Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96935/minnesota-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-02-19 19:56:47
Document Index: 667314795

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 348', '§ 2', '§ 462', '§ 409', '§ 3', '§ 345']

Minnesota Vs United States - Citation 96935 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Minnesota Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96935
Case Number 305 U.S. 382
minnesota v. united states - 305 u.s. 382 (1939) u.s. supreme court minnesota v. united states, 305 u.s. 382 (1939) minnesota v. united states no. 73 argued november 10, 1938 decided january 3, 1939 305 u.s. 382 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit syllabus 1. the united states is an indispensable party defendant in a condemnation proceeding brought by a state to acquire a right of way over lands which the united states owns in fee and holds in trust for indian allottees. p. 386. 2. the exemption of the united states from being sued without its consent extends to a suit by a state. such a suit cannot be maintained unless authorized by act of congress. p. 305 u. s. 387 . .....
Minnesota v. United States - 305 U.S. 382 (1939)
U.S. Supreme Court Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939)
2. The exemption of the United States from being sued without its consent extends to a suit by a State. Such a suit cannot be maintained unless authorized by Act of Congress. P. 305 U. S. 387 .
3. The provision of § 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, that, where Indian allotted lands are condemned under state laws for a public purpose, "the money awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee" does not require the conclusion that the United States is not an indispensable party to the condemnation proceedings in view of the restraints on alienation imposed by other Acts of Congress, the interest of the United States as trustee in the outcome of the proceeding (the amount to be paid), and the authority of the Secretary of the Interior in respect of reinvesting the proceeds. P. 305 U. S. 387 .
4. Where jurisdiction has not been conferred by Congress, no officer of the United States has power to give any court jurisdiction of a suit against the United States. The facts that the United States Attorney petitioned for removal of a suit from the state to the federal court, and stipulated with counsel for plaintiff that the suit could be so removed, are without legal significance in this regard. P. 305 U. S. 388 .
5. A federal court is without jurisdiction of a suit removed to it from a state court which itself lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, even though the federal court might have had jurisdiction had the suit been brought there originally. P. 305 U. S. 389 .
6. The provision of the second paragraph of § 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, authorizing "condemnation of" lands allotted in severalty to Indians "in the same manner as land owned in fee," construed as not authorizing suit in a state court. P. 305 U. S. 389 .
First. The United States is an indispensable party defendant to the condemnation proceedings. A proceeding against property in which the United States has an interest is a suit against the United States. The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 74 U. S. 154 ; Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433 , 98 U. S. 437 ; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255 . Compare Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389 . It is confessedly the owner of the fee of the Indian allotted lands, and holds the same in trust for the allottees. As the United States owns the fee of these parcels, the right of way cannot be condemned without making it a party. [ Footnote 1 ]
The exemption of the United States from being sued without its consent extends to a suit by a state. Compare Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331 , 204 U. S. 342 ; Arizona v. California, 298 U. S. 558 , 298 U. S. 568 , 298 U. S. 571 -572. Compare Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373 , 185 U. S. 382 -387; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60 . Hence, Minnesota cannot maintain this suit against the United States unless authorized by some act of Congress.
Minnesota contends that the United States is not an indispensable party. It argues that, since the second paragraph of § 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, provides that "the money awarded as damages shall be paid to the allottee," the United States has no interest in the land or its proceeds after the condemnation is begun. [ Footnote 2 ] Under § 5 of the General Allotment Act, Act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389, U.S.C. Title 25, § 348, the Indians' interest in these allotted lands was subject to restraints on alienation; [ Footnote 3 ] and, by § 2 of the Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, c. 576, 48 Stat. 984, U.S.C. Title 25, § 462, restraints on alienation were extended. The clause quoted may not be interpreted as freeing the allottee's land from the restraint imposed by
other acts of Congress. As the parcels here in question were restricted lands, the interest of the United States continues throughout the condemnation proceedings. In its capacity as trustee for the Indians, it is necessarily interested in the outcome of the suit -- in the amount to be paid. That it is interested also in what shall be done with the proceeds is illustrated by the Act of June 30, 1932, c. 333, 47 Stat. 474, U.S.C. Title 25, § 409a, under which the Secretary of the Interior may determine that the proceeds of the condemnation of restricted Indian lands shall be reinvested in other lands subject to the same restrictions. [ Footnote 4 ]
by Congress, no officer of the United States has power to give to any court jurisdiction of a suit against the United States. Compare 78 U. S. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 78 U. S. 202 ; Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433 , 98 U. S. 435 -439; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227 , 123 U. S. 232 -233; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255 , 162 U. S. 270 ; United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528 , 302 U. S. 533 -535. If Congress did not grant permission to bring this condemnation proceeding in a state court, the federal court was without jurisdiction upon its removal. For jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. Where the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although, in a like suit originally brought in a federal court, it would have had jurisdiction. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 258 U. S. 377 , 258 U. S. 383 ; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 261 , 260 U. S. 288 .
Third. Minnesota contends that Congress authorized suit in a court of the state by providing in the second paragraph of § 3 of the Act of March 3, 1901, quoted above, for "condemnation of" lands allotted in severalty to Indians "in the same manner as land owned in fee." But the paragraph contains no permission to sue in the court of a state. It merely authorizes condemnation for "any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located." There are persuasive reasons why that statute should not be construed as authorizing suit in a state court. It relates to Indian lands under trust allotments -- a subject within the exclusive control of the federal government. The judicial determination of controversies concerning such lands has been commonly committed exclusively to federal courts. [ Footnote 5 ]
Minnesota asserted in support of its interpretation of the paragraph that, by long established administrative practice, such condemnation proceedings are brought in the state court, and without making the United States a party. [ Footnote 6 ] The assertion was denied by the Government. As the brief of neither counsel furnished adequate data as to the administrative practice, they were requested at the oral argument to furnish the data thereafter. From the report then submitted by the Solicitor General, it appears that, throughout a long period, the Secretary of the Interior has insisted in Minnesota and in other States that condemnation suits must be brought in a federal court, and that the United States must be made a party defendant. [ Footnote 7 ]
The fee of the United States is not a dry legal title divorced from substantial powers and responsibilities with relation to the land. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 ; compare Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286 ; Brader v. James, 246 U. S. 88 . In the case of patents in fee with restraints on alienation, it is established that an alienation of the Indian's interest in the lands by judicial decision in a suit to which the United States is not a party has no binding effect, but that the United States may sue to cancel the judgment and set aside the conveyance made pursuant thereto. Bowling and Miami Investment Co. v. United States, 233 U. S. 528 ; Privett v. United States, 256 U. S. 201 ; Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S. 226 . In the stronger case of a trust allotment, it would seem clear that no effective relief can be given in a proceeding to which the United States is not a party, and that the United States is therefore an indispensable party to any suit to establish or acquire an interest in the lands. Compare McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 .
Compare McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458 ; 28 Stat. 305, 31 Stat. 760, U.S.C. Title 25, § 345. The United States argues that a statute granting permission to sue the United States must be construed to apply only to the federal courts unless there is an explicit reference to the state tribunals, citing Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255 , 162 U. S. 270 ; United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416, 418; United States v. Deasy, 24 F.2d 108, 110. This is not universally true even as to suits against the United States itself. United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 . And, in many instances, the state courts have been held to have jurisdiction of suits against the instrumentalities and officers of the United States which directly affect its property interests without such specific statutory authorization. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554 ; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549 , 258 U. S. 568 -569; Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462 ; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 , 295 U. S. 235 -237. Compare Davis v. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 261 U. S. 280 .