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Timestamp: 2019-12-07 07:06:35
Document Index: 146639097

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11341', '§ 11301', '§ 4', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 407', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11347', '§ 4', '§ 11343', '§ 11347', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 152', '§ 11341', '§ 11343', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11347', '§ 11341', '§ 407', '§ 11341', '§ 11341', '§ 11341']

N. & W. RY. V. TRAIN DISPATCHERS, 499 U. S. 117 - Volume 499 - 1991 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 499 > N. & W. RY. V. TRAIN DISPATCHERS, 499 U. S. 117 (1991) > Full Text
Held: The § 11341(a) exemption "from all other law" includes a carrier's legal obligations under a collective bargaining agreement when necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transaction. The exemption's language, as correctly interpreted by the ICC, is clear, broad, and unqualified, bespeaking an unambiguous congressional intent to include any obstacle imposed by law. That language neither admits of a distinction between positive enactments and common law liability rules nor supports the exclusion of contractual obligations. Thus, the exemption effects an override of such obligations by superseding the law -- here, the RLA -- which makes the contract binding. Cf. Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182, 334 U. S. 194-195, 334 U. S. 200-201. This determination makes sense of the Act's consolidation provisions, which were designed to promote economy and efficiency in interstate transportation by removing
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 499 U. S. 134.
Chapter 113 of the Interstate Commerce Act, recodified in 1978 at 49 U.S.C. § 11301 et seq., contains the current statement of this national policy. The Act grants the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive authority to examine, condition, and approve proposed mergers and consolidations of
In September, 1986, this possibility became a reality. The carriers notified the American Train Dispatchers' Association, the bargaining representative for certain N & W employees,
Pursuant to § 4 of the New York Dock procedures, the parties negotiated concerning the terms of the implementing agreement, but they failed to resolve their differences. As a result, the carriers invoked the New York Dock arbitration procedures. After a hearing, the arbitration committee ruled in the carriers' favor. The committee noted that the transfer of work to Atlanta was an incident of the control transaction approved by the ICC, and that it formed part of the "additional coordinations" the ICC predicted would be necessary to achieve "greater efficiencies." The committee also held it had the authority to abrogate the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and of the RLA as necessary to implement the merger. Finally, it held that, because the application of the N & W bargaining agreement would impede the transfer, the transferred employees did not retain their collective bargaining rights.
2. In No. 89-1028, the Commission approved an application by CSX Corporation to acquire control of the Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc. CSX Corp -- Control -- Chessie System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, Inc., 363 I.C.C. 521 (1980). Chessie was the parent of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company; Seaboard was the parent of the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company. In approving the control acquisition, the Commission imposed the New York Dock conditions and recognized that "additional coordinations may occur that could lead to further employee displacements." 363 I.C.C. at 589.
A divided Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Commission agreed the panel possessed authority to override collective bargaining rights and RLA rights that prevent implementation of a proposed
3. The unions appealed both cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals considered the cases together, and reversed and remanded to the agency. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. ICC, 279 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 880 F.2d 562 (1989). The court held that § 11341(a) does not authorize the Commission to relieve a party of collective bargaining agreement obligations that impede implementation of an approved transaction. The court stated various grounds for its conclusion. First, because the court did not read the phrase "all other law" in § 11341(a) to include "all legal obstacles," it found "no support in the language of the statute" to apply the statute to obligations imposed by collective bargaining agreements. Id. 808 F.2d at 567. Second, the court analyzed the Transportation Act, 1920, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 482, which contained a predecessor to § 11341(a), and found that Congress "did not intend, when it enacted the immunity provision, to override contracts." Id. at 570. The court noted that Congress had "focused nearly exclusively . . . on specific types of laws it intended to eliminate -- all of which were positive enactments, not common law rules of liability, as on a contract." Ibid. The court further noted that Congress had often revisited the immunity provision without making it clear that it included contracts or collective bargaining agreements. Ibid. Finally, the court did not defer to the ICC's interpretation of the Act, presumably because it determined that the Commission's interpretation was belied by the contrary "unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,'" id. at 567 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 843 (1984)).
In ruling that § 11341(a) did not apply to collective bargaining agreements, the court "decline[d] to address the question" whether the section could operate to override provisions of the RLA. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, supra, at 247-250, 880 F. 2d at 570-573. It also declined to consider whether the labor protective conditions required by § 11347 are exclusive, or whether § 4 of the New York Dock conditions gives an arbitration committee the right to override provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 279 U.S.App.D.C. at 250, 880 F.2d at 573. The court remanded the case to the agency for a determination on these issues.
After the Court of Appeals denied the carriers' petitions for rehearing, the carriers in the consolidated cases filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted on March 26, 1990. 494 U.S. 1055 (1990). [Footnote 2] We now reverse.
By its terms, the exemption applies only when necessary to carry out an approved transaction. These predicates, however, are not at issue here, for the Court of Appeals did not pass on them and the parties do not challenge them. For purposes of this decision, we assume, without deciding, that the Commission properly considered the public interest factors of § 11343(b)(1) in approving the original transaction, that its decision to override the carriers' obligations is consistent with the labor protective requirements of § 11347, and that the override was necessary to the implementation of the transaction within the meaning of § 11341(a). Under these
Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 842-843. The contested language in § 11341(a), exempting carriers from "the antitrust laws and all other law, including State and municipal law," is clear, broad, and unqualified. It does not admit of the distinction the Court of Appeals drew, based on its analysis of legislative history, between positive enactments and common law rules of liability. Nor does it support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress did not intend the immunity clause to apply to contractual obligations.
The exemption is broad enough to include laws that govern the obligations imposed by contract. "The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement.'" Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 290 U. S. 429 (1934) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 122, 17 U. S. 197 (1819)). A contract depends on a regime
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 (1948), which construed the immediate precursor of § 11341(a), § 5(11) of the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 7, 54 Stat. 908-909, [Footnote 4] supports this conclusion. In Schwabacher, minority stockholders in a carrier involved in an ICC-approved merger complained that the terms of the merger diminished the value of their shares as guaranteed by the corporate charter,
Just as the obligations imposed by state contract law did not survive the merger at issue in Schwabacher, the obligations imposed by the law that gives force to the carriers' collective bargaining agreements, the RLA, does not survive the merger in this case. The RLA governs the formation, construction, and enforcement of the labor-management contracts in issue here. It requires carriers and employees to make reasonable efforts "to make and maintain" collective bargaining agreements, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, and to refrain from making changes in existing agreements except in
Our determination that § 11341(a) supersedes collective bargaining obligations via the RLA as necessary to carry out an ICC-approved transaction makes sense of the consolidation provisions of the Act, which were designed to promote "economy and efficiency in interstate transportation by the removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure." Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 292 U. S. 534-535 (1934). The Act requires the Commission to approve consolidations in the public interest. 49 U.S.C. § 11343(a)(1). Recognizing that consolidations in the public interest will "result in wholesale dismissals and extensive transfers, involving expense to
We hold that, as necessary to carry out a transaction approved by the Commission, the term "all other law" in § 11341(a) includes any obstacle imposed by law. In this case, the term "all other law" in § 11341(a) applies to the substantive and remedial laws respecting enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Our construction of the clear statutory command confirms the interpretation of the agency charged with its administration and expert in the field of railroad mergers. We affirm the Commission's interpretation of § 11341(a), not out of deference in the face of an
This reading of § 11341(a) will not, as the Court of Appeals feared, lead to bizarre results. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. ICC, 279 U.S.App.D.C. at 244, 880 F.2d at 567. The immunity provision does not exempt carriers from all law, but rather from all law necessary to carry out an approved transaction. We reiterate that neither the conditions of approval nor the standard for necessity is before us today. It may be, as the Commission held on remand from the Court of Appeals, that the scope of the immunity provision is limited by § 11347, which conditions approval of a transaction on satisfaction of certain labor-protective conditions. See n 2, supra. It also might be true that "[t]he breadth of the exemption [in § 11341(a)] is defined by the scope of the approved transaction. . . . " ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 298 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). We express no view on these matters, as they are not before us here.
The statutory exemption that the Court construes today had its source in § 407 of the Transportation Act, 1920 (1920 Act). 41 Stat. 482. Its wording was slightly changed in 1940, 54 Stat. 908-909, and again in 1978, 92 Stat. 1434. There is, however, no claim that either of those amendments modified the coverage of the exemption in any way. It is therefore appropriate to begin with a consideration of the purpose and the text of the 1920 Act.
Given the present plight of our nation's railroads, it may be wise policy to give the ICC a power akin to, albeit greater
With or without the ejusdem generis canon, I believe that the normal reader would assume that the text of § 11341 encompasses the antitrust laws, as well as other federal or state laws, that would otherwise prohibit rail carriers from consummating approved mergers, and nothing more. See ante at 499 U. S. 128. That text contains no suggestion that, whenever a criminal law, tort law, or any regulatory measure impedes the efficient operation of a new merged carrier, the carrier can avoid such a restriction by virtue of the ICC approval of that merger. Nor does the text of § 11341 contain any suggestion
The Court speculates that the reason the 1920 Congress explicitly referred to the antitrust laws was simply to avoid the force of the rule that repeals of the antitrust laws by implication are not favored, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 374 U. S. 350 (1963). In that case, however, the rule was announced in the context of the industry's argument that federal regulatory approval of a transaction exempted the transaction from the antitrust laws even though the regulatory statute was entirely silent on the subject of exemption. Ibid. The authority cited in the Philadelphia
Of greater importance, however, is the Court's rather remarkable assumption that an exemption "from all other
law" should be read to encompass the restraints created by private contract. [Footnote 2/5] Ante at 499 U. S. 129-130. Even if the text of the present Act could bear that reading, it is flatly inconsistent with the text of the 1920 Act, which relieved the participating carriers "from the operation of the antitrust laws' . . . and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal and State. . . . " 41 Stat. 482. Moreover, given the respect that our legal system has always paid to the enforceability of private contracts -- a respect that is evidenced by express language in the Constitution itself [Footnote 2/6] -- there should be a powerful presumption against finding an implied authority to impair contracts in a statute that was enacted to alleviate a legitimate concern about the antitrust laws. Had Congress intended to convey the message the Court finds in § 11341, it surely would have said expressly that the exemption was from all restraints imposed by law or by private contract. [Footnote 2/7]
The ICC order approving the merger did not resolve the Michigan law question. The ICC considered the issue too insignificant to affect the validity of the entire transaction, and left the matter for resolution by negotiation or later litigation. On appeal from the District Court's judgment sustaining the ICC order, this Court held that the ICC's finding that the exchange value was just and reasonable foreclosed any other claim that the dissenting shareholders might assert
It is true that the effect of the Schwabacher decision was to extinguish whatever contractual rights the dissenting shareholders possessed as a matter of Michigan law. But the Court did require the ICC, on remand, to consider whatever value the Michigan law claims might have in connection with its final conclusion that the merger plan was "just and reasonable." A fair reading of the entire opinion makes it clear that the holding was based more on the ICC's "complete control of the capital structure to result from a merger" id. at 334 U. S. 195, than on the exemption at issue in this case. Schwabacher cannot fairly be read as authorizing carriers to renounce private contracts that limit the benefits achievable through the merger.
Ibid. (footnote omitted). In neither of the cases before the Court today did the ICC approval of the merger purport to modify or terminate any collective bargaining agreement. The ICC approval orders were entered in 1980 and 1982 and contained no mention of either of the proposed transfers of personnel that are now at issue and about which the union was first notified several years after the ICC orders were entered. [Footnote 2/8]
279 U.S.App.D.C. at 244-245, 880 F.2d at 567-568.
279 U.S.App. D.C. at 247, 880 F.2d at 570.
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