Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105694/city-council-vs-taxpayers-vincent
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 07:15:10
Document Index: 798190347

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28']

City Council Vs Taxpayers for Vincent - Citation 105694 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
City Council Vs. Taxpayers for Vincent - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105694
Case Number 466 U.S. 789
Appellant City Council
Respondent Taxpayers for Vincent
city council v. taxpayers for vincent - 466 u.s. 789 (1984) u.s. supreme court city council v. taxpayers for vincent, 466 u.s. 789 (1984) members of the city council of the city of los angeles v. taxpayers for vincent no. 82-975 argued october 12, 1983 decided may 15, 1984 466 u.s. 789 appeal from united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus section 28.04 of the los angeles municipal code prohibits the posting of signs on public property. appellee taxpayers for vincent, a group of supporters of a candidate for election to the los angeles city council, entered into a contract with appellee candidates' outdoor graphics service (cogs) to fabricate and post signs with the candidate's name on them......
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent - 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
U.S. Supreme Court City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
1. The "overbreadth" doctrine is not applicable here. There is nothing in the record to indicate that § 28.04 will have any different impact on any third parties' interests in free speech than it has on appellees' interests, and appellees have failed to identify any significant difference between their claim that § 28.04 is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their signs during a political campaign. Thus, it is inappropriate to entertain an overbreadth challenge to § 28.04. Pp. 466 U. S. 796 -803.
2. Section 28.04 is not unconstitutional as applied to appellees' expressive activity. Pp. 466 U. S. 803 -817.
at the expense of others is not applicable here. Section 28.04's text is neutral -- indeed it is silent -- concerning any speaker's point of view, and the District Court's findings indicate that it has been applied to appellees and others in an evenhanded manner. It is within the City's constitutional power to attempt to improve its appearance, and this interest is basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 391 U. S. 377 . Pp. 466 U. S. 803 -805.
(b) Municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression. The problem addressed by § 28.04 -- the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property -- constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 . Pp. 466 U. S. 805 -807.
(c) Section 28.04 curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose of eliminating visual clutter. By banning posted signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. The rationale of Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 , which held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on public streets and sidewalks were invalid, is inapposite in the context of the instant case. Pp. 466 U. S. 808 -810.
(d) The validity of the City's esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment, and there is no predicate in the District Court's findings for the conclusion that the prohibition against the posting of appellees' signs fails to advance the City's esthetic interest. Pp. 466 U. S. 810 -812.
(e) While a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate, § 28.04 does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. The District Court's findings indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. P. 466 U. S. 812 .
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. Pp. 466 U. S. 813 -815.
(g) Although plausible policy arguments might well be made in support of appellees' suggestion that the City could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity like theirs -- such as by providing an exception for political campaign signs -- it does not follow that such an exception is constitutionally mandated, nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. To create an exception for appellees' political speech and not other types of protected speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. The City may properly decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding visual clutter justifies a removal of all signs creating or increasing that clutter. Pp. 466 U. S. 815 -817.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 466 U. S. 818 .
Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property. [ Footnote 1 ] The question presented
is whether that prohibition abridges appellees' freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 2 ] In March, 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. A group of his supporters known as Taxpayers for Vincent (Taxpayers) entered into a contract with a political sign service company known as Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with Vincent's name on them. COGS produced 15- by-44-inch cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations by draping them over crosswires
Acting under the authority of § 28.04 of the Municipal Code, employees of the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all posters attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance, including the COGS signs. The weekly sign removal report covering the period March 1-March 7, 1979, indicated that among the 1,207 signs removed from public property during that week, 48 were identified as "Roland Vincent" signs. Most of the other signs identified in that report were apparently commercial in character. [ Footnote 3 ]
On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers and COGS filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council as defendants. [ Footnote 4 ] They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, and granted the City's motion.
signs and handbills posted in violation of § 28.04 is assigned to the Street Use Inspection Division of the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance. The court found that both political and nonpolitical signs are illegally posted, and that they are removed "without regard to their content." [ Footnote 5 ]
After explaining the purposes for which the City's zoning code had been enacted and noting that the prohibition in § 28.04 furthered those purposes, the District Court found that the large number of illegally posted signs "constitute a clutter and visual blight." [ Footnote 6 ] With specific reference to the posting of the COGS signs on utility pole crosswires, the District Court found that such posting
"would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places. . . . [ Footnote 7 ]"
In addition, the District Court found that placing signs on utility poles creates a potential safety hazard, and that other violations of § 28.04 "block views and otherwise cause traffic hazards." [ Footnote 8 ] Finally, the District Court concluded that the sign prohibition does not prevent taxpayers or COGS
exercising their free speech rights on the public streets and in other public places; they remain free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry signs and to post their signs and handbills on their automobiles and on private property with the permission of the owners thereof. [ Footnote 9 ]"
In its conclusions of law, the District Court characterized the esthetic and economic interests in improving the beauty of the City "by eliminating clutter and visual blight" as "legitimate and compelling." [ Footnote 10 ] Those interests, together with the interest in protecting the safety of workmen who must scale utility poles and the interest in eliminating traffic hazards, adequately supported the sign prohibition as a reasonable regulation affecting the time, place, and manner of expression.
interference with the intended use of public property, and that regulation of the size, design, and construction of posters, or of the method of removing them, might be reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City had not justified its total ban. [ Footnote 11 ]
The seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional "on its face" did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), [ Footnote 12 ] and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938), [ Footnote 13 ] the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants' conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face because it was apparent.that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas. [ Footnote 14 ] In cases of this character, a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute
could never be applied in a valid manner. Such holdings [ Footnote 15 ] invalidated entire statutes, but did not create any exception from the general rule that constitutional adjudication requires a review of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court.
Subsequently, however, the Court did recognize an exception to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. This "overbreadth" doctrine has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). In that case, the Court concluded that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected. [ Footnote 16 ] The Court
has repeatedly held that such a statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it. [ Footnote 17 ] This exception from the general rule is predicated on
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 , 413 U. S. 612 (1973).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 615 (citation omitted). [ Footnote 18 ]
The concept of "substantial overbreadth" is not readily reduced to an exact definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. [ Footnote 19 ] On the contrary, the requirement of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself -- the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 , 458 U. S. 772 (1982) (footnote omitted).
In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 , 422 U. S. 216 (1975). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 , 436 U. S. 462 , n. 20 (1978); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 , 417 U. S. 760 -761 (1974).
Taxpayers and COGS apparently would agree that the prohibition against posting signs on most of the publicly owned objects mentioned in the ordinance is perfectly reasonable. Thus, they do not dispute the City's power to proscribe the attachment of any handbill or sign to any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, lamppost, hydrant, or lifesaving equipment. [ Footnote 20 ] Their
or their constituencies," [ Footnote 21 ] and emphasize the special value of free communication during political campaigns, see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 , 453 U. S. 555 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id. at 453 U. S. 550 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). In light of these arguments, appellees' attack on the ordinance is basically a challenge to the ordinance as applied to their activities. We therefore limit our analysis of the constitutionality of the ordinance to the concrete case before us, and now turn to the arguments that it is invalid as applied to the expressive activity of Taxpayers and COGS. [ Footnote 22 ]
The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City. [ Footnote 23 ] The application of the ordinance to appellees' expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their "freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities.
First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation. "
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 561 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). It has been clear since this Court's earliest decisions concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 , 249 U. S. 52 (1919).
As Stromberg and Lovell demonstrate, there are some purported interests -- such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas -- that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle that has emerged from this line of cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 , 463 U. S. 65 , 463 U. S. 72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530 , 447 U. S. 535 -536 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S. 462 -463 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 , 427 U. S. 63 -65, 427 U. S. 67 -68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , 408 U. S. 95 -96 (1972).
Id. at 391 U. S. 377 .
It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values. Thus, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 , 348 U. S. 32 -33 (1954), in referring to the power of the legislature to remove blighted housing, this Court observed that such housing may be "an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn." Ibid. We concluded:
Id. at 348 U. S. 33 (citation omitted). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 , 438 U. S. 129 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 , 416 U. S. 9 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365 , 272 U. S. 387 -388 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 , 214 U. S. 108 (1909).
In upholding an ordinance that prohibited loud and raucous sound trucks, the Court held that the State had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise. [ Footnote 24 ] In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), the Court upheld the city's prohibition of political advertising on its buses, stating that the city was entitled to protect unwilling viewers against intrusive advertising that may interfere with the city's goal of making its buses "rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive," id. at 418 U. S. 302 -303 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 418 U. S. 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 209 , and n. 5. These cases indicate that the municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression.
that this interest was sufficient to justify a prohibition of billboards, see id. at 453 U. S. 507 -508, 453 U. S. 510 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Stewart, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ.); id. at 453 U. S. 552 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id. at 453 U. S. 559 -561 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); id. at 453 U. S. 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 25 ] JUSTICE WHITE, writing for the plurality, expressly concluded that the city's esthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of billboards; San Diego's interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal. Id. at 453 U. S. 507 -508. [ Footnote 26 ]
We turn to the question whether the scope of the restriction on appellees' expressive activity is substantially broader than necessary to protect the City's interest in eliminating visual clutter. The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City's attempt to accomplish such a purpose is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 , 452 U. S. 647 -648 (1981); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61 , 452 U. S. 68 -71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 470 -471 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 , 408 U. S. 115 -117 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 98 . The District Court found that the signs prohibited by the ordinance do constitute visual clutter and blight. By banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy. [ Footnote 27 ] The plurality wrote in Metromedia:
453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 510 . The same is true of posted signs.
in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter. See id. at 308 U. S. 162 . Taxpayers contend that their interest in supporting Vincent's political campaign, which affords them a constitutional right to distribute brochures and leaflets on the public streets of Los Angeles, provides equal support for their asserted right to post temporary signs on objects adjacent to the streets and sidewalks. They argue that the mere fact that their temporary signs "add somewhat" to the city's visual clutter is entitled to no more weight than the temporary unsightliness of discarded handbills and the additional streetcleaning burden that were insufficient to justify the ordinances reviewed in Schneider.
308 U.S. at 308 U. S. 160 -161. In short, there is no constitutional impediment to "the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets." Id. at 308 U. S. 162 . A distributor of leaflets has no right simply to scatter his pamphlets in the air -- or to toss large quantities of paper from the window of a tall building or a low-flying airplane. Characterizing such an activity as a separate means of communication does not diminish the State's power to condemn it as a public nuisance. The right recognized in
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 , 318 U. S. 416 (1943); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 , 379 U. S. 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part).
The Court held, however, that the city could reasonably conclude that the esthetic interest was outweighed by the countervailing interest in one kind of advertising, even though it was not outweighed by the other. [ Footnote 28 ] So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City's appearance.
While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 647 , a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 , 461 U. S. 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 654 -655; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 535 ; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 , 431 U. S. 93 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited. [ Footnote 29 ] To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 , 362 U. S. 64 -65 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees' general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees' ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression. [ Footnote 30 ]
Appellees suggest that the public property covered by the ordinance either is itself a "public forum" for First Amendment purposes or at least should be treated in the same respect as the "public forum" in which the property is located. "Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection," United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 180 , and appellees maintain that their sign-posting activities are entitled to this protection.
In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 , 307 U. S. 515 -516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), it was recognized:
See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 115 ; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 , 394 U. S. 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 , 340 U. S. 293 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 308 U. S. 163 .
United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114 , 453 U. S. 129 (1981). Rather, the
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 44 (1983).
Lampposts can, of course, be used as signposts, but the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communication does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted. Cf. United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 131 . [ Footnote 31 ] Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 46 . Given our analysis of the legitimate interest served by the ordinance, its viewpoint neutrality, and the availability of alternative channels of communication, the ordinance is certainly constitutional as applied to appellees under this standard. [ Footnote 32 ]
might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 , 380 U. S. 34 -35 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves," that "Abortion is Murder," that every woman has the "Right to Choose," or that "Alcohol Kills" may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as "Roland Vincent -- City Council." See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 , 431 U. S. 231 -232 (1977). [ Footnote 33 ] To create an exception for appellees' political speech and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). Moreover, the volume of permissible postings under such a mandated exemption might so limit the ordinance's effect as to defeat its aim of combating visual blight.
As recognized in Metromedia, if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, "then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them." 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 508 . As is true of billboards, the esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptively at work in all parts of the city, including those where appellees posted their signs, and there is no basis in the record in this case upon which to rebut that presumption. These interests are both psychological and economic. The character of the environment affects the quality of life and the value of property in both residential and commercial areas. We hold that, on this record, these interests are sufficiently substantial to justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against the posting of appellees' temporary signs on public property, and that such an application of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S. 270 (1964). [ Footnote 34 ]
283 U.S. at 283 U. S. 369 -370.
"We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his assault by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing.' And the liberty of the press became initially a right to publish ' without a license what formerly could be published only with one.' While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision."
303 U.S. at 303 U. S. 451 -462 (footnote omitted).
Subsequent cases have continued to employ facial invalidation where it was found that every application of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas. See Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948) (ordinance prohibited use of loudspeaker in public places without permission of the chief of police, whose discretion was unlimited); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (ordinance required license to distribute religious literature without standards for the exercising of licensing discretion); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939) (ordinances prohibited distributing leaflets without a license and provided no standards for issuance of licenses); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 , 307 U. S. 516 (1939) (plurality opinion) (statute permitted city to deny permit for a public demonstration subject only to the uncontrolled discretion of the director of public safety).
310 U.S. at 310 U. S. 97 -98 (citation omitted).
"At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when 'no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,' Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 , 380 U. S. 491 (1965), the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing"
" id. at 380 U. S. 486 . This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression."
Id. at 405 U. S. 520 -521 (citations omitted). See also e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 , 380 U. S. 494 (1965).
See also CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 , 413 U. S. 580 -581 (1973).
However, where the statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth attack. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 , 422 U. S. 217 (1975).
The fact that the ordinance is capable of valid applications does not necessarily mean that it is valid as applied to these litigants. We may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive activity. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 , 435 U. S. 844 (1978). See also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U. S. 87 , 459 U. S. 96 -98 (1983); In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412 , 436 U. S. 433 -438 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 45 -48 68-74 (1976) (per curiam); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , 408 U. S. 100 -101 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 , 394 U. S. 566 -567 (1969); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 , 389 U. S. 264 , 389 U. S. 267 (1967); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 , 389 U. S. 222 -223 (1967); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 , 357 U. S. 462 -465 (1968).
336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 86 -87 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court agreed with this analysis. See id. at 336 U. S. 96 -97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 336 U. S. 97 -98 (Jackson, J., concurring).
The Court of Appeals relied on JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion concurring in the judgment in Metromedia to support its conclusion that the City's interest in esthetics was not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the constitutional interest in free expression unless the City proved that it had undertaken a comprehensive and coordinated effort to remove other elements of visual clutter within San Diego. This reliance was misplaced, because JUSTICE BRENNAN's analysis was expressly rejected by a majority of the Court. Moreover, JUSTICE BRENNAN was concerned that the San Diego ordinance might not, in fact, have a substantial salutary effect on the appearance of the city because it did not ameliorate other types of visual clutter beside billboards, see 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 530 -534, thus suggesting that, in fact, it had been applied to areas where it did not advance the interest in esthetics sufficiently to justify an abridgment of speech.
In Metromedia, a majority of the Court concluded that a prohibition on billboards was narrowly tailored to the visual evil San Diego sought to correct. See 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 510 -512 (plurality opinion); id. at 453 U. S. 549 -553 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id. at 453 U. S. 560 -561 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); id. at 453 U. S. 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 511 .
Id. at 453 U. S. 512 . THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS agreed with the plurality on this point. Id. at 453 U. S. 541 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id. at 453 U. S. 563 -564 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); id. at 453 U. S. 570 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
Although the Court has shown special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large segment of the citizenry, see, e.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S. 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"), this solicitude has practical boundaries, see, e.g., Kovac v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 , 336 U. S. 88 -89 (1949) ("That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks . . . is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open"). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 549 -550 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part) (ban on graffiti constitutionally permissible even though some creators of graffiti may have no equally effective alternative means of public expression).
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 , 385 U. S. 47 (1966).
United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114 , 453 U. S. 132 (1981), and this is particularly true in cases falling between the paradigms of government property interests essentially mirroring analogous private interests and those clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent convention, for the use of citizens at large.
See generally Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 , 389 U. S. 223 (1967).
The plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 (1981), concluded that the City of San Diego could, consistently with the First Amendment, restrict the commercial use of billboards in order to "preserve and improve the appearance of the City." Id. at 453 U. S. 493 . Today, the Court sustains the constitutionality of Los Angeles' similarly motivated ban on the posting of political signs on public property. Because the Court's lenient approach towards the restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the protections of the First Amendment, I dissent.
The Court finds that the City's "interest [in eliminating visual clutter] is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees' expression," and that the effect of the ordinance on speech is "no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's purpose." Ante at 466 U. S. 805 . These are the right questions to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, see Metromedia, supra, at 453 U. S. 525 -527 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 , 452 U. S. 656 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but the answers that the Court provides reflect a startling insensitivity to the principles embodied in the First Amendment. In my view, the City of Los Angeles has not shown that its interest in eliminating "visual clutter" justifies its restriction of appellees' ability to communicate with the local electorate.
In deciding this First Amendment question, the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of communication must not be overlooked. Use of this medium of communication is particularly valuable, in part, because it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer. There may be alternative channels of communication, but the prevalence of a large number of signs in Los Angeles [ Footnote 2/1 ] is a strong indication that, for many speakers, those alternatives are far less satisfactory. Cf. Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 , 420 U. S. 556 (1975).
Similarly, the adequacy of distributing handbills is dubious, despite certain advantages of handbills over signs. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S. 145 -146 (1943). Particularly when the message to be carried is best expressed by a few words or a graphic image, a message on a sign will typically reach far more people than one on a handbill. The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent distributing them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted on public property are doubtless "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people," id. at 319 U. S. 146 , and their prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of communication. Cf. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 233, 257. Because the City has completely banned the use of this particular medium of communication, and because, given the circumstances, there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must examine with particular care the justifications that the City proffers for its ban. See Metromedia, supra, at 453 U. S. 525 -527 (BRENNAN, J., concurring
in judgment); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 , 431 U. S. 93 (1977).
As the Court acknowledges, ante at 466 U. S. 805 , when an ordinance significantly limits communicative activity,
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 , 308 U. S. 161 (1939). The Court's first task is to determine whether the ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U. S. 530 , 447 U. S. 540 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , 408 U. S. 99 (1972). If the restriction is content-neutral, the court's task is to determine (1) whether the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater than is essential to further that objective. Unless both conditions are met, the restriction must be invalidated. See ante at 466 U. S. 805 , 466 U. S. 808 , 466 U. S. 810 . [ Footnote 2/2 ]
453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 531 . I adhere to that view. Its correctness -- premised largely on my concern that aesthetic interests are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to evaluate is, for me, reaffirmed by this case.
in terms like "proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression," ante at 466 U. S. 806 -- creates difficulties for a reviewing court in fulfilling its obligation to ensure that government regulation does not trespass upon protections secured by the First Amendment. The source of those difficulties is the unavoidable subjectivity of aesthetic judgments -- the fact that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." As a consequence of this subjectivity, laws defended on aesthetic grounds raise problems for judicial review that are not presented by laws defended on more objective grounds -- such as national security, public health, or public safety. [ Footnote 2/3 ] In practice, therefore, the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a reviewing court meaningfully to make the required inquiries. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
of the aesthetic environment are important governmental functions, and that some restrictions on speech may be necessary to carry out these functions. Metromedia, supra, at 453 U. S. 530 . But a governmental interest in aesthetics cannot be regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction of speech based on an assertion that the content of the speech is, in itself, aesthetically displeasing. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Because aesthetic judgments are so subjective, however, it is too easy for government to enact restrictions on speech for just such illegitimate reasons, and to evade effective judicial review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not solely communicative -- for example, its sound, its appearance, or its location. An objective standard for evaluating claimed aesthetic judgments is therefore essential; for without one, courts have no reliable means of assessing the genuineness of such claims.
For example, in evaluating the ordinance before us in this case, the City might be pursuing either of two objectives, motivated by two very different judgments. One objective might be the elimination of "visual clutter," attributable in whole or in part to signs posted on public property. The aesthetic judgment underlying this objective would be that the clutter created by these signs offends the community's desire for an orderly, visually pleasing environment. A second objective might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the signs. [ Footnote 2/5 ] In that case, the aesthetic judgment would be that the signs' messages are themselves displeasing. The first objective is lawful, of course, but the second is not. Yet the City might easily mask the second
No one doubts the importance of a general governmental interest in aesthetics, but in order to justify a restriction of speech, the particular objective behind the restriction must be substantial. E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 , 461 U. S. 177 (1983); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 45 (1983); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 391 U. S. 377 (1968). Therefore, in order to uphold a restriction of speech imposed to further an aesthetic objective, a court must ascertain the substantiality of the specific objective pursued. Although courts ordinarily defer to the government's assertion that its objective is substantial, that assertion is not immune from critical examination. See, e.g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, supra, at 452 U. S. 72 -73. This is particularly true when aesthetic objectives underlie the restrictions. But in such cases, independent judicial assessment of the substantiality of the government's interest is difficult. Because aesthetic judgments are entirely subjective, the government may too easily overstate the substantiality of its goals. Accordingly, unless courts carefully scrutinize
The ease with which means can be equated with aesthetic ends only confirms the importance of close judicial scrutiny of the substantiality of such ends. See supra at 466 U. S. 824 -825. In this case, for example, it is essential that the Court assess the City's ban on signs by evaluating whether the City has a substantial interest in eliminating the visual clutter caused by all posted signs throughout the City -- as distinguished from an interest in banning signs in some areas or in preventing densely packed signs. If, in fact, either of the latter two objectives constitute the substantial interest underlying this ordinance, they could be achieved by means far less restrictive
Ante at 466 U. S. 807 . Then, addressing the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the Court can do little more than state the unsurprising conclusion that, "[b]y banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." Ante at 466 U. S. 808 . Finally, as if to explain the ease with which it reaches its conclusion, the Court notes that,
Ante at 466 U. S. 810 . But, as I have demonstrated, it is precisely the ability of the State to make this judgment that should lead us to approach these cases with more caution.
and thereby determine whether the means selected are the least restrictive ones for achieving the objective. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
This does not mean that a government must address all aesthetic problems at one time, or that a government should hesitate to pursue aesthetic objectives. What it does mean, however, is that, when such an objective is pursued, it may not be pursued solely at the expense of First Amendment freedoms, nor may it be pursued by arbitrarily discriminating against a form of speech that has the same aesthetic characteristics as other forms of speech that are also present in the community. See Metromedia, supra, at 453 U. S. 531 -534 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment).
In light of the extreme stringency of Los Angeles' ban -- barring all signs from being posted -- and its wide geographical scope -- covering the entire City -- it might be difficult for Los Angeles to make the type of showing I have suggested. Cf. Metromedia, supra, at 453 U. S. 533 -534. A more limited approach to the visual clutter problem, however, might well pass constitutional muster. I have no doubt that signs posted on public property in certain areas -- including, perhaps, parts of Los Angeles -- could contribute to the type of eyesore that a city would genuinely have a substantial interest in eliminating. These areas might include parts of the City that are particularly pristine, reserved for certain uses, designated to reflect certain themes, or so blighted that broad-gauged renovation is necessary. Presumably, in these types of areas, the City would also regulate the aesthetic environment in ways other than the banning of temporary signs. The City might zone such areas for a particular type of development or lack of development; it might actively create a particular type of environment; it might be especially vigilant in keeping the area clean; it might regulate the size and location of permanent signs; or it might reserve particular locations, such as kiosks, for the posting of temporary signs. Similarly, Los Angeles might be able to attack its visual clutter problem in more areas of the City by reducing the stringency of the ban, perhaps by regulating the density of temporary signs, and coupling that approach with additional measures designed to reduce other forms of visual clutter. There are a variety of ways that the aesthetic environment can be regulated, some restrictive of speech and others not, but it is only when aesthetic regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we can ensure that the
In the absence of such a showing in this case, I believe that Los Angeles' total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches so completely on appellees' use of an important medium of political expression that it must be struck down as violative of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 2/7 ]
Of course, a content-neutral restriction must also leave open ample alternative avenues of communication. See supra at 466 U. S. 819 -820, and this page.