Source: http://id.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20110908_0002796.C09.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 20:22:43
Document Index: 761763411

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2401', '§ 2401', '§ 2401', '§ 2401', '§ 2675', '§ 2401', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 503']

| Timm Adams v. United States of
Timm Adams v. United States of
TIMM ADAMS, PLAINTIFF, AND CLINGER GROWER GROUP; FUNK GROWER GROUP; HANSEN GROWER GROUP; JENTZCH-KEARL GROWER GROUP, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT, AND E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TIMM ADAMS, PLAINTIFF, AND CLINGER GROWER GROUP; FUNK GROWER GROUP; HANSEN GROWER GROUP; JENTZCH-KEARL GROWER GROUP, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT, AND E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. TIMM ADAMS, PLAINTIFF, AND CLINGER GROWER GROUP; FUNK GROWER GROUP; HANSEN GROWER GROUP; JENTZCH-KEARL GROWER GROUP,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, DEFENDANT.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 4:03-cv-00049-BLW, D.C. No. 4:03-cv-00049-BLW, D.C. No. 4:03-cv-00049-BLW
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2011-Seattle, Washington
Cheatgrass is an annual non-native plant that grows up early in the spring, dries out very early in the summer, and provides a continuous bed of fuel for wildfires. It is shallow-rooted, which leads to damaging erosion in areas where it is prevalent. Perennial vegetation, which is native to the Idaho lands, is deep-rooted and stays green longer into the season than cheatgrass. As a result, perennial vegetation is significantly more fire-resistant than cheatgrass. As part of its management duties, BLM has made it a goal to substitute perennial vegetation for cheatgrass in Idaho-if successful, this substitution would reduce the instances and severity of wildfires. During the 1980s, BLM unsuccessfully attempted to fight cheatgrass with prescribed burns, plowing, re-seeding, and seed drilling. Next, BLM tried the herbicide Roundup, which only sometimes killed the cheatgrass. Roundup is a post-emergent herbicide, meaning that it has to be sprayed on green vegetation in order to kill the vegetation. Roundup becomes almost entirely inactive once it hits soil. In 1987, after Roundup had proven only somewhat useful in combating cheatgrass, a BLM ecologist started looking at other herbicides that might be more successful. Oust was one of these herbicides.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court on February 6, 2003-six months and one day after the date BLM mailed the administrative denial letters. The FTCA affords claimants only six months after the government denies their administrative claim to file a lawsuit in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The district court denied BLM's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the government "may not obtain the benefits of [the] limitations period" because it "did not obtain a postmark from the Post Office to establish the mailing date."
As noted, the district court proceeded to adopt a bellwether trial plan and selected four Bellwether Plaintiffs. The bellwether jury selection began May 4, 2009. A nine person jury returned a unanimous special verdict on August 24, 2009. The special verdict form contained questions as to BLM's liability for the following:
* Negligence in selecting Oust and/or the application sites (Yes);*fn2
* Negligence based on a violation of the Idaho Pesticide and Chemigation Act (No);
* Negligence based on a violation of FIFRA (No);
* Violation of the Idaho Nuisance Statute (Yes);
* Trespass (Yes);
* Negligence in supervising the contracted applicators of Oust (No).
* Damage to Bellwether Plaintiff Clinger's sugar beets in 2000-2002, and wheat in 2001 (Yes);
* Damage to Bellwether Plaintiff Funk's sugar beets in 2001-2002, potatoes in 2001-2003, corn in 2001-2003, wheat in 2001-2003, and barley in 2001-2002 (Yes);
* Damage to Bellwether Plaintiff Jentzsch-Kearl's sugar beets in 2000-2002 and 2004, potatoes in 2000-2002 (Yes);
* Damage to Bellwether Plaintiff Hansen's sugar beets in 2000-2002, potatoes in 2000-2004, and wheat in 2001-2002 (Yes).
After oral argument, we issued a limited remand to the district court. We instructed the district court to determine "[w]hether the United States sent administrative denial letters to Plaintiffs by a method that qualifies as certified mail." We explained that, [a] limited remand is warranted because the district court failed to resolve material factual issues relating to whether the United States mailed administrative denial letters to Plaintiffs by a method that qualifies as certified mail. The court reasoned that Congress intended to require that the United States obtain a postmarked sender's receipt when it sends Federal Tort Claims Act administrative denial letters by certified mail, which the government did not do here. The district court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) is inconsistent with the statute's plain text and is not supported by any case law.
In response, the district court filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district court concluded, as a matter of law, that "the only option for mailing certified mail using form 3877 is to mail the letters from a post office, branch, or station, or by giving it to a rural carrier." As a result, the district court concluded that the denial letters for which BLM used Form 3877 and that BLM's USPS collector picked up from the BLM mail room were not sent by a method that qualified as certified mail. Thereafter, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the district court's ruling on remand.*fn3
"We review de novo whether we have subject matter jurisdiction." Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2008).
[1] When the appropriate federal agency denies an administrative FTCA claim, the claimant has six months, from the date when the denial was mailed by certified or registered mail, to file a complaint in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). After the expiration of the six months, the "tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred." Id. The FTCA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling or estoppel. Marley v. United States, 567 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 796 (2009). Thus, FTCA claimants must strictly adhere to the statute of limitations or lose the right to invoke federal jurisdiction.
[2] The government, however, must also strictly comply with § 2401(b)'s requirement that administrative denial letters be sent by certified or registered mail. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (to satisfy administrative exhaustion before filing an FTCA claim in federal court a claimant's "claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail."). We, along with two of our sister circuits, have indicated that the government cannot invoke the FTCA statute of limitations if it has failed to comply with the certified or registered mailing requirement-even if a claimant actually received the notice of denial. Raddatz v. United States, 750 F.2d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 1984); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1998); Miller v. United States, 741 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, we treat the government's compliance with the certified or registered mailing requirement in a manner similar to what we demand of claimants' compliance with the six month requirement.
[3] Here, BLM denied Plaintiffs' administrative claims in "certified" letters bearing the date August 5, 2002. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 6, 2003-six months and one day after the date which appears on the letters denying the administrative claims. Therefore, if the administrative denial letters triggered the FTCA statute of limitations, Plaintiffs' claims are "forever barred." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The district court concluded that the government complied with the statute's certified mailing requirement-thereby triggering the statute of limitations-for only three of the denial letters. Having concluded that the government did not mail the rest of the denial letters by a method that qualified as certified mail, the district court rejected BLM's argument that the FTCA's statute of limitations bars the claims of those 132 Plaintiffs. We agree with the district court, drawing on Raddatz, Flory, and Miller, that if BLM failed to strictly comply with the statute, it cannot invoke the benefit of the statute of limitations to shield itself against Plaintiffs' claims. We do not, however, agree with the district court that, in this instance, BLM's mailing failed to trigger the statute of limitations. As we explain below, BLM mailed all the letters by a method that qualified as certified mail.
[4] USPS Form 3800 is the form commonly associated with certified mail. See Domestic Mail Manual ("DMM") Exhibit 3.3.3.*fn4 Form 3800 has two parts. Id. The left part contains a bar code and a 20 digit identifying number and reads "Certified Mail" vertically from bottom to top. Id. This left part is perforated on the right side and, once the backing is removed, is sticky on the back. The DMM states that "Certified Mail must bear a barcoded green Form 3800 [the left side]." DMM § 503.3.3.3.*fn5
The right part of Form 3800 bears the title "U.S. Postal Service Certified Mail Receipt" horizontally across the top and it contains the same 20 digit identifying number that appears on the sticky left part. DMM Exhibit 3.3.3. This receipt contains space for a customer to fill in, among other information, postage, certified fee, and the name and address of the certified mail's recipient. Id. This receipt does not get attached to the piece of mail that is sent. There are two things a mailer can do with this receipt. First, if a mailer wants a postmarked sender's receipt, the DMM instructs the mailer to "attach the Certified Mail sticker [the left part of Form 3800] to the address side of the article and present the article and the completed receipt [the right part of Form 3800] to the USPS employee, who then round-dates the receipt to show when the article was accepted." DMM § 503.3.3.5(d). If the mailer does not want a postmarked sender's receipt, the DMM instructs the mailer to "attach the 'Certified Mail' sticker [the left part of Form 3800] to the address side of the article, detach the receipt [the right part of Form 3800], and mail the article. Mark the receipt to show the date." This mailing can be done from a "Post Office, branch, or station or give it to a rural carrier. Certified Mail may also be deposited in a Post Office maildrop, a street letterbox, a nonpersonnel unit, or any other receptacle for First-Class Mail." DMM § 503.3.3.1.
Thus, if a mailer chooses not to obtain a postmarked send-er's receipt, USPS never sees or checks the sender's receipt- the right part of Form 3800-and the mail proceeds as certified mail with the left barcoded part of Form 3800.
[5] The DMM specifies that mailers can use Form 3877 (or equivalent privately made Firm Sheets) "in lieu of the receipt portion of Form 3800." DMM § 503.3.3.6 (emphasis added). Even if a mailer uses Form 3877 for the sender's receipt, the mailer must still use the barcoded left part of Form 3800 for every piece of mail. DMM § 503.3.3.3. Because Form 3877 is used "in lieu" of the sender's receipt portion of Form 3800, it follows that, just as a postmark is optional on a Form 3800 sender's receipt, a postmark is optional on a Form 3877 send-er's receipt. Moreover, the DMM states, using conditional language, that "[i]f the mailer wants the firm sheets receipted by the USPS, the mailer must present the books with the articles to be mailed at a Post Office. The sheets of the books become the mailer's receipts." DMM § 503.3.3.6 (emphasis added). Thus, just like a piece of certified mail sent using both the left and right parts of Form 3800, USPS may never see Form 3877. The individual pieces of mail, however, will be processed through USPS as "certified" so long as they contain the left barcoded part of Form 3800 and the sender pays proper postage.
[6] The envelopes containing the administrative denial letters in this case bear the left barcoded part of Form 3800. Plaintiffs do not contend, and no evidence has been offered, that BLM did not pay proper certified mail postage for the denial letters. Plaintiffs now simply claim, as the district court concluded, that the mailing was not done by a method that qualified as certified mail because BLM mailed the Form 3877 letters from its mailroom and USPS did not inspect the letters or postmark the Form 3877 receipts before the items entered the mail. In light of the above discussion, we do not find Plaintiffs' argument persuasive. Because the envelopes containing the denial letters bear the necessary left barcoded part of Form 3800 and BLM paid proper postage, we conclude that BLM mailed the letters by a method that qualified as certified mail.*fn6 Therefore, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit one day late and federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist for any of their FTCA claims. The district court erred by not dismissing the claims against the federal government.
[7] For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs' FTCA claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that we lack subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.