Source: https://m.openjurist.org/331/us/40/trailmobile-co-v-whirls
Timestamp: 2019-11-17 02:46:02
Document Index: 453982923

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 401', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 159', '§ 7', '§ 157', '§ 157', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 158', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

331 U.S. 40 - Trailmobile Co v. Whirls
'Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of active military service, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was ordered into such service, and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.'
The Government argues on respondent's behalf that the correct meaning of § 8, and particularly of subsection (c), is that upon reemployment the veteran is entitled to retain indefinitely his prewar plus service-accumulated seniority.20 Under the statute, it says, this seniority cannot be taken away by a collective bargaining agreement or by the employer,21 either during the year in which the statute insures the veteran against discharge without cause or thereafter while the employment continues.22 Support for this view is thought to be derived from the syntax of the statutory language and from the legislative history.
It is argued that grammatically the 'within one year' provision applies only to the last clause of subsection (c), relating to discharge without cause, and does not refer to the 'other rights'23 given by subsections (b) and (c), including restored statutory seniority. Because the 'within one year' provision appears most proximately in connection with the prohibition against discharge, the Government seeks to give that prohibition, including its temporal term, effect as a command wholly distinct from and unrelated to anything preceding. It treats the clause as a grammatically independent sentence and a substantively unrelated provision, although it is separated from the earlier ones only by a comma followed by the conjunction 'and.'
On this premise of complete severability the Government builds its entire case. The premise necessarily regards § 8(c) as making no express provision for the duration of 'other rights,' but as leaving this to be found wholly by implication. The Government then goes on to conclude that the period to be implied is indefinite. Although the statutory security against discharge ends with the prescribed year, the protection given by § 8(c) to 'other rights' is said therefore not only to be effective for that year, cf. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, supra, but to continue in full force for as long as the job may last beyond that time. In this view, of course, the result would be to 'freeze' the incidents of the employment indefinitely while 'freezing' the right to the job itself for only one year.
Difficulties arise in connection with this construction, both in its premise and in its conclusions. One is that the conclusion of indefinite duration would not follow necessarily, if the premise of complete severability were acceptable. On that basis 'indefinite duration' as the Government conceives it would not be the only tenable period or even the most probably contemplated one. Several alternatives would be presented. However, the statutory year would not be among them, since it is implicit in the premise of severability that the Act does not apply the concluding clause of § 8(c) to 'other rights' to secure their extension either during or after that time. On the other hand, the Government's view ignores the usual rule of construction where time is not expressly prescribed, but is evidently to be implied. For generally in such cases duration for a reasonable period is the term accepted by the law rather than permanency or indefinite extension.24 And this, in varying circumstances, might be found to be longer or shorter than the statutory year prescribed for the job itself.
The real trouble however is in the basic premise both grammatically and substantively. It assumes not only the complete independence of the last clause of § 8 from what precedes, but also that employment within the meaning of the Act is something wholly distinct and separate from its incidents, including seniority, rates of pay, etc. We think, however, that the idea of total severability is altogether untenable. To accept it would do violence both to the grammatical and to the substantive structure of the statute.
To tear the concluding clause from its context is therefore impossible. It is conjunctive with all that precedes. Nor is it any the more permissible to disconnect its constituent temporal term. There can be no doubt whatever that Congress intended by § 8(c) to secure the 'other rights' guaranteed by it for at least the minimum term of the prescribed one-year period. This indeed was a specific ruling of the Fishgold case.
The employee there had not been discharged in the sense of being thrown out of his job altogether. He simply had been deprived of the opportunity to work by the operation of the seniority system when there was not sufficient work for both himself and other employees with greater seniority after he had been accorded his full standing under the Act. That standing included not only his seniority status as of the time he entered the armed forces, but also all that would have accumulated had he remained at work until the date of his reemployment without going into the service. In the language of § 8(c) he is to be 'considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of active military service.' The Court held, indeed, that the Act did not give him standing to outrank nonveteran employees who had more than the amount of seniority to which he was entitled to be and had been restored; in other words, that he was not given so-called 'superseniority.' But it also squarely held that he was given security not only against complete discharge, but also against demotion, for the statutory year. And demotion was held to mean impairment of 'other rights,' including his restored statutory seniority for that year. 'If within the statutory period, he is demoted, his status, which the Act was designed to protect, has been affected and the old employment relationship has been changed. He would then lose his old position and acquire an inferior one. He would within the meaning of § 8(c) be 'discharged from such position." 328 U.S. at page 286, 66 S.Ct. at page 1112.
That § 8(c) applies to secure the protection of 'other rights' for at least the statutory year was therefore inherent in the rationalization of the Fishgold decision. To that extent at any rate the concluding clause was held applicable, not severable, concerning them. This of course destroys the Government's basic premise of the complete severability of that clause and its resulting non-applicability to 'other rights.' While the reemployed veteran did not acquire 'superseniority,' § 8(c) gave him the restored standing for the minimum duration of the prescribed year.
To accept this conclusion, as we have said, would mean 'freezing' the incidents of the employment indefinitely while 'freezing' the right to employment itself for only one year. As long as the employee might remain in his job, his pay could not be reduced, his seniority could not be decreased, insurance and other benefits could not be adversely affected. And this would be true, although for valid reasons all of those rights could be changed to the disadvantage of nonveteran employees having equal or greater seniority and other rights than those of the veteran with restored statutory standing. The reemployed veteran thus not only would be restored to his job simply, as the Fishgold case required, 'so that he does not lose ground by reason of his absence.' 328 U.S. at page 285, 66 S.Ct. at page 1111. He would gain advantages beyond the statutory year over such nonveteran employees.
We do not think Congress had in mind such far-reaching consequence for the nation-wide system of employment, both public and private, when making the statutory provisions for the veteran's benefit. At the time it acted, we had not declared war and the men who were called to service were being inducted for a year's training, with the idea if not the assurance that they would return to civilian life and occupations at the end of that year, without prejudice because of their service. Visionary as this notion proved to be, it hardly can be taken to support the view that Congress contemplated 'freezing' the specified incidents of restored employment indefinitely.
The Fishgold case, it is true, concerned only events taking place within the statutory year. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in distinguishing this case, 154 F.2d at page 871, the issues there involved no question of the reemployed veteran's standing after the statutory year. But, as we have said, the decision did hold that § 8(c) applies to 'other rights' for the year. And the rationalization was wholly inconsistent with the idea that those restored rights continued indefinitely after the year, unaffected by its termination. The restored veteran, it was held, could not be disadvantaged by his service to the nation. He 'was not to be penalized on his return by reason of his absence from his civilian job.' 328 U.S. at page 284, 66 S.Ct. at page 1111. He was to be restored and kept, for the year at least, in the same situation as if he had not gone to war but had remained continuously employed or had been 'on furlough or leave of absence.' It is clear, of course, that this statutory addition to the veteran's seniority status is not automatically deducted from it at the end of his first year of reemployment. But the Fishgold decision also ruled expressly that he was not to gain advantage beyond such restoration, by virtue of the Act's provisions, so as to acquire 'an increase in seniority over what he would have had if he had never entered the armed services. * * * No step-up or gain in priority can be fairly implied.' 328 U.S. at pages 285, 286, 66 S.Ct. at page 1111.
For the statutory year indeed this meant that the restored rights could not be altered adversely by the usual processes of collective bargaining or of the employer's administration of general business policy.25 But if this extraordinary statutory security were to be extended beyond the statutory year, the restored veteran would acquire not simply equality with nonveteran employees having identical status as of the time he returned to work. He would acquire indefinite statutory priority over nonveteran employees, a preferred status which we think not only inharmonious with the basic Fishgold rationalization, but beyond the protection contemplated by Congress.
We are unable therefore to accept the Government's position. Aside from the events taking place after the Court of Appeals' decision, which as we have said are not properly here for consideration except upon the question of mootness. Whirls was treated exactly as were other employees in his group having the same seniority and status as he had on the date of his reemployment. There was no discrimination against him as a veteran or otherwise than as a member of that group. Both groups, the former Trailmobile employees and the former Highland employees, who composed his group, contained veterans and nonveterans in large numbers. Both contained veterans in active service and reemployed veterans when the collective agreement was made. Whirls was treated exactly as all other members of his group, the ex-Highland employees, veterans and nonveterans alike. Whether or not the collective agreement was valid, or infringed rights of Whirls and other members of that group apart from rights given by § 8(c), is not before us, for reasons we have stated. The only question here and the only one we decide is that § 8(c), although giving the reemployed veteran a special statutory standing in relation to 'other rights,' as defined in the Fishgold case, during the statutory year, and creating to that extent a preference for him over nonveterans, did not extend that preference for a longer time.
We find it unnecessary therefore to pass upon petitioners' position in this case, namely, that all protection afforded by virtue of § 8(c) terminates with the ending of the specified year. We hold only that so much of it ends then as would give the reemployed veteran a preferred standing over employees not veterans having identical seniority rights as of the time of his restoration. We expressly reserve decision upon whether the statutory security extends beyond the one-year period to secure the reemployed veteran against impairment in any respect of equality with such a fellow worker.
These reasons, founded in the literal construction of the statute and the policy clearly evident on its face, are sufficient for disposition of the case. They are not weakened by the Government's strained and unconvincing citation of the Act's legislative history.
That argument is grounded in conclusions drawn from changes made without explanation in committee with respect to various provisions finally taking form in § 8, changes affecting bills which eventually became the Selective Training and Service Act and the National Guard Act, 54 Stat. 858, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 401 et seq. Apart from the inconclusive character of the history, the Government's contention assumes that the only alternatives presented by the final form of the bill were indefinite duration for the incidents of the employment named and none at all. This ignores the other possibilities considered in this opinion, including duration for a reasonable time. Moreover, as has been noted, the most important committee changes relied upon were made without explanation.26 The interpretation of statutes cannot safely be made to rest upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers.27
Accordingly the jud ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This however will be without prejudice from the decision here to respondent's assertion in the future of any rights he may have against Trailmobile or the collective agent on account of their acts not presented on this record or involved in the issues determined by this decision. It is so ordered.
Of the millions of wage earners whom the War took from their jobs into the armed services, some came from organized industries, others from unorganized industries; some had priority rights incident to their jobs, others had no such rights. For all, Congress provided the security of being able to get back their old jobs for at least a year after their return to civil life. But since industrial priority rights usually prevailing in organized industry have important bearing both on permanence of employment and wages, Congress guaranteed the veteran not merely 'against loss of position' but also against 'loss of seniority by reason of his absence.' 'He acquires not only the same seniority he had; his service in the armed services is counted as service in the plant so that he does not lose ground by reason of his absence.' Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111. In brief, in employments that were governed by priority rights, absence in the armed services was treated as presence in the plant. The veteran acquired a rating which he would have had, had he not been away.
Congress thus dealt with two very different aspects of employment. It gave all wage earners the assurance of having their old jobs for a year. It further made imperative that wage earners who, by virtue of employment contracts, normally union contracts, had preferred positions should have the same preferred positions as those enjoyed by their fellows who had their status but remained behind. Congress limited the right to have a job to a year. But Congress, having assured a veteran the priority status he would have had had he remained at work, did not take away that status at the end of twelve months. Accordingly, because of the Congressionally assured status, whereby a veteran had a priority right that he would have had, had he never left, he has whatever rights that status gave an employee under the general law of contract and more particularly, as in this case, under the National Labor Relations Act.
In assuring not merely the retention of seniority status but its progression during the years in the service, Congress aimed to insure that the years which the veteran gave to his country should not retard his economic advancement. It is not likely that in furthering this policy Congress would say that an employee, because he is a veteran, should suffer the consequences of having been to war after a year's return. The equality of treatment which Congress designed as between employees who went and employees who stayed could not be achieved by delaying for one year the disadvantages of having been away and then letting them affect the veteran.
What happened to Whirls is this: The employer to whose service he returned was merged or consolidated with a bigger concern of the same kind—a corporation which had owned the company for which Whirls worked—and both businesses were continued under one ownership. This united the two working forces and the question arose as to relative seniority rights. Both groups had belonged to American Federation of Labor unions, so the problem was submitted to its national authorities. They ruled that each employee should retain seniority rights dating from the time he entered the employ of either company.
The bigger group revolted. They demanded their own seniority and demanded that the smaller group coming into the consolidation be treated as entirely new employees. They reorganized as a C.I.O. unit, demanded recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of the whole enterprise and, of course, won the election. They then demanded and obtained a contract allowing their own seniority and establishing a closed shop. To keep his job at all, Whirls was obliged thereby to join the C.I.O. union and, with others, suffered reduction of pay and loss of seniority rights.
The employer urges that we relieve it from the duty imposed by the court below of reinstating Whirls in his seniority rights because 'the majority union members may compel the employer to discharge such returning veteran after the expiration of said one-year period. As in this case, the union might expel the veteran from the union, and thereby compel this employer to discharge such veteran under its closed shop contract with the union.' One might have thought this an exaggerated fear conjured up in hostility to the union except that it is just what has happened, and that instead of repudiating it now the union endorses the threat. It says that the union 'must do one of two things, (a) either discriminate against the Trailmobile veterans and allow the Highland veterans to supersede them on the seniority list, or, (b) in fairness to the Trailmobile veterans, negotiate for the discharge of Highland veterans at the end of one year's guaranteed employment.'
Section 8(b)(B) refers to the job to which the veteran is entitled to be restored, i.e., simply the same job which he left, or its equivalent. Section 8(c) specifies what rights he shall have in that job. He is to have the seniority which would have accumulated while he was in service and he is to be assured against discharge for one year, regardless of what his or others' seniority rights are. Such assurance against discharge certainly does not terminate seniority rights after one year. Section 8(b)(B) together with the provision against arbitrary discharge is enough to assure that the veteran will remain in the same job for one year without diminution of its incidents. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U.S. 275, 286, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 1112, in which this Court said, 'What it (Congress) undertook to do was to give the veteran protection within the framework of the seniority system plus a guarantee against demotion or termination of the employment relationship without cause for a year.' 328 U.S. at page 288, 66 S.Ct. at page 1113.
The job guaranteed against discharge for a year, then, is the job defined in § 8(b)(B). But the right to discharge after the year is not unconditional where the employee is the beneficiary of a seniority plan. Of course, where employees have no seniority rights, the guarantee of one year's employment is their only right. But if a seniority system does exist, the Congress gave the employee 'protection within the framework of the seniority system plus a guarantee against demotion or termination of the employment relationship without cause for a year.' (Emphasis added.) Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U.S. at page 288, 66 S.Ct. at page 1113.
It is to be noted that the seniority rights of Whirls were bargained away from him by a union which, under the National Labor Relations Act, was entitled to bargain as his representative. The Act makes the majority union 'the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit' for bargaining. 49 Stat. 453, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. s 159(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). We have held that this not only precludes the individual from being repre ented by others but also prevents him from bargaining for himself. J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762. While the individual is thus placed wholly in the power of the union, it does not follow that union powers have no limit. Courts from time immemorial have held that those who undertake to act for others are held to good faith and fair dealing and may not favor themselves at the cost of those they have assumed to represent. The National Labor Relations Act, in authorizing union organizations 'for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,' 49 Stat. 452, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, indicates no purpose to excuse unions from these wholesome principles of trusteeship.
We have held under a similar Act that the courts may intervene to prevent a majority union from negotiating a contract in favor of itself against a colored minority. Speaking for all but two members of the Court, Chief Justice Stone, after recognizing that the representatives may make 'contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of the members of the craft represented' in such matters as seniority, based on relevant differences of conditions, said: 'Without attempting to mark the allowable limits of differences in the terms of contracts based on differences of conditions to which they apply, it is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to represent a craft and to make contracts as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on such relevant differences.' Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203, 65 S.Ct. 226, 232, 89 L.Ed. 173. That opinion also declared that 'It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed.' 323 U.S. at page 202, 65 S.Ct. at page 232, 89 L.Ed. 173. And in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187, we held that where an individual is without available administrative remedies, the courts must grant him protection.
The courts cannot tolerate the expulsion of a member of a union, depriving him of his right to earn a living merely because he invokes the process of the courts to protect his rights—even if he does so mistakenly. The Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice by an employer 'To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony' in proceedings under it. 49 Stat. 453, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158. Neither may a union use its own power over its members to by-pass the courts. Cf. Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 47 S.Ct. 86, 71 L.Ed. 248.
This action is equitable in character and equity traditionally adapts its remedies to the facts as developed by trial rather than to the form of pleadings. There could be no objection if the Court would remand the case for development of a more complete record. But I could not agree that it should be done with the suggestion that Whirls was not treated with discrimination because all in the Highland group were treated alike. If the Trailmobile Company had absorbed the wholly-owned Highland Company before Whirls returned and used the consolidation as an excuse to deny Whirls reemployment rights, this Court would hardly have approved so transparent a scheme. The union has no more right to rely on the consolidation to justify deprivation of seniority rights.
54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.App. § 301 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 301 et seq. In 1944 there was a minor modification of § 8 not here relevant. 58 Stat. 798; Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U.S. 275, 278, note 1, 66 S.Ct. 1105. As amended the Selective Training and Service Act expired in its major part March 31, 1947. Public Law 473, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 Stat. 341. But § 8 is saved indefinitely.
'He acquires not only the same seniority he had; his service in the armed services is counted as service in the plant so that he does not lose ground by reason of his absence.' 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111.
Though the fact does not appear affirmatively in the record, the parties agree that Whirls upon his reemployment after his military service received in addition to the seniority he had acquired at the time of his entry into military service also seniority accrued during the period of his service, consistently with the standard of the Fishgold case. This accorded with the then effective collective bargaining agreement which provided: 'In case of a national crisis, such as a declared or undeclared war, any man who relinquishes his job with the Company for services rendered to the Government, shall on his return retain his place on the seniority list with accumulation.'
In the last full year of independent operation, 1942, Highland had approximately 100 employees and produced commodities worth approximately $1,500,000 and Trailmobile had approximately 1,000 employees and produced commodities worth $12,000,000.
51 N.L.R.B. 1106; 53 N.L.R.B. 1248. As the National Labor Relations Board determined that the appropriate bargaining unit was one composed of both Highland and Trailmobile employees, 51 N.L.R.B. at 113, the ex-Highland employees, of course, lost the election, since there were many more Trailmobile employees. See note 5. The bargaining unit excluded supervisory and certain miscellaneous employees of both companies 51 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1115.
These are holdings that, although a collective bargaining agent may be contract with the employer modify the seniority structure, it must act in good faith toward all employees. See Seniority Rights in Labor Relations (1937) 47 Yale L.J. 73, 90; Christenson, Seniority Rights under Labor Union Working Agreements (1937) 11 Temp.L.Q. 355, 370, 371. The class suit was filed and determined before the decisions were rendered here in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187; Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S.Ct. 238, 89 L.Ed. 216.
Hess v. Trailer Co., 17 O.Supp. 39, 31 O.O. 566, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Hamilton County, Ohio, motion to certify record to the Ohio Supreme Court overruled, 31 O.Law Rep. Oct. 15, 1945, 51; 18 Ohio Bar 314.
Whirls' petition in this case alleged that after the notice of July 15, 1944, 'defendant herein again restored plaintiff to his date of hiring, as regulating his seniority, to-wit: February 8, 1935, pursuant to a directive of the Selective Service System of the United States, and he continued to benefit by such seniority status until on or about September 3, 1945, at which time' the defendant transferred him as stated below in the text and threatened, unless restrained, to reduce his pay and seniority rating.
Section 8(e) of the Selective Training and Service Act, quoted in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation, 328 U.S. at page 280, note 3, 66 S.Ct. at pages 1108, 1109.
The Court of Appeals expressly stated its disagreement with the views expressed by Judge Learned Hand, 2 Cir., 154 F.2d 785, writing for the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Fishgold case, the decision in which was affirmed here.
The Government's brief puts the suggestion and discussion it makes as a matter of not desiring its 'failure to explore the nature and causes' of the alleged discrimination to be taken 'as an admission either that' there was not unfair discrimination under the Steele, Tunstall and Wallace cases, supra; or that such discrimination 'cannot be redressed under § 8 * * * after the lapse of the initial year of reemployment. * * *'
The Court of Appeals, noting that Whirls was not named as a party to the class suit other than as a member of the class, pointed out that numerous members of the armed forces were involved in both groups of employees, but that their interests as veterans under § 8 were not common to the nonveteran employees in either group. Hence, it concluded, the class suit was not appropriate for rendering a judgment binding upon veteran members of the complaining class as to the question of their seniority under § 8. 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 866, 872.
'Sec. 8(a) Any person inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act for training and service, who, in the judgment of those in authority over him, satisfactorily completes his period of training and service under section 3(b) shall be entitled to a ertificate to that effect upon the completion of such period of training and service, which shall include a record of any special proficiency or merit attained. * * *
The Government states that a veteran could be reduced in seniority on account of bona fide changed circumstances or on account of cause or upon waiver. As to this, see note 25.
Seniority arises only out of contract or statute. An employee has 'no inherent right to seniority in service * * *.' Ryan v. New York Central R.R., 267 Mich. 202, 208, 255 N.W. 365; Casey v. Brotherhood, 197 Minn. 189, 191, 192, 266 N.W. 737. 'The seniority principle is confined almost exclusively to unionized industry.' Decision (1946) 46 Col.L.Rev. 1030, 1031, and authorities cited. 'In private employment seniority is typically created and delimited by a collective bargaining agreement. * * *' Ibid.
The Government's argument is limited to seniority. But it is equally applicable to the other components of 'position,' such as pay. Thus, if accepted, it would mean that after the guaranteed one year a veteran could be discharged but could not have his pay reduced.
The position to which an employee must be restored is either the position previously held or 'a position of like seniority, status and pay.' See note 18. It is thus recognized that part of the restored 'position' is the seniority accrued prior to service in the armed forces and, under the Fishgold case, during service. 'Seniority' is part of 'position,' and therefore when the Act states in subsection (c) that the veteran may not be discharged 'from such position' it means both from the job itself and from the seniority which is part of the job.
See, e.g., Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375, 41 S.Ct. 510, 512, 65 L.Ed. 994; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 322, 12 S.Ct. 235, 237, 35 L.Ed. 1025; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev.Ed.) 152.
Section 8(c), it will be recalled, forbids discharge 'without cause within one year.' It may be that the 'without cause' qualification applies to 'other rights' as well as to total discharge, more especially in view of the position we take concerning the severability of the concluding clause of § 8(c). But no question is presented in this case whether the employer, for cause, could demote a reemployed veteran within the statutory year consistently with the requirements of § 8(c), and we express no opinion in this respect.
The Government also relies upon certain statements taken out of context from the debates. 'As is true with respect to all such materials, it is possible to extract particular segments from the immediate and total context and come out with road signs pointing in opposite directions.' Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 733, 66 S.Ct. 1218, 1231. None of the selections is directed toward the question whether the veteran's seniority continues after the guaranteed one-year period so as to be not subject to modification by a collective bargaining agreement.