Source: https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/105/jurisdiction/23/aviation-liability-united-states/
Timestamp: 2019-10-24 04:35:03
Document Index: 70183169

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 382', 'art 259', 'art 250', 'art 250', 'art 254', 'art 374', 'art 234', 'art 399', 'art 257', 'art 205', 'art 205', 'art 298', 'art 107']

The United States is a party to the following air law treaties, which have direct effect in the United States:
Warsaw Convention (1929) - Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air; US entry into force 31 July 1934;
Hague Protocol (1955) - Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929; US entry into force 14 December 2003;
Tokyo Convention (1963) - Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; US entry into force 4 December 1969;
Montreal No. 4 (1975) - Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955; US entry into force 4 March 1999; and
Montreal Convention (1999) - Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air; US entry into force 4 November 2003.
Yes, courts interpreting the Montreal Convention look to existing Warsaw Convention case law because the Montreal Convention ‘contains provisions that embrace similar language as the Warsaw Convention’ and ‘so as not to result in a complete upheaval of the “common law” surrounding the Warsaw Convention’. See Baah v Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd, 473 F Supp 2d 591, 595-96 (SDNY 2007). Thus, the Warsaw Convention has persuasive value in interpreting parallel provisions of the Montreal Convention.
In Eastern Airlines v Floyd, 499 US 530 (1991), the US Supreme Court held that under the Warsaw Convention damages for pure mental anguish injuries are not recoverable because such injuries cannot be considered a ‘bodily injury’ within the meaning of article 17. The Court, however, expressed ‘no view as to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries . . . because respondents do not allege physical injury or physical manifestation of injury’. Following Floyd, the lower courts have interpreted the ‘bodily injury’ requirement not to include physical manifestations of mental injuries and require the plaintiff to demonstrate direct, concrete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or anxiety. Even when there is a bodily injury, most courts limit the mental anguish damages to those caused by or flowing from the physical injury. See Jacob v Korean Air Lines Co, 606 Fed App’x 478 (11th Cir 2015), cert denied, 136 S Ct 267 (2015); Bassam v Am Airlines, Inc, 287 Fed App’x 309 (5th Cir 2008); Ehrlich v American Airlines, Inc, 360 F 3d 366 (2d Cir 2004); and In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas, on 1 June 1999 (Lloyd), 291 F 3d 503 (8th Cir 2002). However, one recent case found that mental anguish damages are recoverable so long as there is a bodily injury without regard to causation (Doe v Etihad Airways, 2017 WL 3723233 (6th Cir 2017)). In 2017, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the mainstream view and interpreted article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention to allow for the recovery of emotional or mental damages, so long as they are traceable to the ‘accident’, regardless of whether they are caused directly by the bodily injury. See Doe v Etihad Airways, 870 F 3d 406 (6th Cir 20 August 2017), cert denied, 139 S Ct 1548 (2018).
The burden of proof establishing wilful misconduct is on the claimant and the standard is high. Negligence will not suffice, nor even gross negligence or recklessness judged objectively. Rather, the claimant must show that the carrier either intended to cause the damage or acted recklessly with subjective knowledge that the damage would probably result. Moreover, the US courts apply a subjective, rather than objective standard. ‘[W]hile an objective test asks whether an actor “should have known” of an obvious risk, the subjective test requires, at a minimum, showing that the actor “must have known” of the risk’ (Bayer Corp v British Airways, LLC, 210 F 3d 236, 238-39 (4th Cir 2000)).
The first court to address the availability of forum non conveniens dismissal under the Montreal Convention declined to follow Hosaka and dismissed an action even though article 33 jurisdiction existed in the United States. See In re West Caribbean Airways, SA, 619 F Supp 2d 1299 (SD Fla 2007), aff’d, Pierre-Louis v Newvac Corp, 584 F 3d 1052 (11th Cir 2009). The court noted that article 33(4) expressly states that questions of procedure are governed by the law of the forum and that the forum non conveniens doctrine is a procedural matter. Therefore, the court found that the text of the Convention permits application of the doctrine.
The two-year limitations period prescribed by article 29 of the Warsaw Convention and article 35 of the Montreal Convention is a strict condition precedent, absolutely barring any and all claims for damages arising out of ‘international carriage’ if not timely commenced. As a condition precedent, it is not subject to tolling or waiver and bars third-party actions and cross-claims not brought within two years after accrual. However, US courts have held that article 35 of the Montreal Convention does not apply to bar contribution action by one carrier against another. See Chubb Ins Co of Europe, SA v Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc, 634 F 3d 1023 (9th Cir 2011).
The state law of the relevant state in the United States would govern, subject to a choice of law analysis and resolution of federal preemption issues. However, where the death occurs on the high seas, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 USC sections 30301 et seq, governs. The standard for liability for domestic carriage, however, is generally accepted to be governed by federal aviation standards for matters pertaining to aircraft operation and aviation safety. For claims involving aircraft or engine manufacturing defects as well as claims related to airport security issues, the law is still developing but the standard for determining liability will either be based on federal standards and regulations or state common law and reasonable care standards.
This is an issue that we believe should be governed by federal safety standards, but may be governed by the applicable state law and a duty of ‘ordinary care commensurate with the existing circumstances’ albeit the older cases in some states have found that there is a heightened duty for common carriers.
most states also recognise that persons under a physical or age-related disability, such as minors, are held to a standard of care commensurate with their physical or age capacity while mental disability will generally preclude contributory fault.
The rule varies from state to state. In most states, a cause for contribution can be asserted in a separate action or by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action. However, there are some states that preclude such claims if the defendant is accused of intentional or wilful misconduct. The procedure for instituting a third-party action requires jurisdiction over the third-party defendants and service of a third-party summons and complaint setting forth the grounds for contribution and indemnity.
The rule varies from state to state but the time is generally assessed from the date of liability assessment, settlement, or judgment (typically one to three years, but can be as long as five years). Most courts (including federal courts) establish a schedule for impleader and will generally adhere to it, especially if all discovery is completed and the action is otherwise ready for trial.
The United States is not a party to the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (1952); the Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft (2009); or the Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties (2009). Thus, the liability of air carriers is based upon the applicable local state law applying traditional negligence principles. There is debate, however, about whether federal or state law standards will apply for determining liability, but generally speaking, aircraft damage on the ground is recoverable. Most states will generally preclude recovery of emergency service costs.
While earlier cases applied strict liability principles (many based on state statutes making the carrier absolutely liable), the modern cases apply standard negligence principles and have rejected claims based on trespass and invasion of property rights. But the debate is ongoing as to this issue as well as whether state or federal liability standards will apply.
No. See question 13.
The defences will vary based on the facts and circumstances of the case but some of the more common defences include federal pre-emption of state common law and compliance with federal standards, superseding and intervening cause, foreseeability, causation, Act of war, act of God and sudden emergency.
The Tokyo Convention is the cornerstone of the international law regarding action taken in response to the myriad threats that may arise during a flight. The Tokyo Convention sought to add an element of certainty to the powers and authority of the aircraft commander to address these threats and, therefore, broadly defines its applicability.
The Convention extends not only to ‘offences against penal law’ but also to ‘acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board’. See Tokyo Convention, article 1. While the definition of what constitutes an ‘offence’ is not defined by the Tokyo Convention and is left to local law, the Convention does allow the aircraft commander to act whenever the commander has ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that an act has been or is about to be committed that is a threat to ‘safety’ or ‘good order and discipline on board the aircraft’.
The primary means by which the Tokyo Convention sought to achieve its security and safety goals was to grant the ‘aircraft commander’, who is the ultimate authority on the aircraft while in flight, broad authority to take necessary action in response to acts on board the aircraft. If the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe that a passenger may or does jeopardise safety or good order and discipline on board an aircraft, the Convention immunises the aircraft commander (and crew members and, in specific circumstances, even passengers) from liability for actions taken, including restraining and disembarking the passenger, in accordance with the Convention. See Tokyo Convention, articles 6, 8, 9 and 10. In Eid v Alaska Airlines Inc, 621 F 3d 858 (9th Cir 2010), cert. denied, 131 S Ct 2874 (2011), the court rejected the argument that the captain’s exercise of authority under the Tokyo Convention is to be reviewed with great deference. Rather, the court applied a standard akin to a negligence standard to assess the actions of the captain in disembarking a passenger.
This is another developing area of the law, but it is generally accepted that liability for terrorism or unruly passengers is determined by compliance with federal standards for security.
The Federal Aviation Act, 49 USC section 46501(2) establishes ‘special aircraft jurisdiction’ over crimes committed aboard aircraft and is intended to implement the undertakings of the US in the various international conventions relating to acts against civil aviation.
Section 46504 has been used to criminally prosecute a passenger on board aircraft who, inter alia, had been smoking in the lavatory.
Similarly, 14 CFR section 91.11 specifically prohibits interference with crew members and states: ‘No person may assault, threaten, intimidate, or interfere with a crewmember in the performance of the crewmember’s duties aboard an aircraft being operated.’ See also 14 CFR sections 121.580, 135.129; 49 USC section 46319.
The penalties for violation of these provisions can lead to fines or imprisonment. See 49 USC section 46302 (civil penalty of not more than US$10,000 for each violation); 49 USC v46502 (aircraft piracy); 49 USC section 46507 (criminal penalties for false information and threats).
In addition, 49 USC section 44902 addresses the situation where an air carrier must or may refuse to transport passengers and property and allows the carrier to ‘refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety’. Most courts have interpreted section 44902(b) to give the air carrier broad discretion to decide whether to refuse passage for safety reasons and immunises the carrier from liability for actions taken unless the passenger can demonstrate that under the circumstances known to the airline at the time, its decision was unreasonable, irrational, arbitrary or capricious. See, for example, Cerqueira v American Airlines, Inc, 520 F 3d 1, 15 (1st Cir 2008); Cordero v CIA Mexicana de Aviacion, SA, 681 F 2d 669, 671 (9th Cir 1982); Williams v Trans World Airlines, 509 F 2d 942, 948 (2d Cir 1975); and Al-Watan v American Airlines, Inc, 658 F Supp 2d 816, 824 (ED Mich 2009).
The relevant standards of care for liability for terrorism or unruly passengers are considered sensitive security information and are not allowed to be publicly disseminated. If, however, the incident occurs in a non-sterile area of the airport, then it is possible that state law may determine liability under common law ‘reasonable care’ standards and generally be dependent on foreseeability of this type of event being established.
Courts apply a negligence or fault-based standard where no treaty applies. Fault-based liability is determined by compliance with federal security standards. Ground-based liability is determined by state law reasonable care or negligence standards.
Domestically, foreseeability factors can limit the scope of damages recoverable but most damage claims are governed by state law and not limited for terrorist events. However, if the Department of Homeland Security has certified a security system under the Safety Act:
punitive damages and pre-judgment interest penalties are not allowed;
joint and several liability for ‘non-economic damages’ is limited to an amount directly proportional to the defendant’s responsibility;
damages are reduced in amounts equal to compensation received from collateral sources, such as private insurance and other government benefits; and
liability is capped in an amount equal to the amount of insurance the Department determines the seller will be required to obtain and maintain.
The various treaty, statuary and regulatory provisions outlined in question 24. Additional defences include superseding and intervening criminal acts, lack of foreseeability and no duty, and compliance with applicable legal standards or federal pre-emption (statutory and regulatory) as aviation a highly regulated area by the US government. For in-flight and sterile area incidents, pre-emption for state law and compliance with federal security standards is the main defence. For state-law-based claims, foreseeability and scope of duty are the main defences.
Pursuant to 49 USC section 41712, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) may prohibit ‘unfair or deceptive practices or an unfair method of competition in the sale of air transportation’. Under this authority, the DOT has enacted various consumer protection regulations, the violation of which may subject air carriers to monetary fines or other penalties, or both.
For example, the Air Carrier Access Act, 49 USC section 41705, prohibits discrimination based upon a passenger’s mental or physical disabilities. 14 CFR Part 382 governs air carriers’ responsibilities under this law.
14 CFR Part 259 requires that air carriers have contingency plans for lengthy tarmac delays. The regulations require that carriers covered under these rules (US carriers and foreign carriers operating to and from the United States providing passenger service with aircraft of 30 or more passenger seats) adopt and submit contingency plans ensuring that the aircraft will not remain on the tarmac for over a specified amount of time (three hours for domestic flights and four hours for international) without an opportunity for its passengers to deplane, subject to certain exceptions such as for safety and security. The plan must include providing passengers with adequate food and water, medical attention, operable lavatory facilities and notifications during a delay.
14 CFR Part 250 addresses oversales and protection to passengers denied boarding. If a flight is oversold, the carrier must ensure that the fewest passengers possible are denied boarding involuntarily. Under 14 CFR section 250.2b(a), the carrier must request volunteers to give up seats prior to denying boarding passengers. Part 250 addresses the information a carrier must provide a volunteer giving up his or her seat. If having to resort to involuntary denials, the regulations govern the boarding priority rules the carrier must follow and the compensation a carrier must provide a bumped passenger.
Other aviation consumer protection regulations include rules pertaining to lost and damaged baggage (14 CFR Part 254), refunds (14 CFR Part 374), carrier on-time performance (14 CFR Part 234), advertising and price increases (14 CFR Part 399) and code-sharing disclosures (14 CFR Part 257).
Claims against a governmental agency are governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See 28 USC section 2671 et seq. The FTCA provides an exception to the sovereign immunity generally enjoyed by the US government. The FTCA authorises recovery for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by negligent federal government employees acting within the scope of their federal employment. 28 USC section 1346(b). Liability generally is assessed in the same manner as against a non-governmental defendant, however, there are exceptions to liability under the FTCA. For example, a governmental actor will not be held liable for acts that are deemed to be a ‘discretionary function’.
Claims against state or local state entities depend on the applicable law of the specific state involved.
All actions against the federal government must be brought in federal court. Under the FTCA, a claimant must present an administrative tort claim (via a notice of claim) to the appropriate government agency for adjudication before filing an action in federal court. 28 USC section 2675(a). If the claim is denied, the claimant must file a federal court complaint within six months of the denial of the claim. If no agency action has been taken, the claimant may file an action any time six months after presenting the claim. 28 USC section 2401(b). FTCA statute of limitations requires claim be presented to the appropriate government agency within two years of accrual. 28 USC section 2401(b).
Claims against state or local state entities depend on the applicable law of the specific state involved but as a condition precedent to filing an action, most states and local state entities require some type of notice of claim.
See question 29. Additionally, the United States is not liable for pre-judgment interest or punitive damages and its liability is assessed by the court and not a jury.
Yes but this is not common in the United States and focuses on intentional conduct (falsifying records or documents) (eg, ValueJet (1996), Alaska Airlines (2000) and Platinum (2005)).
In the United States, there is no effect. A party can pursue a civil remedy even if criminal proceedings have been commenced.
Generally no. But there are provisions for restitution as part of a sentence in a criminal case, ordering a defendant to compensate the victim for losses suffered as a result of the crime. However, the recovery is generally sought through the civil litigation process.
An airline’s tariffs on file with the US DOT and conditions of carriage constitute the contract of carriage between the passenger and the carrier, govern the rights of airline passengers and have the force of law. See Pan American World Airways, Inc v Overseas Raleigh Mfg, Ltd, 51 NY 2d 960, 963 (1980); Cenci v Mall Airways, Inc, 140 Misc 2d 907, 909 (NY Sup Ct 1988); see also Edem v Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise, 2009 WL 4639393, at *8 (EDNY 30 September 2009), aff’d, 501 Fed Appx 99 (2d Cir 2012); Seisay v Compagnie Nationale Air France, 1997 WL 431084, at *3 (SDNY 30 July 1997); Factor v Mall Airways, Inc, 1991 WL 196419, at *3 (SDNY 23 September 1991). ‘A properly filed tariff is binding on a passenger, regardless of the passenger’s actual knowledge of the tariff.’ Edem, 2009 WL 4639393 at *8 (quoting Seisay, 1997 WL 431084). However, limitations set forth in a carrier’s conditions of carriage are enforceable only if the passenger has been provided with notice of those conditions.
As with the Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Convention does not expressly address the issues of what compensatory damages may be recovered and who are proper claimants. The Convention leaves these issues to the domestic law applicable under the forum’s choice-of-law rules. In other words, except for the recovery of pure mental anguish and punitive damages - which are not recoverable under the Montreal or Warsaw Convention - the Convention simply provides a pass-through to the applicable domestic law to determine the types of recoverable compensatory damages and the claimants thereof (Zicherman v Korean Air Lines Co, Ltd, 516 US 217, 225 (1996)).
In the United States, the issue of what damages are recoverable can vary from state to state (and there could be certain applicable federal law under certain types of cases). As a general matter, US states allow a broad array of economic and non-economic damages. Economic damages include: medical expenses, costs of living with a disability, lost wages and pre- and post-judgment interest.
Non-economic damages may be difficult to calculate and damage awards may vary significantly between victims and may include:
hedonic damages for the intangible impact an injury has on a plaintiff’s life; and
punitive damages also are non-compensatory and are intended to punish a defendant for intentional or especially egregious conduct. They are available in most states but the standard is high. In order to avoid excessive punitive damage awards, courts typically limit punitive damages to less than 10 times the amount of compensatory damages. Moreover, punitive damages are not recoverable under the Montreal or Warsaw Convention.
Generally the claim is brought by the injured party, but a spouse may have a derivative claim for loss of consortium.
Every state in the United States has modified the common law rule by statute to provide for some form of wrongful death recovery. At the federal level, there are various types of federal wrongful death statutes that provide a remedy in specific situations. See DOHSA. In addition, the US Supreme Court has recognised a common law based wrongful death action under principles of general maritime law. See Moragne v States Marine Lines, Inc, 398 US 375 (1970).
These state and federal wrongful death statutes create a right of action for losses personally suffered by statutorily designated beneficiaries as a result of the death and can include recovery for pecuniary losses such as lost monetary support, and for non-pecuniary losses such as loss of society. In addition, most state and federal statutes provide a ‘survival action’ for the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering.
While the specific provisions of the state and federal death statutes vary and have been differently interpreted with respect to recoverable damages, there are certain common provisions and elements.
Under most state and federal wrongful death statutes, a wrongful death action may only be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person. The personal representative is the person designated or appointed by a court as an administrator of the estate and has the sole authority to litigate, settle and compromise a wrongful death and survival action. The personal representative, however, has a fiduciary duty to protect and bargain for the rights of all the decedent’s beneficiaries and to turn over to them the appropriate share of any proceeds. A failure to do either may give rise to a cause of action against the personal representative.
State and federal wrongful death statutes set forth a coherent and well defined class of beneficiaries who can recover damages. These statutes generally limit recovery to the decedent’s spouse, parents, children and dependent relatives or next of kin. Some state statutes, however, also specifically allow siblings, grandparents or ‘heirs’ to assert a claim. An individual outside the enumerated class of beneficiaries may not recover any damages.
Generally, the types of damages that are recoverable under state and federal wrongful death statutes can be separated into two basic categories: economic or pecuniary damages and non-economic or non-pecuniary damages.
The precise types of economic or non-economic damages that are recoverable depends on the specific statute involved. While the specific provisions of the various state death statutes vary widely, most allow a broad range of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The federal death statutes, however, can be a bit more restrictive and some limit recovery to pecuniary damages.
In accordance with the objective of compensating family members who suffer a pecuniary loss due to a death, almost all state and federal wrongful death statutes allow recovery of ‘pecuniary loss’ for: (i) loss of support or maintenance, (ii) loss of services, (iii) loss of parental nurture, (iv) loss of inheritance and (v) funeral or burial expenses.
Non-economic damages can form a substantial portion of a wrongful death damage award. As noted in question 35, the concept of non-economic damages, however, is abstract and such damages are difficult for juries to quantify and to assess. Although most states now allow recovery of some type of non-economic damage, the problems of assessing and supervising the reasonableness of the size of some non-pecuniary awards, especially punitive damages, has plagued the courts for years. It is for this reason some states have attempted to place caps on such damages. The following are the most common types of such damages allowed:
Loss of society - consortium, love, affection, companionship
The concept of loss of society embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the other’s continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection. An award for loss of society damages is especially difficult to compute, for the jury must calculate the value of the lost love and affection without awarding damages for the survivor’s grief and mental anguish, even though grief is probably the most tangible expression of the survivor’s emotional loss.
Unlike damages for loss of society, which compensate for the loss of positive benefits, a decedent would have bestowed upon family members, survivor’s grief represents an emotional response to the wrongful death. Grief is intended to compensate the survivor for the harrowing experience resulting from the death of a loved one.
In the context of some non-death personal injury suits, courts have permitted recovery for loss of the quality or enjoyment of life (ie, the intangible impact an injury has on the life of the injured person). These damages are often referred to as ‘hedonic damages’. While such damages are a rapidly developing area of law in personal injury litigation, most state and federal courts have rejected the recovery of hedonic damages in wrongful death actions.
Almost all state and federal death statutes permit recovery for conscious pain and suffering in air crash and other traumatic situations. The state and federal statutes denying such pain and suffering damages are the exception (notably California and DOHSA). When allowed, courts require affirmative proof that the decedent: (i) survived the injury causing the event; (ii) was conscious and aware after the injury; and (iii) experienced pain and suffering. Where the record is devoid of any evidence from which it can be determined that a particular decedent survived, was conscious and endured pain and suffering, recovery must be denied. Although eyewitness testimony may not be necessary to sustain an award, there must be some evidence from which to infer that the decedent was conscious and capable of suffering pain after injury.
Punitive damages are typically awarded when the defendant’s conduct has been especially egregious or outrageous. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate (ie, non-compensatory damages), but are viewed as private fines used to punish a defendant’s reprehensible conduct and to deter its repetition. For this reason, punitive damages were unavailable in wrongful death actions because most wrongful death statutes allowed only economic losses which compensated the beneficiaries. Today, almost half of the states allow the recovery of punitive damages for wrongful death either expressly or by judicial interpretation. At the federal level, however, many federal death statutes have been judicially construed to prohibit punitive damages. Moreover, punitive damages are not recoverable under the Montreal (article 29) or Warsaw Convention (judicial interpretation).
This may be awarded depending on the applicable law and jurisdiction. The rate often is set by statute and can vary depending on the jurisdiction (state versus federal). See question 46.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families. See 49 USC sections 1101 et seq. The NTSB is an independent agency of the US government, and not part of the DOT. It frequently makes recommendations to the DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration following an investigation, but it does not have the power to issue mandates to them. The rules applicable to the NTSB, located at Title 49 of the CFR, contain some provisions that are applicable to operators of aircraft, such as mandatory notification requirements in the event of the loss of an aircraft or certain accidents or equipment failures, see 49 CFR sections 830.5 and 830.6, reports and statements that must be made and filed with the NTSB following such occurrences, see 49 CFR section 830.15, and requirements for the preservation of aircraft wreckage, cargo, mail and records, see 49 CFR section 830.10.
‘No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.’ See 49 USC section 1154(b) and 49 CFR section 835.2.
Based on the plain meaning of the statute, the final NTSB Report would not be admissible. However, over the years, the courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding the admissibility or use of factual portions or findings in the final report. Thus, despite the language of 49 USC section 1154(b), numerous courts have held that factual portions of the NTSB report are admissible and only the probable cause finding is excluded.
With respect to the discovery of the CVR recording and CVR transcript, 49 USC section 1154(a) states that a party in a judicial proceeding may not use discovery to obtain any part of a CVR recorder transcript that the NTSB has not made available to the public and a CVR recorder recording expect under certain limited circumstances.
Yes. US and foreign air carriers are required to file with the US NTSB a plan to address the needs of family members in an aircraft accident involving a ‘major loss of life’. The plan must address 18 points such as detailing the notification to family members about an accident, the handling of manifests, the training of support personnel, the management of personal effects, and the coordination of memorials. See Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act in 1996, 49 USC section 41113 (US air carriers); and Foreign Air Carrier Family Support Act of 1997, 49 USC section 41313 (foreign air carriers).
While these Acts apply only to aviation accidents in the United States, many carriers have voluntarily followed their plans in incidents occurring outside the United States.
Yes. 49 USC section 41112 requires certain minimum insurance. 14 CFR Part 205 provides aircraft accident liability insurance requirements. US and foreign direct air carriers, including commuter air carriers but excluding air taxi operators, must maintain third-party aircraft accident liability coverage of at least US$300,000 for third-party bodily injury or death and for damage to property with at least US$20 million per involved aircraft for each occurrence. Carriers, however, need only maintain coverage of US$2 million per involved aircraft for each occurrence for aircraft with no more than 60 seats or 18,000 pounds maximum payload capacity.
Carriers providing passenger air transportation also must maintain insurance coverage for bodily injury or death of passengers at a minimum of US$300,000, and, for involved aircraft in each occurrence, US$300,000 multiplied by 75 per cent of the number of aircraft passenger seats.
14 CFR Part 205 provides different minimums for 14 CFR Part 298 US taxi operators. Such operators must maintain third-party aircraft accident liability coverage for bodily injury or death of individuals at US$75,000 per person and a total of at least US$300,000 per aircraft for each occurrence. For loss or damage to third-party property, the operator must maintain at least US$100,000 for each occurrence. If transporting passengers, the air taxi operator must have insurance coverage for bodily injury or death of aircraft passengers of at least US$75,000 per passenger and US$75,000 multiplied by 75 per cent of the number of passenger seats per involved aircraft.
The US Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It creates a federal system of government in which power is shared between the federal government and the state governments. Thus, under the US constitutional system, both the federal government and each of the state governments have their own court systems.
Generally, however, both the federal and state court system are composed of courts of first impression (generally known as ‘trial courts’), where lawsuits are initially filed and heard by juries and judges, and intermediate appellate courts, where judges hear appeals from the courts of first impression following a final judgment and a Supreme Court that hears appeals from the lower appellate courts only by permission granted by that court.
Discovery is normally governed by the rules of the state or federal court (eg, Fed R Civ P 26-36), and will proceed for a limited amount of time prior to the trial. After the discovery ‘cut-off’ date, the court will hear pretrial motions and the parties will prepare for trial. There are several methods authorised in the rules of court for obtaining discovery from an opposing party, or even from a third party.
Several different forms of discovery are permitted by the applicable rules of court. They include automatic disclosures, document requests, interrogatories, requests for admissions, depositions (live or by written questions), subpoenas for documents or other tangible things directed to a party, and subpoenas for documents or other tangible things directed to a third person.
Many states recognise a cause of action in tort for spoliation. Some states distinguish between spoliation by a third party and spoliation by a party to a case, allowing a separate claim to be made against the former, but allowing only discovery sanctions against the latter. The federal courts, and some of the state courts, do not recognise a separate cause of action for spoliation, but they have the authority to impose discovery sanctions for spoliation in the case in which it has occurred. If the court or jury determine that the destruction was done in bad faith, a ‘dispositive sanction’ (ie, dismissal or judgment by default) sometimes may be imposed. In less egregious situations, the court may instruct the jury to infer that if the evidence had not been destroyed, it would have proven the point in favour of the opposing party.
Not as a general rule. They have been awarded as sanctions under certain limited circumstances when allowed by statute. Moreover, federal courts possess certain ‘inherent powers’ not conferred by rule or statute ‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases’. That authority includes ‘the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process’. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co v Haeger, 137 S Ct 1178, 1186 (2017)
The availability and rate of pre- and post-judgment interest varies depending upon jurisdiction in the United States. For example, in New York, the statutory rate of pre- and post-judgment interest is 9 per cent. See NY CPLR section 5004. However, pre-judgment interest is not available in a personal injury action. In cases brought in federal court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, pre and post-judgment interest is recoverable in any civil action. See 28 USC section 1961. The federal rate is significantly lower than that in New York (at least in recent years) as it is calculated using a rate ‘equal to the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield’.
As a general matter, settlements need not be approved by a court and are not subject to challenge if the settlement was made in good faith. However, many jurisdictions require approval of settlements involving claims brought on behalf of infants or incompetent persons. See NY CPLR section 1207. If a settlement is not approved, it could be subject to later collateral attack by the infant upon reaching the age of majority or by someone acting on behalf of an incompetent person. Parties can seek approval of a settlement even if the claim is settled pre-litigation by commencing a special proceeding.
The effect of a settlement on the right to seek contribution or indemnity varies depending on the jurisdiction. Among the statutes that address this issue are the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the Uniform or Model Joint Obligations Act and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. Some states have enacted their own distinct statutes. These statutes govern such issues as the effect a release of one tortfeasor has on another tortfeasor; whether a settling tortfeasor can recover for contribution or indemnity against a non-settling tortfeasor; and the amount a plaintiff can recover against a non-settling tortfeasor.
Yes. The United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers a wide variety of financial sanctions regulations. These regulations prohibit transactions with certain individuals or entities, nations or regimes. While the OFAC regulations are primarily directed to US persons, which includes entities organised under the laws of the United States, some regulations have extra-territorial reach. Thus, both US and non-US insurers and insureds must consider the OFAC regulations before paying any settlements or judgments.
Unmanned aircraft/drone laws and regulations
The federal government’s right to uniformly regulate navigation is a fundamental precept of our jurisprudence that has long been held applicable to developing technologies. The current structure for regulating and controlling the navigable airspace is predicated upon a uniform and exclusively federal system that precludes any attempt at operational regulation by state or local governments. Consistent with its long-standing mandate to safely and efficiently develop the national airspace, in 2012, the US Congress directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to integrate unmanned aircraft into the national airspace. The FAA promulgated sUAS rules on 21 June 2016, permitting the flight of sUAS at altitudes below 400 feet, subject to various restrictions, such as: requiring VLOS operations; banning UAS operations over anyone not involved with the operation; allowing UAS operations only within visual line of sight; and requiring one operator per UAS. See 14 CFR Part 107.