Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/460/300
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 11:42:47
Document Index: 595189782

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 7', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 2', '§ 20', '§ 11', '§ 3', '§ 20', '§ 1', '§ 47', '§ 7', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 715', '§ 718', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 47', '§ 47', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 7', '§ 3', '§ 715', '§ 3']

NORTH DAKOTA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews NORTH DAKOTA, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES.
460 U.S. 300 (103 S.Ct. 1095, 75 L.Ed.2d 77)
[HTML] Syllabus The federal Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act (Stamp Act) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire easements over wetland areas suitable for migratory waterfowl breeding and nesting grounds. Section 3 of the Wetlands Act of 1961 (Loan Act) provides that no land suitable for waterfowl habitats can be acquired with money from the fund established for such acquisitions unless the acquisition "has been approved" by the Governor or an appropriate agency of the State in which the land is located. Between 1961 and 1977, successive Governors of North Dakota consented to the acquisition of easements covering approximately 1.5 million acres of wetlands in that State. By 1977, the United States had obtained easements covering about half of this acreage. In the 1970's, however, cooperation between North Dakota and the United States began to break down, and in 1977 North Dakota enacted statutes restricting the United States' ability to acquire easements over wetlands. These statutes set out certain conditions that must be met "prior to final approval" of the acquisition of the easements, permitted a landowner to drain any after-expanded wetland in excess of the legal description in the easement, and limited all easements to a maximum term of 99 years. The United States brought suit in Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the 1977 North Dakota statutes were hostile to federal law and could not be applied and any easement acquired in violation of such statutes would nevertheless be valid. The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: 1. The consent required by § 3 of the Loan Act cannot be revoked at the will of an incumbent Governor. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the Loan Act's purpose of facilitating the acquisition of wetlands. Here, the acquisition in question clearly "has been approved" by North Dakota's Governors as § 3's language provides. Nothing in the statute authorizes the withdrawal of approval previously given. Nor does § 3's legislative history suggest that Congress intended to permit Governors to revoke their consent. Pp. 312-316.
In 1929, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (Conservation Act), 45 Stat. 1222, ch. 257, 16 U.S.C. 715 et seq., became law. By § 5 of that Act, 45 Stat. 1223, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to acquire land "for use as inviolate sanctuaries for migratory birds."
Land acquisitions under the Conservation Act are subject to certain conditions: they must be approved in advance by the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, §§ 2 and 5, 16 U.S.C. 715a and 715d, and the State in which the land is located must "have consented by law to the acquisition," § 7, 16 U.S.C. 715f.
In 1934, in order to provide funding for land acquisitions under the Conservation Act, the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act (Stamp Act), 48 Stat. 451, 16 U.S.C. 718 et seq., was enacted. Section 1 of the Stamp Act, 16 U.S.C. 718a, required waterfowl hunters to purchase migratory bird hunting stamps, commonly known as duck stamps. By § 4, 16 U.S.C. 718d, the proceeds from the sale of the stamps were to form a special "migratory bird conservation fund" (conservation fund) to be used primarily to pay for "the location, ascertainment, acquisition, administration, maintenance, and development" of bird sanctuaries pursuant to the Conservation Act.
To hasten the acquisition of land suitable for waterfowl habitats, Congress amended the Stamp Act in 1958. The price of a duck stamp was increased, and, most important for our present purposes, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to expend money from the conservation fund for a new type of property: "small wetland and pothole areas, interests therein, and rights-of-way to provide access thereto," the small areas "to be designated as 'Waterfowl Production Areas.' " Pub.L. 85-585, § 3, 72 Stat. 487, 16 U.S.C. 718d(c). Such waterfowl production areas could be "acquired without regard to the limitations and requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act." Ibid. Because these waterfowl production areas did not have to be maintained as sanctuaries, there was no need for them to be purchased outright; the Secretary was authorized to acquire easements prohibiting fee owners from draining their wetlands or otherwise destroying the wetlands' suitability as breeding grounds.
Despite the 1958 amendments, however, the proceeds from duck stamp sales proved insufficient to acquire land at the rate Congress deemed necessary. Accordingly, a new source of income was provided through the Wetlands Act of 1961 (Loan Act), Pub.L. 87-383, 75 Stat. 813. Section 1 of this new Act originally authorized sums for appropriation not to exceed $105 million for a seven-year period.
These sums were to be added to the conservation fund in the form of interest-free loans that were to be repaid out of duck stamp proceeds. In addition, § 3 of the Loan Act provided that no land could be acquired with money from the conservation fund unless consent had been obtained from the Governor or an appropriate agency of the State in which the land was located.
The principal waterfowl breeding grounds in the continental United States are located in four States of the northern Great PlainsNorth Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana.
North Dakota, in particular, is rich in wetlands suitable for waterfowl breeding, and the Government's acquisition of North Dakota land has been given high priority. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 95-1518, p. 5 (1978); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 4722; S.Rep. No. 94-594, p. 3 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 271.
For the most part, North Dakota has cooperated with federal efforts to preserve waterfowl habitats. Two years after the Conservation Act went into effect, the State, pursuant to § 7 of that Act, 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U.S.C. 715f, gave its consent to the "acquisition by the United States . . . of such areas of land or water, or of land and water in the State of North Dakota as the United States may deem necessary for the establishment of migratory bird reservations." 1931 N.D.Laws, ch. 207, p. 360. By 1958, the United States had acquired more than 276,000 acres of North Dakota land for use as migratory bird refuges. Hearings on S. 2447 et al. before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 79-81 (1958).
The 1977 legislation affects the acquisition of wetlands easements in three major ways. First, § 2 of ch. 204, codified as N.D.Cent.Code § 20.1-02-18.1, as amended by 1979 N.D.Laws, ch. 553, § 11, p. 1412,
requires the Governor to submit proposed wetlands acquisitions for approval by the board of county commissioners of the county in which the land is located. The "federal agency involved"here, the United States Fish and Wildlife Servicemust provide the county with a "detailed impact analysis," and the county, as well, is directed to prepare an impact analysis at federal expense. If the county does not recommend the acquisition, the Governor may not approve it. Next, § 3 of ch. 204, codified as § 20.1-02-18.2, as amended by 1981 N.D.Laws, ch. 258, p. 654,
authorizes the landowner to negotiate the terms and time period of the easement acquired by the United States, to restrict the easement "by legal description to the land, wetland, or water areas being sought," and to "drain any after-expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description." Finally, § 1 of ch. 426, codified as N.D.Cent.Code § 47-05-02.1 (1978),
In 1979, the United States brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1977 state statutes were hostile to federal law in certain respects and could not be applied; that any easement acquired in violation of the 1977 statutes would nevertheless be valid; and that the legislative-consent provision of the Conservation Act, § 7, 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U.S.C. 715f, did not apply to the acquisition of waterfowl production areas under the Stamp Act. The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States, App. to Juris. Statement 16a, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 650 F.2d 911 (1981).
We noted probable jurisdiction over North Dakota's appeal. 455 U.S. 987, 102 S.Ct. 1609, 71 L.Ed.2d 846 (1982).
The protection of migratory birds has long been recognized as "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435, 40 S.Ct. 382, 384, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920). Since the turn of the century, the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Interior successively have been charged with responsibility for "the preservation, distribution, introduction, and restoration of game birds and other wild birds." Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. 187, 16 U.S.C. 701. A series of treaties dating back to 1916 obligates the United States to preserve and protect migratory birds through the regulation of hunting, the establishment of refuges, and the protection of bird habitats.
In the absence of federal legislation to the contrary, the United States unquestionably has the power to acquire wetlands for waterfowl production areas, by purchase or condemnation, without state consent. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S.Ct. 426, 437, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-372, 23 L.Ed. 449 (1875). Here, however, Congress has conditioned any such acquisition upon the United States' obtaining the consent of the Governor of the State in which the land is located.
North Dakota concedes that its governors, at various times since 1961, have consented to the acquisition of easements over 1.5 million acres of North Dakota wetlands. The issue before us is whether North Dakota may revoke its consent to the acquisition of further easements in the State, and whether North Dakota by statute may impose conditions and restrictions on the United States' power to acquire easements.
* North Dakota's central argument is that the gubernatorial consent required by 16 U.S.C. 715k-5, once given, may be revoked by the State at will. North Dakota reads § 715k-5 to require not only that the Governor have consented to the acquisition of land for waterfowl production areas, but also that the Governor (and his successors in office) must continue to consent until the moment the land is actually acquired. Thus, although the United States has acquired easements over only half the acreage authorized by Governors Guy and Link, North Dakota asserts that it can terminate the United States' power to acquire the remainder.
The United States takes the position that § 715k-5 does not permit a State to revoke its consent at will; once consent has been given, "the role assigned to the state by Congress has been exhausted." Brief for United States 24.
As with any case involving statutory interpretation, "we state once again the obvious when we note that, in determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language." Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 986, 990, 74 L.Ed.2d ---- (1983). See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 246, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). "Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). The language of § 715k-5 is uncomplicated; it provides that money from the conservation fund shall not be used to acquire land "unless the acquisition thereof has been approved" by the Governor or the appropriate state agency. In this case, the acquisition of approximately 1.5 million acres of wetlands clearly "has been approved" by North Dakota's Governors. Nothing in the statute authorizes the withdrawal of approval previously given.
Nor does the legislative history of § 715k-5 suggest that Congress intended to permit Governors to revoke their consent. Before 1961, neither legislative nor gubernatorial consent was required prior to the acquisition of wetlands for waterfowl production areas. State legislative consent was a prerequisite to the acquisition of bird sanctuaries, § 715f, but waterfowl production areas were expressly exempted from this requirement, § 718d(c). Nonetheless, the United States followed an informal practice of obtaining agreement from the Governor or appropriate State agency before acquisition. The gubernatorial consent provision was intended simply to incorporate this practice. 107 Cong.Rec. 17171 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); id., at 17172 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). There is no indication in the legislative history or elsewhere that under this prior practice a Governor could withdraw consent already given.
The acquisition program had been underway for only 16 years in 1977, a time span well within the limits contemplated by Congress.
We thus need not consider in this case whether the gubernatorial consent provision, 16 U.S.C. 715k-5, permits North Dakota to impose these conditions on any consent it chooses to give in the future.
At issue here is the status of acquisitions authorized by consents already given. We do not understand the State to argue that § 20.1-02-18.1 imposes retroactive conditions on these prior consents. By its terms, the statute has no application to the acquisition of easements for which consent previously has been given, because nothing in the statute purports to limit the United States' power to acquire land once "final approval" has been obtained. Moreover, any attempt to impose retroactive conditions clearly would be unavailing. We have ruled above that once the requisite gubernatorial consent has been obtained, it may not be revoked. Since 16 U.S.C. 715k-5 does not permit North Dakota to revoke its consent outright, North Dakota may not revoke its consent based on noncompliance with the conditions set forth in N.D.Cent.Code § 20.1-02-18.1.
Applying Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), this Court concluded that because the United States' acquisition of land under the Conservation Act "is one arising from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory program . . ., the choice-of-law task is a federal task for federal courts." 412 U.S., at 592, 93 S.Ct., at 2396. The key factors in Little Lake Misere were that "we dealt with the interpretation of a land acquisition agreement (a) explicitly authorized, though not precisely governed, by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and (b) to which the United States itself was a party." Id., at 594, 93 S.Ct., at 2397. Although the present case involves acquisitions under the Stamp Act rather than the Conservation Act, the federal interests at stake are the same. Thus, the choice of applicable law presents a federal question. Although state law may be borrowed if appropriate, "specific aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards for federal law." Id., at 596, 93 S.Ct., at 2398.
To the extent that § 20.1-02-18.2(2) authorizes landowners to drain after-expanded wetlands contrary to the terms of their easement agreements, we must conclude that it is equally hostile to federal interests and may not be applied to easements acquired under previously-given consents.
The United States is authorized to incorporate into easement agreements such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary for the protection of wildlife, 16 U.S.C. 715e, and these rules and regulations may include restrictions on land outside the legal description of the easement. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 2295, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-526, 17 S.Ct. 864, 867, 42 L.Ed. 260 (1897). To respond to the inherently fluctuating nature of wetlands, the Secretary has chosen to negotiate easement agreements imposing restrictions on after-expanded wetlands as well as those described in the easement itself. As long as North Dakota landowners are willing to negotiate such agreements, the agreements may not be abrogated by state law.
3. N.D.Cent.Code § 47-05-02.1. Much the same analysis persuades us that this statute, which limits nonappurtenant easements to a maximum term of 99 years, may not be applied to wetlands easements acquired by the United States under consents previously given pursuant to the Stamp Act.
and the United States apparently has had no difficulty in negotiating permanent easements with North Dakota landowners. The automatic termination of federal wetlands easements after 99 years would make impossible the "certainty and finality" that we have regarded as "critical when . . . federal officials carrying out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit scarce funds." United States v. Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S., at 597, 93 S.Ct., at 2399. We conclude that § 47-05-02.1 is hostile to federal interests and may not be applied. See 412 U.S., at 596; United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (CA8 1974).
It is so ordered. Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice REHNQUIST joins, concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
First, in its brief, the Government concedes that "Congress must have assumed that the Secretary would be able to rely on the continued effectivenessat least for a reasonable amount of time of gubernatorial consents." Brief for Appellee 26 (emphasis added).
The Government's concession on this point reflects the position, correct in my view, that Congress did not intend that gubernatorial consents, once given, could never be withdrawn even if the United States failed to acquire its easements within a reasonable time. Although there is virtually no legislative history concerning the consent provision in 16 U.S.C. 715k-5, the provision represents an attempt to give to the States a meaningful right to control to some extent federal acquisition of easements in light of the unquestioned federal authority to take the land through condemnation procedures.
See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S.Ct. 426, 437, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963). Congress surely did not intend to bind the States forever by their consents if the federal Government failed to act on them. Permanent irrevocable consents would frustrate legitimate state land use planning just as consents revocable at will would frustrate federal protection of migratory wildfowl. Therefore, I agree with the position taken by the United States that the State's consent is irrevocable for a reasonable time after the consent is given.
Second, for the first time in this Court, North Dakota argues that even if it may not revoke its consent to easement acquisition, the United States has already acquired easements over acreage in excess of the consents that were given. The Court resolves this dispute by holding that North Dakota's argument fails because "the easement agreements make clear . . . that the restrictions apply only to wetlands areas and not to the entire parcels. . . . The fact that the easement agreements include legal descriptions of much larger parcels does not change the acreage of the wetlands over which easements have been acquired." Ante, at 311-312, n. 14.
Section 5 was amended by § 5(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Improvements Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-616, 92 Stat. 3113, with minor changes from the language quoted in the text. The sense of that language, however, was not altered. See 16 U.S.C. 715d (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The authorization loan limit was increased to $200 million by § 2(a) of the Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 189, 16 U.S.C. 715k-3.
This proviso is in addition to the Conservation Act's requirement, in its § 7, that the State "shall have consented by law" to the acquisition of land for inviolate bird sanctuaries. 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U.S.C. 715f. The latter requires consent by the legislature; the former requires consent by the Governor or the "appropriate State agency."
"Federal wildlife area acquisitionsSubmission to county commissioners, opportunity for public comment, and impact analysis required. The governor, the game and fish commissioner, or their designees, responsible under federal law for final approval of land, wetland, and water acquisitions by the United States department of the interior, its bureaus or agencies, for waterfowl production areas, wildlife refuges or other wildlife or waterfowl purposes, shall submit the proposed acquisitions to the board of county commissioners of the county or counties in which the land, wetland, and water areas are located for the board's recommendations. An affirmative recommendation by the board must be obtained prior to final approval of all such proposed acquisitions, whether by transfer of title, lease, easement, or servitude.
"Negotiation of leases, easements, and servitudes for wildlife production purposes. A landowner may negotiate the terms of a lease, easement, or servitude for land, wetland, or water areas sought to be acquired by the United States department of the interior, its bureaus or agencies, with moneys from the migratory bird conservation fund [
16 U.S.C. 718d] for use as waterfowl production areas, wildlife refuges, or for other wildlife purposes. A landowner may:
"Regulations governing easements, servitudes, or nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property.Real property easements, servitudes, or any nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property, which become binding after July 1, 1977, shall be subject to the regulations contained in this section. These regulations shall be deemed a part of any agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document of agreement.
Despite some confusion on this issue in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, see App. to Juris. Statement 11a; 650 F.2d, at 916, the parties now agree that gubernatorial consent is required. See Brief for United States 16 and n. 11. Section 4 of the Stamp Act, as amended in 1958, permits the acquisition of waterfowl production areas "without regard to the limitations and requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act." Pub.L. 85-585, § 3, 72 Stat. 487, 16 U.S.C. 718d(c). The Conservation Act, 45 Stat. 1222, is codified at 16 U.S.C. 715-715k and 715n-715r. The District Court and the Court of Appeals read the gubernatorial consent requirementcodified at § 715k-5as part of the Conservation Act, and concluded that it did not apply to the acquisition of waterfowl production areas. This reading of the statute, we have concluded, is incorrect. The gubernatorial consent provision was enacted in 1961 as § 3 of the Loan Act. 75 Stat. 813. It has never been a part of the Conservation Act. Although the codifiers of the United States Code chose to place the gubernatorial consent provision in the midst of the Conservation Act's provisions, that choice, "made by a codifier without the approval of Congress . . . should be given no weight." United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 99, n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1082, 1085, n. 4, 12 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964). Because the gubernatorial consent provision is not one of the "requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act," 16 U.S.C. 718d(c), it does apply whenever waterfowl production areas are acquired with duck stamp funds.
Although the question of revocability did not arise during the Senate debates, the Senate's brief discussion of the gubernatorial consent provision suggests that consent, once obtained, was expected to remain effective for as long as necessary. Senator Magnuson commented that he could not "conceive of any acreage of wetlands that it is intended to purchase in the next 3 or 4 years that has not already had the joint approval of all the States and everyone else involved." 107 Cong.Rec. 17172 (1961). Senator Hruska, a member of the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, confirmed that when the Commission met to approve land acquisitions, "[t]here has already been processed before that time the area of agreement between the Federal agencies and the State agencies which makes the approval possible." Ibid. Senators Magnuson and Hruska each envisioned precisely the sequence of events that has occurred here: the United States would develop a general plan for the acquisition of wetlands, the plan would be submitted to the Governor or appropriate state agency for approval, and, if approval was given, the United States would proceed to acquire wetlands pursuant to that approvalover the course of years, if need be.