Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/124089013/Order-on-undertaking-Navasca
Timestamp: 2014-07-30 23:16:54
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|Likes: 1Published by J DoeOrder on undertaking - NavascaOrder on undertaking - NavascaMore info:Categories:Business/LawPublished by: J Doe on Feb 06, 2013Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/124089013/Order-on-undertaking-Navasca02/06/2013pdftextoriginal U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIAAF HOLDINGS LLC,Plaintiff,v.JOE NAVASCA,Defendant.___________________________________/ No. C-12-2396 EMC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’SMOTION TO REQUIREUNDERTAKING(Docket No. 22)
Plaintiff AF Holdings, Inc. has filed suit against Defendant Joe Navasca. In essence, AFcharges Mr. Navasca with having infringed a copyright that it owns on an adult entertainment video– more specifically, by intentionally downloading a BitTorrent file particular to the video at issue,which was then reproduced and distributed to third parties through the BitTorrent file sharing.Currently pending before the Court is Mr. Navasca’s motion to require an undertaking pursuant toCalifornia Code of Civil Procedure § 1030. The Court held a hearing on the motion on January 31,2013. At the hearing, the Court
Mr. Navasca’s motion. This order memorializes theruling of the Court and supplements the ruling as necessary.
The Ninth Circuit has addressed the framework for the relief sought herein.There is no specific provision in the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure relating to security for costs. However, the federal districtcourts have inherent power to require plaintiffs to post security forcosts. “Typically federal courts, either by rule or by case-to-casedetermination, follow the forum state’s practice with regard to securityfor costs, as they did prior to the federal rules; this is especiallycommon when a non-resident party is involved.”
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“‘[A]ttorney’s fees’ means reasonable attorney’s fees a party may be authorized torecovery by a statute apart from this section or by contract.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1030(a). Underthe Copyright Act, a court may “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505.2
Smulnet E. Assocs. v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co.
, 37 F.3d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1994).In California, § 1030 of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows for an undertaking “tosecure an award of costs and attorney’s fees[
] which may be awarded” where “the plaintiff residesout of state or is a foreign corporation” and “there is a reasonable possibility that the movingdefendant will obtain judgment in the action or special proceeding.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1030(a)-(b). “The purpose of [§ 1030] is to [1] enable a California resident sued by an out-of-stateresident to secure costs in light of the difficulty of enforcing a judgment for costs against a personwho is not within the court’s jurisdiction . . . [and] [2] prevent out-of-state residents from filingfrivolous lawsuits against California residents.”
Alshafie, v. Lallande
, 171 Cal. App. 4th 421, 428(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a district court’simposition of a costs bond pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1030.
See Kourtis v.Cameron
, 358 Fed. Appx. 863, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2009).In the instant case, there should be no dispute that the first criteria under § 1030 has beenmet. In its complaint, AF alleges that it “is a limited liability company organized ane existing underthe laws of the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis.” FAC ¶ 2.As for the second criteria, it is significant that § 1030 requires only a “reasonable possibility”that the defendant will prevail. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1030(b). As Mr. Navasca argues, thislanguage on its face appears to set a relatively low standard. That the standard is relatively low – orat least not as high as suggested by AF – is also supported by the case law. For example, in
Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan
, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1427 (2001), a state appellate court noted that,under § 1030, a defendant is “not required to show that there [is] no possibility that [the plaintiff]could win at trial, but only that it [is] reasonably possible that [the defendant will] win.”
at 1432.Nevertheless, even if a higher standard were to apply (
, a reasonable probability orlikelihood) as AF contends (in order to insure reasonable access of foreign corporations to courts inCalifornia), the Court concludes that Mr. Navasca has met that threshold. First, based on the
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The Court grants AF’s motion to file a sur-reply.
Docket No. 43 (motion).3evidence of record, there are serious questions as to whether AF has standing to sue for infringementbecause of the “Alan Cooper” issue. Notably, in spite of a declaration from an Alan Coopersuggesting that AF or persons or entities affiliated with AF have fraudulently used his identity, AFhas made no effort to provide any evidence to counter the declaration. AF could have, but did not,present a declaration from its own Alan Cooper or a declaration from its manager and/or CEO. Asthe Court stated at the hearing, even if there was a sufficient transfer for purposes of the CopyrightAct, which focuses on proper authorization by the copyright transferor, not the transferee, that is aseparate issue from (1) whether AF has Article III standing in this Court to assert infringement basedon claimed ownership of the copyright at issue and (2) whether AF is a real party in interest withcapacity and authority to sue.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. The “Alan Cooper” issue raises seriousquestions that remain unanswered.Second, even if standing and capacity/authorization to sue were not a problem, there is areasonable possibility (or even probability) that Mr. Navasca was not the infringer – at least basedon the evidence of record. Most notably, it is undisputed that “[t]here are five additional co-occupants in [Mr. Navasca’s] home, each with authorized access to the internet connection.”Navasa Decl. ¶ 4. In response, AF argues that Mr. Navasca was the most likely infringer out of thehousehold because “Plaintiff’s content attracts a specific demographic, and Joe Navasca was themember of the household who best fit that demographic.” Opp’n at 4. But while that makes Mr.Navasca a possible infringer, that does not preclude the reasonable possibility (or even probability)that Mr. Navasca was not the infringer. Indeed, it appears to be undisputed that “there are still threeother males in [Mr. Navasca’s] immediate household, including two others between the ages of 30-45, just like [himself].” Reply at 5.AF argues still that Mr. Navasca was likely the infringer because, as he testified during hisdeposition, (1) he “works in technical support at a gaming company” and (2) “he is ‘the mostknowledgeable person in his household about computers.’”
Sur-Reply at 12. But this argument isnot very compelling because one does not need to be tech savvy in order to download information
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