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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3517', '§ 3517', '§ 2281', '§ 431', '§ 432', '§ 3517', '§ 413']

Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm. (full text) :: 459 U.S. 87 (1982) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, III, and IV of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 459 U. S. 102. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 459 U. S. 107.
This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3517.01 et seq. (1972 and Supp.1981), can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political party that can show a "reasonable probability" that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to "threats, harassment, or reprisals." Id. at 424 U. S. 74. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.
In 1974, appellees instituted a class action [Footnote 1] in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law. The Ohio statute requires every candidate for political office to file a statement identifying each contributor and each recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds. § 3517.10. [Footnote 2] The "object or purpose" [Footnote 3]
On November 6, 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered a temporary restraining order barring the enforcement of the disclosure requirements against the class pending a determination of the merits. [Footnote 4] The case was then transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which entered an identical temporary restraining order in February, 1975. [Footnote 5] Accordingly, since 1974,
appellees have not disclosed the names of contributors and recipients, but have otherwise complied with the statute. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Following extensive discovery, the trial was held in February, 1981. After reviewing the "substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters," the three-judge court concluded that, under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the Ohio disclosure requirements are unconstitutional as applied to appellees. [Footnote 6] We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U.S. 1122 (1981).
The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 424 U. S. 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 357 U. S. 462. The right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield
only to a "subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,'" NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 357 U. S. 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 354 U. S. 265 (1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 372 U. S. 546.
In Buckley v. Valeo, this Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on political parties by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 60-74. The Court found three government interests sufficient in general to justify requiring disclosure of information concerning campaign contributions and expenditures: [Footnote 7] enhancement of voters' knowledge about a candidate's possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, and the enforcement of contribution limitations. [Footnote 8] The Court stressed, however, that, in certain circumstances, the balance of interests requires exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The government's interests in compelling disclosures are "diminished" in the case of minor parties. Id. at 424 U. S. 70. Minor party candidates "usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints" well known to the public, and the improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially greater:
Id. at 424 U. S. 74. The Court acknowledged that "unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden" on minor parties. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that "[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury." Ibid.
Appellants concede that the Buckley test for exempting minor parties governs the disclosure of the names of contributors, but they contend that the test has no application to the compelled disclosure of names of recipients of campaign disbursements. [Footnote 9] Appellants assert that the State has a substantial interest in preventing the misuse of campaign funds. [Footnote 10] They also argue that the disclosure of the names of
Although appellants contend that requiring disclosure of recipients of disbursements is necessary to prevent corruption, this Court recognized in Buckley that this concededly legitimate government interest has less force in the context of minor parties. The federal law considered in Buckley, like the Ohio law at issue here, required campaign committees to identify both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(c) and (d), and 434(a) and (b). We stated that "by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," disclosure requirements "ten[d] to prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.'" Id. at 424 U. S. 67 (emphasis added), quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 290 U. S. 548 (1934). We concluded, however, that, because minor party candidates are unlikely to win elections, the government's general interest in "deterring the `buying' of elections" is "reduced" in the case of minor parties. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 70. [Footnote 11]
Expenditures by a political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages paid to party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the very core of the First Amendment. [Footnote 12] Disbursements may also go to persons who choose to express their support for an unpopular cause by providing services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion. [Footnote 13] Should their involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the party is solely financial. [Footnote 14] Even individuals
who receive disbursements for "merely" commercial transactions may be deterred by the public emnity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information. [Footnote 15] Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, such an individual may well be deterred from providing services by even a small risk of harassment. [Footnote 16] Compelled disclosure of the names of such recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party's ability to operate effectively, and thereby reduce "the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 71 (footnotes omitted). See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 250-251 (plurality opinion) ("Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents").
The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the SWP. FBI surveillance of the SWP was "massive," and continued until at least 1976. The FBI also conducted a counterintelligence program against the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP's youth organization. One of the aims of the "SWP Disruption Program" was the dissemination of information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function. This program included "disclosing to the press the criminal records of SWP candidates, and sending anonymous letters to SWP members, supporters, spouses, and employers." [Footnote 17] Until at least 1976, the FBI employed various covert techniques to
obtain information about the SWP, including information concerning the sources of its funds and the nature of its expenditures. The District Court specifically found that the FBI had conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP and had interfered with its activities within the State. [Footnote 18] Government surveillance was not limited to the FBI. The United States Civil Service Commission also gathered information on the SWP, the YSA, and their supporters, and the FBI routinely distributed its reports to Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, the United States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The District Court properly concluded that the evidence of private and Government hostility toward the SWP and its members establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the names of contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment, and reprisals. [Footnote 19] There were numerous instances of recent harassment of the SWP both in Ohio and
in other States. [Footnote 20] There was also considerable evidence of past Government harassment. Appellants challenge the relevance of this evidence of Government harassment in light of recent efforts to curb official misconduct. Notwithstanding these efforts, the evidence suggests that hostility toward the SWP is ingrained, and likely to continue. All this evidence was properly relied on by the District Court. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74.
Because it invalidated the Ohio statute as applied to the Ohio SWP, the District Court did not decide appellees' claim that the statute was facially invalid. The Ohio statute requires disclosure of contributions and expenditures no matter how small the amount. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3517.10(B)(4)(e) (Supp.1981). Appellees contended that the absence of a monetary threshold rendered the statute facially invalid, since the compelled disclosure of nominal contributions and expenditures lacks a substantial nexus with any claimed government interest. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 824.
We think that the correctness of both holdings of the District Court is "fairly included" in the question presented in the jurisdictional statement. This Court's Rule 15.1(a). See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 434 U. S. 559, n. 6 (1978) ("[O]ur power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented").
The partial dissent suggests that the government interest in the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is not significantly diminished in the case of minor political parties, since parties with little likelihood of electoral success might nevertheless finance improper campaign activities merely to gain recognition. Post at 459 U. S. 109-110. The partial dissent relies on JUSTICE WHITE's separate opinion in Buckley, in which he pointed out that "unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy to influence an election." 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 265 (emphasis in original).
An examination of the context in which JUSTICE WHITE made this observation indicates precisely why the state interest here is insubstantial. JUSTICE WHITE was addressing the constitutionality of ceilings on campaign expenditures applicable to all candidates. His point was that such ceilings "could play a substantial role in preventing unethical practices." Ibid. In the case of minor parties, however, their limited financial resources serve as a built-in expenditure ceiling which minimizes the likelihood that they will expend substantial amounts of money to finance improper campaign activities. See id. at 424 U. S. 271. For example, far from having "unlimited money," the Ohio SWP has had an average of roughly $15,000 available each year to spend on its election efforts. Most of the limited resources of minor parties will typically be needed to pay for the ordinary fixed costs of conducting campaigns, such as filing fees, travel expenses, and the expenses incurred in publishing and distributing campaign literature and maintaining offices. Thus JUSTICE WHITE's observation that "financing illegal activities is low on the campaign organization's priority list," id. at 424 U. S. 265, is particularly apposite in the case of minor parties. We cannot agree, therefore, that minor parties are as likely as major parties to make significant expenditures in funding dirty tricks or other improper campaign activities. See post at 459 U. S. 110. Moreover, the expenditure by minor parties of even a substantial portion of their limited funds on illegal activities would be unlikely to have a substantial impact.
Furthermore, the mere possibility that minor parties will resort to corrupt or unfair tactics cannot justify the substantial infringement on First Amendment interests that would result from compelling the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. In Buckley, we acknowledged the possibility that supporters of a major party candidate might channel money into minor parties to divert votes from other major party contenders, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 70, and that, as noted by the partial dissent,post, at 459 U. S. 110, and n. 5, occasionally minor parties may affect the outcomes of elections. We thus recognized that the distorting influence of large contributors on elections may not be entirely absent in the context of minor parties. Nevertheless, because we concluded that the government interest in disclosing contributors is substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we held that minor parties are entitled to an exemption from requirements that contributors be disclosed where they can show a reasonable probability of harassment. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 70. Because we similarly conclude that the government interest in requiring the disclosure of recipients of expenditures is substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we hold that the minor party exemption recognized in Buckley applies to compelled disclosure of expenditures as well.
"[F]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 66, quoting California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 416 U. S. 78-79 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring). The District Court found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), at least until 1976, routinely investigated the financial transactions of the SWP and kept track of the payees of SWP checks.
The fact that some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may not be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those who are so exposed. We cannot agree with the partial dissent's assertion that disclosures of disbursements paid to campaign workers and supporters will not increase the probability that they will be subjected to harassment and hostility. Post at 459 U. S. 111-112. Apart from the fact that individuals may work for a candidate in a variety of ways without publicizing their involvement, the application of a disclosure requirement results in a dramatic increase in public exposure. Under Ohio law, a person's affiliation with the party will be recorded in a document that must be kept open to inspection by any one who wishes to examine it for a period of at least six years. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. 3517. 10(C) (Supp.1981). The preservation of unorthodox political affiliations in public records substantially increases the potential for harassment above and beyond the risk that an individual faces simply as a result of having worked for an unpopular party at one time.
424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74. Surely the Ohio SWP may offer evidence of the experiences of other chapters espousing the same political philosophy. See 1980 Illinois Socialist Workers Campaign v. State of Illinois Board of Elections, 531 F.Supp. 915, 921 (ND Ill.1981).
Appellants point to the lack of direct evidence linking the Ohio statute's disclosure requirements to the harassment of campaign contributors or recipients of disbursements. In Buckley, however, we rejected such "unduly strict requirements of proof " in favor of "flexibility in the proof of injury." 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74. We thus rejected requiring a minor party to "come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear" or prove that "chill and harassment [are] directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought." Ibid. We think that these considerations are equally applicable to the proof required to establish a reasonable probability that recipients will be subjected to threats and harassment if their names are disclosed. While the partial dissent appears to agree, post at 459 U. S. 112-113, n. 7, its "separately focused inquiry," post at 459 U. S. 112, and n. 7, in reality requires evidence of chill and harassment directly attributable to the expenditure-disclosure requirement.
I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion and agree with much of what is said in Part II. But I cannot agree, with the Court or with the partial dissent, that we should reach the issue whether a standard of proof different from that applied to disclosure of campaign contributions should be applied to disclosure of campaign disbursements. See ante at 459 U. S. 94, n. 9; post at 459 U. S. 112-113, n. 7. [Footnote 2/1] Appellants did not suggest in the District Court that different standards might apply. Nor was the issue raised in appellants' jurisdictional statement or in their brief on the merits in this Court. Consequently, I would merely assume for purposes of our present decision -- as appellants apparently have assumed throughout this litigation and as the District Court clearly assumed -- that the flexible proof rule of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), applies equally to forced disclosure of contributions and to forced disclosure of expenditures. I would leave for another day, when the issue is squarely presented, considered by the courts below, and adequately briefed here, the significant question that now divides the Court.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court does not decide issues beyond those it has agreed to review. Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U. S. 605, 415 U. S. 623 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 339, n. 4 (1971); General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U. S. 175, 304 U. S. 178-179 (1938). According to the Court, however, the issue whether the flexible standard of proof established in Buckley applies to recipients of expenditures is "fairly included' in the question presented." Ante at 459 U. S. 94, n. 9. But appellants' failure to present the issue was not a mere oversight in phrasing that question. That appellants did not invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review specifically the proper standard for disclosure of campaign expenditures is also apparent from appellants' arguments in their jurisdictional statement and their brief on the merits. In their jurisdictional
"424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74."
Thus, appellants' exclusive theme in the initial presentation of their case here was that the District Court erred in finding that the Buckley standard was satisfied. They did not suggest that the standard was inapplicable, or applied differently, to campaign expenditure requirements. It was not until their reply brief, submitted eight years after this suit was instituted and at a time when appellees had no opportunity to respond in writing, that appellants sought to inject this new issue into the case. See Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 347 U. S. 129 (1954) (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.). In my view, it simply cannot be said that it was "fairly included" in the jurisdictional statement.
consider them." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 398 U. S. 147, n. 2 (1970); Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 355 U. S. 362-363, n. 16 (1958). The District Court did not address the question whether some standard other than that developed in Buckley should apply to disclosure of campaign expenditures. The reason for this was that appellants conceded in the District Court, as they concede here, that the "flexibility in the proof of injury" applicable to disclosure of contributors governed the entire case. In their post-trial memorandum, for example, appellants did not even hint that a different standard should govern disclosure of the identities of recipients of expenditures. Instead, they quoted the Buckley test and granted that "evidence of past harassment may be presented by plaintiffs in cases such as the instant one." Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum 4-5.
This case presents no extraordinary circumstances justifying deviation from this Court's Rule 15.1(a) and its long-established practice respecting issues not presented below. We have deviated from the Rule when jurisdictional issues have been omitted by the parties and lower courts, see, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 351 U. S. 197 (1956), or when the Court has noticed "plain error" not assigned, see Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 330 U. S. 412 (1947). Obviously, the issue that divides the Court from the partial dissent is not jurisdictional. Nor, as the Court's opinion persuasively demonstrates, is application of the Buckley test to disclosure of campaign disbursements "plain error." Indeed, I consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court would adopt the Buckley standard in this context for the reasons stated by the Court. I also consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court might wish to revise the Buckley standard as applied to campaign disbursements -- perhaps to take account of the different types of expenditures covered and their differing impacts on associational rights, or perhaps along the lines suggested in the partial dissent. But this significant constitutional
The Court's apparent reliance on Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 434 U. S. 560, n. 6 (1978), does not provide a rationale for deciding this issue at this time. The petitioner there had included in his petition for certiorari all the questions we eventually decided. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court limited its grant of the petition to a single question, the parties fully briefed the questions on which review had been denied. Deciding those questions, therefore, was neither unwise nor unfair. In this case, in contrast, appellants affirmatively excluded the point at issue in their jurisdictional statement and in their brief on the merits. By failing to raise it until their reply brief, appellants prevented appellees from responding to the argument in writing. There can be no question that, as the Court observes, "our power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented.'" Ante at 459 U. S. 94, n. 9 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 560, n. 6) (emphasis supplied). But Rule 15.1(a) is designed, as a prudential matter, to prevent the possibility that such tactics will result in ill-considered decisions. It is cases like this one that show the wisdom of the Rule.
Thus, for purposes of this case, I would assume, as appellants' jurisdictional statement and brief on the merits assume, that the Buckley standard applies to campaign expenditures just as it applies to contributions. [Footnote 2/2] Appellees
presented "specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself," sufficient under the rule in Buckley to establish a "reasonable probability" that the Ohio law would trigger "threats, harassment, or reprisals" against contributors. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.
Although the partial dissent agrees that this issue is not properly presented, and therefore that the question should not be decided, post at 459 U. S. 112, n. 7, its result and reasoning endorse a different standard of proof. See n. 2, infra.
The partial dissent says it agrees that "this is not the appropriate case to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure of expenditures." Post at 459 U. S. 112, n. 7. If that is so, however, appellees' proof, which the partial dissent agrees established a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals against contributors, likewise allowed the District Court to find a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals against recipients of expenditures. The Buckley standard permits proof that a particular disclosure creates the requisite likelihood of harassment to be based on a showing of harassment directed at members of the party or at the organization itself. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 74. Thus, I do not understand how the partial dissent's "separately focused inquiry" can "plainly require a different result," post at 459 U. S. 113, n. 7, or how it possibly can lead to the conclusion that "appellees did not carry their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions," post at 459 U. S. 115 -- unless, despite the partial dissent's uncertain disclaimer, post at 459 U. S. 113, n. 7, its "separate focus" alters Buckley's "reasonable probability" and "flexible proof" standards in the context of expenditures.
Buckley upheld the validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which requires the disclosure of names of both contributors to a campaign and recipients of expenditures from the campaign. Buckley recognized three major governmental interests in disclosure requirements: deterrence of corruption; enhancement of voters' knowledge about a candidate's possible allegiances and interests; and provision of the data and means necessary to detect violations of any statutory limitations on contributions or expenditures. The precise challenge that the Buckley Court faced, however, was the overbreadth of the Act's requirements "insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates." Id. at 424 U. S. 68-69 (emphasis added). [Footnote 3/1] Since the appellants in Buckley did not challenge the application to minor parties of requirements of disclosure of expenditures, the Court had no occasion to consider directly the First Amendment interests of a minor political party in preventing disclosure of expenditures, much less to weigh them against the governmental interests in disclosure. The test adopted by Buckley, quoted by the majority, ante at 459 U. S. 93, reflects this limitation, for it contemplates only assessing possible harassment of contributors, without a word about considering the harassment of recipients of expenditures if their names are disclosed or any effects this harassment may have on the party.
have overstated their argument in declaring that Buckley has no application to the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. Certainly, Buckley enunciates the general governmental interest in regulating minor parties, who, although unlikely to win, can often affect the outcome of an election. 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 70. Buckley also emphasizes the sensitive associational rights of minor parties.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between disclosure of contributors and disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures -- differences that the Buckley Court had no occasion to address, but that compel me to conclude that the balance should not necessarily be calibrated identically. First, unlike the government's interest in disclosure of contributions, its interest in disclosure of expenditures does not decrease significantly for small parties. The Court in Buckley recognized that knowing the identity of contributors would not significantly increase the voters' ability to determine the political ideology of the minor party candidate, for the stance of the minor party candidate is usually well known. Ibid. [Footnote 3/2] Nor would identifying a minor party's contributors further the interest in preventing the "buying" of a candidate, because of the improbability of the minor party candidate's winning the election. Ibid. Thus, these two major government interests in disclosure of contributions are significantly reduced for minor parties. [Footnote 3/3]
of the electoral process can take many forms: the actual buying of votes; the use of "slush funds;" dirty tricks; and bribes of poll watchers and other election officials. Certainly, a "persuasive" campaign worker on election day can corral voters for his minor party candidate with even a modest "slush fund." [Footnote 3/4] Even though such improper practices are unlikely to be so successful as to attract enough votes to elect the minor party candidate, a minor party, whose short-term goal is merely recognition, may be as tempted to resort to impermissible methods as are major parties, and the resulting deflection of votes can determine the outcome of the election of other candidates. [Footnote 3/5] The requirement of a full and verifiable report of expenditures is important in deterring such practices, for otherwise the party could hide the improper transactions through an accounting sleight of hand. [Footnote 3/6]
As the majority states, ante at 459 U. S. 91, the First Amendment interest here is "[t]he right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs." We have never drawn sharp distinctions between members and contributors, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 66. As we recognized in Buckley, the privacy rights of contributors are especially sensitive, since many seek to express their political views privately through their pocketbook, rather than publicly through other means. Disclosure of contributors directly implicates the contributors' associational rights.
Other recipients of expenditures may have closer ideological ties to the party. The majority suggests that campaign workers receiving per diem, travel, or room expenses may fit in this category. Ante at 459 U. S. 97, n. 12. It is certainly conceivable that such persons may be harassed or threatened for their conduct. Laws requiring disclosure of recipients of expenditures, however, are not likely to contribute to this harassment. Once an individual has openly shown his close ties to the organization by campaigning for it, disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to increase the degree of
In sum, the heightened governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures and the reduced marginal deterrent effect on associational interests demand a separately focused inquiry into whether there exists a reasonable probability that disclosure will subject recipients or the party itself to threats, harassment, or reprisals. [Footnote 3/7]
Turning to the evidence in this case, it is important to remember that, even though proof requirements must be flexible, Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 74, the minor party carries the burden of production and persuasion to show that its First Amendment interests outweigh the governmental interests. Additionally, the application of the Buckley standard to the historical evidence is most properly characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, for which we normally assess the record independently to determine if it supports the conclusion of unconstitutionality as applied. [Footnote 3/8]
In contrast, the record, read in its entirety, does not suggest that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would lead to harassment of recipients or reprisals to the party or its members. Appellees gave no breakdown of the types of expenditures they thought would lead to harassment if disclosed. The record does contain the expenditure statements of the SWP, which itemize each expenditure with its purpose while usually omitting the name and address of the recipient. The majority of expenditures, both in number and dollar amount, are for business transactions such as office supplies, food, printing, photographs, telephone service, and books. There is virtually no evidence that disclosure of the recipients of these expenditures will impair the SWP's ability to obtain needed services. [Footnote 3/9] Even if we assume that a portion
of expenditures went to temporary campaign workers or others whom the public might identify as supporting the party's ideology, [Footnote 3/10] these persons have already publicly demonstrated their support by their campaign work. There is simply no basis for inferring that such persons would thereafter be harassed or threatened or otherwise deterred from working for the party by virtue of inclusion of their names in later expenditure reports, or that, if any such remote danger existed, it would outweigh the concededly important governmental interests in disclosure of recipients of expenditures.
It is plain that appellees did not carry their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions. I would therefore uphold the constitutionality of those portions of the Ohio statute that require the SWP to disclose the recipients of expenditures. [Footnote 3/11]
Of course, the plaintiffs in Buckley challenged many aspects of the federal Act, including expenditure limitations and the disclosure requirements for independent contributions and expenditures. The Court upheld all disclosure requirements, including disclosure of independent expenditures "for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 80. The plaintiffs in Buckley did not challenge, however, the federal requirement that all political parties, including minor political parties, disclose the recipients of their expenditures.
I therefore disagree with the majority's suggestion, ante at 459 U. S. 98-99, n. 16, that the government interest in deterring corruption is not furthered by disclosure of all expenditures, including those for commercial services. Even if improprieties are unlikely to occur in expenditures for commercial services, full and verifiable disclosure is needed to ensure that other, improper expenditures are not hidden in commercial accounts.
According to the majority, "the question whether the Buckley test applies to the compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us." Ante at 459 U. S. 94, n. 9. The majority declares that, in answering this question,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante at 459 U. S. 102, however, more accurately characterizes the District Court's action as assuming that the Buckley standard applies to disclosure of expenditures, and holding the evidence sufficient to meet this standard. The District Court's assumption is understandable, since appellants did not question it below. Thus, this is not the appropriate case to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure of expenditures.
See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 456 U. S. 289, n.19 (1982). The majority does not clearly articulate the standard of review it is applying. By determining that the District Court "properly concluded" that the evidence established a reasonable probability of harassment, ante at 459 U. S. 100, the majority seems to apply an independent review standard.
These two incidents are, of course, remote in time and place, and do not suggest that the party itself has had difficulty in finding office space. Nor do they suggest that the general public is likely to engage in similar activity. Moreover, the FBI's actions against the SWP have long been ended, see Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S.Rep. No. 94-755, Vol. 4, pp. 3-4 (1976), and Congress has since instituted more rigorous oversight of FBI and other intelligence activities, see 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). An inference from these two incidents that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would increase any difficulty the party might have in obtaining office space would be tenuous, and is plainly outweighed by the "substantial public interest in disclosure," Buckley, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 72.
As the majority notes, ante at 459 U. S. 97, n. 12, some entries in the expenditure forms are designated as per diem, travel expenses, and room rental. At least until 1978, the expenditure statements gave the names of persons receiving per diem funds from the SWP. Apparently, party treasurers and party candidates received per diem payments. There is no evidence that filing these statements with the Ohio Secretary of State caused any harassment of the named persons, and indeed it is highly unlikely that this disclosure would increase the exposure of persons already so publicly identified with the party.
In holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied, a court must sever and apply constitutional portions unless the legislature would not have intended to have applied "those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not . . . ,'" Buckley, supra, at 424 U. S. 108 (severing constitutional portions of Federal Election Campaign Act after holding other portions unconstitutional on their face), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U. S. 210, 286 U. S. 234 (1932). Clearly, the expenditure disclosure requirements of the Ohio statute should be severed and applied even though the contribution disclosure requirements cannot be applied in this instance, for the two requirements are analytically and practically distinct.