Source: https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2009/06/ip-update-vol-12-no-6-june-2009
Timestamp: 2018-08-21 14:04:46
Document Index: 304989836

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 337', '§ 337', '§ 337', '§ 1337', '§ 1404', '§ 2']

IP Update, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 2009 | Publications | Thought Leadership | McDermott Will and Emery
IP Update, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 2009
Patents / Hatch-Waxman Act - Federal Circuit Clears Path for Generics to Market Drug Prior to Patent Expiration
Licensing / Right to Make - License to “Make” Includes an Inherent Right to “Have Made”
Patents / Damages - No Damages for Pull-Through Products
Patents / Claim Construction - Overcoming Obviousness on Structural Similarity
Patents / Claim Construction - Context-Dependent Claim Construction Creates an Improper Use Limitation
Patents / Claim Construction - Boundaries of Claim Limitation Construed Based on Intrinsic Record
**WEB ONLY** Patents / Claim Construction - The Flange May Be Rectangular—But It Needn’t Have Four Rims
**WEB ONLY** Patents / Claim Construction - Federal Circuit Affirms ITC’s Claim Construction
Patents / Standing - Inventor Lacks Standing to Correct Inventorship After Assigning Rights to Employer
**WEB ONLY** Patents / Litigation - Scope of Patent Invalidity Assertion Agreement Does Not Broaden Upon Merger
Patents / Litigation/ Personal Jurisdiction - Federal Circuit Limits District Court’s Reach Over Foreign Companies
Patents / Double Patenting - Two-Way Test for Obviousness Type Double Patenting Narrowly Applied
Patents / Interference / Written Description - Claim Meaning May Depend on Why You Are Looking
Patents / Venue - Growing Gaps in the ED Texas Venue Net
**WEB ONLY** Design Patents / Infringement / Ordinary Observer Test - Design Patents—The Ordinary Observer Test Point Is the Sole Test of Design Patent Infringement
Trademark / Disparagement of Laches - Laches Bars Claim of Disparagement
**WEB ONLY** Trademark / Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Unfixed Design Not Ripe for DJ
**WEB ONLY** Trademark / Secondary Meaning - Secondary Meaning Not Established by Length of Use Alone
Copyrights / Statute of Limitations - Federal Discovery Rule Governs the Accrual of Copyright Infringement Claims
Copyrights / Litigation - Insufficient Evidence of Similarity Dooms Copyright Claim
**WEB ONLY** China / IP Litigation - Preliminary Injunction Petitioner Has Liability to Compensate Enjoined Party
Licensing / Right to Make
By Astrid R. Spain
By Alexander Ott and Paul Devinsky
The Flange May Be Rectangular—But It Needn’t Have Four Rims
By Matthew Ell and Paul Devinsky
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a determination by the International Trade Commission (ITC), resulting in a judgment of a § 337 violation against the respondent/intervenors, SMC Corporation and SMC of America (collectively SMC). Norgren Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 08-1415 (Fed. Cir., May 26, 2009)(Moore, J.) (nonprecedential).
Norgren filed a complaint with the ITC, alleging various § 337 violations by SMC. Norgren asserted that SMC had imported into the United States structures that connect fluid-conditioning units in a compressed air pipeline in violation of Norgren’s patent rights. The administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an initial determination (ID”, finding that SMC did not infringe the asserted claims, but also finding that the patent was non-obvious.
The claim in issue recites a structure with “a generally rectangular ported flange,” which the ALJ interpreted to require four projecting rims. As the SMC structures only have two projecting rims, the ALJ found that the accused structures did not infringe and thus there was no violation of § 337. The ITC declined to review the ID and terminated the investigation, finding no violation. Norgren appealed.
The issue on appeal focused on claim construction. Norgren argued that the ALJ’s claim construction was “erroneous for requiring that each flange has projecting rims on all four sides.” To resolve the dispute, the Court, reviewing the claim construction de novo, considered the claim preamble language “generally rectangular ported flange” and structural element “clamp adopted … to engage … the pair of ported flanges.” The Court found that nothing in the claims directly requires four projecting rims, noting that the term “rim” does not even appear in the patent. The Court discussed the “generally rectangular ported flange” language to determine if that language indirectly required four projecting rims. Reviewing the figures in the specification, the Court noted that the term “rectangular” was satisfied by the shape of the flange and did not refer to the number of rims required. The term “ported” was found to indicate that the flange have a hole in the middle permitting the passage of fluids. Finally, the Court found that the word “flange” would not be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art to require four rims. Although the figures depicted in the patent show flanges with four rims, the Court citing the prohibition against importing limitations from the specification into the claims, enunciated in Phillips, and concluded that the ALJ, in the ID, had unduly narrowed the claim.
Thus, the Court found that the term a “generally rectangular ported flange” means a generally rectangular projection with a hole for fluid passage and did not require four rims. On that basis, the Court reversed the ITC’s non-infringement determination.
SMC, acting as intervenor in the appeal, argued that the Court could affirm the ITC’s determination by reversing the finding of the ALJ that the patent was non-obvious. The Court, however, declined to address this issue, stating that the ALJ should evaluate obviousness in the first instance using the proper construction of “generally rectangular ported flange.”
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently affirmed a narrow claim construction by the International Trade Commission (ITC) and the resultant finding of non-infringement. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH et al. v. ITC, Case No. 08-1358 (Fed. Cir., May 19, 2009) (Dyk, J.).
Erbe’s patent covers the performance of electrosurgery by argon plasma coagulation (APC), using a probe in combination with an endoscope. Erbe and Canady compete in selling APC probes. Erbe alleged that Canady’s importation and sale of its probes constituted contributory infringement and induced infringement. Erbe asserted that Canady sold its probes to hospitals knowing that these hospitals combined the probes with endoscopes, as well as that the use of the combined probes and endoscopes directly infringed the asserted claims of Erbe’s patent.
All of the claims at issue required that there be a plurality of “working channels,” which the administrative law judge (ALJ) defined as “a channel through which a device that performs work may be inserted.” On appeal, the parties disputed whether or not the definition contained within its scope a channel with fixed optics. If fixed optics could not be a “working channel,” then the combination of Canady’s probes with an endoscope could not infringe, because they would contain only one “working channel.”
The Court, after examining the specification, determined that having fixed optics constitute a “working channel” was inconsistent with several figures in the specification that showed fixed optics but did not label them as “working channels.” This conclusion was also consistent with the written specification, which did not refer to the fixed optics as “working channels.” Finally, the Court examined the dictionary definition of “working” and determined that it suggested that a “working channel” could not be stationary, as were the fixed optics described in the specification. Accordingly, the Court found that the ITC construction was correct and that Erbe’s patent was not infringed.
Practice Note: The Federal Circuit’s standard for review of the International Trade Commission, as an administrative agency, is slightly different from that for reviewing a district court. The Federal Circuit reviews both district court and ITC claim construction de novo, but under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) reviews ITC rulings of law for correctness and findings of fact for substantial evidence.
By Adam D. Brooke and Paul Devinsky
Addressing the impact on an acquiring company of an acquired company’s agreement not to challenge a third party’s patent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed in part an International Trade Commission (ITC) finding that Epistar Corporation (Epistar) infringed Philips Lumileds Lighting Company (Lumileds) patent. In reversing the ITC’s finding of estopple against Epistar from challenging the validity of the patent, the Federal Circuit held that the acquired company’s (UEC’s) prior agreement with Lumileds to not challenge the validity of the patent only had preclusive effect with respect to UEC products inherited by Epistar in the acquisition. Epistar Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 07-1457 (Fed. Cir., May 22, 2009) (Rader, J.).
Prior to their merger, both Epistar and United Epitaxy Company (UEC) had a history of litigation with Lumileds over the subject patent. UEC’s litigation led to a settlement agreement in which Lumileds granted UEC a license to use the subject patent for the manufacture, sale and importation of LEDs with absorbing substrates, and UEC covenanted, on behalf of itself and its successors, not to challenge the validity of the patent. Epistar’s litigation led to a settlement agreement in which Lumileds granted Epistar a license to use the patent in the manufacture of absorbing-substrate LEDs, and Epistar promised not to challenge the validity of the patent—but Epistar’s agreement was silent with respect to non-licensed products, preserving Epistar’s right to contest validity of the patent if asserted against non-licensed products.
Lumileds filed suit under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 in the ITC to prevent the importation into the United States of certain high-brightness LEDs and products, alleging infringement of certain claims of the subject patent. Both UEC and Epistar were named as respondents. Less than two months later, UEC merged into Epistar, and Epistar assumed all of UEC’s contractual and patent-related rights and obligations. Epistar continued to manufacture its products that were manufactured before the merger, as well as newly-developed products.
Lumileds argued (successfully at the ITC) that UEC’s merger with Epistar bound Epistar to UEC’s agreement—on behalf of itself and its successors—not to challenge the validity of the Lumileds patent. However, the Federal Circuit found that the assignment of a contract to an assignee, such as from UEC to Epistar, only changes the obligated party, not the scope of obligation. The Federal Circuit based this holding on the traditional contract law principle that an assignor (e.g., UEC) has no power to change the performance to be rendered by the obligor (e.g., Epistar).
Patents / Litigation/ Personal Jurisdiction
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the two-way test for obviousness-type double patenting is applicable when the claims could have been presented in an earlier application in the family. In re Fallaux, Case No. 08-1545 (Fed. Cir., May 6, 2009) (Moore, J.).
The Fallaux application, which was filed on July 11, 2003, was the fifth filed in a family of applications stemming from a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filing of June 15, 1995. The four intervening applications in the family had all issued as patents. In rejecting the Fallaux application, the examiner applied the one-way test for obviousness-type or non-statutory double patenting. This rejection was based on a patent to Vogel, which shared a single common inventor with the Fallaux application.
Fallaux argued that the two-way test for obviousness-type or non-statutory double patenting should have been applied. Under the two-way test, the examiner would have had to show that Vogel’s claims were also obvious in view of the Fallaux claims, instead of just the Fallaux claims being rendered obvious by the Vogel claims. The examiner agreed that under the two-way test the rejection could not be maintained. However, the examiner maintained the rejection because Fallaux failed “to argue, much less provide evidence that, the issuance of the [Vogel] patents prior to the instant application was due to administrative delay on the part of the PTO.” Instead, the examiner reasoned that claims at issue could have the presented in any one of the earlier-issued patents in the family.
Fallaux appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board). The Board affirmed the examiner. The Board determined that the record indicated that Fallaux was entirely responsible for the delay that caused the Vogel patent to issue prior to the filing of the Fallaux application. Fallaux appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
After reviewing the jurisprudence related to whether the one-way test or two-way test is appropriate, the Court determined that an “applicant is entitled to the narrow exception of the two-way test when the PTO is at fault for the delay that causes the improvement patent to issue prior to the basic patent.” Fallaux argued that because he did not manipulate prosecution for some ill-gotten gain, but rather prosecuted the family of applications in the ordinary course of business, the delay should not be attributed to him. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the rule is not that an applicant is entitled to the two-way test absent proof of nefarious intent to manipulate prosecution. The Court sided with the Board by reasoning that the delay was attributable to Fallaux. Thus, the one-way test for obviousness-type double patenting rejection was appropriate.
On the same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit issued two decisions on petitions for writ arising from motions to transfer venue out of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (ED Texas). In one case, In re Genentech,it granted the petition for writ, ordering the transfer of the case following a line of Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit cases involving petitions on failed transfer motions filed in the ED Texas. See IP Update Vol. 12, No. 3; IP Update Vol. 12, No. 1; IP Update Vol. 11, No. 11.) In re Genentech, Misc. Docket No. 901 (Fed. Cir., May 22, 2009) (precedential order) (Linn, J.). In the other case, In re Volkswagen, it refused to grant the petition for writ. In re Volkswagen, Misc. Docket No. 897 (Fed. Cir., May 22, 2009) (precedential order) (Linn, J.).
In a patent infringement suit brought in the ED Texas by Sanofi against Genentech and Biogen Idec (the petitioners), the Federal Circuit granted a petition for a writ of mandamus by petitioners to transfer venue of the suit out of the ED Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
The Federal Circuit, in assessing the petition for writ, reviewed the district court’s denial of the petitioners’ request to transfer the suit for abuse of discretion, explaining that “use of mandamus to correct a patently erroneous denial of transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) has been approved under the rulings of the Fifth Circuit in appropriate circumstances.” To determine whether the district court’s decision was a patently erroneous denial of transfer, the Federal Circuit reviewed the “private” and “public” factors for determining forum non conveniens. The private interest factors, as explained by the Circuit, include the following: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” The Circuit explained that the public interest factors include the following: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflicts of laws or in the application of foreign law.”
Of note, the Federal Circuit found that “because a substantial number of material witnesses reside within the transferee venue and the state of California, and no witnesses reside within the Eastern District of Texas, the district court clearly erred in not determining this factor to weigh substantially in favor of transfer.” The Federal Circuit also explained that Genentech is headquartered within the Northern District of California, Biogen Idec is headquartered in San Diego and that “Sanofi is a German corporation that will be traveling a great distance no matter which venue the case is tried in and will be only slightly more inconvenienced by the case being tried in California than in Texas.” Given their relative locations, the Federal Circuit noted that “the parties’ convenience factor favored transfer, and not only slightly.” The Federal Circuit explained that the Fifth Circuit’s “100-mile” rule, which factors inconvenience to witnesses directly proportional to the amount needed to travel beyond 100 miles, “should not be rigidly applied such that it creates the result presented here” because the “witnesses from Europe will be required to travel a significant distance no matter where they testify.”
Also weighing in favor of transfer, as explained by the Federal Circuit, were the availability of compulsory process, which wrote that “there is a substantial number of witnesses within the subpoena power of the Northern District of California and no witness who can be compelled to appear in the Eastern District of Texas.” Access to evidence also weighed in its decision, noting, “Keeping this case in the Eastern District of Texas will impose a significant and unnecessary burden on the petitioners to transport documents that would not be incurred if the case were to proceed in the Northern District of California. Furthermore, because the documents housed in Europe and Washington, D.C. will need to be transported in any event, it is only slightly more inconvenient or costly to require the transportation of those materials to California than Texas.”
In granting the writ, the Circuit concluded, “[b]ecause the petitioners have met their burden of establishing that the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying transfer of venue to the Northern District of California and because we determine that mandamus is appropriate in this case, we grant the petition for a writ of mandamus.”
Although named the same as the seminal October 2008 Fifth Circuit case, which transferred venue of a case on a petition for writ (See IP Update, Vol. 11, No 11), the present case arises from a patent infringement dispute in the ED Texas. MHL Tek, LLC (MHL) is a small Texas company operated out of its offices in Rochester Hills, Michigan. MHL filed first and second suits in the ED Texas against a total of 30 foreign and U.S. automobile companies, including Volkswagen. A third suit was filed by Volkswagen, seeking a declaratory judgment, in the Eastern District of Michigan. The third suit was transferred to the ED Texas to avoid wasting judicial resources and the risk of inconsistent rulings on the same patents. Volkswagen moved to transfer venue of the first suit from the ED of Texas to Michigan and, upon denial by the ED of Texas, petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ to transfer venue.
The Court acknowledged that the “public” and “private” factors for determining forum non conveniens when assessing whether the burden of demonstrating the need to transfer was met. In this case, the Court found that “the existence of multiple lawsuits involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice.” In refusing to grant the writ, the Court further explained “[a]lthough these cases may not involve precisely the same issues, there will be significant overlap and a familiarity with the patents could preserve time and resources. Because the district court’s decision is based on the rational argument that judicial economy is served by having the same district court try the cases involving the same patents, mandamus is inappropriate under our precedents.”
Practice Note: Under the framework established by the Fifth Circuit’s Volkswagen case and the Federal Circuit’s TS Tech case (See IP Update, Vol. 12, No. 1), the Genentech case enumerates the forum non conveniens public and private interest factors that are considered when deciding petitions for writ to transfer cases. Plaintiffs filing suit in the ED Texas that involve parties with headquarters located outside, and perhaps far from, the district; no witnesses within the district; and no evidence located within the district may find themselves defending challenges to venue before the Federal Circuit.
The fact that the Federal Circuit stated that it is only slightly more inconvenient to relocate evidence from Washington, D.C. to California than to Texas seems to suggest that the Federal Circuit may be disinclined to give much weight to the accessibility of evidence factor if the evidence is not located in the ED Texas. The same may also be true, in future cases, for witnesses. It seems that the Federal Circuit is taking the position that if a witness has to travel a significant distance in the first place, increasing that distance to travel to another venue will not be a great inconvenience, and consequently, should not carry much weight in the venue transfer determination. Although Genentech is limited to inventors traveling from Europe, the case raises the question whether someone traveling from Washington, D.C. or New York would be only slightly more inconvenienced traveling to California than to Texas.
Transfer motions may still be denied, as in the Volkswagen case, where the district court’s rationale of judicial economy was upheld by the Federal Circuit, where the patent owners has established that the existence of multiple, related lawsuits in the ED Texas is a “paramount consideration when determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice.”
Design Patents—The Ordinary Observer Test Point Is the Sole Test of Design Patent Infringement
In a decision addressing Gorham’s ordinary-observer test, the sole infringement test pursuant to Egyptian Goddess, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a jury verdict of design patent infringement for further proceedings where the jury was instructed to consider the ordinary observer test and point of novelty. Sofpool LLC v. Intex Recreation, Case No. 08-1498 (Fed. Cir., May 11, 2009) (per curiam) (nonprecedential).
Sofpool LLC (Sofpool) filed suit against Intex Recreation Corp. (Intex), alleging infringement of two design patents. The district court submitted the infringement issue to a jury, with instructions that “[t]he comparison of the accused product to the patented design includes two distinct tests, the ordinary observer test and the point of novelty test.” The court further instructed the jury that it could find infringement only if it determined that both the ordinary observer and the point of novelty tests had been satisfied. The jury returned a verdict in Intex’s favor, finding no infringement of either of Sofpool’s patents. Sofpool appealed.
Subsequent to the jury verdict, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa (See IP Update, Vol. 11, No. 9). In that decision, the Federal Circuit concluded “that the point of novelty test, as a second and free-standing requirement for proof of design patent infringement, is inconsistent with the ordinary observer test laid down by the Supreme Court in [Gorham] … and is not needed to protect against unduly broad assertions of design patent rights.” In stating that the Gorham ordinary observer test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent is infringed—the Federal Circuit noted that the “ordinary noted observer” would benefit from a comparison of the claimed design and accused design. Thus the Court reasoned, “[o]ur rejection of the point of novelty test does not mean … that the differences between the claimed design and prior art designs are irrelevant. To the contrary, examining the novel features of the claimed design can be an important component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design and the prior art. But the comparison of the designs … must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test.” The Court emphasized that such comparisons are not a test of validity, but are designed solely for purposes of infringement. According to the Court, the burden of proof of infringement is on the patentee, but the burden of the production of the prior art is on the accused infringer.
Because the Sofpool jury infringement instructions were based upon the point of novelty test eliminated by Egyptian Goddess, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case.
Sofpool also argued that it “is entitled to an instruction on remand that the … patent is infringed, because both Intex’s expert and its attorney conceded that the accused design satisfied the ordinary observer test.” The Court disagreed stating that “[a]lthough Intex acknowledged that its oval pool might infringe the … patent under the ordinary observer test as it existed prior to Egyptian Goddess, Intex has never conceded that its oval pool infringes under this court’s newly articulated ordinary observer standard.”
Practice Note: The Egyptian Goddess ordinary observer test is a newly articulated test that contemplates a comparison between the accused design and the prior art as a factor that may be considered. To that extent, the test is different than the ordinary observer test as it existed prior to Egyptian Goddess.
Trademark / Disparagement of Laches
Laches Bars Claim of Disparagement
By W. Sutton Ansley and Paul Devinsky
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to preclude, under the doctrine of laches, the plaintiffs-appellants from pursuing their claim for cancellation of the mark “Redskins” against Pro-Football, Inc.—the corporate entity of the Washington Redskins professional football team and owner of the trademark. At issue was whether the district court properly found trial and economic prejudice sufficient to support a defense of laches. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, Case No. 03-7162 (D.C. Cir., May 15, 2009) (Tatel, C.J.).
The plaintiffs in this matter, seven Native Americans, filed an action in 1992 seeking cancelation of six Redskins trademarks that allegedly violated Lanham Act § 2(a), which prohibits disparaging trademarks. Although the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sided with the plaintiffs on this issue, the district court reversed, finding that the equitable doctrine of laches prevented the plaintiffs from bringing their claim. (See IP Update, Vol. 6, No. 10) This doctrine applies when an unjustifiable delay in bringing an action demonstrates a “lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted” and “prejudice to the party asserting the defense.” The D.C. Circuit remanded, holding that the relevant delay period did not begin with the mark’s initial registration in 1967, but with the 18th birthday of the youngest plaintiff, i.e., in December 1984. On remand, the district court found that even the seven-year, nine-month period was sufficient to prevent the trademark disparagement claim under the doctrine of laches.
Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s reliance on trial and economic prejudice to affirm application of laches. With regard to trial prejudice, the court concluded that it was within the district court’s discretion to find that the delay period hampered Pro-Football’s ability to obtain favorable evidence concerning the views of Native American leaders at the time of the marks’ registration—noting the reasoning in its prior (2003) decision that whether marks are disparaging depends on the perceptions of the affected group at the time marks the were registered. As for economic prejudice, the court noted that laches—as opposed to estoppel—requires only “general evidence of prejudice, which may arise from mere proof of continued investment in the late-attacked mark alone.” Given that the application of laches requires equitable weighing of both the length of delay and the amount of prejudice, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court was left “with very broad discretion to take account of the particular facts of particular cases.”
In affirming, the D.C. Circuit also upheld the doctrine of laches as applied to a more recently registered trademark pertaining to the team’s cheerleaders, the “Redskinettes.” The court held that the substantial similarity between the “Redskins” and “Redskinettes” names indicates that the disparaging nature of the latter derives from the disparaging nature of the former. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by analyzing the reasonableness of the 29-month delay in light of the seven-year, nine-month delay in bringing the underlying claims against the name of the team itself.
Trademark / Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Turning to a Federal Circuit decision in a patent case, Sierra Applied Sciences, for guidance, the court found, that like the Sierra Applied Sciences, although the declaratory plaintiff had begun development of a potentially infringing device at the time of suit there was no immediate and real controversy “[b]ecause the design was fluid on the date the complaint was filed, it was impossible to determine‑on that date‑whether any eventual design … would infringe [the] patents.”
Trademark / Secondary Meaning
China / IP Litigation
Contact Paul Devinsky or Kevin Qian, a partner at MWE China Law Offices, a separate law firm based in Shanghai, China. McDermott has a strategic alliance with MWE China Law Offices.
Practice Note : Patent right holders should more seriously weigh both the benefits of requesting a PI and legal risks of losing the litigation in Chinese courts. Since the injured party is only entitled to “reasonable losses” incurred as a result of the granted PI if the patent infringement allegations fail to stand, consideration should be given to seeking relief that will minimize potential damage to the enjoined party if the case on the merits fails.