Source: http://nm.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180727_0001618.DNM.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-03-28 18:39:11
Document Index: 220733809

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 16']

FindACase™ | Wiseman v. United States
In April of 1997, a jury convicted Petitioner of six counts of robbery affecting interstate commerce (Counts 1-5 and 7), contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts of use of a firearm during a crime of violence (Counts 6 and 8), contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). CR Docs. 148, 188-89. Petitioner's convictions were based on a series of grocery store robberies carried out by Petitioner and an accomplice in New Mexico. See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1201-03 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Rosemond v. United States, __ U.S., 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1251 (2014). In counts 6 and 8, the indictment charged Petitioner under both § 924(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, which relates to aider and abettor liability. Id. at 1217. Petitioner was convicted of the § 924(c) offenses on the theory that he had aided and abetted his companion's use of a Tec-9 firearm during the last two robberies, in Silver City and Clovis, New Mexico. Id. Petitioner challenges his firearm convictions under Johnson v. United States, __ U.S., 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (Johnson II) and under Rosemond, which abrogated the legal standard announced by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming Petitioner's § 924(c) convictions on his direct appeal. See Wiseman, 172 F.3d at 1217. Petitioner also argues that under Weekes v. Fleming, 301 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2002), Petitioner should receive certain credit against his federal sentence. The United States argues that Petitioner's claims under Rosemond and Weekes are time barred and that his Johnson II claim is without merit.
In Johnson II, decided June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. See 135 S.Ct. at 2563. Johnson II announced a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016). Accordingly, a claim based on the right recognized by the Supreme Court in Johnson II is timely under § 2255(f)(3) if it is filed by June 26, 2016.
In Sessions v. Dimaya, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Dimaya reached this conclusion through a “straightforward application” of Johnson II, which dictated the result in Dimaya because of the similarity between § 16(b) and the residual clause of the ACCA. Id. at 1213, 1223.
Johnson tells us how to resolve this case. That decision held that “[t]wo features of [ACCA's] residual clause conspire[d] to make it unconstitutionally vague.” 576 U.S., at ___, 135 S.Ct., at 2557. Because the clause had both an ordinary-case requirement and an ill-defined risk threshold, it necessarily “devolv[ed] into guesswork and intuition, ” invited arbitrary enforcement, and failed to provide fair notice. Id., at ___, 135 S.Ct., at 2559. Section 16(b) possesses the exact same two features. And none of the minor linguistic disparities in the statutes makes any real difference. So just like ACCA's residual clause, § 16(b) “produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id., at ___, 135 S.Ct., at 2558.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Relying on Perez-Vargas, Petitioner next contends that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence because &ldquo;fear of injury&rdquo; may be caused by means that involve minimal physical force or no force at all. In Perez-Vargas, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed Colorado's third degree assault statute, which criminalized the knowing or reckless causation of bodily injury without requiring that the injury be caused by any specific means. 414 F.3d at 1285. The Court determined that the offense was not a crime of violence because the statute would allow conviction based on acts “that would not use or threaten the use of physical force: recklessly shooting ...