Source: https://www.arcourtsdvp.org/arkansas-undang-undang.html
Timestamp: 2018-01-21 04:52:55
Document Index: 508402692

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 9', '§ 16', '§ 1690', '§ 12', '§12', '§5', '§16']

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Domestic Violence Orders in Arkansas
2015 Legislative and Case Law Update
Act 304 (SB156) Distribution of Sexual Images to Abuse, Intimidate or Harass This Act creates a Class A misdemeanor for unlawful distribution of sexual images or recordings with the intent to embarrass, harass, frighten, intimidate, threaten, or abuse a family or household member or a person in a current or past dating relationship with the alleged perpetrator. Amends Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-302 (Definitions Section) and adds a new § 5-26314.
Act 701 (HB1587) In-Laws in Definition of “Family or Household Members" This Act adds “in-laws” to the definition of “Family and Household Members” in the Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, and defines “inlaws” as “persons related by marriage within the second degree of consanguinity. Ark. Code Ann §§ 9-15-103(4) and -103(5).
Act 873 (HB1599) Laura’s Card This Act requires law enforcement officers investigating a crime of domestic violence to give a preprinted document (known as “Laura's Card”) explaining the victim's rights to the victim's family, if applicable, and to include his or her badge number and contact information on Laura’s card. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1107(a). As used in this section, “law enforcement agency” includes without limitation a college or university police department. Ark Code Ann. § 1690-1107(c).
Act 876 (HB1706) Domestic Violence Victim Unavailable to Testify This Act concerns “victimless prosecution” for domestic violence, the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence offenses when the victim is not able to testify, and providing for the use of other evidence. The collection of evidence may include without limitation:
properly obtained statements from the alleged offender;
photographs or other media;
other physical evidence; and
statements from the victim that are exclusions or exceptions to Rule 802 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.
Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-108.
Act 877 (HB1707) Lethality Assessment This Act concerns law enforcement response and reporting during the investigation of an act of domestic violence which requires the first law enforcement officer who interviews a victim to assess the potential for danger by completing a lethality assessment form and, based on the results, to decide whether to refer the victim to an available shelter or domestic violence intervention program. The lethality assessment form shall be completed with information the officer obtains from the victim, which is set out in the Act. Ark. Code Ann. §12-12-108.
Act 952 (HB 1685) Health Class Dating Violence/Dating Violence Curriculum Act requires adding dating violence awareness to the educational curriculum taught in health courses in grades 7-12. The curriculum would require a discussion on healthy relationships, definitions of dating violence and abuse, warning signs of dating violence and abusive behavior, resources and reporting procedures for dating violence and abuse and an examination of common misconceptions and stereotypes of dating violence and abuse.
Act 828 (HB 1203) Use of deadly physical force in defense of a person HB 1203 Amends Arkansas Code§5-2-607 to a person may use deadly force upon another person, (with section (c) (2) (A) and (B)) including if the person reasonably believes that the other person is committing or about to commit physical violence, deadly violence, or is imminently about to victimize the person through the continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse or sexual conduct between family or household member that constitutes a crime under state laws.
Act 608 (SB 57) Victim Impact Statements during inmate parole determination The act amends Arkansas Code §16-90-1113 to consideration and release of a victim impact statement during an inmate’s parole determination.
Duvall v. Liang, 2014 Ark. App. 359 [order of protection; notice] The appellant was not given notice of the final hearing at which a 10-year order of protection was entered against him. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order denying his motion to set aside and dismiss the order of protection, and it vacated the January 32, 2013 order of protection. The Court said that because the service requirements for the notice of the final hearing were not satisfied–and he was not present at the hearing–the court was without authority to act, which rendered the final order void. (McCain, M.; No. CV-13-965; 6-4-14; Glover, D.)
Lundy v. Lundy, 2014 Ark. App. 573 [divorce–general indignities] The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented at the divorce hearing did not support the granting of a divorce on the ground of general indignities. Even if her testimony was recognized as sufficient to establish grounds, the appellee failed to provide any proof corroborating those grounds, even though corroborating evidence need be only slight. Here appellee’s sister’s testimony was based only upon information she derived from the appellee, not from any discord that she witnessed between the parties. The decision granting the divorce was reversed and dismissed. (Foster, H.G.; No. CV-14188; 10-22-14; Brown, W.)
Bohannon v. Robinson, 2014 Ark. 458 [order of protection] The Supreme Court reversed and remanded a final order of protection against the appellant, finding insufficient evidence to support the order. The appellee father of appellant’s three-month-old child filed a petition for an order of protection for the child, alleging that the appellant was being released from incarceration within thirty days which would create “an immediate and present danger of domestic abuse.” He alleged that the appellant had committed previous acts of domestic violence by driving under the influence of drugs with the baby and three other children in the car, hitting a pole and almost hitting a gas pump. “She was arrested and charged with four counts of child endangerment.” An ex parte order of protection was entered and a hearing set, and the appellant was served with the petition and the order of protection while in jail. She failed to appear at the hearing. The appellee appeared pro se and was granted a final order of protection for two years. The appellant filed a motion for new trial, or alternatively, for relief from the order of protection, or alternatively, to set aside the default judgment. At the hearing on appellant’s posttrial motion, she argued that, although properly served with the ex parte order, she could not attend the hearing on the final order because she was incarcerated. She said she was denied due process because she had no opportunity to be heard and that insufficient evidence supported the finding of domestic abuse. The Court first considered whether the appellant’s sufficiency argument was preserved for review, based upon the Court’s previous holding in Wills v. Lacefield, 2011 Ark. 262. The Court overruled Wills to the extent it is inconsistent with case law that a party in a civil bench trial may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal. On the merits of the evidence, the Court said that the circuit court based its finding of domestic abuse on the allegations in the petition. The appellee said at the hearing that he did not know whether she had been charged with four counts of child endangerment but that she had a pending trial date and he did not know if they were going to charge her. He presented no proof that she was under the influence of drugs when the accident occurred. He had also alleged that she was in an accident with the other three children in the car (her children but not his) but he did not allege that she was under the influence at that time. He said she was arrested and taken to jail, but he did not say why, nor did he present any evidence on that issue. The Court said, “a car accident in and of itself does not rise to the level of domestic abuse.” (Pierce, M.; No. CV-14-264; 11-6-14; Hannah, J.)
Calaway v. Crotty, 2014 Ark. App. 636 [order of protection–modification] The appellant appealed from the circuit court’s denial of his motion to modify an order or protection the appellee had obtained against him. The parties had a past dating relationship and the order of protection entered November 2, 2012, ordered the appellant to stay away from the appellee, her two children, and other members of her family, and was effective for three years. The order indicates that appellant possessed a firearm and had a history of extreme violence. Neither party appealed from the order. Appellant’s motion to modify the order sought to remove language from the order including “that the victims were in immediate and present danger of domestic abuse and that he had a history of extreme violence.” He also sought to limit the order to six months and to include a provision allowing him to have firearms and to hunt. The appellant’s actions toward the appellee, her children, and other family members were set out in detail in the opinion. The appellant argues it was undisputed that he had never harmed or threatened to harm appellant or her children, and that “harassment, once per month over six months, does not constitute ‘domestic abuse.’” The Court of Appeals said that the evidence supports that appellee continued to fear that appellant would harm her or her children. The trial court had found her testimony credible that he had a temper and was known to seek revenge, and it could conclude reasonably that he still posed a threat to her. The Court held that the trial court did not clearly err in refusing to modify the order of protection, and it affirmed the decision. (Landers, M.; No. CV-14-406; 1112-14; Walmsley, B.)
Beason v. Parks, 2015 Ark. App. 246 [order of protection] The circuit court granted the appellee’s petition for an order of protection. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed based upon the appellant’s argument that the petition was statutorily deficient. Ark. Code Ann. section 9-15-201 provides that a petition for an order of protection shall be, among other things, “verified,” and “accompanied by an affidavit made under oath that states the specific facts and circumstances of the domestic abuse and the specific relief sought.” In the case before the Court, the petition was verified, but the attached handwritten statement of facts was not made under oath. The appellee had argued that the verified petition and her affidavit should be considered as one document to satisfy both subsections of the statute. But the Court said that under the plain language of the statute, the petition was deficient. The Court reversed and dismissed the circuit court’s order granting the order of protection. (Looney, J.; No. CV-14-502; 4-1515; Hoofman, C.)
Steele v. Lyon, 2015 Ark. App. 251 [domestic abuse–order of protection] The appellant appealed from a two-year order of protection granted to the appellee, contending that the trial court erred in allowing him to testify without being on a witness list and that there was insufficient evidence to support the decision to grant the order. In affirming, the Court of Appeals said that, on the evidentiary issue, the appellant failed to provide citation to authority or convincing argument, so the Court would not consider it. On her second point, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the case fell within the scope of the Domestic Abuse Act because this was a case in which other adequate remedies existed to address the appellee’s complaint. She based her allegation on the language of the purpose clause in the statute (“...and other injunctive relief for which there is no adequate remedy in current law.”) and on the fact that the parties never lived together and only dated for about eight months. The Court of Appeals said the Act’s purpose does not indicate that the statute can only be used when there are no other adequate remedies or that the parties must live together. In fact, the statute specifically includes parties who are in a past or present dating relationship, without any requirement that they live together. The appellant also raised some evidentiary issues and a sufficiency of the evidence issue. The Court affirmed the trial court on the evidentiary questions, noting that a trial court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. On the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court noted that, applying the clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence standard, and giving deference to the trial court in judging the credibility of witnesses, there was sufficient evidence for the court to find that an order of protection should be entered and the circuit court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. (Gray, A.; No. CV-14-72; 4-22-15; Abramson, R.)
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