Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19900627_0000028.NNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-24 05:25:04
Document Index: 497604018

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 621', '§ 290', '§ 1961', '§\n297', '§ 298', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 1962']

| WANAMAKER v. COLUMBIAN ROPE CO.
GILES A. WANAMAKER, PLAINTIFF,v.COLUMBIAN ROPE COMPANY, GEORGE T. METCALF AND RICHARD W. COOK, D. BARTON CHAPMAN, TRISTAN E. BEPLAT, ROBERT W. SEIDLER, STEPHEN G. LUDT, S. WARREN METCALF, HANCOCK & ESTABROOK, DEFENDANTS.
The plaintiff, Giles Wanamaker, has filed a second amended
complaint by leave of the court in which he alleges that he was
terminated from his employment by the defendants in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq. ("ADEA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law,
N YExec.Law § 290 et seq. ("HRL"). Plaintiff also alleges that
the defendants violated sections of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 ("RICO"),
by deceiving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and other federal and state authorities, undermining
federal and state laws designed to protect the public interest,
and illegally causing the forced termination and/or early
retirement of, and retaliation against, several employees in a
class protected by the ADEA and HRL, through a pattern of
racketeering activity. Plaintiff further alleges pendent
state-law claims based in breach of contract, inducement of
breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional
The defendants move for dismissal of all the claims in the
complaint, except the ADEA claim against the defendant
Columbian Rope Company. In addition, the defendants move for
reconsideration of this court's prior decision that plaintiff's
filing of an administrative complaint with the EEOC but not
with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR")
constituted compliance with the administrative filing
requirements of the ADEA, but was not an election of remedies
under the HRL. In the alternative, defendants move for
certification of the administrative filing question for
interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Defendants also urge the court to decline to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over plaintiff's state HRL claim if the court does
not reverse its prior decision on the issue. The court heard
oral argument on these motions on May 22, 1990.
The factual background for this proceeding is gleaned from
In April 1973, the plaintiff, a practicing attorney in New
York City, was contacted by a personnel search agent who
informed him of a "career position" as in-house counsel
available at the defendant Columbian Rope Company ("CRC") in
Auburn, New York. In May 1973, the plaintiff met with Paul
George, then a member of CRC's board of directors and CRC's
legal counsel, to discuss the position. According to the
complaint, George, who is not a defendant in this action, told
the plaintiff that the person in the new position would perform
George's functions upon his retirement the following year, and
would eventually become general counsel and secretary to CRC.
Over the next several months, the plaintiff met or spoke with
several representatives from CRC, including the president and
other officers and directors, to discuss the position.
Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly informed the CRC
representatives that it was important to him that he obtain a
permanent "career position," and that they assured him it would
be. On or about February 19, 1974, plaintiff was formally
offered the position by then-president of CRC, Legare Hole.
None of the terms or conditions of plaintiff's employment were
put in writing, except for a job description, and an agreement
that CRC would provide six months salary to the plaintiff if he
was terminated for cause. Plaintiff alleges, however, that
among the conditions orally agreed to was that his employment
was a "permanent career position" that could be terminated only
for cause. None of the CRC representatives whom plaintiff
alleges he met or spoke with during this time, including Hole,
are named as defendants in this action.
Plaintiff began his employment at CRC as "corporate counsel"
on or about March 1, 1974. Approximately two months later,
plaintiff was elected assistant secretary and then secretary
and general counsel for CRC, positions he held until his
termination. In July 1982, plaintiff, in his role as general
counsel, interviewed defendant Richard W. Cook, a partner at
the law firm Hancock and Estabrook, also a defendant in this
action, as possible outside counsel should CRC, which was
experiencing financial difficulties at that time, seek relief
and/or reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. In August
1982, CRC retained
Cook as outside counsel upon plaintiff's recommendation.
Some time in 1984, Cook began performing personal legal work
for the president of CRC, defendant George R. Metcalf, in
addition to Cook's duties as CRC's outside bankruptcy counsel.
Then on or about January 16, 1985, Cook was named as a member
of CRC's board of directors, despite a legal memorandum
circulated by the plaintiff recommending against electing Cook
a director because of an appearance, in the plaintiff's
opinion, of a conflict of interest. About this time, according
to the plaintiff, began a scheme orchestrated by the defendants
to terminate him unlawfully because of his age.
Plaintiff alleges that directors and officers, including
defendants George Metcalf, D. Barton Chapman, Tristan E.
Beplat, Robert W. Seidler, and S. Warren Metcalf, frequently
spoke of the need for "new blood" and "young blood" within CRC
and its subsidiaries. Plaintiff also alleges that during the
period from 1982 to 1986, employees protected by the ADEA (over
40 years of age) were the subject of more than 80 percent of
the "forced early retirements or abolished positions" at
CRC.*fn1 During the years 1985 and 1986, plaintiff claims,
defendant Cook and other partners in defendant Hancock and
Estabrook engaged in repeated criticism of him with respect to
his age, professional competence, and management of outside
In telephone conversations during the month of October 1986
with other CRC officers and directors, including defendants
Beplat, Chapman, and George Metcalf, defendant Cook proposed
that he assume all of plaintiff's duties as counsel and
secretary at CRC, with the option of redelegating some of the
legal work to other partners at defendant Hancock and
Estabrook. Ultimately, all of CRC's directors conducted an
informal breakfast meeting on the morning of October 30, 1986,
at which they decided to terminate the plaintiff's employment
as of June 30, 1987, and turn over all corporate legal matters
to defendant Cook. At that time, Cook was 37 years of age. By
January 1987, Cook had resigned as a director of CRC, but had
assumed many of plaintiff's legal functions.
On or about March 2, 1987, plaintiff presented a memorandum
to the board of directors, requesting a review of the decision
to terminate him, and pointing out that he believed that by
terminating him and replacing him with a younger person (Cook),
they were in violation of the ADEA and HRL. At a regularly
scheduled board meeting on March 5, 1987, attended by the
plaintiff and defendants George Metcalf, Chapman, Stephen G.
Ludt, Beplat, Seidler and Cook, plaintiff again requested
reconsideration of the decision to terminate him. The directors
also questioned plaintiff about whether he intended to pursue
legal remedies for his termination, and implied that
forbearance from legal recourse might be a condition of relief
or other benefits. Plaintiff's answers to those questions are
not apparent in the complaint. Nevertheless, following the
conclusion of the meeting, plaintiff was handed a memorandum
drafted by defendant Cook and signed by defendant George
Metcalf terminating plaintiff immediately and instructing him
to vacate his office. Plaintiff was paid his regular salary
through the end of June 1987.
Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the EEOC on or
about August 26, 1987, alleging discrimination on the basis of
age, and retaliation. Plaintiff typed the following request at
the top of the charge form:
Please do not file with the NYS Div. of Human
Rights per discussions 8/24/87.
On or about September 3, 1987, a copy of the charge form was
stamped as received from the EEOC by the NYSDHR. At the time
plaintiff filed his charge, a "worksharing agreement" was in
effect between the EEOC and the NYSDHR, which provided in part
EEOC will refer to the FEP agency [NYSDHR] copies
of all ADEA co-jurisdictional
charges (verified complaints) received by EEOC.
Such referrals will be made in order to protect
the private action rights of charging parties
under ADEA and accepted by the FEP agency
[NYSDHR] as a verified complaint. The FEP agency
[NYSDHR] will notify complainant in writing that
the investigation of the complaint will be made
by the EEOC and the FEP agency [NYSDHR] will base
its determination on the facts elicited by the
The EEOC's regional director issued a determination on
October 28, 1988, that the evidence did not establish that
plaintiff's discharge was a violation of the ADEA, but that
plaintiff's removal from his positions in March 1987 did
constitute retaliation. The determination was upheld by the
EEOC on appeal. Efforts were apparently made by the EEOC to
settle the retaliation charge, which proved unsuccessful. The
EEOC has closed its file in the matter.
The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action in this court
against CRC, George Metcalf, and Cook, alleging, inter alia,
that his employment was terminated in violation of the ADEA and
the HRL. Those defendants subsequently moved to dismiss
plaintiff's claims on a number of grounds, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This court issued a comprehensive
memorandum-decision and order dated May 17, 1989, ruling upon
the various aspects of defendants' motion. The court dismissed
the claims against defendants Metcalf and Cook, leaving CRC as
the only defendant. The court denied defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiff's ADEA claims for failure to commence
administrative proceedings with the NYSDHR, as required under
the ADEA. The court found that the forwarding by the EEOC to
the NYSDHR of plaintiff's complaint constituted commencement of
a state administrative proceeding for the purposes of the ADEA
administrative filing requirements, but did not constitute a
filing for the purposes of the election of remedy provisions of
the HRL, under which the complainant is required to choose at
the outset whether to commence an administrative proceeding or
to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction
claiming a violation of the HRL. If a complainant files an
administrative complaint with the NYSDHR, he or she can then
commence a court action only if the complaint is dismissed by
the NYSDHR for "administrative convenience." N.Y. Exec.Law §
297(9).
On October 26, 1989, the NYSDHR issued a determination
dismissing plaintiff's charge on the ground of administrative
convenience. Defendant CRC then commenced a special proceeding
in New York State Supreme Court pursuant to N.Y. Exec.Law
§ 298 challenging the dismissal and requesting that the matter
be remanded to the NYSDHR for further investigation and
determination. CRC contended that it is impermissible for the
NYSDHR to dismiss a charge for administrative convenience when
the sole basis is to allow the complainant to prosecute a
federal court action that has already been commenced. CRC's
petition was dismissed by the New York State Supreme Court by
order dated April 11, 1990.
Plaintiff has now submitted to this court a corrected second
amended complaint by leave of the court granted December 12,
1989. The complaint names as defendants CRC, and the following
individuals and entities: George R. Metcalf, Richard W. Cook,
D. Barton Chapman, Tristan E. Beplat, Robert W. Seidler,
Stephen G. Ludt, S. Warren Metcalf, and the law firm of
Hancock and Estabrook. The complaint asserts eight separate
causes of action, as follow: (1) a claim of willful violation
of the ADEA and the HRL based upon plaintiff's loss of
employment; (2) a claim of retaliation, based upon CRC's
removal of plaintiff from his positions in March 1987, in
violation of the ADEA and HRL; (3) a claim for breach of an
alleged oral contract between plaintiff and CRC for a
permanent career position from which the plaintiff could only
be removed for cause; (4) a claim against defendants George
Metcalf, Cook and Hancock and Estabrook for allegedly inducing
the breach of plaintiff's employment contract; (5) a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) a claim
under RICO, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b);
a RICO claim alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c);
and a RICO claim alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
The defendants move for dismissal of all of the above claims
with the exception of the ADEA claim against CRC. The
defendants also seek reconsideration of the court's previous
determination that plaintiff's filing with the EEOC met the
administrative filing requirements of the ADEA, but did not
constitute an election of remedies that would preclude the
plaintiff from pursuing his HRL claims in court. In the
alternative, defendants move for certification of the
following question for interlocutory review by the Second
Does the filing of an administrative complaint
(EEOC) in New York, which is a deferral state,
with a specific request to the EEOC not to file
the charge with the New York State Division of
Human Rights (NYSDHR) where the charge is
forwarded by the EEOC to that state agency
pursuant to a worksharing agreement but not acted
upon in any fashion, satisfy the administrative
filing requirements of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and yet not constitute a
filing with the NYSDHR for the purposes of the
election of remedies pursuant to the N.Y. Human
The defendants also urge the court not to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over plaintiff's HRL claims if the court decides
not to reverse its prior decision. These arguments will be
addressed by the court seriatim.
The standards for considering a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) are well-settled. The motion is
addressed to the face of the complaint, and the court must
construe the complaint's allegations in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accept the well-pleaded
allegations as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94
S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A claim will be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts supporting his
legal claim which will ...