Source: https://elawnora.blogspot.com/2018/05/
Timestamp: 2019-01-19 09:19:14
Document Index: 540883704

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 3', 'Art 2', 'Art 2', 'Art 5', 'Art 3', 'Art 3', 'Art 17', 'Art 11', 'Art 11', 'sui generis', 'Art 11', 'Art 11', 'Art 13', 'Art 2', 'Art 13', 'Art 14', 'Art 13', 'Art 13', 'CJEU ', 'Art 8', 'Art 11', 'Art 8', 'Art 11', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'Arts 2', 'Art 15', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

©-LAW: May 2018
a stable equilibrium?
After months of discussion, yesterday the Council’s permanent representatives committee (Coreper) common position on the text of the draft Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive).
As readers may know, following the proposal for a DSM Directive by the EU Commission [on which see Katposts here] the Council and the European Parliament are now the EU institutions tasked with adopting the draft directive and making it EU law [if you wish to learn more about how the EU law-making process works, click here].
So, what are the key points of the text agreed within Coreper, particularly with regard to the provisions that have attracted the most attention?
Here’s a summary of the most notable elements, with some notations:
Text and data mining (Art 3)
The beneficiaries would only be research organisations (the term is loose but appears to encompass those entities the primary goal of which is to conduct scientific research or to do so together with the provision of educational services: see Recital 11 and Art 2(1)) and cultural heritage institutions (as defined in Recital 11a and Art 2(3)) [Coreper has not opted for an exception without a restricted catalogue of beneficiaries; from this standpoint the EU position would be different from the one envisaged in some Member States, which have legislated using Art 5(3)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive as a basis];
The purposes of text and data mining activities should be ‘scientific research’ (Art 3(1));
The availability of the exception would be subject to the beneficiaries having lawful access to the content in respect of which the mining activities are to be carried out;
Considering the ‘minimal harm’ caused by the exception to rightholders, Member States should not provide for fair compensation mechanisms;
Member States would be free to implement also a ‘neighbouring’ exception (which, unlike the one for text and data mining, would be optional) for temporary reproductions and extractions of works and other subject-matter, insofar as these form a part of the text and data mining process and the copies made are not kept beyond that process (Art 3a);
It appears possible for Member States to adopt their own non-commercial text and data mining exceptions for different types of beneficiaries, in line with what is stated in Recital 5 and Art 17 [already discussed here].
Press publishers’ right (Art 11)
The right should be only available to publishers established in the EU [should this aspect be part of the final text of the directive, depending on the timeframe for national implementations, this might be a Brexit-relevant issue for the UK];
Also The IPKat could be eligible for the right, in that its content seems to fit within the definition of ‘press publication’ as provided for in Recital 33;
The draft Directive clarifies that the use of insubstantial parts of press publications should not fall within the scope of the right. It is left to Member States to determine the ‘insubstantial’ nature of parts of press publications: to this end they may take into account whether these parts are the expression of the intellectual creation of their authors [hence, sufficiently original as per Infopaq - Coreper's press release suggests that Member States have their own standards of originality, which is questionable after a long string of decisions of EU's highest court] or whether these parts are limited to individual words or very short excerpts, without independent economic significance, or both criteria [Recital 34a and Art 11(1) – this new rule does not appear particularly clear in that the text seems to conflate concepts that belong to copyright with concepts that are found in respect of, eg, the protection of the investment in the sui generis database right … In any case, leaving this choice to Member States might lead to a rather unharmonised framework ...];
The duration of this new right would be 1 year [instead of 20 years, as originally proposed by the Commission] from the publication of the press publication (Art 11(4));
The new right would not have retroactive effect (Art 11(5)).
Value gap proposal (Art 13)
Unlike the initial Commission’s text, the Coreper version explicitly refers to the E-commerce Directive (Recital 4), clarifying that the DSM Directive is based upon and complements the rules contained also therein;
The notion of ‘online content sharing service provider’ is one that encompasses providers whose “main or one of the main purposes … is to provide access to a large amount of copyright-protected content uploaded by their users with the purpose of obtaining profit therefrom, either directly or indirectly, by organising it and promoting it in order to attract more audiences” [this is potentially a very broad definition, and the text of the Directive does not really clarify what is to be meant as ‘profit']. One can however read that (Recital 37a):
Organising and promoting content involves for example indexing the content, presenting it in a certain manner and categorising it, as well as using targeted promotion on it;
The notion of ‘online content sharing service provider’ (see Art 2(5)) does not include services whose main purpose is not to provide access to copyright-protected content with the purpose of obtaining profit from this activity, eg internet access providers, cloud providers or online marketplaces. It would thus seem that The IPKat be out of the scope of the provision, in that – similarly to online non-for-profit encyclopaedias – it does “not store and give access to content for profit making purposes” [phewww, says Merpel];
Whether an online content sharing service provider stores and gives access to a large amount of copyright-protected content needs to be made on a case-by-case basis;
The directive is said to clarify without changing the concept of ‘communication to the public’ and ‘making available to the public’. In accordance with Art 13(1) “an online content sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public when it gives the public access to copyright protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users.” [I wonder whether it would be more appropriate, instead of attempting a definition of what qualifies and who makes an act of communication to the public, to say that “an online content sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the public in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union”].
If an online content sharing service provider is deemed to engage in acts of communication to the public/making available to the public, then it should not enjoy the safe harbour protection within Art 14 of the E-commerce Directive in relation to copyright-relevant acts (Recital 38b and Art 13(3)) [this seems correct to me, as I discuss more at length here]. However, this subject might escape liability in a number of situations as per Art 13(4). Online content sharing service providers are in fact subject to a ‘diligent operator’ obligation (Recital 38c) [this appears in line with the L’Oréal and Ziggo judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union]. This means that: “they should not be liable if some unauthorised content is available on their services despite their best efforts to prevent its availability by applying effective and proportionate measures based on the information provided by rightholders.” In addition, the directive refers to a duty to act expeditiously to remove or disable access to content upon being notified by rightholders, and also a subsequent obligation to “make their best efforts to prevent their future availability” (how this is to be done depends on the type of content: see Recital 38e);
A licence granted to online content sharing service providers should also cover the copyright-relevant acts in respect of uploads by the users but only in cases where the users act in their private capacity and for non-commercial purposes (Recital 38d);
Applicable exceptions and limitations shall remain unaffected [also note that Recital 45 mandates an interpretation and application of the Directive in accordance with the rights and principles found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights].
The next step will be now to see the position of the European Parliament (the JURI Committee Rapporteur has yet to issue his report) ... Stay tuned!
[Originally published on The IPKat on 26 May 2018]
Posted by Eleonora Rosati at 13:11 No comments:
Labels: EU copyright; press publishers' right; text and data mining; value gap proposal; DSM Directive; Coreper; Council
Marcus felt slightly challenged
after reading all those CJEU IP decisions ...
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that online IP enforcement must be (increasingly) in want of an effective involvement of intermediaries in the enforcement process.
The topic thus turns to intermediary injunctions, ie something that at the EU level is substantially enshrined in two pieces of legislation, these being: the InfoSoc Directive (Art 8(3)), as far as injunctions in copyright cases are concerned; and the Enforcement Directive (Art 11, third sentence), with regard to the other IP rights.
The relevant provisions have similar content.
Art 8(3) states that "Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right."
The third sentence of Art 11 provides that "Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC [that is the InfoSoc Directive]."
Intermediary injunctions are available irrespective of whether the intermediary targeted by it has any liability for the infringement committed by users of its services and is therefore distinct from both issues of safe harbours protection as per the E-commerce Directive and issues of primary (direct) liability or the intermediary itself.
Having said this, it seems fair to say that the actual EU framework for intermediary injunctions and, more generally, intermediary liability has been shaped through the wealth of cases that have reached the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the past few years by means of references for a preliminary ruling.
But what core principles can be extracted from the resulting CJEU decisions?
In my view, of course by means of a simplification that I prepared with IP students in mind [for more of my IP materials see here; and here's my Facebook IP group for more 'informal' IP-related discussions], there are 5 key principles that emerge from CJEU case law. They are the following:
And here's a short explanation [for a more detailed account, see here and here]:
Principle #1 - In its case law - including the recent judgments in Tommy Hilfiger [here] and Mc Fadden [Katposts here] - the CJEU has clarified that the notion of 'intermediary' is both loose and broad: for an economic operator to be considered as ‘intermediary’ it is sufficient that they provide – even among other things – a service capable of being used by one or more other persons in order to infringe one or more IP rights.
Principle #2 - This is a principle that the CJEU provided in its landmark decision in L'Orèal when it held that the injunctions referred to in the third sentence of Article 11 differ from those referred to in the first sentence of that provision: while the latter are addressed to infringers and intend to prohibit the continuation of an infringement, the former are addressed to the “more complex” situation of intermediaries whose services are used by third parties to infringe one's own IP rights. Also taking into account the overall objective of the Enforcement Directive, ie to ensure an effective protection of IP rights, alongside the provision in Article 18 of the E-commerce Directive and Recital 24 in the preamble to the Enforcement Directive, the court concluded – contrary to the more limited view expressed by Advocate General (AG) Jääskinen in his Opinion – that the jurisdiction conferred by the third sentence in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive allows national courts to order an intermediary to take measures that contribute not only to terminate infringements committed through its services, but also prevent further infringements.
Principle #3 - In respect of this principle it should be noted that, while EU law leaves the conditions and modalities of injunctions to EU Member States, the CJEU has referred to the need of complying with different types of sources that include, inter alia: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (notably copyright protection, freedom of expression/information, freedom to conduct a business, protection of personal data), the Enforcement Directive (in particular Arts 2(3) and 3 therein), the E-commerce Directive (including Art 15 therein).
Principle #4 - In UPC Telekabel [Katposts here] the CJEU held that this particular type of injunction is indeed available under EU law. Importantly, and contrary to the view expressed by AG Cruz Villalón, a blocking injunction does not have to be specific: its addressee should determine the specific measures to be taken in order to achieve the result sought.
Principle #5 - The final principle, which the CJEU has adopted in the context of a reference also concerning the availability of intermediary injunctions (The Pirate Bay case [Katposts here]), serves to note that - when we speak of intermediaries - we should not (or perhaps, no longer) think about them solely as addressees of injunctions or as subjects that might lose (if the relevant conditions are satisfied) their safe harbour protection, but also as subjects that - in certain contexts - might be directly liable for the infringement of third-party IP rights. The decision in The Pirate Bay has potentially begun a new chapter in the topic of intermediary liability (and also injunctions), the relevant implications of which are currently being worked out. While it is true that the CJEU case concerned a rather 'rogue' platform (The Pirate Bay), are the considerations made in that decision more broadly applicable? In this sense, a case pending before the German Federal Court of Justice and concerning the primary liability of YouTube [reported by The IPKat here] might assist in understanding more fully the implications of CJEU case law.
[Originally published on The IPKat on 21 May 2018]
Posted by Eleonora Rosati at 14:51 No comments:
Labels: Intermediaries; intermediary liability; intermediary injunctions; InfoSoc Directive; Enforcement Directive; IP materials; E-commerce Directive; EU Charter; CJEU; principles
The case is now pending before the BGH and the decision is keenly awaited. As far as I know (but please correct me if I am mistaken), a platform like YouTube has never been found primarily liable for the infringement of copyright or a related right by a German court. However, the decision of the BGH – no matter in what sense - will be of great importance, also outside Germany, for two essential reasons.
[Originally published on The IPKat on 14 May 2018]
Posted by Eleonora Rosati at 16:08 No comments:
Labels: user-uploaded content, Ziggo; Filmspeler; BGH; communication to the public; Article 3 InfoSoc Directive; YouTube; GS Media
Posted by Eleonora Rosati at 16:23 No comments: