Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/697/402/11004/
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 04:17:24
Document Index: 445625603

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 309', '§ 325', '§ 309', '§ 325', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 325', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 309', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 151', '§ 307', '§ 151']

Tele-media Corporation, Tele-media Company of Key West, Appellants, v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee,board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, Florida,american Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Intervenors, 697 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1983 › Tele-media Corporation, Tele-media Company of Key West, Appellants, v. Federal Communications Commis...
Tele-media Corporation, Tele-media Company of Key West, Appellants, v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee,board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, Florida,american Broadcasting Companies, Inc., Intervenors, 697 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 697 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1983) Argued Jan. 21, 1982. Decided Jan. 7, 1983. As Amended Jan. 7, 1983
Before EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, DAVIS* , Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
In January, 1977, the County submitted applications to the FCC to construct and operate a number of UHF television translators in order to rebroadcast the signals of five Miami, Florida, television stations. Tele-Media asked the Commission to deny the County's applications outright or to designate them for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e). Tele-Media contended that the FCC was required to hold such a hearing because Tele-Media, an existing cable operator in the area, had provided substantial evidence that the licensing of the County's translator system would cause economic injury to the company and that injury would redound to the public detriment. The company also argued that the County had not obtained the retransmission broadcast consent required by 47 U.S.C. § 325(a), lacked the funds required to construct and operate the proposed system, and had not shown a need for the translator project. Finally, the company argued that the applications should not be acted upon until the conclusion of a pending FCC rulemaking proceeding.3 Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the FCC unconditionally granted the County's applications. Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, Florida, 72 F.C.C.2d 683 (1979). Because we find that the company has raised no specific and material questions of fact that would warrant remand for the requested hearing, and because we find that the Commission correctly concluded that grant of the County's applications is in the public interest, we affirm the Commission's order in all respects.
On January 13, 1977, the County filed with the Commission its applications for construction permits for the translators.13 Petitions to deny the applications were filed by Tele-Media, raising five substantive objections to the proposal. It argued that these objections required the Commission to deny the applications outright or to designate them for hearing pursuant to section 309(e) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e). J.A. 81-161, 162-283.
First, it asserted that the competition offered by the County's translators would result in the elimination of local programming originated by Tele-Media and would ultimately bankrupt the CATV system.14 Tele-Media argued that our decision in Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958), compelled the FCC to hold an evidentiary hearing in this case. In Carroll, the court's focus was directed toward projected competition between an existing broadcast licensee and an applicant for a new broadcast station. We were concerned about protecting the public interest in those instances where an additional broadcast station in the market would have such a severe economic impact on an existing broadcast station as to compel it to reduce or discontinue its public service programming, programming that would not be replaced by the new entrant. The court ruled that "when an existing licensee offers to prove that the economic effect of another station would be detrimental to the public interest, the Commission should afford an opportunity for presentation of such proof and, if the evidence is substantial ..., should make a finding or findings." 258 F.2d at 443. While Tele-Media recognized that the Carroll decision involved competition between an existing broadcasting station and a potential broadcast licensee, J.A. 200, it asserted that the doctrine should apply to existing cable systems threatened by broadcasting services, J.A. 201. Because the company contended that it had "more than [met] the requisite Carroll tests," J.A. 205, it claimed that a hearing on the Carroll issue was required.
Second, the company asserted that the County had not obtained from the five Miami stations adequate consent to rebroadcast their signals as required by section 325(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 325(a). J.A. 84. Tele-Media argued that the language of the statute, as interpreted by the Commission and the courts, required program-by-program consent of each licensee whose programs were to be rebroadcast. J.A. 84. The County had only obtained blanket consents from the originating stations and the networks that were contingent on obtaining approval of the copyright owners, and had not yet negotiated agreements with program syndicators.
The public affairs program [s] that are the Court's concern in Carroll are those that broadcasters develop and fashion to meet community needs and problems after an exhaustive ascertainment procedure that is reviewed by the Commission. These programs, the very heart of broadcasters' public interest obligations, are mandatory and subject to our review every three years.
Under section 309(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d), the Commission, after consideration of the pleadings and other matters that it may officially notice, is required to grant license applications that fail to raise "substantial and material questions of fact," if the license would serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." If a substantial and material question of fact is raised or if for any reason the Commission cannot make a finding that the grant of an application will serve the public interest, section 309(e), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e), requires that the application be designated for hearing. Under the statutory scheme, any party in interest may file a petition to deny a pending application. This petition, however, must "contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show ... that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with the [public interest]." 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1). If the Commission determines that such a showing has not been made, it may dismiss the petition to deny with "a concise statement of the reasons for denying the petition, which statement shall dispose of all substantial issues raised by the petition." 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2).
The statutory scheme, therefore, does not mandate that every application pending before the Commission be designated for hearing. If no factual disputes exist or no specific allegations have been made in the petition to deny, there is no need for a hearing.19 Where factual disputes exist, a hearing is not automatically required, for " [c]ontradictory allegations and affidavits which create some possibly unresolved factual issue do not invariably necessitate an evidentiary hearing before the Commission can judge whether an assignment would be in the public interest."20 To determine whether a "specific and material" question of fact has been raised, this court must consider whether "relevant facts were adequately presented" to the Commission and whether any material properly before the Commission suggests "that a further hearing would produce additional facts that might change the result."21 After careful review of the evidence submitted by the company to the Commission, we conclude that the allegations contained in the petition to deny raised no "specific and material" questions of fact that would warrant an evidentiary hearing on the County's applications and that the Commission acted properly when it granted the County's applications, finding them to be in the public interest.
Tele-Media asserts that the Commission erred when it failed to apply the doctrine enunciated in Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958),22 to the instant case. The company maintains that an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) is mandated to evaluate the public injury that is said to result if the County's proposed translator system is authorized. The company urges that the FCC's order makes a "mockery" of the Carroll rule23 and is inconsistent with its stated desire to promote cable carriage of local programming.
Cable systems,31 however, are not subject to the Commission's public interest programming requirements. As interstate communication, cable is regulated by the FCC.32 In 1968, however, the Supreme Court limited the Commission's regulatory authority under the Communications Act of 1934 to that "reasonably ancillary" to the discharge of its authority to regulate over-the-air broadcasting.33 Acting pursuant to this "reasonably ancillary" standard, the FCC promulgated a host of cable regulations. The Commission extended broadcasting's fairness doctrine34 and equal time requirements35 to cable.36 It also adopted a comprehensive regulating scheme designed to ensure public, governmental, educational, and leased access37 to cable systems.38 The Supreme Court, however, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 99 S. Ct. 1435, 59 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1979), invalidated these access requirements. The Court held that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating these rules because they were not reasonably ancillary to the regulation of broadcasting. Id. at 708, 99 S. Ct. at 1445.
This case is thus quite unlike the situation in H & B Communications Corp. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969), upon which Tele-Media relies. In that case, it appeared that a new translator system might electronically interfere with the reception of television programming by an existing cable system's subscribers. This court held that the Commission should weigh the interests of cable subscribers against those of the rest of the community wishing to receive the free translator programming. Where one system would eclipse the other as a matter of pure physics, thereby foreclosing the community's chance to choose between the two, the location of the public interest was in doubt.
Here, however, it is clear that the installation of the translator system will provide the residents of the County with a choice of systems, which is surely in the public interest. See H & B; see also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475, 60 S. Ct. 693, 697, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940) ("Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive to the public."). That local-origination programming might be reduced would be of countervailing concern except that there is no assurance that Tele-Media will continue to provide that programming in any case. In these circumstances, the Commission could properly ignore the potential diminution in local programming as beyond the scope of the Carroll doctrine. See Board of County Commissioners, 72 F.C.C.2d at 686-87.45
Section 325(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 325(a), provides that no licensed broadcast station may "rebroadcast the program or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority of the originating station." The Commission has expressly applied this requirement of retransmission consent to translators:
The Commission, however, has recognized that, as a practical matter, the translator applicant must have a strong likelihood of obtaining the requisite consents, for without them the grant of an application would be essentially a "futile act." Springfield Television Broadcasting Corp., 34 F.C.C.2d 830, 831 (1972). To ensure that its action will not be "futile," the Commission requires each translator applicant to represent that it has obtained the requisite section 325(a) consent of the originating station when its construction permit application is filed. See FCC Form 346, sec. I, question 4(b), reprinted in 47 Fed.Reg. 21,505 (1982). Typically, the consents obtained by the translator applicants are not unconditional or unqualified; the Commission and this court have recognized that originating stations have justifiable reason for refusing to grant absolute, blanket permission for retransmitting their signals.46 See WBBF, Inc., 24 F.C.C. 179, 186-88 (1958), aff'd sub nom. Federal Broadcasting System v. FCC, 266 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 822, 80 S. Ct. 68, 4 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1959). Accordingly, the Commission has not required a translator applicant to provide evidence of absolute satisfaction of section 325(a) consent requirements prior to initial licensing. It has processed and granted translator applications when the applicant has only provided qualified consents from originating stations.47
We therefore hold that when a translator applicant has filed applications for construction permits with the Commission, the Commission is empowered to authorize construction of the translators without requiring the applicant to produce retransmission consents for each program under contemplation for rebroadcast. We do not decide whether individual consent by each program owner is a necessary prerequisite for actual rebroadcast of the programs or whether section 325(a) merely requires the consent of the "originating station" for translator operation. The proposed translator system for the County has not yet been built and will not be ready to rebroadcast programs for quite some time. Accordingly, determination of the question of whether the County has secured the consents required by section 325(a) in anticipation of operating the system would be premature at this time. See generally Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S. Ct. 461, 463-464, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937).
Tele-Media next challenges the financial qualifications of the County, asserting that a hearing is required pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) to resolve factual questions involving the accuracy of cost projections and availability of committed funding. We find their contentions to be general and conclusory, lacking the specificity required by statute. These allegations, therefore, do not raise substantial and material questions of fact appropriate for a hearing.49
On appeal, Tele-Media argues that the Commission decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Commission simply accepted the County's cost estimate and budget allocation as evidence that the County had the ability to finance the project. This action, asserts the company, is directly contrary to the stringent financial qualifications test that the Commission adopted in Ultravision Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 544 (1965). It urges this court to remand the case to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) on the issue of the County's financial resources.
We reject the company's suggestion that we should remand this case to the Commission. At the outset, we note that the figures submitted by the County to the Commission are estimates, not balance sheets. The County, in its applications and subsequent amendments, provided detailed explanations of the cost of the proposed translator system. Tele-Media asserted that these estimates were not realistic. It failed, however, to carry its burden under section 309(d) (1) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1): it failed to present "specific allegations of fact" that called into question the accuracy of the County's estimates. The company has not demonstrated that these cost estimates are not reflective of current market costs.50 It has not offered to submit particularized evidence to support its allegation that the County's cost estimates are inaccurate or insufficient.51 Because the company failed to present any specific allegations of fact that challenged the County's estimates of construction and operating costs, the Commission had no statutory obligation to designate a hearing on this issue.
Similarly, the challenge to the availability of the funds must also fail. In reviewing applications for translator licenses, the Commission has required applicants to demonstrate no more than a "reasonable assurance" that the funds will be available at the proper time. Crosby N. Boyd, 57 F.C.C.2d 475, 489 (1976); see also Multi-State Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 590 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Jay Sadow, 39 F.C.C.2d 808, 810 (Rev.Bd.1973). In its applications, the County clearly showed that it had budgeted for the then most recent fiscal year $575,000 for the proposed translators, some $45,000 more than the estimated cost of construction and first-year operation. Board of County Commissioners, 72 F.C.C.2d at 688; J.A. 804-24. The County demonstrated that the money had been appropriated from available funds, that there was no question as to its availability, that the funds had been appropriated expressly for the translator system, and that neither ratification by the voters nor approval by any other government body was necessary. J.A. 295. The County also submitted an opinion letter from the Board's legal adviser stating his opinion that under Florida law the expenditures budgeted for the translators constituted a fixed appropriation the funding of which was guaranteed. J.A. 399. It is therefore our view that the County demonstrated, with reasonable assurance, that the funds necessary for construction and operation of the system were available and committed.52
In its reply brief on appeal, however, Tele-Media asserts that the showing of need that is required by the language of section 74.732(b) is need for a single entity to own all the translators required to provide service to the area. Reply Brief of the Appellants at 32. Given the evident thrust of the section to deal with multiple ownership and duopoly, the company's reading is not implausible. Nevertheless, we think the language of the relevant phrase--"an appropriate showing of need for such additional stations"--should be read to require, if anything, only a showing that additional translators are needed to serve an area, and not that there is some special need for a single entity to own all of them. This appears to have been the Commission's consistent interpretation of the showing of need that would be required,60 and we must give the agency's interpretation of its own rules "controlling weight" unless it is "plainly erroneous." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S. Ct. 792, 801, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965), quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945).
Florida state courts rejected that challenge and affirmed the County's right to operate the translators. Cable-Vision, Inc. v. Freeman, 324 So. 2d 149 (Fla.App.1975), appeal dismissed, 336 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.1976) (mem.), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 429 U.S. 1032, 97 S. Ct. 723, 50 L. Ed. 2d 743 (1977)
Tele-Media's criticism of the engineering proposal had related to the sufficiency of the County's justification for use of frequencies below Channel 55. The Commission noted that the County's channel selection was "premised on not duplicating frequencies" and that " [t]his criterion [was] necessitated by the unusually good propagation conditions in the Keys." Id. at 693. Although Tele-Media had asserted that the propagation problem could be resolved in an alternative manner, J.A. 153, 373-74, the Commission explained that that alternative would probably force some viewers to purchase more than one antenna, 72 F.C.C.2d at 693.
Tele-Media's assertion that the proposed translators would constitute unfair competition was also found to be without basis. The company had complained that although the cable system would be subject to copyright liability, the translators would be exempt. The Commission, however, observed that "the thrust of [those] allegations [was] regulatory parity between translators and cable television" and that " [a]n adjudicatory proceeding is not the proper vehicle in which to consider such a question." Id. at 691-92.
West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (footnote omitted)
Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
Broadcast Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 390 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 324 F.2d 402, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also Marsh v. FCC, 436 F.2d 132, 135-36 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-69, 88 S. Ct. 1994, 1999-2000, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1001 (1968)
Id. at 178, 88 S. Ct. at 2005
47 C.F.R. Sec. 73.1910 (1981). See Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed.Reg. 26,372 (1974); In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The Supreme Court has upheld the doctrine as consistent with the Communications Act and the first amendment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1969)
47 U.S.C. § 315. The equal time provision compels broadcasters to "afford equal opportunities" to any "legally qualified candidate" for a public office, once one candidate for the same office has been permitted to "use" the broadcaster's station. All candidates can be charged no more than the station's standard charge. An appearance by an incumbent or any challengers on a bona fide newscast, news interview or documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event is exempt from this provision. Id
In 1969, the FCC adopted a "mandatory origination" rule. 34 Fed.Reg. 17,651 (1969). It required cable television systems with over 3500 subscribers to originate a significant amount of local programming. This rule was promulgated for the purpose of "increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services." Id. at 17,651. The rule was sustained by a sharply divided Supreme Court in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 92 S. Ct. 1860, 32 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1972). The implementation of the rule had been stayed during the course of the litigation. Shortly after the decision issued, the FCC rescinded the rule. The Commission found that " [t]he net effect of attempting to require origination has been the expenditure of large amounts of money for programming that was, in many instances, neither wanted by subscribers nor beneficial to the system's total operation." 39 Fed.Reg. 43,302, 43,308 p 33 (1974). The Commission said that the "creativity and interest" necessary for effective local programming would be better fostered by market demand or operator interest than by legal requirement. Id
In 1976, the Commission revised these access rules and extended their coverage to include all cable systems with more than 3500 subscribers. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements, 41 Fed.Reg. 20,665 (1976). These rules called for systems to have a minimum 20-channel capacity and the capability to return nonvoice communication. 47 C.F.R. Sec. 76.252 (1979). To the extent of their "activated channel capability," cable stations had to dedicate four channels for public access. Id. Sec. 76.254(a). A minimum of one channel had to be set aside for shared access. Id. Sec. 76.254(b). A local production studio and equipment had to be available for public access. Id. Sec. 76.256(a). Cable operators were barred from controlling the content of these channels. Id. Sec. 76.256(b). Access had to be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. Secs. 76.256(d) (1)-(3). Operators were barred from charging for channel time on one public access channel. Id. Sec. 76.256(c) (2). They were barred for five years from charging for time on educational and governmental channels. Id. Sec. 76.256(c) (1). Facilities used to provide a live public access program of up to five minutes in length had to be provided free. Id. Sec. 76.256(c) (3). Beyond that, charges for public access production facilities had to be "reasonable." Id.
In July of 1980, the FCC largely deregulated cable television, eliminating the principal rules that had restricted the number and types of signals a cable operator could provide to its subscribers, although the mandatory-local-carriage, nonduplication, and sports-carriage rules remained in effect. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 45 Fed.Reg. 60,186 (1980). For a thorough discussion of the effect of the deregulation on the cable and broadcasting industry, see Note, The Collapse of Consensus: Effects of the Deregulation of Cable Television, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1981).
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 315 with 47 C.F.R. Sec. 76.205 (1981)
In its recent low-power-television rulemaking, the Commission reaffirmed its holding in the instant case, restating it as " [o]ur holding in Monroe County Board of Commissioners, 42 FCC 2d 683 (1979), that the 'Carroll' doctrine should not apply to cable systems." Low-Power TV Rules, 47 Fed.Reg. 21,468, 21,484 p 64 (1982) (final rules). A broad reading of this statement might lead one to infer that a Carroll-type hearing is never required to sort out the effect on the public interest of a translator license that might have some effect on an existing cable system. In light of H & B, we cannot endorse such a broad reading. In our view, the Commission's decision in the instant case is only that Carroll does not apply to the projected loss due to economic competition of local-origination programming voluntarily produced by cable stations
As the Commission pointed out in its brief on appeal, Brief for Appellee at 36 n.23, the result in this case is consistent with its statutory mandate to make communications service available "to all the people of the United States," 47 U.S.C. § 151 (emphasis added). In implementing this command, the Commission has established as a priority in assigning licenses that each community be provided with "at least one television broadcast station." See Thunder Bay Broadcasting Corp., 47 F.C.C.2d 1227, 1239 n.22 (1974) (emphasis added), quoting Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167 (1952). A denial of the application in this case would be contrary to this statutory and regulatory policy because it would promote local television service to some--those who can afford to pay for Tele-Media's cable programming--at the expense of even minimal service to all. It is unclear to what extent the Commission relied on this rationale in its decision, however, and so we place no weight on it here. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L. Ed. 1995 (1947).
This licensing policy recognizes the practical problems inherent in Tele-Media's approach. An originating station does not own the copyrights for many of the programs scheduled for broadcast, and it may require the translator operator to obtain the rebroadcast authority from the copyright holder. See, e.g., Letter of WTVJ, J.A. 421; Letter of WCKT, J.A. 425. An originating station cannot predict whether one of its program suppliers might impose contract provisions requiring it to deny rebroadcast with respect to specific programming. See, e.g., License Agreement of Warner Brothers, J.A. 723; Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 412 F.2d 162, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Every originating station has a number of program suppliers whose identities vary over time and whose interests cannot be readily ascertained in advance of a translator's licensing. In this instance, the County's ability to secure the consent of every program supplier in advance of its translator authorization was hampered by the fact that the originating stations had not planned their program schedules and that the identities of the specific syndicators were thus unknown. When the County approached four major syndicators--Warner Brothers, Viacom International, Inc., United Artists, and Paramount Pictures Corp.--each syndicator refused to write a blanket consent agreement and indicated that it would determine whether to grant consent on a case-by-case basis depending on such factors as the particular program involved, market considerations, and the payment of additional license fees. J.A. 787-88
We note that if a hearing could be invoked merely upon the assertion of financial inability, the Commission's task under 47 U.S.C. § 307 would be a hopeless one
47 U.S.C. § 151 provides that the FCC's power to regulate communications was created "so as to make [communications service] available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States." (Emphasis added.) See supra note 45. See also C.J. Community Servs. v. FCC, 246 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("it is the clear duty of the Commission to devise ... the basis upon which 'all the people of the United States' may receive service through a licensed station")