Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/461/253/400565/
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 09:37:14
Document Index: 583752801

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1343', '§ 1981', '§ 1331', '§ 1332', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1332']

John N. Flood, M.d., Plaintiff-appellant, v. John Margis, Jr., et al., Defendants-appellees, 461 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1972 › John N. Flood, M.d., Plaintiff-appellant, v. John Margis, Jr., et al., Defendants-appellees
John N. Flood, M.d., Plaintiff-appellant, v. John Margis, Jr., et al., Defendants-appellees, 461 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1972)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 461 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1972) Argued April 11, 1972. Decided May 23, 1972
In a decision and order reported sub nom. Flood v. Margis et al., 322 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1971), the district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court did not rule on defendants' motion to abate the action pending the outcome of pending state court proceedings, or on their motion for increased security for costs. Flood appeals.
In the complaint upon which this appeal is based, Flood invokes district court jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act (28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985), federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331), and diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332). The central theme of this pleading is the refusal of Caledonia's officials to renew Flood's license for the operation of his mobile home and park business. But the grievances adverted to in the pleading range over a broad spectrum of transactions going back as far as 1955.
The grievances pertaining to the raising of license fees and the refusal to renew Flood's license are, for the most part, stated in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of the complaint. They are dealt with in section VI of the district court's opinion. (322 F. Supp. 1086, at 1093-1094). The district court ruled that these paragraphs did not state a claim under the Civil Rights Act because the grievances related only to property rights. The district court also held that these paragraphs did not state a claim cognizable under federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) because the grievances pertain only to violations of state law with respect to hearings and postings and are therefore matters exclusively for the state courts.
The district court rendered its decision on January 15, 1971. On March 23, 1972, in Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424, the Supreme Court held that property rights as well as personal liberties may be vindicated under the Civil Rights Act. It follows that the reason given by the district court for ruling that the paragraphs of the complaint now under discussion fail to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, is no longer sound. With regard to paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of the new complaint, the district court had jurisdiction under that Act.
With regard to federal question jurisdiction, Flood alleged that the raising of license fees, and the refusal to renew his license, was in violation of state law and deprived him of due process. The district court held that where the asserted deprivation of due process results from the alleged violation of a state law no federal question under the Fourteenth Amendment is involved. The court relied primarily upon Barney v. New York, 193 U.S. 430, 24 S. Ct. 502, 48 L. Ed. 737 (1904), although conceding that Barney had often been criticized, and upon East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949). The reasoning of these cases is that the Fourteenth Amendment, with its Due Process Clause, is directed against state action, and if public officials proceed in violation of state law, this does not constitute state action, and the controversy must be dealt with in the state courts.
The Barney decision has been so distinguished and qualified that it is no longer authoritative. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25-26, 80 S. Ct. 519, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960); Home Telephone and Telegraph Company v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 294, 33 S. Ct. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510 (1912). The proper rule, as stated in Home, is as follows:
". . . where a state officer, under an assertion of power from the state is doing an act which could only be done upon the predicate that there was such power, the inquiry as to the repugnancy of the act to the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be avoided by insisting that there is a want of power." (227 U.S., at 288, 33 S. Ct. at 315).2
We conclude that paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of the new complaint properly invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.3
The district court did not deal with the question of whether these paragraphs of the complaint are cognizable under the court's diversity jurisdiction. (28 U.S.C. § 1332). For present purposes we assume that they are.
Since Caledonia is a municipal corporation, it is not a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192, 81 S. Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961). The action should accordingly be dismissed in toto against that defendant insofar as the Civil Rights Act jurisdiction is concerned. We do not now undertake to say whether, insofar as federal question and diversity jurisdiction are concerned, the action should be dismissed against Caledonia, and we leave those questions to the district court on remand.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-172, 81 S. Ct. 473, 476, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court said:
"There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347, [25 L. Ed. 676], that Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287-296 [33 S. Ct. 312, 314, 318, 57 L. Ed. 510]."