Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-church-17
Timestamp: 2018-12-13 06:25:13
Document Index: 571786470

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 846', '§ 856', '§ 856', '§ 2421', '§ 841', '§ 846']

U.S. v. Church, 970 F.2d 401 | Casetext
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh CircuitAug 12, 1992
…See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 [ 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656] (1969).United States…
…Our case law holds that, under § 856, the illicit use need not be the sole purpose. United States v. Church,…
finding the evidence sufficient when it "established significant commercial sales"
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Baumgardner
approving district court&apos;s decision to permit a government informant to testify while referring to notes prepared by government agent who interviewed him after his undercover drug buys
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Darden
rejecting argument that government cannot obtain a conviction under § 856 if drug distribution is "but one of several uses of a residence"
Decided August 12, 1992.
Frank J. Gray (argued), Beckman, Lawson, Sandler, Snyder Federoff, Fort Wayne, Ind., James P. Casey, Bowers, Harrison, Kent Miller, Evansville, Ind., James S. Stephenson, Kenneth Collier-Magar, Stephenson Kurnik, Indianapolis, Ind., and Francis H. Lueken, Ferdinand, Ind., for defendants-appellants.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and VAN SICKLE, Senior District Judge.
Hon. Bruce M. Van Sickle of the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.
Jimmy Lee Church and two co-defendants, Joe Surry and Andre Spence, were indicted on various drug and firearm charges. Following a joint trial, Church was convicted of the following: (1) Count Three — conspiracy to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 841(a)(1); (2) Count Four — possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) Count Five — opening or maintaining a place at 3618 S. Barr Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana, for the purpose of distributing cocaine base, crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); (4) Count Six — opening or maintaining a place at 530 E. Leith Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana, for the purpose of distributing cocaine base, crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1); and (5) Count Seven — conspiracy to open or maintain a place at 244 E. Suttenfield Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana, for the purpose of distributing cocaine base, crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 856(a)(1). Thereafter, Church was sentenced to a total of 108 months imprisonment. On appeal, Church contends that the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress, (2) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, (3) failing to merge two counts, (4) refusing to give an instruction, and (5) failing to make certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
II. ANALYSIS [7] A. Motion to Suppress
Church brought a motion to suppress his statements and physical evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. Following an evidentiary hearing the district court denied the motion. See United States v. Church, No. FCR 90-25 (N.D.Ind. Mar. 26, 1991) (order denying motion to suppress). The district court's factual determinations made in denying Church's motion to suppress will be accepted unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524, 1529 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1628, 113 L.Ed.2d 724 (1991). Whether Church's confession was voluntary "is a question of law, and as such is subject to de novo review." Id.
The psychological pressure complained of was the atmosphere of the arrest scene. An armed S.W.A.T. team had stormed into the house and ordered everyone to the floor. The numerous law enforcement personnel created noise and confusion. Also, Church claims that while lying on the kitchen floor, he witnessed the police kicking codefendant Spence. However, as the district court found, Church was not threatened in any manner during his detention and interrogation, nor was he questioned by anyone other than Agent Cronin.
462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). See also, United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Malin, 908 F.2d 163, 165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 534, 112 L.Ed.2d 544 (1990).
Church next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts Three, Five, Six and Seven. In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the test is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir. 1991).
Church also contends that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of violating the crackhouse statute. The crackhouse statute provides that it shall be unlawful to "knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). To convict Church under section 856(a)(1), the jury had to find that Church (1) knowingly (2) opened or maintained 3618 S. Barr Street (Count Five) and 530 E. Leith Street (Count Six) (3) for the purpose of distributing crack. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1990).
This circuit has not had occasion to consider the crackhouse statute. However, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with an argument similar to that of Church's
Had Congress intended convictions under § 856 to be limited to those who open or maintain facilities having cocaine manufacturing as their sole purpose, it would have said so. Such a narrow construction as Binder suggests would eviscerate the statute, since it is highly unlikely that anyone would openly maintain a place for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing cocaine without some sort of "legitimate" cover — as a residence, a nightclub, a retail business, or a storage barn.
United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2264, 114 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991). The question is whether proof of crack distribution, without more, is sufficient to convict Church of opening or maintaining the houses for the purpose of distribution. We need not accept in this case Church's assertion that all casual drug users risk violating section 856 for drug use in their own home, because those are not the facts. The Barr Street and the Leith Street addresses did not involve isolated instances of distribution. Rather, the evidence established significant commercial sales. We find that the evidence is sufficient for the jury to convict Church of opening or maintaining crackhouses for the purpose of distribution.
Church suggested at oral argument that we analogize to a case by this court construing the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et seq. Prior to amendment, the Mann Act prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of any woman "for the purpose" of prostitution. In United States v. Snow, 507 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1974), we stated that the intent to have women engage in prostitution must be a dominant purpose for the interstate trip. However, this analogy does little for Church. Even though the adjective dominant was placed on purpose, the court held that it was not necessary that the sole purpose of the transportation be for prostitution. "Despite the contrary implication suggested by the word `dominant,' it [prostitution] need not be the most important of defendant's reasons when multiple purposes are present." 507 F.2d at 24. Rather than judicially modify the phrase "for the purpose", we agree that "[t]he meaning of that phrase lies within the common understanding of jurors and needs no further elaboration." Roberts, 913 F.2d at 220.
Church was convicted of conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 856(a)(1). Section 841(a)(1) provides:
(1) to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance.
(a) Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful to —
The plain language of the statute indicates that Congress intended to punish conspiracies to violate section 841(a)(1) separately from conspiracies to violate section 856(a)(1). The effect of development of a crackhouse is to centralize distribution activity and create a special, concentrated burden and danger to a particular community. This problem makes meaningful the separate offense created under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 856(a)(1), and the additional penalty which attaches for that conviction. Also, section 856 focuses on the use of property. Section 856 "goes beyond the proscriptions found in other statutes relating to possession and manufacture [and distribution] of controlled substances and actually criminalizes a particular defendant's use of property." United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1992).
Congress enacted section 856 as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-52. The Senate abstracted section 856 as a provision that "[o]utlaws operation of houses or buildings, so-called `crack houses', where `crack', cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and used." H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S13779 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986). We agree that Congress intended to create a distinct offense, "aimed specifically at criminalizing the use of property for narcotics-related purposes." Sturmoski, 971 F.2d at 462. Because we find clear intent that a violation of section 856 is a distinct offense which may be punished separately, the Blockburger test does not apply.
However, even if we were to agree with the government and apply the Blockburger test, the result is the same. Count Seven required proof of a conspiracy to open or maintain a cocaine distribution center; a crackhouse. Count Three required proof of a conspiracy to distribute crack. Therefore, while Count Three required proof only of a general conspiracy to distribute, Count Seven required proof of a conspiracy to open or maintain the activity at a special address, the Suttenfield Street address. These separate facts to be proved satisfies the Blockburger test. See United States v. Abreu, 952 F.2d 1458, 1464-65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1695, 118 L.Ed.2d 406 (1992).
Church next contends that the district court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction regarding conspiracy. Church is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if he proposes a correct statement of the law; his theory is supported by the evidence; his theory of defense is not part of the charge; and the failure to include an instruction on his theory of defense in the jury charge would deny him a fair trial. United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1987). In determining whether the district court erred, we examine the jury instructions as a whole. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1512 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 859 F.2d 1265, 1277 (7th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 173, 112 L.Ed.2d 137 (1990). Church requested the following instruction:
E. Evidentiary Rulings 1. Hearsay
Church objects to a hearsay statement made at trial. However, Church failed to object at trial and such failure constitutes a waiver on appeal. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 523, 88 L.Ed.2d 456 (1985). Nevertheless, Church argues that the district court committed plain error in allowing the testimony. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The burden of establishing plain error is heavy. To establish plain error, "there must have been a `miscarriage of justice.'" United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 356 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). The term "miscarriage of justice" implies the Church would have been acquitted absent the error. Id. See also United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985).
The confidential informant testified that on December 4, 1990, during a drug purchase at 244 E. Suttenfield Street, Spence told him "[t]hat this is Jimmy's spot", meaning that the home was Church's crackhouse. Tr. 332-33. Since Spence did not testify at the trial, Church was unable to cross-examine him concerning the allege statement. Church maintains that this situation is one of plain error, because the statement "this is Jimmy's spot" was the evidence which convicted Church of Count Seven, conspiracy to open or maintain 244 E. Suttenfield Street for the purpose of distributing crack.
Following the undercover drug buys, Agent Cronin interviewed the confidential informant and made notes. Church contends that the district court erred, when at trial the confidential informant was allowed to refresh his recollection with Agent Cronin's notes pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 612. Tr. 309-10. Church claims to have made a timely objection. However, the government maintains that Church made no objection and therefore waives the issue on appeal. The record indicates that the objection to the use of Agent Cronin's notes to refresh the confidential informant's recollection was made by counsel for Surry. Church did not object. Tr. 310. Church does not point to any understanding on the record with the trial judge as to whether an objection by counsel for one defendant applies to the other two defendants. See United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 707, 112 L.Ed.2d 696 (1991). Nevertheless, we will treat Surry's objection as preserving the issue for Church. See Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1982) ("it would seem both dilatory and fatuous for each of the parties to stand in turn and voice its `me-too.'").
Still, allowing Church the objection does not help him. As Church concedes, the district court has broad discretion regarding the use of evidence to refresh recollection. We find no error. See United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 939, 89 S.Ct. 293, 21 L.Ed.2d 276 (1968); United States v. DiMauro, 614 F. Supp. 461, 466 (D.Me. 1985).