Source: http://voiceforvictims.org/fixed%20cases/State%20v%20Gonzales.htm
Timestamp: 2018-08-16 03:56:54
Document Index: 179863872

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', 'art. 2', '§ 2', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', 'art. 2', '§ 2', '§ 13', '§ 13']

(Cite as: 181 Ariz. 502, 892 P.2d 838)
Ernest Gonzales was found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, theft, armed robbery, and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to death on the murder conviction and to prison terms on the noncapital convictions. Appeal to this court is automatic. See Rules 26.15 and 31.2(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P; A.R.S. § 13-4031. We affirm.
1. Was the murder committed for pecuniary gain? A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5).
2. Did Gonzales knowingly create a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense? A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3).
[23] Relying on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (a state must provide an indigent defendant a psychiatrist where the defendant's sanity is a significant factor at trial), Gonzales argues that he was denied due process when the trial court refused to appoint him serology, fingerprinting, and identification experts for the second trial. The state argues that Ake applies only to cases in which sanity is at issue and that this case is governed by A.R.S. § 13-4013(B), which entitles indigent defendants in capital cases to experts that "are reasonably necessary" to adequately present a defense. Both Ake and the statute, however, require the same threshold showing of "reasonable necessity." State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 139, 800 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1987).
[27] Gonzales argues that Deborah's presence in the courtroom during jury selection and her possible presence during trial after she testified prejudiced him and denied him the right to a fair trial. This argument is without merit. Deborah had a constitutional right to attend all criminal proceedings that Gonzales had the right to attend. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(3); Rule 9.3(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P. Deborah, on her own initiative, attended jury selection. She sat in the back row of the courtroom, and neither the court nor counsel knew she was there until several days later. Nor is there any evidence that prospective jurors noticed Deborah or knew who she was during jury selection. Gonzales has not shown that Deborah's presence during jury selection was prejudicial. There is no evidence that Deborah intended to or did remain in the courtroom after she testified, and therefore we consider the matter no further. State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 574, 592 P.2d 768, 770 (1979).
[31][32][33] The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating circumstances contained in A.R.S. § 13-703(F). State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 369, 857 P.2d 1212, 1223 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1058, 114 S.Ct. 724, 126 L.Ed.2d 688 (1994). The defendant must prove the existence of statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 373, 857 P.2d at 1227. The court must impose a death sentence if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-703(E). In all death penalty cases we independently review the record and facts establishing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether the former outweigh the latter. State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 68, 881 P.2d 1158, 1173 (1994). We must ensure that the Arizona capital sentencing scheme "genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993).
Following an aggravation/mitigation hearing, the court returned a special verdict pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(D). It found two aggravating circumstances: (1) that in the commission of the offense Gonzales knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense, and (2) that Gonzales committed murder in expectation of pecuniary gain. See A.R.S. §§ 13-703(F)(3) and (F)(5). Finding no mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, the court sentenced Gonzales to death. Gonzales challenges each of the statutory aggravators.
To prove the A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) aggravating factor, the state must show that a motivation for the murder was the expectation of pecuniary gain. State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 551, 804 P.2d 72, 84 (1990). We have held that when the defendant kills to facilitate his escape and to permit him to take and keep stolen items, he furthers his pecuniary gain motive. Id. The Wagners interrupted Gonzales during the burglary of their home. Gonzales was there to steal from them. "[H]e expected pecuniary gain and this expectation tainted all of his other conduct." Id. (interrupted burglary); see, e.g., State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 65, 859 P.2d 169, 175 (interrupted burglary), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1015, 114 S.Ct. 609, 126 L.Ed.2d 574 (1993).
[35] The trial court also found that Gonzales knowingly created a grave risk of death **850 *514 to another person (Deborah Wagner) in addition to the victim of the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3). The court determined that Deborah was "within the zone of danger during the time [Gonzales] was stabbing Darrel Wagner, and quite aside from that time in which [Gonzales] was deliberately and independently stabbing Deborah Wagner." Special Verdict at 1. We agree with the trial court that Gonzales knowingly placed Deborah in grave risk of death even before turning his weapon on her.
We reject Gonzales's argument that § 13-703(F)(3) does not apply because Deborah was an "intended victim" of the offense. For Deborah to have been an intended victim, as contemplated by our cases, Gonzales must have acted with the intent to kill her. See, e.g., Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 550, 804 P.2d at 83 ("Fierro's acquittal on the charge of attempted murder establishes that Manross was not an intended victim of the shooting"). Moreover, the intent to kill must have been formed before Deborah was placed in grave risk of death. Gonzales argues that Deborah became an intended victim the moment she jumped on his back. But Deborah was placed in grave risk before she jumped on his back. Thus, even if Gonzales stabbed Deborah with the intent to kill her, the "intended victim" argument fails because that intent was not formed before Deborah was placed in grave risk. Additionally, there was no evidence that Gonzales intended to kill Deborah, and the state did not charge him with her attempted murder. [FN6] Gonzales's only intended murder victim was Darrel. When Deborah jumped on Gonzales's back, his intent was to get her off. He did this by using his body and his weapon, seriously injuring her in the process. Once he threw her off his back, he fled the scene. Gonzales's reliance on the "intended victim" cases is thus misplaced. We find that § 13-703(F)(3) is satisfied.
[36] In capital sentencing proceedings, the trial court must consider the mitigating factors in A.R.S. § 13-703(G) as well as any aspect of the defendant's background or the offense relevant to determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 605, 858 P.2d 1152, 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994). After considering all of the evidence, the trial court found no mitigating circumstances. Gonzales argues that the judge should have found that his felony murder conviction and his good character constituted mitigating circumstances and that mitigation outweighed aggravation, thus making the death penalty inappropriate.
The state proved the existence of the A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3) and (F)(5) factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court found no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. We have also reviewed the record for evidence of mitigation and have found none sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The trial court correctly concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. A.R.S. § 13-**852 *516 703(E) thus requires imposition of the death penalty.
[41][42] Finally, Gonzales argues that the trial court erroneously received and considered Deborah's recommendation that he receive the death penalty, and the investigating detectives' recommendation that he receive the "maximum penalty." Gonzales relies on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). Booth, however, was overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), which held that the Eighth Amendment does not bar victim impact information in capital sentencing. In Arizona, victims have a state constitutional right to be heard at sentencing. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(4). See also A.R.S. § 13- 4410(C),-4424, -4426 (victim may submit oral or written impact statement at sentencing for trial court's consideration); Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 656- 57, 832 P.2d at 673-74 (trial court may rebut evidence offered in mitigation with relevant victim impact evidence). Moreover, trial courts are presumed to be able to focus on relevant sentencing factors and set aside the "irrelevant, the inflammatory, and the emotional factors." Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 657, 832 P.2d at 674. Gonzales has not shown any evidence to suggest that these "recommendations" improperly affected the sentencing decision.
We have examined the entire record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). We have found none. For the above reasons, we affirm Gonzales's convictions and sentences.