Source: https://www.phila-criminal-lawyer.com/blog/2017/11/birchfield-rufusals-and-penndots-dl-26b-form.shtml
Timestamp: 2018-11-14 07:10:35
Document Index: 267466274

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1547', '§ 1547', '§1547', '§1547', '§1547', '§ 1547', '§ 1547', '§ 1547', '§1547', '§1547', '§ 1547']

Birchfield, Refusals, and PennDot's DL - 26B Form | Hark and Hark
Birchfield, Refusals, and PennDot's DL - 26B Form
On behalf of Hark and Hark on Thursday, November 2, 2017.
In many pending 2017 Pennsylvania DUI and civil license refusal cases stemming for arrests between April 2016 and July 2017 police officers administered incorrect chemical test warnings to Pennsylvania motorists. Use of the DL 26B form, I think, is legally insufficient pursuant to then effective 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(2). Counsel should file suppression motions. A corollary issue is whether these drivers are capable as a matter of law of refusing the blood test where the police officer testifies he read the illegal PennDOT DL-26B form.
In May/June 2016 PennDOT created the new DL 26B form in response to Birchfield. Birchfield held that criminally coercing a blood draw -- compelling a defendant to testify/provide blood evidence against themselves or face jail time -- is unconstitutional. After Birchfield, enhanced penalties and threats of jail to secure evidence in DUI cases require suppression of blood evidence. In response PennDOT changed its DUI informed consent form, the DL 26B document that local and state police read to DUI suspects when the want the suspect to give blood. The General Assembly did not give PennDOT authority to do this. This the topic of this blog.
The suppression argument is as follows: The arresting officer's warnings to the DUI suspect fail to comply with Section 1547(b)(2) in that the driver was not advised that refusing the chemical test would result in enhanced criminal penalties (i.e. the penalties provided in Section 3804(c)) as § 1547(b) (pre-July 2017) requires. While there is no statutory or other requirement that any DL-26 Form contain appropriate warnings, or that the form be read verbatim, it is nonetheless the duty of the police officer to inform the petitioner of the statutorily required warnings. (See Section 1547(b)(2)). In other words, if the police officer recites the appropriate warnings from memory without the use of any form at all that is perfectly acceptable under the law. If an officer confirms the only warnings provided were those contained on the DL-26B Form, those warnings are not consistent with the statutory law prior to July 2017.
This date is important because on July 20, 2017, the governor approved Act 30 of 2017 which provides for an amendment to Section 1547(b)(2), removing language requiring a police officer to provide the warnings relating to enhanced criminal penalties for refusal. While this amendment was not effective on the date of petitioner's incident, the fact that the legislature amended it is indicative of its acknowledgement that such an amendment was necessary to effectuate the change required of the warnings pursuant to Birchfield.
Importantly, the §1547 pre-July 2017 statute includes the word shall. The legislature's use of the term "shall" establishes that police officers must comply with the §1547 language mandate. In Comm v. Weaver, the 2006 Pennsylvania Supreme Court interprets §1547(b)(2) verbiage (the same was in effect on prior to July 2017) reaching the same conclusion. Following the September 2003 amendments to the Implied Consent Law, PennDOT implemented the language of§ 1547(b)(2)(ii) into a new DL-26 form. This led to a significant amount of litigation over whether the warnings printed on the December 2003 version of the Department of Transportation's DL-26 form were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of§ 1547(b)(2). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Weaver, held that the warnings printed on that version of the DL-26 form were legally sufficient to satisfy those requirements. In reaching its decision, the Weaver Court stated:
The legislature's use of the term "shall" clearly establishes that police officers must comply with this mandate. Subparagraph (ii) commands police officers to inform an arrestee that "(ii) upon conviction, plea or adjudication of delinquency for violating section 3802(a), the person will be subject to penalties provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties)." The words of this statute are clear and free from all ambiguity; thus, we will glean the legislative intent from those words. The plain language requires only that the officer inform the arrestee that if he is convicted of DUI, refusal will result in additional penalties.
Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the warnings set forth in the 2017 version of § 1547(b)(2) are mandatory and must be strictly complied with in order to suspend a motorist's operating privilege pursuant to the Vehicle Code. Previously, in very certain terms, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has held that, in requesting a chemical test, the police officer must inform the arrestee of the consequences of refusal and notify the arrestee that there is no right to consult with an attorney before making a decision. See O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877-78.12 “An arrestee is entitled to this information so that his choice to take a [chemical] test can be knowing and conscious.” Id. at 878. The choice belongs to the arrestee, not the police officer.
Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has confirmed police officers’ obligation to advise motorists of the exact warning contained in §1547(b)(2). In this 15 month period, police officers utilizing the DL-26B form did not comply with statutory law requiring the correct consequences be advised to these motorists. PennDOT’s utilization of the revised DL-26B was not sanctioned by the General Assembly and not legally effective on the date and time of these arrest render the information provided to them insufficient as a matter of law.§1547 prior to July 2017 required reading all language contained therein, even those provisions deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. This tension between the current statutory laws and judicial decisions create a situation fraught with potential that motorists will not receive sufficient information to make a voluntary, informed decision regarding consent to the requested chemical testing.
The complex criminal versus civil application of Birchfield, Weaver, Kennedy, supra, is born out in Boseman v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 157 A.3d 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), and Gray v. Commonwealth , Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, No. 1759 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 2536439, at *7–8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 9, 2017), reargument denied (Aug. 7, 2017). These cases maintain arresting officer’s statutory obligation to inform a motorist of the General Assembly’s defined § 1547(b)’s ramifications of a refusal – not PennDOT’s version.
In Price v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,, No. 1873 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 4321625, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017), Judge McCullough concurs in the result (she is constrained to follow Boseman, supra) but reiterates her position set forth in Gray and Boseman. However, Judge Cosgroves dissents: