Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103195/musser-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 18:55:00
Document Index: 622119463

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 462', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625', '§ 1625']

Musser Vs United States - Citation 103195 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Musser Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103195CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-12-1973Case Number414 U.S. 31AppellantMusserRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....upon the sole ground that the order to report for induction was invalid for failure of the local board to reopen his classification pursuant to a request for a conscientious objector classification,
see mulloy v. united states,
398 u. s. 418
and received selective service system form 150, a special form for those seeking conscientious objector classification. musser filled out the form, indicating in response to the questions posed that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his religious training and..... Judgment:
Musser v. United States - 414 U.S. 31 (1973)
A local draft board's mere refusal to reopen a registrant's classification following a claim for conscientious objector status made after issuance of an order to report for induction and based on an assertion that the registrant's conscientious objection to war in any form had crystallized after the issuance of the order to report, cannot signify more than a recognition of lack of power to reopen, and cannot be read as a "denial" of the claim on the merits, and thus a bar to in service review, no matter what the board's apparent motivations in refusing to reopen may have been, and notwithstanding an expressed or unexpressed indication of the board's view of the claim.
. Certiorari granted; No. 72-1733, 478 F.2d 1068; and No. 72-6748, 474 F.2d 90, affirmed.
The petitioners in these cases were each convicted for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces, 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a), and each seeks review of the judgment affirming his conviction upon the sole ground that the order to report for induction was invalid for failure of the local board to reopen his classification pursuant to a request for a conscientious objector classification,
and that, pursuant to Selective Service Regulation 1625.2, 32 CFR § 1625.2, [
] his classification would therefore not be reopened. [
(1971), this Court reviewed a claim that a local Selective Service board, operating under laws and regulations substantially the same as those involved here, must reopen a registrant's classification following a claim for conscientious objector status made after issuance of an order to report for induction and based on an assertion that the registrant's conscientious objection to war in any form had "crystallized" after the issuance of the order to report. The Court reasoned that
as a reasonable timeliness rule to insure that all possible claims be presented to and reviewed by the local board prior to its determination that a given registrant is subject to induction.
402 U. S. 101
-102. The Court also concluded, however, that "those whose views are late in crystallizing" cannot
that govern claims based on views crystallizing prior to issuance of induction notices.
402 U. S. 103
. Such a full and fair opportunity, the Court found, existed in in-service Armed Services procedures for hearing and evaluating conscientious objector claims. Under such a system, the "intolerable" situation of a "no-man's land" in which post-notice claims for CO classification were not heard by the local boards because of their timeliness rules, and were not heard by the Army after induction
because of a finding that an inductee had waived his right to claim such classification, was avoided: claims crystallizing prior to issuance of an order to report must be directed to, and are to be reviewed by, local boards, while claims crystallizing thereafter are to be reviewed only by the Armed Forces after induction.
402 U. S. 104
Selective Service regulations, however, did not unambiguously create such a system, but left open the possibility that a classification be reopened after issuance of a notice to report if the local board "specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control." 32 CFR § 1625.2. Prior to
the courts of appeals had divided on the question of whether late crystallization of conscientious objector views qualified as such a change. 402 U.S. at
n. 3. In
we avoided the "theological" argument of whether, as a matter of law, a claim of late-crystallizing conscientious objection was a change over which "the registrant has no control." Rather, we held that, in view of consistent administrative interpretation by the Government that changes envisaged by Regulation 1625.2 were limited to "objectively identifiable" and "extraneous" circumstances, [
] such an interpretation of the regulation would be adopted.
402 U. S. 105
Finally, we considered in
whether "the conditions for the validity of such a rule . . . are met in practice." After reviewing Army regulations, Department of Defense Directives, and a letter from the General Counsel of the Department of the Army, we determined
that an inductee claiming late-crystallizing conscientious objector status would receive a full and fair opportunity to have his claim heard by Armed Forces personnel.
402 U. S. 106
The petitioners in these cases make overlapping arguments in attempting to avoid the
precedent. First, relying on decisions and opinions of the First and Third Circuits, [
] they contend that the refusals of the local boards to reopen their classifications could be read as a "denial" of those claims, and thus a bar to in-service review. In particular, they point to Ś 3.b(2) of Army Regulation 6320, not cited or discussed in the
opinion, which states that, in-service claims for conscientious objector treatment will not be favorably considered when "[b]ased solely on conscientious objection claimed
by the Selective Service System prior to induction." (Emphasis added.) In the language of the First Circuit,
United States v. Alioto,
469 F.2d 722, 727 (1972).
the petitioners claim, did not deal with this problem, because the board in that case had explicitly stated that it was not denying Ehlert's claim on the merits, but was refusing to reach those merits, since no showing had been made of a "
change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.'" 402 U.S. at
402 U. S. 100
. Thus, they argue, the
ambiguity of the board's refusal to reopen, taken together with current Army regulations, raises the specter of the kind of no-man's land specifically found intolerable in
The petitioners misconstrue the reasoning and effect of our holding in
In adopting the Government's interpretation of Regulation 1625.2 that a late crystallization was not a circumstance over which a registrant "had no control," the Court did not hold merely that a local board would be permitted to refuse reopening of a classification in such a situation, [
] but that it was without power to reopen under such circumstances. The mandatory language of Regulation 1625.2, that classification "shall not be reopened" unless the proviso is met, requires no less. If a local board is not empowered to reopen the classification, it follows that it is similarly without power to make any ruling on the merits of a registrant's claims, since such a ruling on the merits of a claim can be made only by a reopening, with concomitant rights in the registrant to a personal appearance and an administrative appeal of an adverse decision,
From this it follows that in no event can a mere refusal to reopen signify more than a recognition of lack of power to do so; it cannot and does not bear any significance as to the merits of a registrant's claim.
as such by the Armed Forces. [
] The simple answer to this contention is that no matter what the boards' apparent motivations in refusing to reopen the petitioners' classifications may have been, the boards were simply without power to reopen, and an expressed or unexpressed indication of the boards' views of the claims cannot be deemed a denial of those claims on the merits.
we turn finally to a consideration of whether "the conditions for the validity of such a rule . . . are met in practice." Army Regulation 6320, Ś 3.b(2),
bars in service review of a request for conscientious
objector status if such a request has been "claimed and denied by the Selective Service System prior to induction." While the critical word "denied" might arguably be applied to a board's refusal to reopen a classification, it cannot be so applied to a refusal to reopen a classification based on a claim of conscientious objection crystallizing after issuance of a notice to report, now that
has made clear that such a refusal can only be based on the board's lack of power to reopen in such a posture. We note that, in a letter written by the General Counsel for the Department of the Army with respect to the then-pending case of
United States v. Shomock
and printed in the opinion of that case, 462 F.2d 338, 345 n. 17 (CA3 1972), the General Counsel indicated that, when a refusal to reopen is not based on a decision on the merits, a registrant may raise such a claim in the Army and will be given a full and fair hearing. [
] In the event that a local board, in one way or another, manifests
It follows that the Courts of Appeals in these cases correctly ruled that the petitioners' orders to report for induction were valid. The motion of the petitioner Waldron for leave to proceed
and the petitions for certiorari are granted, and the judgments are
* Together with No. 72-6748,
As used in the Selective Service Regulations and in this opinion, the term "reopen" signifies a fresh determination by the local board of the classification to which a registrant belongs.
Regulation 1625.11, 32 CFR § 1625.11. When a case is reopened by a local board, the registrant is automatically accorded the right to a personal appearance before the local board and an administrative appeal of any adverse decision by the board, Regulation 1625.13, 32 CFR § 1625.13, even though a registrant is "reclassified" in the same classification as that in which he had formerly been put.
398 U. S. 414
-415 (1970).
As examples of the sort of nonvolitional changes that Regulation 1625.2 was intended to allow, the Government has consistently cited, and the Court in
mentioned, an injury to the registrant or death in his family making him the sole surviving son. 402 U.S. at
469 F.2d 722 (CA1 1972);
465 F.2d 480 (CA3 1972);
United States v. Shomock,
462 F.2d 338 (CA3 1972).
See also United States v. Cotton,
346 F.Supp. 691 (SDNY 1972);
United States v. Usdin,
6 S.S.L.R.3039 (EDNY 1972).
Although the language of Regulation 1625.2 is permissive in stating that a local board "may" reopen if the prerequisites are met, in
Mulloy v. United States, supra,
we held that a board must reopen a classification if a
case for a new classification has been made to the board and the timeliness requirements are met. 398 U.S. at
The petitioners in both of the present cases, relying primarily on
388 F.2d 973 (CA9 1967), contend that, by considering the merits of the claims for conscientious objector status, the boards effected a "
reopening" which was merely clothed as a denial of reopening. In
and in the subsequent case of
United States v. Aufdenspring,
439 F.2d 388 (CA9 1971), the State Director, acting under since-rescinded Regulation 1625.3, independently ordered a reopening of the registrants' cases, thus circumventing the timeliness proviso contained in Regulation 1625.2 with respect to requests for reopening by registrants. The courts in those cases held that the local boards' refusals to reopen were procedurally impermissible, since, in each case, the refusal was based on a review of the substance of the registrant's claim, and thus was, in fact, a refusal to reclassify without the procedural advantages to the registrant inherent in a reclassification,
"If the appellant had entered the Army in May, 1969, under circumstances where his local draft board
merely refused to reopen his classification because his asserted views crystallized subsequent to the receipt of his induction notice,
in the view of the Department of the Army personnel responsible for administering the conscientious objector claims of in-service members, he would have been entitled under Army policy to an in-service determination on the merits of his conscientious objector claim."
(1971), the Court decided that the Selective Service System may place special hurdles on conscientious objector claims first raised after a notice of induction has been issued. In allowing the Selective Service to set what it termed reasonable "timeliness" regulations, the Court assumed that the conscientious objector claims not considered by the local board would receive full consideration by the military after induction.
402 U. S. 107
"[I]f . . . a situation should arise in which neither the local board nor the military had made available a full opportunity to present a
conscientious objection claim for determination under established criteria, . . . a wholly different case would be presented."
arguing that, under the regulations of the Selective Service System, the local boards should consider the claim as arising from a circumstance over which
the registrant has no control, and that civilian, rather than military, adjudication of these claims should be preferred.
402 U. S. 108
. But apart from my own views on that question, the decisions affirmed in today's per curiam are highly questionable, since they appear to be that "wholly different case."
Neither petitioner in these cases received a full administrative review of the conscientious objector claims presented to his local board. But in each case, the board purported to look into the claim. In Musser's case, the board made an explicit finding that his beliefs were not "sincere" -- a finding which one judge below found to be without basis. In Waldron's case, no explicit finding on the merits was made, yet the board postponed his induction and interviewed him after the State Director recommended this course following his review of Waldron's file. Waldron's claim was not specifically denied as untimely. Thus, in each case, it would appear that either explicitly or implicitly some evaluation of the merits of the CO claim was made. But because the claims were considered late, neither petitioner was afforded the normal administrative appeal rights. [
] Such a result can be justified under
only if these claims are to receive full
consideration by the military. In challenging assurances that their claims will receive such consideration, the petitioners point to Ś 3-b(2) of Army Regulation 6320, which was not considered in
The issue, then, is whether the actions of petitioners' local boards may constitute, in the Army's view, denial of the CO claim, thus barring its consideration by the Army. On its face the regulation would surely allow this construction. Such a possibility could perhaps have been avoided if the local boards in these cases had explicitly based their actions on the claims' being untimely, as the Board in
did. But the boards here did not do this, and indeed, in Musser's case, purported rather clearly to reject the claim on the merits. These cases are thus different from the petitioner's in
With the local board's actions here, at best ambiguous, we cannot know that the Army will consider the claims.
The majority emphasizes that, in the circumstances of these cases, the local boards were without authority to reopen the classifications and consider the claims on the merits. That is, of course, now the law. But while this rule effectively forecloses registrants from the procedural rights within the Selective Service System that a reopening would afford, it cannot guarantee that the Army will afford the registrant a full hearing on his claims. That will depend upon the Army's application of its own regulations to these facts. [
Indeed; even if we assume that the Army will superficially grant petitioners' claims
consideration, we, in fact, have no way of discovering whether,
some weight will be accorded the prior proceedings of the draft boards. Yet those proceedings are deserving of no weight whatsoever, since petitioners were foreclosed from the administrative appeal ordinarily allowed.
The opinions summarily affirmed today conflict squarely, as the Solicitor General concedes, with decisions in the First, Second, and Third Circuits.
United States v. Jerrold,
480 F.2d 1293 (CA1 1973);
United States v. Cotton,
6 S.S.L.R. 3039 (EDNY 1972);
462 F.2d 338 (CA3 1972);
No. 72-1974, CA3 June 29, 1973. At a minimum, we should have set these cases for argument and full briefing.
If the board reopens the file, the registrant has the right after an adverse decision to a personal appearance before the board and appeal. Since here the files were not considered reopened, the petitioners had no such rights.
32 CFR § 1625.4
32 CFR § 1625.13.
in these cases we have no assurances from the Army that the registrants will receive a hearing. The majority refers to a letter from the Army's General Counsel lodged with the Court of Appeals in
462 F.2d 338, 345 n. 17 (CA3 1972). But this letter does no more than distinguish between claims denied by the Selective Service System on the merits and those not considered because the board did not reopen the classification; only the latter will receive a hearing in the Army. But there is no assurance that, in the confused circumstances of these cases, the Army will not consider these claims to have been denied on the merits.