Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/591/29/369232/
Timestamp: 2019-11-16 02:35:15
Document Index: 473118529

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', 'art, 171', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 437', '§ 1254', '§ 437']

Bread Political Action Committee et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Federal Election Commission et al., Defendants-appellees, 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1979 › Bread Political Action Committee et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Federal Election Commission et al...
Bread Political Action Committee et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Federal Election Commission et al., Defendants-appellees, 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979) Argued Nov. 8, 1978. Decided Jan. 12, 1979
Under § 437g, either the Commission3 or an individual4 may bring a civil action in a district court to enforce the Act. The decision in such an action may be appealed to the court of appeals, but will only be reviewed by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.5 Under § 437g(a) (11), an enforcement action must be advanced on the calendar of each court ahead of all other cases, save those filed under § 437h. Since challenges to the Act could be raised as defenses in such an enforcement proceeding, § 437g provides an alternative method for obtaining judicial review of the Act. Such defensive challenges to the Act could be on either constitutional or non-constitutional grounds. And since the entire enforcement proceeding would be advanced on the calendar of each court hearing the matter, both constitutional and non-constitutional challenges raised as defenses would receive this partially expedited review.
In contrast, § 437h provides that an action brought expressly to challenge the Act on constitutional grounds should receive the even more expedited review outlined in that section and that such actions may be taken to the Supreme Court by direct appeal. And § 437g(a) (11) makes it clear that Congress intended § 437h actions to take precedence even over enforcement proceedings.
There is no indication in the language of the statute of any intent to exclude any plaintiffs who have standing under traditional rules. In our view, Congress intended to expand the limits of standing under § 437h to the extent possible under Article III. This intent is wholly consistent with the expressed purposes of the statute. Under this view, Congress' purpose for naming the three types of plaintiffs found in subsection (a) was to insure, within constitutional limits, their standing to raise constitutional challenges to the Act. Congress may well have entertained doubts about the standing of the specified plaintiffs to challenge many of the Act's provisions.6 And Congress apparently thought that it was important that those plaintiffs, in addition to others with obvious personal interest in the restrictions imposed by the Act,7 be allowed to test the constitutionality of the Act. Each of the specified plaintiffs has a generalized interest in the operation of the entire Act, which may not have provided standing under the prudential rules of the federal courts, See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975), but which Congress may have deemed sufficiently important, due to the central role of each specified plaintiff in the election process, to justify a Congressional grant of standing.8 Warth v. Seldin, id. at 501.
The sparse legislative history of § 437h adds little to the analysis of its purpose.9 As to case law, the decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) Aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821 (1975), strongly support our construction of § 437h. In Buckley, the original plaintiffs included four individuals and the following organizations: the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency McCarthy '76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc. It is clear that few, if any, of these organizations could be classified as the "national committee of any political party" so as to fit within the specified groups in § 437h. The district court in Buckley, in certifying the case to the court of appeals, impliedly read § 437h as the district court here did, as an exclusive grant of standing to the parties specified. The Buckley court held that the four individual plaintiffs had standing and explicitly left to the court of appeals the question of the standing of the organizational plaintiffs.10
424 U.S. at 11-12, 96 S. Ct. at 631. Footnote 10 from the quoted part of the opinion stated in part: "This Court has held, for instance, that an organization 'may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be protected from compelled disclosure . . . of their affiliation.' NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958). . . ." We cannot read the quoted language as other than a clear holding that Congress intended to expand traditional notions of standing to the limits of Article III. And footnote 10 makes it clear that organizations may have standing under § 437h if they otherwise meet the requirements for "associational standing." See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).12
(a) (1) Any person who believes a violation of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26 has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission. . . .
(3) (A) Any investigation and paragraph (2) shall be conducted expeditiously and shall include an investigation, conducted in accordance with the provisions of this section, of reports and statements filed by any complainant under this subchapter, if such complainant is a candidate. . . .
(9) (A) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party under paragraph (1), or by a failure on the part of the Commission to act on such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this section within 90 days after the filing of such complaint, may file a petition with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (5) (B)
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (9)
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (10). Subdivision (10) also provides for review by the Supreme Court by the certification procedure of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3)
At oral argument, counsel for both sides agreed that without their enumeration in § 437h(a), serious questions could be raised about the standing of each of the specified plaintiffs. The standing of the Commission to challenge the constitutional validity of the statute it was created to enforce may have been doubted on the basis of conflicting case law. Older cases held that an agency or officer has no standing in the federal courts to challenge the statute the agency or officer is bound to enforce. Columbus & Greenville R. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 51 S. Ct. 392, 75 L. Ed. 861 (1931); Stewart v. City of Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 36 S. Ct. 15, 60 L. Ed. 120 (1915); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 34 S. Ct. 92, 58 L. Ed. 206 (1913); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 28 S. Ct. 275, 52 L. Ed. 450 (1908); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 51, 48 L. Ed. 125 (1903). See also Akron Bd. of Ed. v. Bd. of Ed. of Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1296 (6th Cir. 1974) (Weick, J., dissenting). The authority of these cases is now questionable, although they have not been overruled. See Bd. of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5, 88 S. Ct. 1923, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1968); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 933 (2nd Cir. 1973); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100 (2nd Cir. 1973). See generally Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 182 (2d ed. 1973)
Congressional doubts about the standing of political parties and voters may have been based on the fact that challenges to much of the Act by such plaintiffs might be viewed as asserting either "a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens" or the rights of third parties. Such a view might lead to a finding of no standing under prudential rules. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975).
Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 142 n.14 (D.D.C. 1975).