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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 686', '§ 1881', '§ 3046', '§ 3047', '§ 644', '§ 1', '§ 1217', '§ 398']

People v. Linden :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 2d › Volume 52 › People v. Linden
The Substance of the People's Case. On Saturday night, March 16, 1957, defendant became involved in a fight in a Los Angeles bar. Summoned by the bartender's shout, Police Officer Leo Wise, in uniform, entered the bar. He took defendant to the sidewalk, searched him for weapons and found none. The officer said, "I should arrest all of them, but I don't want to see you on the street any more. Go home." [52 Cal. 2d 12] Defendant walked away in one direction and Officer Wise in another. Later that night Officer Wise encountered defendant outside the bar and said, "I thought I told you to go home." The officer "patted him on the sides again" in a search for weapons, then went to a nearby police call box. As Wise started to place a call defendant, at about 12:20 a. m. on March 17, stepped to the officer's side, shot him twice at very close range, and ran away. Officer Wise fired twice at the fleeing defendant; defendant fired once more at the officer; and Wise placed a call and collapsed.
Defendant, Lieutenant Gebhart, and other officers were in [52 Cal. 2d 13] the Homicide Division from 12:45 a. m. until 3 a. m. on March 17. During this period defendant (who was handcuffed) kicked and spat at officers and knocked furniture about. Lieutenant Gebhart testified that during such period defendant made the following statements: In the anteroom of the Homicide Division, defendant said that three years before he had been "framed" by two policemen on a charge of "interfering with an officer"; "That these officers had perjured themselves in the court, that he was convicted ..., and that at that time while he was doing his 90-day sentence, he made up his mind he was going to kill a police officer"; "that it took the jury eight hours of deliberation on a misdemeanor charge to convict him ... and that he was very tough to beat, that he had beaten one other murder rap," and "he was going to be very hard to convict on this charge." Immediately thereafter in the office of the captain of the Homicide Division "the conversation ... followed the same general outline with the exception that ... Mr. Linden then said that he was not talking about himself; he was talking about a fictional character who had served 90 days on a bum rap, and then made up his mind to kill a police officer."
Defendant and his counsel had ample warning that the tape would contain language of defendant which might prejudice the jury. fn. 1 Nevertheless defense counsel asked that all [52 Cal. 2d 14] recorded statements of defendant be produced and that it be "stipulated" that they would be played to the jury. The prosecuting attorney asked, "That is at the defendant's request?" Defense counsel said, "At the defendant's request. Isn't that true, Mr. Linden?" Defendant replied, "That is fine," and shortly thereafter interrupted the court to say, "Nothing cut out, sir, played in their entirety." Defendant asked and was allowed to speak privately with his counsel and immediately thereafter counsel repeated to the court that defendant wished "all" the tapes, "complete."
Lieutenant Gebhart, further examined, reiterated his identification of People's Exhibit 19. When defense counsel concluded his cross-examination of the lieutenant, defendant himself interrupted the proceedings with a request to personally examine the witness and asserted, "That is not my voice on that recording; that is an actor. ... I can prove it." There followed proceedings, hereinafter described, which led to defendant's assuming his own representation. Although [52 Cal. 2d 15] defendant has since often repeated his assertion that People's Exhibit 19 is false, he has never offered any evidence in support of that claim.
Out of the presence of the jury the court fully and correctly advised defendant concerning the right to counsel, the lack of special privileges to a defendant who insists upon representing himself, and the absence of any right to advisory counsel in the capacity of "errand boy," all in substantial accord with the law as stated in People v. Mattson (1959), 51 Cal. 2d 777, 793-795 [336 P.2d 937]. The court further, and properly (see People v. Caritativo (1956), 46 Cal. 2d 68, 73 [10] [292 P.2d 513]; People v. Dorman (1946), 28 Cal. 2d 846, 850 [1] [172 P.2d 686]), ruled that it would not appoint new counsel at the late stage of the proceeding. It relieved [52 Cal. 2d 16] defendant's trial counsel as attorney of record and, with his consent and with express recognition of the difficult position in which he was placed, appointed him as legal advisor.
[2] Defendant's appeal counsel assert that the trial court did not determine that defendant understood the issues and available defenses and had capacity to effectively waive counsel, as required by Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357]; In re James (1952), 38 Cal. 2d 203, 313 [8] [240 P.2d 596]; and People v. Chesser (1947), 29 Cal. 2d 815, 822-825 [4-6] [178 P.2d 761, 170 A.L.R. 246]. Further, they say, the following conduct of defendant shows that he was not competent to waive counsel: Prior to trial defendant told the court that [52 Cal. 2d 17] he was "not capable ... on my own" of determining whether the evidence before the grand jury was sufficient. During the colloquy which resulted in defendant's being allowed to represent himself, his then counsel expressed willingness to remain as attorney of record "Without having anybody telling me how to try a lawsuit when they don't understand what is going on." From the circumstance that defendant did not produce evidence that the tape was false, appeal counsel infer that defendant did not understand that he could offer such evidence. They also say that "From the record, there is a question whether appellant was cognizant of the possible defenses available to him, e.g., self defense," and that "In addition, the confusion which arose with reference to the subpoenaing of the Police Department pictures and records ... and of witnesses, was evidence that the appellant did not know what he was doing."
The foregoing argument is based upon isolated occurrences taken out of context and unwarranted inferences therefrom. Prior to trial defendant was repeatedly urged, and refused, to accept representation by the public defender; he presented the untenable but not naive argument (since rejected in People v. Mattson (1959), supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 783 et seq.), that his state constitutional (art. I, § 13) and statutory (Pen. Code, § 686) right to "appear and defend, in person and with counsel" was "conjunctive" and entitled him to conduct his case personally and at the same time to be furnished the advice of an attorney; he evidenced alertness to protect his rights by his reiterated requests for an attorney to advise him whether the indictment was subject to demurrer or motion to set it aside; and it was in this latter connection that he said, indicating recognition of the difficulty which he might encounter if he insisted upon representing himself, that "I am not capable ... on my own" of appraising the testimony before the grand jury. Long before trial defendant was afforded the advice and accepted the representation of his trial counsel, and after defendant was allowed to undertake his own representation he still had the advisory services of counsel. Trial counsel's statement, when the matter of relegating him to the position of advisor was under discussion, that he was willing to try the case without direction from anyone who did not "understand what is going on," did not indicate his opinion that defendant was altogether devoid of understanding; rather, it indicated no more than what defendant had already explained; i.e., that defendant and [52 Cal. 2d 18] counsel had reached an impasse because counsel did not believe and would not attempt to prove that the tape recording was falsified.
[4] As the principal instance of trial counsel's asserted incompetence, appeal counsel cite the fact that trial counsel requested that the tape, People's Exhibit 19, be put in evidence without having asked to hear it. fn. 4 Although defendant [52 Cal. 2d 19] pro se asserts that his trial attorney convinced him that the recording should be put in evidence, from the record as a whole we conclude that the damaging maneuver must be attributed to defendant personally and that his trial counsel cannot be charged with incompetence because he did not control his client in this regard. As we have indicated, defendant's counsel was careful to obtain defendant's consent in open court to the "stipulation" that the recordings be presented. There being nothing in the record to the contrary, we must assume that counsel did this in fairness to all concerned rather than to protect himself from his own careless or intentional initiation of tactics which might harm defendant. Defendant himself then stated his demand that the recordings be played "in their entirety" and asked and obtained his counsel's repetition of that demand. It appears to us that such demand by defendant was a part of his attempt to discredit the prosecution's case through the claim that the police had used an actor to "fake in" a voice on one or more of the recordings and misrepresented the voice as that of defendant. It thus appears that defendant decided to take the calculated risk of having People's Exhibit 19 presented. While it is unfortunate that defense counsel (in his own words) "built a lawsuit up to that recording," the record fails to persuade us that he is chargeable with defendant's plight. To the contrary, it appears probable that it was defendant's insistence upon urging his claim that the recording was false and did not contain his voice, and counsel's refusal to advance such contention, which led to defendant's demand that counsel no longer represent him.
Defendant complains that the incompetence of his trial counsel appears from his failure to keep from the jury reference to defendant's prior criminal record. Defendant was charged with and admitted two prior convictions of felony. One of these convictions (voluntary manslaughter) was brought to the attention of the jury as hereinafter explained. Defendant asserts that his trial counsel permitted and encouraged procedure contrary to the provision of section 1025 of [52 Cal. 2d 20] the Penal Code that, where defendant admits a previous conviction, it must not be alluded to on the trial.
[6] Lieutenant Gebhart, without objection, gave the previously mentioned testimony that defendant soon after his arrest said that "it took the jury eight hours of deliberation on a misdemeanor charge to convict him ..., that he was very tough to beat, that he had beaten one other murder rap." Statements of defendant on the tape recording show that the mentioned "murder rap" resulted in conviction of manslaughter. Defendant urges that the receipt of this evidence violated the holding of People v. Green (1950), 96 Cal. App. 2d 283, 291-292 [4] [215 P.2d 127], that it is error to receive evidence of defendant's admissions of a criminal record made in the course of but severable from admissible declarations concerning the crime for which defendant was on trial. Here, however, defendant's admissions concerning his criminal record were provable as necessary, inseparable parts of relevant admissions as to his attitude toward police officers and toward accusations of crime. (See People v. McMonigle (1947), 29 Cal. 2d 730, 742 [177 P.2d 745]; People v. Peete (1946), 28 Cal. 2d 306, 314-315 [1] [169 P.2d 924].) [7] And since evidence of defendant's boasts that "he had beaten one other murder rap" was properly received, it was permissible for the prosecuting attorney to make the argument, of which defendant complains, that defendant "has gotten away with murder once." It thus appears that defense counsel did not invite or permit error in connection with defendant's criminal record.
[8, 9] Defendant pro se argues unconvincingly that he was [52 Cal. 2d 21] prejudiced by developments, to which the asserted incompetence of his trial counsel contributed, concerning the role of Mr. Alatorre and his companions in the apprehension of defendant. On examination of prospective jurors counsel for defendant properly asked whether the jurors had seen newspaper or television accounts of the death of Officer Wise, and the prosecuting attorney thereafter made particular inquiry as to a television program which praised "four Mexican nationals" who "captured" defendant. Defendant makes the peculiar complaint that he was tried by a jury who had not seen that program. [10] He further complains that his counsel should have cross-examined the arresting officer to show that his testimony before the grand jury might be understood to mean that defendant expressed thanks for protection from the Mexicans rather than (as shown by the officer's trial testimony) from other officers. So far as appears such cross-examination would only have emphasized defendant's vile language and would not have adduced anything helpful to defendant. [11] Defendant also complains of statements of the prosecuting attorney in argument concerning the "Mexican boys"; these statements were factually correct and could not have prejudiced defendant.
The fact that Mrs. Tepper gave what defendant calls "not a true answer" to the above described question of the trial court could well have been and no doubt was considered by court and counsel to show inattention, not deliberate concealment or self-contradiction as to her acquaintance with Wise. [52 Cal. 2d 22] Certainly it does not appear as a matter of law that defense counsel made an unwise use of his last peremptory challenge. And no ground of challenge for cause appears. [13] Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the trial court's determination as to his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court. (People v. Daugherty (1953), 40 Cal. 2d 876, 890 [4] [256 P.2d 911]; People v. Eudy (1938), 12 Cal. 2d 41, 45 [2] [82 P.2d 359].) [12b] Furthermore, Mrs. Tepper, an alternate juror, did not participate in the deliberations of the jury which rendered the verdict against defendant.
[17] Defendant complains that his counsel during the playing of the tape recording sat near the microphone and the jury, where defendant could not see or speak with him. The record does not show the positions of the persons in the courtroom (although defendant mistakenly says that his statements in oral argument to the jury establish such positions). In any event, once the proceedings had come to a point where the tape was played (a situation for which, as we have concluded, defendant himself must be considered responsible), it [52 Cal. 2d 23] does not appear that counsel could have done anything on defendant's behalf had he remained in a position where he could consult with defendant; rather, counsel without impropriety could decide to place himself where he could best hear the tape and appraise its authenticity (as to containing defendant's voice) and its effect upon the jury.
[18] There is no merit in defendant's pro se complaints that his trial counsel did not obtain a witness for defendant and did not cause the playing of the other tape recordings which had been produced by the prosecuting attorney but not offered in evidence. When defendant chose to appear in propria persona it became his duty, if he wished to present evidence, to do so himself (People v. Mattson (1959), supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 794 [17]) and he cannot complain of any shortcomings in his defense which resulted from his informed discharge of his attorney (People v. Pearson (1940), 41 Cal. App. 2d 614, 620 [107 P.2d 463]). This consideration also disposes of defendant's contention that the trial court and the prosecuting attorney should have caused compliance with the "stipulation" that "all" recordings would be put in evidence.
Defendant in propria persona complains that after he asked to be allowed to represent himself his trial counsel volunteered the following statements to the court in the presence of the prosecuting attorney: "the witnesses have all been subpoenaed with the exception of one witness, Mr. Bierman, whom I have on tape" but "I would not call him" because his testimony "has been ruined by the recording" and because the witness was ill; defendant had told counsel "not to subpoena but to talk with" a Mr. Peters; Mr. Peters had said that he would come to the courtroom, that "he couldn't place the defendant, but if he saw him, he could probably specify what his testimony would be." When defendant protested that his counsel had disclosed confidential matters, the attorney said that "those matters are not any longer of confidence between the defendant and myself. They are matters involving other parties that know of them. ... [T]o protect both the defendant and the witnesses, I feel it is compulsory on my part to make that known to the court, so that he [defendant] will not say he is taken unawares." [19] Of course confidential matters (i.e., matters privileged by Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 2) which an attorney learns from his client and prospective witnesses do not become subject to disclosure by the attorney merely because they become known to "other parties" [52 Cal. 2d 24] or because the client discharges the attorney. (Hardy v. Martin (1907), 150 Cal. 341, 344 [89 P. 111]; People v. Singh (1932), 123 Cal. App. 365, 369-371 [11 P.2d 73].) But since counsel here did not reveal anything prejudicial to defendant or relevant to the ensuing conduct and outcome of the case, we need not decide whether his limited disclosure was a breach of confidence.
[20] Asserted Errors as to Choice of Penalty. This case was tried before the effective date of Penal Code, section 190.1, which provides for separate trial of guilt and of penalty. The prosecuting attorney repeatedly made statements such as the following: "if this defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment he has the right at the conclusion of seven calendar years to be considered for parole." This is correct law (Pen. Code, § 3046) which is pertinent, as a matter of fact rather than a proposition of law, to selection of penalty. (People v. Turville (1959), 51 Cal.2d at pp. 620, 634 [10], 636 [21] [335 P.2d 678]; People v. Riser (1956), 47 Cal. 2d 566, 582 [20] [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Friend (1957), 47 Cal. 2d 749, 754- 755 [1] [306 P.2d 463].)
[22] Defendant mistakenly asserts that his status is that of an habitual criminal with two prior convictions of felony, so that he would not be eligible for parole until he had served nine years (Pen. Code, § 3047.5). Although the indictment charged and defendant admitted two prior felony convictions, neither of such convictions would support a determination of habitual criminality, for as to one it was not alleged that defendant had served any term of imprisonment (see Pen. Code, § 644; People v. Dawson (1930), 210 Cal. 366, 372 [6] [292 P. 267]; In re Tartar (1934), 1 Cal. App. 2d 400 [1] [36 P.2d 419]) and the other was of manslaughter, an offense which does not affect habitual criminal status because it is not enumerated in section 644 (People v. Barclay (1953), 40 Cal. 2d 146, 159 [252 P.2d 321], footnote).
[23] Defendant complains that the prosecutor, when he correctly stated that one sentenced to life imprisonment may [52 Cal. 2d 25] be released by pardon, should further have said that the governor cannot grant a pardon "where the convict has been twice convicted of a felony, unless upon the written recommendation of a majority of the judges of the supreme court" (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 1). Defendant could not reasonably have been prejudiced in this regard. The significant matter was that if the jury fixed the penalty of life imprisonment there were nevertheless means by which defendant could be released from prison; the precise operation of those means was of no particular importance. (See People v. Reese (1956), 47 Cal. 2d 112, 119 [301 P.2d 582].)
[25] The prosecuting attorney in argument said that the jury would be instructed that if they found defendant guilty of first degree murder they "are given the unlimited right" of choice between the penalties of life imprisonment and death, fn. 5 and that "You may say to yourself, what kind of first degree murder warrants life imprisonment and what kind ... warrants the death penalty?" The prosecutor said that [52 Cal. 2d 26] this case "could very well be considered by you as a case which warrants the death penalty" and, "just by way of illustration," stated the facts of other cases "where the penalty might well be considered life imprisonment." He then said, "what is there in this case when you apply the instructions and your own unlimited discretion to say you shouldn't impose the death penalty? I ask you to consider that as I review the testimony."
Defendant urges that the effect of the foregoing argument was to inform the jury, contrary to People v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 755 [2], and People v. Green (1956), 47 Cal. 2d 209, 218 [302 P.2d 307], that they should impose the death penalty unless they found extenuating circumstances. We do not believe that the argument, considered as a whole, has that effect; it presents the prosecutor's opinion that the facts of this case warrant the death penalty, not a contention that the law requires the death penalty in the absence of mitigating circumstances.
[27] No matter how convincing the evidence of second degree murder may appear to an appellate court, such court cannot "believe the evidence is such that only a second-degree murder was committed" if there is evidence of and the trier of fact finds first degree murder. (People v. Matlock (1959), 51 Cal.2d at pp. 682, 698 [24] [336 P.2d 505].) [28] The trier of fact has sole responsibility and absolute discretion to select the penalty for first degree murder. (People v. Friend (1957), supra, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 759 [5a], 764 [11]; People v. Green (1956), supra, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 218 [7].) [29] This court cannot substitute its judgment as to choice of punishment (People v. Odle (1951), 37 Cal. 2d 52, 58 [3, 4] [230 P.2d 345]) even where we may doubt the appropriateness of the death penalty (see People v. Brust (1957), 47 Cal. 2d 776, 792 [306 P.2d 480]; People v. Danielly (1949), 33 Cal. 2d 362, 383 [202 P.2d 18]). [30] Where there is error related only to [52 Cal. 2d 27] selection of the death penalty this court cannot correct the error by reducing the punishment, but must reverse and remand the question to the trier of fact. (People v. Green (1956), supra, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 235 [15].) It is only the trial court which is empowered to reduce the degree or class of offense based on its view of the weight of the evidence. (People v. Borchers (1958), 50 Cal. 2d 321, 330 [325 P.2d 97].)
[26b] Argument such as that of the deputy district attorney above quoted improperly diminishes the jury's recognition of their duties and responsibilities and powers. In People v. Sampsell (1950), 34 Cal. 2d 757, 762 [2], 765 [214 P.2d 813], we characterized similar but more censurable argument as "reprehensible conduct which is not to be condoned," and stated that "we can see no justification for such an argument in the light of the settled rule respecting the function of this court." However, we held that the error, in the circumstances of that case, was not reversible. Since our clear pronouncement in Sampsell there is even less justification for argument of this sort.
[32] It seems that prosecuting officials sometimes consider a holding that particular misconduct is error but not, in the circumstances, prejudicial, as establishing that as a matter of law the conduct is cause for mere rebuke but not reversal (see People v. Wilkes (1955), 44 Cal. 2d 679, 687 [8] [284 P.2d 481]), and continue to try their cases improperly in the expectation that, should a conviction be obtained, the appellate court will uphold it under section 4 1/2 of article VI of the California Constitution (see People v. Lyons (1956), 47 Cal. 2d 311, 319 [8] [303 P.2d 329]). Conduct of that kind demeans the office of prosecutor and his profession. Because it relates to the jury's selection of penalty it implicitly invites reversal in every case. Only under extraordinary circumstances can the constitutional provision save the verdict.
[33] Here, the following circumstances combine to avoid an otherwise indicated reversal and remand for a new trial on [52 Cal. 2d 28] the issue of penalty. Uncontroverted evidence clearly establishes defendant's guilt; at the trial defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks; defendant in argument to the jury admitted that he killed Officer Wise fn. 6 and said that he desired the death penalty with the consequent right of automatic appeal. fn. 7 In the circumstances he cannot successfully object that he received what he requested.
Other Claimed Errors at the Trial. [35] Defendant pro se complains that the trial court did not comply with the requirement of Penal Code, section 1122, that it admonish the jury, at each adjournment, "that it is their duty not to converse among themselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion thereon until the cause is finally submitted to them." No prejudicial impropriety in this regard appears. At each ordinarily taken recess the jury were admonished in the statutory language or an abbreviation thereof. The only occasion when the jury were taken from the courtroom without any admonition was when defendant, while represented by counsel, interrupted the proceeding with reiterated requests to conduct the case personally; the trial court then said, "Put the defendant in the lockup. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, go upstairs. We have a legal point that will be argued outside the presence of the jury." Failure to give the statutory admonition is not ground for reversal where, as here, no prejudice appears. (See People v. Williams (1954), 128 Cal. App. 2d 458, 464 [12] [275 P.2d 513]; People v. Pearson (1940), supra, 41 Cal. App. 2d 614, 620 [6]; People v. Jordan (1937), 24 Cal. App. 2d 39, [52 Cal. 2d 29] 56 [17] [74 P.2d 519]; People v. Leavitt (1929), 100 Cal. App. 93, 94 [279 P. 1056].) [36] After the jury have been repeatedly admonished in the full substance of Penal Code, section 1122, it is not prejudicial error to give the admonition in abbreviated form such as "Remember and abide by the admonition heretofore given," rather than repeating in full the words of the statute. (See People v. Burwell (1955), 44 Cal. 2d 16, 33 [279 P.2d 744].) This is particularly true where no objection is made at the time the abbreviated instruction is given. [37] And the doctrine of invited error applies to the occasion when defendant while represented by counsel personally interrupted the trial. (See People v. Gomez (1953), 41 Cal. 2d 150, 162 [11] [258 P.2d 825].)
[38] A trial court in its discretion may permit counsel to state correct law and illustrate its application to the facts. (People v. Chessman (1951), 38 Cal. 2d 166, 188 [29] [238 P.2d 1001].) Here we need not pass upon the correctness of the law stated by the prosecuting attorney. fn. 8 His argument could not have prejudiced defendant because there is no evidence that any declaration of defendant, whether admission or confession, was coerced.
[39] Defendant pro se says that the prosecutor falsely argued that the tape recording includes admissions of defendant's expressed intent to kill an officer. Rather, fairly interpreted in context, the attacked portions of the argument properly urge that the recorded admissions of hatred toward police [52 Cal. 2d 30] officers tend to prove the intent to kill which was more particularly evidenced by defendant's unrecorded direct admissions of such intent, and that the testimony as to the unrecorded admissions is strengthened by the recorded declarations because the same pattern of obscene language appears in both.
[40] Defendant's pro se arguments concerning the effect of asserted inconsistencies in the evidence are not properly addressed to this court, for there is nothing in the record to suggest that any evidence is inherently improbable or intentionally false. (People v. De Paula (1954), 43 Cal. 2d 643, 649 [8, 9] [276 P.2d 600].) Rather, the evidence is remarkably free from any significant conflict.
The Propriety of the Proceeding which Resulted in Disallowance of Defendant's Proposed Corrections to the Reporter's Transcript. Defendant pro se urges that the proceeding to settle the record violated the provisions of section 13 of article I of the California Constitution that "In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right ... to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend, in person and with counsel." Furthermore, since proceedings to settle a seriously disputed record on a California appeal from a judgment of death have been characterized as "a necessary and integral part of the compulsory appeal" (Chessman v. Teets (1957), 354 U.S. 156, 162-163 [77 S. Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253]), defendant's suggestion that questions of Fourteenth Amendment due process are involved must be considered.
After rendition of the judgment of death defendant, as required by law (Pen. Code, §§ 1217, 3600), was taken to San Quentin Prison. The superior court clerk delivered copies of the transcript to defendant (Rules on Appeal, rule 35 (b)) by mailing them to him at the prison. Defendant at this time was representing himself. fn. 9 He filed "proposed corrections" to the reporter's transcript. These "proposed corrections" did not clearly indicate the nature of the asserted errors in the transcript. The trial court set October 30 for hearing and ordered that defendant be brought to Los Angeles. On October 28 there was filed in the superior court [52 Cal. 2d 31] defendant's request for appointment of counsel "to help and represent" him in the settlement of the transcript and for a continuance of the October 30 hearing to enable him to obtain witnesses and prepare. This request, in the circumstances of defendant's confinement, was timely. On the afternoon of October 29 the trial court appointed Mr. R. F. Bird, deputy public defender, to represent defendant. Defendant arrived in Los Angeles late on the night of October 29 and had opportunity to consult with Mr. Bird only briefly (defendant told the trial court that he "only had five minutes") on the morning of the 30th before the hearing.
When defendant and Mr. Bird appeared for the hearing (before the judge who tried the case), Mr. Bird said that "I am satisfied with that state of the record" but that defendant wished a continuance to obtain witnesses; "I did not ascertain from him who the witnesses are; our conversation ... wasn't altogether cordial because when I told him that the chances are pretty great that his request for witnesses would be denied, he seemed to think that he could do more good representing himself that he could by being represented with counsel, at least by the Public Defender." Defendant said, "I would need advice on procedural matters, but the actual part of this hearing I wish to carry on myself" because "I am the only person who is acquainted with the facts." Defendant refused to be represented by Mr. Bird; the public defender was relieved; and defendant's repeated requests for advisory counsel and a continuance were denied. fn. 10 [52 Cal. 2d 32]
The trial court stated that it did not determine the materiality [52 Cal. 2d 33] of the proposed corrections but only that on the basis of the reporter's testimony it was satisfied that the transcript was in fact accurate. The court denied defendant's request that the trial jurors be subpoenaed to testify to their recollection of the proceedings, and disallowed the proposed corrections.
[43] The right to counsel includes "reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial" (In re Ochse (1951), 38 Cal. 2d 230, 231 [1] [238 P.2d 561]), and the refusal to allow a party to introduce any evidence may amount to denial of a hearing (Estate of Buchman (1954), 123 Cal. App. 2d 546, 560-561 [267 P.2d 73, 47 A.L.R.2d 291]; National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fraties (1941), 46 Cal. App. 2d 431 [115 P.2d 997]). [44] Denial of fundamental constitutional rights is not excused by want of prejudice. (People v. Sarrazawski (1945), 27 Cal. 2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934]; People v. Broad (1932), 216 Cal. 1, 8-9 [6] [12 P.2d 941].)
[45] But questions of prejudice can be considered in determining whether there was in fact a denial of a fundamental constitutional right. [46] For example, concerning Fourteenth Amendment due process at the trial it is generally true that "A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense--a right to his day in court--are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." (In re Oliver (1948), 333 U.S. 257 [68 S. Ct. 499, 507, 92 L. Ed. 682].) [47] But specifically a state's failure to appoint counsel in a non-capital case violates the Fourteenth Amendment only when "the disadvantage from absence of counsel [is] aggravated by circumstances showing that it resulted in the prisoner [sic] actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced" (Townsend v. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736, 739 [68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690]); the presence of defendant at trial "is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only" (Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 107-108 [54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 575]); and the accused has no absolute Fourteenth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him (Stein v. New York (1953), 346 U.S. 156, 195-196 [73 S. Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522]). [52 Cal. 2d 34]
Thereafter defendant pro se filed an application for augmentation of the record, a supplemental brief, and an application for removal of his attorneys. The latter application states that "it would be misrepresentation if they [defendant's appeal counsel] are allowed to make oral argument." Since defendant had not employed other counsel, we denied the application for removal of his appointed counsel. Mr. Fleischner argued and counsel filed a supplemental memorandum on defendant's behalf. We commend counsel for their faithful and diligent representation of defendant in the face of his unwarranted attacks. [52 Cal. 2d 35]
[49] Defendant's pro se requests for augmentation of the record have been disposed of as follows: (1) He asked that the reporter's transcript be augmented to include oral proceedings of July 25, 1957, when he moved for a new trial. (The clerk's transcript shows that on that date the motion was merely made, not argued or determined. The subsequent hearing on the motion is fully transcribed.) Defendant asserts that on July 25 he stated that his motion was "on constitutional grounds" and that the omission of this statement from the record will indicate to a federal court that he did not properly raise his constitutional contentions in the trial court. We deemed augmentation in this regard unnecessary. Our review of defendant's constitutional contentions has not been affected by the absence of a statement that they were asserted as grounds for new trial. And since our opinion shows that we consider the constitutional questions to have been raised, defendant's record is protected should he wish to present the questions to a federal court. (See Whitfield v. Ohio (1936), 297 U.S. 431, 436 [56 S. Ct. 532, 80 L. Ed. 778].) (2) The request for augmentation of the record by a transcript of People's Exhibit 19 was granted. [50] (3) Defendant's request that the record be augmented to include tape recordings which were not offered in evidence could not be granted, for those tapes are not a part of the record in the trial court. (Howard v. Howard (1953), 119 Cal. App. 2d 122, 123 [1] [259 P.2d 41].)
FN 1. On voir dire examination the prosecutor asked a prospective juror if she would be prejudiced by evidence of defendant's vile language and said, "there may even be a tape recording of those statements in court." Thereafter the character of defendant's language was shown by the testimony of officers to his statements at the time of his apprehension and transportation to Homicide Division.
FN 2. In making this request defendant incidentally stated of his counsel that he "has been very fair with me and he has been a very good attorney," to which the trial judge responded, "Yes, he has."
FN 3. With consent of defendant's appeal counsel and this court, defendant has presented briefs in propria persona.
FN 4. The record does not show whether defense counsel heard the tape before he requested its introduction in evidence. (It does at least seem to indicate that he did not attempt to see the transcript of the tape, for after he had adduced testimony that Lieutenant Gebhart had seen such a transcript and after the prosecutor had said that he had such a transcript, defense counsel mistakenly said, "No transcript was made.") We can hardly imagine for what purpose counsel would cause the tape to be played before the jury if he had heard it. The People suggest that he may have thought that doubt would be cast on the officers' testimony as to defendant's express admissions that he intended to kill by a showing that no such admissions were recorded. We also note that apparently defendant can be quite persuasive (both the prosecutor and the trial court mentioned favorably his presentation of his oral argument to the jury) and it is not inconceivable that he might have misled counsel into the belief that there was some seemingly plausible reason for presenting the tape.
FN 5. The court correctly instructed the jury on this subject as follows:
FN 6. Defendant said, "I am responsible for his death. ... It is something I will be guilty of the rest of my life. It is also something I have to answer to later."
FN 7. Defendant argued, "I would rather have you bring back a first degree with a gas chamber because I would have a chance before a Court of Appeal to prove that tape is a fraud ... [L]ife imprisonment ... would never give me a right to prove ... that tape was a fraud. ... I do want you to take into your deepest consciousness that if you find me guilty of first degree murder, with the death penalty, you have no responsibility. You have no responsibility to this transcript [tape recording]. You have accepted it. ... [M]y job then is to disprove it, and I will have the methods, I will have the chance ... I will be trying to prove that Jimmy Linden ... committed an illegal act, but he was not the person in that transcript [tape recording]."
FN 8. The cases as to whether a coerced admission can be received in evidence are not uniform. (See Rogers v. Superior Court (1955), 46 Cal. 2d 3, 10-11 [10, 13, 14] [291 P.2d 929]; People v. Eggers (1947), 30 Cal. 2d 676, 689 [19] [185 P.2d 1]; People v. Nagle (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 216 [3] [153 P.2d 344]; People v. Williams (1901) 133 Cal. 165, 167 [65 P. 323]; People v. Clemmons (1957), 153 Cal. App. 2d 64, 71, 76 [314 P.2d 142]; People v. Allen (1956), 142 Cal. App. 2d 267, 268-269 [16a, 17] [298 P.2d 714]; 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence (1954), § 398.)
FN 9. The occasion for this court to follow our long established practice of appointing counsel for an indigent unrepresented defendant on an automatic appeal had not yet arisen, because in ordinary course we have no way of knowing of the pendency of such an appeal until the transcripts have been certified and transmitted to our clerk. (Rule 35(e).)
FN 10. The transcript shows the following statements by Deputy Public Defender Bird, the defendant, and the court, as indicated:
FN 11. The disputed portion of the transcript of the trial shows that at 11 a.m. the prosecutor resumed his opening argument; when he concluded it defendant's advisor said, "One of the jurors wants to speak"; the juror stated that the prosecutor "said something yesterday I didn't understand that I worried about all night"; the juror referred to the prosecutor's previously mentioned argument as to the difference between an admission and a confession; over defendant's objection that "the prosecutor is instructing the jury" and "I want a running objection to this line," the prosecutor was allowed to again discuss this difference; noon recess was then taken.