Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/959/243/220317/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 06:12:49
Document Index: 796113560

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 5861', 'art, 779', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Laurie Anne Tillman, Aka: Lori Ann Tillman; Aka: Laurieann Tillman, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lawrence Warren Smith, Defendant-appellant, 959 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Laurie Anne Tillman, Aka: Lori Ann Tillman; Aka: La...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Laurie Anne Tillman, Aka: Lori Ann Tillman; Aka: Laurieann Tillman, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lawrence Warren Smith, Defendant-appellant, 959 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 959 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1992) Argued and Submitted March 6, 1992. Decided April 3, 1992
Co-defendant Laurie Ann Tillman appeals her conviction for narcotics and weapons offenses under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5861(i). Her only argument on appeal is that the prosecutor allegedly made improper remarks during closing argument.
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument. We must therefore review Tillman's claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 52(b). Moreover, we must determine whether any error attributable to the prosecutor's remarks is harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 52(a). The applicable standard for harmless error is whether it is more probable than not that the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. United States v. Flake, 746 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1225 (1985).
The transcript shows that the prosecutor's remarks were accompanied by other statements reminding the jury of the government's burden of proof and urging jurors to weigh the evidence carefully and take their time to render a verdict. Proper argument does not alter the character of these gratuitous remarks, though it does suggest that any effect on the jury caused by the questionable statements could be minimal. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 539 (9th Cir. 1988) (statements must be viewed in context to see whether they affect the fairness of the trial).
The prosecutor's single exhortation to jurors about their duty to preserve the safety of the community is less troublesome. We found a similar remark permissible in Guam v. Ignacio, 852 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we find no plain error in this particular remark.
Smith contends that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to convict him under 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1). Specifically, he says that the 27.7 grams of methamphetamine seized by federal agents at the time of his arrest were for personal use rather than distribution. When reviewing a challenge to a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 935 F.2d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Government experts testified on dosage amounts, personal use, and distribution practices to support the conclusion that the 27.7 grams were not for Smith's personal use. The government also presented several items of circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith intended to distribute the 27.7 grams. We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict Smith under 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1).
In a related claim, Smith contends that the district court erred by excluding certain testimony offered by defense experts to support Smith's claim that he possessed the 27.7 grams for personal use only. We review a district court's decisions on admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Peralta, 941 F.2d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 1991). The district court has wide latitude to exclude or limit expert testimony. United States v. Sinigaglio, 942 F.2d at 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1987). Furthermore, we must review any errors on admissibility to determine whether they are harmless. Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 52(a). We will reverse for nonconstitutional error "unless it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict." United States v. Cepeda, 851 F.2d 1564, 1567 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985).
Smith next argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (1) for possession of a gun in conjunction with a drug trafficking offense is not supported by substantial evidence. We have already determined that Smith's conviction for the underlying drug offense is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we need not re-analyze this part of Smith's challenge to the gun charge.
Our decision in United States v. Torres-Medina, 924 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1991) governs our consideration of Smith's claim. In Torres-Medina, we held that conviction under the statute requires only that the gun "embolden" the accused to conduct drug transactions. Id. at 1050 (citing United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1988)). We rejected a doctrine of constructive possession, but did not require that the firearm be within the defendant's reach during the commission of the crime or at the moment of arrest. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047 at 1049 n. 2, 1049-50. We emphasized that our analysis of sufficient evidence claims under § 924(c) (1) will focus on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 1050.
We find that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict convicting Smith for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). The Mac-10 automatic pistol was located in the attic where Smith was found by the police at the time of his arrest. At that time, Smith threatened to kill the police. The 27.7 grams of methamphetamine were found on the floor directly below the attic in a case with a Mac-10 sticker on it. Inside that case along with the drugs were instructions for using the Mac-10. Smith even admitted at first that the case was his, though he later claimed that others also had access to it.
We find that the evidence meets the standard of sufficiency set out for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) in Torres-Medina. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that a jury could have found that all of the elements of an offense under § 924(c) (1) were established beyond a reasonable doubt.