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DONOVAN V. DEWEY, 452 U. S. 594 - Volume 452 - 1981 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
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DONOVAN V. DEWEY, 452 U. S. 594 (1981)
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1290, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), requires the Secretary of Labor to develop detailed mandatory health and safety standards to govern the operation of the Nation's mines. 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1976 ed., Supp. III). [Footnote 1] Section 103(a) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III), provides that federal mine inspectors are to inspect underground mines at least four times per year and surface mines at least twice a year to insure compliance with these standards, and to make followup inspections to determine whether previously discovered violations have been corrected. This section also grants mine inspectors "a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine," [Footnote 2] and states that "no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person." If a mine operator refuses to allow a warrantless inspection conducted pursuant to § 103(a), the Secretary
In July, 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect quarries owned by appellee Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. in order to determine whether all 25 safety and health violations uncovered during a prior inspection had been corrected. After the inspector had been on the site for about an hour, Waukesha's president, appellee Douglas Dewey, refused to allow the inspection to continue unless the inspector first obtain a search warrant. The inspector issued a citation to Waukesha for terminating the inspection, [Footnote 3] and the Secretary subsequently filed this civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to enjoin appellees from refusing to permit warrantless searches of the Waukesha facility.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the ground that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless searches of stone quarries authorized by § 103(a) of the Act. [Footnote 4] 493 F.Supp. 963 (1980). The
Secretary appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the District Court's ruling invalidated an important provision of the Mine Safety and Health Act, we noted probable jurisdiction. [Footnote 5] Sub nom. Marshall v. Dewey, 449 U.S. 1122 (1981).
Our prior cases have established that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial property. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). However, unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, [Footnote 6] legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970). The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an
individual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. United States v. Biswell, supra, at 406 U. S. 316.
The interest of the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from any inspections. Congress has broad authority to regulate commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, and an inspection program may in some cases be a necessary component of federal regulation. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the interest of the owner of property in being free from unreasonable intrusions onto his property by agents of the government. Inspections of commercial property may be unreasonable if they are not authorized by law or are unnecessary for the furtherance of federal interests. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 397 U. S. 77. Similarly, warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 436 U. S. 323.
Colonnade Corp. v. United States, supra, at 397 U. S. 77. In such cases, a warrant may be necessary to protect the owner from the "unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 436 U. S. 323, by assuring him that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 538 (1967).
"subject to close supervision and inspection," Congress enjoyed "broad power to design such powers of inspection . . . as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 76-77. Similarly, in United States v. Biswell, this Court concluded that the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., provided a sufficiently comprehensive and predictable inspection scheme that the warrantless inspections mandated under the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment. After describing the strong federal interest in conducting unannounced, warrantless inspections, we noted:
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316. These decisions make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.
436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 323. Accordingly, we concluded that a warrant was constitutionally required to assure a nonconsenting owner, who may have little real expectation that his business will be subject to inspection, that the contemplated search was "authorized by statute, and . . . pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria." Ibid. However, we expressly limited our holding to the inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, noting that the
Id. at 436 U. S. 321.
Applying this analysis to the case before us, we conclude that the warrantless inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act do not offend the Fourth Amendment. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that there is a substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation's underground and surface mines. In enacting the statute, Congress was plainly aware that the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the country, and that the poor health and safety record of this industry has significant deleterious effects on interstate commerce. [Footnote 7] Nor is it seriously contested that Congress in this case could reasonably determine, as it did with respect to the Gun Control Act in Biswell, that a system of warrantless inspections was
necessary "if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316. In designing an inspection program, Congress expressly recognized that a warrant requirement could significantly frustrate effective enforcement of the Act. Thus, it provided in § 103(a) of the Act that "no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person." In explaining this provision, the Senate Report notes:
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316.
Because a warrant requirement clearly might impede the "specific enforcement needs" of the Act, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 321, the only real issue before us is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. We believe that it does. Unlike the statute at issue in Barlow's, the Mine Safety and Health Act applies to industrial activity with a notorious history of serious accidents and unhealthful working conditions. The Act is specifically tailored to address those concerns, [Footnote 8] and the regulation of mines it imposes is sufficiently pervasive and defined that the owner of such a facility cannot help but be aware that he "will be subject to effective inspection." United States v. Biswell, supra, at 406 U. S. 316. First, the Act requires
inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection. Representatives of the Secretary must inspect all surface mines at least twice annually, and all underground mines at least four times annually. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Similarly, all mining operations that generate explosive gases must be inspected at irregular 5-, 10-, or 15-day intervals. § 813(i). Moreover, the Secretary must conduct followup inspections of mines where violations of the Act have previously been discovered, § 813(a), and must inspect a mine immediately if notified by a miner or a miner's representative that a violation of the Act or an imminently dangerous condition exists. § 813 (g). [Footnote 9] Second, the standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or in Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Indeed, the Act requires that the Secretary inform mine operators of all standards proposed pursuant to the Act. § 811(e). Thus, rather than leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers, the Act establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence. Like the gun dealer in Biswell, the operator of a mine "is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task." 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316.
Appellees contend, however, that even if § 103(a) is constitutional as applied to most segments of the mining industry, it nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to authorize warrantless inspections of stone quarries. Appellees' argument essentially tracks the reasoning of the court below. That court, while expressly acknowledging our decisions in Colonnade and Biswell, found the exception to the warrant requirement defined in those cases to be inapplicable solely because surface quarries, which came under federal regulation in 1966, [Footnote 10] do "not have a long tradition of government regulation." 493 F.Supp. at 964. To be sure, in Colonnade, this Court referred to "the long history of the
regulation of the liquor industry," 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 75, and more recently, in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313, we noted that a "long tradition of close government supervision" militated against imposition of a warrant requirement. However, as previously noted, see supra at 452 U. S. 599, it is the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in United States v. Biswell, this Court upheld the warrantless search provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 despite the fact that
406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 315. Of course, the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to make the imposition of a warrant requirement unnecessary. But if the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur. Under appellees' view, new or emerging industries, including ones such as the nuclear power industry, that pose enormous potential safety and health problems could never be subject to warrantless searches, even under the most carefully structured inspection program, simply because of the recent vintage of regulation.
Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a private home may not be entered to conduct a search or effect an arrest without a warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948). Of course, these same restrictions pertain when commercial property is searched for contraband or evidence of crime. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 429 U. S. 352-359 (1977).
In contrast, the inspection scheme considered in Barlow's did not require the periodic inspection of businesses covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and instead left the decision to inspect within the broad discretion of agency officials. Thus, when a Government official attempted to inspect the facility in that case, the owner had no indication of "why an inspection of [his] establishment was within the program." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 323, n. 20.
Like JUSTICE STEWART, I believe the Court erred in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, when it overruled Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U. S. 360. See post at 452 U. S. 609 (dissenting opinion). I also share JUSTICE STEWART's conviction that each of us has a duty to accept the law as it is; disagreement with the holding in a prior case is not a sufficient reason for refusing to honor it. [Footnote 2/1] Unlike him, however, I also think the Court erred in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, when it concluded that Camara required it to invalidate the safety inspection program authorized by Congress in the Occupational Safety and Health Act. As I explained in my dissent in that case, neither the longevity of a regulatory program nor a businessman's implied consent to regulations imposed by the Federal Government determines the reasonableness of a congressional judgment that the public interest in occupational health or safety justifies a program of warrantless inspections of commercial premises. See 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 336-339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE STEWART has cogently demonstrated that the rationale of today's decision is much closer to the reasoning in my dissent than to the reasoning in the majority opinion in Barlow's, Inc. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the holding in Barlow's, Inc., requires the Court to invalidate the program of mine inspections authorized by the statute we construe today. [Footnote 2/2] I accept the Court's explanation of the differences between the scope of these statutes as sufficient to support a different result in this case. Because I agree with today's majority that the cases are distinguishable, I need not confront the more difficult question whether Camara represented such a fundamental misreading of the Fourth Amendment that it should be overruled. I would merely observe that that option is more viable today than when some of the
reasoning that would support it could only be found in dissenting opinions, see 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 546-555 (Clark, J., dissenting); 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 325-339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), or in the earlier Court opinion in Frank that had itself been overruled in Camara.
See Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 450 U. S. 151 (STEVENS, J., concurring).
Our prior cases hold that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the government must obtain a warrant to conduct a search or effect an arrest in a private home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). This case, however, involves the search of commercial property. Though the proprietor of commercial property is protected from unreasonable intrusions by governmental agents, the Court correctly notes that "legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment." Ante at 452 U. S. 598.
Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 265 U. S. 59 (1924). I necessarily reserve judgment on the extent to which the Fourth Amendment would prevent the implementation of § 103(a) of the Act in the absence of the particular fact situation presented here.
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, the Court concluded that warrantless administrative inspections are not subject to the restrictions that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments place upon conventional searches. The Frank decision was overruled eight years later in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, over the dissent of three Members of the Court, of whom I was one. I believed then that the Frank case had been correctly decided, and that warrantless health and safety inspections do not "requir[e] . . . the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts." Frank, supra, at 359 U. S. 372 (dissenting opinion). [Footnote 3/1]
I must, nonetheless, accept the law as it is, and the law is now established that administrative inspections are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As such, warrantless administrative inspections of private property without consent, are, like other searches, constitutionally invalid except in a few precisely defined circumstances. Camara, supra, at 387 U. S. 528-529. This principle was reemphasized most recently in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, a case in which the Court carefully and explicitly defined the scope of the exception to the general rule of Camara: a search warrant is required for administrative inspections except
in those businesses with "a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313. Because the Court today departs far from this principle, I respectfully dissent.
In Camara, the Court announced the general rule that a warrantless inspection of a private dwelling by municipal administrative officers without proper consent is unconstitutional "unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant." 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 528-529. In the companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, the Court held that the general rule of Camara applies also to administrative inspections of commercial premises.
Until today, exceptions to the general rule have been found in only two cases. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, the Court upheld against constitutional attack a statute that authorized warrantless searches of a liquor licensee's premises by Internal Revenue agents. And in United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, the Court held that federal Treasury agents could search the premises of a licensed gun dealer to determine whether he was in compliance with the Gun Control Act.
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, the Court made clear that Colonnade and Biswell were only limited exceptions to the general rule of Camara, and that they did not signal a trend away from that rule. The Court stated that, "unless some recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies," warrants for administrative inspections are mandatory. 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 313.
"The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must be aware."
added). The rationale for the exception was unmistakably that of implied consent. The Court reasoned that "[t]he businessman [in an industry with a long tradition of close government supervision] in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.'" [Footnote 3/2] (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 413 U. S. 271).
Thus, as explained in Barlow's, the Colonnade-Biswell exception is a single and narrow one: the exception applies to businesses that are both pervasively regulated and have a long history of regulation. Today, the Court conveniently discards the latter portion of the exception. [Footnote 3/3] Yet the very
rationale for the exception -- that the "businessman . . . in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him" -- disappears without it. It can hardly be said that a businessman consents to restrictions on his business when those restrictions are not imposed until after he has entered the business. Yet, because it does not overrule Barlow's, that is precisely what the Court says today to many stone quarry operators. [Footnote 3/4]
Because Barlow's states that the Colonnade-Biswell exception applies only when business is both pervasively regulated and has a long tradition of regulation, it follows that the exception does not apply to stone quarries, and that the Fourth Amendment requires that an inspection that is not consented to can be made only under the authority of a search warrant. [Footnote 3/5]
As I read today's opinion, Congress is left free to avoid the Fourth Amendment industry by industry even though the Court held in Barlow's that Congress could not avoid that Amendment all at once. [Footnote 3/6] Congress after today can define
In Barlow's, consent could not be found for inspections of the premises of the myriad businesses regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The Court was unmoved by the Government's claims that warrantless inspections were necessary for effective enforcement, and that warrants would impose serious burdens upon the inspection system and the courts. 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 316-320. And the Court found similarly unpersuasive the Secretary of Labor's argument that a warrant requirement for OSHA inspections would mean that, "as a practical matter, warrantless search provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm," id. at 436 U. S. 321.
Ante at 452 U. S. 600. It then says that "this" exception to the warrant requirement was reemphasized in Barlow's. Ante at 452 U. S. 600.
The Court today does not, to be sure, rid its reinterpretation of Colonnade and Biswell of all traces of implied consent. It says that under its new test, "the owner . . . cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections for specific purposes." Ante at 452 U. S. 600. But, as the Court must realize, this purported limitation is meaningless. The Court never explains how operators of stone quarries could possibly be aware that the quarries would be subject to warrantless inspections until Congress told them they would be.
Warrants are issued ex parte. If a warrant were sought after a mine operator's refusal to permit inspection, the time of execution of the warrant would not have to be made known to the operator. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 320. And when it was anticipated that consent would not be given for a search, a warrant could be issued in accordance with an administrative plan based on specific neutral criteria in advance of the planned inspection. The Court's expressed fear that the obtaining of a warrant would give advance notice to a quarry operator of a forthcoming inspection is thus groundless.
Contrary to the Court's expressed belief today, ante at 452 U. S. 604-605, a warrant would not be an empty gesture, but would assure the quarry operator of the authority for the search and advise him of its scope and objectives. A warrant protects the proprietor's privacy interests by assuring him that a neutral judicial officer has reviewed the decision to inspect and found it
Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 323. On the other hand, warrantless inspections will allow inspectors "almost unbridled discretion . . . as to when to search and whom to search," ibid., precisely the type of arbitrary government interference with privacy that, it has been held in this context, the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Camara, 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 528; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 387 U. S. 545.
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