Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-turner-156
Timestamp: 2020-07-05 14:15:13
Document Index: 340914656

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 37', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37']

U.S. v. Turner, 438 F.3d 67 | Casetext Search + Citator
See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (commitment to juvenile hall is…
Full title:UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Marlin TURNER, Defendant, Appellant
Date published: Feb 15, 2006
438 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2006)
affirming district court's assessment of criminal history points for juvenile sentences
On May 28, 1998, Turner appeared in Rhea County Juvenile Court for a bench trial on the pending arson charges. An attorney who had never handled a criminal delinquency case was appointed to represent him. The court-appointed counsel consulted with Turner before the bench trial commenced, and Turner executed a written statement acknowledging his various procedural rights at trial, including the right to remain silent, to be represented by counsel, to review a copy of the charges against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, to cross-examine the State's witnesses, and to "appeal" from any adverse judgment, viz., to receive a de novo jury trial in the circuit court. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-121 to 129, 159(a). Following the hearing, Turner was found delinquent, beyond a reasonable doubt, then sentenced to an indeterminate commitment to a juvenile detention program, which was to run concurrently with the earlier Franklin County sentence.
Although the state statute utilizes the label "appeal," the circuit court is not an appellate tribunal, but rather a de novo trial court. Hereinafter, we employ the term "appeal" exclusively in this specialized sense.
The district court's ruling on Turner's CHC is subject to de novo review. See United States v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2001). The Guidelines require that we consider "any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the offense [of conviction]," U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a), which encompasses sentences imposed in juvenile adjudications, see id. § 4A1.2(d); Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d at 14.
Turner premises this appeal upon our decision in United States v. Florentino, 385 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2004) (involving Massachusetts' two-tier trial system). Like Tennessee, at one time Massachusetts had a two-tier trial system, pursuant to which criminal defendants were accorded a first-level bench trial with more limited procedural safeguards, as well as the right to lodge an appeal for a de novo jury trial. Unlike Tennessee, however, Massachusetts provided that the defendant's submission of a notice of appeal served immediately and automatically to vacate the first-tier conviction for most purposes. Id. at 63. In contrast, Tennessee law expressly provides that the filing of a notice of appeal does not, in any sense, vacate the first-tier conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(b) ("An appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile court."); Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 789-90 (Tenn. 1980).
Nevertheless, even then we noted that the Massachusetts courts did not treat the first-tier conviction as a "nullity for all purposes." Id.
In affirming the district court decision to consider Florentino's first-tier conviction under the Guidelines, we noted that notwithstanding the labels employed by the state courts — that the notice of appeal "vacates" the first-tier conviction ( viz., as if it had never been entered) — in actuality the appeal merely rendered that conviction conditionally dormant ( viz., subject to reinstatement in the event the defendant, for example, withdrew or failed to prosecute his appeal). Florentino, 385 F.3d at 63 (describing the first-tier conviction as "half asleep"). Turning to the Guidelines' commentary, the Florentino panel observed that vacated convictions are to be counted unless their vacation resulted from some legal error or newly discovered evidence, whereas all other vacated convictions should be counted unless "expunged," viz., treated as if a nullity ab initio. Id. at 64. The vacating of the Florentino first-tier conviction was neither the result of legal error nor newly discovered evidence (but merely the filing of a notice of appeal), and the conviction was simply dormant, rather than expunged. Id.
The record discloses that, after consulting with counsel, Turner voluntarily and knowingly signed an acknowledgment of his rights, including the right to remain silent, to be represented by counsel, to review a copy of the charges against him, to present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine the State's witnesses, and to "appeal" from an adverse judgment, viz., to receive a de novo jury trial in the circuit court. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-121 to 129, 159. Turner identifies no additional procedural safeguard ( e.g., the right to formal discovery or to full motion practice) which was accorded Florentino under the Massachusetts system.
By their very nature, these first-tier proceedings are administratively streamlined, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), and if the defendant thus has somewhat less than the usual incentive to present his full case at this preliminary stage, any such procedural limitations are fully mitigated by the right to a de novo trial at the second tier. See Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 310, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984); Florentino, 385 F.3d at 62-63. Absent evidence of any particular and palpable procedural deficiencies in the juvenile hearing, Turner has not distinguished his case from Florentino in this respect. Finally, inasmuch as Turner was represented by counsel, his argument constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a state court conviction based upon alleged procedural deficiencies. See United States v. Fraser, 388 F.3d 371, 375 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Even if the procedures used by the state court were somehow deficient, that would not warrant discounting the disposition . . . absent a claim, not made here, that the defendant was entirely without counsel.").
The State district attorney advised Turner's counsel that he would not decide whether to respond to the Rhea County appeal until after the Franklin County appeal had been concluded, but Turner's counsel never received notification that the district attorney had chosen not to respond. Instead, when the circuit court failed to docket or schedule a de novo trial, Turner's counsel simply assumed that the State had abandoned its efforts to maintain the first-tier conviction. As the appellee, however, the State could not withdraw the appeal; rather, as the appellant, only Turner could do so. Thus, all Turner reasonably could assume, without further consultation with the circuit court clerk, would be that, for some unidentified reason, the clerk had failed to docket a de novo trial date. Conceivably, such failure was due entirely to administrative oversight, yet though fully aware of the omission, Turner presumably failed to contact the clerk to determine the status of his notice of appeal. See, e.g., Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn.App. 1982) (noting that parties should not be allowed to take advantage of a clerical oversight of which parties were fully aware). Thus, it is simply inaccurate to suggest that Turner was faultless; as the appellant, he bore the burden to utilize all reasonable measures to prosecute his appeal.
Once again, insofar as the Turner contention would require us to speculate about the reason the appeal was not docketed, it represents an impermissible collateral attack upon the validity of a state court conviction. See Fraser, 388 F.3d at 375; United States v. Burke, 67 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that such collateral challenges "would hopelessly complicate sentencing under the federal Guideline[s]").
The Turner default is more consequential than the Florentino default under the Massachusetts two-tier system, since Turner's first-tier conviction did not become dormant after the filing of his notice of appeal, but remained in full effect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(b) ("An appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile court."). Consequently, Turner knew that mere filing of a notice of appeal did not undo his first-tier conviction, and that unless he could successfully prosecute an appeal and win a de novo trial and acquittal, his first-tier conviction would remain fully intact and in effect.
Turner would have the court disregard this essential difference between the Tennessee and Massachusetts systems, on the ground that the countability of a prior state sentence for Guidelines purposes constitutes a question of federal law. See United States v. Mateo, 271 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2001). However, that may be, the manner in which "state law treats an event in its own court system is relevant to deciding how to classify the event for federal purposes." Florentino, 385 F.3d at 62. Thus, the Turner decision to allow the first-tier conviction to remain intact brings his case squarely within the failure-to-prosecute rule cited in Florentino. Affirmed.