Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105256/weinberger-vs-romero-barcelo
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1531', '§ 1319', '§ 1251', '§ 1311', '§ 1319', '§ 1323', '§ 1319', '§ 17', '§ 217']

Weinberger Vs Romero Barcelo - Citation 105256 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Weinberger Vs. Romero-barcelo - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/105256
Case Number 456 U.S. 305
Respondent Romero-barcelo
weinberger v. romero-barcelo - 456 u.s. 305 (1982) u.s. supreme court weinberger v. romero-barcelo, 456 u.s. 305 (1982) weinberger v. romero-barcelo no. 80-1990 argued february 23, 1982 decided april 27, 1982 456 u.s. 305 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit syllabus the navy, in the course of using an island off the puerto rico coast for air-to-ground weapons training, has discharged ordnance into the waters surrounding the island, when pilots missed land targets and accidentally bombed the waters or intentionally bombed water targets. respondents sued in federal district court to enjoin the navy's operations, alleging violation of, inter alia, the federal water pollution.....
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo - 456 U.S. 305 (1982)
U.S. Supreme Court Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)
Held: The FWPCA does not foreclose completely the exercise of a district court's discretion, but, rather than requiring the court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, permits the court to order relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act, which relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation. Pp. 456 U. S. 311 -320.
(a) The grant of jurisdiction to a court to ensure compliance with a statute does not suggest an absolute duty to grant injunctive relief under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law. Pp. 456 U. S. 311 -313.
(b) Here, an injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance, TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , distinguished, since the FWPCA provides, for example, for fines and criminal penalties. While the FWPCA's purpose in preserving the integrity of the Nation's waters is to be achieved by compliance with the Act, including compliance with the permit requirements, in this case, the discharge of the ordnance has not polluted
the waters, and, although the District Court refuse to enjoin the discharge, it neither ignored the statutory violation nor undercut the purpose and function of the permit system. The FWPCA's prohibition against discharge of pollutants can be overcome by the very permit the Navy as ordered to seek. Pp. 456 U. S. 313 -316.
(c) The statutory scheme as a whole contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities, and suggests that Congress did not intend to deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction. Pp. 456 U. S. 316 -318.
(e) Nor does the legislative history suggest that Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion. P. 456 U. S. 319 .
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 456 U. S. 321 . STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 456 U. S. 322 .
In 1978, respondents, who include the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents of the island, sued to enjoin the Navy's operations on the island. Their complaint alleged violations of numerous federal environmental statutes and various other Acts. [ Footnote 1 ] After an extensive hearing, the District Court found
that, under the explicit terms of the Act, the Navy had violated the Act by discharging ordnance into the waters surrounding the island without first obtaining a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). [ Footnote 2 ] Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646 (PR 1979).
As the District Court construed the FWPCA, the release of ordnance from aircraft or from ships into navigable waters is a discharge of pollutants, even though the EPA, which administers the Act, had not promulgated any regulations setting effluent levels or providing for the issuance of an NPDES permit for this category of pollutants. [ Footnote 3 ] Recognizing that violations of the Act "must be cured," 478 F.Supp. at 707, the District Court ordered the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. It refused, however, to enjoin Navy operations pending
consideration of the permit application. It explained that the Navy's "technical violations" were not causing any "appreciable harm" to the environment. [ Footnote 4 ] Id. at 706. Moreover, because of the importance of the island as a training center,
"the granting of the injunctive relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation. [ Footnote 5 ]"
Id. at 707. The District Court concluded that an injunction was not necessary to ensure suitably prompt compliance by the Navy. To support this conclusion, it emphasized an equity court's traditionally broad discretion in deciding appropriate relief, and quoted from the classic description of injunctive relief in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 , 321 U. S. 329 -330 (1944): "The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish."
643 F.2d at 861. The court suggested that, if the order would interfere significantly with military preparedness, the Navy should request that the President grant it an exemption from the requirements in the interest of national security. [ Footnote 6 ]
It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy. It "is not a remedy which issues as of course," Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334 , 289 U. S. 337 -338 (1933), or "to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling." Consolidated Canal
Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U. S. 296 , 177 U. S. 302 (1900). An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity "is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable." Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453 , 248 U. S. 456 (1919). The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49 , 422 U. S. 61 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61 , 415 U. S. 88 (1974); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 , 359 U. S. 506 -507 (1959); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 321 U. S. 329 .
Where plaintiff and defendant present competing claims of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a "nice adjustment and reconciliation" between the competing claims, Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 321 U. S. 329 . In such cases, the court
Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 321 U. S. 440 (1944).
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 321 U. S. 329 .
In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 , 312 U. S. 500 (1941). Thus, the Court has noted that
Yakus v. United States, supra, at 321 U. S. 440 (footnote omitted). The grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 193 ; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 329 .
These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a "practice with a background of several hundred years of history," Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 321 U. S. 329 , a practice of which Congress is assuredly well aware. Of course, Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 321 U. S. 329 . As the Court said in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 , 328 U. S. 398 (1946):
"Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute, in so many words or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 'The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.' Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 35 U. S. 503 . . . ."
In TVA v. Hill, we held that Congress had foreclosed the exercise of the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity. There, we thought that "[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer" than that before us. 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 173 . The statute involved, the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., required the District Court to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam in order to preserve the snail
It was conceded in Hill that completion of the dam would eliminate an endangered species by destroying its critical habitat. Refusal to enjoin the action would have ignored the "explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act." 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 173 . Congress, it appeared to us, had chosen the snail darter over the dam. The purpose and language of the statute limited the remedies available to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the Act.
That is not the case here. An injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance. The FWPCA itself, for example, provides for fines and criminal penalties. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) and (d). Respondents suggest that failure to enjoin the Navy will undermine the integrity of the permit process by allowing the statutory violation to continue. The integrity of the Nation's waters, however, not the permit process, is the purpose of the FWPCA. [ Footnote 7 ] As Congress explained, the objective of the FWPCA is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
This purpose is to be achieved by compliance with the Act, including compliance with the permit requirements. [ Footnote 8 ] Here, however, the discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters, and, although the District Court declined to enjoin the discharges, it neither ignored the statutory violation nor undercut the purpose and function of the permit system. The court ordered the Navy to apply for a permit. [ Footnote 9 ] It temporarily, not permanently, allowed the Navy to continue its activities without a permit.
In Hill, we also noted that none of the limited "hardship exemptions" of the Endangered Species Act would "even remotely apply to the Tellico Project." 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 188 . The prohibition of the FWPCA against discharge of pollutants, in contrast, can be overcome by the very permit the Navy was ordered to seek. [ Footnote 10 ] The Senate Report to the 1972
Other aspects of the statutory scheme also suggest that Congress did not intend to deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction. Although the ultimate objective of the FWPCA is to eliminate all discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985, the statute sets forth a scheme of phased compliance. As enacted, it called for the achievement of the "best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977, and the "best available technology economically achievable" by July 1, 1983. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). This scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a statute in which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the exercise of discretion. [ Footnote 11 ]
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). [ Footnote 12 ] The provision makes clear that Congress did not
Brief for Petitioners 17. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 , 451 U. S. 320 -322 (1981). Here, again, the statutory scheme contemplates equitable consideration.
Both the Court of Appeals and respondents attach particular weight to the provision of the FWPCA permitting the President to exempt federal facilities from compliance with the permit requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). [ Footnote 13 ] They suggest that this provision indicates congressional intent to limit the court's discretion. According to respondents, the exemption provision evidences Congress' determination that only paramount national interests justify failure to comply, and that only the President should make this judgment.
Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 451 U. S. 310 -311; see generally EPA v . California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 (1976). Nonetheless,
Id. at 321 U. S. 330 . We do not read the FWPCA as foreclosing completely the exercise of the court's discretion. Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation.
"[I]f the truth be said, the control of large areas of Vieques [by the Navy] probably constitutes a positive factor in its over-all ecology. The very fact that there are in the Navy zones modest numbers of various marine species which are practically nonexistent in the civilian sector of Vieques or in the main island of Puerto Rico is an eloquent example of res ipsa loquitur. "
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 , 426 U. S. 205 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 453 U. S. 15 ; see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981). But, as we have also observed in construing this Act: "The question . . . is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress intended. . . ." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 138 . Here, we do not read the FWPCA as intending to abolish the courts' equitable discretion in ordering remedies.
The statute at issue in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), contained language very similar to that in § 1319(b). It directed the Price Administrator to seek "a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order" to halt violations. Id. at 321 U. S. 322 . The Court determined that such statutory language did not require the court to issue an injunction even when the Administrator had sued for injunctive relief. In Hecht Co., the court's equitable discretion overrode that of the Administrator. If a court can properly refuse an injunction in the circumstances of Hecht Co., the exercise of its discretion seems clearly appropriate in a case such as this, where the EPA Administrator was not a party and had not yet expressed his judgment. The action of the District Court permitted it to obtain the benefit of the EPA's recommendation before deciding to enjoin the discharge.
In Hecht Co., unlike here, the violations had ceased by the time the injunction was sought. The Court, however, explained that "the cessation of violations, whether before or after the institution of a suit by the Administrator, is no bar to the issuance of an injunction." Id. at 321 U. S. 327 . Thus, contrary to the dissent's characterization, post at 456 U. S. 327 -328, the Court did not base its decision on the fact that violations had ceased.
The propriety of this disposition is emphasized by the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, post, p. 456 U. S. 322 . I agree with his view that Congress may limit a court's equitable discretion in granting remedies under a particular statute, and that some statutes may constrain discretion more narrowly than others. I stand with the Court, however, in finding no indication that Congress intended to limit the court's equitable discretion under the FWPCA in the manner suggested by JUSTICE STEVENS. As the Court's remand order might be thought to leave open whether the District Court in this case acted within its range of permissible discretion under the
The appropriate remedy for the violation of a federal statute depends primarily on the terms of the statute and the character of the violation. Unless Congress specifically commands a particular form of relief, the question of remedy remains subject to a court's equitable discretion. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Because the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not specifically command the federal courts to issue an injunction every time an unpermitted discharge of a pollutant occurs, the Court today is obviously correct in asserting that such injunctions should not issue "automatically" or "mechanically" in every case. It is nevertheless equally clear that, by enacting the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA, Congress channeled the discretion of the federal judiciary much more narrowly than the Court's rather glib opinion suggests. Indeed, although there may well be situations in which the failure to obtain an NPDES permit would not require immediate cessation of all discharges, I am convinced that Congress has circumscribed the district courts' discretion on the question of remedy so narrowly that a general rule of immediate cessation must be applied in all but a narrow category of cases. The Court of Appeals was quite correct in holding that this case does not present the kind of exceptional situation that justifies a departure from the general rule.
Contrary to the impression created by the Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals did not hold that the District Court was under an absolute duty to require compliance with the FWPCA "under any and all circumstances," ante at 456 U. S. 313 , or that it was "mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law," ibid. The only "absolute duty" that the Court of Appeals mentioned was the Navy's duty to obtain a permit before discharging pollutants into the waters off Vieques Island. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In light of the Court's opinion, the point is worth repeating -- the Navy, like anyone else, [ Footnote 2/3 ] must obey the law.
was not harming the quality of the coastal waters, see Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646, 706-707 (PR 1979); and second, the court was concerned that compliance with the Act might adversely affect national security, see id. at 707-708. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the first consideration is the business of the EPA [ Footnote 2/4 ] and the second is the business of the President. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
The Court unfairly uses the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case as a springboard for a lecture on the principles of equitable remedies. The Court of Appeals' reasoning was correct in all respects. It recognized that the statute categorically prohibits discharges of pollutants without a permit. Unlike the Court, see ante at 456 U. S. 314 -315, it recognized that the requested injunction was the only remedy that would bring the Navy into compliance with the statute on Congress' timetable. [ Footnote 2/6 ] It then demonstrated that none of the reasons offered
by the District Court for refusing injunctive relief was consistent with the statute or was compelling under the circumstances. The position of the Court of Appeals, in effect, was that the federal courts' equitable discretion is constrained by a strong presumption in favor of enforcing the law as Congress has written it. By reversing, the Court casts doubt on the validity of that position. This doubt is especially dangerous in the environmental area, where the temptations to delay compliance are already substantial. [ Footnote 2/7 ]
Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , illustrates the first distinction. The Court there held that Congress constitutionally could preclude a private party from obtaining an injunction against enforcement of federal price control regulations pending an adjudication of their validity. In any balancing process, the Court explained, special deference must be given to the public interest:
"This is but another application of the principle, declared in Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 , 300 U. S. 552 , that"
Id. at 321 U. S. 441 .
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 , which the Court repeatedly cites, did involve an attempt to obtain an injunction against future violations of a federal statute. That case fell into the category of cases in which a past violation of law had been found and the question was whether an injunction should issue to prevent future violations. Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629 , 345 U. S. 633 -636; United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326 , 343 U. S. 332 -334. Because the record established that the past violations were inadvertent,
321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 331 . Indeed, the Court emphasized that any exercise of discretion "should reflect an acute awareness of the Congressional admonition" in the statute at issue. Ibid.
In contrast to the decision in Hecht, today the Court pays mere lipservice to the statutory mandate, and attaches no weight to the fact that the Navy's violation of law has not been corrected. [ Footnote 2/8 ] The Court cites no precedent for its holding that an ongoing deliberate violation of a federal statute should be treated like any garden-variety private nuisance action in which the chancellor has the widest discretion in fashioning relief. [ Footnote 2/9 ]
Our prior cases involving the appropriate remedy for an ongoing violation of federal law establish a much more stringent test than the Court applies today. Thus, in United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16 , a case in which the Government claimed that the city's disposition of electric power was prohibited by an Act of Congress, the Court held that
Id. at 310 U. S. 30 .
Id. at 310 U. S. 31 . An injunction to prohibit continued violation of that policy "is both appropriate and necessary." Ibid. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 , the Court plainly stated that an equitable remedy for the violation of a federal statute was neither automatic, on the one hand, nor simply a matter of balancing the equities, on the other. [ Footnote 2/11 ] Albemarle holds that the district court's remedial
decision must be measured against the purposes that inform the Act of Congress that has been violated. Id. at 422 U. S. 417 .
The Court's discussion of the FWPCA creates the impression that Congress did not intend any significant change in the enforcement provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. See ante at 456 U. S. 319 . The Court goes so far as to suggest that the FWPCA is little more than a codification of the common law of nuisance. [ Footnote 2/12 ] The contrast between this casual attitude toward the FWPCA and the Court's writing in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 , is stark. In that case, the Court refused to allow federal judges to supplement the statutory enforcement scheme by enjoining a nuisance, whereas, in this case, the question is whether a federal judge may create a loophole in the scheme by refusing
Id. at 451 U. S. 326 . Ironically, today the Court holds that federal district courts may, in effect, "write their own ticket" under the guise of federal common law before permits have been issued.
The Court distinguishes TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , on the ground that the Endangered Species Act contained a "flat ban" on the destruction of critical habitats. Ante at 456 U. S. 314 . But the statute involved in this case also contains a flat ban against discharges of pollutants into coastal waters without a permit. [ Footnote 2/13 ] Surely the congressional directive to protect the
Nation's waters from gradual but possibly irreversible contamination is no less clear than the command to protect the snail darter. [ Footnote 2/14 ] To assume that Congress has placed a greater value on the protection of vanishing forms of animal life than on the protection of our water resources is to ignore the text, the legislative history [ Footnote 2/15 ] and the previously consistent interpretation of this statute. [ Footnote 2/16 ]
darter or the completion of the Tellico Dam had to be sacrificed. In the FWPCA, the Court tells us, the congressional objective is to protect the integrity of the Nation's waters, not to protect the integrity of the permit process. Ante at 456 U. S. 314 . Therefore, the Court continues, ante at 456 U. S. 315 , a federal court may compromise the process chosen by Congress to protect our waters as long as the court is content that the waters are not actually being harmed by the particular discharge of pollutants.
A disregard of the respective roles of the three branches of government also tarnishes the Court's other principal argument in favor of expansive equitable discretion in this area. [ Footnote 2/17 ] The Court points out that Congress intended to halt water pollution gradually, not immediately, and that "the scheme as a whole contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities." Ante at 456 U. S. 316 . In the Court's words, Congress enacted a "scheme of phased compliance." Ibid. Equitable discretion in enforcing the statute, the Court states, is therefore consistent with the statutory scheme.
The Court's sophistry is premised on a gross misunderstanding of the statutory scheme. Naturally, in 1972, Congress did not expect dischargers to end pollution immediately. [ Footnote 2/18 ] Rather, it entrusted to expert administrative
agencies the task of establishing timetables by which dischargers could reach that ultimate goal. These timetables are determined by the agencies and included in the NPDES permits; the conditions in the permits constitute the terms by which compliance with the statute is measured. [ Footnote 2/19 ] Quite obviously, then, the requirement that each discharger subject itself to the permit process is crucial to the operation of the "scheme of phased compliance." By requiring each discharger to obtain a permit before continuing its discharges of pollutants, Congress demonstrated an intolerance for delay in compliance with the statute. It is also obvious that the "exercise of discretion and balancing of equities" were tasks delegated by Congress to expert agencies, not to federal courts, yet the Court simply ignores the difference.
respect for the law and the proper allocation of lawmaking responsibilities in our Government. [ Footnote 2/20 ] There we refused to sit as a committee of review. Today the Court authorizes freethinking federal judges to do just that. Instead of requiring adherence to carefully integrated statutory procedures that assign to nonjudicial decisionmakers the responsibilities for evaluating potential harm to our water supply as well as potential harm to our national security, the Court unnecessarily and casually substitutes the chancellor's clumsy foot for the rule of law.
Cf. Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U. S. 39 , 361 U. S. 54 -59 (Frankfurter and Harlan, JJ., concurring).
"Not only are the technical problems difficult -- doubtless the reason Congress vested authority to administer the Act in administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise -- but the general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a regime of federal common law. Congress criticized past approaches to water pollution control as being 'sporadic' and ' ad hoc, ' S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (1971), 2 Leg.Hist. 1511, apt characterizations of any judicial approach applying federal common law, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310 , 348 U. S. 319 (1955)."
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 , 451 U. S. 325 .
In my opinion, the national security considerations that were persuasive to the District Court are not matters that are suitable for judicial evaluation. Congress has wisely given the President virtually unlimited authority to exempt the military from the statute on national defense grounds. If those grounds justify an exemption in this case, the Navy clearly should have obtained it from its Commander in Chief, not from a judge unlearned in such matters. This Court, however, makes the curious argument that the Presidential exemption was intended to permit noncompliance with the statute, and therefore merely complements the equitable discretion of a district court also to authorize noncompliance. Ante at 456 U. S. 318 -319.
The District Court ordered the Navy to file for an NPDES permit " with all deliberate speed.'" Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F.Supp. 646, 708 (PR 1979) (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 , 349 U. S. 301 ).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 609 -610 (concurring opinion).
"The petitioners contend that the statutory scheme provides no guidance, beyond indicating that backpay awards are within the District Court's discretion. We disagree. It is true that backpay is not an automatic or mandatory remedy; like all other remedies under the Act, it is one which the courts 'may' invoke. The scheme implicitly recognizes that there may be cases calling for one remedy but not another, and -- owing to the structure of the federal judiciary -- these choices are, of course, left in the first instance to the district courts. However, such discretionary choices are not left to a court's 'inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.' United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.). The power to award backpay was bestowed by Congress, as part of a complex legislative design directed at a historic evil of national proportions. A court must exercise this power 'in light of the large objectives of the Act,' Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 , 321 U. S. 331 (1944). That the court's discretion is equitable in nature, see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 , 415 U. S. 197 (1974), hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review. In Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U. S. 288 , 361 U. S. 292 (1960), this Court held, in the face of a silent statute, that district courts enjoyed the 'historic power of equity' to award lost wages to workmen unlawfully discriminated against under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958 ed.). The Court simultaneously noted that 'the statutory purposes [leave] little room for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement.' 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 296 ."
"It is true that '[e]quity eschews mechanical rules . . . [and] depends on flexibility.' Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 , 327 U. S. 396 (1946). But when Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes, and not 'equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot.' Important national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that 'produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.' Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 , 398 U. S. 405 (1970)."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 , 422 U. S. 415 -417 (footnotes omitted).
Ante at 456 U. S. 314 , n. 7.
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1 , 426 U. S. 7 .
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 , 426 U. S. 205 .
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 317 . In EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64 , the Court read the "plain language of the statute," id. at 449 U. S. 73 , to require private firms "either to conform to BPT standards or to cease production." Id. at 449 U. S. 76 .
"The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee [, 406 U. S. 91 ,] was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law."
Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 451 U. S. 319 .
451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 320 .
TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , 437 U. S. 194 -195.