Source: http://wyolawlibrary.blogspot.com/2006/12/
Timestamp: 2018-07-21 19:22:57
Document Index: 611028283

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1332', '§ 1', '§ 33', '§ 24', '§ 78', '§ 34', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 286']

Kathy & Meg are both out of the library. When they return, they will write up summaries for these cases. In the meantime, the cases have been loaded and you may view them in full text through the Law Library cases database (http://wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/).
Link: http://tinyurl.com/y5l2lz
Decision issued: December 28, 2006
Case Name: JAMES URIAH RAMSDELL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING
Citation: 2006 WY 159
Representing Appellant (Petitioner/Plaintiff/Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Public Defender.
Representing Appellee (Respondents/Defendant/Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Ramsdell presents the following issues:
Did the trial court err in not dismissing the probation revocation, with prejudice, due to lack of timely hearing?
Did the trial court err in revoking probation, when presented with uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Ramsdell was unable to pay?
The State presents an additional issue:
Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred by dismissing the August 17, 2004, probation revocation petition without prejudice?
Link: http://tinyurl.com/y72gaw
Case Name: CHRISTOPHER RADER V. SUGARLAND ENTERPRISES, INC., a Wyoming corporation, d/b/a Holiday Inn
Citation: 2006 WY 160
Representing Appellant (Petitioner/Plaintiff/Defendant): J. Douglas McCalla and Tyson E. Logan of The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Logan.
Representing Appellee (Respondents/Defendant/Plaintiff): Timothy W. Miller of Casper, Wyoming.
The parties agree that the controlling issue on appeal is whether Sugarland owed a legal duty to Rader under the specific factual circumstances of this case.
Judge Brooks delivered the opinion for the court.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/yys5an
Case Name: DOUGLAS MORRISON, CHARLES W. SMITH, and RONALD HANSEN, in their representative capacities as Trustees of the Newell B. Sargent 1990 Living Trust V. FORREST L. CLAY and F. KELLY CLAY
Citation: 2006 WY 161
Docket Number: 05-281, 06-21
Representing Appellant (Petitioner/Plaintiff/Defendant): Judith Studer and Rick L. Koehmstedt, of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee (Respondents/Defendant/Plaintiff): Patrick Murphy, of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.
The Trust identifies the following issues for review:
1. Should an unsigned arbitration award that violated Wyoming Statutes and the parties’ agreement be vacated?
2. Do clear violations of the code of ethics governing the arbitration [constitute] “undue means” and/or “misconduct” that requires the arbitration award be vacated?
B. Did the court abuse its discretion in not allowing Professor Burman to opine the arbitrator’s failure to make the necessary disclosures as a violation of the code of ethics?
4. Did the court improperly award attorneys’ fees?
A. Did the limited provision in the settlement agreement that allowed for recovery of attorneys’ fees apply?
B. Did defendants’ failure to identify and segregate attorneys’ fees and costs prohibit an award of fees?
1. Is this appeal moot because appellants failed to challenge the district court’s determination that they had contractually waived their right to appeal the arbitration award?
2. If this appeal is not moot, does appellants’ waiver of any right to appeal the arbitration award nonetheless require summary affirmation of the district court’s order?
Link: http://tinyurl.com/y7wj9w
Case Name: SUSAN KAYE CRACKENBERGER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING
Citation: 2006 WY 162
Representing Appellant (Petitioner/Plaintiff/Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Defender Aid Program Director; Suzannah B. Gambell, Student Intern; and Skip S. Reynolds, Student Intern. Argument by Mr. Reynolds.
Representing Appellee (Respondents/Defendant/Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Matthew D. Obrecht, Student Intern; and Mackenzie Williams, Student Intern.
Argument by Mr. Williams.
Whether the district court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence because the information provided by named informants was unreliable, had no basis of knowledge, or was stale.
Have you heard about the Web 2.0? Do you know what a wiki is? How about a mashup? Meg and I have already been throwing the term "RSS" at you, but there's always the chance (slight though it is, due to our phenomenal instruction skills) that it's still confusing.
Do you need to care about these terms? How do they help you? Well, I wouldn't go so far as to say that there's quick money to be made by knowing or even implementing or using these technologies. However, I would suggest that at least having an idea of what they are can be immensely helpful in several ways, professional and personal.
An article by Per Casey and Andrew Smith of Law.com's Legal Technology News, "How Web 2.0 Could Light Up Your Law Firm", provides short explanations of what some popular Web 2.0 technologies. Admittedly, it's kind of techie (especially AJAX--yikes!), but there is some general description for RSS, wikis, and folksonomies.
Speaking of folksonomies, Google has just released a beta (see the above article for the definition of "perpetual beta") version of Blogger, the online software we use to host this blog. We are now able to add labels/tags to each post that you will then be able to use search our blog postings more easily. For example, you will be able to search for summaries of cases about "negligence per se". Or, if you vaguely remember a post about Microsoft Word, you can use the label "microsoft" to find all the posts fitting that label.
I love being able to play with this stuff!
Labels: how-to, label/tag, RSS, technology
Summary of Decision issued December 19, 2006
Case Name: Gould v. State; Kolb v. State
Citation: 2006 WY 157
Docket Number: 05-291 & 06-1
Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County (No. 05-291), the Honorable John Perry, Judge
Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County (No. 06-1), the Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge
Representing Appellants (Defendant): Pro se.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General: Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.
Issue: Appellants did not expressly set out their issues on appeal. Although the Court recognized they had the authority under W.R.A.P. 1.03 to dismiss the appeals because of deficiencies in the briefs, they considered Appellant’s claims. The State phrases the appellate issues as: Whether either district court erred in denying either appellant’s motion for correction of an illegal sentence. Whether either district court erred in denying either appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel.
Holding: Appellants were convicted for committing violent felonies in Wyoming and then were transferred by the Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) to a detention center in Texas to serve their sentences. Each Appellant filed motions to correct their illegal sentence and for appointment of legal counsel to assist them with their post-judgment efforts. Their motions were denied and they appealed. Their appeals have been consolidated for decision by the Court.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the district court’s ruling of an illegal sentence for an abuse of discretion. The question of whether a specific rule applies to a given set of facts is a question of law, requiring a de novo review.
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104, the district court has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel at non-critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and the Court’s review is limited to determining whether or not the district court abused its discretion.
A. Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence: Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be brought at any time. Appellants argue that the district court order denying their motions did not properly address their legal arguments; their convictions should have been merged for sentencing; their sentences were enhanced on the basis of improper factors; and their sentences were illegally executed because the DOC transferred them to a detention center in Texas to serve their sentences.
1. District Court’s Orders: Appellants argue their cases should be remanded to their respective district courts with directions requiring the courts to articulate the legal reasons for denying their motions to correct illegal sentence. The respective orders indicate the district courts did in fact consider the Appellants’ legal claims. In their arguments to the Court, Appellants did not identify any specific authority obligating the district courts to make more definitive findings and conclusions in support of their decisions.
2. Merger of Sentences: Appellants argue their convictions should have been merged for sentencing. The Court considered whether the claims were barred by res judicata which bars relitigation of issues raised and considered in a prior criminal proceeding. Appellant Gould pled guilty to aggravated assault and battery and burglary and was sentenced to consecutive terms for his actions. He initially filed a direct appeal but voluntarily dismissed that appeal before any action was taken by the Court. He had the opportunity to argue his sentences should merge for purposes of sentencing both in his direct appeal and his 2002 motion to reduce his sentence, which he did not appeal. Consequently, the Court concluded the merger issue was barred. Appellant Kolb was convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. He appealed and the Court affirmed. Although he could have presented a claim that his sentences should have merged in his direct appeal, he did not do so. Under the Court’s precedent, it is clear he had an obligation to present his claim that his convictions should have merged for sentencing in a timely fashion. Having failed to do so, he is barred from litigation of that issue at this late date. The Court also noted Appellants’ claims that their convictions should have merged for sentencing were not well-founded. A cursory review of the facts demonstrated Appellant Gould could have committed either of his crimes without necessarily committing the other. His convictions would therefore not merge for sentencing purposes. Appellant Kolb was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and first degree pre-meditated murder. It was evident that although the crimes occurred during an on-going criminal episode, the kidnapping was not an essential element of the pre-meditated murder charge and so Appellant Kolb’s merger argument fails as well.
3. Sentence Enhancement: Appellants relied upon the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi and Blakely to claim their rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated because the district courts “enhanced” their sentences by ordering them to be served consecutively without an admission by the accused or a determination by a jury as to that “enhancement.” Appellants were sentenced in accordance with Wyoming’s indeterminate sentencing statute (except for Kolb’s first degree murder conviction which mandated death or life imprisonment) Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 and their individual sentences fell within the maximums set out for their crimes. Consequently, in accordance with the Court’s decisions in Janssen and Smith, there was no obvious violation of the constitutional principles discussed in Apprendi and Blakely. The Court has long said the district court has discretion in determining whether the sentences will be served consecutively or concurrently. Appellants did not point to any specific error in the district court decision to order their sentences be served consecutively. The argument that judicial imposition of consecutive sentences violates the Sixth Amendment has been soundly rejected by other courts. The Court followed suit and concluded the district courts did not improperly enhance the Appellants’ sentences.
Transfer to Texas Detention Center: Appellants claim their sentences are illegal because the DOC transferred them to a facility in Texas to serve their terms of imprisonment. The threshold question is whether a Rule 35 motion is the proper procedural mechanism to challenge DOC’s actions. Cases which consider the propriety of a state’s actions in executing a sentence are typically brought by means other than a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because Appellants were not contesting the legality of their sentences, but the way the DOC executed them, the issue was not properly before the Court.
Right to Counsel/Law Library: Appellants challenged the district courts’ denials of their requests for appointment of counsel. Their arguments also implicated the right of access to legal materials. W.R.Cr.P. 44(a)(1) states the criminal defendant’s right to appointment of counsel but does not indicate appointment is required for post-judgment proceedings. In order to establish a violation of the constitutional right to access to courts, a defendant must show an actual injury resulting from the claimed violation or deficiency. The lack of legal resources is the basis for their claim that they were entitled to appointment of counsel. Appellants make uncorroborated claims about the deficiencies in the legal resources available to them but do not establish the actual injury required to demonstrate a violation of their constitutional rights to access to courts. The Court did not find any abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions denying their requests for appointment of counsel.
J. Kite delivered the decisions.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/vdxdb .
Case Name: Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp. v. Rohrman
Citation: 2006 WY 156
W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Question from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, The Honorable William F. Downes, Judge
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Mikel L. Moore of Christensen, Moore, Cockrell, Cummings & Axelber, P.C., Kalispell, Montana; and James K. Lubing and Carter Wilkinson of Jackson, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): W. Keith Goody of Alpine, Wyoming; and Robert E. Schroth of Jackson, Wyoming.
The Certified Question: When faced with motions for summary judgment in which there are no genuine issues of material fact, how should a court differentiate as a matter of law, between “inherent risks” as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i) and employed in § 1-1-123(a) and (b), and non-inherent risks in order to determine whether a recreational provider has a duty to eliminate, alter or control the risk at issue?
Statement of Alleged Facts Relevant to the Question Certified: From the federal district court: This case arises out of a ski injury that Plaintiff suffered on March 2, 2000 at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (JHMR). Plaintiff is a resident of Colorado and JHMR is a Wyoming corporation. The case comes to this Court pursuant to 28 USC § 1332 diversity jurisdiction. At the time of his injury, Plaintiff was 24 years old and by his own definition, an experienced skier…He attempted to jump a “table top” in the JMHR terrain park. He alleges that the jump was icier than he could have known from looking at it, and that because of the ice, he lost control and could not land the jump. He suffered several breaks in his left arm and injuries to his thoracic spine…
Two days before this accident, another young man, Adam Harshman, died of injuries sustained after taking off from the other side of the same jump. Plaintiff alleges that JHMR had a duty to close the jump or warn of the dangers because they were not inherent risks of the sport. Defendant JHMR asserts that losing control on a table top jump is a risk inherent in skiing terrain parks and therefore, JHMR owed Plaintiff no duty.
Discussion: The Court referred to the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act § 1-1-122 and 1-1-123. Also, the Court referred to their recently decided case, Muller v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, which posed related issues. The general standard applied to the granting of a motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict in a negligence case is that only in the clearest of cases when the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all reasonable persons can draw but one inference from them, that the question is ever one of law for the court.
The Court stated they did not intend to equate “inherent risk” with “negligence”. If reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether or not a given set of factual circumstances involve an “inherent risk” of skiing, then the protections of the RSA apply and the litigation of that controversy must come to an end. The Court set out several statutory sources to assist in understanding what is intended by the phrase. They considered the definitions of “inherent risks of skiing” enacted by the legislators of states similarly situated to Wyoming and also looked to safety experts and experienced skiers. They specifically referred to Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-44-103 (3.5), N.M. Stat. § 24-15-10 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52. The Court concluded that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-19-101 through 34-19-107 were not applicable to the analysis and did not discuss them further.
The Court concluded that if the facts are such that they are undisputed, and it is plain that all reasonable persons can draw but one inference from them (in light of the definitions and case interpretations set out) then the trial court should either grant a properly filed motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict. However, if the facts do not reach that lofty bar, then the question is properly one for the jury to decide with the guidance of appropriate instructions, or for the trial court to decide if trial is to the court.
J. Burke special concurrence, joined by D. J. Kautz: J. Burke agreed with the primary conclusion reached by the majority capsulized in the third paragraph of the opinion. He stated his concerns regarding the majority’s conclusion that statutes defining “inherent risks of skiing” in Colorado, New Mexico and Utah are a “potential source of guidance for both trial courts in acting on motions to dismiss/summary judgment, as well as for juries in their deliberations.” He stated that he was unaware of any tenet of statutory construction which justified an approach that decisions regarding summary judgment be determined “in light of the definitions” provided in statutes from those states. He stated that in determining whether a specific fact situation involves an inherent risk of a recreational activity under Wyoming law, the Court must apply the definition enacted by the Wyoming legislature as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i), not the definition deemed appropriate by legislatures of other states.
Also, in light of the Court’s holding in Muller, and that the Wyoming statute allows for the consideration of a wider assortment of facts in determining whether an inherent risk exists, the majority’s reliance upon the Colorado statute was difficult to understand. If the Wyoming legislature deems it appropriate to revise its definition, the statutory definitions of inherent risk enacted by other states may be of interest and provide guidance to the legislature. Those statutes are not however, a proper source of guidance for courts attempting to determine the meaning of inherent risk as stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i).
J. Hill delivered the answer.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/y85j6t .
Posted by Meg Martin at 2:16 PM 0 comments
It's here--the moment you've all been waiting for with such anticipation--the law library is officially open!
Okay, so maybe that's not such new news any more. But it is official. We have all our lights, 99.9% of our furniture, and the only boxes in sight are the white ones ready to go into storage.
You can now look forward to using fewer books, more online resources and our fancy new duplex printer! You can also, unfortunately, look forward to the resumption of email notices for those few books you are still checking out. In case you forgot, here is a list of the resources available while we are in the Hathaway Building:
Current CFR's
Federal Register (accessible in-library via HeinOnline)
Summary of Decision issued December 15, 2006
[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Case Name: Frost v. Allred
Citation: 2006 WY 155
Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, the Honorable, Judge Norman E. Young.
Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): John C. Schumacher of Law Office of John Schumacher, of Riverton, Wyoming, and Mark J. White of White & White, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Schumacher.
Representing Appellee (Defendant): Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming
Issues: Whether the district court erred in instructing the jury that violation of a building code could be considered as evidence of negligence, rather than that such a violation was negligence per se. Whether the district court erred in permitting the jury to determine which of two versions of the Uniform Building Code applied in this case.
Holdings: There are four elements to a negligence cause of action: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) the defendant’s breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages.
The duty of care is a question of law to be determined by the court. It is a standard-fixing function which the judiciary must perform in order to give the jury a direction to decide whether a defendant’s conduct in a particular case is justifiable or should be condemned and that if the conduct is found to be at variance with the standard, money is to be taken from the defendant to repair the plaintiff’s damage. Neither the term “negligence per se” nor the term “evidence of negligence” correctly describes the alternatives available to a trial court that has been asked to instruct a jury as to the legal effect of the breach of a statute, ordinance, or administrative agency rule in a negligence action. Saying that the judge’s choice is between “negligence per se” and “evidence of negligence” is linguistically misleading mainly because the former phrase suggests that it captures all four elements of the tort. It does not. What a judge is really being asked to do in such situations is to decide whether to declare the legislative or administrative enactment to be the minimum standard of care as a matter of law. In other words, if the enactment establishes the standard of care, its breach establishes the first two elements of the cause of action. If, however, the trial judge declines to equate the enactment with the duty of reasonable care, then breach of the enactment only becomes evidence that reasonable care was not exercised.
So, what are the means by which a court determines a standard of conduct? The effect of the violation of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation should be decided under the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286, 287, 288, 288A, 288B, and 288C. In Wyoming, under the Restatement approach, (1) the trial court’s decision whether to adopt an enactment as the standard of care is discretionary; and (2) application of negligence per se is not always appropriate, especially when the facts represent a conglomeration of circumstances.
In the case at hand, it was not an abuse of discretion by the district court to use the Restatement approach to determine not to adopt the Uniform Building Code (UBC) as the standard of care, and to instruct the jury, instead, that violation of a building code could be evidence of negligence, rather than being negligence per se. Not only was there a dispute as to which UBC version was in effect, there was also evidence that, even if the latter version was in effect, the front landing provision would not have been well known to the public, and may or may not have been enforced against existing structures. This is exactly the type of “conglomeration of facts” that constitutes a sound basis for allowing the trial judge to exercise his discretion in the matter.
While the question of the existence of a duty generally is a question of law for the court, there are instances where that question is dependent upon a determination of certain basic facts, in which case the question of the existence of a duty is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. In the instant case, several issues of fact required the jury, rather than the court, to determine whether the 1979 version or the 1997 version of the UBC, or neither of them, applied under the circumstances. First, the home was built while the former code was in effect. Second, city officials disagreed as to which code might have applied at the time of the injury. And third, even if the latter code was in effect, evidence indicated that it applied to existing structures only if those structures had violations that were “dangerous to life,” which is a question of fact. The district court did not err in having the jury determine these factual issues.
The district court did not err in instructing the jury that evidence of a violation of the uniform building code could be considered as evidence of negligence, and it did not err in allowing the jury to decide issues of fact in determining whether Appellees owed a duty to Appellant.
C. J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/yddpnp .
Posted by Meg Martin at 11:57 AM 0 comments
[SPECIAL NOTE: These opinions use the "Universal Citation." They were given "official" citations when they were issued. You should use these citations whenever you cite these opinions, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will also note when you look at the opinions that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.
Case Name: LaPlant v. State
Citation: 2006 WY 154
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Elizabeth B. Lance, Assistant Attorney General.
Issues: Whether the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of drug activity found in an object attached to Appellant’s key ring because there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial seizure of Appellant.
Holdings: The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. An investigatory stop represents a seizure which implicates the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, requires the presence of specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a criminal offense. A dual inquiry exists for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) whether the officer’s actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance. An officer’s conduct is judged by an objective standard taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
In this case, no question exists that Appellant was seized when he was ordered back into the vehicle. Appellant insists the seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The majority of Appellant’s argument is based on a faulty premise that his seizure was the product of a routine traffic stop. He therefore attempts to analogize his situation to that of a passenger of a vehicle involved in a routine traffic stop. Such an analysis is wholly inapplicable under the facts of this case.
The encounter between the police officer and Appellant was an investigatory stop, the purpose of which was to investigate reported stolen license plates. The only question is whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to seize and detain Appellant during the investigation. A review of the record shows he did. The record disclosed that the officer had observed a vehicle with stolen Idaho plates parked on Appellant’s property. Around two and one-half hours later, he noticed the same vehicle with the stolen Idaho plates parked at a storage unit. Appellant was in the car. When the officer approached the vehicle, Appellant exited the car and attempted to walk away. These facts and the rational inferences to be drawn from them support a reasonable suspicion that Appellant may have been involved in illegal activity. Therefore, Appellant’s detention was constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.
The investigatory stop of Appellant was supported by reasonable suspicion. Because the stop was proper, no grounds existed to mandate suppression of the incriminating drug evidence found in the subsequent search of the Appellant. The district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/ygn9e5 .
Posted by Meg Martin at 11:55 AM 0 comments
Case Name: Cazier v. State
Citation: 2006 WY 153
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial after the investigating officer testified that Ms. Cazier had refused to speak to him. Whether the district court erroneously permitted evidence or argument concerning prior bad acts of Ms. Cazier. Whether improper character evidence was admitted resulting in plain error. Whether improper vouching for the victim occurred resulting in plain error. Whether sufficient evidence supported Ms. Cazier’s conviction. Whether cumulative error warranted reversal.
Holding: On March 16, 2004, Ms. Cazier and her husband were at home together when after their children left for school, they began to argue. Ms. Cazier became angry and punched Mr. Cazier in the face and whipped him repeatedly with television cables. Ms. Cazier appeals her conviction for aggravated assault and battery.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the denial of a mistrial motion under an abuse of discretion standard. Evidentiary rulings are also committed to the sound discretion of the district court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse of discretion. When no objection is made at trial, the Court applies the plain error standard of review. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court assesses whether all the evidence presented is adequate to form the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
Motion for Mistrial (for improper comment on silence): The Court has described the right to remain silent as one of the most fundamental rights accorded a defendant in the criminal justice system. The statement at issue arose during cross examination when defense counsel inquired as to the nature and extent of the investigation. The statement was not elicited by prosecution and does not reflect the intent to cast guilt upon Ms. Cazier. Defense counsel rejected the district court’s offer of a curative instruction. The district court left the matter open for further consideration. The district court relied on Hughes v. State. The record does not reveal that the State attempted to use the statement to its advantage. The State did not ask the jury to consider Ms. Cazier’s pretrial silence as evidence of her guilt. Accordingly, the Court could find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for a mistrial.
Evidentiary Rulings: Ms. Cazier presented three issues relating to the admission of evidence. In each instance, defense counsel did not object to the evidence that was admitted. The Court is mindful that in some circumstances, a failure to object is a tactical decision.
Prior Bad Acts: Ms. Cazier challenged testimony that she hurt her husband on previous occasions; forced Mr. Cazier to make a false police report and made her daughter falsely report the events of March 16, 2004. The Court then reviewed how the challenged testimony arose at trial. Ms. Cazier did not object to the testimony at trial. Citing Williams and Howard, she contended that no objection was needed because it constituted W.R.E.404(b) evidence. The Court agreed with the State that the testimony was not truly 404(b) evidence. None of the three areas of testimony challenged by Ms. Cazier contravened W.R.E.404(b). Under the circumstances, the Court did not find impermissible inquiry or prosecutorial overkill. The State responded to the defense’s theory and the testimony rebutting it was reasonably limited in scope. The State did not suggest that Ms. Cazier had a propensity to commit crime nor was there any attempt to use evidence regarding Ms. Cazier’s prior conduct as substantive evidence of her guilt. The Court rejected the claim the district court was required to evaluate the evidence in accordance with the strictures of the 404(b) jurisprudence. The Court found no error.
Improper Character Evidence: Ms. Cazier asserted that Officer Malik offered quasi-expert opinion on domestic violence couples that constituted improper character evidence. She analogized it to expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. This testimony combined with the evidence of prior violence demonstrated efforts by the prosecution to prove that she was a batterer who had acted in conformity with that role. No objection was made at trial, so the Court’s review was for plain error. Ms. Cazier opened the door on this testimony with the presentation of the evidence of her husband’s self-injuring behavior. The State was entitled to counter her characterizations and denials. Ms. Cazier further claimed that the prosecutor erred by emphasizing in closing argument that the couple acted in conformity with their domestic violence roles. The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure to interpose a timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver unless the misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error.
Vouching for Credibility of Victim: Ms. Cazier claimed that Officer Malik improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim by saying he looked like a “whipped pup”. There was no objection at trial to the use of the phrase. Defense counsel pursued a strategy to discredit Officer Malik. The Court analyzed the claim in terms of plain error because there was no objection at trial. The Court reviewed the record to determine if the officer was implying that he believed or held an opinion with respect to the victim’s version of the events surrounding the assault. The Court stated that Officer Malik’s expression of belief did not amount to impermissible vouching because it did not concern the truth of Mr. Cazier’s accusations leading to the felony charge. It pertained to a story told about a different, earlier incident. The Court concluded that impermissible vouching did not occur.
Sufficiency of the Evidence: Ms. Cazier claimed the evidence was not sufficient to support her conviction and that it did not demonstrate that the victim suffered serious bodily injury or that his injuries resulted solely from the events of March 16, 2004. The Court reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. They determined whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would or could have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that the evidence could have allowed the jury to conclude that Mr. Cazier had at a minimum suffered severe disfigurement. In addition, Officer Malik found a note of apology from Ms. Cazier located on top of the cables used to beat the victim. The Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the victim’s injuries had resulted from the beating on March 16, 2004.
Cumulative Error: In the absence of finding any error, the claim of cumulative error failed.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/skln8 .
Case Name: Moulton v. State
Citation: 2006 WY 152
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Faculty Director, DAP; Michael Irvin, Student Intern; Kathryn Hogarty, Student Intern. Argument by Ms. Hogarty.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General: Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.
Issue: Whether the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
Holding: Moulton was charged with one count of manufacturing psilocyn, a felony. Prior to trial he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant obtained by deputies after they entered and searched the residence without a warrant. The district court made the following findings of fact relevant to the instant case: there was a call to the Sheriff’s office from Ms. Moulton in her capacity as a medic; there was urgency in the voice of the caller on the tape; the Sheriff’s Office was concerned about Ms. Moulton; deputies proceeded to the Moulton residence, walked around, knocked, announced and entered; the deputies found 2 teenaged girls in one bedroom who speculated their mother was down at the lake; the deputies entered the second bedroom and saw in plain sight evidence of some type of drug operation. The district court reached the following conclusions of law: based on the call, the Sheriff’s Office had reasonable basis on which to believe that Ms. Moulton was either in trouble herself or had encountered trouble; it was reasonable for the Sheriff’s Office to use their best efforts to find her; Ms. Moulton should have expected that once she identified herself as a medic at 4:30 in the morning, that the Sheriff would try to find her; it was reasonable of the Sheriff to believe there was an emergency of some kind that needed to be responded to; the Deputies reasonably went to the Moulton residence to find her; given the likely emergency, it was reasonable for the deputies to enter the residence; during this attempt the drug paraphernalia was discovered; there was no search of closed containers but simply a search for Ms. Moulton. The paraphernalia was in plain sight; the search fell into the emergency assistance exception to obtaining a search warrant
Standard of Review: The question of whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. The Court reverses a district court’s factual findings on a motion to suppress only when they are clearly erroneous.
Discussion: The State argues that officers may enter and search an area to render assistance but not to look for evidence. Because the deputies in this case entered the residence to look for Ms. Moulton and provide assistance in response to her radio transmission and because their search of the residence was limited to looking for her, the State contended the search was proper under the emergency assistance exception. The Court has considered the applicability of the emergency assistance exception to the warrant requirement in two prior cases, Pena and Ortega. In both cases, officers entered private residences without a warrant in response to reported shootings. Like these Wyoming cases, the majority of cases in which other courts have applied the emergency assistance exception to uphold a warrantless search have involved reports of violence where the victims were thought to be seriously injured.
The instant case does not involve a specific clearly described report of an emergency occurring inside the Moulton residence from which the deputies perceived an immediate need to respond in order to protect life or limb. Under the circumstances though, the Sheriff’s Office had no real choice but to respond. Efforts to reach Ms. Moulton by phone were not successful. The only other information they had to make contact with her was her home address. It was reasonable for the deputies to go to the home, to knock and enter when there was no response and to look for Ms. Moulton throughout the home. Once they determined Ms. Moulton was not inside the home, they left.
Allison was cited as supporting Moulton’s argument that the radio transmission was not enough to avoid the warrant requirement. However, the instant case is distinguishable from Allison in important ways. In Allison, the officer re-entered the home without a warrant after the emergency was over. Unlike Allison, the emergency justifying the initial entry into the residence remained unresolved and the deputies had a reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed requiring their assistance.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the case, the Court concluded the officers were acting reasonably when they investigated the possible emergency and properly limited their efforts to determining whether anyone was in need of assistance rather than investigating a crime. The emergency assistance exception applies in these circumstances and the deputies’ entry into and search of the Moulton residence was constitutional.
Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/t284p .
Case Name: Hatton and Hatton v. Energy Electric Co.
Citation: 2006 WY 151
Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee (Defendant): John R. Goodell of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., Pocatello, Idaho.
Issues: Whether the lower court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Energy Electric Co., was proper. Whether the lower court’s Order Granting Energy Electric’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Energy Electric Co., was proper.
Holding: Rebecca Hatton (Rebecca) was injured in an automobile accident while she was traveling through road construction in the Snake River Canyon. She and her husband Asa, filed suit against the general contractor and various subcontractors on the job, including Energy Electric Co. (EEC), claiming the defendants were negligent in providing safety precautions in the construction area. The district court granted EEC’s summary judgment motion, ruling EEC did not owe a duty to the Hattons because it was not working in the area of the accident and had no control over the accident site.
Standard of Review: The Court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the same materials as the district court. The party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. The opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of material fact. They cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or the suggestion of a possibility or probability.
Does the Evidence in the Record Establish Any Issue of Material Fact?
The Hattons’ claims were grounded in negligence. The elements are (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant’s breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages. The determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Summary judgment is not favored in negligence actions. An absence of duty is the surest route to summary judgment in negligence actions. The legal question to be answered by the court is whether upon the facts in evidence such a relation exists between the parties that the community would impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other. In Allmaras v. Mudge the Court held that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to provide for the safety of the driving public; however, no similar duty attached to a sub-contractor who did not exercise control over the general job and was not working on the job site at the time of the accident. EEC supported its summary judgment with a description of the location and timing of EEC’s work on the road construction project and relied on the official accident report to establish the date and location of the accident and stated that the company had not worked in the area of the accident at any time and was not working on the project at all when the accident occurred. The Hattons did not submit any information to counter the basic facts of the accident as set out in the affidavit or the accident report. The Hattons had a duty to provide the Court with a sufficient record on appeal to ensure proper consideration of their arguments. They did not include the transcript of the hearing but stated they referred to the documents at the summary judgment hearing. The Court could not rely on their assertions as to what the missing documents might have contained.
EEC claimed that they were not on the jobsite on the date of the accident. The Hattons did not refute that. The Hattons also presented a claim that the subcontract between EEC and LeGrand imposed a general duty upon EEC. The Court interprets contracts to determine the parties’ true intent. An unambiguous contract is interpreted as a matter of law and in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of its terms. Under the rationale of Allmaras, a subcontractor is not typically responsible for safety on the entire job site as long as it does not exercise control over the same. The records in the instant case fell short of creating some kind of general obligation for EEC to assume responsibility for safety for the entire project. Because the record does not include any evidence suggesting EEC was responsible for safety on the entire job site, or that it was working in the area of the accident, no issue of fact existed concerning whether EEC owed a duty to the Hattons. Summary judgment was proper.
Was the Summary Judgment Premature?
The Hattons cited Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC as support for their position that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to EEC because discovery had not been completed. However, the Hattons did not take the necessary steps to protect their discovery options. According to the record, the deposition of the key witness, Mr. Middleton, was scheduled but not completed and they did not request a continuance to allow them additional time to prepare. The Hattons did not establish the summary judgment hearing held in accordance with the district court’s scheduling order was premature or violated the rules of civil procedure or their due process rights.
Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/sq482 .
Posted by Meg Martin at 11:23 AM 0 comments
Summary of Decision issued December 13, 2006
Case Name: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Abraham
Citation: 2006 WY 150
The matter came before the Court upon a “Report and Recommendation for Public Censure” filed October 31, 2006, by the Board of Professional Responsibility for the Wyoming State Bar. The Court, after a careful review of the Board’s report, Bar Counsel’s “Motion for Public Censure and to File a Report and Recommendation for Discipline,” the Respondent’s “Section 16 Affidavit,” and the file, finds that the Report and Recommendation should be approved, confirmed and adopted by the Court; and that Respondent should be publicly censured in the manner set forth in the Report and Recommendation.
Respondent shall receive a public censure for his conduct in a manner consistent with the recommended censure contained in the Report and Recommendation for Public Censure; Respondent shall reimburse the Wyoming State Bar the amount of $68.58 for some of the costs incurred in handling the matter as well as pay an administrative fee of $500.00 to the Clerk of the Board of Professional Responsibility on or before January 5, 2007. The order shall be docketed as a public record and published in the Wyoming Reporter and the Pacific Reporter, served upon the Respondent and transmitted to the members of the Board of Professional Responsibility and the appropriate clerks of court.
Link to the case: to be posted at a later date.
Posted by Meg Martin at 11:22 AM 0 comments
Case Name: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Keenan
Citation: 2006 WY 149
The matter came before the Court upon a “Report and Recommendation for Public Censure” filed October 30, 2006, by the Board of Professional Responsibility for the Wyoming State Bar. The Court, after a careful review of the Board’s report, Bar Counsel’s “Motion for Public Censure and to File a Report and Recommendation for Discipline,” the Respondent’s “Section 16 Affidavit,” and the file, finds that the Report and Recommendation should be approved, confirmed and adopted by the Court; and that Respondent should be publicly censured in the manner set forth in the Report and Recommendation.
Respondent shall receive a public censure for his conduct in a manner consistent with the recommended censure contained in the Report and Recommendation for Public Censure; Respondent shall reimburse the Wyoming State Bar the amount of $117.78 for some of the costs incurred in handling the matter as well as pay an administrative fee of $1,500.00 to the Clerk of the Board of Professional Responsibility on or before January 5, 2007. The order shall be docketed as a public record and published in the Wyoming Reporter and the Pacific Reporter, served upon the Respondent and transmitted to the members of the Board of Professional Responsibility and the appropriate clerks of court.
Posted by Meg Martin at 11:16 AM 0 comments
Anyone seen an office chair floating around? How about that box with the stuff in it? You know, the one with the papers and books? It was a brown box, I remember that. Oh no, what about the Standard Federal Tax Reporter? Where could it possibly be!? (Really, Kathy, I didn't accidentally set that box in the dark corner on the 3rd floor--I didn't! It was Meg!)
Those are some of the questions we are now asking ourselves. But fear not, the vast majority of what was supposed to make it's way across Capitol Avenue and into the Hathaway Building has done so. Books are on shelves, chairs (most of them, anyway) and tables are ready for research, computers are networked, and we have almost caught up on three weeks of mail. In other words:
The law library is now un-officially open!
We're calling it an un-official opening because we are still missing some lights. We had the indescribable pleasure of shelving books using construction halogen stands and incandescent daisy chains. If you find an employment law treatise in criminal law, I didn't do it (it was Meg). Most of our lights are now working and they promise to finish them next week.
In short, we are operational. Please come visit!
Hathaway Building, Room B24
Phone: 307-777-7509
Hathaway Building, Room 160B
Hathaway Building, Room 160A
Hathaway Building, Room 160C
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