Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/85724/united-states-vs-hill
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 07:15:09
Document Index: 697575583

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 823', '§ 823', '§ 1', '§ 823', '§ 4544', '§ 823', '§ 1']

United States Vs Hill - Citation 85724 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. Hill - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/85724CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJan-31-1887Case Number120 U.S. 169AppellantUnited StatesRespondentHillExcerpt:
united states v. hill - 120 u.s. 169 (1887)
it was the custom in the united states courts in massachusetts, from 1839 to december, 1884, known and approved by the judges, for the clerk to charge $3 as fees in naturalization proceedings. the clerk of the district court never included those fees in his returns. that fact was known to the judges to whom his accounts were semiannually exhibited and by whom they were passed without objection in that particular. relying on that custom and..... Judgment:
It was the custom in the United States courts in Massachusetts, from 1839 to December, 1884, known and approved by the judges, for the clerk to charge $3 as fees in naturalization proceedings. The clerk of the District Court never included those fees in his returns. That fact was known to the judges to whom his accounts were semiannually exhibited and by whom they were passed without objection in that particular. Relying on that custom and believing that those fees formed no part of the emoluments to be returned, the clerk of the district court appointed in 1879 did not include those fees in his accounts. This was known to the district judge when he examined and certified the accounts, and his accounts so made out, to July, 1884, were examined and adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury. Under a rule made by the district court in 1855, the clerk had charged and received the $3 as a gross sum for examining, in advance of their presentation to the court, the application papers and reporting to the court whether they were in conformity with law, and had made no division for specific services according to any items of the fee bill in §§ 823
of the Revised Statutes. In a suit brought in December, 1884, on the official bond of the clerk against him and his surety to recover the amount of the naturalization fees,
(1) The provision in § 823, taken from § 1 of the Act of February 26, 1853, c. 80, 10 Stat. 161, that the fees to clerks shall be "taxed and allowed" applies
to taxable fees and costs in ordinary suits between party and party prosecuted in a court, and there is no specification of naturalization matters in the fees of clerks.
Referring, then, to the fee bill of February 26, 1853, as found in §§ 823
of the Revised Statutes, the court proceeds:
"Upon an examination of the statute, it will be seen that it applies to taxable costs in all ordinary litigation, whether at law or in equity or admiralty, and undoubtedly governs the taxation in all such actions, suits, and proceedings, civil and criminal,
in the courts of the United States. But it has not usually been considered, at least in this district, as applying to certain special and peculiar cases of which the courts have jurisdiction, where only the party asking for the right or privilege is before the court and from the nature of the case no costs are taxable as in ordinary litigated suits. Of such a character are proceedings under the naturalization laws, under the Shipping Commissioner's Act, and applications to be admitted to practice as an attorney. Thus, Judge Shepley early refused to allow the clerk to tax costs by the fee bill on applications under the Shipping Commissioner's Act of June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 272; Rev.Stat. § 4544, for the money and effects of deceased seamen deposited in the circuit court by the shipping commissioner. "
"In respect to naturalization cases, it has never been hitherto understood either by the judges or the departments that the fees of the clerk were for services rendered in his official capacity. At times, especially before elections, these applications are extremely numerous. The papers are usually prepared by the parties themselves or their friends, or, more frequently, by agents of candidates. The hearings are
at no stated times, and it is rare that any person appears in opposition. It has therefore been necessary, both in the interest of the applicants and for the due and orderly execution of the law and to enable the court to dispose of the cases, that the papers should be looked over and corrected by some person familiar with the law and practice, and in many instances that the witnesses should be examined before the cases were presented to the court for final action. It was for this service that the clerk has been allowed to make these charges to the parties. These are duties which the court has the undoubted right to have performed by some other person than the presiding judge. In these cases, the clerk acts rather as a person appointed to assist the court in exercising its functions, like a master or examiner in an equity cause, or an assessor in admiralty, or an auditor in a suit at law. It is the universal practice of all courts of large jurisdiction to appoint special officers, at the expense of the parties, to make inquiries, investigate details, examine papers, take accounts, make computations, and perform ministerial acts. Their reports, when returned into court and accepted, become part of the case and form the basis of the orders and decrees of the court in the cause."
"No complaint of these fees has ever come to the ear of the court from any quarter. On the contrary, this service performed by the clerks has been of great advantage to those seeking to be admitted as citizens. It has had the effect, as originally intended, to simplify the process of becoming a citizen and to make it more expeditious and inexpensive. It saves the parties the expense of employing an attorney, and the fee charged therefor is much less than would be allowed by the fee bill if the application is to be treated and entered on the docket of the court as an ordinary suit. In rejected cases, no fee has been charged. This practice has prevailed for more than forty years, ever since the act of 1842, which first required returns, and has been perfectly well known to everybody conversant with the courts. It was begun by Judge Story and Judge Sprague, and has had the approval of all the judges of this district since their day. It has also had the sanction successively of the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Justice. Until this suit was brought, it has never been called in question by any accounting officer of the government, nor has Congress seen fit to put a stop to it by legislation. This construction of the statute in practice, concurred in by all the departments of the government and continued for so many years, must be regarded as absolutely conclusive in its effect.
105 U. 97;
Viewing the whole subject in the light in which it appears on the face of the statute in regard to the fees of the clerk, we are met by the fact that § 823 of the Revised Statutes, taken from § 1 of the Act of February 26, 1853, c. 80, 10 Stat. 161, provides that "the following, and no other, compensation shall be taxed and allowed" to clerks of the district courts. This applies
to taxable fees and costs in ordinary suits between party and party prosecuted in a court. There is no specification of naturalization matters in the fees of clerks. From as early as December, 1839, the practice, set forth in the agreed statement of facts, has obtained in the District Court in Massachusetts of charging the fees of one dollar and two dollars as gross sums in naturalization proceedings, without any division for specific services, according to any items of the fee bill. The Act of March 3, 1841, before referred to, the first one on the subject of returns, implied that there should be reports of "fees and emoluments" by the clerk to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Act of May 18, 1842, provided for semiannual returns to that officer, and included specifically fees and emoluments under the Bankrupt Act. But the clerk never has included in these returns his fees and emoluments for naturalization proceedings, and his action from 1842 to and including 1884 has been with the knowledge of the successive district judges, to whom his accounts have been semiannually exhibited. From 1842 to 1849, these accounts went to the Secretary of the Treasury; from 1849 to 1870, to the Secretary of the Interior, and since 1870, they have gone to the Attorney General. From 1856, the statute has required that these accounts, before going forward, "shall be examined and certified by the district judge," and that after being sent to the several heads of the departments, they shall be subject to revision
15 Pet. 141, 145 [argument of counsel -- omitted];
8 Wall. 330;
90 U. S. 382
107 U. S. 406
110 U. S. 485
, the same doctrine was applied, the cases in this Court on the subject being collected and it being said that a "contemporaneous and uniform interpretation" by executive officers charged with the duty of acting under a statute "is entitled to weight" in its construction, "and in a case of doubt, ought to turn the scale." A still more recent case on the subject is
United States v. Philbrick, ante,
, where this language is used: