Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US7934256?dq=7,468,661
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 14:15:11
Document Index: 684073011

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application No. 2001', 'Application No. 2005', 'art 131', 'art 131', 'art 131', 'art 131']

Patent US7934256 - Electronic device, update server device, key update device - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsThe present invention offers an electronic device that reduces the amount of data for communication required when files pertaining to software are to be updated, as compared to the conventional devices, and performs tamper detection. The present invention is an electronic device having an application...http://www.google.com/patents/US7934256?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US7934256 - Electronic device, update server device, key update deviceAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS7934256 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 11/914,918Publication dateApr 26, 2011Filing dateMay 30, 2006Priority dateJun 1, 2005Also published asCN100578522C, CN101189617A, EP1887731A1, US20090193521, WO2006129654A1Publication number11914918, 914918, US 7934256 B2, US 7934256B2, US-B2-7934256, US7934256 B2, US7934256B2InventorsHideki Matsushima, Takafumi Kagawa, Tomoyuki Haga, Hiroshi Okuyama, Shigehiko Kimura, Yasuki Oiwa, Yoshikatsu ItoOriginal AssigneePanasonic CorporationExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (35), Non-Patent Citations (3), Referenced by (4), Classifications (24), Legal Events (2) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetElectronic device, update server device, key update deviceUS 7934256 B2Abstract The present invention offers an electronic device that reduces the amount of data for communication required when files pertaining to software are to be updated, as compared to the conventional devices, and performs tamper detection. The present invention is an electronic device having an application file pertaining to an operation of application software and updating the application file via a network. The electronic device (i) stores therein the application file including one or more data pieces, (ii) receives, from an external apparatus via the network, update data and location information indicating a location, within the application file, which is for rewrite with the update data, (iii) rewrites only part of the application file by writing over a data piece present at the indicated location with the update data, to update the application file, and (iv) examines whether the updated application file has been tampered with.
TECHNICAL FIELD The present invention relates to a technology for detecting tampering of software installed in an electronic device, by updating the software via a network.
BACKGROUND ART Technologies for preventing unauthorized alteration and analyses of programs have been studied to this date. For example, Non-patent Reference 1 describes fundamental principles and specific methods for preventing software analyses. Additionally, Non-patent Reference 2 discusses technological issues and measures of TRCS (Tamper Resistant Coding System) developed as a tool for preventing software analyses. These technologies for preventing unauthorized software analyses and tampering are called �tamper resistant technologies�. Hereinafter in this document, unauthorized alteration is simply referred to as �tampering� while authorized alteration is referred to as �updating�.
<Non-patent Reference 1> �Gyaku-kaiseki ya Kaihen kara Soft wo Mamoru (Protecting Software from Inverse Analyses and Tampering)� Nikkei Electronics, 1998. 1.5 (pp. 209-220) <Non-patent Reference 2> �Software no Tai-tampering Technology (Software Tamper Resistant Technology)� Fuji Xerox Technical Report No. 13 (pp. 20-28) <Patent Reference 1> Published Japanese Translation of PCT International Publication for Patent Application No. 2001-500293 <Patent Reference 2> Japanese Laid-Open Patent Application No. 2005-018725 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Problems that the Invention is to Solve In the case when an electronic device for tamper detection updates its software via a network, updated software itself is distributed to the electronic device via the network. Therefore, if the size of the updated software becomes larger, the electronic device requires more time to receive the updated software. That is, the increased time in updating the software leads to user dissatisfaction.
Means to Solve the Problem In order to realize the above object, the present invention is an electronic device having an application file pertaining to an operation of application software and updating the application file via a network. Here, the electronic device comprises: a storage unit storing therein the application file including one or more data pieces;
Advantageous Effects of the Invention According to the above structure, the electronic device receives, via the network, update data for data included in the application file and location information indicating a location, within the application file, which is for rewrite with the update data, and rewrites only part of the application file by writing over the data with the update data based on the received location information. Herewith, the amount of data for communication can be reduced as compared to the case of receiving an updated application file from an external apparatus.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1 shows an overview of a program update system 1;
FIG. 18 shows an example of a data structure of a hash list 122 a; FIG. 19 shows an example of a data structure of a hash list 122 b; FIG. 20 shows an example of hash information piece 1030 in which the number of blocks of a file has decreased to �7� from �8�;
EXPLANATION OF REFERENCES 1 program update system
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 1. Embodiment 1 Embodiment 1 of the present invention is described next with reference to drawings.
The mobile telephone 10 transmits, to the update server apparatus 20, update request information for requesting an update of a file pertaining to application software, and receives an update data list which is data pertaining to the update. Hereinafter, such application software is referred to as �AP� and a file pertaining to AP is referred to as an �AP related file�. The mobile telephone 10 updates the file based on the received update data list. Here, an AP is, specifically speaking, a music recording and playback software application, or a video recording and playback software application. In addition, an AP related file may be: an AP itself; an encoder, a decoder, or a driver called from an AP; or a virtual execution environment, like Java (registered trademark) VM that provides an environment in which an AP operates. Such an AP related file is composed of one or more pieces of data.
In addition, the mobile telephone 10 checks, at the time of AP update and start-up, whether AP related files have been tampered with. Here, the term �tamper� indicates an unauthorized alteration of a file.
Note that the file names of the 1st file 125, . . . , and the nth file 126 are hereinafter �file_1�, . . . , and �file_n�, respectively. Each of the files is recorded at a fixed address when the mobile telephone is manufactured so as to allow partial updating.
An entry 145 located at the end of the MAC information piece 141 is an empty entry reserved for updating, and �Reserved� is written thereto, in place of the offset, size and hash value. Note that the entry located at the end of the MAC information piece 141 is referred also as to the last entry.
In the last entry of the hash information piece located at the end of the data part 131, �end of entry��information indicating the entry is the last entry of the hash list 122�is embedded. Here, since the hash information piece 135 is a hash information piece located at the end of the data part 131, �end of entry� is embedded in a last entry 146 of the hash information piece 135. The remaining elements of the hash information piece 135 are the same as those of the hash information piece 134, except for the last entry 145, and therefore, the explanations are omitted here.
The flag storage unit 161 stores therein a flag indicating whether an update of an AP related file is in progress. Here, the flag value �0� indicates that the update process unit 103 is not performing the update; the flag value �1� indicates that the update process unit 103 is in the middle of the update process. The flag storage unit 161 is, specifically speaking, a non-volatile memory. That is, even if the mobile telephone 10 is powered off, the content stored in the flag storage unit 161 is maintained.
The update control unit 162 sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �1�.
The update control unit 162 outputs, when receiving a nontampering notice from the tamper detection executing unit 105, a notice of update completion to the control unit 102. The update control unit 162 terminates the interrupt inhibition having been set to the control unit 102, and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0�.
The update control unit 162 terminates, when receiving an update end order from the control unit 102, the interrupt inhibition having been set to the update control unit 162, and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0�.
When the mobile telephone 10 is powered on and a power supply is started, the update control unit 162 checks the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161. When the value is �1�, the update control unit 162 determines that an update process is in progress and then sets interrupt inhibition to the control unit 102. The update control unit 162 outputs a restart order indicating a restart of an update process to the update data reading unit 163. When receiving a no-restart requiring notice indicating that a restart of an update process is not necessary from the update data reading unit 163, the update control unit 162 terminates the interrupt inhibition having been set to the control unit 102, and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0�.
The generation of an update information piece whose update data piece is the extracted information is the same as the generation of the update information piece described in the above �When Receiving 1st Update Instruction�, and therefore the description is omitted here.
When receiving a 1st update instruction (�1st update instruction� in Step S10), the data receiving unit 211 obtains update files, each of which corresponds to a different one of one or more files to be updated, a target path list including path names of the one or more files to be updated, and a hash list (Step S15).
The data receiving unit 211 outputs the received 1st update instruction, one or more update files, target path list and hash list (hereinafter referred to as the �old hash list�) to the hash list generation process unit 212. The hash list generation process unit 212 receives, from the data receiving unit 211, the 1st update instruction, one or more update files, target path list and old hash list.
When receiving a 2nd update instruction (�2nd update instruction� in Step S10), the data receiving unit 211 obtains a partial key, one or more files subject to tamper detection, a target path list and a hash list (Step S50), and performs the operation of Steps S20 to S45. Note that, in this case, the instruction each component outputs and receives is the 2nd update instruction. Additionally, in Step S40, the update data list is generated from the old hash list, new hash list and partial key. In Step S45, the generated update data list is associated with AP identification information included in the 2nd update instruction.
When receiving an initial setting instruction (�initial setting instruction� in Step S10), the data receiving unit 211 obtains one or more files subject to tamper detection and a target path list (Step S55).
The update control unit 162 sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �1� (Step S110).
When determining that it has not been normally ended (�NO� in Step S225), the update check unit 167 outputs an abnormal end notice to the update data reading unit 163. When receiving the abnormal end notice from the update check unit 167, the update data reading unit 163 reads once again the same update information piece read in Step S205 (Step S230), and then the update data reading unit 163 returns to Step S210.
When determining that it has been normally ended (�YES� in Step S225), the update check unit 167 outputs a normal end notice to the update data reading unit 163. When receiving the normal end notice from the update check unit 167, the update data reading unit 163 judges whether an unread update information piece is present in the update data list stored in the list storage area of the update file receiving unit 104 (Step S235).
When an unread update information piece is determined to be present (�YES� in Step S235), the update data reading unit 163 returns to Step S205. When an unread update information piece is determined not to be present (�NO� in Step S235), the update data reading unit 163 outputs a writing completion notice to the update control unit 162 and the update file receiving unit 104. The update file receiving unit 104 deletes, when receiving the writing completion notice from the update data reading unit 163, the update data list 150 stored in the list storage area. The update control unit 162 outputs, when receiving the writing completion notice from the update data reading unit 163, a detection start order indicating a start of the tamper detection process and AP identification information to the tamper detection execution unit 105.
In the case when the update control unit 162 determines that no tampering has been detected, i.e. a nontampering notice is received (�NO� in Step S245), the update control unit 162 outputs a notice of update completion to the control unit 102. The control unit 102 displays, when receiving a notice of completion of the file update from the update process unit 103, a message of the update completion via the display unit 109 (Step s250).
The update control unit 162 terminates the interrupt inhibition having been set to the control unit 102 (Step S255), and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0� (Step S260).
In the case when the update control unit 162 determines that tampering has been detected, i.e. a notice of detection of tampering is received (�YES� in Step S245), the update control unit 162 outputs a notice of update failure to the control unit 102. The control unit 102 displays, when receiving a notice of failure of the file update from the update process unit 103, a message of the update failure via the display unit 109 (Step S265). The control unit 102 outputs, when receiving an instruction of an update retry from the input unit 108, an update-retry start order to the update process unit 103. The control unit 102 outputs, when receiving an instruction for not performing an update retry from the input unit 108, an update end order to the update process unit 103.
When receiving, from the control unit 102, either an update-retry start order or an update end order, the update control unit 162 judges whether the received order is an update-retry start order (Step S270). When determining that it is an update-retry start order, i.e. a retry of updating is determined to be performed (�YES� in Step S270), the update control unit 162 outputs once again the AP identification information to the update data reading unit 163, and returns to Step S200. In this case, the update data reading unit 163 receives the update data list once again.
When determining that the received order is an update end order, i.e. a retry of updating is determined not to be performed (�NO� in step S270), the update control unit 162 terminates the interrupt inhibition having been set to the control unit 102 (Step S255), and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0� (Step S260).
In the case when the control unit 102 determines that no tampering has been detected, i.e. a nontampering notice is received (�NO� in Step S310), the control unit 102 performs an operation pertaining to an AP for which a start-up instruction has been issued (Step S315).
In the case when the control unit 102 determines that tampering has been detected, i.e. a notice of detection of tampering is received (�YES� in Step S310), the control unit 102 ends an operation pertaining to an AP for which a start-up instruction has been issued (Step S320).
When determining that they do not match (�NO� in Step S415), the tamper detection process unit 173 outputs a notice of detection of tampering to the detection control unit 171. The detection control unit 171 receives, from the tamper detection process unit 173, either a nontampering notice or a notice of detection of tampering. The detection control unit 171 outputs the received notice to a calling source (i.e. an output source of the detection start order and the AP identification information�either one of the control unit 102 or the update control unit 162 of the update process unit 103 (Step S420).
When determining that they match each other (�YES� in Step S415), the tamper detection process unit 173 decrypts the data part using the tamper detection key (Step S425). Note that, for the decryption, a decryption algorithm corresponding to the algorithm used to encrypt the data part 131 is used.
In the case of determining that it is not the last entry (�NO� in Step S445), the tamper detection process unit 173 reads the offset and size included in the obtained entry, and obtains a block subject to tamper detection from the file read by the file reading unit 174 based on the read offset and size (Step S450). The tamper detection process unit 173 calculates a detection hash value for the obtained block using the calculated tamper detection key and a hash calculation algorithm (Step S455). The tamper detection process unit 173 judges whether the calculated detection hash value and a hash value included in the obtained entry match each other (Step S460). When determining that they match each other (�YES� in Step S460), the tamper detection process unit 173 returns to Step S440. When determining that they do not match (�NO� in Step S460), the tamper detection process unit 173 returns to Step S420.
When determining that the obtained entry is the last entry (�YES� in Step S445), the tamper detection process unit 173 judges whether an unread hash information piece is present (Step S465). When determining that it is present (�YES� in Step S465), the tamper detection process unit 173 returns to Step S430. When determining that it is not present (�NO� in Step S465), the tamper detection process unit 173 outputs a nontampering notice to the detection control unit 171. The detection control unit 171 receives the nontampering notice from the tamper detection process unit 173. The detection control unit 171 outputs the received notice to a calling source (i.e. an output source of the detection start order and the AP identification information)�either one of the control unit 102 or the update control unit 162 of the update process unit 103 (Step S470).
When the flag value is �0�, the mobile telephone 10 determines that the previous update process was completed and does not perform the update process and tamper detection process.
When the flag value is �1�, the update control unit 162 determines that an update process is in progress and then sets interrupt inhibition to the control unit 102. The update control unit 162 outputs a restart order indicating a restart of an update process to the update data reading unit 163.
When determining that the update data list is not present, the update file receiving unit 104 outputs a no-restart requiring notice to the update data reading unit 163. When receiving the no-restart requiring notice, the update data reading unit 163 outputs the received no-restart requiring notice to the update control unit 162. When receiving a no-restart requiring notice indicating that a restart of an update process is not necessary from the update data reading unit 163, the update control unit 162 terminates the interrupt inhibition having been set to the control unit 102, and sets the flag value stored in the flag storage unit 161 to �0�.
2. Relationship Between Detection Key and Each Operation FIG. 17 shows a relationship between each key used in the present embodiment and situation in which the key is used.
3. Modifications Although the present invention has been described based on the above embodiment, it is a matter of course that the present invention is not confined to the embodiment. The following cases are also within the scope of the present invention.
(3) In Embodiment 1 above, if the number of entries of a preupdate MAC information piece increases at updating of the hash list as a result of an increase in the size of a file subject to tamper detection, the update server apparatus may generate a hash list 122 a shown in FIG. 18. In FIG. 18, the last entry of an MAC information piece 141 a corresponding to a file information piece 140 a is a link entry 144 a indicating an address of an entry 1001 included in an MAC information piece 1000. A normal entry and a link entry differ in size and hash. Not a numerical value, but �-� is stored in a link entry. Herewith, a link entry can be distinguished from a normal entry.
In this case, a block number 142 a included in the file information piece 140 a is �4� that is the number of the entries excluding the link entry 144 a of the MAC information piece 141 a and an empty entry 1002 (the last entry) of the MAC information piece 1000.
In the case where a faster speed is required, a procedure may be adopted in which only an entry whose offset is �0� is checked for each MAC information piece. Alternatively, a procedure may be adopted in which the block number of file information pieces is read and then blocks of half the block number are checked.
(17) According to Embodiment 1 above, if the size of a file subject to tamper detection becomes small at the time of updating the hash list, the size included in an unnecessary entry is set to �0�.
FIG. 20 is an example showing the case in which the block number of a file is reduced from �8� to �7�.
In this case, in a preupdate hash information piece 1020, 120 is stored as the size included in an entry 1021 of an 8th block. When the block number is reduced from �8� to �7� as a result of the file update, a hash information piece 1030 is generated in which the size included in an entry 1031 of the 8th block is �0�. It is a matter of course that, in this case, the entry 1031 is subject to updating.
When performing tamper detection, the mobile telephone ignores an entry if the size included in the entry is �0� and does not check the entry for tampering.
Note that the hash value included in the entry 1031 is here a value before the update; however, the hash value may be �0�.
In this case, the mobile telephone is able to use a value stored in the size as judgment information for judging whether an entry including the size is subject to tamper detection. That is, the mobile telephone determines that it is not subject to tamper detection when the value is �0�, and determines that it is subject to tamper detection if the value is other than �0�.
When the 1st AP is started on the mobile telephone 11, a hash information piece 134 c having a file information piece 1040 including the type �1� becomes subject to tamper detection, as shown in FIG. 21.
Also when the 2nd AP is started on the mobile telephone 11, a hash information piece 135 c having a file information piece 1041 including the type �2� becomes subject to tamper detection.
When the integrated AP is started on the mobile telephone 12, all hash information pieces included in the data part 131 c become subject to tamper detection since the integrated AP stores therein the type �ALL�.
For example, in the case where an offset value indicating the starting location of a hash information piece 134 d is stored in the 1st offset and an offset value indicating the end location of the hash information piece 134 d is stored in the 2nd offset, the tamper detection on a file having a file name �file_1� is performed at the time of the AP start-up while the tamper detection on the remaining files is performed in the background during the AP operation.
In the case where an offset value indicating the starting location of the hash information piece 134 d is stored in the 1st offset and an offset value indicating the end location of a hash information piece 136 d is stored in the 2nd offset, the tamper detection on files respectively having a file name �file_1� and a file name �file_2� is performed at the time of the AP start-up while the tamper detection on the remaining files is performed in the background during the AP operation.
(21) In Embodiment 1 above, the update control unit 162 checks the flag value when the mobile telephone 10 is powered on, and automatically restarts a file update when the flag value is �1�; however, the present invention is not limited to this case.
When the update control unit 162 determines that the flag value is �1�, the mobile telephone 10 may issue an inquiry of whether to restart the file update, and restart it when receiving an affirmative instruction from the user.
Or the update control unit 162 may check the flag value when the mobile telephone 10 is powered on, and update only unupdated data when the flag value is �1�. That is, the mobile telephone 10 may restart the update operation from the middle (i.e. from a point which was in operation when the mobile telephone 10 was powered off).
In addition, a block to be updated may be included in the concept of �data� of the present invention.
4. Conclusion The present invention provides a tamper detection method that can be realized also in an electronic device whose programs are updatable. In addition, portions to be updated can be minimized, thus reducing the communication costs for the update. Furthermore, it is possible to offer a tamper detection method allowing tuning of the execution speed according to specifications of the electronic device.
INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY Each apparatus making up the program update system described above can be used operationally, i.e. repeatedly and continuously, in electronic device manufacturing industries.
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22, 2009Mar 24, 2011Bbn Technologies Corp.Device and method for securely storing data* Cited by examinerClassifications U.S. Classification726/22, 713/165, 726/26International ClassificationG08B23/00, G06F12/14, G06F12/16, G06F11/00Cooperative ClassificationH04L67/34, H04L9/0891, G06F21/86, G06F21/57, G06F2221/2129, G06F2221/2107, G06F11/1433, H04L9/08, G06F21/64, H04L63/123, H04L63/1441European ClassificationH04L29/08N33, H04L9/08, G06F21/86, G06F21/64, G06F21/57, H04L63/12ALegal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionNov 13, 2008ASAssignmentOwner name: PANASONIC CORPORATION, JAPANFree format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.;REEL/FRAME:021832/0197Effective date: 20081001Owner name: PANASONIC CORPORATION,JAPANFree format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.;US-ASSIGNMENT DATABASE UPDATED:20100204;REEL/FRAME:21832/197Free format text: CHANGE OF NAME;ASSIGNOR:MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.;US-ASSIGNMENT DATABASE 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