Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/521/168/70190/
Timestamp: 2019-06-18 01:06:57
Document Index: 384017222

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 1821', '§ 1821', '§ 1983', '§ 2412']

Eddie Adams et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Norman Carlson et al., Defendants-appellees, 521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1975 › Eddie Adams et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Norman Carlson et al., Defendants-appellees
Eddie Adams et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Norman Carlson et al., Defendants-appellees, 521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975)
Argued Feb. 21, 1975. Decided July 29, 1975
It is well established that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2412,1 absent specific statutory authority, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded against the United States. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, --- U.S. ---, --- n. 44, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 n. 44, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 499 F.2d 1095, 1096 (1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir. 1973); Cassata v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d 122, 125-6 (7th Cir. 1971). As the district court noted, the defendants here "were clearly officials of the United States acting in their official capacities during the events which gave rise to this litigation." The plaintiffs, moreover, admit that since they brought their suit under the Constitution, there is no applicable statute which directly authorizes the award against the United States. § 2412 would, therefore, appear to bar an award of attorneys' fees against the defendants in this case.
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, in support of an award based on the private attorney general theory, argue that the claim is strengthened by bad faith obstinacy displayed by the defendants during the course of this litigation. There is no mention of this basis of fortification of the claim in the district court opinion. See 375 F. Supp. at 1242. For the reasons indicated hereinbefore we have rejected the private attorney general rationale. We are not unmindful, however, that "a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' (Citations omitted.) In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of 'bad faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 S. Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1973).
We also find unpersuasive the contention that § 2412 should not apply in the present case because the Justice Department was not "available" to aid the plaintiffs in their suit against the federal prison officials. A similar argument was recently rejected by the District of Columbia Circuit in Pyramid Lake, supra. We agree with that court that there is no indication that Congress intended, by providing for a possible intervention on behalf of a plaintiff by a department of the federal Government, to waive its sovereign immunity with respect to attorneys' fees when such possible intervention is "unavailable." It is fundamental that "Congress alone has power to waive or qualify immunity," United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 20, 47 S. Ct. 1, 8, 71 L. Ed. 131 (1926), and "limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S. Ct. 269, 273, 1 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1957).
Legislative reform "may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955). In the present case, Congress obviously intends to consider carefully and area-by-area the question of whether attorneys' fees should be taxable against the United States. In the future Congress may well statutorily authorize such awards where the litigant brings suit under the Constitution. We cannot say that the fact that Congress has not yet done so rises to the level of invidious discrimination.
The amount which the plaintiffs may recover for witness expenses is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. That section basically provides a statutory allowance for travel and subsistence. Where, as here, the witnesses involved are expert witnesses, the prevailing party can recover only the statutory amounts prescribed in § 1821 and not additional expert witness fees. Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 446, 52 S. Ct. 223, 76 L. Ed. 386 (1932); Baum v. United States, 432 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1962). "This rule applies with equal force where the United States is a party." Baum, supra at 86.
The plaintiffs also contend that they are treated unfairly when compared with state prisoners. State prisoners' actions under § 1983 are, however, subject to the Supreme Court's ruling in Alyeska Pipeline, supra. See --- U.S. at ---, 95 S. Ct. 1612 at 1625 (with which compare n. 39 and n. 44); Satoskar v. Indiana Real Estate Commission, supra. We need not reach the question of whether, in a case in which Alyeska would permit an award of fees against state officers but § 2412 would preclude them if a similar claim was asserted against federal officers, equal protection would be denied, this not being such a case. Cf. also this statement in Alyeska (at ---, 95 S. Ct. at 1625):