Source: http://wv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191025_0001033.SWV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 08:56:45
Document Index: 442120472

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 404', '§2', '§ 3', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 3582', '§ 3582']

FindACase™ | United States v. Leggette
United States v. Leggette
DANIEL K. LEGGETTE also known as “Boo Bam”
Pending before the Court is Defendant Daniel K. Leggette's Motion for Reduction of Sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. Mot. for Reduction of Sentence, ECF No. 137. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
On January 5, 2010, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, or “crack, ” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Eligibility Mem., ECF No. 141, at 1. Several months later, on April 13, 2010, this Court sentenced Defendant to 188 months imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Id. Defendant is presently incarcerated at FCI Butner, with a projected release date of July 19, 2022. Id.
On January 17, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to the recently-enacted First Step Act. See Mot. for Reduction of Sentence. Per the Court's Standing Order, the Office of the Federal Public Defender was appointed to determine whether Defendant was qualified to seek a reduction in his sentence. See Standing Order, ECF No. 138. On March 19, 2019, Defendant's counsel filed a memorandum concluding that Defendant was eligible for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. Eligibility Mem, at 1. On April 10, 2019, the United States filed a Response indicating that it also believed that Defendant qualified for a reduced sentence. Resp., ECF No. 143, at 8. The Court considers Defendant's motion below.
The First Step Act of 2018 states, in relevant part, that a “court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 404(b) (2018) (hereinafter “The First Step Act”). Section Two of the Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of cocaine base, or “crack, ” which triggers a mandatory minimum penalty. Pub. L. No. 111-220, §2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Section Three eliminated the statutory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack. Id. at § 3.
To be eligible for a reduction in sentence, a defendant's sentence must not have been imposed or previously reduced under sections two or three of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.[1] Id. at § 404(c). Nor can a defendant have been previously denied a reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. Id. While a defendant, the Government, or the Court can move for a reduced sentence, individuals are not entitled to a reduction as courts are not required to grant relief under § 404. Id. The First Step Act therefore represents a broad grant of authority to the federal courts.
Courts in this district and throughout the Fourth Circuit agree that the proper mechanism to seek relief under the First Step Act is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(b).[2] United States v. Banks, No. 1:07-00157, 2019 WL 2221620, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. May 22, 2019) (Faber, J.) (citing United States v. Shelton, No. 3:07-329, 2019 WL 1598921, at *3 (D.S.C. April 15, 2019) (listing cases)). As such, the language of First Step Act controls the Court's ability to grant relief. See Wright v. United States, Nos. 4:95-39, 4:95-44, 2019 WL 3046096, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 11, 2019). Under § 3582(c)(1)(B), a court can choose to conduct a simple mechanical reduction of a sentence based on a decreased exposure to statutory minimums and the correlating lower guideline range.
Once a defendant is determined to be eligible, the Court must examine the statutory threshold to which that defendant pleaded and compare it to the alteration of the applicable law. The Court recognizes that the drug quantity listed in an indictment traditionally tracks the statutory minimums to ensure a defendant's plea or conviction complies with the Sixth Amendment. It is not illogical to speculate that had the Fair Sentencing Act been enacted at the time of a defendant's plea, the elevated statutory amounts would be listed in the indictment and may have had little to no impact on the defendant's decision to plea. See U.S. v. Blocker, No. 4:07-36-RH, 2019 WL 2051957, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2019) (explaining “indictment-controls” versus “offense-controls” theories, and adopting the latter.). Yet to assume such a fact impermissibly alters the indictment and unconstitutionally abridges a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). In the context of First Step Act cases, this is true whether a court is conducting a full resentencing or not. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 379 F.Supp.3d 543, 546-47 (W.D. Va. May 13, 2019). Due to the constitutional considerations, this Court-along with a number of others- adopts an “indictment-controls” interpretation of the First Step Act's impact on a defendant's plea. United States v. Springs, No. 3:05-CR-00042-FDW-1, 2019 WL 3310092 (W.D. N.C. July 23, 2019) (applying Alleyne to First Step Act cases) (listing cases).