Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/807/857/311475/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 06:13:38
Document Index: 222225056

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 437', '§ 434', '§ 441', '§ 1291', '§ 437', '§ 434', '§ 431']

Federal Election Commission, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Harvey Furgatch, Defendant-appellee, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1987 › Federal Election Commission, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Harvey Furgatch, Defendant-appellee
Federal Election Commission, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Harvey Furgatch, Defendant-appellee, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) Argued and Submitted June 4, 1986. Decided Jan. 9, 1987
Before GOODWIN and FARRIS, Circuit Judges and SOLOMON,* District Judge.
On November 1, 1980, three days before the election, Furgatch placed the same advertisement in The Boston Globe. Unlike the first advertisement, which stated that it was paid for by Furgatch and was " [n]ot authorized by any candidate," the second advertisement omitted the disclaimer. The two advertisements cost Furgatch approximately $25,000.
On March 25, 1983, the Federal Election Commission brought suit against Furgatch under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (6) (A).1 The FEC sought a civil penalty and an injunction against further violation of the Act. It alleged that Furgatch violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)2 by failing to report his expenditures and 2 U.S.C. § 441d3 by failing to include a disclaimer in The Boston Globe advertisement. Furgatch moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim. The district court orally granted the motion to dismiss and on December 10, 1984 entered its final order. It concluded that the advertisement was not an "independent expenditure" within the meaning of the statute because it did not "expressly advocate" the defeat of Jimmy Carter. The court did not rule on the constitutional issues raised by Furgatch.
The FEC timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (9). We review de novo a dismissal under rule 12(b) (6). Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1986).
Individuals who make independent expenditures totalling more than $250 must file a statement with the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c). The Federal Election Campaign Act defines an "independent expenditure" as "an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate...." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17). The Supreme Court has previously passed upon the constitutionality of the Act's disclosure requirements in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).
The disclosure provisions for independent expenditures were originally written more broadly, to cover any expenditures made "for the purpose of ... influencing" the nomination or election of candidates for federal office. Reviewing section 434(e) (the forerunner to the provisions before us) in Buckley, the Supreme Court held that any restriction on political speech--even restrictions that are far from absolute--can have a chilling effect on speech. "In its effort to be all-inclusive, ... the provision raises serious problems of vagueness, particularly treacherous where, as here, the violation of its terms carries criminal penalties and fear of incurring those sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights." 424 U.S. at 76-77, 96 S. Ct. at 662.
The Court reasoned that Congress may place restrictions on the freedom of expression for legitimate reasons, but that those restrictions must be minimal, and closely tailored to avoid overreaching or vagueness. Id. at 78-82, 96 S. Ct. at 663-64. Consequently, the Court was obliged to construe the words of section 434(e) no more broadly than was absolutely necessary to serve the purposes of the Act, to avoid stifling speech that does not fit neatly in the category of election advertising. Id. at 78, 96 S. Ct. at 663. The Court was particularly insistent that a clear distinction be made between "issue discussion," which strongly implicates the First Amendment, and the candidate-oriented speech that is the focus of the Campaign Act. Id. at 79, 96 S. Ct. at 663.
The Court concluded that the only expenditures covered by the disclosure provisions were funds used for communications that "expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." Id. It gave examples, in a footnote, of words of express advocacy, including "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject." See id. at 80, n. 108, 96 S. Ct. at 664 n. 108 (incorporating by reference id. at 44, n. 52, 96 S. Ct. at 647 n. 52). Congress' later revision of the Act, now before us, directly adopted the "express advocacy" standard of Buckley into sections 431(17) and 441d. See H.R.Rep. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 929, reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 1032 (GPO 1977). That standard is designed to limit the coverage of the disclosure provision "precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S. Ct. at 663.
We must apply sections 434(c) and 441d consistently with the constitutional requirements set out in Buckley.
The FEC argues that Furgatch's advertisement expressly advocates the defeat of Jimmy Carter and therefore is an independent expenditure which must be reported to the FEC. The examples of express advocacy contained in the Buckley opinion (i.e., "vote for," "support," etc.), the FEC argues, merely provide guidelines for determining what constitutes "express advocacy." Whether those words are contained in the advertisement is not determinative. The test is whether or not the advertisement contains a message advocating the defeat of a political candidate. Furgatch's advertisement, the FEC contends, contains an unequivocal message that Carter must not "succeed" in "burden [ing]" the country with "four more years" of his allegedly harmful leadership.
The FEC further argues that the advertisement is, in the words of the Supreme Court, "unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, 96 S. Ct. at 663. Nothing more, it contends, is required to place this advertisement under coverage of the Act. The FEC grounds this argument on the Court's effort in Buckley to distinguish between speech that pertains only to candidates and their campaigns and speech revolving around political issues in general. The FEC argues that because the advertisement discusses Carter, the candidate, rather than the political issues, Furgatch must report the expenditure.
Furgatch responds that the mere raising of any question on this issue demonstrates that it is not express advocacy. We would not be debating the meaning of the advertisement, he contends, if it were express. He argues that the words "don't let him do it" do not expressly call for Carter's defeat at the polls but an end to his "attempt to hide his own record, or lack of it." The advertisement, according to Furgatch, is merely a warning that Carter will be re-elected if the public allows him to continue to use "low-level campaign tactics."
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit considered an advertisement in which an anti-abortion group published a "Special Election Edition" of its newsletter which contained photographs of candidates identified as "pro-life." The publication included at least two exhortations to "vote pro-life" and the statement: "Your vote in the primary will make the critical difference in electing pro-life candidates." The court ruled that the "Special Election Edition ... explicitly advocated the election of particular candidates in the primary elections and presented photographs of those candidates only," and thus fell within the FEC's regulatory sphere.
In Federal Election Commission v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Committee, 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit addressed the applicability of the statute to a leaflet which expounded the economic views of a tax reform group and criticized the voting record of a local member of Congress, whose picture was included. The leaflet, however, did not refer to any federal election or to the member's political affiliation or opponent. The court held that because the leaflet did not expressly advocate the defeat or election of the congressman, the Act did not apply to the pamphlet. The leaflet "contains nothing which could rationally be termed express advocacy ... there is no reference anywhere in the Bulletin to the congressman's party, to whether he is running for re-election, to the existence of an election or the act of voting in any election; nor is there anything approaching an unambiguous statement in favor of or against the election of Congressman Ambra." Id. at 53.
Section 434(e) is part of Congress' effort to achieve 'total disclosure' by reaching 'every kind of political activity' in order to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence possible. The provision is responsive to the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as they had been in the past, to avoid the disclosure requirements by routing financial support of candidates through avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions of the Act.
424 U.S. at 76, 96 S. Ct. at 662.
We conclude that the Act's disclosure provisions serve an important Congressional policy and a very strong First Amendment interest. Properly applied, they will have only a "reasonable and minimally restrictive" effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82, 96 S. Ct. at 664. Although we may not place burdens on the freedom of speech beyond what is strictly necessary to further the purposes of the Act, we must be just as careful to ensure that those purposes are fully carried out, that they are not cleverly circumvented, or thwarted by a rigid construction of the terms of the Act. We must read section 434(c) so as to prevent speech that is clearly intended to affect the outcome of a federal election from escaping, either fortuitously or by design, the coverage of the Act. This concern leads us to fashion a more comprehensive approach to the delimitation of "express advocacy," and to reject some of the overly constrictive rules of interpretation that the parties urge for our adoption.
* We begin with the proposition that "express advocacy" is not strictly limited to communications using certain key phrases. The short list of words included in the Supreme Court's opinion in Buckley does not exhaust the capacity of the English language to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. A test requiring the magic words "elect," "support," etc., or their nearly perfect synonyms for a finding of express advocacy would preserve the First Amendment right of unfettered expression only at the expense of eviscerating the Federal Election Campaign Act. "Independent" campaign spenders working on behalf of candidates could remain just beyond the reach of the Act by avoiding certain key words while conveying a message that is unmistakably directed to the election or defeat of a named candidate.
The subjective intent of the speaker cannot alone be determinative. Words derive their meaning from what the speaker intends and what the reader understands. A speaker may expressly advocate regardless of his intention, and our attempts to fathom his mental state would distract us unnecessarily from the speech itself. Interpreting political speech in this context is not the same as interpreting a contract, where subjective intent underlies the formation and construction of the contract and would be the explicit focus of interpretation were it not for the greater reliability of the objective terms. The intent behind political speech is less important than its effect for the purposes of this inquiry. But see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535, 65 S. Ct. 315, 325, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945), quoted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 646.
The problem of the context of speech goes to the heart of some of the most difficult First Amendment questions. The doctrines of subversive speech, "fighting words," libel, and speech in the workplace and in public fora illustrate that when and where speech takes place can determine its legal significance. In these instances, context is one of the crucial factors making these kinds of speech regulable. First Amendment doctrine has long recognized that words take part of their meaning and effect from the environment in which they are spoken. When the constitutional and statutory standard is "express advocacy," however, the weight that we give to the context of speech declines considerably. Our concern here is with the clarity of the communication rather than its harmful effects. Context remains a consideration, but an ancillary one, peripheral to the words themselves.
With these principles in mind, we propose a standard for "express advocacy" that will preserve the efficacy of the Act without treading upon the freedom of political expression. We conclude that speech need not include any of the words listed in Buckley to be express advocacy under the Act, but it must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. This standard can be broken into three main components. First, even if it is not presented in the clearest, most explicit language, speech is "express" for present purposes if its message is ummistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning. Second, speech may only be termed "advocacy" if it presents a clear plea for action, and thus speech that is merely informative is not covered by the Act. Finally, it must be clear what action is advocated. Speech cannot be "express advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate" when reasonable minds could differ as to whether it encourages a vote for or against a candidate or encourages the reader to take some other kind of action.
We disagree with the district court that the word "it" is the proper focus of the inquiry. There is no question what "it" is--"it" is all the things that the ad accuses Jimmy Carter of doing, the litany of abuses and indiscretions that constitutes the body of the statement. The pivotal question is not what the reader should prevent Jimmy Carter from doing, but what the reader should do to prevent it. The words we focus on are "don't let him." They are simple and direct. "Don't let him" is a command. The words "expressly advocate" action of some kind. If the action that Furgatch is urging the public to take is a rejection of Carter at the polls, this advertisement is covered by the Campaign Act.
Reasonable minds could not dispute that Furgatch's advertisement urged readers to vote against Jimmy Carter. This was the only action open to those who would not "let him do it." The reader could not sue President Carter for his indelicate remarks, or arrest him for his transgressions. If Furgatch had been seeking impeachment, or some form of judicial or administrative action against Carter, his plea would have been to a different audience, in a different forum. If Jimmy Carter was degrading his office, as Furgatch claimed, the audience to whom the ad was directed must vote him out of that office. If Jimmy Carter was attempting to buy the election, or to win it by "hid [ing] his own record, or lack of it," as Furgatch suggested, the only way to not let him do it was to give the election to someone else. Although the ad may be evasively written, its meaning is clear.
The Honorable Gus Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation
Section 437g(a) (6) (A) provides:
(6) (A) If the Commission is unable to correct or prevent any violation of this Act or of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26, by the methods specified in paragraph (4) (A), the Commission may, upon an affirmative vote of 4 of its members, institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order (including an order for a civil penalty which does not exceed the greater of $5,000 or an amount equal to any contribution or expenditure involved in such violation) in the district court of the United States for the district in which the person against whom such action is brought is found, resides, or transacts business.
Section 434(c) (1) requires that any person making an "independent expenditure" greater than $250 file a statement with the FEC. The contents of the statement are specified in 434(c) (2), which provides:
Statements ... shall include:
(A) the information required by subsection (b) (6) (B) (iii) of this section, indicating whether the independent expenditure is in support of, or in opposition to, the candidate involved;
The term "independent expenditure" is defined as follows in Sec. 431(17):
(a) Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or solicits any contribution through any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, or any other type of general public political advertising, such communication--