Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/894/208/306903/
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 14:49:34
Document Index: 604028754

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 3551', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Denver Williams, James Robert Davis, Mike Blanton,defendants-appellants, 894 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Denver Williams, James Robert Davis, Mike Blanton,d...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Denver Williams, James Robert Davis, Mike Blanton,defendants-appellants, 894 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1990)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 894 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1990) Argued Nov. 28, 1989. Decided Jan. 25, 1990
Defendants Williams, Davis, and Blanton appeal the sentences imposed after being convicted of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Davis, Blanton, Williams, and Hoskins were each indicted on the first two counts of a federal indictment. The first count charged them with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; the second count, with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Williams and Hoskins were also charged on a third count with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). After a jury trial, Davis, Blanton and Williams were convicted on counts one and two. Williams was acquitted on count three. Because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Hoskins, the court declared a mistrial. Davis was sentenced to 41 months on each count to run concurrently; Blanton to 27 months, and Williams to 30 months, on each count to run concurrently. Each defendant challenges his sentence pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. (West 1985 & Supp.1989). These appeals present several issues including whether Davis' and Blanton's guideline sentencing range was properly enhanced two levels for possession of a firearm during the commission of an offense under Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1).1 Also at issue is whether Blanton's sentencing range should have been reduced two levels for acceptance of responsibility under Guideline Sec. 3E1.1(a) and whether Davis' and Williams' sentencing range was properly enhanced two levels for being organizers under Guideline Sec. 3B1.1(c). Finally, defendants Davis and Williams contend that the trial court erred in assessing the "base" level of cocaine as more than 100 grams, which created a base offense level of 18.
Defendants Davis and Blanton allege that it was improper to enhance their sentences under Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1), which states: "if a firearm or other dangerous weapon was possessed during commission of the offense, increase by 2 levels." They argue that it was error to base their enhancement on a co-conspirator's possession of a gun when they were not present at the commission of the offense and no co-conspirator was convicted of using or carrying a weapon in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Defendants Davis and Blanton contend that the jury's acquittal of Williams on count three charging him with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) and the jury's failure to reach a verdict with regard to Hoskins establishes that there was serious dispute about whether a firearm had been possessed by any member of the conspiracy in relation to the drug offense. Moreover, although the government had requested at the sentencing hearing that the court apply the enhancement to the sentence of defendant Williams, the court refused to do so. The court gave no explanation about why it was applying Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1) inconsistently, using it to enhance the sentence of defendants Davis and Blanton and refusing to use it against defendant Williams.
The government argues that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) is not necessary for an enhancement under Guideline 2D1.1(b) (1), which involves a factual determination of possession of a firearm by the sentencing court. The government contends that under Guidelines Secs. 2D1.1 and 2D1.4 Williams' and Hoskins' possession of the firearm can be imputed to convicted co-conspirators Davis and Blanton if it is reasonably foreseeable that a firearm will be used in a drug trafficking offense.
We agree that under the Guidelines, conviction of a firearm offense is not necessary for application of Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1), and the act of possessing a firearm is attributable to a co-conspirator not present at the commission of the offense as long as it constitutes reasonably foreseeable conduct. See United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1989). For offenses involving drugs, the base offense level is increased by two points "if a firearm or other dangerous weapon was possessed during commission of the offense." Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1). The enhancement for weapons possession also applies to offenses that reference Sec. 2D1.1, i.e., Sec. 2D1.4, which states: "If the defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the sentence should be imposed only on the basis of the defendant's conduct or the conduct of co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to defendant or was reasonably foreseeable." Commentary, Application Note One, Sec. 2D1.4. Moreover, the commentary on the general application principles pertaining to relevant conduct states:
The government argues that even though Hoskins and Williams were found not guilty of the firearm offense,2 the district court could conclude that a weapon was "possessed" by them in the commission of the offense. The government relies on United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989), in which the Fifth Circuit held that a sentencing judge could properly consider facts surrounding the defendant's possession of a firearm despite his acquittal of the related firearm offense as long as the facts were not disputed as false or unreliable. The court did not elaborate on the requirements of reliability. In Juarez-Ortega the uncontradicted testimony was that during one of the drug sales, Juarez-Ortega had a firearm tucked into the waistband of his pants. In the present case, the weapon was on the floor of the truck at Hoskins' feet.3
Under the theory of co-conspirator liability established in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946), the overt act of one partner in crime is attributable to all members of the conspiracy. However, an overt act of one partner cannot be charged against other co-conspirators if it is not charged against the partner who allegedly committed the act, and the act of one partner cannot be charged against other co-conspirators in an inconsistent manner. This would be inequitable. In the present case, the district court at the sentencing hearing decided that defendant Williams, who was present at the drug sale and acquitted of using and carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924, was not to be given a two-level increase for weapons possession. If Williams' acquittal cast doubt about the appropriateness of using the weapons possession guideline against Williams, this doubt should have precluded its use, based on his conduct, against Blanton and Davis as well. Instead, defendants Blanton and Davis, who were not present at the drug sale or charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924, were given a two-level increase for weapons possession. This is contradictory to the rationale for imputing co-conspirator liability and violates the spirit of the Guidelines. One purpose of Congress in establishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to narrow the wide disparity imposed by different federal courts for similar conduct by similar offenders. We find that the district court's inconsistent application of the weapons possession enhancement with regard to co-conspirators Williams, Blanton and Davis created the type of disparity which the Guidelines seek to avoid. It is particularly inequitable to impute the possession of a weapon to co-conspirators who did not commit the conduct relevant to the enhancement, when the act of weapons possession is not used against the co-conspirator who allegedly did commit the relevant conduct. For these reasons, we find that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court, without any explanation, to apply the weapons possession enhancement to the sentences of Davis and Blanton, when the court had decided not to apply the enhancement to the sentence of co-conspirator Williams. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the district court on this issue.
We review the district court's determination of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 1989). Guideline Sec. 3E1.1(a) allows for a two-level reduction "if the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct."
Defendants Davis and Williams contend that the district court erred in enhancing their sentences for their roles as organizers under Guideline 3B1.1(c), which states that the offense level is increased by two levels if "the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor...." This determination is a factual one, which, upon appellate review, is subject to the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 923 (citing United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 3257, 106 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989). Factors which the court should consider include:
Although the government requested at the sentencing hearing that defendant Williams' sentence be enhanced two levels for possession of a firearm during the commission of an offense under Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(b) (1), the court denied this request