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Timestamp: 2018-05-24 08:20:17
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5 The CJEU Interprets the Law in Cases Brought Before It and Acts - Tài liệu text
5 The CJEU Interprets the Law in Cases Brought Before It and Acts as Constitutional Court
The Court deals with the remarkable elements of Article 16 TFEU and Article 8
Charter. As an example, the interpretation of the right to data protection under
Article 8(2) Charter draws on the acquis laid down in Directive 95/46 on data protection. This reasoning is circular, since the Court interprets Directive 95/46 in the
light of the Articles 7 and 8 Charter.
Often, the contribution of the Court of Justice consists of giving guidance, where
it adjudicates in cases by explaining EU data protection legislation in the light of the
Articles 7 and 8 Charter. Cases end up at the Court on the basis of preliminary questions referred by national courts on the explanation of Directive 95/4634 or of other
legislative instruments relating to privacy and data protection.
For the Court, an important perspective is and will increasingly be that the reality
of the internet is difficult to reconcile with core data protection principles. ‘Consent’
and ‘purpose limitation’ are examples of such principles that the Court may have to
interpret, whilst taking into consideration the developments in the information society. These developments also influence the balancing with other interests since fundamental rights and public interests increasingly coincide.
More generally, the assessment by the Court of Justice of limitations applicable
to a fundamental right focuses on proportionality. The entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty prompted a fundamental change of the approach of the Court in relation to
fundamental rights. In this approach, the Charter has become the yardstick and has
a wide scope, without extending the competences and tasks of the European Union.
The proportionality test under the Charter is strict; the strictness in a concrete situation depends on a number of factors. The nature of the fundamental right is such a
factor. This factor is elaborated in this book, which analyses whether meaningful
distinctions can be made between the fundamental rights that must be protected on
10.5.2 T
A Judiciary Explaining the Boundaries with Other
Mandates in an Information Society (The Second
This book distinguished two different types of safeguards flowing from the role of
the Court of Justice within the EU constitutional framework, in relation to Article
16(1) TFEU.
The first type of safeguards is institutional, relating to the role of the judiciary.
Most cases are brought before the Court in the context of the preliminary ruling
procedure. This procedure is a success, also in privacy and data protection. The
preliminary ruling procedure enables the Court to provide guidance, also in important issues. However, the case law of the Court is by definition incremental. It is not
The example is Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc., EU:C:2014:317.
10.5 The CJEU Interprets the Law in Cases Brought Before It and Acts…
the role of a court to develop a policy for better protection. Therefore, guidance by
the Court is not sufficient for bridging the gap between general principles and practice. Bridging the gap requires contributions of actors that can develop a comprehensive policy, such as the EU legislator and the independent DPAs.
The second type of safeguards is substantive: the exercise of the mandate of the
European Union under Article 16 TFEU is limited by mandates of the Union in
other fields and by the competences of the Member States. Ensuring privacy and
data protection requires balancing privacy and data protection with other fundamental rights and essential interests, in the specific internet context. This balancing
plays a key role in the case law of the Court, as the following examples illustrate.
First, the link between the fundamental rights of privacy and data protection, on
the one hand, and the freedom of expression and information, on the other hand, is
changing and intensifying due to internet-related developments. The dividing line
between private and public speech is becoming blurred on the internet. Changes are
caused by the impact of a free and open internet on privacy and data protection,
whereas new intermediaries, like search engines, play a role in promoting the freedom of expression and information.
The debate on the right to be forgotten demonstrates that where an individual is
entitled to request the deletion of personal data, this automatically has an impact on
the right to receive information under Article 11 Charter. In Google Spain and
Google Inc.,35 the Court accepted this consequence, taking the changed reality in the
information society into consideration. This changed reality has an impact on privacy and data protection and on the balancing of fundamental rights. The ubiquitous
availability of information implies a lack of control of the data subject and affects
his autonomy. This ruling of the Court is not undisputed. For instance, the case law
of the US Supreme Court shows a different approach in balancing privacy and with
free speech, with more emphasis on free speech.36 At the same time, Google Spain
and Google Inc. was heavily criticised in the US and by various European scholars,
because of its presumed impact on free speech and democracy.37 Although this book
does not support this criticism, admittedly, the ruling does not precisely define the
boundaries between the fundamental rights at stake. Further case law may be
needed.38
In Google Spain and Google Inc., the Court also took the changed reality in the
information society into consideration in another respect. The Court gave search
engines a social responsibility, attributing to them the task of the balancing of fundamental rights, after they have received requests for the deletion of links containing personal data.
E.g., in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., No. 10-779 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011), see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.11.
E.g., in Case C-398/15, Manni (pending).
Second, the right of access to documents gives effect to core values in society as
transparency, which includes the right to know, and democratic control. The Court
scrutinises the exceptions and limitations to this right restrictively. However, the
same restrictive approach is not applied where the Court balances the right of access
to documents with privacy and data protection. Under the Court’s case law, applicants who request access to documents of the European Union must demonstrate
the necessity for having access to documents if these documents include personal
data.39 The Court does not seem to balance privacy and data protection on an equal
footing with public access to documents, but seems to give more weight to privacy
Third, there are different scholarly views on the status of the right to property as
an essential value in a democratic society.40 The right to property is not included in
all fundamental rights treaties although it plays an important role in the application
of the ECHR. This book argues that privacy and data protection, on the one hand,
and property and especially intellectual property, on the other hand, should not necessarily be balanced on equal footing. The example in support of this argument is
the enforcement, on the internet, of copyright, which is an intellectual property
right. Since copyright is difficult to enforce on the internet, copyright holders claim
that the monitoring of the behaviour of all individuals on the internet is needed to
enforce their copyrights. Recognition of this claim would obviously weaken the
level of privacy and data protection. In view of the essential nature of privacy and
data protection in our democratic societies, it is submitted that, where both rights
need to be balanced against each other, the rights to privacy and data protection
should carry greater weight than the right of the rights holder.
Fourth, the relationship between privacy and data protection and security has
elements of a trade-off. Privacy is, on the one hand, seen as inhibiting the appropriate protection of our societies against threats caused by terrorist attacks or by serious crime and, on the other hand, as a value that should prevail against risks of
unconditioned surveillance. Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger41 gives indications
for balancing privacy and security, with an emphasis on the intrusiveness of monitoring of individuals in an information society. The book includes an interesting
parallel with the approach of the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court, too,
considers the intrusive consequences of the information society. For instance, the
US Supreme Court decided that generally a warrant is needed before the search of
a smartphone, because of the immense storage capacity of a device people carry on
them.42 A smartphone is not just a physical device that people have on them, but can
provide – when it is searched – a broad insight into the private life of individuals.
More generally, the outcome of the trade-off between privacy and data protection
and security is determined by trends in these two areas: the effects of ubiquitous
The leading case is Case C-28/08P, Commission v. Bavarian Lager, EU:C:2010:378.
As explained in Chap. 5, Sect. 5.15 of this book.
Riley v California, No. 13–132.
connectivity for privacy and data protection, on the one hand, and the security
threats for society, on the other hand. Moreover, it proved difficult to measure these
trends and to measure the effects of proposed instruments and to make comparisons
on the basis of this measurement.
Other arguments that should play a role in the trade-off are: (a) the lack of transparency of government surveillance should be addressed, (b) the value given to
privacy and data protection should not depend on political preferences of a majoritarian body, and (c) strong privacy and data protection can benefit law enforcement.
The challenge is to find synergies.
10.5.3 L
 egitimacy as a Factor for Success of the CJEU (The
Third Component)
In a general sense, the extensive role of the Court of Justice compensates for the
democratic deficit of the Union. The Court has further legitimacy because of its
close connection with national courts through the preliminary ruling procedure. The
Court enhances its legitimacy by properly balancing the interest of EU integration
with national interests.
The challenges for internet privacy and data protection justify an emphasis on
context-related balancing with other fundamental rights taking into account that the
internet does not pose the same challenges for all fundamental rights. Freedom of
expression is an example43: as a rule, the internet is a vehicle for the freedom of
expression, not a challenge. This balancing is at the heart of the contribution of the
Court to the exercise of the mandate under Article 16 TFEU, more than it is for the
other actors and roles under Article 16 TFEU. Where the Court succeeds in striking
an acceptable balance between the various interests concerned, this increases the
legitimacy of EU action under Article 16 TFEU.
This book claims that the legitimacy of the European Union, in general, and the
Court, in particular, can even improve if distinctions are made between fundamental
rights (and essential interests), in the sense that not all rights and values are balanced on an equal footing, albeit without establishing a hierarchy between rights.
Making a distinction between fundamental rights can be useful for three purposes. First, this should prevent any weakening of privacy and data protection (and
other fundamental rights that are most crucial for our democracies), which could
result from the equal protection of all rights, by allowing a differentiation in the
standard of review for the different fundamental rights enabling a high standard of
protection for these most crucial fundamental rights. Second, the distinctions should
and enable an efficient use of resources. Third, these distinctions would make it
As illustrated by the CJEU in Case C-131/12, Google Spain and Google Inc., EU:C:2014:317.
possible to focus on extraterritorial application of fundamental rights, taking into
consideration legitimate claims of third countries or international organisations.
Extraterritorial application of EU law in certain fields of EU intervention such as
privacy and data protection is legitimate, precisely because the core values of Article
2 TEU – particularly democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – are at
stake. This legitimacy does not necessarily exist to the same extent for all fundamental rights included in the Charter.
The Charter does not establish a hierarchy between fundamental rights. This
book proposes a simple taxonomy that would permit to apply different standards of
review in respect of fundamental rights protection on the internet, without creating
a hierarchy. This taxonomy would serve the three purposes mentioned above, and
would enable an efficient use of resources, whilst also taking a focused approach on
The book suggests that the legitimacy of the role of the Court would further
improve, if the Court were to assess, in a systematic manner, the application of the
rights to privacy and data protection, taking into account this simple taxonomy.
Privacy and data protection fall within the category of fundamental rights that have
a high impact on human dignity.
This means more concretely that: (1) there is a necessity of protection in an
online environment; (2) where needed, extraterritorial application of the rights must
be safeguarded; (3) the rights should be applicable in horizontal relations; (4)
restrictions and limitations of these rights are subject to a strict test; (5) where a balance is needed with other fundamental rights and public interests, the essential
nature of the rights to privacy and data protection should be taken into account; and
(6) this may lead to an approach where the Court adjudicates itself, and does not
defer the matter to the national courts (in preliminary ruling procedures). These
requirements are in line with the current practice of the Court on privacy and data
10.5.4 E
 ffectiveness as a Factor for Success of the CJEU (The
Fourth Component)
Effectiveness is a key factor in the case law of the Court of Justice. Effectiveness is
an important perspective in the Court’s interpretation of everyone’s rights to privacy
and data protection. Effectiveness is a guiding principle for the Court, also where it
assumes the role of promoting integration (on markets and elsewhere) and where it
acts as an umpire in situations where other public interests or other governmental
actors have an impact on the exercise of Article 16(1) TFEU.
Integration (on markets and elsewhere) is an additional interest to be taken into
account by the Court, where it rules on the basis of Article 16 TFEU. The integration of data protection law in the European Union is to a large extent based on
considerations of effectiveness, based on the view that fragmentation would weaken
the protection. Forum shopping by big internet companies, in the sense of choosing
a forum in a Member States with a perceived low level of protection in a fragmented
Europe, is the example of a practice that may weaken the protection.
The Court acts as an umpire between different powers. Precise answers by the
Court are required, in compliance of the principle of effectiveness, where the Court
adjudicates on the boundaries between competences under Article 16 TFEU and
relating competences.
10.5.5 Final Recommendation
In recent years, the Court Of Justice played an important role in promoting privacy
and data protection, also taking into account the impact of the information society.
Two rulings in 2014, Google Spain and Google Inc, and Digital Rights Ireland and
Seitlinger, are the best illustrations of a court taking privacy and data protection
This book makes the recommendation to base the scrutiny of fundamental rights
on a simple taxonomy. This taxonomy of fundamental rights is structured as
(a)Non-derogable or absolute fundamental rights, corresponding to the rights
included in Title I of the Charter, entitled dignity;
(b)Rights with a huge impact on the human dignity, but not qualified as
non-derogable;
(c) Social, cultural and economic rights.
Further categories include: principles in the Charter (as meant in Articles 51(1)
and 52(5) thereof), the fundamental freedoms of the Treaties relating to free movement, the undefined species of public and general interests.
10.6 T
 he European Parliament and the Council Lay
Down the Rules, Whilst Respecting the Role
of the Member States Under Article 16(2) TFEU
10.6.1 A
 rticle 16(2) TFEU and the Exhaustive Nature
of the EU Legislator’s Task (The First Component)
The mandate of the European Union to act under Article 16 TFEU is widely formulated, and gives the Union the opportunity to realise its ambitions. Article 16(2)
TFEU must be seen as an explicit choice of the authors of the Treaty to bring data
protection to the Union level, by giving the European Parliament and the Council,
in their common capacity as the EU legislator, the duty to lay down the rules. The