Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=2653
Timestamp: 2020-04-06 20:28:53
Document Index: 102304275

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 301', 'Art.\n301', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 301', 'Art.\t301', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\t301', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 301', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 301', 'Art. 301', 'Art. 301', 'Art. 301', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 303', 'Art. 304', 'Art. 304', 'Art.\t301', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\n226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art.\t226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 226']

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus BHAILAL BHAI & ORS
1964 AIR 1006	1964 SCR (6) 261
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V. BHAILAL BHAI & ORS [1964] RD-SC 7 (20 January 1964)
CITATION: 1964 AIR 1006	1964 SCR (6) 261
RF	1965 SC1740	(11) R	1966 SC1089	(34) R	1969 SC 78	(4) E	1970 SC 898	(18,35,37,46,51,62,63) D	1972 SC2060	(4,5) E	1975 SC 813	(5,6) RF	1976 SC2243	(21) R	1982 SC 101	(28) E&R	1990 SC 772	(20,31,32) RF	1990 SC 820	(17) RF	1991 SC1676	(72)
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 226, 301 and 304--Issue of Writ Unreasonable delay in moving Court--what is--Sales Tax--Impeding inter State trade--Validity--Tax	paid under mistake--Order	of repayment--Jurisdiction of	High Court under Art. 226.
The respondents are dealers in tobacco in the State	of Madhya Bharat.	The appellant imposed sales tax on the	sale of imported tobacco by the respondents.	But no such tax was imposed on the sale of indigenous tobacco. The	respondents filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution for	the issue of writ of mandamus 'directing the refund of sales tax collected from them. They contended that the impugned	tax violated Art. 301 (a) of the Constitution and they paid	the tax under a mistake	of law and the tax so paid	was refundable under s. 72 of the Indian Contract	Act, 1872.
The appellant contended that there was no violation of	Art.
301 of the Constitution, even if there was such violation the tax came within the special provision under Art. 304(a), the High Court bar. no power to direct refund of tax already paid and in any event the High Court should not exercise its discretionary power of issuing a writ of mandamus directing this to be done since there was unreasonable delay in filing the petition.	The High Court rejected all the	contentions of the appellant and a writ of mandamus was issued as prayed for. The appellants appealed to this Court.	Before	this Court substantially the same contentions as were canvassed before the High Court were raised.
Held:	(i) Even though the liability to pay tax	was created by the sale of tobacco in Madhya Pradesh and not by the import itself the facts and circumstances	showed	that trade and commerce as between Madhya Bharat and other parts of India was	directly impeded by the impugned tax	and therefore the	said tax violated Art. 301(a) of	the Constitution.
809, Automobiles Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491 and Firm Mehtab Majid &	Co.
v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 928, referred to.
(ii) Even though the	tax contravened Art.	301 of	the Constitution it	would he valid if it came	within	the saving provisions of Art. 304 of the	Constitution.
(iii) Tobacco	manufactured or produced in the appellant State, similar to the	tobacco imported from	outside	had not been subjected to the tax and therefore the tax was	not within	the saving provisions	of Art. 304	(a) of	the Constitution.
262 (iv) The tax which had already been paid was so paid under a mistake	within s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act. The	High Courts	have power for the purpose	of enforcement	of fundamental rights and statutory	rights	to grant consequential	reliefs	by ordering repayment of money realised by the Government without the authority of law.
(v) As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Even if there is	not such delay, in cases where the opposite party raises a prima facie issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on	grounds like limitation the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus.
(vi) Though the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art. 226	the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be claimed	may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be measured.	The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy.	Where the delay is more than this period it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed	for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Iimitation	Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. In the result C.A. Nos. 861-867 are allowed in part and	the other appeals are dismissed.
Appeals	from the judgment and orders dated 28th October, 1960, 16th September, 1960 and 29th July, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 110,	119 and 136 of 1960, 198, 199, 202 to 206 of 1959 respectively.
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated 29th July, 1960, 26th September, 1960, 28th October, 1960, 16th September, 1960 and 28th October, 1960 of the Madhya 263 Pradesh	High Court in Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 273 of 1958, 73, 74, 120 and 132 of 1960 respectively.
M. Adhikari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and 1. N.
Shroff for the appellants (in all the appeals).
M. C. Setalvad, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.
Vohra, for the respondent (in C.A. No. 362/1962).
S. N.	Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for	the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 363 to 377 and 858 to 867 of	1962 and 25 to 27 of 1963).
January	20, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J.-These 31 appeals by the State of Madhya Pradesh are against the orders made by the High Court' of Madhya Pradesh	in 31 applications	under	Art. 226 of	the Constitution by dealers in tobacco. All these	petitioners carried on business in Madhya Bharat which later became part of the State of Madhya Pradesh.	They were assessed to sales tax on	their	sales of tobacco in accordance with	the notification issued by the State Government in exercise of powers	under s. 5 of the State Sales Tax Act and large amounts	were collected by the Madhya Bharat Government	and later by the Madhya Pradesh Government. The	petitioners contended that the taxing provisions under which the tax was assessed and collected from them was unconstitutional as it infringed Art.	301 of the Constitution and did not	come within	the special provision of Art. 304(a).	Accordingly, they prayed for appropriate writs or orders for refund of all the taxes	that has been	collected from them.	In resisting these applications the Madhya Pradesh Government contended, first, that the Wing provisions did	not offend Art. 301 of the Constitution and that in any	case,	they satisfied the requirements of Art. 304(a). It was further contended that even if the taxing provision was unconstitutional and the assessment and collection of tax had been without any legal authority the petitioners	were not entitled to the order for refund prayed for.
264 The High Court was of opinion on a consideration of;	the notification under which the tax was assessed that it imposed a tax only on imported tobacco and not on home grown tobacco and so it did not come within the special provisions of Art. 304(a) of the Constitution and consequently	the infringement of Art. 301 of the Constitution which resulted from the imposition of a tax on import of goods made	the provisions void in law. The prayer for refund was allowed in the	applications out of which C.A. Nos. 362-377,	C.A.
Nos. 861--867 of 1962 and C.A. No. 25 of 1963 have arisen.
In the present appeals the	State	of Madhya Pradesh challenges the correctness of the High Court's decision that the taxing provision was unconstitutional and void and	also the orders for refund made in some of the petitions	men- tioned above.
The liability	to pay tax arose under s.3 of	the Madhva Bharat Sales Tax Act. This Act came into force from the 1st day of May 1950. As originally enacted it provided that (a) every dealer who imports goods into Madhya Bharat shall be liable	to pay tax on his taxable turnover in	respect of sales or supplies of goods effected from the 1st day of	May 1950 if his total turnover in the previous year in respect of sales or supplies	of goods exceeded Rs	5,000;	(b) similarly every manufacturer or processor whose turnover in the previous year exceeded Rs. 5,000 was made liable to	pay tax on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected from the 1st day of May 1950; (c) every other dealer was made liable to pay tax on	his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected from the 1st day of May 1950, if the total turnover in	the previous year exceeded Rs. 12,000. By later amendments	the word "processor" was deleted from cl. (b) of the section and the meaning of the words "any other" in cl. (c) was	made clearer by substituting the words "any goods of a dealer not falling in cl. (a) or cl. (b)".	There was also an amendment in 1950 making it, clear that the taxable turnover on which the tax liability.
Section	5 of the Act provides that the tax payable by a dealer shall be at a single point and shall not be less than Rs. 1/9/- per	cent or more than 6-1/4 per cent of	the taxable	turnover, as	notified from time to time by	the Government by publication in the Official Gazette. This is subject to a proviso that the Government may in respect of a special	class	of goods charge tax upto 12-1/2% on	the taxable	turnover. The second sub-section of s. 5 empowers the Government to notify at the time of notifying the	tax payable	by a dealer, the goods and the point of their	sale at which the tax is payable. The legal position therefore is that unless there is a valid notification under s. 5 no tax can be levied. The contention of the	petitioners- dealers which has succeeded in the High Court is that	the notifications on the strength of which the tax was assessed on them were invalid.
The first notification was issued on April 30, 1950.	This provided that with effect from the 1st day of May 1950 sales tax shall be collected in respect of	goods specified in column	2 of	the Schedule that was attached to	the notification at the point of sale mentioned in column 3 at the rates mentioned in column 4. The relevant portion of the Schedule ran thus:- -------------------------------------------------------- Sl Name of commodity	The point of sale	Rate of No.	by dealers	tax ---------------------------------------------------------
9. Tobacco leaves, manufactu-	Importer	6-4-0 red tobacco (for eating and	Per cent smoking) and tobacco used	Sales Tax for Bidi manufacturing.
----------------------------------------------------------- This was followed by another notification dated May 22, 1950 under which a lower rate was prescribed for tobacco used for Bidi manufacturers. But the point at which the tax	was payable remained unaltered. The rele- 266 vant portion of the Schedule to this notification was in these words:
----------------------------------------------------------- Sl. Name of commodity	Point of sale	Rate per- No.	by the dealers	cent of tax in M. B.
10. Tobacco leaves and manu- factured tobacco (for eating, Importer	6-4-0 smoking and snuffing)
11. Tobacco used for Bidi	Importer	1-9-0 manufacturing.
------------------------------------------------------------ For a short period, i.e., from the 1st January 1954 to	the 21st January	1954 these two notifications remained inoperative in consequence of a notification dated the	24th October, 1953, under which from the 1st January 1954	the point of sale at which the tax was payable was	altered to "on a sale by a dealer direct to a consumer or to a dealer who does not hold a licence or registration	certificate under the Sales Tax Act". This last notification was again superseded by a notification dated the 21st January, 1954 in consequence of	which the old position was restored	with effect	from January 22, 1954.	That is, with	effect	from 22nd January 1954 the point at which the tax was payable, again became a sale by an importer.
There can be no doubt that the tax payable at the point of sale by the importer in Madhya Bharat directly impeded	the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Art. 301 of	the Constitution.	It is true that the import by itself would not bring in the liability to tax and that if the imported goods were not sold	in Madhya Bharat no tax would be -payable. Quite clearly however by far the greater part of the tobacoo leaves, manufactured tobacco (for	eating	and smoking) and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing that would be imported into the State would be sold in Madhya Bharat.
That a very considerable amount was so sold is clear	from the very assessment orders made in these several cases.
There can be no doubt therefore 267 that even though it is the sale in Madhya Bharat of	the imported goods that creates the liability to tax and not the import	by itself, the trade and commerce as between Madhya Bharat and other parts of India is directly impeded by	this tax. On the authority of this Court's decision in Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam(1) it must therefore be held that the tax contravenes the provisions of Art. 301 of	the Constitution.	It may be mentioned that the later decision of this Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v.
State of Rajasthan(2) which slightly modified the majority decision in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case does not	alter	this position. If the tax could have been claimed to be regula- tory or compensatory it would have got the benefit of	the latter	decision. There is, however, no scope for such a claim (See Firm Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras) (3).
The tax could still be good if even though it	contravened the provisions of Art. 301 it came within the saving provi- sions of Art. 304(a) of the Constitution. That Article provides in its cl. (a) that notwithstanding	anything in Article	301 or Art. 303 the legislature of a State may by law impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject so however as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced.	An attempt	was made on behalf of the State before the	High Court and also before us to	construe the	notification mentioned above to mean that not only the tobacco imported from other States but also similar goods manufactured or produced in Madhya Bharat were subject to this tax and at the same rate.	It was argued that a dealer in these goods who was an importer and so sold goods imported by him	into Madhya	Bharat would also be selling goods not	so imported but manufactured and produced in the State. We are prepared to agree that may well be so.	What we are unable to	see, however, is that in respect of sales of such	other goods this person would be liable to (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 809.
268 any tax under the notification. We are informed that in fact where importers dealt with goods other than imported goods the sales of such other goods were in fact excluded from tax. The learned Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh who appeared before us in support of these appeals suggested that that was done by the State Sales Tax Authorities on a mistaken interpretation of the law. We do not think so.	In our opinion, the only reasonable interpretation of	the notification as it stands, viz., that tax on tobacco leaves, manufactured tobacco and tobacco used for Bidi manufacturing would be payable at the point of sale by the importer, is that only the sale of goods which the importer had imported would be liable to tax and not sale of any other goods by him. If the intention had been as suggested by the learned Advocate-General that though the tax is payable at the point of sale by an importer the scale by the same person of goods manufactured or produced in Madhya Bharat would also be liable to tax, the word "importer" would not have been	used in column 3 but the word "dealer" would have been used	and the point of sale would have been indicated by	some other words as the "first sale in Madhya Bharat" or "the sale to the retailer in Madhya Bharat" as the rule-making authority chose.
The matter becomes even more clear if in column 3 we	read for "importer" the definition of "importer of goods" in s.
2(i) of the Act. Reading this we find that the point of sale in Madhya Bharat at which the tax is payable is	the sale "by the dealer who brings or causes to be brought	into Madhya	Bharat	any goods from outside for the	purpose of processing, manufacturing or sale" or "who purchases goods in Madhya Bharat for the purpose of sale from a dealer	who does not ordinarily carry on business in Madhya Bharat."When only such a sale is being made the point at which the tax is payable, there is hardly any scope for a serious argument that the notification was intended to make sales by	that same dealer of goods manufactured or	produced in Madhya Bharat liable to tax.
it may not be out of place to notice in this connection	the distinction made by s.3 of the Madhya Bharat Sales 269 Tax Act between sales by a dealer who imports	goods	[cl.
(a)] and other dealers [cls. (b) and (c) ]. It is not	un- reasonable to	think that the Act itself contemplated	the sales by an importer of goods as meaning only sales by	him of goods imported by him into Madhya Bharat.	Apart	from this, it has to be noticed that admittedly the	notification did not make dealers who dealt only in home grown or	home produced tobacco liable to pay the tax. That by itself would be sufficient to bring in the vice of discrimination which is the purpose of Art. 304(a) to prevent.
There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion	that similar	goods	manufactured or produced in the State of Madhya	Bharat have not been subjected to the tax which tobacco	leaves, manufactured tobacco and tobacco used	for Bidi manufacturing, imported from other States have to	pay on sale by the importer. This tax is, therefore, not within the saving provisions of Art. 304(a). As already pointed out it	contravenes the provisions of Art.	301 of	the Constitution.	The tax has therefore been rightly held by the High Court to be invalid. It is clear that the assess- ment of tax under these notifications was thus	invalid in law.
A portion of the tax thus assessed has been already paid by the petitioners. It	cannot now be	disputed that	this payment	was made under a mistake within s.72 of the Indian Contract Act and so the Government to whom the payment	has been made by mistake must in law repay it. The question is whether the relief of repayment has to be sought by the tax- payer by an action in a civil court or whether such an order can be made	by the	High Court in exercise of	its jurisdiction under Art. 226	of the	Constitution.	The jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 is in very	wide terms.
This Article empowers the High Court to give relief by	way of enforcement	of fundamental rights and other rights by issuing directions, orders or writs, including writs in	the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. According to the petitioners a writ in	the nature of mandamus can be appropriately used where money has been paid to the Government by mistake to give relief by commanding repayment 270 of the same. That in a number of cases the High Courts have used the writ of mandamus to enforce such repayment is	not disputed. In a recent case in Firm Mehtab Majid & Co., v.
The State of Madras(1) this Court made, in a petition under Art. 32, an order for refund of tax illegally collected from the petitioner under Rule 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939.	The question whether the Court has this power to order refund was	not however raised there. in Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya	Lal Mukundlal Saraf (2) the appellants disputed the	correctness of the High Court's order made in an application under	Art.
226 of the Constitution directing refund of taxes that	had been paid under the U.P. Sales Tax Act on the	respondent's forward transactions in silver bullion. After the levy of sales tax on such transactions was held to be ultra vires by the High Court of Allahabad the respondent asked, for refund of the tax paid and when that was refused he applied to	the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari for quashing the assessment orders and a writ of mandamus requiring the appellants to	refund	the amount illegally collected.	The order made in this case by	the High Court for refund was affirmed by this Court in appeal.
In this case also the power of the High Court to order	such refund	was not challenged either before the High Court or before this Court.
We see no reason to think that the High Courts have not	got this power. If a right has been	infringed-whether a fundamental right or a statutory right-and the aggrieved party comes to the court for enforcement of the right it will not be giving complete relief if the court merely	de- clares	the existence of such right or the fact that	that existing right	has been infringed. Where there has	been only a threat to infringe the right, an order commanding the Government or	other statutory authority not to take	the action	contemplated would be sufficient. It has been	held by this Court that where there has been a threat only and the right has not been actually infringed an application (1) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 928.
271 under Art. 226 would lie and the courts would give necessary relief	by making an order in the nature of injunction.	It will hardly be reasonable to say that while the court	will grant relief by such command in the nature of an order of injunction where the invasion of a right has	been merely threatened the court must still refuse, where the right	has been actually invaded, to give the consequential relief	and content	itself	with merely a declaration that the right exists	and has been invaded or with merely quashing	the illegal order made.
For the reasons given above, we are clearly of opinion	that the High Courts have power for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory	rights	to	give consequential relief by ordering repayment of money realised by the Government without the authority of law.
At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that	the special	remedy	provided in Art. 226 is not	intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action	in a civil court or to deny defences	legitimately open in such actions. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Art.	226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among	the several	matters which the High Courts rightly take	into consideration in the exercise of that	discretion is	the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy	and what excuse there is for it. Another is	the nature	of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief.
Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Art. 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a	void provision of law, and the payment was made by	mistake, is still not bound to exercise	its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment	should be ordered in	the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on	its own facts and	circumstances.	It is not easy	nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal	application.
It may however be stated 272 as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.	Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a	prima facie triable issue as	regards	the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds	like limitation, the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue	the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court	and to	refuse	to exercise in his	favour	the extraordinary remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The prayer for refund has been allowed by the High Court in the applications out of which Civil Appeal Nos. 362-377 of 1962 and Civil Appeal Nos. 861--867 of 1962 and Civil Appeal No. 25	of 1963 have arisen.	It appears that the	tax provisions under which these taxes had been assessed	and paid was declared void by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in their decision in Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya	Pradesh on January 17, 1956. Later, on	August	27, 1957 the Appellate Authority, Sales Tax, in Madhya Bharat made an order relying on the High Court's decision mentioned above.	The petitioners claim to have discovered their mistake	in making the payments after they came to know of these decisions. it is reasonable to think however that	the petitioners must have discovered their mistake as soon as the High Court's decision in the case of Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya Pradesh dated January 17, 1956 became known to them' All these 16 applications were	made within less than three years from the 17th January, 1956. The High Court has taken the view that this was not	unreasonable delay and in that view has ordered refund. This appears to us to be a sound and judicial exercise of discretion	with which this Court ought not to interfere. it may be added that no triable issue as regards the availability of	this consequential relief was raised before the High Court nor has any been suggested before us. The order of refund made 273 by the High Court in these cases cannot therefore be dis- turbed- The position in Civil Appeal Nos. 861 to 867	of 1962 is however	different. The applications out of	which these appeals have arisen were made in September 1959, i.e., about three years and eight months after January 17, 1956 when the High Court of Madhya Pradesh gave their decision declaring the tax provisions in question to be void.
It was	necessary for	the High Court to consider	this question of delay before any order for refund was made.	It does not appear however that any attention was paid to	this question. In making the orders for refund in each of these cases the High Court merely said this:- The present case is governed by Bhailal Bhai's Case (1960 M.P.C. 304).	Learned Government Advocate	formally raised the question of	the remedy open to the petitioner for refund of tax in order to keep the point open in	the Supreme Court.	We accordingly	allow	this petition. and issue a writ directing the oppo- nents to	refund to the	applicant firm	the amount of tax collected from it	during	the above-mentioned period." The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that	the delay in these petitions was more than the delay in	the petition made	in Bhailal Bhai's case out of	which Civil Appeal	No. 362 of 1962 has arisen. On behalf of the	res- pondents-petitioners in these appeals (C.A. Nos. 861 to	867 of 1962) Mr. Andley has argued that the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of the order	for refund.	He argued that assuming that the remedy of recovery by action in a civil court stood barred on the	date these applications were made that would be no reason to refuse relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel is right in his submission that the	provisions of	the Limitation Act	do not as such apply to the	granting of relief	under Art. 226.	It appears to us however that	the maximum	period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought 134--159 S.C. 18 274 may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Art. 226 can be measured.	The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy. but where the delay	is more than	this period,	it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable.	The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under	the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly	after	January 17, 1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable. If, on	the other hand, as Mr. Andley seems to argue, the	mistake	was discovered much later, this would be a	controversial	fact which cannot conveniently be decided in writ	proceedings.
In either view of the matter we are of opinion	the orders for refund made by the High Court in	these	seven cases cannot be sustained.
The application out of which Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1963 has arisen	was also made in 1958, that is, within less	than three years from the date of the High Court's	decision in Mohammad Siddique v. The State of Madhya Pradesh. The	High Court was therefore right in stating in its judgment in this case that it is governed by Bhailal Bhai's case. We see no reason	to interfere, with the order for refund made by	the High Court in this case.
In the	result, Civil Appeals Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962	are allowed	in part and the orders for refund made in those cases are set aside. The petitioners will be at liberty to seek such relief as they may be entitled to	in a civil court, if it be not barred by limitation. There will be no order as to costs in these cases. In two other appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 28 and 29 of 1962, the	respondents have not appeared; so there will be no order as to costs in them. In the other appeals which are dismissed, the appel- lant will pay costs to the respondents.	One hearing fee for all these appeals.
Appeals	Nos.	861-867 partly allowed, other appeals dismissed.