Source: https://casetext.com/case/paola-v-state
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 09:43:14
Document Index: 630743818

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 1', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 1', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11']

Paola v. State, C.A. No. KM-2019-0101 | Casetext
Paola v. State
C.A. No. KM-2019-0101 (R.I. Super. Jun. 7, 2019)
Paolav.State
C.A. No. KM-2019-0101
DECISION K. RODGERS , J. Before this Court is James Paola's (Petitioner) Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Application). Petitioner asserts that his conviction should be vacated because the statutes under which he was convicted in State of Rhode Island v. James Paola, K1-2006-0628A (the underlying criminal case) are unconstitutional in that they fail to describe a crime and prescribe a penalty therein.
On October 24, 2006, Petitioner was indicted on one count of first degree child molestation under G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, two counts of second degree child molestation under §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4, and four counts of first degree sexual assault under §§ 11-37-2 and 11-37-3, all alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2001 and February 28, 2006. On September 28, 2007, the trial justice dismissed one count of first degree sexual assault and one count of second degree child molestation. On September 22, 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty of one count of first degree child molestation, one count of second degree child molestation, and one count of the lesser offense of third degree sexual assault under § 11-37-6. The jury found Petitioner not guilty as to the other two counts of sexual assault. On November 24, 2008, as to the count of first degree child molestation, he was sentenced to thirty years, with eighteen years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions (the ACI), the balance of twelve years suspended, with probation and various other conditions. As to the count of second degree child molestation, he was sentenced to thirty years, with five years to serve at the ACI, the balance of twenty-five years suspended, with probation. As to the count of third degree sexual assault, he was sentenced to five years to serve at the ACI. The trial justice ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99 (R.I. 2013).
On November 19, 2018, Petitioner filed a pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction in the underlying criminal case, together with a supporting memorandum asking this Court to vacate his conviction for first and second degree child molestation pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that his conviction is unconstitutional. On December 12, 2018, by agreement of the Office of the Attorney General and Petitioner's court-appointed counsel, this Court ordered Petitioner's Motion to Vacate to be converted to the instant Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in order that his request under Rule 35 would not suffer the same fate as in State v. Linde, 965 A.2d 415, 416 n.2 (R.I. 2009) (refusing to reach merits of a constitutional challenge in the context of a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence).
Petitioner does not challenge his conviction for third degree child molestation.
On March 7, 2019, Petitioner's court-appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief. The State filed an objection and supporting memorandum thereto on March 28, 2019. On May 24, 2019, the Court provided notice to the State and Petitioner's court-appointed counsel that Petitioner's request for relief would be considered by this Court in the context of a summary disposition. The parties thereafter acknowledged that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve the issues before this Court.
Under § 10-9.1-1, any person who has been convicted of a crime may file an application for post-conviction relief to challenge the constitutionality of his or her conviction. Sec. 10-9.1-1(a)(1). Unlike the proceedings afforded to Petitioner for his underlying conviction, post-conviction relief motions are civil in nature. Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 908 (R.I. 2011). Accordingly, the applicant bears "'the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such [post-conviction] relief is warranted.'" Motyka v. State, 172 A.3d 1203, 1205 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)). Additionally, because Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his conviction, Petitioner has the heightened burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Beck, 114 R.I. 74, 77, 329 A.2d 190, 193 (1974).
Section 11-37-8.2 has been amended since January 1, 2001 through February 28, 2006, the date range of the offenses of which he was found guilty after trial. P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 3, effective June 28, 2006; P.L. 2006, ch. 207, § 3, effective June 28, 2006. Thus, this Court will refer only to the earlier version of the statute in effect at that time.
Petitioner was also convicted of one count of second degree child molestation in violation of § 11-37-8.3. Section 11-37-8.3 provides:
Petitioner asserts that his statutes of conviction, §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3, fail to provide a penalty and therefore, a conviction under either statute cannot stand. See Pet'r's Mem. at 6-9; Pet'r's Supp. Mem. at 11-18. The cases upon which Petitioner relies, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar.
This case is also distinguishable from State of New Jersey v. Fair Lawn Service Ctr., upon which Petitioner relies. See Pet'r's Supp. Mem. at 8. In that case, the court held that a person could not be convicted under the state's disorderly conduct statute because the legislature failed to provide a penalty. 20 N.J. 468, 474, 120 A.2d 233, 236 (1956). After quoting the statute under which the defendant was convicted, the court noted that "[n]either this section nor the ensuing sections . . . contain any statutory penalty." Id. at 471, 120 A.2d at 235 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that "while it may be said that it is to be presumed that the Legislature would not denounce certain acts without providing a penalty, [] penal consequences cannot rest upon a mere presumption." Id. at 472, 120 A.2d at 235. Here, unlike in Fair Lawn, the penalties for violating §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 are provided in the very next sections. See id.; cf. §§ 11-37-8.2 and 11-37-8.4. Thus, there is no need to presume what penal consequences the Legislature intended to impose for a violation thereof.
Petitioner also argues that §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 fail to indicate if the offenses are a felony or misdemeanor and that they also fail to establish the criminal character of those crimes. Pet'r's Supp. Mem. at 21-22, 26-27. As to Petitioner's first assertion, there is no requirement that a criminal statute identify the crime as a felony or misdemeanor. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.6(a) (3d ed. Oct. 2018 update) ("[I]n the United States most criminal statutes defining specific crimes do not themselves label as felonies or misdemeanors the crimes which they describe, leaving the matter to be determined by reference to the punishment provided (according to the place or to the length of confinement)."); see also State v. Wolford Corp., 689 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 2004) ("It is not essential for a criminal statute to include language that the violation of the statute constitutes a misdemeanor or felony."). In Rhode Island, crimes are classified as a felony, a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor based on the possible punishment, as set forth in § 11-1-2. It is unnecessary that each criminal statute under Rhode Island law further identify the offense as a felony, misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor. As to Petitioner's second assertion, the statutory phrase "is guilty of first degree [or second degree] child molestation," as stated in both §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3, clearly establishes the criminal nature of the crimes. The word "guilty," means "justly chargeable with or responsible for a usually grave breach of conduct or a crime." Guilty, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guilty. A person of ordinary intelligence would clearly understand that the conduct described in §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 is punishable as a crime. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 460. Accordingly, this Court rejects Petitioner's argument that §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 fail to declare that a violation thereof constitutes a crime in general or a felony more specifically.
Beyond the general premise that Petitioner would like this Court to ignore the existence of § 11-37-8.2, entitled "Penalty for first degree child molestation sexual assault," and § 11-37-8.4, entitled "Penalty for second degree child molestation," Petitioner contends that there are only three ways in which a penalty provision for a criminal offense passes constitutional muster: (1) within the same all-encompassing paragraph-like statute that defines the prohibited conduct; (2) within a single statute that has multiple subsections including the prohibited conduct and the penalty in different subsections; or (3) if cross-referenced in the statute identifying the criminal conduct. See Pet'r's Mem. at 2; Pet'r's Supp. Mem. at 18-21. There is no such hard and fast rule as Petitioner asserts. Instead, § 11-37-8.2, following § 11-37-8.1, and § 11-37-8.4, following § 11-37-8.3, are acceptable structures of specifying the prohibited conduct and the prescribed penalty for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand both what is prohibited and what the penalty is so that he may act accordingly. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 460; see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (3d ed. Oct. 2018 update).
Importantly, Petitioner was charged in the indictment of violating both §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, as well as §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4. Under article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution a person criminally accused has the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." See State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500, 504, 190 A. 854, 857 (1937) (recognizing that "[t]he accused undoubtedly has the constitutional right to be clearly informed of the accusation against him so that he may defend the same and later plead a conviction or acquittal in bar of a subsequent charge for the same offense"). As Petitioner's indictment included both the statutory reference for the criminal conduct for which he was charged with committing and the statutory reference to the possible penalties, he received fair notice "of the nature and cause of the accusation" to enable him to defend his case. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10. A person of ordinary intelligence does not need to go on a hunt to find a penalty wherein the penalty statutes were expressly stated in each of the two separate counts of his indictment for which he was found guilty. See Russell, 890 A.2d at 460.
In sum, the Legislature provided fair notice of the consequences of committing the conduct proscribed in §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 as the penalties for first degree and second degree child molestation are clearly provided in the following sections, §§ 11-37-8.2 and 11-37-8.4, which must be read together. See Such, 950 A.2d at 1156; see also Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423; Briggs, 58 A.3d at 166. Additionally, Petitioner's indictment stated that he was being charged under both §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, as well as §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4. For all the reasons discussed in Sections III.A-C, supra, this Court finds that Petitioner was afforded due process and that his conviction for one count of first degree child molestation and one count of second degree child molestation is constitutionally sound.
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that exist, and that Petitioner has failed to prove by any standard—beyond a reasonable doubt as to the unconstitutionality of his conviction or by the preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief—that his request for relief should be granted. Petitioner's conviction under §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.3 was not rendered unconstitutional because the proscribed criminal conduct and penalties are stated in two separate statutory provisions. In any event, the indictment charging him with first degree and second degree child molestation expressly charged him with violating both §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2 and §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4. Accordingly, Petitioner's request for post-conviction relief is denied.