Source: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=23219
Timestamp: 2017-06-25 00:24:44
Document Index: 437252719

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1978', 'art 24', 'art\n1979', 'art 1980', 'art 1981', 'art 1982', 'art 1983', 'art 24', 'art 1978', 'art 18', 'art 1918', 'art 18', 'art 1978', 'art 1978', 'art 1978', 'art 18']

Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the Employee Protection Provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), as Amended - 77: 44121-44139 | Occupational Safety and Health Administration
77: 44121-44139
1978; 1980; 1982
[Pages 44121-44139]
[FR Doc No: 2012-17994]
[Docket Number: OSHA-2008-0026]
Act of 1982 (STAA), as Amended
SUMMARY: This document provides the final text of regulations governing
employee protection (or "whistleblower") claims under the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), as amended, implementing
statutory changes to STAA enacted into law on August 3, 2007, as part
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
On August 31, 2010, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) published an interim final rule (IFR) for STAA whistleblower
complaints in the Federal Register and requested public comment on the
IFR. This final rule implements changes to the IFR in response to
comments received, where appropriate. This final rule also finalizes
changes to the procedures for handling whistleblower complaints under
STAA that were designed to make them more consistent with OSHA's
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and other whistleblower provisions.
It also sets forth interpretations of STAA.
DATES: This final rule is effective on July 27, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sandra Dillon, Director, Office of the
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3112, 200 Constitution
(Word Perfect, ASCII, Mates with Duxbury Braille System), and
Among other provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), Public Law 110-53,
121 Stat. 266, section 1536 re-enacted the whistleblower provision in
STAA, 49 U.S.C. 31105 (previously referred to as "Section 405"), with
certain amendments. The regulatory revisions described herein reflect
these statutory changes and also seek to clarify and improve OSHA's
procedures for handling STAA whistleblower claims, as well as to set
forth interpretations of STAA. To the extent possible within the bounds
of applicable statutory language, these revised regulations are
other whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA, including Section
211 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851, the
(AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, and Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Responsibility for receiving and
investigating complaints under 49 U.S.C. 31105 has been delegated by
the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to the Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health (Assistant Secretary). Secretary's
Order 1-2012 (Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012). Hearings on
determinations by the Assistant Secretary are conducted by the Office
of Administrative Law Judges, and appeals from decisions by
administrative law judges (ALJs) are decided by the Department of
Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) (Secretary's Order 1-2010),
75 FR 3924-01 (Jan. 25, 2010).
Prior to the 2007 amendments, paragraph (a)(1)(B)(i) of STAA's
terms or privileges of employment for refusing to operate a vehicle in
violation of a regulation, standard, or order related to commercial
motor vehicle safety or health. The statute also protected any employee
who refused to operate a vehicle because he or she had a reasonable
apprehension of serious injury to himself or herself or the public
because of the vehicle's unsafe condition. The recent STAA amendments
expanded these protections to cover: (1) Any employee who refuses to
operate a vehicle in violation of regulations, standards, or orders
related to commercial motor vehicle security; and (2) any employee who
refuses to operate a vehicle because he or she has a reasonable
apprehension of serious injury to himself or herself or the public due
to the vehicle's hazardous security condition.
"unsafe condition" with the phrase "hazardous safety or security
condition" throughout this paragraph.
The 9/11 Commission Act added a new paragraph to 49 U.S.C.
31105(a)(1)(A)(ii), making it unlawful for a person to discharge,
discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms or
privileges of employment because of a perception that the employee has
filed or is about to file a complaint or has begun or is about to bring
a proceeding concerning a violation of a commercial motor vehicle
safety or security regulation, standard, or order. Paragraph (a)(1)(C)
of 49 U.S.C. 31105 is also new and makes it unlawful to discharge,
J.P. Donmoyer, Inc., No. 05-1505, 2007 WL 3286335, at *3 (ARB Oct. 31,
legal burdens of proof set forth in AIR21 at 49 U.S.C. 42121(b). AIR21
industry. Under AIR21, a violation may be found only if the complainant
42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). See Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 437
AIR21).
required the Secretary to notify persons when complaints were filed
against them. The statute has now been amended at paragraph (b)(1) to
clarify that this notice must be in writing. Similarly, the 9/11
Commission Act amended paragraph (b)(2)(A) of 49 U.S.C. 31105 to
clarify that the Secretary's findings must be in writing.
to order the employer to take affirmative action to abate the violation,
reinstate the complainant to his or her former position with the same
pay and terms and privileges of employment, and pay compensatory damages,
including backpay. The 9/11 Commission Act amended paragraph (b)(3)(A)(iii)
to reflect existing law on damages in STAA whistleblower cases and expressly
provide for the award of interest on backpay as well as compensation for
any special damages sustained as a result of the unlawful discrimination,
including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney
fees. The 2007 amendments also added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 31105,
paragraph (b)(3)(C), authorizing punitive damage awards of up to
Definitions applicable to STAA are found at 49 U.S.C. 31101. That
On August 31, 2010, OSHA published in the Federal Register an IFR
implementing statutory changes to STAA enacted into law on August 3,
2007, as part of the 9/11 Commission Act, Public Law 110-53, 121 Stat.
266, as well as making other improvements to Part 1978. 75 FR 53544
(Aug. 31, 2010). In addition to promulgating the IFR, OSHA's notice
included a request for public comment on the interim rules by November
1, 2010. There were no objections to most of the IFR and thus OSHA has
adopted the IFR, except as noted.
In response to the IFR, three organizations--the Government
Accountability Project (GAP), the National Whistleblower Center (NWC),
and the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), filed comments
with the agency within the public comment period. OSHA has reviewed and
considered these comments and now adopts this final rule, which has
been revised in part to address problems perceived by the agency and
NWC made several comments addressing particular provisions of the
rule. These comments have been addressed, and changes to the regulatory
provisions have been explained in the Summary and Discussion of
Regulatory Provisions (below), where applicable. GAP commented that
"these rules reasonably interpret statutory requirements and in some
instances [will] significantly improve [OSHA] procedures to investigate
whistleblower complaints." GAP specifically expressed support for the
following provisions: .103(b), .103(d), .104(c), .104(d), and certain
aspects of .104(f). Finally, TTD expressed its support for the interim
final rules in general, commenting that the "rules implement improved
procedures for handling whistleblower complaints under [STAA]." TTD
believes that the changes "provide important protections for
transportation workers," and TTD applauded OSHA for moving forward
with the rulemaking. TTD's comments went on to suggest some changes and
modifications to other interim final rules that were submitted on the
same docket as the STAA interim final rule, namely the Procedures for
the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the National Transit
System Security Act and the Federal Railroad Safety Act. Those specific
comments were not relevant to STAA and thus have not been addressed in
The regulatory provisions in this part have been made to reflect
the 9/11 Commission Act's amendments to STAA, to make other
improvements to the procedures for handling STAA whistleblower cases,
to interpret some provisions of STAA, and, to the extent possible
within the bounds of applicable statutory language, to be consistent
with regulations implementing the whistleblower provisions of the
following statutes, among others, that are also administered and
enforced by OSHA: the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; the Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C. 6971; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7622; the ERA; the
1980, 42 U.S.C. 9610 (all regulations for these statutory provisions
jointly codified at 29 CFR part 24); AIR21, codified at 29 CFR part
1979; SOX, codified at 29 CFR part 1980; the Pipeline Safety Improvement
Act of 2002, 49 U.S.C. 60129, codified at 29 CFR part 1981; the National
Transit Systems Security Act, 6 U.S.C. 1142, the Federal Railroad Safety
Act, 49 U.S.C. 20109, codified at 29 CFR part 1982; and the Consumer Product
Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. 2087, codified at 29 CFR part 1983. The
section numbers of these STAA regulations correspond as closely as
possible with the numbering in the regulations implementing other
whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA.
These regulatory provisions use more appropriate terminology.
First, cases brought under the whistleblower provisions of STAA are
referred to as actions alleging "retaliation" rather than
"discrimination." This terminology, which has already been used in
the regulations implementing the ERA and the other whistleblower
statutes covered by 29 CFR part 24, is not intended to have substantive
effect. It simply reflects the fact that claims brought under these
whistleblower provisions are prototypical retaliation claims. A
retaliation claim is a specific type of discrimination claim that
focuses on actions taken as a result of an employee's protected
activity rather than as a result of an employee's characteristics
(e.g., race, gender, or religion).
Second, before the issuance of the IFR, the regulations referred to
persons named in STAA whistleblower complaints as "named persons,"
but in these regulations they are referred to as "respondents."
Again, this wording is not intended to have any substantive impact on
the handling of STAA whistleblower cases. This wording simply reflects
a preference for more conventional terminology.
includes an updated citation reference to the correct section of the
United States Code where STAA's whistleblower provision is located and
to reflect the recent statutory amendments extending coverage to
activities pertaining to commercial motor vehicle security matters.
Minor editorial revisions made to paragraph (b) of this section in the
IFR are continued here.
The express inclusion of certain provisions in Part 1978 should not
be read to suggest that similar legal principles may not be implied
under other OSHA whistleblower rules. In other words, the canon of
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another) should not be applied in
comparing these rules to other OSHA whistleblower rules. See United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002) (canon not applied when contrary
to intent of drafters). For example, the express references to oral and
internal complaints in these rules do not imply that oral and internal
complaints are not protected under other OSHA whistleblower statutes.
whistleblower provision. The definitions are organized in alphabetical
order and minor edits made to clarify regulatory text in the IFR are
A definition of "business days" in paragraph (c) clarifies that
the term means days other than Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal
holidays. This definition is consistent with 29 CFR 1903.22(c), an OSHA
regulation interpreting the analogous term "working days" in section
10 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29
U.S.C. 659, in the same way.
The regulations in effect before the IFR defined "commercial motor
carrier" as a person who satisfied the definitions of "motor
carrier" and "motor private carrier" in 49 U.S.C. 10102(13) and
10102(16). The IFR replaced that definition with: "Commercial motor
carrier means any person engaged in a business affecting commerce
between States or between a State and a place outside thereof who owns
or leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business,
or assigns employees to operate such a vehicle." This definition of
e.g., Arnold v. Associated Sand and Gravel Co., ALJ No. 92-STA-19, 1992
WL 752791, at *3 (Sec'y Aug. 31, 1992) (appropriate to give the term
"commercial" its legal meaning; "legislative history of the STAA * *
* additionally militates in favor of construing the term expansively to
describe motor carriers 'in' or 'affecting' commerce"). In addition,
this definition of "commercial motor carrier" is more consistent with
the statutory definition of "employer." See 49 U.S.C. 31101(3). The
definition in the IFR has been adopted here.
The statutory definition of "commercial motor vehicle" in
paragraph (e) included in the IFR has been revised in the final rule.
Rather than reiterate the statutory definition, the final rule simply
refers to the definition of this term as provided in the statute, 49
U.S.C. 31101(1). This change is intended to ensure that the regulation
refers to the appropriate statutory definition, should it be amended in
the future. The definition of "employee" reflects the statutory
amendment expanding coverage to individuals whose work directly affects
commercial motor vehicle security. In addition, the statutory
definitions of "employer" and "State" are in this section at
paragraphs (i) and (n) respectively, and a paragraph at the end of this
section clarifies that any future statutory amendments will govern in
lieu of the definitions contained in section 1978.101. A definition of
"complaint" in paragraph (g) clarifies the scope of activities
protected by STAA's whistleblower provisions. See discussion of section
1978.102 (Obligations and prohibited acts) below.
The definition of "complainant" in paragraph (f) in the IFR has
been changed slightly. The word "whistleblower" has been deleted
A sentence has been added to the definition of "employee" in
section 1978.101(h) to include former employees and applicants. Such
language is included in the definition of "employee" in other OSHA
whistleblower rules, such as those under the National Transit Systems
interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the term "employee" in 42 U.S. C. 2000e-3a, the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to include
former employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). Among
the Court's reasons for this interpretation were the lack of temporal
fear of blacklisting. These reasons apply equally to the anti-
retaliation provision of STAA and the other whistleblower provisions
The definition of "person" in paragraph (k) is basically the same
as the one in the IFR except for the addition of "organized" before the
word "group." The definition reflects the statutory definition of "person"
for the STAA whistleblower provision in 49 App. U.S.C. 2301(4) that existed
before the 1994 codification of Title 49 of the United States Code, dealing
with transportation. See Public Law 103-272, 108 Stat. 984. The provision
at 49 App. U.S.C. 2301(4) stated: " 'person' means one or more individuals,
partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, or any other
organized group of individuals." The definition of "person" was deleted from
the codification because it was regarded as unnecessary due to the Dictionary
Act's definition of "person" in 1 U.S.C. 1, which states that the term
"includes" entities, such as individuals and corporations, which for the
most part are the same as the entities listed in the definition in this rule.
See note after 49 U.S.C. 31101. Changes in codifications are not intended to
make substantive changes in a statute unless the congressional intent to do
so is clear. Muniz v.  Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 472 n.11 (1975); Carbo v. United
States, 364 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1961). The congressional intent to rely on the
definition of "person" in 1 U.S.C. 1 does not indicate an intent to change the
definition. Practically all of the entities listed in 49 App. U.S.C. 2314 are
the same as the ones specifically listed in 1 U.S.C. 1. Some of the entities
are different, but the Dictionary Act definition, using the word "includes,"
is not an exclusive list. Federal Land Bank v.  Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S.
95, 100 (1941) ("* * * term 'including' is not one of all-embracing definition,
but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle.").
Furthermore, because the term "person" includes an individual and it is a
"person" who is prohibited from engaging in the retaliation described in 49
U.S.C. 31105, a corporate officer or other individual responsible for the
retaliation is individually liable under the STAA whistleblower provision.
Smith v. Lake City Enterprises, Inc., Crystle Morgan, and Donald Morgan, Nos.
09-033, 08-091, 2010 WL 3910346, at *6 (ARB Sept. 24, 2010) (corporate president
and sole shareholder individually liable under STAA), citing Wilson v. Bolin
Assocs., Inc., ALJ No. 1991-STA-004 (Sec'y Dec. 30, 1991). Section 1978.102
has been corrected to reflect the fact that the statute imposes obligations
on "person[s]."
This section describes the activities that are protected under STAA
activities. Insertion of this section in the IFR resulted in the
renumbering of many subsequent sections; that renumbering is continued
in the final rule. The discussion below highlights some significant
interpretations of STAA in these provisions, but it is by no means
Among other prohibited acts, it is unlawful under STAA for a person
to retaliate against an employee because the employee, or someone
acting pursuant to the employee's request, has filed a complaint
related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety or security
regulation, standard or order. 49 U.S.C. 31105(a)(1)(A)(i). STAA's
whistleblower provision also prohibits a person from retaliating
against an employee because the person perceives that the employee has
filed or was about to file such a complaint. 49 U.S.C.
31105(a)(1)(A)(ii).
The Secretary has long taken the position that these provisions of
STAA, as well as similarly worded provisions in other whistleblower
statutes enforced by OSHA, cover both written and oral complaints to
the employer or a government agency. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
an analogous whistleblower provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), protects oral as well as written
complaints. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
S.Ct. 1325, 1329 (2011). Among other things, the FLSA forbids employers
from discriminating against any employee "because such employee has
filed any complaint." Although the Court examined "filed any
complaint" in the FLSA, the decision is applicable to analogous
language in STAA, as well as in other OSHA whistleblower statutes. See
Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S.
427, 427-28 (1973) (statutes in pari materia should be construed
similarly). Specifically, Congress's intent in passing the
whistleblower provision of STAA was to encourage employee reporting of
noncompliance with safety regulations. Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 481
U.S. 252, 258 (1987). As with the FLSA, those employees who are in the
best position to report complaints under this provision may find it
difficult or impractical to reduce a complaint to writing. It is
particularly important for STAA to cover oral as well as written
complaints because in many cases truck drivers are out on the road and
the only way they can communicate immediate concerns about violations
of safety and security regulations is via CB radio or phone. Requiring
that complaints of safety concerns and violations be in writing would
undermine the basic purpose of the statute. Furthermore, since the
passage of the STAA whistleblower provision, the ARB and federal courts
have consistently held that protected activity under STAA includes
oral, informal, and unofficial complaints about violations of
commercial motor vehicle regulations. See, e.g., Harrison v. Roadway
Express, Inc., No. 00-048, 2002 WL 31932546, at *4 (ARB Dec. 31, 2002)
("[C]omplaints about violations of commercial motor vehicle
regulations may be oral, informal or unofficial."), aff'd on other
grounds, 390 F.3d 752 (2d Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., Calhoun v. Dep't
of Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 8 F.3d 980, 986 (4th Cir. 1993)) for the
proposition that "written or oral" complaints can be protected under
STAA). Cf. Power City Elec., Inc., No. C-77-197, 1979 WL 23049, at *2
(E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 1979) (noting that the term "filed", as used in
660(c), "is not limited to a written form of complaint."). As the
Court noted in Kasten, long-standing interpretations suggest that such
views are "reasonable" and "consistent with the Act." Kasten, 131
S.Ct. at 1335. For these reasons, sections 1978.102(b)(1) and
1978.102(e)(1) cover the filing of written and oral complaints with
employers or government agencies, and the definition of the term
"complaint," reflecting this intent, in the IFR in section 1978.101
is reiterated here. Similarly, the words "orally or in writing" have
been added after the words "filed" and "file" in sections
1978.102(b)(1) and .102(e)(2) to clarify that the protected activity
includes oral as well as written communication.
Sections 1978.102(b)(1) and 1978.102(e)(2) clarify the long-
standing position of the Secretary, supported by the courts of appeals,
that under STAA and other OSHA whistleblower statutes the filing of a
complaint is protected, whether the complaint is filed with an
employer, a government agency, or others. Similarly, the definition of
"complaint" in section 1978.101(g) states that the term includes
complaints to employers, government agencies, and others. See 29 CFR
1977.9(c) (section 11(c) of the OSH Act protects complaints to an
employer); McKoy v. North Fork Services Joint Venture, No. 04-176, 2007
WL 1266925, at *3 (ARB Apr. 30, 2007) (complaining to employer about
violations of environmental statutes is protected activity). STAA does
not specify the entities to whom a complaint may be filed in order to be
protected. The preamble to the interim final rule noted: "The Secretary
has long taken the position that these provisions of STAA, as well as
similarly worded provisions in other whistleblower statutes enforced by
OSHA, cover both written and oral complaints to the employer or a government
agency." 75 FR 53544, 53547 (Aug. 31, 2010) (emphasis added). In particular,
the Secretary has ruled that complaints to an employer are protected under
STAA in order to promote the statute's goal of highway safety. Israel v.
Branrich, Inc., No. 09-069, 2011 WL 5023051, at *4 (ARB Sept. 29. 2011);
Davis v. H.R. Hill, Inc., ALJ No.1986-STA-018 (Sec'y Mar. 19, 1987). This
interpretation has been adopted by courts of appeals. Calhoun v. Dep't of
Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2009); Clean Harbors Envt'l Services,
Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 19-21 (1st Cir. 1998). Cf. Minor v. Bostwick
Laboratories, Inc., 669 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 2012) (analogous anti-retaliation
provision of Fair Labor Standards Act protects complaints to an employer).
In describing the conduct that is prohibited under STAA, the final
rule adds the words "harass, suspend, demote" to paragraphs (b), (c),
and (e) to make this rule more consistent with other OSHA whistleblower
This section (formerly section 1978.102) was revised in the IFR to
make it more consistent with the regulatory procedures for other OSHA-
administered whistleblower laws; that revision is adopted here with
OSHA's practice under other OSHA whistleblower laws. Language has been
added to paragraph (b) to clarify that when a complaint is made orally,
OSHA will reduce the complaint to writing. In addition, paragraph (b)
provides that if an employee is not able to file a complaint in
English, OSHA will accept the complaint in any other language.
Language in paragraph (c) of the IFR providing that the complaint
should be filed with the "* * * OSHA Area Director responsible for
enforcement activities in the geographical area where the employee
resides or was employed * * *" has been changed. "Area Director" has
been changed to "office" in recognition of the possibility that
organizational changes may take place.
Language in paragraph (d) clarifies the date on which a complaint
will be considered "filed," i.e., the date of postmark, facsimile
transmittal, electronic communication transmittal, telephone call,
person filing at an OSHA office. To be timely, a complaint must be
filed within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged violation. Under
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980), this is
considered to be when the retaliatory decision has been both made and
communicated to the complainant. In other words, the limitations period
commences once the employee is aware or reasonably should be aware of
the employer's decision. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001).
Provisions dealing with tolling of the 180-day period for the
filing of STAA whistleblower complaints were deleted in the IFR for
consistency with other OSHA whistleblower regulations, which do not
contain this language; the final rule makes no changes in this regard.
This revision is not intended to change the way OSHA handles untimely
complaints under any whistleblower laws. A sentence in the regulatory
text clarifies that filing deadlines may still be tolled based on
complaints," conforms to similar provisions implementing other OSHA
whistleblower programs and more clearly describes the relationship
between Section 11(c) complaints and STAA whistleblower complaints.
Section 11(c) of the OSH Act generally prohibits employers from
retaliating against employees for filing safety or health complaints or
otherwise initiating or participating in proceedings under the OSH Act.
In some circumstances an employee covered by STAA may engage in
activities that are protected under STAA and Section 11(c) of the OSH
Act. For example, a freight handler loading cargo onto a commercial
motor vehicle may complain about both the overloading of that vehicle
(a safety complaint protected by STAA) and also about an unsafe
forklift (a safety complaint covered by the OSH Act). In practice, OSHA
would investigate whether either or both of these protected activities
caused the firing. Paragraph (e) now clarifies that STAA whistleblower
complaints that also allege facts constituting an 11(c) violation will
be deemed to have been filed under both statutes. Similarly, Section
11(c) complaints that allege facts constituting a violation of STAA's
STAA is not a formal document and need not conform to the pleading
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l, Inc., ARB
Case No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *9-10 (ARB May 26, 2011) (holding
evidence to make a prima facie showing." 29 CFR 1978.104(e). As
explained in section 1978.104(e), if the complaint, supplemented as
42121(b)(2), 29 CFR 1978.104(e).
This section (formerly section 1978.103) more closely conforms to
the regulations implementing other whistleblower provisions
administered by OSHA. Former paragraph (f) in section 1978.102, which
deals with the notice sent to employers when complaints are filed
against them, is in paragraph (a) in section 1978.104, where it more
appropriately appears under the "Investigation" heading. In
addition, OSHA here adopts minor revisions made to that paragraph in
the IFR to be more consistent with similar provisions in other OSHA
whistleblower regulations. Of particular note, OSHA adopts language in
the IFR which was added requiring OSHA to send the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) a copy of the notice that goes to
the employer. This has been standard practice in any event. Minor
editorial changes to the language of the IFR have been made.
investigate and gather data as it deemed appropriate, was deleted in
the IFR as unnecessary; that deletion remains. The language in
paragraph (a) of the IFR relating to the provision of information to
respondent's counsel has been deleted because when the respondent is
first notified about the complaint the respondent is usually not
represented by counsel. Paragraph (b) conforms to other OSHA
respondents was deleted in the IFR and is not present in the final
rule, but this deletion is not substantive.
Paragraph (c) specifies that throughout the investigation the
counsel, if the complainant is represented by counsel) a copy of all of
to the complainant, the agency will redact them, if necessary, in
accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and other
applicable confidentiality laws. The phrase "if necessary" has been
added because not all of respondent's submissions will contain
confidential information. Paragraph (d) addresses confidentiality in
investigations. Minor editorial changes have been made.
Paragraph (e) reflects the incorporation of the AIR21 burdens of
proof provision by the second sentence of 49 U.S.C. 31105(b)(1), which
was added by the 9/11 Commission Act. This paragraph generally conforms
to similar provisions in the regulations implementing the AIR21 and ERA
whistleblower laws. All of these statutes now require that a
complainant make an initial prima facie showing that protected activity
was "a contributing factor" in the adverse action alleged in the
complaint, i.e., that the protected activity, alone or in combination
with other factors, affected in some way the outcome of the employer's
decision. Ferguson v. New Prime, Inc., No. 10-75, 2011 WL 4343278, at
*3 (ARB Aug. 31, 2011); Clarke v. Navajo Express, No. 09-114, 2011 WL
2614326, at *3 (ARB June 29, 2011). The complainant will be considered
to have met the required burden if the complaint on its face,
supplemented as appropriate through interviews of the complainant,
alleges the existence of facts and either direct or circumstantial
evidence to meet the required showing. Complainant's burden may be
satisfied, for example, if he or she shows that the adverse action took
place shortly after protected activity, giving rise to the inference
that it was a contributing factor in the adverse action. Language from
some of OSHA's other whistleblower regulations, including those
implementing AIR21 and ERA, setting forth specific elements of the
complainant's prima facie case, has been carried over into these
The revised STAA provision specifically bans retaliation against
employees because of their perceived protected activity. This provision
clarifies existing whistleblower law. See Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32
F.3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Construing Sec.  11(c), the OSH Act's
anti-retaliation provision, to protect employees from adverse
employment actions because they are suspected of having engaged in
protected activity is consistent with * * * the specific purposes of
the anti-retaliation provisions."). However, the references in this
section to perceived protected activity have been deleted here because
the concept is covered by the language of paragraph (e)(2)(ii) on
suspected protected activity. Also, the final rule adds language
clarifying that the revised STAA provision protects not only actual
protected activity but also activity about to be undertaken.
Cf. Ferguson, supra (analogous burden shift in litigation); Clarke,
supra (same). Thus, OSHA must dismiss a complaint under STAA and not
investigate (or cease investigating) if either: (1) The complainant
fails to meet the prima facie showing that protected activity or the
perception of protected activity was a contributing factor in the
absent the protected activity or the perception thereof. The final rule
makes other minor editorial corrections.
Former section 1978.103(c) was moved to paragraph (f) of this
section in the IFR; that change remains. In the IFR minor revisions
were made to this paragraph to conform to similar paragraphs in the
regulations implementing the AIR21 and SOX whistleblower provisions;
those changes remain. The provision allows 10 business days (rather
than 5 days) for the respondent to present evidence in support of its
position against an order of preliminary reinstatement. Paragraph (f)
of this section has been revised to provide complainants with copies of
the same materials provided to respondents under this paragraph, except
to the extent that confidentiality laws require redaction.
NWC and GAP commented on the provisions in section 1978.104. NWC
noted that to conduct a full and fair investigation, OSHA needs to
obtain the available, responsive information from both parties. If one
party does not have the information submitted by the other, NWC
explained, that party cannot help the investigation by providing
available information to shed light on the matter. NWC also suggested
that the phrase "other applicable confidentiality laws" be replaced
with more specific language describing the confidentiality laws that
might apply to a respondent's answer.
GAP commented that while it was pleased with the provisions in
section 1978.104 providing copies of respondent's submissions to
complainants and protecting witness confidentiality, it was concerned
that the procedures under section 1978.104(f) "disenfranchise[d] the
victim, giving only one side of the dispute the chance to participate
in the most significant step of the process" and that "[a]t a
minimum, this procedural favoritism means there will not be an even
playing field in the administrative hearing." GAP advocated removing
section 1978.104(f).
OSHA agrees with NWC and GAP that the input of both parties in the
investigation is important to ensuring that OSHA reaches the proper
outcome during its investigation. To that end, in response to the comments,
the procedures under STAA have been revised to contain the following
safeguards aimed at ensuring that complainants and respondents have equal
access to information during the course of the OSHA investigation:
Section 1978.104(c) provides that, throughout the
investigation, the agency will provide the complainant (or the
complainant's legal counsel if the complainant is represented by
counsel) a copy of all of respondent's submissions to the agency that
are responsive to the complainant's whistleblower complaint, with
confidential information redacted as necessary, and the complainant
will have an opportunity to respond to such submissions; and
Section 1978.104(f) provides that the complainant will
receive a copy of the materials that must be provided to the respondent
under that paragraph, with confidential information redacted as
Regarding NWC's suggestion that OSHA provide more specific
information about the confidentiality laws that may protect portions of
the information submitted by a respondent, OSHA anticipates that the
vast majority of respondent submissions will not be subject to any
confidentiality laws. However, in addition to the Privacy Act, a
variety of confidentiality provisions may protect information submitted
during the course of an investigation. For example, a respondent may
submit confidential business information, the disclosure of which would
violate the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905. While the agency
recognizes that a respondent must meet a high standard to show that the
information it submits is protected and that it has a responsibility to
independently evaluate claims that submissions contain confidential
business information not subject to disclosure, it believes that the
provision as drafted appropriately allows it to address legitimate
claims of confidentiality.
With regard to GAP's comment that section 1978.104(f) should be
removed, OSHA notes the purpose of 1978.104(f) is to ensure compliance
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted in
the Supreme Court's ruling in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S.
252, 264 (1987), requiring OSHA to give the respondent the opportunity
to review the substance of the evidence and respond, prior to ordering
preliminary reinstatement.
Nonetheless, while recognizing that the purpose of section
1978.104(f) is to ensure that the respondents have been afforded due
process prior to OSHA ordering preliminary reinstatement, OSHA
appreciates that complainants wish to stay informed regarding their
cases and may continue to have valuable input, even at this late stage
in the investigation. Thus, under these rules, OSHA will provide
complainants with a copy of the materials sent to the respondent under
section 1978.104(f), with materials redacted in accordance with
Paragraph (a) in section 1978.104, as it existed before the IFR,
now at paragraph (a) in this section, was updated in the IFR to reflect
the recent amendments to STAA expanding available remedies; the final
rule adopts those revisions. Minor editorial corrections have been made
in the final rule. If the Assistant Secretary concludes that there is
reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he or she
will order appropriate relief. Such order will include, where
appropriate: a requirement that the respondent take affirmative action
to abate the violation; reinstatement of the complainant to his or her
former position with the same compensation, terms, conditions and
complainant has incurred); and payment of punitive damages up to
$250,000. The final rule adds the words "take affirmative action" in
connection with abatement of the violation because the statute uses
this important term of labor law, found in the National Labor Relations
Act at 29 U.S.C. 160(c) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(1). The word "same" has been
inserted before "compensation" because this language is in the
statute. A minor wording change, the deletion of the word "together",
has been made in the final rule. The discussion of punitive damages has
been put in a separate sentence to track the statute.
that he or she received prior to his or her termination, but not
actually return to work. Smith, supra, at *8 (front pay under STAA).
Such front pay or economic reinstatement is also employed in cases
arising under Section 105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2). See, e.g., Secretary of Labor ex rel.
York v. BR&D Enters., Inc., 23 FMSHRC 697, 2001 WL 1806020, at *1 (ALJ
June 26, 2001). Congress intended that complainants be preliminarily
of the complainant. In such situations, actual reinstatement might be
long as the complainant continues to receive his or her pay and
benefits and is not otherwise disadvantaged by a delay in
reinstatement. There is no statutory basis for allowing the employer to
recover the costs of economically reinstating a complainant should the
employer ultimately prevail in the whistleblower litigation.
In ordering interest on backpay, the agency has determined that,
instead of computing the interest due by compounding quarterly the
Internal Revenue Service interest rate for the underpayment of taxes,
which under 26 U.S.C. 6621 is generally the Federal short-term rate
plus three percentage points, interest will be compounded daily. The
Secretary believes that daily compounding of interest better achieves
the make-whole purpose of a backpay award. Daily compounding of
interest has become the norm in private lending and recently was found
to be the most appropriate method of calculating interest on backpay by
the National Labor Relations Board. See Jackson Hosp. Corp. v. United
Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv.
Workers Int'l Union, 356 NLRB No. 8, 2010 WL 4318371, at *3-4 (2010).
Additionally, interest on tax underpayments under the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. 6621, is compounded daily pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
Paragraph (a)(2) of this section requires the Assistant Secretary
to notify the parties if he or she finds that a violation has not
occurred. Former section 1978.104(c), which provided for
the suspension of 11(c) complaints pending the outcome of STAA
proceedings, was deleted in the IFR; the final rule adopts that
revision. As described above, section 1978.103(e) adequately describes
the relationship between STAA and 11(c) complaints.
Paragraph (b) clarifies that OSHA need not send the original
complaint to the Chief Administrative Law Judge when it issues its
findings and preliminary order; a copy of the complaint will suffice.
Former section 1978.105(b)(1) was moved to section 1978.105(c) in the
IFR; the final rule adopts that revision. This paragraph states that
the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order will be effective 30 days
after receipt, or on the compliance date set forth in the preliminary
order, whichever is later, unless an objection is filed. It also
clarifies that any preliminary order requiring reinstatement will be
effective immediately. This paragraph mirrors existing provisions in
other OSHA whistleblower regulations. Minor editorial changes have been
made in the final rule.
Minor revisions were made to paragraph (a), formerly section
1978.105(a), in the IFR to conform to other OSHA whistleblower
regulations; the final rule adopts those revisions. Other minor
revisions have been made in the final rule. The paragraph clarifies
that with respect to objections to the findings and preliminary order,
the date of the postmark, fax, or electronic communication transmittal
is considered the date of the filing; if the objection is filed in
person, by hand-delivery, or other means, the objection is filed upon
receipt. The filing of objections is also considered a request for a
hearing before an ALJ. The amended language also clarifies that in
addition to filing objections with the Chief Administrative Law Judge,
the parties must serve a copy of their objections on the other parties
of record and the OSHA official who issued the findings and order. The
requirement in the IFR that objections be served on the Assistant
Secretary and the Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and
Health has been deleted because such service is unnecessary. A failure
to serve copies of the objections on the appropriate parties does not
The title to former section 1978.105(b) was deleted in the IFR
because it was unnecessary; the final rule adopts that revision. In
addition, as previously mentioned, former paragraph (b)(1) in section
1978.105 was moved to new paragraph (c) in section 1978.105; the final
rule adopts that revision. Finally, some minor, non-substantive
revisions were made in the IFR to former 1978.105(b)(2), now at
1978.106(b), and additional language was added to that paragraph to
clarify that all provisions of the ALJ's order, with the exception of
any order for preliminary reinstatement, will be stayed upon the filing
of a timely objection; the final rule adopts those revisions. A
respondent may file a motion to stay OSHA's preliminary reinstatement
order with the Office of Administrative Law Judges. However, such a
motion will be granted only on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
A stay of the Assistant Secretary's preliminary order of reinstatement
would be appropriate only where the respondent can establish the
necessary criteria for a stay, i.e. the respondent would suffer
irreparable injury; the respondent is likely to succeed on the merits;
a balancing of possible harms to the parties favors the respondent; and
the public interest favors a stay.
Former section 1978.106, which became section 1978.107 in the IFR,
was titled "Scope of rules; applicability of other rules; notice of
hearing." The title was changed to "Hearings," the title assigned to
similar sections in other OSHA whistleblower regulations. The final
rule adopts those revisions. Other minor revisions have been made in
Minor revisions were made to paragraph (a) in the IFR, which
adopted the rules of practice and procedure and the rules of evidence
Judges, codified at 29 CFR part 18; those revisions have been adopted
here. However, in the final rule the reference to the ALJ rules of
evidence has been deleted. This change is discussed below. Changes were
also made in the IFR to paragraph (b) to conform to other OSHA
whistleblower regulations. The requirements for the ALJ to set a
hearing date within 7 days and to commence a hearing within 30 days
were deleted, and language was added in the IFR to clarify that
hearings will commence expeditiously and be conducted de novo and on
the record. The language in the IFR is not intended to change case-
handling practices. The final rule adopts those revisions.
Paragraph (b) has been modified in the final rule to add language
providing that ALJs have broad discretion to limit discovery in order
to expedite the hearing. This provision furthers an important goal of
STAA--to have unlawfully terminated employees reinstated as quickly as
preliminary order, was revised in the IFR, consistent with the changes
made to paragraph (b), to remove language stating that hearings shall
commence within 30 days of the last objection received. The final rule
adopts those revisions.
the filing of prehearing statements, was deleted in the IFR as
unnecessary; the final rule adopts that change.
A new paragraph (d) has been added to this section. It provides
that in ALJ proceedings formal rules of evidence will not apply, but
rules or principles designed to assure production of the most probative
evidence will be applied. Furthermore, the ALJ may exclude evidence
that is immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious. This evidence
provision differs from the practice under the STAA IFR (section
1978.107(a)) and the original STAA rules (section 1978. 106(a)) to
follow the ALJ rules of evidence in 29 CFR part 1918. The new provision
is consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides at
5 U.S.C. 556(d): "* * * Any oral or documentary evidence may be
received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence * *
*." See also Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 705-06 (1948) (administrative agencies not restricted by rigid
rules of evidence). Furthermore, it is inappropriate to apply the
technical rules of evidence in Part 18 because complainants often
appear pro se. Also, hearsay evidence is often appropriate in
whistleblower cases, as there often is no relevant evidence other than
hearsay to prove discriminatory intent. ALJs have the responsibility to
determine the appropriate weight to be given to such evidence. For
these reasons, the interests of determining all of the relevant facts
are best served by not having strict evidentiary rules.
Former section 1978.107, titled "Parties," was moved in the IFR
to section 1978.108 with the new title "Role of Federal agencies."
The final rule adopts that change. This conforms to the terminology
used in OSHA's other whistleblower regulations.
Former paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) in section 1978.107 were
combined in section 1978.108(a)(1) in the IFR; that revision remains.
The changes which were made to these paragraphs are not intended to be
substantive, i.e., there is no intent to change the rights to party
status currently afforded the Assistant Secretary, complainants, or
respondents. The Assistant Secretary, represented by an attorney from
the appropriate Regional Solicitor's Office, will still generally
assume the role of prosecuting party in STAA whistleblower cases in
which the respondent objects to the findings or preliminary order. This
continues longstanding practice in STAA cases. The public interest
such matters. Relatively few private attorneys have developed adequate
expertise in representing STAA whistleblower complainants, and
complainants in the motor carrier industry have been more likely to
proceed pro se than employees covered by OSHA's other whistleblower
programs. Where the complainant, but not the respondent, objects to the
prosecuting party, and the ALJ will issue appropriate orders to
regulate the course of future proceedings.
must be sent to all parties, or, if represented by counsel, to them. If
the Assistant Secretary is a party, documents shall be sent to the
Regional Solicitor's Office representing the Assistant Secretary. This
is a departure from the IFR, which also required distribution of
documents to the Assistant Secretary and, where he or she was a party,
to the Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health.
Experience has shown that the additional distribution was not
necessary. In the interest of saving time and resources the
requirements for this additional distribution are being deleted.
Paragraph (b) states that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), an agency of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, may participate in the proceedings as amicus curiae at
its own discretion. This paragraph also permits the FMCSA to request
the case. This provision mirrors similar language in the regulations
implementing other OSHA-administered whistleblower laws.
were deleted in the IFR. It is unnecessary to continue to include that
Section 1978.109 Decisions and Orders of the Administrative Law Judge
STAA's whistleblower provision. Minor editorial revisions have been
made in the final rule. References to the perception of protected
activity have been deleted in the final rule. This concept is
adequately covered by section 1978.104(e)(2)(ii) (employer knowledge
shown by suspicion of protected activity). The title of this section
conforms to the title assigned to similar provisions in other OSHA
whistleblower regulations. Before the issuance of the IFR, section
1978.109 addressed decisions of both the ALJs and the ARB. In
conformance with other OSHA whistleblower regulations, these two topics
were separated by the IFR into individual sections; this separation
remains in the final rule. Section 1978.109 covers only ALJ decisions
and section 1978.110 addresses ARB decisions.
Former paragraph (a) was divided in the IFR among multiple
paragraphs in this section and otherwise revised to reflect the
parties' new burdens of proof and to conform more closely to the
regulations implementing other OSHA-administered whistleblower laws.
Those changes remain in the final rule. In litigation, the statutory
burdens of proof require a complainant to prove that the alleged
protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the alleged adverse
action. If the complainant satisfies his or her burden, the employer,
to escape liability, must prove by "clear and convincing evidence"
decision." Clarke, supra, at *3. The complainant (whenever this term
is used in this paragraph, it also refers to the Assistant Secretary)
can succeed by providing either direct or indirect proof of
contribution. Direct evidence is "smoking gun" evidence that
by STAA was the true reason for the adverse action. One type of
circumstantial evidence is evidence that discredits the respondent's
proffered reasons for the adverse action, demonstrating instead that
they were pretexts for retaliation. Id. Another type of circumstantial
evidence is temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
adverse action. Ferguson, supra, at *2. The respondent may avoid
liability if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence" that
it would have taken the same adverse action in any event. Clear and
convincing evidence is evidence indicating that the thing to be proved
is highly probable or reasonably certain. Clarke, supra, at *3. This
burden of proof regimen supersedes the one in effect before the 2007
amendments to STAA. Id. at 7, n.1.
The requirements that the ALJ close the record within 30 days after
the filing of the objection and issue a decision within 30 days after
the close of the record are not in these rules because procedures for
issuing decisions, including their timeliness, are addressed by the
Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative Hearings Before the
Office of Administrative Law Judges at 29 CFR 18.57.
Section 1978.109(c), which is similar to provisions in other OSHA
whistleblower regulations, provides that the Assistant Secretary's
cases de novo and, therefore, may not remand cases to the Assistant
Secretary to conduct an investigation or make further factual findings.
If there otherwise is jurisdiction, the ALJ will hear the case on the
merits or dispose of the matter without a hearing if warranted by the
Section 1978.109(d)(1) now describes the relief the ALJ can award
upon finding a violation and reflects the recent statutory amendments
(see earlier discussion of section 1978.105(a)). The language of the
IFR has been slightly modified to clarify the available remedies. The
requirement to take appropriate affirmative action to abate the
violation is separated from the other remedies, as it is in the STAA
remedy provision, 49 U.S.C. 31105(b)(3)(A). Affirmative action to abate
the violation, required by section 31105(b)(3)(A)(i), includes a
variety of measures in addition to others in (3)(A), such as posting
notices about STAA orders and rights, as well as expungement of adverse
comments in a personnel record. Scott v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 01-
065, 2003 WL 21269144, at *1-2 (ARB May 29, 2003) (posting notices of
STAA orders and rights); Pollock v. Continental Express, Nos. 07-073,
08-051, 2010 WL 1776974, at *9 (ARB Apr. 7, 2010) (expungement of
adverse references). Other minor wording changes have been made. In
has not violated STAA.
Before the IFR, ALJs' decisions and orders were subject to
automatic review by the ARB. These procedures were unique to STAA
whistleblower cases and resulted in a heavy STAA caseload for the ARB.
This made it more difficult for the ARB to promptly resolve the cases
on its docket and delayed the resolution of STAA cases in which the
parties were mutually satisfied with the ALJ's decision and order.
Overall, requiring mandatory ARB review of every STAA whistleblower
case is an inefficient use of limited resources. In conformance with
the procedures used for the other whistleblower cases investigated by
OSHA and adjudicated by ALJs, these regulations provide for ARB review
of an ALJ's decision only if one or more of the parties to the case
files a petition requesting such review. These procedures for review of
ALJ decisions apply to all ALJ decisions issued on or after the
effective date of the IFR, August 31, 2010. The final rule adopts these
In the IFR, former section 1978.109(b) was deleted, although much
of its content was moved to paragraph (e); the final rule adopts those
revisions. Section 1978.109(e), which borrows language from similar
provisions in other OSHA whistleblower regulations, gives parties 14
days after the date of the ALJ's decision to file a petition for review
with the ARB. If no petition for review is filed within that timeframe,
the ALJ's decision is final and all portions of the order become
effective. Paragraph (e), in addition to giving parties14 days to seek
review before the ARB, clarifies that any orders relating to
reinstatement will be effective immediately upon receipt of the
decision by the respondent.
In the IFR, all of the provisions in former section 1978.109, which
codified the automatic review process, primarily former paragraphs
(c)(1) and (c)(2), were deleted. The content of former paragraph
(c)(3), regarding the standard for ARB review of ALJ decisions, was
moved to new section 1978.110(b). The content of former paragraph
(c)(4), which required the ARB to issue an order denying the complaint
if it determined that the respondent had not violated the law, was
moved to section 1978.110(e). Former paragraph (c)(5), which required
service of the ARB decision on all parties, became a part of section
1978.110(c). The final rule adopts all those revisions.
OSHA has revised the period for filing a timely petition for review
with the ARB to 14 days rather than 10 business days. With this change,
the final rule expresses the time for a petition for review in a way
that is consistent with the other deadlines for filings before the ALJs
and the ARB in the rule, which are also expressed in days rather than
business days. This change also makes the final rule congruent with the
2009 amendments to Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
govern computation of time before those tribunals and express filing
deadlines as days rather than business days. Accordingly, the ALJ's
order will become the final order of the Secretary 14 days after the
date of the decision, rather than after 10 business days, unless a
timely petition for review is filed. As a practical matter, this
revision does not substantively alter the window of time for filing a
petition for review before the ALJ's order becomes final.
Section 1978.110 Decisions and Orders of the Administrative Review
This section is borrowed largely from existing regulations
implementing other OSHA whistleblower laws. Minor editorial corrections
have been made in the final rule. In accordance with the decision to
discontinue automatic ARB review of ALJ decisions, paragraph (a) of
this section gives the parties 14 days from the date of the ALJ's
decision to file a petition for review with the ARB. If no timely
petition for review is filed, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final
decision of the Secretary, and is not subject to judicial review.
Paragraph (a) also clarifies that the date of the postmark, fax,
electronic communication transmittal, or hand-delivery will be deemed
In its comments, NWC suggested that the filing period be extended from
10 business days to 30 days to make this section parallel to the
provision in 1978.105(c), which allows for 30 days within which to file
an objection. OSHA declines to extend the filing period to 30 days
because the 14-day filing period is consistent with the practices and
procedures followed in OSHA's other whistleblower programs.
Furthermore, parties may file a motion for extension of time to appeal
an ALJ's decision, and the ARB has discretion to grant such extensions.
However, as explained above, OSHA has revised the period to petition
for review of an ALJ decision to 14 days rather than 10 business days.
As a practical matter, this revision does not substantively alter the
window of time for filing a petition for review before the ALJ's order
With regard to section 1978.110(a), NWC urged deletion of the
provision that "[t]he parties should identify in their petitions for
objections will ordinarily be deemed waived." NWC commented that
parties should be allowed to add additional grounds for review in
subsequent briefs and that allowing parties to do so would further the
goal of deciding cases on the merits. OSHA's inclusion of this
provision is not intended to limit the circumstances in which parties
can add additional grounds for review as a case progresses before the
ARB, but rather the rules include this provision to put the public on
notice of the possible consequences of failing to specify the basis of
a petition to the ARB. OSHA recognizes that while the ARB has held in
some instances that an exception not specifically urged may be deemed
waived, the ARB also has found that the rules provide for exceptions to
this general rule. See, e.g., Furland v. American Airlines, Inc., Nos.
09-102, 10-130, 2011 WL 3413364, at *7, n.5 (ARB Jul. 27, 2011),
petition for review filed, (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2011) (No. 11-14419-C)
(where a complainant consistently made an argument throughout the
administrative proceedings the argument was not waived simply because
it appeared in the complainant's reply brief to the ARB rather than in
the petition for review); Avlon v. American Express Co., No. 09-089,
2011 WL 4915756, at *4-5, n.1 (ARB Sept. 14, 2011) (consideration of an
argument not specifically raised in complainant's petition for review is
believed to be within the authority of the ARB, and parallel provisions
in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower regulations do not mandate that the ARB
must limit its review to ALJ conclusions assigned as error in the
petition for review); Brookman v. Levi Strauss, No. 07-074, 2008 WL
7835844, at *5 (ARB Jul. 23, 2008) (concurring with the ALJ's findings
despite Complainant's failure to specifically identify objections and
invoke ARB review). However, recognizing that the interim final rule
may have suggested too stringent a standard, the phrase "will
ordinarily" has been replaced with "may."
OSHA-administered whistleblower laws, paragraph (b) provides that the
ARB has discretion to accept or reject review in STAA whistleblower
cases. Congress intended these whistleblower cases to be expedited, as
The ARB has 30 days to decide whether to grant a petition for
review. If the ARB does not grant the petition, the decision of the ALJ
becomes the final decision of the Secretary. This section further
provides that when the ARB accepts a petition for review, it will
review the ALJ's factual determinations under the substantial evidence
standard, a standard previously set forth in section 1978.109(c)(3)
before the issuance of the IFR. If a timely petition for review is
filed with the ARB, relief ordered by the ALJ is inoperative while the
matter is pending before the ARB, except that orders of reinstatement
will be effective pending review. Paragraph (b) does provide that in
order of reinstatement. A stay of a reinstatement order is only
appropriate when the respondent can establish the necessary criteria
for a stay, i.e., the respondent will suffer irreparable injury; the
respondent is likely to succeed on the merits; a balancing of possible
harms to the parties favors the respondent; and the public interest
favors a stay.
Paragraph (c), which provides that the ARB will issue a final
decision within 120 days of the conclusion of the ALJ hearing, was
revised to state that the conclusion of the ALJ hearing will be deemed
to be 14 days after the date of the decision of the ALJ, rather than
after 10 business days, unless a motion for reconsideration has been
filed with the ALJ in the interim. Like the revision to section
1978.110(a), explained above, this revision does not substantively
alter the length of time before the ALJ hearing will be deemed to have
been concluded. This paragraph further provides for the ARB's decision
in all cases to be served on all parties, the Chief Administrative Law
Judge, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor for
provision (see earlier discussion of section 1978.109(d)(1)). In
addition, under paragraph (e), if the ARB determines that the
respondent has not violated STAA, it will issue an order denying the
complaint. Paragraph (f) clarifies that the procedures for seeking
review before the ARB apply to all cases in which ALJ decisions were
issued on or after the effective date of the IFR, August 31, 2010.
Subpart C--Miscellaneous Provisions.
Section 1978.111 Withdrawal of STAA Complaints, Findings, Objections,
Minor editorial changes have been made in the final rule.
Paragraph (a) permits a complainant to withdraw orally or in
writing his or her complaint to the Assistant Secretary, at any time
and/or preliminary order. The Assistant Secretary confirms in writing
the complainant's desire to withdraw and will determine whether to
approve the withdrawal. The Assistant Secretary will notify all parties
if the withdrawal is approved. Paragraph (a) clarifies that complaints
that are withdrawn pursuant to settlement agreements prior to the
filing of objections must be approved in accordance with the settlement
approval procedures in paragraph (d). In addition, paragraph (a)
clarifies that the complainant may not withdraw his or her complaint
after the filing of objections to the Assistant Secretary's findings
and/or preliminary order. Paragraph (c) addresses situations in which
parties seek to withdraw either objections to the Assistant Secretary's
findings and/or preliminary order or petitions for review of ALJ
decisions. Paragraph (c) provides that a party may withdraw objections
to the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or preliminary order at any
time before the findings and preliminary order become final by filing a
written withdrawal with the ALJ. Similarly, if a case is on review with
the ARB, a party may withdraw a petition for review of an ALJ's
decision at any time before that decision becomes final by filing a
written withdrawal with the ARB. The ALJ or the ARB, depending on where
the case is pending, will determine whether to approve the withdrawal
of the objections or the petition for review. Paragraph (c) clarifies
that if the ALJ approves a request to withdraw objections to the
preliminary order will become the final order of the Secretary.
Likewise, if the ARB approves a request to withdraw a petition for
review of an ALJ decision, and there are no other pending petitions for
review of that decision, the ALJ's decision will become the final order
of the Secretary. Finally, paragraph (c) provides that if objections or
Minor, non-substantive changes are being made to paragraph (d)(2).
Paragraph (d)(3) is being deleted because the withdrawal of the
Assistant Secretary as a party as a matter of prosecutorial discretion
is adequately covered by section .107(a)(2). Paragraph (e), borrowing
language from similar provisions in other OSHA whistleblower regulations,
clarifies that settlements approved by the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ,
or the ARB will constitute the final order of the Secretary and may be
enforced in federal district court pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 31105(e).
of decisions of the Secretary and, in cases where judicial review is
sought, requires the ARB to submit the record of proceedings to the
and the local rules of such court. Non-substantive revisions to
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) were made in the IFR and are continued
here. Minor editorial changes from the IFR were made in the final rule.
In the final rule a reference to the transmission of the record to a
court of appeals by an ALJ has been made because parties may file
petitions for review of those decisions in the courts of appeals where
they have previously requested review by the ARB and the ARB has denied
Former section 1978.112, which addressed postponement due to the
pendency of proceedings in other forums, including grievance-
arbitration proceedings under collective bargaining agreements, and
deferral to the outcomes of such proceedings, was deleted in the IFR to
conform to other OSHA whistleblower regulations, which do not contain
similar provisions; that deletion remains. This is a non-substantive
change. Postponement and deferral principles will still be applied in
accordance with case law.
In the IFR, non-substantive revisions were made to this section,
which describes the Secretary's power under STAA's whistleblower
provision to obtain judicial enforcement of orders, including orders
approving settlement agreements; the final rule adopts those revisions.
Minor editorial corrections have been made in the final rule.
This section deals with the recent amendment to STAA, 49 U.S.C.
31105(c), allowing a complainant in a STAA whistleblower case to bring
an action in district court for de novo review if there has been no
final decision of the Secretary and 210 days have passed since the
filing of the complaint and the delay was not due to the complainant's
bad faith. Section 1978.114 has been drafted to reflect the Secretary's
position that it would not be reasonable to construe the statute to
permit a complainant to initiate an action in federal court after the
Secretary issues a final decision, even if the date of the final
decision is more than 210 days after the filing of the administrative
complaint. In the Secretary's view, the purpose of the "kick-out"
provision is to aid the complainant in receiving a prompt decision.
That goal is not implicated in a situation where the complainant
already has received a final decision from the Secretary. In addition,
permitting the complainant to file a new case in district court in such
circumstances could conflict with the parties' rights to seek judicial
review of the Secretary's final decision in the court of appeals. The
regulations have been drafted in accordance with this position. Minor
editorial corrections have been made in the final rule.
The IFR did not note that 49 U.S.C. 31105(c) guarantees the right
to a jury trial at the request of either party in these cases. This
rule notes that statutory provision.
In this section, OSHA eliminated the requirement that complainants
provide the agency 15 days advance notice before filing a de novo
complaint in district court. Instead, this section provides that within
seven days after filing a complaint in district court, a complainant
must provide a file-stamped copy of the complaint to the Assistant
Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB, depending on where the proceeding is
pending. A copy of the complaint also must be provided to the OSHA
official who issued the findings and/or preliminary order, the
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor. This
provision is necessary to notify the agency that the complainant has
opted to file a complaint in district court. This provision is not a
substitute for the complainant's compliance with the requirements for
service of process of the district court complaint contained in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of the district
court where the complaint is filed. The reference to the OSHA Regional
Administrator in the IFR has been changed in the final rule to a
reference to the OSHA official who issued the findings and/or
preliminary order to reflect the possibility (not currently
contemplated) of future organizational changes.
This change responds to NWC's comment that the 15-day advance
notice requirement for filing a suit in district court should be
eliminated because it inhibits complainants' access to federal courts.
OSHA believes that a provision for notifying the agency of the district
court complaint is necessary to avoid unnecessary expenditure of agency
resources once a complainant has decided to remove the case to federal
district court. OSHA believes that the revised provision adequately
balances the complainant's interest in ready access to federal court
and the agency's interest in receiving prompt notice that the
complainant no longer wishes to continue with the administrative
In the IFR, OSHA deleted former section 1978.114, which provided
that the time requirements imposed on the Secretary by these
regulations are directory in nature and that a failure to meet those
requirements did not invalidate any action by the Assistant Secretary
or Secretary under STAA; that deletion remains. These principles are
well-established in the case law, see, e.g., Roadway Express v. Dole,
929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991), and this provision, which was
unique to OSHA's STAA regulations, is unnecessary. The deletion of this
provision is a non-substantive amendment. No significant change in STAA
practices or procedures is intended.
complaint, section 1978.103) which was previously reviewed and approved
for use by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13,
109 Stat. 163 (1995). The assigned OMB control number is 1218-0236.
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") do not apply to "interpretive
procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). Part 1978 sets forth
interpretive rules and rules of agency procedure and practice within
the meaning of that section. Therefore, publication in the Federal
Register of a notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments
was not required. Although part 1978 was not subject to the notice and
comment procedures of the APA, the Assistant Secretary sought and
considered comments to enable the agency to improve the rules by taking
into account the concerns of interested persons.
Furthermore, because this rule is procedural and interpretive
provide an immediate effective date for this rule. It is in the public
interest that the rule be effective immediately so that parties may
know what procedures are applicable to pending cases. Furthermore, most
of the provisions of this rule were in the IFR and have already been in
effect since August 31, 2010.
VII. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563; Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995; Executive Order 13132
regulatory action" within the meaning of Executive Order 12866,
reaffirmed by Executive Order 13563, because it is not likely to result
in a rule that may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100
Because no notice of proposed rulemaking was published, no
Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1532. In any event, this rulemaking is procedural
and interpretive in nature and is thus not expected to have a
significant economic impact. Finally, this rule does not have
The regulation sets forth procedures and interpretations, many of which
were necessitated by statutory amendments enacted by Congress.
Additionally, the regulatory revisions are necessary for the sake of
consistency with the regulatory provisions governing procedures under
other whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA. Furthermore, no
certification to this effect is required and no regulatory flexibility
analysis is required because no proposed rule has been issued.
This document was prepared under the direction and control of
Accordingly, for the reasons set out in the preamble part 1978 of
Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations is revised to read as
1978.109 Decisions and orders of the administrative law judge.
1978.110 Decisions and orders of the Administrative Review Board.
1978.111 Withdrawal of STAA complaints, findings, objections, and
(Jan. 18, 2012), 77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012); Secretary's Order 1-
2010 (Jan. 15, 2010), 75 FR 3924 (Jan. 25, 2010).
(a) This part sets forth, the procedures for, and interpretations
of, the employee protection (whistleblower) provision of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105, as
amended, which protects employees from retaliation because the employee
has engaged in, or is perceived to have engaged in, protected activity
(b) This part establishes procedures under STAA for the expeditious
handling of retaliation complaints filed by employees, or by persons
acting on their behalf. These rules, together with those rules codified
at 29 CFR part 18, set forth the procedures for submission of
complaints, investigations, issuance of findings and preliminary
orders, objections to findings and orders, litigation before
administrative law judges (ALJs), post-hearing administrative review,
and withdrawals and settlements. This part also sets forth
interpretations of STAA.
(e) Commercial motor vehicle means a vehicle as defined by 49
U.S.C. 31101(1).
(f) Complainant means the employee who filed a STAA complaint or on
whose behalf a complaint was filed.
(g) Complaint, for purposes of Sec.  1978.102(b)(1) and (e)(1),
includes both written and oral complaints to employers, government
agencies, and others.
individual not an employer, who:
(3) The term includes an individual formerly performing the work
described above or an applicant for such work.
associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or
any other organized group of individuals.
(b) It is a violation for any person to intimidate, threaten,
restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, discipline, harass, suspend,
demote, or in any other manner retaliate against any employee because
the employee or a person acting pursuant to the employee's request has:
(1) Filed orally or in writing a complaint with an employer,
government agency, or others or begun a proceeding related to a
standard, or order; or
(c) It is a violation for any person to intimidate, threaten,
(e) It is a violation for any person to intimidate, threaten,
the employer perceives that:
(1) The employee has filed orally or in writing or is about to file
orally or in writing a complaint with an employer, government agency,
or others or has begun or is about to begin a proceeding related to a
standard or order;
reduced to writing by OSHA. If the complainant is unable to file a complaint
where the employee resides or was employed, but may be filed with any
(d) Time for filing. Within 180 days after an alleged violation of
STAA occurs, any employee who believes that he or she has been
retaliated against in violation of STAA may file, or have filed by any
person on the employee's behalf, a complaint alleging such retaliation.
The date of the postmark, facsimile transmittal, electronic
communication transmittal, telephone call, hand-delivery, delivery to a
third-party commercial carrier, or in-person filing at an OSHA office
will be considered the date of filing. The time for filing a complaint
may be tolled for reasons warranted by applicable case law.
redacted in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a and
complainant (or the complainant's legal counsel, if complainant is
(i) The employee engaged in a protected activity, either actual
activity or activity about to be undertaken;
was a contributing factor in the adverse action. The burden may be
satisfied, for example, if the complainant shows that the adverse
action took place shortly after the protected activity, giving rise to
the inference that it was a contributing factor in the adverse action.
If the required showing has not been made, the complainant (or the
complainant's legal counsel, if complainant is represented by counsel)
days of the Assistant Secretary's notification pursuant to this paragraph,
or as soon thereafter as the Assistant Secretary and the respondent can
agree, if the interests of justice so require.
reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has retaliated against
the complainant in violation of STAA.
of the complainant's employment; and payment of compensatory damages
(backpay with interest and compensation for any special damages
complainant has incurred). Interest on backpay will be calculated using
the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C.
6621 and will be compounded daily. The preliminary order may also
require the respondent to pay punitive damages up to $250,000.
Law Judge a copy of the original complaint and a copy of the findings
at Sec.  1978.106. However, the portion of any preliminary order
1978.105(c). The objections and request for a hearing must be in
record and the OSHA official who issued the findings.
the findings or the preliminary order, the findings and/or the
preliminary order will become the final decision of the Secretary, not
Hearings will be conducted de novo on the record. Administrative law
judges have broad discretion to limit discovery in order to expedite
findings and/or order, the objections will be consolidated and a single
hearing will be conducted.
(3) Copies of documents in all cases shall be sent to the parties
or, if they are represented by counsel, to the latter. In cases in
which the Assistant Secretary is a party, copies of documents shall be
Carrier Safety Administration, copies of all documents in a case must
Sec.  1978.109  Decisions and orders of the administrative law judge.
affirmative action to abate the violation; reinstatement of the
complainant to his or her former position with the same compensation,
payment of compensatory damages (backpay with interest and compensation
including any litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorney fees which the complainant may have incurred); and payment of
punitive damages up to $250,000. Interest on backpay will be calculated
using the interest rate applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26
U.S.C. 6621 and will be compounded daily.
of the decision by the respondent. For ALJ decisions issued on or after
the effective date of the interim final rule, August 31, 2010, all
other portions of the ALJ's order will be effective 14 days after the
date of the decision unless a timely petition for review has been filed
with the Administrative Review Board (ARB), U.S. Department of Labor.
Any ALJ decision issued on or after the effective date of the interim
final rule, August 31, 2010, will become the final order of the
Secretary unless a petition for review is timely filed with the ARB and
the ARB accepts the decision for review.
order of the Secretary unless the ARB, within 30 days of the filing of
the petition, issues an order notifying the parties that the case has
been accepted for review. If a case is accepted for review, the
decision of the ALJ will be inoperative unless and until the ARB issues
an order adopting the decision, except that any order of reinstatement
will be effective while review is conducted by the ARB unless the ARB
grants a motion by the respondent to stay that order based on
exceptional circumstances. The ARB will specify the terms under which
any briefs are to be filed. The ARB will review the factual
Solicitor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S, Department
former position with the same compensation, terms, conditions, and
$250,000. Interest on backpay will be calculated using the interest rate
applicable to underpayment of taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6621 and will be
which the decision of the ALJ was issued on or after August 31, 2010.
Sec.  1978.111  Withdrawal of STAA complaints, findings, objections,
and petitions for review; settlement.
(b) The Assistant Secretary may withdraw the findings and/or
settlement will be filed with the ALJ or the ARB, as the case may be.
enforced in United States district court pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
31105(e).
by the ARB or the ALJ, as the case may be, to the appropriate court
agreement issued under STAA, the Secretary may file a civil action
seeking enforcement of the order in the United States district court
for the district in which the violation was found to have occurred.