restore international peace and security. The consent of the parties to
the conflict, while desirable, is not needed for operations conducted under
Chapter VII. In Chapter VII operations the member states normally will
be authorized to use "all necessary means" to maintain or restore
international peace and security. The important legal issue associated
with this authorization for a peace operation is whether the Security Council
has determined there is a threat to, or breach of, "international"
peace and security. There are two key statutory authorities for US participation in peace
operations. The first of these is the United Nations Participation Act.
Under this authority, no more than 1000 military personnel may be assigned
at any one time to UN missions in a noncombat capacity. The second is Section
628 of the Foreign Assistance Act, a broader authority, which allows the
head of any agency of the US government to detail any officer to serve
with the staff of any international organization, or to render any technical,
scientific, or professional advice or service. There may be specific congressional
authority for certain operations, in a resolution or in a Department of
Defense Authorization Act, authorizing the President to involve the United
States in such operations. In some cases there are statutory authorities
for specific types of missions, such as disaster, humanitarian, security,
and civic assistance operations.[22] When a crisis reaches the point at which an intervention is contemplated,
the first issue is the determination of the type of operation to be conducted.[23]
The foundational documents discussed thus far (the national security and
military strategies, PDD-25, PDD-56, the UN Charter, and the UN Participation
Act) provide the legal authority for a specific operation. From this authority,
or legal basis, will flow the framework for answering many of the legal
issues that will arise in the context of the operation.[24] This authority comes in several forms. First, there should be an agreement
among the parties, or some expression of consent, to a peacekeeping force.
Second, there will likely be a United Nations Security Council Resolution,
often called the mandate. The mandate, political in nature and often imprecise,
will authorize the member states to conduct the operation and will provide
a broadly worded mission, e.g. to "maintain a secure and stable environment,"
or to "effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with
Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement."[25] Simultaneously the US interagency
process will begin, and continue through the crisis, to develop and manage
the US government's response. At the international level, a similar process and plan should also occur.
The Comprehensive Campaign Plan,[26] developed in conjunction with the
US Army Peacekeeping Institute, focuses on bringing all "friendly
assets" to bear on behalf of the victims of complex contingencies.
It provides a broad-gauged planning format to develop suitable immediate
and longer-term solutions. The plan is built upon the known expertise and
anticipated contributions of the responsible, accountable international
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and it is an effective means
to enable the US government and the international community to achieve
greater unity of effort and more efficient use of resources in both defining
and accomplishing the mission. The concept, derived from the Army's operations
order process and format, has been tested in a number of multinational
exercises. The Comprehensive Campaign Plan has great potential as an international
planning tool and as a guide for the range of tasks military units could
be called upon to perform in a complex contingency operation. Interpreting the Mission and Scope of Authority Upon receiving an execute order for an operation from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the commander must interpret the mission, establish his tasks,
and determine the scope of authority he may exercise in accomplishing the
mission. All would agree that a clearly defined mission is absolutely essential
for a successful peace operation, for a commander must know what his mission
is and, more importantly, what it is not. The commander also must be alert
to the problem of expanding mission requirements, known as mission creep.
What constitutes mission creep is controversial; it could be missions that
are obviously beyond the plain text of the execute order or it could be
new guidance from higher headquarters. Missions that are beyond the commander's
interpretation of the execute order or that require different military
operations than initially planned may also be viewed as mission creep.[27]
Mission creep, some say, is like cholesterol: there is a good kind and
a bad kind. The good kind is a change in mission requirements, or granting
of broader authority, that is reflected in a new execute order from the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The bad kind comes from trying to do too many
things, not necessarily allowed in the mandate (e.g. nation building),[28]
and unduly stretching the limits of one's authority.[29] In this, as in
many other aspects of peace operations, one of the commander's most important
assets should be the legal advisor.[30] There are two views on how a commander should approach interpreting
his authority for accomplishing the mission. The first holds that a commander
must have been granted specific authority for each action he takes in the
course of executing his mission. The second embraces the proposition that
unless there is a specific prohibition on taking an action, a commander
may take the action under his own authority. While both approaches are
valid and adopted by different military commanders around the world, the
commander's national or societal culture and his branch of military service
are important factors that influence how he or she approaches the mission.
The approach that a US commander takes may lead to a different result than
those of his coalition partners on issues such as rules of engagement,
geographic limitations on the operation, obligations toward refugees and
displaced persons, and appropriate relationships with NGOs, international
organizations, and other national contingents.[31] Mission creep gives rise to serious political, military, and legal questions
which have potentially profound consequences. Is there political support for the new action? Will the action have political consequences either locally or internationally?
How will the new action affect military readiness? Is the military
capable of performing the action? Are there any legal impediments (e.g. fiscal) to performing the action?
Additionally, unlike many coalition partners, the United States may
face fiscal constraints on taking certain actions deemed necessary for
the accomplishment of the mission. An example of what could be seen as expanding mission requirements occurred
in Bosnia when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) asked the Implementation Force (IFOR) to provide assistance at the
time of the 1996 national elections.[32] IFOR was the NATO military
force that was deployed to Bosnia in support of the Dayton Peace Accords.
The US-led Task Force Eagle, a subordinate unit of IFOR, received the mission
to enhance the election process by supporting OSCE. The associated legal
question was whether an operations order or mission statement constituted
sufficient authority for such a mission, or whether external authority
was needed to authorize the types of support requested by OSCE for the
elections. There is a strong argument that "military mission"
authority does not provide a legally sufficient basis for according support
to an NGO or providing general humanitarian and civic assistance. A directive
from a higher level of command (particularly if a foreign commander is
in the chain of command) or mission statement alone would not necessarily
have provided sufficient authority to serve as a legal basis for providing
broad support to the OSCE mission. This example highlights the issue of mission creep and the approach
the commander takes in accomplishing his mission. The request from OSCE
called for the conduct of military activities that were not spoken to,
and not viewed as being part of the military's responsibilities, in the
Military Annexes to the Dayton Peace Accords.[33] Ultimately lawful methods
were found to provide support to OSCE and the 1996 national elections were
held. Because the scope of a commander's authority may not include independently
authorizing support of a specific mission within the larger operation,
each such request must be tested before the US commander directs that US
assets, in this case Task Force Eagle, can be used to carry it out. Command and Control Command and control is one of the most legally important and politically
charged issues in peace operations. A modern peace operation is unique
in that the military's role, while essential, is a supporting one. Command
and control challenges can appear in at least three forms: command and
control of the national military contingent, of the whole multinational
military effort, or of the entire intervention operation, including international
agencies and NGOs. The question of who is in charge is of obvious importance, and the answer
will vary from one operation to another. Typically, the source of command
authority flows from the Security Council to the Secretary General, who
appoints two key individuals, the Special Representative of the Secretary
General and the force commander. The Special Representative is responsible
to the Secretary General for all aspects of the intervention operation
specified in the Security Council's mandate and for the UN's civilian employees
and agencies deployed to support it (UN agencies also have their own international
legal mandates with separate channels to their respective agency headquarters).[34]
The force commander is responsible for the military effort and may or may
not have "command and control" of the national military contingents
deployed in response to the mandate. In some cases command authority and
responsibility for executing the mission will flow from the Security Council
to a UN member state (as in Haiti and Somalia) or other organization, such
as NATO (as in Bosnia).[35] It is important to note that neither the Special Representative nor
the force commander exercises command and control over the NGOs in the
operational area. Command and control in this context is rather more like
coordination, cooperation, and consensus than the traditional military
view of "command and control." Cooperation and unity of effort
between the military and these organizations must be the goal; the civil-military
operations center concept is so far the most promising means of approaching
that goal. The US commander must keep in mind that regardless of the command and
control arrangements, he must ultimately answer to his American chain of
command. Command is defined here as the lawful authority to issue orders
covering every aspect of military operations and administration. US policy
dictates that the President will never relinquish command authority over
US forces to a foreign commander.[36] Consequently, the US commander must
ensure that he does not inadvertently allow the unauthorized foreign command
of US forces. When appropriate the President may release US forces to the "operational
control" of a foreign officer. Operational control is provided for
a specific mission or period of time, and includes the authority to "assign
tasks" to US units led by US officers. A foreign commander who exercises
operational control of US forces may not change the mission or deploy US
forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President. The
non-US commander may not separate units, affect their logistics, administer
discipline, or intervene in the internal administration or organization
of a unit. Furthermore, "The United States also reserves the right
to terminate participation (in a mission) at any time and to take whatever
action it deems necessary to protect US forces."[37] Finally, the
on-scene US commander always retains the right to report directly to higher
US military authorities and to refer orders that are questionable.[38]
The command and control lines between US forces and foreign commanders
are legal boundaries that must be respected and monitored.[39] The details
of when and under what circumstances US forces will come under the operational
control of a foreign commander are worked out in the interagency process.
The US commander should also realize that he or she may be the "foreign"
commander of forces from other troop-contributing nations; in Bosnia a
Russian contingent was assigned to a US commander. Rules of engagement
(ROE) and fiscal issues are important considerations in designing command
relationships, regardless of which side the US commander finds himself
on. As was the case in Operation Joint Endeavor in 1995-96, the timing
of when operational control shifts from a state to the multinational force
is a critical juncture for fiscal issues, logistics issues, and rules of
engagement. Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force The military uses force in two situations, for self-defense and for
mission accomplishment. During peace operations, when the tactical actions
of a single soldier can have strategic consequences, proper understanding
and application of the rules of engagement are vital. Hence, "US Foreign
Policy may succeed or fail on the basis of how well Rules of Engagement
are conceived, articulated, understood and implemented."[40] Application
of the rules of engagement is probably the most visible military-legal
issue facing both the commander and soldier in peace operations. The rules
are directives issued by competent military authority to delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air
forces will initiate and continue combat engagement with other forces.
The rules of engagement are the means by which the National Command Authority
and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context
of policy and law.[41] Restraint is a principle of peace operations and should guide ROE development.[42]
When force is used, normally only in self-defense, it must be with the
degree of restraint appropriate to the circumstances.[43] Depending on
the UN mandate, the military may or may not have authority to use force
to prevent or remedy violations of the peace agreement. One key point that
must be understood, and fully communicated to all service members, is that
the ROE never limit the inherent right and obligation to use all
necessary means available in self-defense and in defense of other US forces
in the vicinity.[44] Developing Rules of Engagement Rules of engagement are influenced by three considerations; law, policy,
and mission.[45] The rationale for any given rule will be influenced by
one or more of these considerations. And while the rules of engagement
are developed by military commanders, political direction weighs heavily
in their formulation.[46] Multinational peace operations generate some
interesting ROE issues related to development and mission accomplishment.
One such issue involves the variety of ROE applicable to the effort in
Bosnia. For instance, US forces in Hungary supporting the effort in Bosnia
have ROE applicable to them while in Hungary; when they cross the Hungarian
border, the applicable ROE change. Peace operations may find a UN mission,
a US organization, and a military force from another nation operating in
close proximity to one another, each with its unique (and not necessarily
compatible) rules of engagement. During international armed conflict, an adversary will be declared hostile.
Elements of that adversary's forces may be engaged upon identification,
without first having to commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent.[47]
In peace operations, groups are rarely declared hostile. Soldiers still
may use force in self-defense, however, if a hostile act is committed against
them or if there is a demonstration of hostile intent.[48] National contingents
will differ in their views of what constitutes hostile intent. While ROE will never limit the right of self-defense or defense of US
forces, it is imperative that US commanders also understand the other individuals
and facilities that their forces may defend. Commanders need to know if
the US military can defend allied military forces, international organizations,
UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. It is equally important
to determine whether the military can use force to defend or protect host
nation or third-country civilians, contractors of any nationality, or US
civilians. In Bosnia, for example, contractual arrangements between the
US Army and the principal contractor, Brown and Root, require the US military
to provide "necessary physical security" for the contractor's
personnel.[49] Special consideration must be given to the interests and concerns of
other participating states in an attempt to arrive at common ROE. And since
US policy requires that the applicable ROE be acceptable prior to US agreement
to participate in the operation, commanders should expect that other troop-contributing
states will have similar requirements. The domestic law and policy of the
various states, as well as international treaties to which they are a party,
will significantly influence the ROE they can agree upon. Terminology is a critical issue in ROE development in multinational
peace operations. Each participating national military contingent must
have a common understanding of ROE terms, e.g. "warning shots"
and "hostile intent." There may be differences over whether
the term "threat to life" also includes a "threat of serious
bodily injury," which could justify the use of deadly force in the
latter case. There may be differences over whether force can be used to
prevent crime and, if so, what types of crime are included. The level of
permissible force in detaining individuals may also differ among the national
contingents. Given these likely differences in ROE among forces that will
be operating together, one solution is to make ROE issued at theater level
as expansive and permissive as international law would allow, and then
to permit the various national contingents to reflect their national legal
limitations in the ROE cards they provide to their individual soldiers.
There is a significant issue among national contingents with regard
to security classifications and ROE. At some point the ROE must be declassified,
so that every solider from each national contingent has access to and understands
the rules. Ideally, this would happen at a time sufficiently early in the
operation that dissemination of the rules and training on their use can
take place. The concern in peace operations is that once the ROE are declassified
and the population is aware of your ROE, those who seek to frustrate the
peace operation can place the military at a severe disadvantage. Commanders will find that there tends to be a dual approval chain for
ROE. The force commander may request approval of a rule of engagement by
higher political authority (Security Council or North Atlantic Council)
which, once approved, must then be additionally approved by the various
national contingents' governments. This situation may apply if the rule
involves a sensitive issue such as the use of riot control agents. A related
serious issue involving ROE and command and control is inconsistency among
ROE, particularly those promulgated and binding at different levels of
command. Additionally, non-US commanders often will be involved at one
or more levels of command. One possible resolution to some of these issues
would be for the force commander not to assign missions to forces under
his operational control if their national policies, laws, or rules of engagement
will not allow them to carry out the mission. Underlying cultural issues,
which will exist even between close allies, must be bridged; the commander
can use his legal advisor to help in this effort. Commanders will also
be well served to emphasize ROE training while in garrison; the 18th Airborne
Corps' RAMP program is an example of what can be done in this regard.[50]
If soldiers have a baseline understanding of self-defense issues, it will
be much easier to accommodate mission-specific rules. Rules of Engagement in Peace Operations It is often difficult for military forces to withdraw from a complex
contingency operation before the civilian aspects of the mission are well
under way and succeeding. A recurring challenge to the military and civilian
components of such operations is the rehabilitation of the forces of law
and order. This is an ROE issue because of the military's participation,
possibly through the use of force, in supporting the civilian aspects of
the operation. The issue to be decided is against whom and to what extent
the military will be authorized to use force to uphold law and order in
an ostensibly sovereign state. Interaction with civilian police, civilian
police checkpoints, freedom of movement, prevention of crimes by civilians,
and the detention of civilians are usually pressing law enforcement and
force protection matters. Checkpoints are frequently raised as issues within the context of law
and order. In Bosnia, IFOR had the authority to intervene between the local
police and local population to ensure freedom of movement, regulate checkpoints,
and prevent the establishment by the various factions of unauthorized checkpoints.
In 1996, units assigned to NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) had
the authority to use "proportional and minimum force" in removing
unauthorized checkpoints. The ARRC's guidance was to use a "graduated
but uncompromising response" and to allow the checkpoint to be voluntarily
removed at any stage. Task Force Eagle took the position that while it
could regulate police activities, "military security" did not
include a military responsibility for civilian law enforcement. One scenario in which these issues can arise involves the return and
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Return and resettlement
is usually a key process in the civilian part of the peace operation. Commanders
will need to know what exactly the military's obligation is toward refugees
and displaced persons, whether the military will be expected to assist
in return and resettlement, and if the military is expected to provide
protection and other humanitarian assistance to aid in the return and resettlement
process. Consider the refugee who returns to his former home and begins
to rebuild. Suppose that one night members of an opposing ethnic group
set fire to his home, destroying his work, possibly injuring the refugee
or his family. Consequently the refugee changes his mind about resettling,
and other refugees are discouraged from returning. Will the ROE allow the
military to act to prevent these sorts of crimes? Such action could facilitate
the return and resettlement of refugees, further the accomplishment of
the civilian mission, and ultimately expedite the military's withdrawal.
Conversely, such a policy could allow some factions to accuse the military
of favoring the supported group over others. Another scenario in which the ROE might enhance mission accomplishment
involves elections. Elections and the reestablishment of democratic institutions
are also key to the civilian part of any complex contingency operation.
In this scenario, suppose a number of ethnic minority candidates are elected
to office. On the day for the newly elected officials to take office, the
majority ethnic group may attempt to prevent them from taking their seats
in city council or parliament. If the ROE permit such action, commanders
might face decisions about escorting the minority officials to their offices
and using force if met with resistance. How long should such protection
last? There are three highly controversial areas where law and policy are
rapidly changing; any or all of them could be important in interventions.
The first is the use and removal of land mines, raising questions about
the use of mines by intervention forces for force protection, separation
of forces, or safe havens, and about the military's role in demining operations.
Commanders must be very alert to proposals that US forces should be used
in demining operations. The second addresses new technologies and the use
of less-than-lethal means of crowd control or self-defense. There are new
developments in technology that may be very useful in peace operations
to control a volatile situation without resorting to deadly force or riot
control agents. The US recently ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention,
and related issues exist concerning the use of riot control agents in peace
operations. Commanders should plan for the use of such agents but recognize
that obtaining permission to use them may be difficult. Finally, the use of information technologies in peace operations raises
such issues as whether "electronic attack" (nonphysical attack)
constitutes a "use of force" within the meaning of the UN Charter
and whether the use of technology, such as a computer virus, constitutes
a hostile act. Another category of issues is the use of force against information
sources within the operational area. Examples of challenges in this category
are using the electron as a weapon (computer viruses and logic bombs),
inducing crashes of computer systems, establishing a definition of lawful
electronic targets, reacting to computer "hackers," and the manipulation
of data either by the intervention force or by local factions. The ROE
will govern how the commander takes advantage of technology in this rapidly
changing aspect of military operations. The uncertainty is compounded in
multinational operations in which states are governed by different laws
on the matter. These are controversial issues, and commanders must be alert
to changing law and policy regarding each of them. Status of Forces Agreements The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is a subject of immense political,
legal, military, and personal concern during peace operations for soldiers,
commanders, and governments. The Status of Forces Agreement will affect
virtually every aspect of a peace operation; its importance cannot be overstated.
The "law of the flag" concept, whereby the military takes its
domestic law with it on a deployment and is immune from the laws of other
states, generally does not apply in modern peace operations. Commanders
must realize that absent an agreement to the contrary with the host nation,
the visiting military force is fully subject to all the laws and jurisdiction
of the host nation, including the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
host nation's courts. This means that a soldier can potentially be brought
before a civil or criminal court and held financially liable or imprisoned
for his acts or omissions while on or off duty. Obviously these possibilities pose a concern to commanders. A SOFA,
the basic purpose of which is to alleviate this concern, defines the legal
rights and obligations, privileges, and immunities of all the parties,
and facilitates the accomplishment of the military's mission.[51] A SOFA
may be concluded between the host nation and the UN, there may be individual
agreements between participating states and the host nation, or both conditions
may apply during an intervention.[52] An important aspect of any SOFA for the commander is that which specifies
privileges, immunities, and jurisdictional waivers. The SOFA should contain
the following provisions, as recommended in FM 100-23, Peace Operations:
immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction for acts committed within
the scope of duty immunity from search, seizure, or inspection of force documents, personnel,
vehicles, buildings, or areas authority of the force to enforce its own criminal justice system and
conduct legal proceedings in the host nation authority and control over areas and premises occupied by the force
freedom of movement within the host nation waiver of economic and financial regulations (tax, customs, duties,
imports/exports) authority to carry weapons openly procedures for settling claims and disputes between the force and local
population authority to enter and depart the host nation on military identification
cards and orders alone and without tax use of host nation support services such as communications, water,
electricity, airports, and seaports provisions for due process, double-jeopardy protection, and trial observers
a release of liability for damages related to combat or the use of
force[53] Another important aspect of the SOFA is dispute resolution, or the settlement
of claims, between the military and the local population. If handled well,
claims settlements can have a very positive public relations effect, establish
goodwill with the local population, and facilitate mission accomplishment.
An issue related to the claims process is the effect of introducing hard
foreign currency into the local economy as a result of claims made against
the peace operations force. Conversely, if claims are not paid in a timely
and appropriate fashion, there is the possibility of hostile acts being
taken against the military, as happened to the UN Protection Force. Rights and privileges may also be established in other documents. For
example, the Military Annex to the 1995 General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia (Dayton Accords) states that "[IFOR] shall have the
right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities
to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training,
and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. The IFOR
and its personnel shall not be liable for any damages to civilian or governmental
property caused by combat damage or combat-related activities."[54]
There are several international treaties which also may be invoked to
protect the military force while in the host nation. A few members of the
mission may receive diplomatic immunity, but it would be exceptionally
difficult to obtain this level of protection for the entire force. Where
UN missions are concerned two treaties are particularly relevant. The first
is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
which provides that the UN shall enjoy legal capacity, privileges, and
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. The treaty also
recognizes the status of "Expert On Mission" (EOM), and provides
those so designated with immunity from arrest or detention. The EOM's papers
and personal baggage are inviolate; an EOM also has the right to use codes
and to receive sealed mail. Of note, however, is the fact that this status
may be waived by the Secretary General. The Dayton Accords invoked this
convention with respect to NATO personnel involved in operations in Bosnia,[55]
which meant that IFOR personnel (and successor organizations) were immune
from criminal prosecution by Bosnian local and national authorities. The second treaty of particular relevance is the Convention on the Safety
and Protection of UN and Associated Personnel, which provides several important
protections. First, it requires prompt return of captured personnel and
directs that while detained such personnel will receive treatment in accordance
with the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Second, the treaty
imposes criminal liability on those who attack peacekeepers or other personnel
acting for the UN in its authorized operations. Third, it contains provisions
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over those accused of violating
its terms, including their prosecution or extradition. If these UN treaties are not applicable, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations may provide some protections. This treaty provides for Administrative
and Technical Staff Privileges and Immunities (A&T, P&I). This
status grants immunity from criminal and civil liability for acts performed
within the scope of official duties. If this status is applicable to the
force, the SOFA should state that status equivalent to A&T, P&I
is granted, and that the force has the right to determine whether the soldier
was acting within the scope of his duty. The final source of legal protection
is that of a Visiting Forces Act, under which the military force is accorded
status similar to A&T, P&I. If there are no provisions in a SOFA
of the sort described above between the United States and the host nation,
and if none of the treaty protections apply, the members of the intervention
force are essentially tourists. They are totally subject to the law and
jurisdiction of the host nation. An important aspect of the SOFA that can be easily overlooked is the
scope of its coverage. The definitions section should be closely scrutinized
to determine what constitutes the "force." The status of civilians
should also be addressed with respect to contractors supporting the military,
particularly their right to import property for use by the military force
without paying customs or duty. There also should be provisions covering
third-party nationals and local, host nation civilians hired by the contractor.
Is it desirable to specify in the SOFA that the military can use force
to protect these individuals? Should the SOFA provide that US contractors
will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the host nation, and that host
nation customs and tax laws do not apply to these individuals? Another
important issue is the scope of the SOFA's application in federated states.
A SOFA that is negotiated and concluded with the "national" or
"federal" government may or may not apply to its political subdivisions.
Fiscal Law Closely associated with the scope of authority to accomplish the mission
is the fiscal authority to spend appropriated funds in support of the mission.
Once the commander decides upon a course of action he wishes to pursue,
a proper fiscal authority must be found to support the action.[56] Judge
Advocates assigned to Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia in 1997 and 1998
have reported that they spend a substantial portion of their time on fiscal
law issues.[57] In peace operations, the attorney and comptroller become
as important to mission success as the operations and fire support officers
are in combat operations.[58] One of the most significant legal dangers facing the commander is a
potential violation of the rules of fiscal law. For example, a commander
may be pressured to provide unauthorized support or assistance to foreign
military forces participating in the operation or to the local civilian
population. Drawing the line between operational requirements and unauthorized
security assistance is a recurring issue. While providing support and assistance
to friendly foreign entities is security assistance,[59] it may also be
an essential part of coalition peace operations. Funds designated for a
general purpose, such as operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, must
not be used to pay for an effort for which Congress has specifically appropriated
other funds. Providing assistance to a national contingent or the local
population could be considered security assistance or humanitarian assistance,
forms of assistance dealt with by specific legislation. This means that
commanders must consult extensively with their attorneys in order to find
ways to legally accomplish the mission and avoid the improper use of O&M
or other types of funds. In some cases the national force requesting the
assistance, rather than the type of assistance, may be the determining
factor in whether the United States may provide the support in question.
Two mechanisms are available to assist the commander in avoiding many
of the fiscal dangers inherent in peace operations. These are Section 607
of the Foreign Assistance Act, and the Acquisition and Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA).[60] Section 607 allows any agency of the US government
to furnish commodities and services to friendly foreign countries and international
organizations for purposes consistent with, and in furtherance of, the
purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act. Additionally, Section 607 will
establish the overall terms and conditions under which the United States
will provide assistance. An ACSA[61] allows US forces to provide logistics
support, supplies, and services to other forces on a reciprocal basis.
A significant benefit of the ACSA is that the reimbursement to the United
States may be "in kind," such as the US providing port services
to a national contingent in exchange for fuel.[62] Many fiscal issues were raised in 1996 in connection with the request
for the United States to provide logistical support to the Slovenian Battalion.
In this case, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps commander, a foreign officer,
had ordered US-led Task Force Eagle to provide certain supplies requested
by the battalion, which had been operating as a UN force and had used UN
logistics until the UN logistical chain ceased to operate. At the time
of the order, the battalion was operating within the area assigned to Task
Force Eagle. As noted, under US law any support provided to a foreign military
unit must be on a reimbursable basis and pursuant to a proper agreement
(e.g. ACSA) or applicable statutory authority. Because the Slovenian government
had no ACSA in place with the United States, there was no authority to
transfer goods and services to its battalion. In the end, the ARRC intervened
and support was provided to the unit. This example illustrates some of
the fiscal difficulties faced by US military units participating in multinational
peace operations. Violations of fiscal law bring increased oversight, tighter regulations,
and even potential discipline, all of which increase the difficulty of
accomplishing an already difficult mission. Fiscal law constraints are
one of the primary ways in which Congress can exercise its authority in
foreign affairs. For example, Section 8117 of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 imposed a 15-day notice requirement
to Congress before any funds "may be obligated or expended to transfer
to another nation or an international organization any defense articles
or services."[63] International peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and
humanitarian assistance operations conducted under the authority of the
UN are covered by this requirement.[64] This requirement also affects many
of the fiscal elements of peace operations, such as ACSAs and Section 607
of the Foreign Assistance Act, the transportation of humanitarian assistance,
and land mine clearance activities.[65] Of particular concern is its effect
on the ability of the military to provide humanitarian assistance on an
emergency basis, particularly in disasters. This new requirement also affects
authorities under other statutes,[66] such as Section 652 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, under which the Congress only needed to be notified just
prior to the date that the President intended to exercise drawdown authority.[67]
Drawdown authority is the authority to provide defense stocks and services
in response to an unforeseen emergency requiring military assistance to
a foreign country or international organization.[68] The new 15-day notice
requirement significantly affects the ability of the military to respond
quickly to emergencies and has the potential to hinder the achievement
of national security objectives.[69] The Law of War in Peace Operations Discussions of the law of war in peace operations seem to begin with
a dilemma: we are not at war, we are in a peace operation, so the law of
war does not apply. It is true that presently under international law the
"law of war"[70] does not technically apply in the context
of peace operations.[71] Generally, the law of war is triggered by international
armed conflict and not merely by military operations in which force may
be used on a limited basis, as in peace operations.[72] Issues involving
the law of war, however, evolving from either a civil war or an international
armed conflict, are often carried over to the post-conflict
peace operation. While technically the law of war may not apply in a peace operation,
the principles of the law of war do: considerations of necessity, proportionality,
unnecessary suffering, unnecessary destruction of property, and distinction
apply whenever and wherever the military uses force. Furthermore,
in peace operations that do not involve traditional peacekeeping as defined
above,[73] it is anticipated that combat operations or the use of force
beyond that employed for immediate self-defense will occur. The Dayton
Accords arguably anticipated such when providing immunity to IFOR for damage
arising from combat or combat-related activities.[74] There may also exist some residual law of war issues between the parties
that will affect a peace operations force. One such issue that arose in
Bosnia was the identification and return of the deceased. Under the law
of war,[75] the parties to a conflict are required to create an official
graves registration service to assist in the subsequent exhumation, identification,
and return of bodies to the home country. Under the Dayton Accords, each
party agreed to allow graves registration personnel of the other party
to enter its sector and to recover and evacuate the bodies of their deceased
from known grave sites.[76] Task Force Eagle led the effort in coordinating
the work of recovery and exhumation efforts as outlined in the Military
Annex to the Dayton Accords, since IFOR had the authority to ensure the
parties complied with their obligations under the Military Annex.[77] Even though the law of war technically does not apply, it is US policy
that "the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law
of war during the conduct of all military operations and related activities
in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized, and unless
otherwise directed by competent authorities, will apply law of war principles
during all operations that are categorized as Military Operations Other
Than War."[78] Commanders should also be aware that many other treaties
and conventions apply across the entire spectrum of operations, including
peace operations. Examples include the Chemical Weapons Convention (use
of riot control agents), the Conventional Weapons Convention (use of lasers,
mines, and incendiaries), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction (also known as the Ottawa Process). Aside from the applicability of the various conventions and treaties
comprising the law of war in peace operations, the commander should be
aware of two key issues related to the law of war which will almost certainly
arise during any peace operation. The first deals with civilians.
One senior US Army officer has observed that "one word . . . represents
the most vexing legal, political, operational challenge of OOTW [operations
other than war]: civilians." Perhaps the first challenge in dealing
with civilians in a peace operation is that of deciding who qualifies as
a civilian. Once the determination is made that a person is a civilian,
the next determination is whether he is a refugee, a displaced person,
or a migrant. Caution is the key in making this second determination, for
the status provided the person can bring with it legal rights and obligations.
Other questions relate to determining the military's legal obligation
toward civilians. Issues concerning humanitarian assistance, detainment,
and civilian property abound in peace operations. Dealing with civilians
is the type of complex legal situation where issues of sovereignty, the
legal basis for the operation, the ROE, and the SOFA all converge in a
tactical situation, involving only a few people, that could have serious
strategic consequences if not handled properly. Commanders are advised
to consult extensively with their legal and political advisors and civil
affairs officers regarding designation and treatment of civilians. This
is one range of issues that the international media and international organizations
watch very closely. Another vital issue involves war crimes and persons accused or indicted
of war crimes by a tribunal. These topics concern the military's relationship
with local police and an international police task force, if one exists,
the military's role in law enforcement, and the rule of universal jurisdiction
over war crimes. The commander must be aware of, and clearly understand,
his responsibility concerning war crimes and alleged perpetrators related
to incidents that occurred during the conflict but are being investigated
and adjudicated during the peace operation. Added difficulties are the
rule of universal jurisdiction and the newly established permanent international
criminal court (ICC). The ICC is a very recent development in the law. It is the product of
a five-week diplomatic conference in 1998, and many issues regarding the
operation of a permanent international criminal court remain to be resolved.
They include the relationship between the jurisdiction of the ICC and the
universal jurisdiction which each country has over war crimes, the powers
granted to the prosecutor, and the degree of Security Council control over
the court. In the United States, the War Crimes Act of 1997 provides US
federal courts with the jurisdiction to prosecute any person, inside or
outside the United States, for war crimes in which a US national or a member
of the US armed forces is involved either as an accused or a victim. The commander can also expect to receive pressure to actively seek out,
apprehend, and turn over to a tribunal individuals from the former warring
parties who are suspects or indicted on war crimes charges. The SOFA, the
ROE, the mandate, and a troop-contributing nation's interpretation of the
applicable law will determine how the military deals with this issue. Under
the 1998 Foreign Assistance Act, Congress has prohibited providing foreign
aid to any nation that has failed to take necessary and significant steps
to apprehend and transfer to the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia all
persons indicted for war crimes by the Tribunal.[79] During Operation Joint Endeavor (1995-96), Task Force Eagle's policy
was that it would not actively hunt down persons indicted for war crimes
but would detain them if soldiers recognized and came into contact with
such individuals during the normal course of assigned duties. The rationale
behind this policy had five elements: The policy was clearly within the mandate. The policy provided a role more appropriate to the military than serving
as a police force. Force protection was better served. It seemed unlikely that an active search for such individuals would
be successful. It was believed that a policy of actively tracking down such individuals
might compromise the perception of the military's evenhanded treatment
of all factions in the region. Conclusion The objective of this article is to provide a strategic overview of
complex multinational peace operations and foster awareness of key legal
issues that may arise during their conduct. Many of the issues identified
here lack definitive answers, in part because each peace operation is in
many ways unique; variables in one operation that affect the outcome of
a recurring issue, such as law enforcement or election support, may not
apply in a subsequent operation. While the article provides some general
advice to senior commanders and their staffs, it can never substitute for
legal advice from an attorney on the scene in a specific operation. It almost goes without saying that commanders must know the situations
in which significant legal difficulty could be encountered, the likely
issues, and the questions to ask. There are many resources for commanders
and staffs to consult prior to a mission, including The Joint Task Force
Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, A Legal Guide to Peace
Operations, The Operational Law Handbook, various after-action
reviews from previous missions, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the service headquarters, the Joint Staff, various international organizations,
and experts at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute.[80] Familiarity with
the contents of the documents and contact with those who have participated
in complex contingency operations can help commanders and staffs to prepare
for recurring challenges and to be alert to the unexpected ones. When the US military goes to war we have a well-defined body of law
that we have trained with, that we understand, and that guides our conduct--the
law of war. When the military deploys in a contingency operation it does
not have the benefit of a similar body of law, a "law of peace operations."
However, there are internationally recognized legal bases for the conduct
of peace operations--the UN Charter, invitation, SOFA, and treaties such
as the Dayton Peace Accords. Member states of the UN have agreed in Article
25 of the Charter to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council." Likewise, there is domestic US legal authority for participation
in peace operations--the Constitution, the United Nations Participation
Act, and other federal statutes enacted by Congress. While the Security
Council does not "order" member states to provide or deploy troops
to a peace operation, the council does have the legal authority, under
Articles 42 and 43, to authorize member states to use force in the context
of such an intervention. These legal authorities, in conjunction with others
previously discussed, form the body of law that governs the initiation
of peace operations and the conduct of participating military forces. Just as there seems to be no end to conflict around the world, there
is no reason to believe that the US armed forces, as well as other agencies
of the US government, will not continue to be involved in peace operations.
The complexity and variety of the issues raised in different aspects of
each peace operation make clear the importance of the law and the legal
advisor to commanders. The law of war is a fairly well-defined and well-settled
body of law; the law of peace operations is not. Until the law and practice
in peace operations become more clearly defined in the international community,
commanders and legal advisors will continue to grapple with very important,
complex, and sensitive issues surrounded by an uncomfortable degree of
uncertainty. NOTES 1. Major Michael Newton, Peace Operations Speech, 1997 Operational Law
Seminar, The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army (TJAGSA), Charlottesville,
Va. 2. US Army Field Manual 100-23 (FM 100-23), Peace Operations
(Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1994), p. v. 3. 50 USC §404a (National Security Act of 1947 as amended [Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 §6030]). 4. "National Security Strategy," Chapter 3 of the 1998 Operational
Law Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: TJAGSA, 1998), p. 3-1, referring
to the National Security Strategy of 1996. 5. Ibid. 6. Presidential Decision Directive 25, The Clinton Administration's
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, May 1994. Hereafter
PDD-25. 7. The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century,"
May 1997 from Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-2. 8. PDD-25. 9. "Peace Operations," Chapter 8 of Operational Law Handbook,
p. 8-2. 10. Ibid. 11. White Paper, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing
Complex Contingency Operations, Presidential Decision Directive 56,"
May 1997. See also Mark R. Walsh and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex
Emergencies: Under New Management," in this issue of Parameters,
28 (Winter 1998-99); and "Peace Operations Outline," in the 1998
Operations Other Than War Deskbook (Charlottesville, Va.: TJAGSA,
1998), pp. O-10 - O-11. 12. See UN Charter, Articles 2, 39, 42, 51. 13. Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations (7th ed.; Needham Heights,
Mass.: Allyn & Bacon, 1996). See also UN Charter, Article 2. 14. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-1. 15. Ibid. 16. Field Manual 100-23, p. 4. 17. UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII; Chapter VII, Article 42. 18. UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 39. 19. FM 100-23, p. 4. 20. See generally FM 100-23, p. 4, referring to elements of traditional
peacekeeping operations. 21. UN Security Council Resolution 1031, December 1995, acting under
Chapter VII, authorized the establishment of the implementation force (IFOR).
22. See generally Overseas Disaster and Humanitarian/Civic Assistance
fiscal statutes, such as: 10 USC §§127(a), 166(a), 401, 402,
404, 2010, 2011, 2547, 2551, 22 USC §2292. 23. Operational Law Handbook, pp. 8-9 and 8-10 24. See generally Operational Law Handbook, "Peace Operations"
chapter. 25. See UN Security Council Resolution 940, September 1994, authorizing
the multinational force intervention in Haiti; and UN Security Council
Resolution 1031, December 1995, authorizing the Implementation Force intervention
in Bosnia. See also Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-9. 26. The Comprehensive Campaign Plan is an initiative launched by Arthur
(Gene) Dewey and Walter Clarke of the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US
Army War College. The plan is a forerunner to, and analogous in structure
with, the interagency pol-mil plan authorized under PDD-56. For a more
detailed description of the Comprehensive Campaign Plan, including an example
developed in US Southern Command exercises, see the web site of the Congressional
Hunger Center at http://logos.ghn.org/chc/ccp.html. 27. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-10; see also "Peace Operations
Outline," pp. O-17 - O-19. 28. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-11. 29. "Peace Operations Outline," p. O-19; Operational Law
Handbook, p. 8-10. 30. See Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-9, referencing a US commander
from Operation Restore Hope who commented that the lawyer should be the
"High Priest of the mission statement." 31. "Peace Operations Outline," p. O-18, refers to seven areas
affected by the mission statement and therefore by the commander's interpretation
and approach taken to accomplishing the mission. 32. In this regard, "expanding mission requirements" is defined
as at least the perceived expansion of mission requirements, or the expansion
of the military's interpretation of its mission. The military's responsibility
under the Military Annex was to provide secure conditions for others (e.g.
OSCE) to conduct free and fair elections. The military was then asked to
provide logistical support, including everything from medical evacuation,
to transportation, to fuel and repair services. This is arguably more than,
or at least different from, providing "secure conditions" and
could be seen as mission expansion. 33. See generally the General Accounting Office report "Bosnia:
Costs Are Exceeding DoD's Estimate," GAO NSIAD-96-20 BR (July 1996);
see also text in note 32 above. 34. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 72-76; Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-10;
see also Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations
(Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997), Appendix C. See also,
Mark Walsh, "Managing Peace Operations in the Field," Parameters,
26 (Summer 1996), 32-49. 35. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-10. 36. PDD-25. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-4. 40. Naval Justice School, quoted in Joint Task Force Commander's
Handbook for Peace Operations, p. I-13. 41. JCS Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(quoted from Operational Law Handbook, p. 9-1). 42. FM 100-23, p. 35. 43. Ibid., p. 17. 44. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI ) 3121.01,
Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces (SROE), October 1994. 45. Operational Law Handbook, ROE Chapter Diagram, pp. 9-1 -
9-2. 46. FM 100-23, p. 35. 47. CJCSI 3121.01; Operational Law Handbook, p. 9-3. 48. CJCSI 3121.01; Operational Law Handbook, p. 9-3. 49. See contract between Brown and Root and US Army, Paragraph C.5.3(a)
(DACA 78-92-C-0066). 50. The 18th Airborne Corps RAMP program is a methodology for training
soldiers on baseline self-defense rules. RAMP is an acronym which stands
for Return fire with aimed fire, Anticipate attack, Measure
the force used, and Protect with deadly force only life and property
designated by the commander. 51. FM 100-23, p. 66. 52. Ibid., p.67. 53. Ibid. 54. Annex 1-A, Article VI "Deployment of the Implementation Force,"
paragraph 9(a) of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. 55. See Appendix B to Annex 1-A to the Dayton Peace Accord of 21 November
1995, Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the Status of NATO
and its Personnel. 56. Operational Law Handbook, p. 8-13. 57. Ibid. 58. See a similar comment by Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, "The
SJA in Future Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1996,
pp. 15, 16. 59. See generally Operational Law Handbook, Security Assistance
Chapter, p. 28-6. 60. Foreign Assistance Act §607 is codified at 22 USC §2357.
The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement is from 10 USC §2342.
These statutes provide authority to enter into agreements which then grant
the United States military authority to provide logistics, goods, and services.
61. Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements are governed by 10 USC
§§2341,2342, 2344. 62. Ibid. 63. §8080 of the DOD Appropriations Act for FY 98. 64. Ibid. 65. §8117 of the FY (96/98) DOD Appropriations Act. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. See generally the drawdown provisions of the Foreign Assistance
Act (FAA), FAA §506(a)(1), FAA §552(c)(2). 69. §8117 of the FY (96/98) DOD Appropriations Act. 70. The law of war is generally thought to consist of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, the "Geneva Tradition," and the Hague Conventions of
1907, the "Hague Tradition." Other elements that may be thought
to be included in the law of war include the 1977 additional Protocols
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and various conventions and protocols such
as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conventional Weapons Convention,
and others. Some of these conventions apply only during international armed
conflict; others may apply without having international armed conflict
and thus would apply during a peace operation. 71. Chapter VII operations in which the military force is acting as
a combatant may trigger the application of the Law of War. 72. Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 73. By "traditional peacekeeping" I am referring to strict
Chapter VI-style peacekeeping where there is a high degree of consent among
the parties, a peace agreement is in place, the force is small and lightly
armed, the use of force is authorized only in self-defense, and there are
no enforcement powers. 74. Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1-A
to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Article VI, paragraph 9, of the Military Annex. 75. Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick, Articles 16 and 17. 76. Military Annex, Art. IX, para. 2. 77. Military Annex, Art. VI, paras. 2 & 5; Art. IX, para. 2. 78. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5810.01 (4). See
also Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 (DOD Law of War Program).
79. Foreign Assistance Act 98, §573, 111 Stat. 2430-2, also Operational
Law Handbook, p. 28-1. 80. The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations
provides an overview of many issues arising in peace operations and is
produced by the Joint Warfighting Center. A Legal Guide to Peace Operations
provides a comprehensive overview of the legal issues arising in peace
operations and is produced by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, US Army
War College (May 1998). Captain Glenn Bowens is legal advisor and international law attorney
for the US Army Peacekeeping Institute at the US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pa. He is a graduate of Valley Forge Military Academy and the
University of Kentucky, and received his J.D. degree from Chase College
of Law in 1993. In 1994-96 he was Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, III Corps
and Fort Hood. In 1995-96 he served as legal advisor for Joint Task Force
160, Operation Sea Signal, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a unilateral US humanitarian
operation responding to the exodus of Haitians and Cubans from their countries.
Reviewed 6 November 1998. Please send comments or corrections to usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil