Source: http://openjurist.org/291/f3d/735/bejacmar-v-ashcroft-d
Timestamp: 2015-08-01 11:53:08
Document Index: 453009249

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 371']

291 F3d 735 Bejacmar v. Ashcroft D | OpenJurist
291 F. 3d 735 - Bejacmar v. Ashcroft D Home
291 F3d 735 Bejacmar v. Ashcroft D 291 F.3d 735
Necastille David BEJACMAR, Petitioner-Appellant,v.John ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Kevin D. Rooney, Acting Commissioner of the Immigration Service, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
No. 01-13742.
Ovide Val, Miami, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Dexter Lee, Anne R. Schultz, Miami, FL, Regina Byrd, Dept. of Justice/Civil Div./OIL, David V. Bernal, Office of Immigration Litigation Station, Washington, DC, for Respondents-Appellees.
Necastille Bejacmar appeals the district court's decision to dismiss his habeas corpus petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bejacmar, a citizen of the Bahamas, lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident until he committed an aggravated felony and was ordered removed. After an unsuccessful appeal of the removal order, Bejacmar sought habeas corpus review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court dismissed Bejacmar's petition, reasoning that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) barred subject matter jurisdiction, a conclusion consistent with our statutory interpretation in Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (Richardson I), and Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir.1999) (Richardson II).
The Supreme Court, however, has since abrogated our statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) in the Richardson decisions, concluding that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar habeas jurisdiction over final removal orders which are not subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1). I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312-13, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2286, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). Because Bejacmar's removal order is subject to § 1252(a)(2)(C) and not subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1), the district court did in fact have jurisdiction to address Bejacmar's case. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND so that the district court may address the merits of Bejacmar's argument.
Bejacmar entered the United States in 1973 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1978. In June 1997, Bejacmar pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The trial court found that Bejacmar and his co-defendants defrauded three banks of over $34,000, and sentenced Bejacmar to eight months of home detention and five years of probation. Bejacmar's immigration status was not altered at th