Source: http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/1970-1979/Pages/plymouthmagnus.html
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 13:59:50
Document Index: 372297339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 7', '§ 148', '§ 5', '§ 101', '§ 116']

Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ Corp. 20 F.Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
Don Large "The Holiday Polka"
View Partial Score Comment Having overreached by placing copyright notices on public domain works like "We Wish You a Merry Christmas," Plymouth Music was not a compelling plaintiff. Similarly, defendant, a corporation that had scavenged the assets of the bankrupt Magnus Organ Company, including the name, was a less-than-sympathetic party. This corporation had deliberately ignored the prior licensing agreement between Plymouth and Magnus with respect to the publishing and distribution of Plymouth's musical numbers. While defendant claimed that plaintiffs had no copyright interest in the works they had licensed to the original Magnus Organ Company, it is difficult to imagine how they could have believed this given that this interest was the basic consideration for the publishing contract between Plymouth and Magnus. Finding for Plymouth, the court notes copyright's low threshold of originality that was met by nine of the twelve works in which plaintiff claimed interest. Among these is "Holiday Polka," a portion of which is reproduced in the accompanying files. Defendant claimed that the music is nothing more than a combination of "Little Brown Jug" and a German drinking song, and that only the text is original -- and even that is merely a translation of public domain song lyrics. Under these circumstances, does Plymouth's copyright notice (see scanned image) appear disingenuous? Film music writer and founder of Washington's National Symphony, Rudolf Schramm, testified for the plaintiff. The opinion does not name the defendant's musical witness, whom the court found "so opinionated, biased and narrow-minded that his testimony was highly suspect." [ Back to Top ] Opinion by Judge Pierce
Plaintiffs Plymouth Music Co. and Roncom Music Co. bring this suit for an injunction against and to recover damages for alleged copyright infringement by defendants Magnus Organ Corp., Magnus Music Corp. and Charles Hansen Music and Books, Inc. The works claimed to be infringed are twelve compositions contained in a chord organ book known as "Magnus Organ Book No. 703", entitled "Popular Christmas Favorites for the Magnus Chord Organ." (hereinafter referred to as Songbook 703) (PX-31). Jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (amended 1978).1 The non-jury trial in this action began on October 12, 1977, was adjourned during the Christmas season, and continued during a snow blizzard on February 6 and 7, 1978. At the conclusion of trial, the Court reserved decision. The following shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
It's Beginning to Look Like Christmas​
(There's No Place Like) Home for the Holidays​
On or about February 6, 1975, the Minetrans Corp. purchased from First Pennsylvania Bank, N. A., at a private foreclosure sale conducted by the bank, as a secured creditor of Magnus Organ, all of the bank's interest in tangibles and intangibles owned by Mangus Organ, including the name Magnus. (Pretrial Order ¶ 3(vi)). As a result Minetrans Corp. received 870 copies of Songbook 703 then remaining in the inventory of Magnus Organ. On or about March 6, 1975, Minetrans Corp. changed its name to Magnus Music Corp. Of its inventory of 870 copies, Magnus Music Corp. sold 396 copies of Songbook 703.
"One requisite to copyrightability is that the work be original in the sense of being the creative product of the author's own effort. There is no requirement that it be original in the sense of being novel, that is, the first of its kind in existence." Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Dist. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 399 (S.D.N.Y.1952). The Court also notes that "'[o]riginal' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.' No large measure of novelty is necessary. . . . A 'copy of something in the public domain' will support a copyright if it is a 'distinguishable variation'; . . . Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.'" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
Even defendants' expert witness conceded that there was some originality or variation from the traditional public domain works in the songs "Christmas Polka" and "Come to the Stable." As to "Holiday Polka," defendants claim that the words are merely a translation and that the song is a combination of two public domain works -- "Little Brown Jug" and a German drinking song. It is well settled that a translation of the words of a public domain song is copyrightable. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1951); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950); 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) (amended 1978). Further, the Court credits the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness Professor Rudolf Schramm and his rendition of the works as indicating that there is some originality in "Holiday Polka." Cf. Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.Cal.1937) ("[T]he only other test available to a judge who is a musical layman [is] whether there is a resemblance noticeable to the average hearer.").
As to the songs "It's Beginning to Look Like Christmas," "Sweeter the Bells Never Ring," "Gentle Jesus, Meek and Mild," "Bells of Christmas," "Christmas Party," and "Home for the Holidays," the Court rejects the testimony of defendants' expert witness and finds more credible that of Professor Schramm who considered the lyrics to be original. In addition, the Court further notes that it finds the music in "It's Beginning to Look Like Christmas" and "Home for the Holidays" to also contain enough originality to validate the copyrights.
In sum, the Court concludes that nine of the twelve songs contained "at least a modicum of creative work" sufficient to uphold plaintiffs' copyrights.2 See Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y.1961).
Thirdly, defendant Hansen contends that it is not liable for copyright infringement since it is an innocent infringer. It is well settled that "[i]ntention to infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] Act." Buck v. Jewel-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198, 51 S. Ct. 410, 411, 75 L. Ed. 971 (1931). "Innocent intent should no more constitute a defense in an infringement action, whether statutory or common law, than in the case of conversion of tangible personalty . . . . Copyright would lose much of its value if third parties such as publishers and producers were insulated from liability because of their innocence as to the culpability of the persons who supplied them with the infringing material." 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 148, at 660 (1976). Accordingly, the Court rejects defendant Hansen's argument on this ground. Similarly, Magnus Music is not immune from liability as an innocent infringer for the sale of copies it received from Magnus Organ's inventory.
The Court finds the second argument to be a variation of Hansen's claim of immunity as an innocent infringer. Defendant Hansen seeks to impose a duty upon copyright owners to notify all persons who may be dealing with prior licensees. The duty, however, was on Hansen to investigate. "It has been stated repeatedly that after notice of copyright has been published everyone is under the duty to learn the facts concerning the copyright, and copies at his peril, . . ." Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y.1942). Further, this was not an action where the copyright notice was not clearly visible on the copyrighted works. Cf., e.g., Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y.1963); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 188 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y.1960).
"If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the Copyright Laws of the United States such person shall be liable: . . . To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement . . . or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amount hereinafter stated . . . [not to] exceed the sum of $5000.00 nor be less than $250.00 . . . . In the case of any work enumerated in § 5 [which includes musical compositions], $1.00 for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer, or his agents or employees." 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (amended 1978).
The Court notes the reasoning in DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862, 65 S. Ct. 1198, 89 L. Ed 1983 (1944), that "the inference from the copyright law itself would seem to be most direct, for, while it makes significant distinctions in certain instances based on innocent or willful infringement, as the case may be, it does not do so in the general provisions for award of profits and actual damages, or those statutory sums allowable in the Court's discretion in lieu of actual damages." Id. at 410-11. Further "[t]he copying or printing of something which has been lawfully copyrighted has been judicially defined as an infringement of the copyright without any requirement that there be a sale or that profits be made from sale of the copies." Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y.1942).
Section 116 of the Copyright Act provides that full costs must be awarded to the prevailing party in a statutory infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976) (amended 1978). Pursuant to ß 116, the Court also awards reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiffs in the total amount of $500 from defendants jointly and severally. See Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 150, 157 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
1 The Copyright Act was revised in its entirety by Pub.L. 94-553, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 which provided: "This Act . . . becomes effective on January 1, 1978, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act . . .." Section 112 of Pub.L. 94-553 provided: "All causes of action that arose under Title 17 before January 1, 1978, shall be governed by Title 17 as it existed when the cause of action arose." Accordingly, the prior law governs this action.
2 The Court notes that defendants' disclaimer that plaintiffs' work is derived from the public domain would be more plausible if defendant's excuse related to access to this other public domain material. Here it is undisputed that defendants had access to plaintiffs' material. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936); Italian Book Co. v. Rossi, 27 F.2d 1014 (S.D.N.Y.1928).