Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/307/643/521760/
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 22:10:43
Document Index: 59436809

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1344', '§ 1708', '§ 1341', '§ 1344', '§ 1708', '§ 1341']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Akeem Anifowoshe, Defendant-appellant, 307 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 2002 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Akeem Anifowoshe, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Akeem Anifowoshe, Defendant-appellant, 307 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 307 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2002)
Debra Riggs Bonamici (argued), Office of U.S. Atty., Criminal Div., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Akeem Anifowoshe, Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood (Low), White Deer, PA, pro se.
Dean A. Strang, Brian P. Mullins (argued), Federal Defender Services of Eastern Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and MANION, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Akeem Anifowoshe was charged with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, 14 counts of possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A jury found Anifowoshe guilty on all sixteen counts, and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison. Anifowoshe now appeals the conviction on three grounds. He claims that the district court erred in admitting evidence of a state conviction, erred in allowing a non-expert to provide testimony on the similarity of handwriting, and erred in providing the jury with a "conscious avoidance" instruction. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
The crimes for which Anifowoshe was convicted involve a scheme to defraud numerous banks in the Chicago area. From August 1995 to March 1996 someone opened accounts at various banks using one of five fictitious names—Eugene Bradford, Micheal1 Johnson, William Sheron, Bernard Walker, and Paul Armstrong—for each account. One of three addresses was also given for each account — 5919 South Calumet, Chicago; 60 East Chestnut, Chicago; and 16781 Torrence Avenue No. 214, Lansing.
A substantial mass of evidence ties Anifowoshe to the fraud scheme. When arrested he possessed a key to Box 214 and a cellular telephone registered to the name of William Sheron and the address of 5919 South Calumet, Chicago. Anifowoshe also possessed an identification card bearing the 16871 Torrence Avenue address. The card matched a photocopy of an identification card given to a Citibank employee in connection with one of the fraudulent accounts. The number on the card also matched the number written down by a First Chicago Bank employee in connection with one of the other fraudulent accounts. Additionally a photocopy of an Illinois driver's license given to a North Community Bank employee and bearing Anifowoshe's photograph was admitted into evidence. Finally, 26 documents—at least one relating to each charge—including checks and deposit and withdrawal slips bore Anifowoshe's fingerprints.
Based on this and other evidence Anifowoshe was charged with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, 14 counts of possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708 and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A jury trial followed.
Later during the trial Theodore Knesek, a fraud investigator at Old Kent Bank, was called to testify. On cross-examination defense counsel asked Knesek to compare the handwriting of the signatures borne on the signature cards associated with the fictitious account holders. On redirect the government, over defense counsel's objections, asked Knesek to compare the signature purporting to be that of Paul Armstrong with Anifowoshe's signature. Knesek noted that the handwriting appeared to be the same because of the similarities in the "A" in Armstrong and the "A" in Anifowoshe.
At the conclusion of trial the jury was instructed without objection. These instructions included a "conscious avoidance" instruction. The instructions were accepted by attorneys for both sides.
a. Evidence of State Conviction
Anifowoshe first claims that the district court improperly admitted evidence of other acts under Fed.R.Evid 404(b)2 when it allowed the introduction of evidence concerning the state theft charge to which Anifowoshe had pleaded guilty.
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Vaughn, 267 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in the Rule 404(b) context, we apply a four-prong test asking whether:
Anifowoshe argues that because the act at issue in the state fraud conviction occurred subsequent to the acts at issue in the instant case the evidence is inadmissible.3 He draws this conclusion from the language of this court in United States v. Betts, 16 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1997). There we noted that "simply because evidence of a prior act is admissible under Rule 404(b) for a particular purpose does not mean that a similar but subsequent act is necessarily admissible for the same purpose." Id. at 757. Anifowoshe attempts to turn this language into a fifth prong to the established test. The language in Betts does not, however, support this argument. To say that evidence of a subsequent act is not necessarily admissible where evidence of a prior act was admissible is not to say that evidence of a subsequent act is never admissible. This is clear from our language in Betts:
Rule 404(b), of course, does not restrict evidence concerning the defendant's "other acts" to events which took place before the alleged crime; by its very terms, 404(b) does not distinguish between "prior" and "subsequent" acts. The critical question is whether the evidence is sufficiently probative of a matter within the rule's purview. Depending upon the factual circumstances, the chronological relationship of the charged offense and the other act may well have some bearing on this inquiry, but it is not necessarily dispositive.
Applying the four-prong test to the admission of evidence regarding the state conviction, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Starting with the first prong, the evidence was directed at proving a matter in issue other than propensity. There are numerous and striking similarities between the crimes involved in the state charge and the crimes involved in the instant case. The perpetrator of the state theft used the same address to open a fraudulent account as did the perpetrator of the federal fraud scheme. A check from the state theft account was made payable to Micheal Johnson, to whom some of the accounts in the federal scheme were registered. Two checks deposited in the state account displayed an address identical to an address used to open accounts in the federal scheme. The mailbox at Mail Boxes Etc. that was used in the federal scheme was registered to the same name as the account involved in the state scheme. On top of all this, both schemes involved the identical method of depositing stolen credit card access checks into accounts opened under fictitious names. Given these similarities the evidence was admissible to establish modus operandi for the purpose of proving identity. See United States v. Robinson, 161 F.3d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Evidence of modus operandi is evidence that shows a defendant's distinctive method of operation. Such evidence may be properly admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) to prove identity.") (citations omitted).
The fourth prong requires that the probative value of the evidence not be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The probative value of the evidence in question here is extremely high. The evidence goes toward proving identity through modus operandi. Anifowoshe fails to provide any concrete arguments that the evidence created an unfair prejudice. The evidence did not include details that were shocking, repulsive or "so repetitive as to flood the courtroom with evidence of [the defendant's] sordid character." United States v. Paredes, 87 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). And when other acts bear a striking similarity to the acts with which the defendant has been charged, this court has noted that the similarity "increases the probity of that evidence and actually decreases the potential risk of unfair prejudice." Id. Evidence of other acts is probative rather than unfairly prejudicial when the jury infers that a criminal who has committed one crime in a very specific and particular manner, i.e., with a particular modus operandi, is likely to have the same identity as the person who has committed a separate crime in the same particular manner. Explaining this rule we noted in Paredes:
b. Handwriting Testimony
Q: Would you say those would have been written by the same person or appear to be?
Absent a waiver or forfeiture, we review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wash, 231 F.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court's determination regarding the admissibility of evidence is given great deference. Id. Specifically " [t]his circuit has held that a trial judge has broad discretion in determining the scope of redirect examination." United States v. Touloumis, 771 F.2d 235, 241 (7th Cir. 1985).
The district court is within its discretion in allowing testimony if the objecting party has already opened the door for such testimony. "This circuit has held on numerous occasions that when a party questions a witness on a subject, even though that subject may not be strictly relevant to the case, the party cannot complain on appeal if the opposing party subsequently introduces evidence on the same subject." Id.; see also United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2002).
MR. MONDRY: What I would like to do is there's four or five accounts that have been opened up and they have signed signatures on those cards. I am not asking for his expert opinion, but I believe its in his—he can offer an opinion based on his experience in the area of comparing signature cards whether those signatures were made by the same person.
Q: When you said they appeared to be different, can you tell the jury what you meant?
A: It's a different name.
Q: Okay and then that's all that you were saying, correct?
Q: Mr. Knesek, when I showed you, and I can re-show them to you if you don't recall, the signatures all appeared to be different, is that correct?
Q: And when I say "different," I mean that you wouldn't be surprised IF they were written by separate people, is that correct?
Anifowoshe also challenges the "conscious avoidance" jury instruction. We must first determine whether this challenge has been waived.
Waiver of a right at the trial level precludes a party from seeking review on appeal. See United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (7th Cir. 1996). Waiver is deemed to have occurred when a party intentionally relinquishes or abandons a known right. Id. A few brief passages from the record show that such a waiver is present with regard to any right Anifowoshe may have had vis-a-vis objecting to the jury instructions.
THE COURT: And I should memorialize that—it's already in the record someplace, but a fitting place to do it is right after the instructions, that the instructions were given without objection by either side.
The district court properly admitted at trial the evidence of the state conviction under Rule 404(b). Regarding the handwriting testimony, Anifowoshe opened the door and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a non-expert to present testimony on the similarity of the handwriting. Finally Anifowoshe waived any objection to the "conscious avoidance" instruction given to the jury. Therefore Anifowoshe's conviction is AFFIRMED.
The name used was "Micheal" not "Michael."
In his reply brief Anifowoshe concedes that at least one of the acts at issue in this case did occur subsequent to, or at least simultaneously with, the state acts. As the timing of the acts is not decisive in this case, we do not dwell on characterizing acts as simultaneous, subsequent or prior