Source: http://beverlyhillsemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2018/
Timestamp: 2018-12-10 11:02:31
Document Index: 180139409

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1988', '§ 1113', '§630', '§203', '§630', '§630', '§630', '§ 201', '§ 3500', '§ 3509', '§ 3505', '§ 202', '§ 203', '§ 98', '§ 16600', '§ 1291', '§ 12940']

Beverly Hills Employment Law: 2018
When it is undisputed that the Public Employment Relations Board followed its procedures prior to issuing a decision, substantial evidence necessarily supports a trial court's finding that the decision was issued pursuant to the board's established procedures. The PERB's general counsel's post-decision actions cannot be raised as a defense to an enforcement action.
Public Employment Relations Board v. Bellflower Unified School District - filed Dec. 4, 2018, Second District, Div. Four
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 5789
An attorney's participation in a Department of Labor investigation of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act trust fund trustee constituted a protected activity for purposes of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1140. The fact that an individual defendant was not the ultimate decision maker for a retaliatory action does not immunize him under a cat's-paw theory of liability. Pursuant to ERISA Sec. 404 a court must distinguish between actions a fiduciary took in connection with its fiduciary responsibilities to the plan and those that actions taken as an individual or entity acting in its corporate capacity. ERISA Sec. 502(a)(5) does not provide a basis for a permanent injunction where no aspect of the injunction redressed or enforced a violation of ERISA Sec. 510.
Acosta v. Brain - filed Dec. 4, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-56529
ASARCO, LLC v. United Steel, Paper and Forest
An arbitrator did not exceed his authority in reforming a collective bargaining agreement upon finding that the parties were mutually mistaken as to its terms when they agreed to it, even though the agreement contained a "no-add" provision.
ASARCO, LLC v. United Steel, Paper and Forest - filed Dec. 4, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-16363
City of Oakland v. Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System
Following this court’s published decision in City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210 (OPFRS)—which involved the legitimacy of certain retirement benefits regularly paid by the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement Board (Board) to members and beneficiaries of the Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System (PFRS)—the Retired Oakland Police Officers Association, along with several individual PFRS pensioners (collectively, the “Association”) sought attorney fees in the trial court. Specifically, the Association—interveners in the underlying action—claimed an entitlement to fees under both California’s private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (section 1021.5), and section 1988 of the federal Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (section 1988). After considering the matter at some length, the trial court determined that fees were not warranted under either statute. On appeal, many of the trial court’s numerous conclusions made in connection with its denial of fees are disputed either by the Association or by respondent City of Oakland (City). We have considered the arguments raised by both parties, and deem an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 to be proper. We therefore reverse and remand the matter so that the trial court can determine the appropriate amount of such an award, consistent with our conclusions herein.
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The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an ERISA action on the ground that the limitations period had expired.
A former employee and participant in Intel’s retirement plans sued the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of ERISA section 1104. The district court concluded that the employee had the requisite “actual knowledge” to trigger ERISA’s three-year limitations period, 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2).
The panel held that a two-step process is followed in determining whether a claim is barred by section 1113(2). First, the court isolates and defines the underlying violation on which the plaintiff’s claim is founded. Second, the court inquires whether the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of the alleged breach or violation. The panel held that actual knowledge does not mean that a plaintiff had knowledge that the underlying action violated ERISA, nor does it merely mean that a plaintiff had knowledge that the underlying action occurred. Rather, the defendant must show that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach more than three years before the plaintiff’s action was filed. In an ERISA section 1104 case, the plaintiff must have been aware that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. Disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the panel held that the plaintiff must have actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge.
The panel concluded that disputes of material fact as to the plaintiff’s actual knowledge precluded summary judgment, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 4:34 PM No comments:
Workers are not entitled to be compensated for time spent traveling in employer-provided vehicles between their homes and worksites under an optional and voluntary home dispatch program. Simply transporting tools and equipment during commute time is not compensable work where no effort or extra time is required to effectuate the transport.
Hernandez v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company - filed Nov. 15, 2018, Third District
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 5415
Posted by Eli Kantor at 5:20 PM No comments:
G.R.P. Mechanical Company, Inc. (14-CA-211817) Bethalto, IL, November 6, 2018. No exceptions having been filed to the September 24, 2018 decision of Administrative Law Judge Charles J. Muhl’s finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices, the Board adopted the judge’s findings and conclusions, and ordered the Respondent to take the action set forth in the recommended Order. Charge filed by an individual.
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Rhode Island LFG Genco, LLC (01-RC-208704) Johnston, RI, November 7, 2018. The Board denied the Employer’s Request for Review of the Acting Regional Director’s Supplemental Decision on Challenged Ballot and Certification of Representative, finding the petitioned-for unit of maintenance-department technicians appropriate for collective bargaining purposes, as it raised no substantial issues warranting review. The Board also denied the Employer’s Motion to Stay the Certification of Representative. Petitioner—International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 251. Chairman Ring and Members Kaplan and Emanuel participated.
Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998 does not apply to nonfrivolous Fair Employment and Housing Act litigation that predates the application of the amended version of Government Code Sec. 12965(b).
Huerta v. Kava Holdings - filed Nov. 14, 2018, Second District, Div. Eight
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 5371
An employer can be held liable under the Federal Railroad Safety Act for retaliating against a worker for refusing to engage in an action when he had an objectively reasonable belief that the act would violate a railroad safety rule or regulation.
Rookaird v. BNSF Railway Company - filed Nov. 8, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-35786
Posted by Eli Kantor at 4:36 PM No comments:
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Whether a railroad’s payment to an employee for time lost from work is subject to employment taxes under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act.
Guerrero v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Victor Guerrero, a Mexican immigrant and aspiring California correctional officer, filed a federal action alleging discriminatory failure-to-hire against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the CDCR), among other defendants. He pled federal and state law claims, but only his state claims allowed him to seek general damages.
The federal court dismissed Guerrero’s state claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds, effectively limiting his potential money recovery to the equitable remedy of backpay. To recoup damages, Guerrero filed this action in superior court. After final judgment was entered in the federal action—in Guerrero’s favor—the superior court dismissed his state claims under California claim preclusion principles.
On appeal, Guerrero now argues that federal law, not California law, governs the preclusive effect of the federal judgment. Under federal law, Guerrero contends, there is a well-recognized exception to claim preclusion rules where jurisdictional limitations in a prior suit blocked the plaintiff’s request for complete relief, as was the case here. We agree and shall reverse.
John Guido and Dennis Rankin filed suit, alleging that the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, terminated their employment as firefighters in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Fire District responded that it was too small to qualify as an “employer” under the ADEA, which provides: “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §630(b).
Initially, both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA applied solely to private sector employers. In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA to cover state and local governments. A previous, 1972, amendment to Title VII added States and their subdivisions to the definition of “person[s],” specifying that those entities are engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The Title VII amendment thus subjected States and their subdivisions to liability only if they employ a threshold number of workers, currently 15. By contrast, the 1974 ADEA amendment added state and local governments directly to the definition of “employer.” The same 1974 enactment also amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which many aspects of the ADEA are based, to reach all government employers regardless of their size. 29 U. S. C. §203(d), (x).
Held: The definitional provision’s two-sentence delineation, set out in §630(b), and the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and States or political subdivisions with no attendant numerosity limitation.
Reading the ADEA’s definitional provision, §630(b), as written to apply to States and political subdivisions regardless of size may give the ADEA a broader reach than Title VII, but this disparity is a consequence of the different language Congress chose to employ. The better comparator for the ADEA is the FLSA, which also ranks States and political subdivisions as employers regardless of the number of employees they have. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has, for 30 years, interpreted the ADEA to cover political subdivisions regardless of size, and a majority of the States impose age discrimination proscriptions on political subdivisions with no numerical threshold.
Pp. 4–6. 859 F. 3d 1168, affirmed.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except KAVANAUGH, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
An arbitration provision in an employment agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable as applied to the worker’s claims to vindicate her statutory rights and for wrongful termination. If a worker’s claims have their “roots in the relationship” created by the agreement that required arbitration of claims “arising under or related to” the agreement, then the claims fall within the scope of the agreement. The law remains that mandatory employment contracts that require employees to waive their rights to bring statutory discrimination claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and related claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy are unlawful.
Ramos v. Superior Court (Winston & Strawn) - filed Nov. 2, 2018, First District, Div. One
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 5302
In this latest chapter in what originated as a wage and hour class action, defendant Arthur J. Parent, Jr. (Parent) appeals from the amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Amanda Quiles on her individual claim for wrongful employment termination in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA; 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). (All further statutory references are to title 29 of the United States Code unless otherwise specified.) In addition to the damages awarded by the jury, the amended judgment awarded Quiles $689,310.04 in attorney fees and $50,591.69 in costs of litigation.
Parent challenges the attorney fees and costs awards of the amended judgment only, arguing the trial court erred by awarding costs that were not statutorily authorized and by awarding attorney fees and costs that were jointly incurred by Quiles with her coplaintiffs for whom litigation remains pending. He also argues the trial court otherwise abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees and costs that were unrelated and unnecessary to Quiles’s successful FLSA claim.
We affirm. We hold, in this case of first impression, that federal law applies to the determination of what type of costs are recoverable by a prevailing party in an FLSA action filed in state court. Section 216(b) provides that any employer who wrongfully terminates the employment of an employee in retaliation for filing an FLSA action shall be liable for legal or equitable relief and shall pay the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action. Federal courts have construed section 216(b) to authorize awarding a prevailing employee a broad measure of costs, which include copying, postage, and mediation expenses.
We reject Parent’s argument that the trial court erred by awarding Quiles mediation costs because the parties had contractually agreed to mediate the matter and divide the costs between them. The record shows that the parties agreed to each pay the mediation services provider half the costs of mediation, but Parent did not go through with any agreement to mediate, having failed to personally appear at the mediation or otherwise be available to participate in the mediation. Parent forfeited his argument that the trial court awarded expert witness fees that were unauthorized by the FLSA. He failed to raise that argument in the trial court which resulted in the issue not having been fully briefed and in depriving the trial court the opportunity to make that determination in the first instance.
We also reject Parent’s claim that the trial court erred by awarding Quiles costs she jointly incurred with other plaintiffs who continue to litigate their claims. The trial court painstakingly reviewed the lengthy record regarding Quiles’s requests for attorney fees and costs and awarded her what the court determined she reasonably incurred on her own behalf and in relation to her successful claim. Contrary to Parent’s argument, the trial court did not err by awarding Quiles attorney fees and costs she incurred in connection with the trial as to the joint employer issue. Having proven Parent’s status as her joint employer enabled Quiles to avail herself of the opportunity to pursue damages, penalties, attorney fees and costs against Parent for violating the FLSA by wrongfully terminating Quiles’s employment.
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Constance Ramos, an experienced litigator and patent practitioner with a doctorate in biophysics, was hired as an “Income Partner” at the law firm Winston & Strawn, LLP (Winston). After allegedly being denied recognition for her work, excluded from opportunities for career advancement, evaluated based on the success of her male colleagues, and denied compensation and bonuses to which she was entitled, Ramos sued Winston, asserting various causes of action under state law for discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination, and anti-fair-pay practices.
Winston moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the partnership agreement Ramos signed shortly after joining the firm. In opposing the motion, Ramos argued she was an “employee” of Winston, not a partner, and therefore Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz) applied to the arbitration agreement. Ramos further argued the arbitration provision in the partnership agreement failed to meet the minimum requirements set forth in Armendariz for arbitration of unwaivable statutory claims. The trial court disagreed, finding Ramos was “in a partnership relationship” for purposes of the motion to compel. The trial court severed provisions of the arbitration agreement related to venue and cost-sharing, and granted Winston’s motion. Ramos sought a writ of mandate, and we granted review.
We conclude the trial court erred in compelling Ramos to submit her claims to arbitration. Under the framework set forth by our Supreme Court in Armendariz, we find the parties’ arbitration agreement is unconscionable. Further, because we cannot remove the taint of illegality by severing the unlawful provisions without altering the nature of the parties’ agreement, we must void the entire agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for Ramos to proceed with her claims in superior court.
Plaintiff AMN Healthcare, Inc. (AMN) appeals (1) the judgment in favor of defendants Kylie Stein, Robin Wallace, Katherine Hernandez, Alexis Ogilvie (sometimes collectively, individual defendants) and Aya Healthcare, Inc. (Aya) (sometimes individual defendants and Aya are collectively referred to as defendants); (2) the injunction preventing AMN from enforcing its nonsolicitation of employee provision against individual defendants and its other former employees; and (3) the award of attorney fees in favor of defendants.
AMN and Aya are competitors in the business of providing on a temporary basis healthcare professionals, in particular "travel nurses," to medical care facilities throughout the country. Individual defendants were former "travel nurse recruiters" of AMN who, for different reasons and at different times, left AMN and joined Aya, where they also worked as travel nurse recruiters.
As a condition of employment with AMN, individual defendants each signed a Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (CNDA), which, as discussed post, included a provision preventing individual defendants from soliciting any employee of AMN to leave the service of AMN for at least a one-year period. Significant in the instant case, a travel nurse was deemed to be an employee of AMN while on temporary assignment through AMN.
AMN sued defendants, asserting various causes of action including breach of contract and misappropriation of confidential information, including trade secrets as set forth in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Code sections 3426 et seq. (UTSA). Defendants filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief and unfair business competition.
Defendants moved for summary judgment of AMN's operative complaint and of their own cross-complaint. Defendants claimed that the nonsolicitation of employee provision in the CNDA was an improper restraint on individual defendants' ability to engage in their profession, in violation of Business and Professions Code section 16600; that as such, AMN's contract-based causes of action failed as a matter of law; and that AMN's tort-based causes of action also failed as a matter of law because the information allegedly used by defendants to recruit travel nurses was not protected.
The trial court agreed with defendants, granted summary judgment against AMN, and granted summary adjudication of defendants' declaratory relief cause of action in their cross-complaint. After granting such relief, the court subsequently enjoined AMN from enforcing the nonsolicitation of employee provision in the CNDA as to any former (California) AMN employee and awarded defendants attorney fees.
As we explain, we independently conclude the court properly granted summary judgment of AMN's operative complaint and of defendants' declaratory relief cause of action in their cross-complaint. We further conclude the court properly exercised its discretion when it enjoined AMN from attempting to enforce its nonsolicitation of employee provision with respect to its former employees, including individual defendants, and when it awarded defendants their reasonable attorney fees.
The panel filed an order denying a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel reversed the district court’s denial of class certification in a putative class action.
Judge Bea, joined by Judges Bybee, Callahan, Ikuta, and Bennett, dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc because he would hold that the panel erred in concluding that expert opinion testimony need not be admissible evidence in order to be considered at the class certification stage. Judge Bea wrote that the panel’s decision goes against the court’s own binding precedent, the law of four other circuits, and the Supreme Court’s clear guidance on the issue.
A plaintiff bringing a wage and hour claim under the Private Attorneys General Act must state facts and theories supporting the alleged violations not implied by reference to the Labor Code and give the employer sufficient information to assess the seriousness of the alleged violations. However, a bare allegation of a violation of an employer's duty to maintain accurate and complete wage statements is itself sufficient. A plaintiff does not need to specify Labor Code Sec. 558 in her PAGA notice and can proceed with a claim for remedies under that section so long as she gave adequate notice of a violation for which Sec. 558 provides a remedy.
Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Company - filed Oct. 31, 2018, Second District, Div. Five
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 5223
Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido Oral Argument Transcript
Payton v. CSI Electrical Contractors
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the named plaintiff Payton was not an appropriate class representative based on his criminal record denying leave to substitute another representative in light of the age of the case and the futility of doing so.
Payton v. CSI Electrical Contractors - filed Sept. 28, 2018, Second District, Div. Two
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 4792
Atempa v. Pedrazzani
Civil penalties may be assessed for violation of specified overtime pay and minimum wage laws from a person other than the corporate employer that failed to pay the proper wages, where there is no allegation or contention that the alter ego doctrine applies or that there is any other basis on which to pierce the veil of the corporate employer.
Atempa v. Pedrazzani - filed Sept. 28, 2018, Fourth District, Div. One
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 4783
San Francisco Police Officers' Association v. San Francisco Police Commission
A trial court properly made a determination of arbitrability for a union grievance asserting the city had failed to negotiate in good faith before implementing revisions to its use of force policy where the memorandum of understanding between a city and police union specified that arbitrability was to be determined by a court when a grievance is filed regarding actions the city has reasonably found to be necessary to ensure compliance with state law. The trial court properly concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable since the city's power to regulate the use of force by its police officers is a constitutional right which the city cannot suspend, bargain or contract away.
San Francisco Police Officers' Association v. San Francisco Police Commission - filed Sept. 26, 2018, First District, Div. Two
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 4759
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Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions
A plaintiff did not create a disputed issue of material fact about an employer's liability under a theory of respondeat superior by simply challenging the defense witnesses' credibility.
Ayon v. Esquire Deposition Solutions - filed Sept. 21, 2018, Fourth District, Div. Three
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 4679
Moss Brothers Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz
A complaint against a defendant for an alleged breach of an arbitration agreement was based on a protected action where the alleged breach was the defendant's act of filing a lawsuit instead of pursuing arbitration for his employment-related claims. Were it not for the defendant's act of filing suit, the plaintiff would have no factual basis for its claims.
Moss Brothers Toy, Inc. v. Ruiz - filed Sept. 20, 2018, Fourth District, Div. Two
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 4617
Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc. - filed Sept. 17, 2018
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A group of workers can appeal a class decertification order even though they were dismissed from the collective action before final judgment and without prejudice to their individual Fair Labor Standards Act claims since an order of decertification and dismissal disposes of their statutory right to proceed collectively. A group of police officers were not "similarly situated" where they failed to create a triable question about the existence of a department-wide policy or practice discouraging the reporting of overtime.
Campbell v. City of Los Angeles - filed Sept. 13, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 15-56990
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. BNSF Railway Company
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission satisfied the elements of a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112(a) claim by showing an employer had perceived a qualified job applicant as having a disability and that the employer had impermissibly conditioned its offer of employment on the applicant's procurement of a diagnostic test for his perceived disability, at his own expense.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. BNSF Railway Company - filed Aug. 29, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-35457
When a memorandum of understanding is explicit as to the substance of a benefit conferred upon workers, but not the term of the benefits, a party can rely on extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of an implied term requiring the continuation of that benefit in perpetuity. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies to retirees. Changes in retirees' health benefits are covered by the FEHA, despite the fact that they are not active employees.
Harris v. County of Orange - filed Sept. 5, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 13-56061
Posted by Eli Kantor at 4:12 PM No comments:
The state law claims brought by mental health providers against an insurance company over the use of screening criteria for mental healthcare coverage did not fall within the scope of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act since their claims for unfair and deceptive business practices were based on independent duties beyond those imposed by their patients' ERISA plans.
Hansen v. Group Health Cooperative - filed Sept. 4, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-35684
The enactment of Nevada Senate Bill 223 was a legitimate exercise of Nevada's traditional state authority. SB 223 was not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act because it did not intrude on any federally-regulated field, conflict with ERISA's objectives, or otherwise impermissibly "relate to" ERISA plans. ERISA empowers ERISA trusts to bring actions against subcontractors for subcontractors' labor debts, but it does not establish a cause of action for collecting debts from non-parties to an ERISA plan. A challenge to the validity of SB 223 was not rendered moot by the repeal of the bill and the enactment of a replacement measure.
Board of Trustees of the Glazing Health and Welfare Trust v. Chambers - filed Sept. 4, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-15588
Jackpot Harvesting Co. v. Superior Ct.
Jackpot Harvesting Co. v. Superior Ct. (CA6 H044764 8/14/18) Piece Rate/Rest and NP Time
Labor Code section 226.2, which became effective January 1, 2016, addresses the manner in which piece-rate employees are to be compensated for rest and recovery periods and other nonproductive time on the job (collectively, rest/NP time). Subdivision (b) of the statute (hereafter section 226.2(b)) provides a safe harbor for an employer that, prior to 2016, failed to properly compensate its piece-rate workers for rest/NP time. Under section 226.2(b), an employer that pays its employees for previously unpaid rest/NP time accrued between July 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015, is entitled to assert “an affirmative defense to any claim or cause of action . . . based solely on the employer’s failure to timely pay the employee the compensation due for [rest/NP time] . . . for time periods prior to and including December 31, 2015.”
This lawsuit concerns whether an employer complying with the requirements of section 226.2(b) has a safe harbor against any employee claims for rest/NP time accruing prior to and including December 31, 2015, or has an affirmative defense only to those claims accruing between July 1, 2012 and December 31, 2015. We will conclude that under the plain and unambiguous language of section 226.2(b), an employer complying with the statute has an affirmative defense against any employee claims for rest/NP time accruing prior to and including December 31, 2015.
Cal. Dept. of Industrial Relations v. AC Transit
(CA1/4 A142799 8/13/18) Non-Air Conditioned Buses.Outdoor Places of Employment
Clark v. City of Seattle
A group of drivers did not raise a viable challenge to a city ordinance that establishes a multistep collective-bargaining process between "driver-coordinators" and for-hire drivers under Sec. 8(b)(4) or Sec. 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act because the disclosure of the drivers' information to a labor union was neither a concrete nor a particularized injury.
Clark v. City of Seattle - filed Aug. 9, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 17-35693
Today, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Agency”) announced that it will offer voluntary early retirement and voluntary separation to employees holding eligible positions in designated locations within the Agency.
The Agency requested and obtained both Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments (VSIP) authority in order to better manage its caseload and workforce needs. For years, the deficits caused by flat funding of the Agency have been primarily addressed by voluntary personnel attrition. As a result, the NLRB has an imbalance in staffing in both headquarters and the NLRB’s regional offices. To ensure that the Agency is able to carry out its critical mission, the NLRB is utilizing the VERA and VSIP to realign Agency staffing with office caseloads. In addition to addressing the Agency’s current staffing imbalance, utilization of VERA and VSIP will enable the Agency to reallocate its limited resources and to, among other things, provide employees with the tools they need, including training and improvements in technology.
VERA changes the normal retirement eligibility to allow employees to voluntarily retire earlier, with an immediate annuity, with 20 years of service at age 50, or at 25 years of service regardless of age. VSIP provides a financial incentive for employees to voluntarily separate by optional retirement, voluntary early retirement, or resignation. The NLRB is offering both VERA and VSIP opportunities only to employees in targeted job categories. Applying for these opportunities is entirely voluntary and applications from employees in eligible positions will be processed in the order they are received.
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The National Labor Relations Board today rejected a challenge regarding the appointment of its administrative law judges ("ALJs"), concluding that all of the Board’s ALJs have been validly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution.
On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), finding that administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are inferior officers of the United States and thus must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, i.e., by the President, the courts, or the Head of Department. Id. at 2051. Unlike the SEC’s ALJs, the NLRB’s ALJs are appointed by the full Board as the “Head of Department” and not by other Agency staff members.
The challenge was raised by WestRock Services, Inc. (“WestRock”) in Case 10-CA-195617 on a motion to dismiss. Chairman John F. Ring was joined by Members Mark Gaston Pearce, Lauren McFerran, Marvin E. Kaplan and William J. Emanuel in the order denying WestRock’s motion.
As used in Business and Professions Code Sec. 7026.1, a nursery person is a licensed professional engaged in cultivating plants, whereas a gardener holds no license and generally tends existing landscaping. A property owner who has hired a gardener to perform work requiring a license can be held liable to the gardener's employee under a respondeat superior theory.
Jones v. Sorenson - filed Aug. 2, 2018, Third District
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 3823
Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc.
An employee who recovers a judgment against an employer for lost compensation has not suffered a theft of labor for which he is entitled to recover treble damages and attorney fees under Penal Code Sec. 496(c).
Lacagnina v. Comprehend Systems, Inc. - filed Aug. 3, 2018, First District, Div. Four
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 3817
The Code of Civil Procedure and the Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration (Ethics Standards) require arbitrators in contractual arbitrations to make various disclosures about themselves, their experience, and their activity as private judges or, as they are sometimes called, “dispute resolution neutrals.” Failure to make required disclosures may be a ground for disqualifying the arbitrator and, if the arbitrator was actually aware of the ground for disqualification, for vacating an award.
In this case, the arbitrator did not comply with several applicable disclosure requirements, which gave rise to multiple grounds for disqualification. Because the arbitrator was actually aware of at least one of the grounds for disqualification, the resulting arbitration award was subject to vacatur. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition to vacate the award and granting the petition to confirm it.
beverlyhillsemploymentlaw.com
This case arises from unfair practice claims filed by unions after San Diego’s mayor sponsored a citizens’ initiative to eliminate pensions for new municipal employees and rebuffed union demands to meet and confer over the measure. The Court of Appeal annulled a finding by respondent, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), that the failure to meet and confer constituted an unfair labor practice. We granted review to settle two questions: (1) When a final decision by PERB under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (the MMBA; Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.) is appealed, what standards of review apply to PERB’s legal interpretations and findings of fact?; (2) When a public agency itself does not propose a policy change affecting the terms and conditions of employment, but its designated bargaining agent lends official support to a citizens’ initiative to create such a change, is the agency obligated to meet and confer with employee representatives?
These questions are resolved by settled law and the relevant statutory language. First, we have long held that PERB’s legal findings are entitled to deferential review. They will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, though the courts as always retain ultimate authority over questions of statutory interpretation. The MMBA specifies that PERB’s factual findings are “conclusive” “if supported by substantial evidence.” (§ 3509.5, subd. (b).) Second, the duty to meet and confer is a central feature of the MMBA. Governing bodies “or other representatives as may be properly designated” are required to engage with unions on matters within the scope of representation “prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course of action.” (§ 3505.) This broad formulation encompasses more than formal actions taken by the governing body itself. Under the circumstances here, the MMBA applies to the mayor’s official pursuit of pension reform as a matter of policy. The Court of Appeal erred, first by reviewing PERB’s interpretation of the governing statutes de novo, and second by taking an unduly constricted view of the duty to meet and confer.
Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, APC
Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, APC (CA1/4 A147733 8/1/18) Wage & Hour/Waiting Time and Attorneys’ Fees
When an employee resigns without notice, California law requires the employer to pay all wages within 72 hours. (Lab. Code § 202, subd. (a).) If the employer willfully fails to do so, the employee’s wages continue as a penalty from that due date until the wages are paid, for up to 30 days. (§ 203.) This case considers an award of these “waiting time” penalties, as well as an award of attorney fees to the employee for the employer’s unsuccessful appeal. (§ 98.2.)
Taryn Nishiki, a former employee of defendant Danko Meredith P.C., filed a complaint with the California Labor Commissioner (the commissioner) seeking vacation wages, rest period premiums, and waiting time penalties. She prevailed on her claim for waiting time penalties, and was awarded $4,250. Defendant appealed the award to the superior court, which affirmed the commissioner’s award, and awarded Nishiki $86,160 in attorney fees. On appeal, defendant contends the waiting time penalties are unwarranted and the attorney fee award was excessive. We shall reduce the waiting time penalties and otherwise affirm the judgment.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 5:33 PM No comments:
Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc
A safety consultant is liable to an employee of the firm that hired the safety consultant when the employee establishes the elements of a negligent undertaking claim. To establish a negligent undertaking claim, a plaintiff must establish that the consultant undertook to render services to the employer, the services rendered were of a kind the consultant should have recognized as necessary for the protection of the employees of the employer, the consultant to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its undertaking, the failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to an employee, and the consultant's carelessness either increased the risk of such harm, or the undertaking was to perform a duty owed by the employer to the employees, or the harm was suffered because of the reliance of the employer the employees upon the undertaking. Acts are "wrongful in their nature" for purposes of Civil Code Sec. 2343 when they constitute an independent tort, such as the tort of negligent undertaking.
Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc - filed July 30, 2018, Fifth District
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 3736
Estill v. County of Shasta
Estill v. County of Shasta (CA3 C077513 7/31/18) Government Claim/Internal Investigation
Renee Estill submitted a government claim against the County of Shasta and others, specifically representing that she first became aware of the alleged incident [an internal affairs investigation by her employer] on September 9, 2011. The County accepted Estill’s representation and denied her claim on the merits. Because it accepted the claim as timely, the County did not warn Estill to seek leave to present a late claim. This lawsuit followed.
During Estill’s deposition, however, defendants learned she was aware of the alleged wrongdoing as early as 2009. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment primarily on the ground that Estill’s government claim was untimely, but later granted her motion for a new trial, ruling there are triable issues of fact as to whether defendants waived their defense of untimeliness because the County did not warn Estill that she should seek leave to present a late claim pursuant to Government Code section 911.3, subdivision (b). Defendants appeal from the order granting Estill a new trial, and Estill cross-appeals from the judgment in favor of defendants.
After oral argument in this case, we asked the parties for supplemental briefing on the application of equitable estoppel in this context. We conclude that a claimant may be estopped from invoking the section 911.3 waiver provision where a public entity’s failure to notify the claimant that a claim is untimely is induced by the claimant’s representation on the government claim form. And in this case, based on the entire appellate record, including the supplemental briefs, we conclude Estill is estopped from asserting that defendants waived their defense of untimeliness. She represented in her government claim that the incident of wrongdoing occurred in September 2009, but that she “first became aware” of the incident on September 9, 2011. She included an attachment to her government claim in which she could have explained what she had learned in 2009 and 2010 about the alleged misconduct, but she did not mention her prior knowledge. Thus, the record indicates she intended for the County to rely on her representation in the government claim, and the County did in fact rely on the representation. Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s order granting Estill’s motion for a new trial and affirm the judgment entered in favor of defendants.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 6:27 PM No comments:
Troester v. Starbucks Corporation (SC S234969 7/26/18) FLSA/De Minimis Doctrine
Upon a request by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548), we agreed to answer the following question: Does the federal Fair Labor Standards Act’s de minimis doctrine, as stated in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 692, and Lindow v. United States (9th Cir. 1984) 738 F.2d 1057, 1063, apply to claims for unpaid wages under California Labor Code sections 510, 1194, and 1197?
The de minimis doctrine is an application of the maxim de minimis non curat lex, which means “[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles.” (Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 524.) Federal courts have applied the doctrine in some circumstances to excuse the payment of wages for small amounts of otherwise compensable time upon a showing that the bits of time are administratively difficult to record.
We approach the question presented in two parts: First, have California’s wage and hour statutes or regulations adopted the de minimis doctrine found in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? We conclude they have not. There is no indication in the text or history of the relevant statutes and Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage orders of such adoption.
Windsor Redding Care Center, LLC (20-CA-070465, et al.; 366 NLRB No. 127) Redding CA, July 27, 2018.
The Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Respondent did not unlawfully refuse to engage in predisciplinary or postdisciplinary bargaining with the Union. A Board majority (Members Kaplan and Emanuel; Member McFerran, dissenting) further agreed with the judge that the Respondent did not unlawfully terminate a housekeeping employee; Member McFerran would have found that the Respondent failed to establish that it would have taken the same action absent the employee’s union activity. Contrary to the judge, the Board unanimously found that the Respondent unlawfully changed its practice of granting merit raises. A Board majority (Members McFerran and Kaplan; Member Emanuel, dissenting) additionally found that the Respondent unlawfully terminated a restorative nursing assistant; Member Emanuel would have found that the Respondent established that it would have discharged the employee even absent the employee’s union activity.
Charges filed by SEIU United Service Workers-West. Administrative Law Judge Gregory Z. Meyerson issued his decision on December 31, 2012. Members McFerran, Kaplan, and Emanuel participated.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 12:46 PM No comments:
Golden v. CEP
Golden v. CEP (9th Cir. 16-17354 7/24/18) Employment Settlement/“Restraint of a Substantial Character”
We are now called on to answer the question that we left open when this case was last before us: whether a provision of a settlement agreement between Dr. Donald Golden and his former employer, the California Emergency Physicians Medical Group (“CEP”), places a “restraint of a substantial character” on Dr. Golden’s medical practice. See Golden v. Cal. Emergency Physicians Med. Grp., 782 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Golden I”). We conclude that it does, and that it therefore runs afoul of California law. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 5:35 PM No comments:
Rodriguez v. Taco Bell
Rodriguez v. Taco Bell (9th Cir. 16-15465 7/18/18) Wage & Hour/Meal Breaks
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Taco Bell Corp. in a putative class action concerning employee meal breaks.
After the district court granted summary judgment to Taco Bell on most of plaintiff’s claims, the court granted plaintiff’s request that the district court dismiss the remaining pending claim. As a threshold jurisdictional issue, the panel held that the dismissal with prejudice created a valid final judgment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
California Wage Order 5-2001 requires employees be relieved of all duty during a requisite meal period. During plaintiff’s period of employment, Taco Bell offered thirty-minute meal breaks that were fully compliant with California’s requirements, but with a special offer that employees could purchase a meal from the restaurant at a discount, provided they ate the meal in the restaurant.
The panel held that California law was not violated because Taco Bell relieved their employees of all duties during the meal break period and exercised no control over their activities, where employees were free to use the thirty minutes in any way they wished, subject only to the restriction that if they purchased a discounted meal, they had to eat in the restaurant. The panel rejected plaintiff’s contention that employees were under sufficient employer control to render the time compensable. The panel also rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the value of the discounted meals be added to the regular rate of pay for overtime purposes.
Posted by Eli Kantor at 3:34 PM No comments:
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, employers are not fiduciaries as to unpaid contributions to ERISA benefit plans. Parties to an ERISA plan cannot designate unpaid contributions as plan assets.
Glazing Health & Welfare Fund v. Lamek - filed July 19, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-16155
Coffman v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center
An employer cannot begin unconditional bargaining and later withdraw recognition and refusing to bargain. The regional director of the National Labor Relations Board demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success in establishing a withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain unconditionally, as well as a continuing threat of irreparable harm to the union's collective bargaining rights, to support the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief, where the director could show that an employer had considerable dealings with the union following the union's certification, including discussions that resulted in agreements over some hours and working conditions, and that these negotiations took place before the employer made any official challenge to the certification.
Coffman v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center - filed July 16, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 17-17413
Posted by Eli Kantor at 4:50 PM No comments:
Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
A plaintiff lacked standing to bring a suit based on a prospective employer's violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in failing to provide him with a copy of his consumer credit report and an opportunity to correct any inaccuracies where the plaintiff did not allege any actual harm or a substantial risk of such harm resulting from the violation.
Dutta v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. - filed July 13, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-17216
Posted by Eli Kantor at 12:42 PM No comments:
Caldera v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (CA4/3 G053168 7/9/18) FEHA Harassment/Severe or Pervasive
Under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), an employee with a disability can sue his or her employer and supervisors for disability harassment. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) The employee must prove the harassment was either severe or pervasive. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 466.)
Augustine Caldera is a correctional officer at a state prison. Officer Caldera stutters when he speaks. The prison’s employees mocked or mimicked Caldera’s stutter at least a dozen times over a period of about two years. Sergeant James Grove, a supervisor, participated in the mocking and mimicking of Caldera’s stutter. Such conduct reflected the prison’s culture, according to a senior prison official.
Caldera sued the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Grove (collectively defendants) for disability harassment, failure to prevent the harassment, and related claims. A jury found the harassment to be both severe and pervasive and awarded Caldera $500,000 in noneconomic damages. The trial court found the damage award to be excessive and granted defendants’ motion for a new trial solely as to that issue. Defendants appeal and Caldera cross-appeals.
Defendants claim there is insufficient evidence the harassment was either severe or pervasive. We disagree. There is substantial evidence to support the jury’s factual findings. Defendants also claim the trial court committed two instructional and one evidentiary error. We find no prejudicial instructional errors and the claimed evidentiary error has been forfeited.
Caldera claims the trial court failed to file a timely statement of reasons after granting defendants’ motion for a new trial. We agree. The court’s new trial order as to the damage award is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings
An employee's right to bring a claim under the California Private Attorneys General Act cannot be waived. A trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever a PAGA waiver and enforce the remaining arbitration agreement which was printed in both English and Spanish and only the English-language version of the agreement contained a severability clause.
Juarez v. Wash Depot Holdings - filed July 3, 2018, Second District, Div. Six
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 3389
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