Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-1st-circuit/1052632.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 20:28:59
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u200212101', '§\u200228', '§\u200212112', '§\u200228', '§\u200212102', '§\u200212101', '§\u200212112', '§\u20021630', '§\u20021630', '§\u20021630', '§\u20021630', '§\u2002902', '§\u20021630', '§\u200212102', '§\u20021630', '§\u200212111', '§\u200212111', '§\u20022106', '§\u200212102', '§\u200228', '§\u20021630', '§\u200212117', '§\u200212111']

KATZ v. CITY METAL CO INC | FindLaw
KATZ v. CITY METAL CO INC
Alexander KATZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY METAL CO., INC., Milton Wilcox, and Peter Bruno, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 95-2234.
Decided: July 02, 1996
Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge. Robert E. Savage, Warwick, RI, for appellant. Michael P. DeFanti, Providence, RI, with whom Hinckley, Allen & Snyder was on brief, for appellees.
Plaintiff/Appellant Alexander Katz (“Katz”) sued his former employer, Defendant/Appellee City Metal Co. (“City Metal”), its President Milton Wilcox (“Wilcox”) and its Chief Executive Officer Peter Bruno (“Bruno”), under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1995) ( “ADA”), and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-1 et seq. (1995), claiming that City Metal unlawfully discriminated against him by discharging him because of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-6, 5-7. At the close of Katz's case, the district court granted City Metal's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1), finding that Katz had not presented evidence sufficient to show that he had a “disability” as defined under the ADA.1 Katz appeals. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
“We review the grant of a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, under the same standards as the district court.” Andrade v. Jamestown Housing Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir.1996). Accordingly, we “examine the evidence and all fair inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff [and] may not consider the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Richmond Steel, Inc. v. Puerto Rican American Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To warrant submission of an issue to the jury, the plaintiff must present “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence and may not rely on conjecture or speculation. Id. “[T]he evidence offered must make the existence of the fact to be inferred more probable than its nonexistence.” Resare v. Raytheon Co., 981 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To affirm the withdrawal of any claim from the jury, we must find that, as a matter of law, the record would permit a reasonable jury to reach only one conclusion as to that issue. Richmond Steel, 954 F.2d at 22.
After Katz, Wilcox, and Bruno had testified, Katz's attorney informed the court that he had one more witness-Katz's treating physician in Rhode Island-whom he had subpoenaed for the following day. The court recessed until the following day, when Katz's attorney informed the court that the doctor had declined to appear in court until Friday, three days hence, and requested that he be permitted to present the doctor's testimony in rebuttal after the defendants' case. The court stated that it would deal with the issue when it arose and was not sure the doctor's testimony was “vital to the essence of your claim.”
City Metal then moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that in order to prove a disability under the ADA and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, Katz was required to show that the heart attack “severely restricted a basic life activity on a permanent and continuing basis,” and that he had failed to do so because there had been no medical testimony that Katz was permanently impaired in a major life activity. In response, Katz argued that his testimony established that the heart attack resulted in hospitalization, and impaired his ability to breathe, walk, perform manual tasks, care for himself and work, and that the evidence therefore met each of the three alternative definitions of the term “disability” under the ADA-that he had a physical impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities, that he had a record of such an impairment, and that City Metal regarded him as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
The question is whether it produced a permanent disability that he can't perform his work. It's obvious he's a salesman, and he's still selling․ In order for the Plaintiff to recover in this case, the Plaintiff must make a showing that he has some type of permanent impairment, physical impairment in one or more of life's major activities. There's been no showing of that in this case.
The district court erred in ruling that there was insufficient evidence of disability within the meaning of the ADA. We start with the words of the statute. The Americans with Disabilities Act is a federal civil rights statute, enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). See also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 671 (1st Cir.1995). In the employment context, the ADA prohibits a “covered entity” (defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees”) from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To obtain relief under the Act, a plaintiff must prove three things. First, that he was disabled within the meaning of the Act. Second, that with or without reasonable accommodation he was able to perform the essential functions of his job. And third, that the employer discharged him in whole or in part because of his disability.2
In light of the district court's ruling, we focus on the first element-“disability”-as defined in the ADA:
A “physical impairment” is “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition ․ or anatomical loss affecting,” inter alia, the “cardiovascular” system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1995). “Major life activities” are defined as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). “Substantially limited” is defined as:
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). Factors to be considered in assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity are:
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).3 According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Compliance Manual:
2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Interpretations (CCH) § 902.4, ¶ 6884, p. 5319 (1995). Examples of impairments that are “usually not disabilities” because they are “temporary,” “non-chronic,” and “of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,” are “broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at 402.
Especially given that City Metal has never disputed that Katz had a heart attack, we have no doubt that a rational jury could conclude, even without expert medical testimony, that Katz had a condition affecting the cardiovascular system and therefore that he had a physical impairment under the ADA.4 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). We think, however, that it is a very close question whether Katz offered sufficient evidence to prove that that impairment “substantially limited” his major life activities within the meaning of the ADA, his scheduled expert medical witness having proved unavailable.
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is ․ based ․ on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others.
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at 402. See also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir.1993) (recognizing that “the effect of a given type of impairment ․ can vary widely from individual to individual”), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994). Nonetheless, it is at least a debatable question whether, based on Katz's testimony, the jury could conclude that he suffered from a continuing medical condition, persisting beyond the period immediately after the operation, that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities.
We need not definitively resolve the issue of whether expert medical testimony was necessary for the case to go forward on a theory of actual disability in this case, because we think that the evidence permitted Katz to reach the jury under one of the alternative definitions of disability, that City Metal “regarded [Katz] as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). Under the regulations an individual who has an impairment that is not substantially limiting (or has no impairment at all) is nevertheless “disabled” if he is treated by the employer as having an impairment that does substantially limit major life activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l )(1). An example given is an employee whose controlled high blood pressure is not a disability but is reassigned because the employer fears, wrongly, that the employee may have a heart attack. Id. Pt. 1630, App. See also Cook, 10 F.3d at 20-21, 23, 25 (employer treated employee as handicapped by refusing to rehire her based on its belief that her morbid obesity would compromise her ability to do her job and put her at risk of developing serious ailments).
In this case, Katz alleged in his complaint that he was not only actually disabled but also perceived by his employer to be disabled, and was fired because of it. The dramatic encounter at the office, in which Katz was unable to climb the stairs and Wilcox observed his fatigue, is only one piece of evidence; others included the employer's knowledge of the heart attack, angioplasty procedure and hospitalization, and yet another was Katz's own statements to his employer that when he returned to work it would at least initially have to be in a limited capacity. Cf. Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724-26 (7th Cir.1995) (employer did not “regard” employee as disabled where there was no evidence that the person who made the decision to fire him was even told about the employee's arthritis; employee told his direct supervisor that it was “nothing” and “would pass” and continued to do all of the functions of his job). Even if medical expert testimony were required here to permit the jury to find that Katz was suffering from a continuing serious heart condition, the jury certainly did not need medical testimony in making its own judgment as to what the employer may have perceived, rightly or wrongly, about Katz's condition.
The second element of proof is ability to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Katz testified that five days after his discharge from the hospital and again two days after he was fired, he asked Wilcox to accommodate him by allowing him to return to work on a part-time basis. On the latter occasion, Katz suggested a reduction in salary and said he would accept whatever accommodations the company would make in order to keep his job. Reasonable accommodations include, inter alia, “job restructuring [and] part-time or modified work schedules.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). As we noted in Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc.:
With respect to known disabilities, however, the emphasis is on encouraging the employer to “engage in an interactive process with the individual to determine an effective reasonable accommodation.” Guidance § IV.B.6b (citing H.R.Rep. No. 485 (Pt. 2), supra, at 65-66, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 347-48).
Where there must be a remand for a new trial, we have broad authority to draft a remand order that is fair and just. 28 U.S.C. § 2106. In this instance, given that Katz was deprived of his medical testimony more or less by accident, we see no reason why on retrial he should not be allowed to present expert testimony in a timely fashion in order to show an actual disability under the statute.
1. Because the definition of “handicap” under the Rhode Island law is substantially identical to the ADA's definition of “disability,” we will not separately address the state law claim. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) with R.I. Gen. Law § 28-5-6(9).
2. A plaintiff may indirectly prove that he was discriminated against because of a disability by using the prima facie case and burden shifting methods that originated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and were refined and sharpened in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.1995); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir.1995); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995).
3. The regulations set forth a more particularized definition of what it means to be “substantially limited in the major life activity of working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). We need not consider the permutations of that definition, however, because if an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity other than working, or is so regarded, “no determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially limited in working.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App., at 403.
4. In Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.1993), a case under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (which is interpreted substantially identically to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(b), 12201(a)), we upheld the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, in part based on her presentation of expert medical testimony that “morbid obesity” was a physiological disorder that affected the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Id. at 23. In a case like Cook, where it is not obvious to a lay jury that the condition affects one of the bodily systems listed in the regulations, expert testimony that it does may well be necessary to avoid a judgment as a matter of law.
5. City Metal was free, of course, to attempt to show that accommodating Katz would have imposed on it an “undue hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).