Source: https://casetext.com/case/orso-v-city-county-1
Timestamp: 2019-07-23 07:12:59
Document Index: 211294634

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 662', '§ 662', '§ 662', '§ 662', '§ 662', '§ 662', '§ 46', '§ 662', '§ 46', '§ 662', '§ 1305', '§ 2859', '§ 1305']

Orso v. City & County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241 | Casetext
Orso v. City & County of Honolulu
56 Haw. 241 (Haw. 1975)
Orsov.City & County of Honolulu
Supreme Court of HawaiiApr 18, 1975
56 Haw. 241•534 P.2d 489•
RICHARDSON, C.J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA AND MENOR, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KATO ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
Charles F. Marsland, Jr., Deputy Corporation Counsel, for defendant-appellant, cross appellee.
David C. Schutter (Steven H. Levinson with him on the briefs) for plaintiff-appellee, cross appellant.
Detective Ng then testified that he executed an affidavit that included the above information; that based on the affidavit an arrest warrant was obtained from a district judge to arrest appellee; that the affidavit was prepared only in the original without any copies; that he took custody of the affidavit after the issuance of the arrest warrant; that the affidavit is lost or misplaced and cannot be found.
The appellee, after initially filing a conditional acceptance of remittitur, conditional on the ground that appellant forego an appeal or a new trial, finally filed an unconditional acceptance of remittitur accepting only the compensatory damages of $50,000, plus interest and costs allowed by the court.
In addition to the issues mentioned, this court, in light of Salavea v. City and County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 216, 517 P.2d 51 (1973), rendered subsequent to the judgment involved herein, requested of the parties to file additional briefing on the following:
1. Whether or not the action brought by the plaintiff (appellee) may be subject to the provisions of the State Tort Liability Chapter 662 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, particularly the provisions of HRS §§ 662-1, -2, -15(1), and -15(4); and
HRS § 662-1(1) and (2) reads:
HRS § 662-2 reads:
HRS § 662-15(1) reads:
HRS § 662-15(4) reads:
2. The immunities retained in HRS §§ 662-15(1) and 662-15(4) are applicable to the City and County of Honolulu in this action;
a. That HRS § 46-72 and Section 12-106 of the Charter of the City and County of Honolulu which are notice of claim requirements, operate in reality as statutes of limitations for the tort liability of the City and County of Honolulu;
b. That HRS § 662-4, the two-year statute of limitations for tort actions against the State, takes precedence over and hence invalidates the notice of claim requirements in HRS § 46-72 and Section 12-106 of the Charter of the City and County of Honolulu and therefore, claims against the City and County of Honolulu are governed by the two-year limitations of HRS § 662-4.
In Medeiros v. Kondo, 55 Haw. 499, 522 P.2d 1269 (1974), and Runnels v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 525 P.2d 1125 (1974), we held that nonjudicial governmental officers do not have absolute immunity from tort suits. We concluded further in Medeiros, supra, 55 Haw. at 503, 522 P.2d at 1271:
For immunity of judges of court see State v. Taylor, 49 Haw. 624, 631, 425 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1967).
We feel strongly that if an official in exercising his authority is motivated by malice, and not by an otherwise proper purpose, then he should not escape liability for the injuries he causes. To reach that end we view the problem as one of limited liability and not immunity from the action itself. . . .
. . . but to limit liability . . . by holding plaintiff to a higher standard of proof than in a normal tort case. To this end we allocate to plaintiff the burden of adducing clear and convincing proof that defendant was motivated by malice and not by an otherwise proper purpose.
In Runnels, supra, we reaffirmed our holding in Medeiros, supra.
We are of the opinion that the prosecuting attorney is an officer of the executive branch of appellant, and thus subject to liability for his tortious conduct as enunciated in Medeiros, supra.
Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362, 367 (1916).
Under Article V, Chapter 1, Section 5-104(e), the mayor recommends to the council the salary to be paid to the prosecuting attorney.
We are therefore of the opinion, notwithstanding the provision of Section 6-703(b), Charter of the City and County of Honolulu, that the prosecuting attorney is an agent and officer of the appellant, and thus, the appellant is liable for the tortious conduct of the prosecuting attorney under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662, 669, 231 N.E.2d 169, 173 (1967); City of Lexington v. Yank, Ky., 431 S.W.2d 892 (1968).
Section 6-703 Powers, duties and functions. The prosecuting attorney shall:
. . . a finding of an amount of damages is so much within the exclusive province of the jury that it will not be disturbed on appellate review unless palpably not supported by the evidence, or so excessive and outrageous when considered with the circumstances of the case as to demonstrate that the jury in assessing damages acted against rules of law or suffered their passions or prejudices to mislead them.
After a review of the record, we are of the opinion that the damages assessed by the jury is not excessive and outrageous, and is clearly supported by the evidence.
See Alau v. Everett, 7 Haw. 82 (1887); Colegrove v. S.S. "City of Columbia", 11 Haw. 693 (1899); Jacobson v. Yoon, 41 Haw. 181 (1955); Lopez v. Wigwam Dep't Stores, 49 Haw. 416, 421 P.2d 289 (1966).
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict as excessive and order a new trial or in failing to order a remittitur of $49,000 general damages.
See 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1305.1; Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 131, 351 P.2d 1083, 1088 (1960).
The authorities are in agreement that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence can be granted provided the evidence meets the following requirements: (1) it must be previously undiscovered even though due diligence was exercised; (2) it must be admissible and credible; (3) it must be of such a material and controlling nature as will probably change the outcome and not merely cumulative or tending only to impeach or contradict a witness. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.23[4] at 273 (2d ed. 1974). See also WRIGHT MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 2859 (Vol. 11 at 181; 1973); 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1305 at 370 (1958).
In the instant case, based on the record, we agree with appellee that the affidavit of Mr. Low is insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify a new trial on the following grounds:
The appellant errs in contending that the key issue is the innocence or guilt of appellee of the homicide of Burke. The record shows clearly that the complaint of appellee was bottomed upon a claim that he was subjected to arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution by appellant without appellant having the necessary probable cause to so subject the appellee at the time of the arrest. It is elementary that probable cause must be premised on the knowledge of facts at the time of the arrest and not upon knowledge obtained subsequently. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 (1948); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959). Thus, the proffered newly discovered evidence is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether probable cause existed at the time of appellee's arrest and incarceration. Assuming, arguendo, the proffered evidence is material to the issue in question, nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to demonstrate due diligence in the discovery of the evidence.
The issue of punitive damages against the appellant does not merit our consideration. The appellee failed to file a proper notice of appeal. HRCP Rule 73(a).