Source: http://va.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180425_0000364.WVA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-09-23 23:40:22
Document Index: 402769711

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 8', '§ 1983', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Thompson contends that the filing period under § 8.01-243(A) should be tolled during the time he spent exhausting his administrative remedies about the van incident, process he completed on January 5, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 40, Docket No. 1.) This argument lacks merit. Although there is a Virginia statute that provides for tolling during the exhaustion of administrative remedies by state prisoners, [7] the Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized this statute does not apply to § 1983 claims-even those brought by prisoners challenging their confinement. Billups v. Carter, 604 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 2004) (“We hold that § 1983 actions brought in Virginia courts are governed by the two-year limitation prescribed by [Va. Code § 8.01-243(A)].”). The court in Billups reasoned solely from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Owens¸ which instructed courts to use the relevant state's “general or residual” statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. See Owens, 488 U.S. at 250. In Virginia, this general or residual statute of limitations is two years. See Va. Code § 8.01-243(A). Accordingly, the two year statute of limitations under § 8.01-243(A) will be used.[8]
Thompson's extensive litigation history in federal court while confined at River North in 2014 and 2015 shows that he was not so “disabled” or incapacitated that he could not litigate or pursue administrative remedies.[9] His grievance documents and other filings in this case also demonstrate that he could capably receive, evaluate, and communicate information and respond to people and events around him. As later discussed, suicide precautions at River North withhold all personal property items from the inmate, including pen and paper. Even if the statutory filing period were tolled during the periods when Thompson was on suicide precautions, for a total of two weeks, his complaint was still filed a month too late.
For the reasons stated, I conclude that Thompson is barred under Va. Code § 8.01-243(A)(2) from pursing his Eighth Amendment claims concerning the van incident and wheel chair denial on November 17, 2014.[10] Accordingly, I will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count (2)(A).
On the afternoon of January 14, 2015, a nurse was distributing medication to inmates assigned to Restrictive Housing (also known as the Segregation Unit), where Thompson was housed. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Attach. 1, Colna Aff. ¶ 4, Docket No. 57-1.) When the nurse asked Thompson if he wanted his medications, he said he did. (Id. at ¶ 5.) The nurse gave him a cup to put water in and said she would only put crushed medication into the water so that he could take his medication. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Thompson reached out of the tray slot in his cell door, slapped the medication packet out of the nurse's hand, and threw the cup of water on her.[11](Id. at ¶ 7.) He was charged with a disciplinary offense for aggravated assault for slapping the nurse's hand. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
The next morning, the same nurse asked Thompson if he wanted his medication, and he said that he did. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Once the nurse had placed his medications in the cup of water, Thompson threw the cup out of the tray slot, hitting the nurse and an officer. (Id. at ¶ 10.) He then threatened to kill the nurse and her entire family. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Officers then went to Thompson's cell and ordered him to “cuff up”[12] so that cups and other items could be removed from his cell, Thompson refused to obey the order to “cuff up.” (Id. at ¶ 12.)
Later that same morning while performing their rounds, officers noticed that Thompson had placed what appeared to be papers over his window, blocking the view into his cell. (Id. at 13.) Lt. Colna went to Thompson's cell and repeatedly asked him to come to the cell door to be restrained and to remove the paper from the window, but Thompson did not comply. With prior medical staff approval, Lt. Colna administered a one-half to one second burst of oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) spray[13] through the tray slot in the cell door. Thompson still did not obey the order to “cuff up.” Lt. Colna then assembled a team to remove Thompson from his cell. (Id. at ¶ 14.) At approximately 11:32 a.m., Lt. Colna repeatedly asked Thompson to come to the cell door to “cuff up, ” but Thompson did not comply. At that time, there appeared to be blood on the papers covering Thompson's cell window. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Because it appeared that Thompson had injured himself, had blocked his window, and would not “cuff up, ” a decision was made to deploy the extraction team to prevent Thompson from continuing to hurt himself. (Id. at ¶ 35.) The video footage shows that as the cell door was opened remotely, a team member entered the cell, holding a plexiglass shield that he used to herd Thompson to the back wall of the cell and hold him there, while the other officers surrounded him and placed him in shackles and handcuffs. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17; DVD: RNCC, Thompson, P, #1134145, Cell Extraction, Cell Restraints, January 15, 2015 (on file with the court), Docket No. 59.) Once inside Thompson's cell, Lt. Colna saw what appeared to be blood on the walls of the cell and on Thompson's bedding. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;To establish that living conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must prove (1) that &ldquo;the deprivation of a basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious, &rdquo; and (2) that &ldquo;subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.&rdquo; Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379. Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). In order to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege &ldquo;a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.&rdquo; Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381. The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of confinement is satisfied by a showing of deliberate indifference by prison officials. See Farmer v. Brennan,511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for ...