Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/346/15/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-10-17 00:00:58
Document Index: 463295088

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 831', 'art 401', '§ 1651', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 1346', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 51', '§ 688', '§ 751', '§ 901']

DALEHITE V. UNITED STATES, 346 U. S. 15 - Volume 346 - 1953 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 346 > DALEHITE V. UNITED STATES, 346 U. S. 15 (1953) > Full Text
U.S.C. § 831d, first began production for commercial purposes. [Footnote 1] TVA used plant facilities formerly used for production of ammonium nitrate for explosives. In the year 1943, the War Production Board, responsible for the production and allocation of war materials, Exec. Order 9024, January 16, 1942, 7 Fed.Reg. 329, instituted a program of yearly production of 30,000 tons a month of FGAN for private domestic agricultural use through plants no longer required for ammunition production. Administration was to be carried on through the Army's Bureau of Ordnance. The TVA specifications were followed, and advice given by its experts. This early production for domestic use furnished a test for manufacture and utility of FGAN.
The particular FGAN involved at Texas City came to be produced for foreign use for these reasons: following the World War II hostilities, the United States' obligations as an occupying power, [Footnote 2] and the danger of internal unrest, forced this Government to deal with the problem of feeding the populations of Germany, Japan, and Korea. Direct shipment of foodstuffs was impractical; available fertilizer was in short supply, and requirements from the United States were estimated at about 800,000 tons. However, some 15 ordnance plants had been deactivated and turned over to the War Assets Administration, 44 CFR, Part 401, for disposal. Under-Secretary of War Royall suggested in May of 1946, and Secretary Patterson agreed, that these be used for production of fertilizer needed for export. [Footnote 3] The Director of
the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 58 Stat. 785, 50 U.S.C.App. § 1651 et seq. (1944 ed.), acting under the power delegated by the President in Exec.Order 9347, May 27, 1943, 8 Fed.Reg. 7207 and Exec.Order 9488, October 3, 1944, 9 Fed.Reg. 12145, ordered the plants into operation. Cabinet approval followed. The War Department allocated funds from its appropriations for "Supplies" and "Military Posts" for 1946; direct appropriations for relief in the occupied areas were made by Congress in the following year. [Footnote 4] The Army's Chief of Ordnance was delegated the responsibility for carrying out the plan, and was authorized particularly to enter into cost plus fixed fees contracts with private companies for the operation of the plants' facilities. He, in turn, appointed the Field Director of Ammunition Plants (FDAP) to administer the program. Thereafter, the Department entered into a number of contracts with private firms -- including the du Pont Co. and Hercules Powder Co. -- to "operate the installations . . . described herein for the graining of ammonium nitrate (fertilizer grade)," but subjecting "the work to be done by the Contractor . . . to the general supervision, direction, control and approval of the Contracting Officer." A detailed set of specifications was drawn up and sent to each plant which included "FDAP Specifications for Products" and a similar TVA paper. Army personnel were appointed for each plant. These were responsible for the application of these specifications, liaison with supply officials,
and satisfaction of production schedules, pursuant to an Army Standard Operating Procedure. Beyond this, operations were controlled by the administering corporation, which supplied the personnel and production experience required. [Footnote 5]
By April 15, 1947, following three weeks warehouse storage at Texas City on orders of the French Council, some 1,850 tons of the FGAN thus resold had been loaded on the French Government-owned steamship Grandcamp, and some 1,000 tons on the privately owned High Flyer by independent stevedores hired by the French. [Footnote 6] The Grandcamp carried in addition a substantial
cargo of explosives, and the High Flyer 2,000 tons of sulphur at the time. At about 8:15 a.m. of the next day, smoke was sighted in the Grandcamp hold, and all efforts to halt the fire were unavailing. [Footnote 7] Both ships exploded, and much of the city was leveled, and many people killed.
police the shipboard loading. The Court of Appeals en banc unanimously reversed, but, since only three of the six judges explicitly rejected the bulk of these findings, we shall consider the case as one in which they come to us unimpaired. Cf. Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 340 U. S. 498, 340 U. S. 503; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 333 U. S. 395. Even assuming their correctness arguendo, though, it is our judgment that they do not establish a case within the Act. [Footnote 8] This is for the reason that, as a matter of law, the facts found cannot give the District Court jurisdiction of the cause under the Tort Claims Act.
notoriously clumsy. [Footnote 9] Some simplified recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative. This Act was Congress' solution, affording instead easy and simple access to the federal courts for torts within its scope. [Footnote 10]
Earlier tort claims bills considered by Congress contained reservations from the abdication of sovereign immunity. Prior to 1942, these exceptions were couched in terms of specific spheres of federal activity, such as postal service, the activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the collection of taxes. [Footnote 11] In 1942, however, the Seventy-seventh Congress drafted a two-fold elimination of claims based on the execution of a regulation or statute or on the exercise of a discretionary function. The language of the bills then introduced in both the House and Senate, in fact, was identical with that of § 2680(a) as adopted. [Footnote 12] The exception was drafted as a clarifying amendment to the House bill to assure protection for the
Government against tort liability for errors in administration or in the exercise of discretionary functions. [Footnote 13] An Assistant Attorney General, appearing before the Committee especially for that purpose, [Footnote 14] explained it as avoiding
"intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative action not of a regulatory nature, such as the expenditure of Federal Funds, the execution of a Federal project and the like. [Footnote 15]"
"the cases embraced within [the new] subsection would have been exempted from [the prior] bill by judicial construction. It is not probable that the courts would extend a Tort Claims Act into the realm of the validity of legislation or discretionary administrative action, but H.R. 6463 makes this specific. [Footnote 16]"
business, [Footnote 17] it was not contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or function. [Footnote 18] Section 2680(a) draws this distinction. Uppermost in the collective mind of Congress were the ordinary common law torts. [Footnote 19] Of these, the example which is reiterated in the course of the repeated proposals for submitting the United States to tort liability is "negligence in the operation of vehicles." [Footnote 20] On the other hand, the Committee's reports explain the boundaries of the sovereign immunity waived, as defined
by this § 2680 exception, with one paragraph which appears time and again after 1942, and in the House Report of the Congress that adopted in § 2680(a) the limitation in the language proposed for the 77th Congress. [Footnote 21] It was adopted by the Committee in almost the
II. Turning to the interpretation of the Act, our reasoning as to its applicability to this disaster starts from the accepted jurisprudential principle that no action lies against the United States unless the legislature has authorized it. [Footnote 22] The language of the Act makes the United States liable
expresses the social purposes that motivate its legislation. Of course, these modifications are entitled to a construction that will accomplish their aim, [Footnote 23] that is, one that will carry out the legislative purpose of allowing suits against the Government for negligence with due regard for the statutory exceptions to that policy. In interpreting the exceptions to the generality of the grant, courts include only those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception. [Footnote 24] They cannot do less, since petitioners obtain their "right to sue from Congress [and they] necessarily must take [that right] subject to such restrictions as have been imposed." Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 309 U. S. 251.
So our decisions have interpreted the Act to require clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions. [Footnote 25] Where jurisdiction was clear,
though, we have allowed recovery despite arguable procedural objections. [Footnote 26]
One only need read § 2680 in its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised care to protect the Government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmental functions. Negligence in administering the Alien Property Act, or establishing a quarantine, assault, libel, fiscal operations, etc., were barred. An analysis of § 2680(a), the exception with which we are concerned, emphasizes the congressional purpose to except the acts here charged as negligence from the authorization to sue. [Footnote 27] It will be noted from the form of the section, see p. 346 U. S. 18, supra, that there are two phrases describing
the excepted acts of government employees. The first deals with acts or omissions of government employees, exercising due care in carrying out statutes or regulations, whether valid or not. It bars tests by tort action of the legality of statutes and regulations. The second is applicable in this case. It excepts acts of discretion in the performance of governmental functions or duty "whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Not only agencies of government are covered, but all employees exercising discretion. [Footnote 28] It is clear that the just-quoted clause as to abuse connotes both negligence and wrongful acts in the exercise of the discretion, because the Act itself covers only "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee" "within the scope of his office" "where the United States, if a private person, would be liable." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The exercise of discretion could not be abused without negligence or a wrongful act. The Committee reports, note 19 supra, show this. They say § 2680(a) is to preclude action for "abuse of discretionary authority -- whether or not negligence is alleged to have been involved." They speak of excepting a "remedy on account of such discretionary
acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion." [Footnote 29]
So we know that the draftsmen did not intend it to relieve the Government from liability for such common law torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of an employee, see p. 346 U. S. 28, supra, of the administering agency. We know it was intended to cover more than the administration of a statute or regulation, because it appears disjunctively in the second phrase of the section. The "discretion" protected by the section is not that of the judge -- a power to decide within the limits of positive rules of law subject to judicial review. It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law. [Footnote 30]
in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of operations. [Footnote 31] Where there is room for policy judgment and decision, there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed -- that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion. [Footnote 32]
conditions likely to be encountered in shipping, and its combustibility was a matter to be determined by the discretion of those in charge of the production. Obviously, having manufactured and shipped the commodity FGAN for more than three years without even minor accidents, the need for further experimentation was a matter of discretion. Reported instances of heating or bag damage were investigated, and experiments, to the extent deemed necessary, were carried on. In dealing with ammonium nitrate in any form, the industry, and of course Ordnance, was well aware that care must be taken. The best indication of the care necessary came from experience in FGAN production. The TVA had produced FGAN since 1943, and their experience, as we have indicated, pp. 346 U. S. 18-20, was not only available to Ordnance, but was used by them to the most minute detail. It is, we think, just such matters of governmental duties that were excepted from the Act.
We turn, therefore, to the specific acts of negligence charged in the manufacture. Each was in accordance with, and done under, specifications and directions as to how the FGAN was produced at the plants. The basic "Plan" was drafted by the office of the Field Director of Ammunitions Plants in June, 1946, prior to beginning production. [Footnote 33] It was drawn up in the light of prior experience by private enterprise and the TVA. In fact it was, as we have pointed out, based on the latter agency's engineering
techniques, and specifically adopted the TVA process description and specifications. [Footnote 34] This Plan was distributed to the various plants at the inception of the program.
Besides its general condemnation of the manufacture of FGAN, the District Court cited four specific acts of negligence in manufacture. [Footnote 35] Each of these acts looked upon as negligence was directed by this Plan. Applicable excepts follow. Bagging temperature was fixed. [Footnote 36] The type of bagging [Footnote 37] and the labeling thereof [Footnote 38] were also established. The PRP coating, too, was included in the specifications. [Footnote 39] The acts found to have
been negligence were thus performed under the direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of planmaking authority from the apex of the Executive Department. The establishment of this Plan, delegated to the Field Director's Office, supra, p. 346 U. S. 20, clearly required the exercise of expert judgment.
And, assuming that high bagging temperatures in fact obtained, as the District Court found, the decision to bag at the temperature fixed was also within the exception. Maximum bagging temperatures were first established under the TVA specifications. That they were the product of an exercise of judgment, requiring consideration of a vast spectrum of factors, including some which touched directly the feasibility of the fertilizer export program, is clear. For instance, it appears several times in the record that the question of bagging temperatures was discussed by the Army plant officials, among others. In January, 1947, the Bureau of Explosives of the Association of American Railroads wrote to Ordnance concerning a box car fire of FGAN. The letter suggested a reduction of bagging temperatures. The Field Director of Ammunition Plants consulted the commanding officers on the matter. Those of two of the plants which manufactured the Texas City FGAN replied that loading was effected at about 200�. Both, however, recommended that reduced temperatures would be inadvisable. It would be possible to keep the product in graining kettles for a longer
period, or to install cooling equipment. But both methods would result in greatly increased production costs and/or greatly reduced production. This kind of decision is not one which the courts, under the Act, are empowered to cite as "negligence"; especially is this so in the light of the contemporary knowledge of the characteristics of FGAN. [Footnote 40]
Weightman v. Corporation of Washington, 1 Black 39, 66 U. S. 49. The courts have traditionally refused to question the judgments on which they are based. Zywicki v. Jos. R. Foard Co., 206 F. 975; Gutowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 127 Md. 502, 96 A. 630; State v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 F. 51.
Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 340 U. S. 142. It did not change the normal rule that an alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen does not create private actionable rights. Our analysis of the question is determined by what was said in the Feres case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2674. The Act, as was there stated,
The Hercules Powder Company held the original Cairns Explosive Patent on the FGAN process, which contemplated a product substantially similar to that finally produced by the Government, including the use of an organic insulator. See p. 346 U. S. 21, infra.
We are therefore not required to weigh each finding anew as "clearly erroneous." They were characterized below as "profuse, prolific, and sweeping." We agree. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a), in terms, contemplates a system of findings which are "of fact" and which are "concise." The well recognized difficulty of distinguishing between law and fact clearly does not absolve district courts of their duty in hard and complex cases to make a studied effort toward definiteness. Statements conclusory in nature are to be eschewed in favor of statements of the preliminary and basic facts on which the District Court relied. Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U. S. 415, and cases cited. Otherwise, their findings are useless for appellate purposes. In this particular case, no proper review could be exercised by taking the "fact" findings of "negligence" at face value. And, to the extent that they are of law, or course, they are not binding on appeal. E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co., 340 U. S. 147, 340 U. S. 153-154, and concurring opinion at 340 U. S. 155-156.
Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 340 U. S. 139; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495; United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall. 484. Cf. Blackstone, Book I, c. 7 (Sovereignty).
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 340 U. S. 555; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381.
United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 40 U. S. 165; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, 317 U. S. 571; A. H. Phillips v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 324 U. S. 493.
In Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, this Court held that the Act did not waive immunity for tort actions against the United States for injuries to three members of the Armed Forces while on active duty. The injuries were allegedly caused by negligence of employees of the United States. The existence of a uniform compensation system for injuries to those belonging to the armed services led us to conclude that Congress had not intended to depart from this system and allow recovery by a tort action dependent on state law. Recovery was permitted by a serviceman for nonservice disabilities in Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49.
In United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, we held that our courts did not have jurisdiction to try a tort action for injury by a federal employee to a complainant because of an accident at our air base in Newfoundland. This conclusion was reached because of the exception § 2680(k) of "Any claim arising in a foreign country." The sovereignty of the United States did not extend over the base.
United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, Insurance Company, as subrogee of the person injured, may bring suit under the Act in spite of Anti-Assignment Statute.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543. United States may be sued for contribution, and also be impleaded as a third party defendant.
It seems sufficient to cite Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 170; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 161 U. S. 498; Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106; Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 234 U. S. 633; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 310 U. S. 131.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(l).
See Appendix, p. 346 U. S. 45, this opinion.
"Water shall be turned off and discharging of kettle commenced when temperature reaches 200� F."
The relevance of the bagging temperature apparently stemmed from certain testimony that large masses of FGAN, if maintained at temperatures of around 300� F., might spontaneously ignite under certain conditions of mass and confinement. The Government proffered extensive evidence, however, that the FGAN shipped to Texas City did not leave the plants at nearly that temperature, and, of course, there is no evidence as to the the temperature at which it was loaded on the ships.
"Packaging. -- Ammonium nitrate for fertilizer shall be packed 100 lbs. per bag. Moisture-proof paper or burlap bags, as described below, shall be used. (Specifications as to size may have to be altered to meet the manufacturer's requirement)."
"has had discussions concerning a loading temperature lower than 200� F. for ammonium nitrate fertilizer, but it is felt that this is a matter of process control, and not properly an item to be incorporated into specifications."
Government's negligence should abide the outcome of this test litigation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of petitioners. [Footnote 2/1] Supporting that reversal, the Government here urges that (1) a private person would not be liable in these circumstances, and (2) even if a private person were liable, the Government is saved from liability by the statute's exception of discretionary acts. [Footnote 2/2]
"Some theory of liability, some philosophy of the end to be served by tightening or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at the root of any decision in novel situations when analogies are equivocal and precedents are silent. [Footnote 2/3]"
and liberalize remedies. [Footnote 2/4] Congress has even imposed criminal liability without regard to knowledge of danger or intent where potentially dangerous articles are introduced into interstate commerce. [Footnote 2/5] But, when the Government is brought into court as a tort defendant, the very proper zeal of its lawyers to win their case and the less commendable zeal of officials involved to conceal or minimize their carelessness militate against this trend. The Government, as a defendant, can exert an unctuous persuasiveness, because it can clothe official carelessness with a public interest. Hence, one of the unanticipated consequences of the Tort Claims Act has been to throw the weight of government influence on the side of lax standards of care in the negligence cases which it defends.
Forward-looking courts, slowly but steadily, have been adapting the law of negligence to these conditions. [Footnote 2/6] The law which by statute determines the Government's liability is that of the place where the negligent act or omission
occurred. [Footnote 2/7] This fertilizer was manufactured in Iowa and Nebraska, thence shipped to Texas. Speculation as to where the negligence occurred is unnecessary, since each of these jurisdictions recognizes the general proposition that a manufacturer is liable for defects in his product which could have been avoided by the exercise of due care. [Footnote 2/8] Where there are no specific state decisions on the point, federal judges may turn to the general doctrines of accepted tort law, whence state judges derive their governing principles in novel cases. We believe that whatever the source to which we look for the law of this case, if the source is as modern as the case itself, it supports the exaction of a higher degree of care than possibly can be found to have been exercised here.
In order to show that even a private person would not be liable, the Government must show that the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. [Footnote 2/9] It points to what it claims are patent errors in the lengthy findings made upon a record of over 30,000 pages in 39 printed volumes, and apparently urges upon us a rule of "error in uno, error in omnibus." We cannot agree that some or even many errors in a record such as this will impeach all of the findings. We conclude that each individual finding must stand or fall on the basis of the evidence to support it. The trial judge found that the explosions resulted from a fire in the fertilizer which had started by some process akin to spontaneous combustion, and that the Government was negligent in failing to anticipate and take precautions against such an occurrence.
It is unnecessary that each of the many findings of negligence by the trial judge survive the "clearly erroneous" test of appellate review. Without passing on the rest of his findings, we find that those as to the duty of further inquiry and negligence in shipment and failure to warn are sufficient to support the judgment. [Footnote 2/10] We construe these latter findings not as meaning that each
omission in the process of bagging, shipping, and failure to warn, if standing alone, would have imposed liability on the Government, but rather that due care is not consistent with this seriatim resolution of every conflict between safety and expediency in favor of the latter. This Court certainly would hold a private corporation liable in this situation, and the statute imposes the same liability upon the Government unless it can bring itself within the Act's exception, to which we now turn. [Footnote 2/11]
On the ground that the statutory language is not clear, the Government seeks to support its view by resort to selections from an inconclusive legislative history. We refer in the margin to appropriate excerpts which, in spite of the Court's reliance on them, we believe support our conclusion in this case. [Footnote 2/12]
Whatever the substantiality of this dichotomy, the cases which have interpreted it are in hopeless confusion; some have used "discretionary" and "ministerial" interchangeably with "proprietary" and "governmental," while others have rather uncritically borrowed the same terminology from the law of mandamus. [Footnote 2/13] But even cases cited by the Government hold that, although the municipality may not be held for its decision to undertake a project, it is liable for negligent execution or upkeep. [Footnote 2/14]
We think that the statutory language, the reliable legislative history, and the common sense basis of the rule regarding municipalities all point to a useful and proper distinction preserved by the statute other than that urged by the Government. When an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which legally binds one or many, he is acting in a way in which no private person could. Such activities do, and are designed to, affect, often deleteriously, the affairs of individuals, but courts have long recognized the public policy that such official shall be controlled solely by the statutory or administrative mandate, and not by the added threat of private damage suits. For example, the Attorney General will not be liable for false arrest in circumstances where a private person performing the same act would be liable, [Footnote 2/15] and such cases could be multiplied. [Footnote 2/16] The official's act
See, e.g., the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., which abolished the defense of assumption of risk and changed contributory negligence from a complete bar to recovery to a factor which mitigated damages; the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 et seq., which gave a cause of action against their employers to seamen, under the substantive rules of the FELA; the Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1916, 5 U.S.C. § 751 et seq., in which the Government set up a compensation system for its own employees; the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., which sets up a system of workmen's compensation for the described employees and imposes liability without fault on their employers. In cases arising under the last-named Act, the Government is a party to judicial review of any award, representing the interests of the claimant. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504.
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337.
"(g) . . . [Defendant] learned many facts, but did not pursue such investigation far enough to learn all the facts, but negligently stopped short of learning all of the facts. What facts it did learn, however, were sufficient to give Defendant knowledge and to put Defendant on notice, and if not, then upon inquiry that would if pursued, have led to knowledge and notice that such fertilizer which it decided to and began to manufacture was an inherently dangerous and hazardous material, a dangerous explosive, and a fire hazard. . . . (1) Defendant was negligent in the manner in which it prepared such Fertilizer, including the Fertilizer on the Grandcamp and High Flyer, for shipment. Such Fertilizer was by Defendant, or under it [sic] direction, placed or sacked in bags made from paper or other substances which were easily ignited by contact with fire or by spontaneous combustion or spontaneous ignition of the Fertilizer. Such bags also became torn and ragged in shipping, and particles of the bags became mixed with the Fertilizer and rendered same more dangerous and more susceptible to fire and explosion. Such negligence was the proximate cause of such fires and explosions and the injuries of which Plaintiffs complain. . . . (o) Defendant was negligent in delivering or causing to be delivered such Fertilizer, including the Fertilizer on the Grandcamp and High Flyer, so placed in paper bags to the railroad and other carriers over which it was shipped, without informing such carriers that it was dangerous, inflammatory, and explosive in character, and that it was dangerous to persons handling same and to the public. Such negligence was the proximate cause of such fires and explosions and injuries of which Plaintiffs complain."
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