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Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation - PDF
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1 Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Microsoft Windows 8 Microsoft Windows RT Microsoft Windows Server 2012 IPsec VPN Client Security Target Document Information Version Number 1.0 Updated On January Microsoft 2013 Page 1 of 89
2 This is a preliminary document and may be changed substantially prior to final commercial release of the software described herein. The information contained in this document represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation on the issues discussed as of the date of publication. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information presented after the date of publication. This document is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Complying with all applicable copyright laws is the responsibility of the user. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs- NonCommercial License (which allows redistribution of the work). To view a copy of this license, visit or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA. Microsoft may have patents, patent applications, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property rights covering subject matter in this document. Except as expressly provided in any written license agreement from Microsoft, the furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property. The example companies, organizations, products, people and events depicted herein are fictitious. No association with any real company, organization, product, person or event is intended or should be inferred Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Active Directory, Visual Basic, Visual Studio, Windows, the Windows logo, Windows NT, and Windows Server are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. The names of actual companies and products mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners. Microsoft 2013 Page 2 of 89
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS IPSEC VPN CLIENT SECURITY TARGET...1 TABLE OF CONTENTS...3 LIST OF TABLES SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION SECURITY TARGET, TOE, AND COMMON CRITERIA (CC) IDENTIFICATION CC CONFORMANCE CLAIMS CONVENTIONS, TERMINOLOGY, ACRONYMS CONVENTIONS TERMINOLOGY ACRONYMS ST OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION TOE DESCRIPTION PRODUCT TYPES PRODUCT DESCRIPTION SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND TOE BOUNDARY LOGICAL BOUNDARIES PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES TOE SECURITY SERVICES SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION THREATS TO SECURITY ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS SECURITY OBJECTIVES TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVES SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Microsoft 2013 Page 3 of 89
4 5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SECURITY AUDIT (FAU) Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1) Selective Audit (FAU_SEL.1) CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS) Cryptographic Key Generation for Asymmetric Keys (FCS_CKM.1(ASYM)) Cryptographic Key Generation for Internet Key Exchange (FCS_CKM.1(IKE)) Cryptographic Key Zeroization (FCS_CKM_EXT.4) Cryptographic Operation for Data Encryption/Decryption (FCS_COP.1(SYM)) Cryptographic Operation for Cryptographic Signature (FCS_COP.1(SIGN)) Cryptographic Operation for Cryptographic Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH)) Cryptographic Operation for Keyed-Hash Message Authentication (FCS_COP.1(HMAC)) Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) Communications (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1) Cryptographic Operation for Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP) Full Residual Data Protection (FDP_RIP.2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA) Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1) X509 Certificates (FIA_X509_EXT.1) X.509 Certificate Storage and Management (FIA_X509_EXT.2) SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT) Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT) Extended: TSF Self-Test (FPT_TST_EXT.1) Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP) Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1) TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS CC PART 3 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS Development Guidance Documents Testing Vulnerability Assessment Lifecycle Support IPSEC CLIENT VPN PP ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES Security Audit Cryptographic Support IPsec User Data Protection Identification and Authentication Security Management TSF Protection Microsoft 2013 Page 4 of 89
5 Trusted Paths / Channels TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION (TSS) AUDIT FUNCTION Audit Collection Selective Audit Audit Log Overflow Protection SFR MAPPING: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TSS DESCRIPTION SFR MAPPING IPSEC TSS DESCRIPTION RFC Summary TSS MAPPING USER DATA PROTECTION TSS DESCRIPTION SFR MAPPING IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION TSS DESCRIPTION SFR MAPPING SECURITY MANAGEMENT TSS DESCRIPTION SFR MAPPING TSF PROTECTION TSS DESCRIPTION Windows Self-Tests Windows Code Integrity Windows Updates SFR MAPPING TRUSTED PATH / CHANNELS TSS DESCRIPTION SFR MAPPING RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE CLAIM RATIONALE FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE FOR MODIFIED FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE FOR MODIFIED ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS Microsoft 2013 Page 5 of 89
6 8.3 RATIONALE FOR THE TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION APPENDIX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS APPENDIX B: REFERENCES APPENDIX C: DETAILS ON KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES SPECIAL PUBLICATION A NIST SP A SECTIONS Sections Section 4 Key Establishment Schemes Overview Section 5 Cryptographic Elements Section 6 Key Agreement Section 7 DLC-Based Key Transport Section 8 Key Confirmation Section 9 Key Recovery Section 10 Implementation Validation Appendices A, D, and E (Informative) Appendix B: Rationale for Including Identifiers in the KDF Input Appendix C: Data Conversions (Normative) EXCEPTIONS TOE-Specific Extensions Additional Processing Alternative Implementations FIPS SECTIONS FROM FIPS APPENDIX B KEY PAIR GENERATION B.1 FFC KEY PAIR GENERATION B.2 FFC PER-MESSAGE SECRET NUMBER GENERATION B.3 IFC KEY PAIR GENERATION B.4 ECC KEY PAIR GENERATION B.5 ECC PER-MESSAGE SECRET NUMBER GENERATION EXCEPTIONS TOE-Specific Extensions Additional Processing Alternative Implementations LIST OF TABLES Table 3-1 Threats Addressed by Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies Table 3-3 Secure Usage Assumptions Microsoft 2013 Page 6 of 89
7 Table 4-1 Security Objectives for the TOE Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Table 5-1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Table 5-2 Auditable Events Table 5-3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Table 6-1 Audit Log Event Categories Table 6-2 Cryptographic Standards and Evaluation Methods Table 6-3 IPsec VPN Client Keys and Critical Security Parameters Table 8-1 Rationale for Operations Table 8-2 Requirement to Security Function Correspondence Microsoft 2013 Page 7 of 89
8 1 Introduction This section presents the following information required for a Common Criteria (CC) evaluation: Identifies the (ST) and the Target of Evaluation (TOE) Specifies the security target conventions and conformance claims Describes the organization of the security target 1.1, TOE, and Common Criteria (CC) Identification ST Title: IPsec VPN Client ST Version: version 1.0; January 23, 2014 TOE Software Identification: The IPsec client and dependent functionality from the following Windows Operating Systems (OS) that is needed to comply with the security target: Microsoft Windows 8 Edition (32-bit and 64-bit versions) Microsoft Windows 8 Pro Edition (32-bit and 64-bit versions) Microsoft Windows 8 Enterprise Edition (32-bit and 64-bit versions) Microsoft Windows RT Microsoft Windows Server 2012 Standard Edition Microsoft Windows Server 2012 Datacenter Edition The following security updates and patches must be applied to the above Windows 8 products: All critical security updates published as of February The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows RT products: All critical security updates published as of February The following security updates must be applied to the above Windows Server 2012 products: All critical security updates published as of February TOE Hardware Identification: The following real and virtualized hardware platforms and components are included in the evaluated configuration: Microsoft Surface RT Microsoft Surface Pro ASUS VivoTab RT Dell XPS 10 Dell OptiPlex 755, 3.0 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E8400, 64-bit TOE Guidance Identification: The following administrator, user, and configuration guides were evaluated as part of the TOE: Microsoft 2013 Page 8 of 89
9 Microsoft Windows 8, Microsoft Windows Server 2012, Microsoft Windows RT Common Criteria Supplemental Admin Guidance for IPsec VPN Clients (version 1.0; May 29, 2013) Evaluation Assurance: As specified in section and specific Assurance Activities defined in the protection profile associated with the security functional requirements from section CC Identification: CC for Information Technology (IT) Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September CC Conformance Claims This TOE and ST are consistent with the following specifications: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, extended (Part 2 extended) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance requirements Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, conformant (Part 3 conformant) Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 1.1, December 30, 2012 CC Part 3 assurance requirements specified in section and evaluation assurance activities specified in section Conventions, Terminology, Acronyms This section specifies the formatting information used in the security target Conventions The following conventions have been applied in this document: Security Functional Requirements (SFRs): Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement. Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Refinement: allows the addition of details. The conventions for the assignment, selection, refinement, and iteration operations are described in Section 5. Other sections of the security target use a bold font to highlight text of special interest, such as captions Terminology The following terminology is used in the security target: Term Access Definition Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or Microsoft 2013 Page 9 of 89
10 Access control Accountability Administrator Assurance Attack Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) Authentication Authentication data Authorization Authorized user Availability Compromise Confidentiality Critical cryptographic security parameters Cryptographic boundary Cryptographic key Cryptographic module modification of data. Security service that controls the use of resources 1 and the disclosure and modification of data 2. Tracing each activity in an IT system to the entity responsible for the activity. An authorized user who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or the entire TOE and thus whose actions may affect the TOE Security Policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP. A measure of confidence that the security features of an IT system are sufficient to enforce the IT system s security policy. An intentional act attempting to violate the security policy of an IT system. The Authenticated Internet Protocol is an extension to the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol. The Authenticated Internet Protocol supports a more generalized authentication exchange than IKE. This protocol also supports optimizations in key exchange and policy discoverability. 3 A security measure that verifies a claimed identity. The information used to verify a claimed identity. Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform functions and access data. An authenticated user who may, in accordance with the TOE Security Policy, perform an operation. Timely 4, reliable access to IT resources. Violation of a security policy. A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data. Security-related information appearing in plaintext or otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module. An explicitly defined contiguous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds (for hardware) or logical bounds (for software) of a cryptographic module. A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines: the transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data the transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data a digital signature computed from data the verification of a digital signature computed from data a data authentication code computed from data The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements approved security functions, including cryptographic algorithms and key generation, 1 Hardware and software 2 Stored or communicated 3 [MS-AIPS], Authenticated Internet Protocol, page 7 4 According to a defined metric Microsoft 2013 Page 10 of 89
11 Cryptographic module security policy Defense-in-depth Edition Entity General-Purpose Operating System Identity Object Operating environment Persistent storage Resource Secure State Security attributes Security-enforcing Security-supporting (ST) Subject Target of Evaluation (TOE) Threat Unauthorized individual Unauthorized user which is contained within the cryptographic boundary. A precise specification of the security rules under which a cryptographic module must operate. A security design strategy whereby layers of protection are utilized to establish an adequate security posture for an IT system. A distinct variation of a Windows OS version. Examples of editions are Windows Server 2012 [Standard] and Windows Server 2012 Datacenter. A subject, object, user or external IT device. A general-purpose operating system is designed to meet a variety of goals, including protection between users and applications, fast response time for interactive applications, high throughput for server applications, and high overall resource utilization. A means of uniquely identifying an authorized user of the TOE. An entity under the control of the TOE that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations. The total environment in which a TOE operates. It includes the physical facility and any physical, procedural, administrative and personnel controls. All types of data storage media that maintain data across system boots (e.g., hard disk, removable media). A fundamental element in an IT system (e.g., processing time, disk space, and memory) that may be used to create the abstractions of subjects and objects. Condition in which all TOE security policies are enforced. TOE Security Function (TSF) data associated with subjects, objects and users that is used for the enforcement of the TOE Security Policy (TSP). A term used to indicate that the entity (e.g., module, interface, subsystem) is related to the enforcement of the TOE security policies. A term used to indicate that the entity (e.g., module, interface, subsystem) is not security-enforcing; however, the entity s implementation must still preserve the security of the TSF. A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE. An active entity within the TOE Scope of Control (TSC) that causes operations to be performed. Subjects can come in two forms: trusted and untrusted. Trusted subjects are exempt from part or all of the TOE security policies. Untrusted subjects are bound by all TOE security policies. An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation. Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, with the potential to violate the TOE security policy. A type of threat agent in which individuals who have not been granted access to the TOE attempt to gain access to information or functions provided by the TOE. A type of threat agent in which individuals who are registered and have Microsoft 2013 Page 11 of 89
12 Version Vulnerability been explicitly granted access to the TOE may attempt to access information or functions that they are not permitted to access. A Version refers to a release level of the Windows operating system. Windows 7 and Windows 8 are different versions. A weakness that can be exploited to violate the TOE security policy Acronyms The acronyms used in this security target are specified in Appendix A: List of Abbreviations. 1.4 ST Overview and Organization The Windows 8, Windows RT and Windows Server 2012 IPsec security target contains the following additional sections: TOE Description (Section 2): Provides an overview of the TSF and boundary. Security Problem Definition (Section 3): Describes the threats, organizational security policies and assumptions that pertain to the TOE. Security Objectives (Section 4): Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and the TOE operational environment. Security Requirements (Section 5): Presents the security functional and assurance requirements met by the TOE. TOE Summary Specification (TSS) (Section 6): Describes the security functions provided by the TOE to satisfy the security requirements and objectives. Rationale for the Protection Profile Conformance Claim (Section 7): Presents the rationale concerning compliance of the ST with the IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Client Protection Profile. Rationale for Modifications to the Security Requirements (Section 8): Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and TOE Summary Specification as to their consistency, completeness and suitability. 2 TOE Description The TOE includes the Microsoft Windows 8 operating system, the Microsoft Windows RT operating system, the Microsoft Windows Server 2012 operating system, and supporting hardware. The focus of this evaluation is on the IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) client that is part of the Windows operating system. There are two mechanisms examined in this evaluation that invoke the IPsec VPN client: the Remote Access Service (RAS) VPN interface and the (raw) IPsec interface. The IPsec interface is a part of the core networking stack and can be used to create IPsec security associations over both local and remote networks. Microsoft 2013 Page 12 of 89
13 Remote Access Service (RAS) provides remote access capabilities to client applications on computers running Windows. Historically RAS was used for dial-up and point-to-point networking connections. However it can also be used to establish IPsec virtual private network sessions. The following sections expand on the networking, cryptographic, authentication, access control, and management aspects of Windows in the context of a protection profile for an IPsec VPN client. 2.1 Product Types The target of evaluation is the IPsec VPN implementation within Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server Product Description The TOE is delivered by six product variants of Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012: Windows 8 Windows 8 Pro Windows 8 Enterprise Windows RT Windows Server 2012 Standard Windows Server 2012 Datacenter Windows 8 is suited for business desktops and notebook computers. It is the workstation product and while it can be used by itself, it is designed to serve as a client within Windows domains. Windows RT is a new Windows-based operating system that is optimized for thin and light PCs that have extended battery life and are designed for mobile use. Windows RT only runs built-in apps or apps that are downloaded from the Windows Store. Windows RT computers cannot be connected to a Windows domain. Built for workloads ranging from the department to the enterprise to the cloud, Windows Server 2012 Standard delivers intelligent file and printer sharing, secure connectivity based on Internet technologies, and centralized desktop policy management. It provides the necessary scalable and reliable foundation to support mission-critical solutions for databases, enterprise resource planning software, high-volume, real-time transaction processing, server consolidation, public key infrastructure, virtualization, and additional server roles. In terms of security and IPsec client functionality, Windows 8, Windows RT, and Server 2012 all share the same security characteristics. 2.3 Security Environment and TOE Boundary The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries. Its operational environment is that of a networked environment. Microsoft 2013 Page 13 of 89
14 2.3.1 Logical Boundaries The logical boundary of the TOE includes: The IPv4 / IPv6 network stack in the kernel. The IPsec module in user-mode. The IKE and AuthIP Keying Modules service which hosts the IKE and Authenticated Internet Protocol (AuthIP) keying modules. These keying modules are used for authentication and key exchange in Internet Protocol security (IPsec). 5 The Remote Access Service device driver in the kernel, which is used primarily for ad hoc or user-defined VPN connections; known as the RAS IPsec VPN or RAS VPN. The IPsec Policy Agent service which enforces IPsec policies. The Cryptographic Services module which confirms the signatures of Windows program files. Windows Explorer which can be used to create VPN connections and check the integrity of Windows files and updates. The Certificates MMC snap-in which is used when the authorized administrator needs to add a certificate, such as a root CA or machine certificate, to their certificate store. 6 The Computer Configuration MMC snap-in which can be used to set the auditing policy for the computer. The Event Viewer MMC snap-in which is used to view entries in the audit log. The IP Security Monitor MMC snap-in which can be used to view active IPsec security associations. The IP Security Policies MMC snap-in which is used to configure IPsec policies. The Windows Registry to manually set certain properties for the RAS interface. The netsh command line application which can be used to manage IPsec settings. The auditpol command line application which can be used to set the auditing policy for the computer. The sfc command line application which can be used to check the integrity and repair Windows files. The Get-AuthenticodeSignature PowerShell Cmdlet which can be used to confirm the signatures of Windows program files. The PowerShell Cmdlets to manage IPsec: o Get-NetIPsecMainModeSA o Get-NetIPsecQuickModeSA o New-NetIPsecAuthProposal o New-NetIPsecPhase1AuthSet o New-NetIPsecMainModeCryptoProposal o New-NetIPsecMainModeCryptoSet o New-NetIPsecMainModeRule o New-NetIPsecQuickModeCryptoProposal 5 AuthIP key exchange was not examined in the Common Criteria portion of this evaluation. 6 For common deployment scenarios manually adding these certificates should not be necessary. Microsoft 2013 Page 14 of 89
15 o o o o o New-NetIPsecQuickModeCryptoSet New-NetIPsecRule Set-NetIPsecMainModeCryptoSet Set-NetIPsecQuickModeCryptoSet Set-NetFirewallSetting Physical Boundaries Physically, each TOE tablet, workstation, or server consists of an ARMv7 Thumb-2, x86 or x64 computer. The TOE executes on processors from Intel (x86 and x64), AMD (x86 and x64), Qualcomm (ARM), or NVIDIA (ARM). Refer to section 1.1 for the specific list of hardware used in the evaluation. A set of devices may be attached as part of the TOE: Display Monitors Fixed Disk Drives (including disk drives and solid state drives) Removable Disk Drives (including USB storage) Network Adaptor Keyboard Mouse Printer Audio Adaptor CD-ROM Drive Smart Card Reader Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 1.2 or 2.0 While this set of devices is larger than is needed to evaluate IPsec, it is the same set of devices as the General Purpose Operating System Protection Profile evaluation. By using the same set of devices for both evaluations, consumers can gain assurance by using both core OS capabilities and IPsec in combination. The TOE does not include any network infrastructure components. 2.4 TOE Security Services This section summarizes the security services provided by the TOE: Security Audit: Windows has the ability to collect audit data, review audit logs, protect audit logs from overflow, and restrict access to audit logs. Audit information generated by the system includes the date and time of the event, the user identity that caused the event to be generated, and other event-specific data. Authorized administrators can review audit logs and have the ability to search and sort audit records. Authorized administrators can also configure the audit system to include or exclude potentially auditable events to be audited based on a wide range of characteristics. Microsoft 2013 Page 15 of 89
16 Cryptographic Protection: Windows provides FIPS validated cryptographic functions that support encryption/decryption, cryptographic signatures, cryptographic hashing, cryptographic key agreement (which is not studied in this evaluation), and random number generation. The TOE additionally provides support for public keys, credential management and certificate validation functions and provides support for the National Security Agency s Suite B cryptographic algorithms. Windows also provides extensive auditing support of cryptographic operations, the ability to replace cryptographic functions and random number generators with alternative implementations, 7 and a key isolation service designed to limit the potential exposure of secret and private keys. In addition to using cryptography for its own security functions, Windows offers access to the cryptographic support functions for user-mode and kernel-mode programs. Public key certificates generated and used by Windows authenticate users and machines as well as protect both user and system data in transit. o IPsec: Windows implements IPsec to provide protected, authenticated, confidential, and tamper-proof networking between two peer computers. User Data Protection: In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides object and subject residual information protection. Identification & Authentication: In the context of this evaluation, Windows provides the ability to use, store, and protect X.509 certificates that are used for IPsec. Windows also has the ability to use pre-shared keys for IPsec. Security Management: Windows includes several functions to manage security policies. Policy management is controlled through a combination of access control, membership in administrator groups, and privileges. Protection of the TOE s Security Functions: Windows provides a number of features to ensure the protection of TOE security functions. Windows protects against unauthorized data disclosure and modification by using a suite of Internet standard protocols including IPsec, IKE, and ISAKMP. Windows ensures process isolation security for all processes through private virtual address spaces, execution context, and security context. The Windows data structures defining process address space, execution context, memory protection, and security context are stored in protected kernel-mode memory. Windows includes self-testing features that ensure the integrity of executable program images and its cryptographic functions. Finally, Windows provides a trusted update mechanism to update Windows binaries itself. Trusted Path for Communications: Windows uses the IPsec suite of protocols to provide a Virtual Private Network Connection (VPN) between itself, acting as a VPN client, and a VPN gateway. 7 This option is not included in the Windows Common Criteria evaluation. Microsoft 2013 Page 16 of 89
17 3 Security Problem Definition The security problem definition consists of the threats to security, organizational security policies, and usage assumptions as they relate to Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server The assumptions, threats, and policies are copied from the IPsec Client protection profile. 3.1 Threats to Security Table 3-1 presents known or presumed threats to protected resources that are addressed by Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 based on conformance to the IPsec VPN Client PP. Table 3-1 Threats Addressed by Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 Threat T.TSF_FAILURE T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS T.USER_DATA_REUSE Description Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of the TSF. A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data and TOE executable code. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data. A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the product that may compromise the security features of the TOE. Malicious remote users or external IT entities may take actions that adversely affect the security of the TOE. These actions may remain undetected and thus their effects cannot be effectively mitigated. User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the original sender. 3.2 Organizational Security Policies An organizational security policy is a set of rules or procedures imposed by an organization upon its operations to protect its sensitive data and IT assets. Table 3-2 describes organizational security policies that are addressed by Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 which are necessary for conformance to the IPsec VPN Client PP. Table 3-2 Organizational Security Policies Security Policy P.COMPATIBILITY P.CONFIGURABILITY Description The TOE must meet Request for Comments (RFC) requirements for implemented protocols to facilitate inter-operability with other network equipment using the same protocols. The TOE must provide the capability to configure security-relevant aspects of its operation Microsoft 2013 Page 17 of 89
18 3.3 Secure Usage Assumptions Table 3-3 describes the core security assumptions of the environment in which Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 is intended to be used. It includes information about the physical, personnel, procedural, and connectivity aspects of the environment. The following specific conditions are assumed to exist in an environment where the TOE is employed in order to conform to the IPsec VPN Client PP: Table 3-3 Secure Usage Assumptions Assumption A.NO_TOE_BYPASS A.PHYSICAL A.TRUSTED_ADMIN Description Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE. Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment. TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner. Microsoft 2013 Page 18 of 89
19 4 Security Objectives This section defines the security objectives of Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 and its supporting environment. Security objectives, categorized as either TOE security objectives or objectives by the supporting environment, reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats, comply with any organizational security policies identified, or address identified assumptions. All of the identified threats, organizational policies, and assumptions are addressed under one of the categories below. 4.1 TOE Security Objectives Table 4-1 describes the security objectives for Windows 8, Windows RT, and Windows Server 2012 which are needed to comply with the IPsec VPN Client PP. Table 4-1 Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objective O.AUTH_COMM O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS O.GW_AUTHENTICATION O.PROTOCOLS O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING O.SYSTEM_MONITORING O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION O.TSF_SELF_TEST O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES Source The TOE will provide a means to ensure users are not communicating with some other entity pretending to be the TOE, and that the TOE is communicating with an authorized IT entity and not some other entity pretending to be an authorized IT entity. The TOE shall provide cryptographic functions (i.e., encryption/decryption and digital signature operations) to maintain the confidentiality and allow for detection of modification of data that are transmitted outside the TOE and its host environment. The TOE will authenticate the VPN Gateway that it attempts to establish a security association with. The TOE will ensure that standardized protocols are implemented in the TOE to RFC and/or industry specifications to ensure interoperability. The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not available when the resource is reallocated. The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit data. The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow administrators to be able to configure the TOE. The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its security functionality to ensure it is operating properly. The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source. Microsoft 2013 Page 19 of 89
20 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Table 4-2 describes the security objectives for the operational environment as specified in the IPsec VPN Client PP. Table 4-2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Environment Objective OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS OE.PHYSICAL OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Description Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE. Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the operational environment. TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner. Microsoft 2013 Page 20 of 89
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