Source: http://archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de/projekte/Bibliothek/text.php?id=221
Timestamp: 2017-11-22 07:19:13
Document Index: 521505457

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 4', 'Art. 28', 'Art. 5', 'Art. 10', 'Art. 18', 'art. 7', 'art. 34', 'art. 7', 'Art. 6', '§ 4']

Chinese Yearbook of
Private International Law and Comparative Law,
2001, Law Press China, edited by Huang Jin,
Pages 15 - 54.
Michael Martinek [*]
The Seven Pillars of Wisdom in Private International Law -
The German and the Swiss Experience with the Codification of Conflicts Law Rules
2  The codification developments
2.1 The codification of private international law
2.2 The codification of private international law
3  Comparative aspects and questions
3.1 The outer appearances: two unequal sisters
3.2 The quest for common experiences
4  The Savignyan approach
4.1 The fundamental soundness of Savigny’s
4.2 The awareness of the deficiencies
of the Savignyan approach
5  The discussion about a “conflicts revolution”
5.1 The aberration of a political approach
5.2 No escape to lex fori and no “better
6  Refinement and flexibility
7  The “second pillar” of private international law
7.1 Mandatory intervention norms of civil law
7.2 The path to recognition
7.3 Universal conflict rules for the intervention
Whoever considers the codification of one’s private international law these days will most unlikely sit just down and compile a first draft referring to the country’s judge-made law and the accompanying scholarly writing. The desirablility, feasibility and the conceptual framework of a codification of a nation’s law of conflict of laws can hardly in any country be satisfactorily assessed without taking into account the experiences of other countries which have already marched forward on this path. Since presently the idea of a codification of private international law of China is very much under debate[1], my contribution will let you share some views and thoughts on the codification experience that the private international laws of Germany - my native country where I live and work - and of Switzerland - my favorite holiday resort - have gained. The reason why I chose the private international law of those countries is not only personal affection and familiarity; it is the conviction that the expriences Germany and Switzerland have made when codifying their laws of conflict of laws are in many respects paradigmatic for the state of the art (and nobody will deny that we are dealing here with an art).
2 The codification developments
2.1 The codification of private international law in Germany
The German private international law is today codified in the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch), abreviated: EGBGB.[2] This is certainly true with regard to conflict rules of the law of persons, the family law, the law of succession, the law of contractual and non-contractual (legal) obligations as well as the law of property. This dates back to the very beginning of the 20th century, when, on January 1, 1900, the Civil Code with its five books entered into force. The private international law provisions of the Introductory Act (EGBGB) have sometimes been called the “sixth book” or the “private international law book” of the German Civil Code. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the codification of conflict rules was, from the outset, directly linked with the codification of general private law, and that the codified private international law could, together with the German Civil Code, the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), celebrate its hundredth anniversary recently.
It is to be conceded, however, that this codification, namely the artt. 7 to 31 of the former EGBGB, was, for almost ninety years, a very fragmentary and scattered one. In particular, the private international law in the Introductory Act consisted mainly of unilateral conflict rules which were only construed and extended to universally applicable rules by court decisions and doctrinal developments, which happened already before the second world war. The sources of private international law in Germany were for a long time more customary than statutory in nature. There were in fact few fields in German law where scholarly writing and judicial decision-making played a comparatively important role like in the private international law. The most remarkable achievement is perhaps the extension of unilateral conflict rules to multlateral, universal rules. After the Second World War repeatedly the proposal for a new and more elaborate codification of the private international law in Germany came up, especially when, in the seventies, some of the existing provisions were held unconstitutional by the courts.[3] This led to various drafts during the following decades.[4] After a long and changing history the German private international law[5] in the Introductory Act gained its present shape mainly through two reform acts, which had entered into force on September 1, 1986[6] and on June 1, 1999[7], respectively, and which were based on two European Conventions.[8] The first Convention aimed at the harmonisation of the international law of contractual obligations (obligations ex contractu), whereas the second dealt with non-contractual obligations (obligations ex lege), i.e. negotiorum gestio, unjust enrichment and delicts, as well as with the international law of property. These conventions which have been signed and ratified by the member states of the European Union, provide for lois uniformes with regard to the conflict rules covered therein. Moreover, many formerly scattered provisions stating special conflict rules in several other statutes, e.g. the Statute on Timesharing-Rights or the Statute on Unfair Contract Terms, have lately been incorporated into the Introductory Act. There are only few dispersed statutes left which contain additional conflict rules like the Statute on Restriction of Trade and Competition. It is fair so say that at the beginning of the new millenium the German private international law is moulded into a codification-like set of provisions in the artt. 3 to 46 of today’s EGBGB, most of which are now universal conflict rules in full harmony with the pertinent rules of the other European Union member states.[9]
This codification of conflicts rule determining the applicable law omits from its scope, however, questions of jurisdiction and of enforcement of foreign judgements. The pertinent rules are provided mainly in the German Code of Civil Procedure, in the Brussels Convention (1968) and the Lugano Convention (1988) on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters.
2.2 The codification of private international law in Switzerland
Switzerland has enacted the Federal Statute on Private International Law on December 18, 1987 which entered into force on January 1, 1989.[10] Up to 1989 Switzerland solved most of the conflicts law issues by referring to a federal statute of 1891 on the civil law relations of settlers and residents, the NAG.[11] This statute with 40 articles aimed, however, primarily at conflict cases of jurisdiction and of laws raised among the different cantons of Switzerland’s federation and was restricted to questions of the law of persons, family law and the law of succession. Since the coming into force of the Swiss Federal Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch, ZGB) and the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, OR) in 1912, by which the Swiss Federation availed itself of its power in all fields of civil law, the intercantonal law of conflicts lost its genuine objectives, but retained and increased its importance for international conflict situations where the provisions were applied by way of analogy. There were no provisions on the international law of property and the international law of obligations, nor were there any regulations on the general part of private international law. Since the NAG referred to the law of the canton of domicile of a Swiss resident, the principle of domicile was also guiding the analogous application on international conflicts, whereas most of the neighbour countries then favoured the nationality principle – as did Germany. The NAG did not encompass contracts and delicts; insofar case law governed the resolution of conflict cases.
It is clear that under those circumstances the new Swiss private international law code of 1987, the IPRG, was greeted as a giant step forward. This admirable piece of legislation appears as an all-inclusive codification in 12 chapters and some 200 articles (“Gesamtkodifikaton”[12]). It is considered the most elaborate and detailed private international law codification in the world. Today the Swiss private international law code serves as model for many codification projects in other countries, among them the Peoples’ Republic of China.[13] The main feature of this codification is that it encompasses not only the conflict rules determining the applicable law, but also the provisions on conflict of jurisdictions and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements.
3 Comparative aspects and questions
The private international laws of Germany (EGBGB) and Switzerland (IPRG) thus have been tamed in a process which lasted several decades. This process has entailed two fairly comprehensive codifications which cover most of the law of conflict of laws in both countries, although some important questions have been omitted, especially with regard to the general part of private international law (e.g. there are no provisions on characterization, premilinary questions or fraus legis). These codifications belong, from a comparative lawyer’s perspective, to the same “circle” or “family” of legal systems, namely to the Germanic family of laws; they are both daughters or sisters of the Germanic system - despite some admixtures of the Romanic legal system in the Swiss law. In everyday’s life one can frequently encounter that the parents of two daughters utter their amazement about how dissimilar and unlike their children look and behave. And indeed, telling from their outer appearances the two codifications of private international law in Germany and Switzerland seem to be fairly different with regard to their structure and composition. They appear as two unequal sisters.
The German EGBGB confines itself to the issue of the applicable law, i.e. to the private international law in the narrower sense of conflict rules, whereas the Swiss IPRG covers also international conflict of jurisdictions (some 60 articles) as well as recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements (some 30 articles); moreover, international arbitration, intellectual property and international bankruptcy are also being dealt with in the IPRG. The German rules on the law of natural persons, family law and succession are based on the principle of nationality, whereas the Swiss codification adheres to the domicile principle. The German law incorporates some international conventions while others are left unmentioned; the Swiss code expressly refers to all pertinent multilateral treaties which have introduced private international law rules of general application (lois uniformes) into the national system.[14] The renvoi-problem, i.e. the question of how to treat a reference of foreign conflicts law back to the law of the forum state or to the law of a third state, is treated differently in both codifications. German courts are required, according to art. 4 EGBGB, to recognize a renvoi: The German reference to foreign law includes the foreign substantive as well as conflicts law, whereas a foreign reference to German law is considered to be a reference to German substantive law only. The Swiss IPRG excludes, in principle, renvoi, allows, however, for exceptions and tries to avoid dogma in its articles 13 and 14. In fact, many rules in the general part and in the various special parts of the private international laws here and there differ quite remarkably.
In our context there is little use in drawing up a synopsis showing the many differences and enlisting the few common features of the two private international law codifications regarding the actual contents of the provisions. The decisive question is, in our context, whether there are any common features of the two “unequal sisters”, stemming perhaps from common experiences. Of course, no trifling matters or petty coincidences here and there, but only truly fundamental points are of interest, “concurring opinions”, so to speak, with regard to the ratio decidendi. Are there not any corresponding results, any conform outcomes of the long-lasting codification process in Germany and Switzerland? Well, there are, indeed. One can well point out that there are seven fundamental and important common experiences that deserve utmost attention.
4 The Savignyan approach
4.1 The fundamental soundness of Savigny’s approach
It can well be considered a first common experience of both countries in their private international law codification process that the conceptual conflicts law approach which is linked with the name of Carl Friedrich von Savigny forms, in principle, a sound and sturdy fundament. It is obvious that both private international law systems are deeply rooted in this doctrinal thought. As is well known, Savigny, in the eighth volume of his treatise on the system of today’s Roman law (System des heutigen Römischen Rechts), published in 1849, and in recourse to earlier studies of his fellow countryman Carl Georg von Wächter and, more importantly, of the American scholar Joseph Story, has laid down the foundations of the classical private international law. According to Savigny, in the case of a “collision of statutes” (“Collision der Gesetze”) the primary task should be to search for the (geographical) “seat” of a legal relationship according to its characteristic nature.[15] From this starting point on, the private international law developed as a “pure“ law of conflict of laws (“Kollisionsrecht”) which did not even claim to regulate social conflicts with normative provisions, but was inherently restricted to the determination of the applicable law by just stating conflict rules.
Before Savigny, as is also well known, the so-called “theory of statutes” (Statutentheorie) with the differentiation between statuta personalia, statuta realia and statuta mixta had been prevalent for hundreds of years in the wake of the postglossators Baldus and Bartolus, according to whom conflict cases had to be resolved by determining the territorial scope of the national statutes and by reflecting on the state’s sovereign interests in an application. This public law approach of the statutists was based on and restricted by the recognition of foreign law on one’s own territory according to the comitas gentium, the principle of friendliness of peoples.
After the “Kopernikanian turn”[16] launched by Savigny, private international law was merely a neutral law of application of law (“Rechtsanwendungsrecht”) seeking and determining the applicable law for the private persons involved in a private legal relationship, hereby taking consciously into account that the determination ends up in a “leap into the dark” (Rabel)[17], since the actual substantive content of the law to be applied was not discussed nor considered. This approach confined itself to pursueing the ideal of an international decision harmony, i.e. a conformity of judgements in conflict cases independantly form the forum state. In this spirit many unilateral conflict rules of the former German and Swiss private international law which were shaped to determine and declare the applicability of the German or, respectively, the Swiss substantive law in cases of foreign elements, have been extended, by doctrinal and judicial promotion, to universal conflict rules which also could declare a foreign law applicable. This development shows that Savigny’s national approach ist also supranationally orientated in that it strives for an equal, evenly matched, undiscriminatory application of foreign law.
It is here, by the way, that comparative law comes into play rendering an inevitable working tool for the private international lawyer, because the comprehension and classification of foreign legal institutions and of the notions of a foreign legal system in the light of the conceptual categories of the forum state, namely the problem of characterization, can hardly be dealt with in the absence of a reliable knowledge of foreign law and comparative legal methods. Comparative law and private international law closely co-operate in pursueing the task to surmount the diversities of the national legal systems at least partly by way of approximation, harmonisation or conformity of judgements.[18] It is the Savigynan approach which accounts for the close connection between private international law and comparative law in both Germany and Switzerland. Summing up the first common experience of both countries in their private international law codification process it can be recorded that the Savignyan approach is the theoretical starting point in which both codifications are firmly rooted. In Germany Savigny was, in 1982, expressly called “protector and at the same time renewer” of private international law (“Bewahrer und zugleich Erneuerer”).[19]
4.2 The awareness of the deficiencies of the Savignyan approach
The second common experience of Germany and Switzerland in their private international law codification process is that the Savignyan approach also reveals some obvious deficiencies and weaknesses. It provides for a sound fundament of the law of conflict of laws only in principle, but remains in some respects unsatisfactory and leaves ample room for improvements.
The catchword for the feeling of uneasiness has already been mentioned: the “leap into the dark” left many private international lawyers discontented, the more so since the deficiencies of said “leap into the dark” could not sufficiently be mitigated by the refined instruments of characterization and approximation, ordre public and teleological reduction.
The uneasiness is certainly comprehensible: The technical rules on conflict of laws in the former partial codifications of the German EGBGB and of the Swiss NAG had been shaped in the spirit of the 19th century which was the age of natural sciences where all sorts of attempts were made to design social and conceptual phenomena, by way of analogy, like physical or mechanical structures. This positivistic national private international law allowed for the development of a system which was, theoretically, internationally consistent and was based on the equality of all the other legal orders. No doubt, it could unfold a certain intellectual fascination and appeal, because everything worked so nicely together like in a clockwork. And yet, deficiencies and imperfections arose as soon as the national private international law of other states with their conflict rules deviated due to different connecting factors. An international understanding about a harmonization of the national laws of conflict of laws remained highly fragmentary. To make it short: reality did not fit. The fundamental dilemma of private international law thus was unresolved: How can one cope with international cases by employing the imperfect means of the national law which eventually always reflects the national legal notions? The axiom of equality of legal orders is connected with the fiction of their homogeinity, whereas deeply rooted cultural and political peculiarities govern in reality.
At the beginning of the theory of statutes, in the outgoing 12th century, the glossator Magister Aldricus answered the question for the applicable law simply by the characterization: “quae potior et utilior videtur"[20] (which seem to be mightier and more usefull); the classical private international law of Saviny’s provenance, however, confined itself to the determination of the geographically “best” law, irrespective of its content, and employed only the ordre public as a correction. It was a schematic and “blind” instrument for the determination of the applicable substantive law. Substantive justice was out of the scope of the conflict rules. In the liberal tradition of Savgny’s private international law, the private legal order is in principle conceptualized as an area free of state influence. Only in exceptional and especially justified cases could the state intervene in the interactions of the private subjects. The notion of a regulatory state which pursues certain objectives of social and economic policy was fairly foreign; and so was the thought that the state was responsible to protect private autonomy and its conditions of existence against its inherent tendencies to self-destruction. The issue of what the ethical background and the substantial objectives of private international law were, was on the table[21] and caused increasing embarrassment, although nobody wanted to return behind the „Kopernikanian turn“ of Savigny.[22]
Of course, attempts were made to equip the private international law with a substantive justification and legimitation of its own. In particular, the idea emerged that there were specific common interests or interests of the parties, which could be considered characeristic to the tasts of private international law and which could be taken into account when construeing conflict rules.[23] Those attempts to endow private international law with a justice of its own failed eventually. The explicit notion of a specific conflicts justice to be seperated from the substantive law justice gained only partly support. It was commonly felt that a merely formal and purely “geographical justice” was a contradiction to the indivisibility of justice.
To resume: as the second common experience of Germany and Switzerland in the private international law codification process it can be ascertained that there was a wide spread dissatisfaction with the formal and mechanical function of the Savignyan private international law which was - except for the ordre public reservation - only “referring law” (Verweisungsrecht), but not “deciding law” (Entscheidungsrecht)[24] ; it lacked the capability to finally resolve disputes.
5 The discussion about a “conflicts revolution”
As the third common experience which Germany and Switzerland have made in their private international law-codification process one can mention the wrongfulness of a decidely and expressly political approach like the governmental interest analysis approach (Currie)[25] which once was fashionable in the U.S.A. This experience dates back to the sixties and seventies of the last century. Those were the times where some German and Swiss writers tried to import a “revolution” or a change of paradigm in the private international law doctrine. The movement had commenced in the Anglo-american doctrinal thought on private international law. The discussion in the U.S. after the war had brought forth new approaches which quiet radically departed from Savigny’s and Story’s theorems and had found resonance in the court decisions in interlocal conflict cases. After the customary time-lag of about ten years which characterises the trans-atlantic jurisprudential communication, thoses „unconventional US-American analyses and suggestions"[26] also gained foothold in Europe. They were recepted in Switzerland[27] before they found widespread attention in Germany. The discussion among the schools of the American "conflicts revolution", which was linked with names like Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, Cavers, Weintraub, von Mehren or Trautmann, irritated the Swiss and German traditionalists for almost two decades. Also Friedrich K. Juenger played quite an important role. The Americans felt quite free to connect value judgements with the previously strictly formal conflicts rules. Not only in exceptional cases but as a self-evident rule were they willing to let substantive legal considerations influence the decision about the applicable law – according to the motto "look before you leap" (De Nova).[28]
The sympathy for and reception of those new ideas in Germany and Switzerland, particularly of the governmental interest analysis approach as perhaps the most prominent among these various and heterogeneous ventures, was based on the impression that the classical and tradional law of conflict of laws could not satisfactorily comply with the functions of the law as an instrument of societal and economical order.[29] Already in the middle of the last century, when a certain uneasiness with the Savignyan system of private international law had emerged, the slogan of a „crisis of conflict of laws“ had come up.[30] The one or other scholar dared to frankly plead for directly substantive law oriented solutions of conflict cases.[31] The so-called “political school” of private international law in the sixties and seventies - with Wiethölter and Joerges as protagonists - wanted to treat the modern civil law from the outset as instrument of social engeneering and political steering instead of a means for the protection and balance of private interests. Private international law, according to this view, had the task to solve conflicts mainly between the colliding interests of two or more (not: parties, but: ) states to apply and push through their poltical values and their social order in cases with foreign elements. This perspective clearly shifts the center of gravity in the decision about the applicable law from considerations of private law to those of public law and, in particular, to national oder governmental interests. Some writers (Wiethölter, Joerges) expressly demanded to treat questions of the private international law as political questions.[32] They could not find acceptable the old idea of a harmony of decisions and of a “formal justice”, since justice, in their view, could not be seen as being abstract from values, purposes and interests.
In Germany and Switzerland - as in many other countries - we know today that this political approach of private international law, although it contained an element of truth, was not suitable to abolish and to remove the Savignyan fundament. In calling for a radical departure from Savigny and for a “revolution” of private international law, this approach was a “aberration” (Irrweg).[33] It was not by accident that this thought gained territory during the phase of Keynesian economic policy where the understanding of civil law was quite generally inspired by political dirigism and governmental controll. Today, in the years of globalisation and deregulation, we witness again an enhanced awareness of the importance of an indeterminated self-organization of the civilian society. The private international law traditionalists and representativs of the classical doctrine - like Jayme, Kegel, Neuhaus, Lorenz or Schurig[34] - have successfully isolated the opinion leaders of the political school. The notion of private law and of private international law a instruments of public policy has been rejected and the deliberate weakening of individual legal positions has been stopped. The main objective of the political school, namely a radical new orientation of private international law, eventually failed, although in some fields like international labor law[35] or international consumer protection law[36] their arguments still linger on.
The private international law codifications which are in force today in Germany and in Switzerland rightfully neglect or even ignore (if not rebutt) the political approach. The political school of private international law is today regarded as a step backwards into the direction of a destructive politisation and towards a medieval neo-statutism.[37] In fact, there is no reliable and generally consented standard in existance for the assessment of governmental interests in the application of law. All attempts of a public law foundation of private international law have failed during the centuries. Apart from the comitas gentium doctrine and the ordre public reservation there is very little room for political considerations in the cases of conflict of laws, if one wants seriously prevent uncertainty and arbitrarines.[38] The most important governmental interest of all states can only be certainty and conformity of the decisions in different jurisdictions, and this task can at best be pursued by the ways and means of classical private international law of Savigny’s provenance. The idea to replace the classical system of conflict rules by a list of vage policy considerations or by a catalogue of governmental interest - be it on a case-to-case-basis, be it in a general set of norms - is no viable alternative. A system of objective and specific conflict rules with standardized connecting factors (points de rattachement) and clear exceptions are in both countries deemed preferable to open deliberations. Policy considerations can only be the exception, but not the rule in private international law.
5.2 No escape to lex fori and no “better law”-approach
The fourth and the fifth experience, which the German and the Swiss conflicts law theories share, are again of a negative, defensive or repulsive nature, namely: neither the resort to the lex fori nor to a allegedly “better law” is a promising relief. Influenced by the Austrian-American scholar Albert Ehrenzweig, the suggestion has been discussed among German and Swiss private international law theorists to mitigate the dissatisfaction with the “leap into the dark” by resorting to the lex fori as often as possible.[39] It is clear that a general and unlimited application of the lex fori, notwithstanding the foreign elements of the case of whichever quantity and of whichever quality, would practically eliminate the conflicts law issue. It would also renounce, however, the ideal of conformity of judgements in different jurisdictions and would open the door for forum shopping. A general lex fori-prorogation is incompatible with the principle iura novit curia and renounces the axiom of Savigny’s system that it is the law that rules the cases and not the parties. Whilst the private autonomy is being controlled in many respects in the substantive law per iustitiam commutativam, the party autonomy in cases with foreign elements can not be permitted to unfold itself unrestictedly. Neither the German nor the Swiss law have ever seriously considered to go this far. It must be noticed, though, that it is a step into this direction when both private international laws acknowledge to quite an extent the party autonomy in determining the applicable law (lex voluntatis).[40]
The so-called “better law”-approach which has been promulgated in the U.S.A. particularly by Cavers, Leflar and Juenger[41] and which is very much akin to the lex fori preference (most lawyers will find the better law at home) has also scarcely found support in Germany and Switzerland. The main reason is that neither the judge nor the parties can reliably decide which one of the legal systems in question possesses the optimal qualities to justly decide upon the case. The “better law”-approach would entail a radical breach of the classical system of private international law, because it gives up the fiction of equality of all legal systems and presupposes or claims the existence of a reliable standard to assess the quality of a law. Such a standard, however, is not in sight. Certainly, it is the task and the aim of the substantive national laws to search for a better quality of the normative order to achieve the ends and to pursue the interests of justice in accordance with the nation’s values and principles. What is suitable for one legal culture, however, is not necessarily apt for the other and vice versa.
6 Refinement and flexibility
The challenge by the constitution
The sixth common experience which Germany and Switzerland have made in their codification process of the private international law is that only a piecemeal and cumbersome strategy of refinement and flexibility of the conflicts rules can lead to a convincing success. The attacks against the fundaments of the classical private international law have been rebuffed. The architecture of the system of private international law was nevertheless subject not only to minor repairs of the facades, but also to some supporting new constructions. No conceptional purism could be sustained; compromises had to be made. A complete revolution and new fondation of private international law has not taken place, but an evolutionary development altered the structures of private international law eventually quite remarkably.
The beginning of this development is probably marked by the growing awareness that private international law needs a constitutional foundation in the sense that it must be fully in accordance with a country’s constitution or basic law. In Germany the issue of conformity of certain conflict rules with the basic law (the German constitution) came up very early after the second war. In the international family law considerations of substantive law entered the discussion, when the constitutionallity of some provisions of the EGBGB was questioned.[42] The constitutional provisions in the catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms, like equality of gender and protection of family, demanded adherence also in the field of private international law and prevented, in particular, paternalistic, sexually biased conflict rules. The constitution is after all the supreme law of the land, and it is also supreme to a country’s private international law. This has expressly been stated by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1971[43] and later on, and led to the annullation of some statutory provisions in the former version of the EGBGB.[44] In Switzerland, it was never questioned that the Swiss Federal Constitution was the paramount source of law. [45]
In today’s private international law codifications of Germany and Switzerland the conflict rules of international family law are fully in accordance with the pertinent constitutional provisions on non-discrimination and equality. It must not be overlooked that these developments had a manifest and manifold tendency towards the integration of value considerations into the private international law. It is no longer and not alone the determination of the geographically better law that governs private international law unreservedly and independently from substantive value judgements. Due to this development towards a constitutional undercoat of the conflict of laws rules it has been said: “The private international law has lost its innocence.” [46]
Substantive law considerations
The development went farther: The so-called “modern” (as opposed to “classical”) private international law, which had developed, in essence, in an evolutionary way during the decades after the war, albeit under the constant threat of radical and revolutionary changes, can be characerized as follows: the original severity of its forms has been mitigated; the previous strictness of its structures has been moderatd; the former rigidity of the rules has been loosened; the old crampedness of the principles has been broken. The conflict rules on the applicable law and the connecting factors, like domicile, habitual residence, nationality, locus contractus, locus rei sitae, locus delicti commissi and so on, have become decidedly more diverse and flexible than before. The considerations, which justify and legitimate the determination of the applicable law, have become by far more complex than previously. In fact, the times where the determination of the applicable law led to a risky “leap into the dark” are over.
The substantive laws concerned were always taken into consideration to a certain extent, even by the clasical conflicts lawyer, e.g. when he loosened the rigidity of the priciple locus regit actum by the favor negotii or favor validitatis in the international law of legal transactions to uphold the validity of a certain contract. Likewise in the law of torts respectively delicts the favor laesi, or in child custody cases the favor legitimitatis or favor infantis required a comparison of the substantive laws to achieve the priviledge of certain persons and thus to pursue certain substantive objectives in accordance with the national lawgiver. It was always emphasized, though, that these cases are only exceptions and never the rule, otherwise the System of Savigny would be catalysed.
The question is, of course, how far can you go and make exceptions without eroding and eventually abolishing the rule. The German and the Swiss private international law as they are codified today in the EGBGB and the IPRG go fairly far, so that the danger of an erosion of the Savignyan system sometimes appears at the horizon. The most prominent example is perhaps the international law of delicts, where a differentiated modification of the connecting factors has been introduced to determine the applicable law.[47] The traditional and exclusive connection of all delictual questions to the locus delicti commissi has for long been given up. Many efforts have been made in the last decades to shape preferable connecting factors which honour the sociological circumstances of a delict or the interest in the protection of the infringed legal positions. It has been recognized that different types of delicts like road accidents, product liability, delicts in familiy relationships, delicts in competition cases and so on had to be dealt with differently. As a result the old concept of lex loci delicti commissi today serves only as a subsidiary category, where no closer relationship of the factual pattern with a certain legal system can be established. The common personal statute, the connection of a delict to a contractual obligation or to a family relationship, but also a later choice of law by the parties can form such a closer relationship.[48]
The discussion about diversity and flexibility has soon been extended to more and more fields of law. The international law of the right to the use of a name, the international law of the act of marrying, of the effects of a marriage, of the divorce of a marriage, the law of child custody and maintenance, particularly the international law of contract and the international company law have seen an increasing refinement and diversification of their connecting factors. The private international law theorists requested more and more special connecting factors to better suit the individual cases. So-called scales of connecting factors have been worked out and sophisticated exeption clauses, elaborate evasion clauses and intricate escape clauses have been designed. The escape clause in Art. 28 sec. 5 EGBGB with the recourse to the closest connection of a contract with another state is but one example. Even with regard to the international law of property[49] the principle of lex rei sitae has been supplemented by special rules for means of transport with or for import goods or for goods passing through a country (res in transitu). In addition, the admissibility of choice of law by the parties has celebrated a grand victory in many fields of private international law. The idea of a relatively simple and concise private international law systems has fully collapsed.
The law of conflict of laws has enormously gained refinement, flexibility, diversity and sophistication. Yet the other side of the medal must also be noticed: It is quite obvious that the certainty and forseeablility of the determination of the applicable law has suffered, and so has the old ideal of an international hamony of judgements in the sense of a conformity of judgements notwithstanding the jurisdiction. Scales of connecting factors and alternative applications like the ones in Art. 5 sec. 1 or Art. 10 secs. 2 and 5 EGBGB may serve well as instruments of politics, but hardly promote the idea of conformity of judgements. Substantive tasks are undoubtedly being pursued also by the scale of connecting factors in Art. 18 EGBGB according to which, with regard to the obligation to pay maintenace, the law of the habitual residence, the law of the comon personal statute and finally the lex fori applies (with a reservation for German debtors domiciled in Germany); the dangers of such an over-flexibiliy, however, are at hand.
In summary, modern private international law in Germany and in Switzerland has opened itself carefully for the tendencies of incorporation of substantive legal considerations. The law of conflict of laws was recognized as constituting “also a reflecting image of substantive legal value judgements of its time” (“auch Spiegelbild sachrechtlicher Wertungen seiner Zeit”).[50] In principle, however, the traditional mechanisim of private international law remains preserved. The strategy of the “modernists” is differentiation and flexibilisation of the conflict rules, but not substitution of those rules by mere policy considerations, by vague "approaches", "choice-influencing considerations" or "principles of preference", as it was the case formerly in the USA, where meanwhile also a renaissance of the Savigny/Story-approach has taken place.[51]
7 The “second pillar” of private international law
Another - the seventh - common experience of German and Swiss private international laws is the increasing importance of what is known in the international theoretical discussion as lois d’application immédiate or law of direct applicability. Modern private international law in Germany and in Switzerland has also experienced the emergence and growing significance of an independent field of conflicts law which followed its own rules, namely the area of international economic law in the sense of regulating law appertaining both to public and to private law.[52] Here the doctrine of lois d’application immédiate governs. In fact we observe since many years a “splitting” or a “duality” of private international law: On the one hand we find the traditional, “purely” private fields of law (like the law of succession) and on the other hand we see the fields of economic regulation through private law (e.g. the law of competition), the latter forming a “second pillar”[53] of conflicts law.[54]
The problem as such had already been discerned by Savigny who recognized in his system of private international law an inevitable sphere of exceptions, which he described as „law of strictly positive, imperative nature” ("von streng positiver, zwingender Natur").[55] His general conflict rules should not be applied with respect to statutes „which bear a political, a police-related or an economic character“ (die "einen politischen, einen polizeilichen oder einen volkswirtschaftlichen Charakter an sich tragen"). In German and Swiss private international law this type of norms is called „zwingende Eingriffsnormen“ or „mandatory intervention norms“[56], which the state employs to regulate private relationships in the public common interest pursueing socio-economic tasks, hereby restricting the individual feedom of private persons.[57] It is clear that these intervention norms have to be applied anyway, when they belong to the national legal order which forms the lex causae for the private legal relationshp in question. In case of intervention norms of the forum state the application can be justified - at least in “urgent” cases - by (“positive”) ordre public. The crucial point is reached, however, where an intervention norm of a third state demands for application and where this third state is neither the forum state nor the lex causae state.
Those intervention norms have at first been identified with regard to the law of foreign currencies[58] and later on the law of cartels and restrictive trade practices. A prerequisite of the “immediate application” is, of course, that the norm itself demands for an application independently from the applicable substantive law and that the intervening state has a respectable interest in the application. This approach can, of course, lead to a division of the same contractual relationship into one part for the purely private matters and one part for the socio-economic functions of the contract. The reognition of intervention norms was originally restricted to those of the forum state, but it was later more and more extended to those of third states, although hesitantly and not unanimously. In France a similar development took place, and the terminology in Germany and Switzerland follows today the usage in France: lois d'application immédiate[59], norms which demand for a direct and extraterritorial application indepedently from the customary conflict rules. Those norms, although they belong to the substantive law, contain expressly or impliedly a unilateral conflict rule.
The idea of law of immediate application was as such never totally foreign to the private international law, which is easily exemplified by the treatment of nationality of the form of legal transactions (locus regit formam). The new feature is, however, the importance of the law of immediate application for the ever widening field of socio-economically regulating law intervening in private relationships. This type of norms did not matter so much hundrerd years ago: According to the understanding of the classical liberal private international law, the responsibily for the ecomomy was put on the citizens of the civilian society, which could avail themselves of the private law as an instrument for their autonomous and decentralized planning and acting. By contrast, the modern state in a mixed economy tends to instrumentalize the institutions of the private law for his regulating purposes, for instance to secure a workable competition, or to shelter the national currency, or to protect consumers and workers, or to exert export controll, or to push through price regulations, or to guarantee workers’ co-determination. In modern states the “pure” public law of the governing state and the “pure” private law of the acting citizens denote only models and extremes, whereas the bulk of existing norms is located in between. Despite many disputes about this kind of law is constitutes the predomonant challange of private international law at the turn of the millenium. [60]
The danger of an undue extension of the lois d’application immédiate is obvious, since there are relatively few fields of private law without any interventionistic background, be it the protection of the weaker party or simply the maintenance of the peace.[61] The decision about the consideration and recognition of the règles d'application immédiate turns the classical approach of private international law upside down, in that it allocates factual patterns to legal norms instead of the other way round. This decision is, moreover, itself often a political decision. The private internaional lawyer cannot escape the problem by simply calling it a problem of public international law. This just raises the new problem of characterization of the systematical categories of “private” or “public” law and is highly unsatisfactory, because the distinction between private and public law is itself highy questionable and unclear.
The theory of lois d´application immédiate has been fully recognized in the Swiss private international law codification of 1989 in artt. 18 and 19, according to which intervention norms of the forum state, the lex causae state and also a third state can be applied. The German private international law codification does not go so far, although the Rome Convention of the European member states of 1980 about the harmonization of the applicable law for contractual obligations opened in its art. 7 sec. 1 the possibility to give effect “to the mandatory rules of the law of another country”. The parallel provision of art. 34 of the German EGBGB which entered into force in 1986 does not mention the application of intervention norms of third states, which is due to a reservation Germany has made to art. 7 sec. 1 of the Rome Convention. Nevertheless it can be statet that the duality of the two pillars of the law of conflict of laws is in principle ackowledged both in Germany and in Switzerland.
7.3 Universal conflict rules for the intervention norms?
It is still an unresolved issue, however, whether the unilateral conflict rules which are inherent in the intervenional law can be extended to universal conflict rules for the intervention norms of immediate application. In the interest of conformity of judgements independenly from the state of jurisdiction a system of universal rules of conflicts of intervention norms is, of course, highly desirable.[62] Nevertheless, the international discussion is far away from this goal. It is the so-called comity, the principle of friendliness among civilized peoples and nations, which decides about the mutual application of intervention norms,[63] particularly in the field of international competition law.[64] The problem is that the states, when enacting intervention norms, still employ fairly different political strategies and concepts based on different convictions. Undoubtedly the sovereignty of the national states is here the big issue behind it all. The globalisation and the deregulation movement only partly mitigates this problem. Conventions only provide for help among relatively homogeneous states. Beyond conventions comity will perhaps in the course of time evolve into a sound basis for the architecture of a system of universal conflict rules for intervention norms.
The field of „mixed“ private-public law with „social“ or „economic“ norms which serve both public and private interests, does not force a departure from the modern private international law with its flexible conflict rules, as long as the interventionist character of the norms in question does not prevail. There are many fields of private law, particularly in the family law and the law of succession, which are relatively free from public political interferences and belong to a field of law unsuspected to be influenced by socio-economic deliberations.[65] The erection of the second pillar of private international law supplementing and flanking the existing modern system of conflict rules is confined to the law with a prevailing intervention character.[66]
Summarizing the common experiences which Germany and Switzerland have made in shaping the codifications of their private international law one can recall and enlist the following seven points:
The conceptual conflicts of law approach of Savigny forms, in principle, a sound and sturdy fundament. Both private international law codifications, the German EGBGB and the Swiss IPRG, are deeply and firmly rooted in the Savignyan tradition. In fact, they confirm the soundness of this approach in principle.
The Savignyan approach reveals, however, some obvious deficiencies and weaknesses and remains in some respects unsatisfactory (“leap into the dark”; lack of substantive value considerations).
A radical change towards a decidedly and expressly political approach like the governmental interest analysis approach constitutes no convincing alternative, but only leads back to the medieval theory of statutes. Detailed black letter rules are preferable to open-ended provisions stating only choice influencing considerations.
The general resort to the lex fori does not offer a promising relief.
The search for the “better law” can not be considered a guidance towards a viable conflicts law theory.
A departure from the formalistic understanding of private international law and from its restriction to the “blind” determination of the applicable law is inevitable. Compromises have to be made which lead to an increasing consideration of substantive law aspects and of value judgements in addition to ordre public. Only a piecemeal and cumbersome strategy of differentiation, refinement, sophistication and flexibilisation of the conflicts rules with their connecting factors can lead to a convincing success.
The modern private international law must pay full respect to the changed functions of economically motivated and oriented private law which demands for an immediate application of intervention norms irrespective of the lex causae (lois d’application immédiate). The growing importance of this public-private law requests a “second pillar” of private international law.
These seven points of experience which are the result of decades of changing developments in Germany and Switzerland seem to me so fundamental and important that I am tempted to speak - whilst we were dealing with “pillars” - of the seven pillars of wisdom in the field of private international law. They are topped by the latest common experience, namely that it is indeed feasible to draft and finally enact a codification of a nation’s private international law in a fairly satisfactory way. In both countries the codes are successfully in practice for more than a decade and have led to very few difficulties of application. Whether all those experiences tantamount to an advice and recommendation to other countries (for instance to China) to act accordingly[67] – that must be left to further discussion.
[*] Professor Dr.iur. Dr.rer.publ. Michael Martinek, M.C.J.(New York) holds a chair for Civil Law and Commercial Law, Comparative Law and Private International Law at University of Saarland, Saarbruecken, Germany, and is a frequent visitor to Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, P.R.China. He gratefully ackowledges the preparatory work for this contribution by his assistant Dr. Chen Weizuo.
[1] See Huang Jin (ed.), Guoji Sifa (Private International Law), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 1999, 163 – 169; Chinese Society of Private International Law, Model Law of Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China (Sixth Draft), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 2000, 2 – 5.
[2] For a short introduction to German private international law (in English) see Siehr, in: Ebke/Finkin (eds.), Introduction into the German Law, 1996, 337 (this contribution stems from 1996 and could, therefore, not cover the latest developments and the amendments made in 1999 to the Introductory Act ). For all the details of the German private international law it is advisable to consult one of the major treatises or commentaries, e.g. Kegel/Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht, 8th ed. 2000; von Hoffmann, Internationales Privatrecht, 6th ed. 2000; von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 1, 1987 and Vol. 2, 1991; Rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht, Schaeffers Grundriss des Rechts und der Wirtschaft, 1999; Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Vol. 10, EGBGB, 3rd ed. 1998.
[3] See infra, 6.1
[4] Cf. Neuhaus, Empfiehlt sich eine Kodifizierung des Internationalen Privatrechts?, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 37 (1973), 453; Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Reform des deutschen internationalen Personen-, Familien- und Erbrechts des Deutschen Rats für Internationales Privatrecht, 1981; Kühne, IPR-Gesetz, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reform des internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 1980; cf. also the draft for a private international law codification prepared by Neuhaus and Kropholler for the Max-Planck-Institut in Hamburg and the reform guidelines for a new codification formulated by a working group of the institute, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 44 (1980), 325.
[5] For details of this historical developments see Martinek, Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Rechtsvergleichung und des Internationalen Privatrechts in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik - Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Jurisprudenz, 1994, 529.
[6] Gesetz zur Neuregelung des IPR vom 25.7.1986, BGBl. I/1986, 1142; cf. Böhmer, Das deutsche Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts von 1986, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 50 (1986), 646; Jayme, Das neue IPR-Gesetz - Brennpunkte der Reform, in: IPRax – Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 1986, 265; Basedow, Die Neuregelung des Internationalen Privat- und Prozeßrechts, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1986, 2971; Wengler, Zur Technik der internationalprivatrechtlichen Rechtsanwendungsanweisungen des IPR-"Reform"gesetzes von 1986, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 53 (1989), 409; Lüderitz, Internationales Privatrecht im Übergang - Theoretische und praktische Aspekte der deutschen Reform, in: Festschrift für Kegel II, 1987, 343.
[7] Gesetz zum IPR für außervertragliche Schuldverhältnisse und das Sachenrecht vom 21.5.1999, BGBl. I, 1026.
[8] Cf. Matscher/Siehr/Delbrück, Multilaterale Staatsverträge erga omnes und deren Inkorporation in nationale IPR-Kodifikationen - Vor- und Nachteile einer solchen Rezeption, 1986.
[9] Cf. Deckert/Lilienthal, Die Rechtssetzungkompetenz der EG im Privatrecht, in: Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 1999, 121; Basedow, Die Harmonisierung des Kollisionsrechts nach dem Vertrag von Amsterdam, in: Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, 609.
[10] Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht (IPRG) vom 18. Dezember 1987 – Loi féderale sur le droit international privé (LDIP) du 18 décembre 1987; for an overall view cf. Schnyder, Das neue IPR-Gesetz, 2nd ed. 1990; Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s Private International Law, 2nd ed. 1994; cf. also: Lausanner Kolloquium über den deutschen und den schweizerischen Gesetzesentwurf zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts, Veröffentlichungen des Schweizerischen Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung Bd. 1, Zürich 1984; Overbeck, Der schweizerische Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über das internationale Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 42 (1978), 601; Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht (IPR-Gesetz), Schlussbericht der Expertenkommission zum Gesetzesentwurf, Schweizer Studien zum internationalen Recht, Bd. 13, 1997; Honsell/Vogt/Schnyder (eds.), Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, IPR, 1996; Keller/Siehr, Einführung in die Eigenart des internationalen Privatrechts, 3rd ed. 1984.
[11] Bundesgesetz betreffend die zivilrechtlichen Verhältnisse der Niedergelassenen und Aufenthalter (NAG) vom 25. Juni 1891.
[12] Schnyder, Das neue IPR-Gesetz, 2nd ed. 1990, 4.
[13] See Chen Weizuo, Ruishi Guofi Yanjiu (A Study of the Swiss Code on Private International Law), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 1998. This book by Dr. Chen Weizuo is the first monography published in China relating to the Swiss codification on private international law.
[14] Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s Private International Law, 2nd ed. 1994, 12.
[15] Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Band VIII, 1849, 28 (reprint Darmstadt 1956): „daß bei jedem Rechtsverhältniß dasjenige Rechtsgebiet aufgesucht werde, welchem dieses Rechtsverhältniß seiner eigenthümlichen Natur nach angehört oder unterworfen ist (worin dasselbe seinen Sitz hat)".
[16] Cf. Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 366: „kopernikanische Wende“.
[17] Leo Raape, Internationales Privatrecht, 5th ed., 1961, 90.
[18] Cf. Kegel, Angleichung des Rechts in Europa, Kölner Schriften zum Europarecht Vol. 11 (1971), 13, 39; Börner, Rechtsangleichung als Interessenangleichung - Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 381.
[19] Cf. Neuhaus, Die Zukunft des Internationalen Privatrechts, in: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis Vol. 160 (1961), 493; Neuhaus, Abschied von Savigny?, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 46 (1982), 4; see also the first volume of Rabels Zeitschrift after the war (1949/50) where the editors celebrated „in deep respect and gratitude“ ("in Ehrfurcht und Dankbarkeit") the hundredth anniversary of "Savigny's 8th volume“, Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 361; see also Neuhaus, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 381, who stated that Savignys thoughts are in many respects outdated, but „his programme is in a deeper sense still valid today“ ("sein Programm gilt in vertieftem Sinn auch heute noch").
[20] See von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht Vol. I (1987), 367.
[21] Cf. Zweigert, Die dritte Schule im internationalen Privatrecht. Zur neueren Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Kollisionsrechts, in: Festschrift für Leo Raape, 1948, 35; cf. also the critical assessment by Lewald, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1948, 644.
[22] Neuhaus, Savigny und die Rechtsfindung aus der Natur der Sache, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 15 (1949/50), 364, 366.
[23] Cf. Beitzke, Betrachtungen zur Methodik im Internationalprivatrecht, in: Festschrift für Rudolf Smend, 1952, 1; Kegel, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz im internationalen Privatrecht, in: Festschrift für Lewald, 1953, 259, 270.
[24] See Dölle, Gegenwärtige Aufgaben der deutschen Wissenschaft vom IPR, in: Gegenwartsfragen des IPR (5th supplement to Deutsche Richterzeitung), 1948, 3.
[25] Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in: Duke Law Journal 1959, 171; Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 1963.
[26] Cf. Siehr, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 585, 586.
[27] See Heini, Neuere Strömungen im amerikanischen internationalen Privatrecht, in: Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht Vol. 19 (1962), 31; Vischer, Die Kritik an der herkömmlichen Methode des Internationalen Privatrechts, in: Festschrift für Oscar Germann, 1969, 287.
[28] Rodolfo De Nova, Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict of Laws, Recueil des Cours Vol. 118 (1966-II), 435 and 599.
[29] Cf. Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws", in: Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 37 (1948/49), 483; see also Kronstein, Recht und wirtschaftliche Macht, 1962.
[30] Cf. Neuhaus, Deutsche Richterzeitung 1948, 86; Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws", in: Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 37 (1948/49), 483; Wengler, Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze des Internationalen Privatrechts und ihre Kollision, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 1943/44, 473; see also Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 1971, 169.
[31] See e.g. Kronstein, Das Recht der internationalen Kartelle, 1967, 239.
[32] Wiethölter, Vorbemerkungen zum IPR, in: Internationales Nachlaßverfahrensrecht, Vorschläge und Gutachten zur Reform des deutschen internationalen Erbrechts, 1969, 142; Wiethölter, in: Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1967, 465 (book review); Wiethölter, Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz - falsche Fronten im IPR, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 213, 224, 233, 239, 260; Joerges, Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts, 1971, 4; Joerges, Die klassische Konzeption des Internationalen Privatrechts und das Recht des unlauteren Wettbewerbs, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 421, 423; Joerges, Vorüberlegungen zu einer Theorie des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 43 (1979), 6.
[33] Cf. Neuhaus, Neue Wege im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 35 (1971), 401, 417.
[34] Jayme, Zur Krise des "Governmental-Interest Approach“, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 359; Kegel, Vaterhaus und Traumhaus. Herkömmliches internationales Privatrecht und Hauptthesen der amerikanischen Reformer, in: Festschrift für Günther Beitzke, 1979, 551; Neuhaus, Neue Wege im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 35 (1971), 401; Neuhaus, Entwicklungen im Allgemeinen Teil des Internationalen Privatrechts, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 23; E. Lorenz, Zur Struktur des internationalen Privatrechts - Ein Beitrag zur Reformdiskussion, 1977; Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachrecht, 1981, 51.
[35] Cf. Simitis, Internationales Arbeitsrecht - Standort und Perspektiven, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 153.
[36] Cf. Kropholler, Das kollisionsrechtliche System des Schutzes der schwächeren Vertragspartei, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 42 (1978), 634.
[37] See E. Lorenz, Zur Struktur des internationalen Privatrechts - Ein Beitrag zur Reformdiskussion, 1977, 107.
[38] Neuhaus, Neue Wege im europäischen Internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 35 (1971), 401, 417.
[39] Cf. Albert E. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori - Basic Rule in Conflict of Laws, Michigan Law Review Vol. 58 (1959/60), 637; Ehrenzweig, Wirklichkeiten einer Lex-Fori-Theorie, in: Festschrift für Wilhelm Wengler, Vol. II, 1973, 251; Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" of the Lex-Fori-Approach, Oklahoma Law Review Vol. 18 (1965), 340; cf. also Siehr, Ehrenzweigs lex-fori-Theorie und ihre Bedeutung für das amerikanische und deutsche Kollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 585.
[40] Cf. Flessner, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 547; Sturm, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht - Notwendigkeit und Grenzen, in: Festschrift für Zweigert, 1981, 329; Sturm, Der Name der Ehefrau aus kollisionsrechtlicher Sicht, in: Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 1973, 397, 405 with footnote 118; Simitis, Über die Entscheidungsfindung im IPR, Standesamt Zeitschrift 1976, 6, 14; Müller-Graff, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht im internationalen Wettbewerbsrecht?, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 48 (1984), 289.
[41] Cf. David F. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 2nd ed. 1966; Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, Recueil des Cours 1970-III, 75; Scoles/Hay, Conflicts, 31; Robert A. Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 1968, 243 to 265; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, in: Conflicts Law, New York University Law Review Vol. 41 (1966), 267; Leflar, Conflicts Law, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, California Law Review Vol. 54 (1966), 1584; Friedrich K. Juenger, Zum Wandel des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1974, 21; Juenger, Möglichkeiten einer Neuorientierung des internationalen Privatrechts, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1973, 1521; Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law, in: American Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 30 (1982), 117.
[42] See e.g. Dölle, Die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau im Familienrecht, in: Festgabe für E. Kaufmann, 1950, 39; Braga, Die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau und das deutsche internationale Privatrecht, in: Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht 1952, 266; Makarov, Die Gleichberechtigung der Frau und das Internationale Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 17 (1952), 382, 451; Neuhaus, Zur zivilrechtlichen Gleichstellung der Ehefrau außerhalb des BGB, in: Juristenzeitung 1952, 523; Müller-Freienfels, Scheidungsstatut und Gleichberechtigung, in: Juristenzeitung 1957, 141; Siegrist, Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau und internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 24 (1959), 54; Kegel, Reform des deutschen internationalen Eherechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 25 (1960), 201; Gamillscheg, Gleichberechtigung der Frau und Reform des Internationalen Eherechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 33 (1969), 654; Lüderitz, Erneut - Gleichberechtigung im internationalen Eherecht, in: Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 1970, 169.
[43] Bundesverfassungsgericht, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerGE 31, 58 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1971, 1509; cf. Jochem, in: Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 1975, 302: „Judgement of the century“ (Jahrhundertentscheidung); cf. Henrich, Die Bedeutung der Grundrechte bei der Anwendung fremden Rechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 2; Jayme, Grundrecht der Eheschließungsfreiheit und Wiederheirat geschiedener Ausländer, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 19; Kegel, Embarras de Richesse, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 27; Lüderitz, Grundgesetz contra Internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 35; Makarov, Art. 6 I Grundgesetz und die Anwendung spanischen Rechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 54 ff; Klaus Müller, Deutsches Scheidungsurteil als prozessuale Vorfrage und fremder ordre public, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 60; K. H. Neumayer, Zur Zivilehe eines Spaniers mit einer geschiedenen Deutschen, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 73; Siehr, Grundrecht der Eheschließungsfreiheit und Internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 93; Wengler, Die Bedeutung der verfassungsrechtlichen Bestimmungen über die Eheschließungsfreiheit und den Schutz der Familie für das Internationale Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 116; Neuhaus, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Internationales Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 36 (1972), 127; Müller-Freienfels, "Spanierheiraten" Geschiedener im Meinungsstreit, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 55.
[44] See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerfGE 63, 181 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1983, 1968 and Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. 1983 I, 525; Bundesverfassungsgericht, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BVerfGE 68, 384 = Juristische Wochenschrift 1985, 1282 and Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl. 1985 I, 573; Bundesverfassungsgericht, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1986, 658; Bundesgerichtshof, Amtliche Entscheidungssammlung BGHZ 86, 57.
[45] Karrer/Arnold/Patocchi, Switzerland’s Private International Law, 2nd ed. 1994, 11.
[46] Lüderitz, Anknüpfung im Parteiinteresse, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 31: "Das Internationale Privatrecht hat seine Unschuld verloren."
[47] Binder, Zur Auflockerung des Deliktsstatuts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 20 (1955), 401; Beitzke, Les obligations délictuelles en droit international privé, Recueil des Cours 115, 1965-II, 65; Kropholler, Ein Anknüpfungssystem für das Deliktsstatut, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 33 (1969), 601; Jayme, Die Familie im Recht der unerlaubten Handlungen, 1971, 269; Stoll, Anknüpfungsgrundsätze bei der Haftung für Straßenverkehrsunfälle und der Produktenhaftung nach der neueren Entwicklung des internationalen Deliktsrechts, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 113, 133;
[48] Kropholler, Ein Anknüpfungssystem für das Deliktsstatut, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 33 (1969), 601, 639; Flessner, Fakultatives Kollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 34 (1970), 545, 568.
[49] Cf. Drobnig, Entwicklungstendenzen des deutschen internationalen Sachenrechts, in: Festschrift für Kegel, 1977, 141.
[50] Keller/Siehr, Einführung in die Eigenart des internationalen Privatrechts, 3rd ed. 1984, 124.
[51] See Bodenheimer, Norm und Ermessen in der Entwicklung des amerikanischen internationalen Privatrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 51 (1987), 1.
[52] Cf. Drobnig, Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 1; see also Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8.
[53] Cf. Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987, 59.
[54] Cf. Drobnig, Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 1, 7; see also Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8, 9.
[55] Savigny, System des heutige Römischen Rechts, Vol. VIII, 1849, 32 pp.
[56] Karl Neumeyer, Internationales Verwaltungsrecht Vol., 1936, 228 pp., 243 pp.; Neuhaus, Die Grundbegriffe des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1st ed. 1962, 58 and 2nd ed. 1976, 33 ( § 4 II), who, in contrast to Neumeyer, emphasises that the concept of „Eingriffsnormen“ (intervention norms) is not confined to the field public administrative law.
[57] Schulte, Die Anknüpfung von Eingriffsnormen, insbesondere wirtschaftlicher Art, im internationalen Vertragsrecht, 1975; F. A. Mann, Eingriffsgesetze und IPR, in: Festschrift für Wahl, 1973, 139; Drobnig, Die Beachtung von ausländischen Eingriffsgesetzen - eine Interessenanalyse, in: Festschrift für Neumayer, 1985, 159; Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht vor deutschen Gerichten. Zum Einfluss fremdstaatlicher Eingriffsnormen auf privatrechtliche Rechtsgeschäfte, 1986; Siehr, Ausländische Eingriffsnormen im inländischen Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 41; Drobnig, Das Profil des Wirtschaftskollisionsrechts, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 1, 4; Mestmäcker, Staatliche Souveränität und offene Märkte - Konflikte bei der extraterritorialen Anwendung von Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 205.
[58] Wengler, Die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze des IPR und ihre Kollisionen, in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht Vol. 23 (1943/44), 473; Wengler, Die Anknüpfung des zwingenden Schuldrechts im IPR, in: Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft Vol. 54 (1941), 168; Wengler, Über die Maxime von der Unanwendbarkeit ausländischer politischer Gesetze, in: Internationales Recht und Diplomatie 1956, 191; Wengler, Sonderanknüpfung, positiver und negativer ordre public, in: Juristenzeitung 1979, 175; Zweigert, Nichterfüllung aufgrund ausländischer Leistungsverbote, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 14 (1942), 283; Zweigert, Internationales Privatrecht und öffentliches Recht, in: Fünfzig Jahre Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, 1965, 124.
[59] See Schwander, Lois d'application immédiate, Sonderanknüpfung, IPR-Sachnormen und andere Ausnahmen von der gewöhnlichen Anknüpfung im internationalen Privatrecht, 1975; Kegel, Die selbstgerechte Sachnorm, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Albert A. Ehrenzweig, 1976, 51.
[60] Cf. e.g. Rehbinder, Extraterritoriale Wirkungen des deutschen Kartellrechts, 1965, 286; Schwartz, Deutsches Internationales Kartellrecht, 1962, 221; Heiz, Das fremde öffentliche Recht im internationalen Kollisionsrecht, 1958; Mertens, Ausländisches Kartellrecht im deutschen internationalen Privatrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 31 (1967), 385; Kreuzer, Ausländisches Wirtschaftsrecht vor deutschen Gerichten, 1986; Schurig, Kollisionsnorm und Sachnorm, 1981, 138; Schurig, Zwingendes Recht, "Eingriffsnormen und neues IPR, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 54 (1990), 217; Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8; Mestmäcker, Staatliche Souveränität und offene Märkte - Konflikte bei der extraterritorialen Anwendung von Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 52 (1988), 205; Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987; Veelken, Interessenabwägung im Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 1988; Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Sonderanknüpfung und extraterritoriale Anwendung wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Marktrecht, 1990; Habermeier, Neue Wege zum Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Eine Bestandsaufnahme prävalenter wirtschaftskollisionsrechtlicher Methodologie unter dem Blickwinkel des kritischen Rationalismus, 1997.
[61] Cf. von Hoffmann, Über den Schutz des Schwächeren bei internationalen Schuldverträgen, in: Rabels Zeitschrift Vol. 38 (1974), 396, 410 pp.
[62] See Basedow, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Theoretischer Versuch über die ordnungspolitischen Normen des Forumstaates, in: Rabels Zeischrift Vol. 52 (1988), 8, who is decidedly in favour of unilateral conflict rules in the field of economically regulating norms.
[63] Zweigert, Internationales Privatrecht und öffentliches Recht, in: 50 Jahre Institut für internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, 1965, 124.
[64] See Martinek, Das internationale Kartellprivatrecht, 1987 and (contradicting) Mestmäcker, in: Rabels Zeitschrift 52 (1988), 205, 219; see also Veelken, Interessenabwägung im Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 1988; Schnyder, Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht, 1990; Habermeier, Neue Wege zum Wirtschaftskollisionsrecht - Eine Bestandsaufnahme prävalenter wirtschaftskollisionsrechtlicher Methodologie unter dem Blickwinkel des kritischen Rationalismus, 1997.
[65] Heini, Der Entwurf eines Bundesgesetzes über das Internationale Privat- und Zivilprozessrecht (IPR-Gesetz), in: Schweizerische Juristenzeitung Vol. 74 (1978), 249, 256, who, in footnote 29, speaks of the „field unsuspected of interventions by social policy“ („sozialpolitisch unverdächtiger Bereich“).
[66] Rehbinder, Zur Politisierung des IPR, in: Juristenzeitung 1973, 151, 156.
[67] Compare e.g. Huang Jin (ed.), Guoji Sifa (Private International Law), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 1999, 163 – 169; Chinese Society of Private International Law, Model Law of Private International Law of the People’s Republic of China (Sixth Draft), Publishing House of Law, Beijing 2000, 39 - 86.