Source: http://www.bailagentblog.com/category/bail-bond-case-law/
Timestamp: 2017-12-12 19:39:08
Document Index: 726135362

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 17', '§2', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 17', '§22', 'Art. 22', 'Art. 22', '§1704', '§1704', '§40']

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Entries Tagged as 'Bail Bond Case Law'
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United States Bail Law
U.S. v. Humberto Laura-Cota, 262 F. Supp.2d 1118 (S.D. Cal. 2003) set aside forfeiture of the bond because the Government increased the surety’s risk by deporting the defendant.
In United States v. King, 349 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2003) the trial court, over the government’s objection, permitted the defendant to travel to Nigeria despite the fact that he had shown what the court calls a propensity for flight. However, he in fact returned to New York and then skipped. The Seventh Circuit’s decision contains excellent language on exoneration of the surety by an unconsented to increase in the risk assumed, including “That a material change in risk can discharge the surety’s obligation is a staple of suretyship law; the principle is not limited to criminal cases.” [Read more →]
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Wyoming Bail Law
Application of Action Bail Bonds, 2004 WL 583592 (Wyo. March 25, 2004) reviewed the standards that a trial court must follow in exercising its discretion on what part of a bond forfeiture should be remitted. The Court held that remission of 50% was not an abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court.
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In Ranger Insurance Company v. Pierce County, 2004 WL 1834650 (Wash. App. August 17, 2004) Ranger wrote two separate bonds for a defendant named Rogers. The bail agent on both was Signature Bail Bonds, Inc. owned by Ray Hrdlicka. Signature also wrote a bond for Rogers, and two bonds for another defendant, with Granite State Insurance Co. as the surety. One of Ranger’s bonds for Rogers was forfeited along with Granite’s bonds. Signature issued checks to pay the forfeitures but then called Ranger and said that it did not have the funds to pay and that both of Ranger’s bonds had been forfeited. Ranger paid the Clerk the face amount of its two bonds — $35,000, and Signature stopped payment on its checks. The Signature manager (James Barbieri) told the Clerk to apply the $35,000 to pay the forfeited Ranger bond ($15,000) and the forfeited Granite bonds. After the defendants were recovered, Signature had the forfeitures set aside and told the Clerk that it had paid the forfeitures (using copies of the checks it stopped payment on as evidence) and the Clerk refunded the money to Signature. Signature did not send any of it to Ranger.
Ranger sued the Clerk for negligence in applying the payment (which Ranger had designated for the cases on which it was surety) to the Granite bonds and for returning its money to Signature. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Clerk on the theories that Signature was Ranger’s agent and could direct how the payment was to be applied and receive the refunds on Ranger’s behalf and that the Clerk had quasi-judicial immunity for negligent acts.
The Court of Appeals held that Signature had no actual authority to apply Ranger’s money to Granite’s obligation and that there were material issues of fact as Signature’s apparent authority. It also held that the Clerk was acting in a ministerial capacity and was not protected by quasi-judicial immunity. It vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case. A dissenting judge would have affirmed the trial court.
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Utah Bail Law
State of Utah v. Sun Surety Insurance Company, 2003 WL 21295845 (Utah App. February 27, 2003) held that the bail bond was exonerated because the notice of nonappearance was sent to the bail agent not the surety company as required by Utah Code Section 77-20b-101.
In State v. Cobos, 2003 WL 22361492 (Utah App. October 17, 2003) the surety filed a motion in the trial court to set aside entry of judgment against the surety and exonerate the bond. The trial court denied the motion and the surety appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. According to the Court, in Utah the surety can obtain review only as part of an appeal from the final judgment in the criminal case or by filing a petition for an extraordinary writ.
State v. Sun Surety Insurance Company, 99 P.3d 818 (Utah 2004) held that a bail bond surety did not have standing to appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside forfeiture of the bond. The Utah Supreme Court thus vacated the Court of Appeals holding that the forfeiture should be vacated because notice of the forfeiture was mailed only to the bail agent and not to the surety. The Supreme Court held that only the criminal defendant and the State are parties to a criminal case with standing to appeal, but in a footnote it suggested that the proper method for the surety to raise its objections is by “extraordinary writ.”
In Lee v. Langley, 2005 WL 1831115 (Utah App. August 4, 2005) the defendant failed to appear for criminal charges in Colorado and left the state in violation of the bond and of his contract with the surety. He was apprehended in Utah at his brother’s house by a recovery agent licensed in Colorado but not in Utah. The defendant and his brother sued the surety, bail agent and recovery agent for false imprisonment, assault and reckless endangerment. The trial court dismissed the false imprisonment claim. The Court of Appeals held that the recovery agent was not protected by the Utah Bail Bond Recovery statute because he was not properly licensed, but that his apprehension of the defendant was authorized under the contract between the defendant and the surety and so was lawful and could not form the basis of a false imprisonment claim. The jury found for the recovery agent on the other claims, and the bail agent and surety could not be liable if the primary actor was not liable.
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Texas Bail Law
In Soileau v. State of Texas, 2004 WL 78176 (Tex. App. January 20, 2004) the court rejected a number of technical objections to the state’s summary judgment. The surety argued that the exhibits to the summary judgment motion were not properly authenticated, but the court pointed out that the originals were part of the record on appeal. The surety argued that the record did not establish that the principal was served, but the court had ordered the citation of the judgment nisi to be served, and there was no evidence offered to overcome the presumption the court’s order was carried out. The surety argued that the principal was not properly served with the summary judgment motion, therefore the judgment against the principal was void, and there could be no judgment against the surety without a judgment against the principal. The court held that bail forfeiture is a criminal law matter, the civil law of guarantees is inapplicable, and there could be a judgment against the surety even if the principal had been dismissed.
In re Ernesto C. Casteneda, 2004 WL 572355 (Tex. App. March 24, 2004) denied a petition to review the trial court’s refusal to accept Mr. Casteneda as a surety because he had not paid forfeiture judgments in other cases. Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 17.11, §2 disqualifies a surety in default on a bail bond.
In Cardona v. State, 2004 WL 1347275 (Tex. App. June 16, 2004) the defendant was convicted and sentenced by the trial court, but his conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeals. The State intends to seek discretionary review of the Court of Appeals decision in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The defendant requested bail pending the State’s appeal, and the Court reviewed the criteria to be applied in determining the amount of bail. [Not published.]
Castenada v. State 138 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2004) grants reconsideration of Castaneda v. State, 2003 WL 21509098 (Tex. Crim. App. July 2, 2003) and reverses the result. In its initial decision the Court held that the surety was automatically discharged under Art. 17.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because it delivered to the Sheriff an affidavit stating that the defendant accused drug dealers were in INS custody and the Sheriff verified that fact. On reconsideration, the Court held that it would not consider the Art. 17.16 defense because it was not raised in the trial court. The Court then went on to reject the surety’s other contentions either because they also were not raised in the trial court or because they were not supported by the record.
In Cowboy Bail Bonds v. State, 2004 WL 1879643 (Tex. App. August 24, 2004) the court held that the surety had not complied with Article 17.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 17.19 allows a surety to file an affidavit of its intention to surrender the defendant. If the court refuses to issue a bench warrant for the defendant and the defendant fails to appear for a subsequent court date, the bond is discharged. The bail agent filed an “affidavit to go off bond” but did nothing to bring the affidavit to the court’s attention or secure a ruling on it. The Court never took it up, and the defendant subsequently failed to appear. The Court of Appeals held that just filing the affidavit is insufficient to cause the court’s inaction to constitute a “refusal” to issue the warrant. [Not published].
Kubosh v. State, 2004 WL 2966391 (Tex. App. December 23, 2004) affirmed judgments forfeiting two bonds. After being released, the defendant was arrested on another charge, and while he was in custody, the bail bondsman surrendered the bonds with an affidavit to the court, and a warrant was issued for the defendant’s arrest. Article 17.16 of the Texas Code of Crim. Proc. provides that the surety can secure discharge of the bonds if it delivers to the Sheriff of the county in which the prosecution is pending an affidavit that the defendant is in custody and the Sheriff verifies the incarceration. Instead of following the statutory procedure, however, the bondsman telephoned the jail, told a deputy that the arrest warrants had been issued, and asked that a “hold” be placed on the defendant. The Court held that the bondsman was not entitled to relief since he had not complied with the statute. It also rejected his argument that public policy required the sheriff to verify the defendant’s incarceration upon receipt of the telephone call. The Court stated that it had to follow law and precedent not public policy.
Kubosh v. State, 177 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App. 2005) rejected the surety’s argument that the bond should have been exonerated because the defendant was in Mexico and the Mexican government did not issue a “provisional warrant” for his arrest because of inadequate policies of the Harris County District Attorneys Office. The Court held that the four grounds stated in Tex. Code of Criminal Procedure §22.13(a) were the only grounds to exonerate the bond, and the surety’s argument did not fit under any of them.
Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, 177 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App. 2005) denies motions for rehearing of the Court’s opinion at Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, 2004 WL 2307362 (Tex. App. October 14, 2004) but files a replacement opinion reaching the same ultimate conclusion. The case involves the enforceability of Harris County Bail Bond Board Rules 24 and 25, and the Court rejected all the challenges to both rules except a First Amendment challenge to the part of Rule 25 forbidding solicitation within 24 hours of arrest by anyone who does not have a prior or existing relationship with the defendant.
Harrell v. Bowles, 2005 WL 975378 (N.D. Tex. April 25, 2005) rejected a constitutional challenge filed by sureties who deposited cash bonds. The sureties argued that the Sheriff’s refusal to return the deposits, charging of unauthorized fees, retention of interest earned, and refusal to turn over abandoned funds were unconstitutional takings. The court held that the sureties had not availed themselves of the clear state law procedure to seek return of the deposits and other relief and, therefore, they could not assert a claim for an unconstitutional taking. The plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed without prejudice. It appears from the decision that no corporate surety bail bonds were involved. Rather the sureties were individuals who acted as sureties by depositing funds with the Sheriff.
In Vance v. McRae, 2005 WL 1105076 (W.D. Tex. April 29, 2005) a bail bondsman sued the Bexar County Bail Bond Board and one of its members for various civil rights violations. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. The Board suspended the plaintiff’s license, but on appeal the state court lifted the suspension and returned the plaintiff to full licensed status. The plaintiff filed this federal suit seeking damages. The Court held that the Board was subject to suit and did not have judicial immunity but that the individual member of the Board was immune from suit on certain statutory claims. The Court rejected the Board’s argument that the claims were barred by a “deliberative and decisional process privilege.”
In Ranger Insurance Co. v. State, 2005 WL 1384319 (Tex. App. – Hous. June 2, 2005) the surety argued that Article 102 of the Honduran Constitution forbidding extradition of a Honduran citizen was an “uncontrollable circumstance” within the meaning of Art. 22.13(a)(3) of the Texas Penal Code because it prevented the surety from returning the defendant. The court held that the surety had not established a factual basis in the record for its argument and affirmed the judgment of forfeiture. The court did not address the substance of the surety’s contention.
In re State of Texas ex rel. Jose R. Rodriguez, 166 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2005) held that the County Attorney could represent the state in the bond forfeiture proceeding and that the surety did not have standing to complain that the County Attorney’s simultaneous service on the County Bail Bond Board and representation of the state in bond forfeiture proceedings was a conflict of interest. The appeal was by a request for a writ of mandamus to the trial court, which had disqualified the County Attorney, and the Court of Appeals directed the trial court to vacate its opinion with the writ of mandamus to issue if it failed to do so.
Trevino v. State, 2005 WL 1643184 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi July 14, 2005) affirmed judgments forfeiting two bonds in spite of the fact that the bonds described the charge against the defendant as “Theft by Possession” and the judgment nisi stated that the indictment charged the defendant with engaging in organized criminal activity. The trial court took judicial notice of the criminal case files and found that the acts of theft by possession were the basis for the criminal conspiracy and that all the charges were from the same criminal episode. The Court held that the variance was reconciled and not fatal to forfeiture of the bonds.
Alkek v. State of Texas, 2005 WL 1907778 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi August 11, 2005) denied the surety’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. After the judgment of forfeiture was entered, the surety filed a timely petition for a Special Bill of Review that was denied. The surety did not appeal, but after 30 days had run filed another petition for a Special Bill of Review. Eventually, the surety appealed from denial of the second petition. The Court held that when the appeal period ran after denial of the first, timely petition, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment and therefore the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction over the appeal.
Williams v. State of Texas, 2005 WL 1907685 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi August 11, 2005) and Williams v. State of Texas, 2005 WL 1907686 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi August 11, 2005) both rejected three arguments made by the surety and affirmed judgments forfeiting the bonds. In both cases, the Court held that the bond principal was properly noticed by mailing to the address on the bond and that a certified copy of the bail bond was properly admitted into evidence under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The Court also held that the post-forfeiture appearance and guilty plea of the defendant (Westlaw No. 1907686) and post-forfeiture dismissal of the criminal case (Westlaw No. 1907685) were not grounds to discharge the surety under Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 22.13.
Pruett v. The Harris County Bail Bond Board, 2005 WL 3047062 (S.D.Tex. May 20, 2005) held that Tex. Occupations Code §1704.109 was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The Code section forbad “a bail bond surety, an agent of a corporate surety, or an employee of the surety or agent” from taking certain acts to solicit bail bond business. The prohibited acts were soliciting business from an individual for whom a warrant had been issued but not served unless the surety or agent had a prior bail bond on the individual and soliciting business in person or by telephone between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. or within 24 hours following the individual’s arrest. The Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment of the Constitution. It agreed that the prohibited acts were commercial speech but was not convinced that the restrictions directly and materially advanced the state’s interest in preventing harassment and protecting law enforcement officers or that the restrictions were narrowly drawn. In Harris County Bail Bond Board v. Pruett, 2004 WL 2307362 (Tex. App. October 14, 2004) the Texas Court of Appeals considered a Bail Bond Board Rule very similar to §1704.109 and held that it also violated the First Amendment.
Smith v. Johnson County Bail Bond Board, 2005 WL 3436798 (Tex. App. December 14, 2005) affirmed denial of an application for a license to act as the agent of a licensed bail bondsperson. The Board’s Local Rule 10.1 required such an applicant to meet all the requirements of the Texas Bail Bond Act, and one of those requirements was that the applicant not be a convicted felon. The applicant had a felony conviction, and so was properly rejected. The Court upheld Local Rule 10.1 as within the Board’s authority and not a violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Olivarez v. State, 2005 WL 3501714 (Tex. App. – Waco December 21, 2005) dismissed the bondsman’s appeal because she failed to file a docketing statement. Much of the opinion, however, discusses the payment of fees applicable to civil appeals in bond forfeiture cases. The Court stated that such fees are owed but, since they were not customarily collected, they would be waived in this and all other pending appeals. A dissent agrees that the fees are owed, but would not waive them. The dissent would have given the appellant notice that the appeal would be dismissed if she did not pay the fees and file the docketing statement. [Published].
In Kubosh v. State, 2006 WL 560186 (Tex.App. – Houston March 9, 2006) the State asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the bond and the judgment nisi in the court file and rested its case. The surety agreed the court could take judicial notice of its own file but objected to admission of the bond into evidence. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the State and the surety appealed on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to support the judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court could take judicial notice of the documents, that the surety’s evidentiary objections were not raised on appeal, and that the bond and judgment nisi were sufficient evidence to meet the State’s burden of proof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
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Tennessee Bail Law
In State v. Davis, 2004 WL 892530 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 26, 2004) the defendant was arrested for DUI and posted a $1,750 bond. He appeared as required, pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 hours in jail, the balance of a year on probation and a $350 fine. He was also ordered not to drive for a year and to appear before the court in three months for a “probation hearing.” He served the 48 hours but did not pay the fine or appear for the probation hearing. The court forfeited the bond and ordered the bondsman to pay the fine plus costs. On appeal the State and the bondsman agreed that the bond was discharged when the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced, but the court of appeals disagreed. It held that the statute relied on by the bondsman had been partially repealed by implication because in another statute enacted later the legislature allowed the court to continue the bond if a defendant is granted probation. Since the entire bond of $1,750 could be forfeit, the court had discretion to reduce the forfeiture to the amount of the fine and costs and then to apply the forfeited sum to their payment. The Court of Appeals issued a superceding opinion, State v. Davis, 2004 WL 1056474 (Tenn. Crim. App. May11, 2004), and the Supreme Court reversed the case, State v. Davis, 2005 WL 2396274 (Tenn. September 29, 2005).
In re Guy James Bonding, 2004 WL 1402562 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2004) reviewed the statutory basis for relief from forfeiture under Tennessee law. The defendant failed to appear and a conditional forfeiture was entered. The surety paid the forfeiture but subsequently recovered and surrendered the defendant. The trial court denied relief from the forfeiture on the ground that the request came too late. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that once the bail amount was paid, whether there was a final forfeiture order or not, relief could be granted under only Tenn. Code §40-11-204 and that there was no time limit for relief under that statute. The relief is equitable, however, and the party seeking it must establish a basis on which it should be granted. The case, therefore, was remanded to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine the relief, if any, to which the surety is entitled.
In Graham v. General Sessions Court of Franklin County, 2004 WL 2246195 (Tenn. Ct. App. October 5, 2004) two professional bondsmen challenged an order that bail of less than $4,400 could be made by any two owners of real property in Franklin County. The Court of Appeals held that aspect of the order violated the controlling Tennessee statute, which requires that persons guarantying bail have a net worth in excess of the bail amount, and designating the sheriff or judicial commissioner as the officials to decide whether the statutory requirements have been met.
In re AB Bonding Company, Inc., 2004 WL 2853540 (Tenn. Crim. App. December 10, 2004) dismissed the surety’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of the surety’s motion to remit forfeitures of a series of bonds for the same defendant. After the defendant failed to appear, the surety paid the full amount of the bonds and hired a bounty hunter who eventually recovered the defendant. The trial court remitted the amount of the surety’s expenses in the successful recovery effort but denied relief as to the rest of the forfeitures. The surety appealed. The Court held that the record did not include final judgments entered by the trial court against the surety, that final judgments are a necessary prerequisite to jurisdiction in the court of appeals, and that the appeal accordingly must be dismissed.
In State v. Bradley, 2005 WL 1105182 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2005) the defendant was charged in General Sessions court with several traffic offenses and released on $10,000 bond. He failed to appear and a conditional judgment was entered to forfeit the bond. He was later indicted by a grand jury for the same offenses and the Circuit Court forfeited the bond. The surety paid the forfeiture, but eventually located the defendant in jail in another state. He was returned to Tennessee and pled guilty. The Court of Appeals held that the surety was entitled to return of the forfeited amount because the bond was posted in the General Sessions court and the Circuit Court proceeding was a new action not a transfer of the General Sessions case. The Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to forfeit the bond, and its judgment of forfeiture was void. Only the General Sessions court could forfeit the bond, and it had not done so when the defendant appeared and pled guilty. This disposition of the charges against him operated to discharge his surety. Therefore, the surety was entitled to return of its $10,000.
In City Bonding Company, Inc. v. Hauther, 2005 WL 1159431 (E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2005) an established professional bail bond firm, City Bonding Company, Inc., sued a start-up firm, City & County Bail Bonding Company, Inc., for trademark infringement and unfair competition. The Court granted a preliminary injunction against the defendant’s use of a name confusingly similar to City Bonding Company.
In State v. Cabellero-Grajeda, 2005 WL 1931402 (Tenn. Crim. App. August 11, 2005) the defendant’s girlfriend pledged property in El Paso, Texas as security for the bond. The defendant was turned over to INS, which subsequently released him on another bond. After he failed to appear for trial and his bond was conditionally forfeited, the bondsman discovered that the girlfriend did not own the property in El Paso. The bondsman sought relief because the state had indicted the defendant on another, more serious charge after his release, because the girlfriend did not own the property, and because the defendant was turned over to INS. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the requested relief and also held that the criminal court did not have jurisdiction over the bondsman’s claim against the girlfriend.
State v. Davis, 2005 WL 2396274 (Tenn. September 29, 2005) reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals decision reported at 2004 WL 1056474 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 11, 2004) and held the bond was discharged and the surety released from liability once the defendant was convicted and sentenced. Therefore, the surety could have no responsibility for the fees and costs owed by the defendant who did not appear at a post-sentence probation hearing.
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