Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=1267
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 06:46:34
Document Index: 161253154

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 133', 'Art.\n226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 311', 'Art. 133']

THE STATE OF ANDHRA versus GADDAM VENKATAPPAYYA
1961 AIR 779	1961 SCR (3)	45
THE STATE OF ANDHRA V. GADDAM VENKATAPPAYYA [1960] RD-SC 278 (8 December 1960)
08/12/1960 AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K.
CITATION: 1961 AIR 779	1961 SCR (3)	45
Police Service-Officiating Sub-Inspector-Order of reversion as Head Constable-Validity-Rules retating to	the Madras Police Subordinate Service, rr. 3, 4 and 5.
The respondent, holding the substantive rank	of a	Head Constable in the Madras Police Service, was	promoted to officiate as a probationary	Sub-Inspector and, on	the completion of	the period of	probation, placed in	the category of approved probationers for confirmation	when substantive vacancies arose. Instead of being confirmed he was, for administrative reasons, reverted to his substantive post as the number of vacancies in	the post of	Sub- Inspectors was not sufficient to include him. Having failed to obtain redress from the Government, he moved the	High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Annexure 1 of r. 3 of the service rules provided that	the percentage of promotions from the- rank of Head Constable to that of Sub-Inspector was to be "upto not more than 30% of the cadre",	but provided no limitation	for direct recruitment, r. 4 provided that no vacancy shall be filled by the appointment of a person who had not yet commenced his probation when an approved probationer or a probationer	was available; cl.	(a) of r. 5 provided	that, for want of vacancy, the probationers were to be discharged first in order of juniority and thereafter the approved	probationers in order of juniority and cl. (b) provided that this order of discharge might be departed from in cases involving, among others, exceptional administrative inconvenience.
The Single judge, who heard the matter, held that there	was a violation of r. 3 of the Service Rules and directed	the State not to give effect to the order of reversion if by virtue of his seniority he could be included within the	30% prescribed for rank-promotees by that rule. The Division Bench,	on appeal, disagreed with the trial judge as to	the scope of r. 3 but dismissed the appeal holding that the rule as to juniority prescribed by r. 5 of the service rules	had not been strictly observed. The State filed an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court.
Held, that the words "upto and not more than	30% Of	the cadre"	in the Annexure 1 to r. 3, construed in the context of the provision relating to direct recruits which prescribes no	limitation, clearly fix 30 as	the maximum percentage of promotions 46 from the rank	of Head Constables to	the post of	Sub- Inspectors and	leave the appointing authorities free to adopt any other percentage below that figure. There could, therefore, be no infraction of the rule if the percentage of rank-promotees was less than 30% of the total number of	the Sub-Inspectors on' the date of the reversion in question.
Rule 4, which	regulates the	right of probationers	and approved probationers to confirmation, applies only to	the stage prior to confirmation when the	integration of	the rank-promotees and the direct recruits takes place so as to form a united service and the proportion prescribed by r. 3 has effect. That rule has to be separately applied to	the- two classes and, consequently, there was no violation of that rule in appointing direct recruits to substantive posts in preference to the respondent.
Under r. 5(a) the juniority for purposes of reversion	has, on the same reasoning, to be determined separately for	the direct	recruits and the rank-promotees who	constitute separate classes.
Even otherwise, the impugned order could be sustained under r. 5(b) in view of the case of administrative inconvenience made by the Government and accepted by the Courts below.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1957.
Appeal	from the judgment and order dated July 21, 1955, of the High Court of Andhra, Guntur, in Writ Appeal No. 122 of 1954.
T. V. B. Tatachari, for the respondent.
1960.	December 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR., J.-This appeal by the State of Andhra is from the judgment of the High Court, Andhra, dated July 21, 1955, on a' certificate under Art. 133(1) (c) of the Constitution.
The respondent joined the Madras Police Force as a Constable on September 1, 1939. He became a permanent Head Constable in 1946 and was promoted to officiate as a Sub-Inspector on October	1, 1947, when his probation commenced. By order dated	September 24,	1950, he was	declared to	have satisfactorily	completed his period of probation and	was brought to the "A" list with effect from September 10, 1950.
He 47 was still merely officiating as a Sub-Inspector, the effect of his being placed in List "A" being that he came into	the category of an "approved probationer", i.e., fit for being confirmed as Sub-Inspector when substantive vacancies arose.
On August 3, 1952, the District Superintendent	of Police, Krishna, issued an order reverting the respondent to	the rank of Head Constable with effect from August 14, 1952, i.e., to the	post which he substantively held, for	the reason	that there was not a sufficient number of vacancies in the post of Sub-Inspectors for being filled by him.	It may be mentioned that such reversion was not confined to the respondent alone but extended to 'a very large number of officiating Sub-Inspectors, who were	similarly promoters from the rank of Head Constables. The reverted officers petitioned to the Inspector-General of Police and in reply thereto and in further explanation and clarification of	the reasons for the reversions the Inspector-General of Police, Madras,	issued	a memorandum on January 15, 1953, in	the following terms:
Sub: Officiating Sub-Inspector Reverting as Head Constables-Seniority over direct recruits Petitions.
As direct recruits are	recruited against vacancies	specially reserved for them	and cannot be reverted for	want of vacancies, seniority	between directly recruited	Sub- Inspectors and promoted Sub-Inspectors should be determined separately. Their contention that they should not have been	reverted in preference to direct	recruits is	not, therefore, correct. Their reversion as	Head Constables is in order." The respondent thereafter submitted a memorial to Government in which the principal challenge was to the view of	the Government that the directly recruited Sub-Inspectors formed a category distinct from the promotee-Sub-Inspectors as	not being countenanced by the relevant rules relating to	the constitution of the Police Establishment.	Not having obtained any redress	by reason of	his memorial,	the respondent 48 filed before the High Court of Madras a petition under	Art.
226 of the Constitution (Writ Petition No. 524 of 1953)	and prayed	therein that the State of Madras may be directed by the issue of a writ of mandamus to refrain from enforcing the order reverting him as Head Constable but	to consider his claim to be confirmed as Sub-Inspector on the basis of his seniority	in the list	of approved probationers.
Balakrishna Iyer, J., who heard the petition allowed it	and issued	a direction to the State "to forbear	from giving effect	to the' order of reversion if	the petitioner by virtue	of his seniority among promoters can be included in the 30 per cent. already referred to".	We shall be dealing in detail with the nature and scope of the rule as to the 30 per cent. referred to here, which formed the basis of	the learned	Judge's order	in its proper place and will	not interrupt the narration of the events which have led to	the appeal	now before us.	The State preferred an	appeal	from this judgment	which was transferred to the High Court of Andhra after that Court. was formed. The learned Judges who heard the appeal differed from the learned Single Judge in his view as to the scope of the rule as to 30 per cent.	but dismissed the	appeal	holding that	the Government	in directing the reversion of the promotee-probationers had not observed strictly the relevant rule as to juniority prescribed in rule 5 of the Service Rules, to which rule we shall refer in due course. The State of Andhra thereafter moved the High Court for the grant of	a certificate	and having obtained it, has filed this appeal.
Though in his petition under Art. 226 filed before the	High Court of Madras, the	petitioner had alleged that	his reversion from the officiating post of Sub-Inspector to	his substantive post as Head Constable was a reduction in	rank within the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution, i.e., a reduction by way of punishment effected without giving him an opportunity to show cause therefor, this contention	was abandoned early in the proceedings before the Court and	the case has proceeded throughout on both sides on the footing that the reversion was effected solely for administrative 49 reasons	and not for any misconduct by way of	punishment.
Indeed,	it may be mentioned that when the respondent	was normally due for promotion to the substantive post of	Sub- Inspector-without reference to the judgment of the	High Court-he was duly promoted to that post and he now occupies the post of a Sub-Inspector drawing	the increments	and salary fixed therefor.
Article	311(2)	being out of the way.	the questions	that arise fall under two heads: (1) Was there a violation of the Service	Rules	when the respondent was reverted as	Head Constable? (2) If there was such a violation, do breaches of Service	Rules by themselves constitute an infringement of the legal rights of officers to whom they apply, entitling them to seek remedies therefor before Courts.
The rules on the construction of which the answer to	the first point depends are those framed, inter alia, under s.
243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, entitled "Rules relating to the Madras Police Subordinate Service". Rule 3 which relates	to recruitment and which was	held to be violated, by the learned Single Judge ran in these terms:
"Rule 3. Method of appointment and promotions:- (a) Appointment to the several classes and categories shall be made as indicated in Annexure 1.
ANNEXURE I Category 2 Method of	Limitation	Appointing appointment	authority (1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Sub-Inspec- Promotion	Up to not	In the mofus- tors	from Head	more than	sil the D.I.G.
Constables	30% of the	Police con- Cadre	cerned Direct recruitment	Nil	do This is followed by rules 4 and 5 which read:
"Rule 4. Right of probationers and approved probationers to appointment to vacancies:-A 7 50 vacancy in any class or category shall not be filled by the appointment of a person who	has not yet commenced his probation in such class or category when an approved probationer or a probationer therein is	available for	such appointment." "Rule 5. Order of discharge of	probationers and approved probationers:- (a) The	order	in which probationers and approved probationers. shall be discharged for want of vacancies shall be- first, the probationers in order of juniority;
and ,second, the approved probationers in order of juniority.
(b) The order of discharge laid down in sub- rule(a) may be departed from in	cases where such order would involve excessive expenditure on traveling allowance or	exceptional administrative inconvenience." The other rules merely carry out the principles underlying those extracted and do not need to be set out.
To appreciate	the points urged before us by	the learned counsel for the appellant-State on the proper interpretation of these rules, it is necessary to set out the	contentions respectively urged by the two parties in the Courts below and how they were dealt with.	On behalf of the respondent the points urged were:
(1) That on a proper construction of Rule 3, promotee-Sub- Inspectors referred to in departmental parlance as rank- promotees, as distinguished from those	directly recruited were entitled to be appointed to a minimum of 30 per cent.
of the	cadre strength and that this rule was	violated in that at the time of the respondent's reversion the force consisted only of less than 25 per cent. of rank-promotees and more than 75 per cent. of those directly recruited.	If the rule as to the proportion of appointments as laid	down in Rule 3 had strictly been followed there would have	been no necessity for reverting the respondent as Head Constable.
(2) The3O per cent. and the 70 per cent. laid 51 down in r. 3 applied only at the stage of	the initial recruitment of	Sub-Inspectors and that when once	that recruitment was made	and the probation of the officers started, no difference could under the rules be thereafter made between the two classes of appointees but that both of them constituted one unified force the members of which were entitled to be appointed to	substantive posts as	full members of the Service solely on the basis of their inter se seniority (apart from misconduct or inefficiency, etc.). The appointment to	substantive posts of	officers directly recruited in preference to persons like the	respondent whose probation had commenced at an earlier date	was therefore a violation of r. 4 of the Service Rules.
(3) If	at any time the cadre strength was reduced by	the abolition of temporary posts	there	might have, to be reversions, but in reverting	officers the	rule as to juniority laid down by r. 5(a) had to be strictly followed.
This rule made no distinction between Sub-Inspectors appointed directly and rank-promotees.	Both formed a single category and among them those who had not completed their probation had	to be reverted	first	and thereafter	the approved probationers in the order of their juniority.	In the present case the respondent urged that approved probationers like himself who were senior to several of	the officiating Sub-Inspectors directly recruited had	been reverted out of turn in violation of r. 5(a).
(4) If in the circumstances stated by the Government (which would be mentioned later), the directly recruited	Sub- Inspectors could not properly be reverted because of	the assurances given to them, Government were bound to retain all rank-promotee approved probationers as officiating	Sub- Inspectors until they could be appointed in	substantive vacancies as full members thereof.
In answer to these contentions the case which the State	put forward was as follows:- (1) The rule	as to	the proportion	between the rank- promotees and direct recruits laid down by r. 3 read	with the Annexure,	fixed only the maximum percentage of rank- promotees. The words "up to, not 52 more than" meant and could in the context mean	only,	that the maximum proportion of rank-promotees could be only 30 per cent. This was made clear by there being no limitation placed	on the	proportion of direct recruits. In other words,	the 30 per cent. was the ceiling fixed and not	any minimum and the rule in effect guaranteed direct recruits a minimum	proportion of 70 per cent. There was therefore no violation of this rule when	the, proportion of rank- promotees fell	to a	little below 25	per cent. at	the relevant date.
(2) Even if r. 3 had been strictly followed the respondent would have derived no benefit from the operation of	that rule because he was well below the level of rank-promotees who would even then had to be absorbed. It may be mentioned that it was because of this feature	that the order of Balakrishna lyer, J., took the form	of directing	the Government"to forbear	from giving effect to the order of reversion if the petitioner by virtue of his seniority among promotees can be included among 30 per cent." (3) On a proper construction of the rules, the	proportions laid down in r. 3 applied whether or not at the stage of the initial recruitment, certainly at the stage of	appointments to substantive posts, i.e., absorption as full	members of the permanent strength of the cadre. It was their further contention based on	the above, that for	considering confirmations provided for by r. 4 the category of direct recruits had to be treated as a class different from	the category of rank-promotees and there was no	question of seniority as between members of the two groups but	only within each group. On this basis the State Government urged that at the stage of absorption governed by r. 4 the rule as to proportion	had to be worked out and that	consequently there had been no violation of that rule.
(4) There had	been no violation of r. 5 either, on	two grounds	(1) based on denying that there was a unified category of Sub-Inspectors and in putting forward that	the two classes which made up the Service, viz., direct recruits and rank-promotees formed 53 different categories, and (ii) that even if they formed a single	category of officers after their initial appoint- ments,	there had been no violation of the rule fixed	for reversion by r. 5(a) by reason of the special circumstances of the case which brought their action within the specific provision in r. 5(b). In connection with	this	last submission it was pointed out that at the time of the police action in Hyderabad a large number of persons were recruited direct as Sub-Inspectors to whom an assurance had been given that they would not be reverted. A large number of	such temporary appointments were	made and these directly recruited Sub-Inspectors had to be provided with posts when temporary posts were getting abolished.	This introduced an administrative	problem	which	could be solved only	by reverting the rank-promotees.
We shall now proceed to a consideration of the points	thus in controversy between the parties and which were urged on either side before us.	The first point to be dealt with is as to whether there had been an infraction of r. 3 of	the Service Rules by reason of the proportion of rank-promotees being less than 30 per cent. of the total number of	Sub- Inspectors in	service	at the	date of the	respondent's reversion. As	has already been pointed out,	the learned Single	Judge had rested his decision	in favour of	the respondent on an infraction of this rule, but	the learned Judges	of the High Court in appeal had taken	a different view. Learned Counsel for-the respondent sought to support the view that the words "up to, not more than 30 per cent" in the rule meant up to a minimum of 30 per cent. the effect of the addition of the words "	not more than" being merely to eliminate fractions and permit the number to be rounded off to the nearest lower integer. It would be seen that the learned	Single Judge had stressed the use of the words	"up to" and practically gave no effect to the words " not	more than" in arriving at the construction that he adopted.	We consider that this construction is erroneous,	particularly in the context of the provision as regards direct recruits, in regard to	whom there is no limitation placed on	the proportion which they 54 could have in the Service. Taken in conjunction with	this provision it is clear that the words "up to, not more than" merely	fix the maximum percentage of rank-promotees in	the category, leaving it to the appointing authorities to adopt any percentage below this figure. We consequently endorse the view which the learned Judges of the Andhra High Court took in dissenting from the construction which the learned Single	Judge placed on the scope of r. 3. The reversion of the respondent	cannot, therefore, be	challenged on	the ground that there had been an infraction of r.	3 of	the Service Rules.
The next question is as to whether r. 4 of the Service Rules by which confirmations were regulated, had been violated in promoting the	more junior direct recruits to	substantive posts in preference to rankpromotees like the respondent who were senior to them	in service in the sense that	the latter's probation as officiating Sub-Inspectors commenced earlier. The application of these rules in the context of the facts of this case depends largely on whether rank- promotees and	officers directly recruited form or do	not form the same class or category becoming integrated into, one Service on their initial appointment to the Service. It is common ground that the two classes become integrated as members	of a	unified Service after appointment as	full members of the Service.	The point in controversy is limited to the period between the date of their initial	appointment and their absorption as full members.	If up to that	date they formed two categories and the seniority in each group ha,,; to be reckoned separately, the order of the Government would be perfectly in order and constitute no breach of	the rules.	But if on the other hand officers recruited by either	of the two modes-promotions from the rank of	Head Constables and	Sub-Inspectors directly recruited-form an integrated and unified force from the very commencement of their appointments, then on	the application of r. 4 confirmations ought to depend on mere seniority (subject to factors	relevant to merit or demerit) as officiating	Sub- Inspectors without regard to the manner in which they	were originally appointed. Though the 55 learned	Single	Judge	did not directly pronounce on	the effect of r. 4, the Andhra High Court held that the rule of seniority.prescribed by the rule had been violated. After expressing their disagreement with the learned Single Judge in his view that the minimum of 30 per cent. laid down by r.
3 had been violated, they observed:
"Nor does it follow that we can	countenance the argument of the learned Government Pleader that irrespective of the percentage	of promoters	on the cadre at a given time,	all vacancies can be filled up, if the Government so chooses, only with direct recruits.	We think that from both the classes of approved probationers, be it direct recruits or be it candidates from the ranks, selection should be made without any distinction,	provided of course that so far as promotees are concerned the percentage of 30 is not exceeded. Now, it is admitted by	the Government that	the percentage of promotees, was only 24.5 at	the time when the petitioner was sent back as Head Constable. That being so, it cannot be	con- tended for the State that the ceiling will be exceeded if the petitioner is promoted. As we read the rules, when once an officer qualifies as an approved probationer, no distinction can be	made between him and	a direct recrui t approved probationer." We are unable to agree with the reasoning or the conclusion here expressed. It would be seen that the learned Judges have, though tacitly, accepted the case put forward by	the Government, and in our view correctly, that the	integration of the two groups is only after the stage of absorption as full members of the Service, and that at that stage the rule as to the proportion laid down in the annexure to r. 3 comes into operation.	If the 30% which is the limit set for rank- promotees for absorption as full members is merely a ceiling imposed for the benefit of direct recruits, as rightly	held by the learned Judges, it is difficult to see how the	rule could be Held to be violated because the proportion of rank- promotees confirmed fell below the figure of 30.	We, therefore, consider that there was no violation of the	rule as to seniority 56 prescribed by r. 4 in the appointment of the direct recruits to substantive posts before the absorption of rank promotees like the respondent.
We shall next proceed to deal with r. 5 which deals with the power of Government to effect reversions and the conditions and limitations prescribed there for.
It would be seen that cl. (a) of r. 5 substantially reverses for the purpose of discharge or reversion the order in which confirmations are to be made as set out in r. 4. We	have held that the respondent had no right under the rules to insist on his being confirmed, on the terms of r. 4 read in the light of r. 3. On the same line of reasoning it would follow	that as direct recruits and rank-promotees belonged to distinct classes the juniority for reversion had to be determined separately for each class and not on the basis of the two classes forming part of a unified force before	con- firmation. If' this	test were applied, it cannot be contended that the reversion of the respondent infringed r.
But this apart, the impugned order could also be sustained on the basis of the provision contained in cl. (b) of r. 5 which reads:
"The order of discharge laid down in sub-rule (a) may be departed from in cases where	such order would involve excessive expenditure on travelling allowance	or	exceptional administrative inconvenience." In the present case the Government explained their reason for the order	for reversion	of rank-promotees in	the affidavit which they filed to the writ petition in these terms:
"His reversion was necessitated by the	fact that a large number of Sub-Inspectors on other duty in Hyderabad State reverted to this Stat e and that a number of temporary posts created for special purposes during the disturbed period immediately following the police action in Hyderabad had to be abolished and that	the direct recruited Sub-Inspectors	had necessarily to be absorbed as Sub-Inspectors as they cannot be asked to work in any lower 57 post being direct recruits to a particular category,	viz.,	that of	the Sub-Inspector.
This reversion of rank-promoted Sub-Inspectors was rendered absolutely	necessary in	the exigencies of service and for administrative purposes	and as such, it cannot be deemed to be arbitrary or contrary to rules or in	the nature of punishment as alleged by the peti- tioner." It was	this circumstance that was stated before the	High Court of Madras in the Writ Petition as that which brought the impugned	order of reversion within	"exceptional administrative inconvenience" provided for by the last words of the rule. The learned Single Judge accepted as correct the facts stated by the Government as the reason for	the reversion, stating:
"Mr. Seshachalapathi	explained	that Government were in a difficult position as a consequence of the members taken in connection with the police action in Hyderabad. A large number of persons were directly recruited as Sub-Inspectors on the assurance that	they would not be ousted. I do not suggest	that Government should go back on any assurance that they may have given to these direct recruits.	Far be it from me to encourage anything that might savour of bad faith on the part of Government...... But I would still say that in order that Government may keep faith with those whom they recruited	directly as Sub-Inspectors they cannot break faith with or ignore the rights of those who were promoted as Sub-Inspectors." If the facts were accepted as correct, and we	might point out that their accuracy was never challenged at any stage either in the High Court or before us, it appears to us that the order of reversion passed would be justified as being covered by the last words of cl. (b) even if the order	laid down in r. 5(a) were infringed. In these circumstances it is not clear why the learned Judge should have observed:
"The Government do not rest their case on Rule 5(b)" when the facts stated by Government and accepted by 8 58 him brought their action well within the scope of	that clause.	In their memorandum of grounds in Writ Appeal	No.
122 of	1954 which the State filed to the High Court	the appellants urged: "The learned Judge failed to appreciate the special circumstances of the situation which rendered the reversion	necessary in the instant case". When	the matter	was before the High Court of	Andhra	the learned Judges	observed"The learned Judge stated in his, judgment that the Government do not rest their case on	Rule 5(b)".
In their turn they too accepted the case of the Government as regards the circumstances which necessitated the order of reversion and	observed: "The	Government frankly stated, however, that they were in a difficult position because	of certain	measures which they were compelled	to take in connection with the police action in Hyderabad when a large number of persons were directly recruited as Sub-Inspectors with the assurance that they would be entertained	per- manently. In order to keep that assurance with such persons they were constrained to revert the rank-promotees but there is no rule which enables the Government to do so." We	must express our dissent from the last sentence extracted above, because	r. 5(b) makes specific provision for an order of discharge laid down in cl. (a) being departed from in cases where such order would entail	"exceptional administrative inconvenience" and on the facts accepted both by the learned Single	Judge and by the High Court of appeal the words extracted were attracted.
Before	leaving r. 5 there is one other matter to which we desire to advert and that relates to the observation of	the High Court in the judgment now under appeal which seems to imply that if the Government found itself in difficulty owing to the	assurances given to the officers directly recruited, they could under the rules have solved it, not by ordering the	reversion of the rank-promotees but	by continuing them in their officiating posts until they could be absorbed as full members of the Service. This was one of the contentions urged by the respondent and	the learned Judges say:
59 "It seems to us clear	that whether	they imposed merely a ceiling or whether there is an obligation upon the Government to fill up 30 per cent. of the vacancies	from among promotees, the State cannot say, on the facts, before us, that there are no vacancies	for promotees as such." It looks to us impossible to support this view on	any construction of the rules. In effect it means either	that temporary posts could not be abolished, or that approved probationers could not be reverted. The first	alternative could not obviously have been meant and the other is plainly contrary to the terms of r. 5(a) which makes provision	for the reversion	of approved probationers. Of course, as a measure of relief to	their	subordinates and to avoid hardship to them Government might retain people in their officiating posts, but it is quite a	different thing to import	a legal and enforceable obligation on their part to do so.
In the view that we have taken that there has been no breach of the	Service Rules in ordering the reversion of	the respondent as a Head Constable, the question as to whether an infraction of a Service Rule confers a legal right which could be agitated in Court does not	arise.	We do	not propose, therefore, to consider that question and indeed we did not call upon learned counsel for the appellant to argue that part of his case.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the	High Court set aside and Writ Petition No. 524 of 1953 dismissed.
In view of the order of the High Court dated	February 3, 1956, by which the appellant was granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution subject to the condition that the respondent would be entitled to his	taxed costs incurred in this Court in any event from the appellant, there will be an order that the appellant will pay the costs of the respondents in the appeal, in this Court.