Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/18-938
Timestamp: 2020-01-19 18:23:14
Document Index: 356228461

Matched Legal Cases: ['§158', '§158', '§362', '§1291', '§1291', '§158', '§158', '§158', '§362', '§362', '§158', '§3914', '§362', '§3926']

RITZEN GROUP, INC. v. JACKSON MASONRY, LLC | Supreme Court | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
906 F. 3d 494, affirmed.
An appeal of right lies from “final judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy courts “in cases and proceedings.” 28 U. S. C. §158(a). Bankruptcy court orders are considered final and immediately appealable if they “dispose of discrete disputes within the larger [bankruptcy] case.” Bullard v. Blue Hills, 575 U. S. 496, 501.
(a) This Court’s application of §158(a)’s finality requirement is guided by the opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496. Addressing repayment plan confirmations under Chapter 13, the Court held in Bullard that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not final because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Rather, the proceeding would continue until approval of a plan. Id., at 502. P. 6.
RITZEN GROUP, INC., PETITIONER v.JACKSON MASONRY, LLC
Under the Bankruptcy Code, filing a petition for bankruptcy automatically “operates as a stay” of creditors’ debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy case. 11 U. S. C. §362(a). The question this case presents concerns the finality of, and therefore the time allowed for appeal from, a bankruptcy court’s order denying a creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay. In civil litigation generally, a court’s decision ordinarily becomes “final,” for purposes of appeal, only upon completion of the entire case, i.e., when the decision “terminate[s the] action” or “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 574 U. S. 405, 409 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The regime in bankruptcy is different. A bankruptcy case embraces “an aggregation of individual controversies.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶5.08[1][b], p. 5–43 (16th ed. 2019). Orders in bankruptcy cases qualify as “final” when they definitively dispose of discrete disputes within the overarching bankruptcy case. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496, 501 (2015).
In civil litigation generally, 28 U. S. C. §1291 governs appeals from “final decisions.” Under that provision, a party may appeal to a court of appeals as of right from “final decisions of the district courts.” Ibid. A “final decision” within the meaning of §1291 is normally limited to an order that resolves the entire case. Accordingly, the appellant must raise all claims of error in a single appeal. See In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d 441, 443 (CA1 1983) (Breyer, J.) (“Traditionally, every civil action in a federal court has been viewed as a ‘single judicial unit,’ from which only one appeal would lie.”). This understanding of the term “final decision” precludes “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals” that would “undermin[e] efficient judicial administration and encroac[h] upon the prerogatives of district court judges.” Bullard, 575 U. S., at 501 (quoting Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 106 (2009); internal quotation marks omitted).
The provision on appeals to U. S. district courts from decisions of bankruptcy courts is 28 U. S. C. §158(a). Under that provision, an appeal of right lies from “final judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy courts “in cases and proceedings.” Ibid. By providing for appeals from final decisions in bankruptcy “proceedings,” as distinguished from bankruptcy “cases,” Congress made “orders in bankruptcy cases . . . immediately appeal[able] if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger [bankruptcy] case.” Bullard, 575 U. S., at 501 (quoting Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 547 U. S. 651, 657, n. 3 (2006)); see In re Saco Local Development Corp., 711 F. 2d, at 444–447. In short, “the usual judicial unit for analyzing finality in ordinary civil litigation is the case, [but] in bankruptcy[,] it is [often] the proceeding.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10.
On further appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dispositions. As to the timeliness of the first notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered this determination: Adjudication of Ritzen’s motion for relief from the automatic stay qualified as a discrete “proceeding,” commencing with the filing of the motion, followed by procedural steps, and culminating in a “[dispositive] decision based on the application of a legal standard.” In re Jackson Masonry, LLC, 906 F. 3d 494, 499–500 (2018).1 The 14-day appeal clock, the Court of Appeals therefore concluded, ran from the order denying the motion to lift the stay, a disposition “(1) entered in a proceeding and (2) final[ ly] terminating that proceeding.” Id., at 499 (alterations omitted).
This Court’s opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496, guides our application of §158(a)’s finality requirement. Addressing repayment plan confirmations under Chapter 13, we held in Bullard that a bankruptcy court’s order rejecting a proposed plan was not “final” under §158(a) because it did not conclusively resolve the relevant “proceeding.” Id., at 499, 502–503. The plan-confirmation process, the Bullard opinion explains, involves back and forth negotiations. See id., at 502. Plan proposal rejections may be followed by amended or new proposals. Only plan approval, we observed, “alters the status quo and fixes the rights and obligations of the parties.” Ibid. “Denial of confirmation with leave to amend,” by contrast, leaves the “parties’ rights and obligations . . . unsettled,” and therefore cannot be typed “final.” Id., at 503. The appropriate procedural unit for determining finality, we concluded, is not a plan proposal, it is “the process of attempting to arrive at an approved plan.” Id., at 502.
A creditor may seek relief from the stay by filing in the bankruptcy court a motion for an order “terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning” the stay, asserting in support of the motion either “cause” or the presence of specified conditions. §362(d). A majority of circuits and the leading treatises regard orders denying such motions as final, immediately appealable decisions.2 We reach the same conclusion.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and Jackson that the appropriate “proceeding” is the stay-relief adjudication. A bankruptcy court’s order ruling on a stay-relief motion disposes of a procedural unit anterior to, and separate from, claim-resolution proceedings. Adjudication of a stay-relief motion, as just observed, occurs before and apart from proceedings on the merits of creditors’ claims: The motion initiates a discrete procedural sequence, including notice and a hearing, and the creditor’s qualification for relief turns on the statutory standard, i.e., “cause” or the presence of specified conditions. §362(d), (e); Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc. 4001(a)(1) and (2), 9014 (describing procedure for adjudicating motions for relief from automatic stay). Resolution of stay-relief motions does not occur as part of the adversary claims-adjudication process, proceedings typically governed by state substantive law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 54–55 (1979). Under Bullard, a discrete dispute of this kind constitutes an independent “proceeding” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. §158(a). 575 U. S., at 502–505.
Ruling on a motion for stay relief, it is true, will determine where the adjudication of an adversary claim will take place—in the bankruptcy forum or state court. But that effect does not render a ruling nonfinal. Orders denying a plaintiff the opportunity to seek relief in its preferred forum often qualify as final and immediately appealable, though they leave the plaintiff free to sue elsewhere. Notably, dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction ranks as a final decision. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. 117, 124–125 (2014). So too, dismissal for improper venue, or under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U. S. 793, 794–795, n. 1 (1949); 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§3914.6, 3914.12 (2d ed. 1992 and Supp. 2019) (collecting cases on appealability of dismissal without prejudice to filing in another forum).3
Ritzen’s position encounters a further shoal: Many motions to lift the automatic stay do not involve adversary claims against the debtor that would be pursued in another forum but for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy’s embracive automatic stay stops even nonjudicial efforts to obtain or control the debtor’s assets. See §362(a). Motions for stay relief may, for example, seek permission to repossess or liquidate collateral, to terminate a lease, or to set off debts. Ibid. These matters do not concern the forum for, and cannot be considered part of, any subsequent claim adjudication. See Brief for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as Amicus Curiae 23–24. We see no good reason to treat stay adjudication as the relevant “proceeding” in only a subset of cases. As we have held in another context, “the issue of appealability” should “be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (addressing collateral order doctrine).
Because the appropriate “proceeding” in this case is the adjudication of the motion for relief from the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Court’s order conclusively denying that motion is “final.” The court’s order ended the stay- relief adjudication and left nothing more for the Bankruptcy Court to do in that proceeding.4 The Court of Appeals therefore correctly ranked the order as final and immediately appealable, and correctly affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Ritzen’s appeal as untimely.
2 See, e.g., Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F. 3d 1031, 1034 (CA10 2013); In re Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F. 3d 1086, 1092 (CA9 2007); In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F. 2d 160, 166 (CA7 1992); In re Sonnax Industries, Inc., 907 F. 2d 1280, 1284–1285 (CA2 1990); In re Lieb, 915 F. 2d 180, 185, n. 3 (CA5 1990); Grundy Nat. Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F. 2d 1436, 1439 (CA4 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365 (1988); In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 734 F. 2d 426, 429 (CA9 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365; In re Leimer, 724 F. 2d 744, 745 (CA8 1984); 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3926.2, p. 352, nn. 39–40 (3d ed. 2012 and Supp. 2019) (“Automatic-stay rulings by a bankruptcy judge or appellate panel should be appealable as final decisions.”). See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶5.09, pp. 5–55 to 5–57 (16th ed. 2019).