Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-992.ZO.html
Timestamp: 2019-12-15 04:54:59
Document Index: 662295116

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2', '§6', '§ 325', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§4', '§ 534', '§2', '§2', '§ 533', '§ 76', '§2', 'art 2', '§ 534', '§535', '§534', '§535', '§ 534', '§534']

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of Part II A 1.
On appeal, we agreed with the District Court that must carry does not "distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed," 512 U. S., at 643, but is a content neutral regulation designed "to prevent cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of broadcasters," and "to ensure that all Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to free television programming--whatever its content." Id., at 649. We held that, under the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content neutral regulations, must carry would be sustained if it were shown to further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, provided the incidental restrictions did not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further" those interests. Id., at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). Although we "ha[d] no difficulty concluding" the interests must carry was designed to serve were important in the abstract, 512 U. S., at 663, a four Justice plurality concluded genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and need of the protections afforded by must carry," and whether must carry " `burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.' " Id., at 665 (quoting Ward, supra, at 799). Justice Stevens would have found the statute valid on the record then before us; he agreed to remand the case to ensure a judgment of the Court, and the case was returned to the District Court for further proceedings. 512 U. S., at 673-674 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 667-668.
The District Court oversaw another 18 months of factual development on remand "yielding a record of tens of thousands of pages" of evidence, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 755 (DC 1995), comprised of materials acquired during Congress' three years of pre-enactment hearings, see Turner, supra, at 632-634, as well as additional expert submissions, sworn declarations and testimony, and industry documents obtained on remand. Upon consideration of the expanded record, a divided panel of the District Court again granted summary judgment to appellees. 910 F. Supp., at 751. The majority determined "Congress drew reasonable inferences" from substantial evidence before it to conclude that "in the absence of must carry rules, `significant' numbers of broadcast stations would be refused carriage." Id., at 742. The court found Congress drew on studies and anecdotal evidence indicating "cable operators had already dropped, refused to carry, or adversely repositioned significant numbers of local broadcasters," and suggesting that in the vast majority of cases the broadcasters were not restored to carriage in their prior position. Ibid. Noting evidence in the record before Congress and the testimony of experts on remand, id., at 743, the court decided the noncarriage problem would grow worse without must carry because cable operators had refrained from dropping broadcast stations during Congress' investigation and the pendency of this litigation, id., at 742-743, and possessed increasing incentives to use their growing economic power to capture broadcasters' advertising revenues and promote affiliated cable programmers. Ibid. The court concluded "substantial evidence before Congress" supported the predictive judgment that a local broadcaster denied carriage "would suffer financial harm and possible ruin." Id., at 743-744. It cited evidence that adverse carriage actions decrease broadcasters' revenues by reducing audience levels, id., at 744-745, and evidence that the invalidation of the FCC's prior must carry regulations had contributed to declining growth in the broadcast industry. Id., at 744, and n. 34.
Judge Williams dissented. His review of the record, and particularly evidence concerning growth in the number of broadcasters, industry advertising revenues, and per station profits during the period without must carry, led him to conclude the broadcast industry as a whole would not be " `seriously jeopardized' " in the absence of must carry. Id., at 759-767. Judge Williams acknowledged the Government had a legitimate interest in preventing anticompetitive behavior, and accepted that cable operators have incentives to discriminate against broadcasters in favor of their own vertically integrated cable programming. Id., at 772, 775, 779. He would have granted summary judgment for appellants nonetheless on the ground must carry is not narrowly tailored. In his view, must carry constitutes a significant (though "diminish[ing]," id., at 782) burden on cable operators' and programmers' rights, ibid., and the Cable Act's must carry provisions suppress more speech than necessary because "less restrictive" alternatives exist to accomplish the Government's legitimate objectives. Id., at 782-789.
We begin where the plurality ended in Turner, applying the standards for intermediate scrutiny enunciated in O'Brien. A content neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. O'Brien, 391 U. S., at 377. As noted in Turner, must carry was designed to serve "three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, over the air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming." 512 U. S., at 662. We decided then, and now reaffirm, that each of those is an important governmental interest. We have been most explicit in holding that " `protecting noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems' is an important federal interest." Id., at 663 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)). Forty percent of American households continue to rely on over the air signals for television programming. Despite the growing importance of cable television and alternative technologies, " `broadcasting is demonstrably a principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation's population.' " Turner, supra, at 663 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968)). We have identified a corresponding "governmental purpose of the highest order" in ensuring public access to "a multiplicity of information sources," 512 U. S., at 663. And it is undisputed the Government has an interest in "eliminating restraints on fair competition . . ., even when the individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment." Ibid.
At the same time, Congress was under no illusion that there would be a complete disappearance of broadcast television nationwide in the absence of must carry. Congress recognized broadcast programming (and network programming in particular) "remains the most popular programming on cable systems," §2(a)(19). Indeed, reflecting the popularity and strength of some broadcasters, Congress included in the Cable Act a provision permitting broadcasters to charge cable systems for carriage of the broadcasters' signals. See §6, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325. Congress was concerned not that broadcast television would disappear in its entirety without must carry, but that without it, "significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused carriage on cable systems," and those "broadcast stations denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether." 512 U. S., at 666. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 102-628, p. 51 (1992) (House Report) (the absence of must carry "will result in a weakening of the over the air television industry and a reduction in competition"); id., at 64 ("The Committee wishes to make clear that its concerns are not limited to a situation where stations are dropped wholesale by large numbers of cable systems"); S. Rep. No. 102-92, p. 62 (1991) (Senate Report) ("Without congressional action, . . . the role of local television broadcasting in our system of communications will steadily decline . . ."); see also Brief for Federal Appellees in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, No. 93-44, p. 32, n. 22 (the question is not whether "the evidence shows that broadcast television is likely to be totally eliminated" but "whether the broadcast services available to viewers [without cable] . . . are likely to be reduced to a significant extent, because of either loss of some stations altogether or curtailment of services by others").
Nor do the congressional findings support appellants' suggestion that legitimate legislative goals would be satisfied by the preservation of a rump broadcasting industry providing a minimum of broadcast service to Americans without cable. We have noted that " `it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." ' " Turner, 512 U. S., at 663-664 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668, n. 27 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)); see also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 594 (1981). " `[I]ncreasing the number of outlets for community self expression' " represents a " `long established regulatory goa[l] in the field of television broadcasting.' " United States v. Midwest Video Corp., supra, at 667-668 (plurality opinion). Consistent with this objective, the Cable Act's findings reflect a concern that congressional action was necessary to prevent "a reduction in the number of media voices available to consumers." §2(a)(4). Congress identified a specific interest in "ensuring [the] continuation" of "the local origination of [broadcast] programming," §2(a)(10), an interest consistent with its larger purpose of promoting multiple types of media, §2(a)(6), and found must carry necessary "to serve the goals" of the original Communications Act of 1934 of "providing a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of broadcast services" (§2(a)(9)). In short, Congress enacted must carry to "preserve the existing structure of the Nation's broadcast television medium while permitting the concomitant expansion and development of cable television." 512 U. S., at 652.
Although Congress set no definite number of broadcast stations sufficient for these purposes, the Cable Act's requirement that all cable operators with more than 12 channels set aside one third of their channel capacity for local broadcasters, §4, 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B), refutes the notion that Congress contemplated preserving only a bare minimum of stations. Congress' evident interest in "preserv[ing] the existing structure," 512 U. S., at 652, of the broadcast industry discloses a purpose to prevent any significant reduction in the multiplicity of broadcast programming sources available to noncable households. To the extent the appellants question the substantiality of the Government's interest in preserving something more than a minimum number of stations in each community, their position is meritless. It is for Congress to decide how much local broadcast television should be preserved for noncable households, and the validity of its determination " `does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning' . . . the degree to which [the Government's] interests should be promoted." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)); accord, Clark v. Community for Creative Non Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) ("We do not believe . . . [that] United States v. O'Brien . . . endow[s] the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise").
The dissent proceeds on the assumption that must carry is designed solely to be (and can only be justified as) a measure to protect broadcasters from cable operators' anticompetitive behavior. See post, at 24, 26, 32. Federal policy, however, has long favored preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets regardless of whether the conduct that threatens it is motivated by anticompetitive animus or rises to the level of an antitrust violation. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 714; United States v. Midwest Video Corp., supra, at 665 (plurality opinion) (FCC regulations "were . . . avowedly designed to guard broadcast services from being undermined by unregulated [cable] growth"); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-224 (1943) (" `While many of the network practices raise serious questions under the antitrust laws, . . . [i]t is not [the FCC's] function to apply the antitrust laws as such' ") (quoting FCC Report on Chain Broadcasting Regulations (1941)). Broadcast television is an important source of information to many Americans. Though it is but one of many means for communication, by tradition and use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national discourse on subjects across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and expression. See Turner, supra, at 663; FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 783 (1978) (referring to studies "showing the dominant role of television stations . . . as sources of local news and other information"). Congress has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters to ensure that all households have access to information and entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to cable.
On our earlier review, we were constrained by the state of the record to assessing the importance of the Government's asserted interests when "viewed in the abstract," Turner, 512 U. S., at 663. The expanded record now permits us to consider whether the must carry provisions were designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a material way. Id., at 663-664. We turn first to the harm or risk which prompted Congress to act. The Government's assertion that "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must carry," id., at 664-665, rests on two component propositions: First, "significant numbers of broadcast stations will be refused carriage on cable systems" absent must-carry, id., at 666. Second, "the broadcast stations denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether." Ibid.
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, "courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress." Id., at 665. Our sole obligation is "to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence." Id., at 666. As noted in the first appeal, substantiality is to be measured in this context by a standard more deferential than we accord to judgments of an administrative agency. See id., at 666-667; id., at 670, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). We owe Congress' findings deference in part because the institution "is far better equipped than the judiciary to `amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon" legislative questions. Turner, supra, at 665-666 (plurality opinion) (quoting Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331, n. 12 (1985)); Ward, 491 U. S., at 800; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (courts must perform "appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of th[e] evidence"); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973). This principle has special significance in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing rapid economic and technological change. Though different in degree, the deference to Congress is in one respect akin to deference owed to administrative agencies because of their expertise. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) ("[C]omplete factual support in the record for the [FCC's] judgment or prediction is not possible or required; `a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency' "); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S., at 674 (it was "beyond the competence of the Court of Appeals itself to assess the relative risk and benefits" of FCC policy, so long as that policy was based on findings supported by evidence). This is not the sum of the matter, however. We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power. Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial measures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.
As to the evidence before Congress, there was specific support for its conclusion that cable operators had considerable and growing market power over local video programming markets. Cable served at least 60 percent of American households in 1992, see Cable Act §2(a)(3), and evidence indicated cable market penetration was projected to grow beyond 70 percent. See Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 12 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 259 (1991) (statement of Edward O. Fritts) (App. 1253); see also Defendants' Joint Statement of Evidence Before Congress ¶¶9, 10 (JSCR) (App. 1252-1253). As Congress noted (§2(a)(2)), cable operators possess a local monopoly over cable households. Only one percent of communities are served by more than one cable system, JSCR ¶¶31-40 (App. 1262-1266). Even in communities with two or more cable systems, in the typical case each system has a local monopoly over its subscribers. See Comments of NAB before the FCC on MM Docket No. 85-349, ¶47 (April 25, 1986) (App. 26). Cable operators thus exercise "control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home. . . . [and] can thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch." Turner, 512 U. S., at 656.
The reasonableness of Congress' conclusion was borne out by the evidence on remand, which also reflected cable industry favoritism for integrated programmers. See, e.g., Record, Defendants' Additional Evidence, Vol. VII. H, Exh. 170, p. 1749 (DAE) (cable industry memo stating that "All [of an MSO's] systems must launch Starz [an integrated programmer] 2/94. Word from corporate: if you don't have free channels . . . make one free"); Third Declaration of Tom Meek ¶44 (Third Meek Declaration) (App. 2071-2072); see also Declaration of Roger G. Noll ¶¶18-22 (Noll Declaration) (App. 1009-1013); Declaration of James Dertouzos ¶6a (Dertouzos Declaration) (App. 959).
Cable systems also have more systemic reasons for seeking to disadvantage broadcast stations: Simply stated, cable has little interest in assisting, through carriage, a competing medium of communication. As one cable industry executive put it, " `our job is to promote cable television, not broadcast television.' " Hearing on Competitive Issues, at 658 (quoting Multichannel News, Channel Realignments: United Cable Eyes Plan to Bump Network Affils to Upper Channels, Nov. 3, 1986, p. 39); see also id., at 661 (" `Shouldn't we give more . . . shelf space to cable? Why have people trained to view UHF?' ") (vice president of operations at Comcast, an MSO, quoted in Multichannel News, Cable Operators begin to Shuffle Channel Lineups, Sept. 8, 1986, p. 38)). The incentive to subscribe to cable is lower in markets with many over the air viewing options. See JSCR ¶275 (App. 1369); Dertouzos Declaration ¶¶27, 32 (App. 970, 972). Evidence adduced on remand indicated cable systems have little incentive to carry, and a significant incentive to drop, broadcast stations that will only be strengthened by access to the 60% of the television market that cable typically controls. Dertouzos Declaration ¶¶ 29, 35 (App. 971, 973); Noll Declaration ¶43 (App. 1029). Congress could therefore reasonably conclude that cable systems would drop broadcasters in favor of programmers--even unaffiliated ones--less likely to compete with them for audience and advertisers. The cap on carriage of affiliates included in the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B); 47 CFR § 76.504) (1995), and relied on by the dissent, post, at 11, 25, is of limited utility in protecting broadcasters.
Substantial evidence demonstrated that absent must carry the already "serious," Senate Report, at 43, problem of noncarriage would grow worse because "additional local broadcast signals will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried," §2(a)(15). The record included anecdotal evidence showing the cable industry was acting with restraint in dropping broadcast stations in an effort to discourage reregulation. See Hearings on Cable Television Regulation, at 900, n. 81 (statement of James B. Hedlund); Hearings on Cable Television Regulation (Part 2), at 242-243 (statement of James P. Mooney) (App. 1519); JSCR ¶¶524-534 (App. 1515-1519)). There was also substantial evidence that advertising revenue would be of increasing importance to cable operators as subscribership growth began to flatten, providing a steady, increasing incentive to deny carriage to local broadcasters in an effort to capture their advertising revenue. Id., ¶¶124-142, 154-166 (App. 1301-1308, 1313-1319). A contemporaneous FCC report noted that "[c]able operators' incentive to deny carriage . . . appears to be particularly great as against local broadcasters." Id., ¶155 (App. 1313). Then FCC Commissioner James Quello warned Congress that the carriage problems "occurring today are just the `tip of the iceberg.' These activities come at a time when the cable industry is just beginning to recognize the importance of local advertising." Cable Television, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 322 (1988) (App. 1515). Quello continued: "As [cable] systems mature and penetration levels off, systems will turn increasingly to advertising for revenues. The incentive to deny carriage to local stations is a logical, rational and, without must carry, a legal business strategy." Appendix A to Testimony of James B. Hedlund before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, 18 (1990) (statement of James H. Quello) (App. 1315). The FCC advised Congress the "diversity in broadcast television service . . . will be jeopardized if this situation continues unredressed." In re Competition, Rate Regulation, and Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 FCC Rcd 4962, 5040, ¶149 (1990).
The evidence on remand also indicated that the growth of cable systems' market power proceeded apace. The trend towards greater horizontal concentration continued, driven by "[e]nhanced growth prospects for advertising sales." Paul Kagan Assocs., Inc, Cable TV Advertising 1 (Sept. 30, 1994) (App. 301). By 1994, the 10 largest MSO's controlled 63 percent of cable systems, Notice of Inquiry, In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, 10 FCC Rcd. 7805, 7819-7820, ¶79 (1995),a figure projected to have risen to 85 percent by the end of 1996. DAE Vol. VII.D, Exh. 80, at 1 (Turner Broadcasting memo); Noll Declaration ¶26 (App. 1017). MSO's began to gain control of as many cable systems in a given market as they could, in a trend known as "clustering." JSCR ¶¶150-153 (App. 1311-1313). Cable systems looked increasingly to advertising (and especially local advertising) for revenue growth, see, e.g., Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Cable TV Advertising 1 (July 28, 1993) (App. 251); 1 R. Bilotti, D. Hansen, & R. MacDonald, The Cable Television Industry 94-97 (Mar. 8, 1993) (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 232, at 94-97) ("Local advertising revenue is an exceptional incremental revenue opportunity for the cable television industry") Memo from Arts & Entertainment Network, dated Oct. 26, 1992, p. 2 (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 235) (discussing "huge growth on the horizon" for spot advertising revenue), and cable systems had increasing incentives to drop local broadcasters in favor of cable programmers (whether affiliated or not). See Noll Declaration ¶¶29-31 (App. 1018-1020). The vertical integration of the cable industry also continued, so by 1994, MSO's serving about 70 percent of the Nation's cable subscribers held equity interests in cable programmers. See In re Implementation of Section 19 of Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 FCC Rcd 7442, 7526, ¶167, and nn. 455, 457 (1994); id., app. G, tables 9-10; Top 100 MSO's as of October 1, 1994 (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 266); see also JSCR ¶¶199, 204 (App. 1334, 1336). The FTC study the dissent cites, post, at 15, takes a skeptical view of the potential for cable systems to engage in anticompetitive behavior, but concedes the risk of anticompetitive carriage denials is "most plausible" when "the cable system's franchise area is large relative to the local area served by the affected broadcast station," Reply Comment of FTC, at 20 (App. 177), and when "a system's penetration rate is both high and relatively unresponsive to the system's carriage decisions," id., at 18 (App. 175). That describes "precisely what is happening" as large cable operators expand their control over individual markets through clustering. Second Meek Declaration ¶35 (App. 1867). As they do so, they are better able to sell their own reach to potential advertisers, and to limit the access of broad cast competitors by denying them access to all or substantially all the cable homes in the market area. Ibid.; accord Noll Declaration ¶24 (App. 1015).
The harm Congress feared was that stations dropped or denied carriage would be at a "serious risk of financial difficulty," 512 U. S., at 667, and would "deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail altogether." Id., at 666. Congress had before it substantial evidence to support its conclusion. Congress was advised the viability of a broadcast station depends to a material extent on its ability to secure cable carriage. JSCR ¶¶597-617, 667-670, 673 (App. 1544-1553, 1580-1581, 1582-1583). One broadcast industry executive explained it this way:
This assertion misapprehends the relevant inquiry. The question is not whether Congress, as an objective matter, was correct to determine must carry is necessary to prevent a substantial number of broadcast stations from losing cable carriage and suffering significant financial hardship. Rather, the question is whether the legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record before Congress. Turner, 512 U. S., at 665-666. In making that determination, we are not to "re weigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own." Id., at 666. Rather, we are simply to determine if the standard is satisfied. If it is, summary judgment for defendants appellees is appropriate regardless of whether the evidence is in conflict. We have noted in another context, involving less deferential review than is at issue here, that "`the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent . . . [a] finding from being supported by substantial evidence.' " American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981) (citation omitted) (quoting Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
Despite the considerable evidence before Congress and adduced on remand indicating that the significant numbers of broadcast stations are at risk, the dissent believes yet more is required before Congress could act. It demands more information about which of the dropped broadcast stations still qualify for mandatory carriage, post, at 13; about the broadcast markets in which adverse decisions take place, post, at 14; and about the features of the markets in which bankrupt broadcast stations were located prior to their demise. Post, at 19. The level of detail in factfinding required by the dissent would be an improper burden for courts to impose on the Legislative Branch. That amount of detail is as unreasonable in the legislative context as it is constitutionally unwarranted. "Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review." Turner, 512 U. S., at 666 (plurality opinion).
We think it apparent must carry serves the Government's interests "in a direct and effective way." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. Must carry ensures that a number of local broadcasters retain cable carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed to support a multiplicity of stations. Appellants contend that even were this so, must carry is broader than necessary to accomplish its goals. We turn to this question.
The second portion of the O'Brien inquiry concerns the fit between the asserted interests and the means chosen to advance them. Content neutral regulations do not pose the same "inherent dangers to free expression," Turner, supra, at 661, that content based regulations do, and thus are subject to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government latitude in designing a regulatory solution. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U. S., at 798-799, n. 6. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Government may employ the means of its choosing " `so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,' " and does not " `burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further' " that interest. Turner, supra, at 662 (quoting Ward, supra, at 799).
The must carry provisions have the potential to interfere with protected speech in two ways. First, the provisions restrain cable operators' editorial discretion in creating programming packages by "reduc[ing] the number of channels over which [they] exercise unfettered control." Turner, 512 U. S., at 637. Second, the rules "render it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels remaining." Ibid.
Because the burden imposed by must carry is congruent to the benefits it affords, we conclude must carry is narrowly tailored to preserve a multiplicity of broadcast stations for the 40 percent of American households without cable. Cf. Ward, 491 U. S., at 799, n. 7 ("the essence of narrow tailoring" is "focus[sing] on the evils the [Government] seeks to eliminate . . . [without] significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same evils"); Community for Creative Non Violence, 468 U. S., at 297 ("None of [the regulation's] provisions appears unrelated to the ends that it was designed to serve."). Congress took steps to confine the breadth and burden of the regulatory scheme. For example, the more popular stations (which appellants concede would be carried anyway) will likely opt to be paid for cable carriage under the "retransmission consent" provision of the Cable Act; those stations will nonetheless be counted towards systems' must carry obligations. Congress exempted systems of 12 or fewer channels, and limited the must carry obligation of larger systems to one third of capacity, 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1); see also §§535(b)(2)%(3); allowed cable operators discretion in choosing which competing and qualified signals would be carried, §534(b)(2); and permitted operators to carry public stations on unused public, educational, and governmental channels in some circumstances, §535(d).
Appellants say the must carry provisions are overbroad because they require carriage in some instances when the Government's interests are not implicated: the must carry rules prohibit a cable system operator from dropping a broadcaster "even if the operator has no anticompetitive motives, and even if the broadcaster that would have to be dropped . . . would survive without cable access." 512 U. S., at 683 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also NCTA Brief 25-26. We are not persuaded that either possibility is so prevalent that must carry is substantially overbroad. As discussed supra, at 18, cable systems serving 70 percent of subscribers are vertically integrated with cable programmers, so anticompetitive motives may be implicated in a majority of systems' decisions not to carry broadcasters. Some broadcasters will opt for must carry although they would not suffer serious financial harm in its absence. See Time Warner Brief 35-36, and n. 49. Broadcasters with stronger finances tend, however, to be popular ones that ordinarily seek payment from cable systems for transmission, so their reliance on must carry should be minimal. It appears, for example, that no more than a few hundred of the 500,000 cable channels nationwide are occupied by network affiliates opting for must carry (see Time Warner Brief 35-36, and n. 49), a number insufficient to render must carry "substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest." Ward, 491 U. S., at 800. Even on the doubtful assumption that a narrower but still practicable must carry rule could be drafted to exclude all instances in which the Government's interests are not implicated, our cases establish that content neutral regulations are not "invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech." Albertini, 472 U. S., at 689; accord Ward, supra, at 797; Community for Creative Non Violence, supra, at 299.
Appellants posit a number of alternatives in an effort to demonstrate a less restrictive means to achieve the Government's aims. They ask us, in effect, to "sif[t] through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating [cable television] in order to determine whether the [Government's] solution was `the least intrusive means' of achieving the desired end," an approach we rejected in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S., at 797. This " `less restrictive alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity' " of content neutral regulations on speech. Ibid. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984) (plurality opinion) (ellipses in original)). Our precedents establish that when evaluating a content neutral regulation which incidentally burdens speech, we will not invalidate the preferred remedial scheme because some alternative solution is marginally less intrusive on a speaker's First Amendment interests. "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less speech restrictive alternative." Ward, supra, at 800. See generally ibid. (holding regulation valid although Court of Appeals had identified less restrictive "alternative regulatory methods" of controlling volume at concerts); Albertini, supra, at 689 (upholding validity of order barring a person from a military base, although excluding barred person was not "essential" to preserving security and there were less speech restrictive means of attaining that end); Community for Creative Non Violence, supra, at 299 (overnight camping ban upheld although "there [were] less speech restrictive alternatives" of satisfying interest in preserving park lands); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815-817 (1984) (stating that although making exceptions to ban on posting signs on public property "would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity," they were not "constitutionally mandated"). It is well established a regulation's validity "does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests." Albertini, supra, at 689.
In any event, after careful examination of each of the alternatives suggested by appellants, we cannot conclude that any of them is an adequate alternative to must carry for promoting the Government's legitimate interests. First among appellants' suggested alternatives is a proposal to revive a more limited set of must carry rules, known as the "Century rules" after the 1987 court decision striking them down, see Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F. 2d 292. Those rules included a minimum viewership standard for eligibility and limited the must carry obligation to 25 percent of channel capacity. The parties agree only 14 percent of broadcasters added to cable systems under the Cable Act would be eligible for carriage under the Century rules. See Turner Brief 45; Brief for Federal Appellees 45; NAB Brief 49; see also Declaration of Gregory Klein ¶¶21-25 (App. 1141-1143). The Century rules, for the most part, would require carriage of the same stations a system would carry without statutory compulsion. While we acknowledge appellants' criticism of any rationale that more is better, the scheme in question does not place limitless must carry obligations on cable system operators. In the final analysis this alternative represents nothing more than appellants' " `[dis]agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning' . . . the degree to which [the Government's] interests should be promoted." Ward, supra, at 800 (quoting Albertini, supra, at 689); Community for Creative Non Violence, 468 U. S., at 299. Congress legislated in the shadow of Quincy and Century Communications. Its deliberations reflect awareness of the must carry rules at issue in those cases (Senate Report, at 39-41, 62); indeed, in drafting the must carry provisions of the Cable Act, Congress made specific comparisons to the rules struck down in Quincy Cable TV, Inc v. FCC, 768 F. 2d 1434 (1985). See House Report, at 65-66; Senate Report, at 61. The record reflects a deliberate congressional choice to adopt the present levels of protection, to which this Court must defer.
There is a final argument made by appellants that we do not reach. Appellant Time Warner Entertainment raises in its brief a separate First Amendment challenge to a subsection of the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 534(c), that requires carriage on unfilled must carry channels of low power broadcast stations if the FCC determines that the station's programming "would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast stations because of the geographic distance of such full power stations from the low power station's community of license." §534(h)(2)(B). We earlier reserved this question and invited the District Court to address it on remand. See Turner, 512 U. S., at 643-644, n. 6. Because this question has received "only the most glancing" attention, ibid., from the District Court and the parties, we have no more information about "the operation of, and justifications for, the low power broadcast provisions," ibid., on which to base an informed determination than we did on the earlier appeal. The District Court's primary opinion disposed of the question in a perfunctory discussion, 910 F. Supp., at 750-751; and the dissent explicitly declined to reach the question. Id., at 789. The issue has received even less attention from the parties. It was not addressed in the jurisdictional statement, the motions to affirm, or the appellants' oppositions to the motions to affirm. In over 400 pages of merits briefs, the parties devoted a total of four paragraphs (two of which were relegated to footnotes) to conclusory argumentation on this subject, largely concerning not the merits of the question but whether it was even properly before us. On this state of the record we have insufficient basis to make an informed judgment on this discrete issue. Even if the issue is "fairly included" in the broadly worded question presented, it is tangential to the main issue, and prudence dictates that we not decide this question based on such scant argumentation. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588-589 n. 2 (1972); Teamsters v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 334 U.S. 809 (1948) (per curiam); see also Carducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (Scalia, J.).
Judgments about how competing economic interests are to be reconciled in the complex and fast changing field of television are for Congress to make. Those judgments "cannot be ignored or undervalued simply because [appellants] cas[t] [their] claims under the umbrella of the First Amendment." Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 103. Appellants' challenges to must carry reflect little more than disagreement over the level of protection broadcast stations are to be afforded and how protection is to be attained. We cannot displace Congress' judgment respecting content neutral regulations with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings supported by evidence that is substantial for a legislative determination. Those requirements were met in this case, and in these circumstances the First Amendment requires nothing more. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.