Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/419/1076/617417/
Timestamp: 2019-03-20 23:13:26
Document Index: 432434808

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1958', '§ 371', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958', '§ 1958']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Peter Chong, Defendant-appellant, 419 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 2005 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Peter Chong, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Peter Chong, Defendant-appellant, 419 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2005)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 419 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2005)
Argued and Submitted March 15, 2005
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998).
18 U.S.C. § 1958. Chong was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which makes it a crime for two or more persons to conspire "to commit any offense against the United States... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy." The elements of a conspiracy are: "1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, 2) coupled with one or more acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose, and 3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense." United States v. Pemberton, 853 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1988) (adding that the agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence).
Chow said Chong had sent someone previously "to get the territory of Boston." "The job was to take over the Boston town and open up a gambling place." After one of Chong's underlings was shot in Boston while trying to establish a foothold, Chong discussed revenge. " [Chong] was very angry, and he said try to see ... how to get someone to go up there to take care of this matter." When asked what taking care of the matter meant, Chow testified, "that means to get Bike Ming down, to get him killed, whoever that were involved with this incident."
We conclude that the evidence adduced was sufficient to establish that Chong caused the murder-for-hire of Bike Ming. We rely on the Pinkerton doctrine, which holds a co-conspirator vicariously liable for reasonably foreseeable substantive crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946). To establish Pinkerton liability, the prosecution must demonstrate that: "(1) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense fell within the scope of the unlawful project; and (3) the offense could reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
To convict under the murder-for-hire statute, however, the government must further prove that Chong gave or promised something of pecuniary value in exchange for seeking Ming's murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (providing that a person commits murder-for-hire by causing another to travel interstate to commit murder "as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value"). "The intent to pay someone to commit murder is . . . a critical element of `murder-for-hire.'" United States v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1993). According to the legislative history of § 1958, Congress intended the statute to punish " [b]oth the man who ordered the murder and the `hit man.'" S. Rep. 98-225, at 306 (1983). As for the pecuniary component, " [t]he murder must be carried out or planned as consideration for the receipt of `anything of pecuniary value.' This term is defined to mean money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage. . . ." Id. This circuit has not specifically interpreted the language of § 1958's pecuniary value requirement. We did, however, hold in Ritter that the government failed to prove that the defendant, who had supplied a pipe bomb to carry out a murder, had "made an agreement or had the requisite intent to violate Section 1958." 989 F.2d at 321. Although the defendant was paid for the pipe bomb, he was not privy to the arrangements whereby the murderer himself would be compensated for planting the bomb; thus, "Ritter did not know that anyone would be paid to commit murder." Id.
Other circuits have construed the pecuniary value requirement strictly, concluding that the element of the offense is not established in the absence of a clear agreement to exchange something of value for the commission of a murder. The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Wicklund, interpreted the "in consideration for" language as requiring "consideration in the traditional sense of bargained for exchange" — a quid pro quo payment made either before or after the murder. 114 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1997). The court rejected the government's claim that the pecuniary consideration element could be met where the defendant merely expected that his wife might benefit if he had her former husband killed.
In United States v. Frampton, the Second Circuit rejected the government's suggested inference that the defendant enlisted a professional hitman to commit murder in exchange for a "favor." 382 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2004). At trial, one of the conspirators was asked what consideration the hitman expected to receive for the murder. Id. at 218. He said: "If he needed a favor from me, he'd get a favor." Asked what this favor would be, the defendant responded: "Anything. Anything he need." Id. The court held that "consideration in the form of a `favor' is insufficient to support a conviction" under the statute, "at least in the absence of evidence suggesting that either party had an understanding as to the form that it would actually take." Id. at 219.
None of this shows that Casey entered into an agreement or quid pro quo deal with the Wo Hop To lieutenants that he would kill Ming in return for some form of pecuniary consideration, as the statute requires. See Frampton, 382 F.3d at 217 ("The federal murder-for-hire statute proscribes a very limited category of behavior; only those instances in which one party agrees to commit a murder in exchange for another party's provision (or future promise) of payment are punishable under § 1958."); United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1057 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the language of the statute "undeniably contemplates a quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such) between the parties to the transaction, the murderer and the solicitor"); Wicklund, 114 F.3d at 154 (defining consideration as a "bargained for exchange").