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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 166', '§ 35', '§ 7', '§ 29', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 9709', '§ 5', '§211']

70 Wn.2d 391, JAMES K. AMENDE, Respondent and Cross-appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, Appellant
[No. 38352. En Banc. Supreme Court February 2, 1967.]
JAMES K. AMENDE, Respondent and Cross-appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, Appellant.«*»
[1] Equity - Laches - Applicability of Doctrine - In General. Laches is an equitable doctrine existing independently of statutes of limitation. It will not operate as an equitable estoppel to the assertion of a right merely because of acquiescence or a delay in enforcing it, unless changed conditions would make it inequitable to assert the right.
[2] Same - Laches - Applicability of Doctrine - Breach or Repudiation of Trust. Under the doctrine of laches a trust beneficiary cannot hold the trustee liable for a breach of trust if he delays bringing suit for so long a time and under such circumstances that it would be inequitable. Similarly, if the trustee repudiates the trust to the knowledge of the beneficiary, the beneficiary is not barred merely by lapse of time from enforcing the trust, but he may be barred by laches.
[3] Pleading - Issues Not In Pleadings - Tried by Consent of Parties. It is not necessary that laches be specifically pleaded by name where the issue has been tried by express or implied consent of the parties (RPPP 15(b)). RPPP 15(b) is to be liberally construed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 146267, Bartlett Rummel, J., entered December 22, 1964. Reversed.
Action to obtain an accounting. Cross-appeals taken from a judgment substantially in favor of the plaintiff.
- September 1, 1916, "Commercial Waterway District No. 1 of the County of Pierce, State of Washington"«1» issued $172,000 of its 6 per cent coupon negotiable
«*» Reported in 423 P.2d 634.
[2] See Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 166.
«1» Pursuant to Laws of 1911 ch. 11, and to an election, the county commissioners declared the organization of the district on December 14, 1914.
392 AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. [70 Wn.2d
bearer bonds«2» having a face value of $500 per bond. They became due and delinquent September 1, 1926. Bonds Nos. 1 through 327 have been paid. Plaintiff is the owner of 10 of the bonds, Nos. 334 through 337 and Nos. 339 through 344. They had been purchased from the Trust Department of the National Bank of Washington, Tacoma, Mr. D. F. Haskell, in two lots, one August 5, 1959, the other August 12, 1959.«3»
June 16, 1921, "Hylebos Creek Diking District No. 1 of the County of Pierce of the State of Washington"«4» issued $93,000 of its 7 per cent coupon negotiable bearer bonds,«5» each in the denomination of $500. The bonds became due and delinquent June 30, 1926. Bonds Nos. 1 through 61 have been paid. Bonds Nos. 62 through 187, totaling $63,000, were purchased by plaintiff (or his father) from the National Bank of Washington, January 23, 1957.«6»
Although not pertinent to the instant case, we note that prior to the maturity of the bonds in 1926, some of the assessments securing the diking district bonds were held
«2» The bonds were issued pursuant to Laws of 1911, ch. 11, § 35, as amended by Laws of 1913, ch. 46, § 7, p. 123.
«3» The purchase price was $95.
«4» Pursuant to Laws of 1895, ch. 117, p. 304, and an election held September 19, 1914, the county commissioners declared the organization of the district on September 21, 1914.
«5» The bonds were issued pursuant to Laws of 1895, ch. 117, § 29, et seq., p. 324, as amended by Laws of 1921, ch. 87, § 1.
«6» The purchase price was $630.
Feb. 1967] AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. 393
invalid and entire annual levies on certain properties for the bond fund were canceled by court action. Because of the invalidity of some assessments and the delinquency of others, there was not enough money in the bond funds in 1926 to pay the bonds when they matured. At this time, all bond assessments were past due and general taxes were delinquent on many of the properties.
The latter conveyances were made pursuant to Laws of 1939, ch. 45, § 2, p. 131,«7» which provides:
Any lands situate within any such industrial development district heretofore acquired or which may hereafter be acquired by the county wherein such port district is situated through foreclosure of tax liens may by majority vote of the county commissioners of such county, if they deem such lands to be chiefly valuable for industrial development purposes, be conveyed by the county to the port district. Such lands shall be held in trust by the port district and administered, improved, developed, leased and/or sold under the provisions of this act or any amendment thereof. Any moneys derived from the lease or sale of such lands shall be distributed as follows:
(a) The expense incurred by the port district for the administration, improvement and development of said lands shall be returned to the general fund of the port district.
(b) Any balance remaining shall be paid to the county in which the lands are located, to be paid, distributed and prorated to the various funds in the same manner as general taxes are paid and distributed during the year of such payment.
«7» Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 9709-2; reenacted with slight change by Laws of 1955, ch. 73, § 5, p. 433, now appearing as RCW 53.25.050.
394 AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. [70 Wn.2d
January 19, 1961, plaintiff commenced this action. The theory of plaintiff's action is stated in the prayer of his complaint:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for the judgment and decree of the court as follows:
1. That defendant as statutory trustee for said districts and bondholders be required to account (except as to property sold by it prior to 1928) for all of the tax foreclosures which included assessments in either or both of said districts, such accounting to include:
(a) The amounts for which the taxes and assessments were foreclosed;
(b) The amounts of all subsequently accruing assessments in said districts;
(c) The amounts for which said properties were sold or where no sale was made, a description of the other disposition of such property.
2. That upon such accounting defendant be required to pay into the bond funds of said districts the amounts to which said funds are entitled from any cash sales of said properties, and also in the instances in which conveyances were made to the Port of Tacoma without consideration, the total amount of unpaid assessments included in said tax foreclosure sales or subsequently accruing together with interest thereon.
3. That upon payment into said bond funds as herein prayed for that said funds be ordered disbursed in payment of said bonds in numerical order.
November 18, 1963, the court entered an interlocutory order requiring defendant to account (except as to property sold by it prior to 1928) for all of the tax foreclosures which included assessments in either or both of said districts, the accounting to include: (a) the amounts for which
Feb. 1967] AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. 395
the taxes and assessments were foreclosed; (b) the amount of all subsequently accrued assessments; and (c) the amounts for which the properties were sold, or where no sale was made, a description of other disposition of the properties.
The judgment further provides that the court will make additional orders concerning (1) the conduct of sales of the properties after their acquisition by the county from the Port of Tacoma; and (2) the distribution of the proceeds in order to protect the bondholders«8» and effect the payment of the unpaid bonds.
We glean two conclusions from colloquy between counsel and the bench. First, the trial court held that the statute of limitations "is a bar to those properties which were sold to others than the Port District." (Italics ours.)
«8» Plaintiff owns all of the unpaid bonds of the diking district and all of the unpaid bonds of the waterway district except seven $500 bonds, the owners of which are not identified.
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Parenthetically, we point out that neither the Port of Tacoma nor the others to whom the districts conveyed property prior to January 1, 1944 are parties to this action. Second, the trial court concluded that RCW 36.45.010 which provides:
All claims for damages against any county must be presented before the board of county commissioners and filed with the clerk thereof within ninety days from the date that the damage occurred or the injury was sustained. (Italics ours.) barred the entry of judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $8,500 (the amount of all unpaid bonds in the waterway district) and $63,000 (the amount of all unpaid bonds in the diking district) for it is admitted that no claim was ever filed with Pierce County.
We summarize the facts. The bonds in question were issued in 1916 and 1921 with a 1926 maturity date. Several lawsuits regarding the bonds occurred before their date of maturity, which suits are of course, a matter of public record. It was over 35 years from the date of these trials before the plaintiff filed the complaint in this cause. During this extended period the land in question was taken as tax title property in public foreclosure proceedings. There were conveyances to the Port of Tacoma by the county, pursuant to RCW 53.25.050, which conveyances, completed by 1943,
Feb. 1967] AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. 397
are also of public record. The bondholders did not act. Much of the land underwent extensive changes. From undeveloped tidelands, the land was transformed into an extensive industrial complex.
Well, at one time, uh, he came into the office personally - that was after '53 - but he came into the office personally and asked the usual question about it, the condition of the bond fund, how much cash we had available, and during the course of our conversation, I told him then that even if we did have the money to pay the bonds, we felt we couldn't possibly pay them because there was a legal question as to whether or not there were defaulted bonds, or whether or not we had any legal right to pay them if we did have the money; we would feel it had to be resolved through court before we could possibly make any payment on them. (Italics ours.)
[1] The doctrine of laches has existed since the beginning of equity jurisdiction, independently of statutes of limitation. 21 C.J. Laches, Stale Demands and Limitations §211. In Thorsteinson v. Waters, 65 Wn.2d 739, 747, 399 P.2d
398 AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. [70 Wn.2d
510 (1965), the court quotes from 10 R.C.L. 396, as it appears in Morris v. Hillman Inv. Co., 99 Wash. 276, 169 Pac. 837 (1918):
Mere delay, lapse of time, and acquiescence do not defeat the remedy unless so long continued that in a particular case its changed condition would make it inequitable to allow recovery. Gray v. Reeves, 69 Wash. 374, 125 Pac. 162; State ex rel. Kubel v. Plummer, 130 Wash. 135, 226 Pac. 273; Reiner v. Clarke County, 137 Wash. 194, 241 Pac. 973; State ex rel. Hearty v. Multin, 198 Wash. 99, 87 P. (2d) 280.
"The doctrine of laches is grounded upon the principle of equitable estoppel, and before it can be applied there must be some special circumstance which would render the maintenance of the action inequitable." Bowe v. Provident Loan Corp., 120 Wash. 574, 208 Pac. 22.
Feb. 1967] AMENDE v. PIERCE CY. 399
(1) The beneficiary cannot hold the trustee liable for a breach of trust if he fails to sue the trustee for the breach of trust for so long a time and under such circumstances that it would be inequitable to permit him to hold the trustee liable.
(2) The beneficiary is not barred merely by lapse of time from enforcing the trust, but if the trustee repudiates the trust to the knowledge of the beneficiary, the beneficiary may be barred by laches from enforcing the trust.
In determining whether the beneficiary of a trust is precluded by laches from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust, the court will consider among others the following factors: (1) the length of time which has elapsed between the commission of the breach of trust and the bringing of suit; (2) whether the beneficiary knew or had reason to know of the breach of trust; (3) whether the beneficiary was under an incapacity; (4) whether the beneficiary's interest was presently enjoyable or enjoyable only in the future; (5) whether the beneficiary had complained of the breach of trust; (6) the reasons for the delay of the beneficiary in suing; (7) change of position by the trustee, including loss of rights against third persons; (8) the death of witnesses or parties; (9) hardship to the beneficiary if relief is not given; (10) hardship to the trustee if relief is given.
b. Length of time necessary to bar beneficiary. The length of time necessary to bar the beneficiary from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust depends upon the circumstances. In the absence of special circumstances the beneficiary is barred if the period of the Statute of Limitations applicable to actions at law in analogous situations has run.
In applying the doctrine of laches to the instant case, we consider the following: (1) the unavailability of old records; (2) the 35-year lapse of time from the date of maturity of the bonds until commencement of suit; (3) intervening rights of third parties in the land, i.e., the Port of Tacoma and others; (4) knowledge that the county would not pay the bonds without a court fight and thus had
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repudiated the trust; (5) the extensive change in the physical condition of the land.