Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/988/318/141473/
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 03:25:23
Document Index: 701762220

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Benjamin G. Sprecher, Defendant-appellant, 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Benjamin G. Sprecher, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Benjamin G. Sprecher, Defendant-appellant, 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993) Argued Dec. 7, 1992. Decided March 9, 1993
We affirm on all issues of criminal liability substantially for the reasons stated in the thorough opinion of the district court, United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), familiarity with which is presumed. We write only to address a sentencing issue posed by U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, concluding that Sprecher was inappropriately denied a reduction of three levels in his adjusted offense level pursuant to that provision.
The adjusted offense level of nineteen for counts three to seven included a nine-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (1) (J) as in effect at the time that the World Wide offenses were committed2 because of the intended probable loss to the public of $1.3 million from the conspiracy to sell the unregistered World Wide shares. Sprecher contends that it was never contemplated that all the shares could or would be sold, and in any event that he should be accorded a reduction of three levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1. Sprecher explicitly requested, and was denied, this three-level reduction at his sentencing hearing.
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b) (2).
Application note 4 to § 2X1.1 has particular relevance here, and provides in part:In certain cases, the participants may have completed (or have been about to complete but for apprehension or interruption) all of the acts necessary for the successful completion of part, but not all, of the intended offense. In such cases, the offense level for the count (or group of closely-related multiple counts) is whichever of the following is greater: the offense level for the intended offense minus 3 levels (under § 2X1.1(b) (1), (b) (2), or (b) (3) (A)), or the offense level for the part of the offense for which the necessary acts were completed (or about to be completed but for apprehension or interruption). For example, where the intended offense was the theft of $800,000 but the participants completed (or were about to complete) only the acts necessary to steal $30,000, the offense level is the offense level for the theft of $800,000 minus 3 levels, or the offense level for the theft of $30,000, whichever is greater.
We recognize that counts nine and ten are pre-Guidelines counts that each carry a maximum sentence of five years, and that either count could thus justify the forty-six month imprisonment to which Sprecher was sentenced. The district court considered these counts subordinate to the Towers and World Wide counts, however, and the entire sentencing hearing was devoted to application of the Guidelines to Sprecher's offenses of conviction. It is therefore appropriate to remand for resentencing in light of our conclusion that the three-level § 2X1.1 reduction was inappropriately denied to Sprecher. Cf. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1990) (remanding for resentencing in light of reversal of some, but not all, counts of conviction), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1102, 113 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1991); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988) (same). In doing so, we do not intend to circumscribe or limit the district court's discretion to arrive at an appropriate sentence for Sprecher in light of the court's intimate knowledge of the circumstances of this case. See United States v. Alter, 985 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993) (district judge remains free to reevaluate all aspects of sentencing not ruled on in appeal).
Sprecher's sentence was enhanced by nine levels for a fraud of $1.3 million under § 2F1.1(b) (1) (J) as in effect prior to the 1989 amendments, presumably to alleviate any ex post facto concerns raised by greater enhancement for this dollar amount under the 1989 amendments that became effective subsequent to the commission of Sprecher's offenses of conviction but prior to his sentencing. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. no. 154; United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1204 (2d Cir. 1991) (sentencing court normally applies guidelines in effect at time of sentence unless doing so enhances punishment and thereby poses ex post facto problem), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 3029, 120 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1992); see also United States v. Holmes, 975 F.2d 275, 278 (6th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1322, 122 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1993); United States v. Phillips, 952 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 113, 121 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1992); United States v. Green, 952 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1775, 118 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1992); United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (same)
The conspiracy to sell unregistered securities is not covered by another specific offense guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(c) (1), comment. (n. 1); see also United States v. Skowronski, 968 F.2d 242, 249-50 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing applicability of § 2X1.1). Thus, § 2X1.1 is the proper guideline to apply to this conspiracy