Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/461/648/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 10:09:26
Document Index: 517815308

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 284', '§ 284']

GENERAL MOTORS CORP. V. DEVEX CORP., 461 U. S. 648 - Volume 461 - 1983 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 461 > GENERAL MOTORS CORP. V. DEVEX CORP., 461 U. S. 648 (1983) > Full Text
In 1956, respondent Devex Corporation (Devex) filed a suit for patent infringement against petitioner General Motors Corporation (GMC) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. [Footnote 1] Devex alleged that GMC was infringing Reissue Patent No. 24,017, known as the "Henricks" or "Devex" patent. The patent covered a lubricating process used in the cold-forming of metal car
On remand, the case was referred to a Special Master for an accounting. The Special Master ruled that three major divisions of GMC had used infringing processes in the manufacture of bumper parts, and selected a royalty rate "by reference to hypothetical negotiations" that it found would have taken place if GMC had sought to obtain a license from Devex. Special Master's Report at 71. See 667 F.2d 347,
Prior to 1946, the provision of the patent laws concerning a plaintiff's recovery in an infringement action contained no reference to interest. [Footnote 4] The award of interest in patent cases was governed by the common law standard enunciated in several decisions of this Court. E.g., Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U. S. 448 (1936); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136 (1888). Under the Duplate standard, prejudgment interest was generally awarded from the date
The Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions as to whether § 284 incorporates the Duplate standard and, more generally, as to the standard governing the award of prejudgment interest under § 284. [Footnote 7]
There is no basis for inferring that Congress' adoption of the provision concerning interest merely incorporated the Duplate standard. This is not a case in which Congress has reenacted statutory language that the courts had interpreted in a particular way. In such a situation, it may well be appropriate to infer that Congress intended to adopt the established judicial interpretation. See, e.g., 459 U. S. S. 654� MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 459 U. S. 384-386 (1983); Lorillard v. Pons,@ 434 U. S. 575, 434 U. S. 580-581 (1978). In this case, however, the predecessor statute did not contain any reference to interest, and the 1946 amendments specifically added a provision concerning interest in patent infringement actions. We cannot agree with petitioner that the only significance of Congress' express provision for the award of interest was the incorporation of a common law standard that developed in the absence of any specific provision concerning interest.
Both the background and language of § 284 provide evidence of this fundamental purpose. Under the pre-1946 statute, the owner of a patent could recover both his own damages and the infringer's profits. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U. S. 476, 377 U. S. 505 (1964); n 4, supra. A patent owner's ability to recover the infringer's profits reflected the notion that he should be able to force the infringer to disgorge the fruits of the infringement even if it caused him no injury. In 1946, Congress excluded consideration of the infringer's gain by eliminating the recovery of his profits, Aro Mfg. Co., supra, at 377 U. S. 505, the determination of which had often required protracted litigation. H.R.Rep. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1946); S.Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1946); 92 Cong.Rec. 9188 (1946) (remarks of Sen. Pepper). At the same time, Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would, in fact, receive full compensation for "any damages" he suffered as a result of the
The standard governing the award of prejudgment interest under § 284 should be consistent with Congress' overriding purpose of affording patent owners complete compensation. In light of that purpose, we conclude that prejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded. In the typical case, an award of prejudgment interest is necessary to ensure that the patent owner is placed in as good a position as he would have been in had the infringer entered into a reasonable royalty agreement. [Footnote 10] An award of interest from the time that
We do not construe § 284 as requiring the award of prejudgment interest whenever infringement is found. That provision states that interest shall be "fixed by the court," and, in our view, it leaves the court some discretion in awarding
Because we hold that prejudgment interest should ordinarily be awarded absent some justification for withholding such an award, a decision to award prejudgment interest will only be set aside if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. The District Court held that GMC infringed Devex's patent over the course of a number of years, and awarded Devex a reasonable royalty as compensation. While GMC contends that Devex was guilty of causing unnecessary delay, the District Court rejected this contention when it concluded that "Devex has done no worse than fully litigate its claims achieving a large judgment in its favor," and awarded Devex costs on the basis of this conclusion. 494 F.Supp. at 1380. [Footnote 12] On these facts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of prejudgment interest was proper.
The Special Master also ruled that multiple damages and attorney's fees, which are authorized by 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285, would be inappropriate in this case. 667 F.2d at 356, n. 8. These findings were adopted by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and are not before us.
Of course, the general public interest in patent litigation does not justify denial of prejudgment interest in the typical