Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/527/627
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 03:08:47
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§1', '§16', '§5', '§5', '§5', '§8', '§5', '§8', '§8', '§283', '§20', '§1338', '§711', '§21']

527 U.S. 627 | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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527 U.S. 627119 S.Ct. 2199144 L.Ed.2d 575 (527 U.S. 627119 S.Ct. 2199144 L.Ed.2d 575,
527 U.S. 627119 S.Ct. 2199144 L.Ed.2d 575) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 148 F.3d 1343, reversed and remanded.
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College Savings brought an infringement action under 35 U.S.C. 271(a) against Florida Prepaid in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in November 1994.1 By the time College Savings filed its suit, Congress had already passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), 35 U.S.C. 271(h), 296(a). Before this legislation, the patent laws stated only that "whoever" without authority made, used, or sold a patented invention infringed the patent. 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1988 ed.).2 Applying this Court's decision in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 243 (1985), the Federal Circuit had held that the patent laws failed to contain the requisite statement of intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from infringement suits. See, e.g., Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (1989). In response to Chew and similar decisions, Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and officers and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of patents and plant variety protections." Pub. L. 102 560, preamble, 106 Stat. 4230; see also H. R. Rep. No. 101 960, pt. 1, pp. 7, 33 (1990) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 102 280, pp. 1, 5 6 (1992) (hereinafter S. Rep.). Section 271(h) now states: "As used in this section, the term 'whoever' includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity." Section 296(a) addresses the sovereign immunity issue even more specifically:
The Federal Circuit held that Congress had clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in federal court for patent infringement, and that Congress had the power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do so. Id., at 1347. The court reasoned that patents are property subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause and that Congress' objective in enacting the Patent Remedy Act was permissible because it sought to prevent States from depriving patent owners of this property without due process. See id., at 1349 1350. The court rejected Florida Prepaid's argument that it and other States had not deprived patent owners of their property without due process, and refused to "deny Congress the authority to subject all states to suit for patent infringement in the federal courts, regardless of the extent of procedural due process that may exist at any particular time." Id., at 1351. Finally, the court held that the Patent Remedy Act was a proportionate response to state infringement and an appropriate measure to protect patent owners' property under this Court's decision in City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 519. The court concluded that significant harm results from state infringement of patents, 148 F.3d, at 1353 1354, and "there is no sound reason to hold that Congress cannot subject a state to the same civil consequences that face a private party infringer," id., at 1355. We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. __ (1999), and now reverse.
"Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.' That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that ' "it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." ' Id., at 13 (emphasis deleted), quoting the Federalist No. 81 . . . . For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.' Hans, supra, at 15."
College Savings and the United States nonetheless contend that Congress' enactment of the Patent Remedy Act validly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. To determine the merits of this proposition, we must answer two questions: "first, whether Congress has 'unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity,' and second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' " Seminole Tribe, supra, at 55. We agree with the parties and the Federal Circuit that in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress has made its intention to abrogate the States' immunity " 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' " Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). Indeed, Congress' intent to abrogate could not have been any clearer. See 35 U.S.C. 296(a) ("Any State . . . shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in federal court . . . for infringement of a patent.").
"The bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Lemelson v. Ampex Corp. 372 F. Supp. 708 (ND Ill. 1974) recognized that a patent is a form of property, holding that a right to compensation exists for patent infringement. Additionally, because courts have continually recognized patent rights as property, the fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without due process of law." S. Rep., at 8 (footnotes omitted).
We have held that "the 'provisions of this article,' to which §5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S., at 519.
But the legislation must nonetheless be "appropriate" under §5 as that term was construed in City of Boerne. There, this Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., exceeded Congress' authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as RFRA was made applicable to the States. RFRA was enacted "in direct response to" this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which construed the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to hold that "neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest." City of Boerne, supra, at 512, 514. Through RFRA, Congress reinstated the compelling governmental interest test eschewed by Smith by requiring that a generally applicable law placing a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" and must employ the "least restrictive means" of furthering that interest. 521 U.S., at 515 516.
In holding that RFRA could not be justified as "appropriate" enforcement legislation under §5, the Court emphasized that Congress' enforcement power is "remedial" in nature. Id., at 519. We recognized that "legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.' " Id., at 518 (citation omitted). We also noted, however, that " 'as broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited,' " ibid, and held that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation," id., at 519. Canvassing the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and case law examining the propriety of Congress' various voting rights measures,5 the Court explained:
Can the Patent Remedy Act be viewed as remedial or preventive legislation aimed at securing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for patent owners? Following City of Boerne, we must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment "evil" or "wrong" that Congress intended to remedy, guided by the principle that the propriety of any §5 legislation "must be judged with reference to the historical experience it reflects." Id., at 525. The underlying conduct at issue here is state infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the invasion of their patent rights. See H. R. Rep., at 37 38 ("Patent owners are effectively denied a remedy for damages resulting from infringement by a State or State entity"); S. Rep., at 6 ("Plaintiffs in patent infringement cases against a State are foreclosed from damages, regardless of the State conduct"). It is this conduct then unremedied patent infringement by the States that must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act.
Testimony before the House Subcommittee in favor of the bill acknowledged that "states are willing and able to respect patent rights. The fact that there are so few reported cases involving patent infringement claims against states underlies the point." Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H. R. 3886 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1990) (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of William S. Thompson); id., at 32 (statement of Robert Merges) ("States do occasionally find themselves in patent infringement suits"). Even the bill's sponsor conceded that "we do not have any evidence of massive or widespread violation of patent laws by the States either with or without this State immunity." Id., at 22 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).6 The Senate Report, as well, contains no evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become a problem of national import. At most, Congress heard testimony that patent infringement by States might increase in the future, see House Hearings 22 (statement of Jeffrey Samuels); id., at 36 37 (statement of Robert Merges); id., at 57 (statement of William Thompson), and acted to head off this speculative harm. See H. R. Rep., at 38.
Though patents may be considered "property" for purposes of our analysis, the legislative record still provides little support for the proposition that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act. The Due Process Clause provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 (emphasis added). This Court has accordingly held that "in procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest . . . is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis deleted).
Thus, under the plain terms of the Clause and the clear import of our precedent, a State's infringement of a patent, though interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the Constitution. Instead, only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of property without due process result. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 531 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 533 (1984); id., at 539 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In challenging a property deprivation, the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate . When adequate remedies are provided and followed, no deprivation of property without due process can result").
The primary point made by these witnesses, however, was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the uniformity of patent law. See, e.g., House Hearings, at 43 (statement of Robert Merges) ("Uniformity again dictates that that sovereign immunity is a mistake in this field because of the variance among the State's laws"), id., at 34, 41 (Merges); id., at 58 (statement of William Thompson).9
Congress itself said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state remedies in the statute or in the Senate Report, and made only a few fleeting references to state remedies in the House Report, essentially repeating the testimony of the witnesses. See H. R. Rep., at 37, n. 158 ("The availability of a State remedy is tenuous and could vary significantly State to State"); id., at 38 ("If patentees turn to the State courts for alternative forms of relief from patent infringement, the result will be a patchwork of State laws, actually undermining the goal of national uniformity in our patent system"). The need for uniformity in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important, but that is a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather than to any determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without due process of law.
We have also said that a state actor's negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's property does not "deprive" that person of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Actions predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages. See 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III); 5 D. Chisum, Patents §16.022, p. 16 31 (rev. ed. 1998) (" 'It is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent' "). Congress did not focus on instances of intentional or reckless infringement on the part of the States. Indeed, the evidence before Congress suggested that most state infringement was innocent or at worst negligent. See S. Rep., at 10 (" 'It is not always clear that with all the products that government buys, that anyone is really aware of the patent status of any particular invention or device or product' "); H. R. Rep., at 39 ("It should be very rare for a court to find . . . willful infringement on the part of a State or State agency"). Such negligent conduct, however, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history of "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights" of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic §5 legislation. City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 526. Instead, Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the Constitution. Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative, see id., at 531, identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of our §5 calculus because "strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one," id., at 530. Here, the record at best offers scant support for Congress' conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal- court patent actions.
Because of this lack, the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act are "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that they cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Id., at 532. An unlimited range of state conduct would expose a State to claims of direct, induced, or contributory patent infringement, and the House Report itself cited testimony acknowledging " 'it's difficult for us to identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a state.' " H. R. Rep., supra, at 38.10 Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had infringed. Nor did it make any attempt to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement, such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement authorized pursuant to state policy; or providing for suits only against States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement.
Instead, Congress made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal court for all kinds of possible patent infringement and for an indefinite duration. Our opinion in City of Boerne discussed with approval the various limits that Congress imposed in its voting rights measures, see 521 U.S., at 532 533, and noted that where "a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under §5," id., at 533. The Patent Remedy Act's indiscriminate scope offends this principle, and is particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy. In sum, it simply cannot be said that "many of the acts of infringement affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional." Id., at 532.
The Constitution vests Congress with plenary authority over patents and copyrights. U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. Nearly 200 years ago, Congress provided for exclusive jurisdiction of patent infringement litigation in the federal courts.1 See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1895). In 1992 Congress clarified that jurisdictional grant by an amendment to the patent law that unambiguously authorizes patent infringement actions against States, state instrumentalities, and any officer or employee of a State acting in his official capacity. Pub. L. 102 560, 106 Stat. 4230, 35 U.S.C. 271(h). Given the absence of effective state remedies for patent infringement by States and the statutory pre-emption of such state remedies, the 1992 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) was an appropriate exercise of Congress' power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state deprivations of property without due process of law.
James Madison said of the same Clause, "The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned . The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either copyrights or patents, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress." The Federalist No. 43, p. 267 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (J. Madison).
Patent infringement litigation often raises difficult technical issues that are unfamiliar to the average trial judge.2 That consideration, as well as the divergence among the federal circuits in their interpretation of patent issues, provided support for the congressional decision in 1982 to consolidate appellate jurisdiction of patent appeals in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.3 Although that court has jurisdiction over all appeals from federal trial courts in patent infringement cases, it has no power to review state court decisions on questions of patent law. See 28 U.S.C. 1295. The reasons that motivated the creation of the Federal Circuit would be undermined by any exception that allowed patent infringement claims to be brought in state court.
The facts of Chew clearly support both Congress' decision and authority to enact the Patent Remedy Act. Marian Chew had invented a method for testing automobile engine exhaust emissions and secured a patent on her discovery. Her invention was primarily used by States and other governmental entities. In 1987, Chew, an Ohio resident, sued the State of California in federal court for infringing her patent. California filed a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds, which the District Court granted. The Federal Circuit affirmed, id., at 332, expressly stating that the question whether Chew had a remedy under California law "is a question not before us." Nevertheless, it implied that its decision would have been the same even if Chew were left without any remedy. Id., at 336. During its hearing on the Patent Remedy Act, Congress heard testimony about the Chew case. Professor Merges stated that Chew might not have been able to draft her infringement suit as a tort claim. "This might be impossible, or at least difficult, under California law. Consequently, relief under state statutes may be not be a true alternative avenue of recovery." House Hearing 33.7
Even if such remedies might be available in theory, it would have been "appropriate" for Congress to conclude that they would not guarantee patentees due process in infringement actions against state defendants. State judges have never had the exposure to patent litigation that federal judges have experienced for decades, and, unlike infringement actions brought in federal district courts, their decisions would not be reviewable in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Surely this Court would not undertake the task of reviewing every state court decision that arguably misapplied patent law.13 And even if 28 U.S.C. 1338 is amended or construed to permit state courts to entertain infringement actions when a State is named as a defendant, given the Court's opinion in Alden v. Maine, it is by no means clear that state courts could be required to hear these cases at all. Post, at ____ (slip op., at 2).
Even if state courts elected to hear patent infringement cases against state entities, the entire category of such cases would raise questions of impartiality. This concern underlies both the constitutional authorization of diversity jurisdiction and the statutory provisions for removal of certain cases from state to federal courts, 28 U.S.C. 1441 et al. The same concern justified John Marshall's narrow construction of the Eleventh Amendment in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). As he there noted, when there is a conflict between a State's interest and a federal right, it "would be hazarding too much to assert, that the judicatures of the states will be exempt from the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals." Id., at 386.
The Patent Remedy Act merely puts States in the same position as all private users of the patent system,14 and in virtually the same posture as the United States.15 "When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (analyzing Copyright Clause). Recognizing the injustice of sovereign immunity in this context, the United States has waived its immunity from suit for patent violations. In 1910, Congress enacted a statute entitled, "An Act to provide additional protection for owners of patents of the United States." Ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851. The Act provided that owners of patents infringed by the United States "may recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit in the Court of Claims." The United States has consistently maintained this policy for the last 90 years. See 28 U.S.C. 1498.
1. College Savings also filed a separate action alleging that Florida Prepaid had made false claims about its own product in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). The District Court dismissed the Lanham Act suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the Third Circuit affirmed, and we granted College Savings' petition in that case on the same day we granted the petition in this case. See 525 U.S. ___ (1999). The Lanham Act suit is the subject of our opinion in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 52_ U.S. __ (1999).
2. Section 271 still provides in relevant part: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. "(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. "(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer." 35 U.S.C. 271 (1994 ed. and Supp. III).
4. The Patent Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Art. I, §8, cl. 8. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Art. I, §8, cl. 3. The relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment are discussed below.
6. Representative Kastenmeier made this statement in the course of questioning Jeffrey M. Samuels, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Department of Commerce. The discussion continued: "Mr. Kastenmeier: . . . Accordingly, could one argue that this legislation may be premature. We really do not know whether it will have any affect sic or not. "Mr. Samuels: Well, you are right, Mr. Chairman. There have not been many cases that have raised this issue. I guess our feeling is that it is a step that should be taken now because the possibility exists in light of Atascadero and in light of the Chew case that more States will get involved in infringing patents. "I guess as a general policy statement, we believe that those engaged those who do engage in patent infringement should be subject to all the remedies that are set forth in the Patent Act and that the rights of a patent owner should not be dependent upon the identity of the entity who is infringing, whether it be a private individual, or corporation, or State. "So just as a general philosophical matter, we believe that this law needs to be passed."
8. See, e.g., House Hearings, 33 (statement of Robert Merges) ("Thus a patentee . . . would apparently have to draft her cause of action as a general tort claim or perhaps one for restitution to come within the statute. This might be impossible, or at least difficult under California law"); id., at 43 ("It is true that you may have State remedies, alternative State remedies . You could bring a deceit suit. You could try just a general unfair competition suit. A restitution is one that has occurred to me as a possible basis of recovery"); id., at 34 ("Another problem with this approach is that it assumes that such state law remedies will be available in every state in which the patentee's product is sold. This may or may not be true"); id., at 47 (statement of William Thompson) ("In this case there is no balance, since there are no or at least there are not very effective patent remedies at the State level"); id., at 57 ("The court in Lane v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 687 F. Supp. 11 (Mass. 1988), pointed out that the appellant may be able to obtain money damages by recourse to the Massachusetts tort claims act or sue the state for deceit, conversion, or unfair competition under Massachusetts law. The court also noted a Massachusetts statute which provides that damages may be recovered from the state when private property is confiscated for a public purpose. While many states may have similar statutes, the courts' surmise that intellectual property infringement cases may be pursued in some state courts offer us little comfort"); id., at 60 ("It sounds to me like it is a very difficult area to predict what would happen. There is a rich variety of potential causes of action, as the prior speaker Merges pointed out").
10. The relevant testimony stated in full: "The comments regarding copyright centered on substantial use of copyrighted textbooks by state universities as well as state use of copyrighted music and computer software. State use of patented products is more diverse and more substantial. Patented inventions are involved in all manner of commonly used machines, tools, instruments, chemicals, compounds, materials, and devices of all description and purpose. Furthermore, patented processes are commonplace. States and state instrumentalities own and operate hospitals, universities, prisons, and libraries. States build and maintain roads. States provide facilities and equipment for large numbers of employees who perform all manner of state supported activities. It's difficult for us to identify a patented product or process which might not be used by a state." House Hearings 55 (statement of William Thompson).
11. See 35 U.S.C. 271(h) (stating that States and state entities "shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity"); see also H. R. Rep., at 40 ("The Committee believes that the full panoply of remedies provided in the patent law should be available to patentees whose legitimate rights have been infringed by States or State entities"); S. Rep., at 14. Thus, contrary to the dissent's intimation, see post, at 16, the Patent Remedy Act does not put States in the same position as the United States. Under the Patent Remedy Act, States are subject to all the remedies available to plaintiffs in infringement actions, which include punitive damages and attorney's fees, see 35 U.S.C. 284 285, as well as injunctive relief, see §283. In waiving its own immunity from patent infringement actions in 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) (1994 ed. and Supp. III), however, the United States did not consent to either treble damages or injunctive relief, and allowed reasonable attorney's fees only in a narrow class of specified instances.
1. See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, 2 Stat. 37; Act of February 19, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481. There is some dispute over whether federal jurisdiction over patent cases become exclusive in 1800 or in 1836. See 7 D. Chisum, Patents §20.021a, n. 9 (1998). In any event, 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) now provides: "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases." The second sentence of §1338(a) (excluding the reference to plant variety protection cases) has been worded in essentially the same way since 1878. See Rev. Stat. §711 (1878). This Court has used various criteria for determining when an action "arises under" the patent law, see, e.g., Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 52 53 (1888), but it is well established that a patent infringement claim is "the paradigm of an action 'arising under' the patent laws." 8 Chisum, §21.021b.
4. Paragraph 7 of College Savings' complaint alleges that " 'defendant Florida Prepaid with actual knowledge of the '055 patent, with knowledge of its infringement, and without lawful justification, has willfully infringed the '055 patent.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.
6. The Chairman of the House Subcommittee considering the Patent Remedy Act, Representative Kastenmeier, engaged in the following dialogue with William Thompson, President of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, about whether States were definitively immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment following the Federal Circuit's recent decision in Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331 (1990): "Mr. Kastenmeier. 'You mentioned that you do not see the likelihood of further cases in this area since the Atascadero and Chew cases seem to be fairly definitive on this question, unless there were in fact remedial legislation. Do you anticipate that remedial legislation, such as the bill before us, if passed into law, would be the subject of litigation? Mr. Thompson. 'No, I think it would be very clear. Your legislation is very clearly drawn. It seems to match the tests set forth in Atascadero of making it very clear that the patent statute is one that would qualify as an abrogation area sic in the 11th amendment. "I can never guarantee exactly how attorneys are going to read statutes, Mr. Chairman, but all of the sane ones would not bring an action.' " Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1990) (House Hearing).
10. After the 1992 Act was passed, the Florida Supreme Court did hold that a patentee might bring some sort of "takings" claim in a state court, or might seek a legislative remedy. See Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333 (1993). Given the unambiguous text of 28 U.S.C. 1338 there is (a) no reason why Congress could have anticipated that decision, and (b) good reason to believe a well-motivated court may have misinterpreted federal law. See Jacobs Wind, 626 So. 2d, at 1337 1338 (Harding, J., dissenting).
15. The majority's assertion that "the Patent Remedy Act does not put States in the same position as the United States," ante, at 19, n. 11, is misleading. In the case of private infringement suits, treble damages are available only "where the infringer acted in wanton disregard of the patentee's patent rights, that is, where the infringement is willful." Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (CA Fed. 1992) (reversing the District Court's award of enhanced damages). "On the other hand, a finding of willful infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages." Ibid. Attorney's fees are available only in "exceptional" circumstances. 35 U.S.C. 285. Once it has determined that the case is "exceptional," the district court has discretion whether or not to award attorney's fees and the fees "must be reasonable." Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (CA Fed. 1998). In addition, attorney's fees are available in limited circumstances in suits against the United States. Ante, at 20, n. 11. The remaining differences between the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity and the Patent Remedy Act are supported by quintessentially federal concerns. This Court has found that "the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest." Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988). Indeed, the importance of the federal interest in military procurement led this Court to fashion the doctrine of "Government contractors' immunity" without waiting for Congress to consider the question. Id., at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Injunctions are not available against the United States because of the Federal Government's extensive investment in patented military inventions. "The right to enjoin the officer of the United States virtually asserts the existence of a judicial power to close every arsenal of the United States." Crozier v. Krupp A. G., 224 U.S. 290, 302 (1912).
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12202 (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); 11 U.S.C. 106(a) (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994); 29 U.S.C. 2617(a)(2) (Family and Medical leave Act of 1993); 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); 20 U.S.C. 1403(a) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); 17 U.S.C. 511 (Copyright Remedy Clarification Act).
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES ET AL., PETITIONERS v. WILLIAM HIBBS ET AL.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE PORTS AUTHORITY et al.