Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/941/8/402664/
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 06:27:57
Document Index: 641176466

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 846', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3552', '§ 6', '§ 3', '§ 3661', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Alan Berzon, Defendant, Appellant, 941 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Alan Berzon, Defendant, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Alan Berzon, Defendant, Appellant, 941 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 941 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1991) Heard May 9, 1991. Decided Aug. 5, 1991
Berzon was charged in the first two counts of a five count indictment returned against the four defendants. Count II charged Berzon alone with possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute in excess of 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count I charged all four defendants, including Berzon, with conspiracy to commit the same offenses with which Berzon was charged in Count II, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The remaining counts charged Berzon's codefendants.
Berzon's presentence conference was held on September 11, 1990. The PSI, calculated a base offense level of 30 based on the 942 kilograms of marijuana seized at the time of arrest and the application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) (3)4 for amounts between 700 and 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. At the conference, consistent with the government stipulation at the time of the plea, counsel for both sides agreed that only 40.9 kilograms (90 pounds) of marijuana was involved, yielding a base offense level of 20.5 The government specifically noted that the court had found a base offense level of 20 at Steven Novak's sentencing. Remaining to be resolved, however, was the PSI and government recommendation that Berzon's base offense level be increased on account of his leadership role in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). At the end of the presentence conference, Berzon's attorney inquired whether the court had any tentative "feeling" about the issues presented. In response, the court indicated it wanted to hear the evidence about the issues to be resolved. The court did not indicate it had yet made up its mind as to the character of Berzon's role in the offense, nor did it mention having heard evidence at Novak's sentencing hearing relevant to Berzon's role.
On appeal, Berzon contends the district court improperly resolved the disputed sentencing issue of Berzon's role as a leader or organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) against him in reliance on Special Agent Cunniff's prior testimony at codefendant Novak's sentencing hearing, without notifying Berzon that such testimony regarding Berzon's role in the offense had been given and was being considered. Berzon asserts that at his own sentencing hearing he misapprehended the court's statement that it had heard the evidence "in a number of cases," not realizing that the court was referring, among others, to Novak's sentencing hearing. Berzon contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d),13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32,14 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3,15 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution require that a defendant be apprised of the information to be relied on in sentencing and an opportunity to challenge and rebut such information. He maintains that the district court's failure to indicate that it had heard evidence regarding this disputed issue of which the defendant asserts he was unaware--thus depriving him of the opportunity to rebut it--violated the intent of the statutory provisions as well as his constitutional rights.
We recently considered the use of undisclosed evidence for sentencing purposes in United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1991). In Curran, the defendant pled guilty to offenses committed in a scheme to commit fraud. The presentence report included a victim impact section, containing victims' statements, to which Curran objected. In addition, the court received additional letters from defendant's family and other victims, which were not part of the presentence report. These additional letters, although maintained by the probation department in its files, were not disclosed to the defendant or his attorney. At sentencing the court quoted from one of the theretofore undisclosed letters from a victim which urged the severest penalty possible, and then imposed a sentence which exceeded the government's recommendation. Curran, 926 F.2d at 60-61. On appeal, this court exercised its supervisory power over judicial procedure to remand the case for resentencing, because there were relevant statements of fact in the undisclosed letters which were not included in the PSI "victim impact" report and hence which the defendant did not have an opportunity to contradict. Curran, 926 F.2d at 62. We concluded that, without notice to defendant regarding the additional letters, the sentencing procedure "risked at least an appearance of impropriety with which we are not comfortable." Curran, 926 F.2d at 64. In addition, this court held that,
In Curran, we found it well settled "that a defendant has a due process right to be sentenced upon information which is not false or materially incorrect." 926 F.2d at 61 (citing cases). See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948). We further recognized that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32--which requires disclosure of the presentence report to the defendant and an opportunity for the defendant to contest the accuracy of it--"embodies the congressional intent to assure a defendant's due process rights in the sentencing process." Curran, 926 F.2d at 61. This requirement was designed by Congress to "ensure that the 'report [is] completely accurate in every material respect.' " Id. at 62 (quoting United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 674, 690)); see also United States v. Pellerito, 918 F.2d 999, 1002 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) ("To make defendant's [due process] right meaningful, a sentencing court must assure itself that the information upon which it relies when fixing sentence is reliable and accurate.").
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that Rule 32 "contemplates full adversary testing of the issues relevant to a Guidelines sentence." Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2186, 115 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1991). Holding that Rule 32 requires that the district court provide notice to the defendant that it is contemplating a sua sponte upward departure, including notice of the grounds supporting such a ruling, the Court explained:
The situation is less serious here in that defendant was on notice that the government proposed a two level enhancement as organizer and leader and, in general, of the basis for its assertions in that regard. He was, moreover, given full opportunity to comment upon, and to present evidence to rebut, that proposition. However, defendant was not told of certain unfavorable evidence the judge had previously heard. To the extent these damaging assertions remained unknown to him, his opportunity to comment was undercut. See Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2186 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)) ("Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed."). Consistent with this reasoning, in Curran we required the district court to disclose to the defendant documents on which it was relying that had not been disclosed as part of the presentence report under Rule 32. 926 F.2d at 62.
By the same token, if the court expected to consider Cunniff's testimony at Novak's sentencing hearing on the issue of Berzon's role, Berzon should have been alerted in advance, perhaps at the presentence conference, so that Berzon could attempt to challenge it at his own hearing. See United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215, 220 & n. 9 (1st Cir. 1972) (Prior to general disclosure of a PSI under Rule 32, we held: "[T]he substance of a presentence report, to the extent it is relied upon, should be made known to the defendant" because, "[i]f the opportunity given to speak 'in mitigation of punishment' [under Rule 32(a) (1) at the time] is to be meaningful, the defendant and his counsel must have some sense of the information (including that contained in the presentence report) which may influence the court's sentencing decision."); see also United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1990) (the defendant must have an opportunity to address the court regarding matters outside the presentence report on which the court intends to rely in sentencing); United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d 1324, 1328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 158, 112 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1990) (defendant's opportunity in the sentencing hearing to object to the PSI's findings, which were amply supported in the record, and to present supporting evidence on his own behalf, satisfied the Rule 32 "comment" requirement, even though the PSI was allegedly based, in part, on possibly unreliable evidence never before the district court).17
The government points to cases from other circuits upholding instances where a sentencing court considered evidence from related trial proceedings of codefendants. In United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's request for a hearing to challenge information presented as evidence in a related trial. The Romano court, however, noted:
825 F.2d at 730. Likewise, in United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1990), the court of appeals held that the sentencing court could properly rely on evidence adduced at a codefendant's trial. In Notrangelo, as in Romano, the facts contained in the testimony relied upon were included in the presentence report, and Notrangelo was provided with an opportunity to object to the facts and present evidence on his own behalf at the sentencing hearing. 909 F.2d at 365.18 We agree entirely with the results in those cases. The difficulty here, by way of contrast, is that the testimony and argument at Novak's sentencing included information not in the PSI nor otherwise in the record in Berzon's case. This undisclosed information included Cunniff's testimony that Berzon hired Haskins as a courier, Cunniff's views about Novak's role as a broker between Goldin and Berzon, and information about Berzon's prior relationship with Goldin.
We hold that the appropriate remedy is to remand initially to the original sentencing judge. That judge is directed on remand to state, on the record, whether he did or did not rely materially on the information presented in Novak's hearing in finding Berzon to be an organizer or leader under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. If the judge states that he did not rely materially on that information, the present judgment of sentence shall stand. If the judge states that he did rely materially on evidence from the Novak hearing, he should vacate Berzon's sentence and Berzon should go before a different district judge for resentencing. See United States v. Levy, 897 F.2d 596, 599 (1st Cir. 1990) (district court failed to comply with Rule 32(c) (3) (D); case remanded for district court to clarify whether it relied on challenged information in PSI with directions to vacate sentence if it so relied). Consistent with our practice in analogous situations, we believe that if resentencing is required, this should be done by a different district judge. See Curran, 926 F.2d at 64; Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972) ("It is difficult for a judge, having once made up his mind, to resentence a defendant, and both for the judge's own sake, and the appearance of justice, we remand this case to be redrawn.").19
We emphasize that we do not suggest that the district court was not entitled to hear the testimony at Novak's sentencing, and, thereafter, consider it when sentencing Berzon. All the sentencing court need to have done, in such event, was to timely advise Berzon in advance of sentencing that it heard or read, and was taking into account, that testimony, thus enabling him to respond to it before the sentence was set. See Romano, 825 F.2d at 729-30 (applying due process balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), to evaluate adequacy of procedure afforded defendant to challenge accuracy of information from related trial relied upon in sentencing); see also Prescott, 920 F.2d at 143-45 (same where PSI allegedly relied on erroneous hearsay testimony). We acknowledged in Curran that "[a] district court has broad discretion in the information it may receive and consider regarding defendant and his conduct." Curran, 926 F.2d at 61 (citing cases). See also Payne v. Tennessee, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2606, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991) ("In the federal system, we observed that 'a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.' ") (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972)). Generally, there is no limitation on the information which a court may consider in sentencing other than that the information bear sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, and evidence not ordinarily admissible under the rules of evidence at trial may be considered. See supra note 15; 18 U.S.C. § 3661.20 Furthermore, the district court has broad discretion to determine the proper means to call a defendant's attention to, and to allow him to challenge, presentence information. Curran, 926 F.2d at 62; Prescott, 920 F.2d at 144; U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3; see also Romano, 825 F.2d at 728 (the defendant does not have a right to a full-blown evidentiary hearing at sentencing); see also United States v. Rios, 893 F.2d 479, 481 (2d Cir. 1990) ("A district court has broad discretion to consider any information relevant to sentencing, including information adduced at a trial at which the defendant was not present."); United States v. Mescaine-Perez, 849 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1988) (same).21
4 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a) (3) provides for an offense level determined by reference to the Drug Quantity Table set forth in subsection U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (7) specifies a base offense level of 30 for at least 700 but less than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana.
5 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (12) specifies a base offense level of 20 for at least 40 kilograms but less than 60 kilograms of marijuana.
We note that the transcript of Novak's sentencing hearing, while included in Berzon's appendix to his brief on appeal, was never made a part of the record in Berzon's case in the district court, which, of course, is largely the basis for Berzon's complaint on appeal. We are, however, entitled to take judicial notice of the records of the sentencing proceedings in Novak's case. Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is well-accepted that federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have relevance to the matters at hand.")
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) (1) requires that the court, at the sentencing hearing, permit the defendant "to comment upon the probation officer's determination and other matters relating to the appropriate sentence." Subsection (c) (3) (A) provides:
At least 10 days before imposing sentence, unless this minimum period is waived by the defendant, the court shall provide the defendant and the defendants counsel with a copy of the report of the presentence investigation, including the information required by subdivision (c) (2) [enumerating information to be included in the presentence report] but not including any final recommendation as to sentence, and not to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic opinions, which if disclosed, might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation; or sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. The court shall afford the defendant and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment on the report and, in the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it.
(b) The court shall resolve disputed sentencing factors in accordance with Rule 32(a) (1), Fed. R. Crim. P. (effective Nov. 1, 1987), notify the parties of its tentative findings and provide a reasonable opportunity for the submission of oral or written objections before imposition of sentence.
In Curran, we doubted that "due process compels an opportunity to inspect or challenge the information to be relied upon by the sentencing court," 926 F.2d at 61. We found no precedent for the view that the due process clause itself requires disclosure of all such information, and noted also that Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) addresses particular situations in which nondisclosure of certain presentence report information is appropriate. See supra note 14; see also Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187 ("[W]ere we to read Rule 32 to dispense with notice [of intent to depart from the Guidelines and the grounds therefor], we would then have to confront the serious question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process Clause."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, advisory committee notes on 1966 amendments to subsection (c) (2) ("It is not a denial of due process of law for a court in sentencing to rely on a report of a presentence investigation without disclosing such report to the defendant or giving him an opportunity to rebut it (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 79 S. Ct. 421, 3 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1959))
The recent case of United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029 (2d Cir. 1991), is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the court explained:
We decline to find, as an alternative to remand under these circumstances, that the district court's possible reliance on the testimony at Novak's sentencing hearing was harmless error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The government bears the burden of proving the facts at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1991). We ordinarily review the district court's findings of fact for purposes of sentencing only for clear error. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 48 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 177, 107 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1989). But to find harmless error here we must be satisfied that the district court would have been unreasonable--based on the evidence before it in Berzon's case (and excluding Novak's sentencing hearing)--to reject the PSI's conclusion that Berzon was the leader. To be sure, there was evidence suggesting Berzon's leadership role. Were we in the place of the sentencing court, we might well conclude Berzon was a leader, but we cannot say this was the only reasonable outcome. The evidence of leadership was suggestive, requiring inferences from assertions, for example, that Berzon physically gave Goldin the money and the car keys. Berzon presented evidence that Goldin could not have referred to him and his codefendants during the operation as "the Berzon group." Further, the only explicit testimony that Berzon employed a codefendant (Haskins), was Cunniff's statement at Novak's sentencing, and Cunniff also testified at that hearing that Braun was likely financially an equal participant in the transaction. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the sentencing court was bound to find that Berzon was a leader, and hence the harmless error standard has not been met