Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-elise-k-28339
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 15:47:28
Document Index: 298529042

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 232', '§ 600', '§ 232', '§ 227', '§ 232', '§ 232', '§ 396', '§ 1', '§ 366']

In re Elise K. - 33 Cal.3d 138 - Mon, 12/13/1982 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 33 Cal.3d 138
In re Elise K.
In re Elise K. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 138 , 187 Cal.Rptr. 483; 654 P.2d 253
When unusual new circumstances are brought to the attention of an appellate court in the course of a parent's appeal from a judgment declaring a child to be free from the parent's custody and control (Civ. Code, § 232 fn. 1), should the appellate court consider the changed circumstances, [33 Cal.3d 140] or is its consideration of the appeal limited to the evidence which was available to the superior court rendering the judgment? As I shall explain, an appellate court should consider this limited type of postjudgment evidence. Therefore, I concur in the court's decision to reverse the judgment in this case.
To prevail on the petition, the Department had to establish by clear and convincing evidence fn. 4 not only that the elements of subdivision (a)(7) were true but also that returning the child to the parent's custody and control would be harmful [33 Cal.3d 141] to the child fn. 5 and that termination of the relationship was the least detrimental of the alternatives available for the child. fn. 6
In March of 1973, appellant and her husband separated, the children remaining with appellant in San Diego. Neighbors' complaints of inadequate supervision [33 Cal.3d 142] over Elise and an unsanitary home led to three police contacts in the next four months. By the end of August 1973, both children had been declared dependent children of the juvenile court. (Former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 600, subds. (a) and (b).) Elise was then five years old. She was placed in a foster home and has not returned to live with appellant.
By the beginning of 1976, appellant had returned to her parents' home. Her subsequent plan to move into an apartment had to be abandoned in order to take care of Michael. His arthritis had caused his leg to swell and he was forced to leave school. In addition, appellant's estranged husband had begun divorce proceedings, and her social security income was cut off when he would not provide information concerning his past alimony payments. By the end of September [33 Cal.3d 143] 1976, appellant was "in a pretty bad emotional state," according to Louise MacKay, her social worker from the Department.
The hearings on the petition produced considerable, uncontradicted evidence of a lasting affectionate relationship between appellant and Elise. A children's services worker's report observed that "Elise seemed to have very strong ties [33 Cal.3d 144] with her mother [but] recently ... began to request a permanent, long-term family. The minor Elise has been greatly disappointed by infrequent visitation with her natural family. ... Elise wishes to remain in contact with her mother." The testimony of several social workers at the hearings confirmed the "affection," the "strong relationship, the ties," and the "warmth" existing between mother and daughter. fn. 10
The court specifically observed that Elise, "now age 10, has expressed love and sympathy for her mother, but no desire to live with her. She has a strong desire to have permanent parents after five years in foster homes. Elise will need a stable home and parents who are themselves emotionally secure." [33 Cal.3d 145]
The proceedings authorized under section 232 are one part of a comprehensive scheme by which the state asserts its strong interest in the welfare of [33 Cal.3d 146] children. As was noted in In re B.G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at page 696, "California has at least eight separate proceedings in which [child] custody questions can be litigated." The preeminent focus of this scheme is "the welfare and best interests of a child." (See § 232.6; see also, e.g., §§ 227; 4600, subd. (b).)
Case law, legislative history, and statutory law all confirm this obvious conclusion. The courts of this state have long recognized that the "purpose of [a section 232 action] is to facilitate adoption of the minor child." (In re Marriage of O'Connell, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 854. fn. 16) Indeed, the statutory provisions [33 Cal.3d 147] regarding the termination of parental rights were originally transferred from the Juvenile Court Law to the Civil Code for precisely this reason: "What is contemplated by court action under [the Juvenile Court Law predecessor to section 232] is not continuing guidance and supervision by a governmental agency, but freeing the child for adoption by a private person. This is essentially an adoption problem and, therefore, should be handled by the civil court handling adoptions." (Governor's Special Study Com. on Juvenile Justice, pt. I (1960) p. 23. See also In re Jacqueline H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 170, 174, fn. 1 [145 Cal.Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683].)
Thus, a section 300 finding only entitles the juvenile court to order section 232 proceedings if the minor is adoptable. Even then, it has specified three situations in which termination proceedings are inappropriate even as to [33 Cal.3d 148] adoptable minors who are dependent children. fn. 18 In addition, the statutory scheme indicates that termination proceedings are not appropriate if the outlook for the dependent child is for something short of adoption, i.e., legal guardianship or long-term foster care. Thus, adoptability has once again been revealed to be of critical concern to the Legislature in the area of termination of parental rights.
Elise has had a long and caring -- if incomplete -- relationship with her natural mother. This is a relationship which both parties wish to continue. "[T]he importance to a child of continuity of parental relationships" cannot be understated. (See Adoption of Michelle T., supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 706.) Under these circumstances, had the trial court been able to foresee that Elise would not be adopted, it surely would not, and could not, have ordered appellant's parental rights terminated. No established legislative purpose would have been [33 Cal.3d 149] served by sustaining a section 232 petition in such circumstances. Except where the natural parent abuses the child -- a situation not presented by this appeal -- an inadequate parent would appear to be preferable to no parent at all and would be more consistent with the overall legislative scheme. fn. 21
The only question remaining to decide is whether this court may take cognizance of these critical postjudgment events. The general rule is that "an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration." (See In re James V. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 300, 304 [153 Cal.Rptr. 334].) This rule serves to promote speedy adjudications of fact and to avoid prolonged delays on appeal. It also reflects an "essential distinction between the trial and the appellate court ... that it is the province of the trial court to decide questions of fact and of the appellate court to decide questions of law ...." (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262-263 [280 P.2d 970].)
It is true that the power conferred upon appellate courts by section 909 is to be used sparingly and has been narrowly construed. (See People v. Benford (1959) 53 Cal.2d 1, 6-7 [345 P.2d 928]; Estate of Schluttig (1950) 36 Cal.2d 416, 421-423 [224 P.2d 695].) However, most of the decisions limiting the use of this power involved attempts to introduce on appeal evidence which (1) existed at the time of trial, (2) was contested on appeal or was cumulative of evidence that was contradicted at trial, and (3) was not conclusive on the question for which its admission was sought. None of these problems is present [33 Cal.3d 150] here. Moreover, courts have been somewhat more open to admitting evidence that involved events which occurred after the judgment was entered. fn. 22
Such compelling new circumstances are present here. The state took the drastic step of terminating Elise's relationship with her natural mother. This step was considered to be in Elise's best interest at that time. It was based in part on the reasonable premise that Elise could and would be provided with a more satisfactory parental relationship through adoption. For reasons unforeseeable at the time, the premise has turned out to be erroneous. Elise has [33 Cal.3d 151] not been adopted and is no longer adoptable. fn. 24 The basis for the section 232 order has been undermined.
"To refuse to receive appropriate evidence of such facts for [the reason that they arose after judgment] is to deliver up the court as a blind instrument for the perpetration of fraud, and to make its proceedings by such refusal the means of inflicting gross injustice." (Dakota County v. Glidden (1885) 113 U.S. 222, 226 [28 L.Ed. 981, 982, 5 S.Ct. 428].)
­FN 1. All statutory references hereafter are to the Civil Code unless expressly provided otherwise.
­FN 2. The petition also alleged that custody and control should be terminated because Elise was an abandoned child (§ 232, subd. (a)(1)) and had been cruelly treated or neglected (§ 232, subd. (a)(2)). These allegations were dismissed as to Elise's mother, appellant herein. See post, footnote 11.
­FN 3. At that time, section 232 provided in pertinent part:
­FN 4. In re Angelia P., (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 915-922 [171 Cal.Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198].
­FN 5. In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 696-699 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244] [to deprive a parent of custody of a child, a finding is required that the award of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child]; In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 495-496 [146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514] [requirements of In re B. G., supra, applied to section 232 proceedings]. See also In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at page 925.
­FN 6. In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d at page 489; In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at page 923; In re David B. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 184, 198 [154 Cal.Rptr. 63]. See Adoption of Michelle T. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 699, 707-709 [117 Cal.Rptr. 856, 84 A.L.R.3d 654].
­FN 7. Michael has remained in the grandparents' home. McIlroy attempted to place Elise there, too, but the grandmother felt she could not care for both children.
­FN 8. Appellant resisted transfer to a university clinic nearer her home.
­FN 9. In August 1978, appellant called off the engagement.
­FN 10. It is worth noting that the trial court permitted appellant and Elise to visit biweekly, between court hearings.
­FN 11. The court dismissed the allegation of abandonment as to appellant, ruling that appellant "has never intended to abandon Elise, and that her visits have been more than token." It also dismissed the allegation of cruel treatment or neglect "due to remoteness, since the incidents happened in 1973."
­FN 12. The court mentioned appellant's "disappearing for days at a time," "changing housing arrangements every few months," and her "refusal to accept counselling and therapy."
­FN 13. See In re Marriage of O'Connell (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 849, 858-859 [146 Cal.Rptr. 26]; see also Adoption of Pierce (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 316 [85 Cal.Rptr. 104].
­FN 14. The court also was concerned about the "probability" that its judgment freeing Elise "can be reversed" on appeal.
­FN 15. The Legislature has made abundantly clear that foster care is not a satisfactory long-term solution. "It is the policy of the Legislature that foster care should be a temporary method of care for the children of this state, that children have a right to a normal home life, that reunification with the natural parent or parents or another alternate permanent living situation such as adoption or guardianship are more suitable to a child's well-being than is foster care, and that this state has a responsibility to attempt to ensure that children are given the chance to have a happy and healthy life, and that, to the extent possible, the current practice of moving children receiving foster care services from one foster home to another until they reach the age of majority should be discontinued." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 396.)
­FN 16. See also, e.g., In re David B. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 184, 196 [154 Cal.Rptr. 63]; In re Shannon W. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 956, 962 [138 Cal.Rptr. 432]; In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 629 [105 Cal.Rptr. 736].
­FN 17. "The Legislature [also] stated the purpose behind section 232 proceedings when it added section 232.9 to the Civil Code. 'It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting this act to extend adoption services for the benefit of children residing in foster homes at public expense by facilitating legal actions required for adoption so that these children may be placed in adoptive homes where they will have the benefits of stability and security.'" (In re David B., supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 195, quoting Stats. 1970, ch. 583, § 1, p. 1160; italics added in David B.)
­FN 18. One such situation occurs when the "parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the minor and the minor would benefit from continuing this relationship." (§ 366.25, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Further, section 232 proceedings are not authorized when the "minor 12 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights." (Id., subd. (d)(1)(B).) And finally section 232 proceedings are not authorized if "exceptional circumstances" prevent the minor's foster parents from adopting the minor and the removal of the minor from the home of the foster parents would be "seriously detrimental" to the minor. (Id., subd. (d)(1)(C).)
­FN 19. We do not know the nature of the problems Elise experienced in her adoptive home which caused her return to foster care. However, it is apparent that those problems were not attributable to any interference by appellant, since the Department's letter to the Court of Appeal indicated appellant had not visited Elise in the final two years of her adoptive placement.
­FN 20. Elise will be 15 years old in February. It should be remembered that the testimony at Elise's section 232 hearing in 1978 was that it was "now or never" for her adoption. More than four years have elapsed since that time.
­FN 21. It is not a purpose of the child custody laws to punish parents for their shortcomings. (See, inter alia, In re Marriage of Stoker (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 878, 881-882 [135 Cal.Rptr. 616]; Ashwell v. Ashwell (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 211, 217 [286 P.2d 983].)
­FN 22. See People v. Associated Oil Co. (1931) 211 Cal. 348 [296 P. 273] [referee appointed to take evidence concerning facts occurring subsequent to the injunction order appealed from]; Stellman v. Stellman (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 805 [260 P.2d 209] [on wife's appeal of order refusing to annul marriage, appellate court admits postjudgment decree by out-of-state court, divorcing husband from prior wife]; Thompson v. City of Los Angeles (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 45 [185 P.2d 393] [postjudgment evidence admitted that power line sought to be enjoined had been built and put into operation]. But see McCracken v. Teets (1953) 41 Cal.2d 648 [262 P.2d 561] [admission of postjudgment evidence denied because its accuracy contested]; Smith v. Smith (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 100 [286 P.2d 1009] [admission of postjudgment evidence denied because not determinative].
­FN 23. Appellant's counsel urges us to take judicial notice of the September 1981 report filed in the superior court and of the additional fact -- not expressly stated therein -- that Elise is no longer adoptable.
­FN 24. It bears emphasizing that generally, the failure of one adoptive placement is unlikely to mean that a child is not adoptable. Normally, other adoptive placements may be tried and succeed. What makes the present case atypical is the fact that Elise was placed for adoption at a relatively late age and considerable time passed before her adoptive placement was deemed to be unworkable. Both parties now agree that Elise is no longer reasonably likely to be adopted.
Mon, 12/13/1982 33 Cal.3d 138 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
1 In re ELISE K., a Minor. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTIONS (Petitioner)
2 and Respondent, v. SANDRA K., Objector and Appellant (and Respondent, v. SANDRA K.)
3 In re ELISE K., a Minor. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ADOPTIONS (Petitioner)
Dec 13 1982 Opinion: Reversed
SCOCAL, In re Elise K. , 33 Cal.3d 138 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-elise-k-28339) (last visited Saturday August 15, 2020).