Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v40/40-038.html
Timestamp: 2016-08-30 07:43:57
Document Index: 4777364

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5542', '§ 5542', '§ 551', '§ 532', '§ 5544', '§ 5542', '§ 5542', '§ 5548', 'art 550', '§ 204', 'art\n551', '§ 532', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 551', '§ 6101', '§ 2424', '§ 6101', '§ 6101', 'art 610', '§ 5542', '§ 5542', 'art 550', 'art 550', '§ 550', '§ 550', 'art 550', '§ 550', '§ 6101', '§ 610', '§ 6101', 'art 610', '§ 785', '§ 203', '§ 551', '§ 5542', '§ 5542', '§ 5544', '§ 5544', '§ 551', 'art 550', 'art 551', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 254', 'art 551', '§ 203', '§ 5343', '§ 5343', 'art\n551', '§ 550', '§ 550', '§ 6101', '§ 6101']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] 40:0371(38)NG - - AFGE Local 2022 and Army, HQ, 101st Airborne Division, Ft. Campbell, KY - - 1991 FLRAdec NG - - v40 p371
[ v40 p371 ] 40:0371(38)NG
40 FLRA No. 38
0-NG-1737
Statute) and involves five proposals. Proposal 1 provides that in order to permit the adjustment
of an employee's grievance in circumstances where an employee
and his or her representative work different shifts, the Agency
will either change the employee's shift to that of his or her
representative or pay overtime. Proposal 1 is found to be
negotiable. Proposal 2, which requires the Agency to grant up
to 40 hours of administrative leave to employees to attend Boy
or Girl Scout functions, is nonnegotiable because it directly interferes with management's right to assign work under section
7106(a)(2)(B). Proposal 3, which allows employees 10 minutes
for personal cleanup time before lunch periods and at the end
of the workday, is negotiable under section 704(a) of the Civil
Service Reform Act to the extent that it covers wage grade
employees. To the extent that Proposal 3 covers general
schedule employees, it is negotiable as an appropriate
arrangement under section 7106(b)(3). Proposal 4, which provides that employees may not work
over 16 hours within a 24-hour period without the Garrison
Commander's approval, is nonnegotiable because it excessively
7106(a)(2)(B). Proposal 6, which requires that Agency
employees receive consideration for positions before other
candidates are solicited, ranked, or considered for selection,
directly interferes with management's right to select under
section 7106(a)(2)(C) and is nonnegotiable.
Supervisors will give their employees a reasonable
amount of time (see Section 7-4) during working hours
to prepare their grievances or appeals; to secure
advice from Union officials concerning their rights
and privileges under this Agreement, and to obtain
information or assistance from Union officials
pertaining to their grievances and/or appeals. Each
employee, prior to leaving his/her work area, will
obtain permission from his/her immediate/first-line
supervisor. If for any reason that supervisor is not
available, the employee will obtain permission from
the next/second-line supervisor in the employee's
chain of supervision. A supervisor may require an
employee to temporarily delay his/her departure if
the employee's absence will unduly disrupt work. Overtime pay or compensatory time off in lieu of
overtime pay is not authorized for employees to
prepare and to present grievance[s], unless such
overtime is officially ordered and approved by
management. However, when an employee works a shift
different than their [sic] representative, the
employee's shift will be changed to the representative's shift
or overtime will be paid.
The Agency contends that the disputed portion of
Proposal 1 directly interferes with its rights to assign
(B) of the Statute. Additionally, the Agency asserts that
Proposal 1 interferes with management's right to determine
the numbers, types, and grades of employees needed for a
particular tour of duty under section 7106(b)(1) of the
Statute. The Agency states that the "plain language" of
the disputed portion of Proposal 1 requires "that an
employee's shift must be changed to the same shift as the
union representative when the employee needs to prepare
and present a grievance, or overtime must be paid." Statement of Position at 2. However, the Agency notes the
Union's agreement, in its petition, "'that overtime
compensation should not be used to prepare for
grievances.'" Id. at 4.
The Agency asserts that the disputed portion of
Proposal 1 "gives no consideration at all to the
operational needs of the agency, the qualifications
necessary for specific kinds of work, or to the number of
employees needed to perform a particular function." Id.
at 2. Specifically, the Agency contends that not all of
the employees represented by the Union perform shift work. Therefore, the Agency asserts, "having an employee
transfer to a different shift does not necessarily mean
the employee would be assigned similar duties, or that
there would be any work available at all." Id. Additionally, the Agency argues that "there will be
instances where an employee's absence for an undetermined
period will severely impact the staffing resources of a
particular office or shop." Id. at 3.
The Agency also argues that "an employee who would
otherwise be able to resolve a grievance during his or her
regularly scheduled tour of duty is not entitled to
overtime compensation to accommodate a union
representative who happens to be assigned to another work
schedule." Id. at 4. In support, the Agency cites
National Treasury Employees Union v. Gregg, No. 83-546
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1983) (Gregg) and Warner Robins Air
Employees, Local 987, 23 FLRA 270 (1986) (Warner Robins).
The Union contends that the disputed portion of
Proposal 1 does not interfere with the Agency's rights
under the Statute. In support, the Union argues as
[i]t is not uncommon for employees, representatives, and
management officials to have completely different work
hours. If overtime compensation cannot be considered,
then our only option is to terminate the grievance meeting
and continue it another day when overtime can be scheduled
or the employee can be reassigned long enough to process
Petition for Review at 2. The Union contends that the
Agency has the "option" to schedule the meetings on "the
employee[']s shift, on regular time, on overtime, or on
the representative[']s shift." Id. at 3. Therefore, the
Union argues that when the Agency schedules grievance
meetings during "either the employee's or representative's
off-duty time, then they have, in essence, directed or
required them to report at a designated location at a
specified time prior or subsequent to their regular
shift." Id. at 2. The Union argues that "such time
should be compensable at the existing overtime rate . . .
Initially, we note that the disputed portion of
Proposal 1 is not expressly limited to meetings where
grievances are adjusted. However, the Union asserts that
Proposal 1 is intended to address the situation which
occurs when management schedules grievance meetings and
employees, representatives, and management officials have
"completely different work hours." Petition for Review at
2. Moreover, as the Agency notes, the Union states its
"agree[ment] that overtime compensation should not be used
to prepare for grievances." Id. Based on this record, we
conclude that the disputed portion of Proposal 1 applies
only when a meeting is scheduled to adjust an employee's
grievance and the employee is not on the same shift as his
or her representative. The disputed portion of Proposal 1 requires the Agency
to take one of two options when the employee does not work
the same shift as his or her representative. One option
is to change the employee's shift to the representative's
shift. If management does not change the employee's
shift, then Proposal 1 requires that management pay
overtime. The negotiability of the disputed portion of
Proposal 1 depends on whether the Agency has discretion to
pay overtime for the presentation of a grievance. General
schedule employees who work in excess of 8 hours a day or
40 hours a week are entitled to either overtime
compensation or compensatory time off under 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542 and 5543. In addition, general schedule employees
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are also
entitled to overtime compensation under the provisions of
the FLSA if the entitlement would be greater under the
FLSA than under 5 U.S.C. § 5542. See 5 C.F.R. § 551.513. Prevailing rate employees are entitled to overtime
compensation, "in accordance with sections 5544 and 5550
of title 5, United States Code, or, if eligible, under the
provisions of [FLSA] whichever provides the greater
overtime benefit." 5 C.F.R. § 532.503(a)(1). Both
5 U.S.C. §§ 5544 and 5550 provide that prevailing rate
employees are "entitled to overtime pay for overtime work
in excess of 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week."
5 U.S.C. § 5542 provides for the payment of overtime
compensation to covered employees for "hours of work
officially ordered or approved in excess of 40 hours in an
administrative workweek, or . . . in excess of 8 hours in
a day[.]" The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
authorized to promulgate regulations implementing the
overtime provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 5542. See 5 U.S.C. § 5548. These regulations, which are set out in 5 C.F.R.
Part 550, "Pay Administration (General)," do not
specifically discuss whether time spent adjusting
grievances is considered hours of work; however, we find
nothing in these regulations which would prevent the
Agency from ordering and approving overtime for that
OPM also is responsible for administering the
provisions of the FLSA that are applicable to Federal
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(f). Implementing
regulations, governing hours of work determinations and
overtime pay entitlements for general schedule and
prevailing rate employees, are set out in 5 C.F.R. Part
551, "Pay Administration under the Fair Labor Standards
Act." See 5 C.F.R. §§ 532.503(a)(1) and 551.101(c). The
regulations provide generally that "[t]ime that is
considered hours of work . . . shall be used . . . to
determine an employee's entitlement to . . . overtime pay
under the [FLSA.]" 5 C.F.R. § 551.401(d). Time spent adjusting grievances is defined as hours of work under
5 C.F.R. § 551.424(a), which provides: [t]ime spent by an employee adjusting his or her
grievance (or any appealable action) with an agency
during the time the employee is required to be on the
agency's premises shall be considered hours of work. If the Agency schedules a meeting to adjust a
grievance, we find that management is requiring the
grievant to be on the Agency's premises, within the
meaning of 5 C.F.R. § 551.424(a). Consequently,
consistent with this regulation, we conclude that when an
agency schedules a meeting to adjust an employee's
grievance, the time the grievant is in the grievance
meeting is hours of work for the purpose of computing
overtime. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the language
in section (b) of 5 C.F.R. § 551.424, which concerns time
spent performing representational functions, establishes a
different standard to determine hours of work. 5 C.F.R. § 551.424(b) specifically provides:
"Official time" granted an employee by an agency to
perform representational functions during those hours
when an employee is otherwise in a duty status shall
be considered hours of work. This includes
time spent by an employee performing such functions
during regular working hours (including regularly
scheduled overtime hours), or during a period of
irregular, unscheduled overtime work, provided an
event arises incident to representational functions
that must be dealt with during the irregular,
unscheduled overtime period.
It is clear from the wording of 5 C.F.R. § 551.424(b)
that an agency may not schedule union representatives for
overtime in order to permit them to conduct
representational functions. See Gregg; Warner Robins. In
contrast, section 551.424(a), which applies to time spent
by "an employee adjusting his or her grievance . . . ,"
states that hours of work includes "time the employee is
required to be on the agency's premises." Under this
subsection, an agency may schedule a meeting to adjust an
employee's grievance and the time spent by the employee
constitutes hours of work. Accordingly, we conclude that
the disputed portion of Proposal 1, which requires the
Agency to pay overtime to the employee for time spent at a
meeting scheduled by management to adjust his or her grievance, if the employee's
representative is on a different shift, is negotiable. The Agency cites Gregg and Warner Robins in support of
its argument that Proposal 1 is nonnegotiable. However,
these cases are inapposite because they concerned whether
employees, acting as union representatives, could receive
overtime compensation for representational functions. In
Gregg, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia held that under section 7131(a) of the Statute,
union representatives could not receive overtime
compensation for time spent beyond their normal workweek
serving on a union negotiating team. The court noted that
this decision was consistent with 5 C.F.R. § 551.424(b). Similarly, the Authority held in Warner Robins that a
union representative, who represented a grievant at a
meeting scheduled after the representative's regular
workday, was not entitled to overtime compensation under
the FLSA. 23 FLRA at 272.
Further, we distinguish the Authority's decision in
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 2750th Air Base
Wing and American Federation of Government Employees,
Local No. 1138, 23 FLRA 390 (1986) (Wright-Patterson). In
Wright-Patterson, the Authority set aside that portion of
an arbitrator's award which granted overtime pay to
employees for time spent beyond their regularly scheduled
duty hours as union witnesses at an arbitration hearing. Relying on Warner Robins, the Authority found "that time
spent attending the arbitration hearing as union witnesses
is not hours of work under [5 C.F.R. § 551.401(a)] which
would entitle the employees to overtime pay or
compensatory time off under FLSA." Id. at 392. Additionally, the Authority found that 5 C.F.R. § 551.424(a) did not apply to an employee's "attendance as
a union witness at the arbitration hearing to which he was
not a party and at which his attendance was not required." Id. at 393. In contrast to Wright-Patterson, which
concerned employees who assisted a union as witnesses at
an arbitration hearing, the disputed portion of Proposal 1
addresses employees who are adjusting their own
grievances. Finally, we reject the Agency's assertions that
work and employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) and
interferes with the right to determine the numbers, types,
and grades of employees under section 7106(b)(1). Because
the Agency has the option under Proposal 1 to assign
overtime to an employee to adjust his or her grievance,
the proposal does not require management to reassign an
employee to another shift when his or her representative
is not on the same shift. Rather, Proposal 1 preserves management's
right not to reassign the employee because of operational
needs, or for any other reason, by giving the Agency the
option of paying the grievant overtime. As Proposal 1 neither requires nor prohibits the
reassignment of employees to different shifts, we conclude
that the proposal does not directly interfere with the
Agency's rights to assign employees and assign work under
section 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute or to
under 7106(b)(1). Accordingly, that portion of Proposal 1
which gives management the option of making a shift
reassignment to facilitate the adjustment of an employee's
grievance is negotiable. See American Federation of
Government Employees, Department of Education Council of
AFGE Locals and Department of Education, 35 FLRA 56, 61
(1990) (Proposal 1) ("A requirement that an agency
'consider' exercising its rights does not require the
agency to exercise its rights.").
In summary, we find that the disputed portion of
Proposal 1, which is applicable to situations where an
employee and his or her representative work on different
shifts, and which requires that the Agency change an
employee's shift to that of his or her representative or
pay overtime to permit the adjustment of the employee's
grievance, is negotiable. III. Proposal 2
Section 14-7.
Permanent employees will be excused from work
without charge to leave for up to 40 hours annually
to attend Boy Scouts of America/Girl Scouts of
America summer camp, national jamborees, world
jamborees, Philmont Scout Ranch, and other scout
functions. These employees must meet the following
a. Have been in an official scouting leadership
position (Scout Master or Assistant Scout Master)
for 5 years or longer when applying, and b. Have been in civil service for 5 years or longer
[The entire proposal is in dispute.]
The Agency states that Proposal 2 does not concern a
condition of employment, within the meaning of section
7103(a)(14) of the Statute. According to the Agency,
Proposal 2 has "no direct relationship on the work
situation or on the employment relationship of unit
employees." Statement of Position at 5. The Agency notes
the Authority's position that it will examine whether a
proposal vitally affects the working conditions of
employees in the bargaining unit. Proposal 2, according
to the Agency, "does not vitally affect the employees'
working conditions." Id. The Agency states that "there
is no direct relationship between an employee's scouting
activities and the work situation or the employment
relationship of bargaining unit employees." Id.
In addition, the Agency asserts that Proposal 2
7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute because Proposal 2 "bases the
grant of leave on the employee's desire to participate in
scouting activities, rather than the agency's need to
accomplish its mission." Id. at 7. The Agency argues
that Proposal 2 would limit management's right to
determine when assigned work will be performed.
The Union argues that Proposal 2 concerns a condition
of employment within the meaning of the Statute. The
Union asserts that the availability of leave is a factor
in choosing or retaining employment on a particular job,
and, therefore, it is a working condition.
1.Proposal 2 Concerns a Condition of Employment
Proposal 2 requires the Agency to excuse permanent
employees from work for up to 40 hours annually to attend
Boy and/or Girl Scout functions if they meet certain
requirements. We reject the Agency's argument that
Proposal 2 does not concern a condition of employment
within the meaning of section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute. Section 7103(a)(14) of the Statute defines "conditions of
employment," in relevant part, as "personnel policies, practices, and matters . . . affecting working
conditions." A proposal affecting conditions of
employment of bargaining unit employees is within the duty
to bargain under the Statute if it is consistent with
applicable law or regulations. American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 32, AFL-CIO and Office of
Personnel Management, 33 FLRA 335, 338 (1988), decision on
remand, AFGE, Local 32, v. FLRA, 853 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Administrative leave is defined as "an absence from
duty administratively authorized without loss of pay and
without charge to leave." Federal Personnel Manual
chapter 630, subchapter 11-1. Because administrative
leave allows employees to be absent from duty with pay it
affects conditions of employment. The fact that the
administrative leave requested in Proposal 2 is for
participation in a non-work related activity does not
alter our conclusion that administrative leave concerns a
condition of employment. Accordingly, we find that
Proposal 2 concerns a condition of employment within the
2.Proposal 2 Directly Interferes With the Right
Proposal 2 states that "employees will be excused from
work without charge to leave for up to 40 hours" to attend
Boy/Girl Scout functions. Statement of Position at 3. Thus, Proposal 2 would require the Agency, without
exception, to authorize employees' administrative leave
for up to 40 hours to attend scouting functions if they
meet the proposed requirements. Proposals requiring management to grant leave prevent
management from requiring an employee to remain on duty to
perform necessary work and, thereby, directly interfere
with the right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute. See, for example, American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1815 and Army
Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, 28 FLRA 1172, 1178
(1987) (Provision 7) (provision authorizing employees
4 hours of excused absence to donate blood in addition to
travel time to and from the blood center held to directly
interfere with management's right to assign work). Proposal 2 would require the Agency to grant
administrative leave for scouting activities to those
employees who meet certain requirements. As the proposal
does not preserve the Agency's right to decide whether or
not to grant requests for administrative leave, it
directly interferes with the Agency's right to assign work. As the Union does not
argue that Proposal 2 constitutes an appropriate
arrangement, it is nonnegotiable. Compare American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 2298 and U.S.
Department of the Navy, Polaris Missile Facility,
Atlantic, Charleston, South Carolina, 35 FLRA 591, 593
(1990) (proposal providing administrative leave for
training held negotiable because management had determined
that the training was necessary and training was provided
during duty hours). IV. Proposal 3
Section 17-1. CLEAN-UP TIME
Employer and the Union agree normally ten minutes for
personal clean-up time will be allowed employees to
their lunch periods and at the end of their workday. Exception: Supervisors may grant designated
employees specific approval for longer periods of
clean-up time when the type of work being performed
by the employees, either on a continuous basis or on
any given occasion, justifies a large amount of
clean-up time, the employee(s) may request the
supervisor to furnish the reasons for the denial. Clean-up time will not be used to extend an
employees' [sic] regular scheduled tour of duty nor
will it be the basis for granting or compensating
overtime pay unless the employee was prevented, for
work reasons, from his/her normal, allowable clean-up
Section 17-2.
This Article is also applicable to employees required
to perform overtime work under Article 18.
A.Positions of the Parties
1.The Agency
The Agency argues that Proposal 3 is nonnegotiable
because it interferes with its right to assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute by "preclud[ing] the
assignment of other types of work during the specified
period." Statement of Position at 8. Additionally, the
Agency rejects the Union's claim that Proposal 3
of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. In response to the
Union's allegation that employees dealing with toxic
materials need cleanup time, the Agency contends that "any
employees who are required to work with toxic chemicals
are provided with protective equipment and clothing." Id.
at 10. Finally, the Agency also argues that Proposal 3
conflicts with 5 U.S.C. § 6101 and is, therefore,
nonnegotiable under section 7117(a)(1) of the Statute. 2. The Union
The Union contends that cleanup time has been
negotiated by the parties since 1967. According to the
Union, "prevailing rate employees in the bargaining unit
are entitled to continue to negotiate [cleanup time] under
Section 9(b) of the Prevailing Rate Systems Act, . . .
since this was a matter subject to negotiations between
the parties prior to August 19, 1972." Reply Brief at 2
Further, the Union states that cleanup time is
necessary because both prevailing rate and general
schedule employees "are dealing with toxic materials or
are required by management to maintain personal
cleanliness as part of their duties[.]" Petition for
Review at 5. The Union also asserts that "OSHA standards
require the clean-up of the work area and/or the washing
of hands and other areas of exposure." Reply Brief at 2. The Union argues that employees use toxic products
"installation wide" in many departments, such as
Medical-Dental, the Fire Department, the oil lab, the
Directorate of Logistics, and the Directorate of
Engineering and Housing. Id. at 3. Additionally, the Union argues that Proposal 3
of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute because it "mitigates
the adverse effect on employees (1) of the unclean and
potentially unhealthful conditions in their work and
(2) management[']s assignment and direction to maintain
personal cleanliness or face adverse consequences and/or
discipline." Petition for Review at 5. The Union states
"this practice has existed for over a decade without
adversely affecting the mission(s) [of the Agency]." Reply Brief at 6. B.Preliminary Matter
The Union filed a motion requesting that the Authority
a fact finding hearing . . . to determine those
employees entitled to maintain the right to negotiate
cleanup time: (1) due to the assignment of work
detrimental to their health and safety, i.e.,
exposure to toxic materials, germs and infectious
diseases, etc.; and (2) the adverse effect of the
requirement to maintain personal cleanliness, i.e.,
under uniform dress codes, performance evaluations,
etc." Motion for Hearing, October 6, 1989. The Union argues that the Authority should hold a
hearing because "the only way a determination of whether
employees are entitled to retain the right to clean up
time would be to examine the circumstances of each
department branch and office and the circumstances of each
employee's job installation wide." Reply Brief at 6. According to the Union, the Agency and the Authority
should assume some of the "burden of proving the adverse
impact, including evidence pertaining to a massive number
of individual employees . . . once the Union has shown a
prima facia [sic] case exists." Id. We reject the Union's argument that the Authority
should hold a fact finding hearing concerning Proposal 3. Initially, we note that whether a hearing is held in a
negotiability matter is within the Authority's discretion. See 5 C.F.R. § 2424.9 ("A hearing may be held, in the
discretion of the Authority, before a determination is
made under section 7117(b) or (c)." (emphasis added)). In
negotiability matters it is well established that the
parties bear the burden of creating a record upon which
the Authority can make a negotiability determination. A
party failing to meet its burden acts at its peril. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1167 v.
FLRA, 681 F.2d 886, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2050 and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, 35 FLRA 706, 717-18
(1988). Here, the Union had the opportunity in its Petition
for Review and a Reply Brief to explain its position fully
and provide any information necessary for the Authority to
make a negotiability determination on Proposal 3. Accordingly, we deny the Union's motion that the Authority provide an additional opportunity to the Union to support
its arguments by holding a fact finding hearing. Finally, in its Motion for Hearing, the Union
requested that if Proposal 3 was found to be negotiable
"that the proposal be referred back to the parties for
further fact finding or negotiations with the assistance
of the Federal Service Impasses Panel." Motion for
Hearing, October 6, 1989. In this regard, we note that
section 7119(b)(1) provides that when a negotiation
impasse exists "either party may request the Federal
Service Impasses Panel [FSIP] to consider the matter[.]" Therefore, whether FSIP assistance is requested is a
matter within the control of the parties. See National
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 35 FLRA 398, 414-15
(1990) for a discussion of FSIP's role in collective
C.Analysis and Conclusions
Proposal 3 provides employees with cleanup time both
during their regularly scheduled workdays (section 17-1)
and during scheduled overtime assignments (section 17-2). As the Agency points out, in International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 2080 and Department of the Army,
U.S. Army Engineer District, Nashville, Tennessee, 32 FLRA
347, 363-65 (1988) (Army Engineer), the Authority held
that a provision requiring the agency to provide employees
with "a reasonable amount of time . . . to clean up prior
to lunch and at the end of the workday[]" was
nonnegotiable because it conflicted with 5 U.S.C. § 6101.(2) The Authority stated, in this regard, that
section 6101 requires a basic workweek to consist of 40
hours of work and that time set aside for personal cleanup "cannot be considered 'work' or
'employment' for purposes of fulfilling the requirement
for a 40-hour workweek." Id. at 365. See also National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1655 and U.S.
Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau, Department
740, 748-50 (1990) (Illinois Air National Guard); National
Association of Government Employees, SEIU, AFL-CIO and
National Guard Bureau, Adjutant General, 26 FLRA 515,
516-17 (1987). Proposal 3 provides us with an opportunity to
reexamine the statutory and regulatory restrictions, other
than those in the Statute, applicable to proposals
involving cleanup time. We will examine those statutory
and regulatory restrictions first, followed by an analysis
of the Agency's right to assign work under the Statute. We also note that the bargaining unit in this case
includes non-supervisory general schedule and wage grade
(prevailing rate) employees. See, for example, Statement
of Position at 2. Although non-supervisory wage grade
employees are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), non-supervisory general schedule employees may be
excluded from coverage of the FLSA based on the nature of
their positions. See, for example, Federal Personnel
Manual (FPM) letter 551-7. Thus, we will address the
negotiability of the two sections of Provision 3 as they
apply to general schedule employees excluded from coverage
of the FLSA and as they apply to wage grade and general
schedule employees covered by the FLSA.
On reexamination of the statutory and regulatory
restrictions, other than those in the Statute, applicable
to proposals involving cleanup time, we now conclude, for
the following reasons, that such proposals do not conflict
(a). General Schedule Employees Excluded
from Coverage of the FLSA We note first that nothing in 5 U.S.C. § 6101, set out
above, and nothing in 5 C.F.R. part 610, entitled "Hours
of Duty," both of which concern an agency's obligation to
establish basic 40-hour work schedules for employees,
define what will constitute work or prohibit an agency
from assigning personal cleanup during regular duty hours. General schedule employees who work in excess of 8 hours a
day or 40 hours a week are entitled to either overtime compensation or compensatory time off under 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5542 and 5543. Nothing in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542 or 5543
precludes an agency from assigning personal cleanup during
periods of overtime. In order to implement the various provisions of law
concerning the establishment of basic workweeks and
overtime, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has
promulgated 5 C.F.R. part 550, entitled "Pay
Administration (General)," which concerns pay
administration for general schedule employees. We note
that although 5 C.F.R. part 550 does not define "work," it
contains provisions concerning whether certain activities
denoted as "principal activities" and "preshift/postshift
activities" are compensable as hours of work. For
example, with respect to overtime compensation for general
schedule employees, 5 C.F.R. § 550.112(a) provides, as
relevant here, that:
(a) Time spent in principal activities. Principal
activities are the activities that an employee is
employed to perform. They are the activities that an employee performs during his or
her regularly scheduled administrative workweek
(including regular overtime work) and activities
performed by an employee during periods of irregular
or occasional overtime work . . . . Further, 5 C.F.R. § 550.112(b) provides, in relevant
(b) Time spent in preshift or postshift activities. A preshift activity is a preparatory activity that an
employee performs prior to the commencement of his or
her principal activities, and a postshift activity is
a concluding activity that an employee performs after
the completion of his or her principal activities. Such activities are not principal activities defined
in paragraph (a) of this section. (1)(i) If the head of a department reasonably
determines that a preshift or postshift activity is
closely related to an employees's principal
activities, and that the total time spent in that
activity is more than 10 minutes per daily tour of
duty, he or she shall credit all of the time spent in that activity, including the 10 minutes, as
hours of work. . . . . (2) A preshift or postshift activity that is not
closely related to the performance of the principal
activities is considered a preliminary or
postliminary activity. Time spent in preliminary or
postliminary activities is excluded from hours of
work and is not compensable, even if it occurs
between periods of activity that are compensable as
OPM has defined "principal activities" for purposes of
non-overtime and overtime work in Federal Personnel Manual
(FPM) Supplement 990-2, Book 550, Appendix I, at a.(1) as
Principal activities are the activities that an
employee is employed to perform. Simply stated, that
are the duties of his or her position. They include
all activities performed by an employee during his or
her regularly scheduled administrative workweek,
including regular overtime work. They also include
all activities performed by an employee during a
period of irregular or occasional overtime work . . . ." It appears, therefore, that for purposes of pay
administration under 5 C.F.R. part 550 and FPM Supplement
990-2, Book 550, work consists of the activities that an
employee is employed to perform. It is also clear that
the duties an employee is employed to perform include
duties that are not necessarily related to the employee's
classification or position. See, for example, National
815 (1990); Independent Letterman Hospital Worker's Union
and Department of the Army, Nutrition Care, Letterman Army
Medical Center, 29 FLRA 456 (1987) (Proposal 1). OPM
notes, in this regard, that because it is a long-standing
rule that any time, however small, an employee is required
to spend on assigned duties must be counted, "an employee
must be compensated for every minute of work performed
during his or her regularly scheduled workweek, including
regular scheduled overtime." FPM Supplement 990-2, Book
550, Appendix I at a.(2)(a). OPM has also promulgated detailed guidance for the
treatment of activities occurring prior to or after a work
shift and has noted that there is no listing by category
of preshift or postshift activities that are considered
work and, thus, compensable, and activities that are
considered preliminary or postliminary activities and,
thus, not compensable. Rather, "[w]hether a preshift or
postshift activity is considered work or is considered a
preliminary or postliminary activity depends on the facts
and circumstances of each individual employment
situation." FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 550, Appendix I,
Exhibit 2. Further, it is noted in Exhibit 2 that an
activity such as changing clothes before and after the
daily tour of duty which is generally considered to be a
preliminary or postliminary activity and, thus, not
compensable, is compensable "when extraordinary
circumstances are present to make the clothes changing
indispensable to the performance of the [employee's]
principal activities and where the changing of clothes is
required by law, by rule of the employer, or by the nature
of the work." Id. We find nothing in applicable law or regulations that
explicitly or implicitly prohibits an agency from
requiring employees to clean up as a regular assigned duty
during the basic 40-hour workweek or during periods of
overtime. Moreover, even in circumstances where cleanup
duties are not assigned to employees, if an agency
determines that cleanup time: (1) is closely related to
the employee's principal activities; (2) is indispensable
to the performance of the principal activities; and (3)
takes more than 10 minutes per workday, then the employees
are to be compensated for that activity under 5 C.F.R. § 550.112(b). There is no showing in this case that the
Agency would be unable to make these determinations with
respect to cleanup time for General Schedule employees
excluded from coverage of the FLSA. (b). General Schedule and Wage Grade
An agency's obligation to establish basic 40-hour work
schedules for employees under 5 U.S.C. § 6101 and 5 C.F.R. § 610 also applies to general schedule and wage grade
employees covered by the FLSA. As stated above, nothing
in 5 U.S.C. § 6101 and nothing in 5 C.F.R. part 610 limits
an agency's right to assign personal cleanup during the
basic 40-hour workweek.
Similarly, there is no definition of "work" in the
FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 ("The [FLSA], however,
contains no definition of 'work'"); Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (defining "employ" as "to suffer or permit to work.") However, we note that the courts have interpreted the
concept of "work" under the FLSA broadly. See, for
example, Hill v. U.S., 751 F.2d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Cummings v. U.S., 474 U.S. 817
(1985), rehearing denied 474 U.S. 1014 (1985) (court of
appeals held that "work" includes "'physical or mental
exertion' for the employer's benefit[.]") (Citation
omitted). In addition, OPM regulations implementing the
FLSA as it applies to Federal employees, sets forth the
following "[b]asic principles" in section 551.401: (a) All time spent by an employee performing an
activity for the benefit of an agency and under the
control or direction of the agency is "hours of
work." Such time includes:
(1) Time during which an employee is required
(2) Time during which an employee is suffered
or permitted to work[.]
We note that general schedule and wage grade
employees are entitled to overtime compensation either
under the FLSA or under any other authority depending on
which authority provides the greater benefit. 5 C.F.R. § 551.513. As indicated above, General Schedule employees
are entitled to overtime compensation or compensatory time
off under 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542 and 5543. As also stated
above, nothing in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542 or 5543 precludes an
agency from assigning personal cleanup during periods of
overtime. Wage grade employees are entitled to overtime
under 5 U.S.C. § 5544. Nothing in 5 U.S.C. § 5544
concerning the overtime entitlement for wage grade
employees prohibits an agency from assigning personal
cleanup during overtime. OPM has also issued regulations concerning the
overtime entitlement for employees covered by the FLSA in
5 C.F.R. § 551.412, which provides, in relevant part, as
(a)(1) If an agency reasonably determines that a
preparatory or concluding activity is closely related
to an employee's principal activities, and is
indispensable to the performance of the principal
activity is more than 10 minutes per workday, the
agency shall credit all of the time spent in that activity, including the 10
minutes, as hours of work. . . . . (b) A preparatory or concluding activity that is not
OPM has stated that "[p]reshift and postshift
activities under title 5 United States Code, are the same
as preparatory and concluding activities under the FLSA." FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 550, Appendix I at b.(1). As
indicated earlier in this decision, there is no listing by
category of preshift or postshift activities that are
considered work and, thus, compensable, and activities
that are considered preliminary or postliminary activities
and, thus, not compensable. Instead, as stated by OPM,
"[w]hether a preshift or postshift activity is considered
work or is considered a preliminary or postliminary
activity depends on the facts and circumstances of each
individual employment situation." Id. at Exhibit 2. Further, also as indicated earlier in this decision, it is
noted in Exhibit 2 that although an activity such as
changing clothes before and after the daily tour of duty
is generally considered to be a preliminary or
postliminary activity and, thus, not compensable, such
activity is compensable "when extraordinary circumstances
are present to make the clothes changing indispensable to
the performance of the [employee's] principal activities
and where the changing of clothes is required by law, by
rule of the employer, or by the nature of the work." Id. Similar to part 550, nothing in part 551 prohibits an
agency from requiring employees to cleanup as a regular
assigned duty. Moreover, even in circumstances where
cleanup duties are not assigned to employees, an agency must compensate employees for the performance of those
duties if an agency determines that cleanup duties will
last more than 10 minutes per workday, are closely related
to an employee's principal activities, and are
indispensable to the performance of the employee's
principal activities. Indeed, as provided in section 3 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(o),
time spent cleaning up which is otherwise a part of
principal activity constitutes hours of work unless the parties' custom, practice, or
collective bargaining agreement excludes such time. Section 203(o) provides: Hours worked.--In determining . . . the hours for
which an employee is employed, there shall be
excluded any time spent in changing clothes or
washing at the beginning or end of each workday which
was excluded from measured working time during the
week involved by the express terms of or by custom or
practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining
agreement applicable to the particular employee.
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) has been applied by the Comptroller
General to Federal employees to find an entitlement to pay
for time spent by food inspectors in changing their
clothes. 60 Comp. Gen. 611 (1981). See also Steiner v.
Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255 (1956) (court held that the
"clear implication" of 29 U.S.C. 203(o) "is that clothes
changing and washing, which are otherwise a part of the
principal activity, may be expressly excluded from
coverage by agreement."). In other words, unless cleanup
time, which is otherwise part of a principal activity, is
expressly excluded from hours of work by custom, practice,
or an agreement, that time is included within such hours
and, as such, constitutes a compensable activity under the
FLSA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 254 (employers are not liable
for failing to pay for certain activities unless the
parties have expressly agreed that the activities are
compensable). There is no indication in the record before us that
the Union is seeking anything other than to require the
Agency to assign employees the work of cleaning up. Further, we find nothing in 5 C.F.R. part 551, or the
FLSA, which would make illegal an agency determination
that employees be required to cleanup during their regular
tours of duty or on overtime or, in circumstances where
cleanup duties are not assigned to employees, from
reasonably determining whether cleanup duties are closely
related to an employee's principal activities, and whether
they are indispensable to the performance of the
employee's principal activities. In fact, it is
undisputed that in the case now before us, the Agency has,
through collective bargaining, agreed that such time
constitutes hours of work for over 10 years. There is,
therefore, no evidence that the parties have agreed, under
29 U.S.C. § 203(o), to exclude time spent cleaning up from
hours of work. As the Agency does not assert that it
acted illegally, and as nothing in law or regulation so
indicates, we conclude that nothing in law or regulation prohibits the agency from assigning employees
covered by that agreement to cleanup during their regular
tours of duty or on overtime. The case now before us is distinguishable from that in
Georgia, 37 FLRA 197, 207-13 (1990) (Member Armendariz
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Robins Air
Force Base), petition for review filed sub nom. Department of the Air Force v. FLRA, No. 90-1530 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 13, 1990). The proposal in that case sought
overtime compensation for employees whose departure from
work was delayed because of a malfunction of a security
gate. There, the employees had ceased work, and the
Authority found that waiting at the gate was a
postliminary activity for the employees. By contrast, the
proposal in this case seeks the Agency's agreement to
authorize or approve cleanup time. The Union is, in
essence, seeking to require the Agency to assign the
employees the work of cleaning up. Stated otherwise, the
Union here seeks to negotiate over the work to be assigned
to employees during overtime periods. If the Agency
agreed, as it has done for over 10 years, to officially
order or approve cleanup time, cleanup time would
constitute hours of work and payment, whether regular or
overtime, would follow.
Consistent with the foregoing, we have no basis on
which to conclude that cleanup time cannot constitute
compensable work. Accordingly, we will no longer adhere
to previous Authority decisions so holding.
(a). Wage Grade Employees
The bargaining unit includes wage grade employees who
are covered by section 9(b) of the Prevailing Rate Systems
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-392, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5343
(Amendments). Statement of Position at 9 and Reply Brief
Section 704(a) of the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1218,
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5343 (Amendments) (1988), provides
that agencies must continue to negotiate on those terms
and conditions of employment and other employment
benefits, with respect to prevailing rate employees to
whom section 9(b) of Pub. L. No. 92-392 applies, which
were the subject of negotiation in accordance with
prevailing rates and practices prior to August 19, 1972,
without regard to any provision of the Statute. See United States Information Agency, Voice of
America, 37 FLRA 849 (1990) (VOA), decision on remand, 895
F.2d 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1990), petition for review filed sub
nom. United States Information Agency, Voice of America v.
FLRA, No. 90-1582 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 1990). In VOA, the
Authority held that cleanup time relates to terms and
conditions of employment because it concerns work
assignments. 37 FLRA at 868. In this case the Agency has not demonstrated or even
argued that the requirements of section 704(a) of the CSRA
are not met. Thus, we find that the Agency is obligated
to bargain over cleanup time for wage grade employees. Id. at 869.
(b). General Schedule Employees
We have held consistently that proposals requiring an
agency to provide employees with cleanup time during their
hours of duty directly interfere with an agency's right to
assign work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. See, for example, National Association of Government
Employees, Locals R12-122, R12-222 and U.S. Department of
Defense, Washington National Guard, Tacoma, Washington,
38 FLRA 295 (1990) (Proposal 1) (Washington National
Guard); Illinois Air National Guard, 35 FLRA at 740
(Proposal 4). Proposal 3 would require the Agency to
provide employees with cleanup time during their regular
tours of duty and on overtime. Accordingly, we find that
it directly interferes with the Agency's right to assign
As Proposal 3 directly interferes with the Agency's
right to assign work, it is nonnegotiable unless it
constitutes an appropriate arrangement, under section
affected by the exercise of a management right. In
determining whether a provision constitutes an appropriate
arrangement, the Authority first determines whether the
provision is intended to be an "arrangement" for employees
adversely affected by management's exercise of a
management right. If a proposal is determined to be an
"arrangement," the Authority determines whether the
management's rights. National Association of Government
Employees, Local R14-87 and Kansas Army National Guard, 21
FLRA 24, 31-33 (1986) (Kansas Army National Guard).
The Union argues that Proposal 3 is intended to
"mitigate[] the adverse effect[s] on employees (1) of the unclean and potentially unhealthful conditions in their
work and (2) management[']s assignment and direction to
maintain personal cleanliness or face adverse consequences
and/or discipline." Petition for Review at 5. According
to the Union, employees throughout the installation are
required to handle, or are exposed to, dirty, toxic, or
hazardous materials or "are required by management to
maintain personal cleanliness as part of their duties . .
. ." Id. The Agency acknowledges, in this regard, that
"[i]t is a reasonable expectation on the part of any
employer that employees maintain an acceptable level of
personal cleanliness while on duty." Statement of
Position at 9. We conclude that the assignment of work
which involves the handling of, or exposure to, dirty,
toxic, or hazardous materials, as well as, and in view of,
the Agency's expectation of an acceptable level of
personal hygiene, has foreseeable adverse effects on
employees. Consequently, we conclude that Proposal 3 is
intended as an arrangement. Having concluded that Proposal 3 is an "arrangement,"
we now consider whether it is "appropriate" within the
meaning of section 7106(b)(3). In Kansas Army National
Guard, 21 FLRA at 33, the Authority stated that it would
consider whether the negative impact on management's
rights is disproportionate to the benefits to be derived
from the proposed arrangement. Applying that requirement,
we must determine whether Proposal 3 excessively
interferes with management's right to assign work.
The Union asserts that employees throughout the
installation are working with, or exposed to, dirty or "toxic and germ laden materials adverse to their
safety[.]" Reply Brief at 2. Further, the Union provides
a list of approximately 48 "toxic products" that it claims
are being used by employees. Id. at 2-3. Additionally,
the Union asserts that secretaries and computer operators
use products which are marked with "poison symbols" or are
marked "hazardous for humans[,]" and that these employees
"eat their lunches at their desks since they do not have a
lunch room." Id. at 4. In response to the Agency's
assertion that employees using toxic products are provided
with protective equipment and clothing, the Union asserts
that "OSHA standards require the clean-up of the work area
and/or the washing of hands and other areas of exposure." Id. at 2. Additionally, the Union asserts that the
parties have tentatively agreed to a contract provision
which "requires all employees to maintain personal
cleanliness." Petition for Review at 5. The Union argues
that employees could be "disciplined for not meeting [an]
individual supervisor's personal standard of cleanliness." Reply Brief at 6. The Agency asserts that, as there are approximately
2000 employees in the bargaining unit, it would lose "a
significant amount of time (20 minutes per person, per
day)" under Proposal 3 because management would not be
able to assign work to employees during the 10-minute
cleanup periods. Statement of Position at 10. Consequently, the Agency argues, "the negative impact on
the accomplishment of work far outweighs any benefit the
union might otherwise perceive." Id. The Agency notes
that "not all of the positions the union listed require
handling of toxic materials." Id. In addition, the
Agency asserts that:
any employees who are required to work with toxic
chemicals are provided with protective equipment and
clothing. Thus, the employee has complete control
over his or her state of cleanliness. Any adverse
action taken against an employee in such a positions
[sic] is more likely based on the employee's failure
to adhere to safety regulations regarding the wearing
of protective equipment rather than for lack of
After carefully weighing the parties' arguments, we
conclude that Proposal 3 would provide significant
benefits to employees. The proposal would assist
employees who are in contact with toxic, hazardous, or
dirty substances in maintaining personal safety. It is
clear from the record that significant numbers of unit
employees use, or are exposed to, such substances on a
daily basis. In addition, the proposal would benefit
employees in general by providing them with paid time to
cleanup before lunch and before leaving the worksite. We conclude also that the proposal could
significantly restrict management's right to assign work. As the Agency points out, the bargaining unit involved
here consists of approximately 2,000 employees. Although
it is not clear how many general schedule employees are in
the unit, as opposed to prevailing rate employees who,
consistent with our decision above are entitled to
negotiate over cleanup time, it is reasonable to assume
that a significant number of general schedule employees
could, under this proposal, choose to take 20 minutes each
day for clean-up purposes. On balance, however, we find that in the
circumstances of this case, Proposal 3 does not
work. We note, in this regard, that it is uncontroverted in the record before us that for
over 10 years, unit employees have been able to use paid
time for cleanup purposes. The Agency does not assert,
and there is no basis in the record on which to conclude,
that this practice has interfered to any meaningful degree
with the Agency's right to assign work. Moreover,
although it appears that previous agreements provided a
total of 10 minutes per day for cleanup, the Agency does
not assert that the proposal is nonnegotiable because it
provides 20, rather than 10, minutes for cleanup. Finally, we note that providing employees with cleanup
time also benefits the Agency in that the Agency clearly
desires clean employees and a clean environment. The
Agency points out, in this regard, that "[i]t is a
reasonable expectation on the part of any employer that
employees maintain an acceptable level of personal
cleanliness while on duty." Statement of Position at 9. Thus, providing employees with the ability to cleanse
themselves of toxic substances eliminates risks to
employees and possible loss of productivity. Consequently, without addressing what amount of cleanup
time would be so unreasonable so as to excessively
interfere with the Agency's right to assign work, we
conclude here that 20 minutes is not excessive. It is also uncontroverted in the record before us
that "all 2,000 employees have never utilized the washup
time or the full amount of time on a consistent basis." Reply Brief at 6. Therefore, although the proposal would
provide this benefit to all employees, it would be
speculative to assume that all employees would, in fact,
use paid time to cleanup or use the full 20 minutes to do
so. In effect, the Agency requests us to determine
whether Proposal 3 excessively interferes with its right
to assign work based on a mathematical computation of the
maximum amount of time that could be used under the
proposal. We are unwilling to do so, in view not only of
the parties' previous practice but also of our
common-sense understandings of such matters at the
workplace. Instead, consistent with the parties'
practice, it is reasonable to conclude that as the
proposal provides time to cleanup, that time would not be
used if cleanup was not needed. As stated previously, the Agency points out that
Position at 9. We agree. We also find it a reasonable
expectation of employees that they be permitted a
nonexcessive amount of time to do so during their hours of
work, especially where they have been so permitted for
over 10 years. Accordingly, and in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that
Proposal 3 does not excessively interfere with the
Agency's right to assign work and, consequently, is
negotiable under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute. Compare The Washington Plate Printers Union, Local No. 2,
I.P.D.E.U. and U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, 31 FLRA 1250, 1257 (1988)
(Authority found contract provision was an appropriate
arrangement where arbitrator found personal cleanup was
"'absolutely required for minimal protection of the health
of these employees' because there [was] 'a clear and
direct relationship between a careful wash-up' and
prevention of the adverse consequences of contact with
toxic substances."). V. Proposal 4
Section 18-6.
a. Except for employees engaged in fire protection
activities, no employee will be required to work more
than eight hours a day without overtime compensation. It is further understood that if an employee is
directed or required by the Employer to report at a
designated location at a specified time prior or
subsequent to his/her regular eight-hour work shift,
such time will be considered compensable at the
existing overtime rate.
b. No employee will be required to work, including
lunch breaks, with or without his consent, beyond 16
hours, or a double shift, within a 24-hour period,
unless approved by the Garrison Commander.
The Agency argues that the disputed portion of
Proposal 4 interferes with its right to assign work under
section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute by (1) prescribing
that specific duties be performed by a particular
non-bargaining unit employee, the Garrison Commander; and
(2) "limiting the agency's discretion to determine the
duration of the employee's work assignments" by "plac[ing]
a condition on the agency's exercise of its right to assign work." Statement of Position at 11. The Agency contends that the
Union represents several groups of employees and that each
group "has its own Commander who operates independently
from the Fort Campbell Garrison Commander." Id. Therefore, the Agency asserts that "the Garrison Commander
has absolutely no authority to approve or disapprove these
employees' tours of duty." Id. 2. The Union
Proposal 4 is intended to "[e]stablish procedures to
balance the health and well-being of employees working
unreasonably long hours." Petition for Review at 6. The
Union asserts that the disputed portion of Proposal 4 is a
"procedure which [the Agency] will observe in exercising
its authority" under section 7106(b)(2). Id. The Union
further asserts that the disputed portion of Proposal 4
does not prevent the Agency from "assigning employees to
work over 16 straight hours in one day. It merely
requires the decision to be reviewed by the Garrison
Commander." Id.
The disputed portion of Proposal 4 requires that if
the Agency assigns more than 16 hours' work to employees
within a 24-hour period, the assignment must be approved
by the Garrison Commander. Management's right to assign work under section
7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute encompasses the right to
assign specific duties to particular individuals,
including management officials. See American Federation
of Government Employees, Local 1409 and U.S. Department of
the Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground Support Activity,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 38 FLRA 747, 752 (1990)
(proposal providing that commander had discretion over a
particular matter found to directly interfere with
management's right to assign work because it singled out a
particular individual who would be responsible); National
Association of Government Employees, Local R1-144, Federal
Union of Scientists and Engineers and U.S. Department of
the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode
Island, 38 FLRA 456, 484-86 (1990) petition for review
filed as to other matters sub nom. U.S. Department of the
Navy, Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode
Island v. FLRA, No. 91-1045 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 1991)
(proposal providing that activity head designees would
take certain actions held to directly interfere with management's right to assign
work). Here, the Agency would be required to assign to the
Garrison Commander the function of approving or
disapproving employees' extended tours of duty. This
requirement is inconsistent with the Agency's right to
assign specific duties to particular individuals. Consequently, consistent with the cases cited above, we
find that the disputed portion of Proposal 4 directly
interferes with management's right to assign work. Inasmuch as the disputed portion of Proposal 4 directly
interferes with this right, it does not constitute a
Statute. The Union asserts that working beyond 16 hours in a
24-hour period places "unusual demands on employees'
physical safety and well-being [which] should be balanced
by at least a more than usual or cursory look at the
adverse effects upon the employees." Petition for Review
at 6. According to the Union, "[w]orking continually for
this long can be highly detrimental to employees'
health[,] safety and well-being depending on factors such
as the danger involved in the work performed, the amount
of stress or physical demands, etc." Id. We construe
this statement as an assertion that the Union intends the
disputed portion of Proposal 4 to be an appropriate
arrangement, under section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute, for
employees who are adversely affected by the exercise of
management's right to assign work. We determine whether a proposal is an arrangement for
employees adversely affected by management's exercise of
its rights by looking to "the effects or foreseeable
effects on employees which flow from the exercise of those
rights, and how those effects are adverse." Kansas Army
National Guard, 21 FLRA 24, 31. We find that it is
foreseeable that employees could suffer adverse effects
from working more than 16 hours in a 24-hour period and
that the disputed portion of Proposal 4 seeks to mitigate
these effects by requiring that the Garrison Commander
approve such work assignments. Therefore, we conclude
that the disputed portion of Proposal 4 is an
"arrangement," within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of
the Statute, to mitigate the adverse effects of
management's exercise of its right to assign work for more
than 16 hours in a 24-hour period. Next, we examine
whether the arrangement is appropriate, or whether it is
inappropriate because it excessively interferes with the
Agency's right to assign employees. Id. at 31-33. The Union asserts that the "unusual demands on
employees' physical safety and well-being [from working
more than 16 hours in a 24-hour period] should be balanced
at 6. On the other hand, the Agency asserts that the
Garrison Commander, who would be required to approve
extended tours, "does not have jurisdiction over all
employees in the bargaining unit." Statement of Position
at 11. According to the Agency, the Union represents
employees who work for several different tenants--the
Medical Department Activity, the Dental Activity,
Information Systems Command, and the Commissary. The
Agency asserts that each tenant has its own commander and
that the Garrison Commander "has absolutely no authority
to approve or disapprove these employees' tours of duty." Id. Employees would benefit from the disputed portion of
Proposal 4. If extended periods of duty required approval
at a higher level in an organization, it is less likely
that employees would be assigned to work in situations
which would negatively affect their safety and health. On
the other hand, the Agency asserts, without contradiction
by the Union, that the management official named in
Proposal 4 does not have authority over all the employees
in the bargaining unit. Proposal 4 would, effectively,
require that the Agency reorganize its chain of command,
at least for the limited purpose of the proposal. Compare
U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps
Headquarters and American Federation of Government
Employees, Council 240, 37 FLRA 1304 (1990) (arbitrator's
award, which determined that the parties intended "head of
the activity" in their negotiated grievance procedure to
mean the commanding general, had no substantive effect on
the agency's organization and did not interfere with the
agency's right to determine its organization).
We find that the burdens imposed on the Agency
outweigh the benefit to employees from Proposal 4. Accordingly, noting that the Union does not dispute the
Agency's assertions regarding the effect of the proposal
on its organization, we conclude that the disputed portion
of Proposal 4 excessively interferes with management's
Statute and, therefore, is nonnegotiable. Compare
National Federation of Federal Employees and Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, 29 FLRA 1491,
1525 (1987) (provision requiring that the deciding
official not be the proposing official held not to
work because (1) it did not specify any particular level within the agency where the final
decision would be made and (2) it did not require the
agency to modify its organizational structure). VI. Proposal 6
Section 7-8.
a. Agency employees will receive first consideration
for positions. They will be considered before
non-agency candidates are solicited, ranked or
The Agency contends that Proposal 6 conflicts with
its right to select employees under section 7106(a)(2)(C)
of the Statute. The Agency asserts that Proposal 6 is
"practically identical" to Proposal 2 in National Treasury
Employees Union and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 26 FLRA 497 (1987), rev'd
sub nom. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 857 F.2d 819, (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Treasury, BATF). Statement of Position at 13. In
Treasury, BATF, the proposal required the agency to rank
and consider current employees before soliciting or
considering outside applicants. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the proposal "would create pressure on . . . managers to
promote a reasonably competent agency employee rather than
leave a position unfilled during the time it would take to
initiate and complete a late-starting search for a more
qualified outside candidate." Statement of Position at 12
(quoting Treasury, BATF v. FLRA, 857 F.2d at 822). 2. The Union
The Union contends that the intent of Proposal 6 is
"first consideration." Petition for Review at 6. However, the Union asserts that Proposal 6 "does not limit
[the Agency's] right to seek a wide range of candidates." Id. The Union contends that Proposal 6 "establishes a
procedure which, in turn, establishes the sequence by
which management considers those persons developed by the
search." Id. (emphasis in original). B. Analysis and Conclusions
Proposal 6 would require the Agency to give its
employees "first consideration" for positions before
candidates outside the Agency are solicited, ranked, or
considered for selection. In National Association of
Government Employees, Local R5-165 and Tennessee Air
National Guard, 35 FLRA 886, 889 (1990) (Tennessee Air
National Guard), we held that a proposal requiring an
agency to rank and consider unit employees before
soliciting or considering outside applicants directly
interferes with management's right to select employees
under section 7106(a)(2)(C) of the Statute. We concluded
that the proposal would preclude an agency from assessing
the full range of potential candidates when the agency
made its initial employment decisions. Id. at 889-90. We reject the Union's assertion that Proposal 6 does
not "limit" the Agency from seeking a "wide range of
candidates." Petition for Review at 6. Proposal 6 would
require the Agency to consider all of its employees before
considering other candidates. As the Authority found in
Tennessee Air National Guard, "[a]lthough such a proposal
does not prevent management from considering outside
candidates, it does preclude an agency from assessing the
'full range of potential candidates' when it makes its
initial employment decisions." Id. at 888-89 (quoting
Treasury, BATF, 857 F.2d at 822).
In addition, we reject the Union's contention that
Proposal 6 "establishes a procedure" to be used by the
Agency. By limiting the Agency's ability to select from
any appropriate source, Proposal 6 directly interferes
with management's right to select under section
7106(a)(2)(C) of the Statute. Consequently, Proposal 6 is
not a negotiable procedure. As the Union does not assert
that Proposal 6 constitutes an appropriate arrangement,
and as Proposal 6 directly interferes with the Agency's
right to select, it is nonnegotiable. VII. Order
to by the parties, negotiate over Proposals 1 and 3. (3) The petition for review of Proposals 2, 4, and 6 is
Member Armendariz, concurring as to Proposal 3:
I would find Proposal 3 negotiable insofar as the
Agency has discretion under law and regulation to
compensate employees for time spent in personal cleanup
during regular tours of duty or during overtime and to the
extent that the Agency exercises that discretion in a
manner that is consistent with applicable law and
regulation. See American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Madison Region, 21 FLRA 870, 895-98
(1986); National Treasury Employees Union and Department
of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, 21 FLRA 6, 8-12
(1986), aff'd sub nom. Department of Treasury, Customs
Service v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1988). My colleagues state that they "find nothing in
applicable law or regulations that explicitly or
implicitly prohibits an agency from requiring employees to
clean up as a regular assigned duty during the basic
40-hour workweek or during periods of overtime." Slip op.
at 18. I would agree with that statement if it contained
the proviso "so long as the conditions in the above-cited
OPM regulations are met." Similarly, if the same proviso
were added, I would agree with my colleagues' statement
(slip op. at 21) that "we find nothing in 5 C.F.R., part
551, or the FLSA, which would make illegal an agency
determination that employees be required to cleanup during
their regular tours of duty or on overtime[.]" Again, at
22 of the slip opinion, I would make the same point by
noting that there is no basis on which to conclude that
cleanup time cannot constitute compensable work so long as
the conditions in the above-cited OPM regulations are met. In this regard, I would emphasize that FPM Supplement
990-2, Book 550, Appendix I, Exhibit 2, paragraph b.(5)(f)
states that "washing up or showering" is an activity that
has been considered to be a preliminary or postliminary
activity by the courts and the Department of Labor in the
private sector under the FLSA, and that FPM Supplement
990-2, Book 550, Appendix I, Exhibit 2, paragraph a.(1)(b)
provides that time spent in preliminary or postliminary
activities is excluded from hours of work. See also
5 C.F.R. §§ 550.112(b)(2) and 551.412(b) ("time spent in
preliminary or postliminary activities is excluded from
hours of work and is not compensable"). However, if an
agency reasonably determines that a preparatory or
concluding activity like cleanup time: 1) is closely
related to the employees' principal activities; 2) is indispensable to the performance of the principal
activities; and 3) takes more than 10 minutes per workday,
then the employees are to be compensated under 5 C.F.R. §§ 550.112(b)(1)(i) and 551.412(a)(1). FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. Member Armendariz' separate concurring opinion as to
Proposal 3 is set forth after the majority opinion.2. 5 U.S.C. § 6101 provides, in pertinent part:
§ 6101. Basic 40-hour workweek; work schedules;
(2) The head of each Executive agency, military
department, and of the government of the District of
Columbia shall--
(A) establish a basic administrative workweek
of 40 hours for each full-time employee in his
organization[.]
3. In finding Proposals 1 and 3 to be negotiable, we make
no findings as to their merits. Federal Labor Relations Authority