Source: http://tn.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20161130_0001250.ETN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-23 02:32:12
Document Index: 727254654

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924']

MICHAEL GILL WILSON, Petitioner,
Before the Court is Petitioner's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 78]. The petition relies on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was unconstitutionally vague [Id.]. The United States responded in opposition on August 11, 2016 [Doc. 81]. Petitioner did not reply and the time for doing so has now passed. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1, 7.2. For the reasons below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion [Doc. 78] will be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶¶ 1-2]. Based on four prior convictions-a prior Kansas conviction for second-degree murder [Id. ¶ 24], prior Colorado conviction for robbery [Id. ¶ 26], and two prior Colorado convictions for aggravated robbery [Id. ¶ 27]-the United States Probation Office deemed Petitioner to be an armed career criminal subject to an enhanced fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(e). In accordance with that designation, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 180 months' incarceration followed by five years' supervised release on December 5, 2008 [Doc. 70].
Petitioner appealed, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence on November 4, 2010 [Doc. 75]. Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari and, as a result, his conviction became final for purposes of § 2255(f)(1) on February 11, 2011, after expiration of the time to seek such a writ. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003) (explaining that a conviction affirmed on appeal becomes final when the ninety-day period for seeking a writ of certiorari expires); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(3) (providing ninety-day period for requesting a writ of certiorari, running from the date of the Court of Appeal decision).
Five years later-in June of 2016-Petitioner filed the instant collateral challenge requesting vacatur of his ACCA-enhanced sentence in light of the Johnson decision [Doc. 78 (suggesting an undisclosed number of prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates)].
The validity of Petitioner's sentence thus depends on whether three or more of his prior convictions qualify as “serious drug offenses” under § 924(e)(2)(A) or, in alternative, “violent felonies” under one of the unaffected provisions of § 924(e)(2)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining courts need not decide what import, if any, Johnson has on the Sentencing Guidelines' residual clause where the petitioner's prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses independent of the residual clause), overruled on other grounds by Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2251 n.1 (2016). To determine whether an offense qualifies under one of the above provisions, courts must first identify the precise crime of conviction by employing a “categorical approach, ” looking “only to the statutory definitions- elements-of a defendant's prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying [each individual] conviction[].” Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2283, 2285 (2013).
Review of Petitioner's PSR reveals that at least three of his prior convictions categorically qualify as ACCA predicate offenses independent of the now-defunct residual clause. As a result, Petitioner ...