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Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 12', 'art. 15', 'art. 47', 'art 48', 'art 4', 'arts 34', 'arty 31', 'art 42', 'art, 4']

US Supreme Court: 05-746 | Causation (Law) | Negligence
US Supreme Court: 05-746
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner v. TIMOTHY SORRELL. : : : : : No. 05-746
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Washington, D.C. Tuesday, October 10, 2006 The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 12:59 p.m.
the Petitioner. MARY L. PERRY, ESQ., St. Louis, Mo.; on behalf of the Respondent.
CARTER G. PHILLIPS, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARY L. PERRY, ESQ. On behalf of the Respondent REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CARTER G. PHILLIPS, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner 52 28 3
P R O C E E D I N G S (12:59 p.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument next
in Norfolk Southern Railway versus Sorrell. Mr. Phillips. ORAL ARGUMENT OF CARTER G. PHILLIPS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and
may it please the Court: The fundamental question in this case is whether the common law doctrine of equivalence between defendant negligence and plaintiff negligence applies under the FELA. The doctrine of equivalence is, I think, most
clearly stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is reproduced on page 19 of our blue brief in the middle paragraph. second to read it. The rules which determine the causal relation between a plaintiff's negligent conduct and the harm resulting to him are the same as those determining the causal relation between the defendant's negligent conduct and resulting harm to others. That is a principle of law And I think it is worth taking a
that has been in effect long before the Federal Employers Liability Act was enacted. It is obviously a restatement
of the law in 1965, and it is an absolutely clear 3
statement of the law as it applies today. There is nothing in the Federal Employers Liability Act that remotely modifies the doctrine of equivalence. The two provisions, section 51 talks about
negligence resulting from -- or negligence in whole or in part. And section 53, which describes the contributory
negligence portion or comparative negligence talks about negligence attributable to. None of that deviates at all Negligence
from any kind of common law doctrines.
inherently calls for an analysis of proximate causation. JUSTICE SCALIA: Except that the -- what was it,
the Rogers case, which said that the -- well, you debate whether it said that, but let's assume that it said that the rule of proximate causality doesn't apply to the negligence of the defendant. The basis for that holding was that in whole or in part language which is used for the negligence of the defendant, but not used for the contributory negligence. So if you believe that that case was at least decided for the right reason, it seems to me there's a good argument that it changed it for the one, but not for the other. MR. PHILLIPS: Well, even if that were true, we
would still, of course, be entitled to -- I mean, it doesn't change the doctrine of equivalence. It doesn't
say that we're not entitled to the same rule with respect 4
to the -- our clients -JUSTICE SCALIA: MR. PHILLIPS: But nobody does -The plaintiff would be. That
doctrine is unaffected by that holding.
to take issue with the interpretation of Rogers, if you want, at this point. But it seems to me the doctrine of
equivalence is fundamentally different from the doctrine of proximate causation. And therefore, you can change one
without affecting the other one whatsoever. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Phillips, the fundamental
problem, at least for me, in this case is that there was no objection at all at trial to the instruction that the judge gave on negligence. There was an instruction
requested by the defendant on contributory negligence, which read, "such negligence of plaintiff contributed in whole or in part to cause his injury." That was the
only instruction objected to, because the refusal to give that instruction. But you seem to be using that as
a lever to attack the instruction on negligence to which no objection was made. MR. PHILLIPS: Ginsburg. That's not our attack, Justice
Our objection, which is reproduced in 28A of
the cert -- of the petition's appendix, that says -- and I think the current MAI instruction has a different causation standard for comparative fault, meaning that 5
under Missouri's rules, we must prove that such negligence of plaintiff directly contributed to the cause -- to cause the injury. And that misstates the law,
because of the doctrine of equivalence. That's our initial argument, is that no matter how you analyze this, whether you do it from a proximate cause or a slightest cause standard as the appropriate way to evaluate our negligence, that same standard has to be applied in evaluating the plaintiff's negligence. That's the core doctrine. certiorari on. The argument with respect to Rogers was not an argument we put into this case, Justice Ginsburg. an argument that the Respondent put into this case. JUSTICE SOUTER: I take it you would be satisfied It's That's what we sought
-- not wholly satisfied, but substantially satisfied if we said, yeah, we accept the doctrine of equivalence, and we think the instruction on contributory negligence was correct. Because that would mean in the next case, you
would get a proximate cause instruction on defendant's negligence. MR. PHILLIPS: We would regard that as certainly But
at least half a loaf, maybe more than half a loaf.
at the end of the day, I think the right answer in this case is that the Court ought to go ahead and decide 6
whether or not Rogers really did work a sea change in the law. JUSTICE SOUTER: described -MR. PHILLIPS: issue. JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. PHILLIPS: that issue. presented. We wouldn't have to. Absolutely don't have to address You wouldn't have to address that If we came out the way I just
On the other hand, the question is squarely And -But I thought you argued the
Rogers standard was a correct standard in the Missouri court? MR. PHILLIPS: Kennedy. We clearly did that, Justice
And we didn't raise -- we are not here
complaining about Rogers as an argument for why we shouldn't be liable. criticizing that. What we're saying is, in response to the Respondent's argument which seeks to undermine the doctrine of equivalence based on an overreading, I would argue, of Rogers, that that interpretation is incorrect. And if we're right that that interpretation is incorrect, we would win on the doctrine of equivalence for two different reasons. 7
That's not our -- we're not
The first one that Justice Souter described.
the second one would be that to the extent that there's any equivalence, there's no problem here because proximate cause is required in every case. And we think
that that's an issue that the Court doesn't have to decide, but certainly could. JUSTICE GINSBURG: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Mr. Phillips, the defendant
requested a charge on contributory negligence that read, "such negligence of plaintiff contributed in whole or in part to cause his injuries." You didn't want the direct You asked for one
relationship, you didn't ask for that.
that said, "such negligence of plaintiff contributed in whole or in part to his injury." Now you are saying that
that was -- what you asked for was an incorrect charge. MR. PHILLIPS: No, what we're saying, Justice
Ginsburg, is that we were entitled to the same -- if they were going to use slight negligence with respect to our negligence, then with respect to the plaintiff's negligence, we were entitled to slight negligence as well. That's our fundamental argument. we have put on the table. That's the issue
And candidly, I don't think
there's an answer to that that's been offered in this case, other than a harmless error argument, which I think is candidly without substance. 8
The issue, then, is whether in evaluating the doctrine of equivalence, do you want to then entertain the plaintiff's or the Respondent's counter argument, which is that somehow Rogers requires this fundamental change, and indeed overrules the doctrine of equivalence as it applies to FELA. And I would say, one, Rogers doesn't speak to the doctrine of equivalence at all. And, two, to the extent
it does speak to it, it was never meant to change the fundamental rule with respect to proximate causation. JUSTICE SCALIA: Except we've rejected petitions
for certiorari on that issue at least a couple of times. Eleven circuits are in agreement as to what Rogers required. You -Well, at least one circuit clearly. Do you really expect to get five
MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SCALIA:
votes for the railroad on this, what would be a massive change of what is assumed to be the law for, what, 50 years? MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I think the -- well, the
answer is yes, of course, I expect to get five votes for that. JUSTICE SCALIA: ask for that. (Laughter) 9
But you were wise enough not to
But you know, the basic -- the
point here is that if you look at the decisions that have analyzed this Court's opinion in Rogers, I don't think any of them has analyzed it with much care. And the
reality is the Third Circuit has analyzed this case with care, and reached the opposite conclusion. We think there is a split in the circuits. And at
some point, if not through this vehicle to address that issue, then through another vehicle to address that issue. But, yes, it seems reasonably clear that, first
of all, there were at least 20 decisions of this Court dealing not only with the sufficiency evidence, but also with the adequacy of the jury instructions prior to Rogers that refer specifically to proximate causation. There is nothing in the statute that remotely meant to change that. There is nothing that's been It is at least clear to me,
identified in that context.
and I hope clear to five of you -JUSTICE SCALIA: Rogers said, in whole or in part.
Now, I agree with you, that I don't see how that does it. But Rogers said that it did it. MR. PHILLIPS: But what Rogers saying in whole or
in part eliminated was the specific proximate causation standard existing in Missouri. And Missouri's proximate And this
cause standard talked about sole causation. 10
Court said, no, in whole or in part means sole causation can not be the right standard for proximate cause. The Court was not asked to decide, and I don't think it did decide, that proximate causation, as it is traditionally understood, was also thrown out the door, or more fundamentally, that you can never ask for a jury instruction that calls for proximate causation to be given to both parties -- I'm sorry. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: lost a bit here. Mr. Phillips, I may be
But I mean, which -- I'm looking at the And it seems to me it is
instructions that were given.
hard to take issue with the instruction on the railroad's part because it tracks the statutory language. The
statute says in whole or in part, and the instruction says in whole or in part. So if you're pushing the doctrine of equivalence, your objection seems to be to the directly contributed language with respect to the employee, the plaintiff. Now, but doesn't directly contributed, isn't that a typical proximate cause instruction? MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, that is a typical proximate
cause instruction, and that meant that our burden was heavier than the plaintiff's burden, which is why we're saying that under the doctrine of equivalence, we're entitled to the equivalent instructions. 11
If it is slight cause or proximate cause. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. But on the other You
hand, you're also arguing in favor of proximate cause. are saying Rogers didn't change proximate cause. MR. PHILLIPS: Right. But we are only doing that I'm not -- we
in response to the Respondent's argument.
didn't bring to this Court an affirmative argument that said we are entitled to no liability because of proximate cause. That's not the argument we made. JUSTICE KENNEDY: The argument --
How is the blue brief in
response to Respondent's argument? MR. PHILLIPS: Because if you look at the
opposition to the cert petition, which took us to task for not discussing Rogers in our petition, it says on page 6, "inexplicably, petitioner does not cite, let alone discuss Rogers, an omission that enfeebles its entire discussion of FELA's causation standards." Against that kind of an attack, we felt it incumbent on us to deal with Rogers. JUSTICE BREYER: As we're supposed to decide the
case, in your view, there was instruction 13. Instruction 13 used the word direct. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. You object to 13. You said it
should use the word in whole or in part. 12
MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER:
Yes. You then argued to the lower And
courts, 13 should use the word in whole or in part. then you say you've argued that here. So what you're
saying is now we're supposed to decide, should instruction 13 use the word in whole or in part. That's what it is. I have to admit, I didn't quite get that out of the blue brief. I thought you were arguing something But you're not now, you You're arguing
else about railroad negligence.
say, arguing about railroad negligence. about plaintiff negligence. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER:
Right, we're arguing both. All right. So if I reread the
blue brief, what I'll discover on closer examination, that your real objection, not responding to the other side, has simply been about the standard to use in respect to plaintiff's contributory negligence. And what
you want this Court to say is, you're right about that, we want the more relaxed standard used for contributory negligence. End of case. Right. Yes? Yes. It says that in the blue brief? 13
MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 brief.
Yes, it does say that in the blue
Because what we say is that the doctrine And
of equivalence is the principle that should apply.
you know, it is not specifically before the Court whether that means slight cause or proximate cause. JUSTICE BREYER: I would say it sure is before the
Court, because what we are considering before the Court is your objection to instruction 13. And you said it And I have to
should use the words in whole or in part. admit, I don't know why it shouldn't. ask them that. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: That's fair.
But I'll have to
You're going to say yes.
So all this other stuff is quite extraneous about whether -- the railroad standard of negligence, the railroad should be in a relaxed standard of negligence, in whole or in part. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I don't know that it's -Causation. I don't know that it's extraneous.
It clearly is not something that the Court needs to decide. On the other hand, it is something that the And
Respondents, to my mind at least, put into the case.
then we responded, to be sure, somewhat aggressively in urging the Court to rethink whether Rogers was right -14
whether Rogers really decided this issue as some courts of appeals have. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Perhaps my memory is faulty,
but as I recall your opening brief, many pages were devoted to what instruction should have been given on railroad negligence. You were dealing not simply with
what seems to be the question presented, that is, was the instruction on contributory negligence wrong, because it said -- it didn't use the in whole or in part language. Instead it said directly caused. So that's the limit of what we can deal with, whether the in whole or in part should have been in the contributory negligence. But it was your brief that
spent a lot of time talking about the proper standard for the railroad's negligence. MR. PHILLIPS: Justice Ginsburg. arguments. There is no question about that,
But the point is that we made both
And they are in some ways intertwined, in
part because so much of the doctrine of equivalence itself is based on proximate cause as the standard. so if you go back and look at all of the common law analyses here, which are the predicate -JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you didn't object to the You didn't object And
charge that was given on negligence. to the in whole or in part. 15
So that should be out of the
case. MR. PHILLIPS: Except to the extent that the
Respondents are asking you to interpret Rogers as a mechanism for getting at the doctrine of equivalence. Now, it seems to me you can answer that in one of two ways. You can say simply, as I said to Justice Scalia, Rogers doesn't speak to the doctrine of equivalence, and therefore, you don't have to entertain that, you should just reaffirm a doctrine that every court except the courts in Missouri have recognized for a very long time. Or alternatively, you can say, well, look, they say that in order to properly analyze the doctrine of equivalence, you should examine whether or not Rogers worked a sea change in the law. And we took them up on that argument, and said, we don't think it did. And that if it didn't work a sea
change in the law, then there is no basis at all for doubting that you would grant equivalent instructions in these two cases. And that's the guidance you would give Because this case would
to the lower courts on remand. have to go back for a new trial. JUSTICE GINSBURG:
You're not taking them up on
any argument when you spent half your brief arguing about what the proper standard was for the railroad's 16
negligence. JUSTICE KENNEDY: And I would add to that that we
don't usually look at a BIO to see the issues that the Petitioner is presenting. MR. PHILLIPS: understand that. And you know, Justice Kennedy, I
But the reality is we raised the The
doctrine of equivalence as our question presented.
other side raises and uses a substantial amount of its pages for the issue of the meaning of Rogers. that in the reply brief. We answer
The Court grants certiorari.
We decided under those circumstances that the sensible way to proceed was to address the Rogers issue. Now, to be sure, I suppose we could have said, here's -- section one is the doctrine of equivalence. That's a 10 page brief. Maybe the better way to do it is
just write a 15 page brief, wait for their 47 page brief on Rogers, and then 20 pages on Rogers. But we anticipated that they were going to do precisely what they did, which is -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you would have us
announce a decision on the doctrine of equivalence without saying which way it should be made equivalent? Raising the railroad's standard or lowering the employee's? MR. PHILLIPS: Well, because -- courts of appeals 17
have been doing that for years.
There have been a lot --
you know, a lot of them assume that there's a lower standard, and they say that the doctrine of equivalence requires that if the plaintiff gets to go with slight cause, then the defendant gets slight cause. So that's a
ruling that's been rendered for years and years. Is that the most sensible way? I don't know. I
think it would make sense for this Court to address the more fundamental issue of Rogers. Because I think it is I don't
an important issue that needs to be decided. think the Court needs to decide it.
I do think it has
been thoroughly vetted for the Court on both sides, and it would certainly provide significant guidance to the lower courts. JUSTICE STEVENS: question. Mr. Phillips, may I ask you this
Assuming you're right on the doctrine of
equivalence and you're wrong on proximate cause, for the moment. Now, you said earlier in your argument, it is
perfectly clear there was no harmless error here. MR. PHILLIPS: Yes. It seemed to me that a possible
interpretation of the record -- and I'd like you to comment of the record -- is that the jury either believed the one -one truck driver or the other. And that the direct causation
thing really didn't have an impact on the calculation of
damages. And I was going to ask you to comment on that and to tell me whether during the argument of the case before the jury, did the plaintiff's lawyer argue, in effect, that he had -- the railroad has a much heavier burden of proving a causation than we do? MR. PHILLIPS: Let me take the first question There were
first, and then I'll address the second one.
three theories that the plaintiff put forward of the negligence of the railroad. Not just that the one driver There
drove the other driver off the side of the road. was also a claim that the road wasn't constructed
properly, and there was a claim that he wasn't given adequate safety instructions. And there's no way, given that this was a general verdict, to remotely figure out which of those theories was the one the jury thought was correct, and how that theory might line up with a causation theory, based on the plaintiff's own particular view and the defendant's arguments in this particular case. So it is not as cut and dried as he said, he said, and that's it. They were more theories in it. And you
know, if you accept the idea that jury instructions count, and there's clearly a very different burden that's imposed on one as opposed to the other, then it seems to 19
me the answer is there's no way for the Court to make a harmless error determination. It is also a question of State law. It ought to
be decided by the Missouri courts in the first instance in any event, I would think, rather than this Court trying to sort through the record. With respect to the argument at the close of the case, I don't remember any specific arguments that either side made with respect to the burdens, because the jury instructions were what they were. And I think each
side was saying, you know, we really didn't do anything wrong. And so that's basically the way that it was
presented. But I think given the way the jury instructions played out, that there's no way at this time to unscramble that. JUSTICE BREYER: I think I'm seeing now, I think
the structure of your brief is -- perhaps a gloss put on it, but saying this: Look, we objected to the
contributory negligence instruction on the ground that it couldn't be different from the direct instruction -- from the railroad instruction. And we said they should be the
same and they should both be in whole or in part. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Correct. And we now want you to say that 20
the refusal of the court to do that was wrong, because it violated the equivalence. But as soon as you do that,
you're going to have to think about what the right standard should be for a new trial. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Right. And if you stop there, probably,
they will put the in whole or in part, but that's not the right standard. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Correct. And if you really think about it,
you will see that the one we didn't ask for, but the one that the court gave, is the right standard and should have been given in the other case, too. have to say that. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Right. But you're saying unless you say Now, we wouldn't
that, you're not going to give proper instruction to what happens in the future. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: on the merits. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: I'm sorry? How could it be wrong? How could Now -You know, that's -Now let's think back for a minute
it be wrong to have instructed the jury with the in whole or in part language for the railroad, since that's the 21
language of the statute itself? MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I think if we were entitled
to go back to the trial court, and if the issue was what's the proper instruction, we would have asked for and we should have properly received a proximate cause instruction. And that's what -- that's the question that
will be at issue on the remand. JUSTICE BREYER: sides. What possible -- you have two
One, you write a proximate cause instruction in
whatever language you like. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER: Right. The other side submits a proposed I'm a trial
instruction with in whole or in part. judge. before.
I've never heard of this case, kind of case I just was appointed. I read the statute. And
I say, well, here, theirs says what the statute says, and yours doesn't. statute. I'll play it safe. I'll go with the
Now, how could that be an error? Well, it is not a correct statement
MR. PHILLIPS: of the law. JUSTICE BREYER: MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE BREYER:
All right. Is the answer. In other words, what the statute
said it is not a correct statement of the law? MR. PHILLIPS: Well, because it doesn't adequately 22
explain to the jury what decisionmaking it has to go through in order to evaluate this case. I mean, it is
true, it is not an incorrect statement in the sense that there's nothing wrong with it. But it is not an adequate
statement because it doesn't deal, it is not sufficient, it doesn't deal with the proximate cause issue. it seems to me -JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Phillips, may I interrupt on I mean,
exactly the point that I think you're addressing with Justice Breyer? As I understand your argument, you're
saying one view of Rogers is that the in whole or in part language eliminates the proximate cause instruction. all agree that that is one view of Rogers. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. But it also does something else. It We
And I don't think we disagree about that either.
specifically instructs the jury that multiple causation may be present. And if it is, if the defendant is at
least one, the source of one of those causes under Rogers even slightly -MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. -- that that will suffice. The
problem I have with -- in a way with your response to Justice Breyer, and the problem that I have with the instruction that your side requested on contributory 23
negligence is this:
It seems to me that the in whole or
in part language would be wrong on contributory negligence, or at least it would be very misleading, for the simple reason that you never get to contributory negligence unless you found the defendant was negligent in the first place. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. And therefore, if the plaintiff It
is also negligent, it will necessarily be in part. couldn't be wholly or in part. If it were wholly
negligent, you would never have found the defendant was negligent in the first place. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: I -So that to the extent the
instruction addresses multiple causation, it would be misleading to the jury, and it would assume a possibility that couldn't happen. Therefore, if you are not going to
mislead the jury on multiple causation when you instruct on contributory negligence, you've got to have some other way of addressing the proximate cause language. analysis right or wrong? MR. PHILLIPS: levels. Well, I think it is wrong on two Is that
One is, I don't know why you would need to have
proximate cause as your fallback, the last comment you just made, because it seems to me if you're saying slight 24
cause, which is what Missouri thinks the in whole or in part means, then you can just say slight cause when you're describing the contributory negligence. JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. But the instruction that your
side asked for, as I understand it, was not a slight cause instruction, it was an in whole or in part instruction. MR. PHILLIPS: equivalence. JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay, and that -- all right. But What we asked for was an
if you're asking for the in whole or in part instruction on contributory negligence, it seems to me the judge has got to have been correct in saying no to that, because to the extent that it addresses multiple causation, it would be addressing a problem that couldn't even occur in contributory negligence which will always be in part. MR. PHILLIPS: judge rejected it. That was not the basis on which the He didn't reject it on the basis -Well, maybe that was not the
basis on which he rejected it, but if -- we've got to consider it in deciding whether to reverse it. MR. PHILLIPS: Well, the point here that remains
is we said we are entitled to an equivalent instruction. Now, if there's some variant of that, we could certainly argue about that. 25
said equivalence instruction was not on multiple causation. It was the equivalence instruction on either It was the
proximate cause or not proximate cause.
causation issue, it was the proximate causation issue, not the multiple causation issue that concerned you, right? MR. PHILLIPS: this case. JUSTICE SOUTER: They don't have to have Well, that is the specific issue in
proximate, we don't have to have proximate. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. Okay. That's our argument. But because the
instruction addresses both, in one view, proximate cause and multiple cause, it would have been misleading so far as the multiple cause issue was concerned, and a request for an instruction in whole or in part on contributory negligence really should have been denied. correct? MR. PHILLIPS: Well -- I think -- I think the Is that
argument would be that that cuts it too fine, candidly. I think you can make an argument that what, you know, what we were entitled to was some variant. our objection here is not -JUSTICE SOUTER: You were entitled -- your 26
argument is you were entitled to an equivalent instruction on the issue of the need to prove -MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: prove proximate cause. MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. That's your basic argument. That's our basic argument. Okay. And we didn't get that. And I don't think you could have The slightest cause. -- proximate cause or no need to
gotten where you want to go with the instruction that your side requested, which was an in whole or in part instruction. That's my only point. Well, it may be that the in whole
part of this may have been slightly misleading, although I think you can make an argument that you can end up with in whole on both sides as a conceptual matter. But It
that's not the -- that wasn't the complaint at trial. wasn't the basis for the trial judge's decision, wasn't the basis for the court of appeals decision. If the Court wants to send it back and say, is
there another objection to this instruction, that's fine. But it seems to me, this Court ought to address this issue in the way it has been presented. 27
instruction, in your view of the case, that was given, instruction number 13, negligence of plaintiff directly contributed to cause his injuries? MR. PHILLIPS: Because that's proximate causation.
And that's higher than we were required to prove under a doctrine of equivalence, Your Honor. JUSTICE SOUTER: language? MR. PHILLIPS: JUSTICE SOUTER: MR. PHILLIPS: of my time. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Perry? ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARY L. PERRY ON BEHALF OF THE Respondent MS. PERRY: the Court: The controlling question raised here is whether instruction 13 accurately states Federal law. That's Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please Thank you, Mr. Phillips. Yes. Yeah. I would like to reserve the balance That's the direct
exactly what petitioner said in their reply brief to the Missouri Court of Appeals. They could not have been any In
clearer that their challenge was to instruction 13. John versus Poulin, this Court said that State courts 28
have the authority to prescribe the rules of procedure in their courts even when Federal issues are at stake. The requirements in the Missouri courts were not complied with here. No abstract question was presented.
The sole question presented and preserved was with respect to instruction 13. And that can again be seen in
their opening brief in the Missouri Court of Appeals, which specifically says the trial court erred in giving instruction 13 based on MAI 32.07(b). JUSTICE ALITO: Is the question whether
instruction 13 is flawed viewed in isolation, or whether it is flawed when it's viewed together with the instruction on employer negligence? MS. PERRY: It is viewed in conjunction with the
instruction on employer negligence, but a fixed concept of what it was, they did not challenge the language of instruction 12. They accepted that. Holding that
language constant, what should we do to instruction 13? They could have objected to instruction 12 and 13, and they could have said, here are a pair of instructions both in proximate cause, and here are a pair of instructions both in -- resulting in whole or in part, and then they could have preserved this issue. did not do that. But they
They accepted instruction 12 as a
correct statement of the law, and said, now let's look at 29
instruction 13. JUSTICE ALITO: But do you agree that they set out
different causation standards, 12 and 13? MS. PERRY: Yes, they do. Rogers concluded that
50 years ago and the courts in the Federal and State system have nearly uniformly interpreted Rogers as reaching that decision. JUSTICE ALITO: So if the causation standards are
in fact the same, then instruction 13 is defective; isn't that right? MS. PERRY: Yes, if you can reach that decision
without interpreting instruction 12, or the propriety of instruction 12, particularly since instruction 12 contained the exact language of the statute. Whatever
judicial gloss has been put on that language was not told to the jury. Justice Stevens, the question you asked, whether there was any argument about the different standards, the answer is no. There was no argument. The only way in
which the jury learned of this difference was in the language of the instruction. JUSTICE STEVENS: I may. And instruction 12 --
Let me ask you this question, if Is I
Perhaps I should have asked Mr. Phillips.
there such an animal as the doctrine of equivalence?
understand the restatement describes what the plaintiff's 30
burden is on proving causation, and then it says the same rules apply to defendant's contributory negligence. But that doesn't sound to me like any overriding doctrine of equivalence. It just says when they wrote Is there such
the restatement, the rules were the same. a thing as the doctrine of equivalence? MS. PERRY:
There wasn't in the early 1900s for
certain, Your Honor, because at that time, even petitioners recognized the doctrine was emerging. And if
we look at the language of 53, it talks about the type of contributory negligence that used to be a bar. And that
certainly was a type of contributory negligence that only arose with the traditional proximate cause. wasn't on the slightest cause standard. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, doesn't there have It certainly
to be a doctrine of equivalence when you're running a comparative negligence regime? Because, you know, you
talk about the plaintiff's negligence causing the harm to a certain degree and the defendant's negligence causing it to a certain degree. And if you're not dealing with
apples and apples, it seems to me you can't conduct the comparison. MS. PERRY: No, Your Honor. You can conduct the
comparison, and it happens all the time in cases where one party has committed intentional misconduct and 31
another party has had negligent misconduct.
causation standards are different in that instance. There's a -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. But we're talking
about comparative negligence here, where there's negligence on both sides. And I just don't know how you
say one party's 20 percent -- contributed 20 percent to the harm and the other 80 percent, if you're using different causation standards. MS. PERRY: Well, the causation standard is used
to decide what negligence you use in the balance and in the comparison. For example, if a party is negligent,
but the negligence had no causative effect, that negligence falls out of the analysis. JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah, but your example of other
instances including having to compare a defendant who did the tort intentionally with negligent -- contributory negligence, that's not what we have here. difference in the causation. We have here a
Intentional or
non-intentional has nothing to do with causation. But once you say that there's a difference in the causation, it seems to me you cannot compare the two. You cannot compare the two sensibly, unless you are using the same kind of a standard. I mean, let's assume that you find that the 32
railroad did not directly, but nonetheless caused the injury to some extent, but the defendant was directly contributory to it. What do I do? Do I add another 40
percent to his culpability because it was -- his causation was more direct than the plaintiff's causation? MS. PERRY: No. Why not?
JUSTICE SCALIA: MS. PERRY: in the balance.
It just affects which negligence was And -No, it doesn't. It certainly
bears considerably upon the culpability of the two, it seems to me. MS. PERRY: Well, in responding -- going back to
your question about intentional conduct, the petitioner's reply brief, in fact, states that a broader range of harms are considered proximately caused by intentional torts. So there is a different conception of proximate
cause in that context. But in any event, their merits brief consistently argues for a proximate cause standard. closes with that. In fact, it
And its criticism of instruction 13 in
this case was precisely that it was a proximate cause standard. So if they are now before this Court asking
for a proximate cause standard, they conceded that instruction 13 was a proximate cause standard, they in 33
fact complained about it precisely because it was a proximate cause standard, that issue really isn't before this Court anymore. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't have any
conceptual difficulty with adding in whole or in part to instruction 13, which is the employee's instruction, because it's comparative negligence. It seems to me that If you can
necessarily implies in whole or in part.
reduce his recovery because he's in part negligent, what would be wrong with saying in whole or in part in instruction 13? MS. PERRY: Well, I think Justice Souter hit the
nail on the head on that one, in that it does create confusion and it can mislead the jury that the railroad worker is responsible for other parties' culpability as well. Moreover -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no. I thought Justice
Souter's point was that taking it out of the railroad's instruction might cause confusion because of it. But I
don't see how adding it to both of them when you're dealing with comparative negligence, and it's necessarily the case that partial negligence on either of their parts can enter into the verdict, I don't see how that can be confusing. MS. PERRY: Well, in -34
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: MS. PERRY:
You can answer it.
I don't want to interrupt anybody. Answer the question, Justice
JUSTICE SCALIA: Souter. Yes or no.
The point that I was trying to
make about it being misleading is that if you use the in whole or in part language for a contributory negligence instruction, you are misleading the jury into thinking that at least there might be whole contributory negligence. There never will be. You don't get the
contributory negligence unless you've already found the defendant was negligent, at least to some degree. Therefore, if the plaintiff is negligent, it can only be in part. That's all I was trying to say. Under that scenario, then,
what objection could there be to a recognition that the negligence of the plaintiff can contribute in part to the accident? MS. PERRY: If petitioner had asked for an
instruction that said directly contributed in part, the inclusion of the phrase in part there might not have any impact. It could still potentially mislead the jury, but
they were seeking not just to add the words "resulting in whole or in part," but remove the word "directly" because it connoted proximate cause, and that they felt proximate 35
cause was not the appropriate standard for contributory negligence, even though now that is the standard that they solely are seeking. JUSTICE KENNEDY: comment on. Well, two things you might
First, the in whole or in part, you might
take account of the fact that there are other negligent actors, third parties, who have contributed to the injury to the employee. Secondly, Section 53 does not contain the language in whole or in part. MS. PERRY: In section -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Souter has identified, right? adopting different standards. MS. PERRY: I disagree, Your Honor. I think it is The But that's what Justice That's not because they're Absolutely, Your Honor. It does not.
because they are adopting different standards. contributory negligence -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
Well, you just told me, a
good reason for not putting in whole or in part in instruction 13 is because it doesn't make sense, the whole part doesn't make sense with contributory negligence. That's a good reason not to put it in
Section 53 either. MR. PERRY: That's one reason. 36
But another reason
is that it's a different standard.
In Section 53,
they're talking about contributory negligence that was a bar to liability. That type of contributory negligence
was the kind that was more than -- it wasn't caused by slight causation. It required proximate cause. That was
a pretty harsh result. And it certainly didn't arise in instances where the plaintiff had just had the slightest causal connection. Rogers. JUSTICE SOUTER: on that? Well, no, no. May I pick you up And that certainly was the conclusion in
Because there's a point at which you and I are And in all candor, I think
disagreeing about Rogers.
it's because you are ignoring one part of Rogers, and if I'm wrong, I want you to tell me. You quote the
slightest bit language from Rogers on both page 26 and 33 of your brief. And you take that as being language that
eliminates the proximate cause requirement. What you don't include in your quotation is the footnote in Justice Brennan's opinion following that slightest cause language. And the footnote was to a The
citation, the citation was to the Coray case.
opinion in Coray was written by Justice Douglas and -I'm sorry, Justice Black. And in the very language that
Justice Black used, he said expressly that if proximate 37
cause is shown, there can be recovery. Now, given the fact that in Rogers, the very citation to the language which you say eliminated the proximate cause requirement cited a case in which proximate cause was part of the very sentence relied on, I don't see how you can read Rogers -- maybe later cases, but I don't see how you can read Rogers as eliminating the proximate cause requirement. And therefore, I think you have to read Rogers as addressing the issue of multiple causation, not proximate causation. Now, am I going wrong there somewhere? I have two responses, Your Honor.
MS. PERRY:
First, Justice Brennan wrote Crane twelve years later. JUSTICE SOUTER: MS. PERRY: Absolutely right.
And he, you know, definitely clearly
said that a railroad worker does not have to prove common law proximate causation relying on Rogers. JUSTICE SOUTER: He did, but he was also pointing
out, just to make it simpler, he was pointing out in Crane that the liability arose in Crane out of -- I forget the full name of it -- the Appliance Act. Appliance Act had its own set of standards. And And the
therefore, you cannot, from an Appliance Act case, you cannot infer anything one way or the other about the general standard in FELA. And to make it even more 38
complicated, as I recall, Rogers was an Appliance case, too, but he didn't get into that there. But my only point is, you are right about the two Brennan opinions, Rogers and the -- Crane. But given
the fact that it was an Appliance case, I don't think you can infer one thing or another about an ultimate FELA standard in the absence of an Appliance action. What remains is that the citation in Rogers was to Coray, and Coray spoke about there still being proximate cause. MS. PERRY: Yes. But if we look at those earlier
cases, particularly Coray, we can see that Rogers articulated what was meant by that proximate cause language. Proximate cause is, in a sense, a label for
scope of liability or legal cause, as the restatement says. It doesn't have any singular conception. And in
Coray, the Court found -JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it is understood by
everybody, isn't it, that at least it has the conception which is captured by using the word "direct" as in instruction 13, and at least it has that core of meaning whenever it is used, doesn't it? In other words, it may not have a lot of bells and whistles associated with it in the prior law, but at least it requires some direct causation as opposed to 39
indirect, right? MS. PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. Okay. And that's -- I don't know
that Justice Brennan's citation to Coray, or Coray's use of the language carries you any further than that. that's as far as Mr. Phillips wants to go. MS. PERRY: We don't accept that, but even if But
that's the case, the Rogers -- the parties to Rogers immediately interpreted that decision as affecting proximate cause. that in Crane. Twelve years later, this Court did say The lower courts have uniformly, nearly And at
uniformly interpreted Rogers in a certain way.
this point, stare decisis suggests that this Court should not overrule. JUSTICE SOUTER: That may be. That may be. But
it seems to me that that's a different argument from saying Rogers requires it, because I don't think you can get that out of Rogers. MS. PERRY: Well, and I also think, though, that
by lightening -- by saying the slightest cause possible or, you know, a slight cause would create liability, that does affect proximate cause. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: that. You don't have to say
I mean, you know, when in doubt, we ought to And so whole or in part
follow the words of the statute. 40
makes sense with the railroad, but directly doesn't appear in Section 53. Why don't we just -- why shouldn't
the instruction just say, "such negligence of the plaintiff contributed to cause his injury." It's not
going to be a complete bar because we know the immediate -- the next instruction talks about reducing the award by the amount of the negligence. Why wouldn't
that be preferable to introducing extraneous terms? MS. PERRY: Because Section 53 refers to And that was
contributory negligence that created a bar.
the type of negligence that required proximate cause. Moreover, the type of instruction you are positing is not at all what petitioner requested in this case. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, no, but he requested
that the instructions be the same, and the directly is what causes the problem, and directly doesn't appear in the statute. MS. PERRY: But under Missouri procedures, you
have to be clear in the nature of your objection, and the objection was that we want the same language, we want the language resulting in whole or in part. And out of respect for the State courts and their right to create the rules that govern in those courts, that was not satisfactory under Missouri rules. Missouri
rules also have specific requirements for what you have 41
to do in the court of appeals.
There's a "Point Relied
On" which is the argument heading in the brief, and it's required by Rule 84.04. And it sets forth a very
specific format, and it's supposed to start with "The trial court erred in," and then you give your reasons. And it says that negligence -- it erred in instructing the jury to find plaintiff negligent only if it concluded that his negligence directly contributed to cause his injury, rather than cause his injury in whole or in part. You know, there is no issue that was preserved in the Missouri courts other than that challenge. Cook
versus Caldwell which we cite in our brief, in Missouri, not only do you have to object, but you have to keep consistent with the basis of the objection. You can't
just object to instruction 13 on one ground, go up to the court of appeals, and raise a completely different challenge to instruction 13. consistent. You have to stay
And out of respect -Do you think they raised
an objection based on the doctrine of equivalence? MS. PERRY: That was a justification for rewriting
instruction 13 to include the words "resulting in whole or in part." I do not think they raised an abstract
argument about equivalency; that in order to do that, 42
they would have had to object to instruction 12 and instruction 13, because equivalency in the abstract would require modification of both instructions, and they clearly chose to accept the language of instruction 12 and only object to instruction 13. So no, not in the abstract, it hasn't been raised. It was a justification for one particular result, and that was a result that would have modified instruction 13. And in a particular way, too, modified it in a way
of including the words "resulting in whole or in part." JUSTICE BREYER: I guess they want to make the
argument now, whether they did or not, that if we look at Section 53, which I think is the part dealing with contributory negligence. I don't see anything else. It
doesn't speak of causation at all. MS. PERRY: Exactly, Your Honor. It just says if there's some
contributory negligence, the damages will be diminished according to the negligence attributable to the employee. So I take it their argument was, maybe with hindsight, Judge, don't give this direct language, because nothing requires it. And since, other things
being equal, nothing requires it, you ought to give the same language you gave for the other side. And they said the judge rejected that argument, so 43
now they tell us, well, that was wrong, he should have accepted it. And all the rest of what he's saying is
just in case the Court wants to reach it, or something like that. But what about that one? I'm sorry, Your Honor. Could you --
Well, I mean, should we answer
the question he now -- perhaps in his minimalist position -- might want to raise, or maybe did, that Section 53 doesn't speak of causation, the judge gave a causation instruction. The judge's causation instruction
in their view was wrong, and the law requires the judge's causation instruction on contributory negligence, if there is one, to be the same as it was on direct, the defendant's negligence. And he says that isn't what
happened, we objected to it, we produced arguments, one of them was this equivalence thing. So he's saying to us: were wrong. Decide it, say that they
What's your view of that? We disagree with petitioner. I'm not surprised.
JUSTICE BREYER: (Laughter.) MS. PERRY: -JUSTICE BREYER: MS. PERRY:
The abstract question of equivalency
That's just an argument.
Right. 44
It was not, but they say,
nonetheless, we did object that this instruction was wrong. One reason it was wrong is because it speaks of
causation differently than when they spoke of causation in respect to the railroad. why it was wrong then. We thought that was a reason
We think that's a reason why it
is wrong now, and we would like the Missouri court, but they wouldn't do it, so we want you to say it was wrong for that reason. MS. PERRY: Well, I think we're in a difficult
position right now, because they're asking for proximate cause in their blue brief -JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, we say, well, we'll abandon
all that, that's just a series of different arguments that we'd like the Court to say. MS. PERRY: brief then -JUSTICE BREYER: see it, basically. (Laughter.) MS. PERRY: But if the question goes to the fact If you read it carefully, you'll Okay. If we're putting aside the blue
that Section 53 doesn't have an express causation standard in it, what you fall back on is traditional proximate cause, that Congress departed from the traditional proximate cause standard by using the words 45
"resulting in whole or in part" in Section 51. create the same departure in Section 53.
In fact, by referring to the kind of contributory negligence that creates a bar, it was pretty much pointing right back to proximate cause. JUSTICE SCALIA: proximate cause? MS. PERRY: I believe the treatises that say yes. Of course. So then how can "in Can you have more than one
whole or in part" possibly eliminate the proximate cause requirement, because it could be in part and still be a proximate cause. How can that language possibly be
interpreted to eliminate the proximate cause requirement? MS. PERRY: Because when a cause that -- when a
slightest cause can give rise to liability, that has effectively reduced or relaxed that causation standard. There is still a legal cause requirement, yes. JUSTICE SOUTER: But it could be the slightest
direct cause, which is Justice Scalia's point. MS. PERRY: -JUSTICE SOUTER: that's all you say. Now, it may mislead the jury if Well, but if we look at like the first
But as a matter of analyzing the
statute or even of analyzing what the Court meant in Rogers, you can have a slight but direct cause, and that 46
would be proximate cause in the traditional analysis; isn't that so? MS. PERRY: Well, no. The Restatement, for
example, at the time of Rogers talked about substantial factors, and talked, in other words -JUSTICE SCALIA: How can you say no when you
acknowledge that the prior law when there was contributory negligence used to require proximate cause for both the negligence of the defendant and for the contributory negligence of the defendant? Such a
situation could not exist unless proximate cause doesn't have to be the sole cause. part, right? MS. PERRY: Right. So the mere fact that we had It can be just the cause in
contributory negligence statutes that were applying proximate cause requirements demonstrates that a proximate cause can be a cause in part. MS. PERRY: Yes, Your Honor, but what Rogers and
the statute recognizes that it can be a very, very slight cause. -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That's what Rogers might And what it was understood, for example, in the
have said, but the statute doesn't say anything about slight cause. It only says in whole or in part. 47
And neither did the instruction.
just used the words "resulting in whole or in part" also. But Rogers did interpret the language "resulting in whole or in part" as meaning playing any part, even the slightest. And that has been the law for 50 years. And
it would be a massive change in the law, as Justice Scalia said earlier, for this Court to depart from that at this point in time. JUSTICE SCALIA: It doesn't seem to me that slight It could be a slight
is the opposite of proximate. proximate cause. MS. PERRY:
The Restatement at the time of Rogers
talked about substantial factors, and in the comment to that, it explains that sometimes the other causes can be so predominant that one causation is just not sufficiently significant or of sufficient quantum to constitute a legal cause. So there is a component of quantity within the concepts of proximate cause. I believe their reply brief
talks about substantial factor, and to talk about something as being a substantial factor does have a quantum component to it, just as slight has a quantum component to it. A slight cause could not be a
substantial factor, or oftentimes would not be a substantial factor. So the two really do go hand in 48
glove. JUSTICE SOUTER: But under the old rule that
plaintiff's negligence in whatever degree was an absolute bar to recovery, wasn't the rule customarily stated that plaintiff's negligence, however slight, was a total bar to recovery? MS. PERRY: may be. JUSTICE SOUTER: about that. MS. PERRY: I am not aware of that. So that would I thought it was. I may be wrong I'm not aware of that, Your Honor. It
be a pretty harsh remedy if that were the case. JUSTICE SOUTER: That's what I thought. Yes, I
thought it was a pretty harsh rule. MS. PERRY: And clearly, Congress in this statute
was trying to move away from the common law in many respects to protect the railroad worker. And the
interpretation of Section 51 as lightening the causation standard for the defendant's negligence, but leaving intact the traditional proximate cause standard for plaintiff's contributory negligence completely comports with the purpose of Congress in enacting the statute. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why isn't "in whole or in
part" simply the logical corollary of introducing comparative negligence? Why do you have to read that as 49
departing from proximate cause, instead of simply recognizing that under 53, negligence on the part of the employee can reduce recovery which -- without barring it? MS. PERRY: of Rogers. I reach that conclusion on the basis
And in the petitioner's brief -Beyond that, if the plaintiff's
negligence was in whole the cause of the action, then the -- there was no reason to get to comparative negligence or contributory negligence, because by hypothesis, there would have been no negligence by the defendant. MS. PERRY: Yes, Your Honor. That's why you don't have
"in whole or in part" in 53, not because they wanted to depart from proximate cause there, but because, as Justice Stevens pointed out, you wouldn't have it in whole or in part. MS. PERRY: Even the petitioner's brief describes
the language "resulting in whole or in part" as an elaboration of proximate cause. has bearing on proximate cause. They recognize that it And so if it has bearing
on proximate cause in Section 51, it certainly would have bearing on proximate cause if it was incorporated into the language of the instruction on contributory negligence. So that may be one reason for not including the 50
language, but another reason is that it does affect the causation standard and Congress did not incorporate it in Section 53, whereas it did have it in Section 51. And
when it modified the statute in 1939 for assumption of the risk, to abolish assumption of the risk, it did not equate proximate cause and "resulting in whole or in part" necessarily as the same thing because one version had proximate cause and it was not adopted. The phrase
"resulting in whole or in part" was used in its place. So suggesting that Congress may, in fact, have seen a difference, just as Rogers concluded, and I think rightly so. Moreover, as I said, that has been the law for 50 years, and it's pretty settled in this country and it would create a massive change if this Court were to depart from that. Moreover, this is not the right case
to decide that because the language in instruction 12 said, "resulting in whole or in part." has never -JUSTICE SCALIA: It is not the kind of change I mean, I find it And petitioner
anybody would have relied on, is it?
hard to see reliance interest on this interpretation. MS. PERRY: Excuse me, Your Honor? I find it hard to see any
reliance interest on this 50 year old interpretation. 51
Is there anybody doing something differently because they believe that the railroad does not have to be accused of proximate causality? because of that rule? MS. PERRY: Does anybody act differently I don't think so.
Well, for Mr. Sorrell in particular, I
mean, he acted, that he allowed that instruction to be used, and now they're attempting to disrupt this judgment. JUSTICE STEVENS: I suppose employees have been
under the rule for a long time. MS. PERRY: Yes. I suppose employee associations,
workman compensation schemes and Congress have all relied on it. MS. PERRY: Honor. Yes, you're absolutely right, Your
And there is employees' compensation for railroad
workers, and that may be very well be because of this interpretation of Rogers that was adopted 50 years ago. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: MS. PERRY: Thank you. Mr. Phillips, you have two Thank you, Ms. Perry.
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CARTER G. PHILLIPS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. 52
like to address just sort of two issues.
One is the It
minimalist issue that Justice Breyer asked about.
seems to me that the minimalist way to look at this case is we raised the question of whether or not the Missouri standard which says that you cannot deviate from our designated instructions creates a disparity in the way you approach negligence and contributory negligence, that disparity is inconsistent with the common law doctrines, and nothing in FELA modifies it, and it's wrong. And
that by itself warrants the case being set aside and a new jury being -- and a new trial. way to resolve the issue. If the Court wishes to go forward and deal with the issue that Justice Souter addressed, then the question is, what does Rogers mean and what do you do with this "in whole or in part" language. And if you go That's the simplest
back -- you asked the question, Justice Souter, you know, what does the common law say. We cite this on page 38.
If its negligence contributes proximately to the injury, no matter how slightly -- there must be a dozen cases that we cite in those briefs that talk about no matter how slightly. And they refer to "in whole or in part" as
language that still recognizes that you still require proximate causation. The reality is nothing in Rogers remotely casts 53
doubt on cases like Brady that say but-for causation is not enough, you have to have proximate causation, or Earnest, where this Court said that proximate causation is the correct jury instruction that has to be given. This Court said nothing about that in Rogers. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would you have in your ideal
instruction the words proximate cause given to the jury, that defendant's negligence must be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury? MR. PHILLIPS: ask for that. No, Justice Ginsburg. We didn't
All I'm saying to you -Would you?
JUSTICE GINSBURG: MR. PHILLIPS:
-- is that the guidance of the
Court on remand, you could, and we would ask you to address that issue and to resolve it. front of you. JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in your model instruction, It is fairly in
in your correct instruction, would the jury be told, in order to hold the defendant liable, you must find the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury? MR. PHILLIPS: Yes. That would be my preferred
instruction on remand, yes. JUSTICE GINSBURG: Even though almost universally,
the term proximate cause has been criticized as totally 54
incomprehensible to juries? JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me ask this one very brief
question, Mr. Chief Justice. In your view, would the doctrine of equivalence be satisfied if we simply directed that the word directly be omitted from the instruction 13? MR. PHILLIPS: long way. I think that would certainly go a
I don't know exactly how strictly you want to I mean, that's the pivotal problem with
do it, but sure.
the way that instruction reads today, Justice Stevens. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.) Thank you, Mr. Phillips.
A abandon 45:13 abolish 51:5 above-entitled 1:11 55:14 absence 39:7 absolute 49:3 absolutely 3:25 7:8 36:11 38:14 52:15 abstract 29:4 42:24 43:2,6 44:22 accept 6:17 19:23 40:7 43:4 accepted 29:17 29:24 44:2 accident 35:18 account 36:6 accurately 28:21 accused 52:2 acknowledge 47:7 act 3:24 4:3 38:21,22,23 52:3 acted 52:6 action 39:7 50:7 actors 36:7 add 17:2 33:3 35:23 adding 34:5,20 address 7:5,8 10:8,9 17:12 18:8 19:8 27:24 53:1 54:15 addressed 53:14 addresses 24:15 25:14 26:14 addressing 23:9 24:20 25:15 38:10 adequacy 10:13 adequate 19:14
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41:13 44:19 51:18 52:24 petitioners 31:9 petitioner's 33:14 50:5,17 petitions 9:11 petition's 5:23 Phillips 1:15 2:3 2:9 3:5,6,8 4:22 5:3,10,21 6:22 7:5,8,14 8:7,15 9:15,20 10:1,22 11:9 11:21 12:5,12 12:23 13:1,13 13:22,24 14:1 14:12,18,20 15:16 16:2 17:5,25 18:15 18:20 19:7 20:24 21:5,9 21:15,19,22 22:2,11,19,22 22:25 23:8,14 23:21 24:7,13 24:22 25:8,17 25:22 26:8,12 26:20 27:3,6,8 27:10,15 28:5 28:10,12,14 30:23 40:6 52:21,23,25 54:10,13,22 55:7,11 phrase 35:21 51:8 pick 37:11 pivotal 55:9 place 24:6,12 51:9 plaintiff 3:12 5:3,15 6:2 8:9 8:12 11:18 13:12 18:4 19:9 24:8 28:3 35:13,17 37:8 41:4 42:7
plaintiff's 3:19 6:9 8:18 9:3 11:23 13:18 19:4,19 30:25 31:18 33:5 49:3,5,21 50:6 54:9,21 play 22:17 played 20:15 playing 48:4 please 3:9 28:18 point 5:6 10:2,8 15:17 23:9 25:22 27:14 34:18 35:5 37:12 39:3 40:13 42:1 46:19 48:8 pointed 50:15 pointing 38:18 38:19 46:5 portion 4:7 positing 41:12 position 44:8 45:11 possibility 24:16 possible 18:21 22:8 40:20 possibly 46:10 46:12 potentially 35:22 Poulin 28:25 precisely 17:19 33:22 34:1 predicate 15:22 predominant 48:15 preferable 41:8 preferred 54:22 prescribe 29:1 present 23:18 presented 7:10 15:7 17:7 20:13 27:25 29:4,5 presenting 17:4
preserved 29:5 29:23 42:11 pretty 37:6 46:4 49:12,14 51:14 principle 3:22 14:3 prior 10:13 39:24 47:7 probably 21:6 problem 5:11 8:3 23:23,24 25:15 41:16 55:9 procedure 29:1 procedures 41:18 proceed 17:12 produced 44:15 proper 15:14 16:25 21:17 22:4 properly 16:13 19:13 22:5 proposed 22:12 propriety 30:12 protect 49:17 prove 6:1 27:2,5 28:6 38:16 provide 18:13 proving 19:6 31:1 provisions 4:4 proximate 4:10 4:14 5:8 6:6,20 8:4 9:10 10:14 10:23,24 11:2 11:4,7,20,21 12:1,3,4,8 14:5 15:20 18:17 22:5,9 23:6,12 24:20,24 26:4 26:4,5,11,11 26:14 27:4,5 28:5 29:21 31:13 33:17,20 33:22,24,25 34:2 35:25,25
13:10,11 14:15 14:15 15:6 19:5,10 20:22 21:25 33:1 34:14 38:16 41:1 45:5 49:17 52:2,16 railroad's 11:12 15:15 16:25 17:23 34:18 Railway 1:4 3:4 raise 7:15 42:17 44:8 raised 17:6 28:20 42:20,24 43:6 53:4 raises 17:8 Raising 17:23 range 33:15 reach 30:11 44:3 50:4 reached 10:6 reaching 30:7 read 3:17 5:15 8:8 22:15 38:6 38:7,9 45:18 49:25 Q reads 55:10 quantity 48:18 reaffirm 16:10 quantum 48:16 real 13:16 48:22,22 reality 10:5 17:6 question 3:10 53:25 7:9 15:7,16 really 7:1 9:16 17:7 18:16 15:1 18:25 19:7 20:3 22:6 20:11 21:10 28:20 29:4,5 26:18 34:2 29:10 30:17,22 48:25 33:14 35:3 reason 4:20 24:4 44:7,22 45:21 36:20,23,25,25 53:4,15,17 45:3,5,6,9 50:8 55:3 50:25 51:1 quite 13:8 14:14 reasonably quotation 37:19 10:10 quote 37:15 reasons 7:25 42:5 R REBUTTAL R 3:1 2:8 52:23 railroad 9:17 37:5,18,25 38:4,5,8,10,17 39:9,13,14 40:10,22 41:11 45:11,24,25 46:5,7,10,12 46:13 47:1,8 47:11,17,18 48:10,11,19 49:20 50:1,14 50:19,20,21,22 51:6,8 52:3 53:24 54:2,3,7 54:8,20,25 proximately 33:16 53:19 purpose 49:22 pushing 11:16 put 6:13,14 8:22 14:23 19:9 20:18 21:7 30:15 36:23 putting 36:20 45:16 p.m 1:13 3:2 55:13
recall 15:4 39:1 received 22:5 recognition 35:16 recognize 50:19 recognized 16:11 31:9 recognizes 47:20 53:23 recognizing 50:2 record 18:22,23 20:6 recovery 34:9 38:1 49:4,6 50:3 reduce 34:9 50:3 reduced 46:16 reducing 41:6 refer 10:14 53:22 referring 46:3 refers 41:9 refusal 5:17 21:1 regard 6:22 regime 31:17 reject 25:18 rejected 9:11 25:18,20 43:25 relation 3:18,21 relationship 8:11 relaxed 13:20 14:16 46:16 reliance 51:22 51:25 relied 38:5 42:1 51:21 52:13 relying 38:17 remaining 52:22 remains 25:22 39:8 remand 16:21 22:7 54:14,23 remedy 49:12 remember 20:8
remotely 4:3 10:15 19:16 53:25 remove 35:24 rendered 18:6 reply 17:10 28:22 33:15 48:19 reproduced 3:15 5:22 request 26:16 requested 5:14 8:8 23:25 27:13 41:13,14 require 43:3 47:8 53:23 required 8:4 9:14 28:6 37:5 41:11 42:3 requirement 37:18 38:4,8 46:11,13,17 requirements 29:3 41:25 47:17 requires 9:4 18:4 39:25 40:17 43:22,23 44:11 reread 13:14 reserve 28:12 resolve 53:12 54:15 respect 4:25 6:12 8:17,18 9:10 11:18 13:18 20:7,9 29:6 41:22 42:19 45:5 respects 49:17 responded 14:24 Respondent 1:18 2:7 6:14 28:17 Respondents 14:23 16:3
Respondent's 7:20 9:3 12:6 12:11 responding 13:16 33:13 response 7:19 12:6,11 23:23 responses 38:12 responsible 34:15 rest 44:2 restatement 3:14,24 30:25 31:5 39:15 47:3 48:12 result 37:6 43:7 43:8 resulting 3:20 3:22 4:5 29:22 35:23 41:21 42:23 43:10 46:1 48:2,3 50:18 51:6,9 51:18 rethink 14:25 reverse 25:21 rewriting 42:22 right 4:20 6:24 7:23 11:2 12:2 12:5 13:13,14 13:19,22 14:25 18:16 21:3,5,8 21:12,15 22:11 22:18,21 23:14 23:21 24:7,21 25:10 26:7,12 27:6 30:10 32:4 36:14 38:14 39:3 40:1 41:23 44:25 45:11 46:5 47:13,14 51:16 52:15 rightly 51:12 rise 46:15 risk 51:5,5 road 19:11,12
ROBERTS 3:3 11:9 12:2 17:20 28:14 31:15 32:4 34:4,17 35:1 35:15 36:13,19 40:23 41:14 42:20 47:23 49:23 50:12 52:19,21 55:11 Rogers 4:12 5:5 6:12 7:1,12,16 7:22 9:4,7,13 10:3,14,19,21 10:22 12:4,14 12:16,19 14:25 15:1 16:3,8,14 17:9,12,17,17 18:9 23:11,13 23:19 30:4,6 37:10,13,14,16 38:2,6,7,9,17 39:1,4,8,12 40:8,8,12,17 40:18 46:25 47:4,19,23 48:3,12 50:5 51:11 52:18 53:15,25 54:5 rule 4:14,25 9:10 42:3 49:2 49:4,14 52:4 52:10 rules 3:18 6:1 29:1 31:2,5 41:23,24,25 ruling 18:6 running 31:16 S S 2:1 3:1 safe 22:17 safety 19:14 satisfactory 41:24 satisfied 6:15,16 6:16 55:5
saying 7:19 8:13 8:15 10:22 11:24 12:4 13:5 17:22 20:11,19 21:16 23:11 24:25 25:13 34:10 40:17,20 44:2 44:17 54:11 says 5:23 11:14 11:15 12:14 13:25 22:16,16 29:8 31:1,4 39:16 42:6 43:17 44:14 47:25 53:5 Scalia 4:11 5:2 9:11,16,23 10:19 16:7 32:15 33:7,10 35:3 46:6,9 47:6,15 48:7,9 51:20,24 Scalia's 46:19 scenario 35:15 schemes 52:13 scope 39:15 sea 7:1 16:14,17 second 3:14,17 8:2 19:8 Secondly 36:9 section 4:4,6 17:14 36:9,12 36:24 37:1 41:2,9 43:13 44:9 45:22 46:1,2 49:18 50:21 51:3,3 see 10:20 17:3 21:11 34:20,23 38:6,7 39:12 43:14 45:19 51:22,24 seeing 20:17 seeking 35:23 36:3 seeks 7:20
seen 29:6 51:11 send 27:22 sense 18:8 23:3 36:21,22 39:14 41:1 sensible 17:11 18:7 sensibly 32:23 sentence 38:5 series 45:14 set 30:2 38:22 53:10 sets 42:3 settled 51:14 shown 38:1 side 13:17 17:8 19:11 20:9,11 22:12 23:25 25:5 27:13 43:24 sides 18:12 22:9 27:18 32:6 significant 18:13 48:16 simple 24:4 simpler 38:19 simplest 53:11 simply 13:17 15:6 16:7 49:24 50:1 55:5 singular 39:16 situation 47:11 slight 8:17,19 12:1 14:5 18:4 18:5 24:25 25:2,5 37:5 40:21 46:25 47:20,25 48:9 48:10,22,23 49:5 slightest 6:7 27:3 31:14 37:8,16,21 40:20 46:15,18 48:5 slightly 23:20
27:16 53:20,22 sole 10:25 11:1 29:5 47:12 solely 36:3 somewhat 14:24 soon 21:2 Sorrell 1:7 3:4 52:5 sorry 8:6 11:8 21:22 37:24 44:5 sort 20:6 53:1 sought 6:10 sound 31:3 source 23:19 Souter 6:15 7:3 7:7 8:1 23:8,15 23:22 24:8,14 25:4,10,19 26:1,10,13,25 27:4,7,9,11 28:8,11 34:12 35:4,5 36:14 37:11 38:14,18 39:18 40:3,15 46:18,22 49:2 49:9,13 53:14 53:17 Souter's 34:18 Southern 1:3 3:4 speak 9:7,9 16:8 43:15 44:9 speaks 45:3 specific 10:23 20:8 26:8 41:25 42:4 specifically 10:14 14:4 23:17 29:8 spent 15:14 16:24 split 10:7 spoke 39:9 45:4 squarely 7:9 St 1:17 stake 29:2
standard 5:25 6:7,8 7:12,12 10:24,25 11:2 13:17,20 14:15 14:16 15:14,20 16:25 17:23 18:3 21:4,8,12 31:14 32:10,24 33:20,23,24,25 34:2 36:1,2 37:1 38:25 39:7 45:23,25 46:16 49:19,20 51:2 53:5 standards 12:17 30:3,8,18 32:2 32:9 36:15,17 38:22 stare 40:13 start 42:4 State 20:3 28:25 30:5 41:22 stated 3:14 49:4 statement 4:1 22:19,24 23:3 23:5 29:25 states 1:1,12 28:21 33:15 statute 10:15 11:14 22:1,15 22:16,18,23 30:14 40:25 41:17 46:24 47:20,24 49:15 49:22 51:4 statutes 47:16 statutory 11:13 stay 42:18 Stevens 18:15 18:21 30:17,22 50:6,15 52:9 55:2,10 stop 21:6 strictly 55:8 structure 20:18 stuff 14:14 submits 22:12
submitted 55:12 55:14 substance 8:25 substantial 17:8 47:4 48:13,20 48:21,24,25 substantially 6:16 suffice 23:22 sufficiency 10:12 sufficient 23:5 48:16 sufficiently 48:16 suggesting 51:10 suggests 40:13 suppose 17:13 52:9,12 supposed 12:20 13:5 42:4 Supreme 1:1,12 sure 14:6,24 17:13 55:9 surprised 44:20 system 30:6
terms 41:8 Thank 3:8 28:14 52:19,20,25 55:11 theirs 22:16 theories 19:9,16 19:22 theory 19:18,18 thing 18:25 31:6 39:6 44:16 51:7 things 36:4 43:22 think 3:13,16 5:24 6:18,24 8:4,22,24 9:20 10:3,7 11:4 16:17 18:8,9 18:11,11 20:5 20:10,14,17,17 21:3,10,20 22:2 23:9,16 24:22 26:20,20 26:22 27:11,17 34:12 36:16 37:13 38:9 39:5 40:17,19 42:20,24 43:13 T 45:6,10 51:11 T 2:1,1 52:4 55:7 table 8:22 thinking 35:8 take 5:5 6:15 thinks 25:1 11:12 19:7 third 10:5 36:7 36:6 37:17 thoroughly 43:20 18:12 talk 31:18 48:20 thought 7:11 53:21 13:9 19:17 talked 10:25 34:17 45:5 47:4,5 48:13 49:9,13,14 talking 15:14 three 19:9 32:4 37:2 thrown 11:5 talks 4:4,7 31:10 time 15:14 16:11 41:6 48:20 20:15 28:13 task 12:13 31:8,24 47:4 tell 19:3 37:15 48:8,12 52:10 44:1 times 9:12 term 54:25 TIMOTHY 1:7
27:19,20,20 31:7,14 37:4 49:4 way 6:8 7:3 17:12,15,22 18:7 19:15 20:1,12,14,15 23:23 24:20 27:25 30:19 38:24 40:12 43:9,9 53:3,6 53:12 55:8,10 ways 15:18 16:6 V we'll 3:3 45:13 v 1:6 we're 4:25 7:17 variant 25:24 7:19,23 8:15 26:23 11:23,24 12:20 vehicle 10:8,9 13:5,13 32:4 verdict 19:16 45:10,16 34:23 we've 9:11 25:20 version 51:7 whatsoever 5:9 versus 3:4 28:25 whistles 39:24 42:13 wholly 6:16 vetted 18:12 24:10,10 view 12:21 win 7:24 19:19 23:11,13 wise 9:23 26:14 28:2 wishes 53:13 44:11,18 55:4 word 12:22,25 viewed 29:11,12 13:3,6 35:24 29:14 39:20 55:5 violated 21:2 words 14:9 votes 9:17,21 22:23 35:23 39:23 40:25 W 42:23 43:10 wait 17:16 45:25 47:5 want 5:6 8:10 48:2 54:7 9:2 13:19,20 U work 7:1 16:17 20:25 27:12 ultimate 39:6 worked 16:14 35:2 37:15 unaffected 5:4 worker 34:15 41:20,20 43:11 undermine 7:20 38:16 49:17 44:8 45:8 55:8 workers 52:17 understand 17:6 wanted 50:13 23:10 25:5 workman 52:13 wants 27:22 30:25 worth 3:16 40:6 44:3 understood 11:5 wouldn't 7:5,7 warrants 53:10 39:18 47:21 21:13 41:7 uniformly 30:6 Washington 1:9 45:8 50:15 1:15 40:11,12 write 17:16 22:9 wasn't 19:12,13 today 4:1 55:10 told 30:15 36:19 54:18 tort 32:17 torts 3:14 33:17 total 49:5 totally 54:25 tracks 11:13 traditional 31:13 45:23,25 47:1 49:20 traditionally 11:5 treatises 46:8 trial 5:12 16:22 21:4 22:3,13 27:19,20 29:8 42:5 53:11 truck 18:24 true 4:22 23:3 trying 20:6 35:5 35:14 49:16 Tuesday 1:10 twelve 38:13 40:10 two 4:4 7:24 9:8 16:5,20 22:8 24:22 32:22,23 33:11 36:4 38:12 39:4 48:25 52:21 53:1 type 31:10,12 37:3 41:11,12 typical 11:20,21
United 1:1,12 universally 54:24 unscramble 20:16 urging 14:25 use 8:17 12:25 13:3,6,17 14:9 15:9 32:11 35:6 40:4 uses 17:8 usually 17:3
written 37:23 wrong 15:8 18:17 20:12 21:1,23,24 23:4 24:2,21 24:22 28:1 34:10 37:15 38:11 44:1,11 44:18 45:3,3,6 45:7,8 49:9 53:9 wrote 31:4 38:13 X x 1:2,8 Y yeah 6:17 28:11 32:15 year 51:25 years 9:19 18:1 18:6,6 30:5 38:13 40:10 48:5 51:14 52:18 0 05-746 1:6
19 3:15 1900s 31:7 1939 51:4 1965 3:25 2 2:01 55:13 20 10:11 17:17 32:7,7 2006 1:10 26 37:16 28 2:7 28A 5:22 3 3 2:4 32.07(b) 29:9 33 37:16 38 53:18 4 40 33:3 47 17:16 5 50 9:18 30:5 48:5 51:13,25 52:18 51 4:4 46:1 49:18 50:21 51:3 52 2:10 53 4:6 31:10 36:9,24 37:1 41:2,9 43:13 44:9 45:22 46:2 50:2,13 51:3
1 10 1:10 17:15 12 29:17,19,24 30:3,12,13,13 30:21 43:1,4 51:17 12:59 1:13 3:2 13 12:21,22,24 13:3,6 14:8 6 28:3,21,24 6 12:15 29:6,9,11,18 29:19 30:1,3,9 8 33:21,25 34:6 80 32:8 34:11 36:21 39:21 42:16,18 84.04 42:3 42:23 43:2,5,9 55:6 15 17:16
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