Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/384/224/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-08-18 16:10:01
Document Index: 126925251

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 387', '§ 13']

UNITED STATES V. STANDARD OIL CO., 384 U. S. 224 - Volume 384 - 1966 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 384 > UNITED STATES V. STANDARD OIL CO., 384 U. S. 224 (1966) > Full Text
The question presented for decision is whether the statutory ban on depositing "any refuse matter of any
This case comes to us at a time in the Nation's history when there is greater concern than ever over pollution -- one of the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis that we face in this respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretching statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange conditions. But whatever may be said of the rule of strict construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common sense, precedent, and legislative history. We
The 1899 Act now before us was no more than an attempt to consolidate these prior Acts into one. It was indeed stated by the sponsor in the Senate to be "in accord with the statutes now in existence, only scattered . . . from the beginning of the statutes down
The philosophy of those antecedent laws seems to us to be clearly embodied in the present law. It is plain from its legislative history that the "serious injury" to our watercourses (S.Rep.No. 224, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.,
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (L. Hand, Augustus Hand, and Harrie Chase, JJ.) held that causing good oil to spill into a watercourse violated § 13. The word "refuse" in that setting, said the court, "is satisfied by anything which has become waste, however useful it may earlier have been." [Footnote 5] Id., p. 371. There is nothing
Had the majority, in judging this case, been content to confine itself to applying relevant rules of law and to leave policies affecting the proper conservation of the Nation's rivers to be dealt with by the Congress, I think that today's decision in this criminal case would have eventuated differently. The best that can be said for the Government's case is that the reach of the provision of
Whatever might be said about how properly to interpret the 1890 and, more especially, the 1894 statutes, it is the 1899 Act that has been on the books for the last 67 years, and its purposes and language must guide the determination of this case. To the extent that there were some differences in scope between the 1890 and 1894 Acts, these were necessarily resolved in the 1899 codification, which, while embodying the essential thrust of both prior statutes, appears from its plain language to have favored the more restrictive coverage of the 1890 Act. Moreover, it is questionable to what extent the Court's speculation as to the meaning of a phrase in one of the prior statutes is relevant at all when the language of the present
The purpose of § 13 was essentially to eliminate obstructions to navigation and interference with public works projects. This 1899 enactment, like the two preexisting statutes which it was intended to codify, was a minor section attached to a major appropriation act together with other measures dealing with sunken wrecks, [Footnote 2/1] trespassing at public works sites, [Footnote 2/2] and obstructions caused by improperly constructed bridges, piers, and other structures. [Footnote 2/3] These statutes were rendered necessary primarily because navigable rivers, which the Congress was appropriating funds to improve, were being obstructed by depositing of waste materials by factories and ships. [Footnote 2/4] It is of course true, as the Court observes, that "oil is oil," ante, p. 384 U. S. 226, and that the accidental spillage of valuable oil may have substantially the same "deleterious effect on waterways" as the wholesale depositing of waste oil. But the relevant inquiry is not the admittedly important concerns of pollution control, but Congress' purpose in enacting this anti-obstruction Act, and that appears
Given these doubts as to the proper construction of "refuse matter" in § 13, we must reckon with a traditional canon that a penal statute will be narrowly construed. See II Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae 335 (1736); United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 18 U. S. 95. The reasons underlying this maxim are various. It appears likely that the rule was originally adopted in order to spare people from the effects of exceedingly harsh penalties. See Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
A more important contemporary purpose of the notion of strict construction is to give notice of what the law is, in order to guide people in their everyday activities. Again, however, it is difficult to justify a narrow reading of § 13 on this basis. The spilling of oil of any type into rivers is not something one would be likely to do whether or not it is legally proscribed by a federal statute. A broad construction would hardly raise dangers of penalizing people who have been innocently pouring valuable oil into navigable waters, for such conduct in Florida is unlawful whatever the effect of § 13. A Florida statute penalizing as a misdemeanor the depositing into waters within the State of "any rubbish, filth, or poisonous or deleterious substance or substances, liable to affect the health of persons, fish, or live stock . . . ," Fla.Stat.Ann., § 387.08 (1960 ed.), quite evidently reaches the dumping of commercial oil. And Florida's nuisance law would likewise seem to make this conduct actionable in equity. See, e.g., Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Assn. v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers' Assn., 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643. Finally, as noted earlier, ante, p. 384 U. S. 229, n. 5, prior decisions by some lower courts have held § 13 applicable to spillage of oil. For these reasons, this justification for the canon of strict construction is not persuasive in this instance.
In an area in which state or local law has traditionally regulated primary activity, [Footnote 2/7] there is good reason to restrict
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