Source: https://m.openjurist.org/398/us/74
Timestamp: 2020-01-17 17:09:29
Document Index: 693827644

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1404', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 134', '§ 137', '§ 140', '§ 142', '§ 295', '§ 372', '§ 457', '§ 3006', '§ 62', '§ 332', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 1651', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 137', '§ 1651', '§ 234', '§ 1651', '§ 234', '§ 262', '§ 1651', '§ 234', '§ 262', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 332', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 332', '§ 1651', '§ 1361', '§ 601', '§ 332', '§ 333', '§ 604', '§ 332', '§ 43', '§ 332', '§ 134', '§ 137', '§ 142', '§ 372', '§ 62', '§ 1651', '§ 234', '§ 262', '§ 13', '§ 262', '§ 1651', '§ 234', '§ 1651']

398 US 74 Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of United States | OpenJurist
398 U.S. 74 - Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of United States
Stephen S. CHANDLER, United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, Petitioner,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF the TENTH CIRCUIT OF the UNITED STATES.
As examples of the kinds of action a Judicial Council might be expected to take under the proposed bill, Chief Justice Groner suggested that if the statistics showed a particular district court to be falling behind in its work, the Council would 'see to it, either that the particular judge who is behind in his work catches up with his work, or that assistance is given to him whereby the work may be made current.' Id., at 11. If it appeared that a particular judge 'had been sick for 4 or 5 months and had been unable to hold any court, or had been unable, by reason of one thing or another, to transact any business, * * * immediate action could be taken to correct that situation.' Hearings on H.R. 5999, supra, at 11. Asked by Representative Walter Chandler 'what power is given there to require a judge to decide a case that he has had under advisement for months and years,' he responded that the Council, after considering the matter, could issue directions that would be 'final.' Id., at 13. Any 'lazy judge's work would be reported to the council, (which) would take the correct action.' Id., at 27.7
This legislative history lends support to a conclusion that, at least in the issuance of orders to district judges to regulate the exercise of their official duties, the Judicial Council acts as a judicial tribunal for purposes of this Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article III. It seems clear that the sponsors of the bill considered the power to give such orders something that could not be entrusted to any purely 'administrative' agency not even to the Administrative Office, which was to be an arm of the judicial branch of government and under the direct control of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States. Chief Justice Groner, in the passage quoted above, stated that to give such power to an administrative agency 'would be to destroy the very fundamentals of our theory of government.' Instead, any problems unearthed by the Director's studies were to be 'corrected, by the courts themselves.' Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 12—13. See also Hearings on H.R. 5999, supra, at 8.
There were further references throughout the hearings and committee reports to the fact that the corrective power would be exercised by the courts themselves. E.g., Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 16 (statement of A. Vanderbilt); id., at 31—32 (statement of Hon. Harold M. Stephens); id., at 36 (statement of A. Holtzoff); H.R.Rep. No. 702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1939). The House report quoted with approval an endorsement of the bill by the American Judicature Society, stating that 'there is no way to fortify judicial independence equal to that of enabling the judges to perform their work under judicial supervision.' Ibid. These statements indicate that the power to direct trial judges in the execution of their decision-making duties was regarded as a judicial power, one to be entrusted only to a judicial body.
In this regard it is important to note that an earlier draft of the 1939 Act would have given responsibility for supervising the lower courts to the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the United States. The idea of devolving the authority to councils at the circuit level was suggested by Chief Justice Hughes, who believed that the supervision could be made most effective by 'concentration of responsibility in the various circuits * * * with power and authority to make the supervision all that is necessary to induce competence in the work of all of the judges of the various districts within the circuit.' H.R.Doc. No. 201, supra, at 3. It is equally notable that, while the draftsmen did consider giving district judges some representation on the Councils, see id., at 4—5, there was apparently no thought given to including nonjudicial officers. These indications leave no doubt that the Councils' architects regarded the authority granted the Councils as closely bound up with the process of judging itself.8
An order by the Council to a district judge, directing his handling of one or many cases in his court, is an integral step in the progress of those cases from initial filing to final adjudication. Like the district judge's own orders setting a time for discovery or trial, or transferring a case to another district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), such an order, even though concerned with a matter of 'judicial administration,' is part of the official conduct of judicial business. Unlike the more common orders of the district court, the Council's orders involve supervision of a subordinate judicial officer. But in this regard they are not unlike the extraordinary writ of mandamus, which Judge Parker thought the Council's orders would supplement, or the orders entered by courts in proceedings for disbarment of an attorney. In short, the function of the Council in ordering the district judges to take certain measures related to the cases before them is, as the legislative history indicates Congress understood, judicial in nature.9
Respondent argues that the functions of the Judicial Council under § 332 are, under Justice Holmes' definitions, legislative, or administrative, rather than judicial; and that the statutory provision making the membership of the Council coextensive with that of the Court of Appeals for each circuit10 is merely a means of designating the individual members by reference to their office. Certainly respondent is correct in urging that Congress' designation of circuit judges as the members of the Council does not in itself make the Council's function judicial. I think, however, that the Council's orders directing the official business of the district courts are judicial within the general definition of that term in Prentis. In urging that the Council's function merely 'looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule,' respondent disregards the fact that each of the Council's orders, such as those challenged here, is rooted in the factual circumstances of the business of a particular judge or judges and the status of a particular case or cases in the district court; and each order, if properly entered, extends only as far as the circumstances that make it 'necessary * * * for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.' 28 U.S.C. § 332. As noted above, the Council's orders for the handling of cases in the district court serve as one step in the progress of those cases toward judgment. Those orders can be expected to apply commonly accepted notions of proper judicial administration to the special factual situations of particular cases or particular judges.
As respondent points out, the power entrusted to the Councils by § 332, like those added by later enactments see infra, at 109 110, necessarily involves a large amount of discretion; accordingly, review of the Councils' actions will usually be narrow in scope. But this does not mean that the Councils are 'left at large as planning agencies.' United States v. First City National Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 369, 87 S.Ct. 1088, 1094, 18 L.Ed.2d 151 (1967). In First City National Bank, we were faced with a federal statute directing the courts to determine whether the anticompetitive effect of a proposed bank merger was outweighed by considerations of community convenience and need. We ruled that the courts could accept this as a 'judicial task' because, like the 'rule of reason,' long prevalent in the antitrust field, the effect-on-competition standard was a familiar one within 'the area of judicial competence.' See also United Steel-workers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 80 S.Ct. 1, 4 L.Ed.2d 12 (1959). Judicial administration is a matter in which the courts even more clearly should have special competence. Within the framework of the statutes establishing the inferior federal courts and defining their jurisdiction, the Judicial Councils are charged with the duty to take such actions as are necessary for the expedition of the business of the courts in each circuit. Their discretion in this matter, while broad, does not seem to be of a different order from that possessed by district judges with respect to many matters of trial administration. In both instances, review can correct legal error or abuse of discretion where it occurs; that the scope of review will often be very narrow does not in itself establish that the exercise of such discretion is a nonjudicial act.11
Respondent makes a further argument to avert a conclusion that the actions here drawn in question were judicial actions. It points out that Congress since 1939 has given the Judicial Councils many specific powers—powers that respondent considers so clearly nonjudicial as to negate any inference that the Council serves as a 'judicial' body within the purview of Article III. Those powers include the power to order a district judge, where circumstances require, to reside in a particular part of the district for which he is appointed, 28 U.S.C. § 134(c); to make any necessary orders if the district judges in any district are unable to agree upon the division of business among them, 28 U.S.C. § 137; to consent to the pretermission of any regular session of a District Court for insufficient business or other good cause, 28 U.S.C. § 140(a); to approve as necessary the provision of judicial accommodations for the courts by the General Services Administration, 28 U.S.C. § 142; to consent to the designation and assignment of circuit or district judges to sit on courts other than those for which they are appointed, 28 U.S.C. § 295; to certify to the President that a circuit or district judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office by reason of permanent mental or physical disability, thus authorizing the President to appoint an additional judge, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b); to direct where the records of the courts of appeals and district courts shall be kept, 28 U.S.C. § 457; to approve plans for furnishing representation for defendants under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a); and to take various actions in regard to referees in bankruptcy, including removal of a referee for cause, 11 U.S.C. §§ 62(b), 65(a), (b), 68(a), (b), (c), 71(b), (c).
While many of these powers are trivial in comparison with the courts' basic responsibility for final adjudication of lawsuits, I am not persuaded that their possession is inconsistent with a conclusion that the Council, when performing its central responsibilities under 28 U.S.C. § 332, exercises judicial power granted under Article III. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 580—582, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1488—1490, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). In the first place, the respondent concedes that at least one of these enumerated powers—the power to remove referees for cause—'can properly be regarded as judicial,' and it is not at all clear that any of them is beyond the range of the permissible activities of an Article III court. In Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 332, 62 S.Ct. 272, 276, 86 L.Ed. 249 (1941), the Court noted the range of relatively minor responsibilities, other than the hearing of appeals, placed by statute in the courts of appeals. These included prescribing the form of writs and other process and the form and style of the courts' seals; making rules and regulations; appointing a clerk and approving the appointment and removal of deputy clerks; and fixing the times when court should be held. Each of these functions was to be performed by the 'court.' While it is possible that the performance of some of them might never produce a case or controversy reviewable in this Court, they are reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding function of the courts of appeals. Just as the Court in Textile Mills did not question the authority of Congress to grant such incidental powers to the courts of appeals, I see little reason to believe that any of the various supervisory tasks entrusted to the Judicial Council is beyond the capacities of a judicial body under Article III.
This Court does not, of course, necessarily possess all of the appellate jurisdiction permitted to it by Article III. That article provides that our appellate jurisdiction is to be exercised 'with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make,' and this language has been held to give Congress the power, within limits, to prescribe the instances in which it may be exercised. E.g., Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 512—513, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869). I turn, therefore, to the Judicial Code to determine our statutory authority to consider Judge Chandler's petition.
Congress in the Code has not spoken, one way or the other, regarding review of the orders of Judicial Councils. Petitioner asserts that the Court has power to issue mandamus or prohibition to the Councils under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which provides that
This statute has been construed to empower this Court to issue an extraordinary writ to a lower federal court in a case falling within our statutory appellate jurisdiction, where the issuance of the writ will further the exercise of that jurisdiction. See e.g., De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 65 S.Ct. 1130, 1133, 89 L.Ed. 1566 (1945); United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 201—204, 65 S.Ct. 1120, 1124—1126, 89 L.Ed. 1554 (1945). It is now settled that the case need not be already pending in this Court before an extraordinary writ may be issued under § 1651(a); rather, the Court may issue the writ when the lower court's action might defeat or frustrate this Court's eventual jurisdiction, even where that jurisdiciton could be invoked on the merits only after proceedings in an intermediate court. See, e.g., De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S., at 217, 65 S.Ct., at 1133; Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 248—249, 53 S.Ct. 129, 130—131, 77 L.Ed. 283 (1932); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 30 S.Ct. 501, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910); cf. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943). But cf. In re Glaser, 198 U.S. 171, 173, 25 S.Ct. 653, 654, 49 L.Ed. 1000 (1905); In re Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 482, 488, 25 S.Ct. 512, 514, 49 L.Ed. 845 (1905).
Each of the prior cases in which this Court has invoked § 1651(a) to issue a writ 'in aid of (its jurisdiction)' has involved a particular lawsuit over which the Court would have statutory review jurisdiction at a later stage. By contrast, petitioner's reliance on this statute is bottomed on the fact that the action of the Judicial Council 'touches, through Judge Chandler's fate, hundreds of cases over which this Court has appellate or review jurisdiction.' Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus 13. He argues that the Council's orders, allocating to other judges in his district cases that would otherwise be decided by him, constitute a usurpation of power that cannot adequately be remedied on final review of those cases by certiorari or appeal in this Court. The United States as amicus curiae agrees that this claim properly invokes the Court's power to consider whether mandamus or prohibition should be granted.12 Although this expansive use of § 1651(a) has no direct precedent in this Court, it seems to me wholly in line with the history of that statute and consistent with the manner in which it has been interpreted both here and in the lower courts.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court in Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S., at 583, 63 S.Ct., at 796, characterized the 'historic use of writs of prohibition and mandamus directed by an appellate to an inferior court' as that of 'confining the inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiciton, or of compelling it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.' The bounds of this Court's discretionary power to issue such writs were further stated in Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520—521, 76 S.Ct. 912, 917, 100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956):
'The power to issue them is discretionary and it is sparingly exercised. * * * This is not a case where a court has exceeded or refused to exercise its jurisdiction, see Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185, nor one where appellate review will be defeated if a writ does not issue, cf. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 29—30, 46 S.Ct. 185, 189, 70 L.Ed. 449. Here the most that could be claimed is that the district courts have erred in ruling on matters within their jurisdiction. The extraordinary writs do not reach to such cases; they may not be used to thwart the congressional policy against piecemeal appeals. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., supra, 319 U.S. at page 30, 63 S.Ct. at page 943.'13
In Parr, the petitioner's claim was simply that a district court had erred in dismissing an indictment at the Government's request after the Government had obtained a new indictment for the same offenses in another district. In contrast, the present case involves a claim that the Council's orders were entered in a matter entirely beyond its jurisdiction. Judge Chandler claims that the order of December 13, 1965, depriving him of both pending and future cases, was tantamount to his removal from office, and that such an act far exceeded the limited jurisdiction over 'administrative' matters conferred on the Council by § 332. He further asserts, as noted in Part I, supra, that the order of February 4, 1966, exceeded the Council's jurisdiction under either § 332 or § 137. Such grave charges clearly go beyond a mere claim that the Council has 'erred in ruling on matters within (its) jurisdiction.' Cf. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95—96, 98 and n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 273—274, 275, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964).
Further, there seems to be no means by which Judge Chandler's challenge to the orders could be aired adequately on review of the cases to which they pertain. While the losing party in a case assigned to another district judge might conceivably argue on appeal that he is entitled to reversal because his case should have been heard by Judge Chandler, such an argument would encounter formidable obstacles. A reviewing court would have no way of determining whether a particular case filed in the District Court after the February 4 Order would, but for that order, have been assigned to Judge Chandler; nor is it clear that the error, if detectable, would in itself entitle the losing party to invalidate proceedings had before another judge. More basically, Judge Chandler is asserting an injury to himself, apart from any injuries to the parties in those cases; the parties cannot be relied upon to seek vindication of that injury. Cf. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260, 67 S.Ct. 1558, 1559, 91 L.Ed. 2041 (1947); Ex parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363, 372—380, 31 S.Ct. 324, 326 330, 55 L.Ed. 252 (1911).
Mandamus was therefore issued in Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp., and in McCullough, which involved a similar situation in the same District Court, in order to remedy a pervasive disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure affecting numerous cases.14
For these reasons I would conclude that the actions challenged by Judge Chandler sufficiently affect matters within this Court's appellate jurisdiction to bring his application for an extraordinary writ within our authority under § 1651(a), and that his charges, if sustained, would present an appropriate occasion for the issuance of such a writ.15
The United States as amicus urges the Court to rule that no such change was effected by the 1948 revision, arguing correctly that § 234 would clearly encompass the type of review Judge Chandler seeks. The United States points out, in support of such a ruling, that the Reviser's Note stated that § 1651(a) 'consolidates' the earlier provisions, 'with necessary changes in phraseology'; this gave no indication that a significant change in the law was intended, and one should not lightly be inferred. I note that the Court in Ex parte Republic of Peru, referring to both § 234 and § 262, stated that '(u)nder the statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of this Court to issue common-law writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction has been consistently sustained.' 318 U.S., at 582—583, 63 S.Ct., at 796. Its use of the expression 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction' to characterize both statues suggests that the similar phrase in § 1651(a) may also encompass the powers exercised by this Court under § 234. However, there is no need to decide this question here in light of the fact that the reviewability in this Court of the many cases whose allocation is determined by the Judicial Council's orders brings Judge Chandler's petition within the Court's powers as they existed under § 262. moved him from office, as well as the procedures under which the order was issued. His substantive argument is that § 332, on which the Council relied, does not authorize the placing of restrictions upon the functioning of a district judge, even temporarily, and that if it does the statute is unconstitutional because the constitutional provisions16 vesting in Congress authority to impeach federal officers, including judges, establish the exclusive means of inquiry into the fitness of a federal judge to perform his duties. In response the United States as amicus argues that the impeachment provisions should not be read as precluding legislation that would authorize supervision of federal judges by 'judicial trial of the fulfillment of the condition of federal judicial tenure under Article III—that the judge maintain his 'good behavior." This question has been the subject of scholarly debate, and is presently before the Senate as it considers the proposed Judicial Reform Act. See Hearings on S. 1506—S. 1516 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Petitioner's procedural objections to the December 13 Order relate to its issuance ex parte, without notice or hearing circumstances that raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Judicial Conference of the United States made a study in 1961 of the role of the Judicial Councils, culminating in a report that was transmitted to Congress by Chief Justice Warren. That report, after thorough consideration of the legislative history of the 1939 Act, specifically listed as among the responsibilities of the Councils 'having a judge who has an accumulation of submitted cases not take on any further trial work until such cases have been decided.' H.R.Doc. No. 201, supra, at 10. This power has been exercised on other occasions by other Judicial Councils. See, e.g., Fish, supra, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev., at 230; Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 170—171 (1961); Shafroth, Modern Developments in Judicial Administration, 12 Am.U.L.Rev. 150, 160 (1963). The propriety of such action has apparently never before been seriously challenged.
The legislative history of § 332 contains positive refutation of petitioner's argument that the only factor a Council might appropriately consider in making an order such as that of February 4 is the statistical weight of the workloads of the various district judges. It is true, as the legislative history in Part II above confirms, that abatement of delays in disposition of cases was a principal purpose for creation of the Councils; but the Councils were deliberately given broad responsibilities to meet other problems as they arose. Chief Justice Groner contemplated that the Councils would cope not only with delays but also with 'any other matter which is the subject of criticism, or properly could be made the subject of criticism, for which (a district judge) may be responsible.' Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 11. The Senate committee included this part of the testimony in its report recommending passage of the bill. S.Rep. No. 426, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1939). The same witness later stated that the council's responsibilities would embrace correction of 'whatever is wrong in the administration of justice, from whatever sources it may arise,' as a means of promoting 'the strengthening of confidence on the part of the people.' Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 12—13, 14.18
The Conference specifically approved this construction in spelling out its conclusions. Id., at 8—9.
The Congress, which created the lower federal courts, also created a Judicial Council for each circuit composed 'of the circuit judges for the circuit, in regular active service.' 28 U.S.C. § 332. The Council 'shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.' Ibid. And Congress directed that '(t)he district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the judicial council.' Ibid.
As noted, the original action against Judge Chandler was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 332. The action taken February 4, 1966, was under 28 U.S.C. § 137, which provides in part:
But there was no disagreement among the district judges and no power of the Council to act under 28 U.S.C. § 137. That was precisely the strategy that Judge Chandler selected so that if the feud against him continued, it would have to be waged under 28 U.S.C. § 332. But the Council did not oblige. It recited in its order of February 4, 1966: 'In the circumstances a disagreement exists as to the division of business and the assignment of cases in the Western District of Oklahoma.'
The Court holds that because Judge Chandler refused to express to the Council his disagreement with the February 4, 1966, order, he failed to exhaust a possible means for obtaining the relief he now seeks in this Court. Had he disagreed, however, he would have vested the Council with authority to act under § 137, and that was precisely what he wanted to avoid. As Mr. Justice HARLAN points out, the whole basis for Judge Chandler's attack is 'that it is illegal for the Council to deprive him of new cases, and equally so for the Council to condition his access to new cases upon his making a request to it that is tantamount to a form of a certification of disagreement under § 137.' The Court states that by not certifying disagreement to the Council Judge Chandler is apparently attempting 'to have it both ways.' It seems clear, however, that the Court's opinion now allows the Council 'to have it both ways'—for unless Judge Chandler certifies disagreement with the February 4, 1966, order, he is barred from relief in this Court; and if he seeks relief from the Council by disagreeing with its order, he concedes jurisdiction in the Council for its actions under § 137. Nothing in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666, relied on by the Court, compels this result.
The question therefore is whether a judicial council is a lower court or inferior tribunal whose decisions are reviewable in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. A judicial council is only the court of appeals for a named circuit sitting en banc. These councils were created to place 'responsibility for judicial administration where it belongs—with the judiciary.' H.R.Rep.No.702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 4. Chief Justice Groner of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, who helped draft the bill that was enacted, explained it as follows to the Senate:1
The Council by 28 U.S.C. § 137 is under a duty to 'make the necessary orders' in case the district judges are 'unable to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose.' The Council directs the district judges to carry out certain measures. That is indeed the role of a judicial entity. Only members of the Court of Appeals are members of the Council. Those sitting on the Council do not even change their hats. Expediting the flow of cases to the dockets of district judges is wholly in line with the judicial function. We stated in Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 332, 62 S.Ct. 272, 276, 86 L.Ed. 249:
'Provided however, the judicial council of the circuit (or in the case of courts not part of a circuit, the judges of the court in active service) may upon application of a judge approve the acceptance of compensation for the performance of services other than his judicial duties upon a determination that the services are in the public interest or are justified by exceptional circumstances and that the services will not interfere with his judicial duties. Both the services to be performed and the compensation to be paid shall be made a matter of public record and reported to the Judicial Conference of the United States.' (Italics added.) In the Ninth Circuit, of which I am Circuit Justice, this resolution was assumed to bar a federal judge from even being an executor of his own mother's estate, unless of course he got a permit from the other judges. Resolution I apparently required permits for federal judges to teach in a law school—a practice which has paid enormous professional dividends and implicates nothing but the interest and energy of the judge. Justice Joseph Story (who sat here from 1811 to 1845) would, I imagine, have been appalled if he had been told that he could not write any of his many books6 without getting permission from a group of other federal judges. And I imagine that Justice Carodozo, Judge Jerome Frank, and Judge Learned Hand would have felt the same.7
am regrettably compelled in this case to say that the Court today, in my judgment, breaks faith with this grand constitutional principle. Judge Chandler, duly appointed, duly confirmed, and never impeached by the Congress, has been barred from doing his work by other judges. The real facts of this case cannot be obscured, nor the effect of the Judicial Council's decisions defended, by any technical, legalistic effort to show that one or the other of the Council's orders issued over the years is 'valid.' This case must be viewed for what it is—a long history of harassment of Judge Chandler by other judges who somehow feel he is 'unfit' to hold office. Their efforts have been going on for at least five years and still Judge Chandler finds no relief. What is involved here is simply a blatant effort on the part of the Council through concerted action to make Judge Chandler a 'second-class judge,' depriving him of the full power of his office and the right to share equally with all other federal judges in the privileges and responsibilities of the Federal Judiciary. I am unable to find in our Constitution or in any statute any authority whatever for judges to arrogate to themselves and to exercise such powers. Judge Chandler, like every other federal judge including the Justices of this Court, is subject to removal from office only by the constitutionally prescribed mode of impeachment
The wise authors of our Constitution provided for judicial independence because they were familiar with history; they knew that judges of the past—good, patriotic judges—had occasionally lost not only their offices but had also sometimes lost their freedom and their heads because of the actions and decrees of other judges. They were determined that no such things should happen here. But it appears that the language they used and the protections they thought they had created are not sufficient to protect our judges from the contrived intricacies used by the judges of the Tenth Circuit and this Court to uphold what has happened to Judge Chandler in this case.
28 U.S.C. § 137. 'Division of business among district judges.
28 U.S.C. § 332. 'Judicial Councils.
28 U.S.C. § 1651. '(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'
We express no opinion as to whether he could, for instance, have brought an action in the nature of mandamus to compel 'an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed * * *' to him, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, on the theory that this was agency action.
53 Stat. 1223, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604.
53 Stat. 1224, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 332.
53 Stat. 1225, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 333.
'To the end that the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously transacted, it shall be the duty of the senior circuit judge of each circuit to call at such time and place as he shall designate, but at least twice in each year, a council composed of the circuit judges for such circuit, who are hereby designated a council for that purpose, at which council the senior circuit judge shall preside. The senior judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the Director required to be filed by the provisions of section 304, clause (2) (now 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2)), and such action shall be taken thereon by the council as may be necessary. It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the directions of the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts. Nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of existing law relating to the assignment of district judges to serve outside of the districts for which they, respectively, were appointed.' 53 Stat. 1224.
'I think that that provision for a council in each circuit is one of the best provisions in the bill, * * * and will give the circuit judges the power to utilize the judicial man power on each circuit to the best advantage.' Id., at 20—21.
replied Judge Parker. Id., at 22. See also Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 18—19 (statement of A. Vanderbilt).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 332 with 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) and Fed.Rule App.Proc. 35(a).
It should be noted that virtually all of the additional powers that have been conferred on the Councils by provisions of the Judicial Code other than § 332, see infra, define the Council's tasks in terms commonly used as standards for judicial determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 134(c) ('(i)f the public interest and the nature of the business of a district court require'), § 137 ('necessary orders'), § 142 ('court quarters and accommodations * * * approved as necessary'), § 372(b) ('judge * * * unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office by reason of permanent mental or physical disability'); 11 U.S.C. § 62(b) ('(r)emoval * * * for incompetency, misconduct, or neglect of duty').
See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); Bankers Like & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382—383, 74 S.Ct. 145, 147—148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953).
§ 1651 (a). The Court usually did not specify whether it relied upon § 234 or § 262, apparently considering that they furnished overlapping authority. Section 234, which derived from § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, conferred upon this Court, and this Court only, the 'power to issue * * * writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed under the authority of the United States * * *.' Section 262 provided that '(t)he Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.' The former provision was construed as conferring upon this Court 'a general supervisory power over the inferior courts, so far as this power was exercisable through a writ of mandamus in its historic function,' enabling the Court 'to exercise the essentially appellate function of reviewing and revising a judicial proceeding in a lower court by appropriate use of the common-law writ of mandamus, whether or not it had been given by Congress some other statutory appellate jurisdiction, or potential appellate jurisdiction, by way of an appeal or writ of error or otherwise.' In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 177—178 (C.A.1st Cir. 1954). See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323—324, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880); Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 375—377, 19 L.Ed. 214 (1869); Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 190, 8 L.Ed. 92 (1831). In contrast, the power granted by § 262 was not an independent appellate power but merely an auxiliary power exercisable when appellate jurisdiction was granted by some other provision of law.
These two provisions were consolidated into § 1651(a) as part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The brief Reviser' Note explained that the 'revised section extends the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction, to all courts established by Act of Congress, thus making explicit the right to exercise powers implied from the creation of such courts.' The 'special provisions' of § 234 relating to the Supreme Court 'were omitted as unnecessary in view of the revised section.' H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A144—
Hearings on S. 188 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 12—13 (Apr. 4 5, 1939).
'The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.' 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
Judge Jerome Frank: Courts on Trial—Myth and Reality in American Justice (1949); Not Guilty (1957); If Men Were Angels (1942); Fate and Freedom (1945).