Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/alabama/alndce/3:2012cv00332/140895/49
Timestamp: 2017-05-25 08:42:59
Document Index: 769137359

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 2072', '§ 2072', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402']

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that the defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of the third amended complaint is GRANTED, and the remainder of that complaint is STRICKEN; Plaintiff's motion to allow the third amended complaint as filed is DENIED; it is ORDERED that the second amended complaint also is STRICKEN, which leaves the first amended complaint as the operative pleading as more fully set out in order Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 6/20/2013 for Tuscumbia City School System v. Pharmacia Corporation :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
2013 Jun-20 AM 10:46
This putative class action is before the court on a motion by defendant,
Pharmacia Corporation,1 to dismiss or strike portions of plaintiff’s third amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 In the
System, to provide a more definite statement of Count III of the Third Amended
The court is sadly familiar with the difficulties arising out of plaintiff’s attempt
According to plaintiff, Pharmacia Corporation is the successor-in-interest to the Monsanto
Company, see doc. no. 36 (Third Amended Complaint) ¶ 3, which was the company that made the
allegedly defective product at issue in this case. Plaintiff often refers to defendant as Monsanto, see,
e.g., id. ¶ 3, but the court will use defendant’s actual name or simply “defendant.”
Doc. no. 37 (Motion to Dismiss or Strike the Third Amended Complaint).
to properly plead Count III, which asserts a “products liability” claim.4 The raison
d’être for the third amended complaint was the order entered by this court on
November 27, 2012, granting defendant’s request for a more definite statement of only
that Count in the second amended complaint.5 Thus, plaintiff was ordered “to file [a
third] amended complaint that more definitely states Count III” in order to
“disambiguat[e] the theory” upon which that Count was based, and, in order to
“resolve the inconsistency between, on one hand, the pleading of a claim under
Alabama’s Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine and, on the other hand, the
characterization of that claim as one for ‘strict liability in tort.’”6
Defendant now asks the court to dismiss Count III of the third amended
complaint, as well as strike plaintiff’s third, newest class definition that applies to all
Counts. Defendant presents several arguments in support of its motion: i.e., plaintiff
did not fully comply with the court’s order to replead Count III, because it “continues
to try to blend AEMLD and strict liability into a single claim, now on behalf of a
multistate ‘subclass’”;7 plaintiff lacks “standing to assert a products liability claim
See doc. no. 36 (Third Amended Complaint), at 12-15.
See generally doc. no. 32 (Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement of Count
III); doc. no. 35 (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (granting the alternative request for a more
definite statement).
Doc. no. 35 (Memorandum Opinion and Order For a More Definite Statement of Count III),
at 6-7 (alterations and emphasis supplied).
Doc. no. 37 (Motion to Dismiss or Strike the Third Amended Complaint), at 8.
under any [non-Alabama] state law,” and cannot “represent any putative class
members who might have strict liability claims under the laws of [other] states”;8
defendants are left to guess at “which states’ product liability doctrines Plaintiff
contends are implicated by Count III”;9 and the “wholesale last-minute change to the
class definition for all counts” is procedurally improper under Rule 15, prejudicial,
and, in any event, impermissibly overbroad.10
As a partial response to defendant’s argument that plaintiff attempted “to use
an order to provide a more definite statement of Count III as a vehicle to amend the
class definition for Counts I and II,”11 plaintiff filed a motion to allow its third
amended complaint “in the event the Court concludes that plaintiff should have sought
leave of court before changing the class definition.”12 That motion is also before the
Following consideration of the pleadings, motion, briefs, and independent
research, defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III will be granted, the remainder of the
third amended complaint will be stricken, and plaintiff’s motion to accept that
complaint as filed will be denied. In order to place the parties’ motions and arguments
Id. at 2; see also id. at 13-18.
Doc. no. 40 (Motion To Allow the Third Amended Complaint), at 1.
in context, a review of the procedural history of this case is necessary.
The Initial Complaint, the First Amended Complaint, and Defendant’s
Corresponding Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff commenced this putative class action on January 31, 2012, alleging
one count of negligence and one count of wantonness or recklessness against
defendant for the design, manufacture, and marketing of electric ballasts for
fluorescent light fixtures containing “the toxic chemical known as Polychlorinated
Biphenyls (‘PCBs’).”13 Defendant allegedly knew: that PCBs were toxic; that failing
ballasts release PCBs into classrooms like those maintained by the plaintiff; and that
“PCBs could cause systemic toxic injuries” to humans.14 The initial complaint defined
the class that plaintiff proposed to represent as every “school system in the United
States covered by the [Environment Protection Agency’s] December 29, 2010,
recommendation to remove ballasts from every fluorescent light in schools built
before 1979 because of the presence of the toxic chemical PCBs.”15
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.16 After plaintiff’s attorneys were
granted an extension of time for the ostensible purpose of responding to the “many
Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 1.
Doc. no. 6 (Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint).
complex issues” in defendant’s motion,17 plaintiff instead filed its first amended
complaint.18 That complaint again asserted claims for negligence and wantonness, but
it contained a different, broader class definition: “Every school in the United States
owning buildings whose fluorescent light ballasts contain the toxic chemicals
PCBs.”19
Defendant then moved to dismiss the first amended complaint.20 Defendant
asserted that Alabama law does not support negligence and wantonness claims in
cases involving products liability where there is no privity between the parties and the
ultimate consumer, and when the plaintiff is not within the “foreseeable area of risk.”21
In response, plaintiff contended that “Alabama law for almost a century has . . . not
requir[ed] privity as a prerequisite to liability for manufacturing and selling a
hazardous product.”22 Defendant replied that plaintiff was playing a “game of ‘mix
and match,’” and “trying to fit a square peg in a round hole,” by relying upon cases
in which the plaintiffs had sought damages for personal injuries under either the
Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (“AEMLD”) or tort theories,
Doc. no. 10 (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time) ¶ 5; see Margin Order of Apr. 4,
2012 (granting the motion).
Doc. no. 12 (First Amended Complaint).
Doc. no. 15 (Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint).
Doc. no. 16 (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 2, 6-8.
Doc. no. 17 (Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), at 12.
instead of analyzing cases in which the plaintiff sought damages for property losses,
also referred to as “economic losses.”23
On June 27, 2012, this court found that defendant’s first motion to dismiss had
been mooted as a result of plaintiff’s first amended complaint, and denied its motion
to dismiss the first amended complaint. The court began by referencing and
incorporating in haec verba an opinion entered by the undersigned judicial officer
when serving as a Circuit Judge for the State of Alabama in a case styled Huntsville
City Board of Education v. National Gypsum Company, et al., No. CV-83-325L (Mad.
Co. Ala. Cir. Ct., Aug. 27, 1984).24 That opinion discussed the distinctions between
the AEMLD and common law torts.25 This court’s June 27th opinion ruled, consistent
with the discussion in the Huntsville City Board decision, that Alabama courts had
“not adopt[ed] the strict liability regime [under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts] that prevailed in some sister states,” and “clearly stated that
AEMLD is a stand-alone tort, separate from the common-law action for negligence.”26
Although plaintiffs “often assert both AEMLD claims and traditional common-law
tort claims” in the same case, plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged only claims
Doc. no. 19 (Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 2-4, 6.
Doc. no. 23 (Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint), at 8-10.
See doc. no. 23-1.
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original, alteration supplied).
for negligence and wantonness (or recklessness).27 Thus, “despite plaintiff’s reliance
on AEMLD cases in its brief,” the court reviewed the relevant caselaw, distinguished
the cases cited by defendants, and concluded that privity and foreseeability were not
required for plaintiff to recover against defendant under claims based upon those
common-law tort theories.28
The Second Amended Complaint and the Third Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint on October 2, 2012,
to “add a products liability claim against defendant.”29 Defendant did not respond to
the motion. For that reason, this court concluded that defendant did not oppose the
motion and granted it on October 19th.30
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint retained the class definition utilized in
the first amended complaint, as well as the two counts for negligence and wantonness,
respectively, but added a third count for “products liability” based upon defendant’s
alleged “strict liability in tort.”31
Defendant moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement
Id. at 13-14; see id. at 14-24.
Doc. no. 28 (Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint), at 1.
Doc. no. 30 (Order), at 1.
Doc. no. 31 (Second Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 36 (class definition), 53-58, 59 (The
“plaintiff and the class seek a trial on defendant’s strict liability in tort.”).
of Count III of the second amended complaint.32 It argued that a claim for “products
liability” based on a theory of “strict liability in tort” is not available under Alabama
law and, in any event, it was ambiguous whether plaintiff was asserting a claim under
the AEMLD, or some other legal theory.33 In response, plaintiff noted that Count III
“precisely tracks” the elements of the AEMLD.34 Defendant then replied that the
complaint should be amended to clearly reflect the true nature of Count III, and to
eliminate the inconsistency of alleging both an AEMLD claim and one for “strict
liability in tort” within the same count.35
On November 27, 2012, the court — citing the opinion in the Huntsville City
Board of Education case, supra — agreed with defendant that “the AEMLD does not
utilize traditional strict liability.”36 The court found the issue presented by plaintiff’s
second amended complaint to be “frustrating” and “totally unnecessary” given this
court’s prior decisions, and concluded that plaintiff’s counsel had “not even bother[ed]
to read” this court’s previous opinion or the Huntsville City Board opinion attached
Doc. no. 32 (Motion to Dismiss or For a More Definite Statement of Count III of the
Second Amended Complaint).
Id. ¶¶ 3-6.
Doc. no. 33 (Plaintiff’s Response Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss), at 1.
Doc. no. 34 (Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 2-4.
Doc. no. 35 (Memorandum Opinion and Order For a More Definite Statement of Count
III), at 4 (citing Huntsville City Board of Education v. National Gypsum Co., No. CV-83-325L, slip
op. at 42-45 (Madison Co. Ala. Cir. Ct., Aug. 27, 1984)). The Huntsville City Board opinion is now
document 23-1 in this case.
to it.37 Plaintiff had, however, alleged sufficient facts to support an AEMLD claim in
Count III.38 Nevertheless, the court concluded that plaintiff should provide a more
definite statement of Count III.
That conclusion is especially warranted when, as here, the case is a
putative class action. As defendant observes, disambiguating the theory
behind Count III “will make clearer discovery, clearer responsive
pleadings, and clearer framing of the issues if Plaintiff seeks class
certification.”[39] Clarity of the record will also be furthered, because the
basis of Count III will be in plaintiff’s complaint, rather than in
representations within a brief submitted in response to a motion to
Second, and related to the clarity rationale, a more definite
statement is proper in order to resolve the inconsistency between, on one
hand, the pleading of a claim under Alabama’s Extended Manufacturer’s
Liability Doctrine and, on the other hand, the characterization of that
claim as one for “strict liability in tort.”40
The Third Amended Complaint and the Fourth Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff filed its third amended complaint on December 4, 2012.41 Despite the
fact that the court’s November 27th order requiring plaintiff to file a more definite
statement addressed only Count III,42 the third amended complaint yet again changed
The internally quoted passage came from defendant’s reply brief. See doc. no. 34
(Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss), at 3-4.
III), at 6-7 (emphasis in original, internal citations omitted).
the class definition for all Counts to “[e]very school system in the United States
owning buildings constructed before 1979.”43 The third amended complaint also
alleged a theretofore unmentioned “sub-class of plaintiffs” for Count III defined as
Every school system in any state in the United States whose law
recognizes a claim for product liability for hazardous products, the prima
facie elements of which are the same as those stated in Section 402A(1)
of the Restatement of Torts (Second), owning buildings constructed
before 1979 (the “Products Liability Sub-Class”).44
According to plaintiff, it is a typical member of the sub-class that adequately
represents the sub-class’s interests “because its claims for products liability arise
under and are governed by the Alabama Extended Manufacturers Liability Doctrine
(“AEMLD”), the prima facie elements of which are the same as those set forth in
Section 402A(1) of the Restatement.”45
Defendant filed its fourth motion to dismiss on December 17, 2012.46 Plaintiff,
simultaneously with filing its response to defendant’s motion on January 9, 2013, filed
its “motion in the alternative to allow the third amended complaint as filed.”47
III), at 7.
Doc. no. 36 (Third Amended Complaint) ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 54 (emphasis supplied).
Doc. no. 40 (Motion to Allow the Third Amended Complaint).
Similarly, the standards for reviewing motions for a more definite statement under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) were fully reviewed in the memorandum
opinion entered in this action on November 27, 2012, and will not be reiterated here.
See doc. no. 35, at 3.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) addresses amendments to pleadings
before trial, and reads as follows:
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
(3) Time to Respond. Unless the court orders otherwise, any
required response to an amended pleading must be made within the time
remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after
service of the amended pleading, whichever is later.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, after a party has amended its
pleading once as a matter of course, that party bears the burden of obtaining
permission from the opposing party or the court to file further amendments. Although
leave of court should be freely given, it may be denied in situations involving, for
example, “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
futility.” McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999) (alteration
The Amended Class Definition
The court first considers the propriety of plaintiff’s decision to present a new
class definition that governs the entire amended complaint, despite the fact that the
court’s November 27th order for a more definite statement pertained only to Count III.
The definition of the class that plaintiff purports to represent has changed throughout
this litigation. Initially, the class consisted of every “school system in the United
States covered by the EPA’s December 29, 2010, recommendation to remove ballasts
from every fluorescent light in schools built before 1979 because of the presence of
the toxic chemical PCBs.”48 The definition then shifted to every “school in the United
States owning buildings whose fluorescent light ballasts contain the toxic chemicals
PCBs” (the “PCB leakage class”) in the first and second amended complaints.49
Finally, the third amended complaint defines the class as every “school system in the
United States owning buildings constructed before 1979.”50
Defendant presents three reasons to disallow the latest definition:
overbroad; it prejudices defendant because extensive discovery was done while
operating under the “PCB leakage class” definition; and its inclusion violates Rule
15(a).51 Plaintiff does not directly address those reasons, but instead asserts that the
new class definition “is more appropriate given the relief” it seeks: i.e., to require
defendant to inspect schools and “determine whether and to what extent remediation
is required.”52 That argument obscures the fact that plaintiff has requested virtually
the same relief throughout the litigation, and had three prior pleading opportunities
over the course of several months to craft a class definition that best fits its requested
relief.53
Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 34.
Doc. no. 12 (First Amended Complaint) ¶ 36; doc. no. 31 (Second Amended Complaint)
Doc. no. 37 (Motion to Dismiss or Strike the Third Amended Complaint), at 13-18.
Doc. no. 39 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Strike), at 9.
See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 17-18 (Prayer for Relief); doc. no. 12 (First Amended
Rule 15 provides that if “the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required” (e.g., a complaint), a party may amend the pleading once, as a matter of
course, within “21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service
of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff filed its initial complaint on January 31, 2012.54 Defendant filed
a motion to dismiss on March 26, 2012.55 Plaintiff’s ability to amend “once as a
matter of course” normally would have expired under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) twenty-one
days later, on April 16, 2012, but this court allowed plaintiff an additional fourteen
days to respond to defendant’s motion to dismiss the original complaint.56 Hence, the
first amended complaint filed on April 20, 2012 was timely under Rule 15.57 Any
subsequent amendment required “the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s
leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The court’s opinion of November 27, 2012, ordered plaintiff to file a third
amended complaint that more definitely stated the claim asserted in Count III. But the
court did not grant plaintiff leave to amend other portions of the complaint, and
Complaint), at 17-18 (Prayer for Relief); doc. no. 31 (Second Amended Complaint), at 14-15 (Prayer
for Relief).
See doc. no 10 (Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time); Margin Order of Apr. 4, 2012.
plaintiff did not request leave to do so. Indeed, the court’s ruling was in accord with
the underlying motion to dismiss, which challenged the sufficiency of Count III only.58
Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendant’s present motion to dismiss offers no
explanation for why it disregarded Rule 15 by exceeding the scope of the court’s
November 27th order. Moreover, plaintiff’s ex post “motion in the alternative to
accept the third amended complaint as filed” contains only a single sentence that
essentially restates the title of that motion and provides no reason why justice requires
allowing the new class definition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should
freely grant leave when justice so requires.”).
Simply put, an order granting an adverse party’s motion for a more definite
statement of a specific count does not give the pleading party carte blanche to amend
other portions of its complaint without first seeking and receiving leave. The court
will not ratify such action, especially when the offending party does not explain its
initial failure to comply with Rule 15(a)(2), fails to subsequently provide a legitimate
reason for granting relief under that Rule, and had prior opportunities to amend its
complaint. See McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d at 1258; see also Espev v. Wainwright,
734 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing that leave to amend may be denied for
a “substantial reason”).
See doc. no. 32 (Motion to Dismiss Count III of the Second Amended Complaint).
Amended Count III and the “Subclass”
Plaintiff’s repleading of Count III should have been a relatively straightforward
matter, given this court’s prior finding that an action based upon Alabama’s Extended
Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine is distinct from a claim under § 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.59 It is clear from the court’s November 27, 2012
opinion on defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III of the second amended complaint
that plaintiff: (1) had properly stated an AEMLD claim; but (2) could not present both
an AEMLD claim and one based on a theory of strict liability in tort in same Count.60
In order to “disambiguat[e] the theory behind Count III” and to “resolve the
inconsistency between” pleading AEMLD and strict liability claims in the same
Count, the court ordered a more definite statement.61 To remedy those deficiencies,
plaintiff could have, for example, simply eliminated the references to “strict liability”
in Count III.
Instead, as defendant observes, plaintiff “continues to try to blend AEMLD and
strict liability into a single claim, now on behalf of a multistate ‘subclass’ rather than
at 4 (citing Huntsville City Board of Education v. National Gypsum Co., No. CV-83-325L, slip op.
at 42-45 (appended as doc. no. 23-1 to the court’s June 27, 2012 opinion denying defendant’s motion
to dismiss the first amended complaint), and Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park South Hotel, 592 So.
2d 218, 220 (Ala. 1991)).
Id. at 6-7 (alternation and emphasis supplied).
the entire nationwide class.”62 Specifically, plaintiff contends that it can represent
school systems “in any state in the United States whose law recognizes a claim for
product liability for hazardous products” under § 402A because plaintiff’s claims
under the AEMLD share the same prima facie elements.63 As defendant more
succinctly put it, plaintiff wishes “to represent a subclass composed of Alabama
AEMLD claimants and non-Alabama strict liability claimants.”64
The court reiterates that which it has said twice before: a claim under
Alabama’s Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine is not the same as a strict
liability claim under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Huntsville City
Board of Education v. National Gypsum Co., No. CV-83-325L, slip op. at 41-45
1976), and Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So. 3d 128 (Ala. 1976)); doc. no. 35,
at 4 (finding that “defendant is technically correct that the AEMLD does not utilize
traditional strict liability”); see also id. at 6-7 (ruling that it is inconsistent and
ambiguous to allege a strict liability claim in the same Count as an AEMLD claim).
Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that the AEMLD and § 402A
Doc. no. 36 (Third Amended Complaint) ¶ 54.
Doc. no. 37 (Motion to Dismiss or Strike the Third Amended Complaint), at 11.
are not the same. See, e.g., Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park South Hotel, 592 So. 2d
218, 220 (Ala. 1991) (“The AEMLD is not based on a theory of strict liability in tort,
but it retains a fault concept.”) (citing Atkins, 335 So. 2d at 129) (emphasis supplied);
Dennis v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 585 So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Ala. 1991)
(holding that, even though an AEMLD claim “is similar to a strict liability tort action
under § 402A . . . this Court rejected the no-fault concept of § 402A when it
established the AEMLD”) (emphasis supplied).
Even jurists who have disagreed with the Alabama Supreme Court’s explication
of this State’s “Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine” have acknowledged that,
as a descriptive matter, the AEMLD and § 402A differed from the outset. For
example, Justice Kenneth Ingram observed in his dissenting opinion in Campbell v.
Cutler Hammer, Inc., 646 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1994), that:
This Court, in Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (1976),
and Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134, 138-39 (Ala.
1976), adopted our present version of the AEMLD in order to protect
consumers against injuries caused by defective products. Although the
language of the AEMLD is similar to that of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965), this Court has specifically declined to adopt in
total the strict liability concept of § 402A, preferring instead to retain the
fault-based concepts associated with traditional negligence actions.
Id. at 576 (Ingram, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). On the same day the Alabama
Supreme Court decided Cutler Hammer, it also handed down its opinion in General
Motors Corp. v. Saint, 646 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1994), which reversed a trial court’s
refusal to give a jury instruction on contributory negligence in an AEMLD case. Once
again, Justice Ingram dissented to explain his view that “the defense of contributory
negligence has no place in products liability cases.” Id. at 569 (Ingram, J., dissenting).
I believe we need to propel ourselves into the mainstream of
American jurisprudence in regard to products liability law. The course
we must follow to achieve such a goal is simple. In my opinion, we must
either adopt the doctrine of strict liability, as it is stated in § 402A,
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), or we must remove contributory
negligence as a defense in products liability cases.
Since 1965, most American jurisdictions have adopted
Restatement § 402A. I believe it would be sufficient to state that the
doctrine is one that provides strict liability as an alternative method to
traditional and conventional negligence-based torts and to a
contract/warranty theory of recovery. In 1976, this Court flirted with the
adoption of strict liability in the case of Atkins v. American Motors
Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976). However, the Atkins Court slammed
the door shut on strict liability and instead adhered to the proposition
that “selling a dangerously unsafe product is negligence as a matter of
law.” 335 So.2d at 141.
Plaintiff’s attorneys either do not understand, or refuse to accept the
pronouncements of both the Alabama Supreme Court and this court. They cite in
support of their position that the AEMLD and § 402A are interchangeable portions of
the Huntsville City Board opinion that reflect the similarity between the theories:65
See doc. no. 39 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Strike), at 2, 4-5.
e.g., “[w]hen viewed from the perspective of outcome, or result, there really is no
difference” between the two theories;66 “distinctions that may be drawn between the
two approaches may be viewed as differences in emphasis merely, but not as
substantive variances”;67 and the AEMLD is “an indigenous variant of [strict liability]
doctrine which so closely resembles § 402A that it could be called a ‘clone.’”68
While emphasizing the foregoing snippets from the opinion in Huntsville City
Board, plaintiff’s counsel totally ignore many more passages that emphasize the
distinctions between the two theories: e.g., “[w]hen viewed from the perspective of
substantive law, . . . there is a difference between the Restatement doctrine and the
Alabama hybrid.”69 That opinion also refers repeatedly to the AEMLD as a “hybrid”
action.70 It notes that the adoption of strict liability in tort as set out in § 402A “did
not occur” in Alabama.71 And the opinion concludes that the reasons for the
AEMLD’s creation are “peculiar to the legal soil of this State.”72
Plaintiff admits that Alabama law allows certain defenses to an AEMLD claim
Huntsville City Board of Education v. National Gypsum Co., No. CV-83-325L, slip op.
at 43 (Mad. Co. Ala. Cir. Ct., Aug. 27, 1984) (alteration supplied, underlined emphasis in original).
Id. at 46 (underlined emphasis in original).
Id. at 53 (alteration supplied).
Id. at 44 (underlined emphasis in original).
Id. at 45 n.34.
at 44 (Mad. Co. Ala. Cir. Ct., Aug. 27, 1984).
that other states do not permit under their strict products liability doctrines, but it
assures the court that those defenses ultimately will not succeed.73 That argument
prejudges the issue. Plaintiff cannot assume away substantive differences between an
AEMLD theory and a theory based on strict liability in tort, because a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 cannot “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.” The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); see also Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. — , 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (refusing to certify a
class that would not allow defendant to litigate its defenses to individual claims,
because doing so would violate 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
The Rules Enabling Act and due process prevent plaintiff from “stitch[ing]
together” or “amalgamat[ing] disparate claims.” Sacred Hart Health Systems, Inc. v.
Humana Military Healthcare Services, Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1176 (11th Cir. 2010)
(alterations supplied); see also id. at 1180 (ruling that there should be “serious
Doc. no. 39 (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss or Strike), at 8 (“The only
difference defendant points to [between the AEMLD and § 402A] is the availability of certain
fault-based defenses in an AEMLD case, which are not available under some other states’ products
liability tort. We submit that if plaintiff proves an AEMLD case, and if none of these fault-based
defenses defeat plaintiff’s case (which on the facts they will not), then plaintiff has proven liability
under the law of every state except Delaware and North Carolina.”) (emphasis in original, alteration
supplied); see also doc. no. 42 (Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Strike),
at 2 (“Tuscumbia’s only explanation for why it should be allowed to proceed contrary to the Court’s
ruling is its self-serving pronouncement that the differences between the AEMLD and strict liability
won’t matter once all the evidence is in, because Pharmacia will ultimately be unable to prevail on
any of the AEMLD’s unique fault-based defenses. That ipse dixit assumption is legally insufficient
to allow the case to proceed on the basis of a blended AEMLD/strict-liability claim.”).
analysis of the variations in applicable state law relative to . . . affirmative defenses”);
In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that a class action under the varying standards of care imposed by different
states would result in an impermissible “law that is merely an amalgam, an averaging,
of the nonidentical negligence laws of 51 jurisdictions”); In re Conagra Peanut Butter
Products Liability Litigation, 251 F.R.D. 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (concluding
that plaintiffs overlooked or downplayed the nuances and significant variances among
states’ law); Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 735-36 (S.D. Fla.
2007) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300).
In summary, plaintiff once again has failed to properly plead Count III by
conflating an AEMLD claim with a claim for strict liability.
Ordinarily, the court would grant the request to strike the complaint and simply
order repleader. This is not an “ordinary case,” however. Plaintiff’s attorneys have
had four opportunities to properly plead a complaint, but still have not done so.
Further, when ordered on November 27, 2012 to file a more definite statement of
Count III of the second amended complaint only, plaintiff’s counsel: exceeded the
scope of this court’s order; failed to comply with Rule 15; refused to acknowledge this
court’s prior rulings that actions based upon Alabama’s “Extended Manufacturer’s
Liability Doctrine” and § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are not the same;
and, obstinately continued to bundle those theories into a single count. It is a close
question as to whether those actions of counsel were contumacious, or in bad faith, or
Regardless, plaintiff’s counsel will not be rewarded with yet another
opportunity to amend. See, e.g., McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.
1999) (providing a non-exhaustive list of reasons for denying leave to amend,
including the repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
bad faith, undue delay, and futility).
On the other hand, dismissing the complaint in its entirety would be too harsh
a sanction, given that plaintiff has pled viable negligence and wantonness claims.
Defendant proposes, among other solutions, that the court deem the first amended
complaint to be the operative pleading.74 That course, which effectively dismisses
Count III, is appropriate. The actions of plaintiff’s counsel have demonstrated a
general disregard for the orders of this court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As for Count III specifically, the court stated on two prior occasions that an AEMLD
claim is distinct from a claim under § 402A, and plaintiff had two prior opportunities
to properly plead that Count. Yet in an apparent attempt to circumvent the court’s
earlier rulings, the third amended complaint still commingled AEMLD and § 402A.
Doc. no. 42 (Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Strike), at 5.
Those facts warrant dismissal, because they reveal a clear record of willful misconduct
on the part of plaintiff’s counsel, and demonstrate that a lesser sanction, such as
repleader of Count III, would not suffice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing for the
dismissal of a case or claims for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or orders of the court); see also Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th
Cir. 2006) (articulating the two-prong standard — i.e., willful misconduct and the
ineffectiveness of a lesser sanction — for dismissals under Rule 41(b)).
Furthermore, this case has languished in the pleading phase for too long, and
the court has the ability to ensure compliance with its orders by dismissing claims.
As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, in “addition to its power under Rule 41(b), a court
also has the inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of its authority to enforce its
orders and provide for the efficient disposition of litigation.” Zocaras, 465 F.3d at
Thus, the second and third amended complaints will be stricken for abusive
pleading practices, refusal to abide by the rulings and orders of the court, and
counsel’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By default, the
first amended complaint becomes the operative pleading. That course preserves the
claims that plaintiff’s counsel previously and properly pled — i.e., its negligence and
wantonness claims — while also eliminating plaintiff’s improper amendment of the
class definition, as well as remedying its refusal to plead Count III in accordance with
the court’s rulings and November 27th order.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss Count III of the third
amended complaint is GRANTED,75 and the remainder of that complaint is
STRICKEN. Plaintiff’s motion to allow the third amended complaint as filed is
DENIED.76 Finally, it is ORDERED that the second amended complaint also is
STRICKEN,77 which leaves the first amended complaint (doc. no. 12) as the operative
DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2013.