Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/99123/teamsters-union-vs-n-y-n-h-h-r-co
Timestamp: 2016-12-09 17:19:33
Document Index: 795223883

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 152', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 7']

Teamsters Union Vs N Y N H and H R Co - Citation 99123 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Teamsters Union Vs. N.Y., N.H. and H. R. Co. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/99123CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-09-1956Case Number350 U.S. 155AppellantTeamsters UnionRespondentN.Y., N.H. and H. R. Co.Excerpt:.....in hauling loaded truck-trailers "piggy-back" brought an action in a state court to enjoin a labor union from conduct which interfered with such operation and which allegedly violated the labor management relations act. employees of motor carriers with which the union had collective bargaining agreements had been persuaded by agents of the union to refrain from delivering loaded trailers to the railroad for "piggybacking." the union was not concerned in any way with the railroad's labor policy, nor was there any claim that the union interfered in any manner with the railroad's employees.
the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national labor relations board, the railroad may seek any remedy it may have before said board under the labor management..... Judgment:
Teamsters Union v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co. - 350 U.S. 155 (1956)
the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the railroad may seek any remedy it may have before said Board under the Labor Management Relations Act, and the state court had no authority to enjoin the union's conduct. Pp.
350 U. S. 156
(a) A railroad subject to the Railway Labor Act is not precluded from seeking the aid of the National Labor Relations Board in circumstances unrelated to the railroad's relations with its own employees. Pp.
350 U. S. 158
(b) The question whether there was a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act is for the National Labor Relations Board to determine. P.
350 U. S. 161
(c) Even if the union's conduct is not prohibited by § 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act, it may come within the protection of § 7, in which case the State is not free to enjoin the conduct. P.
Weber v. Anheuer-Busch, Inc.,
"The said acts were intended to and did, in fact, result in an unlawful secondary boycott in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act; . . . [
After hearing, a permanent injunction was granted and, on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Jenkins,
331 Mass. 720, 122 N.E.2d 759. We granted certiorari to determine whether the state court had jurisdiction to enjoin the petitioners' conduct or whether its jurisdiction had been preempted by the authority vested in the National Labor Relations Board. 348 U.S. 969.
commerce, [
] determined that it had jurisdiction in this controversy to restrain petitioners' conduct because the Labor Management Relations Act's definition of "employer," as interpreted by the NLRB, cast doubt upon respondent's ability to obtain relief under that Act.
The Act, in its definition of an "employer," expressly excludes anyone subject to the Railway Labor Act. 61 Stat. 137,
, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). [
] It is, of course, true that employer-employee relationships of railroads such as respondent are governed by the Railway Labor Act, [
] which was passed before either the National Labor Relations Act or the Labor Management Relations Act. Neither of the latter Acts was intended to tread upon the ground covered by the Railway Labor Act. It is clear that neither railroads nor their employees may carry their grievances with one another to the NLRB for resolution. But it does not follow from this that a railroad is precluded from seeking the aid of the Board in circumstances unrelated to its employer-employee relations. Respondent itself has maintained throughout the entire course of this litigation that there is no labor dispute with
The NLRB is empowered to issue complaints whenever "it is charged" that any person subject to the Act is engaged in any proscribed unfair labor practice. § 10(b). Under the Board's Rules and Regulations, such a charge may be filed by "any person." [
] We think it clear that Congress, in excluding "any person subject to the Railway Labor Act" from the statutory definition of "employer," carved out of the Labor Management Relations Act the railroads' employer-employee relationships, which were, and are, governed by the Railway Labor Act. But we do not think that, by so doing, Congress intended to divest the NLRB of jurisdiction over controversies otherwise within its competence solely because a railroad is the complaining party. Furthermore, since railroads are not excluded from the Act's definition of "person," they are entitled to Board protection from the kind of unfair labor practice proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(A). This interpretation permits the harmonious effectuation of three distinct congressional objectives: (1) to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for protecting the rights of employers, employees, and the public in labor disputes so as to promote the full, free flow of commerce, as expressed in § 1(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act; (2) to maintain the traditional separate treatment of employer-employee relationships of railroads subject to
the Railway Labor Act; and (3) to minimize "diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies."
Respondent contends, however, that even if railroads may seek the aid of the NLRB, it was not required to do so in this case, because petitioners' conduct was neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8(b)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act. As we noted earlier, respondent's amended complaint alleged violations of the Act. Whether the Act was violated or whether, as respondent now claims, it was not, is, of course, a question for the Board to determine. Even if petitioners' conduct is not prohibited by § 8 of the Act, it may come within the protection of § 7, in which case the State was not free to enjoin the conduct. In any event, the Board's jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case is clearly settled by this Court's recent decision in