Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/343487070/RMP-EPAS-2017-2021
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 04:43:51
Document Index: 658518500

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 33', 'art 25', 'art-145', 'art-21', 'art-21', 'art-21', 'art-21', 'art-21', 'art-21', 'art-66', 'art-66', 'art-26']

RMP-EPAS_2017-2021 | Safety | United States Environmental Protection Agency
сохранитьСохранить «RMP-EPAS_2017-2021» для последующего чтения
4. SkillsFuture - Digital Workplace for Tourist Guides
Httpwww.isoc.Orginet98proceedings2d2d 3.Htm#Section9
description: tags: acsocio1104
215 Oplan Kaluluwa 2017 Day 1
Rulemaking and Safety Promotion Programme including the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS)
European Aviation Safety Agency, 24 January 2017.
Rulemaking and safety promotion programme including EPAS 2017–2021
2.1 Key characteristics of the 2017–2021 safety programmes ...............................................................
2.2 How the programme is structured
2.3 How the programme is developed: The programming cycle
3.1 Systemic safety enablers
3.2 Operational safety .............................................................................................................................
3.3 Environment ....................................................................................................................................
3.5 Level playing field
Safety (EPAS)
5.1 Safety performance .........................................................................................................................
5.2 Systemic enablers ............................................................................................................................
5.3 CAT by aeroplane
5.4 Rotorcraft operations ......................................................................................................................
5.5 General Aviation: Fixed-wing leisure flying
7 Efficiency/Proportionality
operations ....................................................................................................................
7.3 ATM/ANS systems and constituents
7.4 Airlines .............................................................................................................................................
7.5 General Aviation ..............................................................................................................................
7.6 Manufacturers .................................................................................................................................
7.7 Rotorcraft operations ......................................................................................................................
operations.....................................................................................................................
7.9 Maintenance training organisations
organisations .............................................................................................................
7.11 PCP SESAR deployment
7.12 Regular updates
8.1 Implementation of the upcoming new Basic Regulation
8.2 Aerodromes operators ....................................................................................................................
8.3 Airlines .............................................................................................................................................
8.4 Manufacturers .................................................................................................................................
8.5 Operators other than airlines ..........................................................................................................
8.6 Maintenance organisations – service providers – CAMOS
8.7 Horizontal issues
Deliverables expected in 2017
Appendix B: New and deleted tasks
Appendix D: EPAS safety objectives vs EASA strategic objectives
Appendix E: Summary of the EASA Strategic Plan
Appendix F: Policy on performance-based regulation
Appendix G: Policy on Safety Management Systems
H: Acronyms and Definitions
Commissions’ Aviation strategy and the EASA strategic plan (See Appendix E: Summary of the EASA Strategic Plan). The safety priorities were based on the newly developed European Safety Risk Portfolios in the Annual Safety Review 2016 . The efficiency and level playing field priorities were based on stakeholder feedback. These initial sets of priorities were consulted with stakeholders in April 2016. The feedback on this approach was very positive. Based on the stakeholder feedback, the strategic priorities were adjusted. Figure 1 provides an overview of these priorities, whereas details are provided in Chapter 3 of this document. The main chapters of the programme (5 – 8) give the full overview of all activities including the priorities identified, but also standard and regular update (maintenance of rules) tasks. Figure 1: Strategic priorities in a nutshell Page 5 of 125 " id="pdf-obj-4-2" src="pdf-obj-4-2.jpg">
The programme shows a clear strategic orientation
EASA developed concise strategic priorities for the safety programmes based on the Commissions’ Aviation strategy and the EASA strategic plan (See Appendix E: Summary of the EASA Strategic Plan). The safety priorities were based on the newly developed European Safety Risk Portfolios in the Annual Safety Review 2016. The efficiency and level playing field priorities were based on stakeholder feedback. These initial sets of priorities were consulted with stakeholders in April 2016. The feedback on this approach was very positive. Based on the stakeholder feedback, the strategic priorities were adjusted. Figure 1 provides an overview of these priorities, whereas details are provided in Chapter 3 of this document. The main chapters of the programme (5–8) give the full overview of all activities including the priorities identified, but also standard and regular update (maintenance of rules) tasks.
Figure 1: Strategic priorities in a nutshell
Commissions’ Aviation strategy and the EASA strategic plan (See Appendix E: Summary of the EASA Strategic Plan). The safety priorities were based on the newly developed European Safety Risk Portfolios in the Annual Safety Review 2016 . The efficiency and level playing field priorities were based on stakeholder feedback. These initial sets of priorities were consulted with stakeholders in April 2016. The feedback on this approach was very positive. Based on the stakeholder feedback, the strategic priorities were adjusted. Figure 1 provides an overview of these priorities, whereas details are provided in Chapter 3 of this document. The main chapters of the programme (5 – 8) give the full overview of all activities including the priorities identified, but also standard and regular update (maintenance of rules) tasks. Figure 1: Strategic priorities in a nutshell Page 5 of 125 " id="pdf-obj-4-26" src="pdf-obj-4-26.jpg">
The programme is well balanced between safety and efficiency actions in line with the EASA strategic
Approximately 40 % of the tasks are addressing safety issues and the same share is attributed to efficiency issues. This is in line with the EASA strategic plan (see Appendix E).
The programme indicates increased efficiency of the rulemaking process
In 2015, the rulemaking process was overhauled in order to make it more efficient. For this programme and for the first time, efficiency is made measurable as compared to the baseline year of 2015. The indicators show:
a reduction in the average time for rulemaking (Start 1 to Opinion/Decision) from 3.6 years in 2015 to 3.1 years projected for 2017; for new tasks, this period is further reduced to 2.2 years;
a decrease of the input required for core rulemaking in terms of resource allocation by 2021.
Note that the indicator in the first bullet point may be negatively affected by the ‘cooling down’ objective presented below.
The programme illustrates the shift towards more safety promotion activities
The approach to safety promotion has been fully revamped in 2015. The activities of the ESSI teams were reattributed to the new advisory structure and the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs). Safety promotion activities are now managed through safety promotion tasks that are not limited to creating a product (e.g. leaflet), but also include dissemination and measurement activities coordinated with Member States through the Safety Promotion Network. The concept of a European Safety Promotion campaign is tested along those lines by the Safety Promotion Network.
The concept of a ‘cool-down period’ is introduced
Several Member States as well as some part of industry have repeatedly indicated that there is a need for a ‘cool- down period’ in rulemaking in order for the system to absorb and consolidate the regulatory requirements. To address this, the programme introduces a cool-down period for the output (measured in ToRs, opinions and related NPAs).
The evidence-base for the safety programmes is increasing
Safety issue analysis and impact assessments are to drive the decision-making for the programmes. New tasks added to the programme in the fields of helicopters, General Aviation (GA) and loss-of-control are supported by assessments. The results of said assessments are reflected in the justifications inside the main document as well as in the PIA score.
1 ‘Start’ is defined by the first day EASA starts working on the project. This way, the work needed to develop the ToR is also considered.
2.1 Key characteristics of the 2017–2021 safety programmes
In 2015, the rulemaking process was revised so that better, faster and more proportionate rules are developed. A key element to achieve this is the rulemaking programme (RMP) that is structured by issue to determine the most appropriate action, which may be safety promotion, focused oversight, research or rulemaking (or a combination thereof). Another important step in order to achieve this was the alignment of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) with the RMP.
In this new edition of the safety programmes (EPAS and RMP), EASA has strengthened the strategic orientation of the programmes by initiating a discussion with stakeholders on the strategic priorities for the RMP as well as EPAS, which are integral parts of the safety risk management approach. To this end, the paper on ‘Strategic Priorities for the RMP and EPAS 2017–2021’ was consulted with stakeholders in April and May 2016. The strategic priorities presented in Chapter 3 are the outcome of this consultation process.
Based on the strategic priorities, this programme presents all actions per main driver (safety; environment; efficiency/proportionality; level playing field) and action areas (e.g. all tasks related to the issue of loss of control in flight (LOC- I)). Furthermore, they are presented in the context of other related activities. The chapter on safety includes the full content of EPAS.
Through this, we aim to provide the EASA stakeholders with a comprehensive and coherent vision of what EASA intends to do in the coming years in order to improve safety or the environmental performance of the aviation sector (safety/environment driver), to support fair competition and free movement of persons and services (level playing field driver), and to support business, technological development and competitiveness (efficiency/proportionality driver).
This programme is presented per driver, issue category and action area. For each action area, the issue, the objective and the related actions are presented. The drivers are:
Safety — The actions in this category are driven principally by the need to increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector.
Environment — The actions in this category are driven principally by the need to improve the current environmental protection in the aviation sector.
Efficiency/proportionality — The actions in this category are driven by the need to ensure that rules are cost- effective in achieving their objective as well as proportionate to the risks identified.
Level playing field — The actions in this category are driven principally by the need to ensure that all players in a certain segment of the aviation market can benefit from the same set of rules, thereby promoting fair competition and free movement of persons and services. This is considered of particular importance for technological or business advancement where common ‘rules of the game’ need to be defined for all actors. These projects will also contribute to maintaining or even increasing the current level of safety.
The drivers are to be understood as main drivers. A number of tasks could well fall under several categories, but to avoid duplication they are sorted under the main driver (e.g. CS-23 relaunch, drones).
An action area may contain several actions and types of tasks: Rulemaking (RMT), safety promotion (SPT), focused oversight (FOT) as well as research actions (RES) 2 . In the EPAS part of the document, there are also tasks included for the Member States identified as ‘MST’ tasks.
2 Note that the list of research tasks identified in this document is not exhaustive, and a full overview of research activities is available in the EASA research programme.
For each task, the rationale as well as basic information related to responsibility, schedule and affected stakeholders are provided. The results from preliminary impact assessments (PIAs) are presented, where available, in the form of a score: Letters ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ indicate strategic (‘A’), standard (‘B’) or regular update (‘C’) tasks.
Tasks that were newly added to the programme are highlighted with red colour in the RMT number. An overview is also available in Appendix B ‘New and deleted tasks’. Note that this document contains some tasks that are due in 2016. These tasks were not yet published by the cut-off date for this document (11 November).
Further information provided for rulemaking tasks only includes an indication if they are harmonised with third countries (field ‘3rdC’). Rulemaking tasks that are following the accelerated procedure or direct publication (Article 15 ‘Direct publication’ and Article 16 ‘Accelerated procedure’ of MB Decision No 18-2015 on the Rulemaking Procedure) are indicated accordingly 3 . For all documents already delivered, the exact date is given in the format DD/MM/YYYY. For tasks not yet delivered, the planned date is given by Quarter (YYYY QX). When the planning date shows 2016 Q4, the task is delayed.
Figure 2: Overview of the conventions used in this programme
This programme was developed in close cooperation with stakeholders drawing from an increasing evidence based approach. There were two distinct programming phases, each with a dedicated stakeholder consultation. Firstly, during the strategic phase, the strategic priorities (now in Chapter 3) were developed and discussed with the EASA Advisory Bodies in April/May 2016. Based on these strategic priorities, the detailed planning was developed. The detailed planning (draft programme v2.0.16) was then consulted with stakeholders in October/November 2016. Based on the comments received, the final version of this document was developed. This document covers a 5-year time frame. However, as it is a rolling 5-year programme, it will be updated every year.
3 Accelerated procedure is identified as ‘AP’, direct publication as ‘DP’, and standard procedure as ‘ST’ in the field for the procedure type called ‘Proc’.
Commissions’ Aviation strategy and the EASA strategic plan (See Appendix E). The safety priorities were based on the newly developed European Safety Risk Portfolios in the Annual Safety Review 2016 . The efficiency and level playing field priorities were based on stakeholder feedback. The environmental priorities are based on the European Aviation Environmental Report 2016. The priorities were consulted with stakeholders in April and May 2016. The comments received led to a number of adjustments and improvements, notably the removal of a design-related priority as well as the inclusion of helicopter and GA-related safety priorities. In the detailed Chapters 5 – 8 of the document, the actions linked to strategic priorities are identified with an ‘ A ’ in the PIA score. 3.1 Systemic safety enablers Safety management implementation Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organisations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19, which entered into force in November 2013. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation , this safety area will also enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organisational level and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies. See Section 5.2.1. Human factors and competence of personnel As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the safety opportunities presented by new technologies. The safety actions related to aviation personnel are aimed at introducing competency-based training in all licences and ratings, updating fatigue requirements, and facilitating the availability of adequate personnel in competent authorities (CAs). These actions will contribute to mitigating related safety issues, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains. Training and education are considered key enablers. See Section 5.2.2. 3.2 Operational safety Commercial Air Transport Aeroplanes In 2015, the domain with the highest number of fatalities was CAT Aeroplanes. This involved a single fatal accident, which was the Germanwings accident that occurred on 24 March 2015. In 2014, there were 2 fatal accidents and there have not been more than 2 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes since 2005. This operational domain is the greatest focus of the EASA safety activities and the reorganisation of the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs) and Advisory Bodies will help EASA to learn more about the safety challenges faced by airlines and manufacturers. The European Safety Risk Management process identified the following as the most important risk areas for CAT Aeroplanes: Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007 (OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 18). Extract from the EASA Annual Safety Review 2016. Page 9 of 125 " id="pdf-obj-8-2" src="pdf-obj-8-2.jpg">
For this programming cycle, EASA introduced the notion of strategic priorities for the EPAS and the RMP. To this end, EASA developed concise strategic priorities for the safety and environmental programmes based on the Commissions’ Aviation strategy and the EASA strategic plan (See Appendix E). The safety priorities were based on the newly developed European Safety Risk Portfolios in the Annual Safety Review 2016. The efficiency and level playing field priorities were based on stakeholder feedback. The environmental priorities are based on the European Aviation Environmental Report 2016. The priorities were consulted with stakeholders in April and May 2016. The comments received led to a number of adjustments and improvements, notably the removal of a design-related priority as well as the inclusion of helicopter and GA-related safety priorities. In the detailed Chapters 5–8 of the document, the actions linked to strategic priorities are identified with an ‘A’ in the PIA score.
Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organisations to set up
management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19, which entered into force in November 2013. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation 4 , this safety area will also enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organisational level and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies. See Section
As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the safety opportunities presented by new technologies.
The safety actions related to aviation personnel are aimed at introducing competency-based training in all licences and ratings, updating fatigue requirements, and facilitating the availability of adequate personnel in competent authorities (CAs). These actions will contribute to mitigating related safety issues, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains. Training and education are considered key enablers. See Section 5.2.2.
3.2 Operational safety
Commercial Air Transport Aeroplanes
In 2015, the domain with the highest number of fatalities was CAT Aeroplanes. This involved a single fatal accident, which was the Germanwings accident that occurred on 24 March 2015. In 2014, there were 2 fatal accidents and there have not been more than 2 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes since 2005. This operational domain is the greatest focus of the EASA safety activities and the reorganisation of the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs) and Advisory Bodies will help EASA to learn more about the safety challenges faced by airlines and manufacturers. 5
The European Safety Risk Management process identified the following as the most important risk areas for CAT Aeroplanes:
4 Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007 (OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 18).
5 Extract from the EASA Annual Safety Review 2016.
aircraft upset in flight (Loss of Control)
64 % of fatal accidents in the last ten years (EASA MS) involved loss of control. Events such as a deviation from flight path, abnormal airspeed or triggering of stall protections when not dealt with properly can lead to fatal consequences involving many fatalities. Technical failures as well as ground handling safety issues can be also a precursor to this type of scenarios. See Section 5.3.1.
— runway excursions and incursions
Hard landings, high-speed landing, and landings following an unstabilised approach are direct precursors to runway excursions (REs). This risk area represents 30 % of non-fatal accidents within the EASA MS. A runway incursion (RI) occurs when there is an incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway
or in its areas of protection. In the last 10 years, 18 % of fatal accidents within the EASA MS involve RIs. See Section 5.3.2.
Safety in rotorcraft operations
This area includes both CAT and offshore operations as well as aerial work performed by helicopters. In 2015, there were 4 fatalities in CAT Helicopters, 4 fatalities in Aerial Work/Part-SPO Helicopters and no-fatalities in offshore operations. The European Safety Risk Management process has identified opportunities to improve risk controls in the following areas so that accident numbers will not increase.
— aircraft upset in flight (Loss of Control)
In the last 5 years, loss of control played a role in 2 out of the 4 fatal accidents for offshore helicopter operators and 4 out of 17 for aerial work.
terrain and obstacle conflict
In the last 5 years, terrain/obstacle conflict played a part in 3 out of the 17 fatal accidents for aerial work operations with helicopters. It has also been identified as a key risk area for CAT operations.
— system/technical failure
In the last 5 years, system/technical failures contributed to 2 out of the 4 fatal accidents for offshore helicopter operators and 1 out of the 3 in CAT operations. See Section 5.4.
Address safety risks in GA in a proportionate and effective manner
In the last 5 years, accidents involving recreational aeroplanes have led to an average of nearly 80 fatalities per year in Europe (excluding fatal accidents involving microlight airplanes), which makes it one of the sectors of aviation with the highest yearly number of fatalities. Furthermore, in 2015, there were 65 fatalities in non-commercial operations with aeroplanes (2 nd highest number) and 27 in the domain of glider/sailplane operations (3 rd highest number). These two areas present the highest numbers of fatal accidents in 2015. The General Aviation Road Map is key to the EASA strategy in this domain.
Although it is difficult to precisely measure the evolution of safety performance in GA due to lack of consolidated data (e.g. accumulated flight hours), it is reasonable to assume that step changes in the existing safety level are not being achieved at European level, despite all initiatives and efforts.
Therefore, EASA decided to organise a workshop on GA safety to share knowledge and agree on the safety actions that will contribute to improve safety in this domain. A key element of discussions is the appropriate assessment of risks, taking into account the specificities of GA leisure flying with different risk profile and minimal risk for uninvolved third parties. The following strategic safety areas were identified during the workshop: Preventing mid- air collisions, coping with weather, staying in control, and managing the flight.
The number of drones within the EU has multiplied over the last 2 years. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk.
Furthermore, the lack of harmonised rules at EU level makes unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations dependent on an individual authorisation by every MS, which is a burdensome administrative process that stifles business development and innovation. In order to remove restrictions on UAS operations at EU level, so that all companies can make best use of the UAS technologies to create jobs and growth while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety, EASA is engaged in developing the relevant regulatory material.
As the technology advances, consistent requirements and expectations in already crowded airspace will help manufacturers design for all conditions and ease compliance with requirements by operators. JARUS facilitates harmonisation of standards within the EU Member States and other participating authorities.
Address current and future safety risks arising from new and emerging business models
Due to the increased complexity of the aviation industry, the number of interfaces between organisations, their contracted services and regulators has increased. CAs should work better together (cooperative oversight) and EASA should evaluate whether the existing safety regulatory system adequately addresses current and future safety risks arising from new and emerging business models.
Citizens travelling by air are more and more exposed to cybersecurity threats. In order for the new generation of aircraft to have their systems connected to the ground in real time, ATM technologies require internet and wireless connections between the various ground centres and the aircraft. The multiplication of network connections increases the vulnerability of the whole system. It is essential that the aviation industry shares knowledge and learns from experiences to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the B777 MH17 accident, an EU high-level task force is working to define further actions to be taken at European level in order to provide common information on risks arising from conflict zones. Updated information and the sharing of knowledge is of paramount importance.
The aviation industry needs to minimise its impact on the environment as much as possible while providing safe air transport.
Climate change and noise: Introduce the CAEP/10 recommendations
Actions in this area will contribute to meeting European targets on climate change prevention by implementing the ICAO CO 2 standard. ICAO CAEP in February 2016 adopted entirely new standards on CO 2 and particulate matter emissions. The agreed CO 2 standard needs to be implemented in the European system to become effective.
Reduce the regulatory burden for GA
EASA is fully engaged to develop simpler, lighter and better rules for GA. This will be achieved in line with the GA Road Map created in partnership with the European Commission and stakeholders and addressing the recognised importance of GA and its contribution to the European economy and a safe European aviation system.
Enable the implementation of new technologies developed by SESAR
The rationale behind the following actions is to cater for the regulatory needs of the SESAR common projects by enabling the implementation of new working methods and technologies developed by SESAR with focus on data management. Interoperability and NextGen compatibility will form an integral part of EASA's work in impact assessment and future rulemaking.
Better regulation: rules are performance-based, proportionate, and contribute to the competitiveness of the industry
A performance-based approach is intended to make aviation safer, more efficient and flexible. Performance-based regulations (PBR) have been in existence for decades; however, no consistent and systematic approach to implementing PBR principles has been so far. In 2016, EASA adopted a policy on PBR which establishes that actions towards the development of PBR are to be:
1. identified as part of the Rulemaking Programming process;
2. confirmed through impact assessment or ex post evaluation of rules;
3. discussed and agreed with stakeholders on that basis; and
4. formalised in the RMP.
To this end, the RMP contains identifiers for actions with a particular focus on PBR and an entire section dedicated to evaluation which will focus on introducing more performance-based elements following a thorough assessment.
Based on proposals from Member States (including analysis of the use of the flexibility provision — (Article 14 of the Basic Regulation 6 ), the first evaluation will be performed on the current fragmented rule structure. What will be assessed is the impact of continuing with the current approach. See Section 7.1.
Better regulation: Cool-down period
As the European regulatory framework for aviation started being set up in 2002, the volume of regulation created was necessarily significant. As this process is now largely completed, a ‘cool-down period’ has been proposed by stakeholders in order to stabilise the regulatory system and reduce the burden on Member States and industry when implementing new requirements. This cooling down needs to differentiate between the EASA work on technical standards (Certification Specifications) and Opinions that are the basis of new Commission regulations. EASA introduced the cooling down ceilings in its 5–year programme. See Chapter 1.
6 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (J L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1).
Enable innovations and efficiency gains following the review of the Basic Regulation
The European Commission has proposed a modernisation of the Basic Regulation. Once the legal text is adopted by the Council and the Parliament, the related implementing rules need to be aligned. As the exact scope of this activity is not yet known, the present RMP does not include activities related to the Basic Regulation review.
Enable all-weather operations
Enable European industry to take full advantage of safety and economic benefits generated through new technologies and operational experience. This represents a widely recognised interoperability subject touching on a wide range of areas, including aerodrome minima, aerodrome equipment, and procedures both for CAT and GA.
Enable new technologies (open rotor, electric propulsion)
The objective of this priority area is to enable the introduction of new technologies.
Open rotor engine technology is one of these technologies. The related activity will identify and recommend harmonised draft requirements and advisory material for CS-E, 14 CFR Part 33, CS-25 and 14 CFR Part 25 to address the novel features inherent in open rotor engine designs and their integration with the aircraft.
A number of aircraft manufacturers and suppliers are working on electric propulsion for aircraft. EASA has currently one application for type certificates. Many projects are experimental or geared towards the ultra-light market with national type certification. The market potential is considered significant with related effects on wealth and job creation. Environmental benefits for Europe are also potentially significant both in terms of gaseous emissions and noise. To allow for the projects to thrive, a complex number of issues has to be tackled from a regulatory perspective. However, concrete rulemaking actions are foreseen only for future editions of the RMP, once EASA has collected concrete technical experience with the type certification of these types of aircraft.
Harmonise FTL rules for CAT rotorcraft and commercial specialised operations
Develop harmonised and state-of-the-art FTL rules for commercial operations other than CAT fixed wing.
The programme is well balanced between safety and efficiency/proportionality.
Figure 3: Share of tasks by driver
The programme has a clear strategic orientation
Figure 4: Share of tasks by strategic priority
The programme shows the following distribution of tasks per activity type
Figure 5: Share of safety tasks per activity type
The programme shows the increased efficiency of the rulemaking process
Average duration of tasks compared to previous RMP
The calculation is based on tasks closed during 2015. Those tasks are broken down in their milestones (ToR, NPA, Opinion, Decision) and each milestone duration is serving to come to a total for each RMT. A total of 19 tasks were closed in 2015 and the average duration of those is 3,6 years. The current outlook on RMTs and the corresponding workload will lead to an average duration of around 3,1 years. The duration for the new planned rulemaking tasks will be reduced to 2,2 years.
The rulemaking activity shows the EASA commitment to reduced rulemaking (‘cooling-down’) over the programming period. This is shown in the graphs next page by the steady decrease of new rulemaking tasks, materialised by the blue line (number of new ToR).
However, EASA has to handle a backlog of Rulemaking Tasks started in the previous years. The effort to reduce the backlog is materialised by the temporary peak of activity in 2017 and 2018.
In the graphs on the next pages, we show separately the rulemaking activity from the Flight Standards and the Certification Directorate, as the latter has little impact on the MS resources.
The graphs do not contain decision pending IR adoptions. Those are considered being counted through opinions.
The rulemaking activity within the Certification Directorate (Initial Airworthiness and Environment)
Figure 6: Rulemaking activity within the Certification Directorate 2015–2021
The rulemaking activity within the Flight Standard Directorate
Figure 7: Rulemaking activity within the Flight Standards Directorate 2015–2021
5 Safety (EPAS)
The actions in this section are driven principally by the need to maintain or increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector.
5.1 Safety performance
The EASA Annual Safety Review measures safety performance using 2 specific types of safety performance indicators (SPIs). Firstly, at Tier 1, the overall performance is measured across the different operational domains by considering the number of fatal accidents and fatalities in the previous year against the 10-year average. For 2015, this information is provided below and highlights that the domains with the greatest focus for safety activities are CAT Aeroplanes, Non-Commercial Aeroplanes (General Aviation) and Gliders.
The second measure of Tier 2 SPIs monitor safety at an individual domain level. It captures both the Key Risk Areas (Outcomes), helping thus to identify the main areas of focus in each domain, and also identifies the main Safety Issues.
5.2 Systemic enablers
This area addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation as a whole. In most scenarios, these problems become evident by triggering factors and play a significant role in the final outcome of a safety event. They often relate to deficiencies in organisational processes and procedures.
5.2.1 Safety management
Safety management is a strategic priority. Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organisations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19, which entered into force in November 2013. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, this safety area will also enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organisational level, and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies.
Work with authorities and organisations to implement safety management.
How we monitor improvement
Regulatory framework requiring safety management is in place across all aviation domains, and organisations and authorities are able to demonstrate compliance (a cross-domain SMS assessment tool is under development).
How we want to achieve it: actions
RMT.0148
Requirements on air navigation service provision
Development of the necessary AMC/GM for the air navigation service providers.
EASA FS.4.2
ANSPs, indirectly: competent authorities, operators, pilots
Commission IR
RMT.0157
Requirements on competent authorities in ATM/ANS
Development of the necessary AMC/GM for the competent authorities.
competent authorities, indirectly: ANSPs, operators, pilots
RMT.0251
RMT.0262
RMT.0469
Embodiment of safety management system requirements into Commission Regulations (EU) Nos 1321/2014 7 and 748/2012 8 With reference to ICAO Annex 19, the objective is to set up a framework for safety management in the initial and continuing airworthiness domains. Split task:
(a) Part-M linked to OPS (CAMOs)
(b) Part-145, Part-21 for production organisation approval (POA), design organisation approval (DOA).
Owner Affected stakeholders
EASA FS.1 CAMOs, MOs, POA, DOA, TOs, and national aviation authorities (NAAs)
To ensure compliance of Part-21 with the framework of safety management provisions of ICAO Annex 19.
Introduction in Part-21 of a risk-based approach for the determination of the LOI of EASA in product certification. This entails introduction of:
systematic risk management (hazard identification, risk assessment and mitigation); safety performance-based oversight allowing to focus on areas of greater risk; safety awareness and promotion among all staff involved; and
— improved effectiveness and efficiency of Part-21 IRs achieved by their streamlining and improved consistency. Phase 1 of the RMT will end with an Agency decision providing some initial AMC/GM to the amendments to Part-21; this decision will be issued upon adoption by the Commission and publication of the Regulation in the Official Journal, which is expected to take place in Q2/2017. In parallel, EASA develops further AMC/GM to support the application of the amendments to Part-21. An NPA is expected to be published in Q2/2017, the
decision issuing the AMC/GM in Q4/2017.
EASA CT.7 Design approval holders (DAHs)
Development of the necessary AMC/GM for the service providers and the competent authorities.
ANSPs, competent authorities
7 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 of 26 November 2014 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks (OJ L 362, 17.12.2014, p. 1).
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production organisations (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012, p. 1).
RMT.0681
RMT.0706
ATM/ANS service providers, and ATCO TOs
Requirements for MET service providers and the oversight thereof — development of the necessary AMC/GM.
EASA FS.5
Alignment of implementing rules & AMC/GM with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014
Alignment of IRs & AMC/GM with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. With regards to Commission IR and Decision: Depends on the related content, to be published concurrently with another deliverable – specific arrangement with the EU Commission.
Operators, pilots, MOs, ATOs, manufacturers, CAMOs, aerodrome operators,
Competent Authorities: NAAs, NSAs
Update of authority requirements
Address relevant elements of the ICAO Annex 19 considering the latest revision status of the document and ensure appropriate horizontal harmonisation of the requirements across different domains taking on board lessons learned.
MST.001
Member States to give priority to the work on SSPs
Make SSPs consistently available in Europe in compliance with the GASP objectives.
MST.002
Promotion of SMS
SSP established
Encourage implementation of safety promotion material developed by the former ESSI Teams (ECAST, EHEST and EGAST) and SMICG.
ALL, HF
MST.003
Member States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes
States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes, with the objectives of:
SPT.057
promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs, MACs, CFIT and LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP.
Report on activities performed to promote FDM
SMS international cooperation
Promote the common understanding of SMS and human factors principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonisation.
SPT.059
SMS implementation support in ATM
Methodology/training material/best practice
Support to ANSP SMS implementation, especially outside EU Member States; develop a structured approach to the identification of safety key risk areas and to gathering information on operational safety and SMS best practices from the industry; harmonise SMS approaches in FABs. Develop and promote SMS guidance and best practices for ATM.
SPT.060
EASA FS.4
Lack of experience on FDM-based indicators
EASA should further assess, together with Member States, the benefits of FDM-based indicators for addressing national safety priorities
SPT.062
Comparable risk classification of events across the industry
Develop European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS) as mandated by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. This task is owned by the EC, but the development work is being led by EASA on behalf of the EC. The use of the ERCS is only mandated in Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 for the MS and not industry. The latter can continue to use existing schemes.
SPT.063
EASA SM.1, EC, NoA & MS
Continuous monitoring of ATM safety performance
Develop and populate safety indicators to measure performance on ATM and disseminate general public information of the ANSPs’ performance through routine publication of achieved safety levels and trends.
SPT.076
EASA SM.1 and FS.4. in coordination with the Performance Review Board
FDM precursors of aviation occurrences categories (LOC-I, CFIT)
EASA should, in partnership with the industry, establish good practice that is enhancing the practical implementation of operators’ FDM programmes.
SPT.077
EASA SM.1
Good practices for the integration of an operator’s FDM programme with other operators’ processes
EASA should, in partnership with the industry, establish good practices that are enhancing the practical
implementation of operators’ FDM programmes.
5.2.2 Human factors and competence of personnel
Human factors and competence of personnel is a strategic priority. As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the safety opportunities presented by new technologies.
The safety actions related to aviation personnel are aimed at introducing competency-based training in all licences and ratings, updating fatigue requirements and facilitating the availability of adequate personnel in CAs. These actions will contribute to mitigating safety issues such as personal readiness, flight crew perception or CRM and communication, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.
Ensure continuous improvement of aviation personnel competence.
Measurable improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels (flight crews, ATCOs and CAs).
RMT.0106
The main objective is to improve the level of safety by requiring the applicant for a type certificate (TC) or
restricted TC for an aircraft to identify the minimum syllabus of maintenance certifying staff type rating training,
including the determination of type rating.
This minimum syllabus, together with the requirements contained in Appendix III to Annex III (Part-66) to
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014, will form the basis for the development and approval of Part-66
type rating training courses.
EASA FS.1 DAHs, TOs, and maintenance engineers
RMT.0188
Update of EASA FCL implementing rules
A complete first review of Part-FCL addressing a number of issues to be clarified or amended as identified by
industry and MS. It also establishes a flight examiner manual (FEM) and a first draft of the learning objectives
(LOs). Some of these corrections and clarifications also pertain to alleviations for the GA community.
EASA FS.3
Examiners, instructors, pilots, ATOs and DTOs
RMT.0194
RMT.0196
RMT.0486
RMT.0589
Extension of competency-based training to all licences and ratings and extension of TEM principle to all licences and ratings
More performance-based rulemaking will be addressed. The principles of CBT shall be transferred to other licences and ratings, and the multi-crew pilot licence (MPL) should be reviewed in order to address the input from the ICAO MPL symposium and the European MPL Advisory Board. Some action items from the GA Road Map activity list, such as modular training and CBT, will be addressed as well.
ATOs and pilots
Improve flight simulation training devices (FSTDs) fidelity
An ICAO harmonisation issue, as the main purpose is to include in the European provisions elements from ICAO Doc 9625 for the use of FSTDs in flight training. The task will also address three safety recommendations (SRs) and aims at including results and findings from the loss of control avoidance and recovery training (LOCART) and RMT.0581 working group results. Harmonisation with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should be considered.
EASA FS.3 Operators, ATOs, DTOs, pilots, instructors, and examiners
Alignment with ICAO on ATCO fatigue management provisions
Alignment with ICAO on the subject provisions.
ANSPs and ATCOs
Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS) at aerodromes
The objective of this RMT is to ensure a high and uniform level of safety by establishing minimum medical standards for rescue and firefighting personnel required to act in aviation emergencies. It will also ensure that the level of protection for rescue and firefighting at aerodromes serving all-cargo or mail flights is proportionate to this type of traffic and their particular requirements. Finally, it will as well ensure a clearer implementation of the remission factor in general. The RMT has been split in two sub-tasks:
(a) 1st sub-task: Remission factor, cargo flights, etc.
(b) 2nd sub-task: RFFS personnel physical and medical fitness standards.
EASA FS.4.3 Aerodrome operators
RMT.0595
RMT.0596
RMT.0599
Technical review and regular update of learning objectives and syllabi for commercial licences (IR)
Technical review of theoretical knowledge syllabi, learning objectives, and examination procedures for the air transport pilot licence (ATPL), MPL, commercial pilot licence (CPL), and instrument rating (IR).
Competent authorities, ATOs, student pilots, providers of textbooks and
training materials, ECQB
Review of provisions for examiners and instructors (Subparts J & K of Part-FCL)
A complete review of the subparts of Part-FCL containing the provisions for examiners and instructors. Industry and MS experts requested this task as an urgent correction and alignment of the rules in place. It will also address some of the elements proposed by the EASA examiner/inspector task force.
Pilots, instructors, examiners, ATOs, operators and DTOs
In a first phase, a complete review of the provisions contained in ORO.FC. It will also include the review of ATQP programmes and the introduction of evidence-based training (EBT) and competency-based training (CBT) in the field of recurrent training. In a second phase, EBT will be extended to operator conversion course and type ratings as well as increasing the scope of EBT to helicopters and to other types of aircrafts not covered in the current Doc 9995.
Pilots, instructors, examiners, ATOs and operators
SPT.079
Crew resource management (CRM) training best practices
The EASA Safety Risk Management process has identified CRM as the second most important human factors issue in the domain of CAT Aeroplanes. New AMC/GM on CRM Training were adopted in 2015 and entered into force in October 2016. An in-depth assessment of the safety issue concluded that additional actions in the area of safety promotion were needed, which led EASA to organise a workshop on the subject. On 8 November 2016, 80 delegates representing operators, CAs, professional associations and training providers met to share experience and best practices on CRM practical implementation. The workshop was an excellent opportunity for the practitioners to discuss how this important safety net should work in practice. The purpose of this safety promotion task is to take stock of and disseminate the best practices discussed during the workshop.
Unavailability of adequate personnel in competent authorities
EASA Standardisation to monitor the availability of staff in CAs.
EASA to support CAs: a. in defining the right competences needed to properly discharge their safety oversight responsibilities; and b. in providing training to their staff.
RES.006
The objective is to develop and demonstrate the due process for the assessment of the effectiveness of the effectiveness of FTL and fatigue risk management (FRM) provisions as set in Article 9a of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 9 . Particular emphasis will be put on the establishment and qualification of the appropriate metrics with a view to ascertaining the necessity for their update towards improving flight safety by better mitigating the possibly associated risks.
CAT, HF
9 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1).
5.2.3 Aircraft tracking, rescue operations and accident investigation
Safety investigation authorities have frequently raised the issue of lack of data to support investigations of light aircraft accidents. This is also related to the fact that light aircraft are not required to carry a flight recorder. As regards large aircraft, the advent of new technologies, as well as findings during safety investigations highlight the need to update the installation specifications for flight recorders.
The safety actions in this area are aimed at introducing normal tracking of large aircraft, improving the availability and quality of data recorded by flight recorders, assessing the need for in-flight recording for light aircraft and the need to introduce data link recording for in-service large aircraft ..
Increase safety by facilitating the recovery of information by safety investigation authorities and thus helping to avoid future accidents.
Number of investigated accidents or serious incidents in which flight data is not recovered
RMT.0249
Recorders installation and maintenance thereof — certification aspects
The general objective of this RMT is to improve the availability and quality of data recorded by flight recorders in order to better support safety investigation authorities in the investigation of accidents and incidents. More specifically, this RMT is aimed at modernising and enhancing the specifications for flight recorder installation on board large aeroplanes and large rotorcraft. Phase 1 of the RMT will result into an NPA in Q1/2017. Following the public consultation of said NPA, EASA will develop an opinion and a decision issuing CS-25. These two deliverables are planned for Q1/2018. In phase 2 of this RMT, EASA will prepare a second NPA (planned for Q2/2018), which will lead again into an opinion as well as a decision issuing CS-25, both planned for Q1/2019.
Operators (of aircraft required to be equipped with flight recorders),
EASA CT.7
manufacturers, applicants for TC/STC
RMT.0271
Assess the need for in-flight recording and make proportionate suggestions for categories of aircraft and types of operation covered by the air operations rules for which there is no flight recorder carriage requirement. The upcoming NPA will pay particular attention to the proportionality aspect for GA leisure flying and make reference to the risks identified during the GA workshop (see Section 5.5). Note that this NPA (as any other NPA) may propose ‘no rulemaking’ as the most suitable option.
EASA FS.2
Operators (of aircraft not yet required to have flight recorders)
RMT.0294
RMT.0400
Data link recording retrofit for aircraft used in CAT
Assess the need to introduce data link recording for in-service aircraft in line with ICAO Annex 6 Parts I and III
All IRs were adopted with Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/2338; however, the AMC & GM for CAT.GEN.MPA.205 and CAT.GEN.MPA.210 have not yet been issued. We wait until ICAO has completed its work on aircraft tracking and location of an aircraft in distress before proceeding with the AMC & GM to CAT.GEN.MPA.205 and CAT.GEN.MPA.210. ICAO is not expected to complete its work before Q1/2017.
Aircraft operators and manufacturers
In 2015, the domain with the highest number of fatalities was CAT Aeroplanes. This involved a single fatal accident, which was the Germanwings accident that occurred on 24 March 2015. In 2014, there were 2 fatal accidents and there have not been more than 2 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes since 2005. This operational domain is the greatest focus of EASA’s safety activities and the reorganisation of the collaborative analysis groups (CAGs) and Advisory Bodies will help EASA to learn more about the safety challenges faced by airlines and manufacturers 10 .
5.3.1 Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)
Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Loss of control is a strategic priority.
64 % of fatal accidents in the last 10 years (EASA MS) involved loss of control. Events such as a deviation from flight path, abnormal airspeed or triggering of stall protections when not dealt with properly can lead to fatal consequences involving many fatalities. Technical failures as well as ground handling safety issues can be also a precursor of this type of scenarios.
Continuously assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of loss of control.
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the Commercial Air Transport Fixed Wing Portfolio (ref: Annual Safety Review 2016)
RMT.0397
Unintended or inappropriate rudder usage — rudder reversals — To propose an amendment of CS-25 to protect the aeroplane against the risk of unintended or inappropriate rudder usage. This may be achieved either by setting standards mitigating erroneous rudder inputs from pilots to ensure safe flight, or by proposing standards that will ensure pilots will not make the erroneous rudder input. — To determine if retroactive specifications are suitable for already certified large aeroplanes. In case of a positive answer, to propose Part-26/CS-26 standards, eventually including applicability criteria. Those standards may differ from the ones proposed for CS-25 amendment.
10 Extract from the EASA Annual Safety Review 2016.
RMT.0581
Review of the provisions for initial and recurrent training in order to address upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT). The review will also address the implementation of the ICAO documents and several SRs. Other aspects to be covered are manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery (including at high altitude), the training of aircraft configuration laws, the recurrent training on flight mechanics, and training scenarios (including the effect of surprise). This RMT is split into multiple deliverables. See the related ToR on the EASA website. Note: Recurrent and conversion training provisions related to UPRT were already published in May 2015. They have been applicable as of May 2016.
A22 ST
RMT.0647
Loss of control or loss of flight path during go-around or climb
The overall goal is to mitigate the safety risk (for large aeroplanes) of loss of control or loss of the flight path of the aircraft during the go-around or climb phases executed from a low speed configuration and close to the ground. The first objective is to ensure that the thrust available after selecting the go-around mode is set to a reasonable value, such that the aeroplane’s performance parameters (e.g. forward and vertical speeds, pitch attitude) are not excessive to the point that the control of the flight path may be a very demanding or hazardous task. The thrust setting should be such that the aeroplane’s performance still complies with the performance requirements of CS-25 Subpart B, and the pilot can still easily select the full thrust, if needed. The second objective is to prevent an excessive nose-up trim condition when transitioning from a low-speed phase of flight to go-around or climb when high level of thrust is applied. This may be achieved by different means, such as increasing the flight crew awareness of the low speed/excessive nose-up trim condition, or incorporating active systems preventing an unusual configuration (low speed/excessive nose-up trim condition) from developing.
DAHs and operators
A13 ST
MST.004
Include loss of control in flight in national SSPs
LOC-I shall be addressed by the MS on their SSPs. This will include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.
SPT.012
Promote the new European provisions on pilot training
The objective is to complement the new regulatory package on UPRT with relevant safety promotion material.
EASA SM.2
EASA website . Owner EASA SM.1 Activity Sector CAT, HF Deliverable Report Date 2017 5.3.2 Runway safety Issue/rationale This section deals both with REs and RIs and is a strategic priority. According to the definition provided by ICAO, an RE is a veer or overrun off the runway surface. RE events can happen during take-off or landing. Safety events such as hard landings, high-speed landing, landings following an unstabilised approach are direct precursors of REs. It also includes the tail, wing, engine nacelle strike during take ‑ off or landing. This risk area represents 9 % of the fatal accidents (and 30 % of non-fatal accidents) in the last 10 years in EASA MS. An RI refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. In the last 10 years, 18 % of fatal accidents within the EASA MS involve RIs. More detailed analysis of this key risk area is planned for early 2017 together with the development of the ATM and Aerodrome Risk Portfolio. What we want to achieve Continuously assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs. How we monitor improvement Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the ATM and Aerodrome risk portfolio (currently under development) How we want to achieve it: actions Rulemaking RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations — Develop regulatory material to provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in CAT operations with the aim of reducing the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor; and Contribute to the harmonisation of the FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in CAT operations. — Owner Affected stakeholders EASA FS.2 CAT aeroplane operators PIA Proc 3rdC ToR NPA Opinion Commission IR Decision A- ST - 09/06/2015 30/09/2016 2017 Q3 2018 Q3 2018 Q3 RMT.0369 Prediction of wind shear for aeroplane CAT operations (IRs) Set up the framework leading towards reduction of the number of accidents and serious incidents caused by wind shear in CAT aeroplane operations by assessing the need to install and use predictive wind shear systems. Owner Affected stakeholders EASA FS.2 CAT aeroplane operators PIA Proc 3rdC ToR NPA Opinion Commission IR Decision B14 ST - 28/10/2013 15/12/2016 n/a n/a 2018 Q4 Page 31 of 125 " id="pdf-obj-30-2" src="pdf-obj-30-2.jpg">
RES.005
See the detailed Terms of Reference for this activity on the EASA website.
5.3.2 Runway safety
This section deals both with REs and RIs and is a strategic priority.
According to the definition provided by ICAO, an RE is a veer or overrun off the runway surface. RE events can happen during take-off or landing. Safety events such as hard landings, high-speed landing, landings following an unstabilised approach are direct precursors of REs. It also includes the tail, wing, engine nacelle strike during take‑off or landing. This risk area represents 9 % of the fatal accidents (and 30 % of non-fatal accidents) in the last 10 years in EASA MS.
An RI refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. In the last 10 years, 18 % of fatal accidents within the EASA MS involve RIs. More detailed analysis of this key risk area is planned for early 2017 together with the development of the ATM and Aerodrome Risk Portfolio.
Continuously assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs.
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the ATM and Aerodrome risk portfolio (currently under development)
RMT.0296
— Develop regulatory material to provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in CAT operations with the aim of reducing the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal factor; and Contribute to the harmonisation of the FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance in CAT operations.
CAT aeroplane operators
RMT.0369
Prediction of wind shear for aeroplane CAT operations (IRs)
Set up the framework leading towards reduction of the number of accidents and serious incidents caused by wind shear in CAT aeroplane operations by assessing the need to install and use predictive wind shear systems.
RMT.0703
RMT.0704
The objective of this task is to increase the level of safety by reducing the number of REs through mandating existing technologies on aeroplane that allow to measure remaining runway left and thus support pilot- decision-making. Due to the nature of the comments received on NPA 2013-09, EASA has decided to publish a new NPA on the reduction of REs. The proposal of the new NPA will put more emphasis on safety objectives against the risk of REs, while providing more flexibility in terms of design solutions. The means to achieve these objectives will be provided in a technical standard developed jointly by industry and NAAs with the support of an international standardisation body (EUROCAE).
Operators, manufacturers, applicants for TC/STC
European Action Plans for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI) and Excursions (EAPPRE) contain several recommendations to Competent Authorities, Aerodrome Operators and EASA in order to mitigate the risks. In the aerodromes’ domain, EASA had included in Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 11 and in the relevant AMC/GM and CS many of these recommendations, however there are some of them that have not been addressed.
EASA FS.4.3
National Aviation Authorities, aerodrome operators
Revision and update of Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 and of the related AMC and GM in order to include the changes in Annex 14 and PANS Aerodromes.
ANSPs,
11 Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 of 12 February 2014 laying down requirements and administrative procedures related to aerodromes pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 44, 14.2.2014, p. 1–34.
Include runway excursions in national SSPs
REs should be addressed by the MS on their SSPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, airport operators and pilot representatives. This will include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness. MS should implement actions suggested by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) and monitor effectiveness.
MST.011
MS should audit their aerodromes to ensure that a local runway safety team is in place and is effective. MS will report on the progress and effectiveness.
MST.014
Include runway incursions in national SSPs
RIs should be addressed by the MS on their SSPs. This will include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness. MS should implement actions suggested by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI).
CAT/GA, HF
5.3.3 Airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions)
Airborne conflict refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements. Although there have been no CAT aeroplane airborne collision accidents in recent years within the EASA MS, this key risk area has been raised by a number of MS at the Network of Analysts (NoA) and also by some airlines, specifically in the context of the collision risk with aircraft without transponders in uncontrolled airspace. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.
Continuously assess and improve risk controls to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions.
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the Commercial Air Transport Fixed Wing Portfolio (ref: Annual Safety Review 2016 12 )
RMT.0376
Carriage of ACAS II equipment on aircraft other than aeroplanes in excess of 5 700 kg or 19 pax
Set up the framework for reducing the risk of MACs. This task will include a thorough impact assessment aimed at evaluating the cost-benefit of ACAS II equipment carriage.
RMT.0445
Development of the necessary organisational and technical requirements on airspace design, thus ensuring that the specific safety objectives of the Basic Regulation are met. Basically, the scope of the task is to establish the requirements for the design of flight procedures and ATS routes, to support the implementation of PBN operations and evaluate the need for extension to other airspace structures and flight procedure design. This will include an analysis of the need to include procedures for airspace design in the ATM/ANS certification scheme.
ANSPs and operators
12 See link in Executive Summary above.
RMT.0464
Transposition of the relevant ICAO provisions on ATS. The objective is to define a sufficient level of harmonisation throughout the EU, based on mandatory and flexible requirements, and define proportionate and cost-efficient rules.
MS; CAs; ANSPs; ATCOS; aircraft operators; professional organisations; trade
unions; pilots; passengers
Development of the necessary harmonised requirements and AMC/GM for the provision of aeronautical information and data, mainly based on the transposition of ICAO Annex 15 and ICAO Annex 4. The task will also fulfil specific needs stemming from the SES implementation.
RMT.0593
specific organisational requirements for the data service providers (DAT.OR), and the particular roles and responsibilities of such providers in order to ensure the necessary integrity, quality and timeliness of navigation data; — the technical requirements (DAT.TR) for the provision of data services consisting in the origination and processing of data and formatting and delivering data to general air traffic. The DAT.TR shall address the essential requirements set out in paragraph 2(a) of Annex Vb to the Basic Regulation and shall meet the SES objectives on interoperability;
the amendment to the air operations rule contained in CAT.IDE.A.355 and NCC.IDE.A.260 on electronic navigation data management of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 and their extension to helicopter operations. Related AMC and GM should be reviewed as well.
DAT providers, indirectly: Competent Authorities
MST.010
Include MACs in national SSPs
MACs shall be addressed by the MS on their SSPs. This will include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness. MS should implement actions of the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction.
MST.024
Loss of separation between civil and military aircraft
Several EU MS have reported an increase in losses of separation involving civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative military traffic over the high seas. Taking into account this situation, and the possible hazard to civil aviation safety, the European Commission mandated EASA to perform a technical analysis of the reported occurrences. The technical analysis issued a number of recommendations for the MS:
endorse and fully apply Circular 330;
closely coordinate to develop, harmonise and publish operational requirements and instructions for state
aircraft to ensure that ‘due regard’ for civil aircraft is always maintained;
develop and harmonise civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at EU level;
report relevant occurrences to EASA; and
— facilitate/make primary surveillance radar data available in military units to civil ATC units. The objective of this action is to ensure that MS follow-up on the recommendations and provide feedback on the implementation.
5.3.4 Design and maintenance improvements
Design improvements may limit the probability of technical failures. With 45 % of fatal accidents involving some sort of technical failures during the past 10 years, this is both a major accident outcome and a precursor of other types of accident 13 . Specific analysis work is ongoing to identify the systemic, safety issues that may be present in the domains of airworthiness, maintenance and production.
Continuously assess and improve risk controls related to design and maintenance
RMT.0049
To define a standardised criterion for conducting aeroplane-level safety assessment of specific risks that encompasses all critical aeroplane systems on large aeroplanes (i.e. in particular update AMC to CS 25.1309), based on the results of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Airplane-level Safety Analysis Working Group (ASAWG). In addition, to amend AMC 25.1309 taking into account the latest updates of industry documents, such as
ED79A/ARP4754A.
To update CS 25.671 on safety assessment of flight control systems, based on the results of the ARAC Flight Controls Harmonisation Working Group (FCHWG). For both objectives, harmonisation with the FAA, the Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) and Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC) will be ensured as much as possible.
13 This statement is coming from our Annual Safety Review 2016. It does not necessarily mean that the technical failure was the direct cause of the accidents, but that a system component failure was identified in the sequence of events of 1 of the 5 fatal accidents in CAT Aeroplanes during the past 10 years (out of a total of 11). This could be an engine failure, an avionics system failure or some other recoverable technical failure. The cause of the accident is usually the result of a combination of circumstances and events that can only be understood after reading the investigation report. Specific analysis work is ongoing to identify the systemic safety issues that may be present in the domains of airworthiness, maintenance and production. Non-accident data will be used for the analysis.