Source: http://openjurist.org/366/us/117
Timestamp: 2015-03-29 22:30:55
Document Index: 453631978

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 481', '§ 308', '§ 481', '§ 308', '§ 481', '§ 481']

366 US 117 Cohen v. M Hurley | OpenJurist
366 U.S. 117 - Cohen v. M Hurley	Home366 us 117 cohen v. m hurley
366 US 117 Cohen v. M Hurley 366 U.S. 117
81 S.Ct. 954
6 L.Ed.2d 156
Albert Martin COHEN, Petitioner,v.Denis M. HURLEY.
Argued Dec. 14 and 15, 1960.
Mr. Theodore Kiendl, New York City, for petitioner.
Mr. Denis M. Hurley, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
We are called upon to decide whether the State of New York may, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, disbar an attorney who, relying on his state privilege against self-incrimination, has refused to answer material questions of a duly authorized investigating authority relating to alleged professional misconduct.1
The issue arises in the context of the so-called Brooklyn 'ambulance chasing' Judicial Inquiry which this Court had before it in Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 79 S.Ct. 1157, 3 L.Ed.2d 1234. The origins, authority, and nature of the Inquiry have already been sufficiently described in our opinion in that case. There need only be added here that the purpose of the Inquiry, as reflected in the establishing order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department, was twofold: 'to expose all the evil practices (involved in the improper solicitation and handling of contingent-retainers in personal injury cases) with a view to enabling this court to adopt appropriate measures to eliminate them and to discipline those attorneys found to have engagedin them.' In re Cohen, 9 A.D.2d 436, 437, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993.
For some years the Second Department has had a court rule 'which requires that an attorney who makes contingent-fee agreements for his services in personal injury, wrongful death, property damage, and certain other kinds of cases, must file such agreements with the (Appellate Division) and, if he enters into five or more such agreements in any year, must give to the court in writing certain particulars as to how he came to be retained' (called 'Statements ofRetainer'). 7 N.Y.2d 488, 493, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660, 166 N.E.2d 672, 674, see Rule 3 of the Special Rules Regulating the Conduct of Attorneys and Counselors at Law in the Second Judicial Department, Clevenger's Practice Manual, p. 21—19 (1959). Principally as a result of the large number of Statements of Retainer filed by him during recent years, petitioner was called to testify and produce records before the Justice in charge of the Inquiry.2 Relying on his concededly available state privilege against self-incrimination, petitioner refused to produce the records called for and to answer some sixty other questions. The subject matter of such questions was summarized by the New York Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case (7 N.Y.2d 488, 494, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661, 166 N.E.2d 672, 674—675), as follows:
'* * * Those unanswered questions related to the identity of his law office partners, associates and employees, to his possession of the records of the cases described in his statements of retainer, to any destruction of such records, to his bank accounts, to his paying police officers or othes for referring claimants to him, to his paying insurance company employees for referring cases to him, and to his promising to pay to any 'lay person' 10% of recoveries or settlements. He was asked—and refused to answer—as to whether he had made or agreed to make such payments to any of several named persons, as to whether he had hired or paid nonlawyers to arrange settlements of his cases with insurance companies and as to whether his partner or associate Rothenberg had been indicted for and had pleaded guilty to violations of sections 270—a and 270—d of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, which forbid the solicitation of legal business or the employment by lawyers of such solicitors. * * *'
After petitioner had refused to answer these questions, counsel for the Inquiry warned him that 'serious consequences,' in the form of an exercise of the Appellate Division's disciplinary power over attorneys practicing before it,3 might flow from his refusal to respond, even though that refusal was based on a claim of privilege. As the basis for his warning counsel referred to various provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics4 and of the New York Penal Law.5 Petitioner was then given a further opportunity to respond to the unanswered questions, but he declined, preferring to rely upon his claim of privilege.
Thereafter the Justice in charge of the Inquiry recommended to the Appellate Division that petitioner be disciplined. The Appellate Division ordered respondent Hurley to file a petition for disciplinary action. The ensuing petition sought petitioner's disbarment, alleging as grounds therefor:
'The refusal of * * * Albert Martin Cohen, to produce the records (called for by the Inquiry), and his refusal to answer the questions (summarized above), are in disregard and in violation of the inherent duty and obligation of respondent as a member of the legal profession in that, among other things, such refusals are contrary to the standards of candor and frankness that are required and expected of a lawyer to the Court; such refusals are in definance of and flaunt (sic) the authority of the Court to inquire into and elicit information within respondent's knowledge relating to this conduct and practices as a lawyer; by his refusal to answer the aforesaid questions the respondent hindered and impeded the Judicial Inquiry that was ordered by this Court; by his refusals respondent withheld vital information bearing upon his conduct, character, fitness, integrity, trust and reliability as a member of the legal profession. * * *'
The Appellate Division ordered petitioner disbarred, saying (9 A.D.2d at pages 448-449, 195 N.Y.S.2d at page 1003):
'To avoid any possible doubt as to our position, we state again that the basis for any disciplinary action by this court is, not the fact that respondent has invoked his constitutional privilege against self incrimination, but rather the fact that he has deliberately refused to co-operate with the court in its efforts to expose unethical practices and in its efforts to determine incidentially whether he had committed any acts of professional misconduct which destroyed the character and fitness required of him as a condition to his retention of the privilege of remaining a member of the Bar.'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, Judge Fuld dissenting.6 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 166 N.E.2d 672. We granted certiorari because the case presented still another variant of the issues arising in the Konigsberg, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 81 S.Ct. 997, 6 L.Ed.2d 105, and Anastaplo, In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 81 S.Ct. 978, 6 L.Ed.2d 135, cases.
Starting from the undeniably correct premise that a State may not arbitrarily refuse a person permission to practice law, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, petitioner's claim that New York's disbarment of him was capricious rests essentially on two propositions: (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the State from making his refusal to answer the Inquiry's questions a per se ground for disbarment; (2) that in any event such a ground is not permissible when refusal to answer rests on a bona fide claim of a privilege against self-incrimination.
The first contention must be rejected largely in light of our today's opinions in the Konigsberg and Anastaplo cases. The fact that such refusal was here made a ground for disbarment, rather than for denial of admission to the barAs in Konigsberg and Anastaplo, is not of constitutional moment. And there is no claim here either that the unanswered questions were not material or that petitioner was not duly warned of the consequences of his refusal to answer. By the same token those cases also dispose of petitioner's basically similar contention that the State could proceed against him only by way of independent evidence of wrongdoing on his part.
We do not think it can be seriously contended that New York's judicial inquiry was so devoid of rational justification that the mere act of compelling even unprivileged testimony was a deprivation of petitioner's liberty without due process. History and policy combine to establish the presence of a substantial state interest in conducting an investigation of this kind. That interest is nothing less than the exertion of disciplinary powers which English and American courts (the former primarily through the Inns of Court) have for centuries possessed over members of the bar, incident to their broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied. Not only is the practice of such judicial investigations long-established, but the subject matter of the present investigation does not lack a rational basis. It is no less true than trite that lawyers must operate in a three-fold capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes. It is certainly not beyond the realm of permissible state concerns to conclude that too muchattention to the business of getting clients may be incompatible with a sufficient devotion to duties which a lawyer owes to the court, or that the 'payment of awards to persons bringing in legal business' is inconsistent with the personally disinterested position a lawyer should maintain.
Finally, it cannot by any stretch be considered that New York acted arbitrarily or irrationally in applying the disciplinary sanction of disbarment to the petitioner. What Mr. Justice Cardozo (then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals) said in the Karlin case, People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, is enough to put an end to that contention:
'If a barrister was suspected of misconduct, the benchers of his inn might inquire of his behavior. We can hardly doubt that refusal to answer would have been followed by expulsion. There was thus little occasion for controversies as to discipline to be brought before the judges, unless the benchers failed in the performance of their duties. In case they did fail, a supervisory power was ever in reserve. The inns * * * were subject * * * to visitation by the judges. * * * Short shrift would there have been for the barrister who refused to make answer as to his professional behavior in defiance of the visitors.' 248 N.Y. 465, at pages 472—473, 162 N.E. 487, at page 490.
If more than long-lived practice is thought necessary to justify such a sanction, it is to be found in the fact that the denial of continued access to a position that can be misused is permissible to assure that the position may not be held without observance of the obligations lawfully imposed upon it. Revocation of a license for failure to fulfill similar obligations of a licensee is the very sanction which the Federal Government has adopted in a number of situations. See 12 U.S.C. § 481, 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 312(a)(4), 12 U.S.C.A. § 481, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 308(b), 312(a)(4). scope of federal review here as being
A different constitutional conclusion does not result from the fact that petitioner's refusal was based on a good-faith assertion of his state privilege against self-incrimination. Because, from a federal standpoint, there can be no doubt that a State has great leeway in defining the reach of its own privilege against self-incrimination, we regard the scopeof federal review here as being limited to the question whether arbitrary of discriminatory state action can be found in the consequences New York has attached to the exercise of the privilege in this instance.
Basic to consideration of this aspect of petitioner's case is the fact that the State's disbarment order was predicated not upon any unfavorable inference which it drew frow petitioner's assertion of the privilege, cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 557—558, 76 S.Ct. 637, 640—641, 100 L.Ed. 692; Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421, 77 S.Ct. 963, 982, 1 L.Ed.2d 931, nor upon any purpose to penalize him for its exercise, but solely upon his refusal to discharge obligations which, as a lawyer, he owed to the court. The Court of Appeals stated:
'Of course, (petitioner) had the right to assert the privilege and to withhold the criminating answers. That right was his as it would be the right of any citizen and it was not denied to him. He could not be forced to waive his immunity * * *. But the question still remained as to whether he had broken the 'condition' on which depended the 'privilege' of membership in the Bar * * *. 'Whenever the condition is broken the privilege is lost' (citing Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84—85, 116 N.E. 782, at page 782, Cardozo, J.). Appellant as a citizen could not be denied any of the common rights of citizens. But he stood before the inquiry and before the Appellate Division in another quite different capacity, also. As a lawyer he was 'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument * * * of justice' (citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470—471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, Cardozo, J.), with the inevitable consequences that the court which was charged with control and discipline of its officers had its own right to demand his full, honest and loyal co-operation in its investigations and to strike his name from the rolls if he refused to co-operate. Such 'co-operation' is a 'phrase without reality' as Chief Judge Cardozo wrote in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, supra, 248 N.Y. at page 471, 162 N.E. at page 489, if a lawyer after refusing to answer pertinent questions about his professional conduct can retain his status and privileges as an officer of the court.' 7 N.Y.2d at page 495, 199 N.Y.S.2d at page 662, 166 N.E.2d at page 675.
We do not think that it can be seriously contended that the unavailability of the state privilege in judicial inquiries of this type amounts to a distinction from criminal prosecutions so irrational as to suggest either a denial of due process or a purposeful discrimination of the kind which violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A State may rationally conclude that the consequence of disbarment is less drastic than that of a prison term for contempt, albeit arguments to the contrary can be made as well. It may also rationally conclude that procedures resulting in greater preventive certainty are warranted when what is involved is the right to continue to occupy a position affording special opportunities, for deleterious conduct—opportunities, indeed, created by the State's original certification of the petitioner's merit. In this regard all that New York has in effect held is that petitioner, by resort to a privilege against self-incrimination, can no more claim a right not to be disbarred for his refusal to answer with respect to matters within the competence of the Court's supervisory powers over members of the bar, than could a trustee claim a right not to be removed from office for failure to render accounts which might incriminate him. Finally, where illegal or shady practices on the part of some lawyers are suspected, New York could rationally conclude that the profession itself need not be subjected to the disrespect which would result from the publicity, delay, and possible ineffectiveness in their exposure and eradication that might follow could miscreants only be dealt with through ordinary investigatory and prosecutorial processes.' If the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the noisome work.' People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 480, 162 N.E. 487, 493, (Cardozo, J.).
These bases for affording a procedure in such judicial inquiries different from that in criminal prosecutions are more than enough to make wholly untenable a contention that there has here been a denial either of due process or of equal protection.
Although what has already been said disposes of this case, we take note, in conclusion, of two further considerations. First, it is suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment gave petitioner a Federal constitutional right not to be required to incriminate himself in the state proceedings (although, apart from his claim of fundamental unfairness, the petitioner himself does not so contend, Note 1, supra). That proposition, however, was explicitly rejected by this Court, upon the fullest consideration, more than fifty years ago, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97,7 and such has been the position of the Court ever since.8 See Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674;9 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285, 56 S.Ct. 461, 464, 80 L.Ed. 682; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323—324, 58 S.Ct. 149, 150—151, 82 L.Ed. 288; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903;10 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 374, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 1304, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393. This is not to say, of course, that State have free rein either in the choice of means of forcing incriminatory testimony, or in the drawing of inferences from a refusal to testify on grounds of possible self-incrimination, no matter how objectionable or irrational. But these decisions do establish, at the very least, that to make out a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, something substantially more must be shown than that the state procedures involved have a tendency to discourage the withholding of self-incriminatory testimony.
It is, however, suggested that such additional factors are to be found in New York's assertion of a power to grant a state privilege against self-incrimination without including within its sweep protection from disbarment of a lawyer who asserts this privilege during a judicial inquiry into his professional conduct. It is said that this gives rise to a pernicious doctrine whereby lawyers 'may be separated into a special group upon which special burdens can be imposed even though such burdens are not and cannot be placed upon other groups.'
This argument wholly misconceives the issue and what the Court has held respecting it. The issue is not, of course, whether lawyers are entitled to due process of law in matters of this kind, but, rather, what process is constitutionally due them in such circumstances. We do not hold that lawyers, because of their special status in society, can therefore be deprived of constitutional rights assured to others, but only, as in all cases of this kind, that what procedures are fair, what state process is constitutionally due, what distinctions are consistent with the right to equal protection, all depend upon the particular situation presented, and that history is surely relevant to these inquiries.11 State banks may be subjected to periodic examinations that would violate the rights of some other kinds of business against unreasonable search and seizure. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 481, 12 U.S.C.A. § 481, with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746. A state contractor can be deprived of even the rudiments of a hearing on the issue of whether the state executive department is contracting in accordance with applicable state law. Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108. The 'right' to judicial review of agency determinations can be taken away from railroad employees in one situation but guaranteed to professional employees in other situations. Compare Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 64 S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed. 61, with Leedom v. kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210. A state employee need no longer be entrusted with government property if he refuses to explain what has become of property with which he is charged though his refusal may be protected against a contempt sanction by a state or federal privilege against self-incrimination. Cf. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 78 S.Ct. 1311, 2 L.Ed.2d 1423.
Clearly enough, factual distinctions are the determinative consideration upon the question of what process is due in each of these cases. Otherwise making state procedures vary solely on the basis of the given occupation would indeed be nothing less than a denial of equal protection to bankers, contractors, railroad employees, and government employees. On the basis of the factual distinctions that we have mentioned above, we consider that a State can constitutionally afford a different procedure—the present procedure—in these judicial investigation from that in criminal prosecutions.
Petitioner's disbarment is not constitutionally infirm, and the Court of Appeals' order must be affirmed.
We are once again called upon to consider the constitutionality of penalties imposed upon lawyers who refuse to testify before a secret inquiry being conducted by the State of New York into suspected unethical practices among members of the legal profession in and around New York City. In Anonymous v. Baker,1 a majority of this Court upheld the power of New York to conduct such a secret inquiry. Here, the majority upholds the disbarment of petitioner, a New York lawyer for thirty-nine years, solely because, in reliance upon an assertion of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, he refused to testify before that inquiry. The theory upon which this order of disbarment was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals—a theory which the majority here embraces—is that although lawyers, as citizens, have a constitutional right not to incriminate themselves, they also have a special duty, as lawyers, to cooperate with the courts and that this 'duty of co-operation' would become a "phrase without reality' * * * if a lawyer after refusing to answer pertinent question about his professional conduct can retain his status and privileges as an officer of the court.'2 In my judgment, however, the majority is here approving a practice that makes the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination the 'phrase without reality.'3
This almost magical obliteration of the privilege against self-incrimination represents a radical departure from the previously established practice in the State of New York. For, as pointed out in the dissent of Judge Fuld, the New York Court of Appeals had earlier condemned an attempt to introduce precisely the policy it here accepted, saying: "The constitutional privilege (not to incriminate one's self) is a fundamental right and a measure of duty; its exercise cannot be a breach of duty to the court.' It follows that * * * the present disciplinary proceeding instituted against the appellant, wherein the single offense charged is his refusal to yield a constitutional privilege, is unwarrantable.'4
In departing from its prior policy of fully protecting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by both the State and the Federal Constitutions, the New York court relied heavily on several of this Court's recent cases.5 Those cases, I regret to say, do provide some support for New York's partial nullification of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For those cases are a product of the recently emphasized constitutional philosophy under which no constitutional right is safe from being 'balanced' out of existence whenever a majority of this Court thinks that the interests of the State 'weigh more' than the particular constitutional guarantee involved.6 The product of the 'balancing' here is the conclusion that the State's interest in disbarring any lawyer suspected of 'ambulance chasing' outweighs the value of those provisions of our Bill of Rights and the New York Constitution commanding government not to make people testify against themselves. This is a very dubious conclusion, at least to one like me who believes that our Bill of Rights guarantees are essential to individual liberty and that they state their own values leaving no room for courts to 'weigh' them out of the Constitution.7 The First Amendment freedoms have already suffered a tremendous shrinkage from 'balancing,'8 and here the Fifth Amendment once again suffers from the same process.9 I agree with Mr. Justice DOUGLAS that the order here under review is in direct conflict with the mandate of the Fifth Amendment as made controlling upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.10
In a less important area, I would be content to rest my dissent upon the single ground that a State may not penalize any person for invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But, as I see this case, it involves other constitutional problems that go far beyond the privilege against self-incrimination—problems that involve dangers which, though as yet largely peculiar to the members of the legal profession, are so important that they need to be discussed. And, as I understand the majority's opinion, it disposes of those problems on a ground that, from the standpoint of the legal profession, is the most far-reaching possible—that lawyers have fewer constitutional rights than others. It thus places the stamp of approval upon a doctrine that, if permitted to grow, as doctrines have a habit of doing, can go far toward destroying the independence of the legal profession and thus toward rendering that profession largely incapable of performing the very kinds of services for the public that most justify its existence.
The unlimited reach of the doctrine being promulgated can best be shown by analysis of the issue before us as that issue was posed by the court below. In coucluding that petitioner should be disbarred for reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination, the New York Court of Appeals expressly recognized the right of every citizen, under New York law, to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. 'That right,' the court said, 'was his (petitioner's) as it would be the right of any citizen * * *.' But, the curt reasoned, petitioner was more than an ordinary citizen. '(H)e stood before the inquiry and before the Appellate Division in another quite different capacity, also.'11 The capacity referred to was petitioner's capacity as a lawyer. In that 'capacity,' the court concluded, petitioner could not properly avail himself of his rights as a citizen. Thus it is clear that the theory adopted by the court below and reaffirmed by the majority here is that lawyers may be separated into a special group upon which special burdens can be imposed even though such burdens are not and cannot be placed upon other groups. Lawyers are thus to have their legal rights determined by something less than the 'law of the land' as it is accorded to other people.
In my judgment, the theory so casually but enthusiastically adopted by the majority constitutes nothing less than a denial to lawyers of both due process and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. For I have always believed that those guarantees, taken together, mean at least as much as Daniel Webster told this Court was meant by due process of law, or the 'law of the land,' in his famous argument in the Dartmouth College case: 'By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law * * *. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society.'12 I think it is clear that the opinion of the majority in this case says unequivocally that lawyers may not avail themselves of 'the general rules which govern society.'