Source: http://ri.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190823_0000195.RI.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 09:55:09
Document Index: 181741532

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11']

FindACase™ | Caterino v. State
Caterino v. State
Before this Court is Nicholas Caterino's (Petitioner) Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Application). Petitioner asserts that his conviction should be vacated because the statute under which he was convicted in State of Rhode Island v. Nicholas Caterino, P2-2016-1989A (the underlying criminal case) is unconstitutional in that it fails to describe a crime and prescribe a penalty therein.
On July 1, 2016, Petitioner was charged by criminal information with one count of third degree sexual assault under G.L. 1956 § 11-37-6, which was alleged to have occurred between September 1 and 30, 2015, and one count of third degree sexual assault under § 11-37-6, which was alleged to have occurred between October 1 and 31, 2015. On September 26, 2018, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to both counts. As to the first count of third degree sexual assault, he was sentenced to five years, with one year to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), the balance of four years suspended, with probation and various other conditions. As to the second count of third degree sexual assault, he was sentenced to a two-and-a-half year suspended sentence with probation. The trial justice ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.
On February 5, 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se Application for Post-Conviction Relief, together with a supporting memorandum asking this Court to vacate his conviction for third degree sexual assault in the underlying criminal case, alleging that his conviction is unconstitutional.
On May 6, 2019, Petitioner's court-appointed counsel filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief. On May 24, 2019, the Court provided notice to the State and Petitioner's court-appointed counsel that Petitioner's request for relief would be considered by this Court in the context of a summary disposition. The parties thereafter acknowledged that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve the issues before this Court. The State filed an objection and supporting memorandum thereto on August 5, 2019.
When ruling on an application for post-conviction relief, if the court considers matters outside the pleadings, the court should "treat the [party's] motion as though it were a motion for summary disposition" as opposed to a motion to dismiss. Palmigiano v. State, 120 R.I. 402, 406, 387 A.2d 1382, 1385 (1978). As will be discussed, this Court has considered Petitioner's criminal information and plea form, which are outside the pleadings in the instant civil action. Accordingly, this Court will review Petitioner's Application in the context of a summary disposition motion under § 10-9.1-6(c), which "'closely resembles' a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 652 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Palmigiano, 120 R.I. at 405, 387 A.2d at 1384).
Petitioner asserts that his conviction violated his due process rights under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution because the single statute of conviction, § 11-37-6, fails to state what conduct qualifies as a crime and fails to provide a penalty. In response, the State contends that Petitioner cannot prove that § 11-37-6 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt because Chapter 37 of Title 11 of the Rhode Island General Laws, when read as a whole, clearly and unambiguously provides a description of the criminalized conduct and states a penalty.
Petitioner was convicted of two counts of third degree sexual assault in violation of § 11-37-6. Section 11-37-6 provides:
"A person is guilty of third degree sexual assault if he or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual penetration with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under the age of consent, ...