Source: http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/opinions/2002/unpub/010374-1.htm
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7']

In Re: Quick, 149 NC App 489 (01-374) 03/19/2002 - Unpublished
NO. COA01-374
ISAAC DEMARIUS QUICK, JOHN MONTAE QUICK, MICHAEL ANTHONY Harnett County
QUICK, JODI KENOYA QUICK, MARILYN Nos. 97 J 12, 13, IESHIA MCQUEEN, SHAQUANYA 14, 15, 16, 17
Appeal by respondents Jeanette Quick, John Quick and Jodi
Gornik from orders entered 1 December 2000 by Judge Frank Lanier in
Harnett County Juvenile District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 27 November 2001.
Mark A. Key for John Quick respondent appellant.
Johnson and Johnson, P.A., by Rebecca J. Davidson, for
Jeanette Quick respondent appellant.
Duncan B. McCormick for Jodi Gornik respondent appellant.
Jennifer S. O'Connor for Harnett County Department of Social Services petitioner appellee.
Harrington, Ward, Gilleland & Winstead, L.L.P., by Eddie S. Winstead, III, Guardian ad Litem in the Appeal of John Quick, Jeanette Quick and Jodi Gornik.
Respondents Jeanette Quick, John Quick, and Jodi Gornik appeal
from orders terminating their parental rights. Jeanette Quick and
John Quick are the natural parents of four minor children:
Shaquanya Jeanette McQueen, born on 4 March 1988; John Montae
Quick, born on 23 June 1989; Marilyn Ieshia McQueen, born on 22September 1992; and Isaac Demarius Quick, born on 15 January 1993. (See footnote 1) At the time the children were taken into the custody of the Harnett
County Department of Social Services (DSS), John and Jeanette Quick
were still married, but separated. John Quick lived with his
girlfriend, Jodi Gornik, in a two-bedroom trailer; the couple cared
for four of John Quick's children, as well as their own son and
daughter. Jodi Gornik and John Quick are the natural parents of
two minor children: Michael Anthony Quick, born on 22 March 1995;
and Jodi Kenoya Quick, born on 7 April 1996. (See footnote 2) On 6 February 1997,
the trial court entered non-secure orders giving (DSS) custody of
all six children based on allegations of abuse and neglect. On 18
April 1997, the children were adjudicated to be abused and
neglected juveniles. On 21 March 2000, DSS filed petitions to
terminate the parental rights of John Quick and Jeanette Quick to
Shaquanya McQueen, John Quick, Marilyn McQueen, and Isaac Quick. On the same date, DSS also filed petitions to terminate the
parental rights of John Quick and Jodi Gornik to Michael Quick and
Kenoya Quick. At the adjudication hearing on 18 April 1997, DSS presented
evidence that it had been involved with the children and their
parents since 1995. When DSS workers made home visits, the
children were often dirty and wore ill-fitting and soiled clothing. The children were unusually quiet and did not speak or interact
with DSS personnel unless given permission to do so by their
parents. The children were often seen sitting on the floor,
instead of on the furniture, though this situation was not observed
if DSS workers happened to visit the home when other visitors were
present. Between 1995 and the time the children were removed from their
home in 1997, DSS received four reports that the five oldest
children were improperly disciplined by their primary caretakers,
John Quick and Jodi Gornik, and had numerous marks and bruises upon
their bodies; the reports also alleged that the parents could not
adequately provide for the needs of the children. In early February
1997, DSS received a report that Michael Quick had several
suspicious marks upon his body. After investigating the report,
DSS substantiated the allegations and removed Michael and his five
brothers and sisters from the home of John Quick and Jodi Gornik. DSS presented detailed evidence regarding the numerous cuts,
bruises, and scars that each of the five oldest children had upon
their bodies. Pediatricians Dr. Sharon W. Cooper and Dr. Howard M.
Loughlin testified as experts in the field of the diagnosis and
treatment of abused and neglected children. Dr. Cooper recounted
the following injuries: Shaquanya had two old bruises on her left
flank (in the shape of a shoe heel), two 2-centimeter old burns on
her right inner forearm, two old bruises and an old burn on her
left arm, a 2-centimeter oval bruise on her left arm, multiple old
bruises and newer swollen hematomas on both her legs, and numerousold linear scars on her cheeks and forehead. John had multiple
hyper-pigmented lesions on his face and back; there was also
evidence that he had been hit with a shoe. Marilyn had a 3-
centimeter old abrasion, a 5-centimeter scar, a 0.5 x 0.75
scratched X on her right shoulder, numerous cut and scratch
marks, curvilinear blue bruises on her left superior iliac crest,
a 7-centimeter healing abrasion on her right flank, two 2.5-
centimeter longitudinal healed bruises on her right inner thigh, a
2-centimeter deep laceration on the dorsum of her left hand, hyper-
pigmented knuckles and knees (due to forced crawling on fists for
disciplinary purposes), a 2.5-centimeter right wide healed hyper-
trophic scar in the hypomalar region of the cheek (inflicted by a
knife), multiple old linear cuts to her face, and two belt buckle
marks on her thigh. Isaac had a 3-centimeter purple-colored linear
scar under his chin, multiple hyper-pigmented areas on his body,
five scars on his buttocks, two scars on his lower back, a burn
mark on his lower right buttocks, a 7-centimeter pink scar on his
left foot, brown maculas on his right chest, pink centered hyper-
pigmented areas on his left arm, a skin thickened hyper-pigmented
area on some of his knuckles, and scars on both his thighs. Michael had several hyper-pigmented markings on his lower back and
forehead. There was also evidence that he had been hit with a toy
race track, which left scars on his left arm, left leg, and lower
back. While Kenoya did not have any physical injuries, DSS pointed
out that she lived in a home with her five siblings, who were
subjected to serious physical abuse. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court made the
a. Five of the six children, to wit:
Shaquanya, John, Marilyn, Isaac and Michael
have been subjected to one or more methods of
inappropriate discipline by respondents John
Quick and Jodi Gornik to include:
1. Beatings resulting in cuts,
burns, bruises, and scars upon various parts
of their bodies having been caused by means
other than accidental.
2. Forced sitting on the floor in
Indian style position for long periods of
3. Forced crawling on fists
(knuckles) and knees.
g. That some of the foregoing injuries
to the juveniles were inflicted as a procedure
to modify behavior and that said acts were not
the result of accidental means.
l. The respondent parents allowed the
juveniles to live in an environment in which
the juvenile [was] being inappropriately
disciplined and such environment created or
allowed to be created a substantial risk of
serious physical injury to the children other
than by accidental means.
m. The injuries inflicted upon the
juveniles are evidence of serious physical
injury other than by accidental means; said
actions created or allowed to be created a
substantial risk of serious injury to the
juveniles by other than accidental means; and
the parents did not take appropriate steps to
protect the juveniles.
n. The actions of using inappropriate
devises [sic] and procedures to modify
behavior together with the serious bodilyinjuries inflicted upon the juveniles have
created or allowed to be created serious
emotional damage to the children and the same
is evidenced by the children's actions of
being withdrawn and uncommunicative and later
involved in aggressive behavior.
q. None of said juveniles were involved
in any special endeavor to address any
developmental delays. The respondent father
receives food stamps, WIC and medical benefits
for said children. The respondent father
receives a $300 monthly benefit from AFDC for
juveniles Michael, Keyona [sic] and Shaquanya. Juveniles John, Isaac, and Marilyn are bed
wetters and the respondent father was taking
no appropriate action to address said
r. Several of the scars and marks about
the juveniles' bodies are permanent and are
evidence of a failure to seek appropriate
medical attention. These scars and marks
about the bodies of said juveniles have been
and will continue to be a source of
embarrassment to the juveniles and will
adversely affect them in the future as
playmates and others question them concerning
the scars and marks.
The trial court adjudicated the five oldest children, Shaquanya,
John, Marilyn, Isaac, and Michael to be abused juveniles, pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) (1999). Additionally, the trial
court adjudicated the same five children, along with their youngest
sister Kenoya, to be neglected juveniles within the meaning of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). During the dispositional phase of the hearing, the trial court
determined that 4. The goal of reunification of the
juveniles with their parents is deemed to be
the appropriate goal and to realize that goalthe respondent parents shall do and perform
the things hereinafter set forth, to wit:
a. attend parenting classes;
b. participate in a psychological
evaluation which shall include
appropriate testings for child
abuse and other personality
characteristics and to follow
evaluator or evaluators.
c. Participate in appropriate
counseling for the juveniles to
include family counseling if
the same is recommended.
d. Obtain and maintain employment.
e. Obtain and maintain adequate
f. Learn appropriate ways to
interact with and discipline
g. Learn social, physical and
h. Be involved in the juveniles'
treatment plans as deemed
appropriate by the petitioner.
i. Report to and cooperate with
the petitioner's social worker.
j. Report to the Harnett County
Child Support Office within
seven days for a determination
of child support payments and
then make said support payments
as deemed appropriate according
to the guidelines by the child
k. Sign appropriate waivers with
services to the parents in
order for those professionalsto make reports and freely
discuss the parents' diagnosis
and treatment with petitioner's
social worker and the Guardian
On 6 October 1997, the trial court conducted a review hearing
of the case. The trial court heard from Dr. Robert Aiello, who was
tendered as an expert in the field of clinical psychology, with
specialization in abused and neglected children, and with a
specialty in conducting mental health evaluations in adults and
children as it relates to the field of clinical psychology. Dr.
Aiello conducted psychological evaluations on the respondent
parents, and his reports were incorporated by reference as findings
in the trial court's order. Dr. Aiello diagnosed John Quick with mild mental retardation
and personality disorders. He recommended that Mr. Quick receive
individual counseling with long-term treatment objectives. However, Dr. Aiello also stated that Mr. Quick needed to find a
competent, trustworthy person to help him make decisions regarding
the children's welfare; without such a person, Dr. Aiello believed
the chance of repeated abuse was high. Dr. Aiello diagnosed Mrs. Quick with borderline intellectual
functioning that inhibited her ability to solve complex problems.
He recommended that she undergo individual therapy to learn to
accept responsibility for her actions and to establish realistic
expectations for her four children. Dr. Aiello further recommended
that Mrs. Quick find a competent, trustworthy person to help her in
the event her children were returned to her care. Dr. Aiello diagnosed Ms. Gornik with borderline intellectual
functioning, chronic depressive disorder, and personality disorder. He recommended that she undergo therapy to learn to make better
decisions for herself and her family. Dr. Aiello further
recommended that Ms. Gornik find a competent, trustworthy person to
supervise the management of her day-to-day affairs. The trial court noted that Mr. Quick and Ms. Gornik had a
strained relationship but still lived together, even though Dr.
Aiello and a social worker told the couple that their cohabitation
was in direct conflict with the overall reunification plan. Despite Dr. Aiello's recommendations, Mr. Quick did not follow his
treatment recommendations. Mr. Quick was referred to Lee-Harnett
Mental Health Center and was assigned a therapist, but attended
only one meeting. During that meeting, Mr. Quick lied to his
therapist, refused to accept responsibility for his actions toward
his children, and blamed others for what happened to his children. He consistently visited his children and interacted well with them,
but did not act on parenting issues or resolve conflicts that arose
during those visits. Mr. Quick did, however, secure a part-time
job at Justin Auto in Benson, North Carolina. Mrs. Quick missed several visits with her children due to
transportation problems. When able to visit, she demonstrated
appropriate expectations and demands of the children, but did not
demonstrate parenting skills when large conflicts came up during
the visits. Mrs. Quick was able to secure a full-time job at
Britthaven Nursing Home in Erwin. According to the trial court,only Mrs. Quick complied with the previous order concerning child
support. Ms. Gornik had several scheduled appointments at Lee-Harnett
Mental Health Center, but did not keep those appointments. She
consistently visited the children with her mother, Diane Langley. Ms. Gornik worked briefly at the Waffle House in Benson, North
Carolina, but quit because she wanted better pay. At the end of the hearing, the trial court concluded that the
children were to remain in the custody of DSS, because returning
them to their parents was against their welfare. Michael and
Kenoya Quick were placed in the home of Ms. Gornik's mother, Diane
Langley. The trial court ordered the parents to refrain from
disrupting the plan to reunify the family and instructed them not
to threaten, harass or intimidate any of the social workers who
worked with their family. The trial court ordered DSS to continue
working with the family, and stated that:
4. The respondent parents shall
continue to cooperate with the social worker
and shall follow recommendations as made by
Dr. Aiello or the social worker relative to
the service plans which were previously
established between the social worker and
respective parents. The parents shall
continue to comply with directives of the
Court as heretofore established in orders of
Another review hearing took place on 17 April 1998. At that
time, the trial court relieved DSS of its efforts to reunify the
family, though DSS was ordered to create a permanent plan for Mrs.
Quick that was separate from the permanent plan for Ms. Gornik andMr. Quick. With respect to the parents' progress, the trial court
made the following findings of fact: 12. Respondents John Quick and Jodi
Gornick [sic] have continued their
relationship despite Dr. Aiello's
recommendations. They have been living in the
home of Marilyn Quick, sister of John Quick
since approximately December of 1997. They
are currently not living together. 13. Respondent John Quick has not
returned to Lee-Harnett Mental Health, nor is
he participating in therapy. He is not paying
child support. He reports that he is to begin
employment with the city of Raleigh on April
20, 1998. The respondent father testified
that he has attended parenting classes; the
respondent father did not inform the social
worker of his attendance. Said respondent has
made no real progress in removing the
conditions which led to the removal of his
children from his custody and improving his
parenting skills. 14. Respondent Jodi Gornick [sic] has
not obtained employment, attended counseling
or paid any support. Said respondent has made
no progress in removing the conditions which
led to the removal of the juveniles herein
from her care and has done nothing to improve
her parental skills. 15. Respondent Jeanette Quick has
maintained employment through Britthaven
Nursing Home in Erwin since May of 1997. She
has obtained health insurance for her
children. She states that child support is
automatically taken from her paycheck. On
April 7, 1998, the respondent mother obtained
housing at 511-A East Broad Street in Dunn,
NC. This home has three bedrooms. The trial court ordered that the visitation rights of Mr. Quick and
Ms. Gornik be terminated, though Mrs. Quick was still allowed
visitation with the children. The goal for Michael and Kenoya
Quick was changed to permanency planning with persons other thanthe respondent parents. The goal for Shaquanya, John, Marilyn and
Isaac was changed to permanency planning with persons other than
the respondent father. DSS was instructed to continue working
with Mrs. Quick toward reunification with her children, although
the trial court continued to be concerned about Mrs. Quick's
psychological evaluation. At the 9 October 1998 review hearing, the trial court
determined that neither Ms. Gornik nor Mr. Quick showed any
evidence to persuade the trial court to make reunification their
goal. The trial court noted that Mrs. Quick had difficulty dealing
with the children during visitations, had been evicted from her
home, and was not working. Based on this evidence, the trial court
approved a permanent plan in which the children would live separate
and apart from Mrs. Quick, and declined to make reunification a
goal with regard to Ms. Gornik and Mr. Quick. At the permanency planning review hearing on 9 May 1999, the
trial court approved the continued permanent plan for the six
children, which kept them living separate and apart from their
parents. The trial court reached the same conclusion at review
hearings on 12 November 1999 and 21 January 2000. At the 21
January 2000 hearing, the trial court ordered DSS to proceed with
termination of parental rights for all three parents, and all
visitations by the parents with the children were terminated. The trial court held a hearing to consider termination of
respondents' parental rights on 8 and 17 August 2000. At the time
of the hearing, Mr. Quick and Ms. Gornik had resumed theirrelationship and were living together. However, during the time
they were apart, Ms. Gornik stayed briefly at a shelter for victims
of domestic violence and she made multiple allegations of domestic
violence against Mr. Quick. The trial court found that Mr. Quick did not correct the
conditions which prompted DSS to remove the children in the first
place, and failed to develop a plan of care for his six children if
they were to be returned to him. Specifically, Mr. Quick failed to
obtain suitable housing or stable employment, did not follow his
treatment recommendations, did not find a competent person to
assist him with decision making, did not accept responsibility for
the removal of his children, and did not pay child support. The
trial court found that Mrs. Quick also failed to correct the
conditions which led to the initial removal of her children. Specifically, Mrs. Quick did not maintain suitable housing or
stable employment, did not demonstrate appropriate parenting skills
during visitation with her children, made unrealistic promises to
the children during visitation, did not cooperate with DSS
regarding her living situation, did not regularly visit her
children, did not participate in therapy, and did not find a person
to assist her with her children as Dr. Aiello instructed. Finally,
the trial court found that Ms. Gornik failed to rectify the
problems which led to the initial removal of her children. Specifically, Ms. Gornik did not find and maintain stable
employment and suitable housing for herself and her family, failed
to pay child support, did not participate in therapy, and did notfind a suitable person to assist her with decision making as Dr.
Aiello suggested. The trial court reiterated that Shaquanya, John, Marilyn,
Isaac and Michael were abused and neglected within the meaning of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1), and that Kenoya was a neglected child
within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). The trial
court concluded that the children had suffered continued neglect,
that the parents willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of care for the children while they were in the custody of
DSS, and that the children had been out of their parents' homes
considerably longer than the twelve-month period set forth in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (1999). After weighing the evidence,
the trial court found the existence of two statutory grounds which
supported termination of Mrs. Quick's parental rights, three
statutory grounds which supported termination of Ms. Gornik's
parental rights, and four statutory grounds which supported
termination of Mr. Quick's parental rights. Jeanette Quick's parental rights were terminated based on the
following grounds in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a):
(1) The parent has abused or neglected the
juvenile. The juvenile shall be deemed
to be abused or neglected if the court
finds the juvenile to be an abused
juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-
101 or a neglected juvenile within the
meaning of G.S. 7B-101.
(2) The parent has willfully left the
juvenile in foster care or placement
outside the home for more than 12 months
without showing to the satisfaction of
the court that reasonable progress underthe circumstances has been made within 12
months in correcting those conditions
which led to the removal of the juvenile. Provided, however, that no parental
rights shall be terminated for the sole
reason that the parents are unable to
care for the juvenile on account of their
John Quick's parental rights were terminated based on N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2), as well as:
(3) The juvenile has been placed in the
custody of a county department of social
services, a licensed child-placing
agency, a child-caring institution, or a
foster home, and the parent, for a
continuous period of six months next
preceding the filing of the petition, has
willfully failed for such period to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of care
for the juvenile although physically and
financially able to do so. * * * *
(6) That the parent is incapable of providing
for the proper care and supervision of
the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a
dependent juvenile within the meaning of
G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a
reasonable probability that such
incapability will continue for the
foreseeable future. Incapability under
this subdivision may be the result of
substance abuse, mental retardation,
mental illness, organic brain syndrome,
or any other similar cause or condition.
Jodi Gornik's parental rights were terminated based on N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (3). In addition to the trial
court's finding that grounds existed to terminate respondents'
parental rights, the trial court also found that it was in the
children's best interests to terminate all three parents' rights. On 17 August 2000, the trial court entered six orders terminatingthe parental rights of Jeanette Quick, John Quick, and Jodi Gornik. The respondent parents appealed. On appeal, John Quick and Jeanette Quick argue that the trial
court erred in finding that grounds existed for termination of
their parental rights with respect to the six juveniles. John
Quick, Jeanette Quick, and Jodi Gornik argue the trial court erred
in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate their parental rights. For the reasons set forth herein,
we disagree with respondents' arguments and affirm the orders of
A petition for termination of parental rights must be
carefully considered in light of all the circumstances and with the
children's best interests firmly in mind. "Although severing
parental ties is a harsh judicial remedy, the best interests of the
children must be considered paramount." In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App.
222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1984). Termination of parental
rights is a two-step procedure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (1999);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (1999). During the initial adjudication
phase of the trial, the petitioner seeking termination must show by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds exist to
terminate parental rights. In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485
S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(b). A finding of
any one of those grounds is sufficient to support termination of
parental rights. In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 678, 373
S.E.2d 317, 322-23 (1988). If the petitioner succeeds inestablishing the existence of any one of the statutory grounds
listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, the trial court moves to the
second -- or dispositional -- stage, where it determines "whether
it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental
rights." Young, 346 N.C. at 247, 485 S.E.2d at 615. See also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a); and In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607,
543 S.E.2d 906 (2001). The standard for review in termination of parental rights
cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn,
support the conclusions of law. In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118,
124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984). See also In re Huff, 140 N.C.
App. 288, 536 S.E.2d 838 (2000), appeal dismissed, disc. review
denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001). If the petitioner meets
its burden, and the trial court's findings of fact support any one
of the grounds in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, we should affirm the
order terminating the parent's rights. See In re Swisher, 74 N.C.
App. 239, 240, 328 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1985) (stating this standard with
regard to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32 (1995), which was repealed by
N.C. Sess. Laws 1998-202, s. 5, effective 1 July 1999; see now N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (1999)). We now address each respondent in
(a) John Quick
The trial court concluded there were four grounds for
terminating John Quick's parental rights: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (abuse or neglect of the juvenile), -(a)(2) (willfullyleaving the juvenile in foster care for over twelve months without
showing reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions which
led to removal of the juvenile from the home), -(a)(3) (willfully
failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for a
juvenile who has been placed in custody, though the parent is
physically and financially able to pay), and -(a)(6) (inability to
care for and supervise a dependent juvenile, with a reasonable
probability that such incapability will continue for the
foreseeable future). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) permits termination of
parental rights when the parent fails within twelve months to make
reasonable progress toward rectifying the conditions which led to
the initial removal of the children and their placement in foster
care. Mr. Quick argues the trial court erred in finding that he
failed to make reasonable progress on his reunification plan after
the children were adjudicated abused and neglected. We disagree.
The record clearly indicates that all six of Mr. Quick's
children were placed in the custody of DSS in 1997. Thus, by the
time the termination of parental rights hearing took place in
August 2000, the children had been in foster care for over three
years. The trial court found that, at the time of the termination
hearing, Mr. Quick failed to correct the conditions which prompted
DSS to remove the children in the first place. Against the advice
of DSS and Dr. Aiello, Mr. Quick continued to live with Ms. Gornik
and entrusted her with the care of the children, even though he
told his therapist that Ms. Gornik was the person who harmed thechildren. Mr. Quick was unable to obtain suitable housing and
could not maintain stable employment, though the trial court
repeatedly told Mr. Quick he needed to accomplish both those goals
in order to regain custody of his children. Mr. Quick also failed
to follow his treatment recommendations. Though he had several
appointments at Lee-Harnett Mental Health, he only attended one
screening session. At that session, he lied to his therapist,
refused to accept responsibility for the harm that befell his
children, and continued to deny that he needed therapy. He did not
find a competent person to assist him with decision making, as Dr.
Aiello told him. Finally, Mr. Quick did not pay child support. We have previously stated the burden for a parent seeking to
show reasonable progress:
Extremely limited progress is not reasonable
progress. See Bishop, 92 N.C. App. at 670,
375 S.E.2d at 681. Further, respondent has
not shown a positive response to DSS's
efforts to help her in improving her
situation. Implicit in the meaning of
positive response is that not only must positive efforts be made towards improving the
situation, but that these efforts are
obtaining or have obtained positive results.
In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 224-25 (1995). This standard operates as a safeguard for the children; if we did
not require parents to show both positive efforts and positive
results, a parent could forestall termination proceedings
indefinitely by making sporadic efforts for that purpose. Id. at
700, 453 S.E.2d at 225. See also In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733,
743, 535 S.E.2d 367, 373 (2000) (mother who exhibited positiveefforts by participating in counseling and taking medication still
failed to show positive results, because she continued to harass
[her son's] caretakers, failed to demonstrate financial
responsibility, could not focus properly on [her son's] needs,
missed scheduled visitations, and did not keep DSS informed of
changes in her circumstances). Similarly, while Mr. Quick has attempted to improve his
parenting skills and become an appropriate parent to his six
children, there have been no significant positive results which
would support his regaining custody of the children. The trial
court considered the evidence regarding Mr. Quick's sporadic
employment, his resistance to therapy, his unwillingness to accept
responsibility, and his refusal to follow Dr. Aiello's
recommendations. The trial court concluded that Mr. Quick had not
made reasonable progress within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1111(a)(2). We hold that the trial court's conclusion is
fully supported by the findings of fact, which are in turn
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. In light of our holding, we need not consider the other three
grounds enumerated by the trial court as additional grounds for
termination of Mr. Quick's parental rights. See In re Taylor, 97
N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990) (stating that a
finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination). (b) Jeanette Quick
The trial court concluded there were two grounds forterminating Jeanette Quick's parental rights: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (abuse or neglect of the juvenile), and -(a)(2)
(willfully leaving the juvenile in foster care for over twelve
months without showing reasonable progress toward correcting the
conditions which led to removal of the juvenile from the home). Like John Quick, Mrs. Quick argues the trial court erred in finding
that she failed to make reasonable progress on her reunification
plan after the children were adjudicated abused and neglected. Again, we disagree.
It is undisputed that the children were taken into DSS custody
in February 1997, and were in foster care for over three years at
the time of the termination hearing. The trial court found that,
at the time of the termination hearing, Mrs. Quick still failed to
correct the conditions which prompted DSS to remove the children in
the first place. Though at one time Mrs. Quick lived in a three-
bedroom home in Dunn, North Carolina, she did not maintain that
housing at the time of the termination hearing. Mrs. Quick also
lost her job at Britthaven Nursing Home and did not have stable
employment at the time of the termination hearing. Mrs. Quick did
not attend all her scheduled visitations with her children; when
she did visit, Mrs. Quick made unrealistic promises to the
children, did not demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, and was
unable to resolve conflicts. Mrs. Quick also failed to fully
cooperate with DSS regarding her living situation. Like Mr. Quick,
Mrs. Quick had scheduled therapy sessions at Lee-Harnett Mental
Health. However, she did not participate in therapy and did notfind a person to assist her with her children as Dr. Aiello
instructed. While Mrs. Quick initially made some positive efforts in
locating housing and employment and paying child support, those
efforts did not culminate in positive results. The trial court
concluded that Mrs. Quick had not made reasonable progress within
the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We hold that the
trial court's conclusion is fully supported by the findings of
fact, which are in turn supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. Once again, in light of our holding, we need not
consider the other grounds enumerated by the trial court as
additional grounds for termination of Mrs. Quick's parental rights. See Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 387 S.E.2d 230.
(c) Jodi Gornik
The trial court concluded there were three grounds for
terminating Jodi Gornik's parental rights: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (abuse or neglect of the juvenile), -(a)(2) (willfully
leaving the juvenile in foster care for over twelve months without
led to removal of the juvenile from the home), and -(a)(3)
(willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care
for a juvenile who has been placed in custody, though the parent is
physically and financially able to pay).
Careful examination of the record reveals Ms. Gornik admitted
that she willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of care for her children who were in foster care, though she wasphysically and financially able to do so. As Ms. Gornik has not
appealed this issue, we need not review it. Once again, in light
of our holding, we need not consider the other grounds enumerated
by the trial court as additional grounds for termination of Ms.
Gornik's parental rights. See Taylor. Best Interests
All three parents argue the trial court erred in determining
it was in the best interests of the children to terminate their
parental rights. We do not agree. Once a petitioner meets its
burden of proof at the adjudicatory stage, the court's decision to
terminate the parental rights is discretionary. In re Parker, 90
N.C. App. 423, 430, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1988). See also In re
Leftwich, 135 N.C. App. 67, 518 S.E.2d 799 (1999); and In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) balances the need for stability
in a child's life with the desire to keep the biological family
intact. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) states that
[s]hould the court determine that any one or
(Emphasis added.) Here, the trial court conducted numerous review
and permanency planning hearings. The trial court stated that its
initial goal was reunification of the family. However, as timepassed, the parents failed to fully comply with the trial court's
requirements. These developments forced the trial court to order
that the children live separate and apart from their parents. The
trial court considered the efforts made by the parents to become
appropriate parents, but expressly found that reunification was not
a realistic option for the family. In reaching that decision, the
trial court considered the evidence, accorded more weight to the
evidence presented by the petitioner, and made findings of fact
that supported terminating all three respondents' parental rights.
We recognize that the fundamental principle underlying North
Carolina's approach to controversies involving child neglect and
custody[] [is] that the best interest of the child is the polar
star. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 251. The
children have improved behaviorally and emotionally since leaving
their parents' care. They have been happy in their foster
placements and continue to make positive strides. All three
respondent parents have had a significant amount of time in which
to make reasonable progress, but have failed to make the progress
necessary to reunite with their children. While the decision to
terminate a parent's rights should never be made lightly, it is not
in the best interests of the children of abuse and neglect to
require that they remain indefinitely in foster care in hopes of
eventual reunification with a parent.
The sum total of this evidence supports the trial court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law; moreover, there is nothing
in the record which requires us to upset the exercise of the trialcourt's discretion. See King v. Allen, 25 N.C. App. 90, 92, 212
S.E.2d 396, 397, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975)
(stating that so long as there is competent evidence to support the
trial court's findings of fact, its determination regarding the
child's best interests cannot be upset absent a manifest abuse of
We have carefully reviewed the remaining arguments and
contentions of respondents and find them meritless. The trial
court's orders terminating the parental rights of John Quick and
Jeanette Quick as to Shaquanya McQueen, John Quick, Marilyn
McQueen, and Isaac Quick are affirmed. Likewise, the trial court's
orders terminating the parental rights of John Quick and Jodi
Gornik to Michael Quick and Kenoya Quick are affirmed.
Judges GREENE and CAMPBELL concur.
Footnote: 1 John Quick and Jeanette Quick are also the natural parents
of two other children, who are not subjects of this appeal.
Footnote: 2 John Quick and Jodi Gornik are also the natural parents of
another child, who is not a subject of this appeal.