Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/225626795/Harbor-Church-v-Buenaventura-Complaint
Timestamp: 2017-05-24 07:03:27
Document Index: 433907113

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1391', '§ 700', '§ 24', '§ 800', '§ 802', '§ 703', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 24', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 24', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 24', '§ 1988']

Harbor Church v Buenaventura Complaint | Free Exercise Clause | First Amendment To The United States Constitution
ScribdExploreEXPLORE BY INTERESTSCareer & MoneyBusiness Biography & HistoryEntrepreneurshipLeadership & MentoringMoney ManagementTime ManagementPersonal GrowthHappinessPsychologyRelationships & ParentingReligion & SpiritualitySelf-ImprovementPolitics & Current AffairsPoliticsSocietyScience & TechScienceTechHealth & FitnessFitnessNutritionSportsWellnessLifestyleArts & LanguagesFashion & BeautyFood & WineHome & GardenTravelEntertainmentCelebrity Biography & MemoirPop CultureBiographies & HistoryBiography & MemoirHistoryFictionChildren’s & YAClassic LiteratureContemporary FictionHistorical FictionLGBTQ FictionMystery, Thriller & CrimeRomanceScience Fiction & FantasyBROWSE BY CONTENT TYPEBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicUploadSign inJoinOptionsJoinSign InUploadHarbor Church v Buenaventura ComplaintUploaded by Howard FriedmanFree Exercise ClauseFirst Amendment To The United States ConstitutionVenue (Law)ComplaintVirtue0.0 (0)DownloadEmbedDescription: RLUIPA lawsuit complaint.View MoreRLUIPA lawsuit complaint.Copyright: © All Rights ReservedDownload as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentComplaint1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 James A. Sonne, State Bar No. 250759 jsonne@law.stanford.edu Jared M. Haynie, State Bar No. 294375 jhaynie@law.stanford.edu Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic Crown Quadrangle 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305 Phone: (650) 723-1422 Fax: (650) 723-4426 Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION Harbor Missionary Church Corporation, Plaintiff, v. City of San Buenaventura; Jeffrey Lambert, in his official capacity as Community Development Director; Mark Watkins, in his official capacity as City Manager; Cheryl Heitmann, in her official capacity as Mayor and presiding City Councilmember; Erik Nasarenko, in his official capacity as Deputy Mayor and City Councilmember; and Neal Andrews, James L. Monahan, Carl E. Morehouse, Mike Tracy, and Christy Weir, in their official capacities as City Councilmembers; Case No.: Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 1. Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 2. Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 1 of 20 Page ID #:1
Complaint 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dan Long, in his official capacity as Chair of the Planning Commission; Nancy Francis, in her official capacity as Vice Chair of the Planning Commission; and Christopher Beck, Scott Boydstun, Laura Dunbar, David Ferrin, and Rondi Guthrie, in their official capacities as Planning Commissioners, Defendants. Introduction 1. This action is brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2. Plaintiff Harbor Missionary Church Corporation is a Christian congregation in San Buenaventura, California that believes it is called to serve the homeless and the downtrodden. The church has ministered to the poor in its current location since 2008, but was recently forced by the City to terminate its ministry to the poor. Accordingly, Harbor seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the deprivation of its religious liberties. 3. Ministry to the poor is a substantial part of Harbor’s religious exercise. For approximately five hours per day, Monday through Friday, Harbor provides meals, clothing, access to laundry and shower facilities, and Bible study and prayer, at its location in a residential neighborhood. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 2 of 20 Page ID #:2
Complaint 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4. In 2004, the church purchased the property at its current location from the Quakers who had used the building as both a church and, on weekdays, a daycare facility. Because conditional use permits run with the land, upon purchasing the property Harbor obtained the permit that had been secured by the Quakers with the same rights and obligations the Quakers had had under the permit. 5. In late 2012, however, City officials determined Harbor’s permit to operate as a church did not suffice for the church’s ministry to the poor; the city demanded the church apply for an additional permit. 6. Because Harbor already had a permit in place (and because it had been operating its ministry to the poor for more than four years), it was confused by the City’s request. Because Harbor’s ministry to the poor was (and is) central to its doctrine, faith, and practice, it felt that its current permit to operate as a church was sufficient and that a separate permit was not necessary. Nevertheless, in the spirit of cooperation it applied for a separate permit and paid the nearly $7,200 application fee. 7. Ultimately, the City denied the permit. In November 2013, the City Planning Commission denied the permit and categorized the church’s homeless ministry as “secular” activity. Harbor appealed to the City Council. In May 2014, the City Council deadlocked in its deliberations, resulting (by default) in an affirmation of the Planning Commission’s decision. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 3 of 20 Page ID #:3
Complaint 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8. Ministering to the poor, both spiritually and physically, has been and continues to be a central tenet of the church’s doctrine, faith, and practice. By forcing Harbor to discontinue its ministry to the poor, the City has substantially burdened the church’s religious exercise without a legally justifiable reason, in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Jurisdiction and Venue 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 10. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because at least one of the defendants resides in this district (and all defendants are residents of California); and because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in this district. Parties 11. Plaintiff Harbor Missionary Church Corporation is a nonprofit religious corporation organized under the laws of California. It is located at 3100 Preble Avenue in San Buenaventura, California. 12. Defendant City of San Buenaventura (“the City”) is a municipal corporation created under the laws of California and situated in Ventura County. 13. The City is empowered to act through its officers, employees, and official bodies. All powers of the City are vested in the City Council (“the Council”), Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 4 of 20 Page ID #:4
Complaint 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 except as otherwise provided for in the City Charter or the California Constitution. Ventura City Charter § 700. The City Council has the authority to issue a conditional use permit to allow Harbor to continue its homeless ministry at its current location. Id. 14. Defendant Jeffrey Lambert is Community Development Director for the City and is sued in his official capacity. As Community Development Director, Mr. Lambert is charged with enforcing the City’s zoning ordinance, including the terms and conditions of any land use permit issued by the City Council. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code § 24.580.030. He is authorized to arrest persons who violate the City’s zoning ordinance. Id. 15. Defendant Mark Watkins is City Manager for the City and is sued in his official capacity. As City Manager, Mr. Watkins is the “administrative head” of the City. Ventura City Charter § 800. It is his duty to “see that all laws, provisions of [the City Charter,] and acts of the City Council, subject to enforcement by him or by officers subject to his direction and supervision, are faithfully executed.” Ventura City Charter § 802(e). 16. Defendant Cheryl Heitmann is a member of the City Council for the City (“City Councilmember”) and is also the Mayor of the City; she is sued in her official capacity. As Mayor, Ms. Heitmann serves as the presiding City Councilmember. Ventura City Charter § 703. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 5 of 20 Page ID #:5
Complaint 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17. Defendant Erik Nasarenko is a City Councilmember and is also the Deputy Mayor of the City; he is sued in his official capacity. As Deputy Mayor, Mr. Nasarenko acts as Mayor in the absence of the Mayor. Id. 18. Defendant Neal Andrews is a City Councilmember and is sued in his official capacity. 19. Defendant James L. Monahan is a City Councilmember and is sued in his official capacity. 20. Defendant Carl E. Morehouse is a City Councilmember and is sued in his official capacity. 21. Defendant Mike Tracy is a City Councilmember and is sued in his official capacity. 22. Defendant Christy Weir is a City Councilmember and is sued in her official capacity. 23. Defendant Dan Long is Chair of the Planning Commission and is a Planning Commissioner; he is sued in his official capacity. 24. Defendant Nancy Francis is Vice Chair of the Planning Commission and is a Planning Commissioner; she sued in her official capacity. 25. Defendant Christopher Beck is a Planning Commissioner and is sued in his official capacity. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 6 of 20 Page ID #:6
Complaint 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26. Defendant Scott Boydstun is a Planning Commissioner and is sued in his official capacity. 27. Defendant Laura Dunbar is a Planning Commissioner and is sued in her official capacity. 28. Defendant David Ferrin is a Planning Commissioner and is sued in his official capacity. 29. Defendant Rondi Guthrie is a Planning Commissioner and is sued in her official capacity. Statement of Facts 30. Harbor purchased the property at 3100 Preble Avenue in 2004. The property previously belonged to a Quaker congregation and had been used as a place of communal worship for decades. 31. When Harbor acquired it, the property had a City-issued permit for church use and a daycare operation for up to 150 children. 32. In 2007, Sam Gallucci became Harbor’s pastor and began to focus the church’s ministry toward fulfilling the gospel’s command to minister to the poor. 33. Harbor sincerely believes the gospel of Jesus Christ requires it to feed the hungry and clothe the naked. The central scripture guiding the church’s vision is the parable of the sheep and the goats, found in the New Testament, where Jesus taught the significance of feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and visiting the Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 7 of 20 Page ID #:7
Complaint 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 sick and those who are in prison. Jesus said, “whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.” See Matthew 25:34-40. 34. Harbor’s weekday activities (hereinafter “ministry”) consist of inviting its congregants, including the homeless, to gather at the church five days a week for meals, clothing, showers, laundry, and Christian teaching and fellowship. With the help of local business and charitable organizations, the church provides breakfast and lunch, interspersed with songs, prayers, scripture study, and fellowship. During this time, showers and laundry facilities are made available to those who need them. 35. Harbor’s ministry occurs from approximately 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday, and from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Fridays. These times were worked out with Harbor’s next door neighbor—Blanche Reynolds Elementary—to ensure the church’s ministry would not interrupt the school’s daily operations. 36. In December 2012, the City told Harbor it needed a separate conditional use permit to continue its ministry. 37. As Harbor’s ministry is an integral part of its church practice, Harbor believed its current permit to operate as a church was adequate to allow it to continue its activities. Nevertheless, in the spirit of cooperation, Harbor complied Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 8 of 20 Page ID #:8
Complaint 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 with the City’s request and in February 2013 filed an application for an additional conditional use permit. 38. The City has a multi-step process for issuing a conditional use permit. First, City Staff conducts a thorough study of the application. Second, Staff presents its findings and recommendation to the City Planning Commission on two separate issues: (1) whether the Planning Commission ought to approve the application and, if so, subject to what conditions; and (2) whether approval of the application might have a significant effect on the environment, an analysis mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act. Third, the Planning Commission reviews Staff’s findings and recommendations, and makes its own determinations. 39. The four findings that must be made to grant a conditional use permit are: (1) the use conforms to the comprehensive plan and is consistent with the purposes and requirements of the zoning ordinance; (2) the use will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare; (3) the use will be compatible with the scale, mass, bulk, and orientation of the buildings and structures in the surrounding vicinity; and (4) the use will be compatible with, and will not adversely affect or be materially detrimentally to, uses, buildings, or structures in, or the general character of the surrounding vicinity. See Ventura Municipal Code, § 24.520.070. The Planning Commission’s determinations may be appealed to the City Council. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code § 24.520.100. The City Council considers appeals from Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 9 of 20 Page ID #:9
Complaint 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Planning Commission de novo; its determination is final. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code § 24.565.060. 40. On June 19, 2013, City staff issued a Notice of Intent to Adopt a Negative Declaration under CEQA, specifically finding that Harbor’s ministry to the poor “COULD NOT have a significant effect on the environment.” Staff noted that city ordinances currently in place control potential noise impacts Harbor could cause. Further, staff noted that prior police interactions with Harbor had been “part of their normal operations,” and that no new police efforts would be required for the continuation of Harbor’s ministry. 41. Shortly thereafter, City staff issued its initial report, recommending the Planning Commission grant the conditional use permit subject to conditions. Staff specifically found that, subject to conditions, Harbor’s ministry was fully compatible with and would not adversely affect or be materially detrimental to the surrounding uses or the general character of the neighborhood. 42. At the hearing sessions held by the Planning Commission, the Commissioners devoted little discussion to City Staff’s proposed conditions and ultimately instructed staff to return with “new findings” that would support a denial. On November 13, 2013, the Planning Commission voted to deny the permit. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 10 of 20 Page ID #:10
Complaint 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 43. The denial classified Harbor’s ministry as a “secular land use[],” refusing to consider it as part of the church’s religious exercise. 44. The denial was also based on the erroneous assertion that because Harbor objected to certain proposed conditions, it would be unwilling to comply with any conditions. Harbor, however, has always been willing to follow reasonable and legally imposed conditions. 45. The Planning Commission denied the church’s application without applying RLUIPA’s heightened scrutiny for religious land use, and, therefore, never reached the question of whether the denial was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 46. On November 25, 2013, Harbor filed a timely appeal to the City Council. Separate appeals were filed by the Unitarian Universalist Church and the Ventura Interfaith Ministerial Association. Robert Gibson, a Harbor congregant, filed an appeal but it was rejected for failure to pay the $1,000 filing fee. 47. Two members of the City Council recused themselves. 48. The City Council held three hearing sessions. At the conclusion of the third session, the four sitting Councilmembers deadlocked, 2-2. (One member of the City Council was absent at the third session.) Consequently, the City Council took no action, and the Planning Commission’s decision stands. Ventura, Ca., City Council Protocols III.15 (Sept. 2013). Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 11 of 20 Page ID #:11
Complaint 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 49. The process the City used to determine whether to grant Harbor’s application for a conditional use permit was one that by its nature required an individualized assessment of Harbor’s application. 50. The denial of Harbor’s application for a conditional use permit prevents Harbor from continuing its ministry. 51. Relocating the church’s ministry is impractical—at least for the foreseeable future. Immediate relocation is impossible. Harbor lacks the financial means to move. And even under ideal conditions, moving will take time—time to find a new location; to navigate the permitting process; to fund the building, construction, and moving costs; to remodel a likely industrial shell to suit the needs of a church; and finally to simply relocate an entire church and its belongings. Such a process cannot be completed in mere weeks or months. In the meantime, Harbor’s congregants need a church. If the church simply shuts its doors, its congregants will have nowhere to go. 52. Evidence was not presented to the City that would support a compelling interest in forcing Harbor to close its ministry. 53. Denial of Harbor’s application for a permit was not the least restrictive means available to advance any purported governmental interest. At the very least, restrictions could have been placed on the permit that would allow Harbor to continue to operate while, at the same time, addressing the City’s concerns. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 12 of 20 Page ID #:12
Complaint 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 54. Harbor continued to operate its ministry while the proceedings were pending before the Planning Commission and the City Council. The City did not attempt to force Harbor to close its ministry during that period. 55. The City receives federal financial assistance. Count I Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) 56. Harbor re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 57. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Harbor of its right to the free exercise of religion, as secured by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (RLUIPA). 58. RLUIPA prevents the government from imposing a substantial burden on the sincere religious belief of a religious assembly or institution unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 59. RLUIPA applies whenever (1) the substantial burden “is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance”; (2) the substantial burden “affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce . . . among the several States”; or (3) the substantial burden is “imposed in the Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 13 of 20 Page ID #:13
Complaint 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2). 60. Because the City receives federal financial assistance; because the imposition of the substantial burden on Harbor’s religious exercise affects commerce “among the several States”; and because this case arises out of the City’s implementation of a land use regulation under which the City made individualized assessments concerning Harbor’s proposed use of the property at 3100 Preble Avenue, RLUIPA’s terms are binding in this case. 61. Harbor is a religious assembly or institution for purposes of RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. 62. The City is a “government” subject to the requirements of RLUIPA; and the other Defendants are government officials subject to the requirements of RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-5. 63. Harbor’s ministry is an integral part of its religious exercise, contrary to the City’s assertion that the ministry is a “secular” land use unprotected by RLUIPA. 64. Defendants have unlawfully imposed a substantial burden on Harbor’s sincere religious exercise. The Council’s denial of the church’s application to continue its ministry imposes “a significantly great restriction or onus” on Harbor’s Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 14 of 20 Page ID #:14
Complaint 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 religious exercise. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 65. If Harbor were to continue its ministry to the poor, it would face potential criminal prosecution. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code § 24.580.030. The church has evaluated its relocation options, and moving is highly impracticable given the church’s financial constraints (and immediate relocation is financially impossible). Therefore, the denial forces Harbor to abandon its ministry or risk criminal liability. This burden is “oppressive to a significantly great extent.” Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 66. No compelling governmental interest justifies Defendants’ decision. Defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that Harbor’s ministry implicates a compelling interest, and they have not carried that burden. 67. Moreover, there are less restrictive means available than denying Harbor’s permit. Defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that outright denial is the least restrictive means available, and they have not carried that burden. Count II Violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 68. Harbor re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 15 of 20 Page ID #:15
Complaint 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 69. The First Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 1217, 1860 S. Ct. 900, 903 (1940). Municipalities are also bound by the Free Exercise Clause by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 450, 82 L. Ed. 949, 953, 58 S. Ct. 666, 668 (1938). 70. As a municipality or official agents of a municipality, Defendants are obliged to comply with the First Amendment. 71. Congress has provided a statutory vehicle to bring challenges to First Amendment violations by state actors. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person has a private right of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” The private right of action includes “an action at law” and a “suit in equity.” Id. 72. Defendants have deprived and continue to deprive Harbor of its right to the free exercise of religion, as secured by the First Amendment. 73. Harbor’s ministry to the poor is an integral part of the church’s religious exercise. Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 16 of 20 Page ID #:16
Complaint 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 74. Defendants have unlawfully imposed a substantial burden on Harbor’s sincere religious exercise. The Council’s denial of the church’s application to continue its ministry to the poor imposes “a significantly great restriction or onus” on Harbor’s religious exercise. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 75. If Harbor were to continue its ministry to the poor, it would face potential criminal prosecution. Ventura, Ca., Mun. Code § 24.580.030. The church has evaluated its relocation options, and moving is highly impracticable given the church’s financial constraints (and immediate relocation is financially impossible). Therefore, the denial forces Harbor to abandon its ministry or risk criminal liability. This burden is “oppressive to a significantly great extent.” Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 76. This burden was imposed by a process that necessarily required an individualized government assessment—that is, the denial of Harbor’s permit was based on a judgment regarding the particular circumstances surrounding the church’s application. When a substantial burden is imposed through an individualized government assessment, strict scrutiny applies; in such cases, the rule or decision imposing the substantial burden violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest. See Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 17 of 20 Page ID #:17
Complaint 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 889, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 972, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1795-96 (1963). 77. No compelling governmental interest justifies Defendants’ decision. Defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that Harbor’s ministry implicates a compelling interest, and they have not carried that burden. 78. Moreover, there are less restrictive means available than denying Harbor’s permit. Defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that outright denial is the least restrictive means available, and they have not carried that burden. Prayer for Relief 79. Harbor seeks a declaration that its ministry is religious exercise; that its existing permit to operate as a church is sufficient to carry on its ministry; and that no additional permit is required to continue that ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue. 80. Harbor seeks a declaration that Defendants’ outright denial of Harbor’s application for a permit to continue its ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue violates its religious liberty rights secured by RLUIPA and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 81. Harbor seeks a preliminary injunction restraining Defendants and their agents, during the pendency of this action, from bringing any enforcement action Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 18 of 20 Page ID #:18
Complaint 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 against the church resulting from Harbor’s denied application for a permit to continue its ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue. 82. Harbor seeks a permanent injunction directing Defendants to grant Harbor’s application for a conditional use permit to continue its ministry at 3100 Preble Avenue in a manner consistent with Harbor’s religious liberty protected under RLUIPA and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 83. Harbor is entitled to recover attorney fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and costs, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). 84. Accordingly, Harbor prays that this Court grant: A. Declaratory and injunctive relief as set forth in this Complaint; B. Reasonable attorney fees, litigation expenses, expert fees, and costs; and C. All such other and further declaratory and injunctive relief as appears reasonable and just. Dated: May 14, 2014 Respectfully submitted, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC By: /s/ James A. Sonne James A. Sonne jsonne@law.stanford.edu Jared M. Haynie jhaynie@law.stanford.edu Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 19 of 20 Page ID #:19
Complaint 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Stanford Law School Religious Liberty Clinic 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, CA 94305 (650) 723-1422 Attorneys for Plaintiff Case 2:14-cv-03730 Document 1 Filed 05/14/14 Page 20 of 20 Page ID #:20
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