Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/71034582/Torts-Negligence-MBE-Outline-Fall-10
Timestamp: 2017-05-25 22:25:57
Document Index: 214219976

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§3', '§3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§5', '§5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Torts Negligence MBE Outline Fall 10 | Causation (Law) | Negligence
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§ 1 Elements
Plaintiff seeking to establish liability in negligence must prove each of the following elements: 1. 2. 3. 4. Defendant owed a legal duty to plaintiff. Defendant's conduct breached that duty. Defendant's breach of duty was the actual and legal (proximate) cause of injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant's conduct.
§ 2 Duty
§ 2.1 General Rule--Duty to Foreseeable Plaintiffs
The element of "duty" is usually described as an obligation, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risk. Where defendant engages in conduct which is claimed to have injured plaintiff, the issue could be framed: did defendant have a duty to plaintiff to conform to a certain standard of conduct? In the famous Palsgraf case, Justice Cardozo articulated the rule that defendant owes a duty only to "foreseeable" plaintiffs. (Justice Andrews' dissent in that case argued that "[e]veryone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts which unreasonably threaten the safety of others.") Justice Cardozo's view is probably the "majority" view. § 2.2 Analytical Approach
For analytical purposes, the question is more usefully formulated as follows: under the circumstances, can it be said that defendant has no duty to plaintiff? (This is for analytical value only; the rule should be articulated that plaintiff must prove that defendant owed a duty as part of the prima facie case of negligence, and that the existence of a duty is determined by whether the plaintiff is "foreseeable.") Most frequently tested are situations in which the defendant's allegedly wrongful "conduct" is a failure or omission to act. § 2.3 Duty to Take Affirmative Action--Failure or Omission to Act § 2.3(A) General Rule--No Duty to Act for the Protection of Others The traditional rule is that there is no affirmative duty to take action (as opposed to doing nothing) to aid or protect a plaintiff who is at risk of injury unless such action is taken. The law does recognize certain situations, however, in which a duty to take action does arise. § 2.3(B) Exceptions to General Rule (1) Defendant's Conduct Causes Peril If defendant's conduct is responsible for placing plaintiff in a position where she requires aid, defendant has a duty to take action to aid plaintiff. (1)(a) Nature of defendant's conduct The traditional application of this exception recognized a duty to act only when defendant's conduct which caused plaintiff to be in peril was itself negligent. The modern approach is to recognize a duty to take action even when defendant's conduct creating the peril was not tortious. (2) Defendant Takes Action or Promises to Do So Although defendant has no general duty to take affirmative action to aid plaintiff, once defendant actually takes such action, or promises to take such action to aid plaintiff, defendant has a duty to exercise due care as to his subsequent conduct.
(2)(a) The Good Samaritan rule Where defendant voluntarily takes action to aid plaintiff, defendant must exercise due care in giving assistance. This means that defendant must not discontinue aiding plaintiff if doing so would leave plaintiff in a worse position than when the aid began. (2)(a)(i) Good Samaritan statutes: In some jurisdictions, statutes provide immunity from civil liability for persons, often physicians and nurses, who give emergency aid to others. Such statutes usually limit the immunity to negligent conduct (i.e., a defendant otherwise within the statute's protection would be liable if the action taken in aid of plaintiff was reckless.) (2)(b) Defendant promises to take action--no liability for nonfeasance The majority rule is that a defendant who gratuitously promises to take action to aid plaintiff has no duty to actually take the promised action. This is so even if plaintiff relied on the promise to his detriment. (This is often referred to as "nonfeasance," a complete failure to render the promised aid.) (2)(b)(i) Exception to majority rule--liability for malfeasance: Having made a gratuitous promise to aid plaintiff, once defendant attempts to give the promised aid, defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care in doing so. Due to the perceived harshness of the nonfeasance rule, courts readily find that a defendant who makes a gratuitous promise to aid plaintiff has subsequently taken action which constitutes an attempted performance of the promise. (2)(b)(ii) Minority rule--liability for nonfeasance: In a minority of jurisdictions, defendant is liable for a complete failure to perform a gratuitous promise of aid, if plaintiff relied on the promise to his detriment (e.g., by foregoing other aid). (3) Special Relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff Defendant has a duty to take affirmative action in aid of plaintiff where a special relationship exists between defendant and plaintiff. This special relationship is most frequently tested in three contexts--(1) duty to care for plaintiff, (2) duty to control others, and (3) duty to warn plaintiff of danger. (3)(a) Duty to care for plaintiff Defendant has a duty to take affirmative action to benefit plaintiff where there exists a special relationships between defendant and plaintiff from which defendant derives economic benefit or as to which defendant occupies a position of power over plaintiff (e.g., plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon defendant). The following relationships have been generally recognized as triggering the duty to care for plaintiff--(a) employer/employee (during and in the scope of employment), (b) common carrier and innkeeper/ customer, (c) school/pupil, (d) parent/child, and (e) jailer/prisoner. (3)(b) Duty to control others Defendant has a duty to take affirmative action to protect plaintiff where defendant has a special relationship with a third person that gives defendant power to control the behavior of the third person. Defendant must exercise due care to prevent the person under control from injuring plaintiff. Relationships which have been recognized as triggering the duty to control others include (a) employer/employee, (b) parent/child, (c) bailor/bailee (e.g., car owner/driver), (d) partner or joint enterpriser/another partner or joint enterpriser, and (e) in some circumstances, dispenser of liquor/customer.
then defendant failed to act as a reasonable person would. the employer is liable for her own negligence in hiring the employee. the more likely defendant will not be found to have breached a duty to plaintiff merely by engaging in such an activity or by not undertaking certain precautions.
. this is a useful way to remember and to articulate the relevant considerations. which is attributed by law to the employer.g. (3)(c) Duty to warn plaintiff of danger In some jurisdictions. defendant breaches the duty to plaintiff if he fails to conduct himself as a reasonable person would in the same circumstances. so that such precautions are considered to be "outweighed" in the Learned Hand calculus.Law 3211
(3)(b)(i) Negligent hiring: Defendant/employer has a duty to plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in hiring employees. defendant breached his duty of care by not taking such precautions. and considering the social utility of the activity in which defendant is engaged. driving a car presents a fairly high probability of colliding with others. Judge Learned Hand offered the following analysis: if the burden (or cost) on defendant of taking precautions against the threatened risk was outweighed by the likelihood (or probability) that plaintiff would be injured by the risk-producing activity.) (3)(b)(ii) Negligent entrustment: Where defendant permits a third person to use his personal property.1(A) Learned Hand Breach of Duty Formula In determining whether defendant's conduct constituted a breach of duty under the "reasonable person" standard. if the burden of taking precautions is less than the probability of injury "times" the severity of that injury. which might be thought to justify significant precautions.
§3 Breach of Duty
§3. § 3. The special relationships which have been recognized as triggering this duty include (a) psychotherapist-patient and (b) custodian/prisoner or patient. and a relatively severe danger of death or great injury. such that defendant may be liable to plaintiff if an employee subsequently injures plaintiff. The context in which this issue is frequently tested is an auto owner/defendant who permits a member of his family (e. Less burdensome precautions such as remaining alert and operating the vehicle competently are regarded as sufficient to fulfill the duty of care.1 General Rule In general. (1) Social Utility of Defendant's Activity The greater the benefit society derives. defendant has a duty to control such use and to exercise due care in permitting the third person to use the property.. and a reasonable person would not undertake them. In short. such as driving very slowly. Although legal problems cannot be reduced to simple mathematical formulae. viewed in the aggregate. considering also the gravity (or severity) of the injury to plaintiff if the risk manifests itself. not vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of the employee. However. his minor child) to drive his car. In negligent hiring. plus the social utility of defendant's activity. (Distinguish the vicarious liability of an employer for her employee's torts--respondeat superior--where the negligent conduct is that of the employee. a defendant who has the requisite special relationship with a third person who becomes aware that the third person intends to do specific harm to an identified plaintiff has a duty to warn plaintiff of the harm. from the activity engaged in by defendant. For example. or avoiding driving at all when there is great congestion or pedestrian activity. the social utility of driving is also very great.
In the majority of jurisdictions. (3)(a) Adult activities Many states alter the breach of duty analysis for minor defendants when they engage in adult activities (such as driving a car or a boat). it is relevant how a person engaging in defendant's activity would customarily behave. and disabilities as the defendant would have done under the circumstances. the trier of fact assesses what conduct a reasonable person of the same height. which divided--minors into three age levels--age six and below. as to which the defendant was conclusively presumed incapable of being negligent.1(B) Reasonable Person
(1) Knowledge and Mental Ability In assessing breach of duty. the above principle is not applied in assessing the reasonableness of defendant's conduct during the emergency. the "reasonable" person to whom defendant is compared is thought of as also possessing that greater knowledge (or expertise). the trier of fact may find either that the customary manner of behavior was not reasonable under the circumstances. Minors engaged in adult activities are held to the same standard of care as a reasonable adult in the same circumstances. and age fourteen and up.1(C) Same Circumstances (1) Effect of Custom In determining how a reasonable person would behave under the circumstances.Law 3211
§ 3. mental disability or intoxication is assessed without such diminishment of abilities. the conduct of defendants whose cognitive abilities are diminished due to mental illness. age seven to thirteen. For purposes of negligence analysis. as to which it was rebuttably presumed that the defendant was not negligent.
. Thus. intelligence and experience would have done. the "reasonable person" standard is applied as though the reasonable person possessed the knowledge and mental capabilities of an average member of the community. (2)(a) Exception--defendant's negligence caused emergency If defendant's own negligent conduct is responsible for creating the emergency situation. a minor defendant's conduct is assessed according to what a reasonable child of the same age. or that a reasonable person would not have engaged in customary behavior. as to which it was rebuttably presumed that the defendant was capable of being negligent. A minority of states follow the traditional rule. (2) Physical Characteristics The reasonable person standard is applied as though the reasonable person possessed the same physical characteristics as defendant. However. But evidence of custom is not conclusive. it is recognized that a reasonable person might accept greater risk or have less opportunity for reflection in determining the reasonable course of action. even if defendant did not herself actually possess that knowledge or mental capability. (3) Age The reasonable person standard specifically takes account of age when defendant is a minor. education. ability to see or hear. (2) Effect of Emergency Where defendant's conduct occurred in an emergency situation. weight. (2)(a) Exception--voluntary intoxication The reasonable person standard is not altered to account for defendant's physical disability if the disability is the result of defendant's voluntary intoxication. § 3. to the extent that defendant possessed greater knowledge (or expertise) than the average person.
gas) caused many jurisdictions to impose a duty of care which required that such utilities "take every reasonable precaution suggested by experience or prudence" to avoid injury to the public. (Some of these types of defendants were also discussed above in connection with a duty to take affirmative action to protect plaintiffs. In a majority of jurisdictions.") Other (minority) jurisdictions regard a qualifying violation of statute by defendant as either raising a rebuttable presumption (plaintiff wins unless defendant introduces enough evidence to overcome the presumption) or as prima facie evidence (plaintiff wins unless defendant introduces any evidence. c." or "the utmost caution characteristic of very careful prudent persons.Law 3211
§ 3.3(B) Innkeepers Some jurisdictions utilize the same standard of care for assessing the conduct of innkeepers toward their customers as that applied to a common carrier regarding its passengers. § 3.
§ 3. trains.g. the statute may establish the standard of conduct for breach of duty purposes.2 Effect of Violation of Statute
§ 3. bus lines) were traditionally said to have a duty to avoid harm to their passengers through exercise of "the highest degree of vigilance.2(B) Criminal Statute Where defendant's conduct also violates a statute that does not provide for civil liability (which will usually be a criminal statute). Defendant's civil liability is determined by the specific statutory provisions. this means that it is conclusively established that defendant breached his duty to plaintiff (often referred to as "negligence per se. (1) When Violation Is "Negligence Per Se" In a jurisdiction that has adopted a "negligence per se" rule. conclusive or otherwise. Plaintiff is a member of the class intended to be protected by the statute.3 Higher Standard of Care
Historically. The injury caused by defendant's conduct is the type which the statute was intended to prevent.g.. defendant's violation of a criminal statute has the effect of establishing the standard of care only when all of the following three conditions are present: a." § 3..
(2) When Violation of Statute Excused Defendant's violation of an applicable statute is excused if compliance with the statute (1) would have resulted in a harm greater than the harm produced by the violation. and does not raise any presumption in the defendant's favor.2(A) Civil Statute A statute which provides for civil liability supersedes the common law of torts. but plaintiff retains burden of proof if defendant offers evidence) that defendant's conduct breached the duty to plaintiff..g. or (2) would have been impossible. defendants who engaged in certain activities were held to a "higher" standard of care to the public or to their customers.) § 3.3(A) Common Carriers Common carriers (e. care and precaution.
. § 3.3(C) Public Utilities The dangerous products or services dispensed by public utilities (e. electricity. (2)(a) Non-excusable violations Some statutes are regarded as so important that their violation cannot be excused as a matter of law (e. Defendant's violation of the statute is not excused. the statutory obligation to maintain a vehicle's brakes in proper working order). b. (3) Effect of Compliance with Statute Compliance with a statute is regarded as mere evidence on the issue of whether defendant breached his duty of care.
§ 3. These categories are: a. minimally competent member of the medical profession would tell the plaintiff/patient under the same circumstances.
§ 3.4(A) Customary Level of Knowledge and Expertise The effect of the above rule is that defendant will be found to have breached the standard of care if he did not conduct himself as would a competent member of the trade or profession with minimally adequate knowledge and expertise. If defendant is a specialist within a trade or profession.5 Guest Statutes
Statutes in many jurisdictions reduce the duty of care owed by the driver of an automobile to a "guest" (a nonpaying passenger) in that auto. Some jurisdictions apply a more modern. the standard of care is applied according to the higher standards appropriate to that specialty. (1) Disclosure as Measured by Patient's Desire for Information Some jurisdictions determine what information must be disclosed by defendant/physician to meet the standard of care with reference solely to what a reasonable patient would believe was material in making the decision to undertake the medical procedure or treatment. b. § 3. the conduct of a defendant with specialized skill or expertise was assessed for reasonable person/breach of duty purposes with regard to the community in which defendant practiced his trade or profession.4(C) Informed Consent Some jurisdictions follow the traditional rule which held a physician liable for the intentional tort of battery if he failed to properly inform a plaintiff/patient about the risks and alternatives of a proposed medical procedure or treatment. (Plaintiff's consent was said to be vitiated by the lack of disclosure.6 Owners and Occupiers of Land
§ 3. the breach of which constitutes negligence. What must be disclosed under this duty is determined by comparison with what a reasonable. national standard. (1) Categories of Risks The standard of care applied to owners and occupiers of land varies according to which of three categories of danger or activity were involved in the injury to plaintiff. Artificial conditions--the injury to plaintiff derived from circumstances created by persons on the land. recognizing that technology permits communication and exchange of knowledge that transcends traditional geographic limitations. Such statutes frequently provide that the driver of an auto is not liable for injuries suffered by the guest unless the driver's wrongful conduct amounted to gross negligence or recklessness. Specialists are particularly likely to be held to a national standard.4 Malpractice (Greater Than Average Knowledge or Expertise)
If defendant possesses knowledge or expertise that is greater than the average person's. Activities--the injury to plaintiff derived from the conduct of persons on the land.Law 3211
§ 3.6 (A) General Considerations For historical reasons.4(B) Standard of Care as Affected by Geographical Area Traditionally. breach of duty is assessed as though the reasonable person possessed the customary level of specialized knowledge and expertise of a practitioner in good standing of the same or a similar trade or profession as the defendant. § 3.
. (1) Varying Standards Within Profession Where recognized differences in doctrine exist within a profession.
§ 3. most jurisdictions modify the general "reasonable person" standard of care when assessing breach of duty where defendant is an owner or occupier of land and plaintiff is a person injured while on or adjacent to defendant's land. the standard of care applied to defendant is that of the "school" or doctrine to which she belongs.) Other jurisdictions utilize a breach of duty analysis-the physician has a duty to inform the patient of such matters.
Persons not on the land (but adjacent to it) Persons on the land 1. The trespasser category is further broken down into four sub-categories. analysis of standard of care varies according to categories of plaintiffs who claim injury: A B. Invitees 4.
such as buildings. (1)(b) Artificial conditions Defendant must exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to a plaintiff not on his land. Privileged entrants
(3) Owner or Occupier The defendant to whom the standard of care is applied is the person in possession of the land. a vendee.
(2) Categories of Plaintiffs In addition to considering the category of danger or activity which injured plaintiff. cultivation. etc. deriving from defendant's activities or the activities of others conducted on defendant's land. Licensees 3. as to which the standard of care may vary. (2) Plaintiffs on the Land (2)(a) Trespassers (2)(a)(i) Trespasser defined: If plaintiff enters onto defendant's land without defendant's permission or without a privilege to so enter. § 3. deriving from unreasonably dangerous artificial conditions which abut or protrude onto adjacent land. (1)(c)(i) Exception to majority rule---native trees in urban areas: Many jurisdictions require that in urban areas. plaintiff is classified as a trespasser. defendant must exercise reasonable care to protect a plaintiff passing by defendant's land on adjacent public streets from injuries deriving from native trees on defendant's land.Law 3211
c. excavations. Natural conditions--the injury to plaintiff derived from circumstances not created by persons but existing on the land. trees occurring naturally. which includes the owner. a tenant. or an adverse possessor. Trespassers (a) unknown (b) known (c) frequent (d) children 2. (1)(c) Natural conditions A majority of jurisdictions impose no duty on defendant to protect a plaintiff not on defendant's land from dangers deriving from natural conditions on defendant's land. falling boulders.
. Standard of care may also vary if the possessor of land is a lessor/landlord or a vendor/seller of land. Defendant must also exercise reasonable care to protect passersby on a public street from injury deriving from dangerous artificial conditions on defendant's land. such as natural bodies of water. etc.6(B) Standards of Care (1) Plaintiffs Not on the Land (but Adjacent to It) (1)(a) Activities Defendant must exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to a plaintiff not on defendant's land. The minority rule is that defendant must exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to a plaintiff not on defendant's land from dangers deriving from natural conditions on defendant's land.
unreasonable risk of danger to children trespassers if defendant knows or reasonably should know of the existence and nature of the artificial condition. the plaintiff is regarded as a known trespasser. Activities: Most jurisdictions require defendant to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to a known trespasser deriving from activities conducted on defendant's land. The child trespasser is unaware of the risk. Heightened duty--to exercise reasonable care: If the heightened standard of care as to children trespassers is invoked. defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to the children (applicable to dangerous artificial conditions). even though defendant may not be aware that a particular plaintiff is present on defendant's land. (2)(a)(ii)(D) Children trespassers: Where activities and natural conditions are involved. It is foreseeable that children are likely to trespass where the artificial condition is located. Natural conditions: Defendant has no duty to prevent injury to a known trespasser deriving from natural conditions on defendant's land. A heightened standard of care may apply as to artificial conditions on defendant's land.Law 3211
(2)(a)(ii) Standards of care
(2)(a)(ii)(A) Unknown trespasser: Defendant has no duty of care as to a trespasser whose presence is unknown to defendant. Defendant also has no duty to inspect his land to attempt to discover unknown trespassers. The applicable standard of care varies according to category of danger. The risk of danger of the artificial condition outweighs its utility. Defendant has no independent duty to inspect the land to discover such artificial conditions. Frequent trespassers are owed the same duty of care as known trespassers. When heightened standard of care arises: The heightened standard of care set forth above arises if four prerequisites are shown to exist: (1) (2) (3) (4) The artificial condition is a foreseeable risk of unreasonable danger to trespassing children. For example. (2)(a)(ii)(B) Known trespasser: If defendant becomes aware that a particular plaintiff has trespassed on his property (or becomes aware of facts from which he should reasonably conclude that plaintiff has trespassed). and without regard to whether a particular plaintiff has ever previously trespassed upon defendant's property. he would be alerted to the presence of frequent trespassers. Nature of risk as unreasonable danger. the standard may be higher than that normally applicable to unknown trespassers. the standard of care as to children who trespass is the same as for the applicable category of adult trespassers. if defendant observed that a beaten path cuts across his property.
Discussion of prerequisites: (1) Foreseeable risk An artificial condition on defendant's land poses a foreseeable. Artificial conditions: Defendant must exercise reasonable care to warn a known trespasser of hidden dangers of which (1) defendant is aware and (2) the known trespasser is unaware. (2)(a)(ii)(C) Frequent trespasser: If defendant knows or reasonably should know that trespassers frequently enter upon a portion of defendant's land. It is relevant to whether a condition poses a foreseeably
the child is treated as if he were an adult trespasser). if the artificial condition is located near a park or playground. or near a street. did not discover the condition or did not appreciate the danger it represented. social guests.. and door-to-door salespersons. (b) which present an unreasonable danger. and who does not enter for a purpose benefiting defendant or defendant's activities. Risk outweighs utility--It is said that the utility of maintaining the dangerous artificial condition must be "slight" compared to the risk to trespassing children in order for this prerequisite to be satisfied.e. defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from injury arising from activities conducted by defendant or on defendant's behalf. or is easily climbed. below. such conditions do not present a foreseeably unreasonable risk of danger with regard to appropriate children trespassers. Examples are visiting relatives. and other relevant factors.) (2)(b)(i) Standard of care (2)(b)(i)(A) Activities: As to licensees.
Foreseeable that children are likely to trespass--If defendant has no reason to anticipate that children are likely to trespass where an artificial condition is located. Thus. but defendant's duty includes the exercise of reasonable care to discover licensees of whom he is not aware. (Note that invitees who exceed the scope of defendant's invitation are treated as licensees.Law 3211
unreasonable danger to children trespassers that the danger is one which a child might ordinarily be expected to recognize.) Child trespasser unaware of risk--This prerequisite is satisfied if the child trespasser. (2)(c)(i) Business invitees: A business invitee is an invitee who enters onto defendant's land for a purpose related to defendant's business activities or interests. Therefore. Thus. Defendant has no duty to inspect his land for such dangerous artificial conditions.
. the heightened standard of care is not triggered.
(2)(b)(i)(B)
(2)(b)(i)(C)
(2)(c) Invitees An invitee is a person who enters onto defendant's land at defendant's express or implied invitation. Foreseeability of the likelihood of children trespassers may arise from defendant's knowledge of past trespasses.
(2)(b) Licensees A licensee is a person who enters onto defendant's land with defendant's express or implied permission. See discussion of invitees. This is similar to the negligence calculus (cost of precautions balanced against probability and gravity of harm considering social utility). Natural conditions: The standard of care applicable to licensees requires defendant to protect them from dangerous natural conditions to the same extent required as to artificial conditions. and by falling (from a height or into a hole). accessibility to the artificial condition.) Artificial conditions: Defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn of any artificial conditions (a) of which he is aware or reasonably should be aware. defendant owes no heightened duty to prevent injury to that child (i. due to her age or immaturity. by fire. a child old enough to play without immediate parental supervision can ordinarily be expected to recognize the danger represented by water (drowning). and (c) of which the plaintiff/licensee is unaware and unlikely to discover. proximity to places where children are likely to be. and is able to avoid that risk. Customers and persons accompanying them. If the child trespasser is aware of the condition. etc. (Compare treatment of trespassers. understands the risk of danger it poses. whether it represents any different balancing than "reasonability" ordinarily calls for is less important than articulating the prerequisite and discussing it. defendant should reasonably know that children are likely to trespass there. It is usually sufficient for defendant to warn plaintiff/licensee. (It was from this aspect of foreseeability that the traditional label "attractive nuisance doctrine" was derived. discussed above. and who enters for a purpose relating to defendant's interests or activities. Invitees are classified as either business invitees or public invitees.
(2)(d)(i)(A)
(2)(d)(ii)
(3) Landlords and Tenants The standard of care applicable to owners and occupiers of land is invoked in connection with possession of land. However. If it would be insufficient to make the dangerous condition reasonably safe by providing only a warning. or private persons exercising a privilege (e. nonresidential premises may be interested in purchasing). defendant's duty includes reasonable care to provide other precautions.
(2)(c)(ii)
Public invitees: A public invitee is a member of the public who enters onto defendant's land for a purpose as to which the land is held open to the public.. Privileged entrants are classified as either licensees or invitees. Under certain circumstances. Natural conditions: Defendant's duty to invitees with regard to dangerous natural conditions is the same as that applicable to artificial conditions. the classification of public invitee is not recognized. Thus. certain persons are nevertheless privileged by law to enter onto defendant's land. and (b) to warn invitees of the existence of such conditions. the privileged entrant is regarded as an invitee for standard of care purposes. however. Areas retained in possession of the landlord. As set forth above. Invitee exceeds scope of invitation: An invitee may be regarded as a licensee or even as a trespasser if the invitee enters areas of defendant's property to which his invitation does not extend. remain the responsibility of the landlord (as to whom the appropriate standard of care also applies). (2)(d)(i) Public entrants: If the public purpose on which the privileged entrant was acting has a connection with defendant's activities conducted on the premises.
(2)(c)(iii)(C) (2)(c)(iv)
(2)(d) Privileged entrants Where there has been no express or implied permission or invitation extended by defendant. the appropriate standard of care (determined as discussed above) applies when defendant is a tenant in possession of leased premises. Examples include visitors to airports and visitors to churches. census takers. or if the invitee stays in a permitted area longer than was contemplated by the invitation. These include police officers or fire fighters responding to an emergency. such as common areas in multiple housing units. Police and fire fighter: Police and fire fighters entering onto premises have traditionally been regarded by the courts as licensees.Law 3211
delivery persons. Artificial conditions: Defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover dangerous artificial conditions which invitees would not reasonably be aware of. job applicants (if reasonable to expect that employment may be available) are examples of business invitees. (2)(c)(iii) Standard of care (2)(c)(iii)(A) (2)(c)(iii)(B) Activities: Defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to invitees caused by activities conducted on defendant's land. defendant has no duty to inspect and discover dangerous conditions as to licensees. salespersons (if reasonable to expect that someone on the non-private.
(2) (c) (ii) (A) Minority--no public invitees: In a minority of jurisdictions. a landlord may be liable to the tenant or to third persons for injuries they suffer on areas as to which the landlord has surrendered possession to the tenant. unauthorized entry is necessary to avoid a greater harm).g. Courts readily find that such a connection exists. courts in such jurisdictions readily find a business purpose in the visits by persons who would otherwise be considered public invitees. usually depending on the purpose for which they entered. Private entrants: A private person entering onto defendant's land under some legal privilege is regarded as a licensee.
(3)(c) Landlord's duty to tenant on leased premises The nature and extent of the landlord's duty to protect tenant in possession from harm arising from a dangerous condition on the premises varies according to whether the defect was patent. or arose after the transfer of possession. (3)(d)(i) Exception to traditional view--leased premises to be open to public: Even under the traditional view.. latent. the landlord had a duty to prevent injury to members of the public who came onto the premises. Duration of landlord's duty: The duty imposed on landlords to protect persons not on premises (leased to a tenant) from harm continues only for a reasonable period.
. (3)(c)(iii) Defects arising after transfer of possession: The landlord has no duty to exercise reasonable care as to dangerous conditions which arise after possession has been transferred to the tenant.Law 3211
(3)(a) Liability for criminal attacks in common areas of multiple housing units Modernly. a landlord had no duty to protect third persons from injuries arising from dangerous conditions or activities on the leased premises. imposing liability where the tenant is injured because the landlord failed to perform a contractual duty to repair a dangerous condition of which the landlord knew or should have known and as to which the landlord had a reasonable opportunity to repair. If the landlord actively concealed a dangerous condition. The landlord has no duty to inspect the premises for latent dangers. a minority of jurisdictions impose a duty on a landlord to exercise reasonable care to protect residential tenants from foreseeable criminal attacks which occur in the common areas as to which the landlord has retained control. This standard of care required the landlord to exercise reasonable care to discover and repair any dangerous natural or artificial conditions existing at the time of transfer of possession. a landlord would have the duty mentioned immediately above as to those premises in the hands of a tenant.) (3)(d) Landlord's duty to third persons (not tenants) on leased premises Under the traditional view. (3)(b) Landlord's duty to persons outside tenant's premises A landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to discover and repair (or. many jurisdictions treat third persons who would otherwise be classified as licensees or invitees of the tenant as though they were tenants themselves in assessing the tort liability of the landlord.g. (This latter view is a modern minority position. The landlord is under no duty to warn of or repair such obvious conditions. the period is extended until the tenant actually discovers the concealed condition. at minimum. warn tenant of) dangerous artificial conditions existing on the premises at the time possession is transferred to the tenant. branches of native trees overhanging public streets) as to particular premises. Modernly. The landlord has a duty to warn the tenant of such dangers or repair them. if the landlord knew that the tenant intended to open the leased premises to the public. and (2) the landlord is or reasonably should be aware are classified as latent defects. (3)(c)(i) Patent defects: Dangerous natural or artificial conditions which are or should be reasonably apparent to the tenant upon transfer of possession are called patent defects. (3)(c)(ii) Latent defects: Dangerous natural or artificial conditions of which (1) the tenant is unaware and are not reasonably apparent to her. (3)(b)(i) Landlord's duty as to natural conditions: If an owner/occupier of land would have a duty to prevent harm from natural conditions (e. the landlord has no such duty unless the landlord covenanted to make repairs or actually undertook them. which period terminates when the tenant has had a reasonable time to discover and remedy any defects. unless the landlord actually undertakes to repair such conditions or covenants to repair them. If a dangerous condition arises after transfer of possession to the tenant.
. Defendant must then produce sufficient evidence to support a verdict in his favor. there is generally no further duty to protect anyone from injuries arising out of the conditions of the land or from activities conducted thereon. (4)(a)(ii) Seller's active concealment extends period of duty: Where the defendant/seller actively conceals the existence of a dangerous condition (as opposed to negligently failing to disclose it). the builder of a residence has a tort law duty to exercise reasonable care in construction. if believed by the jury. vendor/seller of land has a continuing duty even after the transfer of possession and title. Under limited circumstances.
§ 3. it may still find that the breach of duty element is not proven. § 3. so that such a builder remains liable for defects in its construction. (4)(a) Seller liable for latent dangerous conditions A defendant/seller has a duty to disclose to the purchaser of land any hidden dangerous natural or artificial conditions (a) of which the seller knows or reasonably should know and (b) which the seller reasonably could anticipate the purchaser will not discover. seller may not argue that the purchaser reasonably should have discovered the condition). and issue a verdict in favor of defendant even if the defendant offers no contrary evidence. if plaintiff makes a qualifying showing of res ipsa loquitur. The duty to disclose non-disclosed hidden dangers continues until the purchaser has had a reasonable chance to discover and remedy the dangers. (4)(a)(i) To whom duty is owed: The seller's duty to disclose hidden dangerous conditions applies both to the purchaser and to the purchaser's invitees and licensees (as to injuries occurring on the land). and the jury may find for defendant if plaintiff has not established breach of duty by a preponderance of the evidence. § 3. that he did meet the applicable standard of care. (2) Minority View--Res Ipsa Loquitur Also Shifts Burden of Persuasion Some jurisdictions--another small minority--give a qualifying showing of res ipsa loquitur the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to defendant. the burden of persuasion remains on plaintiff. (4)(b) Seller is also builder of residence In many jurisdictions. or the court will instruct the jury that breach of duty is established. the duty to disclose continues until the purchaser actually discovers the dangerous condition and remedies it (i. If the jury does not credit plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur evidence.7 Proving Breach of Duty--Res Ipsa Loquitur
Plaintiff generally meets his burden of proving breach of duty by establishing that defendant's conduct fails to conform to the applicable standard of care. by a preponderance of the evidence. breach of duty is established. he has produced evidence sufficient.7(A) Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine--May Satisfy Prima Facie Showing of Breach In the majority of jurisdictions. This is rendered difficult or impossible where plaintiff does not know and cannot effectively determine specifically what defendant's injurious conduct was. however. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") ameliorates this difficulty. and also to persons not on the land (if the dangerous conditions create an unreasonable risk as to such persons). (1) Minority View--Res Ipsa Loquitur Shifts Burden of Producing Evidence A small minority of jurisdictions regard a qualifying showing of res ipsa loquitur as shifting the burden of producing evidence to defendant as to the issue of breach of duty. to support a finding that defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of care. Res ipsa loquitur is thus merely a means of adducing evidence of breach of duty to satisfy the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.7(B) Demonstrating Res Ipsa Loquitur Plaintiff must establish that three requisites are present in order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:
. If defendant produces qualifying evidence.e. If defendant does not then persuade the jury.Law 3211
(4) Sellers of Land Where defendant transfers both possession and ownership of land to another.
1. In effect. would have been sufficient to directly cause the injury. each and every defendant's conduct is regarded as a "but for" cause of the injury. (3) Establishing That Plaintiff Was Not Responsible Plaintiff must demonstrate that she did not set in motion the forces that resulted in her injury. 2. § 4. and plaintiff is unable to establish which defendant is in fact responsible.1 General Rule Defendant's breach of duty must have been the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury. either exclusive or not.2(B) Concurrent Liability If plaintiff's injury is a result of the conduct of more than one defendant. the burden of proof as to cause-in-fact is shifted from plaintiff to defendant. § 4. Modernly. only one of whom can actually be responsible. is merely a circumstance relevant to determination of defendant's responsibility. Tice Test Where plaintiff's injury arises from the conduct of two or more independently acting defendants. unless a particular defendant can show that her conduct caused only an identified injury.4 Summers v.
§ 4 Actual Cause
§4.3 Substantial Factor Test A defendant's conduct is the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury if that conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. § 4. taken alone. Plaintiff was not responsible for the event which caused injury. § 4. plaintiff was required to show that defendant was in exclusive control of the instrumentality (or instrumentalities) that inflicted injury upon plaintiff. unless a defendant can prove that he did not cause plaintiff's injury. and thus "but for" causation did not exist.
. each and every defendant's conduct is regarded as a cause-in-fact of the injury. acting independently and at distinct times. This accounts for the situation where the conduct of two or more defendants results in injury to plaintiff. A mechanical application of the "but for" test would permit each defendant to claim that plaintiff's injury would have occurred whether he acted or not. 3.
§ 3.2 "But For" Test Defendant's conduct was the cause-in-fact of an event if that event would not have occurred but for the existence of the conduct. It is immaterial in this regard that plaintiff placed herself in a situation of peril or that she did not take precautions to avoid injury.7(C) Nature of Elements (1) Establishing Inference of Negligence The trier of fact may determine whether an event is one which would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence with reference to common experience or.2(A) Successive Liability If plaintiff's injuries are the result of conduct by multiple defendants. Expert testimony may be required to establish that negligence is the likely cause of the injury-causing event. and the conduct of each defendant. It is more likely than not that it was defendant's negligence which was responsible for the injury-causing event. (2) Establishing Defendant Was Responsible Traditionally. would not have been sufficient to cause the injury. each and every defendant's conduct is regarded as a "but for" cause of all injuries to plaintiff. § 4. taken alone. it is sufficient if plaintiff shows that it is more likely than not that defendant was responsible for the negligent event.
The event which caused plaintiff's injury was one which would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. it is enough if the trier of fact finds that negligence was more likely than not the cause. by resort to evidence provided by plaintiff. if that is not sufficient. This does not require that plaintiff show negligence was the only possible cause of the injury-causing event. and each individual defendant's conduct. Control.
whether it was the legal or proximate cause of plaintiff's injury varies according to whether the jurisdiction follows one of two leading cases. defendant's conduct is nevertheless the legal or proximate cause of the injury.3(A) Foreseeable Injury If a reasonable person would have anticipated that the extent and type of plaintiff's injury was threatened by defendant's risk-creating conduct. Legal or proximate cause is present depending on whether it was the extent or the type of plaintiff's injury which was unforeseeable. (1) Unforeseeable Extent of Injury If a reasonable person would have foreseen that defendant's conduct threatened the type of injury suffered by plaintiff. which was filled with flammable gas. analysis of legal cause turns on whether the injury itself was foreseeable. (2)(a) Polemis jurisdictions Jurisdictions that follow the analysis of In re Polemis. Legal/proximate cause involves examination of the causal connection between defendant's breach of duty and plaintiff's injury considering (1) directness versus indirectness.Law 3211
§ 4. the court held defendants (employers of the dock workers) liable to plaintiffs (the ship
. and (3) principles of policy and justice. further analysis is necessary. A spark struck by the falling plank ignited the gas. § 5. but would not have reasonably anticipated the extent of damage suffered by plaintiff.e.3(B) Unforeseeable Injury If a reasonable person would not have anticipated that plaintiff would be injured as a result of defendant's conduct.
§5 Legal (Proximate) Cause
§5. § 5. This is the "thin skull" or "eggshell skull" doctrine. (2) nearness versus remoteness in time and space.2 Legal Cause as Limitation on Liability The requirement that defendant's conduct be the legal cause of plaintiff's injury serves to limit what otherwise might be the near-infinite liability of a defendant whose breach of duty was the actual cause of harm to plaintiff. each defendant's conduct may be regarded as a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury." (2) Unforeseeable Type of Injury If a reasonable person could not have foreseen that defendant's conduct threatened the type of injury suffered by plaintiff. each acting independently. in which defendant "takes the plaintiff as he finds him." and defendant's conduct is the legal or proximate cause thereof. Liability is apportioned among the defendants (assuming other elements of negligence are established) based upon the economic benefit (measured by percentage or market share) each defendant derived from the risk-producing conduct. Even though explosion and fire were not the type of injuries reasonably foreseeable from the negligent unloading of wood (since wood is unlikely to strike a spark). an English case. with the result that the ship was destroyed. cause of plaintiff's injury. § 5.. find proximate cause whenever the injury is a direct result of defendant's breach of duty (i.1 General Rule Defendant's breach of duty must be the legal. or proximate. but plaintiff cannot identify which particular defendant's conduct actually injured him. plaintiff's injury was "foreseeable.3 Direct Cause If the actual cause of plaintiff's injury is a force applied directly by defendant or forces set in motion by defendant without intervention by force from a third party.5 Market Share Liability Where plaintiff demonstrates that the injury resulted from conduct engaged in by several defendants. § 5. it is not the product of an intervening force). It is immaterial that the nature of the injury was unforeseeable under this view. Polemis involved a ship whose unloaders negligently knocked a wooden plank into the hold.
only if the type of injury is one that could have been reasonably foreseen. (1) Sources of Intervening Forces Intervening forces can arise from persons other than defendant and plaintiff. find legal or proximate cause where plaintiff's injury resulted directly from defendant's breach of duty. it was regarded as highly unlikely that it would catch fire while floating on water. there are also two different approaches to the legal/proximate cause analysis.
. This is regarded as a direct cause situation (rather than indirect cause.4 Indirect Cause Indirect causation is present where the injury to plaintiff is brought about by a combination of defendant's conduct and an intervening force set in motion by a third party. above.Law 3211
owners) because the injury was a direct result of the negligent act. and not the product of any intervening forces. § 5. finding that defendant's breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury if that was a type of injury that could have been reasonably foreseen. where it was set on fire by molten metal falling onto cotton waste floating amongst the oil. (1) Defendant's Breach Was Direct Cause of Plaintiff's Injury Some jurisdictions focus on the foreseeability of the injury as a direct consequence of defendant's activity. The dock was destroyed by the resulting fire. which holds that even a foreseeable injury is not proximately caused by defendant's breach if the injury came about in a highly extraordinary manner. See the analysis of direct cause.3(C) Foreseeable Injury Brought About in Unforeseeable Manner If defendant's breach of duty results in a type of injury which could reasonably have been foreseen. Here. Wagon Mound I involved a freighter (owned by defendant) from which furnace oil was negligently permitted to leak into the bay in which plaintiff's dock was located. but the manner in which the injury was brought about was unforeseeable. Intervening forces which cut off defendant's liability (for conduct which is an actual cause of plaintiff's injury) are said to "supersede" defendant's breach of duty.
§ 5. another English case. discussed below. The oil was carried by the water about 600 feet to the dock. or from nature itself. analysis considers whether the intervening force is dependent or independent. (2)(b) Wagon Mound I jurisdictions Jurisdictions that follow the analysis of Wagon Mound I.4(A) Intervening Force A force that combines with defendant's conduct is "intervening" if it arises after defendant's conduct has begun. which requires an intervening force). from animals. and whether resulting injury is foreseeable or unforeseeable. (2) Plaintiff's Injury Occurred in Highly Extraordinary Manner Other jurisdictions follow the Restatement view. The English court held that defendant's negligent discharge of the oil was not the proximate cause of the destruction of the dock because it was unforeseeable that the discharge of oil would result in that injury. without regard to the unusual sequence of events which brought it about. (2) Compare Preexisting Conditions Defendant's conduct may combine with preexisting conditions which were in place before defendant took action. Since furnace oil had a very high ignition point. § 5.
Legal cause does not exist if the dependent intervening force is abnormal.3(B)(2)(a) and (b). (2)(a) Unforeseeable extent of injury Some jurisdictions find proximate cause where the type of injury brought about by the combination of defendant's breach of duty and an independent intervening force is foreseeable. above). (1) Foreseeable Independent Intervening Force.Law 3211
§ 5. and both ships then rammed a negligently lowered
. § 5. b. accident--defendant's breach of duty weakens plaintiff. There. (2)(a) Exception--unforeseeable reaction causes foreseeable injury If the type of injury plaintiff suffers is one which is foreseeable given the nature of defendant's conduct. some courts will find proximate cause even where that injury is brought about by an abnormal/ unforeseeable dependent intervening force. The leading case exemplary of this view is known as Kinsman I. negligent medical treatment--defendant's breach of duty injures plaintiff. Unforeseeable independent intervening forces result in a finding that defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. or their property in peril.4(C) Independent Intervening Force An independent intervening force is one which does not arise in response to defendant's breach of duty. and plaintiff is injured during a negligent rescue or escape. the suicide is regarded as unforeseeable and is a superseding dependent intervening force. and that treatment is itself negligent (Note: reckless or intentional misconduct by the medical provider is regarded as abnormal and thus is a superseding dependent intervening force). negligence of third party--defendant's breach of duty places plaintiff in a position of increased danger from third party's negligence. rescue/protection--defendant's breach of duty places plaintiff. illness--defendant's breach of duty causes injury to plaintiff that weakens plaintiff. who seeks medical treatment. c. Independent intervening forces which are reasonably foreseeable do not supersede defendant's negligence. which weakness brings about a subsequent accident. (1) Normal or Foreseeable Dependent Intervening Forces Dependent intervening forces that are normal or foreseeable and that will support a finding of proximate cause include: a. there is a split in authority similar to the Polemis-Wagon Mound I variations (see section 5.4(B) Dependent Intervening Force A dependent intervening force is one that arises in response to defendant's act. even though the extent of the injury caused thereby is not. The first ship floated downstream. struck another moored ship. defendant's negligently moored ship was ripped from its mooring by ice and debris in a river. b. If a sane plaintiff takes his own life because nonfatal pain or disability caused by defendant becomes unbearable. suicide--defendant's breach of duty injures plaintiff non-fatally but plaintiff becomes insane and takes his own life. who dies or whose recovery is delayed or diminished. third persons. Defendant is liable if the dependant intervening force is normal or foreseeable. (2) Abnormal/Unforeseeable Dependent Intervening Forces Abnormal or highly unusual reactions to defendant's breach of duty are viewed as unforeseeable and thus supersede defendant's liability. Foreseeable independent intervening forces include: a. but the injury itself is not foreseeable. (2) Foreseeable Independent Intervening Force Causes Unforeseeable Injury If the independent intervening force that operates in combination with defendant's breach of duty to cause an injury to plaintiff is foreseeable. c.
e. courts generally regard the intervening force as superseding. that the current would accumulate debris and sever the mooring lines of defendant's negligently moored ship. even though the type of injury to plaintiff was foreseeable.
. it is considered a foreseeable independent intervening force which does not supersede defendant's liability. (3)(a) Foreseeable injury produced by unforeseeable intervening force If the injury plaintiff suffers is within the risk generated by defendant's breach of duty. plaintiff's economic losses were too tenuous and remote from defendant's negligence. Plaintiff was a grain shipper located downstream of the bridge where defendant's negligently moored ship had come to rest. (3)(a)(ii) Foreseeable criminal or tortious acts: The above exception does not apply where defendant's conduct increases the risk that plaintiff will suffer a criminal or intentional/reckless tortious act. A leading case is Kinsman II. Analysis varies where the type of injury produced is nevertheless foreseeable. If such an act occurs. (3) Unforeseeable Force An unforeseeable independent intervening force is generally viewed as superseding defendant's breach of duty so that defendant's negligence is not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. intervention of an unforeseeable independent force supersedes defendant's breach of duty and there is no proximate causation. i. (2)(b) Unforeseeable type of injury Most jurisdictions do not regard defendant's breach of duty as the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury where that injury was not within the risk created by defendant's conduct. and incurred economic losses in obtaining alternate transportation and replacement grain for his customers.Law 3211
bridge. located downstream of defendant's mooring place but upstream from the bridge. Plaintiff was unable to transport his grain upstream by ship because the river was blocked by the wreckage. The court held that although the risk that commerce on the river would be blocked was a foreseeable one. Plaintiffs' businesses. (3)(a)(i) Exception--unforeseeable criminal or tortious acts: If the independent intervening force acting in combination with defendant's conduct is a criminal or an intentional or reckless tortious act. defendant was liable for the combination of his breach of duty and the foreseeable independent intervening forces. The criminal or intentional/ reckless wrongdoing of the third party "shifts responsibility" from defendant to the third party. The court held that because the forces causing risk to downstream plaintiffs were foreseeable. even if the independent intervening force that combined with defendant's breach was foreseeable. The resulting pileup of wreckage and ice flooded the surrounding city extensively. and thus no proximate cause was present. many courts will find proximate cause present even though the independent intervening force that combined with defendant's conduct was unforeseeable.. even though the extent of the injury ultimately caused was much greater than could reasonably have been foreseen. (3)(b) Unforeseeable injury produced by unforeseeable intervening force All jurisdictions agree that where plaintiff's injury is not the type reasonably threatened by defendant's negligence. above. were damaged by the flooding. which arose from the same circumstances of Kinsman I.
2. the plaintiff's own negligence--called contributory negligence at common law--may bar plaintiff's recovery. (1) Effect of Contributory Negligence---Complete Bar to Plaintiff's Recover Traditionally. Plaintiff and the contributorily negligent third person are sufficiently related that plaintiff would be vicariously liable for the third person's negligence (e. above.) § 6. employers and employees).g. plaintiff is threatened with immediate danger of bodily harm or death because of defendant's negligence).1(C) Children Analysis of whether a child plaintiff is contributorily negligent is similar to the negligence analysis for children generally. § 6. contributory negligence is precluded as a matter of law. A majority of jurisdictions apply the "reasonable child" standard: Would a child of the same age.1(F) Imputed Contributory Negligence In two limited situations. the child/plaintiff is rebuttably presumed incapable of contributory negligence.1 Contributory Negligence
§ 6. wrongful death. the child/plaintiff is rebuttably presumed capable of contributory negligence. (1) Minority View--No Imputed Contributory Negligence in Loss of Consortium A minority of states do not impute one spouse's contributory negligence to another in an action against a
. These are: 1.g.1(D) Plaintiff's Conduct Is Violation of Statute The concept of "negligence per se" discussed above in connection with defendant's breach of duty is applicable to plaintiff in a contributory negligence situation. Plaintiff's claim against defendant is completely derivative of the third person who was contributorily negligent (e. § 6. defendant must prove that plaintiff's conduct is the legal or proximate cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff.1(B) Emergency/Rescue Risks or dangerous acts undertaken by plaintiff which might otherwise be regarded as contributory negligence are often viewed as reasonable in an emergency (i.. education.e. (1) Plaintiff Member of Protected Class Contributory negligence is not available. and the harm suffered by plaintiff is the type the statute was intended to avoid. where defendant's negligent act violates the same statute. § 6. § 6.Law 3211
§6 Defenses § 6.. fourteen and older. Thus. age seven to thirteen. if plaintiff is found to have engaged in contributory negligence he is barred from recovery for defendant's otherwise negligent conduct. intelligence and experience. in the same circumstances. have acted as the plaintiff did? A minority of states utilize the traditional age categories---below age six.. loss of consortium).1(A) In General Tort law requires a plaintiff to exercise due care to protect himself from injury by defendant. even though plaintiff's conduct violates a statute. the contributory negligence of a third person may be imputed to plaintiff so as to bar recovery against defendant. partners and joint enterprisers. (See discussion of legal/proximate cause.1(E) Plaintiff's Contributory Negligence Must Be Proximate Cause of Injuries Suffered In order to invoke contributory negligence. Analysis is similar to that for defendant's negligence--did plaintiff act as a reasonable person would under the same circumstances. or if plaintiff is attempting to rescue someone. recklessness or strict liability. plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. (2) No Effect on Other Torts Contributory negligence does not bar recovery if plaintiff's theory is intentional tort.
2(B) Partial Comparative Negligence Other states adopted a "partial" comparative negligence system. then defendant is said to have had the last clear chance to avoid harm. (1)(a) Helpless peril versus inattentive peril Plaintiff is in helpless peril when his negligence has placed him in a position of danger from which he cannot extricate himself. This is the rule that you are to assume applies to MBE questions.1(G) Last Clear Chance The "last clear chance" doctrine provides a basis for recovery even where plaintiff is otherwise contributorily negligent. and make no distinction between helpless peril and inattentive peril.2(A) Pure Comparative Negligence Some states have adopted a "pure" system of comparative negligence. Thus. the total damages caused by defendant may be apportioned based upon a determination of the relative fault of each party. (Some of these states deny plaintiff recovery only if he is "more" responsible than defendant. damages are apportioned only if defendant's responsibility exceeds plaintiff's responsibility. either by statute or judicial decision. In an aggregate system. If plaintiff is responsible for a greater percentage than the total responsibility of all defendants. (1) When Plaintiff May Assert Last Clear Chance If defendant is aware that his breach of duty has placed plaintiff in danger. apportionment of damages tracks apportionment of fault perfectly--if defendant is 25% responsible and plaintiff is 75% responsible.2(C) Multiple Defendants If there are two or more defendants.2 Comparative Negligence
Under a modern comparative negligence regime. plaintiff would be barred from recovery. and plaintiff's contributory fault does not bar recovery. (1) Aggregate System. plaintiff is denied recovery completely only if his responsibility is 51% or greater. The majority of jurisdictions deny plaintiff the benefit of the last clear chance doctrine if (1) defendant is not aware that plaintiff is in danger. recovery is barred. plaintiff does not recover anything if her responsibility exceeds that of any single defendant. (1)(a)(i) Defendant under duty to discover: In majority jurisdictions.) § 6. owner/occupier of land has duty to exercise due care to discover dangerous conditions and protect invitees from them).. if defendant was under a duty to discover danger to plaintiff (e. and the defendants are not jointly liable. unless the question states otherwise.g.
§ 6. § 6.e. A majority of states have adopted comparative negligence systems. Here. the last clear chance doctrine is always available to plaintiff.. plaintiff recovers from defendant 25% of the total damages he suffered. The focus is on the time period after plaintiff has engaged in contributory negligence--if injury to plaintiff could still have been avoided through a subsequent exercise of due care by defendant. A minority of states apply the last clear chance doctrine whenever defendant reasonably should have known of the danger to plaintiff. two different systems of comparative negligence have been developed. Plaintiff is in inattentive peril when his contributory negligence has placed him in a position of danger from which he could escape if observant enough to recognize his peril. and apportioned only if this total exceeds plaintiff's percentage responsibility. Plaintiff is denied any recovery if he is responsible for 50% or more of his own damages. if two defendants each contributed 33% of plaintiff's damages. the "aggregate" system and the "individual equality" system. § 6. and (b) plaintiff is in "helpless peril" (rather than "inattentive peril"). no distinction is made between helpless and inattentive danger. (2) Individual Equality System. the percent responsibilities of all defendants are combined. and plaintiff contributed 34%.
. Under an individual equality system.Law 3211
defendant for loss of consortium.
§ 6. i. In such states. where plaintiff's negligence has contributed to her own injuries.
a plaintiff who knowingly agrees to ride in a car where the driver is speeding does not assume the risk that the driver might also be intoxicated. With regard to implied assumption of the risk. or slipping on ice. even if a “reasonable plaintiff” would have recognized the danger under similar circumstances. If so. an exculpatory clause in a contract providing one party will hold the other party harmless for injuries caused by the other party).3 Assumption of Risk
Plaintiff "assumes the risk" of injury from defendant's negligence if plaintiff expressly or impliedly consents to undergo the risk created by defendant's conduct. (1)(a) Plaintiff must appreciate specific danger Plaintiff must appreciate the specific danger which injured him in order to have assumed the risk of injury from defendant's negligent conduct. (2) Voluntary Choice to Assume Risk Voluntariness can be established by express consent (e. or consent may be implied from the fact that plaintiff continued in the face of a known danger.Law 3211
§ 6. or lack of experience may justify a finding that plaintiff actually failed to comprehend the risk involved. (3) Plaintiff Member of Statutory Protected Class Assumption of the risk may not be asserted where plaintiff is a member of a class intended to be protected by a statute. and (b) plaintiff voluntarily chose to subject himself to that danger.. there can be no assumption of the risk. (1) Knowledge and Appreciation of Risk This is a subjective standard. (1)(b) Obvious risks Some risks are regarded as so obvious that any competent adult is expected to be aware of them. § 6. or of being struck by a baseball at a baseball game. Youth.3(A) When Available Plaintiff is barred from recovery under the assumption of the risk doctrine if defendant establishes that (a) plaintiff had knowledge of and appreciated the nature of the danger involved. Assumption of the risk bars plaintiff completely from recovery. Examples include the danger of falling through an unguarded opening. courts examine closely whether behavior is voluntary when there is a lack of alternatives. and defendant's conduct both violates the statute and threatens the risk the statute was designed to prevent.g. In some states. any risk-creating violation by defendant of a public safety statute has the above effect. lack of information. For example.
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