Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100614_0001344.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-27 04:50:05
Document Index: 302779891

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1114', '§ 1114', '§ 1125', '§ 1125', '§ 1125', '§ 501', '§ 56', '§ 56', '§ 2685', '§ 2688', '§ 1114', '§ 1114', '§ 1125', '§ 1125', '§ 1125', '§ 501', '§ 1114']

| Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts
Coach, Inc. v. Ocean Point Gifts
COACH, INC. AND COACH SERVICES, INC., PLAINTIFF,v.OCEAN POINT GIFTS AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10, DEFENDANT.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Coach, Inc. and Coach Services, Inc.'s ("Coach") motion for default judgment (Docket No. 9) as against Defendant Ocean Point Gifts ("Defendant"). For the reasons expressed below, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion.
For over sixty years Coach has been in the trade of luxury fashion accessories. Coach manufactures, markets, and sells a variety of goods including, most prominently, handbags. Coach sells its goods through its own specialty retail stores, department stores, catalogs, and via the Internet at www.coach.com. Coach owns a number of trademarks, trade dresses, and design elements/copyrights that it uses on its products.
Based on information obtained from a private investigator and Coach staff, Coach alleges that Defendant Ocean Point Gifts has sold counterfeit Coach items at its store located at 1631 Boardwalk, Atlantic City, New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 28; Smith Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) For example, Defendant sold a $12.99 imitation of a $200 Coach wallet that included a paper insert reading "The Coach Signature Collection" with contact information for Coach Consumer Service. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) Ocean Point Gifts has not been given permission to use the Coach trademarks. (Pyatt Decl. ¶ 11; Compl. ¶ 33.)
Plaintiffs served Defendant Ocean Point Gifts with a copy of the summons and complaint on August 23, 2009. (Docket No. 5.) On November 20, 2009, nearly three months after process was served, the investigator returned to the store and found that the Defendant was still selling counterfeit Coach products. (Smith Decl. ¶ 8.) Coach alleges that Defendant Ocean Point Gifts has engaged in selling counterfeit goods knowingly and intentionally for the purpose of trading on the reputation of Coach and that Defendant will continue to do so unless otherwise restrained. (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36.)
On August 18, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a nine-count Complaint against Ocean Point Gifts and ten John Does presenting claims of trademark counterfeiting (15 U.S.C. § 1114), trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), trade dress infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), false designation of origin and false advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), trademark dilution (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)), copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513), trafficking in counterfeit trademarks (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:3-13.16), unfair competition (N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:4-1, 56:4-2), and unjust enrichment. The Defendant was properly served on August 23, 2009, but has failed to respond. On November 10, 2009, Coach filed a request for default, which the Clerk of Court entered pursuant to Rule 55(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., on November 12, 2009. Coach now moves the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and seeks a permanent injunction, statutory damages, and an award of attorney fees, investigator fees, and costs.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) authorizes the entry of a default judgment against a party that has defaulted. However, default judgment is not a right. Franklin v. Nat'l Mar. Union of Am., No. 91-480, 1991 WL 131182, at *1-2 (D.N.J. July 16, 1991) (quoting 10A Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2685 (3d ed. 1998)), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1331, 1331 (3d Cir. 1992). The decision about whether default judgment is proper is primarily within the discretion of the district court. Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984).
Once a party has defaulted, the consequence is that "the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true." Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Thomas v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885)). Entry of default judgment where damages are not a sum certain requires an application to the court to prove, inter alia, damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Comdyne, 908 F.2d at 1149. In addition, liability is not established by default alone. D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 n.2 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing Wright, supra, § 2688). The Court must determine whether a sufficient cause of action was stated, Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D.N.J. 2008), and whether default judgment is proper. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
In the present case, after being properly served on August 23, 2009 (Docket No. 5), the Defendant failed to appear or otherwise defend and the Clerk of the Court entered a default. Therefore, the first issue is whether the Plaintiffs have stated a sufficient cause of action. As will be explained below, the Court determines that Coach has established Defendant's liability for the purposes of this default judgment motion.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs have asserted six federal claims against the Defendant: trademark counterfeiting (15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)); trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)); trade dress infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)); false designation of origin and false advertising (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)); trademark dilution (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)); and copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513). Each was stated sufficiently to establish liability based on federal law.
The first two elements are satisfied by registration and ownership of the relevant trademarks. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) The third element is also satisfied. In the Complaint (Compl. ¶ 49) and through exhibits, (e.g. Smith Decl., Ex. B) the record has uncontested assertions and evidence that are sufficient to show a likelihood of confusion between the counterfeit handbags and genuine Coach product. Further, it is reasonable to believe that some consumers would be confused by these counterfeit products. See Coach, Inc. v. Cellular Planet, No. 2:09-cv-00241, 2010 WL 1853424, at *1, *4 (S.D. Ohio, May 7, 2010) (holding that although the counterfeit items could be distinguished from genuine Coach items because they were being sold out of a trunk of a car, the counterfeit nature of the products meant they were inherently likely to cause confusion). Therefore, a cause of action for trade infringement and false designation has been sufficiently established.
To establish trademark counterfeiting (Count I) the record must show (1) the defendant infringed a registered trademark in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and (2) the defendant intentionally used the trademark knowing it was counterfeit or was willfully blind to such use. Chanel v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 537. "The only distinction between the standard for federal trademark counterfeiting and the standard for establishing infringement is that to obtain treble or statutory damages for a counterfeiting claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally used the plaintiff's trademark, knowing that it was a counterfeit." Chanel v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 536-537. Intent can be inferred from continued use after being given notice. Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Bad Boy Club, Inc., No. 08-02662, 2009 WL 2147843, at *6 (D.N.J. July 15, 2009)
Here, both elements of trademark counterfeiting are met. As discussed above, a trademark was infringed. The alleged willfulness of the Defendant (Compl. ¶ 41) is confirmed by evidence showing the Defendant continuing to sell the handbags nearly three months after being served with notice of the Complaint. (Smith Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. C.) ...