Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/942/1427/282261/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 06:03:40
Document Index: 123702569

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 304', '§ 1314', '§ 1314', '§ 1314', '§ 1314', '§ 1314', '§ 1314', '§ 1342', '§ 1342', '§ 1369', '§ 46', '§ 46', '§ 1369', '§ 1314', '§ 123', '§ 1251', '§ 702', '§ 1369', '§ 1251', '§ 1314', '§ 123', '§ 1369']

Boise Cascade Corporation; Pope & Talbot, Inc.; Jamesriver Ii, Inc., Petitioners, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (ncap), Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.citizens for a Better Environment, Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent,the Santa Clara Valley Nonpoint Source Dischargers,respondent-intervenor.northwest Coalition for Alternatives, et al., Petitioners, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1991 › Boise Cascade Corporation; Pope & Talbot, Inc.; Jamesriver Ii, Inc., Petitioners, v. United States E...
Boise Cascade Corporation; Pope & Talbot, Inc.; Jamesriver Ii, Inc., Petitioners, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (ncap), Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.citizens for a Better Environment, Petitioner, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent,the Santa Clara Valley Nonpoint Source Dischargers,respondent-intervenor.northwest Coalition for Alternatives, et al., Petitioners, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991) Argued and Submitted Aug. 2, 1991. Decided Aug. 23, 1991. As Amended Oct. 7, 1991
Section 304(l) of the Act requires each state to list all navigable waters for which the state does not expect to be able to achieve applicable water quality standards (the "A list"). § 304(l) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l) (1) (A). States are to submit another list (the "B list") of waters for which the anticipated failure to achieve the relevant standard is due to the discharge of certain toxic pollutants identified in section 1317(a). See id. § 1314(l) (1) (B). States must also identify the point sources responsible for the problem (the "C list"). Id. § 1314(l) (1) (C).5 For each point source listed, the state must devise an "individual control strategy" (ICS) calculated to bring about compliance with the water quality standards within three years of the adoption of the ICS. Id. § 1314(l) (1) (D).
The EPA must approve or disapprove a state's ICS within a specified period of time. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l) (2). If a state fails to submit lists or ICSs, or if EPA disapproves an ICS, the EPA "in cooperation with such State ... shall implement the requirements of paragraph (1) in such States." Id. § 1314(l) (3). See generally Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1990).
The federal-state relationship established by the Act is also illustrated in Congress' goal of encouraging states to "assume the major role in the operation of the NPDES program." Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978); see also American Paper Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 873 & n. 6 (7th Cir. 1989). The Administrator of the EPA is authorized to delegate to individual states the authority to issue NPDES permits themselves, subject to EPA objection. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (d).
When a state has been granted such authority, the EPA must suspend its own authority to issue permits until the Administrator determines that the state is no longer capable of issuing permits and notifies the state that the state's authority to do so is being withdrawn. Id. § 1342(c). The result is "a system for mandatory approval of a conforming State program [which] creates a separate and independent State authority to administer the NPDES pollution control." Shell Oil, 585 F.2d at 410 (quoting Mianus River Preservation Committee v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1976)).
California submitted the section 1314(l) lists to the EPA in February 1989. The South San Francisco Bay was included on the B-list of water segments impaired by the discharge of section 1317(a) toxic pollutants. Area storm drains were identified as point sources contributing to violations of water quality standards. EPA approved the listing decisions, but found that California had missed the February 1989 deadline for submitting an ICS for the storm drain discharges into the South San Francisco Bay. The EPA decision stated:
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1) provides:
Section 1369(b) (1) specifically grants courts of appeals jurisdiction to review only certain EPA actions taken with respect to each of the requirements of the Act.8 The section distinguishes between EPA approvals, determinations and promulgations. Such specificity demonstrates that Congress did not intend court of appeals jurisdiction over all EPA actions taken pursuant to the Act. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 1976) (" [T]he complexity and specificity of section [1369(b) (1) ] in identifying what actions of EPA under the [Clean Water Act] would be reviewable in the courts of appeals suggests that not all such actions are so reviewable.").
Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous. See Sutherland Stat. Const. §§ 46.05, 46.06 (4th ed.1984); see also Aluminum Co. of America v. Bonneville Power Admin., 891 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). We must presume that words used more than once in the same statute have the same meaning. See Sutherland § 46.06.
We hold that for the purposes of section 1369(b) (1), "promulgation" is not the same as "approval." The difference between subsection (G) and subsection (E), which provides for review of EPA decisions "approving or promulgating" effluent limitations, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1) (E), compels this conclusion. See United Technologies Corp. v. OSHA, 836 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1987) (The use of different words in the same sentence of a statute signals that Congress intended to distinguish between them.). To fail to distinguish between "promulgation" and "approval" would either result in a conflict between subsections (E) and (G) or would make superfluous the use of "approval" in subsection (E). We conclude, therefore, that Congress did not consider EPA approval of ICSs to be "promulgation" for the purpose of judicial review pursuant to subsection (G).
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991), in which the court held that the EPA's approval of an ICS is not reviewable under section 1369(b) (1) (G).
The Roll Coater court stated that " [u]ntil the state amends Roll Coater's permit to incorporate the terms of the ICS, there is no review anywhere." Id. at 671. The court did not, however, suggest that once the EPA approved the final permit, jurisdiction in the federal appellate courts existed pursuant to section 1369(b). To the contrary, the court stated that once the state amended the permit "a state court may review the action, including all of the antecedent decisions about the content of the B and C lists." Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the rationale underlying the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 1369 is not based on the finality of the EPA's decisions, but on the distinction the statute draws between approval and promulgation and the fact that in the case of ICSs, Congress intended federal courts to have jurisdiction only where the EPA itself promulgates the ICS.
In anticipation of such a conclusion, the petitioners argue that the EPA has effectively promulgated the ICS in question here. Section 1314(l) (3) states:
33 U.S.C. § 1314(l) (3). The petitioners contend that once the states failed to submit timely ICSs, the EPA's duty to "implement" the paragraph requiring ICSs transforms the EPA's role from oversight to intervention and that any resulting ICS was therefore promulgated by the EPA, no matter who was actually responsible for developing the ICS.
The regulations, however, suggest that even where the EPA is required to implement section 1314(l) (1), the state retains the authority to issue the ICS in most circumstances. 40 C.F.R. § 123.46(f) states:
" [O]nly upon mailing of this notification does such permit issuing authority pass to the EPA." P.H. Glatfelter Co. v. EPA, 921 F.2d 516, 517 (4th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, the mere fact that the EPA cooperates with a state in developing an ICS does not make the ICS an EPA promulgation. In Shell Oil, we held that even if a state's decision to issue or deny an NPDES permit was made pursuant to EPA instructions, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the decision because it was not an EPA action issuing or denying the permit, as required by section 1369(b) (1) (F). 585 F.2d at 411.
Our interpretation of the EPA's duty to implement the Act is consistent with the purpose of the Act to afford states as much control as possible over implementation and enforcement of pollution controls. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Maximizing state control also suggests that federal courts should review ICS decisions only when the ICS was actually developed by the EPA, leaving review of state-developed ICSs to state courts. See Roll Coater, 932 F.2d at 671 (Once the state develops a final NPDES permit as an ICS, "a state court may review the action."). This is precisely the system formalized by Congress in allowing federal review of ICS decisions only where the ICS is "promulgat [ed]" by the EPA. Cf. American Paper Institute, 890 F.2d at 874-75 (Under the Act, a final state-issued NPDES permit, although subject to EPA approval, is subject to judicial review in state court.).
In the present cases, the EPA satisfied its duty to implement section 1314(l) by requiring the states to modify and complete the ICSs. The EPA did not demonstrate any intention to issue the ICSs itself or to rescind the states' authority to issue NPDES permits. This was a reasonable manner of implementing section 1314(l) because the states had completed studies of their toxic problems and had already begun to develop permit requirements.
The petitioners further argue that if the EPA's approval of California's ICS is not reviewable in this court, there will be an irrational bifurcation of review between federal courts of appeals and district courts. This argument assumes that if federal courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review EPA action regarding ICSs under section 1369(b) (1), such action is reviewable in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 702.9
The bifurcation envisioned by the petitioners might occur if a state does not have any procedure for reviewing decisions regarding an ICS.10 It is unclear, however, whether such a situation exists. It is also unclear how this limited potential for bifurcation in federal court would require us to disregard Congress' intent to ensure that States retain the primary responsibility in the restoration and maintenance of their waters. Any bifurcation problem is simply the logical consequence of the interrelationship of sections 1369(b) (1) (G) and 1342(d).
The petitions are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The EPA and the Santa Clara Valley Nonpoint Source Dischargers' request for attorney's fees in No. 91-70056 is DENIED. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (3) (fee awards to prevailing parties left to court's discretion).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b); see also American Paper Institute, 890 F.2d 869, 873 n. 6 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting numerous similar expressions of congressional intent found in the legislative history of the Act).
Section 1369(b) (1) provides for review in the federal courts of appeals of
the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any standard of performance under section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any determination pursuant to section 1316(b) (1) (C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent standard, prohibition, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, (D) in making any determination as to a State permit program submitted under section 1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title, (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342 of this title, and (G) in promulgating any individual control strategy under section 1314(1) of this title.
It appears that even states not authorized to issue NPDES permits, must develop and submit ICSs themselves, even though ICSs are to be developed in the form of NPDES permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l) (1) (lists of impaired waters and ICSs to be submitted by "each state"); 40 C.F.R. § 123.46(a), (c). In such a case, federal court review of the substance of the ICS might be possible. In such states, once the ICS is approved, the permit itself must be issued by the EPA. Section 1369(b) (1) (F) grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review EPA actions "in issuing or denying" NPDES permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1) (F). A challenge to the issuance of a permit on the ground that the ICS on which it was based was not properly developed would essentially be a challenge of the ICS itself