Source: http://www.sensortime.com/Diehr81-en.html
Timestamp: 2017-02-21 00:36:59
Document Index: 116317493

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§103', '§ 101', '§1', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§102', '§102', '§103', '§101', '§101', '§101', 'art,417', '§101', '§101', 'art.16', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§102', '§101', '§101', '§101', 'art.40', '§101', '§101']

http://swpat.ffii.org/papiere/diehr81/index.en.html www.sensortime.com/Diehr81-de.html
How the software patent disaster lead off:
1975, Diehr and Luttons filed a patent application to the US-Patent Office that claimed a process for molding raw uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The process used a program for a digital computer to determine the cure time on base of measurement variables like time, temperature and cure relationships by means of the well-known Arrhenius equation. For the first time in the history, a patent protection of a digital algorithm became proclaimed as under statutory basis - AGAINST the resistance of the US Patent Office; AGAINST the US Patent Office Board of Appeals; AGAINST the desperately expressed worries about threatening patent-inflation as a consequence thereof; and AGAINST the opinions of many judges and experts, whose warnings in the second part are described extensively.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court (I, II, III, IV)
Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which are properly cured. Achieving the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the Arrhenius equation2 when to open the press <450 U.S. 178> and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, according to the respondents, the industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate cures because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured thus making it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine cure time.3 Because the temperature inside the press has heretofore been viewed as an uncontrollable variable, the conventional industry practice has been to calculate the cure time as the shortest time in which all parts of the product will definitely be cured, assuming a reasonable amount of moldopening time during loading and unloading. But the shortcoming of this practice is that operating with an uncontrollable variable inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-opening time and overcuring the rubber, and in other instances to underestimating that time and undercuring the product.4 Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These temperature measurements are then automatically fed <209 USPQ 5> into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. <450 U.S. 179> When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press. According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art.
The Government sought certiorari arguing that the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. Because of the importance of the question presented, we granted the writ. ____ U.S. ____, 205 USPQ 488 (1980). Held (Short Abstract):
Respondents' claims recited subject matter that was eligible for patent protection under § 101. (a) For purposes of § 101, a "process" is "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery…. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable." Cochrane v. Deener , 94 U.S. 780, 788. Industrial processes such as respondents' claims for transforming raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing are the types which have historically been eligible to receive patent-law protection. (b) While a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent, cf. Gottschalk v. Benson , 409 U.S. 63; Parker v. Flook , 437 U.S. 584, respondents do not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but instead seek protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Although their process employs a well-known mathematical equation, they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Respondents' claims must be considered as a whole, it being inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. The questions of whether a particular invention meets the "novelty" requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or the "nonobviousness" requirements of §103 do not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under § 101. (c) When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies the formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies 101's requirements. Detailed adjudication of the Court(II, II, IV):
<450 U.S. 182> In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” Perrin v. United States, ____ U.S. ____ (1979), and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that “courts ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which a legislature has not expressed.’“Diamond v. Chakrabarty,____ U.S. at ____, 206 USPQ at 196 quoting United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199, 17 USPQ 154, 162 (1933). The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].” Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, §1, 1 Stat. 318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word “art” with the word “process.” It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.” S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952), H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., Sec. 2d Sess., 6 (1952).
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the <450 U.S. 183> particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. * * * A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. The process requires <450 U.S. 184> that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.” Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-788 (1876) . <209 USPQ 7> Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a “process” did not change with the addition of that term to §101. Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 663, 175 USPQ 673 (1972), we repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener,adding “Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” Id.,at 70, 175 USPQ at 676 .
Analyzing respondents’ claims according to the above statements from our cases, we think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be disputed. The respondents’ claims describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such beginning with the loading of a mold with raw uncured rubber and ending with the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the cure. Industrial processes such as this are the type which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.8 III.
Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer. In Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, we noted “It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.” 409 U.S.,at 71, 175 USPQ at 676 . Similarly, in Parker v. Flook,supra,we stated, “A process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.” 437 U.S.,at 590, 198 USPQ at 197 . It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed <450 U.S. 188> Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 USPQ 280 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v. Deener,94 U.S. 780 (1876); O’Reilly v. Morse,15 How. 62 (1853); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1852). As Mr. Justice Stone explained four decades ago:
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of <209 USPQ 9> knowledge of scientific truth may be.” Mackay Radio Corp. & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94, 40 USPQ 199, 202 (1939).11 We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this case. Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by §101.
In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under §101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The “novelty” of any element or steps in a process, or even of the <450 U.S. 189> process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.12 It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under §101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in §101 referring to any “new and useful” process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Specific conditions for patentability follow and §102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty.13 <450 U.S. 190> The question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is “fully apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.” In re Bergey, 596 F.2d 952, 961, 201 USPQ 352, 361 (CCPA 1979). See also Nickolas v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 198 USPQ 385 (CA6 1978). The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is in accord with this reasoning. The Senate Report provided: <209 USPQ 10> Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, ‘subject to the conditions and requirement of this title.’ The conditions under which a patent may be obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) (emphasis supplied).
See also H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), at 6, 7, and 17. In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents’ process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under §102 or nonobviousness under §103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the determination that respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent protection under §101.
We have before us today only the question of whether respondents’ claims fall within the §101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. Parker v. Flook, supra. Similarly, insignificant post-solution activity will not transform <450 U.S. 192> an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Ibid.14 To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of §101. Because we do not view respondents’ claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process <450 U.S. 193> for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.15 <209 USPQ 11> Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting (I, II, III, IV).
In In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 158 USPQ 141 (CCPA 1968), a divided Court of Customs and Patent Appeals overruled the line of cases developing and applying the “function of a machine” doctrine. The majority acknowledged that the doctrine had originated with decisions of this Court and that the lower federal courts, including the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had consistently adhered to it during the preceding 70 years. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the doctrine rested on a misinterpretation of the precedents and that it was contrary to “the basic purposes of the patent system and productive of a range of undesirable results from the harshly inequitable to the silly.” Id.,at 867, 158 USPQ at 149 .12 Shortly thereafter, a similar <450 U.S. 199> fate befell the “mental steps” doctrine. In In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 159 USPQ 583 (1968), modified on rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969), the court found that the precedents on which that doctrine was based either were poorly reasoned or had been misinterpreted over the years. Id.,at 1382-1387, 159 USPQ at 587 . The court concluded that the fact that a process may be performed mentally should not foreclose patentability if the claims reveal that the process also may be performed without mental operations.Id.,at 1389, 159 USPQ at 593 .13 This aspect of the original Prater opinion was substantially undisturbed by the opinion issued after rehearing. However, the second Prater opinion clearly indicated that patent claims broad enough to encompass the operation of a programmed computer would not be rejected for lack of patentable subject matter. Id.,at 1403, n. 29, 162 USPQ at 549 .14 <450 U.S. 200> The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals soon replaced the overruled doctrines with more expansive principles formulated with computer technology in mind. In In re Bernhart,417 F.2d 1395, 163 USPQ 611 (CCPA 1969), the court reaffirmed Prater, and indicated that all that remained of the mental steps doctrine was a prohibition on the granting of a patent that would <209 USPQ 14> confer a monopoly on all uses of a scientific principle or mathematical equation. Id.,at 1399, 163 USPQ at 615 . The court also announced that a computer programmed with a new and unobvious program was physically different from the same computer without that program; the programmed computer was a new machine or at least a new improvement over the unprogrammed computer. Id.,at 1400, 163 USPQ at 616 . Therefore, patent protection could be obtained for new computer programs if the patent claims were drafted in apparatus form.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals turned its attention to process claims encompassing computer programs in In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 280 (CCPA 1970). In that case, the court emphasized the fact that Prater had done away with the mental steps doctrine; in particular, the court rejected the Patent Office’s continued reliance upon the “point of novelty” approach to claim analysis. Id.,at 889, 167 USPQ at 286 .15 The court also announced a new standard for evaluating process claims under §101: any sequence of operational steps was a patentable process under §101 as long as it was within the “technological arts.” Id.,at 893, 167 USPQ at 289 . This standard effectively disposed of any vestiges of the mental steps doctrine remaining <450 U.S. 201> after Prater and Bernhart.16 The “technological arts” standard was refined in In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 USPQ 548 (CCPA 1971), in which the court held that computers, regardless of the uses to which they are put, are within the technological arts for purposes of §101. Id.,at 688, 169 USPQ at 552 . In re Benson, of course, was reversed by this Court in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ 673 (1972).17 Justice Douglas’ opinion for a unanimous Court made no reference to the lower court’s rejection of the mental steps doctrine or to the new technological arts standard.18 Rather, the Court clearly held that new mathematical procedures that can be conducted in old computers, like mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts, see id., at 67, 175 USPQ at 674 ,are not patentable processes within the meaning of §101.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in subsequent cases began to narrow its interpretation of Benson. In In re Johnston,502 F.2d 765, 183 USPQ 172 (CCPA 1974), the court held that a record-keeping machine system which comprised a programmed digital computer was patentable subject matter under §101. Id.,at 771, <209 USPQ 15> 183 USPQ at 176 .The majority dismissed Benson with the observation thatBenson involved only process, not apparatus, claims. Ibid. Judge Rich dissented, arguing that to limit Benson only to process claims would make patentability turn upon the form in which a program invention was claimed.Id.,at 773-774, 183 USPQ at 178 .19 The court again construed Benson as limited only to process claims in In re Noll,545 F.2d 141, 191 USPQ 721 (CCPA 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 195 USPQ 465 (1977); apparatus claims were governed by the court’s pre-Benson conclusion that a programmed computer was structurally different from the same computer without that particular program. Id.,at 148, 191 USPQ at 726 . In dissent, Judge Lane,joined by Judge Rich, argued that Benson should be read as a general proscription of the patenting of computer programs regardless of the form of the claims. Id.,at 151-152, 191 USPQ at 728 . Judge Lane’s interpretation of Benson was rejected by the majority <450 U.S. 203> in In re Chatfield,545 F.2d 152, 191 USPQ 730 (CCPA 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 195 USPQ 465 (1977), decided on the same day as Noll. In that case, the court construed Benson to preclude the patenting of program inventions claimed as processes only where the claims would pre-empt all uses of an algorithm or mathematical formula. Id.,at 156, 158-159, 191 USPQ at 733,735 .20 The dissenting judges argued, as they had in Noll, that Benson held that programs for general-purpose digital computers are not patentable subject matter. Id.,at 161, 191 USPQ at 738. Following Noll and Chatfield, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals consistently interpreted Benson to preclude the patenting of a program-related process invention only when the claims, if allowed, would wholly pre-empt the algorithm itself. One of the cases adopting this view was In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195 USPQ 9 (CCPA 1977),21 which was reversed in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 198 USPQ 193 (1978). Before this Court decided Flook, however, the lower court developed a two-step procedure for analyzing program-related inventions in light of Benson.In In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1978), the court held that such inventions must first be examined to determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly claimed; if an algorithm is recited, the court must then determine whether the claim would wholly preempt that algorithm. Only if a claim satisfied both inquiries was Benson considered applicable. Id.,at 1245, 197 USPQ at 470 . See also In re Toma,575 F.2d 872, 877, 197 USPQ 852, 856-857 (CCPA 1978). <450 U.S. 204> In Flook, this Court clarified Benson in three significant respects. First, Flook held that the Benson rule of unpatentable subject matter was not limited, as the lower court believed, to claims which wholly pre-empted an algorithm or amounted to a patent on the algorithm itself. 437 U.S.,at 589-590, 198 USPQ at 197 . Second, the Court made it clear that an improved method of calculation, even when employed as part of a physical process, is not patentable subject matter under §101. Id.,at 595, n. 18, 198 USPQ at 199 . Finally, the Court explained the correct procedure for analyzing a patent claim employing a mathematical algorithm. Under this procedure, the algorithm is treated for §101 purposes as though it were a familiar part of the prior art; the claim is then examined to determine whether it discloses “some other inventive concept.” Id.,at 591-595, 198 USPQ at 197 .22<209 USPQ 16> Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in several post-Flook decisions held that program-related inventions were not patentable subject matter under §101, see, e.g., In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 197 USPQ 788 (CCPA 1978); In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 201 USPQ 136 (CCPA 1979), in general <450 U.S. 205> Flook was not enthusiastically received by that court. In In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 201 USPQ 352 (CCPA 1979), the majority engaged in an extensive critique ofFlook, concluding that this Court had erroneously commingled “distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated.” Id.,at 959, 201 USPQ at 360 .23 In subsequent cases, the court construedFlook as resting on nothing more than the way in which the patent claims had been drafted, and it expressly declined to use the method of claim analysis spelled out in that decision. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has taken the position that, if an application is drafted in a way that discloses an entire process as novel, it defines patentable subject matter even if the only novel element that the inventor claims to have discovered is a new computer program.24 The court interpreted Flook in this manner in its opinion in this case. See In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 986-989, 203 USPQ 44, 49-52 (CCPA 1979). In my judgment, this reading of Flook -- although entirely consistent with the lower court’s expansive approach to §101 during the past 12 years -- trivializes the holding in Flook,the principle that underliesBenson,and the settled line of authority reviewed in those opinions.
The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an algorithm that could be programmed on a digital computer.31 <450 U.S. 210> InFlook,the algorithm made use of multiple process variables; in this case, it makes use of only one. In Flook, the algorithm was expressed in a newly-developed mathematical formula; in this case, the algorithm makes use of a well-known mathematical formula. Manifestly, neither of these differences can explain today’s holding.32 What I believe<450 U.S. 211> does explain today’s holding is a misunderstanding of the applicants’ claimed invention and a failure to recognize the critical difference between the “discovery” requirement in §101 and the “novelty” requirement in §102.33 <209 USPQ 19> III.
Proper analysis, therefore, must start with an understanding of what the inventor claims to have discovered -- or phrased somewhat differently -- what he considers his inventive concept to be.36 It seems clear to me that Diehr and <450 U.S. 213> Lutton claim to have developed a new method of programming a digital computer in order to calculate -- promptly and repeatedly -- the correct curing time in a familiar process.37 In the §101 analysis, we must assume that the sequence of steps in this programming method is novel, unobvious, and useful. The threshold question of whether such a method is patentable subject matter remains. <209 USPQ 20> If that method is regarded as an “algorithm” as that term was used in Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, and in <450 U.S. 214> Parker v. Flook, supra,38 and if no other inventive concept is disclosed in the patent application, the question must be answered in the negative. In both Benson and Flook, the parties apparently agreed that the inventor’s discovery was properly regarded as an algorithm; the holding that an algorithm was a “law of nature” that could not be <450 U.S. 215> patented therefore determined that those discoveries were not patentable processes within the meaning of §101.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, we held that a program for the<450 U.S. 216> solution by a digital computer of a mathematical problem was not a patentable process within the meaning of §101. In Parker v. Flook, we further held that such a computer program could not be transformed into a patentable process by the addition of post-solution activity that was not claimed to be novel. That holding plainly requires the rejection of Claims 1 and 2 of the Diehr and Lutton application quoted in the Court’s opinion. Ante, at 3-4, n.5, <209 USPQ 21> 209 USPQ at 5 n.5 . In my opinion, it equally requires rejection of Claim 11 because the presolution activity described in that claim is admittedly a familiar part of the prior art.40 Even the Court does not suggest that the computer program developed by Diehr and Lutton is a patentable discovery. Accordingly, if we treat the program as though it were a familiar part of the prior art -- as well-established precedent requires41 -- it is absolutely clear that their application contains no claim of patentable invention. Their application was therefore properly rejected under §101 by the Patent Office and the Board of Patent Appeals.
The broad question whether computer programs should be given patent protection involves policy considerations that <450 U.S. 217> this Court is not authorized to address. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.,at 72-73, 175 USPQ at 676 ; Parker v. Flook,437 U.S.,at 595-596, 198 USPQ at 199 . As the numerous briefs amicus curiae filed in Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, Dann v. Johnston, supra, Parker v. Flook, supra, and this case demonstrate, that question is not only difficult and important, but apparently also one that may be affected by institutional bias. In each of those cases, the spokesmen for the organized patent bar have uniformly favored patentability and industry representatives have taken positions properly motivated by their economic self-interest. Notwithstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the software industry,42 commentators have noted that “this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it.”43 In addition, <450 U.S. 218> even some commentators who believe that legal protection for computer programs is desirable have expressed doubts that the present patent system can provide the needed protection.44 Within the Federal Government, patterns of decision have also emerged. Gottschalk, Dann, Parker, and Diamond were not ordinary litigants -- each was serving as Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks when he opposed the availability of patent protection for a program-related invention. No doubt each may have been motivated by a concern about the ability of the Patent Office <209 USPQ 22> to process effectively the flood of applications that would inevitably flow from a decision that computer programs are patentable.45 The consistent concern evidenced by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and by the Board of Patent Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office has not been shared by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which reversed the Board in Benson,Johnston,andFlook, and was in turn reversed by this Court in each of those cases.46
2 The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius and has long been used to calculate the cure time in rubber molding presses. The equation can be expressed as follows: ln v = CZ + x
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (ln),
23 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested that the cause of this Court’s error was the argument presented by the Solicitor General in Flook.According to the majority, the Solicitor General’s briefs “badly, and with a seeming sense of purpose” confused the statutory requirements. 596 F.2d, at 962, 201 USPQ at 362 .The court went on to describe part of the Solicitor General’s argument in Flook as “subversive nonsense.” Id.,at 963, 201 USPQ at 363 24 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 200 USPQ 199 (CCPA 1978); In re Phillips, 608 F.2d 879, 203 USPQ 971 (CCPA 1979); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 204 USPQ 537 (CCPA 1980), petition for cert. pending, No. 79-1941.
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 728 (1880).See also Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267 (1853). Modern rubber curing methods apparently still are based in substantial part upon the concept discovered by Goodyear:
Finally, in a description of a simple hypothetical application using the invention described in Claim 1, this is the reference to the temperature-reading device: Thermocouples, or other temperature-detecting devices, located directly within the mold cavity may read the temperature at the surface where the molding compound touches the mold, so that it actually gets the temperature of the material at that surface.
32 Indeed, the most significant distinction between the invention at issue in Flook and that at issue in this case lies not in the characteristics of the inventions themselves, but rather in the drafting of the claims. After noting that “[t]he Diehr claims are reminiscent of the claims in Flook,” Blumenthal &Riter, supra, 62 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y,at 502-503 (footnote omitted), the authors of a recent article on the subject observe that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ analysis in this case “lends itself to an interesting exercise in claim drafting.” Id.,at 505. To illustrate their point, the authors redrafted the Diehr and Lutton claims into the format employed in the Flook application: An improved method of calculating the cure time of a rubber molding process utilizing a digital computer comprising the steps of: a. inputting into said computer input values including 1. natural logarithm conversion data (ln),
2. an activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of rubber being molded. 3. a constant (X) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press, and 4. continuous temperature values (Z) of the mold during molding; b. operating said computer for 1. counting the elapsed cure time, 2. calculating the cure time from the input values using the Arrhenius equation In V = CZ+X, where V is the total cure time, and c. providing output signals from said computer when said calculated cure time is equal to said elapsed cure time. Id.,at 505. The authors correctly conclude that even the lower court probably would have found that this claim was drawn to unpatentable subject matter under §101. Id.,at 505-506.
37 A few excerpts from the original patent application will emphasize this point: The invention will probably best be understood by first describing a simple example, in which a single mold is involved and in which the information is relatively static.
38 In Benson, we explained the term “algorithm” in the following paragraph: “The patent sought is on a method of programming a general-purpose digital computer to convert signals from binary-coded decimal form into pure binary form. A procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem is known as an ‘algorithm.’ The procedures set forth in the present claims are of that kind; that is to say, they are a generalized formulation for programs to solve mathematical problems of converting one form of numerical representation to another. From the generic formulation, programs may be developed as specific applications.” 409 U.S.,at 65, 175 USPQ at 674 .
45 This concern influenced the President’s Commission on the Patent System when it recommended against patent protection for computer programs. In its report, the President’s Commission stated: The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent. Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, “To Promote the Progress of * * * Useful Arts” in an Age of Exploding Technology 13 (1966).
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