Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/541/02-1667/dissent.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-07 06:30:06
Document Index: 424316668

Matched Legal Cases: ['§12111', '§12131', '§5', '§5', '§1', '§1', '§5']

Justia > US Law > US Case Law > US Supreme Court > Volume 541 > Tennessee v. Lane - 02-1667 > Dissent (Justice Chief Justice Rehnquist)	NEW - Receive Justia's FREE Daily Newsletters of Opinion Summaries for the US Supreme Court, all US Federal Appellate Courts & the 50 US State Supreme Courts and Weekly Practice Area Opinion Summaries Newsletters. Subscribe Now
(Justice Ginsburg,)	Dissent	(Chief Justice Rehnquist)	Dissent
(Justice Thomas)	REHNQUIST, C. J., DISSENTING
In Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 (2001), we held that Congress did not validly abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. §§12111–12117. Today, the Court concludes that Title II of that Act, §§12131–12165, does validly abrogate that immunity, at least insofar “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.” Ante, at 19. Because today’s decision is irreconcilable with Garrett and the well-established principles it embodies, I dissent.
The Eleventh Amendment bars private lawsuits in federal court against an unconsenting State. E.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 726 (2003); Garrett, supra, at 363; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73 (2000). Congress may overcome States’ sovereign immunity and authorize such suits only if it unmistakably expresses its intent to do so, and only if it “acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hibbs, supra, at 726. While the Court correctly holds that Congress satisfied the first prerequisite, ante, at 6, I disagree with its conclusion that Title II is valid §5 enforcement legislation.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the familiar substantive guarantees contained in §1 of that Amendment. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 (“No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Congress’ power to enact “appropriate” enforcement legislation is not limited to “mere legislative repetition” of this Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Garrett, supra, at 365. Congress may “remedy” and “deter” state violations of constitutional rights by “prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text.” Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such “prophylactic” legislation, however, “must be an appropriate remedy for identified constitutional violations, not ‘an attempt to substantively redefine the States’ legal obligations.’ ” Id., at 727–728 (quoting Kimel, supra, at 88); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 525 (1997) (enforcement power is “corrective or preventive, not definitional”). To ensure that Congress does not usurp this Court’s responsibility to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, valid §5 legislation must exhibit “ ‘congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.’ ” Hibbs, supra, at 728 (quoting City of Boerne, supra, at 520). While the Court today pays lipservice to the “congruence and proportionality” test, see ante, at 8, it applies it in a manner inconsistent with our recent precedents.
The first step is to “identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Garrett, supra, at 365. This task was easy in Garrett, Hibbs, Kimel, and City of Boerne because the statutes in those cases sought to enforce only one constitutional right. In Garrett, for example, the statute addressed the equal protection right of disabled persons to be free from unconstitutional employment discrimination. Garrett, supra, at 365. See also Hibbs, supra, at 728 (“The [Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)] aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace”); Kimel, supra, at 83 (right to be free from unconstitutional age discrimination in employment); City of Boerne, supra, at 529 (right of free exercise of religion). The scope of that right, we explained, is quite limited; indeed, the Equal Protection Clause permits a State to classify on the basis of disability so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Garrett, supra, at 366–368 (discussing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985)); see also ante, at 11.
In this case, the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional protection is more difficult because Title II purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled persons: not only the equal protection right against irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Ante, at 11–12. However, because the Court ultimately upholds Title II “as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,” ante, at 19, the proper inquiry focuses on the scope of those due process rights. The Court cites four access-to-the-courts rights that Title II purportedly enforces: (1) the right of the criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of the trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 819 (1975); (2) the right of litigants to have a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” in judicial proceedings, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971); (3) the right of the criminal defendant to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the commun-
ity, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522, 530 (1975); and (4) the public right of access to criminal proceedings, Press&nbhyph;Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U. S. 1, 8–15 (1986). Ante, at 11–12.
Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due process rights on which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled. Ante, at 12–15. This digression recounts historical discrimination against the disabled through institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and public education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of unequal treatment in the administration of public programs and services. Some of this evidence would be relevant if the Court were considering