Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/485/568/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 19:04:30
Document Index: 515444221

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Held: The Court of Appeals did not err in construing § 8(b)(4) as not reaching respondent's handbilling. That construction makes it unnecessary to pass upon the serious First Amendment questions that would be raised by the Board's interpretation. Pp. 485 U. S. 574-588. chanrobles.com-red
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., concurred in the judgment. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. chanrobles.com-red
The handbills' chanrobles.com-red
After DeBartolo failed to convince the union to alter the language of the handbills to state that its dispute did not involve DeBartolo or the mall lessees other than Wilson, and to limit its distribution to the immediate vicinity of Wilson's construction site, it filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), charging the union with engaging in unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(4) of the National chanrobles.com-red
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). [Footnote 2] The Board's General Counsel issued a complaint, but the Board eventually dismissed it, concluding that the handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4). Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, chanrobles.com-red
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, chanrobles.com-red
1346 (1986). Because there would be serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) could constitutionally ban peaceful handbilling not involving nonspeech elements, such as patrolling, the court applied our decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979), to determine if there was a clear congressional intent to proscribe such handbilling. The language of the section, the court held, revealed no such intent, and the legislative history indicated that Congress, by using the phrase "threaten, coerce, or restrain," was concerned with secondary picketing and strikes, rather than appeals to consumers not involving picketing. 796 F.2d 1336-1340. The court also concluded that the publicity proviso did not manifest congressional intent to ban all speech not coming within its terms, because it was "drafted as an interpretive, explanatory section," and not as an exception to an otherwise all-encompassing prohibition on publicity in § 8(b)(4). Id. at 1344. The court went on to construe the section as not prohibiting consumer publicity; DeBartolo petitioned for certiorari. Because this case presents important questions of federal constitutional and labor law, we granted the petition, 482 U.S. 913 (1987), and now affirm.
The Board, the agency entrusted by Congress with the authority to administer the NLRA, has the "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life." NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 373 U. S. 236 (1963); see Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U. S. 95, 473 U. S. 114 (1985); NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 357 U. S. 362-363 (1958). Here, the Board has construed § 8(b)(4) of the Act to cover handbilling at a mall entrance urging potential customers not to trade with any retailers in the mall, in order to exert pressure on the proprietor of the mall to influence a particular mall tenant not to do business with a nonunion construction contractor. That statutory interpretation by the Board would normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress. @ 467 U. S. 842-843, and n. 9 (1984). chanrobles.com-red
Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop, supra, at 440 U. S. 499-501, 440 U. S. 504. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in 6 U. S. 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. E.g., Catholic Bishop, supra, at 440 U. S. 500-501; Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 367 U. S. 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 279 U. S. 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 213 U. S. 407-408 (1909); 28 U. S. 448-449 (1830) (Story, J.). As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 155 U. S. 657 (1895), "[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. See Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 112 U. S. 269 (1884).
We agree with the Court of Appeals and respondents that this case calls for the invocation of the Catholic Bishop rule, for the Board's construction of the statute, as applied in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4) under the First Amendment. The handbills involved here truthfully revealed the existence of a labor dispute and urged potential customers of the mall to follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to patronize the retailers doing business in the mall. The handbilling was peaceful. No picketing or chanrobles.com-red
The Board was urged to construe the statute in light of the asserted constitutional considerations, but thought that it was constrained by its own prior authority and cases in the Courts of Appeals, as well as by the express language of chanrobles.com-red
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 (1980) (Safeco), in turn, held that consumer picketing urging a general boycott of a secondary employer aimed at causing him to sever relations with the union's real antagonist was coercive and forbidden by § 8(b)(4). It is urged that Safeco rules this chanrobles.com-red
It is nevertheless argued that the second proviso to § 8(b)(4) makes clear that that section, as amended in 1959, was intended to proscribe nonpicketing appeals such as handbilling chanrobles.com-red
This approach treats the proviso as establishing an exception to a prohibition that would otherwise reach the conduct excepted. But this proviso has a different ring to it. It states that § 8(b)(4) "shall not be construed" to forbid certain described nonpicketing publicity. That language need not be read as an exception. It may indicate only that, without the proviso, the particular nonpicketing communication the chanrobles.com-red
Neither do we find any clear indication in the relevant legislative history that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to proscribe chanrobles.com-red
peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That section was one of several amendments to the NLRA enacted in 1959 and aimed at closing what were thought to be loopholes in the protections to which secondary employers were entitled. We recounted the legislative history in Tree Fruits and NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), and the Court of Appeals carefully reexamined it in this case and found "no affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to prohibit nonpicketing labor publicity." 796 F.2d 1346. For the following reasons, for the most part expressed by the Court of Appeals, we agree with that conclusion.
Third, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was one of the amendments agreed upon by a House-Senate Conference on the House's Landrum-Griffin bill and the Senate's Kennedy-Ervin bill. An analysis of the Conference bill was presented in the House by Representative Griffin and in the Senate by Senator Goldwater. With respect to appeals to consumers, the summary said that chanrobles.com-red
105 Cong.Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg.Hist. 1432. The Board relies on this part of the Senator's exposition as an authoritative interpretation of the words "threaten, coerce, or restrain," and argues that, except as saved by the express language of the proviso, informational appeals to customers not to deal with secondary employers are unfair labor practices. The Senator's remarks about the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii) echoed his views, and that of others, expressed in opposing and defeating in the Senate any attempts to give more protection to secondary employers from consumer boycotts, whether carried out by picketing or nonpicketing means. See n 8, supra, and accompanying text. And if the proviso added in conference were an exception, rather than a clarification, it surely would not follow, as the Senator said, that, under the Conference bill, unions would be free to "conduct informational activity short of picketing," and could handbill, advertise in newspapers, and carry out chanrobles.com-red