Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/43/899/553330/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 02:51:33
Document Index: 461831120

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 921', '§ 902', '§ 945', '§ 932', 'art 727', '§ 902']

Eva W. Barber, Petitioner, v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Unitedstates Department of Labor; United States Steelmining Company, Incorporated, Respondents, 43 F.3d 899 (4th Cir. 1995) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1995 › Eva W. Barber, Petitioner, v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Unitedstates Depar...
Eva W. Barber, Petitioner, v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Unitedstates Department of Labor; United States Steelmining Company, Incorporated, Respondents, 43 F.3d 899 (4th Cir. 1995)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 43 F.3d 899 (4th Cir. 1995) Argued Nov. 4, 1994. Decided Jan. 10, 1995
Lawrence Barber filed a claim for black lung benefits in 1973. The claim was denied because Barber was still working in the mines. On September 30, 1980, two months after he last worked, Barber filed a new claim. He died on June 29, 1985. His widow, petitioner Eva Barber, filed a claim for survivor's benefits on August 15, 1985, and, as the miner's "surviving spouse," she has continued to pursue her husband's claim for benefits during his lifetime. See generally Charles v. Director, OWCP, 1 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing standing of survivors).
On remand, the ALJ again found the existence of a totally disabling respiratory impairment, but he concluded under Sec. 718.204(b) that Mrs. Barber had not affirmatively demonstrated that pneumoconiosis contributed to that impairment, see Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1990), and so he denied benefits. The BRB affirmed, and Mrs. Barber petitioned for review.
The ALJ and BRB improperly placed an affirmative duty on Mrs. Barber to show that pneumoconiosis contributed to her husband's totally disabling respiratory impairment. On claims filed before January 1, 1982, where a miner has fifteen years of employment and a totally disabling respiratory impairment, it is presumed that pneumoconiosis is a contributing cause of his impairment. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (4); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.305(a), (d). The respondent may rebut this presumption by showing either (i) that the miner does not have pneumoconiosis at all or (ii) that pneumoconiosis does not contribute to the miner's disability. "However, in no case shall the presumption be considered rebutted on the basis of evidence demonstrating the existence of a totally disabling obstructive respiratory or pulmonary disease of unknown origin." Sec. 718.305(d).
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record from which an ALJ could find that the employer has rebutted the presumption that Barber suffered from "pneumoconiosis." We have reminded ALJs and the BRB on several occasions4 that "pneumoconiosis" is a legal term defined by the Act,5 and they must bear in mind when considering medical evidence that physicians generally use "pneumoconiosis" as a medical term that comprises merely a small subset of the afflictions compensable under the Act. If there is any lingering confusion on this point, let us dispel it now. The legal definition of "pneumoconiosis" is incorporated into every instance the word is used in the statute and regulations. See 30 U.S.C. § 902 (definition applies " [f]or purposes of this subchapter"); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.201 (definition applies " [f]or the purpose of the Act"). Neither authority nor logic supports the proposition that the legal definition can be ignored for selected purposes. See Chastain v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 919 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that legal definition did not apply to rebuttal of the interim presumption under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.203(b) (4)).6
A short background discussion is in order. In 1977, dissatisfied with the low rate of Part B7 claims approvals, Congress retroactively loosened eligibility criteria and directed that, if the claimant so elected, a Part B claim could be reopened and its denial reviewed by either the Social Security Administration or the Department of Labor. Every miner whose claim had been denied was sent an "election card," which he was required to return within six months of receipt if he wished to have his claim considered anew. 30 U.S.C. § 945(a) (1); 20 C.F.R. Secs. 410.704(d), 727.104(b). To mitigate any injustice to responsible operators flowing from this retroactive unsettling of settled claims, Congress directed that all payments for benefits awarded on reopened claims would come from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. 30 U.S.C. § 932(c) (2); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 725.496.
An election card was sent to Mr. Barber on June 14, 1978, but it was never returned. The employer and Mrs. Barber contend that the miner did not have a meaningful opportunity to request review, so "good cause" to excuse his failure to elect review has been shown.8 Mrs. Barber therefore asks that the 20 C.F.R. Part 727 interim regulations be applied to the claim, while the employer argues that liability should shift to the Trust Fund. See Director, OWCP v. Quarto Mining Co., 901 F.2d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 1990); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Luker, 826 F.2d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 1987).9
In light of the ALJ's award of benefits on the miner's claim, this denial was plainly erroneous. For claims filed before January 1, 1982, a surviving spouse receives survivor's benefits automatically if the miner was entitled to benefits at the time of death. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 725.212(a) (3) (ii). The rule applied after January 1, 1982, is somewhat stricter: the survivor must show that pneumoconiosis hastened the miner's death in any way. Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 969, 122 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1993). Mrs. Barber did not seek review of the denial of her survivor's claim
E.g., Robinson, 914 F.2d at 39; Nance v. Benefits Review Board, 861 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1988); Rose v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 614 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1980)
See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b); 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.201
It is not at all clear that we could address this issue if it were not raised by Mrs. Barber. The employer has not filed a cross-petition. Generally, an appellee may rely on any ground appearing in the record in support of the judgment below, though this principle does not apply to administrative action. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L. Ed. 626 (1943); Dayton v. Consolidation Coal Co., 895 F.2d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 115 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1991). Moreover, what the employer seeks here is not to defend the judgment but rather to fasten liability for a reversed judgment onto another. In any event, because Mrs. Barber has raised the point, and because we affirm the ALJ's finding, whether we could order transfer of liability to the Trust Fund is a moot question