Source: http://www.vkblaw.com/news/eightysix.htm
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 04:22:46
Document Index: 234779744

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 606', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 1241', '§ 212', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 212', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 212', '§ 1', '§ 235', '§ 1225', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 1', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 301', '§ 235', '§ 1225', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 1251', '§ 235', '§ 1225', '§ 1', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 242', '§ 1252', '§ 2', '§ 235', '§ 1225', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 212', '§ 235', '§ 235', '§ 240', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 2', '§ 212', '§ 553', '§ 236', '§ 3', '§ 236', '§ 236', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 212', '§ 236', '§ 212', '§ 1182', '§ 3', '§ 235', '§ 1225', '§ 235', '§ 235']

Official Policy on Cuban Adjustment
U.S. INS Policy on Cuban Adjustment
I have concluded that the same reasoning applies to inadmissibility for having arrived at a place other than a designated port-of-entry. Aliens arriving in this manner have been eligible for CAA adjustment for many years. Congress recently reaffirmed the availability of this adjustment provision, by enacting that the CAA is to continue in force until there is a democratic government in Cuba. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1966 (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C. § 606(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-695. Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA was designed to complement the new legal doctrine, enacted as part of IIRAIRA, under which aliens who come into the United States without inspection are inadmissible, rather than deportable, aliens. Compare INA §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1225(a)(1) with 8 U.S.C. § 1241(a)(1)(B)(1994). Nothing in the legislative history of these changes suggests that Congress also intended to make aliens who arrive in the United States away from ports-of-entry ineligible for CAA adjustment.
Finally, the Office or the General Counsel has advised the Service concerning the relationship between parole under § 212(d)(5) and "release" under § 236. Memorandum from Paul W. Virtue to Executive Associate Commissioners for Policy and Planning and for Field Operations, and to Regional, District and Sector Counsels (August 21, 1998). In a case involving an applicant for admission, the General Counsel concluded that
…release under § 236 of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (d)(1) should not be seen as a separate form of relief from custody. Any release of an applicant for admission from custody, without resolution of his or her admissibility, is a parole. (Citations omitted.) In the case of an applicant for admission who is not an "arriving alien," therefore, § 212(d)(5)(A) and § 236 should be seen as complementary, rather than as alternative release mechanisms.
Id. at 3. For this reason, if the Service releases from custody an alien who is an applicant for admission because the alien is present in the United States without having been admitted, the alien has been paroled. This conclusion applies even if the Service officer who authorized the release thought there was a legal distinction between paroling an applicant for admission and releasing an applicant for admission under § 236. When the Service releases from custody an alien who is an applicant for admission because he or she is present without inspection, the Form I-94 should bear that standard annotation that shows that the alien has been paroled under § 212(d)(5)(A). [1]
[1] It way be the case that the Service has released an alien who is an applicant for admission because he or she is present without inspection, without providing the alien with a parole Form I-94. In this case, the Service will issue a parole Form I-94 upon the alien's asking for one, and satisfying the Service that the alien is the alien who was released. The Service will then update the Service records concerning the alien to reflect the fact that the alien has been paroled.
[Editor's Note: Attached below is Paul Virtue's August 21, 1998 INS memorandum, as mentioned above.]
Memorandum For: Executive Associate Commissioner For Policy and Planning
All. District Counsels
All Sector Counsels
Subject: Authority to parole applicants for admission who are not also arriving aliens
This memorandum addresses the following issue, which has arisen recently in several cases in the Miami district:
Does the Service have authority to parole an applicant for admission who is not also an "arriving alien," as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q)?
Aliens who were once deportable for having entered without inspection are now considered in law to be applicants for admission, id. § 235(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)(A), who are inadmissible, Id. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). As aliens applying for admission, they are within the scope of the statutory parole authority. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). The Service has authority, therefore, to parole an applicant for admission who is not also an "arriving alien," as defined by 8 C.F.R, § 1.1(q). It remains the case, however, that parole is an act of discretion, not an entitlement. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
This question over the extent of the parole authority arises because of two significant amendments to the immigration laws enacted in 1996. INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 235, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1225, as amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRAIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C, §§ 301(c) and 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-578, 3009-579. First, aliens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled are now deemed to be applicants for admission, id. § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), who are inadmissible, id. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Before this amendment, of course, alien who had entered the United States without having been inspected were amenable to deportation, rather than to exclusion, proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994). Second, Congress has now provided for an expedited removal proceeding, conducted by a Service officer, rather than an immigration judge. INA § 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A). The Service may invoke this procedure if an alien "who is arriving in the United States" is inadmissible because the alien does not have the required passport or visa, or because the alien obtained a passport or visa by fraud or material misrepresentation. The Service has defined by regulation which aliens are to be considered "arriving aliens." 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q), as amended, 63 Fed. Reg. 19,382, 19,383 (1998). The consequence of these two amendments is that there are now two categories of applicants for admission: those who are arriving aliens, and those who are not. See, e.g. 62 Fed Reg. 444, 444-5 (1997).[1]
INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), gives the Attorney General authority to parole from custody "an alien applying for admission" who would otherwise be held in custody until the Attorney General had resolved whether to admit or remove the alien. In order to exercise this authority, the Attorney General must find, on a case-by-case basis, either that "urgent humanitarian reasons" justify the parole, or that paroling the alien will yield a "significant public benefit." Id. Even if the Attorney General finds that either factor exists, parole remains a matter of discretion. In fact, there is no judicial review of the exercise of this discretion. Id. § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Attorney General has delegated this parole authority to the Service. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1.
As we have already noted, aliens who were once deportable for having entered without inspection are now considered in law to be applicants for admission, id. § 235(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)(A), who are inadmissible, id. § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). As aliens applying for admission, they are within the scope of the statutory parole authority. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
The question whether there is authority to parole these aliens arises not from tile statute itself, but from an implementing regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5. Section 212.5(a) specifies circumstances in which it is, generally, appropriate to parole aliens "detained in accordance with § 235.3(b) or (c)." Id. Sections 235.3(b) and (c), in turn, refer not to the universal set of all applicants for admission, but to the subset of arriving aliens. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (arriving aliens subject to expedited removal) and (c) (arriving aliens subject to § 240 removal proceedings. [2] Section 212.5(b) refers to "all other arriving aliens." 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Neither § 212.5(a) nor § 212.5(b) addresses the parole of applicants for admission who are not also "arriving aliens." Neither provision, therefore, purports to prohibit the Service from exercising the Attorney General's broad statutory parole authority in the case of an applicant for admission who is not an "arriving alien."
For two reasons, we conclude that § 212.5 cannot correctly be read as exhausting the Service's parole authority. First, nothing in § 212.5 expressly purports to forbid the parole of applicants for admission who are not also arriving aliens. Section 212.5 simply says nothing at all about that issue. Second, as we have noted, the Attorney General has delegated to the Commissioner the fullness of the Attorney General's statutory authority under the INA, except for matters delegated to the Executive Office for Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1. The Service, therefore, may parole anyone whom the Attorney General may parole.
We are mindful of the protracted litigation that resulted in the Supreme Court's judgment in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). But our reading of § 212.5 is an expansive, not a restrictive, application of the parole authority. A rule that said, in effect, that the parole authority is as broad as the statute says it is, would clearly be an interpretative rule. There is no obligation to publish interpretative rules in accordance with the APA. 5 U.S.C § 553(b)(A) and (d)(2).
We are also aware of the argument that our conclusion, in effect, gives an inadmissible applicant for admission who is not an arriving alien "two bites at the apple" in seeking release from custody. If the Service denies a parole request, the alien may seek release from the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1). The restrictions on the immigration judge's authority would not apply, since the alien is not an "arriving alien." Cf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.19(h)(1)(B) and (2)(I)(B) and 236.1(c)(11), as amended, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,448-49 (1998). But release under § 236 of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) should not be seen as a separate form of relief from custody. Any release of an applicant for admission from custody, without resolution of his or her admissibility, is a parole. See INA §§ 101(a)(13)(B) and 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(13)(B) and 1182(d)(5)(A); Leng May Ma v. Barber 357 U.S. 185, 189 (1958); Matter of L-Y-Y-, 9 I&N Dec. 70, 71 (BIA 1960). In the case of an applicant for admission who is not an "arriving alien," therefore, § 212(d)(5)(A) and § 236 should be seen as complementary, rather than as alternative release mechanisms. We realize that the traditional rule has been that neither the Board nor an immigration judge had authority to exercise the parole authority. Matter on Conceiro, 14 I&N Dec. 278, 281 (BIA 1973). But the Board based this rule on the fact that the Attorney General had established by regulation that only the Service could exercise the parole authority on the Attorney General's behalf. Id. The statute itself does not forbid delegation of the parole authority to officials who are not Service officers. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
The Service may consider it imprudent, as a matter of policy, to permit an immigration judge to adjudicate requests for release made by applicants for admission who are not arriving aliens. The way to achieve this policy, however, is to ask the Attorney General to amend 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.19 and 236.1. Taking the position that the Service has no authority to parole in these cases does not amend the regulations that appear to permit an immigration judge to adjudicate a request for release, if the applicant for admission is not an arriving alien.
[1] The Attorney General has the authority to invoke the expedited removal proceeding against an alien who is inadmissible because he or she is present in the United States without admission or parole, if the alien has been physically present for less than 2 years. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). To date, neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner has chosen to exercise this authority. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii), of 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,313 (1996).
[2] Section 235.3(b) also refers to applicants for admission who are not arriving aliens, but who are inadmissible, and subject to expedited removal, because they are present without admission or parole, but have been present for less than two years. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii). No aliens currently belong to this subset, since neither the Attorney General nor the Commissioner has provided for the use of expedited removal proceedings for these aliens.