Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180705_0002311.ENC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-08-20 00:00:52
Document Index: 402706459

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 636', '§ 404', '§ 405', '§ 416', '§ 416', '§ 404']

In this action, plaintiff James Powell ("plaintiff or, in context, "claimant") challenges the final decision of defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. Berryhill ("Commissioner") denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") on the grounds that he is not disabled. The case is before the court on the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings. D.E. 12, 16. Both filed memoranda in support of their respective motions. D.E. 13, 17. The motions were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See 22 Feb. 2018 Text Ord. For the reasons set forth below, it will be recommended that plaintiffs motion be allowed, the Commissioner's motion be denied, and this case be remanded.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on 3 December 2013, alleging a disability onset date of 10 June 2011. Transcript of Proceedings ("Tr.") 20. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and a request for a hearing was timely filed. Tr. 20. On 19 July 2016, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") at which plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert testified. Tr. 35-62. On 30 August 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiffs application. Tr. 20-30.
Plaintiff timely requested review by the Appeals Council. Tr. 183. On 9 June 2017, the Appeals Council denied the request for review. Tr. 1. At that time, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.[1] On 8 August 2017, plaintiff commenced this proceeding for judicial review of the ALJ's decision, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") (D.E. 1); Order Denying IFP Mot. (D.E. 4); Compl. (D.E. 5).
The first four steps create a series of hurdles for claimants to meet. If the ALJ finds that the claimant has been working (step one) or that the claimant's medical impairments do not meet the severity and duration requirements of the [R]egulations (step two), the process ends with a finding of "not disabled." At step three, the ALJ either finds that the claimant is disabled because her impairments match a listed impairment [i.e., a listing in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 ("the Listings")] or continues the analysis. The ALJ cannot deny benefits at this step. If the first three steps do not lead to a conclusive determination, the ALJ then assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity ["RFC"], which is "the most" the claimant "can still do despite" physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to work. [20 C.F.R.] § 416.945(a)(1).[2] To make this assessment, the ALJ must "consider all of [the claimant's] medically determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware," including those not labeled severe at step two. Id. § 416.945(a)(2).[3]
Plaintiff was 53 years old on the alleged disability onset date and 58 years old on the date of the hearing. Tr. 28 ¶ 7; 42. The ALJ found that he has at least a high school education (Tr. 28 ¶ 8)[5] and past relevant work as a parcel post clerk handler (Tr. 28 ¶ 6).
Applying the five-step analysis of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 10 June 2011, the alleged disability onset date. Tr. 22 ¶ 2. At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments that were severe within the meaning of the Regulations: affective mood disorder; anxiety-related disorder; alcohol, substance addiction disorder; and drugs; substance addiction disorder. Tr. 22 ¶ 3. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any of the Listings. Tr. 23 ¶4.
The ALJ next determined that plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional limitations:
the performance of only simple, routine tasks; making only simple work-related decisions; no transactional interaction with the general public; and no close, ...