Source: https://casetext.com/case/peter-pan-fabrics-inc-v-martin-weiner-corp
Timestamp: 2019-02-16 10:25:42
Document Index: 660496352

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 21', '§ 5', '§ 10', '§ 19', '§ 21', '§ 10']

Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp, 274 F.2d 487 | Casetext
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.
274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
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Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc.v.Martin Weiner Corp.
United States Court of Appeals, Second CircuitJan 27, 1960
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…The appeals court has in effect held: (1) That there was no genuine issue as to any facts material to the…
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holding that two works are substantially similar if "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same"
Summary of this case from JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc.
noting that "no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the `idea,&apos; and has borrowed its `expression&apos;" and that such decisions hence must "inevitably be ad hoc"
Summary of this case from Murray Hill Pubs. v. Twentieth Century Fox
discussing what the court termed as "verbal works," the court stated "[T]here can be no copyright in the `ideas&apos; disclosed but only in their `expression.&apos; Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the `idea,&apos; and has borrowed its `expression.&apos; Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."
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No. 90, Docket 25716.
Samuel J. Silverman and Frederick E.N. Ballon, New York City, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton Garrison, New York City, Irving Younger, Forest Hills, N.Y., of counsel, for appellant.
Bernard A. Helfat, Helfat Helfat, New York City, J. Nathan Helfat, New York City, of counsel, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a preliminary injunction, granted by Judge Herlands, forbidding the defendant to copy an ornamental design, printed upon cloth. The plaintiffs — which for the purposes of this appeal are to be regarded as one — and the defendant are both "converters" of textiles, used in the manufacture of women's dresses. A "converter" buys uncolored cloth upon which he prints ornamental designs, and which he then sells to dressmakers. The plaintiffs bought from a Parisian designer a design, known as "Byzantium," which it registered as a "reproduction of a work of art," (§ 5(h) of Title 17 U.S. Code) and for which the Copyright Office issued Certificate No. H. 7290. This design they print upon uncolored cloth, sold in bolts to dressmakers. The cloth, so "converted," bears upon its edge at each repetition of the design printed "notices" of copyright which are concededly adequate under the Copyright Law. The buyers of the bolts cut the cloth into suitable lengths and use it to make women's dresses; but in doing so, they either altogether cut off the selvage which bears the notices, or else they sew the adjacent edges of the cloth together at the seams in such a way that the notices are not visible unless the seams are pried, or cut, apart, or unless the dress is turned inside out. The appeal raises two questions: (1) whether the defendant has in fact copied so much of the registered design as to infringe the copyright; and (2) whether the design was dedicated to the public, because it was sold without adequate notice of copyright as required by § 10 of the statute.
I could reconcile the majority's result with the language of § 10 if, but only if, there were clear evidence that the dominant intention of Congress was to afford the widest possible copyright protection whereas the notice requirement was deemed formal or at least secondary. I find nothing to support such a stratified reading of § 10. The notice requirement goes back to almost the earliest days of copyright under the constitutional grant, Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171; its essentiality has been emphasized by the highest authority, Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 1903, 190 U.S. 260, 23 S.Ct. 769, 47 L.Ed. 1040, Mifflin v. Dutton, 1903, 190 U.S. 265, 23 S.Ct. 771, 47 L.Ed. 1043; Louis Dejonge Co. v. Breuker Kessler Co., 1914, 235 U.S. 33, 37, 35 S.Ct. 6, 59 L.Ed. 113 and when Congress has wished to make an exception, it has known how to do so, see 17 U.S.C. § 21. The notice requirement serves an important public purpose; the copyright proprietor is protected so long and only so long as he gives effective warning to trespassers that they are entering on forbidden ground. Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., supra, 190 U.S. at page 264, 23 S.Ct. at page 771; Shapiro, Bernstein Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 2 Cir., 161 F.2d 406, 409, certiorari denied, 1947, 331 U.S. 820, 67 S.Ct. 1310, 91 L.Ed. 1837. And if the statutory requirement of notice has not been met, it is immaterial whether a particular defendant had actual knowledge of a claim of copyright or not. Metro Associated Services v. Webster City Graphic, D.C.D. Iowa 1953, 117 F. Supp. 224, 234.
I realize that the view I hold may seriously impair the use of copyright to prevent piracy in an area where this has been recognized to be rampant for thirty years, Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 2 Cir., 1929, 35 F.2d 279, certiorari denied, 1930, 281 U.S. 728, 50 S.Ct. 245, 74 L.Ed. 1145, and probably for much longer, since it may not be practicable to affix the notice to an inside seam on every repetition of the design. It can be argued also that this is to insist on a useless formality since, though there is reason for requiring notice on each copy of a book, one notice on a dress is as good as ten. But, as was held by the Supreme Court in Dejonge, it is not for the courts to say that something less than the statutory requirement will serve. Congress has not accompanied the broadening of the subjects of copyright in § 5 with a relaxation of the notice requirement of § 10, except as it has simplified the form of notice for certain subjects in § 19 and has saved against accidental omission in § 21. Nothing gives me warrant for belief that Congress would be content with the proprietor's simply affixing the copyright notice to each copy as it leaves him, when, as here, he knows that almost every notice will be removed before the copyrighted reproductions reach their intended market. As said in Louis Dejonge Co. v. Breuker Kessler, supra, 235 U.S. at page 37, 35 S.Ct. at page 6, "The appellant is claiming the same rights as if this were one of the masterpieces of the world, and he must take them with the same limitations that would apply to a portrait, a holy family, or a scene of war." To be sure, the precise defect held fatal in Dejonge is not present here since the notice was on "each copy" as it left plaintiffs, but Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition remains pertinent. So also, while I do not contend decision to be controlled by National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 594, 600, 601, opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927, Deward Rich, Inc. v. Bristol Savings Loan Corp., 4 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 537, and Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Anderson, 8 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 907, these cases are at least closer than those relied on by the District Court in holding for plaintiffs. Perhaps my brothers are right in thinking that Congress wished literal compliance with § 10 to be excused under such circumstances as here; but the voice so audible to them is silent to me.