Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/425/536/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 05:33:53
Document Index: 376497490

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2255']

The petitioner, Abraham Francis, was brought to trial in a Louisiana court in 1965 upon an indictment for felony murder. He was represented by counsel provided by the State. The Louisiana law then in force clearly required that any objection by a defendant to the composition of the grand jury that had indicted him had to be made in advance of his trial. Otherwise, the law provided, "all such objections shall be considered as waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard." [Footnote 1] No such chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There can be no question of a federal district court's power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a case such as this. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254. The issue, as in the Davis case, goes rather to the appropriate chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 241. The Louisiana time limitation applicable in the present case was obviously designed to serve precisely these same important purposes, as the Court specifically recognized more than 20 years ago in a case involving this chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I dissent. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), was a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Despite Fay's unqualified holding that a state procedural default can bar federal habeas relief sought by a state prisoner who was denied fundamental constitutional rights only if the petitioner deliberately bypassed orderly state procedures, the Court now rejects that "deliberate bypass" standard in the context of a constitutional challenge to the composition of a grand jury. [Footnote 2/1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If this case were an isolated instance of infidelity to the teaching of Fay, it might be seen as a simple aberration. But it is particularly distressing in light of decisions such as Estelle v. Williams, ante p. 425 U. S. 501, where the Court also exposes its hostility toward and makes substantial inroads into the precedential force of Fay chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Today's opinion is notably deficient in that respect. After properly conceding that "[t]here can be no question of a federal district court's power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a case such as this," ante at 425 U. S. 538, the Court notes that Davis v. United States, 411 U. S. 233 (1973), sustained Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The defects in this analysis are glaring. As my Brother MARSHALL pointed out in dissent in Davis, see 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 245-257, there was no justifiable basis for the Court's holding there. I still concur in the reasoning of that dissent, and therefore I will not repeat those arguments here. But more fundamentally for purposes of this case, it must be emphasized that the decision in Davis was at least based on the notion that Congress intended that the availability of collateral relief for federal prisoners under § 2255 would be governed by the same rules it had determined would govern the availability of relief during the criminal proceeding itself. See 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 241-243. [Footnote 2/2] I fail to comprehend how "considerations chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of comity and federalism" -- vague concepts that are given no content by the Court -- grant this Court the power to circumscribe the scope of congressionally intended chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
relief for state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Such considerations, in our federal system in which the federal courts are the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional rights, at most justify the postponement, not the abnegation, of federal jurisdiction. Fay interpreted § 2254 in light of such factors as the limitations on this Court's certiorari jurisdiction, the policy that federal rights not be denied "without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review," the concern that States are often not sufficiently sensitive to the need to protect those rights, and the historical significance and role of the Great Writ, see 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 399-435, and concluded that the discretionary power of federal courts to deny habeas relief to state petitioners deprived of constitutional rights is confined to the narrow category of situations in which they can be said to have waived the right to have their claims adjudicated by the knowing, intelligent, and deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures. Id. at 372 U. S. 438-439. "Surely no stricter rule is a realistic necessity." Id. at 372 U. S. 433. Yet the Court, invoking "comity and federalism," would now essentially preclude federal habeas relief for state defendants deprived of their constitutional rights, so long as the State requires that they assert those rights within a certain time period; this absolute and automatic "waiver" of the underlying constitutional claim would apparently take effect whether or not the defendant knew of his rights, whether or not the "untimely" challenge was nevertheless made at a time when no legitimate state interest would be upset by an adjudication of the claim on the merits, and whether or not mere inadvertence or actual incompetence of counsel accounted for the untimely challenge. It is difficult to conceive of a more pervasive repudiation of federal judicial responsibility to safeguard and preserve those precious rights to fair criminal process enshrined in the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, even if the Court were to carve out an exception to Fay for waiver of the right to challenge the composition of grand juries on the ground that the rule of Davis v. United States should apply "with equal force" to proceedings under § 2254 as to those under § 2255, there is no basis for the Court's inexplicable conclusion that petitioner must show not only "cause" for the untimeliness of the challenge, but also "actual prejudice." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ante at 425 U. S. 542. [Footnote 2/3] This ipse dixit, baldly asserted by the Court in its penultimate sentence without the slightest veneer of reasoning to shield the obvious fiat by which it has reached its result, hardly qualifies as, judicial craftsmanship. It is, beyond peradventure, a sad disservice to the Court's obligation to elaborate on its rationales for arriving at a particular rule of law. Indeed, the Court's apparent overruling of Fay at least for constitutional challenges to the composition of grand chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
juries [Footnote 2/4] and its unexplained imposition of an "actual prejudice" requirement on petitioner are particularly egregious in light of certain salient facts in this case, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Two months later, the State appointed uncompensated counsel for petitioner. During the period before trial, petitioner's counsel, who was in failing health and who had not practiced criminal law for several years, took essentially no action with respect to petitioner's defense. Not until the day before trial did counsel file any motions in this capital case, and it was only then that he filed such elementary motions as an application for a bill of particulars, a motion to quash the indictment on vagueness grounds, and a discovery motion seeking production of copies of the confessions petitioner had allegedly made to the police while he was still unrepresented. No challenge was made to the composition of the grand jury that had indicted petitioner, and petitioner was informed neither of the fact that such a challenge was possible nor of the fact that his counsel had not made such a challenge. On the day of petitioner's one-day trial, his motion to exclude the statements made to the police was denied without hearing. Petitioner was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, while his two older accomplices, who, after plea bargaining, had pled guilty, each received 8-year prison terms. [Footnote 2/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That court granted the writ on the ground that the Orleans Parish grand jury, which had been chosen by the Orleans Parish Jury Commission intentionally and systematically to exclude daily wage earners, was unconstitutionally constituted in that it excluded a disproportionate number of blacks and was not an impartial jury representing a cross-section of the community. The court, relying on Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), noted that, although petitioner could not now raise his grand jury challenge in the state courts, there was no similar bar to federal habeas relief because petitioner had not intentionally relinquished or abandoned his constitutional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Given these facts, the Court's unexplained imposition of an "actual prejudice" requirement for collateral relief from the state procedural default looms even more oppressive. The District Court has found that the grand jury that indicted petitioner was unconstitutionally composed, and that petitioner neither knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a proper grand jury indictment nor deliberately bypassed the state procedures for adjudicating his federal allegations, thus meeting Fay's prerequisites for habeas relief. Moreover, the District Court found that petitioner has shown sufficient "cause" for relief under the Davis test for relief from a procedural "waiver." This Court, recognizing that petitioner has overcome the hurdles of showing an unconstitutionally chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It would seem that, at a minimum, if the Court were to impose any "prejudice" requirement, it should require the State, once the racial bias of the grand jury is shown, to demonstrate that the constitutional deprivation was harmless error in that petitioner would have, beyond any reasonable doubt, been indicted for the same offense by a constitutionally composed grand jury. Such a test would at least allow the clearly justifiable relief sought in this case. For a constitutionally constituted grand jury was of the utmost importance to petitioner. The facts concerning the crime were essentially undisputed, and the pivotal decision in this case was invocation of the felony murder doctrine in an extremely rare factual context laden with racial overtones. If there was any case in which a constitutionally composed grand jury could perform its "historic function" of determining chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, the Court has never fully addressed the constitutional dimensions of the waiver problem, and certainly failed to do so in Davis. "[W]aiver affecting federal rights is a federal question." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 372 U. S. 439 (1963). If, as a matter of constitutional law, a substantive constitutional right (for example, the right to counsel or the right to a speedy trial) may not be lost unless it has been knowingly and intelligently waived by the defendant, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464 (1938); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 407 U. S. 525-529 (1972); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 412 U. S. 235-246, 412 U. S. 276-277 (1973), it is difficult to fathom how the existence vel non of a state procedural rule that a claim to that right must be asserted at a particular time can in any way dilute that constitutional waiver standard. For example, if a State passed a rule that any defendant must claim indigency upon arrest or be deemed to have waived his right to appointed counsel, I do not see how we could legitimately conclude that the substantive right was waived unless the defendant knew he had the right to appointed counsel and knowingly and intelligently failed to assert it. Similarly, even if we were to hold that a defendant may be bound by certain actions of his counsel, it would seem that counsel must be shown to have knowingly and intelligently acted on his client's behalf. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 (1965). This symmetry between waiver of the substantive right in the absence of a procedural rule and forfeiture of that right by failure to assert it in compliance with a State's procedural rule was preserved in Fay, which adopted the analogue of the Johnson v. Zerbst "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard -- the deliberate bypass standard -- as the appropriate standard for measuring procedural defaults. See 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 439. See also 425 U. S. 4, infra.