Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/681/246/405072/
Timestamp: 2020-07-10 20:17:19
Document Index: 604535116

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1341', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1341', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Faggart Daniel Murr, Iii, Appellant, 681 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1982 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Faggart Daniel Murr, Iii, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Faggart Daniel Murr, Iii, Appellant, 681 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1982)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 681 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1982) Argued April 1, 1982. Decided June 17, 1982
On appeal, Murr's sole argument is that the government presented insufficient evidence to provide "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged ..." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). He relies heavily on the fact that both of the prisoner affiants were convicted felons and that each became an inmate trusty after the incident. Furthermore, Murr notes that the trial judge stated that if he were sitting as a juror, he would not have voted to convict because he doubted the credibility of the two prisoner affiants who testified for the government. Additionally, appellant argues that because the § 1983 petition did not contain any request for monetary damages, it cannot be considered a scheme to defraud.
To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the prosecution must prove two essential elements-(1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8, 74 S. Ct. 358, 362, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954); United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1975). While utilization of the mail fraud statute to prosecute the filing of a false § 1983 petition is apparently a case of first impression, a survey of recent mail fraud prosecutions from this circuit alone shows that the statute has had varied use. E.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), vacated 602 F.2d 653 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 1647, 64 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1980) (bribing a State official to take an act); United States v. Caldwell, 544 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1976) (bribing a State official to violate a statutory duty); Brewer, 528 F.2d 492 (aiding evasion by others of Florida use tax on cigarettes). The common element of such cases is that the accused attempted to use the mail as an instrument of his crime. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1358; Brewer, 528 F.2d at 498.
Turning to the question of whether there existed a scheme to defraud Palmer or the Sheriff's Department's insurance carrier, appellant does not contend that intentionally filing a false § 1983 petition is not within the statute. Instead, he argues that because his petition did not ask for monetary damages, there could not have been in the words of the statute, a "scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses ..." 18 U.S.C. § 1341. While it is apparently not finally settled among the courts as to whether a pecuniary benefit must be part of a mail fraud scheme,2 the issue is present here only as to whether or not it existed, not whether or not it is necessary. As noted above, both of Murr's fellow prisoners testified that the appellant had offered to split the recovery from the lawsuit with them in exchange for signing the affidavits. Furthermore, the appellant himself testified that when filing the § 1983 petition, he thought that a prayer for declaratory relief was for an award of money in whatever amount the court would award him. Evidence of a mail fraud scheme is not limited to the content of the material which passed through the mails. Actually, the mailed material may be totally innocent, and yet it still may be found that a scheme to defraud exists. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 36 S. Ct. 367, 60 L. Ed. 706 (1916); Caldwell, 544 F.2d at 696. Here, the proof of a monetary aspect to the scheme, even if not provided by the § 1983 petition, was provided by the appellant's testimony and that of his fellow prisoners.
In Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641, 23 S. Ct. 841, 47 L. Ed. 345 (1902), the court, in upholding a blackmail by mail conviction, construed a predecessor of the current mail fraud statute to have a broad meaning which would allow conviction for mail fraud on the finding of a wrongful purpose short of trickery or cunning. The Supreme Court, in reversing a conviction for urging resistance to the draft by use of the mails, subsequently limited Horman by saying that it "should be confined to pecuniary or property injury inflicted by a scheme to use the mails for the purpose.... (The mail fraud statute's) construction in the Horman Case cannot be used as authority to include within the legal definition of a conspiracy to defraud the United States a mere open defiance of the governmental purpose to enforce a law by urging persons subject to it to disobey it." Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188-89, 44 S. Ct. 511, 512, 68 L. Ed. 968 (1924). The Eighth Circuit has in terms construed Hammerschmidt not to limit the mail fraud statute to situations involving monetary or property loss. In United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909, 950, 94 S. Ct. 2605, 3078, 41 L. Ed. 2d 212, 671 (1974), the court applied the mail fraud statute to a scheme involving execution of fraudulent absentee ballots. We have done the same by necessary implication in Caldwell and Mandel