Source: http://lib.convdocs.org/docs/index-132193.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 13:43:53
Document Index: 126385604

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 1', '§ 8', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 922', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', 'Art. 1', '§ 8', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922']

Название Westlaw Download Summary Report for sanders,gloria 3743210
Friday, September 29, 2006 11:27:00 Central
115 S.Ct. 1624
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Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, H.F. Garcia, J., of possessing firearm in school zone in violation of Gun-Free School Zones Act, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Garwood, Circuit Judge, 2 F.3d 1342, reversed and remanded with directions, and government petitioned for certiorari review. After granting certiorari, 114 S.Ct. 1536, the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm at place that individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority, since possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.
Justice Kennedy filed concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined.
Justice Thomas filed concurring opinion.
Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions.
Justice Breyer filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined.
[1] Commerce 5
83k5 Most Cited Cases
Test for determining whether activity is within Congress' power to regulate under commerce clause is whether it substantially affects interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[2] Commerce 5
Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, federal legislation regulating that activity will be sustained. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[3] Criminal Law 5
110k5 Most Cited Cases
[3] States 4.4(2)
360k4.4(2) Most Cited Cases
Under federal system, states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing criminal law.
[4] Commerce 82.50
83k82.50 Most Cited Cases
[4] Weapons 3
406k3 Most Cited Cases
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority; Act was criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly defined; possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce; and statute contained no jurisdictional element to ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that possession of firearm had any concrete tie to interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; 18 U.S.C.(1988 Ed.) § 922(q)(1)(A).
[5] Commerce 5
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to substantial burdens that activity has on interstate commerce to establish constitutionality of legislation under commerce clause. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
[6] Commerce 82.20
83k82.20 Most Cited Cases
Congressional authority under commerce clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect educational process, though broad, does not include authority to regulate each and every aspect of local schools. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Prior Version Held Unconstitutional
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(1)(A).
**1625 *549 Syllabus [FN*]
After respondent, then a 12th-grade student, carried a concealed handgun into his high school, he was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows ... is a school zone," 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). The District Court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that § 922(q) is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, § 922(q) is invalid as beyond Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.
Held: The Act exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority. First, although this Court has upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce, the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have such a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly those terms are defined. Nor is it an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under the Court's cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce. To uphold the Government's contention that § 922(q) is justified because firearms possession in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would require this Court to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause *550 authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States. Pp. 1626-1634.
2 F.3d 1342, (CA5 1993), affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 1634. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 1642. STEVENS, J., post, p. 1651, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 1651, filed dissenting opinions. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p. 1657.
Drew S. Days, III, New Haven, CT, for petitioner.
John R. Carter, Georgetown, TX, for respondent.