Source: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tdec/en/70718SP2.htm
Timestamp: 2014-03-09 03:05:54
Document Index: 571362990

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.\n25', 'art. 211', 'art. 230', 'art. 237', 'art. 216', 'art. 101', 'art. 109', 'art. 94', 'art. 420', 'art. 575', 'art: 1', 'art: 2', 'Art. 62']

Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subponae
Before: Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Presiding Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito
Judge Saad Saood Jan Registrar: Mrs. Dorothee de Sampayo Garrido-Nijgh
Decision of: 18 July 1997 PROSECUTOR
TIHOMIR BLASKIC ______________________________________
DECISION ON THE OBJECTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE ISSUANCE
OF SUBPOENAE DUCES TECUM ______________________________________
To: The Office of the Prosecutor Ms. Louise Arbour, Prosecutor Mr. Mark Harmon Mr. James Crawford
To: The Republic of Croatia Ambassador Ivan Simonovic Ambassador Branko Salaj Mr. David Rivkin
Ms. Katharine Baragona Mr. Ivo Josipovic
To: The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Madame Vasvija Vidovic Ms. Jadranka Slokovic Glumac (on behalf of the Minister of Defence)
To: Defence Counsel for Tihomir Blaskic Mr. Russell Hayman
1. Pending before Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("International Tribunal") is the question of the validity of
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald to the Republic of
Croatia and its Defence Minister, Mr. Gojko Susak. The Government of the Republic of
Croatia ("Croatia") challenges the legal power and authority of the
International Tribunal to issue this compulsory order to States and high government
officials. This Decision addresses the basis of the authority and power of the
International Tribunal to issue such orders to States as well as individuals, including
high government officials, as well as the duty to comply with such orders. It also
discusses the extent of the authority and power and its effect on national security
concerns. Not discussed here are the appropriate remedies for non-compliance with such
orders, as that issue is not yet ripe for consideration. Prior to addressing the arguments
of Croatia, however, a review of the procedural history concerning the manner in which the
question arose is necessary. B. Procedural History
2. Pursuant to a request by the Office of the Prosecutor ("Prosecution"),
Judge McDonald issued on 15 January 1997 subpoenae duces tecum to the Republic of
Croatia and the Croatian Defence Minister, Mr. Susak, and to Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Custodian of the Records of the Central Archive of what was formerly the Ministry of
Defence of the Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna, respectively (Registry Page nos.
("RP") D488-93 and D495-501). The requests for the subpoenas were directed to
Judge McDonald, who issued them in her role as the Judge confirming the Indictment against
Tihomir Blaskic, the accused in this case (RP D143-55). 3. In a letter dated 10 February 1997 (RP D3261-63), Croatia, through its
representative Dr. Sre}ko Jelinic, declared "its readiness for full cooperation
under the terms applicable to all states", but challenged the legal authority of the
International Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign State.
Croatia also contested the naming of a high government official in a request for
assistance pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal
("Statute") as, in its view, such requests are only properly directed to a
State. The letter also stated Croatia's position that, even when assisting the
International Tribunal, it maintains the right to tailor its assistance in a manner such
that its national security interests are protected. 4. On 14 February 1997 the first hearing was held at which the addressees of the subpoenae
duces tecum were requested to appear to answer questions relevant to the production of
the subpoenaed documents. A representative of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
appeared and explained the steps taken thus far in compliance with the subpoena duces
tecum. Croatia did not appear, and Judge McDonald issued an Order requesting the
Republic of Croatia and Mr. Susak to produce the documents or, in the event of
non-compliance, that a representative of the Ministry of Defence personally appear before
Judge McDonald on 19 February 1997 (RP D3883-85)1. 1. Judge McDonald also, on 14 February 1997, issued an Order to Ensure
Compliance with a Subpoena Duces Tecum to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mr. Ante
Jelavic (RP D3280-82). 5. Representatives from both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were present at the
19 February 1997 hearing, after which Judge McDonald suspended the subpoena duces
tecum issued to the Republic of Croatia and to Mr. Susak (RP D3303-06) in order to
allow the parties to resolve the matter informally and also because of Croatia's challenge
to the authority of the International Tribunal to issue such subpoenas. Croatia thereafter
provided to the Prosecution some of the requested documents and has informed the
International Tribunal that it is in the process of locating other documents. Croatia
asserts that many of the remaining documents either do not exist, or that the
"unspecific and broad nature of the request" makes it impossible to provide them2.
2. Answer of the Republic of Croatia to the Prosecutor's Brief in
Support of Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 11 April 1997 (RP D4731-47) at D4745. 6. Thereafter, on 28 February 1997, counsel for the accused filed a Motion for Issuance
of a Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Compelling the
Production of Exculpatory Documents (RP D3342-51), for which an Order Compelling the
Production of Documents was subsequently entered (RP D4844-50). 7. Additional hearings in regard to the subpoena duces tecum addressed to Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Custodian of the Records of the Central Archive were held on 24
and 28 February and 7 March 1997. On 7 March 1997 Judge McDonald issued an order
directing all parties to file with the Registry, by 1 April 1997, briefs on issues
relating to the power of a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal to issue subpoenae
duces tecum to States and high government officials, and the appropriate remedies for
non-compliance (RP D3411-13). The Order listed the following issues as appropriate for
discussion: (1) the power of a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal to
issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign State; (2) the power of a Judge or
Trial Chamber to make a request or issue a subpoena duces tecum to a high
government official of a State; (3) the appropriate remedies to be taken if there is
non-compliance with a subpoena duces tecum or request issued by a Judge or Trial
Chamber; and (4) any other issue concerned in this matter. The Order called for briefs to
be filed by 11 April and set a hearing for 16 April 1997. 8. Due to the importance of the issue, Judge McDonald ordered, on 14 March 1997,
that the matter be heard by the full Trial Chamber II, consisting of herself as Presiding
Judge, Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito and Judge Saad Saood Jan (RP D3455-56). She also
invited requests for leave to submit amicus curiae briefs on the above-mentioned
issues pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal ("Rules"). 9. The Prosecution submitted, on 20 March 1997, a Request in Respect of Issues to be
Briefed for the Hearing of 16 April 1997 Relating to Subpoenae Duces Tecum (RP
D3469-72) by which it sought to narrow the scope of the issues to be briefed, which
request was denied by the Trial Chamber on 27 March 1997 (RP D3612-13). On 21 March 1997
the Prosecution filed a Request for Reinstatement of Subpoena Duces Tecum (RP
D3474-79), which was opposed by Croatia (RP D3607-08). 10. On 25 March 1997 Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its Brief on the Issues (RP
D3589-91). On 1 April 1997 the Prosecution, the Minister of Defence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Croatia submitted briefs regarding the subpoena duces tecum (RP
D3620-3671, D3673-76, and D3682-84, respectively). Counsel for the accused was invited on
this same day to participate in the hearing and to file a brief (RP D3614-15). Croatia
responded to the Prosecution's Brief on 11 April 1997 (RP D4747-31). Also submitted prior
to the 16 April 1997 hearing were amicus curiae briefs from Bartram S. Brown
(RP D4539-45); Luigi Condorelli (RP D4515 bis/1-10); the Croatian Association of
Criminal Science and Practice (RP D4758 bis/1-9); Marie-Jos� Domestici-Met (RP
D4684 bis/1-7); Donald Donovan for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (RP
D4709-26); J.A Frowein, Georg Nolte, Karin Oellers and Andreas Zimmermann, for the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (RP D4547-4607);
Annalisa Ciampi and Giorgio Gaja (RP D4502-05); Peter Malanczuk (RP D4608-23); Juristes
sans Fronti�res and Alain Pellet (RP D4538 bis/1-20); Juan-Antonio Carrillo
Salcedo (RP D4660-72); Bruno Simma (RP D4763-86); Thomas Warrick, Rochelle Stern and J.
Stefan Lupp (RP D4496-4501); and Ruth Wedgwood (RP D4624-59). 11. In a letter dated 15 April 1997, Mr. Jelinic requested, inter alia, that
Judge McDonald recuse herself from participating in the 16 April hearing as she was
"the judge who issued the order that is here at issue" (RP D4805). On 16 April
the Bureau of the International Tribunal, consisting of President Antonio Cassese,
Vice-President Adolphus Karibi-Whyte, Judge Claude Jorda and Judge McDonald met to
consider this request. After stating her position on the issue, Judge McDonald retired and
the Bureau considered the request in her absence. The Bureau concluded that the
impartiality of Judge McDonald was in no way hindered by her earlier participation in the
issuing of the subpoena and that she was therefore not precluded by Rule 15(A) of the
Rules from further participation (RP D4814-13). 12. At the 16 April 1997 hearing, which continued on 17 April 1997, the Prosecution,
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a representative of its Minister of Defence, Mr. Ante
Jelavic, and counsel for the accused, Tihomir Blaskic, as well as several of those who
submitted amicus curiae briefs3, presented oral arguments.
Croatia, on 8 May 1997, submitted, with leave of the Trial Chamber, a final written Brief
in Opposition to the Subpoena Duces Tecum (RP D4874-4937) ("Croatia's Final
Brief"), to which the Prosecution responded on 28 May 1997 (RP D6203-12). 3. Those appearing included Alain Pellet, Luigi Condorelli, Vladimir
Lujbanovic on behalf of the Croatian Association of Criminal Science and Practice, Andreas
Zimmermann for the Max-Planck-Institute, Ruth Wedgwood, Peter Malanczuk, and Donald
Donovan for the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights. 13. After due consideration of the written briefs and oral arguments, including those
of the amicus curiae, the Trial Chamber issues the following Decision. II. ANALYSIS
A. Power to Issue Binding Orders to States
14. Croatia has challenged the capacity of the International Tribunal to address subpoenae
duces tecum to sovereign States. The Trial Chamber considers, however, that the heart
of this dispute in fact concerns the International Tribunal's authority and power to issue
binding compulsory orders, rather than the particular nomenclature used for such orders. A
discussion of whether or not the International Tribunal inherently possesses this power or
has been expressly granted this authority is, therefore, required. Only after such inquiry
can the Trial Chamber determine whether a subpoena is an appropriate mechanism available
to the International Tribunal. An examination of the nature of the International Tribunal,
its purposes and the circumstances surrounding its establishment, is therefore necessary,
for this impacts upon the subsequent examination of its inherent and express powers. 1. Nature and Purposes of the International Tribunal 15. The decision of the United Nations Security Council to establish an international
tribunal was a response to an ongoing armed conflict, with attendant widely reported
atrocities which violated fundamental norms of international humanitarian law, in the
former Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1991, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions
in an attempt to resolve the conflict and bring to a halt these violations. Resolution
713, of 25 September 1991, initially determined that the situation in Yugoslavia
constituted a threat to international peace and security. Resolutions 764 and 771, adopted
in July and August 1992 respectively, then reaffirmed the obligation on the parties to the
conflict to abide by international humanitarian law, demanded that they cease and desist
from all breaches of this law, and called upon States and international organizations to
collate substantiated information in their possession of such violations. In addition,
pursuant to resolution 780 of 6 October 1992, a Commission of Experts was set up to
examine and analyse this information gathered by States and international organizations
and also to conduct its own investigations. 16. A preparatory investigation of serious violations of international humanitarian law
was undertaken by the Commission of Experts, which produced an interim report, stating: The Commission was led to discuss the idea of the establishment of an ad hoc International
Tribunal. In its opinion, it would be for the Security Council or another competent organ
of the United Nations to establish such a tribunal in relation to events in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia. The Commission observes that such a decision would be consistent
with the direction of its work. 4
Impetus for such a tribunal also came from other sources, such as the reports presented
by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki5,
and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe which, through its Moscow Human
Dimension Mechanism, had appointed Rapporteurs to investigate reports of atrocities and
make recommendations6.
4 U.N. Doc. S/25274, Annex 1, para. 74.
5 Reports on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992. U.N. Docs.
E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, E/CN.4/1993/50.
6 See Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia By Rapporteurs (Corell-T�rk-Thune) under the CSCE Moscow Human Dimension
Mechanism to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, 9 February 1993, reprinted in Michael P.
Scharf and Virginia Morris - An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter "Insider's Guide") (vol. II)
(1995) at p. 211. 17. By resolution 808, adopted on 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided
"that an International Tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991". This resolution also requested that
the United Nations Secretary-General submit to the Security Council a report on the
matter, including specific proposals for such a tribunal and taking into account the
suggestions of States. The Secretary-General presented his report on 3 May 19937, incorporating a draft Statute for the tribunal, of 34
articles. The Security Council subsequently, by resolution 827, a resolution under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, approved the Secretary-General's Report and adopted the
Statute, finding that the establishment of an international criminal tribunal "will
contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed"8. 7 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
the Security Council resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993 (hereafter
"Secretary-General's Report"). 8 S/RES/827 (1993). Given that the legitimacy of the establishment of the
International Tribunal by such a method is not here in dispute, it is not necessary to
discuss this issue further. In addition, the range of measures envisaged under Chapter VII
and the establishment of the International Tribunal as a Chapter VII mechanism have
already been addressed by the Appeals Chamber: see The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (IT-94-1-AR72,
2 Oct. 1995, RP D6413-D6491) (hereafter "Jurisdiction Decision"). The
Appeals Chamber found that Article 41 of the Charter provides a sufficient basis for the
establishment of the International Tribunal and the Security Council may legitimately
establish a subsidiary organ with judicial powers. 18. The Security Council, on behalf of all Member States, can adopt binding measures to
address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression9.
Since 1945 it has exercised this mandate in a number of creative ways, but it was not
until 1993 that it chose to set up an international criminal tribunal, as a subsidiary
organ. Such resort to a judicial institution places emphasis on the individual
responsibility of those committing violations of international humanitarian law10. In the especially complex circumstances of the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia, the international community deemed a judicial response capable of
achieving the goals of peace and reconciliation. 9 United Nations Charter, Arts. 24 and 25 and Ch. VII. 10 Security Council resolutions, throughout the conflict, had emphasized the
individual responsibility of persons perpetrating such crimes. See, e.g.,
resolution 764, 13 July 1992, resolution 771, 13 August 1992, resolution 780, 6 October
1992, resolution 787, 16 November 1992. 19. The extent of the powers that the Security Council can, intended to and, in fact,
did confer upon this special subsidiary organ is relevant to the present Decision. The
United Nations Charter envisages that the principal organs of the Organization might
create such subsidiary organs "as may be found necessary"11.
The Security Council in particular, by virtue of Article 29, is granted the power to
establish subsidiary organs which it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.
Even a cursory examination of the practice of the United Nations' principal organs and the
academic discussion of Articles 7 and 29 of the Charter reveals that the concept of a
"subsidiary organ" is flexible and amorphous12.
This is necessarily so in relation to an international organization of an organic nature
and possessed of a broad mandate. The view has been expressed that " '[s]ubsidiary
organs' are actually instrumentalities at the disposal of international organizations:
devices which respond ultimately to the principles of functional necessity, effectiveness,
specialization and decentralization"13. 11 Article 7(2). 12 See Bernardez - Subsidiary Organs, in Dupuy (ed) - Manuel sur les
organisations internationales (1988), at p. 100 (hereafter
"Bernardez"). Also, Goodrich, Hambro and Simons - Charter of the United
Nations: Commentary and Documents (3rd ed. 1969), and Simma (ed.) - The Charter of
the United Nations: A Commentary (1994) (hereafter "Simma Commentary").
13 Bernardez at p. 144. 20. Thus, each subsidiary organ established within the United Nations system requires
evaluation in its own particular context. In his Commentary to the United Nations Charter,
Bruno Simma observes that the SC is only allowed to make use of subsidiary organs to help it perform its
functions. In other words, it cannot transfer all its powers to its subsidiary organs but
must remain competent to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the Charter. The SC must
remain 'master of its sphere of responsibility'. In practice, this limitation on the
ability to transfer tasks has not been made completely clear14.
He concludes: The powers of a subsidiary organ are determined in the resolution of the SC concerning
the creation of that organ. These cannot exceed the powers assigned to the SC. The SC may
limit or repeal these powers at any time. Subsidiary organs may be empowered to perform
the functions of the SC even to the extent that this may have external consequences. Art.
25 obliges member states to accept and execute the decisions of the SC. These include the
decisions of subsidiary organs, to the extent that they confine themselves to the scope of
functions transferred by the SC15.
14 Simma Commentary at p. 482. 15 Id. at p. 486. 21. It is well recognized that the functions entrusted to subsidiary organs cannot
exceed the competence and functions of the Organization itself. Despite such limitation on
their actions, it is equally important to note their independent nature16.
Simma further states that: In particular, the term 'subsidiary organ' does not necessarily imply any presumption as
to the measure of control that the principal organ may exercise over the subsidiary organ
it has established, or as to the measure of autonomy this subsidiary organ may enjoy vis-�-vis
the principal organ. The use of the term 'subsidiary' does not necessarily mean that the
functions attributed to these organs could only be of an auxiliary or subordinate
character. The term 'subsidiary organ' is essentially a formal one: it means any organ
that has been established or otherwise recognized as a UN organ by one of the principal
organs of the UN.17
16 See Bernardez at p.130. 17 Simma Commentary at p. 196. 22. As such a subsidiary organ, the International Tribunal is a creature of its parent
body, but it must also be possessed of a large degree of independence in order to
constitute a truly separate institution and, in order to be able to fulfil properly its
judicial mandate, free from political considerations18.
The Secretary-General's Report, in confirmation of this, states that: In this particular case, the Security Council would be establishing, as an enforcement
measure under Chapter VII, a subsidiary organ within the terms of Article 29 of the
Charter, but one of a judicial nature. This organ would, of course, have to perform its
functions independently of political considerations; it would not be subject to the
authority or control of the Security Council with regard to the performance of its
judicial functions.19 (Emphasis added)
18 The Appeals Chamber has, in the Jurisdiction Decision,
confirmed the legitimacy of the establishment of the International Tribunal as a
subsidiary organ of the United Nations, performing a judicial function which the Security
Council does not itself possess, but which was deemed necessary for the performance of its
function to maintain international peace and security. See paras. 37-38. 19 Secretary-General's Report at para. 28. 23. In sum, the International Tribunal is an independent international court created
under the terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to bring justice, to
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia and to
deter further violations of international humanitarian law. Its establishment was the
culmination of a progression of thought and discussion on how to achieve these aims
effectively. As a subsidiary organ of a judicial nature, it cannot be overemphasized that
a fundamental prerequisite for its fair and effective functioning is its capacity to act
autonomously. The Security Council does not perform judicial functions, although it has
the authority to establish a judicial body20. This serves
to illustrate that a subsidiary organ is not an integral part of its creator but rather a
satellite of it, complete and of independent character. 20 See Jurisdiction Decision at para. 36. 2. Inherent Powers
24. In support of its position that the International Tribunal may issue a subpoena
duces tecum to a State, the Prosecution asserts that the International Tribunal has
implied and inherent powers necessary or essential for the effective performance of its
functions. It contends that a teleological method of interpretation of the Statute is
appropriate and supported by the Appeals Chamber in its Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case ("Jurisdiction
Decision") and the jurisprudence of other international tribunals21. Thus, the International Tribunal should be deemed to have
those powers which, although not expressly conferred, arise by necessary implication as
being essential to the performance of its duties. The Prosecution then submits that the
power to require the production of evidence is part of the inherent powers of a judicial
organ, as such powers are necessary and essential for the effective administration of
justice22. During its oral submissions, the Prosecution
emphasized that, as the Security Council clearly intended that the International Tribunal
would effectively discharge the responsibility assigned to it, the principle of
effectiveness must govern whenever there arises a question of its competence in a
particular area. 21 See Prosecutor's Brief In Support of Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 1 April 1997 (RP D3620-D3671) (hereafter "Prosecution Brief")
at p. 9. Brownlie describes the teleological principle thus: "Judicial interpretation
may lead to expansion of the competence of an organization if resort be had to the
teleological principle according to which action in accordance to the stated purposes of
an organization is intra vires or at least is presumed to be." Brownlie - Principles
of Public International Law, (4th ed. 1990) at p. 690. Note, however, the Jurisdiction
Decision, in which the Appeals Chamber examined different methods of interpretation,
including the teleological approach, but nevertheless found that Article 2 of the Statute
applies only to international armed conflicts. This appears to rely more on a literal
interpretation, rather than a teleological one. Judge Georges Abi-Saab, in his Separate
Opinion, himself adopted the teleological approach. 22 See Prosecution Brief at p. 12. 25. Croatia, however, argues that the Prosecution here seeks a form of compulsory
process that is unprecedented in international law. It contends that where such a
departure from the general practice is intended, the constitutive instrument - namely the
Statute - must provide so expressly. That its challenge is not founded on a preclusion
under general principles of international law, but rather involves a statutory limit of
authority, is made evident by its concession during oral submissions, upon questioning
from the Bench, that there would be no violation of international law if the word
"subpoena" were simply inserted into the Statute23.
23 See Transcript Page ("TP") 416 (Thursday,
17 April 1997). 26. The absence of an express grant of power, however, does not negate the existence of
such a power if it can be considered to be inherent and implied. The question of whether
an international organization may exercise powers which have not been expressly conferred
upon it has been previously considered by the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"). In the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations case24, the court found, inter alia,
that the United Nations has the capacity to bring an international claim against a
government responsible for causing injury to an agent of that Organization. Such capacity
is not provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and, the court found, is
dependent upon a measure of international personality being ascribed to the United Nations25. The court stated that "[t]hroughout its history, the
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international
life. . . .[Thus] to achieve [the purposes of the United Nations] the attribution of
international personality is indispensable"26. The
court took a teleological approach and held that the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its
purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed
in practice.27
It then affirmed the legitimacy of the doctrine of implied powers and stated that, [u]nder international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary
implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. 28
It concluded that [u]pon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Organization and
of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear that the capacity of the
Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by
necessary intendment out of the Charter.29
24 ICJ Rep. (1949) p.171 (hereafter "Reparations Case").
25 For discussion of this case and the doctrine of implied powers, see
Rama-Montaldo - International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International
Organizations, 44 Brit. Ybk Int'l L. 111 (1970) (hereafter "Rama-Montaldo"). Reparations Case at p. 178. 27 Id. at p. 180. 28 Id. at p. 182. The ICJ noted that the Permanent Court of
International Justice had applied the same principle of powers by necessary implication to
the International Labour Organization, in its Advisory Opinion Number 13, of 23 July 1926
(Ser. B,. No. 13, p. 18). 29 Id. at p. 184. Judge Hackworth registered his dissent from the
majority in this case. He concurred with the court's conclusion that the United Nations
has the capacity to bring an international claim, because this is a proper application of
the implied powers doctrine. He disagreed with the majority in that he considered the
Organization to have no capacity to become a sponsor of claims on behalf of its employees
because there is no necessity for the exercise of such a power. 27. In the Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal case30, the ICJ considered
whether the General Assembly of the United Nations was legally entitled to refuse to give
effect to an award of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal. In the course of
its examination of this question, the court determined that the Charter of the United
Nations gives the General Assembly the power to establish a tribunal competent to render
judgments binding on the United Nations. No such express provision appears in the Charter
and the court, therefore, citing the Reparations Case, enquired whether there was
an implied power to establish a judicial tribunal to adjudicate upon disputes arising out
of staff contracts of service. It found that the power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as between the Organization and the
staff members, was essential to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to
give effect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of
efficiency, competence and integrity. Capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment
out of the Charter.31
30 Advisory Opinion of 13 July 1954, ICJ Rep. (1954) p. 47
(hereafter "Effects of Awards Case"). 31 Effects of Awards Case at p. 57. 28. The court concluded that the awards determined by the tribunal were binding on the
General Assembly, even though there was no express provision in its statute as to their
intended effect. It recognized that this subsidiary organ was an "independent and
truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments . . . within the limited field of its
functions"32. 32 Id. at p. 53. 29. Furthermore, in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case,33 the ICJ effected a negative presumption that if a
constitutive instrument does not deny a power, the relevant organization is to have it. It
found that [t]he provisions of the Charter which distribute functions and powers to the Security
Council and to the General Assembly give no support for the view that such distribution
excludes from the powers of the General Assembly the power to provide for the financing of
measures designed to maintain peace and security.34
When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate
for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is
that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.35
In finding that the International Tribunal has the competence to determine its own
jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber has adopted a similar approach. It recognized that such
competence is part of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial tribunal
and, in particular, "[i]t is a necessary component in the exercise of the judicial
function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the constitutive documents . .
. although this is often done".36 33 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Rep.
(1962), p. 151. 34 Id. at p. 164. 35 Id. at p. 167. 36 Jurisdiction Decision at para. 18. 30. The Trial Chamber concludes that the power of the International Tribunal to issue a
subpoena duces tecum to a State may similarly be implied if it is necessary in
order to fulfil its fundamental purposes and to achieve its effective functioning37. 37 See amicus brief by Juan Antonio Carillo
Salcedo (hereafter "Salcedo Brief") at p. 4. See also Rama-Montaldo, who
warns that "this doctrine is not an open door to an unlimited interpretation of the
powers of an organization" but must be limited by the criterion of necessity (p.
148). The proposition that the International Tribunal must have certain implied as well as
express powers has also been recognized in the Insider's Guide (vol. I) at p. 193. 31. The International Tribunal is, primarily, a criminal judicial institution, with
jurisdiction over individuals charged with the most serious offences. It is imperative
that a Trial Chamber, which must ultimately make a finding of the guilt or innocence of
such individuals and impose the appropriate sentence as penalty, has all the relevant
evidence before it when making its decisions. It is noteworthy in this regard that, in United
States v. Nixon,38 the Supreme Court of the United
States of America stated that: The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgements were to be founded on a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on the full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the Rules of Evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is
imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence either by the Prosecution or by the Defense.39
38 418 U.S. 683, at p. 709 (Supreme Ct. 1974). 39 Id. at pp. 230-231. 32. Article 20 of the Statute provides, inter alia, that it is for the Trial
Chamber to ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious. Given that the Rules were adopted
in order to give practical effect to the principles espoused in the Statute, it is
reasonable to expect that they should contain provisions intended to secure this
particular aim. The use of the words "necessary . . . for the preparation or conduct
of the trial" in Rule 5440 must be interpreted in
this light. Hence, an order or subpoena for the production of evidence is appropriate
where the fairness of the trial so requires. In addition, if it could not use the method
of compulsion, the Trial Chamber would be unable to ensure that the trial proceed
expeditiously. Furthermore, Article 21, paragraph 4(e) provides that the accused shall be
entitled "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him". If third parties cannot be compelled to produce documents in
their possession, the Trial Chamber would be unable to guarantee the rights of the
accused. 40 Reproduced in full at para. 46. 33. The Prosecution, in its oral submission, emphasized the different consequences
which would result from pre- and post-indictment non-compliance with orders. The Trial
Chamber considers, however, that the duty of States, government officials and individuals
to comply with orders from the International Tribunal is the same, regardless of the stage
of the proceedings at which the particular order is issued41.
The impact of non-compliance on the ability of the Trial Chamber to afford a fair trial
and recognize the rights of the accused is, of course, critical after the indictment has
been confirmed and the accused person transferred to the International Tribunal. 41 See Section II.C, infra, regarding the duty
to comply with orders. 34. The International Tribunal is also an international institution, whose jurisdiction
- ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione loci - is such that the
tangible evidence required for proof of the guilt or innocence of those persons appearing
before it will often be in the possession of States. Many of the crimes listed in Articles
2, 3 and 5 of the Statute relate to the conduct of military operations and therefore the
records of those operations may constitute vital evidence. The fact that these are
government documents should not automatically bar their production42.
42 See amicus brief by Ruth Wedgwood (hereafter
"Wedgwood Brief"). During her oral presentation, Wedgwood emphasized the fact
that when a case concerns command responsibility, the nature of much of the evidence means
that it will most likely be in the possession of States, from whom production must be
ensured. 35. By virtue of Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Statute, the International Tribunal has
primacy over national courts. While this Article does not provide explicitly that States
are required to supply documents to the International Tribunal when it is exercising this
primacy, States must comply with a request for deferral43.
The statutory primacy of the International Tribunal would be meaningless if such requests
did not impose a binding obligation on States. In addition, if a domestic court were to
prosecute a person within its jurisdiction for violations of international humanitarian
law, it would have available all the tools of that national system necessary to guarantee
that the prosecution and defence were conducted effectively and its verdict fairly
reached. Given that it was envisaged that the International Tribunal would have concurrent
jurisdiction with, and primacy over, national courts, its capacity to obtain all the
necessary documents for the adjudication of a case cannot be less than that of these
courts. An examination of a number of domestic legal systems reveals that, whatever the
particular mechanisms utilized, they do provide for the production of all relevant
evidence. 43 See Rules 10 and 11. 36. In the United States, a subpoena is a tool which is widely used to compel the
attendance of a witness at criminal proceedings. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 1995 specifically provides for this mechanism, which may also command that the
witness bring with him or her, for production, books, documents or other objects
designated in the subpoena. Should a person fail to obey a subpoena addressed to them,
without adequate excuse, this may be deemed contempt of court. The term is also utilized
in the Canadian Criminal Code, which provides that a subpoena may be issued by a judge or
court, directing the attendance of a witness and the bringing of any thing relating to the
subject-matter of the proceedings44. In England the
terminology used is that of a summons. There, section 2 of the Criminal Procedure
(Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 stipulates that a witness may be summoned to appear
before the Crown Court in a criminal proceeding and to give evidence or produce any
document or thing specified in the summons. 44 Canadian Criminal Code, ss. 698-700. Reprinted in Martin's
Annual Criminal Code, 1996. 37. In Scotland, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 1995 apply. In that
jurisdiction the relevant concept is the citation of a witness. Despite this difference in
form, when a witness receives his or her citation to appear, it includes notice that a
penalty will be imposed should he or she fail to attend on the requisite date. The Code of
Criminal Procedure of Pakistan also empowers a court to issue a summons to a person in
possession of a document or thing necessary or desirable for the purposes of an
investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, requiring his or her attendance and the
production of the document or thing45. If such a summons
is disobeyed, the court may not only issue a search warrant under this section, but also
punish the person for contempt and impose a fine or prison sentence46.
45 The Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898, as
amended), s. 94. Reprinted by Mahmood and Shaukat (eds.) 1995. 46 Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 175. 38. In the civil law tradition, the Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure of 1977 provided
that articles which are required as evidence in criminal proceedings may be confiscated
and turned over to the court. Persons in possession of such items who refuse to submit
them to the court may be subject to a fine or imprisonment47.
Furthermore, a witness can be summoned by means of a written subpoena which must specify
the consequences of an unjustified failure to appear48.
If he or she fails to appear, an order can be issued to compel him to do so, and he may
also be fined49. In Costa Rica also, a judge may order
the production of any items connected to the commission of a crime, or that have been
seized for use in evidence50. 47 Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure 1977, art. 211. 48 Id. art. 230. 49 Id. art. 237. 50 C�digo de Procedimientos Penales, art. 216. Reprinted in C�digo
de Procedimientos Penales: anotado, concordado y con jurisprudencia, Dobles Ovares
(ed.) 1994. 39. Under the French system, the investigating judge may call all persons whose
statements might be useful to appear before him51.
Coercive measures may be applied to those who do not appear or who refuse to answer the
questions put to them52. In order to obtain items which
are useful to establish the truth, an investigating judge may himself carry out, or
prescribe that a commission (une commission rogatoire) carry out, searches and
seizures of property53. Also in Germany, a witness may be
summoned to appear before a court and such summons refers to the legal consequences which
will be incurred if the witness fails to appear54. Thus,
witnesses are obliged to testify and are subject to coercive measures should they refuse
to do so. Premises may be searched and objects of proof seized at the order of a judge55. Similarly, the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable in
Spain provides that a person may be judicially summoned. Non-appearance, or refusal to
disclose information about which he or she has been asked, results in a fine or charge of
contempt of court56. Furthermore, all persons are under
the obligation to produce objects or documents that are suspected to relate to the case.
Once again, should anyone refuse such production, they may be subject to a fine or charged
with contempt of court in some cases57. 51 Code de Proc�dure P�nale, art. 101. 52 Id. art. 109. 53 Id. art. 94. 54 Strafprozessordnung, ss. 48 and 51. Reprinted by Kleinknecht and
Meyer (eds.) 1995. 55 Id. Chapter VIII. 56 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, art. 420. 57 57. Id. art. 575. 40. From this it is clear that a number of national legal systems, while not perhaps
using the term "subpoena", have provisions granting criminal courts the power to
compel the attendance of a witness and the handing over of documents and other evidence.
As mentioned above, the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal dictates that the
evidence which it requires will often be in the form of government documents. However,
since the International Tribunal is not a national court, it relies on the assistance of
States (which will always be non-parties to the proceedings) in order to be able to
function at any effective level, in particular in the gathering of evidence. A Judge or
Trial Chamber must, therefore, have the authority to oblige States to submit whatever
material is necessary to evaluate the case effectively and fairly58.
58 See amicus brief by Bruno Simma (hereafter
"Simma Brief") at p. 4. See also amicus brief by the Lawyers'
Committee for Human Rights (hereafter "Lawyers' Committee Brief") at p. 6. 41. In the Reparations Case, the ICJ emphasized the functions and goals of the
United Nations and concluded that it "could not carry out the intentions of its
founders if it was devoid of international personality"59.
Thus, taking into consideration its nature and purposes, the Trial Chamber finds that the
International Tribunal has the inherent power to compel the production of documents
necessary for a proper execution of its judicial function. To hold to the contrary would
prevent the International Tribunal from effectively redressing serious violations of
international humanitarian law, its very raison d' �tre. 59 Reparations Case, at p. 179. 3. Express Power
42. Having established that the effective functioning of the International Tribunal
requires that it have the power to issue binding orders to States for the production of
all necessary evidence, an examination of the provisions in the Statute and Rules
demonstrates that express authority is given to the International Tribunal to direct
mandatory orders to States. 43. Article 1 of the Statute, articulating the competence of the International
Tribunal, provides that it "shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for
former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present
Statute". It is clear from the statements of members of the Security Council voting
on resolutions 808 and 827, and from the Secretary-General's Report60,
that the International Tribunal was intended to apply existing international law and not
to create new norms. However, it is also evident from these documents that this limitation
was solely concerned with the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Tribunal.
In other words, the International Tribunal is not empowered to "create" the
crimes over which it has jurisdiction, but simply to prosecute serious violations of
existing customary international humanitarian law. Article 15 of the Statute is not,
however, so constrained. It reads: The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for
the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission
of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.
The Judges are empowered to adopt rules of procedure and evidence and, while these
cannot go beyond the boundaries of the International Tribunal's jurisdiction, a judicial
body which combines elements of common and civil law traditions will naturally create
procedures for which there is no analogue. 60 See Secretary-General's Report at para. 34. See
also statement of the Representative of Venezuela, statement of the Representative of
the United Kingdom and statement of the Representative of Brazil, in the provisional
Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting of the
Security Council (S/PV.3217), 25 May 1993. 44. A literal reading of the relevant provisions of the Statute and Rules reveals the
broad nature of the powers available to the International Tribunal in order to carry out
its judicial functions. Article 18 of the Statute reads in part: 1. The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of
information obtained from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations
organs, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess
the information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to
2. The Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to
collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the
Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authorities concerned.
45. Article 19, entitled "Review of the indictment", then provides in
relevant part: 2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor,
issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of
persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial.
Article 29, entitled "Cooperation and judicial assistance", subsequently
reinforces the proposition that the International Tribunal has the ability to render
binding orders, by requiring that States comply with any order issued by a Trial Chamber. 46. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is expressly authorized in the Rules.
Rule 54 reads: At the request of either party or proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may
issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be
necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of the
trial. (Emphasis added.)
47. The word "subpoenas" was inserted into Rule 54 in January 1995, when the
Rules were revised at the Fifth plenary session. The Second Annual Report states that this
was "to improve the clarity, consistency and completeness of the rules"61. Given that the word "subpoenas" appears beside
orders, summonses, warrants and transfer orders, it would seem that Rule 54 was intended
to confer a general power. 61 Second Annual Report of the International Tribunal, 23
August 1995 ( A/50/365), at para. 21, fn. 6. 48. It is the contention of Croatia that the Security Council only intended that
individuals could be the subjects of orders from the International Tribunal, and not
States. The duty upon States, it argues, is discharged upon their due execution. According
to Croatia, the competence of the International Tribunal, in Article 1 of the Statute,
does not extend to States and, therefore, to issue a subpoena to a State would break with
accepted norms of international law and constitute an illegitimate extension of the
International Tribunal's mandate. 49. Although the International Tribunal's function is the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law within a limited
geographical and temporal scope, this does not mean that it cannot address itself
incidentally to others in the fulfilment of this task. For example, under Rule
77, a Trial Chamber can find a witness in contempt of court, even though that witness is
not a person responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Therefore, by addressing an order to a State, the International Tribunal is not seeking to
extend its competence beyond that laid down in the Statute. It is not attributing criminal
responsibility to the State, but merely exercising its necessary incidental judicial
functions in fulfilment of its purpose. Such incidental functions have been recognized by
the Appeals Chamber in the Jurisdiction Decision62.
62 "[T]he jurisdiction of the International Tribunal,
which is defined in the middle sentence and described in the last sentence as "the
full extent of the competence of the International Tribunal", is not, in fact, so. It
is what is termed in international law "original" or "primary" and
sometimes "substantive" jurisdiction. But it does not include the
"incidental" or "inherent" jurisdiction which derives automatically
from the exercise of the judicial function". Jurisdiction Decision at para.
14. 50. There can be no doubt that the Security Council intended that a Judge or Trial
Chamber would issue orders to States, should such prove necessary. The very fact that
there is an express duty upon States to comply with orders of the International Tribunal
in Article 29 and in paragraph 4 of resolution 82763
confirms that orders to States were envisaged. The Secretary-General's Report, in its
discussion of cooperation and judicial assistance, states that an order by a Trial Chamber for the surrender or transfer of persons to the custody of
the International Tribunal shall be considered to be the application of an enforcement
measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.64
It is indisputable from this that the Secretary-General considered the International
Tribunal to be a body capable of issuing binding orders to sovereign States.65
63 Discussed in Section II.C.1, infra. 64 Secretary-General's Report at para. 126. 65 See amicus brief by the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative
Public Law and International Law (hereafter "Max-Planck-Institute Brief") at p.
10. Malanczuk, however, asserts that this statement of the Secretary-General is misleading
because the Security Council did not transfer coercive enforcement powers to the
International Tribunal. (See amicus brief by Peter Malanczuk, hereafter
"Malanczuk Brief" at p. 8). Malanczuk argued orally that resolution 827 did not
adopt the same language as the Secretary-General's Report. This latter point appears
misapprehended, as resolution 827 did adopt the Report in its entirety. Thus, it would
seem that the Security Council, without stating so explicitly in the Statute, accepted the
view that it is the application of an enforcement measure whenever an order is issued by a
Trial Chamber for the surrender or transfer of persons. 51. The argument that a State cannot be ordered to perform a particular act is simply
incorrect66. The Security Council itself regularly orders
that specific action be taken, such as, for example, resolution 771, where it demanded
that all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia cease and desist from breaches
of international humanitarian law67. The mandatory terms
of this resolution, and many others, indicate that the Security Council has the power to
compel the behaviour that it desires. All States, upon exercising their sovereign
prerogative in joining the United Nations, recognize the primary authority of the Security
Council in relation to matters of international peace and security. As has been previously
noted, while the Security Council has not delegated its functions to the International
Tribunal, it has created an independent subsidiary organ of a specialized nature. An order
within the International Tribunal's mandate, addressed to a State, as with any compulsory
action taken by the Security Council itself, in no way offends the sovereignty of that
State. It is a logical corollary of the special nature and functions of the International
Tribunal that it has the ability to order States to take action that falls within its
given sphere of competence. 66 The Max-Planck-Institute Brief claims that the national
laws on cooperation indicate that there is no general principle prohibiting orders
addressed directly to States. At p. 13. 67 S/RES/771 (1992). 4. Power to Obtain Evidence as Compared with Other International
52. There has been some discussion in the amicus briefs and the submissions of
Croatia of the powers of various other international tribunals to compel the production of
evidence. While it cannot be overemphasized that the International Tribunal is
fundamentally different from those other bodies, since it possesses mandatory authority by
virtue of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is useful to examine briefly the
provisions of their constitutive instruments in order to determine whether the assertion
of such a power is an anathema in international law. 53. Article 49 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the
court may call upon the agents of the State parties to a dispute before it to produce any
document or supply explanations. The rules of the ICJ further grant it the power to
request the parties to bring witnesses or call for the production of any other evidence68. There is, therefore, no doubt that the ICJ can instruct
States to provide documents and, should they not do so, it can take formal note of this
fact. The sanction for non-compliance is thus the negative inference that may be drawn69. Sandifer states that [w]hile it [the Statute of the ICJ] contains no specific statement of a general nature
with reference to the obligation of parties to produce evidence, its general provisions
and the regulations embodied in the Rules appear definitely to contemplate a full
disclosure by the parties of evidence in their control. In its practice the Court has made
it clear that parties are expected to furnish the Court, together with the pleadings, all
available relevant evidence, or as soon thereafter as the need for it may appear.70
Thus, Croatia is correct in its assertion that the ICJ has no power to compel
the attendance of witnesses or production of documents71.
However, since States are parties to matters before the ICJ, it is in their interests to
comply, even with a 'request', in order to advance their claim fully and avoid the
negative inference that may be drawn from non-compliance. 68 68. Art. 62(1) of the Rules of the court. 69 In the Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of 9 April 1949 (ICJ Rep. 1949)
(hereafter "Corfu Channel Case"), the United Kingdom refused to provide
documentation requested by the court and no negative inference was drawn. Croatia seeks to
use this case to demonstrate the powerlessness of the court in the face of a negative
response to its requests. However, this case concerned t