Source: https://quizlet.com/20004871/tort-7-breach-of-statutory-duty-hra-flash-cards/
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 09:04:13
Document Index: 6128599

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'UKHL ', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8', 'Art.8']

Tort 7: BReach of statutory duty , HRA Flashcards | Quizlet
Curran v NICHA [1987]
C bought a property. The previous owner had had it refurbished, but it now appeared that the work had been defective. He sought damages in negligence from the D grant paying authority for having paid out the full amount of the grant without having withheld under the Order a sum to cover the necessary works of repair.
Held: The statutory power to withhold part payment was exercisable in favour of the Ds only, and they had no DOC to a subsequent P of the property.
for BOD standard of care varies
Fault based - requiring reasonable care
Summers v Frost [1955]
Summers v Frost [1955]: strict liab
D was liable for a breach even without fault
if not strict liab , it is fault, what needs to be showed
Proving causal link
Factual causation (but for test)
McWilliams v Sir William Arrol [1962]
Damage of a kind statute was intended to prevent
killed when he climbed high building without a harness
NO harness provided by employer
BUT evidence =>worker hated them, would not have worn
not liab
Curran v NICHA [1987]: damage intended to protected was for taxpayers, NOT occupiers
Gorris v Scott [1874]:
Gorris v Scott [1874
statute protected the spread of disease by requiring animals to be fenced in. Animals drowned because of lack of fence. NOT liab, not type of damage statue intended to prevent, here it was for disease.
however not always clear what the damage was
Human Rights Act 1998 key sections
S6: Unlawful for public authority to act in a way incompatible with convention right
S7: Claimant may bring proceedings in UK court
S8: Court may award damages
Violation of HRA may be established tort
Existing tort may adapt in response to HRA
Damages may be awarded for breach of convention rights
Bernard v Enfield LBC [2002]
R(Greenfield) v Sec of State for Home Dept [2005]
Jain v Trent SHA [2009]
Mrs Bernard and her family lived in a property in the London Borough of Enfield. Mrs Bernard was severely disabled, had limited mobility which required her to use a wheelchair. Assessments of Mrs Bernard's needs, carried out by Enfield's social services department, revealed that the property was unsuitable as Mrs Bernard could not use her wheelchair or access the first floor where the bathroom and bedrooms were situated. This was a particular problem as she was incontinent and since there was no wheelchair access to the bathroom she was constantly soiling herself. She had no privacy and could not participate in the rearing of her children.
The Council accepted that it was in breach of its duties under the National Assistance Act 1948, but no action was taken to meet the family's needs following the initial assessment. Mrs Bernard argued that leaving her in unsuitable accommodation for more than 20 months amounted to a breach of her Article 8 rights (right to respect for family and private life).
This is an important case which demonstrates the court's willingness to enforce the duty of public authorities to act in compliance with the articles under the Human Rights Act. The court decided that the Council's failure to act on the assessments amounted to a lack of respect for the claimants' private and family life. It condemned the claimants to living conditions which made it virtually impossible for them to have any meaningful private or family life as protected by Article 8.
Importantly, Article 8 placed an obligation on the Council to take positive steps, including the provision of suitably adapted accommodation, to enable Mrs Bernard and her family to enjoy their family life. The court said that suitably adapted accommodation was important not only because it would facilitate family life (for example enabling Mrs Bernard to move around her home more freely and help to look after her children) but also because such accommodation would secure her 'physical and psychological integrity', which is protected by Article 8
do not like approach of Wolf in
cf Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC [2004]
The appellant had been serving a sentence in a private prison when he was found guilty of a drugs offence by the deputy controller of the prison.
appellant contended that he was entitled to damages because the refusal of legal representation meant he had lost the opportunity to achieve a different result on the charge against him. He also sought damages for anxiety and frustration on the basis that he did not think the charge against him would be fairly tried because the prison authorities were biased against prisoners. He also submitted that when exercising their power to award damages under section.8 of the Human Rights Act, the courts should apply the domestic scales of damages and awards should be comparable to tortious awards.
In determining the level of damages to award under Section 8 of the Human Rights Act, a domestic court had to take into account the principles applied by the Strasbourg Court in awarding compensation under Article 41 of the Convention,
reason why the Strasbourg Court is so reluctant to award damages for breach of Article 6 is that the quantification of the award founders on the speculative nature of the outcome had the procedure been Convention compliant; a classic "loss of chance" problem. As Lord Bingham pointed out, these Article 6 cases have a major feature which distinguishes them from violations of other articles such as 3 or 8, particularly involving actual physical abuse of an individual, or the removal of a child from its family, that is,
"it does not follow from a finding that the trial process has involved a breach of an article 6 right that the outcome of the trial process was wrong or would have been otherwise had the breach not occurred."
Jain v Trent SHA [2009] cases occurred before coming into effect of HRA
House of Lords have determined that where a public authority uses its statutory powers for the benefit of a particular class of persons (in this case, the residents of a nursing home), the public authority does not owe a duty of care to others whose interests may be adversely affected (such as Mr and Mrs Jain). Without a duty of care, negligence cannot be established.
The Lords reasoned that, otherwise, the public authority might be inhibited in using its powers, which would increase the risk to the very class of persons that the powers are intended protect.
HL also notes that this is a pre HRA case and there must be a clear separation between actions in Tort for N and under HRA
but indicated there could be a claim under rright to fair trial 6, and protection of property art 1
Law Commission: Law Com No. 266 [2000]
principle for awarding of damages under HRA
primary principle governing the award of compensation by that Court is that the victim should, as far as possible, be placed in the same position as if the violation of his or her rights had not occurred.
differences between Strasbourg court and UK for punitive damages
Strasbourg Court does not award punitive damages. In contrast, the Strasbourg Court has awarded compensation in relation to some forms of non-pecuniary, or intangible, loss - such as for loss of relationship between parent and child - which have not yet been recognised by courts in this country. Following the practice of the Strasbourg Court may require further development of the law by courts in this country.
HRA s8 key points on damages
(1) s 8(2) of the Act states that damages may only be awarded by a court which has power to award damages or to order the payment of compensation in civil proceedings.
(2) s 8(3) states that damages cannot be awarded unless it is 'necessary to afford just satisfaction' to the applicant. Accordingly,if another remedy or exercise of the court's power can achieve this effect then damages should not be awarded.
(3) s 8(3) requires the court, in determining whether an award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is to be made, to take into account "any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court)..." and "the consequences of any decision ... in respect of that act".
(4) s 8(5) of the HRA enables a public authority which has been held liable in damages under the Act to claim contribution from any other person who would be liable in respect of the same damage. This might happen were another public authority also to have been involved in the violation or were another person to be liable to the applicant in T.
questions for Breach of stat duty
should the breach of the duty imposed by the statute be a T as well as a crime? This is a long-standing question. A similar question can be raised in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998. Should a person suffering a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights have a claim for damages?
Chapman v Honig [1963]
no rule that : if you do something illegal and thereby injure another person, you would be liable for the damage done.
D landlord gave notice to the tenant to quit. This was lawful within the terms of the lease, but amounted to a contempt of court because it was done to punish the tenant for evidence he had given against the landlord in legal proceedings.
The court held that, although the landlord could be punished for his conduct, there was no civil liability to the tenant. There is therefore no principle of civil liability for criminal conduct even when damage is foreseeable and even when damage is intended as a consequence of the criminal conduct. It follows that there is no reason of principle why breach of a statute should necessarily give rise to civil liability.
Possible approaches where a statute is involved When Parliament passes a statute requiring or forbidding certain conduct, it can deal with the question of possible civil liability in a number of ways:
i. it can expressly say that there will be civil liability
ii. it can provide its own machinery for civil liability separate from an action in tort
(this is common in relation to anti-discrimination legislation)
iii. it can expressly say that there will be no civil liability
iv. it can say nothing at all (this needs to be anlyzed
iv. it can say nothing at all: strategies to approach if there is civil liability
They can decide that there should be civil liability for the breach.
They can decide that the claim should be framed in negligence and the breach of the statutory requirement can be regarded as evidence of negligence.. In Froom v Butcher [1976] 2 QB 286 (see Chapter 13) the fact that Parliament has made the wearing of seat belts mandatory makes it easier to hold that a person who fails to do so is not taking reasonable care for his safety and is therefore contributorily i.e. the statutory duty helps to set the standard of reasonableness.
C does not automatically have a claim for injuries resulting from a breach of the statutory duty, but may do so, depending, for example, on the seriousness of the breach and the state of mind of the D at the time of the breach. It is likely that this approach will be adopted in respect of some breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights
When does civil liability arise?
most useful general guidance is this: it seems to be the modern tendency to decide that no civil action should be available.
There is however one important exception. Since the end of the nineteenth century the courts have invariably allowed an action in respect of statutes imposing safety standards in factories and other workplaces Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898]
doctrine of common employment severely restricted the right of employees to secure compensation for industrial injuries. One of the ways in which the courts got round this was by allowing a direct action against the employer for breach of any statutory regulations.
Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898]
existence of an action in negligence for breach of an employer's non-delegable duty did not preclude the employee's action for breach of statutory duty established by
Legislation protecting safety in the workplace gives rise to an action for breach of statutory duty.
Vaughan Williams LJ said: "it cannot be doubted that, where a statute provides for the performance by certain persons of a particular duty, and some one belonging to a class of persons for whose benefit and protection the statute imposes the duty is injured by failure to perform it, prima facie, and, if there be nothing to the contrary, an action by the person so injured will lie against the person who has so failed to perform the duty." and "In such a case as this one must, as Lord Cairns said in Atkinson v. Newcastle Water Works Co. (1877) 2 Ex.D. 441, look at the general scope of the Act and the nature of the statutory duty; and in addition one must look at the nature of the injuries likely to arise from a breach of that duty, the amount of the penalty imposed for a breach of it, and the kind of person upon whom it is imposed, before one can come to a proper conclusion as to whether the legislature intended the statutory remedy to be the only remedy for breach of the statutory duty."
tests for when civil liability is applicable
The courts will not allow a civil action unless the statute is for the protection of a particular class. If the purpose of the statute is to protect the general public or to achieve some administrative objective, then there will be no civil action. This test is quite clear, but can be difficult to apply in practice (see in particular the O'Rourke
There may be civil liability where the statutory duty is quite precise (e.g. to provide safety helmets of particular specifications) but not where it is very general and open-ended (e.g. to provide an education suitable for the needs of C).
A private right of action for damages will not be appropriate where a public law action (e.g. to force a public authority to carry out its duty) would be more effective
cases which refused civil liability
Lonrho Ltd. v Shell Petroleum Co. [1982] AC
Hague v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1992]
X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995]
O'Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998]
Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003]
Lonrho Ltd. v Shell Petroleum Co. [1982]
Cs sought compensation for damage to their business by the Ds, who had allegedly broken the oil embargo imposed on the regime in Southern Rhodesia that had illegally declared independence. It was held that the purpose of the embargo was to bring down the regime and not to protect the interests of individual companies.
Cs had been wrongly segregated from other prisoners contrary to the requirements of the Prison Rules. It was held that these rules were concerned with securing proper prison administration and did not create individual rights. Some judges thought obiter that there might be liability for breaches of those parts of the rules that set safety standards in prison workshops.
claims based on the N way in which the statutory functions had been carried out. In addition the HL rejected the argument that the breaches of the various welfare and education statutory provisions could be the basis of an action in breach of statutory duty.
O'Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] VIMP
particulars of claim allege that after an initial refusal, Camden agreed to make inquiries pursuant to section 62 and on 12 April 1991 provided temporary accommodation pursuant to section 63(1) at the Northumberland Hotel. Mr. O'Rourke says that Camden thereby acknowledged that it owed him a duty under section 63(1) to secure that accommodation was made available. But he alleges that, in breach of that duty, on 24 April Camden wrongfully evicted him from the hotel and did not offer him any other accommodation. He claims damages.
HL, overruling earlier authorities, held that a breach of the statutory duty on a local council to provide housing for homeless people did not give rise to civil liability. The principal reason was that the main purpose of the legislation was to promote the public interest in not having homeless people on the streets rather than to protect the homeless as a class of people. This is very sweeping and could apply to almost any such statutory provisions. For example, any legislation designed to prevent personal injuries could be described as having the public purpose of reducing the costs to the Health Service.
breach of the statutory duty to give reasons for authorising the delay of an accused person's access to a solicitor did not give that person a private right of action.
Kirvek v Attorney Gen. of Trinidad and Tobago [2002] demonstrates where civil liability was found, VIMP
Cs had been involved in a civil law claim: they had been required as a condition of continuing the action to pay a very large sum of money into court as a kind of security. The authorities did not deposit the payment in an interest-bearing account, but deposited it with the Treasury in a way that did not attract interest. The Cs were entitled to a civil action for damages representing the lost interest. It is unusual to allow an action for breach of statutory duty where the loss is economic, but it is difficult to see what other remedy would have dealt in a satisfactory way with the injustice to the Cs.
scope of the action. important elements to be noted are these:
broken statute:Chipchase v British Titan Products Co Ltd [1956], mental states, strict liab etc.
The C must belong to the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect O'Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998]
damage must be of a kind that the statute was intended to prevent. This is akin to the concept of remoteness of damage in negligence and is illustrated by Gorris v Scott (1874) held that the purpose of regulations requiring machinery to be fenced is to keep the workman out of the machine and not to † These cases illustrate the reasons for denying a private law action. Remember that it is more important to understand the reasoning in these cases so that they can be applied in other contexts than to know about the particular statutory duties involved keep the contents of the machine in, so that a worker injured by an object flying out of the machine has no claim (Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962] AC
damage must have been caused by the breach of duty. This concept has been explained in s 4.1 and indeed some of the cases used to illustrate the notion of causation were claims for breach of statutory duty. See McWilliams v Sir William Arroll & Co Ltd [1962]
Gorris v Scott (1874)
Is the damage within the ambit of the statute? Type of envisaged injury was injury by desease, not being swept overboard, therefore C's claim failed.
McWilliams v Sir William Arroll & Co Ltd [1962]
breach of statutory duty. No liability if employee refuses to wear safety devices.
What reasons did Lord Hoffmann give in O'Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188 for saying that no civil action lay for breach of the statutory duty on the local council to provide accommodation for homeless people?
1. whether it gives rise to a cause of action sounding in damages depends upon whether the Act shows a legislative intention to create such a remedy.
2. indicator upon which Mr. Drabble Q.C., who appeared for Mr. O'Rourke, placed most reliance was the common sense proposition that a statute which appears intended for the protection of a limited class of people but provides no other remedy for breach should ordinarily be construed as intended to create a private right of action. Otherwise, as Lord Simonds said in Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd.. the statute would be but a pious aspiration
contra-indications which make it unlikely that Parliament intended to create private law rights of action.
1. expenditure interacts with expenditure on other public services such as education, the National Health Service and even the police. It is not simply a private matter between the C and the housing authority. Accordingly, the fact that Parliament has provided for the expenditure of public money on benefits in kind such as housing the homeless does not necessarily mean that it intended cash payments to be made by way of damages to persons who, in breach of the housing authority's statutory duty, have unfortunately not received the benefits which they should have done.
2. If a duty does arise, the authority has a wide discretion in deciding how to provide accommodation and what kind of accommodation it will provide. The existence of all these discretions makes it unlikely that Parliament intended errors of judgment to give rise to an obligation to make financial reparation. Control by public law remedies would appear much more appropriate (judicial review)
3. intent of the statue
Regulations require workers in a particular factory to wear a helmet if they are working at a height above 3 metres. Ivan falls from a platform 2.9 metres off the ground. He is not wearing a helmet and fractures his skull when he falls. Has he claim for breach of the regulations?
No, because the statute has not been broken.
Regulations require sheep on board a ship to be kept in separate small pens on the deck. Hugh's sheep and those of other owners are transported by ship. There are no pens on the deck. During heavy seas the sheep all slither to one side of the deck, the ship capsizes and Hugh's sheep are drowned. Has he a claim for breach of statutory duty?
Statutory regulations require certain machinery to be fenced. John is working at an unfenced machine. Slivers of metal are extruded from the machine, coil themselves round John's hand and pull it into the machine, injuring him. Has he a claim for breach of statutory duty?
Millard v Serck Tubes [1969]
Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962]
cf Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962] where injury was unrelated.
The plaintiff operated a power drill during the course of his employment. The drill was fenced, but the guard was not complete in that there was a gap in it through which the operator's hand could be drawn. While the plaintiff's hand was resting on the guard a piece of swarf thrown out from the drill wound itself around the plaintiff's hand and drew it into the drill causing injury to the plaintiff.
Where a D has failed to fence dangerous machinery , he cannot escape liability for consequential injury on the grounds that such injury occurred in a way that was not reasonably foreseeable.
summary conditions for civil liability
has been a breach, then the C is entitled to damages for any consequential injuries provided that he was a member of the protected class, that the damage was caused by the breach and that the damage was of a kind that the statute was intended to prevent.
s 6 makes it 'unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right'. That raises a question as to the remedies for those whose rights have been infringed. s 7 enables a person 'to bring proceedings against the (public] authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal'. s 8 envisages that damages may be awarded, but provide (s.8(3)) that 'no award of damages is to be made unless...the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made
Where claims for damages are to be awarded where a Convention right has been infringed, these awards may be fitted into the structure of the law of T in the following ways:
a. A breach of a Convention right may fit into an established T. For example, if a public authority such as the police were to torture a citizen contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, a claim would lie without reference to the Convention in the T of battery
b. An existing T may, if necessary, be adapted to accommodate the requirements of the Convention.
c. courts may award damages for a breach of the Convention. This has analogies with the T of breach of statutory duty. difference: 'Whereas damages are recoverable as of right in the case of damage caused by a T, the same is not true in the case of a claim brought under HRA for breach of the convention' (Lord Woolf CJ in Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004]
likely to arise where there has been some administrative failure depriving a claim of welfare benefits, alleged to be a breach of Article 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment) and/or Article 8 (private and family life).
Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough
Council [2004]: damages VIMP
damages were not recoverable as of right where Convention rights had been breached and courts were to look critically at such claims. The concern in such cases was usually to bring the infringement to an end and compensation was of secondary importance. An equitable approach to the award of damages was therefore required and the need for damages should be ascertainable from an examination of the correspondence and witness statements.
R (Bernard) v Enfield London Borough Council [2002]
awarded damages where the council had denied welfare benefits over a substantial period to a seriously disabled woman leaving her in squalid conditions without access to a lavatory.
Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004]: considerations
when the maladministration amounts to an infringement of a Convention right
ii. when such an infringement merits an award of damages
iii. how damages should be assessed (both common law damages and awards by
various ombudsmen were suggested as parallels).
R (on the application of Greenfield) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL suggested that the observations of Lord Woolf in Anufrijeva should be reconsidered
not keen on analogies with T statutes and held that the approach of the European Court of Human Rights should be followed. No damages were awarded in that case for the violation of a prisoner's rights: just satisfaction was attained by a concession by the Secretary of State that he had not had a trial before an independent tribunal as required by the Convention
Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council [2004]
Secretary of State appealed against a decision in favour of another asylum seeker, N, which held that N's rights under Art.8 had been infringed The asylum seekers all complained that their respective local authorities, L, had, as a result of maladministration, failed to comply with their statutory public law duty to provide benefits or advantages to which they were entitled, the consequences of which constituted a breach of their rights under Art.8. They contended that L had failed to take positive action to ensure that their rights under Art.8 were respected and the court was required to examine
(1) when a duty to take positive action under Art.8 arose;
(2) the circumstances in which maladministration constituted a breach of Art.8, and
(3) whether damages should be awarded and if so, how they should be assessed.
1) Art.8 was capable of imposing on the state a positive obligation to provide support. However, such an obligation was only likely to arise where family life was seriously inhibited or the welfare of C was threatened, R. (on the application of Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2002]
maladministration did not infringe Art.8 simply because it caused stress which led to a particularly susceptible individual, such as N, to suffer psychiatric harm in circumstances where this was not reasonably to be anticipated. In relation to B's claim based on the delay in granting his Angolan family permission to be reunited with him in the UK, there was no breach of Art.8. Culpable delay in the administrative process was not an infringement of Art.8 unless substantial prejudice resulted. It was necessary to have regard to both the extent of the culpability of the failure to act and the severity of the consequences. The more glaring the deficiency in the behaviour of the public authority, the easier it would be to establish the necessary want of respect for Art.8 rights
failure, in breach of duty, to provide the C with some benefit or advantage to which the C was entitled under public law. Such failure may have come to an end before the trial. If not, it is likely to be brought to an end as a consequence of a finding of breach of duty made at the trial, so that what is likely to be in issue is the consequences of delay
1. In so far as article 8 imposes positive obligations, these are not absolute.
2. must be some ground for criticising the failure to act.
3. knowledge that the claimant's private and family life were at risk:
4. need to have regard to resources when considering the obligations imposed on a state by article 8. The demands on resources would be significantly increased if states were to be faced with claims for breaches of article 8 simply on the ground of administrative delays. Maladministration of the type that we are considering will only infringe article 8 where the consequence is serious.
5. e more glaring the deficiency in the behaviour of the public authority, the easier it will be to establish the necessary want of respect. Isolated acts of even significant carelessness are unlikely to suffice.
possible and appropriate to apply the rules by which damages in T are usually assessed to claims under the HRA" . and that it may be " . appropriate to treat those rules as the prima facie measure to be applied" . unless they are in conflict with the Strasbourg approach. However, the report also contains timely warnings as to the dangers of drawing the analogy too strictly. As is stated earlier in the report, " . the exercise is difficult and the comparisons must be treated with care" .
basic distinction between a claim under the HRA for compensation in respect of the consequences of maladministration and a claim by a member of the public against a public officer for damages for breach of a duty owed in T. In the former case the C is seeking a remedy that would not be available in this jurisdiction for misfeasance prior to the HRA.
whereas damages are recoverable as of right in the case of damage caused by a T, the same is not true in the case of a claim brought under the HRA for breach of the Convention. The language of the HRA and the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights make this clear.
HRA section 8 and damages
(3) No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including—(a) any other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question (by that or any other court), and (b) the consequences of any decision (of that or any other court) in respect of that act, the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made. *1153 " . (4) In determining—(a) whether to award damages, or (b) the amount of an award, the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under article 41 of the Convention. " . (5) A public authority against which damages are awarded is to be treated ... (b) for the purposes of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 as liable in respect of damage suffered by the person to whom the award is made. " . (6) In this s—'court' includes a tribunal; 'damages' means damages for an unlawful act of a public authority; and 'unlawful' means unlawful under s 6(1).
HRA damages motivation
Where an infringement of an individual's human rights has occurred, the concern will usually be to bring the infringement to an end and any question of compensation will be of secondary, if any, importance. This is reflected in the fact that, when it is necessary to resort to the courts to uphold and protect human rights, the remedies that are most frequently sought are the orders which are the descendants of the historic prerogative orders or declaratory judgments.
HRA damages conditions
(a) The award of damages under the HRA is confined to the class of unlawful acts of public authorities identified by s 6(1) : see s 8(1) and (6). (b) The court has a discretion as to whether to make an award (it must be " . just and appropriate" . to do so) by contrast to the position in relation to CL claims where there is a right to damages: see s 8(1). (c) The award must be necessary to achieve " . just satisfaction" . ; language that is distinct from the approach at CL where a C is invariably entitled, so far as money can achieve this, to be restored to the position he would have been in if he had not suffered the injury of which complaint is made. The concept of damages being " . necessary to afford just satisfaction" . provides a link with the approach to compensation of the Court of Human Rights under article 41 . (d) The court is required to take into account in determining whether damages are payable and the amount of damages payable the different principles applied by the Court of Human Rights in awarding compensation. (e) Exemplary damages are not awarded.
a balance to be drawn between the interests of the victim and those of the public as a whole
basic principles the Court of Human Rights applies. The fundamental principle underlying the award of compensation
be placed in the same position as if his Convention rights had not been infringed. Where the breach of a Convention right has clearly caused significant pecuniary loss, this will usually be assessed and awarded. The awards of compensation to homosexuals, discharged from the armed forces, in breach of article 8, for loss of earnings and pension rights in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) are good examples of this approach.
BUT breach of a Convention right which are not capable of being computed in terms of financial loss?
breach of a Convention right which are not capable of being computed in terms of financial loss?
Infringements can involve a variety of treatment of an individual which is objectionable in itself. The treatment may give rise to distress, anxiety, and, in extreme cases, psychiatric trauma. The primary object of the proceedings will often be to bring the adverse treatment to an end. If this is achieved is this enough to constitute " . just satisfaction" . or is it necessary to award damages to compensate for the adverse treatment that has occurred? More particularly, should damages be awarded for anxiety and distress that has been occasioned by the breach? It is in relation to these questions that Strasbourg fails to give a consistent or coherent answer.
R (KB) v South London and South and West Region Mental Health Review Tribunal [2004]
article 5(5) did not make an award of damages mandatory in such cases. It was complied with provided that it was possible to make an application for compensation; it did not preclude the contracting states from making the award of compensation conditional upon proof that procedural delay had resulted in damage.
damages are not recoverable in the absence of a deprivation of liberty, and that damages are recoverable for distress which may be inferred from the facts of the case. It follows that this court must itself determine the principles it is to apply
even in the case of mentally ill Cs, not every feeling of frustration and distress will justify an award of damages. The frustration and distress must be significant: 'of such intensity that it would in itself justify an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
damages principle for article 8 cases like Anufrijeva
critical message is that the remedy has to be " . just and appropriate" . and " . necessary" . to afford " . just satisfaction" . .
courts dealing with claims for damages for maladministration should adopt a broad-brush approach. Where there is no pecuniary loss involved, the *1158 question whether the other remedies that have been granted to a successful complainant are sufficient to vindicate the right that has been infringed, taking into account the complainant's own responsibility for what has occurred, should be decided without a close examination of the authorities or an extensive and prolonged examination of the facts. In many cases the seriousness of the maladministration and whether there is a need for damages should be capable of being ascertained by an examination of the correspondence and the witness statements.
scale and manner of violation can therefore be taken into account.
example cited is Aksoy v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 553 , where the applicant had been detained, tortured and finally released without charge and damages were awarded for pecuniary loss and for non-pecuniary loss (distress to the father of the applicant who continued the case after his son had died).
Anufrijeva
question arises in relation to injury which is not quantifiable in financial terms.
Clayton & Tomlinson
If the court decides to award compensation, then it is guided by the particular circumstances in every case, having regard to what it describes as equitable considerations. The court has given little guidance about how the discretion should be exercised, the relevant factors appear to be the applicant's conduct and the extent of the breach.
should damages be moderate (an approach which has since been endorsed by decisions in this jurisdiction)
award compensation under the HRA is not to be compared to the approach adopted where damages are claimed for breach of an obligation under civil law. Where, however, in a claim under the HRA, the court decides that it is appropriate to award damages, the levels of damages awarded in respect of torts as reflected in the guidelines issued by the Judicial Studies Board, the levels of awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board and by the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Local Government Ombudsman may all provide some rough guidance
three comparators: (1) damages for discomfort, inconvenience and injury to health arising out of breaches of repairing covenants in residential tenancies; (2) awards of the Local Government Ombudsman on behalf of disabled persons deprived of benefits or assistance as a result of administration; (3) Judicial Studies Board guidelines for damages for *1161 personal injuries where there has been full recovery and where the damages are principally for pain and suffering.
where the breach arises from maladministration, in those cases where an award of damages is appropriate, the scale of such damages should be modest. The cost of supporting those in need falls on society as a whole. Resources are limited and payments of substantial damages will deplete the resources available for other needs of the public including primary care. If the impression is created that asylum seekers whether genuine or not are profiting from their status, this could bring the HRA into disrepute.
POLICY for cost , considerations
1. future cases should look critically at damage claims under HRA
2. attempt to obtain summary judgement to reduce costs in lower courts.
psu Comm 403 exam 1
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Tort 9 Intentional injuries to the person
Tort 8 Particular statutory regimes: strict liability
Tort 10 Interference with economic interests