Source: http://maritimedefense.net/blog
Timestamp: 2020-07-14 09:33:30
Document Index: 494986986

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 902', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 901', '§ 1333', '§ 30104', '§ 1445']

Law Office of Matthew H. Ammerman, P.C. - Maritime Defense Blog: LHWCA & Jones Act
by Matthew H. Ammerman on March 20th, 2020
This inquiry is timely because the Port of Houston closed the Bayport and Barbours Cut terminals on March 19, 2020, because a worker tested positive for COVID-19.[1]
The critical word in the question above is “workplace.” And the answer is most likely yes if the infection was caused by workplace exposure, such as contact with an infected employee in covered LHWCA employment.
Keep in mind that the worker will be aided by the LHWCA’s Section 20 presumption of compensability if the matter is litigated. Therefore, if an employee credibly asserts her infection was caused by exposure in covered LHWCA work, the employer must show by substantial evidence that the infection was not caused at work to rebut that presumption. If the presumption is rebutted, the worker must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her COVID-19 disease was caused by exposure in the workplace.
The LHWCA’s definition of “injury” includes “…occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment ….”[2] To invoke the Section 20 presumption, the worker need only make a prima facie showing “(1) that she suffered a harm and (2) that conditions existed at work, or an accident occurred at work, that could have caused, aggravated or accelerated the condition.”[3] The burden of production then shifts to the employer to show by substantial evidence—facts, not speculation--that the harm was not work-related. “Substantial evidence” is “evidence that ‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’"[4]
The LHWCA has been interpreted to cover infections from exposure to a disease or toxic substance at work.[5] The exposure must be in work that is covered by the LHWCA, i.e., the employee meets the LHWCA status requirement and the exposure occurred on a LHWCA situs.[6]
Therefore, in a case serious enough to warrant it, a LHWCA employer or carrier should seek the opinion of an infectious disease or environmental health expert as to whether the exposure was within a reasonable probability caused by workplace exposure. That means fact-gathering in the intake and investigation process will be very important, including finding out what other exposure to the disease at home or in the public the worker may have had and when.
Comprehensively screening workers, keeping good documentation of those screenings, and using rigorous mitigation strategies in the workplace may be a proactive measure to lower the risk of workplace exposure and liability for COVID-19.
The overall impact of COVID-19 on the maritime community will hopefully be less than the population overall. The percentage of severe outcomes in typical working-age adults (20-64) is much lower than those 65 and older.[7] Risk mitigation strategies such as social distancing rely in large part on the maritime industry to deliver goods from overseas that are in turn delivered to doorsteps across the country. Keep calm but stay vigilant, friends! [end].
[1] Erin Douglas, 2 Port of Houston terminals close after worker tests positive for COVID-19, Houston Chronicle, March 20, 2020; https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Two-Port-Houston-terminals-close-after-worker-15143266.php (viewed 3/20/2020).
[2] 33 U.S.C. § 902(2)(emphasis added).
[3] Conoco, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP [Prewitt], 194 F.3d 684, 687-88 (5th Cir. 1999).
[4] Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 806 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2015)(internal citation omitted).
[5] Casey v. Georgetown Univ. Medical Center, 31 BRBS 147 (1997)(death from liver disease allegedly caused or aggravated by exposure to halothane gas at work was compensable); Overton v. Marmac Corp., BRB No. 06-0782 (Ben. Review Board)(March 28, 2007)(unpublished)(Hepatitis C compensable, “Employer here did not rebut the presumption because it did not produce substantial evidence that claimant’s hepatitis C was not related to his sewage exposure.”); Cf. White v. Ameri-Force, Inc., 35 BRBS 91 (ALJ)(Claimant’s pneumonia was not due to being rained on at work but was caused by a host of other factors including laryngeal dysfunction, bullous emphysema, and smoking), citing in part, McNeelly vs. Sheppeard, 89 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1937)(pneumonia not compensable).
[6] Hough v. Vimas Painting Co., Inc., 45 BRBS 9 (2011)(worker who contracted histoplasmosis from exposure to bird guano while on bridge [instead of barge] failed to meet situs requirement).
[7] “Severe Outcomes Among Patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) — United States, February 12–March 16, 2020.” MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. ePub: 18 March 2020. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6912e2; https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6912e2.htm (viewed 3/20/20).
The original LHWCA enacted in 1927 only covered workers injured on the “navigable waters of the United States” or a dry dock.[1] The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA expanded its statutory coverage landward. Congress added a land-based “situs” and an activity-based “status” requirement for workers injured on land.[2] Both must be satisfied for the LHWCA to apply to a worker who is injured on land or an extension of land.
The Fourth Circuit in Muhammad v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.[3] holds that a bridge is not a LHWCA situs. Consequently, Muhammad, a railroad worker who was injured replacing crossties on a bridge, could bring his lawsuit under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) against his employer for injuries sustained when he fell from the bridge.
Bad facts make bad law.[4] A corollary might be that bad stipulations make confusing law. The Fourth Circuit had some jurisprudential cleaning up to do. It held in LeMelle v. B. F. Diamond Construction Co., 674 F.2d 296, 298 (4th Cir. 1982) that a worker had LHWCA status who was engaged in replacing a bridge that had a lift section to facilitate vessels passing under it, i.e., was engaged in maritime employment. But LeMelle did not deal with situs. The parties—for reasons that are unclear—stipulated that LeMelle was hurt on a LHWCA situs when working on a piling on a fixed section of the bridge one mile from shore.[5] That decision created confusion among those who thought a bridge that was an aid to navigation was a covered situs.[6] However, that is not correct.
Bridges have long been held to be extensions of land.[7] Therefore, absent customary use for loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel sufficient to fit within the definition of an “adjoining area,” a bridge is not a LHWCA situs under the plain language of the statute.[8] In fact, in holding that LeMelle’s work gave him LHWCA status, the Fourth Circuit relied on three cases in which the workers were hurt or killed while standing on vessels or who fell into navigable waters and died.[9] Consequently, this distraction in this area of the law could be placed at the feet of an apparent erroneous stipulation of situs in the LeMelle case.
The Fourth Circuit in Muhammad does its best to clarify that a bridge is not a covered situs. The court points out a quote from the LeMelle case had been taken out of context by the trial court.[10] The Fourth Circuit should have perhaps gone further in Muhammad to reverse or cabin LeMelle as being an anomaly. The anomaly is that, by all appearances, it was erroneously stipulated in LeMelle that there was LHWCA situs on the piling of a bridge, and, consequently, LHWCA situs in that case was probably lacking.[11]
This, therefore, is the dividing line: a worker who is injured on navigable water and who happens to be working on a bridge project is covered by the pre-1972 LHWCA. But a worker who is injured on the bridge itself—regardless of whether it “aids navigation”—cannot be covered by the LHWCA because the situs prong is not satisfied (except in an unusual circumstance in which the bridge happens to be “customarily used” for loading, unloading, etc., sufficient to qualify as an “adjoining area”). Muhammad was on the bridge itself. LHWCA situs was lacking. He was not covered by the LHWCA and, therefore, could bring his suit under FELA.
The district court also erred in holding it lacked “subject-matter jurisdiction” because the court wrongly held that Muhammad’s exclusive remedy against his employer was under the LHWCA. The Fourth Circuit corrects this error, holding that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because Muhammad claimed recovery under a federal law, FELA, over which the court certainly had subject-matter jurisdiction. This too is a frequent point of confusion when the paths of the LHWCA and civil courts at law cross. Assuming a court has subject-matter jurisdiction of the injured party’s lawsuit, then the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether the LHWCA applies to an injury.[12] However, that court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to award LHWCA benefits.[13] And if there is an administrative proceeding underway, a civil court’s determination could be stayed due to the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency such as the U.S. Department of Labor.[14] [end].
[1] Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, March 4, 1927, ch 509. § 3, 44 Stat. 1426 (amended 1972)(“Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. …”); Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 46, 110 S. Ct. 381, 107 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1989).
[2] Act of Oct. 27, 1972, P. L. 92-576, §§ 2(c), 21, 86 Stat. 1251, 1265; Director v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 319, 103 S. Ct. 634, 648 (1983).
[3] 925 F.3d 192, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16773 (4th Cir. June 4, 2019).
[4] Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 547 (2018)(Thomas, J. dissenting)(“If bad facts make bad law, then ‘unusual facts’ inspire unusual decisions.”).
[5] LeMelle, 674 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir. 1982).
[6] Kehl v. Martin Paving Company, 34 BRBS 121 (2000)(reversing ALJ’s decision finding section of bridge to be a covered situs and describing LeMelle as an “anomaly.”).
[7] Id. at 197, citing Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214-15, 90 S. Ct. 347, 349-50 (1969)(“Since long before the Longshoremen's Act was passed, it has been settled law that structures such as wharves and piers, permanently affixed to land, are extensions of the land. Thus, literally read, a statute that covers injuries ‘upon the navigable waters’ would not cover injuries on a pier even though the pier, like a bridge, extends over navigable waters.”).
[8] LeMelle at 298, citing Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 251, 63 S. Ct. 225, 226 (1942)(“Deceased had helped to cut some steel from the bridge and, at the time of the accident, was working on the barge….”); Hardaway Contracting Co. v. O'Keeffe, 414 F.2d 657, 658 (5th Cir. 1968)(“…the decedent [Richard Gerald Rogers], while performing service for the employer as a laborer and while engaged in building a bridge … sustained personal injury resulting in his death, when, as he was standing on board the employer's vessel, 'Dutchman,' and loading diesel fuel tanks from the 'Dutchman'….”); Peter v. Arrien, 325 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff’d, 463 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1972)(crane operator died in the river after crane toppled from temporary causeway that was often submerged).
[9] Muhammad, 925 F.3d 192, 199.
[10] Muhammad, 925 F.3d 192, 198 (“To be sure, an employee working from a barge on navigable waters while constructing or maintaining a bridge would, under the pre-1972 standard, be on navigable waters, as that employee would then be physically working from a vessel on navigable waters.”).
[11] The U.S. Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board holds that parties cannot stipulate to coverage of the LHWCA because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See, e.g., Foster v. Davison Sand & Gravel Company, 31 BRBS 191 (1997).
[12] See, e.g, In re Shippers Stevedoring Co., 274 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008)(“But regardless of the merit of that defense to the specific claims pleaded in this case—a question that we do not reach–its assertion does not deprive the state trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
[13] Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1208 (5th Cir. 1992).
[14] See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., L.P., 226 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2007)(discussing primary jurisdiction of administrative agency); Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation v. Gibson, 52 Wn. App. 653, 656, 763 P.2d 206, 208 (1988).
There are only a handful of federal district court opinions addressing the contours of the Supreme Court’s “substantial nexus” test from Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Vallodolid.[1] That test is used to determine whether a worker is covered by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) extension of the LHWCA. Specifically, OCSLA applies where there is a “…significant causal link between the injury that [the worker] suffered and his employer's on-OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] operations conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS.”[2]
The district court in Mays v. Chevron Pipe Line Company[3] entered a judgment based on a jury’s $2.9M verdict to the widow and family of a worker, James Mays, who was killed doing pipeline maintenance on a drilling platform in Louisiana’s territorial waters. The jury found a “substantial nexus” between Mays’ death and his employer’s operations on the OCS.[4] Chevron moved for judgment as a matter of law that the court misapplied the law in focusing on Chevron’s operations on the OCS instead of Mays’ payroll employer, Furmanite. Presumably, as a labor supply company, Furmanite did not have direct extractive operations on the OCS because Chevron’s extractive operations were highlighted by the Mays’ plaintiffs. Chevron did not want OCSLA to apply because it would enjoy immunity as a “statutory employer” if the Louisiana workers’ compensation statute applied instead of OSCLA.
The district court rejects Chevron’s argument because Vallodolid did not adjudicate the meaning of “employer” under Section 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b).[5] That section defines an employer as “an employer any of whose employees are employed in such [extractive] operations.” The court instead looks to the pre-Vallodolid opinion from Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982). There, the Fifth Circuit holds that the OCSLA’s definition of “employer” applied to cover a helicopter pilot’s employer, even though the helicopter company was not engaged in extractive operations on the OCS. Writing for the panel in Barger, Judge Rubin reasoned that helicopter pilots who transport workers to and from the Shelf play “an important role in developing the Shelf.”[6] Therefore, such workers “should not be treated differently on the basis of who their immediate employer is.”[7]
The district court in Mays applies Barger to reason that Mays also played an “important role” in extractive operations because he serviced valves on pipelines transporting gas from the OCS.[8] Therefore, the district court denies Chevron’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for new trial.
This case brings into focus what import we should ascribe to the Justice Thomas’s reference to the employer’s “on-OCS” operations in the substantial nexus test from the Valladolid case. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Vallodolid twice recites that the injury must have a substantial nexus, or significant causal link, to the “…employer's on-OCS operations conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS.”[9] That limiting factor also provides a level of predictability to the employer, who should have control over whether it operates on the OCS, as well as litigants.[10] Also, in 2016, the Fifth Circuit in the Baker case considered an employer’s lack of on-OCS operations as one of the factors to deny OCSLA coverage to a carpenter injured on land who was building offshore living quarters destined for the OCS.[11]
On the other side of the coin, in addition to the Barger case, the 1988 panel opinion in Mills v. Director, OWCP—which was one year later reversed en banc by the now-rejected situs-of-injury test—did not focus on the employer’s operations on the OCS.[12] Instead, the Fifth Circuit panel focused on the connection between the platform being constructed on land in Amelia, Louisiana, which was destined specifically for the OCS, and “operations on the Shelf.”[13]
The Mays case is before the Fifth Circuit where this issue may be sorted out by early next year.[14] [end].
[1] 565 U.S. 207, 132 S.Ct. 680, 181 L.Ed.2d. 675 (2012).
[2] Id., 565 U.S. 207, 222, 132 S. Ct. 680, 691 (emphasis added).
[3] 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103751, 2019 WL 2517864 (W.D. La. June 18, 2019).
[6] Id. at *7, citin Barger, 692 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1982).
[9] Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207, 222, 132 S. Ct. 680, 691 (2012).
[10] There is also arguably a statutory basis, which is not discussed in the Mays case. The extension of the LHWCA through OCSLA at 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) refers to “operations” conducted on the OCS, and an employer is later defined in a subsection as an entity that employs workers in “such operations”:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as the result of operations, conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act [Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act] [33 USCS §§ 901 et seq.].
(2) the term “employer” means an employer any of whose employees are employed in such operations; ….”
43 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(emphasis added).
[11] Baker v. Director, OWCP, 834 F.3d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 2016)(“And although [employer] Gulf Island manufactured the living quarters for Big Foot, the company had no role in moving Big Foot to, installing Big Foot on, or operating Big Foot once placed on the OCS.”).
[12] 846 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1988)(“…the requirement that the claimant show a nexus between the work being done and operations on the shelf similar to the proximate cause test in tort law; it requires that the work ‘further[s] the operation of a fixed rig on the shelf and [is] in the regular course of extractive operations on the shelf.’”)(internal citation omitted), rev’d, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev’d, Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207 (2012).
[14] Doc. 255, Case 6:14-cv-03098-BAJ-CBW, Peggy Mays, et al. v. Chevron Pipe Line Company, et al.; in the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division (July 1, 2019).
Though referred to as a “guideline” for seaman status by the Supreme Court,[1] the thirty-percent rule used to determine the durational element of the substantial-connection prong is, in practice, a bright dividing line in the Fifth Circuit.[2] When a worker in the offshore oil patch spends time divided between land, fixed platforms, and vessels, determination of seaman status turns into a numbers game. Specifically, the issue for the court is often what variables to include in the numerator and divisor to determine whether the thirty-percent threshold is met.
The district court in Lee v. Nacher Corporation[3] grants summary judgment in favor of Nacher Corporation that its offshore oil patch worker, Tom Lee, was not a seaman. Lee worked a total of 387 hours for Nacher. He spent 68% of his time either on land or on a fixed platform. He spent 22% of his employment with Nacher working on a vessel. The remaining time was spent on vessel being transported to a fixed platform (5%) or loading or unloading a vessel at a stationary platform (5%).[4] Therefore, if all of Lee’s time spent on a vessel was included, he would satisfy the thirty-percent guideline with a total of 32%.
However, the district court excluded the time Lee spent being transported on a crew boat to or from a fixed platform as well as his time loading or unloading a vessel at a fixed platform. The court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Munguia v. Chevron Company, U.S.A. (Munguia II),[5] to exclude the transport time.[6] The Munguia II court excluded the time that a roustabout spent using a “nautical motor pool” of Joboats, Lafitte skiffs, and Boston whalers to reach the fixed platforms to perform his work.[7] In Munguia II, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the injured roustabout “had no regular work duties aboard any vessel.”[8] Lee’s time being transported to a fixed platform similarly was not performed in service of a vessel and was, therefore, excluded.[9]
With regard to Lee’s time spent loading or unloading crew boats at fixed platforms, the district court holds that allotted time was devoted to the work on a fixed platform rather than a vessel.[10] Therefore, that time—even though partly aboard a vessel—was not counted toward the durational element of the substantial-connection test.[11]
Therefore, Lee spent at most 22% of his time employed with Nacher on vessels. The court granted summary judgment that Lee was not a seaman as a matter of law.[12] [end].
[1] Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 371, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2191 (1995)(“Generally, the Fifth Circuit seems to have identified an appropriate rule of thumb for the ordinary case: A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. This figure of course serves as no more than a guideline established by years of experience, and departure from it will certainly be justified in appropriate cases.”).
[2] Roberts v. Cardinal Services, Inc., et al., 266 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2001)(“Accordingly, we see no reason to depart from our well-established rule, as reaffirmed in Hufnagel and St. Romain, that a worker who fails to show that at least 30 percent of his time is spent on vessels under the common ownership or control of his employer is precluded from recovering as a seaman under the Jones Act.”)(internal citations omitted).
[3] 362 F.Supp. 3d 359 (E.D. La. 2019).
[5] 768 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1985)(Munguia II), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
[7] Munguia II, 768 F.2d at 653-654.
[8] Munguia II, 768 F.2d 649, 654.
[9] Lee, 362 F.Supp. 3d at 367.
[11] Id. at n. 49, citing Butcher v. Superior Offshore, 357 Fed. App'x 619, 620 (5th Cir. 2009)("[Plaintiff] worked thirty percent of his time on board the vessel but this included time spent for meals and breaks, which does not make [plaintiff] a seaman."); Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Ind., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 344-45 (5th Cir. 1999); Pearson v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., No. CIV. A. 91-3350, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15246, 1992 WL 300826, at *2-*3 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1992)(finding a plaintiff tasked with sandblasting and painting a platform was not a seaman because his time on a vessel attached to the platform did not contribute to the vessel's mission of providing sleeping and eating quarters to people working on the platform).
[12] Id. at 367-368.
If a worker changes assignment from land-based to vessel-based work, “…he is entitled to have the assessment of the substantiality of his vessel-related work made on the basis of his activities in his new position.”[1]
The change-of-assignment concept, however, may also apply in reverse. The district court in Ross v. W&T Offshore, Inc.[2] entered summary judgment that a galley hand/cook assigned to work on a fixed production platform was not a seaman despite prior work on vessels. Alton Ross worked for Bailey Support Services as a galley hand and cook for four months on W&T Offshore’s Ship Shoal 349-A prior to his claimed slip-and-fall injury. The SS 349-A, however, is not a vessel.[3] It is an oil production platform that for over two decades has been permanently affixed to the seafloor by eight pilings.[4]
Ross argued that his prior service for Bailey aboard four vessels owned by three different companies afforded him seaman status.[5] The district court rejected Ross’s arguments, holding that there was not a fact issue that Ross was permanently assigned to the SS 349-A, which, as a non-vessel, could not support seaman status.[6] Therefore, even if his prior work aboard four vessels owned by three different companies made him a seaman, which is unlikely, his assignment to a fixed production platform precludes seaman status.[7] [end].
[1] Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 372, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2191-92 (1995); see also
Wilcox v. Wild Well Control, Inc., 794 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2015)(“This reassignment exception applies only when an employee has ‘undergone a substantial change in status, not simply [by] serv[ing] on a boat sporadically.’”), citing Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 389 (5th Cir. 2003)(emphasis added).
[2] 357 F.Supp. 3d 554 (E.D. La. 2018)(Brown, J.).
[3] Id. at 563.
[5] Id. at 559.
[6] Id. at 564.
To be a seaman, (1) a worker’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission; and, (2) the worker’s connection to the vessel or identifiable group of vessels must be substantial “in both its duration and nature.”[1]
It is rare to see a summary disposition on the “nature” element of the substantial-connection prong. But that is what the Southern District of Texas did in Sanchez v. Enterprise Offshore Drilling, LLC, involving a contract welder injured offshore on a jacked-up drilling rig.[2]
Sanchez sued Enterprise and his employer, Smart Fabricators of Texas, LLC, in state court. Defendants removed to federal court arguing that Sanchez was not a seaman and the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCSLA because Sanchez’s injury occurred while the rig was jacked up on the Outer Continental Shelf.[3] Sanchez, on the other hand, argued he was a seaman, and, therefore, his case was not removable.[4]
Judge Rosenthal necessarily held that Enterprise’s jack-up rigs that Sanchez worked on were “vessels in navigation” despite being jacked-up at the time Sanchez worked on them.[5] The judge further held that—though Sanchez’s employer worked for different clients—Sanchez had the requisite durational connection to the two Enterprise jack-ups because he spent over 30% of his work days on those jack-ups.[6] But, Sanchez lacked a substantial connection to Enterprise’s vessels in terms of nature.[7]
The court credited Enterprise’s evidence that Sanchez only worked on those two rigs when they were jacked up, and, consequently, he was not exposed to sea-perils sufficient to satisfy the nature element.[8] The Court distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s Naquin case because the lift boat crane repair supervisor in Naquin was primarily shore-based but also performed parts of his job on moving vessels.[9] The evidence submitted did not show that Sanchez had a substantial connection to Enterprise’s rigs that regularly exposed him to the perils of the sea.[10] Therefore, Sanchez was not a seaman, and his suit was properly removed. On July 17, 2019, Sanchez filed a notice of appeal to the Fifth Circuit of Judge Rosenthal’s final judgment holding that Sanchez was not a seaman as a matter of law and dismissing his suit.[11] The parties briefs have been filed in the appeal, and a decision may be issued in early 2020. [end].
[1] Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 376, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 2194 (1995)(emphasis added).
[2] 376 F. Supp. 3d 726 (S.D. Tex. March 25, 2019).
[3] Id. at 728.
[4] Id., citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104; 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a).
[5] Id. at 731, citing Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2013)(jack-up rigs are considered vessels under maritime law)(additional citations omitted).
[6] Id. at 732 (“During those 67 days, Sanchez worked two days in a shop on land; 48 days on the Enterprise WFD 350, a jacked-up drilling rig next to a pier; and 13 days on the Enterprise 263, a jacked-up drilling rig offshore. (Id.). Because Sanchez spent more than 30% of his time working on the Enterprise WFD 350 and the Enterprise 263, he satisfies the minimum-duration requirement.”)(citations omitted).
[7] Id. at 732-733.
[8] Id., citing Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 137 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1997).
[9] Id. at 732, citing Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934-935 (5th Cir. 2014); see also 2018 Recent Developments at 382-384.
[10] Id at 733, citing Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 391 (the plaintiff, an intern, was not a seaman because his work "[did] not constitute the kind of regular or continuous commitment of his labor to the service to that vessel that regularly exposed him to the perils of the sea"); In re Buchanan Marine, L.P., 874 F.3d 356, 367-68 (2d Cir. 2017).
[11] 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101436 (June 18, 2019), notice of appeal filed, Cause No. 4:19-cv-00110, Doc. 30 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 2019).