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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 17', '§ 432', '§ 432', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 1301', '§ 1352', '§ 3']

SHAPIRO V. THOMPSON, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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SHAPIRO V. THOMPSON, 394 U. S. 618 (1969)
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(c) If the constitutionality of § 402(b) were at issue, that provision, insofar as it permits the one-year waiting period, would be unconstitutional, as Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. P. 394 U. S. 641. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
No. 9, 270 F.Supp. 331; No. 33, 279 F.Supp. 22, and No. 34, 277 F.Supp. 65, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These three appeals were restored to the calendar for reargument. 392 U.S. 920 (1968). Each is an appeal from a decision of a three-judge District Court holding chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In No. 9, the Connecticut Welfare Department invoked § 17-2d of the Connecticut General Statutes [Footnote 2] to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In No. 33, there are four appellees. Three of them -- appellees Harrell, Brown, and Legrant -- applied for and were denied AFDC aid. The fourth, appellee Barley, applied for and was denied benefits under the program for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The denial in each case was on the ground that the applicant had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellee Brown lived with her mother and two of her three children in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Her third child was living with appellee Brown's father in the District of Columbia. When her mother moved from Fort Smith to Oklahoma, appellee Brown, in February, 1966, returned to the District of Columbia, where she had lived as a child. Her application for AFDC assistance was approved insofar as it sought assistance for the child, who chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In No. 34, there are two appellees, Smith and Foster, who were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for a year prior to their applications, as required by § 432(6) of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pennsylvania Welfare Code. [Footnote 5] Appellee Smith and her five minor children moved in December, 1966, from Delaware to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where her father lived. Her father supported her and her children for several months until he lost his job. Appellee then applied for AFDC assistance and had received two checks when the aid was terminated. Appellee Foster, after living in Pennsylvania from 1953 to 1965, had moved with her four children to South Carolina to care for her grandfather and invalid grandmother, and had returned to Pennsylvania in 1967. A three-judge District Court for the F,astern District of Pennsylvania, one judge dissenting, declared § 432(6) unconstitutional. 277 F.Supp. 65 (1967). The majority held that the classification established by the waiting period requirement is "without rational basis and without legitimate purpose or function," and therefore a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 67. The majority noted further that, if the purpose of the statute was "to erect a barrier against the movement of indigent persons into the State or to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Primarily, appellants justify the waiting period requirement as a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs. It is asserted that people who require welfare assistance during their first chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions. In the Congress, sponsors of federal legislation to eliminate all residence requirements have been consistently opposed by representatives of state and local welfare agencies who have stressed the fears of the States that elimination of the requirements would result in a heavy influx of individuals into States providing the most generous benefits. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10032 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 309-310, 644 (1962); Hearings on H.R. 6000 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st Cong., chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. That chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
proposition was early stated by Chief Justice Taney in the @ 48 U. S. 492 (1849):
More fundamentally, a State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants argue further that the challenged classification may be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes. We have difficulty seeing how long-term residents who qualify for welfare are making a greater present contribution to the State in taxes than indigent residents who have recently arrived. If the argument is based on contributions made in the past by the long-term residents, there is some question, as a factual matter, whether this argument is applicable in Pennsylvania, where the record suggests that some 40% of those denied public assistance because of the waiting period had lengthy prior residence in the State. [Footnote 9] But we need not rest on the particular facts of these cases. Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed, it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellants next advance as justification certain administrative and related governmental objectives allegedly served by the waiting period requirement. [Footnote 12] They argue chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The argument that the waiting period requirement facilitates budget predictability is wholly unfounded. The records in all three cases are utterly devoid of evidence that either State or the District of Columbia, in fact, uses the one-year requirement as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the budget year. None of the appellants takes a census of new residents or collects any other data that would reveal the number of newcomers in the State less than a year. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nor are new residents required to give advance notice of their need for welfare assistance. [Footnote 13] Thus, the welfare authorities cannot know how many new residents come into the jurisdiction in any year, much less how many of them will require public assistance. In these circumstances, there is simply no basis for the claim that the one-year waiting requirement serves the purpose of making the welfare budget more predictable. In Connecticut and Pennsylvania, the irrelevance of the one-year requirement to budgetary planning is further underscored by the fact that temporary, partial assistance is given to some new residents [Footnote 14] and full assistance is given to other new residents under reciprocal agreements. [Footnote 15] Finally, the claim that a one-year waiting requirement is used for planning purposes is plainly belied by the fact that the requirement is not also imposed on applicants who are long-term residents, the group that receives the bulk of welfare payments. In short, the States rely on methods other than the one-year requirement to make budget estimates. In No. 34, the Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Assistance Policies and Standards testified that, based on experience in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, her office had already estimated how much the elimination of the one-year requirement would cost and that the estimates of costs of other changes in regulations "have proven exceptionally accurate." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The argument that the waiting period serves as an administratively efficient rule of thumb for determining residency similarly will not withstand scrutiny. The residence requirement and the one-year waiting period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance under these three statutes, and the facts relevant to the determination of each are directly examined by the welfare authorities. [Footnote 16] Before granting an application, the welfare authorities investigate the applicant's employment, housing, and family situation and in the course of the inquiry necessarily learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resident. [Footnote 17] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pennsylvania suggests that the one-year waiting period is justified as a meals of encouraging new residents to join the labor force promptly. But this logic would also require a similar waiting period for long-term residents of the State. A state purpose to encourage employment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
One year before the Social Security Act was passed, 20 of the 45 States which had aid to dependent children programs required residence in the State for two or more years. Nine other States required two or more years of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
residence in a particular town or county. And 33 jurisdictions required at least one year of residence in a particular town or county. [Footnote 23] Congress determine to combat this restrictionist policy. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports expressly stated that the objective of § 402(b) was to compel "[l]iberality of residence requirement." [Footnote 24] Not a single instance can be found in the debates or committee reports supporting the contention that § 402(b) was enacted to encourage participation by the States in the AFDC program. To the contrary, those few who addressed themselves to waiting period requirements emphasized that participation would depend on a State's repeal or drastic revision of existing requirements. A congressional demand on 41 States to repeal or drastically revise offending statutes is hardly a way to enlist their cooperation. [Footnote 25] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The waiting period requirement in the District of Columbia Code involved in No. 33 is also unconstitutional, even though it was adopted by Congress as an exercise of federal power. In terms of federal power, the discrimination created by the one-year requirement violates the Due chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1825), 75 U. S. 180 (1869), and 79 U. S. 79 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 211 U. S. 97 (1908). In Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 314 U. S. 181, 314 U. S. 183-185 (1941) (DOUGLAS and Jackson, JJ., concurring), and Twining v. New Jersey, supra, reliance was placed on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868). In Edwards v. California, supra, and the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (1849), a Commerce Clause approach was employed.
"The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized." United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 383 U. S. 757. This constitutional right, which, of course, includes the right of "entering and abiding in any State in the Union," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 39, is not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and control under conventional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
And it further follows, as the Court says, that any other purposes offered in support of a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The constitutional right of interstate travel was fully recognized long before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See the statement of Chief Justice Taney in the @ 48 U. S. 492:
The Court insists that § 402(b) of the Social Security Act "does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year requirement." Ante at 394 U. S. 639. From its reading of the legislative history it concludes that Congress did not intend to authorize the States to impose residence requirements. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Great Depression of the 1930's exposed the inadequacies of state and local welfare programs and dramatized the need for federal participation in welfare assistance. See J. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939 (1940). Congress determined that the Social Security Act, containing a system of unemployment and old-age insurance as well as the categorical assistance programs now at issue, was to be a major step designed to ameliorate the problems of economic insecurity. The primary purpose of the categorical assistance programs was to encourage the States to provide new and greatly enhanced welfare programs. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6, 18-19 (1935); H.R.Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1935). Federal aid would mean an immediate increase in the amount of benefits paid under state programs. But federal aid was to be conditioned upon certain requirements so that the States would remain the basic administrative units of the welfare system and would be unable to shift the welfare burden to local governmental units with inadequate financial resources. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Statutory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants for Public Assistance 9-26 (1964). Significantly, the categories of assistance programs created by the Social Security Act corresponded to those already in existence in a number of States. See J. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939, at 26-32. Federal entry into the welfare area can therefore be best described as a major experiment in "cooperative federalism," King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 392 U. S. 317 (1968), combining state and federal participation to solve the problems of the depression. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress quickly saw evidence that the system of welfare assistance contained in the Social Security Act including residence requirements was operating to encourage States to expand and improve their categorical chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress has imposed a residence requirement in the District of Columbia and authorized the States to impose similar requirements. The issue before us must therefore be framed in terms of whether Congress may chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In only three cases have we been confronted with an assertion that Congress has impermissibly burdened the right to travel. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958), did invalidate a burden on the right to travel; however, the restriction was voided on the nonconstitutional basis that Congress did not intend to give the Secretary of State power to create the restriction at issue. Zemel v. Rusk, supra, on the other hand, sustained a flat prohibition of travel to certain designated areas and rejected an attack that Congress could not constitutionally impose this restriction. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964), is the only case in which this Court invalidated on a constitutional basis a congressionally imposed restriction. Aptheker also involved a flat prohibition, but in combination with a claim that the congressional restriction compelled a potential traveler to choose between his right to travel and his First Amendment right of freedom of association. It was this Hobson's choice, we later explained, which forms the rationale of Aptheker. See Zemel v. Rusk, supra, at 381 U. S. 16. Aptheker thus contains two characteristics distinguishing it from the appeals now before the Court: a combined chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The insubstantiality of the restriction imposed by residence requirements must then be evaluated in light of the possible congressional reasons for such requirements. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 366 U. S. 425-427 (1961). One fact which does emerge with clarity from the legislative history is Congress' belief that a program of cooperative federalism combining federal aid with chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellees suggest, however, that Congress was not motivated by rational considerations. Residence requirements are imposed, they insist, for the illegitimate purpose of keeping poor people from migrating. Not only does the legislative history point to an opposite conclusion, but it also must be noted that "[i]nto the motives which induced members of Congress to [act] . . . this Court may not enquire." Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 283 U. S. 455 (1931). We do not attribute chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If this is the import of the Court's opinion, then it seems to have departed from our precedents. We have long held that there is no requirement of uniformity when Congress acts pursuant to its commerce power. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 310 U. S. 401 (1940); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 306 U. S. 13-14 (1939). [Footnote 3/6] I do not suggest that Congress is completely free when legislating under one of its enumerated powers to enact wholly arbitrary classifications, for Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163 (1964), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court, after interpreting the legislative history in such a manner that the constitutionality of § 402(b) is not at issue, gratuitously adds that § 402(b) is unconstitutional. This method of approaching constitutional questions is sharply in contrast with the Court's approach in Street v. New York, ante at 394 U. S. 585-590. While, in Street, the Court strains to avoid the crucial constitutional question, here it summarily treats the constitutionality of a major provision of the Social Security Act when, given the Court's interpretation of the legislative materials, that provision is not at issue. Assuming that the constitutionality of § 402(b) is properly treated by the Court, the cryptic footnote in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 384 U. S. 651-652, n. 10 (1966), does not support its conclusion. Footnote 10 indicates that Congress is without power to undercut the equal protection guarantee of racial equality in the guise of implementing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The era is long past when this Court, under the rubric of due process, has reviewed the wisdom of a congressional decision that interstate commerce will be fostered by the enactment of certain regulations. Compare chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court today holds unconstitutional Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia statutes which restrict certain kinds of welfare benefits to persons who have lived within the jurisdiction for at least one year immediately preceding their applications. The Court has accomplished this result by an expansion of the comparatively new constitutional doctrine that some state statutes will be deemed to deny equal protection of the laws unless justified by a "compelling" governmental interest, and by holding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause imposes a similar limitation on federal enactments. Having decided that the "compelling interest" principle chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These three cases present two separate but related questions for decision. The first, arising from the District of Columbia appeal, is whether Congress may condition the right to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled in the District of Columbia upon the recipient's having resided in the District for the preceding year. [Footnote 4/1] The second, presented in the Pennsylvania and Connecticut appeals, is whether a State may, with the approval of Congress, impose the same conditions with chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
respect to eligibility for AFDC assistance. [Footnote 4/2] In each instance, the welfare residence requirements are alleged to be unconstitutional on two grounds: first, because they impose an undue burden upon the constitutional right of welfare applicants to travel interstate; second, because they deny to persons who have recently moved interstate and would otherwise be eligible for welfare assistance the equal protection of the laws assured by the Fourteenth Amendment (in the state cases) or the analogous protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment (in the District of Columbia case). Since the Court basically relies upon the equal protection ground, I shall discuss it first. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The "compelling interest" doctrine, which today is articulated more explicitly than ever before, constitutes an increasingly significant exception to the long-established rule that a statute does not deny equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. [Footnote 4/4] The "compelling interest" doctrine has two branches. The branch which requires that classifications based upon "suspect" criteria be supported by a compelling interest apparently had its genesis in cases involving racial classifications, which have, at least since Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 323 U. S. 216 (1944), been regarded as inherently "suspect." [Footnote 4/5] The criterion of "wealth" apparently was added to the list of "suspects" as an alternative justification for the rationale in 383 U. S. 668 (1966), in which Virginia's poll tax was struck down. The criterion of political allegiance may have been added in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968). [Footnote 4/6] Today the list apparently has been further enlarged to include classifications based upon recent interstate movement, and perhaps those based upon the exercise of any constitutional right, for the Court states, [email protected] at 394 U. S. 634:
I think that this branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine is sound when applied to racial classifications, for, historically, the Equal Protection Clause was largely a product of the desire to eradicate legal distinctions founded upon race. However, I believe that the more recent extensions have been unwise. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, at 383 U. S. 680, 383 U. S. 683-686, I do not consider wealth a "suspect" statutory criterion. And when, as in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, and the present case, a classification is based upon the exercise of rights guaranteed against state infringement by the Federal Constitution, then there is no need for any resort to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this Court may properly and straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden upon those rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g., my separate opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 393 U. S. 41. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The second branch of the "compelling interest" principle is even more troublesome. For it has been held that a statutory classification is subject to the "compelling interest" test if the result of the classification may be to affect a "fundamental right," regardless of the basis of the classification. This rule was foreshadowed in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541 (1942), in which an Oklahoma statute providing for compulsory sterilization of "habitual criminals" was held subject to "strict scrutiny" mainly because it affected "one of the basic civil rights." After a long hiatus, the principle reemerged in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 377 U. S. 561-562 (1964), in which state apportionment statutes were subjected to an unusually stringent test because "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Id. at 377 U. S. 562. The rule appeared again in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 380 U. S. 96 (1965), in which, as I now see that case, [Footnote 4/8] the Court applied an abnormally severe equal protection standard to a Texas statute denying certain servicemen the right to vote, without indicating that the statutory distinction between servicemen and civilians was generally "suspect." This branch of the doctrine was also an alternate ground in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra, see 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 670, and apparently was a basis of the holding in Williams v. Rhodes, supra. [Footnote 4/9] It chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I think this branch of the "compelling interest" doctrine particularly unfortunate and unnecessary. It is unfortunate because it creates an exception which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule. Virtually every state statute affects important rights. This Court has repeatedly held, for example, that the traditional equal protection standard is applicable to statutory classifications affecting such fundamental matters as the right to pursue a particular occupation, [Footnote 4/11] the right to receive greater or smaller wages [Footnote 4/12] or to work more or less hours, [Footnote 4/13] and the right to inherit property. [Footnote 4/14] Rights such as these are, in principle, indistinguishable from those involved here, and to extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in which such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a "super-legislature." This branch of the doctrine is also unnecessary. When the right affected is one assured by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For reasons hereafter set forth, see infra at 394 U. S. 672-677, a legislature might rationally find that the imposition of a welfare residence requirement would aid in the accomplishment of at least four valid governmental objectives. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In my view, it is playing ducks and drakes with the statute to argue, as the Court does, ante at 394 U. S. 639-641, that Congress did not mean to approve these state residence chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If any reinforcement is needed for taking this statutory language at face value, the overall scheme of the AFDC program and the context in which it was enacted suggest strong reasons why Congress would have wished to approve limited state residence requirements. Congress determined to enlist state assistance in financing the AFDC program, and to administer the program primarily through the States. A previous Congress had already enacted a one-year residence requirement with respect to aid for dependent children in the District of Columbia. [Footnote 4/15] In these circumstances, I think it only sensible to conclude that, in allowing the States to impose limited residence conditions despite their possible impact on persons who wished to move interstate, [Footnote 4/16] Congress was motivated by a desire to encourage state participation in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Nor do I find it credible that Congress intended to refrain from expressing approval of state residence requirements because of doubts about their constitutionality or their compatibility with the Act's beneficent purposes. With respect to constitutionality, a similar residence requirement was already in effect for the District of Columbia, and the burdens upon travel which might be caused by such requirements must, even in 1935, have been regarded as within the competence of Congress under its commerce power. If Congress had thought residence requirements entirely incompatible with the aims of the Act, it could simply have provided that state assistance plans containing such requirements should not be approved at all, rather than having limited approval to plans containing residence requirements of less than one year. Moreover, when Congress, in 1944, revised the AFDC program in the District of Columbia to conform with the standards of the Act, it chose to condition eligibility upon one year's residence, [Footnote 4/18] thus strongly indicating that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
it doubted neither the constitutionality of such a provision nor its consistency with the Act's purposes. [Footnote 4/19] Opinions of this Court and of individual Justices have suggested four provisions of the Constitution as possible sources of a right to travel enforceable against the federal or state governments: the Commerce Clause; [Footnote 4/20] the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2; [Footnote 4/21] the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; [Footnote 4/22] and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Footnote 4/23] The Commerce Clause can be of no assistance to these appellees, since that clause grants plenary power to Congress, [Footnote 4/24] and Congress either enacted or approved all of the residence requirements here challenged. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2 [Footnote 4/25] is irrelevant, for it appears settled that this clause neither limits federal power nor prevents a State from distinguishing among its own citizens, but simply "prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own." Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 307 U. S. 511 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); @see 83 U. S. 77 (1873). Since Congress enacted the District of Columbia residence statute, and since the Pennsylvania and Connecticut appellees were residents chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." It is evident that this clause cannot be applicable in the District of Columbia appeal, since it is limited in terms to instances of state action. In the Pennsylvania and Connecticut cases, the respective States did impose and enforce the residence requirements. However, Congress approved these requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 602(b). The fact of congressional approval, together with this Court's past statements about the nature of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause, leads me to believe that the clause affords no additional help to these appellees, and that the decisive issue is whether Congress itself may impose such requirements. The view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause which has most often been adopted by the Court and by individual Justices is that it extends only to those "privileges and immunities" which "arise or grow out of the relationship of United States citizens to the national government." Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 307 U. S. 520 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.). [Footnote 4/26] On the authority of Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868), those privileges and immunities have repeatedly been said to include the right to travel from State to State, [Footnote 4/27] presumably for the reason assigned in Crandall: that state restrictions on travel chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Some Justices, notably the dissenters in the 83 U. S. 83, 83 U. S. 111, 83 U. S. 124 (1873) (Field, Bradley, and Swayne, JJ., dissenting), and the concurring Justices in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 314 U. S. 177, 314 U. S. 181 (1941) (DOUGLAS and Jackson, JJ., concurring), have gone further and intimated that the Fourteenth Amendment right to travel interstate is a concomitant of federal citizenship which stems from sources even more basic than the need to protect citizens in their relations with the Federal Government. The Slaughter-House dissenters suggested that the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, including freedom to travel, were those natural rights "which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments," 16 Wall. at 83 U. S. 98 (Field, J.). However, since such rights are "the rights of citizens of any free government," [email protected] at 83 U. S. 114 (Bradley, J.), it would appear that they must be immune from national, as well as state, abridgment. To the extent that they may be validly limited by Congress, there would seem to be no reason why they may not be similarly abridged by States acting with congressional approval.
The concurring Justices in Edwards laid emphasis not upon natural rights, but upon a generalized concern for the functioning of the federal system, stressing that to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The last possible source of a right to travel is one which does operate against the Federal Government: the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Footnote 4/29] It is now settled chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, in United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966), the Court again had occasion to consider the right of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The next questions are: (1) To what extent does a one-year residence condition upon welfare eligibility interfere with this right to travel?, and (2) What are the governmental interests supporting such a condition? The consequence of the residence requirements is that persons who contemplate interstate changes of residence, and who believe that they otherwise would qualify for welfare payments, must take into account the fact that such assistance will not be available for a year after arrival. The number or proportion of persons who are actually deterred from changing residence by the existence of these provisions is unknown. If one accepts evidence put forward by the appellees, [Footnote 4/30] to the effect chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Against this indirect impact on the right to travel must be set the interests of the States, and of Congress with respect to the District of Columbia, in imposing residence conditions. There appear to be four such interests. First, it is evident that a primary concern of Congress and the Pennsylvania and Connecticut Legislatures was to deny welfare benefits to persons who moved into the jurisdiction primarily in order to collect those benefits. [Footnote 4/31] This seems to me an entirely legitimate objective. A legislature is certainly not obliged to furnish welfare assistance to every inhabitant of the jurisdiction, and it is entirely rational to deny benefits to those who enter primarily in order to receive them, since this will make more funds available for those whom the legislature deems more worthy of subsidy. [Footnote 4/32] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A second possible purpose of residence requirements is the prevention of fraud. A residence requirement provides an objective and workable means of determining that an applicant intends to remain indefinitely within the jurisdiction. It therefore may aid in eliminating fraudulent collection of benefits by nonresidents and persons already receiving assistance in other States. There can be no doubt that prevention of fraud is a valid legislative goal. Third, the requirement of a fixed period of residence may help in predicting the budgetary amount which will be needed for public assistance in the future. While none of the appellant jurisdictions appears to keep data sufficient to permit the making of detailed budgetary predictions in consequence of the requirement, [Footnote 4/33] it is probable that, in the event of a very large increase or decrease in the number of indigent newcomers, the waiting period would give the legislature time to make needed adjustments in the welfare laws. Obviously, this is a proper objective. Fourth, the residence requirements conceivably may have been predicated upon a legislative desire to restrict welfare payments financed in part by state tax funds to persons who have chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Fifth, and of longer-range importance, the field of welfare assistance is one in which there is a widely recognized need for fresh solutions and consequently for experimentation. Invalidation of welfare residence chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
requirements might have the unfortunate consequence of discouraging the Federal and State Governments from establishing unusually generous welfare programs in particular areas on an experimental basis, because of fears that the program would cause an influx of persons seeking higher welfare payments. Sixth and finally, a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to statutes of the types now before us. Congressional enactments come to this Court with an extremely heavy presumption of validity. See, e.g., 25 U. S. 436 (1827); Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 284 U. S. 158 (1931); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 297 U. S. 67 (1936); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 372 U. S. 32 (1963). A similar presumption of constitutionality attaches to state statutes, particularly when, as here, a State has acted upon a specific authorization from Congress. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 127 U. S. 684-685 (1888); United States v. Des Moines N. & R. Co.,@ 142 U. S. 510, 142 U. S. 544-545 (1892).
I do not consider that the factors which have been urged to outweigh these considerations are sufficient to render unconstitutional these state and federal enactments. It is said, first, that this Court, in the opinions discussed, supra, at 394 U. S. 669-671, has acknowledged that the right to travel interstate is a "fundamental" freedom. Second, it is contended that the governmental objectives mentioned above either are ephemeral or could be accomplished by means which do not impinge as heavily on the right to travel, and hence that the requirements are unconstitutional because they "sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288, 377 U. S. 307 (1964). The appellees claim that welfare payments could be denied those who come primarily to collect welfare by means of less restrictive provisions, such as New York's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Taking all of these competing considerations into account, I believe that the balance definitely favors constitutionality. In reaching that conclusion, I do not minimize the importance of the right to travel interstate. However, the impact of residence conditions upon that right is indirect and apparently quite insubstantial. On the other hand, the governmental purposes served by the requirements are legitimate and real, and the residence requirements are clearly suited to their accomplishment. To abolish residence requirements might well discourage highly worthwhile experimentation in the welfare field. The statutes come to us clothed with the authority of Congress and attended by a correspondingly heavy presumption of constitutionality. Moreover, although the appellees assert that the same objectives could have been achieved by less restrictive means, this is an area in which the judiciary should be especially slow to fetter the judgment of Congress and of some 46 state legislatures [Footnote 4/36] in the choice of methods. Residence requirements have chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Of the District of Columbia appellees, all sought AFDC assistance except appellee Barley, who asked for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. In 42 U.S.C. § 602(b), Congress has authorized "States" (including the District of Columbia, see 42 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1)) to require up to one year's immediately prior residence as a condition of eligibility for AFDC assistance. See n. 394 U. S. 15, infra. In 42 U.S.C. §§ 1352(b)(1) and 1382(b)(2), Congress has permitted "States" to condition disability payments upon the applicant's having resided in the State for up to five of the preceding nine years. However, D.C.Code § 3-203 prescribes a one-year residence requirement for both types of assistance, so the question of the constitutionality of a longer required residence period is not before us.
See 394 U. S. 9, infra.
See 394 U. S. 9, supra.
See 83 U. S. 79 (1873); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 136 U. S. 448 (1890); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 146 U. S. 38 (1892); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 148 U. S. 661 (1893); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 152 U. S. 382 (1894); Twining v. New Jersey,@ 211 U. S. 78, 211 U. S. 97-98 (1908).