Source: https://openjurist.org/658/f2d/271/chevron-inc-v-united-states-environmental-protection-agency
Timestamp: 2017-09-19 12:12:52
Document Index: 670217425

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7491', '§ 7491', '§ 7472', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 7607', '§ 307', '§ 7607']

658 F2d 271 Chevron Inc v. United States Environmental Protection Agency | OpenJurist
658 F. 2d 271 - Chevron Inc v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
658 F2d 271 Chevron Inc v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
658 F.2d 271
16 ERC 1878, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,044
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ("EPA"), an
Agency of the United States, and Anne M. Gorsuch,
in her capacity as Administrator of the
EPA, Respondents.
Nos. 80-3081, 80-3892.
The 1977 amendments require the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary), to "promulgate a list of mandatory class I Federal areas in which he determines visibility is an important value." 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(2). The term "mandatory class I Federal areas" is defined as "Federal areas which may not be designated as other than class I under this part," 42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(5), and the provision with respect to mandatory class I status for national wilderness areas provides in relevant part that:
42 U.S.C. § 7472(a)(2).
On February 12, 1979, the Administrator proposed to accept the Secretary's recommendation that certain areas, including Breton, possessed visibility as an important value. 44 Fed.Reg. 8909. The Administrator elected to treat this action under section 307(d)(1)(N) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(N), and accordingly established a public comment period and public docket. In response to the Administrator's proposed determination, Chevron filed written comments asserting, inter alia, that Breton was not over 5,000 acres on August 7, 1977, the relevant statutory date, and that Breton therefore did not qualify as a mandatory class I federal area.2 Specifically, Chevron noted that according to the Department of the Interior's 1970 Breton Wilderness Proposal, Breton contained 4,421 acres in late 1969.
The standard for judicial review of the Administrator's determination is found in section 307(d)(9) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9), which provides that the Administrator's action may be reversed if shown to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ...."4 With respect to the Administrator's denial of an administrative petition for reconsideration, the controlling standard is found in section 307(d)(7)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), which provides that the Administrator shall convene a proceeding to reconsider the rule in question only if a person raising an objection can demonstrate that (1) it was impracticable to raise the objection during the period for public notice and comment; and (2) the objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the rule.5
S.Rep.No.93-1287, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. at 17-19 (1974). Pursuant to the Secretary's recommendation, the act establishing Breton as a national wilderness area fixes that area at "5,000 acres, more or less." Certificate of Legal Description and Map of the Boundary of Breton Wilderness as Approved by Pub.L. No. 93-632 (June 3, 1975).
Alternatively, Chevron argues that even if the materials considered by the Administrator in denying Chevron's administrative petition for reconsideration form a sufficient basis for his determination, those materials are not properly a part of the record in the instant proceeding, and therefore should not be considered in determining whether the Administrator's decision was arbitrary or capricious. In support of this argument, Chevron relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(C), which provides that "(t)he promulgated rule may not be based (in part or whole) on any information or data which has not been placed in the docket as of the date of such promulgation." Consequently, Chevron argues that if the Administrator desires to reconsider the merits of the Breton designation, he must "provide the same procedural rights as would have been afforded had the information been available at the time the rule was proposed," 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B), including notice of the reconsideration proceeding, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) and an opportunity to present additional evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(5).8
In assessing this argument, the controlling standard of review is stated in section 307(d)(8) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8), which provides that judicial invalidation of a rule on procedural grounds may be based only on error "so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such error had not been made." As noted supra, the Administrator, in reviewing Chevron's administrative petition for reconsideration, requested FWS to analyze all available information in an attempt to determine Breton's size on August 7, 1977, the relevant statutory date. In response, FWS considered the information contained in the April 19, 1979 FWS memorandum cited by Chevron, as well as other pertinent information, including satellite photographs and other measurements of the islands. The Administrator specifically noted in his denial of Chevron's administrative petition, however, that "this new analysis confirms that we know now no more than Congress did in 1975: Breton's acreage fluctuates above and below 5,000 acres, but cannot accurately be pinpointed at any given time. The April 19, 1979 (FWS) memorandum, therefore, adds no new information at all." 45 Fed.Reg.No. 194 at 65590 n.33. Inasmuch as the above-quoted passage negates any inference that the Administrator is now attempting to rely upon information not in the public docket at the time of his final action, it does not appear that the Administrator's consideration of that information, even if erroneous, was "so serious and related to matters of such central relevance" to his decision that, absent the error, a "substantial likelihood" exists that his decision would have been affected.
Section 307(d)(9) provides:
As noted supra, the Administrator elected to treat his determination as an agency "action" under § 307(d)(1)(N) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(N), which allows the Administrator to treat "such other action as (he) may determine" under the procedures generally applicable to rulemaking