Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/878/50/166668/
Timestamp: 2019-06-16 02:33:13
Document Index: 640245652

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 952', '§ 952', '§ 3553', '§ 991', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3552']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Humberto Cervantes, Defendant-appellant, 878 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1989) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1989 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Humberto Cervantes, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Humberto Cervantes, Defendant-appellant, 878 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1989)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 878 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1989)
Argued May 1, 1989. Decided June 14, 1989
On the afternoon of July 17, 1988, Cervantes disembarked from a Caracas flight at Kennedy Airport. A Customs Officer arrested him after examining his luggage and discovering a white powdery substance. It was determined that he possessed 1,685 grams of 74% pure cocaine, which was hidden under the soles of four pairs of shoes. Indicted for importing, as well as possessing with intent to distribute, over 500 grams of cocaine, Cervantes pleaded guilty to a one count superseding information that charged importation in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a) (1) and 960(b) (F).
The report indicated that conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) yields a base offense level of 26. Guidelines Sec. 2D1.1(a) (3). Cervantes received a four level reduction because he was "recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction." Id., Commentary to Sec. 3B1.2(a). Thus, his participation in the apparently larger criminal activity was deemed "minimal." Id. Sec. 3B1.2(a). An additional two level downward adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility, id. Sec. 3E1.1(a), resulted in a total offense level of 20. At the other axis of the Sentencing Table, Cervantes's lack of previous convictions placed him in Criminal History Category I. At the intersection of level 20 and Category I is the agreed upon range of 33-41 months.
In design, the formulae through which the Guidelines instruct judges to devise sentences represents an accommodation between two competing philosophies of sentencing. In its early thinking, the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") leaned toward a "real offense" system--one that correlates punishment to the specific facts of every case. Unlike a "charge offense" system, which links the penalty to the statutory definition of the crime of conviction, a real offense system would allow judges to tailor sentences based upon the actual facts of each incident, thus recognizing that like crimes may be committed differently. As its deliberations progressed, the Commission determined that a charge system with real elements best suited its goals. See United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1988).
Consistent with this purpose, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, permits the district court to select a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range if it finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines...." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. V 1987). The Guidelines address the particular grounds for a departure in two distinct provisions. In most instances, Sec. 5K2 is the principal policy statement dealing with the parameters of a divergence because it offers, inter alia, an extended discussion of those factors the Commission expressly considered. As discussed below, however, where a departure involves prior criminal history, Sec. 4A1 primarily controls.
We have already noted and endorsed the " 'wide discretion' accorded district courts in determining what circumstances to consider in deciding whether to depart from the Guidelines" under Sec. 5K2.0. United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1988)). The Government urges us to affirm Cervantes's sentence under this section, asserting that the departure was based upon an inadequately considered factor: a "penchant for avoiding the criminal justice system." Even if it were clear--and from the record it is not--that Chief Judge Platt relied upon this factor, bail jumping and other related unlawful acts constitute prior criminal history within the purview of Sec. 4A1. Therefore, we now turn to the Commission's treatment of that topic.
The Government contends application of the Sec. 4A1.3 analysis is not mandatory because the Commission, "in suggesting this approach, merely state [d] that ... a court should use [the most representative criminal history category] 'as a reference....' " This characterization distorts the intent of the Commission. The phrase "as a reference" is designed to order and standardize the departure process without removing a judge's discretion to impose an alternative sentence. For example, while Sec. 4A1.3 expressly states that a judge may impose a sentence beyond the highest possible guideline range, before doing so, the court must consider Category VI. To construe this section as purely discretionary would ignore the principles that support the Commission's mission.
Moreover, consistent with the congressional goal of "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities," 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1987), a sentencing judge must articulate the grounds for any departure. Congress intended that the most detailed explanation be set forth for a sentence beyond the boundary of the Guideline range. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1) (Supp. V 1987) (requiring expression of "the reason" for imposing a particular sentence within a guideline range of 24 or more months) with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2) (Supp. V 1987) (judge must state "the specific reason" for departing from the applicable range). The rule is also designed to facilitate appellate review of sentencing decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. V 1987).
We believe that the district court should explicitly articulate its reasons for departing pursuant to Sec. 4A1.3. Failure to do so renders the sentence unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (1) (Supp. V 1987). Of course, we do not require sentencing judges to "incant the specific language" used in the Guidelines. See United States v. DeLuna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1989). It is necessary, however, that the court clearly identify any aggravating factors and specify its reasons for utilizing a particular criminal history category. In this way, a district court's initial assessment will clarify the methodology for appellate review by this court, which assesses the reasonableness of the departure, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (3) (Supp. V 1987), by ascertaining whether the enhanced or reduced sentence corresponds to the alternate criminal history category. Cf. United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1989). We would suggest that only especially aggravating circumstances fully articulated by the judge warrant significant departures.
In the instant case, Chief Judge Platt selected a sentence that would have been appropriate only if Cervantes's prior record justified an increase of three criminal history categories. Due to the lack of prior convictions, the presentence report and plea agreement appropriately placed the defendant in Category I. The departure to a 60 month term of imprisonment--from an initial range of 33-41 months--can only be supported by placing Cervantes in Criminal History Category IV. The district court's cryptic statement regarding this departure does not satisfy the congressional requirement that specific reason or reasons be cited. The failure even to attempt a minimal version of the detailed process prescribed by Sec. 4A1.3 compounds the problem and renders the sentence unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (1) (Supp. V 1987).
The record, which indicates that the chief judge imposed the sentence because of the bail jumping and the conclusion that the appellant had a "pretty bad record," leaves us with the impression that the Chief Judge departed upwards without any consideration of Sec. 4A1.3. No mention of this section was made. Nor was an explanation offered for selecting a sentence appropriate for a defendant in Category IV rather than Category II or III. The Fifth Circuit has vacated a sentence and remanded because of this failure. See United States v. Lopez, 871 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1989). Indeed, part of the rationale for requiring a clear articulation of the grounds for departure is illustrated by our inability to discern reasons for such a significant deviation on the record before us.
The departure might have been influenced by any of three considerations, but not all of them may validly be relied upon. One possibility is that the district court relied upon Cervantes's prior arrest record. The reference to the "pretty bad record" suggests that this occurred. However, the Guidelines explicitly reject this factor. Section 4A1.3 states, " [A] prior arrest record itself shall not be considered...." Guidelines Sec. 4A1.3, at 4.9.
Finally, this case raises serious concerns about notice and the defendant's meaningful opportunity to be heard. The presentence report must be disclosed to the defendant at least ten days prior to sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d) (Supp. V 1987). As amended in 1983, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 required disclosure within "a reasonable time" before sentencing and an opportunity for defense counsel to comment upon the probation officer's determinations. Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 32(a) (1) & (c) (3) (A). Primarily, these changes sought to "ensure accuracy of sentencing information." Advisory Committee Notes of the 1983 amendment to Rule 32(c) (3) (A), (B), & (C).
This rationale also applies to the grounds for an upward departure, especially where the judge relies upon factors not addressed in the presentence report or which, if mentioned, have been recast by the judge. Indeed, the language of Rule 32(a) (1) provides for consideration of these matters: "At the sentencing hearing, the court shall afford counsel ... an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence." Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 32(a) (1) (emphasis added). See United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1989).