Source: http://narf.org/icwa/state/alaska/case/catholic.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-23 04:19:44
Document Index: 710964902

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1901', '§ 1914', '§ 1911', '§ 1912', '§ 1915']

ICWA Guide Online | Alaska Cases Federal Resources | Resources by State | Cases A-Z (Cite as: 783 P.2d 1159)
SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., C.G. and S.G., Appellants,
and Cook Inlet Tribal Council, Appellees.
Indian child's tribe, under the Indian Child Welfare Act, is
not entitled to notice of a proceeding for voluntary termination
of parental rights. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, §§ 2-403,
102(a), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963,
1912(a); U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14; AS 13.11.045(1).
Robert B. Flint, Hartig, Rhodes, Norman, Mahoney & Edwards, Anchorage,
Michael Gershel, Tred Eyerly, and Carol Daniel, Alaska Legal Services
Corp., Sharon Gleason, Reese, Rice & Volland, Anchorage, for appellee
Lloyd Benton Miller, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Miller, Anchorage, for
appellee Cook Inlet Tribal Council.
Philip J. McCarthy, Jr., Deputy Public Advocate, Brant McGee, Public
D. Rebecca Snow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fairbanks, Grace Berg Schaible,
Atty. Gen., Juneau, for Amicus Curiae, State of Alaska, Dept.
The appellees' contention that due process requires tribal notice lacks
merit. In enacting the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress has
both created and defined tribal rights in adoption and termination
proceedings. The provisions of the Act which give tribes the
right to notice of certain proceedings and not to others,
define the scope of tribal rights. The Act strikes a
balance between the sometimes conflicting interests of Indian parents, Indian
children, and their tribes. We are unable to say that
the fact that Congress stopped short of granting tribes the
right to notice in voluntary termination proceedings is fundamentally unfair.
The judgment is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) explicitly grants
tribes the right to intervene in any State court proceeding
for the termination of parental rights to an Indian child.
This right to intervene is fundamental to the ICWA's purpose,
and confers upon tribes an implicit right to notice of
any proceeding within the Act's scope. To hold otherwise is
to misread the Act. I therefore dissent.
On June 30, 1986 CAA appeared before a probate master
in a voluntary relinquishment proceeding. CAA indicated that she wanted
CMF to be adopted by the Caucasian couple with whom
CMF now lives (Mr. and Mrs. G). At Catholic Service's
request, CAA signed a Relinquishment of Parental Rights. Catholic Services
did not offer CAA the alternative consent to adoption form;
neither did Catholic Services explain to CAA that Catholic Services
would become CMF's legal custodian once a decree terminating CAA's
parental rights was entered. Finally, Catholic Services did not inform
CAA of the existence of her tribal organization, the Cook
Inlet Tribal Council, or her right to be represented by
her own attorney. The Cook Inlet Tribal Council (CITC) received
no notice of the proceedings from any source and so
Subsequently, CAA began to put her life back together. She
received assistance with her drinking problem, and in September 1986
stopped drinking and began out-patient treatment. In early 1986 CAA
learned of the Cook Inlet Tribal Council through a television
advertisement; she contacted the tribe for counseling and for assistance
in regaining custody of CMF.
On March 26, 1987, Mr. and Mrs. G petitioned to adopt CMF, filing their petition in the relinquishment proceeding rather than commencing an independent adoption action. CAA filed a Revocation of Relinquishment the same day. CITC moved to intervene in the adoption proceeding May 7, and moved to set aside the termination decree pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1914. CAA and CITC raised numerous grounds for setting aside the decree including Catholic Services' failure to provide notice of the termination proceedings to the child's tribe. Thereafter the superior court issued a Memorandum Order and Decision vacating CAA's relinquishment of parental rights for Catholic Services' failure to notify the Cook Inlet Tribal Council of the voluntary relinquishment proceeding. In so holding the superior court stated in part: The
tribe's right to intervene as provided by the statute would
be hollow and *1162
without practical effect if there was not a duty imposed
upon the court to ensure that the tribe in fact,
had been notified and given the opportunity to respond as
is required in an involuntary termination proceeding.
In my opinion the court erroneously concludes that Congress did
not grant tribes the right to intervene in voluntary termination
proceedings. The text of 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)
is simply not supportive of the court's reading: In
State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian
custodian of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall
have a right to intervene at any
point in the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) Contrary to the court's apparent rationale, the tribe's right to intervene is not grounded upon a right to notice. Rather, the tribe has a right to intervene at any point in any State proceeding regardless of the parents' consent. This right to intervene is absolute, as an instrumental part of the jurisdictional scheme "[a]t the heart of the ICWA." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 104 L.Ed.2d 29, (1989). To deny tribes this right in voluntary proceedings is to allow parents to defeat the Congressional scheme by usurping the tribe's equal interest in the Indian child. Id. 490 U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 1610 ("[T]he tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents.") (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70 (Utah 1986)); see also Holyfield, 490 U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 1609 ("Congress determined to subject [placements of Indian children in non-Indian homes] to the ICWA's jurisdictional and other provisions, even in cases where the parents consented to an adoption, because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents.").
FN3. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) provides: (a)
time for commencement of proceedings; additional time for preparation
FN6. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 provides in part: (a)
care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences
Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account any special needs of the child. In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with-- (i)
resolution for different order of preference; personal preference considered; anonymity
in application of preferences