Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/1053217/US-Supreme-Court-06-562
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§106', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§106', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§9607', '§107', '§9607', '§107', '§9607', '§9607', '§113', '§9613', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§106', '§107', '§106', '§107', '§106', '§107', '§9613', '§9613', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§106', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§9607', '§9601', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§9607', '§9607', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§9607', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§9613', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§106', '§107', '§9613', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§9607', '§107', '§106', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§9613', '§113', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§107', '§9613', '§107', '§106', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§107', '§107', '§113', '§113', '§9613', '§107', '§113', '§886', '§107', '§107', '§107', '§113']

US Supreme Court: 06-562 | Superfund | Supreme Court Of The United States
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No. 06–562. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided June 11, 2007
Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 allow private parties
to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites.
Section 107(a) defines four categories of potentially responsible par
ties (PRPs) and makes them liable for, among other things, “(A) all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan” and “(B) any other necessary costs of re
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with [such] plan,”
§§107(a)(4)(A)–(B). Originally, some courts interpreted §107(a)(4)(B)
as providing a cause of action for a private party to recover voluntar
ily incurred response costs and to seek contribution after having been
sued. However, after the enactment of §113(f), which authorizes one
PRP to sue another for contribution, many courts held it to be the ex
clusive remedy for PRPs. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser
vices, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, this Court held that a private party
could seek contribution under §113(f) only after being sued under
§106 or §107(a).
After respondent Atlantic Research cleaned up a Government site
it leased and contaminated while doing Government work, it sued the
Government to recover some of its costs under, as relevant here,
§107(a). The District Court dismissed the case, but the Eighth Cir
cuit reversed, holding that §113(f) does not provide the exclusive
remedy for recovering cleanup costs and that §107(a)(4)(B) provided a
cause of action to any person other than those permitted to sue under
§107(a)(4)(A).
Held: Because §107(a)(4)(B)’s plain terms allow a PRP to recover costs
from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic Research with a cause
of action. Pp. 4–11.
2 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
(a) Applying the maxim that statutes must “be read as a whole,”
King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221, subparagraph (B)’s
language can be understood only with reference to subparagraph (A).
The provisions are adjacent and have similar structures, and the text
denotes a relationship between them. Subparagraph (B)’s phrase
“other necessary costs” refers to and differentiates the relevant costs
from those listed in subparagraph (A). Thus, it is natural to read the
phrase “any other person” by referring to the immediately preceding
subparagraph (A). Accepting the Government’s interpretation—that
“any other person” refers only to a person not identified as a PRP in
§§107(a)(1)–(4)—would destroy the symmetry of subparagraphs (A)
and (B) and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing. Moreover,
because the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in virtually
all persons likely to incur cleanup costs, accepting that interpretation
would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero, ren
dering subparagraph (B) a dead letter. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Contrary to the Government’s argument, this interpretation
will not create friction between §107(a) and §113(f). Their two clearly
distinct remedies complement each other: §113(f)(1) authorizes a con
tribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an ac
tion instituted under §106 or §107(a), while §107(a) permits cost re
covery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has
itself incurred cleanup costs. Thus, at least in the case of reim
bursement, a PRP cannot choose §107(a)’s longer statute of limita
tions for recovery actions over §113(f)’s shorter one for contribution
claims. Similarly, a PRP could not avoid §113(f)’s equitable distribu
tion of reimbursement costs among PRPs by instead choosing to im
pose joint and several liability under §107(a). That choice of reme
dies simply does not exist, and in any event, a defendant PRP in a
§107(a) suit could blunt any such distribution by filing a §113(f) coun
terclaim. Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under §107(a)
will not eviscerate §113(f)(2), which prohibits §113(f) contribution
claims against “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settle
ment . . . .” Although that settlement bar does not by its terms pro
tect against §107(a) cost-recovery liability, a district court applying
traditional equity rules would undoubtedly consider any prior settle
ment in the liability calculus; the settlement bar continues to provide
significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that have in
equitably reimbursed costs incurred by another party; and settlement
carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the
United States or a State. Pp. 7–11.
No. 06–562
Two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental
(CERCLA)—§§107(a) and 113(f)—allow private parties to
recover expenses associated with cleaning up contami
nated sites. 42 U. S. C. §§9607(a), 9613(f). In this case,
we must decide a question left open in Cooper Industries,
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161 (2004):
whether §107(a) provides so-called potentially responsible
parties (PRPs), 42 U. S. C. §§9607(a)(1)–(4), with a cause
of action to recover costs from other PRPs. We hold that it
Courts have frequently grappled with whether and how
PRPs may recoup CERCLA-related costs from other PRPs.
The questions lie at the intersection of two statutory
provisions—CERCLA §§107(a) and 113(f). Section 107(a)
defines four categories of PRPs, 94 Stat. 2781, 42 U. S. C.
§§9607(a)(1)–(4), and makes them liable for, among other
“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an In
dian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin
gency plan; [and]
“(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national con
tingency plan.” §9607(a)(4)(A)–(B).
Enacted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reau
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 100 Stat. 1613, §113(f)
authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution in
certain circumstances. 42 U. S. C. §9613(f).1
Prior to the advent of §113(f)’s express contribution
right, some courts held that §107(a)(4)(B) provided a cause
of action for a private party to recover voluntarily incurred
response costs and to seek contribution after having been
sued. See Cooper Industries, supra, at 161–162 (collecting
cases); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809,
816, n. 7 (1994) same. After SARA’s enactment, however,
some Courts of Appeals believed it necessary to “direc[t]
traffic between” §107(a) and §113(f). 459 F. 3d 827, 832
(CA8 2006) (case below). As a result, many Courts of
Appeals held that §113(f) was the exclusive remedy for
PRPs. See Cooper Industries, supra, at 169 (collecting
cases). But as courts prevented PRPs from suing under
§107(a), they expanded §113(f) to allow PRPs to seek
“contribution” even in the absence of a suit under §106 or
§107(a). Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 312
F. 3d 677, 681 (CA5 2002) (en banc).
In Cooper Industries, we held that a private party could
seek contribution from other liable parties only after
having been sued under §106 or §107(a). 543 U. S., at 161.
113(f)(1) permits private parties to seek contribution during
or following a civil action under §106 or §107(a). 42 U. S. C. §9613(f)(1).
Section 113(f)(3)(B) permits private parties to seek contribution after
they have settled their liability with the Government. §9613(f)(3)(B).
This narrower interpretation of §113(f) caused several
Courts of Appeals to reconsider whether PRPs have rights
under §107(a)(4)(B), an issue we declined to address in
Cooper Industries. Id., at 168. After revisiting the issue,
some courts have permitted §107(a) actions by PRPs. See
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423
F. 3d 90 (CA2 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation
Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F. 3d 824 (CA7 2007). However, at
least one court continues to hold that §113(f) provides the
exclusive cause of action available to PRPs. E. I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515 (CA3
2006). Today, we resolve this issue.
In this case, respondent Atlantic Research leased prop
erty at the Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot, a facility
operated by the Department of Defense. At the site, At
lantic Research retrofitted rocket motors for petitioner
United States. Using a high-pressure water spray, Atlan
tic Research removed pieces of propellant from the motors.
It then burned the propellant pieces. Some of the resul
tant wastewater and burned fuel contaminated soil and
Atlantic Research cleaned the site at its own expense
and then sought to recover some of its costs by suing the
United States under both §107(a) and §113(f). After our
decision in Cooper Industries foreclosed relief under
§113(f), Atlantic Research amended its complaint to seek
relief under §107(a) and federal common law. The United
States moved to dismiss, arguing that §107(a) does not
allow PRPs (such as Atlantic Research) to recover costs.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, relying
on a case decided prior to our decision in Cooper Indus
tries, Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F. 3d 525 (CA8
4 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Recognizing that Cooper Industries undermined the rea
soning of its prior precedent, 459 F. 3d, at 830, n. 4, the
Court of Appeals joined the Second and Seventh Circuits
in holding that §113(f) does not provide “the exclusive
route by which [PRPs] may recover cleanup costs.” Id., at
834 (citing Consolidated Edison Co., supra). The court
reasoned that §107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any person
other than the persons permitted to sue under
§107(a)(4)(A). 459 F. 3d, at 835. Accordingly, it held that
§107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action to Atlantic Re
search. To prevent perceived conflict between
§107(a)(4)(B) and §113(f)(1), the Court of Appeals reasoned
that PRPs that “have been subject to §§106 or 107 en
forcement actions are still required to use §113, thereby
ensuring its continued vitality.” Id., at 836–837. We
granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2007), and now affirm.
The parties’ dispute centers on what “other person[s]”
may sue under §107(a)(4)(B). The Government argues
that “any other person” refers to any person not identified
as a PRP in §§107(a)(1)–(4).2 In other words, subpara
2 CERCLA §107(a) lists four broad categories of persons as PRPs, by
definition liable to other persons for various costs:
“(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
“(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub
stances were disposed of,
“(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
“(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
graph (B) permits suit only by non-PRPs and thus bars
Atlantic Research’s claim. Atlantic Research counters
that subparagraph (B) takes its cue from subparagraph
(A), not the earlier paragraph (1)–(4). In accord with the
Court of Appeals, Atlantic Research believes that sub
paragraph (B) provides a cause of action to anyone except
the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe—the persons
listed in subparagraph (A). We agree with Atlantic
Statutes must “be read as a whole.” King v. St. Vin
cent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). Applying that
maxim, the language of suparagraph (B) can be under
stood only with reference to subparagraph (A). The provi
sions are adjacent and have remarkably similar struc
tures. Each concerns certain costs that have been
incurred by certain entities and that bear a specified
relationship to the national contingency plan.3 Bolstering
the structural link, the text also denotes a relationship
between the two provisions. By using the phrase “other
necessary costs,” subparagraph (B) refers to and differen
tiates the relevant costs from those listed in subparagraph
In light of the relationship between the subparagraph, it
is natural to read the phrase “any other person” by refer
ring to the immediately preceding subparagraph (A),
which permits suit only by the United States, a State, or
an Indian tribe. The phrase “any other person” therefore
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threat
ened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazard
ous substance, shall be liable for [various costs].” 42 U. S. C.
§§9607(a)(1)–(4).
3 “The national contingency plan specifies procedures for preparing
and responding to contaminations and was promulgated by the Envi
ronmental Protection Agency . . . .” Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall
Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, n. 2 (2004) (citing 40 CFR pt. 300
6 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
means any person other than those three. See 42 U. S. C.
§9601(21) (defining “person” to include the United States
and the various States). Consequently, the plain language
of subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by
any private party, including PRPs. See Key Tronic, 511
U. S., at 818 (stating in dictum that §107 “impliedly au
thorizes private parties to recover cleanup costs from other
PRP[s]” (emphasis added)).
The Government’s interpretation makes little textual
sense. In subparagraph (B), the phrase “any other neces
sary costs” and the phrase “any other person” both refer to
antecedents—“costs” and “person[s]”—located in some
previous statutory provision. Although “any other neces
sary costs” clearly references the costs in subparagraph
(A), the Government would inexplicably interpret “any
other person” to refer not to the persons listed in subpara
graph (A) but to the persons listed as PRPs in paragraphs
(1)–(4). Nothing in the text of §107(a)(4)(B) suggests an
intent to refer to antecedents located in two different
statutory provisions. Reading the statute in the manner
suggested by the Government would destroy the symmetry
of §§107(a)(4)(A) and (B) and render subparagraph (B)
internally confusing.
Moreover, the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to
sweep in virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs.
Hence, if PRPs do not qualify as “any other person” for
purposes of §107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party
would. The Government posits that §107(a)(4)(B) author
izes relief for “innocent” private parties—for instance, a
landowner whose land has been contaminated by another.
But even parties not responsible for contamination may
fall within the broad definitions of PRPs in §§107(a)(1)–
(4). See 42 U. S. C. §9607(a)(1) (listing “the owner and
operator of a . . . facility” as a PRP); see also United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F. 3d 179, 184 (CA2 2003)
(“CERCLA §9607 is a strict liability statute”). The Gov
ernment’s reading of the text logically precludes all PRPs,
innocent or not, from recovering cleanup costs. Accord
ingly, accepting the Government’s interpretation would
reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero,
rendering §107(a)(4)(B) a dead letter.4 See Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 475 (1911) (“We
must have regard to all the words used by Congress, and
as far as possible give effect to them”).
According to the Government, our interpretation suffers
from the same infirmity because it causes the phrase “any
other person” to duplicate work done by other text. In the
Government’s view, the phrase “any other necessary costs”
“already precludes governmental entities from recovering
under” §107(a)(4)(B). Brief for United States 20. Even
assuming the Government is correct, it does not alter our
conclusion. The phrase “any other person” performs a
significant function simply by clarifying that subpara
graph (B) excludes the persons enumerated in subpara
graph (A). In any event, our hesitancy to construe stat
utes to render language superfluous does not require us to
avoid surplusage at all costs. It is appropriate to tolerate
a degree of surplusage rather than adopt a textually dubi
ous construction that threatens to render the entire provi
sion a nullity.
The Government also argues that our interpretation will
create friction between §107(a) and §113(f), the very harm
4 Congress amended the statute in 2002 to exempt some bona fide
prospective purchasers (BFPPs) from liability under §107(a). See 42
U. S. C. §9607(r)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The Government claims that
these persons are non-PRPs and therefore qualify as “any other person”
under its interpretation of §107(a)(4)(B). Prior to 2002, however, the
statute made this small set of persons liable as PRPs. Accordingly,
even if BFPPs now give some life to the Government’s interpretation of
§107(a)(4)(B), it would be implausible at best to conclude that
§107(a)(4)(B) lay dormant until the enactment of §107(r)(1) in 2002.
8 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
courts of appeals have previously tried to avoid. In par
ticular, the Government maintains that our interpreta
tion, by offering PRPs a choice between §107(a) and
§113(f), effectively allows PRPs to circumvent §113(f)’s
shorter statute of limitations. See 42 U. S. C.
§§9613(g)(2)–(3). Furthermore, the Government argues,
PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under §113(f)
in favor of joint and several liability under §107(a). Fi
nally, the Government contends that our interpretation
eviscerates the settlement bar set forth in §113(f)(2).
We have previously recognized that §§107(a) and 113(f)
provide two “clearly distinct” remedies. Cooper Industries,
543 U. S., at 163, n. 3. “CERCLA provide[s] for a right to
cost recovery in certain circumstances, §107(a), and sepa
rate rights to contribution in other circumstances,
§§113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).” Id., at 163 (emphases added).
The Government, however, uses the word “contribution” as
if it were synonymous with any apportionment of expenses
among PRPs. Brief for United States 33, n. 14 (“Contribu
tion is merely a form of cost recovery, not a wholly inde
pendent type of relief”); see also, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301 (CA9 1997)
(“Because all PRPs are liable under the statute, a claim by
one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for contribu
tion”). This imprecise usage confuses the complementary
yet distinct nature of the rights established in §§107(a)
and 113(f).
Section 113(f) explicitly grants PRPs a right to contribu
tion. Contribution is defined as the “tortfeasor’s right to
collect from others responsible for the same tort after the
tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate
share, the shares being determined as a percentage of
fault.” Black’s Law Dictionary 353 (8th ed. 1999). Noth
ing in §113(f) suggests that Congress used the term “con
tribution” in anything other than this traditional sense.
The statute authorizes a PRP to seek contribution “during
or following” a suit under §106 or §107(a). 42 U. S. C.
§9613(f)(1).5 Thus, §113(f)(1) permits suit before or after
the establishment of common liability. In either case, a
PRP’s right to contribution under §113(f)(1) is contingent
upon an inequitable distribution of common liability
among liable parties.
By contrast, §107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs
but does not create a right to contribution. A private
party may recover under §107(a) without any establish
ment of liability to a third party. Moreover, §107(a) per
mits a PRP to recover only the costs it has “incurred” in
cleaning up a site. 42 U. S. C. §9607(a)(4)(B). When a
party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court
judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response.
Rather, it reimburses other parties for costs that those
parties incurred.
Accordingly, the remedies available in §§107(a) and
113(f) complement each other by providing causes of ac
tion “to persons in different procedural circumstances.”
Consolidated Edison, 423 F. 3d, at 99; see also E. I. Du
pont de Nemours, 460 F. 3d, at 548 (Sloviter, J., dissent
ing). Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to
PRPs with common liability stemming from an action
instituted under §106 or §107(a). And §107(a) permits
cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a private
party that has itself incurred cleanup costs. Hence, a PRP
that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a
court judgment may pursue §113(f) contribution. But by
reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP
has not incurred its own costs of response and therefore
cannot recover under §107(a). As a result, though eligible
5 Similarly, §113(f)(3)(B) permits a PRP to seek contribution after it
“has resolved its liability to the United States or a State . . . in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C.
§9613(f)(3)(B).
10 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.
to seek contribution under §113(f)(1), the PRP cannot
simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses under
§107(a). Thus, at least in the case of reimbursement, the
PRP cannot choose the 6-year statute of limitations for
cost-recovery actions over the shorter limitations period
for §113(f) contribution claims.6
For similar reasons, a PRP could not avoid §113(f)’s
equitable distribution of reimbursement costs among
PRPs by instead choosing to impose joint and several
liability on another PRP in an action under §107(a).7 The
choice of remedies simply does not exist. In any event, a
defendant PRP in such a §107(a) suit could blunt any
inequitable distribution of costs by filing a §113(f) counter
claim. 459 F. 3d, at 835; see also Consolidated Edison,
supra, at 100, n. 9 (collecting cases). Resolution of a
§113(f) counter-claim would necessitate the equitable
apportionment of costs among the liable parties, including
the PRP that filed the §107(a) action. 42 U. S. C.
§9613(f)(a) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appro
6 We do not suggest that §§107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) have no overlap at
all. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 816 (1994) (stat
ing the statutes provide “similar and somewhat overlapping
remed[ies]”). For instance, we recognize that a PRP may sustain
expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under §106 or
§107(a). See, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus
tries, Inc., 33 F. 3d 96, 97 (CA1 1994). In such a case, the PRP does not
incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another
party. We do not decide whether these compelled costs of response are
recoverable under §113(f), §107(a), or both. For our purposes, it suffices
to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by
way of §107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person
pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are recoverable only under
§113(f). Thus, at a minimum, neither remedy swallows the other,
contrary to the Government’s argument.
7 We assume without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and
priate”).
Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under §107(a)
will not eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in
§113(f)(2). That provision prohibits §113(f) contribution
claims against “[a] person who has resolved its liability to
the United States or a State in an administrative or judi
cially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §9613(f)(2).
The settlement bar does not by its terms protect against
cost-recovery liability under §107(a). For several reasons,
we doubt this supposed loophole would discourage settle
ment. First, as stated above, a defendant PRP may trig
ger equitable apportionment by filing a §113(f) counter
claim. A district court applying traditional rules of equity
would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement as part
of the liability calculus. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§886A(2), p. 337 (1977) (“No tortfeasor can be required to
make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the
liability”). Second, the settlement bar continues to provide
significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that
have inequitably reimbursed the costs incurred by another
party. Third, settlement carries the inherent benefit of
finally resolving liability as to the United States or a
Because the plain terms of §107(a)(4)(B) allow a PRP to
recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlan
tic Research with a cause of action. We therefore affirm
8 Because §107(a) expressly permits PRPs to seek cost recovery, we
need not address the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that
§107(a) contains an additional implied right to contribution for PRPs
who are not eligible for relief under §113(f). Cf. Cooper Industries, 543
U. S., at 171 (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U. S. 630 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451
U. S. 77 (1981)).
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