Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191029_0002833.SCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-12-06 04:10:31
Document Index: 615482880

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

FindACase™ | Rasuwl v. Hays
Rasuwl v. Hays
ALMALIK RASUWL, CDCR #BK-0601, Plaintiff,
MARK HAYS, Captain; FRANK CLAMSER, Assistant Sheriff; APRIL SIPPERLEY, Sergeant; JUSTIN WHITE, Lieutenant, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; [DOC. NO. 5] DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(B)
Plaintiff Almalik Rasuwl, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the California Institution for Men (“CIM”), and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 5. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when he was a pre-trial detainee housed at the San Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”).
Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a Prison Certificate signed by a trust account official at CIM, together with a certified copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement Report showing his trust account activity at the time of filing. See Doc. No. 5 at 5-6; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show that Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of $84.53, and had $54.14 in average monthly deposits to his account over the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. He had an available balance of $36.18 at the time of filing. See Doc. No. 5 at 6.
Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP and assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $16.91 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
However, the Court will direct the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the initial fee assessed only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff's account at the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S.Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program, ” “as soon as practicable after docketing, ” and ideally before the service of process upon any Defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915[] is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;While the court &ldquo;ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt, &rdquo; Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not ...