Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/422/289/case.php
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2325', '§ 15', '§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 102', '§ 15', '§ 15', 'arte 281', 'arte 281', '§ 13', 'arte 270', 'arte 281', '§ 2325', '§ 1253', '§ 1253', 'arte 281', '§ 2325', 'arte 281', 'arte 281', '§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 13', '§ 13', 'arte 281', 'arte 281', 'arte 270', 'arte 281', '§ 13', 'arte 281', 'arte 281', 'arte 281', 'arte 270', 'arte 281', 'arte 270']

ABERDEEN & ROCKFISH R. CO. V. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289 (1975) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 422 > ABERDEEN & ROCKFISH R. CO. V. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289 (1975)
ABERDEEN & ROCKFISH R. CO. V. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289 (1975)
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In December, 1971, the Nation's railroads, citing sharply increasing costs and decreasing or negative profits, collectively proposed to file tariffs increasing their freight rates by a temporary surcharge across the board. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), in the ensuing general revenue proceeding, finding that the railroads had a critical and immediate need for revenue, declined to exercise its power to suspend proposed rate increases, and the surcharge became effective in February, 1972. The railroads shortly filed for larger, selective rate increases, but, in April, 1972, the ICC suspended the effectiveness of these increases pending its investigation of their lawfulness, the ICC the previous month having served a brief draft environmental impact statement on all parties to the investigation, discussing the environmental consequences of rate increases with respect to recyclables in general terms and concluding that there was no basis yet to believe that the environment would be substantially affected thereby. Thereafter, appellee SCRAP and other environmental groups filed suit alleging that the ICC had decided not to suspend the surcharge pending its investigation -- which decision would have a substantial effect on the environment -- without preparing an environmental impact statement or considering environmental issues as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); that the preexisting rate structure discriminated against recyclables and in favor of virgin materials; and that the surcharge exacerbated this situation with the unfortunate consequence to the environment that use of recyclable materials would be inhibited and use of virgin materials encouraged. A three-judge District Court was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (now repealed), which required that an injunction restraining the enforcement operation, or chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
execution of an ICC order would not be granted unless the application therefor was heard and determined by a three-judge court, and relief was granted. On direct appeal, this Court reversed in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, (SCRAP I), holding that § 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act lodges in the ICC exclusive power to suspend rate increases pending final determination of their lawfulness. Meanwhile, in October, 1972, after an oral hearing, the ICC issued a final report declining to declare the selective rate increases unlawful, terminating the previously entered suspension order, canceling the surcharge that had been subsumed in the selective increases, and ordering a ceiling on rate increases with respect to some, but not all, recyclables. The report stated that, having given extensive consideration to environmental factors, the ICC would not file a separate, formal impact statement under the NEPA, and pointed out that the ICC had begun a separate investigation into the entire rate structure focusing on whether it interfered with the Government's environmental program. However, in November, 1972, the ICC reopened its investigation into the lawfulness of selective rate increases to reconsider the environmental effects of the new rates on recyclables, such rates being suspended for an additional period with the railroads' consent. In March, 1973, the ICC served an expanded draft impact statement, and in May, 1973, issued a final impact statement, concluding that its order of October, 1972, had been correct, and finally terminating its investigation without declaring any of the proposed rates unlawful except as previously provided in the October, 1972, order. In May, 1973, shortly before the increased rates on recyclables were to become effective, appellees SCRAP and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of increased rates on recyclables, and the three-judge court granted the motion. The railroads and the ICC appealed, and in June, 1973, THE CHIEF JUSTICE stayed the order on the railroads' motion, and the full Court declined to vacate the stay, 413 U.S. 917, with the result that the increased rates on recyclables went into, and remain in, effect. In November, 1973, this Court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the cases for reconsideration, 414 U.S. 1035. Meanwhile, appellees had filed motions for summary judgment in the three-judge court. Finding that the ICC had failed to comply with the NEPA in that, inter alia, it failed to hold an oral hearing before adopting the final impact statement, having previously held such a hearing (presumptively chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) Nor is there any merit to the railroads' argument (1) that, treating the District Court's decision as a review of whether the record supported the ICC's decision not to suspend the rates as to recyclables, the District Court reviewed an issue not yet decided finally by the ICC in violation of the principles of finality chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. The District Court also erred in deciding that the ICC should have "started over again" after it decided to propose a formal impact statement, even assuming that the ICC erred in failing to prepare a separate impact statement to accompany its October, 1972, report or that the consideration given to environmental factors in that report was inadequate. To the extent that such decision is based on the court's belief that the March, 1973, draft chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(b) There is no merit to the appellees' argument that the environmental consequences flowing from a facially neutral rate increase, which, when superimposed on an underlying rate structure, allegedly discriminates against recyclables, must be explored in an impact statement and can be explored only by analyzing the underlying rate structure; and that, moreover, the ICC has been tardy in complying with the NEPA, was required to analyze the underlying rate structure only once with a view toward environmental consequences, had plenty of time and cause to do so before its general revenue proceeding, and therefore should not have been permitted to terminate that proceeding without having done so. Such argument is not only contrary to the holding in United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, giving the ICC wide discretion to decide what issues to address in a general revenue chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which DOUGLAS, J., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 422 U. S. 328. POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Nation's railroads, the United States, and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) appeal from the judgment of a three-judge federal court which set aside an ICC order terminating a general revenue proceeding without declaring unlawful certain rate increases filed by the Nation's railroads with the ICC. The order directed the ICC to reopen the proceeding, prepare a better environmental impact statement under § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), hold hearings, and reconsider, in light of the new impact statement, its determination not to declare the rate increases applicable to recyclables [Footnote 1] unlawful. The impact statement involved is that required by § 102(2) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2), set out in the margin. [Footnote 2] The judgment was based on the three-judge chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
court's view that the 150-printed-page impact statement prepared by the ICC in connection with the general revenue proceeding insufficiently considered certain environmental issues, and thus failed to comply with the mandate of subsection (2)(C) of § 102 of NEPA; and that failure of the ICC to hold hearings after preparing a draft of the statement violated the command of the statute that the statement "accompany the proposal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This lawsuit has a lengthy history, a brief summary of which is necessary to an understanding of the issues presented by this appeal. In December, 1971, citing sharply increasing costs and decreasing or negative profits, substantially all of the Nation's railroads collectively proposed to file tariffs increasing their freight rates by 2.5% across the board. The "surcharge" was stated to be temporary, and was to be followed by a filing for larger, somewhat selective rate increases. Finding that the railroads had a critical and immediate need for revenue, the ICC declined to exercise its power to suspend proposed rate increases under 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7), and the surcharge became effective on February 5, 1972. On March 17, 1972, the railroads filed their selective increase proposal, which would result in an average increase across the board of 4.1% over the rates antedating the surcharge -- these new selective increases to become effective on May 1, 1972. Meanwhile, the ICC had directed the railroads to file an environmental impact statement with respect to the rate increases and to serve it on interested parties. This was done on January 3, 1972, and those served included appellee SCRAP. Numerous comments were received in response to this statement. On April 24, 1972, the ICC suspended the effectiveness of the selective increases for the maximum allowable seven-month period under 49 U.S.C. § 15(7), until November 30, 1972, pending its investigation, styled Ex parte 281, into their lawfulness. On March 6, 1972, the ICC served a brief draft environmental impact statement of its own on all parties to Ex parte 281, including appellees and the Council on Environmental Quality chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, on October 4, 1972, the ICC issued a final report dated September 27, 1972, declining, in the main, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The report noted that the "principal issue" in a general revenue proceeding is whether the railroads are in need of additional revenue; and concluded that the railroads had demonstrated overwhelmingly that they were. It then stated that there were two possible adverse affects on the environment which might flow from failure to declare the increases unlawful. First, the increase in rail rates might divert traffic to trucks, which are allegedly heavier polluters than trains. Second, the increase in rates for recyclables might discourage their use resulting in increased solid waste -- disposal of which creates environmental problems -- and an accelerated depletion of the country's natural resources. The danger of diversion to truck traffic was considered insubstantial for several reasons, among which were the fact that truck rates had increased due to similar increases in costs and the fact that the rate increases sought by the railroads were permissive, and would not be used with respect to commodities which would be diverted to trucks. Moreover, any danger of diversion was plainly outweighed by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
With respect to recyclables, the report emphasized that time is of the essence in general revenue proceedings in light of the claim of need by the railroads for immediate revenue, and that their entitlement to the overall increase usually follows from a showing of such need. The consideration of other factors is therefore necessarily abbreviated, and their further analysis is postponed to specialized proceedings more appropriate for their in-depth consideration, such as proceedings incident to individual complaints filed under 49 U.S.C. § 13(1) asserting that a particular rate or group of rates, such as rates on recyclables, are unjust and unreasonable, too high in relation to other rates, or otherwise illegal under the applicable law. Indeed, the report pointed out that the ICC had itself begun Ex parte 270, a separate comprehensive investigation into the entire rate structure, and was there focusing on the question whether the rate pattern interfered with the Government's environmental program. The report noted that there were limits on the extent to which the applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act would permit special rates for recyclables or allow the ICC to require the railroads to subsidize their transportation. Applying standard ratemaking criteria, the report rejected, on the basis of the information then before it, the claim that the underlying rate structure discriminated against recyclables. It also concluded that the use of recyclables, particularly ferrous scrap, was not responsive to rate increases -- particularly when accompanied by similar rate increases applicable to competing virgin materials. The ICC ordered a 3% ceiling on increases with respect to some, but not all, [Footnote 4] recyclables, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On March 13, 1973, the ICC served an expanded draft environmental impact statement. Comments were thereafter received from the EPA, the CEQ, the Department of Transportation, all of the appellees herein, and others. On May 1, 1973, the ICC issued a final impact statement covering 150 printed pages, with an additional 21-page bibliography. The main difference between the October 4, 1972, report and the impact statement was that the latter substantially expanded on the discussion of the underlying rate structure and the effect of rate increases on each of the recycling industries. With respect to the underlying rate structure, the conclusion, in the light of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On May 30, 1973, 11 days before the increased rates on recyclables were to become effective, appellees SCRAP and EDF filed a motion -- apparently in the context of their earlier filed complaint against the surcharge -- for a preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of the freight rate increases with respect to recyclables. On June 7, 1973, the three-judge court entered an order temporarily enjoining the railroads from collecting the rates, declaring, without any explanation whatever, that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, appellees had filed motions for summary judgment before the three-judge court seeking (a) a declaration that the ICC's orders declining to declare the rate increases unlawful were themselves unlawful because the environmental impact statement was inadequate, and an order directing the ICC to reconsider its decision in light of a better impact statement; and (b) a permanent injunction restraining collection of the rate increases on recyclables by the railroads. Over a dissent, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The court then found that the ICC had failed to comply with NEPA in two respects. First, no oral hearing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
had been held after circulation of the second draft impact statement on March 13, 1973, and before the preparation of the final impact statement. The court conceded that NEPA does not require the holding of hearings which the agency does not otherwise hold, and that the ICC is not required to hold hearings in a general revenue proceeding, United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U. S. 224 (1973). However, it ruled that, since the ICC held an oral hearing before adopting its October 4, 1972, report, such a hearing was therefore presumptively an "existing agency review process," and one should have been held before adopting the final environmental impact statement on May 1, 1973. Moreover, the ICC had simply reconsidered its October 4, 1972, decision in light of the impact statement, instead of starting all over again from the beginning. In order to start over again, it had to consider its impact statement at an oral hearing. Second, the court concluded that the report did not give "good faith" consideration to environmental factors. The court viewed the tone of the impact statement as "combative, defensive and advocatory"; it criticized the ICC for refusing to find in NEPA a congressional expression that it should invalidate rates otherwise just and reasonable on the ground that the rates would negatively affect the environment; and it criticized the ICC for refusing to change its analysis even after other Government agencies commented unfavorably on the statement. It held the statement deficient in two respects. First, it held that the statement did not sufficiently analyze the underlying rate structure, and that the ICC had, instead, considered only the impact of the increase involved in Ex parte 281. Second, the ICC should have more extensively explored the quantitative response of recycling businesses to freight rates by conducting a "rigorous price sensitivity study" and by analyzing whether industry chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the outset, we face a challenge to our appellate jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2325, now repealed, [Footnote 10] a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The question under the statutory language is whether the order being appealed from is an "injunction" within the meaning of that word as used in § 1253. Appellees claim that, since the court below declined to restrain collection of the increased rates, its order was not an injunction, but a declaratory judgment not appealable under § 1253, e.g., Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970); Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970). But the District Court's order not only declared that the ICC had failed to comply with NEPA, it also directed the ICC to perform certain acts. The order was plainly cast in injunctive terms. The order "directs" the ICC to reopen Ex parte 281 and to conduct further proceedings which "must" include preparation of an impact statement dealing with enumerated issues. In declining to restrain collection of the rates, the court said it was declining to grant "to plaintiffs additional injunctive relief" (emphasis added). Were the order of the District Court left undisturbed, the ICC would hardly be free to decline to prepare a new impact statement or to conduct further proceedings. The order would have as coercive an effect on the ICC, its members, and its chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is also apparent that the District Court's injunction restrained "the enforcement, operation or execution" of the order of the ICC within the meaning of § 2325, and could therefore have been issued only by a three-judge court. The ICC order of October 4, 1972, reaffirmed on May 1, 1973, declined to declare the general rate increase unlawful, or, with minor exceptions, to interfere with its collection. That order terminated Ex parte 281. The District Court, although it did not enjoin collection of the increased rates, emasculated the ICC order in major respects. Contrary to the order of the ICC, Ex parte 281 was to be reopened and further proceedings had with respect to the legality of the increased rates. Contrary to the ICC order, the environmental impact statement of the ICC was declared insufficient, and a new statement ordered prepared. The District Court's order, as we chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
have said, was in injunctive terms; and it is not tenable to assert that it did not interfere with the operative effect of the ICC order of May 1, 1973. [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The railroads, but not the United States or the ICC, argue that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the ICC, made in a general revenue proceeding, not to declare the increased rates unlawful. The argument is supported by a long line of District Court decisions; see, e.g., Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F.Supp. 487 (ED Va.1935); Koppers Co. v. United States, 132 F.Supp. 159 (WD Pa.1955); Florida Citrus Comm'n v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 517 (ND Fla.1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1021 (1957); Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 338 (SDNY 1969), and Alabama Power Co. v. United States, 316 F.Supp. 337 (DC 1969), both aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U. S. 73 (1970); Electronic Industries Assn. v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1286 (DC 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); and its correctness in its application to this case turns in part on an understanding of just what a general revenue proceeding is. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the initiative in setting rates remains with the railroads. See SCRAP I, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 672. The ICC has the power, after exercise of this initiative by the railroads, and after an investigation, either upon its own initiative or upon complaint by an interested party, to declare a rate unlawful if it finds that the rate is unjust, unreasonable, preferential, discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of the Act. 49 U.S.C. §§ 13 and 15. The ICC, and only the ICC, SCRAP I, supra, also has the power to suspend a new rate for up to seven months pending its determination of lawfulness. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7). [Footnote 13] Where the increase initiated by a railroad relates only to a single commodity, and where the ICC conducts an investigation, the investigation will be a thorough inquiry into the justness and reasonableness of that particular rate. However, the reason for increasing a particular rate may be a reason, such as across-the-board cost increases, which dictates an increase in virtually all rates by a large number of railroads. In those cases, the railroads have, in the exercise of their initiative, proposed across-the-board increases applicable to all or nearly all of their rates. This Court in New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 261 U. S. 196-198 (1923), recognizing the practical problems which the ICC faced in such a situation, permitted it to find the new rates lawful after taking proof relating not to any particular rate, but to the reasonableness of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Of course, the ICC has the power in a general revenue proceeding to declare the new rates unlawful and disapprove the increase. It could also, if it chose, declare some of the rates discriminatory, unreasonable, or otherwise unlawful; and it could itself affirmatively approve chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F.Supp. 487 (ED Va.1935), shippers of coal sought review in a three-judge court of the decision of the ICC in a general revenue proceeding not to declare the proposed increases unlawful insofar as they applied to coal. The claim was that the increased rates on coal were unjust and unreasonable. The court declined to set aside the rate increases. It pointed out that the ICC's order was permissive only -- it simply declined to prevent the rate increases. [Footnote 15] It then stated that the ICC had not yet decided whether the increased rates on coal specifically were just and reasonable, but had decided only that the railroad's revenue needs rendered the general increase reasonable, and that the plaintiffs had a procedure available to them -- a complaint under § 13 seeking a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since the Algoma decision, shippers seeking to undo, with respect to particular commodities, a decision by the ICC in a general revenue proceeding not to declare rate increases unlawful have been uniformly unsuccessful. In those cases in which the shipper claimed only that the increase on a particular commodity was unjust or unreasonable -- without addressing the question whether a general increase of some sort was justified -- the courts have declined to rule on the issue posed for the reason that the ICC had not yet addressed it. Koppers Co. v. United States, 132 F.Supp. 159 (WD Pa.1955); Florida Citrus Comm'n v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 517 (ND Fla.1956); Electronic Industries Assn. v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1286 (DC 1970). In those cases in which shippers have attacked the ICC's decision that rate increases chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The railroads claim that the decision of the court below violates the rule of the cases discussed above that decisions by the ICC in general revenue proceedings are unreviewable. First, the railroads argue that the decision in a general revenue proceeding not to declare rates unlawful is just as much an interim decision -- since it does not finally decide the lawfulness of any particular rate -- as is a decision not to suspend a particular rate pending investigation. See Algoma Coal Coke Co. v. United States, supra. Therefore, review of that decision is squarely banned by the Court's holding in SCRAP I that the courts have no power to suspend, or to overturn the ICC's decision not to suspend, rates pending the ICC's final determination of their lawfulness. Second, treating the decision of the court below as though it were a substantive review of the ICC's order -- addressed to the question whether the record supported the ICC's decision not to suspend the rates as to recyclables -- the railroads contend that the court below reviewed an issue not yet decided finally by the ICC in violation of settled principles of finality and exhaustion of administrative remedies. [Footnote 17] More generally, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The railroads' second argument fails because, unlike the issue of the reasonableness of a particular rate, and arguably unlike the issue of the reasonableness of a general increase, [Footnote 18] the issue addressed by the court below had chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Although the railroads claim that a general revenue proceeding is an interim proceeding -- the final one being a § 13 proceeding at which particular rates are adjudicated just and reasonable -- for ratemaking purposes, they do not claim that it has a similar status for NEPA purposes. All parties now agree that a general revenue proceeding is itself a "major federal action," independent of any later adjudication of the reasonableness of particular rates, requiring its own final environmental chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with appellants that the District Court erred in deciding that the oral hearing which the ICC chose to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
NEPA provides that "such statement . . . shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes" (emphasis added). This sentence does not, contrary to the District Court opinion, affect the time when the "statement" must be prepared. It simply says what must be done with the "statement" once it is prepared -- it must accompany the "proposal." The "statement" referred to is the one required to be included "in every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," and is apparently the final impact statement, for no other kind of statement is mentioned in the statute. Under this sentence of the statute, the time at which the agency must prepare the final "statement" is the time at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. Where an agency initiates federal action by publishing a proposal and then holding hearings on the proposal, the statute would appear to require an impact statement to be included in the proposal and to be considered at the hearing. Here, however, until the October 4, 1972, report, the ICC had made no proposal, recommendation, or report. The only proposal was the proposed new rates filed by the railroads. [Footnote 19] Thus, the earliest time at which the statute required a statement was the time chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Assuming that the ICC erred in failing to prepare a separate formal environmental impact statement to accompany its October 4, 1972, report, or that the consideration given to environmental factors in that report was inadequate, the ICC need not have "started over again." To the extent that the District Court's conclusion to the contrary is based on its belief that the draft statement of March, 1973, had to be considered at a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In order to decide what kind of an environmental impact statement need be prepared, it is necessary first to describe accurately the "federal action" being taken. The action taken here was a decision -- entirely nonfinal with respect to particular rates -- not to declare unlawful [Footnote 21] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
a percentage increase which, on its face, applied equally to virgin and some recyclable materials and which, on its face, limited the increase permitted on other recyclables. As in most general revenue proceedings, the "action" was taken in response to the railroads' claim of a financial crisis; and the inquiry, true to our decision in United States v. Louisiana, supra, was primarily into the question whether such a crisis -- usually thought to entitle the railroads to the general increase -- existed, leaving primarily to more appropriate future proceedings the task of answering challenges to rates on individual commodities or categories thereof. [Footnote 22] The point is that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The appellees insist that the decision not to prevent the facially neutral increases itself involves an impact on the environment when superimposed on an underlying rate structure which discriminates against recyclables. [Footnote 23] They claim that the underlying rate structure involved here does discriminate against recyclables, with serious environmental consequences, and that, upon more extensive consideration of the issue, the ICC has, in some part, at least, agreed with them and acted accordingly in subsequent general revenue proceedings. [Footnote 24] Accordingly, it is said, the environmental consequences owing from a facially neutral increase must be explored in an impact statement, and can only be explored by analyzing the underlying rate structure. They further argue, with force and some support in the record, that the ICC has been tardy in complying with NEPA, that the ICC was required chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
to analyze the underlying rate structure only once with a view toward environmental consequences; [Footnote 25] that it had plenty of time and cause to do so before Ex parte 281; and that it should, therefore, not have been permitted to terminate Ex parte 281 without having done so. This argument, however, stumbles over the holding in United States v. Louisiana, supra, which gives the ICC wide discretion in deciding what issues to address in a general revenue proceeding and permits it to postpone comprehensive consideration of claims of discrimination. It loses virtually all of its force in light of the fact that the ICC had begun an investigation of the underlying rate structure in Ex parte 270 before commencing Ex parte 281, and had started devoting specific attention to environmental issues in that proceeding before the decision of the court below. Thus, even if NEPA -- in the face of United States v. Louisiana and the failure of the appellees to initiate a proceeding under § 13 challenging rates on recyclables -- were read to require the ICC to address comprehensively the underlying rate structure at least once before approval of a facially neutral general rate increase, no purpose could have been served by ordering it to thoroughly explore the question in the confined and inappropriate context of a railroad proposal for a general rate increase when it was already doing so in a more appropriate proceeding. The rate increases will remain effective in any event until such time as the ICC obtains sufficient information to declare the increase on some commodities lawful or unlawful. [Footnote 26] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Having defined the scope of the "federal action" being taken in Ex parte 281, our decision of this case becomes easy. The lower court held that the environmental impact statement inadequately explored the underlying rate structure and the extent to which the use of recyclables will be affected by the rate structure. Whatever the result would have been if the ICC had been approving the entire rate structure in Ex parte 281, [Footnote 28] given the nature of the action taken by the ICC, the lower court was plainly incorrect. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A review of the record discloses that environmental issues pervaded the proceeding. In terms of time, paper, and effort on the part of the Commission, the railroads, other Government agencies, and the appellees, the environmental issues far outweighed the financial issue usually thought controlling at a general revenue proceeding. The various statements, formal and informal, expressly recognized what all agree are the important possible environmental consequences involved -- increased solid waste disposal and accelerated depletion of natural resources. The statements implicitly recognized the common sense proposition that decisions to increase rates on recyclables could deter their use. The reports explored at some length the degree to which rate changes would affect the use of several separate categories of recyclables, looking, inter alia, at past responses to rate changes and at various other factors affecting use of recyclables, including technological aspects of the different recycling industries. Finally, the statements inquired, preliminarily, into the fairness of the underlying rate structure, concluding that, on the basis of the information then available, no discrimination could be found. Assuming that some rudimentary examination into the underlying rate structure and into the reasonableness of the new rates on particular recyclables was required, the consideration of environmental factors in connection therewith was more than adequate. Appellees' best argument is that the ICC has acquired more knowledge since Ex parte 281, and has changed its mind on a number of matters and acted accordingly. This, however, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The environmental effects at stake are described in my opinion when the case was here before. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 412 U. S. 699-714 (1973). Appellees oppose increases on the rates for recyclables because increases in transportation costs will retard the use of recycled chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Yet the Commission persisted in these assertions, and it failed to make the price sensitivity studies the Council chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court implicitly concedes the shortcomings of the Commission's analysis, relying, as the Commission did, on the prospect that the environmental issues would receive further study in Ex parte 270, a proceeding initiated to investigate the entire freight rate structure. But NEPA commands an agency to consider environmental effects before it takes a "major federal action," not to relegate consideration to further proceedings after action is taken, particularly where there is no assurance that a prompt conclusion will be forthcoming. When the Commission terminated its proceedings in Ex parte 281, Ex parte 270 had been in progress for more than two years. The scope of the investigation had not been fully defined at that time, and the prospect of any chanroblesvirtualawlibrary