Source: http://openjurist.org/941/f2d/1172
Timestamp: 2014-12-19 00:47:21
Document Index: 537550622

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 401', '§ 481', '§ 482', '§ 411', '§ 481', '§ 411', '§ 402']

941 F2d 1172 Department of Labor v. Aluminum Brick and Glass Workers International Union Local | OpenJurist
941 F. 2d 1172 - Department of Labor v. Aluminum Brick and Glass Workers International Union Local	Home941 f2d 1172 department of labor v. aluminum brick and glass workers international union local
941 F2d 1172 Department of Labor v. Aluminum Brick and Glass Workers International Union Local 941 F.2d 1172
138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2381, 60 USLW 2251,120 Lab.Cas. P 10,963
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Elizabeth Dole, Secretary, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.ALUMINUM, BRICK AND GLASS WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL200, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-7505.
Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., Katherine L. Corley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Jeffrica J. Lee, Michael Jay Singer, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Appellate Staff, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Frank B. Potts, Robert L. Potts, Sherry Collum-Butler, Potts & Young, Florence, Ala., for defendant-appellee.
The Secretary of Labor brought this suit against a union, Local 200, Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers International, alleging it had denied some of its members the right to participate in the election of union officers. At issue was whether the union could condition the members' participation in union elections upon the payment of an assessment to assist other workers on strike. The union moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b), which the district court granted. We affirm.
Local 200 represents approximately 1,200 hourly-wage workers in the aluminum industry in Alabama. About fifty of its members work at the Muscle Shoals Minerals Company in Tuscumbia; the others work at Reynolds Metals Company in Listerhill. In May 1986 the International Union's national bargaining committee voted for a strike against Alcoa, another aluminum company, but not against Reynolds. The national committee also voted to assess each union member working for Reynolds $25 to aid the striking Alcoa workers. Local 200 members met on June 9-10 and approved the $25 strike assessment to be paid by Reynolds workers each week beginning June 9 for as long as the Alcoa strike lasted.1 Some members authorized Reynolds to withhold the $25 per week and transmit it to Local 200, but this check-off system was not implemented until the Alcoa strike had been underway for two weeks and the company deducted only after that two-week period. The strike lasted five weeks, so each Reynolds member of Local 200 owed a total of $125. For those members who authorized a check-off system, $50 was due directly and $75 was withheld by Reynolds. Local 200 notified its members of the assessment by letter on June 25, 1986.
In the months following the assessment, some members paid in full, some paid in part, and some did not pay. The issue arose again when Local 200 was preparing for its triennial election of union officers, which was scheduled for October 1988.2 On July 29, 1988, Local 200 sent a letter to all members--including those not working on account of reductions in the work force, vacation or illness--notifying them of the upcoming meeting for nominations for the union offices. The letter quoted from the Local 200 Constitution, Art. XIII, Section 2, which states:
Only members in good standing shall be allowed to vote. Good standing in the Local Union shall be defined as:
All dues (except current months dues), fines, reinstatement fees, and assessments, must be paid in full not later than the adjournment of the nomination meeting.
Art. XIII, Sec. 2 (Oct. 1987 version) (emphasis added). On August 16, 1988 the local posted on its bulletin boards a reminder that all "strike assessments must be paid prior to adjournment of the nominations meeting in order to vote in the next general election of officers." Local 200 then sought a ruling from the International Union on whether members who had not paid the Alcoa strike assessment on time would be allowed to vote, nominate and run for office in the upcoming election. Ernie LaBaff, president of the International Union, informed Local 200 that under Article XXVI of the International's constitution, any member who became two months in arrears in the payment of "dues, financial obligations, or assessments" automatically lost good standing status and was subject to the eligibility requirements of the local's constitution. The Local 200 Constitution stated that voters must have been in good standing as of the end of nominations;3 that those who nominate must have been in good standing for six months prior to nominations;4 and that those who are nominated must have been in continuous good standing and have paid all assessments during the thirty-six months prior to nominations.5
When the nominations meeting concluded August 23, 1988, about 400 members had not paid the strike assessment in full and were thus ineligible to vote. In addition, four nominations were voided either because the nominating member had not been in good standing at the time of the meeting or the nominee had not been in good standing for the previous thirty-six months.6 In the resulting slate, three candidates ran for President; for each of the other offices one candidate ran unopposed. The election was held October 10, and the incumbent president won a majority with 148 votes, compared to 89 and 44 for each of the challengers. Forty-four voters who had not paid as of the nomination meeting voted, but their votes were not counted. After two union members, Hinton and Dawson, complained that they unfairly had been denied the right to be nominated and had exhausted internal remedies, the Secretary of Labor filed this suit pursuant to Title IV of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The Secretary alleged that Local 200 members who had not paid the strike assessment on time had been entitled to participate in the October election under 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) and sought a new election under the supervision of the Department of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 482. The Secretary also alleged that those members had been subject to improper disciplinary action and therefore had been denied due process under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). The district court decided that relief was not available under either section 481(e) or 411(a)(5) because those sections protected only union members in good standing and the union had determined that good standing depended on payment of the strike assessment. The Secretary appeals.
The Secretary relies on two separate statutory sections to prove a violation of the federal labor code. One is in the subchapter dealing with union elections:
In any election required by this section ... every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed ) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (emphasis added).7 The second provision deals with safeguards against improper disciplinary action and is in the subchapter enumerating the Bill of Rights of individual union members:
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). The coverage of both of these statutory provisions is affected by the following definition in the Act:
"Member" or "member in good standing", when used in reference to a labor organization, includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of such organization.
29 U.S.C. § 402(o ). These three sections of the labor code form the framework of the lawsuit. We have plenary review of the district court's disposition of summary judgment. See Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1986); Thrasher v. State Far