Source: https://ro.scribd.com/document/311887395/SEC-proposed-rule-incentive-based-compensation-pdf
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 13:28:07
Document Index: 712333239

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 236', 'art 372', 'art 1232', 'arts 741', 'arts 303', 'art 30', 'art 208', 'art 364', 'art 1230', 'art 1231', 'art 1261', '§1201', 'art 42', 'art 236', 'art 372', 'art 303', 'arts 741', 'art 1232', 'art 30', 'arts 1230', 'art 1230', 'art 1231', 'art 252', 'art 701', 'art 708', 'art 750', 'art 1230']

SEC proposed rule incentive based compensation.pdf | Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act | Financial Crisis Of 2007–2008
salvareSalvați SEC proposed rule incentive based compensation.pdf pentru mai târziu
Singapore Property Weekly Issue 53
May2012 Dodd.frank.progress.report
Docket No. OCC-2011-0001 RIN 1557-AD39
12 CFR Part 236
RIN 7100 AE- 50
12 CFR Part 372
RIN 3064-AD86
12 CFR Part 1232
12 CFR Parts 741 and 751
RIN 3133-AE48
17 CFR Parts 303, 240 and 275
Release No. 34-77776; IA-4383; File no. S7-07-16 RIN 3235-AL06
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA); National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and U.S.
SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking
comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies
published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956
generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines: (1) prohibiting
incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate
risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to
material financial loss; and (2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information
concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.
DATES: Comments must be received by July 22, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Although the Agencies will jointly review the comments submitted, it would
facilitate review of the comments if interested parties send comments to the Agency that is the
appropriate Federal regulator, as defined in section 956(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act, for the type of
covered institution addressed in the comments. Commenters are encouraged to use the title
“Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements” to facilitate the organization and distribution of
comments among the Agencies. Interested parties are invited to submit written comments to:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area
and at the OCC is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments by the
Federal eRulemaking Portal or e-mail, if possible. Please use the title “Incentive-based
Compensation Arrangements” to facilitate the organization and distribution of the comments.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal—Regulations.gov: Go to www.regulations.gov. Enter
“Docket ID OCC-2011-0001" in the Search Box and click "Search."
“Comment Now” to submit public comments.
• Click on the “Help” tab on the Regulations.gov home page to get information on using
Regulations.gov, including instructions for submitting public comments.
• Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 400 7 th Street, SW., Suite 3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7 th Street, SW., Suite 3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11,
Instructions: You must include “OCC” as the agency name and “Docket ID OCC-2011-0001” in
your comment. In general, OCC will enter all comments received into the docket and publish
them on the Regulations.gov Web site without change, including any business or personal
information that you provide such as name and address information, e-mail addresses, or phone
numbers. Comments received, including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of
the public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not enclose any information in your
comment or supporting materials that you consider confidential or inappropriate for public
You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to this proposed rule by any
• Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to www.regulations.gov. Enter “Docket ID
OCC-2011-0001" in the Search box and click "Search." Click on “Open Docket Folder”
on the right side of the screen and then “Comments.” Comments can be filtered by
clicking on “View All” and then using the filtering tools on the left side of the screen.
Regulations.gov. Supporting materials may be viewed by clicking on “Open Docket
Folder” and then clicking on “Supporting Documents.” The docket may be viewed after
the close of the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
• Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect and photocopy comments at
the OCC, 400 7 th Street, SW., Washington, DC. For security reasons, the OCC requires
that visitors make an appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202)
649-6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, (202) 649-5597. Upon
arrival, visitors will be required to present valid government-issued photo identification
and to submit to security screening in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: You may submit comments, identified
by Docket No. 1536 and RIN No. 7100 AE-50, by any of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting
• E-mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov. Include the docket number and RIN
• Mail: Address to Robert deV. Frierson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20 th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20551.
All public comments will be made available on the Board’s Web site at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, unless modified
for technical reasons. Accordingly, comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or
contact information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper form in
Room 3515, 1801 K Street, NW. (between 18 th and 19 th Streets NW), Washington, DC 20006
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-
AD86, by any of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html. Follow
instructions for submitting comments on the Agency Web Site.
• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov. Include the RIN 3064-AD86 on the subject line of the
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17 th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be hand delivered to the guard station at the rear of the
550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and
• Public Inspection: All comments received, including any personal information provided,
will be posted generally without change to http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal.
Federal Housing Finance Agency: You may submit your written comments on the proposed
rulemaking, identified by RIN number, by any of the following methods:
submitting comments. If you submit your comment to the Federal eRulemaking
Portal, please also send it by e-mail to FHFA at RegComments@fhfa.gov to ensure
timely receipt by the Agency. Please include ‘‘RIN 2590-AA42’’ in the subject line
• Hand Delivery/Courier: The hand delivery address is: Alfred M. Pollard, General
Counsel, Attention: Comments/RIN 2590-AA42, Federal Housing Finance Agency,
Eighth Floor, 400 7 th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219. The package should be
delivered at the 7 th Street entrance Guard Desk, First Floor, on business days between
• U.S. Mail, United Parcel Service, Federal Express, or Other Mail Service: The
mailing address for comments is: Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel, Attention:
Comments/RIN 2590-AA42, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 400 7 th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20219. Please note that all mail sent to FHFA via U.S. Mail is
routed through a national irradiation facility, a process that may delay delivery by
All comments received by the deadline will be posted without change for public inspection on
the FHFA Web site at http://www.fhfa.gov, and will include any personal information provided,
such as name, address (mailing and email), and telephone numbers. Copies of all comments
timely received will be available for public inspection and copying at the address above on
government-business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. To make an
appointment to inspect comments please call the Office of General Counsel at (202) 649-3804.
National Credit Union Administration: You may submit comments by any of the following
methods (please send comments by one method only):
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for
• Agency Web site: http://www.ncua.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail: Address to regcomments@ncua.gov. Include ‘‘[Your name] Comments on
‘‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements’’ in
• Fax: (703) 518–6319. Use the subject line described above for e-mail.
• Mail: Address to Gerard S. Poliquin, Secretary of the Board, National Credit Union
Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314–3428.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as mail address.
• Public Inspection: All public comments are available on the agency’s Web site at
http://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Regs/Pages/PropRegs.aspx as submitted, except when not
possible for technical reasons. Public comments will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information. Paper copies of comments may be inspected in
NCUA’s law library at 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, by appointment
weekdays between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. To make an appointment, call (703) 518–
6546 or send an e-mail to OGCMail@ncua.gov.
• Use the SEC’s Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml);
• Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number S7-07-16 on the
• Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-07-16. This file number should be included on
the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The SEC will post all comments on the SEC’s Internet Web site
(http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also available for Web site viewing
and printing in the SEC’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549 on
official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received
will be posted without change; the SEC does not edit personal identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
Studies, memoranda or other substantive items may be added by the SEC or staff to the
comment file during this rulemaking. A notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any
such materials will be made available on the SEC’s Web site. To ensure direct electronic receipt
of such notifications, sign up through the “Stay Connected” option at www.sec.gov to receive
OCC: Patrick T. Tierney, Assistant Director, Alison MacDonald, Senior Attorney, and Melissa
Lisenbee, Attorney, Legislative and Regulatory Activities, (202) 649-5490, and Judi
McCormick, Analyst, Operational Risk Policy, (202) 649-6415, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 400 7th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219.
BOARD: Teresa Scott, Manager, (202) 973-6114, Meg Donovan, Senior Supervisory Financial
Analyst, (202) 872-7542, or Joe Maldonado, Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 973-7341,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation; or Laurie Schaffer, Associate General Counsel,
(202) 452-2272, Michael Waldron, Special Counsel, (202) 452-2798, Gillian Burgess, Counsel,
(202) 736-5564, Flora Ahn, Counsel, (202) 452-2317, or Steve Bowne, Senior Attorney, (202)
452-3900, Legal Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20 th and C Streets
FDIC: Rae-Ann Miller, Associate Director, Risk Management Policy, Division of Risk
Management Supervision (202) 898-3898, Catherine Topping, Counsel, Legal Division, (202)
898-3975, and Nefretete Smith, Counsel, Legal Division, (202) 898-6851.
FHFA: Mary Pat Fox, Manager, Executive Compensation Branch, (202) 649-3215; or Lindsay
Simmons, Assistant General Counsel, (202) 649-3066, Federal Housing Finance Agency, 400 7 th
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219. The telephone number for the Telecommunications Device
for the Hearing Impaired is (800) 877-8339.
NCUA: Vickie Apperson, Program Officer, and Jeffrey Marshall, Program Officer, Office of
Examination & Insurance, (703) 518-6360; or Elizabeth Wirick, Senior Staff Attorney, Office of
General Counsel, (703) 518-6540, National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street,
SEC: Raymond A. Lombardo, Branch Chief, Kevin D. Schopp, Special Counsel, Division of
Trading & Markets, (202) 551-5777 or tradingandmarkets@sec.gov; Sirimal R. Mukerjee,
Senior Counsel, Melissa R. Harke, Branch Chief, Division of Investment Management, (202)
551-6787 or IARules@SEC.gov, U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street,
B. Supervisory Experience
C. Overview of the 2011 Proposed Rule and Public Comment
E. Overview of the Proposed Rule
Authority, Scope and Initial Applicability
Definitions pertaining to covered institutions
Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 covered
Definitions pertaining to covered
Exposure test at certain
Dollar threshold test
Relationship between defined
When average total consolidated assets
When total consolidated assets
(c) Compliance of covered institutions that are subsidiaries of covered
(f) Disclosure and Recordkeeping Requirements and (g) Rule of
5 Additional Disclosure and Recordkeeping Requirements for Level 1 and Level 2
§ Reservation of Authority for Level 3 Covered
§ Deferral, Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment, and Clawback Requirements for
Minimum deferral amounts and deferral periods for
qualifying incentive-based compensation and incentive-based compensation awarded
under a long-term incentive
under a long-term incentive plan
Adjustments of deferred qualifying incentive-based compensation and
deferred long-term incentive plan compensation
7(a)(4)
Composition of deferred qualifying incentive-based compensation and
deferred long-term incentive plan compensation for Level 1 and Level 2 covered
Cash and equity-like instruments
§ Compensation at
7(b)(1)
§ Events triggering forfeiture and downward adjustment
§ Senior executive officers and significant risk-takers affected by forfeiture and
7(b)(3)
7(b)(4)
Determining forfeiture and downward adjustment
7(c) §
Additional Prohibitions for Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions
§ Maximum incentive-based compensation opportunity
§ Relative performance measures
§ Volume-driven incentive-based compensation
Risk Management and Controls Requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 Covered
Governance Requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions
11 Policies and Procedures Requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions
§ NCUA and FHFA Covered Institutions in Conservatorship, Receivership, or
SEC Amendment to Exchange Act Rule
SEC Amendment to Investment Advisers Act Rule 204-2
Appendix to the Supplementary Information: Example Incentive-Based Compensation
Arrangement and Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment Review
Ms. Ledger: Senior Executive Officer at Level 2 Covered Institution
Award of incentive-based compensation for performance periods ending December 31,
Use of options in deferred incentive-based
Other requirements specific to Ms. Ledger’s incentive-based compensation arrangement.
Risk management and controls and
Mr. Ticker: Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment Review
C. The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999—Assessment of Federal
Regulations and Policies on Families
E . Solicitation of Comments on Use of Plain Language
Differences Between the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Enterprises
H. NCUA Executive Order 13132 Determination
I. SEC Economic Analysis
Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the
“Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”) 1 requires the Agencies to jointly prescribe regulations or
guidelines with respect to incentive-based compensation practices at certain financial institutions
(referred to as “covered financial institutions”). 2 Specifically, section 956 of the Dodd-Frank
Act (“section 956”) requires that the Agencies prohibit any types of incentive-based
compensation 3 arrangements, or any feature of any such arrangements, that the Agencies
determine encourage inappropriate risks by a covered financial institution: (1) by providing an
executive officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered financial institution
with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to
the covered financial institution. Under the Act, a covered financial institution also must
disclose to its appropriate Federal regulator the structure of its incentive-based compensation
arrangements sufficient to determine whether the structure provides excessive compensation,
fees, or benefits or could lead to material financial loss to the institution. The Dodd-Frank Act
2 12 U.S.C. 5641.
3 Section 956(b) uses the term “incentive-based payment arrangement.” It appears that Congress used the terms “incentive-based payment arrangement” and “incentive-based compensation arrangement” interchangeably. The Agencies have chosen to use the term “incentive-based compensation arrangement throughout the proposed rule and this Supplementary Information section for the sake of clarity.
does not require a covered financial institution to report the actual compensation of particular
The Act defines “covered financial institution” to include any of the following types of
institutions that have $1 billion or more in assets: (A) a depository institution or depository
institution holding company, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (“FDIA”) (12 U.S.C. 1813); (B) a broker-dealer registered under section 15 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o); (C) a credit union, as described in section
19(b)(1)(A)(iv) of the Federal Reserve Act; (D) an investment adviser, as such term is defined in
section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)); (E) the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); (F) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac); and (G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal
regulators, jointly, by rule, determine should be treated as a covered financial institution for these
The Act also requires that any compensation standards adopted under section 956 be
comparable to the safety and soundness standards applicable to insured depository institutions
under section 39 of the FDIA 4 and that the Agencies take the compensation standards described
in section 39 of the FDIA into consideration in establishing compensation standards under
section 956. 5 As explained in greater detail below, the standards established by the proposed
rule are comparable to the standards established under section 39 of the FDIA.
4 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1. The OCC, Board, and FDIC (collectively, the “Federal Banking Agencies”) each have adopted guidelines implementing the compensation-related and other safety and soundness standards in section 39 of the FDIA. See Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness (the “Federal Banking Agency Safety and Soundness Guidelines”), 12 CFR part 30, Appendix A (OCC); 12 CFR part 208, Appendix D-1 (Board); 12 CFR part 364, Appendix A (FDIC).
5 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1(c).
In April 2011, the Agencies published a joint notice of proposed rulemaking that
proposed to implement section 956 (2011 Proposed Rule). 6 Since the 2011 Proposed Rule was
published, incentive-based compensation practices have evolved in the financial services
industry. The Board, the OCC, and the FDIC have gained experience in applying guidance on
incentive-based compensation, 7 FHFA has gained supervisory experience in applying
compensation-related rules 8 adopted under the authority of the Safety and Soundness Act, 9 and
foreign jurisdictions have adopted incentive-based compensation remuneration codes,
regulations, and guidance. 10 In light of these developments and the comments received on the
2011 Proposed Rule, the Agencies are publishing a new proposed rule to implement section 956.
The first part of this Supplementary Information section provides background
information on the proposed rule, including a summary of the 2011 Proposed Rule and areas in
which the proposed rule differs from the 2011 Proposed Rule. The second part contains a
6 76 FR 21170 (April 14, 2011).
7 OCC, Board, FDIC, and Office of Thrift Supervision, “Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies” (“2010 Federal Banking Agency Guidance”), 75 FR 36395 (June 25, 2010).
8 These include the Executive Compensation Rule (12 CFR Part 1230), the Golden Parachute Payments Rule (12 CFR Part 1231), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Directors’ Compensation and Expenses Rule (12 CFR Part 1261 Subpart C).
9 The Safety and Soundness Act means the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as amended (12 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.). 12 CFR §1201.1. 10 See, e.g., the European Union, Directive 2013/36/EU (effective January 1, 2014); United Kingdom Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”) and Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), “PRA PS12/15 / FCA PS15/16: Strengthening the Alignment of Risk and Reward: New Remuneration Rules” (June 25, 2015) (“UK Remuneration Rules”), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps1215.pdf; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”), Prudential Practice Guide SPG 511 – Remuneration (November 2013), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Documents/Prudential-Practice-Guide-SPG-511- Remuneration.pdf; Canada, The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (“OSFI”) Corporate Governance Guidelines (January 2013) (“OSFI Corporate Governance Guidelines”), available at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rg-ro/gdn-ort/gl-ld/pages/cg_guideline.aspx and Supervisory Framework (December 2010) (“OSFI Supervisory Framework”), available at http://www.osfi- bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/sframew.pdf; Switzerland, Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”), 2010/01 FINMA Circular on Remuneration Schemes (October 2009) (“FINMA Remuneration Circular”), available at https://www.finma.ch/en/documentation/circulars/#Order=2.
section-by-section description of the proposed rule. 11 To help explain how the requirements of
the proposed rule would work in practice, the Appendix to this Supplementary Information
section sets out an example of an incentive-based compensation arrangement for a hypothetical
senior executive officer at a hypothetical large banking organization and an example of how a
forfeiture and downward adjustment review might be conducted for a senior manager at a
hypothetical large banking organization.
For ease of reference, the proposed rules of the Agencies are referenced in this
Supplementary Information section using a common designation of section
1 to section
14 (excluding the title and part designations for each agency). Each agency would codify its
rule, if adopted, within its respective title of the Code of Federal Regulations. 12
Incentive-based compensation arrangements are critical tools in the management of
financial institutions. These arrangements serve several important objectives, including
attracting and retaining skilled staff and promoting better performance of the institution and
individual employees. Well-structured incentive-based compensation arrangements can promote
the health of a financial institution by aligning the interests of executives and employees with
those of the institution’s shareholders and other stakeholders. At the same time, poorly
structured incentive-based compensation arrangements can provide executives and employees
with incentives to take inappropriate risks that are not consistent with the long-term health of the
11 This section-by-section description also includes certain examples of how the proposed rule would work in practice. These examples are intended solely for purposes of illustration and do not cover every aspect of the proposed rule. They are provided as an aid to understanding the proposed rule and do not carry the force and effect of law or regulation.
12 Specifically, the Agencies propose to codify the rules as follows: 12 CFR part 42 (OCC); 12 CFR part 236 (the Board); 12 CFR part 372 (FDIC); 17 CFR part 303 (SEC); 12 CFR Parts 741 and 751 (NCUA); and 12 CFR part 1232 (FHFA).
institution and, in turn, the long-term health of the U.S. economy. Larger financial institutions in
particular are interconnected with one another and with many other companies and markets,
which can mean that any negative impact from inappropriate risk-taking can have broader
consequences. The risk of these negative externalities may not be fully taken into account in
incentive-based compensation arrangements, even arrangements that otherwise align the interests
of shareholders and other stakeholders with those of executives and employees.
There is evidence that flawed incentive-based compensation practices in the financial
industry were one of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in 2007. Some
compensation arrangements rewarded employees – including non-executive personnel like
traders with large position limits, underwriters, and loan officers – for increasing an institution’s
revenue or short-term profit without sufficient recognition of the risks the employees’ activities
posed to the institutions, and therefore potentially to the broader financial system. 13 Traders with
large position limits, underwriters, and loan officers are three examples of non-executive
personnel who had the ability to expose an institution to material amounts of risk. Significant
losses caused by actions of individual traders or trading groups occurred at some of the largest
financial institutions during and after the financial crisis. 14
13 See, e.g., Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Financial Crisis Inquiry Report” (January 2011), at 209, 279, 291, 343, available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; Senior Supervisors Group, “Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence” (March 6, 2008), available at
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/newsevents/news/banking/2008/SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_fi
nal.pdf.
14 A large financial institution suffered losses in 2012 from trading by an investment office in its synthetic credit portfolio. These losses amounted to approximately $5.8 billion, which was approximately 3.6 percent of the holding company’s tier 1 capital.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961713000221/0000019617-13-000221-
index.htm Form 10-K 2013, Pages 69 and 118. In 2007, a proprietary trading group at another large institution caused losses of an estimated $7.8 billion (approximately 25 percent of the firm’s total stockholder’s equity). http://www.morganstanley.com/about-us-ir/shareholder/10k113008/10k1108.pdf
Of particular note were incentive-based compensation arrangements for employees in a
position to expose the institution to substantial risk that failed to align the employees’ interests
with those of the institution. For example, some institutions gave loan officers incentives to
write a large amount of loans or gave traders incentives to generate high levels of trading
revenues, without sufficient regard for the risks associated with those activities. The revenues
that served as the basis for calculating bonuses were generated immediately, while the risk
outcomes might not have been realized for months or years after the transactions were
completed. When these, or similarly misaligned incentive-based compensation arrangements,
are common in an institution, the foundation of sound risk management can be undermined by
the actions of employees seeking to maximize their own compensation.
The effect of flawed incentive-based compensation practices is demonstrated by the
arrangements implemented by Washington Mutual (WaMu). According to the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Staff’s report on the failure of Washington Mutual “[l]oan
officers and processors were paid primarily on volume, not primarily on the quality of their
loans, and were paid more for issuing higher risk loans. Loan officers and mortgage brokers
Form 10-K 2008, Pages 45 and 108. Between 2005 and 2008, one futures trader at a large financial institution engaged in activities that caused losses of an estimated EUR4.9 billion in 2007, which was approximately 23 percent of the firm’s 2007 tier 1 capital.
http://www.societegenerale.com/sites/default/files/03%20March%202008%202008%20Registration%20
Document.pdf, Pages, 52, 159-160;
http://www.societegenerale.com/sites/default/files/12%20May%202008%20The%20report%20by%20the
%20General%20Inspection%20of%20Societe%20Generale.pdf, Pages 1-71. In 2011, one trader at another large financial institution caused losses of an estimated $2.25 billion, which represented approximately 5.4 percent of the firm’s tier 1 capital.
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-bans-kweku-mawuli-adoboli-from-the-financial-services-
industry, Page1; https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/investor_relations/other_filings/sec.html. 2012 SEC Form 20- F, Page 34. In 2007, one trader caused losses of an estimated $264 million at a large financial institution, which represented approximately 1.7 percent of its tier 1 capital. http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20081118a.htm, Page1; https://www.bmo.com/ci/ar2008/downloads/bmo_ar2008.pdf, Page 61.
were also paid more when they got borrowers to pay higher interest rates, even if the borrower
qualified for a lower rate – a practice that enriched WaMu in the short term, but made defaults
more likely down the road.” 15
Flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements were evident in not just U.S.
financial institutions, but also major financial institutions worldwide. 16 In a 2009 survey of
banking organizations engaged in wholesale banking activities, the Institute of International
Finance found that 98 percent of respondents recognized the contribution of incentive-based
compensation practices to the financial crisis. 17
Shareholders and other stakeholders in a covered institution 18 have an interest in aligning
the interests of executives, managers, and other employees with the institution’s long-term
health. However, aligning the interests of shareholders (or members, in the case of credit unions,
mutual savings associations, mutual savings banks, some mutual holding companies, and Federal
Home Loan Banks) and other stakeholders with employees may not always be sufficient to
protect the safety and soundness of an institution, deter excessive compensation, or deter
15 Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse at 143 (Comm. Print 2011).
16 See Financial Stability Forum, “FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices” (April 2009) (the “FSB Principles”), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf; Senior Supervisors Group, “Risk-management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008” (October 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2009/ma091021.html. The Financial Stability Forum was renamed the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) in April 2009.
17 See Institute of International Finance, Inc., “Compensation in Financial Services: Industry Progress and the Agenda for Change” (March 2009), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/OW_En_FS_Publ_2009_CompensationInFS.pdf. See also UBS, “Shareholder Report on UBS's Write-Downs,” (April 18, 2008), at 41-42 (identifying incentive effects of UBS compensation practices as contributing factors in losses suffered by UBS due to exposure to the subprime mortgage market), available at
http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/agm?contentId=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.p
18 As discussed below, the proposed rule uses the term “covered institution” rather than the statutory term “covered financial institution.”
behavior or inappropriate risk-taking that could lead to material financial loss at the institution.
Executive officers and employees of a covered institution may be willing to tolerate a degree of
risk that is inconsistent with the interests of stakeholders, as well as broader public policy goals.
Generally, the incentive-based compensation arrangements of a covered institution
should reflect the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders, to the extent that the
incentive-based compensation makes those covered persons demand more or less reward for
their risk-taking at the covered institution, and to the extent that incentive-based compensation
changes those covered persons’ risk-taking. However, risks undertaken by a covered institution
– particularly a larger institution – can spill over into the broader economy, affecting other
institutions and stakeholders. Therefore, there may be reasons why the preferences of all of the
stakeholders are not fully reflected in incentive-based compensation arrangements. Hence, there
is a public interest in curtailing the inappropriate risk-taking incentives provided by incentive-
based compensation arrangements. Without restrictions on incentive-based compensation
arrangements, covered institutions may engage in more risk-taking than is optimal from a
societal perspective, suggesting that regulatory measures may be required to cut back on the risk-
taking incentivized by such arrangements. Particularly at larger institutions, shareholders and
other stakeholders may have difficulty effectively monitoring and controlling the impact of
incentive-based compensation arrangements throughout the institution that may affect the
institution’s risk profile, the full range of stakeholders, and the larger economy.
As a result, supervision and regulation of incentive-based compensation can play an
important role in helping safeguard covered institutions against incentive-based compensation
practices that threaten safety and soundness, are excessive, or could lead to material financial
loss. In particular, such supervision and regulation can help address the negative externalities
affecting the broader economy or other institutions that may arise from inappropriate risk-taking
by large financial institutions.
To address such practices, the Federal Banking Agencies proposed, and then later
adopted, the 2010 Federal Banking Agency Guidance governing incentive-based compensation
programs, which applies to all banking organizations regardless of asset size. This Guidance
uses a principles-based approach to ensure that incentive-based compensation arrangements
appropriately tie rewards to longer-term performance and do not undermine the safety and
soundness of banking organizations or create undue risks to the financial system. In addition, to
foster implementation of improved incentive-based compensation practices, the Board, in
cooperation with the OCC and FDIC, initiated in late 2009 a multidisciplinary, horizontal review
(“Horizontal Review”) of incentive-based compensation practices at 25 large, complex banking
organizations, which is still ongoing. 19 One goal of the Horizontal Review is to help improve the
Federal Banking Agencies’ understanding of the range and evolution of incentive-based
compensation practices across institutions and categories of employees within institutions. The
second goal is to provide guidance to each institution in implementing the 2010 Federal Banking
Agency Guidance. The supervisory experience of the Federal Banking Agencies in this area is
19 The financial institutions in the Horizontal Review are Ally Financial Inc.; American Express Company; Bank of America Corporation; The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation; Capital One Financial Corporation; Citigroup Inc.; Discover Financial Services; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Morgan Stanley; Northern Trust Corporation; The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; State Street Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S. Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company; and the U.S. operations of Barclays plc, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings plc, Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Societe Generale, and UBS AG.
also relevant to the incentive-based compensation practices at broker-dealers and investment
As part of the Horizontal Review, the Board conducted reviews of line of business
operations in the areas of trading, mortgage, credit card, and commercial lending operations as
well as senior executive incentive-based compensation awards and payouts. The institutions
subject to the Horizontal Review have made progress in developing practices that would
incorporate the principles of the 2010 Federal Banking Agency Guidance into their risk
management systems, including through better recognition of risk in incentive-based
compensation decision-making and improved practices to better balance risk and reward. Many
of those changes became evident in the actual compensation arrangements of the institutions as
the review progressed. In 2011, the Board made public its initial findings from the Horizontal
Review, recognizing the steps the institutions had made towards improving their incentive-based
compensation practices, but also noting that each institution needed to do more. 20 In early 2012,
the Board initiated a second, cross-firm review of 12 additional large banking organizations
(“2012 LBO Review”). The Board also monitors incentive-based compensation as part of
ongoing supervision. Supervisory oversight focuses most intensively on large banking
organizations because they are significant users of incentive-based compensation and because
flawed approaches at these organizations are more likely to have adverse effects on the broader
financial system. As part of that supervision, the Board also conducts targeted incentive-based
20 Board, “Incentive Compensation Practices: A Report on the Horizontal Review of Practices at Large Banking Organizations” (October 2011) (“2011 FRB White Paper), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/incentive-compensation-practices-report-
201110.pdf.
compensation exams and considers incentive-based compensation in the course of wider line of
business and risk-related reviews.
For the past several years, the Board also has been actively engaged in international
compensation, governance, and conduct working groups that have produced a variety of
publications aimed at further improving incentive-based compensation practices. 21
The FDIC reviews incentive-based compensation practices as part of its safety and
soundness examinations of state nonmember banks, most of which are smaller community
institutions that would not be covered by the proposed rule. FDIC incentive-based compensation
reviews are conducted in the context of the 2010 Federal Banking Agency Guidance and Section
39 of the FDIA. Of the 518 bank failures resolved by the FDIC between 2007 and 2015, 65
involved banks with total assets of $1 billion or more that would have been covered by the
proposed rule. Of the 65 institutions that failed with total assets of $1 billion or more, 18
institutions or approximately 28 percent, were identified as having some level of issues or
concerns related to compensation arrangements, many of which involved incentive-based
compensation. Overall, most of the compensation issues related to either excessive
compensation or tying financial incentives to metrics such as corporate performance or loan
production without adequate consideration of related risks. Also, several cases involved poor
21 See, e.g., FSB Principles; FSB, “FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: Implementation Standards, Basel, Switzerland” (September 2009), available at http://www.fsb.org/wp- content/uploads/r_090925c.pdf?page_moved=1 (together with the FSB Principles, the “FSB Principles and Implementation Standards”); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Report on Range of Methodologies for Risk and Performance Alignment of Remuneration” (May 2011); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for the Effective Supervision of Financial Conglomerates” (September 2012); FSB, “Implementing the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and their Implementation Standards - First, Second, Third, and Fourth Progress Reports” (June 2012, August 2013, November 2014, November 2015), available at
http://www.fsb.org/publications/?policy_area%5B%5D=24.
governance practices, most commonly, dominant management influencing improper
incentives. 22
The OCC reviews and assesses compensation practices at individual banks as part of its
normal supervisory activities. For example, the OCC identifies matters requiring attention
(MRAs) relating to compensation practices, including matters relating to governance and risk
management and controls for compensation. The OCC’s Guidelines Establishing Heightened
Standards for Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and
Insured Federal Branches 23 (the “OCC’s Heightened Standards”) require covered banks to
establish and adhere to compensation programs that prohibit incentive-based payment
arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks by providing excessive compensation or that
could lead to material financial loss. The OCC includes an assessment of the banks’
compensation practices when determining compliance with the OCC’s Heightened Standards.
In addition to safety and soundness oversight, FHFA has express statutory authorities and
mandates related to compensation paid by its regulated entities. FHFA reviews compensation
arrangements before they are implemented at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan
Banks, and the Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. By statute, FHFA
must prohibit its regulated entities from providing compensation to any executive officer of a
regulated entity that is not reasonable and comparable with compensation for employment in
other similar businesses (including publicly held financial institutions or major financial services
22 The Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency must conduct a Material Loss Review (“MLR”) when losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund from failure of an insured depository institution exceed certain thresholds. See FDIC MLRs, available at https://www.fdicig.gov/mlr.shtml; Board MLRs available at http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/audit-reports.htm; and OCC MLRs, available at https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Pages/audit_reports_index.aspx. See also the Subcommittee Report. 23 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix D.
companies) involving similar duties and responsibilities. 24 FHFA also has additional authority
over the Enterprises during conservatorship, and has established compensation programs for
Enterprise executives. 25
In early 2014, FHFA issued two final rules related to compensation pursuant to its
authority over compensation under the Safety and Soundness Act. 26 The Executive
Compensation Rule sets forth requirements and processes with respect to compensation provided
to executive officers by the Enterprises, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Home
Loan Bank System’s Office of Finance. 27 Under the rule, those entities may not enter into an
incentive plan with an executive officer or pay any incentive compensation to an executive
officer without providing advance notice to FHFA. 28 FHFA’s Golden Parachute Payments Rule
governs golden parachute payments in the case of a regulated entity’s insolvency,
conservatorship, or troubled condition. 29
In part because of the work described above, incentive-based compensation practices and
the design of incentive-based compensation arrangements at banking organizations supervised by
the Federal Banking Agencies have improved significantly in the years since the recent financial
crisis. However, the Federal Banking Agencies have continued to evaluate incentive-based
compensation practices as a part of their ongoing supervision responsibilities, with a particular
24 12 U.S.C. 4518(a).
25 As conservator, FHFA succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of the Enterprises, and of any shareholder, officer or director of each company with respect to the company and its assets. The Enterprises have been under conservatorship since September 2008.
26 12 CFR parts 1230 and 1231, under the authority of the Safety and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C. 4518), as amended by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Congress enacted HERA, including new or amended provisions addressing compensation at FHFA’s regulated entities, at least in part in response to the financial crisis that began in 2007.
27 12 CFR Part 1230.
28 12 CFR 1230.3(d).
29 12 CFR Part 1231.
focus on the design of incentive-based compensation arrangements for senior executive officers;
deferral practices (including compensation at risk through forfeiture and clawback mechanisms);
governance and the use of discretion; ex ante risk adjustment; and control function participation
in incentive-based compensation design and risk evaluation. The Federal Banking Agencies’
supervision has been focused on ensuring robust risk management and governance practices
rather than on prescribing levels of pay.
Generally, the supervisory work of the Federal Banking Agencies and FHFA has
promoted more risk-sensitive incentive-based compensation practices and effective risk
governance. Incentive-based compensation decision-making increasingly leverages underlying
risk management frameworks to help ensure better risk identification, monitoring, and escalation
of risk issues. Prior to the recent financial crisis, many institutions had no effective risk
adjustments to incentive-based compensation at all. Today, the Board has observed that
incentive-based compensation arrangements at the largest banking institutions reflect risk
adjustments, the largest banking institutions take into consideration adverse outcomes, more pay
is deferred, and more of the deferred amount is subject to reduction based on failure to meet
assigned performance targets or as a result of adverse outcomes that trigger forfeiture and
clawback reviews. 30
Similarly, prior to the recent financial crisis, institutions rarely involved risk management
and control personnel in incentive-based compensation decision-making. Today, control
functions frequently play an increased role in the design and operation of incentive-based
compensation, and institutions have begun to build out frameworks to help validate the
30 See generally 2011 FRB White Paper. The 2011 FRB White Paper provides specific examples of how compensation practices at the institutions involved in the Board’s Horizontal Review of Incentive Compensation have changed since the recent financial crisis.
effectiveness of risk adjustment mechanisms. Risk-related performance objectives and “risk
reviews” are increasingly common. Prior to the recent financial crisis, boards of directors had
begun to consider the relationship between incentive-based compensation and risk, but were
focused on incentive-based compensation for senior executives. Today, refined policies and
procedures promote some consistency and effectiveness across incentive-based compensation
arrangements. The role of boards of directors has expanded and the quality of risk information
provided to those boards has improved. Finance and audit committees work together with
compensation committees with the goal of having incentive-based compensation result in
Notwithstanding the recent progress, incentive-based compensation practices are still in
need of improvement, including better targeting of performance measures and risk metrics to
specific activities, more consistent application of risk adjustments, and better documentation of
the decision-making process. Congress has required the Agencies to jointly prescribe regulations
or guidelines that cover not only depository institutions and depository institution holding
companies, but also other financial institutions. While the Federal Banking Agencies’
supervisory approach based on the 2010 Federal Banking Agency Guidance and the work of
FHFA have resulted in improved incentive-based compensation practices, there are even greater
benefits possible under rule-based supervision. Using their collective supervisory experiences,
the Agencies are proposing a uniform set of enforceable standards applicable to a larger group of
institutions supervised by all of the Agencies. The proposed rule would promote better
incentive-based compensation practices, while still allowing for some flexibility in the design
and operation of incentive-based compensation arrangements among the varied institutions the
Agencies supervise, including through the tiered application of the proposed rule’s requirements.
The Agencies proposed a rule in 2011, rather than guidelines, to establish requirements
applicable to the incentive-based compensation arrangements of all covered institutions. The
2011 Proposed Rule would have supplemented existing rules, guidance, and ongoing supervisory
efforts of the Agencies.
The 2011 Proposed Rule would have prohibited incentive-based compensation
arrangements that could encourage inappropriate risks. It would have required compensation
practices at regulated financial institutions to be consistent with three key principles—that
incentive-based compensation arrangements should appropriately balance risk and financial
rewards, be compatible with effective risk management and controls, and be supported by strong
corporate governance. The Agencies proposed that financial institutions with $1 billion or more
in assets be required to have policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the requirements
of the rule, and submit an annual report to their Federal regulator describing the structure of their
incentive-based compensation arrangements.
The 2011 Proposed Rule included two additional requirements for “larger financial
institutions.” 31 The first would have required these larger financial institutions to defer 50
percent of the incentive-based compensation for executive officers for a period of at least three
years. The second would have required the board of directors (or a committee thereof) to
identify and approve the incentive-based compensation for those covered persons who
31 In the 2011 Proposed Rule, the term “larger covered financial institution” for the Federal Banking Agencies and the SEC meant those covered institutions with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. For the NCUA, all credit unions with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more would have been larger covered institutions. For FHFA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and all Federal Home Loan Banks with total consolidated assets of $1 billion or more would have been larger covered institutions.
individually have the ability to expose the institution to possible losses that are substantial in
relation to the institution’s size, capital, or overall risk tolerance, such as traders with large
position limits and other individuals who have the authority to place at risk a substantial part of
the capital of the covered institution.
The Agencies received more than 10,000 comments on the 2011 Proposed Rule,
including from private individuals, community groups, several members of Congress, pension
funds, labor federations, academic faculty, covered institutions, financial industry associations,
and industry consultants.
The vast majority of the comments were substantively identical form letters of two types.
The first type of form letter urged the Agencies to minimize the incentives for short-term risk-
taking by executives by requiring at least a five-year deferral period for executive bonuses at big
banks, banning executives’ hedging of their pay packages, and requiring specific details from
banks on precisely how they ensure that executives will share in the long-term risks created by
their decisions. These commenters also asserted that the final rule should apply to the full range
of important financial institutions and cover all the key executives at those institutions. The
second type of form letter stated that the commenter or the commenter’s family had been
affected by the financial crisis that began in 2007, a major cause of which the commenter
believed to be faulty pay practices at financial institutions. These commenters suggested various
methods of improving these practices, including basing incentive-based compensation on
measures of a financial institution’s safety and stability, such as the institution’s bond price or
the spread on credit default swaps.
Comments from community groups, members of Congress, labor federations, and
pension funds generally urged the Agencies to strengthen the proposed rule and many cited
evidence suggesting that flawed incentive-based compensation practices in the financial industry
were a major contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. Their suggestions included:
revising the 2011 Proposed Rule’s definition of “incentive-based compensation”; defining
“excessive compensation”; increasing the length of time for or amount of compensation subject
to the mandatory deferral provision; requiring financial institutions to include quantitative data in
their annual incentive-based compensation reports; providing for the annual public reporting by
the Agencies of information quantifying the overall sensitivity of incentive-based compensation
to long-term risks at major financial institutions; prohibiting stock ownership by board members;
and prohibiting hedging strategies used by highly-paid executives on their own incentive-based
The academic faculty commenters submitted analyses of certain compensation issues and
recommendations. These recommendations included: adopting a corporate governance measure
tied to stock ownership by board members; regulating how deferred compensation is reduced at
future payment dates; requiring covered institutions’ executives to have “skin in the game” for
the entire deferral period; and requiring disclosure of personal hedging transactions rather than
A number of covered institutions and financial industry associations favored the issuance
of guidelines instead of rules to implement section 956. Others expressed varying degrees of
support for the 2011 Proposed Rule but also requested numerous clarifications and
modifications. Many of these commenters raised questions concerning the 2011 Proposed
Rule’s scope, suggesting that certain types of institutions be excluded from the coverage of the
final rule. Some of these commenters questioned the need for the excessive compensation
prohibition or requested that the final rule provide specific standards for determining when
compensation is excessive. Many of these commenters also opposed the 2011 Proposed Rule’s
mandatory deferral provision, and some asserted that the provision was unsupported by empirical
evidence and potentially harmful to a covered institution’s ability to attract and retain key
employees. In addition, many of these commenters asserted that the material risk-taker provision
in the 2011 Proposed Rule was unclear or imposed on the boards of directors of covered
institutions duties more appropriately undertaken by the institutions’ management. Finally, these
commenters expressed concerns about the burden and timing of the 2011 Proposed Rule.
The Agencies considered international developments in developing the 2011 Proposed
Rule, mindful that some covered institutions operate in both domestic and international
competitive environments. 32 Since the release of the 2011 Proposed Rule, a number of foreign
jurisdictions have introduced new compensation regulations that require certain financial
institutions to meet certain standards in relation to compensation policies and practices. In June
2013, the European Union adopted the Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD”) IV, which sets
out requirements for compensation structures, policies, and practices that apply to all banks and
investment firms subject to the CRD. 33 The rules require that up to 100 percent of the variable
remuneration shall be subject to malus 34 or clawback arrangements, among other requirements. 35
32 See 76 FR at 21178. See, e.g., FSB Principles and Implementation Standards.
33 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (effective January 1, 2014). The remuneration rules in CRD IV were carried over from CRD III with a few additional requirements. CRD III directed the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (“CEBS”), now the European Banking Authority (“EBA”), to develop guidance on how it expected the compensation principles under CRD III to be implemented. See CEBS Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (December 10, 2010) (“CEBS Guidelines”), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0076&from=EN.
34 Malus is defined by the European Union as “an arrangement that permits the institution to prevent vesting of all or part of the amount of a deferred remuneration award in relation to risk outcomes or performance.” See, PRA expectations regarding the application of malus to variable remuneration -
The PRA’s and the FCA’s Remuneration Code requires covered companies to defer 40 to 60
percent of a covered person’s variable remuneration – and recently updated their implementing
regulations to extend deferral periods to seven years for senior executives and to five years for
certain other covered persons. 36 The PRA also implemented, in July 2014, a policy requiring
firms to set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. The PRA’s clawback
policy requires that variable remuneration be subject to clawback for a period of at least seven
years from the date on which it is awarded. 37
Also in 2013, the EBA finalized the process and criteria for the identification of
categories of staff who have a material impact on the institution’s risk profile (“Identified
Staff”). 38 These Identified Staff are subject to provisions related, in particular, to the payment of
variable compensation. The standards cover remuneration packages for Identified Staff
categories and aim to ensure that appropriate incentives for prudent, long-term oriented risk-
taking are provided. The criteria used to determine who is identified are both qualitative (i.e.,
related to the role and decision-making authority of staff members) and quantitative (i.e., related
to the level of total gross remuneration in absolute or in relative terms).
SS2/13 UPDATE, available at:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2015/ss213update.pdf.
35 CRD IV provides that at least 50 percent of total variable remuneration should consist of equity-linked interests and at least 40 percent of any variable remuneration must be deferred over a period of three to five years. In the case of variable remuneration of a particularly high amount, the minimum amount required to be deferred is increased to 60 percent.
36 See UK Remuneration Rules.
37 See PRA, “PRA PS7/14: Clawback” (July 2014), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/ps/2014/ps714.aspx.
38 EBA Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution’s risk profile under Article 94(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (December 16, 2013), available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/526386/EBA-RTS-2013-
11+%28On+identified+staff%29.pdf/c313a671-269b-45be-a748-29e1c772ee0e.
More recently, in December 2015, the EBA released its final Guidelines on Sound
Remuneration Policies. 39 The final Guidelines on Sound Remuneration Policies set out the
governance process for implementing sound compensation policies across the European Union
under CRD IV, as well as the specific criteria for categorizing all compensation components as
either fixed or variable pay. The final Guidelines on Sound Remuneration Policies also provide
guidance on the application of deferral arrangements and pay-out instruments to ensure that
variable pay is aligned with an institution’s long-term risks and that any ex-post risk adjustments
can be applied as appropriate. These Guidelines will apply as of January 1, 2017, and will
replace the Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices that were published by the CEBS
Other regulators, including those in Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, have taken either
a guidance-based approach to the supervision and regulation of incentive-based compensation or
an approach that combines guidance and regulation that is generally consistent with the FSB
Principles and Implementation Standards. In Australia, 40 all deposit-taking institutions and
insurers are expected to comply in full with all the requirements in the APRA’s Governance
standard (which includes remuneration provisions). APRA also supervises according to its
Remuneration Prudential Practice Guide (guidance). In Canada, 41 all federally regulated
39 EBA, “Guidelines for Sound Remuneration Policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU and Disclosures under Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013” (December 21, 2015) (“EBA Remuneration Guidelines”), available at
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1314839/EBA-GL-2015-
22+Guidelines+on+Sound+Remuneration+Policies.pdf/1b0f3f99-f913-461a-b3e9-fa0064b1946b.
40 See APRA, “Prudential Standard CPS 510 Governance” (January 2015), available at
http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/Final-Prudential-Standard-CPS-510-Governance-
%28January-2014%29.pdf; APRA, Prudential Practice Guide PPG 511 – Remuneration (November 30,
2009), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/PrudentialFramework/Pages/adi-prudential- framework.aspx.
41 See OSFI Corporate Governance Guidelines and OSFI Supervisory Framework.
financial institutions (domestic and foreign) are expected to comply with the FSB Principles and
Implementation Standards, and the six Domestic Systemically Important Banks and three largest
life insurance companies are expected to comply with the FSB’s Principles and Implementation
Standards. OSFI has also issued a Corporate Governance Guideline that contain compensation
provisions. 42 Switzerland’s Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority has also published a
principles-based rule on remuneration consistent with the FSB Principles and Implementation
Standards that applies to major banks and insurance companies. 43
As compensation practices continue to evolve, the Agencies recognize that international
coordination in this area is important to ensure that internationally active financial organizations
are subject to consistent requirements. For this reason, the Agencies will continue to work with
their domestic and international counterparts to foster sound compensation practices across the
financial services industry. Importantly, the proposed rule is consistent with the FSB Principles
and Implementation Standards.
The Agencies are re-proposing a rule, rather than proposing guidelines, to establish
general requirements applicable to the incentive-based compensation arrangements of all covered
institutions. Like the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule would prohibit incentive-based
compensation arrangements at covered institutions that could encourage inappropriate risks by
providing excessive compensation or that could lead to a material financial loss. However, the
proposed rule reflects the Agencies’ collective supervisory experiences since they proposed the
2011 Proposed Rule. These supervisory experiences, which are described above, have allowed
42 See OSFI Corporate Governance Guidelines. 43 See FINMA Remuneration Circular.
the Agencies to propose a rule that incorporates practices that financial institutions and foreign
regulators have adopted to address the deficiencies in incentive-based compensation practices
that helped contribute to the financial crisis that began in 2007. For that reason, the proposed
rule differs in some respects from the 2011 Proposed Rule. This section provides a general
overview of the proposed rule and highlights areas in which the proposed rule differs from the
2011 Proposed Rule. A more detailed, section-by-section description of the proposed rule and
the reasons for the proposed rule’s requirements is provided later in this Supplementary
Scope and Initial Applicability. Similar to the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule
would apply to any covered institution with average total consolidated assets greater than or
equal to $1 billion that offers incentive-based compensation to covered persons.
The compliance date of the proposed rule would be no later than the beginning of the first
calendar quarter that begins at least 540 days after a final rule is published in the Federal
Register. The proposed rule would not apply to any incentive-based compensation plan with a
performance period that begins before the compliance date.
Definitions. The proposed rule includes a number of new definitions that were not
included in the 2011 Proposed Rule. These definitions are described later in the section-by-
section analysis in this Supplementary Information section. Notably, the Agencies have added a
definition of significant risk-taker, which is intended to include individuals who are not senior
executive officers but who are in the position to put a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution at
risk of material financial loss. This definition is explained in more detail below.
Applicability. The proposed rule distinguishes covered institutions by asset size, applying
less prescriptive incentive-based compensation program requirements to the smallest covered
institutions within the statutory scope and progressively more rigorous requirements to the larger
covered institutions. Although the 2011 Proposed Rule contained specific requirements for
covered financial institutions with at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets, the proposed
rule creates an additional category of institutions with at least $250 billion in average total
consolidated assets. These larger institutions are subject to the most rigorous requirements under
The proposed rule identifies three categories of covered institutions based on average total
consolidated assets: 44
• Level 3 (greater than or equal to $1 billion and less than $50 billion). 45
Upon an increase in average total consolidated assets, a covered institution would be
required to comply with any newly applicable requirements under the proposed rule no later than
the first day of the first calendar quarter that begins at least 540 days after the date on which the
covered institution becomes a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 covered institution. The proposed
rule would grandfather any incentive-based compensation plan with a performance period that
44 For covered institutions that are subsidiaries of other covered institutions, levels would generally be determined by reference to the average total consolidated assets of the top-tier parent covered institution.
A detailed explanation of consolidation under the proposed rule is included under the heading
“Definitions pertaining to covered institutions” below in this Supplementary Information section.
45 As explained later in this Supplementary Information section, the proposed rule includes a reservation
of authority that would allow the appropriate Federal regulator of a Level 3 covered institution with
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $10 billion and less than $50 billion to require
the Level 3 covered institution to comply with some or all of the provisions of sections
compensation practices of the Level 3 covered institution are consistent with those of a Level 1 or Level 2
11 of the proposed rule if the agency determines that the complexity of operations or
begins before such date. Upon a decrease in total consolidated assets, a covered institution
would remain subject to the provisions of the proposed rule that applied to it before the decrease
until total consolidated assets fell below $250 billion, $50 billion, or $1 billion, as applicable, for
four consecutive regulatory reports (e.g., Call Reports).
A covered institution under the Board’s, the OCC’s, or the FDIC’s proposed rule that is a
subsidiary of another covered institution under the Board’s, the OCC’s, or the FDIC’s proposed
rule, respectively, may meet any requirement of the Board’s, OCC’s, or the FDIC’s proposed
rule if the parent covered institution complies with that requirement in such a way that causes the
relevant portion of the incentive-based compensation program of the subsidiary covered
institution to comply with that requirement.
Requirements and Prohibitions Applicable to All Covered Institutions. Similar to the 2011
Proposed Rule, the proposed rule would prohibit all covered institutions from establishing or
maintaining incentive-based compensation arrangements that encourage inappropriate risk by
providing covered persons with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits or that could lead to
material financial loss to the covered institution.
Also consistent with the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule provides that
compensation, fees, and benefits will be considered excessive when amounts paid are
unreasonable or disproportionate to the value of the services performed by a covered person,
taking into consideration all relevant factors, including:
• The combined value of all compensation, fees, or benefits provided to a covered
• The compensation history of the covered person and other individuals with
comparable expertise at the covered institution;
• The financial condition of the covered institution;
• Compensation practices at comparable institutions, based upon such factors as
asset size, geographic location, and the complexity of the covered institution’s
• For post-employment benefits, the projected total cost and benefit to the covered
• Any connection between the covered person and any fraudulent act or omission,
breach of trust or fiduciary duty, or insider abuse with regard to the covered
The proposed rule is also similar to the 2011 Proposed Rule in that it provides that an
incentive-based compensation arrangement will be considered to encourage inappropriate risks
that could lead to material financial loss to the covered institution, unless the arrangement:
• Appropriately balances risk and reward;
• Is compatible with effective risk management and controls; and
• Is supported by effective governance.
However, unlike the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule specifically provides that an
incentive-based compensation arrangement would not be considered to appropriately balance
risk and reward unless it:
• Includes financial and non-financial measures of performance;
• Is designed to allow non-financial measures of performance to override financial
measures of performance, when appropriate; and
• Is subject to adjustment to reflect actual losses, inappropriate risks taken,
compliance deficiencies, or other measures or aspects of financial and non-
The proposed rule also contains requirements for the board of directors of a covered
institution that are similar to requirements included in the 2011 Proposed Rule. Under the
proposed rule, the board of directors of each covered institution (or a committee thereof) would
• Conduct oversight of the covered institution’s incentive-based compensation
• Approve incentive-based compensation arrangements for senior executive officers,
including amounts of awards and, at the time of vesting, payouts under such
• Approve material exceptions or adjustments to incentive-based compensation policies
or arrangements for senior executive officers.
The 2011 Proposed Rule contained an annual reporting requirement, which has been
replaced by a recordkeeping requirement in the proposed rule. Covered institutions would be
required to create annually and maintain for at least seven years records that document the
structure of incentive-based compensation arrangements and that demonstrate compliance with
the proposed rule. The records would be required to be disclosed to the covered institution’s
appropriate Federal regulator upon request.
The proposed rule includes more detailed disclosure and recordkeeping requirements for larger
covered institutions than the 2011 Proposed Rule. The proposed rule would require all Level 1
and Level 2 covered institutions to create annually and maintain for at least seven years records
that document: (1) the covered institution’s senior executive officers and significant risk-takers,
listed by legal entity, job function, organizational hierarchy, and line of business; (2) the
incentive-based compensation arrangements for senior executive officers and significant risk-
takers, including information on the percentage of incentive-based compensation deferred and
form of award; (3) any forfeiture and downward adjustment or clawback reviews and decisions
for senior executive officers and significant risk-takers; and (4) any material changes to the
covered institution’s incentive-based compensation arrangements and policies. Level 1 and
Level 2 covered institutions would be required to create and maintain records in a manner that
would allow for an independent audit of incentive-based compensation arrangements, policies,
and procedures, and to provide the records described above in such form and frequency as the
appropriate Federal regulator requests.
Deferral, Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment, and Clawback Requirements for Level 1
and Level 2 Covered Institutions. The proposed rule would require incentive-based
compensation arrangements that appropriately balance risk and reward. For Level 1 and Level 2
covered institutions, the proposed rule would require that incentive-based compensation
arrangements for certain covered persons include deferral of payments, risk of downward
adjustment and forfeiture, and clawback to appropriately balance risk and reward. The 2011
Proposed Rule required deferral for three years of 50 percent of annual incentive-based
compensation for executive officers of covered financial institutions with $50 billion or more in
total consolidated assets. The proposed rule would apply deferral requirements to significant
risk-takers as well as senior executive officers, and, as described below, would require 40, 50, or
60 percent deferral depending on the size of the covered institution and whether the covered
person receiving the incentive-based compensation is a senior executive officer or a significant
risk-taker. Unlike the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule would explicitly require a shorter
deferral period for incentive-based compensation awarded under a long-term incentive plan. The
proposed rule also provides more detailed requirements and prohibitions than the 2011 Proposed
Rule with respect to the measurement, composition, and acceleration of deferred incentive-based
compensation; the manner in which deferred incentive-based compensation can vest; increases to
the amount of deferred incentive-based compensation; and the amount of deferred incentive-
based compensation that can be in the form of options.
Deferral. Under the proposed rule, the mandatory deferral requirements for Level 1 and
Level 2 covered institutions for incentive-based compensation awarded each performance period
• A Level 1 covered institution would be required to defer at least 60 percent of a senior
executive officer’s “qualifying incentive-based compensation” (as defined in the
proposed rule) and 50 percent of a significant risk-taker’s qualifying incentive-based
compensation for at least four years. A Level 1 covered institution also would be
required to defer for at least two years after the end of the related performance period at
least 60 percent of a senior executive officer’s incentive-based compensation awarded
under a “long-term incentive plan” (as defined in the proposed rule) and 50 percent of a
significant risk-taker’s incentive-based compensation awarded under a long-term
incentive plan. Deferred compensation may vest no faster than on a pro rata annual basis,
and, for covered institutions that issue equity or are subsidiaries of covered institutions
that issue equity, the deferred amount would be required to consist of substantial amounts
of both deferred cash and equity-like instruments throughout the deferral period.
Additionally, if a senior executive officer or significant risk-taker receives incentive-
based compensation in the form of options for a performance period, the amount of such
options used to meet the minimum required deferred compensation may not exceed 15
percent of the amount of total incentive-based compensation awarded for that
A Level 2 covered institution would be required to defer at least 50 percent of a senior
executive officer’s qualifying incentive-based compensation and 40 percent of a
significant risk-taker’s qualifying incentive-based compensation for at least three years.
A Level 2 covered institution also would be required to defer for at least one year after
the end of the related performance period at least 50 percent of a senior executive
officer’s incentive-based compensation awarded under a long-term incentive plan and 40
percent of a significant risk-taker’s incentive-based compensation awarded under a long-
term incentive plan. Deferred compensation may vest no faster than on a pro rata annual
basis, and, for covered institutions that issue equity or are subsidiaries of covered
institutions that issue equity, the deferred amount would be required to consist of
substantial amounts of both deferred cash and equity-like instruments throughout the
deferral period. Additionally, if a senior executive officer or significant risk-taker
receives incentive-based compensation in the form of options for a performance period,
the amount of such options used to meet the minimum required deferred compensation
may not exceed 15 percent of the amount of total incentive-based compensation awarded
for that performance period.
The proposed rule would also prohibit Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions from
accelerating the payment of a covered person’s deferred incentive-based compensation, except in
the case of death or disability of the covered person.
Forfeiture and Downward Adjustment. Compared to the 2011 Proposed Rule, the
proposed rule provides more detailed requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions
to reduce (1) incentive-based compensation that has not yet been awarded to a senior executive
officer or significant risk-taker, and (2) deferred incentive-based compensation of a senior
executive officer or significant risk-taker. Under the proposed rule, “forfeiture” means a
reduction of the amount of deferred incentive-based compensation awarded to a person that has
not vested. “Downward adjustment” means a reduction of the amount of a covered person’s
incentive-based compensation not yet awarded for any performance period that has already
begun. The proposed rule would require a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution to make subject
to forfeiture all unvested deferred incentive-based compensation of any senior executive officer
or significant risk-taker, including unvested deferred amounts awarded under long-term incentive
plans. This forfeiture requirement would apply to all unvested, deferred incentive-based
compensation for those individuals, regardless of whether the deferral was required by the
proposed rule. Similarly, a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution would also be required to
make subject to downward adjustment all incentive-based compensation amounts not yet
awarded to any senior executive officer or significant risk-taker for the current performance
period, including amounts payable under long-term incentive plans. A Level 1 or Level 2
covered institution would be required to consider forfeiture or downward adjustment of
incentive-based compensation if any of the following adverse outcomes occur:
• Poor financial performance attributable to a significant deviation from the covered
institution’s risk parameters set forth in the covered institution’s policies and procedures;
• Inappropriate risk-taking, regardless of the impact on financial performance;
• Material risk management or control failures;
• Non-compliance with statutory, regulatory, or supervisory standards resulting in
enforcement or legal action brought by a federal or state regulator or agency, or a
requirement that the covered institution report a restatement of a financial statement to
• Other aspects of conduct or poor performance as defined by the covered institution.
Clawback. In addition to deferral, downward adjustment, and forfeiture, the proposed
rule would require a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution to include clawback provisions in the
takers. The term “clawback” refers to a mechanism by which a covered institution can recover
vested incentive-based compensation from a senior executive officer or significant risk-taker if
certain events occur. The proposed rule would require clawback provisions that, at a minimum,
allow the covered institution to recover incentive-based compensation from a current or former
senior executive officer or significant risk-taker for seven years following the date on which such
compensation vests, if the covered institution determines that the senior executive officer or
significant risk-taker engaged in misconduct that resulted in significant financial or reputational
harm to the covered institution, fraud, or intentional misrepresentation of information used to
determine the senior executive officer or significant risk-taker’s incentive-based compensation.
The 2011 Proposed Rule did not include a clawback requirement.
Additional Prohibitions. The proposed rule contains a number of additional prohibitions for
Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions that were not included in the 2011 Proposed Rule.
These prohibitions would apply to:
• Maximum incentive-based compensation opportunity (also referred to as leverage);
• Relative performance measures; and
• Volume-driven incentive-based compensation.
Risk Management and Controls. The proposed rule’s risk management and controls
requirements for large covered institutions are generally more extensive than the requirements
contained in the 2011 Proposed Rule. The proposed rule would require all Level 1 and Level 2
covered institutions to have a risk management framework for their incentive-based
compensation programs that is independent of any lines of business; includes an independent
compliance program that provides for internal controls, testing, monitoring, and training with
written policies and procedures; and is commensurate with the size and complexity of the
covered institution’s operations. In addition, the proposed rule would require Level 1 and
Level 2 covered institutions to:
• Provide individuals in control functions with appropriate authority to influence the risk-
taking of the business areas they monitor and ensure covered persons engaged in control
functions are compensated independently of the performance of the business areas they
• Provide for independent monitoring of: (1) incentive-based compensation plans to
identify whether the plans appropriately balance risk and reward; (2) events related to
forfeiture and downward adjustment and decisions of forfeiture and downward
adjustment reviews to determine consistency with the proposed rule; and (3) compliance
of the incentive-based compensation program with the covered institution’s policies and
Governance. Unlike the 2011 Proposed Rule, the proposed rule would require each Level 1
or Level 2 covered institution to establish a compensation committee composed solely of
directors who are not senior executive officers to assist the board of directors in carrying out its
responsibilities under the proposed rule. The compensation committee would be required to
obtain input from the covered institution’s risk and audit committees, or groups performing
similar functions, and risk management function on the effectiveness of risk measures and
adjustments used to balance incentive-based compensation arrangements. Additionally,
management would be required to submit to the compensation committee on an annual or more
frequent basis a written assessment of the effectiveness of the covered institution’s incentive-
based compensation program and related compliance and control processes in providing risk-
taking incentives that are consistent with the risk profile of the covered institution. The
compensation committee would also be required to obtain an independent written assessment
from the internal audit or risk management function of the effectiveness of the covered
institution’s incentive-based compensation program and related compliance and control
processes in providing risk-taking incentives that are consistent with the risk profile of the
Policies and Procedures. The proposed rule would require all Level 1 and Level 2 covered
institutions to have policies and procedures that, among other requirements:
• Are consistent with the requirements and prohibitions of the proposed rule;
• Specify the substantive and procedural criteria for forfeiture and clawback;
• Document final forfeiture, downward adjustment, and clawback decisions;
• Specify the substantive and procedural criteria for the acceleration of payments of
deferred incentive-based compensation to a covered person;
• Identify and describe the role of any employees, committees, or groups authorized to
make incentive-based compensation decisions, including when discretion is
• Describe how discretion is exercised to achieve balance;
• Require that the covered institution maintain documentation of its processes for the
establishment, implementation, modification, and monitoring of incentive-based
• Describe how incentive-based compensation arrangements will be monitored;
• Specify the substantive and procedural requirements of the independent compliance
• Ensure appropriate roles for risk management, risk oversight, and other control
personnel in the covered institution’s processes for designing incentive-based
compensation arrangements and determining awards, deferral amounts, deferral
periods, forfeiture, downward adjustment, clawback, and vesting and assessing the
effectiveness of incentive-based compensation arrangements in restraining
inappropriate risk-taking.
These policies and procedures requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions
are generally more detailed than the requirements in the 2011 Proposed Rule.
Indirect Actions. The proposed rule would prohibit covered institutions from doing
indirectly, or through or by any other person, anything that would be unlawful for the covered
institution to do directly under the proposed rule. This prohibition is similar to the evasion
provision contained in the 2011 Proposed Rule.
Enforcement. For five of the Agencies, the proposed rule would be enforced under section
505 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as specified in section 956. For FHFA, the proposed rule
would be enforced under subtitle C of the Safety and Soundness Act.
Conservatorship or Receivership for Certain Covered Institutions. FHFA’s and NCUA’s
proposed rules contain provisions that would apply to covered institutions that are managed by a
government agency or a government-appointed agent, or that are in conservatorship or
receivership or are limited-life regulated entities under the Safety and Soundness Act or the
Federal Credit Union Act. 46
A detailed description of the proposed rule and requests for comments are set forth
46 The FDIC’s proposed rule would not apply to institutions for which the FDIC is appointed receiver under the FDIA or Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, as appropriate, as those statutes govern such cases.
1 Authority, Scope and Initial Applicability.
1 provides that the proposed rule is issued pursuant to section 956. The
Agencies also have listed applicable additional rulemaking authority in their respective authority
The OCC is issuing the proposed rule under its general rulemaking authority, 12 U.S.C.
93a and the Home Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq., its safety and soundness authority
under 12 U.S.C. 1818, and its authority to regulate compensation under 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1.
The Board is issuing the proposed rule under its safety and soundness authority under
section 5136 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 24), the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 321-
338a), the FDIA (12 U.S.C. 1818), the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1844(b)), the
Home Owners’ Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1462a and 1467a), and the International Banking Act (12
U.S.C. 3108).
The FDIC is issuing the proposed rule under its general rulemaking authority, 12 U.S.C.
1819 Tenth, as well as its general safety and soundness authority under 12 U.S.C. 1818 and
authority to regulate compensation under 12 U.S.C. 1831p-1.
FHFA is issuing the proposed rule pursuant to its authority under the Safety and
Soundness Act (particularly 12 U.S.C. 4511(b), 4513, 4514, 4518, 4526, and ch. 46 subch. III.).
NCUA is issuing the proposed rule under its general rulemaking and safety and
soundness authorities in the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. 1751 et.seq.
The SEC is issuing the proposed rule pursuant to its rulemaking authority under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 78q, 78w,
80b–4, and 80b–11).
The approach taken in the proposed rule is within the authority granted by section
956. The proposed rule would prohibit types and features of incentive-based compensation
arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks. As explained more fully below, incentive-
based compensation arrangements that result in payments that are unreasonable or
disproportionate to the value of services performed could encourage inappropriate risks by
providing excessive compensation, fees, and benefits. Further, incentive-based compensation
arrangements that do not appropriately balance risk and reward, that are not compatible with
effective risk management and controls, or that are not supported by effective governance are the
types of incentive-based compensation arrangements that could encourage inappropriate risks
that could lead to material financial loss to covered institutions. Because these types of
incentive-based compensation arrangements encourage inappropriate risks, they would be
prohibited under the proposed rule.
The Federal Banking Agencies have found that any incentive-based compensation
arrangement at a covered institution will encourage inappropriate risks if it does not sufficiently
expose the risk-takers to the consequences of their risk decisions over time, and that in order to
do this, it is necessary that meaningful portions of incentive-based compensation be deferred and
placed at risk of reduction or recovery. The proposed rule reflects the minimums that are
required to be effective for that purpose, as well as minimum standards of robust governance,
and the disclosures that the statute requires. The Agencies’ position in this respect is informed
by the country’s experience in the recent financial crisis, as well as by their experience
supervising their respective institutions and their observation of the experience and judgments of
regulators in other countries.
Consistent with section 956, section
1 provides that the proposed rule would apply to
a covered institution with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion that
offers incentive-based compensation arrangements to covered persons.
The Agencies propose the compliance date of the proposed rule to be the beginning of the
first calendar quarter that begins at least 540 days after the final rule is published in the Federal
Register. Any incentive-based compensation plan with a performance period that begins before
such date would not be required to comply with the requirements of the proposed rule. Whether
a covered institution is a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 covered institution 47 on the compliance
date would be determined based on average total consolidated assets as of the beginning of the
first calendar quarter that begins after a final rule is published in the Federal Register. For
example, if the final rule is published in the Federal Register on November 1, 2016, then the
compliance date would be July 1, 2018. In that case, any incentive-based compensation plan
with a performance period that began before July 1, 2018 would not be required to comply with
the rule. Whether a covered institution is a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 covered institution on
July 1, 2018 would be determined based on average total consolidated assets as of the beginning
of the first quarter of 2017.
The Agencies recognize that most incentive-based compensation plans are implemented
at the beginning of the fiscal or calendar year. Depending on the date of publication of a final
47 As discussed below, the proposed rule includes baseline requirements for all covered institutions and additional requirements for Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions, which are larger covered institutions.
rule, the proposed compliance date would provide at least 18 months, and in most cases more
than two years, for covered institutions to develop and approve new incentive-based
compensation plans and 18 months for covered institutions to develop and implement the
supporting policies, procedures, risk management framework, and governance that would be
required under the proposed rule.
1.1. The Agencies invite comment on whether this timing would be sufficient to allow covered
institutions to implement any changes necessary for compliance with the proposed rule,
particularly the development and implementation of policies and procedures. Is the length of
time too long or too short and why? What specific changes would be required to bring
existing policies and procedures into compliance with the rule? What constraints exist on the
ability of covered institutions to meet the proposed deadline?
1.2. The Agencies invite comment on whether the compliance date should instead be the
beginning of the first performance period that starts at least 365 days after the final rule is
published in the Federal Register in order to have the proposed rule’s policies, procedures,
risk management, and governance requirements begin when the requirements applicable to
incentive-compensation plans and arrangements begin. Why or why not?
1 also specifies that the proposed rule is not intended to limit the authority of
any Agency under other provisions of applicable law and regulations. For example, the proposed
rule would not affect the Federal Banking Agencies’ authority under section 39 of the FDIA and
the Federal Banking Agency Safety and Soundness Guidelines. The Board’s Enhanced
Prudential Standards under 12 CFR Part 252 (Regulation YY) would not be affected. The
OCC’s Heightened Standards also would continue to be in effect. The NCUA’s authority under
12 U.S.C. 1761a, 12 CFR 701.2, part 701 App. A, Art. VII. section 8, 701.21(c)(8)(i), 701.23(g)
(1), 701.33, 702.203, 702.204, 703.17, 704.19, 704.20, part 708a, 712.8, 721.7, and part 750, and
the NCUA Examiners Guide, Chapter 7, 48 would not be affected. Neither would the proposed
rule affect the applicability of FHFA’s executive compensation rule, under section 1318 of the
Safety and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C. 4518), 12 CFR part 1230.
The Agencies acknowledge that some individuals who would be considered covered
persons, senior executive officers, or significant risk-takers under the proposed rule are subject to
other Federal compensation-related requirements. Further, some covered institutions may be
subject to SEC rules regarding the disclosure of executive compensation, 49 and mortgage loan
originators are subject to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s restrictions on
compensation. This rule is not intended to affect the application of these other Federal
compensation-related requirements.
2 defines the various terms used in the proposed rule. Where the proposed
rule uses a term defined in section 956, the proposed rule generally adopts the definition included
in section 956. 50
Definitions pertaining to covered institutions.
Section 956(e)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines the term “covered financial institution”
to mean a depository institution; a depository institution holding company; a registered broker-
dealer; a credit union; an investment adviser; the Federal National Mortgage Association
48 The NCUA Examiners Guide, Chapter 7, available at
https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/GuidesEtc/ExaminerGuide/Chapter07.pdf.
49 See Item 402 of Regulation S-K. 17 CFR 229.402.
50 The definitions in the proposed rule would be for purposes of administering section 956 and would not affect the interpretation or construction of the same or similar terms for purposes of any other statute or regulation administered by the Agencies.
(“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) (together,
the “Enterprises”); and any other financial institution that the Agencies determine, jointly, by
rule, should be treated as a covered financial institution for purposes of section 956. Section
956(f) provides that the requirements of section 956 do not apply to covered financial institutions
with assets of less than $1 billion.
The Agencies propose to jointly, by rule, designate additional financial institutions as
covered institutions. The Agencies propose to include the Federal Home Loan Banks as covered
institutions because they pose risks similar to those of some institutions covered under the
proposed rule and should be subject to the same regulatory regime. The Agencies also propose
to include as covered institutions the state-licensed uninsured branches and agencies of a foreign
bank, organizations operating under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (i.e., Edge and
Agreement Corporations), as well as the other U.S. operations of foreign banking organizations
that are treated as bank holding companies pursuant to section 8(a) of the International Banking
Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106). Applying the same requirements to these institutions would be
consistent with other regulatory requirements that are applicable to foreign banking
organizations operating in the United States and would not distort competition for human
resources between U.S. banking organizations and foreign banking organizations operating in the
United States. These offices and operations currently are referenced in the Federal Banking
Agency Guidance and are subject to section 8 of the FDIA (12 U.S.C. 1818), which prohibits
institutions from engaging in unsafe or unsound practices to the same extent as insured
depository institutions and bank holding companies. 51
51 See 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(3) and 1818(b)(4).
In addition, the Agencies propose to jointly, by rule, designate state-chartered non-
depository trust companies that are members of the Federal Reserve System as covered
institutions. The definition of “covered financial institution” under section 956 of the Dodd-
Frank Act includes a depository institution as such term is defined in section 3 of the FDIA (12
U.S.C. 1813); that term includes all national banks and any state banks, including trust
companies, that are engaged in the business of receiving deposits other than trust funds. As a
consequence of these definitions, all national banks, including national banks that are non-
depository trust companies, are “depository institutions” within the meaning of section 956, but
non-FDIC insured state non-depository trust companies that are members of the Federal Reserve
System are not. In order to achieve equal treatment across similar entities with different charters,
the Agencies propose to include state-chartered non-depository member trust companies as
covered institutions. These institutions would be “regulated institutions” under the definition of
“state member bank” in the Board’s rule.
Each Agency’s proposed rule contains a definition of the term “covered institution” that
describes the covered financial institutions the Agency regulates.
The Agencies have tailored the requirements of the proposed rule to the size and
complexity of covered institutions, and are proposing to designate covered institutions as
Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 covered institutions to effectuate this tailoring. The Agencies have
observed through their supervisory experience that large financial institutions typically have
complex business activities in multiple lines of business, distinct subsidiaries, and regulatory
jurisdictions, and frequently operate and manage their businesses in ways that cross those lines
of business, subsidiaries, and jurisdictions. Level 3 covered institutions would generally be
subject to only the basic set of prohibitions and disclosure requirements. The proposed rule
would apply additional prohibitions and requirements to incentive-based compensation
arrangements at Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions, as discussed below. Whether a
covered institution that is a subsidiary of a depository institution holding company is a Level 1,
Level 2, or Level 3 covered institution would be based on the average total consolidated assets of
the top-tier depository institution holding company. Whether that subsidiary has at least $1
billion will be based on the subsidiary’s average total consolidated assets.
The Agency definitions of covered institution, Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 covered
institution, and related terms are summarized below.
Covered Institution and Regulated Institution. Each Agency has set forth text for its
Agency-specific definition of the term “covered institution” that specifies the entities to which
that Agency’s rule applies. 52 Under the proposed rule, a “covered institution” would include all
• In the case of the OCC:
A national bank, Federal savings association, or Federal branch or agency of a
foreign bank 53 with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1
A subsidiary of a national bank, Federal savings association, or Federal branch or
agency of a foreign bank, if the subsidiary (A) is not a broker, dealer, person
providing insurance, investment company, or investment adviser; and (B) has
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion.
52 The Agency-specific definitions are intended to be applied only for purposes of administering a final rule under section 956.
53 The term “Federal branch or agency of a foreign bank” refers to both insured and uninsured Federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.
• In the case of the Board, the proposed definition of the term “covered institution” is a
“regulated institution” with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1
billion, and the Board’s definition of the term “regulated institution” includes:
A state member bank, as defined in 12 CFR 208.2(g);
A bank holding company, as defined in 12 CFR 225.2(c), that is not a foreign
banking organization, as defined in 12 CFR 211.21(o), and a subsidiary of such a
bank holding company that is not a depository institution, broker-dealer or
A savings and loan holding company, as defined in 12 CFR 238.2(m), and a
subsidiary of a savings and loan holding company that is not a depository
institution, broker-dealer or investment adviser;
An organization operating under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act
(Edge and Agreement Corporation);
A state-licensed uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank, as defined in
section 3 of the FDIA (12 U.S.C. 1813); and
The U.S. operations of a foreign banking organization, as defined in 12 CFR
211.21(o), and a U.S. subsidiary of such foreign banking organization that is not a
depository institution, broker-dealer, or investment adviser.
• In the case of the FDIC, “covered institution” means a:
o State nonmember bank, state savings association, and a state insured branch of a
foreign bank, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the FDIA, 12 U.S.C. 1813,
with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion; and
o A subsidiary of a state nonmember bank, state savings association, or a state
insured branch of a foreign bank, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the
FDIA, 12 U.S.C. 1813, that: (i) Is not a broker, dealer, person providing
insurance, investment company, or investment adviser; and (ii) Has average total
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion.
• In the case of the NCUA, a credit union, as described in section 19(b)(1)(A)(iv) of the
Federal Reserve Act, meaning an insured credit union as defined under 12 U.S.C.
1752(7) or credit union eligible to make application to become an insured credit union
under 12 U.S.C. 1781. Instead of the term “covered financial institution,” the NCUA
uses the term “credit union” throughout its proposed rule, as credit unions are the only
type of covered institution NCUA regulates. The scope section of the rule defines the
credit unions that will be subject to this rule–that is, credit unions with $1 billion or more
• In the case of the SEC, a broker or dealer registered under section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78o; and an investment adviser, as such term is defined
in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11). 54
The proposed rule would not apply to persons excluded from the definition of investment
adviser contained in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act nor would it
apply to such other persons not within the intent of section 202(a)(11) of the Investment
Advisers Act, as the SEC may designate by rules and regulations or order. Section 956
54 By its terms, the definition of “covered financial institution” in section 956 includes any institution that meets the definition of “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Investment Advisers Act”), regardless of whether the institution is registered as an investment adviser under that Act. Banks and bank holding companies are generally excluded from the definition of “investment adviser” under section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act, although they would still be “covered institutions” under the relevant Agency’s proposed rule.
does not contain exceptions or exemptions for investment advisers based on
• In the case of FHFA, the proposed definition of the term “covered institution” is a
billion, and FHFA’s definition of the term “regulated institution” means an Enterprise, as
defined in 12 U.S.C. 4502(10), and a Federal Home Loan Bank.
Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 covered institutions. The Agencies have tailored the
requirements of the proposed rule to the size and complexity of covered institutions. All covered
institutions would be subject to a basic set of prohibitions and disclosure requirements, as
4 of the proposed rule.
The Agencies are proposing to group covered institutions into three levels. The first
level, Level 1 covered institutions, would generally be covered institutions with average total
consolidated assets of greater than $250 billion and subsidiaries of such institutions that are
covered institutions. The next level, Level 2 covered institutions, would generally be covered
institutions with average total consolidated assets between $50 billion and $250 billion and
subsidiaries of such institutions that are covered institutions. The smallest covered institutions,
those with average total consolidated assets between $1 and $50 billion, would be Level 3
55 Commenters to the 2011 Proposed Rule requested clarification with respect to those entities that are excluded from the definition of “investment adviser” under the Investment Advisers Act and those that are exempt from registration as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act. Section 956 expressly includes any institution that meets the definition of investment adviser regardless of whether the institution is registered under the Investment Advisers Act. See supra note 54. Thus, the proposed rule would apply to institutions that meet the definition of investment adviser under section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act and would not exempt any such institutions that may be prohibited or exempted from registering with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act.
covered institutions and generally would be subject to only the basic set of prohibitions and
requirements. 56
The proposed rule would apply additional prohibitions and requirements to incentive-
based compensation arrangements at Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions, as described in
of the proposed rule and further discussed below.
The specific requirements of the proposed rule that would apply to Level 1 and Level 2 covered
institutions are the same, with the exception of the deferral amounts and deferral periods
Generally, the Agencies also propose that covered institutions that are subsidiaries of
other covered institutions would be subject to the same requirements, and defined to be the same
level, as the parent covered institution, 57 even if the subsidiary covered institution is smaller than
the parent covered institution. 58
This approach of assessing risks at the level of the holding
56 As discussed later in this Supplemental Information section, under section
an Agency would be able to require a covered institution with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $10 billion and less than $50 billion to comply with some or all of the provisions of
of operations, risk profile, or compensation practices of the covered institution are consistent with those of a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution. 57 Commenters on the 2011 Proposed Rule questioned how the requirements would apply in the context of consolidated organizations where a parent holding company structure may include one or more subsidiary banks, broker-dealers, or investment advisers each with total consolidated assets either above or below, or somewhere in between, the relevant thresholds. They also expressed concern that the 2011 Proposed Rule could lead to “regulatory overlap” where the parent holding company and individual subsidiaries are regulated by different agencies. 58 For the U.S. operations of a foreign banking organization, level would be determined by the total consolidated U.S. assets of the foreign banking organization, including the assets of any U.S branches or agencies of the foreign banking organization, any U.S. subsidiaries of the foreign banking organization, and any U.S. operations held pursuant to section 2(h)(2) of the Bank Holding Company Act. In contrast, the level of an OCC-regulated Federal branch or agency of a foreign bank would be determined with reference to the assets of the Federal branch or agency. This treatment is consistent with the determination
6 of the proposed rule,
if the Agency determines that the activities, complexity
company for a consolidated organization recognizes that financial stress or the improper
management of risk in one part of an organization has the potential to spread rapidly to other
parts of the organization. Large depository institution holding companies increasingly operate
and manage their businesses in such a way that risks affect different subsidiaries within the
consolidated organization and are managed on a consolidated basis. For example, decisions
about business lines including management and resource allocation may be made by executives
and employees in different subsidiaries. Integrating products and operations may offer
significant efficiencies but can also result in financial stress or the improper management of risk
in one part of a consolidated organization and has the potential to spread risk rapidly to other
parts of the consolidated organization. Even when risk is assessed at the level of the holding
company, risk will also be assessed at individual institutions within that consolidated
organization. For example, a bank subsidiary of a large, complex bank holding company might
have a different risk profile than the bank holding company. In that situation, a risk assessment
would have different results when conducted at the level of the bank and at the level of the bank
Moreover, in the experience of the Federal Banking Agencies, incentive-based
compensation programs generally are designed at the holding company level and are applied
throughout the consolidated organization. Many holding companies establish incentive-based
compensation programs in this manner because it can help maintain effective risk management
and controls for the entire consolidated organization. More broadly, the expectations and
incentives established by the highest levels of corporate leadership set the tone for the entire
of the level of a national bank or Federal savings association that is not a subsidiary of a holding company and the OCC’s approach to regulation of Federal branches and agencies.
organization and are important factors of whether an organization is capable of maintaining fully
effective risk management and internal control processes. The Board has observed that some
large, complex depository institution holding companies have evolved toward comprehensive,
consolidated risk management to measure and assess the range of their exposures and the way
these exposures interrelate, including in the context of incentive-based compensation programs.
In supervising the activities of depository institution holding companies, the Board has adopted
and continues to follow the principle that depository institution holding companies should serve
as a source of financial and managerial strength for their subsidiary depository institutions. 59
The proposed rule is designed to reinforce the ability of institutions to establish and
maintain effective risk management and controls for the entire consolidated organization with
respect to the organization’s incentive-based compensation program. Moreover, the structure of
the proposed rule is also consistent with the reality that within many large depository institution
holding companies, covered persons may be employed by one legal entity but may do work for
one or more of that entity’s affiliates. For example, an employee of a national bank might also
perform certain responsibilities on behalf of an affiliated broker-dealer. Applying the same
requirements to all subsidiary covered institutions may reduce the possibility of evasion of the
more specific standards applicable to certain individuals at Level 1 or Level 2 covered
institutions. Finally, this approach may enable holding company structures to more effectively
manage human resources, because applying the same requirements to all subsidiary covered
59 See 12 U.S.C. 1831o-1; 12 CFR 225.4(a)(1).
institutions would treat similarly the incentive-based compensation arrangements for similar
positions at different subsidiaries within a holding company structure. 60
The proposed rule would also be consistent with the requirements of overseas regulators
who have examined the role that incentive-based compensation plays in institutions. After
examining the risks posed by certain incentive-based compensation programs, many foreign
regulators are now requiring that the rules governing incentive-based compensation be applied at
the group, parent, and subsidiary operating levels (including those in offshore financial
centers). 61
The Agencies are cognizant that the approach being proposed may have some
disadvantages for smaller subsidiaries within a larger depository institution holding company
structure by applying the more specific provisions of the proposed rule to these smaller
institutions that would not otherwise apply to them but for being a subsidiary of a depository
institution holding company. As further discussed below, in an effort to reduce burden, the
Board’s proposed rule would permit institutions that are subsidiaries of depository institution
holding companies and that are subject to the Board’s proposed rule to meet the requirements of
the proposed rule if the parent covered institution complies with the requirements in such a way
that causes the relevant portion of the incentive-based compensation program of the subsidiary
covered institution to comply with the requirements. 62
Similarly, the OCC’s proposed rule would allow a covered institution subject to the
OCC’s proposed rule that is a subsidiary of another covered institution subject to the OCC’s
60 For example, requirements that apply to certain job functions in one part of a consolidated organization but not to the same job function in another operating unit of the same holding company structure could create uneven treatment across the legal entities.
61 See, e.g., Article 92 of the CRD IV (2013/36/EU).
62 See section
proposed rule to meet a requirement of the OCC’s proposed rule if the parent covered institution
complies with that requirement in a way that causes the relevant portion of the incentive-based
compensation program of the subsidiary covered institution to comply with that requirement.
The FDIC’s proposed rule would similarly allow a covered institution subject to the
FDIC’s proposed rule that is a subsidiary of another covered institution subject to the FDIC’s
proposed rule to meet a requirement of the FDIC’s proposed rule if the parent covered institution
The SEC is not proposing to require a covered institution under its proposed rule that is a
subsidiary of another covered institution under that proposed rule to be subject to the same
requirements, and defined to be the same levels, as the parent covered institution. In general, the
operations, services, and products of broker-dealers and investments advisers are not typically
effected through subsidiaries 63 and it is expected that their incentive-based compensation
arrangements are typically derived from the activities of the broker-dealers and investment
advisers themselves. Because of this, any inappropriate risks for which the incentive-based
compensation programs at these firms may encourage should be localized, and the management
of these risks similarly should reside at the broker-dealer or investment adviser. Where that is
not the case, individuals that are employed by subsidiaries of a broker-dealer or investment
adviser may still be considered to be a “significant risk-taker” for the covered institution and,
63 In addition, the SEC’s regulatory regime with respect to broker-dealers and investment advisers generally applies on an entity-by-entity basis. For example, subject to certain exclusions, any person that for compensation is engaged in the business of providing advice, making recommendations, issuing reports, or furnishing analyses on securities, either directly or through publications is subject to the Investment Advisers Act. See 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11).
therefore, subject to the proposed rule. 64 In addition, broker-dealers and investment advisers that
are subsidiaries of depository institution holding companies would be consolidated on the basis
of such depository institution holding companies generally, where there is often a greater
integration of products and operations, public interest, and assessment and management of risk
(including those related to incentive-based compensation) across the depository institution
holding companies and their subsidiaries. 65
Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 covered institutions.
For purposes of the proposed rule, the Agencies have specified the three levels of covered
o A “Level 1 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution that is a
subsidiary of a depository institution holding company with average total
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion; (ii) a covered
64 The proposed rule also prohibits a covered institution from doing indirectly, or through or by any other person, anything that would be unlawful for such covered institution to do directly. See section 303.12. For example, the SEC has stated that it will, based on facts and circumstances, treat as a single investment adviser two or more affiliated investment advisers that are separate legal entities but are operationally integrated. See Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3222 (Jun. 22, 2011) 76 FR 39,646 (Jul. 6, 2011); In the Matter of TL Ventures, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3859 (June. 20, 2014) (settled action); section 15 U.S.C. 80b-8.
65 As discussed above in this Supplementary Information, the Agencies propose that covered institutions that are subsidiaries of covered institutions that are depository institution holding companies would be subject to the same requirements, and defined to be the same level, as the parent covered institutions. Because the failure of a depository institution may cause losses to the deposit insurance fund, there is a heightened interest in the safety and soundness of depository institutions and their holding companies. Moreover, as noted above, depository institution holding companies should serve as a source of financial and managerial strength for their subsidiary depository institutions. Additionally, in the experience of the Federal Banking Agencies, incentive-based compensation programs generally are designed at the holding company level and are applied throughout the consolidated organization. The Board has observed that complex depository institution holding companies have evolved toward comprehensive, consolidated risk management to measure and assess the range of their exposures and the way these exposures interrelate, including in the context of incentive-based compensation programs.
institution with average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to
$250 billion that is not a subsidiary of a covered institution or of a
depository institution holding company; and (iii) a covered institution that
is a subsidiary of a covered institution with average total consolidated
assets greater than or equal to $250 billion.
A “Level 2 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution that is a
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $50 billion but less than $250
billion; (ii) a covered institution with average total consolidated assets
greater than or equal to $50 billion but less than $250 billion that is not a
subsidiary of a covered institution or of a depository institution holding
company; and (iii) a covered institution that is a subsidiary of a covered
$50 billion but less than $250 billion.
A “Level 3 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution with
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion but less
than $50 billion; and (ii) a covered institution that is a subsidiary of a
covered institution with average total consolidated assets greater than or
equal to $1 billion but less than $50 billion.
• In the case of the Board:
o A “Level 1 covered institution” means a covered institution with average
total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion and any
subsidiary of a Level 1 covered institution that is a covered institution.
A “Level 2 covered institution” means a covered institution with average
total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $50 billion that is not a
Level 1 covered institution and any subsidiary of a Level 2 covered
institution that is a covered institution.
A “Level 3 covered institution” means a covered institution with average
total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion that is not a
Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution.
• In the case of the FDIC:
A “Level 1 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution that is a
$250 billion that is not a subsidiary of a depository institution holding
subsidiary of a depository institution holding company; and (iii) a covered
institution that is a subsidiary of a covered institution with average total
o A “Level 3 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution that is a
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion but less than $50
greater than or equal to $1 billion but less than $50 billion that is not a
• In the case of the NCUA:
A “Level 1 credit union” means a credit union with average total
consolidated assets of $250 billion or more.
A “Level 2 credit union” means a credit union with average total
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $50 billion that is not a Level 1
A “Level 3 credit union” means a credit union with average total
consolidated assets greater than or equal to $1 billion that is not a Level 1
or Level 2 credit union.
• In the case of the SEC:
o A “Level 1 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution with
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion; or
(ii) a covered institution that is a subsidiary of a depository institution
holding company that is a Level 1 covered institution pursuant to 12 CFR
A “Level 2 covered institution” means: (i) a covered institution with
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $50 billion that is
not a Level 1 covered institution; or (ii) a covered institution that is a
subsidiary of a depository institution holding company that is a Level 2
covered institution pursuant to 12 CFR 236.2.
Level 1 covered institution or Level 2 covered institution.
• In the case of FHFA:
A “Level 1 covered institution” means a covered institution with average
total consolidated assets greater than or equal to $250 billion that is not a
Level 1 covered institution and any Federal Home Loan Bank that is a
The Agencies considered the varying levels of complexity and risks across covered
institutions that would be subject to this proposed rule, as well as the general correlation of asset
size with those potential risks, in proposing to distinguish covered institutions by their asset
size. 66 In general, larger financial institutions have more complex structures and operations.
These more complex structures make controlling risk-taking more difficult. Moreover, these
larger, more complex institutions also tend to be significant users of incentive-based
compensation. Significant use of incentive-based compensation combined with more complex
business operations can make it more difficult to immediately recognize and assess risks for the
institution as a whole. Therefore, the requirements of the proposed rule are tailored to reflect the
size and complexity of each of the three levels of covered institutions identified in the proposed
rule. The proposed rule assigns covered institutions to one of three levels, based on each
institution’s average total consolidated assets.
Additionally, the Agencies considered the exemption in section 956 for institutions with
less than $1 billion in assets along with other asset-level thresholds in the Dodd-Frank Act 67 as
an indication that Congress views asset size as an appropriate basis for the requirements and
prohibitions established under this proposed rule. Consistent with this approach, the Agencies
also looked to asset size to determine the types of prohibitions that would be necessary to
discourage inappropriate risks at covered institutions that could lead to material financial loss.
66 But see earlier discussion regarding consolidation.
67 See, e.g., section 116 of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5326) (allowing the Financial Stability Oversight Council to require a bank holding company with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more to submit reports); section 163 of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5363) (requiring prior notice to the Board for certain acquisitions by bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more); section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 5365) (requiring enhanced prudential standards for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more); section 318(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act (12 U.S.C. 16) (authorizing the Board to collect assessments, fees, and other charges from bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more).
The Agencies are proposing that more rigorous requirements apply to institutions with
$50 billion or more in assets. These institutions with assets of $50 billion or more tend to be
significantly more complex and, the risk-taking of these institutions, and their potential failure,
implicates greater risks for the financial system and the overall economy. Tailoring application
of the requirements of the proposed rule is consistent with other provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act, which distinguish requirements for institutions with $50 billion or more in total consolidated
assets. For example, the enhanced supervision and prudential standards for nonbank financial
companies and bank holding companies under section 165 68 apply to bank holding companies
with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or greater. It is also consistent with the definitions of
advanced approaches institutions under the Federal Banking Agencies’ domestic capital rules, 69
which are linked to the total consolidated assets of an institution. Other statutory and regulatory
provisions recognize this difference. 70
Most of the requirements of the proposed rule would apply to Level 1 and Level 2
covered institutions in a similar manner. Deferral requirements, however, would be different for
Level 1 and Level 2 covered institutions, as discussed further below: incentive-based
compensation for senior executive officers and significant risk-takers at covered institutions with
68 12 U.S.C. 5365.
69 See 12 CFR 3.100(b)(1) (advanced approaches national banks and Federal savings associations); 12 CFR 324.100(b)(1) (advanced approaches state nonmember banks, state savings associations, and insured