Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2005_documents/05me50kr.htm
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 06:48:25
Document Index: 273887524

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 11007', '§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 5', '§\n3', '§ 9', '§ 480', '§ 341', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 480', '§ 480', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 480', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 9', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 480']

Decided: April 7,
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J.,
and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
[¶1] Harold A. Kroeger appeals from a
judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) affirming the Department of Environmental
Protection's denial of his application to build a dock. The Department denied the permit
because it found that the proposed dock did not meet the requirements of the
Natural Resources Protection Act, 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 480-A to -Z (2001 & Supp.
2004), in two respects: (1) the dock would unreasonably interfere with existing
scenic uses, and (2) the dock would unreasonably harm significant marine
aquatic habitat. Kroeger
challenges the factual findings of the Department, arguing that they are
unsupported by the record and arbitrary.[1] We affirm the Department's denial of
the permit on the basis that the proposed dock will interfere with existing
scenic uses, and we do not reach the issue of unreasonable harm to the marine
[¶2] Kroeger owns property on Mount Desert
Island with two hundred feet of shorefront on the eastern shore of Somes Sound
in the area known as the Narrows. He applied to the Department for a permit to construct a dock. In the application, Kroeger stated that
the dock would be used for recreational boating and that its purpose was to
access and store dinghies and to access his large boat that is moored nearby. Kroeger's plan describes a 180-foot
long dock, consisting of the following: a permanent pier, 110 feet in length by
six feet wide; a seasonal ramp, fifty feet long by four feet wide; and a float,
twenty feet long by fifteen feet wide.[2] The plan calls for the pier to be
supported by a concrete abutment on shore and two granite cribs. The pier would impact 138 square feet
of the coastal wetland substrate. [¶3] During the process of reviewing the
application for the permit, the Department received letters from citizens who
use Somes Sound and who criticized the proposal. These included comments from a neighboring landowner, who
opposed the construction of the dock and who was later granted intervener
status in the Superior Court. Kroeger was allowed to supplement his application to respond to the various
comments. Before the Department
rendered its decision, it issued a draft order and gave Kroeger an opportunity
to comment on the draft, which he did.
[¶4] In its final order, the Department made
detailed factual findings and concluded that Kroeger's application met seven of
the nine NRPA standards. 38
M.R.S.A. § 480-D (2001 & Supp. 2004). However, because a permit cannot be issued unless an applicant has demonstrated
that all nine standards are met and because the Department found that Kroeger
failed to meet two of the standards, the Department denied the permit. One of the standards he failed to meet
requires that an "activity will not unreasonably interfere with existing
scenic, aesthetic, recreational or navigational uses." 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D(1) (2001). Regarding this standard, the Department
stated that the proposed dock would unreasonably interfere with existing scenic
uses because it "would represent a sharp visual contrast to the existing shoreline
. . . and the applicant has alternatives that would meet the project purposes
making the impacts unnecessary and unreasonable."
[¶5] The other standard that the Department
found that Kroeger failed to meet is the "harm to habitats" standard, which
requires that an activity "not unreasonably harm any significant wildlife
habitat, freshwater wetland plant habitat, threatened or endangered plant
habitat, aquatic habitat, travel corridor, freshwater, estuarine or marine
fisheries or other aquatic life." 38 M.R.S.A. § 480‑D(3) (Supp. 2001).[3] The Department found that Kroeger's
proposed dock "would result in the loss of coastal wetland area, functions and
values; would result in a loss of marine aquatic life and habitat; and that the
applicant has alternatives that would meet the project purpose making the
impacts unnecessary and unreasonable."
[¶6] Kroeger appealed the denial of the
permit to the Superior Court. The
Superior Court affirmed the Department's decision, and Kroeger appealed. The neighbor, who was granted
intervener status in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 24(b), has
also participated in this appeal as an appellee.
[¶7] When a party appeals a judgment
resulting from the Superior Court's review of an administrative agency
decision, we review the agency's decision directly. Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 11, 832 A.2d 765, 768. We do not vacate an agency's decision
unless it: violates the Constitution or statutes; exceeds the agency's
authority; is procedurally unlawful; is arbitrary or capricious; constitutes an
abuse of discretion; is affected by bias or an error of law; or is unsupported
by the evidence in the record. 5
M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C) (2002).
[¶8] Kroeger contends that the Department's
findings are contrary to the record evidence and are arbitrary. When, as here, an appellant challenges
the findings of the administrative agency, the appellant cannot prevail unless
he shows that the record compels contrary findings. Lentine v. Town of St. George, 599 A.2d 76, 80 (Me. 1991). We do not find that an administrative agency has acted arbitrarily or
capriciously unless its action is "wilful and unreasoning" and "without
consideration of facts or circumstances." Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 281 A.2d 233, 242 (Me. 1971) (quotation marks
Scenic Uses
[¶9] The construction of a permanent
structure in, on, or over a coastal wetland is an activity that requires a
permit. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-C (2001
& Supp. 2004). An applicant
for a permit has the burden to demonstrate that the activity will not
unreasonably interfere with existing scenic uses. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D(1). An applicant also has to meet the standards set forth in the
regulations promulgated by the Department. One of those is the "avoidance" standard: "No activity shall
be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the project that would be
less damaging to the environment." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-4 § 5(A) (2002). The regulation also states that even if there is no
practicable alternative, "the application will be denied if the activity will
have an unreasonable impact on the wetland." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-5 § 5(D)(1) (2002).
[¶10] In the decision denying Kroeger's
application for a permit, the Department described Somes Sound, the location of
the proposed dock, as "the only natural fjord on the east coast of the United
States." It noted that Acadia National Park is located on the opposite
side of Somes Sound from the proposed dock. The Department found that the dock would not blend into the
shoreline and that "a light colored, linear structure 17 feet high and
the natural shoreline of the Somes Sound fjord." [¶11] The evidence before the Department
included reports by experts opining on the visual impact of the proposed
dock. Kroeger's expert concluded
that the proposed dock would be "prominent only from close range," but that it
would blend with the existing shoreline. Kroeger's expert commented that the visual impact of the proposed dock
would diminish with distance:
close range the structures can cross a viewers [sic] entire field of vision. At middle distances the structures cross a small percentage
of a viewers [sic] field of
vision, while distant viewers see the structures taking a very small percentage
of their field of vision.
[¶12] The intervener submitted an expert's report
to the Department that criticized the lack of information in Kroeger's expert's
report regarding the existing scenic uses. The intervener's expert stated: People
from all over the world come to view Somes Sound. The people who will see the proposed pier from boats and
hiking trails will be largely recreationists who, as a group, and especially in
a landscape of such national significance, primarily seek high quality
settings. As such, they are very
highly sensitive to changes in the landscape.
[¶13] In addition to the experts' reports on
existing scenic uses and the visual impact of the proposed dock, the record
contains photographs of the affected area, including photographs submitted by
Kroeger containing simulations of the proposed dock. The photographs demonstrate the scenic beauty of the area
and the lack of other docks. The
photographs with simulations also demonstrate the interference of the proposed
dock with the existing scene. The
record evidence discloses that there are no other docks within 2000 feet of the
location of Kroeger's proposed dock, and the other docks on the Sound are more
secluded than the proposed dock and are not on the narrow reach of the Sound.
[¶14] The administrative record also includes
comments by members of the public and neighbors. The comments attest to the unique scenic beauty of the area
and the fear that the proposed dock would interfere with the scenery of the
Sound. The Department noted that
Somes Sound is used by many boaters to enjoy the beauty of the area. Department personnel also visited the
site and took notice of the proposed location and its proximity to Acadia
National Park. The record
adequately supports the Department's finding that the proposed dock will
interfere with existing scenic uses of boaters, hikers, and sightseers of Somes
Sound. [¶15] The dissent contends that the scenic
use at issue is that of the wetland itself. Because "[c]oastal wetlands" are defined as "all tidal and
subtidal lands," 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-B(2) (2001), the dissent concludes that
there is seldom any scenic use of subtidal lands, because they are underwater
and invisible to most people. However, section 480-D(1) does not limit the requirement of
noninterference to existing uses of the coastal wetland itself. In Conservation Law Foundation, Inc.
v. Department of Environmental Protection,
2003 ME 62, ¶ 33, 823 A.2d 551, 562, we focused on the "uses of the location in
which the pier or wharf is to be constructed." If the uses were limited to "tidal and subtidal lands"
without the use of the water covering those tidal and subtidal lands, the
requirement of noninterference with navigational uses in section 480-D(1) would
[¶16] Furthermore, the dissent's finding that
subtidal lands have no scenic use for anyone other than a scuba diver is
contrary to the legislative finding that "coastal wetlands . . . are resources
of state significance . . . [that] have great scenic beauty." 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-A (2001). The dissent's unduly restrictive
construction of "scenic and aesthetic uses" to apply only to the land beneath
the subtidal and tidal waters does not comport with the "broad, liberal
interpretation" that we give to NRPA. Murphy v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,
615 A.2d 255, 259 (Me. 1992). Finally, the dissent's application of section 480-D and the Department's
regulations is contrary to the Department's interpretation of the statute it is
charged with enforcing and the regulations it has promulgated, and we give
deference to the Department's interpretation. Id. By visiting the surrounding area and
considering the impact of the proposed dock on the boaters and hikers who flock
to Acadia for the scenic beauty of the area, the Department has interpreted the
statute and its own regulations to mean that the general location of the
proposed activity is at issue when considering interference with existing
scenic uses.[4]
[¶17] The Department determined that the
interference that the proposed dock would have on scenic uses would be unreasonable
because Kroeger had practicable alternatives to the construction of a
dock. The Department regulations
require a permit applicant to analyze alternatives to the proposed activity and
"demonstrate that a practicable alternative does not exist." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-4, 310-7
§§ 5(A), 9(A) (2002). "Practicable" is defined as "[a]vailable and feasible considering cost,
existing technology and logistics based on the overall purpose of the
project." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-3 §
3(R) (2002). The Department found
that Kroeger failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that a practicable
[¶18] Kroeger stated in his permit
application that the dock would be used for recreational boating and that the
purpose was to access dinghies, store them, and access his large boat that is
moored nearby. Contrary to the
requirement in the regulations to provide information regarding an alternatives
analysis with the application, 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-7 § 9(A), Kroeger failed to
provide the information. By letter
dated April 18, 2002, the Department listed additional information that was
required for processing. Included
in this list were the following:
is the draft of the boat the applicant intends to dock at the proposed pier?
regard to practical alternatives for egress and ingress to the water, please
provide evidence in regard to why the following alternatives are not
a. Use of an existing public or commercial
pier. Please include the distance
to the nearest public piers in your response.
b. Use of a three-point hitch and a
In responding to this letter, please carefully
consider all alternatives for access and egress, and provide specific evidence
on the practicability of all alternatives.
In response, Kroeger stated the drafts of his
fifty-two-foot boat and his twenty-eight-foot powerboat. He noted that the float was designed
primarily for skiffs and that there would also be kayaks. He responded that a dinghy and
three-point hitch were impractical "because of the physical ability required to
use one" and that the rocky shore was not conducive to the use of a three-point
hitch. He stated that the public
marina was two miles away.
[¶19] In the letter to the Department
commenting on the draft decision, Kroeger stated that the dock would be used
primarily by kayaks, canoes, a small rowboat, and an inflatable combination
motor/row boat. He stated that he
and his wife were ages sixty-two and fifty-eight and that it was not practical
for them to load a vessel onto a vehicle and transport it to another location.
[¶20] The Department found that Kroeger has
dock space and a mooring at the Northeast Harbor Town Landing for his large
boat and that he is a member of a private marina in the area. The Department found that Kroeger did
not demonstrate that he did not have practical alternative access to the water
through the public and private marinas nearby and by launching small boats from
his shore. The record supports
these findings and does not compel a finding that no practicable alternatives
existed, particularly in the absence of any information offered by Kroeger as
to why shore launching was impracticable. D. Arbitrariness
[¶21] Kroeger also argues that the
Department's findings regarding the unreasonable interference with existing
scenic uses are arbitrary. He
refers to the finding that the proposed dock would sharply contrast with the
shoreline and argues that the Department could not have made this finding
except by ignoring the photographs with simulations and his expert's opinion
that the dock would retain a dark green color that would be compatible with the
surroundings. However, the
Department's decision expressly refers to his expert's opinion, and it states
that the Department did not agree with the assertion that the color would
remain dark and blend into the shoreline. The decision adds that the Department's refusal to agree with Kroeger's
expert on this issue is based on the opinion of the intervener's expert and on
the observations by Department personnel. An agency does not act arbitrarily when it considers but disagrees with
evidence submitted by one party and believes evidence submitted by another
party. Cent. Me. Power Co., 281 A.2d at 242.
[¶22] The Department also found that Kroeger
had not met the NRPA standard requiring no unreasonable harm to the habitat,
and Kroeger challenges that finding on appeal. However, because an applicant must meet all of the NRPA
standards in order to obtain a permit, our affirmance of the Department's
decision on the existing scenic uses standard renders discussion of the other
standard superfluous. The
DANA, J.,
with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶23] Because Kroeger's application for a
permit to build a pier on his property met all of the Natural Resources
Protection Act standards, I must respectfully dissent.
[¶24] To qualify for a permit an applicant
must meet all nine of the Act's standards. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D (2001). Pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 341-D(1-B) (2001), the Board
of Environmental Protection promulgated rules implementing the Act. The rules require an applicant to avoid
the activity if there are practicable alternatives that would be less damaging
to the environment. 2 C.M.R. 06
096 310-4 § 5(A) (2002). Each
applicant must provide an analysis of the alternatives available. Id. The regulations also require an
applicant to minimize alteration and, in some cases, provide compensation. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-4 § 5(B), (C)
(2002). Even if the project has no
practicable alternative and the applicant has minimized the impact as much as
possible, the regulations provide that there must be no unreasonable
impact. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-5
§ 5(D)(1) (2002). [¶25] The Department determined that Kroeger
failed to meet the Act's "existing uses" standard, which requires an applicant
to demonstrate that "[t]he activity will not unreasonably interfere with
existing scenic, aesthetic, recreational or navigational uses," 38 M.R.S.A.
§ 480-D(1) (2001), that he also failed to meet the "harm to habitat"
standard, which requires an applicant to demonstrate that "[t]he activity will
not unreasonably harm any significant wildlife habitat . . . or other
aquatic life," 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D(3) (2001),[5]
and that there was a practicable alternative to a pier on his property. [¶26] The Court did not reach the harm to
habitat standard and did not address the Department's flawed reliance on
cumulative prospective development. Instead, the Court concludes that the record adequately supports the
Department's finding that the proposed dock will interfere with existing scenic
uses. It also concludes that the
record does not compel a finding that there was no practicable alternative to
the pier. Because the record does
compel findings that the impact on the scenic uses of the wetlands would be
virtually nonexistent, the impact on the wetland habitat would be minor, and
there was no practicable alternative to a pier on Kroeger's property, the Court
compounds the Department's error.
[¶27] The Court also finds that the
Department's determination that the color of the pier would sharply contrast
with the shoreline was not arbitrary. Because both the Department and the Court misapply the scenic impact
analysis from the outset, I do not address this issue.
[¶28] When the Superior Court acts as an
intermediate appellate court, we directly review the decision of the
administrative agency. Hannum v.
Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123,
¶ 11, 832 A.2d 765, 768. We
accord no deference to the Superior Court. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 22, 823 A.2d 551,
559. Thus, we directly review the
Department's order to determine whether its decision is supported by evidence
in the record and whether it is affected by any abuse of discretion or error of
law. Hannum, 2003 ME 123, ¶ 11, 832 A.2d at 769; see also Downeast
Energy Corp. v. Fund Ins. Review Bd., 2000
ME 151, ¶ 13, 756 A.2d 948, 951. A. The
Impact on the Scenic Uses of the Wetland Would Be Virtually Non‑Existent
[¶29] When determining whether a project
would have an unreasonable impact on the wetland, the Department considers the
"functions and values provided by the wetland." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-5 § 5(D)(1)(b) (2002). The regulations define "[f]unctions" to
mean "[t]he roles wetlands serve which are of value to society or the
environment including, but not limited to, . . . scenic and aesthetic
use." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-3
§ 3(J) (2002). [¶30] The Department suggests that because
the project site is visible primarily by boaters and hikers, the wetland
provides valuable scenic and aesthetic uses. Due to the regulatory language, however, the focus of the analysis
must be on the scenic and aesthetic value "provided by the wetland." 2
C.M.R. 06 096 310‑5 § 5(D) (emphasis added). The wetlands at issue are coastal
wetlands.[6] "Coastal wetlands" are defined by the
NRPA as "all tidal and subtidal lands."[7] 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-B(2)
(2001). Kroeger's pier has no
impact on subtidal lands. Even if
it did, subtidal lands are not regarded as particularly scenic or aesthetic,
except perhaps by scuba divers, because they are underwater all the time, and
generally invisible to hikers and boaters. Tidal lands are visible, especially at low tide when they
are fully exposed; most of the time, tidal lands are only partially
visible. [¶31] Even when visible, there is no evidence
that the tidal lands in Somes Sound are any different from the tidal lands
elsewhere on the Maine coastline. No evidence was presented that hikers and sailors attribute a higher
scenic and aesthetic value to Mount Desert tidal lands than other tidal lands. In fact, the rock, seaweed, sand, shells,
and various critters that occupy the tidal lands, and may, on close inspection,
offer some aesthetic value, are largely invisible to boaters in the Sound and
hikers in Acadia. [¶32] The Court notes that Somes Sound is
"the only natural fjord on the east coast of the United States." While that may be true, in the context
of coastal wetlands, the only area relevant to the analysis is the tidal land
itself, not the landscape. Because
tidal lands offer little scenic and aesthetic value to boaters and hikers in
the area, the pier's impact on the scenic and aesthetic uses provided by the
wetland would be virtually non-existent. [¶33] The Department's determination that the
pier would unreasonably impact scenic uses stems from its misapplication of the
statutory and regulatory requirements to scenery outside the scope of the
Act. Accordingly, its decision not
to grant Kroeger his permit is affected by error of law. Because the evidence in the record,
properly applied, compels a finding that the pier would not unreasonably impact
scenic uses, Kroeger meets the no unreasonable impact to scenic uses standard.
Impact on the Wetland Habitat Would Be Minor
[¶34] The pier's granite supports would cover
only a small amount of wetland. Far from harming habitats, there is evidence in the record that the
granite supports would actually increase the area on which life can grow. Granite blocks are excellent attachment
sites for algae, barnacles, and mussels. Kroeger's plan envisioned stacking the granite blocks so as to allow
water to circulate between them. Organisms would find shelter from the waves and predators between the
blocks. With the surfaces of the
blocks exposed, the wetland's surface area available for organisms to live and
grow would increase. [¶35] The Department of Marine Resources'
(DMR) letter to the Department, dated May 31, 2002, lends additional support to
a finding of no unreasonable harm to habitat. In response to the Department's request for project review,
and after a visit to the property, the DMR stated that "[Kroeger's proposed
pier] should not cause significant adverse impacts to marine resources, or
traditional fisheries." [¶36] Further, the impact of the pier would
be so minor that the Department's regulations do not require Kroeger to provide
compensation for the loss of wetland. The regulations only require an applicant to compensate for a loss of
wetland if the area affected exceeds 500 square feet. 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-5 § 5(C) (2002). Since Kroeger's pier would cover only
138 square feet of wetland, its impact is too minor to require
compensation. The evidence,
therefore, compels a finding that Kroeger's proposed pier would not
unreasonably harm wetland habitat.
Practicable Alternative Analysis is Flawed
[¶37] In complying with the regulation's
avoidance standard, Kroeger had the burden of establishing that no practicable
alternative existed. 2 C.M.R. 06
096 310-4 § 5(A). The
regulations provide that practicable alternatives include: (1)
[u]tilizing, managing or expanding one or more other sites that would avoid the
wetland impact; (2) [r]educing the size, scope, configuration or density of the
project as proposed, thereby avoiding or reducing the wetland impact; (3)
[d]eveloping alternative project designs, such as cluster development, that
avoid or lessen the wetland impact; and (4) [d]emonstrating the need, whether
public or private, for the proposed alteration.
2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-7 § 9(A) (2002). [¶38] Kroeger persuasively argues that local
marinas are not practicable alternatives to a pier on his property. Alternatives are practicable if they
are "[a]vailable and feasible considering cost, existing technology and
logistics based on the overall purpose of the project." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-3 § 3(R)
(2002). Kroeger's application
indicated that the overall purpose of the project was access to the water from
his property in exercise of his right to
wharf-out to navigable waters. See Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996) (discussing the nature
and scope of the riparian right to construct piers and wharf-out). Kroeger plainly wanted to recreate on
the water around his property, not around the local marina. Kroeger also presented evidence in his
application that, other than a pier, there was no practicable alternative for
accessing the water from his property.[8] He stated that a three-point hitch and
dinghy were impractical because his rocky shoreline would tend to snag the
ropes. He also stated that a
temporary structure was impractical because it would not be able to withstand
the remarkably strong tidal currents present in the Narrows. [¶39] Further, it is plain from the record
that shore launching is not a practicable alternative. A steep embankment separates his home
from the shoreline, the base of which is protected from erosion by
boulders. The very presence of the
boulders indicates that the high watermark reaches the base of this embankment,
making shore mooring impossible and launching impractical. To the extent that the Department's
order states that there are practicable alternatives to a pier for accessing
the water from Kroeger's property, it is contrary to the evidence in the
record.[9]
[¶40] Moreover, stating that shore access is
a practicable alternative necessarily assumes the applicant's ability to drag
or carry boats from some storage facility to the water at low tide. Such an assumption has no place in a
practicable alternatives analysis. Plainly apparent from the Department's order, brief, and argument is its
consideration of the physical and economic circumstances of the individual
applicant in determining the existence of a practicable alternative. Implicit in finding that a marina is a
practicable alternative is a finding that Kroeger is either physically capable
of loading and unloading boats from his car, or financially able to hire people
to do so. If this kind of analysis
is permissible, an elderly or disabled individual would receive a permit but an
able-bodied thirty-year-old would not. This level of discretion is plainly an overreading of the
regulations. The Legislature could
not have intended that the Department undertake such an arbitrary analysis when
it enacted the NRPA.
[¶41] Other examples further highlight the arbitrary
nature of the Department's reasoning. What if the marina was five, ten, or twenty miles away? How far is too far? What if Kroeger had been rejected for
membership in the private marina? Would an unwelcomed applicant receive a permit?
[¶42] The regulations anticipate that piers
may not have a practicable alternative. "[P]rojects for which no practicable alternative may exist are limited
to those necessary for: . . . (3) [w]ater dependent uses." 2 C.M.R. 06 096 310-4 § 5(A)(3)
(2002). A pier is a "water
dependent use." 2 C.M.R. 06 096
310-3 § 3(W) (2002). A fair
reading of the regulations is that the authors understood that a pier may have
no practicable alternative. Certainly, in Kroeger's case, his pier did not have a practicable
alternative. The Department's
finding of one cannot form a basis for its order denying Kroeger a permit for
his pier.
on Cumulative Prospective Development was Flawed
[¶43] In Hannum, we held that unsupported speculation about future development of
piers that could cause the proposed pier to have an unreasonable impact in the
future, even if it would not have an unreasonable impact now, cannot properly
support an agency's decision. 2003
ME 123, ¶ 17, 832 A.2d at 770. But we also stated that the Department could deny an application if a
proposed dock would add an incremental effect so as to create a cumulative
impact. Id. ¶ 15, 832 A.2d at 769.
[¶44] In analyzing the cumulative impact of
the pier, the Department referred to the "potential for visual clutter on this
relatively undeveloped shoreline." This statement presents two problems. First, since the regulations are only concerned with the
cumulative impact on the wetland, the Department erroneously considered the
impact on the scenery. Second,
this kind of speculation is improper under Hannum. [¶45] In fact, the evidence supports a
finding that there is no cumulative impact. As the Department notes, the shoreline is relatively
undeveloped. There are no piers
within 2000 feet of Kroeger's property. Since this is the first pier on this particular stretch of wetland, the
pier's incremental effect cannot create a cumulative impact. Thus, Kroeger's pier causes no
unreasonable impact.
Margaret Bensinger,
Brian M. Rayback,
[7] The definition of "[c]oastal wetlands" also includes the contiguous lowland area subject to tidal action during maximum spring tide levels. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-B(2) (2001). This area could conceivably include a beach or other land-form that would be visible almost year round. In this case, however, the evidence in the record suggests that normal high tide reaches the embankment on the property. Since the pier would extend out perpendicular from the embankment into the Sound, the pier would not impact any of the additional land subject to tidal action during high spring tides. [8] Kroeger primarily intended to use the pier for smaller boats, such as dinghies, kayaks, picnic boats, and other boats with a shallow draft. Tide permitting, Kroeger also expected to use the pier for boats with deeper drafts, such as his sloop, which is permanently moored at one of the local marinas.
In its decision denying Kroeger his permit, the Department stated that the applicant had not demonstrated that the marina and shore launching together would not meet his needs. Although the Department, as the Court notes, requested additional information regarding the use of an existing public pier, a three-point hitch, or a temporary structure, it did not request information regarding shore launching. Given the location and the nature of the shoreline, as evidenced by the many pictures and descriptions in the record, Kroeger should be entitled to presume that he met his burden proving that shore launching was impractical when he allowed the Department to visit and inspect the site. Even public comments objecting to the pier and offering alternatives did not go so far as to suggest that shore launching was a practicable alternative.