Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98873/moore-vs-mead-s-fine-bread-co
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 01:32:29
Document Index: 458080875

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 2', '§ 13', '§ 3', '§ 13', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3']

Moore Vs Mead S Fine Bread Co - Citation 98873 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Moore Vs. Mead's Fine Bread Co. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98873CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnDec-06-1954Case Number348 U.S. 115AppellantMooreRespondentMead's Fine Bread Co.Excerpt:.....clayton act and the robinson-patman act, congress barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business and outlawed the price cutting employed by respondent. p.
348 u. s. 120
this is a suit for treble damages, 38 stat. 731, 15 u.s.c. § 15, brought for violations of § 2(a) of the clayton act, as amended by the robinson-patman act, 49 stat. 1526, 15 u.s.c. § 13(a), and of § 3 of the robinson-patman act, 15 u.s.c. § 13a. the jury found for petitioner; the court of appeals reversed, 208 f.2d 777; and we
granted certiorari, 347 u.s. 1012, because of the importance of the question of law presented. [
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. - 348 U.S. 115 (1954)
such practices are included in the scope of § 2 of the Clayton Act and § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, and a judgment for petitioner is sustained. Pp.
(a) Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to prevent the opportunities afforded by interstate commerce from being employed to injure local trade. Pp.
(b) By the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business and outlawed the price cutting employed by respondent. P.
For some months, petitioner and respondent were in competition in Santa Rosa. There is evidence that, on the threat of petitioner to move his bakery to another town, the local Santa Rosa merchants agreed to purchase petitioner's products exclusively. Respondent, labeling that action a boycott, cut the wholesale price of bread in Santa Rosa from 14 cents to 7 cents for a pound loaf and from 21 cents to 11 cents for a pound-and-a-half loaf. The Mead companies did not cut the prices of bread in
Those sections, on their face, seem to cover the instant case. Respondent is engaged in commerce, selling bread both locally and interstate. In the course of such business, it made price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate transactions and cutting the price in the intrastate sales. The destruction of a competitor was plainly established, as required by the amended § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, and the evidence to support a finding of purpose to eliminate a competitor, as required by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, was ample. [
The Court of Appeals read the antitrust laws as reaching local transactions only where: (1) the local restraint has an effect on the free flow of interstate trade or commerce,
e.g., Wickard v. Filburn,
; or (2) the restraint on or the monopoly of local trade is effected through the utilization of interstate mechanisms,
342 U. S.
143; or (3) local prices are fixed by the use of interstate commercial transactions,
; or (4) the discriminatory sales are to purchasers who compete in interstate commerce,
e.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
; or (5) interstate commerce is in some other way used to destroy competition or is injured or impaired as a result of unlawful acts.
We think that the practices in the present case are also included within the scope of the antitrust laws. We have here an interstate industry increasing its domain through outlawed competitive practices. The victim, to be sure, is only a local merchant, and no interstate transactions are used to destroy him. But the beneficiary is an interstate business; the treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local, sources which include not only respondent, but also a group of interlocked companies engaged in the same line of business; and the prices on the interstate sales, both by respondent and by the other Mead companies, are kept high while the local prices are lowered. If this method of competition were approved, the pattern for growth of monopoly would be simple. As long as the price warfare was strictly intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with impunity at the expense of local merchants. The competitive advantage would then be with the interstate combines not by reason of their skills or efficiency, but because of their strength and ability to wage price wars. The profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns. No instrumentality of interstate commerce would be used to destroy the local merchant and expand the domain of the combine. But the opportunities afforded by interstate commerce would be employed to injure local trade. Congress, as guardian of the Commerce Clause, certainly
This type of price-cutting was held to be "foreign to any legitimate commercial competition" even prior to the Robinson-Patman Act.
30 F.2d 234, 237. It seems plain to us that Congress went at least that far in the Robinson-Patman Act. As we have shown, the facts charged and found read upon the words of the statute. And the history of the Act shows it was designed to have the reach now claimed for it by petitioner. Congressman Utterback, manager of the bill in the House, included this type of case in the price-cutting that he claimed was outlawed:
The case first reached the Court of Appeals on appeal from a dismissal of the action at the close of plaintiff's case. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was precluded by petitioner's own illegal acts which initiated the alleged price discrimination. 184 F.2d 338. We granted a petition for certiorari, vacated that judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of
See Moore v. Mead Service Co.,
340 U.S. 944. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals receded from its former position, reversed the judgment dismissing the complaint, and remanded the case for trial. 190 F.2d 540.
Respondent contends that the so-called boycott justified its price cutting. In
340 U. S. 214