Source: http://openjurist.org/222/f2d/398/taylor-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-01-23 09:20:26
Document Index: 172788937

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4244', '§ 14', '§ 4244', '§ 4244', '§ 4246', '§ 4244', '§ 2263', '§ 24', '§ 211', '§ 14', '§ 2285']

222 F2d 398 Taylor v. United States | OpenJurist
222 F. 2d 398 - Taylor v. United States HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 222 F.2d.
222 F2d 398 Taylor v. United States 222 F.2d 398
George TAYLOR, Appellant,
Petition for Rehearing In Banc Denied April 29, 1955.
Mr. Edward de Grazia, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), with whom Mr. Charles Jay Pilzer, Washington, D. C. (appointed by the District Court), was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Gerard J. O'Brien, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and Lewis Carroll and Edward Troxell, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
The appellant was indicted in December 1952 for robbery, housebreaking and grand larceny alleged to have been committed on October 25 and 27, 1952. Before trial, in proceedings under 18 U.S. C.A. § 4244, he was found in March 1953 to be "presently insane and so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him, or properly to assist in his own defense". He was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital "until he is mentally competent to stand trial * * *"1 In October 1953 the Superintendent of the Hospital certified that the appellant was mentally competent to stand trial, and in November 1953 he was tried.
"In the courts of the District of Columbia no physician or surgeon shall be permitted, without the consent of the person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to disclose any information, confidential in its nature, which he shall have acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity * * *." D.C.Code 1951, § 14-308, 29 Stat. 138. "`The local statute is very broad. It forbids disclosure by the physician of any information obtained by him in his professional capacity.'" Sher v. De Haven, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 257, 260, 199 F.2d 777, 780, 36 A.L.R.2d 937, certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 936, 73 S.Ct. 797, 97 L.Ed. 1363.
In regard to mental patients, the policy behind such a statute is particularly clear and strong. Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition. * * * It would be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that all they say &#x2014; and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say &#x2014; may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand."2
"Presumably all of the patients in any good mental hospital are receiving psychiatric treatment. That is true of persons whether they are sent to St. Elizabeths Hospital as civil insane, as criminal insane, or as `sexual psychopaths.'"3
The cases on which the government relies4 do not support its position. They hold that a doctor who does not treat a prisoner, but only examines him in order to testify about his condition, may testify about it. Of course he may.5 Examination for testimonial purposes only has nothing to do with treatment. A doctor who makes such an examination is not "attending a patient". There is no confidential relation between them. Instead of implying that confidence will be respected, the circumstances imply the contrary.6 It is a far cry from such cases to the government's contention that a psychiatrist who treats a patient charged with crime may expose the man's secrets to a jury despite a statute that expressly excludes information "acquired in attending a patient." The statute does not say or imply that the privilege it creates may be withheld from patients who have been committed to a public mental hospital. Most courts that have considered the matter hold, as we do, that such patients are entitled to the protection of such a statute.7
18 U.S.C. § 4244, which provides for the examination of accused persons to determine whether they are competent to stand trial, does not limit the privilege of accused persons. It extends the privilege, though we need not concern ourselves with the extension. It restricts the testimony that a psychiatrist who so much as examines an accused person, pursuant to this section, may give. It provides: "No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding." Since the whole of Dr. Epstein's testimony was inadmissible by reason of the District of Columbia privilege statute, we need not consider whether some or all of it would have been inadmissible by reason of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 if Dr. Epstein had merely examined Taylor and not treated him.
Taylor did not consent to the violation of his privilege. He made no effort to consent. No effort he might have made would have been effective. Since it had been judicially determined that he was incompetent to stand trial, he could not validly consent to a trial or any part of a trial.8 In the course of a civil trial, perhaps an incompetent's committee might consent to the admission of privileged testimony.9 But this was not a civil trial and Taylor had no committee. He could no more authorize a "legal representative" to consent to the admission of Dr. Epstein's testimony than he himself could consent. His failure to protest had no more effect than a positive expression of consent would have had.
If such instructions were commonly given, defendants who plead insanity would be encouraged to make a show of insanity in court. Since we are reversing the conviction on other grounds we need not consider whether the instruction violated appellant's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.10
The appellant says the judge told the jury, in effect, that if the appellant was acquitted he would go free. We think he did not convey that erroneous idea. But we think that when an accused person has pleaded insanity, counsel may and the judge should inform the jury that if he is acquitted by reason of insanity he will be presumed to be insane11 and may be confined in a "hospital for the insane"12 as long as "the public safety and * * * [his] welfare" require.13 Though this fact has no theoretical bearing on the jury's verdict it may have a practical bearing.
"Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Rule 52(b), Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A. We have repeatedly applied this rule to errors in admitting evidence and instructing juries.14 It is especially appropriate when the mental competence of the accused is in question. His competence cannot be assumed and his rights disregarded because he has done the physical acts charged.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4246 provides that when an accused is found mentally incompetent "the court may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial * * *."
2. Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and The Law (1952), p. 272.
3. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeths, "Some Problems of the `Criminal Insane' at Saint Elizabeths Hospital", Med.Ann. of D.C., Vol. XXII, p. 349, July 1953.
4. Catoe v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 131 F.2d 16; People v. Sliney, 137 N.Y. 570, 33 N.E. 150; Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189; etc.
5. This assumes the absence of a special statute, such as 18 U.S.C. § 4244, which restricts the examining doctor's testimony; and the absence of deceit, cf. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N. E.2d 553, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948. "The general rule, in jurisdictions having a statute prohibiting a physician or surgeon from disclosing information acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, is that where the physician or surgeon is consulted for the purpose of examination only, and not for treatment, communications made to him, or information acquired by him, on such examination, are not privileged." 107 A.L.R. 1495.
6. In the Catoe case, supra note 4, the prisoner was expressly warned, as he should be, against making damaging statements. Moreover Catoe was and Taylor is not within an express statutory exception absolving physicians from the obligation of confidence in criminal cases that involve injuries to human beings.
7. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees of Michigan Asylum for the Insane, 1913, 178 Mich. 193, 144 N.W. 538, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 22; Casson v. Schoenfeld, 1918, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N.W. 23, L.R.A.1918C, 162; Linscott v. Hughbanks, 1934, 140 Kan. 353, 37 P.2d 26; Westphal v. State, 191 Misc. 688, 79 N.Y.S.2d 634, 638; McGrath v. State, 200 Misc. 165, 104 N.Y.S.2d 882; Petition of Maryland Casualty Co., Sup., 78 N.Y.S.2d 651. As Judge Prettyman points out, some New York courts have held the contrary.
8. "The patient whose medical history is sought herein being incompetent * * * privilege cannot be waived * * *." Westphal v. State, 191 Misc. 688, 79 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641.
9. McGrath v. State, 200 Misc. 165, 104 N.Y.S.2d 882, 888.
10. Cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-253, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021; McFarland v. United States, 80 U.S.App. D.C. 196, 150 F.2d 593; Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., §§ 2263, 2265.
11. Orencia v. Overholser, 1947, 82 U.S. App.D.C. 285, 163 F.2d 763.
12. D.C.Code 1951, § 24-301. Cf. 24 U.S. C.A. § 211.
13. Barry v. White, 1933, 62 App.D.C. 69, 71, 64 F.2d 707, 709. Cf. Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. ___, ___, 214 F.2d 862, 876, fn. 57.
14. E. g., Robertson v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 171 F.2d 345; Simmons v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 206 F.2d 427.
In the first place no objection to the testimony of Dr. Epstein was made at the time by defense counsel, no objection was made to the charge to the jury in which that testimony was discussed, and no point as to this testimony was made in the motion for a new trial. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that objections to evidence, and the grounds therefor, shall be made known to the trial judge1 and that objections to instructions must be noted before the jury leaves the box.2 Substantial justice does not require a departure from the applicable rules; this man, Taylor, was clearly proven guilty and, indeed, did not even claim that he did not commit the robbery. I would abide by the rules and not now entertain an attack upon the admission of the evidence or the instruction to the jury.
In the second place, under the statute3 information otherwise inadmissible can be disclosed with the consent of the patient or of his legal representative. In the present case both the patient and his legal representative sat silent in the courtroom when it was proposed to disclose these communications and the other material. I would construe that willful silence as consent.
In the third place I think this testimony was not privileged. When pursuant to the dictates of criminal justice a person is confined by order of a court in a state institution for the mentally ill, the relationship between him and the doctor on the staff at that institution is not the ordinary relationship between physician and patient contemplated and treated by the statute which confers the doctor-patient privilege.4 Under such circumstances the Government, as a matter of public concern, is entitled to the benefit of the testimony of those doctors, whether as to diagnosis, treatment or observation. It is contrary to the interests of justice to give such an accused person power to close the mouths of those doctors.
This court used the expression "ordinary patient-doctor relationship" in the Catoe case5 in describing this statutory privilege. The full sentence was: "It protects the personal nature of an ordinary patient-doctor relationship." The cases clearly establish that, when an accused person is subjected to an examination by Government doctors, no doctor-patient relationship is established.6 Taylor's commitment to St. Elizabeths was not for examination but was for treatment, and so those cases do not apply literally. But it seems to me the rationale applies. Certainly it is clear enough that the relationship between Taylor and Dr. Epstein was not the ordinary one of doctor and patient. Nothing was voluntary about it on either's part. And certainly nothing was confidential about Taylor's admissions; they were made before a conference of several physicians. He was a person in custody under authority of the criminal law. Dr. Epstein was acting in the capacity of a Government officer, not as a personal physician. It seems to me the rationale of the rule relating to examinations by Government officers, rather than that of the rule relating to physician-patient relationships, applies to the present problem.
I agree with the view held by some New York courts,7 illustrated by the opinions in Liske v. Liske,8 Munzer v. Blaisdell,9 and Scolavino v. State.10 In the latter case the court quoted with approval from the Liske case, as follows:
"`* * * I do not think that the relation arising by operation of law between a patient committed by legal process to a state institution for the insane and the official physicians in charge thereof is within the professional relation contemplated by Section 834 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or that such section was designed to exclude the testimony of such official physicians, whose duty it is under the police power of the state to make physical examinations of irresponsible patients. * * *'"11
The New York court, in the Scolavino case, also cited and relied upon Professor Wigmore's analysis of the physician-patient privilege.12
I agree with the court that Taylor should have a hearing pursuant to Gunther.13 But I would not reverse the judgment for that purpose; I would follow the procedure as well as the principle of Gunther.
1. Rule 51.
2. Rule 30.
3. 29 Stat. 138 (1896), as amended, D.C. Code § 14-308 (1951).
5. Catoe v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 295, 131 F.2d 16, 19 (1942).
6. State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950), certiorari denied, 341 U.S. 932, 71 S.Ct. 799, 95 L.Ed. 1361 (1951); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 307 Mass. 155, 29 N.E.2d 719 (1940); Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936); Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A.2d 43 (1946); People v. Dutton, 62 Cal.App.2d 862, 145 P.2d 676 (1944); Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 10 N.W.2d 161 (1943).
7. Other New York courts hold the contrary.
8. Sup., 135 N.Y.S. 176 (1912).
9. 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1944), affirmed, 269 App.Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
10. 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1946), modified, 271 App.Div. 618, 67 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1946), affirmed as modified, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947).
11. Id., 62 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
12. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Gunther v. United States, 94 U.S.App. D.C. ___, 215 F.2d 493 (D.C.Cir.1954).