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WEINBERGER V. ROMERO-BARCELO, 456 U. S. 305 (1982) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Subscribe to Cases that cite 456 U. S. 305 U.S. Supreme CourtWeinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)Weinberger v. Romero-BarceloNo. 80-1990Argued February 23, 1982Decided April 27, 1982456 U.S. 305CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
(b) Here, an injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance, TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, distinguished, since the FWPCA provides, for example, for fines and criminal penalties. While the FWPCA's purpose in preserving the integrity of the Nation's waters is to be achieved by compliance with the Act, including compliance with the permit requirements, in this case, the discharge of the ordnance has not polluted chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 306
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 456 U. S. 321. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 456 U. S. 322.
The issue in this case is whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or Act), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), requires a district court to enjoin immediately all discharges of pollutants chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 307
In 1978, respondents, who include the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents of the island, sued to enjoin the Navy's operations on the island. Their complaint alleged violations of numerous federal environmental statutes and various other Acts. [Footnote 1] After an extensive hearing, the District Court found chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 308
"dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked Page 456 U. S. 309
As the District Court construed the FWPCA, the release of ordnance from aircraft or from ships into navigable waters is a discharge of pollutants, even though the EPA, which administers the Act, had not promulgated any regulations setting effluent levels or providing for the issuance of an NPDES permit for this category of pollutants. [Footnote 3] Recognizing that violations of the Act "must be cured," 478 F.Supp. at 707, the District Court ordered the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. It refused, however, to enjoin Navy operations pending chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 310
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court's order and remanded with instructions that the court order the Navy to cease the violation until it obtained a permit. 643 F.2d 835 (1981). Relying on TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978), in which this Court held that an imminent violation of the Endangered Species Act required injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 311
643 F.2d 861. The court suggested that, if the order would interfere significantly with military preparedness, the Navy should request that the President grant it an exemption from the requirements in the interest of national security. [Footnote 6]
It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy. It "is not a remedy which issues as of course," Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, 289 U. S. 337-338 (1933), or "to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling." 177 U. S. 302 (1900). An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity "is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable." Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 248 U. S. 456 (1919). The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 422 U. S. 61 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 415 U. S. 88 (1974); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 359 U. S. 506-507 (1959); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra,@ at 321 U. S. 329.
"where an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest for whose impairment, even temporarily, an injunction bond cannot compensate, the court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the Page 456 U. S. 313
"Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute, in so many words or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. 'The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.' @ 35 U. S. 503. . . ."
In TVA v. Hill, we held that Congress had foreclosed the exercise of the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity. There, we thought that "[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer" than that before us. 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 173. The statute involved, the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., required the District Court to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam in order to preserve the snail chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 314
That is not the case here. An injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance. The FWPCA itself, for example, provides for fines and criminal penalties. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c) and (d). Respondents suggest that failure to enjoin the Navy will undermine the integrity of the permit process by allowing the statutory violation to continue. The integrity of the Nation's waters, however, not the permit process, is the purpose of the FWPCA. [Footnote 7] As Congress explained, the objective of the FWPCA is to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 315
In Hill, we also noted that none of the limited "hardship exemptions" of the Endangered Species Act would "even remotely apply to the Tellico Project." 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 188. The prohibition of the FWPCA against discharge of pollutants, in contrast, can be overcome by the very permit the Navy was ordered to seek. [Footnote 10] The Senate Report to the 1972 chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 316
Other aspects of the statutory scheme also suggest that Congress did not intend to deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction. Although the ultimate objective of the FWPCA is to eliminate all discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985, the statute sets forth a scheme of phased compliance. As enacted, it called for the achievement of the "best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977, and the "best available technology economically achievable" by July 1, 1983. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). This scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a statute in which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the exercise of discretion. [Footnote 11] chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 317
33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). [Footnote 12] The provision makes clear that Congress did not chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 318
Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 30. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 319
S.Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 63. Violations of the Refuse Act have not automatically led courts to issue injunctions. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 535-538 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 175 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562, 571 (CA1 1973), on remand, 399 F.Supp. 754, 759-760 (Me.1975). chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 320
It is so ordered. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 321
The propriety of this disposition is emphasized by the dissenting opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, post, p. 456 U. S. 322. I agree with his view that Congress may limit a court's equitable discretion in granting remedies under a particular statute, and that some statutes may constrain discretion more narrowly than others. I stand with the Court, however, in finding no indication that Congress intended to limit the court's equitable discretion under the FWPCA in the manner suggested by JUSTICE STEVENS. As the Court's remand order might be thought to leave open whether the District Court in this case acted within its range of permissible discretion under the chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 322
The Court's mischaracterization of the Court of Appeals' holding is the premise for its essay on equitable discretion. This essay is analytically flawed, because it overlooks the limitations on equitable discretion that apply in cases in which public interests are implicated and the defendant's violation chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 323
Contrary to the impression created by the Court's opinion, the Court of Appeals did not hold that the District Court was under an absolute duty to require compliance with the FWPCA "under any and all circumstances," ante at 456 U. S. 313, or that it was "mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law," ibid. The only "absolute duty" that the Court of Appeals mentioned was the Navy's duty to obtain a permit before discharging pollutants into the waters off Vieques Island. [Footnote 2/2] In light of the Court's opinion, the point is worth repeating -- the Navy, like anyone else, [Footnote 2/3] must obey the law. chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 324
The Court of Appeals did not hold that the District Court had no discretion in formulating remedies for statutory violations. It merely "conclude[d] that the district court erred in undertaking a traditional balancing of the parties' competing interests." Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861 (CA1 1981). The District Court was not free to disregard the "congressional ordering of priorities" and "the judiciary's responsibility to protect the integrity of the . . . process mandated by Congress.'" Ibid. (quoting Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 892 (CA1 1973)). The Court of Appeals distinguished a statutory violation that could be deemed merely "technical" from the Navy's "[utter disregard of] the statutory mandate." 643 F.2d 861-862. It then pointed out that an order prohibiting any discharge of ordnance into the coastal waters off Vieques until an NPDES permit was obtained would not significantly affect the Navy's training operations, because most, if not all, of the Navy's targets were land-based. Id. at 862, n. 55. Finally, it noted that the statute authorized the Navy to obtain an exemption from the President if an injunction would have a significant effect on national security. Id. at 862; see 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).
Under these circumstances -- the statutory violation is blatant and not merely technical, and the Navy's predicament was foreseen and accommodated by Congress -- the Court of Appeals essentially held that the District Court retained no discretion to deny an injunction. The discretion exercised by the District Court in this case was wholly at odds with the intent of Congress in enacting the FWPCA. In essence, the District Court's remedy was a judicial permit exempting the Navy's operations in Vieques from the statute until such time as it could obtain a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency or a statutory exemption from the President. The two principal bases for the temporary judicial permit were matters that Congress did not commit to judicial discretion. First, the District Court was persuaded that the pollution chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 325
The Court unfairly uses the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case as a springboard for a lecture on the principles of equitable remedies. The Court of Appeals' reasoning was correct in all respects. It recognized that the statute categorically prohibits discharges of pollutants without a permit. Unlike the Court, see ante at 456 U. S. 314-315, it recognized that the requested injunction was the only remedy that would bring the Navy into compliance with the statute on Congress' timetable. [Footnote 2/6] It then demonstrated that none of the reasons offered chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 326
Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, illustrates the first distinction. The Court there held that Congress constitutionally could preclude a private party from obtaining an injunction against enforcement of federal price control regulations pending an adjudication of their validity. In any balancing process, the Court explained, special deference must be given to the public interest: chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 327
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, which the Court repeatedly cites, did involve an attempt to obtain an injunction against future violations of a federal statute. That case fell into the category of cases in which a past violation of law had been found and the question was whether an injunction should issue to prevent future violations. Cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 345 U. S. 633-636; United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 343 U. S. 332-334. Because the record established that the past violations were inadvertent, chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 328
"The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity of a court of equity as a Page 456 U. S. 329
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, the Court plainly stated that an equitable remedy for the violation of a federal statute was neither automatic, on the one hand, nor simply a matter of balancing the equities, on the other. [Footnote 2/11] Albemarle holds that the district court's remedial chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 330
The Court's discussion of the FWPCA creates the impression that Congress did not intend any significant change in the enforcement provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. See ante at 456 U. S. 319. The Court goes so far as to suggest that the FWPCA is little more than a codification of the common law of nuisance. [Footnote 2/12] The contrast between this casual attitude toward the FWPCA and the Court's writing in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, is stark. In that case, the Court refused to allow federal judges to supplement the statutory enforcement scheme by enjoining a nuisance, whereas, in this case, the question is whether a federal judge may create a loophole in the scheme by refusing chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 331
The Court distinguishes TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, on the ground that the Endangered Species Act contained a "flat ban" on the destruction of critical habitats. Ante at 456 U. S. 314. But the statute involved in this case also contains a flat ban against discharges of pollutants into coastal waters without a permit. [Footnote 2/13] Surely the congressional directive to protect the chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 332
It is true that, in TVA v. Hill, there was no room for compromise between the federal project and the statutory objective to preserve an endangered species; either the snail chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 333
The Court's sophistry is premised on a gross misunderstanding of the statutory scheme. Naturally, in 1972, Congress did not expect dischargers to end pollution immediately. [Footnote 2/18] Rather, it entrusted to expert administrative chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 334
The decision in TVA v. Hill did not depend on any peculiar or unique statutory language. Nor did it rest on any special interest in snail darters. The decision reflected a profound chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPage 456 U. S. 335
See also 456 U. S. 5, supra.