Source: http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/Special:Drilldown/Cases?Subject%5B0%5D=Diminished+responsibility+cases&Subject%5B1%5D=Reporting+restriction+order+cases&Subject%5B2%5D=Restriction+order+cases&Subject%5B3%5D=Unlawful+detention+cases
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 23:27:05
Document Index: 781354072

Matched Legal Cases: ['UKSC ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'art 36', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

Not many cases (186) have been added to the database so far. To see the full list of cases (2017) go to the Mental health case law page.
Cases (186)
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Cases > Subject : Diminished responsibility cases or Reporting restriction order cases or Restriction order cases or Unlawful detention cases
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A Clinical Commissioning Group (1) · AB (1) · BW (1) · Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (1) · Chief Constable of Essex Police (2) · Donna Osker (1) · Gloria Esegbona (1) · Ibrahima Jollah (1) · Imran Hussain (1) · JB (1) · King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (1) · Michael Ciaran Parker (2) · MW (1) · PB (1) · PLW (1) · Priory Group Ltd (1) · PW (1) · RW (1) · Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) · Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust (1) · SW (1)
County court (1) · Court of Appeal (1) · Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (2) · Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (2) · Court of Protection (2) · High Court (Queen's Bench Division) (2)
Showing below up to 10 results in range #1 to #10.
Esegbona v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (2019) EWHC 77 (QB) Aggravated damages following MCA breaches "The claimant, Dr Gloria Esegbona, brings this claim as administrator of the estate of the deceased, her mother, Christiana Esegbona. The action is brought in negligence and false imprisonment. The amended claim form states that the claimant's claim is a claim in clinical negligence and/or pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and/or the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. The claimant claims damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity as well as damages, including aggravated damages, for false imprisonment. It is the claimant's case not only that the medical, nursing and other staff at the defendant’s hospital owed her mother a duty to treat her with reasonable care and skill but also that the defendant had duties under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: to take reasonable steps to establish whether Mrs Esegbona lacked capacity before doing any act in connection with her care or treatment; and further that if the defendant reasonably believed that Mrs Esegbona lacked capacity whether it would be in her best interests for any act in connection with her care or treatment to be done; and to take steps to obtain a court order or the relevant authorisation under schedule A1 to the Act before depriving Mrs Esegbona of her liberty. The claimant says the defendant acted in breach of these duties."
Parker v Chief Constable of Essex Police (2017) EWHC 2140 (QB) Damages following unlawful arrest (Barrymore) "The Defendant founds its submission that the Claimant is entitled to nominal damages only on the decision of the Supreme Court in Lumba (WL) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 12. Lumba has been considered and applied by the Supreme Court in R (Kambadzi) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 23! and by the Court of Appeal in Bostridge v Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 79, [2015] MHLO 12. The Defendant relies upon Kambadzi and Bostridge as well as Lumba. ... Applying the basic principles of compensatory damages in tort, the counterfactual (i.e. what would have happened if the tort had not been committed) in Lumba was that the Secretary of State would have detained the claimants lawfully pursuant to the published policy. ... In Bostridge the finding of the trial judge was that the appellant would have been detained as and when he was if his illness had been correctly addressed via section 3 of the Mental Health Act, as it should have been; and that he would then have received precisely the same treatment and been discharged when he was. The Court of Appeal held that the fact that this counterfactual necessarily included steps being taken by persons other than the Defendant did not prevent the application of the principles set out in Lumba. The appellant therefore recovered only nominal damages. It is not enough for a Defendant in the position of the Secretary of State in Lumba or the Defendant in the present case to show that the counterfactual could have resulted in the same outcome as had been caused by the tort: the Defendant must go on to show that it would have done so. ... It follows that I reject the Defendant's submission that the principles set out in Lumba are applicable if the unlawfully arrested Claimant was "arrestable", meaning that he could have been lawfully arrested: it is necessary for the Defendant also to show that he would have been lawfully arrested. The principles set out in Lumba lead to an award of nominal damages if no loss has been suffered because the results of the counterfactual are the same as the events that happened. If and to the extent that they diverge (e.g. because a lawful arrest would not have occurred at the time but would have occurred later) the Court will have to decide on normal tortious compensatory principles whether and to what extent a substantial award of damages is merited for the divergence in outcome. What is the appropriate counterfactual in a given case will be acutely fact-sensitive."
Parker v Chief Constable of Essex Police (2018) EWCA Civ 2788 Nominal damages (Barrymore) "In the early hours of 31 March 2001, Michael Parker (a celebrity entertainer who is better known by his stage name, Michael Barrymore) returned to his home with eight guests. ... In relation to Mr Parker, that arrest was to be effected by Det. Con. Susan Jenkins who had played a central role in the re-investigation and was well aware of the evidence: she believed she had reasonable grounds both to suspect Mr Parker of committing an offence and to conclude that it was necessary to effect his arrest. In the event, she was detained in traffic and a surveillance officer (P.C. Cootes) was ordered to effect the arrest, which he did. ... For these reasons, I would conclude that Stuart-Smith J was correct to conclude that there were reasonable grounds both to suspect Mr Parker of committing an offence and that it was necessary to arrest him. Equally, however, I have no doubt that had things been done as they should have been done (to quote Baroness Hale in Kambadzi), a lawful arrest would have been effected. Thus, I would allow this appeal and, in answer to the issue posed by the Master, declare that Mr Parker is entitled to nominal damages only."
PB v Priory Group Ltd (2018) MHLO 74 Damages for unlawful psychiatric detention A Part 36 offer of £11,500 plus legal costs was accepted in this claim brought for unlawful detention and breach of Article 5. The patient had been detained under s5(2) when not an in-patient, and this section had lapsed for nearly seven hours before detention under s2 began.
R (Jollah) v SSHD (2018) EWCA Civ 1260 False imprisonment and damages "The context is one of immigration detention. The claimant, who is the respondent to this appeal (and who for present purposes I will call "IJ"), was made subject to a curfew restriction between the hours of 23.00 and 07.00 for a period between 3 February 2014 and 14 July 2016, pending potential deportation. Such curfew was imposed by those acting on behalf of the appellant Secretary of State purportedly pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 (5) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 (as it then stood). It has, however, been accepted in these proceedings that, in the light of subsequent Court of Appeal authority, there was no power to impose a curfew under those provisions. Consequently, the curfew was unlawfully imposed. The question arising is whether IJ is entitled to damages for false imprisonment in respect of the time during which he was subject to the unlawful curfew. The trial judge, Lewis J, decided that he was. Having so decided, the judge at a subsequent hearing assessed the damages at £4,000: [2017] EWHC 330 (Admin)!; [2017] EWHC 2821 (Admin)!. The Secretary of State now appeals, with leave granted by the judge, against the decision that IJ was entitled to damages for false imprisonment. IJ cross-appeals, with leave granted by Singh LJ, against the amount of the award of damages. It is said on behalf of IJ that a much greater award should have been made."
R v Hussain (2019) EWCA Crim 666 Diminished responsibility medical evidence "The single judge has referred the application for leave to appeal against conviction [for murder] and the extension of time application to the full court. The application for leave to appeal raises again the issue of what a trial judge should do when the sole issue to be determined at trial is the partial defence of diminished responsibility provided by section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (as amended) and there is unanimity amongst the psychiatric experts as to the mental health of the killer at the time of the killing."
R v Osker (2010) EWCA Crim 955 Appeal against restriction order Successful appeal against restriction order.
Re SW (2017) EWCOP 7 Medical treatment, costs, anonymity (1) "[A]s matters stand, the transplant being proposed cannot proceed, whatever the court may say or do. As it has been presented to the court, this scarcely coherent application is totally without merit, it is misconceived and it is vexatious. It would be contrary to every principle of how litigation ought to be conducted in the Court of Protection, and every principle of proper case management, to allow this hopelessly defective application to proceed on the forlorn assumption that the son could somehow get his tackle in order and present a revised application which could somehow avoid the fate of its predecessor." (2) "As against the son, the claim for costs could not, in my judgment, be clearer. Given everything I have said, this is the plainest possible case for departing from the ordinary rule, set out in rule 157 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, and applying the principles set out in rule 159. ... [B]oth Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, in my judgment, are persons against whom a costs order can be made even though are not, formally, parties to the litigation – and, if that is so, then for the same reasons as in relation to the son, it is, in my judgment, fair and just to order them to pay the costs." (3) "There is no reason why either SW or SAN should be named, and, indeed, every reason why they should not. Nor, in all the circumstances, is there any reason why the son should be named. Dr Waghorn and Dr Jooste, however, stand in a very different position. There is a very strong public interest in exposing the antics which these two struck-off doctors have got up to, not least so that others may be protected from their behaviour."
Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust v AB (2019) EWCOP 11 Injunction against publication of video "This is an application to prevent publication of a video of a patient, AB, in her treating hospital. ... At times she is catatonic and lies in a foetal position on the floor. She has a history during these periods of self-harm, and for that reason she wears protective headgear at all times. In the light of AB's condition and the difficulties in accommodating her appropriately, the Trust has had to adapt the room in which she has been living urgently, and it is true to say that the condition of the room therefore looks somewhat poor. ... On about 20 January 2019, AB's son, W, who is the second respondent, took a video recording of his mother in her room. ... I am clear that it is appropriate in these circumstances to make the order. First of all, having seen the video, it is apparent that AB can be identified, even if pixilated, and would be identifiable from the information that Mail Online intend to publish. ... Secondly, it is clear from Dr Marlowe's statements that AB does not currently have capacity ... Thirdly, I have no doubt, having watched it, that the video would be an interference with AB's privacy and her private life. ... The draft order provides for W being able to apply to the court at a full hearing if he wishes to do so to seek to lift the injunction, and argue that it is in her interests to publish the video. Further, according to Dr Marlowe, AB may well regain capacity herself relatively shortly, i.e. within a matter of weeks, and if she then wishes for publication, that will be a matter for her."