Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103295/mourning-vs-family-publications-svc-inc
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 10:42:30
Document Index: 231759626

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 130', '§ 105', '§ 128', '§ 121', '§ 105', '§ 8', '§ 105', '§ 130', '§ 226', '§ 226', '§ 8', '§ 1408', '§ 1640', '§ 1631', '§ 1640', '§ 1602', '§ 1231', '§ 1601', '§ 1602', '§ 1602', '§ 1602', '§ 691', '§ 672']

Mourning Vs Family Publications Svc Inc - Citation 103295 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Mourning Vs. Family Publications Svc., Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/103295CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-24-1973Case Number411 U.S. 356AppellantMourningRespondentFamily Publications Svc., Inc.Excerpt:
mourning v. family publications svc., inc. - 411 u.s. 356 (1973)
petitioner, who contracted to purchase magazine subscriptions from respondent, brought this action in district court, alleging that respondent had failed to comply with the disclosure provisions of the truth in lending act, as implemented by federal reserve board "regulation z." the district court found that respondent had failed to comply with regulation z, in that respondent..... Judgment:
1. The "Four Installment Rule" of Regulation Z is a valid exercise of the Federal Reserve Board's rulemaking authority under the Truth in Lending Act. Pp.
411 U. S. 363
(a) Congress, which was well aware that merchants could evade the disclosure requirements of the Act by concealing credit charges, gave the Board broad rulemaking power to prevent such evasion, and, in the exercise of that power, the Board issued the challenged rule to deal with the practice of concealing finance charges in the cash price of merchandise sold. Pp.
(b) No conflict arises from the fact that the Act mentions disclosure only in regard to transactions in which a finance charge is imposed, while the disclosure requirements of the rule sometimes apply where no such charge exists, since Congress did not attempt to specify all types of situations under which the Board's regulations might apply, and the deterrent effect of the rule clearly implements the objectives of the Act. Pp.
411 U. S. 372
prevent circumvention, even if the rule embraces some transactions that the provisions of the Act might not, on their face, reach.
411 U. S. 373
(d) Existence of penalty provisions in the Act does not require a narrow construction of the Act's nonpenalty provisions.
FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,
2. Imposition, pursuant to § 130 of the Act, of a minimum penalty of $100 in cases such as this where the finance charge is nonexistent or undetermined, but where disclosure has not been made, is a permissible sanction. P.
411 U. S. 376
3. In imposing a disclosure requirement on all members of a defined class to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class, the challenged regulation does not create a conclusive presumption violative of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined,
411 U. S. 378
411 U. S. 383
We granted the writ of certiorari in this case to resolve whether the Federal Reserve Board exceeded its authority under § 105 of the Truth in Lending Act [
] in promulgating that portion of Regulation Z commonly referred to as the "Four Installment Rule." [
"Knowing, therefore, the obligations we have incurred in your name, we feel confident that you will continue your magazine subscriptions and make the convenient monthly payments regularly and promptly. [
"After an account is three months delinquent it is brought to my attention. I feel that you should realize that you are receiving our merchandise which we have paid for.
Had you dealt directly with the publishers yourself, you would have had to pay them in advance for the magazines.
"Again, let me remind you that we have ordered these magazines in advance, and that you have incurred an obligation to repay us.
This is a credit account, and as such must be repaid by you on a monthly basis,
much the same as if you had purchased any other type of merchandise on a monthly
budget plan. [Emphasis supplied; underlined words are emphasized in the original letter]. [
Respondent admitted sending each of the above letters to petitioner. [
] In addition, respondent submitted one affidavit to the District Court, describing the nature of the contracts which it offered to its clients. The affidavit stated that a customer who ordered magazine subscriptions from respondent was required to pay for all magazines during the first half of the contract term. [
] Thus, according to the affidavit, at all times during the course of a contract, a purchaser who has complied with the
Section 121 of the Truth in Lending Act requires merchants who regularly extend credit, with attendant finance charges, [
] to disclose certain contract information "to each person to whom consumer credit is extended and upon whom a finance charge is or may be imposed." [
] Among other relevant facts, the merchant must, where applicable, list the cash price of the merchandise or service sold, the amount of finance and other charges, and the rate of the charges. [
] Failure to disclose renders the seller liable to the consumer for a penalty of twice the amount of the finance charge, but in no event less than $100 or more than $1,000. [
] The creditor may also be assessed for the costs of the litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees [
] and, in certain circumstances not relevant here, may be the subject of criminal charges. [
Section 105 of the Act [
] provides:
Accordingly, the Board has promulgated Regulation Z, which defines the circumstances in which a seller who regularly extends credit must make the disclosures outlined in § 128. [
] The regulation provides that disclosure is necessary whenever credit is offered to a consumer
"for which either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than four installments. [
Relying on the rule governing credit transactions of more than four installments, the District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner. The court found that respondent had extended credit to petitioner [
] which, by agreement, was payable in more than four installments, but had failed to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the regulation upon which the District Court relied. The regulation was found to conflict with § 121 of the Act [
] since it required that disclosure be made in regard to some credit transactions in which a finance charge had
not been imposed. As an alternative ground for its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the regulation created a conclusive presumption that credit payments made in more than four installments included a finance charge. Relying on
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,
270 U. S. 230
(1926), and
Passage of the Truth in Lending Act in 1968 culminated several years of congressional study and debate as to the propriety and usefulness of imposing mandatory disclosure requirements on those who extend credit to consumers in the American market. By the time of passage, it had become abundantly clear that the use of consumer credit was expanding at an extremely rapid rate. From the end of World War II through 1967, the amount of such credit outstanding had increased from $5.6 billion to $95.9 billion, a rate of growth more than 4 1/2 times as great as that of the economy. [
] Yet, as the congressional hearings revealed, consumers remained remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations and of the costs of deferring payment. [
] Because of the divergent, and at times fraudulent, practices by which consumers were informed of the terms of the credit extended to them, many consumers were prevented from shopping for the best terms available and, at times, were prompted to assume liabilities they could not meet. [
] Joseph Barr, then Under Secretary of the Treasury, noted in testifying before a Senate subcommittee
that such blind economic activity is inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours, whose ability to provide desired material at the lowest cost is dependent on the asserted preferences and informed choices of consumers. [
"[B]y requiring all creditors to disclose credit information in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional mandatory charges imposed by the creditor as an incident to credit be included in the computation of the applicable percentage rate, the American consumer will be given the information he needs to compare the cost of credit and to make the best informed decision on the use of credit. [
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit. [
The hearings held by Congress reflect the difficulty of the task it sought to accomplish. Whatever legislation was passed had to deal not only with the myriad forms in which credit transactions then occurred, but also with those which would be devised in the future. [
] To accomplish its desired objective, Congress determined to lay the structure of the Act broadly, and to entrust its construction to an agency with the necessary experience and resources to monitor its operation. Section 105 delegated to the Federal Reserve Board broad authority to promulgate regulations necessary to render the Act effective. The language employed evinces the awareness of Congress that some creditors would attempt to characterize their transactions so as to fall one step outside whatever boundary Congress attempted to establish. It indicates as well the clear desire of Congress to insure that the Board had adequate power to deal with such attempted evasion. In addition to granting to the Board the authority normally given to administrative agencies to promulgate regulations designed to "carry out the purposes" of the Act, Congress specifically provided, as noted earlier, that the regulations may define classifications and exceptions to insure compliance with the Act. [
411 U. S. 361
-362. The Board was thereby empowered to define such classifications as were reasonably necessary to insure that the objectives of the Act were fulfilled, no matter what adroit or unscrupulous practices were employed by those extending credit to consumers. One means of circumventing the objectives of the Truth in Lending Act, as passed by Congress, was that of "burying" the cost of credit in the price of goods sold. Thus, in many credit transactions in which creditors claimed that no finance charge had been imposed, the creditor merely assumed the cost of extending credit as an expense of doing business, to be recouped as part of the price charged in the transaction. [
] Congress was well aware, from its extensive studies, of the possibility that merchants could use such devices to evade the disclosure requirements of the Act. The Committee hearings are replete with suggestions that such manipulation
would render the Act a futile gesture in the case of goods normally sold by installment contract. [
] Opponents of the bill contended that the reporting provisions would actually encourage merchants who had formerly segregated their credit costs not to do so. They predicted that the effect of the Act would thus be to reduce the amount of information available to the consumer, a result directly contrary to that which was intended. [
] Proponents of the legislation claimed that the Act would enhance the consumer's ability to make an informed choice even if finance charges were hidden. In response to a claim that credit costs would be incorporated in the price of goods, Senator Douglas, who first proposed the Truth in Lending Act, stated:
cash price or delivery price of the property or service to be acquired. Both things are to be stated, price and finance charges, and the judgment of the consumer can be on the basis of both of these factors, not merely on one alone; and if a merchant tries to have a low finance charge and bury it in a high cash price or delivered price, then the purchaser can shop on price just as much as on the finance charges. [
It was against this legislative background that the Federal Reserve Board promulgated regulations governing enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act. In September, 1968, with the aid of an advisory board composed of representatives of diverse retail, lending, and consumer groups, the Board compiled and released a draft of proposed regulations. [
] Comments and criticisms from interested parties were invited. After more than 1,800 responses were received and considered by the Board, the regulations were reviewed and published in the Federal Register. [
The Four Installment Rule was included in the original published draft of the regulations, and was not amended prior to its final adoption. [
] The Board's objective in promulgating the rule was to prevent the Act from fulfilling the prophecy which its opponents had forecast. As J. L. Robertson, vice chairman of the Board of Governors, stated in an advisory letter issued a year later:
under the Regulation, since, without this provision, the practice of burying the finance charge in the cash price, a practice which already exists in many cases, would have been encouraged by Truth in Lending. Obviously this would have been directly contrary to Congressional intent. [
Furthermore, even as to sales in which it was impossible to determine what, if any, portion of the price recompensed the creditor for deferring payment, the regulation at least required that the consumer be provided with some information which would enable him to make an informed economic choice. [
The standard to be applied in determining whether the Board exceeded the authority delegated to it under the Truth in Lending Act is well established under our prior cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may "make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act," [
] we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation."
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham,
393 U. S. 280
-281 (1969).
See also American Trucking Assns. v. United States,
We have also construed enabling provisions similar to § 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, in which Congress has stressed the agency's power to counteract attempts to evade the purposes of a statute. In
(1945), we were asked to determine whether the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor was empowered under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [
] to prohibit companies from allowing or requiring their employees to do industrial homework. The Act required the Administrator to approve orders which were designed to raise the minimum wage to 40 cents an hour. While the Act did not specifically mention industrial homework, § 8(f) stated that the Administrator's orders
"shall contain such terms and conditions as the Administrator finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders, to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof, and to safeguard the minimum wage rates established therein. [
324 U. S. 255
In light of our prior holdings and the legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act, we cannot agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Four Installment Rule. Congress was clearly aware that merchants could evade the reporting requirements of the Act by concealing credit charges. In delegating rulemaking authority to the Board, Congress emphasized the Board's authority to prevent such evasion. To hold that Congress did not intend the Board to take action against this type of manipulation would require us to believe that, despite this emphasis, Congress intended the obligations established by the Act to be open to evasion by subterfuges of which it was fully aware. As in
the language of the enabling provision precludes us from accepting so narrow an interpretation of the Board's power.
be chosen, courts should defer to the informed experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate authority.
Northwestern Co. v. FPC,
321 U. S. 119
321 U. S. 124
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States,
Respondent contends, however, that the Four Installment Rule must be abrogated, since it is "inconsistent" with portions of the enabling statute. The purported conflict arises because the statute specifically mentions disclosure only in regard to transactions in which a finance charge is, in fact, imposed, [
] although the rule requires disclosure in some cases in which no such charge exists. Respondent argues that, in requiring disclosure as to some transactions, Congress intended to preclude the Board from imposing similar requirements as to any other transactions.
To accept respondent's argument would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an administrative agency. In
American Trucking Assns. v. United States, supra,
we noted that it was not
344 U. S. 309
-310 (citations omitted). Neither the sections of the Truth in Lending Act which refer specifically to transactions involving finance charges nor any other sections of the Act indicate that Congress attempted to list comprehensively all types of transactions to which the Board's regulations might apply. To the contrary, § 105's broad grant of rulemaking authority reflects an intention to rely on those attributes of agency administration recognized in
American Trucking.
We cannot then infer that references in the Act to transactions involving credit charges were intended to limit the deterrent measures which the Board might choose.
Since the deterrent effect of the challenged rule clearly implements the objectives of the Act, respondent's contention is reduced to a claim that the rule is void because it requires disclosure by some creditors who do not charge for credit, and thus need not be deterred. The fact that the regulation may affect such individuals does not impair its otherwise valid purpose. A similar contention was made in
and rejected by the Court.
claimed that the Administrator was not attempting to enforce the requirements of the statute, but was attempting to advance "experimental social legislation" which Congress had not approved. Responding to that argument the Court stated:
324 U. S. 257
There, the Court was referring to the regulation of subject matter not specifically mentioned in the enabling legislation. A similar rule applies when a remedial provision requires some individuals to submit to regulation who do not participate in the conduct the legislation was intended to deter or control. In
272 U. S. 388
-389 (1926), the Court held that, in defining a class subject to regulation, "[t]he inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity."
See also North American Co. v. SEC,
327 U. S. 686
(1946). Nothing less will meet the demands of our complex economic system. Where, as here, the transactions or conduct which Congress seeks to administer occur in myriad and changing forms, a requirement that a line be drawn which insures that not one blameless individual will be subject to the provisions of an act would unreasonably encumber effective administration and permit many clear violators to escape regulation entirely. That this rationale applies to administrative agencies as well as to legislatures is implicit in both
In neither case was every individual engaged in the regulated activity responsible for the specific consequences the agency sought to eliminate.
Respondent argues that such an interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act is inconsistent with our holding in
(1954). In that case, the Court considered whether, in
. Since, in drafting its regulation, the Commission had failed to apply the well established rule that penal provisions must be construed narrowly, the Court held the regulation invalid.
American Broadcasting,
respondent contends that the Truth in Lending Act must be construed narrowly, since it contains penal provisions, [
] and that a narrow interpretation requires that the Board's rule be nullified. We cannot agree, however, that every section of an act establishing a broad regulatory scheme must be construed as a "penal" provision, as that term is used in
merely because two sections of the Act provide for civil and criminal penalties. Penal statutes are construed narrowly to insure that no individual is convicted unless
(1931). [
] Where, as here, the language of the challenged rule is explicit, that risk is not present.
See Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States,
327 U. S. 614
327 U. S. 621
-622 (1946).
We are also unable to accept respondent's argument that § 130 [
] does not allow imposition of a civil penalty in cases where no finance charge is involved, but where a regulation requiring disclosure has been violated. Section 130 provides that the penalty assessed shall be twice the amount of the finance charge imposed, but not less than $100. Since the civil penalty prescribed is modest and the prohibited conduct clearly set out in the regulation, we need not construe this section as narrowly as a criminal statute providing graver penalties, such as prison terms. We have noted above that the objective sought in delegating rulemaking authority to an agency is to relieve Congress of the impossible burden of drafting a code explicitly covering every conceivable future problem. Congress cannot then be required to tailor civil penalty provisions so as to deal precisely with each step which the agency thereafter finds necessary. In light of the emphasis Congress placed on agency rulemaking and on private and administrative enforcement of the Act, we cannot conclude that Congress intended those who failed to comply with regulations to be subject to no penalty or to criminal penalties alone. As the District Court concluded, imposition of the minimum sanction is proper in cases such as this, where the finance charge is nonexistent or undetermined.
Finally, the Four Installment Rule does not conflict with the Fifth Amendment under our holdings in
(1932). In
we held that certain taxing provisions violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because they conclusively presumed the existence of determinative facts. The challenged rule contains no comparable presumption. The rule was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not presume that all creditors who are within its ambit assess finance charges, [
] but, rather, imposes a disclosure requirement on all members of a defined class in order to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class.
"Whereas, FPS, acts initialy [
] as agent for the various publishers; upon acceptance of her contract, FPS thereafter acts solely as financier, and co-guaranter [
] of service with the various publishers; whereas FPS has fully invested in Mrs. Mourning's contract, and does not receive refund in part or full from any, or, all publishers; for said FPS, investment, we therefore, must insist on compliance of your client to the terms of said contract until fullfilment [
] of said terms in the aforementioned contract result [
] in mutual resolve [
] of liability."
Respondent challenges the finding of the District Court that credit was extended to petitioner. In some cases in which a consumer pays in installments for a magazine subscription, credit may not have been extended to the consumer. However, in view of the admissions by respondent which were before the District Court, respondent's failure to controvert those admissions by affidavit, and the litigation posture which respondent has consistently maintained beginning in the District Court,
that no factual matters remained unresolved, we conclude that summary judgment on this issue was properly granted. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(e).
at 13; S.Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1967).
H.R.Rep. No. 1040,
18, at 13; S.Rep. No. 392,
19, at 1-2.
18, at 13.
letter from Paul R. Dixon, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, to Senator A. Willis Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Feb. 18, 1964, in Hearings on S. 750 before the Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1303 (1963-1964).
Hearings on S. 1740 before the Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 49, 56-57, 127, 389-390, 447-448, 563, 1155-1156 (1961); Hearings on S. 1740 before the Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 16, 45, 265, 267-268, 287, 341-342, 360-361, 365-367, 376, 407, 415 (1962); Senate Hearings on S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.,
24, pt.s. 1 and 2, pp. 13-14, 749, 1284-1285; Hearings on S. 5 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-42, 123-134, 377-379, 513, 699 (1967); House Hearings on H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
21, pts. 1 and 2, pp. 583, 590-591, 802, 825-826.
Senate Hearings on S. 1740, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
27, at 287; Senate Hearings on S. 750, 88th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.,
24, pt. 1, pp. 13-14; House Hearings on H.R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
21, pt. 2, p. 596.
Senate Hearings on S. 1740, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
27, at 447-448.
27, at 45.
§ 226.2(h), 33 Fed.Reg. 15507 (1968),
§ 226.2(k), 34 Fed.Reg. 2003 (1969).
Federal Reserve Board Advisory Letter of Mar. 3, 1970, by J. L. Robertson.
Federal Reserve Board Advisory Letter of Aug. 26, 1969, by J. L. Robertson.
§ 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1408.
See Kordel v. United States,
335 U. S. 345
W. LaFave A. Scott, Criminal Law 72 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 1640. This section refers only to the failure to provide "information required
to be disclosed. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The italicized language was added to the statute to distinguish disclosure required in regard to sales transactions from that required in regard to advertising. H.R.Rep. No. 1040,
18, at 19, 30. The penalty provision applies both to the failure to disclose information specifically required by the statute and to the failure to abide by regulations promulgated by the Board to govern such disclosure.
I have concluded that this is not a proper case for summary judgment under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c), which provides that summary judgment only may be granted if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." As I interpret the present record in light of our decisions,
see, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U. S. 654
, there remains unresolved a genuine issue of material fact. Although I agree with the majority that Regulation Z is valid, and accordingly would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, I would remand this case to the District Court for resolution of that material issue.
The disclosure provisions of the Truth in Lending Act apply only to an extension of "consumer credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1631. Thus, in order to assert successfully a claim under the Act for the statutory penalty and reimbursement for the costs of the action,
§ 1640, petitioner,
must satisfy her burden of proving that respondent extended consumer credit within the meaning of the Act. Section 103(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e), defines "credit" as "the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment." In her complaint, petitioner merely alleges that respondent "extends Consumer Credit as defined in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. [§] 226.2(K). . . ."
On the basis solely of these allegations, one would conclude that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent did not constitute a credit transaction. If respondent merely collected $3.95 per month from each customer and sent the receipts periodically to the publisher, [
] less the respondent's commission, respondent never would have made any advances for the customer, and the customer would owe nothing to the respondent for the loan of money or, in the words of the Act, as a "finance charge." On the other hand, if respondent advanced all or part of the subscription price to the publishers, respondent would be advancing "credit" for the benefit of the customer. [
] The legislative history indicates
that "the disclosure requirement would not apply to transactions which are not commonly thought of as credit transactions. . . ." [
] As Professor Corbin has stated:
"A transaction may be an installment contract without being a credit transaction at all. Both parties may agree to perform in installments without promising to render any performance in advance of full payment of the price of each installment so rendered. [
The Act, in defining "credit," refers to the deferred payment of a "debt." A debt, however, is more than a binding contractual obligation to pay a sum of money in the future upon the performance of certain conditions by the other party to the contract. It is an unconditional obligation to pay. [
] Thus, in my view, a proper resolution of the issue whether respondent extended credit to petitioner depends, at least in part, on the contractual relationships between the respondent and the publishers. The contracts between respondent and the publishers are not in the present record. [
"that we have ordered these magazines in advance, and that you have incurred an obligation to repay us.
This is a credit account,
and as such must be repaid by you on a monthly basis, much the same as if you had purchased any other type of merchandise on a monthly budget plan."
Respondent formally admitted that it had sent this letter to petitioner. Accordingly, it was properly considered by the District Judge. [
] But I do not view this "admission"
as conclusive or sufficient proof that respondent had extended credit within the meaning of the Act at the time the contract between petitioner and respondent was entered into. [
] First, this is not an admission in terms that credit was extended within the meaning of the Act. Second, since petitioner, at the time the letter was sent, was three months in arrears, it may be that respondent had advanced money on her account only after she failed to meet her contractual obligation. It is settled under our decisions that material lodged by the moving party "must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party."
Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U. S. 157
398 U. S. 158
369 U. S. 655
We cited this comment with approval in
Adickes v. Kress & Co., supra,
398 U. S. 160
. The moving party, in this case petitioner, [
] must meet her burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
. I cannot conclude that she met that burden. The District Judge was not possessed of sufficient information to resolve properly the issue whether credit had been extended. Under these circumstances, he should not have granted summary judgment.
Cf. White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U. S. 263
My Brother POWELL asserts that, given the undisputed fact that petitioner agreed to pay in advance, respondent, as a matter of law, could not have extended credit.
-384. We do not, however, know what the financial relationships in this tripartite arrangement are. For example, it may be that respondent advances the full five-year subscription price to the publisher on the subscriber's behalf when the contract between the subscriber and respondent is executed. If that is so, the subscriber may receive an unconditional right to receive magazines from the publisher over the five-year period, whether or not he meets his contractual obligations with respondent. Under these circumstances, respondent will be acting as a financier, enabling the subscriber to take advantage of the publisher's five-year subscription offer, but yet to defer payment on the subscription price. Any "profit" respondent receives will be largely attributable to its services as a financier. I do not see that such a financial arrangement differs substantially from the case where a subscriber borrows the full subscription price from a bank and pays the publisher directly, obligating himself to repay the bank in equal installments, with interest, over two and one-half years. As my Brother POWELL argues, the subscriber under those circumstances will be advancing credit to the publisher because he has paid for all magazines in advance, but it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, the bank has advanced credit to the subscriber.
] of service with the various publishers; whereas, FPS, has fully invested in Mrs. Mourning's contract and does not receive refund in part or full from any, or, all publishers; for said FPS, investment, we therefore, must insist on compliance of your client to the terms of said contract. . . ."
Although respondent admitted that the letter appeared on its stationery and was written by an employee. it denied that the employee was authorized to send the letter. Accordingly, since there was an issue of fact whether the letter was authorized, and thus a binding admission, the letter could not be considered properly on petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
3 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, federal Practice and Procedure § 1231, p. 75 (1971 Supp.).
Both parties moved for summary judgment. That does not relieve the District Judge of his responsibility to consider each motion separately in light of the theories advanced by each party, and to proceed to trial if he concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved.
6 J. Moore, Federal Practice Ĺš 56.13 (2d ed.1972).
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground that there was no extension of consumer credit within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act. [
] The majority takes the position that the credit issue is a question of fact properly resolved against respondent on petitioner's motion for summary judgment below. I cannot agree. In my view, the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that the transaction between petitioner
15 U.S.C. § 1601 The phrase "extension of consumer credit" is not defined in the Act. Nor does the Act's definition of "credit" provide any enlightenment. [
] However, a transaction is commonly understood to involve credit when one party receives value in exchange for his unconditional promise to pay the other party for such value in the future. The mere fact that a party obligates himself in a contract to pay for goods or services in installments over a period of time does not render the contract a credit transaction:
The transaction before the Court may well have been a credit transaction, but it was not respondent that extended the credit. Petitioner obligated herself to pay in advance for the magazines she was to receive. The contract required petitioner to pay equal installments over a 30-month period, but respondent was obligated only to provide magazines over 60 months. In effect, petitioner paid every month for two months' worth of magazines. Until the last magazine had been delivered, petitioner would have paid for more magazines than she received. Thus, the contract called for the extension of credit by petitioner to respondent. For this reason, it was not an "extension of consumer credit" within the meaning of the Act.
1 U.S.C. § 1602(h).
The Federal Reserve Board, upon whose authority to interpret the Act the majority so heavily relies in sustaining Regulation Z, has indicated that a necessary element in a consumer credit transaction is the consumer's obligation to pay
he has received the bargained-for goods or services. In a published Opinion Letter dealing with the practice of assessing obstetrical services in periodic installments, the Board stated that,
"[a]s long as there are no finance charges assessed,
and at no point do the charges for the services rendered exceed the payments to the extent that it would require more than of the periodic installments to repay the obligation,
then the plan would not fall within the provisions of Regulation Z. [
value of goods or services provided exceeds the payments made. [
might nevertheless have extended credit. [
] Thus, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS states that,
411 U. S. 362
n. 16. The implication, however, is that, in some such transactions, though the consumer pays for the magazines in advance, he may be the recipient of credit. I am unable to agree that, under any set of circumstances, given the undisputed fact that petitioner agreed to pay in advance for each magazine, respondent might have extended credit. Petitioner did not obtain a loan from respondent which she would be unconditionally obligated to repay. She entered into a contract imposing continuing, mutually dependent obligations on both parties. [
Whether respondent advanced any part of the subscription price to magazine publishers is quite immaterial to a determination of the legal effect of the only transaction involved in this case: whether there was extension of consumer credit by respondent to petitioner. The only contract at issue is that between the parties; how and upon what terms respondent may have arranged to obtain the magazines for delivery to petitioner in fulfillment of its contractual obligations is of no concern to petitioner. Nor can any such arrangement by respondent with a third party change the nature of the transaction between the parties to this litigation. [
15 U.S.C. § 1602(e). The Act provides no gloss on the terms "debtor" and "debt," and the definition of "creditor" is limiting, rather than explanatory. ("The term
creditor' refers only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f).)
FRB Opinion Letter No. 262 (1970); 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide Ĺš 30,516.
3A A. Corbin, Contracts § 691, p. 264 (1960).
Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 672.2-612 672.2-711, 672.2-717 (1966).