Source: http://sallyrobertslegal.com/ct-grand-jury-systerm.htm
Timestamp: 2017-08-22 14:47:38
Document Index: 765884383

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 54', 'art. 1', '§ 9', '§ 54', '§ 8', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 9', '§ 54', '§ 1785', '§ 953', '§ 8', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 604', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 477', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 54', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 54', '§ 78', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54', '§ 54']

Connecticut’s Grand Jury System
By Sally A. Roberts, Esq.
A. Definition and Nature
B. Origin and History
C. Grand Jury takes root in Connecticut
D. Criticism of the Grand Jury
II. Constitutional Grand Jury
A. Grand Jury Clause of United States Constitution
B. Constitutional Grand Jury in Connecticut
III. Common Law Investigatory Grand Jury
IV. Statutory Investigatory Inquiry (“One Man Grand Jury”)
Right to be Present in the Grand Jury Room
Presence of Counsel before Grand Jury
Guidance from Federal Law
Secrecy of Proceedings
Testimony of Accused during Grand Jury Proceedings
Transcript of Indicting Grand Jury
Transcript of Investigatory Grand Jury
Findings and Record of Investigatory Grand Jury
Public Disclosure of Investigatory Grand Jury Findings
Access to Transcript of Proceedings by State’s Attorney
Access to Transcript of Proceedings by Witness
Access to Transcript of Proceedings by Defendant
Use of Defendant’s Testimony from an Investigatory Grand Jury
A grand jury[1] is a body of qualified persons selected and organized for the purpose of inquiring into the commission of crimes within the county or jurisdiction from which its members are drawn, determining the probability of a particular person’s guilt, and finding indictments against supposed offenders. It is an inquisitorial or investigative body of ancient origin, charged primarily with the duty of investigating infractions of the criminal law occurring within the county or jurisdiction. It is not the final arbiter of guilt or innocence. A grand jury is a part of the machinery of government, having for its object the detection and punishment of crime. It is an adjunct or appendage of the court under whose supervision it is impaneled, and it has no existence aside from that court.[2]
Originally transported to America from England by the early colonists, the grand jury has historically enjoyed considerable affection in this country as a shield or buffer against unfounded or unjust prosecutions. As explained in 1884 by the United States Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California:
The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.[3]
These sentiments have been echoed by the Connecticut Supreme Court: “The purpose of a requirement of an indictment by a grand jury is, no doubt, to prevent the harassment and suffering of an innocent person by compelling him to appear in court to respond to malicious or unfounded charges. Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 260 (1948), aff’d, 337 U.S. 901, reh’g denied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949). See also State v. Menillo, 159 Conn. 264, 275 (1970).
The grand jury’s history as an Anglo institution is believed to have originated with a command of Henry II at the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 for twelve knights, or twelve “good and lawful men” of every hundred and four lawful men, to disclose under oath the names of those in the community believed guilty of criminal offenses.[4] Gradually grand jury accusations began to be premised on information supplied by others as the grand jurors took to examining witnesses in private; by the time its role as a shielding device was first established in 17th century England, the grand jury had been operating in an investigatory capacity for at least three hundred years.[5]
In Connecticut, the grand jury originated during the colonial period, where it became the practice by custom and later by statute for the court to summon grand juries in all cases where an accused was charged with a capital crime. In this capacity, the grand jury appears to have achieved great popularity by ignoring technical guilt and refusing to indict in the numerous cases were (as was common in that period) capital punishment was imposed for relatively minor offenses. [6]
In the preface to the first volume of the Connecticut Reports, Thomas Day wrote of the history of the grand jury in Connecticut.[7] The earliest enactment in regard to grand juries was passed in 1643, which provided that a grand jury of twelve men was required to assemble annually in September “or as many & oft as the Governor or Courte shall thinke meet” in order to “make presentment” of any crimes in their jurisdiction of which they had knowledge.[8] The Superior Court was established as a court of general jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters in 1711,[9] and in 1784,[10] the Superior Court and the County Courts were authorized by statute to order a grand jury of eighteen chosen from the Grand Jurors of the respective towns “to enquire after and present such criminal offenses as should be cognizable by said courts respectively, where there should be occasion.”[11]
Under this statute, which remains essentially unchanged to this day,[12] the inquisitorial powers of the common-law grand jury have been utilized by state prosecutors to conduct investigations not preceded by formal charges into complex criminal schemes involving public officials.[13]
Despite its popularity, the grand jury has been attacked as inefficient and incompetent. In the late nineteenth century, a movement toward abolition of the grand jury took hold, which was fueled in part by the United States Supreme Court’s refusal to impose the Fifth Amendment’s indictment requirement on the states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process.[14] This movement culminated ultimately with the abolishment of grand juries in Great Britain.[15]
Much of the criticism has centered on the grand jury’s perceived role as a “rubber stamp” for a prosecutor who drafts the indictments, determines the evidence to be reviewed, provides legal advice, examines witnesses, and otherwise controls the timing of a proceeding, which takes place in secret and ex parte and therefore without benefit of the defendant’s input and presence. In addition, the United States Supreme Court’s refusal[16] to invalidate federal indictments based entirely on hearsay evidence, and the ensuing judicial reluctance to prescribe the nature and quantity of evidence required for grand jury accusation, has been regarded as a severe impediment to the quality of grand jury review. In its place, many critics advocate use of a preliminary hearing, conducted before a single knowledgeable judicial official in a public adversarial setting, as simpler, cheaper, relatively impervious to procedural attack, and much more effective and reliable as a screening device.[17]
Proponents contend, on the other hand, that the grand jury offers a more independent and democratically desirable screening alternative, since it invests a panel of anonymous lay representatives with authority to define the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial power in light of community notions of fairness, in a setting insulated from public pressure and criticism.[18]
Many of the criticisms outlined above have less impact when applied to Connecticut, where the independence and impartial character of the grand jury is supported and buttressed by many unique features.[19]
The durability of the Connecticut grand jury is highlighted by the virtual absence, until recently, of legislative enactments governing its powers and operation, despite the fact that grand juries have functioned in Connecticut since the Colonial period. With the exception of the relatively recent statutes governing grand jury transcripts and witness immunity, the only sources of authority defining the function of the grand jury prior to the adoption of the Practice Book Rules in 1976 have been Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45 (enacted in 1784 and essentially unchanged to this day), and the original constitutional provision mandating prosecution by indictment for capital offenses.
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, except in certain military cases, “no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”[20] While the Fifth Amendment's grand jury indictment clause imposes certain constraints on prosecutions in federal courts,[21] this provision of the Bill of Rights has not been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Lanfranco v. Murray, 313 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2002); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884));[22] Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1118 (2d Cir. 1990). [23] “The Hurtado case has been followed or accepted as authoritative in a long line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court.” Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 273 (1948).
When Connecticut’s constitution was originally adopted in 1818, it required that prosecutions for certain offenses be commenced by grand jury indictment: “And no person shall be holden to answer for any crime, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life, unless on a presentment or an indictment of a grand jury; except in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war, or public danger.” Conn. Const. art. 1, § 9 (1818).[24] From 1818 until 1982, that provision remained substantially unchanged.[25] All persons charged with a crime punishable on conviction by death or life imprisonment had a constitutional right to a grand jury determination that there was probable cause to believe the charge before being required to stand trial.
This requirement for grand jury screening of capital charges was eliminated from the Connecticut Constitution in 1982, and replaced with a requirement for a preliminary hearing as a result of a state-wide voter referendum.[26] The amendment provides in relevant part, that: “Section 8 of article first of the constitution is amended to read as follows: .... No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law....” (Emphasis added.)
The Constitutional Amendment contemplated a probable cause hearing “in accordance with procedures contemplated by law.” However, on November 24, 1982, the date the Amendment was certified by the Secretary of State, there was neither statutory nor Practice Book “procedures” in place and the legislation establishing a statutory right to grand jury indictment, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45, had not yet been repealed.[27] The Supreme Court resolved the issues of the effective dates of the new legislation in State v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671 (1984), which held that although amendment seventeen became a part of the constitution on November 24, 1982, it did not take effect until May26, 1983, the effective date of enabling legislation, and that defendants’ right to a probable cause hearing did not vest until that date. All defendants, therefore, who were indicted before May 26, 1983, had no right to any further pretrial determination of probable cause.[28]
The repeal of the grand jury provision of article first, § 8 of the constitution, however, did not simultaneously nullify the statutory grand jury provisions that complemented the former article. See Conn. Gen. Gen. Stat. § 54-45. It merely substituted a constitutionally mandated court determination of probable cause for what had been a constitutionally mandated grand jury indictment. The legislature’s authority to enact a statute providing for grand jury indictment, as § 54-45 did, did not depend on the repealed constitutional provision. Subsequently, portions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45 [29] were repealed in 1983 and put in place as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-46a, a statutory provision establishing procedures for a probable cause hearing for persons charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.
The grand jury is a creature of common law and was adopted by statute in Connecticut long before it was mandated by the first constitution in 1818.[30] Grand jury procedure has been almost entirely governed by the common law in Connecticut.[31] Throughout this period, there also existed a statutory right to a grand jury indictment as a precondition to trial for such offenses. Before the 1983 amendments, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45 (b) provided, in relevant part: “No person shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life unless an indictment has been found against him for such crime by a grand jury legally impaneled and sworn....”
IV. Statutory Investigatory Inquiry (“One Man Grand Jury”)[32]
In comparison to indicting grand juries, which have long existed at common law, the investigatory grand jury is purely a creature of statute.[33] Originally enacted in 1941,[34] the legislature instituted far-reaching procedural reforms in 1985.[35] Because the investigatory grand jury has no common law power, its powers necessarily are limited by the language of the enabling statute which authorizes its creation, now codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-47a through 54-47i.[36]
This statute provides for grand jury inquiries by one or more judges of the Superior Court, who sit as grand jurors and exercise the same powers as the common-law investigative grand jury, except for the absence of authority to return indictments. The One Man Grand Jury has supplanted the common-law grand jury because of its greater attractiveness as a prosecutorial investigatory tool. The statutory procedure permits the prosecutor to apply directly for the convening of the grand jury; to attend the proceedings accompanied by investigatory staff; to question witnesses directly in the absence of counsel; and to retain control over the charging decision, since grand jurors conducting a judicial inquiry are without authority to make formal accusations. The One Man Grand Jury has enormous power to compel the attendance of virtually any person or object it deems relevant to the subject it was convened to investigate at the behest of the prosecutor and his investigatory staff. Accordingly, it has been hailed by prosecutors as an important, even necessary tool for the investigation of sophisticated, complex criminal schemes when there is good reason for believing that a crime has been committed, but no apparent demonstration that it has.[37]
Supporters of the judicial inquiry contend that it is a superior alternative to the common-law investigative grand jury, since the judge-juror can be expected to exert greater control over the proceedings, and since its activities (most notably, the decision to issue a report) are subject to the supervision and review of the Superior Court. On the other hand, those critical of the inquiry stress that judges, even appointed judges, are more subject to political pressures than a panel of anonymous laymen;[38] that in a non-inquisitorial system such as ours, it is improper and ultimately damaging to judicial prestige to cast judges in an investigative rather than a deliberative role; and that a grand jury composed of professional jurists sacrifices the vital democratic characteristic of an institution traditionally composed of ordinary citizens. Despite repeated constitutional challenges, neither the state nor federal courts have demonstrated any willingness to tamper with the scope or conduct of a statutory judicial inquiry.[39]
An investigating grand jury is not engaged in an adversary proceeding. Neither is an indicting grand jury. The distinction between the two is that “[g]rand-juries [of the indicting type] do not try, but enquire; they do not condemn, but only accuse....” State v. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272, 280 (1851). Investigating grand juries neither try nor condemn nor accuse; they only inquire and report. [40]
B. Subpoena Powers
The attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at such investigation may be compelled by subpoena. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47f (b).
C. Right to be Present in the Grand Jury Room
The right to be present in the grand jury room during the interrogation of witnesses was first accorded a suspect in Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815), and has been continued by the “liberality of [the Connecticut] practice’ State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457, 468 (1844), up to the present time.[41] “While the accused is not, as a matter of right, entitled to be present within the grand jury room, in practice ... he is allowed the privilege of being present in the grand jury room during the taking of evidence by the grand jury although not during their deliberations.”[42]
D. Presence of Counsel before Grand Jury
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47f (d) presently states: “At the hearing, the official conducting the investigation shall inform the witness that he has the right to have counsel present and to consult with such counsel.” However, there is no reported decision indicating that the witness has the right to counsel inside the hearing room itself.[43] “It is well established that an accused person has no constitutional right to the presence of counsel before a grand jury. ... This is ‘the settled law of this state.’... Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815). Federal authorities take the same view.” State v. Canady, 187 Conn. 281, 289-90 (1982) (Citations omitted.)[44] “[T]he state’s attorney submits a list of witnesses, but neither he nor any counsel for the accused is in the grand jury room.... The grand jury proceedings ... are conducted in secret.” State v. Coffee, 56 Conn. 399, 410 (1888). “Recently, we had occasion to examine the grand jury procedure in this state, in State v. Menillo, 159 Conn. 264, 274 (1970. In that case, we reaffirmed that an accused has no right to the presence of counsel during the proceedings.” See State v. Stallings, 154 Conn. 272, 282-83 (1966).”[45]
Although the issue of the right to counsel is a question of federal constitutional law, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that the grand jury is not a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding under Connecticut law, nor does the suspect become “the accused” until an indictment is returned against him. Stallings, id. [46]As summarized by the Second Circuit: “If ....every suspect whose case is before the grand jury, is granted the right to be accompanied by his counsel while he is in the grand jury room, it would inevitably and speedily follow that the State’s Attorney would also be granted the right to be there to present the State’s case. The Connecticut grand jury would thereupon become an adversary proceeding, and it would entirely lose its character and purpose. We do not find that there is any constitutional mandated which requires or permits the petitioner to have his attorney with him when petitioner exercises his right to be present in the jury room during the questioning of witnesses by the Connecticut grand jury.” Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976).
E. Rules of Evidence
The Connecticut Code of Evidence is explicitly made inapplicable to an investigatory grand jury.[47] Moreover, because such a jury seeks only to find “probable cause,” its proceedings are not governed by any other “technical rules” of evidence.[48]
F. Alternate Jurors
Several alternate jurors may be added to the grand jury panel, in the discretion of the court.[49]
G. Guidance from Federal Law
Connecticut courts have traditionally sought guidance from federal case law on issues involving grand jury proceedings.[50]
H. Immunity from Prosecution
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47a empowers a state’s attorney to grant immunity from prosecution in order to obtain testimony from a reluctant witness. The protection from prosecution is coextensive with the privilege of immunity and completely fulfills all federal constitutional requirements.[51] The immunity is intended to provide witnesses compelled to testify in criminal proceedings against others with protection at least equivalent to that available under the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.[52] The protection afforded by this provision, like that inherent in the privilege, is expressly restricted to the immunized witness. Historically, the statute has been used only for prosecution witnesses, and courts have routinely rejected claims that the immunity should also be granted to a defense witness.[53]
I. Handwriting Exemplars
Neither the Fifth Amendment for the Fourth Amendment protects a witness before a grand jury from submitting handwriting exemplars. In re Fernandez, 31 Conn. Supp. 53 (1974).
J. Secrecy of Proceedings
As a matter of history, grand jury proceedings have always been presumptively secret.[54] The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated: “We have not in the past distinguished between investigating and indicting grand juries in recognizing the need to encourage citizen cooperation which underlies the expectation that grand juries normally operate in secrecy. We decline to do so now.”[55] The traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings is well entrenched in the common law - “older than our Nation itself.”[56] Historically, the only exceptions to this rule of grand jury secrecy have been in a trial for perjury committed by a witness before the grand jury, or impeachment of a witness at trial who has testified differently from his grand jury testimony. State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457, 467 (1844).
The secrecy of the testimony obtained during proceedings before the grand jury remain inviolate unless, in the discretion of the court, it is persuaded that statements made are inconsistent with statements made at trial, or that testimony is needed to impeach a witness or to attack the credibility of a witness.[57] In determining whether to pierce the secrecy of grand jury proceedings in cases where the testimony of a witness at trial is different from his testimony before the grand jury, the court may consider the extent to which other evidence can adequately provide the jury with the theory that the introduction of the grand jury testimony would provide.[58]
Grand jury proceedings have repeatedly been exempted from recently expanded rights of public access to public records and proceedings. Although constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of speech provide public access to many governmental proceedings, these constitutional rights do not apply to proceedings before grand juries.[59] The constitution confers upon a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, and hence affords access to the public, but no such right pertains to the inquiry of an investigatory grand jury, which is not a criminal proceeding.[60] The Freedom of Information Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-7, et seq., expressly exempts records that pertain to “the detection or investigation of crime.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-19 (b) (3).
K. Testimony of Accused during Grand Jury Proceedings
Since the grand jury does not consider the guilt or innocence of the accused but only determines whether he or she should stand trial, the accused is not allowed to testify or to introduce evidence tending to prove his innocence except insofar as his questioning of the state’s witnesses may disclose the weakness of the state’s case.[61]
L. Transcript of Indicting Grand Jury
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45a (b), which governs indicting grand juries, expressly prohibits subsequent use of the witness’s testimony in the state’s case-in-chief.[62] This section applies to grand jury proceedings ordered pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45, which, while still “on the books,” has been essentially supplanted by the probable cause hearing established by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-46a (after the 1982 constitutional amendment which provided for such a hearing in lieu of grand jury indictment). Thus, by its terms, § 54-45a (b) does not apply to investigatory grand juries appointed in accordance with § 54-47a, et seq.
M. Transcript of Investigatory Grand Jury
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g governs the disclosure of and access to the record of the investigation. A hearing is required to determine whether disclosure of the transcripts is in the public interest.[63] Investigatory grand jury’s records are open to the public unless the court orders that all or a part of such records not be disclosed. Even where such nondisclosure order is entered, witnesses may obtain the record of their own testimony, unless the court finds that the best interests of justice do not permit it. The accused also has a right to a record of his own testimony. Any person aggrieved by an order of the investigatory grand jury has an immediate right to appeal such order to the appellate court.[64]
N. Findings and Record of Investigatory Grand Jury
Within sixty days of the conclusion of the investigation, the investigatory grand jury is to file its findings with the court. The findings and record include the report of the grand juror, the transcript and documentation submitted to the grand juror.[65] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (a) authorizes “any person” to file an application with the grand jury panel for disclosure of any part of the record and empowers the panel to grant such application if, after notice and a hearing, it determines, by a majority vote, that disclosure would be in the public interest.[66]
O. Public Disclosure of Investigatory Grand Jury Findings
The legislative genealogy of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g reveals a distinct trend away from the policy of rigid nondisclosure in grand jury matters. Prior to the 1985 legislative changes, the authority to release grand jury reports was vested in the Superior Court:[67] In 1985, a grand jury “panel”[68] was empowered, by majority vote, to disclose the findings and record upon a determination that such disclosure would be in the “public interest.”[69] The standard for release prior to the 1985 amendment was “a particularized need.”[70]
In 1988, the legislature cut back even further on the confidentiality of the grand juror’s findings and conclusions by establishing, in effect, a rebuttable presumption of disclosure. The amendment provided, in relevant part, that “the finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection and copying ... seven calendar days after it has been filed, unless within that period the chief state’s attorney or a state’s attorney ... [requests] that a part or all of such finding not be so disclosed. The finding may include all or such part of the record as the investigatory grand jury may determine....”[71]
P. Access to Transcript of Proceedings by State’s Attorney
The state’s attorney may be allowed to receive the record and transcripts of the grand jury proceedings upon request and without a hearing. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (a).[72]
Q. Access to Transcript of Proceedings by Witness
A witness may be allowed access to the transcript of his own testimony, regardless of whether there has been an order of nondisclosure. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (f).
R. Access to Transcript of Proceedings by Defendant
A defendant also has an absolute right to obtain the transcript of his own testimony, regardless of whether there has been an order of nondisclosure. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (g). However, a criminal defendant is not entitled to the transcripts of testimony of any and all grand jury witnesses on demand. “ ‘A defendant has no absolute right to inspect investigative grand jury testimony for the purpose of assisting him in preparation of a defense.’ State v. Waterman, 7 Conn. App. 326, 345, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 807 (1986).” State v. Rado, 14 Conn. App. 322, 331 (1987).[73]
S. Use of Defendant’s Testimony from an Investigatory Grand Jury
The State’s right of access to the testimony of a grand jury witness includes the right to use that testimony in its case-in-chief in a subsequent criminal prosecution of that witness.[74] Such use by the State of the defendant’s testimony would not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be a witness against himself, where the defendant was advised of his rights immediately prior to testifying before the grand jury, including his Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer any question if doing so would have tended to incriminate him.[75] The trial court is not required to find that such disclosure is in the public interest in a subsequent prosecution, since the State has the absolute right to obtain the grand jury testimony from the clerk of the court. The State’s use of the defendant’s testimony given in such proceedings.
[1] Compare a petit jury, usually consisting of 6 or 12 persons, summoned and impaneled in the trial of a specific case. Also termed petty jury; trial jury; common jury.
[2] See generally, 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury.
[3] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 522 (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 (8 Gray) (1867).
[4] Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 101, 110 (1931).
[5] Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury (1906).
[6] See Milton Nahum & Lewis Schatz, The Grand Jury in Connecticut, 5 Conn. B.J. 111 (1931).
[7] Day, Preface to Connecticut Reports, 1 Conn. ix (1817).
[8] 1 Col. Rec. 91; Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 267-68 (1948).
[9] 5 Col. Rec. 238.
[10] Prior to 1784, there was no constitutional or statutory requirement in Connecticut for an indictment by a grand jury as the basis for the trial of one accused by a crime, whatever the nature of the offense. Neither the fundamental orders of 1683, nor the Bill of Rights embodied in the code of 1650, or the royal charter of 1662, under which the government of Connecticut continued to be conducted until the adoption of the Constitution in 1818, contained any such provision. The 1643 statute did not require indictment by a grand jury as the necessary basis of a prosecution. See Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 267-68 (1948).
[11] The grand jury statute of 1784 provided:
That the Superior Court and County Courts in this State shall have Power to order a Grand-jury of Eighteen of those chosen by the respective Towns in the County, or other sufficient Free-holders of the County where such Court is sitting, to be summoned, impannelled, and sworn to enquire after and present such criminal Offenses as shall be cognizable by said Courts respectively, where there shall be occasion. And no Person shall be held to trial, or put to plead to any Complaint, Indictment or Accusation for a Capital Offense punishable with Death, unless a Bill of Indictment be found against such Person for such Crime, by a Grand-jury legally impannelled and sworn; and that no Bill of Indictment shall be presented by a Grand-jury so impannelled, unless twelve at least of the Jurors agree to it.
Conn. Acts & Laws, 1784, p. 93. The part of this statute dealing with requirement of a grand jury was incorporated in 1818 into the Connecticut Constitution: “And no person shall be holden to answer for any crime, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; except in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war, or public danger.” Const. Conn. art. I § 9.
[12] In its present form, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45: When grand jury is required. Selecting grand jury. Alternate grand jurors.
(a) The superior court may, when necessary, order a grand jury of eighteen electors of the judicial district where said court is sitting to be summoned, impaneled and sworn to inquire after and present such offenses as are cognizable by said court. Said court may, in its discretion, order one or two additional electors to be added to the grand jury as alternate grand jurors. Such alternate jurors shall be sworn separately from those constituting the regular panel and shall not counsel or confer with members of the regular panel as to any matters before the grand jury unless they become a part of the regular panel as hereinafter provided. They shall attend the sessions of the grand jury and shall be seated with or near the members of the regular panel, with equal opportunity to see and hear all matters adduced in the proceedings. If for any reason a grand juror is unable to further perform his duty, the court may excuse him and, if any grand juror is so excused or dies, the court may order that the alternate juror or, if more than one, that one who is designated by lot drawn by the clerk of the superior court, shall become a part of the regular panel and the inquiry shall then proceed as though such grand juror had been a member of the regular panel from the beginning of the inquiry.
(b) No person shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for life, charged by the state before May 26, 1983, unless an indictment has been found against him for such crime by a grand jury legally impaneled and sworn, and no bill shall be presented by any grand jury unless at least twelve of the jurors agree to it.
[13] See, for example, State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543 (1941) (investigation of municipal graft in City of Waterbury); State v.Kemp, 126 Conn. 60 (1939) (investigation of land purchase kick-back scheme).
[14] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
[15] See R. Younger, The People’s Panel (1963).
[16] See Costello v United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1965).
[17] See, e.g., Berdon, Connecticut Grand Juries: The Case for Reform, 54 Conn. B.J. 8, 17-18 (1980); Hugh F. Keefe, Tyranny Works Best in Secrecy, 54 Conn. B.J. 19 (1980); G. Lawyer, Should Grand Jury System be Abolished? 15 Yale L.J. 178 (1906).
[18] See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884):
[O]ne of the peculiar benefits of the grand jury system, as it exists in this country and England, is that it is composed, as a general rule, of a body of private persons, who do not hold office at the will of voters. In many if not in all of the States civil officers are disqualified to sit on grand juries. In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and helpless -- proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public clamor -- have found, and will continue to find, security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their personal enemies. “Grand juries perform,” says Story, “most important public functions, and are a great security to the citizens against vindictive prosecutions either by the government, or by political partisans, or by private enemies.” Story’s Const. § 1785.
Id. at 554-555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[19] The unique features of the Connecticut grand jury procedures were outlined in Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1338-41 (2d Cir. 1975):
(1) Neither the State’s Attorney nor any counsel for the prosecution is allowed to appear before the grand jury. The prosecutor remains outside the grand jury room and sends the State’s witnesses in one at a time for examination by the grand jury.
(2) There is a practicing attorney among the membership of the grand jury who usually acts as the foreman. He leads off in the examination of the witnesses, exercises some control to minimize the use of evidence which would be inadmissible at the trial itself, see State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 71 (1939), and seeks to protect both the interests of the person charged and the State.
(3) A person who is charged by the State with having committed a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment and whose case is being presented to a grand jury is permitted at his own election to be present in the grand jury room while the witnesses are being interrogated. He himself may question any or all of the witnesses, though the grand jurors may not question or examine him. He may not call or present witnesses to appear before the grand jury.
The right to be present in the grand jury room during the interrogation of witnesses was first accorded a suspect in Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815), and has been continued by the “liberality of [the Connecticut] practice’ State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457, 468 (1844), up to the present time.
[20] U.S. Const. amend V; See Sterlich and Jastovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 63 (Spring 1974).
[21] The Fifth Amendment's indictment clause prohibits "constructive amendments" of an indictment when the government's evidence and the jury instructions "modify essential elements of the offense charged to the point that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged by the grand jury." United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Lanfranco v. Murray, 313 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2002).
[22] The plaintiff had maintained that the phrase “due process of law” was equivalent to “law of the land” as found in the 29th Chapter of Magna Charta, that the venerable institutions, having been the birthright and inheritance of every English subject, crossed the Atlantic with the colonists and were transplanted and introduced into the U.S. Constitution, and that one of those institutions was the grand jury. The Court stated: “The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of English law and history” and then proceeded with an exhaustive historical analysis, back to the code of the Roman Empire. Id. at 531. The Court then surveyed the constitutions of several of the states, and analyzed Connecticut’s Constitution as follows: “The Constitution of Connecticut, adopted in 1818 and in force when the Fourteenth Amendment took effect, requires an indictment or presentment of a grand jury only in cases where the punishment of the crime charged is death or imprisonment for life, and yet it also declares that no person shall ‘be deprived of life, liberty, or property but by due course of law.’ It falls short, therefore, of that measure of protection which it is claimed is guaranteed by Magna Charta to the right of personal liberty.” Id. at 537.
[23] See Sterlich and Jastovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 63 (Spring 1974).
[24] In Connecticut, a “presentment consisted of formal charges prepared by the grand jury on its own initiative with the assistance of the prosecutor. Alternatively, and more usually, the grand jury would report its findings to the prosecutor who would then incorporate them in a subsequently issued information. See State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 577-78 (1941); 3 D. Wright & D. Havanich, Connecticut Jury Instructions § 953 (2d ed. 1975).
[25] In the Constitution of 1965, the grand jury provision was moved to article first, § 8, and its language modernized.
[26] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-46 now provides: “For all crimes charged by the state on or after May 26, 1983, the prosecution may be by complaint or information. For all crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for life charged by the state before May 26, 1983, the prosecution shall be by indictment.”
[27] See generally, Orland and Borden, 4 Connecticut Practice, Criminal Procedure (3d ed.), Ch. 36.
[28] The new statutory enactment has also withstood constitutional challenge. See State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641 (1987) (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-46a was not subject to attack as a violation of separation of powers as the constitutional amendment abolishing the grand jury and providing for preliminary hearing conferred upon the legislature the authority to fashion procedures for hearings; substitution of probable cause hearing for grand jury indictment did not constitutionally disadvantage defendant whose offense was committed prior to repeal of the grand jury provisions so that retroactive application of the new scheme for instituting prosecutions did not violate ex post facto protections).
[29] Although indicting grand juries were rendered obsolete by the 1982 constitutional amendment, the statutory provisions pertaining to indicting grand juries have never been repealed.
[30] See State v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671 (1984), for an extensive historical overview.
[31] Grand jury procedure was first extensively codified in the 1976 amendments to the Practice Book. The Practice Book of 1978 contained essentially the same rules, found at §§ 604-14.
[32] The Connecticut Supreme Court has noted: “Although described in the vernacular as a ‘one man grand jury,’ the correct designation for a proceeding under § 54-47 is ‘investigatory inquiry.’ ” State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, n.1 (1973). In order to avoid confusion with the common-law investigative grand jury authorized by § 54-45, some commentators use the term “judicial inquiry.”
[33] Connelly v. Doe, 213 Conn. 66, 70 (1989).
[34] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47, subsequently amended at numerous times until it was repealed in 1985. Despite the number of changes that the 1941 act had undergone prior to its repeal in 1985, the language defining the scope of the investigation has remained the same, directing the grand jury to perform an “investigation to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that a crime or crimes have been committed within the county.”
[35] See State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541 (1987). The 1985 act substituted, as authority for the appointment of a grand jury, the approval of a panel of three Superior Court judges, whereas under the prior law an applicant could obtain the requisite permission from the Superior Court or from the chief court administrator. Under the new act, but not under the old, an applicant requesting the appointment of an investigatory grand jury must demonstrate a reasonable belief that there is probable cause to believe that crimes have been committed. The new act further described in detail the information that must be furnished in the application, including the identity of the applicant and his authority to make the application, the facts and circumstances that justify his reasonable belief that an investigation will lead to a finding of probable cause, and any additional facts and evidence the panel may require to evaluate the application. The act also limited the duration of authorized grand juries to six months, subject to express but limited extension, to avoid the continuation of protracted and indefinite grand jury investigations. A number of substantive safeguards for witnesses were also established, which included the constitutional right against self-incrimination, and the right to have counsel present during grand jury proceedings. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-47f (d) and (e). Id. at 549 n.4 (1987).
One of the reforms was to eliminate the abuses allegedly inherent in the so-called “perpetual” one-man grand jury by imposing a six month time limitation on the duration of the grand jury, subject to a maximum of two six month extensions. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47d(c). A potential for the excessive duration of the grand jury was perceived as an abuse that the legislature intended to cure by the new act. See Connelly v. Doe, 213 Conn. 66, 71 n.6 (1989) (statements of Representative Christopher Shays, May 15, 1985). In 1986, the legislature clarified (codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47i) the legislative intent not to repeal or terminate any one-man investigatory grand jury that had been impaneled prior to the 1985 act. State v. Blasko, 202 Conn.541, 558-59 (1987).
[36] Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-47a through 54-47i has been amended a number of times since 1985. Public Acts 1987, No. 87-350; Public Acts 1988, No. 88-148; Public Acts 1988, No. 88-345; Public Acts 1998, No. 98-48.
[37] Austin J. McGuigan, Judicial Inquiry, 54 Conn. B.J. 28 (1980). See also State v. Kemp, 126 Conn.60 (1939), praising the investigatory value of the judicial inquiry’s common law counterpart: “So valuable is this inquisitorial power of the grand jury that, in states where felonies may be prosecuted by information as well as indictment, the power is ordinarily reserved to courts of impaneling grand juries for the investigation of riots, frauds and nuisances, and other cases where it is impracticable to ascertain in advance the names of the persons implicated.” Id. at 67 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906)).
[38] Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590, 604 (1961).
[39] See, e.g., Puglia v. Cotter, 333 F. Supp. 940 (D. Conn. 1971), aff’d, 450 F.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972) (One-man grand jury system and immunity statutes did not violate the First, Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights of plaintiff, who had been subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, or subject him to involuntary servitude); Salvaggio v. Cotter, 324 F. Supp. 681 (D. Conn. 1971), aff’d, 447 F.2d 1406 (1971) (Connecticut statutes authorizing naming of one-man grand jury and outlining procedures did not present unconstitutional delegation of executive authority to members of judiciary by legislature in violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to plaintiff who was called to testify privately before state referee, who had been ordered to conduct inquiry by Supreme Court justice; neither did it violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights, despite claimed adverse effect of publicity, where it did not appear that there was harassment or bad faith); State v. Rado, 14 Conn. App. 322, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 813, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988) (Allowing judge to act as sole grand juror did not violate separation of powers doctrine; sole purpose of one man grand jury was to determine if there was probable cause to believe that crimes had been committed and that determination has traditionally been a judicial function); State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (Inquiry under § 54-47 relating to one-man investigation, which is made by an independent judicial officer and which is investigatory and nonadjudicative, does not violate a defendant’s due process rights).
[40] In re Investigation of the Grand Juror into the Bethel Police Department, 188 Conn. 601 (1982).
[41] The unique features of the Connecticut grand jury procedures were outlined in Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1338-41 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976). The first written code of operation for grand juries was set forth by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Lung’s Case, 1 Conn. 428 (1815):
You will retire to some convenient apartment to be provided for you by the sheriff. You will choose some one of your number to be your foreman. You will choose some one of your number to be your foreman. The attorney for the state will lay before you such bills as he may think proper, and refer you to the witnesses to support them. You will cause the prisoner and the witnesses to come before you. You will admit no counsel on the part of the state, or of the prisoner. You will permit the prisoner to put any proper questions to the witnesses, but not to call any witnesses on his part. You will admit no spectators to be present during your enquiries and deliberations. At least twelve of your number must be agreed to find a bill. Such bills as you find supported by the evidence you will return into court endorsed by your foreman - A true bill. Such bills as you find not supported by the evidence you will return in like manner indorsed by your foreman - Not a true bill.
Id. See generally Nahum & Schatz, The Grand Jury in Connecticut, 5 Conn. B.J. 111 (1931).
[42] State v. Menillo, 159 Conn. 264, 274 (1970).
[43] “This grand jury inquiry hearing is being conducted in private, with each witness having the opportunity to consult with his counsel outside the hearing room as issues arise. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).” Salvaggio v. Cotter, 324 F. Supp. 681, 686 (D. Conn. 1971).
[44] Practice Book of 1975, § 477D (the proceedings before ... [the] grand jury shall be secret and no attorney for the state or for an accused shall be present.)
[45] State v. Vennard, 159 Conn. 385, 390 (1970).
[46] Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972), where a plurality of the Supreme Court held the “right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated ... whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.... For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.”
[47] See Conn. Code of Evidence, Commentary § 1-1(d).
[48] See, e.g., State v. Avcollie, 188 Conn. 626, 630-31 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983) (“The grand jury, here and in England, has, for hundreds of years, convened as a body of laymen, free from technical rules and acting in secret. Their proceedings are both ex parte and interlocutory; moreover, the grand jury only seeks for a ‘probable cause’; hence, on all principles, the jury-trial rules of Evidence should not apply. Moreover, in point of policy, no rules should hamper their inquiries, nor need a presentment amounting only to probable cause be based on a system of rigid shifting of evidence. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, (3d Ed.) § 4, p. 21.”) (Citations omitted.)
See also United Stated v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (As Justice Black stated in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956): “If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”)
[49] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45 (a). See State v. McGann, 199 Conn. 163 (1986) (Although alternate jurors are not permitted to remain in the grand jury room during the deliberative phase after the presentation of evidence is completed, absent a showing of prejudice, a conviction will not be overturned where the court advised that alternates were not to confer or participate with other members of the grand jury.)
[50] See State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188 (1999); In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, 197 Conn. 698, 707 (1985) (“We have not in the past distinguished between investigating and indicting grand juries in recognizing the need to encourage citizen cooperation which underlies the expectation that grand juries normally operate in secrecy. We decline to do so now); In re Investigation of the Grand Juror into Cove Manor Convalescent Center, Inc. 4 Conn. App. 544 (1985).
[51] Judge T. Emmet Clarie, in a comprehensive opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the One Man Grand Jury system and the immunity statute. See Salvaggio v. Cotter, 324 F. Supp. 681 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 447 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1971).
[52] State v. Williams, 206 Conn. 203 (1988); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, rev’d on other grounds, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
[53] State v. Reis, 33 Conn. App. 521, 527, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 901 (1994); see also Morant v. State, 68 Conn. App. 137, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 914 (2002); State v. Giraud, 258 Conn. 631 (2001).
[54] In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, 197 Conn. 698, 707 (1985).
[56] Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959), quoted in State v. Canady, 187 Conn. 281, 287 (1982); Grand jury proceedings have been secret for a “time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1807), p. 473, as quoted in State v. Rivera, 45 Conn. Supp. 1, 2 (1997).
[57] In re Investigation of the Grand Juror into Cove Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 544 (1985).
[58] State v. Maldonado, 193 Conn. 350 (1984).
[59] In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Department, 197 Conn. 698, 708 (1985); see also Day Publishing v. State’s Attorney, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3220 (Nov. 7, 2005; Gordon, J.).
[60] The Freedom of Information Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-210, et seq., expressly exempts records that “were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of crime.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-210 (b) (3).
[61] State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 556 (1984).
[62] “The transcript of such proceedings may not be used as evidence in any proceedings against the accused except for the purpose of impeaching a witness, attacking the credibility of a witness or proving inconsistent statements of a witness. The transcript may also be used as evidence in a prosecution for perjury by a witness while giving such testimony.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-45a (b).
[63] See In re Grand Jury Investigation by Schaller, 20 Conn. App. 447 (1990); In re Grand Jury Investigation by Curran, 19 Conn. App. 230 (1989).
[64] Conn. Rules of Appellate Practice, § 78-1, provides for review within seventy-two hours after the issuance of the order. The provision for a direct appeal to the Appellate Court was enacted in 1988; no such appeal previously existed.
[65] In re Grand Jury Investigation by Judge John M. Alexander, 207 Conn. 98, 107 (1988).
[66] See In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01, 221 Conn. 625 (1992).
[67] “At the conclusion of an inquiry by an investigating grand jury the judge or referee who conducts the inquiry files a report with the court. It is then the court’s function to direct whether and to what extent the report shall be made available to the public or interested parties.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g.
[68] The “panel” means a panel of three superior court judges, one of whom may be the Chief Court Administrator. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47b (4).
[69] See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (a). The legislative history of P.A. 85-611 indicates that it was a compromise between those legislators who wanted to increase the openness of grand jury proceedings and those who believed that premature public disclosure of information gleaned from the investigation would limit the capability of the grand jury to investigate crime effectively. See, e.g., 28 S. Proc., Pt. 17, 1985 Sess., p. 5714, remark of Senator Richard B. Johnston (“the agreement worked out between the Committee members was that such proceedings, or rather the investigation and the grand jury’s findings and report would be private, provided the ... three judge panel, by majority vote, may very well decide to disclose the fact than any matter has been referred to a grand jury for investigation; or subsequently may, by majority vote ... again, the panel of judges, decide that the findings and record of the investigation by the grand jury should be disclosed and made public, because of the investigation and/or the findings and the report to be in the public interest, and therefore, to be a public matter.”) See State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 204 (1999).
[70] While the phrase “particularized need” was not contained in the language of the pre-1985 statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court articulated it as the proper standard for disclosure under that statute in In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Dept., 197 Conn. 698, 709-14 (1985); See also In re Investigation of the Grand Juror into Cove Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 544 (1985). The Alexander decision left open the question of whether there was any substantive difference between the “public interest” and the “particularized need” standard. The Court in In re Grand Jury Investigation by Judge Barry R. Schaller, 20 Conn. App. 447 (1990), held that “The initial determination of that question should be left to the grand jury panel since it is to that body that the legislature has entrusted the duty of determining when disclosure is in the public interest.” Id. at 450.
[71] P.A. 88-345, now codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-47g (b). This section has not been amended since 1988.
[72] The legislative purpose behind this 1987 amendment was to facilitate the prosecutor’s receipt of copies of grand jury testimony and records for use in the investigation and prosecution of crime, in recognition of the central role of the prosecutor in the grand jury process. See 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1987 Sess. p. 6922, remarks of Representative Jay B. Levin; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 1987 Sess., p. 945, remarks of John Kelly, chief state’s attorney.
[73] See also State v. Crotty, 17 Conn. App. 395, 402 (1989) (“The defendant’s bald assertion that he needed the transcripts to prepare for trial does not amount to the requisite showing of particularized need.”).
[74] State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 209 (1999).