Source: https://m.openjurist.org/490/us/319
Timestamp: 2020-02-26 17:44:31
Document Index: 440064871

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1988', '§ 1915']

490 US 319 Neitzke v. Williams | OpenJurist
490 U.S. 319 - Neitzke v. Williams
490 US 319 Neitzke v. Williams
109 S.Ct. 1827
104 L.Ed.2d 338
Dean NEITZKE, etc., et al., Petitioners
Harry Lawrence WILLIAMS, Sr.
A provision in the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), authorizes courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if, inter alia, "the action is frivolous or malicious." Respondent Williams, a prison inmate, filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court, charging that prison officials had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him medical treatment and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by transferring him without a hearing to a less desirable cell house when he refused to continue working because of his medical condition. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous under § 1915(d) on the grounds that Williams had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court of Appeals, holding that the District Court had wrongly equated the standard for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) with the more lenient standard for frivolousness under § 1915(d), which permits dismissal only if a petitioner cannot make any rational argument in law or fact entitling him to relief, affirmed the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim on the ground that a prisoner clearly has no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in being incarcerated in a particular institution or wing. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim as to two of the five defendants, declaring itself unable to state with certainty that Williams was unable to make any rational argument to support his claim.
Held: A complaint filed in forma pauperis is not automatically frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d) because it fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The two standards were devised to serve distinctive goals and have separate functions. Under Rule 12(b)(6)'s failure-to-state-a-claim standard—which is designed to streamline litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding—a court may dismiss a claim based on a dispositive issue of law without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one, whereas under § 1915(d)'s frivolousness standard—which is intended to discourag baseless lawsuits—dismissal is proper only if the legal theory (as in Williams' Fourteenth Amendment claim) or the factual contentions lack an arguable basis. The considerable common ground between the two standards does not mean that one invariably encompasses the other, since, where a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not. This conclusion flows from § 1915(d)'s role of replicating the function of screening out inarguable claims from arguably meritorious ones played out in the realm of paid cases by financial considerations. Moreover, it accords with the understanding articulated in other areas of law that not all unsuccessful claims are frivolous. It is also consonant with Congress' goal in enacting the in forma pauperis statute of assuring equality of consideration for all litigants. To conflate these standards would deny indigent plaintiffs the practical protections of Rule 12(b)(6)—notice of a pending motion to dismiss and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled on—which are not provided when complaints are dismissed sua sponte under § 1915(d). Pp. 324-331.
837 F.2d 304 (C.A.7 1988), affirmed.
Robert S. Spear, Indianapolis, Ind., for petitioners.
George A. Rutherglen, for respondent.
The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) on the grounds that Williams had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b (6). Insofar as Williams claimed deficient medical care, his pleadings did not state a claim of "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs," as prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims must under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), but instead described a constitutionally noncognizable instance of medical malpractice. Williams v. Faulkner, Cause No. IP 86-1307-C (SD Ind., Jan. 16, 1987), reprinted at App. 67. Insofar as Williams protested his transfer without a hearing, his pleadings failed to state a due process violation, for a prisoner has no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in being incarcerated in a particular institution or a particular wing. Id., at 26. The court gave no other reasons for finding the complaint frivolous. On Williams' ensuing motion to vacate the judgment and amend his pleadings, the District Court reached these same conclusions. Williams v. Faulkner, Cause No. IP 86-1307-C (SD Ind., Mar. 11, 1987), reprinted at App. 29.1
Evaluated under this frivolousness standard, the Court of Appeals held, Williams' Eighth Amendment claims against two of the defendants had been wrongly dismissed. Although the complaint failed to allege the level of deliberate indifference necessary to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), at this stage of the proceedings, the court stated, "we cannot state with certainty that Williams is unable to make any rational argument in law or fact to support his claim for relief" against these defendants. 837 F.2d, at 308. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded these claims to the District Court.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dis issal of Williams' due process claims as frivolous, however. Because the law is clear that prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in a particular wing of a prison, the court stated, Williams could make no rational argument in law or fact that his transfer violated due process. Id., at 308-309.
We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 488 U.S. 816, 109 S.Ct. 53, 102 L.Ed.2d 32 (1988), filed by those defendants against whom Williams' claims still stand to decide whether a complaint that fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is necessarily frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d), a question over which the Courts of Appeals have disagreed.3 We now affirm.
The brevity of § 1915(d) and the generality of its terms have left the judiciary with the not inconsiderable tasks of fashioning the procedures by which the statute operates and of giving content to § 1915(d)'s indefinite adjectives.4 Articulating the proper contours of the § 1915(d) term "frivolous," which neither the statute nor the accompanying congressional reports defines, presents one such task. The Courts of Appeals have, quite correctly in our view, generally adopted as formulae for evaluating frivolousness under § 1915(d) close variants of the definition of legal frivolousness which we articulated in the Sixth Amendment case of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). There, we stated that an appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where "[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits." Id., at 744, 87 S.Ct., at 1400. By logical extension, a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. As the Courts of Appeals have recognized, § 1915(d)'s term "frivolous," when applied to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.5
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This procedure, operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon, supra, 467 U.S., at 73, 104 S.Ct., at 2232, a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one. What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. District court judges looking to dismiss claims on such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.6
To the extent that a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) both counsel dismissal.7 But the considerable common ground between these standards does not mean that the one invariably encompasses the other. When a complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved against the plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not. This conclusion follows naturally from § 1915(d)'s role of replicating the function of screening out inarguable claims which is played in the realm of paid cases by financial considerations. The cost of bringing suit and the fear of financial sanctions doubtless deter most inarguable paid claims, but such deterrence presumably screens out far less frequently those arguably meritorious legal theories whose ultimate failure is not apparent at the outset.
Close questions of federal law, including claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, have on a number of occasions arisen on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and have been substantial enough to warrant this Court's granting review, under its certiorari jurisdiction, to resolve them. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). It can hardly be said that the substantial legal claims raised in these cases were so defective that they should never have been brought at the outset. To term these claims frivolous is to distort measurably the meaning of frivolousness both in common and legal parlance. Indeed, we recently reviewed the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and found by a 9-to-0 vote that it had, in fact, stated a cognizable claim—a powerful illustration that a finding of a failure to state a claim does not invariably mean that the claim is without arguable merit. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). That frivolousness in the § 1915(d) context refers to a more limited set of claims than does Rule 12(b)(6) accords, moreover, with the understanding articulated in other areas of law that not all unsuccessful claims are frivolous. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (criminal defendant has right to appellate counsel even if his claims are ultimately unavailing so long as they are not frivolous); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (attorney's fees may not be assessed against a plaintiff who fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless his complaint is frivolous); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-79, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (complaint that fails to state a claim may not be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction unless it is frivolous).
Our conclusion today is consonant with Congress' over-arching goal in enacting the in forma pauperis statute: "to assure equality of consideration for all litigants." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447, 82 S.Ct. 917, 922, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1892). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff with an arguable claim is ordinarily accorded notice of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an opportunity to amend the complaint before the motion is ruled upon.8 These procedures alert him to the legal theory underlying the defendant's challenge, and enable him meaningfully to respond by opposing the motion to dismiss on legal grounds or by clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the requirements of a valid legal cause of action. This adversarial process also crystallizes the pertinent issues and facilitates appellate review of a trial court dismissal by creating a more complete record of the case. Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 158, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 811, 83 L.Ed.2d 804 (1985). By contrast, the sua sponte dismissals permitted by, and frequently employed under, § 1915(d), necessary though they may sometimes be to shield defendants from vexatious lawsuits, involve no such procedural protections.
To conflate the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim, as petitioners urge, would thus deny indigent plaintiffs the practical protections against unwarranted dismissal generally accorded paying plaintiffs under the Federal Rules. A complaint like that filed by Williams under the Eighth Amendment, whose only defect was its failure to state a claim, will in all likelihood be dismissed sua sponte, whereas an identical complaint filed by a paying plaintiff will in all likelihood receive the considerable benefits of the adver ary proceedings contemplated by the Federal Rules. Given Congress' goal of putting indigent plaintiffs on a similar footing with paying plaintiffs, petitioners' interpretation cannot reasonably be sustained. According opportunities for responsive pleadings to indigent litigants commensurate to the opportunities accorded similarly situated paying plaintiffs is all the more important because indigent plaintiffs so often proceed pro se and therefore may be less capable of formulating legally competent initial pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).9
The two defendants against whom the Eighth Amendment claims were reinstated were Han Chul Choi, a reformatory doctor whom Williams alleged had refused to treat the brain tumor, and Dean Neitzke, who as administrator of the reformatory infirmary was presumptively responsible for ensuring that Williams received adequate medical care. Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 308 (CA7 1988). The Court of Appeals held that Williams' complaint had alleged no personal involvement on the part of the remaining three defendants in his medical treatment, and that these defendants' prison jobs did not justify an "inference of personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of medical care." Ibid. Because Williams could thus make no rational argument to support his claims for relief against these officials, the Court of Appeals stated, the District Court had appropriately dismissed those claims as frivolous. Ibid.
Compare Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U.S.App.D.C. 155, 159, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 811, 83 L.Ed.2d 804 (1985), with Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 740 (CA11 1987); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 182 (CA5 1985); Franklin, supra, at 1227; Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 261 (CA6 1983).
See, e.g., Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial Standards, 31 Rutgers L.Rev. 655 (1978); Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 Ford.L.Rev. 413 (1985).
See, e.g., Payne v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 177, 178 (CA5 1988); Franklin, 745 F.2d, at 1227-1228; Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 824 (CA4 1984); Brandon, supra, at 159, 734 F.2d, at 59; Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (CA10 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840, 103 S.Ct. 90, 74 L.Ed.2d 83 (1982).
A patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed, for example, for want of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-79, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are " 'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit' ") (citation omitted); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776-76, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).
Petitioners' related suggestion that, as a practical matter, the liberal pleading standard applied to pro se plaintiffs under Haines provides ample protection misses the mark for two reasons. First, it is possible for a plaintiff to file in forma pauperis while represented by counsel. See, e.g., Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43 (1948). Second, the liberal pleading standard of Haines applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations. Responsive pleadings thus may be necessary for a pro se plaintiff to clarify his legal theories.