Source: http://openjurist.org/954/f2d/209
Timestamp: 2016-05-06 07:51:24
Document Index: 133847382

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 921', '§ 932', '§ 923', '§ 725', '§ 932', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 725', '§ 4', '§ 725', '§ 203', '§ 922', '§ 725', '§ 725']

954 F2d 209 Keener v. Eastern Associated Coal Corporation | OpenJurist
954 F. 2d 209 - Keener v. Eastern Associated Coal Corporation HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 954 F.2d.
954 F2d 209 Keener v. Eastern Associated Coal Corporation 954 F.2d 209
Violet KEENER, Petitioner,v.EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORPORATION, Director, Office ofWorkers' Compensation Programs, United StatementsDepartment of Labor, Respondents.
Argued Oct. 28, 1991.Decided Jan. 15, 1992.As Amended March 2, 1992.
On March 3, 1991, Mrs. Keener petitioned this court for review of the Board's decision.3II.
This court must decide whether the Board correctly determined that the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a); Zbosnik v. Badger Coal Co., 759 F.2d 1187, 1189-90 (4th Cir.1985); Wilson v. Benefits Review Bd., 748 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.1984). "Substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); accord Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Parker, 935 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir.1991).
We believe, as did the Board, that Keener's certified statement, standing alone, constitutes substantial evidence that the withdrawal of Keener's application was valid. That statement, by its terms, shows that Keener wished to continue to work into the "foreseeable future"; that he understood that he could not continue to work and receive benefits because he did not believe that he was suffering from complicated pneumoconiosis; and that he understood that he could, within three years of a determination that he had contracted complicated pneumoconiosis, reapply for benefits. J.A. at 8. Keener correctly understood the law on both receipt of benefits while employed, see 30 U.S.C. § 923(d); 20 C.F.R. § 725.503A(a)(2), and on the need to apply for benefits within three years of a medical determination of total disability due to pneumoconiosis, see 30 U.S.C. § 932(f); 20 C.F.R. § 725.308(a). And there is no suggestion that in fact Keener wished to cease work, and thus that his statement that he intended to continue to work was either unknowing or involuntary.
As to the asserted misinterpretation of Keener's statement, Keener certified that he was "informed of the requirement of a miner to claim black lung benefits within three (3) years of the date on which the miner is determined to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." J.A. at 8. In his decision and order, the ALJ initially summarized Keener's statement correctly, explaining that "the miner certified that he had been informed of the requirement of a miner to claim black lung benefits within three years of the date on which the miner is determined to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." Id. at 72. Two sentences later, however, the ALJ characterized Keener's statement as "indicat[ing] that he was informed that he had three years from the time that he was found to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis in which to stop work." Id. (emphasis added). And he repeated the substance of this characterization two sentences later in his finding based upon Keener's statement.
Under Labor Department regulations, a miner suffering from simple rather than complicated pneumoconiosis must cease coal mine employment within "1 year after a final determination of eligibility" in order to receive black lung benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 725.503A(a)(2) (emphasis added). Keener does not refer to this requirement in his certified statement. Both petitioner and her daughter testified that Keener "understood" Ashley's advice to mean that he had to cease work within a year of applying for benefits.4 Neither witness, however, testified that Ashley told her that Keener had to cease work within a year of applying for benefits. Nor did either witness testify that Keener told her that Ashley had told him he was required to cease work within a year of applying for benefits.
Neither the ALJ nor the Review Board explicitly addressed petitioner's claim that Ashley misinformed Keener, and the parties disagree over what the evidence proves. We do not believe that it is necessary for this court to resolve the disagreement. The decisions below that withdrawal of the application was valid are still supported by the substantial evidence recited above even if Ashley did misinform Keener as to the law in the respect suggested by petitioner.6B.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.306, a claimant may withdraw a previously filed claim for benefits provided inter alia that "the appropriate adjudication officer approves the request for withdrawal on the grounds that it is in the best interests of the claimant." Id. § 725.306(a)(2) (emphasis added).7 Ashley determined that Keener's request to withdraw his application for benefits was "in [his] best interest," although the precise reasons for her determination are not evident from the record. See J.A. at 9 (letter of Jan. 23, 1979, from Ashley to Keener). The requirement of section 725.306(a)(2) that the adjudication officer approve the withdrawal request on the grounds that withdrawal is in the best interests of the claimant thus was satisfied. Petitioner's contention is not that this requirement was not fulfilled, but rather that the underlying determination that withdrawal was in Keener's best interest was incorrect.
The record is unclear as to whether Ashley initiated contact with Keener, or vice versa, on the specific issue of application withdrawal. See Petitioner's Br. at 7-8; Federal Respondent's Br. at 7 n. 6, 20 n. 20; Private Respondent's Br. at 19 n. 12. But even if Ashley first contacted Keener, the purpose of that contact was not to act against a property interest of Keener's, or even to apprise him of an action that the Labor Department intended to take against him or his property; no government action against Keener was ever contemplated. The purpose of the telephone call was merely to discuss with Keener whether he wished to withdraw his application9--a decision that rested solely with him--and to inform him of the rules governing his claim and withdrawal. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment is simply not implicated because there is no "deprivation" of a property interest.
Petitioner challenged the validity of her husband's withdrawal of his 1978 claim because under the applicable law at the time of that withdrawal, a survivor could receive derivative benefits if his or her spouse had died from black lung disease or was totally disabled by the disease. See Pub.L. No. 92-303, § 4(b)(2), 86 Stat. 153, 154 (1972); 20 C.F.R. § 725.212(a)(3)(ii); Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d 1321, 1326-28 (3d Cir.1988). By the time that Keener reapplied for benefits, however, the law had been amended to eliminate "total disability" as a ground for a survivor's recovery. Under the amended statute, a survivor can receive benefits only if the death of his or her spouse was caused by pneumoconiosis. See Pub.L. No. 97-119, § 203(a)(2), 95 Stat. 1639, 1644 (1981), codified at 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 725.212(a)(3)(ii). Because Keener died from a heart attack, Mrs. Keener could not meet the threshold requirement for recovery under the new law
Petitioner does not appear to have raised below or otherwise preserved a claim of equitable estoppel, and neither the ALJ nor the Board addressed an equitable estoppel claim as such. The claim, however, would have no merit in this case. The Supreme Court has never sustained an equitable estoppel claim against the government, see, e.g., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 2469-71, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990), although it has reserved judgment on whether "affirmative misconduct" could support such a claim. See Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 & n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 & n. 12, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1470, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (per curiam); see also United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 912 (3d Cir.1987) (estoppel against the government available upon proof of "affirmative misconduct"); New Jersey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 670 F.2d 1284, 1297 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824, 103 S.Ct. 56, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982). Even were we to hold that the government may be equitably estopped upon a showing of affirmative misconduct, there is no evidence of such misconduct in this record. At the hearing before the ALJ, Mrs. Keener's counsel conceded, "I don't think [the Labor Department] was lying, I think it was misleading," J.A. at 44, and in her brief in this court she states that Ashley's conduct was not "malicious" and "probably seemed entirely innocent to Ashley," Appellant's Br. at 19.
Respondent Department of Labor argues that the purpose of § 725.306(a)(2) is to provide the deputy commissioner the authority he would otherwise lack to "disapprove of a claimant's withdrawal of his claim when such a withdrawal is not in [the claimant's] best interests." Respondent reasons from this premise that petitioner lacks standing to challenge the commissioner's "best interests" determination. Federal Respondent's Br. at 22. We do not read the provision in the way that respondent does. It seems to us that the clear purpose of the provision is to set forth the conditions that must be satisfied before a claimant "may" withdraw his claim, not to empower the deputy commissioner to disapprove a withdrawal request