Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/636/908/26388/
Timestamp: 2019-11-16 23:40:45
Document Index: 498073103

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 416', '§ 402', '§ 402', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 208', '§ 416']

Dwyer, Hilda G. v. Califano, Joseph, Secretary of Health, Education Andwelfare, Appellant, 636 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1980 › Dwyer, Hilda G. v. Califano, Joseph, Secretary of Health, Education Andwelfare, Appellant
Dwyer, Hilda G. v. Califano, Joseph, Secretary of Health, Education Andwelfare, Appellant, 636 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 636 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980) Argued Oct. 6, 1980. Decided Dec. 11, 1980
Effie had previously received social security benefits on her own account. These payments stopped when she began to receive the larger amount of widow's benefits.1 In 1980, Effie received $388.20 per month as a widow of Roland and would have received $229.90 per month on her own account. The administrative law judge found that Hilda would qualify as a deemed widow but for Effie's status as the legal widow. Hilda claimed that, even if Effie were Roland's legal widow, under Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976), Hilda was his "deemed" widow under section 216(h) (1) (B) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1) (B) (1976),2 and should receive the amount which the Administration would have paid to Effie on her own account if she were not receiving a widow's benefit. The administrative law judge rejected this contention and declined to follow Rosenberg on the facts he found in this case, although he found that Hilda had believed in good faith that she had married Roland. This determination became the Secretary's final decision on April 12, 1978, when the Appeals Council denied her request to review it.
In Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976),3 the deceased wage earner had procured a Mexican divorce from his first wife. His second wife received $165.20 per month after his death until the first wife also applied for those benefits. The Administration determined that New York would not recognize the divorce and awarded these benefits ($165.20) to the first wife, terminating the second wife's payments. The first wife then ceased to receive the $163.80 per month payments she had previously been receiving on her own account her net gain being $1.40 per month by receipt of benefits as a widow.
We decline to follow Rosenberg in view of the record in this case for these reasons. First, the legislative history of section 216(h) (1) (B) only restates the basic language of the statute. H.R.Rep.No.1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 91 (1960); S.Rep.No.1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1960) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 3608, 3629, 3684-85. It provides no support for plaintiff on this record. We conclude that the words of the statute, "is entitled to a benefit," plainly refer to a benefit, not only to a full benefit. In any event, Effie Seitz was entitled to a full benefit, payable due to the death of her husband Roland, as of April 1977. Her net gain was less than the entire amount of widow's benefits, see note 1, supra, but the statute uses the word "entitled." See note 2, supra.
Second, Rosenberg ignores other language in section 216(h) (1) (B). This other language states that the "provisions of the preceding sentence (providing for deemed widows) shall not apply ... if another person is or has been entitled to a benefit" as a legal widow (emphasis added). Under this clause, if a legal widow previously but no longer received her spouse's benefits and hence "has been entitled to a benefit," the deemed widow could not receive any widow's benefits for that husband. Woodson v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3214 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 1978) (argued May 1, 1980). This clear language in subparagraph (h) (1) (B) ("has been entitled") contradicts Rosenberg's analysis; under the Rosenberg analysis, the deemed widow would receive the entire benefit since the legal widow was receiving nothing. The words "or has been entitled" would mean nothing, and we decline the invitation to hold that such words were a mere oversight.
The district court in this case held that Congress intended to take care of deemed widows (9a). Since the language of section 216(h) (1) (B) is narrow in scope due to its limitations on the deemed widows entitled to recover under its terms (see page 6 above), it seems most unlikely that Congress intended to provide for deemed widows generally. If Congress had such intention, then the Rosenberg case does not accomplish this objective. A few deemed widows will receive some benefits under that rule, but many will still receive none.5 Under Rosenberg, if Effie had no benefits from her own account, then Hilda would still get nothing. The second wife receives the first wife's own benefits under the Rosenberg formula. Since Rosenberg held that expectations were crucial, one might ask whether the first wife works and pays her social security taxes with the expectation of providing for her husband's second wife. The Rosenberg holding has this effect.
When legal widows receive widows' benefits in excess of their own benefits, the latter payments cease. Congress made no provision to transfer these discontinued payments to the "deemed" widow. To do so wholly defeats section 202(k) (3) (A) (42 U.S.C. § 402(k) (3) (A)), which existed in 1960 when Congress added the provision for "deemed" widows. See Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d at 628-29. It is for Congress, not this court, to order such a transfer of payments to a person such as plaintiff solely because she is deserving or for any other reason it may determine.7 Some might be outraged that Effie receives Roland's benefits when she has had nothing to do with him or their children for nearly 50 years. The issue of Effie's payments, however, is not before this court. We decide only that the statute does not authorize additional payments to the plaintiff under the facts in this record.
Section 202(k) (3) (A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (k) (3) (A) (1976), prevents people from receiving both their own benefits and widow's or widower's benefits. Each dollar of widow's benefits in effect cancels one dollar of the woman's own benefits. Therefore, if the widow's benefits exceed the woman's own benefits, she will no longer receive any of her own benefits
This section provides that a person who was not legally married to a deceased wage earner may still be "deemed" to be a widow or widower. A deemed widow must have in good faith gone through a marriage ceremony with the deceased and have been living with him when he died. The deemed widow receives her spouse's benefits unless and until another "is or has been entitled to a benefit" as the legal widow. Section 216(h) (1) (B) reads:
"A plain and fair reading of Section 416(h) (1) (B) leaves no room for question, doubt or ambiguity. Congress decided that there can be no deemed spouse receiving widow's benefits if the legal widow is entitled to the benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1) (B); see Woodson v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1978); McGuire v. Califano, 440 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Neb. 1977). In the present case we have already affirmed the Secretary's determination that Novella Davis is Henry's legal widow. Mary, therefore, is precluded from receiving benefits.
"The Congress, recognizing that persons may have entitlement to multiple benefits, enacted Section 402(k) (3) (A) to establish a maximum level of benefits. See footnote 8. There is no authority that persuades us that Congress intended to suspend the operation of the statute for a new category, the deemed spouse. We are convinced that there can be no deemed spouse receiving benefits if the legal widow is entitled to the payment, 42 U.S.C. § (416(h) (1) (B)), as we cannot close our eyes to clear congressional intendment. The Congress declined to command the Social Security Administration to pay widow's insurance benefits to two widows, and so must we. In some ways this is a disturbing and inequitable result. We understand the desire of the district court to work out a division of the payments. It may not have been a bad solution, but we do not believe it to be good law."
See also Martin, Social Security Benefits for Spouses, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 789 (1978), stating that "(i)n Rosenberg (the court) was so offended by the termination of substantial benefits to a longstanding 'good faith' widow ... that (it) twisted the language of § 416(h) (1) (B) to reach a contrary and insupportable conclusion." Id. at 819 n.119
Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 208, 74 Stat. 951
A copy of this opinion will be sent to the appropriate committees of both Houses of Congress so that they may consider amending section 216(h) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1) (B) (1976), if they care to do so