Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/580-f-2d-1055-603014686
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 09:52:15
Document Index: 35696411

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 8', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 141', '§ 117', '§ 3', '§ 9', 'Art. 1', '§ 7', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 3', '§ 3']

580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), 78-1166, Edwards v. Carter - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 603014686
Docket Nº: 78-1166.
Party Name: Mickey EDWARDS, Member of Congress, Oklahoma, et al., Appellants, v. James Earl CARTER, President of the United States.
580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
Mickey EDWARDS, Member of Congress, Oklahoma, et al., Appellants,
James Earl CARTER, President of the United States.
Certiorari Denied May 15, 1978. See 98 S.Ct. 2240.
As Amended May 18 and June 13, 1978.
Robert E. Kopp, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Steven I. Frank, and Brook Hedge, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the motion for summary affirmance, for appellee.
Daniel J. Popeo, Washington, D. C., with whom Joel D. Joseph and Paul D. Kamenar, Washington, D. C., were on the motion for an injunction pending appeal and the motion for summary reversal, for appellants.
This is an appeal from the District Court's dismissal of a challenge to appellee's use of the treaty power to convey to the Republic of Panama United States properties, including the Panama Canal, located in the Panama Canal Zone. 1 Appellants,
sixty members of the House of Representatives, sought a declaratory judgment that the exclusive means provided in the Constitution for disposal of United States property requires approval of both Houses of Congress, See Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and that therefore the Panama Canal Zone may not be returned to Panama through the Treaty process, which invests the treaty-making power in the President by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, See Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Appellee contends that the Constitution permits United States territory to be disposed of either through congressional legislation or through the treaty process, and that therefore the President's decision to proceed under the treaty power is constitutionally permissible.
The District Court did not reach the merits of this controversy; rather, it dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that appellants lacked standing because they had failed to demonstrate injury in fact from the President's invocation of the treaty process. A notice of appeal and a request for a preliminary injunction pending appeal were immediately filed with this court. Appellee has moved for summary affirmance of the District Court's judgment either on the jurisdictional ground stated by the District Court or on the merits of appellants' contention; appellants have moved for summary reversal. We have heard oral argument and have considered the case on an expedited basis. 2 For the reasons appearing below, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint, not on the jurisdictional ground relied on by the District Court but for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
In addition to its argument on the merits, appellee has presented several substantial and complex challenges to the jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate the merits of the constitutional question presented in this case. We refer not only to the contentions as to lack of standing, but also to the arguments that appellants' action is both premature and presents a nonjusticiable political question. Deciding only the jurisdictional issue before us could result in this court, or the Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings either on the merits or on jurisdictional issues. Because the merits of this controversy present a pure question of law, with no
need of a hearing for fact development, because these merits are so clearly against the parties asserting jurisdiction, and because the judgment appealed from was based on only one of several asserted grounds of lack of jurisdiction, we believe it is appropriate to proceed directly to the merits of this case. This conclusion is bolstered when the time constraints imposed by the immediacy of Senate action on the treaties are considered. See Adams v. Vance, 186 U.S.App.D.C. --- at --- n.7, 570 F.2d 950 at 954 n.7 (1978), and cases cited therein.
Consequently, the precise question we address is whether the constitutional delegation found in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 is exclusive so as to prohibit the disposition of United States property by self-executing treaty I. e., a treaty enacted in accordance with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which becomes effective without implementing legislation.
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution states in its entirety:
Appellants contend that this clause gives Congress exclusive power to convey to foreign nations any property, such as the Panama Canal, owned by the United States. 3 We find such a construction to be at odds with the wording of this and similar grants of power to the Congress, and, most significantly, with the history of the constitutional debates. 4
The grant of authority to Congress under the property clause states that "The Congress shall have Power . . .," not that only the Congress shall have power, or that the Congress shall have exclusive power. In this respect the property clause is parallel to Article I, § 8, which also states that "The Congress shall have Power . . . ."
Many of the powers thereafter enumerated in § 8 involve matters that were at the time the Constitution was adopted, and that are at the present time, also commonly the subject of treaties. The most prominent example of this is the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, and appellants do not go so far as to contend that the treaty process is not a constitutionally allowable means for regulating foreign commerce. It thus seems to us that, on its face, the property clause is intended not to restrict the scope of the treaty clause, but, rather, is intended to permit Congress to accomplish through legislation what may concurrently be accomplished through other means provided in the Constitution.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Foreign Relations, directly addressing this issue, comes to the same conclusion we reach:
The mere fact, however, that a congressional power exists does not mean that the power is exclusive so as to preclude the making of a self-executing treaty within the area of that power.
ALI Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (2d), § 141, at 435 (1965). The section of the Restatement relied on by the dissent merely states that the treaty power, like all powers granted to the United States, is limited by other restraints found in the Constitution on the exercise of governmental power. (Rest.For.Rel. § 117). 5 Of course the correctness of this proposition as a matter of constitutional law is clear. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957); Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 10 S.Ct. 295, 33 L.Ed. 642 (1890); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 515, 68 L.Ed. 1041 (1924), also relied on by the dissent. To urge, as does the dissent, that the transfer of the Canal Zone property by treaty offends this well-settled principle that the treaty power can only be exercised in a manner which conforms to the Constitution begs the very question to be decided, namely, whether Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 places in the Congress the Exclusive authority to dispose of United States property. 6
There are certain grants of authority to Congress which are, by their very terms, exclusive. In these areas, the treaty-making power and the power of Congress are not concurrent; rather, the only department of the federal government authorized to take action is the Congress. For instance, the Constitution expressly provides only one method congressional enactment for the appropriation of money:
Art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Thus, the expenditure of funds by the United States cannot be accomplished by self-executing treaty; implementing legislation appropriating such funds is indispensable. Similarly, the constitutional mandate that "all Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives," Art. 1, § 7, cl. 1, appears, by reason of the restrictive language used, to prohibit the use of the treaty power to impose taxes. 7
These particular grants of power to Congress operate to limit the treaty power because the language of these provisions clearly precludes any method of appropriating money or raising taxes other than through the enactment of laws by the full Congress. This is to be contrasted with the power-granting language in Art. 1, § 8, and in Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Rather than stating the particular matter of concern and providing that the enactment of a law is the only way for the federal government to take action regarding that matter, these provisions state simply that Congress shall have power to take action on the matters enumerated.
Thus it appears from the very language used in the property clause that this provision was not intended to preclude the availability of self-executing treaties as a means for disposing of United States property. The history of the drafting and ratification of that clause confirms this conclusion. The other clause in Art. IV, § 3 concerns the procedures for admission of new states into the Union, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrate that the property clause was intended to delineate the role to be played...