Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/353/20/
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 16:18:07
Document Index: 497048041

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 152']

AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 427, AFL, et al., Petitioners, v. FAIRLAWN MEATS, Inc. | LII / Legal Information Institute
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 427, AFL, et al., Petitioners, v. FAIRLAWN MEATS, Inc.
353 U.S. 20 (77 S.Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613)
Syllabus from 21 intentionally omitted
Respondent operates three meat markets in the vicinity of Akron, Ohio. All of its sales are intrastate, but of its purchases in one year totaling not quite $900,000, slightly more than $100,000 worth came from outside Ohio directly and as much or more indirectly. Petitioner union, after an unsuccessful attempt to organize respondent's employees, asked respondent for recognition as their bargaining agent and for a union shop contract. When respondent refused to enter into such a contract, the union picketed respondent's stores and put some secondary pressure on its suppliers. Upon respondent's complaint, the Court of Common Pleas enjoined the union from picketing respondent, from trespassing upon respondent's premises and from exerting secondary pressure on the suppliers. Petitioners objected throughout that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board was exclusive. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals (99 Ohio App. 517, 135 N.E.2d 692) found that respondent's business was 'purely of a local character' and interstate commerce, therefore, was not burdened or obstructed. The Court of Appeals held that the union's picketing was unlawful according to Ohio policy, and it continued in effect the injunction granted by the Court of Common Pleas. 1 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed an appeal 'for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved.' 2 We granted certiorari, 351 U.S. 922, 76 S.Ct. 779.
We do not agree that respondent's interstate purchases were so negligible that its business cannot be said to affect interstate commerce within the meaning of § 2(7) of the National Labor Relations Act. 3 Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 683—685, 71 S.Ct. 943, 948—949, 95 L.Ed. 1284. In this case, unlike Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 77 S.Ct. 607, no effort was made to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. Although the extent of respondent's interstate activity seems greater even than that in building Trades Council v. Kinard Constitruction Co., 346 U.S. 933, 74 S.Ct. 373, 98 L.Ed. 423, we will assume that this is a case where it was obvious that the Board would decline jurisdiction. 4
On this view of the case, our decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, controls. If the proviso to § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes within the National Board's jurisdiction in the absence of a cession agreement, it must also exclude state courts. See Garner v. Teamsters, Etc., Union, 346 U.S. 485, 491, 74 S.Ct. 161, 166, 98 L.Ed. 228. The conduct here restrained—an effort by a union not representing a majority of his employees to compel an employer to agree to a union shop contract—is conduct of which the National Act has taken hold. § 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(2). Garner v. Teamsters, etc., Union, supra, teaches that in such circumstances a State cannot afford a remedy parallel to that provided by the Act.
61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. 152(7), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(7).