Source: http://www.laag.us/2008/01/connecticut-supreme-court-bans-piccolo.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-23 03:12:29
Document Index: 801451086

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 2', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 51', '§ 65', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 2', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29', '§ 29']

Lakewood Accountability Action Group™ LAAG | www.LAAG.us | Lakewood, CA: Connecticut Supreme Court bans Piccolo Petes
Connecticut Supreme Court bans Piccolo Petes
This is just an example of the lengths that the fire and smoke sellers will go to get the ability to "legally" sell a firework. What do you think was a stake for TNT fireworks in one ban in one state on one firework? Clearly a very profitable Chinese made firework that clearly must be a top seller due to its ability to annoy (via noise) and to be modified into an illegal firework that shoots in the air. That popularity and money must have been the reason TNT took the issue all the way to the Conn. Sup. Court. Looks to me like most states really dont have a chance against this kind of power. This reminds me of how the tobacco companies react to bans and advertising laws. They run to court as fast as possible. Cigarettes are on the run. Lets hope with anti-pollution laws and global warming that "personal fireworks" (those you use at home) will eventually loose favor with a more educated consumer. Once Hummers start to loose favor I think the tide may start to turn on the fireworks sellers.Court Silences FireworkJustices: 'Piccolo' Plays Too Dangerous A TuneBy LYNNE TUOHY | Courant Staff WriterJanuary 12, 2008The state Supreme Court often decides weighty matters, such as the constitutionality of the death penalty or whether gay and lesbian couples have a right to marry.Sometimes its rulings involve more fanciful issues, such as Friday's determination of whether the "Piccolo Pete" firework is a harmless sparkler or a pyrotechnic firecracker banned by state law.Suffice to say, you can no longer buy a Piccolo Pete in Connecticut.Prior to June of 2000, all fireworks were illegal in Connecticut. Effective June 1 of that year, the legislature carved out an exception for sparklers and "fountains" that spewed sparks or smoke, but were considered nonexplosive. Enter Piccolo Pete, marketed by American Promotional Events, doing business as TNT Fireworks.Five years later, however, the state fire marshal and state police personnel scrutinized Piccolo Pete and concluded that it is a potentially unsafe pyrotechnic that emits a 4- to 5-inch flame that lasts up to six seconds. It also produces some sparks, some smoke and a loud whistle.Attorney General Richard Blumenthal issued a cease and desist order in 2005, barring TNT from selling the Piccolo Pete. TNT complied, but also appealed to the trial court, which determined that Piccolo Pete was a "fountain" firework and exempt from the state ban. The court told Blumenthal that he could not prevent TNT from marketing Piccolo Pete.The trial involved a clash of the experts.Wayne Maheu, head of the state Department of Public Safety's division of fire, emergency and building services, testified that Piccolo Pete emits some smoke and sparks, but that its "dominant feature" is its flame.John Conkling, a chemist and frequent expert witness for the fireworks industry, countered that Piccolo Pete's most striking feature is its whistle, and that all sparklers and fountains involve some flame. He said that the firework meets the criteria for being exempt from the ban —that it is nonexplosive, non-aerial and contains 100 grams or less of pyrotechnic material.The trial court concluded that because Piccolo Pete emits some smoke, it falls within the definition of "fountain" fireworks that are exempt from the ban. Fountain fireworks, by law, must emit a "shower" of sparks or smoke as their dominant feature.The state Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision released Friday, reversed the trial court and doomed Piccolo Pete to the status of a banned firework. It did so through statutory analysis, while acknowledging that a "shower of smoke is not a commonly used term," Justice Richard N. Palmer wrote."In view of the fact that fireworks are widely banned and otherwise intensively regulated under our statutory scheme, it would be contrary to that scheme to construe it as permitting a dangerous and otherwise prohibited pyrotechnic effect — in the present case, a four to five inch exposed flame that lasts up to six seconds — merely because the pyrotechnic effect is produced by a firework that also emits a shower of colored sparks or smoke," Palmer wrote.The high court could have remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the smoke emitted by Piccolo Pete satisfies the "shower of smoke" standard required to be exempt from the ban. Instead, the justices watched the same video demonstration "of an ignited Piccolo Pete" that the trial court did and determined that no one reasonably could conclude that the smoke emitted by the firework constituted "a shower of smoke."Contact Lynne Tuohy at ltuohy@courant.com.AMERICAN PROMOTIONAL EVENTS, INC. v.RICHARD BLUMENTHAL ET AL.(SC 17868)Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.*Argued May 15, 2007—officially released January 22, 2008Terrence M. O’Neill, assistant attorney general, withwhom was Michael J. Lanoue, assistant attorney general,and, on the brief, Henri Alexandre, assistant attorneygeneral, for the appellants (defendants).F. Jerome O’Malley, for the appellee (plaintiff).OpinionPALMER, J. The sole issue raised by this appeal iswhether the trial court correctly concluded that a fireworkknown and marketed as ‘‘Piccolo Pete’’ is a ‘‘fountain’’within the meaning of General Statutes § 29-3561and, therefore, exempt from the general prohibitionagainst fireworks contained in General Statutes § 29-357.2 The plaintiff, American Promotional Events, Inc.,doing business as TNT Fireworks, brought this actionseeking declaratory and injunctive relief after thenamed defendant, Richard Blumenthal, the attorneygeneral of the state of Connecticut,3 issued a cease anddesist order directing the plaintiff to cease any furthersales or distribution of Piccolo Pete. The trial courtrendered judgment for the plaintiff, concluding that PiccoloPete is an exempt ‘‘fountain’’ for purposes of §§ 29-356 (3) and 29-357 (a). The trial court also enjoined thestate from preventing or seeking to prevent the plaintifffrom selling or distributing Piccolo Pete in this state. Onappeal,4 the state claims that the trial court incorrectlyconcluded that Piccolo Pete is a fountain and, therefore,subject to the statutory exemption applicable to suchproducts. We agree with the state and, accordingly,reverse the judgment of the trial court.The following undisputed factual and proceduralbackground is relevant to our resolution of the state’sclaim. The plaintiff is an Alabama corporation engagedin the wholesale and retail sale and distribution of consumerfireworks. The plaintiff has been doing businessin this state since about June, 2000, principally throughlarge, retail chain stores. Among the products that theplaintiff sells and distributes is Piccolo Pete, a fireworkthat, upon ignition, emits a flame, some sparks andsmoke, and a loud whistling noise.For some time prior to June 1, 2000, the use andsale of fireworks generally, including sparklers, wasprohibited in this state. On that date, however, the legislaturepassed Public Acts 2000, No. 00-198 (P.A. 00-198), which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1999)§§ 29-356 and 29-357. Under that amendment, the unauthorizeduse and sale of fireworks continued to bebanned. See P.A. 00-198, § 2. Although sparklers wereincluded in the definition of fireworks, the legislaturecarved out an exception for the sale and use of sparklersthat were nonexplosive, nonaerial and did not containmore than 100 grams of pyrotechnic mixture per item.Id., codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 29-357(a).5 Piccolo Pete meets those requirements, and theplaintiff sold and distributed Piccolo Pete as a sparklerin reliance on the provisions of P.A. 00-198.In June, 2005, however, personnel from the office ofthe state fire marshal of the department of public safetyconducted a field test of Piccolo Pete after being alertedby local fire marshals that the product potentially wasunsafe. The test revealed that, when ignited, PiccoloPete produces sparks, smoke, a whistling noise and afour to five inch open flame that lasts for five to sixseconds. On June 27, 2005, acting on the state fire marshal’sdetermination that Piccolo Pete was not a sparklerwithin the meaning of General Statutes (Rev. to2005) § 29-357 (a),6 the attorney general issued a ceaseand desist order requiring, inter alia, that the plaintiffimmediately discontinue the sale and distribution ofPiccolo Pete.7 The plaintiff complied with the cease anddesist order8 but thereafter commenced the presentaction seeking both a declaratory judgment that PiccoloPete is a lawful product and an injunction prohibitingthe state from bringing or threatening to bring anyenforcement action against it for the distribution orsale of Piccolo Pete in this state.While the plaintiff’s action was pending in the trialcourt, the legislature again amended §§ 29-356 and 29-357 in 2006. Public Acts 2006, No. 06-177, §§ 1 and 2(P.A. 06-177) (effective June 9, 2006).9 Under the amendments,‘‘ ‘[s]parklers’ ’’ are defined as a ‘‘wire or stickcoated with pyrotechnic composition that produces ashower of sparks upon ignition’’; id., § 1, codified atGeneral Statutes § 29-356 (2); and ‘‘ ‘[f]ountain’ ’’ isdefined in relevant part as ‘‘any cardboard or heavypaper cone or cylindrical tube containing pyrotechnicmixture that upon ignition produces a shower of coloredsparks or smoke. . . .’’ P.A. 06-177, § 1, codifiedat General Statutes § 29-356 (3). Although neither sparklersnor fountains fall within the statutory definitionof fireworks; see General Statutes § 29-356 (1); it isunlawful to use, sell or distribute sparklers and fountainsunless they are nonexplosive, nonaerial and containnot more than 100 grams of pyrotechnic mixtureper item.10 General Statutes § 29-357 (a). In fact, theunlawful use, sale or distribution of sparklers and fountainsis subject to criminal sanctions.11 General Statutes§ 29-357 (d).At trial, both parties presented expert testimonyregarding the pyrotechnic characteristics of PiccoloPete. Wayne H. Maheu, executive director of the divisionof fire, emergency and building services of thedepartment of public safety, testified for the state.According to Maheu, the field tests that he had conductedon behalf of the office of the state fire marshalrevealed that Piccolo Pete produced an exposed flameof approximately four to five inches in height and fiveto six seconds in duration. Maheu further testified thatPiccolo Pete emits only a limited amount of smokeand sparks, and that the product’s dominant feature orattraction is its flame. Maheu also indicated that he wasnot aware of any other firework marketed or sold inConnecticut that produces a flame as large as the flameproduced by Piccolo Pete.John A. Conkling testified as an expert witness forthe plaintiff. Conkling is a chemist and consultant whoregularly testifies as an expert for the American PyrotechnicsAssociation, the primary trade association ofthe fireworks industry. Conkling testified that all sparklersand fountains have some sort of flame associatedwith them, that Piccolo Pete’s most striking pyrotechniceffect is its whistle, and that a four to five inch flamewith a five to six second duration is not inconsistentwith the pyrotechnic effects of a fountain. In additionto hearing the expert testimony, the trial court vieweda video demonstration of an ignited Piccolo Pete.12In support of its claim that Piccolo Pete is exemptfrom the prohibition of § 29-357, the plaintiff maintainedthat Piccolo Pete emits a shower of colored sparks, isnonexplosive and nonaerial, and contains not more than100 grams of pyrotechnic mixture. The state maintainedthat Piccolo Pete’s flame is its primary pyrotechniceffect and that Piccolo Pete does not produce sufficientsparks to constitute a ‘‘shower’’ of sparks within themeaning of § 29-356 (2) or (3).The trial court issued a memorandum of decisiondenying the plaintiff’s request for declaratory andinjunctive relief. The court concluded that, althoughPiccolo Pete does emit ‘‘some smoke and sparks from[its] flame,’’ it does not produce a ‘‘shower’’ of sparkswithin the meaning of § 29-356 (2) or (3) and, therefore,is not a sparkler or fountain within the meaning of thosestatutory provisions.The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to reargue inwhich it asserted, for the first time, that, under § 29-356 (3), a firework that produces either a ‘‘shower ofcolored sparks or smoke’’ is a fountain as long as italso is nonexplosive, nonaerial and does not containmore than 100 grams of pyrotechnic mixture. (Emphasisaltered.) The plaintiff further maintained that,because Piccolo Pete produces at least some smokeand otherwise meets the requirements of § 29-356 (3),it is a fountain and, therefore, exempt from the generalban on fireworks. See General Statutes § 29-357 (a). Inresponse to the plaintiff’s motion, the state claimedthat § 29-356 (3) must be construed to require either ashower of colored sparks or a shower of smoke.According to the state, Piccolo Pete does not satisfythe latter requirement because it only produces a smallamount of smoke, and the minimal amount of smokethat it does produce is ancillary to its primary pyrotechniceffect, which, the state asserted, is its four to fiveinch flame.The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion and,after reargument, issued a second memorandum ofdecision in which it concluded that, ‘‘since Piccolo Peteemits smoke,’’ it is a fountain within the meaning of§ 29-356 (3). In accordance with its conclusion, the trialcourt rendered judgment for the plaintiff and issued aninjunction prohibiting the state from taking any actionagainst the plaintiff or its retail agents for selling ordistributing Piccolo Pete.On appeal, the state claims that the trial court incorrectlyconcluded that Piccolo Pete is a fountain withinthe meaning of § 29-356 (3) merely because it emitssmoke. In particular, the state maintains that, to fallwithin the statutory definition of ‘‘fountain,’’ a fireworkthat does not produce a shower of sparks must, alternatively,produce a shower of smoke, not just some smoke,and otherwise meet the requirements of § 29-356 (3).13In support of its claim, the state notes, and the plaintiffconcedes, that all fireworks produce at least somesmoke,14 and, therefore, to construe § 29-356 (3) asmerely requiring the emission of smoke, no matter howsmall the amount, would render superfluous the provisionof § 29-356 (3) exempting fireworks that producea ‘‘shower of colored sparks . . . .’’ The state furthermaintains that, reading §§ 29-356 and 29-357 together,it is apparent that the legislature did not intend to grantan exemption to an otherwise prohibited firework unlessthe firework’s predominant pyrotechnic effect isa shower of sparks or a shower of smoke. The statecontends that Piccolo Pete fails that test because thefour to five inch flame that Piccolo Pete produces, andnot the smoke that it emits, is the product’s primarypyrotechnic effect. We agree with the state.15The state’s claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation.‘‘It is well settled that in construing statutes,[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and giveeffect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .[W]e seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, themeaning of the statutory language as applied to thefacts of [the] case, including the question of whetherthe language actually does apply.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp.,277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006). To ascertainthe meaning of a statute, we look first to the text ofstatute itself and its relationship to other statutes. GeneralStatutes § 1-2z. If the statute is not plain and unambiguous,16 ‘‘we also look for interpretive guidance tothe legislative history and circumstances surroundingits enactment, to the legislative policy it was designedto implement, and to its relationship to . . . commonlaw principles governing the same general subject matter.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fedus v. Planning& Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751, 756, 900A.2d 1 (2006). Finally, we review the trial court’s constructionof the relevant statutory provisions de novo.See, e.g., Greco v. United Technologies Corp., supra,348.General Statutes § 29-356 (3) defines ‘‘ ‘[f]ountain’’ as‘‘any cardboard or heavy paper cone or cylindrical tubecontaining pyrotechnic mixture that upon ignition producesa shower of colored sparks or smoke.’’ (Emphasisadded.) The trial court concluded that Piccolo Pete isa fountain because it produces some smoke and otherwisemeets the requirements of § 29-356 (3). See footnote1 of this opinion. Under the court’s interpretationof § 29-356 (3), however, the language ‘‘shower of coloredsparks’’ is mere surplusage because it is undisputedthat all fountains—indeed, all fireworks—produce at least some smoke.Interpreting a statute to render some of its languagesuperfluous violates cardinal principles of statutoryinterpretation. ‘‘It is a basic tenet of statutory constructionthat the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaninglessprovisions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 602, 758 A.2d 327 (2000);see also Vibert v. Board of Education, 260 Conn. 167,176, 793 A.2d 1076 (2002) (‘‘in interpreting a statute,we do not interpret some clauses of a statute in a mannerthat nullifies other clauses but, rather, read thestatute as a whole in order to reconcile all of its parts’’).‘‘[I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is apurpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase usedin an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. Going Forward,Inc., 281 Conn. 417, 424, 915 A.2d 298 (2007).Because ‘‘[e]very word and phrase [of a statute] is presumedto have meaning’’; Vibert v. Board of Education,supra, 176; § 29-356 (3) must be construed, ‘‘if possible,such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous,void or insignificant.’’ (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn.279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003). In view of the fact thatthe term ‘‘shower of colored sparks’’ is surplusage underthe trial court’s construction of § 29-356 (3), we rejectthat construction. By contrast, the interpretation of§ 29-356 (3) that the state advocates, namely, that thesmoke produced must be a shower of smoke and notmerely any amount of smoke, gives full meaning to allof the statutory language.We acknowledge that the term ‘‘shower of smoke’’is not a commonly used term and that, under differentcircumstances, we might be reluctant to construe astatutory provision so as to ascribe such a meaning toit. We are persuaded, however, that, as between theconstruction that the state advocates, which affordsmeaning to all of the language of § 29-356 (3), and thetrial court’s construction, which renders superfluous aportion of the statute, the former construction is thebetter, more plausible one. Moreover, we believe that,by using the term ‘‘shower’’ of smoke, the legislaturewas seeking to ensure that, to be classified as a fountain,the firework must produce either a significant amountof sparks or a significant amount of smoke, the effectsthat represent the salient pyrotechnic characteristicsof the particular type of firework known as a fountain.We also agree with the state that §§ 29-356 and 29-357, when read together and in proper context, evincea legislative intent that a firework shall be deemed tofall within the limited exemption for sparklers and fountainsonly if the primary or principal pyrotechnic effectof the firework is the pyrotechnic effect that the legislatureexpressly has permitted. Under § 29-356 (3), a fountainis defined as a cardboard or heavy paper cone ortube that produces a shower of colored sparks or smoke.Because § 29-356 (3) does not mention any other pyrotechniceffect, the defining pyrotechnic attribute orcharacteristic of a fountain is the shower of coloredsparks or smoke that it produces. Of course, neitherof those two effects can be achieved without ignition,which requires a flame that, in turn, necessarily causesat least some smoke. Both the flame and resultingsmoke, however, are ancillary to the fountain’s primarypyrotechnic effect of sparks or smoke.17 In other words,a firework whose primary pyrotechnic effect is not ashower of colored sparks or smoke simply is not afountain within the meaning of § 29-356 (3).We find support for this conclusion in § 29-357. Underthat statutory section, the legislature has broadly prohibitedthe use and sale of most fireworks that posesignificant public safety concerns because of their combustibility.Indeed, prior to 2000, the use or sale of anyfirework was prohibited in this state. In view of thefact that fireworks are widely banned and otherwiseintensively regulated under our statutory scheme, itwould be contrary to that scheme to construe it aspermitting a dangerous and otherwise prohibited pyrotechniceffect—in the present case, a four to five inchexposed flame that lasts up to six seconds—merelybecause that pyrotechnic effect is produced by a fireworkthat also emits a shower of colored sparks orsmoke. See, e.g., Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commissionon Human Rights & Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127,136, 827 A.2d 659 (2003) (when construing statutes,we consider, inter alia, ‘‘the policy that the legislaturesought to implement in enacting the statute’’). In urgingus to adopt its interpretation of §§ 29-356 and 29-357,the plaintiff not only ignores the overriding public safetypurpose of our statutes governing the use and sale offireworks, it also seeks a result that the legislature reasonablycould not have contemplated. See, e.g., ModernCigarette, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 105, 120, 774 A.2d969 (2001) (in construing statutes, courts must use commonsense and presume that legislature intended reasonableand rational result); see also Vibert v. Boardof Education, supra, 260 Conn. 177 (statutes should beconstrued to avoid bizarre or absurd results).The plaintiff asserts that the rule of lenity, whichprovides that penal laws generally are to be construedstrictly against the state; see, e.g., State v. King, 249Conn. 645, 681, 735 A.2d 267 (1999) (‘‘[c]riminal statutesare not to be read more broadly than their languageplainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to beresolved in favor of the defendant’’ [internal quotationmarks omitted]); requires us to read § 29-356 (3) asauthorizing the use and sale of fireworks that otherwisemeet the requirements of §§ 29-356 and 29-357 if thosefireworks produce some smoke. We are not persuadedby this argument. ‘‘[T]he touchstone of [the] rule oflenity is statutory ambiguity. . . . Thus, as the UnitedStates Supreme Court has explained, courts do notapply the rule of lenity unless a reasonable doubt persistsabout the statute’s intended scope even after resortto the language and structure, legislative history, andmotivating policies of the statute. . . . Moskal v.United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S. Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed. 2d 449 (1990); accord State v. Jason B., [248 Conn.543, 555, 729 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967, 120S. Ct. 406, 145 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1999)]; see also Albernazv. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 67L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981) (Lenity thus serves only as an aidfor resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to begetone. The rule comes into operation at the end of theprocess of construing what [the legislature] hasexpressed, not at the beginning as an overriding considerationof being lenient to wrongdoers. . . .); State v.Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 556 n.15, 816 A.2d 562(2003) (rejecting contention that rule of lenity applieswhenever defendant musters plausible interpretationof criminal statute); State v. Albert, 252 Conn. 795, 803,750 A.2d 1037 (2000) (rule of lenity does not requirestatutory interpretation that frustrates evident legislativeintent).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198, 219–20,853 A.2d 434 (2004). Upon reviewing the language, context,legislative genealogy and purpose of §§ 29-356 and29-357, we conclude that no reasonable doubt exists asto whether § 29-356 (3) requires the emission only ofsome discernible amount of smoke. Therefore, the ruleof lenity is inapplicable.18 See id., 220.Having concluded that the plaintiff was required todemonstrate that Piccolo Pete produces a sufficientamount of smoke to constitute a ‘‘shower’’ of smoke,we also must determine whether the record is sufficientto permit a finding that Piccolo Pete satisfies that statutoryrequirement. We conclude that the record is insufficientto support such a finding. Although the trial courtfound that Piccolo Pete produced some smoke, just asit produces some sparks, the court made no finding asto whether Piccolo Pete produces a shower of smoke.19Although it might be argued that ‘‘some’’ smoke doesnot satisfy the requirement of a shower of smoke anymore than ‘‘some’’ sparks satisfy the requirement of ashower of sparks, ordinarily, we likely would be requiredto remand the case to the trial court for a findingon the issue of whether Piccolo Pete emits sufficientsmoke to constitute a shower of smoke. We need notdo so in the present case, however, because we havereviewed the same video demonstration of an ignitedPiccolo Pete that the trial court reviewed, and it is clearfrom that video demonstration that (1) Piccolo Peteproduces only a small amount of smoke, (2) the smokethat Piccolo Pete does emit is merely the ancillary byproductof the flame that Piccolo Pete produces andnot the primary or predominant pyrotechnic effect ofthe firework,20 and (3) that smoke cannot possibly becharacterized as a shower of smoke within the meaningof § 29-356 (3). Accordingly, no trial court reasonablycould conclude that Piccolo Pete is a fountain withinthe meaning of § 29-356 (3).The judgment is reversed and the case is remandedwith direction to render judgment for the defendants.In this opinion the other justices concurred.* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status as of the date oforal argument.1 General Statutes § 29-356 provides: ‘‘(1) ‘Fireworks’ means and includesany combustible or explosive composition, or any substance or combinationof substances or article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible oran audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation, andincludes blank cartridges, toy pistols, toy cannons, toy canes or toy gunsin which explosives are used, the type of balloons which require fire underneathto propel the same, firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets, Roman candles,Daygo bombs, and any fireworks containing any explosive or flammablecompound, or any tablets or other device containing any explosive substance,except that the term ‘fireworks’ shall not include sparklers andfountains and toy pistols, toy canes, toy guns or other devices in whichpaper caps manufactured in accordance with the regulations of the UnitedStates Interstate Commerce Commission or its successor agency for packingand shipping of toy paper caps are used and toy pistol paper caps manufacturedas provided therein.‘‘(2) ‘Sparklers’ means a wire or stick coated with pyrotechnic compositionthat produces a shower of sparks upon ignition.‘‘(3) ‘Fountain’ means any cardboard or heavy paper cone or cylindricaltube containing pyrotechnic mixture that upon ignition produces a showerof colored sparks or smoke. ‘Fountain’ includes, but is not limited to, (A)a spike fountain, which provides a spike for insertion into the ground, (B)a base fountain which has a wooden or plastic base for placing on theground, or (C) a handle fountain which is a handheld device with a woodenor cardboard handle.’’All references in this opinion to § 29-356 are to the current revision unlessotherwise indicated.2 General Statutes § 29-357 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Except as providedin subsection (b) of this section, no person, firm or corporation shalloffer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail or use or explode or possesswith intent to sell, use or explode any fireworks. A person who is sixteenyears of age or older may offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail,purchase, use or possess with intent to sell or use sparklers or fountainsof not more than one hundred grams of pyrotechnic mixture per item, whichare nonexplosive and nonaerial, provided (1) such sparklers and fountainsdo not contain magnesium, except for magnalium or magnesium-aluminumalloy, (2) such sparklers and fountains containing any chlorate or perchloratesalts do not exceed five grams of composition per item, and (3) when morethan one fountain is mounted on a common base, the total pyrotechniccomposition does not exceed two hundred grams.‘‘(b) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt reasonable regulations, in accordancewith chapter 54, for the granting of permits for supervised displaysof fireworks or for the indoor use of pyrotechnics, sparklers and fountainsfor special effects by municipalities, fair associations, amusement parks,other organizations or groups of individuals or artisans in pursuit of theirtrade. . . .‘‘(d) Any person, firm or corporation violating the provisions of this sectionshall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not morethan ninety days or be both fined and imprisoned, except that (1) any person,firm or corporation violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this sectionby offering for sale, exposing for sale or selling at retail or possessing withintent to sell any fireworks with a value exceeding ten thousand dollars shallbe guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and (2) any person, firm or corporationviolating any provision of subsection (b) of this section or any regulationadopted thereunder shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except if deathor injury results from any such violation, such person, firm or corporationshall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not morethan ten years, or both.’’All references in this opinion to § 29-357 are to the current revision unlessotherwise indicated.3 Leonard C. Boyle, formerly the commissioner of public safety, also is adefendant in this case. We hereinafter refer to the defendants collectivelyas the state.4 The state appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the AppellateCourt, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to GeneralStatutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.5 General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 29-357 (a) provides: ‘‘Except as providedin subsection (b) of this section, no person, firm or corporation shall offerfor sale, expose for sale, sell at retail or use or explode or possess withintent to sell, use or explode any fireworks, except, notwithstanding theprovisions of section 29-356, any person who is sixteen years of age or oldermay offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail, purchase, use or possesswith intent to sell or use sparklers of not more than one hundred grams ofpyrotechnic mixture per item, which are nonexplosive and nonaerial.’’6 The 2005 revision of § 29-357 (a) and the 2001 revision of § 29-357 (a),at which P.A. 00-198, § 2, was codified, are identical.7 The attorney general contended that Piccolo Pete was not exempt underP.A. 00-198, which contained no definition or description of the term ‘‘sparkler,’’due to the size of the exposed flame that Piccolo Pete produces andthe relatively small amount of sparks that it emits.8 The cease and desist order also barred the plaintiff from selling ordistributing ‘‘any other product’’ that was prohibited by General Statutes(Rev. to 2005) § 29-357. Piccolo Pete, however, is the only product that isthe subject of the present action. In addition, the cease and desist orderdirected retailers of Piccolo Pete to cease all sales of the product. Thoseretailers are not parties to this litigation.9 Public Act 06-177 contains the current versions of §§ 29-356 and 29-357.See footnotes 1 and 2 of this opinion.10 The limited use of sparklers and fountains that do not meet those threerequirements may be permitted in accordance with regulations adopted bythe state fire marshal. See General Statutes § 29-357 (b). That type of use,however, is not at issue in this appeal.11 Because the cease and desist order and the present action both predatedthe effective date of P.A. 06-177, namely, June 9, 2006, ordinarily, that publicact would not apply retroactively to the claims raised by this action. See,e.g., State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 680–81, 888 A.2d 985 (substantive criminalstatutes have prospective applicability only), cert. denied, U.S. , 127S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006). In view of the fact that P.A. 06-177 isidentical to the current revision of §§ 29-356 and 29-357, however, it governsthe rights of the parties going forward. Consequently, the parties requestedthat the trial court resolve the issues raised by this case under GeneralStatutes (Rev. to 2005) §§ 29-356 and 29-357, as amended by P.A. 06-177,§§ 1 and 2, and the court agreed to do so. Accordingly, our resolution ofthis appeal also is governed by the 2006 amendments to General Statutes(Rev. to 2005) §§ 29-356 and 29-357, or what is now the current revision ofthose statutory sections.12 The video demonstration also had an audio component that capturedthe sound emitted by an ignited Piccolo Pete, in particular, its loud whistlingsound.13 As we previously have explained, there is no dispute that Piccolo Petesatisfies those other statutory requirements, that is, it is nonexplosive, nonaerialand contains not more than 100 grams of pyrotechnic mixture.14 The plaintiff conceded this fact at oral argument before this court.15 The state also maintains that the trial court should not have grantedthe plaintiff’s motion to reargue because that motion was predicated on aclaim that the plaintiff previously had not raised, namely, that becausePiccolo Pete produces at least some smoke, it is a fountain within themeaning of § 29-356 (3). As the plaintiff asserts, however, a trial court hasbroad discretion to reconsider a ruling in the interests of justice, and thestate, therefore, has a heavy burden of establishing that the trial court abusedthat discretion. Nevertheless, because we agree with the state’s alternateclaim that Piccolo Pete is not a fountain for purposes of § 29-356 (3), we neednot address the state’s contention that the trial court improperly granted theplaintiff’s motion to reargue.16 We note that, under § 1-2z, if, after considering the text of the statuteitself and its relationship to other statutes, the meaning of the statutory textis plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,we are precluded from considering extratextual evidence of the meaningof the statute. Because neither party persuasively contends that the statutoryprovisions at issue in the present case are plain and unambiguous as appliedto the facts of this case, § 1-2z does not limit our review of the state’s claim.17 Of course, under § 29-357 (a), the magnitude of these ancillary pyrotechniceffects is limited by the fact that the sparkler or fountain may containno more than 100 grams of pyrotechnic mixture per item.18 The plaintiff apparently claims that the term ‘‘shower of colored sparksor smoke’’ is so vague that it is proper to ignore it in construing § 29-356(3). Instead, the plaintiff ‘‘urges exclusive consideration of the pyrotechniceffects expressly prohibited’’ by § 29-357, including explosions, aerial projectilesand other fireworks that contain more than 100 grams of pyrotechnicmixture. We note, first, that the plaintiff has not challenged the statutoryscheme on the ground of constitutional vagueness. With respect to theplaintiff’s contention that we should disregard the ‘‘shower of colored sparksor smoke’’ language of § 29-356 (3) as a matter of statutory construction,we reject that argument because, as we previously have explained, to dootherwise would run afoul of fundamental principles governing the interpretationof statutes.19 The court did not do so, of course, because of its determination thatsome smoke is a sufficient amount of smoke to qualify a firework as afountain for purposes of § 29-356 (3).20 It need not be determined whether Piccolo Pete’s predominant pyrotechniceffect is its whistle, as Conkling, the plaintiff’s expert, testified, or itsflame, as Maheu, the state’s expert opined. For purposes of this appeal, itis sufficient that Piccolo Pete’s primary pyrotechnic effect is not the smokethat it emits.Lakewood Accountability Action Group™ LAAG | www.LAAG.us | Lakewood, CAA California Non Profit Association | Demanding action and accountability from local government™click here to receive LAAG posts by email