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Timestamp: 2016-12-06 14:40:25
Document Index: 241889194

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1951', '§ 601', '§ 601', '§ 601', '§ 601', '§ 2385', '§ 462', '§ 2101', '§ 1951', '§ 1951', '§ 1951', '§ 171', '§ 1951', '§ 171', '§ 1951', '§ 1951', '§ 1951', '§ 1952', '§ 1951']

| United States v. Cerilli
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.EGIDIO CERILLI, APPELLANT IN NO. 78-2105; MAYLAN YACKOVICH, APPELLANT IN NO. 78-2106; JOHN SHURINA, APPELLANT IN NO. 78-2107; RALPH BUFFONE, APPELLANT IN NO. 78-2439
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL No. 76-22 (W.D. PA.)
In recent years, much attention has been paid on the national level to the methods by which political parties finance their partisan activities and by which political leaders choose individuals for certain high-ranking positions. This case involves the relationship, on a local level, between the financing of political parties and the choice of individuals for certain not-so-high-ranking but sometimes lucrative work. Appellants Egidio Cerilli, Maylan Yackovich, Ralph Buffone, and John Shurina have been convicted and sentenced for conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951*fn1 and for substantive violations of that Act. We will affirm the respective judgments of sentence.
Appellants do not challenge these basic facts. Instead they attack their convictions primarily on the theories that these facts do not constitute violations of the Hobbs Act and that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant conviction under the Hobbs Act because appellants' participation in a conspiracy was not proved and because there was an insufficient effect on interstate commerce.*fn2
Appellants argue that since the Hobbs Act defines extortion as the "Wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear," (emphasis supplied), if the force, violence or fear is used for a lawful purpose, the use is not wrongful and extortion is not committed. Appellants submit that the solicitation of political contributions is not only lawful, but is protected by the First Amendment.*fn3 Appellants also argue that extortion "under color of official right" is likewise restricted to situations where the purpose for the obtaining of the payments is unlawful.
Appellants urge that their theory is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S. Ct. 1007, 35 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1973). In that case, the indictment charged certain members and officials of labor unions with committing acts of violence and destruction against the property of the Gulf States Utilities Company in the course of a strike against that company in order to force that company to agree to a contract providing for higher wages and other benefits. The Court stated that "wrongful" as used in the Hobbs Act "limits the statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be "wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property." 410 U.S. at 400, 93 S. Ct. at 1009-1010. The Court concluded that where violence is used "to achieve legitimate union objectives . . . there has been no "wrongful' taking of the employer's property; he has paid for the services he bargained for, and the workers receive the wages to which they are entitled in compensation for their services." Id.
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied heavily on the legislative history of the Hobbs Act. Section 2 of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979, while similar to the Hobbs Act, contained an exception for the payment of wages by an employer to an employee. On the basis of this language, the Court in U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 62 S. Ct. 642, 86 L. Ed. 1004 (1942) held that a scheme by New York City teamsters to coerce payments from out-of-town drivers and owners for allowing their trucks to enter the city did not violate the Anti-Racketeering Act. In response, Congress passed what became the Hobbs Act. The legislative history made it clear that the new act reached extortion by union members "under the guise of obtaining wages." 91 Cong.Rec. 11900 as quoted in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 403, 93 S. Ct. at 1011. That history also made it clear that the new act "does not have a thing in the world to do with strikes." 91 Cong.Rec. 11912 as quoted in U. S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 404, 93 S. Ct. at 1012.
410 U.S. at 411, 93 S. Ct. at 1015.
Once a collective bargaining agreement is reached, it is generally impossible to determine what portion of the benefits, if any, are the result of violent action. Thus the Court in Enmons could properly conclude that the defendants there had a "lawful claim" to the wages they received. It is clear from this record, however, that the contributions were, in substantial if not total measure, a result of appellants' extortionate actions. Thus, although the solicitation of political contributions is not inherently "wrongful,"*fn4 the solicitations here were "wrongful" in that neither the appellants nor any political committee had a "lawful claim" to those contributions.
More importantly, Enmons is a labor case. The Court's reasoning was obviously and explicitly tied to the labor context and more specifically to the strike context. Any application of Enmons to cases outside of that context must be done with caution. Otherwise there is a danger that Enmons, if read as the appellants read it, could effectively repeal the Hobbs Act. The receipt of money whether by a political party, a charitable institution or by an individual is generally not inherently wrongful. The wrong under the Hobbs Act is the manner in which it is obtained. Thus we understand Enmons as not relying primarily on the legitimacy of the union's objectives but rather on the clear Congressional intent, as expressed both in the legislative history of the Hobbs Act and the entire federal scheme regulating labor-management relations, that violence during labor strikes not be punishable as extortion under the Hobbs Act. There is no corresponding intent to exempt the type of activity here from the ambit of the Act.*fn5
It is well-established that a person may violate the Hobbs Act without himself receiving the benefits of his coercive actions. See U. S. v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420, 76 S. Ct. 522, 100 L. Ed. 494 (1956), U. S. v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1098 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S. Ct. 2167, 48 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1976); U. S. v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S. Ct. 440, 13 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1964). U. S. v. Trotta itself involved political contributions and the court there held that this fact did not alter the defendant's criminal liability.*fn6 This court in U. S. v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), Cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954, 97 S. Ct. 2673, 53 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977), which involved the conviction of a state legislator under the Hobbs Act, stated that evidence that the defendant delivered the money he had extorted to the local party treasurer was not probative of the extortion charge and was therefore properly excluded. On the basis of this well-established line of case law, we conclude that the appellants' conduct here constituted extortion regardless of whether the payments went into appellants' pockets or their party's coffers.
The primary concern of Congress in passing § 601 was obviously with preventing government employees from having to make political contributions in order to obtain or retain their jobs. See S.Rep.No.94-1245, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2883; H.R.Rep.No.94-986, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976). It is doubtful whether appellants could be prosecuted under this section since they obtained payments from lessors not employees. Section 601 is clearly not jurisdictionally co-extensive with the Hobbs Act. The jurisdictional basis for § 601 is that the employment, position, work, etc. must have been provided at least in part by an Act of Congress. This is in contrast to the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional requirement of an effect on commerce. We conclude that § 601 is Congress' attempt to deal with a problem related to but not identical with the problem at which the Hobbs Act is aimed. The passage of § 601 thus does not indicate that activities such as those in which appellants have engaged are not proscribed by the Hobbs Act. We hold therefore that the coercive solicitation of political contributions is within the realm of actions that are illegal under the Hobbs Act.*fn7
This doctrine, which literally translated means "of the strictest right," apparently arose out of two Supreme Court cases reviewing convictions under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. In Scales v. U. S., 367 U.S. 203, 232, 81 S. Ct. 1469, 1487-88, 6 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1961), the Court stated that "Smith Act offenses involving as they do subtler elements than are present in most other crimes, call for strict standards in assessing the adequacy of the proof needed to make out a case of illegal advocacy." The Court in Noto v. U. S., 367 U.S. 290, 299-300, 81 S. Ct. 1517, 1522, 6 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1961) ruled that the individual defendant's criminal intent like other elements of a violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act,*fn8 "must be judged Strictissimi juris, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share."
The doctrine was applied in U. S. v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969), where defendants who had been involved in the formulation and distribution of "A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority," were convicted of conspiring to aid others in refusing or evading registration of service in the armed forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a). Partially as a result of the application of this doctrine, the convictions were vacated. The Seventh Circuit, in U. S. v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 392 (7th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S. Ct. 1443, 35 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973) which involved convictions under the Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2102, described the application of the doctrine in the following terms:
The coercive solicitation of appellants here is not the type of "bifarious undertaking . . . within the shadow of the first amendment" that warrants the application of the Strictissimi juris doctrine. We need not sort out the subtle shadings of intent involved in Scales, Noto, Spock, and Dellinger. We need not seriously fear that convictions in cases such as this will chill the legitimate exercise of first amendment rights. Appellants have not been indicted for membership in a political party nor have they been indicted for their personal political preferences. They have been indicted for extortion. We are satisfied that the traditional standards of proof and of judicial review are fully adequate to protect appellants' rights without application of the doctrine of Strictissimi juris.
"Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a "development and collocation of circumstances'." Glasser v. U. S., 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942), quoting U. S. v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1938) Cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664, 60 S. Ct. 590, 84 L. Ed. 1012 (1940). Accord, U. S. v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1027 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964, 99 S. Ct. 450, 58 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1978).
At trial, eleven lessors testified to the demands made of them by the appellants. Although the "shake-down" techniques were not always identical,*fn9 the basic pattern of appellants' demanding a specific amount, generally based on a percentage of the lessors' income under the lease, remained essentially constant. Particularly persuasive evidence of joint action is the testimony of several lessors who dealt with two or more of the appellants.
The Supreme Court has stated that this language manifests a Congressional purpose "to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence." Stirone v. U. S., 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S. Ct. 270, 272, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1959). In Stirone, a proprietor of a ready-mixed concrete business in Pennsylvania who brought sand from outside of Pennsylvania was the victim of extortion. The Court stated:
This court has held, "It is not necessary that the Purpose of the extortion be to affect interstate commerce, . . . but only that one of the Natural effects thereof be an obstruction of that commerce." U. S. v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (3d Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 949, 30 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1972). "(W)here the resources of an interstate business are depleted or diminished "in any manner' by extortionate payments, the consequent impairment of ability to conduct an interstate business is sufficient to bring the extortion within the play of the Hobbs Act." U. S. v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 642; U. S. v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d at 77; U. S. v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir.) Cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S. Ct. 440, 13 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1964). "(A)ll that is required to bring an extortion within the statute is proof of a reasonably probable effect on commerce, however minimal, as result of the extortion." U. S. v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), Cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S. Ct. 2974, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1977); U. S. v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 672 (4th Cir. 1978). See also, U. S. v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064, 94 S. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1973); Carbo v. U. S., 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S. Ct. 1625, 12 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1964). "Congress was as much concerned with the threatened impact of the prohibited conduct as with its actual effect." U. S. v. bStaszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (in banc), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S. Ct. 65, 46 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1975).
We reject such a limitation as being inconsistent with Congress' purpose "to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce . . . ." Stirone v. U. S., 361 U.S. at 215, 80 S. Ct. at 272. We perceive no meaningful distinction between the effect on interstate commerce in the Stirone situation where money was extorted from a concrete supplier who bought sand from out of state and the situation here where fuel and supplies are purchased from out of state. This Court has already held that extorting money from a tavern owner has the natural effect of diminishing the owner's ability to purchase liquor originating in interstate commerce and this natural effect is a sufficient basis for conviction under the Hobbs Act even though there was no evidence of a decline in actual liquor purchases. U. S. v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1975).*fn10 In U. S. v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), the court held that extortion from rubbish collection business limited that business' ability to purchase receptacles and trucks originating from out of state and that this was a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act conviction. Although the effect on interstate commerce proven here is certainly not very large, the Hobbs Act does not proscribe only those extortions that have a large effect on commerce. Because there is adequate evidence to establish that there was Some effect on commerce, the convictions here were properly supported.*fn11
IV. UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
The Hobbs Act definition of extortion explicitly includes the obtaining of property by any of the following: "wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, Or under color of official right."*fn12 Since the dissent argues that extortion under color of official right (at least outside of the context of an improper fee) requires proof of some element of coercion, it is essentially arguing that a disjunctive reading of the relevant statutory language is incorrect. Professor Ruff, upon whose writing the dissent heavily relies, states:
This task (of asserting that a disjunctive reading of the Hobbs Act is improper) is complicated, however, by the necessity of arguing not that an alternative interpretation of the operation language is more consistent with the legislative intent, But that the language, in effect, should be struck from the Act. If one adopts the usual course and attempts to give meaning to all the statutory language, it is hard to challenge the result reached by the courts.*fn13
I concur in the result reached by Judge Higginbotham, and join in his fine opinion. I write separately in order to note that in light of the issue raised and arguments advanced by the dissent, it was and is my view that the Court should rehear this case En banc.*fn1
Having noted my position in this regard, I am of the view that the approach previously taken by this Court, by all other courts that have considered the question, and by the majority here, is correct: the Hobbs Act may be used to reach the type of activity involved in the present case. But I do not pretend to be so certain of my understanding of the statute and the intent of Congress in enacting it that I am prepared to dispense with the assistance of the parties in deciding the issue. It is a basic premise of our legal system that judges are open to persuasion and that it is the role of the advocate to persuade them. In the present case the appellants find themselves confronted with a decision apparently turning on our legal judgment concerning an issue that they, for understandable reasons,*fn2 have not addressed. However confident we may be of the rightness of our conclusions, we ought not to adhere to them without affording the parties an opportunity to brief and argue a controlling issue that was not injected into the case until after the argument.
It is now seven years since this court decided the seminal case of United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972), announcing a revolutionary interpretation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951.*fn1 We stated therein that a Hobbs Act violation based on extortion by a public official need not include proof of threat, fear or duress. We found no error in the following jury instruction: "Extortion under color of official right is the wrongful taking by a public officer of money not due him or his office, whether or not the taking was accomplished by force, threats or use of fear."*fn2
I describe our decision as revolutionary because it became the country's landmark case interpreting extortion under the Hobbs Act and departed completely, without benefit of in banc rehearing, from Judge Rosenn's opinion for the panel in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 949, 30 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1972), in which, discussing extortion by the mayor of Newark, it was stated that "while the essence of bribery is voluntariness, the essence of extortion is duress." (Emphasis added).
I believe this court was right in Addonizio, and that Kenny erred both in determining the substantive law and in reversing a panel decision without in banc consideration. I would cure our error by having the full court reexamine the Kenny rule in this case, and order a new trial because the trial judge gave a Kenny charge and refused an Addonizio point for instruction.*fn3
It is now my view that our interpretation in Kenny and its progeny is not supported by the legislative intent underlying the Hobbs Act nor is it historically accurate.*fn4 I believe that our failure to reexamine its rationale has resulted in a perpetuation of erroneous law not only in this circuit but in the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits which have followed our lead without setting forth a reasoned elaboration for their conclusions.*fn5
A year after deciding Addonizio, with less than one page of discussion we affirmed the extortion conviction of a public official without "proof of threat, fear, or duress." Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229. We said, "But while private persons may violate the statute only by use of fear and public officials may violate the act by use of fear, persons holding public office may also violate the statute by a wrongful taking under color of official right." Id. Authority for this disjoinder of the "force, violence, or fear" and the "color of official right" phrases of § 1951(b)(2) was said to be found in United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289, 89 S. Ct. 534, 21 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1969); United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947); State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2d 161 (1961); and State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 91 A.2d 751, 759-760 (1952).
Nardello, supra, 393 U.S. at 295-96, 89 S. Ct. at 539. Clearly, the decision was tied to the Travel Act prohibition of extortion, and nowhere supports the notion that public officials may commit extortion without threat, fear or duress under § 1951.
Sutter reversed the conviction of a federal employee charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 171, a statute which prohibited, but did not define, extortion. The court reasoned that because "(t)here are no common law crimes within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government," and because "Congress did not see fit to define extortion in the terms known to the common law . . ., extortion is used in its common, ordinary sense as distinguished from the sense in which it was known at common law." Sutter, 160 F.2d at 756. After quoting Webster's definition of extortion, the court held,
All of this might be relevant to the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 if it were assumed that the Hobbs Act incorporated the common law definition of extortion. Unfortunately, the cases cited by the Kenny court beg that question. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Nardello held that the Travel Act offense of extortion was Not equivalent to the common law offense as did the Seventh Circuit in Sutter as to 18 U.S.C. § 171.*fn6
A brief passage from State v. Begyn, supra, shows the fragility of its relevance to the Kenny conclusion:
The essence of (extortion under the common law) was the receiving or taking by any public officer, by color of his office, of any fee or reward not allowed by law for performing his duties. The purpose would seem to be simply to penalize the officer who non-innocently insisted on a larger fee than he was entitled to or a fee where none was permitted or required to be paid for the performance of an obligatory function of his office. The matter was obviously of particular importance in the days when public officials received their compensation through fees collected and not by fixed salary. Our early cases dealt with precisely this kind of a situation.
Begyn, supra, 167 A.2d at 166. Obviously, that common law definition was of less importance when public officials received salaries, so that "(i)n many States . . . the crime of extortion has been statutorily expanded to include acts by private individuals under which property is obtained by means of force, fear, or threats." Nardello, supra, 393 U.S. at 286, 89 S. Ct. at 536. Nardello, adopted the government's suggestion that under the Travel Act, "Congress intended that extortion should refer to those acts prohibited by state law which would be generically classified as extortionate, I. e., obtaining something of value from another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats." Id. at 290, 89 S. Ct. at 536. Such crimes are called extortion, blackmail, theft by intimidation, or are classified "under the general heading of offenses directed against property." Id. at 288-90, 89 S. Ct. at 536.
In 1899 Holmes lamented, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."*fn7 He would not voice this complaint today, for although contemporary courts are fond of stating that "(t)he starting point in every case involving the construction of a statute is the language itself,"*fn8 methodology now appears to abjure a strictly semantic approach. We have played with the Mischief Rule of Heydon's case,*fn9 the Golden Rule,*fn10 and the Literal Rule.*fn11 We have dallied with what American jurisprudence has called the "Plain Meaning Rule."*fn12
Impressive authorities have warned us not to depend too much on the actual language of a statute. Cardozo said that "(w)hen things are called by the same name, it is easy for the mind to slide into an assumption that the verbal identity is accompanied in all its sequences by identity of meaning."*fn13 Holmes told us: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."*fn14 Learned Hand said "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."*fn15
Current wisdom requires judges to ascertain the "legislative intent," a task somewhat akin to pinpointing the intent of a testator or of disputing parties to a contract. Proper judicial construction, in the modern view, requires recognition and implementation of the underlying legislative purpose; the judge, the theory holds, must accommodate the societal claims and demands reflected in that purpose.*fn16 To do this, as Justice Roger J. Traynor puts it, we need "literate, not literal" judges,*fn17 lest a court make a construction within the statute's letter, but beyond its intent.*fn18
This approach to statutory precept demonstrates a fundamental difference in the judicial process today from that of a half century past. Today, what the legislature has said is not as important as what it intended. Its words will be respected, it is true, but its intentions will be discovered and given equal, if not superior, respect. Very seldom do we now encounter the watchwords of another day: "If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different meaning."*fn19 Rather, we now say, "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination.' "*fn20 That we no longer follow the rigid semantic approach is sound, because in the common law tradition a rule from case law is never considered In vacuo. The Reason for the rule is Always considered. In sum, the purpose, the subject matter, the context, and the legislative history appear to be the major aids in considering statutory precept today. It is to the legislative history of the Hobbs Act that I now turn.
Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion in United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 651-55 (3d Cir.) (in banc), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014, 96 S. Ct. 446, 46 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1975), sets forth in detail the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), the extortion section of the Hobbs Act under which appellants were convicted. A summary of the important points in that discussion will be sufficient.
The word "extortion" first appeared in the Anti-Racketeering Act of *fn194621 which amended the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.*fn22 Although the 1934 statute did not use the term, it did proscribe what must have been intended as common law extortion, that is, obtaining property "under color of official right." The latter language has been carried forward without change since the initial Act so that whatever congressional intention may be ascribed to that term must be found in the records of the Seventy-third Congress.
Nothing in the legislative history shows that the 1934 Act was intended to permit federal authorities to police influence peddling in the political processes of the states. Indeed, whatever legislative history there is suggests a contrary conclusion. The 1934 Act originated in the Senate as S. 2248, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), Reprinted in 78 Cong.Rec. 457-58 (1934), and contained no reference to extortion by "color of official right." After passing the Senate, 78 Cong.Rec. 5734 (1934), it was submitted in the House, where it was completely amended and a new bill substituted. The reasons for this amendment have been described by the Supreme Court in United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 529, 62 S. Ct. 642, 645, 86 L. Ed. 1004 (1942), as follows:
The drafters of the 1934 Act took the term "color of official right" from the New York Penal Law of 1909 which defined the crime of extortion as follows:
Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, or the obtaining the property of a corporation from an officer, agent or employee thereof, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.*fn23
Extortion under color of official right was in turn divided into two parts: oppression, defined as the unlawful and malicious arresting of an individual or seizure of his property,*fn1a and extortion, defined as a public officer's asking, receiving, or agreeing to receive a fee in excess of that allowed by statute or when no such fee is authorized.*fn2a Both of these offenses were misdemeanors, whereas the larceny-type offenses were felonies carrying sentences of up to twenty years in prison.*fn3a
The relationship of the New York Penal Code to the Hobbs Act definition of extortion is of paramount importance in considering the elements of the § 1951 offense because of two fundamental precepts of statutory interpretation. First, it is elementary that the ultimate aim is to ascertain the intention of Congress in the enactment of a statute, and that intention, when discovered, must prevail. "In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the court is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S. Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L. Ed. 1345 (1940). Second, any ambiguity which exists in a penal statute must be construed in favor of the defendant. Chief Justice Marshall stressed the predominance of this rule over other "maxims or rules for the construction of statutes":
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed Chief Justice Marshall's admonition consistently through the years, as recently as United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 99 S. Ct. 2077, 60 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1979). For our purposes, the reasons for the rule are as important as the rule itself. An examination of these reasons demonstrates that this court did violence both to the rule and its reasons when we opted for the broad interpretation of extortion in Kenny. When a choice is to be made between two readings of a federal criminal statute, "it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222, 73 S. Ct. 227, 229, 97 L. Ed. 260 (1952).
I believe that the congressional intent underlying the Hobbs Act is clearly and unambiguously disclosed by its legislative history. Not only is there a total lack of specific congressional intent that the Act apply to state and local public officials in the absence of violence or coercion, but the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to rely on the New York law of extortion for its definition of the crime. To hold otherwise is to defy the Supreme Court's admonition that "because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, Legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S. Ct. 515, 523, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971) (my emphasis). It is said that this policy embodies an instinctive revulsion against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should. Id. Thus, one of the basic errors we committed when we embarked on the Kenny journey was to ignore the mandate that "where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant." Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285, 98 S. Ct. 566, 573, 54 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1978).
Although this nuance of New York law has been criticized as a "Unique interpretation" which should not restrict federal courts applying the Hobbs Act,*fn25 I believe it is totally consistent with the common law origins of the offenses. Moreover, congressional reliance on New York law demands adherence to that interpretation, however it may differ from the law of other states.
The historical basis of extortion, a common law misdemeanor, was the corrupt collection of an unlawful Fee under color of public office.*fn26 The requirement that the unlawful fee be associated with the office held by the recipient is central to an understanding of the traditional Blackstonian definition generally expressed in broader language. Professor Perkins advises:
A fee collected under color of office is unlawful if (1) the law does not authorize a fee for the purpose for which this fee is collected, or (2) a fee is authorized but only in an amount smaller than that collected, or (3) a fee might be authorized but none was due at the time this fee was collected. For this reason Blackstone defined extortion as "an abuse of public justice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due." Since a fee is unlawful under any one of the three circumstances the simpler wording is preferred for purposes of definition.*fn27
Against the backdrop of this common law history, it becomes important to understand exactly what Judge, later Justice, Minton meant in United States v. Sutter, supra, when, in dictum, he stated that at common law "color of public office took the place of the force, threats, or pressure implied in the ordinary meaning of the word extortion."*fn28 If this statement means that no force, threat, or pressure need be proved if the officer charged an official fee when none was required by law or charged a fee larger than that provided by law, it is proper. But if, outside the context of charging an improper fee for the mandatory performance of official duty, the statement means that one need not prove force, fear or duress at common law to prove wrongdoing on the part of an official, then I agree with Professor Ruff that this is "an explanation wholly at odds with the true common law origins of the offense."*fn29 That a number of courts have subsequently parroted Minton's formulation*fn30 does not legitimate what was illegitimate when first uttered. Error is not cured by repetition.
On the other hand, the common law misdemeanor of bribery is an offense which may be committed both by the giver and the recipient. It originated as an offense which could only be committed by a judge or other person concerned with the administration of justice but was broadened in the eighteenth century to extend beyond the conduct of judicial officers. A bribe has been defined as "something given for the purpose of improperly influencing official action, and either giving or accepting a bribe constitutes bribery."*fn31
There is an obvious correlation between the common law offenses of bribery and extortion. Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that both a bribe-giver and a bribe-taker are guilty of bribery whereas the victim of extortion is innocent, another distinction between the offenses is apparent. The later development of the crime of extortion, including blackmail, occurred "in order to plug a loophole in the robbery law by covering sundry threats which will not do for robbery. . . . (B)oth crimes equally require that the defendant's threats induce the victim to give up his property, something which he would not otherwise have done."*fn32 Thus, although both bribery and extortion originated as offenses related to performance of public office, bribery is a victimless crime whereas extortion developed along the lines of robbery.
The government supports this result for an obvious and self-serving reason. To obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, with its possible twenty year sentence, the government must prove "robbery or extortion," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); bribery is not illegal under the Hobbs Act. To establish a federal case of bribery implicating a state official, the government must resort to the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970),*fn33 which prohibits both bribery and extortion. But the Hobbs Act jurisdictional base is much broader than that of the Travel Act. An essential element of any Travel Act offense is the requirement of travel in interstate commerce, or the use of interstate commerce facilities. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971), noted that Congress did not intend overly broad application of the Travel Act which "would alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations in which the geographic origin of customers, a matter of happenstance, would transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies."
Thus, in situations where interstate travel or use of interstate facilities cannot be proven, or where the knowing use of them by the public official cannot be demonstrated, the federal government will often have to prosecute local political corruption under the Hobbs Act Or not at all.*fn34
But the fact that a government prosecutor who wants "to prosecute local political corruption" finds it easier to establish federal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act than under the Travel Act cannot possibly form a reasoned basis for obliterating the distinction between the separate crimes of extortion and bribery or for affirming the Hobbs Act convictions of local public officials who were not permitted the defense that they were bribed. Our tolerance of this prosecutorial legerdemain is an indulgence in jurisprudential anarchy at the expense of basic tenets of criminal law the presumption of innocence, the government's burden in all prosecutions, and the basic maxim Nullum crimen, nulla poena. One charged with extortion, carrying a twenty year Hobbs Act penalty, should have the option of defending on the basis that he is guilty only of bribery under the Travel Act, carrying a five year penalty. This is an option, in my view, explicitly granted by the Congress. It is an option, unfortunately, which is substantially foreclosed by our decision in Kenny.*fn35
The grave danger of our Kenny rule is its potential of embracing myriad situations which threaten fundamental federal-state relations and of creating very real tensions in the traditional operations of political party fund raising. The case at bar is illustrative of one set of circumstances. United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S. Ct. 2167, 48 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1976), illustrates another facet of the problem. There, a municipal commissioner of public works was charged with demanding that a firm of consulting engineers contribute to the local Republican Committee. The district judge dismissed the indictment because it did not charge that there had been any adverse action, any threat of action, or, indeed, any relationship between the demand for contributions and any contract awarded by the defendant. The Second Circuit reversed, relying on another of Kenny's progeny, United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S. Ct. 1561, 43 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1975), stating, "So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1951." Trotta, supra, 525 F.2d at 1100. The decision utilizes this far-reaching language:
(I)f a public official who asks for a political contribution from one who does, or may do, business with the government can be prosecuted on proof of those facts alone, then the Hobbs Act has become an extraordinary mechanism for controlling political activity on the state and local levels. . . . If the Trotta opinion means that a local government official commits extortion by soliciting a contribution from an organization that has or might have contracts with his agency, and is thereby liable to be imprisoned for twenty years, one may well ask whether a governor who attends a fundraising dinner and solicits contributions from the businessmen present has committed a felony.*fn36