Source: http://www.uclpractitioner.com/attorneys_fees_ccp_10215/page/2/
Timestamp: 2018-01-20 01:25:36
Document Index: 719170733

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§ 1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§ 1021', '§1021', '§1021', '§ 1782', '§1021', '§1021', '§1021']

One important point to remember from Vasquez is the holding that, while a prelitigation demand is not absolutely required, whether the plaintiff made one is going to be relevant to the court's analysis of whether a fees award is proper under section 1021.5. See, e.g., slip op. at 6, 18. The opinion provides some examples of factors that might justify not making a prelitigation demand:
The statute’s relevant language provides the court may award attorney fees if, among other things, “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate ... .” (§ 1021.5, subd. (b), italics added.) This language does not expressly or by necessary implication require that the plaintiff have attempted to settle the dispute; it requires, instead, only that the court determine that private enforcement was sufficiently necessary to justify the award. To be sure, failed attempts to settle can help to demonstrate that litigation was necessary, but the absence of settlement attempts does not logically or necessarily demonstrate the contrary. Depending on the circumstances of the case, attempts to settle may have been futile, exigent circumstances may have required immediate resort to judicial process, or prior efforts to call the problem to the defendant’s attention — perhaps by other parties or in other proceedings — may have been rebuffed. The language of section 1021.5 is sufficiently flexible to permit courts to consider these and all other relevant circumstances in determining whether private enforcement was sufficiently necessary to justify awarding fees.
Slip op. at 6-7 (footnote omitted). The opinion goes on:
As we have explained, settlement efforts (or their absence) are relevant in every case to show that “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate . . . .” (§ 1021.5, italics added.) In assessing such information in a particular case to determine whether private enforcement was sufficiently necessary to justify an award of fees, the trial court exercises its equitable discretion in light of all the relevant circumstances. That a plaintiff for tactical reasons might choose not to propose, or not to accept, a reasonable settlement offer is thus, in every case, a circumstance that potentially weighs against an award of fees. In Graham, we simply identified a set of cases at one end of the equitable spectrum that appeared to justify a bright-line rule because, in those cases, no court-ordered change in the parties’ legal relationship exists to show that the public benefit supposedly meriting fees was caused by the plaintiff’s litigation rather than by the defendant’s voluntary action.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Another important aspect of the opinion is its discussion of whether the case at bar was a "catalyst" case subject to the prelitigiation demand requirement of Graham. The Court said no:
While we did not in Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th 553, expressly define “catalyst case,” a definition of the term is necessarily implicit both in Graham and in its companion case, Tipton-Whittingham, supra, 34 Cal.4th 604. In Graham, we described “the catalyst theory” as permitting attorneys fees to be awarded “even when litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation.” (Graham, at p. 560, italics added.) Similarly, in Tipton-Whittingham we held that Graham’s “limitations on the catalyst theory” (Graham, at p. 575) set out the factual prerequisites that a plaintiff must establish “[i]n order to obtain attorney fees without ... a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties ... .” (Tipton-Whittingham, at p. 608, italics added.) Accordingly, and of necessity, a plaintiff who has not succeeded in obtaining “a judicial resolution” (Graham, at p. 560) or “a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties” (Tipton-Whittingham, at p. 608) must obtain attorney fees under the catalyst theory, or not at all.
This case is not a catalyst case because Vasquez successfully obtained a stipulated injunction that was entered as a judgment and thus brought about a judicially recognized change in the parties’ legal relationship. (See Tipton-Whittingham, supra, 34 Cal.4th 604, 608.) ....
It will be quite interesting to see how Vasquez plays out in future cases. What do you think?
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
This morning's Daily Journal has an article on the Supreme Court's decision yesterday in the Vasquez case. An excerpt:
Attorney Michael Rubin of Altshuler Berzon in San Francisco ... said the opinion eliminates any potential confusion about when attorneys can collect fees.
"This ruling is consistent with the California Supreme Court's pragmatic, centrist approach to judicial decision-making," Rubin said. "It ended up with a result that is fair to all parties in this and future cases."
The attorney general's office had also weighed in on the state's side. The office was in the unique position of wanting to see public-interest lawyers get compensated for their work but also having to defend the state against such litigation.
Although the court did not adopt the rule the state sought, Supervising Attorney General Ed Weil said the new guidelines are an improvement.
"As a practical matter, if you're an attorney out there deciding what to do, the only prudent course is an effort to resolve the matter before filing," he said. "If you don't, the ruling may come back to haunt you."
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 09:41 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), News reports and practice articles | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The Supreme Court's decision in Vasquez v. State of California, ___ Cal.4th ___ (Nov. 20, 2008) is now up. The Court held that in non-catalyst cases, section 1021.5 contains no "categorial" rule requiring a prelitigation demand as a prerequisite to an attorneys' fees award. In other words, the Court limited its holding in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553 (2004) to catalyst cases. The Court also held that evidence of prelitigation efforts to resolve a dispute may be considered, in the trial court's discretion, when determining whether "the necessity ... of private enforcement ... [was] such as to make the award appropriate."
The State argues a court may never award attorney fees under section 1021.5 unless the plaintiff attempted to settle before resorting to litigation. Neither the language of the statute nor the cases interpreting it impose[s] such a categorical requirement. In determining, however, whether “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement ... are such as to make the award appropriate” (§ 1021.5), a court properly takes into consideration whether the party seeking fees attempted to resolve the matter without litigation.
We have not interpreted section 1021.5 as imposing a prelitigation settlement demand requirement in noncatalyst cases. In Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th 553, we did require prelitigation demands, but only in catalyst cases.
Slip op. at 7, 9 (emphasis in original).
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 01:48 PM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Today's notice of forthcoming opinions states that the Supreme Court will be handing down its opinion in the Vasquez attorneys' fees case tomorrow morning. Vasquez v. Superior Court, case no. S143710 (argued 09/03/08). This is the issue on review:
The court limited review to the following issue: Does the rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to this case? (See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966–967.)
If the question is answered in the affirmative, it stands to expand the pre-filing notice requirement to cases beyond catalyst theory cases, which were addressed in Graham. For more on the case, see this blog post. When the opinion is handed down, it should be available at this link.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 12:30 PM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The docket confirms that on Wednesday, September 3, 2008, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Vasquez v. State of California, no. S143710, which raises the following issue:
Does the rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to this case? (See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.).
I was out of town on the day of the argument, and I have received no reports on it. We can expect an opinion to be handed down no later than December 1, 2008.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 04:51 PM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Here is an interesting case. In In re Lugo, 164 Cal.App.4th 1522 (Jul. 21, 2008), the class action device was used in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding to compel the Board of Parole Hearings to provide timely parole consideration hearings as required by the Penal Code. The class was defined as "all prisoners serving indeterminate terms of life with the possibility of parole who have approached or exceeded their minimum eligible parole dates without receiving their parole hearings within the time required" by law. The trial court issued a remedial injunction requiring the Board to take various steps to come into compliance with the law, then awarded attorneys' fees to the prisoners' counsel, including a 1.5 multiplier. Slip op. at 3-5.
The Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Three) reversed certain aspects of the remedial injunction, but affirmed the attorneys' fees award, holding that the 1.5 multiplier (a figure that is "not large by comparison to those typically seen in reported cases") was not an abuse of discretion. Slip op. at 21-23.
The Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have issued some interesting class-action-related opinions in recent weeks:
In In re: Nortel Networks Corp. Securities Litig., ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 2008), the Second Circuit affirmed an attorneys' fees award in a securities class action settlement.
In Silvercreek Mgmt. Inc. v. Banc of America Securities LLC, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Jul. 7, 2008), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's approval of a class action settlement, holding that the objectors' objections were properly overruled and that others had failed to timely opt out. [Via Blawgletter.]
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), Class actions - general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), The CLRA, UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (1)
The Supreme Court has set Vasquez v. Superior Court, no. S143710, for oral argument on September 3, 2008 at 9:00 a.m. in San Francisco. The Court will be deciding this issue:
Does the rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to this case? (See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.)
The Court of Appeal determined that the party opposing the fee award waived that issue by not raising it below. Vasquez v. State of California, 138 Cal.App.4th 550 (2006) (Fourth Appellate District, Division Two).
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), Supreme Court and Court of Appeal arguments | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
On a related note, the Supreme Court is currently considering Vasquez v. State of California, no. S143710 (review granted 08/16/06), in which the issue on review is as follows:
Does the rule that, in order to receive attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the plaintiff must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation, apply to [cases other than catalyst theory cases]? (See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 557; Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.)
The Court of Appeal determined that the party opposing the fee award waived the issue by not raising it below. Vasquez v. State of California, 138 Cal.App.4th 550 (2006) (Fourth Appellate District, Division Two) (slip op. at 18-19).
BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court to issue private attorney general doctrine opinion tomorrow: Olson v. Autombile Club of Southern California
Tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m., the Supreme Court will release its opinion in a case involving Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general doctrine:
Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, no. S143999 (argued in San Francisco 1-09-08) The court limited review to the following issue: Is a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney’s fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5) entitled to recover expert witness fees?
When the opinion is up, it will be available at this link: Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, __ Cal.4th ___ (Feb. 28, 2008).
UPDATE: The opinion is up. The Supreme Court held that "a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to an award of expert witness fees in addition to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5." Slip op. at 2.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 05:30 PM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Two new decisions construing the private attorney general doctrine of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 have recently been handed down.
In Adoption of Joshua S., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jan. 24, 2008), the Supreme Court held that "section 1021.5 does not authorize an award of attorney fees against an individual who has done nothing to adversely affect the rights of the public or a substantial class of people other than raise an issue in the course of private litigation that could establish legal precedent adverse to a portion of the public ...." Slip op. at 2. The Court agreed with the argument that "section 1021.5 attorney fees should not be imposed on parties ... who ha[ve] only engaged in litigation to adjudicate private rights from which important appellate precedent happens to emerge, but has otherwise done nothing to compromise the rights of the public or a significant class of people." Id. at 8.
And in Roybal v. Governing Board, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Jan. 11, 2008; pub. ord. Feb. 6, 2008), the Court of Appeal (Sixth Appellate District) reversed a fees award under section 1021.5, holding that the action had not "resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest." Slip op. at 5-9, passim.
The Supreme Court just announced that it will hand down two new opinions tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. While they are not strictly related to the UCL, they do sound very interesting, especially the second one, which addresses attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5:
ROSS (GARY) v. RAGINGWIRE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
This case presents the following issue: Was the plaintiff in a civil action that was brought to confirm the validity of a so-called second parent adoption (see Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417) entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 for enforcing an important right affecting the public interest, when the plaintiff had a strong and significant, but nonpecuniary, individual private interest in pursuing the litigation?
When the opinions come down, they will be available at these links:
Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jan. 24, 2007)
Adoption of Joshua S., ___ Cal.4th ___ (Jan. 24, 2007)
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 12:40 PM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), UCL - Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Yesterday's Recorder had an article on a case to be argued today in the California Supreme Court addressing whether expert witness fees, in addition to attorneys' fees, are recoverable under the private attorney general doctrine of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Mike McKee, "Private AGs Watching Fate of Expert Fees" (Jan. 8, 2007) (subscription).
The case in which this issue has been raised is Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, no. S143999. The Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Two) held that section 1021.5 did not authorize recovery of expert witness fees:
Only one reported decision, Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1421 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 459] (Beasley), permits the award of expert witness fees under section 1021.5 for experts not ordered by the court. We disagree with Beasley, as its conclusion is contrary to the plain statutory language and legislative intent, and its reasoning is unpersuasive.
Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 139 Cal.App.4th 552 (2006) (review granted 07/26/06).
The California Blog of Appeal has a detailed post on Cruz v. Ayromloo, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 3, 2007) (Second Appellate District, Division Seven), which is an interesting attorneys' fees case. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed a fees award in a pro bono matter, holding (in dicta, due to the prevailing party's failure to cross-appeal from the order fixing the amount of fees) that that there is no authority for reducing the lodestar simply because the case was taken on a pro bono basis: "We do not find it self-evident a law firm’s commendable willingness to provide its services on a pro bono basis to low income clients should necessarily justify a diminishment in the fee award when that pro bono representation proves successful. .... [O]ur research uncovered no case in which a trial court reduced a fee award simply because of the 'pro bono type of work' involved." Slip op. at 9 (footnote omitted).
And California Appellate Report has a post on Nichols v. City of Taft, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Oct. 2, 2007) (Fifth Appellate District), another attorneys' fees case. This case involves attorneys' fees sought by "members of a large out-of-town law firm with offices in Los Angeles and San Francisco, [whose] usual fees [are] considerably higher than would be charged in the local Kern County area." Slip op. at 2. The Court of Appeal held that applying a lodestar multiplier is not mandatory, but rather discretionary, and that the trial court erred by concluding that it was required to apply a multiplier. Id. at 7-10 (citing Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 (2001)). The Court also held that "[u]se of a fee multiplier to compensate for the higher rates of out-of-town counsel requires a sufficient showing -- which plaintiff failed to make in this case -- that hiring local counsel was impracticable." Id. at 12.
New federal decision re catalyst theory: Trew v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc.
In Trew v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, E.D. Cal., Civ. No. S-05-1379 RRB EFB (order filed 07/31/07), United States District Judge Ralph R. Beistline granted final approval of a class action settlement and awarded attorneys' fees under the catalyst theory. The court found that a CLRA notice letter (see Civ. Code § 1782) satisfied the pre-litigation demand requirement of Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553 (2004). Thanks to the blog reader who emailed me this order.
The Appellate Division also affirmed the amount of the fees award, finding it reasonable, and further held that Mr. Gorman would be entitled to recover his attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. Id. at 11. While challenges to unconscionable arbitration clauses come up quite often in class action litigation, this decision certainly provides an incentive for credit card holders and other consumers to challenge such clauses even in individual actions.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Appellate practice, Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), Class actions - arbitration | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The decision addresses a question about the catalyst theory that I've had in my mind ever since the Supreme Court decided Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553 (2004). In Graham, the Supreme Court held that fees can be recovered under the catalyst theory only if the plaintiff made a pre-lawsuit attempt to resolve the dispute. Id. at 577. So, what if your case was already on file before Graham was decided? How can you satisfy that requirement after the fact? Under Abouab, you can't. The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could not recover fees under the catalyst theory because (among other reasons) he had not satified the pre-lawsuit notification requirement, even though his case was filed before the Supreme Court announced that requirement in Graham. (Slip op. at 21-30.) That does not seem entirely fair, but I suppose we should all be thankful that the Supreme Court adopted the catalyst theory at all.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)
Because the UCL has no attorneys' fees provision, successful plaintiffs typically seek their fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the "private attorney general" doctrine. In Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo, ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (May 26, 2006), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Five) held that, absent a contrary agreement with the client, the right to recover fees under section 1021.5 belongs to the attorney. That means that the attorney can intervene in the action and seek fees on her own behalf even if the client refuses to authorize a fee request:
Were we to interpret section 1021.5 as precluding intervention and an attorney’s request for fees where the client declines to move for a fee award, we would diminish the certainty that attorneys who undertake public interest cases will receive reasonable compensation and dilute section 1021.5’s effectiveness at encouraging counsel to undertake litigation enforcing important public policies. (See Flannery [v. Prentice], supra, 26 Cal.4th [572] 583 [(2001)].) Were we to adopt respondents’ position it would also provide a windfall to the wrongdoing defendant, at the expense of the attorneys who labored in the public interest. (Cf. id. at pp. 585-586 [interpreting Government Code section 12965 to avoid windfall to client]; MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1091 [“California courts are justifiably reluctant to construe statutes to confer a windfall”]; Lolley v. Campbell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 367, 376 [interpreting fee provision in the Labor Code to avoid windfall to wrongdoing employer in form of exemption from paying attorney fees].) Finally, interpreting section 1021.5 as permitting intervention and a motion for fees by attorneys on their own behalf avoids wasteful collateral actions wherein attorneys sue their former clients because the clients’ refusal to move for fees led to loss of an opportunity to seek a fee award under section 1021.5.
Slip op. at 15. The opinion also notes that any motion for fees under section 1021.5 must be filed before entry of final judgment. Slip op. at 14.
Posted by Kimberly A. Kralowec at 06:00 AM in Attorneys’ fees (CCP §1021.5), UCL - remedies in general | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)