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Grant v. Torstar Corp. - SCC Cases (Lexum)
Decisions and Resources > Supreme Court Judgments > Grant v. Torstar Corp.
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Neutral citation 2009 SCC 61
Report [2009] 3 SCR 640
Case number 32932
Notes SCC Case Information: 32932
Citation: Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640
Docket: 32932
Peter Grant and Grant Forest Products Inc.
Bill Schiller, John Honderich and Mary Deanne Shears
Ottawa Citizen, Canadian Newspaper Association,
Magazines Canada, Canadian Association of Journalists,
PEN Canada, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Danno Cusson
(paras. 142 to 146)
McLachlin C.J. (Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
Grant Forest Products Inc. Appellants/Respondents on cross‑appeal
Bill Schiller, John Honderich and
Mary Deanne Shears Respondents/Appellants on cross‑appeal
Writers’ Union of Canada,
Book and Periodical Council, PEN Canada,
and Danno Cusson Interveners
Indexed as: Grant v. Torstar Corp.
Neutral citation: 2009 SCC 61.
File No.: 32932.
2009: April 23; 2009: December 22.
Per McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell JJ.: The law of defamation should be modified to provide greater protection for communications on matters of public interest. The current law with respect to statements that are reliable and important to public debate does not give adequate weight to the constitutional value of free expression. The first two rationales for the freedom of expression guarantee in s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — the proper functioning of democratic governance and getting at the truth — squarely apply to communications on matters of public interest, even those which contain false imputations. Freewheeling debate on matters of public interest is to be encouraged and the vital role of the communications media in providing a vehicle for such debate is explicitly recognized in the text of s. 2 (b) itself. While the law must protect reputation, the current level of protection — in effect a regime of strict liability — is not justifiable. The law of defamation accords no protection for statements on matters of public interest published to the world at large if they cannot be proven to be true. To insist on court‑established certainty in reporting on matters of public interest may have the effect not only of preventing communication of facts which a reasonable person would accept as reliable and which are relevant and important to public debate, but also of inhibiting political discourse and debate on matters of public importance, and impeding the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to discovery of the truth. Although the right to free expression does not confer a licence to ruin reputation, when proper weight is given to the constitutional value of free expression on matters of public interest, the balance tips in favour of broadening the defences available to those who communicate facts it is in the public’s interest to know. A consideration of the jurisprudence of other common law democracies also favours replacing the current Canadian law with a rule that gives greater scope to freedom of expression while offering adequate protection of reputation. A defence that would allow publishers to escape liability if they can establish that they acted responsibly in attempting to verify the information on a matter of public interest represents a reasonable and proportionate response to the need to protect reputation while sustaining the public exchange of information that is vital to modern Canadian society. The law of defamation should therefore be modified to recognize a defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest. [7] [52‑54] [57‑58] [65‑66] [85‑86]
Referred to: Cusson v. Quan, 2007 ONCA 771, 231 O.A.C. 277, rev’d 2009 SCC 62, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 712; WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420; Horrocks v. Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135; Toogood v. Spyring (1834), 1 C.M. & R. 181, 149 E.R. 1044; Ross v. New Brunswick Teachers’ Assn., 2001 NBCA 62, 201 D.L.R. (4th) 75; Douglas v. Tucker, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 275; Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland, [1960] S.C.R. 203; Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., [1961] S.C.R. 474; Jones v. Bennett, [1969] S.C.R. 277; Parlett v. Robinson (1986), 5 B.C.L.R. (2d) 26; Grenier v. Southam Inc., [1997] O.J. No. 2193 (QL); Leenen v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 656, aff’d (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 612; Young v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 170, aff’d (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 680; Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439; R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994), 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. (1997), 145 A.L.R. 96; Lange v. Atkinson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 424; Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. 257; Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385; Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850; National Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi, 1998 (4) SA 1196; Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609; Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, rev’g [2005] EWCA Civ 74, [2005] 4 All E.R. 356; Seaga v. Harper, [2008] UKPC 9, [2008] 1 All E.R. 965; Charman v. Orion Publishing Group Ltd., [2007] EWCA Civ 972, [2008] 1 All E.R. 750; Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994), 124 A.L.R. 1; N.M. v. Smith, [2007] ZACC 6, 2007 (5) SA 250; Khumalo v. Holomisa, [2002] ZACC 12, 2002 (5) SA 401; Mthembi‑Mahanyele v. Mail & Guardian Ltd., [2004] ZASCA 67, 2004 (6) SA 329; Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] 1 All E.R. 652; London Artists, Ltd. v. Littler, [1969] 2 All E.R. 193; Simpson v. Mair, 2004 BCSC 754, 31 B.C.L.R. (4th) 285; Miller v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [2005] EWHC 557 (QB) (BAILII); Galloway v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2004] EWHC 2786 (QB) (BAILII); “Truth” (N.Z.) Ltd. v. Holloway, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 997; Al‑Fagih v. H.H. Saudi Research & Marketing (U.K.) Ltd., [2001] EWCA Civ 1634 (BAILII); Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v. Houston, [2007] EWHC 2735 (QB) (BAILII); Roberts v. Gable, [2007] EWCA Civ 721, [2008] 2 W.L.R. 129; Bonnick v. Morris, [2002] UKPC 31, [2003] 1 A.C. 300; Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 36; Scott v. Fulton, 2000 BCCA 124, 73 B.C.L.R. (3d) 392.
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 108, 134(6).
Ronald F. Caza and Jeff G. Saikaley, for the intervener Danno Cusson.
[1] Freedom of expression is guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . It is essential to the functioning of our democracy, to seeking the truth in diverse fields of inquiry, and to our capacity for self-expression and individual realization.
[3] Two conflicting values are at stake — on the one hand freedom of expression and on the other the protection of reputation. While freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom protected by s. 2 (b) of the Charter , courts have long recognized that protection of reputation is also worthy of legal recognition. The challenge of courts has been to strike an appropriate balance between them in articulating the common law of defamation. In this case, we are asked to consider, once again, whether this balance requires further adjustment.
[39] The first argument is grounded in principle. It asserts that the existing law is inconsistent with the principle of freedom of expression as guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Charter . In the modern context, it is argued, the traditional rule has a chilling effect that unjustifiably limits reporting facts, and strikes a balance too heavily weighted in favour of protection of reputation. While the law should provide redress for baseless attacks on reputation, defamation lawsuits, real or threatened, should not be a weapon by which the wealthy and privileged stifle the information and debate essential to a free society.
[41] The fundamental question of principle is whether the traditional defences for defamatory statements of fact curtail freedom of expression in a way that is inconsistent with Canadian constitutional values. Does the existing law strike an appropriate balance between two values vital to Canadian society — freedom of expression on the one hand, and the protection of individuals’ reputations on the other? As Binnie J. stated in WIC Radio, “[a]n individual’s reputation is not to be treated as regrettable but unavoidable road kill on the highway of public controversy, but nor should an overly solicitous regard for personal reputation be permitted to ‘chill’ freewheeling debate on matters of public interest” (para. 2).
[43] In 1982, the Charter , through s. 2 (b), confirmed and expanded constitutional protection for free expression, specifically extending it to the press: “Everyone has . . . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication”.
[44] The constitutional status of freedom of expression under the Charter means that all Canadian laws must conform to it. The common law, though not directly subject to Charter scrutiny where disputes between private parties are concerned, may be modified to bring it into harmony with the Charter . As Cory J. put it in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 97, “Charter values, framed in general terms, should be weighed against the principles which underlie the common law. The Charter values will then provide the guidelines for any modification to the common law which the court feels is necessary.”
[46] While Hill stands for a rejection of the Sullivan approach and an affirmation of the common law of defamation’s general conformity with the Charter , it does not close the door to further changes in specific rules and doctrines. As Iacobucci J. observed in R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at p. 670, “[j]udges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country.” It is implicit in this duty that the courts will, from time to time, take a fresh look at the common law and re-evaluate its consistency with evolving societal expectations through the lens of Charter values.
[47] The guarantee of free expression in s. 2 (b) of the Charter has three core rationales, or purposes: (1) democratic discourse; (2) truth-finding; and (3) self-fulfillment: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at p. 976. These purposes inform the content of s. 2 (b) and assist in determining what limits on free expression can be justified under s. 1 .
[52] By contrast, the first two rationales for free expression squarely apply to communications on matters of public interest, even those which contain false imputations. The first rationale, the proper functioning of democratic governance, has profound resonance in this context. As held in WIC Radio, freewheeling debate on matters of public interest is to be encouraged, and must not be thwarted by “overly solicitous regard for personal reputation” (para. 2). Productive debate is dependent on the free flow of information. The vital role of the communications media in providing a vehicle for such debate is explicitly recognized in the text of s. 2 (b) itself: “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication”.
[55] Against this, it is argued that false statements cannot advance the purposes of s. 2 (b). This contention, however, is belied by the fact the existing defence of privilege concedes: sometimes the public interest requires that untrue statements should be granted immunity, because of the importance of robust debate on matters of public interest (e.g. Parliamentary privilege), or the importance of discussion and disclosure as a means of getting at the truth (e.g. police reports, employment recommendations).
[56] The argument also overlooks the fact that the Charter ’s s. 2 (b) protection is not confined to statements that a person can ultimately prove are true. As Professor Boivin puts it:
Those who argue that false and defamatory publications have a weak claim to Charter protection omit to mention that it is only at trial, usually several years after publication, that a trier of fact determines whether a defence of justification is well founded. Moreover, it is only then that the defamatory nature of the publication is assessed. Surely freedom of expression encompasses more than statements which, after the fact, are either proven factually accurate or do not injure someone’s reputation. [Emphasis added.]
[57] I conclude that media reporting on matters of public interest engages the first and second rationales of the freedom of expression guarantee in the Charter . The statement in Hill (at para. 106) that “defamatory statements are very tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2 (b)” must be read in the context of that case. It is simply beyond debate that the limited defences available to press-related defendants may have the effect of inhibiting political discourse and debate on matters of public importance, and impeding the cut and thrust of discussion necessary to discovery of the truth.
[58] This brings me to the competing value: protection of reputation. Canadian law recognizes that the right to free expression does not confer a licence to ruin reputations. In assessing the constitutionality of the Criminal Code ’s defamatory libel provisions, for example, the Court has affirmed that “[t]he protection of an individual’s reputation from wilful and false attack recognizes both the innate dignity of the individual and the integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an individual in Canadian society”: R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 48, per Cory J. This applies both to private citizens and to people in public life. People who enter public life cannot reasonably expect to be immune from criticism, some of it harsh and undeserved. But nor does participation in public life amount to open season on reputation.
[61] The answer to this argument lies in the fact that a balanced approach to libel law properly reflects both the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. The law must take due account of the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. But this does not preclude consideration of whether the defendant acted responsibly, nor of the social value to a free society of debate on matters of public interest. I agree with Sharpe J.A. that the partial shift of focus involved in considering the responsibility of the publisher’s conduct is an “acceptable price to pay for free and open discussion” (Quan, at para. 142).
[68] Commonwealth courts have rejected the precise balance struck in Sullivan between free expression and protection of reputation. However, the law has begun to shift in favour of broader defences for press defendants, most prominently in England, but also in Australia (Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. (1997), 145 A.L.R. 96 (H.C.)), New Zealand (Lange v. Atkinson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 424 (C.A.) (“Lange v. Atkinson No. 1”); Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 1 N.Z.L.R. 257 (P.C.) (“Lange v. Atkinson No. 2”); Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.) (“Lange v. Atkinson No. 3”)), and South Africa (Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC); National Media Ltd. v. Bogoshi, 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA)).
The House of Lords also made clear that the defence is available to “anyone who publishes material of public interest in any medium”, not just journalists or media companies: Jameel, at para. 54, per Lord Hoffmann; Seaga v. Harper, [2008] UKPC 9, [2008] 1 All E.R. 965.
[83] The Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently adopted a responsible journalism defence in Bogoshi. Writing for the court, Hefer J.A. held that “the publication in the press of false defamatory allegations of fact will not be regarded as unlawful if, upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, it is found to have been reasonable to publish the particular facts in the particular way and at the particular time” (p. 1212). Approving of this approach in the Constitutional Court, Sachs J. recently commented that “[i]n Bogoshi the SCA developed in a way that was sensitive to contemporary concerns and realities, a well-weighted means of balancing respect for individual personality rights with concern for freedom of the press”: N.M. v. Smith, [2007] ZACC 6, 2007 (5) SA 250, at para. 203. See also Khumalo v. Holomisa, [2002] ZACC 12, 2002 (5) SA 401; Mthembi-Mahanyele v. Mail & Guardian Ltd., [2004] ZASCA 67, 2004 (6) SA 329.
[103] The authorities offer no single “test” for public interest, nor a static list of topics falling within the public interest (see, e.g., Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed. 2008), at p. 530). Guidance, however, may be found in the cases on fair comment and s. 2 (b) of the Charter .
[114] Some sources of information are more worthy of belief than others. The less trustworthy the source, the greater the need to use other sources to verify the allegations. This applies as much to documentary sources as to people; for example, an “interim progress report” of an internal inquiry has been found to be an insufficiently authoritative source in the circumstances: Miller v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [2005] EWHC 557 (QB) (BAILII). Consistent with the logic of the repetition rule, the fact that someone has already published a defamatory statement does not give another person licence to repeat it. As already explained, this principle is especially vital when defamatory statements can be reproduced electronically with the speed of a few keystrokes. At the same time, the fact that the defendant’s source had an axe to grind does not necessarily deprive the defendant of protection, provided other reasonable steps were taken.
[131] The division of responsibility proposed here accords with the general rule that matters of law are for the judge, and matters of fact are for the jury. In preserving a central role for the jury, it is consistent with Canadian tradition and statutory enactments. Traditionally, defamation actions have usually been tried by judge and jury, and many Canadian jurisdictions continue to have special rules for jury trials in defamation cases even as juries in most other kinds of civil actions have become less common: see, e.g., British Columbia Supreme Court Rules, B.C. Reg. 221/90, r. 39(27); Alberta Jury Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J‑3, s. 17(1). In Ontario, where the case at bar arose, there is no longer any special right to a jury trial in defamation cases. However, s. 14 of the Ontario Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12, guarantees the right of a jury in a defamation action to render a general verdict (see also Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 108(5)). Courts have interpreted s. 14 to mean that the jury cannot be required to answer specific questions, and if they are asked to do so they must also be informed of their right to render a general verdict: Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 36 (Div. Ct.), at pp. 43-44, per Sharpe J. Finally, s. 108 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act provides that in a defamation action tried by judge and jury, it is for the jury to decide questions of fact and to assess the quantum of damages.
[134] Second, permitting the jury to have the ultimate say on whether or not the new defence applies, is consistent with the jury’s role with respect to the defence of fair comment. The Reynolds model, where “primary facts” are determined by the jury but the decision on responsible journalism is made by the judge, entails a complex back and forth between judge and jury and may lead to interlocutory rulings, and in due course appeals from those interlocutory decisions. Moreover, confining the jury’s role to preliminary fact-finding would entail seeking jury responses to numerous detailed questions, which may in turn “thwart many of the benefits sought through the doctrinal changes”: Kenyon, at p. 433; see also Lord Phillips, M.R., in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, [2005] EWCA Civ 74, [2005] 4 All E.R. 356, at para. 70, lamenting the division of roles that has taken shape in English courts under Reynolds.
[142] Abella J. — I am in complete agreement with the Chief Justice’s reasons for adding the “responsible communication” defence to Canadian defamation law. I also share her view that determining the availability of this defence entails a two-step analysis: the first to determine whether a publication is on a matter of public interest; and the second to determine whether the standard of responsibility is met. Yet while I agree that the first question is a matter of law for the judge to decide, I do not, with great respect, share her view that the jury should decide the second step. I see very little conceptual difference between deciding whether a communication is in the public interest and whether it is responsibly made. While both inquiries engage questions of fact and law, both are nonetheless predominantly legal issues. As a result, in my view the legal character of deciding whether the applicable standard of responsibility has been met in a given case is, like the public interest analysis, a matter for the judge.
[144] I accept that the jury’s participation in defamation cases is firmly entrenched in the psyche of defamation law and that authorizing judges to decide both steps of the responsible communication analysis leaves juries with a limited role. But I am unpersuaded that it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme to leave the legal issues at stake here with the judge and any disputed facts with the jury. It is worth remembering that such a potentially determinative role for the judge already exists when the defence of absolute or qualified privilege is engaged (Raymond E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), vol. 2, at pp. 12-289, 13-405 and 16-136). It is also useful to bear in mind the historical basis for the jury’s preeminent role in defamation cases. It was an outgrowth of Britain’s Libel Act of 1792 when juries were seen to be necessary as “watchdogs of democratic rights against unrepresentative governments” (New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 75, Defamation (1995), at para. 3.2, cited in Australian Broadcasting Corp. v. Reading, [2004] NSWCA 411 (AustLII), at para. 143). More than two centuries later, this rationale is difficult to sustain, as is the primacy of the jury’s role (Brown, vol. 3, at p. 17-115; Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, [2005] EWCA Civ 74, [2005] 4 All E.R. 356, at para. 70, per Lord Phillips, M.R.; Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed. 2008), at p. 1241; and David A. Anderson, “Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?” (1991-1992), 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, at p. 540).
Long‑time Harris backer awaits Tory nod on plan
NEW LISKEARD — During the past decade, millionaire lumber magnate Peter Grant — one of the most powerful business people in northern Ontario — has been generous with Mike Harris and the Conservatives.
In 1999, Grant poured $45,000 into Conservative pockets to speed their re‑election, — followed by another $21,000 last year.
Here, on a tiny peninsula on a cottage‑speckled lake, where families have come for generations, Grant wants to take three small golf holes on his property and expand them into a 3,290‑yard, nine‑hole course.
To do so, he needs the Harris government — with the support of Snobelen’s ministry — to sell him 10.5 hectares of crown land and approve the project.
“Herbicides, pesticides, fertilizers, will all wash into our lake,” insists Bonnie Taylor, who might be forgiven for sounding a little proprietary. Her pioneering family first built on this spring‑fed lake nearly 60 years ago.
Last winter, she wrote the province to say she’s worried about the impact the course could have on lake and well water — especially, she said, “with Walkerton still fresh on everyone’s mind.”
“Our client . . . does not intend to discuss his personal affairs with you,” his lawyers informed The Star by letter.
But for concerned cottagers back at lakeside — the issue is water.
It’s a worry not without foundation: some 18‑hole golf courses in the north have provincial permits to take as much as 2.2 million litres of water per day.
Such suspicions and anxiety over the approval process have set the stage for a classic confrontation, which — in the cottagers’ view — pits the public good of ordinary Ontarians, many of whom are senior citizens, against a single, powerful, private interest: Peter Grant.
The board — a kind of court of appeal for developers and citizens who disagree on a development — sided with a consultant who argued that the lake was too sensitive, teetering on overdevelopment with 200 cottages, and any additional building might constitute an environmental hazard.
His company, Grant Forest Products, is an important local employer. The company’s radio ads, which continually remind locals that Grant is “using our forests wisely,” are part of public consciousness. And every autumn, a charity golf tournament Grant holds using two public courses — the tournament culminates at his mini‑course — heralds the high point of this area’s social season. It always makes front‑page news.
So did the Premier’s visit here last fall, when he attended a post‑tournament reception for more than 600 at Grant’s palatial home.
When it comes to looking after business interests there, Grant depends on North Bay lobbyist Peter Birnie. Records at Elections Ontario show Birnie is vice‑president of Harris’ riding association.
His 14,500 square‑foot house on 4.5 hectares of lavishly landscaped property, was once appraised at $1.9 million. Neighbours note the occasional helicopter coming and going through the bush.
The seven‑bedroom main house has an indoor squash court with viewing gallery, a fully equipped gymnasium, and a Jacuzzi that can accommodate 15 people.
Outside, tennis courts are equipped with banks of lights that illuminate the night sky. And down on the water, there’s a 1,500‑square‑foot boat house.
There is also his three‑hole mini‑course — that Grant calls Frog’s Breath — which can be configured to play as a tiny five.
She remembers a run‑in she had with the Ministry of Natural Resources not so long ago over a sandbox.
“Around 1994, the ministry told us to move a sandbox we’d erected for our son,” Kramp recalls, “four planks with sand in the middle, because it was on crown land. This sandbox seemed to be interfering with the natural habitat of the area. And now a nine‑hole golf course is okay?”
Today, five politicians who represent the people of Hudson Township here (population: 501), are scheduled to meet to discuss a motion to amend local zoning bylaws and, according to a published notice, “permit the construction of a personal golf course — for the personal use of the property owner.”
“The people on this lake aren’t mega‑millionaires,” says Alexandra Skindra, mother, grandmother and property owner.
“They’re just regular people. Hard‑working people. This shouldn’t be happening.”
Looking trim at 75, Ira, a retired Hydro supervisor, can point to the shore where he built a two‑storey tree house for his granddaughters 18 summers ago.
“You know, we’ve known Peter since he was 3 years old,” says Murphy, a handsome, gray‑haired man with a taste for the outdoors.
Rudi Ptok, 71, says he’s worried about run‑off, and not just with pesticides, he says, but with the 400 kilograms of fertilizers per year that will be needed to keep Grant’s course green too.
(A.R., vol. XI, at pp. 4-12)
Appeal and cross‑appeal dismissed, with costs of the appeal in this Court to the respondents.
Solicitors for the appellants/respondents on cross‑appeal: Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondents/appellants on cross‑appeal: Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener the Ottawa Citizen: Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the interveners the Canadian Newspaper Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, RTNDA Canada/Association of Electronic Journalists, Magazines Canada, the Canadian Association of Journalists, the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, the Writers’ Union of Canada, the Professional Writers Association of Canada, the Book and Periodical Council, and PEN Canada: Brian MacLeod Rogers, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener Danno Cusson: Heenan Blaikie, Ottawa.