Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99629/burns-vs-ohio
Timestamp: 2017-09-22 08:25:59
Document Index: 241678892

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1257', '§ 2', '§ 1512', '§ 2', '§ 25', '§ 1257', '§ 1979', '§ 1983']

Burns Vs Ohio - Citation 99629 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Burns Vs. Ohio - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/99629
Case Number 360 U.S. 252
.....been affirmed by the ohio court of appeals, he gave notice of appeal and attempted to file in the ohio supreme court motions for leave to appeal and to proceed in forma pauperis, supported by an affidavit of poverty. these papers were returned to him by the clerk of the ohio supreme court with a letter advising him, in effect, that the court had determined on numerous occasions that such papers could not be filed without payment of a docket fee. in this court, counsel for the state conceded that the clerk's letter is "in reality and in effect" the judgment of the supreme court of ohio. held: 1. since the ohio supreme court had sanctioned its clerk's well publicized and uniform practice of returning pauper's applications with form letters such as that used in this case,.....
Burns v. Ohio - 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
U.S. Supreme Court Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)
1. Since the Ohio Supreme Court had sanctioned its Clerk's well publicized and uniform practice of returning pauper's applications with form letters such as that used in this case, this amounted to a delegation to the Clerk of a matter involving no discretion, and it sufficed to make the Clerk's letter a "final judgment" of Ohio's highest court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Pp. 360 U. S. 256 -257.
2. Since a person who is not indigent may have the Ohio Supreme Court consider his application for leave to appeal from a felony conviction, denial of the same right to this indigent petitioner solely because he was unable to pay the filing fee violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 . Pp. 360 U. S. 257 -258.
(a) That petitioner had already received one appellate review of his conviction in Ohio does not require a different result, since others similarly situated who could pay the filing fee could have the State's Supreme Court consider their applications for leave to appeal. P. 360 U. S. 257 .
(b) That the granting of leave to appeal is discretionary with the Ohio Supreme Court in such a case as this does not require a different result, since that Court did not permit petitioner to invoke its discretion. Pp. 360 U. S. 257 -258.
After a trial in Ohio in 1953, the petitioner was convicted of burglary and sentenced to life imprisonment. [ Footnote 1 ] That same year, his conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Ohio Court of Appeals. Petitioner immediately filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals, but did nothing further until 1957, when he sought to file a copy of the earlier notice of appeal and a motion for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Ohio. [ Footnote 2 ] To these papers petitioner attached an affidavit of poverty which declared that he was "without sufficient funds with which to pay the costs for Docket and Filing Fees in this
"We are returning the above mentioned papers to you herewith. [ Footnote 3 ] "
Under Art. IV, § 2, of the State Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio has appellate jurisdiction in many types of cases, including those "involving questions arising under the constitution of the United States or of this State" and "cases of felony on leave first obtained." [ Footnote 4 ] Since burglary is a felony in Ohio, [ Footnote 5 ] the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review petitioner's conviction, and petitioner sought to file his motion asking leave to appeal. [ Footnote 6 ] The filing fee required by the Supreme Court on a motion for leave to appeal is $20, [ Footnote 7 ] and, if that fee is paid, and the
We granted certiorari and leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 358 U.S. 919. Subsequently, an order was entered, 358 U.S. 943, expressly limiting the grant of certiorari to the question posed by petitioner in his pro se petition which is restated at the outset of this opinion. [ Footnote 8 ]
"It is the duty of the clerk of this court, in the absence of instructions from the court to the contrary, to accept for filing any paper presented to him, provided such paper is not scurrilous or obscene, is properly prepared, and is accompanied by the requisite filing fee. [ Footnote 9 ]"
In a companion case, the court observed that its clerk "acts as the court in carrying out its instructions." [ Footnote 10 ] The State represented that the clerk had been instructed not to docket any papers without fees, and also that the Supreme Court had not deviated from its practice in this respect. Moreover, the State asserted that it was impossible for petitioner to file any action at all in the Supreme
Although the State admits that petitioner "in truth and in fact" is a pauper, it presses several arguments which it claims distinguish Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 , and justify the Ohio practice. First, the State argues that petitioner received one appellate review of his conviction in Ohio, while, in Griffin, Illinois had left the defendant without any judicial review of his conviction. This is a distinction without a difference for, as Griffin holds, once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty. 351 U.S. at 351 U. S. 18 , 351 U. S. 22 . This principle is no less applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellant procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.
Since Griffin proceeded upon the assumption that review in the Illinois Supreme Court was a matter of right, 351 U.S. at 351 U. S. 13 , Ohio seeks to distinguish Griffin on the further ground that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio is a matter of discretion. But this argument misses the crucial significance of Griffin. In Ohio, a defendant who is not indigent may have the Supreme Court consider on the merits his application for leave to appeal from a felony conviction. But, as that court has interpreted § 1512 and its rules of practice, an indigent defendant is denied that opportunity. There is no
What was said in Griffin might well be said here: "We are confident that the State will provide corrective rules to meet the problem which this case lays bare." 351 U.S. at 351 U. S. 20 . [ Footnote 11 ]
The appellate power of this Court to review litigation originating in a state court can come into operation only if the judgment to be reviewed is the final judgment of the highest court of the State. That a judgment is the prerequisite for the appellate review of this Court is an ingredient of the constitutional requirement of the "Cases" or "Controversies" to which alone "The judicial Power shall extend." U.S.Const. Art. III, § 2. That it be a "final judgment" was made a prerequisite by the very Act which established this Court in 1789. Act of September 24, 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 85, now 28 U.S.C. § 1257. "Close observance of this limitation upon the Court is not regard for a strangling technicality." Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62 , 334 U. S. 67 . Such has been the undeviating constitutional, legislative and judicial command binding on this Court and respected by it without exception or qualification to this very day.
The requisites of such a final judgment are not met by what a state court may deem to be a case or judgment in the exercise of the state court's jurisdiction. See Tyler v. Judges, 179 U. S. 405 ; Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U. S. 429 . Nor can consent of the parties to the determination of a cause by this Court overleap the jurisdictional limitations which are part of this Court's being. Litigants cannot give this Court power which the Constitution and Congress have withheld. Mansfield, C. & L.M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 , 111 U. S. 382 . The President of the United States himself cannot secure from this Court determination of a legal question except when such a question duly arises in the course of adjudication of a case or controversy, even though he asks for needed help in a great national emergency. See President Washington's questions in 33 Writings of Washington (Fitzpatrick ed. 1940) 15-19, 28, and the correspondence between Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Chief Justice Jay, in 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (Johnston ed. 1891) 486-489.
asking that that court instruct its clerk to accept petitions for filing.) The Supreme Court of Ohio might well yield to this claim of Burns as other courts in like situations have yielded since Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 . But, in any event, a denial of Burns' application or refusal to entertain it would constitute a judgment of that court as an appropriate prerequisite for review here.
(3) Under the Civil Rights Act, R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Burns, like others before him who have allegedly been denied constitutional rights under color of any statute of a State, may have his constitutional rights determined and, incidentally, secure heavy damages for any denial of constitutional rights. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 .
(4) Burns' claim, in essence, is unlawful detention because of a denial of a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment. That lays the foundation for a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 . To be sure, if the right he claims be recognized in habeas corpus proceedings, he would not be released as a matter of course, but merely conditionally on the State Supreme Court's entertaining his petition for review as an indigent incapable of meeting court costs. The contingent nature of the release would not impair the availability of habeas corpus. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 .