Source: http://fredericborel.blogspot.com/2016/06/cuozzo-speed-technologies-llc-v-lee.html
Timestamp: 2017-10-24 03:47:34+00:00
Document Index: 155221737

Matched Legal Cases: ['§100', '§102', '§103', '§314', '§316', '§42', '§314', '§314', '§314', '§100']

Frédéric Borel: Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, Docket 15-446
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, Docket 15-446
Patents (reexamination of claims): Chevron deference: Rulemaking authority: Judicial review (in general): The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100 et seq., creates a process called “inter partes review.” That review process allows a third party to ask the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office to reexamine the claims in an already-issued patent and to cancel any claim that the agency finds to be unpatentable in light of prior art. See §102 (requiring “novelty”); §103 (disqualifying claims that are “obvious”).
“No Appeal.—The determination by the Director of the Patent Office whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and non­appealable.” 35 U. S. C. §314(d).
Does this provision bar a court from considering whether the Patent Office wrongly “determined . . . to institute an inter partes review,” when it did so on grounds not specifically mentioned in a third party’s review request?
The second provision grants the Patent Office the au­thority to issue “regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter.” §316(a)(4).
Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a regulation stating that the agency, in inter partes review, “shall construe a patent claim according to its broad­est reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears”? 37 CFR §42.100(b)(2015).
We conclude that the first provision, though it may not bar consideration of a constitutional question, for example, does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run claim at issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to insti­tute inter partes review. We also conclude that the second provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue the regula­tion before us. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229 (2001); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984).
35 U. S. C. §314(d) : The text of §314(d) expressly states that the Patent Office’s determinations whether to institute inter partes review “shall be fi­nal and nonappealable.” Moreover, construing §314(d) to permit ju­dicial review of the Patent Office’s preliminary decision to institute inter partes review undercuts the important congressional objective of giving the agency significant power to revisit and revise earlier pa­tent grants. Past practice in respect to related proceedings, including the predecessor to inter partes review, also supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend for courts to review these initial deter­minations.
The “strong presumption” favoring judicial review, Mach Min­ing, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___, is overcome here by these “ ‘clear and convincing’ ” indications that Congress intended to bar re­view, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349. Given that presumption, however, the interpretation adopted here applies to cases in which the challenge is to the Patent Office’s de­termination “to initiate an inter partes review under this section,” or where the challenge consists of questions closely tied to the applica­tion and interpretation of statutes related to that determination. C.’s claim does not implicate a constitutional question, nor does it present other questions of interpretation that reach well beyond “this section” in terms of scope and impact.
The Patent Office regulation requiring the Board to apply the broadest reasonable construction standard to interpret patent claims is a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority granted to the Patent Office by statute. Where a statute leaves a gap or is ambiguous, this Court typ­ically interprets a congressional grant of rulemaking authority as giv­ing the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of the statute. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843. Here, the statute grants the Patent Office the authority to issue regulations “governing inter partes review,” and no statutory provision unambiguously mandates a particular claim construction standard.
(U.S.S.C., June 20, 2016, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, Docket 15-446, J. Breyer).
Brevets (nouvel examen du droit à un brevet après avoir reconnu ce droit dans un premier temps) : une loi fédérale (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100 et seq.) institue une procédure connue sous le nom de « inter partes review », qui permet à un tiers de saisir le Bureau fédéral des brevets et des marques, concluant à un nouvel examen de certaines revendications protégées par un brevet déjà octroyé, en vue d’obtenir l’annulation de la reconnaissance de ces revendications au motif qu’elles ne remplissent pas les conditions posées à l’octroi d’un brevet (absence de nouveauté, caractère évident, etc.).
La décision de mettre en œuvre, ou non, la procédure « inter partes » relève de la discrétion du Directeur du Bureau. Il s’agit d’une décision finale sans voie de recours. La Cour juge ici que telle est la volonté clairement exprimée par le Congrès. Est toutefois réservée la saisine des cours fédérales pour violations alléguées de la Constitution fédérale. Le principe de la forte présomption en faveur de l’existence d’une voie de recours ne s’applique pas lorsque le Congrès s’est prononcé de manière claire et convaincante.
En outre, dite loi fédérale attribue au Bureau des brevets la compétence d’édicter les règles de procédure applicables à une révision « inter partes ». Le Bureau agit dans le cadre de sa compétence en adoptant une règle précisant que le Bureau, dans la procédure de révision, appliquera à une revendication l’interprétation raisonnablement la plus large possible, à la lumière des spécificités du brevet lié à la revendication (déférence selon la jurisprudence « Chevron », le Bureau a procédé ici à un exercice raisonnable de son autorité législative conférée par une loi fédérale ; en cas d’ambiguïté dans la loi ou en cas d’attribution de compétence prévue par la loi, l’administration peut édicter des règles, qui doivent être raisonnables à la lumière du texte, de la nature et du but de la loi, cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843).
Labels: Breyer, Chevron deference, Judicial review (in general), Patents (reexamination of claims), Rulemaking