Source: http://sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2010-12.shtml
Timestamp: 2014-03-12 10:15:15
Document Index: 693551452

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 125', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 127', '§ 127', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 127', '§ 213', '§ 127', '§ 129', '§ 127', '§ 127', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 81', '§ 214']

Election Advisory No. 2010-12
Acceptance Testing (Reference: Texas Election Code (TEC), Chapter 129.021).
Election Set-up and Definition (Reference: TEC, § 125).
Program and configure election management system software, direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machine, electronic ballot marker, optical scan, and any other devices used in an election, as applicable to your jurisdiction.
Proofing the programming of your election for accuracy shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
Verify races within each precinct;
Verify precincts included in each ballot style;
Verify candidates associated in each race;
Verify party affiliation with candidates;
Check for all contests on ballot and verify that candidate/proposition spelling is correct;
Check contest order;
Verify the correct number of votes allowed for each race;
Verify that write-in positions are correct;
If available, verify the audio ballot; and
If another entity does your programming, keep your own back-up copy at a secure off-site location that is in your control, not the programming entity’s control. Election setup materials shall be secured by limiting access to the person or persons so authorized in writing by the county clerk and/or election official.
Voting System Testing (Reference: TEC, Chapters 125, 127 and 129).
Hardware Diagnostic Test (Reference: TEC § 129.022).
System screen displays; Boot performance and initializations; Firmware and/or software loads; Confirmation that screen displays are functioning; Verify and adjust to correct date and time, if necessary; Verify and adjust calibration, if applicable; Confirm that the unit is cleared of votes; Confirm that it is configured for the current election; and Confirm that physical security devices are in working order (locks, seal hasps, etc.) Logic and Accuracy Test (Reference: TEC, § 129.023)
Prior to the commencement of voting and no later then 48 hours before voting begins on the equipment, the designated general custodian of election records shall conduct the public Logic and Accuracy Test. A public notice must be published 48 hours prior to the testing. (An internal L&A test should be done soon after the programming and proofing of your election is complete. This will provide you time to make corrections as necessary and be better prepared for the public L&A test.)
The Public Logic and Accuracy Test shall be open to representatives of the press and the public to the extent allowable. (Reference: TEC, § 129.023(b)). Test Ballots – In preparation for the Logic and Accuracy Test, the designated general custodian of election records shall design a method which directs the Testing Board to cast votes which will verify that each precinct, ballot style, and contest position on the ballot can be voted and is accurately counted.
The predetermined results must be pre-calculated from the Test Ballots to allow comparison after the votes are tallied. (Reference: TEC, § 129.023(c)(10)).
(AutoMARK Only) Verify that the printed ballot reflects the choices entered on the AutoMARK. Also, if applicable, process the AutoMARK ballots with the optical scan equipment. (Optical Scan Only) Optical Scan Equipment must be tested as prescribed in TEC Ch. 127, Subchapters D and F. Pursuant to TEC § 127.094(e) the design of the test ballots must also include the design in Section 3(c)(i)(4) of this advisory. (Precinct Optical Scan and DRE Only) The Secretary Of State has determined that it is not feasible to conduct the 2nd and 3rd test on precinct tabulators as described in TEC § 127.152(b).
Upon completion of the testing, the Testing Board shall witness and document all steps taken to reset, seal, and secure any equipment or test materials, as appropriate; and the general custodian of election records shall preserve a copy of the system’s software at a secure location that is outside the administrator’s and programming entity’s control until at least 22 months after election day.
All test materials, when not in use, shall be kept in a container with a uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seal. The general custodian of election records and at least two members of the Testing Board shall sign the seal. (Reference: TEC § 129.024).
The container may not be unsealed unless the contents are necessary to conduct a test under Ch. 129, Subchapter B or a criminal investigation, election contest, or other official proceeding under the Election Code. If the container is unsealed, the general custodian of elections shall reseal the contents when not in use.(Reference: TEC § 129.024(c)).
The test materials shall remain sealed for the period for preserving the precinct election records. (Reference: TEC § 129.024(b)).
Post-Election Audit (Partial Manual Count) (Reference: TEC, Chapter 127).
On selection or notification, as applicable, of the precincts and contest(s) to be counted, the general custodian of election records shall post in the custodian’s office a notice of the date, hour, and place of the count. (TEC § 127.201(c)).
The general custodian of elections is authorized entry into the ballot box or container containing election records for the purpose of the partial manual count. When the count has been completed, the records shall be restored to their secured condition for the preservation period. (TEC § 213.007).
Conduct of Partial Manual Count for Direct Recording Electronic (DRE).
The general custodian of election records, who conducts an election in which a DRE is used for the first time, must conduct a manual count in one percent of the election precincts or three election precincts, whichever is greater. (TEC § 127.201(a) and § 129.001(d)).
Conduct of Partial Manual Count for Optical Scan Equipment.
Each candidate is entitled to be present and to have a representative present. The designated election official may appoint additional deputized clerks to assist in the functions of the audit. (Reference: TEC § 127.201(d)).
The signature of the election official.
Central Accumulator System Procedures, if applicable.
Testing Central Accumulator System (Reference: TEC, Chapter 127).
The test shall be conducted as part of the Logic and Accuracy testing stated in Section 3(c).
Design of test.
Conduct of the test.
The general custodian of elections shall publish notice of the date, hour, and place of the test conducted under TEC § 127.093(b) in a newspaper, as provided by general law for official publications by political subdivisions, at least 48 hours before the date of the test. (This is the same notice as your public L&A test. Recommendation: An internal L&A test should be done soon after the programming and proofing of your election is complete. This will provide you time to make corrections as necessary and be better prepared for the public L&A test).
Election Night Verification when central accumulator system is used to consolidate the vote results.
After uploading the precinct results to the central accumulator system, the election official must verify and document that the central accumulator’s record of number of votes cast matches the number of signatures on the combination form or ballot and seal certificate for that precinct. If there is a discrepancy, the Presiding Judge of the Counting Station determines if a further audit is necessary. Post-Election Verification when central accumulator system is used to consolidate the vote results.
Any political subdivision that utilizes modem transfer of election results for the purpose of being combined with other such tabulations to produce complete returns shall establish procedures to reconcile received tabulations to transmitted tabulations so that no deviation can go undetected.
Personnel Security (Reference: TEC § 129.051(g)).
The general custodian of election records shall conduct a criminal background check for relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers upon hiring. For further information on this process, please see Election Advisory No. 2009-14 and Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to the Conduct of Criminal Background Checks under House Bill 2524 dated December 21, 2009. Pre-election Security Procedure.
All electronic media (e.g., memory cards, compact flash card, PCMCIA card, PEBs, voter card encoders, supervisor cards, and key cards) shall have an external permanent unique identifier (e.g., numbers, letters, or combination of numbers and letters). The identifier can be either etched or printed on a tamper resistant label. (Recommendation: include a barcode on the label, which will make it more efficient to inventory). (Reference: TEC § 129.051).
For election information storage medium that are device independent (e.g., PEBs, voter card encoders) these devices should be stored in a secured, sealed container and must also be identified on a master log.
The general custodian of elections shall have a training plan for relevant election officials and staff that addresses these security procedures and the relevant work instructions.
Storage and Transport of Voting System Equipment (Reference: TEC § 129.052).
The general custodian of election records shall adopt procedures for securely storing and a secure method for transporting voting device equipment. This shall include procedures that are to be used at locations outside the direct control of the general custodian of election records, such as overnight storage at a polling location. Secure storage must employ the use of uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seals and logs, or other security measures that will detect any unauthorized access.
Restrict Access to Voting Systems (Reference: TEC § 129.053).
The general custodian of election records must maintain these access control keys/passwords in a secured and controlled environment. Who has access to these items must be delineated in the relevant position descriptions.
Prohibit the Use of Network Connections and Restrictions on Wireless Technology (Reference: TEC § 129.054).
Restrict Usage of Voting System Computers (Reference: TEC § 129.055).
Plan for Machine Failure (Reference: TEC § 129.056)
The general custodian of election records shall create a contingency plan for addressing direct recording electronic voting machine failure. This plan must include the timely notification of the Secretary of State’s office.
Polling Place Preparation and Procedures.
Periodically check for evidence of tampering on voting equipment during the election. For example, make sure uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident seal is still intact. (Reference: TEC § 125.005).
Equipment Failure During Voting.
If a DRE malfunctions during voting and there have been votes cast on that machine, extra precaution should be taken to protect the cast vote records (ballot images) and audit logs stored on that DRE. Secure the equipment and document the chain of custody when transporting the equipment to another location. (Reference: TEC § 125.006).
Opening the Polls.
Maintain zero tapes in a secure location to be returned with election materials. (Ballot Box #4 or other secure means designated by the general custodian of elections).
Fleeing Voter.
When a voter leaves without fully depositing their paper ballot into the optical scanner or ballot box, this ballot must be treated as a spoiled ballot.
The presiding judge or an election clerk shall cancel the ballot and document the cancellation.
Provisional Voter.
Provisional votes may be cast electronically on a direct recording electronic voting system only if the system segregates provisional votes from regularly-cast votes on the election day precinct returns. Verify that no conditions are listed on the Secretary of State certification document for your system that would restrict the use of provisional voting. (TAC § 81.176).
Curbside Voter.
Lock and secure voting device, so no more votes may be cast; and
Restrict physical access to equipment.
Automatic Recount (Reference: TEC, Chapter 216).
An automatic recount must be conducted in an election requiring a plurality vote when two or more candidates for the same office tie for the number of votes required to be elected, unless the tying candidates cast lots to resolve the tie or one of them decides to withdraw. An automatic recount must also be conducted in an election requiring a majority vote if more than two candidates tie for the highest number of votes or if two or more candidates tie for the second highest number of votes to determine who will be the runoff candidates before resorting to casting lots in order to resolve the tie.
Requested Recount on DRE Voting Systems (Pursuant to TEC § 214.071).
Requested Recount on Optical Scan Voting Systems (See TEC, Chapter 214, Subchapter C).
Retention of election material.
The optical scanner system provides the capability to view and print the audit log(s) as needed to retain the records listed above.
Electronic data on a DRE, a DRE component (Hart – JBC) and any external memory store (compact flash card) used in conjunction with a DRE shall not be cleared until a backup of the electronic records has been performed. Also, the electronic data on a DRE and any external memory store shall be preserved for 10 days after Election Day unless the DRE is required for another election before that time expires. In that case, the results shall be preserved until the local canvass of the returns containing the election results from the DRE is complete and a backup of the electronic records has been done.
ES&S (formerly Premier)
– JBC backup From SERVO’s “Backup and Reset Menu,” select “JBC” and the event associated with the data to be backed up. Using the Quatech or parallel cable, connect the SERVO computer to the JBC, and then power on the JBC. Click once on the box to the left of Download Logs under Backup Data. Wait ten seconds after you hear the “ding” to uncheck Download Logs, and then disconnect the cable from the JBC. Repeat for all JBCs. This process also stores the public serial number and the firmware version of the JBC in the SERVO database if it has not already been stored.