Source: https://www.scribd.com/book/380637878/Public-Private-Partnerships-for-Infrastructure-Principles-of-Policy-and-Finance
Timestamp: 2020-03-31 08:35:15
Document Index: 147203468

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Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure by E. R. Yescombe and Edward Farquharson - Book - Read Online
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Length: 1,166 pages520 hours
Captures and explains the latest approaches, providing a comprehensive all-round guide for those on both the public- and private-sector sides of the table Emphasises a step-by-step approach within a comprehensive, cross-referenced format Includes clear explanations of PPP evaluation, structuring and financing concepts for the benefit of those new to the topic: no prior knowledge is assumed or required Provides detailed reference points for more experienced practitioners Draws from the authors’ experience and practice in PPP markets worldwide to provide a perspective on practical application of the key underlying principles Includes an extensive glossary of technical and financial terms used in the PPP sector Includes more technical information and a stronger legal perspective than other books Emphasizes a step-by-step approach within a comprehensive, cross-referenced format Expands and updates the historical backgrounds and political contexts of public-private partnerships
Author Jay-Hyung Kim
Author Jean-Pierre Danthine
Author Slavica Joković
Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure - E. R. Yescombe
Chapter 2 What Are Public-Private Partnerships?
Chapter 3 Cash Flow and Investment Analysis
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become increasingly popular as a way of procuring and maintaining public-sector infrastructure, in sectors that include transport (such as roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, ports and airports), social infrastructure (such as hospitals, schools, prisons and social housing), public utilities (such as water supply, wastewater treatment and waste disposal), government offices and other accommodation, and specialised services such as communication networks or defence equipment.
This book reviews the general policy issues that arise for the public sector in considering whether to adopt the PPP procurement route, and the specific application of this policy approach in PPP contracts. This book also offers a systematic and integrated approach to financing PPPs within this public-policy framework. Policy and finance are inextricably entangled in PPPs, so the public sector must develop PPP policies taking account of financing constraints, and be careful to avoid entering into PPP arrangements whose financial implications are misunderstood, or not understood at all, thus undermining the benefit of the PPP. Similarly, the policy background and drivers for public-sector decisions are also often quite unclear to private-sector investors and lenders.
Structuring PPPs is complex because of the need to reconcile the aims of the large number of parties involved—on the private-sector side, there are investors, lenders and companies providing construction and operational services; on the public-sector side, there are public-sector entities creating, implementing and overseeing PPP policies as well as those actually procuring and managing the PPP contract, not forgetting the general public who use the facilities that a PPP provides. Most of these parties need to have a basic understanding of policy and finance issues, and how their part of the project is linked to, and affected by, such issues.
Reflecting the authors’ own practical experience while sitting on the public- and private-sector sides of the table, this book is intended to provide a guide to both the general policy principles and the related financing issues that can cause the most difficulty in PPP negotiations and in the long-term management of PPP contracts. It serves both as an introduction for those who are new to the subject, whether in the academic, public-sector, investment and finance or contracting fields, and as an aide-mémoire for those developing PPP policies and negotiating and managing PPPs. No prior knowledge of PPPs or financing is assumed or required. The views expressed by the authors are their own and do not reflect those of any institution for whom they work.
• Chapter 3 provides a basic introduction to cash-flow and investment analysis, which are at the heart of understanding the financial benefits, costs and structuring of PPPs for both the public- and private-sector parties.
This part covers the process of selecting, appraising and procuring PPP projects from the public-sector point of view:
• Chapter 4 sets out the policy, legal and institutional frameworks behind a PPP programme.
• Chapter 7 deals with the initial needs assessment, project definition and selection; logically, these processes come before the decision to procure a particular project as a PPP, the processes for which are set out in the following chapters.
• Chapter 9 looks at the further key issues of a PPP project’s affordability, budgeting for PPPs and financial/statistical reporting requirements.
Part 3: Risk Analysis and Allocation
Risk allocation between the public and private sectors lies at the heart of the PPP process.
• Chapter 11 summarises the theory behind risk allocation in PPPs, and the main risk categories.
• Chapter 14 explains how insurance is used to mitigate risks in both the construction and the operation phases.
This part covers the main elements of a PPP contract, the support that the public sector may provide for such contracts and public-sector management of a PPP contract.
• Chapter 15 describes the payment mechanisms and performance incentives usually found in a PPP contract.
• Chapter 16 explains how changes in the original assumptions behind the PPP can be accommodated.
• Chapter 17 covers termination of a PPP contract, either during or at the end of its term, and the hand-back of the asset to the public sector.
• Chapter 19 sets out good practice for public-sector contract management during the life of a PPP.
This part moves to the other side of the table and covers PPPs from the private-sector point of view.
• Chapter 20 sets out the different categories of equity investors (i.e. shareholders) in PPP projects, how they organise themselves to bid for, develop and manage such projects.
• Chapter 21 describes project-financing techniques, and why these are used to raise debt for PPPs.
• Chapter 23 explains how the different elements of the financial jigsaw are fitted together to create a financing plan.
• Chapter 24 deals with the important topic of financial hedging, and the effect of interest-rate movements, inflation and changes in currency exchange rates on a PPP project and its financing.
• Chapter 26 considers ways of sharing the benefits of financial ‘windfalls’, derived from debt refinancing or sale of the equity investment, between the public and private sectors.
• Finally, Chapter 28 reviews the complex arguments for and against using PPPs as one method of delivering public infrastructure investment.
In addition to details of references in the text, the References and Further Reading provide some further background reading, both about aspects of PPPs generally, and specific countries’ PPP programmes.
Financial and other terms used in this book are defined and cross-referenced in the Glossary and Abbreviations. Dynamic spreadsheets that were used to construct a number of the tables in this book can be downloaded from www.yescombe.com.
Although this book is entirely self-contained, it can be usefully read in conjunction with E.R. Yescombe’s Principles of Project Finance (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2nd edition, 2014), which deals in more detail with some of the topics only covered briefly here, in particular process-plant projects (such as power stations), project-finance loan negotiation and the use of project finance in emerging markets.
In conclusion, it might be thought that this book concentrates too much on detailed process rather than broad policy. But in the real world, it is all too easy for the potential benefits of a PPP programme to be eroded by failures of detailed implementation. Similarly, the credibility of some academic and political discussion on PPPs is eroded by a lack of understanding of how policy translates into practice. The old aphorism, quoted in Principles of Project Finance—‘the devil is in the detail’—is equally applicable to the PPP field.
This chapter examines the reasons for private involvement in public infrastructure (§2.2), defines what is meant by a public-private partnership (PPP) and traces PPPs’ historical development and current structures. The place of PPPs in the provision of public infrastructure is considered. Finally, some statistics on the scale of the worldwide market for PPPs are provided.
PPP; P3; PFI; private finance; infrastructure
This chapter examines the reasons for private involvement in public infrastructure (§2.2), defines what is meant by a PPP (§2.3) and traces PPPs’ historical development and current structures (§2.4). The place of PPPs in the provision of public infrastructure is considered (§2.5). Finally, some statistics on the scale of the worldwide market for PPPs are provided (§2.6).
§2.2 Public Infrastructure and the Private Sector
Public infrastructure can be defined as facilities that are necessary for the functioning of the economy and society. These are thus not an end in themselves, but a means of supporting a nation’s economic and social activity, including facilities that are ancillary to these functions, such as public-sector offices or other accommodation. Broadly speaking, public infrastructure can be divided into:
• ‘economic’ infrastructure, such as transport facilities and utility networks (for water, sewage, electricity, etc.), i.e. infrastructure considered essential for day-to-day economic activity; and
A distinction can also be made between ‘hard’ infrastructure, whether economic or social, primarily involving provision of buildings or other physical facilities, and ‘soft’ infrastructure, involving the provision of services, either for economic infrastructure (e.g. street cleaning) or for social infrastructure (e.g. education and training, social services).
There is probably universal agreement that the state has to play a rôle in the provision of public infrastructure, on the grounds that:
• The private sector cannot take account of ‘externalities’—i.e. general economic and social benefits—and therefore public-sector intervention is required.
• Without such intervention, infrastructure that has to be freely available to all (‘public goods’) will not be built, especially where this involves networks, such as roads, or services, such as street lighting.
• Competitive provision of infrastructure may not be efficient, but at the same time monopoly provision requires some form of public control.
• Even where competition is possible, the public sector should still provide ‘merit goods’, i.e. those that would otherwise be underprovided (such as schools, as the rich could pay for private schools but the poor would get no education).
• Infrastructure requires a high initial investment on which only a very long-term return can be expected. It may be difficult to raise private capital for this investment without some public-sector support.
• Some of the risks in the delivery of infrastructure are more efficiently managed by the state or may simply not be investible by the private sector.
It could thus be argued that infrastructure should be provided by the public sector if competitive market pricing would distort behaviour or lead to loss of socio-economic benefits. But history suggests that there are two ways for the state to do this—either by direct provision or by the facilitation of private-sector provision (whether through regulation, tax subsidy or similar incentives, or by contract). As discussed below, the use of private capital to finance economic infrastructure (e.g. for transport) is of long standing. Equally, it was generally only during the 19th and 20th centuries that the state took over responsibility, mainly from religious or private charity, for the provision of much social infrastructure (e.g. for schools and hospitals). Indeed, it may be said that private provision of a large proportion of public infrastructure was the historical norm until recently—but the definition of ‘necessary’ public infrastructure has clearly widened over the last couple of centuries. PPPs may therefore be considered a modern way of facilitating private provision to help meet an increased demand for public infrastructure.
§2.3 Public-Private Partnerships
The term ‘public-private partnership’ appears to have originated in the United States in the early 20th century, initially relating to joint public- and private-sector delivery of educational programmes, and then in the 1950s in connection with similar approaches in the utilities sector (cf. §27.5.3). By the 1960s the term came into wider use in reference to public-private joint ventures for urban renewal. It is also used in the United States to refer to publicly-funded provision of social services by non-public-sector bodies, often from the voluntary (not-for-profit) sector, as well as public funding of private-sector research and development in fields such as technology. In the international-development field the term is used when referring to joint government, aid agency and private-sector initiatives to combat diseases such as AIDS and malaria, introduce improvements in farming methods or promote economic development generally. Most of these can be described as ‘policy-based’ or ‘programme-based’ PPPs.
However, the subject of this book is what may be called ‘project-based’ or ‘contract-based’ PPPs, a more recent development. (Although some urban-renewal PPPs are also project-specific, they do not involve the same long-term relationship.) PPPs as defined here have the following key elements:
• a long-term contract (a ‘PPP contract’) between a public-sector party and a private-sector party;
• the design, construction and operation of public infrastructure (the ‘facility’) by the private-sector party;
• the use of private-sector capital to finance all or a substantial part of the facility’s construction;
• payments over the life of the PPP contract to the private-sector party for the use of the facility, made either by the public-sector party or by the general public as users of the facility or both;
• the facility remaining in public-sector ownership, or reverting to public-sector ownership at the end of the PPP contract;
(In some cases, a PPP contract may involve major upgrading of existing infrastructure rather than a ‘green-field’ construction.)
Private-sector acquisition or management of existing public infrastructure without any major new capital investment or upgrading is not considered to be a PPP as defined here. Similarly, private-sector provision of services that involves no significant investment in fixed assets (and hence no need for private-sector financing) falls into the category of ‘outsourcing’ rather than PPPs, although obviously the boundary is not precise as a variety of services are often associated with the provision of infrastructure (cf. §15.2). Nor is a PPP a simple joint-venture investment between the public and private sectors, unless this is also linked to a PPP contract (cf. §27.4). Also, this book does not deal in detail with smaller PPPs, usually at a municipal level, in sectors such as parking garages; this smaller end of the market follows the same general principles, but is usually less elaborate in contract form and financing (cf. §21.6), unless projects can be bundled together (cf. §7.5.1).
The public-sector party to a PPP contract (the ‘contracting authority’)¹ may be a central-government department, a state or regional government, a local (county/municipal) government, a public agency or other public-sector entity.
The private-sector party is usually a special-purpose company (the ‘project company’),² created by private-sector investors specifically to undertake the PPP contract.
The entities (usually companies) on the private-sector side that put the PPP bid together and, if successful, become the key investors in the project company, are known as the ‘sponsors’.³
It should be noted that the relationship between the public and private parties in the types of PPP covered in this book is not a partnership in the legal sense, but is contractual, being based on the terms of a PPP contract. ‘Partnership’ is largely a political slogan in this context.
An important terminological distinction needs to be made between what it being built (i.e. the physical public-infrastructure assets or ‘facility’, as mentioned above), what is being procured (i.e. the infrastructure asset and the services it provides) and how this bundle of assets and services is procured and delivered. For the purposes of this book, the bundle of assets and services is referred to as the ‘project’ and its procurement using a PPP arrangement as a ‘PPP’ or ‘PPP project’. This is important because the decision about how a project is best procured is distinct from the decision about what project to procure.
• Private Finance Initiative (PFI), a term originating in Britain, but also used in Japan and Malaysia;
• Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI), used in Korea⁴;
• P-P Partnership (to avoid confusion with PPP meaning ‘purchasing power parity’, a method of comparing currency exchange rates to reflect the real costs of goods and services in different countries);
• Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure (PPPI), the term used in this book’s title, which helps to avoid the ambiguity of the term PPP as discussed above.
But over time, the term PPP has become more universally accepted. Governments may use other terms to label particular parts of their own PPP programmes or types of PPP. AFP (Alternative Financing and Procurement) in Ontario is one such example and, more recently, the British Treasury has modified and relabelled its PFI policy as ‘PF2’⁵ to signify a break from, and changes to, its previous PFI programme.
In some countries, ‘PPP’ is more narrowly defined as those arrangements where the public-sector party is the entity that mainly pays for the service and ‘concession’ is used to describe those PPP-type arrangements where the general public as users pay for the service. This is often a product of history and of the laws that may govern these different arrangements (such as in Brazil and France). However, in this book, ‘PPP’ will be used for the general concepts covering both models. These models are discussed in more detail in the following section.
PPPs are often confused with privatisations. Perhaps the two most fundamental differences are firstly that, unlike a privatisation, the ownership of the asset is not transferred to the private sector and secondly that the contracting authority remains ultimately responsible for the public provision of the service provided by the PPP. Governments launching a PPP programme should communicate this difference clearly, as not doing so may lead to confusion and opposition later on (cf. §4.4, §28.2, §28.13).
§2.4 Development and Structures
There are a number of different approaches to the introduction of private financing into the provision of public infrastructure. Concessions have a long history (§2.4.1), as do their subtype, franchises (§2.4.2). Power-purchase agreements (PPAs) (§2.4.3) provided the modern contractual (§2.4.4) and financing (§2.4.5) framework for PPPs—both for concessions (§2.4.6) and availability PPPs (§2.4.7).
§2.4.1 Concessions
Although the term PPP is a new one (at least in the current context), the concept of using private capital to provide public infrastructure is very old. In France, the construction of canals with private-sector capital began in the 17th century. In 18th- and early 19th-century Britain, groups of local magnates formed turnpike trusts which borrowed money from private investors to repair the roads, and repaid this debt by charging tolls. Most of London’s bridges were also financed by similar bridge trusts until the mid-19th century, and in the late 19th century, the Brooklyn Bridge in New York was also built with private-sector capital.
This type of PPP is known as a ‘concession’: that is, a ‘user pays’ model in which a private-sector entity (the ‘project company’⁶) is allowed to charge the general public ‘service fees’⁷ for using the facility. These service fees may also be referred to as ‘user charges’ or, in the case of a road concession, ‘tolls’. User charges reimburse the concessionaire for the cost of building and operating the facility, which usually reverts to public-sector control at the end of the concession period. Apart from roads and related facilities, concessions were used in many countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries to construct facilities such as water supply and wastewater treatment networks.
The rôle of the public sector in concessions is:
• to establish the framework within which the concessionaire operates, usually under a general concession law or legislation specific to the particular concession;
• to regulate the detailed requirements for the construction and operation of the facility, usually through a concession agreement signed between the contracting authority and the concessionaire.
Although the use of concessions for constructing new infrastructure faded away in many countries after the 19th century, as the rôle of the state expanded, franchises (see below) continued to be important in France and a number of countries in Africa and Latin America. The use of concessions began to increase again towards the end of the 20th century, as interest started to grow in this and other types of PPP as an alternative funding model.
§2.4.2 Franchises and Affermage
A variant of concessions is the franchise, or to use the less-ambiguous French term, affermage. A franchise is the right to exploit an already-constructed facility, i.e. it is similar to a concession but without the initial construction phase. The franchisee (equivalent to a concessionaire) makes a lump-sum payment to the contracting authority in return for this right, or pays a share of the revenues. ‘Farming’, in its older English meaning (e.g. ‘tax farming’) means the same as the French term but has largely gone out of use in this sense. ‘Lease’ is also used, but this is misleading given its other meanings. In European Union terminology a franchise is known as a ‘service concession’, while a concession as defined in this book—i.e. involving the construction of new infrastructure—is known as a ‘works concession’.
A franchise is not considered to be a PPP as previously defined, because it does not involve the provision or upgrade of infrastructure, but only its operation.⁸ However, the contractual and financial basis is similar in some respects (and hence is covered in this book). New types of franchise have also evolved, such as in the British railway sector.
§2.4.3 Power-Purchase Agreements
PPAs, developed in the United States in the 1980s, provided the template for modern PPP contracts. PPAs began after the 1978 Private Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which encouraged the construction of cogeneration plants, whose electricity could be sold to the regulated power utilities. These utilities’ long-term commitment under a PPA to purchase the power enabled the finance to be raised for the cogeneration plant, using the PPAs as security. PPAs arrived in Europe in the early 1990s, with the privatisation of the British electricity industry; this encouraged a separation between private-sector companies involved in power generation and those involved in distribution, and the development of ‘independent power projects’ selling their power output to the distribution companies so increasing competition in power generation. Under a PPA, the investors are paid a ‘tariff’ split between:
• an availability charge (also known as a ‘capacity charge’) for making their power station available to provide power to the utility: this covers the capital expenditure involved in building the power station and its fixed operating expenditure; and
• a usage charge (also known as a ‘variable charge’) for the marginal cost of generating power as and when required by the electricity utility: this mainly covers the cost of the fuel used to generate the electricity (e.g. natural gas).
A key aspect of a PPA is therefore that the project company that builds and operates the power station does not take any risk on whether the electricity which it has the capacity to generate is actually needed: this ‘despatch’ risk remains with the utility, which pays the availability charge whether it uses any power or not. The project company is, however, responsible for completing the power station on time and to budget, and thereafter for the operating performance of the power station. If for any reason it is not capable of generating the level of power committed, the availability charge will be reduced accordingly. This is obviously unlike the position of a concessionaire, who is only paid if people use the facility. PPAs are now widely used in many parts of the world for both conventional and renewable power projects.
§2.4.4 BOO—BOT—BTO—DBFO
The PPA as first developed was a ‘build-own-operate’ (BOO) contract between private-sector parties, whereby the ownership of the power facility remains with its investors at the end of the contract term. However, it soon became apparent that a similar structure could be used for developing public-sector projects. The concept of the ‘build-operate-transfer’ (BOT) contract was first developed in Turkey; this was also intended for power generation, but with the key differences that the off-taker (purchaser) of the power would be a public-sector entity (the state power utility), and that at the end of the contract, ownership of the power station could pass from its investors to the off-taker (usually for a nominal or zero cost) and hence to the public sector.
It was but a short step from the BOT model to the ‘build-transfer-operate’ (BTO) contract, where ownership is transferred to the contracting authority on completion of construction, and the ‘design-build-finance-operate’ (DBFO) contract, under which legal ownership of the facility remains with the contracting authority throughout the contract; the private-sector’s interest in the project is based solely on the contractual rights to operate the facility and to receive revenues from the off-taker for doing so, rather than on ownership of the physical assets.
In developing countries, BOT, BTO and DBFO contracts provided a means for cash-constrained state power utilities to finance investment in more efficient plant, without relinquishing control over either the generation of the power (since the off-taker decides when the power from the facility is to be despatched, i.e. when the facility is brought into use to generate power), the delivery of power to the consumer, or the cost of power to the consumer—in other words, the private sector delivers the service on behalf of the public sector, but under public-sector control.
§2.4.5 Project Finance
The other vital factor that enabled the PPA model to be developed was the financing technique known as ‘project finance’, which provides the high ratio of long-term debt financing required for such projects (cf. §21.5). Although such techniques had existed previously in the natural-resources sector, the particular project-finance structures used to finance PPAs provided the basis for financing all types of PPPs.
An important aspect of project finance is lack of recourse to the project sponsors (i.e. they do not usually guarantee the debt raised by the project company), as well as the transfer of the risks mentioned above from the project company to subcontractors. Figure 2.1 shows how this risk transfer fits within the main building blocks for a power-generation project. (The arrows show the direction of cash flows—contract cash flows are shown with solid lines and financing cash flows with dotted lines.) The main components in the structure are:
• a PPA with an electricity-distribution company (which may be a public- or private-sector entity), with payments based on availability and usage charges as discussed above;
• an ‘engineering, procurement and construction’ (EPC) subcontract, under which the EPC subcontractor agrees to deliver a completed and fully-equipped power facility to the project company to the required specification, at a fixed price and schedule; this type of contract to provide a complete facility at a fixed price is known as a ‘turnkey’ contract;
• where relevant, a fuel-supply subcontract, under which, say, natural gas is provided to the project company to fuel the power facility’s turbines;
• an operation and maintenance (O&M) subcontract, under which an O&M contractor agrees to operate and maintain the facility on behalf of the project company; and
• surplus cash flow after payment of fuel and operating costs (‘opex’) is used, firstly, for payments of interest and repayments of loan principal (‘debt service’) to the lenders, and then to give a return on investment to the equity investors (‘distributions’).
Figure 2.1 Project finance for a power-purchase agreement
The subcontractors have thus taken over many of the key risks that the contracting authority had passed to the project company, e.g. as to the outturn capital cost of the power station and its operating costs (other than fuel costs).
§2.4.6 Project Finance for Concessions
The modern use of project-financing techniques for concessions, influenced by the BOT model, began with a number of transport projects in the 1980s including Eurotunnel—the Channel Tunnel project between Britain and France—in 1987 (albeit in the event this was a financially disastrous project), and the Dartford Bridge (across the Thames Estuary east of London) around the same time. It has to be said that neither of these were ‘typical’ projects, but the lessons learned from them have been widely applied to financing concessions since then, most commonly in toll-road projects.
Figure 2.2 shows the main contractual and financing building blocks for a toll-road concession. The resemblance to the ‘spider diagram’ as in Figure 2.1 for the power project is evident, the most important difference being the source of revenues (from tolls). Here the key elements in the structure are:
• a ‘concession agreement’ (a standard name for this type of PPP contract) with the contracting authority that allows the collection of tolls from road users;
• a ‘design and build’ (D&B) subcontract, under which the D&B subcontractor agrees to design and construct the completed road and related works (e.g. toll booths) to the required specification, at a fixed price and schedule;
• an operating subcontract, under which a toll operation company provides services, such as manning the toll booths, minor repairs and accident management, to the project company;
• a maintenance subcontract, under which a maintenance company provides road-maintenance services to the project company; and
• surplus cash flow after opex (consisting mainly of payments to the toll operator and maintenance contractor, being used by the project company, firstly, for debt service, and then to pay distributions to the investors).
Figure 2.2 Project finance for a toll-road concession
§2.4.7 Availability PPPs
In 1992 the British government launched the PFI programme, with the aim of bringing private finance into the provision of public infrastructure. This really began from the rediscovery of concessions in the 1980s, as mentioned above. The first wave of projects, in 1994, therefore involved construction and operation of new roads. But since the scope for toll roads in Britain was limited, instead of the ‘user pays’ principle of a concession, the PFI model introduced the concept of payment by the contracting authority instead. Initially, however, payments from the contracting authority were still based on usage by drivers, through so-called shadow tolls, i.e. a fixed schedule of payments by the contracting authority per driver/km (cf. §15.5.4).
The next stage in the development of the PFI model was the use of PFI contracts for the provision of infrastructure where usage risk inherently cannot be transferred to the private sectors, such as prisons, schools and hospitals. In these cases, the structure of the contract is still based on the PPA, in that the private-sector investor is paid by the contracting authority for ‘availability’, i.e. constructing the facility to the required specification and making it available for the period of the PFI contract, as well as for provision of services such as maintenance, cleaning and catering. The service fee in this instance is often referred to as a ‘unitary charge’ (or ‘unitary payment’). This underlines an important feature in that the payment cannot be split into different parts to pay for the different costs of the project such as the financing or maintenance costs, sometimes referred to as the concept of ‘separability’. If an element of the service fee was always paid to cover the financing costs irrespective of (i.e. separable from) the availability of the service, then the important mechanism of having private capital at risk to performance would be lost. For the purposes if this book, this model of PPP is referred to as an ‘availability PPP’.⁹
Figure 2.3 shows the main building blocks for a school project in an availability PPP. The resemblance to a PPA is evident. Here the key elements in the structure are:
• a ‘project agreement’ (a standard name for an availability PPP contract) with the contracting authority, under which the project company is paid for the provision of the school building and associated services;
• a D&B subcontract, under which the D&B subcontractor agrees to design and construct the school to the required specification, at a fixed price and to a fixed schedule;
• a ‘soft’ facilities-management (FM) subcontract, under which a service company provides services such as security, cleaning and catering for the school (‘soft FM’);
• a ‘hard’ FM subcontract, under which a maintenance company (or the original D&B contractor) provides building-maintenance services (‘hard FM’); and
• cash flow after opex—mainly payments on the FM subcontracts—is used, firstly, for debt service, and then to pay distributions to the investors.
Figure 2.3 Project finance for a PPP school project
An availability PPP (like a concession) is thus an alternative to procurement of the facility by the public sector (‘public-sector procurement’¹⁰), using funding from tax revenues or public borrowing. In a typical public-sector procurement (known as ‘design-bid-build’), the contracting authority sets out the specifications and design of the facility, calls for bids on the basis of this detailed design and pays for construction of the facility by a private-sector contractor. The contracting authority has to fund the full cost of construction, including any cost overruns. The contracting authority may undertake FM itself, or engage a private-sector company to do so under a separate contract.
On the other hand, as with PPPs generally, an availability PPP is based on the delivery of a service: the contracting authority specifies its requirements in terms of ‘outputs’, which set out the public services that the facility is intended to provide, but does not specify how these are to be provided. It is then left to the private sector to design, finance, build and operate the facility to meet these long-term output specifications. The project company receives service fees over the life of the PPP contract (perhaps 25 years on average) on a pre-agreed basis, which are intended to repay the financing costs and give a return to investors. The service fees are subject to deductions for failure to meet the output specifications, and there is generally no extra allowance for cost overruns that occur during construction or in operation of the facility.
Availability PPPs comprise three main sub-categories: accommodation; equipment, systems or networks, and process plant.
Accommodation-based projects are those such as hospitals, schools and prisons, where the contracting authority pays for the availability of a building (typically in the social infrastructure field). In addition to the provision of the use of the building to an agreed standard, and hard FM services, the private-sector partner may also provide soft FM services such as cleaning, catering, maintenance or even custodial services in a prison. However, this provision of soft services is secondary in importance to the construction and maintenance of the building and its availability to the contracting authority (cf. §15.6.2).
– Equipment, systems or networks
For equipment, systems or network-based PPPs, payments by the contracting authority are based on a form of availability. For example in a road project, instead of payments being dependent on usage, they are dependent on the road being ‘available’, availability being judged by measures such as whether any traffic lanes are closed, the speed at which traffic is able to move on the road and the rate at which accidents or spillages are cleared from the road. Similarly, payment for rail projects can be made on the basis of how well the system (e.g. signalling or the train sets) works rather than the volume of passengers. Projects can also involve systems like street lighting or information technology, and another important sector is that of defence equipment.
The original BOT model for power generation of course falls into this category. Outside of power, important types of PPP-related process plant are water and wastewater treatment plants, and municipal waste incinerators. The key difference between these and other types of projects set out above is that they all involve a clearly-measurable process. Water-treatment projects can be undertaken either under as a concession or an availability PPP, but in either case payments are primarily made for the ability to produce an end product, e.g. treated water or wastewater, rather than on the actual volume processed or produced. Similarly, in a waste-incineration project, the contracting authority pays for processing the waste, and if this requirement cannot be fulfilled, payments will not be made. The principles in such projects are the same as those set out above for a PPA, but payments based on usage are comparatively less important; hence, availability is again the main criterion.¹¹ This book focusses mainly on concession and availability PPPs, excluding PPAs. While the power sector shares many similar characteristics with concessions and availability PPPs, this is a large sector in its own right, with a number of specific contractual and financing issues that are better dealt with elsewhere.¹²
§2.5 PPPs in the Spectrum of Public Infrastructure
Figure 2.4 shows where PPPs lie on the spectrum from wholly public-sector projects (and risk) to wholly private-sector projects. It is important to note that:
• Ownership of the facility has little or nothing to do with which particular PPP model is applied, and hence concessions or availability PPPs can be used whether the contractual basis is DBFO, BTO or BOT (cf. §2.4.4).
• Terminology for the various types of contract is not used consistently, but the most common usage has been followed.
• Figure 2.4 does not purport to show all possible structural variations, but does set out the most important models.
Figure 2.4 Public and Private Provision of Infrastructure
The same public infrastructure may be placed at different points on this spectrum in different countries. Using water treatment and supply services as an example, there is a range of possibilities in this respect¹³:
• Public-sector ownership and private-sector management: for example, affermage contracts in France, where the franchisee takes over facilities that are owned by the contracting authority under a long-term management contract (typically for 10-12 years).
• Availability PPP: in Turkey and China, for example, BOT/BTO contracts, transferring usage risk and payment to the public sector (i.e. with payments by a contracting authority rather than end users), have been used for the development of new water-services projects (in these cases, water distribution may be carried out separately by the contracting authority).
• Concessions: here the project company builds a new treatment or distribution system or upgrades an existing one, collects service fees (tariffs) from users—prices being regulated under the concession agreement, takes the demand risk and has to meet output specifications such as water quality and availability; at the end of the concession, the facility reverts to the contracting authority.
• Privatisation (BOO): in some parts of Britain, the state-owned water boards have been converted into private-sector regional water companies that own the water supply and sewage networks; the public-sector involvement is through a Water Services Regulator that monitors the service provided, fixes maximum costs for water based on a reasonable rate of return on the project company’s investment and ensures a degree of competition in water supply; a similar system can be found in Chile (cf. §27.6).
So, can it be said that one type of public infrastructure is inherently more suitable for a PPP than another? There is some public infrastructure that it would be generally agreed cannot be privatised, such as roads, and for which PPPs (either concessions or availability PPPs) are therefore the only way of bringing in private finance and the efficiencies of private-sector management. These tend to be types of infrastructure that are parts of a network and therefore where privatising different components is less practical. For other types of infrastructure such as water supply, there are clearly differing views on whether state ownership, privatisation or the PPP approach is appropriate. In other cases, such as building mobile-phone networks, there is little disagreement in most countries that this is best done on the basis of licences to the private sector, i.e. in a competitive private-sector market rather than via a PPP. There is probably an irreducible core of public-sector activity which has to be provided by the state without any delegation to the private sector—private armies were used in the Middle Ages but are rarely to be found now (although the private sector may well provide PPP-based accommodation, equipment and services to the armed forces).
§2.6 PPP Markets Worldwide
Figure 2.5 shows the development of PPPs from 2000 to 2016. As can be seen, Europe and to some extent Latin America were the most active regions initially. However, in more recent years, PPP activity has become more evenly distributed throughout the world. Europe’s relative decline in activity is probably a result of lower levels of public-sector investment when compared with other parts of the world, particularly after the financial and then fiscal crises in 2007-11.
Figure 2.5 PPPs worldwide by region, 2000-16. Source: ProjectWare, Inframation, EPEC
Many countries around the world have been developing their PPP programmes for a number of years and now have well-developed processes and experience over the project life-cycle. These include Australia, Britain, Canada, Chile, France, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. Countries such as Colombia, Peru, Philippines, the Netherlands and New Zealand have more recently increased their use of PPPs and developed a number of sophisticated approaches. And there are signs of increasing activity in the United States.
Figure 2.6 shows the levels of activity by sector for the same period. As can be seen, transport consistently dominates, reflecting the long use of concessions in this sector and the relatively large size of projects.¹⁴ However, PPPs have also been consistently used to deliver social infrastructure projects, particularly in health and education, since the early 2000s. Projects in this sector are generally smaller than in transport (with some notable exceptions such as the health sector in Turkey), so that in terms of numbers of projects, social infrastructure is more active than the total value of projects in this sector might otherwise suggest.
Figure 2.6 PPPs worldwide by sector, 2000-16. Sources: ProjectWare, Inframation, EPEC
Information on PPP project pipelines is greater interest for the market. A number of attempts have been made over the years to try to capture this information. However, wide variations in the level of preparedness and maturity of different projects make this a challenging exercise. Nevertheless, initiatives such as the Sustainable Infrastructure Foundation’s ‘Source’ and the Global Infrastructure Hub’s ‘Project Pipeline’ have recently developed more sophisticated approaches to this problem, seeking to ensure greater standardisation and integrity of project information and more active tracking of the development of projects.
Some caution needs to be exercised with PPP statistics due to the varying definitions of PPPs and the way their values are calculated and as further discussed in §22.2.1. The data in Figure 2.5 have been compiled from a range of publicly-available sources and cross-checked to the extent possible for a degree of consistency, as different sources classify financing activities in different ways. Also, the values are based on the level of private-sector project-finance debt and equity finance in sectors assumed to be dominated by PPPs, as a proxy for PPP activity.¹⁵ Equally, the cost of PPPs with capex funded in part with government resources (cf. Chapter 18, §22.9) will be understated. The figures may also include privatisations and refinancings, although these have been eliminated as far as possible. Also, some projects are cancelled after financial close or revert to public-sector funding which may not always be captured in the data sets.
¹Also known by a variety of other terms, such as the ‘public entity’, ‘public party’, ‘government procuring entity’, ‘institution’, ‘grantor’, ‘procuring authority’, ‘public authority’ or just the ‘authority’.
²Again known by a variety of names, including the ‘private party’, ‘contractor’ or ‘SPV’. (SPV=special-purpose vehicle; cf. §20.6.1.)
³The term sponsor is sometimes, confusingly, used to refer to the contracting authority because it is ‘sponsoring’ the project, but it is not so used in this book.
⁴The term PPI is also used by the World Bank, but includes both PPPs and privatised or private-sector owned infrastructure. This is the basis for the World Bank’s PPI database (see References and Further Reading).
⁵This is the full name of the programme, not an abbreviation.
⁶Also known as the ‘concessionaire’ in this context.
⁷The term ‘service fees’ is used in this book to mean payments to the project company for the use of the facility either by users or a contracting authority.
⁸Although affermage contracts may include an obligation to make some capital investments from the facility’s cash flow.
⁹Also known as the ‘PFI model’, ‘build-transfer-lease’ (BTL) in Korea, or just as a PPP in countries where this term relates only to availability PPPs, distinguishing from concessions that are not referred to as PPPs (cf. §2.3).
¹⁰The term ‘public procurement’ will be used for procurement of a PPP by a contracting authority.
¹¹For waste-processing projects, the payment is usually on a per ton basis, i.e. usage, but there may be either a minimum tonnage of waste, or the contracting authority agrees that it will send all its waste to the project, meaning the project company takes the risk on the quantity of waste. Also, the waste delivered has to have certain characteristics, such as calorific value within an agreed range.
¹²PPAs and similar ‘process-plant’ off-take contracts are discussed in detail in Yescombe 2014.
¹³Treatment and supply can also be provided separately, e.g. treatment under a PPP and supply (distribution) by the public sector.
¹⁴Transport projects are also procured as availability PPPs.
¹⁵However, projects in some countries in some sectors are nevertheless probably fully private-sector, i.e. not involving a PPP contract between the public and private sectors.
The question of whether the costs of investing today are justified by the expected future benefits is fundamental to both public- and private-sector investment decisions. A widely used approach is to express the costs and benefits in numerical, usually money, terms. This Chapter explains key concepts in cash-flow analysis and how these are used in a PPP context.
Public- and private-sector investment; PPP; present value; discounted cash flow; net present value; internal rate of return
The question of whether the costs of investing today are justified by the expected future benefits is fundamental to both public- and private-sector investment decisions. A widely-used approach is to express the costs and benefits in numerical, usually money, terms.
A large part of this book deals with the financial, and to some extent the economic, aspects of PPPs and their effect on policy issues. It is therefore necessary for the reader to have a basic understanding of certain key concepts used in financial and economic analysis that are used in this book. This chapter is therefore aimed mainly at those not familiar with these concepts—those who are may omit the chapter.
A PPP deals with cash flows over long periods of time, and the value of money is affected by the time that this money is received or paid. It is evident that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in a year’s time, but is a dollar today worth more than two dollars in a year’s time? Two interlinked types of calculation are normally used to make this decision:
• a discounted cash flow (DCF) calculation, which gives a value today, or ‘present value’ (PV), for a future cash flow (§3.2); and
• an internal rate of return (IRR) calculation, which determines the overall rate of return on an investment based on its future cash flow (§3.3).
Although both of these methods of calculation have some problems (§3.4), they are widely used in PPP projects in a variety of contexts (§3.5).
§3.2 Present Value / Discounted Cash Flow
§3.2.1 Present Value
The PV is the value today of a sum of money due in the future, discounted at the cost of money, i.e. a relevant interest rate.¹ The formula for a PV calculation is
PV=present value, i.e. the ‘money of today’,
FV=future value, i.e. the ‘money of the future’,
i=the discount rate, and
n=the number of periods (e.g. annual or semi-annual with the discount rate adjusted accordingly) until FV is paid.
Thus if the discount rate is 10% p.a. , or $909.1. To turn the calculation the other way around, if $909.1 is invested for a year at 10%, $1,000 (i.e. 909.1x1.10) will be repaid at the end of the year. Similarly the PV of a sum of $1,000 due in 2 years’ time at a discount rate of 10% p.a. calculated semi-annually (i.e. 5% per half year) is $1,000÷(1+0.05)⁴, or $822.7.
§3.2.2 Discounted Cash Flow
A DCF calculation is the PV of a series of future cash sums, the purpose of the calculation being to find what this stream of future cash flows is worth in money of today. It is calculated as the sum of the cash flow for each future period (usually semi-annually in PPP cash-flow calculations), each period’s cash flow being discounted to its PV as set out above.
Typically the cash flow in a DCF calculation offsets, or ‘nets off’, the costs (such as investment and running costs) in a project against the stream of future revenues which the project produces. When this happens, the result is called the net present value (NPV). The term ‘net present cost’ (NPC) may be used when looking at the DCF from a contracting authority’s perspective (because the future cash flows are a series of payments by the contracting authority or users), but the calculation is the same as an NPV.
Although DCF calculations can easily be done using the relevant spread-sheet software function, it is useful to understand the underlying formulæ and calculations as a way of checking and understanding the final result.
The choice of discount rate is obviously crucial in determining the NPV of a project’s cash flow, and hence the value of the project as an investment: the higher the rate the lower the NPV, and vice versa. The discount rate used also depends on the context in which the DCF calculation is being performed, and by whom, as discussed at the end of this chapter.
§3.2.3 Using Discounted Cash-Flow Calculations
The use of DCF calculations can be illustrated by the two contrasting investment cash flows set out in Table 3.1. Both involve an initial investment of $1,000, and cash flows over five years of $1,350, producing a surplus (net of the initial investment) of $350. The cash flow for each annual period has been discounted to its NPV at 10% p.a. Year 0 is the first day of the project, when the investment is made (the investment being shown as a negative figure in the cash flow); the remaining cash flows are received at annual intervals thereafter.
It will be seen that although the undiscounted cash flows produce the same net result over the five-year period, the NPV of Investment A is $49 (i.e. DCFs from years 1 to 5 of $1,049, less the original investment of $1,000), whereas that of Investment B is −$2. Investment A is thus the better project. These differences in the DCF calculations illustrate the importance to investors of the timing of cash flows.
The discount rate is often used as a ‘hurdle rate’, meaning that if the NPV is positive using this rate the investment is acceptable, whereas if it is negative the return is too low and therefore the investment is not acceptable. Thus if the same cash flows are discounted at 5% p.a., the NPV of Investment A is $184 and that of Investment B is $154; so, changing the hurdle rate does not affect the decision that Investment A is the better one, but it also turns Investment B from a doubtful into an attractive investment. If Investment B were the only choice, changing the hurdle rate from 10% to 5% would affect the decision whether to go ahead with it or not, which illustrates the importance of the choice of discount rate.
A DCF calculation also provides a means of valuing an investment that is already held (in which case there is no initial investment cost outflow). If a PPP contract is expected to provide a stream of revenues of $1,000 a year for the next 20 years, the financial value of this business is determined by discounting this stream of revenues to its value today, i.e. its PV. The choice of discount rate again makes a substantial difference to the result: if this stream is discounted at 15% p.a., its value today is $6,259, but if discounted at 8% p.a., its value is $9,818. As will be seen, investors have different views about the value of a stream of future revenues, and so use different discount rates—thus the same PPP project may have a different value for different investors.
§3.3 Internal Rate of Return
The IRR measures the return on the investment over its life. It is the discount rate at which the NPV of the cash flow (adding up both the outflows and the inflows) is zero. Thus using the examples in Table 3.1 as set out in Table 3.2, the IRR of Investment A is 12.08% and Investment B is 9.94%, so again showing that Investment A is the better of the two; the calculation can be checked by discounting the two cash flows at these respective rates. Again a minimum IRR can be used as a hurdle rate, so if the investor has an IRR hurdle rate of say 12%, Investment A will be acceptable but Investment B will not.
§3.4 Problems with Discounted Cash Flow and Internal Rate of Return Calculations
Some caution must be exercised with DCF and IRR calculations, as both have defects or weaknesses which need to be understood.
§3.4.1 Single Discount Rate
The use of a single discount rate or IRR to assess investments suggests that the risks involved in a project are the same throughout its life. In reality, of course this is not the case (cf. §20.3.1).
Similarly, in a typical PPP, there is a construction period lasting several years, during which the project’s cash flow is of course negative, generally followed by positive cash flows for the rest of the project life, unlike the cash flows in the tables above, where all the investment is assumed to take place on day one of the project. If a high discount rate is used to calculate the NPV of the project, which is usually the conservative approach because a higher discount rate gives a lower NPV, the negative cash flows over an extended construction period are also being discounted at this high rate, which is not conservative: where future cash flows are negative, the conservative approach is to use a low discount rate. Arguably two different discount rates should be used for the initial negative and subsequent positive cash flows although this is not generally the case in the PPP