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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 10012', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 10012', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 10012', '§ 6', '§ 10012', '§ 10012', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 12', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 3796', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Renne v. Geary (full text) :: 501 U.S. 312 (1991) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Renne v. Geary
Renne v. Geary 501 U.S. 312 (1991)
U.S. Supreme CourtRenne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991)Renne v. GearyNo. 90-769Argued April 23, 1990Decided June 17, 1991501 U.S. 312CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
(a) Although respondents have standing to claim that § 6(b) has been applied in an unconstitutional manner to bar their own speech, the allegations in their complaint and affidavits raise serious questions about their standing to assert other claims. In their capacity as voters, they only allege injury flowing from § 6(b)'s application to prevent speech by candidates in the voter pamphlets. There is reason to doubt that that injury can be redressed by a declaration of § 6(b)'s invalidity or an injunction against its enforcement, since a separate California statute, the constitutionality of which was not litigated in this case, might well be construed to prevent candidates from mentioning party endorsements in voter pamphlets, even in the absence of § 6(b). Moreover, apart from the possibility of an overbreadth claim, discussed infra, the standing of respondent committee members to litigate based on injuries to their respective committees' rights is unsettled. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 475 U. S. 543-545. Nor is it clear, putting aside redressability concerns, that the committee Page 501 U. S. 313 members have third-party standing to assert the rights of candidates, since no obvious barrier exists preventing candidates from asserting their own rights. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400. Pp. 501 U. S. 318-320.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-B of which SCALIA, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring Page 501 U. S. 314 opinion, post, p. 501 U. S. 325. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 501 U. S. 334.
In view of our determination that the case is nonjusticiable, the identity of the parties has crucial relevance. Petitioners are the City and County of San Francisco, its Board of Supervisors, and certain local officials. The individual respondents are 10 registered voters residing in the City and County of San Francisco. They include the chairman and three members of the San Francisco Republican County Central Committee and one member of the San Francisco Democratic County Central Committee. Election Action, an association Page 501 U. S. 315 of voters, is also a respondent, but it asserts no interest in relation to the issues before us different from that of the individual voters. Hence, we need not consider it further.
We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), to determine whether § 6(b) violates the First Amendment. At oral argument, doubts arose concerning the justiciability of that issue in the case before us. Having examined the complaint and the record, we hold that respondents have not demonstrated a live controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts. As a consequence of our finding of nonjusticiability, we vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss respondents' third cause of action. Page 501 U. S. 316
and that they will continue such deletions in the future unless restrained by court order. ¦ 38. Respondents believe an actual controversy exists because they contend § 6 and any other law relied upon to refuse to print the endorsements are unconstitutional in that they "abridge [respondents'] Page 501 U. S. 317 rights to free speech and association," while petitioners dispute these contentions. ¦ 39. The third cause of action concludes with general assertions that respondents have been harmed by the past and threatened deletion of endorsements from candidate statements, and that, because of those deletions, they have suffered and will suffer irreparable injury to their rights of free speech and association. Id. at 5-6, ¦¦ 40-41.
"[i]n elections since 1986, the Democratic Committee Page 501 U. S. 318 has declined to endorse candidates § or nonpartisan office solely out of concern that committee members may be criminally or civilly prosecuted for violation of the endorsement ban contained in"
As an initial matter, serious questions arise concerning the standing of respondents to defend the rights of speakers Page 501 U. S. 319 in any of these categories except to the extent that certain respondents in the third category may assert their own rights. In their capacity as voters, respondents only allege injury flowing from application of § 6(b) to prevent speech by candidates in the voter pamphlets. We have at times permitted First Amendment claims by those who did not themselves intend to engage in speech, but instead wanted to challenge a restriction on speech they desired to hear. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976). There is reason to doubt, however, that the injury alleged by these voters can be redressed by a declaration of § 6(b)'s invalidity or an injunction against its enforcement. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 490 U. S. 615-616 (1989) (opinion of KENNEDY, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS and SCALIA, JJ.) (party seeking to invoke authority of federal courts must show injury "likely to be redressed by the requested relief"); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 468 U. S. 751 (1984) ("relief from the injury must be likely' to follow from a favorable decision"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38, (1976). A separate California statute, the constitutionality of which was not litigated in this case, provides that a candidate's statement "shall not include the party affiliation of the candidate, nor membership or activity in partisan political organizations." Cal.Elec.Code Ann. § 10012 (West 1977 and Supp.1991). This statute might be construed to prevent candidates from mentioning party endorsements in voter pamphlets, even in the absence of § 6(b). Overlapping enactments can be designed to further differing state interests, and invalidation of one may not impugn the validity of another.
The respondent committee members allege injury to their rights, either through their committees or as individual committee members, to endorse candidates for nonpartisan offices, and also allege injury from the inability of candidates to include those endorsements in voter pamphlets. Respondents, Page 501 U. S. 320 of course, have standing to claim that § 6(b) has been applied in an unconstitutional manner to bar their own speech. Apart, though, from the possibility of an overbreadth challenge, an alternative we discuss below, the standing of the committee members to litigate based on injuries to the rights of their respective committees is unsettled. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 543-545 (school board member, as member of a "collegial body," could not take appeal board as a whole declined to take). It may be that rights the committee members can exercise only in conjunction with the other members of the committee must be defended by the committee itself. Nor is it clear, putting aside our concerns about redressability, that the committee members have third-party standing to assert the rights of candidates, since no obvious barrier exists that would prevent a candidate from asserting his or her own rights. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 499 U. S. 414-415 (1991).
"Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, in itself, show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief Page 501 U. S. 321 . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."
We also discern no ripe controversy in the allegations that respondents desire to endorse candidates in future elections, either as individual committee members or through their committees. Respondents do not allege an intention to endorse any particular candidate, nor that a candidate wants to include a party's or committee member's endorsement in a candidate statement. We possess no factual record of an actual Page 501 U. S. 322 or imminent application of § 6(b) sufficient to present the constitutional issues in "clean-cut and concrete form." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549, 331 U. S. 584 (1947); see Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972); Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. 111 (1962) (per curiam); Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 (1945). We do not know the nature of the endorsement, how it would be publicized, or the precise language petitioners might delete from the voter pamphlet. To the extent respondents allege that a committee or a committee member wishes to "support" or "oppose" a candidate other than through endorsements, they do not specify what form that support or opposition would take.
While petitioners have threatened not to allow candidates to include endorsements by county committees or their members in the voter pamphlets prepared by the government, we do not believe deferring adjudication will impose a substantial hardship on these respondents. In all probability, respondents can learn which candidates have been endorsed by particular parties or committee members through other means. If respondents or their committees do desire to make a particular endorsement in the future, and a candidate wishes to Page 501 U. S. 323 include the endorsement in a voter pamphlet, the constitutionality of petitioners' refusal to publish the endorsement can be litigated in the context of a concrete dispute.
We conclude with a word about the propriety of resolving the facial constitutionality of § 6(b) without first addressing its application to a particular set of facts. In some First Amendment contexts, we have permitted litigants injured by a particular application of a statute to assert a facial overbreadth challenge, one seeking invalidation of the statute because its application in other situations would be unconstitutional. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). We have some doubt that respondents' complaint should be construed to assert a facial challenge to § 6(b). Beyond question, the gravamen of the complaint is petitioners' application of § 6(b) to delete party endorsements from candidate statements in voter pamphlets. While the complaint seeks a declaration Page 501 U. S. 324 of § 6(b)'s unconstitutionality, the only injunctive relief it requests relates to the editing of candidate statements. References to other applications of § 6(b) are, at best, conclusory.
It is so ordered. Page 501 U. S. 325
* JUSTICE SCALIA joins all but 501 U. S. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.
Moreover, I am troubled by the redressability issues inherent in this case. Respondents' complaint has challenged § 6(b) of the State Constitution, but it has not challenged the validity of § 10012 of the California Election Code. That section Page 501 U. S. 327 plainly prohibits the inclusion of the party affiliation of candidates in nonpartisan elections, and unquestionably would provide an adequate basis for petitioners' challenged policy even if the constitutional prohibition against endorsements were invalidated. Even if we were to strike down § 6(b) as overbroad, then, it is unclear whether respondents' alleged injury would be redressed.
The majority's concerns about the justiciability of this case, even though ultimately misplaced, are understandable, in light of the failure by the courts below to analyze the precise nature of the constitutional challenge that is presented here. Those concerns, however, should not prevent us from independently examining the record and deciding the issues that are properly presented. In doing so, I conclude that the only constitutional challenge that is properly before us is to the action by the San Francisco Registrar of Voters in deleting references in official voter pamphlets to political party endorsements, a challenge that is fully justiciable. Because the Registrar's action does not violate the First Amendment, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I therefore dissent from the majority's disposition of this case. Page 501 U. S. 328
App. 3, ¦ 10. The first cause of action then challenges the Registrar's deletion of portions of proposed ballot arguments submitted for inclusion in the voter pamphlets. 2 Record, Complaint ¦¦ 11-20. The second cause of action challenges the Registrar's charge of a fee for ballot arguments. Id., ¦¦ 21-30. The third cause of action is the one that is at issue in this case. That cause of action, like the two before it, concerns Page 501 U. S. 329 actions by the Registrar with regard to the voter pamphlets. Specifically, respondents alleged:
"The basis of [respondents'] complaint as it relates to this appeal was the refusal of [petitioners], the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Registrar of Voters, to permit official political party and party central committee endorsements of candidates for nonpartisan office to be printed in the San Francisco Voter Pamphlet in connection with elections scheduled for June Page 501 U. S. 330 2 and November 3, 1987. [Petitioners] based their refusal to print party endorsements on the language of article II, § 6(b)."
United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. 21 (1960), quoting Liverpool, New York d Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 113 U. S. 39 (1885). See also 911 F.2d at 304-305 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 6(b) should not be invalidated on this record).
I have no doubt that the narrow issue presented in this case is justiciable. As the majority recognizes, ante at 501 U. S. 319, respondents in their capacity as registered voters are alleging that § 6(b), as applied by the Registrar to the voter pamphlets, interferes with their right to receive information concerning party endorsements. Such a claim finds support in our decisions, which have long held that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas, and that this right is sufficient to confer standing to challenge restrictions on speech. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 425 U. S. 756-757 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 408 U. S. 762 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 Page 501 U. S. 331 U.S. 367, 395 U. S. 390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 394 U. S. 564 (1969).
The difference between ASARCO and the present case is obvious. In ASARCO, the State could, by other actions, legally preclude the relief sought by the plaintiffs. By contrast, in this case, if petitioners' refusal to allow references to party endorsements in voter pamphlets is unconstitutional when based on § 6(b), it probably is also unconstitutional if based on some other state law, such as California's Elections Code. The injury alleged by respondents, therefore, "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 38 (1976). Page 501 U. S. 332
Although the Court does not discuss the merits, I shall briefly outline my view that the state constitutional provision Page 501 U. S. 333 at issue in this case is constitutional as applied to the exclusion of party endorsements from the official voter pamphlets. California has decided that its "[j]udicial, school, county, and city offices shall be nonpartisan." Cal.Const., Art. II, § 6(a). I am confident that this provision is valid, at least in so far as it authorizes the State not to identify on the official ballot candidates for nonpartisan offices as the candidates of political parties. The interests proffered as supporting California's nonpartisan provision -- promotion of the impartial administration of government, prevention of corruption, and the avoidance of the appearance of bias -- are interests that we have already held are sufficiently important to justify restrictions on partisan political activities. See CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 413 U. S. 665 (1973). These interests are also similar to the interests supporting limitations on ballot access and voting eligibility that have been upheld by this Court. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767, 415 U. S. 786 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 415 U. S. 736 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 410 U. S. 761 (1973); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431, 403 U. S. 442 (1971).
If the State may exclude party designations from the ballot, it surely may exclude party endorsements from candidate statements contained in the official voter pamphlet prepared by the government and distributed to prospective voters. It is settled that "the First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government." United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 453 U. S. 129 (1981). The voter information pamphlet obviously is not a traditional public forum, and its use may be limited to its intended purpose, which is to inform voters about nonpartisan elections. See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 460 U. S. 46, n. 7 (1983). Refusing to permit references in candidate statements to party endorsements is therefore plainly constitutional. Page 501 U. S. 334
The majority vacates the judgment below and remands the case with instructions to dismiss. It does so not because it disagrees with the merits of respondents' constitutional claim; indeed, the majority never reaches the merits. Rather, the majority finds a threshold defect in the "justiciability" of this case that did not occur to any of the courts below or to any party in more than three years of prior proceedings. Federal courts, of course, are free to find, on their own motion, defects in jurisdiction at any stage in a suit. But the majority's conclusion that respondents have failed to demonstrate a "live controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts," ante at 501 U. S. 315, is simply not supported by the record of this case or by the teachings of our precedents. Because I cannot accept either the views expressed in, or the result reached by, the majority's opinion, and because I would affirm the decision of the Ninth Circuit on the merits, I dissent. Page 501 U. S. 335
I would have thought it quite obvious that these allegations demonstrate a justiciable controversy. In cases in precisely the same posture as this one, we have repeatedly entertained preenforcement challenges to laws restricting election-related speech. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 12; Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, supra; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, supra. Indeed, standing and ripeness arguments nearly identical to those canvassed by the majority today were expressly considered and rejected by the Ninth Page 501 U. S. 336 Circuit in Eu, see San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 821-824 (1987), which no doubt explains why the lower courts and the parties did not even bother to return to these issues in this case.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 468 U. S. 751 (1984). In my view, "careful . . . examination of [the] complain[t]," id. at 468 U. S. 752, makes it clear that these requirements are met in this case. All of the individual respondents are registered voters in California. See App. 2, ¦ 1. Moreover, all allege that petitioners' redaction policy has injured them in that capacity by restricting election-related speech that respondents wish to consume. See id. at 5, ¦¦ 37-38. As the majority acknowledges, see ante at 501 U. S. 319, our cases recognize that "listeners" Page 501 U. S. 337 suffer a cognizable First Amendment injury when the State restricts speech for which they were the intended audience. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 425 U. S. 756-757 (1976); see also San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v. Eu, supra, (applying "listener" standing in election law setting), aff'd, 489 U. S. 489 U.S. 214 (1989). Nor can there be any doubt that the injury that respondents allege as listeners of election speech is "fairly traceable" to petitioners' redaction policy. Finally, this injury would, in my view, be redressed by the relief requested by respondents, for an injunction against the redaction policy would prevent petitioners from continuing to block respondents' access to committee endorsements in voter pamphlets.
The majority's "doubt" about respondents' entitlement to proceed on a listener standing theory [Footnote 2] relates wholly to redressability. The majority notes that a provision in the California Election Code bars inclusion of a candidate's party affiliation in the statement submitted for publication in a voter pamphlet. See Cal.Elec.Code Ann. § 10012 (West 1977 and Supp.1991). The majority speculates that, if respondents succeed in invalidating § 6(b), petitioners might henceforth rely on § 10012 as a basis for continuing their policy of deleting endorsements. See ante at 501 U. S. 319. Articulating a novel theory of standing, the majority reasons that the registrar's possible reliance upon § 10012 to implement the same policy currently justified by reference to § 6(b) would defeat the redressability of respondents' listener injury. Page 501 U. S. 338
I cannot believe that Article III contemplates such an absurd result. Obviously, if respondents succeed on the merits of their constitutional challenge to § 6(b), the immediate effect will be to permit candidates to include endorsements in the voter pamphlet. This is so because no other law (and no other interpretation of a law that petitioners have formally announced) purports to bar inclusion of such endorsements. Perhaps, as the majority speculates, see ante at 501 U. S. 319, petitioners will subsequently attempt to reinstate their redaction policy under some legal authority other than § 6(b). But whether or not they ultimately do so has no consequence here. Just as a plaintiff cannot satisfy the redressability component of standing by showing that there is only a possibility that a defendant will respond to a court judgment by ameliorating the plaintiff's injury, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 43 (1976), so a defendant cannot defeat the plaintiff's standing to seek a favorable judgment simply by alleging a possibility that the defendant may Page 501 U. S. 339 subsequently act to undermine that judgment's ameliorating effect.
The record clearly demonstrates the likelihood of both future disobedience of § 6(b) and future enforcement of that provision by way of petitioners' redaction policy. As even the majority acknowledges, see ante at 501 U. S. 321, some respondent central committee members have expressed an intention to continue endorsement of candidates for nonpartisan offices. Indeed, the chairman of one committee, in addition to identifying the specific candidates that the committee has endorsed in past elections, states in an affidavit that it is the committee's "plan and intention . . . to endorse candidates for nonpartisan offices in as many future elections as possible." App. 15. Likewise, as the majority acknowledges, see ante at 501 U. S. 322, petitioners expressly admit in their answer to the complaint that they intend to enforce § 6(b) by deleting all references to party endorsements from candidate statements submitted for inclusion in official voter pamphlets. See App. 9, ¦ XIV. Of course, petitioners will have occasion to enforce § 6(b) in this manner only if candidates seek to include such endorsements in their statements. Respondents allege and petitioners concede, however, that candidates have Page 501 U. S. 340 sought to advert to such endorsements in their statements in the past, and that petitioners have always deleted them from the voter pamphlets. Id. at 5, ¦ 38; id. at 9, ¦ XIV. When combined with the clearly expressed intentions of the parties, these allegations of "past wrongs" furnish sufficient evidence of "a real and immediate threat of repeated injury." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 414 U. S. 496 (1974).
For this reason, it is surely irrelevant that the record does not demonstrate an "imminent application of § 6(b)." Ante at 501 U. S. 322. So long as the plaintiff credibly alleges that he plans to disobey an election law and that government officials plan to enforce it against him, he should not be forced to defer Page 501 U. S. 341 initiation of suit until the election is so "imminent" that it may come and go before his challenge is adjudicated. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 143 ("'One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief,'" quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 262 U. S. 593 (1923)). Indeed, in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, we held a preenforcement challenge to be justiciable even though the case was filed in the District Court nearly two years before the next scheduled national election. See id. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 11-12. Similarly, nothing in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, supra, and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, supra, suggests that elections were "imminent" when those cases were filed.
In my view, these uncertainties do not detract in the slightest from the ripeness of this case. The form of future disobedience can only matter in ripeness analysis to the extent that it bears on the merits of a plaintiff's preenforcement challenge. The majority never bothers to explain how the identity of the endorsed candidates, the "nature" of the endorsement, the mode of publicity (outside of candidate statements submitted for inclusion in voter pamphlets), or the precise language that petitioners might delete from the pamphlets affects the merits of respondents' challenge. Indeed, it is quite apparent that none of these questions is relevant. Page 501 U. S. 342 In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U. S. 214 (1989), we struck down a similar California provision that barred party endorsements in primary elections for partisan offices. See id. at 489 U. S. 222-229. Nothing in our analysis turned on the identity of the candidates to be endorsed, the nature or precise language of the endorsements, or the mode of publicizing the endorsements. Similarly, here we can dispose of respondents' challenge to § 6(b) knowing simply that party central committees will continue to make endorsements of candidates for nonpartisan offices, and that petitioners will continue to redact those endorsements from the voter pamphlets. [Footnote 4]
Because I conclude that the controversy before us is justiciable, I would reach the merits of respondents' challenge. In my view, it is clear that § 6(b) violates the First Amendment. Page 501 U. S. 343
At the outset, it is necessary to be more precise about the nature of respondents' challenge. In effect, respondents' complaint states two possible First Amendment theories. The first is that § 6(b), as that provision has been applied to delete endorsements from voter pamphlets, violates the First Amendment. See App. 4-5, ¦¦ 36-39(a). The second is that § 6(b), on its face, violates the First Amendment because it "purports to outlaw actions by county central committees . . . to endorse, support or oppose candidates for city or county offices." Id. at 4, ¦ 35. This second theory can be understood as an overbreadth challenge: that is, a claim that, regardless of whether § 6(b) violates the First Amendment in its peripheral effect of excluding references to party endorsements from candidates' statements, § 6(b) is unconstitutional in its primary effect of barring parties and party committees from making endorsements. See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 467 U. S. 965-966 (1984) (party who suffers unwanted but constitutionally permissible effect of a law may nonetheless succeed in voiding that law by showing that "there is no core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct that the [provision] prohibits"). [Footnote 5] Page 501 U. S. 344
As the majority notes, it is this Court's "usual . . . practice . . . [not] to proceed to an overbreadth issue . . . before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied." Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 492 U. S. 484-485 (1989). This is so because Page 501 U. S. 345
In my opinion, competing prudential factors clearly support considering respondents' overbreadth challenge first in this case. Unlike the situation in Fox, the as-applied challenge here is actually more difficult to resolve than is the overbreadth challenge. Insofar as they attack petitioners' redaction policy as unconstitutional, respondents must be understood to argue that they have a right to receive particular messages by means of official voter pamphlets or a right to communicate their own messages by that means. Either way, this argument would require us to determine the "public forum" status of the voter pamphlets, cf. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators ' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 460 U. S. 48 (1983), an issue on which the law is unsettled, see generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-24, p. 987 (2d ed.1988) (noting "blurriness . . . of the categories within the public forum classification"). By contrast, respondents' overbreadth challenge is easily assessed. In the first place, the application of § 6(b) to party speech that "endorse[s], support[s], or oppose[s] a[ny] candidate for nonpartisan office" clearly is "substantial" when compared with § 6(b)'s only alleged "legitimate" application, namely, the redaction of voter Page 501 U. S. 346 pamphlets. Moreover, the constitutional doctrine relevant to § 6(b)'s restriction of party speech is well settled. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U. S. 214 (1989). Rather than undertaking to determine what sort of "public forum" voter pamphlets might constitute -- a finding that could have broad ramifications, see, e.g., Patterson v. Board of Supervisors of City and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal.App.3d 22, 248 Cal.Rptr. 253 (1988) (suit challenging constitutionality of §§ 3796 and 6026 of California Election Code, authorizing deletions from arguments about ballot propositions in the voter pamphlet -- a court should, if possible, resolve this constitutional challenge by well-settled doctrine.) See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 492 U. S. 525-526 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
In addition, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals disposed of respondents' challenge on overbreadth grounds, and that is the only theory briefed by the parties in this Court. Because the as-applied component of respondents' challenge has not been fully aired in these proceedings, resolving the case on that basis presents a significant risk of error. For these reasons, I turn to respondents' overbreadth challenge, which I find to be dispositive of this case. [Footnote 6] Page 501 U. S. 347
In my view, this case is directly controlled by Eu. As in Eu, there can be no question here that the endorsements that § 6(b) purports to make unlawful constitute core political speech. And, as in Eu, this prohibition is unsupported by any legitimate compelling state interest. Petitioners assert that § 6(b) advances a compelling state interest because it assures that "local government and judges in California are . . . controlled by the people, [rather than] by those who run political parties." Brief for Petitioners 7. The only kind of "control" that § 6(b) seeks to prohibit, however, is that which "those who run political parties" are able to exert over voters through issuing party endorsements. In effect, then, Page 501 U. S. 348 petitioners are arguing that the State has an interest in protecting "the people" from their own susceptibility to being influenced by political speech. This is the very sort of paternalism that we deemed illegitimate in Eu.
Thus, whereas the Austin Court worried that corporations might dominate elections with capital they had only accumulated by dint of "economically motivated decisions of investors and customers,'" id. at 494 U. S. 659, the party endorsements in this case represent an expenditure of political capital accumulated Page 501 U. S. 349 through past voter support. And, whereas the special benefits conferred by state law in Austin "enhance[d]" the corporations' "ability to attract capital," id. at ibid., the benefits California confers upon parties -- e.g., permitting taxpayers to make voluntary contributions to parties on their tax returns -- should have little effect on the parties' acquisition of political capital. In sum, the prospect that voters might be persuaded by party endorsements is not a corruption of the democratic political process; it is the democratic political process.