Source: https://tanzlii.org/tz/judgment/court-appeal-tanzania/2006/42-0
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 10:11:18
Document Index: 55728180

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application No. 175', 'Application No. 175', 'Application No. 32', 'Application No. 11', 'Application No. 53', 'Application No. 66', 'Application No. 72', 'Application No. 133', 'Application No. 50', 'Application No. 64', 'Application No. 50', 'Application No. 68', 'Application No. 69', 'Application No. 133']

Selcom Gaming Limited v Gaming Management (T) Limited and Another (Civil Application No. 175 of 2005) [2006] TZCA 42; (16 March 2006) | Tanzania Legal Information Institute
Selcom Gaming Limited v Gaming Management (T) Limited and Another (Civil Application No. 175 of 2005) [2006] TZCA 42; (16 March 2006)
SELCOM GAMING LIMITED ………………………………… APPELLANT
2. GAMING BOARD OF TANZANIA
] …………… RESPONDENTS
(Application for the suspension and stay of the interim Order of the High Court of Tanzania - Commercial Division at Dar es Salaam)
This is an application for the gsuspension and stayh of the interim Order of the High Court (Commercial Division) in Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005 (Dr. S.J. Bwana, J.) issued on the 19.10.2005. The application was brought under a certificate of urgency and the Court was moved by the applicant, Selcom Gaming Limited, under Rules 3 (2) (a) and (b) read together with Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979.
At the hearing of the application, Mr. D. Kesaria, learned advocate, represented the applicant; Mr. G.M. Kilindu, learned advocate, represented the 1st respondent, Gaming Management (T) Limited and Mr. E.D. Kisusi, learned advocate, represented the 2nd respondent, Gaming Board of Tanzania.
In the High Court (Commercial Division) the first respondent, Gaming Management (T) Limited, instituted Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005 against the second respondent, Gaming Board of Tanzania, seeking inter alia ?
a declaration that the 2nd respondentfs act of allowing M/S Selcom Tanzania Ltd. to operate a sub licence under the national lottery independently and without being under the auspices of the 1st respondent is unlawful;
an order enjoining the 2nd respondent direct, oversee and compel M/S Selcom Tanzania Limited to conduct its activities under the sub licence under the auspices and direction of the 1st respondent;
An order enjoining the 2nd respondent to compel M/S Selcom Tanzania Limited to enter into a contract to conduct its activities under the sub licence under the auspices and direction of the 1st respondent;
A declaration that the sub licence granted to SMS Tanzania Limited by the 2nd defendant is illegal and void for being contrary to public policy and good morality;
An order restraining the 2nd respondent from granting a sub-licence in respect of SMS lottery licence except under the auspices of the national lottery licencee.
The notice of motion by the applicant, Selcom Gaming Limited, seeks to gsuspend and stayh the interim order made by Dr. S.J. Bwana, in Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005 dated the 19.10.2005. This Ruling concerned a chamber summons made under section 68 (c) and (e) and Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Act. The parties to this application for injunctive orders were Gaming Management (T) Ltd. (1st respondent) and Gaming Board of Tanzania (2nd respondent). In his Ruling, the learned judge, stated inter alia,
gTherefore I grant an interim Order restraining the respondent ? Gaming Board of Tanzania its licencees, sub-licencees, servants, agents, from continuing operation of an SMS online national lottery pending the hearing and determination of the main suit.h
This is the Order which the applicant herein is seeking to be gsuspended and stayedh. In essence, the applicant is seeking for an order of stay of execution of the interim injunction made by the learned judge on the 19.10.2005.
Mr. Kesaria submitted that Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court Rules gives power to this Court to stay execution in civil proceedings where a notice of appeal has been lodged. He added however that when the rules were made the Court had no powers of revision and therefore there was no corresponding rule permitting stay of execution pending revision. In the absence of a specific rule in the Court Rules, the learned advocate submitted that Rule 3 (2) (a) and (b) of the Court Rules should be applicable under the circumstances. Furthermore, the learned advocate was of the view that the same considerations which the Court takes into account in applications for stay of execution should also apply to applications for stay of execution pending revision. He cited a number of decisions of this Court including Civil Application No. 32 of 2002, Independent Power Tanzania Limited v. VIP Engineering and Marketing Limited; Civil Application No. 11 of 2001 Tanga Cement Company Limited v. Christopherson Company Limited; Civil Application No. 53 of 1999, Sayi Trading Company Limited v. Reynald Francis Magingo; Civil Application No. 66 of 1998, Miroslav Katik Vesra and Paladin Ingra v. Ivan Makobrad. The conditions which the applicant was to satisfy the Court included ?
the prospects of success of the intended appeal;
if applicant would suffer substantial and irreparable loss if execution takes place;
if the judgment or decision against which it is intended to appeal is problematic.
Mr. Kesaria stressed however that in exercising its discretion the court takes into account the individual circumstances and merits of each case.
On his part, Mr. Kilindu, learned advocate for the 1st respondent, strongly resisted the application. He submitted that the application cannot be entertained as the Court Rules stand now. The rules as they are only apply to appeals and so the application before the Court was incompetent and should be dismissed. To bolster up his argument, the learned advocate referred to Civil Application No. 72 of 2000, NBC Holding Corporation v. Grace Ndeana (unreported). As regards the substantive application, Mr. Kilindu submitted to the effect that the order of the High Court had been complied with. He relied on the passage from Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1995, National Bank of Commerce v. Dar-es-Salaam Education and Office Stationery (unreported) wherein this Court stated ?
gIn this case, the matter had already been carried beyond the stage in which the restraining relief being sought would serve any purpose. That is, the house had already been sold in which case there was nothing from which the appellant would be restrained to do. The sale having taken place any measure aimed at preventing the sale from taking place would be an exercise in futility.h
He also cited Civil Application No. 133 of 2004 M/S Ilabila Industries Limited & Two Others v. Tanzania Investment Bank (unreported); Civil Application No. 50 of 1999, Athanas Albert and Four Others v. Tumaini university, Iringa University College (unreported). On whether or not the intended application for revision has any chances of success, Mr. Kilindu submitted that it was too early at this moment for the Court to make an informed comment and referred to Civil Application No. 64 of 1997, Millan Zinzuadis v. Abdul Hakim and Another (unreported). As regards the allegation that the applicant is bound to suffer irreparable loss, Mr. Kilindu submitted that the applicant had not particularized the loss and in any case, the applicant could be compensated for any monetary loss that he would suffer. Mr. Kilindu implored the Court not to make any comment at this stage on whether or not the applicant was granted the right to be heard before the learned judge made the interim injunctive order. In his view this issue should be raised when the application for revision is being determined. Lastly, the learned advocate submitted that an injunction cannot be stayed unless there are exceptional circumstances. In support of this proposition, Mr. Kilindu referred to a renowned text-book, Kerr on Injunctions (6th edition) by J.M. Paterson at page 334 where the learned author has this to say -
gThe Court has a discretion to stay proceedings pending an appeal, but the general rule is that in the case of an injunction a stay will not be granted. But each case depends largely upon its own special circumstances.h
Mr. Kisusi, learned advocate for the 2nd respondent, fully associated himself with the submissions made by Mr. Kesaria, learned advocate for the applicant. As an additional ground in support of the application he referred to paragraphs 2 and 7 of the affidavit by James Bakinege Mbalwe to the effect that the licence issued to the 1st respondent expired on the 31.10.2005 and that it was this licence which was the basis for obtaining the interim injunctive order.
The first hurdle that the applicant has to jump over, is the competency of the application as raised by Mr. Kilindu. The applicant is not a party to Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005 now before the High Court. Consequently, the applicant cannot invoke Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court Rules since the applicant does not qualify as gany personh who is involved in the original suit and therefore who can file a notice of appeal. (see: Attorney-General v. Kadau (1997) TLR 96).
As stated before the applicant also sought to move this Court by invoking Rule 3(2) (a) and (b) of the Court Rules which provides ?
(2) where it is necessary to make an order for the purposes of ?
dealing with any matter for which no provision is made by these Rules or any other written law;
better meeting the ends of justice; or
the Court may, on application or on its own motion, given directions as to the procedure to be adopted or make any other order when it considers necessary.h
These provisions empower the Court to make orders for the purpose of dealing with any matter for which provision is not made in the Rules or any other written law or for the better meeting the ends of justice. What is before me is basically an application for stay of execution of an interlocutory order made by the High Court pending revision of the Order of the High Court. When the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1979 was amended by Act No. 15 of 1993 vesting in the Court powers of revision, Rule 9 (2) (b) was not amended to reflect the change in the parent Act. I can safely state that there is no provision in the Court Rules governing an application for stay of execution pending revision. I am therefore inclined to invoke Rule 3 (2) (b) to entertain this application gfor better meeting the ends of justice.h I therefore reject Mr. Kilindufs contention that the application before me is incompetent.
The applicant advanced five grounds seeking gsuspension and stayh of the interim order issued on the 19.10.2005, namely ?
g1. The aforementioned High Court restraining and prohibition Order is problematic and has been erroneously issued
There are good and sufficient reasons for suspending and staying the aforementioned order so as to protect and preserve the applicantfs rights and interests
The suspension and stay of the aforementioned High Court Order is necessary on the balance of convenience
The application for revision of the High Court proceedings, Rulings and Orders filed by the applicant contemporaneously with this application has overwhelming chances of success
The applicant stands to suffer irreparable loss and injury of the application herein is not granted.h
Mr. Kilindu, learned advocate for the first respondent, strenuously submitted that a stay order cannot be granted where execution has already taken place. Such an order, he said, would be an exercise futility. He cited Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1995, National Bank of Commerce v. Dar-es-Salaam Education and Office Stationery (unreported) and Civil Application No. 50 of 1999, Athanas Albert & 4 Others v. Tumaini University (unreported). The learned advocate relied mainly on paragraphs 15 and 16 of Mr. Sameer Hirjifs affidavit in support of the application. Paragraph 15 provides as follows ?
g 15. As a consequence of the said Rulings, the applicant received a letter from the second respondent on the same day requiring the applicant to stop operating the SMS Lottery. In compliance with the second respondentfs said letter the applicant on 19th October, 2005 stopped all operations and activities relating to SMS lottery.
Admittedly, the High Court made the interlocutory order and the applicant had no option but to comply with a lawful order of the High Court, otherwise they would face possible charges of contempt of court for non-compliance. The fact of the matter however is that the main suit in Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005 has not been heard and determined. It is still being litigated in the High Court. It is not like a house which has already been sold to third parties, i.e. the substratum does not exist any more. In the case of In re Overseas Aviation Engineering (G.B.) Ltd. (1963) 1 Ch 24, 39 Lord Denning, M.R. stated thus ?
gExecutionh means, quite simply, the process for enforcing or giving effect to the judgment of the court: and it is completed when the judgment creditor gets the money or other thing awarded to him by the judgment.h
Obviously, the High Court has not as yet pronounced judgment in respect of Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005. Before there is any execution there must be a judgment of the Court to be enforced. Execution is the final act, the satisfaction of the judgment. (see: Civil Application No. 68 of 1999 Shell and BP Tanzania Ltd. v. The University of Dar-es-Salaam (unreported).
The second matter which I would like to discuss was also raised by Mr. Kilindu. In the course of his submissions, he referred the Court to the following sentence culled from the learned author of Kerr on Injunctions (6th edition) at page 334 which reads ?
Unfortunately, the learned advocate did not elaborate on the point being made. My understanding is that a court has discretionary powers to grant stay orders pending the determination of an appeal. This is what is embodied in Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court Rules and now extended by decided cases of this Court to applications for revision. However, I am not sure whether or not this general rule applies to interlocutory orders, that is orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide the rights or liabilities of the parties, and what principles should apply in the exercise of the judicial discretion. I have found inspiration in Hadmor Productions ltd. & Others v. Hamilton and Another (1983) 1 AC 191 wherein Lord Diplock stated as under at page 220 ?
g An interlocutory injunction is a discretionary relief and the discretion whether or not to grant it is vested in the High Court judge by whom the application for it is heard. Upon an appeal from the judgefs grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction the function of an appellate court, whether it be the Court of Appeal or your Lordshipsf House, is not to exercise an independent discretion of its own. It must defer to the judgefs exercise of his discretion and must not interfere with it merely upon the ground that the members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently. The function of the appellate court is initially one of review only. It may set aside the judgefs exercise of his discretion on the ground that it was based upon a misunderstanding of the law or of the evidence before him or upon an inference that particular facts existed or did not exist, which, although it was one that might legitimately have been drawn upon the evidence that was before the judge, can be demonstrated to be wrong by further evidence that has become available by the time of the appeal; or upon the ground that there has been a change of circumstances after the judge made his order that would have justified his acceding to an application to vary it. Since reasons given by judges for granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions may sometimes be sketchy, there may also be occasional cases where even though no erroneous assumption of law or fact can be identified the judgefs decision to grant or refuse the injunction is so aberrant that it must be set aside upon the ground that no reasonable judge regardful of his duty to act judicially could have reached it.h (emphasis added)
Mr. Kesaria complained that the applicant was not a party in the High Court Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005, and in particular to the chamber summons in which the first respondent prayed for the grant of interim orders the subject matter of this application. The prayer was granted without giving the applicant the opportunity of being heard. Mr. Kesaria submitted that this was a fundamental right and its non-observance should result in the Court nullifying the Order. The learned advocate cited a number of decisions of this Court including Civil Application No. 69 of 2003, District Executive Director of Rufiji District Authority v. Abbas S. Likonda (unreported); Civil Application No. 133 of 2002 Abbas Sherally and Another v. Abdul Sultan Haji Mohamedi Fazaboy (unreported). The response of Mr. Kilindu, to this was to the effect that the 2nd respondent has raised the issue in the defence and hence the issue will be resolved by the High Court. I am in respectful agreement with Mr. Kesaria that it is a cardinal principle of natural justice that a person should not be condemned unheard but that fair play demands that both sides should be heard. It is not a fair and judicious exercise of power but a negation of justice, where a party is denied a hearing before its rights are taken away. (see: Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2000, Mbeya Rukwa Autoparts & Transport Ltd. v. Jestina George Mwakyoma (unreported). This is now a constitutional right embodied in Article 13 (6) (a) which reads in part as under ?
g13 (6) Kwa madhumuni ya kuhakikisha usawa mbele ya sheria, Mamlaka ya Nchi itaweka taratibu zinazofaa au zinazozingatia misingi kwamba ?
wakati haki na wajibu kwa mtu yeyote inapohitajika kufanyiwa maamuzi na mahakama au chombo kingine chochote kinachohusika, basi mtu huyo atakuwa na haki ya kupewa fursa ya kusikilizwa kwa ukamilifu, na pia haki ya kukata rufani au kupata nafuu nyingine ya kisheria kutokana na maamuzi ya mahakama au chombo hicho kinginecho kinachohusika;h
Paragraph 11 of the affidavit in support by Mr. Sameer Hirji, reads ?
g11. The first respondentfs application for injunction and the second respondentfs petition for stay of proceedings were disposed of by way of written submissions ---------------
The applicant herein was deliberately or otherwise excluded from this process.h (emphasis added)
And paragraph 9 of Mr. Ramarujan Govinda Gurufs affidavit in opposition to the application reads ?
g9. That the contents of paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the affidavit are admitted as being substantially true.h
So the fact that the applicantfs rights were taken away without being heard is factually correct. In as much as the trial judgefs exercise of his discretionary powers should not be lightly interfered with, I am of the settled view that the applicant has shown exceptional circumstances in that the applicant was on the face of it denied of the right to be heard before the interim injunctive order was given. No reasonable judge regardful of his duty to act judicially could have made adverse orders against the applicant who was not a party in Commercial Case No. 92 of 2005. Having reached this conclusion, I do not deem it necessary to consider the remaining grounds so very ably canvassed by the learned advocates.
In the result, the application for stay of execution of the interim injunctive order dated the 19.10.2005 is hereby granted pending the hearing and determination of the application for revision. Costs to be in the cause.
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