Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-836.ZPC.html
Timestamp: 2017-10-22 07:03:32
Document Index: 584232663

Matched Legal Cases: ['§5', '§1', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§1', '§5', '§5', '§1', '§5']

The Supreme Court of the State of Florida interpreted its elections statutes in proceedings brought to require manual recounts of ballots, and the certification of the recount results, for votes cast in the quadrennial Presidential election held on November 7, 2000. Governor George W. Bush, Republican candidate for the Presidency, filed a petition for certiorari to review the Florida Supreme Court decision. We granted certiorari on two of the questions presented by petitioner: whether the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, by effectively changing the State’s elector appointment procedures after election day, violated the Due Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. §5, and whether the decision of that court changed the manner in which the State’s electors are to be selected, in violation of the legislature’s power to designate the manner for selection under Art. II, §1, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution. 531 U. S. ____ (2000).
The Supreme Court, with the expedition requisite for the controversy, issued its decision on November 21. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, Nos. SC00–2346, SC00–2348, and SC00–2349 (Nov. 21, 2000), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. As the court saw the matter, there were two principal questions: whether a discrepancy between an original machine return and a sample manual recount resulting from the way a ballot has been marked or punched is an “error in vote tabulation” justifying a full manual recount; and how to reconcile what it spoke of as two conflicts in Florida’s election laws: (a) between the time frame for conducting a manual recount under Fla. Stat. §102.166 (2000) and the time frame for submitting county returns under §§102.111 and 102.112, and (b) between §102.111, which provides that the Secretary “shall … ignor[e]” late election returns, and §102.112, which provides that she “may … ignor[e]” such returns.
The parties before us agree that whatever else may be the effect of this section, it creates a “safe harbor” for a State insofar as congressional consideration of its electoral votes is concerned. If the state legislature has provided for final determination of contests or controversies by a law made prior to election day, that determination shall be conclusive if made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors. The Florida Supreme Court cited 3 U.S.C. §§1–10 in a footnote of its opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a, n. 55, but did not discuss §5. Since §5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality of the State’s determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the “safe harbor” would counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law.
After reviewing the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, we find “that there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision.” Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 555 (1940) . This is sufficient reason for us to decline at this time to review the federal questions asserted to be present. See ibid.
Specifically, we are unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, §1, cl. 2. We are also unclear as to the consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. §5. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.