Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190726_0002178.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 12:44:44
Document Index: 562984678

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 405', '§ 1614', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405']

Gray Helms Jackson, Plaintiff,
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).[2] Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”).[3] For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for an award of benefits for the relevant time period at issue in this matter.
In March 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning February 25, 2011. [R. 192-201.] The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (“the Administration”). [R. 68-79, 82-109.] Plaintiff filed a request for hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and, on June 20, 2013, ALJ Clinton C. Hicks conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's claims. [R. 35-65.]
On September 13, 2013, the ALJ issued his decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled. [R. 18-28.] Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, which denied review on November 13, 2014. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff commenced an action for judicial review in this Court on December 31, 2014, and, on January 27, 2016, this Court remanded the matter to the Commissioner. [R. 585-616.] Plaintiff filed a subsequent application for a period of disability and DIB as well as SSI on August 9, 2015. [R. 457.]
On December 8, 2015, the Commissioner issued a favorable determination finding Plaintiff's disability began on August 1, 2015. [R. 581-84.] The State agency medical consultant in this subsequent claim opined that Plaintiff could perform a range of simple, unskilled, light work that does not involve ongoing interaction with the general public. [R. 545-80.] The State agency noted Plaintiff turned 55 on January 27, 2016, and applied the borderline age regulation to find Plaintiff was disabled beginning August 1, 2015. [R. 561.] Thus, the relevant period of adjudication is from Plaintiff's alleged onset date of February 25, 2011, through July 31, 2015. [R. 457.]
The Appeals Council issued an Order remanding the case to the ALJ for further proceedings, directing the ALJ to evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments and the opinions of Dr. Goldsmith, Dr. Waller, and Dr. Mika, as well as Lisa Fowler, a clinical social worker. [R. 619-23.] Plaintiff testified before the ALJ in a subsequent hearing on December 7, 2016, [R. 482-511], and, on March 8, 2017, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the Act from February 25, 2011, through July 31, 2015. [R. 457-72.]
At Step 1[4], the ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) on September 30, 2017, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 25, 2011, the alleged onset date. [R. 460, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: viral hepatitis, possible hepatic encephalopathy, grade II, stage II to III septal fibrosis, osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, status post right total knee arthroplasty, chronic GERD, atrial fibrillation, status post pacemaker implantation, sick sinus syndrome, chronic hypertension, as well as depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and a bipolar disorder. [R. 460, Finding 3.][5] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments. [R. 460-62, Finding 4.]
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform “light” work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is to have a sit/stand option with the ability to change position twice an hour. He is not to climb any ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He is to avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights. Further, he can stay on task for two hours at a time and he is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a low stress environment, defined as no constant change in routine with no crisis situations and no complex decision-making.
[R. 462, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. [R. 470, Finding 6.] The ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”), there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 471, Finding 10.] Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from February 25, 2011, through July 31, 2015. [R. 472, Finding 11.] Additionally, the ALJ found that, based on the application for SSI protectively filed on March 31, 2011, Plaintiff was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. [Id.] The ALJ directed that the finding of disability as of August 1, 2015, was not disturbed. [Id.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but the Appeals Council declined review. [R. 434-40.] Plaintiff filed an action for judicial review on August 2, 2018. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff contends the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains multiple legal errors warranting the reversal and remand of the case. [Doc. 12.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical evidence of record in determining Plaintiff's RFC.[6] [Id. at 10-15.] Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's testimony that he is unable to work due to his mental impairments in accordance with SSR 16-3p. [Id. at 16-18.] Lastly, Plaintiff contends that there is conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT based on a flawed hypothetical that failed to include Plaintiff's moderate limitations in interacting with others and a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. [Id. at 18-21.] Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse this matter solely for a calculation and award of benefits for the period at issue in this case, February 25, 2011, through July 31, 2015. [Id. at 21.]
The Commissioner contends the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence of record that supports the Commissioner's final decision that Plaintiff's mental impairment did not preclude him from performing other light work in the national economy. [Doc. 14.] Specifically, the Commissioner contends the ALJ adequately considered the medical opinions in determining Plaintiff's RFC and, to the extent the ALJ made an error in discussing the evidence and assigning weight to the medical opinions, remand is not warranted because the ALJ's determination would not change. [Id. at 10-13.] The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ adequately considered Plaintiff's testimony. [Id. at 13-14.] Lastly, the Commissioner contends there is no conflict between the VE's testimony and Plaintiff's ability to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks because it is compatible with the mental demands of a laundry sorter. [Id. at 15-17.]
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might reasonably have been different had the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the evidence when the claim was before the Commissioner; and (4) the claimant made at least a general showing of the nature of the new evidence to the reviewing court. Borders v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954, 955 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1983); Sims v. Harris, 631 F.2d 26, 28 (4th Cir. 1980); King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979)), superseded by amendment to statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as recognized in Wilkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 769, 774 (4th Cir. 1991).[7] With remand under sentence six, the parties must return to the court after remand to file modified findings of fact. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. The reviewing court retains jurisdiction pending remand and does not enter a final judgment until after the completion of remand proceedings. See Allen v. Chater, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision) (holding that an order remanding a claim for Social Security benefits pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is not a final order).