Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/586/16-1363/
Timestamp: 2019-08-19 18:58:30
Document Index: 356066025

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1252', '§1252', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§236', '§1003', '§1226', '§1226', '§1182', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1225', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§3262', '§1226', '§1226', 'art, 537', 'art, 537', '§1226', '§1226', 'art, 537', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1182', '§1226', '§1182', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1226', '§1252', '§1226', '§1252', '§1221', '§1221', '§1252', '§1252', '§1221', '§1252', '§1231', '§1226', '§1226', '§1182', '§1226', '§1227', '§1226', '§1182', '§1229']

Nielsen v. Preap :: 586 U.S. ___ (2019) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 586 › Nielsen v. Preap
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the Secretary of Homeland Security generally has the discretion to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision or to release the alien on bond or parole. Section 1226(c), enacted out of “concer[n] that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear,” sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for bearing links to terrorism or for committing specified crimes; paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and paragraph (2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a removal determination. Aliens detained under 1226(c)(2), alleged that because they were not immediately detained by immigration officials after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described in paragraph (1),” even though they fall into at least one of the four categories. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the statute’s text does not support the argument that because the aliens were not arrested immediately after their release, they are not “described in” 1226(c)(1). Congress’s use of the definite article in “when the alien is released” indicates that the scope of the word “alien” “has been previously specified in context,” so the class of people to whom “the alien” refers must be fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D). Paragraph (c)(2) does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested “pursuant to” or “under authority created by” (c)(1), but to anyone simply “described in” (c)(1).
Aliens, not arrested by immigration authorities immediately after their release from jail, are subject to mandatory detention pending their removal hearings.
No. 16–1363. Argued October 10, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019[1]
Federal immigration law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision, and generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien or to release him on bond or parole. 8 U. S. C. §1226(a). Another provision, §1226(c)—enacted out of “concer[n] that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513—sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for bearing certain links to terrorism or for committing specified crimes. Section 1226(c)(1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such criminal alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and §1226(c)(2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a determination on removal (with one exception not relevant here).
831 F.3d 1193 and 667 Fed. Appx. 966, reversed and remanded.
(c) This reading of §1226(c) does not flout the interpretative canon against surplusage. The “when . . . released” clause still functions to clarify when the duty to arrest is triggered and to exhort the Secretary to act quickly. Nor does this reading have the incongruous result of forbidding the release of a set of aliens whom there is no duty to arrest in the first place. Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply where there is no ambiguity. See Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50. Pp. 20–26.
Justice Alito, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh, concluded in Parts II and III–B–2:
(a) This Court has jurisdiction to hear these cases. The limitation on review in §1226(e) applies only to “discretionary” decisions about the “application” of §1226 to particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over “the extent of the Government’s detention authority under the ‘statutory framework’ as a whole.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___. For reasons stated in Jennings, “§1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.” See id., at ___. Whether the District Court in the Preap case had jurisdiction under §1252(f)(1) to grant injunctive relief is irrelevant because the court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief. And, the fact that by the time of class certification the named plaintiffs had obtained either cancellation of removal or bond hearings did not make these cases moot. At least one named plaintiff in both cases could have been returned to detention and then denied a subsequent bond hearing. Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be moot because the harms alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52. Pp. 7–10.
(b) Even assuming that §1226(c)(1) requires immediate arrest, the result below would be wrong, because a statutory rule that officials “ ‘shall’ act within a specified time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later,” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158. This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fixture of the legal backdrop when Congress enacted §1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 209. Pp. 17–20.
Aliens who are arrested because they are believed to be deportable may generally apply for release on bond or parole while the question of their removal is being de- cided. These aliens may secure their release by proving to the satisfaction of a Department of Homeland Security officer or an immigration judge that they would not endanger others and would not flee if released from custody.
The first provision, §1226(a),[1] applies to most such aliens, and it sets out the general rule regarding their arrest and detention pending a decision on removal. Section 1226(a) contains two sentences, one dealing with taking an alien into custody and one dealing with detention. The first sentence empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security[2] to arrest and hold an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The second sentence generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien or to release him on bond or parole. If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary), see 8 CFR §§236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19, 1236.1(d)(1) (2018); and the alien may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community. See §§1003.19(a), 1236.1(d); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). But while 8 U. S. C. §1226(a) generally permits an alien to seek release in this way, that provision’s sentence on release states that all this is subject to an exception that is set out in §1226(c).
Section 1226(c) was enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and it sprang from a “concer[n] that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003). To address this problem, Congress mandated that aliens who were thought to pose a heightened risk be arrested and detained without a chance to apply for release on bond or parole.
Section 1226(c) consists of two paragraphs, one on the decision to take an alien into “[c]ustody” and another on the alien’s subsequent “[r]elease.”[3] The first paragraph (on custody) sets out four categories of covered aliens, namely, those who are inadmissible or deportable on specified grounds. It then provides that the Secretary must take any alien falling into one of these categories “into custody” “when the alien is released” from criminal custody.
The categories of predicates for mandatory detention identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D) generally involve the commission of crimes. As will become relevant to our analysis, however, some who satisfy subparagraph (D)—e.g., close relatives of terrorists and those who are thought likely to engage in terrorist activity, see 8 U. S. C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX)—may never have been charged with any crime in this country.[4] Still, since the vast majority of mandatory-detention cases do involve convictions, we follow the heading of subsection (c), as well as our cases and the courts below, in referring to aliens who satisfy subparagraphs (A)–(D) collectively as “criminal aliens.”
Respondents in the two cases before us are aliens who were detained under §1226(c)(2)’s mandatory-detention requirement—and thus denied a bond hearing—pending a decision on their removal. See Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (CA9 2016); Khoury v. Asher, 667 Fed. Appx. 966 (CA9 2016). Though all respondents had been convicted of criminal offenses covered in §§1226(c)(1)(A)–(D), none were arrested by immigration officials immediately after their release from criminal custody. Indeed, some were not arrested until several years later.
Although the named plaintiffs in Preap were not taken into custody on immigration grounds until years after their release from criminal custody, the District Court certified a broad class comprising all aliens in California “ ‘who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U. S. C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a [s]ection 1226(c)(1) offense.’ ” 831 F. 3d, at 1198 (emphasis added). The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the mandatory detention of the members of this class, holding that criminal aliens are exempt from mandatory detention under §1226(c) (and are thus entitled to a bond hearing) unless they are arrested “ ‘when [they are] released,’ and no later.” Preap v. Johnson, 303 F.R.D. 566, 577 (ND Cal. 2014) (quoting 8 U. S. C. §1226(c)(1)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitu- tional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter [including §§1225 and 1226] shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” (Emphasis added.)
Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be moot because the fact that a class “was not certified until after the named plaintiffs’ claims had become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction” when, as in these cases, the harms alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (affirming jurisdiction over a class action challenging a county’s failure to provide “prompt” determinations of probable cause for those subjected to warrantless arrest and detention). Respondents claim that they would be harmed by detention without a hearing pending a decision on their removal. Because this type of injury ends as soon as the decision on removal is made, it is transitory. So the fact that the named plaintiffs obtained some relief before class certification does not moot their claims.
Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits. Respondents contend that they are not prop- erly subject to §1226(c)’s mandatory-detention scheme, but instead are entitled to the bond hearings available to those held under the general arrest and release authority provided in §1226(a). Respondents’ primary textual argument turns on the interaction of paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1226(c). Recall that those paragraphs govern, respectively, the “[c]ustody” and “[r]elease” of criminal aliens guilty of a predicate offense. Paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such alien “when the alien is released,” and paragraph (2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a determination on removal (with one exception not relevant here). Because the parties’ arguments about the meaning of §1226(c) require close attention to the statute’s terms and structure, we reproduce the provision in full below. But only the portions of the statute that we have highlighted are directly relevant to respondents’ argument. Section 1226(c) provides:
Our reading is confirmed by Congress’s use of the definite article in “when the alien is released.” Because “[w]ords are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them,” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012), the “rules of grammar govern” statutory interpretation “unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose,” ibid. (citing Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 122–126 (1964)). Here grammar and usage establish that “the” is “a function word . . . indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005). See also Work v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208 (1923) (Congress’s “use of the definite article [in a reference to “the appraisement”] means an appraisement specifically provided for”). For “the alien”—in the clause “when the alien is released”—to have been previously specified, its scope must have been settled by the time the “when . . . released” clause appears at the tail end of paragraph (1).
For these reasons, we hold that the scope of “the alien” is fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D).[5] And since only those subparagraphs settle who is “described in paragraph (1),” anyone who fits their description falls under paragraph (2)’s detention mandate—even if (as with respondents) the Secretary did not arrest them immediately “when” they were “released.”
The text of §1226 itself contemplates that aliens ar- rested under subsection (a) may face mandatory detention under subsection (c). The second sentence in subsection (a)—which generally authorizes the Secretary to release an alien pending removal proceedings—features an exception “as provided in subsection (c).” But if the Court of Appeals were right that subsection (c)(2)’s prohibition on release applies only to those arrested pursuant to subsection (c)(1), there would have been no need to specify that such aliens are exempt from subsection (a)’s release provision. This shows that it is possible for those arrested under subsection (a) to face mandatory detention under subsection (c). We draw a similar inference from the fact that subsection (c)(2), for its part, does not limit manda- tory detention to those arrested “pursuant to” subsection (c)(1) or “under authority created by” subsection (c)(1)—but to anyone so much as “described in” subsection (c)(1). This choice of words marks a contrast with Congress’s reference—in the immediately preceding subsection—to actions by the Secretary that are “authorized under” subsection (a). See §1226(b). Cf. 18 U. S. C. §3262(b) (referring to “a person arrested under subsection (a)” (emphasis added)). These textual cues indicate that even if an alien was not arrested under authority bestowed by sub- section (c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection (c)(2).
But even if the Court of Appeals were right to reject this reading, the result below would be wrong. To see why, assume with the Court of Appeals that only someone arrested under authority created by §1226(c)(1)—rather than the more general §1226(a)—may be detained without a bond hearing. And assume that subsection (c)(1) requires immediate arrest. Even then, the Secretary’s failure to abide by this time limit would not cut off her power to arrest under subsection (c)(1). That is so because, as we have held time and again, an official’s crucial duties are better carried out late than never. See Sylvain v. Attorney General of U. S., 714 F.3d 150, 158 (CA3 2013) (collecting cases). Or more precisely, a statutory rule that officials “ ‘shall’ act within a specified time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158 (2003).
Especially relevant here is our decision in United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990). There we held that “a provision that a detention hearing ‘shall be held immediately upon the [detainee’s] first appearance before the judicial officer’ did not bar detention after a tardy hearing.” Barnhart, 537 U. S., at 159 (quoting Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S., at 714). In that case, we refused to “bestow upon the defendant a windfall” and “visit upon the Government and the citizens a severe penalty by mandating release of possibly dangerous defendants every time some deviation from the [statutory] strictures . . . occur[red].” Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S., at 720. Instead, we gave effect to the principle that “ ‘if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.’ ” Barnhart, 537 U. S., at 159 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)).
This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fixture of the legal backdrop when Congress enacted §1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 209 (2003) (relying on the “legal backdrop” against which “Congress legislated” to clarify what Congress enacted). Indeed, we have held of a statute enacted just four years before §1226(c) that because of our case law at the time—never since abrogated—Congress was “presumably aware that we do not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency’s power to get a mandatory job done merely from a specification to act by a certain time.” Barnhart, 537 U. S., at 160 (relying on Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986)). Here this principle entails that even if subsection (c)(1) were the sole source of authority to arrest aliens without granting them hearings, that authority would not evaporate just because officials had transgressed subsection (c)(1)’s command to arrest aliens immediately “when . . . released.”
Especially hard to swallow is respondents’ insistence that for an alien to be subject to mandatory detention under §1226(c), the alien must be arrested on the day he walks out of jail (though respondents allow that it need not be at the jailhouse door—the “parking lot” or “bus stop” would do). Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. “Assessing the situation in realistic and practical terms, it is inevitable that” respondents’ unsparing deadline will often be missed for reasons beyond the Federal Government’s control. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S., at 720. Cf. Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 459, n. 3 (1998) (“The Secretary’s failure to meet the deadline, a not uncommon occurrence when heavy loads are thrust on administrators, does not mean that [she] lacked power to act beyond it”). To give just one example, state and local officials sometimes rebuff the Government’s request that they give notice when a criminal alien will be released. Indeed, over a span of less than three years (from January 2014 to September 2016), the Government recorded “a total of 21,205 declined [requests] in 567 counties in 48 states including the District of Columbia.” ICE, Fiscal Year 2016 ICE Enf. and Removal Operations Rep. 9. Nor was such local resistance unheard of when Congress enacted the language of §1226(c) in 1996. See S. Rep. No. 104–48, p. 28 (1995). Under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that Congress made the Secretary’s mandatory-detention authority vanish at the stroke of midnight after an alien’s release.
According to respondents, the Government’s reading of §1226(c) flouts the interpretive canon against surplusage—the idea that “every word and every provision is to be given effect [and that n]one should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Scalia, Reading Law, at 174. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant”). Respondents’ surplusage argument has two focal points.
The “when . . . released” clause also serves another purpose: exhorting the Secretary to act quickly. And this point answers respondents’ second surplusage claim: that the “Transition Period Custody Rules” enacted along with §1226(c) would have been superfluous if §1226(c) did not call for immediate arrests, since those rules authorized delays in §1226(c)’s implementation while the Government expanded its capacities. See Matter of Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec. 672, 675 (BIA 1997). This argument again confuses what the Secretary is obligated to do with the consequences that follow if the Secretary fails (for what- ever reason) to fulfill that obligation. The transition rules delayed the onset of the Secretary’s obligation to begin making arrests as soon as covered aliens were released from criminal custody, and in that sense they were not superfluous.[6] This is so even though, had the transition rules not been adopted, the Secretary’s failure to make an arrest immediately upon a covered alien’s release would not have exempted the alien from mandatory detention under §1226(c).
To begin with the latter point: Under the Court of Appeals’ reading, the mandatory-detention scheme would be gentler on terrorists than it is on garden-variety offenders. To see why, recall first that subparagraphs (A)–(C) cover aliens who are inadmissible or deportable based on the commission of certain criminal offenses, and there is no dispute that the statute authorizes their mandatory detention when they are released from criminal custody. And the crimes covered by these subparagraphs include, for example, any drug offense by an adult punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, see §§1182(a)(2), 1226(c)(1)(A), as well as a variety of tax offenses, see §§1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012). But notice that aliens who fall within subparagraph (D), by contrast, may never have been arrested on criminal charges—which according to the court below would exempt them from mandatory detention. Yet this subparagraph covers the very sort of aliens for which Congress was most likely to have wanted to require mandatory detention—including those who are representatives of a terrorist group and those whom the Government has reasonable grounds to believe are likely to engage in terrorist activities. See §§1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(III), (IV), 1226(c)(1)(D).[7] Thus, by the Court of Appeals’ logic, Congress chose to spare terrorist aliens from the rigors of mandatory detention—a mercy withheld from almost all drug offenders and tax cheats. See Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 7–8. That result would be incongruous.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the “when released” clause as limiting the class of aliens subject to mandatory detention, we read subsection (c)(1) to specify the timing of arrest (“when the alien is released”) only for the vast majority of cases: those involving criminal aliens who were once in criminal custody. The paragraph simply does not speak to the timeline for arresting the few who had no stint in jail. (And why should it? Presumably they—unlike those serving time—are to be detained as they come across the Government’s radar and any relevant evidentiary standards are satisfied.[8])
Finally, respondents perch their reading of §1226(c)—unsteadily, as it turns out—on the canon of constitutional avoidance. This canon provides that “[w]hen ‘a serious doubt’ is raised about the constitutionality of an act of Congress, ‘. . . this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’ ” Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
Respondents say we should be uneasy about endorsing any reading of §1226(c) that would mandate arrest and detention years after aliens’ release from criminal cus- tody—when many aliens will have developed strong ties to the country and a good chance of being allowed to stay if given a hearing. At that point, respondents argue, mandatory detention may be insufficiently linked to public benefits like protecting others against crime and ensuring that aliens will appear at their removal proceedings. In respondents’ view, detention in that scenario would raise constitutional doubts under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which held that detention violates due process absent “adequate procedural protections” or “special justification[s]” sufficient to outweigh one’s “ ‘constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint,’ ” id., at 690 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)). Thus, respondents urge, we should adopt a reading of §1226(c)—their reading—that avoids this result.
The trouble with this argument is that constitutional avoidance “ ‘comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.’ ” Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). The canon “has no application” absent “ambiguity.” Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 50 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at 696 (“Despite this constitutional problem, if Congress has made its intent in the statute clear, we must give effect to that intent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here the text of §1226 cuts clearly against respondents’ position, see Part III, supra, making constitutional avoidance irrelevant.
1 This provision states: “(a) Arrest, detention, and release “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General— “(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and “(2) may release the alien on— “(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or “(B) conditional parole; but “(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.”
6 The dissent asks why Congress would have felt the need to provide for a delay if it thought that either way, the Secretary would get to deny a hearing to aliens arrested well after release. Post, at 10; see also post, at 13–14. The answer is that Congress does not draft legislation in the expectation that the Executive will blow through the deadlines it sets. That is why Congress specifies any deadlines for executive duties at all; and here it explains why Congress furthermore provided that the deadline it set for this particular duty (to arrest criminal aliens upon their release) would not take effect right away. In fact, if the dissent’s argument from the transition rules were sound—i.e., if textual evidence that Congress expects the Executive to meet a deadline (once it officially takes effect) were proof that Congress wanted the deadline enforced by courts—then every case involving an express statutory deadline would be one in which Congress intended for courts to enforce the deadline. But this would include, by definition, all of the loss-of-authority cases we discussed above, see Part III–B–2, supra—a long line of precedent that the dissent does not question.
This case is also not about how long a noncitizen may be detained during removal proceedings or before removal. We have addressed that question in cases such as Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___ (2018).
This case is also not about whether Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal, as opposed to merely giving the Executive Branch discretion to detain. It is undisputed that Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain certain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal. Congress has in fact mandated detention of certain noncitizens who have been in criminal custody and who, upon their release, would pose a danger to the community or risk of flight. As relevant here, Congress has mandated detention “when” such noncitizens are “released” from criminal custody. 8 U. S. C. §1226(c)(1).
The first class action was brought in the Northern District of California and has three class representatives. One of the plaintiffs, Mony Preap, received cancellation of removal and was not in immigration custody at the time of certification. The other two, Eduardo Vega Padilla and Juan Lozano Magdaleno, had received bond hearings as required by a Ninth Circuit decision, Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (2013); Padilla had been released, while Magdaleno was denied release. The District Court certified a class of all aliens in California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under §1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the Government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a §1226(c)(1) offense. The court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Government to provide all class members with bond hearings under §1226(a).
First, §1252(b)(9) bars judicial review of “all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States,” except for review of “a final order” or other circumstances not present here. These cases raise questions of law or fact arising from removal proceedings—“[d]etention is necessarily a part of [the] deportation procedure” that culminates in the removal of the alien, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952)—and they do not come to us on review of final orders of removal. Thus, for the reasons I set forth in Jennings, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–11), no court has jurisdiction over these class actions.
Second, §1226(e) provides that “[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the [Secretary] under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” (Emphasis added.) This provision “unequivocally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to set aside ‘any action or decision’ by the [Secretary]” regarding detention, discretionary or otherwise. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 533 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see Jennings, supra, at ___, n. 6 (slip op., at 11, n. 6). The Court once again reads this language as permitting judicial review for challenges to the “statutory framework as a whole.” Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the text of the statute contains no such exception. Accordingly, I continue to think that no court has jurisdiction over these kinds of actions.
Third, §1252(f)(1) deprives district courts of “jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§1221–1232] other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under [§§1221–1232] have been initiated.” The text of §1252(f)(1) explicitly prohibits the classwide injunctive relief ordered by the Northern District of California in this instance, given that the class includes future, yet-to-be detained aliens against whom proceedings have not been initiated. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481 (1999) (explaining that §1252(f)(1) “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§1221–1231”). The District Court relied on Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (CA9 2010), which held that this provision does not affect authority to enjoin alleged violations of the specified statutes because those claims do not “seek to enjoin the operation of the immigration detention statutes, but to enjoin conduct . . . not authorized by the statutes.” Id., at 1120. This reasoning is circular and unpersuasive. Many claims seeking to enjoin or restrain the operation of the relevant statutes will allege that the Executive’s action does not comply with the statutory grant of authority, but the text clearly bars jurisdiction to enter an injunction “[r]egardless of the nature of the ac- tion or claim.” Although the Court avoids deciding whether §1252(f)(1) prevented the District Court’s injunction here, ante, at 8, I would hold that it did.
Finally, I harbor two concerns about whether the class actions were moot at the time of certification. First, as the Court recognizes, class actions are ordinarily “moot if no named class representative with an unexpired claim remain[s] at the time of class certification.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 4); ante, at 9. At the time of class certification, all six of the named plaintiffs had received bond hearings or cancellation of removal. As I understand the plaintiffs’ arguments, that was the full relief that they sought: “individualized bond hearings where they may attempt to prove that their release would not create a risk of flight or danger to the public.” Motion for Class Certification in Preap v. Beers, No. 4:13–cv–5754 (ND Cal.), Doc. 8, p. 8; see Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in Preap, supra, Doc. 1, p. 3 (seeking “immediate individualized bond hearings”); First Amended Class Action Complaint in Khoury v. Asher, No. 2:13–cv–1367 (WD Wash.), Doc. 19, p. 13 (requesting relief of “individualized bond hearings to all Plaintiffs”). The Court concludes that some of the named plaintiffs still faced the threat of rearrest and mandatory detention at the time of class certification because the bond hearings that they received were pro- vided as part of a preliminary injunction in a separate case that was later dissolved. But whether the plaintiffs actually faced that threat has not been addressed by the parties, and I question whether this future contingency was sufficiently imminent to support Article III jurisdiction.
If the threat of rearrest and mandatory detention was too speculative to support jurisdiction, I disagree with the Court that our jurisdiction would be saved by our precedent on transitory claims. Ante, at 9–10. We have held that a court has Article III jurisdiction to certify a class action when the named plaintiffs’ claims have become moot if the claim is “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399 (1980). The “inherently transitory” exception is measured from the time that the complaint is filed to the court’s ruling on the motion for class certification. See Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2013). In other words, the named plaintiff’s standing in a class action need not exist throughout the lifecycle of the entire lawsuit. Here, Members of the Court have recognized that aliens are held, on average, for one year, and sometimes longer. See Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (noting that detention for aliens is “often lengthy,” sometimes lasting years). I am not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ claims are so “inherently transitory” as to preclude a ruling on class certification, especially since both District Courts certified the classes here within a year of the filing of the complaints. Cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 47, 52 (1991) (finding jurisdiction over a class action that challenged a county’s failure to provide “prompt” probable-cause hearings within the 48-hour window for arraignments, as required by state law).
Here we focus on the meaning of a key phrase in paragraph (2): “an alien described in paragraph (1).” This is the phrase that identifies the aliens to whom paragraph (2) (and its “no-bail-hearing” requirement) applies. Does paragraph (1) “describ[e]” all ABCD aliens, even those whom the Secretary has “take[n] into custody” many years after their release from prison? Or does it “describ[e]” only those aliens whom the Secretary has “take[n] into cus- tody . . . when the alien [was] released” from prison?
The key phrase in paragraph (2) is “an alien described in paragraph (1).” As a matter of ordinary meaning and usage, the words “take into custody . . . when the alien is released” in paragraph (1) form part of the description of the “alien”: An “alien described in paragraph (1)” is an ABCD alien whom the Secretary has “take[n] into cus- tody . . . when the alien is released” from prison.
Thus, the release rule in each subsection (the second sentence) applies only if the Secretary complies with the detention rule in that subsection (the first sentence). In light of “the parallel structures of these provisions,” it would “flou[t] the text” to find that an alien is subject to (c)’s release rule, which forbids release, without also finding that the alien was detained in accordance with (c)’s detention rule, which requires the alien to be detained “when . . . released.” Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 132 (1989).
Even if statutory text and structure were not enough to resolve these cases, the Government’s reading would fail for another reason. A well-established canon of statutory interpretation provides that, “if fairly possible,” a statute must be construed “so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (using word “serious” instead of “grave”). The Government’s reading of the statute, which the majority adopts, construes the statute in a way that creates serious constitutional problems. That reading would give the Secretary authority to arrest and detain aliens years after they have committed a minor crime and then hold them without a bail hearing for months or years. This possibility is not simply theoretical. See Appendix B, infra.
Although the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that paragraph (2)’s prohibition on release applies only to an alien whom the Secretary “take[s] into custody . . . when the alien is released” from criminal custody, it also held that the phrase “when the alien is released” means that the Secretary must grant a bail hearing to any alien who is not “ ‘immediately detained’ when released from criminal custody.” Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193, 1207 (CA9 2016). I disagree with the Court of Appeals as to the meaning of the phrase “when the alien is released.”
As an initial matter, the phrase “when the alien is released” imposes an enforceable statutory deadline. I cannot agree with Justice Alito, who writes for a plurality of the Court on this point, that our cases holding certain statutory deadlines unenforceable are applicable here. Ante, at 17. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 152 (2003) (holding that the Government’s untimeliness did not bar it from taking action beyond the statutory deadline); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 713–714 (1990) (holding that a provision requiring a detention hearing to “ ‘be held immediately’ ” did not bar detention in the event of a late hearing); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 266 (1986) (holding that the Government’s failure to observe a 120-day statutory deadline did not deprive it of authority under the statute).
I disagree with the plurality on this point because our case law makes clear that a statutory deadline against the Government must be enforced at least in contexts where “other part[s]” of the relevant statutes indicate that the time limit must be enforced, Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 717; see also Barnhart, supra, at 161, 163; Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 613 (2010); where the statute “ ‘specif[ies] a consequence for noncompliance’ ” with the time limit, Barnhart, supra, at 159 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)); or where the harms caused by the Government’s delay are likely to be serious, see Dolan, supra, at 615–616; Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 719–720.
Mindful of “the greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive Branch” and “the serious administrative needs and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive [Government] efforts to enforce this complex statute,” I would interpret the word “when” in the same manner as we interpreted other parts of this statute in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001). The words “when the alien is released” require the Secretary to detain aliens under subsection (c) within a reasonable time after their release from criminal custody—presumptively no more than six months. If the Secretary does not do so, she must grant a bail hearing. This presumptive 6-month limit is consistent with how long the Government can detain certain aliens while they are awaiting removal from the country. Id., at 682, 701 (interpreting a different provision, §1231(a)(6)). To insist upon similar treatment in this context would give the Government sufficient time to detain aliens following their release from local, state, or federal criminal custody. It would also ensure that the Government does not fall outside the 1-year maximum dictated by the transition statute. See supra, at 10, 14.
The following citations support the claims made supra, at 4, regarding the breadth of the Government’s reading of the statute. I do not intend to suggest that these citations provide a complete description of the many aliens who are detained without a bail hearing under 8 U. S. C. §1226(c). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (indicating that thousands of aliens are eligible to be detained under subsection (c), that many are held for six months or longer, and that “[n]early 40% of those who have served criminal sentences receive relief from removal”); Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193, 1197 (CA9 2016) (noting that one respondent was detained 11 years after his release from prison); Brief for Advancement Project et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (presenting data from a recent lawsuit in Massachusetts indicating that more than one in five aliens detained under subsection (c) were taken into custody more than five years after their release from prison); §1226(c)(1)(A) (referencing §1182(a)(2), which includes aliens who have committed federal or state controlled substance offenses for which the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year); §1226(c)(1)(C) (referencing §1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which applies to aliens convicted of certain crimes “involving moral turpitude”); Hashish v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 572, 576 (CA7 2006) (illegally downloading music is a crime of “moral turpitude”); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 261 (CA2 2000) (possessing stolen bus transfers is a crime of “moral turpitude”); §1226(c)(1)(D) (referencing §1182(a)(3)(B), which covers the “spouse or child” of certain aliens engaged in terrorist activity); §1229b (identifying the requirements for obtaining cancellation of removal).
March 31, 2017 Application (16A944) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from April 11, 2017 to May 11, 2017, submitted to Justice Kennedy.
April 7, 2017 Application (16A944) granted by Justice Kennedy extending the time to file until May 11, 2017.
May 11, 2017 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due June 12, 2017)
May 18, 2017 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including July 12, 2017, for all respondents.
June 26, 2017 Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including August 11, 2017.
August 8, 2017 Brief of respondents Mony Preap, et al. in opposition filed.
August 23, 2017 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/25/2017.
August 23, 2017 Reply of petitioners Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. filed. (Distributed)
February 27, 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/2/2018.
March 19, 2018 Petition GRANTED.
April 10, 2018 As Rule 34.6 provides, “If the Court schedules briefing and oral argument in a case that was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c) or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1(c), the parties shall submit electronic versions of all prior and subsequent filings with this Court in the case, subject to [applicable] redaction rules.” Subsequent party and amicus filings in the case should now be submitted through the Court’s electronic filing system, with any necessary redactions.
April 10, 2018 Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioners' brief on the merits is extended to and including June 1, 2018. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including August 6, 2018. The reply brief is to be filed pursuant to Rule 25.3.
April 10, 2018 Motion for an extension of time to file the briefs on the merits filed.
May 11, 2018 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.
May 29, 2018 Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioners GRANTED.
June 1, 2018 Brief of petitioners Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. filed.
June 8, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Immigration Reform Law Institute filed.
June 8, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation filed.
June 8, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of U.S. Rep. Andy Biggs, et al. filed.
August 6, 2018 Brief of respondents Mony Preap, et al. filed. (Distributed)
August 10, 2018 Amicus brief of National Immigrant Justice Center submitted.
August 13, 2018 Amicus brief of Former INS and DHS General Counsels submitted.
August 13, 2018 Amicus brief of Advancement Project et al. submitted.
August 10, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of National Immigrant Justice Center filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Amicus brief of Constitutional and Immigration Law Professors submitted.
August 13, 2018 Amicus brief of Administrative And Immigration Law Professors submitted.
August 13, 2018 Amicus brief of Members of Congress submitted.
August 13, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Former INS and DHS General Counsels filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional and Immigration Law Professors filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Administrative And Immigration Law Professors filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Former INS and DHS General Counsels filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Constitutional and Immigration Law Professors filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Administrative and Immigration Law Professors filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Members of Congress filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Advancement Project et al. filed. (Distributed)
August 13, 2018 Brief amici curiae of Advancement Project, et al. filed. (Distributed)
August 7, 2018 Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 9th Circuit.
August 30, 2018 Record from the U.S.C.A. 9th Circuit is electronic and located on PACER.
August 30, 2018 Record from the U.S.D.C. California Northern District (Oakland) is electronic and located on PACER, with the exception of Restricted documents that's electronic.
September 5, 2018 Reply of Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. submitted.
September 5, 2018 Reply of petitioners Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. filed. (Distributed)