Source: https://allthingspros.blogspot.com/2013/07/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 21:54:57
Document Index: 339156134

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application No. 20020020142', 'Application No. 20020020142', '§ 1', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 101', '§ 1', '§ 1']

All Things Pros: July 2013
Board notes differences in independent claims and reverses some rejections while affirming others
Takeaway: In an appeal involving disk drive controllers, the Board focused on differences between independent claims to reverse the obviousness rejection of several independent claims while affirming the rejection of another independent claim. The Board found that the primary reference did not disclose emulation of an ATA controller, and so reversed the rejection of claims that specifically recited such emulation. But for another claim that recited "interfacing with a [host] as through [a controller] were attached to the [host]," the Board found that the phrase "as though" did not exclude a controller actually attached to the host. Beacuse this feature was disclosed by the primary reference, the Board affirmed this rejection. (Ex parte Stolowitz, PTAB 2010.)
a host interface compliant with ATA interface specifications for interfacing with a PCI bus host as though an ATA controller were attached to the PCI host bus;
Levy is teaching that the disclosed method and design provides for RAID functionality while emulating existing IDE/ATA functionality such that the existing software drivers and software applications can still be used, this is a description of a system and method for emulating existing hardware and software functionality.
[C]learly Levey is teaching that the MIR-95 system is emulating a normal IDE ATA disk drive channel, while actually performing RAID level 1 mirroring with a plurality of ATA IDE disk drives. ... Col. 8 lines 29-34 [teaches] more specifically, "...if the disk drive adapter MIR-95 determines that the system is in a mirror mode, then for each WRITE command it will cause the same data to be written to all of the hard drives rather than to only one hard drive ...", in other words, the MIR-95 emulates the behavior of a single disk drive, but actually performs RAID level 1 disk mirroring and performs a WRITE to more than one drive.
The MIR-95 accepts the same inputs and produces that same outputs as the system represented, which is a single disk on an ATA IDE channel. However, the MIR-95 is in fact another system that simulates the functionality of a single ATA IDE channel, but actually provides the functionality of a RAID level 1 mirroring system.
According to the Examiner, "this is description of emulation as it is defined by the IEEE."
The Board reversed the rejection of claim 1, but affirmed the rejection of claim 20. With respect to claim 1, the Board found that the Examiner had mischaracterized the MIR-95 interface between the IDE controller and the physical drives:
This misses the point; Levy’s MIR-95 is not a host interface because it does not connect to the host computer. Levy’s host interface is an IDE controller, which generally is an ATA compatible controller. There is no emulation; there is identity instead.
While claim 1 actually recited "emulating an ATA controller," claim 20 did not. Claim 20 instead recited "interfacing with a PCI bus host as though an ATA controller were attached to the PCI host bus." The Board framed the issue for claim 20 as: "whether, as a matter of inferential logic, doing something as though A were true precludes A from being true."
Because claim 20 did not exclude a configuration in which the ATA controller was in fact attached to the PCI bus, the Board affirmed the rejection.
My two cents: The Board got the rejection of claim 1 right. From my own cursory reading of the reference, it appears that Levy teaches emulation, just not the emulation that was claimed. That is, Levy teaches a redundant disk controller that emulates a single disk controller. And maybe it's obvious to go from that to what the Applicant claimed. But even if the Examiner understood Levy's limited teaching and was relying on obviousness to carry the rejection the rest of the way, he didn't explain his reasoning well enough to make a prima facie case.
The Applicant got lucky here with claim 1, because the arguments were not very persuasive. The Applicant's argument amounted to little more than a quote from each cited portion of the reference, followed by a corresponding assertion that the particular quote did not amount to a teaching of the claim element at issue. That strategy doesn't usually work. This is one of those unusual cases where the gap between the reference and the claims was so large on its face that a mere assertion was all it took to convince the Board. In other words, the Examiner read way too much into the reference.
As for claim 20, I interpret it differently than the Board did. I read the phrase "as though attached" to exclude attachment. That is, I read the claim as expressing a counterfactual conditional rather than an indicative conditional. (If you're into linguistics, Wikipedia has more about conditionals here.)
The Board's affirmation of the rejection of claim 20 should have been designated as a new ground, because it definitely relied on a new claim construction, one not seen by the Applicant before the Board's decision. I say this not because the Examiner didn't make his claim construction explicit, but because at no point during prosecution did the Examiner treat claim 20 any differently than claim 1. So the only way it's fair for the Board to interpret the two claims differently on appeal is to designate an affirmed rejection as a new ground.
Finally, an important lesson here is that sometimes small differences in claim language can have big results. Here, expressing the distinguishing limitation with exactly the same language in all claims – a very common tactic for patent prosecutors – would have resulted in either a complete win or a complete loss. Instead, some of the Applicant's claims made it through appeal, even though others did not.
Labels: broadest reasonable interpretation, differences in claims
Board reverses indefiniteness of claim that references a published patent application
Takeaway: The Examiner rejected as indefinite a claim which referred to a published patent application: "A nonwoven mat ... suitable for use as the scored and folded vertical webs spanning between an exposed mat and a backer mat in a compressible ceiling tile as disclosed in published U.S. Patent Application No. 20020020142 filed April 23, 2001 ..." The Examiner cited Ex parte Fressola as authority, asserting that Fressola allowed incorporation by reference "only in exceptional circumstances where there is no practical way to define the invention in words and where it is more concise to incorporate by reference than duplicating a separate document into the claim. The Board reversed the rejection. The Board distinguished Fressola on the grounds that Fressola's claim included no limitations other than a reference to Fressola's specification and drawings. (Ex parte Jaffee, PTAB 2012.)
Ex parte Jaffee
Appeal 2010011413; Appl. No. 10/718,007; Tech. Center 1700
The application described a fibrous mat and a method of manufacturing the mat. According to the abstract, the disclosed mats are flame resistant, have good strength after being scored and folded, and are particularly useful in making lightweight, compressible ceiling panels.
The original claims to the mat specified only physical properties of the fibers and of the curing resin. To overcome prior art, the Applicant amended during prosecution to specify a number of properties of the mat itself. The Applicant also argued that "the mats of the invention were designed for ceiling tiles of the type described in U.S. 20020020142, as pointed out in the specification," while the mat in the primary reference did not have these properties. The Examiner responded by commenting that the claims were directed to a mat rather than a ceiling tile, and the claims themselves did not specify that the mat meets the requirements of the vertical, folding panels in the ceiling tile of U.S. 20020020142.
In response, the Applicant further amended one of the independent claims so that it referred to the ceiling tile. After this amendment, claim 91 read:
91. A nonwoven mat having a basis weight of 2 to about 2.6 lbs/100 sq. ft, a high flame resistance and unexpected excellent tensile strength, flex and recovery properties after scoring and folding and suitable for use as the scored and folded vertical webs spanning between an exposed mat and a backer mat in a compressible ceiling tile as disclosed in published U.S. Patent Application No. 20020020142 filed April 23, 2001, including the ability to, after being scored, folded, and compressed, to spring back to the original shape and orientation ...
the fibrous nonwoven mat comprised of
a blend of fibers comprising about 84 to about 92 wt. percent of chopped glass fibers having an average fiber diameter in the range of about 13 to about 17.5 microns and a length in the range of about 0.7 to about 1.1 inches and about 8 to about 15 wt. percent of polyester fibers having a length of about 0.25 +/0.07 inch,
the blend of fibers being bound together with about 20 to 30 wt. percent, based on the dry weight of the fibrous nonwoven mat, of a cured resin consisting essentially of a resin derived from an aqueous homopolymer or copolymer of polyacrylic acid and a polyol, with or without a polycarboxy polymer,
the fibrous nonwoven mat having a Taber Stiffness of at least about 50 gram centimeters and passing the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) Method #701 Flammability Test.
The next Office Action included an indefiniteness rejection for claim 91 because "claims may not incorporate another publication, but instead should clearly spell out the intended structure, composition, etc. of the invention." The rejection indicated that the limitation was "interpreted as intended use limitation that does not contribute to the structure or chemistry of the claimed article."
After several more rounds in which the Examiner maintained the prior art and indefiniteness rejections, the Applicant appealed both.
In arguing against indefiniteness,the Applicant first noted that the Examiner had cited no authority that prohibited a claim from referring to a published patent application. Next, the Applicant noted that claim 51 was not rejected as indefinite, even though it pointed out with less particularity, by including the "spring back to the original shape" language without reference to the publication. Third, the Applicant argued that reference to a patent publication was a concise way of describing specific "spring back" properties for which no standard test yet existed. Finally, the Applicant addressed a position taken by the Examiner in prosecution: that a claim should be self-contained and understandable by a POSITA without guidance from a separate document. According to the Applicant, "it has long been accepted and practiced to use shorthand terms and identifiers to incorporate or explain limitations in the claims." Moreover, claim 51 referenced "the NFPA Method #701 Flammability Test" and yet was not subject to an indefiniteness rejection.
In the Answer, the Examiner provided authority for the indefiniteness rejection. The Examiner relied on Ex parte Fressola (27 USPQ2d 1608, 1609 (Bd. Pat. Appl. & Inter. 1993) for the proposition that "incorporation by reference is permitted only in exceptional circumstances where there is no practical way to define the invention in words and where it is more concise to incorporate by reference than duplicating a separate document into the claim. Incorporation by reference is a necessity doctrine, not for applicant's convenience." (Emphasis added.) The Examiner asserted that here, "there is a practical way to define the invention in words as demonstrated in instant claim 51."
The Board reversed the prior art rejection and the indefiniteness rejection. In discussing the indefiniteness rejection, the Board distinguished Ex parte Fressola, where the claim relied entirely on the entire specification and figures: "42. A system for the display of stereographic three-dimensional images of celestial objects as disclosed in the specification and drawings herein." In the instant case, the reference "merely sets forth a capability requirement of the mat described in the claim," and the Examiner failed to explain "how reciting the capability requirement in that form causes the claim to fail to circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity."
My two cents: The Board got this one wrong. The claim here is different than Fressola, but is still indefinite. Patent applications disclose a lot of things, so claiming "as disclosed in patent publication X" is almost certainly indefinite. Tell me exactly what characteristics are included in a mat "suitable for use as the scored and folded vertical webs ... in U.S. 20020020142."
Is it a tile where "the dividers are elongated cells having collapsible sides so that when lateral or transverse pressure is applied to the cell in predetermined directions it will collapse into a shallow space." The publication says one embodiment contains such dividers.
Is it a tile where the dividers are "of an elongated cellular or tubular configuration." The publication says one embodiment contains such dividers.
"The inquiry under section 112, paragraph 2, now focuses on whether the claims, as interpreted in view of the written description, adequately perform their function of notifying the public of the patentee's right to exclude." Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379, 55 USPQ2d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Jaffee's claims do not provide such notice to the potential infringer or the public.
Related posts: I discussed Ex parte Fressola in another blog post: BPAI holds that claim which includes figure is not indefinite.
According to the specification, the claimed melt index was unconventional in an extrusion process, "because the resulting coating would be thought to be too soft to provide an article with useful properties." However, the inventors found that using the claimed melt index in combination with other claimed processing parameters allowed an increase in extrusion speed (recited in step c of the claim) and improved the foam quality.
The Examiner rejected the independent claims as obvious. The Examiner relied on a primary reference, Iioka, for everything except the claimed melt index, for which the Examiner relied on a secondary reference, Roox. The Examiner asserted that "melt index is a result effective variable of viscosity controlling at least ease of extrusion and is therefore subject to routine optimization."
The Board was not persuaded by any of the other arguments made by the Applicant, and so affirmed the rejection.
My two cents: Materials science isn't my area of expertise, but seems to me that the Board went a bit beyond the Examiner's actual findings. I don't see that the Examiner said Roox "focused on the melt index of the blend" – all I saw was that the Examiner relied on Roox's blend melt index to teach the claimed LDPE melt index. I certainly don't see how this "focus" led the Examiner to the conclusion that Roox taught that viscosity was controlled by melt index. All I saw was the Examiner's assertion that viscosity was controlled by melt index.
If so, the Applicant didn't frame the argument very well – the section title for the argument was "result determinative variable" rather than "unexpected results." And the Applicant didn't carry the evidentiary burden either. The Specification did include various statements that the claimed LDPE properties led to an increase in web speed. The Specification even included some technical explanation of why a POSITA would have found the results unexpected. However, case law also requires a comparison of the claims with the closest prior art. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991). No such comparison was present in the Specification, nor did the Applicant file a § 1.132 declaration making a comparison.
Labels: 103, obviousness, result effective variable, routine optimization, unexpected results
Board reverses enablement rejection for "computer readable medium" since specification discloses an integrated circuit embodiment
Takeaway: The Examiner issued a § 112 First, Enablement rejection after the Applicant changed "medium" to "computer readable medium." The Applicant appealed and pointed to the specification 's disclosure of "a processor such as a computer or an electronic data processor in accordance with code such as computer program code, software, and/or integrated circuits." The Applicant also argued that computer readable media are "so notoriously well known" that undue experimentation was not required. The Board reversed the rejection since specification did disclose "at least one embodiment of a medium as an integrated circuit coded to perform functions." (Ex parte Hofstee, PTAB 2011.)
Ex parte Hofstee
Appeal 2009006207; Appl. No. 10/763,079; Tech. Center 2400
The Applicant was directed to secure electronic communications. Original claim 22 recited
22. A computer program product for secure communications, the computer program product having a medium with a computer program embedded thereon, the computer program comprising:
When this claim was rejected under § 101, the Applicant amended to add "computer readable":
22. A computer program product for secure communications in a message source, the computer program product having a computer readable medium with a computer program embedded thereon, the computer program comprising:
The Examiner then gave a § 112 First, Enablement rejection, alleging that "the Applicant fails to sufficiently point out or describe computer readable media." The Applicant appealed this rejection, along with prior art rejections.
In the Appeal Brief, the Applicant pointed to the following passage in the specification as evidence of enablement:
[C]omputer readable media, such as floppy disks, magnetic tape, hard disk drives, random access memories, flash memories, optical disks, and the like are so notoriously well-known that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not require any undue experimentation to store computer code that performs the functions described in the instant specification onto a computer readable medium.
The Board reversed the rejection because the passage quoted above from the Applicant's specification disclosed "at least one embodiment of a medium as an integrated circuit coded to perform functions." The Board noted that enablement did not require a specification to disclose what is well known in the art (Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), and that "omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement." Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
My two cents: The Applicant was smart to focus on "undue experimentation," since the Examiner did reject under Enablement rather than Written Description. By its very nature, enablement is about what a POSITA knows and what a POSITA understands from Applicant's specification. In the computer and electronics arts, the amount of detail required about specific implementation mechanisms is relatively low. You don't need much detail about processors, logic circuits, memory, and storage. As long as enough detail is present about the claimed functions, a POSITA can generally figure out how to implement that functionality on the appropriate hardware or software platform. So it didn't surprise me that the Board reversed this Enablement rejection.
Now, had this been a § 112 First rejection under Written Description, the story would be different. In that case, the Board is less likely to be persuaded with arguments about what a POSITA knows, because the focus is instead on what the inventor possessed.
Examiners are sometimes sloppy about the distinction between Enablement and Written Description. (As is the Board ... see BPAI confuses enablement and written description.) For this reason, I read all § 112 First and Second rejections very carefully. I've even seen an Examiner throw in § 101, Enablement, Written Description, and indefiniteness, giving essentially the same explanation for all.
Labels: 112 1st, computer readable medium, enablement, written description
Takeaway: Ex parte Moody was a rare case in which an Examiner relied on personal knowledge in a rejection. During prosecution of claims directed to a paper towel dispenser, the Examiner used, as prior art, photos of a dispenser shown alongside a tape measure. The Examiner asserted that that this dispenser had been "in use in the USPTO Crystal Park 5 restrooms since at least 1999." The Applicant traversed the rejection and demanded an affidavit of personal knowledge per CFR § 1.102(a)(d)(2). The Examiner produced two affidavits, one declaring the date of use and another attesting to the measured dimensions. On appeal, the Applicant argued that the dispenser in the photo did not disclose the claimed length of the dispensing aperture relative to the length of the paper towels.
Appeal 2008005114; Appl. No. 10/004,823; Tech. Center 3600
The application was directed to a paper towel dispenser (shown below), and the limitation at issue was a shortened dispensing aperture, as emphasized.
1. A modified gravity-feed towel dispenser for dispensing C-fold and interfolded towels,
said bottom portion of said towel dispenser defining said elongated bottom dispensing aperture,
wherein an adapter plate is secured to said bottom portion of said towel dispenser and is configured to abridge the length of said dispensing aperture to a length L' of 80 percent to 90 percent of said transverse length, L, of said C-fold or interfolded towels.(Emphasis added.)
During prosecution, the Examiner rejected various claims using a combination of an issued patent (Gettelman) and a Bobrick 363 model towel dispenser. Bobrick was alleged to be prior art because it bore a "3/81 copyright date on the interior instruction panel" and had been "in use in the USPTO Crystal Park 5 restrooms since at least 1999." The Office Action included several photos of a tape measure along various parts of the dispenser. According to the Examiner, these photos showed that the Bobrick dispenser included a 9.75" dispensing slot and a towel magazine capable of holding 11" wide towels, which met the limitation of "a length L' of from about 80% to about 90% of transverse length, L, of C-fold or interfolded towels. The Examiner relied on the primary reference, Gettelman, for all other limitations.
The Applicant argued that the copyright date did not establish that the Bobrick dispenser was prior art, noted that the Examiner-supplied photographs were too blurry to accurately show dimensions, and demanded an affidavit of personal knowledge as to the dimensions measured by the Examiner:
First, in order to be prior art, the dispenser must have existed in its current form as of that date. In this regard, the copyright date on the loading instructions do not establish that the aperture on a lower part of the dispenser existed in its current form before 2000. That part of the device may have been changed or modified at any time. The Examiner has not testified that he made any measurement of any device which existed before the priority date of this application.
The rejections should also be withdrawn because the Examiner has not complied with [the personal knowledge requirement of] CFR § 1.102(a)(d)(2) ... Counsel cannot tell from the obscured photographs provided the length of the dispensing opening, nor can Applicant determine the length of towel placed therein. Other indistinguishable features include whether there are inclined terminal portions, what the angle of inclination is, the shape of the aperture, etc.
In a Final Office Action, the Examiner acceded to the Applicant's demands for clear photographs and also provided two personal affidavits. One affidavit attested to the date of use of the Bobrick dispenser as being at least August of 1999 – though the Examiner nonetheless maintained that the copyright date "establishes by preponderance of the evidence a 1981 public sale/use date." The other affidavit attested as to various dimensions, and read as follows:
Examiner's Affidavit in Support of the Measured
Bobrick Model 363 Towel Dispenser Dimensions
It would have been obvious for the Gettelman et al. retrofit adapter to have dimensions selected from those used in the proven BOBRICK 363 towel dispenser because such dispenser has proven itself effective in minimizing multiple dispensed towels and fall through and come up with the instant invention.
The magazine is well capable of holding towels exceeding the width by about 10-25% and would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to place towels of such dimensions in the dispenser ... The length of slot is sufficiently close to 90% of available towel length to obviate a slot about 80-90% of the towel length.
Furthermore, upon examination of the photographs of the dispenser [provided by the Examiner], it appears that the dispensing slot actually extends from sidewall to sidewall, just as in Fig. 3 of Gettner [the primary reference], and therefore does not at all suggest dispensing a towel through an aperture shorter than the towel.
The Applicant also attacked the Examiner's rationale for combining, arguing that there is no motivation to modify the adapter in Gettelman using the Bobrick dispenser (which did not use an adapter). According to the Applicant, "an adapter plate modifies a dispenser, not vice-versa."
In the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner disagreed with the Applicant about the width of the dispensing slot shown in the photos:
My two cents: I included the Board's discussion of why the Examiner's obviousness rationale was deficient, but did so just to be complete. My real interest in this case is the Examiner Affidavit of personal knowledge – this is the only case I can recall where the Examiner provided one. I think this is a useful example of when to ask for an affidavit, how to do so, and what to look for in the Examiner's Affidavit when he provides it.
Here, it was crystal clear that the Examiner really was relying on personal knowledge. But from what I've seen, some Applicants request a personal affidavit as sort of a boilerplate response whenever the Examiner uses Official Notice, "well known", inherency, or even KSR's "creative inferences." It's usually abundantly clear from the record that the Examiner is not relying on personal knowledge, adn in such cases I'm not sure why Applicants bother with the request. See my post Examiner affidavit of personal knowledge for some of those.
And for an example of another case where the Applicant probably should have asked for an Examiner Affidavit, check out my blog post here about Ex parte Gray. In Gray, the Examiner asserted that a patent reference was really a Gillette Mach 3 razor. The Examiner then used his own measurements of a Mach 3 razor rather than the dimensions depicted in the patent drawing. The Applicant disputed the assertion, but did not ask for an affidavit of personal knowledge. The Board ignored the Examiner's unsupported assertion.