Source: https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1504805032
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 20:02:04
Document Index: 308036428

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 457', '§ 458', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

SSA - POMS: PR 04805.032 - New Hampshire - 09/09/2009
Effective Dates: 09/09/2009 - Present Previous | Next
PR 04805.032 New Hampshire
A. PR 09-167 Common Law Marriage in New Hampshire-Gary P~ SSN: ~
The materials you submitted indicate that Gary P~ formally married Angela E~ on December 30, 1974. Mr. P~ and Ms. Y~ began residing together in New Hampshire in July 1, 1994, until Mr. P~ death on March 6, 2009. Mr. P~ marriage to Ms. E~ was legally dissolved on August 10, 2006. Although they were never formally married, Mr. P~ and Ms. Y~ considered themselves to be husband and wife during the time they lived together in New Hampshire. The question of whether Mr. P~ and Ms. Y~ met the requirements for common law marriage was presented to the New Hampshire Probate Court in April 2009. The Probate Court determined that Ms. Y~ and Mr. P~ had entered into a common law marriage.
New Hampshire law provides that persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for a period of three years and until the death of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:39. However, this provision applies only to persons who are competent to contract marriage together. Hilliard v. Baldwin, 80 A. 129 (1911). Relevant here, under New Hampshire law, a marriage is absolutely void where either party to the marriage has a former spouse still living and knows that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:1. Consequently, since Mr. P~ marriage to Ms. E~ was only legally dissolved on August 10, 2006, Mr. P~ and Ms. Y~ were only competent to contract marriage together from August 10, 2006, to March 6, 2009, which is a period less than three years. Thus, the provisions of section 437:39 to this case are inapplicable, and Ms. Y~ cannot be found to have been the common law wife of the number holder. See generally Fowler v. Fowler, 79 A.2d 24 (1951).
C. PR 01-181 Termination of Child's Benefits Based on State Court Order Amending Birth Certificates Due to Paternity Blood Test Results Jon G.~ S~ SSN: ~
A New Hampshire state court determination satisfies the prerequisites of Gray v. Richardson where the court had jurisdiction over a relationship issue, both the putative father and the mother appeared before the court, and the determination is not inconsistent with any Supreme Court authority.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has placed some limits on a husband's ability to disclaim paternity of children born to his wife during the duration of a marriage, especially when the father had previous opportunities to raise the issue of paternity and failed to do so. There appears to be no controlling case law on whether putative fathers of illegitimate children may also lose their right to disclaim paternity by undue delay in raising the issue of non-paternity.
Under Gray v. Richardson, adopted by SSA as Social Security Ruling 83-37C, SSA should follow a New Hampshire state court determination of non-paternity because the court had jurisdiction over the relationship issue; both the putative father and the mother appeared before the court, and the decision is not inconsistent with any New Hampshire Supreme Court authority. Therefore, if SSA acts diligently, it has the authority to reopen Alyssa's application for auxiliary child's benefits and find her not entitled. SSA would not have the authority to reopen Amanda's application if, as it currently appears, the initial determination on her application was issued more than four years prior to January 30, 2001 (when Mr. S~ requested reopening). There does not appear to be any basis here for reopening due to fraud or similar fault..
The wage earner, Jon G.~ S~ was awarded disability benefits as of May 1994. In his application, he named Amanda S~ as his biological child. After, he was awarded benefits and prior to 1997, Lee A.~ H~, Amanda's mother applied for auxiliary benefits on her behalf. The decision on that application was issued either at the end of December 1996 or during January 1997. Another child, Alyssa, was born to Ms. H~ in February 1997. Ms. H~ subsequently filed an application for auxiliary benefits on Alyssa's behalf, claiming Mr. S~ as the child's father, and such application was granted on June 30, 1997 (or shortly thereafter). We are advised that Ms. S~ and Ms. H~ were not married to each other at any point during the period at issue.
On January 22, 2001, the New Hampshire Superior Court issued an order granting a petition to modify the birth certificates of both Amanda and Alyssa, based on paternity blood test results that showed Mr. S~ was not the biological father of either child. This order also relieved Mr. S~ of any and all child support obligations. In a letter dated January 30, 2001, counsel for Mr. S~ requested that benefits to both children be terminated.
Social Security Ruling 83-37C adopted the Sixth Circuit's decision in Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973) as national agency policy. In Gray, the Sixth Circuit held that SSA should have accepted the determination made by the state court, stating:
Such a holding is proper in the present case where the following prerequisites are found: (1) An issue in a claim for social security benefits previously has been determined by a State court of competent jurisdiction; (2) this issue was genuinely contested before the State court by parties with opposing interests; (3) the issue falls within the general category of domestic relations law; and (4) the resolution by the State trial court is consistent with the law enunciated by the highest court in the State.
The January 22, 2001 order of the state court here appears to meet three of the prerequisites of SSR 83-37C on it's face. The order indicates that it was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, that both Mr. S~ and Ms. H~ appeared before the court, and that the court's determination that Mr. S~ was not the father of either Amanda or Alyssa was supported by conclusive paternity blood testing results. We are advised that the time for an appeal of this order has passed without any appeal being filed. The only remaining prerequisite is that this state court decision be consistent with the law of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has placed some limits on a husband's ability to disclaim paternity of children born to his wife during the duration of a marriage. W~ v. W~, 115 N.H. 186, 337 A.2d 350 (N.H. 1975); M~ v. M~, 115 N.H. 353, 341 A.2d 762 (N.H. 1975). In both W~ and M~, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that putative fathers who had accepted children born during a marriage to the mother of those children for a lengthy period of time (15 years and 8 years, respectively), could not disclaim parental liability based on blood testing, especially when the father had previous opportunities to raise the issue of paternity and failed to pursue such issue. Although New Hampshire law also recognizes that fathers of children born outside wedlock may also have support obligations (see W~, supra), there is obviously no presumption of legitimacy to be overcome in such instances. Similarly, unwed fathers do not have any opportunity to disclaim parenthood during the course of divorce proceedings. There appears to be no controlling case law on the issue of whether putative fathers of illegitimate children may also lose their right to disclaim paternity by undue delay in raising the issue of non-paternity. In any event, the delay in disputing paternity here does not seem to have been so lengthy that the state court's finding of non-paternity would appear to have exceeded the authority of that court or to be clearly erroneous under New Hampshire law.
The state court's action in finding Mr. S~ was not, in fact, the father of either Amanda or Alyssa can serve as "new evidence" warranting reopening within four years of the date of the notice of the initial determination on each application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(b) (2000). Based on our own review of the regulations and consultation with attorneys in the Office of General Counsel at Headquarters, it does not appear that reopening would be permissible if it was not requested until more than four years after the date of the initial notice in each child's claim. Mr. S~ has made no allegation of outright fraud and has not described any special circumstances that might amount to "similar fault". Thus, the provisions that allow reopening at any time would not be available. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c) (2000).
In this case, Mr. S~ requested reopening on January 30, 2001. Unless, Amanda's initial notice was dated on or after January 30, 1997, the four year time period for requesting reopening would have expired by the date of such request. It appears more likely than not that the initial notice to Amanda was issued prior to January 30, 1997, but inspection of the actual notice in the claims folder will be necessary to determine the precise date of such notice.
So long as SSA acts diligently in investigating whether or not reopening is warranted in the case of Alyssa, it is not necessary that final action on such investigation be completed by June 30, 2001 (four years after the initial notice on her claim). 20 C.F.R. § 404.991a (2000). It would appear, however, that we would need to complete our investigation and make any revised determination that is unfavorable by July 30, 2001, six months after Mr. S~'s request for reopening. 20 C.F.R. § 404.991a(a) (2000). In the event that Mr. S~'s request for reopening should turn out to be timely in the case of Amanda, the same due date for final action would be applicable.
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1504805032
PR 04805.032 - New Hampshire - 09/09/2009
Rev:09/09/2009