Source: https://casetext.com/case/hagelthorn-v-kennecott-corp
Timestamp: 2019-03-22 20:56:12
Document Index: 749551004

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 621', '§ 216', '§ 216', '§ 216', '§ 216', '§ 216']

Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp, 710 F.2d 76 | Casetext
710 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1983)
Hagelthornv.Kennecott Corp.
United States Court of Appeals, Second CircuitJun 14, 1983
V. Pamela Davis, New York City (Lane, Felcher, Kurlander Fox, P.C., David L. Fox, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant-cross-appellee.
Henry P. Baer, New York City (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher Flom, Dorothy B. Symons, John P. Furfaro, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee-cross-appellant.
On March 29, 1982, a jury of the Southern District of New York returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Thomas Hagelthorn. Finding that he had been fired because of his age by the defendant, Kennecott Corporation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 Supp. V 1981), the jury awarded him $82,350 in lost wages and benefits. Judge Griesa entered judgment for the plaintiff, reduced the award to offset pension payments paid by Kennecott to Hagelthorn, and doubled the remainder per 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) (Supp. V 1981) 626(b) (1976), which provide double liquidated damages for "willful" violations.
Beyond this, Preisner's recollection of the August conversation was somewhat different. Preisner did admit speaking with Belanger about Hagelthorn a few weeks before. Indeed, he admitted that Belanger had told him that Hagelthorn "should be fired." Preisner denied, however, mentioning this to Hagelthorn. And he emphatically denied telling Hagelthorn that he would be fired for his age. Preisner observed at trial that it would have been "stupid . . . to say anything like that," since age discrimination is unlawful.
Hagelthorn's version of Preisner's remarks was indirectly supported by two other witnesses. Mary La Verme, Hagelthorn's secretary, testified that after Preisner left, ". . . Hagelthorn came out, and he said to me, `Mr. Preisner said that I was not going to Connecticut because of my age.'" Joseph Carr, Hagelthorn's friend, provided similar testimony. He claimed that Hagelthorn had told him of Preisner's remarks in mid-September.
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied. At the close of evidence, the court submitted to the jury the simple question whether Kennecott had violated the ADEA. The court instructed the jurors that they could find for the plaintiff even if they determined that several factors influenced Kennecott's decision, so long as they also found it more likely than not that "but for this factor of age, plaintiff would not have been terminated." After deliberating for a day and a half, the jury found, in answer to special interrogatories, that "age was a determinative factor in Kennecott's decision to terminate plaintiff's employment" and that "the amount of loss of wages and other benefits resulting to plaintiff from the termination" was $82,350.
The court declined to submit the plaintiff's liquidated damages claim to the jury. The court noted that if Kennecott had violated the Act, then there was no question on the evidence presented but that Kennecott had knowingly violated the law. Thus, if the jury found a violation of the Act, then even under the strictest standard plaintiff had established a "willful" violation and was entitled to liquidated damages.
The court denied motions for a judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. It reduced the award for pension payments Kennecott had made to Hagelthorn and then doubled the remainder on the ground that Kennecott had willfully violated the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) 626(b). These appeals followed.
Kennecott first argues that the court erred in denying it a directed verdict because Hagelthorn failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the four part standard of Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 n. 6, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). We disagree. Hagelthorn made out a prima facie case in a manner we have approved before, by offering "direct proof" of discrimination — evidence that "the employer had told the employee that he was being fired because of his age." Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981). Burdine, decided the same day as Stanojev, is not to the contrary. See Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1034, 1036 n. 4 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
Our resolution here and in Part II(B) infra of defendant's arguments on its appeal from the denial of a directed verdict makes it unnecessary to address independently defendant's identical arguments on its appeal from the denial of summary judgment.
In Burdine, the Supreme Court looked to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as this court had done in Stanojev, for "an appropriate model for a prima facie case of racial discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 6. Under McDonnell Douglas the plaintiff must show "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complaint's qualifications." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. The defendant argues that Burdine made two of the McDonnell Douglas requirements invariant elements of a prima facie case — that every ADEA plaintiff must show that he is qualified for an available position. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Moreover, defendant argues, a plaintiff's own self-serving assessments are insufficient to establish prima facie qualification.
However, Burdline itself noted that the McDonnell Douglas standard "is not inflexible." 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 6. Thus, we believe we are still required to approach each situation on a "case-by-case basis," H.R.Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S.Code Cong. Ad.News 2213, 2220, always mindful that the central question is whether plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that age was a determinative factor in the employer's decision. U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1480, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, we find nothing in Burdline suggesting that the Court was abandoning its position in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). There the Court suggested that McDonnell Douglas had relied on proof of qualification for an available job in order to compensate for the typical unavailability of direct proof of discrimination. Id. at 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. at 1866 n. 44; Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 n. 12 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Furnco v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). Where direct proof is available, there is no reason to "adhere stubbornly to [McDonnell Douglas's] specific formulae when common sense dictates the same result on the basis of alternative formulae." Grant v. Bethlehem Steel, 635 F.2d 1007, 1014 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940, 101 S.Ct. 3083, 69 L.Ed.2d 954 (1981).
Hagelthorn presented direct evidence of discrimination. He testified that after twenty years in a position not likely to be totally eliminated, he was told he would be fired because of his age. If the jury believed this testimony then they might reasonably accept that Kennecott thought Hagelthorn was "unqualified," and nevertheless conclude that but for his age, he would not have been fired. Because Hagelthorn was relying on this direct evidence, and not merely trying to create an inference of an illegitimate reason by eliminating "all legitimate reasons . . . as possible reasons for the employer's action," Furnco v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 2950, he was not required to eliminate altogether the possibility that Kennecott regarded his performance as below its legitimate expectations. Cf., Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d at 1014 (requiring such proof when evidence of discrimination was circumstantial).
As we discuss in Parts II(b) and 111, infra, plaintiff also attempted to persuade the jury that Kennecott's explanation was pretextual by showing that management's alleged dissatisfaction was manufactured and without adequate basis in fact.
Similarly, Hagelthorn was not required to prove, as part of his prima facie case, that he was replaced by any employee or that his job continued to exist as such after the reorganization. Failure to require such proof does not, as Kennecott asserts, deprive the employer of "the right to restructure his organization to reflect his perception of the demands of his business and the opportunities afforded by new technology." We merely hold that even during a legitimate reorganization or workforce reduction, an employer may not dismiss employees for unlawful discriminatory reasons, see Williams v. General Motors, 656 F.2d 120, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1439, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982), just as it may not fire unqualified employees who would not be fired as such but for their age.
Moreover, Kennecott's argument misconceives Burdine's requirement that the plaintiff prove the employer's explanation was a pretext. The meaning of this requirement must be understood in the context of plaintiff's ultimate burden of showing that age was a "determinative factor." Plaintiff is not required to show that age was the sole factor in the employer's decision. Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 68 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981). Hence, to prove that "the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons," Burdine, supra 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, Hagelthorn was not required to show that the reasons offered were false, but that they were not Kennecott's only reasons and that age made a difference. Golomb v. Prudential, 688 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1982); Parcinski v. Outlet Co., 673 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 725, 74 L.Ed.2d 950 (1983).
Nor can we agree with Kennecott's argument that the evidence supporting its explanation for the discharge was so great as to compel acceptance. Kennecott points to the evidence that Hagelthorn was not liked, that people complained about him and his department, that he had been denied a raise in 1978 because of his poor reaction to Preisner's promotion, and that he performed unsatisfactorily on the "nine critical tasks" during his probationary period. Kennecott also notes that Belanger, the man ultimately responsible for Hagelthorn's termination, claimed to have heard numerous complaints about Hagelthorn. Finally, Kennecott points to its statistical evidence tending to show that its relocation policy did not have a disparate impact on older employees. Kennecott argues that the jury could have found for Hagelthorn in the face of this evidence only by "inferr[ing] that Kennecott ignored the undisputed reasons for terminating his employment and focused on his age instead" (emphasis added). This argument is twice mistaken.
Defendant's statistical evidence that Kennecott's relocation decisions did not generally have a disparate impact presented the jury with grounds for inferring that Kennecott probably did not take age into account in any of its decisions. However, this inference was not compelled, and the evidence provides no basis for taking the discriminatory treatment question from the jury.
For instance, the thrust of Kennecott's case against Hagelthorn was that, although he got along well with his staff he also got along poorly with his superiors. However, Belanger, the alleged decision maker, explained in rather colorful language that the problem with Hagelthorn was, while he was obsequious with his superiors, he got along poorly with his staff. Belanger "knew" that people in Hagelthorn's department were "very unhappy," because Preisner reported a very high turnover rate in Hagelthorn's department. However, at trial, Preisner denied that there was a high turnover rate and denied ever telling Belanger anything to the contrary. Belanger's claim that people were always complaining about Hagelthorn conflicted with Feick's survey, which had revealed no particular complaints about office services or about Hagelthorn. Of course, nothing in the ADEA prohibited Belanger from firing Hagelthorn on the basis of erroneous beliefs. Nevertheless, the jury could have taken the extent to which Belanger's "reasons" were wide of the mark as evidence that they were manufactured to cover discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d at 1012 n. 6 ("[t]he reasonableness of the employer's reasons may of course be probative of whether they are pretexts").
Tom Hagelthorn . . . does not do anything to get his boss mad but dumps all over everyone else in the organization. . . .
[T]his kind of case allows a plaintiff to come out of a room after a conversation, distort that conversation, and make a case out of it, tell his secretary . . . tell a bunch of other people, as he alleges, and then he has a case. I see no reason for termination because of his age. He wasn't on an executive level where they were needing young, dynamic people. He was on a very junior level....
. . . I think a verdict has been rendered which is against the great weight of the evidence, but I don't think that it is something where the jury did not have the minimum amount required to reach a verdict.
In addition to an award of back pay, the ADEA provides for "an additional equal amount" as liquidated damages "in cases of willful violations." 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) 626(b). The defendant argues that the district court erroneously found that Kennecott's violation was "willful" on the sole ground that Kennecott was aware of the ADEA's requirements. such a standard would, defendant argues, render liquidated damages virtually automatic.
Because, as the district court noted, there was sufficient evidence of willfulness under either standard, we do not believe it necessary to resolve this question. The uncontradicted evidence showed that Kennecott knew that a decision to fire Hagelthorn because of his age would violate the law. There is no suggestion that anyone at Kennecott thought that age could be legitimately considered as, say, a bona fide occupational qualification; and, since this is a disparate treatment case, there is no suggestion that the discrimination was inadvertent. See Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1981). We agree with the district court, that if in these circumstances Kennecott decided to fire Hagelthorn because of his age, then Kennecott voluntarily and knowingly violated the law.
Defendant raises numerous objections to the court's charge. Most of these objections are raised for the first time on appeal. On March 25, 1982, the court discussed proposed instructions with counsel. Only four questions were discussed: (1) whether the court should instruct the jury on plaintiff's burden to establish a " prima facie case"; (2) whether the court should instruct the jury as to the "shifting burden of proof" set out in Burdine; (3) whether the court should instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove that he was qualified; and (4) what language the court should use to elucidate for the jury the meaning of a "determinative factor."
We agree with the district court that the defendant's proposed instructions, couched in such lawyerly cant as " prima facie case" and "shifting burden of proof," would only have confused the jury. Neither Burdine nor " McDonnell Douglas was . . . written as a prospective jury charge; to read its technical aspects to a jury . . . will add little to the juror's understanding of the case and, even worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination." Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d at 1016. We agree with the First Circuit that "the advantages of trial by jury lie in utilization of the jurors' common sense," and that this advantage would be lost by "engulfing a lay jury in the legal niceties" of Burdine and McDonnell Douglas. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016.
The discussion between counsel and court focused generally on the felicity of instructing the jury on Burdine's legal terminology. Counsel never suggested to the court that the substance of the proposed charge be offered without the objectionable terminology, nor after the charge was given to the jury, did counsel object to the failure to charge the jury on the substantive elements of the proposed charge. Nevertheless, counsel objected for the first time on appeal that the jury was never told that the employer's explanation for its decision "does not have to be a valid one . . . or one that the jurors would agree with," and that the jury was not told that the defendant did not have to prove that it was "actually motivated by the reason it gave in court." Assuming, without deciding, that these issues are properly before us, we note that the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover unless age was a determinative factor, even if the jury disagreed with the defendant's reason, "even though you don't like what Kennecott did, even though you might think it was unfair or arbitrary or unjust or you might sympathize with the plaintiff." Contrary to defendant's assertion, nothing in the charge could have misled the jury to conclude that Kennecott had "to prove that it acted in a non-discriminatory manner."
Defendant argues that as a result of the failure to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, "the jury never understood that it was Hagelthorn's burden to prove that he was qualified, not Kennecott's prove that he wasn't." We do not believe the jury was misled. First, we agree with the district court that Hagelthorn's basic qualifications — his knowledge of business practices and machines, his education, his experience and his basic intelligence — were not at issue. See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d at 1013 n. 10. Second, as we noted above, although Kennecott was not required to prove its claim that Hagelthorn's poor performance and attitude rendered him unqualified for his position, neither was Hagelthorn required to disprove this claim. He was required to prove only that, even if performance and attitude were factors in his termination, nevertheless he would not have been fired but for his age. In these circumstances, asking the jury to make an isolated finding that Hagelthorn was "qualified" would have been confusing.
Finally, the defendant objects that the court gave the jury no meaningful assistance on the concept of a "determinative factor." See Bentley v. Stromberg-Carlson, 638 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1981) (error to provide no explanation for "determinative factor"). The court told the jurors that if they believed there were several factors, including age, in Kennecott's decision, then they could return a verdict for the plaintiff only if they concluded that " but for this factor of age, plaintiff would not have been terminated" (emphasis added). We believe the charge set forth in simple terms the two aspects of a "determinative factor" crucial to the jury's understanding: first, that there can be more than one determinative factor in the employer's decision; second, that age must be a factor in the absence of which the plaintiff would not have been discharged. Indeed, we believe the "but for" formulation used here is clearer and more readily understood by lay jurors than the "factor that made a difference" charge we approved in Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d at 1035 (also approving the "but for" formulation).
However, the court had no discretion to deny fees to a prevailing plaintiff; its discretion extended only to the amount allowed. Section 626(b) of the ADEA incorporates by reference that portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act providing that "[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff . . . , allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Since an award of fees is mandatory under § 216(b), Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 415 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 694, 697 n. 5, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1191 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1979), it is mandatory under the ADEA. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2254, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978).
2) $4,500 representing the present value of the monthly supplemental pension payments which were to bring Hagelthorn's total monthly payment up to that to which he would have been entitled had he retired two years later at the age of sixty-five, plus
3) $10,500 representing the present value of the monthly "social security" payments Kennecott agreed to pay Hagelthorn until he turned sixty-five, at which point he would collect an equivalent amount from the Social Security Administration.
. . . There is a saying in business, very bluntly, the s___ flows downhill, and Tom Hagelthorn was probably standing at his level throwing it downhill at people below his level.