Source: http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20020306-pl-us-1101-railways-act/
Timestamp: 2017-06-27 03:33:50
Document Index: 383576596

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 11', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 4', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§\n10', 'Art. 95', '§ 10', '§ 109', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 4', '§ 10', '§ 127', '§ 42', '§ 69', '§ 68', 'Art. 39', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 23', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 127', '§ 415', '§ 417', '§ 419', '§ 84', '§ 84', '§ 94', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 104', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 23', '§ 5', '§ 21', '§ 10', '§ 127', '§ 415', '§ 4', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 419', '§ 9', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 10', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 1', '§ 10']

2002/03/06 - Pl. ÚS 11/01: Railways Act - Ústavní soud
ÚvodDecisions2002/03/06 - Pl. ÚS 11/01: Railways Act 2002/03/06 - Pl. ÚS 11/01: Railways Act 06 March 2002
Constitutional Court respects the specification of the socially binding
nature of property under Art. 11 para. 3 of the Charter and Art. 1 para. 2 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, under which the right to protection of property does not interfere with the right of states to pass laws which they consider necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the public interest. Such legal regulations are also valid in the Czech Republic, although restrictions on use of property in accordance with the public interest in the Civil Code and other statues do not have
– nor, in view of the variety of circumstances, can they have – the character of an inventory of individually specified obligations, but of obligations which are formulated generally, but interpreted commensurately. In view of the sweeping nature of the provisions
on removing a source of danger at the expense of its owner or operator,
the Czech Railways Act does not yet allow regulation which would be commensurate with the variety of circumstances related to expenses of removing a source of danger to railways. As a result of this, the Constitutional Court found this provision to be in conflict with Art. 1,
Art. 4 para. 1 a para. 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Because other provisions of the second, third and fourth sentences in § 10 of the Act on Railways would, after annulment of the words “at his expense” in the third sentence, lose the necessary clarity
and consistency, the Constitutional Court annulled the contested sentences in full, and thus made possible a fully balanced new regulation. Making the judgment go into effect as of 31 December
2002 is intended to make possible a new legislative regulation which would, in particular, also commensurately differentiate the obligations for compensation of expenses related to removing a source of danger to the railways. CZECH REPUBLICCONSTITUTIONAL COURTJUDGMENTIN THE NAME OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC The
Plenum of the Constitutional Court decided in the matter of a petition from the Prague High Court to annul the second, third and fourth sentences of § 10 of Act No. 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, as follows: The
petition is granted, and the second, third and fourth sentences of § 10
of Act No. 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, are annulled as of 31 December 2002. REASONINGI. On
2 April 2001 a petition from a Panel of the Prague High Court (Panel 6 A) of 28 March 2001 to annul the second, third and fourth sentences of §
10 of Act No. 266/1994 Coll., on Railways, (the “Railways Act”) was submitted to the Constitutional Court. Under Art. 95 para. 2 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (the “Constitution”) a general court shall do so, if it concludes that a statute which is to be used in adjudicating a matter is in conflict with a constitutional act. The petition, signed by the panel chairman, JUDr. B. H., states that the High Court is conducting proceedings under file no. 6 A 44/98 on an administrative complaint by the plaintiff, JUDr. V. S., against the defendant, the Ministry of Transport and Communication of the CR, in which the plaintiff seeks annulment of specified decisions by the defendant and the Prague Railways Office as the administrative body of the first level. The subject of the proceedings before the Prague High Court was the fact that the Prague Railways Office ordered the plaintiff
to remove a source of danger to the railways from his forest property by cutting down four trees. It did so after a passenger train collided with one of the trees which had fallen from the plaintiff’s property onto the tracks. The Railways Office stated that there is a danger of the accident recurring, which was confirmed by local investigation and an expert evaluation, which determined that the tree fell under normal weather conditions. The owner of the land filed objections against this decision, on which the first-level administrative body ruled on 4 November 1997. By decision of 4 November 1997, file no. 1112-97-DÚ/S/Su,
the Railways Office ordered the Czech Railways to remove the source of danger to the railways at the expense of the plaintiff, who did not comply with its previous call to cut down 4 trees on his property. On 12
January 1998, the Ministry of Transport and Communication, under file no. 16 178/98-0210 denied the plaintiff’s appeal against this decision, and confirmed the contested decision. In handling the administrative complaint in the matter, the Prague High Court concluded that § 10 of the Railways Act, under which the administrative bodies proceeded, is in
conflict with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic, insofar as it authorizes the administrative railways office to order the owner or operator of a source of danger to the railways to remove it, or authorizes it to decide on such removal at the expense of the owner or operator. Therefore, in accordance with § 109 para. 1 let. c) of the Civil Procedure Code (the “CPC”), it submitted the matter to the Constitutional Court with a petition to annul the second, third and fourth sentences of the provision in question. In its petition, the Prague High Court makes the following arguments: If the owner or operator of a source of danger to the railways has an obligation to remove the source of danger when called upon by the railways office, the
law must also impose on him a corresponding obligation to care for his property, i.e. land or a building, so that the risk of a source of danger arising will be as low as possible, which the Railways Act does not do. The petitioner finds in this fact conflict with Art. 2 para. 3 a
Art. 4 para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). Neither the Railways Act nor any other act governing the obligations of owners of real property states that the owner of real property is required to take measures on his real estate serving to protect the land, building or facilities of another, or to tolerate such
measures and bear their expense. This is what the railways office imposes on the owner when it calls upon him to fulfill this non-existent
obligation, and, if the call is not met, decides to take measures at the owner’s expense. However, § 10 of the Railways Act does not give the
administrative body room for discretion: the words “shall order” and “shall decide” indicate the office’s obligation, upon finding a source of danger to the railways, to proceed only in the abovementioned manner.
This leads to a restriction of the property rights of the owner of the “source of danger” which has no statutory basis and which is not carried
out for compensation, if the owner himself bears the expenses. The
obligation imposed under the contested provision is imposed in the public interest and does not serve to protect private rights. Therefore,
removal of a source of danger to the railways should not be done at the
expense of the owner of the source of danger. The Civil Code regulates the rights and obligations of owners of neighboring real estate in § 127. However, this obligation is of a private law nature, and does not establish the authority of an administrative office to handle a situation by issuing an administrative ruling imposing obligations on a real estate owner. II. In
accordance with § 42 para. 3, 4 and § 69 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by later regulations (the “Constitutional Court Act”) the Constitutional Court sent the petition in question to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic for their comments and requested a written position statement from the Ministry of Transport and Communication of the CR. III.The
Constitutional Court first, in accordance with § 68 para. 2 of the Constitutional Court Act, reviewed whether the act whose provisions the petitioner claims to be unconstitutional was passed and issued within the bounds of constitutionally determined jurisdiction and in a constitutionally prescribed manner. It is evident from the statement by the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic as well as from the received parliamentary documents and data about voting that the Railways Act was passed and issued in a constitutionally prescribed manner and within the bounds of constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction, and that quotas provided in Art. 39 para. 1 and 2 of the Constitution were observed.After reviewing the substance of the petition and considering all circumstances, the Constitutional Court decided to annul the contested provisions, although for reasons not completely identical with the petitioner’s opinion.The provision
of § 10 of the Railways Act, whose second, third and fourth sentence the Prague High Court proposes to be annulled, governs a “source of danger to the railways” which it defines as a source of endangering, damaging or interfering with the operation of railways, railway transportation, railway telecommunication facilities and lines, which is
determined by the railways administrative office (first sentence). The contested provisions (second, third and fourth sentences) read as follows: “Upon finding a source of danger, it shall order it to be removed by the operator or owner of the source of danger. If the operator or owner of the source of danger does not comply, the railways administrative office will decide on the removal of the source of danger
at his expense. An appeal against this decision does not have suspensory effect”. The content of these provisions is thus the right and obligation of the railways administrative office to find and order the removal of a source of danger, and in the event of non-compliance to decide on its removal at the expense of the operator or owner. The fourth sentence only removes suspensory effect from this decision. The petitioner’s constitutional law arguments are based primarily on the opinion that neither the Railways Act nor any other act
governing the obligations of real estate owners imposes on a real estate owner an obligation to take preventive measures preventing the creation of possible danger to another’s land, building or facilities, or an obligation to tolerate measures for their protection and bear the expenses of their removal.One can not agree with the petitioner’s opinion that neither the Railways Act nor any other act imposes on a real estate owner an obligation to remove a source of danger to the railways. The railway protected zone (60, in some cases 100 meters from the axis of the outside rail in both directions) is subject to a quite specific public law regime, in which the rights of owners of adjacent real estate are, in the public interest, incomparably
more restricted than with the Forests Act (§ 9 of the Railways Act – comparable, for example, to § 23 para. 3 and 4 of the German Railways Act of 27 December 1993, as amended by later regulations). Under § 9 para. 1 of the Railways Act, buildings can be established and operated in the railway protected zone, and other enumerated activities conducted, only with the consent of the railways administrative office and under conditions set by it; para. 2 of this provision permits a railway operator and transporter to enter the land of another for purposes of removing other obstacles restricting the operation of railway transportation. The provision of § 10 of the Railways Act then provides the obligation of an operator or owner of a source of danger to
remove that source of danger. Likewise, the petitioner’s opinion that other legal regulations do not establish corresponding obligations and restrictions on owners can not be agreed with. In view of the variety of possible dangers to the operation of the railway, the general provisions of the Civil Code are fundamentally significant. Therefore, the Constitutional Court points to these legal regulations:a) Civil Code § 127, under which the owner of a thing must refrain from anything whereby he would seriously endager the exercise of the rights of another, for example, adaptations to land, vegetation on land, but also, for example, light (which, in the given case, could substantially lower the visibility of railway signaling equipment).b) Civil
Code § 415, which requires everyone to conduct himself so that damage will not occur; the Civil Code commentary (Jehlička, Švestka and collective of authors, Civil Code, Commentary, 3rd Edition 1996, C.H.Beck) states on pp. 251-252 that “everyone is required to conduct himself so that damage does not occur”, and therefore also “not conducting one’s self this way is failure to fulfill one’s legal obligations and is illegal conduct. Thus, everyone is liable for the damage which arises as a result.” This concept corresponds to European law. In German law, for example, persons may violate their obligations both by acting and by neglecting to act – for example, by not maintaining their property in proper condition. The owner of land can not rid himself of liability for, for example, trees on his land, by claiming that he did not plant them and that they grew by themselves. c) Civil Code § 417 directly provides the obligation of everyone who is in danger of damage “to intervene in a manner commensurate with the circumstances of the danger” so that the damage will be averted, with awareness of the fact that the existence of a source of danger does not arise only upon an order to remove it. The order merely finds that a source of danger already exists and that it has not yet been removed. A complete list of sources of danger a priori is not possible; therefore it is up to the railways administrative body, which has the necessary expertise at its disposal, to point out an obligation of which the owner himself is unaware. Under § 419 of the Civil Code, the one who averted the impending damage has a right to compensation for expenses incurred for that purpose. The approach of the Railways Act to the protection of the public interest in safe transportation is not an isolated case in our legal order. The
regulation under Act No. 13/1997 Coll., on Surface Thoroughfares, as amended by Act No. 102/2000 Coll., is thematically closest to the Railways Act. The amended text of this Act differentiates liability for endangering road transport and limits the removal of sources of danger at the expense of the owner or operator to cases where this danger arises from the actions of the owners of land neighboring on the thoroughfare themselves. Likewise Act No. 50/1976 Coll., on Zoning and the Building Code (the Building Code), as amended by later regulations, entrusts to the building office the right to order, in the public interest, the owner of a construction to perform necessary adaptations, and similarly the owner of a land parcel. The owner is required to perform the ordered adaptations at his own expense (§ 84 para. 1, similarly § 84 para. 4). Under § 94 the building office shall, in the public interest, under the conditions of para. 1 order the owner of a building to perform urgent works to secure it, or under para. 2 shall ensure that they are immediately performed at the owner’s expense.
Other laws, such as the Forests Act, Energy Act, Mining Act, Water Act, Environment Act and Fire Protection Act also contain certain limitations on the exercise of property rights. It is natural that a democratic state in the post-communist phase of its development takes increased care of the protection of freedom of property, which the old regime suppressed or substantially curtailed. However, this does not mean that any limitation whatsoever on the exercise of property is the product or relic of the communist regime. The Czechoslovak Railways Act,
i.e. the Act on Railways no. 86/1937 Coll. of Laws and Orders, whose text is reminiscent of Austrian and German legislation on these issues, in § 102 and 103 regulates the forbidden zone and fire zone and provides
a number of limitations on the exercise of property rights in that area
in § 102 para. 1, 2 and 3, as well as in § 104 para. 1, 2 and 3, and in
§ 105 on the use of land parcels in the area of the railway. Under § 105 para. 1 “Land parcels in the area of the railway may not be used in a
manner that would result in land sliding, rocks falling, objects falling on the tracks, flooding of the tracks or any other endangering of the railway and its operation. The railways administration office may
expressly identify land parcels to which this applies”. Under paragraph
2 of the same section. “If land parcels in the area of the railway are used in a manner which is forbidden in para. 1, the railways administration office is authorized to order necessary measures so that the track is not endangered;… The railways company may also be required to take such measures on the account of the user of the land parcels”.The
regulations in the current Czech Republic Railways Act are, however, to
a certain extent, comparable with the regulations in other European states. Both the legislature, in the background report to the act, and the ministry, in its statements, point to the Council directives on the development of Community railways of 29 July 1991, as amended by directives of the European Parliament and the Council no. 2001/12/ES, which also concern the principles of ensuring safe operation of the railways and railway transportation. In Germany, for example, under § 23
para. 3 and 4 of the federal Railways Act of 27 December 1993, as amended by regulations in effect, a railway operator and transporter is authorized, within the railway protected zone, to enter another’s land, including for purposes of removing sources of danger to public transportation. The railways act of Baden-Würtemberg of 8. June 1995 provides, in § 5 on protective measures, that the owners and holders of land parcels neighboring the railway must tolerate measures necessary to
protect the railway from the effects of nature, such as snowdrifts, falling rocks, caving in and floods. The person in question is authorized to take the necessary measures himself, in agreement with the
appropriate office. Under para. 2 vegetation and fences, as well as stacks, piles and other facilities which are not firmly joined to the land, may not endanger the safety and smoothness of rail transportation.
Upon a written request from the appropriate office, they must be removed at the expense of the person concerned. The Swiss railways act of 20 December 1957, in§ 21 para. 1, also permits the railway company itself, in urgent cases, to take measures on the lands of third parties to avert danger. Under paragraph 2 the expenses for removing the source of danger are borne by the owner or operator of the land, without being entitled to a claim for compensation. However, an exception to this principle exists: if the sources of danger are trees, the railway company bears the expense of removing the danger, unless it proves the fault of another person. Slovak regulation of these issues is virtually identical with the Czech regulation.The current text of § 10 of the Railways Act affects in a comparable way precisely those cases in which railway operation was endangered through the action or failure to act of an owner or operator of the source danger and thereby violation of an owner’s obligations under § 127 or § 415 – 420a of the Civil Code and § 4a, as well as § 8 – 10 of the Railways Act. If an owner of real estate adjacent to the railway failed to meet this obligation, under § 10 of the Railways Act it is up to the railways administrative office to
order the owner or operator to remove the source of danger, and – if he
does not do so – decide to remove the source of danger at his expense. The law can not define all individual steps, acts, manners of behavior and conduct of the owners of adjacent real estate which it considers necessary, in view of the variety of particular situations; however, it assumes that the real estate owner himself – aware of his obligation – keeps track on his land of objects and events which could endanger the operation of the railway and takes care to remove them. Failure to fulfill this obligation need not be only action (e.g. planting a tree in
an unsuitable place), but also failure to act (e.g. leaving a tree which grew in an unsuitable place by itself without causation by the owner). The railways administrative office’s right to order the owner to
take necessary measures, or a decision to remove a source of danger at his expense, is merely a necessary operating guarantee of priority protection for the safe operation of the railway and thus of an eminent public interest. In such cases, the provision on removing a source of danger at the expense of a land owner or operator who did not comply with an order to remove it is appropriate. This “advantageous treatment” of the public interest is also, in the interest of protecting
property rights, compensated by certain rights of owners, which protect
them from arbitrariness by administrative bodies, as the compensation of expenses and damage arising from measures necessary to remove the source of danger to the railway is handled in accordance with the principle of reasonableness. Of fundamental importance in this regard is
§ 419 of the Civil Code (which is expressly referred to by § 9 para. 2 of the Railways Act), under which “Anyone who averted imminent damage has a right to compensation of expenses incurred for that purpose and to
compensation of damages which he incurred thereby, including against the person in whose interest he acted, to a maximum extent corresponding
to the damage which was averted.” The commentary to the Civil Code emphasizes that the right to compensation of damages and expenses incurred is also directed against the party in whose interest this party
acted. (Jehlička, Švestka and collective of authors, Civil Code, Commentary, 3rd Edition 1996, C.H.Beck).On the other hand, one can also imagine a number of different situations. Situations, in which the particular obligation of prevention imposed on the owner of real estate in the area of the railway protected zone (operator or owner of the source of danger) would be beyond his realistic possibilities, and his subsequent liability for the source of danger would be in conflict with the principle of reasonableness. This is not merely a situation of "vis major" (a situation caused by events on which the owner could have no influence). It is always necessary to carefully evaluate each case, taking into account all its circumstances. The Railways Act, in the incriminated provision, rules out such an approach, as it sweepingly requires the administrative office to issue a decision on the removal of
the source of danger at the owner’s or operator’s expense. The Constitutional Court notes that, for example, the cited Railways Act of Baden-Würtemberg, although on the one hand it permits the railways office to decide on the removal of vegetation, fences, piles, stacks and
other objects which are not firmly joined with the land at the owner’s expense, on the other hand provides a right for commensurate compensation to those owners or users on whom limitations are imposed, which are a disproportionate burden, inequitable and unacceptable vis a vis others (§ 4 para. 4 of the Act). Provision of § 5 of the Act imposes an obligation to tolerate measures take to protect the railways from effects of nature such as snowdrifts, falling rocks, caving in, etc., and in these cases the affected land owner is entitled to commensurate monetary compensation for damage incurred. The land owner can also absolve himself of liability for the source of danger if the particular regime in the railway protected zone made in impossible for him to take due care of his property.It is evident from the foregoing that the provisions of of the Czech Railways Act are too strict, unequivocal and undifferentiated, so that the sweeping provision
of § 10 on removal of a source of danger to the railway at the expense of the owner of that source does not commensurately apply to those cases
where payment of the expenses can not fairly be required of the land owner. In conclusion, on can say that the Constitutional Court respects the specification of the socially binding nature of property under Art. 11 para. 3 of the Charter and Art. 1 para. 2 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, under which the right to protection of property does not interfere with the right of states to pass laws which they consider necessary to regulate the use of property in accordance with the public interest. Such legal regulations are also valid in the Czech Republic, although restrictions on use of property in accordance with the public interest in the Civil Code and other statues do not have – nor, in view of the variety of circumstances, can they have – the character of an inventory of individually specified obligations, but of obligations which are formulated generally, but interpreted commensurately. At
the same time, however, as far as the sweeping nature of the provision on removal of the source of danger at the expense of its owner or operator goes, the Constitutional Court has no alternative but to agree with the petitioner’s opinion. On this issue, the Czech Railways Act does not yet permit regulation which would be commensurate with the variety of circumstances related to expenses for removing sources of danger for the railway. Because other provisions of the second, third and fourth sentences in § 10 of the Act on Railways would, after annulment of the words “at his expense” in the third sentence, lose the necessary clarity and consistency, the Constitutional Court annulled the
contested sentences in full, and thus made possible a fully balanced new regulation. For all the cited reasons, the Constitutional Court decided as is stated in the verdict. Making the judgment go into effect as of 31 December 2002 is intended to make possible a new legislative regulation which would, in particular, also commensurately differentiate the obligations for compensation of expenses related to removing a source of danger to the railways. Instruction: Decisions of the Constitutional Court can not be appealed.Brno, 6 March 2002