Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/411/389
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 11:38:17
Document Index: 623675664

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 11', '§ 8', '§ 172', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 11', '§ 172', '§ 172']

Roosevelt F. PALMORE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
411 U.S. 389 (93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342)
Argued: Feb. 21, 1973.
dissent, DOUBLAS [HTML]
Palmore was convicted of a felony in violation of the District of Columbia Code by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, rejecting Palmore's contention that he was entitled to be tried by an Art. III judge with lifetime tenure and salary protection, affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had 'constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine . . . particular criminal cases within the District.' Palmore seeks to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction on the basis of 28 U.S.C. 1257(2), which provides for an appeal to this Court from a final judgment upholding the validity of 'a statute of any state' against a claim that it is repugnant to the Constitution. Held:
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2), this case requires us to decide whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. III of the Constitution. We hold that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may provide for trying local criminal cases before judges who, in accordance with the District of Columbia Code, are not accorded life tenure and protection against reduction in salary. In this respect, the position of the District of Columbia defendant is similar to that of the citizen of any of the 50 States when charged with violation of a state criminal law: Neither has a federal constitutional right to be tried before judges with tenure and salary guarantees.
* The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department observed a moving automobile with license tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver's license and carrental agreement. Palmore, the driver of the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove compartment of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a gun protruding from under the armrest in the front seat of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the District of Columbia after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of the District of Columbia Code, § 22—3204 (1967). 1 He was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 (Reorganization Act), 2 the judges of the Superior Court are appointed by the President and serve for terms of 15 years. D.C.Code Ann. §§ 11—1501(a), 11—1502 (Supp. V, 1972). 3 Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, urging that only a court 'ordain(ed) and established(ed)' in accordance with Art. III of the United States Constitution could constitutionally try him for a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The motions were denied in the Superior Court, and Palmore was convicted.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia, conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had 'constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine these particular criminal cases within the District.' 290 A.2d 573, 576—577 (1972). Palmore filed a notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting to perfect an appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2). We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the merits. 409 U.S. 840, 93 S.Ct. 66, 34 L.Ed.2d 79 (1972).
Title 28 U.S.C. 1257 4 specifies the circumstances under which the final judgments of the highest court of a State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by § 172(a)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 590, the term 'highest court of a State' as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies from such courts only where a statute of the United States is struck down, 28 U.S.C. 1257(1), or where a statute of a State is sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., § 1257(2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment lies only if the statute was a 'statute of any state' within the meaning of § 1257(2). Palmore insists that it is, but we cannot agree.
The 1970 amendment to § 1257 plainly provided that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be treated as the 'highest court of a State,' but nowhere in § 1257, or elsewhere, has Congress provided that the words 'statute of any state,' as used in § 1257(2), are to include the provisions of the District of Columbia Code. A reference to 'state statutes' would ordinarily not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code, which was enacted, not by a state legislature, but by Congress, and which applies only within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the States, Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed. 332 (1805); cf. National Mutual Ins. Co. of Dist. of Col. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949). Nor does it follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of § 1257. We are entitled to assume that in amending § 1257, Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to equate the District Code and state statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said so expressly, and not left the matter to mere implication. 5
Palmore relies on Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627 (1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature of Puerto Rico was held to be a statute of a State within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory provisions governing appeals to this Court. That result has been codified in 28 U.S.C. 1258; but, even so, the Balzac rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris, where we held that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto Rico is not 'a State statute' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), and that it should not be treated as such in the absence of more definitive guidance from Congress.
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ of certiorari under § 1257(3); and treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, cf. 28 U.S.C. 2103, we grant the petition limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled to be tried by a court ordained and established in accordance with Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution. 6 It is to this issue that we now turn.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power '(t)o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over' the District of Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress 'may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a state might exercise within the State, and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the constitution of the United States.' Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5, 19 S.Ct. 580, 582, 43 L.Ed. 873 (1899). This has been the characteristic view in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the District. 7 It is apparent that the power of Congress under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404, 408, 6 S.Ct. 427, 429, 29 L.Ed. 680 (1886).
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted of violation of § 22—3204 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecution for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections provided by Art. III. 8 Palmore's argument is straightforward: Art. III vests the 'judicial Power' of the United States in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the 'judicial Power' that these courts are to exercise 'shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . .'; the District of Columbia Code, having been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; his prosecution for violation of § 22—3204 of the Code is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, involves an exercise of the 'judicial Power' of the United States, and must therefore be tried by an Art. III judge.
Article III describes the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested 'in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' The decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discretion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United States, including those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. '(T)he judicial power of the United States . . . is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845). 9 Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875 Congress refrained from providing the lower federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal cases not involving the required jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It is also true that throughout our history, Congress has exercised its power under Art. IV to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States' by creating territorial courts and manning them with judges appointed for a term of years. These courts have not been deemed subject to the strictures of Art. III, even though they characteristically enforced not only the civil and criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the United States, but also the laws applicable only within the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for a unanimous Court in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida, although not Art. III courts, could hear and determine cases governed by the admiralty and maritime law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III judges. '(T)he same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.' Id., at 546. This has been the consistent view of this Court. 10 Territorial courts, therefore, have regularly tried criminal cases arising under the general laws of Congress, 11 as well as those brought under territorial laws. 12
We cannot agree that O'Donoghue governs this case. 13 The District of Columbia courts there involved, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority not only in the District, but also over all those controversies, civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and having nationwide application. These courts, as this Court noted in its opinion, were 'of equal rank and power with those of other inferior courts of the fedthose of other inferior courts of the federal system . . ..' O'Donoghue, supra, 289 U.S., at 534, 53 S.Ct., at 744. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congress, by consistently providing the judges of these courts with lifetime tenure, had indicated a 'congressional practice from the beginning (which) recognize(d) a complete parallelism between the courts of the District (of Columbia) and the District and Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States.' Id., at 549, 53 S.Ct., at 750. Moreover, these courts, constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, 'exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general government and its various departments,' id., at 535, 53 S.Ct., at 744, and were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their 'right to have their cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III.' Id., at 540, 53 S.Ct., at 746.
From its own studies, Congress had concluded that there was a crisis in the judicial system of the District of Columbia, that case loads had become unmanageable, and that neither those matters of national concern nor those of strictly local cognizance were being promptly tried and disposed of by the existing court system. See, e.g., 115 Cong.Rec. 25538 (1969); 116 Cong.Rec. 8091—8092 (1970). 14 The remedy in part, was to relieve the regular Art. III courts, that is, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from the smothering responsibility for the great mass of litigation, civil and criminal, that inevitably characterizes the court system in a major city and to confine the work of those courts to that which, for the most part, they were designed to do, namely, to try cases arising under the Constitution and the nationally applicable laws of Congress. The other part of the remedy, equally essential, was to establish an entirely new court system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction. S.Rep. No. 91—405, pp. 1—3, 5, 18; H.R.Rep. No. 91—907, pp. 23—24, 33.
Appellant, indicted for carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of D.C.Code Ann. § 22—3204, was tried and convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, an Art. I court created by Congress 1 under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473. His timely objection is that he was tried, convicted, and sentenced by a court not established under Art. III.
—hold office for a term of fifteen years, 2 not for lie as do Art. III judges;
—unlike Art. III judges, 3 their salaries are not protected from diminishment during their continuance in office;
—unlike Art. III judges, they can be removed from office by a five-member Commission 4 through less formidable means of procedure than impeachment. While two of the five members must be lawyers (one a member of the District Bar in active practice for at least five of the ten years prior to his appointment and one an active or retired federal judge serving in the District) the other three may be laymen. One of the three must be a layman. D.C.Code Ann. § 11 1522 (Supp. V, 1972).
In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 it was proposed that judges 'may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives.' The proposal was defeated only Connecticut voting for it. Wilson apparently expressed the common sentiment: 'The Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on any gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Government.' 5
Without the independence granted and enjoyed by Art. III judges, a federal judge could more easily become the tool of a ravenous Executive Branch. This idea was reflected in Reports by Congress in 1965 and 1966, 6 sponsoring a law that would give lifetime tenure to federal judges in Puerto Rico. The House Report stated: 7
Much is made of the fact that many States (about three-fourths of them) have their judges at all levels elected by the people. That was one of the basic Jacksonian principles. But the principle governing federal judges is strongly opposed. 8 Hamilton stated the proposition in No. 79 of the Federalist (J. Cooke ed. 1961):
There have been many proposals in our history that are kin to those approved today; and the important ones are reviewed by Prof. Kurland. 9 To date efforts to tamper with the federal judiciary have not been successful, unless it be the bizarre decision of this Court in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003, 1004, 86 S.Ct. 610, 15 L.Ed.2d 494, in which Mr. Justice Black and I dissented. The States, of course, have mostly gone the other way. 10 But as Prof. Kurland observed: 11
The way to achieve what is done today is by constitutional amendment. President Andrew Johnson in 1868 said; 12
Title 28 U.S.C. 1257 provides:
An express provision 'would have been easy,' Farnsworth v. Territory of Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113, 9 S.Ct. 253, 255, 32 L.Ed. 616 (1889), as demonstrated by specific provisions in the United States Code concerning the District of Columbia. Cf. 28 U.S.C. 1363, added to the United States Code by § 172(c)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 590, where for purposes of c. 85 dealing with the jurisdiction of the United States District Courts, it is provided that 'references to laws of the United States of Acts of Congress do not include laws applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.' See also the treatment of the District of Columbia as a 'State' for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and the equally discrete provision of 28 U.S.C. 1451, added to the Code by § 172(d)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 591, which provides that for purposes of the removal provisions, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is to be considered a 'State court'; and the District of Columbia is deemed to be a 'State.'
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