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United States Ex Rel Toth Vs Quarles - Citation 98954 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Ex Rel. Toth Vs. Quarles - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98954CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-07-1955Case Number350 U.S. 11AppellantUnited States Ex Rel. TothRespondentQuarlesExcerpt:
united states ex rel. toth v. quarles - 350 u.s. 11 (1955)
five months after he had been honorably discharged from the united states air force and had returned to his home and was privately employed, an ex-serviceman was arrested by military authorities on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while he was an airman in korea. when arrested, he had..... Judgment:
He could not constitutionally be subjected to trial by court-martial. Pp.
350 U. S. 13
1. The Act cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the constitutional power of Congress "To raise and support Armies," "To declare War," or to punish "Offences against the Law of Nations." Pp.
2. This assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander-in-Chief, nor on any theory of martial law. P.
350 U. S. 14
3. The Fifth Amendment does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely makes clear that there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to govern the armed forces. P.
4. The Act is not a valid exercise of the power granted Congress in Article I of the Constitution "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp.
(a) The power granted Congress "To make Rules" to regulate "the land and naval Forces" is to be construed as restricting court-martial jurisdiction to persons who have a relationship with the armed forces. P.
encroaches on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution, where persons on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals. Pp.
(c) It is within the constitutional power of Congress to provide for federal district court trials of discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the armed services. Pp.
350 U. S. 20
(d) The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces does not empower Congress to deprive civilians of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and power to circumvent those safeguards is not to be inferred from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp.
350 U. S. 21
(e) A different result than that here reached is not required by the fact that some other countries which do not have our Bill of Rights subject civilians who were once soldiers to trials by court-martial, rather than to trials by civilian courts. P.
(f) Considerations of discipline in the armed forces do not warrant expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury. Pp.
(g) Ex-servicemen, like other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution. P.
After serving with the United States Air Force in Korea, Robert W. Toth was honorably discharged. He returned to his home in Pittsburgh and went o work in a steel plant. Five months later, he was arrested by military authorities on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder while an airman in Korea. [
] At the time of arrest, he had no relationship of any kind with the military. He was taken to Korea to stand trial before a court-martial under authority of a 1950 Act of Congress. [
] The Court of Appeals sustained the Act, rejecting the contention that civilian ex-servicemen like Toth could not constitutionally be subjected to trial by court-martial. 94 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 215 F.2d 22. We granted certiorari to pass upon this important constitutional question. 348 U.S. 809. [
Nations." [
] And this assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as commander-in-chief, or on any theory of martial law.
-127. The Government's contention is that the Act is a valid exercise of the power granted Congress in Article I of the Constitution "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. [
This Court has held that the Article I clause just quoted authorizes Congress to subject persons actually in the armed service to trial by court-martial for military and naval offenses. [
] Later it was held that court-martial jurisdiction could be exerted over a dishonorably discharged soldier then a military prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a prior court-martial. [
] It has never been intimated by this Court, however, that Article I military jurisdiction could be extended to civilian ex-soldiers who had severed all relationship with the military and its institutions. [
] To allow this extension of military
This right of trial by jury ranks very high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards. [
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. [
] Such juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the military field. [
] On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors -- plain people -- have manfully stood up in defense of liberty
against the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. [
] The acquittal of William Penn is an illustrious example. [
] Unfortunately, instances could also be cited where jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures. In such circumstances, independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan, since they have power to set aside convictions. [
The 1950 Act here considered deprives of jury trial and sweeps under military jurisdiction over 3,000,000 persons who have become veterans since the Act became effective. That number is bound to grow from year to year; there are now more than 3,000,000 men and women in uniform. [
] These figures point up what would be the enormous scope of a holding that Congress could subject every ex-serviceman and woman in the land to trial by court-martial for any alleged offense committed while he or she had been a member of the armed forces. Every veteran discharged since passage of the 1950 Act is subject to military trial for any offense punishable by as much as five years' imprisonment unless the offense is now punishable in a civilian court. And one need only glance at the Military Code to see what a vast number and variety of offenses are thus brought under
military jurisdiction. [
] Included within these are crimes such as murder, conspiracy, absence without leave, contempt toward officials, disrespect toward superior officers, willful or neglectful loss, damage, or destruction of government property, making false official statements, dueling, breach of the peace, forgery, fraud, assault, and many others. [
] It is true that, with reference to some of these offenses, very minor ones, veterans cannot now be tried because of a presidential order fixing the punishment for such offenses at less than five years. [
] But that amelioration of the Military Code may be temporary, since punishment can be raised or lowered at the will of the President. It is also true that, under the present law, courts-martial have jurisdiction only if no civilian court does. But that might also be changed by Congress. Thus, there is no justification for treating the Act as a mere minor increase of congressional power to expand military jurisdiction. It is a great change, both actually and potentially.
is not warranted, and was not shared by the Judge Advocate General of the Army, who made a strong statement against passage of the law. [
] He asked Congress to
It is conceded that it was wholly within the constitutional power of Congress to follow this suggestion and provide for federal district court trials of discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the armed services. This concession is justified. U.S.Const., Art. III, § 2,
and see, e.g., Jones v. United States,
-74. There can be no valid argument, therefore, that civilian ex-servicemen must be tried by court-martial or not tried at all. If that is so, it is only because Congress has not seen fit to subject them to trial in federal district courts.
to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause. It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians. And we are not impressed by the fact that some other countries which do not have our Bill of Rights indulge in the practice of subjecting civilians who were once soldiers to trials by courts-martial instead of trials by civilian courts. [
There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service. Even as late as the Seventeenth Century, standing armies and courts-martial were not established institutions in England. [
] Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that, within the military ranks, there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience and order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-martialing, rather than trying by jury, some civilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the service for months, years or perhaps decades. Consequently, considerations of discipline provide no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal
and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury. [
Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to "
] We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians, are entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of the Constitution.
In 1863, Congress passed a statute authorizing trial of ex-soldiers for commission of fraud against the Government while in the service; this law also authorized court-martial trial of contractors not part of the military forces. 12 Stat. 696. The latter provision of the 1863 law appears never to have been sustained by any court. Lower courts have disagreed as to the constitutional validity of the provision authorizing ex-soldiers to be tried.
See, e.g., In re Bogart,
3 Fed.Cas. 796.
Compare Ex parte Henderson,
11 Fed.Cas. 1067;
United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General,
69 F.Supp. 661, reversed by stipulation in unreported order of the Second Circuit, No. 20235, April 18, 1946.
See United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke,
. A statute authorizing court-martial trial of inmates of the Soldiers' Home has been ruled unconstitutional by the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Dig.Op.J.A.G. (1912), pp. 1010, 1012. It was declared that "such inmates are not a part of the Army of the United States, but are civilians."
at 1012. Col. Winthrop, concededly a leading authority on military law, expressed the view that
17 Mich. 9, 27.
An outstanding instance is the
Dean of St. Asaph's Case,
21 How.St.Tr. 847, discussed in Stryker, For the Defense, 119-136.
Penn and Mead's Case,
6 How.St.Tr. 951. After trial, the jurors were fined for acquitting Penn contrary to the court's instructions. One was imprisoned for not paying the fine, but the Court of Common Pleas released him in a habeas corpus proceeding, upholding the freedom of the jury to decide the case.
6 How.St.Tr. 999.
"(2) who with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person or persons, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against such authority is guilty of sedition; (3) who fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress an offense of mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or
fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior or commanding officer of an offense of mutiny or sedition which he
has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.
Table of Maximum Punishments, 127
, MCM, 1951, 16 Fed.Reg. 1364-1368.
The historical background of this country's preference for civilian over military trials was impressively presented in the arguments of counsel and opinion of this Court in
And see Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court in
-486, said,
"With perhaps some exceptions, trial by jury has always been, and still is, generally regarded as the normal and preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in civil cases at law, as well as in criminal cases. Maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body is of such importance, and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence, that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.
Compare Patton v. United States,
Justice, 64 Stat. 108, 50 U.S.C. § 551
under which the United States Air Force acted in this case.
The judgment just announced turns loose, without trial or possibility of trial, a man accused of murder. In future similar cases among the military, if Congress enacts the substitute law as the Court suggests,
, the accused must face a jury far removed from the scene of the alleged crime and before jurors without the understanding of the quality and character of a military crime possessed by those accustomed to administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Or perhaps those accused will be extradited and tried by foreign law.
Robert W. Toth, after service in the United States Air Force, was honorably discharged on December 8, 1952. On April 8, 1953, formal charges were signed under the procedures required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice charging Toth with premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder. [
] The specifications under the
64 Stat. 109, 50 U.S.C. § 553(a). [
This was the situation when the petition for habeas corpus was filed by the relator. The Government did not question jurisdiction in the District Court, and, after argument, that court ordered the writ to issue. [
] Toth was returned to the United States and produced in court, whereupon the District Court ordered his discharge on the ground that, even if the Air Force police had authority to apprehend Toth, they had no legal power to transport him to a distant point for trial, or at least to do so without
The Code was enacted May 5, 1950, after careful military and congressional study to assure that the military justice of the unified services would be in accordance with the present-day standards of fairness. [
] Article 3(a) was adopted in view of the decision of this Court in
Hirshberg v. Cooke,
(1949), holding the Articles for the Government of the Navy, then in force, did not allow trial on charges filed subsequent to honorable discharge "without a grant of congressional authority,"
336 U. S. 215
, although the charges arose from acts committed while the defendant was in military service. The near escape from military justice of Army personnel accused of the theft in Germany of the Hesse crown jewels was also in mind. [
] It was thought that a serviceman's discharge should not bar his prosecution in a military court for crimes committed when subject to military discipline. [
The enactment of Article 3(a) was chosen instead of the alternative of federal district court jurisdiction, although thorough presentations of objections not only on constitutional, but also on policy grounds appear in the committee report and the Congressional Record. [
] The military were well aware, as was Congress, of possible unfavorable public reaction to extension of the jurisdiction of military courts to discharged veterans for alleged misdeeds during service. The language of Article 3(a) was drawn to cover only the most serious offenses and restricted to those instances in which the guilty would otherwise escape trial or punishment in any American courts. Although Congress, under Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, [
] and the Necessary and Proper Clause, doubtless might have authorized the civil courts to try charges arising from violations of the Military Code during former service, even
though committed on foreign soil, [
] it chose the method of Article 3(a).
No question of accommodating the liberty of the citizen to requirements of the military through the interpretation of an ambiguous Act arises.
323 U. S. 300
. It is not for courts to question the wisdom of the legislation. Its obvious purpose was to assure, insofar as discipline may do so, the proper conduct of our far-flung and numerous military personnel in foreign lands. One need not stress the necessity of orderly conduct by the military on foreign posts for the maintenance of good relations in friendly or vanquished countries. It also seems a reasonable choice that uniform treatment by courts-martial trial of all accused of crimes punishable by the Military Code is preferred for morale and disciplinary purposes to courts-martial trial only for those who remain in the service. This case itself would make a good example of the difficulty of a federal district court trial. We address ourselves to the constitutionality of Article 3(a).
punishment by the military, for crimes committed by members of the armed services, to the period of service. Certainly the power of Congress to provide for a military trial and punishment for a breach of the Military Code on charges brought before the end of enlistment or discharge may continue thereafter. [
] The crime charged against Toth was one covered by the Code. The circumstance that he was discharged from the service prior to the detection of the alleged crime and prior to being charged with its commission should make no constitutional difference.
Courts-martial are deeply rooted in history. War is a grim business, requiring sacrifice of ease, opportunity, freedom from restraint, and liberty of action. Experience has demonstrated that the law of the military must be capable of prompt punishment to maintain discipline. The power to regulate the armed forces must have been granted to Congress so that it would have the authority over its armed forces that other nations have long exercised, subject only to limitations of the Constitution.
61 U. S. 78
100 U. S. 21
. The Government calls our attention to the current provisions for military trial after discharge of other nations with legal background similar to ours. Each of them allows such trials under varying conditions. [
to empower Congress to authorize courts-martial after separation from the services. The crime charged was committed during service, and violated the Military Code. Surely, when read with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the conclusion must follow. Article 3(a) bears a reasonable relation to the "Government and Regulation" of the armed forces; it is appropriate and plainly adapted to that end.
That has been the test of congressional power.
This is not an effort to make a civilian subject to military law, in distinction to martial law, as in
4 Wall. 2, 121,
. Such an effort would meet condemnation as an invasion of the liberty of the citizen.
. Congress was granted authority to regulate the armed forces in order to enforce obedience by members of the military establishment to military regulation during their service to the end that order may be ensured. Disobedience may occur in nationally critical times. What reason can there be for
refusing courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes so committed by a serviceman merely because they passed undiscovered during the service period? [
] Could there now be doubt as to the power of Congress under Art. I to make a draftee subject to courts-martial before actual induction into the armed forces? This Court had none in 1944. Then we said, when considering a habeas corpus for release from military imprisonment after trial by court-martial of a person claiming civilian status:
"We have no doubt of the power of Congress to enlist the manpower of the nation for prosecution of the war and to subject to military jurisdiction those who are unwilling, as well as those who are eager, to come to the defense of their nation in its hour of peril.
[Selective Draft Law Cases]."
321 U. S. 556
. Toth may be a civilian, but his crime was a violation of military regulations.
forces shall be punished for fraud under military regulation "as the court-martial may adjudge, save the punishment of death." 12 Stat. 696-697, § 1. Under § 2, jurisdiction of the court-martial was extended to dischargees. [
] The provision for charge and court-martial after discharge was ruled constitutional in 1866 by Attorney General Stanbery. [
] The section was held constitutional in 1873.
note 22,
It was apparently held unconstitutional in 1946 under Article I in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, although the problem under the Fifth Amendment was also considered.
69 F.Supp. 661, 664. [
It is also to be noted that the present Uniform Code, Art. 4, 50 U.S.C. § 554, provides that an officer dismissed by the President may request trial by Court-martial after such dismissal. A similar provision was first enacted by Congress in 1865, § 12, 13 Stat. 487, 489;
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920), 64, 65.
(b) Another constitutional problem arises,
that Article 3(a) is unlawful by reason of the limitations on prosecutions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. [
to jury and place were intended to apply to the "cases arising in the land or naval forces" which were excepted from the protection of the grand jury by the Fifth. That would abrogate the authority of Congress to govern the military by courts-martial. It was so announced by this Court, unanimously, in
Turning to the Fifth Amendment, the critical words are obviously "cases arising in the land or naval forces." The events leading to the taking of Toth into custody occurred while he was enlisted. They constituted then and now a violation of the Uniform Code. Relator would limit the quoted words to cases where charges had been filed during service. She stresses the phrase "when in actual service," but this Court has held, and all the history of our courts-martial shows, that such phrase has reference only to "cases arising . . . in the Militia."
conversant with the problem. In the state conventions for ratification of the Constitution, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island suggested words for regulation of the armed forces quite similar to the ones adopted by Congress. [
] It will be observed that two employ "arise." Three speak of "cases." Since the state suggestions were made as the result of consideration of the proposed Constitution, it is quite natural that the language of Article III concerning the judicial power would find an echo in the suggestions. Article III, § 2, reads,
When the Congress considered the Act against military fraud in 1863,
no one suggested that a "case," the prosecution for which under the Act did not
begin until after discharge of a serviceman, would not be a "case arising in the land or naval forces." The concern of Congress was with the liability of contractors, as part of military personnel, under § 1 of the Act, when they had no true military service status. [
] Because not service-connected, the contractors' clause has been held unconstitutional.
Ex parte Henderson,
11 Fed.Cas. 1067, 1071.
The word "case," of course, might refer to litigation -- a charge or complaint brought in court, here a prosecution. But it seems to us that its meaning, as used in the constitutional clauses under consideration, is a state of facts for judicial action,
the series of events that creates an enforceable right or obligation. The context in which it is used bears on the final definition. Here, "cases arising" is more specific than the word "case" alone. The Government gives us several citations to cases applying the meaning for which it contends. [
Relator does the same. [
] Article III uses "cases arising" under federal law to indicate the extent of possible federal jurisdiction over legal rights or duties created by the laws of the United States. The meaning of "cases arising" in Article III and the Fifth Amendment must be determined by their purpose. That purpose is similar -- to mark the source of the cause of action that ripens into a civil complaint or criminal charge. However restricted the word "case" may be, its use with "arising" points to the source of the litigation. If a case is claimed to exist only after institution of legal proceedings, nevertheless that case has its roots, it arises, in the events that give life to the cause of action. When a case so arises was stated thus in
, in an opinion concerning the removal statute, where
That conclusion has the support of the weight of the precedents dealing with this phase of the Fifth Amendment. To meet the argument of defendant that jurisdiction must attach before discharge, it was said in the
case, 3 Fed.Cas. 796, 799:
This statement has been strengthened by the accord given the argument by other courts. [
(c) The Court, of course, does not gainsay the constitutional authority of Congress to adopt a military code for regulation of members of the armed forces without regard to the generally applicable requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. It holds that, where the constitutional safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for a citizen's freedom from tyranny are at stake, they should not be withdrawn except through absolute necessity. There is no such necessity here, for it would have been possible to have provided a proper civil trial with the full protection of the applicable clauses of the Amendments. But here we are considering an exception to the safeguards offered by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. That exception has been written into the Constitution from the experience of history to protect the discipline of the armed forces. Of course, that exception from the protections of these Amendments should be strictly construed to hold those excluded to the minimum as was done in
Ex parte Henderson, supra,
p. 39. Construction of the Constitution, however, should not be allowed to emasculate the natural meaning of language designed to protect the Nation in the regulation of its armed forces.
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 879-885.
See Durant v. Hiatt,
81 F.Supp. 948.
Both the House and Senate Committee Reports stated that the need for Article 3(a) was to remedy the undesirable situation pointed out by the
decision. Both reports contain the following sentence:
96 Cong.Rec. 1294
The proposed substitute for Article 3(a) was:
171 F.2d 921.
183 U. S. 382
Mosher v. Hunter,
143 F.2d 745.
Cf. Kahn v. Anderson,
255 U. S. 7
Walker v. Morris,
3 American Jurist and Law Magazine 281.
the Defence Act of Australia, § 103(3), Commonwealth Acts, Vol. II (1901-1950), 1560, 1596; National Defence Act of Canada, 1950, §§ 56(2) and (3), and 68(f), Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Vol. III, 3814 and 3821. New Zealand has a similar statute (Army Act, § 127(1), New Zealand Statutes, 1950, 283, 370-371).
The judges ended with a reservation of the privilege of changing their minds if the matter were judicially presented, apparently in accordance with the practice in such advisory opinions.
note, 28 Eng.Rep. 941. II Eden's Chancery Reports, App. p. 371.
Trials, Courts Martial -- Sackville, 1760. On conviction, the King directed the sentence be recorded in the order book of every regiment, British and American. In view of the prominence of the parties and the subsequent distinguished career of Lord George Sackville, who died in 1785 after having been advanced in 1782 to the peerage as Viscount Sackville for his services in Parliament, the Irish administration, and as Secretary of State for the Colonies, the case could hardly have escaped the notice of the members of the Constitutional Convention.
VII Dictionary of Nat.Biography 1110; 4 Smollett, History of England, 337; Tytler, Military Law (2d ed.), 113. 8 Op.Atty.Gen. 328.
31 Op.Atty.Gen. 521; Clode, Martial and Military Law, 92.
It must be noted, however, that a leading military authority is against that view.
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., Reprint 1920), 105, although he admits the weight of the precedents is against him.
a comparable authority, Edmund M. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 4 Minn.Law Rev. 79, 83 (1920). For further discussion of the problem,
Myers and Kaplan, Crime Without Punishment, 35 Geo.L.J. 303 (1947); Note, Military Jurisdiction over Discharged Servicemen: Constitutionality and Judicial Protection, 67 Harv.L.Rev. 479 (1954); Note, The Amenability of the Veteran to Military Law, 46 Col.L.Rev. 977 (1946).
In 1848, Attorney General Toucey, in the absence of any applicable rule for the government of the Army, had ruled that a charge of murder could not be brought against an officer already mustered out. 5 Op.Atty.Gen. 55, 58. A similar conclusion was stated by Attorney General Palmer (1919), 31 Op.Atty.Gen. 521, 529.
8 Op.Atty.Gen. 328, 332.
We are advised by the Government that this case was reversed by stipulation.
See Kronberg v. Hale,
180 F.2d 128, 130.
"Another guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was denied a trial by jury. The great minds of the country have differed on the correct interpretation to be given to various provisions of the Federal Constitution, and judicial decision has been often invoked to settle their true meaning; but, until recently, no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of attack. It is
assailed; but if ideas can be expressed in words, and language has any meaning,
-- one of the most valuable in a free country -- is preserved to everyone accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service. The sixth amendment affirms that, 'in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,' language broad enough to embrace all persons and cases; but the fifth, recognizing the necessity of an indictment or presentment before anyone can be held to answer for high crimes, '
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger,' and the framers of the Constitution doubtless meant to limit the right of trial by jury in the sixth amendment to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth."
71 U. S. 137
It was so held as to Haupt, treated as an American citizen in
317 U. S. 20
317 U. S. 45
United States v. Bevan,
, "the waters on which . . . cases may arise";
46 U. S. 466
, "case of collision taking place on the Mississippi river," and "cause of action arisen on the ocean."
46 U. S. 467
7 Fed.Cas. 418, 432, 434-435.
9 Wheat. 738, at
In re Pacific R. Commission,
32 F. 241, 255.
"These definitions have been adhered to by this Court in
Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth,
Ex parte Joly,
290 F. 858;
Terry v. United States,
2 F.Supp. 962;
Kronberg v. Hale,
180 F.2d 128.
I know of no reason why Congress could not pass this statute, 50 U.S.C. § 553, retaining court-martial jurisdiction over Toth to answer for a crime he allegedly committed when he was clearly subject to court-martial.
, holds that, even though discharged from service, one convicted and serving sentence for a military offense could still be tried by court-martial