Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93973/lee-vs-chesapeake-ohio-ry-co
Timestamp: 2019-09-23 16:22:44
Document Index: 723037000

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 24', '§ 51', '§ 24', '§ 28', '§ 29', '§ 28', '§ 53', '§ 28', '§ 29', '§ 51']

Lee Vs Chesapeake and Ohio Ry Co - Citation 93973 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Lee Vs. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/93973
Decided On Jan-22-1923
Case Number 260 U.S. 653
..... section 28 of the code deals with the jurisdiction of the district courts on removals from the state courts, saying, so far as is material here: "any suit of a civil nature at law or in equity arising under the constitution or laws of the united states or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, of which the district courts of the united states are given original jurisdiction by this title, which may now be pending or which may hereafter be brought in any state court may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the district court of the united states for the proper district. any other suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the united states are given jurisdiction by this title, and which are now pending or.....
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. - 260 U.S. 653 (1923)
U.S. Supreme Court Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653 (1923)
1. A case which, by virtue of the diverse citizenship of the parties, falls within the general jurisdiction of the district courts as conferred by Jud.Code § 24, is within the general jurisdiction of a district court sitting in a state of which neither party is a citizen. P. 260 U. S. 654 .
2. The clause of Jud.Code § 51 providing that such suits shall be brought only in the district court in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant does not limit the general jurisdiction created by § 24, or withdraw any suit therefrom, but merely confers a personal privilege on the defendant, which he may assert or waive, at his election. P. 260 U. S. 655 .
3. Whenever such a suit is removed from a state court under Jud.Code § 28, the removal must be to the district court in the district where the suit is pending. Id., §§ 29, 53. P. 260 U. S. 656 .
4. The right of removal under § 28 is exercisable by the defendant or defendants without regard to the assent of the plaintiff. P. 260 U. S. 658 .
5. An action between citizens of different states begun in a court of a which neither is a citizen is removable by the defendant to the district court of the district in which the suit is pending. P. 260 U. S. 658 . Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449 , overruled; In re Moore, 209 U. S. 490 , qualified.
6. The purpose of the Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433, to contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts affords no basis for subtracting from its provisions where definite and free from ambiguity. P. 260 U. S. 660 .
It is a necessary conclusion from repeated decisions, going back to the original Judiciary Act of 1789, that this provision does not limit the general jurisdiction of the district courts or withdraw any suit therefrom, but merely confers a personal privilege on the defendant, which he may assert or may waive at his election, and does waive if, when sued in some other district, he enters an appearance without claiming his privilege. Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 37 U. S. 330 ; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 , 96 U. S. 378 ; Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129 ; Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217 ; United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1 , 237 U. S. 12 ; Camp v. Gress, 250 U. S. 308 , 250 U. S. 311 ; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
Ry. Co., ante, 260 U. S. 261 . The following excerpt from Interior Construction Co. v. Gibney, p. 160 U. S. 219 , is particularly apposite:
Section 29 deals, among other things, with the venue on removals, and shows that, in every instance, the removal must be into the district court "in the district where such suit is pending," and this requirement is emphasized by § 53, which directs that, where the district is composed of two or more distinct divisions, the removal shall be into the district court "in the division in which the county is situated from which the removal is made." Thus, the words "for the proper district" in § 28 find exact definition in §§ 29 and 53, and that definition conforms to what has appeared in all removal statutes, beginning with the original Judiciary Act of 1789. [ Footnote 1 ]
203 U. S. 449 , which, it must be conceded, is not in accord with the views expressed in this opinion. In that case, the facts were like those here, and the same statutory provisions were involved. These provisions were then part of the Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433, but, as respects the matter now under consideration, their meaning has not been changed by their inclusion in the Judicial Code. In that case, it was ruled that the provision, now embodied in § 51, respecting the venue of actions originally begun in the circuit (now district) courts was strictly jurisdictional, could not be overcome even by the consent of both parties, and affected removals accordingly. The ruling proceeded on the theory that this was a right, if not a necessary, conclusion, inasmuch as the general purpose of Congress in adopting the Act of 1888 was to contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The decision was given in 1906, and was a departure from what had been said of the same provisions in prior cases, notably Mexican National R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201 , 157 U. S. 208 , and Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 199 U. S. 252 , 199 U. S. 259 . Much that was said in the opinion was soon disapproved in In re Moore, 209 U. S. 490 , where the Court returned to its former rulings respecting the essential distinction between the provision defining the general jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the one relating to the venue of suits originally begun in those courts. But, as the decision was not fully and expressly overruled, it has been a source of embarrassment and confusion in other courts. [ Footnote 2 ] We had occasion to criticize