Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/419/480/33247/
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Ruth Crowder, Mother and Next Friend of Walter Paul Crowder and David Douglas Crowder, Minors, Appellants, v. Gordons Transports, Inc., Appellee, 419 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1969) :: Justia
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Ruth Crowder, Mother and Next Friend of Walter Paul Crowder and David Douglas Crowder, Minors, Appellants, v. Gordons Transports, Inc., Appellee, 419 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1969)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 419 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1969) December 23, 1969
On July 12, 1966, Ruth Crowder, as administratrix of her husband's estate, instituted a wrongful death diversity action against Gordons in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. She prayed for damages for herself, for her two sons, and for funeral expenses in the respective amounts of $150,000, $100,000, $150,000, and $1,500, making a total of $401,500. The Arkansas wrongful death statutes, Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 27-906 to -910 (Repl.1962), authorized this procedure and have no limitation as to recoverable amount.
Before the issues so drawn were ruled upon the district court granted the plaintiff the opportunity and the time to amend her complaint. The amendment was filed January 21, 1967, a date more than a year after the accident. With the amendment, Mrs. Crowder now sued as "mother and next friend" of the two minor sons and claimed damages only in the amount of $25,000. These changes obviously were made in the light of Mo. Rev.Stat. §§ 537.080 and .090, V.A.M.S., as then in effect, designating the proper party plaintiff and the maximum amount recoverable in a wrongful death action. (Those statutes were repealed and replaced, with like section numbers, by Laws 1967, p. 663 § 1.)
Gordons then moved to dismiss the complaint as so amended on the ground that the action was barred by the expiration of the one year limitation period then applicable to a Missouri wrongful death action. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.100, V.A.M.S. (This period was extended to two years by Laws 1967, p. 663 § 1.)
The district court sustained the motion to dismiss; it held that, under Rule 15(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., the amendment did not relate back to the date of the filing of the complaint. Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ark. 1967). On appeal this court reversed and remanded. 387 F.2d 413 (8 Cir. 1967). We ruled, citing Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8 Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 891, 86 S. Ct. 184, 15 L. Ed. 2d 149, that the district court reached a permissible conclusion when it held that the substantive Missouri law controlled this wrongful death action in the Arkansas federal court for an injury and death which occurred in Missouri, and "that an action must be commenced in the manner set forth in the Missouri statute and within the time therein prescribed." 387 F.2d at 415. We further held, however, that the issue of relation back was one of procedure and not of substantive law and was controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that, under Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 674 (8 Cir. 1962), the amendment did relate back. The appropriate form of the lawsuit and its timeliness were thereby established.
With this factual development, Gordons moved for summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. The district court sustained this motion. Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Ark. 1968). In its opinion the court incorporated the unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee concerning the same issue as it emerged with respect to the death of Crowder's coemployee and passenger, David Willett, who also lost his life in the collision of July 27, 1965. The railway similarly had paid Mrs. Willett, individually and as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate, the sum of $25,000 upon her covenant not to sue.
The Tennessee court referred to Mo. Rev.Stat. § 537.080, V.A.M.S., cited above, and also to § 537.060. The latter concerns contribution between tort-feasors and provides that it shall be lawful for a person having a cause of action against two or more joint tort-feasors to settle with and release one "without impairing the right of such person * * * to demand and collect the balance of said claim or cause of action from the other joint tort-feasors * * *." The Tennessee court recognized that if the situation were reversed and Mrs. Willett had first settled with Gordons for $25,000, she would not be barred from claiming an additional amount against the railroad under the FELA. It noted, 289 F. Supp. at 169, that there was "no Missouri case precisely in point". It felt that the Missouri statute should be construed to mean that, for purposes of the statute, there is one claim or cause of action against joint tort-feasors; that the alleged facts would make Gordons and the railroad joint tort-feasors if both were negligent; and that, therefore, defendant Gordons' motion for summary judgment should be granted. The Arkansas court held that the memorandum decision of the Tennessee court was "decisive of all matters at issue" here, 289 F. Supp. at 170, and sustained Gordons' motion for summary judgment accordingly.
The plaintiffs contend that the case turns on the relationship between the FELA and the Missouri wrongful death statute with its maximum recovery limitation; that both statutes are in derogation of the common law; that, however, any similarity between the two ends at that point; that the FELA is a federal act and uniform in its application; that a wrongful death statute, on the other hand, is a creature of the state; and that statutes of that kind vary from state to state. They stress comments in the cases that a purpose of the FELA was to abolish the common law defenses of assumption of risk, of contributory negligence, and of the fellow servant doctrine, and that the federal statute is an outgrowth of the same economic and social considerations which prompted the adoption of the workmen's compensation laws and the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. They cite Ganotis v. New York Central R. R., 342 F.2d 767 (6 Cir. 1965); Barrett v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 334 F.2d 803 (7 Cir. 1964); Phillips v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 420, 423-424 (W. D.La.1963); and Wilson v. Massagee, 224 N.C. 705, 32 S.E.2d 335, 340, 156 A. L.R. 922 (1944). They point out that the FELA differs from the Missouri statute in its designation of beneficiaries, in its measure of damages, in the absence of a monetary limit, in its exclusion of defenses which are available under the state statute, and in its conception of negligence.
Gordons contends that the plaintiffs misconstrue the issue; that the suit concerns, instead, only the effect of the $30,000 payment; that the FELA is a negligence statute; that Gordons' liability also is predicated on negligence; that the right of recovery under the Missouri statute is limited; and that the $30,000 payment was more than "full response" to the Missouri statute, to use the phraseology employed in Myers v. Kennedy, 306 Mo. 268, 267 S.W. 810, 815 (1924).
We start with the proposition, seemingly obvious enough, that there can be but one recovery for a wrong. This, of course, is recognized in Missouri. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, supra, 330 S.W.2d at 864; Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825, 833 (1938). A corollary to this, however, is that if a plaintiff makes only a partial compromise with one tort-feasor, he may still proceed against the other "for the balance of the injury." Berry v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., supra, 121 S.W.2d at 833; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, supra, 330 S.W.2d at 864; Booker v. Kansas City Gas Co., 231 Mo. App. 214, 96 S.W.2d 919, 923 (1936); Roberts v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App. 1162, 163 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1942); Hails v. Systems Constructors, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 583, 589 (Mo.App.1966); Mo. Rev.Stat. § 537.060.
The case, therefore, comes down to the question whether the $30,000 payment eliminated any "balance" of any claim the plaintiffs might otherwise have against Gordons under the Missouri statute. Gordons says that it did and the district court so held. The Crowders say that it did not. It is to be noted that the Missouri decisions cited and § 537.060 speak of the "balance" of any claim or injury.
2. The Missouri statutes themselves do not read adversely to the plaintiffs. Section 537.080 speaks of a defendant's liability "to an action for damages * * * which damages may be sued for and recovered * * * [b]y * * *." Section 537.090, the limiting statute, merely states that in the action under § 537.080 "the jury may give to the surviving party or parties who may be entitled to sue such damages, not exceeding [twenty-five thousand] dollars, as the jury may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned * * *." We view this language not as a recital that damages actually sustained could not exceed the specified amount but only as fixing the arbitrary and artificial maximum which the jury may award and for the recovery of which the statutes and the courts may be utilized. Section 537.080 does not purport to measure the limit of actual damages. It specifies only the upper limit of the fact finder's discretion.
3. We are fortified, as to this, by the Missouri court's consistent observation that "the statutory limit * * * is not meant to be the maximum value of a human life * * *." Marlow v. Nafziger Baking Co., 333 Mo. 790, 63 S.W.2d 115, 121 (1933); Steger v. Meehan, 63 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo.1933); Combs v. Combs, 284 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Mo.1955); Huffman v. Mercer, 295 S.W.2d 27, 35 (Mo.1956); Waller v. Oliver, 296 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo.1956).
4. The district court's opinion, through its incorporation of the Tennessee opinion, states, 289 F. Supp. at 169,
"It is certainly true that if the situation were reversed and plaintiff had first settled with Gordon's for $25,000, plaintiff would not have been barred from claiming an additional amount against Frisco under the F.E. L.A."
5. We regard as of no particular significance, in this case and for the resolution of the issue presently before us, the question whether the plaintiffs' claims under the FELA and under the Missouri statute are identical or are separately rooted. In a contribution context this court rejected the separateness argument in a Minnesota case and permitted contribution. Zontelli Bros. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 263 F.2d 194 (8 Cir. 1959). Contrastingly, in Phillips v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, 219 F. Supp. 420, where Louisiana law was involved, contribution was denied on the ground that the two statutes did not impose a common liability.
6. The Zontelli decision, however, is not without a measure of significance for the present case. At the time of the Zontelli decedent's death in 1956, the Minnesota wrongful death ceiling was $17,500. M.S.A. § 573.02, as amended by Laws 1955 ch. 407 § 1. (It is now $35,000. Laws 1965 ch. 837 § 1.) The railroad employer of the decedent paid $42,500 in full settlement. It then sought contribution from Zontelli. The jury returned a verdict for the railroad for half the settlement amount, or $21,250. Zontelli, among other arguments, urged that judgment against it should be reduced to $8,750, or half the wrongful death maximum. This court, speaking through Judge Matthes, 263 F.2d at 201, rejected the argument on the ground that contribution is essentially equitable and that, on the facts of the case, the loss would be equitably divided if the wrongful death defendant were required to contribute the statutory maximum but no more. The judgment, therefore, was reduced from $21,250 to $17,500. One may say that, in effect, this result is a refusal to count the FELA recovery toward the wrongful death maximum for to have done so would have left Zontelli with only half the maximum to pay.
8. Cases under the federal Tort Claims Act are somewhat helpful. Unlike the FELA, which imposes a policy of uniformity of recovery throughout the nation, a tort claim against the government shall be "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). And 28 U.S.C. § 2674 provides generally that the United States shall be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances * * *." A tort claim death case, therefore, funnels into the state wrongful death statute. In Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929 (3 Cir. 1957), the plaintiff sued the United States for wrongful death and recovered $15,000, the limit under the applicable Alaska statute. The court refused to reduce the judgment, or to set off against it the sum of $16,075 already paid the plaintiff by the government under other legislative provisions. The court held, 242 F.2d at 931, that "there is no overreaching, no double payment and no unfairness to the United States" because the pecuniary loss to the family had been established at $55,000 and this amount exceeded the sum of $15,000 and $16,075. In Harris v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Va. 1963), the court reached the same result. That court, furthermore, distinguished cases involving recovery under the Tort Claims Act based on a state wrongful death statute which had no limitation on recoverable damages. In those cases the recovery was presumed to be for the total loss, and so compensation paid under other statutes could be set off against the judgment in order to avoid double recovery.
9. The district court's concession that the plaintiffs could have recovered the state maximum first and then proceeded to recover more in an FELA action is significant in the light of Richards v. United States, 285 F.2d 521 (10 Cir. 1960), aff'd 369 U.S. 1, 82 S. Ct. 585, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962). The plaintiffs' decedents in Richards died in a commercial plane's crash in Missouri allegedly attributable to the joint negligence of the United States and the airline. The airline had paid or tendered each plaintiff the sum of $15,000, the then specified Missouri maximum. The court held that because of this "the causes of action under the law of Missouri became extinguished, and recovery against the tort feasor or tort feasors was barred." 285 F.2d at 526. The Supreme Court similarly observed that "the petitioners thus have received full compensation for their claims." 369 U.S. at 16, 82 S. Ct. at 595. Inasmuch as liability under the Tort Claims Act is tied to the law of the place, it was deemed to be governed by the state wrongful death statute and by the state ceiling on recovery. In this context the concession that the Crowder plaintiffs could have recovered the state maximum and then proceeded under the FELA is telling against Gordons' position. This is precisely what the Richards plaintiffs attempted but were unable to accomplish. It indicates that the Tort Claims Act and the FELA relate differently to the state recovery ceiling.
We note, in passing, that it might be argued that Dixon v. Ross, 94 Ga.App. 187, 94 S.E.2d 86 (1956), contains implications contrary to the result we reach. The court there held that FELA recovery, pursuant to a jury verdict, against the decedent's railroad employer barred an action under the Georgia wrongful death statute. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent reveals whether the Georgia statute imposed a maximum. The majority opinion recites that "recovery under both laws would amount to a double recovery for the same wrong." 94 S.E.2d at 88. This certainly implies, as one would expect, that the FELA suit involved a determination of damages in full, in contrast to the covenant not to sue in the case before us. The dissent speaks of the cumulative character of the remedies and, of course, acknowledges that if the settlement is in full the entire right of the plaintiff is extinguished. The dissenting judge says that only profits and actual property damage were claimed in the FELA action, whereas in the state suit general damages were sought. With this uncertainty as to the underlying facts, we are unable to regard the case as significant authority either way. To the extent, if any, the decision stands against the plaintiffs' position here, we find ourselves in disagreement with it.