Source: http://www.michbar.org/e-journal/070913.cfm
Timestamp: 2014-10-02 16:31:28
Document Index: 435257661

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 19', '§ 1903', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19']

Search	Tuesday, July 9, 2013
Issues: Divorce; Denial of request for attorney fees; Loutts v. Loutts; Kurz v. Kurz; MCR 3.206(C); Woodington v. Shokoohi; MCR 3.206(C)(1), (2)(a), and (2)(b)
Case Name: Harwood v. Harwood
e-Journal Number: 54920
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Jansen, Cavanagh, and Markey The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant-wife's request to the extent she sought attorney fees in connection with the 2011 and 2012 hearings. However, because the record disclosed that the trial court expressly reserved the issue of attorney fees related to prior proceedings and then failed to address the issue later, the court remanded to allow defendant to renew her request for and show a right to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(C) in connection with prior proceedings in which the issue was reserved. The parties were divorced in 2007. They were involved in numerous postjudgment proceedings since then, most relating to the plaintiff-husband's failure to comply with the judgment of divorce and other orders. In late 2011 and early 2012, the trial court held various hearings related to the plaintiff's motion to modify his spousal support obligation, defendant's motions as to plaintiff's noncompliance with various orders, and the court's remand order in a prior appeal. In 3/12, the trial court denied defendant's request for attorney fees and this appeal followed. Defendant did not specifically request attorney fees in connection with the late 2011 and early 2012 hearings, or show facts justifying an award of fees under subrule (C)(2)(a) or (b). Her representations as to her lack of funds to pay even basic expenses showed the need for attorney fees, but defendant did not show that plaintiff had the ability to pay. The parties' representations to the trial court indicated that both were equally impoverished. Further, although the record showed that plaintiff had failed to comply with various court orders throughout the proceedings, defendant did not show that plaintiff had the ability to comply with any particular order. The court noted that while defendant did not specifically request attorney fees in connection with the late 2011 and early 2012 hearings, she did ask the trial court to rule on her prior requests for attorney fees that were reserved. While the trial court correctly noted that it had not reserved the issue of fees "every single time," it erred to the extent that it found that it had never reserved the issue. The record disclosed that the trial court "reserved" the issue in 1/11 in connection with defendant's 12/10 motions based on plaintiff's failure to pay support and effectuate the division of pension assets through entry of a QDRO. It also "preserved" the issue in 2/11 in connection with defendant's 1/11 motion based on plaintiff's failure to pay $12,500 as ordered. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues: Whether the statements defendant made to the police were admissible where he was not given Miranda rights; People v. Genter, Inc.; People v. Chowdhury; Whether he was "in custody"; People v. Zahn; People v. Anderson;; Whether the trial court properly allowed G's preliminary examination testimony; People v. Asevedo; People v. Bean; "Unavailability"; MRE 804(a)(5); MRE 804(b)(1); Whether the Confrontation Clause was violated; Crawford v. Washington; United States v. Owens; Whether the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel; People v. Traylor; People v. Mack; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 9; People v. Carter; People v. Morson; Other sentencing errors; People v. Kimble; People v. Weathersby; Mitigating evidence; People v. Osby; People v. Jackson; The PSIR; People v. Babcock; People v. Elston; MCR 6.425(A)(1)(e); People v. Spanke; Jury instructions; People v. Davis; People v. Grissom; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH)
Case Name: People v. Black
e-Journal Number: 54954
The court held, inter alia, that the trial court's finding that there was no custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings was correct, and it properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to a police officer. Defendant and his brother (B-the victim) had an altercation at B's apartment. There was conflicting testimony as to whether defendant and G, B's friend or fiancée, also lived in the apartment. Defendant, G, and B were at the apartment and defendant and B were drinking. Defendant left the apartment for about 10 to 15 minutes and B locked the door behind him. When defendant returned, he forcibly broke in the door. B could not recall exactly what occurred, but at some point he had a knife and thought he threatened defendant. B also recalled that defendant came at him with a crowbar in his hands. G's preliminary examination testimony was read into the record at trial. She testified that defendant and B had a fist fight, then defendant left the apartment. When he returned, he had a crowbar and hit B in the face and head a couple times. G testified that B did not have a knife or weapon. B was in the hospital for six days, and was in a coma for four days. B had many injuries in the face and head, including fractures and bleeding on the brain. A lived in an apartment in the same house and testified that on that day, defendant stopped at his apartment and asked to borrow his crowbar. Defendant took the crowbar and returned two or three minutes later. He told A to not tell anyone and to hide the crowbar. When officers responded to the scene, they found B's door broken in, blood in the kitchen, a knife on the kitchen floor, and B bleeding heavily from his head. G spoke with officer-S at the scene and he put out the description of the person who assaulted B. Officer V found defendant and approached him. He indicated that he knew why V wanted to talk with him. Defendant then spontaneously said that he had an argument with B. Defendant provided several different versions of what happened. He had no apparent injuries and did not mention a knife or crowbar. V took defendant back to the scene, where he told S that B did not have a weapon during the fight and defendant did not have a crowbar. He claimed that B punched G in the face four or five times. G denied being assaulted. At trial, defendant testified that he tried to protect himself, B got a knife, and defendant grabbed the crowbar when B got close to him and made a stabbing motion toward him. Defendant claimed he hit B with the crowbar once. Defendant argued that his statements to V were inadmissible because he was not given Miranda warnings. The court concluded that defendant was not in custody when he made the statements. V testified he never asked him any questions and defendant just willingly kind of blabbed out a statement, was not handcuffed, restrained, or told that he was being detained. Defendant's conviction of AWIGBH was affirmed.
Issues: Termination of parental rights pursuant to § 19b(3)(j); Whether the trial court properly twice denied the respondent-father's request for an expert witness; In re Bell; In re MKK; MRE 706(a); Whether the trial court failed to determine KT's tribal status under the ICWA (25 USC § 1903(4) & (8)); In re Morris; In re Fried; Lown v. JJ Eaton Place; Whether § 19b(3)(j) was established by clear and convincing evidence; In re Van Dalen; In re HRC; In re Hudson; Whether the trial court properly applied the rules of evidence to exclude hearsay evidence respondent proffered at the initial dispositional hearing; In re Utrera; In re AMAC; MCR 3.977(E)(3): Child Protective Services (CPS); Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
Case Name: In re Thibeault
e-Journal Number: 54963
The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-father's parental rights to his minor son (KT) where the statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the child's best interests. Respondent was the father of infant twins, ET and KT. ET died from head injuries that he sustained while in the sole care and custody of respondent, who told CPS and medical personnel that ET accidentally fell from a couch onto a carpeted floor in respondent's home. Dr. G treated ET on the night of the injury and determined that ET died from non-accidental injuries that were inconsistent with respondent's version of events. Also, though KT appeared healthy, G examined him and discovered KT had a fractured shin. N of CPS investigated ET's death, N opined that respondent was responsible for ET's injuries and the mother was responsible for KT's injuries. The DHS filed a petition to remove KT and to terminate both parents' parental rights to KT. The petition alleged that both children suffered non-accidental injuries that were indicative of abuse and neglect. At the preliminary hearing, N testified that she was concerned that KT would be at risk of physical harm if returned to his parents. Before adjourning the hearing, the trial court asked the parents whether KT was a member of a Native American tribe. Respondent said that he was a member of the Mackinac Bands of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, but stated that the tribe was not recognized. The trial court instructed him to inform CPS of his tribal status. N sent a notice of proceedings to the BIA, which responded that there was not a federally recognized Mackinac Bands of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the ICWA did not apply. Respondent twice requested an expert witness to determine the cause of the children's injuries. Both requests were denied. Four doctors testified as the children's injuries and the consensus was that the injuries were not accidental. The trial court took jurisdiction over KT, held that reunification efforts would not be made, and KT was to continue placement with the DHS for care and supervision. The trial court entered a termination order as to the respondent's parental rights based on ET's death. Affirmed. Full Text Opinion	Negligence & Intentional Tort
Issues: Premises liability; Fall on stairs; Whether plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the stairs were defective; Maiden v. Rozwood; Rose v. National Auction Group, Inc.; Whether the court should rely on the "non-defective" nature of the stairs; Whether the trial court should have considered a brief; Whether the trial court's ruling was premature because discovery had not yet occurred; Davis v. Detroit
Case Name: McCoy v. Gutton
e-Journal Number: 54955
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Whitbeck, Meter, and Donofrio The court found no basis for reversal of the trial court's order granting defendant-landlord's motion for summary disposition this case involving a fall on basement stairs because plaintiff set forth no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the steps were defective. Plaintiff while walking down the basement steps from her apartment fell as a result of the allegedly defective basement stairs. She lost her balance and fell violently to the floor of the basement with great force and violence as a result of the dangerous conditions. She alleged that defendant failed to protect her from or warn her about "the hazards arising in the existence of poorly lit and detached, defective, worn and/or deteriorated basement steps[.]" She alleged that defendant knew or should have known about the dangerous condition. She contended that she suffered numerous injuries in the fall, such as a closed-head injury and back injuries. While plaintiff provided a conclusory affidavit alleging that the stairs were "falling apart," she did not elaborate on how the steps were falling apart and the photographs did not substantiate that they were falling apart. Also, while she contended in her affidavit that the stairs were "too narrow," she provided no frame of reference for this allegation. She did not provide measurements or comparables or even indicate which part of or in what respect the stairs were "too narrow." Conclusory statements such as those on which plaintiff relied are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Affirmed.
Issues: Termination of respondent-father's parental rights under § 19b(3)(g); In re JK; In re Gazella; In re Mason; In re HRC; Hearsay; The foster care worker's testimony summarizing victim statements contained in old police reports, "Plain error"; In re Utrera; MCR 3.977(H); MCR 3.977(F); In re CR; MRE 402; MRE 401; MRE 801(c); MRE 802; The public records exception of MRE 803(8); The foster care worker's recitation of a previous statement one of the minor children allegedly made; MCR 3.972(C)(2)(a); In re Archer; Termination of respondent-mother's parental rights under § 19b(3)(g); In re JK; Prevention and Training Services (PATS)
Case Name: In re Broker
e-Journal Number: 54929
Judge(s): Per Curaim – Owens, Gleicher, and Stephens The court held, inter alia, that the trial court properly terminated both respondents-parents' parental rights to the minor children where the statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. The respondent-father argued that his participation and progress in his court-ordered services was of such magnitude as to render erroneous the trial court's finding any statutory grounds under § 19b(3) to terminate his parental rights. His court-ordered services were derived from his PATS, and he was required by the trial court order to demonstrate improvement and benefit from these services. The father showed improvement in his parenting skills, as he completed his parenting classes, brought the children dinner at the parenting time sessions, and appropriately instructed them during the sessions. The children noted that he appeared happier and less aggressive during the latter parenting time sessions. By the date of the termination hearing, the father was participating in substance abuse treatment, counseling, and domestic violence therapy. However, he failed to complete the home study, which was a necessary predicate to being able to provide care and custody for the children. The father remained unemployed and lacked an independent source of income. The trial court also held him in contempt several times for failing to participate in his services plan. Although he started participating in services in 11/11, his mere participation did not compensate for the fact that he failed to demonstrably benefit from those services. He was not honest about the full scope of his substance abuse problems, or about his past involvement in domestic violence with his partners. His frequent vacillation on these significant barriers made it dubious whether he will fully recover and become a safe, stable parent for his children. In light of his failure to demonstrate meaningful progress in his service plan, the trial court clearly had sufficient evidence to find that there was no reasonable likelihood that he will be able to provide proper care and custody for his children within a reasonable amount of time, regardless of his intent. The respondent-mother argued that the trial court committed clear error in finding that she did not make any progress in her services plan. The court interpreted this argument as a general challenge to the trial court's finding statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. She was court-ordered to show improvement and benefit from these services. The record was "replete with evidence" of her failure to comply with, or benefit from, these services. She refused to participate in her services for most of the case history, which resulted in the trial court holding her in contempt several times due to noncompliance. Although she started showing improvement in 11/11, her progress came "too little, too late" and was dwarfed by her inconsistency and relapse. She did not demonstrate long-term benefit from her therapy or substance abuse treatment, and she was held in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with her services plan. She also was unable to control her children during parenting time sessions and blamed her daughter for the fact that they were in care, which further showed her inappropriate parenting skills and her inability to benefit from services. The trial court had sufficient evidence to find by clear and convincing evidence that she did not, and could not within a reasonable amount of time, provide proper care and custody for the children. Affirmed.
Full Text Opinion	Issues: Termination of parental rights pursuant to § 19b(3)(c)(i); Whether the trial court considered that the children were placed with relatives in determining their best interests; In re Jones; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Whether the trial court should have considered the best interests of each child individually Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: In re Heuer/Franzel
e-Journal Number: 54930
Judge(s): Per Curiam - M.J. Kelly, Murray, and Boonstra
The court vacated the trial court's order terminating the respondent-mother's parental rights to her four minor children and remanded for specific findings on the best interests of the children. The three older children came into protective custody in 10/10 at a time when respondent was abusing prescription medications. She made substantial progress toward reunification. The youngest child was born during the course of these proceedings. After he was taken into custody he was initially placed with respondent. However, he was placed with his grandfather and step-grandmother after respondent was found unresponsive with the child red from crying, and respondent admitted to taking 14 Klonopin and 1 Percocet. The DHS continued to work with respondent toward reunification, but after she took a Xanax during a visitation and fell asleep leaving the older children to care for the infant, the DHS sought authorization to petition for terminate her parental rights. The trial court authorized the petition but stated it was not going to consider it for 60 days, during which time there would be no contact with the children, respondent was to continue therapy, and would have the opportunity to establish that she was using prescription drugs therapeutically and had in place the prerequisites for taking care of the children. She substantially complied, but did not strictly comply. The trial court encouraged her to work toward strict compliance with the hope that she might be able to create a defense to the termination petition. Later, she agreed that the grounds for termination were established. The plan called for placement of all the children with respondent's grandfather and step-grandmother who would seek a permanent juvenile guardianship, and for respondent to have visitation if she did not skip visitations and appeared sober and drug-free. However, she failed to appear for a disposition hearing. The DHS filed a motion to reconsider the best interest determination representing that respondent had not taken any action to visit her children since the last hearing and she was incarcerated for multiple criminal offenses. She was charged with several crimes, entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was sentenced to 330 days in jail with credit for 65 days. The trial court concluded that her chaotic life was affecting the children's need for permanency and stability and it would be in the children's best interests to terminate her parental rights. The court vacated the trial court's termination order and remanded for specific findings on the best interests of the children as required by In re Olive/Metts Minors. The court retained jurisdiction.
Full Text Opinion	Issues: Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), and (j); In re Beck; In re Trejo Minors; In re Miller; Children's best interests; In re VanDalen
Case Name: In re Mullins/Oltersdorff
e-Journal Number: 54932
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Jansen, Cavanagh, and Markey The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-mother's parental rights to her two minor children where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the children's best interests. The evidence included that respondent did not attend visitations with the minor children from 10/10 to 4/11, and did not seek custody of them during that time. The conditions that led to this adjudication included her homelessness, unemployment, substance abuse, and abandonment of the children for extended periods of time. During these proceedings, she failed to appear at several court hearings, could not be located for extended periods of time, was placed under arrest for an outstanding warrant and for striking an officer, failed to comply with the service agreement, failed to complete required drug screening tests, and continued abusing substances, including while pregnant with a child who died. Respondent also failed to complete an inpatient rehabilitation program. Further, from 4/11 to 6/12, she only attended 23 of 59 possible visitations with the children, and failed to visit them at all from 8/28/12 to 9/24/12. She also did not complete individual therapy, did not complete parenting classes, did not secure permanent housing, and remained unemployed. Further, during these proceedings, respondent indicated that she was not willing to participate in the required services. Affirmed.
The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-father's parental rights to his minor son (KT) where the statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the child's best interests. Respondent was the father of infant twins, ET and KT. ET died from head injuries that he sustained while in the sole care and custody of respondent, who told CPS and medical personnel that ET accidentally fell from a couch onto a carpeted floor in respondent's home. Dr. G treated ET on the night of the injury and determined that ET died from non-accidental injuries that were inconsistent with respondent's version of events. Also, though KT appeared healthy, G examined him and discovered KT had a fractured shin. N of CPS investigated ET's death, N opined that respondent was responsible for ET's injuries and the mother was responsible for KT's injuries. The DHS filed a petition to remove KT and to terminate both parents' parental rights to KT. The petition alleged that both children suffered non-accidental injuries that were indicative of abuse and neglect. At the preliminary hearing, N testified that she was concerned that KT would be at risk of physical harm if returned to his parents. Before adjourning the hearing, the trial court asked the parents whether KT was a member of a Native American tribe. Respondent said that he was a member of the Mackinac Bands of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, but stated that the tribe was not recognized. The trial court instructed him to inform CPS of his tribal status. N sent a notice of proceedings to the BIA, which responded that there was not a federally recognized Mackinac Bands of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and the ICWA did not apply. Respondent twice requested an expert witness to determine the cause of the children's injuries. Both requests were denied. Four doctors testified as the children's injuries and the consensus was that the injuries were not accidental. The trial court took jurisdiction over KT, held that reunification efforts would not be made, and KT was to continue placement with the DHS for care and supervision. The trial court entered a termination order as to the respondent's parental rights based on ET's death. Affirmed. Full Text Opinion	Classifieds