Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-titlbach-2
Timestamp: 2018-11-17 23:52:02
Document Index: 323313592

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 841', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 3']

U.S. v. Titlbach, 300 F.3d 919 | Casetext
U.S. v. Titlbach
300 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002)
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth CircuitAug 22, 2002
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affirming imposition of § 3C1.1 enhancement where defendant&apos;s testimony that he had not participated in methamphetamine manufacturing conflicted with other witnesses&apos; testimony
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Flieger
affirming imposition of a § 3C1.1 enhancement when the defendant&apos;s testimony that he had not participated in methamphetamine manufacturing conflicted with other witnesses&apos; testimony
affirming the district court&apos;s drug quantity determination of 172.03 grams of methamphetamine, even though the jury found the defendant guilty of a conspiracy involving fifty grams or less
No. 01-2761.
Wallace L. Taylor, argued, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellant.
BEFORE: LOKEN and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, Judge.
Susan Titlbach appeals from the sentence imposed on her following her conviction for conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 (2000). Titlbach was sentenced to serve 88 months in prison, based in part on the district court's findings that Titlbach was involved in the manufacture or distribution of 172.03 grams of methamphetamine mixture and that she perjured herself at trial. On appeal, Titlbach contends that her sentence cannot be based on a greater quantity of drugs than that found by the jury; that the district court's finding as to drug quantity was clearly erroneous; and that the district court erred in enhancing her sentence for obstruction of justice. We affirm the sentence.
The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, who at the time of trial and sentencing was United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa. Judge Melloy has since become a Circuit Judge of this Court.
The district court sentenced Susan Titlbach in accord with the Sentencing Guidelines' procedure, which required the court to determine what amount of drugs were involved as relevant conduct during the course of the conspiracy. See USSG § 1B1.3(a) (Nov. 2001). The court sifted through the pre-sentence investigation report and the testimony at trial, rejecting some incidents as not relevant to Susan's offense, and determining that some other incidents were attributable to her, though she argued to the contrary. The court arrived at a total of 172.03 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, which equates to offense level 26 under the guidelines' table. See USSG § 2D1.1(7) (Nov. 2001). The court also assessed a two-level increase in offense level for obstruction of justice, because the court found that Susan Titlbach had committed perjury at trial by categorically denying any involvement in the methamphetamine business, to the point of denying that she had ever shared methamphetamine with anyone. The result of the district court's guidelines calculation was a range of 87 to 108 months. The court sentenced her to 88 months' imprisonment, four years' supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. The statutory maximum for distribution of an unspecified amount of methamphetamine is twenty years' imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
Susan Titlbach's first argument on appeal is that it violated the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), for the district court to base its sentencing calculation on a greater quantity of drugs than the jury specified in the special verdict form. This argument has no viability after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Harris v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002). There, the Court upheld a sentence based, in part, on the district court's finding at sentencing that the defendant brandished a gun while committing the offense. The government had proceeded on the theory that brandishing was not an element of the crime and so did not include it in Harris's indictment or prove it at trial. The district judge's finding of brandishing rendered the defendant subject to a mandatory minimum sentence that would not have otherwise been applicable. The Supreme Court held that this sentencing procedure did not violate the defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights because the sentence imposed fell within the maximum prescribed for the crime of which the defendant had been properly convicted:
122 S.Ct. at 2419 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). Our Circuit precedent correctly anticipated this holding. See, e.g., United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026, 121 S.Ct. 600, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 411, 151 L.Ed.2d 312 (2001).
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment in Harris, even though he believes judges ought to be able to apply sentencing factors even to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. 122 S.Ct. at 2420-21.
Titlbach was indicted for conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, but was found guilty by the jury of conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine mixture. The statutory maximum punishment for distribution of less than 50 grams is twenty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Titlbach received a sentence of only 88 months, which is less than the statutory maximum for her crime. This does not violate her constitutional rights.
Titlbach's last argument is that the district court erred in adding two points for obstruction of justice because the court found that Titlbach willfully lied when she testified that she had nothing to do with Ron's methamphetamines business and had never even shared methamphetamine with anyone else. A defendant who commits perjury is subject to an obstruction enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-93, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). A defendant commits perjury if he testifies falsely under oath in regard to a material matter and does so willfully, rather than out of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. Id. at 94, 113 S.Ct. 1111; United States v. Chadwick, 44 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). We review the district court's finding of obstruction for clear error. United States v. Hollingsworth, 257 F.3d 871, 879 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 856, 151 L.Ed.2d 732 (2002), overruled on other ground, United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). At trial, Titlbach denied involvement in the methamphetamine manufacturing activities that other witnesses said she participated in, such as cleaning glassware used for manufacturing, taking out the garbage from the manufacturing process, collecting money, and driving Ron to collect ingredients. At one point, she denied sharing any methamphetamine with anyone. Titlbach's testimony conflicts with that of many other witnesses who testified that she was actively involved in the manufacture and distribution of the drugs. The district court specifically found that Titlbach committed perjury, that her denial of involvement with methamphetamine was willful, and that it was material. The district court's finding that Titlbach committed perjury was not clearly erroneous, and it was sufficient to support the two-point enhancement.