Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/913/99/341819/
Timestamp: 2019-09-23 02:44:40
Document Index: 494973785

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981']

Perry, Edith, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Command Performance, Defendant-appellee, 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1990 › Perry, Edith, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Command Performance, Defendant-appellee
Perry, Edith, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Command Performance, Defendant-appellee, 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1990)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1990) Argued June 27, 1990. Decided Aug. 30, 1990
Before SLOVITER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges and THOMPSON, District Judge.* OPINION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal of the grant of summary judgment to the defendant Command Performance. Plaintiff, a black woman, brought this action against defendant beauty salon claiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Pennsylvania law of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff was refused service by one of the operators employed by defendant beauty salon after making an appointment by telephone to have her hair done. The district court granted summary judgment because it viewed the hairdresser's conduct as racial harassment occurring subsequent to contract formation and therefore not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 under the interpretation of that statute enunciated in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989). We conclude that the district court erred when it entered summary judgment on defendant's behalf, because there was an insufficient basis on the record for the court to have concluded that a contract had been formed before the incident. As we have frequently stated, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1977).
Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that "all persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). One year ago the Supreme Court decided the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, (1989). While not overruling the landmark case of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 49 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1976), the Court limited the scope of conduct covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372, 2373; McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
The Court held that section 1981 "prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter into a contract with someone, as well as the offer to make a contract only on discriminatory terms."2 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. It does not extend to "problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment." Id. It followed that racial harassment in an employment context "is not actionable under Sec. 1981.... Rather, such conduct is actionable under ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. at 2374.3
The court on a motion for summary judgment must view the facts presented and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Matthews v. Freedman, 882 F.2d 83, 84 (3d Cir. 1989). In this case, the district court's dismissal was based on its conclusion that the parties had entered into a contract at the time Ms. Perry's husband telephoned Command Performance to set up an appointment for his wife. However, the record is inadequate to determine if the refusal to serve plaintiff occurred after the contract was made or was concurrent with the making of the contract. Arguably, an appointment for hair salon services is merely an invitation to negotiate, and that acceptance of the offer occurs simultaneously to the performance of the contract. If that were the fact, then there would be no obligation to pay until, at least, the hairdresser began to render the services. Ms. Abbott's refusal to wash and set Ms. Perry's hair could be viewed as a declination to enter into a contract for services with Ms. Perry.4
Because the court entered judgment for the defendant, it never considered whether the conduct of the employee at issue was either authorized or a policy of Command Performance for which it may be held liable. Nor did it decide whether defendant's acts were intentionally discriminatory, for only intentional discrimination is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1982)). These matters remain for consideration on remand.
The Court further explained that the statutory protection against discrimination in the enforcement of contracts refers only to a prohibition of "discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or her race...." Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373 (emphasis added). This part of the Court's holding is not germane to the analysis of Ms. Perry's claim
Plaintiff relies on a number of service cases that arose prior to Patterson. See e.g., Wyatt v. Security Inn Food and Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1987) (Plaintiffs were permitted to proceed to trial and recover on claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 2000a. They alleged that defendant had discriminated against black lounge patrons by uneven enforcement of a policy which limited lounge access to drinking patrons only.); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974) (Contract between white resident and private swim club, which prohibited members' bringing black guests to the pool, but allowed resident to bring other guests upon payment of a fee, could be enforced by black guests as third party beneficiaries, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973) (Plaintiffs were permitted to bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 when they were served beer upon entering a bar, but were asked to leave when they began speaking Spanish.). We express no opinion on the effect of Patterson on these cases.
The scope of Patterson in the employment context is not before us. The Supreme Court, in deciding Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989), assumed without deciding that a petitioner's rights under section 1981 were violated by his removal and reassignment from his coaching position, which he alleged occurred because he was white. See also Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 1990) (Holding that discriminatory discharge is actionable under section 1981 after Patterson decision because protection from racially motivated deprivations of contracts is essential to the full enjoyment of the right to make contracts.) (emphasis in original).
See Roberts v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1527, 1529 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (Defendant wrote race of plaintiffs on plaintiffs' check for payment of goods they sought to purchase. "After Patterson the resolution of this civil rights claim turns on an interpretation of the Missouri Commercial Code to determine whether the contract was formed at the time the alleged violation occurred. The court does not possess enough information about the retail transaction to ascertain whether a contract was already formed at the time defendant recorded the race of plaintiffs on the check.")