Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19801008-849679
Timestamp: 2017-04-26 17:50:30+00:00
Document Index: 84927321

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 7"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; Partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8496/79Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-10-08;8496.79 Analyses : (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNES, (Art. 35-3) RATIONE TEMPORIS, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : C. ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUE7'E NÂ° 8496/7 9 X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 8 October 1980 on the admissibility of the application D Ã CISiON du 8 octobre 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convetition : (a) A dispute relating to the right of a police offrcer to continue to carry out his duties does not involve civil rights and obligations , these dttties being of a jnridamentally different nature from a liberal profession (reference to the KÃ¼nig case) .
(b) Examination of the question whether disciplinary proceedings against a police officer involve the determination of a crintinal charge . Importance attached in this respect to the qualiftcation of the act in domestic law . the nature of the offence and oj the punishment (reference to the case of Engel and others) .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : (a) Un litige ayant trait au droit d'un agent de police de continuer Ã exercer ses jonctions ne porte pas sur des droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil , ces fonctions se distinguant nettement d'une profession libÃ©rale (rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l i4ffaire Ktlnig). (b) Examen du point de savoir si une procÃ©dure disciplinaire contre un agent de police iniplique une dÃ©cision sur le bien fondÃ© d'une accusation pÃ©nale . Importance attribuÃ©e Ã cet Ã©gard Ã la qualificatitin de l'acte en droit interne . Ã la nature de l'infraction et Ã celle de la sanction (rÃ©jÃ©rence Ã l'Affaire Engel et autres) .
(fnmcais : voir p. 172)
Disciplitta ry proceedings were brought against the applicant, a Metropolitan Police officer . for having appropriated one gallon of petrol for his personal use, by filling up the spare petrol can of an official vehicle of which he was the driver. In his deJÃ©nce, he'stated that, not having any rnonev on him, he had used the petrol to top-up his motorcycle, intending to make it up the next day . When consulted by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, the Directo r
of Public Prosecutions advised that the evidence hardly justified instituting crintina( proceedings . â¢ . . . . Bearing in mind that the applicant had previously been -warned for othÃ©r breaches of duty, the disciplina ry board dismissed him . in order to set an example . On the applicant's appeal, the Metropolitan Police Camntissioner conrrmed the ptmishrnent and it was published in the offtcial police orders . On the applicant's appeal to the Hame Office . the Secretary o(' State varied the pnrtishment by proposing that the applicant be invited to resign . â¢ The applicant complains of the manner in which disciplinary proceedings were conducted against hint .
THE LAW (Extract ) I . The applicant has made various complaints under Article 6 of the Convention concerning the procedure pursuant to which he was required'to resign from his employment as a police officer . Article 6 . paragraph I, of the Convention provides, inter alia, that "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal'charge against hint, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing withiiri' a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" . Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 3, also guarantees specific rights to everyone charged with a criminalotTence . The Commission first observes that the procedure complained ofwas considered as disciplinary according to the legal rules and principles applying in the United Kingdom . In this respect the Commission recalls that in aseries of previous decisions it considered that disciplinary proceedings, in particÃ»lar against menibers of the police forces, fall outside the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (see e .g . No . 4121/69, Coll . 33 . p . 23, Yearbook 13, p . - 772) . It held in several cases that proceedings concerning the loss of the right to b e
employed in the public service do not fall within the scope of Article 6 (see e .g . No . 1931/63, Coll . 15, p . 8 . Yearbook 7, p . 213 ; No . 7341/76 . Decisions and Reports 5, p . 134) . However, in view of the more recent case-law of the European Court o f Human Rights, in particular in the case of Engel and others (judgment of 8 June 1976) and in the case of Ktinig Qudgment of 28 June 1978), the Commission considers it necessary to examine whether or not the procedure coniplained of in the present case involved the determination of civil rights and obligations of the applicant or of a criminal charge against him . The Comniission has held in a series of previous decisions that the concept of "civil rights and obligations" cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law of the High Contracting Party concerned : it relates to an autonomous notion which must be interpreted independently having regard to the nature of the claim and to the purpose of the complaint . Only in this connection can the principles of the domestic law of the High Contracting Party be taken into consideration (see e .g . No . 808/60, Yearv book 5, p . 108 : Report of the Conimission in the case of Ringeisen v/Austria . paragraph 142 : No . 4618/70, Yearbook 15, p . 360) . The European Court of Human Rights has adopted the same approach (Ktinig judgment, para . 88) . Whether or not the relation between the State and a police officer are governed by a contract of employment or otherwise and whether or not a litigation concerning the dismissal of such an officer is justiciable under the law of the United Kingdom is therefore not decisive in the present case . In examining whether or not the right to continue to practise medicine is a "civil right", the Court gave preponderant importance to the fact that the medical profession is a traditional liberal profession whose nature is undeniably private and that a doctor provides treatment for his patients on the basis of a contract concluded with them (K6nig judgment, paragraph 93) . The Commission considers that the profession of a police officer is of a fundamentally different nature . Police officers are specially selected and trained by the State in order to perforni on its behalf tasks related to maintaining public order . In the ezercise of all their functions, they are, :exclusively subordinated to governmental authorities and do not enter into contractual relationships of a private nature . Whatever thelegal qualification of their employntent is, the Comniission considers that they have no "civil right", within the meaning of Article 6 . paragraph I, to continue to perform their functions . It follows that the procedure complained of in the instant case did not involve "civil rights and obligations" of the applicant . The Commission now turns to the question whether or not the disciplinary procedure against the applicant involved the determination of a criminal charge against him . . . .
. In its judgntent on the case of Engel and others (paragraphs 81 and 82) the Court observed that, unlike the notion of "civil rights and obligations" . the autonomy of the concept of "criminal" charge operates, as it were : one way only : the Convention leaves the State free to designate as a criminal offence an act or omissiori not constituting the normal exercise of one of the rights that it protects, but the converse choice (i .e . to designate an act or oniissionas a disciplinarv offence) is subject tb stricter rules . Hence the Convention's organs ntust determine whether a given "charge" vested in the State in question, as in the instant case, with a disciplinary character nonetheless counts as "crintinal" within the meaning of Article 6 . In this connection . the Court referred to three criteria : (a) whether the provision(s) defining the offence charged belong .according to the legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law, disciplinary â¢ or both concurrently ; (b) the very nature of the offenc e (c) the degree of severity of the penalty thÃ¢t the person concerned risk s incuring . On the basis of these criteria the Commission will ascertain whether in the present case the applicant was the subject of a "criminal charge", within the meaning of Article 6 . It first notes that the charge of failure to account for property received, brought against the applicant, is a disciplinary offence under RegulÃ tion 7 of the Disciplinary Code in force at that time, under the heading "Corrupt or improper practice" . The Commission further notes that the Director of Public Prosecutions was of the opinion that the applicant could hardly be brought beforea court for theft because the element of dishonesty would be difficult to establish . It follows that while it is clear that the charge against the applicant was disciplinary under international law, it is at least doubtful whether it could not equally be seen as criminal under the sante law .
As to the very nature of the offence, the Commission observes that an offence of the kind of which the applicant was suspected is not necessarily linked with the exercise of his official function, insofar as he was charged to have unlawfully taken or at least "borrowed" for his own use one gallon of petrol . On the other hand, the applicant can also be seen to have abused the facilities put at the disposal of police officers in relation to the exercise of their function, in particular as oRcial car drivers . As to the degree of severity of the penalty, the Commission recalls that the applicant risked incurring dismissal and was finally forced to resign . Heretofore, the Commission and Court have only considered in thi s context penalties involving deprivation of liberty, to which the Convention has special regard (see the case of Engel and others ; No . 6224/73, Kiss v/the - 171 -
United Kingdom, Decisions and Reports 7, p . 55) . The applicant's forced resignation from the police force is of quite another nature ; it is a typical penalty for a disciplinary offence in that service and, according to the Disciplinary Board and Commissioner, a"stern punishment" . It is not a penalty belonging to the "criminal sphere" . ' Taking into account the various elements mentioned above, the Commission concludes that it cannot be said that the procedure by which the applicant was forced to resign from his employment as a police officer involved the determination of a criminal charge against him, within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention . ' It follows that the guarantees provided for in this article did not apply t o
this procedure and that the present complaint is therefore incompatible ratione rnmeriae with the provisions of the Convention, . within the meaning of Arlicle 27, paragraph 2 .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faits pertinents Une procrdure distiplinaire a Ã©tÃ© ouverte contre le requÃ©rant . agent de police Ã Londres . pour avoir dÃ©tournÃ© Ã son profit un gallon (environ 4,5 litres) d'essence en faisatu le plein d'une voitnre de service dont il Ã©tait le chauffeur . Il a expliquÃ© pour sa dÃ©fense que, se rmtrvanr Ã rourt de monnaie, il avait utilisÃ© ce gallon d'essertce pour remplir le rÃ©servoir de sa motocyclette, avec l'iturruion de le rendre le lendemain .
Lr parquer . cnnsuhÃ© par le prÃ©fet de police, dÃ©clara qu'une poursuite prualr neâ¢ paraissait gur:re possible . ConsidÃ©rantque le rÃ©quÃ©ratu arait dÃ©jÃ fait l'objet demises en garde pour d'mures manquernems . lu Commission disciplinuire, dÃ©sireuse de faire un exemple . prmrottca sa rÃ©vocation . . Sur recours du requÃ©rant, le prÃ©fet de police confirma la sanction et rrlle-ri fut publire dans la feuille officielle de la police . Le requÃ©ranu s'adres a alors au Minstre de 17ntÃ©rieur. Celui-ci dÃ©cida dr nrodifier la sanction de rÃ©vocation en lui substituant une invitation Ã donner sa dÃ©tnission .
Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la rnaniÃ¨re dont a Ã©tÃ© conduite la pmcÃ©dure disciplinaire dirigÃ©e contre lui . - 172 -
(TRADUCTION) .,, ,
EN DROIT (Extrait ) 1 . Le requÃ©rant a formulÃ© . stir le terrain de l'article 6 de Ia .Convention . divers griefs relatifs Ã la procÃ©dure par laquelle il a Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© Ã dÃ©missionner : '- . de son emploi d'agenrde police . â¢ . L'article 6 . paragraphe, 1 . dc laConcention stipule notantmenl que - toute personne a droit,Ã ce que sa cause soil entendue Ã©quitablentent . publiquement et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribtmal indÃ©pendant Ã©t impartial . Ã©tabli par la loi . qui dÃ©cidera . soit dcs contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re ci'vil . soit du bien-fondÃ© de loule acctisation Ã©n matiÃ©re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . L'arlicle 6 . paragraphes 2 et 3 . garantit Ã©g :demÃ©nl dec droits spÃ©cifiques Ã qniconque'est accusÃ© d'nne infr :iclion . La Cotnntission remarque tout d'abord que la procÃ©dure inerini nÃ©e Ã©tai t
qualifiÃ©e de disciplinaire selon les nornies et principes juridiques applicables au Royaume-Uni : Elle rappelle Ã cet Ã©gard avoir estimÃ© . dans une sÃ©rie dc dÃ©cisions antÃ©rieures . que les procÃ©dures disciplinaires . dirigÃ©es notantmenl contre des mentbres des forces de police . ne figurent pas dans le champ d'application de l'article 6 de la Convention (voir par exentple NÂ° 1931/63 . Recueil 15 . p . 8 . Annuaire 7 . p . 213 : NÂ° 7341/76 . DÃ©cisions ct Rapports 5 . p . 1341 . Toutelois . aprÃ©s la jurisprudence plus rÃ©cente de la Conr enropÃ©enne des Droits cle l'Homme . notamment dans l'affaire Engel et autres (ArrÃ¨l du 8 juin 1976) et dans l'affaire Kiinig (ArrÃªt du 28 juin 1978) . la Commission estime nÃ©cessaire d'examiner si la procÃ©dure incriminÃ©e en l'espÃ¨ce impliquait pour le requÃ©rant utte dÃ©cision sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨rÃ©'civil ou sur une accusation en ntatiÃ¨re pÃ©nale portÃ©e contre lui . '- . La Connnission a dÃ©clarÃ© . dans tine sÃ©rie de dÃ©cisions antÃ©rieures .'que la notion de - droits el obligations de caraclÃ©re civil - ne saurait s'interprÃ©ter par simple rÃ©fÃ©rence au droit interne de la Haute Partie Contractante intÃ©ressÃ©e :--
il s'agit d'une notion autonome qui doit s'interprÃ©ter de maniÃ©re indÃ©pendante . conipte tenu de la nature et de l'objet de l'action . C'est seulement Ã cet Ã©gard que les principes du drait interne de la Haute Partie Contractante peuvenl Ãªtre pris en considÃ©ration (voir par exentple N" 808/60 . Annuaire 5 . p . 108 . paragraphe 142 iRapnrtdelComsian'freRgisc/Auth N^ 4618i70 . Annuaire 15 . p . 360) . La Cour europÃ©enne des Droils *de l'Hontme a adoptÃ© le mÃªnte raisonnement (ArrÃªt KÃ¼nig . paragraphe'88) . fl n'est donc pas dÃ©terniinanl en l'espÃ¨ce de savoir si les r :~pports entrel'Etal et un agent de police sont ou non rÃ©gis par un contrat (Ie tracail et si . en droit brit :mnique . le litige relatif au .licenciement d'un tel agent peut ou- non @tre portÃ© devant les tribunaux .
Exantinant si le droit de coniinuer Ã praiiquer la mÃ©decine est un droit civil â¢ . la Cour a altribuÃ© une importance prÃ©pondÃ©rante au fait que la profession ntÃ©dicale est tradilionnellentent tine profession libÃ©rale de caractÃ¨re indÃ©niabfetnent privÃ© el qu'un ntÃ©decin assure le traitement de ses patients sur la base de contrais passÃ©s avec eux (ArrÃªt KÃ´nig . paragraphe 93) . La Contntission estinte que la profession d'agent de police a tin caractÃ¨re fondamental . Les policiers sont en effet spÃ©cialement choisis et formÃ©s par entdifÃ©r l'Elat pour s'acquitter en son nom de tiches concernant le ntainlien de l'ordre pubfic . Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions . ils sont exclusivement subordonnÃ©s Ã des instances goucernententafes et n'ont Ã s'engager dans aucun rapport contractuel d'ordre privÃ© . La Commission eslinie que . quefle que soit la qualification juridique de leur entpfoi . ils n'ont aucun ~ droit civil . . au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, Ã conliriuer Ã exercer feurs fonctions .
Il en dÃ©coule que la procÃ©dure litigieuse ne ntet pas en jeu pour le requÃ©rant des - droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil â¢ . La Commission exantinera ensuile si la procÃ©dure disciplinaire engagÃ©e contre Ic requÃ©rant entportait dÃ©cision sur le bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e conlre lui . Dans l'arrÃªt qu'elle a rendu dans l'affaire Engel et autres (paragraphes 81 et 82) . la Cour fait ohserver que, contrairentent Ã la notion de ~droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil , l'autonomie de la notion de Â« matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale â¢ opÃ¨re potir ainsi dire Ã sens unique . La Convenlion laisse les E(ats libres d'Ã©riger en infraction pÃ©nale une action ou ontission ne constituant pas l'exercice norntal de l'un des droits qu'effe protÃ¨ge, niais le choix inverse (c'est-Ã -dire Ã©riger une action ou omission en infraction disciplinaire) obÃ©ic lui . Ã des rÃ¨gles plus strictes . DÃ¨s fors, les organes de la Convention doivent vÃ©rifier si une - accusation - donnÃ©e, Ã laquelle l'Elat en cause attribue en l'espÃ¨ce un caractÃ¨re disciplinaire, relÃ¨ve nÃ©anmoins de la = tnatiÃ¨re pÃ©nale â¢â¢ telle que l'entend l'article 6 . A ce sujet, la Coiir s'est fondÃ©e sur trois critÃ¨re s
a . savoir si le ou les textes dÃ©finissant l'infraction incriminÃ©e appartiennent, dans le svstÃ¨me juridique'de l'Etat dÃ©fendeur, au droit pÃ©naf . au droit disciplinaire ou aux deux Ã la fois ; h . la nalure mÃ©me de l'infraction : c . le degrÃ© de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la sanction encourue par l'intÃ©ressÃ© . C'est sur la base de ces critÃ¨res que la Comntission recherchera si . en l'espÃ¨ce . le requÃ©rant a fait l'objet d'une â¢ accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale . au sens de l'articfe 6 . Elle relÃ¨ve tout d' ;tbord que l'accusation portÃ©e contre lui - ne pas aeoir rendu compte des biens re Ã§ us - esl une infraction disciplinaire selon l'article 7 du Code discipfinaire en vigueur Ã l'Ã©poque . au chapilre â¢â¢ Corruption ou pratiqties abusives . La Contntission relÃ¨ve en outre que . selon le
parquct . le requÃ©ranl poucait difficilenienl Ãªtre Iraduit pour vol decant un Irihunnl cu la difficultÃ© d'Ã©tablir l'i9Ã©nienl de mcdhonniletÃ© . Il c'ensuil que si l'nccusalion portÃ©e conlre le requÃ©raut :rrail Inanifestement un caractÃ¨re disciplinaire en droit interne . il Ã©tnit pour le moin .c douteux qu'elle puisse Ã©tre Ã©galement considÃ©rÃ©e contme une accusation pÃ©nale au regard du mÃ©me droit .
Ouanl Ã la nature mÃªme de l'infraction . la Contntission fait reniarquer qu'une infraclion conimc celle qui Ã©tait reprochÃ©e au requÃ©rant n'est pas nÃ©cessairement liÃ©e i l'excrcice de sa fonetion officielle dans la mesure oii il Ã©tait accusÃ© d'avoir irrÃ©guliÃ¨rentent pris, ou du moins â¢ empruntÃ© â¢ . pour son usage personnel un gallon d'essence . Mais on peut aussi considÃ©rer que le requÃ©rant a abusÃ© des facilitÃ©s mises Ã la disposition des agents de police dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions . notamnienl celle de chauffeur de voitures de service . Ouam au degrÃ© de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© de la sanction . la Commission rappelle que le requÃ©rant risquait un licenciement et a finalement Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de dÃ©ntissionner . Jusqu'Ã prÃ©sent . la Contniission et la Cour n'ont examinÃ© dans ce contexte,que des sanctions impliquant une privation de libertÃ© . Ã laquelle s'intÃ©resse spÃ©cialement la Convention (voir l'affaire Engel et autres N" 6224/73, Kiss c/Royaume-Uni . DÃ©cisions et Rapports 7, p . 55) . La dÃ©mission forcÃ©e du requÃ©rant des forces de police est d'un ordre tout Ã fait diffÃ© . rent : il s'agit d'une xanction caractÃ©ristique d'une infraction disciplinaire dans ce service et une â¢ sanction exentplaire . . selon la commission disciplinaire et le prÃ©fetde police, mais il ne s'agit pas d'une .aanetion relevant de la â¢ matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale â¢ . Au vti des divers Ã©lÃ©nients susmentionnÃ©s . la Commixsion estime que la procÃ©dure selon laquelle le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de dÃ©niissionner de son eniploi d'agent de police ne saurail Ã¨lre considÃ©rÃ©e conime impliquant, au sens de l'arlicle 6 de la Convention, tine dÃ©cician sur le hien-fondÃ© d'une accusation pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e conire Iui . Il s'ensuil que les garanties prÃ©cues dans cet article ne s'appliquent pas Ã ladite procÃ©dure et que le prÃ©seni grief est incompatible rationr ma(eriae avec les dispositions de la Convention, au sens de l'a rt icle 27, paragraphe 2 .
- 175-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 08/10/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page