Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/65735719/civ-pro
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 18:28:15
Document Index: 614344126

Matched Legal Cases: ['arty 4', '§ 1332', '§ 2', '§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1332', '§ 1331', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1441', '§ 1446', '§ 1446', '§ 1391', '§ 1441', '§ 1391', '§ 1446', '§ 1447', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1406', '§ 1631', '§ 1404', '§ 1406', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1391', '§ 1631', '§ 1406', '§ 1391', '§ 1404', '§ 1652', '§ 1', '§1738', 'arty 2', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', '§ 1367', 'arty 4', 'arty 2', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1253']

civ pro | Jurisdiction | Diversity Jurisdiction
BrowseInterestsBiography & MemoirBusiness & LeadershipFiction & LiteraturePolitics & EconomyHealth & WellnessSociety & CultureHappiness & Self-HelpMystery, Thriller & CrimeHistoryYoung AdultBrowse byBooksAudiobooksArticlesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinCIVIL PROCEDURE OUTLINE I. Personal Jurisdiction (PJ)—In what states can the π sue the Δ? A.In personam—power over the Δ herself i. General: Δ can be sued in that forum on a claim that arose anywhere in the world 1. If the Δ has continuous and systematic or substantial ties with the forum that Δ is subject to general jurisdiction a. Domicile in the forum b. Corporation is incorporated in the forum ii. Specific: the Δ is being sued on a claim that arises from activities in the forum 1. discreet and insular contact (car accident)—claim arises out of and related to the contact with the forum Coastal Video Communications v. Starwell (1999): copyright infringement; Δ based in CA but sold videos and advertised in VA; copyright violation did not arise out of contact with VA—is there specific or general jurisdiction in VA? Court says it needs more information about the extent of the Δ’s contact with the forum state in order to determine whether they are subject to general or specific jurisdiction. iii. Constitutional test: Pennoyer v. Neff (1877): the state has power over people and property inside its boundaries; very physical determination; gives us the traditional basis of in personam jurisdiction 1. Traditional bases of in personam PJ: a. Presence: If the Δ is served with process in the forum it gives the forum general in personam jurisdiction b. Agent: Service of process on the Δ’s agent in the forum creates general jurisdiction c. Domicile: Δ is domiciled in the forum gives general jursidiction d. Consent: Δ consents to specific jurisdiction Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute (1991): adhesion contract term requiring passengers to consent to suit in FL; court held that you can waive your constitutional protections and that minimum contacts are not necessary when there is consent; efficiency argument to prevent cruise line from defending in whatever state passengers are from (cost passed on to consumer) • POLICY ISSUES: i. In terms of fairness the cruise line is better able to afford distant defense ii. Purposeful availment—did the cruise line advertise in the Δ’s home state? iii. Unconscionability—unequal bargaining power in adhesion contracts
2. “Minimum Contacts” and “Traditional Notions of Fair Play” International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945): company based in St. Louis had salesmen in Washington and Washington wanted a contribution from corporation to state unemployment fund; company claimed no personal jurisdiction; SC found personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporate Δ where the Δ has “such minimum contacts with the forum so that exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”. Factors in assessing minimum contacts: 1. presence in the state 2. systematic and continuous activities within the state 3. enjoys the benefits and protections of state laws 4. whether it is reasonable to expect the Δ to defend itself in that state a. More flexible than Pennoyer b. It is clear that you can serve process outside the forum state so long as he has such minimum contacts… etc. c. Two part assessment (1) contacts (2) fairness d. Did not overrule Pennoyer—test if the Δ is not present in the forum (implying that presence in the forum when served is still enough) “Relatedness” and “Purposeful Availment” (sufficiency of contacts) a. Π’s claim was related to contact with forum (contacts create specific jurisdiction)
McGee v. International Life (1957): TX insurance company sued in CA; only had one contract in CA but the court said that was enough because (1) Δ solicited that business (2) court noticed that the π’s claim arose from the Δ’s contact with the forum, call “relatedness” (3) state’s interest in protecting its citizens from out of state companies b. Π’s contact with forum must be purposeful availment of the forum Hanson v. Denckle (1958): PA woman has a trust fund with a DE bank before she moves to FL; she dies and the question is, does FL have jurisdiction over that DE bank? NO—because that bank had no relevant contact with FL; contact must result from Δ’s “purposeful availment” of that forum and not based on unilateral action of a party 4. “Foreseeability” a. A π has purposefully availed himself of a forum when it is foreseeable that he could be haled into court there as a result of the contact. Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980): family lives in NY and is moving to AZ; they buy a car in NY, got in accident in OK that car was defective; there was jurisdiction over Volkswagen nationally but is there jurisdiction in OK over the regional distributor and the NY retailer?—NO;
because there is no relevant contact or “purposeful availment” because the Δ’s took the car to OK i. Isn’t is foreseeable that the car would get to OK? Court says foreseeability is relevant but only foreseeability that the Δ could get sued in that forum. Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court (1987): victim of motorcycle accident brought suit in CA court against Taiwanese tire-tube maker who cross-claimed against a Japanese manufacturer of the tube valve assembly. When a company puts a product into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it will reach the forum state are minimum contacts satisfied? no majority opinion so two theories emerge • O’Connor approach (decision): We need more than just a reasonable anticipation that a product will reach the forum state; we need that plus the intent to serve the forum state (advertise, customer phone line, distributors) • Brennan approach: It is a contact if you put the product in the stream and could reasonably anticipate that it would get to a state 5. The “effect” test: a. Jones v. Calder (1984): you don’t have to actually step into the forum if you can reasonably expect to have an effect in the forum which would expose you to lawsuit (defamation in newspaper) Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002): website gave info to decrypt data stored on DVDs to permit copying copyrighted materials; (limiting Calder) a passive website that only makes information available is not grounds for personal jurisdiction even if harm in the forum is foreseeable; exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information. 6. The Fairness requirement of Due Process a. High burden placed on Δ to show forum is unfair Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985): two franchisees of a BK store in MI are sued for breaching the franchise agreement in FL; Δs claim it is too burdensome to defend in FL and it violates due process; court says there is jurisdiction in FL because the Δs should have anticipated when they entered into the franchise agreement that they would have to defend in FL. Factors: (1) convenience to Δ (2) effective relief for π (3) forum state interest (4) sister state interest (5) efficiency i. There are two parts to International Shoe test (1) contact (2) fairness ii. You must have a relevant contact before we even are concerned with fairness iii. The burden is on the Δ to show that the forum is unconstitutionally unfair and it’s a high burden—so gravely inconvenient that you are at a severe
Statutory Inquiry—we only get to exercise PJ if a statute that allows it. 1. NY reads it to mean the Δ must act in the state) Gibbons v. • Scalia approach (decision): presence when you’re served is enough by itself based on historical pedigree of Pennoyer • Brennan approach: we need minimum contacts—finds minimum contacts because he was in CA and while he was there he purposefully availed himself of the services of the state --dangerously broad!! What if I mail you a letter.disadvantage in the litigation (due process does not promise the most convenient forum) 7.. purposeful availment ii. Does the long arm statute allow personal jurisdiction? If yes -> 2. Long-Arm Statutes—two types a. domicile)—those may be enough by themselves under 4 justices in Burnham. substantial business) ii. Reaffirming Pennoyer Burnham v. Laundry list statute—various things the Δ can do in the state that subject Δ to jurisdiction i.e. π sought to assert jurisdiction over nonresident Δ on the grounds that the Δ had filed a lawsuit in the forum two years earlier stemming from the same incident (π was not a party to that suit). does CA have general jurisdiction? Questions whether presence when served is still enough or do we need minimum contacts? All agreed CA had general jurisdiction but no majority reasoning. Minimum contacts? a. Do traditional bases apply? (presence. Language varies from state to state (any business v. consent. FL long arm-statute permitted jurisdiction over those “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity” within the state. “tortious act”—IL reads that to be the location of the injury. California—we have jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution b. agent. Relevant contact between the Δ and the forum i. Brown (1998): car accident from bad directions. every state has a series of statutes about PJ (all have Pennoyer traditional standards) 2. Δ served while in the state of CA briefly. iv. no personal jurisdiction. have I availed myself of the postal system? Better to keep to strict physical presence standard than lower the standard for minimum contacts. Same language can be interpreted in different ways (i. Held. relatedness—does this claim arise from the Δ’s contact with the forum?
. v. bringing an action in the state two years earlier does not qualify as substantial activity. Superior Court (1990): NJ Δ sued in CA on a claim that arose in NJ (general jurisdiction). Analytical Framework 1. but maybe we need some more per the other 4 justices 3.
[neither the ownership of shares of stock of a corporation located in the forum state nor holding a position as a director of the corporation is sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction over individual Δs] 1. Goes to a clock shop and buys a clock. Statutory Inquiry—attachment statute requires attachment at the outset of the litigation 1. Heitner (1977): where there is property in the state that serves as a basis for jurisdiction but is unrelated to the cause of action. In Rem Jurisdiction—power over Δ’s property (specific jurisdiction) i. common law attachment standard from Pennoyer ii. foreseeable that the Δ could get sued in that forum ii. there must be sufficient minimum contacts with the state to support jurisdiction over the Δ. Fairness—burden on the Δ to show that it is unconstitutionally unfair (severe disadvantage in the litigation) iii. domicile)
. This holding made quasi in rem insufficient and incorporated pure in rem on the presumption that there’s always contact between the owner and the property and the property is within the forum state. Π’s interest (not often discussed) v. 3. Takes it home to Washington state where he is injured by the clock. Property in a forum may still suffice to create general in personam jurisdiction under minimum contacts assessment. State’s interest (McGee)—does the forum have some interest in allowing the litigation? iv. HYPO: π lives in Washington and drives down to Oregon to drive around. consent. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice i. In many states it is statutorily mandated that being the director of a corporation registered in that state submits those directors to personal jurisdiction in the state 2. Constitutionality Shaffer v. Legal system’s interest in efficiency vi. if there was negligence it’s where the clock was made in OR o Constitutional validity?  No traditional Pennoyer basis (presence.b. Interstate interest in shared policies B. Can we sue the Oregon clock maker in Washington? • Personal Jurisdiction— o Is there a Washington statute?  Traditional basis statute won’t work here  Long Arm statute?—suppose it says that Washington has jurisdiction over non-residents who commit a tortious act in Washington • Illinois rule—yes there was a tortious act in WA because π was injured in Washington • NY Rule—no because there was no tortious act in WA.
Geographic Limitations—Rule 4(k)(1)(a)—we can serve process throughout the state in which our federal court sits but we can serve process out of state only if a state court in this state could do so (such as long arm statutes). Process consists of summons and a copy of the complaint ii. Personal service—hand the process to the Δ anywhere in the state b. Rule 4(e)(2) a. How do we serve an individual? 1. federal court incorporates methods for serving process allowed by the state in which the federal court sits or the state in which service is actually effected 2. Bulge rule—4(k)(1)(b)—a federal court can serve outside the state in which it sits within 100 miles of where it sits. Service of Process—Rule 4 i. serve an officer or a managing or general agent (someone with enough responsibility to be considered reliable for passing along important documents) v. does NOT allow service of process by mail (only allows service by mail if states rule is incorporated under 4(e)(1)) 2. he went there already. but what if the shop is on the interstate highway two miles from the border or Δ advertises in WA (like in McGee) • Foreseeability—again an issue of the facts Fairness • Relatedness—(usually required by long arm statutes) • Burden on Δ—these are neighboring states. Substituted service—at the Δ’s usual abode and you must serve someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there c. does NOT apply to original Δs only to parties being joined later in the case under Rule 14 or Rule 19 B. this is not a severe burden • State interest in protecting citizens from defective products from other states
II. Rule 4(e)(1)—incorporates state law. Agent—You can serve the Δ’s agent iv.
Contact? • Purposeful availment—clock got into WA because of a unilateral act of a third party (like in Volkswagen). Exceptions: 1. if Δ does not return waiver form then she will be formally served and she may have to pay for service vi. How do we serve a corporation? Rule 4(h) 1. Constitutional standard for notice
. Waiver of service by mail—Rule 4(d) 1. federal statutes allows for nationwide service of process for federal courts 4(k)(1)(c) and (d) 2. Notice— A. Service can be made by any nonparty who is at least age 18 iii.
Diversity of Citizenship—28 USC § 1332(a)(1)— creates federal court jurisdiction over “controversies between citizens of different states” and citizens of a state and foreign citizens (codifies Art III § 2) i. US citizens are citizens in the state of their domicile (only one domicile at a time. title. Subject Matter Jurisdiction (SMJ): does this claim belong in state or federal court? A. in most instances it is not good because it will not satisfy Mullane.i. Curtiss) 2. it would not have burdened the trust to mail individual notices because they knew of the location of the beneficiaries. liberty or property by adjudication. however Mullane addresses “all the circumstances” and permits publication notice where beneficiaries of a trust could not be identified/ located III. 28 USC § 1332(a) was amended in 1988 to provide that an alien admitted to the US for permanent residence is deemed a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled. Farouki (1997): the 1988 amendment does not extend diversity jurisdiction over an alien and another alien who has permanent residence status in the US. retain old domicile until you get a new one) i. everyone has one. Due process requires that notice be provided prior to the deprivation of life.
. Constructive notice (publication notice): giving notice to people in the newspaper. lives in KS with wife and possible plan to move to MO . due process requires notice must be “reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise the Δ of the suit and provide an opportunity to be heard”. Concurrent jurisdiction—cases arising under federal law can be brought either in state or federal court B. Central Hanover Bank (1950): pooled trust funds and notice of terminated right to suit for mismanagement published in newspaper. Mullane v.Δ is KS b. Citizenship a. Masters Farms (2003): π is KS. ii. Foreign Citizens: i. license. not create jurisdiction for two noncitizen parties. Intent to make that state your permanent home Hawkins v. Saddeh v. π lived in MO. and insurance for car. pay checks sent. Complete diversity rule—there is no diversity if any π is a citizen of the same state as any Δ (Strawbridge v. amendment to § 1332(a)(5) was meant to exclude diversity between alien resident and citizen in same state. Exclusive Jurisdiction—Congress has made federal court the exclusive forum for certain actions such as bankruptcy and antitrust cases C. Presence in the state ii. driver's license. Held. Citizens of different states 1.
One state where it has principle place of business (only one principle place of business) 1. All states where it is incorporated ii. Counterclaims: a.01)—does include punitive damages 2. Amount in Controversy—§ 1332(a)(1) 1. π’s ultimate recovery is irrelevant to jurisdiction—§ 1332(b) may have to pick up the other side’s costs if the judgment is under $75K 3. total activities test—use the nerve center unless all corporate activity is in a single state ii. Congress
. look only at the Complaint b. Case must “arise under federal law” (federal statute or Const. amount must exceed $75.000 not counting interest and costs (must be $75. Citizenship of a corporation: defined by statute § 1332(c)(1)— i. ?s NY . a. St. muscle center—where most activities are conducted 3. Courts view the allegations in the pleading as controlling and do not speculate about the likelihood of π collecting what is asked for. must appear to legal certainty that claim is for less than statutory amount to dismiss. claim) 1.US citizen with foreign residence cannot claim diversity jurisdiction as a citizen of a foreign state (needed to allege facts to support CA domicile) -(a) (2 c. it is the π’s claim that must arise under federal law Lousiville Nashville v. Paul Mercury Indemnity v.000. Aggregation—adding two or more claims to exceed amount in controversy a. Federal Question—§ 1331 i. Motley (1908): husband and wife settled for lifetime passes on the RR. nerve center—executive center of the corporation 2.ii. Sanders (2000): US citizen may not claim diversity jurisdiction as a citizen of a foreign state. Red Cab Co. Mutiple Δs with a common interest or single title/ right are aggregated (total value of interest in the amount in controversy) 4. Aggregate claims if it is one π versus one Δ (even for unrelated claims) i. Compulsory—may be heard regardless of amount when πs claims meets statutory requirement b. US citizens who reside in foreign countries may not claim diversity jurisdiction. Permissive—requires independent basis for jurisdiction (supplemental under § 1367) D. Redner v. Well Pleaded Complaint Rule— a. But NOT if there are multiple parties on either side b. ? is a US citizen residing in France.
Issue of state law predominates over issue of federal law 2. would a federal question arise? E. Δ is a citizen of TN. (a) Δ can remove to the district court in which the action is pending 2. Removal—a Δ in state court can have the case transferred to federal court i. Alleging that a defense will be based on federal law is not sufficient to raise a federal question “Federalizing Warp”—question that arises under state law but contains federal interest or turns on interpretation of federal law may be allowed in federal court. Does § 1367(a) grant supplemental jurisdiction? Yes—if it meets the Gibbs test of “common nucleus of operative fact” 2. If the parties were reversed and the π had made that claim. Declaratory judgment—federal courts can hear cases where a Δ seeks a declaration of rights i. Judicial economy and fairness to the litigants (prejudicial) Jin v. π has two claims against the same Δ one is FQ the second is a state law claim • Claim #1 is a federal question (qualifies for federal court) • Claim #2 does not invoke federal question because it’s based on state law and no diversity • Supreme Court said federal court can hear Claim #2 because it has supplemental jurisdiction (pendant) over that claim because it “shares a common nucleus of operative fact” with Claim #1 (similar to “same transaction or occurrence”) iii. supported by judicial economy. they said the fed rule the RR will assert does not apply to them. United Mine Workers v. Does § 1367(b) remove supplemental jurisdiction? a. Supplemental Jurisdiction—§ 1367—when a federal court has proper original jurisdiction over a claim. Federal claim must support federal question jurisdiction ii. convenience and fairness iv. 19. 20. Discretionary factors: 1. it may hear all other claims that form part of the same “case or controversy” including cases involving joinder or intervention. TEST: when we see a non-federal claim 1. a. § 1441 : 1. Gibbs ( ): π is a citizen of TN.share a common nucleus of operative facts. Federal and non-federal claims must arise from the same nucleus of operative facts such that they can be tried in one proceeding. are the Motley’s enforcing a federal right? No—their claim is simply breach of contract.passes a statute that says RR cannot give lifetime passes (federal law). or 24 F. i. the federal issue is an anticipated defense. if original jurisdiction is based on diversity: no supplemental jurisdiction over claims by π against persons made parties under 14. Ministry of State Security (2003): federal RICO claim and state defamation claim (no diversity b/c foreign on both sides) .
§ 1446(b): no removal more than one year after the case was filed in state court (stupid because encourages joining a local defendant and dismissing a year later) 6. Venue. Lewis (1996): If the Dist Court fails to remand a case where removal was improper. (b) Δ may remove regardless of diversity if there is a federal question. (2) You may lay venue in any district where a substantial part of the claim arose v. (d) remand order is not reviewable by appellate court 3. § 1446 : iii. Statutes: § 1391(a) for diversity. Straight Up: we remove only to the federal district embracing the state court where the case was filed 3. but not if the case is filed in the state in which they are domiciled 3. Supplemental: dist court has discretion to hear Caterpillar v. (1) If all Δs reside in different districts of the same state we can lay venue where any individual Δ resides iv. § 1441(b): no removal if any Δ is a citizen of the forum (no local Δ rule) b. Rules of Removal: 1. If no other district works
.third hurdle π must get over in forum selection—which district do we go to? A. πs cannot remove 4. if removal is improper the federal court remands it to the state court 2. (c) Dist court has discretion to hear or refuse to hear removal claims brought under supplemental jurisdiction ii. Coulda Rule: you can remove a case if it could have been brought in federal court however.2. Basic provisions for venue— i. a corporation residence is defined by § 1391(c): resides in all districts where it is subject to personal jurisdiction when the case is filed iii. not in FQ) a. Timely: you must remove within 30 days of service of the document that first makes the case removable (§ 1446) 5. Δs Only: all Δs must agree to the removal. § 1447 : 1. Only Up: removal is a one way street goes only from state to federal. human beings reside at their domicile 2. (e) if after removal π seek to join Δs that would destroy SMJ the court can deny joinder or permit and remand to state ct iv. two exceptions (apply in diversity cases. § 1391(b) for FQ ii. You may lay venue in any district where all Δs reside 1. efficiency and judicial economy IV. the judgment will be upheld if the federal jurisdiction requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. considerations of finality. (c) motion to remand must be filed within 30 days except if its because of lack of SMJ which can be remanded any time 2.
1. cannot transfer between state courts in different states 3. Or dismiss for improper venue (usually transfer) 4. pain and suffering. The transferee court follows the law of the transferor court 3. punitive damages. Δs reside in different states and events took place outside of US. can only transfer to a court that has personal jurisdiction and is a proper venue 2. Reyno (1981): plane crashed in Scotland and all the people killed were Scottish. Statutes: § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) and § 1631 1. cannot § 1404 transfer between federal and state courts (if you want to go backwards) 2. etc. Circuit Court overruled dismissal for forum non conveniens on the grounds that Scottish law would disadvantage πs. πs would much rather recover in the US because you get much more money (strict liability in tort. Transfer in the interest of justice b. § 1406(b)—failure to raise the matter of venue does not invalidate a district court’s 5. DIVERSITY: § 1391(a)(3): a district where any Δ is subject to personal jurisdiction 2. Held. venue for American Δs controlled by § 1391(b)(3) because it’s a FQ.). FED QUESTION: § 1391(b)(3): a district where any Δ may be found (lower standard than diversity) Dee-K Enterprises v. Δ moved to dismiss for lack of PJ and improper venue. Forum Non Conveniens—where a court dismisses because there is another court that is more convenient in a different judicial system: i. B. only applies where first venue is proper but a better venue exists 1. § 1631—if the suit is filed in a court without jurisdiction the court shall if in the interest of justice transfer the action to any other court in which the action could have been brought C. when better venue is foreign country Piper Aircraft v. § 1406(a)—the transferor court is an improper venue a. PJ is proper where minimum contacts are satisfied. under federal statute 28 USC § 1391(d) an alien corporation is subject to suit in any judicial district. Held: in ruling on forum non conveniens motion the court should not give dispositive weight to the fact that the alternative forum is less favorable to πs unless the alternative is clearly inadequate such that it would
. Transfer of Venue—from one court to another within the federal system i. general venue statute overrides specific antitrust venue statute requiring suit where company “transacts business”. π ordered to amend complaint to allege with specificity the venue in the district in which the complaint was filed. Heveafil Sdn Bhd (1997): purchaser of rubber thread in US sued international distributors (Δ) for conspiracy to restrain trade in rubber thread. And/or in the interest of justice c. § 1404(a)—the transferor court (original) is a proper venue a. In the interest of convenience of the parties and witnesses b. plane was manufactured in the US so suit was brought in CA state court and removed to fed court and then transferred to to PA. additional facts are necessary to establish contacts or business in the Eastern District.
Once the case is dismissed for forum non conveniens the burden is on the π to re-submit the case in the alternate forum. V. 12(b)(1) can be raised any time—you cannot waive lack of SMJ and court can bring it up on its own B. Rule 12(g) and (h)— 1. SMJ 2. Relative ease of access to sources of proof b. Factors for dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens 1. PJ 3. Availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling c. defenses under 12(b)(2). Cost of attendance of willing witnesses d. Unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty 2. Making a 12(b)(2) motion does not subject Δ to the personal jurisdiction he is protesting (special appearance rule—not used in fed court)
.provide no remedy. Local interest in having localized controversies at home c. Possibility of viewing premises if relevant to action iii. Rule 12(b)—seven defenses can be raised either in your answer or by motion 1. Venue 4. Public factors a. insufficient process (summons and complaint) 5. The avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or application of foreign law e. (4). failure to state a claim 7. (3). and (5) must be put in your first Rule 12 response (answer or motion) or else they are waived 2. insufficient service of process 6. Private factors a. Administrative difficulties from court congestion b. Rule 12: when you get sued within 20 days after service of process you must respond in one of two ways (motion or answer) i. Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction—Rule 12(b)(1) & (2) i. Challenging Forum Selection— A. Reasons Scotland is better: • No presumption in favor of πs choice of forum when π is foreign (this would encourage onslaught of foreign cases in US Courts) • Witnesses and relevant evidence are more easily located in Scotland • Claim should be resolved in one trial (difficult impleading third party Δs in US) • PA courts are unfamiliar with Scottish law (applies to one Δ and not the other) ii. defenses under 12(b)(6) and (7) can be raised for the first time any time through trial 3. failure to join an indispensable party ii. Interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action d.
Erie Doctrine—only comes up in diversity jurisdiction (never FQ) when a state claim is being heard in federal court. Supreme Court decided the meaning of “laws” in the RDA did not include “unwritten” law by a state’s highest court (except local things like land title). splits Erie into two prongs a. Court denies the motion. Collateral Attack 1. Swift v. Federal court must apply state substantive law. Rules of Decision Act § 1652 (1789)—“the law of the several states” shall be followed in federal diversity cases. Plumer (1965): service of process was ok under state substitution but not under FRCP. PJ: right to object is waived if Δ makes a motion raising any of the defenses listed in Rule 12 and personal jurisdiction defense is not included (2) Δ files answer but makes no Rule 12 motion nor raises the personal jurisdiction defense 2..ii. SMJ: Cannot waive lack of subject matter jurisdiction C. Waiver of Jurisdiction Defenses: 1. const. If the court finds jurisdiction in State 1 was proper. Δ files answer and in the answer she says there is no personal jurisdiction. Default: if Δ defaults in an action in State 1 he may collaterally attack default judgment when it is sued upon in State 2 on the ground that State 1 lacked personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. When do we apply state law to a question in diversity cases? i. What is pure substantive law? 1. Reed concurrence: distinction between procedure and substance ii. HYPO: π sues Δ and Δ files a 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. RDA includes judge made law 2. Art IV § 1: Full Faith and Credit Clause requires one state to recognize and enforce judgments of another state (Δ’s property or wages in State 2 may be seized to satisfy a judgment in State 1) 2. only includes written law of statutes. the first thing we’re going to ask is whether there is a federal directive on point? (statute. she has waived the PJ defense because PJ must be in your first Rule 12 response. VI. Tyson (1841) [reversed by Erie] Erie RR v. Δ has waived right to defend on the merits. Hanna v. a. Constitution 10th Amend—reserved powers 2. FRCP) if yes then apply federal directive as long as it is valid—this comes from the Supremacy clause of the Const because federal law prevails as long as it is valid
. why? 1. Tompkins (1938): 1. default to state unless federal law on point a. do we apply state law or federal law? A. no general federal common law 3.
but out-of-state π does) Semtek Int’l Inc v. Plumer: 1. we will follow state law unless the fed court has a strong interest in doing it it’s own way (leaving fact determinations to a jury is a legitimate federal interest) Byrd v. outcome determination—Guarantee Trust v. might violate REA because modified right to sue • So Rule 41b is inapplicable • Federal preclusion law is whatever the Supreme Court says it is .Hanna v. New York (1945): state SOL would bar the claim.no conflict)
. Blue Ridge: under state law the judge and not the jury was to decide the matter. avoid forum shopping—will it cause people to flock to federal court? (kind of same as inequity because if they are flocking to fed court it gives advantage to out of staters) 2. SC said it was not substantive because we have to balance the relative interests. (2001): CA federal court dismissed for statute of limitations. re-file in MD state court with longer statute of limitations • full faith and credit clause and §1738 are inapplicable because 1st decision was federal not state • supremacy clause requires state court to respect federal court decision so must give same res judicata effect that the issuing court would (federal CA court in diversity) • state law means no claim preclusion because CA rule allows re-filing in a different jurisdiction with longer statute of limitations • federal rule seems to preclude because same claim. twin aims of Erie—Hanna v. what if there’s no federal directive on point? three factors i. Lockheed Martin Corp. avoid “inequitable administration of law”— different outcomes in the same state violate Equal Protection (in-state Δ does not have choice of venues. parties and valid final judgment on the merits • R41b literally says that dismissal for statute of limitations is on the merits • Scalia says on the merits there means with prejudice (cannot re-file in the same court) • If really on the merits. New York (1945) ii. Plumer (1965): • Harlan—does the vertical arbitrage influence “primary activities” b. Blue Ridge iii.and it mirrors state preclusion law (no collision) unless there is a countervailing federal interest • Apply federal law here (and state . balancing interest—Byrd v. should the fed judge follow the state SOL? Yes—SOL is substantive so fed court must follow state law (it’s outcome determinative) Guarantee Trust v.
Balancing interests—is there a federal interest in avoiding arbitration? 3. law always wins b. US Statute v. Rule 9(b)—must plead in detail under circumstances of fraud and mistake. Hannah problem—the federal rule is on point so it wins. state law— (direct conflict) i. state law i. Twin aims of Erie—if fed judge says federal court means avoiding arbitration you will get forum shopping which automatically creates inequitable application of law VII. Is the Rule Enabling Act constitutional? Yes then supremacy (Hanna case) 2. Short and plain statement of the claim 1. ERIE TEST: i. Rule 9(g)—must plead with specificity if you seek relief for special damages (those that do not normally flow from an event)
. Notice pleading—generally only have to put the other side on notice by including enough information to give Δ a fair chance to respond 2. Is there a clear collision between federal and state law? 1. must be particularized 3. Is the statute constitutional? If yes then federal supremacy (when law is directly on point) c. state law—(direct conflict) i. Guaranty Trust Test—is this substantive/ outcome determinative? ii. Hanna Test—twin aims of Erie HYPO #1: class action met under Rule 23 but under state law it could not proceed as a class action. HYPO #2: state passes statute on medical malpractice case that says medical malpractice case must go to arbitration and if you lose at the arbitration you can go to jury trial but arbitration decision is admitted in evidence. No federal law on point a. Const provision vs. Byrd Test—is there a strong federal interest in using federal practice? iii. federal court diversity case for malpractice.B. Federal law on point a. FRCP v. does the federal judge have to admit the arbitration proceedings to evidence? • Not a Hannah problem—there is no federal directive • Erie problem—so is it substantive? 1. state law—Const. Statement of the grounds of SMJ ii. Pleadings A. Complaint: Rule 8(a) i. Federal practice (fed common law) v. Is this rule enacted by the Rule Enabling Act? (allows courts to create enabling rules but not disturb substance) ii. outcome determinative—probably not 2.
Demand for judgment (prayer for relief) iv. defenses under 12(b)(6) and (7) can be raised for the first time any time through trial c. Δ moved for 12(b)(6) because the complaint did not state specific acts of negligence. Say you don’t know (lack sufficient information to admit or deny)—treated as denial
. Deny i. Rule 12(f)—Motion to Strike 4. Rule 12(e)—Motion for a More Definite Statement 3. you only need a short and plain statement of the claim. Rule: A complaint may be dismissed only if there is no set of facts in support of the π’s claim that would entitle him to relief. If complaint is inadequate then file Rule 12(b)(6)—Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim Haddle v. and (5) and 12(e) and 12(f) must be put in your first Rule 12 response (answer or motion) or else they are waived b. Supreme Court reversed and said the law will allow recovery so 12(b)(6) was not appropriate. (4). Garrison (1998): π’s case was dismissed by district court for failure to state a claim on the grounds that discharge from at-will employment did not create legally cognizable injury. B. Rule 12(b)—seven defenses can be raised either in your answer or by motion a. Bell v. 12(b)(1) can be raised any time—you cannot waive lack of SMJ and court can bring it up on its own ii. (4) insufficient process (summons and complaint) e. (7) failure to join an indispensable party 2. (3). Admit b. Rule 12(g) and (h)— a. Novick (1955): π alleged he was struck by the Δ’s tractor driven by Δ’s agent. Rule 8(b): Respond to the allegations of the complaint a. (3) Venue d. Motion (not a pleading)—Rule 12: within 20 days of service 1. (2) PJ c. (5) insufficient service of process f. (1) SMJ b. If you fail to deny an allegation it is deemed an admission (except for damages) c. defenses under 12(b)(2). Held. Answer—might answer in lieu of the motion or make answer when motion is denied 1. (6) failure to state a claim g. Response: i. the details will come out in discovery.iii. Consistency: you can put hypothetical or alternative theories v.
If there’s no right to amend. leave to amend is fully within the discretion of the court. Δ answered with general denial. • Rule of Thumb: when the Δ raises a new matter that is not already at issue in the case it should be pled as an affirmative defense. π has a right to amend once before Δ serves Answer (not motions!!) 2. (1977): π was injured by a faulty waterslide. Rule 15(a): 1. jury will be instructed that agency is presumptively admitted by both parties. Generally only denied when to do so will cause actual prejudice to the other party (has statute run?) Beeck v. POLICY: SOL has run for π to file against a different Δ so π would have no redress in violation of principles of equitable estoppel 2. however. but imagine the alternative. the court has discretion to grant leave to amend and will allow amendment “when justice so requires” a. Δ cannot deny allegation that π was injured by a forklift therefore denial is invalid. If Δ went to trial they would have to argue that they had not acted negligently in the manufacturing of a slide that they did not manufacture. A general denial challenges all material allegations (π’s cause of action never had legal existence). at trial Δ raised right of entry by easement and π objected but was overruled.Zielinski v. Southwestern Bell Telephone (1977): π sued telephone company for trespass for laying telephone wires on her property without permission. a general denial is not valid if any of the allegations being denied have been admitted by the parties as true. Δ answered complaint and made a general denial of allegations. Held. Amending Pleadings: Rule 15 i. in the absence of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant. more accurate denial would have put π on notice that he was suing the wrong party before SOL ran. Statute of limitation b. POLICY: It seems unfair to the π to leave him with no recourse. an easement is an affirmative defense to trespass and must be set forth in the answer or evidence of the easement will not be allowed at trial. Philadelphia Piers (1956): π was hit by a forklift he believed was operated by an agent of Δ. Held.
. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp. Δ answered complaint admitting that it was the manufacturer of the slide. Δ later claimed that the forklift operator was not their agent and that this was included in their general denial. Res Judicata Layman v. Δ has a right to amend once within 20 days of serving Answer 3. affirmative defenses admit facts of complaint but aver that Δ is not legally responsible because of an additional element. Rule 8(c): raise affirmative defenses—must be included in the answer or they are waived a. Held. the π had constructive (record) notice of the easement so is this really something new? C. Statute of Frauds c. a year later (after SOL had run for filing against proper Δ) Δ moved to amend answer to deny they manufactured the slide.
b. original complaint alleged negligent maintenance of court. Π would have to prove completely separate facts for the second claim. claimant may aggregate all claims in order to satisfy amount in contro ii. • Azarbalv. later (after SOL had run and π got new attorney) wanted to amend for counseling negligence. here it was allowed because of the causal connection between the claims Bonerb v. Relation Back—you treat the amended pleading as though it was filed when the original was filed a. supplemental jurisdiction only applies if first claim was a federal question and the second arises from same T/O 2. nothing would put Δ on notice that he was negligent during surgery. transaction or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. Many states allow a π to allege an action against “Doe 1” and later to amend to substitute a name when the proper party is identified. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Rule 15(b): evidence at trial does not match the pleadings (variance) 1. Here the complaint indicated that the exercise was mandatory and injury was caused by failure to supervise and instruct so there was notice of a claim for negligent performance of professional duties. diversity will not be affected (if first claim was in diversity) 3. if other side objects then the evidence is not admissible a. 15(c)(3)—when joining a new Δ they must have had notice so as not to prejudice and be added within 120 days of filing of suit Moore v. Arg: if Δ has notice then they are provided with the protections that SOL is designed to afford. ii. Joinder—EVERY CLAIM IN FED COURT MUST HAVE SMJ A. other side does not object then we will allow the evidence in and after trial we can amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence iii. π filed complaint on last day of SOL alleging violation of informed consent laws. Original complaint concerned actions prior to surgery. Held. Δs Counterclaim: Rules 13(a) and (b)—
. Held. Richard J. VIII. 15(c)(2)—when adding a new claim arising out of the conduct. relation back requires that the operational facts set out in the original complaint are sufficient to put the Δ on notice that the amended claim could be brought. Medical Center (1989): negligence claim was first and wanted to amend to add failure to inform. later moved to amend to include negligence claim. the side offering the variance can move to amend at trial 2. Claim Joinder: Rule 18(a)—π can join any and all claims against the same opposing party even if they are not transactionally related (never compulsory but claim preclusion may apply depending on state def of clam preclusion) i. relation back requires that a proposed amendment have its basis in the same conduct. Caron Foundation (1994): π was a patient of Δ’s rehab center when he fee while playing basketball as part of mandatory exercise program. transaction or occurrence set forth in the original complaint b. Rule 15(c): amending after the SOL has run 1. Threshold question: whether the original complaint gave notice to the Δ of the claim that is now being asserted. Baker (1993): π signed a consent form prior to a surgery that went wrong.
Does it arise out of the same transaction or occurrence to satisfy § 1367(a)? YES 2. Services (1979): π borrowed money from Δ and made no payments on note. Cross-claim: Rule 13(g)—asserted against a co-party in an existing action 1. Held: action on underlying debt in default is a compulsory counterclaim. must ask for actual relief (otherwise it’s a defense) 3. it must be asserted in the pending case or else it is waived. Δ has compulsory counterclaim for $45K. there is no diversity jurisdiction over that counterclaim because it does not satisfy the amount in controversy and no federal question. the court separate suits under Rule 42(b) for efficiency iii. Compulsory: Rule 13(a)—arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the π’s claim. must be asserted in your Answer a. there’s diversity SMJ HYPO #2: π is NY and Δ is citizen of FL. Permissive: Rule 13(b)—does not arise from same transaction or occurrence as the π’s claim so you may assert it but you don’t have to. Blazer Fin. Does 1367(a) grant supplement jurisdiction? NO—a permissive counterclaim by definition does not arise out of same transaction or occurrence so cannot get supplemental jurisdiction
. claim is for $100K so diversity is satisfied. logical relation test concludes that claims come from single aggregate of operative facts (loan transaction). No supplemental jursidiction b. claim is for $100K so diversity is satisfied. π sued in fed court for violation of Truth-in-Lending Act and Δ counterclaimed on the unpaid balance on the note (state matter). is there SMJ over the counterclaim? Yes. must arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying dispute. there is no diversity because it does not satisfy amount in controversy and no federal question. compulsory counterclaim always has SMJ if it arises out of same T/O T/O determined by: • Some common issues of law or fact • Whether res judicata would bar it • The same evidence is needed • Whether there is a logical relation HYPO #1: π is NY and Δ is citizen of FL. Δ has compulsory counterclaim for $90K. supplemental jurisdiction? 1. claim is for $100K so diversity is satisfied. never compulsory 4. you can still sue separately a. 2. Does § 1367(b) remove jurisdiction? NO—only removes claims by πs HYPO #3: π is NY and Δ is citizen of FL. always covered by supp jurisdiction (when original claim is in FQ and cross-claim is not) Plant v. Δ has permissive counterclaim for $50K. Supplemental SMJ always extended to compulsory counterclaims 2.1. Exception: if the court lacks jurisdiction over a third party who is necessary to the action then the counterclaim is not waived b. supplemental jurisdiction? 1.
Raise at least one common question of fact or law Mosley v. maintain complete diversity 3. Claims arise from the same T/O b. Joinder of πs—multiple πs voluntary joined if: a. If first action was in Diversity: 1. Personal Jurisdiction: Δ who are joined must individually meet requirements of PJ i. Permissive Joinder: Rule 20 gives right of multiple πs to join together and the π’s right to make several co-Δs to the claim 1. General Motors (1974): ten parties joined in discriminatory hiring practices suit against GM. Logical relationship is required. no supp juris under § 1367(b) 2. every claim satisfies amount in controversy. Contacts: each Δ must have in personam minimum contacts iii. A (π) is citizen of NY and sues B and C (CT). Is A necessary? Rule 19(a)—generally only among parties connect by property ownership or contract rights
. we represent B and we want to assert claims against A and C. another FQ is original jurisdiction 2.HYPO: three-way car collision. identical effects is not necessary. claim against C is a cross claim because it is against a co-party and arise from same T/O. Subject Matter Jurisdiction i. Supplemental jurisdiction may apply ii. Held. satisfy amount in controversy with regard to each party 4. Long Arm Limits: each Δ must be amenable to suit— NOTE—fed court in diversity follows long arm of state in which it sits so long arm must be able to reach Δ b. Raise at least one common question of fact or law 3. no diversity between B and C and no federal question. Joinder of Δs: (at the option of the πs) a. If first action was FQ: 1. 2. Jurisdiction in Permissive Joinder of Parties a. • 1367(a) grants jurisdiction because it arises out of same T/O as claim in federal court • 1367(b) does not take away because only applies to claims by π B. a company-wide policy of discrimination constitutes the same T/O and because the discriminatory conduct is basic to the class the facts that different effects are suffered is immaterial. Joinder of Parties i. court ordered suits severed. Necessary and Indispensable Parties: Rule 19—parties that must be joined a. Service: each personally served ii. claim against A is a compulsory counterclaim which invokes diversity (gets Supp SMJ). Claims against them arise from same T/O b.
Lord’s is a party to be joined if feasible but there is no PJ over Lord’s so the Dist Court must determine if it is indispensable. HELD: a 3rd party is properly impleaded under Rule 14(a) when that party may be liable to the original Δ for the judgment. 19(a)(2)(i): A’s interest may be harmed if she is not joined iii. Possibility of framing judgment to mitigate prejudice iii. Will π have remedy if dismissed? (another forum) Temple v. does the court have PJ over A? ii. Adequacy of remedy in party’s absence iv. 19(a)(1): without A the court cannot afford complete relief among the parties ii. Δ may be subject to inconsistent judgments but that is a result of executing inconsistent contracts. ask if under state law the nail maker could be liable to the coop maker. these parties are not necessary Helzberg Diamond Shops v. Held. vicarious. i.i. If A is determined to be necessary but joinder is not feasible— Rule 19(b)—Is the party indispensable? i. dr. Joint tortfeasors contribution c. warranty b. motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 19 denied and mall is enjoined from permitting the store (Lord’s) to open. π sues Δ in fed court and Δ files for motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties [12(b)(7)]. CTB (2001): action against constructor of chicken houses (Latco). does bringing in A destroy SMJ? c. Indemnity in strict liability. Impleader: Δ joining new Δ who may be liable to him (derivative liability) Price v. Lord’s chose not to intervene so there is no concerns of prejudice to absent party. Exs: a. a party does not become indispensable to an action to determine rights under a contract simply because that person’s rights or obligations under a separate contract will be affected by the result of the action. 1. C. Rule 14(a)—a defending party may join a third party defendant who is or may be liable to for all or part of the claim (same transaction or occurrence). Extent of prejudice to the absentee/ present parties ii. agreement. and hospital in state court. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center (1977): jewelry store sued shopping mall for violating lease agreement by allowing four jewelry stores in the mall. and hospital cannot be joined because of lack of PJ. Held. Subrogation
. Is joinder of A feasible? i. it is not. common law rule of implied indemnification supports finding that ITW may be liable to Latco and was properly impleaded. Latco impleaded ITW (nail manufacturer) as a 3rd Party Δ based on common law claim of indemnification of sellers. 19 (a)(2)(ii): A’s interest may subject Δ to multiple or inconsistent obligations (joint tortfeasors are not necessary) b. Synthes (1990): π sues dr.
6. Held. Supplemental Jurisdiction: a. Supplemental—all above claims are covered by supplemental jurisdiction b. Permissive Intervention: Rule 24(b)(2)—show that your claim or defense and the pending case have at least one common question iii. cross-claims against other TPDs from same T/O 3. counterclaim against original π if original π has made a claim against TPD—careful of jurisdiction. first Δ granted summary judgment and Owen moved for summary judgment for lack of SMJ (princ.
2. claim against original π out of same T/O 4. Intervention: Rule 24—a party may bring herself in as a Δ or π i. Your interest may be harmed if you are not joined 2. 100-mile bulge: service may be made with 100 mile bulge surrounding the courthouse even of outside state or long arm. TPD need not satisfy diversity or AIC requirements (automatic supp juris) 3. the complete diversity requirement cannot be circumvented by naming only the diverse party and waiting for a Δ to implead a non-diverse party. iii. Jurisdiction: a. Your interest is not adequately represented now ii. Wife knew or should have known that Owen would be impled. Rule 4(k) 2. If venue is proper between original parties it remains valid regardless of resident of TPD Claims by the TPD: 1. power company impled company that maintained lines (Owen). Subject Matter Jurisdiction?—ALWAYS CHECK
. (she was Iowa). D. wife amended complaint to name Owen asserting that Owen was a Nebraska corp. Intervention of Right— 1.ii.
iv. no supplemental over π’s claim against TPD 5. Δ may not claim that TPD is the only party liable (it’s not me it’s him) but may plead in the alternative that neither he nor TPD is liable 14(b)— π against whom a counterclaim is filed can assert a claim against third party Δ if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the underlying case Impleader Jurisdiction: 1. counterclaims against TPP 2. impleader claims against persons not previously part of suit if these persons may be liable to TPD for all or part of TPPs claims against TPD.
v. Defenses—a TPD may raise any defenses against the original π that the original Δ could have raised Claims by Original π: against the TPD must satisfy independent jurisdictional grounds (no supp)
Owen Equipment v. place of biz was Iowa). Kroger (1978): wife of dead man sued power company in diversity.
achieving relief in this case could be at the expense of other types of relief 3. where a class member was not adequately represented in a prior class action suit. • numbers alone justify impracticability of joinder. 23(b)(3): most common class actions. Initial Requirements: Rule 23(a) 1. giving res judicata effect to the judgment violates due process. Why?—mass tort claims where there are so many claims that Δ may be insolvent before all claimants can collect 2. those seeking to enforce the agreement are not members of the same class as those seeking to challenge its validity. Inconsistent decisions forcing an opponent to observe incompatible standards of conduct b. Why?—civil rights cases where class seeks injunction against further discrimination Communities for Equity v. • adequacy satisfied. Numerosity: too many for practicable joinder 2. can they be certified as a class action? Held. defined as all present and future high school females. Michigan High School Athletic Assoc. “rigorous analysis” means you cannot simply parrot Rule 23. • typicality met because discreet harms alleged are suffered by members of Communities for Equity. 23(b)(1): action allowed under (b)(1) if individual actions by or against members of the class would create a risk of either a. but concerns are 1. the named rep. Class Action: representative sues on behalf of people similarly situated i. Adequacy: Representative and lawyer will adequately represent the class Hansberry v. Yes. (1999): high school girls sued athletic assoc. common question of law or fact predominates over any question affecting only individual members
. Lee (1940): black land purchaser sued to invalidate racially restrictive covenant and was held to res judicata because an earlier state court class action decision had held the covenant valid. however.E. for gender discrimination under Title IX. • commonality satisfied by common policy of discrimination. Impairment of the interests of the members of the class who are not parties to the individual actions (if they brought the action individually they would move for 12(b)(7) for failure to join indispensable parties under Rule 19) c. ii. Typicality: representative’s claim must be typical of the class’ claims 4. 23(b)(2): allows use of a class action if the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and class seeks injunction a. judgments entered in representative suits may bind members of the class who were not parties to the suit. Held. Rule 23(b): fit the case within a type of class action 1. must show a. Commonality: some common question of fact or law 3. it will not bar class actions if some members of the class do not wish to sue 2.
amount in controversy a. sued in class action pursuant to 23(a) and (b)(3). factors: i. class certification rejected. in class actions personal jurisdiction does not require that each class member have minimum contacts with the forum state. but most courts require it in all actions
. but the forum state much have sufficient interest in the claims to assert its state law to all claims. mailing notice will suffice. supplemental jurisdiction expanded to cover iv. Held. Traditional rule—every member of the class must claim more than $75K.000 then we don’t care about the individual member’s claims (SC granted certiorari this year on this question). desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in a particular forum iv. Held. in class actions the court and the class reps protect interests of absent members. interest of class members in individually controlling actions ii. counterclaims would require individual factual determinations as to the πs and the interests of some class members in controlling their cases could be compromised. as long as there’s diversity and venue is ok. Kansas did not have sufficient interest in claims in other states and Kansas law conflicts with other laws (TX) where many members reside so Kansas law cannot be applied. exposure as counterclaim Δs could exceed amount recovered under statutory penalties for class members. v. presence of any suits that have already been commenced involving class members iii. class is the superior way to resolve the dispute. we’re fine 3. makes Diversity Jurisdiction class actions hard to bring 4. Notice to the Class: FRCP requires notice only in the (b)(3) class action. Trust Company Bank (1997): π leased a car from Δ and then sued them for failure to comply with Consuming Leasing Act. Δ counterclaimed that individual class members had defaulted on leases. 4. Shutts (1985): π brought class action on behalf of people in every state against oil distributor for royalty payments in Kansas state court. Personal Jurisdiction: Phillips Petroleum v. Most class actions will be certified as federal question 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: 1. If the Court certifies the class (Rule 23(c)) it must define the class appoint class counsel (Rule 23(g)) iii.b. when the district court has not relied upon impermissible factors in denying a class action there is no abuse of discretion. Why?—used for mass product liability Heaven v. Δ said Due Process prevent adjudication of non-resident claims and Full Faith and Credit prevents application of Kansas law to all claims. New Rule—it’s ok if the representative’s exceeds $75. look only to the citizenship of the representative citizen. difficulties in managing the class action c.
1. Evidence of a special relationship between an attorney and his expert witness is relevant to establishing bias and such discovery is allowed where it is not unduly burdensome. Deposition: you can depose a party or non-party. Held. Opting Out: everyone is bound unless you opt out of the 23(b)(3) class action (the others you cannot opt out of) vii. 26(a)(1) Initial disclosures: you are required even without request to name people and documents with discoverable information that you may use for your claims or defenses. Scope of Discovery
. Discovery Devices: which can be used to get info from a non party? i. Windsor (1997): Windsor sues CCR in tort. written questions answered in writing within thirty days iii. Required Disclosures: Rule 26(a)—parties must produce information even without a request by the other party i. Discovery Butler v. A. Rigby (1998): Δ requested information from πs health care providers about the total patients involved in accident claims. notice by mail should be given to all class members who can be located with reasonable effort 2. Interrogatories (Rule 33): can only be sent to other parties. publication notice for everyone else 3. 26(a)(3) everything you’ll rely in trial B. motion for class certification and settlement together. list of things you have to tell them is in Rule 23(c)(2)(b) vi. ii. members of (b)(3) class must be given another chance to opt out before settlement Amchem Products v. 26(a)(2) Experts: Identify experts iii. live oral testimony under oath. non-party must be subpoenaed ii. Rule 26(g)—certification that this is not for improper purpose D. Medical Examination (Rule 35): must get a court order v. can information that is relevant under Rule 26(b)(1) and not unduly burdensome under 26(b)(2) be protected by privilege? Held. Settlement: you must get court permission to settle a class action once it has been certified under Rule 23(e) 1. no class action under 23(b)(3) because lawyers are representing people with conflicting interests (exposed but no claim and “inventory” exposed with symptoms). class defined as “all person who have not yet filed but have been exposed” to asbestos. Request for Admission (Rule 36): only go to parties C. Request to Produce (Rule 34): can go to party or non-party but non-arty should be subpoenaed (Rule 34(c)) iv. yes. IX. benefit of certification and the settlement together is that you don’t have a trial so you don’t have to worry about class manageability under Rule 23(b)(3)(D).
Is this ok? Held. courts prefer to see the parties engage on the merits • Peralta did receive actual notice. Substantial need b. the fact that the Δ would have lost the first suit in which he defaulted does not alter the requirement of notice or service of process required for due process. Judges are given discretion in determining when a lawsuit has been abandoned ii. Voluntary Dismissal i. Privileged material is not discoverable (confidential communications that the law protects from disclosure. just after the 90 days required under TX law—is this really a Due Process issue if he had actual (albeit invalid) notice and defaulted? B. After Δ has answered voluntary dismissal is at discretion of the court—Rule 41(a)(2) iv. a Δ who fails to receive notice can re-open the case—Rule 60 ii. doctor-patient. Π may unilaterally dismiss at any time before the Δ has answered. i. Without prejudice the first time and the second time is with prejudice C. POLICY • Rather than enter default. Default: court may enter a default judgment against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend under Rule 55 i. opinions and theories are absolutely protected X. Can be set aside for good cause—Rule 55(c) and 60(b) Peralta v. the judgment would have been the same. priest-penitent. default judgment was entered and land attached and later sold to satisfy judgment. Standard of discoverability: Rule 26(b)(1)—you can discover anything relevant to a claim or defense 1.. Default will not be entered unless Δ has received notice. Some states have timetables for determining dismissal (Cal. Failure to Prosecute—Rule 41(b): Δs may move to dismiss a case on the grounds that the π has failed to pursue a lawsuit. Default is a judgment on the merits iii. If Δ had received notice. attorney-client. π sues to invalidate judgment and sale and court holds that because he did not have meritorious defense in the first suit. conclusions. Work product: Rule 26(b)(3)—material prepared in anticipation of litigation.Rule 41(a) ii. he might have impleaded original debtor. Relevant means reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence (broader than admissible) 2.Rule 41(a)(1) iii. BUT mental impressions. spouse) 3.i. worked out settlement or paid debt without attaching property (sold below market value).e. Heights Medical Center (1988): grantor of debt was served 90 days after summons making the service of process null under state law.)
. No. can be overcome with showing of a. Information is not otherwise available c. i. Πs may dismiss if all the parties agree. can be generated by a party or any representative of the party (not just lawyer). Pre Trial Adjudication A.
whether or not a reasonable person could infer the death was an accident). Court looks only at the face of the Complaint. Celotex: Δ moved for summary judgment because π had no evidence to support her assertion that the event happened (shifted the burden to the π to show evidence to support the claim) iii. not evidence ii. You have no evidence to prove that I did it Bias v. the requirements of 56(c) do not require that movant produce evidence. Held. a moving party may meet its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to supply sufficient evidence of an issue of material fact.. inference of accident cannot be drawn from the facts and grants summary judgment. pleadings are not evidence because they are not sworn under oath but they can be used as admissions for failure to deny in Answer 2. motion for summary judgment was granted but reversed on appeal on grounds that Δ failed to produce evidence supporting the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. no dispute on a material issue of fact 2. Rule 12(b)(6)—Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim i. Houchens only needs to prove that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact (i.D. family claimed breach of contract against agent for failure to get insurance policy. family said he doesn’t use drugs but teammates say he did. (1990): basketball player overdoses on cocaine. Motion for Summary Judgment—Rule 56 i. she argues by accident to collect on insurance policy. Advantage International Inc. Catrett (1986): π sued manufacturer of products she claimed were responsible for her husband’s death. Δ argues he couldn’t have gotten a policy because he was a drug user. Mrs. POLICY • Shouldn’t it go to the jury to decide which witnesses are credible? Houchens v. Met Life (1991): Mrs. Held. Two approaches: 1. If still no then dismissed with prejudice E. a. would she win a judgment? (does the law recognize this claim?) 1. If no then leave to amend 2. Houchen’s husband disappeared and is presumed dead. I have evidence to prove I didn’t do it 2. sues for breach of contract. verified pleadings) 1. the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ii. Rules of Thumb
. answers to interrogatories. If the π proved everything in the Complaint. Rule 56(c) third sentence: 1. Court can look at evidence (affidavits. Purpose is to weed out cases that don’t need to go to trial (purpose of trial is to resolve disputed fact) Celotex Corp v.e. deposition testimony. Motion for Summary Judgment: there is no genuine issue of material fact because the specific evidence of teammates trumps the general denials so Summary Judgment is proper. no jury could find it more reasonable than not that he is dead. iv.
Trial A. Δ says in response that he had the green light and that the π was jaywalking and jumped in front of him. Civil = preponderance of the evidence ii. Tougher to get in tort cases than in contract 3. π admits affidavit that says the light was red. Court has the power to direct a verdict if. Production: produce and present evidence at trial B. where the facts give equal support to inconsistent inferences a party has not sustained their burden. (assume everything is true) ii. Controlling Juries Before Verdict i. Same basis—no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the party 2. NO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. You never resolve disputes of fact on summary judgment including credibility HYPO: π is crossing the street and was hit by Δ. there is equal support for the inference that a collision occurred btw other strings of rail cars. Renewed Motion for JMOL (Notwithstanding the Verdict)—Rule 50(b) allows to renew after Δ presents evidence 1. the judge says no jury trial 2. Rarely granted for the party with the burden at trial (tougher for π) 2. Persuasion 1. All evidence should be considered in the light and with reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposed to the motion. Burdens i. Instructions and Comment: serve both to instruct jury on the law and provide statement of applicable law which is reviewable in appellate process C. Law of evidence controls what is presented iii. No legally sufficient evidentiary basis on which the jury could find for the party with the burden of proof Pennsylvania R. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Directed Verdict)—Rule 50(a) 1. Jury came to a decision that no reasonable person could (assume everything is true) 3. Chamberlain (1933): action for negligence by train brakesman’s heir against the RR contending that certain rail cars collided killing the brakesman based upon the testimony of someone who heard but did not see the collision (requires inference). it determined that the inferences made by the jury from the evidence are not rational.1. by looking at the evidence presented.
. v. After the π’s evidence has been presented. case goes to trial XI. π sues Δ alleging negligence for running red light. Excluding Improper Influences: ensuring jurors do not reach verdicts that cannot be sustained by the evidence 1.R. Voir dire—eliminate jurors who might reach irrational verdict 2. Held. Controlling Juries after the Verdict i. Criminal = beyond a reasonable doubt 2. 3. Δ moves for summary judgment and proffers affidavits of witnesses that the π was jaywalking.
4. Error in jury instructions f. (1) design defect under strict product liability (2) negligence (3) breach of warranty of merchantability. After the jury has decided and the judgment is entered some problem with the case requires starting over 2. claimed RR negligently maintained a fence which was down in places. there is insufficient evidence to support a verdict where two equal inferences exist to prove a fact. Shenley b. Motion for New Trial—Rule 59(a) 1. Contrary to law c. & Salt Lake R. Held. often grant new trial in the alternative in case the appellate court overturns the JMOL 5. (1911): π sued RR for negligence after her cattle was hit by a train. on appeal court says jury could have reached that conclusion so it was an abuse of discretion to grant JNOV. ii. Π has the burden of proof to establish liability by a preponderance of the evidence and if two inferences are equal this burden is not met. Snapper (1987): πs finger was cut off my a lawmower. Δ moved for JNOV and won. 13th juror standard—judge thinks verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence (evidence could support the verdict but the judge thinks it shouldn’t)—Lind v. L. only one of which establishes liability. San Pedro. Impermissible argument to the jury d. Error in admission of evidence e. Norton v.R. JNOV—you would only give a new trial when you would give a JNOV (but instead of turning the verdict around you let them try again) c. Does a trial judge abuse his discretion in granting a new trial where he substitutes his judgment for that of the jury concerning weight of the evidence? Held. Trial judge may grant partial new trial limited to damages
. A verdict should only be set aside as against the weight of the evidence upon finding the jury reached a seriously erroneous result. Jury misconduct 3. jury decided π wins on the strict liability claim. Bases for new trials: (appellate court reviews de novo) a. Schenley (1960): liquor company manager obtained jury verdict for breach of contract and liquor company moved for JMOL and alternatively a new trial. you have to make a motion for directed verdict or you waive right to renew after jury verdict Reid v. Gross miscarriage of justice (toughest standard) Lind v.A. but a gate in the fence was also open due to the landowner and no evidence was presented as to how the cow got on the tracks.4. Conditional New Trials a. Contrary to the weight of the evidence b. strict liability turned on whether it was defective because of lack of “dead man’s device” and whether defect caused injury. Various standards for granting: (appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion) a. Yes.
then petition Sup Court for certiorari ii. Two necessary criteria: i. No. Addittitur—order for a new trial unless Δ consents to an increase in the amount of the verdict (not allowed in fed cts as violation of 7th amend jury trial right) XII. whatever the ruling is. π requests information from the union during discovery and the union objects. FRCP Rule 23(f) and 54(b): class action certification decisions and cases with multiple parties or multiple claims and the court has decided fewer than all claims 3. Appeals Apex Hosiery Co. reduce verdict to the lowest amount the jury could have awarded ii. Only orders that have the effect of ending the case in favor of a party can be appealed (except orders punishing criminally for contempt) A. It is effectively unreviewable if we wait until final judgment B. Leader (1939): π sues labor union for treble damages under the Sherman Act. It’s an important issue separate from the merits b. v. Appellate structure: i. An order to produce is an interlocutory order cannot be appealed. judge orders a new trial 3. and appeals. § 1292(a) and (b): injunctions or certified decisions 2.b. Trial judge may order condition new trial i. after the judge makes this order. Final Judgment Rule: a party can only appeal a final disposition of the case—28 USC § 1291 1. Sup Court jurisdiction governed by 28 USC § § 1253-1258
. is denied. reduce verdict to a reasonable amount 3. Judge-made: collateral order rule—court of appeals has discretion to hear an appeal if: a. Interlocutory review: categories that permit going up to appeal without final judgments 1. Sup Court can review decisions of highest state court if federal question is raised. NOT final judgment: motions. 1. Can a party appeal a fed court order to produce documents under Rule 34? Held. No appealing interlocutory rulings (exceptions below) ii. FEDERAL: parties appeal from district court to circuit court. STATE: parties appeal from trial court to state court. The court order completely resolved the issue even if not the case c. Remittitur—order for a new trial unless π agrees to accept reduced damages. is there any remaining determination on the merits of the case? 2. reduce verdict to the highest amount the jury could have awarded 2. approches 1. state Sup Courts also have discretionary jurisdiction.
privity means so identified together as to represent the same legal right. first in state court for replevin action then in fed court on const. General Rule—the court in case 2 has to apply the res judicata and collateral estoppel law of the system that decided case 1 B. although the claim does not qualify as a compulsory counterclaim under 13(a) (because there was no pleading) this falls into a narrow category of common law counterclaims barred by res judicata effect (not officially “compulsory” but if the claim will be barred it might as well be). Fed court follows the preclusion rule of the court where the first claim was heard (state court).HYPO: Δ claims 11th Amend immunity from suit in federal court. court says no you’re not immune because it’s an important issue and you shouldn’t have to go through a suit before you assert immunity to the suit XIII. McDonald’s System (1979): McDonald’s sued Martino for breach of contract and there was a consent judgment. Both cases must be brought by the same claimant against the same defendant 1. then it is precluded by res judicata acting as common law compulsory counterclaim ii. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel A. POLICY: a. Consistency Martino v. Held. Martino then brought suit on antitrust claim. broad = nucleus of operative facts b. Held. a claim which could have been brought against the same Δ arising from the same T/O must be brought or it will be claim precluded. all three elements must be present for res judicata to apply i. Δ who asserted a counterclaim is a claimant so if he sues in case 2 he was claimant in both Searle Bros. no privity so no
. wife claims res judicata and collateral estoppel. a consent judgment is a valid final judgment on the merits. Held. narrower = cause of action c. to hold otherwise permits the π to impose liability for the exercise of rights established by the prior judgment. collateral estoppel can be asserted against a party who was in privity with a party in the prior suit. Searle (1978): Searle Bros (partnership) brought suit against divorced wife of Searle for return of property wrongfully divided in divorce settlement. REST: uses T/O because it mirrors the joinder rule—if the claim could have been joined in the first suit it is reasonable to require it instead of bringing two suits on the same facts 2. if the suit involved different parties those parties are not bound by prior judgments. b. Efficiency Frier v City of Vandalia (1985): car owner brought suit against city for multiple towings of cars parked illegally. if it’s not compulsory under Rule 13 but it could nullify a prior judgment. v. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion): means that you only get one bite at the apple. super-narrow = same evidence d. grounds. claim is all right to relief arising from a transaction or occurrence a. Both cases involve the same claim (litigation unit) 1.
12b7 are NOT on the merits ii. Case #2 B sues A about the same wreck. does res judicata apply? • Same parties?—YES • Valid final judgment on the merits?—YES • Same claim?—YES (majority view) because it’s the same occurrence. Pierce. minority view would say the rights are different so NO HYPO #2: A sues B for property damage and personal injury. final judgment on the merits is entered. any judgment in favor of the claimant is on the merits (even default) b. 12b6 – how can failure to state a claim preclude another claim? This is a practical consideration to prevent people from filing the same complaint that won’t survive a 12b6 motion d. issue in fed court when G sues ML for fed securities because state court did not have jurisdiction over the claim (exlcusive fed. 12b3. 2. CA says it has to be heard or rejected from Sup Court c. 56 Summary Judgment f. A sues B in Case #1 to recover personal injuries and the case is litigated with final judgment. If claim is precluded and then the first judgment is reversed you can reopen under Rule 60(b)(5) 3. Motion to dismiss 12b i. 50 Directed Verdict g.). 12b1. Fenner & Smith (1990): ML sues for breach of contract in OH state court and G counterclaims for negligence and fed securities. SOL not on the merits under Semtec c. res judicata? NO—not the same claimant • But now B is in trouble under compulsory counterclaim rule because she should have raised the counterclaim (same T/O) and now has waived it
. venue or indispensable parties i. iii. VALID Gargallo v. After trial court for most states b. counterclaim dismissed as sanction for failure to follow discovery. A sues B for property damage for the crash. Question: what effect would OH state court give to judgment? OH would say it’s invalid so no res judicata.preclusion. Merrill. Rule 41(b)—all involuntarily dismissals are deemed on the merits unless it was based on jurisdiction. Jury Verdict HYPO #1: A and B are driving and their cars collide. Lynch. FINAL a. ON THE MERITS a. 12c pleadings (but not SOL) e. Case #1 must have ended in a valid final judgment on the merits 1.
Parks (1979): train hit a car. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion): some fact or question adjudicated in the earlier case would be again put at issue between the same parties. we can use it against somebody who was a party to Case #1 including people in privity with that party i. if a judgment could have been based on two findings. Dismissal as sanction for failure to follow discovery rules could qualify as being “actually litigated” because you had your chance 3. No preclusion if the issue could not have been raised in the first suit. ii.e. That issue was essential to the judgment in Case #1 (we needed to have that finding on that issue in order to reach the judgment) Illinois Central Gulf RR v. gives π incentive to join all Δs because if the π loses the first suit all the other Δs can use issue preclusion. RR said that the prior case established RR was negligent and because husband got nothing the jury must have decided that he was contributorily negligent or that he sustained no damages. Against whom is collateral estoppel used? 1. Held. By whom is collateral estoppel used? 1. allows the judgment in the prior action to operate as an estoppel to those facts or question i. wife sued for injuries and husband for loss of consortium. neg. Substantively—same content b. rules of evidence (let’s you sue in civil court after he says not guilty in crim court) c.. partial summary judgment estopping RR from denying negligence and allowing litigation of cont. a. the party pleading estoppel has the burden of proving it turned on the fact in question or that finding will be open to contention. Valid Final Judgment on the Merits (see above) 2. Procedurally—same burden of proof. matter. (day in court!—due process) iii. ELEMENTS: 1. The same issue was actually litigated and determined in Case #1 a. Essentiality: we strike out the issue of fact or law in suit 1 and ask if that flips the winner. if there are multiple. b. but if π had won first suit he’s not allowed to use issue preclusion against different Δs because of due process (day in court) Blonder-Tongue
. jury could have found no compensable damages so it’s not clear. Mutuality rule—victim of the preclusion must have been a party to the first suit or in privity (not based in due process so courts don’t have to apply it and recently courts are allowing non-mutual collateral estoppel) a. class member.C. Defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel: Δ in Case #2 is using collateral estoppel when she was not a party in Case #1— permitted when π had a full opportunity to litigate the issue i. and since damages were uncontroverted it must have been negligence. sufficient grounds for the decision then there is no issue preclusion for either 4. husband then sued for his own injuries.
• Brainard Theory: if first πs sue and lose and one wins. collateral estoppel will not apply. multiple suits brought against owner of warehouse. then C sues A for damage to car. A sues C. it is fundamentally unfair to say he cannot litigate when on another day he has prevailed. State Farm Fire & Casualty v. others filed for summary judgment. Offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel: most courts don’t allow offensive. offensive collateral estoppel may be used at the discretion of the court when the effect is not unfair to the Δ (no mutuality required). some courts will allow it as long as it is fair under the circumstances i. C is vicariously liable for B’s act. which is inconsistent and unfair
HYPO #1: B is driving C’s car. Century Home Components (1976): fire in a warehouse spread to other buildings. v Shore (1979): π filed suit for misleading statements in merger and SEC filed suit soon after. Π could not easily have joined case #1 iii. then everyone after that would be able to use issue preclusion. but
. A was negligent • Essential?—YES • Against party to Case #1?—YES • By a party to Case #1?—NO. Δ had chance to fully litigate in case #1 ii. Δ could foresee multiple suits (incentive to litigate first case well) iv. B and jury finds that A was negligent. can she get collateral estoppel on A’s negligence? • All four are the same as the first time • By a party to Case #1?—NO. use it and if not he’s not bound by it. A is driving his own car and they collide. POLICY: this allows a π to sit and wait for another judgment against the Δ and if he likes it. Δ claimed it would violate its right to a jury trial. can C get collateral estoppel on the issue of A’s negligence? • Final judgment?—YES • The issue litigated?—YES. Held. Parklane Hosiery Co. it’s non-mutual because she was not a party to the first case. when there are multiple inconsistent judgments. Case #1 A v. SEC won and π moved for summary judgment on grounds that issue was already litigated. Held. this does not violate the Seventh Amendment because the factual issues were already resolved in this previous action. when some of those suits said warehouse was negligent. under the mutuality rule this would not be allowed but most courts will allow collateral estoppel HYPO #2: same case #1. No inconsistent judgments (procedural opportunities in this action not available in prior action) v.b.
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