Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/279/63/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-10-27 14:55:17
Document Index: 661122148

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 101', '§ 5', '§ 101', '§ 5', '§ 59', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 5', '§ 59', '§ 101']

Lewis v. United States (full text) :: 279 U.S. 63 (1929) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
U.S. Supreme CourtLewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63 (1929)Lewis v. United StatesNo. 182Argued December 3, 4, 1928Decided March 5, 1929279 U.S. 63CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
In 1925, the petitioners were indicted in the District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for violations of the National Banking Laws alleged to have been committed in 1923 at Tulsa, in Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Motions to quash and dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction of the prosecution and that the grand jury had not been legally constituted, and to quash the petit jury panel, were overruled. The petitioners were tried, convicted, and sentenced. The judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 22 F.2d 760, 26 F.2d 465. And the cause is here for limited review. 278 U.S. 587. Page 279 U. S. 67
By an Act of February 16, 1925, [Footnote 2] § 101 of the Judicial Code was amended so as to divide Oklahoma into three judicial districts: the Northern, Eastern, and Western. The Northern District embraced ten counties, including Tulsa County, which previously had been in the Eastern Page 279 U. S. 68 District, and two counties formerly in the Western District. The Eastern District embraced the remaining thirty counties which previously had been in that district. The senior judge of the Eastern District was assigned to that District, and the junior judge, to the Northern District. Terms of court for the Eastern District, were to be held at Muskogee, Ardmore, and three other court towns, as before, and at two other places instead of Tulsa and another court town which were placed in the Northern District. And the clerk, in addition to keeping his office at Muskogee, as before, was also required to maintain an office in charge of a deputy at Ardmore. No other change was made in the court for the Eastern District. By § 5 of the Act, it was further provided that:
"Whenever any new district . . . has been or shall be established, or any county or territory has been or shall be transferred from one district . . . to another district . . . , prosecutions for crimes and offenses committed within such district, . . . Page 279 U. S. 69 county, or territory prior to such transfer shall be commenced and proceeded with the same as if such new district . . . had not been created, or such county or territory had not been transferred, unless the court, upon the application of the defendant, shall order the cause to be removed to the new district . . . for trial. [Footnote 3]"
After the return of the indictment, the fact that the names of all persons from the ten transferred counties Page 279 U. S. 70 had been removed from the jury box was called to the attention of the judge by the motion to quash and dismiss the indictment and the evidence offered in support thereof, on which he ruled in July. Thereafter, in December, 1925, nearly eight months after these names had been removed, he made an order directing that petit jurors be drawn from the jury box for a term of court to be held at Ardmore -- another one of the court towns in the Eastern District under both § 101 of the Judicial Code and the amendment of 1925. The petit jury drawn in obedience to this order likewise contained no persons from any of the transferred counties. The trial was had at Ardmore in January, 1926, before a district judge of Kansas, sitting by assignment, and the petit jury.
This, we think, is untenable. Rightly construed, the Act of 1925 -- as shown especially by the specific provisions of § 5, including the reference to § 59 of the Judicial Code -- did not create a new court for a new district, but merely amended § 101 of the Judicial Code by limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the court for the Eastern District, for most purposes, to certain counties, while continuing its original territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of commencing and continuing prosecutions for crimes and offenses previously committed therein. In short, the identity of the court was not changed, and it continued to be, as it had been before, the court of the Eastern District. Aside from the transfer of one of the judges, its officers continued as before, retained the custody of its records, Page 279 U. S. 71 and were charged with the same duties. And, while its territorial jurisdiction was reduced for most purposes, this was not changed for the prosecution of past offenses, but for that purpose remained as before -- that is, as defined and ascertained by § 101 of the Judicial Code. Compare United States v. Hackett, 29 F. 848, 849; United States v. Benson, 31 F. 896, 898, in which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Field as circuit justice; In re Benson, 58 F. 962, 963; In re Mason, 85 F. 145, 148; Mizell v. Beard, 25 F.2d 324, 325.
We therefore conclude that the petitioners were both indicted and tried in the court for the Eastern District, sitting as the court for the entire original district, including the counties that had been transferred to the Northern District after the offenses were committed. This was in accord with § 5 of the Act of 1925 and § 59 of the Judicial Code. And, as this district had been ascertained by § 101 Page 279 U. S. 72 of the Judicial Code before the offenses had been committed, there was no violation of the provision of the Sixth Amendment granting an accused person the right to a trial by a "jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."
In the situation in which the court would deal occasionally with past offenses in which jurors from the ten transferred counties would be eligible, but ordinarily with cases in which jurors from such counties would not be eligible, the judge might well have thought that it would be most favorable to impartial trials and avoid unnecessary expense or undue burden to the citizens of these ten counties to return only jurors from the thirty other counties -- who would be eligible to service in all cases. The evidence, it is true, does not affirmatively disclose that he gave any such direction or required the names of the persons from the ten counties to be removed from the box; nor does it affirmatively show the contrary. But, since the names of these persons had been removed Page 279 U. S. 73 almost two months before he made the order to draw the grand jurors -- he did not direct those names to be restored to the box, and his attention had been called to the removal of these names before making the order to draw the petit jurors from the box -- it fairly may be inferred that he had either directed that the names be removed or approved the removal before making the orders for drawing the jurors.