Source: https://www.creedongill.com/laborlaw
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 14:54:41
Document Index: 559701283

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 241', '§ 23', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 200', '§ 200', '§ 200', '§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 23', '§ 200', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 240', '§ 240', '§ 241', '§ 23', '§ 200']

laborlaw | Creedon & Gill
INTRODUCTION TO THE “SCAFFOLD LAW” ROUNDUP
Section 240(1) of New York’s Labor law is known as its “Scaffold” Law. It is unique among Labor Laws in requiring a finding of strict liability against Owners and General contractors who run afoul of its provisions. Under the Scaffold Law, a worker’s own negligence which contributes in part, or nearly entirely, to his accident, counts for nothing. Even if the Owner or General Contractor did nothing wrong and had no knowledge of the condition which caused Plaintiff’s injuries, they may be held strictly liable under the Scaffold Law. It reads, in pertinent part:
THE TWELVE MOST RECENT NEW YORK LABOR LAW DECISIONS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND DEPARTMENT
Toussaint v. Port Authority of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. May 30, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 22916072019 N.Y. Slip Op. 04302
Plaintiff was injured when he was struck in the back by a power buggy after an operating engineer on the construction site attempted to move the buggy….According to plaintiff, the operating engineer was a watchman on another side of the construction site. It is undisputed that the operating engineer was not designated to operate the power buggy.
12 NYCRR 23–9.9(a) states: “Assigned operator. No person other than a trained and competent operator designated by the employer shall operate a power buggy.” The term “designated person” is defined in 12 NYCRR 23–1.4(b)(17) as “[a] person selected and directed by an employer or his authorized agent to perform a specific task or duty.”
We have held that similarly worded provisions of the Industrial Code are sufficiently specific to support a Labor Law § 241(6) claim. In Medina v. 42nd & 10th Assoc., LLC, 129 A.D.3d 610, 611, 12 N.Y.S.3d 68 (1st Dept. 2015), we found Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23–5.1(h), which provides that “[e]very scaffold shall be erected and removed under the supervision of a designated person,” and section 23–5.8(c)(1), which provides that “[t]he installation or horizontal change in position of every suspended scaffold shall be in charge of and under the direct supervision of a designated person,” sufficiently specific.
Martinez-Gonzalez v. 56 West 75th Street, LLC Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. May 28, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 22611552019 N.Y. Slip Op. 04111
Plaintiff was injured in a fall from a scaffold. It is undisputed that the scaffold he was supplied with and directed to use lacked railings, and that he fell off when the scaffold tipped as one wheel broke through the floor on which it was standing. Plaintiff was not provided with any other safety devices. This evidence establishes prima facie a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) Plaintiff was not required to show that the scaffold was defective.
Pearl, plaintiff's employer, which was hired to do sheetrocking and taping work at the job site, signed an agreement in connection with the renovation work, which clearly and unambiguously obligated it to defend and indemnify 56 West and Brusco for any personal injury claims resulting therefrom. 56 West and Brusco had no involvement in plaintiff's work, and their liability to plaintiff was strictly vicarious. Under these circumstances, defendants are entitled to contractual indemnification by Pearl.
Colon v. Third Avenue Open MRI, Inc. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 28, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 2261200 (Mem) 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 04107
Plaintiff, who occasionally worked as a handyman for defendants, was injured when he fell from a six-foot A-frame ladder which he was climbing to fix a leak from the ceiling in defendant's x-ray room. Plaintiff surmised that the leak was coming from the joint of a cast iron drain pipe in the ceiling, and that he could tighten the clamps with a screwdriver that he had on his person. Defendant's principal testified that the leak eventually stopped on its own, and he ultimately learned that the source of the leak was a spill from the apartment above, and not an issue with the plumbing system at all. Under these circumstances, the motion court correctly found that plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance, rather than “repairing,” and, therefore, that defendants cannot be held liable for his injury under Labor Law § 240(1) (see Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 N.Y.3d 46, 53, 781 N.Y.S.2d 477, 814 N.E.2d 784 [2004]; Esposito v. New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1 N.Y.3d 526, 770 N.Y.S.2d 682, 802 N.E.2d 1080 [2003]; cf. Soriano v. St. Mary's Indian Orthodox Church of Rockland, Inc., 118 A.D.3d 524, 526–527, 988 N.Y.S.2d 58 [1st Dept. 2014] ).
Clark v. FC Yonkers Associates, LLC Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York. May 22, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 2202533 (Mem)2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03948
The plaintiff Jonathan Clark was a construction supervisor employed by IBEX Construction Company, LLC, a general contractor hired for the “fit[ting]-out” of a retail space in a shopping center under construction. The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he suffered a herniation in his neck as he attempted to throw a hose onto an area located 15 to 20 feet above him to provide a water supply required for the fireproofing of the retail space.
The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment (as to) Labor Law § 200 by demonstrating that the accident at issue was the result of the means and methods of the plaintiff's work, that the plaintiff's work was directed and controlled by his employer, and that the defendants had no authority to exercise control over his work.
Labor Law § 240(1) imposes strict liability on building owners and contractors for failure to provide proper protection against elevation-related hazards (see Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, 13 N.Y.3d 599, 603, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279, 922 N.E.2d 865). At the time that the plaintiff was injured, he was standing on the ground level, moving a 100–pound hose. Although the accident tangentially involved elevation, it was not caused by any elevation-related risk contemplated by the statute.
Hernandez v. 601 West Associates Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. May 21, 201998 N.Y.S.3d 744 (Mem)2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03911
Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries he sustained when a refrigerator he was pushing up the stairs from the basement of a restaurant fell on him after the rope that tied the refrigerator to a hand-truck being pulled up by another individual broke. Notwithstanding the work being performed in other parts of the premises, and contrary to his own characterization of his work as demolition, plaintiff, whose task was to remove debris and garbage, including the refrigerator, from the basement, was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law § 240(1) or 241(6) at the time of his accident.
Bellucia v. CF 620 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York. May 16, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 21275022019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03884
This action arises out of an accident in which a manually operated freight elevator in a building undergoing construction dropped suddenly from the fourth floor to the basement while carrying plaintiff Joseph Marandola, and (22) other individuals working on the project, causing injuries.
Robinson Elevator had recently serviced the elevator for conditions implicated in the accident. ..a broken switch/spring inside the elevator control handle and improperly installed brakes Robinson Elevator had purportedly …. performed modifications to the brake system in the weeks preceding the accident. Just over a week before the accident, CF620 had emailed Robinson Elevator, informing it that the elevator car had fallen and requesting service. Robinson Elevator serviced the elevator and told CF620 that the free fall had been caused by operator error. (I)ssues of fact as to Robinson Elevator's negligence preclude summary judgment (.
(As to) Schindler Elevator … factual issues exist as to whether, pursuant to its service contract, Schindler properly serviced the governor, a device that detects and arrests dangerous elevator speeds, and whether it properly serviced the switch/spring inside the elevator control handle.
CF620 also established that Supreme Court erroneously granted summary judgment to the Marandola plaintiffs and to the other plaintiffs who moved for summary judgment with respect to Labor Law § 241(6) predicated on CF620's violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(f), (Protection from General Hazards: (f) Vertical passage. Stairways, ramps or runways shall be provided …)
and erroneously granted the Fund's and Henegan's motions for summary judgment with respect to indemnification against CF620. Issues of fact exist as to whether CF620 was negligent and whether any such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Turgeon v. Vassar College Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.May 15, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 21123612019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03838
“Labor Law § 200(1) is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe place to work…Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories… those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (
Where “a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers arising from a subcontractor's methods or materials, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had unless it is shown that the party to be charged exercised some supervisory control over the operation”
A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” …M]ere general supervisory authority at a work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200”
Urquiza v. Park and 76th St., Inc. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 14, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 20922152019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03744
The homeowners' exemption to liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) is clearly applicable here where defendant owners Edmund and Mary Carpenter did not direct or control the work in their cooperative apartment that they intended to use for personal use …Although defendant owners failed to plead the homeowners' exemption as an affirmative defense, Supreme Court should have granted their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint “since plaintiff was not surprised by the defense, and fully opposed the motion”
Decedent's action in standing on the radiator casing in front of the open window to accomplish his work was not the sole proximate cause of his accident as he was not provided proper safety devices for working next to the open window
Insofar as predicated Industrial Code § 23–1.7(d), issues of fact exist as to whether a slippery condition existed in violation of that Industrial Code provision where decedent was working while standing on an unsecured plywood board atop the radiator casing next to an open window during a rainstorm
With regard to plaintiffs' Labor Law §§ 200 and common law negligence claims against Nordic and Nordic's claim for common law indemnification against decedent's employer, issues of fact exist as to whether Nordic's site supervisor directed that the work be performed .. without the authorization of decedent's employer and whether Nordic's site supervisor was an independent contractor for whose acts it is not liable.
Djuric v. City of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 7, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 19969812019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03538
Worker brought action against premises owner, general contractor, and others, alleging labor law violations and claims for common law negligence, for injuries he allegedly suffered when pipe saddle detached from overhead ceiling pipe assembly and struck him.
The motion court correctly found that Labor Law § 240(1) was inapplicable here, because the pipe saddle that detached from an overhead ceiling pipe assembly and struck plaintiff was not an object that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking; rather it was a permanent part of the structure.
Similarly, plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241(6) claim was correctly dismissed, since neither of the pleaded violations of the Industrial Code apply. 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(a)(1) is inapplicable here, because plaintiff was not injured by debris that may have been falling from a ceiling demolition, but instead, from a fixture of the building which dislodged 12 NYCRR 23–3.2(b) is also inapplicable because it pertains to protecting the stability of adjacent structures, not the stability of the building or structure allegedly being demolished.
Tropea v. Tishman Construction Corp. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 7, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 19969972019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03533
The cable tray that fell on plaintiff's head from atop two ladders was an object that required securing to prevent it from falling. The distance the tray fell was not de minimis and “the harm to plaintiff was the direct consequence of the application of the force of gravity” upon the unsecured cable tray. Moreover, securing the cable tray against falling would not have been contrary to the purpose of the work.
Supreme Court correctly concluded that USIS Systems was liable under Labor Law § 240(1) as an agent of the owner … the terms of the subcontract by which USIS Systems subcontracted the work to USIS Electric demonstrate that USIS Systems had been delegated authority to direct and control the work Moreover as premises lessee which contracted for the work, AECOM was an owner within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)
DeMercurio v. 605 West 42nd Owner LLC Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 7, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 19969152019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03550
Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell on protective brown paper that had been installed on the floor of an apartment unit under construction…torn, dirty, and not properly taped to the walls… the paper was slippery because it was on top of a cleaning agent called “green dust,”
The motion court improperly dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23–1.7(d). The alleged presence of green dust on the floor created a triable issue as to whether a “foreign substance” created a slippery condition on the floor, in violation of this Code section.
Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims should not have analyzed under the manner and means standard, but should instead have applied the dangerous condition standard (The green dust was a dangerous condition that existed prior to plaintiff's arrival at the job site it was not part of the work plaintiff was performing As such, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the general contractor, defendant Tishman Construction Corporation had notice of the hazardous condition of the floor… owner 605 West 42nd Owner LLC failed to demonstrate the absence of actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition on its part, since it failed to point to any probative evidence on this issue
Cutaia v. Board of Managers of 160/170 Varick Street Condominium Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.May 2, 2019--- N.Y.S.3d ----2019 WL 19386892019 N.Y. Slip Op. 03458
The purpose of section 240(1) is to protect the worker from worksite injuries attributable to gravity-related risks. “It is sufficient for purposes of liability under section 240(1) that adequate safety devices to prevent the ladder from slipping or to protect plaintiff from falling were absent” (Orellano v. 29 E. 37th St. Realty Corp., 292 A.D.2d 289, 291, 740 N.Y.S.2d 16 [1st Dept. 2002]
The “safety device” provided to plaintiff was an unsecured and unsupported A-frame ladder that was inadequate to perform the assigned task. The ladder could not be opened or locked while plaintiff was performing his task, and the only way plaintiff could gain access to his work area on the ceiling at the end of the room was by folding up the ladder and leaning it against the wall. It is undisputed that the ladder was not anchored to the floor or wall. There were no other safety devices provided to plaintiff. Plaintiff's expert opined that had the ladder been supported or secured to the floor or wall by anchoring, it would have remained stable when plaintiff was shocked. He further opined that given the nature of plaintiff's work, which involved cutting pipes and the use of hand tools at an elevated height, plaintiff should have been furnished with a more stable device such as a Baker scaffold or a man lift. It is well settled that the failure to properly secure a ladder and to ensure that it remain steady and erect is precisely the foreseeable elevation-related risk against which section 240(1) was designed to protect
The fact that the fall was precipitated by an electric shock does not change this fact. This case is distinguishable from Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, 28 N.Y.3d 1054, 43 N.Y.S.3d 251, 65 N.E.3d 1286 (2016), relied on by the dissent. The plaintiff in Nazario fell while “holding the ladder, which remained in an open locked position when it landed” (135 A.D.3d 506, 507, 23 N.Y.S.3d 192 [1st Dept. 2016] ). Thus, there was no evidence that the ladder was defective or that another safety device was needed. Here, on the other hand, it is undisputed that the ladder provided was not fully open and locked, nor was it otherwise secured, as plaintiff's expert opined it ought to have been.