Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/966/161/142357/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 17:28:51
Document Index: 66336339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 659', '§ 641', '§ 641', '§ 659', '§ 2', '§ 659', '§ 641', '§ 2314', '§ 2311', '§ 2311', '§ 641', '§ 641', '§ 659', '§ 2311', '§ 641', '§ 661', '§ 2', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joe Clyde Watson, Defendant-appellant, 966 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joe Clyde Watson, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Joe Clyde Watson, Defendant-appellant, 966 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 966 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992)
The Presentence Report (PSR) calculated the loss to Rubbermaid at $12,232.80, based on Rubbermaid's district manager's statement of the estimated retail value of the goods, including warehousing and shipping costs. Because the loss was over $10,000, the PSR recommended a five-point increase in offense level according to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (1) (F) (Nov.1991). Based on an offense level of 9 and a criminal history category of III, Watson's sentencing guideline range was 8-14 months. Restitution was recommended in the amount of $4,564.80.
Factual findings regarding sentencing factors are entitled to considerable deference and will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous. "A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole." United States v. Sanders, 942 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1991).
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (1) provides for an increase in the offense level based on "loss." "Loss" is defined in the commentary as "the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed. Ordinarily, when property is taken or destroyed the loss is the fair market value of the particular property at issue. Where the market value is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure harm to the victim, the court may measure loss in some other way, such as reasonable replacement cost to the victim." § 2B1.1, comment. (n.2). The loss does not have to be determined with precision and "may be inferred from any reasonably reliable information available." § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3). The Guidelines refer only to "fair market value" and do not discuss if or when wholesale value should be used instead of retail value.
This court has not previously addressed loss valuation for sentencing purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 659. We have, however, construed "value" under § 659 in a related context. The value of the property stolen is significant to determine whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony under § 659. In United States v. Payne, 467 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1972), the court had to determine whether the value of the goods was over or under $100. The evidence showed that the dealer's price was $84.00 but that the retail price was $109.95. The court stated that the definition of "value" in 18 U.S.C. § 659 was that found in § 641, which defines "value" as "face, par, or market value, or cost price, wholesale or retail, whichever is greater." Id. at 830 & n. 5, citing 18 U.S.C. § 641 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court applied § 659's felony provisions to Payne.
We also take guidance from the Eighth Circuit's treatment of the same issue we face today. In United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1687, 114 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1991), that court held that the district court properly used the retail value in sentencing the defendant under § 2B1.1 for a conviction under § 659. The court applied the definition of value found in 18 U.S.C. § 641, just as this court did in Payne. Watson's attempt to distinguish Russell is not persuasive. Watson suggests that there was no evidence of wholesale value in Russell, whereas there is such evidence here. We disagree that that fact was determinative in Russell. Indeed, the Russell court stated that " [u]se of wholesale as opposed to retail value would only encourage disparate sentencing for essentially similar criminal acts, especially in cases involving stolen property with several tiers of distribution." Id. at 1293. We find the Russell court's reasoning compelling.
We find Perry distinguishable, however. Perry involved a conviction under § 2314, which falls within Chapter 113 of Title 18. Chapter 113 contains its own section of definitions, § 2311. Under § 2311, "value" is defined as "the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest...." This definition differs from that of § 641, which refers explicitly to retail and wholesale values. Sections 641 and 659 are both found within Chapter 31 of Title 18. This court has specifically applied § 641's definition of "value" to offenses under § 659. Payne, 467 F.2d at 830 n. 5. We see no reason to change this policy now and apply the definition of "value" found in another Chapter. See Russell, 913 F.2d at 1292 n. 3 (declining to follow cases construing § 2311); United States v. Griffin, 527 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying § 641's definition of "value" to conviction under § 661 because both sections are within Chapter 31 of Title 18).
Watson also complains that the district court improperly included shipping and warehouse costs in its calculation. Such costs have been found to be included in the meaning of "loss" under § 2B1.1. United States v. Burns, 894 F.2d 334, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus the district court did not clearly err by including these costs in its calculation. Moreover, Watson has not provided us with the amount of shipping and warehouse costs in question. Thus Watson has not demonstrated that the evidence is sufficient to reduce the value of the stolen property by at least $2,232.80, the amount necessary to decrease his offense level by one. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (1) (F). Accordingly, any error by the district court would be harmless. United States v. Kim, 963 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir. 1992); Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 117 L. Ed. 2d 341, 355 (1992).