Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/396/83/216153/
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 10:48:37
Document Index: 272624570

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 54', '§ 22', '§ 70', '§ 659', '§ 181', '§ 207']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Cowan, Appellant, 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1968 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Cowan, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Robert Cowan, Appellant, 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968)
Argued March 22, 1968
Decided May 13, 1968
We agree with the Government's position that the possibility that appellant may receive a harsher sentence as a recidivist for any subsequent felony conviction in many states (e. g., N.J.S.A. § 2A: 85-8, 9, 12; Conn.Stat.Ann. § 54-118; D.C.Code § 22-104) is a sufficient potential collateral effect to prevent the appeal from being moot. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358, 77 S. Ct. 481, 1 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512, 74 S. Ct. 247, 98 L. Ed. 248 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S. Ct. 224, 91 L. Ed. 196 (1946).
Cowan has a criminal record consisting of numerous misdemeanor convictions and one felony conviction in New York for attempted grand larceny second degree. Because Cowan committed the federal crime prior to his incarceration for the state felony, he will not be liable to increased criminal penalties for subsequent New York felony convictions on account of his federal felony conviction. New York Penal Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 40, § 70.10(1) (c). Because of his previous New York felony conviction, Cowan's civil rights were not adversely affected by his federal conviction. Nevertheless, this case is not controlled by St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S. Ct. 910, 87 L. Ed. 1199 (1943), and United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 73, 100 A.L.R.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1962) because this felony conviction might result in a harsher sentence for Cowan for any subsequent felony conviction in some states.
Cowan contends that the search and seizure of the luggage were unlawful. We hold that appellant does not have standing to raise this issue. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), a defendant generally was required to "claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched" in order to have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. 362 U.S. at 261, 80 S. Ct. at 731. However, because the narcotics charge for which Jones was indicted would have been established if Jones admitted possession, the Court held "that possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged." 362 U.S. at 263, 80 S. Ct. at 732. Appellant contends that because possession of the baggage would be sufficient for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 659, United States v. Minieri, 303 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 847, 83 S. Ct. 79, 9 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1962), he is automatically entitled to standing to object to its search and seizure. We do not read the Jones case quite so broadly. In Jones, the conviction flowed from possession at the time of the search, while in this case the hotel had possession at the time of the search and the conviction flows from appellant's possession at an earlier time. Possession on or about March 23, as charged in the indictment, does not give appellant standing to challenge a search on March 29 when the baggage was concededly in the possession of the hotel manager pursuant to the hotel's lien. N. Y. Lien Law, § 181 (McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 33, 1966), Roth v. Hotel Riverside Plaza, Inc., 188 Misc. 180, 67 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1st Dept. 1947). Unlike Jones, Cowan was not charged in the indictment with possession or the right to possession at the time of the search and the subsequent seizure. See United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 222-223 (2d Cir. 1966).
In order to have standing to challenge the legality of a search, one must establish that he was the victim of an invasion of privacy. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960). See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304-306, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967); United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897, 900, 903 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 903, 88 S. Ct. 816, 19 L. Ed. 2d 869 (Jan. 23, 1968). While redress for persons aggrieved by searches and seizures originally depended upon proof of a superior property interest, recent decisions rest upon the constitutional right to the protection of privacy rather than any interest in the property which was subject to the search or seizure. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303-306, 87 S. Ct. 1642. The Supreme Court's decisions in Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S. Ct. 889, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856 (1964) and Chapman v. United States, 367 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961), upon which appellant relies, recognized that protection of privacy requires suppression in some circumstances where property interests have not been violated. Here there was no invasion of Cowan's right to privacy. He had lost his right to use the room and with this the law gave the hotel the right to seize the property. Although Cowan concedes that the hotel was entitled to remove the luggage from the room, and prepare it for sale, he argues that he retained all other rights in the property and therefore the hotel manager's consent was not sufficient to authorize the search. This argument is unsound because, whatever Cowan's rights to reclaim the luggage might be under New York Law, it is clear that by leaving the luggage in the room and failing to pay his bill, Cowan forfeited the right to occupy the room undisturbed and, as to the luggage, the right to retain possession and any claim to privacy concerning it and its contents.
Under § 207 of N. Y. General Business Law (McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 20, 1968), the hotel could sell the baggage at public auction, provided that at least 15 days prior to the time of the sale, notice of the sale "containing a brief description of the goods, baggage and articles to be sold" was published in a newspaper advertisement, and mailed to the guest if his address was known. Lane v. Hotel Investors, Inc., Sup., 29 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1st Dept. 1941), indicates that the contents of luggage should be exhibited at the sale and that an inventory should be made prior to sale. In order to comply with the statutory scheme, the hotel would have to examine the luggage and its contents prior to publication of notice of sale and notification of the guest. Indeed the New York statute requires publication of the contents of the baggage and an invitation to the entire community to examine them before the hotel can assert its right to conduct a sale in satisfaction of its lien. In view of the information given to the F.B.I. the hotel had the right, if not the duty, to render every assistance to determine who were the lawful owners of the luggage and its contents. "It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement." Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Moreover, we agree with Judge Weinfeld that the luggage had been abandoned at the time of the search. United States v. Cowan, 37 F.R.D. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Appellant argues that the abandonment doctrine does not apply because there was no unambiguous act of intentional discard, as in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1960) and Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872, 83 S. Ct. 123, 9 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1962). Abandonment does not require performing a ritual; rather it is a question of intent. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240, 39 S. Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211 (1918). The New York Court of Appeals has stated the test of abandonment as follows:
Appellant contends that the successive adjournments of the preliminary hearing without notice deprived him of his right to the hearing and that the judgment should be reversed or the evidence suppressed because of the delay in determination of whether or not there was probable cause. The delay in holding a preliminary hearing was not error of which Cowan can complain. Cowan was arrested at 3:30 A.M. on April 8, 1963. He was booked, then brought before the United States Commissioner at about 1 P.M. The Commissioner read the complaint to Cowan and advised him of his right to a preliminary hearing. He stated he wanted a hearing, and a hearing was set for April 22. After the appearance before the Commissioner, Cowan was released on his own recognizance, while in the presence of his New York State Parole officer, who promptly took him to City Prison as a parole violator. During his incarceration in City Prison until July 1, 1963, the preliminary hearing was adjourned five times and was finally marked off the Commissioner's calendar on June 28, 1963 when an indictment was handed down, superseding the complaint. See Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220, 85 S. Ct. 1365, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1965); United States v. Heap, 345 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
We find that appellant was in no way prejudiced by the delay of the preliminary hearing and find no abuse that would justify reversal of the conviction or suppression of the evidence. United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S. Ct. 32, 19 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1967). The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to "afford a person arrested upon complaint an opportunity to challenge the existence of probable cause for detaining him or requiring bail." Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906, 19 L. Ed. 2d 872 (Jan. 23, 1968), United States v. Motte, 251 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cowan was neither detained nor required to post bail since he was released on his own recognizance in order to face the New York parole violation charge and the status quo was maintained on the Federal charge until after the state sentence was served and the complaint was marked off the Commissioner's calendar because an indictment was handed down. See United States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). None of the purposes of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c) would be furthered by granting appellant the relief he seeks. United States v. Cowan, 37 F.R.D. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. at 228, 85 S. Ct. 1365 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part).
There is no merit whatever to Cowan's contention that failure to grant the preliminary hearing required the court to suppress evidence acquired through the search of the luggage. The search preceded Cowan's arrest by ten days and was entirely unrelated to the question of probable cause for Cowan's detention which might have been raised at a preliminary hearing. 37 F.R.D. at 218. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70, 64 S. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944), United States v. Klapholz, 17 F.R.D. 18, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) aff'd, 230 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924, 76 S. Ct. 781, 100 L. Ed. 1454 (1956).