Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97178/united-states-vs-cooper-corp
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 07:09:46
Document Index: 197915493

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 16', '§ 26', 'art 1', '§ 17']

United States Vs Cooper Corp - Citation 97178 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Cooper Corp. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97178
Case Number 312 U.S. 600
Respondent Cooper Corp.
united states v. cooper corp. - 312 u.s. 600 (1941) u.s. supreme court united states v. cooper corp., 312 u.s. 600 (1941) united states v. cooper corporation no. 484 argued march 6, 1941 decided march 31, 1941 312 u.s. 600 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus 1. while the united states is a juristic person in the sense that it can sue upon its contracts or in vindication of its property rights, the term "person" does not include the sovereign in common usage nor, ordinarily, when employed in statutes. p. 312 u. s. 604 . 2. the sherman antitrust act, in creating new rights and remedies, allowed two classes of actions -- those made available only to the government and.....
United States v. Cooper Corp. - 312 U.S. 600 (1941)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941)
1. While the United States is a juristic person in the sense that it can sue upon its contracts or in vindication of its property rights, the term "person" does not include the sovereign in common usage nor, ordinarily, when employed in statutes. P. 312 U. S. 604 .
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act, in creating new rights and remedies, allowed two classes of actions -- those made available only to the Government and a right of action for treble damages granted to redress private injury. P. 312 U. S. 608 .
We took this case because it presents the important question whether the United States may maintain an action for treble damages under § 7 of the Sherman Act. [ Footnote 1 ]
combined and conspired to fix collusive prices of articles purchased by the United States, alleged the money damage inflicted upon the United States thereby, and sought judgment for three times that amount. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the United States is not a person as the term is used in § 7 of the Sherman Act. [ Footnote 2 ] The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. [ Footnote 3 ]
The United States is a juristic person in the sense that it has capacity to sue upon contracts made with it or in vindication of its property rights. The Sherman Act, however, created new rights and remedies which are available only to those on whom they are conferred by the Act. [ Footnote 4 ] The precise question for decision, therefore, is whether, by the use of the phrase "any person," Congress intended to confer upon the United States the right to maintain an action for treble damages against a violator of the Act.
Since, in common usage, the term "person" does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it. [ Footnote 5 ] But there is no hard
and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law. [ Footnote 6 ]
Decision is not to be reached by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense, and, if doubts remain, resolve them in the light not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other available aids to construction. But it is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made. [ Footnote 7 ]
The recent expressions of this court in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 , 310 U. S. 148 -149, warn that it is not for the courts to indulge in the business of policymaking in the field of antitrust legislation. Congress has not left us at large to devise every feasible means for protecting the Government as a purchaser. It is the function of Congress to fashion means to that end, and Congress has discharged this duty from time to time according to its own wisdom. Our function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of Congress.
1. Without going beyond the words of the section, the use of the phrase "any person" is insufficient to authorize an action by the Government. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, if the purpose was to include the United States, "the ordinary dignities of speech would have led" to its mention by name. [ Footnote 8 ] It is supported also by the collocation of the phrase in the section. The provision is that "any person" injured by violation of the Act "by any other person or corporation" may maintain an action for treble damages against the latter. It is hardly credible that Congress used the term "person" in different senses in the same sentence. Yet, unless it did, the United States would not only be entitled to sue, but would be liable to suit for treble damages. The more natural inference, we think, is that the meaning of the word was, in both uses, limited to what are usually known as natural and artificial persons -- that is, individuals and corporations. In addition, the concluding words of the section give the injured party, as part of his costs, a reasonable attorney's fee -- a provision more appropriate for a private litigant than for the United States.
It seems evident that the Act envisaged two classes of actions -- those made available only to the Government, which are first provided in detail, and, in addition, a right of action for treble damages granted to redress private injury. If this be the fair construction of the Act, the Court's task is finished when it gives effect to the purposes of the law, evidenced by the various remedies it affords for different situations. Though the law gave a remedy by way of injunction at the suit of the United States, we were pressed to say that a private person should have the same remedy. We were compelled to answer that Congress had not seen fit so to provide. [ Footnote 9 ] For the like reasons, we cannot hold that, since a private purchaser is given a remedy for his losses in treble damages, the United States should be awarded the same remedy.
4. Supplemental legislation lends support to the view that Congress had in mind the distinction between public and private remedies, and did not intend to confer a right of action on the United States by the use of the phrase "any person" in § 7. The antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act [ Footnote 10 ] follow the same pattern as the Sherman Act. Section 73 [ Footnote 11 ] denounces combinations and agreements between parties importing articles from a foreign country, and declares that every person guilty of
The anti-dumping provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916 [ Footnote 12 ] make it a criminal offense for "any person" importing articles from a foreign country to sell, or cause to be imported or sold, such articles within the United States at substantially less than the market value of such articles at the time of exportation in the principal markets of the country of production, etc. They further declare that any person injured in his business or property by any violation may sue therefor in the United States courts and recover threefold damages and costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee. It must be obvious that the United States cannot be embraced by the phrase "any person" there used.
When Congress came to supplement the Sherman Act by the Clayton Act, [ Footnote 13 ] it included in the latter a significant section bearing upon the question under consideration. Doubts had arisen as to whether issues adjudicated in a criminal proceeding or a suit in equity brought by the United States should be taken as concluded in an action for treble damages subsequently brought by an injured party. By § 5 of the Clayton Act, it was sought to give such adjudication that effect. The section provides:
5. There has been a considerable body of judicial expression to the effect that § 7 authorizes an action for damages only by private suitors, and not by the Government. [ Footnote 14 ] While none of the cases presented the exact question
6. The legislative history is persuasive that the Sherman Act was not intended to give the United States a civil action for damages. Senator Sherman, on March 18, 1890, introduced a bill which, in § 1, provided that the United States might bring various civil actions and, in § 2, that "any person" should be entitled to sue any "person" or "corporation" for double damages. [ Footnote 15 ]
States. He stated that the civil suit by the United States authorized by § 1 might be for an ouster of the power of the corporation, for damages, or in quo warranto, and added: "But the second section provides purely a personal remedy, a civil suit also by citizens of the United States." [ Footnote 16 ]
"There is no suit authorized by any of these statutes except a criminal prosecution or a suit in equity. The United States does not bring a suit at law for damages. [ Footnote 17 ] "
"Under Section 7, which gives to private persons the right to sue for injuries arising under the act, a number of actions have been instituted. The United States, however, under the statute, is not a party to suits under that section. [ Footnote 18 ]"
"The bill permits the United States, in effect, to bring a suit for damages against an offending corporation and against its individual directors and officers. [ Footnote 19 ]"
the statute has been in force until the present action was instituted. Down to the close of the year 1937, 428 criminal prosecutions and suits in equity had been instituted by the Government. [ Footnote 20 ] Down to December, 1939, 103 civil suits had been instituted by private persons, including corporations. [ Footnote 21 ] In the meantime, the World War intervened, with the Government a purchaser of enormous quantities of material and supplies. Then, as now, the complaint was prevalent that agreements and conspiracies existed to fix and maintain prices of materials needed by the Government. And, throughout the life of the legislation, able and vigilant officials devoted to enforcement of the policy of the Sherman Act have not been wanting.
Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U. S. 165 , 236 U. S. 174 ; Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U. S. 27 , 240 U. S. 29 ; Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 , 254 U. S. 593 .
In re Fox, 52 N.Y. 530; United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 , 94 U. S. 321 .
See Levy v. M'Cartee, 6 Pet. 102, 31 U. S. 110 ; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 44 U. S. 565 ; Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 , 292 U. S. 370 ; Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 .
The Pedro, 175 U. S. 354 , 175 U. S. 364 ; Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 510 , 178 U. S. 519 -520; Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438 , 182 U. S. 451 ; White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545 , 191 U. S. 551 -552; Ebert v. Poston, 266 U. S. 548 , 266 U. S. 554 ; Helvering v. Oregon Life Insurance Co., 311 U. S. 267 , 311 U. S. 272 .
Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315 , 268 U. S. 318 .
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48 , 194 U. S. 71 ; Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 . The Act was amended to authorize suits for injunctions by private litigants. See the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 730, 737, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F. 821, 822; Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911; Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 F. 1, 3; City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry, 101 F. 900, 904; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 , 226 U. S. 52 ; United States v. Patterson, 201 F. 697, 714; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan So. Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 261 , 260 U. S. 286 ; Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 889; Quemos Theater Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 35 F.Supp. 949, 950; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 , 310 U. S. 148 .
In order to give purchasers of goods an opportunity to buy them at prices fixed by competitive trade, the Sherman Act made it illegal to fix prices by combination or conspiracy. It is difficult for me to believe that Congress did not intend to give equal protection to all purchasers similarly injured. In my judgment, no language of that Act, nothing in its history, and no argument now presented for our consideration makes necessary the conclusion that Congress intended to discriminate in favor of some purchasers and against others. It would require clear and unequivocal statutory language to persuade me that Congress intended to grant a remedy to all except one of those who were injured by trust prices -- the "all" including every natural and artificial person, every corporation and association, [ Footnote 2/1 ] foreign and domestic, and the single exception
being the United States, which buys more goods and services than any other single purchaser. [ Footnote 2/2 ] No such clear and unequivocal statutory language exists. And no plausible reason has been hazarded to prove that the government, as a purchaser of goods, needs less protection from unlawful combinations than do other buyers. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Many deplorable instances in our history, in fact, indicate the contrary. Congress, no doubt stimulated to action by these historical occurrences, has by numerous enactments recognized the urgent necessity for safeguarding governmental purchases of goods and services against unfair and collusive price-fixing. To that end, competitive bidding as a prerequisite to government contracts has been the general statutory rule over a long period of years, and combinations to deprive the government of the advantages of such competition have been made criminal. It is therefore strange indeed that the Sherman Act, the greatest of all legislative efforts to make competition, not combination, the law of trade should now be found to afford a greater protection against collusive price-fixing to every other buyer in the United States than is afforded to the United States itself.
that face those who buy the government's supplies. In the final analysis, it is probably true that even an Attorney General who might zealously desire to enforce the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act would not likely be stimulated to institute civil proceedings for damages unless his attention was directed to the point by keenly alert and diligent purchasing agencies. To attempt to construe the Sherman Act by a vain effort to appraise the reasons responsible for the nonaction of Attorneys General is a journey into the realm of imponderables I find it unnecessary to take. I would simply read the Act from its language and manifest purpose as giving all purchasers of goods a right to sue if they have been injured as the result of prices held up by those types of unlawful combination condemned by the Act. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
the government entitled to their benefits. [ Footnote 2/5 ] And certainly it can hardly be denied that the language of the Act, giving all persons a right of action, should if liberally construed be held to justify suit by the United States. For, in Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 52 U. S. 231 , decided forty years before the Sherman Act was adopted, this Court said, in speaking of the United States:
And, speaking in similar vein in Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84 , 293 U. S. 92 , after having cited Blackstone for the proposition that the sovereign is a "corporation" and after having gone even beyond this to hold that the statutory word "resident" included the United States, the Court said:
of the law when they are required by the demands of convenience and justice. [ Footnote 2/6 ]"
These particular cases are but facets of a general rule that has long been accepted -- the United States can exercise all of the legal remedies which other persons, bodies or associations can exercise, both at common law and under statutes, [ Footnote 2/7 ] unless there is something in a statute or in its history to indicate an intent to deprive the United States of that right. [ Footnote 2/8 ] In this case, nothing in the Sherman Act itself and nothing in its legislative history makes necessary the conclusion that Congress intended to withhold from the United States a remedy given to all other purchasers. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the judgment below should be reversed.
A 1940 report to the Senate, made by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to a Senate Resolution, revealed that the federal government was transacting part of its business through the medium of at least 1,469 government corporations. Senate Document No. 172, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Part 1, p. 4. The judgment here does not foreclose such corporations from suing for damages under section 7, or so I assume. If I am correct in my assumption, the result is that as to those purchases made by its corporate agencies, the Government is protected by the Sherman Act, while, as to those purchases made by its noncorporate agencies, it is not so protected. A process of statutory construction which results in giving to government corporations a right denied to constitutionally authorized government departments seems to me to conflict with the frequently declared rule that a statute should not be interpreted in such way as to produce an unreasonable or unjust result. See United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534 , 310 U. S. 542 -543; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 , 287 U. S. 446 .
38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 17. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 .
It is argued that, if the government can sue for damages, it may also be sued for damages. That question is not before us, and need not be decided. Other principles will be material if such a question ever should be presented. See United States v. Sherwood, ante, p. 312 U. S. 584 ; Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 , 302 U. S. 383 -384; United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 39 U. S. 315 . Among these principles, the most important is that of sovereign immunity.
Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675 , 272 U. S. 686 ; Price v. United States, 174 U. S. 373 , 174 U. S. 375 -376; United States v. Sherwood, supra.
Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 , 292 U. S. 370 , 371; Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508 , 147 U. S. 517 .
See Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172; United States v. Gear, 3 How. 120; Cotton v. United States, supra. Cf. 86 U. S. United States, 19 Wall. 227; United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U. S. 250 .
Cf. Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315 .