Source: http://www.courts.maine.gov/opinions_orders/opinions/2003_documents/03me127ph.htm
Timestamp: 2014-08-21 21:59:26
Document Index: 748174066

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6651', '§ 57', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 6653', '§ 57']

Decision: 2003 ME 127
Docket: Aro-02-590
on Briefs: March
[¶1] In this action regarding the ownership
of an island located on Wytopitlock Lake, in Aroostook County,
defendants Blaine Johnson, Cheryl Cropley, and Karen Gallant appeal from an
order of the District Court (Houlton, Griffiths, J.) denying their motion for relief from summary
judgment and to file a late answer, affirmative defenses, answer, counterclaim,
and opposition to summary judgment. The defendants also appeal from an order of the court denying their
motion to extend time for filing notice of appeal pursuant to M.R. App. P.
2(b)(5). Plaintiffs Larry, Gary,
and Addison Phillips have moved for dismissal of the appeal as untimely
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 4(c). [¶2] We deny the plaintiffs' motion to
dismiss the defendants' appeal and vacate the court's denial of the motion to
extend time for filing notice of appeal. Addressing the appeal on the merits, we vacate the denial of the
defendants' motion for relief from the summary judgment, and to file late
pleadings, and remand for further proceedings.
[¶3] The parties are engaged in a dispute
regarding the ownership of an island located on the southern end of Wytopitlock
Lake in Glenwood Plantation, Aroostook County. In 1923, Isaiah Pierce first settled the island by building
a small camp on it. Pierce and his
spouse, Mabel, had six children, including son Donald and daughter Audrey. In the present action, the Donald
Pierce branch of the family (Larry, Gary, and Addison Phillips) has commenced
an action against the Audrey Pierce Emerson branch (Blaine Johnson, Cheryl
Cropley, and Karen Gallant), and other branches, to quiet and establish title
to the island first settled by Isaiah Pierce.
[¶4] On November 2, 2001, the Phillipses filed
an action to quiet and establish title, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 6651‑6658
(2003),[1]
against multiple family members, including "Blaine Johnson, Cheryl Lawrence
[now Cropley], and Karen Gallent."[2] At the same time, the plaintiffs also
submitted a motion for service by publication pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4(g),[3]
accompanied by the supporting affidavit of their attorney. [¶5] On November 5, 2001, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to serve by
publication, requiring the filing of a written answer to the complaint within
twenty days after the first publication. On January 2, 2002, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit of publication
stating that the order was published in the Houlton Pioneer Times on November 14, 21, and 28, 2001. The defendants failed to appear or file
responsive pleadings before the time period designated by the court
expired. [¶6] Sometime in late November or early December 2001, Johnson, Cropley, and
Gallant learned that the complaint had been published in the paper and Johnson
contacted their attorney. Johnson
later averred: "since the inception of this action . . . [the defendants'
attorney] and [the plaintiffs' attorney] were working together to resolve this
matter on an amicable basis . . . . [The plaintiffs' attorney] has known since late in 2001 that my sisters
and I have vigorously contested any attempt" to wrest the property away. The defendants did not, however,
file any response to the action, apparently believing that they would be served
in another way if the negotiations failed. [¶7] After notifying the defendants' attorney
by letter dated January 15 that they would seek a default judgment within
twenty days, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on March 29, 2002. The plaintiffs' motion and accompanying
statement of material facts included a supporting affidavit from Larry
Phillips, and a copy of a release deed by which Phyllis Phillips, daughter of
Donald Pierce and spouse of Addison Phillips, purported to convey an interest
in the family island to herself, her husband, and her children, Larry and Gary
Phillips. The plaintiffs asserted
that their submissions established that they owned the property and that the
defendants failed to dispute their claim to it. [¶8] On April 25, 2002, the court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, vesting title to the property in the plaintiffs,
barring all claims in the property by all defendants, and awarding costs
against any defendants who asserted claims adverse to the plaintiffs. [¶9] On May 3, 2002, the defendants moved to
file late responsive pleadings, including an answer, affirmative defenses, a
counterclaim, and material in opposition to summary judgment. The responsive pleading failed to
provide a proper opposing statement of material facts as required by M.R. Civ.
P. 56(h)(2).[4] The motion to file late pleadings
asserted that the defendants had not been personally served with process and
that service by publication was inadequate. The affidavits of Johnson, Gallant, and Cropley averred that
none of the three had ever been personally served with a complaint and summons,
but conceded that their mother had informed them soon after the publication
that the Houlton Pioneer Times had
published a notice of the complaint. Johnson's affidavit identified this time period as either November or
December 2001, and he indicated that he called his attorney as soon as he
learned that the suit had been filed against him. [¶10] In support of their motion, the
defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' affidavit of diligent search was
inadequate to support service by publication and that the plaintiffs had
misrepresented the facts known about the defendants' whereabouts. The defendants also submitted a copy of
a quitclaim deed, dated April 30, 1982, by which Audrey Pierce Emerson
purported to convey her interest in the island property to her children,
Lawrence (now Cropley), Gallant, and Johnson. [¶11] On August 2, 2002, the defendants filed
an amendment to their motion to file late responsive pleadings. The amendment requested relief pursuant
to M.R. Civ. P. 55(c)[5]
to set aside any default judgment, and M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)[6]
to obtain relief from the summary judgment. The defendants included the affidavits of Johnson, Gallant,
and Cropley in their amended motion. The affidavit of Cropley stated that, with the possible exception of one
year, she has paid all of the local property taxes for the Wytopitlock Lake
island and that the town manager has her correct address.
[¶12] The plaintiffs responded to the defendants'
motions by asserting that the defendants had received actual notice and had
nonetheless failed to file a response of any kind. In addition to the service by publication, which resulted in
actual notice, the plaintiffs' attorney mailed a copy of the complaint to one
of Blaine Johnson's addresses, provided the defendants' attorney a copy of the
complaint, notified the defendants' attorney that he would be seeking a default
judgment unless a response was forthcoming, and made the defendants' attorney
aware of the impending motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs also disputed the defendants' allegations of
misrepresentations regarding the plaintiffs' diligence preceding their motion
for service by publication.[7]
[¶13] On August 15, 2002, the court held a
hearing regarding the defendants' motions. Following the hearing, the court denied the defendants'
motions in an order entered on August 29, 2002. The court found that service by publication was achieved
through "a Clerk's Certificate which was published in the Houlton Pioneer Times
on November 14, 2001, November 21, 2001, and November 28, 2001," and that the
plaintiffs' attorney "provided [the defendants' attorney] with a copy of the
Summons, Complaint of Action to Quiet Title, Motion for Service by Publication,
and Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint with a request that [the
defendants' attorney] sign the acknowledgment form and return it at his
earliest convenience." The court
made no findings on the defendants' allegations of insufficient diligence or
misrepresentation. Ultimately, the
court concluded that, despite having actual notice of the complaint and summons
through notice by publication in November 2001, and copies thereof having been
provided to their attorney, the defendants failed to file a responsive pleading
until May 3, 2002. Accordingly,
the court declined to grant relief from the summary judgment. [¶14] On September 19, 2002, the defendants
filed a notice purporting to appeal from the court's order of August 29 denying
their motions.[8] The defendants' notice, however,
erroneously directed the appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P.
76D,[9]
rather than to the Law Court pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(a)(1). On September 26, 2002, the defendants
filed an amendment to their notice of appeal, requesting that the court "delete
'appeal to the Superior Court' and substitute in its place 'appeal to the Law
Court.'" [¶15] On October 8, 2002, the defendants
moved, in the District Court, to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5),[10]
citing excusable neglect. The
defendants noted that their amendment to their notice of appeal was filed after
the expiration of the original time limit of September 19, 2002, but within the
twenty-one-day extension period for excusable neglect pursuant to M.R. App. P.
2(b)(5). On October 10, 2002, the
District Court denied the defendants' motion to extend time for filing notice
of appeal pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5), and deemed the amended notice of
appeal untimely filed. [¶16] The plaintiffs then moved to dismiss the
defendants' appeal as untimely pursuant to M.R. App. P. 4(c). On October 22, 2002, the defendants
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Law Court from the court's order of
October 10, 2002, denying their motion to extend time. The notice of appeal stated, however,
that it was filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76D rather than M.R. App. P.
2(b)(3). We consolidated the
defendants' appeals of the court's orders of August 29, 2002, and October 10,
2002, as well as the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. App. P.
4(c). II. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Notices of Appeal
[¶17] An appeal
from a judgment of the District Court in a quiet title matter must be filed
within twenty-one days of the entry of judgment and proceeds directly to the
Law Court. M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3); 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (Supp. 2002). [¶18] We have held that an appeal is
cognizable, despite being directed to the wrong court, if the notice of appeal
is otherwise valid and timely, immediate steps are taken to correct the error,
and the steps taken to correct the error are undertaken within the period of
extension allowed by the Rules. In
re Amanda D., 549 A.2d 1133, 1134 (Me.
1988). That is precisely what
occurred here. The defendants
filed their notice of appeal within twenty-one days, identified the error
before the end of the extension period, moved to correct the error through two
different methods, and consistently prosecuted the appeal.
[¶19] By contrast, in
Chase Home Mortgage Corp. v. Hider, 2000
ME 46, 747 A.2d 1193, the case upon which the plaintiffs rely, the appellant
failed to take actions to correct his error in appealing to the Superior Court
rather than the Law Court within the time for filing a motion to extend the
period of appeal. In fact, the
appellant failed to direct the appeal to the correct court until after the
appeal had been dismissed by the Superior Court for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 2, 747 A.2d at 1194. See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Patten, 2000 ME 42, ¶¶ 16-17, 746 A.2d 373, 376-77
(dismissing appeal when plaintiff failed to appeal to the proper court until
approximately eight months after the entry of a final judgment of
foreclosure). The defendants in
the present case, in stark contrast, made appropriate efforts to correct their
error. [¶20] The Rules of
Appellate Procedure are to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every appeal." M.R. App. P. 1. They are not intended to bar appellate review when inconsequential
errors are made. We therefore
conclude that when a notice of appeal is filed within the twenty-one-day period
prescribed by M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) and served on the opposing party, but
directed to the wrong court, and when the error in the appeal is corrected and
brought to the attention of the opposing party and the court through a motion
to extend that is filed within the brief twenty-one-day period of extension
pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5), the court exceeds the bounds of its
discretion when it declines to allow the extension, unless other facts, not
existing here, support the denial.[11] We therefore vacate the court's denial
of the motion to extend time for filing the appeal from the August 29
order. Similarly, we conclude that
the notice of appeal from the October 10 decision was adequate despite its
citation of the improper rule. See M.R. App. P. 1. Accordingly, we deny the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss, and
address the merits of the appeal.
B. Denial of Motion for Relief From the
[¶21] The defendants next challenge the court's denial of their request to file
responsive pleadings and for relief from the summary judgment. The court based its denial of the
requested relief on its conclusion that the defendants had received notice and
an opportunity to respond, but failed to do so. [¶22] There are several issues
presented. First, we review the
trial court's original decision granting a motion for service by publication
for abuse of discretion. Margani
v. Sanders, 453 A.2d 501, 505 (Me.
1982). We next address the court's
factual finding that the defendants received actual notice. Finally, in light of the allegations of
fraud by the moving party, we review the court's legal conclusion that actual
notice was sufficient. The court's
factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo. QAD
Investors, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001 ME 116, ¶
13, 776 A.2d 1244, 1248.
[¶23] Regarding
the court's initial order granting the motion for service by publication, M.R.
Civ. P. 4(g)(1) provides, "[t]he court, on motion upon a showing that service
cannot with due diligence be made by another prescribed method, shall order
service by publication." See
also 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine
Civil Practice § 4.12 at 95 (2d ed. 1970)
("Publication is available . . . only upon failure after using due
diligence to get service by another prescribed method more likely to give
actual notice to the defendant, and then only upon order of court."). Based
on the information before the court when it first adjudicated the motion for
service by publication, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's initial decision to grant the motion on November 5, 2001.
[¶24] We turn to the defendants' second contention, that is, that
actual notice will not suffice. Because actual notice is the ultimate goal of any form of service, the
discovery of a technical defect in service will not ordinarily negate the
notice when actual notice is accomplished. See Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v. Pease, 2002 ME 82, ¶ 14, 797 A.2d 1270, 1275 ("'If the
defendant has received actual notice by the method of service used, the court
should hesitate in finding the service insufficient for some technical
noncompliance . . . .'") (quoting 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, § 4.5 at
69). We have held, for instance,
that technical noncompliance with M.R. Civ. P. 5(b), which requires service on
a represented party's attorney, is harmless error when a defendant has timely
actual notice and suffers no prejudice. Moores v. Doyle, 2003 ME
105, ¶ 10, 829 A.2d 260, 263; cf. Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v.
White, 1997 ME 204, ¶ 4, 704 A.2d 318, 319
(holding that the defendant's ultimate participation in the action by appearing
at a conference with the court without raising service resulted in a waiver of
claims relating to insufficiency of process).
[¶25] Here, there is no dispute that service
by publication had the intended effect: the defendants learned that a suit had
been filed against them. All three
defendants averred in their affidavits that they learned about the complaint
from their mother, who read about it in the paper. Their attorney was then in regular contact with the
plaintiffs' attorney, who provided copies of all documents and later gave notice
of the plaintiffs' intent to request a default judgment. Similarly, notwithstanding the failure
of all defendants to file appearances or answers, the plaintiffs provided the
motion for summary judgment to the defendants' attorney and to Johnson. Thus, the court did not err in its
factual finding that the defendants did receive notice. In ordinary circumstances, such actual
notice is legally sufficient to trigger the defendants' responsibility to
respond to the suit.
[¶26] The defendants assert, however, that
notwithstanding their actual notice, the plaintiffs' alleged misconduct in
seeking to serve the defendants by publication was so egregious that the court
should have declined to recognize the notice. Thus, the question is not whether actual notice is
sufficient when there is a defect in the method of service, but rather, whether
service by publication obtained through fraudulent representations to the court
will be countenanced. [¶27] The unique nature of notice by
publication demands that the applicant for such notice be scrupulous in the
exercise of diligence and in representations made to the court.[12] Because service by publication should
occur only when notice cannot be accomplished by other means, courts must be
vigilant in assuring that this method of service is not obtained through
fraud. See Robinson Roofing
& Remodeling, Inc. v. Clayton (Ex parte Robinson Roofing & Remodeling,
Inc.), 709 So. 2d 444, 446 (Ala. 1997)
("[A] judgment procured by fraud upon the court itself may be set aside
. . . ."); In re Estate of Roedell, 112 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1962) ("A judgment or
decree based on jurisdictional fraud is void."). We now hold that, to assure the integrity of the court's
actions in allowing service by publication, a court may decline to accept as
legally sufficient service by publication that was obtained through fraudulent
means, even when that service results in actual notice. Cf. Bonneville Billing v.
Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 773 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) ("[I]f a plaintiff falsely avers or intentionally misleads a court to
believe that he or she has exercised [due] diligence when he or she has not
done so, the court . . . never had jurisdiction . . . ."); Jones
v. Buford, 359 P.2d 232, 234 (Okla. 1961)
("[A]ctual knowledge of a proceeding to obtain a tax deed does not relieve the
person seeking the deed from complying with the applicable statutes relating to
notice.").
[¶28] In the matter before us, the defendants raised substantial allegations
of fraud, which the plaintiffs disputed. Although the court held a hearing, it did not address the issue of fraud
because it determined that actual notice sufficed. We conclude, however, that in the face of allegations of
fraud, the finding of actual notice is not enough. When substantial allegations of fraud in pursuit of service
by publication have been raised, the court must determine whether the
allegations are accurate before determining whether actual notice is
sufficient. Service by publication
that is obtained through a fraud on the court should not be countenanced and
will ordinarily require new service. See Robinson Roofing & Remodeling, 709 So. 2d at 446; Roedell,
112 N.W.2d at 844; Bonneville Billing, 949 P.2d at 773. In
contrast, inaccuracies or errors that do not constitute fraud will not
ordinarily result in treating actual notice as a nullity. See Benjamin v. Grosnick, 999 F.2d 590, 592 (1st Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1112 (1994) (holding that
a party is not prejudiced by defective service when he or she receives actual
notice of a lawsuit and has time to answer it).[13]
[¶29] The plaintiffs vigorously disputed the
defendants' allegations of fraud. In the absence of a factual determination regarding the allegations of
fraud, we cannot determine whether the finding of sufficient service upon which
the court based its denial of the motion for relief should be affirmed or set
aside. Accordingly, we vacate the
denial of the motion for relief from judgment and remand to the trial court for
findings on the allegations of fraud in the motion for service by
publication. Because the trial
judge has since moved to active retired status, and may not be available to
hear this matter, any judge may hear the matter on remand and may, in the
discretion of that judge, take additional evidence on the question of the basis
for service by publication.
Motion to dismiss the appeal
denied. Order of October 10, 2002,
denying extension of time to file appeal vacated. Denial of the motion for relief from summary judgment
vacated. Case remanded for further
Richard C. Cleary, Esq.
Cleary Law Office, P.A.
21 Military Street
Samuel W. Lanham Jr., Esq.
Cuddy & Lanham
470 Evergreen woods
[1] The service requirements for
proceedings to quiet title are set forth in section 6653:
Service in such
action shall be made as in other actions on all supposed known claimants
residing either in the State or outside the State, and notice to persons who
are unascertained, not in being or unknown
shall be given by publication as in other actions where publication is
required, unless the court on motion permits posting in such public places as
the court may direct in lieu of all or part of the publication ordinarily
14 M.R.S.A. § 6653 (2003) (emphasis added).
The parties do not raise any issues relating to the use of Cheryl Cropley's maiden name or the misspelling of Karen Gallant's name in the complaint.
In relevant part, M.R. Civ. P. 4(g) states that "[t]he court, on motion upon a showing that service cannot with due diligence be made by another prescribed method, shall order service by publication." M.R. Civ. P. 4(g)(1). The rule states that "[t]he first publication of the summons shall be made within 20 days after the order is granted" and that "[s]ervice by publication is complete on the twenty-first day after the first publication." M.R. Civ. P. 4(g)(3). [4] Rule 56(h)(2) provides, in pertinent
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule. The opposing statement may contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation . . . . [5]
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), "[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)."
[6] M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows the court to
relieve a party from final judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. [7]
Among other facts, the plaintiffs noted that they had not had contact with Cropley for eight to ten years and that she was known to them as Cheryl Lawrence, not Cheryl Cropley; that they do not know Gallant and that she was listed under her husband's name in the phone book; and that Johnson had multiple addresses (with different addresses used even by his own attorney in the pleadings) and that he was difficult to locate for service in a prior unrelated proceeding.
Pursuant to M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3), "[t]he time within which an appeal may be taken in a civil case shall be 21 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law."
M.R. Civ. P. 76D governs appeals to the Superior Court of certain specified judgments of the District Court. Where no statutory authorization exists for appeal from the District Court to the Superior Court, the Law Court reviews judgments of the District Court pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (Supp. 2002). [10] M.R. App. P. 2(b)(5) provides:
Except when prohibited by statute, upon a showing of excusable neglect, the court may, before or after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing the notice of appeal otherwise allowed for a period not to exceed 21 days from the expiration of the original time prescribed by this subdivision. [11]
It is not surprising that a trial court would conclude that failure to comply strictly with the rules governing appeal to the Law Court would normally lead to a denial of the defendants' motion to extend time to file notice of appeal. See, e.g., Bourke v. City of South Portland, 2002 ME 155, ¶ 4, 806 A.2d 1255, 1256 (holding that strict compliance with the time limits prescribed by M.R. App. P. 2(b) is a prerequisite to the Law Court entertaining an appeal). In the present case, however, the defendants' error did not delay the appeal beyond the allowable extension period and did not lead the opposing party to assume that no appeal would be pursued.
When a party's identity and location are "reasonably ascertainable," notice by publication is "not reasonably calculated to provide actual notice of the pending proceeding." Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795, 800 (1983), citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
[13] In either instance, the court retains
the discretion to accept or reject the efficacy of the service based on a
review of the entirety of the circumstances.