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GREGG V. GEORGIA, 428 U. S. 153 - Volume 428 - 1976 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 428 > GREGG V. GEORGIA, 428 U. S. 153 (1976) > Full Text
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the imposition of the death sentences for murder. 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974). After reviewing the trial transcript and the record, including the evidence, and comparing the evidence and sentence in similar cases in accordance with the requirements of Georgia law, the court concluded that, considering the nature of the crime and the defendant, the sentences of death had not resulted from prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty applied in similar cases. [Footnote 2] The death
Before considering the issues presented, it is necessary to understand the Georgia statutory scheme for the imposition of the death penalty. [Footnote 3] The Georgia statute, as amended after our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), retains the death penalty for six categories of crime: murder, [Footnote 4] kidnaping for ransom or where
in the statute. [Footnote 9] The sentence of death may be imposed only if the jury (or judge) finds one of the statutory aggravating circumstances and then elects to
The Court, on a number of occasions, has both assumed and asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment. In several cases, that assumption provided a necessary foundation for the decision, as the Court was asked to decide whether a particular method of carrying out a capital sentence would be allowed to stand under the Eighth Amendment. [Footnote 12] But until Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), the Court never confronted squarely the fundamental claim that the punishment of death always, regardless of the enormity of the offense or the procedure followed in imposing the sentence, is cruel and
The history of the prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment already has been reviewed at length. [Footnote 16] The phrase first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which was drafted by Parliament at the accession of William and Mary. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 Calif.L.Rev. 839, 852-853 (1969). The English version appears to have been directed against punishments unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, as well as those disproportionate to the offense involved. Id. at 860. The
In the earliest cases raising Eighth Amendment claims, the Court focused on particular methods of execution to determine whether they were too cruel to pass constitutional muster. The constitutionality of the sentence of death itself was not at issue, and the criterion used to evaluate the mode of execution was its similarity to "torture" and other "barbarous" methods. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 99 U. S. 136 (1879) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment. . . ."); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 136 U. S. 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. . . ."). See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 329 U. S. 464 (1947) (second attempt at electrocution found not to violate
But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with "the dignity of man," which is the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." Trop v. Dulles, supra at 356 U. S. 100 (plurality opinion). This means, at least, that the punishment not be "excessive." When a form of punishment in the abstract (in this case, whether capital punishment may ever be imposed as a sanction for murder), rather than in the particular (the propriety of death as a penalty to be applied to a specific defendant for a specific crime), is under consideration, the inquiry into "excessiveness" has two aspects. First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 408 U. S. 392-393 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. at 99 U. S. 136; Weems v. United States, supra, at 217 U. S. 381. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 356 U. S. 100 (plurality opinion) (dictum); Weems v. United States, supra, at 217 U. S. 367.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 313-314 (WHITE, J., concurring). See also id. at 408 U. S. 433 (POWELL, J., dissenting). [Footnote 19] But, while we have an obligation to insure that constitutional
Furman v. Georgia, supra at 408 U. S. 383 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). The deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 465-470 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), is enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for "these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 357 U. S. 393 (1968). Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 664-665; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 103 (plurality opinion); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 136 U. S. 447. Caution is necessary lest this Court become,
The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States [Footnote 23] have enacted new statutes that provide for the
death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the death of another person. And the Congress of the United States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death. [Footnote 24] These recently adopted statutes have attempted to address the concerns expressed by the Court in Furman primarily (i) by specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by making the death penalty mandatory for specified crimes. But all of the post-Furman statutes make clear that capital punishment
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510, 391 U. S. 519 n. 15 (1968). It may be true that evolving standards have influenced juries in
recent decades to be more discriminating in imposing the sentence of death. [Footnote 26] But the relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence does not indicate rejection of capital punishment per se. Rather, the reluctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases. See Furman v. Georgia, supra at 408 U. S. 388 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the actions of juries in many States since Furman are fully compatible with the legislative judgments, reflected in the new statutes, as to the continued utility and necessity of capital punishment in appropriate cases. At the close of 1974, at least 254 persons had been sentenced to death since Furman, [Footnote 27] and, by the end of March, 1976, more than 460 persons were subject to death sentences.
Furman v. Georgia, supra at 408 U. S. 308 (STEWART, J., concurring). "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law," Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 337 U. S. 248 (1949), but neither is it a forbidden objective, nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 394-395 (BURGER, C. dissenting); id. at 408 U. S. 452-454 (POWELL, J., dissenting); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 531, 392 U. S. 535-536 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. [Footnote 30] Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. [Footnote 31] The result
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, [Footnote 32] there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant
Id. at 408 U. S. 309-310 (STEWART, J., concurring). [Footnote 36]
Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U. S. 51, 302 U. S. 55 (1937). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U. S. 576, 358 U. S. 585 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 337 U. S. 247. [Footnote 37] Otherwise, "the system cannot function in a consistent and a rational manner." American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 4.1(a), Commentary, p. 201 (App.Draft 1968). See also President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 144 (1967); ALI, Model Penal Code § 7.07, Comment 1, pp. 52-53 (Tent.Draft No. 2, 1954). [Footnote 38]
But it creates special problems. Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question. [Footnote 40] This problem, however, is scarcely insurmountable. Those who have studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure -- one in which the
ALI, Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 5, pp. 74-75 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 385 U. S. 567-569 (1967); Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, �� 555, 574; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1135-1136 (1953). When a human life is at stake, and when the jury must have information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated
ALI, Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 3, p. 71 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959) (emphasis in original). [Footnote 44] While such standards are, by
We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Furman, or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, [Footnote 46] for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis. Rather, we have embarked upon this general exposition to make clear that it is possible to construct capital sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's constitutional concerns. [Footnote 47]
These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die. Instead, the jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime: was it committed in the course of another capital felony? Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way, or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: does he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses? Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment (e.g., his youth, the extent of his cooperation with the police, his emotional state at the time of the crime). [Footnote 49] As a result, while
The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the issues before us. At each of these stages, an actor in the criminal justice system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards, so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. [Footnote 50]
The petitioner attacks the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance, which authorizes imposition of the death penalty if the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," contending that it is so broad that capital punishment could be imposed in any murder case. [Footnote 51] It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction. [Footnote 52] In only one case has it upheld a jury's decision to sentence a defendant to death when the only statutory aggravating circumstance found was that of the seventh, see McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974), and that homicide was a horrifying torture-murder. [Footnote 53]
The petitioner also argues that two of the statutory aggravating circumstances are vague, and therefore susceptible of widely differing interpretations, thus creating a substantial risk that the death penalty will be arbitrarily inflicted by Georgia juries. [Footnote 54] In light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, we must disagree. First, the petitioner attacks that part of § 27-2534.1(b)(1) that authorizes a jury to consider whether a defendant has a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, has demonstrated a concern that the new sentencing procedures provide guidance to juries. It held this provision to be impermissibly vague in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 540, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1976), because it did not provide the jury with "sufficiently clear and objective standards.'" Second, the petitioner points to § 27-2534.1(b)(3) which speaks of creating a "great risk of death to more than one person." While such a phrase might be susceptible of an overly broad interpretation, the Supreme Court of Georgia has not so construed it. The only case in which the court upheld a conviction in reliance on this aggravating circumstance involved a man who stood up in a church and fired a gun indiscriminately into the audience. See
§ 27-2537(c)(3) (Supp. 1975). [Footnote 56] In performing
See Ga.Const., Art. 5, § 1, � 12, Ga.Code Ann. § 2-3011 (1973); Ga.Code Ann. §§ 77-501, 77-511, 77-513 (1973 and Supp. 1975) (Board of Pardons and Paroles is authorized to commute sentence of death except in cases where Governor refuses to suspend that sentence).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 519 n. 15, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 101 (plurality opinion). See also Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, � 571.
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 402 U. S. 204-207; Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd. 8932, � 595.
Under the new Georgia statutory scheme, a person convicted of murder may receive a sentence either of death or of life imprisonment. Ga.Code Ann. § 26-1101 (1972). [Footnote 2/1] Under Georgia Code Ann. § 26-3102 (Supp.
The jury was instructed on the elements of murder [Footnote 2/4] and robbery. The trial judge gave an instruction on self-defense, but refused to submit the lesser included
The threshold question in this case is whether the death penalty may be carried out for murder under the Georgia legislative scheme consistent with the decision in Furman v. Georgia, supra. In Furman, this Court held that, as a result of giving the sentencer unguided discretion to impose or not to impose the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily, [Footnote 2/6]
The argument is considerably overstated. The Georgia Legislature has made an effort to identify those aggravating factors which it considers necessary and relevant to the question whether a defendant convicted of capital murder should be sentenced to death. [Footnote 2/10] The
In considering any given death sentence on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court is to determine whether the sentence imposed was consistent with the relevant statutes -- i.e., whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance. Ga.Code Ann § 27-2537(c)(2) (Supp. 1975). However, it must do much more than determine whether the penalty was lawfully imposed. It must go on to decide -- after reviewing the penalties imposed in "similar cases" -- whether the penalty is "excessive or disproportionate" considering both the crime and the defendant. § 27-2537(c)(3) (Supp. 1975). The new Assistant to the Supreme Court is to assist the court in collecting the records of "all capital felony cases" [Footnote 2/11] in the State of Georgia in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1970. § 27-2537(f) (Supp. 1975). The court also has the obligation of determining whether the penalty was "imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." § 27-2537(c)(1) (Supp. 1975). The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted the appellate review statute to require it to set aside the death sentence whenever juries across the State impose it only rarely for the type of crime in question, but to require it to affirm death sentences whenever juries across the State generally impose it for the crime in question.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 408 U. S. 257 (1972) (concurring opinion), I read "evolving standards of decency" as requiring focus upon the essence of the death penalty itself, and not primarily or solely upon the procedures
Id. at 408 U. S. 296. [Footnote 3/2] That continues to be my view. For the Clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments under our constitutional
This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand before our Bar, "moral concepts" require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should declare that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society. [Footnote 3/4] My opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our civilization and the law had progressed to this point, and that, therefore, the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is "cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. I shall not again canvass the reasons that led to that conclusion. I emphasize only that foremost among the "moral concepts" recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause is the primary moral principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings -- a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity. A judicial determination
Id. at 408 U. S. 273. As such, it is a penalty that "subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the [ Clause]." [Footnote 3/5] I therefore would hold,
In Furman, I concluded that the death penalty is constitutionally invalid for two reasons. First, the death penalty is excessive. Id. at 408 U. S. 331-332; 408 U. S. 342-359. And
Even assuming, however, that the post-Furman enactment of statutes authorizing the death penalty renders the prediction of the views of an informed citizenry an
The other principal purpose said to be served by the death penalty is retribution. [Footnote 4/14] The notion that retribution
can serve as a moral justification for the sanction of death finds credence in the opinion of my Brothers STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS, and that of my Brother WHITE in Roberts v. Louisiana, post, p. 428 U. S. 337. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 394-395 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). It is this notion that I find to be the most disturbing aspect of today's unfortunate decisions.
Of course, it may be that these statements are intended as no more than observations as to the popular demands that it is thought must be responded to in order to prevent anarchy. But the implication of the statements appears to me to be quite different -- namely, that society's judgment that the murderer "deserves" death must be respected not simply because the preservation of order requires it, but because it is appropriate that society make the judgment and carry it out. It is this latter notion, in particular, that I consider to be fundamentally at odds with the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 343-345 (MARSHALL, J., concurring). The mere fact that the community demands the murderer's life in return for the evil he has done cannot sustain the death penalty, for as JUSTICES STEWART, POWELL, and STEVENS remind us, "the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society." Ante at 428 U. S. 182. To be sustained under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty must "compor[t] with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment," ibid.; the objective in imposing it must be "[consistent] with our respect for the dignity of [other] men." Ante at 428 U. S. 183. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 356 U. S. 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). Under these standards, the taking of life "because the wrongdoer deserves it" surely must
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment, pt. II, � 159, p. 123 (1968).