Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/975/1396/163374/
Timestamp: 2013-12-09 00:21:08
Document Index: 799625591

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 472', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501', '§ 3501']

975 F.2d 1396: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Pedro Alvarez-sanchez, Defendant-appellant :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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975 F.2d 1396: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Pedro Alvarez-sanchez, Defendant-appellantUnited States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. - 975 F.2d 1396
Argued and Submitted Nov. 9, 1990.Decided Sept. 15, 1992
Robert L. Brosio and Michael W. Fitzgerald, Asst. U.S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before D.W. NELSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and PRICE,* Senior District Judge.
The defendant, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez, was convicted after a jury trial of possession of counterfeit government obligations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. During the trial, the government introduced in evidence a confession obtained while the defendant was in custody. The defendant had moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was inadmissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3501 due to the delay between his arrest and arraignment. The district court denied the defendant's motion, and he appeals that denial. We review de novo the district court's decision to admit the confession. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (9th Cir.1988). We reverse and remand.
* The facts, as found by the district court in its denial of the defendant's suppression motion, are relatively simple. On Friday, August 5, 1988, Alvarez-Sanchez was arrested by Los Angeles Sheriff's deputies on narcotics charges during the execution of a search warrant on his residence. During the search, the deputies recovered $2,260 in counterfeit money; the Secret Service was notified. Although the state never pursued any narcotics or other prosecution against Alvarez-Sanchez, he remained in state custody throughout the weekend. On Monday, August 8, 1988, while still in state custody, Alvarez-Sanchez was interviewed by federal agents, one of whom was apparently fluent in Spanish. After agreeing to waive his Miranda rights, Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to knowing possession of the counterfeit money. Later that afternoon, the federal agents took custody of the defendant, and the next morning, Tuesday, August 9, he was arraigned before a federal magistrate.
The defendant argues that his confession was inadmissible because it was obtained during a period of unreasonable prearraignment delay. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an arrested person be arraigned before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." The right to a speedy arraignment codified in Rule 5(a) has been recognized to serve at least three important interests; it: (1) "protect[s] the citizen from a deprivation of liberty as a result of an unlawful arrest by requiring that the Government establish probable cause," (2) "effectuate[s] and implement[s] the citizen's constitutional rights by insuring that a person arrested is informed by a judicial officer" of those rights, and (3) "minimize[s] the temptation and opportunity to obtain confessions as a result of coercion, threats, or unlawful inducements." 113 Cong.Rec. 36,067 (1967); see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343, 63 S.Ct. 608, 614, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943) ("The purpose of this impressively pervasive requirement of criminal procedure [that of prompt arraignment] is plain.... The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary."). Alvarez-Sanchez's case presents us with the problem of determining the circumstances under which the failure to arraign an arrestee within a reasonable time should result in the suppression of his confession.
Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court determined that one appropriate remedy for violations of Rule 5(a) is to suppress confessions obtained during an unnecessary delay in arraignment. See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341, 63 S.Ct. at 613. In a line of decisions culminating in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), the Supreme Court adopted a general exclusionary rule that rendered inadmissible all confessions obtained during a detention in violation of Rule 5(a). This rule was not as severe as it seemed, however, as not all delays in arraignment violate Rule 5(a)--only "unnecessary delays." As long as the delay was reasonable, it did not violate Rule 5(a). See, e.g., Muldrow v. United States, 281 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir.1960); Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 798 (9th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951, 80 S.Ct. 862, 4 L.Ed.2d 868 (1960). Suppression was required only "when the federal officers cannot justify their failure to promptly bring the accused before a committing magistrate, or when the federal officers delay arraignment in order to obtain evidence from the accused." Cote v. United States, 357 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 173, 17 L.Ed.2d 110 (1966); see also Smith v. United States, 390 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1968). The rule was clear, however, with regard to delays deliberately incurred in order to allow investigating officers time to interrogate the accused--any confession obtained would have to be suppressed. See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414, 69 S.Ct. 170, 172, 93 L.Ed. 100 (1948).
The continued vitality of the McNabb Mallory remedy for Rule 5(a) violations was made uncertain, however, when in 1968 Congress enacted statutory provisions regarding the admissibility of confessions in federal criminal prosecutions, which provisions are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the text of which is set out in the margin.1 One of the purposes of this enactment was to limit the McNabb- Mallory rule by allowing certain pre-arraignment confessions to be admitted notwithstanding the presence of a Rule 5(a) violation. See United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir.1970). Unfortunately, the text of § 3501 is confusing and has given rise to uncertainty and disagreements among the circuits over the proper application of the provision. See United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026, 1034 (2d Cir.1984) (discreetly describing interpretation of the act as "somewhat murky"). The degree to which the operation of the McNabb- Mallory rule has been curtailed is unquestionably not clear from the plain language of the statute.
Two sections of § 3501, sections (a) and (c), appear to address the role of pre-arraignment delay in determining the admissibility of confessions obtained during such delay.2 The most elaborate, and pertinent, is § 3501(c). That section states that a confession obtained during a pre-arraignment detention "shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in [arraignment] if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention." The clear effect of this provision is to create a six-hour "safe harbor" during which a confession will not be excludable on the basis of the McNabb- Mallory rule. The section also provides that the permissible time for arraignment is extended "in any case in which the delay in [arraignment] is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer." Section 3501(c) is designed to allow the McNabb- Mallory rule to operate only when the delay in arraignment exceeds the greater of six hours or the time deemed reasonable by the court in light of the available means of transportation and the distance to the nearest magistrate. See Perez, 733 F.2d at 1031. Another way of putting it is that § 3501(c) modified the right to speedy arraignments so that delays of less than six hours or delays that are necessary in light of the logistics involved should be considered reasonable per se, but left unaltered the McNabb- Mallory requirement that all confessions given during an unreasonable delay in arraignment should be suppressed.
The other section that appears to affect the McNabb- Mallory rule is § 3501(a). This section states that "[i]f the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence." If, as this language suggests, the section renders the admissibility of a confession dependent only on its voluntariness, then the McNabb- Mallory rule is eliminated entirely. Although a prolonged detention prior to a confession may weaken a person's will and thereby render a confession involuntary, delay in arraignment (which includes both pre- and post-confession delay) does not necessarily affect the voluntariness with which a confession is given. Further, because involuntary confessions are rendered inadmissible by the Constitution regardless of any additional Rule 5(a) violation, see, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07, 80 S.Ct. 274, 279-80, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960), McNabb- Mallory would be purely superfluous. In short, § 3501(a) literally construed would make delay in arraignment that violates Rule 5(a) irrelevant to the admissibility of a confession.
Section 3501 is one of the many statutes, however, which provide strong evidence of the truth of Judge Learned Hand's simple aphorism that "[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally." Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir.1944) (Hand, J., concurring), aff'd, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921 (1945); see also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431, 63 S.Ct. 409, 412, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification."). The difficulty with construing § 3501(a) literally--aside from the obvious problem that it would leave violations of speedy arraignment rights remediless--is that to do so would create a clear conflict with § 3501(c) and would render the latter section meaningless. According to section (c), a court is forbidden to suppress a confession solely on the basis of pre-arraignment delay only when the confession is given within six hours of arrest or when the delay in arraignment is due to the distance to the nearest magistrate. But a literal reading of section (a) forbids a court to suppress a confession solely on the basis of pre-arraignment delay under all circumstances. As the Second Circuit has noted, such a construction of section (a) "reads subsection (c) out of the statute." Perez, 733 F.2d at 1031; see also United States v. Erving, 388 F.Supp. 1011, 1016 (W.D.Wis.1975).
Courts must not make a fetish of construing statutes in a literal fashion. Our role is not that of super-grammarian obsessed with the plain meaning of language but rather that of perceptive diviner of congressional intent. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir.1992). In such a role, if possible, "effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute." D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 323, 76 L.Ed. 704 (1932). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that a court should reject the literal interpretation of a section of an enactment when that interpretation would render a different section meaningless. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 250, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 2595, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). Accordingly, we reject a literal interpretation of § 3501(a)--in light of the provisions of § 3501(c), there must be circumstances in which delay in arraignment will require suppression of a confession regardless of the voluntariness of the confession. See Perez, 733 F.2d at 1032; United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir.1983) ("Section 3501(c), by implication, provides that unreasonable pre-arraignment delay can provide the sole basis for a finding of involuntariness, if the delay exceeds six hours."). The next question, of course, is--what circumstances?
We begin our analysis of the question by reviewing the approaches to § 3501 adopted by other circuits. Although all the opinions we have reviewed consider pre-arraignment delay in determining the admissibility of confessions, the methods by which the circuits perform this function can be divided into two distinct categories. One category involves constructions that attempt to harmonize sections (a) and (c) by expanding the meaning of the term "voluntary" as used in section (a) to include consideration of a factor unrelated to free will--specifically, pre-arraignment delay. The other category involves constructions that recognize that sections (a) and (c) were addressed to different matters--the former to concerns regarding the confessor's free will and the implementation of Miranda, and the latter to concerns regarding delay in arraignment and the implementation of McNabb- Mallory. While the former approach understandably tends to create confusion regarding the purpose of the two sections, the latter permits them to be analyzed separately and coherently.
The most primitive version of the first approach--the "expanded voluntariness" category--has been adopted by the Sixth Circuit, which resolved the conflict between sections (a) and (c) by holding simply that "[unnecessary delay] is one of five relevant factors which the trial judge must consider in determining voluntariness." United States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729, 734 (6th Cir.1977). The resolution is puzzling, however, because the court also stated that "unnecessary delay, in and of itself, is not sufficient to justify suppression of an otherwise voluntary confession under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)." Id. As explained above, the absolute bar on suppressions based solely on delays in arraignment, as adopted by the Sixth Circuit, conflicts with section (c)'s command that a confession not be suppressed "solely because of delay in [arraignment]" if the confession falls within the six hour safe harbor. The Sixth Circuit's approach does, however, have the superficial benefit of apparent obedience to § 3501(a)'s command that voluntariness be the touchstone of admissibility under that section.
Yet, this obedience is nothing more than apparent; it makes "voluntariness" the touchstone only by distorting the meaning of that term. As we have already noted, the delay in arraignment (as opposed to the delay during the pre-confession period) is irrelevant to the determination whether the confession was given with a free will. Worse still, in assessing "voluntariness," Mayes insists upon a consideration only of unnecessary delay. The reasons for the delay--whether the delay was necessary or unnecessary--have no bearing, of course, on the confessor's state of mind. See Perez, 733 F.2d at 1031 ("[T]he government's excuses for the delay have no logical or legal relevance to the defendant's voluntariness [in giving the confession]."); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 F.2d 561, 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004, 97 S.Ct. 537, 50 L.Ed.2d 616 (1976).