Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/105170/board-educ-vs-mccluskey
Timestamp: 2017-04-23 21:46:50
Document Index: 301544981

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 82', '§ 11', '§ 10', '§ 11', '§ 1983', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11', '§ 11']

Board of Educ Vs Mccluskey - Citation 105170 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Board of Educ. Vs. Mccluskey - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/105170CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJul-02-1982Case Number458 U.S. 966AppellantBoard of Educ.RespondentMccluskeyExcerpt:.....court of appeals for the eighth circuit
under §§ 9 and 10 of petitioner school board's rules, the board has discretion to suspend a high school student for "good cause," which is defined as including "sale, use or possession of alcoholic beverages or illegal drugs." section 11 of the rules provides for mandatory suspension for the remainder of the semester if a student has on school premises used, sold, or been under the influence or in possession of "narcotics or other hallucinogenics, drugs, or controlled substances" classified as such by an arkansas statute. that statute specifically exempts alcohol from its coverage of "controlled substances." after a hearing before the board, respondent, a 10th-grade student, was expelled for the remainder of the semester..... Judgment:
Board of Educ. v. McCluskey - 458 U.S. 966 (1982)
The courts below plainly erred in replacing the Board's construction of § 11 with their own notions under the facts of this case. The Board's interpretation of § 11 is reasonable, since even though alcohol is not a "controlled substance" under § 11, that section also covers "drugs," and alcohol is a "drug." It is reasonable to conclude that § 11 requires suspension for any drug use, including use of alcohol, on school premises, while § 10 permits discretionary suspension for drug use off school premises. In any event, federal courts are not authorized to construe school regulations,
The District Court found as a matter of fact that the Board acted under § 11 when it suspended respondent. It then went on to decide that § 11 did not apply to alcohol.
Section 11 applies to "narcotics or other hallucinogenics, drugs, or controlled substances classified as such by Act 590 of 1971, as amended." Act 590, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 82-2602(e) (Supp.1981), specifically exempts alcohol from its coverage; therefore, alcohol is not a "controlled substance." Nor is it a "narcotic or other hallucinogenic." The District Court also concluded that alcohol is not a "drug." While technically alcohol is a drug, the District Court noted, it is not considered a drug in common parlance. For this reason, the District Court
A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 662 F.2d 1263 (1981). It reviewed the District Court's conclusion that the Board acted under § 11, rather than § 10, under the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), and held that the District Court's conclusion passed muster. It also affirmed the District Court's holding that § 11 cannot reasonably be interpreted to apply to alcohol because "the express terms of section 11 apply only to
drugs,' and expressly exempt alcohol." 662 F.2d at 1267. For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded,
(1975), was distinguishable. There this Court had stated that
at 326. Although this Court had plainly stated that federal courts were not authorized to construe school regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that
was distinguishable, because the school board in that case had construed its regulations reasonably, while here the Board had construed its regulations unreasonably. 662 F.2d at 1267. Judge McMillian dissented because he concluded that
barred federal courts from construing the school regulations involved in this case differently than the Board had construed them.
plainly requires that the Court of Appeals be reversed. There high school girls were expelled for "spiking" a punch served at a school meeting by adding two bottles of malt liquor. The malt liquor had an alcoholic content of 3.2% and the alcoholic content of the spiked punch was estimated at 0.91%. 420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 326
. The Court of Appeals
420 U. S. 325
. The Court continued, as noted
"§ 1983 does not extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings
or the proper construction of school regulations.
The Court of Appeals and the District Court plainly erred in distinguishing
on the ground that the Board's interpretation of § 11 in this case was unreasonable, while the school board's construction of "alcoholic beverage" in
was reasonable. A case may be hypothesized in which a school board's interpretation of its rules is so extreme as to be a violation of due process, but this is surely not that case. The Board's interpretation of § 11 is reasonable. Contrary to the Court of Appeals, alcohol is not expressly exempted from the coverage of § 11. Section 11 covers "controlled substances classified as such by Act 590," and Act 590 expressly exempts alcohol from its coverage. Therefore, alcohol is not a "controlled substance" under § 11. But § 11 also covers "drugs," and, as the District Court conceded, alcohol is a "drug." Moreover, § 11 mandates suspension of students under the influence of drugs while on school premises. Section 10, which gives the Board discretion to suspend students for drug use, is not limited in its application
In any case, even if the District Court's and the Court of Appeals' views of § 11 struck us as clearly preferable to the Board's -- which they do not -- the Board's interpretation of its regulations controls under
Wood v. Strickland.
The Chairman of the Board testified that the Board had interpreted § 11 as requiring the suspension of students found intoxicated on school grounds for a number of years prior to respondent's suspension, and it is undisputed that the Board had the authority to suspend students for that reason. We conclude that the District Court and the Court of Appeals plainly erred in replacing the Board's construction of § 11 with their own notions under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
As JUSTICE REHNQUIST has reminded us, in "our zeal to provide
equal justice under law,' we must never forget that this Court is not a forum for the correction of errors."
454 U. S. 364
454 U. S. 367
-368 (1982) (dissenting opinion).
"To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. [
The case is not of sufficient importance to warrant full briefing and argument. It is not worthy of an opinion signed by a Member of this Court. The disposition is explained by an anonymous author writing "per curiam" -- that is to say, "for the Court." In ever-increasing numbers, appeals throughout the federal system are being decided in this anonymous fashion. It is not uncommon for courts of appeals to issue pinions that are not to be cited as authority in other cases. [
] In one recent published case -- which was sufficiently important to induce this Court to grant certiorari even before a conflict in the circuits had developed -- the court purported to justify such an
adjudication by asserting that it lacked "precedential character." [
] The threat to the quality of our work that is presented by the ever-increasing impersonalization and bureaucratization of the federal judicial system is far more serious than is generally recognized. Regrettably, the example set by this Court in cases of this kind is not one of resistance, but rather of encouragement, to the rising administrative tide.
We are far too busy to correct every error that we perceive among the thousands of cases that litigants ask us to review. In recent years, when we have exercised our discretionary jurisdiction and issued per curiam rulings deciding cases summarily, we have most frequently come to the aid of a prosecutor or a warden who has been rebuffed by another court. [
] Today we exercise our majestic power to enforce a
Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent -- Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum.L.Rev. 1167 (1978); Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 Cornell L.Rev. 128 (1977).
Rowley v. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District,
632 F.2d 945, 948, n. 7 (CA2 1980),
rev'd, ante
see Duckworth v. Serrano,
Jago v. Van Cren,
California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater,
United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., ante
Michigan v. Thomas, ante
But see Boag v. MacDougall,
It certainly cannot be said that egregious error is presented only in cases in which prosecutors and wardens seek review.
See, e.g., McKinney v. Estelle,
657 F.2d 740 (CA5 1981),
Tejeda-Mata v. INS,
626 F.2d 721 (CA9 1980),
456 U.S. 994 (1982).