Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103291/gibson-vs-berryhill
Timestamp: 2018-05-21 01:47:39
Document Index: 435397730

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 210', '§ 211', '§ 206', '§ 210', '§ 211', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2283', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Gibson Vs Berryhill - Citation 103291 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Gibson Vs. Berryhill - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103291
Case Number 411 U.S. 564
Respondent Berryhill
gibson v. berryhill - 411 u.s. 564 (1973) u.s. supreme court gibson v. berryhill, 411 u.s. 564 (1973) gibson v. berryhill no. 71-653 argued january 9-10, 1973 decided may 7, 1973 411 u.s. 564 appeal from the united states district court for the middle district of alabama syllabus appellees, licensed optometrists employed by lee optical co., who were not members of the alabama optometric association (association), were charged by the association with unprofessional conduct within the meaning of the state optometry statute because of their employment with the company. the complaint was filed with the alabama board of optometry (board), all members of which were association members. the board deferred proceedings while.....
U.S. Supreme Court Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)
1. The anti-injunction statute did not bar the District Court from issuing the injunction, since appellees brought suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pp. 411 U. S. 572 -575.
2. Nor did the rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 , or principles of comity require the District Court to dismiss appellees' suit in view of the pending Board proceeding, since the appellees
alleged and the District Court concluded that the Board's bias rendered it incompetent to adjudicate the issues. Pp. 411 U. S. 575 -577.
3. Since the Board was composed solely of private practitioners and the corporate employees it sought to bar from practice constituted half the optometrists in the State, the District Court was warranted in concluding that the Board members' pecuniary interest disqualified them from passing on the issues. Pp. 411 U. S. 578 -579.
4. Though the District Court did not abuse its discretion in not abstaining until the Lee Optical decision was rendered by the Alabama Supreme Court, the principles of equity, comity, and federalism warrant reconsideration of this case in the light of that decision. Pp. 411 U. S. 579 -581.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BURGER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 411 U. S. 581 . MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 411 U. S. 581 .
advertising practices of of optometrists and which, until 1965, appeared to contemplate the existence of commercial stores with optical departments. [ Footnote 1 ] In 1965, § 210 was repealed in its entirety by the Alabama Legislature, and § 211 was amended so as to eliminate any direct reference
to optical departments maintained by corporations or other business establishments under the direction of employee optometrists. [ Footnote 2 ]
Soon after these statutory changes, the Alabama Optometric Association, a professional organization whose membership is limited to independent practitioners of optometry not employed by others, filed charges against various named optometrists, all of whom were duly licensed under Alabama law but were the salaried employees of Lee Optical Co. The charges were filed with the Alabama Board of Optometry, the statutory body with authority to issue, suspend, and revoke licenses for the practice of optometry. The gravamen of these charges was that the named optometrists, by accepting employment from Lee Optical, a corporation, had engaged in "unprofessional conduct" within the meaning of § 206 of the Alabama optometry statute, and hence were practicing their profession unlawfully. [ Footnote 3 ] More particularly,
the Association charged the named individuals with, among other things, aiding and abetting a corporation in the illegal practice of optometry; practicing optometry under a false name, that is, Lee Optical Co.; unlawfully soliciting the sale of glasses; lending their licenses to Lee Optical Co.; and splitting or dividing fees with Lee Optical. [ Footnote 4 ] It was apparently the Association's position that, following the repeal of § 210 and the amendment of § 211, the practice of optometry by individuals as employees of business corporations was no longer permissible in Alabama, and that, by accepting such employment, the named optometrists had violated the ethics of their profession. It was prayed that the Board revoke the licenses of the individuals charged following due notice and a proper hearing.
Proceedings on the Association's charges were held in abeyance by the Board while its own state court suit progressed. The individual defendants in that suit were dismissed on grounds that do not adequately appear in the record before us, and, eventually, on March 17, 1971, the state trial court rendered judgment for the Board, and enjoined Lee Optical both from practicing optometry without a license and from employing licensed optometrists. [ Footnote 5 ] The company appealed this judgment.
Meanwhile, following its victory in the trial court, the Board reactivated the proceedings pending before it since 1965 against the individual optometrists employed by Lee, noticing them for hearings to be held on May 26 and 27, 1971. Those individuals countered on May 14, 1971, by filing a complaint in the United States District Court naming as defendants the Board of Optometry and its individual members, as well as the Alabama Optometric Association and other individuals. The suit, brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought an injunction against the scheduled hearings on the grounds that the statutory scheme regulating the practice of optometry in Alabama [ Footnote 6 ] was unconstitutional
insofar as it permitted the Board to hear the pending charges against the individual plaintiffs in the federal suit. [ Footnote 7 ] The thrust of the complaint was that the Board was biased, and could not provide the plaintiffs with a fair and impartial hearing in conformity with due process of law.
would follow in the normal course of events. [ Footnote 8 ]"
Appeal was taken to this Court and probable jurisdiction noted on June 26, 1972. 408 U.S. 920. Meanwhile, on March 30, 1972, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the judgment of the state trial court in the Lee Optical Co. case, [ Footnote 9 ] holding that nothing in the Alabama statutes pertaining to optometry evidenced
"a legislative policy that an optometrist duly qualified and licensed under the laws of this state may not be employed by another to examine eyes for the purpose of prescribing eyeglasses. [ Footnote 10 ]"
which are "expressly authorized" by another Act of Congress. [ Footnote 11 ] Last Term, after the District Court's decision here, this Court determined that actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were within the "expressly authorized" exception to the ban on federal injunctions. [ Footnote 12 ] Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972).
Our decision in Mitchum, however, held only that a district court was not absolutely barred by statute from enjoining a state court proceeding when called upon to do so in a § 1983 suit. As we expressly stated in Mitchum, nothing in that decision purported to call into question the established principles of equity, comity, and federalism which must, under appropriate circumstances, restrain a federal court from issuing such injunctions. Id. at 407 U. S. 243 . These principles have been emphasized by this Court many times in the past, albeit under a variety of different rubrics. First of all, there is the doctrine, usually applicable when an injunction is sought, that a party must exhaust his available administrative remedies before invoking the equitable jurisdiction of a court. See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675 (1943). Secondly, there is the basic principle of federalism, restated as recently as 1971 in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 , that a federal court may not
In the instant case the matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not detain us long. Normally, when a State has instituted administrative proceedings against an individual who then seeks an injunction in federal court, the exhaustion doctrine would require the court to delay action until the administrative phase of the state proceedings is terminated, at least where coverage or liability is contested and administrative expertise, discretion, or factfinding is involved. [ Footnote 13 ] But this Court has expressly held in recent years that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states an otherwise good cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Whether this is invariably the case even where, as here, a license revocation proceeding has been brought by the State and is pending before one of its own agencies and where the individual charged is to be deprived of
nothing until the completion of that proceeding is a question we need not now decide, for the clear purport of appellees' complaint was that the State Board of Optometry was unconstitutionally constituted, and so did not provide them with an adequate administrative remedy requiring exhaustion. Thus, the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy, an issue which, under federal law, the District Court was required to decide, was, for all practical purposes, identical with the merits of appellees' lawsuit. [ Footnote 14 ]
As frequently occurs in the case of summary affirmance, the decision in Geiger is somewhat opaque. We doubt, however, that it is controlling here. First of all, it appears from the jurisdictional statement and motion to affirm in Geiger that state criminal proceedings were pending at the time of the challenged dismissal of the federal case. Moreover, it also appears that, subsequent to that dismissal, the State Medical Board completed its proceedings and revoked Geiger's license, and that judicial proceedings to review that order were already under way in the state courts. Secondly, there is no judicial finding here, as there was in Geiger, that, under applicable state law, license revocation proceedings are quasi -criminal in nature; nor is the Alabama case law now cited for this proposition persuasive. See State v. Keel, 33 Ala.App. 609, 35 So.2d 625 (1948). Finally, although it is apparent from Geiger that administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a license to practice
Unlike those situations where a federal court merely abstains from decision on federal questions until the resolution of underlying or related state law issues [ Footnote 15 ] -- a subject we shall consider shortly in the context of the present case -- Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts. Such a course naturally presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved. Here, the predicate for a Younger v. Harris dismissal was lacking, for the appellees alleged, and the District Court concluded, that the State Board of Optometry was incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it. If the District Court's conclusion was correct in this regard, it was also correct that it need not defer to the Board. Nor, in these circumstances, would a different result be required simply because judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of the administrative proceedings. [ Footnote 16 ] Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972).
Arguably, the District Court was right on both scores, but we need reach, and we affirm, only the latter ground of possible personal interest. [ Footnote 17 ]
Arguably, the District Court should have awaited the outcome of the Lee Optical Co. appeal, a decision which might have obviated the need for an injunction in this case. [ Footnote 18 ] But the Board was pressing its charges against appellees without awaiting that outcome and, in any event, it appears that at least some of the charges pending against appellees might have survived a reversal of the state trial court's judgment by the Alabama Supreme Court. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to proceed as it did.
The District Court held § 2283 inapplicable in the present case because the plaintiffs sought an injunction against a state administrative body, and not a state court. Whether this distinction is tenable in all circumstances -- even where the administrative proceeding is adjudicatory or quasi -judicial in character -- we need not decide here, since the present action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I concur although, in my view, the three-judge District Court would have been better advised, as a matter of sound judicial discretion, to have refrained from acting until the outcome of the Lee Optical appeal. See my dissenting opinion in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 , 400 U. S. 443 (1971).
I join the opinion of the Court except insofar as it suggests that the question remains open whether plaintiffs in some suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may have to exhaust administrative remedies. See ante at 411 U. S. 574 -575. In my opinion, the inapplicability of the exhaustion requirement to any suit brought under § 1983 has been firmly settled by this Court's prior decisions. McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 , 373 U. S. 671 -672 (1963). See also Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 , 392 U. S. 312 n. 4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967).