Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/237/1/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 15:02:40
Document Index: 718363544

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 297', '§ 4219', '§ 14', '§ 11', '§ 10']

UNITED STATES V. HVOSLEF, 237 U. S. 1 (1915)
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 237 > UNITED STATES V. HVOSLEF, 237 U. S. 1 (1915)
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Under the Refunding Act of July 27, 1912, protest at the time of affixing chanrobles.com-red
The government demurred to the petition upon the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant, or of the subject of the action, and that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled (217 F.6d 0), and, after answer, the case was heard on the merits. The court found in substance that the firm, of which the defendants in error were the surviving members, had paid without protest certain stamp taxes on charter parties of the character described; that, on filing their claim under the Act of 1912, it had been certified by the collector to be correct in its statement of facts, but that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had rejected it for the reason that the act was not applicable. Holding the taxes to be unconstitutional, and the claim to have been duly presented, the court rendered judgment for the claimants.
The first contention with respect to jurisdiction is that, the claim having been rejected, the remedy of the claimants was an action against the Collector of Internal Revenue, and not against the United States. The course of the pertinent legislation since the passage of the War Revenue Act of 1898 may be briefly reviewed: in 1900, Congress provided for the redemption of, or allowance for, internal revenue stamps, including cases where "the rates or duties represented thereby" had been "excessive in amount, paid in error, or in any manner wrongfully collected." Act of May 12, 1900, c. 393, 31 Stat. 177. In chanrobles.com-red
The Act of 1902 was followed by other refunding statutes. In United States v. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 200 U. S. 488, suit had been brought in the district court to recover taxes which had been paid under the War Revenue Act upon manifests of cargoes bound to foreign ports, and it was held (following Chesebrough v. United States, 192 U. S. 253) that no recovery could be had because the payment had been voluntarily made; the jurisdiction of the court was not impugned. Thereupon Congress provided for the refunding of sums paid for stamps "on export ships' manifests" representing taxes "which were illegally assessed and collected," "said refund to be made whether said stamp taxes were paid under protest or not, and without being subject to any statute of limitations." Act of March 4, 1907, c. 2919, 34 Stat. 1371, chanrobles.com-red
It thus appears that the Act of 1912, upon which the present claim is based, was the culmination of a series of statutes which leave no question as to the intention of Congress to create an obligation on the part of the United States in favor of those holding the described claims, and it follows that these claims must be deemed to be founded upon a "law of Congress" within the meaning of the provisions of the Tucker act, now incorporated in the Judicial Code. See Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 173 U. S. 497; McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 226 U. S. 378. With respect to the refunding of taxes paid on the "contingent interests" described in the Act of June 27, 1902, supra, it has been held that, upon the rejection of the claim, an action lies against the United States in the Court of Claims, or in the district court (where the amount is within the prescribed limit). Fidelity Trust Co. v. United States, 45 Ct.Cl. 362, s.c. 222 U. S. 222 U.S. 158; United States v. Jones, 236 U. S. 106; Thacher v. United States, 149 F.9d 2; United States v. Shipley, 197 F.2d 5. And this is true not only where such taxes were paid before the refunding act was passed, but also where subsequently they were wrongfully collected in violation of its provisions. United States v. Jones, 236 U. S. 106. The same rule must obtain chanrobles.com-red
Another objection to the jurisdiction of the district court is that, under § 5 of the Tucker act (a provision which was saved from repeal by § 297 of the Judicial Code), the suit was to be brought "in the district where the plaintiff resides." 24 Stat. 506, c. 359. The petition alleged that petitioners were the surviving members of a copartnership engaged in business in the City of New York "within the district aforesaid," and that their "business and partnership residence was and is in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, in said district." It is said that the allegation was insufficient to show the residence required by the statute, but it does not appear that any such objection was chanrobles.com-red
It is also apparent, in the light of the manifest purpose and scope of the legislation to which we have referred, that the contention based upon the absence of protest cannot be sustained. Where taxes have been illegally assessed upon the "contingent interests" described in the refunding Act of 1902, it has been held that recovery may be had although the taxes were paid without protest. United States v. Jones, supra. In the Acts of 1907 and 1909, supra, with respect to stamp taxes on "export ships' manifests" and on foreign bills of exchange against exports, Congress expressly provided for refunding whether the taxes had been paid under protest or not. The fact that these express words were not repeated in the Act of 1912 cannot, in view of the nature of the subject, be regarded as evidencing a different intent; rather must this act receive in this respect the same construction as that which had been given to the Act of 1902. If it appeared that the sums sought to be recovered were not legally payable, and the claim was duly presented within the time fixed, the right to chanrobles.com-red
The prohibition relates only to exportation to foreign countries ( 75 U. S. 154, 183 U. S. 162), and is designed to give immunity from taxation to property that is in the actual course of such exportation (Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S. 372; Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504; Cornell v. Coyne,@ 192 U. S. 418). This constitutional freedom, however, plainly involves more than mere exemption from taxes or duties which are laid specifically upon the goods themselves. If it meant no more than that, the obstructions to exportation which it was the purpose to prevent could readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming to the constitutional restriction, but in effect overriding it. It was the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution that
In Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, the question of federal taxation of export bills of lading was directly involved, and, after great consideration, was definitely determined. In that case, there had been a conviction under the War Revenue Act of 1898. It was the contention of the government that no tax was placed upon the article exported; that, so far as the question was as to what might be exported, and how it should be exported, the statute imposed no restriction; that the full scope of the legislation was to impose a stamp duty on a document not necessarily, though ordinarily, used in connection with the exportation of goods; that it was a mere "stamp imposition chanrobles.com-red
The Court found an analogy in the construction which had been given to the commerce clause in protecting interstate commerce from state legislation imposing direct burdens (Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489, 120 U. S. 494), and legislative precedents for the tax were held chanrobles.com-red
Following this decision, it was held by the district court that the stamp tax on manifests of cargoes for foreign ports was invalid. These manifests were essential to the exportation. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. United States, 125 F.3d 0. And while the case was determined in this Court upon another ground, the correctness of this ruling as to the invalidity of the tax was conceded by the United States. 200 U. S. 200 U.S. 488, 200 U. S. 491.
Under this established doctrine, we are of the opinion that the tax upon these charter parties cannot be sustained. A charter party may be a contract for the lease of the vessel, or for a special service to be rendered by the owner of the vessel. Where, as is very frequently the case, the shipowner undertakes to carry a cargo, to be provided by the charterer, on a designated voyage, the arrangement is, in contemplation of law, a mere contract of affreightment. By such a charter, the shipowner is the carrier of the goods transported by the ship, "for the reason that the charter party is a mere covenant for the conveyance of the merchandise or the performance of the stipulated service." 12 U. S. 49-50; 78 U. S. 600-601; 81 U. S. 610; Richardson v. Winsor, 3 Cliff. 395, 399; The T. A. Goddard,@ 12 F.1d 4, 178; 1 Parsons, Shipping, p. 278. The findings in the present case do not permit us to question the character of the charter parties here involved. It appears that the defendants in error, being ship brokers, engaged at various times the vessels respectively, which are named in the schedule attached to the findings, solely for the carriage of cargo from ports in the United States to the foreign ports specified -- that is, we understand the findings to mean that these charters were for chanrobles.com-red
The government urges the analogy of tonnage taxes or duties. The same argument was pressed unsuccessfully in the Fairbank case, supra, p. 181 U. S. 305. It should be observed that a tonnage tax, as it has been laid by the federal government from the beginning, is a tax on entry. 1 Stat. 135 (July 20, 1790); Rev.Stat. § 4219; Acts Feb. 27, 1877, c. 69, 19 Stat. 240, 250; June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 14, 23 Stat. 53, 57; June 19, 1886, c. 421, § 11, 24 Stat. 79, 81. See Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 107 U. S. 696. A duty of tonnage under Article I, § 10, of the Constitution, has been described as a charge "for entering or leaving a port" (Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 119 U. S. 549); but Congress has not attempted to impose a tonnage tax for the privilege of leaving a state port for a foreign port, and we have no occasion to consider the question of the validity of such a tax. Again, it is contended that the tax bore only incidentally upon exportation. It was to be paid on all charter parties of vessels having a "registered tonnage." But, aside from any question as to the scope of this provision, the tax as chanrobles.com-red
applied to the charter parties here in question was nothing else than a tax on exportation, and to this extent was, in any event, invalid. The same principle governs that has constantly been held to obtain in cases where it has been sought to give effect to taxes upon interstate commerce under general legislation of the states. In Robbins v. Shelby County, supra, it was strongly urged, "as if it were a material point in the case," that no discrimination was made "between domestic and foreign drummers," -- that is, between those of the state whose legislation was in question and those of other states; that all were taxed alike. But the court held that this did not meet the difficulty, inasmuch as interstate commerce could not "be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce." This had been decided, as the Court pointed out, in the case of 82 U. S. 304; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 187 U. S. 629; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 203 U. S. 510; Crenshaw v. Arkansas,@ 227 U. S. 389. We know of no ground upon which a different effect can be given to the explicit constitutional provision which denies to Congress the right to tax exportation from the states.