Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/65/306.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-27 07:57:05
Document Index: 174532021

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 126', '§ 142', '§ 607', '§ 412', '§ 3294', '§ 1174', '§ 3294', '§ 766', '§ 155', '§ 36']

Cyrus v. Haveson :: :: California Court of Appeal Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. App. 3d › Volume 65 › Cyrus v. Haveson
(Opinion by Thompson, J., with Lillie, Acting P. J., and Hanson, J., concurring.) [65 Cal. App. 3d 307]
Allegations of the first cause of action state that on June 1, 1971, defendants orally leased an apartment to plaintiff on a month-to-month tenancy at $170 per month, and that in violation of the covenant of quiet [65 Cal. App. 3d 310] enjoyment contained in the lease defendants, on June 1, 1973, entered the premises and evicted plaintiff, keeping her out of the premises and installing a new tenant in the apartment. There is no factual allegation that the month-to-month tenancy was in effect on June 1, 1973. Damages are asserted for loss of personal property in the amount of $6,000, "grevious [sic] mental and emotional disgress [sic] to [plaintiff's] general damage" in the amount of $10,000, and the cost of medical attention in an amount not yet ascertained. Exemplary damages of $10,000 are claimed because defendants acted maliciously and wantonly in disregard of plaintiff's rights.
The third cause of action asserts that defendants converted $6,000 in value of personal property owned and possessed by plaintiff. It alleges that "[p]laintiff has suffered great distress of body and mind and has had need of professional medical services in consequence of the unlawful, unjust and wrongful acts of defendants ...." to plaintiff's damage in an undetermined amount. The third cause of action alleges, also, that "defendants ... committed said acts wilfully, wantonly, and maliciously and the natural result of said intentional acts of defendants caused plaintiff severe mental suffering and wounded feelings, and because of such wilfulness and malice, plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the sum of $10,000.00." [65 Cal. App. 3d 311]
While captioned an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the fifth cause of action contains no allegation that defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiff. [65 Cal. App. 3d 312]
Nathans called plaintiff's counsel on March 14 and informed counsel that Nathans had no responsibility, having disposed of the property before the incident alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff's counsel advised Nathans to consult his own lawyer. On March 27, plaintiff's counsel, at Dorman's request, mailed him a copy of the summons and unverified complaint. Recognizing for the first time on May 14, 1974, the legal requirement for verification of a complaint charging forcible detainer, plaintiff's counsel caused a verification of the complaint to be filed on that date. [65 Cal. App. 3d 313]
On November 8, 1974, plaintiff filed her request to enter default. Copies of the filing were sent to Nathans and Haveson on November 8 and again to Haveson at a different address on November 13. The copies of the request to enter default were received by Haveson and Nathans. Haveson forwarded his copy to his personal counsel. No other action was taken by either Haveson or Nathans. Default of Haveson and Nathans was entered. [65 Cal. App. 3d 314]
On January 16, 1975, defendants Haveson and Nathans moved to set aside the default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The notice asserts that the motion will be made on the ground that the default was entered "by virtue of mistake, inadvertance [sic], surprise and excusable neglect ...." Declarations filed in support of and in opposition to the motion established the facts recited above when they are read, as they must be, in the light most favorable to action of the trial court. (Lynch v. Spilman (1967) 67 Cal. 2d 251, 259 [62 Cal. Rptr. 12, 431 P.2d 636].) The trial court denied the motion to set aside the default.
Defendants' contentions of trial court error in denying their motion to set aside their default lack merit. Those contentions assert: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find that defendants had met the burden imposed by Code of Civil Procedure section 473; and (2) defendants were not properly served with the summons and complaint. [65 Cal. App. 3d 315]
[1] The record does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that defendants had not made a sufficient showing to satisfy the requirements of section 473. That statute provides in part that: "The court may ... relieve a party ... from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." The mistake, inadvertence or surprise which justifies a court in setting aside a default must be reasonable. (See 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 126-147.)
Here the trial court could properly find that defendants did not act reasonably in failing to plead to the complaint. Defendants sought to excuse their neglect by their reliance upon Dorman and the insurance company he represented to defend them. Reliance upon a third person's agreement to defend may be reasonable so as to justify a failure to plead to a complaint. (See 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 142.) Here, however, there is evidence from which the trial court could determine that defendants' continued reliance upon Dorman and his company was unreasonable.
[2] Contrary to defendants' argument, they were properly served with summons and complaint. Defendants contend that the filing of a verification to the complaint after it had been filed amended the pleading so as to require that summons be issued on an amended complaint and served with it upon defendants. "Amendment of the complaint after service of summons does not require either a new summons or a new service on an existing party defendant. Once jurisdiction of such a party is obtained by service of the summons and [65 Cal. App. 3d 316] original complaint, the amended pleading alone is served ...." (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Actions, § 607, italics in original; see also Judicial Council of Cal. com. to Code Civ. Proc., § 412.10.) Here the complaint was amended after it was served upon defendants. The amendment was served upon them and subsequently both the complaint as amended and the summons were again served.
Exemplary damages are sought in the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. In each instance, $10,000 is claimed. [4] The first cause of action is for breach of contract and thus does not support a claim of punitive damage. (Civ. Code, § 3294; Crogan v. Metz (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 398, 405 [303 P.2d 1029].) The second cause of action alleges forcible entry and detainer and that defendants "acted maliciously and [were] guilty of ... wanton disregard of the rights of plaintiff in that plaintiff had lawful possession of [the] premises and had not received notice to quit or consented to defendants entering and taking possession thereof ...." The third cause of action alleges conversion of personal property and that defendants acted "wilfully, wantonly, and maliciously." The fourth cause of action asserts trespass and alleges that defendants' conduct in placing another tenant in her apartment was malicious and in wanton disregard of her rights. The fifth cause of action, while captioned one for intentional infliction of emotional distress, contains no allegation that defendants intended to inflict emotional distress on plaintiff. Absent that allegation, the fifth cause of action is nothing more than a restatement of the causes of action for forcible entry and detainer, trespass, and conversion.
We thus consider the sufficiency of the pleading to support punitive damages as claimed in its second, third, and fourth causes of action as amplified by the fifth. A cause of action for forcible entry and detainer supports punitive damages in an amount not in excess of three times actual damage in lieu of actual damage where malice is shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174, subd. (b).) Causes of action for conversion and trespass also support the award of exemplary damages. (Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp. (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 351 [87 Cal. Rptr. 226]; Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal. App. 2d 615, 619-620 [36 Cal. Rptr. 84].) [5] To support punitive damages, the complaint asserting one of those causes of action must allege ultimate facts of the defendant's [65 Cal. App. 3d 317] oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) "Malice is properly pleaded by alleging the wrongful motive, intent or purpose." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Pleading, § 766.) "A general allegation of [that] intent is sufficient ...." (Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 616, 632 [102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063].)
We conclude, therefore, that the allegations of the complaint do not state a cause of action for punitive damages. Hence, plaintiff is not entitled to that relief and the judgment granting it must be set aside to that extent. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Proceedings Without Trial, § 155.)
Plaintiff contends that the trial court order reducing the amount of the original judgment is erroneous because: (1) it violates plaintiff's right to a jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution; and (2) the trial court lacked power to modify the judgment once it was entered. [65 Cal. App. 3d 318]
The right to jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution is the right which existed under the common law at the time the California Constitution was adopted. (People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-287 [231 P.2d 832].) At common law, as it existed when California's Constitution became effective, the default of a defendant resulted in a writ of inquiry directed to the "sheriff." Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff empanelled a jury which assessed damages, but after the writ of inquiry was returned, the court could either raise or reduce the damages awarded by the jury. (Dean v. Willamette Bridge Ry. Co. (1892) 22 Ore. 167 [29 P. 440]; but see Loiselle v. Gladfelter (1964 Fla.App.) 160 So. 2d 740, assuming without discussion a defaulting defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial where the plaintiff had originally demanded one.)
Subdivision 2 of section 585 thus provides interchangeably for reference to a jury or to a referee in the court's discretion to assess damages in the case of a default. The factual determination of a referee is not binding upon the court. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) Proceedings Without Trial, § 36.) The jury's assessment of damages in the event of default must be construed as no more binding. [65 Cal. App. 3d 319]
[8] Plaintiff argues, however, that the court once having reduced the jury's assessment to judgment, it then lacked power to modify the judgment as originally entered. The record does not support the argument. The judgment was not effective until "entered." (Phillips v. Phillips (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 869, 874 [264 P.2d 926].) Here the judgment is noted as modified and is stamped as "entered" on May 19, 1975, the same date on which the written order of the court modifying the judgment was filed. Neither order bears a time stamp. Since we cannot presume error not appearing in the record, we must assume that the order of modification was filed before the judgment was "entered."