Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/112/1068/585273/
Timestamp: 2019-11-17 07:31:14
Document Index: 524102336

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1002', '§ 1002', '§ 1002', '§ 1054', '§ 411', '§ 1054', '§ 1053', '§ 1053', '§ 1054', '§ 1054', '§ 1054', '§ 1053', '§ 1054']

Grant T. Lindsay, F. Bruce Stevens, Russell M. Rasmussen,thomas C. Labau, Individually and on Behalf of Aclass of Similarly Situated Individuals,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Thiokol Corporation and Thiokol Corporation Pension Plan,defendants-appellees, 112 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
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Grant T. Lindsay, F. Bruce Stevens, Russell M. Rasmussen,thomas C. Labau, Individually and on Behalf of Aclass of Similarly Situated Individuals,plaintiffs-appellants, v. Thiokol Corporation and Thiokol Corporation Pension Plan,defendants-appellees, 112 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1997)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 112 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1997) April 18, 1997
Before HENRY, MURPHY, and RONEY* , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs seem to argue that 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) permits the plan to define "normal retirement age" only earlier than 65, not later. If Congress had intended this, it could have easily said so. There is no support for the argument that the statute should be judicially rewritten to make this modification. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 n. 13, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 n. 13, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985) (" [C]ongressional silence, no matter how 'clanging,' cannot override the words of the statute."). The exceptions to our obligation to interpret a statute according to its plain language are "few and far between." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 F.2d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing three exceptions: (1) "rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters," United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S. Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989); (2) "if such an interpretation would lead to 'patently absurd consequences,' " United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S. Ct. 376, 380-81, 92 L. Ed. 442 (1948); and (3) "when two provisions whose meanings, if examined individually, are clear, but whose meanings, when read together, conflict, it is up to the court to interpret the provisions so that they make sense," Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom., AFL-CIO v. Love, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S. Ct. 1932, 104 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1989)).
Nowhere in the statute is the plan-declared "normal retirement age" required to be the same as that defined in the statute for the purposes of the statute. See Johnson v. Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 443-45 (5th Cir. 1984) (" [T]he statutorily intended meaning of 'normal retirement age' is provided by ERISA's own definitions section, which defines the meaning of terms used for purposes of that statute.").
Thiokol's pension plan is considered a defined benefit plan under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). An "accrued benefit" in a defined benefit plan is a participant's "accrued benefit determined under the plan ... and expressed in the form of an annual benefit, starting at normal retirement age," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (A), or the actuarial equivalent of such a benefit, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c) (3).
(2) A defined benefit plan must determine a participant's accrued benefit by a specified method that satisfies at least one of three alternatives. 26 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1) (A); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (A).
(5) A participant's right to the accrued benefit derived from his own contribution must be nonforfeitable at all times. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1).
Thiokol may not eliminate accrued benefits by plan amendment. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a). With the 1983 Retirement Equality Act, Congress amended ERISA "to make clear that 'a plan may not be amended to eliminate or reduce an early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy with respect to benefits attributable to service before the amendment.' " Ahng v. Allsteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law, 142-43 (2d ed.1995) (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g))). Thiokol's plan complies with 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) because it preserves all early retirement benefits, including subsidies, that accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Plaintiffs' last count fails on its face based on the foregoing holdings. Count IV alleged that Thiokol's plan violates 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (B), which provides:
Building on our above construction of 29 U.S.C. § 1053, under Thiokol's plan we construe 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1) (B) to read: