Source: http://openjurist.org/997/f2d/525/united-states-v-taren-palma
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 02:33:09
Document Index: 702243543

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 924', '§ 1291', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 3742', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 924', '§ 924']

997 F2d 525 United States v. Taren-Palma | OpenJurist
997 F. 2d 525 - United States v. Taren-Palma	Home997 f2d 525 united states v. taren-palma
997 F2d 525 United States v. Taren-Palma 997 F.2d 525
37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 888
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Ruben TAREN-PALMA, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Ismael CALDERON-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 92-10085, 92-10110.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 2, 1993.Decided June 10, 1993.
Ruben Taren-Palma appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). Ismael Calderon-Perez appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and for unlawfully carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
I. TAREN-PALMA
Taren-Palma argues that the district court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction concerning multiple conspiracies. We review the district court's determination whether there was a factual basis for giving an instruction for an abuse of discretion and review related issues of law de novo. United States v. Gomez-Osorio, 957 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir.1992). If the evidence indicates two or more conspiracies may exist, a multiple conspiracies instruction must be given. United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 533 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 104, 54 L.Ed.2d 85 (1977). However, "[a] trial court must instruct the jury on a defendant's theory of the case only if the evidence sufficiently supports the theory and the theory is supported by law." United States v. Ravel, 930 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 308, 116 L.Ed.2d 251 (1991) (citations omitted).
A mere change in participants and a lapse of time, without more, are insufficient to support a finding of multiple conspiracies. See United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456, 465 (7th Cir.1980). Every member of the conspiracy need not know every other member nor be aware of all acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464, 469, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 2208, 48 L.Ed.2d 819 (1976). Finding multiple conspiracies requires some evidence of separate agreements and purposes. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir.1987). There is no evidence in this case that there was any purpose or agreement other than to sell ten kilograms of cocaine. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Taren-Palma's proposed multiple conspiracies instruction.
Proof of an overt act is necessary under 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Martinez v. Borg, 937 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir.1991). The district court failed to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act is necessary for conviction of a drug conspiracy under the statute. We must therefore determine whether the error is harmless. United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2421, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989)). The error is harmless if no rational jury could have made its findings without also finding the omitted or presumed fact to be true. Martinez, 937 F.2d at 425.
The jury was instructed that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement to distribute cocaine. There was no evidence showing an actual agreement. The jury could not have found Taren-Palma guilty of conspiracy under § 846 without inferring an agreement from the evidence presented at trial. See United States v. Thomas, 887 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that agreement may be inferred from the defendant's acts pursuant to the scheme, or other circumstantial evidence). The evidence showed that Taren-Palma: 1) attended meetings along with other members of the conspiracy and made telephone calls to set up a drug transaction; 2) provided samples of cocaine along with other members of the conspiracy in connection with setting up a drug transaction; and 3) provided cocaine along with other members of the conspiracy for the primary drug transaction.
C. Coercive Jury Instructions
Taren-Palma argues that the district court's jury instructions were impermissibly coercive. Taren-Palma did not object. We review for plain error. United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1991).
The relevant instructions stated: "After you have reached a unanimous verdict, agreement on a verdict, your foreperson will fill out a form that will be given to you...." The court further cautioned the jury that "you are not to tell anyone, including me, how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on the question of guilt of the defendants until after you have reached a unanimous verdict and have been discharged." The court also instructed the jury that "[i]t is important that you attempt to reach a unanimous verdict, but only, of course, if each of you can do so after having made up your own conscientious decision. Do not change an honest belief about the weight and effect of the evidence simply to reach a verdict."
D. Expert Translation
Taren-Palma argues that the district court erred in allowing Officer Soto to testify regarding his translation of the conversations recorded by Flick. Taren-Palma did not object at trial. We review for plain error. United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 (1990).
The district court's admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Antone, 981 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.1992). The district court has wide discretion in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1104, 107 S.Ct. 1337, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987). If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence, a witness qualified as an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Fed.R.Evid. 702.
Taren-Palma argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow his attorney to argue to the jury that the government, with the intent to increase the potential sentence, improperly charged him with conspiring to distribute ten, instead of two, kilograms of cocaine. We review the district court's rulings on the scope of argument for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Guess, 745 F.2d 1286, 1288 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1225, 105 S.Ct. 1219, 84 L.Ed.2d 360 (1985).
Arguments must be based on the evidence at trial. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990). The evidence showed Kaminski and Flick bargained for the delivery of ten kilograms of cocaine. No evidence was adduced at trial showing that Kaminski or Flick were aware of, or that there was a possibility of, increased punishment. Taren-Palma's theory that the government intended to obtain a higher sentence for Taren-Palma is without support in the record. The district court did not abuse its discretion in restricting Taren-Palma from making this argument.
Taren-Palma argues that the district court erred in not granting a mistrial because counsel for Calderon-Perez referred to evidence not adduced at trial in his opening argument. We review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Marsh, 894 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1143, 107 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1990).
Opening argument, like closing, should not refer to matters that are not to be presented as evidence. See United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 955 (9th Cir.1985). Calderon-Perez's counsel made the following remark in his opening argument: "On July 31 and before, the informant told the police that Mr. Taren-Palma was dealing with lots and lots of kilograms of cocaine, the informant had seen lots and lots of kilograms of cocaine." The court later ruled that the underlying evidence was inadmissible. The opening argument was therefore improper.
The district court's error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507-08, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1979-80, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir.1979). The other evidence at trial was overwhelming, the court gave a curative instruction, and the comment was an isolated one.
G. Sentencing Finding
Taren-Palma contends that the district court erred in finding, for purposes of sentencing, that he was able to produce ten kilograms of cocaine. We review this factual finding for clear error. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d); United States v. Uzelac, 921 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir.1990).
The finding is not clearly erroneous. Taren-Palma agreed to provide ten kilograms of cocaine and repeatedly assured his prospective buyers that he could provide that amount with adequate notice. The fact that only two kilograms were seized does not preclude a finding of ten kilograms. The district court may consider the weight under negotiation. United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir.1990). Evidence of Taren-Palma's participation in a conspiracy to sell ten kilograms of cocaine is sufficient to support the district court's determination of his base offense level.
II. Calderon-Perez
Calderon-Perez argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for severance, and that joinder in this case was improper and prejudicial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14. We review motions to sever for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mariscal, 939 F.2d 884, 885 (9th Cir.1991). Joinder must be so manifestly prejudicial that the district court was required to conduct separate trials. Id. Calderon-Perez has the burden of proving clear, manifest or undue prejudice from the joint trial. United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1991). The evidence of prejudice must demonstrate that Calderon-Perez was denied a fair trial. Id.
"In considering a motion to sever based on the allegation that a codefendant will provide exculpatory testimony, the trial court must weigh several factors, including the good faith of the intent to have a codefendant testify, the probability that the testimony will materialize, the economy of a joint trial, the possible weight and credibility of the predicted testimony, and the degree to which the predicted testimony is exculpatory." United States v. Cuozzo, 962 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 475, 121 L.Ed.2d 381 (1992). The proffered testimony must be "substantially exculpatory." Mariscal, 939 F.2d at 886. Testimony merely contradicting the government's proof is insufficient. Id.
Taren-Palma's statement that Calderon-Perez was not involved in any drug dealings is arguably exculpatory. The statement is not specific enough, however, to require severance. It fails, for instance, to explain why Calderon-Perez was present or why he was carrying a gun at the transaction. A mere assertion of ultimate facts is not substantially exculpatory. See United States v. Ford, 870 F.2d 729, 730-32 (D.C.Cir.1989) (holding that proffered testimony stating that defendant "had nothing to do with the transaction" was insufficient to mandate severance). The district court properly determined that the Taren-Palma affidavit was not substantially exculpatory to mandate severance.
Calderon-Perez next argues that he was the victim of "prejudicial spillover" because there was such overwhelming evidence against Taren-Palma. The fact that more evidence was introduced against his codefendant is insufficient to show that joinder was improper. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1554 (9th Cir.1986). There is no showing that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence on the various counts against the various defendants. See United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2332, 124 L.Ed.2d 244 (1993). The district court instructed the jury to consider the case of each defendant separately. "Judicial economy justifies reliance on the jury to follow the instructions of the court that segregate the evidence and limit the applicability of the evidence to each defendant." United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 262, 98 L.Ed.2d 220 (1987).
B. Expert Translation
C. Dismissal Based on the Sixth Amendment
Calderon-Perez argues that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because the prosecutor interfered with his ability to prepare his case, in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. We review this issue de novo. United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1119, 113 L.Ed.2d 227 (1991).
The government did not interfere with the defense's ability to prepare its the case by instructing Seely to hang up. Seely had already said that he did not wish to be interviewed. The defense is not entitled to have the informant produced in advance of trial. United States v. Bonilla, 615 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir.1980). Nor did the district court order that the defense be permitted to interview Seely. The court stated merely that the "consent or denial of a pretrial interview by the informant must be communicated by the informant." There was no Sixth Amendment violation.
D. Expert Testimony Regarding Firearms
Calderon-Perez argues that the district court erred in admitting Kaminski's testimony regarding the use of guns in narcotics transactions. Kaminski testified that firearms are often used in drug transactions to protect either the money or the drugs at the time of the exchange. We review the district court's decision to admit expert opinion testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1521 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1290, 122 L.Ed.2d 682 (1993).
We have held that similar evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the modus operandi of the crimes charged. See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 (1990).
Our decisions in United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.1993), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (No. 92-8546), and United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir.1991), are not to the contrary. Those cases involved drug courier profile evidence. We noted that such evidence "is inherently prejudicial to the defendant because the profile may suggest that innocuous events indicate criminal activity." Lim, 984 F.2d at 334-35; Lui, 941 F.2d at 848. We held that "[d]rug courier profile testimony may be admissible to establish modus operandi, but only in exceptional, complex cases" so that "perfectly innocent items" are not turned into "evidence of guilt." Id.
Nor do we agree that the jury surely was able to infer the connection between the gun and the drug transaction without the aid of Kaminski's testimony. The connection is no more obvious than the use of "lookouts," United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982), or "pay and owe" ledgers, United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-13 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 441 (1988), in drug transactions. We have upheld the admission of expert testimony in those situations. We must do so here.
Calderon-Perez argues that the district court should have given the three "theory of the case" jury instructions he proposed. We review this issue de novo. United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 748, 107 L.Ed.2d 765 (1990). The defense is entitled to have instructions given on its theory if it is supported by law and has some factual foundation. United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990). If the defense instructions are refused, the instructions given by the court must adequately cover the defense theory. See United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.1991).
The district court did not err in refusing the proposed instructions because the defendant's theories of mere presence, association, and knowledge were adequately covered by several of the court's instructions. The court instructed the jury regarding the insufficiency of mere association, the requirement of willful participation with the intent to further the conspiracy, and the requirement of knowing action in furtherance of the conspiracy. A trial judge is not required to instruct the jury in the chosen words of the accused and may refuse a proposed instruction if it finds that it is not a fair statement of the law or facts. United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1384, 122 L.Ed.2d 759 (1993). The district court did not err in refusing the proposed defense instructions.
F. Sentencing Reduction Based on Minor Role
Calderon-Perez argues that the district court should have decreased his base offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, for his minor role in the conspiracy. We review issues concerning the application of the sentencing guidelines de novo ; the underlying facts found by the district court are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Uzelac, 921 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir.1990). A downward adjustment under § 3B1.2 is to be used infrequently and only in exceptional circumstances. United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir.1990). Calderon-Perez has the burden of proving that he was a minor participant by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir.1990).
The district court properly found that Calderon-Perez was not a minor participant. He carried a weapon during the course of the offense. Calderon-Perez was therefore not "substantially less culpable than the average participant." United States v. Zweber, 913 F.2d 705, 710 (9th Cir.1990). The district court properly refused the downward adjustment.
In United States v. Nakagawa, 924 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.1991), we held that an upward departure on a possession offense for possession of a weapon was not inconsistent with the mandatory sentence under § 924 because "the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.... Congress did not intend for [§ 924] to provide the only source of increased punishment for possessing a weapon during the commission of a crime." Id. at 805 (citations omitted). A refusal to adjust downward is less severe than an upward departure. Under Nakagawa, therefore, no Double Jeopardy violation occurred. The district court properly considered for purposes of Calderon-Perez's conspiracy sentence that he carried a firearm.
Calderon-Perez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that he participated in the conspiracy. We decide, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir.1991).
The essential elements of a conspiracy are (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective; (2) the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying offense. United States v. Thomas, 887 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1989). An agreement may be inferred from the defendant's acts, or from other circumstantial evidence, and a defendant's proximity to the scene of illicit activity may support an inference when viewed in context with other evidence. Id. at 1347-48. Once the existence of a conspiracy is shown, the government need only prove a slight connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. Aichele, 941 F.2d at 763-64. A defendant's knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the codefendants' actions.
In United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.1989), we affirmed the defendant's conspiracy conviction based on the following evidence: 1) the defendant accompanied his coconspirators to a drug transaction; 2) he carried a gun during the transaction; and 3) he made a statement indicating that he knew a drug transaction was taking place. Id. at 737. Calderon-Perez was present during the drug transaction; he confirmed the quality of the cocaine; and he carried a weapon during the transaction. A reasonable jury could have found that Calderon-Perez was a knowing participant in the conspiracy and that an overt act was committed. The district court properly denied his motions for acquittal and new trial on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
Calderon-Perez also claims that the government's proof impermissibly varied from the allegations in the indictment. See United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1984). The indictment alleged a conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, not two. The claim lacks merit.
The amount of the cocaine is not an element of the conspiracy offense. See United States v. Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1186, 117 L.Ed.2d 428 (1992). Any variance in the amount of cocaine is therefore insufficient to mandate reversal. See Von Stoll, 726 F.2d at 587 (noting that a variance does not require reversal where it does not alter the crime charged).
Clearly, in order to be admissible, expert testimony must not be unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. "A trial court should not routinely admit [expert testimony], but should carefully weigh the testimony's probative value against its possible prejudicial effect." United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 612 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 441 (1988). Applying this principle, this court has held that expert testimony is only admissible to establish the modus operandi of crimes in complex cases, and that in simple cases, such evidence is unduly prejudicial. See United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331, 334-35 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2944, 124 L.Ed.2d 692 (1993); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984)). While Lim and Lui were cases involving the admissibility of expert testimony regarding drug courier profiles, I disagree with the majority that the principles stated therein are less applicable to this case. As we indicated in Espinosa, the court must seriously consider the prejudicial effect of expert testimony in every instance, not just in drug courier cases. See Espinosa, 827 F.2d at 612.
As in Lim and Lui, there was nothing complex about this conspiracy. It involved a simple drug transaction, a limited number of participants and occurred over the span of a few weeks. The jury surely was able to infer the connection between the firearm and the drug transaction without the aid of Kaminski's testimony. Similarly, in United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.1991), the Second Circuit held that police testimony regarding the modus operandi of drug dealers, such as the connection between their possessing scales, baggies and firearms and their drug related activities, was unnecessary because jurors "are capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar training.... [W]e are not convinced that ... jurors ... need an expert to enlighten them as to such elementary issues." Id. at 1232-33. Because Kaminski's testimony was equally unnecessary, it should have been excluded.
Home997 f2d 525 united states v. taren-palma