Source: https://casetext.com/case/feldman-v-state-1
Timestamp: 2020-02-28 18:09:58
Document Index: 677792221

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 2', 'Art. 37', '§ 2', 'Art. 37', '§ 2', 'Art. 35', '§ 2', 'Art. 35', 'art. 37', '§ 2', 'Art. 37', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', 'Art. 37', '§ 2', '§ 2']

Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738 | Casetext
See Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. 1998). If, on the other hand, the potential juror makes a…
Appellant then objected to the seating of the twelfth juror, thereby preserving any error for review on…
Full title:DOUGLAS ALAN FELDMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
Date published: Feb 20, 2002
71 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
holding that the detriment from an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is that the defendant was forced to take an identified objectionable juror whom he would have struck had the trial court granted his challenge for cause or granted him additional peremptory strikes
Summary of this case from Comeaux v. State
Delivered: February 20, 2002.
We grant rehearing on our own motion and withdraw our prior opinion. Appellant was convicted of capital murder in August 1999. Tex. Penal Code Ann.§ 19.03(a). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071§ 2(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071§ 2(h). Appellant raises twenty-one points of error but does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at either stage of trial. Appellant's points of error will be addressed in the chronological order of trial, and the facts will be set out only as necessary to address those points. We affirm.
Unless otherwise indicated all future references to Articles refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
To preserve error on denied challenges for cause, an appellant must demonstrate on the record that: 1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause; 2) he used a peremptory challenge on the complained-of venireperson; 3) all his peremptory challenges were exhausted; 4) his request for additional strikes was denied; and 5) an objectionable juror sat on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997). The record in this case shows that appellant exhausted all fifteen of his peremptory challenges, requested and received an additional challenge, used that challenge, and again requested, but was denied, further challenges. Appellant then objected to the seating of the twelfth juror, thereby preserving any error for review on appeal.
When the trial judge errs in overruling a challenge for cause against a venireperson, the defendant is harmed if he uses a peremptory strike to remove the venireperson and thereafter suffers a detriment from the loss of the strike. Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). Because the record reflects that appellant received an extra peremptory challenge in addition to the fifteen he was granted by statute, appellant can only demonstrate harm by showing that at least two of the complained-of challenges were erroneously denied. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 732 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 (1995); Martinez v. State, 763 S.W.2d 413, 425 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the court's ruling. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 488 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106 (1996). We give great deference to the trial court's decision because the trial judge is present to observe the demeanor of the venireperson and to listen to his tone of voice. Id. Particular deference is given when the potential juror's answers are vacillating, unclear or contradictory. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 568 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000).
Appellant may properly challenge any prospective juror who has a bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which he is entitled to rely. Art. 35.16(c)(2). The test is whether the bias or prejudice would substantially impair the prospective juror's ability to carry out his oath and instructions in accordance with law. See, e.g., Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 489; Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Before a prospective juror can be excused for cause on this basis, however, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985 (1999).
In point of error nine, appellant complains about prospective juror G. Henry. Specifically, he complains that the trial court erred in denying his challenge to Henry because the prospective juror indicated that: 1) he would automatically answer the future dangerousness issue "yes" based upon his finding of guilt; and 2) he would be more inclined to believe a police officer's testimony over that of a lay witness. Article 37.071§ 2(c), requires the State to prove the future dangerousness and "anti-parties" special issues beyond a reasonable doubt. Any veniremember who would automatically answer either of those special issues in the affirmative or who would place the burden of proof on the defense is challengeable for cause under Article 35.16(c)(2) for having a bias or prejudice against a law applicable to the case upon which the defense is entitled to rely. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000). Further, a juror who cannot impartially judge the credibility of the witnesses is challengeable for cause for having a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant. Art. 35.16(a)(9); see also Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985 (1999). We must review the entirety of Henry's voir dire to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the court's determination.
The "anti-parties" special issue is set out in art. 37.071,§ 2(b)(2):
Q. I know you've heard that a lot of people feel that, you know, if you were to prove a person guilty of killing two people, that they would automatically answer that yes. But people that would automatically answer yes are not going to be qualified for the jury, okay, because the law requires you, after you find a person guilty, to sort of step back, take a breather, come to a stop at this stop sign, and reconsider all the evidence that you've heard both from the first part and then in the second part of the trial before you answer that question. And if you're not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, you know, you may have a situation here where — again, some of the examples are extreme. But you may have a situation where, yeah, a person did knowingly and intentionally kill two people during a liquor store robbery. But once they came out, say the police shot them and paralyzed them. Well, they are guilty of killing two people, but is that guy going to be any type of a continuing danger to society? Don't think so.
Q. So you see that there are situations —
Q. — that come up like that.
Q. And that's what I need to know is, are you going to — The way you personally feel about this, Mr. Henry, is there any way that you're going to be able to set aside your personal feelings?
The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing his challenge is proper. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 128 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 25 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); see also Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 846 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting). The proponent does not meet his burden until he has shown that the venireman understood the requirement of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow it. Id.
Looking at the record of Garcia's voir dire, we note that the judge and the prosecutor instructed Garcia on the procedure involved in a capital case; Garcia said that she could follow that procedure. During the State's questioning, the prosecutor again explained the punishment questions and emphasized that a juror must consider those questions with an open mind and answer them according to the evidence. Garcia agreed that she would consider all of the facts and circumstances before answering the future dangerousness question. However, during questioning by defense counsel, Garcia stated that killing two people during the same transaction or course of conduct was an especially heinous crime in her opinion, and that death was the appropriate penalty. Upon clarification by the prosecutor, Ms. Garcia said that she thought that the defense attorney was asking her about her reasoning process if "there was already evidence to prove" future dangerousness. In a colloquy that followed, she reiterated that she would keep an open mind on the future dangerousness issue:
For example, when the prosecutor asked Ms. Garcia if she could keep an "open mind as to either option depending on the facts," she responded:
Q. So you're not one of those that says automatically kill him because I've already —
With regard to points twelve and thirteen, even assuming that the trial court erred in its application of Article 35.16(b)(3), appellant has not shown that the error deprived him of a lawfully constituted jury. Without such a showing, reversal is not required. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 985 (1999). Points of error twelve and thirteen are overruled.
On the other hand, whether a venireperson was properly challenged based upon her views of the death penalty is a matter of constitutional dimension and requires a different analysis. See Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 390-91. Under Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), a venireperson may be excluded for cause consistent with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when his views on capital punishment are such that they would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Clark v. State, 929 S.W.2d 5, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 942 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 997 (1992); Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 888 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839 (1992). However, prospective jurors may not be excused merely because their beliefs about the death penalty might influence the decision-making process. Clark, supra. In reviewing such an issue, we give deference to the trial court's decision to exclude a prospective juror and will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. See Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Furthermore, we will uphold the trial court's decision when a prospective juror's answers are "vacillating, unclear, or contradictory." Id.
Finally, the prosecutor described the actual procedure involved when a person is executed — from the person's life in a small cell to the process of lethal injection. After he finished his explanation, the prosecutor again asked Dreifke whether she could participate in this process. At this time, the venireperson answered that she did not think that she could and to do so would go against her conscience.
Because Dreifke vacillated on her ability to follow the law and ultimately told the court that she was not sure whether she could perform the duty entrusted her, the trial judge was within his discretion in determining that her views on capital punishment would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath. Wainwright, supra; see also Rocha, 16 S.W.3d at 6; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Point of error fourteen is overruled.
To determine whether a charge on a lesser-included offense should be given, this Court has implemented a two-step test. See Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (plurality opinion). The first step is to decide whether the offense is actually a lesser-included offense of the offense charged. See Art. 37.09; see also, e.g., Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919 (1993); Aguilar, 682 S.W.2d at 558. Murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder. See Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Hence, the first prong of the test is satisfied.
Article 37.09 defines a lesser-included offense:
The second step of the Aguilar/Rousseau test requires that the record contain some evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8; Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672. In other words, there must be some evidence from which a rational jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting him of the lesser-included offense. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8. The evidence must establish the lesser-included offense as a valid rational alternative to the charged offense. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 113-14 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1407 (2001).
In Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), this Court explained why the evidence raising a lesser-included must provide a viable and rational alternative to the greater offense:
After the shooting, appellant stopped for a period of time in a mall parking lot off the highway. He then rode back to where Everett's truck had stopped to determine whether Everett was dead. Appellant then headed for home. After riding approximately eleven miles, however, appellant passed an Exxon service station where Nicolas Velasquez, a tanker truck driver for Exxon, was refilling the gas supply for the station. Velasquez had just finished filling the ground tanks and was walking towards the service station entrance when appellant drove into the station area and shot Velasquez twice in the back, killing him. Appellant finally drove home.
The evidence showed that the total elapsed time between the two murders was 45 minutes.
Appellant was apparently in Dallas County at that time.
Appellant was indicted for killing Nicolas Velasquez by shooting him with a firearm and, during the same criminal transaction, killing Robert Stephen Everett by shooting him with a firearm. In the alternative, appellant was indicted for killing Nicolas Velasquez by shooting him with a firearm and, during a different criminal transaction but pursuant to the same scheme and course of conduct, killing Robert Stephen Everett by shooting him with a firearm. After his arrest, but prior to trial, appellant admitted responsibility for the shootings in letters that he mailed from jail to a police detective and to one of the prosecutors working on the case. In the letter to the police detective, appellant stated that the murders resulted from a traffic altercation with Everett, "after which [appellant] erupted in rage and subsequently committed the attacks[.]"
Under either theory, appellant would be guilty of capital murder for killing two different people under Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7) either:
Appellant was charged at trial with both alternative theories alleged in the indictment and the jury found him guilty "as charged in the indictment." See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7)(A) and (a)(7)(B). When the State has tried a defendant on an indictment in which alternative theories of capital murder are alleged, the defendant is entitled to a requested lesser-included offense charge if a rational jury could convict him only on the lesser-included offense after considering each of the alternative theories of commission. See Arevalo v. State, 970 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
As this Court explained in Arevalo:
In the instant case, the State presented evidence on all three theories of aggravation [from sexual assault to aggravated sexual assault], and the jury charge required the jury to find only one of the three to convict of aggravated sexual assault. If the evidence was disputed on only one of those theories and the evidence on the remaining two was uncontested, the jury could not rationally find Appellant guilty only of the lesser. Therefore, we hold that if sufficient evidence of more than one theory of the greater offense is presented to allow the jury to be charged on alternate theories, the second prong of the Royster/Aguilar test is satisfied only if there is evidence which, if believed, refutes or negates every theory which elevates the offense from the lesser to the greater. See Schweinle v. State, 915 S.W.2d 17, 19-20 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). Only if every theory properly submitted is challenged would the jury be permitted to find the defendant guilty only of the lesser offense.
Under the first theory alleged, the jury was authorized to convict appellant if it found that he had murdered both victims during the same criminal transaction. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7)(A). Although the legislature did not define the term "same criminal transaction" in the statute, this Court has interpreted that phrase to mean "a continuous and uninterrupted chain of conduct occurring over a very short period of time . . . in a rapid sequence of unbroken events." Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 311-312 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051 (1993); Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 941 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 997 (1992).
This Court noted in Corwin v. State, 870 S.W.2d 23, 28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 826 (1994), that the sponsors of the bill that became this penal provision intended subsection (B) to embrace "serial" murders. The Revised Bill Analysis for the legislation gave as an example of same scheme or course of conduct one who, "e.g. kills all Senators over the course of a year for snubbing his legislation." Id. The evidence in this case shows that appellant became enraged because of a truck driver's behavior and so he killed him. Appellant's own testimony then indicated that he became enraged anew when he saw the second truck driver later that same night and, therefore, he killed him. The jury was then presented with evidence of a third attack a little more than a week later on a person appellant thought was a truck driver.
Appellant testified that he saw a diesel truck parked near where Vega was using the phone. Therefore, appellant thought that he might be a truck driver.
Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person's character or that a person acted in conformity with that character. However, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Faced with an objection, the proponent of such evidence must satisfy the trial court that the extraneous act has relevance apart from its tendency to prove character conformity. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 168 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 837-838 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 (1993). If the proponent succeeds in his task, then the trial court has discretion to admit the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). If, however, the trial court determines that the proponent has not met his burden or decides that the evidence has no relevance apart from character conformity, then the evidence is not admissible, and the trial court has no discretion in the matter. Id.
"Relevant evidence" is evidence which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Tex.R. Evid. 401. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Tex.R.Evid. 402.
While the trial court may decide that the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), it may nevertheless exclude that evidence if it determines that the probative value of the extraneous act evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Tex.R.Evid. 403. However, the trial court need not engage in this balancing test unless the opponent of the evidence further objects based upon Rule 403. Montgomery and McFarland, both supra. When the trial court balances probativeness and prejudice, a presumption exists favoring probative value. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389.
I am responsible for the criminal mischief which occurred at Central Volkswagen on 8/23/98 (shooting of windows vehicles), as well as the shooting deaths (murder) of Mr. Robert Stephen Everett (8/24/98) and Mr. Nicolas Velasquez (8/25/99) [sic] as well as the attempted murder of Mr. Antonio Vega (9/5/98).
I have no excuse for my actions other than that I was in a state of extreme emotional distress at the time. I had an altercation in traffic with Mr. Everett, after which I erupted in rage subsequently committed the attacks mentioned above.
Towards the end of the guilt/innocence phase of trial, appellant took the stand in his own defense. He now advances in points of error six through eight that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine him about extraneous offenses which he committed more than twenty years before the offense for which he was currently on trial. A defendant who takes the witness stand may be cross-examined and impeached in the same manner as any other witness. Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 219 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). Indeed, a defendant may be contradicted, impeached, discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matters, and treated in every respect as any other witness. Id. Furthermore, an appellant who "opens the door" to otherwise inadmissible evidence risks having that evidence admitted and used against him. However, the party offering the evidence may not "stray beyond the scope of the invitation." See Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).
Given the totality of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. See, e.g., Schutz, 957 S.W.2d at 71; Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The State's question asking appellant to explain his previous statement about being in trouble did not exceed the scope of the invitation appellant initially gave. Furthermore, every time appellant volunteered additional information, the State was justified in asking for clarification. Appellant's sixth through eighth points of error are overruled.
In his fifteenth point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred when it informed the jury about the forty year minimum for parole eligibility if a life sentence were assessed, but then further instructed the jury not to consider that minimum in answering the future dangerousness issue. See Art. 37.071 § 2(b). Appellant concedes that he failed to object to these instructions, but argues that the "error" caused him egregious harm, necessitating reversal under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). This Court has repeatedly held that parole eligibility is not a proper subject for the jury to consider at the sentencing phase of a capital case. See, e.g., Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); see also, Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1407 (2001). Even if we were to assume that the trial court committed error, there is no possibility that the parole instructions caused appellant egregious harm because parole was not an issue applicable to appellant's case. See, e.g, Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929 (1998). Point of error fifteen is overruled.
This Court has held repeatedly that the trial court need not define such terms because the jury is presumed to understand them without instruction. See, e.g., Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 572-73 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000). Appellant has given us no reason to revisit these holdings. Point of error sixteen is overruled.
In his seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth points of error, respectively, appellant argues that the "12/10 Rule" of Article 37.071 §§ 2(d)(2) and 2(f)(2) is unconstitutional and that the death penalty scheme allows the jury unlimited discretion in violation of the federal and state constitutions. We have previously addressed and rejected these contentions. Appellant raises no new arguments here. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 885 (2001); Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826 (1996). Points of error seventeen through nineteen are overruled.
Appellant asserts in his twentieth and twenty-first points of error that the "cumulative effect" of all of the above errors denied him due process under the federal constitution and due course of law under the Texas constitution. A number of errors may be found harmful in their cumulative effect. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000). However, cumulative error has not been shown here. See Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 537. Points of error twenty and twenty-one are overruled.
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