Source: https://www.cljlaw.com/bulletin/?CLJBulletin;2020;18;b;
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 00:10:31
Document Index: 187092430

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 2', 'art. 121', 'art. 8', 'art. 149', 'art. 149', 'art. 8']

CLJ Bulletin #18/2020 (23 April 2020)
Issue #18/2020
MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA v. NORSIAH ALI [2020] 4 CLJ 149
AJS v. RIS & ANOR [2020] 4 CLJ 170
SURESH KUMAR VELAYUTHAN v. PP [2020] 4 CLJ 270
CLJ 2020 Volume 4 (Part 2)
HAMID SULTAN ABU BACKER JCA; HANIPAH FARIKULLAH JCA; KAMALUDIN MD SAID JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(A)-2254-11-2018]
Whilst an advocate and solicitor who is dishonest and has committed an act of dishonesty in dealing with a client deserves to be sanctioned under the Legal Profession Act 1976 or the Rules thereunder, it may need more than the mere commission of such offence to justify the invocation of the harshest punishment of striking him off the Roll of Advocates and Solicitors. The Disciplinary Board, in determining where the advocate's punishment should fall within the available spectrum of punishments, must consider a plethora of factors; this said, the Board must not take an idealistic approach to the issues at hand, must have an eye for the humanitarian aspects of punishment, and as far as practical, should move for a rehabilitative form of punishment.
LEGAL PROFESSION: Disciplinary proceedings - Disciplinary Board - Professional misconduct - Advocate and solicitor struck off from Roll - Whether decision excessive, harsh and disproportionate in absence of criminal element - Whether wrong had been remedied - Whether decision missed humanitarian aspect - Whether High Court correct in setting aside decision of Disciplinary Board
FAIZAH JAMALUDIN J
[PETITION FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION NO: WA-33-364-07-2019]
Giving s. 58 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 its proper construction, the fact that an alleged adulterer or adulteress is a Muslim does not bar a petitioner in a petition for divorce from citing him or her as a co-respondent or from seeking that he or she be condemned to damages in respect of the alleged adultery. Section 58, however, makes it clear that only in petitions for divorce can an alleged adulterer or adulteress be made a co-respondent, or damages for adultery be claimed, and not otherwise. Where, therefore, a petitioner wife petitions for judicial separation against the husband, and cites a Muslim woman as an alleged adulteress and co-respondent, the petition, obviously, is only seeking to embarrass the woman and is not entirely bona fide. Needless to say, it will be struck out for being scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, and an abuse of the process of court.
FAMILY LAW: Judicial separation - Petition - Striking out - Application for - Co-respondent in petition applied to strike out petition against her - Petitioner alleged husband and co-respondent had adulterous relationship and prayed that co-respondent be condemned for damages - Co-respondent a Muslim practising the religion of Islam - Whether Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 applies to Muslims - Whether alleged adulteress may only be cited as co-respondent in petition for divorce - Whether petitioner citing alleged adulteress as co-respondent in petition for judicial separation contrary to s. 58 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b) & (c) - Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, r. 103 - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 3(3)
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Striking out - Petition - Petition for judicial separation - Co-respondent in petition applied to strike out petition against her - Petitioner alleged husband and co-respondent had adulterous relationship and prayed that co-respondent be condemned for damages - Co-respondent a Muslim practising the religion of Islam - Whether Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 applies to Muslims - Whether alleged adulteress may only be cited as co-respondent in petition for divorce - Whether petitioner citing alleged adulteress as co-respondent in petition for judicial separation contrary to s. 58 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 - Rules of Court 2012, O. 18 r. 19(1)(a), (b) & (c) - Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, r. 103 - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 3(3)
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 'to a Muslim or to any person' - Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s. 3(3) - Principle of noscitur a sociis - Whether applies to Muslim married under Islamic law - Intention of Parliament - Whether citing of Muslim as co-respondent for alleged adultery in petition for divorce under s. 58 of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 comes within ambit of a 'marriage of one of the parties which professes the religion of Islam' in s. 3(3) - Whether fact that adulterer or adulteress is a Muslim bars petitioner from citing him or her as co-respondent in petition for divorce
[CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO: WA-44-337-12-2019]
Section 13 of the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ('SOSMA') which absolutely prohibits the grant of bail for persons charged with an offence under Chapter VIA of the Penal Code which relates to terrorism is not ultra vires art. 121 or art. 8 of the Federal Constitution. Whilst it is indisputable that courts are vested with judicial power to declare a legislation invalid or unconstitutional, no such judicial power can exist where there is no substratum or foundation laid for its exercise. There was no basis or foundation laid for the exercise of judicial discretion in respect of bail in the case of persons charged with offences relating to terrorism under s. 13 of SOSMA, and that being so, no pronouncement as to its validity or constitutionality can discretionally and legally be made by the court. To proceed to make the pronouncement regardless is likely to encroach upon the doctrine of separation of powers which is very much an integral part of the Federal Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Judicial power - Exercise of judicial power - Power to grant/refuse bail in security offences - Accused charged for security offences relating to terrorism under ss. 130J & 130JB of Penal Code - Section 13 of Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ('SOSMA') prohibits granting of bail to person charged with offences relating to terrorism - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA unconstitutional - Whether bail a judicial power - Whether there was basis or foundation for exercise of judicial discretion - Doctrine of separation of powers - Whether violated - Whether SOSMA validly enacted law pursuant to art. 149 of Federal Constitution - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA ultra vires arts. 8 & 121 of Federal Constitution
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Legislation - Ultra vires - Accused charged for security offences relating to terrorism under ss. 130J & 130JB of Penal Code - Section 13 of Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ('SOSMA') prohibits granting of bail to person charged with offences relating to terrorism - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA unconstitutional - Whether bail a judicial power - Whether there was basis or foundation for exercise of judicial discretion - Doctrine of separation of powers - Whether violated - Whether SOSMA validly enacted law pursuant to art. 149 of Federal Constitution - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA ultra vires arts. 8 & 121 of Federal Constitution
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Bail - Granting of - Security offences - Accused charged for security offences relating to terrorism under ss. 130J & 130JB of Penal Code - Section 13 of Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ('SOSMA') prohibits granting of bail to person charged with offences relating to terrorism - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA unconstitutional - Whether bail a judicial power - Whether there was basis or foundation for exercise of judicial discretion - Whether court has discretion to grant/refuse bail - Whether s. 13 of SOSMA ultra vires arts. 8 & 121 of Federal Constitution
Syarikat Hing Lee Fishing (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v. Lin Yun Thai & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 289 (CA) overruling the High Court case of Syarikat Hing Lee Fishing (Sabah) Sdn Bhd v. Lin Yun Thai & Ors [Suit No: TWU-22NCVC-1/1-2017]
Ong Keh Keong & Anor v. Low Kah Khuen [2019] 1 LNS 357 (CA) affirming the High Court case of Low Kah Khuen v. Ong Keh Keong & Anor [Saman Pemula No: 24 NCVC-144-01/2013]
[2019] 1 LNS 106
WONG SIE KWONG & ANOR v. HELENA KUBAL
1. In a claim for loss of dependency, a deduction of 1/3 for personal expenses may be made from the gross pay instead of the nett pay where the income of the deceased is low.
2. A claim for special damages for expenses incurred in serving food and beverages during a funeral must be strictly proved by adducing evidence as to number of people who attended the funeral, type of food and beverages served and details of the caterer who supplied the same.
ROAD TRAFFIC: Negligence - Road accident - Ascertaining of liability - Collision between car and lorry - Fatal accident - Location of most of debris and lorry's brake marks on travel path of car - Considerable length of lorry's brake marks measuring about 65 meters - Lorry driver admitted lorry was going at 80 km per hour - Whether lorry had encroached onto travel path of car in a negligent manner - Whether lorry driver was solely liable - Whether failure to mention certain details in police report was detrimental to plaintiff's case
DAMAGES: Fatal accident - Dependency claim - Claim for loss of dependency - Low income - Whether 1/3 deduction for personal expenses may be made from gross pay instead of nett pay
DAMAGES: Fatal accident - Special damages - Claim for expenses incurred in serving food and beverages during funeral - Absence of evidence as to number of people who attended funeral who were given food and beverages, type of food and beverages served and details of caterer - Whether special damages must be strictly proved
For the appellants - Gladys Lee; Gladys & Brandon
For the respondent - Catherine David; Khaira & Co
[2019] 1 LNS 108
HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD v. SINAR MENTARI TECHNOLOGY SDN BHD & ORS
A company has implied powers to borrow money by virtue of the Third Schedule to the Companies Act 1965 and thus the facilities granted to a company were not ultra vires its memorandum of association. Facilities granted to a company may be in excess of its paid up capital.
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Summary judgment - Banking - Triable issues - Breach of repayment obligations - Allegation that facilities granted was illegal and was ultra vires borrower's object clause as stated in memorandum of association - Facilities granted was in excess of paid up capital - Whether company has implied powers to obtain loan facilities - Whether allegations raised by defendant amount to triable issues - Whether discrepancies in amount of principal outstanding was a triable issue
[2019] 1 LNS 132
DR PRIMALATHA RAMA GOVINDA lwn. PREMAVATHY BALAKRISHNAN
1. Peranan yang dimainkan oleh isteri dalam menyara keluarga, menyelesaikan dan menyumbang di dalam membayar perbelanjaan bulanan keluarga adalah merupakan sumbangan tidak langsung ke arah pemerolehan aset perkahwinan dan justeru, isteri berhak ke atas sebahagian aset perkahwinan walaupun aset perkahwinan tersebut didaftar di atas nama mendiang suami.
2. Sesuatu wasiat yang dipertikaikan atas sebab keadaan pembuat wasiat yang didakwa mengalami encephalopathy hanya dapat dibuktikan keesahannya melalui keterangan pakar.
UNDANG-UNDANG KELUARGA: Aset perkahwinan - Hak dan kepentingan - Tuntutan oleh isteri ke atas rumah yang didaftarkan atas nama mendiang suami - Sumbangan tidak langsung - Pembubaran perkahwinan secara semulajadi - Bayaran deposit pembelian rumah dibayar oleh isteri melalui bantuan keluarganya - Isteri memainkan peranan utama di dalam menyara keluarga, menyelesaikan dan menyumbang di dalam membayar perbelanjaan bulanan keluarga - Sama ada isteri telah memberikan sumbangan tidak langsung ke arah pemerolehan rumah - Sama ada isteri berhak ke atas sebahagian rumah yang didaftarkan atas nama mendiang suami
PERWARISAN: Wasiat - Keesahan - Pertikaian berkenaan keadaan mental si mati ketika membuat wasiat - Dakwaan bahawa si mati mengalami encephalopathy - Sama ada keterangan pakar bagi menentukan keadaan mental si mati adalah diperlukan - Sama ada terdapat sebarang bukti yang menunjukkan si mati mengalami encephalopathy - Sama ada si mati dalam keadaan sempurna akal ketika membuat wasiat
Bagi pihak plaintif - Cyndi LK Chow & Lim Eu Jin; T/n Josephine LK Chow & Co
Bagi pihak defendan - Vengetraman Manickam; T/n Jeyaratnam & Co
[2019] 1 LNS 139
CIMB BANK BERHAD lwn. JAMRI AHMED & SATU LAGI
Pengstrukturan semula cara pembayaran dan perjanjian penyelesaian di antara pemegang gadaian dan penggadai adalah perkara persendirian di antara mereka dan tidak menjejaskan hak penguatkuasaan gadaian oleh pemegang gadaian apabila kemungkiran telah dilakukan oleh penggadai.
UNDANG-UNDANG TANAH: Gadaian - Perintah jualan - Prosiding halang tebus - Kausa yang bertentangan - Kemungkiran terma-terma perjanjian pinjaman dan perjanjian penyelesaian oleh penggadai - Sama ada pemegang gadaian hanya menguatkuasakan haknya dibawah gadaian setelah kemungkiran dilakukan oleh penggadai - Sama ada jumlah keberhutangan telah diterangkan kepada penggadai - Sama ada pengstrukturan semula cara pembayaran dan perjanjian penyelesaian di antara pemegang gadaian dan penggadai menjejaskan hak penguatkuasaan gadaian oleh pemegang gadaian
Bagi pihak perayu - Ahmad Mukmin; T/n Mukmin Azmi & Co
Bagi pihak responden - Norasidi Nadziruddin & Farhana Aqlilie; T/n Tan Norizan & Associates
[2019] 1 LNS 141
PP v. NORAZMAN V SULTAN
The present application of the prosecution to discontinue the prosecution and recharge the accused together with other accused is an abuse of court process when there exists an earlier decision of the court directing trial against both accused to be conducted separately. Hence, it is only fair for the court to make an order to discharge the accused amounting to acquittal.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Acquittal or discharge - Discharge not amounting to acquittal - Prosecution applied for withdrawal of case so that accused could be recharged jointly with other accused - Existence of previous court order dismissing prosecution's application for joint trial - Whether prosecution could discontinue prosecution and recharge accused with other accused - Whether prosecution's discontinuance is clearly to circumvent earlier decision of court directing separate trial - Whether prosecution's application was an abuse of process of court - Whether discharge amounting to an acquittal was justified
For the applicant - Mohd Amril Johari; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri
For the respondent- Md Yusuf Md Idris; M/s Yusuf Idris & Co
Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Norsiah Ali [2020] 4 CLJ 149 [CA]
For the appellant - KN Geetha & GS Saran; M/s GK Ganesan
For the respondent - Razlan Hadri & Danny Soong Hou Ming; M/s Gan, Ho & Razlan Hadri
AJS v. RIS & Anor [2020] 4 CLJ 170 [HC]
FAMILY LAW | CIVIL PROCEDURE | STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
For the petitioner - Ravi Nekoo, Pushpa Ratnam & Parvinder Kaur; M/s Hakem Arabi & Assocs
For the co-respondent - CJ Siew & CY Ong; M/s Douglas Yee
An application under s. 451 of the Companies Act 2016 for leave to proceed with an action against a company which has been placed under liquidation in the Civil Court instead of the winding-up court may be granted if the applicant can show a real dispute and if the remedy sought cannot be adequately dealt with or given by the latter court. Such leave, further, can be granted retrospectively after commencement of proceedings, as there is nothing in s. 451 or the Act that prohibits the court from giving it a retrospective effect.
AWH Equity Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors v. GMV-Borcos Sdn Bhd (Dalam Likuidasi Sukarela) [2020] 4 CLJ 185 [HC]
COMPANY LAW: Liquidation - Voluntary liquidation - Application to proceed with suit against company in voluntary liquidation - Suit premised on breach of agreement, negligence, tortious duty of care, misrepresentation and vicarious liability - Whether applicant satisfied requirements under s. 451 of Companies Act 2016 - Whether suit could be dealt by winding-up court - Whether there was prima facie case to warrant granting of leave - Whether leave to commence proceedings may be granted retrospectively - Whether there was basis to restrict applicants from enforcing judgment against company should applicants succeed in suit - Whether suit had sufficient degree of complexity
For the applicants - Sunil Abraham & Austen Pereira; M/s Cecil Abraham & Partners
For the respondent - Lee Shih & Janice Ooi; M/s Skrine
The court does not answer academic questions unless they come within the narrow band of important public law issues. The plaintiff's pleas, though patently academic, had to be addressed since they raised unprecedented public law issues on the constitutionality of a statute. Be that as it may, the allegations that the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA) is discriminatory and that its adjudication proceedings are unsurping the judicial power of the court and violative of arts. 8 and 121 of the Federal Constitution, are flawed and misplaced. Article 8 contemplates lawful discrimination based on classification; and the creation of a class comprising disputants to a construction contract by CIPAA is permissible; it is permissible because the disputants are treated equally and made subject to the same rules and procedure. Further, whilst adjudication proceedings under CIPAA may have the trappings of a court, they are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power. The judicial function the adjudicator exercises is not, and not synonymous with "judicial power of the Federation".
Mega Sasa Sdn Bhd v. Kinta Bakti Sdn Bhd & Ors [2020] 4 CLJ 201 [HC]
CONSTRUCTION LAW | JURISDICTION
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Jurisdiction - Adjudication proceedings under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') - Appointment of adjudicator - Challenge against validity of appointment - Distinction between judicial power and judicial function - Whether CIPAA violated arts. 8(1) and 121 of Federal Constitution - Whether proceedings amounted to usurpation of judicial powers of court - Whether merely another statutory dispute resolution process - Whether appointment of adjudicator valid
CONSTRUCTION LAW: Adjudication - Jurisdiction - Adjudication proceedings under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') - Imposition of adjudicator's fees and expenses - Whether constitutional - Whether Asian International Arbitration Centre empowered by CIPAA to charge administrative fees - Whether challenge on illegality of imposition of administrative fees ought to be pursued by way of judicial review - Asian International Arbitration Centre Adjudication Rules and Procedure, r. 9(2)(b)
JURISDICTION: Courts - Powers and jurisdiction - Adjudication proceedings under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('CIPAA') - Challenge against validity of appointment of adjudicator - Distinction between judicial power and judicial function - Whether statutory adjudication under CIPAA is judicial function - Whether CIPAA violated arts. 8(1) and 121 of Federal Constitution - Whether CIPAA only affects disputants - Costs incurred in adjudication proceedings - Whether amounted to inequality as contemplated by art. 8(1) of Federal Constitution
For the plaintiff - Arun Kasi, T Gunaseelan & R Kairnan; M/s Arun Kasi & Co
For the 1st defendant - James Ding Tze Wen & Ling Jia Wen; M/s CH Tay & Partners
For the 2nd defendant - Muhammad Faisal Moideen, Maximilian Tai Kim Sen & Wan Nur Addibah Adnan;
M/s Moideen & Max
For the 3rd & 4th defendants - Foo Joon Liang, Celine Chelladurai & Tan Wei Li; M/s Celine & Oommen
For the 5th-7th defendants - Alice Loke Yee Ching; AG's Chambers
For the Bar Council Malaysia - Balbir Singh
For the Malaysian Society Of Adjudicators - Wilfred Abraham
For the Chartered Institute Of Arbitrators (Malaysia Branch), Malaysian Institute Of Arbitrators And Society Of Construction Law Malaysia - Choon Hong Leng
In a proceeding for an offence of causing death or injury while driving under intoxication pursuant to ss. 44 or 45 of the Road Transport Act 1987, the non-production of the certificate under s. 45F(3) of the Act purporting to certify the alcohol level in the accused's blood specimen is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the medical officer who took the sample was called as a witness. It is also relevant to note that in such proceeding, where a locus in quo was resorted to, that the conduct of such locus in quo be left to the discretion of the Sessions Court judge or Magistrate as the case may be, and that, where no questions were asked of any witness thereat, it is still open, by reason of a new matter or a new evidence having arisen at the scene, that the parties be at liberty to examine and cross-examine the same on their return to the court room.
Olivia Chong Oi Yun v. PP [2020] 4 CLJ 246 [HC]
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | ROAD TRAFFIC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Appeal - Appeal against conviction and sentence - Offence of driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs - Accused drove car at a fast speed and flung from one side of road to other side, killing four people and injuring one - Accused found guilty of two charges under s. 44(1)(b) of Road Transport Act 1987 - Accused sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and fine of RM20,000 for first charge and seven years' imprisonment and fine of RM19,000 for second charge - Imprisonment terms ordered to run consecutively - Whether conviction safe - Whether sentence manifestly excessive
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Principles - Appeal against sentence - Offence of driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs - Accused drove car at a fast speed and flung from one side of road to other side, killing four people and injuring one - Accused found guilty of two charges under s. 44(1)(b) of Road Transport Act 1987 - Accused sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and fine of RM20,000 for first charge and seven years' imprisonment and fine of RM19,000 for second charge - Imprisonment terms ordered to run consecutively - Whether ought to run concurrently - Whether sentence manifestly excessive - Whether sentence meted out in line with principles of sentencing
ROAD TRAFFIC: Accident - Reckless driving - Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs - Accused drove car at a fast speed and flung from one side of road to other side, killing four people and injuring one - Accused found guilty of two charges under s. 44(1)(b) of Road Transport Act 1987 - Accused sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and fine of RM20,000 for first charge and seven years' imprisonment and fine of RM19,000 for second charge - Appeal against sentence and conviction - Whether conviction safe - Whether sentence manifestly excessive
ALWI ABDUL WAHAB J
For the appellant - Ram Singh, Kimberly Ye; M/s Ram Singh Harbans & Co
For the respondent - Don Stiwin Malanjum; DPP
Suresh Kumar Velayuthan v. PP [2020] 4 CLJ 270 [HC]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
For the applicant - Ram Karpal Singh & Harshaan Zamani; M/s Karpal Singh & Co
For the respondent - Tommy Thomas, Aslinda Ahad, Rohaiza Abd Rahman & Mohamad Nurzul Azuar Zulkifli; DPPs
THE ALTERNATIVE FORM OF SENTENCING* [Read excerpt]
by DATUK JOY APPUKUTTAN** [2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxviii
[2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxviii
THE ALTERNATIVE FORM OF SENTENCING*
Until recently, many offenders of the Prevention And Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within the Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020[1] (“Regulation”), were subjected to the maximum fine of RM1,000-00 and in some cases custodial sentences.
This Article will now examine the application and use of community service as an alternative means of sentencing and why current legislations are inadequate and ought to be reviewed.
* This article is made possible through the assistance, support and invaluable research by my colleagues, Mr Kelvynn Foo Wai Tzen, Ms. Joycelyn Keziah & Mr Leong Teen Yue. The Article was completed on 10thApril 2020.
** Barrister At Law (Middle Temple), Advocate & Solicitor (Malaya) & Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore).
MALAYSIAN ANTI-DUMPING POLICY EXERCISES: A FLAWED INTERNATIONAL TRADE MECHANISM [Read excerpt]
by MOHD HAKIM MUSA* [2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxix
[2020] 1 LNS(A) xxxix
MALAYSIAN ANTI-DUMPING POLICY EXERCISES:
A FLAWED INTERNATIONAL TRADE MECHANISM
MOHD HAKIM MUSA*
Generally, dumping is a situation of international price discrimination. A legal definition of dumping as accorded by Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (“GATT”) 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (“ADA”) is that dumping is a situation where the introduction of a product into the commerce of another country is made at less than its normal value in the domestic country. According to Article VI GATT 1994, an exercise of dumping is not prohibited, however, it is condemned if it causes injury to the domestic industry of the importing country. In the legal framework of the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”), the injured domestic countries are allowed to counter-react or remedy this through anti-dumping measures within the ambit of GATT 1994 and ADA to protect their domestic industry.
*Non-Practicing Advocate & Solicitor, High Court of Malaya, (formerly practising at M/s B.H. Gan, Nor & Kim); Master (Commercial) Law candidate, UM; Bachelor of Law (LL.B) (Hons) UiTM; Bachelor of Legal Studies (BLS) (Hons) UiTM.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DURING MCO AND COVID-19 PANDEMIC [Read excerpt]
by P. Jayasingam[i], Wong Keat Ching[ii], Thavaselvi Pararajasingam[iii] [2020] 1 LNS(A) xli
[2020] 1 LNS(A) xli
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
DURING MCO AND COVID-19 PANDEMIC
P. Jayasingam[i]
Wong Keat Ching[ii]
Thavaselvi Pararajasingam[iii]
On 16 March 2020, the Prime Minister of Malaysia announced the Government’s decision that a nationwide Movement Control Order (“MCO”) would be imposed from 18 March 2020 until 31 March 2020 (“the Period”) under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act and the Police Act 1967.
On 18 March 2020, the Government issued the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures within Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020 (“Regulation No. 1”) which laid down relevant regulations to implement the MCO.
*Reproduced with permission by Zul Rafique & Partners.
[i] Head, Litigation and Employment & Industrial Relations practice groups, Zul Rafique & Partners.
[ii] Partner, Litigation and Employment & Industrial Relations practice groups, Zul Rafique & Partners.
[iii] Partner, Litigation and Employment & Industrial Relations practice groups, Zul Rafique & Partners.
[The contents do not constitute legal advice, are not intended to be a substitute for legal advice and should not be relied upon as such.]
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON SHARIAH NON-COMPLIANT COLLATERAL* [Read excerpt]
by MOHAMMAD MAHBUBI ALI, LOKMANULHAKIM HUSSEIN [2020] 1 LNS(A) xl
[2020] 1 LNS(A) xl
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON SHARIAH NON-COMPLIANT COLLATERAL*
LOKMANULHAKIM HUSSEIN
Collateral is an essential tool that financial institutions use to manage the risk of customer default. In such an event, the bank may claim from the collateral to recover payment of the customer’s outstanding obligation. Collateral is typically charged to secure a financing facility, which can be either in the form of tangible assets, such as real estate and vehicles or financial assets such as bonds, sukuk and shares.
The remarkable development of Islamic financial products has stirred the introduction of exotic, sophisticated collateral instruments, such as unit trusts, current accounts and investment accounts. These may raise issues, mainly if they involve Shariah non-compliant elements. This short article, therefore, sheds critical light on the use of Shariah non-compliant assets as collateral in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs).
PU(A) 121/2020 Prison (Amendment) Regulations 2020 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 PU(A) 325/2000
PU(A) 120/2020 Prisons Regulations 2000 - Corrigendum 20 April 2020 PU(A) 325/2000
PU(A) 119/2020 Registration of Pharmacists (Amendment of First Schedule) (No. 2) Order 2020 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 371
PU(A) 118/2020 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Compounding of Offences) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 14 April 2020 15 April 2020 PU(A) 327/1993
PU(A) 117/2020 Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 14 April 2020 15 April 2020 to 28 April 2020 ACT 342
PU(B) 209/2020 Declaration of Quarantine Stations (No. 12) 2020 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 342
PU(B) 208/2020 Appointment of Lock-Up to Be a Place of Confinement - Travers Police Station, Kuala Lumpur 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 537
PU(B) 207/2020 Appointment of Lock-Up to Be a Place of Confinement - Travers Police Station, Kuala Lumpur 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 537
PU(B) 206/2020 Appointment of Lock-Up to Be a Place of Confinement - Perlis Contingent Police Headquarters, Perlis 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 537
PU(B) 205/2020 Appointment of Lock-Up to Be a Place of Confinement - Perlis Contingent Police Headquarters, Perlis 20 April 2020 21 April 2020 ACT 537
ACT 730 Trade Descriptions Act 2011 ACT A1607 27 December 2019 [PU(B) 656/2019] Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 39
AKTA 730 Akta Perihal Dagangan 2011 AKTA A1607 27 Disember 2019 [PU(B) 656/2019] Seksyen 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 dan 39
ACT 371 Registration of Pharmacists Act 1951 (Revised 1989) PU(A) 119/2020 21 April 2020 First Schedule
PU(A) 325/2000 Peraturan-Peraturan Penjara 2000 PU(A) 121/2020 21 April 2020 Peraturan 111 dan 280; Jadual Pertama
PU(A) 325/2000 Prison Regulations 2000 PU(A) 121/2020 21 April 2020 Regulations 111 and 280; First Schedule