Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/425/352/case.php
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 3', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 806', '§ 552', '§ 3', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 522', '§ 522']

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE V. ROSE, 425 U. S. 352 (1976) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
4. Even if "personnel files" were to be considered as wholly exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 without regard to whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the case summaries here were not in that category, although they constituted "similar files," relating as they chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondents, student editors or former student editors of the New York University Law Review researching chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
disciplinary systems and procedures at the military service academies for an article for the Law Review, [Footnote 1] were denied access by petitioners to case summaries of honor and ethics hearings, with personal references or other identifying information deleted, maintained in the United States Air Force Academy's Honor and Ethics Code reading files, although Academy practice is to post copies of such summaries on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy and to distribute copies to Academy faculty and administration officials. [Footnote 2] Thereupon, respondents brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against petitioners, the Department chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of the Air Force and Air Force officers who supervise cadets at the United States Air Force Academy (hereinafter collectively the Agency). [Footnote 3] The District Court granted petitioner Agency's motion for summary judgment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
-- without first requiring production of the case summaries for inspection -- holding in an unreported opinion that case summaries, even with deletions of personal references or other identifying information, were "matters . . . related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency," exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552(b)(2) of the statute. [Footnote 4] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 552(b)(2) did not exempt the case summaries from mandatory disclosure. 495 F.2d 261 (1974). The Agency argued alternatively, however, that the case summaries constituted
exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552(b)(6). The District Court held this exemption inapplicable to the case summaries, because it concluded that disclosure of the summaries without names or other identifying information would not subject any former cadet to public identification and stigma, and the possibility of identification by another former cadet could not, in the context of the Academy's practice of distribution and official posting of the summaries, constitute an invasion of personal privacy proscribed by § 552(b)(6). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pet. for Cert. 32A. The Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, stating that it "ignores certain practical realities" which militated against the conclusion "that the Agency's internal dissemination of the summaries lessens the concerned cadets' right to privacy, as embodied in Exemption six." 495 F.2d 267. But the court refused to hold, on the one hand, either
The District Court made factual findings respecting the administration of the Honor and Ethics Codes at the Academy. See Pet. for Cert. 28A-29A, nn. 5, 6. Under the Honor Code, enrolled cadets pledge: "We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us any chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
At the announcement of the verdict, the Honor Committee Chairman reminds all cadets present at the hearing that all matters discussed at the hearing are confidential, and should not be discussed outside the room with anyone other than an honor representative. A case summary consisting of a brief statement, usually only one page, of the significant facts is prepared by the Committee. As we have said, copies of the summaries are posted on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy, and distributed among Academy faculty and administration officials. Cadets are instructed not to read the summaries, unless they have a need, beyond mere curiosity, to know their contents, and the reading chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79. Congress therefore structured a revision whose basic purpose reflected "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965) (hereinafter S.Rep. No. 813). To make crystal clear the congressional objective -- in the words of the Court of Appeals, "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny," 495 F.2d 263 -- Congress provided in § 552(c) that nothing in the Act should be read to "authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated. . . ." Consistently with that objective, the Act repeatedly states "that official information shall be made available to the public,' `for public inspection.'" Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79. There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure. They are nine in number, and are set forth in § 552(b). But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. "These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). . . ," Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79, and must be narrowly construed. Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 343, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (1973); 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 193, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (1975); Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 157, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (1971). In sum, as said in Mink, supra, at 410 U. S. 80:
No final action was taken on S. 1666 in the 88th Congress; the Senate passed the bill, but it reached the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
House too late for action. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 415 U. S. 18 n. 18 (1974). But the bill introduced in the Senate in 1965 that became law in 1966 dropped the "internal management" exemption for matters required to be published in the Federal Register and consolidated all exemptions into a single subsection. Thus, legislative history plainly evidences the congressional conclusion that the wording of Exemption 2, "internal personnel rules and practices," was to have a narrower reach than the Administrative Procedure Act's exemption for "internal management" matters.
Almost all courts that have considered the difference between the Reports have concluded that the Senate Report more accurately reflects the congressional purpose. [Footnote 5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"where knowledge of administrative procedures might help outsiders to circumvent regulations or standards. Release of the [sanitized] summaries, which constitute quasi-legal records, poses no such danger to the effective operation of the Codes at the Academy."
495 F.2d 265 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the materials sought in this case are distributed to the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It might appear, nonetheless, that the House Report's reference to "[o]perating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure" supports a much broader interpretation of the exemption than the Senate Report's circumscribed examples. This argument was recently considered and rejected by Judge Wilkey speaking for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Vaughn v. Rosen, 173 U.S.App.D.C. at 193-194, 523 F.2d 1142:
"[Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 157, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (1971)]. As a result, we have repeatedly stated that '[t]he policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirements be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly.' [Ibid.; Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 343, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (1973).] Thus, faced with a conflict in the legislative history, the recognized principal purpose of the FOIA requires us to choose that interpretation most favoring disclosure."
". . . [W]e, as a court viewing the legislative history, must be wary of relying upon the House Report or even the statements of House sponsors where their views differ from those expressed in the Senate. As Professor Davis said: 'The basic principle is quite elementary: the content of the law must depend upon the intent of both Houses, not of just one.' [See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.31, p. 175 (1970 Supp.).] By unanimously passing the Senate Bill without amendment, the House denied both the Senate Committee and the entire Senate an opportunity to object (or concur) to the interpretation written into the House Report (or voiced in floor colloquy). This being the case, we choose to rely upon the Senate Report."
For the reasons stated by Judge Wilkey, and because we think the primary focus of the House Report was on exemption of disclosures that might enable the regulated chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court had also concluded in this case that the Senate Report was "the surer indication of congressional intent." Pet. for Cert. 34A n. 21. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to take "a firm stand on the issue," concluding that "the difference of approach between the House and Senate Reports would not affect the result here." 495 F.2d 265. The different conclusions of the two courts in applying the Senate Report's interpretation centered upon a disagreement as to the materiality of the public significance of the operation of the Honor and Ethics Codes. The District Court based its conclusion on a determination that the Honor and Ethics Codes,
Pet. for Cert. 34A. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded that, under "the Senate construction of Exemption Two, [the] case summaries . . . clearly fall outside its ambit" because "[s]uch summaries have a substantial potential for public interest outside the Government." 495 F.2d 265.
We agree with the approach and conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The implication for the general public of the Academy's administration of discipline is obvious, particularly so in light of the unique role of the military. What we have said of the military in other contexts has equal application here: it "constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian," Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 345 U. S. 94 (1953), in which the internal law of command and obedience invests the military officer with "a particular position of responsibility." @ 417 U. S. 744 (1974). Within this discipline, the accuracy and effect of a superior's command depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability of subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and customary reliability of the superior. [Footnote 6] The importance of these considerations to the maintenance of a force able and ready to fight effectively renders them undeniably significant to the public role of the military. Moreover, the same essential integrity is critical to the military's relationship with its civilian direction. Since the purpose of the Honor and Ethics Codes administered and enforced at the Air Force Academy is to ingrain the ethical reflexes basic to these responsibilities in future Air Force officers, and to select out those candidates apparently unlikely to serve these standards, it follows that the nature of this instruction -- and its adequacy or inadequacy -- is significantly related to the substantive public role of the Air Force and its Academy. Indeed, the public's stake in the operation of the Codes as they affect the training of future Air Force officers and their military careers is underscored by the Agency's own proclamations of the importance of cadet-administered Codes to the Academy's educational and training program. Thus, the Court of Appeals said, and we agree:
items such as newspaper excerpts, a press conference by an Academy officer and a White House Press Release, which illustrate the extent of general concern with the working of the Cadet Honor Code. As the press conference and the Press Release show, some of the interest has been generated -- or at least enhanced -- by acts of the Government itself. Of course, even without such official encouragement, there would be interest in the treatment of cadets, whose education is publicly financed and who furnish a good portion of the country's future military leadership. Indeed, all sectors of our society, including the cadets themselves, have a stake in the fairness of any system that leads, in many instances, to the forced resignation of some cadets. The very study involved in this case bears additional witness to the degree of professional and academic interest in the Academy's student-run system of discipline. . . . [This factor] differentiate[s] the summaries from matters of daily routine like working hours, which, in the words of Exemption Two, do relate 'solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.'"
495 F.2d 265 (emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion).
In sum, we think that, at least where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a genuine and significant public interest. The exemption was not designed to authorize withholding of all matters except otherwise secret law bearing directly on the propriety of actions of members of the public. Rather, the general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
have an interest. [Footnote 7] The case summaries plainly do not fit that description. They are not matter with merely internal significance. They do not concern only routine matters. Their disclosure entails no particular administrative burden. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the Senate interpretation, "the Agency's withholding of the case summaries (as edited to preserve anonymity) cannot be upheld by reliance on the second exemption." Id. at 266. [Footnote 8]
Additional questions are involved in the determination whether Exemption 6 exempts the case summaries from mandatory disclosure as "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The first question is whether the clause "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" modifies "personnel and medical files" or only "similar files." The Agency argues that Exemption 6 distinguishes "personnel" from "similar" files, exempting all "personnel files" but only those "similar files" whose disclosure constitutes "a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
495 F.2d 266.
We agree with these views, for we find nothing in the wording of Exemption 6 or its legislative history to support the Agency's claim that Congress created a blanket exemption for personnel files. Judicial interpretation has uniformly reflected the view that no reason would exist for nondisclosure in the absence of a showing of a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, whether the documents are filed in "personnel" or "similar" files. See, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (CA3 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 126, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 484 F.2d 820 (1973); Getman v. NLRB, 146 U.S.App.D.C. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"The phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to governmental information. [Footnote 9]"
Plainly, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress did not itself strike the balance as to "personnel files" and confine the courts to striking the balance only as to "similar files." To the contrary, Congress enunciated a single policy, to be enforced in both cases by the courts, "that will involve a balancing" of the private and public interests. [Footnote 10] This was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as to medical files, and that conclusion is equally applicable to personnel files:
Congress' recent action in amending the Freedom of Information Act to make explicit its agreement with chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
judicial decisions [Footnote 11] requiring the disclosure of nonexempt portions of otherwise exempt files is consistent with this conclusion. Thus, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V) now provides that
"[a]ny reasonably segregale portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection. [Footnote 12] And § 552(a)(4)(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V) was added explicitly to authorize in camera inspection of matter claimed to be exempt 'to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld.' (Emphasis supplied.) The Senate Report accompanying this legislation explains, without distinguishing 'personnel and medical files' from 'similar files,' that its effect is to require courts"
S.Rep. No. 93-854, p. 32 (1974). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
120 Cong.Rec. 17018 (1974). In so specifying, Congress confirmed what had perhaps been only less clear earlier. For the Senate and House Reports on the bill enacted in 1966 noted specifically that Health, Education, and Welfare files, Selective Service files, or Veterans' Administration files, which as the Agency here recognizes [Footnote 13] were clearly included within the congressional conception of "personnel files," [Footnote 14] were nevertheless intended to be subject to mandatory disclosure in redacted form if privacy could be sufficiently protected. As the House Report states, H.R.Rep. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, even if we were to agree that "personnel files" are wholly exempt from any disclosure under Exemption 6, it is clear that the case summaries sought here lack the attributes of "personnel files" as commonly understood. Two attributes of the case summaries require that they be characterized as "similar files." First, they relate to the discipline of cadet personnel, and while even Air Force Regulations themselves show that this single factor is insufficient to characterize the summaries as "personnel files," [Footnote 15] it supports the conclusion that they are "similar." Second, and most significantly, the disclosure of these summaries implicates similar privacy values; for, as said by the Court of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appeals, 495 F.2d 267,
See generally, e.g., Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 13137; Rural Housing Allance v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 162 U.S. App D.C. at 125-126, 498 F.2d 76-77; Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 84846 (CA4 1973). But these summaries, collected only in the Honor and Ethics Code reading files and the Academy's honor records, do not contain the "vast amounts of personal data," S.Rep. No. 813, p. 9, which constitute the kind of profile of an individual ordinarily to be found in his personnel file: showing, for example, where he was born, the names of his parents, where he has lived from time to time, his high school or other school records, results of examinations, evaluations of his work performance. Moreover, access to these files is not drastically limited, as is customarily true of personnel files, only to supervisory personnel directly involved with the individual (apart from the personnel department itself), frequently thus excluding even the individual himself. On the contrary, the case summaries name no names except in guilty cases, are widely disseminated for examination by fellow cadets, contain no facts except such as pertain to the alleged violation of the Honor or Ethics Codes, and are justified by the Academy solely for their value as an educational and instructional tool the better to train military officers for discharge of their important and exacting functions. Documents treated by the Agency in such a manner cannot reasonably be claimed to be within the common and congressional meaning of what constitutes a "personnel file" under Exemption 6. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This contention has no merit. First, the argument implies that Congress barred disclosure in any case in which the conclusion could not be guaranteed that disclosure would not trigger recollection of identity in any person whatever. But this ignores Congress' limitation of the exemption to cases of "clearly unwarranted" [Footnote 16] invasions chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of personal privacy. [Footnote 17] Second, Congress vested the courts with the responsibility ultimately to determine "de novo" any dispute as to whether the exemption was properly invoked in order to constrain agencies from withholding nonexempt matters. [Footnote 18] No court has yet seen the case chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In striking the balance whether to order disclosure of all or part of the case summaries, the District Court, in determining whether disclosure will entail a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy, may properly discount its probability in light of Academy tradition to keep identities confidential within the Academy. [Footnote 19] Respondents sought only such disclosure as was consistent with this tradition. Their request for access to summaries "with personal references or other identifying information deleted," respected the confidentiality interests embodied in Exemption 6. As the Court of Appeals recognized, however, what constitutes identifying information regarding a subject cadet must be weighed not only from the viewpoint of the public, but also from the vantage of those who would have been familiar, as fellow cadets or Academy staff, with other aspects of his career at the Academy. Despite the summaries' distribution within the Academy, many of this group with earlier access to summaries may never have identified a particular chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
cadet, or may have wholly forgotten his encounter with Academy discipline. And the risk to the privacy interests of a former cadet, particularly one who has remained in the military, posed by his identification by otherwise unknowing former colleagues or instructors cannot be rejected as trivial. We nevertheless conclude that consideration of the policies underlying the Freedom of Information Act, to open public business to public view when no "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy will result, requires affirmance of the holding of the Court of Appeals, 495 F.2d 267, that, although
To be sure, redaction cannot eliminate all risks of identifiability, as any human approximation risks some degree of imperfection, and the consequences of exposure of identity can admittedly be severe. But redaction is a familiar technique in other contexts, [Footnote 20] and exemptions to disclosure under the Act were intended to be practical chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
workable concepts, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 79; S.Rep. No. 813, p. 5; H.R.Rep. No. 1497, p. 2. Moreover, we repeat, Exemption 6 does not protect against disclosure every incidental invasion of privacy -- only such disclosures as constitute "clearly unwarranted" invasions of personal privacy.
Upon respondent Rose's request for documents, Academy officials gave him copies of the Honor Code, the Honor Reference Manual, Lesson Plans, Honor Hearing Procedures, and various other materials explaining the Honor and Ethics Codes. They denied him access to the case summaries, however, on the grounds that, even with the names deleted, "[s]ome cases may be recognized by the reader by the circumstances alone without the identity of the cadet given," and "[t]here is no way of determining just how these facts will be or could be used." App. 21, 155. On appeal to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary, by letter from his Administrative Assistant, refused disclosure of the case summaries on the ground that they were exempted from disclosure by Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), and by Air Force Regulations 12-30, ¦¦ 4(f) and 4(g)(1)(b), 32 CFR §§ 806.5(f), (g)(1)(ii) (1974), App. 21, 121-122.
The Court of Appeals held that the argument raised by the Agency that courts have a broad equitable power to decline to order release when disclosure would damage the public interest was not a substantial one in the context of Exemption 6, since that exemption itself requires a court to exercise a large measure of discretion. 495 F.2d 269. The Agency has not renewed this argument in this Court.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b) (1970 ed., Supp. V). One of the prime shortcomings of § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, in the view of the Congress which passed the Freedom of Information Act, was precisely that it provided no judicial remedy for the unauthorized withholding of agency records. EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 410 U. S. 79 (1973).
The Court of Appeals cited as examples Revenue Rulings collected in the Cumulative Bulletin of the Internal Revenue Service, and American Bar Association, Opinions on Professional Ethics (1967). 495 F.2d 268 n. 18.
(1) This case does not compel us to decide whether the summaries at issue here are "personnel files" or whether files so categorized are beyond the proviso of Exemption 6 that disclosure constitute "a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Even assuming, arguendo, that the Government must show that the summaries are subject to the foregoing standard, it is quite chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The opinions of this Court have long recognized the opprobrium which both the civilian and the military segments of our society attribute to allegations of dishonor among commissioned officers of our Armed Forces. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 744 (1974), quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 345 U. S. 91 (1953). The stigma which our society imposes on the individual who has accepted such a position of trust [Footnote 2/1] and abused it is not erasable, in any realistic sense, by the passage of time chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
or even by subsequent exemplary conduct. The absence of the broken sword, the torn epaulets, and the Rogue's March from our military ritual does not lessen the indelibility of the stigma. Significantly, cadets and midshipmen -- "inchoate officers" [Footnote 2/2] -- have traditionally been held to the same high standards and subjected to the same stigma as commissioned officers when involved in matters with overtones of dishonor. [Footnote 2/3] Indeed, the mode of punitive separation as the result of court-martial is the same for both officers and cadets -- dismissal. United States v. Ellman, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 549, 26 C.M.R. 329 (1958). Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, it is unrealistic to conclude, in most cases, that a finding of "not guilty" or "discretion" exonerates the cadet in anything other than the purely technical and legal sense of the term.
Admittedly, the Court requires that, before release, these documents be subject to in camera inspection with power of excising parts. But, as the Court admits, any such attempt to "sanitize" these summaries would still leave the very distinct possibility that the individual would still be identifiable, and thereby injured. In light of Congress' recent manifest concern in the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1970 ed., Supp. V), for "governmental respect for the privacy of citizens . . . ," S.Rep. No. 93-1183, p. 1 (1974), it is indeed difficult to attribute to Congress a willingness to subject an individual citizen to the risk of possible severe damage to his reputation simply to permit law students to invade individual privacy to prepare a law journal article. Its definition of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As the Court noted in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. at 345 U. S. 91:
An officer may be punitively dismissed (the equivalent of a dishonorable discharge) when found guilty of any offense by a general court-martial, regardless of the limitations placed on the punishment for the offense when committed by enlisted personnel. Manual for Courts-Martial 126d (1969). See generally United States v. Goodwin, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 647, 18 C.M.R. 271 (1955).
We are here concerned with the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), and with two of the exemptions provided by § 552(b). The Court in the very recent past has not hesitated consistently chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The Act's second exemption, § 552(b)(2), extends to matters that are "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." There can be no doubt that the Department of the Air Force, including the faculty and staff who supervise cadets at the Air Force Academy, qualifies as an "agency," within the meaning of § 522(b)(2), and the Court so recognizes. Ante at 425 U. S. 355-356. I would have thought, however, that matters that concern the established Honor Codes of our military academies, codes long in existence and part of our military society and tradition, see Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 743-744 (1974), and the disciplining of cadets as they move along in their Government-supplied education, would clearly qualify as "internal personnel . . . practices" of that agency. By its very nature, this smacks of personnel and personnel problems and practices. It is the agency's internal business, and not the public's, and, because it is, the exemption is, or should be, afforded. Thus, although the Court does not, I find great support in the language of the second exemption for the petitioners' position here. To me, it makes both obvious and common sense, and I would hold, as did the District Court, that the Act's second exemption applies to the case summaries respondent Rose so ardently desired, and removes them from his eager grasp.
I cannot accept the rationale of the Court of Appeals majority that the existence of a "substantial potential for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
B. The Act's sixth exemption, § 522(b)(6), is equally supportive for the petitioners here and for the result opposite to that which the Court reaches today. This exemption applies to matters that are "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Once again, we have a specific reference to "personnel . . . files," and what I have said above applies equally here. But, in addition, the sixth exemption covers "similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The added restrictive phrase applies not to "personnel," and surely not to "medical files," but only to "similar files." See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845-846 (CA4 1973). The emphasis is on personnel files and on medical files and on "similar" files to the extent that privacy invasion of the latter would be unwarranted. The exemption as to personnel files and as to medical files is clear and unembellished. It is almost inconceivable to me that the Court is willing today to attach the qualification phrase to medical files, and thereby open to the public what has been recognized as almost the essence of ultimate privacy. The law's long established physician-patient privilege establishes this. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Anyone who has had even minimal contact with the practice of medicine surely cannot agree with this extension by judicial construction and with the reasoning of another Court of Appeals in Ackerly v. Ley, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 136-137, n. 3, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339-1340, n. 3 (1969), referred to and seemingly approved by the Court. Ante at 425 U. S. 373.
If, then, these case summaries are something less than "personnel files," a proposition I do not accept, they surely are "similar" to personnel files and, when invaded, afford an instance of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." It is hard to imagine something any more personal. It seems to me that the Court is blinding itself to realities when it concludes, as it does, that Rose's demands do not result in invasions of the personal privacy of the cadets concerned. And I do not regard it as any less unwarranted just because there are court-ordered redaction, a most impractical solution, and judicial rationalization that, because the case summaries were posted "on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy," ante at 425 U. S. 355, and copies distributed to faculty and administration officials, the invasion is not an invasion at all. The "publication" is restricted to the Academy grounds and to the private, not public, portions of those facilities. It is disseminated to the corps alone and to faculty and administration, and is a part of the Academy's general pedagogical and disciplinary purpose and program. To be sure, 40 may appear to some to be a large number, but the Academy's "family" and the area confinement are what are important. And the Court's reasoning must apply, awkwardly it seems to me, to 20 or 10 or five or two posting places, or, indeed, to only one.
I should add that I see little assistance for the Court in the legislative history. As is so often the case, that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
history cuts both ways, and is particularly confusing here. The Court's struggle with it, ante at 425 U. S. 362-370, so demonstrates.
Finally, I note the Court's candid recognition of the personal risks involved. Ante at 425 U. S. 380-381. Today's decision, of course, now makes those risks a reality for the cadet, "particularly one who has remained in the military," and the risks are imposed upon the individual in return for a most questionable benefit to the public and personal benefit to respondent Rose. So often the pendulum swings too far.
Although this case requires our consideration of a claim of a right to "privacy," it arises in quite a different context from some of our other recent decisions such as Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976). In that case, custodians of public records chose to disseminate them, and one of the subjects of the record claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited the custodian from doing so. Here, the custodian of the records, petitioner Department of the Air Force, has chosen not to disseminate the records, and its decision to that effect is being challenged by a citizen under the Freedom of Information Act. That Act, as both the Court's opinion and the dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE point out, requires the federal courts to balance the claim of right of access to the information chanroblesvirtualawlibrary