Source: http://fredericborel.blogspot.com/2018/04/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 22:45:57
Document Index: 757103507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§1', '§201', '§213', '§207', '§213', '§779', '§176']

Frédéric Borel: April 2018
Posted by Frédéric Borel at 2:21 PM No comments:
Posted by Frédéric Borel at 1:56 PM No comments:
Judicial independence: Declaration of Independence: Art. III Court: Common law:
We sometimes take it for granted today that independent judges will hear our cases and controversies. But it wasn’t always so. Before the Revolution, colonial judges depended on the crown for their tenure and salary and often enough their decisions followed their interests. The problem was so serious that the founders cited it in their Declaration of Independence. Once free, the framers went to great lengths to guarantee a degree of judicial independence for future generations that they themselves had not experienced. Under the Constitution, judges “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and their “Compensation . . . shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” Art. III, §1. The framers knew that “a fixed provision” for judges’ financial support would help secure “the independence of the judges,” be-cause “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.” The Federalist No. 79, p. 472 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). They were convinced, too, that “periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to the courts’ necessary independence.” The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. Hamilton).
“When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789 . . . and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with” Article III judges endowed with the protections for their independence the framers thought so important. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).
(U.S.S.C., April 24, 2018, Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, Docket No. 16-712, J. Gorsuch, dissenting)
Les sources de l'indépendance de la justice, Art. III, §1 de la Constitution fédérale (The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office).
Labels: Art. III Court, Common law, Declaration of Independence, Gorsuch, Independence of justice
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, Docket No. 16-1362
Labor: Fair Labor Standards Act: Overtime compensation:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees. The FLSA exempts from the overtime-pay requirement “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership. §213(b)(10)(A). We granted certiorari to decide whether this exemption applies to service advisors—employees at car dealerships who consult with customers about their servicing needs and sell them servicing solutions. We conclude that service advisors are exempt.
Enacted in 1938, the FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to covered employees who work more than 40hours in a week. 29 U. S. C. §207(a). But the FLSA exempts many categories of employees from this requirement. See §213. Employees at car dealerships have long been among those exempted.
(…) In 2011, however, the Department reversed course. It issued a rule that interpreted “salesman” to exclude service advisors. 76 Fed. Reg. 18832, 18859 (2011) (codified at 29 CFR §779.372(c)). That regulation prompted this litigation (…) We explained that courts cannot defer to the 2011 rule because it is procedurally defective. See Encino I, 579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–12).
(…) The parties agree that petitioner is a “nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling automobiles to ultimate purchasers.” The parties also agree that a service advisor is not a “partsman” or “mechanic,” and that a service advisor is not “primarily engaged . . . in selling automobiles.” The question, then, is whether service advisors are “salesmen. . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” We conclude that they are. Under the best reading of the text, service advisors are “salesmen,” and they are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” The distributive canon, the practice of construing FLSA exemptions narrowly, and the legislative history do not persuade us otherwise.
Secondary authorities: Dept. of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles 33 (3d ed. 1965) (defining “partsman” as someone who “purchases, stores, and issues spare parts for automotive and industrial equipment”); In the dissent (fn. 3): D. VanDeusen, Labor and Employment Law §176.02[1] (2018).
(U.S.S.C., April 2, 2018, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, Docket No. 16-1362, J. Thomas)
La loi fédérale FLSA prévoit un système d'indemnisation des heures supplémentaires à charge de l'employeur. Les employés du domaine automobile engagés dans la vente ou dans la fourniture de services ne sont pas protégés par dite loi. En l'espèce, la Cour juge que les conseillers à la clientèle des points de vente et réparations ne sont pas protégés non plus.
La présente affaire rappelle que FLSA, qui date de l'année 1938, impose aux employeurs du personnel couvert par la loi d'indemniser le temps de travail supplémentaire quand l'employé travaille plus de 40 heures par semaine. Dite loi contient cependant de nombreuses exceptions.
Labels: Fair Labor Standards Act, Labor law, Overtime compensation, Thomas