Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=41443:g-r-no-147571-may-5,-2001-social-weather-stations,-et-al-v-comelec,-et-al&catid=1406&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 08:14:33
Document Index: 19562111

Matched Legal Cases: ['§5', '§5', '§4', '§4', '§14', 'In fine']

G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 - SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, ET AL. v. COMELEC, ET AL. | Home of ChanRobles Virtual Law Library
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC, 1 a total ban on political advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated broast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more limited.
The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. Instead, reliance is placed on Art. IX-C, §4. As already stated, the purpose of Art. IX-C, §4 is to "ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor for public information campaigns and forums among candidates." Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, §14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to advertise their candidacies in print and broast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that the usual bombast and hyperbolic claims made during the campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process.
It bears emphasizing that Section 5.4 limits itself to prohibiting the publication of surveys affecting national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys affecting local candidates seven days before an election. It does not restrict reporting by tri-media of the merits or demerits of national and local candidates and their chances at the polls. Neither does it prohibit commentaries by radio broasters and TV anchors, the expression of opinions by columnists and editors of newspapers. In fact, the provision in dispute does not prohibit paid hacks from trumpeting the qualifications of their candidates. In fine, while survey organizations who employ scientific methods and engage personnel trained in the statistical sciences to determine socio-political trends, are barred from publishing their results within the specified periods, any two-bit scribbler masquerading as a legitimate journalist can write about the purported strong showing of his candidate without any prohibition or restriction. The means used to regulate free expression is thus, not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Worse, it is unduly oppressive upon survey organizations, which have been singled out for suppression, on the mere apprehension that their survey results will lead to misinformation, "junking," or contrived bandwagon effect.
In the recent case ABS-CBN Broasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections, 2 the Court en banc junked Comelec Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998, which restrained the conduct of exit polls, a species of electoral surveys. We held that "the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press." They cannot be banned "totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud." As mankind pushes the frontiers of science and technology in mass communications, so must the scope of free expression expand 3 to cover the conduct and the publication of surveys.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Although among our most cherished rights, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not absolute or unlimited. In certain instances, this Court has allowed the regulation of the exercise of these freedoms vis-a-vis election-related laws. In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections 9 and National Press Club v. Commission on Elections, 10 the law prohibiting newspapers, radio broasting and television station from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes was declared valid. In Badoy v. Commission of Elections, 11 the prohibition on the publication of paid political advertisements outside the COMELEC space was likewise upheld. In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 12 where the prohibition on the early nomination of candidates and the limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity under Republic Act No. 4880 was assailed for being violative of the freedoms of speech, of the free press, of assembly and of association, the Court declared the law not unconstitutional.
15.	ABS-CBN Broasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811 (2000); Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections, supra; Imbong v. Ferrer, 35 SCRA 28 (1970).
28.	Id.; ABS-CBN Broasting Corp. v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 811 (2000).