Source: http://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_civil_rights/
Timestamp: 2017-06-27 12:15:33
Document Index: 344559310

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8547', '§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§ 128', '§ 1988', '§ 998', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1021', '§ 1021', '§ 1415', '§ 1983', '§ 12205']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : Cases: Civil Rights CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES ABOUT
2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014-2015 Marc Alexander & William M. Hensley Cases: Civil Rights
Posted at 11:05 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Defendant appealed, winning a little relief but not most. Because plaintiff did vindicate rights applicable to all patients at defendant's nursing home, fees were properly awarded under the H&S Code fee entitlement statute. The amount awarded in fees was reasonable, given the large number of H&S Code violations and the trial judge's 30% reduction in the trial fees requested. Fees on appeal were properly awarded to plaintiff given than the case involved important issues of first impression. However, with respect to the costs award, a reversal was warranted. Expert fees are not specifically mentioned as costs under H&S Code section 1430(b) such that they are not expressly authorized. That brought the 2/6 DCA to deciding whether the defendant had to post an undertaking for a fees and costs award. Answer: "no," given that this was not an exceptional SLAPP fee/costs award (where an undertaking is required) such that generally no undertaking was required in this non-SLAPP case. (Ziello v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.4th 651, 655 (1999).) Posted at 01:41 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Costs, Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Undertaking | Permalink
Pocketbook, Pocketbook, Plus Lack Of Frivolity Were The Reversing Factors. If you do not think that judges and appellate justices are not attuned to financial disparity, Alvarez v. Bank of America, Case Nos. B238087/B242275 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 19, 2017) (unpublished) might change your mind or at least provide mollifying food for thought. 11 plaintiffs brought various FEHA discrimination cases and lost them in a summary judgment proceeding, based primarily on a BofA independent investigation showing a true objective basis to discharge plaintiffs based upon fraudulent conduct. However, the racially-neutral basis for discharge was not revealed until some time after the onset of the litigation. Later, BofA moved to recoup about $760,000 in attorney’s fees under the theory the FEHA suit was frivolous in nature. The trial court ultimately agreed, awarding BofA $626,821.22 in fees. The summary judgment merit ruling was affirmed, but the fee award was reversed as a matter of law. First of all, the appellate court believed the trial judge likely ignored plaintiffs’ declarations that they could not pay for the requested fees, which is a relevant concern under FEHA. However, rather than remand, the 2/4 DCA decided that the fee awards could be reversed as a matter of law: BofA claimed the actions were frivolous at the outset, but the record showed that it was only during ongoing discovery stage that plaintiffs learned about the internal investigations showing fraudulent conduct which would show the actions were frivolous during the lawsuit “prosecution” stage. Given that the action was not frivolous at the outset, fee awards reversed.
Posted at 09:07 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
However, Appellate Court Provides Remand Guidance On Allocation, Paralegal Compensation, And Reasonableness Issues. In Samuelson v. Dept. of State Hospitals, Case No. A143149 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 28, 2016) (unpublished), plaintiff was awarded $1 million in damages against defendants Dept. of State Hospitals and three psychologists hired by Napa State Hospital based upon employer retaliation and whistleblower protection claims. She was then awarded attorney’s fees totaling $1,231,188.70 based on fee entitlement statutes, namely, the whistleblower fee-shifting provision allowing recovery against individual defendants, but not the employer (Gov’t Code, § 8547.8(c)), and the private attorney general statute as against Dept. of State Hospitals (CCP § 1021.5). Defendants appealed the fee award. In a prior appeal, the appellate court reduced the $1 million judgment down to $695,000. Based on this reversal, the appellate court then reversed and remanded the fee award based on the merits reduction. However, it did offer some guidance to the trial judge having to adjudge fees upon remand. First, the trial judge did not apportion fees as between the two substantive claims based upon confusing conduct by the State which suggested no apportionment was necessary under the whistleblower fee-shifting provision (given the whistleblower fees were only assessable against the individual defendants and the private attorney general fees only against the State defendant). Although no “prejudging” was done by the reviewing court, it did remand for the trial judge to look at the allocation decision again, but stressing that State’s prior positions about no need for an allocation and unified defense of the case might lead to the same result. Second, the work for pre-litigation administrative work that was intertwined with the subsequent court proceeding happened to be compensable, in line with what the trial judge did previously. Third, the trial judge’s award of fees to plaintiff’s “household partner” or “boyfriend” (a patent lawyer not licensed to practice law in California) for volunteered paralegal work was no abuse of discretion, especially given the lower court reduced the requested work amount 25% for non-paralegal work. “Defendants point to no legal authority or good reason to support the position that volunteered paralegal services may only be compensable in a public interest lawsuit” and nothing in CCP § 1021.5 cases “restricts its application” on the paralegal issue. (Slip Opn., pp. 9-10.)
Respondents Did A Smart Thing On Appeal. Respondents in McClain v. Pacific Maritime Assn., Case No. B262952 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished) did a smart thing after winning a disability discrimination case and after being awarded routine costs against the losing FEHA plaintiff. Given that FEHA costs are not awardable against a losing FEHA plaintiff unless the action was objectively without foundation, see Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, 105 (2015), respondents waived routine costs upon plaintiff’s appellate challenge to the cost award—which was a prudent move because the action was likely not frivolous given that it went all the way to a statement of decision determination following a bench trial. Respondent’s decision resulted in the merits determination being affirmed and preempting any remand for a likely pointless hearing at which costs would not be awarded anyway.
Posted at 09:00 AM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Costs | Permalink
2/8 DCA Adopts Reasoning of 2/7 DCA In Roman Decision On Costs Apportionment. Metoyer v. L.A. Unified School Dist., Case No. B259458 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Sept. 22, 2016) (unpublished) is a situation where plaintiff brought both FEHA and non-FEHA claims, but was defensed after a jury verdict finding lack of causation—namely, that District’s conduct was not a substantial motivating factor in decisions which were made. However, the lower court did grant District routine costs of $7,660.19. Although plaintiff lost the merits appeal, the costs award was remanded for further consideration. The reason was the California Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97 (2015), which mandated a different analysis on FEHA costs recovery against a losing plaintiff. However, the real issue devolved into what happens to costs recovery where there were both FEHA and non-FEHA claims which a plaintiff loses. In this regard, the 2/8 DCA in Metoyer followed the 2/7 DCA’s analysis of the issue in Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc., 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1059-1060, 1062 (2015) [discussed in our June 27, 2015 post], which essentially decided that post-Williams costs issues depended on how interrelated FEHA and non-FEHA claims were to each other. If inextricably intertwined, then maybe no costs award against the losing FEHA plaintiff is in order; however, if the non-FEHA claims were solely allocable, then some apportioned costs were in order. So, the costs award was remanded to relook at in light of the 2/7 DCA’s Roman analysis.
Trial Judge Reduced Defense’s First Request By 75%. In Radakovic v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B266194 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Sept. 1, 2016) (unpublished), a trial judge awarded attorney’s fees to the defense (L.A. County) in the sum of $35,185 after one plaintiff lost a summary judgment motion and then plaintiffs together lost another summary judgment motion in two FEHA case. The basis for the fee award was Government Code section 12965(b) which allows courts discretion to award prevailing parties their reasonable attorney’s fees, but only against a plaintiff if the FEHA action was objectively without foundation when brought or prosecuted after it became objectively meritless in nature. (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, 115 (2015).) This was only 25% of the defense’s fee request. Plaintiffs’ appeal of the fee award was unavailing. The defense initially requested fees of $141,000 based on $300-400 hourly rates. However, because County’s attorney only charged $155 per hour, the defense did a smart thing: it alternatively requested reduced fees of $70,525 based on the lower hourly rate. The lower court awarded about half of the lower request and only 25% of the higher request in arriving at the $35,185 award. The appellate court did determine the FEHA action was objectively unreasonable based on (1) the loss of two summary judgment motions, (2) no exhaustion of administrative remedies by one plaintiff in the second suit, and (3) the absence of a causal link between the earlier lawsuit and later suspension leading to the second suit. As far as reasonableness of the fee award, the lower court certainly pared it down reasonably, with the absence of a reporter’s transcript of the fee hearing further hampering review. BLOG TIP—County did provide the trial judge two alternatives for the fee award, with the second option based on very low hourly rates which municipalities usually require counsel to accede to. This highlights two good fee petition tips: give the trial court some alternatives or provide some voluntary reductions to make its decision easier.
Posted at 10:00 PM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Defense Lost Two 128.7 Prior Sanctions Requests, But Got It On The Third Try, Doing Some Nice Things As Far As Amount Requested. Dzhanikyan v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Case No. B261113 (2d Dist., Div. 8 June 15, 2016) (unpublished) is a nice illustration of how good defense thinking and tenacity can produce a fee award in a FEHA case, where fees are not awarded unless the case was frivolous/unreasonable in nature. What happened here was that plaintiff employee lost a FEHA-dominated case against the employer on a summary judgment motion. The defense earlier moved two times for CCP § 128.7 sanctions against employee, but the trial court denied them based on the procedural posture of the case. However, the defense did not give up but shifted focus to moving for fees as the prevailing party under the FEHA fee-shifting statute codified in Government Code section 12965. The defense also did something very smart: it limited its fee request as to time (only asking fees from the date of the summary judgment to dismissal of the case) and limited the fees during that period to 5/8ths of the work effort (given that the FEHA claims were only 5 of the 8 claims). That strategy worked, with the lower court awarding the defense $78,681 in fees. The appellate court affirmed. Given that the FEHA claims were administratively barred and pursued in bad faith, the defense was awarded for its tenacity in finally finding the right fee entitlement basis—although the prior history certainly did not hurt in on appeal. (We, as bloggers, also would add that the defense’s reasonableness in limiting fees as to time and amount had some influence on the reviewing panel—just sayin’ ….).
Case Was Deemed Complex, With Plaintiff’s Attorneys Displaying Dexterity Along The Way. In Gonzales v. City of San Jose, Case No. 5:13-cv-00695-BLF (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2016, Doc. 244), U.S. District Judge Beth Labson Freeman awarded plaintiff recovering $10,000 in an eve-of-trial settlement of a complex civil rights case—where a mother was arrested after son’s involvement in a gang-related murder based on mistaken identity, with a host of police officers involved in the arrest—a total of $724,295 in attorney’s fees under the federal civil rights fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The facts are somewhat gross in nature, which we will not repeat, but certainly weighed in the district judge’s determination and assessment of the complexity of the case. The result was also dictated by the fact that the City finally accepted a second FRCP, rule 68 offer of judgment for $10,000, but one which conceded that plaintiff was entitled to fees as the prevailing party. (At an earlier juncture of the case, plaintiff rejected an initial rule 68 offer which still involved $70,000 in attorney’s fees, with plaintiff improving their position by rejecting the initial offer.) The district judge held the City to its settlement agreement position that plaintiff was to be deemed a prevailing party, which was also shown by the excellent results obtained by her anyway in a case that was on the edge of trial. The hourly rates were Bay Area rates in the San Jose forum. The district judge recounted numerous decisions awarding rates in the $350-750 range for associates/very experienced partners or attorneys. The main challenge was to the $575 hourly rates requested by a ten year experienced attorney, but one who assumed leading management for the firm representing the plaintiff and who played a central role in the litigation. However, the district judge found that this attorney’s skill and results obtained justified this rate for a ten year attorney. District Judge Freeman did discount hours for battery claims unrelated to the successful claims, adopting the reductions in hours itemized by plaintiff at the court’s request. The district judge also granted a modest 1.1 multiplier in the case. BLOG OBSERVATIONS—Steven M. Berki of San Jose was the lead attorney obtaining this result, so kudos to Mr. Berki. There are some takeaways from this case: (1) if you want higher hourly rates, stress your importance to the case and results obtained; and (2) if the district judge requests apportionment out of work on unsuccessful or unrelated claims, provide the hours which should be allocated out rather than making the court became the “auditor” on such an issue.
No Showing Of Bad Faith In Labor Commissioner’s Position on Employment Issue. In Happy Nails & Spa of Fashion Valley v. California Labor Commissioner, Case No. D067391 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 25, 2016) (unpublished), a plaintiff ultimately prevailing on an employee/independent contractor classification issue sought to recover attorney’s fees from the Labor Commissioner, seeking recoupment under the federal civil rights statute for due process violations. Both the trial and appellate courts rebuffed this request. Although plaintiff ultimately prevailed in showing that independent contractor status was the “binding” end result, nothing showed the Commissioner pursued the classification action in bad faith—especially given that the ruling was based on the collateral estoppel impact of an administrative ruling, with collateral estoppel being a rather elastic doctrine depending on the circumstances of record.
Posted at 09:29 PM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Requested Amount By Plaintiff’s Attorney Was $2.9 Million. On April 8, 2016, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Mark Mooney determined that Bikram Choudhury, a well known yoga pioneer, owed $1.1 million in attorney’s fees after a jury found that he was liable for $7.4 million on claims he wrongfully terminated and sexually harassed his ex-legal advisor. Plaintiff’s attorney had asked for recovery of $2.9 million in fees, inclusive of a positive multiplier request. Judge Mooney acknowledged that the award might go away should Mr. Choudhury be granted a new trial based on pending post-trial motions.
Posted at 12:50 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, News | Permalink
Case Tells Government Entities To Beware When They Aggressively Litigate And Lose In Pro-Civil Rights Fee Shifting Cases. The next case is one that litigators representing governmental entities need to pay attention to. Often times, government will aggressively litigate until the end, only to tell the appellate court that fees to a successful party were excessive or multipliers unjustified despite the contingency risk absorbed by the winning party’s counsel showing great acumen to prevail in the matter. Williams v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Auth., Case No. B259327 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Apr. 5, 2016) (unpublished) shows that governmental entities faced with the right facts will not win a “Hail Mary” attempt on appeal. In this one, plaintiff prevailed on a disability discrimination-related FEHA case, requesting a lodestar plus a 2.0 multiplier in a case where Metro aggressively contested all along the way. Plaintiff’s counsel requested $600 per hour for lead counsel (17 years of experience) and $325-425 for junior counsel (6 years of experience). The trial judge granted the lodestar, augmented by a 1.5 positive multiplier based on the skill shown by plaintiff’s counsel in the case plus the contingency risk absorbed by the same counsel. Once “fees on fees” were added, the total fee award to plaintiff was $1,163,977.50. This award was affirmed on appeal. The lodestar component of the award was not challenged on appeal, just the multiplier. However, the appellate court found it was appropriate in light of the demonstrated skill and contingency risk factors. It found that the prior case of Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1175 (1998) was trumped by Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-1133 (2001) [one of our Leading Cases], which does allow consideration of contingency risk in FEHA and other cases. Finally, the “scorched earth” plea by Metro, which itself left no stone unturned, did not resonate in light of plaintiff having no choice but to respond in kind. Posted at 05:44 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Multipliers | Permalink
$1.367 Million Expenditures Over Thirty Years On Public Areas, With $13.3 Million In Fees And $1.7 Million To Class Counsel. On February 9, 2016, U.S. District Judge Consuelo B. Marshall of the Central District of California gave preliminary approval to a substantial American with Disabilities Act class action settlement by which the City of Los Angeles has committed to spend $1.367 billion over 30 years to provide public sidewalk and crosswalk system accessibility to persons with mobile disabilities. As part of the settlement, the City of Los Angeles separately agreed to pay Class Counsel $13.3 million in fees (representing a lodestar plus 1.3 multiplier) and $1.7 million in expenses, with the payment in addition to the $1.367 billion over-time payment. The settlement was brokered by two mediators, retired federal judges Tevrizian and Infante. The case is Willits v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:cv10-05782-CBM (RZx). Posted at 10:07 AM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Class Actions, News | Permalink
Failure to File Separate Motion for Recovery of Expert Witness Fees Not Damning. In Baez v. Burbank Unified School Dist., Case No. B254852 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Jan. 25, 2016) (unpublished), plaintiff finally won on FEHA claims after a third trial following a couple of earlier appellate hiccups. Plaintiff won $179,398 in compensatory damages plus $2 million in punitive damages, while the District won $19,500 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages on a cross-complaint against plaintiff. Plaintiff then obtained $3,224,569.30 in fees, plus expert witness fees, as the prevailing party under FEHA. The defense appeal was unsuccessful. District’s challenge to time spent on the first trial was found to be compensable fees, especially given that it led to a successful conclusion and that the reversal of the first trial was due to the defense’s failure to give notice of using prior sexual conduct at the trial. The interesting issue was whether the award of expert witness fees to prevailing plaintiff was infirm because they were sought via a filed costs memorandum rather than a separate motion for recovery of these fees. The appellate court determined that the costs memorandum was a proper vehicle, by analogy to the reasoning in a CCP § 998 case—no separate motion was a legal requirement. (Jonkey v. Carignan Constr. Co., 139 Ca.App.4th 20, 27 (2006).)
Williams Is Found To Be Retroactive To Cases Pending On Appeal. Plaintiff lost FEHA/non-FEHA claims, both found to be interrelated, through a summary judgment motion. After that, the trial judge found the case to be meritless, awarding defendants a modest fee award of $15,000 after considering plaintiff’s ability to pay (with the defense requesting $292,567.50 in fees, with the tentative awarding $45,000, and with the final decision lowering the tally to only $15,000). The lower court also awarded routine costs in favor of defendants and against plaintiff in the sum of $16,072.07 before the California Supreme Court decided Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District, 61 Cal.4th 97 (2015) [discussed in our May 4, 2015 post], which held that the award of routine costs against a losing FEHA plaintiff is discretionary. Plaintiff appealed both the fee and costs award in De La Cruz v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., Case No. B255434 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Jan. 19, 2016) (unpublished), not obtaining any change in result on the fee award but a remand on the costs award. With respect to fees, the trial judge’s decision to award quite a bit less than the requested fees was proper given the conclusions the case was not complex and plaintiff’s financial condition did not justify a higher award. No apportionment of fees was necessary given that the FEHA and non-FEHA claims were interrelated, as the defense argued in its request for fees. However, the costs award had to be revisited in light of Williams. Williams was found retroactive to a case pending on appeal, such as here, and established that the costs award was discretionary rather than mandatory—especially given that it was not clear the trial judge believed the award was discretionary (including no clear indication that ability to pay was considered in deciding the costs award). The defense tried to argue the costs award was defensible based on the existence of the non-FEHA claims, but the appellate court found that this argument was too much in opposition to the defense argument in support of fees, namely, that the FEHA and non-FEHA claims were crucially interrelated. With respect to plaintiff’s other challenges to the costs award, the reviewing court found that costs relating to plaintiff’s non-appearance at a scheduled deposition, expediting a deposition transcript for use in court proceedings, and attempting to obtain service were all compensable in the trial judge’s judgment if they were necessary to the litigation and reasonable in nature.
Posted at 05:26 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Costs | Permalink
Simply Because Plaintiff Only Obtained $1 In Damages Did Not Diminish His Forward-Looking Conduct Success In The Case. In Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, No. 13-56973 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) (published), plaintiff brought an as-applied civil rights challenge to Laguna Beach’s ordinance containing restrictions on the use of amplification devices on public sidewalks (with Mr. Klein using amplification for a religious youth outreach program). After two successful appeals, he won nominal damages of $1 on three out of four claims, but Laguna Beach did soften its restrictions following the Ninth Circuit’s decision on one of the appeals. The district court did acknowledge Mr. Klein was the prevailing party, but denied fees altogether under Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) which allows a district judge to determine whether seeking lots of compensatory damages but getting little justifies no award under the circumstances under § 1988 (the civil rights fee-shifting statute). The Ninth Circuit reversed. The problem here is that Mr. Klein did get a measure of great success by obtaining Laguna Beach’s change in forward-looking conduct as to use of amplification devices. So, the focus on only the damages recovery was too myopic even under Farrar. (Accord, Sanchez v. City of Austin, 774 F.3d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 2014).) Reversed and remanded for another fee “shot” by prevailing Plaintiff.
Posted at 11:12 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Court of Appeal Applies Ninth Circuit’s Gates And Moreno Decisions. Getting a haircut. Camp Shelby. 1941. William Perlitch, photographer. Library of Congress. Kerkeles v. City of San Jose, Case No. H040915 (6th Dist. Dec. 18, 2015) (published) is a significant 2015 end-of-the year decision, where an appellate court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s heightened scrutiny for civil rights fee awards that were severely reduced in amount as compared to the fee claimant’s request for fees. In this case, the parties reached a settlement in a civil rights case which expressly allowed the claimant to seek fees under a liberal 42 U.S.C. § 1988 fee-shifting statute, with the defense not contesting that fee entitlement could be had by plaintiff under this federal provision. Plaintiff subsequently requested $2.351 million in fees and costs, consisting of (1) a base lodestar of $1.448 million; (2) a 1.5 multiplier to this amount, which got the request to $2.25 million; (3) $103,000 in “fees on fees;” and (4) costs of a little over $75,000. For you readers out there, plaintiff’s counsel did a great job of providing a “roadmap” for the trial judge by submitting detailed declarations about the case, hourly rates (percipient and expert), work effort, and reasons for a positive multiplier based on counsel working 6 years on a risk-laden contingency basis. In response, the defense opposed with declarations challenging the hourly rate but only objecting to 23.85 hours of total time, then advocating that the lower court should reduce the hourly rates and further reduce the requested lodestar by 50%. The trial judge took the defense’s suggestion hook, line and sinker—reducing the hourly rates, then reducing the lodestar by another 50%, and denying a multiplier, for a total 80% reduced fee award of $436,807.50. (Costs of $23,935.07 were awarded, but plaintiff did not contest that award.) Plaintiff, however, did appeal the fee award. The Sixth District reversed, finding that the trial judge did not provide an adequate explanation for the large reduction, especially given the pro-fee bent of section 1988 in the civil rights area. In doing so, the appellate court found that the federal approach on fee decision making needed to be followed, heavily relying on Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992) and Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111-1119—both of which held that substantial reductions would be subject to heightened scrutiny and that fee “haircuts” over 10% had to be explained in depth by the lower court. The panel even quoted Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010) for the proposition that a lower court needs to provide a fee decision methodology permitting meaningful review rather than one on “an impressionistic basis.” By sending the matter back down for a “re-do,” the Sixth District also instructed the trial judge to revisit the hourly rate determination by keeping in mind that the contingency risk is a factor to be considered in lodestar analysis. Posted at 04:17 PM in Cases: Civil Rights, Cases: Lodestar | Permalink
1.25 Multiplier Sustained; Reversal of One Intertwined Retaliation Claim Did Not Require Reconsideration Of Fee Award. William A. Offutt, winner of adding machine operators contest, 1937. Library of Congress. In Warehime v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Case No. F068843 (5th Dist. Dec. 15, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiff brought a four-count FEHA inspired suit against Farmers, winning $749,999 on all four claims. Then, in the post-trial aftermath, the trial judge awarded plaintiff $696,576.50 out of a requested $747,115.50 for the base lodestar, augmented by a 1.25 positive multiplier for a total fee award of $870,720.63. Fee entitlement was undisputed, based on a FEHA fee-shifting statute. The fee award was affirmed on appeal to the Fifth District. Justice Levy, on behalf of a 3-0 panel, did reverse the merits verdict on the retaliation claim, but this did not require a revisit of the fee award because affirmance of the verdict on the other counts—intertwined claims—did not mandate another look-see. The 1.25 multiplier was justified given that plaintiffs’ counsel took the case on contingency, with the panel observing that it was “relatively modest” and less than the 1.5 multiplier requested by plaintiffs’ counsel.
Lower Court Discounted Lodestar And Awarded No Multiplier; CCP § 1021.5 Public Importance Analysis Not Required Under FEHA Fee Awards. A FEHA prevailing plaintiff has a strong basis to reap fee recovery under Government Code section 12965(b); however, the trial judge frequently does discount the lodestar and multiplier request, as happened in Lafleur v. Woodbridge Structural Funding, Case No. B258832 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Oct. 9, 2015) (unpublished)—rulings affirmed by the Second District, Division 8, in an opinion authored by Presiding Justice Bigelow. Plaintiff won a FEHA case claiming she was discriminated due to a pregnancy, with a jury awarding $30,000 damages. Then came the real reckoning in this case—plaintiff seeking a $317,500 lodestar fee award augmented by a 2.0 positive multiplier for a total fee award of $635,000. The lower court found the fee request to be too much, awarding $160,700 as the lodestar and denying the multiplier request. The defense appeal did not succeed. The main contention was that FEHA fee awards had to also vindicate a broader significant, public importance like that involved in private attorney general fee awards under CCP § 1021.5. Although sometimes 1021.5 is considered under specific circumstances, the 2/8 DCA rejected the defense’s 1021.5-grafting requirement given that “[the defense] has failed to cite to any case which holds that a plaintiff suing under FEHA is only entitled to attorney fees if she also meets the public interest requirement of section 1021.5.” Fee award affirmed.
Posted at 04:57 PM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Out-of-Town Counsel Use/High Hourly Rates And Positive Multiplier Enhancement Dominate Discussion In Lengthy Unpublished Decision From Riverside DCA. Although this case should be of interest to civil rights practitioners on the merits (discussing various evidentiary and instructional error issues), Ruelas v. Harper, Case No. E051961 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 6, 2015) (unpublished) has some nice takeaways on fee awards under civil rights statutes. Although there was a partial reversal and remands, the appellate court did provide some guidance on the fee awards. First, it determined that attorney’s fees under section 1988 should be paid to the individual plaintiffs, not the attorneys. (Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2529 (2010).) Second, the reviewing court did not buy the argument that the fee awards were excessive for 7 years of active litigation and trial time for which verdicts were achieved in favor of numerous civil rights plaintiffs. Third, because the billing substantiation attached to the fee petitions was specific in nature, discovery could be denied by the trial court in its discretion into plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records. (Riverside Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Riverside, 152 Cal.App.4th 414, 424-425 (2007).) Fourth, the fee claimants did a good job of showing the relevant community for hourly fees was the “greater L.A. area,” not just San Bernardino such that using Los Angeles and Orange County attorneys with $407 and $550 hourly rates was appropriate. Fifth, although acknowledging that one high billing civil rights senior specialist at $850 per hour did a great job, the reviewing court needed some more specificity from the fee claimants and the trial court in order to justify a positive multiplier on this attorney’s rates under Perdue, with the lower court not being able to use quality of representation or complexity factors given that these were already considered under the lodestar analysis of hourly rate reasonableness (put another way, no “double dipping” allowed as far as lodestar and multiplier analyses).
Painter v. Francis Realty, Inc., Case No. C078106 (3d Dist. Oct. 6, 2015) (Unpublished)—Allocation. After reversing the fee award and remanding to see if apportionment was required between tort and contract claims under Civil Code section 1717 (with only contract claims compensable under section 1717), the trial judge determined the tort and contract claims were “inextricably intertwined” such that apportionment was not required in the case, a determination affirmed on appeal. Success on the contractual declaratory relief claim depended on defeating the tort fraud and improper foreclosure claims, which the defense did with the result it won $41,350 fees against losing plaintiff for work on both contract and tort claims. Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., Case No. E055755 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Oct. 6, 2015) (Unpublished)—Civil Rights; Costs. In this one, the appellate court remanded to the trial court to make findings on whether the losing civil rights plaintiff was subject to routine costs because plaintiff’s suit was frivolous/unreasonable/without basis as required by the state supreme court decision to this effect in Williams, 61 Cal.4th 97 (2015) [discussed in our May 4, 2015 post] and in light of the remand directive in Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc., 237 Cal.App.4th 1040 (2015) [discussed in our June 27, 2015 post]. So, this one went back for a re-do given the wrong standard was used by the trial judge in assessing costs against the non-victorious plaintiff.
Case Is A Primer On How To Satisfy Lodestar Factor And Fight An Award Reduced By A District Judge, Whether In CAFRA Or Other Cases. In U.S.A. v. Moser, No. 13-55266 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015) (published), the Ninth Circuit, in a majority decision by Circuit Judge Hurwitz and a concurrence by Circuit Judge Reinhardt, reversed a district judge’s award of $14,000 in attorney’s fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) to a prevailing claimant out of a requested $50,000 where the government only opposed on the ground it should be capped under a contingency agreement between the claimant and claimant’s attorney. (Claimant prevailed after the government seized currency during an improper marijuana cultivation search.) Here are the reasons that the reduced award was reversed and remanded for recalculation given that the lodestar method guides CAFRA awards: 1. Government waiver: Although the claimant still bears the burden of proof, once this is done, the government waived contesting the reasonableness by not presenting any competent proof in opposition to the fee petition. 2. Hourly rate proof: Claimant’s proof on this was entitled to a presumption of correctness. 3. Claimant’s presentation of fee experts on hourly rate: The district judge erred by ignoring three declarations by attorneys or experts on hourly rates (including forfeiture practitioners), reducing the hourly rate from $500 to $300. 4. Reliance on inapt criminal indigent representation principles: The district court also relied on inapt criminal indigent representation standards where the hourly rate is $125, because CAFRA is not just criminal but has a purpose to make sure claimants are adequately represented in government civil forfeiture battles. 5. Error in reducing for non-delegation to associates. The district judge reduced hours because he felt that tasks could be delegated to associates; however, the problem was that most CAFRA cases are handled by small firms or sole practitioners. 6. Using “stale” prior fee awards. The district court erred in using a 9-year-old fee award as a basis to reduce the claimed rate down to $300/hour—too stale. 7. Improper task reduction: The district court can reduce work effort under an hour-by-hour analysis or an across-the-board percentage cut, if adequately explained. Here, the judge could only identify 6.75 hours which were improper but still cut them down by an overall 40%. 8. Decrease based on contingency fee: The district court also improper reduced the lodestar based on the contingency fee in the fee agreement between claimant and his attorney. In concurrence, Circuit Judge Reinhardt added that unopposed government oppositions meant the district court had a modest task to review the fee petition to make sure it was not unjust or a fraud on the system, with careful review needed where there is a fee proceeding involving sophisticated private clients with resources and where the claimant is claiming a lot of fee recovery.
However, Appeals Court Decided That Longer Statute Of Limitations Applied To Attorney’s Fees Request As An Independent Claim Under IDEA. In the end, parents likely were sorely disappointed over the reversal of an attorney’s fees award for their Asperger’s Syndrome-suffering son under circumstances where he was entitled to the preparation of an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE) at public expense under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) but where their son was not determined to need special education services. However, the Ninth Circuit had to confront some legal issues in reversing the fee recovery in Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., No. 13-35329 et al. (9th Cir. July 6, 2015) (published), ultimately giving deference to the plain meaning of the fee-shifting statute. The fee-shifting statute at issue was 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), providing that attorney’s fees may be awarded “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” defined in section 1401(3) as a child who needs special education and related services. The first issue to be faced was whether the parents’ attorney’s fees request was timely. After determining that IDEA did not contain a limitations period governing the parents’ fees claim, the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning in Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2002), which preferred the view that an IDEA fees claim was an independent action so as to invoke much longer deadlines for filing a fee request. The next issue was whether parents prevailed, but they certainly did given the findings that their son was entitled to an IEE at public expense, which altered the legal relationships between the parties. The last issue, the most wrenching for parents, was the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of the section 1415(i)(3)(B) disability language. It followed the approach of the Fifth Circuit in T.B. v. Bryan Independent School Dist., 628 F.32d 240, 244-245 (5th Cir. 2010) which found the plain statutory language prevented a fee recovery because the parents’ son did not meet the “disability/special education services” requirement—an equitable result found distasteful to the district judge but not enough to surmount legislative language of a much narrower nature in the appellate court’s view.
Posted at 09:44 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
However, Striking Plaintiff’s Costs Had To Be Reconsidered Under Williams. Actually, Myres v. San Francisco Housing Authority, Case No. A141107 (1st Dist., Div. 5 May 20, 2015) (unpublished) may be more interesting for its decision on the costs issue versus the fee issue. On the fee issue, plaintiff did obtain about a $35,000 compensatory verdict on only one of four causes of action, a harassment/hostile work environmental claim under FEHA. Plaintiff then sought $15,627.81 in costs and $332,061.75 in fees (with the fees being based on a $221,374 lodestar, augmented by a 1.5 multiplier). The trial court issued an order granting $78,750 in fees but striking $7,642.46 in costs. The appellate court affirmed the fee award but reversed the costs reduction. The fee award was no abuse of discretion. However, on the costs award, the appellate court was sensitive to the state supreme court’s recent decision in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., 2015 WL 1964947 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2015) [surveyed in our May 4, 2015 post], which found that FEHA plaintiffs ordinarily should be awarded costs and fees unless special circumstances were at play and circumscribing the circumstances under which FEHA prevailing defendants could recover costs. The problem was that the defense, even at the appellate argument, conceded that plaintiff would be entitled to costs unless they would be unjust, which was not the basis for the lower court ruling striking costs. So, the costs issue had to be remanded for a “relook.”
California Supreme Court Treats Attorney’s Fees And Costs Alike With Regard To Losing FEHA Plaintiffs. Our California Supreme Court, in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist., Case No. S213100 (Cal. Supreme Ct. May 4, 2015) (published), has decided that losing plaintiffs in FEHA cases should be treated alike with respect to a trial judge’s assessment of both attorney’s fees and costs: court costs are not automatic in favor of the winning FEHA defendant and court costs should only be awarded if the losing plaintiff brought/continued litigation without an objective basis for believing the case had potential merit. On the automatic court costs issue, the state supreme court decided Government Code section 12965(b) constituted an exception to the routine Code of Civil Procedure 1032(b) statute, disapproving broad dictum in Davis v. KGO-TV, Inc., 17 Cal.4th 436, 444 n. 3 (1998) to the contrary and disapproving three intermediary appellate decisions to the contrary. With respect to the second discretionary standard issue, the unanimous court determined that court cost recoveries, like fee recoveries, were governed by the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 484 U.S. 412 (1978) standard only allowing for fee recovery if the FEHA case was frivolous, unreasonable, meritless or vexatious. In so doing, it relied heavily on 1978 legislative history that changed the wording in the Government Code section based on Christiansburg.
No Material Modifications in Amended Opinion. On March 6, 2015, we posted on C.W. v. Capistrano Unified School District, No. 12-57315 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) (published), which dealt with an attorney’s fees award in favor of school district and against plaintiff under various civil rights-oriented schemes, namely, IDEA, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983. Plaintiff did well to appeal in connection with the fee recovery, although there was a partial concurrence/partial dissent. We can now report that, on April 9, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion (with no material changes) and denied a rehearing request.
Posted at 11:15 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Case Law Did Not Clearly Show Claims Were Without Foundation. In Kohler v. Bed Bath & Beyond of California, Nos. 12-56520 et al. (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2015) (published), a disabled plaintiff lost a summary judgment on certain American with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims. The district judge then granted the defense, as prevailing party, attorney’s fees of $59,892 under 42 U.S.C. § 12205—with the theory being that many of the claims were “without foundation.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment but reversed the fee award. In this one, the summary judgment was affirmed, but case law was not clear on the maneuvering space and tenant liability for ADA violation issues. Beyond that, another claim was moot and plaintiff was making a novel extension of a California requirement into the ADA guidelines area. The case did not involve frivolous claims, even though plaintiff did not ultimately prevail given that a “prevailing defendant” in ADA fee-shifting contexts must meet a higher burden in order to receive fee recovery.
Posted at 09:20 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink
Some Reductions In Requested Fees Made By U.S. District Judg­e. In Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit invalidated, on constitutional grounds, a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting use of cars as sleeping quarters, which the appeals court found was wrongfully targeted at the homeless. We can now report that U.S. District Judge R. Gary Klausner has awarded $713,487 in attorney’s fees to the successful civil rights attorneys. He did make reductions for hours spent on drafting the complaint (not buying that more than 200 hours were in order—reducing them in half) and on preparing a motion for partial summary judgment and opposing the city’s summary judgment motion (with 739.1 hours being deemed excessive). In making reductions, District Judge Klausner did put some stock on the lower number of hours expended by defense counsel as a gauge of reasonableness, a topic we have posted on earlier. (See our June 8, 2008 post and our April 27, 2013 post on In re Tobacco Cases I, subsequently published at 216 Cal.App.4th 570 (2013), see especially pages 584-585.) However, a 1.2 multiplier was applied to the lodestar based the contingency factor—a high risk of nonpayment. HAT TIP AND OBSERVATION—We thank Carter “Cappy” White of U.C. Davis School of Law’s Civil Rights Clinic for the “heads up” on this fee order. We also observe that Carol Sobel was involved in this case, an attorney providing expert fee testimony in many civil rights/public interest cases.
Posted at 09:36 AM in Cases: Civil Rights | Permalink