Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103348/epa-vs-mink
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 3', '§ 1002', '§ 3', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 281', '§ 2378', '§ 2371', '§ 2378', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

Epa Vs Mink - Citation 103348 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Epa Vs. Mink - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103348
Case Number 410 U.S. 73
epa v. mink - 410 u.s. 73 (1973) u.s. supreme court epa v. mink, 410 u.s. 73 (1973) environmental protection agency v. mink no. 71-909 argued november 9, 1972 decided january 22, 1973 410 u.s. 73 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus respondent members of congress brought suit under the freedom of information act of 1966 to compel disclosure of nine documents that various officials had prepared for the president concerning a scheduled underground nuclear test. all but three were classified as top secret or secret under e.o. 10501, and petitioners represented that all were inter-agency or intra-agency documents used in the executive branch's decisionmaking.....
EPA v. Mink - 410 U.S. 73 (1973)
U.S. Supreme Court EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)
1. Exemption 1 does not permit compelled disclosure of the six classified documents or in camera inspection to sift out "non-secret components," and petitioners met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under that exemption. Pp. 410 U. S. 79 -84.
in camera inspection that the documents sought are clearly beyond the range of material that would be available to a private part in litigation with a Government agency. Pp. 410 U. S. 85 -94.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 410 U. S. 94 . BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 410 U. S. 95 . DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 410 U. S. 105 . REHNQUIST, J., tool no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Respondents' lawsuit began with an article that appeared in a Washington, D.C. newspaper in late July, 1971. The article indicated that the President had received conflicting recommendations on the advisability of the underground nuclear test scheduled for that coming fall and, in particular, noted that the "latest recommendations" were the product of "a departmental under-secretary committee named to investigate the controversy." Two days later, Congresswoman Patsy Mink, a respondent, sent a telegram to the President urgently requesting the "immediate release of recommendations and report by inter-departmental committee. . . ." When the request was denied, an action under the Freedom of Information Act was commenced by Congresswoman Mink and 32 of her colleagues in the House. [ Footnote 1 ]
Petitioners immediately moved for summary judgment on the ground that the materials sought were specifically exempted from disclosure under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(5) of the Act. [ Footnote 2 ] In support of the motion, petitioners filed an affidavit of John N. Irwin II, the Under Secretary
Results of the Committee's reviews were to be transmitted to the President "in time to allow him to give them full consideration before the scheduled events." In Ś 5 of the affidavit, Mr. Irwin stated that, pursuant to "the foregoing directions from the President," the Under Secretaries Committee had prepared and transmitted to the President a report on the proposed underground nuclear test known as "Cannikin," scheduled to take place at Amchitka Island, Alaska. The report was said to have consisted of a covering memorandum from Mr. Irwin, the report of the Under Secretaries Committee, five documents attached to that report, and three additional letters separately sent to Mr. Irwin. [ Footnote 3 ] Of the
In addition, at least eight (by now reduced to six) of the nine remaining documents were said to involve highly sensitive matter vital to the national defense and foreign policy, and were described as having been classified Top Secret or Secret pursuant to Executive Order 10501. [ Footnote 4 ]
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, [ Footnote 5 ] is a revision of § 3, the public disclosure section, of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). Section 3 was generally recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals, and came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosure statute. See S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1965) (hereinafter S.Rep. No. 813); H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1966) (hereinafter H.R.Rep. No. 1497). The section was plagued with vague phrases, such as that exempting from disclosure "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest." Moreover, even "matters of official record" were only to be made available to "persons properly and directly concerned" with the information. And the section provided no remedy for wrongful withholding of information. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act stand in sharp relief against those of § 3. The Act eliminates the "properly and directly concerned" test of access, stating repeatedly that official information shall be made available "to the public," "for public inspection." Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled disclosures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed. Aggrieved citizens are given a speedy remedy in district courts, where "the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). Noncompliance with court orders may be punished by contempt. Ibid.
S.Rep. No. 813, p. 3. [ Footnote 6 ]
Subsection (b)(1) of the Act exempts from forced disclosure matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy." According to the Irwin affidavit, the six documents for which Exemption 1 is now claimed were all duly classified Top Secret or Secret, pursuant to Executive Order 10501, 3 CFR 280 (Jan. 1, 1970). That order was promulgated under the authority of the President in 1953, 18 Fed.Reg. 7049, and, since that time, has served as the basis for the classification by the Executive Branch of information "which requires protection in the interests of national defense." [ Footnote 7 ] We do not believe that Exemption 1 permits compelled disclosure of documents, such as the six here that were classified pursuant to this Executive Order. Nor does the Exemption permit in camera inspection of such documents to sift out so-called "nonsecret components." Obviously, this test was not the only alternative available. But Congress chose to follow the Executive's determination in these matters, and that choice must be honored.
H.R.Rep. No. 1497, pp. 9-10. [ Footnote 8 ] Similarly, Representative
argue that the "Order has nothing to do with the first exemption." [ Footnote 9 ]
What has been said thus far makes wholly untenable any claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen. It also negates the proposition that Exemption 1 authorizes or permits in camera inspection of a contested document bearing a single classification so that the court may separate the secret from the supposedly nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter. The Court of Appeals was thus in error. The Irwin affidavit stated that each of the six documents for which Exemption 1 is now claimed "are and have been classified" Top Secret and Secret "pursuant to Executive Order No. 10501," and as involving "highly sensitive matter that is vital to our national defense and foreign policy." The fact of those classifications and the documents' characterizations have never been disputed by respondents. Accordingly, upon such a showing and in such circumstances petitioners had met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under Exemption 1, and the duty of the District Court under § 552(a)(3) was therefore at an end. [ Footnote 10 ]
Disclosure of the three documents conceded to be "unclassified" is resisted solely on the basis of subsection (b)(5) of the Act (hereafter Exemption 5). [ Footnote 11 ] That Exemption was also invoked, alternatively, to support withholding the six documents for which Exemption 1 was claimed. It is beyond question that the Irwin affidavit, standing alone, is sufficient to establish that all of the documents involved in this litigation are "inter-agency or intra-agency" memoranda or "letters" that were used in the decisionmaking processes of the Executive Branch. By its terms, however, Exemption 5 creates an exemption for such documents only insofar as they "would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the
agency." This language clearly contemplates that the public is entitled to all such memoranda or letters that a private party could discover in litigation with the agency. Drawing such a line between what may be withheld and what must be disclosed is not without difficulties. In many important respects, the rules governing discovery in such litigation have remained uncertain from the very beginnings of the Republic. [ Footnote 12 ] Moreover, at best, the discovery rules can only be applied under Exemption 5 by way of rough analogies. For example, we do not know whether the Government is to be treated as though it were a prosecutor, a civil plaintiff, or a defendant. [ Footnote 13 ] Nor does the Act, by its terms, permit inquiry into particularized needs of the individual seeking the information, although such an inquiry would ordinarily be made of a private litigant. Still, the legislative history of Exemption 5 demonstrates that Congress intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule that "confidential intra-agency advisory opinions . . . are privileged from inspection." Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl.
or purely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from its context would generally be available for discovery by private parties in litigation with the Government. [ Footnote 14 ] Moreover, in applying the privilege, courts often were required to examine the disputed documents in camera in order to determine which should be turned over or withheld. [ Footnote 15 ] We must
assume, therefore, that Congress legislated against the backdrop of this case law, particularly since it expressly intended "to delimit the exception [5] as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation." S.Rep. No. 813, p. 9. See H.R.Rep. No. 1497, p. 10. Virtually all of the courts that have thus far applied Exemption 5 have recognized that it requires different treatment for materials reflecting deliberative or policymaking processes, on the one hand, and purely factual, investigative matters, on the other. [ Footnote 16 ]
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters dealing solely with matters of law or policy. [ Footnote 17 ]"
This formulation was designed to permit "[a]ll factual material in Government records . . . to be made available to the public." S.Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964). (Emphasis in original.) The formulation was severely criticized, however, on the ground that it would permit compelled disclosure of an otherwise private document simply because the document did not deal "solely" with legal or policy matters. Documents dealing with mixed questions of fact, law, and policy would inevitably, under the proposed exemption, become available to the public. [ Footnote 18 ] As a result of this criticism,
Petitioners further argue that, although in camera inspection and disclosure of "low-level, routine, factual reports" [ Footnote 19 ] may be contemplated by Exemption 5, that type of document is not involved in this case. Rather,
"It seems . . . obvious that the very purpose of the privilege, the encouragement of open expression of opinion as to governmental policy, is somewhat impaired by a requirement to submit the evidence even [ in camera ]."
A separate action was brought to enjoin the test itself. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg (DC, Civ. Action No. 1346-71). After adverse decisions below, plaintiffs in that case applied for an injunction in this Court. On November 6, 1971, we denied the application, Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U. S. 917 , and the test was conducted that same day.
The Report states ( ibid. ):
Portions of two documents for which Exemption 1 is claimed were ordered disclosed in connection with the action brought to enjoin the test ( see n 1, supra ). Petitioners seek no relief with respect to any matters already disclosed.
The House Report, it is true, indicates that the President must determine that the exempted matter be kept secret. Clearly, however, Executive Order 10501 is based on presidential authority, and specifically delegates that authority to "the departments, agencies, and other units of the executive branch as hereinafter specified. " 3 CFR § 281 (Jan. 1, 1970) (emphasis added). One may disagree with the scope of the delegation or with how the delegated authority is exercised in particular cases, but the authority itself nevertheless remains the President's, and it is his judgment that the first exemption was designed to respect.
Brief for Respondents 18. Respondents note that the preamble of the new Executive Order 11652 ( see n 7, supra ), specifies that material classified pursuant to its provisions "is expressly exempted from public disclosure by Section 552(b)(1) of Title 5, United States Code." Executive Order 10501 has no comparable recital, but only the sheerest ritualism would distinguish the effect of the two orders on any such basis. Indeed, respondents' apparent acceptance of the new order as a justifiable ground for resisting disclosure under Exemption 1 points to the absurdity of maintaining that Executive Order 10501 is irrelevant to the Act.
See generally 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice Ś 26.61 (1972), and authorities collected ( id. at Ś 26.61[1] n. 2) (hereinafter Moore); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2378, 2379 (McNaughton rev.1961) (hereinafter Wigmore).
There were early disputes over the issue of Executive privilege. See Chief Justice Marshall's decisions in the trial of United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) and 25 F.Cas. 187, 191-192 (No. 14,694) (CCD Va. 1807), discussed in 8 Wigmore § 2371, pp. 739-741 (3d ed.1940) and 4 Moore Ś 26.61[6.-4]. See also Wigmore § 2378, p. 805 and n. 21.
The Court holds that Exemption 1 immunizes from judicial scrutiny any document classified pursuant to Executive Order 10501, 3 CFR 280 (Jan. 1, 1970). [ Footnote 2/1 ] In reaching this result, however, the Court adopts a construction of Exemption 1 that is flatly inconsistent with the legislative history, and, indeed, the unambiguous language of the Act itself. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In plain words, Exemption 1 exempts from disclosure only material " specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy. " (Emphasis
Even the petitioners concede, [ Footnote 2/3 ] no doubt in response to the "specifically required" standard of § 552(b)(1)
and the "specifically stated" requirement of § 552(C), [ Footnote 2/4 ] that documents classified pursuant to § 3(b) of Executive Order 10501 cannot qualify under Exemption 1. Indeed, petitioners apparently accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that, as to § 3(b):
foreign policy." [ Footnote 2/5 ] The District Court's authority stops with the inquiry whether there are components of the documents that would not have been independently classified as secret. If the District Court finds, on in camera inspection, that there are such components, and that they can be read separately without distortion of meaning, the District Court may order their release. The District Court's authority to make that determination is unambiguously stated in § 552(a)(3): "the [district] court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." The Court's contrary holding is in flat defiance of that congressional mandate. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
The Court's reliance on isolated references to Executive Order 10501 in the congressional proceedings is erroneous and misleading. The Court points to a single passing reference to the Order in the House Report which even a superficial reading reveals to be merely suggestive of the kinds of information that the Executive Branch might classify. Nothing whatever in the Report even remotely implies that the Order was to be recognized as immunizing from public disclosure the entire file of documents merely because one or even a single paragraph of one has been stamped secret. The Court also calls to its support some comments out of context of Congressmen Moss and Gallagher on the House floor. But, on their face, these comments do no more than confirm that Exemption 1 was written with awareness of the existence of Executive Order 10501. Certainly, whatever significance may be attached to debating points in construing a statute, [ Footnote 2/7 ] these comments hardly support the Court's conclusion that a classification pursuant to Executive Order 10501, without more, immunizes an entire document from disclosure under Exemption 1.
" some official information and material . . . bears directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct of our foreign relations"
" [t]his official information or material, referred to as classified information or material in this order, is expressly exempted from public disclosure by Section 552(b)(1) of [the Freedom of Information Act]."
"A major source of unnecessary classification under the old Executive order was the practical impossibility of discerning which portions of a classified document actually required classification. Incorporation of any material from a classified paper into another document usually resulted in the classification of the new document, and innocuous portions of neither paper could be released. "
S.Rep. No. 813, p. 8; H.R.Rep. No. 1497, p. 9. It could not be more clear, therefore, that Congress sought to make certain that the ordinary principle of judicial deference to agency discretion was discarded under this Act. The Executive was not to be allowed "to file an affidavit stating [the] conclusion [that documents are exempt], and, by so doing, foreclose any other determination of the fact." Cowles Communications v. Department of Justice, 325 F.Supp. 726, 727 (ND Cal.1971). Accord, Frankel v. SEC, 336 F.Supp. 675, 677 n. 4 (SDNY 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (CA2 1972); Philadelphia Newspapers v. HUD, 343 F.Supp. 1176, 1180 (ED Pa.1972). [ Footnote 2/8 ]
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 , 341 U. S. 395 , 341 U. S. 397 (1951) (Jackson. J., concurring) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I repeat what I said in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 , 408 U. S. 641 -642 (dissenting opinion):
Unless the District Court can do those things, the much-advertised Freedom of Information Act is on its way to becoming a shambles. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Unless federal courts can be
to a Farce or a Tragedy, or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. [ Footnote 3/2 ]"
The bureaucrat who uses the "secret" stamp obviously does not have the final say as to what "memorandums or letters" would be available by law under Exemption 5, for § 552(a)(3) gives the District Court authority, where agency records are alleged to be "improperly withheld," to "determine the matter de novo, " the "burden" being on the agency "to sustain its action." Hence, § 552(b)(5), behind which the executive agency seeks refuge here, establishes a policy which is served by the fact/opinion distinction long established in federal discovery. The question is whether a private party would routinely be entitled to disclosure through discovery of some or all of the material sought to be excerpted. When the Court answers that no such inquiry can be made under § 552(b)(1), it makes a shambles of the disclosure mechanism which Congress tried to create. To make obvious the interplay of the nine exemptions listed in § 552(b), as well as § 552(c), I have attached them as an Appendix to this dissent.