Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/471/524/259510/
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 14:39:51
Document Index: 101273878

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2825', '§ 2826', '§ 2834', '§ 2834', '§ 2825', '§ 701', '§ 701', '§ 2726', '§ 2834', '§ 261', '§ 262', '§ 4321', '§ 1132', '§ 261']

East Oakland-fruitvale Planning Council, a Nonprofitcalifornia Corporation, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Donald Rumsfeld, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity,defendant-appellee, 471 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
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East Oakland-fruitvale Planning Council, a Nonprofitcalifornia Corporation, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Donald Rumsfeld, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity,defendant-appellee, 471 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1972)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 471 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1972) Dec. 8, 1972
East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council sued the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council v. Rumsfeld, 310 F. Supp. 546 (N.D.Calif.1970).1 We vacate the judgment and remand.
The Council is a nonprofit corporation. It received a grant from OEO under section 232 of the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2825, to conduct a research and pilot program in "advocacy planning." The goal of the program was to organize community groups in the East Oakland and Fruitvale areas of the City of Oakland, California, into a "single policy-making and priority setting body which directs its attention to the multiplicity of problems and concerns of that community."
The Council operated successfully during its first year. Evaluations of its program by independent evaluators pursuant to section 233 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2826, were favorable, and established that the program "was fully consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes" of the Act.
The Council applied to OEO for a grant of funds for a second year. The application was approved by the Director of OEO. It was then submitted to the Governor of the State of California pursuant to section 242 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2834.2 The Governor disapproved the grant. The Council entered into negotiations with representatives of the Governor's office to determine whether the Governor's objections could be satisfied. The Council "learned that the Governor's basis of disapproval was 'philosophical objections' to the very nature of [the Council's] program, i. e., advocacy planning for dealing with problems and concerns of the East Oakland-Fruitvale community." Ultimately negotiations were terminated by the Governor's representatives; the Governor's disapproval was not withdrawn.
As the legal basis of its claim, the Council alleges that section 242 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2834, requires the Director to reconsider a vetoed grant and either make a finding that it is not "fully consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes" of the Act, or override the Governor's disapproval. The Council contends that its program is "fully consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes" of the Act, and that it has been informed by the Director that its program conforms in all respects to the Director's overall plan established pursuant to section 232(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2825(b). The Council concludes that the Director's failure to make a favorable finding and override the Governor's disapproval is arbitrary and unlawful. It also concludes that the Director's denial of a hearing, specification of issues, and opportunity to participate is arbitrary and unlawful.
The district court assumed that the Director had failed to take any action at all following the Governor's disapproval, and that the complaint therefore presented the first and most extreme issue. 310 F. Supp. at 547.3 Agreeing with the Director, the district court held that he need do nothing at all once the Governor exercised his veto-that he had unreviewable discretion to decide whether he would or would not consider overriding the Governor's disapproval. 310 F. Supp. at 549.
Whether the Director has such discretion is a question for the courts to decide. The statute does not bar judicial review, and there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended resolution of this threshold question of statutory construction to be "committed to agency discretion." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971). Courts are as expert as administrators in matters of statutory construction. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166, 90 S. Ct. 832, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1970). We see no reason to decline to decide whether this statute imposes a duty upon the Director to re-examine any program vetoed by a governor, even if it would not be proper for a court to review a decision made by the Director in the discharge of such a duty. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268, 74 S. Ct. 499, 98 L. Ed. 681 (1954); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1971). The question is one of law-the daily grist of the judicial mill. We turn to the merits.
It is true that the next sentence of the report uses permissive language: "Where, however, after review of the facts the Director of the OEO makes the determination that the application is in fact fully consistent with the law, and with the purposes and policies of the act, these projects and programs may be permitted to go forward in spite of the Governor's disapproval" (emphasis added). A Conference Committee report contains similar language, stating that when a program is disapproved by a governor, "the Director could reconsider it, and if he found it fully consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes of this act, could override the Governor's disapproval." H.R. Rep.No. 1061, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) (emphasis added). The latter language led the district court to conclude that the Director is free to accept a governor's veto without further consideration. 310 F. Supp. at 549.
This ground of the Director's motion invokes the provision of the Administrative Procedures Act excluding agency action from judicial review "to the extent that" the agency action is "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2). This "very narrow" exception to the general rule of reviewability is "applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 410, 91 S. Ct. at 821.7
It does not follow, however, that no aspect of the Director's action can be reviewed. Agency action is made unreviewable by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2) only "to the extent" that it is committed to agency discretion. "Even under the committed-to-agency-discretion doctrine, partial review may be available for separable issues, as to which discretion or expertise is insignificant." Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367, 372 (1968). "When, after considering the relevant factors and balancing the institutional and individual interests, a court initially decides that an agency action is not reviewable in toto, it should next inquire whether partial review is possible if limited to separable issues so structured that the balance between institutional and individual interests is more favorable to review. A factor which prevents overall review may not bar review of particular issues." Id. at 395. See also Davis, Administrative Law (1970 Supp.) Sec. 28.16 pp. 977-78.
Congress provided the override power in part "to prevent Governors from using their veto power over antipoverty projects in such a way as to defeat the policy and purpose of the act." H.R. Rep.No. 428, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1965). The Director may sustain a governor's veto " [w]here the Director finds reason, upon sound program grounds, for supporting a Governor's disapproval." Id. (emphasis added). Proponents in both Houses expressed the view that the override provision guaranteed that a project would be disapproved only on the basis of considerations relating to the wisdom and efficacy of the project in light of the purposes of the Act.12
In view of this legislative history, the Director could not, as he suggests, sustain a governor's veto on a ground wholly unrelated to the merits of the vetoed project-for example, in exchange for the governor's agreement to refrain from exercising his absolute veto over the establishment of Job Corps centers or the assignment of VISTA volunteers within the state concerned. See sections 115(c) and 810(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2726(c) and 2992(b).
The Council's general allegation that the Director acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law adds nothing to the complaint. Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 676, 80 S. Ct. 1288, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1478 (1960).
Of course, formal findings by the Director reflecting his reasons for overriding or sustaining a veto would be helpful, but the statute itself imposes no obligation upon the Director to make such findings; and if a court is to require findings, or a less formal explanation of the basis for the Director's decision, as an aid to review (see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 420-421, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136), it must be in a case in which a reviewable issue is presented.
42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970 ed.) provides:
Two statutes were invoked. One provides that the Commissioner "shall have the sole power and authority" to appoint Indian traders and "to make such rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper" regarding the kind, quantity, and price of goods to be sold. 25 U.S.C. § 261. The second states that persons trading with the Indians on any reservation should do so "under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may prescribe for the protection of said Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 262.
Examining the legislative history, the court noted that much of the congressional debate related to abuses and injustices that had occurred because of unregulated monopolies in the Indian trading post system. The court concluded that Congress had authorized the Commissioner to issue regulations in order to end these abuses, and therefore intended that the Commissioner should exercise the authority given to him. Although the task of determining the specific content of the regulations was delegated to the Commissioner, the court held, " [t]his does not mean that the Commissioner has unbridled discretion to refuse to regulate, but rather that he shall exercise discretion in deciding what regulations to promulgate . . . ." 449 F.2d at 571.
The Director's contention that, under Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), review is barred whenever a statutory authorization is "permissive" rather than "mandatory" misstates the law. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-166, 90 S. Ct. 832, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1970); Rockbridge v. Lincoln; 449 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 391, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (1970); Wong Wing Hang v. I. & N. S., 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415, 90 S. Ct. 1766, 26 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1970). The "permissive" character of the statutory authorization is one factor to be considered in determining whether Congress intended to preclude judicial review, but " [t]he question is whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred from the over-all statutory scheme." Rockbridge v. Lincoln, supra, 449 F.2d at 570
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859, 874-875 (1970) (whether the Federal Aviation Administration violated its own regulations in awarding a government contract for instrument landing systems); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971) (whether the Secretary of Interior complied with the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., in terminating a government contract for the purchase of helium); Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793, 796-797 (10th Cir. 1971) (whether the Secretary of Agriculture violated Sec. 3(b) of the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b), before contracting for the sale and harvesting of certain timber from public lands, by failing to include these lands in studies and reports relating to recommendations to be made by the Secretary to the President)
Although the court recognized that the pertinent statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 261 and 262, invested the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with discretion to determine the specific content of regulations governing trading on Indian reservations, the court nonetheless held that the court could review the separable questions (1) whether the Commissioner had discretion to refuse to issue any regulations at all, and (2) whether the regulations issued satisfied the statutory requirement that they be "for the protection of said Indians." The court said:
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568, 581, 188 Ct. Cl. 644 (1969), and authorities cited; National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 654 (10th Cir. 1971); see Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367, 372 (1968)
Congressman Roosevelt stated that the language of the override provision made sure "that the veto must be within the concept of the bill and the rightness of the project." 111 Cong.Rec. 17923 (1965). Senator Javits emphasized that the Director would be expected to override or not depending upon his convictions "about the program." 111 Cong.Rec. 20655 (1965). Senator Yarborough, a member of the Conference Committee, said, " [T]he bill as finally agreed upon effectively curtails the power of Governors to frustrate the purposes of the war on poverty. . . . If [a Governor] vetoes a project, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity will reconsider the application, and if he finds it to be consistent with the provisions and in furtherance of the purposes of the war on property, he shall override the Governor's veto and the project will go forward." 111 Cong.Rev. 25127 (1965)
Policy reasons for not reviewing the merits of an agency's discretionary decision (see Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452, 454-455 (9th Cir. 1971), Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 367 (1968)) do not apply to review of such a specific limitation upon agency discretion