Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20141029_0000807.SAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 18:18:44
Document Index: 84772457

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 406', '§ 406', '§ 405', '§ 406', '§ 406', '§ 406', 'art, 535', '§ 406']

AMANDA L. PAYNE, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), on the petition for authorization of attorney's fees filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) ( see Doc. 27) and the defendant's response (Doc. 28). Upon consideration of all pertinent materials contained in the file, it is determined that petitioner should receive a reasonable fee in the amount of $5, 508.00 under the Social Security Act.
Byron A. Lassiter, Esquire, has been plaintiff's representative since October 27, 2009 and in that capacity has represented Payne in connection with her claims for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. ( See Doc. 27, ¶ 1.) On September 4, 2012, two days before the filing of the complaint in this Court ( see Doc. 1 (complaint filed September 6, 2012)), Payne executed a fee agreement wherein she agreed to the payment of an attorney's fee equaling twenty-five percent (25%) of all past-due benefits following a favorable decision ( see Doc. 27, Exhibit C, FEE AGREEMENT ("I hereby retain the law firm of BYRON A. LASSITER AND ASSOCIATES, P.C. to represent me and my family in proceedings at all federal court levels on my claim for Social Security Disability (Title II) and/or Supplemental Security Income (Title XVI) of the Social Security Act. [] It is understood and agreed that I will pay an attorney's fee that will be 25% of the combined gross retroactive benefits from Social Security and Supplemental Security Income [] resulting from a favorable award of the Commissioner, prior to any reduction under Section 1127(a) of the Act. [] It is understood that the term combined gross retroactive benefits', as used herein, represents the total amount of money to which I and any auxiliary beneficiary or beneficiaries become entitled through the month before the month SSA effectuates a favorable administrative determination or decision on my Social Security claim and that SSI past-due benefits are the total amount of money from which I become eligible through the month SSA effectuates a favorable administrative determination or decision on my SSI claim.... My attorney shall have the option to retain either the EAJA fee or a fee, if any, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), whichever amount shall be higher, and refund to me the lower of the two amounts, if any.").)
Following remand proceedings ( see Doc. 20 (judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), the Commissioner determined that plaintiff was entitled to social security benefits commencing December 2009 through November 2013. (Doc. 27, Exhibit B, at 1.)
The amount of past-due disability insurance benefits the Social Security Administration determined Ms. Payne was entitled to receive totals $46, 032.00. ( See id. at 2-3.) The SSA withheld twenty-five percent (25%) of those past-due benefits, that is, $11, 508.00, for payment of attorney's fees. ( See id. ) The petitioner has represented in the present application that he "received payment of $6, 000.00 on March 19, 2014 for an authorized administrative attorney[s] fee." (Doc. 27, ¶ 9.)
Petitioner has submitted to this Court an itemized statement regarding the time spent before this Court pursuing Payne's claims. (Doc. 27, Exhibit A.) The total time delineated therein is 18 hours. ( Id. )
Petitioner requests that this Court approve an attorney's fee in the amount of $5, 508.00 for services rendered in court, which represents the remainder of 25% of the past-due benefits to which the Social Security Administration has determined Payne entitled under the Social Security Act, following subtraction of the $6, 000.00 fee petitioner received from the Administration for services rendered before the Administration.
Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), provides that a court which renders a favorable judgment to a Social Security claimant may award the claimant's attorney a reasonable fee for his representation of the claimant "not in excess of 25 percent of the total of past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits."[1] Section 406(b) thus "provides for contingent fees to be charged to the client, with the amount to be set by the district court subject to a statutory maximum." Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original; citations omitted); see Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1035 n.12 (11th Cir. 1992) (the total amount of attorney's fees that may be awarded under the Social Security Act is limited to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded).
The Supreme Court has held that "§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements." Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808-809, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1829, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002). As noted in Gisbrecht, "Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.[2]... Within the 25 percent boundary, as petitioners in this case acknowledge, the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered." Id. at 807, 122 S.Ct. at 1828 (footnote added).
In line with Gisbrecht, therefore, this Court will begin with the contingency fee agreement and will only reduce the amount called for by the agreement upon a determination that this amount is unreasonable. In adopting this approach, the Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the lodestar calculation of fees in Kay v. Apfel, 176 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the "contingent fee" approach to calculation of attorney's fees under § 406(b) in favor of the "lodestar" approach) in favor of the contingency fee approach of other Circuits, like that of the Second Circuit in Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1990) (district courts must begin with the contingency fee agreement and may only ...