Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19770711-762676
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 00:26:47+00:00
Document Index: 289265493

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 10", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 27", "l'article 2", "l'article 8", "l'article 2", "l'article 2", "l'article 2", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevable ; requête jointe à la requête n° 6878/75Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7626/76Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1977-07-11;7626.76 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 9-1) LIBERTE DE RELIGIONParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATIDN/REQUÃTE NÂ° 7626/7 6 X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 11 July 1977 on the admissibdity of the application DÃCISION du 11 julllet 1977 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Convention : The relationship between a child born out of wedlock and his natural parents are covered in principte, by the concept of "family life". "Family life" does not only imply parenrhood, bur also certain factual ties . The adoption of a child without the mother's consent constitutes a particularly severe interference in the exercise of the right to respect for family life . Article 8 paragraph 2 of the Convention : The adoption of a child without the mother's consent considered, in the present case, as a measure necessa ry for the protection of the health and interests of the child. Article 2 of the First Protocof : A mother, whose child has been adopted by a third person no longer has the right to ensure the education of the child in accordance with her own religious and philosophical conviction s
Article 8, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Les relations entre un enfant nÃ© hors mariage et ses parents naturels sont couvertes, en principe, par la notion de Â« vie famitiate Â» .
La n vie familiale Â» implique non seulement une parentÃ© mais aussi certains liens de fait . L'adoption d'un enfant sans le consentement de la mÃ©re constitue une ingÃ©rence particuliÃ¨rement grave dans l'exercice du droit au respect de la vie familiale . Articfe 8, paragraphe Z de fa Convention : Adoption d'un enfant sans le consentement de la mÃ©re considÃ©rÃ©e, en /'espÃ©ce, comme une mesure nÃ©cessaire 2 /a protection de la santÃ© et des intÃ©rÃ©ts de l'enfant . Article 2 du Protocole additionnel : Une mÃ©re dont l'enfant a Ã©tÃ© adoptÃ© par un tiers ne dispose plus du droit d'assurer l'Ã©ducation de l'enfant conformÃ©ment Ã ses propres convictions religieuses et philosophiques .
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I Engfish : see p . 164)
AgÃ©e de 18ans, la requÃ©rante', ressortissante franÃ§aise domiciliÃ©e en France, a eu une brÃ¨ve liaison amoureuse et s'est trouvÃ©e enceinte. La liatson prit fin sans qu'elle ait rÃ©vÃ©/Ã© son Ã©tat Ã son partenaire, qui dÃ©cÃ©da accidentellement un mois plus tard. Craignant la dÃ©sapprobation de sa famille et dÃ©pourvue de ressources financiÃ©res, la requÃ©rante s'est rÃ©solue Ã interrompre cette grossesse non dÃ©sirÃ©e . Elle entra en contact avec une clinique de Londres . Jugeant la grossesse trop avancÃ©e pour un avortement, le mÃ©decin proposa d'effectuer plus tard une cÃ©sarienne et de faire adopter l'enfant. La requÃ©rante accepta . La naissance eut lieu et l'enfant fut confiÃ©, en vue d'adoption, Ã un couple de mÃ©decins, dont la femme renonÃ§a Ã toute activitÃ© professionnelle pour s'occuper du bÃ©bÃ© . La requÃ©rante regagna la France sans avoir vu son enfant. La cÃ©sarienne ayant eu des sÃ©quelles, la requÃ©rante dut subir quelques mois plus tard l'ablation de l'utÃ©rus . N'ayant aucun espoir d'une nouvelle maternitÃ©, la requÃ©rante refusa alors de consentir formellement Ã l'adoption de son enfant . Les parents nourriciers introduisirent alors une procÃ©dure judiciaire en vue d'adoption, au cours de laquelle la requÃ©rante put faire valoir ses moyens . En fÃ©vrier 1976, l'enfant Ã©tant Ã¢gÃ© de deux ans, la High Court of Justice prononÃ§a l'adoption en vertu de la loi dite Adoption Act 1958, qui permet de prononcer l'adoption sans le consentement de la mÃ©re si son refus ne paraÃ®t pas raisonnable. Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© par la Commission Ã prÃ©senrer ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte .
EN DROI T 1 . La requÃ©rante allÃ©gue que l'adoption de son enfant prononcÃ©e contre son grÃ© par l'autoritÃ© judiciaire a violÃ© le droit au respect de la vie familiale garanti par l'article 8 de la Convention . Se rÃ©fÃ©rant Ã la dÃ©cision du Tribunal arbitral dans l'affaire Ambatielos (Recueil des Sentences arbitrales, vol . XII pp . 85 et ss .), selon laquelle l'utilisation prÃ©alable des recours internes embrasse l'usage de toutes les ressources procÃ©durales disponibles devant les juridictions internes, le Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni soulÃ©ve Ã cet Ã©gard l'exception de non-Ã©puisement . II fait valoir que la requÃ©rante aurait dÃ», prÃ©alablement au jugement d'adoption, rÃ©clamer la garde effective de son enfant . La Commission estime pouvoir laisser ouvertes en l'espÃ©ce les questions de savoir si l'utilisation de ce moyen pouvait Ãªtre tenue pour essentielle en vue d'em' Devam la Commisaion, la requArante Ã©tait repr9aenrEe par Mâ¢ J . flaffin, avocat Ã le cour d'appel de Faris.
pZher le tribunal de procÃ©der Ã l'adoption sans le consentement de la requÃ©rante Icf . DÃ©cision Ambatielos, loc . cit p . 1201 et si celle-ci ne s'est pas trouvÃ©e empÃ©chÃ©e en fait d'utiliser ce moyen . La requÃªte est, en effet, irrecevable pour un autre motif . 2 Les relations entre un enfant nÃ© hors mariage et ses parents naturels sont couvertes en principe par la notion de Â« vie familiale Â» au sens de cette disposition IRequÃ©te NÂ° 6833/74, Paula Marckx c/Belgique et jurisprudence citÃ©e, D . et R . 3 , pp . 112 et ss .l . Pour Ã©tablir si, dans un cas concret, elle est en prÃ©sence d'une vie familiale, la Commission examine non seulement s'il existe des liens de parentÃ©, mais encore si l'on peut constater en fait Â« un lien qui puisse Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme crÃ©ant une vie de famille au sens de l'article 8 de la Convention Â»(RequÃ©tes NÂ° 3110/67, Ann . 11, p . 494 , NÂ° 2991/66 et NÂ° 2992/66, Alam et Singh c/Royaume-Uni, Ann . 10, p 478) . En l'espÃ©ce, il est vrai, la requÃ©rante a confiÃ© son enfant, dÃ©s sa naissance, en vue de son adoption par des tiers . Elle ne l'a pas revu depuis . De par son fait, il n'y a pas eu entre elle et son fils, dans les premiers mois, une vie de famille . Toutefois, alors qu'elle avait manifestÃ© le dÃ©sir de reprendre son enfant, ou de s'en rÃ©server la possibilitÃ©, la requÃ©rante s'est trouvÃ©e privÃ©e pour l'avenir, par dÃ©cision judiciaire, de toute possibilitÃ© d'Ã©tablir avec lui des relations familiales . Le droit moderne de l'adoption fait en effet sortir dÃ©finitivement l'adoptÃ© de sa famille d'origine ou naturelle . Ainsi que l'Ã©nonce l'article 10 de la Convention europÃ©enne en matiÃ©re d'adoption, posant en la matiÃ©re des principes communs aux Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe, les droits et obligations de nature familiale existant entre l'adoptÃ© et son pÃ©re ou sa mÃ©re cessent d'exister . Cela ressort Ã©galement sans Ã©quivoque de l'Adoption Act 1958 . L'adoption prononcÃ©e sans le consentement de la mÃ©re, a ainsi constltuÃ© une mesure concrÃ¨te d'ingÃ©rence, d'une particuliÃ©re gravitÃ© . Car, si l'article 8 n'oblige pas l'Etat Ã intervenir positivement pour rÃ©tablir les conditions de la vie familiale dÃ©jÃ dÃ©gradÃ©es par le fait des intÃ©ressÃ©s Icf . RequÃªtes NÂ° 5416/72, c/Autriche, Rec . 46 p . 88 et NÂ° 6577/74 c/R .F .A ., D . et R . 1 p . 911 il protÃ©ge en principe contre tout acte d'une autoritÃ© publique de nature Ã compromettre ou rendre impossible Ã l'avenir la reprise de la vie familial e Sans doute l'intervention de l'autoritÃ© publique a-t-elle Ã©tÃ© provoquÃ©e par le comportement de la requÃ©rante qui, placÃ©e dans une situation tragique, a souhaitÃ© reprendre son enfant aprÃ¨s l'avoir confiÃ© Ã des tiers en vue de l'adoption . Cette intervention Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire pour arbitrer un conflit entre ses intÃ©rÃ©ts et ceux de son enfant, placÃ© dans une nouvelle famille . Le principe gÃ©nÃ©ralement admis en matiÃ©re d'adoption est, toutefois, qu'en raison de la rupture qu'elle provoque du lien avec la famille d'origine, elle ne peut Ãªtre prononcÃ©e sans le consentement de la mÃ©re . L'article 8, paragraphe 2, de l a
Convention europÃ©enne en matiÃ©re d'adoption stipule ainsi qu'il n'est pas permis Ã l'autoritÃ© compÃ©tente de se dispenser de recueillir un tel consentement ou de passer outre un refus de consentement de la mÃ©re Â« sinon pour des motifs exceptionnels dÃ©terminÃ©s par la lÃ©gislation Â» . L'adoption Act 1958 Ã©nonce d'ailleurs de faÃ§on limitative les cas dans lesquels il peut Ã¨tre passÃ© outre Ã un refus de consentement, notamment lorsque celui-ci est refusÃ© de faÃ§on dÃ©raisonnable .
En gardant ce principe Ã l'esprit, la Commission est confrontÃ©e Ã la question suivante, au regard de l'article 8, paragraphe 2 : AprÃ©s deux ans de placement dans la famille adoptive, l'intÃ©rÃ©t de l'enfant Ã Ãªtre adoptÃ©, tant du point de vue de la rupture des liens avec la mÃ©re que de celui de la consolidation des liens avec les adoptants, Ã©tait-il dÃ©jÃ Ã ce point manifeste pour que l'adoption doive Ãªtre prononcÃ©e contre le grÃ© de la mÃ©re, Ã©cartant pour elle toute possibilitÃ© de vie familiale avec son enfant 7 Pour rÃ©pondre Ã cette question, elle dispose de tous les Ã©lÃ©ments de fait rassemblÃ©s avec soin par le juge . ConformÃ©ment Ã la loi anglaise qui dispose que l'intÃ©rÃ©t de l'enfant est la premiÃ©re, mais non la seule considÃ©ration, le juge a en effet relevÃ© toutes les indications d'ordre moral, matÃ©riel, effectif, Ã©ducatif pouvant militer en faveur de l'adoption ou, au contraire, de la restitution de l'enfant Ã sa mÃ©re . Il a mentionnÃ© les conclusions des psychiatres citÃ©s par les deux parties qui ont tous conclu au danger de rÃ©percussions nÃ©gatives Ã court et long termes sur le dÃ©veloppement de la personnalitÃ© de l'enfant, s'il retournait vivre en France prÃ©s de sa mÃ©re . Sur base d'un examen du jugement, il n'y a pas lieu de douter que la rÃ©alisation de l'adoption par dÃ©cision judiciaire, quelque douloureuse qu'elle soit pour la mÃ©re, qui se trouve par ailleurs dans l'impossibilitÃ© d'avoir d'autres enfants, ait constituÃ©, dans les circonstances de la cause, une mesure nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de la santÃ© et des intÃ©rÃ©ts primordiaux de l'enfant et justifiÃ©e au regard de l'article 8, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . 3 . La requÃ©rante allÃ©gue encore la violation de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel qui implique, selon elle, le droit des parents de n'Ã©tre dÃ©possÃ©dÃ©s d'aucune de leurs prÃ©rogatives d'autoritÃ© parentale . La disposition invoquÃ©e impose Ã l'Etat, Â« dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il assumera dans le domaine de l'Ã©ducation et de l'enseignement Â», de respecter Â« le droit des parents d'assurer cette Ã©ducation et cet enseignement conformÃ©ment Ã leurs convictions religieuses ou philosophiques n . Aussi longtemps que l'enfant n'est pas en Ã¢ge de recevoir une Ã©ducation publique, ce droit est purement potentiel et ne saurait Ãªtre mÃ©connu, en tant que tel, par l'Etat . Il est liÃ© Ã l'existence des droits et obligations de nature familiale existant entre les parents et l'enfant, droits protÃ©gÃ©s par l'article 8 de la Convention . La Commission vient de constater que le transfert de l'autoritÃ© parentale et la rupture du lien avec la famille d'origine opÃ©rÃ©s par l'acte d'adoption, Ã©taient justifiÃ©s en l'espÃ¨ce au regard du paragraphe 2 de cet article .
S'agissant de l'obligation supplÃ©mentaire Ã charge de l'Etat pouvant rÃ©sulter en cette matiÃ¨re de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, il y a lieu de remarquer que durant la pÃ©riode prÃ©cÃ©dant l'adoption, la requÃ©rante, qui avait alors juridiquement l'autoritÃ© parentale sur son enfant, ne semble pas s'Ã©tre prÃ©occupÃ©e des convictions religieuses ou philosophiques des adoptants . Son refus de consentir Ã l'adoption n'a jamais Ã©tÃ© motivÃ© par la personnalitÃ© ou les idÃ©es et convictions de ceux-c i A supposer donc qu'on puisse dÃ©duire de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel une obligation pour l'autoritÃ© publique de ne pas transfÃ©rer l'autoritÃ© parentale sur un enfant Ã des personnes qui ne partagent pas, en matiÃ¨re d'Ã©ducaLion, les convictions des parents d'origine, un examen du dossier ne permet de constater, en l'espÃ©ce, aucun manquement Ã cette obligation nÃ©gative . Par la suite, le jugement d'adoption a confÃ©rÃ© aux adoptants Ã l'Ã©gard de l'enfant les droits et obligations existant jusqu'alors entre la requÃ©rante et son enfant, conformÃ©ment Ã un principe gÃ©nÃ©ralement admis constituant la base mÃªme de l'institution de l'adoption (cf . article 10, paragraphe 1, de la Convention europÃ©enne en matiÃ©re d'adoptionl . La requÃ©rante ne peut plus, dÃ©s lors, Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e, pour les besoins de l'article 2 du Protocole additionnel, comme un parent disposant du droit d'assurer l'Ã©ducation conformÃ©ment Ã ses convictions religieuses et philosophique s II en rÃ©sulte que la requÃªte est, sur ce point Ã©galement, manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commission DÃCLARELA REQUÃTEIRRECEVABL E
Summary of the facts At the age of 78, the applicant', a french national resident in France, had a short love affair and got pregnant . The relationship ended before she had revealed her condition to her partner, who died in an accident one month later . Fearing disapproval of her family and being withour resources the applicant decided to inrerrupt this undesired pregnancy . She got into touch with a clinic in London Considering that this pregnancy was too advanced for an abortion, the doctor proposed to carry out a ceasarlan later on and to have the child adopted . The applicanr accepted .
' Before the Commission the applicant is representetl by Mr J . Raffin, barrister at the Court of Appeal in Paris .
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The birth took p/ace and the child was placed, with a view to adoption with a married couple, husband and wife both being doctors, the wife of which decided to give up all professional activity in order to take care of the child . The applicant returned to France without having seen her child . The cesarian having had aftereffects, the applicant had to undergo a few month later the ablation of the uterus . Since she had no longer any prospects of a further pregnancy, the applicant refused ro give her formal consent to the adoption of her child. The adoptive parents instituted legal proceedings with a view to the adoption, during which the applicant had the opportunity to present her arguments. In February 7976, the child having reached the age of 2 years, the High Court of Justice pronounced the adoption on the basis of the Adoption Act 7966, which provides for the pronounciation of adoption without the mother's consent, if the refusal does not seem reasonable . The respondent Government has been invited by the Commission to submit its observations on the admissibility of the application .
1 TRANSLAT/ON I THE LAW The applicant maintains that the adoption of her child ordered by the court 1 against her will constitutes a violation of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention . Relying on the decision of the arbitral Court in the Ambatielos case (Collection of Arbitral Awards, Vol . XII pp . 85 et seq), which lays down the principle that prior recourse to the internal remedies comprises exhaustion of all the procedural remedies available before the domestic courts, the Government of the United Kingdom raises the exception of non-exhaustion . It argues that the applicant should have claimed effective custody of the child before the judgment ordering the adoption . The Commission considers that it is not necessary to decide in the instant case whether the use of this procedure could be considered essential in order to prevent the court from ordering the adoption without the applicant's consent (cf . Ambatielos decision, loc . cit . p . 120) or whether she was not in fact in a position to avail herself of this remedy since the application is inadmissible on a different ground .
2 In principle the relations between a child born out ot wedlock and its natural parents are covered by the concept of "family life" within the meaning of this provision IApplication No 6833/74, Paula Marckx v/Belgium and the quoted decisions, D and R . 3 pp . 112 et seql . To ascertain whether in a specific case it is dealing with family life the Commission considers not only whether a relationship exists but also whether there is in fact "a link that can be considered to establish family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention" IApplications No . 3110/67, Yearbook 11, p . 494 ; No . 2991/66 and No . 2992/66, Alam and Singh v/United Kingdom, Yearbook 10, p . 478) . In the present case it is true that the applicant had from its birth handed over her child for adoption by third parties . She has not seen it since By virtue of her own decision there was no family life between herself and her son during the first months . However, when she did show a desire to lake back her child, or to reserve the right to do so, she was deprived for the future of all possibility of establishing family relations with him by a court decision . In effect the modern law of adoption separates for good the adopted child from its original or natural tamily . As stated in Article 10 of the European Convention on Adoption, which lays down the principles common to the member states of the Council of Europe, the family rights and obligations between the adopted person and his fater and mother cease to exist . This is also unequivocally stated in the Adoption Act 1958 . The adoption ordered without the mother's consent was thus a specific act ot interference of a particularly serious nature . For, though Article 8 does not oblige the state to take positive action to restore family life when it has been upset through the actions of the persons concerned Icf . Applications No . 5416/72 v . Austria, Collection 46 p 88 and No . 6577/74 v/F .R .G ., D . and R . 1, p . 911 in principle it affords protection against any action by a public authority which adversely affects or makes impossible in future the resumption of family life . Admittedly the action taken by the public authorities was brought about by the conduct of the applicant who, finding herself in a tragic situation, wanted to take her child back after having confided it to third parties for adoption The action taken was necessary to settle the conflict between her interests and those of the child in its new family . However, in the view of the break with the family of origin which it causes, the generally accepted principle in the field of adoption is that this must not be ordered without the mother's consent Article 5 121 of the European Convention on Adoption provides that the competent authorities may not dispense with such consent or overrule the mother's refusal to consent a save on exceptional grounds determined by law x . Moreover the Adoption Act 1958 contains an exhaustive list of the cases in which a refusal of consent may be overruled, II particular when such a refusal is unreasonable .
Bearing this principle in mind the Commission is faced with respect to Arlicle 8(2) with the following question : After living for two years in its adopted family was the child's interest in being adopted both (rom the point of view of breaking its links with its mother and that of consolidating its links with the adopters already so clear that the adoption should be ordered against the mother's will thus destroying all possibility of family life between her and the child T In answering this question it has at its disposal all the evidence carefully collected by the court . In accordance with English law which provides that the child's interest is the first but not the only consideration, the court went into all the moral, material, sentimental and educational considerations which might tell either in favour of the adoption or of restoring the child to the mother . It mentioned the conclusions reached by the psychiatrists called by both sides, all of whom stated there was a danger of short or long term negative effects on the development of the child's personality if it came back to live in France with its mother . On an examination of the judgment it was clear that the adoption ordered by the court, however painful for the mother, who was unfortunately unable to have further children, was in the circumstances ot the case a necessary measure to protect the health and overriding interests of the child and justified from the point of view Article 8(2) of the Convention . It follows that the application is on this point manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention . 3 . The applicant also alleges the violation of Article 2 of the First Protocol which in her view implies a right in the parents not to be deprived of any of the rights inherent in their parental authority . The provision relied on requires the state "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching" to respect "the right of the parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions" . So long as the child is not of an age to benefit from public education this right is merely a potential one and cannot as such be infringed by the state . It is bound up with the existence of rights and obligations of a family nature between the parents and the child, these rights being protected by Article 8 of the Convention . The Commission has just found that the transfer of parental authority and the termination of the link with the family of origin brought about by the adoption were justified in the present case in the light of paragraph (2) of that Article . With respect to the additional obligation which may be imposed on the state in this connection under Article 2 of the First Protocol, it should be observed that during the period prior to the adoption the applicant, who was at that time legally entitled to exercise parental authority over her child, does not appear to have been concerned about the religious and philosophical convictions of the adopters . Her refusal of consent to the adoption was never based either on their personality or on their ideas and beliefs .
Assuming therefore that it is possible to deduce from Article 2 of the First Protocol an obligation on the public authorities not to transfer parental authority over a child to persons who do not share the convictions of its original parents in the matter of education, an examination of the file does not reveal any failure to comply with this negative obligation in the instant case . Subsequently in accordance with a generally accepted principle which constitutes the essential basis of the institution of adoption Icf . Article 10, (1 ) of the European Convention on Adoptionl the adoption order conferred on the adopters the same rights and obligations with regard to the child as up to that moment has existed between the applicant and the child . The applicant can accordingly no longer be considered with respect to Article 2 of the First Protocol as a parent enjoying the right to ensure the education of the child in accordance with her religious and philosophical convictions . It follows that on this point also the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention . Now, therefore, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
- 168 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/07/1977Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page