Source: http://narf.org/icwa/state/alaska/case/tnf.html
Timestamp: 2014-11-23 23:59:28
Document Index: 307323724

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 1903', '§ 2', '§ 103', '§ 1913', '§ 103', '§ 104', '§ 1914', '§ 1901', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1901', '§ 1902', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1903', '§ 1901', '§ 1902', '§ 1902', '§ 1901', '§ 1903', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1911', '§ 1911', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1911', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 93', '§ 65', '§ 2862', '§ 1911', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 78', '§ 78', '§ 1914', '§ 1901', '§ 8', '§ 1901', '§ 1902', '§ 1903', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1914', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1913', '§ 1913']

ICWA Guide Online | Alaska Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 781 P.2d 973)
the Matter of the ADOPTION OF T.N.F., a Minor.
S-3104, 3524.
Compton, J., filed opinion concurring in result.
Rabinowitz, J., filed opinion dissenting in part.
Child Welfare Act applied to adoption of child by the
child's Indian father and his wife, even though child's biological
mother was not Indian. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,
§§ 4(4,
9), 103, 103(a), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1903(4,
9), 1913, 1913(a).
of Indian child was not collaterally estopped from challenging adoption
of her child under Indian Child Welfare Act, although adoption
decree specifically noted that Act did not apply; mother did
not participate adversarily in adoption proceedings and was not represented
by counsel, so that issue was not fully litigated. Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, §§ 2-403,
statute of limitations applied to action challenging adoption of Indian
child under Indian Child Welfare Act on grounds that mother's
consent to adoption was invalid under Act. Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, §§ 103(d),
104, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1913(d),
1914; AS 25.23.140(b).
Child Welfare Act incorporates state statutes of limitations except in
challenges based on fraud or duress which are governed by
Act's two-year statute of limitations. Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, §§ 103(d),
one-year limitations period, rather than California's three-year period, applied to
mother's action to set aside adoption of Indian child under
Child Welfare Act; although child was born in California, adoption
decree was issued by Alaska court, adoptive child and her
family lived in Alaska, child was conceived in Alaska, and
mother consented to adoption in Alaska court. Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, § 104,
25 U.S.C.A. § 1914;
AS 25.23.070, 25.23.070(b).
Karla F. Huntington, Kentch and Huntington, Anchorage, for appellant.
Sarah J. Tugman, Tugman and Clark, Anchorage, for appellees.
Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963,
(ICWA) provides minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian
children from Indian families and allows vacation of any adoption
decree rendered in violation of its terms. We first address
the applicability of ICWA to the unique facts of this
case. Secondly, we consider the applicability of Alaska's one-year statute
of limitations to an action initiated pursuant to § 1914
of ICWA. The trial court found that the action to
vacate the adoption decree was time-barred by Alaska's one-year statute
of limitations. We
In 1986, SAF and BFF had been married for sixteen
years. SAF could not have children. SAF's sister, LJJ, a
California resident, who was married and had four children, agreed
to have BFF's child for SAF. LJJ was artificially inseminated
with BFF's sperm during a trip to Alaska, and then
returned home to California. LJJ, the biological mother, and BFF,
the biological father, have never lived together or established a
family of any sort.
The child, TNF, was born in California on September 6,
1986 and is the biological daughter of BFF and his
wife's sister, LJJ. Although SAF and LJJ are non-Indians, BFF
is 1/32 Chickasaw Indian. Thus, the child, TNF, is 1/64
Chickasaw Indian as a result of her father's heritage. Shortly
after TNF's birth, her custody was relinquished to SAF, who
had arrived for the birth. SAF and BFF (hereinafter the
F.s) remained in California for several weeks after the child's
birth and then returned to Anchorage with her.
On November 2, 1986, LJJ signed a written consent (as
did her husband) to the adoption of TNF by SAF.
The consent states that LJJ "consents to the adoption of
[TNF] by [SAF] and is aware that she has the
right to withdraw this consent as provided in A.S. 25.23.070(b),"
and that "she has read this document and fully understands
that her consent to this adoption terminates her legal rights
as the mother of [TNF] and freely and voluntarily consents
to the adoption." LJJ
made one change in the consent form.
[FN1] She was also provided a copy of the Alaska
statute concerning withdrawal of consent.
[FN2] LJJ signed her consent and it was notarized in
California, before a notary public for that state.
She crossed out and initialed a sentence that read: "3.
That [TNF] is not the member of any Indian tribe
and is not the biological child of the member of
any Indian tribe."
LJJ was provided a copy of AS 25.23.070 which provides:
of Consent. (a) A consent to adoption may not be
withdrawn after the entry of a decree of adoption. (b)
A consent to adoption may be withdrawn before the entry
of a decree of adoption, within 10 days after the
consent is given, by delivering written notice to the person
obtaining consent, or after the 10-day period, if the court
finds, after notice and opportunity to be heard is afforded
to the petitioner, the person seeking the withdrawal, and the
agency placing a child for adoption, that the withdrawal is
in the best interest of the person to be adopted
and the court orders the withdrawal.
On December 12, 1986, SAF filed a petition for the
adoption of TNF. Notices of
the adoption proceedings were sent to LJJ and the Chickasaw
Tribe. The notice noted that TNF was of Indian blood
but stated that the "adoption would not terminate or modify
in any fashion the parental rights of [BFF] ( 1/32
nd Chickasaw) as father of [TNF] ( 1/64 th Chickasaw)
and would merely terminate the parental rights of LJJ (non-Indian)."
The notice also stated that "[i]f the Indian Child Welfare
Act applies to this matter ... the following rights may
apply," and listed the pertinent rights.
In their adoption petition, the F.s contended that ICWA did
not apply to this adoption since LJJ is a non-Indian
and the child was to remain with her Indian father.
An adoption decree was entered by the Alaska Superior Court,
Judge Peter A. Michalski, in February of 1987. Judge Michalski
specifically found ICWA inapplicable because the parental rights of the
only Indian involved in the proceedings were not modified.
On April 18, 1988, LJJ filed a motion to vacate
the adoption decree. She argued that ICWA was applicable and
that her consent to the termination of her parental rights
was invalid under § 1913(a)
of ICWA since her consent was not "recorded before a
On November 17, 1988, Judge Carlson denied the petition to
vacate the decree of adoption. Judge Carlson rested his decision
on AS 25.23.140 which provides that a decree of adoption
may not be questioned on any ground one year after
its issuance. The court found that ICWA applied but that
it "enlarges the
state's statute of limitations *975
only ... if the consent was obtained by fraud or
duress." Since there were no allegations of fraud or duress,
the court found that Alaska's one-year statute of limitations barred
LJJ's petition to vacate the adoption. LJJ appeals.
Section 1913(a) of ICWA requires that any voluntary consent by
a parent or Indian custodian to the termination of their
parental rights be recorded before a judge.
[FN3] LJJ argues that the decree of adoption is void
because her consent to the adoption did not conform to
this requirement, since it was only notarized by a California
state notary and was not recorded before the Alaska judge.
Section 1913(a) provides: Where
any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster
care placement or to termination of parental rights, such
consent shall not be valid unless
executed in writing and recorded
before a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction and
accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the terms and
consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and
were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian.
The court shall also certify that either the parent or
Indian custodian fully understood the explanation in English or that
it was interpreted into a language
that the parent or Indian custodian understood. Any consent given
prior to, or within ten days after, birth of the
Indian child shall not be valid. 25
U.S.C. § 1913(a)
(Supp.1987) (emphasis added).
In response, the F.s argue inter
that 1) ICWA does not apply to this case since
an "Indian family" is not involved, and 2) the one-year
statute of limitations in AS 25.23.070 bars the § 1914
The applicability of ICWA to this case and the question
of whether § 1914
of ICWA incorporates state statutes of limitations are questions of
law to which we apply our independent judgment. Sloan
v. Jefferson,
758 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1988). We will "adopt the
rule of law that is most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason and policy." Guin
B. Applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act
Congress adopted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963, in response to concerns over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families and Indian tribes of abusive state child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes. [FN4] In order to address these concerns, ICWA establishes "minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture." [FN5]
H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1978), reprinted
1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7530, 7530-34.
25 U.S.C. § 1902
Section 1913 of ICWA provides that any "voluntary termination of
parental rights" by "any parent or Indian custodian" must be
"executed in writing and recorded before a judge ... of
competent jurisdiction." LJJ argues that § 1913
applies to TNF's adoption since she falls under ICWA's definition
of a parent and TNF falls under the Act's definition
of an Indian child. Section 1903(9) of ICWA states that
" 'parent' means any biological parent or parents of an
Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted
an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom.
It does not include the unwed father where paternity has
not been acknowledged or established." We agree that as the
biological parent of TNF, LJJ falls within the Act's protections
in § 1913(a).
Secondly, LJJ argues that TNF falls within the Act's definition
child. The Act defines an Indian child as "any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a)
a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4)
(Supp.1987). TNF's biological father, BFF, is a member of the
Chickasaw Nation. As the biological child of BFF, TNF is
also a member of the Chickasaw tribe. As a result,
TNF falls within the definition of an Indian child under
The F.s argue that the result of applying ICWA to this case would be to disrupt an Indian family, not to protect one. They urge us to follow several state court decisions holding that ICWA does not apply to the adoption of an Indian child which was never part of an Indian family. The F.s also point to language in ICWA indicating that Congress intended the act to protect Indian families. [FN6] The F.s also rely on the Congressional findings of purpose within ICWA in arguing that the Act should not be applied in this case.
The F.s also argue that LJJ is collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of the Act's application to this case
since the findings of law within the adoption decree specifically
note that the Act does not apply. Collateral estoppel applies
to issues actually litigated by the parties to the prior
judgment. Bignell
v. Wise Mechanical Contractors,
720 P.2d 490, 494-95 (Alaska 1986). "Notions of fairness require
that only those issues that have been fully litigated and
considered by the parties should be excluded from future actions."
J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, A. Miller, Civil
675 (1985). While LJJ was a party to the adoption
action, she did not participate adversarially in the proceedings. She
was not represented by counsel and the only briefing on
the Act's applicability was done by the F.s' attorneys. We
therefore conclude that the issue was not so fully litigated
as to bar LJJ from raising it in this action
to set aside the decree.
In enacting ICWA Congress found: (4)
families. 25 U.S.C. § 1901
(Supp.1987). In § 1902
Congress made the following declaration of policy: The
reflect the unique values of Indian culture. 25 U.S.C. § 1902
Several of the cases the F.s rely on [FN7]
involved belated challenges by unwed Indian fathers to the adoption
of an illegitimate Indian child.
[FN8] The Supreme Court of Indiana expanded on the holdings
of these cases in In
the Matter of the Adoption of T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d 298, 302-03 (Ind.1988). In Adoption
of T.R.M.,
an Indian mother *977
arranged to have her illegitimate child adopted by a non-Indian
couple. One year later, the Indian mother and the Tribe
brought actions to invalidate the adoption on the grounds that
it did not comply with ICWA. The court found ICWA
did not apply since the child was given up shortly
after birth and thus was never part of an Indian
family. The court noted that "except for the first five
days after birth, [T.R.M.'s] entire life of seven years to
date has been spent with her non-Indian adoptive parents in
a non-Indian culture." Id.
In the Matter of the Adoption of T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d 298, 302-03
(Ind.1988); In
the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy L.,
231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982); In
the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okl.1985) reh'g
(1987), cert.
---U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1042, 98 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1988); In
the Interest of S.A.M.,
703 S.W.2d 603, 607-09 (Mo.App.1986); Claymore
v. Serr,
405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (S.D.1987); see
Indian Child Welfare Act: Does It Cover Custody Disputes Among
Extended Family Members?,
1 Alaska L.Rev. 157, 160-68 (1984) (critique of this court's
refusal to create an "Indian family" exception to ICWA in
v. M.H.,
651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982)).
e.g., Baby Boy L,
643 P.2d at 175 (ICWA does not "dictate that an
illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an
Indian home or culture ... should be removed from its
primary cultural environment over the express objections of its non-Indian
mother"); Baby
742 P.2d 1059 (unwed father lacked standing to invoke ICWA
since he never had custody and had not acknowledged or
established paternity and where child never resided in an Indian
family and had a non-Indian mother); S.A.M.,
703 S.W.2d at 607-09 (Mo.App.1986) (ICWA did not apply since
unwed Indian father and non-Indian mother never lived as a
family); Claymore,
405 N.W.2d at 654 (ICWA inapplicable since Indian child
resided with non-Indian mother and was never part of "Indian
of T.R.M.
and the other cases recognizing an "Indian family" exception to
the plain language of ICWA have been criticized by a
[FN9] In A.B.M.
651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982), cert.
461 U.S. 914, 103 S.Ct. 1893, 77 L.Ed.2d 283 (1982),
we were urged to adopt an "Indian family" exception to
the Act's coverage. There, an Indian child was adopted by
the mother's sister and brother-in-law but the biological mother later
sought to revoke her consent to the adoption.
e.g., In re Junious M.,
144 Cal.App.3d 786, 193 Cal.Rptr. 40, 46 (1983) ("We note
that the trial court predicated its decision not to apply
the Act in part, on its determination that the minor
had developed no identification as an Indian. The language of
the Act contains no such exception to its applicability, and
we do not deem it appropriate to create one judicially.");
Re Custody of S.B.R.,
43 Wash.App. 622, 719 P.2d 154, 156 (1986) ("The Browns
assert that the Act does not apply where the child
has never been part of an Indian family relationship. Again,
the language of the Act contains no such exception, and
the Browns have presented no compelling reasons to create one.").
prospective adoptive parents argue that because the Act was intended
to remedy the agency bias that has resulted in the
removal of Indian children from their cultural settings, its application
is not required in the instant case. They contend that
R.H.'s adoption by members of her "extended family" (M.H. and
A.H.) will not deprive her of the exposure to Indian
cultural or social values the Act is designed to safeguard.
agree that the H.'s have correctly identified one of the
primary purposes of the Act, and that application in the
instant case is not required to preserve R.H.'s ties to
Indian culture or social values. Nevertheless, we cannot justify creating
a judicial exception to the Act's coverage on this basis
alone. 651 P.2d at 1173.
Similarly, we decline to create an exception to the Act's
coverage in this case. We initially note that in enacting
ICWA, Congress did not seek simply to protect the interests
of individual Indian parents. Rather, Congress sought to also protect
the interests of Indian tribes and communities, and the interests
of the Indian children themselves. See
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1609, 104 L.Ed.2d
29 (1989). Reliance on a requirement that the Indian child
be part of an Indian family for the Act to
apply would undercut the interests of Indian tribes
and Indian children themselves that Congress sought to protect through
the notice, jurisdiction and other procedural protections set out in
We have serious policy reservations concerning the creation of judicial
exceptions to the plain language of ICWA as was done
by the Indian Court in Adoption
The court in Adoption
sidestepped the Act's protections by relying on the fact that
the mother gave up the child shortly after its birth.
Such application of an "Indian family" requirement effectively deprived both
the Indian mother and her Tribe of the protections set
out in the Act. It would seem that the adoption
in T.R.M.
was exactly the type of scenario in which Congress sought
to impose federal procedural safeguards in order to protect the
rights of the Indian parents and their tribe.
Moreover, these judicially-created exceptions to the coverage of ICWA are
somewhat suspect in light of the Act's purpose of imposing
federal procedural safeguards. State courts must be particularly hesitant in
creating judicial exceptions to a federal act which was enacted
to counter state *978
courts' prejudicial treatment of Indian children and communities.
e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1606, 104 L.Ed.2d
29 (1989); In
732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)
("Congress finds the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of
Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in
Indian communities and families") (emphasis supplied); H.R.Rep. No. 95-1389, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted
1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7530, 7543, 7544.
We certainly agree with the F.s' contention that it is
very unlikely that Congress had surrogate parent arrangements in mind
when it adopted the Act. However, to utilize a judicially-created
"Indian family" exception would be to enter onto a slippery
slope which threatens to exclude the very type of cases
Congress had in mind when it adopted the Act.
Under the plain language of the statute, LJJ has standing
to challenge the adoption under ICWA because she is the
biological parent of an Indian child under § 1903(9).
C. Application of State Statutes of Limitations to Section 1914
of ICWA
Section 1914 provides that "any parent or Indian custodian from
whose custody [an Indian] child has been removed ... may
petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action
upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
the sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this
title." Section 1914 does not set forth any time limitations
for such a collateral attack. The only time limitations mentioned
in the Act are in § 1913(d).
Section 1913(d) provides that once an adoption decree is final,
the parent may withdraw an otherwise valid consent to an
adoption on the grounds that the consent was obtained through
fraud or duress if the petition to vacate the decree
is made within two years unless a longer period is
allowed under state law.
Section 1913(d) provides: After
the entry of a final decree of adoption of an
Indian child in any State court, the parent may withdraw
consent thereto upon the grounds that consent was obtained through
fraud or duress and may petition the court to vacate
such decree. Upon a finding that such consent was obtained
through fraud or duress, the court shall vacate such decree
and return the child to the parent. No adoption which
has been effective for at least two years may be
invalidated under the provisions of this subsection unless otherwise permitted
by state law. 25
U.S.C. § 1913(d)
Judge Carlson found that since ICWA was silent as to
statutes of limitations, except in the narrow situation specified in
1913(d), actions under § 1914
governed by AS 25.23.140(b).
[FN12] LJJ argues that incorporation of the one-year statute of
limitation would frustrate the legislative intent of ensuring that voluntary
consents to the termination of parental rights meet minimum federal
procedural safeguards. In particular, LJJ argues that a short state-imposed
statute of limitations would essentially prevent the challenge of many
adoptions made in violation of ICWA.
AS 25.23.140(b) provides in part: Subject
to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of
one year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree
may not be questioned by any person including the petitioner,
in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure
to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of
the parties or of the subject matter....
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "[w]hen
Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal
cause of action, the settled practice [is] to adopt a
local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson
471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d
254, 260 (1985). [FN13]
The resolution of whether § 1914
incorporates state statutes of limitations thus centers on whether the
one-year Alaska statute obstructs
or frustrates the purposes of ICWA.
also Reed v. United Trans. Union,
488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 626, 102 L.Ed.2d 665,
674 (1989); South
Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.,
476 U.S. 498, 505, 106 S.Ct. 2039, 2043, 90 L.Ed.2d
490, 498 (1986); Board
of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794-95, 64 L.Ed.2d
440, 447 (1980); Johnson
421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d
295, 302 (1975).
Similarly, under a federal preemption analysis of whether § 1914
prevents application of state law, we apply the following analysis:
looking to the "policy, intent, and context" of the federal
statute, whether the state regulation is expressly or implicitly preempted,
second, even if no declaration is found, whether the statutes
conflict to the extent that (1) it is impossible to
comply simultaneously with the dual regulation or (2) the state
regulation obstructs the execution of the purpose of the federal
regulation. Webster
v. Bechtel,
621 P.2d 890, 897 (Alaska 1980).
As to the first prong, Congress clearly did not preempt
the entire field of family law relating to Indian children.
Rather, Congress sought to impose certain
minimum federal standards to ensure that Indian families and Indian
culture were respected in child welfare decisions.
Thus, under both a preemption analysis and the Wilson
test, the resolution of this issue centers on whether § 1914
conflicts with the state statute of limitations so as to
obstruct or frustrate the purposes of ICWA.
It is clear that Congress intended state statutes of limitations
to govern the withdrawal of valid consents under the Act.
Section 1913(d) provides for one exception to the application of
state statutes of limitation by allowing collateral attacks on consents
obtained through fraud or duress for at least two years
after the final decree of adoption. The legislative history makes
clear that "[t]his right is limited to two years after
entry of the the decree unless a longer period is
provided by state law." H.R. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 23 (1978), reprinted
1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7530, 7545-46. It is therefore
clear that Congress realized that state statutes of limitations might
bar withdrawal of valid consents earlier than two years after
the decree and wished to establish an exception to those
limitations in cases of fraud or duress.
The critical issue is whether Congress intended state statutes of
limitations to apply to § 1914
actions to set aside consents which are invalid
under the terms of the Act. LJJ cites to one
commentary on the Act which argues that invalid consents under
are void as a matter of law and not subject
statutes of limitations. These commentators argue: No
specific federal statute of limitations is provided for suits brought
pursuant to section 1914. It is thus possible that in
many instances a parent's collateral attack upon the state decree
would be barred by a state statute of limitations. However,
with respect to decrees entered in violation of two particular
provisions of ICWA, there may be no time limit on
the bringing of a suit. In those child custody proceedings
in which the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to
subsection 1911(a), any state court orders or decrees would be
Similarly, since parental consent obtained in violation of the ICWA
is invalid as a matter of law, any subsequent state
court order for foster care or adoptive placement predicated on
that defective consent should likewise be void. It would seem,
therefore, that if these particular violations of the Act render
the state court orders or decrees void, such void orders
and decrees could be vacated by another court at any
time. Trentadue and DeMontigny, The
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Practitioner's Perspective,
62 N.D.L.Rev. 487, 536 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
We disagree with these commentators' analysis. We initially note they
do not cite any case law, nor have we found
[FN14] for their proposition that consents in violation of ICWA
can be set aside at any time. More importantly, however,
it would be inconsistent to allow a collateral attack
on a consent in violation of ICWA to *980
be brought at any time but only allow collateral attacks
on consents which are the product of fraud or duress
within two years of the adoption decree. Fraud and duress
are evils at least as serious as violations of the
procedural protections contained in ICWA. A consent obtained in violation
of § 1913
of ICWA should not be more questionable than a consent
obtained through fraud or duress. Since Congress clearly intended that
state statutes of limitations would apply to actions pursuant to
§ 1913(d)
it is logical to assume that state statutes of limitations
also apply to § 1914
actions. If Congress had intended to establish a minimum time
for bringing § 1914
actions, it would have mandated a statutory minimum as it
did in § 1913(d).
651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982), does not support LJJ's position
that § 1914
actions can be brought at any time. The State's motion
to vacate the decree of adoption in that case was
made within the one year period provided for in AS
25.23.140. 651 P.2d at 1171-72.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a number
of other important federal statutes have been construed to incorporate
state statutes of limitations. For example, the United States Supreme
Court has held that state statutes
of limitations apply to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.
471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942; Board
440 (1980). State statutes of limitations have been applied to
a number of other important federal causes of action. See,
e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 210 n. 29, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1389
n. 29, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) ( section 10(b) actions
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Hawaii
Carpenters' Trust v. Waiola Carpenter Shop,
627 F.Supp. 237, 243-44 (D.Hawaii 1985) (Employee Retirement Income Security
Act actions).
As a matter of policy, both the two-year federal statute
of limitations in § 1913(d)
and the one-year limitation in AS 25.23.140 recognize that at
some point adoptions must become final. To allow collateral attacks
on final adoption decrees at any time threatens to unreasonably
disrupt the upbringing of the adopted child. AS 25.23.140 is
a strong policy statement by the Alaska Legislature that an
adoption decree should not be challenged on any ground after
Section 1914 seeks to enforce important federal procedural rights contained
in ICWA. However, this interest must be balanced against the
adoptive family's interests. At some point, the adopted child's relations
with his or her adoptive parents needs protection from further
LJJ argues that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989),
precludes application of state statutes of limitations since such a
result would disrupt uniform nationwide application of ICWA. The Supreme
Court's decision in Holyfield
centered on the question of whether state law governed the
definition of "domicile" in § 1911(a)
of ICWA. This section establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal
courts for proceedings concerning an Indian child "who resides or
is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(a)
(Supp.1987). The Court first noted that the proper construction of
the term domicile as used in ICWA was a matter
of federal law, reasoning that Congress did not intend such
a critical jurisdictional term to be defined by reference to
varying state laws. The Court concluded that Mississippi law defining
domicile was inconsistent with "generally accepted doctrine in this country
and cannot be what Congress had in mind when it
used the term in the ICWA." 490 U.S. at ----,
109 S.Ct. at 1608. The Court therefore vacated the state
court adoption decree, holding that the Choctaw tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption pursuant to ICWA. 490 U.S.
at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 1610-11.
In their dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and
Kennedy expressed concern that the Court's interpretation of domicile "renders
any custody decision made by a state court suspect, susceptible
to challenge at any time as void for having been
entered in the absence of jurisdiction." [FN15]
490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. at *981
1616. LJJ argues that the Court's reasoning dictates that a
consent to adoption made in violation of § 1913(a)
is likewise subject to challenge at any time. We disagree.
In footnote 12, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. at 1616,
the dissenters noted a decision by the Utah Supreme Court,
732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986), in which some two years
after the petition for adoption was filed, the Indian tribe
intervened in the proceeding and after appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court succeeded in having the case transferred to the
Tribal court. Even
assuming that Halloway
did not involve a question of exclusive tribal jurisdiction under
ICWA, the case does not provide support for LJJ's position
actions may be brought at any time since a final
decree of adoption was never issued in the case. The
Navajo tribe therefore did not have to bring a § 1914
action to set aside the decree. Rather, the Tribe sought
to intervene in the proceedings two years after the trial
court ordered the adoptive parents to contact the Tribe and
obtain its consent before proceeding. Id.
at 963. The Tribe intervened after negotiating informally for the
child's return. Id.
at 963 n. 1. The trial court denied the Tribe's
motion to transfer the case to the Tribal court pursuant
to § 1911(b).
at 963-64. The Utah Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the Navajo Nation had exclusive jurisdiction
over the child. Id.
at 972.
We initially note that the § 1914
action in Holyfield
was brought by the Tribe within two months of the
state court's adoption decree. 490 U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct.
at 1603. As a result, the majority in Holyfield
did not reach the issue of the time limits for
such a motion since the § 1914
action was brought in a timely manner.
Mississippi law requires that an action to set aside a
final decree of adoption be brought within six months. Miss.Code
Ann. § 93-
17-15 (1987).
More importantly, however, unlike the state chancery court in Holyfield,
the superior court in the case at bar had jurisdiction
over the adoption when it issued its decree.
[FN17] We do not equate a decree made without jurisdiction
with a decree based on a consent allegedly made in
violation of a non-jurisdictional provision of ICWA.
[FN18] It is well-settled law that decrees issued by a
court without jurisdiction are void and generally may be set
aside if relief is sought within a reasonable time. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §§ 65,
69 (1982); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
and Procedure: Civil
§ 2862,
at 198-200 (1973). The same is not true of erroneous
judgments. Title
263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir.), cert.
359 U.S. 989, 79 S.Ct. 1118, 3 L.Ed.2d 978 (1959);
v. Board of Appeals,
16 Mass.App. 29, 448 N.E.2d 1293, 1295, review
389 Mass. 1104, 451 N.E.2d 1167 (1983); Wright & Miller,
at 198-200.
The exclusive tribal jurisdiction provisions in § 1911(a)
are not at issue in this case. It is not
alleged that T.N.F. has ever resided or is domiciled within
the Chickasaw Reservation.
Annotation, Validity
and Construction of Statutes Imposing Time Limitations Upon Actions to
Vacate or Set Aside an Adoption Decree or Judgment,
83 A.L.R.2d 945, 949-50 (1962) ("In the absence of fraud,
the courts have declined to accept lack of the requisite
consent to the adoption by one of the parties necessary,
or other procedural irregularities, as grounds for excluding the application
of time limitation provisions for attacks on the adoptions").
We therefore conclude that ICWA incorporates state statutes of limitations except in challenges based on fraud or duress which are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in § 1913(d). Since LJJ does not raise any allegation of fraud or duress, [FN19] we conclude that application of a state statute of limitations is appropriate to determine whether LJJ's challenge to the adoption decree is time barred.
At oral argument, counsel for LJJ specifically conceded that fraud
or duress in obtaining the consent was not an issue
D. Does the Alaska or California Statute of Limitations Apply
to this Action?
LJJ argues that if state statutes of limitations apply to § 1914 actions, the superior court erred in applying Alaska's one-year limitation rather than California's three-year limitation. Since LJJ did not raise this issue in the trial court, she poses her argument in terms of a constitutional due process violation.
A state violates federal due process if it applies its
own substantive law to a transaction with little or no
relationship to the forum state. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985).
A state "must have a 'significant contact or aggregation of
contacts'*982
to the claims ..., contacts 'creating state interests,' in order
to ensure that the choice of [state] law is not
arbitrary or unfair." Shutts,
472 U.S. at 821, 105 S.Ct. at 2979, 86 L.Ed.2d
Alaska has sufficient contacts with and interests in this adoption
to ensure that application of Alaska law was not arbitrary
or unfair to LJJ. The original decree was issued by
an Alaska court, the adoptive child and her family live
in Alaska, TNF was conceived in Alaska, LJJ consented to
the adoption in an Alaska court, the consent stated that
Alaska law governing withdrawal of consent prior to entry of
a decree applied to this adoption, and LJJ invoked the
jurisdiction of the Alaska court to set aside the decree.
[FN20]
We therefore conclude that the application of Alaska law conformed
to the dictates of due process.
In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. B-7087,
118 Ariz. 437, 577 P.2d 723, 724 (1977) ("Adoption being
a status, its creation and existence is governed by the
law of the forum creating such status. 1 Conflict of
Law, Restatement 2nd, § 78"),
118 Ariz. 428, 577 P.2d 714 (1978); In
re Adoption of J.L.H. & J.P.H.,
737 P.2d 915, 918-20 (Okl.1987); Watkins
v. Chirrick,
19 Or.App. 241, 526 P.2d 1399, 1401-02 (1974); In
re Adoption of MM,
652 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo.1982) (Wyoming law not New York
law applied since adoptive child resided in Wyoming and action
brought in Wyoming. Wyoming therefore had the "greatest interest in
the child's welfare and should properly apply its own law");
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78
In conclusion, we find that Judge Carlson correctly applied the
one-year statute of limitations contained in AS 25.23.140(b) so as
to bar LJJ's § 1914
action to vacate the adoption decree. The judgment of the
superior court is AFFIRMED.
COMPTON, J., concurs.
COMPTON, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the result the court reaches, but do
not agree with its reasoning. In my view, the Indian
Child Welfare Act (Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1983) does not apply to LJJ's action to set aside
the decree of adoption. Since LJJ cannot avail herself of
the Act's protections, we have to look no farther than
AS 25.23.140(b) to resolve the case.
Through United States Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 and other constitutional authority,
the United States reserved to Congress the power to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes, and plenary power over Indian affairs.
The Indian Child Welfare Act is grounded in this special
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes and their
members, and Federal responsibility to Indian people. The import of
the Act's congressional findings, 25 U.S.C. § 1901,
and declaration of congressional policy, 25 U.S.C. § 1902,
is a concern for Indian culture, Indian tribes, Indian tribal
members, Indian families, and Indian children. The purpose of the
Act is to protect the universe of Indian people by
protecting discrete segments of that universe. The principal malefactor is
the non-Indian and non-Indian agency, public or private.
I join with the court in rejecting the so-called "Indian
family" exception to the plain language of the Indian Child
Welfare Act. Such an exception could lead too easily to
chicanery which would defeat the very purpose of the Act.
I do not agree with the court, however, that the
non-Indian in this case, LJJ, may avail herself of the
protections of the Act to further purposes which have nothing
to do with furtherance of Indian welfare, so emphatically determined
by Congress to be in need of protection.
According to affidavits filed on behalf of SAF and BFF,
there came a point after the birth of TNF when
her biological mother, LJJ, began to regret her surrogate
parent role and resent other family members, including her parents
and her sisters, one of whom, SAF, had become the
adoptive mother of the child. Following an apparent suicide attempt,
LJJ began collecting material regarding surrogate parenthood. She sent packets
of anti-surrogacy material to her mother and another sister, including
press clippings regarding her own case and the efforts being
made by the National Coalition Against Surrogacy to assist her.
Apparently she testified in support of an anti-surrogacy bill before
a legislative body, and appeared on television programs in both
Seattle and Los Angeles, during which she espoused her anti-surrogacy
views. LJJ's mother opines that LJJ may be attempting to
obtain remuneration by creating publicity regarding her case.
It is within this context that LJJ seeks to avail
herself of the protections of the Act. Regardless of the
merits of her anti-surrogacy views, or other personal reasons she
may have for wanting to set aside the decree of
adoption, nothing LJJ has advanced furthers the cause of Indian
welfare. Although she has provided an affidavit in which she
states that it is not her present intention to obtain
custody of TNF, she is seeking significant visitation rights to
further both her desire to have the best maternal relationship
with TNF that circumstances permit and her desire that TNF
and her other other children get to know one another.
While these goals may be born of the best intentions,
I submit that the Act is not the appropriate vehicle
to achieve them. As the trial judge correctly noted, LJJ's
legal position would defeat the very purpose the Act was
enacted to serve.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey had occasion to discuss
the Act at length in Matter
of Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage,
111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J.1988). In that case,
the unwed Indian mother took her baby from her home
in a town bordering the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation to
New Jersey for adoptive placement. She and the putative father
already had one child, and allegedly she told the putative
father that he was the father of this baby. At
about the time of birth of the baby, the putative
father returned to his family home in a nearby town,
where he remained until approximately a month after birth. When
he returned and began again to live with the mother,
he learned that the baby had been placed for adoption.
He did nothing for approximately 21 months, at which time
he filed suit to set aside the adoption. The suit
was filed one day before the expiration of the relevant
statute of limitations. He never sought to establish paternity by
either a court proceeding, written acknowledgement of paternity or holding
out the baby as his own. It was on this
basis that the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the putative
father's argument, since 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9)
excludes an unwed father from the definition of "parent" under
where paternity has not been acknowledged or established. Since only
a parent or Indian custodian can invalidate an action for
termination of parental rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1914,
the putative father in this case could not prevail.
The case is of interest in several respects. First, it
rejected the "Indian family" exception, just as does this court
today. I find its reasoning persuasive. Additionally, it rejected a
related argument that since the child was never in the
putative father's custody, the child was not "removed" from the
putative father's custody and thus the putative father had no
standing under 25 U.S.C. § 1914
to challenge the adoption. Again, I find the court's reasoning
persuasive. However, it is clear throughout the opinion that the
court assumes that the "parent" referred to in the Act
is an Indian parent, not a non-Indian parent. Furthermore, as
the court develops extensively, the entire thrust of the Indian
Child Welfare Act is the protection of Indian people. The
clear implication is that the Indian Child Welfare Act should
not be applied where its application is inconsistent with that
In concluding its decision, the court observes: The
Act provides Indian
the right to challenge even a final judgment of adoption
in situations where a non-Indian would have no right to
complain; it
is only [the putative father's] unexcused delay in establishing his
right as a parent that prevents him from taking advantage
of the benefits provided by the Act. Child
of Indian Heritage,
543 A.2d at 943. (Emphasis added).
Whether LJJ is sincere in her declaration that she does
not intend to gain custody of TNF is not significant.
What is significant is the principle she seeks to establish;
a non-Indian may avail himself or herself of the protections
of the Act, even when the result would be to
stand the Act on its head.
[FN1] LJJ was not without rights and remedies, for she
had both under state law. In my view what she
does not have are rights and remedies created especially for
Indian people, when the principal she is seeking to establish
inevitably would lead to results which would defeat the purposes
The court acknowledges how unlikely it is that Congress had
a situation such as TNF's in mind when the Act
was adopted (Op. at 14) and yet it proceeds to
apply the Act. Although the "plain meaning" of the Act
speaks to the court's result, it is a general rule
of construction that "a thing which is within the letter
of the statute is not within the statute unless it
be within the intention of the makers." Hawaii
v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, 212, 23 S.Ct. 787, 788, 47 L.Ed.
1016 (1902). See
v. Hannon,
5 Cal.3d 330, 96 Cal.Rptr. 35, 486 P.2d 1235, 1238
(1971) (literal interpretation of a statute is not necessarily controlling
and will be rejected if it leads to an absurdity);
v. Multnomah County,
179 Or. 548, 173 P.2d 475, 478 (1946) (in arriving
at the legislative intention, it is proper for the court
to take into consideration the policy and purposes of the
act, and to consider, in that connection, whether or not
such policy and purposes will be attached by a literal
interpretation of the language used).
I recognize that my construction of "parent" to include only
a biological Indian parent may be open to the same
criticism that has been leveled against the "Indian family" exception
or the related "custody" exception derived from 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
However, it is clear that "parent" does not necessarily include
all biological parents, and further that it does not include
a non-Indian person who has adopted an Indian child. Taken
in context, I do not believe that a construction of
the term "parent" that excludes non-Indian biological parents is an
I agree with the court's holding that the Indian Child
Welfare Act applies to L.J.J.'s petition to vacate the adoption
decree here in question, and further agree with the court's
rejection of the "Indian family" exception to the Act's coverage.
L.J.J. has standing to challenge the adoption because she is
the biological parent of T.N.F., an Indian child. I cannot
agree with the court's holding that the one year statute
of limitations provided in AS 25.23.140(b) bars L.J.J.'s § 1914
action to vacate the adoption decree.
As the majority notes, "The critical issue is whether Congress
intended state statutes of limitations to apply to § 1914
under the terms of the Act." Maj.Op. at 979 (emphasis
in original). In my view Congress' intent is clear. State
statutes of limitations are inapplicable in circumstances where a § 1914
action is based on noncompliance with the provisions of § 1913(a).
The court shall also certify
that either the parent or Indian custodian fully understood the
explanation in English or that it was interpreted into a
language that the parent or Indian custodian understood. Any consent
given prior to, or within ten days after, birth of
the Indian child shall not be valid. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a)
Given the unambiguous text of § 1913(a),
I conclude Congress intended that any consent obtained in violation
of the strict procedural safeguards governing termination of parental rights
was to have no force or effect. It follows that
an adoption based on an invalid consent is void ab
and that a petition to vacate such a void decree
can, pursuant to § 1914,
be filed at any time.
Admittedly, the factual circumstances of this case are highly unusual
and there are significant considerations which militate against disturbing any
parent-adoptive child relationship. Nevertheless, I believe that my reading of
§§ 1913(a)
and 1914 is consonant with Congress' overall intent in enacting
the Indian Child Welfare Act and with the specific intent
reflected in the procedural safeguards provided in § 1913(a).
It is apparent that the provisions of § 1913(a)
were designed to increase the likelihood that a consent to
termination of parental rights was in fact voluntarily given. If,
but only if, ICWA's procedures are followed does the
Act achieve its purpose to establish "minimum Federal standards for
the removal of Indian children from their families." 25 U.S.C.
(Supp.1987). If, but only if, such procedures have been followed
should a parent of an Indian child need allege fraud,
duress, or other misconduct.
I cannot agree that the absence of fraud or duress
under § 1913(d)
impliedly limits the protections of § 1913(a).
delimits minimum not maximum protection; it expands not contracts the
rights of Indian parents. The majority instead construes the narrow
provision of § 1913(d)
to restrict the broad scope of ICWA and hobble its
The legislative history of ICWA discloses that Congress was aware
of the following considerations: The
decision to take Indian children from their natural homes is,
in most cases, carried out without due process of law....
cases do not go through an adjudicatory process at all,
since the voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device
widely employed by social workers to gain custody of children.
Because of the availability of waivers and because a great
number of Indian parents depend on welfare payments for survival,
they are exposed to the sometimes coercive arguments of welfare
departments. See
H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978), reprinted
1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7530, 7533.
I would hold that L.J.J.'s petition to vacate the adoption
decree is not barred by the one year statute of
limitations of AS 25.23.140(b).
In reaching this conclusion I reject appellee's harmless error and
substantial compliance arguments as lacking in merit.
781 P.2d 973