Source: http://openjurist.org/515/us/900
Timestamp: 2015-10-13 13:51:18
Document Index: 250870292

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 1973', '§ 2284', '§ 1253']

515 US 900 Miller v. Johnson Abrams | OpenJurist
515 U.S. 900 - Miller v. Johnson Abrams Homethe United States Reports515 U.S.
515 US 900 Miller v. Johnson Abrams 515 U.S. 900115 S.Ct. 2475132 L.Ed.2d 762
Zell MILLER, et al., Appellants,v.Davida JOHNSON et al. Lucious ABRAMS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Davida JOHNSON et al. UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Davida JOHNSON et al.
Argued April 19, 1995.
In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511, this Court articulated the equal protection principles that govern a State's drawing of congressional districts, noting that laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against race-based decisionmaking, that this prohibition extends to laws neutral on their face but unexplainable on grounds other than race, and that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same strict scrutiny given to other state laws that classify citizens by race. Georgia's most recent congressional districting plan contains three majority-black districts and was adopted after the Justice Department refused to preclear, under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act (Act), two earlier plans that each contained only two majority-black districts. Appellees, voters in the new Eleventh District—which joins metropolitan black neighborhoods together with the poor black populace of coastal areas 260 miles away challenged the District on the ground that it was a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted in Shaw. The District Court agreed, holding that evidence of the State Legislature's purpose, as well as the District's irregular borders, showed that race was the overriding and predominant force in the districting determination. The court assumed that compliance with the Act would be a compelling interest, but found that the plan was not narrowly tailored to meet that interest since the Act did not require three majority-black districts.
In Shaw v. Reno, supra, we recognized that these equal protection principles govern a State's drawing of congressional districts, though, as our cautious approach there discloses, application of these principles to electoral districting is a most delicate task. Our analysis began from the premise that "[l]aws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of [the Equal Protection Clause's] prohibition." Id., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2824. This prohibition extends not just to explicit racial classifications, but also to laws neutral on their face but " 'unexplainable on grounds other than race.' " Id., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)). Applying this basic Equal Protection analysis in the voting rights context, we held that "redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' . . . demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race." 509 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, 97 S.Ct., at 563).
In 1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (Act). 30 Fed.Reg. 9897 (1965); see 28 CFR pt. 51, App.; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1553, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980). In consequence, § 5 of the Act requires Georgia to obtain either administrative preclearance by the Attorney General or approval by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of any change in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" made after November 1, 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The preclearance mechanism applies to congressional redistricting plans, see, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 133, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1360, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976), and requires that the proposed change "not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. "[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer, supra, at 141, 96 S.Ct., at 1363.
Between 1980 and 1990, one of Georgia's 10 congressional districts was a majority-black district, that is, a majority of the district's voters were black. The 1990 Decennial Census indicated that Georgia's population of 6,478,216 persons, 27% of whom are black, entitled it to an additional eleventh congressional seat, App. 9, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to redraw the State's congressional districts. Both the House and the Senate adopted redistricting guidelines which, among other things, required single-member districts of equal population, contiguous geography, nondilution of minority voting strength, fidelity to precinct lines where possible, and compliance with §§ 2 and 5 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c. See App. 11-12. Only after these requirements were met did the guidelines permit drafters to consider other ends, such as maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, preserving the core of existing districts, and avoiding contests between incumbents. Id., at 12.
"[t]he populations of the Eleventh are centered around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that have absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch the district hundreds of miles across rural counties and narrow swamp corridors." 864 F.Supp., at 1389 (footnote omitted).
Elections were held under the new congressional redistricting plan on November 4, 1992, and black candidates were elected to Congress from all three majority-black districts. Id., at 1369. On January 13, 1994, appellees, five white voters from the Eleventh District, filed this action against various state officials (Miller Appellants) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Id., at 1369, 1370. As residents of the challenged Eleventh District, all appellees had standing. See United States v. Hays, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2436, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1995). Their suit alleged that Georgia's Eleventh District was a racial gerrymander and so a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted in Shaw v. Reno. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284, and the United States and a number of Georgia residents intervened in support of the defendant-state officials.
Appellants filed notices of appeal and requested a stay of the District Court's judgment, which we granted pending the filing and disposition of the appeals in this case, Miller v. Johnson, 512 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 36, 129 L.Ed.2d 932 (1994). We later noted probable jurisdiction. 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 713, 130 L.Ed.2d 620 (1995); see 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
Shaw recognized a claim "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution claim. 509 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2830; see id., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2828. Whereas a vote dilution claim alleges that the State has enacted a particular voting scheme as a purposeful device "to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1499, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (citing cases), an action disadvantaging voters of a particular race, the essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts. Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 79 S.Ct. 99, 3 L.Ed.2d 46 (1958) (per curiam), buses, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 77 S.Ct. 145, 1 L.Ed.2d 114 (1956) (per curiam), golf courses, Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 76 S.Ct. 141, 100 L.Ed. 776 (1955) (per curiam), beaches, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 76 S.Ct. 133, 100 L.Ed. 774 (1955) (per curiam), and schools, Brown, supra, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race. The idea is a simple one: "At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." ' " Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3028, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1990) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083, 103 S.Ct. 3492, 3498, 77 L.Ed.2d 1236 (1983)); cf. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2303, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (" 'injury in fact' " was "denial of equal treatment . . . not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit"). When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, "think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." Shaw, supra, at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2827; see Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636, 110 S.Ct., at 3046 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Race-based assignments "embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution." Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 604, 110 S.Ct., at 3029 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ("Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence"); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) ("Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category"). They also cause society serious harm. As we concluded in Shaw:
"Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny." Shaw, supra, at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2832.
Our reasoning in Shaw compels this conclusion. We recognized in Shaw that, outside the districting context, statutes are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain express racial classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a racial purpose or object. 509 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2825. In the rare case, where the effect of government action is a pattern " 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' " ibid. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S., at 266, 97 S.Ct., at 563), "[t]he evidentiary inquiry is . . . relatively easy." Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, 97 S.Ct., at 563 (footnote omitted). As early as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), the Court recognized that a laundry permit ordinance was administered in a deliberate way to exclude all Chinese from the laundry business; and in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), the Court concluded that the redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries left no doubt that the plan was designed to exclude blacks. Even in those cases, however, it was the presumed racial purpose of state action, not its stark manifestation, that was the constitutional violation. Patterns of discrimination as conspicuous as these are rare, and are not a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, n. 14, 97 S.Ct., at 563, n. 14. In the absence of a pattern as stark as those in Yick Wo or Gomillion, "impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence" of race-based decisionmaking. Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, 97 S.Ct., at 563 (footnotes omitted).
Shaw applied these same principles to redistricting. "In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e] . . . voters' on the basis of race." Shaw, supra, at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 2826 (quoting Gomillion, supra, at 341, 81 S.Ct., at 127). In other cases, where the district is not so bizarre on its face that it discloses a racial design, the proof will be more "difficul[t]." Ibid. Although it was not necessary in Shaw to consider further the proof required in these more difficult cases, the logical import of our reasoning is that evidence other than a district's bizarre shape can be used to support the claim.
In sum, we make clear that parties alleging that a State has assigned voters on the basis of race are neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district's geometry and makeup nor required to make a threshol