Source: http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2010/12/index.html
Timestamp: 2018-08-20 11:27:17
Document Index: 458642159

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 5', 'art 6']

Menendez & Fossum on Constitutional Synthesis & the EU
Agustin J. Menendez and John Erik Fossum (Universidad de Leon and University of Oslo - Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State) have posted The Theory of Constitutional Synthesis: A Constitutional Theory for a Democratic European Union (THE CONSTITUTION'S GIFT, Chapter 2, John Erik Fossum, Agustín José Menéndez, Rowman Littlefield, eds., 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper puts forward the main elements of the theory of constitutional synthesis as a constitutional theory of European integration. Constitutional synthesis is both a political philosophy of European integration (which dilucidates what kind of polity the Union is an what is its basis of legitimacy) and a theoretical framework capable of guiding constitutional adjudication in hard cases (such as the resolution of conflicts between European and national constitutional law). In essence, constitutional synthesis refers to a process in which already established constitutional states integrate through constitutional law, without losing their institutional structure and identity. We claim that there are three basic insights in constitutional synthesis. The first is that the constitutional law which frames and contributes to steer integration is characterised by the central role played by the constitutions of the participating states (by the regulatory ideal of a common constitutional law). The second is that the supranational legal order comes hand in hand with a supranational institutional structure which is only partially established at the founding, takes time to be rendered functional in a process where different national institutional cultures and structures try to leave their mark on the supranational level, and its structure is necessarily rendered more complicated as new institutions and decision-making processes are added up to handle new policies. The third is that while supranational law is one, there are several institutions that apply the supranational law in an authoritative manner. In the last section of the paper, we complete the exposition of constitutional synthesis by considering how it is placed and how it relates to other political and legal theories of integration.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 09:07 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Nowlan on Hindsight Bias
Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan (Yale University - Law School) has posted Living with Hindsight Bias on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The reasonable man, through the Law and Economics movement, has recently taken up the features of homo economicus, the rational, self-interested maximizer of economic theory. It is increasingly apparent that most people, most of the time, do not evaluate their own utility or make decisions in the way economic models predict. Our reasonable man and homo economicus are looking more aspirational every day. This paper examines how heuristics and biases influence ex post jury evaluations of whether a defendant arrived at the same assessment of risks as a reasonable person would, or whether a party should have made a different decision to prevent an adverse outcome. In particular, this paper will discuss the hindsight bias, one area where recent insights into rationality and decision-making raise especially severe concerns about jury judgments. This paper will ask why we trust ex-post evaluations when it is apparent that judges and juries will systematically produce holdings based on assessments that don’t, and possibly can’t, replicate the historical judgments they are evaluating in a way that legitimates second-guessing those decisions. This paper will argue that, despite valid concerns, drastic changes in jury deliberation and scope of responsibility are inadvisable. In addition, it will explain how the purported irrationality of hindsight bias suffers from a lack of clarity about what constitutes rationality or irrationality in a jury system. Finally, it will argue that incremental changes should be made through procedural improvements. The legal system’s adaptation to the hindsight bias can set a precedent for further improvements inspired by developments in behavioral science. Unlike the wholesale importation of homo economicus by Law and Economics, the legal system needs to evaluate potential reforms in light of the complex and interrelated goals and safeguards built into the system.
An interesting student paper.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 05:53 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Simons on the Typology of Moral & Criminal Law Norms
The world is not flat. Neither is the topography of criminal wrongdoing and culpability, or of actus reus and mens rea. This complex terrain should not surprise or frighten us. It is a complexity built upon the varied, and in some instances incommensurable, moral norms that lie beneath criminal law doctrine.
This essay, a contribution to a forthcoming volume on the philosophical foundations of the criminal law, suggests the following conclusions. Criminal law norms can be more general or more particular. How particular should they be? The answer depends, in significant part, on the underlying landscape of the moral norms that criminal law instantiates, and on the political principles through which those moral norms are refracted. On three plausible accounts of moral justification — foundational pluralism, reliance on concrete moral intuitions, and variable relevance particularism — moral norms are relatively particularistic. At the same time, such accounts entail that the moral map contains localized areas of incommensurability. Finally, criminal law norms can be purely descriptive, or instead partially evaluative. But the difference that this distinction makes should not be overstated. A partially evaluative criterion does empower the fact-finder to play a more significant role in appraising the moral wrongfulness and the moral culpability of the defendant’s actions than does a purely descriptive criterion, but either type of criterion ultimately serves a normative function.
Modern criminal law scholars and reformers have made enormous progress in simplifying and rationalizing criminal statutes. But we should not assume that if criminal law norms are complex and messy, those norms cannot be cogently justified. In the moral domain, Bernard Williams cautioned against wholesale rejection of “thick” ethical concepts. In the related domain of legal punishment, we should heed his caution.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 12:03 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Redding on Spiro on Citizenship
Jeff Redding (Saint Louis University School of Law) has posted Beyond Exclusion: A Review of Peter J. Spiro’s 'Beyond Citizenship' (Minnesota Law Review Headnotes, Vol. 95, p. 29, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In a disorienting world where many non-Americans (and Americans) no longer recognize or identify with the United States, Peter J. Spiro’s "Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization" intervenes with a timely and provocative discussion of the issues, problems, and dilemmas that accompany twenty-first century American identity, and its articulation in U.S. citizenship law. In 163 pages of learned but accessible text, Spiro’s rich and erudite work describes the history and future trajectory of key aspects of U.S. citizenship law, American national identity, and their interaction. Spiro’s work is particularly interested in giving a descriptive account of citizenship law’s contributions to the “eroding foundation of the national community." And while most of the broad themes that Spiro engages with in his book are intriguing, he makes a number of particular arguments in his work concerning the similarities between religious and national community that are especially provocative.
As I argue in this Review, however, Spiro’s arguments about religious and national communities’ shared need to exclude outsiders and also insist upon internal conformity in order to become “meaningful” communities are often quite simplistic. This is especially so where Spiro premises his arguments on unsupportable generalizations about religion writ large, and under-theorizes the foundational ideas of “community” and “meaningfulness.” In fact, Spiro ultimately undermines his ambitious and thought-provoking arguments connecting religious and national communities by relying on narrow and inaccurate accounts of what counts as a real or meaningful “religion” or “nation” in the first place. Ultimately, these problems undermine his overarching account concerning American community, including his account of how an over-inclusive U.S. citizenship regime has seriously diluted American national identity.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 11:53 AM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Feldman on Law's Conception of Science
Robin Cooper Feldman (University of California Hastings College of Law) has posted Historic Perspectives on Law & Science (Stanford Technology Law Review, p. 1, 2009) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Law has had a long and troubled relationship with science. The misuse of science within the legal realm, as well as our failed attempts to make law more scientific, are well documented. The cause of these problems, however, is less clear. With this in mind, I would like to suggest that the unsatisfying relationship of law and science can be attributed, at least in part, to law’s inadequate understanding of what constitutes science and law’s inflated view of the potential benefits of science for law.
The article begins by describing law’s vision of science. It then traces the history of Western philosophical thought on what constitutes science in an effort to demonstrate for a legal audience how modern philosophical views of science contrast sharply with perspectives in law. Finally, the article explores the nature of law and describes distortions in our image of what science can do for law. In particular, while most people would argue that the changing nature of science creates problems for law, this article suggests that it is the constantly evolving nature of law that makes science such a bad fit for the development of legal doctrines.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 05:02 AM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
O'Rourke on Amending the Clean Air Act
Kevin O'Rourke (Vermont Law School) has posted The Long Road to Clean Air: An Argument for Greater Efficiency through Amendments to the Clean Air Act on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In passing broad and sweeping legislation to regulate industry and protect the environment, Congress has taken precautionary measures to ensure that its enactments would not unduly burden existing industry or potentially harm economic growth. Crafted by Congress along with other broad, comprehensive, environmental bills in the 1970’s, the foundation of the current Clean Air Act (CAA) is a perfect example of such legislation and should be seen as a historic bi-partisan legislative success.
However, throughout the CAA’s evolution there have been several Congressional Amendments and EPA rulemakings that have caused inefficient results; both economically and for the health of the populations living near the polluting sources. As the Act has grown in scope with subsequent Amendments, it has also grown in inefficiency, as new programs have been layered over each other in an attempt to correct fundamental structural flaws. This paper will examine these key decisions and argue for greater equity and efficiency in future air pollution reduction by even handedly applying technology-based regulation at a minimum to all electricity generating stationary sources. This paper will also demonstrate that technology-based regulation is pragmatically the most efficient, equitable way to remedy past regulatory inequities, as well as alleviate current problems that have been caused by a history of over-accommodation for existing industry that has occurred to the detriment of economic efficiency and public health.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 31, 2010 at 12:21 AM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Bianchi on Textual Interpretation & International Law
Andrea Bianchi (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) has posted Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (in) Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning (MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS, pp. 34-56, P. Bekker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) on SSRN. Here is an excerpt from the text (in lieu of the very brief abstract):
Lawyers find certainties very appealing. Perhaps this is the case because they regard the law as stable and predictable. Law’s fundamental certain- ties lie in its rules. The certainties of lawyers are also found there. Rules are called upon to perform the reassuring function of making us believe that what the law-maker considered to be right or wrong is clearly expressed in them. If there is doubt or ambiguity, objective canons of interpretation can readily be used to solve them. The law can thus regain its stabilising function. Reflections about law and its interpretation, which depart from the practitioner’s task of saying what the law is, are often looked down upon and strictly relegated to the narrow boundaries of the academic discourse. To be fair, legal philosophers have long engaged in a debate about what interpretation is and how it works,1 but the discourse within particular legal disciplines is usually confined to the rules and techniques (rules under the guise of technical tools) that lawyers must follow while interpreting legal provisions.2 Lately, a certain interest has arisen within the community of international lawyers about interpretation, partly due to its potential use for coping with the phe- nomenon of fragmentation. Interestingly enough, interpretation is regarded as both the problem, given the increasing number of epistemic communities within the discipline, and the solution, for its potential harmonising effect.3
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 30, 2010 at 08:32 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Follesdal on the Role of Normative Political Theory & the EU
Andreas Follesdal (University of Oslo) has posted Handmaiden, Gadfly, Midwife? The Roles of Normative Political Theory on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The present paper considers the role of normative political theory and its relationships to empirical social science research, arguing for the possibility, plausibility and fruitfulness of normative political theory regarded as providing a somewhat independent stance for critical assessment of existing social institutions. The central topics occasioning these reflections are the intertwined issues of legitimacy, democracy and stability within the European Union. Part 1 delineates various important conceptions of ‘legitimacy’, part 2 considers the notion of democracy. Part 3 sketches some alternative conceptions of the role of political theory, and part 4 pursues the implications of these views for why research in normative political theory appears important. Part 5 expands on one alternative to strict functionalist accounts of political theory, indicating how Normative Contractualism may be brought to bear on central issues facing Europe. Part 6 concludes the paper by indicating where this kind of normative political theory relies on empirical research.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 30, 2010 at 04:59 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Grynberg on Individual Property Rights & Copyright
Michael Grynberg (Oklahoma City University) has posted Property is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied Authorization (Fordham Law Review Vol. 79, No. 2, 2010) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
When we use the Internet, we know that copyright law limits our freedom. We know, for example, that downloading popular music is legally risky. Those who want to get moralistic about it argue that illegal downloading violates a “property” right of the copyright holder. But what about our property rights in our computers? Even if copyright is a form of property, it maintains a parallel existence as an intrusion upon property rights. This intrusion is increasingly a part of daily life, as copyright’s literal scope sweeps broadly enough to threaten a range of everyday activities that social norms regard as acceptable.
These observations form the basis of a “moral” critique of copyright law, but they do not figure prominently in modern doctrine. This Article looks to the common law property rights of copyright users to develop a framework for limiting copyright’s reach. If we take seriously traditional rules governing the interplay between statutes and preexisting common law rights, courts have room to incorporate user property rights into copyright doctrine. First, the common law provides a baseline against which the Copyright Act should be construed. Courts should be reluctant to interpret the statute in a manner that negates longstanding expectations that personal property may be used in conjunction with copyrighted material for personal purposes.
Second, the property rights of copyright users offer a new foundation for implied license doctrine. Instead of looking solely to the conduct of the licensor (i.e., the copyright holder) to determine whether an implied license to use copyrighted content exists, courts should appreciate the reasonable expectations of consumers in their control of personal property used to interact with the protected works. Expanding our conception of implied license in this manner would help address the uneasy status of personal uses of copyrighted works under modern law.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 30, 2010 at 12:55 PM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Bagley on Agency Preemption & the Subprime Crisis
Nicholas Bagley (University of Michigan Law School) has posted Agency Preemption and the Subprime Crisis on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
A few years before the subprime mortgage market collapsed, several states began to notice a dramatic increase in the rate of foreclosures among many of their most vulnerable citizens. Attributing the increase to predatory lending, these states enacted a new type of fair lending law that, for the first time, imposed liability not only on the originators of abusive subprime loans, but also on investors in the secondary mortgage market that helped to finance those loans. National banks, which were some of the biggest players in the secondary market, went to their federal regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and asked the agency to preempt the state laws. The OCC agreed, and in January 2004 declared the laws preempted.
This paper examines that preemption determination and uses it as a case study to explore how best to address the phenomenon of agency preemption. The consensus view is that permitting agencies with narrow regulatory agendas to preempt state laws could unjustifiably undermine state autonomy. In response, commentators have repeatedly called on the courts to help check agency preemption. But courts are unlikely to prove up to the task: as a general matter, they lack the institutional competence to counter an agency’s expert and informed determination that certain state laws pose a substantial obstacle to federal regulatory goals. It is therefore unsurprising that the courts have readily deferred to the OCC’s highly contestable preemption determination. Effectively curbing agencies’ appetite to preempt will instead require the development of alternative approaches, which could include deputizing independent intra-agency authorities to vet preemption determinations, constituting a new body to institutionalize a greater role for state officials in regulatory decision-making, or crafting new procedural tools to guide courts’ review of agency preemption determinations.
Posted by Lawrence Solum on December 30, 2010 at 09:26 AM | Permalink | TrackBack (0)