Source: http://openjurist.org/506/us/40
Timestamp: 2015-03-31 03:40:53
Document Index: 244911863

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13']

506 US 40 Richmond v. A Lewis | OpenJurist
506 U.S. 40 - Richmond v. A Lewis	Home506 us 40 richmond v. a lewis
506 US 40 Richmond v. A Lewis 506 U.S. 40
113 S.Ct. 528
121 L.Ed.2d 411
Willie Lee RICHMOND, Petitioner,v.Samuel A. LEWIS, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
No. 91-7094.
Following a sentencing hearing on petitioner Richmond's first degree murder conviction, the Arizona trial judge found three statutory aggravating factors, including, under Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(6), that the offense was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner" ((F)(6) factor). Concluding also that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, the judge sentenced Richmond to death. The State Supreme Court affirmed, with each of the five justices joining one of three opinions. Among other things, the principal opinion for two of the justices found that the (F)(6) factor—which had been narrowed in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1, subsequent to Richmond's sentencing—was applicable. The principal opinion also conducted an independent review of the sentence and concluded that Richmond's mitigation evidence did not outweigh the aggravating factors. In a special concurrence, two of the other justices disagreed that the offense came within the (F)(6) factor as narrowed by Gretzler, but agreed that a death sentence was appropriate even absent that factor. The fifth justice filed a dissenting opinion urging reversal. After this Court denied certiorari, the Federal District Court declined to grant Richmond habeas corpus relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Richmond's death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. The (F)(6) factor was unconstitutionally vague at the time the sentencing judge gave it weight. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3073, 111 L.Ed.2d 511. The State Supreme Court did not cure this error, because the two specially concurring justices did not actually reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in affirming the sentence. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725. Those justices did not purport to perform a new sentencing calculus, or even mention the evidence in mitigation. Nor can such a reweighing be presumed, since language in the concurrence plainly indicates that Richmond's aggravated criminal background provided a conclusive justification for the death penalty, thereby evincing the sort of automatic affirmance rule proscribed in a "weighing" State such as Arizona. Id., at 751, 110 S.Ct. at 1450. Because a majority of the State Supreme Court did not perform a curative reweighing in voting to affirm Richmond's death sentence, the question whether the principal opinion properly relied on the (F)(6) factor as narrowed in Gretzler need not be decided by this Court. Pp. ____.
948 F.2d 1473 (CA9, 1990), reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle, Wash., for the petitioner.
Paul Joseph McMurdie, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.
The question in this case is whether the Supreme Court of Arizona has cured petitioner's death sentence of vagueness error.
* On August 25, 1973, Bernard Crummett had the misfortune to meet Rebecca Corella in a Tucson, Arizona, bar. Crummett left the bar with Corella and, in the parking lot, met petitioner, who had been waiting for Corella with his girlfriend, Faith Erwin. Corella agreed to perform an act of prostitution with Crummett, and petitioner drove the group to Corella's hotel. There, Corella communicated to petitioner that Crummett was "loaded," and petitioner in turn whispered to Erwin that he intended to rob Crummett.
After Corella and Crummett concluded their encounter at the hotel, the group again went for a drive, this time to a deserted area outside Tucson, where, Crummett believed, Corella would perform another act of prostitution. Petitioner stopped the car and got out. He first struck Crummett to the ground and next threw several large rocks at Crummett's head. Crummett's watch and wallet were taken by Corella, petitioner, or both, and these two then drove away with Erwin. Either petitioner or Corella was driving, and whoever it was drove the car over Crummett twice. Crummett suffered injuries to his head and trunk, and died.
Petitioner was convicted of both robbery and first degree murder. The jury was instructed as to the elements of felony murder as well as premeditated murder; the murder conviction was returned by a general verdict. Judge Roylston held the penalty hearing required by Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (1989), then codified as § 13-454, and sentenced petitioner to death for the murder and 15-20 years' imprisonment for the robbery. The judge found two statutory aggravating factors: that petitioner had a prior felony conviction involving the use or threat of violence on another person, § 13-703(F)(2) (an armed kidnapping), and that petitioner "committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," § 13-703(F)(6) ((F)(6) factor). Specifically, Judge Roylston's written order stated that "the Defendant did commit the offense in an especially heinous and cruel manner." App. 44. There was no explicit finding about the identity of the driver of the vehicle.
Petitioner unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in the trial court, attaching two affidavits by persons who claimed to have been told by Corella that she, not petitioner, drove the car over Crummett. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentence, conviction and denial of postconviction relief. State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976). Although the opinion is ambiguous on this point, it appears that the Court did not reach petitioner's vagueness challenge to the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" factor because his death sentence was supported by another valid aggravating factor and no statutory mitigating factors applied. Id., at 196-197, 560 P.2d, at 51-52. We denied certiorari. 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977). Federal habeas corpus proceedings ensued, as a result of which petitioner's conviction was found valid but his sentence invalid because the sentencing judge had been constrained to consider a limited set of mitigating factors. Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F.Supp. 519 (Ariz.1978). Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court of Arizona held the Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional insofar as it limited defendants to statutory mitigating factors, State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 444-445, 586 P.2d 1253, 1256-1257 (1978), and vacated every pending Arizona death sentence, see Brief for Respondents 5.
Petitioner's resentencing took place in March 1980. At the hearing, one defense witness testified that Erwin had identified Corella as the driver, while another stated that Corella had admitted the same. The defense also produced evidence of petitioner's rehabilitation in prison and of the effect his execution would have on his family. Judge Roylston again sentenced petitioner to death, this time finding three statutory aggravating circumstances: under Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(2) (prior violent felony) and § 13-703(F)(6) ("especially heinous, cruel or depraved" offense), as before, and also under § 13-703(F)(1) (prior felony meriting life imprisonment), for a murder charge of which petitioner had been convicted after the first sentencing even though the murder predated Crummett's. Once again, the judge found that "the Defendant did commit the offense in this case in an especially heinous and cruel manner," App. 74, but did not explicitly find that petitioner was the driver. The findings as to mitigation were, among others, that "Rebecca Corella was involved in the offense but was never charged with any crime"; that "Faith [E]rwin was involved in the offense but was never charged with any crime"; that "the jury was instructed both on the matters relating to the felony murder rule, as well as matters relating to premeditated murder"; and that "the Defendant's family . . . will suffer considerable grief as a result of any death penalty that might be imposed." Id., at 75. The judge w