Source: http://openjurist.org/419/f3d/700/united-states-v-puig
Timestamp: 2013-12-18 10:20:52
Document Index: 372169933

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 853', '§ 1607', '§ 853']

419 F3d 700 United States v. Puig | OpenJurist
419 F. 3d 700 - United States v. Puig	Home419 f3d 700 united states v. puig
419 F3d 700 United States v. Puig 419 F.3d 700
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Jay Michael PUIG, Defendant.Michael Hance, Claimant-Appellant.
No. 04-2687.
Patrick Dinneen, argued, Silver Bay, Minnesota, for appellant.
James S. Alexander, argued, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellee Asst. U.S. Attorney.
Following the district court's1 entry of a Final Order of Forfeiture in the criminal prosecution of Jay Michael Puig, which included the forfeiture of a motorcycle and motorcycle parts now claimed to be owned by the appellant in this case, Michael Hance, Mr. Hance filed a third-party petition seeking adjudication of his asserted claim to the forfeited property. The district court dismissed the third-party petition as untimely. Rather than appeal that order, Hance filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion seeking to reopen the Final Order of Forfeiture. The district court denied the motion, and Hance appeals that denial. We affirm.
Puig and others were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the government related to a motorcycle "chop shop" run by Puig. The indictment included a forfeiture charge related to property involved in the chop shop. Puig pleaded guilty to the charged offenses and agreed to forfeit all motorcycles, parts, tools, and equipment that were seized during the investigation. The government agreed to return any items that Puig could show were not the instrumentalities or proceeds of criminal activity.
A Preliminary Order of Forfeiture was entered in Puig's case on December 30, 2002, forfeiting all of Puig's interest in property listed on Attachment A of the Order, including the motorcycle and motorcycle parts now claimed to be legally owned by Hance, who owned a legitimate motorcycle business in St. Louis. Puig's counsel at the time, Patrick Dinneen, was served with the preliminary order. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (2000), the United States published a Notice of Forfeiture in three issues of Finance and Commerce on January 17, 24, and 31, 2003, delineating the property to be forfeited and prescribing the process by which a third party could claim an interest in the listed property. No claims were filed with the court within 30 days of the last publication.
On March 6, 2003, the United States sent Mr. Dinneen a proposed Amended Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, reflecting changes to the list of forfeited property pursuant to discussions between the United States and Mr. Dinneen, but still listing the motorcycle and motorcycle parts now claimed by Hance. The Final Order of Forfeiture was filed on March 31, 2003, and was served on Mr. Dinneen as counsel for Puig.
Hance first attempted to contest forfeiture of the claimed property by letters to the United States dated March 12, 2003, and April 4, 2003, from his counsel, Mr. Dinneen.2 The United States responded in a letter dated May 13, 2003, that it believed the property belonged to Puig, and was therefore properly forfeited. Hance filed his third-party petition asserting an interest in the motorcycle and motorcycle parts on July 7, 2003, which the district court dismissed as untimely. Hance then filed a motion under Rule 60(b), seeking to reopen the Final Order of Forfeiture. The district court denied the motion without discussion, and Hance appeals.
Hance appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the Final Order of Forfeiture. We review a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 474 (8th Cir.2004). The United States does not dispute the use of Rule 60(b) to collaterally attack the criminal forfeiture order, and we proceed to review the district court's disposition of the Rule 60(b) motion. See United States v. Estevez, 845 F.2d 1409, 1411 (7th Cir.1988) ("[T]he government agrees that the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available to a third-party claimant seeking to vacate the final judgment of forfeiture."); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c) advisory committee notes (noting that a third-party claimant may file a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the ancillary proceeding allowed by 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)).
Rule 60(b) provides that "the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for a variety of reasons, one of them being excusable neglect. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). "Excusable neglect means good faith and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the rules." Ivy v. Kimbrough, 115 F.3d 550, 552 (8th Cir.1997) (internal mark omitted) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion where attorney failed to respond to summary judgment motion, noting that "an attorney's ignorance or carelessness does not constitute `excusable neglect'"). Hance argues that his failure to file a timely petition for an ancillary proceeding to adjudicate his right to the forfeited property should be excused because the United States failed to provide him with adequate notice of its intent to forfeit the property, and therefore he was unaware of the need to file a petition, and because he relied on the government's representations that it would return the property once he provided ownership documentation.
Section 853 of Title 21 of the United States Code governs the criminal forfeiture of property involved in criminal offenses. A criminal judgment of conviction that includes a forfeiture count conclusively determines the property rights as between the government and the criminal defendant, but the government does not receive clear title to the forfeited property as against the rest of the world until the government complies with the requirements of § 853(n). Following entry of a forfeiture order, § 853(n)(1) requires the government to publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property as prescribed by the Attorney General. The government may also, but is not required to, provide direct written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the property. Id. Third parties claiming an interest in the property then have 30 days to file a petition with the district court for a hearing to adjudicate the claimed interest. § 853(n)(2). If no third parties file a petition within the 30 days provided in paragraph (2), "the United States shall have clear title to property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture." § 853(n)(7). A § 853(n) ancillary proceeding is the only avenue by which a third-party claimant may seek to assert an interest in property that has been included in an indictment alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture. § 853(k) (providing a bar against intervening in a criminal case or commencing either a legal or equitable action against the United States, except as allowed in subsection (n)).
Hance argues that the government's published notice of its intent to forfeit and dispose of the property at issue was inadequate as to him because the government should have been aware of his claimed interest based on information in the criminal file, and therefore the government had a duty to personally notify him of the forfeiture proceedings as a "person known to have alleged an interest in the property." He relies on the district court case of United States v. Bouler, 927 F.Supp. 911, 914-15 (W.D.N.C.1996),3 which held that the mandatory notice provisions contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (2000) applied to proceedings under § 853(n