Source: https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/briefing-report-suppressing-ftf-supporting-pha/appendix-research-bases-for-provisional-quantitative-allocation-of-points-per-state
Timestamp: 2018-03-17 17:57:37
Document Index: 426855508

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 101', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 102', 'Art. 102', 'Art. 103', 'Art. 102', 'art_3']

Appendix: Research Bases for Provisional Quantitative Allocation of Points per State — HLS PILAC
Compliance with five key foreign terrorist fighter elements of Resolution 2178 (2014)
Points allocated: 47 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Prevent and suppress foreign terrorist fighter travel: 7 out of 10.
Assessment criterion i: 6 out of 8. Criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Australia may subject a person (must be over 16 years old) to a preventative detention order (allowing the authorities to take a person into custody and detain that person for a short period of time to prevent an imminent terrorist attack from occurring or to preserve evidence relating to a recent attack) or issue a control order. A person may be subject to a control order if it substantially helps prevent a terrorist attack, or if the person has trained or participated in training with a listed terrorist organization, engaged in hostile activity in a foreign country, or been previously convicted of a terrorism offense. A control order may prevent a person's freedom of movement by confining the person to a particular area or preventing the person from leaving the country; prevent communication or association with certain people; carrying out certain activities, including work; or accessing certain forms of technology, including the internet. The person may be required to remain at a specified location for a maximum of 12 hours. Control orders must be issued by a court and must have the consent of the Attorney General (http://www.ag.gov.au/nationalsecurity/counterterrorismlaw/pages/controlorders.aspx). In October 2014, Australian lawmakers adopted amendments to the Australian Passports Act, which allow for the suspension of a person's Australian travel documents for 14 days if requested by the Director-General of Security. The law also allows a person's passport to be canceled if it is suspected that the person is likely to engage in conduct that might prejudice the security of Australia (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). See also http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/ for text of bill (Section 22A).
Penalizing foreign terrorist fighter conduct: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Australia adopted amendments to its Criminal Code in October 2014 that criminalize "advocating terrorism" (punishable by five years' imprisonment) and entering or remaining in a "declared area" of a foreign country where a terrorist organization is engaging in hostile activity (punishable by ten years' imprisonment) (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php; see also http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/oct/29/foreign-fighter-measures-approved-as-senate-passes-counter-terrorism-bill). The amendments also permit the use of "delayed notification search warrants." Providing or receiving terrorist training in Australia or abroad is punishable by up to 25 years' imprisonment (Australian Criminal Code, Art. 101.2 and 102.5, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00254). Preparation for or planning a terrorist act is punishable by life imprisonment (Art. 101.6).
Penalize funding to foreign terrorist fighters: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
If a person receives funds from or makes funds available to a terrorist organization, or collects funds for a terrorist organization, they may be punished with up to 25 years' imprisonment (Art. 102.6). Providing support or resources to terrorist groups is also punishable by up to 25 years' imprisonment (Art. 102.7). If a person provides or collects funds and is reckless as to whether the funds will be used to facilitate or engage in a terrorist act, if convicted, they would receive life imprisonment (Art. 103.1). Australia has continued to play an active role in regional organizations, such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Penalize the facilitation of (including organization and recruitment of) foreign terrorist fighters: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Recruitment for a terrorist organization is punishable by a maximum of 25 years' imprisonment (Art. 102.4, Australian Criminal Code).
Bring foreign terrorist fighters to “justice”: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Recent news articles have focused on the evidentiary hurdles that prosecutors face in successfully charging and convicting returned foreign fighters (http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/prosecutions-of-foreign-fighters-hard-experts-say-as-labors-matthew-gardiner-returns-home-20150407-1mfdwm.html). See also http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/asia/australia-arrests-nurse-who-says-he-worked-with-isis-under-duress.html.
Support of five key aspects of principled humanitarian action in counterterrorism contexts
Points allocated: 46 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Knowability of anti-terrorism lists: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Australia maintains a publicly available terrorist list (http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx).
Ease of navigability and efficiency of the regulatory system: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient. (But note that the FATF found that Australia was noncompliant with Recommendation 8) (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf).
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principled humanitarian action: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
See Australian Criminal Code, Section 119.4(7) (providing that the section on the crime of preparations for incursions into foreign countries for purpose of engaging in hostile activities “does not apply if the person engages in conduct solely by way of, or for the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature.”) See also Section 102.8(4)(c), providing that the section on the crime of associating with terrorist organizations “does not apply if: [...] the association is only for the purpose of providing aid of a humanitarian nature”), Section 119.2(3)(a) (providing that the section on the crime of entering, or remaining in, declared areas “does not apply if the person enters, or remains in, the area solely for one or more of the following purposes: providing aid of a humanitarian nature”), and Section 119.5(4) (providing that the section on the crime of allowing the use of buildings, vessels and aircraft to commit offences “does not apply if the person engages in conduct solely by way of, or for the purposes of, the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature.”)
No reported legal proceedings on the basis of principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists nor reported “chilling effect” (self-imposed curtailment) of principled humanitarian action due to state counterterrorism measures: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. In one (potentially) related case, it is not clear whether the institution of legal proceedings was based on martial support (even if under duress) to designated terrorists, rather than on provision of humanitarian aid and assistance to designated terrorists (see http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/asia/australia-arrests-nurse-who-says-he-worked-with-isis-under-duress.html). Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state’s domestic counterterrorism legislation had or has a reported “chilling effect” on principled humanitarian organizations.
Financial support via designated channel to Iraq and Syria in 2015 (to date) as a percentage of GDP: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
0.002% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 43 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 3 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 2 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2. A 1979 law prohibits the recruitment of Belgian citizens by foreign armed forces and authorizes the government (requiring a government decree) to prohibit Belgian citizens from joining foreign armed forces. The punishment for this crime ranges from three months’ to two years’ imprisonment. Article 140 of the Belgian Penal Code also prohibits recruitment to commit a terrorist crime (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). The new coalition government, elected in 2014, has applied prohibitions to Belgian citizens who participate in foreign conflicts such as Syria, and has increased the sanctions under the law, to include the option of courts to strip dual citizens of their Belgian citizenship (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Twelve such measures were announced on January 16, 2015 (http://www.premier.be/sites/default/files/articles/PPT_16012015_définitif.pdf). "Belgian officials announced stricter enforcement of regulations that allow them to prohibit passport issuance of or revocation of passports to disrupt the travel of suspected foreign terrorist fighters. All new Belgian passports include biometric data” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Belgian counterterrorism law includes provisions that could be applied to foreign fighters, including provisions of the Belgian Penal Code (Article 140) prohibiting actions that constitute "take part in the activities of a terrorist group…with the true knowledge that this participation contributes to the perpetration of a crime or an offense by the terrorist group." Article 140 also criminalizes "any person who, in Belgium or abroad, receives [terrorist training]" (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). Penalties for these acts can range from five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 5,000 euros (http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/5).
Article 140 of the Belgian Penal Code also criminalizes the following: "anyone who participates in an activity of a terrorist group, including by providing it with information or material resources or through any form of financing of a terrorist group's activity, in the knowledge that such participation aides the commission of a crime or offense." (http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/5). Belgium is a member of the FATF, the Egmont Group, and MONEYVAL, a FATF-style regional body. It also employs a financial intelligence unit to track and investigate financial crimes such as terrorist financing (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Belgian counterterrorism law includes provisions that could be applied to foreign fighters, including provisions of the Belgian Penal Code (Article 140) prohibiting actions that constitute "tak[ing] part in the activities of a terrorist group…with the true knowledge that this participation contributes to the perpetration of a crime or an offense by the terrorist group." (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). Penalties for these acts can range from five to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 5,000 euros (http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/5).
Of the estimated 358 foreign terrorist fighters of Belgian origin, approximately 87 have returned to Belgium (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Measures taken toward these individuals include monitoring upon return from fighting abroad; measures aimed at reintegration; and deleting individuals from local residents' registries, thereby denying them some public benefits (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). The Belgian Penal Code allows for extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts (http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/5). A French-Algerian dual national (and alleged former FTFer) was arrested by authorities and extradited to Belgium for shooting and killing four individuals at the Brussels Jewish Museum. Others have been prosecuted for alleged participation in terrorist activities abroad (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Points allocated: 36 out of 50 (see methodology section).
While Belgium does not maintain a domestic terrorist list, the country belongs to the European Union, which does maintain publicly available terrorist lists that comply with the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient. Belgium nonprofit associations are subject to the same accounting rules as commercial enterprises and smaller organizations face simplified accounting rules (http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Belgium-2015.pdf). Larger nonprofit organizations must submit information regarding the purpose and objectives of their activities, as well as the identities of their senior leadership and board members.
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principled humanitarian action: 0 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research suggests that the domestic legislation, if any, limiting travel to conflict zones involving terrorists does not exempt staff of principled humanitarian organizations (expressly or as a subset of non-profit organizations, automatically or potentially through a petition/license); that domestic legislation, if any, applicable within the territory of the state and/or extraterritorially restricting engagement with terrorists does not exempt impartial wartime medical care for terrorists; and that relevant domestic legislation, if any, does not exempt other forms of principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists.
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. Nor did initial research uncover evidence that the state’s domestic counterterrorism legislation had or has a reported “chilling effect” on principled humanitarian organizations.
0.00398% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 29 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 1 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 0 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: In April 2014, the legislature adopted amendments to the Criminal Code (Article 162b) that extend prison terms for convicted terrorists to ten years. The amendments also include a five-year minimum sentence to anyone who "organizes, directs, trains, equips, or mobilizes individuals or groups for the purpose of joining, in any manner, foreign military or foreign para-police formations that operate outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not less than five years." Those individuals who "join in any way a foreign paramilitary and para-police formation" face a minimum three-year sentence. Recruitment, as well as "anyone who procures or makes available means, removes obstacles, creates plans, or makes agreements with others...or undertakes any activity that creates the conditions for directly committing this criminal offense" is punishable by one to ten years’ imprisonment (http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Country%20Profiles/Legislation/BiH%20Criminal%20Code%20Article%20162b%20-%20draft.pdf). “The Bosnia Border Police uses a computerized database and software system to support immigration and passenger information collection. The system links all 55 border crossings and four airport locations via the State Police Information Network, which provides the Border Police with immediate access to other databases (including Interpol) to run appropriate checks and cross-checks. Derogatory information triggers a ‘hit’ when a subject's passport or identification card is passed through the scanner at the port of entry. Individuals may be detained for up to 24 hours while Border Police officials consult with other agencies about next steps” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Penalizing foreign terrorist fighter conduct: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section).
In April 2014, the legislature adopted amendments to the Criminal Code that extend prison terms for convicted terrorists to ten years (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina).
Penalize funding to foreign terrorist fighters: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Bosnia belongs to the Egmont Group and to MONEYVAL, a regional FATF-style body, which expressed concerns in 2014 that Bosnia needed to improve its laws to better deter and detect terrorist financing. Bosnia's new law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing had not been fully implemented by the end of 2014 (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Recruitment, as well as "anyone who procures or makes available means, removes obstacles, creates plans, or makes agreements with others...or undertakes any activity that creates the conditions for directly committing this criminal offense" is punishable by one to ten years' imprisonment (http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Country%20Profiles/Legislation/BiH%20Criminal%20Code%20Article%20162b%20-%20draft.pdf).
In September 2014, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ordered a one-month sentence for five individuals found guilty of recruiting people to join fighters in Syria and Iraq (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina).
Points allocated: 22 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Knowability of anti-terrorism lists: 0 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has established a domestic anti-terrorism list (at a minimum, a list implementing binding Security Council-imposed al-Qaeda-related sanctions) and/or made the requisite measures relating to that list publicly available.
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient. Nonprofit organizations must register with the government, but there appears to be no other special requirements specifically aimed at NGOs (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round3/MONEYVAL(2009)42Rep_BIH3_en.pdf).
Financial support via designated channel to Iraq and Syria in 2015 (to date) as a percentage of GDP: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section).
0% (no financial assistance reportedly provided via the designated funding channel) (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 48 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 8 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 6 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 2 out of 2. In 2013, Canada's Criminal Code was amended by the Combating Terrorism Act to make it a criminal offense for individuals to leave the country for the purpose of participating in the activity of a terrorist group, punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). In June 2015, Canada passed its Anti-Terrorism Act 2015, which aims to prevent terrorists from recruiting others by allowing government officials to seize terrorist propaganda, including from the Internet (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=926039&_ga=1.55138409.335140496.1436125429). "The Passenger Protect Program identifies individuals who may pose a threat to aviation security and reduces their ability to harm or threaten aviation by taking preventative action, such as not allowing them to board an aircraft" (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf). Additionally, the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Act "enhance[s] the ability of law enforcement agencies to detain suspected terrorists before they can harm Canadians...while still requiring judicial authorization of the detention either before or after the arrest" (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=926009&_ga=1.257644489.335140496.1436125429). "Canadian officials can deny passport applications or revoke valid passports of Canadian citizens suspected of traveling abroad (or aspiring to travel abroad) to commit acts of terrorism. In June 2014, the government passed the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (C-24), which provides for the collection, retention, use, disclosure, and disposal of information on Canadian citizens, including disclosure for the purposes of national security, the defense of Canada, the conduct of international affairs, or the verification of citizenship status or identity of any person for the purpose of administering the law of another country. C-24 also permitted the Canadian government to strip Canadian citizenship from dual nationals convicted of treason, terrorism, and espionage. Canada has an extensive border security network and uses travel document security technology, biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry, information sharing with host governments and other countries, and collection of advance passenger name record information on commercial flights" (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Committing terrorist acts, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, and traveling abroad to commit acts of terrorism violates Canadian law (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Canada is a member of the FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. It has a "rigorous detection and monitoring process in place to identify money laundering and terrorist financing activities." In June 2014, the Canadian government adopted the Economic Action Plan 2014 (C-31), which, among other things, enhanced recordkeeping and registration requirements for financial institutions and intermediaries (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf). "Canada works closely with the United States on bilateral homeland security programs such as the Beyond the Border initiative and the Cross Border Crime Forum. It has also contributed to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In June 2014, the government passed the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (C-24), which provides for the collection, retention, use, disclosure, and disposal of information on Canadian citizens, including disclosure for the purposes of national security, the defense of Canada, the conduct of international affairs, or the verification of citizenship status or identity of any person for the purpose of administering the law of another country. In December 2014, Canada lawmakers passed the Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act (C-13), which, among other things, allows for cooperation amongst specific states by establishing a system for exchanging information and evidence on behalf of a foreign state for use in a criminal investigation and prosecution conducted by that state" (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
In 2013, Canada's Criminal Code was amended by the Combating Terrorism Act to make it a criminal offense for individuals to leave the country for the purpose of participating in the activity of a terrorist group, punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). In June 2015, Canada passed its Anti-Terrorism Act 2015, which aims to prevent terrorists from recruiting others by allowing government officials to seize terrorist propaganda, including from the Internet (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=926039&_ga=1.55138409.335140496.1436125429).
"In July 2014, Canadian authorities handed down the first charge for travel for the purposes of terrorism. A Canadian national was charged in absentia for murder ‘in association with a terrorist group,’ reportedly in Syria" (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Points allocated: 42 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Canada maintains a publicly available terrorist list (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/index-eng.aspx).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient. The Charities Registration Act makes it possible for government officials to issue security certificates against a charity based on intelligence, which can prevent an organization from registering or deregisters an existing charity (http://www.researchgate.net/publication/225923254_International_NGOs_and_National_Regulation_in_an_Age_of_Terrorism). See also http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/chcklsts/vtb-eng.html (Checklist for Charities on Avoiding Terrorist Abuse). This Act, however, does not appear to impose especially onerous restrictions on non-profit organizations with respect to funding, registration, and/or financial reporting. Initial research suggests that domestic legislation prohibiting financial transactions with terrorists appears to exempt principled humanitarian organizations (expressly or as a subset of non-profit organizations, whether automatically or through a petition or license) (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/ct_study_full_report.pdf).
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principled humanitarian action: 7 out of 10 (see methodology section).
The Criminal Code, Section 83.01(1) provides that the definition of “terrorist activity” expressly “does not include an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules of international law.” Thus, this section exempts only those elements of principled humanitarian action undertaken in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to armed conflict.
No reported self-imposed curtailment (“chilling effect”) of principled humanitarian action due to state counterterrorism measures: 5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. “Some humanitarian actors reported that counter-terrorism legislation in countries such as Canada…as well as restrictions in funding agreements, had a ‘chilling effect.’” (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/ct_study_full_report.pdf).
Financial support via designated channel to Iraq and Syria in 2015 (to date) as a percentage of GDP: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
0.00967% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 24 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 8 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state prevents entry or transit through their territory of FTFs, nor did our research uncover evidence that the state prevents the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents (see methodology section).
In 2014, China began consideration of a draft counterterrorism law, which has been subject to criticism by certain governments and activists for being too restrictive of and violating individual rights. On an initial review, the draft law, in defining terrorism broadly to include not only "activity" but also "opinion" that "generates social panic, threatens public security, or coerces a state organ or international organization," nonetheless does not appear to fully penalize all of the relevant Security Council-imposed obligations concerning FTF conduct (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-invokes-terrorism-as-it-readies-additional-harsh-measures/2015/03/04/html).
China is a member of the FATF and two other FATF-style regional bodies. The government has strengthened its preventative measures to combat terrorist financing, emphasizing that financial institutions are required to collect and maintain beneficial ownership information, and making Suspicious Transaction Reports more comprehensive (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf). Its draft counterterrorism law includes a section mandating that the central bank and civil administration should supervise and inspect financial flows into foundations, social organizations, and foreign NGOs (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-invokes-terrorism-as-it-readies-additional-harsh-measures/2015/03/04/1e078288-139c-497e-aa8a-e6d810a5a8a2_story.html).
Penalize the facilitation of (including organization and recruitment of) foreign terrorist fighters: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Under Article 120 of China's Criminal Code, anyone who "organizes, leads, and actively participates in a terrorist organization" will receive three to ten years' imprisonment, or "criminal detention if circumstances are relatively minor." (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm). Thus, on an initial review, the state’s legislation does not appear to criminalize the provision or receiving of terrorist training.
Bring foreign terrorist fighters to “justice”: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has ensured that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice.
Points allocated: 17 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Knowability of anti-terrorism lists: 5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research uncovered inconclusive evidence as to whether China may maintain a domestic terrorist list (see article at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t56257.htm, describing a 2003 listing of Turkish groups identified as terrorist organizations), but our research proved inconclusive on whether China continues to maintain such a list, and if so, who might be listed.
Ease of navigability and efficiency of the regulatory system: 0 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial evidence suggests the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively difficult to navigate and/or inefficient (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html).
Assessment criterion i: 2 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2. Under counterterrorism legislation passed in 2006, Denmark can surveil and wiretap terrorist suspects with a valid warrant and sufficient evidentiary proof (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Chapter 13 of the Danish Penal Code prohibits individuals from participating in unlawful military organizations (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Any person who recruits another person to commit or "advance" actions under this section of the Penal Code, including joining a group or association, is subject to ten to sixteen years' imprisonment (Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(c)(1)). Any individual who recruits another person to provide financial support or provide funds to terrorism may be punished for up to six years' imprisonment ((Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(c)(2). “Denmark conducts travel document checks for non-Schengen area travel; has biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry; and security forces patrol and control Denmark's land and sea borders. Denmark has open borders with EU neighbors, pursuant to the Schengen Agreement, and consequently there are no passport controls at the land borders or airport terminals servicing most Schengen Visa area flights” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Denmark can confiscate the passports of minors and does not issue new ones unless the minor's parents agree (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf).
Chapter 13 of the Danish Penal Code criminalizes participation in unlawful military organizations, and instructing others to commit terrorism (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Individuals who participate in an illegal military organization or group may receive a fine or up to two years' imprisonment (Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(g)). Persons who conduct terrorist training may be imprisoned for up to ten years, while those who train persons on terrorist financing may receive up to six years' imprisonment. Persons who receive terrorist training may be punished with up to six years' imprisonment (Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(d)).
Denmark can freeze assets within hours or days with a valid court order. Denmark is also a member of the FATF and the Egmont Group, and it cooperates closely with other Nordic financial intelligence units (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Chapter 13 of the Danish Penal Code criminalizes the financing of terrorism, which is punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment (Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(b)). Persons committing acts under Chapter 13 may lose their Danish citizenship (provided they do not subsequently become stateless) (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Chapter 13 of the Danish Penal Code prohibits individuals from participating in unlawful military organizations (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Any person who recruits another person to commit or "advance" actions under this section of the Penal Code, including to join a group or association, is subject to ten to sixteen years' imprisonment (Danish Penal Code, Chapter 13, Section 114(c)(1)). One report notes, however, that as of February 2014, no criminal case has been brought against an "aspiring foreign fighter" before their departure (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf).
“Denmark has prosecuted multiple individuals for terrorist acts, including promoting terrorist propaganda (four years' imprisonment); collecting and sending funds to terrorist organizations (case still underway); inciting terrorism by posting a link to his Facebook page to a video of an ISIS spokesperson in Syria (case still underway); and ‘explicitly expressing support for terrorism’ by posting on Facebook pictures from the Syrian conflict (charged in absentia)” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Points allocated: 35 out of 50 (see methodology section).
While Denmark does not appear to maintain a domestic terrorist list, the country belongs to the European Union, which does maintain publicly available terrorist lists that encompass the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient.
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. However, “[s]ome humanitarian actors reported that counter-terrorism legislation in countries such as …Denmark…as well as restrictions in funding agreements, had a ‘chilling effect.’” (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/ct_study_full_report.pdf).
0.00722% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 4 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 2 out of 2: Under a 2012 counterterrorism law (Law No. 2012-1431 of December 21, 2012, Regarding Security and the Fight Against Terrorism), French criminal law (including provisions regarding participation in a group formed for the purpose of preparing an act of terrorism) should apply to citizens and residents of France for acts committed within France and abroad (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). This 2012 legislation also allows for the prosecution of French citizens who return to France after committing an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camp with the intention to return to France and commit terrorist acts. A November 13, 2014 law also prevents people from leaving the country when there are reasons to believe that they intend to engage in illicit terrorist activities abroad (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). In January 2014, French officials arrested three individuals at the Saint-Etienne Airport. The individuals were planning to travel to Syria and were charged with preparing to commit terrorist acts, and the prosecutor asked for a sentence ranging from two to six years' imprisonment. (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). Following the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, Prime Minister Manuel Valls stated that he would create a database listing the names of those who, among other things, were members of a terrorist fighting group, which would force those listed to notify the government of any trip abroad. The November 13, 2014 law also authorized the Interior Ministry to void or confiscate the passports of people considered to be potential terrorist threats (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/europe/amedy-coulibaly-paris-gunman-france.html).
The 2012 legislation also allows for the prosecution of French citizens who return to France after committing an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camp with the intention to return to France and commit terrorist acts. A November 13, 2014 law also prevents people from leaving the country when there are reasons to believe that they intend to engage in illicit terrorist activities abroad (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
France belongs to the FATF and regional FATF-related bodies. “In January 2014, the French Treasury froze the assets of a nonprofit association called ‘Perle d'Espoir’ (Pearl of Hope), and later arrested two employees of that organization for terrorist financing and conspiracy” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). France has worked closely with the United States "for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-relating information and partnered in fostering closer regional and international cooperation" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). France is also a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamist State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Additionally, France undertook joint counterterrorism operations with the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and has taken steps to assist other countries with building their counterterrorism capacity (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Article 421 of the French Penal Code criminalizes "conspiracy with a terrorist enterprise," defined as "participating in a group formed, or agreement made, for the purpose of preparing" a terrorist act. This crime is punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment and a fine of 225,000 euros. If the individual has assumed a leadership role in the organization, the penalty increases to up to 20 years' imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 euros (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Foreign fighters that return to France are "systematically questioned" by French intelligence and law enforcement authorities, following which they are "almost always detained and charged with conspiracy with a terrorist enterprise" (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). As of October 7, 2014, approximately 50 returned foreign fighters were detained, although they had not yet been tried for "conspiracy with a terrorist enterprise" (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Points allocated: 34 out of 50 (see methodology section).
While France does not appear to maintain a domestic terrorist list, the country belongs to the European Union, which does maintain publicly available terrorist lists that encompass the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/). France does provide procedures for freezing assets pursuant to UNSCR 1373, and recognizes Daesh (ISIS) as a terrorist organization (http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/terrorism).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.cof.org/content/france).
Financial support via designated channel to Iraq and Syria in 2015 (to date) as a percentage of GDP: 4 out of 10 (see methodology section).
0.0001% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 7 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 6 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: German counterterrorism law criminalizes the membership in or support for domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, and the provision of financial or material support for terrorist groups or acts, as well as attendance at terrorist training camps. In September 2014, the Ministry of Interior made it explicitly illegal to join, recruit, provide material support for, propagandize for, or display the symbols of ISIS. (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). German officials have made use of existing counterterrorism provisions to seize passports of those individuals deemed to pose a security risk and began preparatory work on other measures to block travel, such as limitations on national identification cards. German passports and other identity documents have "strong security features." Germany, however, does not collect entry or exit data. (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Government officials work closely with border officials in Turkey to exchange information on travelers who may be foreign fighters (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
German counterterrorism law criminalizes the membership in or support for domestic and foreign terrorist organizations, and the provision of financial or material support for terrorist groups or acts, as well as attendance at terrorist training camps. In September 2014, the Ministry of Interior made it explicitly illegal to join, recruit, provide material support for, propagandize for, or display the symbols of ISIS (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Germany is a member of the FATF and an observer of several FATF-style regional bodies. In April, the Ministry of the Interior banned a Hezbollah-affiliated charity, the Lebanese Orphan Children Project, and seized nearly $80,000 (U.S.) in assets (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). See also above concerning German counterterrorism legal provisions.
The German Criminal Code criminalizes participation in terrorist training. Section 129 criminalizes the formation of criminal organizations, or those who participate in organizations as a member, recruit members or supporters, or support it themselves. These crimes are punishable by five years' imprisonment or a fine. Individuals who form terrorist organizations or who participate in those groups as a member may receive one to ten years' imprisonment. Recruitment for terrorist organizations is punishable by six months to five years' imprisonment. These provisions, under Section 129b, also apply to organizations abroad (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html).
"German officials actively investigated [German foreign fighter] returnees for any terrorist threat resulting from their experience abroad….At the end of 2014, the Federal Minister of Justice said authorities were carrying out approximately 300 investigations or prosecutions nationwide related to ISIL membership or support" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Points allocated: 38 out of 50 (see methodology section).
While German law allows for the proscription of terrorists, initial research was inconclusive as to whether Germany maintains a domestic terrorist list (Martha Crenshaw (ed.), The Consequences of Terrorism (2010), at 50). Germany belongs to the European Union, however, which does maintain publicly available terrorist lists that encompass the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.cof.org/content/germany#Activities).
Financial support via designated channel to Iraq and Syria in 2015 (to date) as a percentage of GDP: 8 out of 10 (see methodology section).
0.00531% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section) (assessment criteria i: 0 [out of 8]).
Assessment criterion i: 0 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 2 out of 2. Article 3c of Law 55 of 2006, amended by Law 18 of 2014, prohibits Jordanian citizens from joining military groups and terrorist organizations inside the country and abroad (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). “Jordan continued to develop its border security infrastructure, largely through the Jordan Border Security Program, which began in 2009 and consists of a sophisticated package of sensors to help improve situational awareness along the border. Jordan also uses biographic and biometric screening and engages in passenger information sharing. The Jordan Border Security Program aims to prevent infiltrations into Jordan or unauthorized departures. Jordan actively monitors airports and border crossings for potential foreign fighters” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Penalizing foreign terrorist fighter conduct: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Article 3c of Law 55 of 2006, amended by Law 18 of 2014, prohibits Jordanian citizens from receiving any military training from terrorist organizations within the country or abroad. Individuals committing these offenses may be imprisoned (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). The Jordanian Parliament amended its 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law in April 2014, broadening the definition of terrorism to include forming a group with the intention to commit terrorist acts; harming relations with a foreign state; using the internet to facilitate terrorist acts or promote terrorist ideas; and attacks on the life or liberty of the royal family. The Jordanian Penal Code defines terrorism broadly, to include acts that "contravene the public order." (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
"Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. Although the Parliament introduced amendments to its counterterrorist financing law, which would bring Jordan more in line with international standards, the amendments had not been adopted by December 2014. No known prosecution of terrorist financing occurred in 2014. The Associations Law requires nonprofit organizations to apply for Cabinet approval before receiving foreign funds. Jordan's Anti-Money Laundering Law does not require nonprofit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports. Jordan participated actively in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. It also actively engages in passenger information sharing " (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Jordan has arrested and charged individuals for recruiting or otherwise supporting ISIS (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm). See also above regarding the scope of Jordanian counterterrorism law.
"During 2014, Jordanian authorities took legal action against individuals accused of seeking to join ISIS; recruiting for or otherwise supporting ISIS, especially on the internet; and attempting to travel to or return from Syria to fight with extremist groups. Beginning in August 2014, security officials arrested over 100 ISIS supporters, many for posting pro-ISIS videos or statements on social medial sites, charging them with using the internet to propagate terrorist ideology. Officials also regularly arrested departing or returning Jordanian foreign fighters, charging them with joining armed groups" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Ease of navigability and efficiency of the regulatory system: 5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For example, associations, foundations, and not-for-profit companies may not have any "political goals," and cannot participate in "activities of political parties." Prior approval is required before the receipt of foreign donations, and government officials must be notified 48 hours in advance of any assembly (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html).
Points allocated: 16 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 0 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 0 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2. The Lebanese security forces seek to limit ISIS's threat, including the flow of foreign fighters to and from Syria, by working to secure the porous, ungoverned border with Syria and conducting counterterrorism operations within Lebanon. The government has increased security measures at airports and border crossings to prevent the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. Lebanon does not have biometric systems, however, in place at official ports of entry. Lebanese officials were considering the adoption of biometric passports. Lebanon uses an electronic database to collect biographic data for travelers at all ports of entry. "The government was not in full compliance with UNSCR 2178 at year's end, however, since it has not taken significant action to prevent Hizballah from sending its fighters to Syria and Iraq." (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
“Lebanon does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism law, but several provisions of its criminal code are used to prosecute terrorist acts; however, implementation of these provisions has been complicated by Lebanon's complex political and confessional system, and by Hizballah restricting access to attack sites within areas under its control” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. Lebanon is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Lebanon's financial intelligence unit (SIC) can investigate suspicious financial transactions and freeze assets. Neither the SIC or the ISF received any allegations of terrorist financing that led to terrorist financing cases in 2014. NGOs must submit a yearly financial statement to the government, but are not required to file suspicious transaction reports to prevent terrorist financing; however, the banking sector subjects NGOs to enhanced due diligence and reports suspicious transactions to the SIC (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
The Internal Security Forces (ISF) have worked to prevent terrorist recruitment and the direction of terrorist activities by prison inmates, who, in many cases, have complete control of certain cell blocks, and access to cell phones and the Internet (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Lebanese associations must notify the government immediately after they are created, and the government will issue a receipt of notification, after which an association can take advantages of all the legal rights and privileges of legal associations. Associations have faced restrictions, however, following the crisis in Syria, as government officials have moved to restrict NGO activities, including economic support programs (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/lebanon.html).
Points allocated: 8 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 0 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: Libya has a draft counterterrorism law, prepared by the interim government, that would define a terrorist organization as a group of three or more persons established to commit terrorist crimes within or outside Libya. If enacted, Article 9 would criminalize the act of joining such an organization, either within or outside Libya (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Libya's porous borders and "critically weak" law enforcement continued to make it a permissive environment for terrorist groups. (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). The Libyan government lacks a comprehensive border management strategy and has struggled to secure the country's land and sea borders, enabling the flow of foreign fighters, among other illicit items, that pose serious security challenges to the region. Border security forces are ineffective and often participate in illicit cross-border trade. Security at airports is minimal, with limited document screening and no use of passenger name record systems or biometric technology (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, although the Libyan Penal Code criminalizes offenses prejudicial to state security, including terrorism and the promotion of terrorist acts. Libyan law enforcement lacks the capacity to detect, deter, respond to, or investigate terrorist incidents (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Penalize funding to foreign terrorist fighters: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, although the Libyan Penal Code criminalizes offenses prejudicial to state security, including the handling of money in support of such acts (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. “Libyan government and financial institutions lack the ability to identify and interdict illicit financial transactions” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Penalize the facilitation of (including organization and recruitment of) foreign terrorist fighters: 2 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has ensured that domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and penalize the willful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the provide or receiving of terrorist training.
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html).
Assessment criterion i: 2 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Government airport authorities can detect fraudulent documents but currently lack biometric screening capabilities (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
As of December 2014, the Moroccan government was reviewing draft amendments to its criminal codes to comply with UNSCR 2178 by criminalizing support to terrorist groups, travel to fight or train in conflict areas, and recruitment of others for such acts (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm). These amendments later passed and were published in the official gazette (http://81.192.52.100/BO/AR/2015/BO_6365_Ar.pdf).
Morocco is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. In March 2014, officials arrested four individuals for terrorist financing and the recruitment of youth to travel to Syria to fight. Law enforcement officials in Morocco, along with private carriers, have worked regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempt to transit illegally through Morocco (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
As of December 2014, the Moroccan government was reviewing draft amendments to its criminal codes to comply with UNSCR 2178 by criminalizing support to terrorist groups, travel to fight or train in conflict areas, and recruitment of others for such acts (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
In July 2014, the Ministry of Interior claimed to have arrested over 120 foreign terrorist fighters who had returned from Syria since the start of the Syrian conflict. The government tried and convicted individuals for recruiting volunteers for ISIS; raising funds and exporting people to conflict zones; preparing to join ISIS in Syria; and sentenced seven people to three years in prison for traveling to Syria and receiving military training (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Ease of navigability and efficiency of the regulatory system: 5 out of 10 (see methodology).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/morocco.html).
Assessment criterion i: 4 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 2 out of 2: The Dutch Ministers of Social Affairs and Employment and of Security and Justice have formulated an "Action Plan: Integrated Approach to Jihadism," in order to "protect democracy and the rule of law, counter and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands, and eliminate the causes of radicalization." The action plan's 38 measures would allow for the revocation of the nationality of jihadists who joined a terrorist group (unless doing so would render them stateless); requiring periodic reporting of returned foreign fighters; and preparing legislation to permit "the systematic collection and processing of travel data for the purpose of counterterrorism" (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). The Dutch government prevents outbound terrorist foreign fighters from leaving the country, when possible, through punitive and administrative measures (e.g., revoking passports or halting social welfare benefits) (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). As of December 2014, it had revoked 53 passports of potential foreign terrorist fighters. In December 2014, the government began the consultation process on draft legislation to revoke citizenship, without a court ruling, of dual national foreign terrorist fighters who have joined a designated terrorist organization. Dutch ports of entry have biographic and biometric screening capabilities (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Under Article 134a of the Dutch Penal Code, "Participating in armed jihad or jihadist training abroad is a criminal offense," and it also makes it illegal "to furnish oneself or another intentionally the opportunity, resources, or intelligence, or to try to do so, in order to commit a terrorist crime or a crime in preparation or facilitation of a terrorist crime, or to acquire knowledge or skills to this end or impart these to another" (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf)
The Netherlands is a member of the FATF and a cooperating and supporting nation of a FATF-style regional body. The Netherlands immediately freezes assets of individuals on terrorist watch lists (including UN, EU, and its own national designations), and Dutch authorities monitor financial transactions (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). The United States reports "cooperation with U.S. law enforcement [and the Netherlands] remained excellent." The government coordinates and shares information related to foreign terrorist fighters with Interpol and Europol. The Dutch have taken a lead role in the EU to establish protocols against terrorist financing and have provided funds to the IMF for assistance to countries that lack the resources to implement these measures expeditiously. The Dutch participate in a broad range of regional and international counterterrorism forums (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Article 205 of the Dutch Criminal Code punishes recruitment for terrorism purposes and can be applied to foreign terrorist fighters (http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf). Article 132(3) states that persons who disseminate material inciting others to commit terrorist offenses or to facilitate or prepare terrorist offenses may be punished with up to four years' imprisonment (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/general/docs/report_on_the_implementation_of_cfd_2008-919-jha_and_cfd_2002-475-jha_on_combating_terrorism_swd_en.pdf).
The Dutch government has pursued criminal cases against prospective and returned foreign terrorist fighters and against foreign terrorist fighter recruiters. Multiple cases have been brought against suspected or known foreign terrorist fighters, as well as individuals committing other terrorist offenses, such as financing terrorism, planning terrorist attacks, and recruiting individuals to travel to Syria (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The Netherlands maintains a domestic terrorist list (see International Monetary Fund, Kingdom of The Netherlands: Detailed Assessment of Standards and Codes (2004), at 186); it also belongs to the European Union, which maintains publicly available terrorist lists that encompass the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (see generally http://www.scp.nl/english/dsresource?objectid=22125).
0.00636% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 25 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 9 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criteria i: 8 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: New anti-terrorism measures passed in late 2014 would allow the nation's domestic spy agency to surveil individuals for up to 24 hours without a warrant (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/new-zealand-approves-anti-terrorism-laws-to-counter-foreign-fighters-risk). Changes to New Zealand law, made in late 2014, allow the Minister of Internal Affairs to cancel passports for up to three years and to temporarily suspend passports for up to 10 working days in urgent cases (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state ensures that domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and penalize their nationals and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality, for the purpose of perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or providing or receiving terrorist training.
While it does not specifically mention foreign fighters, New Zealand law prohibits the provision of funding to terrorists in its Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. Providing funding to terrorists is punishable by 14 years’ imprisonment (http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM152710.html).
In October 2014, the New Zealand Prime Minister authorized a targeted review of security settings "to ensure that the capability, capacity, and legislation to counter the evolving domestic threat posted by foreign terrorist fighters and other violent extremists are adequate to meet that threat." (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Points allocated: 39.5 out of 50 (see methodology section).
The New Zealand Police posts lists of designated terrorist entities pursuant to Resolutions 1267/1989 and 1988 (http://www.police.govt.nz/about-us/publication/designated-terrorist-entities), as well as of entities designated pursuant to authorities provided under Resolution 1373 (http://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities/lists-associated-with-resolution-1373).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol8iss3/art_3.htm). (New Zealand requires NGOs to be accredited to receive certain types of funding from the New Zealand Aid Programme (http://www.aid.govt.nz/funding-and-contracts/new-zealand-disaster-response-partnership/accreditation).)
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principled humanitarian action: 5.5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (NZ) s 10(3) provides, as an exception to the prohibition on making property, or financial or related services, available to designated terrorist entity, that “[a]n example of making property available with a reasonable excuse, for the purposes of subsection (1), is where the property (for example, items of food, clothing, or medicine) is made available in an act that does no more than satisfy essential human needs of (or of a dependent of) an individual designated under this Act.”
0.00080% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 45 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 4 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Norway is currently reviewing new legislation that would criminalize Norwegian citizens from recruiting or participating as foreign terrorist fighters (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). (This law has been criticized as overbroad and for possibly affecting humanitarian assistance (http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/leder/Hastverksarbeid-Amot-IS-krigere-7739520.html).) Norwegian immigration officials use biometric equipment for fingerprinting arrivals from outside the Schengen area. Norway cannot revoke or permanently hold a citizen's passport for expressing support for a terrorist group, or expressing an interest to travel to Syria and Iraq (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Current laws criminalize conducting or planning to conduct a terrorist act, receiving terrorist training, or providing material support to a terrorist organization with money, materials, recruitment, fighting, and related crimes. Serious terrorism offenses are punishable by a maximum sentence of 30 years' imprisonment (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Current laws criminalize, among other things, providing material support to a terrorist organization with money. Norway is a member of the FATF and the Egmont Group, and in response to UNSCR 2178 the government established an interagency group to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. Nonprofit organizations are subject to strict accounting and regulatory requirements, and the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime is charged with monitoring and the periodic testing of these requirements. Norway participates in many international and regional counterterrorism forums, including work on countering violent extremism. (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The Norwegian Criminal Code criminalizes the planning of terrorism, as well as recruitment of terrorists. Three individuals have been recently tried under these laws for (allegedly) fighting in Syria (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
The Norwegian Criminal Code criminalizes the planning of terrorism, as well as recruitment of terrorists. Three people have been recently tried under this legislation for fighting in Syria (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Points allocated: 40 out of 50 (see methodology section).
In 2006, Norway announced that it would no longer adopt the EU terrorist list, and, instead, to maintain its neutrality, Norway would list groups independently (see, e.g., http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/3734-norway-to-revise-terrorist-organizations-list-after-the-elections and Martha Crenshaw (ed.), The Consequences of Terrorism (2010), at 108).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.brreg.no/english/registers/frivillighet/; Femida Handy & Pamala Wiepking (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy (2015), at 236-37).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. Nor did initial research uncover evidence that the state’s domestic counterterrorism legislation had or has a reported “chilling effect” on principled humanitarian organizations. (As noted above, Norway is currently reviewing new legislation that would criminalize Norwegian citizens from recruiting or participating as foreign terrorist fighters (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). This draft law has been criticized as overbroad and for possibly affecting humanitarian assistance (http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/leder/Hastverksarbeid-Amot-IS-krigere-7739520.html).)
0.00825% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 33 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 8 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: The Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951 provides the authority to revoke citizenship and cancel passports. The Passports Act of 1974 provides that Pakistan can cancel passports without notice to the individual if the person "has been engaged in subversive activities which are prejudicial to the interest of Pakistan or Pakistan's relations with any foreign power" (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Pakistan is implementing biometric collection in national databases and screening at border land crossings with the International Border Management Security system. Pakistan collects advance passenger name records on commercial flights (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
In 2013, the Pakistani government passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2013, which amended the definition of terrorism to include threats and acts against a "foreign government or population or an international organization." The law also prohibits membership in proscribed organizations. Pakistan's Penal Code also prohibits certain "offenses against the state," including waging war against any power in alliance or at peace with Pakistan (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). In 2014, Pakistan promulgated new legislation that supported the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenses (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
In 2013, the Pakistani government passed the Anti-Terrorism Bill, which prohibits support and funding of proscribed terrorist organizations (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Pakistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. The government adopted legislation that gave it the ability to freeze terrorist assets; however, as of the end of 2014, it had not yet been implemented. In 2014, Pakistan promulgated new legislation that supported the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenses (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf). According to the U.S. State Department, cooperation with Pakistan during 2014 was "mixed," and the country continued to deny visas for trainers focused on law enforcement and civilian counterterrorism assistance (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
In 2014, Pakistan promulgated new legislation that supported the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenses (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Bring foreign terrorist fighters to “justice”: 6 out of 10 (see methodology section).
In 2014, Pakistan promulgated new legislation that supported the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offenses (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf). Pakistan continued to arrest terrorists and initiate prosecutions during 2014; however, problems persist throughout the criminal justice system, and intimidation by accused terrorists against witnesses, police, victims, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges contributed to both the slow progress of cases in anti-terrorism courts, and a high acquittal rate (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Points allocated: 27 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Pakistan maintains a publicly available domestic list of designated terrorists (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm; see also http://pakarmedforces.com/2014/02/list-of-60-terrorist-organizations-declared-terrorists-by-government-of-pakistan.html).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For instance, international NGOs may work only in specified areas, and NGOs may not work in specified "security zones." (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/pakistan.html).
Assessment criterion i: 6 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: The Russian Criminal Code contains several provisions that could apply to foreign terrorist fighters, including Article 205 (Act of Terrorism) and Article 210 (Creation of a Criminal Group/Organization and Participation Therein) (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). "Russia has a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework that includes provisions of the Criminal Code and a law ‘On Security on Transport.’ Russian passports have enhanced security features, such as holographic images on the biographic data page, and a recent bill would require fingerprint data to be included in Russian passports. Older versions of Russian passports that do not contain these security features continue to be used, however, as passports may be valid for five or ten years. Border guards patrol air, land, and sea ports of entry, but the extent they are able to patrol all ports of entry is unclear. While border guards can collect biometric data at ports of entry, they do not do so on a regular basis." (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
On December 29, 2014, participation in ISIS activities became a criminal offense under Russian law. Russia also added two components to Article 205.1 of the Russian Criminal Code on "aiding and abetting terrorist activity," which criminalize the act of organizing terrorist financing, leading an act of terrorism, and leading an organization that conducts "terrorist crimes" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
"Russia is a member of the FATF and belongs to two FATF-style regional bodies. Russia has a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework that includes provisions of the Criminal Code and a law ‘On Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.’ Russia imposes administrative liability under its Administrative Code for legal entities that collect funds or provide legal services in the preparation, organization, or commission of a terrorist act. The penalty ranges from 10 million to 60 million rubles (approximately $166,000 to one million U.S.). Russian banks must report suspicious transactions to the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring), which also receives reports from all nonprofit organizations. In 2014, Russia also enacted changes that assure tighter control over nonprofits and other non-commercial entities in Russia by lowering the reporting threshold to approximately $1,700 U.S. for Russian non-governmental organizations that receive money and in-kind assistance from abroad. Russia does not use a risk-based approach towards its regulation of the nonprofit sector" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). "Russia maintains an International Counterterrorism Database (MBD) that holds information regarding terrorist events, subjects, organizations, and methods. International intelligence and law enforcement agencies can contribute information to this database. Russia cooperated with the FBI's investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing, as well as multilaterally on other counterterrorism issues" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The Russian government uses its “anti-extremism” legislation to prosecute individuals and organizations, including the political opposition, independent media, and certain religious minorities, for crimes such as incitement to “religious discord” and “assistance to extremism” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
"Russia took measures to address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, which included law enforcement and judicial actions that resulted in the conviction of at least four Russian citizens who were known to have fought with militants against the Syrian government, and all of whom were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to four years' imprisonment. Other terrorism cases have resulted in prison sentences ranging from two to life imprisonment" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). A Russian official reports that over 300 criminal investigations have been opened against suspected ISIS fighters (http://www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-russia-heightened-security/26928550.html).
Russia maintains a publicly available list of designated terrorists (available in Russian at http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For instance, NGOs face "burdensome" reporting requirements; NGOs must register with government officials if they wish to receive foreign funding and conduct political and/or advocacy activities, and consequently will be considered a "foreign agent" (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html).
0.00011% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Points allocated: 39 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 3 out of 10 (see methodology section) (assessment criteria i: 2 [out of 8]).
Assessment criterion i: 2 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Royal Decree No. 44(a) of 2014 punishes Saudi citizens who join extremist organizations, participate in military operations with such organizations, and support those organizations either materially or by recruiting others to join them. These crimes are punishable by three to 20 years' imprisonment. If the individual is affiliated with the Saudi Armed Forces, the penalty for such crimes is increased to five to 30 years' imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). “The Saudi government improved border security in 2014 by using biometric systems, aerial reconnaissance, thermal imaging, and remote unattended sensors along the border region” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Royal Decree No. 44(a) of 2014 punishes Saudi citizens who join extremist organizations, participate in military operations with such organizations, and support those organizations either materially or by recruiting others to join them. These crimes are punishable by three to 20 years' imprisonment. If the individual is affiliated with the Saudi Armed Forces, the penalty for such crimes is increased to five to 30 years' imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. The Saudi government has "affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts in the region." It continued to provide specialized training for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other government and agency officials on terrorist financing. The 2014 Saudi counterterrorism law further outlines the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorist financing. It specifies that individuals who provide "financial or material donations to or funding of the extremist or terroristic organizations, factions, or groups" shall be punished with three to 20 years' imprisonment (http://www.aawsat.net/2014/03/article55329804/full-text-of-saudi-interior-ministry-statement-announcing-terrorist-list). "Despite these efforts, however, foreign charities with suspected links to terrorist groups continued to leverage social media to solicit funds from Saudi donors, a trend the government worked to combat" (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm). Saudi Arabia is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. It continued to cooperate with the United States through information exchange programs (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Saudi Arabia tracks, arrests, and prosecutes terrorist suspects through the Saudi General Investigations Directorate. In 2014, Saudi officials disrupted a more-than-70-member ISIL cell active in Saudi Arabia (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239407.htm).
Points allocated: 31 out of 50 (see methodology section).
In 2014, news sources reported that Saudi Arabia announced a terrorist list by royal decree (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/saudi-terrorism-list-syria-spark-new-conflicts.html#). The list is available through the Ministry of the Interior (http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/investigationdepartment/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For instance, NGOs reportedly face considerable delays in the registration process, which can take years; government officials attend NGO meetings; and, reportedly, foreign funding is not permissible in practice, although it is not proscribed by law (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/saudiarabia.html).
0.00158% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Assessment criterion i: 2 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Swedish law has no provisions that criminalize fighting for terrorist groups abroad (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). The Swedish government is investigating how to enhance existing counterterrorism legislation to mitigate the risks posed by foreign terrorist fighters. Sweden uses the Schengen Information System II for information sharing, port of entry screening, lost and stolen passport information, and watchlisting. Under the auspices of the PNR agreement between the EU and the United States, Sweden collects and shares PNR information from commercial flights (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Swedish law has no provisions that criminalize fighting for terrorist groups abroad (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Swedish law criminalizes incitement of terrorist acts, and providing terrorist training. Sweden is undertaking an internal investigation on how to implement the provisions of UNSCR 2178, including the possibility of criminalizing the act of training with terrorist organizations or waging war on behalf of terrorist organizations (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
“Sweden is a member of the FATF. In 2014, it passed legislation that allowed officials to halt transactions for two days if the transaction was suspected to be terrorist financing. Internal reports have indicated Sweden's vulnerability to many forms of terrorist financing…U.S. agencies worked with their Swedish counterparts for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information. Sweden also cooperates and is active within the EU, UN, and Council of Europe on CVE and the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters. Sweden is also a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Sweden also participated in an ad hoc group of EU and other countries on foreign terrorist fighter issues” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Swedish law criminalizes recruitment to terrorist organizations (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
“Sweden's Security Service (SAPO) reported that it is conducting several ‘pre-investigations’ related to individuals who have returned from conflict areas with fighting experience. With respect to other terrorist-related crimes (incitement, recruitment, and providing terrorist training), only five people have been convicted under these laws, and only two convictions have stood following appeals. In all other prosecutions, evidence has proven inadequate to secure a conviction” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Sweden (through the Swedish police) maintains a terrorist list and list of terrorist symbols (for instance, see https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/18439-sweden-including-palestinian-flag-on-list-of-terrorist-symbols-a-mistake), and it also is a member of the EU, which maintains publicly available terrorist lists that encompass the provisions of the al-Qaeda sanctions and other relevant Security Council measures (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/national_report_se_en.pdf).
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principle humanitarian action: 0 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research suggests that the domestic legislation, if any, limiting travel to conflict zones involving terrorists does not exempt staff of principled humanitarian organizations (expressly or as a subset of non-profit organizations, automatically or potentially through a petition/license); that domestic legislation, if any, applicable within the territory of the state and/or extraterritorially restricting engagement with terrorists does not exempt impartial wartime medical care for terrorists; and that relevant domestic legislation, if any, does not exempt other forms of principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. See also Department for Development Policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010): “Humanitarian organisations should always maintain a clear division of roles between themselves as civilians on the one hand and armed groups and other parties to the conflict on the other. This approach is particularly important in areas where military forces operate.”
0.00641% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Assessment criterion i: 0 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: “Tunisia has an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and maintains fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints. Tunisia does not currently share AFIS or biometric data with other countries. The government has undertaken a ‘sweeping study of its options to modernize and strengthen its border security capabilities.’ Border security remained a priority in 2014 and Tunisia collaborated with Algeria to stem the flow of weapons and insurgents across their borders with Libya” (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Tunisia's counterterrorism law was passed in 2003, and it criminalizes acts aimed at "disturbing international peace and security" (Kent Roach, Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law, at 36). As of March 26, 2015, the Tunisian Parliament began considering a new law, which, among other things, would allow police to hold suspects in detention (incommunicado and pre-charge) for up to 15 days (current law allows the government to hold terrorism suspects for six days). The new law would also permit the death penalty for anyone convicted of a terrorist act resulting in death. It contains a "broad and ambiguous definition of terrorist activity," according to Human Rights Watch, which could allow the government to infringe upon its citizens' freedoms (http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/08/tunisia-flaws-revised-counterterrorism-bill). The law passed on July 24, 2015 (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/07/25/world/middleeast/ap-ml-tunisia-anti-terror-law.html). See also Roach for 2014 definition of terrorism, which includes acts that "harm[] public or private property..."
“Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa FATF, a FATF-style regional body. Tunisia's financial intelligence unit has worked effectively over the past year to gather information to improve its efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Tunisian Penal Code provides for the seizure of assets and property related to terrorist activities. While it freezes and confiscates assets, the timeframe varies depending on the case” (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
According to the U.S. State Department, Tunisian security forces are "inexperienced in tackling terrorist threats," although the Ministries of Interior and Defense reportedly work well together, coordinating their efforts within Counterterrorism Task Forces established in the military exclusion zones (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively easy to navigate and efficient (http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf; http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends3-1.html).
Points allocated: 21 out of 50 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 4 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: As of 2014, the Turkish government is considering how to implement UNSCR 2178. Currently, Turkish counterterrorism law remains focused on domestic threats posed by terrorist groups such as the PKK. Terrorism, under Turkish law, is relatively narrowly defined as a crime targeting the Turkish state or Turkish citizens (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). “In 2014, Turkish officials intensified efforts to interdict the travel of suspected foreign terrorist fighters through Turkey to and from Syria and Iraq, including the development and implementation of a ‘banned from entry list,’ which aims to prevent travel into Turkey by individuals identified by foreign governments and internal security units as potential foreign terrorist fighters; and the deployment of ‘Risk Analysis Units’ to detect suspected foreign terrorist fighters at airports, land border crossings, and border cities. Risk Analysis Units exist at 11 major ports of entry, including international and domestic airports, land border crossings, and border cities…Turkey's border security challenges, however, continued to be aggravated by its failure to impose visa requirements for certain major foreign terrorist fighter source countries such as Libya.” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state ensures that domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and penalize their nationals and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality, for the purpose of perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or providing or receiving terrorist training. Turkish counterterrorism law remains focused on domestic threats posed by terrorist groups such as the PKK. Terrorism, under Turkish law, is relatively narrowly defined as a crime targeting the Turkish state or Turkish citizens (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
“Turkey is a member of the FATF and an observer of a FATF-style regional body. No terrorist finance cases were prosecuted in 2014. While Turkey may freeze assets of organizations, it remains unknown whether any assets have actually been frozen. The nonprofit sector is not audited on a regular basis for terrorist financing vulnerabilities.” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). Turkey is an active member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and it co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum along with the United States. According to the U.S. State Department, cooperation with other source countries increased during 2014 in response to the foreign terrorist fighter threat, with both Turkey and source countries seeking improvements in information sharing (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
Three individuals identified as members of ISIL killed a police officer, and were subsequently captured and remained in custody at the end of 2014 (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The Turkish government does maintain a publicly available list of terrorist organizations (http://www.egm.gov.tr/en/pages/terrorist_organizations.aspx).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For instance, NGOs have "cumbersome" reporting requirements, and must notify the government when they use foreign funding or receive grants from international organizations (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkey.html).
Assessment criterion i: 8 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state prevents entry or transit through their territory of FTFs, nor did our initial research uncover evidence that the state prevents the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
Under Article 10 of UAE Law 1 of 2004, amended in 2014, individuals cooperating with or joining organizations located outside the UAE that use terrorism to achieve their goals are punishable with up to life imprisonment. If an individual receives military training by this kind of organization, they would be punished by a minimum ten-year prison sentence. If the individual participates in any terrorist activities, they would be punished with life imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has ensured that domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and penalize the willful provision or collection of funds by their nationals or in their territories.
The UAE maintains a publicly available list of terrorist groups and organizations (http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/list-of-groups-designated-terrorist-organisations-by-the-uae).
Initial research suggests that the relevant portions of the regulatory system are relatively challenging to navigate and/or relatively inefficient. For instance, news reports indicate that the UAE has previously taken steps to limit the travel and registration of individuals affiliated with foreign NGOs (http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/05/exclusive-uae-detains-foreign-ngo-workers/).
0.01317% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Assessment criterion i: 6 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 1 out of 2: Under the Terrorism Act, the police may take terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which are restrictive measures imposed on individuals, and can include the requirement to reside at a specific property and limitations on travel (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). In 2015, a new law obliges teachers, health care workers, and local government employees to inform law enforcement agencies if they suspect a young person is being radicalized (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ten-years-after-77-bombings-britain-is-split-over-how-to-fight-extremism/2015/07/03/html). In July 2014, the UK enacted the Antisocial Behavior Crime and Policing Act, which amended the port and border security powers of the Terrorism Act 2000, increasing the protection of individual freedoms during counterterrorism-related border stops. (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). The police have the authority to stop and question individuals they suspect of being terrorists at ports and borders. The Home Secretary can reportedly use the Royal Prerogative to strip a person of their passport and thereby disrupt any overseas travel. News sources report that the Home Secretary has 23 passports under this power. The Secretary of State, under the British Nationality Act, can deprive a person of their British citizenship, unless it would render them stateless (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 allows for, among other enhanced counterterrorism powers, the seizure and temporary retention of travel documents if a person is suspected of leaving the country "in connection with terrorism-related activity." (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/section/1/enacted).
British law prohibits any British national to travel abroad to commit or prepare a terrorist offense, or to obtain training in terrorism, and suspects may be prosecuted for other terrorist acts, even if committed overseas. Any acts to prepare, or to assist others to prepare for acts of terrorism are also criminal offenses, punishable by up to life imprisonment (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php). Under Section 54 of the Terrorism Act 2000, weapons training is punishable by a maximum of ten years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
“The UK is an active member of the FATF, and has observer or cooperating status with five regional FATF bodies. The UK amended its Terrorism Act 2000 in December 2014, to implement the freezing of assets in relation to terrorist offenses. The Protection of Charities Bill, introduced in 2014, would enable the Charities Commission to ‘more effectively counter terrorist financing in the nonprofit sector.’ The UK seizes assets, freezes assets, as well as prosecutes individuals involved in the financing of terrorism: since 2001, 48 individuals have been charged, and 17 have been convicted. It has placed asset freezes on individuals (including six ISIL-affiliated individuals in 2014). The UK Charities Commission also works to counter terrorist financing, and of the regulator's 85 open compliance cases as of October 2014, 37 are Syria-related investigations. Charities have a duty to report suspicious activities under Section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). “The UK is an active member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In September 2014, the UK ordered the extradition of a UK resident to the United States to face terrorism charges. This case provides one example of the cooperation between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Metropolitan Police Extradition Unit. The UK distributes a list of all UK-designated terrorists and terrorist entities to 15,000 institution subscribers, mainly in the UK and its territories overseas” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The Terrorism Act 2000 prohibits the direction of terrorist organizations, which is punishable by life imprisonment (Section 56). The Terrorism Act 2000 also prohibits the provision of support for proscribed organizations, to include actions other than the provision of money or other property (1)(b). A person who arranges, manages, or assists with arranging or managing meetings to support or further the activities of a proscribed organization may be punished by a maximum of ten years' imprisonment, a fine, or both.
“In 2014, police charged at least 16 people with terrorism-related offenses after they had returned from either Syria or Iraq. In October 2014, two individuals were arrested related to violent extremism in Syria, one of them having been suspected of attending a terrorist training camp, and in November, police arrested four men for suspected terrorism as part of ‘an ongoing investigation into Islamist-related terrorism.’ Additionally, two individuals were imprisoned for three and four and a half years, respectively, for conspiring to attend a terrorist training camp in Syria (these were the first Britons imprisoned after returning from Syria or Iraq)” (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm).
The UK maintains a publicly available list of proscribed terrorist groups and organizations (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/current-list-of-designated-persons-terrorism-and-terrorist-financing).
The Charity Commission oversees the operation and registration of most charities operating in the UK (some charities are exempt from registration) (https://www.gov.uk/topic/running-charity/setting-up, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission/about).
No reported legal proceedings on the basis of principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists nor reported “chilling effect” (self-imposed curtailment) of principled humanitarian action due to state counterterrorism measures: 5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists. Yet “[s]ome humanitarian actors reported that counter-terrorism legislation in countries such as … the [United Kingdom] … as well as restrictions in funding agreements, had a ‘chilling effect.’” (https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/ct_study_full_report.pdf).
0.01254% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 10 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 8 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 2 out of 2: The U.S. State Department hosts the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) to counter recruitment and radicalization online through counter-messaging. CSCC currently works on a campaign against Syria and Iraq-based terrorists' online messaging to affect their ability to recruit foreign terrorist fighters (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-comprehensive-us-government-approach-foreign-terrorist-fighte). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has mandated advanced screening measures at certain overseas airports, and it has strengthened other measures to prevent and ensure lawful travel, including enhancing the security of the Visa Waiver Program by making changes to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). DHS now requires additional data to improve its ability to screen prospective visa waiver program travelers (https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/AlphaStatement20150202.pdf). The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center has information sharing agreements with over 40 international partners, which helps identify and share terrorist activity. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses travel information like Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data to identify known and previously unknown foreign terrorist fighters (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-comprehensive-us-government-approach-foreign-terrorist-fighte).
U.S. law criminalizes the provision of material support or resources to terrorists, to include any tangible or intangible property; service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities; lodging; training; expert advice or assistance; safehouses; false documentation or identification; communications equipment; facilities; weapons; lethal substances; explosives; personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself); and transportation. The only exceptions to this prohibition are medicine and religious materials. Persons convicted of material support to a terrorist organization may be punished with 15 years' imprisonment. (18 U.S.C. 2339A and B).
U.S. law criminalizes the provision of material support or resources to terrorists, to include any tangible or intangible property; service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities; lodging; training; expert advice or assistance; safehouses; false documentation or identification; communications equipment; facilities; weapons; lethal substances; explosives; personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself); and transportation. The only exceptions to this prohibition are medicine and religious materials. Persons convicted of material support to a terrorist organization may be punished with 15 years' imprisonment. (18 U.S.C. 2339A and B). The United States provided evidentiary support and expert testimony in the German trial of four members of an al-Qaida terrorist cell (http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239406.htm). The United States also states that it employs a "whole-of-government outreach effort with foreign partners to highlight the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters." The U.S. State Department appointed a senior adviser for partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters to engage with other nations to "prioritize the threat, address vulnerabilities, and adapt to prevent and interdict foreign terrorist fighters" (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/24/fact-sheet-comprehensive-us-government-approach-foreign-terrorist-fighte).
The United States bans foreign military recruitment (18 U.S.C. 959); however, the statute does not specifically mention FTFs (at least as FTFs are defined in Security Council Resolution 2178).
The United States has prosecuted many individuals under the material support law (see, e.g., http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/14/jihadi_love_does_us_law_prohibit_marrying_an_isis_fighter/).
Points allocated: 37.5 out of 50 (see methodology section).
The United States maintains several publicly available domestic terrorist lists through various government agencies (see, e.g., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/ and http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx).
NGOs seeking to operate in areas that may also be the target of U.S. sanctions must apply for a license to operate in those areas. As part of the review of the license application, OFAC may conduct background investigations of key personnel. (http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2012/10/CHE-Project-OFAC-Licensing.pdf).
Explicit exemptions from counterterrorism measures of principled humanitarian action: 4.5 out of 10 (see methodology section).
The U.S. material support law exempts only the provision of “medicine and religious materials” (18 U.S.C. 2339 A and B). Also, as noted above, NGOs seeking to operate in areas that may also be the target of U.S. sanctions (including certain terrorism-related sanctions) must apply for a license to operate in those areas.
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has instituted criminal or civil counterterrorism proceedings on the basis of engaging in principled humanitarian action in conflict zones involving terrorists; while a number of counterterrorism prosecutions of and civil proceedings against (putative) “humanitarian” organizations and their personnel have occurred, an initial assessment of the available evidence does not confirm (or disconfirm) whether those organizations necessarily comported with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, independence, and impartiality. Further research in this area would be desirable. “Chilling effects” from the state’s counterterrorism measures on humanitarian assistance have been reported (see, e.g., "The Chilling Effect of the 'Material Support' Law on Humanitarian Aid: Causes, Consequences, and Reforms," http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Vol-4-Adelsberg-Pitts-Shebaya.pdf; https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/ct_study_full_report.pdf).
0.00483% (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD and https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-customsearch).
Preventing and suppressing foreign terrorist fighter travel: 4 out of 10 (see methodology section).
Assessment criterion i: 4 out of 8. Assessment criteria ii and iii: 0 out of 2: Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state prevents entry or transit through their territory of FTFs, nor did our research uncover evidence that the state prevents the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
Uzbekistan's president has warned citizens who leave the country to join Islamic extremist groups and train at terrorist camps that if they return home, they will be imprisoned for five to seven years (http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-imu-terrorism/25241539.html).
Individuals who know about potential terrorist activities and do not inform authorities may be imprisoned (http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-fighters/country-surveys.php#Uzbekistan).
Initial research did not uncover evidence that the state has established a domestic anti-terrorism list (at a minimum, a list implementing binding Security Council-imposed al-Qaeda-related sanctions) and/or made the requisite measures relating to that list publicly available..
“NGOs are required to register with the Uzbek government, and the registration process and associated fees can be lengthy, cost-prohibitive, and opaque. On March 10, 2014, the Government approved the new Regulation on Procedure on State Registration of Non-Governmental and Non-Commercial Organizations (CSO Regulation). The CSO Regulation establishes a simplified registration procedure for non-governmental and non-commercial organizations (CSOs) and makes reports to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) annual instead of quarterly, further simplifying reporting for Uzbek CSOs. The government also places limitations on NGOs, including foreign funding” (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html).
Project Page [link]