Source: https://armsandthelaw.com/archives/2007/03/dc_handgun_ban.php
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Of Arms and the Law: DC handgun ban stricken by DC Circuit
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DC handgun ban stricken by DC Circuit
Posted by David Hardy · 9 March 2007 03:36 PM
Just got word that Cato's suit against the DC gun ban, on 2d Amendment grounds, won. I'm just reading the decision now. Some segments I'll cut and paste:
'The District’s argument, on the other hand, asks us to read “the people” to mean some subset of individuals such as “the organized militia” or “the people who are engaged in militia service,” or perhaps not any individuals at all—e.g., “the states.” See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227. These strained interpretations of “the people” simply cannot be squared with the uniform construction of our other Bill of Rights provisions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently endorsed a uniform reading of “the people” across the Bill of Rights."
"In sum, the phrase “the right of the people,” when read intratextually and in light of Supreme Court precedent, leads us to conclude that the right in question is individual. This proposition is true even though “the people” at the time of the founding was not as inclusive a concept as “the people” today."
"The wording of the operative clause also indicates that the right to keep and bear arms was not created by government, but rather preserved by it. "
"With respect to the right to defend oneself against tyranny and oppression, some have argued that the Second Amendment is utterly irrelevant because the arms it protects, even if commonly owned, would be of no use when opposed to the arsenal of the modern state. But as Judge Kozinski has noted, incidents such as the Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943 provide rather dramatic evidence to the contrary. See Silveira, 328 F.3d at 569-70 (dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). The deterrent effect of a well-armed populace is surely more important than the probability of overall success in a full-out armed conflict."
" The term “bear Arms” is obviously susceptible to a military construction. But it is not accurate to construe it exclusively so. First, the word “bear” in this context is simply a more formal synonym for “carry,” i.e., “Beware of Greeks bearing gifts.” The Oxford English Dictionary and the original Webster’s list the primary meaning of “bear” as “to support” or “to carry.” See Silveira, 328 F.3d at 573 (Kleinfeld, J.). Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary—which the Supreme Court often relies upon to ascertain the founding-era understanding of text, see, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003)—is in accord. The first three definitions for “bear” are “to carry as a burden or carry as a mark of authority.”
"The District claims that Miller’s historical account of the “Militia” supports its position. Yet according to Miller, the militia included “all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defence” who were “enrolled for military discipline.” And Miller’s expansive definition of the militia—qualitatively different from the District’s concept—is in accord with the second Militia Act of 1792"
"The District argues that the modifier “well regulated” means that “[t]he militia was not individuals acting on their own; one cannot be a one-person militia.” We quite agree that the militia was a collective body designed to act in concert. But we disagree with the District that the use of “well regulated” in the constitutional text somehow turns the popular militia embodied in the 1792 Act into a “select” militia that consisted of semi-professional soldiers like our current National Guard. Contemporaneous legislation once again provides us with guidance in reading ambiguous constitutional text. See Op. at 30; see also Silveira, 328 F.3d at 579-80 (Kleinfeld, J.). "
"The second Militia Act provides a detailed list of directions to both individuals and states that we take as an indication of what the drafters of the Second Amendment contemplated as a “well regulated Militia.” It will be recalled, the second Militia Act requires that eligible citizens enroll in the militia and, within six months, arm themselves accordingly. Subsequent to enrollment, arming oneself became the first duty of all militiamen. See Silveira, 328 F.3d at 581 (Kleinfeld, J.). The Act goes on to require of the states that the militiamen be notified of their enrollment; that within one year, the states pass laws to arrange the militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, as well as appoint various militia officers; that there be an Adjutant General appointed in each state to distribute all orders for the Commander in Chief of the State to the several corps, and so on. The statute thus makes clear that these requirements were independent of each other, i.e., militiamen were obligated to arm themselves regardless of the organization provided by the states, and the states were obligated to organize the militia, regardless of whether individuals had armed themselves in accordance with the statute. We take these dual requirements—that citizens were properly supplied with arms and subject to organization by the states (as distinct from actually organized)—to be a clear indication of what the authors of the Second Amendment contemplated as a “well regulated Militia.” "
"On the question whether the Second Amendment protects an individual or collective right, the Court’s opinion in Miller is most notable for what it omits. The government’s first argument in its Miller brief was that “the right secured by [the Second Amendment] to the people to keep and bear arms is not one which may be utilized for private purposes but only one which exists where the arms are borne in the militia or some other military organization provided for by law and intended for the protection of the state.” Appellant’s Br. at 15, 307 U.S. 704 (No. 696). This is a version of the collective right model. Like the Fifth Circuit, we think it is significant that the Court did not decide the case on this, the government’s primary argument. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 222. Rather, the Court followed the logic of the government’s secondary position, which was that a shortbarreled shotgun was not within the scope of the term “Arms” in the Second Amendment. "
"By the terms of the second Militia Act of 1792, all militiamen were given six months from the date of their enrollment to outfit themselves with “a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein, to contain not less than twenty four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder . . . .” Act of May 8, 1792, ch. XXXIII, 1 Stat. 271 (emphasis added). Commissioned officers had somewhat more onerous requirements. The Act demanded that, in addition to the foregoing, they “shall severally be armed with a sword or hanger and espontoon . . . .” Id. at 271-72. Still further demands were placed on the artillery officers, who were to be “armed with a sword or hanger, a fusee, bayonet and belt, with a cartridge-box to contain twelve cartridges . . . .” Id. at 272."
"We take the outfitting requirements of the second Militia Act to list precisely those weapons that would have satisfied the two prongs of the Miller arms test. They bore a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” because they were the very arms needed for militia service. And by the terms of the Act, they were to be personally owned and “of the kind in common use at the time.” The modern handgun—and for that matter the rifle and long-barreled shotgun—is undoubtedly quite improved over its colonial-era predecessor, but it is, after all, a lineal descendant of that founding-era weapon, and it passes Miller’s standards. Pistols certainly bear “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.” They are also in “common use” today, and probably far more so than in 1789. Nevertheless, it has been suggested by some that only colonial-era firearms (e.g., single-shot pistols) are covered by the Second Amendment. But just as the First Amendment free speech clause covers modern communication devices unknown to the founding generation, e.g., radio and television, and the Fourth Amendment protects telephonic conversation from a “search,” the Second Amendment protects the possession of the modern-day equivalents of the colonial pistol. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-41 (2001) (applying Fourth Amendment standards to thermal imaging search). That is not to suggest that the government is absolutely barred from regulating the use and ownership of pistols. The protections of the Second Amendment are subject to the same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as limiting, for instance, the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[G]overnment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”). Indeed, the right to keep and bear arms—which we have explained pre-existed, and therefore was preserved by, the Second Amendment—was subject to restrictions at common law. We take these to be the sort of reasonable regulations contemplated by the drafters of the Second Amendment. For instance, it is presumably reasonable “to prohibit the carrying of weapons when under the influence of intoxicating drink, or to a church, polling place, or public assembly, or in a manner calculated to inspire terror . . . .” State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921). And as we have noted, the United States Supreme Court has observed that prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons does not offend the Second Amendment. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281-82. Similarly, the Court also appears to have held that convicted felons may be deprived of their right to keep and bear arms. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178). These regulations promote the government’s interest in public safety consistent with our common law tradition. Just as importantly, however, they do not impair the core conduct upon which the right was premised. Reasonable restrictions also might be thought consistent with a “well regulated Militia.” The registration of firearms gives the government information as to how many people would be armed for militia service if called up. Reasonable firearm proficiency testing would both promote public safety and produce better candidates for military service. Personal characteristics, such as insanity or felonious conduct, that make gun ownership dangerous to society also make someone unsuitable for service in the militia. Cf. D.C. Code § 49-401 (excluding “idiots, lunatics, common drunkards, vagabonds, paupers, and persons convicted of any infamous crime” from militia duty). On the other hand, it does not follow that a person who is unsuitable for militia service has no right to keep and bear arms. A physically disabled person, for instance, might not be able to participate in even the most rudimentary organized militia. But this person would still have the right to keep and bear arms, just as men over the age of forty-five and women would have that right, even though our nation has traditionally excluded them from membership in the militia. As we have explained, the right is broader than its civic purpose. See Volokh, supra, at 801-07. 17 D.C. Code § 7-2502.02 18 prohibits the registration of a pistol not registered in the District by the applicant prior to 1976. 19 The District contends that since it only bans one type of firearm, “residents still have access to hundreds more,” and thus its prohibition does not implicate the Second Amendment because it does not threaten total disarmament. We think that argument frivolous. It could be similarly contended that all firearms may be banned so long as sabers were permitted. Once it is determined—as we have done—that handguns are “Arms” referred to in the Second Amendment, it is not open to the District to ban them. See Kerner, 107 S.E. at 225 (“To exclude all pistols . . . is not a regulation, but a prohibition, of . . . ‘arms’ which the people are entitled to bear.”). Indeed, the pistol is the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182-83 (1995). And, as we have noted, the Second Amendment’s premise is that guns would be kept by citizens for self-protection (and hunting). D.C. Code § 22-4504 20 restricts separately the carrying of a pistol. Appellant Heller challenges this provision and a companion provision, § 22-4506, insofar as they appear to ban moving a handgun from room to room in one’s own house, even if one has lawfully registered the firearm (an interpretation the District does not dispute). In order to carry a pistol anywhere in the District (inside or outside the home), one must apply for and obtain an additional license from the Chief of Police, whom the Code gives complete discretion to deny license applications. Heller does not claim a legal right to carry a handgun outside his home, so we need not consider the more difficult issue whether the District can ban the carrying of handguns in public, or in automobiles. It is sufficient for us to conclude that just as the District may not flatly ban the keeping of a handgun in the home, obviously it may not prevent it from being moved throughout one’s house. Such a restriction would negate the lawful use upon which the right was premised—i.e, self-defense. Finally, there is the District’s requirement under D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 that a registered firearm be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by trigger lock or similar device, unless such firearm is kept at [a] place of business, or while being used for lawful recreational purposes within the District of Columbia.” This provision bars Heller from lawfully using a handgun for self protection in the home because the statute allows only for use of a firearm during recreational activities. As appellants accurately point out, § 7-2507.02 would reduce a pistol to a useless hunk of “metal and springs.” Heller does not appear to challenge the requirement that a gun ordinarily be kept unloaded or even that a trigger lock be attached under some circumstances. He simply contends that he is entitled to the possession of a “functional” firearm to be employed in case of a threat to life or limb. The District responds that, notwithstanding the broad language of the Code, a judge would likely give the statute a narrowing construction when confronted with a self-defense justification. That might be so, but judicial lenity cannot make up for the unreasonable restriction of a constitutional right. Section 7-2507.02, like the bar on carrying a pistol within the home, amounts to a complete prohibition on the lawful use of handguns for self-defense. As such, we hold it unconstitutional. VI For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded. Since there are no material questions of fact in dispute, the district court is ordered to grant summary judgment to Heller consistent with the prayer for relief contained in appellants’ complaint.
Letalis | March 9, 2007 3:48 PM | Reply
And unexpected, to boot.
David M. McCleary | March 9, 2007 4:01 PM | Reply
I just want to say thanks for all of your hard work. The seed you planted is bearing fruit.
You, my friend, are a true Patriot.
dwlawson | March 9, 2007 8:47 PM | Reply
I'm excited about much of the judges findings. I disagree that the Second Amendment is subject to the "same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as limiting, for instance, the First Amendment."
Admittedly I'm an amateur, but to me the wording of the Second is much more emphatic than the wording of the First.
Bonnie | March 9, 2007 10:11 PM | Reply
What path will this take in the future? Will it go back to the Appellate Division to be heard by 12 judges before it could go to the SCOTUS? In your opinion, will SCOTUS agree to hear it in our lifetime?
Jordan | March 10, 2007 1:04 AM | Reply
Depends on what you mean by reasonable restriction. A static bar, like no violent felonies and not legally insane, is perfectly reasonable. Anything more than that though, and you DO start to infringe on the right itself. The above two are akin to the shouting fire in a crowded theater restriction to the first amendment.
Steam Dragon | March 11, 2007 2:03 PM | Reply
And from the D.C. Circuit to boot.
Speaking of which, do I mis-understand what Judge Henderson is saying?
That persons residing in the District are not able to availe themselves of Consstitutional protections?
The implication of lesser standing than Citizens of a State... is rather worrysome from a circuit court judge.
Class = "people"
Subclass a: = Citizen
Subclass b: = slave
subclass c = convicted criminal (involuntary servitude)
a subclass c2 might be considered politicians and bureaucrats that think of themselves as "Master".
The majority opinion is remarkably easy to read and understand by non-lawyers.
I also understand why they wrote the way they did.
So that when this case goes to the en banc, and possibly the Scotus, there will be no question of this courts reasoning.
They certainly don't want to end up being thought of as a second "9th Circus."
straightarrow | March 12, 2007 11:17 PM | Reply
Tony | May 8, 2007 10:00 PM | Reply
I find it refreshing that the rights of "the people" were upheld above the desires of the politician. However, I still find it hard to believe it took this long to do something about the abuse that was levied on the citizens of DC and that so many were made to suffer for so long without relief. I also find it depressing that DC would continue to fight against basic rights. Kudos to the Court.