Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/87906/coffin-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-12-03 02:06:10
Document Index: 517473477

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1281', '§ 114', 'art 5', '§ 63', 'art 5', '§ 29', '§ 1244']

Coffin Vs United States - Citation 87906 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize CoffIn Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/87906CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-04-1895Case Number156 U.S. 432AppellantCoffinRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
coffin v. united states - 156 u.s. 432 (1895)
in an indictment for..... Judgment:
they were officers of the bank or occupied any specific relation to the bank which made aiding and abetting possible. The language of the statute fully answers this contention. It provides that "every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who." etc., and adds, after defining the acts which are made misdemeanors, "that every person who with like intent aids and abets," etc. The phrase "every person" is manifestly broader than the enumeration made in the first portion of the statute. In other words, the unambiguous letter of the law is that every president, director, agent, etc., who commits the designated offenses, shall suffer the penalties provided, and that every person who aids or abets such officer, etc. The argument is that no one but an officer or an agent can be punished as an aider and abettor, and hence that every person who aids and abets, not being an officer, shall go unwhipped of justice. To adopt the construction contended for would destroy the letter and violate the spirit of the law; for the letter says, "every person who aids and abets," and the proposition is that we should make it say "every officer or agent who aids and abets." The spirit and purpose of the statute are to punish the president, cashier, officer, or agent, etc., and likewise to punish every person who aids and abets. The assertion that one who is not an officer, or who bears no official relation to the bank, cannot, in the nature of things, aid or abet an official of the bank in the misapplication of its funds is an argument which, if sound, should be addressed to the legislative, and not the judicial, department. We cannot destroy the law on the theory that the acts which it forbids cannot be committed. In other words, the construction which we are asked to give does not deal with the meaning of the statute, but simply involves the claim that it is impossible to prove the commission of the offense defined by the law. The question whether the proof shows the commission of an offense is one of fact, and not of law. The citation made from
120 U. S. 333
, is not apposite. True, we there said,
Nor is the contention sound that the particular act by which the aiding and abetting was consummated must be specifically set out. The general rule upon this subject is stated in
"Nor was it necessary, as argued by counsel for the accused to set forth the special means employed to effect the alleged unlawful procurement. It is laid down as a general rule that in an indictment for soliciting or inciting to the commission of a crime, or for aiding or assisting in the commission of it, it is not necessary to state the particulars of the incitement or solicitation, or of the aid or assistance. 2 Wharton, § 1281;
12 Wheat. 460."
The form books give the indictment substantially as it appears here. Bishop's Forms, § 114, p. 52. Nothing in
, conflicts with these views. In that case, the question was whether the eighth count stated misapplication of the funds, and not whether the particular acts by which the aiding and abetting were done were necessary to be set out in the indictment. On the contrary, the counts there held good charged the aiding and abetting in the very language found in the indictment in hand,
3. It is further contended that all the counts of the indictment except the first are insufficient because they fail to aver the actual conversion of the sum misapplied to the use of any particular person. This proposition is based on the cases of
107 U. S. 666
United States v. Northway, supra.
Britton Case,
Northway's Case,
stronger than that held sufficient in
Evans v. United States, supra.
In connection with this ruling, the bill of exceptions states that there was no evidence whatever on the subject offered by either side, and nothing to indicate that there was knowledge in the grand jurors of the matter which the indictment declared to be to them unknown. The instruction was rightly refused. It presupposes that where there is an averment that a person or matter is unknown to a grand jury, and no evidence upon the subject of such knowledge is offered by either side, acquittal must follow, while the true rule is that, where nothing appears to the contrary, the verity of the averment of want of knowledge in the grand jury is presumed. Thus, it was said in
Commonwealth v. Thornton,
14 Gray 43:
And previously, in
Commonwealth v. Sherman,
3 Allen 248, the court observed:
"It is always open to the defendant to move the judge before whom the trial is had to order the prosecuting attorney to give a more particular description, in the nature of a specification or bill of particulars, of the acts on which he intends to rely, and to suspend the trial until this can be done, and such an order will be made whenever it appears to be necessary to enable the defendant to meet the charge against him, or to avoid danger of injustice.
1 Gray 469;
The King v. Curwood,
3 Ad. & El. 815; Rosc. Crim.Ev. (6th ed.) 178, 179, 420."
It is stated as unquestioned in the textbooks, and has been referred to as a matter of course in the decisions of this Court and in the courts of the several states.
Taylor on Evidence, vol. 1, c. 5, 126, 127; Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, c. 5, 91; Best on Presumptions, part 5, §§ 63, 64; c. 3, 31-58; Greenleaf on Evidence, part 5, §§ 29, &c.; 11 Criminal Law Magazine 3; Wharton on Evidence § 1244; Phillips on Evidence, Cowen & Hill's Notes, vol. 2, p. 289;
Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States,
5 Cush. 320;
State v. Bartlett,
43 N.H. 224;
Alexander v. People,
96 Ill. 96;
People v. Fairchild,
48 Mich. 31;
People v. Millard,
53 Mich. 63;
Commonwealth v. Whittaker,
Blake v. State,
3 Tex.App. 581;
Wharton v. State,
73 Ala. 366;
State v. Tibbetts,
35 Me. 81;
Moorer v. State,
44 Ala. 15.
"The noble (
) Trajan wrote to Julius Frontonus that no man should be condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better to let the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the innocent."
"And thus the reasons stand on both sides, and though these seem to be stronger than the former, yet in a case of this moment, it is safest to hold that in practice, which hath least doubt and danger,
Blackstone (1753-1765) maintains that "the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 2 Bl.Com. c. 27, margin p. 358
How fully the presumption of innocence had been evolved as a principle and applied at common law is shown in
McKinley's Case
(1817), 33 St.Tr. 275, 506, where Lord Gillies says:
It is well settled that there is no error in refusing to give a correct charge precisely as requested, provided the instruction actually given fairly covers and includes the instruction asked.
16 Wall. 504;
Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Whitton,
13 Wall. 270. The contention here is that inasmuch as the charge given by the court
on the subject of reasonable doubt substantially embodied the statement of the presumption of innocence, therefore the court was justified in refusing, in terms, to mention the latter. This presents the question whether the charge that there cannot be a conviction unless the proof shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt so entirely embodies the statement of presumption of innocence as to justify the court in refusing, when requested, to inform the jury concerning the latter. The authorities upon this question are few and unsatisfactory. In Texas, it has been held that it is the duty of the court to state the presumption of innocence along with the doctrine of reasonable doubt, even though no request be made to do so.
Black v. State,
1 Tex.App. 369;
Priesmuth v. State,
1 Tex.App. 480;
McMullen v. State,
5 Tex.App. 577. It is doubtful, however, whether the rulings in these cases were not based upon the terms of a Texas statute, and not on the general law. In Indiana, it has been held error to refuse, upon request, to charge the presumption of innocence, even although it be clearly stated to the jury that conviction should not be had unless guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
46 Ind. 582;
Line v. State,
51 Ind. 175. But the law of Indiana contains a similar provision to that of Texas. In two Michigan cases where the doctrine of reasonable doubt was fully and fairly stated but no request to charge the presumption of innocence was made, it was held that the failure to mention the presumption of innocence could not be assigned for error in the reviewing court.
89 Mich. 353;
People v. Graney,
91 Mich. 648. But in the same state, where a request to charge the presumption of innocence was made and refused, the refusal was held erroneous although the doctrine of reasonable doubt had been fully given to the jury.
People v. Macard,
73 Mich. 15. On the other hand, in Ohio it has been held not error to refuse to charge the presumption of innocence where the charge actually given was "that the law required that the state should prove the material elements of the crime beyond doubt."
Moorehead v. State,
34 Ohio St. 212. It may be that the paucity of authority upon this subject results from
But whatever be the cause, authorities directly apposite are few and conflicting, and hence furnish no decisive solution of the question, which is further embarrassed by the fact that in some few cases, the presumption of innocence and the doctrine of reasonable doubt are seemingly treated as synonymous.
Ogletree v. State,
28 Ala. 693;
44 Ala. 15;
People v. Lenon,
79 Cal. 625, 631. In these cases, however, it does not appear that any direct question was made as to whether the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt were legally equivalent, the language used simply implying that one was practically the same as the other, both having been stated to the jury.
Some of the textbooks, also, in the same loose way, imply the identity of the two. Stephen, in his History of the Criminal Law, tells us that "the presumption of innocence is otherwise stated by saying the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt." Volume 1, 437. So, although Best, in his work on Presumptions, has fully stated the presumption of innocence, yet, in a note to Chamberlayne's edition of that author's work on Evidence (Boston, 1883; page 304, note
), it is asserted that no such presumption obtains, and that
"As men do not generally violate the Penal Code, the law presumes every man innocent; but some men do transgress it, and therefore evidence is received to repel this presumption. This legal presumption of innocence is to be regarded by the jury in every case
as matter of evidence to the benefit of which the party is entitled.
"In the investigation and estimate of criminatory evidence, there is an antecedent
presumption in favor of the innocence of the party accused, grounded in reason and justice not less than in humanity, and recognized in the judicial practice of all civilized nations, which presumption must prevail until it be destroyed by such an overpowering amount of legal evidence of guilt as is calculated to produce the opposite belief."
Best on Presumptions declares the presumption of innocence to be a "
presumptio juris.
" The same view is taken in the article in the Criminal Law Magazine for January, 1888, to which we have already referred. It says:
"This presumption is in the nature of evidence in his favor [
in favor of the accused], and a knowledge of it should be communicated to the jury. Accordingly, it is the duty of the judge in all jurisdictions, when requested, and in some when not requested, to explain it to the jury in his charge. The usual formula in which this doctrine is expressed is that every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled, if he so requests it, . . . to have this rule of law expounded to the jury in this or in some equivalent form of expression. "
The fact that the presumption of innocence is recognized as a presumption of law, and is characterized by the civilians as a
presumptio juris,
demonstrates that it is evidence in favor of the accused. For in all systems of law, legal presumptions are treated as evidence giving rise to resulting proof to the full extent of their legal efficacy.