Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/39/1439/512002/
Timestamp: 2019-09-19 10:56:24
Document Index: 546519186

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 794', '§ 794', '§ 706', '§ 12101', 'art, 984', '§ 1291', 'art, 804']

Jay Lee Gates, John Ronald Bertram, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James Rowland and His Successor in Office James H. Gomez,directorof the California Department of Correction; Nadimkhoury, M.d., Assistant Deputy Director--cdc Healthservices; Eddie Ylst and His Successor in Office Stevecambra, Warden (interim)--california Medical Facility;kenneth Shepard, M.d., Chief Deputy Warden for Cmf Clinicalservices; Nicholas Poulos, M.d., and His Successor Inoffice George R. Gay, Chief Physician and Surgeon (acting);cmf; Paul Morentz, M.d., Chief Psychiatrist--cmf Outpatientpsychiatric Program; H. Benton, M.d., and His Successor Inoffice A.r. Rotella, M.d., Chief Psychiatrists--northernreception Center; D. Michael O'connor, M.d., and Hissuccessor in Office William Mayer, Director of Thecalifornia Department of Mental Health; Douglas G.arnold and His Successor in Office Clyde Murrey, Actingdeputy Director for State Hospitals; Dmh and Sylvia Blount,r.n., Executive Director--dmh Vacaville Psychiatric Program,defendants-appellants.jay Lee Gates, Plaintiff-appellant,andgeorge Deukmejian, Governor, Plaintiff, v. James Rowland, Director, Defendant-appellee.jay Lee Gates, et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. George Deukmejian; Ron Shinn; James Rowland; Nadimkhoury, M.d.; Assistant Deputy Director--cdc Healthservices; Eddie Ylst; Kenneth Shepard, Chief Deputy Wardenfor Cmf Clinical Services, et al., Defendants-appellants, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1994 › Jay Lee Gates, John Ronald Bertram, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James Rowland and His Successor in Offi...
Jay Lee Gates, John Ronald Bertram, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James Rowland and His Successor in Office James H. Gomez,directorof the California Department of Correction; Nadimkhoury, M.d., Assistant Deputy Director--cdc Healthservices; Eddie Ylst and His Successor in Office Stevecambra, Warden (interim)--california Medical Facility;kenneth Shepard, M.d., Chief Deputy Warden for Cmf Clinicalservices; Nicholas Poulos, M.d., and His Successor Inoffice George R. Gay, Chief Physician and Surgeon (acting);cmf; Paul Morentz, M.d., Chief Psychiatrist--cmf Outpatientpsychiatric Program; H. Benton, M.d., and His Successor Inoffice A.r. Rotella, M.d., Chief Psychiatrists--northernreception Center; D. Michael O'connor, M.d., and Hissuccessor in Office William Mayer, Director of Thecalifornia Department of Mental Health; Douglas G.arnold and His Successor in Office Clyde Murrey, Actingdeputy Director for State Hospitals; Dmh and Sylvia Blount,r.n., Executive Director--dmh Vacaville Psychiatric Program,defendants-appellants.jay Lee Gates, Plaintiff-appellant,andgeorge Deukmejian, Governor, Plaintiff, v. James Rowland, Director, Defendant-appellee.jay Lee Gates, et al., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. George Deukmejian; Ron Shinn; James Rowland; Nadimkhoury, M.d.; Assistant Deputy Director--cdc Healthservices; Eddie Ylst; Kenneth Shepard, Chief Deputy Wardenfor Cmf Clinical Services, et al., Defendants-appellants, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)
Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 1994. Decided Nov. 4, 1994
A consent decree entered into by various California state officials and a class, including all inmates at the California Medical Facility ("CMF") in Vacaville, California, gives rise to these three separate appeals and a cross-appeal. The inmates brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge deficient medical and psychiatric care, indecent confinement conditions, and treatment and segregation of HIV-positive inmates at the CMF--Main and Northern Reception Center. The consent decree included a provision for payment of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs brought this action to challenge conditions at the CMF--Main and Northern Reception Center, which they alleged were overcrowded and understaffed. The certified class of all inmates at CMF claimed that the shortages of custody staff and overcrowding exposed them to an unconstitutional risk of harm in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a remedy, they proposed limits on the numbers of inmates who could be housed at CMF and an increase in the correctional staff to provide "adequate supervision" for inmates. They also alleged that the denial of access to medical and mental health care and to attorneys, and the segregation of HIV-positive inmates violated their constitutional rights. A subclass of HIV-positive inmates made claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The section 504 claims of mobility-impaired inmates confined to wheelchairs and of mentally ill inmates were also included in the action.
The primary issue is whether "adequate custodial staffing to properly supervise" means only that staff sufficient to protect inmates from an unreasonable risk of violence, which is the constitutional minimum standard. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200-01, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). The plaintiffs contend that the district court and the mediator properly applied the higher standard of accepted correctional practices.
Interpretation of a consent decree is a question of law that we review de novo. Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 965, 117 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1992). The rules of contract interpretation of the situs state govern interpretation of the consent decree. Id. The language of the contract governs if it is clear and explicit. Id. Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1638. Words in a contract are generally understood in their ordinary and popular sense, and technical words are interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate. Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1644.
The plain meaning of the terms of the consent decree is clear: the staff must be adequate "to properly supervise prisoners and to provide escorts and other services." The consent decree does not state that the staff must only protect inmates from an unreasonable risk of violence. We must interpret the contract "to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting," Thompson, 915 F.2d at 1388 (citing Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1636), but we determine that by referring to the language of the agreement, if possible. Cal.Civil Code Secs. 1638, 1639. Where the parties negotiated use of a constitutional standard, they specified so in the language of the consent decree. Otherwise, the consent decree is not limited to constitutional standards. In fact, it states that " [t]he parties agree that it is not the intent of [the] Consent Decree to prescribe the minimum standards required by the United States Constitution."
The language of the consent decree is not ambiguous. Even if it were, the objectively determinable mutual intention of the parties at the time the parties agreed to the consent decree does not indicate any alternative meaning. The consent decree did not mention the constitutional standard. " [T]he true intent of a party is irrelevant if it is unexpressed." United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 660, 121 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1992).
In agreeing to the provisions of the consent decree, the parties recognized that rights established by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were implicated. Section 504, as amended and codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) ("the Act"), provides that " [n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."1 Thus, the Act requires that the plaintiff (1) have a disability, (2) be otherwise qualified for the job, and (3) be excluded due to discrimination solely by reason of his or her disability. In addition, the program doing the discriminating must receive federal assistance.
The term "individual with a disability" is defined in section 706(8) (B) of the Act to be "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B).
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the Act applied to a teacher with tuberculosis who had been removed from a teaching position to an administrative position because of the perceived threat her condition posed to the health of others. The Court stated that the contagious effects of a disease could not be meaningfully distinguished from the disease's physical effect on the claimant. "It would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment." Id. at 282, 107 S. Ct. at 1128. Thus, the Court held that the essential inquiry was whether she was otherwise qualified for the job. Id. at 287, 107 S. Ct. at 1130. The Court stated:
" [findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm."
Id. at 287-88, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 (citation and footnote omitted).
Following the Arline decision, we held in Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988), that the Act applied to a teacher who was diagnosed with AIDS. We noted that:
Id. at 706. In this case, as in Chalk, the physical impairment to the individual is not the issue, but rather the issue is the contagious effect of the HIV virus. Thus, there is no distinction to be drawn, for purposes of the Act, between those persons in whom the HIV virus has developed into AIDS and those persons who have remained asymptomatic. It is the possible transmission of the virus to others that is the basis of the individual's disability under the provisions of the Act. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2), defines disability in terms identical to those of the Act in section 706(8) (B). The regulations implementing the ADA include, as a physical or medical impairment, "HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic)." 28 C.F.R. Sec. 35.104(4) (l) (ii). This is consistent with the holdings of Arline and Chalk. Thus, we hold that a person infected with the HIV virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Eleventh Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522-24 (11th Cir. 1991).
We have held that the Act is applicable to prisons receiving federal financial assistance. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1988). It is undisputed that the prison facilities involved here received federal financial assistance. The defendants do not contest the fact that the policy restricts HIV prisoners who are otherwise qualified from participating in the food service program solely because they are infected with the HIV virus.
The issue is how the Act is to be applied in a prison setting. It is clear that HIV-seropositive prisoners have certain statutory rights; but, just as constitutional rights of prisoners must be considered in light of the reasonable requirements of effective prison administration, so must statutory rights applicable to the nation's general population be considered in light of effective prison administration. The Act was not designed to deal specifically with the prison environment; it was intended for general societal application. There is no indication that Congress intended the Act to apply to prison facilities irrespective of the considerations of the reasonable requirements of effective prison administration. It is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more stringent application of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act than it would the prisoners' constitutional rights. Thus, we deem the applicable standard for the review of the Act's statutory rights in a prison setting to be equivalent to the review of constitutional rights in a prison setting, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). The Court stated:
Id. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at 2261. This is equally applicable to the statutory rights created by the Act. In applying Turner to a prison regulation in an Arizona prison system, we synthesized the factors relevant to the determination of reasonableness as set forth in Turner.
Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85, 107 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974)). Under the standard of review announced in Turner, deference is due to the prison authorities' policy not to open food service jobs to HIV-infected inmates. We reverse that portion of the district court's order, which requires the defendants to allow HIV-infected inmates the opportunity to work in food service jobs.
Following the entry of the consent decree, the plaintiffs made an application for attorneys' fees and an award was made by the district court. That award was appealed, and we entered a judgment reversing that award in part and remanding for further proceedings in the district court. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1993). The issues raised in that remand are not before us on this appeal. The issue on this phase of the appeal relates only to the plaintiffs' award of attorneys' fees for preparing and litigating the fee application. However, the opinion in that case provides guidance in resolving some of the issues involved in this appeal.
On the issue of whether the time expended by law firms in addition to the Rosen law firm should be compensated, the test is whether the time expended was duplicative. See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1544 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). The plaintiffs contend that the time was necessarily spent, and the defendants have made no showing that the hours claimed are duplicative.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 confers jurisdiction of appeals on the courts of appeals over all final decisions of the district courts. Interim attorneys' fees awards made under section 1988 prior to entry of a final judgment on the merits are not appealable under section 1291. See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1988); Hillery v. Rushen, 702 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1983).
The awards before us are different because they follow a final judgment on the merits, and they do dispose of the issue of attorneys' fees for monitoring work performed during the first period of the consent decree. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Messe, 791 F.2d 1489, 1494 (award finally disposing of issue of fees for litigating the case up to certain point was appealable), vacated in part, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986).