Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=7722
Timestamp: 2020-01-18 12:02:57
Document Index: 98768526

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 136', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\t136', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\n136', 'Art. 226']

D.P. MAHESHWARI versus DELHI ADMN. & ORS
1984 AIR 153	1983 SCR (3) 949 1983 SCC (4) 293	1983 SCALE (2)313
D.P. MAHESHWARI V. DELHI ADMN. & ORS [1983] RD-SC 123 (14 September 1983)
CITATION: 1984 AIR 153	1983 SCR (3) 949 1983 SCC (4) 293	1983 SCALE (2)313
R	1984 SC1164	(20) R	1984 SC1683	(1) D	1988 SC 329	(7,15)
Industrial Disputes Act-Adjudication of disputes-Duty of Tribunals	and Courts while deciding	Preliminary Questions.
Constitution of India-Arts. 226	and 136-Nature of jurisdiction-Courts not	to be	too astute to interfere with exercise of	jurisdiction by Special tribunals	at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.
An industrial dispute concerning	the termination of services of the appellant	in 1969 was referred	for adjudication by the Labour Court under ss. 10 (1) (c) and 12 (5) of	the Industrial	Disputes Act in the year 1970. The Management of	the company in which he was employed questioned the	reference itself by filing a petition under Art. 226 and when it was rejected, the Management raised a preliminary contention	before the Labour Court that	the appellant was not a 'workman' and therefore the reference was incompetent. The Labour Court, after a detailed	and careful examination of the oral and documentary evidence produced by both the appellant and the Management came to the conclusion that the appellant was a 'workman' under s. 2 (s) of the Act	as he	was employed mainly for clerical duties. This finding was challenged by the Management once again by filing a petition under Art. 226 and a Single Judge of the	High Court allowed the same and quashed the order of the Labour Court as well as the reference made by	the Government. On his appeal having been rejected by a Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant approached this Court under Art. 136.
HELD: The	nature of jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and	not appellate	while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory	but the Court may exercise	all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction	neither the High Court	nor this Court is required	to be	too astute to interfere with the exercise	of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues. [951 G-H] Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary	objections and	journeyings up and down.
Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must 950 ask themselves	whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will	not lead to other woeful consequences. There was	a time	when it was thought prudent and wise to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy.
It is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating Labour	disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of	them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the	exercise of their jurisdiction	under Art. 226 stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issues may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 nor the	jurisdiction of	this Court under Art 136 may be allowed	to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136 are not	meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. [951 F, C-D] The instant case relates	to a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication in 1970 which is still at the stage of decision of a preliminary objection. The Labour Court considered the entire evidence and recorded a positive finding that appellant who was discharging duties of a clerical nature	was a	'workman'. The	Single Judge of the High Court did not refer to a single item of evidence while reversing the finding of the Labour Court. He appeared to differ from the Labour Court on a question of fact on the basis of a generalisation without reference	to specific evidence. The Division Bench which affirmed the judgment of the Single Judge also read the judgment of the Labour Court in a similar unfair fashion and did not consider any of the evidence considered by the	Labour Court and	yet characterised the conclusion	of the Labour Court as perverse. No appellate Court is entitled to do that less so, a Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
[951 C, 953 B, 954 C-D, 955 C]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3844 of 1983.
Appeal by	Special leave from the	Judgment and Order dated the 25th July, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A.
No. 89 of 1976.
A.K. Gupta for the Appellant.
G.B. Pai,	S.N.	Bhandari and	Ashok	Grover	for Respondent. No. 3.
R.N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 951 CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. It was just the other day that we were bemoaning	the unbecoming	devices adopted	by certain employers to avoid decision	of industrial	disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry	the matter to the High Court under Art. 226 of the	Constitution and to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of	the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating	in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage	of decision on a preliminary objection.	There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first.
But the	time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with	the task of	adjudicating labour disputes where	delay may lead	to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues.
Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them.
Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Art. 226 and Art. 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are	requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold	part-adjudication is really necessary	and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like Industrial	Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections journeyings	up and	down. It is also worth while remembering that	the nature of	the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art.	136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all	necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise	of jurisdiction by special tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.
952 Having sermonised	this much, we may now	proceed to state the facts which	provoked the sermon. The appellant D.P. Maheshwari	was an	employee of Toshniwal Brothers Pvt.
Ltd., when his services were terminated with effect	from 28th July 1969. He raised an industrial dispute and on 3rd July 1970 the Lt. Governor of Delhi referred the dispute for adjudication to	the Additional	Labour	Court	Delhi under sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The dispute referred for adjudication to the Labour Court was, "Whether the termination	of services of Shri	D.P.
Maheshwari is illegal and/or unjustified and if so to what relief is he entitled	and what directions are necessary in this respect ?" The Management straightaway questioned the reference by filing Writ petition No.	159 of	1972 in the Delhi High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on 22nd May 1972. Thereafter the management raised a	preliminary contention before the Labour Court that D.P. Maheshwari was not a 'workman' within	the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the reference was therefore incompetent. The Labour Court	tried the question whether D.P. Maheshwari	was a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial	Disputes Act as a preliminary issue.	Both parties	adduced oral	and documentary evidence. After referring to the evidence of the employee's witnesses the Labour Court said, "Thus according to	the evidence of the claimant's witnesses the claimant was employed mainly for clerical duties	and he	did discharge the same." The Labour Court then referred to the evidence of the witnesses examined by the management and said, "Thus the said evidence falls far short of proving that the claimant	was in fact discharging mainly Administrative of supervisory duties." The Labour Court then	proceeded to refer to the documents produced by the management and observed, "Thus the documents filed by the respondent do not go to	show that the real nature	of the duties discharged by the claimant	was supervisory or	administrative in nature." The Labour Court next referred to what	it considered to be an admission on the part of the management who had classified all their employees into three separate	classes A, B and C, Class-A described as 'Managerial' Class-B described as 'Supervisory' and Class-C described as 'Other Staff'. The name of D.P.
Maheshwari was	shown in Class-C. After reviewing the entire evidence the Labour Court finally recorded the following finding:
"From the above discussion,	it is clear that the claimant's evidence shows that he was doing mainly 953 clerical work of maintaining	certain registers preparing drafts and seeking instructions from	the superiors and respondents' lawyers during the period of his services though designated Accounts	Officer or officer in	special duty	or store purchase officer .......................................................
As a result, in my opinion it has to be held that the nature of	the main duties being	discharged by	the claimant was clerical	and not supervisory	or administrative despite his designation	as officer.
Accordingly, he has to be held to be a workman under section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act." The management was dissatisfied with the	decision of the Labour Court on the preliminary issue. So, they invoked the High Court's extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the	Constitution. A	learned single	judge of the	High Court, by his judgment dated 12th July 1976 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of the Labour Court and the reference made	by the	Government. A Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the decision of the Single Judge on 25th July 1980. The matter	is now	before us at the instance of the workman who obtained special leave to appeal under Art.
136 on	4th April 1983. The services of the workman	were terminated on 28th July 1969. A year later the dispute was referred to the Labour	Court	for adjudication. Thirteen years thereafter the matter is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary question. In our view, further comment is needless.
Shri A.K.	Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that	the High Court literally exercised appellate powers and recorded findings of fact	differing from those recorded by the Labour	Court and this, he complained, had been done by an unfair reading of the order of the Labour Court and without the High Court itself considering a single item of	evidence or document. We are afraid there is considerable force in Shri Gupta's criticism.
Curiously enough,	the Learned Single Judge of the High Court affirmed	the finding of the Labour Court that D.P.
Maheshwari was	not employed in a supervisory capacity. He said, "In the face of this material and the admitted hypothesis the conclusion that the respondent was not 954 mainly employed in a supervisory capacity is certainly a possible	conclusion that may be arrived at by any Tribunal duly instructed in the law as to the manner in which the	status of an employee may be determined. It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to disturb such a conclusion having regard to the limited admit of review of the impugned order." Having so held, the Learned Single Judge went on to consider whether the workman was discharging duties of a clerical nature. He found that it would be difficult to say that D.P.
Maheswari was discharging 'routine duties of	a clerical nature	which	did not involve initiative,	imagination, creativity and	a limited power of self direction.'	The Learned Single	Judge did not refer to a single item of evidence in support of the conclusions thus recorded by him.
He appeared to differ from the Labour Court on a question of fact on	the basis of a generalisation without reference to specific evidence. No appellate court is entitled to do that, less so, a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction.
Referring to the finding of the Labour Court that	the workman was discharging mainly	clerical duties the Learned Single Judge observed, "It is erroneous to presume, as was apparently done	by the Additional Labour Court, that merely because	the respondent did	not perform substantially supervisory functions,	he must belong to the clerical category." This	was an unfair reading of the Labour Court's judgment. We have earlier extracted the relevant findings of the Labour Court. The	Labour Court not only found that the workman was not performing supervisory functions but also expressly found that the workman was discharging duties of a clerical nature. The Division	Bench	which affirmed	the judgment of the Learned Single Judge also read the judgment of the	Labour	Court	in a similar	unfair	fashion	and observed." It is no doubt true that the Labour Court held that the appellant's evidence	showed	that he was doing mainly clerical	work. As we read the order as a whole it appears that in arriving at this conclusion the Labour Court was greatly influenced by the fact that the appellant was not employed in a supervisory capacity." We have already pointed out that the Labour Court did not infer that the appellant was discharging duties of a clerical nature from the mere circumstance that	he was not	discharging supervisory functions.	The Labour Court considered the entire evidence	and recorded a positive finding that	the appellant was 955 discharging duties of a clerical nature. The finding	was distinct from	the finding that the	appellant was	not discharging supervisory	function as claimed by the company.
We would further like to add that the circumstance that the appellant was not discharging	supervisory functions	was itself a very strong circumstance from which it could be legitimately inferred that he	was discharging	duties of a clerical nature. If the Labour Court	had drawn such an inference it would have been well justified in doing so.
But, as	we said, the Labour Court considered	the entire evidence and recorded a positive finding that the workman was discharging duties of a clerical	nature. The Division Bench, we are sorry to say, did not	consider any of the evidence considered by the	Labour Court and	yet characterised the conclusion	of the Labour Court as perverse. The	only evidence	which the Division Bench considered was	that of	M.W.I.Shri K.K. Sabharwal and under the impression	that the Labour Court had not considered the evidence of K.K. Sabharwal, the Division Bench observed.
"The non-reference to the said evidence while discussing the point in issue, would	clearly vitiate	the order to	the Labour Court." This was again incorrect since we find that the Labour Court did consider the evidence of M.W.I fully.
Shri G.B.	Pai, Learned Counsel for the company, drew our attention to the qualifications of the appellant	and certain letters	written by him to the Managing Director and argued that the qualifications	and the letters indicated that the appellant was discharging duties, not of a clerical nature but those of a	senior	executive closely in	the confidence of the Managing Director. We are enable to agree with Mr. Pai. First, we are not prepared to go behind the finding of fact arrived at by the	Labour	Court which certainly was based on relevant evidence and next, all that we can	say from the qualifications and the letters is that the appellant was occasionally deputed by the Managing Director to undertake some important missions. The question is what	were his main duties and not whether he	was occasionally entrusted	with other work. On that question, the clear finding of the Labour Court is that he was mainly discharging duties of a clerical nature.
We are clearly of	the opinion that the High Court was totally unjustified in interfering with the order of	the Labour Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We	set aside the judgments of	the Learned Single Judge and	the Division Bench of the Delhi High 956 Court, restore	the order of the Additional Labour Court and direct	the Additional	Labour	Court	to dispose of	the reference within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order to that Court. That appellant is entitled to his costs	which we stipulate at	Rupees	five thousand.