Source: https://m.openjurist.org/339/us/563
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 10:16:44
Document Index: 703552435

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 203', '§ 203']

339 US 563 National Labor Relations Board v. Mexia Textile Mills | OpenJurist
339 U.S. 563 - National Labor Relations Board v. Mexia Textile Mills
70 S.Ct. 833
94 L.Ed. 1067
MEXIA TEXTILE MILLS, Inc. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, petitioner, v. POOL MANUFACTURING COMPANY.
Mr. A. Norman Somers, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
This is a proceeding brought by the National Labor Relations Board charging unfair labor practices of the respondent, Mexia Textile Mills, a manufacturer of cotton goods at Mexia, Texas, engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act1 and the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.2 On the Board's petition for enforcement of its cease and desist order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit referred the case back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report whether the order had been complied with by the respondent; if so, whether the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and if not, what recommendations the Board had to make. We granted certiorari upon the claim that the effect of the order of the Court of Appeals was at variance with previous decisions of this Court. 1950, 338 U.S. 909, 70 S.Ct. 348.
The pertinent facts are these. In November 1944, the Board conducted an election at the respondent's plant, in which the Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., received an overwhelming majority.3 The Board thereupon certified that Union as the exclusive representative of those production and maintenance employees who constituted the appropriate bargaining unit designated by the Board. In January 1947 the Union filed a charge with the Board complaining that respondent had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union, and was thus guilty of unfair labor practices within the meaning of §§ 8(1) and 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board issued its complaint pursuant to those charges in June 1947. Respondent, in answer, admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act, denied the charges contained in the complaint, and alleged, inter alia, that the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, though the number of employees who had withdrawn was unknown to respondent. A hearing was held before a trial examiner in August 1947. The Trial Examiner denied respondent's motions for a more definite statement of the complaint, and for an order permitting the inspection and copying of certain evidence. Respondent's counsel thereupon withdrew from the hearing and took no further part therein.
In December 1947 the Trial Examiner issued his report. He concluded that 'From the evidence, it is apparent that, although the respondent conferred with the Union on possible contract provisions, it did not bargain in good faith and had no intention of doing so.' The failure to bargain was manifest from evidence of incidents taking place from the time of the certification of the Union until a month before its complaint was filed. Unilateral wage increases and respondent's efforts to shunt the Union representatives from one company official to another in search of the final authority in wage and contract negotiations—these and other findings led the Examiner to conclude that 'an unmistakable effort to escape genuine collective bargaining' and demonstated. Further, the Examiner determined, there was no merit in the respondent's contention that the Union did not retain the membership of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Respondent, having taken no part in the hearing, did not of course introduce any evidence to support its allegation.
We think it plain from the cases that the employer's compliance with an order of the Board does not render the cause moot, depriving the Board of its opportunity to secure enforcement from an appropriate court.4 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has apparently recognized this rule both before and after the decision in the instant cases.5 A Board order imposes a continuing obligation; and the Board is entitled to have the resumption of the unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remarked, 'no more is involved than whether what the law already condemned, the court shall forbid; and the fact that its judgment adds to existing sanctions that of punishment for contempt, is not a circumstance to which a court will ordinarily lend a friendly ear.' National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors Corp., 1950, 179 F.2d 221, 222. The Act does not require the Board to play hide-and-seek with those guilty of unfair labor practices.
That the respondent doubts the Union's ability to muster a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit does not justify the denial of an enforcement decree. Explicit congressional policy stands in the way of permitting the employers to stall enforcement of the Board's orders on this ground. Under § 9(c) of the Act 'an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf' may 'assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in section 9(a) * * *.' § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii). Petitions by the employer concerning selection of bargaining representatives are limited to those 'alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section 9(a) * * *.' § 9(c)(1)(B). To authorize the employer to assert diminution in membership in the certified union in an enforcement proceeding subverts the statutory mandate to leave these matters to the Board in separate proceedings under § 9(c).6
The cases are to the contrary. National Labor Relations Board v. Condensor Corp., 3 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 67, 81; National Labor Relations Board v. Swift & Co., 8 Cir., 1942, 129 F.2d 222, 224; National Labor Relations Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 9 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 488, 493, and cases therein cited. If compliance with an order of the Board is irrelevant to the reviewing court's function after the new evidence has been adduced, we do not see that there is point in adducing evidence of that compliance. This Court has emphasized that the 'power to adduce additional evidence granted to the Circuit Court of Appeals by § 10(e) cannot be employed to enlarge the statutory scope of judicial review.' National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 1947, 330 U.S. 219, 234—235, 67 S.Ct. 756, 764, 91 L.Ed. 854. As the managers on the part of the House of Representatives for the Conference Committee reported concerning the Wagner Act, that statute contemplated that there be 'immediately available to the Board an existing court decree to serve as a basis for contempt proceedings,' in the event a renewal of the unfair practice occurs after the enforcement order. H.R.Rep.No.1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. See also H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 510, on H.R.3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., &. 55; compare H.R.Rep.No.245, on H.R.3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 43, 93. Section 10(e), which 'in effect formulates a familiar principle regarding newly discovered evidence,' National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., supra, 330 U.S. at page 234, 67 S.Ct. at page 764, 91 L.Ed. 854, does not authorize a discretion so broad that evidence irrelevant as a matter of law may be considered 'material.' Compare Griffin v. United States, 1949, 336 U.S. 704, 708, 69 S.Ct. 814, 815, with United States v. Johnson, 1946, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562.
Compliance with an order of the National Labor Relations Board is, of course, no defense to the Board's petition for judicial enforcement of its order. Therefore, a Court of Appeals would be abusing the authority conferred by § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,* if, upon such a petition for enforcement, it even temporarily withheld enforcement merely for the purpose of asking the Board to report to it whether the order had already been complied with. Even if it had, the Board is entitled to a formal decree as a safeguard against repetition of the unfair labor practice. If in the cases before us the Court of Appeals had, by seeking light from the Board on the issue of compliance, in effect ruled that compliance with an order of the Board was relevant to enforcement, it would be incumbent upon this Court, in the fair administration of law, to issue its discretionary writ of certiorari and reverse the orders of the Court of Appeals summarily.
These are general considerations, but due regard for them goes, I believe, to the very marrow of high judicial performance. Let me apply them to the cases in hand. A year ago three circuit judges of long experience deferred motions of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its orders (one of which had been outstanding for two and one-half years) by requesting the Board for 'additional evidence' which these judges deemed material. The Court made this request under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, with respect to various claims, outlined above, as they emerged in the proceedings before it. When it was confronted with the employers' applications for leave to adduce such additional evidence, the court presumably examined the cases in this Court as to the nature of its power to grant them and noted that our cases held that such applications are 'addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court.' Southport Petroleum Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 315 U.S. 100, 104, 62 S.Ct. 452, 455, 86 L.Ed. 718; National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 233, 234, 67 S.Ct. 756, 763—764, 91 L.Ed. 854. In granting the applications, the court, expressly reserving decision on the merits, merely referred the matters back to the Board for its assistance in furnishing further information and for its recommendations and requests 'in the light of such further information.' Indeed, that court has rather plaintively explained that in the two cases which are now reversed 'nothing was decided.' National Labor Relations Board v. Cooper Co., 5 Cir., 179 F.2d 241.
National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1938, 303 U.S. 261, 271, 58 S.Ct. 571, 576, 82 L.Ed. 831, 115 A.L.R. 307; Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 1938, 305 U.S. 197, 230, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126; National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 1949, 337 U.S. 217, 225, 69 S.Ct. 960, 963; National Labor Relations Board v. Draper Corp., 1 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 294, 297; National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 2 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 862, 869—870; National Labor Relations Board v. Condensor Corp., 3 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 67, 81; National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 4 Cir., 1944, 140 F.2d 51, 55; National Labor Relations Board v. Toledo Desk & Fixture Co., 6 Cir., 1946, 158 F.2d 426; National Labor Relations Board v. Bachelder, 7 Cir., 1942, 125 F.2d 387, 388; National Labor Relations Board v. Swift, & Co., 8 Cir., 1942, 129 F.2d 222, 224; National Labor Relations Board v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 9 Cir., 1938, 98 F.2d 488; Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 10 Cir., 1941, 118 F.2d 304, 307. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1938, 304 U.S. 257, 58 S.Ct. 863, 82 L.Ed. 1326.
See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 2 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 862, 869—870. See also, §§ 203.46, 203.47 of the Board's regulations under the Wagner Act, 11 Fed.Reg. 177A 605, 177A—610 (1946), and §§ 203.52 and 203.53 of the rules printed at 13 Fed.Reg. 5651, 5662 (1947); National Labor Relations Board v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 1938, 96 F.2d 197. Compare Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1944, 321 U.S. 702, 705—706, 64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020.