Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US20030217165?ie=ISO-8859-1&dq=6,202,008
Timestamp: 2016-02-12 22:48:08
Document Index: 56750975

Matched Legal Cases: ['art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000', 'art_000']

Patent US20030217165 - End-to-end authentication of session initiation protocol messages using ... - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inPatentsEnd-to-end authentication capability based on public-key certificates is combined with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to allow a SIP node that receives a SIP request message to authenticate the sender of request. The SIP request message is sent with a digital signature generated with a private...http://www.google.com/patents/US20030217165?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US20030217165 - End-to-end authentication of session initiation protocol messages using certificatesAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS20030217165 A1Publication typeApplicationApplication numberUS 10/151,575Publication dateNov 20, 2003Filing dateMay 17, 2002Priority dateMay 17, 2002Also published asUS7240366, US8307421, US8732818, US20080046745, US20130036308Publication number10151575, 151575, US 2003/0217165 A1, US 2003/217165 A1, US 20030217165 A1, US 20030217165A1, US 2003217165 A1, US 2003217165A1, US-A1-20030217165, US-A1-2003217165, US2003/0217165A1, US2003/217165A1, US20030217165 A1, US20030217165A1, US2003217165 A1, US2003217165A1InventorsJeremy Buch, David SimonsOriginal AssigneeMicrosoft CorporationExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (11), Referenced by (137), Classifications (11), Legal Events (4) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetEnd-to-end authentication of session initiation protocol messages using certificates
[0041] In response to the 401 challenge 156, the SIP client 72 sends a second INVITE request 82 that includes a digital signature 100 contained in the Authorization header 150 of the SIP message. The syntax of the fields in this Authorization header 150 is as follows: Authorization = “Authorization” “:” “PKCS” # PKCS-response PKCS-response = 1# (PKCS-signature | nonce | nonce-count|qop) nonce-count = “nc” “=” nc-value nc-value = quoted-string qop = “qop” “=” qop-value qop-value = “auth” | “auth-int” | “auth-conf” PKCS-signature = “signature” “=” quoted-string [0042] In particular, the PKCS-signature field provides the digital signature generated using the private key of the user 76. An example of the Authorization header is provided below. [0043] Authorization: PKCS nonce=“913082051”, nc=“00000001”, signature=7GhIGfH . . . [0044] In one implementation, the signature is a Base64 encoded signature of a message hash and is added after the hash is calculated from the message. The signature is computed, in order, across the nonce and nonce count (if present), request method, request version, and header fields following the Authorization header, and the message body. In this regard, headers in the SIP message are ordered so as to put all those headers excluded from the signature calculation before the Authorization header. Whether a header should be included in the signature or not may depend on whether it will be modified by the SIP proxy. For instance, headers that should or must be modified by the SIP proxy should not be included in the signature, while those headers that must not be modified by the SIP proxy should be included in the signature. The SIP request message may optionally include the certificate of the sender by using a “certificate” field or tag in the Authorization header 150. [0045] Referring still to FIG. 4, when the SIP client 86 receives the second INVITE request 82 that contains the digital signature, it authenticates the sender by verifying the digital signature using the sender's certificate as described above. If the sender authentication is successful, the SIP client 86 sends a code 200 OK message 162 to the sending SIP client 72 to indicate that the request 82 is accepted. [0046] As mentioned above, the sender may encrypt the SIP request message with the public key of the recipient. Alternatively, sender may encrypt the SIP request with a session key and encrypt the session key with the public key of the recipient. In one implementation, the encryption is indicated by using an “Encryption” header, the syntax of which is as follows: Encryption = “Encryption” “:” “PKCS” PKCS-encoding EncryptionKey [ SessionKey ] PKCS-encoding = “encoding” “=” (“base64” | token) EncryptionKey = “encryption-key” “=” quoted-string SessionKey = “session-key” “=” quoted-string [0047] The “EncryptionKey” field identifies the certificate for the public key of the recipient that the sender uses to encrypt the data, so that the recipient knows which private key to use for decryption in case they have more than one. [0048] An example of an encryption header using this syntax is provided below. [0049] Encryption: PKCS encoding=base64, encryption-key=J53vDe . . . [0050] In many applications, SIP messaging is used to establish sessions in which a large amount of data, such as data for instant messaging or media streams, are to be transmitted in encrypted form. In such a case, it is not desirable to use the public keys of the communicating parties for data encryption because public key cryptographic calculation is slow and CPU intensive. Instead, a session key for symmetric encryption may be generated by either of the SIP clients for symmetric encryption of the data, which may be orders of magnitude faster than public key encryption. For instance, the SIP client 72 that sends the SIP request 82 may generate a symmetric key and encrypt it with the public key 116 of the recipient and include the encrypted key 166 as part of the Authorization header 150. Alternatively, the SIP client 86 of the recipient may include the encrypted symmetric key in the 200 OK response 162 to the SIP client 72. If a session key is used for data encryption, the “SessionKey” field in the Authorization header contains the encoded session key. [0051] It should be noted that the certificate-based authentication scheme for SIP in accordance with the invention can be used not only for the challenge and the authentication between an end SIP client the a request sender to an end SIP client, but also for the challenge and authentication of the request sender to between an intermediate entity (e.g., SIP proxy 96 of FIG. 2) working on a client's behalf and the sender. By way of example, referring now to FIG. 8, in one embodiment, in accordance with the SIP specification, when an intermediate SIP entity 202 receives an unsigned SIP request 198 and wants to challenges the sender 76 for authentication, it sends a “Code 407” challenge packet 206 (in accordance with the SIP specification) that includes a Proxy-Authenticate header 208 requesting certificate-based authentication. The fields of this Proxy-Authentication header, with the exception of the header title, have the same syntax as that of the WWW-Authenticate header described above. In respond to the 407 challenge, the sender sends a signed request 210 that contains a Proxy-Authorization header 212, which has the same syntax for its fields as the Authorization header described above. [0052] The response-challenge sequence described above may be used for requests other than the INVITE request. For instance, as shown in FIG. 5, it may be used when the SIP client 72 registers with a SIP registrar 146. The SIP client 72 first sends an unsigned REGISTER request 170 to the SIP registrar 146. The SIP registrar responds by sending a “Code 401” challenge message 172 with a WWW-Authenticate header to indicate to the SIP client that authentication using the public key scheme is required. The SIP client 72 then sends a second REGISTER request 174 with an Authorization header containing a digital signature to the SIP registrar 146. After authenticating the SIP client based on the digital signature, the SIP registrar returns a 200 OK message 180. [0053] Referring now to FIG. 6, instead of waiting to be challenged for authentication, the SIP client 72 may sign an initial SIP request 182 sent to the receiving SIP client 86. After receiving the request message, the SIP client 86 authenticates the sender of the request based on the digital signature in the message, and returns a 200 OK message 184 if the sender is successfully authenticated. [0054] To illustrate the use of the PKCS Authorization header of a SIP request to carry a digital signature, several examples are provided below. In the first example, the SIP request is SUBSCRIBE, and a user with the SIP address of jbuch@microsoft.com subscribes to another user with the SIP address of roberbr@microsoft.com. The latter requires authentication, so a certificate challenge is made, and jbuch responds by sending the SUBSCRIBE message with a signature for authentication. The following shows the exemplary SIP messages involved in the exchange. For simplicity and clarity of illustration, the messages are simplified to show only stripped-down versions of the headers. SUBSCRIBE roberbr3.ntdev.microsoft.com SIP/2.0 From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... ---------------- SIP/2.0 401 Unauthorized From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... WWW-Authenticate: PKCS nonce=”234baa234089da324”, qop=”auth-int”, realm=”microsoft.com; verisign.com”, ... ---------------- SUBSCRIBE roberbr3.ntdev.microsoft.com SIP/2.0 ... Authorization: PKCS nonce=”234baa234089da324”, nc=”00000001”, signature=”09bd4e5af8e90d...” From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ---------------- SIP/2.0 200 OK From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... [0055] In a second example, the SIP method is “MESSAGE,” and a user dsimons@microsoft.com is sending a message to the user roberbr@microsoft.com, but roberbr requires authentication and sends a 401 challenge. The user dsimons then resends the MESSAGE request with a digital signature for authentication. MESSAGE roberbr3.ntdev.microsoft.com SIP/2.0 From: dsimons@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... Where do you want to go today? ---------------- SIP/2.0 401 Unauthorized From: dsimons@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... WWW-Authenticate: PKCS nonce=”234baa234089da324”, qop=”auth-int”, realm=”microsoft.com; verisign.com”, ... ---------------- MESSAGE roberbr3.ntdev.microsoft.com SIP/2.0 ... Authorization: PKCS nonce=”234baa234089da324”, nc=”00000001”, signature=”09bd4e5af8e90d...” From: dsimons@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com Where do you want to go today? ---------------- SIP/2.0 200 OK From: dsimons@microsoft.com To: roberbr@microsoft.com ... [0056] In yet another example, the user jbuch@microsoft.com sends another user vlade@microsoft.com an encrypted message that is encrypted using vlade's public key. In this example, the certificate for jbuch already has vlade's certificate, which may have been passed already with an earlier SIP signature or received from the network directory, etc. MESSAGE vlade004.ntdev.microsoft.com SIP/2.0 From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: vlade@microsoft.com ... Encryption: PKCS encoding=”base64”, certificate=”30818902818100d00eca85fb551a00d60729c28c2a0d3da3c7fa3568e 5906f71f0f43dfbc6eb8042eda9085fc3d1d7b0c4c6d119d87f4ea35009bfe708e71a251c2d 2dd06f4eb8cef4ab6be140f138181c4847ff02fadbf33f20ccd3544e5ed8669ab4c08bb8addc 8ef0576dfbd164031f2c67e9” WC$TMOIWC$ACMKL:CAK:LACS_)ACO:A$C$CL:T$CJT @#%$@#J#!$%#LM:FMJ:KLMIO{circumflex over ( )}KL{circumflex over ( )}DFMDF>){circumflex over ( )}GJD<FTL DFJ$#{circumflex over ( )}KL&)3jkl;4K$#K#5Krdkdgp03w45K#%jkeekl;j3etERT ---------------- SIP/2.0 200 OK From: jbuch@microsoft.com To: vlade@microsoft.com ... [0057] Instead of using a SIP header, the digital signature may be carried in the message body of the SIP request. In one embodiment, the message body of the SIP message is constructed according the Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) standard. The S/MIME standard is described in IETF RFC 2633 entitiled “S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification.” It provides a method to send and receive secure MIME messages by using public-key certificates. The handling of certificates in connection with S/MIME is described in IETF RFC 2632 entitled “S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling.” These RFCs are hereby incorporated by reference. [0058] As illustrated in FIG. 7, the S/MIME message body 190 of the SIP request message 192 includes a digital signal 200 generated using the user's private key and may optionally include a certificate 102 of the user. The S/MIME body 190 may also be encrypted. The sending SIP client 72 sends the SIP request message 192 containing the S/MIME message body 190 to the receiving SIP client 86. The receiving SIP client 86 retrieves the digital signature 200 from the message body and authenticates the sender based on the digital signature and the certificate of the sender. If the message body 192 is encrypted, the SIP client 86 uses the private key of the recipient to decrypt the encrypted data. [0059] Generally, S/MIME messages are a combination of MIME bodies and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) objects. The data to be secured is a canonical MIME entity. The MIME entity and other data, such as certificates and algorithm identifiers, are given to CMS processing facilities that produce a CMS object. The CMS object is then finally wrapped in MIME. The S/MIME standard defines two MIME types for signed messages: “application/pkcs7-mime” with signedData, and “multipart/signed.” The application/pkcs7-mime type is used to carry CMS objects of several types including signedData and envelopedData. The multipart/signed format, on the other hand, is a clear-signing format that contains a plain MIME entity with a “detached signature.” An S/MIME message body may include multiple blocks, each of which has a “content-type” identifying the MIME format of that block. [0060] When the SIP message is to be signed, the signature covers at least the SIP method and version number, the “To” header, Call-ID, and Cseq. If the SIP message is to be encrypted, preferably all the fields that SIP proxies do not need to have access to are encrypted. [0061] Several examples of SIP requests are provided below to illustrate the use of a S/MIME message body in a SIP request for carrying a digital signature and/or encrypted data. The first example uses the “multipart/signed” format, in which the regular SIP headers of the request are placed in a text/plain MIME entity, and the digital signature is in a separate part of message body. REGISTER sip:microsoft.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP amun1.ntdev.microsoft.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; micalg=sha1; boundary=“----=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0” Expires: 900 Authorization: SMIME From: sip:jbuch@microsoft.com To: sip:roberbr@microsoft.com Call-ID: 09812389@microsoft.com CSeq: 1 REGISTER Contact: sip:jbuch@ 157.59.135.51:5060 ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756------=_NextPart_000_0003— 01C0F8A6.B926A0F0-- [0062] In a second example, the application/pkcs7-mime format is used to carry the digital signature. REGISTER sip:microsoft.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP amun1.ntdev.microsoft.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; micalg=shal; boundary=“----=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0” Expires: 900 Authorization: SMIME From: sip:jbuch@microsoft.com To: sip:roberbr@microsoft.com Call-ID: 09812389@microsoft.com CSeq: 1 REGISTER Contact: sip:jbuch@ 157.59.135.51:5060 ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data; name=smime.p7m Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B9 26A0F0-- [0063] The third example of SIP with S/MIME illustrates a SIP request with encryption. The “multipart/encrypted” format is used to carry the encrypted data. MESSAGE sip:microsoft.com SIP/2.0 Via: SIP/2.0/UDP amun1.ntdev.microsoft.com From: sip:jbuch@microsoft.com To: sip:roberbr@microsoft.com Call-ID: 09810929@microsoft.com CSeq: 1 MESSAGE MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; protocol=”TYPE??/STYPE??”; boundary=“----=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0” Authorization: SMIME ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0 Content-Type: TYPE??/STYPE?? ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0 Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Type: text/plain; charset=“us-ascii” ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756 ------=_NextPart_000_0003_01C0F8A6.B926A0F0-- [0064] In view of the many possible embodiments to which the principles of this invention may be applied, it should be recognized that the embodiments described herein with respect to the drawing figures are meant to be illustrative only and should not be taken as limiting the scope of the invention. Therefore, the invention as described herein contemplates all such embodiments as may come within the scope of the following claims and equivalents thereof. Patent CitationsCited PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS6173173 *Jul 2, 1998Jan 9, 2001Lucent Technologies, Inc.Invalid mobile telephone call terminating system and methodUS6353891 *Aug 9, 2000Mar 5, 20023Com CorporationControl channel security for realm specific internet protocolUS6865681 *Dec 29, 2000Mar 8, 2005Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd.VoIP terminal security module, SIP stack with security manager, system and security methodsUS6870848 *Jun 7, 2000Mar 22, 2005Nortel Networks LimitedMethod and apparatus for call processing in response to a call request from an originating deviceUS20020078153 *Nov 2, 2001Jun 20, 2002Chit ChungProviding secure, instantaneous, directory-integrated, multiparty, communications servicesUS20020141358 *Nov 14, 2001Oct 3, 2002Requena Jose CostaMobile system, terminal and interface, as well as methods for providing backward compatibility to first and second generation mobile systemsUS20020150226 *Mar 15, 2002Oct 17, 2002Worldcom, Inc.Caller treatment in a SIP networkUS20020157019 *Apr 19, 2001Oct 24, 2002Kadyk Donald J.Negotiating secure connections through a proxy serverUS20030009463 *Mar 15, 2002Jan 9, 2003Gallant John KennethXML based transaction detail recordsUS20030012382 *Jul 29, 2002Jan 16, 2003Azim FerchichiSingle sign-on processUS20030081791 *Oct 26, 2001May 1, 2003Hewlett-Packard Co.,Message exchange in an information technology network* Cited by examinerReferenced byCiting PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS7024687 *May 21, 2003Apr 4, 2006Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for providing end to end authentication in a network environmentUS7185091 *Nov 20, 2003Feb 27, 2007Motorola, Inc.Method and system for transmitting compressed messages at a proxy to a mobile device in a networkUS7330483 *Dec 19, 2002Feb 12, 2008At&T Corp.Session initiation protocol (SIP) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (MIME) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the SIP messageUS7535905 *Mar 31, 2004May 19, 2009Microsoft CorporationSigning and validating session initiation protocol routing headersUS7591013Jul 31, 2007Sep 15, 2009Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for client initiated authentication in a session initiation protocol environmentUS7715562May 19, 2006May 11, 2010Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for access authentication in a mobile wireless networkUS7720227 *Mar 28, 2006May 18, 2010Hitachi, Ltd.Encryption method for SIP message and encrypted SIP communication systemUS7751547May 4, 2005Jul 6, 2010Avaya Inc.Extending a call to a telecommunications terminal through an intermediate pointUS7752315 *Dec 1, 2005Jul 6, 2010International Business Machines CorporationMethod for extending the use of SIP (session initiated protocol) for providing debug servicesUS7782824Jul 20, 2006Aug 24, 2010Cisco Technology, Inc.Method and system for handling a mobile endpoint in a wireless networkUS7805127Mar 6, 2007Sep 28, 2010Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for generating a unified accounting record for a communication sessionUS7912035Mar 6, 2007Mar 22, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Communicating packets using a home anchored bearer path or a visited anchored bearer pathUS7917620Jul 8, 2003Mar 29, 2011Nokia CorporationCommunication systemUS7929966Apr 19, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Access terminal for communicating packets using a home anchored bearer path or a visited anchored bearer pathUS7934088 *Mar 31, 2005Apr 26, 2011Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.Method of secure communication between endpointsUS7936722Mar 6, 2007May 3, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for handover of an access terminal in a communication networkUS7940722Mar 6, 2007May 10, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for determining a network for processing applications for a communication sessionUS7944875Mar 6, 2007May 17, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Enforcement of user level policies from visited networks in a mobile IP environmentUS7948973Jan 8, 2008May 24, 2011At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P.Session initiation protocol (SIP) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (MIME) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the SIP messageUS7949114Mar 15, 2005May 24, 2011Avaya Inc.Granting privileges to a telecommunications terminal based on the relationship of a first signal to a second signalUS7962123Jun 14, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Authentication of access terminals in a cellular communication networkUS7966645Jun 21, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Application-aware policy enforcementUS7991385Mar 6, 2007Aug 2, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for network charging using policy peeringUS7992000 *Jun 8, 2005Aug 2, 2011Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.Session initial protocol identification methodUS7995990Mar 6, 2007Aug 9, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for consolidating accounting data for a communication sessionUS8024476May 21, 2004Sep 20, 2011Microsoft CorporationEfficient message routing when using server poolsUS8037309Apr 26, 2004Oct 11, 2011Trek 2000 International Ltd.Portable data storage device with encryption systemUS8040862Mar 6, 2007Oct 18, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for providing emergency services in a visited communications environmentUS8041022Oct 18, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Policy-based control of content interceptUS8045540 *May 3, 2005Oct 25, 2011Nokia CorporationHandling of identities in a trust domain of an IP networkUS8045959Mar 6, 2007Oct 25, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.Assigning a serving-CSCF during access authenticationUS8050391Nov 1, 2011Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for capturing accounting data for a communication sessionUS8090786Jan 25, 2010Jan 3, 2012Research In Motion LimitedMethod and apparatus for processing digitally signed messages to determine address mismatchesUS8160579Mar 6, 2007Apr 17, 2012Cisco Technology, Inc.Performing deep packet inspection for a communication sessionUS8165113 *Jan 30, 2003Apr 24, 2012At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P.Session initiation protocol (SIP) message incorporating a number of predetermined address headers having predetermined address informationUS8200819 *Mar 14, 2008Jun 12, 2012Industrial Technology Research InstituteMethod and apparatuses for network society associatingUS8200959 *Jun 28, 2007Jun 12, 2012Cisco Technology, Inc.Verifying cryptographic identity during media session initializationUS8214640 *Dec 5, 2005Jul 3, 2012Alcatel LucentMethod of embedding information in implementation defined SIP header fieldsUS8295242Mar 6, 2007Oct 23, 2012Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for exchanging policy information in a roaming communications environmentUS8301884 *Sep 16, 2003Oct 30, 2012Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method of managing metadataUS8363648May 20, 2011Jan 29, 2013At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P.Session initiation protocol (SIP) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (MIME) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the SIP messageUS8369357Feb 28, 2006Feb 5, 2013Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for providing simultaneous handling of layer-2 and layer-3 mobility in an internet protocol network environmentUS8417942Aug 31, 2007Apr 9, 2013Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for identifying encrypted conference media trafficUS8438613May 7, 2013Cisco Technology, Inc.Establishing facets of a policy for a communication sessionUS8458776Oct 21, 2009Jun 4, 2013Microsoft CorporationLow-latency peer session establishmentUS8472454 *Sep 12, 2007Jun 25, 2013Murata Machinery, Ltd.Relay-server arranged to carry out communications between communication terminals on different LANSUS8478830Dec 13, 2011Jul 2, 2013Research In Motion LimitedMethod and apparatus for processing digitally signed messages to determine address mismatchesUS8516259Sep 3, 2008Aug 20, 2013Alcatel LucentVerifying authenticity of voice mail participants in telephony networksUS8533462Jun 11, 2012Sep 10, 2013Cisco Technology, Inc.Verifying cryptographic identity during media session initializationUS8553700 *Nov 25, 2009Oct 8, 2013Sprint Communications Company L.P.Method and system for facilitating packet-based communicationsUS8555071Oct 31, 2007Oct 8, 2013Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method of managing metadataUS8560834 *Apr 19, 2012Oct 15, 2013Akamai Technologies, Inc.System and method for client-side authentication for secure internet communicationsUS8607334 *Jul 7, 2005Dec 10, 2013Research In Motion LimitedSystem and method for secure message processingUS8634412Nov 28, 2012Jan 21, 2014At&T Intellectual Property Ii, L.P.Session initiation protocol (SIP) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (MIME) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the SIP messageUS8718042 *May 8, 2008May 6, 2014Microsoft CorporationExtensible and secure transmission of multiple conversation contextsUS8719895Mar 6, 2007May 6, 2014Cisco Technology, Inc.Determining a policy output for a communication sessionUS8832430 *Sep 17, 2010Sep 9, 2014Microsoft CorporationRemote certificate managementUS8837598Dec 28, 2007Sep 16, 2014Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for securely transmitting video over a networkUS8850576 *Mar 4, 2012Sep 30, 2014Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.Methods for inspecting security certificates by network security devices to detect and prevent the use of invalid certificatesUS8903820Jun 23, 2004Dec 2, 2014Nokia CorporationMethod, system and computer program to enable querying of resources in a certain context by definition of SIP even packageUS9002748May 25, 2007Apr 7, 2015T-Mobile International AgMethod for securing IP connections for network operator combinatory connectionsUS9178696 *Nov 30, 2007Nov 3, 2015Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ)Key management for secure communicationUS9178888Jun 14, 2013Nov 3, 2015Go Daddy Operating Company, LLCMethod for domain control validationUS20030237004 *Jun 18, 2003Dec 25, 2003Nec CorporationCertificate validation method and apparatus thereofUS20040003058 *Jun 26, 2002Jan 1, 2004Nokia, Inc.Integration of service registration and discovery in networksUS20040123109 *Sep 16, 2003Jun 24, 2004Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method of managing metadataUS20040128344 *Dec 30, 2002Jul 1, 2004Nokia CorporationContent and service registration, query and subscription, and notification in networksUS20040177145 *Jul 8, 2003Sep 9, 2004Gabor BajkoCommunication systemUS20040236947 *May 21, 2003Nov 25, 2004Cisco Technology, Inc.System and method for providing end to end authentication in a network environmentUS20050114513 *Nov 20, 2003May 26, 2005Motorola, Inc.System and method for transmitting compressed messagesUS20050220095 *Mar 31, 2004Oct 6, 2005Sankaran NarayananSigning and validating Session Initiation Protocol routing headersUS20050240758 *Mar 31, 2004Oct 27, 2005Lord Christopher JControlling devices on an internal network from an external networkUS20050249219 *May 3, 2005Nov 10, 2005Nokia CorporationHandling of identities in a trust domain of an IP networkUS20050268328 *Jun 24, 2003Dec 1, 2005Gabriele CorlianoTrust establishment for multi-party communicationsUS20060010321 *Aug 27, 2004Jan 12, 2006Hitomi NakamuraNetwork system, data transmission device, session monitor system and packet monitor transmission deviceUS20060021038 *Jul 7, 2005Jan 26, 2006Brown Michael KSystem and method for secure message processingUS20060031536 *May 21, 2004Feb 9, 2006Microsoft CorporationEfficient message routing when using server poolsUS20060075229 *Sep 30, 2004Apr 6, 2006Marek James AMethod and apparatus for maintaining a communications connection while guarding against bandwidth consuming attacksUS20060085545 *May 6, 2004Apr 20, 2006Utstarcom, IncorporatedSession initiation protocol-based routing support apparatus and methodUS20060105748 *Apr 26, 2004May 18, 2006Ooi Chin Shyan RPortable storage device with encryption systemUS20060121879 *Dec 7, 2004Jun 8, 2006Motorola, Inc.Method and apparatus for providing services and services usage information for a wireless subscriber unitUS20060210039 *Mar 15, 2005Sep 21, 2006Avaya Technology Corp.Granting privileges to a telecommunications terminal based on the relationship of a first signal to a second signalUS20060210049 *May 4, 2005Sep 21, 2006Avaya Technology Corp.Extending a call to a telecommunications terminal through an intermediate pointUS20060236091 *Mar 28, 2006Oct 19, 2006Tadashi KajiEncryption method for SIP message and encrypted SIP communication systemUS20060259761 *Sep 15, 2005Nov 16, 2006Vladimir ButenkoPublic Key Infrastructure (PKI) Information Encryption by a Non-Sender SystemUS20060264202 *May 19, 2004Nov 23, 2006Joachim HagmeierSystem and method for authenticating clients in a client-server environmentUS20060265587 *Apr 21, 2006Nov 23, 2006Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method and servers for managing address information of user session initiation protocol terminalUS20070101144 *Oct 27, 2005May 3, 2007The Go Daddy Group, Inc.Authenticating a caller initiating a communication sessionUS20070118750 *Oct 27, 2005May 24, 2007The Go Daddy Group, Inc.Authenticating a caller initiating a communication sessionUS20070130345 *Dec 1, 2005Jun 7, 2007International Business Machines CorporationMethod for extending the use of SIP (Session Initiated Protocol) for providing debug servicesUS20070130475 *Dec 5, 2005Jun 7, 2007Ajay SathyanathMethod of embedding information in internet transmissionsUS20070186101 *Nov 6, 2006Aug 9, 2007Nokia CorporationTrust concept for the SIP reason headerUS20070255952 *Jun 8, 2005Nov 1, 2007Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.Session Initial Protocol Identification MethodUS20070288744 *Mar 31, 2005Dec 13, 2007Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.Method of Secure Communication Between EndpointsUS20080019332 *Jul 20, 2006Jan 24, 2008Oswal Anand KMethod and System for Handling a Mobile Endpoint in a Wireless NetworkUS20080044032 *Nov 14, 2006Feb 21, 2008Bce Inc.Method and system for providing personalized service mobilityUS20080052388 *Jul 2, 2007Feb 28, 2008Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Substitutable domain management system and method for substituting the systemUS20080063001 *Sep 12, 2007Mar 13, 2008Murata Machinery, Ltd.Relay-serverUS20080072054 *Oct 31, 2007Mar 20, 2008Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Method of managing metadataUS20080107130 *Jan 8, 2008May 8, 2008Peters Robert Y JrSession initiation protocol (sip) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (mime) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the sip messageUS20080120715 *Jul 31, 2007May 22, 2008Cisco Technology, Inc.System and Method for Client Initiated Authentication in a Session Initiation Protocol EnvironmentUS20080167888 *Jan 9, 2007Jul 10, 2008I4 Commerce Inc.Method and system for identification verification between at least a pair of entitiesUS20090006844 *Jun 28, 2007Jan 1, 2009Wing Daniel GVerifying cryptographic identity during media session initializationUS20090041006 *Mar 8, 2006Feb 12, 2009Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.Method and system for providing internet key exchangeUS20090063856 *Aug 31, 2007Mar 5, 2009Zaheer AzizSystem and Method for Identifying Encrypted Conference Media TrafficUS20090080655 *Nov 19, 2008Mar 26, 2009Hitachi, Ltd.Network system, data transmission device, session monitor system and packet monitor transmission deviceUS20090168892 *Dec 28, 2007Jul 2, 2009Cisco Technology, Inc.System and Method for Securely Transmitting Video Over a NetworkUS20090169001 *Dec 28, 2007Jul 2, 2009Cisco Technology, Inc.System and Method for Encryption and Secure Transmission of Compressed MediaUS20090193128 *Jul 30, 2009Kayo MotohashiCall Connection Processing Method And Message Transmission/Reception Proxy ApparatusUS20090222887 *Mar 2, 2009Sep 3, 2009Ram CohenSystem and method for enabling digital signatures in e-mail communications using shared digital certificatesUS20090234910 *Mar 14, 2008Sep 17, 2009Industrial Technology Research InstituteMethod and apparatuses for network society associatingUS20090279533 *Nov 12, 2009Microsoft CorporationExtensible and secure transmission of multiple conversation contextsUS20100030694 *May 25, 2007Feb 4, 2010T-Mobile International AgMethod for securing ip connections for network operator combinatory connectionsUS20100054433 *Sep 3, 2008Mar 4, 2010Alcatel-LucentVerifying authenticity of voice mail participants in telephony networksUS20100121931 *Jan 25, 2010May 13, 2010Research In Motion LimitedMethod and apparatus for processing digitally signed messages to determine address mismatchesUS20100268937 *Nov 30, 2007Oct 21, 2010Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ)Key management for secure communicationUS20110066848 *Sep 17, 2010Mar 17, 2011Microsoft CorporationRemote certificate managementUS20110093710 *Oct 21, 2009Apr 21, 2011Microsoft CorporationLow-latency peer session establishmentUS20110216766 *Sep 8, 2011Peters Robert Y JrSession initiation protocol (sip) message incorporating a multi-purpose internet mail extension (mime) media type for describing the content and format of information included in the sip messageUS20120167212 *Mar 4, 2012Jun 28, 2012Check Point Software Technologies, Ltd.Methods for inspecting security certificates by network security devices to detect and prevent the use of invalid certificatesUS20120204025 *Aug 9, 2012Akamai Technologies, Inc.System and method for client-side authentication for secure internet communicationsUS20120290833 *Nov 15, 2012Sybase, Inc.Certificate Blobs for Single Sign OnUS20130247160 *Mar 16, 2012Sep 19, 2013Peter Matthew HillierMethod and System for User Authentication Over a Communication NetworkUS20140223187 *Apr 14, 2014Aug 7, 2014Unify Gmbh & Co. KgMethod for Authenticating Key Information Between Terminals of a Communication LinkUS20140281498 *Mar 14, 2013Sep 18, 2014Comcast Cable Communications, LlcIdentity authentication using credentialsDE102006025603A1 *Jun 1, 2006Dec 6, 2007T-Mobile International Ag & Co. KgVerfahren zum Absichern von IP Verbindungen f�r NetzbetreiberzusammenschaltungenEP1583318A2 *Mar 29, 2005Oct 5, 2005Microsoft CorporationSigning and validating session initiation protocol routing headersEP1591867A2 *Feb 11, 2005Nov 2, 2005Trek 2000 International LtdPortable data storage device with encryption systemEP1724964A1 *Mar 27, 2006Nov 22, 2006Hitachi, Ltd.Encryption method for SIP message and encrypted SIP communication systemEP2472825A2 *Mar 14, 2007Jul 4, 2012Avaya Inc.Providing communications including an extended protocol headerWO2004075587A1 *Feb 17, 2004Sep 2, 2004Nokia CorpA communication systemWO2006100970A1 *Mar 8, 2006Sep 28, 2006Matsushita Electric Ind Co LtdMethod and system for providing internet key exchange (ike) during sip sessionWO2007091142A2 *Feb 5, 2007Aug 16, 2007Nokia CorpTrust concept for a sip headerWO2009082097A1 *Dec 4, 2008Jul 2, 2009Lg Electronics IncMethod and system for providing a message including a list of recipient user devices to each recipient user deviceWO2010026562A1 *Aug 27, 2009Mar 11, 2010Alcatel LucentVerifying authenticity of voice mail participants in telephony networksWO2011049712A2 *Sep 24, 2010Apr 28, 2011Microsoft CorporationLow-latency peer session establishmentWO2011145949A1 *May 18, 2011Nov 24, 2011Sibcom AsMethod, system and devices for the establishment of a secure communication session* Cited by examinerClassifications U.S. Classification709/229, 709/246International ClassificationH04L29/06Cooperative ClassificationH04L65/1006, H04L63/0823, H04L63/126, H04L29/06027European ClassificationH04L63/12B, H04L63/08C, H04L29/06C2, H04L29/06M2H2Legal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionMay 17, 2002ASAssignmentOwner name: MICROSOFT CORPORATION, WASHINGTONFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:BUCH, JEREMY T.;SIMONS, DAVID J.;REEL/FRAME:012919/0253Effective date: 20020430Dec 3, 2010FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 4Dec 9, 2014ASAssignmentOwner name: MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING, LLC, WASHINGTONFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:MICROSOFT CORPORATION;REEL/FRAME:034541/0477Effective date: 20141014Dec 29, 2014FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 8RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services