Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/604/1091/7812/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 20:31:19
Document Index: 148626229

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 8']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 265,respondent, 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
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National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 265,respondent, 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 604 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1979)
Submitted Feb. 14, 1979. Decided Aug. 20, 1979
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) petitions this court, pursuant to § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 Et seq., for enforcement of its order finding that the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 265 (the Union), violated § 8(b) (7) (C) of the Act by unlawfully picketing for recognitional and organizational purposes.
The Board concluded that the Union violated § 8(b) (7) (C) by picketing R P & M Electric (the Company), an electrical contractor in the construction industry, with an object of forcing or requiring the Company to recognize or bargain with the Union when the Union was not the certified bargaining representative of the Company's employees and had not filed an election petition within thirty days after commencement of the picketing. We grant enforcement of the Board's order.
At the outset we are reminded of the very narrow standard of review in Board decisions. This court must affirm any Board decision to the extent that it rests on findings of fact for which there is substantial evidence in the record. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 488 F.2d 114, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Union contends that there is not substantial evidence in support of the Board's findings. The Union also contends that the attempts at attaining recognition by the Company of the Union had been abandoned prior to the sending of the August 9, 1976, letter. It argues that both the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Board presumed a continuation of a recognitional and an organizational objective because of the events that occurred in August, 1974. Granted, the August, 1974, attempts were well beyond the six-month period provided in § 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). This in no way detracts from the Board's finding that the Union's picketing had a recognitional object. In our view, the earlier events of August, 1974, while remote, at least shed some light upon the specific conduct beginning with Heald's conversation with Bruce Trautwein in July, 1976, Bruce's report back as to his brother Roger's position, and the subsequent August 9, 1976, letter. See NLRB v. Carpenters Local 745, 450 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1971). In any event, neither the Board nor the ALJ purported to rest their decisions entirely upon the 1974 conduct, but instead rested upon their interpretation of the July, 1976, conversation and the subsequent August 9 letter for their finding of a § 8(b) (7) (C) violation.
Section 8(b) (7), enacted as part of the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendment to the Act, establishes a comprehensive code governing recognitional and organizational picketing. NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274, 291, 80 S. Ct. 706, 4 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1960). The application of § 8(b) (7) is limited to picketing by unions, not currently certified, where an object thereof is either forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with it or forcing or requiring employees to select it as their bargaining representative. Houston Building & Construction Trade Council, (Claude Everett Construction Co.), 136 NLRB 321, 49 LRRM 1757 (1962).
Congress enacted § 8(b) (7) as a corollary to the federal policy of ensuring employees a free choice in the selection of a bargaining representative. Dayton Typographical Union No. 57 v. NLRB, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 94, 103-106, 326 F.2d 634, 637, 646-649 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Local 542, Operating Engineers (R. S. Noonan, Inc.), 142 NLRB 1132, 53 LRRM 1205 (1963), enf'd, 331 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 379 U.S. 889, 85 S. Ct. 161, 13 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1964). Prior to the 1959 amendments, a union could lawfully picket an employer for an unlimited length of time, either to compel the employer to recognize it as the bargaining representative of his employees or to force the employees to select it as their representative. Section 8(b) (7) (C) removes these threats by encouraging prompt resort to the Board's election process and by discouraging the economic pressures of picketing as the vehicle to resolve questions of representation. Dayton Typographical Union No. 57 v. NLRB, supra, 117 U.S.App.D.C. at 104, 326 F.2d at 647. See also Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw,30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 78, 79-83 (1962). Consequently, § 8(b) (7) (C) makes it an unfair labor practice for an uncertified labor organization to picket an employer for more than thirty days if the picketing has a recognitional or organizational objective, and the union fails to file a § 9(c) election petition within thirty days of its commencement. Hirsch v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 1976). In no way does § 8(b) (7) (C) restrict picketing for other objectives. Indeed, one recognized non-recognitional objective outside of the proscription of § 8(b) (7) (C) is so-called "area standards picketing," that is, picketing for the sole purpose of compelling compliance with prevailing area wage and benefit standards. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board v. NLRB, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 239, 501 F.2d 794, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For the "area standards" rule to apply, however, the union must have the "area standards" exception as its sole object, to the exclusion of any recognitional and organizational intent or purposes. Id. n. 9. Moreover, picketing under § 8(b) (7) (C) is proscribed if one of the objects of the picketing is recognitional or organizational. Nor is there any requirement that recognitional or organizational objectives either be the sole or even the principal objective. General Service Employees Local 73 v. NLRB, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 131, 578 F.2d 361, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Suffolk County District Council of Carpenters, 387 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1967).
To establish that an object of picketing is recognitional, it need not be established that the union is seeking to gain recognition Qua recognition. Rather, Congress proscribed as recognitional picketing any picketing that seeks to establish a union in a continuing relationship with an employer with regard to matters which could substantially affect terms or conditions of employment of his employees and which are or may be subjects of collective bargaining by a lawfully recognized exclusive representative. Dallas Building & Construction Trades Council v. NLRB, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 31-32, 396 F.2d 677, 680-681 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Building & Construction Trades Council (Samuel E. Long, Inc.), 201 NLRB 321, 82 LRRM 1218, Enf'd without published opinion, 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973). Therefore, a recognitional object is established when a union, although purportedly picketing to maintain area standards, undertakes to go beyond a legitimate area standard object and demands that a picketed employer do more than equal the total cost package of its area contracts. For example, to attempt to dictate to the employer the distribution of benefits paid to his employees between wage and fringe benefits establishes a recognitional object under § 8(b) (7). Local Joint Executive Board (Holiday Inns of America, Inc.), 169 NLRB 683, 684, 67 LRRM 1214, 1215 (1968); Retail Clerks Local 899 (State-Mart, Inc.), 166 NLRB 818, 823-24, 65 LRRM 1666, 1667 (1967). In such circumstances the union's conduct is seen as an attempt to engage in Pro tanto bargaining to gain benefits for employees it does not represent. State-Mart, Inc., supra, 166 NLRB at 824,65 LRRM at 1667. Similarly, because the rationale for permitting area standards picketing is the recognition of the legitimate concern of unions that the employers with whom they have contractual relationships should not be put at a competitive disadvantage because of the cost of such contracts, a union has no legitimate concern in demanding that a picketed employer observe non-cost benefits which the union obtained for its own members. Attempts to impose such noneconomic terms of employment on the employees of other employers sounds more in terms of demanding acceptance of the area bargain than adherence to area standards. Id. See also San Francisco Joint Board (Romay of California), 171 NLRB 761, 769, 68 LRRM 1187, 1188 (1968).
Furthermore, even in the event such picketing could be construed to be publicity or informational picketing within the meaning of the proviso to § 8(b) (7) (C) that exempts "picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization," this proviso affords the Union no defense. The purpose of the proviso is to exempt from the Act a comparatively innocuous species of picketing having the immediate purpose of informing or advising the public, NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 317 F.2d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 1963), but to forbid picketing which has the effect of inducing employees of other employers to exert economic pressure on the picketed employer and thereby disrupt, interfere with, or curtail the picketed employer's business. Hirsch v. Building & Construction Trades Council, supra, 530 F.2d at 304. Here, the record shows that the effect of the picketing induced employees of Cook to stop working for two days, thereby disrupting the Company's business operation at the Lawrence project site. Nor can it fairly be said that the legend on the picket sign came within the protective proviso of § 8(b) (7) (C). Also, contrary to the Union's contention before the Board, the Union cannot escape the proscription of the proviso even if the Union did not actively coerce Cook's employees to cease performing services because the Union's picketing did, in fact, have that effect on Cook's employees. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board, supra, 163 U.S.App.D.C. at 240, 501 F.2d at 800; NLRB v. Knitgoods Workers Local 155, 403 F.2d 388, 391 (2d Cir. 1968).
We find no merit to the Union's argument that § 8(b) (7) (C) is unconstitutional as transgressing the free speech provisions of the First Amendment. While it cannot be gainsaid that the dissemination of information concerning a labor dispute is protected by the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940), it is well settled that picketing by an organized group is more than free speech. Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942). Because picketing involves patrolling, which is not constitutionally protected, Thornhill and its progeny lend no "support to the contention that peaceful picketing is beyond legislative control." Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 500, 69 S. Ct. 684, 690, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949).3 Rather, it is now recognized that the government may, in enforcing a valid public policy, "constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 293, 77 S. Ct. 1166, 1171, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1957). In Vogt, the Supreme Court upheld the state's right to prohibit peaceful picketing designed to coerce an employer to put pressure on his employee to join a union in contravention of the state policy favoring employee free choice in the selection of their representatives.
Consequently, the Congressional policy underlying § 8(b) (7)'s proscription on recognitional picketing is to preserve industrial peace in those situations where unions had previously applied economic pressure to force bargaining relationships upon unwilling employers and employees in contravention of various national labor policies. See Dayton Typographical Union No. 57 v. NLRB, supra, 117 U.S.App.D.C. at 94, 326 F.2d at 637; See also Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB, supra, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 83. Accordingly, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly upheld the constitutionality of § 8(b) (7). See Local Joint Board v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75, 79 (8th Cir. 1963); Accord, NLRB v. Lawrence Typographical Union No. 570, 376 F.2d 643, 654 (10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Local 3, IBEW, 339 F.2d 600, 601 (2d Cir. 1964).
Finally, the Union admits that its picketing was designed to force the Company to sign a prehire agreement under § 8(f) of the Act but argues that picketing in support of this objective does not violate § 8(b) (7) (C) of the Act. Actually these contentions by the Union provide further support for the Board's finding. In NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345, 98 S. Ct. 651, 658, 54 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1978), the Supreme Court specifically approved of the Board's decision in Ruttman Construction Co., 191 NLRB 701, 702 (1971), that a "prehire agreement is merely a preliminary step that contemplates further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship." As the Supreme Court further noted, "when the Union successfully seeks majority support, the prehire agreement attains the status of a collective-bargaining agreement executed by the employer with a union representing a majority of the employees in the unit." NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, supra, 434 U.S. at 350, 98 S. Ct. at 660. Thus, if there is a question whether the picketing by the Union had a recognitional objective, the Union's admission that it picketed to force the Company to sign a prehire agreement, which is "a preliminary step . . . for the development of a full bargaining relationship," further demonstrates that the Union's picketing had a recognitional objective.
We believe such an interpretation is consistent with Congressional intent. In NLRB v. Local 103 Iron Workers, supra, 434 U.S. at 348 n.10, 98 S. Ct. at 659, the Supreme Court found that "Congress was careful to make its intention clear that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily, and no element of coercion was to be admitted into the narrow exception being established to the majority principle." As the House Conference Report states: "Nothing in (Section 8(f)) is intended . . . to authorize the use of force, coercion, strikes or picketing to compel any person to enter into such prehire agreements." H.R.Rep.No.1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, Reprinted in (1959) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 2318, 2514; I Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959 at 946.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, a majority of the three-person panel of the National Labor Relations Board has rewritten § 8(b) (7) (C) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 151 Et seq., to suit their own fancy, which happens to be a dislike of picketing which has as its objective the maintenance of Union standards in an area. Unfortunately, this Court now accepts the views of the panel; and, in the process, expands § 8(b) (7) (C) unjustifiably.
The Board's majority finding, that the Union's use of the terms "working conditions" and "Union conditions" import a meaning to the Union's request which implied a demand that the Company adopt the terms of the union collective bargaining agreement executed with other area employees, is drawn out of thin air and Heald's testimony provides no support for it. Heald made it clear that the Union's concern was that the picketed Company meet the monetary benefits in the Union contract so that they would not be able to compete unfairly with Union contractors and, thus, take work away from their employees. Such a concern is a proper one. No unfair labor practice occurs when a union engages in picketing which has, for its sole object, truthfully advised the public that some employer is operating under substandard working conditions. Centralia Building and Construction Trades Coun. v. N. L. R. B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 363 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Even if recognition were not the only object of the Union's conduct, the violation is still present because recognition need only be an object of a labor organization's conduct in order to render § 8(b) (7) (C) applicable. Building Service Employees Local 87 (Liberty House/Rhodes), 223 NLRB 30, 33 (1976)
See International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S. Ct. 1166 (1957), for a discussion of Thornhill and AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 (1941) in light of subsequent cases limiting their application