Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/568/1369/288232/
Timestamp: 2019-09-16 02:07:13
Document Index: 792025465

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 301', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 301', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 1311', '§ 1311', '§ 301', '§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 1857', '§ 1342', '§ 208', '§ 1288', '§ 1288']

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, et al., National Forest Productsassociation, Appellant.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Etc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, et al., National Milk Producersfederation, Appellant.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Etc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, and Environmentalprotection Agency, et al., Appellants.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, Colorado River Water Conservationdistrict, Appellant, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1977 › Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protecti...
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, et al., National Forest Productsassociation, Appellant.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Etc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, et al., National Milk Producersfederation, Appellant.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Etc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, and Environmentalprotection Agency, et al., Appellants.natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protectionagency, Colorado River Water Conservationdistrict, Appellant, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Argued Dec. 3, 1976. Decided Nov. 16, 1977
In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (hereafter referred to as the "FWPCA" or the "Act"1 . It was a dramatic response to accelerating environmental degradation of rivers, lakes and streams in this country. The Act's stated goal is to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the Nation's waters by 1985. This goal is to be achieved through the enforcement of the strict timetables and technology-based effluent limitations established by the Act.
The National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) sought a declaratory judgment that the regulations are unlawful under the FWPCA. Specifically, NRDC contended that the Administrator does not have authority to exempt any class of point source from the permit requirements of § 402. It argued that Congress in enacting §§ 301, 402 of the FWPCA intended to prohibit the discharge of pollutants from all point sources unless a permit had been issued to the discharger under § 402 or unless the point source was explicitly exempted from the permit requirements by statute. The District Court granted NRDC's motion for summary judgment. It held that the FWPCA does not authorize the Administrator to exclude any class of point sources from the permit program. NRDC v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975). The EPA has appealed to this court. It is joined on appeal by a number of defendant-intervenors, National Forest Products Association (NFPA), National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), and the Colorado River Conservation District.6
The EPA argues that since § 402 provides that "the Administrator may . . . issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant" (emphasis added), he is given the discretion to exempt point sources from the permit requirements altogether. This argument, as to what Congress meant by the word "may" in § 402, is insufficient to rebut the plain language of the statute and the committee reports. We say this with due awareness of the deference normally due "the construction of a new statute by its implementing agency." NRDC v. Train, 166 U.S.App.D.C. at 326, 510 F.2d at 706; see Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192, 90 S. Ct. 314, 24 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965). The use of the word "may" in § 402 means only that the Administrator has discretion either to issue a permit or to leave the discharger subject to the total proscription of § 301. This is the natural reading, and the one that retains the fundamental logic of the statute.
In Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 1938, 48 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1976), Justice Marshall characterized the enforcement scheme of the FWPCA as follows:
Id. at 7, 96 S. Ct. at 1941 (footnote omitted).
In EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 96 S. Ct. 2022, 48 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1976), the issue was whether federal installations were subject to state NPDES programs. Justice White's majority opinion describes NPDES at 205, 96 S. Ct. at 2025 (footnote omitted):
In E. I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 97 S. Ct. 965, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1977), the Court held that under FWPCA the EPA can set uniform effluent limitations through industry-wide regulations rather than develop them on an individual basis during the permit issuance process. But the Court, per Justice Stevens, clearly indicated that those limitations were translated into obligations of the discharger through their inclusion in an NPDES permit. Id. at 119-20, 97 S. Ct. 965.
Section 402 does not explicitly describe the necessary scope of a NPDES permit. The most significant requirement is that the permit be in compliance with limitation sections of the Act described above. As a result NRDC and the District Court have suggested the use of area or general permits. The Act allows such techniques. Area-wide regulation is one well-established means of coping with administrative exigency. An instance is area pricing for natural gas producers, which the Supreme Court upheld in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 88 S. Ct. 1344, 20 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1968).24 A more dramatic example is the administrative search warrant, which may be issued on an area basis despite the normal Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause for searching specific premises. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967).
Our approach is not fairly subject to the criticism that it elevates form over substance that the end result will look very much like EPA's categorical exemption. It is the function of the courts to require agencies to comply with legislative intent when that intent is clear, and to leave it to the legislature to make adjustments when the result is counterproductive.26 At the same time, where intent on an issue is unclear, we are instructed to afford the administering agency the flexibility necessary to achieve the general objectives of the Act. Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653, 93 S. Ct. 2448, 37 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78, 88 S. Ct. 1994, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1001 (1968); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780, 88 S. Ct. 1344, 20 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1968). These lines of authority conjoin in our approach. We insist, as the Act insists, that a permit is necessary; the Administrator has no authority to exempt point sources from the NPDES program. But we concede necessary flexibility in the shaping of the permits that is not inconsistent with the clear terms of the Act.
Many of the intervenor-appellants appear to argue that the District Court should be reversed because the categories exempted by EPA are nonpoint sources and are not, in fact, point sources.28 We agree with the District Court "that the power to define point and nonpoint sources is vested in EPA and should be reviewed by the court only after opportunity for full agency review and examination." 396 F. Supp. at 1396. The only issue precisely confronted by all the parties and properly framed for our consideration is whether the Administrator has authority to exempt point sources from the NPDES program. We also think that we should, for similar reasons, not consider at this time the appropriate definition of "discharge of any pollutant" as used in § 402. The American Iron and Steel Institute as amicus curiae has pressed upon us the argument that the term "discharge" as used in § 402 was intended to encompass only "volitional flows" that add pollutants to navigable waters. Most forms of runoff, it is argued, do not involve volitional flows.
As the Supreme Court recently stated in a FWPCA case, "(t)he question . . .is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress intended . . .." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138, 97 S. Ct. 965, 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1977). We find a plain Congressional intent to require permits in any situation of pollution from point sources. We also discern an intent to give EPA flexibility in the structure of the permits, in the form of general or area permits. We are aware that Congress hoped that more of the NPDES permit program would be administered by the states at this point.29 But it also made provision for continuing EPA administration. Imagination conjoined with determination will likely give EPA a capability for practicable administration. If not, the remedy lies with Congress.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1975)
Id. § 1311(b) (2) (A)
C v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 400, 94 S. Ct. 2315, 2327, 41 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1974).
Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator, discharges of pollutants from a point source or group of point sources, with the application of effluent limitations required under (§ 301(b) of the Act), would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters which shall assure protection of public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water, effluent limitations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such point source or sources shall be established which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the attainment or maintenance of such water quality.
FWPCA § 402(a) (3), (b) (2) (B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (3), (b) (2) (B) (Supp. V 1975). EPA concedes that it has this authority. Federal Appellants' Memorandum on "Impossibility" at 14
390 U.S. at 777, 88 S. Ct. at 1365.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated this instruction in Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 49 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1976). There the Court held that the EPA Administrator could not consider claims of technological or economic infeasibility when approving state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-1857l (1970). Such claims were held only to be cognizable by the states in the plan design stage or by the Administrator when drawing up compliance orders. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, emphasized that federal courts are not to ignore clear expressions of Congressional intent in order to accommodate claims of technological or economic infeasibility
427 U.S. at 268-69, 96 S. Ct. at 2531 (footnote omitted). See also Wilderness Society v. Morton, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 171, 479 F.2d 842, 892 (1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S. Ct. 1550, 36 L. Ed. 2d 309 (quoting United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31-32, 60 S. Ct. 749, 84 L. Ed. 1050 (1940): " 'We cannot accept the contention that administrative rulings such as those relied on can thwart the plain purpose of a valid law.' ")
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (3), (b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1975)
We would put in the same category EPA's contention that the exempt categories are best handled under the areawide waste treatment management planning process of § 208 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. V 1975). By its terms that section is concerned with areawide waste treatment plans that identify and control "agriculturally and silviculturally related non-point sources of pollution." Id. § 1288(b) (2) (F).