Source: http://edpdlaw.com/Capua.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-18 14:58:26
Document Index: 242866437

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40', '§ 40']

City fire fighters and police department employee brought actions challenging mass urine testing for drug abuse. The District Court, Sarokin, J., held that: (1) governmental taking of urine specimen constituted search and seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment; (2) means chosen by city to achieve goal of ensuring fire fighters were free from drug-induced impairments and capable to perform their public service were not “reasonable” within meaning of Fourth Amendment; and (3) administration of urine testing program impermissibly violated constitutionally protected liberty and property reputational interests of city employees without due process.
Judgment for plaintiffs; injunctive relief ordered.
[1] Constitutional Law 92 278.4(1)
92k278.4 Regulations Affecting Public Officers and Employees
92k278.4(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Even if mass urine testing of government employees for drug abuse were justified without individualized basis, such mass testing would nonetheless be illegal where employees' due process rights were flagrantly violated by coercion of long-time employees into testing without notice, without standards, and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
Assuming program of mass urine testing of government employees for drugs is warranted, before it may be implemented, its existence must be made known, its methods clearly enunciated, and its procedural and confidentiality safeguards adequately provided.
[3] Declaratory Judgment 118A 274.1
118AIII(B) Jurisdiction and Venue
118Ak274 Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
118Ak274.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 118Ak274)
Federal Courts 170B 221
170BIII Federal Question Jurisdiction
170BIII(C) Cases Arising Under Laws of the United States
170Bk219 Civil Rights and Elective Franchise, Laws Relating to
170Bk221 k. Particular Cases and Questions. Most Cited Cases
Federal jurisdiction over civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is appropriate even where § 1983 action asserts claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
[4] Searches and Seizures 349 14
As with blood, each individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in personal “information” bodily fluids contain, for purposes of determining whether testing of bodily fluids constitutes search and seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[5] Searches and Seizures 349 14
Governmental taking of urine specimen constitutes search and seizure within meaning of Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[6] Searches and Seizures 349 23
Fundamental command of Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be “reasonable.” U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[7] Searches and Seizures 349 23
What is “reasonable” search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment depends upon context in which search takes place. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[8] Searches and Seizures 349 24
Ordinarily, search requires both warrant and probable cause to qualify as constitutionally reasonable.
[9] Searches and Seizures 349 23
Ultimate determination of search's constitutional reasonableness requires judicious balancing of intrusiveness of search against its promotion of legitimate governmental interest.
[10] Searches and Seizures 349 26
Degree of intrusion engendered by any search must be viewed in context of individual's legitimate expectation of privacy, in determining whether search is constitutionally reasonable.
[11] Searches and Seizures 349 78
Mass urine testing program for city fire fighters subjected fire fighters to relatively high degree of bodily intrusion, for purposes of determining whether individual's legitimate expectation of privacy was invaded by such testing, in determining constitutional reasonableness of such search; urine is generally discharged and disposed of under circumstances that warrant legitimate expectation of privacy, bodily surveillance during urine collection was considered essential and standard operating procedure in administration of urine drug tests, compulsory urinalysis forced fire fighters to divulge private, personal medical information unrelated to government's professed interest in discovering illegal drug abuse, and there was no forewarning that submission to compulsory employee urine testing would become condition of continued employment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[12] Searches and Seizures 349 78
Mass urine testing of city fire fighters to detect drug abuse was not “reasonable” means of assuring fire fighters were free from drug-induced impairments and capable to perform their public service under the Fourth Amendment, despite claim that widespread, large scale drug use in all segments of population led to reasonable and logical inference that some of those affected might ultimately be employed in public safety capacity and that mass urinalysis was most efficient way to detect drug use, where city proceeded in urine testing campaign without any specific information or independent knowledge that any individual employee was under influence of drugs, and there had been no increased incidence of fire-related accidents or complaints of inadequate fire protection from community. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[13] Searches and Seizures 349 82
349k80 Effect of Illegal Conduct; Trespass
349k82 k. Curing Illegality; Justification by Result. Most Cited Cases
Results achieved cannot justify means utilized for search, and constitutionality of search cannot rest on its fruits.
[14] Searches and Seizures 349 78
As to each individual tested in mass urine testing of city fire fighters for drug abuse, search was unreasonable, where government lacked any specific suspicion as to that fire fighter.
[15] Searches and Seizures 349 23
Under the Fourth Amendment, every individual has absolute right to be free from searches and seizures absent establishment of some degree of reasonable suspicion against him. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[16] Searches and Seizures 349 78
Mere possibility of discovering that some city fire fighters were using drugs and therefore might be impaired in their job performance at some future time because of drug use could not render mass urine testing constitutionally reasonable.
[17] Searches and Seizures 349 78
Fourth Amendment allows city to demand urine of employee only on basis of reasonable suspicion predicated upon specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of experience. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[18] Searches and Seizures 349 78
Reasonable suspicion standard governing demanding of urine from city employees requires individualized suspicion, specifically directed to person who is targeted for search. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[19] Searches and Seizures 349 78
“Reasonable suspicion” rather than “mere suspicion” is standard for urine testing of city police and fire fighters, who are subject to constant observation by their superiors and co-workers, such that one so under influence of drugs as to impair performance of his duties must manifest some outward symptoms which would give rise to reasonable suspicion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[20] Searches and Seizures 349 78
City fire fighters were not “voluntary participants in a highly-regulated industry,” so as to justify subjecting them to mass urinalysis absent requirement of individualized suspicion, where city fire department had traditionally not invoked intrusive regulatory authority in supervising fire fighters' persons and effects, fire fighters had no notice or warning they would be subject to intrusive personal searches by city officials, and fire fighters were not afforded opportunity to make informed employment decision based on knowledge that they might be required to submit to intrusive government intervention on the job.
[21] Searches and Seizures 349 78
City did not need to demonstrate propriety of its fire fighters by program of mass urine testing for drug use, as ability of fire fighters to perform their jobs was not dependent upon public's perception of their integrity, but rather, city was concerned with determination of job-related capability, which did not require mass urinalysis, but could be safely accommodated by individualized suspicion standard; city's interest did not require use of department-wide urinalysis.
[22] Searches and Seizures 349 78
In balancing government's interest in conducting search against intrusiveness and potential harms city fire fighters subjected to mass urine testing for drug use might suffer, city had to meet much higher burden of reasonableness to justify subjecting city fire fighters to potential criminal charges as result of urine testing than if information were kept confidential from enforcement agents.
[23] Constitutional Law 92 277(2)
92k277 Property and Rights Therein Protected
92k277(2) k. Public Office or Employment. Most Cited Cases
New Jersey statutory scheme conferring upon fire department employees reasonable expectation of continued employment unless and until “just cause” is established for their termination bestows property interest upon fire fighters which cannot be abrogated by government employer without due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-7 et seq., 40A:14-19.
[24] Constitutional Law 92 278.4(3)
92k278.4(3) k. Discipline, Suspension, Lay-Off, or Discharge. Most Cited Cases
City fire fighters derive constitutionally protected reputational interests in their individual reputations and in honor and integrity of their good names from their employment status as fire fighters, and such protected reputational interests cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously infringed by government officials.
[25] Constitutional Law 92 277(2)
Constitutional Law 92 278.4(3)
Discharge of city fire fighters on charges of drug abuse based on results of mass urine testing could severely affect constitutionally protected reputational interests deriving from employment status as fire fighters, and deprivation of fire fighters' constitutionally protected liberty and property reputational interests triggered constitutional requirements of procedural due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[26] Constitutional Law 92 278.4(1)
Subjecting city fire fighters to mass urine testing without individualized suspicion impermissibly violated fire fighters' constitutionally protected liberty and property reputational interests without due process of law, where unannounced mass urine testing took place and was completely lacking in procedural safeguards, testing was unilaterally imposed by city as condition of employment without prior notice to fire fighters and without opportunity for fire fighters to voice objection or seek advice of counsel, and city effectively coerced waiver of any rights by compelling fire fighters to participate in urine testing under threat of immediate discharge. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-7 et seq.
[27] Constitutional Law 92 278.4(5)
92k278.4(5) k. Proceedings and Review. Most Cited Cases
City's refusal to afford fire fighters full opportunity to evaluate and review their personal urine test results or to have their own urine specimens retested by technician of their choice offended traditional notions of fundamental fairness and due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[28] Injunction 212 99
212II Subjects of Protection and Relief
212II(G) Personal Rights and Duties
212k99 k. Interference with Occupation in General. Most Cited Cases
Invasion of Fourth Amendment privacy rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive and due process rights resulting from administration of mass urine testing program with respect to city fire fighters warranted injunctive relief, where absent injunctive relief, fire fighters faced threat of immediate termination from their jobs without pay and without opportunity for due process hearing, any opportunity for other employment had been jeopardized by adverse publicity generated by action which had left each fire fighter vulnerable to suspicion of being “drug abuser,” and requiring individualized, reasonable suspicion for urine testing would not unduly burden city's ability to ensure its citizens safe, unimpaired fire fighting force. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4, 14.
[29] Civil Rights 78 1126
78k1124 Public Employment
78k1126 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k146, 78k13.4(1))
City's actions relating to mass urine testing of employees violated civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, depriving fire fighters and police department employee of constitutional rights and privileges secured to them.
*1510 Justin, Gast, & Kuhn, New Brunswick, N.J., Loccke & Correia, P.A., Englewood, N.J., Robinson, Wayne, Levin, Ricco & La Sala, Newark, N.J., for plaintiffs.
We would be appalled at the spectre of the police spying on employees during their free time and then reporting their activities to their employers. Drug testing is a form of surveillance, albeit a technological one. Nonetheless, it reports on a person's off-duty activities just as surely as someone had been present and watching. It is George Orwell's “Big Brother” Society come to life.
[1] [2] In this matter, long time employees were coerced into testing without notice, without standards and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Even if such testing were justified without such individualized basis, it nonetheless, would be illegal because of the flagrant violation of plaintiffs' due process rights in this instance. Assuming a program of drug testing is warranted, before it may be implemented, its existence must be made known, its methods clearly enunciated, and its procedural and confidentiality safeguards adequately provided.
Between July 10 and July 14, 1986, sixteen firefighting personnel were advised that their respective urinalysis had proved positive for the presence of controlled dangerous substances. They were immediately terminated without pay. Those who tested positive were not informed of the particular substance found in their urine or of its concentration. Neither were they provided copies of the actual laboratory results. Written complaints were served ten days later on July 24, 1986, charging these fire fighters with numerous violations including “commission of a criminal act”.
[3] Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. FN1 They seek to have the urine testing declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the City of Plainfield and its agents from further conducting standardless, department-wide urine testing in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The parties have agreed to submit the matter for a final determination on the record before the court conceding that no factual issues exist which would require a hearing.
FN1. This Court notes that plaintiffs' cause of action is properly in federal court. The Supreme Court has unambiguously ruled that exhaustion of State judicial or administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Similarly, federal jurisdiction is appropriate even where, as here, the § 1983 action asserts claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737 (3d Cir.1983).
The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to “impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government officials” in order to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). “The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’ ” Id., (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949)). The constitutional issue here arises only if *1513 the Fourth Amendment is implicated by defendants' conduct. The threshold question then is whether urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Courts have clearly established that individuals retain an expectation of privacy and a right to be free from government intrusion in the integrity of their own bodies. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1978). “One's anatomy is draped with constitutional protection.” United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 131 (5th Cir.1978). The “taking” of urine has been likened to the involuntary taking of blood which the Supreme Court found to constitute a search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber, supra. Though urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body so that no actual intrusion is required for its collection, it is normally discharged and disposed of under circumstances that merit protection from arbitrary interference.
[4] [5] Both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came, including, but not limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs. “One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds.” McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. 1122, 1127 (D.Iowa 1985). As with blood, each individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal “information” bodily fluids contain. For these reasons, governmental taking of a urine specimen constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See McDonnell v. Hunter, supra; Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. 482, 288-89 (N.D.Ga.1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F.Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y.1984); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (D.C.App.Fla.1985). Most recently, the Third Circuit implicitly confirmed the applicability of Fourth Amendment prohibitions to the taking of urine samples, invoking Fourth Amendment doctrine to determine the constitutionality of urine testing of race horse jockeys. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.1986) (“the question that arises in this case is whether the administrative search exception extends to warrantless [urine] testing of persons”).
[6] [7] [8] [9] Having determined that urine testing constitutes a search and seizure, this court must now evaluate defendants' search under the Fourth Amendment's dictates. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be “reasonable.” New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). What is reasonable depends upon the context in which a search takes place. Ordinarily a search requires both a warrant and probable cause to qualify as constitutionally reasonable. Yet the Supreme Court has stated that neither element is “an irreducible requirement of a valid search.” New Jersey v. TLO, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 743. Instead, the ultimate determination of a search's reasonableness requires a judicious balancing of the intrusiveness of the search against its promotion of a legitimate governmental interest. See Illinois v. Lafayete, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). The Supreme Court has explained:
*1514 Even in the limited circumstances where the Supreme Court has created explicit exceptions to the stringent Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements-e.g. administrative and regulatory searches-the Court has held such exempted searches to a reasonableness standard in order to protect individuals from the abuses possible when government officials are entrusted with “almost unbridled discretion ... as to when ... and whom to search.” Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1826, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (invalidating warrantless administrative searches by OSHA where professed enforcement needs were outweighed by privacy interests of employers subjected to inspections); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
This Court must determine whether the intrusion occasioned by compelling members of the Plainfield Fire Department to submit to compulsory urine testing is sufficiently justified by the governmental interest in ferreting out drugs so as to be “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
[10] The degree of intrusion engendered by any search must be viewed in the context of the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. The test for determining when an expectation of privacy is “legitimate” was articulated by Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States: “[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).
Courts have used this standard to differentiate between levels and degrees of intrusiveness among searches and seizures. As measured by the expectation of privacy, inspections of personal effects are generally least intrusive, while breaches of the “integrity of the body” result in the greatest invasion of privacy.
[11] Applied to the facts at hand, defendants' mass urine testing program subjected plaintiffs to a relatively high degree of bodily intrusion. As stated earlier, while urine is routinely discharged from the body, it is generally discharged and disposed of under circumstances that warrant a legitimate expectation of privacy. The act itself, totally apart from what it may reveal, is traditionally private. Facilities both at home and in places of public accommodation recognize this privacy tradition. In addition, society has generally condemned and prohibited the act in public. The “interests of human dignity and privacy” which compelled Justice Brennan to find mandatory blood extractions greatly intrusive, Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, are implicated with equally compelling force when individuals are directed to urinate in the presence of a government agent. The requirement of surveillance during urine collection forces those tested to expose parts of their anatomy to the testing official in a manner akin to strip search exposure. Body surveillance is considered essential and standard operating procedure in the administration of urine drug tests, (See Brief Submitted on Behalf of Defendants' at 3), thus heightening the intrusiveness of these searches. FN2 A urine test done under close surveillance of a government representative, regardless of how professionally or courteously conducted, is likely to be a very embarrassing and humiliating experience. See United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc).
FN2. The district court in deciding Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F.Supp. 1151 (D.N.J.1985); aff'd 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.1986), concluded that urinalysis was a more minimal bodily intrusion than either blood extractions or body cavity and strip searches. In Shoemaker though, urine specimens were collected privately by the individual being tested and later submitted for analysis absent any personal identification other than a testing number. No surveillance was imposed on those tested. The Shoemaker urinalysis was therefore qualitatively different from that at issue in this case and the district court's assessment of the intrusiveness of urinalysis is not controlling here.
Both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have recognized a right of privacy in medical information. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 97 S.Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.1980). In Shoemaker v. Handel, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the medical disclosure resulting as a by-product of urinalysis created cause for grave confidentiality concerns. 795 F.2d 1136 (1986). The Shoemaker court nonetheless upheld the urine testing of jockeys as constitutionally reasonable. But it based its ruling on the fact that such confidentiality concerns had been carefully addressed in statutory regulations strictly limiting the use and publication of test results so as to guarantee the jockeys utmost confidentiality. 795 F.2d at 1144. The court's decision in Shoemaker is thus readily distinguishable from the case at hand. Plainfield had not established any procedural guidelines to govern the urine testing, and in particular had not taken any precautions to vouchsafe confidentiality. Quite to the contrary, following the suspension of those fire fighters who had tested positive for drugs, the City of Plainfield publicized its actions to the media. While no individuals were identified by name, the exposure has subjected all Plainfield fire fighters to public suspicion and degradation.
There can be no doubt on this record that the members of the Plainfield Fire Department reasonably expected to be free from intrusive government urine testing while on the job. No provisions for mass urine testing were included in the collective bargaining agreement signed by the fire fighters and the City. No directive or policy statement authorizing the City of Plainfield to conduct such tests was ever written or communicated to the plaintiffs. There was absolutely no warning prior to the rude awakening on May 26, 1986 that submission to compulsory employee urine testing would become a condition of continued employment. Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of privacy fell subject to the unbridled discretion of their government employer, contrary to the very tenet of the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (Fourth Amendment safeguards are necessary “to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field’ ”).
Defendants urge the court to find that theirs was an exempted search properly within the “employment context searches of government employees” exception to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960, 86 S.Ct. 1228, 16 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Ga.1985). This emerging body of case law suggests that the government as employer “has the same right as any private employer*1516 to oversee its employees and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's performance of his duties.” Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.Supp. at 491.
[12] The deleterious effects of drug consumption upon public safety officers' ability to properly perform their duties is undeniably an issue legitimately within the City's concern. But the merits of the City's efforts to assure that all fire fighters are free from drug induced impairments and capable to perform their public service is not at issue in this case. Rather the question to be answered is whether the means chosen by the City to achieve this laudable goal are “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This court is compelled to conclude that they are not.
As justification for undertaking the department-wide search, defendants explain that the widespread, large scale drug use in all segments of the population leads to the “reasonable and logical inference that some of those affected may ultimately be employed in a public-safety capacity.” See Brief Submitted on Behalf of Defendants at 14. Defendants contend that mass round-up urinalysis is the most efficient way to detect drug use.
[13] It is beyond dispute that the taking and testing of urine samples achieves the city's desired goal, namely the identification of employees who use drugs. But under the law, the results achieved cannot justify the means utilized and the constitutionality of a search cannot rest on its fruits. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. 1122 (D.Iowa 1985).
[14] The sweeping manner in which defendants set about to accomplish their goals violated the fire fighter's individual liberties. As to each individual tested the search was unreasonable because defendants lacked any specific suspicion as to that fire fighter. See e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“[F]irst, one must consider ‘whether the ... action was justified at its inception,’ ... second, one must determine *1517 whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place’ ”).
The invidious effect of such mass, round-up urinalysis is that it casually sweeps up the innocent with the guilty and willingly sacrifices each individual's Fourth Amendment rights in the name of some larger public interest. The City of Plainfield essentially presumed the guilt of each person tested. The burden was shifted onto each fire fighter to submit to a highly intrusive urine test in order to vindicate his or her innocence. Such an unfounded presumption of guilt is contrary to the protections against arbitrary and intrusive government interference set forth in the Constitution. Although plaintiffs' privacy and liberty interests may be diminished on the job, these interests are not extinguished and therefore must be accorded some constitutional protection.
[15] The Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of individual guarantees. Every individual has the absolute right to be free from searches and seizures absent the establishment of some degree of reasonable suspicion against him or her. Even with respect to law enforcement investigations at the scene of a crime, courts have refused to permit police agents to transfer reasonable suspicion established against one individual to other individuals also present at the crime site. In these situations the court has reasoned that “the fourth amendment does not permit any automatic or casual transference of ‘suspicion’ ”. United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir.1978). “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ must be specifically directed to the person to be searched.” Id., at 1331. “An investigatory search will be found constitutionally permissible only when supported by reasonable suspicion directed to the person to be searched”. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 89-91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 341, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); See United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir.1981). If we cannot impute suspicion from one individual legitimately under investigation to others in his presence, we cannot impute suspicion to an entire fire fighter force when no reasonable suspicion exists as to any one of the individuals to be searched.
[16] Defendants undertook this search driven by the mere possibility of discovering that some fire fighters were using drugs and therefore might be impaired in their job performance at some future time because of this drug use. Such attenuated protestations of concern for the welfare of the Plainfield community, without more, cannot render the seizure of urine specimens constitutionally reasonable.
[17] [18] The Fourth Amendment allows defendants to demand urine of an employee only on the basis of a reasonable suspicion predicated upon specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of experience. McDonell v. Hunter, supra, at 1130; Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.1976). The reasonable suspicion standard requires individualized suspicion, specifically directed to the person who is targeted for the search. See Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, 444 U.S. at 89-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341; Hunter v. Augur, 672 F.2d 668 (1982); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, supra. Divorcing the requirement of individualized suspicion from the reasonable suspicion standard, would leave “no readily apparent limitation on ... public officials' power to search.” U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905-08 (9th Cir.1973). Absent a requirement of individualized suspicion, the Fourth Amendment would cease to protect against arbitrary government intrusion.
[19] Defendants argue that “mere suspicion” rather than “reasonable suspicion” should be the standard for urine testing of government employees given the weighty interest the state has in protecting the general public from the danger of impaired, unfit fire fighters. Concededly the state's interest is a weighty one, but the Fourth Amendment requires that it be balanced against the significant intrusion urinalysis imposes upon the individual fire fighters. *1518 In this case it has been demonstrated that the intrusion engendered upon the many dedicated fire fighters and fire officials of Plainfield was severe. The humiliation experienced by governmental intrusion into, and surveillance of, a highly private bodily function; the compelled disclosure of personal physiological data not properly within the government's possession, without any confidentiality safeguards; the complete absence of notice or opportunity to refute such testing; the implied presumption of guilt borne by each individual fire fighter; the compulsion exercised upon threat of discharge-for all these reasons, the government may not continue to usurp unregulated and standardless discretion, but must instead comply with the minimal constitutional mandates.
[20] Finally, defendants contend that the recent Third Circuit ruling in Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (1986), upholding the constitutionality of breathalyzer and urinalysis testing of race horse jockeys absent any requirement of individualized suspicion, provides controlling precedent for the case at hand. This court disagrees.
In balancing the state's interest against that of individual jockeys, the considerations before the Shoemaker court differed dramatically from those in the instant case. First, horse racing unlike fire fighting, is an intensely regulated industry within the administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-41, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (coal mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-7, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1597, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (gun selling); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 777, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (liquor industry).
Although Shoemaker creates an exception to the individualized suspicion requirement, it is instructive that the exception created is very narrowly tailored. The court explicitly ties its decision to the unique circumstances surrounding “closely regulated industries”. In the court's own words: “Our holding applies only to breathalyzer and urine sampling of voluntary participants in a highly-regulated industry.” Id., at 1142, n. 5. To read this exception broadly would violate the court's apparent intention. Precisely because fire fighting is not a pervasively regulated industry, the determination of what constitutes*1519 a “reasonable” invasion of a fire fighter's privacy cannot be informed by the standards applied in Shoemaker.
Traditionally, the Plainfield Fire Department has not invoked intrusive regulatory authority in supervising its fire fighters' persons and effects. Plaintiffs in this case had no notice or warning that they would be subject to intrusive personal searches by Fire Department officials or other City officials. Nothing in the initial employment agreement nor any civil service requirements permits the conclusion that these fire fighters voluntarily forfeited their privacy interest in the same way as jockeys. Plaintiffs were not afforded an opportunity to make an informed employment decision based on the knowledge that they might be required to submit to intrusive government intervention on the job. Given these facts, the plaintiffs do not qualify as “voluntary participants in a highly regulated industry”. The circumscribed ruling in Shoemaker cannot be applied to the instant search.
[21] The Third Circuit's determination in Shoemaker was largely influenced by concerns specific to the horse racing industry. For instance, the Court afforded great deference to the state's interest in “assuring the public of the integrity of the persons engaged in the horse racing industry” because the state had a direct financial stake in the revenue generated by public wagering on horses and because the court recognized the industry's unique vulnerability to “untoward influences”. Id., at 1141. Drug testing was the only “effective” means the state could employ in its effort to dispel long standing public suspicion of criminal influences permeating the organized gambling associated with horse racing.
In Shoemaker, the court placed great emphasis upon the public's “perception” of the industry's integrity because, “[p]ublic confidence forms the foundation for the success of an industry based on wagering”. Id., at 1142. Although there may exist ways to detect drug use among jockeys, other than subjecting them to mandatory urinalysis, what was at stake in Shoemaker was the appearance of propriety. The state's interest was to demonstrate to the public that drug abuse was not interfering with racing. Mandatory, mass urinalysis provided such a demonstration.
Clearly, no one can deny that the public has an interest in the integrity of its fire fighting forces. Yet, the ability of fire fighters to perform their jobs is not dependent upon the public's “perception” of this integrity in the same way as the racing industry's. In other words, fire fighters can still continue to serve the public effectively, even in the face of unpopular public “perception”. For the municipality of Plainfield then, it is not the demonstration of propriety that is essential but rather the determination of job-related capability. Such determination does not require mandatory, mass urinalysis, but can be safely accommodated by an individualized suspicion standard.
The City of Plainfield is not seeking to combat public perception of “untoward influence” undermining its fire force. On the contrary, these fire fighters daily prove *1520 their ability and their commitment on the job. Therefore, the state's interest in this case does not require the use of departmentwide urinalysis. Having determined that both the fire fighter's privacy rights in this case are greater than those of the jockeys, and that the state's interest is less than that of the Racing Commission, this court finds that the search in question does not fall within the Shoemaker exception.
[22] The City of Plainfield is in an entirely different posture. Governmental agents, once they possess incriminatory information concerning drug use, may not have the authority to withhold such information from prosecuting agents, even if that is their desire. More specifically, in the instant case, Plainfield charged the plaintiffs with “acts of criminal misconduct” in their formal written complaints. The potential for criminal prosecution that exists vis a vis the Plainfield fire fighters poses a greater intrusion than that faced by the Shoemaker jockeys. “ ... [G]overnment investigations of employee misconduct always carry the potential to become criminal investigations”. Allen v. Marietta, supra, at 491. In balancing the government's interest in conducting the search against the intrusiveness and potential harms plaintiffs may suffer, it is clear that Plainfield defendants must meet a much higher burden of reasonableness to justify subjecting plaintiffs to potential criminal charges. For these reasons, Shoemaker is not controlling on the present facts.
[23] As civil servants employed by the Plainfield Fire Department, plaintiffs are endowed with constitutionally protected property interests in their tenure pursuant to the New Jersey statutory scheme governing municipal fire fighters. See N.J.S.A. § § 40A:14-7 et seq. Specifically, N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-19 confers upon plaintiffs, as fire department employees, a reasonable expectation of continued employment unless and until “just cause” is established for their termination. N.J.S.A. § 40A-14-19 provides in pertinent part as follows:
This statutory scheme bestows a property interest upon plaintiffs which cannot be abrogated by their government employer without due process. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 194 (D.C.Cir.1980); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. 1500, 1504 (D.D.C.1986).
[24] Furthermore, plaintiffs have constitutionally recognized liberty and property interests in their individual reputations, and in the honor and integrity of their good names. Such protected reputational interests derive directly from plaintiffs' employment status as fire fighters and cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously infringed by *1521 government officials either. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1164, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Jones v. McKeinzie, 628 F.Supp. at 1505.
[25] [26] It is beyond argument that discharge on charges of drug abuse could severely affect these interests. The deprivation of plaintiffs' liberty and property interests trigger constitutional requirements of procedural due process. Defendants' actions impermissibly violated these protected liberty and property interests without due process of law.
[27] Defendants' actions are cause for particular concern given numerous reports challenging the reliability and accuracy of the urinalysis tests themselves. The procedural dangers inherent in relying on the results of such tests are well documented in both legal and medical literature. See e.g. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. at 1505-06 and authorities cited therein; see also M.K. Divoll and D.J. Greenblatt, The Admissibility of Positive EMIT Results as Scientific Evidence: Counting Facts, Not Heads, 5 Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology 114-116 (1985). In light of these concerns, defendants' refusal to afford plaintiff a full opportunity to evaluate and review their personal test results or to have their own specimens re-tested by a technician of their choice offends traditional notions of fundamental fairness and due process.
On its face, N.J.S.A. § 40A:14-19 explicitly mandates that no suspension shall occur until an opportunity has been provided for the presentation of charges, hearing, opportunity for defense and an adjudication of guilt or innocence. This statute has been interpreted by the New Jersey courts to permit pre-hearing suspension where the suspension is clearly “procedural”-a temporary measure pending further investigation and a due process hearing-but impermissible where pre-hearing suspension is invoked as a punitive measure prior to the adjudication of guilt. See D'Ippolito v. Maguire, 33 N.J.Super. 477, 111 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1955). In the instant action, defendants conducted and terminated their investigation with the urinalysis testing conducted in late May and early June. The terminations without pay that followed for those who tested positive were unquestionably punitive in nature. Defendants gave no indication that they would conduct second tests to corroborate their initial findings, nor was mention made of a hearing procedure in the written complaints served upon the plaintiffs. Absent a sufficient procedural framework, defendants' delay in issuing the written complaints setting forth the charges against those terminated is unjustifiable.
By consent the parties have agreed to submit the matter for a final determination on the record, conceding that no factual issues exist which would require additional hearings. In accordance with Federal Rule 65(a)(2), the court will consider this to be an application for permanent injunction.
[28] The invasion of Fourth Amendment privacy rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive and due process rights as a result of defendants' conduct warrants the issuance of injunctive relief.
Absent injunctive relief, plaintiffs face the threat of immediate termination from their jobs without pay and without an opportunity for a due process hearing. Any opportunity for other employment has been jeopardized by the adverse publicity generated by this action, which has left each Plainfield fire fighter vulnerable to the suspicion of being a “drug abuser”. Such harm cannot be adequately remedied at law.
[29] Title 42 Section 1983 of the United States Code, creates a federal statutory cause of action against any person “who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” Defendants' by their actions have violated Title 42 Section 1983, depriving plaintiffs Plainfield Fire Fighters and Plaintiff Monica Tompkins, a Police Department employee, of the constitutional rights and privileges secured to them. See e.g. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir.1983) (cities and their officials and agents may be held liable under Section 1983 for causing violations of the constitutional or civil rights of other city employees).
D.N.J.,1986.
643 F.Supp. 1507, 1 IER Cases 625, 55 USLW 2170, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,538