Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2011cv01584/634802/17
Timestamp: 2017-05-29 19:33:23
Document Index: 633317451

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 502', '§ 502', '§502', '§ 1132', '§ 1202', '§ 502', '§ 1132', '§ 1132', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§\n502', '§ 502', '§ 502', '§502', '§502']

AMENDED ORDER re 16 Order - granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss 7 Plaintiff's Second and Third Claims for Relief and the request for § 502 for Haug v. Midstate Mechanical Incorporated et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Haug v. Midstate Mechanical Incorporated et al
AMENDED ORDER re 16 Order - granting Defendants Motion to Dismiss 7 Plaintiff's Second and Third Claims for Relief and the request for § 502(c) damages found in the First Claim for Relief. Granting Plaintiff leave to amend the C omplaint with respect to the First Claim for Relief. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within ten (10) days of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within that time, the Court will not consider his request for §502(c) damages. Signed by Judge James A Teilborg on 2/23/12. (DMT)
Midstate Mechanical, Inc., an Arizona)
corporation; Midstate Mechanical)
Nonqualified Defined Contribution Plan;)
Midstate Mechanical Nonqualified)
Jon Haug,
No. CV-11-01584-PHX-JAT
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 7.) The Court now
rules on the motion.
On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff Jon Haug filed a Complaint against Defendants
Midstate Mechanical, Inc., Midstate Mechanical Nonqualified Defined Contribution Plan,
and Midstate Mechanical Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s
Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, including an order that Defendants violated 29
U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1); damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and
for an accounting of funds. Id. at 6-8. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
on the basis that they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 7.) In his
response, Plaintiff concedes that his claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and for an accounting should be dismissed. (Doc. 9 at 1.)
The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) for two
reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory and 2) insufficient facts alleged under a
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual allegations
of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Id.
Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004)).
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions will
not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts
that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
Section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
creates an “exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990). Section 502(a)(1) permits a participant or beneficiary
to recover the relief provided for in § 502(c). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A). Section
502(c)(1)(B) provides, in part, that a plan administrator “who fails or refuses to comply with
a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to
furnish to a participant or beneficiary . . . may in the court’s discretion be personally liable
to such participant or beneficiary . . . . ” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
ERISA § 502(c)
As the plain language of § 502(c)(1) indicates, a remedy only exists if there is a
violation of a participant or beneficiary’s right to information under ERISA. See Williams
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 944 F.2d 658, 667 (9th Cir. 1991). Absent a violation of an ERISA-
provided right, § 502(c)(1) does not provide any relief.
Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s Second and Third Claims for Relief should be
dismissed. Accordingly, the Court now addresses only Plaintiff’s request for § 502(c)
damages found in his First Claim for Relief.
In evaluating Defendants’ motion for dismissal, the Court construes the facts alleged
in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege a claim for a § 502(c) violation. Plaintiff argues that paragraph 23 of the
Complaint and pages 2-3 of its attached Exhibit 6 serve as adequate pleading. Accepting the
facts alleged as true, then Plaintiff has shown that he filed an appeal of Defendants’ claim
denial and that he asked for “all documents showing how the Committee was constituted,
who made the determination who would be on the Committee, the board resolution
appointing the Committee and any minutes or documents that reflect any determination by
the Committee,” as well “copies of the board minutes.” (Doc. 1-1 at 41-42.)
For Plaintiff to adequately plead a claim under § 502(c)(1), Plaintiff must allege that
his request for documents was made pursuant to a statutory right and that the plan
administrator wrongfully refused or denied such request in violation of that right. These two
requirements must be met to show a valid claim for relief under § 502(c)(1). Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to allege any statutory basis for his request for documents, fails to allege that
the plan administrator denied his request or failed to provide the requested documents, and
fails to allege that this failure was a violation of the an ERISA statute. There is no “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
Because the Complaint fails to specify the necessary elements of a claim for relief under §
502(c)(1), it lacks both a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts upon which relief can
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim for § 502(c) damages and
that request for relief will be dismissed.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend its pleading with
either the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. “The court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962) (“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be
a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the
merits.”). A party who moves for leave to amend “must attach a copy of the proposed
amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion or stipulation . . .” L. R. CIV. P. 15.1.
Though leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” FED. R. CIV.
P. 15(a), “it may be denied if the proposed amendment either lacks merit or would not serve
any purpose because to grant it would be futile in saving the plaintiff’s suit.” Universal
Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 799 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth
Circuit has denied leave to amend where “the movant presents no new facts but only new
theories and provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his
contentions originally.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). In making the
legal determination that an amended complaint is futile, a court may examine the merits of
the case. See Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 785 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff’s Response asks this Court to “permit [Plaintiff] an opportunity to amend to
set out with more specificity what is alleged clearly in Exhibit 6 of the Complaint.” (Doc. 9
at 2.) Because leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, the Court treats
this request as a motion for leave to amend the Complaint with respect to the First Claim for
Relief, even though Plaintiff has not complied with Local Rule 15.1. Defendant argues that
granting leave to amend would be futile and that this Court should not grant such leave. This
Court cannot conclude that it would be futile for Plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff
asserts that a valid claim can be alleged “with more specificity,” (Doc 9 at 2), and it is
possible that Plaintiff can allege facts and statutory violations that satisfy the pleading
standard. Because, at this point, the Court cannot say with certainty that amendment would
be futile, the Court will give Plaintiff leave to amend.
IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) Plaintiff’s
Second and Third Claims for Relief and the request for § 502(c) damages found in the First
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint with
respect to the First Claim for Relief. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within ten (10)
days of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within that time, the Court
will not consider his request for §502(c) damages.1
The Court amends its earlier Order to make clear that if Plaintiff fails to file an
Amended Complaint, the case will still proceed on his First Claim for Relief for declaratory
relief, just without the request for §502(c) damages.