Source: https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/30.262
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 18:18:41
Document Index: 258342722

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§9', '§8', '§30', '§52', '§1983']

ORS 30.262 - Certain nonprofit facilities and homes public bodies for purposes of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 - 2017 Oregon Revised Statutes
2017 ORS Vol. 1 Chapter 30 Section 30.262
2017 ORS 30.262¹
(1) The following facilities and training homes are public bodies for the purposes of ORS 30.260 (Definitions for ORS 30.260 to 30.300) to 30.300 (ORS 30.260 to 30.300 exclusive):
(a) A nonprofit residential training facility as defined in ORS 443.400 (Definitions for ORS 443.400 to 443.455), nonprofit residential training home as defined in ORS 443.400 (Definitions for ORS 443.400 to 443.455) or nonprofit facility as defined in ORS 427.005 (Definitions), organized and existing under ORS chapter 65, that receives more than 50 percent of its funding from the state or a political subdivision of the state for the purpose of providing residential or vocational services to individuals with intellectual or other developmental disabilities.
(b) A nonprofit residential training facility as defined in ORS 443.400 (Definitions for ORS 443.400 to 443.455), nonprofit residential training home as defined in ORS 443.400 (Definitions for ORS 443.400 to 443.455) or nonprofit facility as defined in ORS 427.005 (Definitions), organized and existing under ORS chapter 65, that receives less than 50 percent of its funding from the state or a political subdivision of the state but that provides residential or vocational services to individuals with intellectual or other developmental disabilities, more than half of whom are eligible for funding for services by the Department of Human Services under criteria established by the department.
(2) The provisions of this section apply only to a nonprofit residential training facility, nonprofit residential training home or nonprofit facility that provides services to individuals with intellectual or other developmental disabilities under a contract with:
(a) The Department of Human Services; or
(b) A community mental health program or community developmental disabilities program established pursuant to ORS 430.620 (Establishment of community mental health and developmental disabilities programs by one or more counties). [1997 c.579 §2; 2001 c.900 §9; 2007 c.70 §8; 2011 c.658 §30; 2011 c.720 §52]
Note: 30.262 (Certain nonprofit facilities and homes public bodies for purposes of ORS 30.260 to 30.300) was added to and made a part of 30.260 (Definitions for ORS 30.260 to 30.300) to 30.300 (ORS 30.260 to 30.300 exclusive) by legislative action but was not added to any smaller series therein. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.
Where plaintiff was mis­takenly arrested following computer retrieval of identifying and locator data for individual of similar name, demurrer as to three of defendants was properly sustained because plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts from which duty to plaintiff could be discerned, and summary judg­ment as to two of defendants was improperly allowed because affidavits did not reveal whether defendant’s acts were discre­tionary or ministerial. Murphy v. City of Portland, 36 Or App 745, 585 P2d 732 (1978)
Even if Children’s Services Division’s failure to follow re­quired APA rulemaking pro­ce­dures could constitute tort within meaning of these sec­tions, CSD was immune from tort liability under ORS 30.265 (Scope of liability of public body, officers, employees and agents) (3)(f) where it terminated its benefit program without prior rulemaking pro­ce­dures. Burke v. Children’s Services Division, 288 Or 533, 607 P2d 141 (1980)
Where police of­fi­cer pursued plaintiff in marked police car with lights and siren activated in area defendant was assigned to patrol, with no known motive other than to fulfill duty as police of­fi­cer, trial court was correct in concluding that defendant was acting in course and scope of employ­ment, despite plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s acts were excessive. Brungardt v. Barton, 69 Or App 440, 685 P2d 1021 (1984)
Plaintiff in 42 U.S.C. 1983 ac­tion brought under the Oregon Tort Claims Act against municipality for ac­tions of its employes need not show that employes acted according to “custom or usage” as in federal §1983 ac­tion. Haase v. City of Eugene, 85 Or App 107, 735 P2d 1258 (1987)
Where plaintiffs brought ac­tion under 42 U.S.C 1983 and this sec­tion after defendant Children’s Services Division employees removed plaintiff’s child from home following reports of abuse, defendants are entitled to absolute immunity under this sec­tion for their discre­tionary acts as provided by ORS 30.265 (Scope of liability of public body, officers, employees and agents) (3). Tennyson v. Children’s Services Division, 308 Or 80, 775 P2d 1365 (1989)
There is no legislative purpose to extend defini­tion of “agent” to control to include ostensible agent when doctrine of apparent authority is intended to achieve different purpose. Giese v. Bay Area Health District, 101 Or App 410, 790 P2d 1198 (1990), Sup Ct review denied
Because there was evidence that resident was not hospital’s agent in first place, fact that “loaned servant” doctrine does not eliminate agency rela­tionship between hospital and employee who assists physician in surgery did not give plaintiff grounds for di­rected verdict. Shepard v. Sisters of Providence, 102 Or App 196, 793 P2d 1384 (1990)