Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2013cv00641/770198/17
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 16:15:01
Document Index: 364703536

Matched Legal Cases: ['art.1', '§ 2000', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 2000', '§\n2201', '§ 1988']

ORDER, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 10 is granted in part and denied in part; the request for injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees are dismissed from the Complaint for Cheatham v. Phoenix, City of :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Cheatham v. Phoenix, City of
ORDER, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 10 is granted in part and denied in part; the request for injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees are dismissed from the Complaint. Signed by Judge G Murray Snow on 9/27/13.(REW)
Frank Cheatham,
No. CV-13-00641-PHX-GMS
Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Phoenix’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc.
10.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.1
This case arises out of a supervisor’s instructions concerning and objection to
sexually offensive materials in the workplace and his employer’s response to that
objection. Plaintiff Frank Cheatham has been employed with Defendant City of
Phoenix’s (the “City”) Fire Department (the “Fire Department”) as a Firefighter since
1979.2 (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 7.) Cheatham was promoted through the ranks to the Deputy
Chief Shift Commander of the South Shift Command. (Id. ¶ 9.)
In November 2009, Cheatham observed sexually suggestive drawings depicting
adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence, and oral argument will not aid the
The Court takes as true the allegations contained in Cheatham’s Complaint at
this stage of the litigation. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996).
male genitalia openly displayed in Fire Station 1. (Id. ¶ 11–12.) The Fire Department had
a policy prohibiting such materials in the workplace. (Id. ¶ 13.) Cheatham admonished
the Station supervisors that such drawings were inappropriate and would not be tolerated
in the future. (Id. ¶ 15.) After Cheatham’s admonishments, the supervising Battalion
Chief asked Cheatham to refrain from taking his meals at the Station. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Soon after Cheatham’s complaint, he observed a t-shirt with another drawing of
male genitalia displayed at the Fire Department’s gym. (Id. ¶ 18.) Cheatham also received
in the interoffice mail two small pieces of pasta resembling male and female genitalia;
written on the female genitalia was Cheatham’s first name. (Id. ¶ 19–20.)
In February 2010, Cheatham began hearing rumors that he would be removed
from his position at the Fire Department. (Id. ¶ 21.) Then, in March 2010, Cheatham was
informed by his supervisors that he had been removed from his position and transferred
to the Safety Division. (Id. ¶ 22.) Cheatham’s job responsibilities in the Division are less
significant than those he had as Deputy Chief Shift Commander. (Id. ¶ 27.) As
Commander, Cheatham had three full-time staff members, supervised four battalion
chiefs, and indirectly supervised approximately 440 firefighters. (Id. ¶ 25.) In the Safety
Division, his job duties are undefined and do not involve supervision of firefighters,
personnel management, or direct reports. (Id. ¶ 23–24.) He also has less favorable
working hours than before. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The constructive demotion and sexual harassment of Cheatham was in retaliation
to his complaints of sexually offensive materials at the Fire Department. (Id. ¶ 29.) Even
after Cheatham’s repeated complaints to authorities at the City, the City did not properly
investigate the complaints, halt the harassment, or remediate the retaliation. (Id. ¶ 31.)
The harassment and retaliation had a negative impact on Cheatham’s psychological well-
being along with his employment and continues to do so. (Id. ¶ 33.)
Cheatham filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against the City on June 1,
2010. (Id. ¶ 34.) Cheatham received a Right to Sue Letter on January 10, 2013, (id. ¶ 36.),
and filed this action against the City on March 29.
In his Complaint, Cheatham alleges retaliation and sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. (Id. ¶¶ 1,
29.) He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal, compensatory, and punitive
damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k). (Id. ¶
36.) The City now moves to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. 10.) In his Response to the
City’s Motion, Cheatham abandons his prayer for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Doc. 13 at 10.)
v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility
requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, a plaintiff must do more than employ “labels,”
“conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id .
Cheatham requests the Court to “[i]ssue a declaratory judgment that the retaliatory
conduct of Defendant as described [in the Complaint] violated Plaintiff’s rights under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended . . . .” (Doc. 1 ¶
36(A).) The Court assumes that Cheatham is seeking declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (the “FDJA”) states that “[i]n a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction [with noted exceptions] . . . any court of the
United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. §
2201(a). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the FDJA “was an authorization, not a
command. It gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not
impose a duty to do so.” Amer. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hungerford, 53 F.3d 1012 (9th
Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by Gov't. Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d
1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the FDJA “is deliberately cast in terms of
permissive, rather than mandatory, authority”) (internal citation omitted).
For purposes of declaratory relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied
by any continuing, present adverse effects.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
102 (1983) (internal citation omitted); Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that the same test applies both to requests for declaratory and injunctive
relief). Further, a plaintiff who may have standing to seek damages for a past injury “does
not necessarily have standing to seek prospective relief such as a declaratory judgment.”
Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
Cheatham’s request is based on the City’s alleged retaliation in violation of Title
VII. Cheatham alleges he was constructively demoted to another position within the Fire
Department after he admonished personnel at the Fire Station for allowing the display of
sexually offense materials. Cheatham’s claim is founded wholly upon past conduct; he
does, however, allege ongoing adverse effects from the retaliation. He alleges that there is
still a substantial negative impact on his employment and psychological well-being. That
is based on allegations that his current position with the Fire Department has significantly
less responsibilities and less favorable working hours. The City argues that there cannot
be ongoing effects because the alleged retaliation occurred more than three years ago in
2009 and 2010. But Cheatham has standing to seek declaratory relief because he is still in
the allegedly demoted position as of the filing of this suit.
Cheatham requests the Court to “[i]ssue an injunction ordering the City not to
retaliate against Plaintiff in the future.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 36(C).) To have standing to sue for
injunctive relief, there must be a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Lyons,
461 U.S. at 102 (internal citation omitted). Past wrongs are evidence bearing on that
issue. Id. As discussed above, however, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in
by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Although Cheatham has alleged that the City retaliated against him for objecting
to sexually offensive materials in the workplace, he does not allege a real threat that the
City will retaliate again. For example, he does not allege that because he was once
“demoted” to another position in the Fire Department, he will be demoted yet again based
on past or current protected activity. Therefore, Cheatham does not have standing to seek
injunctive relief to prevent the City from retaliating against him in the future. This part of
the prayer for relief will also be dismissed.3
Cheatham states in his Response to Defendant’s Motion that he prayed for
equitable relief to reserve the right to later request reinstatement to his prior position at
Cheatham also prays for nominal and compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 36(B), (D), (E).) The City contends that “no relief could be granted to Plaintiff
under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with his allegations regarding these
claims” and requests the Court to dismiss Cheatham’s claims in their entirety. (Doc. 10 at
12.) Assuming that the City maintains that Cheatham has not stated claims for sexual
harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII, it has not argued the deficiencies in
Cheatham’s prima facie case. Though it is possible that such a case is lacking, the City
has not sufficiently briefed the issue. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Cheatham’s
remaining prayers for relief.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10)
is granted in part and denied in part. The request for injunctive relief, punitive damages,
and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36(A), (C), (E)), are
dismissed from the Complaint.
the Fire Department. But Cheatham did not pray for that relief in his Complaint. He is
precluded from now challenging on that basis dismissal of his request for injunctive