Source: http://wv.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190710_0000634.SWV.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 09:08:41
Document Index: 24554477

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 115', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

FindACase™ | Riggleman v. United States
ELISHA RIGGLEMAN, Petitioner,
The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's March 7, 2019 motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct sentence (Document 511), brought on the grounds, inter alia, that subsequent case law establishes that he should not have been sentenced as a career offender.[1]
The Movant, Elisha Riggleman, pled guilty to threatening to kidnap and assault a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) on January 25, 2013. He was sentenced to a 120-month term of incarceration, the top of his Guideline range following application of an enhancement based on his career offender status. He unsuccessfully appealed, then filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on January 21, 2014. The § 2255 motion was amended multiple times, including to add a claim that he no longer qualified as a career offender because neither his current offense nor his predicate offenses qualified as crimes of violence following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The § 2255 motion was denied on May 1, 2018. On June 7, 2018, the Movant filed a motion for authorization o file a successive motion under § 2255 with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). The motion was denied. He filed the instant motion requesting to reopen his case on August 13, 2018. The Court construed it as a new § 2255 motion on March 7, 2019.
The Magistrate Judge found the motion to be a successive proceeding under Section 2255 that may not proceed absent authorization from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which was denied. Even if consideration on the merits were permitted, Judge Aboulhosn found that Dimaya is not applicable to the Movant's case and that vagueness challenges to “crime of violence” provisions are not applicable to the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. Mr. Riggleman argues that his motion should be considered under Rule 60(b)(6), rather than construed as a new motion pursuant to Section 2255. He further contends that his sentence should be reduced because his conduct does not constitute a crime of violence and the First Step Act permits a sentence reduction.
Whether construed as a successive § 2255 motion or as a motion to re-open the previous proceeding, the Court finds that Mr. Riggleman is not entitled to relief. He challenges application of the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines based on case law finding similar statutory provisions to be unconstitutionally vague. The United State Supreme Court has held “that the advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.” Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886, 890 (2017). Therefore, a collateral attack challenging application of the career offender guideline enhancement is foreclosed. To the extent Mr. Riggleman argues that the First Step Act provides a legislative avenue for the relief he seeks, the Court has previously denied a motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. See Order, Document 521 in 5:11-cr-124. Therefore, the objections must be overruled, and this matter must be dismissed.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Court has additionally considered whether to grant a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. &sect; 2253(c). A certificate will not be granted unless there is &ldquo;a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.&rdquo; Id. &sect; 2253(c)(2). The standard is satisfied only upon a showing that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by this Court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. ...