Source: http://wyolawlibrary.blogspot.com/2008_12_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 10:29:41
Document Index: 658804583

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 1', '§ 4', '§ 17', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 39', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 34', '§ 1', '§ 34', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 34']

Law Library Letter: December 2008
Summary of Decision issued December 31, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Walters v. StateCitation: 2008 WY 159Docket Number: S-08-0037Original Proceeding, Petition for Writ of Review, District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge.Representing Walters: R. Michael Vang, Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.Representing State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.Facts/Discussion: Walters entered a conditional guilty plea to a second offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. She appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Judgment and Sentence. Walters petitioned the Court for a Writ of Review which was granted. Conditional guilty pleas are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2). It imposes several requirements including that parties must make a reservation of the right to appeal a specific issue in writing. It is undisputed that the parties did not make a reservation of the right to appeal in writing. The record does not sufficiently demonstrate that Walters intended to preserve the right to appeal the specific issues she raised on appeal. The other requirements of the rule – consent of the State and approval of the court – are mandatory. In the instant case, all the issues presented are not dispositive, and there is no indication in the trial court record regarding the specific issue or issues that were preserved for appeal. The Court’s main basis for its decision to reject the plea for noncompliance with the Rule was that two of the three issues raised on appeal were not dispositive. Walters contended that the circuit court inappropriately ruled that evidence of her performance on field sobriety tests and the portable breath test were admissible. Even if she were to prevail, the case would not be fully resolved because the State could still introduce the statements of Walters and the results of the alcohol sensor test administered at the jail. Because no trial occurred, there was no record of how the evidence would be introduced, how it would be addressed by counsel or whether any other evidence of guilt would be introduced. The third issue is dispositive. She contended the initial stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. If Walters were to prevail on that issue, all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal traffic stop would have to be suppressed. The Court noted this was a situation similar to Bundy. The question being whether the two non-dispositive issues taint the entire constitutional plea, or whether the Court might separate the single dispositive issue and resolve it. Like the Bundy court, the Court concluded the entire plea was invalid. Conclusion: The Court found that Walters did not enter a valid conditional guilty plea pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2). On remand, Walters may choose to enter another conditional guilty plea – with the consent of the State and the approval of the court – reserving only dispositive issues. Alternatively, she may enter an unconditional guilty plea or proceed to trial. Reversed, remanded.J. Burke delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/9vt7e6 .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
conditional plea,
Summary of Decision issued December 31, 2008[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.] Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Cecil A. CundyCitation: 2008 WY 158Docket Number: D-08-0001Order Suspending Attorney From the Practice of LawThe matter came before the Court upon a “Report and Recommendation for Discipline” filed Nov. 26, 2008, by the Board of Professional Responsibility for the Wyoming State Bar. After a careful review of the Board’s report and the File, the Court finds that the Report and Recommendation should be approved, confirmed and adopted by the Court; and that Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, beginning on January 2, 2009. Cecil A. Cundy will comply with the requirements of the Disciplinary Code for the Wyoming State Bar, reimburse the Bar in the amount of $2649.37. The order shall be docketed as a public record and published in the Wyoming Reporter and the Pacific Reporter, served upon the Respondent and transmitted to the members of the Board of Professional Responsibility and the appropriate clerks of court.The Report and Recommendation for Discipline can be found at the link below.C.J. Voigt delivered the order for the court.Link: http://tinyurl.com/7kndan .
order suspending,
Summary of Decision issued December 31, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: GOB, LLC v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc.Citation: 2008 WY 157Docket Number: S-08-0035Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge.Representing Appellant GOB: Steven F. Freudenthal, Freudenthal & Bonds, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellees Rainbow Canyon, Inc; Palmer; Irvine and Deline: Joel M. Vincent, Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming.Facts/Discussion: GOB filed a derivative action against Rainbow Canyon and three of its shareholders and directors, Gary Palmer, William Irvine and Robert Deline. GOB asked the district court, inter alia, to void an agreement that Rainbow Canyon entered into with Tridem Minerals, LLC, which is solely owned by Deline. GOB challenged that the agreement was a conflict of interest transaction because of Deline’s position within Rainbow Canyon. The district court determined that no conflict of interest transaction occurred, and that GOB did not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders. It entered judgment in favor of Appellees. GOB appealed.GOB asserted that Apellees are precluded from raising the issue presented because they did not file a cross-appeal. W.R.A.P. 7.03 plainly contemplates that an appellee, in its brief, may raise additional “issues and arguments.” The Court found no merit in GOB’s contention that Appellees were required to file a cross-appeal in order to raise the issue they now present.Derivative actions are those by one or more stockholders to enforce a corporate cause of action. Shareholders must meet certain requirements pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-741. Additionally, W.R.C.P. 23.1 requires that the party bringing the derivative action must allege in the complaint that the statutory requirements have been met. The contemporaneous ownership rule is designed to prevent the courts from being used to litigate purchased grievances. The undisputed evidence at trial established that GOB was not a shareholder when the agreement between Rainbow Canyon and Tridem was made.GOB contended that the purchase from the bankruptcy trustee and confirmation by the bankruptcy court was a transfer by operation of law. GOB presented no authority for the proposition. The deliberate purchase was not a transfer of ownership by operation of law.Conclusion: The Court held that GOB may not maintain a derivative action challenging the agreement because it did not own Rainbow Canyon stock at the time of the transaction it complains of and did not acquire its share of stock by operation of law.Affirmed.J. Burke delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/98rngd .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 31, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Counts v. WyomingCitation: 2008 WY 156Docket Number: S-08-0095Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.Representing Appellant Counts: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.Facts/Discussion: The appellant contended that his constitutional right to due process of law was violated when his probation was revoked without him having received adequate notice of the basis for that revocation, and without the district court having supervised his removal from a community corrections facility.Counts was represented by counsel at the hearing and counsel’s statement made it clear Appellant was admitting the violation without conceding the question of revocation. The appellant’s admission conclusively proved the violation leaving only the question of disposition for further hearing. The admission effectively waived any due process rights the appellant may have had based on an alleged lack of notice. Counts raised the purported lack of an allegation of willfulness as part of his argument that notice was lacking and the Court concluded he conceded that allegation by admitting that he had violated a condition of probation. The Court noted the district court found the violation was willful. The district court was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses, to consider the administrative proceedings that led to the appellant’s termination from CAC and to consider the appellant’s history at the CAC.Conclusion: Under the Adult Community Corrections Act, offenders, parolees, and inmates may be terminated from a community correctional facility by administrative action of the governing entity. The appellant was afforded an administrative hearing before he was terminated from the CAC, with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. He was also offered both an adjudicatory hearing and a dispositional hearing in the district court before his probation was revoked, during which judicial process he was represented by appointed counsel. His only complaint with the discovery documents provided to him by the State was that there was “too much” and not that there was “too little.” At the adjudicatory hearing, he admitted that he had violated a term of his probation, and the district court’s finding that the violation was willful was not clearly erroneous.Affirmed.C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/7dx9kf .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Case Name: Williams Production RMT Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue
Citation: 2008 WY 155
Docket Number: S-08-0018
Rule 12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Dan R. Price III, Judge.
Representing Appellant Williams Production RMT Co.: Patrick R. Day and Delissa L. Hayano of Holland & Hart LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Facts/Discussion: After the Wyoming Board of Equalization (Board) affirmed the Department of Revenue’s (DOR) valuations of Williams Production RMT Co’s (Williams) coal bed methane (CBM) production for production years 2000-2002, Williams sought review in district court. The DOR moved for, the district court ordered and the Court accepted certification pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b). The primary issue for the Court’s determination was whether the point of valuation of Williams’ 2000-2002 CBM production was at the outlet of the initial dehydrator pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-14-203(b)(iv) or as Williams maintains was upstream from the initial dehydrator where Williams transferred the CBM to a third party for transportation.
Point of Valuation: The Court relied on its decision in Kennedy Oil holding that the DOR properly determined that the fair market value for Williams’ CBM included the third-party transportation fees incurred before the outlet of the initial dehydrator. The fair market value of the production was the value established by the arms-length sales price plus the fee Williams paid to Western for getting the gas to the initial dehydrator minus the transportation fees incurred downstream of the point of valuation. The Court discussed their decision in RME and stated that it was of limited significance to the instant case. RME involved the question of how royalties and production taxes were considered in the proportionate profits method for determining the fair market value of minerals sold downstream of the point of valuation, an entirely different scenario than when minerals are sold to or transported by a third-party upstream of the point of valuation.
The line for taxation purposes between mineral production and transportation or processing has been the subject of dispute for many years which the Court stated the legislature intended to end by drawing a clear line at the outlet of the initial dehydrator where production would be considered complete. If this conclusion is wrong, the Court is confident the legislature will act.
Disallowance of Downstream Transportation Fee Deduction and On-Lease Fuel Exemption: The DOR calculated a deduction for the part of Western’s fee downstream from the dehydrator, something it was not required to do when Williams provided no supporting information. The DOR also points out that the Court previously upheld the same method for calculating allowable deductions in Williams I. The Court concluded the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.
The record is clear that both parties agreed Williams was entitled to a fuel use exemption; their figures differed by only $307.00. Given the parties’ agreement, the Court held that the Board could not reasonably conclude that Williams failed to meet its burden of showing that it was entitled to a fuel use exemption. Williams failed to present evidence substantiating its assertion that the taxable value was $2,998,620 therefore the Court held that the specific adjustment is to be based upon the DOR’s figure of $2,998,927.
Conclusion: Section 39-14-203(b) clearly provides that CBM is to be valued after completion of the production process which occurs after it is extracted, gathered, separated, injected and any other activity which occurs before the outlet of the initial dehydrator. Pursuant to that provision, the point of valuation of Williams’ 2000-2002 CBM production was at the outlet of the initial dehydrator. The statutory language clearly provides that expenses incurred by the producer prior to the point of valuation are not deductible in determining fair market value.
The Board’s ruling upholding the DOR’s calculation of the allowable deductions was supported by substantial evidence. The Board’s ruling disallowing an on-lease fuel exemption was not supported by substantial evidence. Williams is entitled to the exemption based upon the DOR’s calculation of the taxable value of the fuel used on-lease.
Link: http://tinyurl.com/9gkbdr .
Announcement from GPO (12/30/2008)The United States Code, 2006 Edition is now available on GPO Access at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/>. The 2006 Edition contains Titles 1 through 41, with the exception of Title 38A. Additional Titles will be added as they are made available from the Office of the Law Revision Counsel.In addition, the United States Code browse feature has been restored.The browse feature allows you to browse individual U.S. Code titles, down to the section level, for the latest available update. In the current table, Titles 1 through 41, with the exception of 38A, are based on the 2006 edition (January 3, 2007) of the Code. Titles 38A, and 42 through 50 Appendix, are based on Supplement V of the 2000 Edition (January 2, 2006) of the Code.The U.S. Code is the codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States, based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives.Since 1926, the United States Code has been published every six years.In between editions, annual, cumulative supplements are published in order to present the most current information. Documents are available as ASCII text files.GPO Access contains the 2006, 2000 and 1994 editions of the U.S. Code, plus annual supplements.Don't forget that the law library has the United States Code Service and the United States Code Annotated, as well as free public access to Westlaw!
Summary of Decision issued December 31, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Kennedy Oil v. Department of RevenueCitation: 2008 WY 154Docket Number: S-07-0287Rule 12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge.Representing Appellant Kennedy Oil: Morris R. Massey of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.Representing Appellee Department of Revenue: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Martin L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Karl D. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General.Facts/Discussion: After the Wyoming Board of Equalization (Board) affirmed the Department of Revenue’s (DOR) valuations of Kennedy Oil’s (Kennedy) coal bed methane (CBM) production for production years 2000-2002, Kennedy sought review in district court. The DOR moved for, the district court ordered and the Court accepted certification pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b). The primary issue for the Court’s determination concerned the point at which CBM is valued for taxation purposes. Point of Valuation: Kennedy contended the uncontested evidence established that it sold the CBM at or near the wellhead. Citing § 39-14-203(b)(v), Kennedy maintains that the point of sale is the point of valuation for tax purposes. The DOR responded that the Board correctly found that the point of valuation was the outlet of the initial dehydrator downstream from the wellhead. Section 39-14-203(b)(i) provides that natural gas is to be valued for taxation purposes as provided in the subsection and that § 39-14-203(b)(ii) provides the fair market value for natural gas is to be determined after the production process is completed. Paragraph (b)(ii) also clearly provides that expenses incurred prior to the point of valuation are not deductible in determining the fair market value. Giving the language its plain and ordinary meaning, Kennedy’s CBM production was to be valued for taxation purposes at the point when the production process was completed. Any expenses incurred up to that point were not deductible in determining fair market value. Section 39-14-203(b)(iv) defines the production process for natural gas is completed after it is extracted from the well, gathered, separated, injected and any other activity which occurs before the outlet of the initial dehydrator. The Court stated that § 39-14-203(b)(iv) established the point of valuation while § 39-14-203(b)(v) established only the method of valuation.Conclusion: Section 39-14-203(b)(iii) clearly and unambiguously provides that the fair market value for gas is determined after the production process is complete. Paragraph (b)(iv) further provides that the production process for gas is completed after it is extracted from the well, gathered, separated, injected and any other activity which occurs before the outlet of the initial dehydrator. Under the clear language of paragraph (b)(iii), producer expenses incurred prior to the point of valuation, i.e. the outlet of the initial dehydrator, are not deductible. The DOR properly determined the fair market value of Kennedy’s CBM production after the production process was complete and disallowed expenses Kennedy incurred before the production process was complete and disallowed expenses Kennedy incurred before the outlet of the initial dehydrator. Affirmed.J. Kite delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/8qytvy .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 23, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Meyer v. Hatto; Hatto v. MeyerCitation: 2008 WY 153Docket Number: S-07-0223; S-07-0224Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.Representing the Meyers: Robert N. Williams and Pamela T. Harvey of Meyer & Williams, Attorneys at Law, PC, Jackson, Wyoming.Representing Hatto and Sullivan: Mark Diehl Sullivan of Levy Coleman LLP, Jackson, Wyoming.Facts/Discussion: These two consolidated appeals arise from the dismissal of a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Meyers reside in Teton County, Wyoming. They own real property in Hawaii. Hatto and Sullivan, partners in the business Design Workshop, reside in Hawaii and were hired to design a residence for the Meyers. Lack of Evidentiary Hearing: A district court possesses extreme latitude in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists. It may be decided on the basis of pleadings and other materials; it may require discovery; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and documentary submissions the district court sent a letter imparting its preliminary determination of the pertinent undisputed basic facts. The district court determined there was no dispute as to any material, basic fact. An evidentiary hearing was unnecessary to resolve factual disputes. Existence of Personal Jurisdiction: Wyoming’s long-arm statute requires three conditions: the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in Wyoming or of causing important consequences in Wyoming; the cause of action must arise from the consequences in Wyoming of the defendant’s activities; and the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with Wyoming to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. The constitutional right to exercise personal jurisdiction hinges upon a sufficient contact initiated by the defendant. Affiliations with Wyoming that involve Design Workshop but were instituted by the Meyers do not meet the constitutional minimum. The analysis revolves around the quality and nature and not the quantity of Design Workshop’s contacts. The fact that Design Workshop knew it would have to communicate with people in Wyoming in order to fulfill its contractual obligations does not qualify as purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in Wyoming. Submission to Jurisdiction: The Meyers argue that Design Workshop voluntarily submitted itself to jurisdiction in Wyoming by requesting attorneys’ fees and costs. Courts in other jurisdictions have gone both ways on the issue of whether a party submits to personal jurisdiction by filing a motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court concluded that a motion for attorneys’ fees is not an affirmative action that involves personal jurisdiction. Holding otherwise would allow on contracting party to force the other party to subject itself to a foreign jurisdiction or forgo its contractual right to attorneys’ fees. Such a result does not further the parties’ intent, as expressed in the contract, that litigation over the contract be undertaken at the risk of having to pay the successful party’s attorneys’ fees. Conclusion for Appeal S-07-0223: Design Workshop is a Hawaiian firm hired in Hawaii to design a residence to be built in Hawaii. It did not solicit the contract in Wyoming. Its only connection to Wyoming is through the Meyers. Under the circumstances, the Court found Design Workshop did not purposely avail itself of the privilege of acting in Wyoming. Affirmed.Conclusion for Appeal S-07-0224: The Meyers ignored the arbitration clause in the Agreement at their own peril. The clause was meant to avoid litigation. The Meyers cannot use their attempt to litigate instead of arbitrate as a shield against the attorneys’ fees and other expenses provision of the arbitration clause. Reversed, remanded.J. Golden delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/78sr2o.[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 19, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Sublette Cty. Sch. Dist. #9 et al v. McBride State Superintendent of Pub. InstructionCitation: 2008 WY 152Docket Number: S-08-0073W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Questions from the District Court of Sublette County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.Representing Appellant Schools: Mark W. Gifford and Kelley A. Anderson of Law Offices of Gifford & Brinkerhoff, Casper, Wyoming, for Sublette School District #1; Tracy J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming for Sublette School District #9 and Lincoln County #1; Ford T. Bussart of Bussart, West & Tyler, PC, Rock Springs, Wyoming, for Campbell School #1; Joel M. Vincent of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, Wyoming, for Fremont School District #24.Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael R. O’Donnell, State’s School Finance Counsel, Special Assistant Attorney General.Certified Questions: Is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) unconstitutional in light of the amendment to Article 15, Section 17 of the Wyoming Constitution? Do ex post facto principles impact the Wyoming Department of Education’s calculation of rebated revenue if the districts have encumbered, obligated or spent any of the funds sought by the Department?The issue that first must be determined is whether the 2006 Amendment was impliedly repealed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). If the Amendment was impliedly repealed then the district may well be required to rebate to the Department one hundred percent of the difference between their local funding revenues and the statewide average revenues for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years as opposed to the historical amount of seventy-five percent. If it was not repealed then the five school districts are obligated only to rebate the traditional seventy-five percent rebate for those two years and may retain the remaining twenty-five percent, which roughly translates into a collective dispute over $97,550,113.36.There is no express clear abrogation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). It was necessary for the Court to decide if there was an obvious, clear, and strong conflict between the 2006 Amendment and § 21-13-102(c) in effect at that time. After review, the Court determined that the provisions of the pre-existing statute were not inconsistent with the subsequent constitutional amendment, so there was no basis on which to declare the statute impliedly repealed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c) remained in effect until the Legislature expressly repealed the statue in 2008. The five appellant school districts also asked the Court to go one step further in declaring that § 21-13-102(c) did not create unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities in the amount of education funding distributed by the State, even with the seventy-five percent cap. The districts argued that unconstitutional inequality was related solely to funding levels that primarily or predominantly depend upon local wealth as opposed to funding levels that simply permit educational enhancements based on local wealth. The Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of the seventy-five percent rebate limit. Previous comments were a neutral observation of the fact that under prior legislation, excess rebate funds could be recaptured by the school districts as a possible source of funding for local enhancements.Conclusion: The Court concluded that the 2006 Amendment to Wyoming Constitution, Article 15, Section 17, did not impliedly repeal Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-102(c). That statute remained in effect until its express repeal in 2008, and the seventy-five percent limit on the special school district property tax rebate imposed by § 21-13-102(c) remained in place for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 fiscal years for all Wyoming school districts. Accordingly, the five Appellant school districts were entitled to recapture any rebate amounts in excess of the seventy-five percent cap and are not now obligated to pay those sums over to the Department. Having so concluded, the Court declined to make any determination on the constitutionality of the now-repealed seventy-five percent cap. Finally, the determination that Appellants are entitled to retain their excess local funds for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 moots the second certified question.The answer to the District Court’s first Certified Question was “yes” in the sense that § 21-13-102(c) was not impliedly repealed by the 2006 Amendment.Remanded.D.J. Donnell delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/3lvmoq .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 18, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: In re Estate of JedrzejewskiCitation: 2008 WY 151Docket Number: S-07-0268Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, the Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.Representing Appellant Jedrzejewski: Susan L. Feinman and Laura J. Jackson of Long Reimer Winegar LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellee Bierma: Alexander K. Davison of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, Wyoming; William D. Bagley of Bagley, Karpan, Rose & White LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Facts/Discussion: Jedrzejewski through her estate is appealing the district court’s decision upholding a deed of her residence in favor of Bierma. Jedrzejewski alleges Bierma obtained her signature on the deed by wrongful act. She also claims the deed was unenforceable due to lack of consideration and lack of proper notarization.Sufficiency of the Evidence: The factual finding by the district court that the conveyance was not induced by fraud or undue influence is presumptively correct. The parties offered almost diametrically opposed testimony. The factual findings came down to a determination of credibility. The district court was in the best position to make that determination. Given the trial testimony and other evidence, the Court had no reason to question the district court’s implicit credibility determination and subsequent evidentiary ruling.Lack of Proper Acknowledgment: In construing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-113 which requires the execution of all deeds be acknowledged by an authorized notary, the Court has consistently held an improperly executed interest in real property is not void ab initio. The lack of proper acknowledgment prevents the instrument from being recorded, but the instrument is valid as between the parties to the instrument. The lack of proper acknowledgment is no bar to the enforcement of the deed as between the parties in the instant case.Lack of Consideration: The rule is that a deed is good without consideration in the absence of some wrongful act on the part of the grantee. The Court stated the deed was good between the parties despite the lack of consideration.Holding: The Court found no error in the district court’s decision. Under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the Court found the factual decision by the district court that Bierma did not engage in any wrongdoing in the initiation and execution of the deed is not clearly erroneous. Since there was no wrongdoing, the deed is valid between Jedrzejewski and Bierma despite the lack of proper acknowledgment and the lack of consideration.Affirmed.J. Golden delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/5xtg49 .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 17, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Swinney v. JonesCitation: 2008 WY 150Docket Number: S-07-0176Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge.Representing Appellant Swinney, et al: John H. Robinson, Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.Representing Appellees, Jones, Lovelace, Lunstrum, Jones and Welo: Kendal Royce Hoopes, Yonkee & toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Peter C. Nicolaysen, Nicolaysen & Wilking, PC, Casper, Wyoming.Representing Appellees Anthony Ingram and Robert Ingram: Douglas R. McLaughlin, Casper, Wyoming; Mary Bell Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellee Hilltop National Bank: Stuart R. Day, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, Wyoming.Facts/Discussion: Appellants (Sellers) filed suit against Appellees (Buyers) alleging breach of a real estate sales contract. In response, Buyers sought dismissal and judgment on the pleadings asserting that the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.The statute of limitations applicable to this case is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), which provides a ten-year limitation period for actions based upon a written contract. The land sale closing occurred on September 15, 1992. The district court determined the limitation period began, at the latest, one year later. The district court relied upon the language of the contract and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141(c). Sellers filed the complaint on August 18, 2006 which was more than ten years after the alleged breach occurred. Sellers do not dispute the district court’s conclusion that the limitation period expired on September 15, 2003, rather they contend that Buyers should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense under the theory of equitable estoppel. In Archuleta as well as other cases, the Court has determined that equitable estoppel does not preclude assertion of the applicable statute of limitations as a defense. When the Court applied the Archuleta analysis to the allegations contained in Sellers’ complaint and proposed amended complaint, the Court reached the conclusion that the allegations were insufficient to support Sellers’ contention that Sellers have alleged a sufficient factual basis to preclude Buyers from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.Holding: The allegations of the complaint, and the amended complaint, reflect that Sellers knew or should have known that the breach of contract occurred on September 15, 1993. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(i), they had ten years to initiate litigation. Sellers failed to bring their lawsuit within that time period. Their complaint and amended complaint clearly demonstrate that the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Affirmed.J. Burke delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/6k4x6r .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 17, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Schafer v. StateCitation: 2008 WY 149Docket Number: S-07-0175Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge.Representing Appellant Schafer: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.Facts/Discussion: A Natrona County jury found Schafer guilty on seven of eight counts, which included various assault charges and multiple drug charges. The Court looked at the statutory language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i). Schafer was convicted of attempting to threaten to use a drawn deadly weapon on another. The question was whether the Wyoming Legislature intended attempted aggravated assault to be a criminal offense. The Court analyzed the language of the aggravated assault and battery statute in order to determine if it covered the issue of attempt, thus precluding the overlay of the general attempt statute. A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he: 1) seriously injures someone or injures a pregnant woman; 2) attempts to injure someone with a deadly weapon; or 3) threatens to injure someone with a drawn deadly weapon. The Court concluded the Wyoming Legislature did not intend for the general attempt statute to be applicable to the specific aggravated assault and battery statute. Three claims of prosecutorial misconduct were alleged on appeal. Schafer was mentioned in a newspaper article with Zach Cohen who had been convicted of numerous offenses similar to those with which Schafer was charged at trial. At trial, a computer desktop file folder that was projected on a large screen at trial was marked “Cohen.” The Court reviewed the record and agreed with the district court that the icon had to have been tied in some way to Schafer to prejudice him. The prosecutor would know of a connection between Schafer and Cohen given his line of work. Schafer argued that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof to Schafer with his comments. The district court struck that portion of the argument and instructed the jury that Schafer had no burden to present any evidence. The prosecutor asked the jury in closing argument to consider the protection of the community in general. The Court stated the prosecutor’s comments did not rise to the level that so prejudiced Schafer that the district court could not have reasonably concluded as it did. The cumulative effect of the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not add up to reversible error.Holding: The Wyoming Legislature did not intend attempted aggravated assault to be a criminal offense; therefore Schafer’s conviction under Count I cannot stand. The Court reversed Schafer’s conviction because the Legislature never intended for the general attempt statute to be applied to the aggravated assault and battery statute. The crime as charged in the Count simply does not exist except by judicial and prosecutorial creation. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schafer’s motion for a new trial.Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.J. Hill delivered the decision.Concurrence: C.J. Voigt, (concurring in part and dissenting in part) The Chief Justice concurred in the part of the majority opinion that affirmed Appellant’s various convictions and agreed that the aggravated assault and battery conviction should be reversed, but would do the latter on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence as opposed to doing so as a matter of law. He dissented from the portions of the opinion that concluded that the legislature manifested an intent to declare that “attempt to threaten with a drawn deadly weapon” was not a crime and that concluded that the legislature manifested an intent that the general attempt statute did not apply to any of the subdivisions of the aggravated assault and battery statute.Link: http://tinyurl.com/5klvlt .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
general attempt statute,
Summary of Decision issued December 15, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: State, DOT v. RobbinsCitation: 2008 WY 148Docket Number: S-08-0077Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.Representing Appellant State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael Thomas Kahler, Assistant Attorney General.Representing Appellee Robbins: Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.Facts/Discussion: Robbins initiated this declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes under which the Wyoming DOT disqualified him from operating commercial motor vehicles. Rather than deciding the constitutional question, the district court ruled that the DOT lacked authority to disqualify Robbins because he had not been convicted of any crime relating to driving while under the influence of alcohol. On this basis, the district court ruled that the DOT lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and in turn, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the declaratory judgment action.The district court’s decision hinged upon the statutory provision that any person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one year if convicted of driving or in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person’s blood, breath or other bodily substance is o.o4%. The DOT’s authority to disqualify Robbins from operating commercial motor vehicles is found in the statutes. The DOT had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the disqualification case. The statutes also provide the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over Robbins’ declaratory judgment action. Even though Robbins dismissed his petition for judicial review of the DOT’s decision, he may still challenge the constitutionality of the underlying statutes through a declaratory judgment action. Holding: Even though Robbins dismissed his petition for judicial review of the DOT’s decision, he may still challenge the constitutionality of the underlying statutes through a declaratory judgment action. The Court reversed the district court’s decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court remanded the case to the district court to consider Robbins’ declaratory action challenging the constitutionality of the statutes under which the DOT disqualified him from driving commercial vehicles. Reversed and remanded.J. Burke delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/5lvao4 .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 15, 2008Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.Case Name: Demeulenaere v. StateCitation: 2008 WY 147Docket Number: S-08-0039Appeal from the District Court of Sublette County, the Honorable Norman E.Young, Judge.Representing Appellant Demeulenaere: Diane M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.Facts/Discussion: Appellant was pulled over because a rear brake light on his car was malfunctioning. He was arrested after the sheriff learned his driver’s license was suspended. A search was conducted and cash, drugs and drug paraphernalia was found. After entering a plea of guilty, Demeulenaere sought to withdraw that plea before his sentence was imposed.Demeulenaere contended that the district court abused its discretion in denying his presentencing motion to withdraw guilty pleas. He analyzed his case using the seven-factor test originally set out in Frame v. State. (1)The appellant asserted his innocence stating that his brake light was working. The record showed that Demeulenaere provided adequate factual basis for the crimes to which he pled guilty but there had been no claim that he was innocent of possessing either methamphetamine or marijuana. (2)As to the second factor, the Court agreed with the State that they would suffer prejudice because the crime occurred over four years ago. (3)Demeulenaere was the cause of much of the delay in the case. (4)The withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the district court because Appellant’s claim of “pretext” would not have resulted in suppression of the evidence and the arresting officer testified he had no previous knowledge that Appellant might be carrying drugs. (5)The record is replete with instances of Demeulenaere’s interaction with counsel. (6)Appellant contended that because of the missing videotape, his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. However the record reveals a thorough colloquy at the time of the plea acceptance establishing a knowing and voluntary character. (7)Finally, the Court agreed with the State that Appellant’s claim of “pretext” had little merit and that the district court could have rationally concluded as it did.Holding: The Court should allow withdrawal of a defendant’s plea before sentencing if a defendant presents a “fair and just reason” to do so. The district court had conducted a thorough and careful hearing pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11 where Demeulenaere entered knowing, voluntary and intelligent pleas of guilty.Affirmed.J. Hill delivered the decision.Link: http://tinyurl.com/6anrl8 .[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]
Summary of Decision issued December 12, 2008 Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Case Name: Conine v. State Citation: 2008 WY 146 Docket Number: S-07-0202 Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge. Representing Appellant Conine: Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender’s Office; Diane E. Courselle, Faculty Director, and Jonah Buckley and Robert Pascoe, Student Interns of the Defender Aid Program. Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandi L. Monger, Assistant Attorney General. Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Conine of aggravated assault and battery. In an altercation with the victim at their boarding house, Conine punched the victim several times, and then hit him with an aluminum frying pan. On appeal, Conine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction and asserts reversible error based on alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and opening statement. Sufficiency of the Evidence: It’s the jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Conine argued the evidence failed to support the jury’s finding that the frying pan constituted a deadly weapon because it did not cause actual serious bodily injury to the victim. The statutes only require that the victim incurred bodily injury caused by Conine’s use of an object which was reasonably capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. The State was not required to prove nor was the jury required to find that the victim suffered serious bodily injury when Conine hit him with the frying pan. Viewing the evidence as a whole and affording the State every favorable inference, the Court had no trouble concluding the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the frying pan caused the victim bodily injury.Prosecutorial Misconduct: Conine complained of prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire. The Court reviewed the prosecutor’s questions and agreed they violated Rule 24(c). The line of highlighted questioning served only to instruct the prospective jurors on the law and place the suggestion in their minds that an object such as a frying pan could be a deadly weapon. In effect, the prosecutor was using voir dire to argue an important aspect of the State’s case. Although improper, the Court decided the questions were not so suggestive as to commit any member of the panel to find a frying pan was a deadly weapon. There was more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that the frying pan was used as a deadly weapon and the jury was repeatedly advised that findings of fact were exclusively within their realm.During opening statement, the prosecutor remarked that the victim was a “pretty honest man.” The Court noted the remark was a transgression of the clear rule of law that a prosecutor not assert his personal belief or credibility into the case. The statement was isolated and the district court twice instructed the jury concerning its responsibilities to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, as well as weigh the evidence and resolve factual issues, in determining guilt or innocence. Holding: The record contains sufficient evidence to support Conine’s conviction for aggravated assault and battery. The prosecutor’s conduct during voir dire and opening statement did not constitute plain error, warranting reversal of Conine’s conviction. Affirmed. J. Golden delivered the decision. Link: http://tinyurl.com/5g3kpa . [SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.] Posted by
Summary of Decision issued December 10, 2008 Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Case Name: Belden v. Thorkildsen Citation: 2008 WY 145 Docket Number: S-08-0021 Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge. Representing Appellant Belden: Richard J. Mulligan, Mulligan Law Office and Heather Noble, Jackson, Wyoming. Representing Appellee Thorkildsen: David G. Lewis, Jackson, Wyoming. Facts/Discussion: Previously, the Court reversed a judgment in favor of Thorkildsen because the district court specifically declined to consider parol evidence of an alleged oral agreement regarding repayment of the loan at issue. Following remand, the district court once again entered judgment in favor of Thorkildsen. The district court found that Belden had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement for repayment of the loan and also found against Belden on her claim that she was an accommodation party to the promissory note at issue. The district court rejected Belden’s attempt to introduce new evidence at the hearing following remand and entered judgment based upon evidence submitted at trial held in 2005. Rejection of Request to Introduce Additional Evidence: After remand, Appellants indicated to the trial court that they wished to present additional evidence to support their claim that Belden had signed the promissory note as an accommodation party. The issue presented was similar to that found in Decker II. Appellants had the opportunity to present witnesses during the trial in 2005. For reasons not evidence in the record, they chose not to present the testimony in that proceeding. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to refuse admission of additional evidence at the hearing.Accommodation Party: Whether a person is an accommodation party to a negotiable instrument is a question of fact. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-3-419 plainly requires that the accommodated and the accommodating parties be parties to the notes. Note 2 clearly had only one maker, the LLC. Belden’s signature appears as an officer of the LLC and not as an individual. Belden’s uncontradicted testimony that all four members signed separate guaranty agreements does not alter the promissory notes. Neither Belden nor Thorkildsen signed Note 2 in their individual capacities and were not “parties” to the note. Therefore, Belden cannot be an accommodation party. In light of that determination, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the district court’s factual finding that Belden directly benefited from the loan was clearly erroneous. Separate Oral Contract: Belden contended that the district court erred when it concluded that no independent oral contract between her and Thorkildsen existed. The district court’s findings were amply supported by the record. The district court specifically found Belden’s credibility to be questionable. The Court’s review of the record lead it to the conclusion that the district court correctly stated that there was no evidence that Thorkildsen agreed to reimburse the LLC or Belden for amounts they paid toward Note 2. Holding: Belden did not sign Note 2 in her individual capacity and therefore was not a party to the note. As a result, Belden cannot be an accommodation party. The district court correctly stated there was no evidence that Thorkildsen agreed to reimburse the LLC or Belden for amounts paid toward Note 2. Affirmed. J. Burke delivered the decision. Link: http://tinyurl.com/5ztae3 . [SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.] Posted by