Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-christopher-r-31526
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 08:34:52
Document Index: 92352716

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 213', '§ 213', '§ 1', '§ 211', '§ 12022', '§ 637', '§ 1', '§ 304', '§ 12022', '§ 91', '§ 12022', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 137', '§ 6', '§ 1']

In re Christopher R. - 6 Cal.4th 86 S029234 - Thu, 10/28/1993 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 6 Cal.4th 86
In re Christopher R. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 86 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 786; 859 P.2d 1301
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1769 (hereafter section 1769) establishes the maximum period of control for a minor committed by the [6 Cal.4th 89] juvenile court to the California Youth Authority because of a criminal offense. Under subdivision (a), which applies to offenses generally, the period of control automatically extends for two years or until the minor's twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs later. But under subdivision (b), which applies to offenses specified in subdivision (b) of section 707, the period of control automatically extends for two years or until the minor's twenty-fifth birthday, whichever occurs later.
In count III, the delinquency petition alleged that, on or about March 22, 1991, minor committed the felony of burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. It also effectively alleged that the burglary was of an "inhabited [6 Cal.4th 90] dwelling house" within the meaning of former subdivision 1 of Penal Code section 460 and, as a consequence, was of the first degree (Stats. 1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476).
The juvenile court committed minor to the California Youth Authority. It set the maximum term of confinement at seven years, six for the felony of [6 Cal.4th 91] robbery and one for the armed-with-a-firearm sentence enhancement. It did so because it fixed the degree of the robbery at the first (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (a)) rather than the second (id., § 212.5, subd. (b)), and imposed six years as the upper term for the former (id., § 213, subd. (a)(1)) rather than five years as the upper term for the latter (id., § 213, subd. (a)(2)). Under subdivision (b) of section 1769, the period of control by the California Youth Authority was permitted to extend to minor's 25th birthday because of his commission of a criminal offense specified in subdivision (b) of section 707.
In setting out to construe "[r]obbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon" specified in subdivision (b)(3) of section 707, we seek, of course, to discover the meaning of the provision. In other words, we aim to discern the Legislature's intent. Here, we do no more and no less than to follow the "fundamental rule of statutory interpretation" (People v. Aston (1985) 39 Cal.3d 481, 489 [216 Cal.Rptr. 771, 703 P.2d 111]; accord, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1095 [282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025]), viz., "to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent" (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; accord, e.g., Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672]).
What the Legislature did in specifying criminal offenses in subdivision (b) of section 707 may be simply stated. It merely referred to offenses that are [6 Cal.4th 92] independently defined in the general criminal law. Thus, subdivision (b) of section 707 expressly points to section 602, and section 602 in turn expressly points to the "law of this state" and "of the United States" and to the "ordinance[s]" of this state's "cit[ies]" and "count[ies]."
In 1976, former section 211a of the Penal Code stated: "All robbery which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, and the robbery of any person who is performing his duties as operator of any motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley used for the transportation of persons for hire, is robbery in the first degree. All other kinds of robbery are of the second degree." (Stats. 1961, ch. 1874, § 1, p. 3975, italics added.) fn. 1 It covered "vicarious" as well as "personal" arming. (E.g., People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 708 [83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d [6 Cal.4th 93] 64], disapproved on another point, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 287, fn. 36 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]; People v. Perkins (1951) 37 Cal.2d 62, 64 [230 P.2d 353]; see, e.g., People v. Barclay (1953) 40 Cal.2d 146, 155-156 [252 P.2d 321], disapproved on another point, People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 648-649 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810]; People v. Wade (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 646, 651 [163 P.2d 59]; People v. Wallace (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [97 P.2d 256]; People v. Stevens (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 666, 667-668 [90 P.2d 595]; People v. Jones (1931) 114 Cal.App. 91, 93 [299 P. 559].)
Thus, the felony described in Penal Code section 211 plus the sentence enhancement established by subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 12022 meets the three requirements identified above. First, of course, there is robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) Second, there is arming, either "personal" or "vicarious." (Id., § 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Third, there is a dangerous or [6 Cal.4th 94] deadly weapon, to wit, a firearm. (Ibid.) When loaded, a "gun is unquestionably a dangerous and deadly weapon"; even when unloaded, it is at least a "dangerous weapon." (2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against Property, § 637, pp. 718, 719.)
In arguing that the criminal offense of "[r]obbery while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon" specified in subdivision (b)(3) of section 707 covers only "personal" arming, minor sets out to construe the relevant language in accordance with, among other provisions, Penal Code section 12022 as it stood in 1976, when subdivision (b)(3) was added to section 707. In that year, Penal Code section 12022 provided a sentence enhancement for "[a]ny person who commits or attempts to commit any felony within this state while armed with any ... deadly weapon[ ]" (Stats. 1968, ch. 1386, § 1, p. 2720)-"armed" having been construed to mean "personally armed" (e.g., People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757, 766, fn. 4 [94 Cal.Rptr. 393, 484 P.2d 65]; People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 241 [133 Cal.Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306]; see Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 304, p. 5161 [amending Pen. Code, § 12022 to reach only the "person who commits or attempts to commit any felony within this state while personally armed with any deadly weapon" (italics added)], superseded before it became operative by Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 91, p. 678 [amending Pen. Code, § 12022 to cover "vicarious" as well as "personal" arming], which became operative on the same date).
Although we need not address particular aspects of minor's argument because of our conclusion above, we may properly comment on his reliance on two purported canons of statutory construction. One is that "if a statute is [6 Cal.4th 95] intended to impose a derivative liability on some person other than the actor, there must be some legislative direction that it is to be applied to persons who do not themselves commit the proscribed act." (People v. Walker, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 241-242.) The other is that any "ambiguity [in a statute] must be resolved in [the minor's] favor ...." (People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 832 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186].) By its very terms, however, subdivision (b)(3) of section 707 was not intended to impose liability, derivative or otherwise. Neither is it ambiguous. Notwithstanding minor's claim, it clearly covers "vicarious" as well as "personal" arming.
First degree robbery comprises "[e]very robbery of any person who is performing his or her duties as an operator of any bus, taxicab, cable car, streetcar, trackless trolley, or other vehicle, including a vehicle operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the air, and used for the transportation of persons for hire, every robbery of any passenger which is perpetrated on any of these vehicles, and every robbery which is perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, a vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the [6 Cal.4th 96] Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation, or a trailer coach, as defined in the Vehicle Code, which is inhabited, or the inhabited portion of any other building ...." (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (a).) Second degree robbery includes "[a]ll kinds of robbery other than those listed" above. (Id., § 212.5, subd. (b).)
­FN 1. In 1976, not long after subdivision (b) was added to section 707, former section 211a of the Penal Code was amended to remove the language relating to robbery "which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon" and to delete the classification by degrees. (See Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 137.5, p. 5100, eff. Jan. 1, 1977, operative July 1, 1977 ["The robbery of any person who is performing his duties as operator of any motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley used for the transportation of persons for hire, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four or five years."].) In 1978, it was amended in a way not relevant here. (Stats. 1978, ch. 579, § 6, pp. 1981-1982.) In 1986, it was repealed. (Stats. 1986, ch. 1428, § 1, p. 5123.)
Thu, 10/28/1993 6 Cal.4th 86 S029234 Review - Criminal Appeal closed; remittitur issued
1 R., C. (Appellant)
3 R., C. (Overview party)
Oct 28 1993 Opinion: Affirmed in part/reversed in part
Applt Christopher R.
Appellant's Votes: Lucas,CJ; Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, J.
Kerry C. Connor for Applt Christopher R.
Feb 5 1993 Application for Extension of Time filed
To file Opening brief on the merits To 3-15-93 (35 Days) by Counsel for Applt Christopher R.
Feb 9 1993 Extension of time granted
To file Applt's Opening brief on the merits To 2-26-93
Resp's answer brief on the merits [asking to 4/30] (received in Sacramento 3/29/93)
Apr 1 1993 Extension of time granted
Resp's answer brief on the merits To: 4-16-93
Apr 6 1993 Filed letter from:
Apr 13 1993 Answer brief on the merits filed
May 3 1993 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
by appellant Christopher R.
Oct 28 1993 Opinion filed: Affirmed in part, reversed in part
Judgment reversed to extent it affirmed judgment of juvenile court finding that robbery was of 1st degree & imposing 6 years as upper term therefor, Remanded with directions to modify the judgment to fix the robbery at 2nd degree and to impose 5 years as upper term; In all other respects, affirmed. Majority Opinion by Mosk, J. -- joined by Lucas C.J., Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter & George JJ.
Dec 9 1993 Received:
Receipt for Remittitur Signed by Felix Quenga, Deputy Clerk
May 9 1994 Compensation awarded counsel
Atty Connor
SCOCAL, In re Christopher R. , 6 Cal.4th 86 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-christopher-r-31526) (last visited Wednesday August 5, 2020).