Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/699/1367/231769/
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 18:17:47
Document Index: 613898076

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2412']

August Gava, Jr., Appellee, v. the United States, Appellant, 699 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Federal Circuit › 1983 › August Gava, Jr., Appellee, v. the United States, Appellant
August Gava, Jr., Appellee, v. the United States, Appellant, 699 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 699 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Feb. 18, 1983
This is an appeal by the United States from a judgment of the United States Claims Court* that, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1981) (the Act), the appellee is entitled to attorney's fees for his successful challenge in the Court of Claims of his dismissal from civilian employment by the United States Army. Insofar as here pertinent, the Act entitles a litigant who prevails in a civil action against the United States to attorney's fees unless the court finds that "the position of the United States was substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1981). The Claims Court ruled that the position of the United States here was not substantially justified. We reverse that determination, and therefore hold that the appellee is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Approximately a week later, Gava received an offer of another assignment in the United States (in Michigan) to do the same work and at the same grade as in Korea. The offer stated that if he declined it, he was "subject to separation from Federal Service." Gava declined the offer " [f]or the following reason: Due to the adverse action and defamation of character previously filed against the undersigned ... I will not accept employment outside of Korea until this matter is resolved to my satisfaction."
In its decision on the merits in this case, the Court of Claims determined that " [u]nbeknownst to plaintiff until nearly three months later, the May 24th request for disciplinary action had been terminated and withdrawn contemporaneously with the issuance of the notice of proposed separation." August Gava, Jr. v. United States, No. 317-78 (Ct. Cl. Oct. 24, 1980) (order granting summary judgment).
With respect to the issue we deem determinative--whether the position of the United States was substantially justified--the trial judge stated that " [t]he facts of this case, as set out in the court's order granting summary judgment in plaintiff's favor, provide ample evidence that the government's action was not substantially justified." The judge quoted with approval the statement in Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C. 1982), that "the Court must scrutinize not only the government's theory in defending the legal issues raised but also the occurrences that impelled plaintiff to bring this action." The judge discussed the facts leading to Gava's dismissal, quoted extensively from the prior decision in this case, and concluded:
A. As noted, a successful litigant against the United States may not recover attorney's fees under the Act if "the position of the United States was substantially justified." In Broad Avenue Laundry and Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1982), we recently examined the standards for determining that issue. We held that the "position of the United States" to be evaluated is the position taken "in the 'civil action' in which the attorney's fees were 'incurred.' " Broad Avenue, supra, at 1390.
We further held that the test for determining whether the position of the United States was "substantially justified" was one of reasonableness, and that reasonableness "depends upon all of the pertinent facts of the case." Id. at 1391. We pointed out that although " [f]ixed rules cannot be established for determining the issue," two guidelines could be stated: (1) " [T]he mere fact that the United States lost the case does not show that its position in defending the case was not substantially justified;" and (2) "the position of the United States is not shown to have been substantially justified merely because the government prevailed before the tribunal below and endeavored to uphold the decision in its favor." Id. at 1392.
The government apparently contends that the correct standard for determining substantial justification is not reasonableness, but whether its conduct was "reprehensible." It refers to two decisions of the Court of Claims which indicated that attorney's fees could be awarded if the government's conduct in litigating the case was so characterized. Estate of Berg, 687 F.2d 377 (Ct. Cl. 1982); In re Papson, No. 602-80T (Ct. Cl. order, June 18, 1982). Those statements may relate to another provision of the Act (28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. V 1981), making the United States liable for attorney's fees when a private party would be liable "under the common law," i.e., when it acted in bad faith. See H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, and H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4986-87, 5014. In any event, Broad Avenue announced the rule that the standard of substantial justification is reasonableness, and that is the standard we apply.
As the Court of Claims recognized in its prior decision, the government has broad discretion to reassign its employees to different locations, and to discharge them for refusal to accept a new assignment. See, e.g., Leefer v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1061 (1978). The government's arguments supporting the applicability of this principle to Gava's case, were cogent. The government pointed out that no disciplinary proceeding actually had been instituted against Gava (it only had been recommended), that Gava asserted other reasons besides the pending possible removal proceedings as justification for his refusal to accept the reassignment, and that there was no need to counsel Gava about the alternatives to refusing the reassignment because "the record demonstrates that the plaintiff was well aware of his alternatives as a result of and as shown by events surrounding a previous avoidance of an offer to rotate."Although the Court of Claims rejected the government's position on this issue and characterized the Army's discharge of Gava for refusing to accept the reassignment as arbitrary and capricious, the government had a reasonable basis for litigating the issue before the Court of Claims. Here, as in Broad Avenue, "it was far from clear that the [Army's] decision was erroneous or that the Court of Claims would reverse it." At 1392. Indeed, on the first page of his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment, Gava twice described the question whether the government could reassign him in these circumstances as "one of first impression."
Our subsequent decision in Broad Avenue, however, pointed out that although " [t]he justification for the government's litigating position necessarily implicates the decision of the tribunal being reviewed ... the court is not to re-examine the administrative proceedings in an attempt to determine whether the party seeking the attorney's fees should have prevailed before that tribunal." In determining an application for attorney's fees under the Act, the inquiry is directed to the justification for the government's litigating position before the court, not the justification for the government's administrative action that prompted the suit.
I fear I may have authored the use of the word "reprehensible" as descriptive of the attorney conduct which might justify an award of counsel fees to a party litigating against the government under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. It seems to cause the present panel some embarrassment. I do not think the panels in Papson v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 602-80T (order entered June 18, 1982, to be published, 231 Ct. Cl. ---), or in Estate of Lillian G. Berg v. United States, 687 F.2d 377 (Ct. Cl. 1982), intended to construe the statute as defendant now says that court did construe it, as limited to instances of censurable, or culpable behavior, or measures taken in bad faith. Such a construction would have gone far to nullify the statute and would have been dictum in the cases before the court, when the actions of government counsel had been perfectly reasonable, things such as we ourselves would have done if in their place, probably, though they did not prevail and we would not have either. In Webster's Unabridged, the preferred meaning of "reprehend" is "voice disapproval of, especially after judgment" and the preferred meaning of "reprehensible" is "worthy of being reprehended." I continue to believe a court should not award counsel fees unless its attitude towards the conduct of government counsel includes some degree of disapproval, but I presume Judge Friedman would disapprove of conduct he held unreasonable, so there is no disagreement between us in this case.
The court so far has attempted to apply its reasonableness test under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 chiefly or wholly by assessing the government attorney's reasonableness in expecting that his contentions of fact and law would prevail. This, of course, is a factor not to be overlooked, but it is not all. On the one hand, duty might require a government counsel to take a stand which, though not frivolous, stood as he knew but a slim chance of prevailing. On the other hand, there are in my view other cases where government conduct, though subjectively in good faith, is in fact oppressive. It is quite clear to me, both from the text of the statute itself, with its limits on the size or wealth of the claimant who may receive an award of fees, and from the legislative history, that Congress perceived the existence of litigants not having the resources of the United States, and that this inequality, coupled with oppressive exploitation of it, might at times effectively deny justice even though not so intended.
Broad Avenue Laundry and Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (Broad Avenue II), is an example of the first category. An agency such as the Department of Defense, which goes to the trouble of creating an independent, impartial, and well-qualified board, to hear disputes under its procurement contracts according to the principles of due process, is certainly entitled to expect that the resulting board decisions will be supported and defended in the Article III courts by the only counsel the agency is permitted to employ there. Possibly instances may occur when this is not so, but frankly, I have never seen one in the 18 years I have been engaged in adjudicating such cases, and I believe they must be rare. Broad Avenue I was not such a case. There was oppressive behavior towards Broad Avenue, an innocent and confiding small business that was shamefully treated, but this was not by Department of Justice attorneys and not in the Court of Claims. The case came to that court fit for adjudication by appellate review, and it was thus adjudicated, a procedure easy on the resources of small litigants. The government position was highly obnoxious in that it exploited what it said was the absence of authority and ignorance of relevant law on the part of its duly designated contracting officer. Also, the government position would, had it prevailed, have undermined the foundations of disputes clause procedure by compelling government contractors to challenge contracting officer's orders, and to defy them, instead of obeying them and claiming relief as for a constructive change order. But these were errors of the board, not of government counsel in the Court of Claims, and were res gestae when the case got to that court. They were far short of the extraordinary case that would have justified denying the board decision any defense.
In Kay Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Kay I), I saw and am urging in my dissent in Kay II, that the court see an example of outrageous oppression displayed right in the Court of Claims, which that court could not ignore. The reasons why I think that are fully spelled out in the dissent and need not be repeated here. At the time Kay's petition was filed in the Court of Claims, the government may have had a valid claim for refund of excessive profits and the Renegotiation Board had certainly thought so. But by the peculiar provisions of the Renegotiation Act, the case had to be retried de novo and the board decision enjoyed no presumption of validity. Thus the conditions that in an ASBCA case virtually compel Department of Justice counsel to adopt and defend the board position, did not at all obtain in Kay. Government counsel was entirely free to dump, and in fact did dump, the board decision, and embarked on a line of his own, for which he must take moral responsibility, if it was oppressive. Whatever the situation had been on the original filing date, when the case went to the usual prolonged and costly trial, prospects of government success were gone because counsel pursued a line of his own choice, in which he had no prospect of success.
I suppose I would allow government counsel a broader scope to make assertions of fact or law possibly but not likely to be accepted by the court, if he makes them on appeal or in a summary judgment motion and not in course of bringing about a prolonged and costly trial. The issue of substantial justification is in my view to be balanced and weighed equitably in light of the resources of the adverse party and the type of court proceeding involved. It should not be forgotten, too, that counsel in a court proceeding is an officer of the court. The court has an interest in averting the abuse of its process and the waste of judicial resources. It appears to me that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 is to be regarded as one of the means Congress has put in the hands of the judiciary to use towards these ends, and the law is to be construed with that in mind.