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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1254', '§ 1301', '§ 307', '§ 1348', '§ 611', '§ 611', '§ 1431', '§ 1431', '§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 1348', '§ 1301', '§ 1422', '§ 1348', '§ 1348', '§ 611', '§ 1431', '§ 611', '§ 1431']

CITY OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL, INC., 411 U. S. 624 (1973) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 411 > CITY OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL, INC., 411 U. S. 624 (1973)
CITY OF BURBANK V. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL, INC., 411 U. S. 624 (1973)
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DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 411 U. S. 640. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, first stated the rule of preemption which is the critical issue in the present case. Speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, it said:
This suit, brought by appellees, asked for an injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance adopted by the City Council of Burbank, California, which made it unlawful for a so-called pure jet aircraft to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p.m. of one day and 7 a.m. the next day, and making it unlawful for the operator of that airport to allow any such aircraft chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
to take off from that airport during such periods. [Footnote 1] The only regularly scheduled flight affected by the ordinance was an intrastate flight of Pacific Southwest Airlines originating in Oakland, California and departing from Hollywood-Burbank Airport for San Diego every Sunday night at 11:30.
The District Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional on both Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause grounds. 318 F.Supp. 914. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds of the Supremacy Clause both as respects preemption and as respects conflict. [Footnote 2] 457 F.2d 667. The case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). We noted probable Jurisdiction. 409 U.S. 840. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., as amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, and the regulations under it, 14 CFR pts. 71, 73, 75, 77, 91, 93, 95, 97, are central to the question of preemption.
By §§ 307(a), (c) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348(a), (c), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been given broad authority to regulate the use of the navigable airspace "in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace . . ." and "for the protection of persons and property on the ground. . . ." [Footnote 3]
Curfews such as Burbank has imposed would, according to the testimony at the trial and the District Court's findings, increase congestion, cause a loss of efficiency, and aggravate the noise problem. FAA has occasionally enforced curfews. See Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F.Supp. 573. But the record shows that FAA has consistently opposed curfews, unless managed by it, in the interests of its management of the "navigable airspace."
As stated by Judge Dooling in American Airlines v. Hempstead, 272 F.Supp. 226, 230, aff'd, 398 F.2d 369:
The Noise Control Act of 1972, which was approved October 27, 1972, provides that the Administrator, "after consultation with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies and interested persons," shall conduct a study of various facets of the aircraft noise problems and report to the Congress within nine months, [Footnote 4] i.e., by July, 1973. The 1972 Act, by amending § 611 of the Federal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Aviation Act, [Footnote 5] also involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the comprehensive scheme of federal control of the aircraft noise problem. Under the amended § 611(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1239, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. II), FAA, after consulting with EPA, shall provide
"for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of any certificate authorized by this title. [Footnote 6]"
Section 611(b)(2), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
as amended, 86 Stat. 1239, 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(2) (170 ed., Supp. II), provides that future certificates for aircraft operations shall not issue unless the new aircraft noise requirements are met. [Footnote 7] Section 611(c)(1), as amended, provides that, not later than July, 1973, EPA shall submit to FAA proposed regulations to provide such "control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom" as EPA determines is "necessary to protect the public health and welfare." FAA is directed within 30 days to publish the proposed regulations in a notice of proposed rulemaking. Within 60 days after that publication, FAA is directed to commence a public hearing on the proposed rules. Section 611(c)(1). That subsection goes on to provide that, within "a reasonable time after the conclusion of such hearing and after consultation with EPA," FAA is directed either to prescribe the regulations substantially as submitted by EPA, or prescribe them in modified form, or publish in the Federal Register a notice that it is not prescribing any regulation in response to EPA's submission, together with its reasons therefor. Section 611(c)(2), as amended, also provides that, if EPA believes that FAA's action with respect to a regulation proposed by EPA "does not protect the public chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
health and welfare from aircraft noise or sonic boom," EPA shall consult with FAA and may request FAA to review and report to EPA on the advisability of prescribing the regulation originally proposed by EPA. That request shall be published in the Federal Register; FAA shall complete the review requested and report to EPA in the time specified, together with a detailed statement of FAA's findings and the reasons for its conclusion, and shall identify any impact statement filed under § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, [Footnote 8] 83 Stat. 853, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The original complaint was filed on May 14, 1970; the District Court entered its judgment November 30, 1970; and the Court of Appeals announced its judgment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is, to be sure, no express provision of preemption in the 1972 Act. That, however, is not decisive. As we stated in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 331 U. S. 230:
It is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to conclude that there is preemption. As Mr. Justice Jackson stated, concurring in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 322 U. S. 303:
Both the Senate and House Committees included in their Reports clear statements that the bills would not change the existing preemption rule. The House Report stated: [Footnote 9]
The Senate Report stated: [Footnote 10]
82 Stat. 39. When the legislation which added this section to the Federal Aviation Act [Footnote 11] was considered at Senate hearings, Senator Monroney (the author of the 1953 Act) asked Secretary of Transportation Boyd whether the proposed legislation would "to any degree preempt State and local government regulation of aircraft noise and sonic boom." [Footnote 12] The Secretary requested leave to submit a written opinion, and in a letter dated June 22, 1968, he stated:
According to the Senate Report, [Footnote 13] it was
and the Report concurred in the views set forth by the Secretary in his letter. [Footnote 14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Senate version of the 1972 Act as it passed the Senate contained an express preemption section. [Footnote 15] But the Senate version never was presented to the House. Instead, the Senate passed, with amendments, the House version; [Footnote 16] the House, also with amendments, then concurred in the Senate amendments. [Footnote 17] The Act as passed combined provisions of both the House and Senate bills on the subject that each had earlier approved. When the blended provisions of the present Act were before the House, Congressman Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in urging the House to accept the amended version, said: [Footnote 18]
When the House approved the blended provisions of the bill, Senator Tunney moved that the Senate concur. He made clear [Footnote 19] that the regulations to be considered by EPA for recommendation to FAA would include:
"proposed means of reducing noise in airport environments through the application of emission controls on aircraft, the regulation of flight patterns and aircraft and airport operations, and modifications in the number, frequency, or scheduling of flights [as well as] . . . the imposition of curfews on noisy airports, the imposition of flight path alterations in areas where noise was a problem, the imposition of noise emission standards on new and existing aircraft -- with the expectation of a retrofit schedule to abate noise emissions from existing aircraft -- the imposition of controls to increase the load factor on commercial flights, or other reductions in the joint use of airports, and such other procedures as may be determined useful and necessary to protect public health and welfare."
interstate commerce and can be effectively regulated only at the federal level. [Footnote 20]"
Our prior cases on preemption are not precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in question. Cf. Hines v. Davidovitz, 312 U. S. 52; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440. Control of noise is, of course, deep-seated in the police power of the States. Yet the pervasive control vested in EPA and in FAA under the 1972 Act seems to us to leave no room for local curfews or other local controls. What the ultimate remedy may be for aircraft noise which plagues many communities and tens of thousands of people is not known. The procedures under the 1972 Act are under way. [Footnote 21] In addition, the Administrator has imposed a variety of regulations relating to takeoff and landing procedures and runway preferences. The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety and efficiency, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a), and the protection chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance and a significant number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling air traffic flow. [Footnote 22] The difficulties of scheduling flights to avoid congestion and the concomitant decrease in safety would be compounded. In 1960, FAA rejected a proposed restriction on jet operations at the Los Angeles airport between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. because such restrictions could "create critically serious problems to all air transportation patterns." 25 Fed.Reg. 1764-1765. The complete FAA statement said:
"the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners, acting a proprietors, can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is nondiscriminatory."
(Emphasis added.) This portion as well was quoted with approval in the Senate Report. Ibid.
Id. at 35886.
Id. at 37075.
Id. at 37083.
Id. at 37317.
The Court concludes that congressional legislation dealing with aircraft noise has so "pervaded" that field that Congress has impliedly preempted it, and therefore the ordinance of the city of Burbank here challenged is chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ante at 411 U. S. 633. Yet the House and Senate committee reports explicitly state that the 1972 Act to which the Court refers was not intended to alter the balance between state and federal regulation which had been struck by earlier congressional legislation in this area. The House Report H.R.Rep. No. 92-842, in discussing the general preemptive effect of the entire bill, stated:
"The authority of State and local government to regulate use, operation, or movement of products is not affected at all by the bill. (The preemption provision discussed in this paragraph does not apply to aircraft. See discussion of aircraft noise below.)"
Id. at 8. The report went on to state specifically:
Id.. at 10.
"States and local governments are preempted from establishing or enforcing noise emission standards for aircraft [see American Airlines v. Hempstead, 272 F.Supp. 226 (EDNY 1967)], unless such standards are identical to standards prescribed under this bill. This does not address responsibilities or powers
In the light of these specific congressional disclaimers of preemption in the 1972 Act, reference must necessarily be had to earlier congressional legislation on the subject. [Footnote 2/1] It was on the basis of these earlier enactments that the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress had preempted the field from state or local regulation of the type that the city of Burbank enacted.
The Burbank ordinance prohibited jet takeoffs from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport during the late evening and early morning hours. Its purpose was to afford local residents at least partial relief, during normal sleeping hours, from the noise associated with jet airplanes. The ordinance in no way dealt with flights over the city, cf. American Airlines v. Hempstead, 272 F.Supp. 226 (EDNY 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969), nor did it categorically prohibit all jet takeoffs during those hours.
Appellees do not contend that the noise produced by jet engines could not reasonably be deemed to affect chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 331 U. S. 230 (1947). This assumption derives from our basic constitutional division of legislative competence between the States and Congress; from
"due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism, but as a promoter of democracy. . . ."
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 359 U. S. 243 (1959) (emphasis added). Unless the requisite preemptive intent is abundantly clear, we should hesitate to invalidate state and local legislation for the added reason that
Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U. S. 261, 318 U. S. 275 (1943).
Since Congress' intent in enacting the 1972 Act was clearly to retain the status quo between the federal regulation and local regulation, a holding of implied preemption of the field depends upon whether two earlier congressional enactments, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., and the 1968 noise abatement amendment to that Act, 49 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The 1958 Act was intended to consolidate in one agency in the Executive Branch the control over aviation that had previously been diffused within that branch. The paramount substantive concerns of Congress were to regulate federally all aspects of air safety, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1422 and, once aircraft were in "flight," airspace management, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a). See S.Rep. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6, 13-15. While the Act might be broad enough to permit the Administrator to promulgate takeoff and landing rules to avoid excessive noise at certain hours of the day, see 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c), Congress was not concerned with the problem of noise created by aircraft, and did not intend to preempt its regulation. Furthermore, while Congress clearly intended to preempt the States from regulating aircraft in flight, the author of the bill, Senator Monroney, specifically stated that FAA would not have control "over the ground space" of airports. [Footnote 2/2]
Several years after the conclusion of these hearings, Congress enacted the 1968 noise abatement amendment, 82 Stat. 395, which added § 611 to the 1958 Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431, and which was the first congressional legislation dealing with the problem of aircraft noise. On its face, [Footnote 2/3] § 611, as added by the 1968 amendment, neither preempted the general field of regulation of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a group who provide various air transportation services. On the other hand, there is a group who live, work, and go to schools and churches in communities near airports. The latter group is frequently burdened to the point where they can neither enjoy nor reasonably use their land because of noise resulting from aircraft operations. Many of them derive no direct benefit from the aircraft operations which create the unwanted noise. Therefore, it is easy to understand why they complain, and complain most vehemently. The possible solutions to this demanding and vexing problem which appear to offer the most promise are (1) new or modified engine and airframe designs, (2) special flight operating techniques and procedures, and (3) planning for land use in areas adjacent to airports so that such land use will be most compatible with aircraft operations. This legislation is directed toward the primary problem, namely, reduction of noise at its source."
"Relation to Local Government Initiatives"
" The courts have held that the Federal Government presently preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight of aircraft. Local noise control legislation limiting the permissible noise level of all overflying aircraft has recently been struck down because it conflicted with Federal regulation of air traffic. American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F.Supp. 226 (U.S.D.C. E. D., N.Y.1966). The court said, at 231, 'The legislation operates in an area committed to Federal care, and noise limiting rules operating as do those of the ordinance must come from a Federal source.' H.R. 3400 would merely expand the Federal Government's role in a field already preempted. It would not change this preemption. State and local governments will remain unable to use their police powers to control aircraft noise by regulating the flight of aircraft."
49 U.S.C. § 1431(a), while a broad grant of authority to the Administrator, cannot fairly be read as prohibiting the States from enacting every type of measure which chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The preemption question to which the Secretary's letter was addressed related to "the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling the flight of aircraft" (emphasis added), and thus included types of regulation quite different from that enacted by the city of Burbank that would be clearly precluded. See American Airlines v. Hempstead, supra. But more important is the highly practical consideration that the Hollywood-Burbank Airport is probably the only nonfederal airport in the country used by federally certified air carriers that is not owned and operated by a state or local chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
government. [Footnote 2/4] There is no indication that this fact was brought to the attention of the Senate Committee, or that the Secretary of Transportation was aware of it in framing his letter. It simply strains credulity to believe that the Secretary, the Senate Committee, or Congress intended that all airports except the Hollywood-Burbank Airport could enact curfews.
Considering the language Congress enacted into law, the available legislative history, and the light shed by these on the congressional purpose, Congress did not intend, either by the 1958 Act or the 1968 Amendment, to oust local governments from the enactment of regulations such as that of the city of Burbank. The 1972 Act quite clearly intended to maintain the status quo between federal and local authorities. The legislative history of the 1972 Act, quite apart from its concern with avoiding additional preemption, discloses a primary focus on the alteration of procedures within the Federal Government for dealing with problems of aircraft noise already entrusted by Congress to federal competence. The 1972 Act set up procedures by which the Administrator of EPA would have a role to play in the formulation and review of standards promulgated by FAA dealing with noise emissions of jet aircraft. But because these agencies have exclusive authority to reduce noise by promulgating regulations and implementing standards directed at one or several of the causes of the level of noise, local governmental bodies are not thereby foreclosed from dealing with the noise problem by every other conceivable method. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court found that the Burbank ordinance would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and held it invalid under the Commerce Clause for that reason. Neither the Court of Appeal nor this Court's opinion, in view of their determination as to preemption, reached that question. The District Court's conclusion appears to be based, at least in part, on a consideration of the effect on interstate commerce that would result if all municipal airports in the country enacted ordinances such as that of Burbank. Since the proper determination of the question turns on an evaluation of the facts of each case, see, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U. S. 520 (1959), and not on a predicted proliferation of possibilities, the District Court's conclusion is of doubtful validity. The Burbank ordinance did not affect emergency flights, and had the total effect of prohibiting one scheduled commercial flight each week and several additional private flights by corporate executives; such a result can hardly be held to be an unreasonable burden on commerce. Since the Court expresses no opinion on the question, however, I refrain from any further analysis of it. [Footnote 2/5]
Statements or comments of individual Senators or Representatives on the floor of either House are not to be given great, let alone controlling, weight in ascertaining the intent of Congress as a whole, see, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 254 U. S. 474 (1921); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 283 U. S. 494, (1931); cf. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 300 U. S. 464 (1937). This guidance is particularly appropriate in this case, as the statements of two individual Congressmen quoted in the Court's opinion are at odds with the views expressed in the committee reports.
Although cited by the Court, this situation is clearly not a Cooley situation, in which the control of aircraft noise
@ 53 U. S. 319 (1852). The court below also held, but by a divided vote, that the Burbank ordinance was invalid because it was in conflict with a clearly articulated federal policy, to-wit, a non-mandatory runway preference order of the FAA tower chief at Burbank which requested pilots to use a particular runway at night. The Court does not decide this case on that ground; I see no occasion to express in detail my views on the conflict issue, except to note my doubt as to the correctness of the disposition of that question.