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Timestamp: 2017-01-17 03:00:11
Document Index: 523521943

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 5861', '§ 5861', '§ 1341', '§ 4208', '§ 4201', '§ 4206', '§ 4208', '§ 4206', '§ 4208', '§ 844', '§ 4205', '§ 4205', '§ 4205', '§ 4205']

| United States v. Ferri
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.FRANCIS D. FERRI A/K/A RICK JOSEPH LAVERICH KENNETH R. MATTHEWS KENNETH R. MATTHEWS, APPELLANT (WESTERN DIST. OF PENNA. CRIM. NO. 74-0277 (2255 APPEAL))
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT No. 79-6574
Kenneth Matthews was convicted for maliciously damaging by means of an explosive a vehicle used in interstate commerce; for illegally making a destructive device; for the unregistered possession of a destructive device; and for mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 and 844; 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(f), 5871; 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871; 18 U.S.C. § 1341. A sentence of 15 years incarceration was originally imposed on April 23, 1975.*fn1 The convictions were affirmed by this Court in a judgment order dated March 7, 1976. 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976) (mem.).
(3) That the guidelines and salient factors used by the Parole Commission changed since sentencing (April 23, 1975) and commencement of the sentence (December 1, 1977) to the detriment of appellant;
(4) That since the parole guidelines call for fifty-five months imprisonment, which is in excess of one-third of his sentence, the sentencing intent of the district judge was frustrated; and
The arguments listed under B, F and G were presented for the first time. In effect, they advance the proposition that the Parole Commission had improperly and incorrectly applied its guidelines to Matthews. Neither the district court nor this Court had the opportunity to rule on these contentions. The principal claim that seems to have been advanced in the petition for certiorari is that the application to Matthews of the guidelines constituted an ex post facto violation.*fn2
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of affirmance that had been entered by this Court and remanded for further consideration in light of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981).
The Supreme Court rejected the argument by Florida that the statute was not retrospective because gain time was not part of the original sentence and thus not part of the punishment annexed to the crime. To the contrary, the Supreme Court reasoned that gain time is one determinant of the prison term and that a sentence or punishment is effectively changed when the determinant is changed. Further, the Supreme Court noted that it has held a statute retrospective even when it alters punitive conditions outside of the sentence. 28-31, 101 S. Ct. at 964-966. For prisoners who were sentenced prior to the enactment, the challenged Florida statute substantially altered the consequences attached to the crime. Only retrospective law which does not alter the consequences to a prisoner's detriment escapes the ex post facto prohibition. The Supreme Court proceeded to hold that the Florida statute materially constricted to his detriment the petitioner's opportunity to earn gain time. This limitation, explained the Court, violates the ex post facto clause notwithstanding the fact that the award of gain time is discretionary. The Supreme Court's holding in this regard was based on two cases involving parole opportunities: Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S. Ct. 797, 81 L. Ed. 1182 (1937), and Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D.Mass.1967) aff'd 390 U.S. 713, 88 S. Ct. 1409, 20 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1968). The net effect of Weaver, as applied here, would appear to render violative of the ex post facto clause a statute which operates retrospectively and which significantly diminishes a prisoner's opportunity to reduce his period of incarceration and thereby increases his punishment.
In Geraghty the prisoners were sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2), the statute which was in effect prior to the enactment of the Parole Commission Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). Consequently, they had been immediately eligible for parole at the discretion of the Parole Board in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4206. Section 4206 empowered the Board to release a prisoner when the Board determined that there was a reasonable possibility that the prisoner could live and remain at liberty without violating the laws and such release would not be incompatible with the welfare of society. With the advent of the new guidelines it was argued that certain prisoners otherwise eligible for parole under the old standards would not be released until the mandatory release date or considered for release prior to reaching the minimum range of their sentences.
We concluded in Geraghty that the net effect of the guidelines in this regard, if mechanically applied to prisoners sentenced prior to the new statute, might well be to deprive them of the opportunity to apply for discretionary release under § 4208(a)(2) and § 4206. In the course of the Geraghty opinion, we employed an analysis parallel to that of the Supreme Court in Weaver predicating our reasoning on Lindsey v. Washington, supra; Greenfield v. Scafati, supra ; and Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 94 S. Ct. 2532, 41 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1974). See Geraghty, supra, 579 F.2d at 263-65.*fn3 We remanded, inter alia, for further proceedings so that the district court could determine whether the Parole Commission had, in fact, exercised discretion in applying the new guidelines.
In view of the remand by the Supreme Court, we have carefully reconsidered the petition for writ of habeas corpus that had been filed previously by Matthews. We believe it does present an ex post facto claim, but fails to allege any arbitrary, unreasonable or nonindividualized treatment resulting in a detrimental impact or an actual denial of parole for Matthews. Indeed, the only proceeding*fn4 about which Matthews complains is an initial parole classification procedure which occurred within 120 days of Matthews' arrival at prison. He asserts that he did not receive a parole classification within 90 days of his arrival, and contends that this was an infraction of parole board regulations. However, Section 2.12, 28 C.F.R. provides that the initial classification should occur within 120 days of a prisoner's arrival at the prison. In addition, Matthews makes no claim of prejudice as a result of the alleged delay in establishing his original classification.
We note that recent developments in the district court may affect this matter. Matthews' sentence has been altered twice. First, by an order dated October 21, 1980, the district court vacated the original sentence and resentenced Matthews to exactly the same sentence to permit the timely filing of a Rule 35 F.R.Crim.P. motion for reduction of sentence, in accordance with this Court's opinion in United States v. Ackerman, 619 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1980). Second, four motions on Matthews' behalf have been filed recently, by Matthews and court-appointed counsel, to correct his sentence and to reduce his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. In an opinion and order filed April 1, 1981, the district court disposed of the motions by correcting the sentence imposed on Count 2 of Matthews' indictment. Matthews was originally sentenced to 5 years on Count 1, 15 years on Count 2, and 3 years on Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, all to run concurrently, with parole eligibility to be ascertained in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2).
Relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Schwanke, 598 F.2d 575, 578-579 (10th Cir. 1979), which held that Congress did not intend § 844(i) to reach the injuries of a coconspirator, the district court concluded that Matthews' sentence on Count 2 should be changed. First, the court corrected the sentence to 10 years, and then reduced it further to 9 years. This was done by an order dated April 1, 1981. In addition, the district court altered the parole eligibility aspect of the sentence from 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a). Section 4205(a) provides that "a prisoner shall be eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of such term or terms...." Both counsel and the appellant pro se filed notices of appeal from the April 1st order. See C.A. No. 81-1866.
On remand the district court should consider what impact, if any, the adjustments in Matthews' sentence may have on the ex post facto contentions he has presented, eliciting argument regarding the effect of the Guidelines on the sentences covered by § 4205(a) as well as on Matthews' earlier § 4205(b)(2) sentence, all in light of Weaver and Geraghty.