Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/375639204/CED-Properites-LLC-v-City-of-Oshkosh-No-2016AP474-Wis-April-3-2018
Timestamp: 2019-01-21 20:50:09
Document Index: 165157048

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 1314', '§ 38', '§ 1', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§ 66', '§\n66', '§ 32', '§ 66', '§ 32']

CED Properites, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474 (Wis. April 3, 2018) | Summary Judgment | Virginia Circuit Court
CED Properites, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, No. 2016AP...
Evangelista v Mercator Finance
McDevitt & Street Company, Incorporated, Now Known as McDevitt Street Bovis, Incorporated v. Seaboard Surety Company American Home Assurance Company, and Sae Builders, Incorporated Sae Engineering & Construction Company, Incorporated, Spc Concrete, Incorporated, and Third Party v. Ncnb Charter Associates the American Insurance Company, Third Party, 57 F.3d 1066, 3rd Cir. (1995)
Ganley v. Dependable, Ariz. Ct. App. (2015)
Laverne Alexander-Igbani v. Dekalb County School District, 11th Cir. (2014)
2018 WI 24
CASE NO.: 2016AP474
COMPLETE TITLE: CED Properties, LLC,
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 767, 895 N.W.2d 855
(2017 – Unpublished)
OPINION FILED: April 3, 2018
ORAL ARGUMENT: November 1, 2017
JUDGE: John A. Jorgensen
DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY,
J. (opinion filed)
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Erik S. Olsen, Joseph J. Rolling, Andrew D. Weininger,
and Eminent Domain Services, LLC, Madison. There was an oral
argument by Erik S. Olsen.
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Richard J. Carlson and Silton Seifert Carlson, SC, Appleton.
There was an oral argument by Richard J. Carlson.
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
No. 2016AP474
(L.C. No. 2015CV70)
CED Properties, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, FILED
v. APR 3, 2018
City of Oshkosh, Shelia T. Reiff
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and
the cause remanded to the circuit court.
¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. CED Properties, LLC (CED)
challenges the special assessment imposed by the City of Oshkosh
(City)1 following the reconfiguration of a traditional traffic
light intersection into a roundabout.2 We review the unpublished
court of appeals decision, CED Properties, LLC v. City of
The City imposed the special assessment on other affected
commercial property owners, but this case involves only CED's
challenge to the special assessment.
Roundabout, American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (5th ed. 2011) ("A traffic circle.").
Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan.
18, 2017), affirming the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City.3 CED raises two issues:
(1) whether the term "special benefits" in Wisconsin's eminent
domain statute has the same meaning in Wisconsin's special
assessments statute, and if so, whether the City's denial of the
existence of any special benefits during the earlier eminent
domain proceeding precludes the City from asserting the
conferral of special benefits in the later special assessment
action; and (2) whether CED raised genuine issues of material
¶2 We hold that "special benefits" has the same meaning
under both statutes. Although the failure to raise the issue of
special benefits in an eminent domain action does not
necessarily preclude a municipality from later doing so in a
special assessment action, a municipality's admission that
special benefits are non-existent in the context of an eminent
domain proceeding constitutes relevant evidence in a later
¶3 We further hold the court of appeals erred in
concluding CED failed to overcome the presumption of correctness
afforded the City's special assessment and to establish
sufficient genuine issues of material fact. The affidavit of
CED's expert raises material factual issues in dispute,
The Honorable John A. Jorgensen, Winnebago County,
including whether the roundabout project conferred a local
rather than a general benefit, whether the project conferred any
special benefits on CED's property or actually diminished its
value, and whether the amount of the special assessment was fair
and equitably apportioned among the commercial properties
involved as well as proportionate to the benefits accruing to
the property. Because we conclude CED overcame any presumption
of correctness by presenting competent evidence to the contrary,
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to
the circuit court for a trial.
¶4 CED owns property located on the northeast corner of
the intersection of United States Highway 45 and State Highway
76. Locally, United States Highway 45 is called Murdock Avenue
and State Highway 76 is called Jackson Street. A Taco Bell
franchise has operated on the property since 1992.
¶5 In January 2008, the City and the Wisconsin Department
of Transportation entered into an improvement plan agreement to
reconstruct and install a multi-lane roundabout at the Jackson-
Murdock intersection. The reconstruction plan proposed the
removal of traffic signals, concrete and asphalt paving,
concrete driveway approaches, sidewalk replacement and repair,
sanitary and storm sewer laterals, and the improvement of
streetscaping and landscaping. The plan required the City to
take about six percent of CED's property to ensure enough space
to build the roundabout. The City used its power of eminent
domain under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 to do so. In April 2012, after
lengthy litigation, the City and CED agreed the City would pay
CED $180,000 just compensation for the taking. During that
litigation, the City filed with the circuit court the appraisal
of its expert, Patrick Wagner. According to Wagner's report,
the City's partial taking caused CED's property to decrease in
value by $38,850, and he testified during his deposition that
the taking did not confer any "special benefits" on CED's
property under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3) (2015-16).4
¶6 In July 2010, the City passed a resolution that levied
special assessments upon CED's property and other commercial
properties pursuant to its police power under Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0703(1)(a)5 to help fund the intersection improvement
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(3) provides:
Special benefits accruing to the property and
affecting its market value because of the planned
improvement shall be considered and used to offset the
value of property taken or damages under [Wis. Stat.
§ 32.09(6)], but in no event shall such special
benefits be allowed in excess of damages described
under sub. (6).
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in s. 66.0721, as a complete
alternative to all other methods provided by law, any
city, town or village may, by resolution of its
governing body, levy and collect special assessments
upon property in a limited and determinable area for
special benefits conferred upon the property by any
municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or
project. CED challenged the special assessment, but the City
argued the challenge was untimely. That dispute ended after
this court ruled that CED's appeal of the assessment was timely
and its complaint sufficient; we instructed the circuit court to
grant summary judgment in favor of CED. See CED Properties, LLC
v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613, 843 N.W.2d 382
[hereinafter "CED I"].6
¶7 Following this court's decision in CED I, the City re-
assessed CED pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(10),7 imposing a
improvement out of the proceeds of the special
Paragraph (b) provides where "an assessment represents an
exercise of the police power, the assessment shall be upon a
reasonable basis as determined by the governing body of the
city, town or village."
CED asserted in CED I that the improvement project had not
conferred special benefits under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), but
this substantive issue was not addressed or resolved. See CED
Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613,
843 N.W.2d 382.
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(10) provides:
If the actual cost of any project, upon completion or
after the receipt of bids, is found to vary materially
from the estimates, if any assessment is void or
invalid, or if the governing body decides to
reconsider and reopen any assessment, it may, after
giving notice as provided in sub. (7)(a) and after a
public hearing, amend, cancel or confirm the prior
assessment. A notice of the resolution amending,
canceling or confirming the prior assessment shall be
given by the clerk as provided in sub. (8)(d). If the
assessments are amended to provide for the refunding
of special assessment B bonds under s. 66.0713(6), all
direct and indirect costs reasonably attributable to
special assessment of $19,486.36 based on CED's frontage along
Jackson Street and $20,616.67 based on CED's frontage along
Murdock Avenue for a total special assessment of $40,103.03.8
The City issued a final resolution authorizing the re-assessment
and a report describing the special benefits conferred upon CED
as: "a substantial increase in accessibility, which includes
safer, lower cost, and shorter travel times for customers,
deliveries and employees. These special benefits are different
in kind than those enjoyed by the public for through traffic."
The City said additional special benefits were conveyed by
correcting sidewalk defects in sections contiguous with the
property, which "provide[d] a safe corridor for pedestrians to
access the site," and by improving the streetscape, which
enhanced the property's overall aesthetics.
¶8 The City's report further explained that the project
improved the intersection's primary function of moving and
carrying traffic (a "community benefit") as well as the
secondary benefit of providing access to traffic flow (a
"special benefit" to abutting property owners, like CED).
According to the City, this intersection served about 25,000
the refunding of the bonds may be included in the cost
of the public improvements being financed.
The entire project cost $4,060,000. The Wisconsin
Department of Transportation paid $2,610,750. The City paid
$1,449,250, but specially assessed the affected property owners
$307,118.72 of that amount. The $40,103.03 charged to CED
equaled 0.99 percent of the total entire project cost.
vehicles each day, with 1,973 (or about 7.9 percent) of those
vehicles tied to stops at the Taco Bell on CED's property. The
City's analysis indicated that before the roundabout, it took a
vehicle 37.9 seconds to travel through the intersection; this
was reduced to 10.5 seconds per vehicle after the project.
¶9 CED again appealed the special assessment to the
circuit court, claiming the project conferred only community or
general benefits of better traffic flow and no local or special
benefits at all. CED further claimed the assessment was
unreasonable because it had no nexus between the linear feet
upon which the property was assessed and the alleged benefits
¶10 The City moved for summary judgment. It acknowledged
the improvement conferred public benefits, but asserted that the
improvement also conferred special benefits assessable against
CED, that the resulting assessment was reasonable, and that CED
failed to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the
City's assessment.
¶11 CED opposed the motion, arguing that because the City
conceded "special benefits" did not accrue to CED's property
during the Wis. Stat. ch. 32 eminent domain action, the City
forfeited the opportunity to assert "special benefits" during
the later special assessment appeal. Alternatively, CED argued
that even if asserting special benefits during the eminent
domain action was not a condition precedent to asserting them
during the ch. 66 special assessment action, the improvements
were not local in nature, no special benefits accrued, and the
assessments' costs were unreasonably apportioned among the
abutting property owners. CED also argued that the special
assessment violated the equal protection clause of the Wisconsin
and United States Constitutions.9
¶12 In support of its arguments, CED submitted the
affidavit and appraisal of its expert witness, James C. Johnson.
According to his affidavit, Johnson is a certified general
appraiser who was previously employed by the Wisconsin
Department of Transportation as an "access specialist." During
his time with that department, he "served on the committee that
established the 'Special Benefits Criteria' which were
implemented and used by the [department] for assessing whether
benefits were general benefits or special benefits." He cites
to cases on which he acted as an "access expert . . . on the
issue of reasonable access." He served as the department's
"litigation coordinator," training the department's consultant
appraisers "on evaluating general vs. special benefits." "[A]ll
requests for changes in the amount of compensation due to
landowners in the southwest region were reviewed by
[Johnson] . . . includ[ing] consideration of any access issues,
general benefits, and special benefits."
¶13 Having personally inspected CED's property, Johnson
believed that "absolutely no benefit to [CED's property], let
alone a special benefit" arose from any of the improvements. In
CED does not make this argument before this court.
fact, Johnson opined that the roundabout was a detriment to
CED's property, explaining: "Retail fast food sites like the
subject are more valuable when they are on controlled
intersections" since "[g]reater time at the intersection is
desirable for the subject because the subject is an impulse
stop." According to Johnson's appraisal, as of October 29,
2009, the roundabout project caused the fair market value of
CED's property to decrease $251,370.
¶14 CED also submitted an affidavit from its attorney,
attaching, as material here, Wagner's appraisal and the page
from Wagner's deposition where he said no special benefit
accrued to CED's property in the eminent domain action. CED
asserted in its brief opposing summary judgment that Wagner's
appraisal and testimony precluded the City from later specially
assessing CED for "special benefits."
¶15 The circuit court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment. It did not address whether genuine issues of
fact remained regarding the existence of a special benefit,
whether the benefit was local or general, or whether the
assessment was reasonable.
¶16 CED appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, with
Judge Mark Gundrum dissenting. CED Properties, LLC v. City of
18, 2017). The court of appeals' majority ruled CED failed to
prove "a genuine issue of material fact to show that it has
overcome the presumption of correctness" and failed to prove the
special assessments were not reasonable. Id., ¶29. Judge
Gundrum disagreed, concluding that CED's expert's affidavit
setting forth reasons why the project made vehicle access to
CED's property "worse, not better" was sufficient evidence that
"could support a finding by a reasonable jury that a special
benefit does not exist." Id., ¶34 (Gundrum, J. dissenting)
(quoting First State Bank v. Town of Omro, 2015 WI App 99, ¶20,
366 Wis. 2d 219, 873 N.W.2d 247). Judge Gundrum said "a jury
issue exists as to whether the Jackson-Murdock Project conferred
special benefits on the CED property," and the "matter should be
returned to the circuit court for a jury trial on the issue."
Id., ¶¶30, 34. CED petitioned for review in this court, which
we granted.
¶17 This case requires us to review a grant of summary
judgment against CED. "We independently review a grant of
summary judgment using the same methodology of the circuit court
and the court of appeals." Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v.
Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶11, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881
N.W.2d 285. The law governing summary judgment is well-known.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). Summary judgment must
be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
judgment as a matter of law." Id.
¶18 We apply a two-step test to make this determination.
Garza v. Am. Transmission Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶21, 374
Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1 (citing Green Spring Farms v. Kersten,
136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987)). First, this
court asks if the plaintiff stated a claim for relief. Id.
Second, this court applies Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), asking if any
factual issues exist that preclude a grant of summary judgment.
Id. It is undisputed here that CED's complaint states a claim
for relief. The parties' dispute focuses on whether CED
presented sufficient evidence to create any material issues of
fact to overcome the presumption of correctness.
¶19 "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; therefore, the
moving party must clearly be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Genrich v. City of Rice Lake, 2003 WI App 255, ¶6, 268
Wis. 2d 233, 673 N.W.2d 361 (citing Vill. of Fontana-On-Geneva
Lake v. Hoag, 57 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 203 N.W.2d 680 (1973)). In
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in a
light most favorable to CED, the nonmoving party. See Genrich,
268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶6. Any doubts as to whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists should be resolved against the City as
¶20 This case also involves the interpretation and
interplay of two statutes, Wis. Stat.
§§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a). The interpretation of statutes
presents a question of law we review de novo. State v. Talley,
2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 N.W.2d 390.
¶21 CED and the City disagree on whether the term "special
benefits" has the same meaning in both Wis. Stat. ch. 32 and
ch. 66. CED argues that if it has the same meaning, then the
City cannot take the position that no special benefits exist in
a ch. 32 action but later assert special benefits exist in a
ch. 66 action. We hold the term "special benefits" has the same
meaning in both statutes, but that it is used differently in
each context. Accordingly, the City is not barred from imposing
a special assessment on CED's property to pay for improvements,
provided the City establishes the improvements were local,
conferred special benefits on CED's property, and were fair,
equitable, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the
property. These issues involve questions of fact for the trier
of fact to resolve.
¶22 We begin with the language of the statutes. See State
ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000
WI 76, ¶31, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). Except for
technical or specially-defined words or phrases, "[s]tatutory
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning. . . ." Id. Additionally, because "[c]ontext is
important to meaning. . . . statutory language is interpreted in
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results." Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).
"Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage." Id.
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a) both use
the term "special benefits." Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 governs
"all matters involving the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings." Section 32.09(3) provides:
under sub. (6).[10]
(Emphasis added.) Section 66.0703 governs the general rules
applicable to special assessments imposed by a city, town or
village. Section 66.0703(1)(a) provides:
Except as provided in s. 66.0721,[11] as a complete
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6) provides the method to
determine the amount a property owner shall be compensated in
the case of a partial taking of property.
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0721, entitled "Special assessments
on certain farmland or camps for construction of sewerage or
water system," is not relevant to the analysis of this case.
¶24 Because neither statute defines the non-technical term
"special benefits," we give the term its common, ordinary, and
accepted meaning. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. The common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning of the term "special benefits"
itself does not change from one statutory section to another,
particularly when the statutory provisions have some
relationship as they do here.12 "Statutes in pari materia are to
be interpreted together as though they were one law." Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 252 (2012). In other words, laws addressing the
same subject should be interpreted harmoniously, if possible.
Id. There is no textual basis for assigning different
interpretations of "special benefits" accruing to property in
the context of eminent domain versus "special benefits"
conferred on property upon which a special assessment is levied.
Wisconsin courts have applied the same definition of special
benefits in both the eminent domain and special assessment
¶25 "Special benefits" means "an uncommon advantage." Red
Top Farms v. DOT, 177 Wis. 2d 822, 833, 503 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App.
1993) (eminent domain); Goodger v. City of Delavan, 134
"The presumption of consistent usage applies also when
different sections of an act or code are at issue" and "the more
connection the cited statute has with the statute under
consideration, the more plausible the argument becomes."
Interpretation of Legal Text 172-73 (2012).
Wis. 2d 348, 352, 396 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1986) (special
assessment). "Special" is defined as "[s]urpassing what is
common or usual." Special, American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (1992 3d. ed.). "Benefit" is defined as
"[s]omething that produces or enhances well being; an
advantage." Benefit, American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language (1992 3d ed.). This judicial definition of
"special benefits" as "an uncommon advantage" aligns with the
text of both statutes.
¶26 In Goodger, the court of appeals addressed whether a
special benefit was conferred for purposes of determining the
validity of a special assessment. 134 Wis. 2d at 352. It
adopted a plain meaning definition of "special benefits" to
denote "uncommon advantage" because "[a]bsent . . . a
legislative definition, the ordinary and accepted meaning of a
word used by the legislature can be established by reference to
a recognized dictionary." Id. (citation omitted).
¶27 The legislature uses the term "special benefits" in
each statute differently. In Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), the term
begins the subsection and is qualified by the words that follow:
"Special benefits accruing to the property and affecting its
market value because of the planned improvement . . . ." In
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), the term is embedded in the middle
of a sentence and is not qualified by an effect on the
property's market value: " . . . for special benefits conferred
upon the property by any municipal work or improvement. . . ."
Although the meaning of the term "special benefits" itself
remains the same in both statutes, how it is used and applied in
the eminent domain and special assessment contexts is textually
¶28 In the eminent domain statute, "special benefits" are
restricted to those local improvements that affect the market
value of the property13 for purposes of determining whether to
offset compensation to the owner of property taken for a planned
public improvement. If the improvement project necessitating
the taking does not affect the market value of the property,
then the City is not entitled to an offset for any special
benefits accruing to the property because of the planned
improvement. An assertion of "special benefits" in eminent
domain actions acts as an affirmative defense for the condemnor;
the governmental body has the burden of showing it is entitled
to an offset when property immediately increases or imminently
will increase in market value. Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d
650, 656-57, 130 N.W.2d 248 (1964); see also Molbreak v. Vill.
of Shorewood Hills, 66 Wis. 2d 687, 703, 225 N.W.2d 894 (1975)
("special benefits accruing to land not taken in eminent
domain . . . may be set off against damages if they enhance the
This court expanded the scope of special benefits to
include "imminent adaptability of the land to a higher and
better use from an economic standpoint because of proximity to
the public improvement." Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 650, 656,
130 N.W.2d 248 (1964). Concomitantly, this court also extended
the meaning of special benefits "to include enhanced value
because of more advantageous adaptability for use." Petkus v.
State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964).
market value immediately" (emphasis added) (citing Hietpas, 24
Wis. 2d at 656-57)).
¶29 The statutory qualification in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3)
links special benefits to an effect on the market value of the
property. When the property's market value remains unaffected
by the planned improvement, a particular taking may not require
an offset against compensation owed to the property owner.
Regardless, the improvement project may nevertheless confer
special benefits on the property owner within the meaning of
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) does not condition
special assessments on the conferral of special benefits
affecting the market value of the property. The work or
improvement must only provide an uncommon advantage specific to
that property. See Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶13-14; Goodger,
134 Wis. 2d at 352. Under § 66.0703(1)(a), "special benefits"
can include an increase in market value following the
improvement. Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 703. But the text does
¶31 CED argues that the word "shall" in Wis. Stat.
§ 32.09(3) is mandatory language requiring the City to consider
and use any special benefits to offset compensation to the
property owner in an eminent domain action; therefore, CED
argues, failing to raise special benefits in an eminent domain
action forecloses a municipality from later assessing the
property for special benefits purportedly conferred. This
argument ignores the narrowing of § 32.09(3)'s mandate to only
those special benefits affecting a property's market value. In
the absence of an immediate or imminent increase in a property's
fair market value triggered by the planned public improvement,
the municipality need not consider or use special benefits to
offset the value of property taken under § 32.09.14
¶32 In the eminent domain proceeding involving CED's
property, the City's expert witness testified that he did not
believe CED's property received any special benefits from the
CED asserted at oral argument before this court that the
City is judicially estopped from specially assessing CED for
"special benefits" because it conceded no special benefits arose
in the condemnation action. We disagree. Judicial estoppel
"precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent
position." State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817
(1996)(citations omitted). The doctrine is equitable in nature,
intended to protect the proceedings against "cold manipulation"
rather than "unthinking or confused blunder[s]." Id. (citations
omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he doctrine is only applied when the
positions taken by a party are truly inconsistent."
Id. at 350 n.5.
The City's position in each proceeding is not clearly
inconsistent. "Special benefits" in condemnation actions are
limited to immediate or imminent increases to a property's fair
market value. The City is not specially assessing CED on the
basis of an increase in the fair market value of CED's property.
If the City successfully establishes the conferral of special
benefits on CED's property, based on the asserted "substantial
increase[s] in accessibility, which includes safer, lower cost,
and shorter travel times for customers, deliveries and
employees," then the City may levy and collect a special
assessment upon CED's property, provided the other
prerequisites——the improvement is local and the special
assessment is reasonable——are met.
Q. Okay. In your appraisal here, did you find any
special benefits to the subject property?
Q. Okay. Are there any special benefits to the
property in this case?
This testimony does not resolve the issue of special benefits in
the context of a special assessment because the record is
unclear regarding whether the City's expert identified no
special benefits that affected the property's market value or if
he identified no special benefits whatsoever.
¶33 We conclude that "special benefits" has the same
meaning in each statute, but the failure to raise the issue of
necessarily preclude a municipality from levying and collecting
"special benefits" via a subsequent special assessment.
Notably, in an eminent domain action, only special benefits
accruing to the property that affect its market value because of
the planned improvement are required to be considered and used
to offset the value of the property taken. Wis. Stat.
§ 32.09(3). In contrast, special assessments upon property may
be levied and collected for special benefits conferred on the
property by the improvement, regardless of the impact on the
property's market value; Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 is silent on the
¶34 CED decries the inefficiency and burden of forcing
property owners to "endure" two proceedings; however, the remedy
lies not with the judiciary but with the legislature, which
produced the ostensible problem. Perhaps, as CED contends, the
legislature did not intend this result but this court does not
divine the legislature's intentions; it interprets what the
legislature actually enacted.
B. Prerequisites to Police Power Special Assessments
¶35 While the City's denial of special benefits in the
eminent domain action does not foreclose its assertion of
special benefits in a subsequent special assessment, the City
must satisfy certain requirements in order for its assessment to
be valid. In order for the City to exercise its police power 15
to levy a special assessment on property to pay for public
improvements, three requirements must be met: (1) the
improvement must be local rather than general; (2) the
improvement must confer special benefits on the property; and
(3) the assessment must be fair and equitable and in proportion
to the benefits accruing. First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶9
(citations omitted). These three requirements are
interdependent. If the improvement is deemed general, the
inquiry stops and the special assessment is not permissible. If
the improvement is local, the analysis shifts to whether the
property received special benefits. If not, the special
assessment is invalid. If special benefits are found, the
review moves to the assessment's reasonableness. Each
requirement is addressed in turn.
It is undisputed that the City exercised its police power
in imposing the special assessments to fund the improvement
1. Local versus general improvements
¶36 Because special assessments can be levied only for
local improvements, the character of the improvement must first
be determined before the propriety of the assessment is
considered. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶9. A public improvement
is general in character if it "confers a substantially equal
benefit and advantage on the property of the whole community or
benefits the public at large." Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview
Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).
Typically, general improvements are "financed by general taxes."
Id. Because a general improvement benefits the whole community,
it may naturally provide a benefit of some degree to the
affected property. In contrast, although a local improvement
"may incidentally benefit all the property in the municipality
and the public at large" it "is made primarily for the
accommodation and convenience of inhabitants of a particular
area in the community whose property receives a special benefit
from the improvement." Id. (emphasis added). "The fact that an
improvement confers a general benefit on the community does not
mean that certain property cannot benefit specially." Molbreak,
66 Wis. 2d at 699 (first citing Brock v. Lemke, 455 P.2d 1, 3
(1969); then citing 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corps. § 1314) (special
assessment); see also Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 829
("special benefit . . . accrues to a property owner in addition
to the benefit enjoyed by other property owners in the
community").
¶37 Because special assessments can be levied only "for
local improvements . . . the circuit court must examine whether
the improvement was local, that is, whether the purpose was to
accommodate particular property owners and confer a special
benefit." Park Ave. Plaza v. City of Mequon, 2008 WI App 39,
¶20, 308 Wis. 2d 439, 747 N.W.2d 703 (citations omitted). In
order to be considered local rather than general, the special
benefit must also have "the effect of furnishing an uncommon
advantage to a property differing in kind, rather than in
degree, from the benefits enjoyed by the general public." Id.,
¶17 (citations omitted); Genrich, 263 Wis. 2d 233, ¶14; Petkus
v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964). This
concept dates back to 1851, when this court held that "common
advantages to the neighborhood were not chargeable as
benefits . . . but only such as were peculiar to [the particular
parcel]." Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 826 (citing Milwaukee &
Miss. R.R. v. Eble, 3 Pin. 334, 358 (1851)). The test is
whether the property upon which the special assessment is levied
"has gained a benefit not shared by any other parcel." Id. at
¶38 If an improvement is local in character, the next
consideration is whether the improvement conferred special
benefits on the subject property. Section III.A comprehensively
examines the meaning of "special benefits." Additionally, we
note that "a benefit could accrue without any actual use of the
improvement." Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 701. Commercial property
may receive special benefits from improved traffic safety and
aesthetic improvements to an adjacent public road. Id. at 699.
Finally, "the benefits necessary to sustain a special assessment
'must be substantial, certain, and capable of being realized
within a reasonable time.'" Wm. H. Heinemann Creameries, Inc.
v. Vill. of Kewaskum, 275 Wis. 636, 641, 82 N.W.2d 902
(1957)(citation omitted).
¶39 We also address CED's argument that this court
incorrectly expanded "special benefits" to mean not only an
improvement, but also to encompass a "service." Duncan, 22
Wis. 2d at 264 (first citing 14 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations § 38.11 (3d ed.); then citing 48 Am. Jur. 2d
Special or Local Assessments § 1 (1964)). The expansion of
"special benefits" in Duncan ostensibly to include services was
repeated but not applied by the court of appeals in Genrich, 268
Wis. 2d 233, ¶13, and First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20
("[a]n uncommon advantage will either increase services to
property or enhance its value"). Notably, Duncan involved an
assessment based on enhanced value of the property as a result
of the improvement. 22 Wis. 2d at 268.
¶40 Accepting CED's argument could require us to overrule
Duncan, a step we need not analyze.16 While it is questionable
whether services constitute "special benefits" for which a
Because a roundabout is unquestionably an improvement and
not a service, we defer a thorough analysis of Duncan
Development Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary District, 22
Wis. 2d 258, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).
special assessment potentially could be levied,17 the issue is
irrelevant in this case because a roundabout is an improvement,
not a service. "Service" as defined in § 66.0627(1)(c)
snow and ice removal, weed elimination, street
sprinkling, oiling and tarring, repair of sidewalks or
curb and gutter, garbage and refuse disposal,
recycling, storm water management, including
construction of storm water management facilities,
tree care, removal and disposition of dead animals
under s. 60.23 (20), loan repayment under s. 70.57 (4)
(b), soil conservation work under s. 92.115, and snow
removal under s. 86.105.
Construction of a roundabout is not mentioned in the statutory
definition of services and nothing in the list of services is
analogous to a roundabout. While use of the word "includes"
indicates that what follows are examples rather than an
Under Wis. Stat. § 66.0627(2), a municipality "may impose
a special charge against real property for current services
rendered . . . ." Section 66.0627(1)(c) defines "service." In
contrast, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 governs the levying and
collection of "special assessments" for "special benefits"
conferred on property by an improvement. Because special
charges are imposed for services, whereas special assessments
are levied and collected for improvements, the legislature
regards services and improvements as distinct things subjecting
property owners to different taxes: charges for services and
assessments for improvements.
exhaustive list,18 the associated-words canon instructs that
associated words bear on one another's meaning. Brown v. Chi. &
N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 156, 78 N.W. 771 (1899) ("You may
know the meaning of a term by its associates,——what precedes and
what follows it. When? Not in every case; but when not
apparent from the language itself."); Scalia & Garner,
supra ¶24, at 195. The statutory examples of "services" have in
common the removal or rectification of temporary but recurring
occurrences, such as snow, weeds, and dead animals, along with
repair of sidewalks, curbs, or gutters——but not the construction
of a permanent structure like a roundabout.19 Contrary to the
City's characterization, infrastructure is not a service.
"The verb to include introduces examples, not an
exhaustive list." Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 132; State
v. James P., 2005 WI 80, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698, 698 N.W.2d
95, 102 (quoting Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v.
DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶17 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612)
("'Generally, the word "includes" is to be given an expansive
meaning, indicating that which follows is but a part of the
whole.' While courts may sometimes read the word 'includes' as
a term of limitation or enumeration under the doctrine of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there must be some
textual evidence that the legislature intended this doctrine to
The reconstruction of the intersection included the
replacement and repair of sidewalks: According to the report of
the Public Works Director and City Manager, "[d]efective
sidewalks section include those with open cracks, offset joints
or other defects that create a hazard to those using the
sidewalk. Removal of the hazards provides a safe corridor for
pedestrians to access the site." "[R]epair of sidewalks" is
specifically enumerated as a service for which the City may
impose a special charge on real property under Wis. Stat. §
66.0627(2).
Improved infrastructure may facilitate the delivery of services
to a property but it is not, in and of itself, a service.
¶41 The third prerequisite to the exercise of the police
power to levy a special assessment requires a reasonable basis
for the assessment. An assessment made under the police power
is not limited to the value of the benefits conferred on the
property but must be made on a reasonable basis. Steinbach v.
Green Lake Sanitary Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶13, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715
N.W.2d 195. Reasonableness in this context requires (1)
uniformity——the assessment must be fairly and equitably
apportioned among all affected properties; and (2) uniqueness——
the assessment on a particular property must be in proportion to
the benefits conferred. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶20-21.
¶42 Multiple methods may be used to achieve uniformity.
Id., ¶21. The City's selected method must be fair and equitable
and produce an assessment in proportion to the benefits accruing
to the property. Berkvam v. City of Glendale, 79 Wis. 2d 279,
287, 255 N.W.2d 521 (1977). In examining uniqueness, the
circuit court must consider the degree, effect, and consequences
of the special benefits. Id. "Whether the facts relating to a
special assessment made pursuant to the police power fulfill the
'reasonableness' standard is a question of law . . . ."
Steinbach, 291 Wis. 2d 11, ¶11. A special assessment in
substantial excess of special benefits accruing to the property
is an unlawful taking without compensation. Wm. H. Heinemann
Creameries, 275 Wis. at 640-41 (citing Vill. of Norwood v.
Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898)).
C. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Regarding the
Validity of the Special Assessment Levied on CED's Property.
¶43 Having set forth the law governing the validity of
assessments, we now apply it to the City's assessment of CED's
property. CED argues the court of appeals erred in affirming
the circuit court's grant of summary judgment because CED
presented sufficient evidence demonstrating disputed issues of
material fact. The City responds that CED failed to overcome
the presumption of correctness and therefore summary judgment
was proper. In the case of a special assessment appeal, "where
the assessing body did consider what property would be benefited
by the improvement and assessed according to the amount of the
benefit . . . in the absence of evidence to the contrary there
is a conclusive presumption that the assessment was on the basis
of benefits actually accrued." Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 696
(emphasis added) (first citing Hennessy v. Douglas Cty., 99 Wis.
129, 139, 74 N.W. 983 (1898); then citing Friedrich v.
Milwaukee, 118 Wis. 254, 256, 95 N.W. 126 (1903)). To overcome
this presumption on appeal to the circuit court,
the burden is on the objector to show either that:
(1) The statutory procedure was not followed, or
(2) that the assessment was not based on benefits, or
(3) that the assessing authority did not view the
premises to make such a determination, or (4) for the
objector to produce competent evidence that the
assessment is in error.
Id. Significantly, the presumption of correctness exists only
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Molbreak, 66
Wis. 2d at 696.
¶44 CED contends the affidavit of its expert witness,
James C. Johnson, raises genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether the improvement plan was general or local,
whether the project conferred special benefits on CED's
property, and whether the assessment was reasonable. The City
dismisses the Johnson affidavit as insufficient to overcome the
presumption of correctness and asserts this matter is controlled
by Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, in which the court of
appeals upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City
because the new road project resulted in increased traffic flow.
We hold that CED overcame any presumption of correctness and
presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether the improvement was general or
local and whether the project conferred special benefits on
CED's property. Resolution of these issues will determine
whether the circuit court reaches the reasonableness of the
assessment on remand.
¶45 With respect to the first issue, the City's Initial
Resolution Declaring Intent to Reassess CED's property declares
"[t]he purpose of the project is to reduce congestion at the
intersection, increase traffic safety, renew utilities and
enhance aesthetics." Generally, the City identifies the
sidewalk replacement and repair, concrete paving, new and re-
laid sewer laterals, concrete driveway approaches, and
streetscape/landscape improvements as providing local and
specific benefits to CED's property. The City also points to
the improved traffic flow, a substantial increase in
accessibility, and reduced congestion as local and specific
¶46 In response, CED generally argues the roundabout was
constructed not to benefit nearby businesses, but for the
primary purpose of benefiting the traveling public.
Specifically, CED proffers Johnson's affidavit as evidence
contradicting the City's assertion of local benefits. In his
affidavit, Johnson denies the purpose of the roundabout was
local, points to a decreased value of CED's property as a result
of its construction, and opines that the project did not improve
the convenience of CED's property or its customers, noting the
safety issues created by the reconfiguration of the
intersection. CED also points to evidence indicating that
increased accessibility was not an effect of the reconstruction
project, citing testimony in the affidavit of the City's
Assistant Director of Public Works/City Engineer that "[t]he CED
property has the exact same access after completion of the
project as it did prior to the project. The driveway access is
in the same location. The driveway access has the same
¶47 "[T]he inquiry into the nature of an improvement"——
that is, whether a special benefit is local or general——
"presents a question of fact." Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶2.
"What may be called a local improvement under one set of facts
may well constitute a general improvement in the context of
different facts." Duncan, 22 Wis. 2d at 265. On remand the
finder of fact must determine whether the purpose was to
accommodate CED's property in particular, along with the other
property owners, with the effect of conferring special benefits
on CED's property.
¶48 Whether a special benefit has been conferred is also a
question of fact. First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20
(citing Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, ¶20). "Summary
judgment is improper if specific facts could support a finding
by a reasonable jury that a special benefit does not exist."
Id. In this case, the testimony of the City's expert witness
during the eminent domain proceeding regarding the absence of
special benefits, coupled with the comparable testimony of CED's
expert witness, who opined that "[t]here is absolutely no
benefit to [CED's property] let alone a special benefit" from
the improvement, contradict the City's position in the special
assessment proceeding. The existence or absence of a special
benefit presents a question for the factfinder to decide.
Hietpas, 24 Wis. 2d at 656.
¶49 Here, Johnson's affidavit contains evidence
contradicting the City's position; he insists the property
received no special benefits whatsoever. Johnson's affidavit
and appraisal assert that the placement of the roundabout
actually impairs rather than benefits CED's property for a
variety of reasons, including reduced congestion discouraging
impulse stops at fast food restaurants, the removal of
landscaping that obscured drive-thru traffic for diners inside,
and the lack of direct access to the property for traffic coming
from three directions, potentially causing unsafe lane changes
to access it. Johnson opines that the roundabout's construction
overall reduced the value of CED's property. The City disagrees
with Johnson's assessment and points out that the roundabout
improved traffic flow through the area, improved existing
sidewalks and landscaping, and made the area safer. In his
affidavit, Johnson refutes the notion that the landscaping on
the central island of the roundabout increases the value of
CED's property, noting that CED possesses no property rights in
landscaping, which could be changed at any time.
¶50 Johnson's affidavit "cuts to the heart of the matter
and creates a genuine issue of material fact" rendering summary
judgment inappropriate. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶17. A
reasonable jury could find that CED's property received no
benefits at all from the reconfigured intersection or it could
find that CED received the exact same benefits as the public at
large. Park Ave. Plaza is distinguishable because the property
owner presented "nothing to rebut the City's conclusion that
commercial properties received special benefits." Id., ¶26.
Here, CED presented Johnson's evidentiary affidavit. Because
disputed issues of material fact must be resolved by the
factfinder, summary judgment was improper.
¶51 Additionally, CED contends that the assessment imposed
upon it was unreasonable because it was unfairly and inequitably
apportioned among similarly situated property owners. CED's
$40,103.03 assessment was twice as much as any other assessment.
The City responds that it performed a "per lineal foot"
assessment and justifies the higher assessment on CED's property
because it sits on the corner. Accordingly, it has footage on
both Murdock and Jackson Streets. While the reasonableness of
the assessment presents a question of law, the analysis depends
upon resolution of the first two issues. Because
"'[r]easonableness' turns on the totality of the facts and
circumstances" this issue "is not easily disposed of on summary
judgment." Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 122
n.3, 334 N.W.2d 580 (1983) (citation omitted). In this case,
the issue of reasonableness cannot be disposed of on summary
judgment because issues of fact related to the character of the
improvement and whether it conferred any special benefits on
CED's property must first be resolved. Specifically, the trier
of fact must determine what, if any, benefits CED's property
received in order to determine if the assessment is
proportionate to those benefits compared with the benefits
accruing to all benefited properties. Steinbach, 291
Wis. 2d 11, ¶20.
¶52 The term "special benefits" means the same in both the
eminent domain statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), and the special
assessments statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a): "uncommon
advantage." Under § 32.09(3), only those special benefits that
affect the market value of a property because of a planned
improvement must be considered and used to offset the
compensation owed to the owner of property taken for the
improvement. Section 66.0703(1) permits a municipality to levy
and collect a special assessment upon property for special
benefits conferred upon the property by an improvement,
regardless of the improvement's effect on the property's market
value. Because of this distinction, a governmental body's
failure to raise special benefits in the eminent domain action
does not foreclose its ability to levy and collect a special
assessment upon a property for special benefits conferred.
¶53 The circuit court improperly entered summary judgment
in the City's favor in light of CED's submission of evidence
challenging the validity of the special assessment, which showed
a genuine dispute regarding whether the improvement plan was
general or local and whether the project conferred special
benefits on CED. Each of these issues must be decided by the
trier of fact. If the factfinder on remand finds the
improvement was local and conferred a special benefit on CED's
property, the circuit court will then determine whether the
assessment was reasonable as a matter of law.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
No. 2016AP474.ssa
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). The court
of appeals got it right. The majority errs.
¶55 I write separately to make two points.
¶56 First, the court of appeals (correctly) made clear
that although "'[s]pecial benefits' in the eminent domain
context and the special assessment context [are] similar in
definition, they are distinct and different considerations under
distinct and different governmental actions."1 The majority
recognizes that unlike in condemnation proceedings, "special
benefits" in eminent domain proceedings must affect the market
value of the property. Majority op., ¶33.
¶57 Second, the majority stumbles by failing to
acknowledge that CED has not overcome the presumption of
correctness of the City's actions and has not established a
genuine issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment.
¶58 I agree with Chief Judge Lisa Neubauer, who emphasized
these points in her concurrence in the court of appeals: "[CED]
has failed to show by 'strong . . . clear and positive proof'
that the $20,000 special assessments are not reasonable——given
that it is undisputed that improvements to the sidewalks, curb
and gutters, etc. have been made——and the reasonableness
analysis requires only that CED's property be 'benefited to some
extent' and that the amount of the assessment can exceed the
value of the special benefits."2
CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474,
unpublished slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017).
CED Props., unpublished slip op., ¶29.
¶59 The City is entitled to summary judgment.
¶60 For these reasons, I dissent.
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion.
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