Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca5/c383550/nick-belluso-v-turner-communications-corporation
Timestamp: 2020-04-09 00:17:59
Document Index: 464167127

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 605', '§ 73', '§ 151', '§ 154', '§ 315', '§ 312', '§ 401', '§ 1', '§ 153']

Nick Belluso v. Turner Communications Corporation, Fifth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
The Federal Communications Act does not expressly authorize suits to recover damages for violations of section 315(a) by broadcast licensees. The question, then, is whether such a private damages remedy can be implied under the Act. To our knowledge, the majority of courts to consider the question have held that no such remedy can be inferred from the Act. See Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1962); Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622 (D.C.Cal.1972); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y.1969); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y.1968); but compare Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (implying a private cause of action for unauthorized publication of a telephone conversation in violation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 605); Lorentz v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 472 F. Supp. 946 (W.D.Pa.1979) (implying a private cause of action for violation of the personal attack rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123). The case is one of first impression in this Circuit.
In determining whether plaintiff has an implied private cause of action, we are guided by a series of Supreme Court cases which outline the role of the courts in inferring private remedies under federal statutes. The collective teaching of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975), and its progeny, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 60 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2479, 61 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S. Ct. 242, 62 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1979), is that the task before the Court is a limited one. The Court is not to determine whether allowing a private remedy to redress a statutory violation would be practical or desirable, but only to determine, as a matter of statutory construction, whether Congress intended at the time it enacted the statute to create the private remedy asserted. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688, 99 S.Ct. at 1953; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 15-16, 100 S.Ct. at 245; Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 246, 66 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980). It is assumed without examination, in light of a broadcaster's First Amendment rights, that Congress could have provided a damage remedy if it had chosen to do so.
In Cort v. Ash, the Supreme Court outlined four considerations which are relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not explicitly providing one. These are (1) whether the statute creates a federal right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create or deny such a remedy; (3) whether it would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. Subsequent cases make clear that these factors are not to be applied in a rigid or mechanical manner. They are merely guides which may shed light on what Congress intended. In any given case one or more factors may point in favor of implication of a private cause of action, yet another may be so persuasive of legislative intent to deny such a remedy as to be dispositive. See Smith v. Cotton Brothers Baking Co., 609 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 79, 66 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1980).
With these considerations in mind, we begin our analysis with the language of the statute in question. An examination of this language provides answers regarding two of the factors outlined in Cort. Section 315(a) imposes certain obligations on broadcast licensees as part of a comprehensive scheme regulating the broadcast industry. The field is pre-empted by federal law and the cause of action clearly is not one traditionally relegated to state law. Moreover, although the Federal Communications Act was enacted primarily for the protection of the public interest in telecommunications, and not to create new private rights, Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14, 62 S. Ct. 875, 882, 86 L. Ed. 1229 (1942), the obvious thrust of section 315(a) is to protect bona fide candidates for public office from discrimination and unfair advantage in the use of broadcast facilities. Flory v. FCC, 528 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1975); Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974). By imposing an affirmative duty on broadcast licensees to afford equal opportunities to all qualified candidates in the use of broadcast facilities, the statute can be read as conferring a federal right in favor of candidates in plaintiff's position.
The purpose of the 1934 Act "was to protect the public interest in communications," Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., 316 U.S. at 14, 62 S.Ct. at 882, by formulating "a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the industry," FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137, 60 S. Ct. 437, 439, 84 L. Ed. 656 (1940) (footnote omitted). To achieve these goals, Congress created the Federal Communications Commission and granted it broad regulatory authority. 47 U.S.C.A. § 151. The Commission was empowered to prescribe rules and regulations in furtherance of the Act generally, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 154(i), 303(f), and of section 315 in particular, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(c), and to enforce compliance therewith through various administrative sanctions, 47 U.S.C.A. § 312. The role of the courts was limited to review and enforcement of Commission decisions and orders under an abuse of discretion standard, FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91, 73 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 97 L. Ed. 1470 (1953); issuance of writs of mandamus to compel compliance with the Act upon application of the Attorney General at the request of the Commission; and prosecution for criminal violations of the Act. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 401 and 402. See Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, Titles I, III and IV, §§ 1, 4(i), 303(f), 315, 401, 402, 48 Stat. 1064, 1066, 1082, 1084, 1092, 1093. Though the Act has been amended on several occasions since 1934, these amendments have in no way diminished either the central role of the Commission in enforcing the Act or its powers thereunder.
It is apparent from an examination of the 1934 Act that enforcement of the statute and vindication of the public interest are vested in the Federal Communications Commission. See Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950); McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 600 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779, 66 S. Ct. 530, 90 L. Ed. 1007 (1946); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 628, 631 (D.C.1968).
The existence of this pervasive statutory and administrative scheme is strong evidence that Congress intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive. Likewise, under the third criterion of Cort v. Ash, creation of a private cause of action would be inconsistent with the clear legislative intent to centralize enforcement of the Act in the expert agency. Applying the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Supreme Court has admonished "when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies." National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S. Ct. 690, 693, 38 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1974); see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 19, 100 S.Ct. at 247 ("where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it"); Rogers, 611 F.2d at 1084-85. This is a case in which it is proper to heed such advice.
The First Amendment is a restraint on Government, not on private persons. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, 72 S. Ct. 813, 820, 96 L. Ed. 1068 (1952). Although the rule is easily stated, the determination of what separates "private" action from "state" action is much more difficult. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said generally that, "(c)onduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action," and that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations," Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S. Ct. 486, 488, 15 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1966). But the Court is aware that "generalizations do not decide concrete cases." Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can a determination be made that governmental action exists in a particular case. Id. at 299-300, 86 S.Ct. at 488-489.
In reaching this decision, the Court first noted that most lower courts which have considered the question whether broadcasters are instrumentalities of the Government for First Amendment purposes have concluded they are not, citing Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curiam), adopting the opinion of the district court, 87 F. Supp. 822, 825 (D.Mass.1949); McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co. of Philadelphia, 151 F.2d 597, 601 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779, 66 S. Ct. 530, 90 L. Ed. 1007 (1946); Moro v. Telemundo Incorporado, 387 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.P.R.1974); Smothers v. C.B.S., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622, 627 (C.D.Cal.1972); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799, 803-04 (E.D.N.Y.1971). 566 F.2d at 387. The court in fact found only two cases which might suggest that a broadcast licensee's action can be treated as governmental action. First, in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 450 F.2d 642 (1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that a broadcaster's ban on editorial advertising violated the First Amendment. The primary reason for finding governmental action was the fact that the Federal Communications Commission had expressly validated the broadcaster's policy. 450 F.2d at 652. The Supreme Court reversed, with a majority holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee every individual a right of access to the broadcast media. The Justices were unable to agree on the governmental action issue, however. The Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, in Part III of the opinion, 412 U.S. at 114-21, 93 S.Ct. at 2092-96 ( see also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, id. at 132-46, 93 S.Ct. at 2101-08), and Justice Douglas, id. at 148-70, 93 S.Ct. at 2109-20 (concurring in the judgment), expressed the view that there was no governmental action. Justice White, id. at 146-47, 93 S.Ct. at 2108 (concurring), and Justices Blackmun and Powell, id. at 147-48, 93 S.Ct. at 2108-09 (concurring), considered it unnecessary to decide the governmental action issue in light of the substantive holding under the First Amendment. In their dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall would have found governmental action in the case, emphasizing the Commission's specific approval of the broadcaster's action. Id. at 170-81, 93 S.Ct. at 2120-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In the second case, a finding of governmental action was based on the Commission's exertion of significant pressure on the broadcasters to adopt the contested policy. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (D.C.Cal.1976). It is noteworthy that since the decision in Kuzco, the Ninth Circuit has vacated and remanded the Writers Guild case without deciding the governmental action issue on the ground that the controversy is properly within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 85, 66 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1980).
The Second Circuit's persuasive reasoning in Kuzco applies equally to this case. The existence of regulations does not automatically transform a regulated entity into a Government instrumentality. See, e. g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1972). In the area of broadcasting, while a broadcaster can operate only with a license from the Government and is required to operate in the public interest, it retains significant discretion in determining how that public interest requirement will be met. Unlike the all-encompassing regulation of the District of Columbia transportation utility in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 72 S. Ct. 813, 96 L. Ed. 1068 (1952), the intent of Congress in enacting the Communications Act of 1934 was not to exert total governmental control over the broadcast industry, or to make broadcasters common carriers, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(h), but was to permit private broadcasting to develop the widest possible journalistic freedom consistent with its obligation to the public. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 110, 93 S.Ct. at 2090. Consistent with that goal, broadcasters exercise wide discretion over the content and format of their programming. These considerations counsel that where a broadcast licensee acts in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the Act, and where those acts are in no way sanctioned by a governmental body such as the Federal Communications Commission, they are private and not governmental acts for purposes of First Amendment analysis.
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1973), the Supreme Court failed to find a First Amendment right under which the plaintiffs could require a broadcaster to accept editorial advertisements. The earlier decision approving the Fairness Doctrine imposed by the Federal Communications Commission on broadcasters would necessarily negate a First Amendment right of access in individuals that would contravene that doctrine. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 89 S. Ct. 1794, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1969).
Furthermore, a decision that a broadcaster may be constitutionally prohibited by statute from removing defamatory statements contained in speeches broadcast by legally qualified candidates for public office does not demonstrate any First Amendment right of a candidate to access. In re Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 79 S. Ct. 1302, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1407 (1959).
Although in a different context and involving a different set of values, the Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1974), necessarily denied that there is any First Amendment right of access to the print media.
DocketNumber： 79-1799
Citation Numbers： 633 F.2d 393
Filed Date： 12/22/1980
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