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Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0166-P | Casetext Search + Citator
Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc.
Full title:RICHARD NMI BELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated…
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0166-P (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2002)
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-0166-P
JORGE A. SOLIS, United States District Judge:
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' Amended Motion Agreed to by All Prior Movants, Seeking the Appointment of Plutarch, Ltd., Singlinde M. Jeffries and Mario Sonzone as Lead Plaintiffs and Approval of their Selection of Counsel (the "Motion"), filed November 20, 2001. After careful consideration of the Parties' briefing and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion, DENIES the motion to appoint co-lead counsel, and GRANTS provisionally the motion to appoint liaison counsel.
The Ascendant Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs' Amended and Agreed Upon Motion to be Appointed Lead Plaintiff and for Approval of Lead Counsel, and Opposition to the Proposed Order on November 30, 2001. Counsel for the proposed lead Plaintiffs filed a reply brief on December 17, 2001.
Before the Court is the consolidation of six securities class actions alleging violations under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Richard Bell ("Bell") originally filed this action individually and on behalf of all those who purchased common stock of Ascendant Solutions, Inc. ("Ascendant") between November 11, 1999 and January 24, 2000. Bell claims that Defendants disseminated materially false and misleading statements regarding Ascendant.
On March 30, 2001, three different plaintiffs moved the Court separately for their appointment as Lead Plaintiff. Those plaintiffs were Plutarch, Ltd., Singlinde M. Jeffries, and the ASD Plaintiffs (Mario Sonzone, Kimberly Cox, and Aaresh Jamshedi) ("Original Movants"). On November 20, 2001, prior to any Court ruling on the three pending motions, the Original Movants withdrew their motions and filed this consolidated Motion seeking their appointment as Lead Plaintiff and approval of their selection of co-lead counsel.
Plaintiffs Plutarch, Ltd., Singlinde M. Jeffries, and Mario Sonzone ("the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs") seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff in this consolidated action pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the PSLRA. The Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs also seek approval of the appointment of the law firms Abbey Gardy, LLP, Cauley Geller Bowman Coates, LLP, and Abraham Paskowitz as lead counsel, and Claxton Hill, P.L.L.C. as local counsel.
Although the Parties refer to members of the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiff as "co-Lead Plaintiffs," we agree with the Third Circuit (and the Securities and Exchange Commission) that "[t]here is one lead plaintiff under the Reform Act: an individual, an institution or a properly-constituted group." In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 223 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2001).
"The statute always speaks of the lead plaintiff in the singular, requiring that the court appoint `as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members' and stating that the presumptively `most adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons' that satisfies the statute's three threshold requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (iii) (emphasis added). The biggest consequence of this distinction is that only one `entity' is entitled to speak for the class: the lead plaintiff. In cases where a group serves as lead plaintiff, it is for the group's members to decide how the group will make decisions, but it is the group — not its constituent members — that speaks for the class. A fortiori, we use the singular `Lead Plaintiff' throughout this opinion." Id.
The PSLRA establishes the procedure governing the appointment of a Lead Plaintiff and lead counsel in private class actions arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1),(a)(3)(B). The Court considers the statutory requirements in turn.
In their Motion, the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs request that the Court appoint all three of them as Lead Plaintiff in this action and that the Court approve their selection of three different law firms as co-lead counsel. (Mot. at 1.) In response, Defendants argue that the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs fail to qualify as the "most adequate plaintiff," as required by the PSLRA, the statute that governs the appointment of Lead Plaintiff and lead counsel in class action securities lawsuits, and therefore, the Motion should be denied. Further, Defendants oppose the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs' proposed Order, which seeks entry of a motion-to-dismiss briefing schedule and imposes certain document-retention obligations, both of which Defendants find objectionable.
A. DEFENDANTS' STANDING TO OBJECT TO APPOINTMENT OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS.
In their reply brief, the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs contend that Defendants lack standing to challenge a lead-plaintiff application pursuant to the express terms of the PSLRA. (See Reply at 3-4.) Although courts are split on whether a defendant has standing to object to the lead plaintiff appointment, the majority of courts — and this court — have concluded that a defendant does not have standing to object. See Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (Buchmeyer, J.); Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., Civ. A. No. 3:96-CV-2258-T, 1997 WL 314422, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar 28, 1997) (Maloney, J.); see also In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp.2d 401, 409 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Takeda v. Turbodyne Technologies, Inc., 67 F. Supp.2d 1129, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Greebel v. FTP Software Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1996); Fischler v. AMSouth Bancorporation, NO. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1997 WL 118429, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb 6, 1997).
Courts have so held because "[t]he statute is clear that only potential plaintiffs may be heard regarding appointment of a Lead Plaintiff." Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 550 (emphasis added.) ("[I]t is clear that Defendants have no standing to oppose the appointment of Lead Plaintiff at this stage of the litigation"). Further, the PSLRA expressly directs the Court to "consider any motion made by a purported class member" to determine the most adequate plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added). And rebuttal of the presumption of the most adequate plaintiff is limited to " proof by a member of the purported plaintiff class." Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (emphasis added). Moreover, discovery regarding the issue "may be conducted by a plaintiff' only if "the plaintiff first demonstrates a reasonable basis" for finding the presumptively most adequate plaintiff inadequate. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (emphasis added); see Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 550; Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60.
Defendants suggest in their Response that the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs are required at this stage, and have failed, to establish their adequacy as a class under Rule 23's certification requirements. (Resp. at 2.) However, Congress intended that appointment of a Lead Plaintiff occur at an early stage of the litigation, before consideration of certification issues. See Gluck 976 F. Supp. at 550. "Requiring evidentiary proof of the Rule 23 requirements at the Lead Plaintiff appointment stage (absent a showing of a reasonable basis by another plaintiff) would vitiate Congress' intent to provide for a speedy Lead Plaintiff determination, to pass the reins of the litigation to large investors at an early stage, and to eliminate unnecessary expenses in securities litigation." Id.
Congress intended that the lead plaintiff be determined at an early stage of the litigation. Though neither the text of the PSLRA nor its legislative history explicitly describe the relationship between motions for lead plaintiff and motions for class certification, it seems clear that Congress recognized that these motions involved distinct inquiries. [ 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)] refers throughout its text to `purported class members.' Congress implicitly understood, therefore, that lead plaintiff motions would be decided prior to consideration of certification issues.
Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60-61 (D. Mass. 1996)
Therefore, Defendants have no standing to oppose the appointment of Lead Plaintiff at this stage of the litigation. However, the Court's finding is without prejudice to later typicality or adequacy challenges at the class certification stage of this litigation.
B. APPOINTMENT OF LEAD PLAINTIFF — THE PRESUMPTIVELY MOST ADEQUATE PLAINTIFF.
Where a court has pending before it one or more class actions arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the PSLRA directs that a Lead Plaintiff be selected early in the case, and that the Lead Plaintiff is to select and retain lead counsel, subject to court approval. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). One of the main goals of the PSLRA is "to have the plaintiff class, represented by a member with a substantial financial interest in the recovery as incentive, monitor the litigation to prevent its being lawyer-driven." See In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp.2d 401, 411-12 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
The PSLRA provides that the Court shall consider all timely-filed motions made by purported class members seeking to be appointed Lead Plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(1). The Court shall appoint as Lead Plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court considers most capable of adequately representing the interests of the class members. Id. This Lead Plaintiff is termed the "most adequate plaintiff." Id.
In making its determination of the Lead Plaintiff, the court is directed to adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the person or group of persons that filed a motion, that "has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class," and that "otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). This presumption may be rebutted only by proof by another member of the purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff "will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" or "is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class." Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
1. Filing of Motion for Appointment of Lead Plaintiff.
The first factor the Court must consider in determining whether the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs are entitled to the presumption of Lead Plaintiff status is whether the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs filed the complaint or a motion for their appointment as Lead Plaintiff.See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa). In this case, the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs have moved — and are the only plaintiffs who have moved — for Lead Plaintiff status.
2. Largest Financial Interest and Aggregation of Plaintiffs.
The second criterion to gain the presumption is to have, in the determination of the Court, the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb). According to the briefing filed by the Original Movants, Plutarch's losses are calculated at $443,049.14 (Plutarch Mot. at 5), Jeffries' losses are calculated at $299,159.06 (Jeffries Mot. at Ex. 1), and Sonzone's losses are calculated at $89,331 (ASD Mot. at 1-2) — for a total of $831,539.20. The Court agrees with those courts that have found that when there are no other parties seeking to be appointed Lead Plaintiff, the moving parties have the largest financial interest. See Holley v. Kitty Hawk, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 275, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (Solis, J.) (quoting Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 64; Squyres v. Union Texas Petroleum Holdings, Inc., NO. CV 98-6085-LGBAIJX, 1998 WL 1144586, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 02, 1998). Thus, the largest financial interest requirement is met by the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs regardless of whether another aggregated group might hold a greater financial interest in the outcome of the case.
At this juncture, the Court must decide whether aggregating the plaintiffs into one Lead Plaintiff is appropriate. Courts are divided over whether multiple plaintiffs may be aggregated to satisfy the "largest financial interest" requirement. See Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp.2d 1061, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Though the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs need not all aggregate to satisfy the largest financial interest requirement in the absence of opposition from competing potential lead plaintiffs, many Courts are remain skeptical of appointing multiple plaintiffs as the Lead Plaintiff. See generally Burke v. Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp.2d 1280, 1322-1338 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (discussing at length whether to aggregate plaintiffs into one lead plaintiff group); Glen DeValerio et al., Appointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SE82 ALI-ABA 417, 421-34 (2000).
Yet, "[t]he majority of courts addressing this issue have permitted the aggregation of claims," because multiple plaintiffs are permitted by the PSLRA. See Yousefi, 70 F. Supp.2d at 1070 (listing a selection of courts); Kevin P. Roddy, Five Years of Practice and Procedure under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5G022 ALI-ABA 47, 63-67 (2001) (citing cases approving and rejecting aggregation of plaintiffs). Aggregation has been permitted even where the plaintiffs are wholly unrelated to each other outside of the class action, as long as no party or class member opposes the motion. See Yousefi, 70 F. Supp.2d at 1067. Often courts have denied applications for one hundred or more plaintiffs to be aggregated but permitted groups of six or less to serve together. See id; see, e.g., In re Advanced Tissue Sciences Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 352 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (denying appointment to group of 250 unrelated investors); Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 408-09 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting a group of 300 but accepting a group of six).
The Court sees no textual statutory obstacle to considering the three plaintiffs' financial interests together. Nevertheless, the Court will consider whether grouping the three plaintiffs offers advantages that outweigh the disservice to the PSLRA's interest in creating a small number of lead plaintiffs to counterbalance the influence of lawyers. The Court favors the "rule of reason" employed on a case-by-case inquiry to decide whether a certain group is appropriately compact. See Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 409 (employing rule-of-reason standard in considering a group of six, and ordering the submission of a twenty-person group representing both large institutional and small investors); see also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that diversity among plaintiffs helps ensure that all class members' interests are represented); but see Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp.2d at 1326-38 (disfavoring a diversity rationale for large groups and favoring a strict inquiry to find the minimum number of plaintiffs necessary).
Applying the rule of reason in this particular case, the Court finds that aggregation of all three plaintiffs into one Lead Plaintiff is appropriate. In this case, the selection of three plaintiffs does not unreasonably disrupt the Lead Plaintiff's ability to control the lawyers while keeping its decisionmaking from becoming unwieldy. Although this is not a case involving complicated facts, massive sums of money, or allegations of wrongdoing spread out over several years, the two plaintiffs with the largest financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Plutarch and Jeffries) appear to be foreign citizens. Therefore, because it may be inconvenient for Plutarch and Jeffries to appear for hearings, to meet in person with counsel, and to meet in person for settlement discussions, the Court believes it is sensible and useful to include Sonzone, a United States resident, as one of the plaintiffs included as Lead Plaintiff. Moreover, the inclusion of one foreign corporation (Plutarch), one foreign individual (Jeffries) and one United States resident (Sonzone), helps create balance among the demographics of the lead plaintiff group members, and improves diversity of experience. Thus, the Court finds that the appointment of all three plaintiffs as Lead Plaintiff would not frustrate the purpose of the PSLRA.
Plutarch is a foreign corporation based in Israel (Plutarch Mot. Ex. C) and Jeffries is an individual who resides in Germany (Jeffries Mot. Ex. A).
3. Rule 23 Requirements.
Under Rule 23, only typicality and adequacy are directly relevant to the choice of the Lead Plaintiff in securities fraud cases. See In re Waste Management, Inc., 128 F. Supp.2d at 411. Although the inquiry at this stage of the litigation in determining the Lead Plaintiff is not as searching as the one triggered by a subsequent motion for class certification, the proposed Lead Plaintiff must make at least a preliminary showing that it has claims that are typical of those of the putative class and the capacity to provide adequate representation for those class members. See id.
Judging from the nature of the claims presented to the Court, proof of the injury and losses resulting from Defendants' alleged misrepresentations would prove the claims of and other claimants alike.See Cellstar, 976 F. Supp. at 546. The Court is aware of no differences among the class members that would substantially alter the proof required for one member's claims versus another's. Thus, for the purpose of appointing a Lead Plaintiff, the claims of the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs are typical of those of the purported class members. See id. Additionally, the Lead Plaintiff must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Each of the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs have a substantial sum at stake and they have no apparent potential conflicts between themselves and the class members; further, they have chosen competent counsel. See Cellstar, 976 F. Supp. at 546; Modell v. Eliot Savs. Bank, 139 F.R.D. 17, 23 (D. Mass. 1991) (requiring lack of conflict between class representatives and class, as well as qualified and experienced counsel who will vigorously conduct the litigation). Thus, for the purpose of appointing a Lead Plaintiff, the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs are an adequate representative of the class.
Since there is no rebuttal from other class members, Plutarch, Ltd., Singlinde M. Jeffries, and Mario Sonzone are provisionally approved as Lead Plaintiff, subject to any later challenges at the class certification stage of this litigation.
C. APPOINTMENT OF LEAD COUNSEL.
The Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs seek to appoint three law firms as co-lead counsel: Abbey Gardy, LLP, Cauley Geller Bowman Coates, LLP, and Abraham Paskowitz. They also seek appointment of Claxton Hill, P.L.L.C. as liaison counsel. Because one of the central purposes of the PSLRA is to enable plaintiffs to control counsel, the PSLRA provides that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v); see S. Rep. No. 104-98 at 11 (1995). The Court should not disturb the Lead Plaintiff's choice of counsel unless it is necessary to "protect the interests of the [plaintiff] class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa).
The Court is skeptical of the need to appoint three law firms as lead counsel in this case. The losses suffered by the Proposed Ascendant Lead Plaintiffs totals $831,539.20 and the company's total losses as described in the Complaint is less than $2 million, which is no small sum, but would not in itself compel the Court to find that three law firms need to manage the case. (See Compl. ¶¶ 33, 36.) Nor does the Court see why this action is particularly complex or beyond the capabilities of each of the proposed lead firms individually. See In re Orbital Sciences Corp. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 237, 240 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("the purpose of the statute favors the choice of one law firm to act in this capacity absent a specific reason to use multiple firms"); In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 180 (D.N.J. 1999) (rejecting proposal that court appoint several co-lead counsel, executive committee, and liaison counsel). Thus, in this case, the Court finds that the PSLRA and the class would be better served by the appointment of one law firm to manage this case. Due to the manageable size of this case, the Court believes that it is in the class's best interest to have one law firm controlling and coordinating the litigation and with whom the Lead Plaintiff has their primary attorney-client relationship.
Because Congress has evinced a preference for Lead Plaintiff's selection of its choice of counsel, the Court hereby instructs Lead Plaintiff to select and present to the Court within thirty (30) days of entry of this order, the name and qualifications of one law firm to serve as lead counsel in this lawsuit. Lead Plaintiff may select one of the three firms already proposed ( i.e. Abbey Gardy, LLP, Cauley Geller Bowman Coates, LLP, and Abraham Paskowitz) or may select an entirely different firm. The Court will then review Lead Plaintiff's selection and will approve the selection in accordance with the PSLRA. If Lead Plaintiff is unable to select or agree on a single law firm to serve as lead counsel within the prescribed time period, the Court will sua sponte appoint lead counsel.
Should Lead Plaintiff select one of the three law firms already proposed or should Lead Plaintiff select a firm that is based outside of the Northern District of Texas (and does not have a local office capable of handling the work), the Court hereby appoints Claxton Hill, P.L.L.C., local counsel in this case. The Court expects that the firm will advise lead counsel on local procedural matters, create and maintain a master list of all parties and their respective counsel, distribute communications between the Court and counsel, apprise counsel of developments and scheduling matters in the case, and generally assist in the coordination of the case. On these conditions, the Court approves the appointment of Claxton Hill as liaison counsel temporarily with the further proviso that Claxton Hill's role be limited to the procedural advice and services specified above. Compensation will be awarded according to only those duties listed above, strictly construed. The Court will not permit both Claxton Hill and the lead counsel to be compensated for any duplication of services among the law firms. The appointment is provisional, dependent upon the permanent appointment of a Lead Plaintiff at the class certification stage.
The other firms listed on the Motion that have not sought appointment to any role in this action will have no lead plaintiff counsel role or liaison counsel role in this case. However, lead counsel, once approved, is permitted to distribute non-duplicative work assignments to non-lead counsel to facilitate the orderly and efficient prosecution of the case and to spread the risk of the litigation.
D. DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED ORDER.
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed motion-to-dismiss briefing schedule and document retention plan as unnecessary. The Court agrees. Because the Court has not yet approved Lead Plaintiff's selection of lead counsel, it is premature to establish a scheduling order and briefing schedule concerning an amended and consolidated complaint and motions to dismiss same. The Court is willing to revisit this issue at the appropriate time.