Source: https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/voting_rights_election_law/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 21:10:47
Document Index: 534592800

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 1983', '§ 3', '§ 7', 'art. 2', '§ 7']

Wednesday's Reading List: Vermont Eminent Domain, The Big Island's Weed Ordinance, And Quo Warranto
Eminent Domain, Ultra Vires, and Adverse Possession Walk Into a Bar... - from SCOV Law, a blog about the decisions of the Vermont Supreme Court: "Get ready to dust off your nineteenth-century-property-law hats, folks, cause this case is chock-full of neglected old cases about rail beds, public trails, adverse possession, eminent domain, and railroad corporations venturing outside the realm of their existential purpose."
Writ to Watch: Ruggles v. Yagong - from Rebecca Copeland at Record on Appeal, about a case which the Hawaii Supreme Court recently agreed to review. The issue is whether an ordinance adopted by the voters of the County of Hawaii (the Big Island) is preempted by state law. The initiative ordinance made it the official policy of the County to make enforcement of personal use of marijuana the lowest priority for the police and prosecutors. Oh my. The trial court and the court of appeals agreed with the County that the ordinance was preempted by superior state law. Muni law junkies, take note.
Another one from the Big Island, on our second-favorite topic, quo warranto, Judge rejects motion to dismiss Leithead Todd case. The County Charter requires the Director of the Department of Environmental Management have "an engineering degree or a degree in a related field." Turns out that the person who holds that position has a JD -- but alas and alack -- not an engineering degree, so was sued by a Big Island councilmember in quo warranto.
Small kid time: Views of central-leeward Oahu in 1957, from Ian Lind's blog. A few photos of what Hawaii used to look like (and still does, in more places that some folks would like you to believe). We know, we were there about then.
Property Rights Save the Environment - from Defining Ideas, a journal at California's Hoover Institution. It's about fracking and the risk associated therewith ("Real, but rare" starts off the piece).
This Land Is Your Land, Until Dallas Need It - from Texas Monthly, a story about privately-owned land that might be flooded in order to create a new reservior to provide Dallas with water.
Attorney: Suit against Leithead Todd should be dropped
Posted on June 18, 2014 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Environmental law, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Voting rights | election law, ▪ Water rights | Public trust, ▪ Zoning & Planning | Permalink | 0 Comments
It was always ironic to us that on one hand, the State of Hawaii and seemingly every Hawaii pol aggressivly lobbied for a large military presence in Hawaii in order to enjoy the money and the extra seat in Congress that Hawaii's military population brings us, but when it came time to count these folks in the population for state apportionment and districting, Hawaii law considers them to be "transients," and aggressively treats them as invisible: mahalo for your money, but don't expect to be counted.
Posted on February 25, 2014 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Schadenfreude, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Our Latin cousins warned us long ago homo sapiens non urinat in ventum ("a wise man does not pee into the wind") but such wisdom doesn't prevent us from trying at times to buck the conventional thinking. Because sometimes, you don't know which way the wind is blowing until you go outside and actually feel the breeze.
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court told us. In a one-line order, the Court affirmed the three-judge U.S. District Court's ruling that the 2012 Hawaii Reapportionment Plan, which excluded active duty military, military families, and students who do not pay resident tuition from the population basis, did not fall short of Equal Protection's requirements. See also SCOTUSblog's "Hawaii Redistricting Upheld." The 2012 Plan treats these classes as residents who have not exhibited the intent to remain in Hawaii "permanently." The Court also affirmed the 2012 Plan's very large (44% and 21%) deviations from population equality.
Disclosure: we represent the challengers to the Plan.
This was always an uphill (upwind?) challenge because in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the Court seemed to conclude that it was purely a political question about who Hawaii must include within its definition of "population," and it could thus exclude the military as "transients." What this means presently is that these exclusions will not be touched by the courts, at least until the next reapportionment cycle, and that the questions presented by the case will need to be debated and resolved in the political arena and elsewhere, if at all.
But for now, the Court's order ends the case.
Posted on January 21, 2014 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Equal Protection, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
We're going, for sure. The Law School is at 2515 Dole Street, in balmy Honolulu.
Posted on January 9, 2014 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Seminars, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Here's the latest on the Hawaii Democratic Party's federal court challenge to Hawaii's "open primary" election system, a case we've covered earlier. Both the Party and the defendant State of Hawaii have sought summary judgment, but according to this report ("Judge hints at ruling in Democratic Party's lawsuit"), it may be too early in the case for either side to win as a matter of law.
The issue at the heart of the case is whether Hawaii's mandatory open primary system of choosing a party's standard-bearer to run in the general election is a "severe burden" on the Party's right to association. As this story by Ian Lind in Civil Beat ("Is 'Open Primary' a 'Severe Burden' on Democrats?") notes:
That question of whether or not the “open primary” is a “severe burden” on the party will likely determine the eventual outcome of the case.
If the court agrees that the open primary creates a severe burden on the right of association, then it must subject the state’s justifications to “strict scrutiny.” Under this standard, the state’s justifications must be both “compelling” and narrowly drawn, both tough legal standards to meet.
But if the burden on the party’s rights is something less than severe, the court would apply a lower standard of review, perhaps requiring only that the state have a “rational basis” for adopting the open primary.
Mr. Lind followed up on that report with "Another look at the Democratic Party lawsuit against state's 'open primary'" on his own blog, correctly concluding that "[t]he case is a classic clash of two constitutional rights," the Party's right to association and to determine who votes to choose the Party's general election candidate on one hand, and on the other, the voters' rights to choose their representatives in primary elections, which, in Hawaii's deep-blue political environment, often determine who wins the general election. The open primary system, which allows anyone to associate on primary election day with the Democratic Party for that day (or longer), is a voter-focused process. The Party's associational right to choose its standard-bearer, however, could be the trump card, since the U.S. Supreme Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), affirmed that principle is very tough to overcome.
Legalities aside, what to us makes this case intriguing is the very fact that the Democratic Party -- whose members form the overwhelming majority of Hawaii's federal, state, and local elected officials -- found this lawsuit a necessary or wise move. You'd think that if the mandatory open primary resulted in general election candidates who diluted Democratic Party values, the Party could gets its elected members to try and change the law, rather than file a lawsuit that most of its elected officials have publicly disavowed, and, as the Civil Beat story notes, the public has shown only a "collective yawn" at.
What this indicates to us is that the Party's leaders really want a more ideological Democratic Party, and perhaps this lawsuit, while not exactly popular, is part of a long-term gambit to take the Party -- and Hawaii -- further into the blue territory. If that happens, expect even more aggressive legislation, which, unless the other party suddenly finds political legs that it hasn't had for decades (or takes advantage of this by positioning itself as the "big tent" party), would mean that Hawaii's leftward arc would not only continue but would likely accelerate. The Democratic Party leaders appear to be gambling that the Hawaii GOP will remain weak, so we at least won't be subject to ideologically-based political battles as we've recently witnessed from Washington. But if that prediction is wrong, a couple of results may be in the cards: a pitch by the Hawaii GOP for the middle, for those voters who are no longer welcome in the Hawaii Democrats' ideological litmus-test primary, and if that is successful, legislative turf wars between a more-idelogical Hawaii Democratic Party and a moderated-but-still-likely-minority Hawaii GOP.
Today, on behalf of the people challenging the 2012 Hawaii Reapportionment Plan for excluding military personnel, their families, and out-of-state students from Hawaii's population, we filed this Jurisdictional Statement (with Appendix), arguing that there are substantial questions meriting the U.S. Supreme Court's full consideration in our appeal of a three-judge U.S. District Court decision upholding the Plan.
We won't go into the details of the argument, but here's the short story, and earlier briefs.
Here are the Questions Presented, which should give you a flavor of the issues:
1. Equal representation. At the direction of the Hawaii Supreme Court, the 2011 Hawaii Reapportionment Commission (Commission) determined that 108,767 residents—nearly 8% of Hawaii’s Census-counted population—were not "permanent residents," and thus could be excluded from Hawaii’s body politic because they did not intend to remain permanently: (1) active duty military personnel who indicated on a federal form that another state should withhold taxes, (2) their spouses and children, and (3) students who did not qualify for in-state tuition. The Commission acknowledged those whom it "extracted" were not counted anywhere else, and that they were not represented equally in Hawaii. The District Court refused to apply close constitutional scrutiny, and concluded Hawaii’s "permanent resident" population basis was a rational means of protecting other residents’ voting power, which superseded the extracted classes' right to equal representation. The Commission counted others who could not intend to remain permanently (e.g., undocumented aliens), or whose inclusion diluted voting power because they were not qualified to vote (prisoners, minors). The first question presented:
Does the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement of substantial population equality mandate that representational equality take precedence over voting power as held by the Ninth Circuit, or is the choice of whom to count left entirely to political processes, as held by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and the District Court, and has Hawaii appropriately defined and uniformly applied "permanent residents" to deny the extracted persons equal representation?
2. Extreme deviations. The Commission recognized that with overall deviations of 44.22% in the Senate and 21.57% in the House of Representatives—the product of Hawaii’s prohibition of "canoe districts" (districts spanning more than a single county)—the 2012 Reapportionment Plan was presumptively discriminatory. This Court has never upheld a reapportionment plan with deviations in excess of 16%, which "may well approach tolerable limits." The District Court accepted these substantial departures from population equality because Hawaii is geographically and culturally different. The second question presented:
Is Hawaii’s prohibition on legislators representing people in more than one county a "substantial and compelling" justification rendering the 44.22% and 21.57% deviations "minor," or are these deviations too large to be constitutionally acceptable?
Here's the latest brief in the Democratic Party's federal court challenge to Hawaii's "open primary" system (the Party's reply brief, which both is its final word supporting its motion for summary judgment, and its response to the State of Hawaii's counter-motion for summary judgment).
This brief responds to the State's argument that the mandatory open primary (in which voters can pull a ballot for any party on election day, regardless of the voter's party affiliation or nonaffiliation) isn't that much of a burden on the Democrats' freedom to associate with whom they choose. The Party asserts its associational rights are overly burdened by prohibiting it from insuring that its card-carrying members are the ones who are making the choice for the Party's general election standard-bearer.
Yes, the brief argues, Hawaii may be overwhelmingly blue, but don't penalize us for being good at what we do by making us hang out with those who haven't sworn allegiance to our goals (those whom the brief labels "lazy Democratic-leaning persons"):
Frankly, Defendant’s goal is troubling. Using the power of the state to equalize political outcomes, in a district where most citizens think one way, is a dangerous idea. Excusing political fecklessness by penalizing political competence, is a dangerous idea. Also, if the purported state interest is to preserve parties as interest groups that are “viable and identifiable” and able to engage in robust debate, how can any party take a non-conventional view, if all voters can select its candidates?
Brief at 4-6.
Here's some news: the State of Hawaii thinks that Hawaii has a "vibrant multi-party system."
The reality, of course, is not only different, it is much different, as a summary of the situation by Honolulu Civil Beat ("One-Party Dominance") points out. An overwhelmingly Democratic congressional delegation, a nearly one-party legislature, only one non-Democratic governor since the initial post-statehood Bill Quinn (R), etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.
Here's more interesting news. To all you "crossover" voters who pulled one party or another's ballot in Hawaii's "open primary" election: the State of Hawaii says that by doing so, you are affiliating with that party. Well, at least enough that the primary system is not violating the Party's right to association with whom it wants, meaning most likely not you.
These are among the gems to be gleaned from the State's counter-motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opp to the Democratic Party's motion for summary judgment, filed earlier this week in the federal lawsuit challenging the open primary process.
The lawsuit -- which perhaps says more about the internal differences within Hawaii's Democratic Party than it does about First Amendment and voting law (despite the fact that Hawaii's legislature is overwhelmingly Democratic, it has not altered the open primary process in the way the Democratic Party lawsuit seeks) -- argues the open primary system violates the constitution because it forces Democrats to potentially associate with -- gasp -- non-card-carrying Democrats during the state-law-mandated primary election.
As we noted here, we think the case may turn on the fact that the open primary is the exclusive method for political parties to select their general election candidates. If Hawaii law was more "open," and provided alternative means for the parties to choose their candidates, then the lawsuit seems like it would be less likely to suceed. The odd part about this, as we noted above, is that with an iron grip on the legislative and executive branches, why can't the Democratic Party just get its member-legislators to amend the statute and close the primary? The fact that a lawsuit was necessary to do what the legislature could have but didn't, points to more going on that we understand. Perhaps someone out there who knows the politics of this (there's always politics, isn't there?) can 'splain it to us.
The State's brief makes as good an argument as it can, arguing that if the Democratic Party's associational rights are indeed burdened by the mandatory open primary system, then the burden isn't all that "severe," because it doesn't really force parties to associate with total strangers.
Say your're a Republican and on election day pull a Democratic ballot. Under the open primary system, you can't then go and pull a Republican ballot. To the State, that means that on that day at least, you are affiliating with the Democratic Party. Democrat-for-a-Day. Your affiliation may be brief, but unlike the "blanket" primary system that has been invalidated as unconstitutional (those provide a ballot with everyone, and a voter can freely wander between parties on a single ballot), your affiliation is exclusive.
That seems about as "affiliating" as a one night stand. Sure, your're "together," but you won't be tomorrow. A marriage of convenience, so to speak. But the State argues that although your "relationship" may be neither deep and meaningful, nor long, there's no denying it's exclusive, if only for the moment. Makes some sense, no? And hey, the U.S. Supreme Court said it, not us. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 n.8 (2000) ("The act of voting in the Democratic primary fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with the Democratic Party.").
The State's brief argues this is the critical point: the Democratic Party isn't being forced to associate with complete strangers, but with "affiliates."
Ah, now we get it. doo-be-doo-be-doo ...
And what of the State's point that the public's interest in this system outweighs the Democratic Party's interest in its not-severly-limited associational rights because this promotes our robust multi-party system in Hawaii? Well, under the existing state of affairs, that seems positively laughable. But as the Republicans of the pre-statehood era surely were taught, times do change so perhaps one day, a statement like this that today is more humorous than an accurate reflection of reality, may become reality.
In the meantime, and until such time as the federal court strikes down Hawaii's open primary requirement, political parties will be forced only to associate with their "Affiliates in the Night."
Defendant Scott Nago's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's...
We represent the plaintiffs (and now appellants). Our Statement of Jurisdiction will be filed in the next couple of months.
As usual with the comments section, there are a few let's say "inaccurate" comments. Here's how we responded:
First, those who were extracted are not counted in their "home states" or anywhere else but Hawaii. Because HI doesn't count them, they have no representation in any state legislature. Second, this is not about being counted for voting. Hawaii does not extract others who don't vote: aliens (both lawful and otherwise), COFA migrants, prisoners, children, those who are eligible but simply choose not to vote. Hawaii's rationale for the extraction is that the right to voting equality is more important than the right to representational equality. We think the Constitution says otherwise. That's one of the issues the Supreme Court will decide.
Finally, the current procedures are not the usual "certiorari" procedures is most cases where the Supreme Court has the discretion whether to take a case decided by the Courts of Appeals. In state reapportionment cases such as this, the Court has "appellate" jurisdiction to directly review decisions by the US District Court for the District of Hawaii. In these specialized appeals, the Court *must* review the case (although it may do so summarily, if it chooses). The headline is accurate.
Stay tuned, as we say.
Posted on August 14, 2013 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Hawaii Federal Court: Kauai Charter Amendment Limiting Vacation Rentals Is A Prohibited "Zoning Initiative"
Late last year, we posted the Complaint in a federal court lawsuit originating on Kauai. In that case, the owner of a property that has been designated for resort development for 35 years asserted that the adoption of a Charter amendment by the County's voters and a follow-on ordinance adopted by the County Council that together created a new land use classification ("transient accommodation unit"), and severely limit the number of TAU's was an attempt to restrict the number of visitors and part-time residents.
The Complaint contains three major allegations: (1) the measures are arbitrary and capricious and violate substantive due process as an attempt to limit visitors, (2) they violate the Hawaii Zoning Enabling Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-4, the state statute delegating zoning authority to the counties in certain areas for all you land use nerds), which prohibits adopting of zoning ordinances by initiative, and (3) the Charter measure violated the Kauai Charter's requirement that the ballot question contain an objective summary of the measure.
In an order filed two weeks ago, the District Court addressed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the latter two counts (neither the plaintiff nor the defendants sought judgment on the substantive due process claim).
The court concluded that the Charter amendment adopted by the voters was, in reality, a prohibited zoning initiative. The court relied on the rationale of Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 777 P.2d 244 (Haw. 1989), a case in which we successfully argued that § 46-4 prohibits a municipality from adopting a zoning ordinance via the initiative process. In Kaiser Hawaii Kai, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that section 46-4 delegates comprehensive zoning authority to the counties, and this requires them to exercise that power in a uniform manner, which is jeopardized by piecemeal voter-adopted measures. The District Court held:
First, although the facts of Kaiser Hawaii Kai are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case, nothing in Kaiser Hawaii Kai indicates that the legal principles which the Hawai`i Supreme Court articulated in that case are limited to initiatives to change the zoning of specific tracts of land. The legal principles in Kaiser Hawaii Kai are clear, and they are equally applicable to other instances in which counties attempt to legislate zoning issues through voter initiative. This Court also rejects Defendants’ argument that Section 3.19 and Ordinance No. 912 merely enacted a permissible shift of internal authority within the County. Section 3.19 and Ordinance No. 912 created a land use classification that did not previously exist, and they established the process developers must follow in order to use their land within that classification. Section 3.19 and Ordinance No. 912 did not merely shift authority over a classification and process that already existed. This Court therefore CONCLUDES that Section 3.19 was an improper zoning initiative and, pursuant to Kaiser Hawaii Kai and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-4(a), Section 3.19 is invalid.
The court also held, however, that the requirement for a not-misleading ballot measure does not apply to Charter amendments. See slip op. at 47 ("Although KBV presents a logical argument that ballot materials describing a proposed Charter amendment should contain an objective summary and should neither mislead nor advocate a position, the courts are not in a position to create such a requirement.").
The Order doesn't say how the court concluded that a measure adopted as a Charter Amendment can be treated as an ordinance adopted by the initiative power. Under the Kauai Charter, "initiative" is the "power of voters to propose ordinances." That's an entirely diffferent process, with entirely different adoption requirements than initiative ordinances. For example, initiative proposals require the signatures of 20% of the number of eligible voters in the last election, while Charter amendments require 5% of registered voters in the last general election, and initiative proposals undergo an elaborate pre-election process, whereas Charter amendments, once qualified, simply go to the voters for adoption or rejection. Yet, the court treated the Charter amendment as an initiative ordinance. Did the court simply pierce the veil and conclude this was a disguised zoning initiative? Sorry, we just don't know.
In light of the above, would it have been better for the court to have concluded that Kauai voters were simply without the power to amend their Charter to create a new land use or zoning classification? That would have ended up in the same place (the Charter amendment is improper) -- but not because it's an impermissible zoning ordinance, but rather because state law prohibits the counties from creating new zoning classifications, whatever the method used. While it may be an intellectual exercise at this point, if this decision gets appealed to the Ninth Circuit, this seems like it would be an alternative gounds for affirmance.
The court also struck down the follow-on TAU ordinance adopted by the County Council, concluding that because the Charter amendment is invalid, the ordinance falls also because "[t]he Council enacted Ordinance No. 912 to implement [the Charter amendment]. See slip op. at 42. The order doesn't provide more analysis and thus we're not sure how independent council action -- while accomplished to implement what turns out to be an invalid Charter amendment -- can deemed illegal. We think that's the right result, mind you, but the conclusion does not seem to flow as an obvious point, so we would have appreciated an analysis, if only to use in our next case.
There will undoubtedly be more on this case, either in the Ninth Circuit or when the court deals with the remaining substantive due process claim. When that happens, we'll be there.
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts II and III of...
Posted on July 15, 2013 in ▪ Due process, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Vacation rentals, ▪ Vested rights, ▪ Voting rights | election law, ▪ Zoning & Planning | Permalink
We won't comment on the case, but we can repeat what we told the papers:
We always believed that the issues in this case merited resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court. We were hoping that a favorable decision from the Hawaii District Court would save us from taking it further, but alas no. While we have not finished reviewing the Hawaii District Court's rationale in detail, everything we've read so far leads us to believe that the Supreme Court will be interested in reviewing this decision, and in resolving the issues in our favor.
Here are some other reports on the decision:
More to follow. As a decision of a three-judge district court, we're allowed to skip the Ninth Circuit and go straight to the Supreme Court with an as-of-right appeal.
More about the case here (including a complete set of briefs and relevant pleadings).
Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendants' Motion for Summa...
Ian Lind has more on the federal lawsuit by the Hawaii Democratic Party that seeks to invalidate Hawaii's "open primary" system. Start here at his blog ("Dem lawsuit: Bold strategy or self-inflicted injury?"), then continue to the full story at Honolulu Civil Beat ("Hawaii Monitor: Primary Politics").
Hawaii adopted the open primary system in the 1978 constitutional convention:
The 1978 Con-Con couldn’t help being colored by the overarching political issues and debates of the day, including concerns over the kinds of government secrecy and manipulation revealed by the Watergate scandal, and Congressional investigations of government spying on citizens, which included Army spying on civilian activists in Hawaii.
The move to protect information about political affiliations was playing out against what at the time was recent political history of a president with an “enemies list” and targeted attacks against his political opponents. Both openness and personal privacy were very much on the public’s mind.
“That was a time when everybody was for more openness, it was the era of freedom of information and sunshine laws, and there was a national trend away from selection of candidates in smoke-filled rooms,” said Honolulu attorney Robert H. Thomas, whose professional practice includes election law issues. “There was a thought the open primary would stem the tide of decline of voter participation.”
Of course, Hawaii’s voter turnout continued to plunge, and still ranks down at or near the bottom of all 50 states. Proponents of the open primary say turning away voters by restricting primary participation to party members once again will only further depress voter turnout.
The way the system currently works is that when you go to the polling place to vote in the primary election, you are handed three ballots: one for each major party, plus an independent ballot. You vote one ballot, and one only. You return that one, and dump the other two. Your choice remains secret. This allows any voter to participate in choosing one party's standard-bearer for the general election, and in a place like Hawaii where one party overwhelmingly dominates politics and the primary election is often determinative, allows those who are not (or who don't want to be) party members or registered Democrats to have input on who gets elected. On the other hand, it allows strategic crossover voting. For example, those who identify as Republicans can pull a Democratic ballot and vote for whom they believe would be the weakest opponent for the Republican candidate in the general election.
Two issues to watch in the case. First, the plaintiff's Complaint and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Preliminary Injunction assert that state law requires political parties to use the primary system as their exclusive means to choose a candidate for the general election. Thus, parties are prohibited from using some other process such as a caucus or convention. We're thinking the liability part of the case may turn on this issue. If the plaintiff's reading of the law is correct, it would seem to cut in its favor on its forced association argument (bet you never knew that the Hawaii Democratic Party was such a supporter of the Citizens United decision, did you?).
Second, the remedy, in the event the court buys the plantiff's argument that the open primary is unconstitutional. The complaint asks the court to prohibit the State from holding an open primary, but doesn't expressly say what alternative would be acceptable. We assume a closed primary would be acceptable, but there are other alternatives. For more on this, see Mr. Lind's report.
One final note. Even if the lawsuit succeeds, it seems about as welcome as a dog in a game of skittles by Democratic elected officials, including the Governor, the House Majority Leader, and others, who have distanced themselves from the lawsuit, if not voiced their outright opposition, at least publicly. The Hawaii Republicans seized on this, and issued a press release that in essence said "come on in, the water's fine," and that if the Democrats want a closed shop, the door's open at the GOP.
Posted on June 19, 2013 in ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
This morning, the Supreme Court released the order with the results of last Friday's conference, revealing the Court has declined to review Lepak v. City of Irving, No. 12-777 (petition for cert. filed Dec. 21, 2012). We're covering this issue here because as some of you might recall, we represent the plaintiffs in a case challenging the 2012 Hawaii Reapportionment Plan, and Lepak raised related issues.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state and local reapportionment and redistricting be accomplished so that the resulting districts are of roughly equal "population," but the Supreme Court has never defined exactly what it means by "population." Is it like Congressional reapportionment which requires that all persons get counted, i.e., the census count? Can some lesser population be counted? This is another way of describing the question of whether Equal Protection guarantees each person's right to vote equally, or each each person's right to be represented equally, and the Court has never determined which principle of Equal Protection trumps the other if they are in conflict.
In Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the Court upheld a reapportionment plan based on a count of less than all persons (in that case, Hawaii counted "registered voters"), but only because but there was no claim that doing so would result in an apportionment substantially different than one based on a count of a "permissible population basis" such as total population, state citizens, or U.S. citizens. Moreover, the state "need not count aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote." Id. at 92. Since that time the Court has avoided further defining what it meant, although when a state elects to count less than all persons, it has the burden of showing that its choice passes "close constitutional scrutiny." See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). This requires the state to prove a "substantial and compelling reason," id. at 336, supporting "[a]n appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement." Id. at 342.
The basic premise of the Lepak petition was that Equal Protection requires state and local redistricting to be on an "eligible voters" basis in order to protect the oft-quoted "one person, one vote" principle. The Question Presented by the petition was:
Whether a city violates the "one-person, one-vote" principle of the Fourteenth Amendment when it creates city council districts that, while roughly equal in total population, are grossly malapportioned with regard to eligible voters.
The city asserted that it is never a violation of Equal Protection to count everyone, even when doing so would result in districts that are not equal in numbers of eligible voters. The city had support in the Fifth Circuit's decision in its case, as well as similar rulings from the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that redistricting either may or must be accomplished on a total population basis. The denial of cert seems to indicate that a majority of the Justices are content with the idea that it is never wrong for a state or local redistricting plan to use the Census count, even when doing so might impact voting equality. Indeed, nearly every jurisdiction nationwide does so. More on the case from Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak at the New York Times here.
Today's ruling from the Court doesn't upset the circuit court cases, nor does it directly impact the Hawaii reapportionment case, which challenges Hawaii's 2012 Plan because it has not demonstrated a "substantial and compelling reason" under Dunn for excluding nearly 8% of the actual population from the population basis. Hawaii counts only "permanent residents" -- a term the plaintiffs allege is not "appropriately defined and uniformly applied" -- to exclude approximately 108,000 military personnel, their families, and university students who do not qualify to pay resident tuition from the counted population. The State asserts it counts only "permanent residents" (which it defines as those persons who are both physically present in Hawaii, and who have demonstrated an intent to remain permanently) in order to protect the equal voting power of its citizens.
Posted on April 1, 2013 in ▪ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | Civil Rights, ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
The Ninety Day Period to Challenge a Land Use Approval is Not Extended by More General Rules Governing Administrative Mandamus - via Abbott & Kindermann's Land Use Blog.
Supreme Court Revises Test to Establish Common Carrier Status in Condemnation Cases - more on the Edwards Aquifer case, from the Jackson Walker firm in Texas.
Eminent Domain & Land Use in Hawaii - May 12, 2012 seminar in Honolulu.
Res judicata did not bar circuit court’s review of inverse condemnation claim - via the Michigan Township Law Blog.
Hawaii Legislature: the gift that keeps on giving. The Senate passed the bill that would require "nonresident" property owners to use a real estate broker to rent their property as a short term (vacation) rental. Yes, really.
Civil Beat op-ed: Reality Check Needed On Reapportionment Plan.
Posted on March 8, 2012 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Inverse condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Seminars, ▪ Vacation rentals, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Cal Ct App: No iSign For You!
Here's an interesting court of appeal decision about the intersection of technology and direct democracy from the epicenter of citizen lawmaking, California.
In Ni v. Slocum, No. A128721 (June 30, 2011), the court held that a voter using his smartphone to put his "electronic signature" on a petition does not qualify as "personally affixing" his signature to an initiative petition as required by California statute. The initiative in this case was to legalize marijuana.
Examining the language of the statute, the court concluded that "personal" means by the voter's own hand and that both sides agreed that an e-signature qualifies, but that "affix" is subject to several possible meanings. Thus, because the statutory term is subject to multiple interpretations, the court looked at the legislature's intent, noting that when it first adopted the "affix" requirement it obviously did not anticipate signing a petition by smartphone: "When the Legislature first required voters personally to affix information to an initiative petition in 1933, electronic signatures were not even a twinkle in the eyes of Messrs. Hewlitt and Packard." Slip op. at 13. [Barista's query: how about an autopen? They've been around a while.]
However, just because the legislature has not considered something does not mean it will not fit within the statute, the court held. But what led it to rejecting e-signatures was the statutory requirement of a "circulator," the person who circulates the petition and who certifies that he or she witnessed the signing and believes it to be genuine. The court held that the circulator is a "partial guarantor that the signatures were not the result of fraud," and that "[u]se of an electronic signature system bypasses this function of the circulator." Slip op. at 16. The court concluded that even if there is an equivalent security in an e-signature, it is up to the legislature to change the law.
Overall, an interesting decision worth reviewing for any of us who do this kind of work. And it is certainly not the last word on the issue.
Ni v. Slocum, No. A128721 (Cal Ct App 6/30/2011)
Posted on July 2, 2011 in ▪ Municipal & Local Govt law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
An Interesting Footnote To Judge King's Career
Senior U.S. District Judge Samuel P. King -- an iconic figure in Hawaii's legal circles -- passed away last week, sparking an outpouring of praise, reminiscence, and love. While many remember him for his relatively recent role as one of the authors of Broken Trust, the book that sparked the reformation of the Bishop Estate trustees, his long service on the state and federal benches mean that his impact was much broader.
We can't add much to how Judge King is being fondly remembered by others, except to note this one nearly forgotten snippet that resulted in a published opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court that's certainly not more than a footnote in Judge King's life, but it is an interesting peek into local politics, how those politics can seem to creep over into judicial decision making, and how there's often much more lurking beneath the surface of a seemingly routine case.
The opinion is In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972), a case that on the surface involved the rather mundane issue of Pioneer Mill's application to register land in Hawaii's Land Court.
There was a trial after which the Land Court judge entered an "informal oral opinon ... and the judge expressly stated that the decision would be effective only when signed." The case remained dormant for over two years, at which time Pioneer Mill submitted proposed its findings of fact which was signed and filed.
The formal decision that was filed was signed by both the Land Court judge and by the "Second Judge of the Land Court." The latter had heard none of the evidence in the case and had not participated in the trial in any way. In addition, in a curious order dated March 13, 1970 the second judge of the Land Court appointed the first Land Court judge a "master" to report findings made in the trial held three years earlier.
Id. at 497-98, 497 P.2d at 551 (footnote omitted).
The judgment was eventually appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court, with the appellant arguing that the "issues had not been framed within a certain time."
We're not sure what exactly that means, but in the end it didn't matter, because the Hawaii Supreme Court sua sponte decided the Land Court judge wasn't really a Land Court judge at the time he signed the judgment, because he had automatically forfeited his judgeship when he earlier announced he was the Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor.
The Land Court judge who automatically lost his office when he became a candidate for Lieutenant Governor? None other than Samuel P. King.
As the court noted, King had publicly announced his candidacy a month before signing the judgment. The court took "judicial notice of the fact that on February 3, 1970, the Land Court judge, in his newly opened campaign headquarters, made an announcement concerning his candidacy for public office." Id. at 497-98 n.1, 497 P.2d at 551 n.1. At that time, the Hawaii Constitution in a section that has since been repealed, provided "[a]ny justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office." Haw. Const. art. V, § 3 (the requirement was eliminated in 1978 when article V was amended and redesignated as article IV).
In its 3-2 decision authored by Justice Kazuhisa Abe and joined by Chief Justice William Richardson (a former Democratic Lieutenant Governor and future Bishop Estate trustee) and Justice Bernard Levinson, the court concluded that Judge King "became a candidate" when he publicly announced his candidacy, not when he took out nomination papers (which occured several months after he signed the judgment). While acknowledging that the requirement that a judge forfeit office upon becoming a candidate might be a "rather silly provision," the majority concluded "the Land Court judge had become a candidate for public office at the time he rendered the decision below, and that under the Hawaii Constitution, he had forfeited his judgeship. The case must be remanded for a new trial." Pioneer Mill, 53 Haw. at 498, 497 P.2d at 551.
In one fell swoop, the judgment was vacated and Judge King was off the bench (although by that time, the issue was moot since he had stepped down "a little more than a month after his announcment of candidacy." DeJetley v. Kahoohalahala, 122 Haw. 251, 263 n.28, 226 P.3d 421, 433 n.28 (2010)).
But as we know, even though he was off the bench, it was only temporary. After losing the election Judge King returned briefly to private practice, and in 1972, President Nixon appointed him to the federal bench.
One final note: the Pioneer Mill court's conclusion that a person becomes a candidate for elective office at the time she announces her candidacy was distinguished by a unanimous Hawaii Supreme Court in Blair v. Harris, 98 Haw. 176, 45 P.3d 798 (2002). In that opinion, the court concluded that under Haw. Const. art. II, § 7, a person is "eligible as a candidate" for the purposes of the resign-to-run requirement only after she takes out nomination papers, not before. The Blair court distinguished Pioneer Mill on the grounds that the language of the repealed constitutional provision in that case differed from article II. More about Blair here.
Posted on December 10, 2010 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Perpetual Campaigns And Hawaii's "Resign To Run" Requirement
Today's Honolulu Star-Advertiser runs the editorial Perk of incumbency: Unequal time, about Hawaii's "resign to run" requirement (article II, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution), particularly the interplay with equal time in broadcast media:
To say [former Congressman Neil] Abercrombie [also a candidate for Governor] is unhappy, particularly about the relative advantage of his primary rival Hannemann, is an understatement. The mayor has now declared his intent to seek the governor's job but won't have to resign his Honolulu Hale seat, with all its publicity perks, until the July 20 deadline to file his nomination papers. That's when, according to the courts, he becomes "eligible" for the seat.
As for the lieutenant governor: [Duke] Aiona won't have to resign at all. The "resign to run" provision in the state Constitution only requires resignation if the term of office being sought starts before the candidate's current job ends.
For the details about when a candidate must resign under article II, section 7, read this post.
Posted on June 20, 2010 in ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Hawaii's "Resign To Run" Law - When Must A Candidate Resign?
We mostly cover property and land related issues on this blog. But since our interest (and practice) includes election, voting, and campaign finance law, we occasionally touch upon those subjects as well. For example, we've posted on residency requirements for county council members, how a voter registered as a resident of one district changes his residency to another, why Hawaii voters can't vote on property taxes, and Hawaii's "open primary" system. So we're going only slightly off-topic when we discuss Hawaii's "resign to run" requirement for state officials seeking another state elected office.
With election season in full swing and the game of candidate musical chairs well underway, the current mayor of Honolulu recently announced that he wanted the job of governor. Although he announced he was running, he did not resign. He stated he would not take out his nomination papers until the just before the July deadline. This triggered calls from a candidate for the job the mayor will be vacating, and from his primary election opponent that he resign his post now. Neil Abercrombie, who voluntarily resigned as a Congressman in order to run for governor, issued this statement:
"Mayor Mufi Hannemann has been raising money and holding campaign rallies for the Governor’s race since June of last year, all the while using the city government and Honolulu’s rail project in particular as political leverage. This latest pronouncement is just the latest step in planning to enter the race for Governor sometime in July.
"If he is truly running for Governor, the Hawaii State Constitution requires the Mayor to resign from office. Even if he has found a loophole to exploit, he displays a continuing willingness to violate the spirit of the Constitution for his own personal advantage. Although I was not required by law to resign, I did so because I didn't feel it was right to campaign for Governor in this critical election year while holding public office and collecting a government paycheck. Mayor Hannemann has a different view.
So what's the deal? Did Hannemann find a "loophole" in the law? Read on, then you decide.
As a result of the 1978 Constitutional Convention, article 2, section 7 was added to the Hawaii Constitution. That provision requires that in order to be "eligible as a candidate" for another state office, a state elected official must resign:
Haw. Const. art. 2, § 7. This only applies to state or county officials running for another state or county office, and does not govern the behavior of officials occupying federal offices (federal law is supreme). Further, in 1986, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that it does not require a state elected official to resign to run for federal office. See Cobb v. Watanabe, 68 Haw. 564, 722 P.2d 1032 (1986).
In 2002, the Hawaii Supreme Court analyzed when a state official is required to resign. In Blair v. Harris, 98 Haw. 176, 45 P.3d 798 (2002), the plaintiff asserted that Honolulu mayor Jeremy Harris, who was seeking the governorship, should have resigned before he filed a gubernatorial campaign spending report. The court rejected the argument and concluded that a candidate's taking out of nomination papers is the event that makes her "eligible as a candidate for another public office," and that before that time, an officeholder has no obligation to resign, even if she acts like a candidate:
We hold that, under section 7, a public officer becomes "eligible as a candidate for another public office" at the time he or she files nomination papers for the second office. Therefore, he or she must resign from his or her present office before filing nomination papers for the second office, if the term of the office sought begins before the end of the term of the office held.
Id. at 177, 45 P.3d at 799. The court focused on the phrase "eligible as a candidate," and concluded:
Thus, the resignation requirement is triggered when an individual becomes "qualified" to "seek" office as a candidate. The "eligibility" or "qualification" requirement must be significant in helping to determine the definition of the word "candidate." If the "eligibility" or "qualification" requirement did not help to shape the meaning of the word "candidate," any valid officeholder would always be "qualified" to "seek" another office as a candidate. Thus, the officeholder would be required to resign immediately upon taking office. Clearly, such an absurd result was not intended. The question, therefore, focuses on how the phrase "eligible as a candidate" determines the definition of "candidate."
Id. at 179, 45 P.3d at 801.
The court determined that an earlier decision in which it held that a state judge became a candidate and thereby forfeited his office when he announced his candidacy for Lieutenant Governor was not applicable because the language of the constitutional requirement in that case was not the same as article 2, section 7. Id. at 181, 45 P.3d at 803 (citing In re Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 53 Haw. 496, 497 P.2d 549 (1972)).
Thus, it's been settled law for more than a few election cycles that an official must resign only before taking out nomination papers. Before that time, he's not "eligible" to run, even if he announces his candidacy and takes other steps towards that end. If this is a "loophole," it is one created by the language of article 2, section 5, and the Hawaii Supreme Court's read of the constititional text. Of course, the question of whether an officeholder should resign as a matter of honor when he throws his hat into the ring for another office is an entirely different issue from whether he is required by law to do so.
Posted on May 29, 2010 in ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
What we're looking at and listening to today. Some video, some podcasts.
First up is the video above from Reason.tv, Billionaires v. Brooklyn's Best Bar: Eminent Domain Abuse & The Atlantic Yards Project
A clip about the owner of what might be "the most condemned property in America." It features a Virginia rancher whose property has been subject to condemnation 10 times, and who now is alleging an inverse condemnation claim because the VA DOT this time didn't bother to exercise eminent domain before it interfered with his property rights. Joe Waldo, my Owners' Counsel colleague, is also featured.
From the Federalist Society, a podcast or a video of a recent discussion about "Civil Pleadings Standards After Iqbal" for all of us federal civil procedure nerds.
A podcast of a debate on post-Kelo eminent domain reforms between George Mason lawprof Ilya Somin and U.Chicago lawprof Saul Levmore.
Posted on March 4, 2010 in ▪ Eminent Domain | Condemnation, ▪ Land use law, ▪ Property rights, ▪ Public Use | Kelo, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink | 0 Comments
Final Brief In Maui Councilmember Residency Appeal: What Is "Immediate Forfeiture And Vacancy?"
Today, we filed the Reply Brief in DeJetley v. Kahoohalahala, No. 29929, the appeal now pending in the Hawaii Supreme Court regarding the Lanai member of the Maui Council who is alleged to not be a resident of Lanai as required by the county charter.
Posted on November 16, 2009 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink
Answering Brief In Maui Councilmember Residency Appeal: What Is "Immediate Forfeiture And Vacancy?"
Here's the Answering Brief filed by a Maui Councilmember in the case in which Lanai residents and voters assert he forfeited the Lanai seat on the Maui County Council under section 3-3 of the Maui Charter since he is not a resident of Lanai.
The Maui Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, and the Lanai voters appealed.
Disclosure: we represent the Lanai voters; the Opening Brief we filed earlier is posted here.
More to follow as the appeal progresses. This was earlier transferred from the Intermediate Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
Note: on October 20, 2009, the Hawaii Supreme Court issued an opinion in a separate but related case, Dupree v. Hiraga, No 29464, the councilmember's appeal from a determination by the State Board of Registration hearing that he is a Lahaina resident and his attempt to register to vote as a Lanai resident was invalid. More about that decision here.
Posted on November 5, 2009 in ▪ Appellate law, ▪ Voting rights | election law | Permalink