Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/63/178.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:39:26
Document Index: 130355450

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1237', '§ 1382', '§ 995', '§ 999', '§ 31', '§ 189', '§ 187', '§ 192', '§ 4']

Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 2d › Volume 63 › People v. Teale
Defendants Thomas L. Teale and Ruth Elizabeth [63 Cal. 2d 183] Chapman were convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Billy Dean Adcock, robbery of the first degree and simple kidnaping. A life sentence was imposed upon the defendant Chapman as to the murder count and she appeals from the whole of the judgment. The death penalty was imposed upon the defendant Teale, and his appeal is automatic pursuant to the provisions of section 1239, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. The order denying defendants' motion for a new trial being nonappealable, the defendant Chapman's purported appeal therefrom must be dismissed. (Pen. Code, § 1237.)
Later that morning the victim's body was found in a remote area north of Lodi. It was half submerged in an open ditch by the side of a road. The clothing was torn and there was blood on the face and on the surface of the road nearby. The victim had been shot three times in the head, two bullets apparently penetrating through the same wound on the left side of the head from a gun held as close as two inches. The third bullet entered the back of the head from a gun held [63 Cal. 2d 184] some 18 inches away. The time of death from the gunshot wounds was estimated at 3 on the morning of the 18th.
After his return to California Teale was confined with one Waldo Vowel, another prisoner, who testified as to a conversation he had with Teale wherein Teale stated that "he hoped Mrs. Chapman did not break down and start saying anything, because they didn't have anything on them yet." Later, the witness testified, he had another conversation with Teale in the prison yard: "I told him I knew Bill [the deceased], [63 Cal. 2d 185] and he [Teale] told me he didn't plan for it to happen that way, and he started relating to me how it happened. He said that they were arguing over money all afternoon, and he said it was his idea to rob him and said he was going to take him out in the country and just run him off up through the vineyard, or something like that, but had no idea of killing him. But he said when they pulled up and stopped, that he opened the door, he didn't say who was driving or nothing, just said when they stopped that he got out to go around--go around to the other side of the car to get Adcock out, and said that Mrs. Chapman shot him once in the back of the head, and then said when he fell, before he could get around the car, he said she shot him two more times."
Mrs. Chapman was arrested by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in St. Joseph, Missouri, on October 26, 1962, and thereafter gave conflicting accounts to the officer of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18. She stated first that she had been in Ukiah from the 17th to the 20th of October, on which latter date she left by bus for St. Joseph. She later stated that on the evening of the 17th and early morning of the 18th she had waited in a bus depot in San Francisco. However it was stipulated at the trial that a registration card for occupancy of a motel room by a "Mr. and Mrs. T. L. Rosenthal" in Woodland at 4:40 a.m. on October 18, was made out in her handwriting. The clerk of the motel also testified that the registrant gave a false license number, and that the automobile in which the parties arrived was the one found in Teale's possession upon his arrest. [63 Cal. 2d 186]
[1a] Mrs. Chapman's first contention, that she was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial, is not borne out by the record. She voluntarily waived the 60-day limit (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2) and trial was set for February 5, 1963. On that date appointed counsel, the public defender, withdrew due to a conflict in interest in his representation of both her and the defendant Teale. New counsel appointed for Mrs. Chapman on February 5 instituted discovery proceedings and trial was postponed until March 19, presumably in the defendant's interest. (People v. Donohoe, 200 Cal. App. 2d 17 [19 Cal. Rptr. 454].)prior to the March 19 trial date Mrs. Chapman filed an affidavit that the public defender's prior representation of her would prejudice her right if a joint trial was had, and the court permitted the public defender to withdraw as counsel for Teale also. New counsel was appointed for Teale and trial was again postponed, to give such counsel an opportunity to prepare, until April 16, when trial was had.
[2] Where a continuance is granted upon good cause to a codefendant the rights of the other defendants are generally not deemed to have been prejudiced. (People v. McFarland, 209 Cal. App. 2d 772 [26 Cal. Rptr. 596]; Ferenz v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 2d 639 [128 P.2d 48].) [1b] Moreover, assuming without concluding that there was an improper denial of a speedy trial, the error must be prejudicial to merit a reversal therefor. (People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 152 [32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452].) Although Mrs. Chapman asserts that the delay caused her an emotional upset which persuaded her not to testify in her own behalf she still fails to show how her testimony would have aided her cause.
Both defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdicts. The defendant Teale further contends that the evidence presented to the grand jury failed to establish reasonable or probable cause to hold him to answer for [63 Cal. 2d 187] the crimes charged. Teale unsuccessfully moved in the trial court to set aside the indictment on grounds of insufficiency (see Pen. Code, § 995), and his petition for prohibition upon the ground that the indictment was found without reasonable or probable cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal (see Pen. Code, § 999a). [3a] The evidence before the grand jury was substantially the same as that herein recited other than that of the People's expert witness and the fellow prisoner to whom Teale made certain admissions. [4] We recently stated in People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal. 2d 503 at page 532 [30 Cal. Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394]: " 'Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344].) An indictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of it.' (Bompensiero v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal. 2d 178, 183-184 [281 P.2d 250], emphasis added; see also Weber v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 68, 69 [216 P.2d 871].) [5] 'If there is some evidence to support the indictment, the courts will not inquire into its sufficiency. ...' (Lorenson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 49, 55 [216 P.2d 859]; Greenberg v. Superior Court (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 319, 322 [121 P.2d 713].)"
[3b] Unquestionably the motion to set aside the indictment on grounds of a lack of reasonable or probable cause was properly denied. [6] Resolving as we must all intendments in favor of the findings of guilt, circumstantial as it may be, we cannot fairly conclude that there is a lack of substantial evidence as to either defendant or as to any count. (See People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 93 [10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086]; People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 850-851 [3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705].)
Both defendants also contend that the court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on conspiracy when no conspiracy was charged in the indictments and the prosecution did not indicate that it would try the case as a conspiracy. It is true that there was no count in conspiracy but the court nevertheless fully instructed thereon, not only a first time as a part of its general instructions but also a second time upon request by the jury after it had initially retired. If the giving of such instructions constitutes error [63 Cal. 2d 188] the prejudicial effect thereof is manifest where, as in the instant case, a determination as to which of two defendants might have delivered the fatal blow is a difficult one. Furthermore, as will be seen, the question of the admissibility of certain real evidence as to one or both of the defendants depends, in part at least, upon the presence or lack of a conspiracy and the propriety of taking it into consideration.
[7] It must be deemed to be established law that "a conspiracy need not be pleaded in the indictment or information if the evidence actually shows the existence of one. (People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 415, 447 [22] [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714]; People v. Davis (1957) 48 Cal. 2d 241, 250 [11] [309 P.2d 1]; People v. Tanner (1935) 3 Cal. 2d 279, 299 [7] [44 P.2d 324]; People v. Wells (1960) 187 Cal. App. 2d 324, 329-330 [12] [9 Cal. Rptr. 384].)" (People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 88 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656].) [8] In the instant case there was evidence that the parties were together in Reno where Mrs. Chapman purchased two guns; that thereafter they remained in each other's company until after the commission of the crimes charged; that immediately before appearing at the victim's bar they departed from another bar upon Mrs. Chapman's conclusion that they were not "going to do anything here"; that they were left in the bar alone with the victim; that they departed from the tavern with the victim under unusual circumstances; that the victim entered their automobile; that while in the automobile the victim was robbed and killed with a gun of the caliber purchased by defendants; that the defendants disposed of his body and went together to a motel. Based on the foregoing and other evidence the jury could reasonably have inferred the existence of a conspiracy between the defendants to commit the crimes with which they were charged (Pen. Code, § 31), and no error is apparent in the giving of an instruction on conspiracy.
[9] Objection is further made that the instruction, as submitted by the prosecution and given by the court made references to the "alleged conspiracy" and the "alleged conspirators." Even if we assume such references were inaccurate it does not appear that any prejudice resulted therefrom. As concluded, the conspiracy, if the jury found it to be a fact, could have been considered in determining the substantive crimes whether or not a conspiracy was alleged, and defendants were found guilty only of the substantive crimes. [63 Cal. 2d 189] Nor is there any merit to defendants' further implication that they were misled by the prosecution's strategy. The People indicated during the trial in open court but out of the presence of the jury that the consequences of the conspiracy would be placed in issue if the evidence justified it.
[10] It is next asserted on the part of the defendant Teale that certain evidence was improperly admitted over objection. He objected to the admission of the gun record in the pawnshop in Reno where Mrs. Chapman made purchases, the check of Mrs. Chapman found near the body, a blue dress with blood stains thereon and the registration card for the motel in Woodland, which she signed. The objection in each instance is based on the claim that none of the exhibits were connected with Teale personally. However, once a conspiracy has been established, evidence of the acts and declarations of the alleged conspirators individually in furtherance of that conspiracy is admissible. (People v. Calhoun, 50 Cal. 2d 137, 143 [323 P.2d 427]; People v. Buckley, 202 Cal. App. 2d 142, 148 [20 Cal. Rptr. 659].)
[12] Both defendants further contend that the dress referred to above was improperly admitted on the further ground that the People failed to establish a foundation as to the source of the dress. It was confiscated with other clothing in Mrs. Chapman's possession at the time of her arrest in St. Joseph. She admitted at that time that the dress was her property. The impropriety is claimed to exist, however, because the People failed to establish that the dress was in Mrs. Chapman's possession or in the automobile at the time of the homicide. It appears that two cartons of personal effects were shipped to St. Joseph prior to the homicide and the implication thus raised by the objection is that the People should [63 Cal. 2d 190] have established, as part of the foundation, that the dress was not a part of that shipment.
The contention raised does not go to the question of whether the real evidence offered is in fact the identical property confiscated without alteration, or to the integrity of the chain of possession between confiscation and admission into evidence. (See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 580 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 113-114 [193 P. 92]; People v. Lugo, 203 Cal. App. 2d 772, 776 [21 Cal. Rptr. 871].) The significance of the blood stains on the dress was a matter which the jury had the right to consider and it was for the jury to determine as a question of fact from all the evidence whether the dress had been in the automobile at the time of the homicide. (People v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 2d 478, 485 [165 P.2d 3].) The dress tended to throw light on an issue in dispute and the question thus was not its admissibility but rather the weight to be accorded to it. [13] Nor was it error, as further claimed by defendants, to exclude their offer of another dress which was claimed to have been worn by Mrs. Chapman on the evening and early morning of the 17th and 18th of October. The relevancy of the dress itself was not demonstrated, and defendants were in no manner foreclosed from disputing the significance of the blood spots on the dress which was put into evidence.
There is, in fact, no basis for a reasonable belief that the prosecution withheld any information in its possession or otherwise frustrated the defendants. There is no claim that particular information, as distinguished from the nature of the recording thereof, has been withheld. The trial court, however, did not let the question of the prosecution's compliance with the discovery order get before the jury, and [63 Cal. 2d 191] advised counsel that the question of compliance was for the court on proper motion in proceedings which were independent of the trial of the causes. It further advised that the question of compliance with discovery was to be distinguished from the suppression or destruction of evidence, which latter matters were pertinent for the jury's consideration.
[15] The issue raised is a novel one, and we have concluded that the question of compliance with a discovery order is not a matter for the jury's consideration providing, of course, that the jury's right to determine matters bearing on the suppression of evidence is not restricted. [14b] As stated, the record presents no ground for a reasonable belief of misconduct on the part of the prosecution in the instant case. (See People v. Kroeger, 61 Cal. 2d 236, 246-247 [37 Cal. Rptr. 593, 390 P.2d 369].)
The court did not give an instruction on second degree murder or manslaughter, and instructed that defendants were either not guilty of murder at all or were guilty of murder of the first degree. It must be presumed that defendants, if guilty of murder of the first degree, were guilty under the felony murder doctrine, as no instructions on premeditation and deliberation were given. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Thus, the jury was instructed, in effect, that if it found defendants committed the unlawful killing then it must further [63 Cal. 2d 192] find that the killing occurred in the perpetration of a robbery. That a robbery had been committed is uncontroverted and appears as a matter of law.
The defendant Teale's only defense was a denial of the commission of the homicide. (See People v. Turville, 51 Cal. 2d 620, 633 [335 P.2d 678]; People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 715 [21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304].) Mrs. Chapman, in addition to a denial, submitted evidence tending to show that she lacked mental capacity to form the requisite intent. However, such testimony was to the effect that she suffered from a "disassociative reaction"; that when she found herself in an uncontrollable situation she would " 'black out' by simply not knowing."
[17] It is contended that, at least as to Mrs. Chapman, her crime might have been manslaughter because she could not have entertained the specific intent to murder, but might have entertained the lesser intents associated with involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722 [31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) But an objective evaluation of the defendant's evidence as to her mental capacity does not permit a reasonable conclusion that she could not have acted with "malice aforethought" (Pen. Code, § 187), and at the [63 Cal. 2d 193] same time have entertained an intent to commit an "unlawful act, not amounting to a felony" or a lawful act "in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection." (Pen. Code, § 192.) According to her expert witness' testimony she did not have the mental capacity to commit any crime. Hence, the jury was properly instructed that defendants were guilty of murder of the first degree or were not guilty of the unlawful commission of any homicide.
[18] Error is claimed by Mrs. Chapman in instructions given on the effect which intoxication of an accused may bear on the question of specific intent where such intent is an element of the crime charged. fn. 1 The challenged instructions are similar to those condemned in People v. Spencer, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 86-87 [31 Cal. Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134]. Although further instructions which immediately followed properly stated the law, and, as in Spencer, "it appears that upon rather elaborate analysis a correct understanding of the relevant law can be gleaned from the instructions construed as a whole," nevertheless it was error to burden the jury with the confusing and contradicting instructions in such circumstances. However, for the reasons which follow, the error was harmless.
As in Spencer, the evidence of the defendant's intoxication was minimal and for that reason the erroneous instruction must be deemed nonprejudicial. (People v. Spencer, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 64, 87.) Moreover, the defendant did not rely on intoxication in the ordinary sense. Her defense was that due to her emotional instability, coupled with the presence of alcohol in her system, she "blacked out" and suffered a complete mental disassociation. This theory was fully exploited by the defendant and in such circumstances the instant error on the effect of intoxication on ability to form a specific intent was not prejudicial.
[19] Defendant Chapman next claims that an instruction relating to confessions and admissions was not applicable to [63 Cal. 2d 194] her, as she personally had made no such statements, and that it was prejudicial error to not so instruct the jury. In People v. Burns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 566 [250 P.2d 619], it was held to be reversible error as to a nonconfessing defendant to fail to limit an instruction on confessions to his confessing codefendant. (See also, People v. Wade, 185 Cal. App. 2d 226 [8 Cal. Rptr. 197].)
It must be deemed, in view of the foregoing, that the jury was not misled as to those statements of Mrs. Chapman not received in evidence. As to extrajudicial statements which were received in evidence, the court instructed as follows immediately preceding the general instructions on confessions and admissions: "Where evidence has been received against one of the defendants but is not received as against the other, the jury may consider such evidence only as against the defendant against whom it was permitted to be [63 Cal. 2d 195] received. It may not be considered by the jury for any other purpose, or against the other defendant.
No contention is made that any of the extrajudicial statements were received in evidence in violation of defendants' right to counsel as enunciated in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977], Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 [84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246], and [63 Cal. 2d 196] People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338 [42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], and it otherwise does not appear that defendants' rights in this regard have been infringed. In any event, aside from Teale's statement to his fellow inmate, which clearly falls outside the proscription of Escobedo, Massiah and Dorado, the admission of other statements could not have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4 1/2.)
The foregoing comments and instructions have been ruled in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106], Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653]), but the question remains whether in any particular instance the error in allowing such comments and in [63 Cal. 2d 197] giving such instruction has resulted in a miscarriage of justice requiring a reversal of the judgment of conviction. (People v. Bostick, 62 Cal. 2d 820, 823-827 [44 Cal. Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d 529].)
We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of the erroneous comments and instructions a result more favorable to defendants was not reasonably probable in view of the entire record (People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), and that there has been no miscarriage of justice as to either Mrs. Chapman or Mr. Teale.
[21] Contention is also made by the defendant Teale that prejudicial error occurred in the penalty phase in the court's instructions, and the prosecutor's arguments going to the role played by the Adult Authority in fixing parole for those convicts sentenced to life terms. (People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33].) However, the instructions [63 Cal. 2d 198] and arguments fall far short of those condemned in Morse.
[22] As the evidence clearly indicates that all of the crimes charged and of which Mrs. Chapman stands convicted are inseparable, she was improperly sentenced for all three counts. (People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748 [26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449]; People v. Houston, 219 Cal. App. 2d 187 [33 Cal. Rptr. 26].) Thus the judgment, insofar as it imposes punishment for robbery and kidnaping, the lesser crimes, must be reversed as to Mrs. Chapman. As the death penalty was imposed on the defendant Teale he is not affected by the multiple sentencing. (People v. Seiterle, 59 Cal. 2d 703, 712 [31 Cal. Rptr. 67, 381 P.2d 947].)
The judgment is reversed insofar as it imposes sentences for robbery and kidnaping on Mrs. Chapman, and in all other respects is affirmed. The judgment as to the defendant Teale is affirmed in all respects. [63 Cal. 2d 199]
FN 1. The portion of the instructions objected to were as follows: "Our law provides that no act committed by persons while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in such condition. This means that such a condition, if shown by the evidence to have existed in the defendants at the time when allegedly they committed the crimes charged, is not of itself a defense. It may throw light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place; but when a person in a state of intoxication, voluntarily produced in himself, commits a crime, the law does not permit him to use his own vice as a shelter against the normal, legal consequences of his conduct."