Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97142/holiday-vs-johnston
Timestamp: 2017-12-13 07:36:36
Document Index: 634685413

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 757', '§ 756', '§ 758', '§ 759', '§ 761', '§ 262', '§ 377']

Holiday Vs Johnston - Citation 97142 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Holiday Vs. Johnston - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97142
Case Number 313 U.S. 342
Appellant Holiday
.....jeopardy. p. 313 u. s. 349 . 2. a prisoner, while serving a valid sentence cannot, by habeas corpus, attack a second sentence for the same offense timed to begin at the end of the first, although the second must be vacated before he can apply for parole under the first. p. 313 u. s. 349 . his remedy is to apply for vacation of the sentence and for a resentence in conformity with the statute under which he was adjudged guilty. 3. petitions for habeas corpus are not to be regarded meticulously; and, even if insufficient in substance, may be amended in the interest of justice. p. 313 u. s. 350 . in the present instance, the district judge, by regarding the petition, traverse, and return as making issues of fact justifying the taking of evidence, did.....
Holiday v. Johnston - 313 U.S. 342 (1941)
U.S. Supreme Court Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941)
1. The erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense of which the accused has been convicted, or as to which he has pleaded guilty, does not constitute double jeopardy. P. 313 U. S. 349 .
2. A prisoner, while serving a valid sentence cannot, by habeas corpus, attack a second sentence for the same offense timed to begin at the end of the first, although the second must be vacated before he can apply for parole under the first. P. 313 U. S. 349 .
3. Petitions for habeas corpus are not to be regarded meticulously; and, even if insufficient in substance, may be amended in the interest of justice. P. 313 U. S. 350 .
4. Under the habeas corpus statute, the district judge must himself hear the prisoner's testimony and, in the light of it and other testimony, must find the facts and base his disposition of the case upon his findings. P. 313 U. S. 351 .
5. Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with references to Masters, has no application to habeas corpus cases. P. 313 U. S. 353 .
The petitioner applied to the District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition alleged that he was unlawfully detained by the respondent in Alcatraz Penitentiary; that he had been indicted in the District Court for North Dakota under an Act of May 18, 1934, § 2, [ Footnote 1 ] the indictment being in two counts, one for robbery of an insured bank and the other for jeopardizing the lives of officials of the bank in the course of the robbery; that he pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to ten years under the first and to fifteen years under the second, "commencing at the expiration of the sentence imposed under count one." The petition charged that he was unlawfully detained because he was tried without the advice and assistance of counsel, was ignorant of his right to have counsel, although unable to pay for an attorney, was not advised by the court that he was entitled to counsel, and was unable to, and did not, intelligently waive his constitutional right to have counsel. The petition alleged that the two counts of the indictment charged but one offense, and that the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the imposition of the consecutive sentences.
The petitioner moved the Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, which was denied. He then petitioned this Court for certiorari, [ Footnote 2 ] Ex parte Holiday, 312 U.S. 673, and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Both petitions were granted, and counsel was appointed to represent him in this Court.
1. The respondent admits that § 2 of the Act of May 18, 1934, supra, does not create two separate crimes, but prescribes alternative sentences for the same crime depending upon the manner of its perpetration. This concession, however, does not aid the petitioner. The erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense of which the accused has been convicted, or as to which he has pleaded guilty, does not constitute double jeopardy. And if, as the petitioner contends, the first sentence of ten years is valid and the second void, he is no better off. Conceding, without deciding, that he is right in saying the first sentence is the only valid one, he has not served that sentence, and is not entitled now to be discharged from custody under it. He urges that, if the second sentence is adjudged void, he will now be entitled to apply for parole under the first. But we have recently decided that habeas corpus cannot be awarded to afford a prisoner such an opportunity. [ Footnote 3 ] His remedy is to apply for vacation of the sentence and a resentence in conformity to the statute under which he was adjudged guilty.
Revised Statutes §§ 757, 758, and 761 [ Footnote 4 ] prescribe the procedure to be followed. The first requires that
and the second that: "The person making the return shall at the same time bring the body of the party before the judge who granted the writ." [ Footnote 5 ] The third provides that:
It is plain, as the respondent concedes, that a commissioner is not a judge, and that the command of the court's writ that the petitioner appear before that officer was not a literal compliance with the statute. The respondent argues, however, that the writ in effect referred the cause to the commissioner as a master whose function was to take the testimony and submit it, together with his findings and conclusions, for such action as the court might take upon such submission. The argument runs that this practice is, in substance, equivalent to a hearing before the judge in his proper person, has long been followed in the district courts in California, has not incurred the criticism of this Court in cases brought here where it was followed, is a convenient procedure, tends to expedite the disposition of such cases, is in accordance with longstanding equity practice, and is countenanced by Rule 53(a)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. [ Footnote 6 ]
We cannot sanction a departure from the plain mandate of the statute on any of the grounds advanced. We have recently emphasized the broad and liberal policy adopted by Congress respecting the office and use of the writ of habeas corpus in the interest of the protection of individual freedom to the end that the very truth and substance of the cause of a person's detention may be disclosed and justice be done. [ Footnote 7 ] The Congress has seen fit to lodge in
It is said that the procedure tends to expedite the disposition of habeas corpus cases. The record in this case would seem to contradict the argument. [ Footnote 8 ] And when it is remembered that R.S. § 756 [ Footnote 9 ] required that the return
in this case be made within three days of the issue of the writ, and that R.S. § 758, supra, required the respondent to produce the body at the same time he made the return; that R.S. § 759 [ Footnote 10 ] commands that the hearing shall be set not more than five days after the return, and that R.S. § 761, supra, enjoins the judge to proceed in a summary way to hear the cause and dispose of the petitioner, it is difficult to see how the comparatively cumbersome and time-consuming procedure of reference, report, and hearing upon the report can be thought a more expeditious method than that prescribed by the statute.
We have jurisdiction under § 262 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 377; In re 620 Church Street Corporation, 299 U. S. 24 .
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 .