Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/132323819/Brian-Kendrick-Cert-Petition
Timestamp: 2017-03-29 09:54:10
Document Index: 668552369

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1257', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 1257', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 35']

Brian Kendrick Cert Petition | Confrontation Clause | Indiana
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IN THE Supreme Court of the United States ____________ Brian Kendrick, Petitioner, v.
State of Indiana, Respondent. ____________ On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Indiana Court of Appeals ____________ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ___________
Victoria L. Bailey Marion County Public Defender Agency 151 N. Delaware, Suite 200 Indianapolis, IN 46204 (317) 327-4488 victoria.bailey@indy.gov Counsel of Record for Petitioner
QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the Confrontation Clause permits a witness to be found unavailable after the prosecution contributed to his absence from trial.
TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................ 1 OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 1 JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1 RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION .......................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................... 6 I. The Decision Below Decides An Important Question of Federal Law In A Way That Conflicts With Relevant Decisions Of This Court ........................................................................................................ 6 This Issue Is Important To The Proper Administration of Criminal Trials ........................................................................................................ 9 The Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For Considering The Question Presented .................................................................................................. 9 The Indiana Court Of Appeals‟ Decision Is Incorrect ........................... 10
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 11 APPENDIX A, Opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals ........................................... 1a APPENDIX B, Order of the Indiana Court of Appeals .............................................. 8a APPENDIX C, Order of the Indiana Supreme Court................................................. 9a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).............................................................. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) .............................................................. 7, 8, 9 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ................................................................ 10 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)...................................................... 6, 7, 10 Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S _____ (2011) ....................................................................... 1, 7 Kendrick v. State, 947 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) ........................................... 1, 6 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) ...................................... 6, 7, 9 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)....................................................................... 7, 8, 9 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ........................................................................... 6 CONSTITIONAL PROVISION U.S. Const. amend. VI ..........................................................................................passim STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ........................................................................................................ 1 Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 ..................................................................................................... 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 ..................................................................................................... 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-6 ..................................................................................................... 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 ..................................................................................................... 3 Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 ..................................................................................................... 3
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI Petitioner Brian Kendrick respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to the Indiana Court of Appeals in Kendrick v. State, 49A02-1003-CR-300. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals (App. 1a – 7a) is published at 947 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The order of the Indiana Court of Appeals (App. 8a) denying rehearing is unpublished. The order of the Indiana Supreme Court denying transfer (App. 9a) is unpublished. The judgment and sentence of the trial court are not published. JURISDICTION The opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals was entered on May 26, 2011. App. A. The order of the Indiana Supreme Court denying transfer was entered on October 13, 2011. App. B. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). RELEVANT CONSTITIONAL PROVISION The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” STATEMENT OF THE CASE This Court held in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-725 (1968), cited in Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. ____ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5), that a witness is not “unavailable” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause “unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” This case raises the question of whether the prosecution complies with that holding by taking action to cause a witness‟ failure to appear at trial and then introducing that witness‟ prior testimonial statements to the jury. In this case, the Indiana Court of Appeals held such actions by the prosecution satisfy the good-faith requirement. In so holding, it has created an “unintentional miscommunication” exception to the Confrontation Clause‟s good-faith effort requirement. The creation of such an
exception decides an important question of federal law in a way that conflicts with this Court‟s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 1. On an evening in April 2008, a group of men were hanging out in
Aaron Little‟s garage on the near northwest side of Indianapolis. One of those men was Aaron Stewart. Another was Brian Kendrick. During the evening, Mr. Stewart stated “jokingly” that he was “so broke he wanted to rob him a bank cause he needed some money.” Tr. at 406. Sometime after 8:00 pm, Mr. Stewart and
Petitioner left Mr. Little‟s in Mr. Stewart‟s blue Chevy Trailblazer. The next morning, Mr. Stewart asked to borrow a car from Mr. Little. Mr. Little arranged for Mr. Stewart to use a black Chrysler Sebring belonging to Mr. Little‟s girlfriend, Twaunya Taylor. Mr. Little, Mr. Stewart, and Petitioner drove to pick up the black Sebring in Mr. Stewart‟s blue Chevy Trailblazer. After the three men picked up the black Sebring, they ended up back at Mr. Little‟s house. Mr. Stewart and Petitioner then drove off with one of the men driving the black Sebring and the other driving the blue Trailblazer.
Later that morning, a masked gunman robbed a Huntington Bank branch and, during the course of the robbery, shot a visibly pregnant bank teller in the abdomen. After taking money from another teller‟s drawer, the gunman fired
another shot, hitting a wall, and fled the bank. The bank teller who was shot required two surgeries – one the day of the shooting and the second, two days later. In addition to the injuries suffered by the bank teller, one of her twin girls was stillborn and the other died a few hours after she was delivered. Near the scene of the robbery and right around the time the incident ended, a man named Gilberto Mendez saw a masked man with a gun running through his back yard. He saw the masked man jump into the front passenger seat of a brown or gray Dodge Intrepid. However, he did not see a black Sebring. A blue Honda Pilot was parked right behind the Intrepid. Mr. Mendez called police to report what he had seen. 2. In June 2008, the State charged Petitioner with five counts: Count I,
Attempt Murder, a Class A Felony, in violation of Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1 and 35-421-1; Count II, Robbery, a Class A Felony, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1; Count III, Feticide, a Class C Felony, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-6; Count IV, Feticide, a Class C Felony, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-6; and Count V, Carrying a Handgun Without a License, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1. At Petitioner‟s trial, Mr. Stewart identified Petitioner as the robber/shooter. Mr. Stewart testified Petitioner parked the Sebring near the bank and then came
back to the car wearing the same clothes the robber was seen wearing on bank surveillance. In exchange for his testimony against Petitioner, Mr. Stewart was only charged with conspiracy to commit robbery as a Class B felony, leaving open the possibility that any sentence he received could be suspended. Mr. Little also testified against Petitioner. In exchange for his testimony, Mr. Little was not charged in relation to the robbery/shooting and received a reduced sentence on a domestic battery case in another court. Ms. Taylor, Mr. Little‟s girlfriend, cooperated with law enforcement and testified for the State because she wanted to be cleared since her car had allegedly been used in the robbery. A friend of Mr. Little‟s C.J. Petty, came forward and cooperated with law enforcement two months after the robbery and only after a $10,000 reward had been offered. Detective Challis, the lead detective on the case, testified that beyond the testimony of Mr. Stewart, Mr. Little, Ms. Taylor, and Mr. Petty, there was no evidence linking Petitioner to the robbery and shooting. Tr. at 1263. On the fifth and final day of Petitioner‟s trial, Friday, the State sought to have the trial court declare Gilberto Mendez an unavailable witness so that it could read his deposition testimony into the record. Petitioner objected on Confrontation Clause grounds because Mr. Mendez was not “unavailable” for purposes of trial since his absence was procured by the State. During an earlier hearing, John Koss, an investigator for the Marion County Prosecutor‟s office testified he served Mr. Mendez with a subpoena five days before the trial started but did not know what dates and/or times the subpoena called for Mr. Mendez to appear. Tr. at 680, 689.
Then, Mr. Koss testified he went to Mr. Mendez‟s house on Wednesday, the t hird day of trial and told Mr. Mendez to be on stand-by to come to court either that day or the next, which was Thursday, the fourth day of trial; he told Mr. Mendez he would call if he needed him to come to court; he never told Mr. Mendez that he may need to come to court on Friday, the fifth day of trial. Tr. at 1110-1113. In fact, Mr. Koss specifically told Mr. Mendez to stay home unless Mr. Koss told him otherwise. Tr. at 1113. Additionally, the State was never able to produce its subpoena for Mr. Mendez and the State offered no evidence as to which dates of Petitioner‟s five-day trial Mr. Mendez had been subpoenaed for. Tr. 812-813. Ultimately, the trial
court overruled Petitioner‟s objection and permitted the State to read Mr. Mendez‟s deposition into evidence. The jury convicted petitioner on all five counts and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years in prison. 3. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. It agreed Mr. Mendez‟s
deposition was testimonial hearsay, but upheld the trial court‟s finding that Mr. Mendez was unavailable for trial. The court of appeals reasoned that Mr. Mendez‟s absence from trial was the result of an “unintentional miscommunication between the State and [Mr.] Mendez” and that State made a good-faith effort to secure Mr. Mendez‟s attendance at trial, noting the State “hand delivered the subpoena to Mendez‟s home the week before the trial and then sent Koss out to Mendez‟s home on the Wednesday of trial to ensure his availability.” Kendrick, 947 N.E.2d at 516. App. 4a.
Petitioner sought discretionary review of this decision in the Indiana
Supreme Court. He cited, among other things, this Court‟s opinion in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) for the proposition that the “Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.” Pet. to Transfer at 5. The Indiana Supreme Court denied review without comment. App. at 9. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT I. The Decision Below Decides An Important Question Of Federal Law In A Way That Conflicts With Relevant Decisions Of This Court “There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965), cited in Barber, 390 U.S. at 721. This Court‟s commitment to and recognition of the critical role confrontation plays in criminal trials is reflected in the Court‟s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, beginning with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, this Court held that the prosecution may not, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, introduce testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant when the declarant fails to testify unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 59, 68. By logical extension, therefore, the introduction of testimonial hearsay against a
criminal defendant would violate the Confrontation Clause if the declarant was not unavailable. Regarding witness unavailability, this Court clarified in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), that “the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.” Id. at 2541. To satisfy its burden, the
prosecution must make a “good-faith effort to obtain [the witness‟] presence at trial.” Barber, 390 U.S. at 725 (“The State made no such effort here . . . because the State did not attempt to seek [the witness‟] presence.”). “Although it might be said that the Court‟s prior cases provide no further refinement of this statement of the rule, certain general propositions safely emerge.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), overruled in part by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-68. Specifically, as noted in Roberts, “the law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness‟ intervening death) „good faith‟ demands nothing of the prosecution.” Id. However, “if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation.” Id. (emphasis in original). Ultimately, “„[t]he lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness . . . is a question of reasonableness.‟” Id. (quoting
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189, n. 22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)), cited in Hardy, 565 U.S. ________, (slip op., at 6).
Thus, while this Court has found that the prosecution makes a good-faith effort to secure a witness‟ presence even where not every possible effort has been made, this Court has never found the good-faith effort requirement satisfied where an action on the part of the prosecution was the reason why the witness did not appear. Quite to the contrary, in fact, this Court stated in California v. Green that admission of testimonial hearsay may comply with the Confrontation Clause “as long as the declarant‟s inability to give live testimony is in no way the fault of the State.” 399 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added). When read alongside Barber and Roberts, this statement from California v. Green seems to stand for the proposition that the prosecution cannot be said to have made a good-faith effort to secure the witness‟ attendance while at the same time having played a part in the witness‟ absence. Put another way, a witness is not constitutionally unavailable when the prosecution contributes to his absence. The Indiana Court of Appeals‟ opinion in petitioner‟s case creates an exception to this Court‟s decisions in Barber, Roberts, and California v. Green. Specifically, the opinion below holds that the prosecution satisfies the Confrontation Clause‟s good-faith requirement even when the prosecution contributed to the witness‟ absence so long as it did so “unintentionally.” App. at 4. Not only is the Indiana Court of Appeals‟ holding contrary to this Court‟s relevant decisions, but even more importantly, it marks the beginning of a dangerous journey down a slippery slope. In the next case, the prosecution could unintentionally list the
wrong courtroom on a witness‟ subpoena and that would satisfy the good faith
requirement. In the case after that, the prosecution could unintentionally list the wrong date for the trial and that also would satisfy the good faith requirement. Finally, the prosecution could unintentionally fail to serve a subpoena at all and, based on the opinion below, still be found to have satisfied the good-faith effort requirement. II. This Issue Is Important To The Proper Administration Of Criminal Trials This Court should not allow this conflict with its prior decisions to persist. The question presented implicates not only this Court‟s holdings in Barber, Roberts, and California v. Green, but also its holding in Melendez-Diaz, where this Court made clear that the burden is always and only on the State to produce its witness at trial. 129 S.Ct. at 2540. Prosecutors and judges need to know that there is no exception to the State‟s burden and that good-faith cannot include contributing to a witness‟ absence. III. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For Considering The Question Presented This case presents an excellent vehicle for resolving the important federal question raised in the question presented. Specifically, this case raises the question presented on direct review to this Court and is without any issues of waiver or the constraints of collateral review. The question presented was properly preserved by way of clear and unambiguous objections in the trial court wherein the petitioner argued the State failed to demonstrate the witness‟ unavailability and that the admission of the witness‟ deposition violated the Confrontation Clause. Peti tioner
further preserved this issue by arguing at each level of the Indiana appellate courts that the admission of the witness‟ deposition violated the Sixth Amendment and the Indiana Court of Appeals decided the issue on the merits. Finally, if this Court concludes that petitioner‟s confrontation rights were violated, he would be entitled to a new trial because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.1 IV. The Indiana Court Of Appeals’ Decision Is Incorrect The Indiana Court of Appeals erred in holding that a witness is constitutionally unavailable when the State contributed to the witness‟ absence. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend VI. A State cannot both make a goodfaith effort to secure a witness‟ attendance at trial while at the same time taking actions causing the witness‟ absence from trial. In Crawford, this Court held, “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of „reliability.‟” 541 U.S. at 61. What the Indiana Court of Appeals has done is left the Sixth
Amendment‟s protections to the even more amorphous notion of “unintentionality.” This Court should not allow the Indiana Court of Appeals‟ decision to stand.
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
________________________ Victoria L. Bailey Marion County Public Defender Agency 151 N. Delaware, Suite 200 Indianapolis, IN 46204 (317) 327-4488 January 9, 2012
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