Source: https://casetext.com/case/wheatley-v-adler
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Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307 | Casetext
Wheatley v. Adler
407 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
Wheatleyv.Adler
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia CircuitMay 17, 1968
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Capital Hilton Hotel v. Dept. of Emp. Serv
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holding that the presumption was not rebutted where the employer's medical expert "was not able to say, one way or the other, either as a reasonable medical certainty or with any other estimate of probability, that [work activity] was not the factor bringing on the [employee's] heart seizure"
Summary of this case from Bath Iron Works v. Fields
permitting compensation for injury suffered while urinating, but this holding is particular to the Longshoreman's Act and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Summary of this case from Miedema v. Dial Corp.
Summary of this case from Whittaker v. Dept. of Employment Services
In this workmen's compensation case appellee, Deputy Commissioner, concluded that the collapse and death of appellant's late husband, Edward E. Wheatley, on February 12, 1964, "did not arise out of and in the course of the employment." Her action to set aside this decision was dismissed by the District Court, which granted summary judgment to appellee. We reverse.
The action was brought under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901-950, made applicable to the District of Columbia by D.C. Code § 36-501.
The testimony established that the employee began his last day like any other work day. At 8:48 a.m. he punched in at Associated Transport Company, the trucking concern where he had been employed as a mechanic for seventeen years. He changed into work clothes and assembled his tools before starting in on his first repair job. Apparently before beginning actual repair work, Wheatley walked out into the yard adjacent to the garage to answer a call of nature. The "bathroom is way in the back of the terminal" and Wheatley, crippled in one leg, never "done much about climbing the steps," and "didn't do too much running around." It was an average day in winter, temperature about 40 degrees.
Appellee's order included these statements as his crucial findings of fact: On the morning of February 12, the employee "was not subject to any employment-related emotional disturbance or to any significant physical exertion." His collapse and death were caused by a myocardial insufficiency, due to a pre-existing advanced arteriosclerotic heart disease, which was "neither caused nor aggravated by the employment on February 12, 1964 or prior thereto." The myocardial insufficiency "resulted from the natural progression of the arteriosclerotic heart disease."
Although judicial review of workmen's compensation proceedings is limited, the courts must set aside compensation orders, including denials of claims, when "not in accordance with law." 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1964). An administrative order must be set aside if it rests on factual premises not based on substantial record evidence or if the agency's underlying standards are not in accord with law. With this in mind we examine the record and premises underlying appellee's order.
Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 477, 67 S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947); Hurley v. Lowe, 83 U.S. App.D.C. 123, 125-126, 168 F.2d 553, 555-556, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828, 68 S.Ct. 1338, 92 L.Ed. 1756 (1948).
Claimant's medical expert, Dr. Chapman, testified without contradiction, on examination of the coroner's autopsy report, and of the microscopic slides obtained from the morgue (which revealed an absence of a significant degeneration of heart tissue), that the attack could have begun no more than one and one-half hours before death, and probably began less than an hour before then. The seizure therefore began after Wheatley arrived at work. Claimant's expert further testified that such an attack is always preceded by some precipitating event, and that the strain of urinating on a cold day could have brought it on.
This is so even if the time of death is taken at 9:45 a.m. as stated in the autopsy certificate, and a fortiori if it was 10:22 a.m., as the Commissioner found.
The general rule of law is that accidents and deaths "occurring while an employee is on his way to or from toilet facilities, or while he is engaged in relieving himself, arise within the course of employment, subject only to the possible question * * * of the reasonableness of the means or place chosen." Recovery is denied on this ground when abnormal means are chosen despite the availability of satisfactory conventional facilities, and when the means chosen are both dangerous and unreasonable in the circumstances. Working in this garage Wheatley used the nearby yard rather than walk, with his "stiff" leg, up a number of steps and across the building to the bathroom in the back. There was no hint that Wheatley had not made customary resort to these ad hoc facilities or that he had been forbidden to do so. Wheatley's use of the yard was not only for his convenience, but may have benefited his employer through the time saved. In any event, the employer did not show that he had forbidden Wheatley's use of the informal facilities, or that there had been no prior use of these facilities which might have put the employer, through its supervisors, on notice of the conduct and prompted a warning if such conduct was to be forbidden. On either of these possibilities, the burden was on the employer to illuminate the facts.
1 A. LARSON, WORKMENS COMPENSATION LAW § 21.53 at 321 (1965).
It would not defeat compensation even if the act of urinating, in cold weather out of doors, is taken as not involving an unusual strain. The law in this jurisdiction does not require any unusual stress, and contemplates awards so long as the death or injury results from activity in the course of employment. It makes no difference that the decedent was exposed to no more than the ordinary hazards of living and working, or that the same kind of injury might have occurred wherever he might have been.
See Hartford Accident Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App.D.C. 52, 54, 112 F.2d 11, 13, cert. denied 310 U.S. 649, 60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1415 (1940); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 61 App.D.C. 306, 307, 62 F.2d 468, 469, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 608, 53 S.Ct. 400, 77 L.Ed. 982 (1933).
Taking the commissioner's decision as we find it, it cannot be sustained by hypothesizing that he might have ruled that an injury or seizure which occurs while an employee is urinating in the yard outside is by that fact excluded from the coverage of the law. We need not consider whether such a standard might be permissible, notwithstanding contrary rulings already noted. If such a standard is to be the basis of decision, it must be presented with a reasoned analysis and in such form as to show that it was invoked as a standard of general application, and was not an ad hoc rule being applied obliquely for one occasion without any purpose of breadth in application.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).
There is an express statutory presumption that the "claim comes within the provisions of this chapter," a presumption of compensability grounded in the "humanitarian nature" of the Act. Moreover, and this is significant in the present case, the fact that an injury or death occurs "in the course of employment strengthens the presumption that it arises out of the employment, with doubts resolved in the claimant's favor." Vendemia v. Cristaldi, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 232, 221 F.2d 103, 105 (1955). The rejection of the claim cannot be supported as a matter of law unless the record contains "substantial evidence" showing that death did not arise out of employment.
33 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1964); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman Grylls Assoc., 380 U.S. 359, 362, 85 S.Ct. 1012, 13 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1965).
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 56 S.Ct. 190, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935); Butler v. District Parking Management Co., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 363 F.2d 682 (1966).
It is undisputed that the employee had a pre-existing condition of arteriosclerosis. But it is settled that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition may constitute a compensable accidental injury under the Act, Howell v. Einbinder, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 313, 350 F.2d 442, 443 (1965). Thus the statutory presumption brings within the Act a death that results in the course of employment when a pre-existing internal disorder takes a sudden turn for the worse, unless the record contains substantial evidence as to the cause of the collapse which shows that it was not aggravated or precipitated by a work-related factor. Butler v. District Parking Management Co., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 363 F.2d 682 (1966). Complaints have been voiced against the aggravation rule as applied to cardiac cases, and suggestions made for narrowing compensability. But these would require changes in our long-standing construction of the Act, and they are appropriately addressed to the Congress.
"Thus the cases almost invariably decide that the fact that the injury would not have resulted but for the pre-existing disease, or might just as well have been caused by a similar strain at home or at recreation, are both immaterial." H. McNIECE, HEART DISEASE AND THE LAW 12 (1961). See also id. at 57-59.
Rebutting evidence may be hard to develop, given the limits of medical ability to reconstruct why "something unexpectedly goes wrong within the human frame." But that is precisely why the presumption was inserted by Congress. It signals and reflects a strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases. We have frequently pointed out that since the statute "should be construed liberally" in favor of employees and their dependents, it is "in their favor [that] doubts, including the factual, are to be resolved."
Baltimore Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414, 52 S.Ct. 187, 76 L.Ed. 366 (1932) (Butler, J.). "The law's humanitarian purpose is to ensure that all shall be compensated, regardless of the employer's fault." Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 736, 87 S.Ct. 1419, 1423, 18 L.Ed.2d 488 (1967). This expression in Justice Stewart's dissent was not controverted in the majority opinion.
See J.V. Vozzolo, Inc. v. Britton, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 377 F.2d 144, 147 (1967); Howell v. Einbinder, 121 U.S. App.D.C. 312, 314, 350 F.2d 442, 444 (1965); Hancock v. Einbinder, 114 U.S. App.D.C. 67, 70, 310 F.2d 872, 875 (1962); Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York v. Britton, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 120, 289 F.2d 784, 786 (1961).
This approach has also characterized our application of the substantial evidence test in these cases. We have made it clear that we "will not sustain the administrative findings merely because they are substantiated by some isolated evidence. Our review must also take account of the settled rule that the Act is to be construed with a view to its beneficent purposes. Doubts, including the factual, are to be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependent family."
Friend v. Britton, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 141, 220 F.2d 820, 822 (1955).
A claim to be compensable under the Act must stem from "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment." The decedent Wheatley, a garage mechanic, had reported for duty at 8:48 A.M. on February 12, 1964, then some 18 minutes late after coming in from Beltsville. After changing into work clothes, Wheatley about 9:15 A.M. was instructed by his foreman as to the morning's job. Wheatley placed a hammer, a chisel and a pair of pliers next to a tractor in the employer's garage. Although he otherwise had not yet commenced the assigned task, I deem it undeniable that Wheatley had entered upon his duties and that the crucial episode under discussion was shown as a matter of law to have occurred "in the course of employment."
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 2(2), 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1964), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
"that the `obligations or conditions' of employment create the `zone of special danger' out of which the injury arose."
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 507, 71 S.Ct. 470, 472, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951); and we have so applied that test, Wolff v. Britton, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 213, 327 F.2d 181, 184 (1964), in determining that an employee must have encountered some occupational hazard or that the injury must have been related to his work. In the Wolff case the appellant conceded that death had resulted from an idiopathic seizure, not related to or caused by any condition of employment.
By the same token I do not join the approach taken by the majority, for it seems to me the result properly should be reached by the route I have been developing. I continue at the risk of some redundancy.
Certain cases to which we have been pointed have no controlling effect here for each involved some clearly job-related physical exertion which served as a causal factor in precipitating the injury complained of. See, e.g., General Accident Fire Life Assur. Corp. v. Donovan, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 204, 251 F.2d 915 (1958); Robinson v. Bradshaw, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 219, 206 F.2d 435, 438, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 899, 74 S.Ct. 226, 98 L.Ed. 400 (1953), where "death in the course of employment [resulted] from an aggravation, caused by the employment, of a pre-existing illness * * *" (emphasis added); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hoage, 64 App.D.C. 158, 159, 75 F.2d 677, 678 (1935), where we noted "that an accidental injury may occur notwithstanding the injured is then engaged in his usual and ordinary work, and likewise that the injury need not be external." (Emphasis added.)
The Deputy Commissioner found that Wheatley's collapse and sudden death were "caused by a myocardial insufficiency due to the advanced arteriosclerotic heart disease" from which he suffered. Since on this record as I read it, and additionally by virtue of the presumption, the death clearly had occurred in the course of employment, the general principles of law do not apply as the Supreme Court has put it. The Act "announces its own rule" that presumably, likewise, the death was one "arising out of" the employment.
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286, 56 S.Ct. 190, 193 (1935).
Thus "[t]he employer must rebut this prima facies." The employer's expert, its only witness, here testified directly that "[t]he absence of any specific stimulating or exertional episode makes me feel that the attack was in no way related to his employment."
From the statement so quoted and from his testimony in its entirety, the doctor seems to have deemed necessary the demonstration of some external precipitating factor before there could be an injury "arising out of" the employment. But Del Vecchio, supra, teaches that precisely in circumstances as here shown, a claimant is entitled to the benefit of the statutory presumption.
The Court continued "that the evidence to overcome the effect of the presumption must be substantial," explaining further that "a finding must be supported by evidence."
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, supra note 4.
If an employer shall have "carried his burden" of refuting the effect of the presumption, that "presumption falls out of the case." It is not evidence by itself, for its "office is to control the result where there is an entire lack of competent evidence." (Emphasis added.)
My careful reading of the evidence here persuades me that the employer utterly failed by substantial evidence to carry its burden of dispelling the effect of the presumption. Accordingly the result must be controlled by the statute, and upon the analysis I have respectfully submitted, reversal is required.
Indeed, in my reading, the employer's evidence presented no conflict with that offered by the claimant. Had it done so, the Deputy Commissioner would have been bound to resolve on the issue so created "upon the whole body of proof pro and con." ( 296 U.S. at 287, 56 S.Ct. at 193) His inferences thereupon if substantially supported by competent evidence, would, of course, be controlling.
The statute is that these claims must be allowed unless substantial evidence to the contrary appears. Did substantial evidence to the contrary appear in the case at bar? No witness stated directly and affirmatively that Wheatley's heart attack arose out of or was causally connected with his employment; in other words, there was no specific direct evidence in support. And no witness stated that in his expert opinion it was thus causally connected. No documentary evidence was to that effect. On the other hand there was ample showing of what was not the situation. There was no heavy work, no strain, no excitement, no outward appearance of inward disturbance, no unusual physical activity, no emotional distress, no discernible warning, no anticipatory indication. The victim had a severe arteriosclerosis. Medical evidence was that for people with this affliction death may be triggered by a shock or strain (called a precipitating event), or it may devolve from progress of the disease alone with no outside factor. The testimony did not fix which was the case here. The doctors went only so far as to say that the back-alley incident might have been a precipitating event. The Deputy Commissioner did not find the "might have been" persuasive but deemed the accumulation of negatives to constitute substantial negative evidence and, on summation, found it not offset by any positive evidentiary item. It seems to me that an accumulation of negatives can constitute a negative. Positive proof that a person has no symptom of a certain disease seems to me to be substantial evidence that he does not have that disease; it may not be proof positive, but it is substantial evidence. Thus in the case at bar the affirmative evidence that Wheatley that day had no experience known or generally thought to precipitate a heart failure in an arteriosclerotic patient, and exhibited none of the symptoms of such a precipitating event, is substantial evidence that he experienced no such incident. We need not find that he had no such experience. We need find only that there was substantial evidence he did not. When we find the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion bottomed upon such a record, our function is at an end.
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 56 S.Ct. 190, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 568, 64 S.Ct. 747, 88 L.Ed. 931 (1944).
The Deputy Commissioner-appellee made detailed findings of fact as a result of his hearing in this case. As I have indicated, these findings are supported and justified by the evidence. We are required to sustain the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner if they are supported by substantial evidence, O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., supra, or if his holding is not irrational, O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359, 85 S.Ct. 1012, 13 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1965) or if the order under review is not "forbidden by the law," Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801. As the majority opinion accurately points out, the evidence before the Commissioner easily permits the drawing of adverse inferences, but this fact does not allow us to overthrow the inferences drawn by the Deputy Commissioner if his selection is reasonable. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 56 S.Ct. 190, 80 L.Ed. 229 (1935); Voehl v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 288 U.S. 162, 53 S.Ct. 380, 77 L.Ed. 676 (1933). We have repeatedly adhered to these principles. Wolff v. Britton, supra, Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York v. Britton, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 120, 289 F.2d 784, 786 (1961); General Accident Fire Life Assurance Corp. v. Britton, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 255 F.2d 544 (1958); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Britton, 100 U.S.App. D.C. 236, 243 F.2d 659 (1957); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Britton, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 294, 188 F.2d 674, 675 (1951). The principle has been applied even in instances where, as stated in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801, the inference to be drawn from the facts is "more legal than factual. * * *" Thus, even though the reviewing court might not agree with the Deputy Commissioner's determination for itself (see Wolff v. Britton, supra), that determination, if not "forbidden by the law," is to be sustained. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801.
The knowledgeable trial judge was not only justified in upholding the Deputy Commissioner's findings, but he was required to do so. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman Grylls Associates, Inc., supra; O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., supra; Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Britton, supra; Gooding v. Willard, 209 F.2d 913 (2nd Cir. 1954); Hurley v. Lowe, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 168 F.2d 553, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828, 68 S.Ct. 1338, 92 L.Ed. 1756 (1948); Groom v. Cardillo, supra; General Accident Fire Life Assurance Corp. v. Britton, supra. I would affirm the District Court.