Source: http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2015/04/sentencing-guidelines-calculations-over.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 16:18:05
Document Index: 79822324

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 5']

Federal Tax Crimes: Sentencing Guidelines Calculations Over the Top -- 4800 Months (4/2/15)
Here is what the Court of Appeals said on the original appeal, United States v. Okun, 453 Fed. Appx. 364 (4th Cir. Va. 2011), here:
Edward Hugh Okun operated a “Ponziesque” scheme, resulting in losses in excess of $125 million dollars. Following a jury trial, he was convicted on twenty-three counts arising from this scheme. He was sentenced to 1200 months’ imprisonment, a sentence 3600 months below the advisory Guidelines sentence.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). The first step in this review requires us to inspect the record for procedural reasonableness by ensuring that the district court committed no significant procedural errors, such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2010).
In explaining the selected sentence, the district court is not required to "robotically tick through § 3553(a)'s every subsection." United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). Rather, the district court "must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented," by applying "the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances of the case before it." United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). The district court must also state in open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence and "set forth enough to satisfy" us that it has "considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority." Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 168 L. Ed. 2d 203 (2007). "If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider" its substantive reasonableness. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the sentence imposed is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. First, the district court properly calculated the applicable Guidelines range. Okun was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, twelve counts of wire fraud, seven counts involving money laundering, one count of bulk cash smuggling, and one count of making a false declaration. The convictions were grouped together for sentencing purposes and produced a single offense level of 53, ten levels above the highest offense level on the Sentencing Table. A total offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) Chapter 5, Part A Sentencing Table, comment. (n.2). Okun's criminal history category was I. Under the Guidelines, offense level 43, in criminal history category I, provides an advisory Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. Because none of the counts of conviction carried a statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment, the district court applied USSG § 5G1.2, which governs sentencing on multiple counts of conviction. n5 As such, Okun's advisory Guidelines sentence was the statutory maximum sentence on all counts of conviction combined—4,800 months.
n5 The statutory maximum sentences for the counts of conviction varied from five to twenty years. USSG § 5G1.2(d) states: "If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law." USSG § 5G1.2(d)
Next, the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the extensive harm caused by Okun's conduct, and the need for adequate deterrence and to protect the public from further crimes by Okun. The district court also considered Okun's heart condition.
Okun's main challenge to his sentence is that the district court did not consider his age and lack of criminal history in imposing sentence. However, we have repeatedly emphasized that the district court is not required to apply § 3553(a) in a checklist fashion. Johnson, 445 F.3d at 345. Here, the district court made extensive findings supporting the imposition of a variance sentence 3600 months below the advisory Guidelines sentence. After reviewing those extensive findings, we are satisfied that the district court considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Accordingly, we reject Okun's challenge to his sentence. n6
n6 Okun also complains that his sentence exceeded the length of sentence typically imposed in similar cases. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), one relevant sentencing factor is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). We note the sentence imposed in this case is in line with sentences imposed in similar white-collar cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir.) (affirming 310-year sentence for a defendant convicted by a jury of an investment fraud of over $40 million dollars), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3441, 177 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2010).
I tried on quick calculations to figure out exactly how the Guidelines calculations came to 4800 months (again, not as stated, a range, but still ...). I did not have the patience to plug through SG § 5G1.2, here. But apparently the defendant did not contest the calculation, so I suppose it was correct.
I should note that the Commentary Application Notes has the saving grace for us guys who are challenged by the provision:
The total punishment is the punishment indicated by the Sentencing Table.
Posted by Jack Townsend at 5:39 PM