Source: http://openjurist.org/227/f3d/732/united-states-of-america-v-kenneth-king
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 21:49:02
Document Index: 127802757

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 860', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 860', '§ 841', '§ 851', '§ 851']

227 F3d 732 United States of America v. Kenneth King | OpenJurist
227 F. 3d 732 - United States of America v. Kenneth King	Home227 f3d 732 united states of america v. kenneth king
227 F3d 732 United States of America v. Kenneth King 227 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2000)
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Kenneth King, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 98-4046
Argued: February 4, 2000Decided and Filed: August 28, 2000Rehearing Denied October 19, 2000
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
David A. Sierleja, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
James R. Willis, WILLIS, BLACKWELL & ROGERS, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.
Before: NELSON, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. COLE, J. (pp. 37-39), delivered a separate concurring opinion. NELSON, J. (p. 40), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Defendant, Kenneth King, appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the district court on June 18, 1998, pursuant to Defendant's conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within 1000 feet of a school yard in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and § 860, wherein Defendant reserved the right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and VACATE Defendant's conviction and sentence.
On November 20, 1995, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Defendant and his brother, Kewin King, in Count 1 with possession with intent to distribute 443 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Kewin was named in Count 2 as having possessed 60.60 grams of cocaine base; and Defendant was charged in Count 3 as having possessed 16.65 grams of cocaine base, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Each of the counts carried a corresponding "schoolyard provision," in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 860.
Prior to trial, both Defendant and Kewin filed various motions to suppress. Defendant's motion challenged the search warrant and its underlying affidavit, alleging that it was issued without probable cause. Kewin moved for separate trials. The district court conducted a hearing on the motions, and thereafter denied the motions to suppress. The court granted the motion for separate trials, and ordered Defendant's trial to begin on January 22, 1996, and Kewin's trial to begin on February 6, 1996.
Thereafter, the district court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the search of the basement of the two-family dwelling where Defendant and Kewin resided - 1437 East 116th Street, Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Ohio - exceeded the scope of the search warrant. The district court invited supplemental briefing on the issue, and Defendant and Kewin subsequently moved to suppress the 443 grams of cocaine base seized from the basement of the dwelling on the basis that the search of the basement exceeded the scope of the warrant. On January 18, 1996, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion to suppress the cocaine seized from the basement.
The government filed an interlocutory appeal to this Court on January 19, 1996, challenging the district court's order granting the motion to suppress the cocaine seized from the basement. The government also moved to stay or continue Defendant's trial pending review of the suppression order by this Court. The district court granted the continuance, and rescheduled Kewin's trial to begin on January 22, 1996, the date upon which Defendant's trial was originally set to begin. The government therefore filed an emergency motion to stay Kewin's trial with this Court, which was denied. On January 22, Kewin moved for a continuance, which the district court denied.
The case proceeded to trial as scheduled, and on January 23, 1996, the jury found Kewin guilty. The government sought to have the district court enhance Kewin's sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A) based on his prior Ohio state court conviction for felony drug trafficking. The district court refused to enhance Kewin's sentence, however, because the government failed to comply with the notice provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a). Kewin was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment to be followed by 5 years of supervised release.
Kewin appealed the denial of his motion for a continuance and raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Kewin's appeal was consolidated with the government's appeal of the district court's suppression order and the court's refusal to enhance Kewin's sentence. Regarding the government's appeal of the suppression order, this Court held that the order be vacated, and remanded the issue to the district court for an evidentiary hearing because the record was inadequately developed for a proper review. See United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1997). This Court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kewin's motion for a continuance; that the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel could not be considered based upon the inadequate record; and, in a matter of first impression, held that a clerical error in the information did not preclude the application of the § 851 enhancement because Kewin had sufficient notice despite the error, thereby reversing the district court's refusal to apply the enhancement to Kewin's sentence. Id.
Upon remand, the district court conducted a suppression hearing regarding the cocaine found in the basement. Thereafter, in an order dated May 27, 1998, the district court reversed its previous decision and denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
Kewin was resentenced to a term of 240 months of imprisonment, with credit given for time served, and to 5 years of supervised release. Kewin appealed the judgment to this Court, which is not at issue here. On June 11, 1998, Defendant entered conditional guilty pleas on Count 1 and Count 3 of the indictment, and was sentenced to a term of 168 months of imprisonment to be followed by 10 years of supervised release. It is from Defendant's guilty plea conviction and sentence that he now appeals.
B.Facts
The following recitation of facts is taken from this Court's prior decision in this case:
On October 31, 1995, members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Caribbean Gang Task Force obtained a warrant to search 1437 East 116th Street, Cleveland, Ohio, for drug paraphernalia, and weapons. The warrant authorized a search of the "premises, curtilage, containers, and persons therein" at a location described as "1437 East 116th Street, Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and being more fully described as the downstairs unit in a two-family, two and one half story, white wood [-]sided dwelling with green trim."
Although the record is sparse, it appears that the "downstairs unit" is a five-room apartment consisting of a front room, two bedrooms, a kitchen, and a bathroom. One bedroom and the kitchen are located in the rear of the apartment. There is a door in the kitchen that leads to a common hallway. The hallway contains a door that leads into the building's basement. A person cannot directly access the basement from the downstairs unit. Defendants Kenneth and Kewin King lived in the downstairs unit.
On November 1, members of the Task Force executed the warrant. As the agents entered the downstairs unit, they observed defendants standing near the kitchen. Kenneth ran to the second floor but was apprehended by one of the agents. Both defendants were subsequently secured in the downstairs unit.
The officers searched the downstairs unit and found 60.6 grams of cocaine base in one bedroom and 16.65 grams in the other bedroom. One of the agents exited the downstairs unit and searched the building's basement where he discovered 443 grams of cocaine base.
King, 127 F.3d at 485.
At the suppression hearing held upon remand, the district court first determined whether Defendant and Kewin had standing to challenge the search of the basement of the dwelling in which the cocaine was found. The court noted that if it was determined that Defendant and Kewin had standing to challenge the search of the basement, the issue then became whether the agents exceeded the scope of the search, as authorized by the warrant, when they searched the basement. Carolyn King, mother of Defendant and Kewin who resided in the upper unit of the two-family flat, was called to testify in order to establish standing. Mrs. King testified that Defendant and Kewin lived on the first floor of the house; that she lived on the second floor with her two daughters and another son; and that her teenage son lived on the third floor. After considerable testimony by Mrs. King regarding the configuration of the dwelling and the living arrangements of the occupants, the district court concluded that Defendant and Kewin had standing to challenge the search.
The district court then considered arguments from defense counsels that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was constitutionally defective, and that the good faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), did not apply. Testimony was also presented by the agents who conducted the search.
On May 27, 1998, the district court entered an order denying the motion to suppress the evidence. In its order, the court began by noting that although it was still of the belief "that the basement was not within the scope of the warrant," the court first had to decide whether Defendant and Kewin had "standing" to challenge the search, by determining whether Defendant and Kewin enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy "vis-a-vis the basement." (J.A. at 169.) The district court considered the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing and found that neither Defendant nor Kewin had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement. Accordingly, the district court held that "they have no 'standing' to challenge the search of the basement and the seizure of crack cocaine from the basement," despite the court's earlier ruling at the suppression hearing itself. (J.A. at 171-72.)
The district court then went on to state that "[s]ince this Court has concluded that the warrant did not include a search of the basement, and especially in the event a reviewing court were to find that the King brothers did have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the basement, it is necessary to discuss the so-called 'Leon exception.'" (J.A. at 172.) The district court concluded that "the officer who searched the basement had an objectively reasonable reliance that the search warrant for the 'downstairs unit' included the basement. Therefore, on that basis, the crack cocaine seized from the basement shall not be suppressed." (J.A. at 173 (footnote omitted)). Following the district court's ruling, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment.
A.Sufficiency of the Affidavit
Defendant first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause for the warrant to issue because it lacked the requisite particularized facts regarding the alleged criminal activity and the premises to be searched. We disagree.
This Court reviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th Cir. 1993). When, as in this case, the district court is the reviewing court, we owe no particular deference to the district court's conclusions. Id.
When reviewing a state magistrate's determination of probable cause in reference to the issuance of a search warrant, this Court must determine whether, under a totality of the circumstances, "the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 'a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.'" United States v. Sonagere, 30 F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). This court pays "'great deference'" to a magistrate's findings, which "'should not be set aside unless arbitrarily exercised.'" Leake, 998 F.2d at 1363 (quoting United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236)). Yet, "the magistrate [must] perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for police." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). To that end, "[d]eference to the [issuing] magistrate . . . is not boundless." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The warrant requirement serves to interpose between the police and an individual's personal privacy an orderly procedure involving "a neutral and detached magistrate[,]" Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), who is responsible for making an "informed and deliberate determination" on the issue of probable cause. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110. The warrant process thus avoids allowing the determination of probable cause to rest with the "zealous" actions of the police who are "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
Probable cause is defined as "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion," United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990), that "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. This determination does not lend itself to the application of "[r]igid legal rules," and no one decision may serve to provide a definitive basis upon which to rely inasmuch as "informant's tips, like all other clues and evidence . . . may vary greatly in the value and reliability." Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Rather, the probable cause standard is a "'practical non-technical conception . . . [wherein] we deal with probabilities . . . [which are] the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949)). Stated otherwise, "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons. . . . Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. One simple rule will not cover every situation." Id. at 232 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As such, the issuing magistrate must apply a "totality of the circumstances" test to probable cause issues. Id. at 238. This test requires the magistrate to "make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying the hearsay information," probable cause exists. Id.
The Supreme Court identified factors which, although not to be analyzed as "separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case," should be weighed by a reviewing court in assessing the value that should be afforded to an informant's tip when determining whether a substantial basis for probable cause exists. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-32. These factors, which consist of the "veracity" or "reliability" as well as "basis of knowledge" of the tip, are relative where the strength of one factor may compensate for the deficiency of another. Id. at 230, 238-39; see United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 982 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Clay, J., dissenting). However, "the information presented must be sufficient to allow the official to independently determine probable cause; 'his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.'" United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239). "In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. With these standards and cautionary instructions from the Supreme Court in mind, we turn to the affidavit presented to the magistrate in this case to determine whether, under a totality of the circumstances, the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrant to issue.
The affidavit submitted to the court by Detective John Gannon of the Cleveland Police Department in support of the search warrant in question provided as follows:
Before me, a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, personally appeared the undersigned Det. John Gannon, #2452, who being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is member of the Police Department of the City of Cleveland, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and that his training and experience include: twenty-six years experience with the Cleveland Police, with a current assignment to the Caribbean Gang Task Force; training in the recognition, production, and distribution of controlled substances; over one thousand arrests for drug-related offenses.
Affiant has good cause to believe that on the premises known as 1437 East 116th Street, Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and being more fully described as the downstairs unit in a two family, two and one half story, white wood sided dwelling with green trim, the numbers "1439," the address for the upstairs unit, clearly visible on the south side of the entrance door to the upstairs unit, the structure being located on the east side of East 116th Street, facing west, and in the vehicle described as 1980's model gray Chevrolet Cavalier, Ohio Temporary License Number K591513, there is now being kept, concealed, and possessed the following evidence of criminal offense:
Cocaine, and other narcotic drugs, and/or controlled substances; instruments and paraphernalia used in taking or preparing drugs for sale, use, or shipment; records of illegal transactions including computers and computer files, articles of personal property, and papers tending to establish the identity of the persons in control of the premises; other contraband, including, but not limited to, money, communications equipment, motor vehicles, and weapons being illegally possessed therein; and/or any and all evidence pertaining to the violations of the laws of the State of Ohio, to wit: R.C. 2923.24, 2925.03, and 2925.11, and 2925.13.
1.Within the past twenty-four hours, affiant was contacted by another a confidential reliable informant concerning the delivery of a large quantity of crack cocaine to the above described premises.
2.This information from confidential reliable informant (CRI) indicated that Kenneth King was trafficking in cocaine, and had crack cocaine at the above-described premises having been delivered to King by Antonio Cook within the past day.
3.CRI is made reliable in that CRI has given information to the law enforcement official which has led to the arrest and/or conviction of more than seventy individuals for violations of state and/or federal drug laws, as well as the confiscation of more than $100,000.00 and 5 kilograms of controlled substances.
4.CRI stated that King kept drugs at the above -described premises, giving a description of the premises, and King utilized th