Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-kahn-3
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Matched Legal Cases: ['art.\n18', '§ 3731', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2510', '§ 2518', '§ 605', '§ 2515', '§ 2517', '§ 2518', '§ 2517', '§ 801', '§ 801', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 | Casetext Search + Citator
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized a "business affairs" exception, where the spouse's marital…
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized a “business affairs” exception, where the spouse's marital…
Full title:UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. IRVING KAHN AND MINNIE…
471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972)
involving the confidential communication privilege
Decided October 31, 1972. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied January 29, 1973.
James R. Thompson, U.S. Atty., Allan E. Lapidus, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
The government has appealed from an order of a district judge suppressing as evidence conversations between Irving and Minnie Kahn, husband and wife, gathered from wiretaps authorized by a district judge's order permitting interception of their telephone communications by virtue of the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
18 U.S.C. § 3731, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (b).
18 U.S.C. § 2516 and 2518.
On March 20, 1970 the judge issued the wiretap order on application of the government, through a specially designated Assistant Attorney General, supported by an FBI agent's affidavit. The order authorized interception of Irving Kahn's conversations with "others as yet unknown" using the two Kahn home telephone numbers. Minnie Kahn was not named in the order. The government presumed the order authorized interception of her conversations as a member of the class of "others as yet unknown." The judge accepted the FBI status report he required under authority of § 2518(6) of the Act and presumably approved the government's interpretation of the order.
The order cautioned that execution of the order should be as "soon as practicable" and "in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective or, in any event, at the end of fifteen (15) days from the date of this order." On March 25, 1970 the government reported interception had been terminated by attainment of the objective. The report stated the objective was attained by gathering information, inter alia, that on March 21, 1970 Irving Kahn called his wife from Arizona and discussed gambling wins and losses, and that the same day Minnie Kahn called a known gambling figure twice and discussed numbers and amounts of bets placed and the identity of the bettors by numbers.
18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520.
On March 10, 1971 an order was entered authorizing the FBI, in possession of tapes from the eavesdropping, to break the seal, make copies of recordings and supply the defendants' counsel with a copy.
On February 24, 1971 Irving and Minnie Kahn were indicted for using a telephone "facility in interstate commerce" with intent to promote gambling in violation of Illinois law. On April 27, 1971 the Kahns filed motions to suppress the wiretap evidence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a). The joint motion asserted that the Kahns' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the wire taps. It also challenged the sufficiency of the application for the order, the necessity for the order and the FBI use of telephone company records allegedly in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 18 U.S.C. § 2515, the duration of the order, and its excessive breadth. The Kahns also challenged the order for its lack of directions for minimizing interception, and alleged that it violated the marital privilege under the Ninth Amendment, the common law and 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4).
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that —
The judge found that the Attorney General's application for the intercepting order was adequately supported by the FBI agent's affidavit and that the order was valid and enforceable under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3-5). The judge further found that the statute authorizing the wiretap order was "undoubtedly" constitutional when limited to conversations participated in by "Irving Kahn with persons unknown at the time." However, the judge, without hearing testimony, suppressed any conversations "exclusively" between Irving and Minnie Kahn as being within the marital privilege doctrine as applied through 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4). The judge also decided that the wiretap order did not authorize interception of Minnie Kahn's conversations. The government's appeal followed.
The criminal case was assigned to a district court judge other than the judge who authorized the wiretap.
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that —
We agree with the government. If the intercepted conversations had to do with the commission of a crime and not with the privacy of the Kahn marriage, the judge's ruling is erroneous. Society has an interest in protecting the privacy of marriage because invasion of the privacy endangers the family relationship. The privilege has been interpreted in some jurisdictions to exclude conversations between spouses about business, since their role as spouses is merely incidental. That rule reinforces the exception to the privilege; "[w]here both spouses are substantial participants in patently illegal activity, even the most expansive of the marriage privileges should not prevent testimony."
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 835.
Note, Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privilege, 77 Harv. L.Rev. 730, 734 (1964).
The Doughtys were in the unlawful enterprise together, and we think it highly unlikely that the court's admission of the testimony [of an agent] . . . militated against their domestic peace or offended the public interest which the rule in Hawkins [ 358 U.S. 74, 79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958)] sought to protect.
That language reflects Exception (2)(e) of Uniform Rule of Evidence 28; see also United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 500 (2nd Cir. 1945). We realize that "the law of evidence has demonstrated a degree of solicitude toward the intimacy of marriage not manifested with regard to other protected relationships," but the conversations before us between the Kahns were with respect to ongoing violations of Illinois gambling laws. We hold therefore that the judge erred in suppressing those conversations.
It is noteworthy also that the attorney-client privilege may not be invoked where commission of a crime is involved. See United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 37 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'd 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966).
77 Harv.L.Rev. at 734.
The cases cited by the Kahns do not aid them. The point here was not raised in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S.Ct 279, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934), and there was no evidence in that case of dual participation in crime. In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951), the husband refused to disclose the whereabouts of his wife, sought as a grand jury witness, who secretly entrusted her address to him. The privileged communication was not in furtherance of a crime. The decision in Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965), is also distinguishable, since the objectionable testimony of Mrs. Ivey did not deal with the furtherance of a crime, but was an admission of a past crime. In Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denying a pre-trial motion for severance which urged the possibility that the government would use statements in violation of the marital privilege — the district court had deferred ruling to the actuality of the trial. In the case before us the judge used his discretion to rule before trial. No claim is made that the ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Section 2518(1)(b) (iv) of the Act requires the government to identify, in an application, any person, "if known," whose communications are to be intercepted. The implication is that if not known, such a person's conversations may be intercepted if that person's probable complicity in the offenses being committed is not yet known. The wiretap order was limited to conversations of "Irving Kahn and others as yet unknown." Thus in order to satisfy the limitations of the judge's order the wiretap had to meet two requirements: 1) that Irving Kahn be a party to the conversations, and 2) that his conversations intercepted be with "others as yet unknown."
Congress, in order to "safeguard the privacy of innocent persons," found that interception should be disallowed where none of the parties had consented to the wiretap and where it is not authorized by a proper court order. It stated that the purpose of Title III was twofold: protection of personal privacy, and "delineating on a uniform basis" the circumstances and conditions under which wiretapping may be authorized. We think that it is necessary therefore to limit the class of "others as yet unknown" as tightly, in the interest of personal privacy, as the competing need for reasonable public protection in law enforcement permits. In our opinion Congress did not intend that the implication in the term "if known" should be extended to embrace persons whom careful investigation by the government would disclose were probably using the Kahn telephones in conversations for illegal activities. We conclude that in the interest of protecting personal privacy a broader construction of the term "others as yet unknown" is required, i. e., if the government did not know but should have known by prudent investigation of the likelihood of Minnie Kahn's use of the telephones for illicit activities, she was not a person "unknown."
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 801(b), Title III, 82 Stat. 197; S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News, 1968, pp. 2112, 2153.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 801(d), Title III, 82 Stat. 197.
It is not in the public interest to relax concern of individual privacy to accommodate less than careful performance on the part of government agents. It is far more important, in our opinion, to protect Minnie Kahn's personal privacy that it is to permit the government to avail itself of fruits of its less than careful intrusion upon her privacy in order to prosecute her for the offense.
"What is truly central to the fourth amendment, as Justice Bradley stated in his historic opinion in Boyd v. United States [ 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)] is `the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.'" Spitzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 169, 180 (1969).
The application of the Assistant Attorney General merely sought authority to wiretap the conversations of "others as yet unknown" on the basis of the agent's affidavit. The affidavit did no more than indicate that the wiretap of conversations of "others as yet unknown" would be useful. The agent's affidavit contains long lists taken from telephone company records of interstate telephone calls using the Kahn phones to discuss gambling. The sources which led to these lists were gamblers who had worked with or engaged in gambling enterprises with Irving Kahn. It is highly improbable that all of these communications were with Irving Kahn. The sources which led to these lists would also seem likely sources from which questioning would elicit information identifying members of the Kahn household other than Irving Kahn who used the telephones in aid of the unlawful enterprise. And if the attempt to elicit that information was unsuccessful, we fail to see why the agent could not state the reason for lack of success, and the interception order find that "normal" investigative procedures have been tried and have failed. The conclusionary statement in the application and affidavit that "normal investigative methods reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed and are too dangerous to be used" is too slender a reed upon which to rest the invasion of Minnie Kahn's privacy. And the government was precluded from augmenting the application and affidavit at a suppression hearing. United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967).
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c): "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous:"
We think the government's wiretap impinged upon Minnie Kahn's privacy and accordingly the government had the burden, at the suppression hearing, of justification. We find no justification in the record for not determining from the informants used for the government's application and affidavit whether Minnie Kahn had received or sent, through the particular telephone numbers, communications with respect to unlawful gambling activities; and the government has not shown that had it conducted its investigation with the care Congress intended to protect personal privacy, it would not have discovered whether or not Minnie Kahn had implicated herself by her conversations. Where, as here, the government's application and affidavit disclosed sources from which it could probably have learned the likelihood that Minnie Kahn was using the Kahn phones in illicit activity, but neither made the attempt, nor stated facts justifying not attempting, to gain that knowledge, the subsequent wiretaps amounted to a virtual general warrant in violation of her Fourth Amendment right. We conclude that the application and affidavit do not support an interpretation of the interception order to include Minnie Kahn in the class of "others as yet unknown" and that the district judge did not err in deciding that the order did not authorize the wiretapping of her telephone conversations.
Spitzer, supra n. 17, at 191.
It might be questioned whether conversations of Minnie Kahn could be lawfully seized had the government after proper investigation determined that no other persons in the household — other than Irving Kahn — had used the phones in committing crimes, and intercepted Irving Kahn's conversations only to find Minnie Kahn discussing with him an illegal enterprise. The suppositious question presupposes no prior knowledge of any unlawful activity by Minnie Kahn and no basis on which to include her in the application and affidavit class of "others as yet unknown" who had in the past used or were presently using the phones for conversations regarding the offense. The question is not relevant to the question before us. However, we think the evidence seized in such an event might be used in the prosecution of Irving Kahn, but not against Minnie Kahn. There is a distinction between the event supposed in this question and the question arising where, for example, a valid tap on a named person concerning a particular offense uncovers evidence against another person of a different offense. United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971).
Furthermore, the government analogizes the Kahn situation to the discussion in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 177 n. 10, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), where the Court approved seizure and use of narcotics in a proper warrant specifying gambling material. There the narcotics were contraband. In United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 325 (S.D.Fla. 1971), a district judge decided that "if a lawful court order . . . [as to a] named person[s] is issued, and . . . conversations [of] . . . other persons not named . . . are lawfully intercepted" (emphasis added), the seized conversations may be used. This decision was followed in United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 919-921 (D.Del. 1971). The word "lawful" in the language quoted begs the question before us.
[24] KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[26] STEVENS, Circuit Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On March 20, 1970, the government applied to Judge Campbell for an order authorizing the interception of conversations using two telephones identified by number and by location in Irving Kahn's residence. One purpose of the request was to intercept communications which would reveal the identity of Irving Kahn's confederates.
Affidavit of Douglas P. Roller, p. 4.
There are two separate reasons why I believe the majority misreads the statute: (1) in my opinion the record does not support the conclusion that Minnie Kahn's participation in the gambling enterprise was "known" to the government on March 20, 1970, within the meaning of § 2518(4)(a); and (2) the adequacy of the government's investigation prior to March 20, 1970, is not relevant to the "if known" issue arising under § 2518(4)(a), but rather pertains to a question which was resolved by a finding of fact entered in compliance with § 2518(3)(c).
"(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted; . . ."
82 Stat. 219, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a).
Just as a search warrant must carefully limit the discretion of the officer executing the warrant by defining the scope of his authority to search and the objects to be seized, this subsection was intended to require the order to define the scope of the agent's authority to intercept conversations. The inclusion of the words "if known" indicates that Congress intended to permit the interception of some conversations of persons whose participation in the criminal activity was unknown at the time the order was entered. As I read the record, Minnie Kahn was such a person on March 20, 1970.
At least that is a fair inference to be drawn from the language of the section and the explanatory reference in the Senate Committee Report to West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, see especially 87-88, 14 S.Ct. 752, 38 L.Ed. 643, U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News, 1968, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 2191 (1968).
As Judge Kiley points out, it is entirely possible that one of the anonymous informants referred to in the affidavit supporting the government's application for intercept authority might have known that Minnie made illegal telephone calls and might have given that information to a government investigator; on the other hand, it is also possible that she made such calls only on rare occasions when Irving was out of town, or that informants willing to describe Irving might not have been willing to mention Minnie. The whole inquiry, in my opinion, is a matter of speculation and is neither necessary nor appropriate to the determination of whether the order meets the "if known" requirement of § 2518(4) (a).
The statute authorizes the judge to enter an intercept order if he makes certain determinations on the basis of the government's factual showing. Among others, he must determine that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 82 Stat. 219, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).
Judge Campbell made an express finding of fact complying with this requirement. The finding is supported by a detailed description of the "normal investigative procedures" which had been used, and by a perfectly reasonable explanation of why "the interception of these telephone communications is the only available method of investigation which has a reasonable likelihood of securing the evidence necessary to prove violations of these statutes." Although the results of the investigation plainly indicated that Irving Kahn's telephones were being used in connection with the commission of an offense, the record also supports the conclusion that it was unlikely that admissible evidence would be available to prove Kahn's guilt unless intercept authority was obtained. Nothing in the record suggests that a further investigation which might have ascertained Minnie's participation would have obviated the need for such authority. In short, the finding required by § 2518(3) (c) was made and, in my opinion, is supported by the record.
Affidavit of Ray I. Shryock, p. 16.
Although § 2518(3)(c) imposes a duty on the government to exhaust normal investigative procedures before applying for an intercept order, it seems unlikely that the "if known" requirement in § 2518(4)(a) was intended to impose either an additional exhaustion requirement or a more severe standard for measuring the government's compliance with the express language of subsection (3)(c). I am therefore persuaded that the majority's interpretation of the "if known" requirement will merely tend to confuse two quite different statutory purposes.
In Kahn we concluded that the public interest in preserving the family was not great enough to justify protecting conversations in furtherance of crimes joined in by both spouses; similarly here, we think that goal does not justify assuring a criminal that he can enlist the aid of his spouse in a criminal enterprise without fear that by recruiting an accomplice or conspirator he is creating another potential witness.
Summary of this case from United States v. Van Drunen
In United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194, (7th Cir. 1972), reversed on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225, we held that the somewhat related privilege for confidential marital communications did not apply where the conversations were about an unlawful enterprise in which both spouses participated.
In Kahn we concluded that the public interest in preserving the family was not great enough to justify protecting conversations in furtherance of crimes joined in by both spouses; similarly here, we think that goal does not justify assuring a criminal that he can enlist the aid of his spouse in a criminal enterprise without fear that by recruiting an accomplice or coconspirator he is creating another potential witness.
In Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, reversed on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974), the government appealed from an order suppressing conversations between husband and wife that were gathered from wiretaps authorized by a district judge's order permitting interception of their telephone communications.
In Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, reversed on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974), the government appealed from an order suppressing conversations between husband and wife that were gathered from wiretaps authorized by a district judge's order permitting interception of their telephone communications.
In United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 980, 93 S.Ct. 2275, 36 L.Ed.2d 956 (1973), a decision defendant pillars his position upon, the Seventh Circuit tightly contracted the category of "unknowns."
Summary of this case from United States v. Bleau
In United States v Kahn (471 F.2d 191, revd on other grounds 415 U.S. 143) the court, en banc, was presented with facts almost identical with those found in this case.