Source: http://openjurist.org/955/f2d/757
Timestamp: 2015-12-01 09:37:27
Document Index: 162941946

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 1', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

955 F2d 757 Leeds v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks | OpenJurist
955 F. 2d 757 - Leeds v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 955 F.2d.
955 F2d 757 Leeds v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 955 F.2d 757
114 A.L.R.Fed. 773, 293 U.S.App.D.C. 429,21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1771
Jackson LEEDS, Appellant,v.COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, Appellee.
Argued Jan. 9, 1992.Decided Feb. 14, 1992.
Jackson Leeds seeks access under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to statements of "Reasons for Allowance" of patent claims prepared pursuant to § 1.109 of the Patent and Trademark Office's ("PTO") regulations.1 The Commissioner of the PTO responded to Leeds' request by stating that all statements of reasons for allowance, including those made pursuant to Rule 109 ("Rule 109 statements"), are available to Leeds as part of the patent files themselves, which are open to public inspection and indexed according to number, owner, and subject matter. Leeds brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Commissioner is required to provide a separate index to Rule 109 statements under § 552(a)(2),2 or to make these documents available separately from the rest of the files in which they repose under § 552(a)(3).3
In granting summary judgment for the Commissioner, the district court ruled that a patent examiner's Rule 109 statements are not separate "final opinions ... made in the adjudication of cases" within the meaning of § 552(a)(2), and are therefore not required to be indexed. Leeds v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Civil Action No. 90-1038 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1990). We agree that Rule 109 statements are not separate and distinct "final opinions" requiring indexing under FOIA, and because such statements are already made available as part of the indexed files on all issued patents, they fall within the exception listed in § 552(a)(3) for records made available under § 552(a)(2).
Leeds argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. He argues that Rule 109 statements are separate and distinct "final opinions" within the meaning of § 552(a)(2) and, as such, must be separately indexed apart from the patent file.
FOIA does not define the term "final opinion." As previously noted, in Irons & Sears v. Dann, 606 F.2d 1215, 1223 n. 40 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075, 100 S.Ct. 1021, 62 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980), however, the Supreme Court has suggested that the test of a "final opinion[ ]' is to be based in large measure on finality." See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 158-60, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1520-21, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975). In NLRB v. Sears, the documents sought were Advice and Appeals Memoranda written by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board to explain his decisions whether to file complaints for unfair labor practices. The Board panel adjudicates a charge brought by a private party only after the General Counsel determines whether to file the charge as a "complaint." Because the General Counsel has unreviewable authority to determine whether to file a complaint, the Supreme Court held that where the General Counsel refused to file a complaint, the Advice and Appeals Memoranda explaining his decision were "final opinions made in the adjudication of cases"; but where he decided to file a complaint, the Advice and Appeals Memoranda were not "final opinions," id. at 148, since they signaled the commencement not the termination of litigation. It was the finality of the decision as regards the future of the claim that determined whether the reasons underlying it were disclosable under FOIA.
First, an examiner's decision to add a Rule 109 statement to the file does not necessarily occur at the end of the patent application process.6 As discussed infra, each patent application must contain at least one claim and may contain many different ones. Each claim must be individually examined and specifically allowed by an examiner. Thus, the examination of a single patent application may involve anywhere from one to dozens of official actions on the part of an examiner. At any point in the process, an examiner may determine that some or all of the claims are eligible for allowance and prepare a Rule 109 statement for the file. On the other hand the examiner may determine that no Rule 109 statement is needed at any time because the record is already clear as to the reasons for allowing the patent. Those reasons may be found in a variety of official communications at all stages of the patent application process, none of which were made pursuant to Rule 109. Indeed, the same patent file might contain several statements in which an examiner indicated different reasons for allowing different claims at different stages of the prosecution. Only when the examination of an application is finally completed, do all claims allowed during any prior stage of the application process become the official claims protected by the patent. There is thus nothing inherent in Rule 109 statements that "effect as 'final' a 'disposition' as possible, as an administrative decision can." NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. at 155, 95 S.Ct. at 1519.
We know of no decision ruling that documents already made available to the public as part of indexed "final dispositions," are themselves deemed separate and distinct "final opinions" within the meaning of FOIA, subject to a separate indexing requirement. In Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 18 (D.C.Cir.1978), a FOIA request was made for documents prepared by the Federal Trade Commission during an investigation and enforcement proceeding. We ruled that if memoranda existed explaining the FTC's decision to terminate an enforcement proceeding or not to include a proposed charge in a complaint, they would be considered "final opinion[s]" and disclosable under FOIA. Id. at 25-26. The question in Bristol-Myers, however, was not whether such a memorandum was a separate and distinct final opinion from the statement terminating the enforcement proceeding, thus requiring a separate index, but rather whether such documents had to be made available at all. Bristol-Myers held only that the explanation of an agency's final decision needed to be publicly available along with the decision itself. Rule 109 statements, along with everything else, are publicly available in indexed patent files. A request that they be separately indexed would be akin to requesting that every one of several reasons listed in a single "final opinion" be indexed separately. FOIA provisions make no such excessive demands.
Our result in no way impugns the "strong theme" in our FOIA decisions that "an agency will not be permitted to develop a body of secret law used by it in the discharge of its regulatory duties," not available to public scrutiny. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C.Cir.1980) (emphasis added). In NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. at 132, 95 S.Ct. at 1504, as in Coastal States, the memoranda were used to develop "uniform policies" of prosecution and relied upon as separate documents by agency personnel to make decisions on whether to file complaints in similar cases. Rule 109 statements, on the other hand, are not used as directives or as policies by the PTO staff. They are not even collected and maintained independently from the patent files for patent office examiners' or employees' perusal. The public has the same access to patent files and Rule 109 statements therein as the PTO personnel. Moreover, a patent examiner would have no cause to look at a Rule 109 statement outside of its contextual file. There is therefore no way that Rule 109 statements could be used to create a "body of secret law." See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 867.
As our preceding analysis indicates, Rule 109 statements are not separate and distinct "final opinions" but instead are an interim part of the final decision issuing the patent. All of the reasons for that final decision are contained in the entire patent file; these files are available to the public and appropriately indexed under § 552(a)(2). Because Rule 109 statements are already available under § 552(a)(2), they are specifically excepted from the category of documents that must be produced upon request under § 552(a)(3). "The agency's responsibilities are at an end once it provides a reasonable index of the requested decisions and makes the files containing them available." Irons & Sears, 606 F.2d at 1223. The district court properly held that the PTO was not required under FOIA to search for, copy, and provide Leeds with all Rule 109 statements requested.
(A) final opinions ... as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases.... Each agency shall also maintain and make available for public inspection and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated ... required by this paragraph to be made available or published. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1977 & Supp.1991).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1977 & Supp.1991).
The PTO maintains indices of the following types of final decisions: (1) the aforementioned Index of Patents; (2) ex parte decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; (3) inter parte decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; (4) decisions denying delayed payment of maintenance fees; (5) decisions determining eligibility for extension of patent term; (6) decisions denying relief from provisions related to reexamination; (7) decisions upholding the denial of reexamination requests; (8) decisions denying extensions of time in a reexamination; (9) decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board; (10) Commissioner's decisions in trademark matters; (11) Commissioner's decisions in disciplinary matters; (12) Commissioner's decisions concerning practice before the PTO; (13) Commissioner's decisions in regrades of the PTO registration examination; and (14) Commissioner's decisions concerning scientific and technical training requirements for practice before the PTO. See Irons v. Gottschalk, 369 F.Supp. 403, 409-10 (D.D.C.1974), remanded, 548 F.2d 992 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965, 98 S.Ct. 505, 54 L.Ed.2d 451 (1977).
We need not address the question raised in Irons & Sears v. Dann of when a decision may be so collateral to an ongoing adjudicative procedure that it will be deemed final for § 552(a)(2) purposes. See Irons & Sears, 606 F.2d at 1223 n. 40. Any expression of reasons for allowing a patent claim are central not collateral to the final decision whether to grant the patent application