Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98761/dickinson-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 02:16:14
Document Index: 793141012

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 456', '§ 12', '§ 1622', '§ 6', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 1622', '§ 11', '§ 451']

Dickinson Vs United States - Citation 98761 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Dickinson Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98761CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-30-1953Case Number346 U.S. 389AppellantDickinsonRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....the universal military training and service act, and his conviction for refusing to submit to his local board's induction order is reversed. pp.
346 u. s. 390
(a) the provision of the act that classification orders by selective service authorities shall be "final" does not preclude judicial inquiry into the question of jurisdiction where there is no basis, in fact, for the classification order. p.
346 u. s. 394
(b) the ministerial exemption being a matter of legislative grace, the registrant bears the burden of clearly establishing a right to the exemption. pp.
(c) petitioner made out a
case within the statutory exemption by uncontroverted evidence that he was ordained in accordance with the ritual of his..... Judgment:
Dickinson v. United States - 346 U.S. 389 (1953)
There was no basis in fact for denying petitioner's claim to ministerial exemption under § 6(g) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and his conviction for refusing to submit to his local board's induction order is reversed. Pp.
case within the statutory exemption by uncontroverted evidence that he was ordained in accordance with the ritual of his sect (Jehovah's Witnesses) and that he was regularly engaged, as a vocation, in teaching and preaching the principles of his sect and conducting public worship in the tradition of his religion. P.
346 U. S. 395
(d) That petitioner worked five hours a week as a radio repairman did not supply a factual basis for denial of the ministerial exemption to which he was otherwise entitled. Pp.
(e) There is no affirmative evidence in the record in this case to support the local board's overt or implicit finding that petitioner had not painted a complete or accurate picture of his activities. P.
(f) When the uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him
within the statutory exemption, the claim may not be dismissed solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation. Pp.
203 F.2d 336 reversed.
The principal and decisive issue before us is whether there was a basis in fact for denying Dickinson's claim to a ministerial exemption under § 6(g) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 611, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 456(g). [
] After the selective service authorities denied his claim, Dickinson refused to submit to induction in defiance of his local board's induction order. For this refusal he was convicted, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, [
] of violating § 12(a) [
] of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 203 F.2d 336. We granted certiorari. 345 U.S. 991=.
Registrants who satisfy this definition are entitled to be classified IV-D. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43. [
In the Spring of 1949, Dickinson voluntarily left his 40-hour-a-week job as a radio repairman and was baptized, the mark of ordination to Jehovah's Witnesses. In August, 1949, he was enrolled by national headquarters of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society and began his work as a full-time "pioneer" minister, devoting 150 hours each month to religious efforts. This shift in Dickinson's activities occurred after February, 1949,
when selection under the Act was at a standstill, regular inductions having been halted. [
] As of January, 1950, Dickinson changed his residence in order to assume the role of "Company Servant" or presiding minister of the Coalinga, California, "Company," which encompassed a 5,400-square-mile area. At that time, he dedicated approximately 100 hours each month to actual pioneer missionary work-delivering public sermons, door-to-door preaching, conducting home Bible studies. In the remaining 50 hours devoted to religious activities each month, Dickinson studied, planned sermons and discourses, and wrote letters connected with his work. A substantial portion of this time was spent conducting three to four meetings each week of the "Company" or congregation at a public hall in Coalinga. Dickinson arranged for and presided over these meetings, usually delivering discourses at them. He also instructed prospective ministers in the proper delivery of sermons at the "Company's" Theocratic Ministry School. Dickinson received no salary for his missionary or company servant work. He lived on $35 a month earned by a weekly average of five hours of radio repair work. This modest income, a low $15-17.50 a month rental for an apartment, self-performance of household tasks, and invitations to various private homes enabled Dickinson to subsist.
Despite this uncontroverted evidence of marked change in Dickinson's activities, the local board continued him in I-A. This ruling was affirmed by the state and national appeal boards, and he was ordered to report for induction on July 16, 1951. Dickinson reported to the
At the outset, it is important to underline an elemental feature of this case. The Universal Military Training and Service Act does not permit direct judicial review of selective service classification orders. Rather, the Act provides, as did the 1917 and 1940 conscription Acts before it, [
] that classification orders by selective service authorities shall be "final." However, in
-123 (1946), a case arising under the 1940 Act, this Court said:
The ministerial exemption, as was pointed out in the Senate Report accompanying the 1948 Act, "is a narrow one, intended for the leaders of the various religious faiths, and not for the members generally." S.Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13. Certainly all members of a religious organization or sect are not entitled to the exemption by reason of their membership, even though, in their belief, each is a minister.
Cf. Cox v. United States,
332 U. S. 442
(1947). On the other hand, a legitimate minister cannot be, for the purposes of the Act, unfrocked simply because all the members of his sect base an exemption claim on the dogma of its faith. That would
leave a congregation without a cleric. Each registrant must satisfy the Act's rigid criteria for the exemption. Preaching and teaching the principles of one's sect, if performed part-time or half-time, occasionally or irregularly, are insufficient to bring a registrant under § 6(g). These activities must be regularly performed. They must, as the statute reads, comprise the registrant's "vocation." And since the ministerial exemption is a matter of legislative grace, the selective service registrant bears the burden of clearly establishing a right to the exemption. [
Why, then, was Dickinson denied IV-D? It may be argued that his five hours a week as a radio repairman supplied a factual basis for the denial. We think not. The statutory definition of a "regular or duly ordained minister" does not preclude all secular employment. Many preachers, including those in the more traditional and orthodox sects, may not be blessed with congregations or parishes capable of paying them a living wage. A statutory ban on all secular work would mete out draft exemptions with an uneven hand, to the detriment of those who minister to the poor, and thus need some secular work in order to survive. To hold that one who supports himself by five hours of secular work each week may
Local boards are not courts of law, and are not bound by traditional rules of evidence; they are given great leeway in hearing and considering a variety of material as evidence. [
] If the facts are disputed, the board bears the ultimate responsibility for resolving the conflict -- the courts will not interfere. Nor will the courts apply a test of"substantial evidence." However, the courts may properly insist that there be some proof that is incompatible with the registrant's proof of exemption. The local board may question a registrant under oath, subpoena witnesses to testify, and require both registrant and witnesses to produce documents. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.15. The board is authorized to obtain information
from local, state, and national welfare and governmental agencies. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.14. The registrant's admissions, testimony of other witnesses, frequently unsolicited evidence from a registrant's neighbors, or information obtained from other agencies may produce dissidence which the boards are free to resolve. Absent such admissions or other evidence, the local boards may call on the investigative agencies of the federal government, as they would if a registrant were suspected of perjury. But when the uncontroverted evidence supporting a registrant's claim places him
within the statutory exemption, dismissal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice.
32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c).
See Lehr v. United States,
139 F.2d 919, 922 (1944).
, that, in a criminal prosecution under § 11 of the Selective Service Act, the court must allow the registrant to prove that his local draft board acted without jurisdiction in classifying him for service. The Court cited several examples of a board's acting without jurisdiction, such as where a Pennsylvania board orders a citizen and resident of Oregon to report for induction, or where a board bases classification on the registrant's color or creed in direct defiance of the applicable regulations. But the Court then made this statement: "The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is
for the classification which it gave the registrant." (Emphasis added.) The import was that a local board loses jurisdiction if there are insufficient facts in the record to support its conclusion. The ramifications of such a theory were not explored at the time, and have not
been clarified by subsequent decisions. [
] But the majority opinion today squarely poses the question of whether such a theory has a place in the statutory scheme of the Selective Service Act.
No allegation has been made that the local board or the Appeals Board acted fraudulently or maliciously in this matter. The only logical assumption from the classification is that the boards disbelieved part of petitioner's testimony or doubted his good faith in taking up religious work at the particular time he did. The record itself raises some suspicions, and petitioner's appearance
The problem inherent in
and raised by the majority opinion today is what is required of the board under such circumstances? It will not do for the Court as in
to say, on the one hand, that the board's action is not subject to "the customary scope of judicial review," and that "the courts are not to weigh the evidence," and then, on the other, to strike down a classification because no affirmative evidence supporting the board's conclusion appears in the record. Under today's decision, it is not sufficient that the board disbelieve the registrant. The board must find and record affirmative evidence that he has misrepresented his case -- evidence which is then put to the test of substantiality by the courts. In short, the board must build a record.
There is nothing in the Act which requires this result. [
] To the contrary, the whole tenor of the Act is that the factual question of whether the registrant is entitled to the claimed exemption shall be left entirely in the hands of the board. The philosophy of the Act is that the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just. 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, §§ 451-471. To that end, it decrees,
Even when we all interpret "final" so as to allow judicial review of the board's jurisdiction, it does not follow that jurisdiction may be lost through a lack of evidence. Despite the comment in
that the board's action is not subject to ordinary review, the Court continues to examine and weigh these purely factual determinations.
We think the Act nevertheless requires that, in the absence of affirmative proof by the registrant that the board has misconstrued the law or acted arbitrarily, the board's decisions are final, and not subject to judicial scrutiny. Whether there is sufficient evidence to grant the exemption is to be left wholly with the board. The Court does not sit here to weigh the evidence. All factual questions are for the board, and its decision is final. The Court
Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels,
329 U. S. 304
329 U. S. 316
332 U. S. 176
332 U. S. 448
332 U. S. 451