Source: https://openjurist.org/957/f2d/482
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 20:41:28
Document Index: 522803749

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2671', '§ 2679', '§ 2679', '§ 2679', '§ 228', '§ 2679', 'art, 947']

957 F2d 482 Snodgrass v. F Jones | OpenJurist
957 F. 2d 482 - Snodgrass v. F Jones
957 F2d 482 Snodgrass v. F Jones
957 F.2d 482
Kerri W. SNODGRASS and Stacey L. Becker, Plaintiffs,
Thomas F. JONES, Defendant-Appellant,
The United States at first certified that Jones was acting within the scope of his employment, and removed the case to the federal district court for the Central District of Illinois under the Federal Driver's Act. The District Court reviewed the government's decision and held that Jones had not, in fact, been acting within the scope of employment. The case was remanded to state court. In the meantime, the Federal Drivers Act was replaced by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (FELRTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.1 Under the FELRTCA the Attorney General is first asked to certify that the employee acted within the scope of employment. The Attorney General refused to certify that Jones acted within the scope of employment and Jones, under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3),2 petitioned the state court to certify that he was acting within the scope of employment. The United States removed this petition to the federal district court. The District Court ruled that Jones was not acting within the scope of employment. This appeal followed.
The District Court found that there were no disputed facts and that Jones was acting outside the scope of his employment as a matter of law. 755 F.Supp. 826. It is undisputed that Illinois law governs whether Jones was acting within the scope of employment. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir.1990). Under Illinois law, "where the essential facts are undisputed, whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment presents a question of law." Stevenson Olds Sales and Service v. Industrial Com. of Illinois, 140 Ill.App.3d 703, 95 Ill.Dec. 107, 109, 489 N.E.2d 328, 330 (3d Dist.1986). We review the District Court's determination of a question of law de novo.
In some of the early cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) and (2)--where the Attorney General certified scope of employment and the plaintiff objected--the government argued that the Attorney General's determination was unreviewable or at least entitled to great deference. See, e.g., S.J. & W. Ranch, Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir.1990), amended, 924 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir.1991), cert. den., --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 62, 116 L.Ed.2d 37 (1991). Several courts have held that the Attorney General's decision on certification is reviewed de novo, including this circuit. Hamrick v. Franklin, 931 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir.1991), S.J. & W. Ranch, supra, and cases collected therein. The courts' power to determine whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment is even clearer in § 2679(d)(3) cases such as this one--the statute specifically provides for the court to determine scope of employment (see text in footnote 2).
Illinois draws upon the Restatement (Second) of Agency for defining the scope of employment. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989) adopted § 228 of the Restatement:
I. Jones at the bar
II. Jones on the road home
Jones makes a more serious argument about the drive home. It is possible for someone to leave the scope of their employment on a 'frolic,' but later return within the scope. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304 (1989); Parotto v. Standard Paving Co., 345 Ill.App. 486, 104 N.E.2d 102 (1st Dist.1952). "Once an employee abandons a frolic and reenters the scope of employment, the employer will be vicariously liable for injuries caused by the employee's negligence." Pyne, 135 Ill.Dec. at 562, 543 N.E.2d at 1309. In this case Jones argues that driving home was within the scope of his employment, and when he returned to doing that he returned to the scope.
III. Jones and a hearing
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3) provides:
In the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify scope of office or employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment. Upon such certification by the court, such action or proceedings shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the United States in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the petition is filed in a civil action or proceeding pending in a State court, the action or proceeding may be removed without bond by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which it is pending. If, in considering the petition, the district court determines that the employee was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding shall be remanded to the State court.
The government also argues that, Illinois presumptions aside, Jones had the burden of proof on the scope of his employment because he was the party challenging the Attorney General's decision. Hamrick, 931 F.2d at 1211, S.J. & W. Ranch, 913 F.2d at 1543, Cooper v. Kribble, 1991 WL 2526, *2, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88, * 4 (N.D.Ill.1991). Jones disputes the applicability of the burden of proof allocation made in these cases to his own, since the other cases involved challenges by plaintiffs to certification, not by employees to failure to certify. But see, Wang v. Horio, 741 F.Supp. 1373, 1376 (N.D.Cal.1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir.1991), in which the party challenging failure to certify was given the burden of proof. At any rate, this dispute is academic since any burden on the government to overcome the presumption has been met