Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/735/32/212191/
Timestamp: 2018-11-18 09:40:45
Document Index: 751413215

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1253', '§ 1101', '§ 1226', '§ 1362', '§ 1253', '§ 1105', '§ 1158', '§ 1101']

Basseter Augustin, Petitioner-appellant, v. Charles C. Sava, District Director of the New York Districtof the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Kevindoyle, Deputy Assistant Director for Detention Anddeportation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,respondents-appellees, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1984 › Basseter Augustin, Petitioner-appellant, v. Charles C. Sava, District Director of the New York Distr...
Basseter Augustin, Petitioner-appellant, v. Charles C. Sava, District Director of the New York Districtof the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Kevindoyle, Deputy Assistant Director for Detention Anddeportation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,respondents-appellees, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984)
Argued Feb. 23, 1984. Decided May 22, 1984
On August 25, 1981, Augustin left Haiti in a small boat. The boat sank off the Florida coast on October 26, 1981. Thirty-three passengers (including Augustin's sister) drowned. Augustin was carried by the current to the beach. He attempted to help others involved in the sinking and then began walking into town. He was arrested as he approached a Miami sidewalk with others from the boat. After his arrest and initial processing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), he was taken to Krome Detention Center near Miami where he was held for nine months pursuant to an INS detention program. Pro bono counsel Magda Montiel Davis was assigned to Augustin pursuant to a consent decree forbidding exclusion or deportation of Haitian refugees not represented by counsel. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 930 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
In an oral decision at the conclusion of the hearing on July 7, 1982, the IJ denied appellant's petition for political asylum on the ground that he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1) (1982). On January 28, 1983, the BIA affirmed. It rejected Augustin's claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and the right to present evidence. It held that denial of the continuance was justified because Ms. Davis had not shown that she could not have been prepared to proceed with Augustin's claim by the time of the exclusion hearing and that she had not shown actual prejudice.
Although aliens who petition for admission have no constitutional rights regarding their applications,12 they do have such statutory rights as Congress grants. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982), and federal regulations promulgated thereunder, afford certain procedural and substantive entitlements to excludable aliens. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), an alien who seeks entry is entitled to a hearing before an Immigration Judge on the validity of his application. At the hearing the alien has the right to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to examine and object to evidence offered against him. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 236.2(a) (1983). He has the right to counsel. 8 U.S.C. § 1362. Most pertinent to Augustin's case, the INS regulations contemplate that proceedings and documents in a foreign language will be accurately translated. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 242.12 ("Any person acting as interpreter ... shall ... translate accurately"); id. Sec. 103.2 ("A foreign document must be accompanied by an English translation .... The translator must certify ... that the translation is accurate"). These procedural protections plainly apply to hearings on applications for asylum. Although a grant of asylum is discretionary,13 the Act creates a right to petition for such relief.14 Congress clearly intended to " 'grant aliens the right to submit and the opportunity to substantiate their claim for asylum.' " Jean v. Nelson, supra note 5, 727 F.2d at 982, (quoting Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, supra, 676 F.2d at 1038).
Moreover, these elemental procedural protections may well be required not only by the pertinent statutes and regulations but also by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the absence of protected interests which originate in the Constitution itself, constitutionally protected liberty or property interests may have their source in positive rules of law creating a substantive entitlement to a particular government benefit. E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976). In such a case, limited due process rights attach. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) prohibits the Attorney General from deporting or returning an alien to a country in which his life or freedom would be jeopardized. This statute creates a substantive entitlement to relief from deportation or return to such a country. Thus, despite the unavailability of due process protections in most exclusion proceedings, see Landon v. Plasencia, supra, and whether or not due process protections apply to an application for a discretionary grant of asylum, which secures admission to this country, compare Jean v. Nelson, supra note 5 (no due process rights) with id. at 989-90 (Kravitch, J., dissenting in part) (some due process rights), it appears likely that some due process protection surrounds the determination of whether an alien has sufficiently shown that return to a particular country will jeopardize his life or freedom so as to invoke the mandatory prohibition against his return to that country. As we recently observed, an alien's "interest is not being returned [to a country where he fears persecution] may well enjoy some due process protection not available to an alien claiming only admission." Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 877 (2 Cir. 1983).
The requirements of the due process clause are flexible and dependent on the circumstances of the particular situation examined. E.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983). Without attempting precisely to map the contours of due process in the immigration area, we think that the protected right to avoid deportation or return to a country where the alien will be persecuted warrants a hearing where the likelihood of persecution can be fairly evaluated. Since Congress intended this right to be equally available to all worthy claimants without regard to language skills, we think that an applicant for relief under Sec. 1253(h) must be furnished with an accurate and complete translation of official proceedings. As a sequel to this right, translation services must be sufficient to enable the applicant to place his claim before the judge. A hearing is of no value when the alien and the judge are not understood. Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 934, 937 (6 Cir. 1930).15 The very essence of due process is a "meaningful opportunity to be heard". Hewitt, supra, 459 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To erect barriers by requiring comprehension of English would frustrate the inclusive aim of the UN Protocol and the intent of Congress.
We hold that appellant was denied procedural rights protected by statute and INS regulations and very likely by due process as well where the translation of the asylum application was nonsensical, the accuracy and scope of the hearing translation are subject to grave doubt, appellant misunderstood the nature and finality of the proceeding, and a credible claim which developed following translation was not reviewed. See Gonzales v. Zurbrick, supra (inadequate translation in deportation hearing); see also United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2 Cir. 1970) (inadequate translation in state court criminal trial). Augustin's true claim has not been given any scrutiny, either by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the State Department. We agree with the Ninth Circuit that " [i]t is particularly important that an applicant for relief under 243(h) have a reasonable opportunity to present his proofs, for the stakes are high." Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 108 (9 Cir. 1969).
The Tonton Macoutes (Volontaires de la Securite Nationale) are paramilitary forces supporting Haitian President Jean Claude Duvalier. They frequently are held responsible for illegal arrests and extrajudicial executions. As one court has stated, the Tonton Macoutes "did indeed make persons disappear. The bad persons visited by the Macoutes, however, were not criminals, but enemies of Duvalier.... [V]irtually any encounter with a member of the security forces is a political encounter." Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 497, 500 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5 Cir. 1982)
Our Court is not the first to be concerned with the ability of Creole translators in Haitian immigration proceedings. In Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1463 (11 Cir. 1983), vacated, 727 F.2d 957 (11 Cir. 1984) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit stated that " [o]verwhelming evidence established that Creole translators were so inadequate that Haitians could not understand the proceedings nor be informed of their rights." See Louis v. Meissner, supra, 530 F. Supp. at 927
An alien may challenge a final order of exclusion in a United States District Court by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982)
Although courts hesitate to intervene in this area, judicial review nevertheless is appropriate to determine "whether the statutory procedures which govern exclusions have been observed and whether [petitioner] has been accorded a fair hearing thereunder." United States ex rel. Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affirmed per curiam, 274 F.2d 667 (2 Cir. 1960)
Since Augustin effected an illegal entry in Florida before he was detained, he arguably is a member of this class. Immigration officials placed him in an exclusion proceeding, however, and counsel failed to raise this argument before the IJ or the BIA. Thus it has been waived. Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 468 (2 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979)
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) provides that an alien "may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) ]."