Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98553/labor-board-vs-international-milling
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Labor Board Vs International Rice Milling Co Inc - Citation 98553 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Labor Board Vs. International Rice Milling Co., Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98553CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-04-1951Case Number341 U.S. 665AppellantLabor BoardRespondentinternational Rice Milling Co., Inc.Excerpt:.....board v. international rice milling co., inc. - 341 u.s. 665 (1951)
although the union here involved was not certified or recognized as the representative of the employees of a certain mill engaged in interstate commerce, its agents picketed the mill with the object of securing recognition of the union as the collective bargaining representative of the mill's employees. in the course of their picketing, the agents sought to..... Judgment:
such action did not violate the "secondary boycott" provisions of § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947. Pp.
341 U. S. 666
(a) The union's picketing and its encouragement of the men on the truck did not amount to such an inducement or encouragement to "concerted" activities as the section proscribes. Pp.
341 U. S. 670
(b) It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed by § 8(b)(4), rather than the means adopted to make it felt, and violence on the picket line is not material in this case, since the complaint was not based upon that violence as such, and did not rely upon § 8(b)(1)(A). P.
(c) Congress did not seek by § 8(b)(4) to interfere with ordinary strikes. Pp.
(d) By § 13, Congress has made it clear that § 8(b)(4), and all other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to interfere with, impede or diminish a union's traditional right to strike, may be so read only if such interference, impediment, or diminution is "specifically provided for" in the Act. P.
341 U. S. 673
Management Relations Act, 1947. 84 N.L.R.B. 360. The Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. 183 F.2d 21. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 902.
341 U. S. 674
The question presented is whether a union violated § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, [
] under the following circumstances:
This case was heard here with No. 393,
Labor Board v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, post,
; No. 108,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, post,
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board, post,
. Its facts, however, distinguish it from those cases.
This review is confined to the single incident described in the complaint issued by the Acting Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 201, A.F.L., herein called the union. The complaint originally was based upon four charges made against the union by several rice mills engaged in interstate commerce near the center of the Louisiana rice industry. The mills included the International Rice Milling Company, Inc., which gives its name to this proceeding, and the Kaplan Rice Mills, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, which operated the mill at Kaplan, Louisiana, where the incident now before us occurred. The complaint charged that the union or its agents, by their conduct toward two employees of a neutral customer of the Kaplan Rice Mills, engaged in an unfair labor practice contrary to § 8(b)(4). The Board, with one member not participating, adopted the findings and conclusions of its trial examiner as to the facts, but disagreed with his recommendation that those facts constituted a violation of § 8(b)(4)(A) or (B). The Board dismissed the complaint, but attached the trial examiner's intermediate report to its decision. 84 N.L.R.B. 360. The Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. 183 F.2d 21. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the principle involved and because of the conflicting views of several circuits as to the meaning of § 8(b)(4). 340 U.S. 902. [
conduct by the employees of the neutral employer. [
] That language contemplates inducement or encouragement to some concert of action greater than is evidenced by the pickets' request to a driver of a single truck to discontinue a pending trip to a picketed mill. There was no attempt by the union to induce any action by the employees of the neutral customer which would be more widespread than that already described. There were no inducements or encouragements applied elsewhere than on the picket line. The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geographically restricted area near the mill is significant, although not necessarily conclusive. The picketing was directed at the Kaplan employees and at their employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that, in itself, was not proscribed by § 8(b)(4). Insofar as the union's efforts were directed beyond that and toward the employees of anyone other than Kaplan, there is no suggestion that the union sought concerted conduct by such other employees. Such efforts also fall short of the proscriptions in § 8(b)(4). In this case, therefore, we need not determine the specific objects toward which a union's encouragement of concerted conduct must be directed in order to amount to an unfair labor practice under subsection (A) or (B) of § 8(b)(4). A union's inducements or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees. Generally, therefore, such actions do not come within the proscription of § 8(b)(4), and they do not here.
In the instant case, the violence on the picket line is not material. The complaint was not based upon that violence, as such. To reach it, the complaint more properly would have relied upon § 8(b)(1)(A), [
] or would have addressed itself to local authorities. The substitution of violent coercion in place of peaceful persuasion would not, in itself, bring the complained-of conduct into conflict with § 8(b)(4). It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed by that section, rather than the means adopted to make it felt. [
That Congress did not seek, by § 8(b)(4), to interfere with the ordinary strike has been indicated recently by this Court. [
] This is emphasized in § 13 as follows:
By § 13, Congress has made it clear that § 8(b)(4), and all other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to interfere with, impede or diminish the union's traditional right to strike, may be so read only if such interference, impediment or diminution is "specifically provided for" in the Act. [
] No such specific provision in § 8(b)(4) reaches the incident here. The material legislative history supports this view. [
"(4) to engage in, or,
to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or
to perform any services, where an object thereof is:
forcing or requiring
any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or
any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person;
forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class, rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work:
That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act. . . ."
International Union v. Wisconsin Board,
In this Act, "Congress safeguarded the exercise by employees of
concerted activities' and expressly recognized the right to strike."
International Union v. O'Brien,
see also Amalgamated Assn. of Employees v. Wisconsin Board,
340 U. S. 389
340 U. S. 404
United Electrical & Machine Workers,
85 N.L.R.B. 417, 418;
Oil Workers International Union,
84 N.L.R.B. 315, 318-320.
the protection given to the right to engage in concerted activities by § 7 of the Act,
As to both §§ 13 and 7,
see International Union v. Wisconsin Board, supra,
336 U. S. 258
The character of the problem of reconciliation of the right to strike with the limitations expressed in § 8(b)(4) is not unlike that which confronted the Court in
325 U. S. 806
"the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification) is not proscribed." S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1) 22,
H.R.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43.