Source: http://academy.lawofselfdefense.com/statute/co-18-3-103-murder-in-the-second-degree/
Timestamp: 2020-06-03 16:19:18
Document Index: 428208075

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 40', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 184', '§ 18', '§ 40', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§ 18', '§ 16', '§ 18', '§ 18']

CO 18-3-103. Murder in the second degree – Law of Self Defense
CO 18-3-103. Murder in the second degree
C.R.S. 18-3-103 (2016)
HISTORY: Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 418, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-103.L. 75: (1)(a) amended, p. 622, § 1, effective March 19.L. 77: (1)(a) amended and (1)(b) repealed, pp. 960, 971, § § 6, 67, effective July 1.L. 86: (4) added, p. 776, § 1, effective July 1.L. 95: IP(1) amended and (2.5) added, p. 1222, § 5, effective July 1.L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1844, § 12, effective July 1.L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 1512, § 184, effective October 1.
Law reviews. For article, “Homicides Under the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 49 Den. L. J. 137 (1972). For article, “Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code”, see 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 167 (1981). For note, “Extreme-Indifference Murder: The Impact of People v. Marcy”, see 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 83 (1982).
Annotator’s note. Since § 18-3-103 is similar to former § 40-2-3, C.R.S. 1963, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
Section constitutionally distinguishable from manslaughter statute, § 18-3-104 (1)(a), because the two statutes require different mens rea elements for conviction. People v. DelGuidice, 199 Colo. 41, 606 P.2d 840 (1979); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981). See People v. White, 199 Colo. 82, 606 P.2d 847 (1980).
Statutory prohibition of extreme indifference murder in § 18-3-102 (1)(d) (as it existed prior to the 1983 amendment) violated equal protection of the laws because it could not reasonably be distinguished from the lesser offense of second degree murder as defined in this section. People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981); Crespin v. People, 721 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1986).
The distinctions between § 18-3-102 and this section are not inconsequential and satisfy due process requirements and the informational requirements of § 16 of art. II, Colo. Const. People v. Mendoza, 195 Colo. 19, 575 P.2d 403 (1978).
Second degree murder as defined in this section is “conceptually distinguishable” from intentional manslaughter. People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 570 P.2d 231 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038, 98 S. Ct. 776, 54 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1978).
Term “knowingly” describes the requisite culpability for second degree murder. People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1981).
Elements of murder in second degree concerning defendant’s state of mind are: (1) That the death was more than merely a probable result of the defendant’s actions; and (2) that the defendant was aware of the circumstances which made death practically certain. The first is an objective standard; the second, a subjective standard. People v. Mingo, 196 Colo. 315, 584 P.2d 632 (1978); People v. District Court, 198 Colo. 70, 595 P.2d 1045 (1979).
Second degree murder is general intent crime which entails being aware that one’s actions are practically certain to result in another’s death. People v. Mingo, 196 Colo. 315, 584 P.2d 632 (1978).
Conviction requires proof that death natural consequence of unlawful act. A conviction for criminal homicide requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s unlawful act. People v. Fite, 627 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1981).
For “premeditated intent” and “intentionally, but without premeditation” as different elements, prior to the 1975 amendment of § 18-3-102, see People v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 313, 546 P.2d 1259 (1976).
Subsection (3) sets forth the elements of provocation, which is a mitigating factor and not a separate crime or a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. If proven, provocation is a statutory mitigating factor that will reduce a defendant’s sentence for second degree murder, but it is not an element of a separate offense. Further, to secure a conviction of second degree murder, the prosecution must prove a lack of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d, 28 P.3d 340 (Colo. 2001).
Subsection (2) does not create any presumption of culpability, conclusive or otherwise, and the prosecution retains the burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt as to all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1981).
Prosecution’s burden of proving “knowingly”. Subsection (2) does not lessen the prosecution’s constitutional burden to prove the requisite culpability of “knowingly” for a second-degree murder. People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1981).
Where the trial court admits evidence as to the defendant’s diminished mental capacity and such evidence is considered as to the charge of murder in the second degree, subsection (2) does not unconstitutionally restrict the defense in contesting the culpability element of the charge nor does it lessen the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1981).
Use of a deadly weapon is not in itself sufficient to show deliberation. People v. Hamrick, 624 P.2d 1333 (Colo. App. 1979), aff’d, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1981).
Jury’s province to determine degree evidence justifies. Assuming the sufficiency of the evidence to support first degree murder, it is strictly within the province of the jury to evaluate the evidence and say by its verdict whether the evidence justifies a verdict of first or second degree murder. People v. Lankford, 185 Colo. 445, 524 P.2d 1382 (1974).
Court properly excluded defendant’s expert heat of passion testimony because the heat of passion mitigator does not apply when a person seeks out the highly provoking act in question, as defendant did here. Therefore, trial court properly excluded the testimony since it would not have been helpful to the jury. People v. Valdez, 183 P.3d 720 (Colo. App. 2008).
After properly refusing to allow defendant’s expert heat of passion testimony, trial court erred by instructing the jury on the heat of passion mitigator. People v. Valdez, 183 P.3d 720 (Colo. App. 2008).
Evidence sufficient to establish deliberation. Where a witness testified that the defendant left the room for a moment and returned carrying a wooden stick, that when the victim saw the stick he asked the defendant, “Where did you get that?” and to this question the defendant replied, “In the bedroom”, and began hitting the victim, this evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant acted after deliberation. People v. Hamrick, 624 P.2d 1333 (Colo. App. 1979), aff’d, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo. 1981).
Jury had sufficient evidence to determine that defendant was aware his conduct was practically certain to result in victim’s death. People v. Fry, 74 P.3d 360 (Colo. App. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
Sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that defendant knew his conduct was practically certain to cause death. Evidence of the size differential between the defendant and victim, the way the defendant struck the victim, and the defendant’s effort to conceal the crime afterwards was sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant knew his actions would cause death. Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
An instruction limiting voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense to second degree murder does not constitute a violation of due process by reducing the people’s burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. DelGuidice, 199 Colo. 41, 606 P.2d 840 (1979). See People v. White, 199 Colo. 82, 606 P.2d 847 (1980); People v. Lee, 199 Colo. 301, 607 P.2d 998 (1980).
The refusal of a marriage proposal and the request or demand to leave one’s home cannot under any circumstances rise to the level of provocation that would justify a reasonable person to use violence. Thus, there was not sufficient evidence to support the heat of passion mitigator. People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89 (Colo. App. 2002).
Error to instruct that the prosecution was required to prove the elements of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Since provocation is a mitigating factor, not a separate offense, the prosecution must prove a lack of provocation in order to secure a conviction of second degree murder. People v. Garcia, 1 P.3d 214 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d, 28 P.3d 340 (Colo. 2001).
A provocation instruction is warranted whenever a defendant shows some supporting evidence–regardless of how incredible, unreasonable, improbable, or slight it may be–to establish each factor described in subsection (3)(b). Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
Instruction on involuntary manslaughter should have been granted. Where one of the defense theories was that the grade of the crime, if there was a crime, was at most involuntary manslaughter because the shooting of the victim was unintentional according to some of the defense evidence presented to the jury, the defendant’s request for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter should have been granted in prosecution for second degree murder. People v. Travis, 183 Colo. 255, 516 P.2d 121 (1973).
Failure to give instruction on lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide was harmless, even if assumed to be erroneous, where jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and rejected charge of reckless manslaughter because criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter. Jury’s selection of the highest available grade of offense was a rejection of the next lower included offense and of all lesser offenses included in the latter. People v. Medina, 51 P.3d 1006 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
One can be guilty of first degree assault but not attempted second degree murder. A jury’s verdict of guilty of first degree assault under § 18-3-202 (1)(e) is not irreconcilable and inconsistent with its verdict of not guilty on the charge of attempted second degree murder under this section. These crimes require different elements of proof, and the jury can find from the very same evidence that an element of one crime is present while an element of another charged crime is absent. People v. Ward, 673 P.2d 47 (Colo. App. 1983).
Overturned first degree murder conviction resulting in conviction and resentence for second degree murder. Prosecution has discretion to decide whether case with conviction overturned, because of trial court’s submission of extreme indifference murder, should be retried on other theories of first degree murder that were originally charged or whether defendant should be convicted and resentenced for second degree murder. Crespin v. People, 721 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1986).
Where conviction was overturned because of jury instruction regarding “after deliberation” element of first degree murder, prosecution has discretion to decide whether case should be retried or whether defendant should be convicted and resentenced for second degree murder. People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002 (Colo. 2003).
By Andrew Branca| 2017-04-01T15:42:21+00:00	April 1st, 2017|Comments Off on CO 18-3-103. Murder in the second degree