Source: http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/digest/IA2.htm
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 04:27:26
Document Index: 216459204

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14505', '§ 504', '§ 504', 'art, 66', '§ 1168', '§ 503']

First Principles: Jurisdiction: In Personam
PRINCIPLES: Jurisdiction: In Personam
United States v. Nettles, 74 M.J. 289 (a discharge terminates in personam court-martial jurisdiction of an active duty servicemember after there is (1) a delivery of a valid discharge certificate; (2) a final accounting of pay; and (3) the undergoing of a clearing process as required under appropriate service regulations to separate the member from military service). (the law of discharges for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction is judicially created, and therefore an appellate court is free to modify it). (in the case of an active duty servicemember, no delivery of a valid discharge can be effective if it is contrary to expressed command intent; it is also strongly suggested that delivery means actual physical receipt; however, the physical delivery rule does not apply to the reserve components). (in cases of reserve personnel with self-executing discharge orders issued pursuant to statute, it is the effective date of those orders that determines the existence of personal jurisdiction - not physical receipt of a piece of paper). (in this case, because 10 USC § 14505 (a statute requiring discharge for captains who failed to be selected for promotion on the second try) commanded that appellant be discharged no later than a specific date, and because appellant was not on active duty under an administrative hold on the date of the self-executing discharge orders, appellant’s discharge became effective on the date ordered - regardless of the failure physically to deliver the discharge certificate; and because appellant was arraigned after the effective date of that discharge, no military jurisdiction existed over his person). (in cases where the accused is not on active duty pursuant to an administrative hold on the date the self-executing order sets for a reservist’s discharge, he is not subject to court-martial jurisdiction). 2011 (September
United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, provides for UCMJ jurisdiction in time of declared war or contingency operation over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field). (the court-martial’s jurisdiction over the offense alone is not sufficient to establish jurisdiction; the Constitution conditions the proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused; thus, an inquiry into court-martial jurisdiction focuses on the person’s status, i.e., whether the person is subject to the UCMJ at the time of the offense; in this case, whether jurisdiction over the offense existed requires an analysis of the criteria found in Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ). (with respect to whether a person is serving with or accompanying an armed force as provided in Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, the test is whether the accused has moved with a military operation and whether his presence with the armed force was not merely incidental, but directly connected with, or dependent upon, the activities of the armed force or its personnel; also, an accused may be regarded as accompanying or serving with an armed force, even though he is not directly employed by such a force or the government, but, instead, works for a contractor engaged on a military project). (appellant, a foreign national working as a civilian contractor in Iraq, was both serving with and accompanying the armed forces, as required to subject him to court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, where he was virtually indistinguishable from the US military police squad he was serving with and faced the same daily routines and threats as they did; specifically, he served as an interpreter for the squad on every mission the squad went on, he was not only an integral part of the team, but was a necessary part of the team, without whom the mission could not be accomplished, he wore a tape stating “U.S. Army” and the unit patch on his uniform, he wore body armor and a helmet like the soldiers, he lived in a combat outpost, he received mission orders from the squad leader/team chief and reported for operational purposes to the squad leader/team chief, and he faced daily threats from enemy insurgents). (with respect to whether a person is serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field as provided in Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, the meaning of in the field means in an area of actual fighting). (appellant, a foreign national working as a civilian contractor in Iraq, was serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field, as required to subject him to court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, where he served as an interpreter for a US military police squad, lived at a combat outpost, and conducted missions with the squad in an area where he faced attacks from enemy insurgents on a daily basis). (the status of the individual is the focus for determining both jurisdiction over the offense and jurisdiction over the person; the only difference is that jurisdiction over the person depends on the person’s status as a person subject to the Code both at the time of the offense and at the time of trial). (even though appellant, a foreign national working as a civilian contractor in Iraq, was no longer serving with the armed forces after his civilian employment contract was terminated prior to trial, jurisdiction remained because he was still accompanying the force at the time of trial by the fact that he was confined awaiting trial). United States v. Fry, 70 M.J. 465 (perhaps no relation between the government and a citizen is more distinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces; for this reason, the scope, nature, legal incidents, and consequences of the relation between persons in service and the government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority; federal law, not state law, is the benchmark by which courts measure whether a person is subject to court-martial jurisdiction).
(under Article 2(c), UCMJ, which makes persons subject to court-martial jurisdiction, notwithstanding any other provision of law, if they submit voluntarily to military authority, meet the mental competence and minimum age qualifications, receive military pay or allowances, and perform military duties, courts-martial need not concern themselves with the legal effect of other clauses in statutes, contracts, or other legal instruments, when deciding whether they have jurisdiction). (Congress has the power to override state law that would interfere with the servicemember-military relationship, given its distinctively federal character). (in assessing whether the accused met the mental competency requirements for court-martial jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2(c), UCMJ, the military judge was not bound by a state court order that established a limited conservatorship over the accused, even assuming it was directly on point; the military judge was only required to review the relevant evidence, including the order, to determine whether the requirements for military jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ, were met).
(Article 2(c), UCMJ, sets out a three-part analytical framework for finding jurisdiction; the threshold question is whether the person is serving with an armed force; if that can be established, the analysis proceeds to the four-part test laid out in Article 2(c), which requires findings that the accused: voluntarily submitted to military authority; met the mental and age requirements; received military pay or allowances; and performed military duties; if all four parts of the test are met, then the person is subject to court-martial jurisdiction, until the person is released pursuant to law or regulation).
(voluntariness is a separate and distinct requirement for court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ, that retains its usual meaning; furthermore, voluntariness remains a question evaluated under the traditional rubric of looking at the totality of the relevant circumstances, including the individual’s mental state). (evidence either that appellant’s actions were compelled by an outside influence, like duress or coercion, or that appellant could not understand the nature or significance of his actions might be reasons to find that he has not acted voluntarily in submitting to military authority for purposes of determining if he is subject to court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(c), UCMJ). (if appellant met the mental competence requirement of Article 2(c)(2) (i.e., not insane under 10 USC § 504), then it is surely evidence that he had the requisite mental capacity to understand the significance of submitting to military authorities, i.e., it would tend to show that he acted voluntarily in that regard).
(given that the concept codified in 10 USC § 504 (persons not qualified for enlistment) is akin to capacity to contract, the events that occurred before and after enlistment are relevant to determining the person’s mental condition on the date the enlistment was executed in determining the mental capacity to enlist). (the weight of authority seems to hold that mental capacity to contract depends upon whether the allegedly disabled person possessed sufficient reason to enable him to understand the nature and effect of the act in issue; even average intelligence is not essential to a valid bargain). (in this case, the military judge’s conclusion that jurisdiction existed pursuant to Article 2(c) because appellant was mentally competent to enlist was not clearly erroneous; the evidence of record fairly supported the conclusion that appellant had the capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment and acted voluntarily; although expert testimony conflicted as to whether appellant had the mental capacity to understand the significance of his enlistment, and a state court order entered prior to enlistment established a limited conservatorship over appellant, the military judge concluded that the surrounding circumstances did not sufficiently support appellant’s claim of impulsivity because appellant ultimately managed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, orders, and directives and complete recruit training). (when faced with conflicting evidence on whether a party is competent, the military judge does not err merely because some evidence points in the opposite direction of the military judge’s ultimate conclusion).
States v. Watson, 69 M.J. 415 (a pretrial
terminates court-martial jurisdiction over an accused, returning him to
civilian status by virtue of the discharge). (a void administrative
discharge, such as one
obtained by fraud, does not preclude either the exercise of
jurisdiction or the approval of an unexecuted punitive discharge). (for purposes of ascertaining
administrative discharge on court-martial proceedings, there are three
generally applicable elements of a valid discharge: first, there must
delivery of a valid discharge certificate; second, there must be a
accounting of pay made; and third, appellant must undergo the clearing process required under appropriate service
separate him from military service). 2008 (September
States v. Kuemmerle, 67 M.J. 141 (courts-martial
may only exercise
jurisdiction over a servicemember who was a member of the Armed
time of the offense charged). 2008
States v. Hart, 66 M.J. 273 (under Article
2(a)(1), UCMJ, members of a
regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting
expiration of their terms of enlistment are subject to court-martial
(it is black letter law that in personam jurisdiction over a military
person is lost upon his discharge from the service, absent same saving
circumstance or statutory authorization). (the UCMJ itself does not define the exact
point in time when discharge occurs, but pursuant to 10 USC § 1168(a), a
servicemember may not be discharged from active duty until his
certificate and his final pay, or a substantial part of that pay, are
delivery to him). (for purposes of court-martial
three elements must be satisfied to accomplish an early discharge: (1)
must be a delivery of a valid discharge certificate; (2) there must be
accounting of pay made; and (3) the servicemember must undergo the
process required under appropriate service regulations to separate him
military service). (although appellant had
received his DD Form
214 discharge certificate, his discharge from active duty was not
court-martial jurisdiction existed pursuant to Article 2(a)(1), UCMJ,
only the initial calculation of appellant’s separation pay had been
the DFAS computer system, where appellant had not received his final
pay, or a substantial portion thereof, and that pay was not ready for
and where appellant’s command stopped processing the computation of his
pay and revoked his DD Form 214). 2006
States v. Davis, 63 MJ 171 (an essential component of court-martial
jurisdiction is in personam jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the
person of an
accused; Article 2(a)(1) and (7), UCMJ, authorize court-martial
over members of the armed forces and persons serving sentences imposed
courts-martial). (as
matter, an individual discharged and returned to civilian life is not
to the jurisdiction of a court-martial convened under the UCMJ). (appellant,
had been administratively discharged while confined under a
sentence and whose sentence was set aside, remained subject to the
of a court-martial; the power of the court-martial over appellant was
established at his initial trial and the intervening administrative
did not divest the appellate courts of the power to correct error,
proceedings, and maintain appellate jurisdiction over the person during
pendency of those proceedings). (when
appellate court approves the findings of a court-martial, disapproves
sentence, and orders a sentence rehearing, a post-trial administrative
discharge does not preclude completion of the sentencing proceedings
an appellate court; there is “continuing jurisdiction” over a case that
been tried and in which the accused was convicted while in a status
subjected him to the UCMJ).
jurisdiction attaches, it continues until the appellate processes are
a rehearing relates back to the initial trial and to the appellate
responsibility to ensure that the results of a trial are just; where
appellate courts are invoked by an appellant and a rehearing is
authorized, an
intervening administrative discharge does not serve to terminate
over the person of the accused for purposes of that rehearing). United
States v. Harmon, 63 MJ 98 (members of a regular component of the
forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their
enlistment are subject to the UCMJ; generally, a person becomes subject
court-martial jurisdiction upon enlistment in or induction into the
forces; court-martial jurisdiction over active duty personnel
ordinarily ends
on delivery of a discharge certificate or its equivalent to the person
concerned issued pursuant to competent orders; thus, military
the person continues as long as military status exists). (a
armed force may not be discharged or released from active duty until
discharge certificate and his final pay or a substantial part of that
pay, are
ready for delivery to him; to effectuate an early discharge, there must
be: (1) a delivery of a valid discharge certificate; (2) a final
accounting of pay; and (3) the undergoing of a clearing process as
under appropriate service regulations to separate the member from
service). (if
individual commits an offense before his official discharge, and the
initiates action with a view to trial, the individual may be retained
service for trial; if jurisdiction has attached by the commencement of
before the effective terminal date of self-executing orders, the person
held for trial by court-martial beyond the effective terminal date;
actions by which
court-martial jurisdiction attaches include: apprehension;
restraint, such as restriction, arrest, or confinement; and preferral
charges). (delivery
valid discharge can operate as a termination of court-martial in
personam jurisdiction;
however, the discharge authority must have intended the discharge to
effect). (although
physical delivery of a discharge certificate is generally considered
that terminates a servicemember’s active duty status, it is crucial to
the intent of the command to determine the actual effective time and
the Court holds that the accused’s status as an active duty service
not terminate until 2359 on 17 May 2001; the discharge documents (the
214 in conjunction with the NAVMC 11060 Form) indicated the command’s
discharge the accused at 2359 hours on May 17, 2001; it was not the
intent that the accused’s discharge would be effective at some
in time when a personnel clerk decided to deliver the copies of the DD
to the accused; thus, the accused’s status as a military member
2359 hours on May 17, 2001; until that time, the accused was merely a
possession of an order not yet operative; because prior to 2359 hours
17, 2001, the command placed a valid legal hold on the accused and
revoke the discharge, the accused’s military status was not terminated
17, 2001, the court-martial had personal jurisdiction over him, and in
jurisdiction over the accused was never lost).
States v. Alexander,
61 MJ 266 (questions of jurisdiction are not subject to waiver;
over the person, as well as jurisdiction over the subject matter, may
the subject of waiver; a jurisdictional defect goes to the underlying
of a court to hear a case; thus, a jurisdictional error impacts the
the entire trial and mandates reversal). 2003
States v. Phillips, 58 MJ 217 (court-martial
exists to try a person as long as that person occupies a status as a
subject to the UCMJ; status in the armed forces for purposes of
jurisdiction is generally governed by Article 2, UCMJ; Article 2(c)
notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an
force who--(1) submitted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the
and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of title 10 at
of voluntary submission to the military authority; (3) received
military pay or
allowances; and (4) performed military duties, is subject to the UCMJ
such person’s active service has been terminated in accordance with law
regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned). (Article 2(c) was amended in 1979, and its legislative history
that the amendment was primarily enacted to ensure that court-martial
jurisdiction would not be defeated by assertions that military status
tainted by recruiter misconduct; the legislative history also makes it
that the four-part test for active service applies to circumstances not
involving defective enlistments; an individual comes within the new
(c) whenever he meets the requisite four-part test regardless of other
regulatory or statutory disqualification). (Article 2(c), by its express terms, establishes a specific
framework; first, the person must be "serving with an armed force" at
the pertinent point in time; the phrase "serving with" an armed force
has been used to describe persons who have a close relationship to the
forces without the formalities of a military enlistment or commission;
question of whether a person is "serving with" the armed forces is
dependent upon a case-specific analysis of the facts and circumstances
individual’s particular relationship with the military, and means a
relationship that is more direct than simply accompanying the armed
the field; second, the statute provides that a person serving with the
forces also must meet the four-part test; merely serving with the armed
as a reservist or a civilian is not sufficient to establish
Article 2(c); finally, the statute provides that once a person meets
four-part test, the individual retains status as a person in "active
service," until released under applicable laws and regulations. (applying the first step of the of the four-part analysis to the
case, Appellant’s status as a person "serving with" the armed forces
on July 11, 1999, is established by the following uncontested facts:
that day, she was a member of a reserve component of the armed forces;
traveled to a military base on that day pursuant to military orders,
was reimbursed for her travel expenses by the armed forces; (3) the
issued for the purpose of performing active duty; (4) she was assigned
military officers’ quarters, she occupied those quarters, and she
pertinent offense in those quarters; (5) she received military service
in the form of a retirement point for her service on that date; and (6)
received military base pay and allowances for that date; in terms of
step of the analysis, Appellant’s status on July 11 as a person in
service under the four-part test in Article 2(c) is established by the
following uncontested facts: (1) Appellant submitted voluntarily to
authority; (2) Appellant’s date of birth and record of service
there was no issue as to whether she met the mental and minimum age
qualifications under 10 U.S.C. §§ 503 and 504; (3) as noted in
the first step, she received military pay and allowances for her
that date; and (4) her military duty on that day, which she voluntarily
to perform, was to travel to the base preparatory to report to a
organization on July 12; she performed that duty; the fact that her
orders did
not require her to report to a specific organization until July 12 did
detract from her voluntary performance of the duty, pursuant to orders,
travel on July 11; finally, it is uncontested that during the period in
question, she was not released pursuant to law or regulation; under
circumstances, Appellant was subject to military jurisdiction on the
travel to her active-duty site at the time of her offense). 2002
States v. Oliver, 57 MJ 170 (Article 2(a)(1) indicates that
servicemembers, including reservists, who are "lawfully called or
into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces," are subject
jurisdiction). (a "reserve component" servicemember who is on active duty prior
to arraignment is subject to court-martial jurisdiction). (the beginning language of Article 132 -- "`[a]ny person subject to
this chapter' -- does not establish an element of the offense but,
rather, sets
forth the baseline for jurisdiction under the UCMJ common to all
- Congress set forth the "any person" language as a basic
jurisdictional prerequisite, not as an element of a particular offense
offenses that are not peculiarly military). (medical hold is a valid reason for extending the active duty of a
reservist, or any servicemember, and entitles him or her to the full
benefits of being on active duty; where the medical records submitted
indicate that appellant was retained on active duty beyond the
his orders, the court-martial possessed subject matter jurisdiction
offense committed during that period of extension for medical hold). 2000
Melanson, 53 MJ 1 (court-martial does not have
jurisdiction over persons lawfully discharged from the armed forces,
cases involving offenses allegedly committed prior to discharge). (a servicemember is lawfully discharged when: (1) the member
a valid discharge certificate of release from active duty, such as a
of Defense Form 214; (2) the member’s final pay or a substantial part
pay is ready for delivery to the member; and (3) the member has
administrative clearance process required by the Secretary of the
which he or she is a member). (where pertinent Army Regulation
provided that an administrative discharge was “effective at 2400
[hours] on the
date of notice of discharge to the soldier”, the discharge is not
where a copy was provided to the member earlier in the day as a matter
administrative convenience unless it is clear that the discharge was
to be effective at the earlier time). (where pertinent Army Regulation provided that an administrative
was “effective at 2400 [hours] on the date of notice of discharge to
soldier”, and where the military judge’s findings of fact were not
erroneous on this point, appellant’s administrative discharge was not
until 2400 hours on the date specified on the approved discharge). United
States v. Williams, 53 MJ 316 (other than a few narrow
exceptions, jurisdiction over active duty military personnel continues
the member receives a valid discharge; there is a final accounting of
the member has completed administrative clearance processes required by
her service Secretary). (jurisdiction over appellant did not terminate where a valid legal
initiated before the expiration of the date that constituted the
of the discharge). United
States v. Wilson, 53 MJ 327 (for the purposes of
court-martial jurisdiction, a member of the National Guard must be in
service/status at both the time of the offense and at the time of
trial). (there are four main principles that apply to the question of
federal court-martial jurisdiction over a member of the Guard has been
terminated: (1) if a member has completed a required period of
service and been returned to a state status, a court-martial will have
jurisdiction only if the member has been ordered to active duty for
court-martial proceedings under Article 2(d), UCMJ; (2) a discharge
terminates a person’s military status as a member of a federal military
component normally precludes the exercise of federal court-martial
jurisdiction; (3) if jurisdiction attaches before the effective
of self-executing orders, the person may be held for trial by
beyond the effective terminal date by action with a view toward trial
person is still subject to the UCMJ; and (4) when a member of the Guard
been ordered to active federal service with the consent of the state,
period of service subject to court-martial jurisdiction includes any
of such service authorized under the Manual for Courts-Martial or other
applicable rules and regulations, regardless of whether the state
consents to the extension of a particular individual). (amenability to court-martial jurisdiction is not terminated by
unless: (1) the member receives a valid discharge certificate or
certificate of release from active duty; (2) there is a final
accounting of pay
such that the member’s final pay or a substantial part of that pay is
delivery to the member; and (3) the member has completed any final
procedures required by service regulations). (servicemembers may be retained past their scheduled time of
over protest, by action with a view toward trial while that member is
subject to the Code; actions with a view toward trial include
apprehension, imposition of restraint, preferral of charges, and
highly likely to result in criminal charges against the member). (a period of unauthorized absence which commenced while a Guardsman
an active federal status suspended the termination date of his active
orders, and the Guardsman remained on federal active duty during the
his unauthorized absence). (an order to perform federal active duty places a guardsman in
federal status for the entire period of duty reflected in those
orders). (a Guardsman’s period of active federal service was properly
extended by an
order issued while that Guardsman was in federal status and absent
authority; this order accomplished by officials in the State Guard and
order of the Secretary of the Air Force” met the requirements of 10 USC
12301(d) – action by federal officials with the consent of state
officials). (state officials have no unilateral authority to shorten a
Guardsman’s
period of active federal service once that individual has moved from
federal status; upon commencement of a period of active federal service
affiliation is suspended in favor of an entirely federal affiliation
period of active federal service). (absent a delegation of authority from the federal government, a
no unilateral authority to terminate a Guardsman’s period of federal
whether through modification of his federal orders or termination of
status). (discharge documents issued by the state “by order of the Governor”
effect on the authority of the federal government to retain
Guardsman until he was relieved by federal authorities from his federal
status). (even if the state had been delegated authority by the federal
terminate a Guardsman’s federal status, actions taken by the state did
comply with applicable laws and regulations and did not terminate
status by discharge because: (1) those actions were not taken by
competent authority; (2) they were based upon a misinterpretation of
Instructions; (3) they did not comport with applicable regulations; and
they were not accompanied by any of the steps necessary to complete the
discharge process). (actions with a view toward court-martial taken before the
Guardsman’s federal active duty obligation were valid to retain that
on active duty past his expiration of federal active duty date; those
actions included the member’s apprehension, imposition of pretrial
preferral of charges, and investigation under Article 32, UCMJ). 1999
Steele v. Van Riper,
50 MJ 89 (issuance of an administrative discharge after trial
the convening authority’s responsibility or power to act on findings or
sentence). United
nations and not a right of the suspect or accused). (even
if US military
misled German authorities with respect to jurisdictional process under
SOFA, court-martial was not without jurisdiction over appellant who was
times a soldier in the US Army and thus had required military status to
jurisdiction in the court-martial).