Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/527/627/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-11-20 02:15:18
Document Index: 337121080

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 271', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 11', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 20', '§ 1338', '§ 1338', '§ 711', '§ 21', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 1338']

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, and Elise W Porter, Assistant Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Jan Graham of Utah, Mark L. Earley of Virginia, and Gay Woodhouse of Wyoming; for the National Con-cralaw
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Joseph R. Re, Michael K. Friedland, and Don W Martens; and for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Leon Friedman, Louis A. Craco, Jr., and James F. Parver.cralaw
"(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,cralaw
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U. S. C. § 271 (1994 ed. and Supp. III).cralaw
3 The District Court concluded that, for purposes of immunity from suit, Florida Prepaid is an arm of the State of Florida, a conclusion the parties did not dispute before either the Federal Circuit or this Court.cralaw
Whether Congress had the power to compel States to surrender their sovereign immunity for these purposes, however, is another matter. Congress justified the Patent Remedy Act under three sources of constitutional authority: the Patent Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-cralaw
4 The Patent Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment are discussed below.cralaw
"[T]he bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Lemelson v. Ampex Corp. [, 372 F. Supp. 708 (ND Ill. 1974),] recognized that a patent is a form of property, holding that a right to compensation exists for patent infringement. Additionally, because courts have continually recognized patent rights as property, the fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law." S. Rep., at 8 (footnotes omitted).
But the legislation must nonetheless be "appropriate" under § 5 as that term was construed in City of Boerne.cralaw
In holding that RFRA could not be justified as "appropriate" enforcement legislation under § 5, the Court emphasized that Congress' enforcement power is "remedial" in nature. Id., at 519. We recognized that "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" Id., at 518 (citation omitted). We also noted, however, that" '[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited,'" ibid., and held that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation," id., at 519. Canvassing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment andcralaw
5 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980).cralaw
Hearing on H. R. 3886 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1990) (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of Williamcralaw
"So just as a general philosophical matter, we believe that this law needs to be passed."cralaw
7 There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in the House or Senate Reports of the bill which became the statute, that Congress had in mind the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since Congress was so explicit about invoking its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, we think this omission precludes consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act.cralaw
8 See, e. g., House Hearings 33 (statement of Robert Merges) ("Thus a patentee ... would apparently have to draft her cause of action as a general tort claim-or perhaps one for restitution-to come within the statute. This might be impossible, or at least difficult under California law"); id., at 43 ("[I]t is true that you may have State remedies, alternative State remedies .... You could bring a deceit suit. You could try just a general unfair competition suit. A restitution is one that has occurred to me as a possible basis of recovery"); id., at 34 ("Another problem with this approach is that it assumes that such state law remedies will be available in every state in which the patentee's product is sold. This mayor may not be true"); id., at 47 (statement of William Thompson) ("In this casecralaw
9 It is worth mentioning that the State of Florida provides remedies to patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of the State. Aggrieved parties may pursue a legislative remedy through a claims bill for payment in full, Fla. Stat. § 11.065 (1997), or a judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim, see Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1993).cralaw
The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history of "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights" of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation. City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 526. Instead, Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do notcralaw
Because of this lack, the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." I d., at 532. An unlimited range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or contributory patent infringement, and the House Report itself cited testimony acknowledging "'it [']s difficult for us to identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a state.'" H. R. Rep., at 38.10 Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer any
"The comments regarding copyright centered on substantial use of copyrighted textbooks by state universities as well as state use of copyrighted music and computer software. State use of patented products is more diverse and more substantial. Patented inventions are involved in all manner of commonly used machines, tools, instruments, chemicals, compounds, materials, and devices of all description and purpose. Furthermore, patented processes are commonplace. States and state instrumentalities own and operate hospitals, universities, prisons, and libraries. States build and maintain roads. States provide facilities and equipment for large numbers of employees who perform all manner of state supported activities. It [']s difficult for us to identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a state." House Hearings 55 (statement of William Thompson).cralaw
The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore make it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The examples of States avoiding liability for patent infringement by pleading sovereign immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough, but any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State deprived patentees of property and left them without a remedy under state law is scarcer still. The statute's apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States on the same footing as private parties undercralaw
1 See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25,2 Stat. 37; Act of Feb. 19, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481. There is some dispute about whether federal jurisdiction over patent cases became exclusive in 1800 or in 1836. See 7 D. Chisum, Patents § 20.02[1][a], n. 9 (1998). In any event, 28 U. S. C. § 1338(a) now provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such ju-cralaw
risdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." The second sentence of § 1338(a) (excluding the reference to plant variety protection cases) has been worded in essentially the same way since 1878. See Rev. Stat. § 711 (1878). This Court has used various criteria for determining when an action "arises under" the patent law, see, e. g., Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46, 52-53 (1888), but it is well established that a patent infringement claim is "the paradigm of an action 'arising under' the patent laws." 8 Chisum, Patents § 21.02[1][b].cralaw
Sound reasons support both Congress' authority over patents and its subsequent decision in 1800 to vest exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement litigation in the federal courts. The substantive rules of law that are applied in patent infringement cases are entirely federal. From the beginning, Congress has given the patentee the right to bring an action for patent infringement. § 4, 1 Stat. 111. There is, accordingly, a strong federal interest in an interpretation of the patent statutes that is both uniform and faithful to the constitutional goals of stimulating invention and rewarding the disclosure of novel and useful advances in technology. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 9 (1966). Federal interests are threatened, not only by inadequate protection for patentees, but also when overprotection may have an adverse impact on a competitive economy. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 162-163 (1989). Therefore, consistency, uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and relevant body of patent jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance in this area of the law.cralaw
3 In its Report on the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the House stated, "Patent litigation long has been identified as a problem area, characterized by undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in adjudications. Based on the evidence it compiled during the course of thorough hearings on the subject, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System-created by Act of Congress-concluded that patent law is an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases. As a result, some circuit courts are regarded as 'pro-patent' and other 'anti-patent,' and much time and money is expended in 'shopping' for a favorable venue. In a Commission survey of practitioners, the patent bar reported that uncertainty created by the lack of national law precedent was a significant problem; the Commission found patent law to be an area in which widespread forum-shopping was particularly acute." H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-21 (1981) (footnotes omitted); see also S. Rep. No. 97-275, p. 5 (1981).cralaw
As the Court recognizes, Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to enforcing the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. Ante, at 637. Congress decided, and I agree, that the Patent Remedy Act was a proper exercise of this power.cralaw
4 Paragraph 7 of College Savings' complaint alleges that" '[d]efendant Florida Prepaid with actual knowledge of the '055 patent, with knowledge of its infringement, and without lawful justification, has willfully infringed the '055 patent.''' App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.cralaw
"Mr. THOMPSON. No, I think it would be very clear. Your legislation is very clearly drawn. It seems to match the tests set forth in Atascaderocralaw
"I can never guarantee exactly how attorneys are going to read statutes, Mr. Chairman, but all of the sane ones would not bring an action." Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1990) (House Hearing).cralaw
7 Merges continued: "Another problem with this approach is that it assumes that such state law remedies will be available in every state in which the patentee's product is sold. This mayor may not be true. In any event, requiring a potential plaintiff (patentee) to ascertain the validity of her claims under the differing substantive and procedural laws of the fifty states may well prove a very substantial disincentive to the commencement of such suits. Moreover, it would vitiate a major goal of the federal intellectual property system: national uniformity. In short, these remedies are simply no substitute for patent infringement actions." Id., at 34.cralaw
8 See generally Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 Food & Drug L. J. 453 (1997); Bertha, Intellectual Property Activities in U. S. Research Universities, 36 IDEA: J. L. & Tech. 513 (1996); Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996).cralaw
10 Mter the 1992 Act was passed, the Florida Supreme Court did hold that a patentee might bring some sort of "takings" claim in a state court, or might seek a legislative remedy. See Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333 (1993). Given the unambiguous text of 28 U. S. C. § 1338, there is (a) no reason why Congress could have anticipated that decision, and (b) good reason to believe a well-motivated court may have misinterpreted federal law. See Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d, at 1337-1338 (Harding, J., dissenting).cralaw
13 In the House Report advocating the creation of the Federal Circuit, Congress noted, "The infrequency of Supreme Court review of patent cases leaves the present judicial system without any effective means of assuring even-handedness nationwide in the administration of the patent laws." H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 22.cralaw
In City of Boerne we affirmed the well-settled principle that the broad sweep of Congress' enforcement power en-cralaw
The difference between the harm targeted by RFRA and the harm that motivated the enactment of the Patent Remedy Act is striking. In RFRA Congress sought to overrule this Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. The Patent Remedy Act, however, was passed to prevent future violations of due process, based on the substantiated fear that States would be unable or unwilling to provide adequate remedies for their own violations of patent holders' rights. Congress' "wide latitude" in determining remedial or preventive measures, see id., at 520, has suddenly become very narrow indeed.cralaw
That congruence is equally precise whether infringement of patents by state actors is rare or frequent. If they are indeed unusual, the statute will operate only in those rare cases. But if such infringements are common, or should become common as state activities in the commercialcralaw
The remaining differences between the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity and the Patent Remedy Act are supported by quintessentially federal concerns. This Court has found that "the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest." Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500,507 (1988). Indeed, the importance of the federal interest in military procurement led this Court to fashion the doctrine of "Government contractors' immunity" without waiting for Congress to consider the question. Id., at 531 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Injunctions are not available against the United States be-cralaw
16 I am also persuaded that a State like Florida that has invoked the benefits of the federal patent system should be deemed to have waived any defense of sovereign immunity in patent litigation. The reasoning in JUSTICE BREYER'S dissent in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., post, at 693-699, applies with special force to this case.cralaw