Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190107_0000127.SIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-01 20:08:35
Document Index: 126516882

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 1382', '§ 1382', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art 404', 'art, 309']

FindACase™ | Dianna H. v. Berryhill
Dianna H. v. Berryhill
DIANNA H., Plaintiff,
This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) for a Report and Recommendation as to its appropriate disposition. (Docket No.8). Plaintiff Dianna H.[1] seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's final decision deeming her ineligible for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The matter is fully briefed. (Docket No. 15, Docket No. 21, Docket No. 24). It is recommended that the District Judge REMAND the decision of the Deputy Commissioner of the Social Security Administration finding that Plaintiff Dianna H. is not disabled, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration, consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff, Diana H., protectively filed her applications for Title II and Title XVI on November 12, 2014, and November 25, 2014, for disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February 23, 2012. (Docket No. 6-6 at ECF pp. 223-229; 230-236). Her claims were initially denied on February 2, 2015 (Docket No. 6-4 at ECF p. 118-126; 127-135), and upon reconsideration on May 7, 2015. (Docket No. 6-4 at ECF pp. 138-144; 145-151). Administrative Law Judge Belinda Brown (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on February 8, 2017, at which Dianna H., represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”), Stephanie R. Archer, appeared and testified. (Docket No. 6-2 at ECF pp. 45-68). On February 27, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Docket No. 6-2 at ECF pp. 13-28) The Appeals Council denied review on November 14, 2017. (Docket No. 6-2 at ECF pp. 1-7). On January 18, 2018, Dianna H. timely filed this civil action, asking the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Deputy Commissioner denying her benefits.
To prove disability, a claimant must show she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Plaintiff is disabled if her impairments are of such severity that she is not able to perform the work she previously engaged in and, if based on her age, education, and work experience, she cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has implemented these statutory standards by, in part, prescribing a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Step one asks if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if she is, then she is not disabled. Step two asks whether the claimant's impairments, singly or in combination, are severe. If they are not, then she is not disabled. A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). The third step is an analysis of whether the claimant's impairments, either singly or in combination, meet or medically equal the criteria of any of the conditions in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”). The Listing of Impairments includes medical conditions defined by criteria that the SSA has pre-determined are disabling, so that if a claimant meets all of the criteria for a listed impairment or presents medical findings equal in severity to the criteria for the most similar listed impairment, then the claimant is presumptively disabled and qualifies for benefits. Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002).