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recusal | suesspiciousminds
Tag Archives: recusal
Is there bias if the Judge is leading one of the barristers in a different case?
Posted on December 29, 2015 by suesspiciousminds
Watts v Watts 2015
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/1297.html
is a Court of Appeal decision about judicial bias, and whether the Judge should have recused herself. This was a dispute between a brother and a sister about property issues.
In this case, the issues were effectively that the Judge did disclose to the parties that one of the barristers, Mr Holland (the one acting for the sister) was being led by the Judge in another case. I.e the Judge was still in practice as a barrister and was leading counsel in a different case where one of the barristers in front of her was her junior.
The request for the Judge to recuse herself, and the subsequent appeal, was therefore on these arguments:-
1. That the Judge had a conflict of interest due to professional involvement with Mr Holland, which might cause or give rise to the perception of bias.
2. That as the case was on a conditional fee arrangement (no win no fee), Mr Holland would only get paid if he won the case, so the existing professional involvement might make the Judge more desirous of an outcome where her junior in a long-running case where she would have to continue working with him would not have lost a big pile of money as a result of the Judge’s decision on this case.
3. That as the nature of that particular case involving the Judge leading Mr Holland was not known, it was possible that the Judge might be tempted (if it was in a similar field) to give a decision or set a principle in THIS case which might be helpful in that case.
The nub of the case was as to in terms of the conflict of interest, was the Judge expected to reveal absolutely everything, or was it sufficient that she revealed sufficient for a proper view to be taken, whilst not showing more than was necessary or appropriate? Just how much should be uncovered?
This is important stuff, and I think it is really important that all of the essentials get covered here.
Now, is the coverage sufficient here? I’d hate to be accused of skimpy coverage
[My inclusion of this is actually LESS gratuitous than the inclusion of it in the show itself…]
On the appeal, Mr McLarnon criticised the judge on three grounds: (i) for the paucity of information provided by her about her involvement with Mr Holland; (ii) for announcing her ruling at the commencement of the hearing but only giving her reasons at the end of it; and (iii) for the decision not to recuse herself, which he maintained was unlawful because of the appearance of bias which he submitted she presented in the circumstances. I deal with these in turn.
In relation to ground (i), Mr McLarnon relied in particular on the following guidance. In Davidson v Scottish Ministers Lord Bingham said at [19] that where a judge discloses matters which would or might provide the basis for a reasonable apprehension of lack of impartiality, “It is very important that proper disclosure should be made …, first, because it gives the parties an opportunity to object and, secondly, because the judge shows, by disclosure, that he or she has nothing to hide and is fully conscious of the factors which might be apprehended to influence his or her judgment.” Similarly, in Jones v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance Co. [2003] EWCA Civ 1071 at [35] this court emphasised that where a judge becomes aware of circumstances which might give rise to an appearance of bias and a real as opposed to fanciful objection being taken by a notional fair-minded observer and an application for recusal might be made, “The judge should make every effort in the time available to clarify what his interest is which gives rise to this conflict so that the full facts can be placed before the parties.”
Mr McLarnon submitted that provision of full material in this sort of situation is particularly important because parties are not permitted to question the judge about the position, and so are not able to seek and obtain the full facts if they are not disclosed by the judge of her own volition at the outset. In that regard, Mr McLarnon referred to Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, CA, in which at p. 472A-B the court said “The proof of actual bias is very difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually exists.” Mr McLarnon further submitted that the inadequacy of the disclosure by the judge serves to reinforce his main ground of appeal, that she presented an objective appearance of bias.
I do not agree with Mr McLarnon’s criticism of the extent of disclosure made by the judge. The disclosure required to be given is of the material facts, not every background detail: see Resolution Chemicals at [42]. The judge did disclose the material facts. Armed with this information, Mr McLarnon was fully equipped to make the relevant application. No further disclosure was required.
Mr McLarnon submitted that the disclosure was inadequate because it did not reveal the subject matter of the litigation in which Mr Holland and the judge were instructed, so it was possible that the judge might have an interest in giving a ruling in the present case which might assist them in that other case. Additional disclosure should have been given to allay any such fears.
This argument proves too much. I cannot accept it. The notional fair-minded and informed observer, knowing the professional standards applied by part time judges drawn from the legal profession, would understand that any deputy judge who found that she was being asked to try a case in relation to subject matter where there was a real risk that her ruling in the case (which would of course acquire a degree of authority as the ruling of a court) might have a bearing on the arguments to be advanced in other ongoing litigation in which she was involved as counsel, would immediately for that reason recuse herself. In such a case it would be clear that her interest as a barrister would conflict with her duty as a judge and, since that would be clear, it would be obvious that she could be expected to identify such a conflict and then act ethically and in accordance with her professional obligations by recusing herself. This would be so whether or not she happened to be instructed along with another counsel in the case, and whether or not that counsel was now appearing as counsel in the case in which she was to sit as a deputy judge. A part time judge does not have to reveal details of every ongoing piece of litigation in which she is professionally involved as counsel in order to allay suspicion whether any of them concern subject matter which overlaps with the case to be tried by her. On the contrary, the notional fair-minded and informed observer would not consider that there is any real risk that there is any such conflict of interest, since if there were the deputy judge could naturally be expected to identify the problem and recuse herself without more. The addition of the extra feature that the deputy judge might be leading other barristers in such other ongoing litigation does not change this analysis.
I should also mention that the judge was bound by obligations of confidentiality owed to her client in the other case and was therefore not at liberty to go further than she did unless there was a strong public interest to do so. There was none, for the reasons I have given. To my mind, it is clear that she has behaved entirely correctly in giving the disclosure that she did.
In fact, any residual concern the appellant might have had that the other litigation in which the judge was involved trespassed upon the subject area of the proceedings which she was to try could have been resolved very simply either by asking Mr Holland or by raising the matter with the judge herself. Mr McLarnon’s reference to the passage in Locabail at p. 19A-B, set out above, as precluding such an approach is misplaced. The point being made there is that a judge cannot be questioned about influences upon her with a view to making out a case of actual bias; but if a party has a reasonable request to make of a judge for relevant factual information in the context of an argument that an appearance of bias exists, in the absence of which the application cannot be made on the proper fully-informed basis which is required by the law, that passage does not prevent raising the difficulty with other counsel or the judge. This is not to encourage requests to judges to provide further information in relation to recusal applications: as I have emphasised above, a judge only has to provide relevant information which is material to the application and will in almost all cases have done just that. But there is no rule of law which prevents a party asking politely for more information if it exists and explaining why disclosure of it is required in order to enable the recusal application on grounds of appearance of bias to be advanced in a properly informed and effective way.
I record here that we asked Mr Holland, through leading counsel, whether the subject matter of the other litigation in which he was instructed with the judge overlapped with the subject matter in the present proceedings and he confirmed it did not. No doubt the judge would have given the same confirmation had the point been raised with her. But for the reasons given above this was not information which she was required to state or volunteer.
Under ground (ii), Mr McLarnon contends that the judge erred by reserving her reasons for refusing the recusal application until the end of the hearing. He submits that this left the appellant in the difficult position throughout the trial of believing that he had good grounds for objecting to the judge sitting in the case, knowing that she disagreed, but not knowing why: the appellant was subjected to a trial without any certainty that non-recusal on the part of the judge was justified. This again, Mr McLarnon says, reinforces the objective impression that the judge might be biased and might be behaving unfairly.
I reject this submission. In my view it was correct in the circumstances for the judge to give her decision with reasons to follow later, so that the trial could proceed without further delay and to minimise the risk that it might have to run over, so adding to the cost. The test is not one of how the individual litigant might feel subjectively, but an objective one of how the notional fair-minded and informed observer would view matters. Such an observer would not think that this way of proceeding displayed any disposition of unfairness towards the appellant. It only gave rise to the appearance of a judge willing to make a sensible case management decision in accordance with the overriding objective set out in CPR Part 1. Proceeding in this way was in line with the approach adopted by this court in Resolution Chemicals, in which the court considered an appeal in which permission had been granted for an appeal against the judge’s refusal to recuse himself and then gave its ruling dismissing the appeal with reasons to follow, so that the trial could proceed straight away and before the court’s reasons were handed down: see [4]. There was no suggestion by this court in that case that this would create any difficulty in terms of appearance of bias, simply because the disappointed applicant would not know until after trial the reasons why its arguable appeal for recusal of the trial judge had been unsuccessful. I cannot see that any difficulty arises by reason of a court proceeding in this way.
The appeal had not succeeded. The Court of Appeal give their final summary here
Finally I turn to ground (iii) and the main substance of the appellant’s case. I would dismiss the appeal for the following reasons, which essentially reflect the reasons given by the judge below:
i) The notional fair-minded and informed observer would know about the professional standards applicable to practising members of the Bar and to barristers who serve as part-time deputy judges and would understand that those standards are part of a legal culture in which ethical behaviour is expected and high ethical standards are achieved, reinforced by fears of severe criticism by peers and potential disciplinary action if they are departed from: Taylor v Lawrence [2001] EWCA Civ 119, [33]-[36]; Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90; [2003] QB 528, [61]-[63]. These aspects of the legal culture of the Bench and legal professionals are not undermined by the fact that some litigation is now funded by means of CFAs;ii) The notional fair-minded and informed observer would understand that a part-time judge’s approach to the case she is trying and to her relationships with other professionals will be governed by these professional standards. There is no reason to think that a judge would allow her professional training and ethics to be overridden by a concern not to upset a junior counsel she is leading in other litigation. Moreover, the judge would know that the junior counsel would himself understand that she is bound by strict professional standards, and hence would have no expectation that she would do anything other than act in accordance with them. So the judge would not expect any disgruntlement or difficulty to arise in her relationship with the junior counsel even if she makes a decision adverse to him in the case she is trying. Accordingly, the idea that the judge would adjust her behaviour as judge to avoid upsetting the junior counsel is far-fetched indeed. The notional fair-minded and informed observer would not consider that there was any genuine possibility of this occurring;
iii) There is a danger in cases of this kind of multiplying reference to authority in the hope of finding analogies on which to found arguments one way or the other, and we were presented with a plethora of authorities to address what is really quite a simple matter. However, it may be observed that a number of authorities indicate strongly that it could not be said that there is any objectionable connection between the judge and counsel for the respondent sister in this case. In The Gypsy Council v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR CD 96 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed as manifestly ill-founded an argument that Article 6 (right to a fair trial) was infringed on grounds of appearance of bias where a part-time deputy judge in a case involving gypsies on one side and a public authority on the other was a barrister in practice (David Pannick QC) who had been instructed as counsel for the government in numerous cases before the Court of Human Rights involving gypsies, in which he had argued that public authorities had not infringed the rights of gypsies: p. 101. The deputy judge in that case remained in practice and might hope to be so instructed by the government again, but still it was clear that no appearance of bias arose. In Laker Airways Inc v FLS Aerospace Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 113, Rix J dismissed an application to remove an arbitrator on grounds that “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality” (section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996) where the arbitrator was a QC practising in the same chambers as counsel for one of the parties in the arbitration. It is true that the judge directed himself by reference to the then current standard for assessing an appearance of bias set out in R v Gough [1993] AC 646, which was adjusted in Porter v Magill to bring it into line with the test under Article 6, but I do not think that is significant for the analysis in the case. The position is underlined by Smith v Kvaerner Cementation Foundations Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 242; [2007] 1 WLR 370. In that case, a personal injury claim was tried by a practising barrister and part-time judge sitting as a recorder, who was the head of the chambers to which both counsel for the claimant and counsel for the defendant belonged and who had also acted for the defendant or associated companies in the past and might do so in the future. This court rejected the suggestion that an appearance of bias arose by reason of the connection between the recorder and counsel through being members of the same chambers: [17]-[19]; it was only because the recorder regarded himself as having an on-going barrister-client relationship with the defendant that this court held he should have recused himself. Similarly, in Resolution Chemicals at [46] this court referred to the idea that the reasoning in Lawal “would preclude a judge from hearing a case in which his former pupil master or regular instructing solicitors were acting for one of the parties, or a deputy High Court judge from ever hearing a case in which a more senior member of his or her chambers was acting for one of the parties” as something which it regarded as obviously untenable;
iv) As both the Taylor v Lawrence judgments and these other decisions indicate, relationships between members of the Bar, or between members of the Bar and their clients, can be much closer than that between the deputy judge and counsel for the respondent in the present case, yet because the relationships are mediated through known professional standards no appearance of bias arises.
Posted in case law and tagged 2015 EWCA Civ 1297, appeal, conflict of interest, Judge's professional relationship with counsel, judicial bias, recusal, watts v watts 2015. Bookmark the permalink.
I am sailing, I am sailing – judicial recusal
Posted on October 12, 2015 by suesspiciousminds
Given how much fun the last case about judicial recusal was to write about, I was pleased to see a new one.
This one, Mackay v Mackay 2015, relates to what is presumably a big money divorce. As the amounts of money are discussed as £X million and £Y million, we can’t be sure exactly how much money, but a decent estimate is that it is at least two million, and probably quite a bit more.
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2015/2860.html
In this case, Holman J was made aware of a situation.
I personally have had no prior involvement in this case whatsoever prior to today. Very early in the hearing today, Mr Valentine Le Grice QC, who appears today on behalf of the husband (but does not act for him generally in these proceedings), said that there were certain facts that he, Mr Le Grice, had been informed about that required to be drawn to my attention in case they impacted upon the appropriateness of my dealing with this case at the substantive hearings. There has been no suggestion, nor could there be, that I should not deal with this directions stage of this case today. I was somewhat surprised to hear that, since the full names of the husband simply do not impact upon me at all and, to put it bluntly but colloquially, I have simply never ever heard of him before. Further, when the husband came into court, he is not somebody who, frankly, I have the least recognition of, or the slightest recollection of ever having met; nor, indeed, do I have the slightest recognition of the wife, who is also in court.
My interest was massively piqued here. If the Judge doesn’t know the names of the parties, and doesn’t recognise their faces, under what scenario could there possibly be a suggestion that the Judge might have to consider whether it was appropriate for him to continue? (I have to confess that the idea of some sort of Eyes Wide Shut masked ball scenario came to mind, but of course it isn’t that)
I am a very open judge and I have never concealed, for instance by entries in “Who’s Who” and Debrett’s “People of Today”, that one of my recreations is sailing. I was told that the husband is also keen on sailing. I have been told that he thinks that in the more distant past he has competed in boats racing against boats in which I myself was also racing. Whether or not that is so is, frankly, completely irrelevant to the situation with which I am now faced. However, I was also informed that the husband knew that I am a member (as I am) of a certain sailing club. He is not a member of that club. He is a member of another sailing club of which I am not a member, but the question was raised whether, through my membership of the sailing club, I might know or have friendship with certain sailing friends of the husband.
Certainly the fact that at some point in the past, the husband might have seen Holman J’s catamaran, or what have you, either sail off into the distance or whistle past it at a rate of knots during a race is neither here nor there.
Whether they might, as fellow afficiandos of the sail, have some mutual friends, is a possibility.
A list containing 14 names was then produced to me. It is right to say that I recognised as names every name on that list. The majority of the people named I do not personally know at all. One or two of the others on the list I know very slightly or have met at some stage in the past. None of that, frankly, impacts on me at all. However, there is one name on the list which for the purposes of this judgment I will call “AB” (although those are not the person’s actual initials). I was told that he is somebody whom the husband knows well. I was told that, in the past, there have been business dealings between, or involving, the husband and AB. I was told that the husband currently meets AB about once a month and met him as recently as about two weeks ago. I was told that in the past AB has stayed at these parties’ villa in the south of France whilst participating in a sailing event.
On behalf of the wife, Mr Nigel Dyer QC said on instructions that she did not appreciate that, and doubts whether, the true strength and extent of the connection between the husband and AB is as great as has been described by Mr Le Grice. Without hearing oral evidence on the point, which would be disproportionate and extraordinarily invidious, I have to take the state of affairs as being as described by Mr Le Grice.
AB is not someone whom I would describe as a close personal friend of mine. He is, however, someone whom I have known for many years. There is, undoubtedly, friendship between us, friendship also between him and my wife, and friendship between me and his wife. He and his wife are people whom I and/or my wife meet from time to time in the sailing social context, and we and AB have numerous other mutual friends in common.
The question that arises is whether that connection of a shared mutual relationship with AB is such that I should not have further involvement in this case. The expressed position of Mr Le Grice on behalf of the husband was that he was merely drawing these facts to my attention so that I should be aware of them. There was no application by Mr Le Grice that I should recuse myself as a result of them.
The position of the wife, after Mr Dyer had had an opportunity privately to discuss the matter and take instructions from her, was that she was not concerned about this mutual relationship and that she did not apply that I should recuse myself
Well, that’s that then. The father knows AB fairly well, and AB also knows Holman J fairly well. Neither father nor mother say that this intersection would make Holman J unsuitable to hear the case. That’s that.
Aha! Not quite. If you’ve been following the Appleton v Gallagher divorce case, you may have picked up that there is something of a schism in the High Court about divorce and publicity. On the one hand, represented by Mostyn J, is the school of thought that there should be no publicity in divorce proceedings unless the case itself represents case law and that divorcing celebrities or millionaires should not have their innermost financial affairs set out by the Press just because they are getting divorced. On the other hand, represented so far chiefly by Holman J, is the transparency camp, which is publishing the details in judgments and thus the Press have access to it. The Appleton v Gallagher case is going up to the Court of Appeal to see who might be right.
http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/appleton-v-gallagher-and-ors-2015-ewhc-2689-fam
If you are a millionaire or celebrity who wants privacy then, at the moment, you might well prefer that your divorce is not dealt with by a pro-transparency Judge, or one who you think might be pro-transparency.
The Wife makes this implied motivation explicit.
The position of the wife did, however, go further than that. One of the applications that was issued by the husband on 11th September 2015 and returnable today was for orders to do with privacy. He sought orders that the hearings in October and February should be heard not only in private, but with the press and media excluded; and, further (most unusually in my experience) some advance order as to the terms in which any judgment might ultimately be couched. To exclude the press even from a hearing held in private is these days a strong step, and one which can only be taken in tightly circumscribed circumstances provided for in the relevant rules and practice direction; but it is known at the Bar that I am a judge who favours as much openness as possible in all court proceedings. Mr Dyer, frankly, speculated that the purpose of the husband in even referring to the possibility of overlapping friendships was a device deliberately aimed at causing me to recuse myself.
It is, indeed, of the utmost importance that judges are very astute to spot, and not be trapped by, attempts to manipulate the identity of a judge for whatever purpose. Obviously, there may be judges who are believed to make high awards or low awards, and it is only too easy for a party who is seeking a low or a high award respectively to try to manipulate the position so that that judge is unable to hear the case. Similarly, it would, indeed, be intolerable if parties could manipulate the position so as to obtain or avoid, according to where their interests lay, a judge who favours openness in legal proceedings as opposed to secrecy. I am very alive to that risk.
Unquestionably, if nothing had been said today about this shared interest in sailing and the possibility that there may be some overlapping friendships, then I would have continued to deal with this case and there could not have been the slightest difficulty. The fact is that the point has been raised. The fact is that it has been identified that amongst the friends or associates of the husband is this person, AB, who is also a friend of mine.
(In short, is this sailing issue, a well-disguised attempt at forum shopping?)
The leading authority on the circumstances in which a judge should recuse himself probably remains Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Limited and others [1999] EWCA Civ 3004, a judgment of the court consisting of the then Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls and Vice-Chancellor. The situation with which I am faced today is not one that falls within the principles which are the focus of that judgment. There is no question in this case of my having any kind of interest in the outcome of these proceedings and, in my view, no question in this case of any possible objective or apparent bias. Indeed, at paragraph 25 of their judgment in that case, the Court of Appeal were at pains to list many circumstances upon which, at any rate ordinarily, no objection could soundly be based. But at paragraph 21 of the judgment there is reference, albeit passing, to a judge recusing himself, “If, for solid reasons, the judge feels personally embarrassed in hearing the case.” Further, the broad approach at paragraph 25 is as follows:
“In most cases, we think, the answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal. We repeat: every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.”
I have given very careful consideration indeed to this matter. Apart from some obvious situations where I actually knew a party concerned, I can only recall one occasion in the over 20 years in which I have been a full-time judge, in which I have felt the slightest need to recuse myself for considerations of this kind. In that case, I had a long-term friendship dating back to university with the brother of the husband in the case. Although the brother did not feature at all in the case, it did not seem to me appropriate that I should hear it. This case is more remote than those facts, but I have decided that I do, or might, “feel personally embarrassed” in hearing this case.
I wish to stress that I believe myself to be an independent-minded and fearless judge. I do not doubt my ability to be detached and objective in decision-making. But the context of this case, as I have outlined above, does, or may, involve making a judgment about the integrity or probity, and possibly the very honesty, of this husband. I do not yet know much about the facts, nor, of course, how the evidence may turn out. But, at any rate at its highest, the wife’s case will involve a proposition that the husband deliberately failed to disclose the discussions that he was having for the sale of his company at that much greater value, and may well involve the proposition that, at some stage or another, he deliberately lied or, certainly, deliberately suppressed the truth. If there is a common friendship with AB, I do feel that it could be a source of personal embarrassment to me in my relationship with AB if I had to find that another friend of his had acted in a fraudulent, devious or untruthful way.
There is the further consideration in this case that, currently, a two-stage hearing is envisaged, with some months between the first and second stage. Undoubtedly, during that interval, there will be occasions upon which I will be meeting AB, since, as I have said, he is a friend whom I do meet from time to time.
It seems to me that what I have described does amount in this case to “solid reasons” why I personally, as I do, feel personally embarrassed about further involvement in this case. For those reasons, I must, as I now do, recuse myself from any further involvement in the case after today.
It seems a shame to me that we may be moving towards a scenario where a Judge can’t have interests, hobbies or pastimes outside of the law, for fear that they may bring them into a position where someone they met at “Jam Club”, “Abseilers Anonymous” or simply someone who shares their love of “Yacht Rock” might be a friend of a future Party.
mmmm…. smoooth
[I know, I had a perfect opportunity to crowbar in a photo of Nicole Appleton, and I decided instead to use a photo of people pretending to be Hall and Oates. I did really want to use the Nicole Appleton photo, but then a voice in my head said “I can’t go for that (no can do)” ]
The weakest recusal I’ve ever seen in real life was a Judge who recused himself from what was going to be a really desperately boring hearing on the basis that one of the parties had a job as an insurance salesman for Norwich Union (you can feel the dullness of this case seep out) and the Judge concluded that he would be potentially embarassed as he had once received an unsolicited telephone call from someone trying to sell him Norwich Union insurance and had put the phone down “more abruptly than perhaps was reasonable”, and it could not be excluded as a possibility that it was the Party in question. If you can suitably anonymise them, I’d love to hear weak recusal decisions or even applications…
Posted in Uncategorized and tagged gallacher v appleton 2015, holman j, judicial recusal, mackay v mackay 2015, recusal, transparency. Bookmark the permalink.
Judicial baggage
This one isn’t a family case, so you don’t have to read it at all. Which, reading between the lines, means that I’m writing about it because it is funny.
Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways 2015
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2015/2201.html
This is some commercial litigation, which was being dealt with by Smith J in the High Court. The facts of the case seem to be that there are 300 claimants (as a class action) who are suing British Airways.
One might get the sense from the opening remarks that the Judge lacked some enthusiasm for trying this case.
I have been the nominated judge in this case since November last year. I have been involved in the case since March of last year. When this case first came in front of me in March of last year, I suggested to the parties very early on that it was appropriate to have a nominated judge to deal with the hugely complicated interlocutory applications which arise. When I said so, I said I was not bidding for the case, because no judge really would look upon this case with enthusiasm because he or she would be in a no-win situation, as this case has demonstrated.
Since then I have heard numerous application, made numerous rulings. There are currently two outstanding, I think, appeals against some of my decisions. There is a CMC listed for three days next week. There is a separate hearing listed in October for a strikeout of the Bau Xiang, of other litigation and various other matters. There have been huge interlocutory orders, circulating mostly around the attempts to come up with some form of redacted decision that the European Commission made as long ago as five years now, but which is still not published, and my last recollection is that it was not promised before 2020. A point which I probably met with indifference, and probably half the Bar before me as well.
It is what happened next that catapulted the case into the realms of legal curiosity.
When you initially read the next twenty paragraphs of the judgment, you think to yourself – what a curious decision, for the Judge to set out the details of the Claimants case in the first person. It is all “I did this” and “this happened to me” and “The effect on my that”. A peculiar stylistic choice, you think.
It is little like the jarring effect of Jay McInerney’s decision to write “Bright Lights Big City” in the unorthodox second person, so that one keeps reading sentences like “You sneak into a fashion show in an attempt to find Amanda” and saying to yourself, “no I didn’t.”
And then after a short time, it dawned on me that the Judge is not actually here setting out the claimant’s case, he is instead setting out in judicial fashion the history of his own ongoing dispute with British Airways who have lost his luggage. At length.
On 30 April, I booked a return ticket to Florence with the first defendant. On 6 July, I flew to Florence, together with my wife, due to return on 10 July. On 10 July, as I have set out in my emails, the flight was delayed for two hours without any explanation. Six people were then summoned to the departure desk and were told that they were bumped off the flight. It turns out that they were the lucky ones, because they got their luggage back then, unlike anybody else in the flight.
The rest of us were then rushed to the aeroplane. Somewhat intriguingly, as I have said in my email, we were sitting right next to the plane while it was refuelling for 20 minutes. It might be a standard practice in Florence, I don’t know. It might be a standard practice for the accompanying fire tender to arrive after the refuelling is completed. Anyway, we were then put on the plane and the pilot said that they had been moved to another runway and the load had had to be adjusted because of the crosswinds, and that was it.
We arrived at Gatwick, hung around in the baggage claim, as people do at Gatwick, for 45 minutes and then we were told to go to Global Recoveries, where we were told for the first time that the entire flight’s luggage had been left behind. No explanation, no representative, nothing. Nothing from BA. Nothing from Vueling who provided the flight.
I saw the distress that lots of people suffered as a result of that; and I contacted BA customer relations, who simply said: it was a Vueling flight, you will have to take it up with Vueling. That is all they said.
Vueling were no better. In fact, they were worse, for the reasons I have said in argument. Vueling refused to acknowledge my communicating with them until a computerised individual number went onto their system. As I said earlier, it never did. The luggage arrived spontaneously and without warning on Wednesday last week.
I signed my emails as my judicial capacity to alert the Chairman to the fact that this was not merely an issue of a disgruntled consumer. For reasons which I set out below was essential that his office knew about the proceedings and those conducting the proceedings knew about the complaint. I also advised him to contact the lawyers conducting this litigation on BA’s behalf.
The Judge did not get an answer to his grievance, despite having played the “do you know who I am?” card.
Unwise people, who are hasty and unfair might consider that if BA’s customer service department can’t resolve the lost luggage of a Judge who (a) tells them that he is the Judge and (b) that he is the Judge currently dealing with some really big litigation against BA, what hope is there for anyone else? Those unwise, hasty and unfair people might wonder how the hell a Customer Service department doesn’t immediately move heaven and earth to get that luggage found. Why, you cynical bunch. The answer is that BA Customer Service department provides exactly the same stellar service to all customers on a completely egalitarian philosophy, without grace or favour.
The Judge goes on
This is not an issue over luggage, however. It never has been
12. I was concerned about as Mr Turner QC rightly says, BA’s conduct in dealing with that flight — or Vueling’s conduct, which as far as I can see BA take responsibility. They are in the same group of companies, my contract was with BA, BA charged me and I got a BA flight number — if it was not explained, it might be something that is strikingly similar to some of the allegations in this case.
The reason I was concerned really ought to have been blindingly obvious, although some of the submissions by Mr Turner QC today would suggest otherwise. The situation is that I do not know how a plane departs with all of the passengers’ luggage left behind, unless that is a deliberate decision. It is an easy enough question to pose and it ought to be an easy enough question to answer. We are now 12 days from the flight and I have no explanation, and Mr Turner QC and the team who instruct him have deliberately refused to enquire, to provide me with an answer, praying in aid a desire to separate what they call a private dispute from this judicial dispute. This is not possible but could have been easily resolved had BA and its advisors wished it. This if correct was similar to some of the allegations in this case. If correct I would have had to recuse myself as I made clear in argument. BA’S FAILURE TO ANSWER
BA must know what the position is. I am promised some form of answer, by Mr Turner QC, in the normal course of events with expedition. Well, I am 12 days down the line and if those simple questions cannot be answered in 12 days with expedition, I really feel for other people who have the misfortune to fly with BA. It is unexplained.
Equally, I do not see how the pilot can take off and not know the luggage isn’t there. Equally, I do not see that the ground staff can conduct themselves in the way they did with us and not know that the luggage was not going.
In my email to the chief executive, which was the only way forward, having been rebuffed by customer relations, I said that I didn’t see how there was any logical explanation for those.
I remain of that view. Of course, I do not operate airlines. There might be a logical explanation. I am surprised, if there is a logical explanation, that it hasn’t been forthcoming in the last 12 days. I do not believe there is a logical explanation. I believe that the passengers’ luggage was deliberately bumped off for a more profitable cargo.
I hope BA can write back, if they were to write back and tell me that that is not so, because if that is so, my investigation will carry on in a private capacity — where that ends up, I don’t know yet, but it will — which I will pursue with the vigour for which I am known, because I am no longer involved in this case.
At this point, I am saying that if a TV company want to commission a show about a (highly fictionalised and not in any way real) vengeful High Court Judge who simply will not rest until he gets to the truth of what happened to his luggage, I think it has legs. I’d cast Jack Nicholson. Let’s call it “Case Closed” . I want to watch Smith J battle and find his baggage.
[* When I was about ten, I’m sure that I saw a TV show that featured one of those clever dogs, like Littlest Hobo, or Boomer. But this dog was about an Army German Shepherd and the opening dialogue said that this dog was “wrongly accused of a crime he didn’t commit, now he travels the country searching for the evidence that will clear his name”, which even at ten years old, I thought was a ludicrous premise for a TV show. “Cracking the case” / “Baggage Control” “Unexpected item in the baggage area”is far better.
I’ll do the voiceover crawl. “In thirty years as a lawyer, Justice Coltrane never lost a case. But now BA have lost his, and they’re going to find out what happens when you stand in the way of Justice” oh, how about “His bags got checked in, and now something doesn’t check out. ” or “They put a tag on his suitcase and then they lost it. But now he’s lost it, he’s gonna put a tag on their toes. ]
Again, unwise, hasty and unfair people might be saying “Jeez, if that’s the way that BA treat a Judge when he wants an answer to what happened to his luggage and has people in Court in front of him who can’t give a straight answer, I’m sitting with my valuables in my lap for the whole flight”. Tsk, tsk, you hasty and unfair people.
An application was made for the Judge to recuse himself. It is somewhat hard to see how a Judge who has said that in his personal dispute with BA, ” I believe that the passengers’ luggage was deliberately bumped off for a more profitable cargo. ” could continue.
But I underestimated the determination of Smith J. He argues it out at length, pointing out again that this is not actually about his suitcase, it is about a resolution of how his suitcase came to be lost. [I suppose the 300 claimants may have been thinking that it was actually about their claim, rather than a judicial trip abroad which didn’t work out, but Claimants, Schlaimants…]
REASONABLE OBSERVER
I do not believe for one minute that the reasonably minded observer, which is the test, as Mr Turner has reminded me of, would think that merely because I have raised issues over the non-delivery of my luggage of itself should lead to the possibility of bias.
I believe a reasonably minded observer would see a Judge with a problem trying to resolve that issue and finding the parting question being obstructive and unwilling to address the issue and find a solution. A simple dispute as to the luggage cannot possible be grounds for recusal. However BA and its solicitors have simply escalated the problem almost immediately.
As I have said in argument, it has been open to BA in this case simply to damp the fires of this dispute immediately, by coming up with an explanation of an operational nature as to why the luggage was not sent. They have not done it despite me giving them the earliest opportunity to do so.
REACTION BY BA AND ITS SOLICITORS
The solicitors and the person apparently instructing them have adopted a three wise monkeys approach which I found, frankly, astonishing. The reason I conclude they do that is because they don’t want to know the answers, because it might affect them. And the reason why BA have not replied, I conclude, is because there has been some kind of operation designed to maximise profits at the expense of their regular customers. Further I am satisfied they want to exploit this situation to pressure me into coming off the case.
Judges spend all the time drawing conclusions from people’s actions; and the like; the taking off with no luggage and the knowledge of the pilot, I find it impossible to believe that if those instructing Mr Turner QC wanted to, they could not have found out what the answer was to this in good time. And having seen me on Monday, it would have been perfectly easy for them to write and say, “Thank you for drawing it to our attention. We have spoken to the operations and the luggage had to be left behind, we regret, for this, this and this”, and that would have been the end of the matter. I had of course brought it to their attention as soon as practicable on the Monday.
But they didn’t do that. Almost within a matter of hours of the meeting, they decided that I should recuse myself.
Now, I do not accept that the correspondence justifies that application. And I am afraid to say that it is, in my view, an opportunistic application, made by a party that has wanted to get me off this case before.
I would remind the parties that even before the case was allocated to me, Mr Turner expressed a view in open court spontaneously that his clients did not think I was capable of dealing with the CMC in this case because it represented difficult issues of competition law, of which It was alleged I had no experience. His client’s major difficulty was that I had been an allocated judge for four years in the Competition Appeals Tribunal, although I had not actually sat on any cases. But presumably if the Lord Chancellor thinks I am competent to sit there, that really ought to be enough, even for Slaughter and May, but apparently it isn’t.
And when the parties finally followed up the suggestion that they apply to nominate a judge, they actually wrote [the Chancellor] should not appoint Mr Justice Peter Smith. That was an unfortunate letter for them to have written because it held a gun to the Chancellor’s head, but as the Chancellor rightly observed, there are no competition issues of significance left in this case now. There is either a common law claim for conspiracy, and in that regard I am probably the most experienced judge in the division dealing with those cases, and there are issues as to damages that might flow from an already admitted breach of competition law.
If you thought the application to recuse was so-so before those remarks (and really? Did you? ) then I’m fairly sure that at the point where the Judge says that the application for recusal is a conspiracy theory because BA are running some sort of behind the scenes arrangement where they routinely ditch passengers luggage so that they can carry commercial freight for profit, is the point where the reasonable observer would think “nope, you need to step aside now”
So the question then is: what should I do? Well, Slaughter and May wrote to me on Monday, requiring me to confirm immediately that I would recuse myself, failing which they would make an urgent application to the Court of Appeal. This litigation is complex enough, without those distractions. It is of no interest to the other parties, who have all had to come here today, to have a proper application made and a decision made. And that has a cost consequence which will probably be irrecoverable, and it is a matter of great regret to my mind that the parties have been inconvenienced for no apparently good or acceptable reason. It would not be appropriate for a recusal application to be acceded to as a result of an exchange of private correspondence.
This would lead to a waste of a lot of judicial resource time in addition to the parties it will also slow progress of the case which I have been attempting to progress. I am afraid BA are not in my view really interested in progressing the matter expeditiously for obvious reasons.
I however cannot allow my presence in the case and its difficulties to distract the parties from this case. And therefore, regretfully, I feel that I have no choice, whatever my feelings about it, but to recuse myself from the case, and that is what my decision is; not for the reasons put forward by BA, but for the reasons that I have said.
So I will recuse myself. I will vacate the hearing next week; and I shall not direct it to be fixed before the most convenient date as suggested. I shall direct that the parties shall attend on 2 October for directions from the newly appointed judge as to the further conduct of this case. I shall also require the parties to make an immediate application to the Chancellor to appoint a substitute judge; and to tell the Chancellor that I have directed that the first hearing of the case by that newly appointed judge should take place on 2 October.
I will, if necessary, adjourn the application that BA issued, I think, yesterday for a strikeout in the Bau Xiang litigation as well, to be considered as part of the other matters which the judge will be required to do. And I will make no order as to costs.
This is a regrettable but necessary decision caused in my view entirely by BA’s attitude and determination to achieve a result which is nothing to do with the problem. It is a regrettable feature that some litigants now regard a recusal application as one of the tools they can deploy in aid of their case. BA has finally achieved its aim. Neither of their attacks was in my view justified but ultimately they were successful for the reasons given.
So there you have it. BA succeeded in removing a Judge from the case whom they perceived to be biased. But it was a Pyrrhic victory, since the Judge was able to use that recusal application to publish a judgment setting out just what he thought of them, and as you can’t sue for defamation for anything that happens in Court or reporting what happened in Court, any national newspaper can report everything that the Judge said about his views about BA (as long as they don’t go further and say that they agree with them)
Seriously, Jack Nicholson’s agent should really talk to me. I think we have a hit here. [I’m not ruling out Liam Neeson for the role, I think he’d be great for this – but Liam’s agent, you need to know that Jack is interested, so you’d better make a commitment, or the part will be gone]
Posted in case law and tagged asking a judge to recuse himself, British Airways, emerald supplies Ltd v BA 2015, judicial bias, judicial luggage, recusal, smith j. Bookmark the permalink.
Posted on July 18, 2012 by suesspiciousminds
An imaginary judgment, dealing with what happens when a key piece of evidence is found from an unwelcome source
This matter comes before me as an Appeal from a decision of the Family Proceedings Court to make Care Orders and Placement Orders in respect of three young children, who in time honoured fashion, I will label A, B, and C. The eldest is just four, the youngest is six months old, born within these proceedings. The mother of all three children is Miss X. The father of the older two children has played no part in these proceedings. The father of the youngest child is Mr Y.
The facts of the case before the Court were relatively straightforward and sadly not uncommon in the cases involving public law applications for children which are being heard throughout the land. The mother of the children was proceeding very well with her care of A and B until she formed a relationship with Mr Y. Mr Y, although he seemed attractive, kind and attentive, had an unfortunate background, involving convictions for very serious sexual offences against children, he having only just been released from prison. Understandably, the Local Authority concerned, once they became aware of Mr Y’s background and involvement with the family sought to provide mother with certain advice about the merits of this relationship continuing. Expert evidence was before the Court, and was unchallenged, that Mr Y’s history, psychological make-up and lack of empathy, insight and remorse for his proven past crimes meant that he was unsafe to be around children and that any timescales for treatment were well outside of the children’s timescales and the prognosis in any event was poor.
The mother and Mr Y separated, but of course, baby C had been conceived by then.
As often occurs in these cases, concerns arose as to whether the separation was genuine, or whether it was, in effect a placatory public gesture to satisfy professionals whilst clandestinely it continued apace. Allegations of this, together with such corroborating evidence as the Local Authority were able to assemble was placed before the Family Proceedings Court and tested appropriately in evidence.
Thus far, there is nothing exceptional about the case, and this Court would be exceedingly reluctant to interfere with any findings made by the Family Proceedings Court about the factual matrix of the case or whether the relationship was, or was not continuing.
The unusual facet of the case, and the impetus behind this appeal, is that after the parents had given their evidence, but before the Guardian had given hers, the case concluded for the day, with the intention being to reassemble the next day. One of the three Magistrates who had been hearing the case, left the Court building and happened upon two adults locked in what can best be described as passionate and tender embrace. It was with some understandable embassment and chagrin that this Magistrate came to the opinion that these adults were Mr Y and Miss X, and that far from having been completely separated and with no intention to spend any time together, as had been their sworn evidence, there was a passion and intensity about the embrace that called that into question.
The next morning, the Magistrate concerned, who I will label Miss J, immediately notified the Legal Advisor of this. In that consultation, they resolved that Miss J should not discuss this in any way with the other two magistrates and that the issue should be put to the parties in order that representations could be made about the way forward. The Legal Advisor suggested to Miss J, who took this advice, that she could no longer sit as a Magistrate in resolving this particular case as she was now potentially a witness of fact. Miss J prepared a short document setting out what she had observed. It was very plain that Miss J was advised not to discuss the issue with the other Magistrates, and that no discussion of the issue other than the formal representations (and if necessary, evidence) given in Court should take place, to do ones utmost to preserve the integrity and impartiality of the other Magistrates.
If I may say so, I think that the Legal Advisor in this case acted very sagely in the most exceptional of circumstances. It is difficult to see what more she could have done.
When the document that Miss J had prepared was circulated to the parties, two camps effectively formed. As one might expect, the mother and father sought an adjournment of the case with there to be a re-hearing at which Miss J could give evidence before a completely fresh bench, untainted by any association with Miss J. The Local Authority and Guardian pointed out that the case could proceed with two magistrates and that Miss J could give evidence, which would be assessed by the bench with the same impartiality and scrutiny as any other witness and the parents recalled, adding that any other bench that could be assembled in due course to hear the case would be as likely as these two Magistrates to have sat with Miss J as some time or another, it being the nature of the Family Proceedings Court that rather than a fixed block of three Magistrates always working together, there is more of a ‘mix and match’ approach. The decision was taken to continue, and the parents representatives quite properly registered their disquiet about the unusual situation and that they reserved the right to seek an appeal of any final adjudication, not least because of the wider public interest issues that the case had thrown up.
In relation to the way the Court approached the evidence of Miss J, I can find no fault with that. A proof of evidence was available to the parties and all had seen it in advance of her giving evidence. It was made plain that she was giving her evidence as a member of the public who had witnessed something (she having left the curtilage of the Court, she was no longer effectively Miss J, Magistrate, at the time, but Miss J, person). The Legal Advisor ensured that a Turnbull direction was given in Court before the evidence was heard.
I remind myself at this point that the Court of Appeal have previously given a decision in which it was made plain that Turnbull directions on the risks of misidentification of a person is not limited to criminal trials but applicable in a family case where there is eye witness evidence about a specific individual being alleged to do certain things. This particular Legal Advisor was familiar with that case. It is a shame that more people are not. RE A (CHILDREN) sub nom EH v (1) X LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2) AA (3) REA & RHA (BY THEIR GUARDIAN) (2010) [2010] 2 FLR 661
In all cases such as this, I consider that it is incumbent upon a judge to remind himself in judgment of the precise terms of the passages in R v Turnbull[1977] QB 224 in which Widgery CJ stated at 228:
First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition he should instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear term the judge need not use any particular form of words.
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special
reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance? If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have reason to believe that there is such a
material discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars of the description the police were first given. In all cases if the accused asks to be given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply them”. Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weakness which has appeared in the identification evidence.
“Recognition may be more reliable then identification of a stranger but even then when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows,
the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made. “
When the Family Proceedings Court, sitting as a bench of two, made their determination on this factual issue, they took considerable pains to analyse each and every point of the Turnbull principles in their determination. They made the finding that the evidence of Miss J was preferred, following that careful analysis to the evidence of Mr Y and Miss X, and that the couple on the day of their substantive evidence declaring effectively undying separation had been observed in the throes of considerable and lengthy passionate embrace. The Court made other findings about the relationship based on the allegations. I note, and it is of some significance, that two of the five allegations made by the Local Authority about occasions when the parents were suspected to be together were not made out because the Court felt that there was not sufficient evidence to be satisfied about them, and the Court did not make the mistake of conflating the likelihood of (a), (b) and (c) having been true, just because they had found a significant (d) to be true.
In this appeal, no criticism is made of the way that the Magistrates drew up their reasons, nor that they took into account something that was irrelevant, or failed to give sufficient weight to something that was relevant. Clearly, with one eye on the likely appeal and the need in this case because of the circumstances to be rigorous, the Facts and Reasons are an exemplar of their kind.
Counsel for the appellant mother, makes effectively one point in this appeal and it is a compelling one. I am grateful that a ‘scattergun’ approach was not taken, but the issue confined to the one which is the crux of the case. Does this decision satisfy the Sussex Justices case that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.
Could the two Magistrates determining the case, no matter how much care and attention they gave the matter and no matter how hard they strove for neutrality and impartiality, really appropriately weigh and sift the evidence without giving a disproportionate weight to the fact that one witness of fact on a key disputed issue had previously been sitting by their side on the case as they heard live evidence?
Counsel for the appellant makes the strong case that if this were a criminal trial, and the witness of fact had been a member of the jury who perhaps overheard some material evidence being talked about by a defendant, the jury would be discharged and the case reheard. The Joanne Frail case, where the juror had been in communication with the defendant on Facebook whilst the jury were still deliberating was referred to
ATTORNEY GENERAL v (1) JOANNE FRAILL (2) JAMIE STEWART : R v KNOX (2011) [2011] EWHC 1629 (Admin) as was the case where a juror had been flirting with a police officer giving evidence in the trial
R v (1) JOHN CORT (2) BRIAN FARRELL (2011) [2011] EWCA Crim 1597 and indeed the case where an officer of the Court involved in jury selection had been socialising with members of the jury
R v CHRISTOPHER JOHN BURCOMBE (2010) [2010] EWCA Crim 2818 and R v MICHAEL WILLIAM MCDONNELL (2010) [2010] EWCA Crim 2352 where the jury had searched for information about the defendants on the internet.
All of which chiefly made me very relieved that I no longer conduct criminal trials, as they seem to be a hot-bed of socialisation, fraternisation and social networking pitfalls, with the court and jury room being more akin to some form of speed-dating evening than the administration of justice.
I consider that it is right and proper to draw the distinction here between a juror who has set out to act inappropriately (whether through ignorance or sheer bloody-mindedness) and a Magistate who here happened to stumble into possession of material evidence which made her a witness. Had she endeavoured to follow Mr Y or Miss X and observe them, or visit their home to watch them, then I would be in no doubt whatsoever that her conduct would be reprehensible. There is, in my judgment, a clear bright line when a person is sitting in a judicial capacity between hearing and testing the evidence that is presented in Court and endeavouring to find out more outside the Court. The latter is not acceptable. By way of illustration, it would be appropriate for a Judge to indicate to the parties that they seek to read a specific piece of research referred to in Dr Jinglebones report, but not to search on the internet for criticisms of Dr Jinglebones or photographs illustrating his vivid social life and partiality towards tequilla. There is a clear, bright line between hearing the evidence that is presented in court and making ones own enquiries, and a Magistrate or indeed Judge would step over that clear bright line at their own peril.
However, here it is different. Miss J had not desired or intended to gather evidence, rather it was a matter of happenstance – in the altered words of Malvolio “Some are born with evidence, some achieve evidence and some have evidence thrust upon them”. She turned a corner and saw what she saw and could not unsee it. Nor could she have ignored it. Nor could this information have rightly been set to one side or supressed. It was material evidence, and it was deeply unfortunate that it was Miss J who happened to fall upon it, rather than the social worker or the Guardian. It could have been worse – it could have been counsel for either of the parents, which certainly would have led to the need to a rehearing with fresh counsel.
The appellant makes the second point, arising from this, that even if there is no culpability, the impartiality of the Court is tainted inexorably by one of the tribunal giving evidence. They submit, wisely and correctly, that if this had been a County Court judge who had made the identification, mistaken or genuine, then it would have been impossible to continue the case, and that the parents should not be prejudiced by the mere happenstance that the Family Proceedings Court have three Magistrates allowing for an element of ‘redundancy’ whereby one can drop out and the hearing continue.
This is clearly a difficult case, and as the well known axiom has it (though I have not found authority for it) “hard cases make bad law” – the closest authority I have identified arises here :-
R v National Insurance Comrs, Ex pp Hudson [1972] AC 944, 966, Lord Reid also observed,
at p 966: “It is notorious that where an existing decision is disapproved but cannot be overruled courts tend to distinguish it on inadequate grounds. I do not think
that they act wrongly in so doing: they are adopting the less bad of the only alternatives open to them. But this is bound to lead to uncertainty for no one
can say in advance whether in a particular case the court will or will not feel bound to follow the old unsatisfactory decision. On balance it seems to me that
overruling such a decision will promote and not impair the certainty of the law.”
I am certain that in this case, it was appropriate for the Court to consider the evidence of Miss J, that it was incumbent on them to consider the problems of eye witness identification evidence and give themselves a Turnbull direction, which they did. I am certain that Miss J could not play any part in the decision-making, being a witness of fact, and she did not. I am certain that had she discussed the case in any informal sense after becoming a material witness, the case should be reheard, and I am satisfied that this did not happen. I am satisfied that if Miss J had sought out this evidence deliberately, this would have indelibly tainted the entire bench and the case would need to be reheard, which she did not. I am satisfied that the Court would have to give very careful and compelling reasons for accepting Miss J’s evidence to remove any lingering suggestion that her evidence was preferred because of her status, and I am satisfied that the Court did so. I am completely satisfied that the Court were not biased, and that they did everything possible to remove any suggestion or impression of bias.
All things being equal, if one had a time machine and could revisit that hearing, I would myself have preferred a decision that the case be transferred to the County Court and for a circuit judge (who would be not associated with miss J) to hear all of the evidence and determine the case. But it is not, of course the role of the appeal court to substitute its own judgment for that of the Family Proceedings Court, but to analyse whether that decision was plainly wrong. It is my conclusion that a spectrum of possible decisions about the way forward existed for the Court – they decided to proceed with a raft of safeguards and in my determination they were not plainly wrong to do so.
Should a situation arise in the future where a Magistrate or Judge finds themselves in the unfortunate position of having to give evidence in the same case, however, I would not wish this case to be authority for any principle that they should not recuse themselves. With the benefit of hindsight, a recusal and rehearing would have been a better approach and more in keeping with the principles of R v Sussex Justices, and one would hope that should this situation ever arise again, a rehearing with a fresh tribunal would be the outcome.
I therefore dismiss the appeal.
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Posted in case law, imaginary judgment and tagged recusal, rehearing, witnes of fact. Bookmark the permalink.
Court can EXTEND a Supervision Order after the original has run out