Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/390/261/
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 14:10:11
Document Index: 194712498

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 16', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 17']

Volkswagenwerk AG v. FMC :: 390 U.S. 261 (1968) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 390 › Volkswagenwerk AG v. FMC
A committee of the Association investigated various possible formulas for collecting the Fund from the stevedoring contractors and terminal operators -- i.e., those Association members who were employers of workers represented by the ILWU. A majority of the committee recommended that the Mech Fund assessment be based solely on tonnage handled, and this recommendation was adopted by the Association membership. [Footnote 3] Under this
formula, general cargo was assessed at 27 1/2� per "revenue ton." [Footnote 4] A revenue ton is based either on weight (2,000 lbs. = one ton) or measurement (40 cu. ft. = one ton). Whether tonnage declarations on a particular item of cargo were to be by weight or by measurement was to depend, with one exception, upon how that cargo had customarily been manifested (and reported to the Association for dues purposes) in 1959. The one exception was automobiles, for which there had been no uniform manifesting custom. [Footnote 5] The Association decided that automobiles were to be declared by measurement for Mech Fund purposes, regardless of how they were or had been manifested.
an increase in unloading costs of 22.5%. [Footnote 6] If the vehicles had been assessed by weight (0.9 tons), rather than by measurement (8.7 tons), [Footnote 7] the assessment would have been 25� per vehicle -- an increase of about 2.4%, comparable to the average Mech Fund assessment of 2.2% for all other general cargo. Assessment by measurement, rather than by weight, thus resulted in an assessment rate for the petitioner's automobiles of 10 times that for other West Coast cargo -- although automobiles had less to gain than other cargo from the Mech Fund agreement. [Footnote 8] The petitioner and Terminals both protested these seeming inequities to a committee of the Association set up to handle such claims, but without success. [Footnote 9]
The petitioner then began the present proceedings by filing a complaint with the Commission raising the above issues. The petitioner alleged that the Association was dominated by common carriers, [Footnote 10] which had agreed upon the assessment formula in order to shift a disproportionate share of the Mech Fund assessment onto the petitioner,
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 380 U. S. 291. "The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia. . . ." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 380 U. S. 318. Cf. FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 356 U. S. 499-500 (where this Court overturned the Commission's construction of § 14 of the Shipping Act).
The petitioner also attacked the Association's assessment of its automobiles under § 16 and § 17 of the Shipping Act. Section 16 makes it unlawful "to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage," [Footnote 27] and
The Commission ruled that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" under § 16 solely because it had not shown any unequal treatment as between its automobiles and other automobiles or cargo competitive with automobiles. In so ruling, the Commission applied the "competitive relationship" doctrine which it has developed in cases concerning rates for carriage of goods by sea. [Footnote 30]
Bulk cargo was assessed at 5 1/2� per revenue ton. In December, 1961, the rates were increased to 28 1/2� for general cargo and 9� for bulk cargo.
Id. at 353 U. S. 95.
The Court, noting that the assessment agreement levied $29,000,000, thus "necessarily resulting in substantially increased stevedoring and terminal charges," ante at 390 U. S. 277, holds that the assessment agreement must be filed under § 15 of the Act. It says that the underlying labor agreement is not before us, and the "continuing validity" of that agreement is not brought into question by today's decision. Ante at 390 U. S. 278.
The true solution of the matter, it seems to me, is that, in each situation, the problem has been to devise some workable basis for determining whether rates are fair vis-a-vis other rates. It simply would not be feasible, as the Second Circuit has noted, [Footnote 2/8] to assess the fairness of charges for shipping heavy industrial equipment by comparison with the cost of shipping bananas. The notion of a "preference" for bananas over heavy equipment is simply too elusive to be implemented. At the same time, when the service rendered is, for example, procuring insurance or arranging for cartage,
I believe the Court has misconstrued § 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, [Footnote 3/1] and I fear that its erroneous construction will cause serious disruption in the process of
Because the shipping industry is vitally important both to our national commerce and national defense, the Federal Government has maintained a special interest in trying to promote its growth and stability. The Shipping Act, 1916, is one example of this concern. [Footnote 3/5] With respect to maritime labor relations, however, the activities of the Federal Government were, until our entry into World War I, primarily devoted to laws protecting or disciplining seamen as individual workers. The war years saw the Government actively encouraging collective bargaining
That strike was the product of deep-seated grievances of maritime employees regarding low wages and poor working conditions. [Footnote 3/6] The situation on the Atlantic Coast was not much better. Although an agreement was reached in late 1934 for Atlantic Coast workers, labor relations remained unstable, and work stoppages were rampant. On both coasts, intra-union and inter-union disagreements, coupled with employer-union hostility, made agreement highly difficult. Quickie strikes dotted the ports, and another general strike followed in 1936. On the Pacific Coast, the employers and the ILWU (which had achieved recognition after the 1934 strike) were in constant conflict through 1948, when still another general strike erupted. This period, from 1934 to 1948, has been
The Board was instructed in the 1938 Act to submit to Congress by 1940 its recommendations for establishing a permanent federal maritime labor policy ensuring stable labor relations. The Board, in its 1940 report, concluded that conditions in the industry were still uneasy, and recommended a permanent federal body with wide jurisdiction over questions of maritime labor -- including representation [Footnote 3/10] and settlement of disputes.
In 1948, another general maritime strike rocked the Pacific Coast. Following that strike, which lasted about 100 days, there was a "period of relative calm." [Footnote 3/13] The 1948 strike had led to a change in employer leadership, a less hostile attitude on the part of the union leadership,
and a consequent lessening of tension along the Pacific Coast. Both sides recognized that the reduction of strife was desirable, since a substantial amount of traffic had been diverted from the Pacific Coast to other ports or to other means of transportation on account of chronic maritime labor difficulties and work stoppages. But, despite the reduction in hostility between labor and management, solutions to problems were not readily forthcoming. Business was bad for the shipping companies -- foreign competitors had cut heavily into the market, and a decline in business meant less work for both seamen and longshoremen. Modernization was sorely needed, but it was also greatly feared, for mechanization would cut out jobs. But without improved techniques and facilities, the employers could not regain a strong competitive position. [Footnote 3/14] In addition to lack of modern
equipment, employers were further hampered by highly restrictive work rules that had been in effect since the 1930's, such as multiple handling, [Footnote 3/15] sling-load weight, [Footnote 3/16] and gang-size restrictions. [Footnote 3/17]
concluded in October, 1960, and providing for a $29,000,000 trust fund to be financed by PMA. The fund was to consist of the $1,500,000 due under the 1959 agreement plus another $27,500,000 to be accumulated over a five-and-one-half-year period at the rate of $5,000,000 per year. The fund was to be used to protect longshoremen and marine clerks from the consequences of reduced employment caused by mechanization. The agreement was to enter into force upon approval by the members of PMA and the ILWU, and was to expire on July 1, 1966. [Footnote 3/21] The agreement also provided management with the relatively free rein it had sought to eliminate restrictive work practices. The former practice of multiple handling was eliminated, and the minimum size of a gang for loading and unloading operations was specified. The sling-load limit for loads was to remain unchanged if the manner of operation was the same as when the limit was first negotiated; otherwise, the employer could set the weight, provided that he acted "within
Association, and this promise to comply was the quid pro quo for the union's agreement not to write any particular formula into the contract or take part in the determination of the method of assessment. [Footnote 3/24] Thus, the PMA decision on the method of assessment was part and parcel of the collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the
The Solicitor General would have us atomize the collective bargaining agreement and treat the schedule of charges that create the fund as a mere "side agreement." But without the so-called "side agreement," there would have been no collective bargaining agreement. And it must be remembered that § 15, if applicable, requires that an agreement be filed "immediately with the Commission." What would have to be filed is the entire agreement, not merely the proviso to which petitioner now objects. The Commission then must give notice and a hearing and "disapprove, cancel or modify" the agreement. Which persons would be entitled to participate in the hearing presents an initial problem. [Footnote 3/27] Thereafter, what provisions would become the target in the hearing
course, be challenged in the courts as violative of the antitrust laws. [Footnote 3/29] Moreover, §§ 16 and 17 of the Shipping Act afford protection to foreign commerce in cases of undue discrimination or unreasonable practices affecting that commerce. While I cannot say that the Commission erred in finding no violation of § 16, I concur in a remand to the Commission for further findings under § 17. [Footnote 3/30]
Oral Argument - November 13, 1967