Source: http://de.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190924_0000867.DDE.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 12:18:57
Document Index: 481798053

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2254', '§ 2244', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

FindACase™ | King v. Dematteis
King v. Dematteis
DAVID KING, Petitioner,
Pending before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner David King (“Petitioner”). (D.I. 2). The State filed an Answer in opposition, to which Petitioner filed a Reply. (D.I. 11; D.I. 15). For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition.
On June 22, 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine and possession with intent to deliver cocaine (“PWITD”). (D.I. 11 at 2). On that same day, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to eight years of Level V incarceration for trafficking, and to fifteen years at Level V, suspended for six months at Level IV, followed by one year of Level III probation, for PWITD. (D.I. 11 at 2). Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
On July 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion for sentence reduction, which the Superior Court denied on September 16, 2010. (D.I. 11 at 2). Petitioner filed a second motion for sentence modification on June 27, 2013, which the Superior Court denied on July 19, 2013. Petitioner did not appeal these decisions. (D.I. 11 at 2).
On May 13, 2014, Delaware’s Office of Defense Services (“OPD”) filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 motion”) on Petitioner’s behalf. (D.I. 20-7 at 3). On June 20, 2014, the OPD filed a second Rule 61 motion on Petitioner’s behalf, purportedly due to clerical errors. (D.I. 20-7 at 4). On July 1, 2014, the OPD filed a letter with the Superior Court stating that the OPD “erroneously filed two separate . . . motion[s] for post-conviction relief in this case. We hereby withdraw the motion filed on May 13, 2014. The motion dated June 19, 2014 is the motion that should be considered by the court.” (D.I. 20-7 at 4). The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on April 20, 2015, and denied his motion for reargument on June 17, 2015. (D.I. 11 at 2). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 61 motion on December 9, 2015. (D.I. 11 at 2).
On September 21, 2016, the OPD filed a § 2254 Petition on Petitioner’s behalf, asserting that Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of an evidence scandal at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) was material to his decision to plead guilty and, therefore, his guilty plea was involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). (D.I. 2). Petitioner also argues that the Delaware Supreme Court made unreasonable findings of fact during his post-conviction appeal regarding OCME misconduct. The State filed an Answer asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred or, alternatively, because the claims are meritless. (D.I. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply, asserting that the Petition should be deemed timely filed after applying § 2244(d)(1)(D) and the doctrine of equitable tolling. (D.I. 15 at 2).
Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition, filed in 2016, is subject to the one-year limitations period contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The State contends that the starting date for the limitations period is July 22, 2010, the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final. (D.I. 11 at 6). Petitioner, however, appears to assert that he is entitled to a later starting date for AEDPA’s limitations period – April 15, 2014 – under § 2244(d)(1)(D), because that is the date on which the State began to notify defendants in certain active cases about the OCME evidence misconduct. (D.I. 15 at 2).
First, Petitioner pleaded guilty on June 22, 2010. Although the OCME report concerning the drug evidence in Petitioner’s case is not dated, the cover later from the Attorney General’s office is dated March 15, 2010, thereby demonstrating that Petitioner was provided the OCME report prior to entering a guilty plea. (D.I. 8 at 1). Second, facts sufficient to provide a basis for a good faith claim that state employees engaged in impermissible conduct were not available to defense counsel until April 15, 2014 when, as part of its Brady v. Maryland obligation, the State informed Petitioner and other defendants that all drug evidence housed at the lab was susceptible to compromise.[4] (D.I. 15 at 2).
Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that the AEDPA’s limitations period in this case began to run on April 15, 2014.[5] Accordingly, to comply with the one-year limitations period, Petitioner had to file his § 2254 petition by April 15, 2015. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (e) applies to federal habeas petitions); Phlipot v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1906127, at *3 n.3 (D. Del. Apr. 27, 2015) (AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is calculated according to the anniversary method, i.e., the limitations period expires on the anniversary of the triggering event).
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed application for state collateral review tolls the AEDPA’s limitations period during the time the application is pending in the state courts, including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the application is filed during the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying a state post-conviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, when Petitioner filed his Rule 61 motion on June 20, 2014, [6] sixty-six days of the limitations period had already expired. The Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations period from June 20, 2014 December 9, 2015, the date on which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of the motion. The limitations clock started to run again on December 10, 2015, and ran another 286 days until Petitioner filed the instant on September 21, 2016. At that point in time, there were thirteen days remaining in AEDPA’s limitations period. Thus, the Petition is timely filed. The Court will proceed to review the Claims in the Petition.
Finally, a federal court must presume that the state court’s determinations of factual issues are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (stating that the clear and convincing standard in § 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable application standard of § 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions).