Source: http://openjurist.org/117/f3d/1520
Timestamp: 2015-04-18 19:30:25
Document Index: 593473139

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839', '§ 839']

117 F3d 1520 Northwest Environmental Defense Center | OpenJurist
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117 F3d 1520 Northwest Environmental Defense Center 117 F.3d 1520
27 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,215, 97 Cal. Daily Op.Serv. 5234,97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8493
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER; Northwest ResourceInformation Center, Inc.; Oregon Trout, Inc.;Idaho Steelhead and Salmon Unlimited;Salmon For All, Petitioners,v.BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION; U.S. Department of Energy,Respondents,Direct Service Industrial Customers (Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, Atochem North America, Columbia Falls AluminumCompany, Georgia-Pacific Corp., Kaiser Aluminum & ChemicalCorp., Intalco Aluminum Corp., et al.); Puget Sound Power &Light Company, a Maine Corporation; City of Seattle, CityLight Department ("City"); Public Utility Dist. No. 2 ofGrant County, Washington ("Grant"); Washington Water PowerCompany; Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County,Washington, A Washington municipal corporation ("Chelan");Public Power Council; Canby Utility Board ("Canby");Tillamook Peoples' Utility District; Public UtilityDistrict # 1 of Benton County, Washington; Public District# 1of Franklin County, Washington; Public Utility # 1 ofSkamaia County; Washington and Western Montana Generating &Transmission Cooperative, Inc.; Portland General ElectricCompany; Pacific Power & Light Company; Public UtilityDistrict No. 1 of Douglas County, Respondents-Intervenors.NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER; Northwest ResourceInformation Center, Inc.; Idaho Steelhead andSalmon Unlimited; Petitioners,Public Power Council, Petitioner-Intervenor,v.BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION; U.S. Department of Energy,Respondents,Direct Service Industrial Customers (Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, Atochem North America, Columbia Falls AluminumCompany, Georgia-Pacific Corp., Kaiser Aluminum & ChemicalCorp., Intalco Aluminum Corp., et al.); Puget Sound Power &Light Company, a Maine Corporation; City of Seattle, CityLight Department ("City"); Public Utility Dist. No. 2 ofGrant County, Washington ("Grant"); Washington Water PowerCompany; Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County,Washington, A Washington municipal corporation ("Chelan");Public Power Council; Canby Utility Board ("Canby");Tillamook Peoples' Utility District; Public UtilityDistrict # 1 of Benton County, Washington; Public District# 1of Franklin County, Washington; Public Utility # 1 ofSkamaia County; Washington and Western Montana Generating &Transmission Cooperative, Inc.; Portland General ElectricCompany; Pacific Power & Light Company; Public UtilityDistrict No. 1 of Douglas County, Respondents-Intervenors.
Nos. 90-70548, 91-70265.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1993.Decided July 1, 1997.
Daniel J. Rohlf, Portland, Oregon, for petitioners.
Philip S. Key, Bonneville Power Administration, Portland, Oregon, for respondent, Bonneville Power.
Kristi M. Wallis, Culp, Guterson & Grader, Seattle, Washington, for Public Utility Dist. No. 1, et al.
Petitions to Review a Decision of the Bonneville Power Administration. BPA No. NWPA.
Opinion by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge REINHARDT.
Petitioners representing environmental and fishing interests1 challenge final actions of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)2 in these consolidated petitioners for review. In 1990, BPA entered into agreements with British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro) and several electric utilities, known as the Mid-Columbia Participants,3 governing rights to water stored behind hydroelectric dams on the Columbia River system in Canada. Petitioners argue that BPA ignored its statutory duty to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife on the river by entering into these agreements. Petitioners also argue that BPA violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement.
There is no single "Law of the River" on the Columbia. Rather, as we consider BPA's decision to enter into these two agreements we must navigate a maze of overlapping treaties, laws, and regulations, which together attempt to balance the varied interests on the river. Prominent among the laws on the river are the United States-Canada Columbia River Treaty, the Northwest Power Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Subsequent to the submission of this case for decision, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) began playing a significant role. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir.1996); Aluminum Co. of America v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 92 F.3d 902 (9th Cir.1996); Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir.1996); Idaho Dep't Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir.1995). It is important to understand both the terms of the agreements, and the law of the river as it existed when BPA entered into them, to properly analyze BPA's decision to enter into the NTSAs.
The 1964 Columbia River Treaty between the United States and Canada provided for building four storage reservoirs: three in Canada (Mica, Kennleyside, and Duncan) and one in the United States (Libby). The reservoirs that were built and operated under the Treaty represent almost half the water storage on the Columbia River System. The Treaty required 15.5 million acre-feet of Canadian storage, but reservoirs actually built contained storage capacity of 20.5 million acre-feet. The excess storage capacity, most of which is behind Mica Dam, is referred to as non-Treaty storage. The Non-Treaty Storage Agreements, discussed below, were necessary to govern the rights to this additional storage capacity. Nothing in the Treaty prevented Canada from using all of the non-Treaty storage unilaterally, although the United States argued it had the right to compensation if use of the non-Treaty storage resulted in reduced Columbia River flows in the United States.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Northwest Power Act (NPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h, which "marked an important shift in federal policy." Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning, 35 F.3d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.1994). "Continually declining fish runs had revealed the failures of previous legislative efforts requiring that 'equal consideration' be given to fish and wildlife affected by resource exploitation." Id. The NPA created "a pluralistic intergovernmental and public review process." Id. at 1378. At the hub of this process, Congress established the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council (Council), directing it to create "a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance" the Columbia River Basin's fish and wildlife "to the extent affected by the development and operation of the Basin's hydropower system."4 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A), (h)(10)(A). The Council's authority with respect to fish and wildlife measures is constrained; the Council "can guide, but not command, federal river management." 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(h)(10), 839b(i), 839b(j); see also Northwest Resource Information Center v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 25 F.3d 872, 874 (9th Cir.1994).
Under this statutory scheme, the BPA Administrator has two responsibilities: First, the Northwest Power Act requires the Administrator to exercise his responsibilities under the Act "in a manner that provides equitable treatment" for fish and wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(i). Second, the Administrator must take into account "to the fullest extent practicable, the program adopted by the Council." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii). Attempting to balance environmental and energy considerations, the Act states that fish and wildlife protection measures cannot jeopardize "an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5).
Since the adoption of the Northwest Power Act, BPA has exercised its responsibility to take into account the Council's Program by adopting many of the Program's essential fish protection measures. First, BPA adopted the centerpiece of the Council's 1987 Program, the "Water Budget," which is a volume of water to be released during the spring in order to "create an artificial freshet that speeds juvenile fish to the ocean." O.R. at 2856. To assist migrating juvenile salmon, the Council established a water budget of 1.19 million acre-feet for the Snake river and 3.45 million acre-feet for the Columbia. Second, BPA agreed to spill water through a spillway, rather than the dam's turbines, which assists juvenile passage through dams. Third, BPA funded fish hatcheries throughout the Columbia River Basin.
After the implementation of the Council's 1987 Fish and Wildlife Program, BPA adopted further protective measures for anadromous fish. In 1988, BPA entered in the Vernita Bar Agreement with the Mid-Columbia utility districts to protect chinook spawning, incubation and emergence on Vernita Bar. In 1989, BPA entered into a spill agreement with several fish agencies and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Council's Program, and BPA's implementation of the Program, failed to reverse the trend of decreasing fish populations on the Columbia. See generally Northwest Resource Information Center, Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1381-84 (9th Cir.1994). Salmon and steelhead populations continued to decline through 1990. Id. at 1381. In 1990, environmental advocates petitioned the National Marine Fisheries Service to list three Snake River stocks and one Columbia River stock under the Endangered Species Act. Id. In response to the endangered species petitions, various political leaders convened a "Salmon Summit" to develop a comprehensive plan to enhance fish populations on the Columbia. The result of the "Salmon Summit" was the development of the "Strategy for Salmon" which has also been attacked as inadequate. Id. Congress' declared goal "to protect, mitigate and enhance the fish and wildlife" populations on the Columbia River, 16 U.S.C. § 839(6), was still unmet ten years after the passage of the Northwest Power Act.
In the early 1980s, a dispute arose between Canada and the United States regarding the use of non-Treaty storage. BC Hydro asserted its right to use the non-Treaty storage unilaterally, while BPA contended that it was entitled to compensation for any reduction in flows that would result if BC Hydro filled the non-Treaty storage. The parties negotiated a compromise by entering into a Non-Treaty Storage Agreement in 1983. This original fourteen-month agreement was superseded in 1984 with a ten-year agreement in which BPA and BC Hydro agreed to share equally in 2 million acre-feet of water in non-Treaty storage space.
In 1987, BPA and BC Hydro agreed to study methods of increasing the efficient operation of the Columbia River hydrosystem without constructing new facilities. The result of these negotiations was the 1990 Non-Treaty Storage Agreement (NTSA or BC Hydro NTSA), which is the subject of this litigation. The NTSA expanded the amount of non-Treaty storage capacity from 2 million acre-feet to about 4.5 million acre-feet, and extended the agreement from 1993--when the old agreement expired--to the year 2003.
The BPA Administrator signed the agreement after a two-year public process involving written comments and public meetings. During the process, BPA circulated a draft Environmental Assessment (EA). It issued a final EA after receiving comments on the draft. The U.S. Department of Energy issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) on June 25, 1990, and the Administrator issued his NTSA Decision Record and signed the NTSA on July 9, 1990. BPA explains that it entered the NTSA with BC Hydro in part because the Council encouraged it to take actions to offset the loss of power and annual revenue caused by compliance with the Water Budget. It asserts that "the NTSA does not compel any particular allocation" of non-Treaty storage. Official Record ("O.R.") at 1337.
During the public comment process leading up to the NTSA, BPA held a series of public meetings with federal and state fish and wildlife agencies, Indian Tribes, utilities, and the public to exchange information and discuss the proposed NTSA. O.R. at 1324-25. Various fishery advocates comprising the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Authority (CBFWA) focused their comments regarding the NTSA on two issues: (1) a concern that the NTSA would negatively impact fisheries interests; and (2) a request that the non-Treaty storage be dedicated to increase flows for anadromous fish. Id.
In response to CBFWA's first concern, BPA entered into a separate non-Treaty storage agreement (NTS Fish and Wildlife Agreement). O.R. at 1485-90. This agreement ensures that non-Treaty storage will not be operated in a manner which harms fish and wildlife. O.R. at 1338, 1485-1505. Second, the agreement guarantees that non-Treaty storage will not disrupt existing fish protection measures, such as the Vernita Bar Agreement and the Water Budget. O.R. at 1490. Third, BPA agreed to fund a study regarding the rental of irrigation water in Idaho to augment Snake River flows, and to provide further funds for renting the water, if feasible. O.R. at 1491-92.
Finally, BPA entered into a third agreement, which petitioners challenge along with the BC Hydro NTSA. Approximately six months after entering into the NTSA, BPA entered into a power agreement with several utility districts known as the Mid-Columbia Participants. Through this agreement (MCP NTSA), BPA contracted to use some of its share of the non-Treaty storage capacity. The MCP NTSA was made subject to the NTS Fish and Wildlife Agreement. The Mid-Columbia Participants could not, therefore, use their share of the non-Treaty storage water in a manner that would cause adverse effects on the fish to be "greater than would have occurred in the absence of non-Treaty storage." O.R. at 1337, 1489.
Petitioners argue that BPA violated the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act or NPA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by entering into the BC Hydro NTSA and the MCP NTSA.5 For relief, petitioners ask this court (1) to invalidate both the BC Hydro NTSA and the MCP NTSA, and (2) to enjoin BPA from implementing the NTSA agreements until an EIS is prepared. We exercise original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e). Northwest Resource Information Center v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 25 F.3d 872 (9th Cir.1994).
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS
Before addressing petitioners' claims that BPA violated the NPA and NEPA, we must first address whether we may consider affidavits submitted by petitioners on appeal. Petitioners have submitted four affidavits in an attempt to establish standing before this court. BPA and the Mid-Columbia Participants moved to strike the affidavits on the grounds that petitioners inappropriately attempted to supplement the administrative record and expand the scope of this litigation. Alternatively, they asked that we allow them to file a supplemental response. Petitioners replied that they submitted the affidavits for the sole purpose of establishing standing. We deny respondents' motion to strike and the alternative motion for leave to file a supplemental response.
BPA cited several cases for the proposition that parties appealing agency decisions cannot supplement the record on appeal. These cases are inapposite because they address the merits of the agency decision rather than standing to challenge that decision in a federal court. See, e.g., Seattle Community Council Fed'n v. FAA, 961 F.2d 829, 834 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992). Because Article III's standing requirement does not apply to agency proceedings, petitioners had no reason to include facts sufficient to establish standing as a part of the administrative record. We therefore consider the affidavits not in order to supplement the administrative record on the merits, but rather to determine whether petitioners can satisfy a prerequisite to this court's jurisdiction. Didrickson v. United States Dep't of Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir.1992) (accepting appellant-intervenors' supplemental declarations alleging particularized injury because intervenors were not required to establish standing until they appealed).
BPA also argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), requires that petitioners establish standing in their opening brief. In Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court discussed the quantum of proof required of plaintiffs at the pleading, summary judgment, and trial phases of litigation in district court. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37. This case is quite different than the examples cited by the Supreme Court, because here we have original jurisdiction. As we have previously noted, "[t]he original jurisdiction granted this court by ... 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5), raises procedural problems that will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis." California Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Com'n v. Johnson, 807 F.2d 1456, 1465 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986). Determining standing is essentially a legal inquiry but may involve underlying factual findings. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501, 506 (9th Cir.1991). Because standing was not at issue in earlier proceedings, we hold that petitioners in this case were entitled to establish standing anytime during the briefing phase. We consider the affidavits solely to determine whether petitioners have standing to bring this action.
We deny BPA's alternative motion for leave to file a supplemental response because, from the content of the motion and the representations of counsel at oral arguments, it became clear that BPA wishes to respond only to the affiants' criticisms of BPA's implementation of the NTSA's and the Fish and Wildlife Agreement. As BPA points out, however, implementation of the agreements is not before this court. The profferred response is therefore irrelevant.
Petitioners argue that BPA violated the Northwest Power Act by failing to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife. They argue that BPA acted inequitably towards the fish in that (1) the NTSAs will cause a reduction in the number of fish on the river; and (2) by entering into the NTSAs, BPA benefitted power interests without guaranteed and concomitant benefits for fish. In addition to their equitable treatment claim, petitioners argue that BPA failed to comply with the Act's procedures for the acquisition of major resources.
As a threshold issue, BPA argues that petitioners lack standing to raise their Northwest Power Act claim. To establish standing petitioners "must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition, petitioners must show that such injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. Id. Finally, they must show that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a foreseeable decision. Id. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing. Id. Standing must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.
The supplemental affidavits submitted by the petitioners are sufficient to establish that any injury to fish and wildlife interests on the Columbia River would cause injury to each petitioner.6 The more difficult issue for petitioners is demonstrating that the NTSAs will cause injury to the fish. First, petitioners argue that the NTSAs will cause harm to fish by reducing their stocks on the river. They claim that BPA's environmental assessment itself, prepared prior to entering into the NTSAs, identifies negative impacts to salmon as a likely result of BPA's decision to enter into the NTSA and MCP NTSA. The portion of the EA to which petitioners refer, states:
Changes to flow and spill resulting from the proposal have little effect on anadromous fish migrating through the Columbia and Snake River systems. The analysis of survival changes under the opportunity storage alternative shows projected average relative changes in survival throughout the contract for all yearling, subyearlings, steelhead, and sockeye ranged respectively, from increases of 1.5, 1.0, 0.7, and 0.4 percent to decreases of 0.2, 0.9, 0.2, and 0.0 percent. These effects were evaluated based on their stock assessment information and were found to be insignificant.
O.R. at 1278. Contrary to petitioners' claim, this statement does not show that the harm to the fish is a likely result of the NTSA. Petitioners submit no evidence rebutting BPA's conclusion that the NTSAs' effects on fish populations were insignificant. Petitioners' claim of injury, therefore, is too speculative, falling far short of the Court's requirement that the injury be "certainly impending." See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 n. 2. Here, it is just as likely that BPA's decision to enter into the NTSAs will result in an increase in the fish population as a decrease.
Petitioners also argue that BPA's responsibility to provide equitable treatment for fish and wildlife required BPA to dedicate a portion of the non-Treaty storage capacity for the benefit of fish.7 If the Northwest Power Act guarantees the fish a portion of the non-Treaty storage, it is clear that a denial of this great benefit would injure the fish; consequently, petitioners would be injured and they would have standing to sue. Therefore, we will address the merits of petitioners Northwest Power Act claim to determine whether the Act requires BPA to dedicate a portion of the non-Treaty storage for the benefit of the fish.
"[W]e review the construction of a statute de novo as a question of law, [but] we accord substantial deference to the interpretation given statutes by the officers or agency charged with their admini