Source: http://www.whittedtakifflaw.com/for-parents/memorandum/student-student-harassment-survey/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 23:42:42
Document Index: 61203224

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1681', '§ 1681', '§ 1681', '§ 504', '§ 794', '§ 701', '§ 2000', '§ 302', '§ 12182', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§1983', '§ 7']

There are several possible causes of action available to a victim depending on the circumstances. The causes of action vary in their likelihood of success. These include claims in violation of: Title IX , Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also willful and wanton misconduct, and miscellaneous other claims.
Legal claims filed in cases of student-on-student harassment vary widely and are extremely fact specific. The current trend in bullying claims is the use of claims of violations of the Title IX. However, the recent ruling by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Ed. and its subsequent clarification of Title IX violations may change to number of future claims. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Ed. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Other legal claims have included violations against Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, personal injury claims of willful and wanton misconduct, personal liability and emotional distress may be available in certain egregious fact scenarios.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). Once an educational institution has notice of a hostile educational environment created by peer-on-peer sexual harassment it must take steps to remedy the situation. Cf. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir.1994).
In a 5: 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that school authorities are liable for failure in addressing student-student harassment under Title IX of the Education Amend­ments of 1972. A female fifth grade student complained numerous times about incidents of unwanted touching and inappropriate comments by a male student. Each case of harassment was reported to both the student’s teacher and mother. Her mother attempted to have the school take measures to stop the unwanted behavior and protect the student. The perpetrator was not disciplined by school officials nor was the victim permitted a new seating assignment away from her harasser. The victim’s previously high grades began dropping. When the incidents escalated, the victim and her mother filed charges against the perpetrator who was charged and pled guilty to sexual battery.
The victim’s mother filed suit on behalf of her daughter in federal district court alleging that the fail­ure of the school officials to stop the sexual harassment violated her daughter’s rights to be free from sexual dis­crimination under Title IX of the Education Amend­ments of 1972 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)].
The victim sought injunctive relief and compensa­tory damages. The district court dismissed the case and the victim’s mother appealed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the victim. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996). Then, the appellate court sitting en banc vacated that judgment and af­firmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1998). The victim then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court concluded that its earlier ruling in Gebser controlled liability in cases of student-to-student harassment. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). Therefore, a private cause of action under Title IX against a school district could only be successful if school officials had actual knowledge of the harassment and responded to that knowledge with deliberate indifference since school officials have significant disciplinary au­thority over any student’s inappropriate behavior.
The Court limited the scope of its judgment stating that the standard does not extend to minor incidents of childish behavior to which American educators appear to have overreacted in recent years. The Court clarified this point by stating, “the behavior [must] be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an educa­tional program or activity” (slip op. at 11). The Court went on to explain that although conceivable, it is un­likely that a single isolated event would constitute exclu­sion from an educa­tional program. A series of misbehaviors would therefore be necessary to substantiate a claim. The court concluded that funding recipients are liable for damages only “where they are de­liberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, perva­sive and objectively offensive that it can be said to de­prive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school” (slip op. at 11, emphasis added). The Court held that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to present evidence and thereby remanded the case back to the lower court.
A female student sued her school under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 for gender discrimination alleging that on twelve separate occasions, four male professors and six male students harassed her and that professors had retaliated by giving her “unfair grades.” The acts involving professors included “ogling” and “unwanted touching” of her arm and back. Eight of the student acts involved touching of the hand, shoulder, back and leg. One incident involved a kiss on the cheek at graduation. The other two incidents respectively involved touching the top and bottom of Adusumilli’s breast. Adusumilli, however, alleged that she complained about only two of these incidents to school officials: the touching of her right shoulder by a student named “Sam,” and the touching of her breast by another student.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991, prohibits gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace and includes specific enforcement regulations. Title VII standards for establishing a hostile work environment claim apply to hostile learning environment claims brought under federal statutes prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Â§ 504(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182. Guckenberger v Boston Univ. (1997, DC Mass) 957 F. Supp. 306, 21 ADD 243, 6 AD Cas 746.
A fe­male student alleged that a group of male students touched her, used epithets, and in one incident a student deliberately exposed himself. The student and her parents had complained several times to school officials. She claimed the school had not done enough to punish the conduct and to prevent further occurrences by suspending one student and transferring another. Her parents removed her from the school due to the harassment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court dismissal of Doe’s Title IX claim. The court held that a Title IX funding recipient might be liable for failure of prompt and appropriate action in cases of stu­dent-on-student sexual harassment during school activities under the supervision of school employ­ees when school officials knew of the harass­ment. The court looked to Title VII case law and found no reason why students should receive less protection from hostile environment discrimination than adult workers who are reg­ulated by Title VII.
The first issue in a § 1983 action is whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged a deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution. D.R., 109 F.3d at 1367. There are three claims that can be made in a Â§ 1983 action. First, a special relationship existed between parties. Second, the state created a danger and is liable for the consequences of that danger. Finally, the school deprived the student of a constitutional right by actively or passively promulgating a de facto custom, policy, and/or practice of failing to properly safeguard its students, assuming the unlawful acts alleged were committed under the color of state law.
The court rejected all three § 1983 claims; first, that school officials deprived him of his interest in a public education because the continued attacks forced him to leave Williamston Middle School; second, that school officials deprived him of his bodily integrity by failing to stop the attacks by his fellow students; and third, that the Martin County Board of Education contributed to the violence by failing to develop safety plans and training its school personnel in how to respond to violent students. The Court stated that the “failure to protect by itself is not sufficient to trigger constitutional liability in this situation.”
A District Court dismissed a § 1983 claim in a case where a high school freshman was repeatedly harassed and assaulted at school. The school principal and teachers witnessed several attacks yet made no effort to stop the harassment.
The court held that the State of Ohio compelled Elliott to attend school, but did not restrict her freedom as in the case of prisoners or patients in mental institutions. The court noted that students return home at the end of the school day and are free to act as people in society, unlike prisoners and patients of mental institutions. The state is not the primary caretaker of school children as in the case of prisoners and patients of mental institutions, therefore there is no special relationship under § 1983.
The court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the §1983 equal protection claim against the School District. The court held that the harassment was directed solely at Jones and did not demonstrate a custom or policy of the School District to be deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment as a general matter. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 US 691 (1978).
The Superior Court of Connecticut found an assistant principal negligent in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465(a) for failing to protect the victim breaching a “certain duty of care” to protect students from dangers that may be reasonably anticipated.