Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/415/423/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 15:44:19
Document Index: 716426724

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 527', '§ 1450', '§ 1450', '§ 301', '§ 185', '§ 1450', '§ 1450', '§ 1450', '§ 1450', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 1450', '§ 1450', '§ 2954']

GRANNY GOOSE FOODS, INC. V. TEAMSTERS, 415 U. S. 423 (1974) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
1. Whether state law or Rule 65(b) is controlling, the restraining order expired long before the date of the alleged contempt, since, under the State Code of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining order is returnable no later than 15 days from its date, 20 days if good cause is shown, and must be dissolved unless the party obtaining it proceeds to submit its case for a preliminary injunction, and similarly, under Rule 65(b), such an order must expire by its own terms within 10 days after entry, 20 days if good cause is shown. Pp. 415 U. S. 431-433. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) Where a court intends to supplant a temporary restraining order, which, under Rule 65(b), expires by its own terms within 10 days of issuance, with a preliminary injunction of unlimited duration pending a final decision on the merits or further order of the court, it should issue an order clearly saying so, and where it has not done so, a party against whom a temporary restraining order has issued may reasonably assume that the order has expired within Rule 65(b)'s time limits. Here, since the only orders entered were a temporary restraining order and an order denying a motion to dissolve the temporary order, the Union had chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court held respondent Union in criminal contempt for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
violating a temporary restraining order issued by the California Superior Court on May 18, 1970, prior to the removal of the case from the Superior Court to the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting, on the ground that the temporary restraining order had expired long before November 30, 1970, the date of the alleged contempt. 472 F.2d 764 (CA9 1973). The court reasoned that, under both § 527 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 65(b), the temporary restraining order must have expired no later than June 7, 1970, 20 days after its issuance. The court rejected petitioners' contention that the life of the order was indefinitely prolonged by § 1450 "until dissolved or modified by the district court," holding that the purpose of that statute "is to prevent a break in the force of an injunction or a restraining order that could otherwise occur when jurisdiction is being shifted," 472 F.2d 767, not to
As this understanding of the statute was in conflict with decisions of two other Circuits interpreting § 1450 to preclude the automatic termination of state court temporary restraining orders, [Footnote 2] we granted certiorari. 414 U.S. 816 (1973). Finding ourselves in substantial agreement with the analysis of the Ninth Circuit in the present case, we affirm. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On May 15, 1970, petitioners Granny Goose Foods, Inc., and Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California for the county of Alameda alleging that respondent, a local Teamsters Union, and its officers and agents, were engaging in strike activity in breach of national and local collective bargaining agreements recently negotiated by multiunion-multiemployer bargaining teams. Although the exact nature of the underlying labor dispute is unclear, its basic contours are as follows: the Union was unwilling to comply with certain changes introduced in the new contracts; it believed it was not legally bound by the new agreements because it had not been a part of the multiunion bargaining units that negotiated the contracts; [Footnote 3] and it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
wanted to negotiate separate contracts with petitioner employers. The same day the complaint was filed, the Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining all existing strike activity and ordering the defendants to show cause on May 26, 1970, why a preliminary injunction should not issue during the pendency of the suit. An amended complaint adding petitioner Standard Brands, Inc., was filed on May 18, and a modified temporary restraining order was issued that same day adding a prohibition against strike activities directed toward that employer. On May 19, 1970, after having been served with the May 15 restraining order but before the scheduled hearing on the order to show cause, the Union and the individual defendants removed the proceeding to the District Court on the ground that the action arose under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185. [Footnote 4] On May 20, 1970, an amended removal petition was filed to take into account the modified temporary restraining order of May 18. Simultaneously with the filing of the removal petition, the defendants filed a motion in the District Court to dissolve the temporary restraining order. The sole ground alleged in support of the motion was that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to maintain the restraining order under this Court's decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), where chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Evidently picketing and strike activity stopped, and the labor dispute remained dormant after June 4. The flame was rekindled, however, when, on November 9, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The next day, the employers moved the District Court to hold the Union, its agents, and officers in contempt of the modified temporary restraining order issued by the Superior Court on May 18. A hearing was held on the motion the following day. The Union's argument that the temporary restraining order had long since expired was rejected by the District Court on two grounds. First, the court concluded that its earlier action denying the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order gave the order continuing force and effect. Second, the court found that § 1450 itself served to continue the restraining order in effect until affirmatively dissolved or modified by the court. Concluding after the hearing that the Union had willfully violated the restraining order, the District Court held it in criminal contempt and imposed a fine of $200,000. [Footnote 5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Leaving aside for the moment the question whether the order denying the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order was effectively the grant of a preliminary injunction, it is clear that whether California law or Rule 65(b) is controlling, the temporary restraining order issued by the Superior Court expired long before the date of the alleged contempt. Section 527 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, [Footnote 6] under which the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
order was issued, provides that temporary restraining orders must be returnable no later than 15 days from the date of the order, 20 days if good cause is shown, and unless the party obtaining the order then proceeds to submit its case for a preliminary injunction, the temporary restraining order must be dissolved. [Footnote 7] Similarly, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
under Rule 65(b), [Footnote 8] temporary restraining orders must expire by their own terms within 10 days after entry, 20 days if good cause is shown. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners argue, however, that notwithstanding the time limitations of state law, § 1450 keeps all state court injunctions, including ex parte temporary restraining chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the outset, we can find no basis for petitioners' argument that § 1450 was intended to turn ex parte state court temporary restraining orders of limited duration into federal court injunctions of unlimited duration. Section 1450 was simply designed to deal with the unique problem of a shift in jurisdiction in the middle of a case which arises whenever cases are removed from state to federal court. In this respect, two basic purposes are served. Judicial economy is promoted by providing that proceedings had in state court shall have force and effect in federal court, so that pleadings filed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
But while Congress clearly intended to preserve the effectiveness of state court orders after removal, there is no basis for believing that § 1450 was designed to give injunctions or other orders greater effect after removal to federal court than they would have had if the case had remained in state court. After removal, the federal court "takes the case up where the State court left it off." Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U. S. 810, 101 U. S. 812 (1880). The "full force and effect" provided state court orders after removal of the case to federal court was not intended to be more than the force and effect the orders would have had in state court. [Footnote 10] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By the same token, respondent Union had a right to the protections of the time limitation in Rule 65(b) once the case was removed to the District Court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like other provisions of federal law, govern the mode of proceedings in federal court after removal. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 81(c). [Footnote 11] In addition, we may note that, although the durational limitations imposed on ex parte restraining orders are now codified in a federal rule, they had their origin in § 17 of the Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 737. As the House Report recommending its enactment emphasized, the durational and other limitations imposed on temporary restraining orders were thought necessary to cure a serious problem of "ill-considered injunctions without notice." [Footnote 12] The stringent restrictions imposed by § 17, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We can find no indication that Congress intended § 1450 as an exception to its broader, longstanding policy of restricting the duration of ex parte restraining orders. The underlying purpose of § 1450 -- ensuring that no lapse in a state court temporary restraining order will occur simply by removing the case to federal court -- and the policies reflected in Rule 65(b) can easily be accommodated by applying the following rule: an ex parte temporary restraining order issued by a state court prior to removal remains in force after removal no longer than it would have remained in effect under state law, but in no event does the order remain in force chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
472 F.2d 767. We reach essentially the same conclusion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, situations might arise where the parties are not prepared and do not intend at the hearing on the motion to dissolve or modify the temporary restraining order to present their cases for or against a preliminary injunction. In such circumstances, the appropriate procedure would be for the district court to deal with the issues raised in the motion to dissolve or modify the restraining order, but to postpone for a later hearing, still within the time limitations of Rule 65(b), the application for a preliminary injunction. See generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2954, p. 523 (1973 ed.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It would be inconsistent with this basic principle to countenance procedures whereby parties against whom an injunction is directed are left to guess about its intended duration. Rule 65(b) provides that temporary restraining orders expire by their own terms within 10 days of their issuance. Where a court intends to supplant such an order with a preliminary chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I agree with the Court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case should be affirmed, since there was no injunctive order in effect at the time that respondent's allegedly contemptuous conduct occurred. But I do not join that portion of the Court's opinion which lays down a "rule" for all cases chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I think it likely that the interest in limiting the duration of temporary restraining orders which is exemplified in Rule 65(b) can be fully protected in cases removed chanroblesvirtualawlibrary