Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/275995/MOSES-Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari-FINAL
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§\n51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§\n51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 51']

MOSES Petition for Writ of Certiorari FINAL | Summary Judgment | Certiorari
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SUPREME COURT DOCKET NUMBER _____________
COURT OF APPEALS CASE NUMBER A07A1474
Petitioner, ] Supreme Court Case No.
TRATON CORP., et al. ] ______________________
+1 (404) 514-8237
sam.han.pc@gmail.com
Georgia Bar Number 261575
Rome, GA 30161-3003
Georgia Bar Number 570601
Georgia Bar Number 220327
3355 Lenox Road, NE
Petitioner, ] Supreme Court Case No. ________
v. ] Court of Appeals Case No. A07A1474
TRATON CORP., et al. ]
Pursuant to Rule 38(2) of the Rules of this Honorable Court,
Petitioner hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the opinion and judgment in Moses v. Traton
Corp. et al., Court of Appeals Case No. A07A1474,1 dated July 10,
2007, Motion for Reconsideration denied on July 30, 2007.2
The issues presented in this petition are of great concern,
gravity, and importance to the public, and this petition should
be granted because the Opinion from the Court of Appeals: (a)
violates public policy; (b) produces manifestly unjust results;
(c) contravenes Georgia's constitutional and statutory scheme;
(d) departs significantly from decades of legal precedent; and
(e) defies common sense.
(A) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a
homeowner has no right to prevent others from
repeatedly damaging the yard that adjoins the home,
when the damaged yard affects the value of the home,
and the homeowners' association (HOA) has threatened to
impose financial penalties on the homeowner for the
damaged yard (see Exh. C for photograph of damaged
yard); and
(B) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
County, rather than the homeowner, is liable for
maintaining a significant portion of the homeowner's
yard if that portion is located within a County-owned
This honorable Court should grant this Petition for
Certiorari because of the negative repercussions that are left in
the wake of the Court of Appeals' decision. Namely, the Opinion
of the Court of Appeals:
(1) eviscerates every homeowner's ability to prevent others
from damaging the yard that adjoins a homeowner's
home;3
(2) requires the County to maintain a significant portion
of the yard that adjoins everyone's home, despite the
fact that those yards have always been maintained by
(3) effectively abrogates a host of statutory provisions,
including OCGA §§ 51-9-1, 51-9-3, 51-9-10, and 44-5-
(4) disregards legal precedent by affirming the lower
court's impermissible resolution of genuine issues of
material facts on summary judgment; and
(5) prevents homeowners' associations from requiring
homeowners to properly maintain the yard that adjoins
the home, thereby effectively nullifying a contract
between two private parties.
Insofar as the Court of Appeals departs significantly from
both the spirit and letter of the law, and insofar as such a
departure produces manifestly unjust results and is contrary to
public policy, Petitioner respectfully petitions this Honorable
A picture of Petitioner's home and the 13-foot-wide tract of
damaged land, which is the property in question, is attached
hereto as Exh. C. This picture is found in the record at R.
An individual's property right is of such paramount
importance that both the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia
Constitution are dedicated to the protection of private property.
No fewer than eleven (11) separate paragraphs of the Georgia
Constitution4 expressly address individual property rights.
Particularly, the Georgia Constitution emphasizes that protection
of property is "the paramount duty of government[,]"5 and this
very Court has repeatedly held that the "right of the humblest
individual in the enjoyment of his property must be protected."6
So important are property rights that the Georgia
Legislature has codified property-related torts, thereby
providing statutory causes of action for any interference with an
individual's property rights.7 These property rights extend by
statute to rights-of-way.8
Despite the protections afforded by Georgia's Constitution
and statutes, and despite this Court's mandate that the humblest
individual's property rights must be protected, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless holds that a homeowner has no right to
See, e.g., Georgia Constitution, Art. I, § I, ¶¶ I, II, IV,
XXVI, and XXVII; Art. III, § III, ¶ I; Art. VII, § I, ¶¶ II and
III; Art. VII, § II, ¶¶ II and IV; and Art. IX, § VII, ¶ III.
Georgia Constitution, ¶ II.
Williams v. LaGrange, 213 Ga. 241 (1957); Ammons v. Central of
Georgia Railway Co., 215 Ga. 758 (1960).
OCGA §§ 51-9-1, 51-9-2, 51-9-3, and 51-9-10.
OCGA § 51-9-10.
prevent others from continuously destroying the land which
adjoins the homeowner's home and which detrimentally affects the
value of that home.9 This is so, despite the fact that the
homeowners' association has obligated the homeowner to maintain
the damaged property, under threat of financial penalties to his
Even a cursory examination of the land in question (see,
Exh. C) removes any doubt that the homeowner, in fact, actually
possesses the entire damaged yard and is responsible for
maintaining the entire yard. The homeowners' actual possession
of the yard is further evidenced by a plethora of objective
evidence, which is wholly ignored by the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the issue of actual possession is a factual inquiry that
is improper for disposal by summary judgment, yet the Court of
Appeals affirms the lower court's impermissible fact-finding
Despite the homeowners' actual possession of the yard, the
Court of Appeals shifts the responsibility for maintaining the
yard from homeowners to the County. In doing so, the Court of
Appeals simultaneously eviscerates every homeowner's ability to
protect the yard that adjoins the home, obligates the County to
maintain that portion of every homeowner's yard, and nullifies
The subject property is shown in Exh. C, attached (from the
trial court record at R. 493-510).
R. 66-67 (First Moses Affidavit, ¶¶ 4-8); See, Exh. D (Letter
from Homeowners' Association, attached to First Moses Affidavit
at R. 66-67).
the intent of the parties to the subdivision covenants.
Such a result: (a) contravenes Georgia's constitutional and
statutory scheme; (b) violates public policy; (c) produces a
manifestly unjust result; (d) significantly departs from decades
of legal precedent; and (e) defies common sense.
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests this
Honorable Court to GRANT Certiorari.
II. SUBJECT MATTER OF THE LAWSUIT
Petitioner's home is situated within a covenanted
subdivision.11 Given the ongoing construction within the
subdivision, the builder also functions as the Home Owners'
Association (HOA).12
Since the purchase of his home, Petitioner has always
maintained immaculate care of the lawn that is attached to his
home,13 including the right-of-way that forms a part of his
yard.14 As shown in Exh. C, the right-of-way is visibly
indistinguishable from Petitioner's recorded lot and adjoins the
lot.15 In fact, homeowners believe that the entire yard is in
the homeowner's possession, and, hence, the homeowners maintain
the entire yard in order to protect the value of their homes.
R. 1408; T. 4:1-4; T. 14:8-9. R. 308, 323 (Admitted by
Defendant; see, Complaint and Answer, ¶ 28). See, also, R.
335, 346 (Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions and
Defendant's Response to First Request for Admissions
(collectively "Traton's First Admissions"), ¶ 2, Attached to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhs. D and E).
R. 1411; T. 4:6-9; T. 14:14-21. R. 371, 403 (Traton's Second
Admissions, ¶ 60). See, also, R. 423-461 (Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Lakefield Manor
Subdivision ("Covenant") (stating that the Declarant is Poston
Properties, Inc., which is an affiliate of Traton Corp),
Attached to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as Exh. H).
T. 19:2-4; T. 58:11-22. R. 68 (Affidavit of Christopher Moses
in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss ("First Moses Affidavit"), ¶¶ 19-20).
T. 61:8-9 (The right of way extends thirteen (13) feet beyond
the curb into Petitioner's yard).
T.58:11-12; T. 65:21. R. 1123-1125 (Order, ¶¶ 20 ("right-of-
way adjacent to his property"), 23, and 28 ("right-of-way
adjoining Plaintiff's property")).
Over the course of eight (8) months, during continued
development of the subdivision, the builder's large construction
vehicles repeatedly drove over Petitioner's yard, thereby
damaging the yard.16
Petitioner complained to the builder about the damage,17 and
requested the builder to stop damaging the yard.18 Rather than
repairing the damage that it caused, the builder (acting as the
HOA) cited Petitioner's damaged yard as being in violation of the
subdivision covenants.19 In other words, the builder damaged the
yard and then cited that very damage, which the builder had
caused, as being a violation of the covenants, thereby
threatening to impose monetary fines on the homeowner if the
homeowner failed to repair the damage.20
In an effort to stop the ongoing damage to the yard,
Petitioner filed this lawsuit in Cobb County Superior Court on
October 13, 2005.21
R. 1412; T. 4:13-17; T. 14:21-23. R. 373-374, 407(Admitted by
Defendant, Traton's Second Admissions, ¶¶ 95-103). See, Exh.
C, attached hereto.
R. 1413; R. 368, 400 (Admitted by Defendant, Traton's Second
Admissions, ¶ 24).
R. 1413; T. 15:1-4. R. 336, 348 (Admitted by Defendant,
Traton's First Admissions, ¶ 15).
R. 1418-1420; T. 6:11-17; T. 11:16-18; T. 15:16-21. R. 368-
370, 400-402 (Admitted by Defendant, Traton's Second
Admissions, ¶¶ 25 and 27-55). R. 66-67 (First Moses Affidavit,
¶¶ 4-8).
R. 1423; T. 7:9-10; T. 15:25-16:1. R. 337, 351 (Admitted by
On October 9, 2006, the Superior Court disposed of this case
on summary judgment, holding that Petitioner had no rights in the
damaged land because the damage was confined to the right-of-way
portion of Petitioner's yard. In doing so, the Superior Court
made a factual finding on summary judgment that Petitioner did
not have actual possession of the damaged land. Consequently,
the Superior Court dismissed the case, holding that Petitioner
had no standing to bring any legal action for the damaged land
(see Exh. C).
Petitioner appealed, noting: (a) that Petitioner had actual
possession of the damaged land; (b) that possession was a
question of fact, for which Petitioner had submitted ample
evidence; and (c) that summary judgment was inappropriate, since
the factual inquiry of actual possession could not be disposed of
On July 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that Petitioner's factual indicia of actual possession was
irrelevant, since Petitioner could not, as a matter of law, have
a possessory interest in that portion of Petitioner's yard.22 In
Defendant, Traton's First Admissions, ¶ 34). See, also, R. 6-
15 (Complaint).
Petitioner submits that the logic of the Court of Appeals is
circular. Rather than reviewing the factual indicia of
possession to determine whether there was actual possession
(which would confer standing), the Court of Appeals first
concludes that Petitioner has no possessory interest, and then
dismisses the objective evidence of actual possession as being
irrelevant in determining actual possession. Petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals has placed the
proverbial cart before the horse.
doing so, the Court of Appeals shifted the liability for
maintaining a significant portion of every homeowner's yard from
the homeowners to the County.
On July 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, noting that the Court
of Appeals overlooked a material fact in the record, and also
overlooked a statute that is controlling as authority and which
would require a different judgment from that rendered.
On July 30, 2007, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, and, on August 07, 2007, Petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals his Notice of Intention to Petition for Writ of
Certirorari.
Petitioner now files this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
A. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals Contravenes
Georgia's Constitutional and Statutory Scheme, Departs
Substantially from Decades of Precedent, Violates
Public Policy, and Defies Common Sense
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals contravenes Georgia's
constitutional and statutory scheme, departs substantially from
decades of precedent, is contrary to public policy, and defies
1. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals Contravenes
Georgia's Constitutional and Statutory Scheme, and
also Departs Significantly from Decades of Legal
As noted above, the Georgia Constitution and this Court
consider an individual's property rights to be of paramount
importance.23 Given that an individual's home is of such
importance, Georgia provides statutory remedies for any
interference with an individual's property rights.
For example, OCGA § 51-9-1 recites that "[t]he right of
enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every
citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with
such enjoyment is a tort for which an action shall lie."24
Rather than requiring ownership of property, OCGA § 51-9-3
permits those in bare possession to bring an action for
trespass.25 The issue of whether one actually possesses land is
a question of fact that cannot be disposed of on summary
Despite Georgia's constitutional and statutory scheme, which
emphasizes the importance of an individual's property rights, the
Court of Appeals deprives a homeowner of the right to bring an
action to prevent damage to land, which indisputably affects the
value of the home and for which the homeowner has actual
possession. Even though actual possession is a question of fact
Georgia Constition, Art. I, § I, ¶ II. Williams v. LaGrange,
213 Ga. 241 (1957); Ammons v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.,
215 Ga. 758 (1960).
OCGA § 51-9-1 (emphasis supplied).
OCGA § 51-9-3 ("The bare possession of land shall authorize
the possessor to recover damages from any person who wrongfully
interferes with such possession in any manner").
Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509, 520
(1984); Friendship Baptist Church, Inc. v. West, 265 Ga. 745,
746 (1995) (If the possession is not clearly evident, as in
enclosure or cultivation, then "possession becomes a question of
that cannot be disposed of on summary judgment,27 the Court of
Appeals wholly discounts the objective evidence of actual
possession28 and affirms the lower court's summary judgment, that
homeowners cannot protect their yards.
By ruling as it did, the Court of Appeals obliterates a
homeowner's ability to prevent others from damaging property
which directly affects the value of the home. In other words,
contrary to Georgia's constitutional and statutory scheme, which
mandates protection of even the "humblest individual in the in
the enjoyment of his property,"29 the Court of Appeals deprives
homeowners of the very protection that the Georgia Constitution
seeks to provide.
Here, the homeowners' association (HOA) obligates Petitioner
to maintain the damaged land, including the damaged sod, turf,
and grass in the right-of-way.30 Petitioner's neighbors expect
fact for the jury").
Moses v. Traton Corp., et al., Appeal No. A07A1474, 2007 Ga.
App. LEXIS 811, *8 (July 10, 2007) ("Factual Indicia of
Possession . . . . [T]he facts Moses points to, such as his
mowing of the area, or another property owners' opinions with
respect to Moses's legal interest in the land, are not
sufficient to create in Moses a legally cognizable possessory
interest in the public right of way.").
Petitioner to maintain the damaged yard.31 Petitioner has been
maintaining the right-of-way portion of his yard since the day
that he bought his home. Indeed, every Georgia homeowner
maintains the entire yard, including the sod, turf, and grass in
the right-of-way. This is because rights-of-way often extend
well into the yard from the curb.32 For this very reason, the
homeowners actually possess the entire yard "by enclosure,
cultivation, or any use and occupation of the lands[.]"33
The Court of Appeals nevertheless holds that neither
Petitioner nor any other homeowner has any obligation to maintain
the 13-foot-wide portion of the lawn that extends to the curb.34
Consequently, the Court of Appeals holds that Petitioner has no
standing to sue for damage done to that portion of Petitioner's
yard. Such a ruling is contrary to Georgia's statutory scheme
that requires only "bare possession of land,"35 and incompatible
with Georgia's constitution, which considers an individual's
property rights to be of paramount importance.
Furthermore, while OCGA § 51-9-10 provides that an "unlawful
interference with a right-of-way or a right of common constitutes
R. 66-67 and 71-72.
App. LEXIS 811, *8 (July 10, 2007).
a trespass to the party entitled thereto[,]"36 the Court of
Appeals limits the statutory reach of OCGA § 51-9-10 to only the
rights of ingress and egress.37 This is contrary to precedent:
The damages, therefore, that an individual
may recover for injuries to his property need
not necessarily be caused by acts amounting
to trespass, or by an actual physical
invasion of his real estate; but if his
property be depreciated in value by his being
deprived of some right of use or enjoyment
growing out of and appurtenant to his estate
as the direct consequence of the construction
and use of any public improvement, his right
of action is complete, and he may recover to
the extent of the injury sustained.38
It makes no sense that OCGA § 51-9-10 permits a homeowner to
recover for the lesser act of hindering access to a right-of-way
with no physical damage to the right-of-way, yet prohibits a
homeowner from recovering for the greater harm of actual physical
damage to the right-of-way. Such a construction of OCGA § 51-9-
10 is contrary to established precedent, which permits recovery
for "being deprived of some right of use or enjoyment growing out
of and appurtenant to [a homeowner's] estate."39
For at least these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests
this Honorable Court to GRANT Certiorari.
App. LEXIS 811, *6 (July 10, 2007).
Clayton County v. Billups Eastern Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App.
778 (1961) (emphasis supplied).
778 (1961).
2. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals Violates
In addition to contravening Georgia's constitutional and
statutory scheme, the Opinion of the Court of Appeals violates
public policy. In holding that homeowners have no obligation to
maintain the right-of-way portion of their respective yards,40
the Court of Appeals now obligates the County to maintain a
significant portion of every homeowner's yard.41
Prior to the decision by the Court of Appeals, the counties
have never mowed, weeded, cultivated, landscaped, or maintained
the right-of-way portion of any homeowner's lawn. The reason
being that the counties are not equipped with sufficient funds or
personnel to maintain even a small portion of everyone's yard.
In view of the decision by the Court of Appeals, it is now
evident that all of the counties have been unjustly enriched by
every Georgia homeowner, insofar as the homeowners have been
maintaining county-owned public property at the homeowner's
Moreover, going forward, the Court of Appeals' decision
exposes the counties to legal action by the homeowners, should
the homeowners wish for the counties to begin landscaping and
maintaining the county-owned rights-of-way that form a portion of
T. 41 ("Mr. Moore: Ultimately, your honor, that property is
owned by the public. It's Cobb County public right-of-way.
Ultimately, Cobb County is responsible to maintain its right-
of-way, the full width of its right-of-way.").
each homeowner's yard.
Surely, burdening the counties with the maintenance of every
homeowner's yards cannot be an acceptable public policy. For
this additional reason, Petitioner respectfully requests this
3. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals Defies Common
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals also defies common
sense. As Justice Frankfurter noted, and as the Georgia courts
have recognized, "[t]here comes a point where th[e] Court should
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."42 Here, the
Court of Appeals did exactly what Justice Frankfurter cautioned
against. A review of the damaged yard, shown in Exh. C, clearly
evidences that the damaged land is an integral portion of the
homeowner's yard, irrespective of whether or not it is a right-
of-way. The Court of Appeals defies common sense by holding that
homeowners cannot prevent others from repeatedly damaging that
portion of the yard, especially since it is undisputed that the
damaged land diminishes the value of the home, and the damage
affects the homeowner's enjoyment of his home.43
Byrom v. Felker et al., 137 Ga. App. 400, 224 SE2d 72 (1976),
citing Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
T. 58:11-22 ("Mr. Moses has, since buying this house,
continued to maintain that portion of the property, because he
was under the understanding that that was his property. The
Homeowners' Association was under the understanding that it was
his property. All of his neighbors are still giving Mr. Moses
grief because he's not maintaining his property. And all of
For this additional reason, Petitioner respectfully requests
4. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals Produces a
Manifestly Unjust Result
As noted above, the builder and the HOA are the same entity,
namely, the Respondent. It is undisputed that Respondent
obligated Petitioner to maintain the right-of-way that abuts
Petitioner's lot.44 Respondent threatened that if Petitioner
failed to repair the damage that Respondent caused, then
Respondent would impose monetary penalties on Petitioner.45
It is indisputable that the threat of such monetary
penalties, which are directly tied to the home itself, adversely
affects a homeowners' enjoyment of his home. This is exactly
what happened in this case: Petitioner's enjoyment of his own
home was detrimentally affected by the obligation that Respondent
imposed on Petitioner due to the damaged land. Ample evidence,
including Petitioner's affidavit, was submitted to show the
detrimental effect on Petitioner's enjoyment of his home.46
these individuals that have maintained that this is Mr. Moses'
property are signatories to the covenant. And those facts need
to be viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Moses"). R. 68
(First Moses Affidavit, ¶¶ 19 ("I take great pride in
maintaining a beautiful yard") and 20 ("As such, I have
attempted to keep immaculate care of my yard")).
T. 58:11-22. R. 368-370, 400-402. See, Exh. D, appended
Petitioner respectfully submits that it is manifestly unjust
to deny Petitioner the right to prevent others from damaging the
right-of-way that forms a portion of Petitioner's yard, when that
very damage and threat of financial penalties adversely affects
Petitioner's right to the enjoyment of his own home.47
Here, it is especially unjust, since: (a) it was Respondent
that repeatedly damaged Petitioner's yard; and (b) it was
Respondent that cited Petitioner for the damage done by
Respondent. By permitting Respondent to financially penalize
Petitioner for the damage, the Court of Appeals punishes
Petitioner for Respondent's wrongful acts. In other words, the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals produces an unjust result by
rewarding the wrongdoer and denying the aggrieved any remedy.
Such a result is fundamentally unjust, and should not be
permitted by this Court. This Court should not permit the legal
system to be used as such an instrument of injustice.48
that this Honorable Court GRANT Certiorari.
OCGA § 51-9-1.
As inscribed in this Court's hallowed halls, Fiat Justitia,
B. This Court should Grant Certiorari to Correct the
Numerous Errors of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment,
the Court of Appeals commits numerous legal errors. First, the
Court of Appeals fails to view all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Namely, the question of
actual possession is a question of fact that should have been
viewed in favor of Petitioner on summary judgment. Secondly, the
Court of Appeals overlooks undisputed material facts, which
evidence that the damaged property affects the value of
Petitioner's home. Additionally, the Court of Appeals overlooks
controlling statutes, which, if considered, would require a
1. Actual Possession Under OCGA § 51-9-3, a Statute
which the Court of Appeals Overlooks, is a
Question of Fact that Cannot be Disposed of on
The Court of Appeals wholly ignores OCGA § 51-9-3,49 which,
if considered, would require a different judgment than that
rendered. Namely, the Court of Appeals recites: "in light of our
rulings herein with respect to Moses's lack of legal interest in
the right of way, the facts Moses points to, such as his mowing
of the area, or another property owners' opinions with respect to
Petitioner expressly cited this statutory provision to the
Court of Appeals in both the Appellate Brief and in the Brief
in Support of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals, however, wholly ignored OCGA § 51-9-3.
Moses's legal interest in the land, are not sufficient to create
in Moses a legally cognizable possessory interest in the public
right of way."50
The Court wholly ignores the statutory provision of OCGA §
51-9-3, which is directed to actual possession, which is a
factual inquiry.51 OCGA § 51-9-3 recites that "[t]he bare
possession of land shall authorize the possessor to recover
damages from any person who wrongfully interferes with such
possession in any manner."52 In other words, not only does the
Georgia Code address possessory interest (under OCGA § 51-9-2),
the Georgia code also addresses actual possession (under OCGA §
51-9-3).
Petitioner advances his case under OCGA § 51-9-3,53 yet the
Court of Appeals wholly ignores OCGA § 51-9-3 by dismissing all
of Petitioner's factual indicia of actual possession.54 In other
words, rather than viewing the evidence to see if Petitioner had
actual possession, the Court of Appeals begins with the
conclusion that Petitioner did not have a possessory interest
(OCGA § 51-9-2) and, from there, summarily concludes that an
App. LEXIS 811, *9 (July 10, 2007).
enclosure or cultivation, then "possession becomes a question
of fact for the jury").
See, OCGA § 51-9-3 (emphasis supplied).
See, Petitioner's Appeal Brief at 15, 26, and 27.
analysis of actual possession (OCGA § 51-9-3) is unnecessary.
Such an analysis places the cart before the horse, insofar as it
begins with the conclusion and then summarily discounts the
facts, which should have been viewed in the light most favorable
Insofar as actual possession under OCGA § 51-9-3 is a
distinct inquiry from possessory interest under OCGA § 51-9-2,
the Court of Appeals cannot simply ignore the factual indicia of
actual possession under OCGA § 51-9-3, regardless of its
conclusion on possessory interest under OCGA § 51-9-2. This is
especially so on summary judgment, when all facts (including
whether or not Petitioner actually possessed the damaged land)
must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party (i.e.,
"Actual possession of lands may be evidenced by enclosure,
cultivation, or any use and occupation of the lands[,]"55 and
since actual possession is a separate factual legal inquiry from
ownership or legal possessory interest, the Court was required to
consider Petitioner's factual indicia of actual possession in the
light most favorable to Petitioner, and not simply discount it as
The factual indicia of possession, which the Court of
Appeals ignores, includes:
(1) Respondents' admission that the pictures of the damaged
property56 (see Exh. C) were of Mr. Moses' home and Mr.
Moses' yard.57
(2) Petitioner's affidavit, in which Petitioner noted his
immaculate maintenance of his yard, including the damaged
(3) Respondent's admission that the Homeowners' Association,
which is operated by Respondent, indicated that the damaged
land was Petitioner's land.59
(4) Respondent's admission that Petitioner's neighbors considered
the damaged property to be Petitioner's property.60
(5) Respondent's admission that Respondent considered the damaged
property to be Petitioner's property.61
R. 492-510.
R. 377, 411 (Traton's Second Admissions, ¶¶ 137 ("Admit that
the pictures of Exhibit A show Mr. Moses' home"; "Defendant
admits the allegations contained in Request for Admission No.
137") and 138 ("Admit that the pictures of Exhibit A show Mr.
Moses' yard"; "Defendant admits the allegations contained in
Request for Admission No. 138")).
T. 58:11-22 ("If we're looking at just the damage to the
property, it's not just the portion of the property that is on
the other side of the curb. It's actually the property that's
contiguous to Mr. Moses' lot. And, again, Mr. Moses has, since
buying this house, continued to maintain that portion of the
property, because he was under the understanding that that was
his property. The Homeowners' Association was under the
understanding that it was his property. All of his neighbors
are still giving Mr. Moses grief because he's not maintaining
his property. And all of these individuals that have
maintained that this is Mr. Moses' property are signatories to
the covenant. And those facts need to be viewed in the light
most favorable to Mr. Moses"). R. 68 (First Moses Affidavit,
¶¶ 19 ("I take great pride in maintaining a beautiful yard")
and 20 ("As such, I have attempted to keep immaculate care of
my yard")).
T. 58:11-22. R. 368-370, 400-402 (Traton's Second Admissions,
¶¶ 25 and 27-55 ("The second area in violation is the front
right corner of your yard (looking from the street at your
home)").
T. 58:11-22. R. 368-370, 372-374, 400, 402, 404-4-5, 407
(Traton's Second Admissions, ¶¶ 25, 55, 72, 78, 95, and 100-103
(e.g., "The fact that you have decided to refuse to mow this
portion of your yard has upset your surrounding neighbors, and
is a violation of the CC&R's")).
(6) Defendants' Request for Entry Upon Land for Inspection, in
which Respondents and counsel for Respondents requested
Petitioner's permission to enter upon the damaged land for
inspection.62
(7) Petitioner's refusal to grant access to the land.63
(8) The threat by Respondent (HOA) to impose monetary fines on
Petitioner if Petitioner failed to maintain the right-of-
way.64
All of these facts supporting actual possession should have
been taken as true, and Petitioner's evidence of actual
possession, which is a factual inquiry, should not have been
disposed of on summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, in
affirming the grant of summary judgment, contravenes well-
established precedent that prohibits courts from engaging in
fact-finding on summary judgment.
Since the Court of Appeals errs in affirming the trial
court's fact-finding on summary judgment, Petitioner respectfully
requests this Court to GRANT Certiorari to correct the legal
errors from the Court of Appeals.
(e.g., "As for your yard issues, simply stated, Traton Homes
has fixed your corner many times in the past due to the fact
that it seemed reasonable to assume that the developer's large
equipment trailers ran over your curb and placed a rut in your
grass")).
R. 179-180 (Defendants' Request for Permission to Enter Upon
Land for Inspection).
T. 51:10-22.
¶¶ 25 and 27-55 ("If these two violations are not corrected the
Homeowners Association has the authority to remedy the
violations and charge your home for the expense")).
2. In Determining Standing, the Court of Appeals
Overlooks Undisputed Material Facts: Namely, that
the Damaged Right-of-Way Detrimentally Affects the
Value of Petitioner's Home and Petitioner's
Enjoyment of His Home
Both Parties agree that the condition of the right-of-way,
which is contiguous to a homeowners' lot, affects the homeowners'
enjoyment of his home.65 Yet, the Court of Appeals finds that
"Moses has identified no diminishment in his right of user [sic]
or enjoyment with respect to his own property . . . ."66 In
overlooking the fact that Petitioner's enjoyment of his land is
diminished by the damaged right-of-way, the Court of Appeals
overlooks a material fact.
Petitioner has the right to prevent others from damaging
property that affects the value of his home and his right to
enjoyment of his home.67 Here, it is undisputed that the
condition of the right-of-way affects the value of Petitioner's
home.68 Indeed, the homeowners' association's threat to impose
monetary penalties on Petitioner's home69 detrimentally affects
Petitioner's enjoyment of his home.
By showing that the damaged right-of-way detrimentally
affects the value of his home and his enjoyment of his home,70
Petitioner has proven a real harm to his own property right. For
T. 49:13-16; T. 50:3-8; T. 41:11-21.
App. LEXIS 811, *7 (July 10, 2007).
this reason, Petitioner has standing to bring an action on the
very property that affects the value of his home.71
The Court of Appeals errs in overlooking this critical fact,
and holding that Petitioner has no standing to bring a trespass
action for the damaged yard. This Honorable Court should GRANT
Certiorari to correct that legal error.
For at least the reasons set forth above, Mr. Moses
respectfully requests that this court GRANT Petitioner's Petition
Phone: (404) 514-8237
(Opinion from the Court of Appeals)
(Court of Appeals, Denial of Motion for Reconsideration)
(From R. 493-510)
(From Moses First Affidavit, R. 66-67)
This is to certify that on this day I filed with the Court
one (1) original and seven (7) copies, and served the within and
foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI upon the following via
first class mail, postage prepaid, and properly addressed as
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