Source: https://casetext.com/case/bryant-v-haynie
Timestamp: 2019-05-25 17:56:52
Document Index: 754191866

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 24', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 3']

Bryant v. Haynie, 216 Ga. App. 430 | Casetext
Bryant v. Haynie
216 Ga. App. 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
Bryantv.Haynie
Court of Appeals of GeorgiaJan 20, 1995
216 Ga. App. 430•454 S.E.2d 533•
DECIDED JANUARY 20, 1995. RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 28, 1995.
Although served with process, the Bryants did not answer the complaint within the 30-day period prescribed by OCGA § 9-11-12 (a) or the 15-day grace period allowed by OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). Ultimately, the Bryants moved to open the default under OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). The Bryants asserted that Haynie's complaint was defective because it did not assert facts showing that the court was the proper jurisdiction and venue in which to bring the complaint. With the parties' consent, however, the case was transferred to the State Court of DeKalb County.
1. The Bryants' allegation that the trial court erred by refusing to open the default is without merit. Under our law, a default may be opened if the Bryants satisfied the four conditions and one of the three grounds for opening a default. The four conditions are: (1) showing made under oath, (2) offer to plead instanter, (3) announcement of ready to proceed to trial, and (4) setting up a meritorious defense. The three grounds are: (1) providential cause, (2) excusable neglect, and (3) a proper case. See OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). Whether to open the default on one of the three grounds rests within the discretion of the trial judge. Powell v. Eskins, 193 Ga. App. 144, 145 ( 387 S.E.2d 389). Here, the trial court found that the Bryants met the four conditions for opening a default, but denied the motion since the three grounds were not established.
As the record is devoid of any evidence even suggesting that a providential cause (see Thomas v. State, 118 Ga. App. 748 ( 165 S.E.2d 477); Evans Pennington v. Nail, 7 Ga. App. 129, 136 ( 66 S.E. 543)) was responsible for the Bryants' failure to file a timely answer, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to open the default on that basis. Moreover, as the record plainly shows the Bryants' failure to answer was the result of their wilful disregard of their obligations under our law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that this was not a proper case for opening the default.
The Bryants' contention that the complaint was defective is without merit. The complaint was filed in Fulton County against several joint tortfeasors under 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV and OCGA § 9-10-31. Although the complaint did not specifically assert that venue against the Bryants was on this basis, the complaint did assert the facts on which venue depended. OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (2). In any event, by failing to answer, the Bryants waived any objection to venue. OCGA § 9-11-12 (h) (1); Bouldin v. Contran Corp., 167 Ga. App. 364 ( 306 S.E.2d 685).
2. The Bryants' allegation that the trial court erred by granting Haynie's motion in limine to exclude evidence of her prior recovery is also without merit. The fact and amount of a settlement with other parties is not relevant to the amount of damages to be awarded in this case and were properly excluded from the jury's consideration. OCGA § 24-2-1; Allison v. Patel, 211 Ga. App. 376, 381-385 ( 438 S.E.2d 920); Carney v. JDN Constr. Co., 206 Ga. App. 785, 787-788 ( 426 S.E.2d 611).
3. Finally, the Bryants contend the trial court erred by denying their motion in limine to exclude any evidence of special damages Haynie incurred because she did not specifically plead special damages in the complaint. Under OCGA § 9-11-9 (g), "[w]hen items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." The record shows that the complaint alleged that Haynie had incurred "far more than $200,000" in medical expenses, and in the pretrial order Haynie asserted medical expenses in excess of $265,000. There is thus no factual support for the Bryants' assertion that OCGA § 9-11-9 (g) was violated. Further, the remedy for failure to plead special damages specifically is to move for a more definite statement of Haynie's claim. Avery v. K. I., Ltd., 158 Ga. App. 640, 641 ( 281 S.E.2d 366). See also Georgia Civil Practice, § 3-3 (G). The Bryants did not so move. This enumeration of error is without merit.
DECIDED JANUARY 20, 1995 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 28, 1995.