Source: https://oig.justice.gov/special/0509/chapter5.htm
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 17:53:06
Document Index: 747134504

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 2331', '§ 533', '§ 2', '§ 1961', '§ 2331', '§ 2332', '§ 1961', '§ 100', '§ 100', '§ 100', '§ 2331', '§ 2331', '§ 100']

Chapter Five: Attorney General's Guidelines on
General Crime, Racketeering Enterprise and
The range of investigative techniques in a preliminary inquiry is broad, with the Guidelines prohibiting only mail openings and nonconsensual electronic surveillance. General Crimes Guidelines, Introduction, A. The Guidelines state that the FBI should not hesitate to use any lawful techniques in a preliminary inquiry, even if "intrusive," where "the intrusiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of the possible crime or the strength of the information indicating its existence or future commission." Id. § II.B.4.
The Guidelines define full investigations as either general crimes investigations or criminal intelligence investigations. General crimes investigations may be opened where facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed. GCI Guidelines, Introduction, B. The standard for initiating a general crimes investigation is "substantially lower than probable cause" and may be satisfied when the objective of the investigation is to prevent future criminal activity, as opposed to investigating a completed criminal act. Id. § II.C.1.
The second type of full investigation defined by the General Crimes Guidelines is a criminal intelligence investigation. There are two types of criminal intelligence investigations: racketeering enterprise investigations (REIs) and terrorism enterprise investigations (TEIs). According to the General Crimes Guidelines, a racketeering enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Id. § III.A.2.a. A terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of: 1) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a federal crime, 2) engaging in terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(1) or (5) that involves a federal crime, or 3) committing any offense described in 18 § U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). Id. § III.B.1.a.
The General Crimes Guidelines state that the opening of a preliminary inquiry must be based on an allegation or other information that is recorded in writing and authorized by an FBI supervisor. In "sensitive criminal matters," the FBI must notify the U.S. Attorney or an appropriate Department of Justice (DOJ) official of the basis for an inquiry as soon as practicable after its opening, and must create a record of the notification. GCI Guidelines § II.B.2.
Preliminary inquiries may be authorized for up to 180 days. A Special Agent in Charge (SAC) may grant up to two 90-day extensions if the inquiry has failed to yield a "reasonable indication" of criminal activity and further investigative steps are warranted. Additional extensions require approval by FBI Headquarters. Id. § II.B.3.
When a preliminary inquiry fails to develop sufficient information to justify a full investigation, the FBI must end the inquiry and record its closing. In sensitive criminal matters, the FBI must notify the U.S. Attorney of the closing and record the fact of the notification in writing. Id. § II.B.7.
OIG Compliance Findings from 46 Preliminary Inquiries
in Select FBI Field Offices
Preliminary inquiries that extended past the initial 180-day authorization period 19
Preliminary inquiries that extended past the first extension period 13
The FBI has jurisdiction to investigate federal crimes except where such responsibility is specifically assigned by statute or otherwise to another federal investigative agency. General Crimes Guidelines Preamble; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 533 (2002).
The FBI's general crimes investigations address a broad range of criminal conduct and account for the majority of FBI criminal investigations. From May 2002 through March 2004, the FBI had over 62,000 open general crimes investigations. The FBI categorizes these investigations in program classifications such as Domestic Terrorism, Organized Crime, Drug Program, White Collar Crime, Civil Rights, and Violent Crime and Major Offenders. MIOG Introduction, § 2-1.285
The General Crimes Guidelines impose requirements for both the predication needed to open a full investigation and the authorization process that the FBI must follow. Under the Guidelines, "[a] general crimes investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed." General Crimes Guidelines § II.C.1. The Guidelines explain that information justifying the opening of an investigation "must [have] an objective factual basis" and that "a mere hunch is insufficient." Id. In making the determination whether to open a general crimes investigation, the FBI "may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent investigator would consider." Id.
The approval process to open an investigation under the General Crimes Guidelines is similar to the process for opening a preliminary inquiry. The FBI supervisor authorizing an investigation must ensure that facts or circumstances satisfy the reasonable indication standard described above and that this information is recorded in writing. Id. § II.C.3. In "sensitive criminal matters," written notification must be provided to the U.S. Attorney or an appropriate DOJ official, as well as to FBI Headquarters, as soon as practicable after the investigation commences. Id. When that investigation is terminated, the FBI must notify the appropriate federal prosecutor within 30 days. Id. § II.C.4.
The Guidelines also contain procedures for disseminating information regarding general crimes. With limited exceptions, in circumstances where the FBI obtains credible information concerning serious criminal activity not within its investigative jurisdiction, the Guidelines require the relevant FBI field office to promptly transmit the information, or to refer the complainant, to the law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction. Id. § II.C.6. Where full disclosure is not made to these agencies within 180 days, the FBI field office is required to notify FBI Headquarters in writing of the facts and circumstances concerning the criminal activity. Id.
To examine the FBI's compliance with the general crimes provisions of the General Crimes Guidelines, we reviewed 72 general crimes files at 12 field offices. Initially, we requested that each field office provide documentation on six "sensitive criminal matters" within the meaning of § II.A.2 of the Guidelines. However, many of the case files identified by the FBI did not involve circumstances that met this definition, and we were advised that it was not practicable to isolate qualifying cases from the FBI's many general crimes files during our site visits. In total, we examined 32 files involving sensitive criminal matters, which accounted for 44 percent of all the general crimes files we reviewed.
Did the FBI appropriately disseminate investigative information outside DOJ?
The General Crimes Guidelines require that in sensitive criminal matters, the predication for investigations be recorded in writing and provided to both DOJ and FBI Headquarters as soon as practicable after commencement of the investigation.288 Although we found that the U.S. Attorney, or DOJ, was consistently notified of the basis for sensitive criminal matter openings, in 5 of these 32 cases the written notification required by the Guidelines was not included in the case file. We therefore had to find evidence of the notification from other information in the file (such as an FBI internal memorandum indicating field discussions with a prosecutor). In one of these instances, we were unable to locate the written notification to FBI Headquarters and could not determine from other case file documentation that the notification was made.
Closing notifications were contained in every case file where appropriate.289
Dissemination of Information to Other Law Enforcement Agencies
Our review examined 16 instances where the FBI disseminated information developed in general crimes investigations to other law enforcement agencies pursuant to § II.C.6 of the General Crimes Guidelines. We determined in each case that the FBI adhered to the applicable Guidelines' requirements.
The General Crimes Guidelines authorize the initiation of racketeering enterprise investigations "when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)." General Crimes Guidelines § III.A.2.a. The Guidelines state that "[t]he standard of 'reasonable indication' is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation." Id.
Racketeering enterprise investigations must be approved by the SAC with notification to FBI Headquarters and must be based upon a written recommendation indicating that the standard for opening the investigation is satisfied. Id. § III.A.5.a. The FBI also must notify the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of DOJ's Criminal Division and any affected U.S. Attorney's Office of the initiation of the investigation. Id. § III.A.5.b. The first authorization period may not exceed one year, and renewals may be obtained for additional periods also not to exceed one year. Renewal authorization is obtained from the SAC, with notification to FBI Headquarters and the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of DOJ's Criminal Division. Id. § III.A.5.c. The SAC must review the investigations on or before the expiration of the period for which the investigation and each renewal is authorized. Id. § III.A.5.d.
A terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of: (i) furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of federal criminal law, (ii) engaging in terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C.§§ 2331(1) or (5) that involves a violation of federal criminal law, or (iii) committing any offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B).
Id. § III.B.1.a. As with racketeering enterprise investigations, the Guidelines provide that terrorism enterprise investigations must be authorized by the SAC with notification to FBI Headquarters, and they must be based upon a written recommendation.294 The FBI also must notify the Counterterrorism Section of DOJ's Criminal Division, DOJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and any affected U.S. Attorney's Office of the opening of a terrorism enterprise investigation.295 General Crimes Guidelines § III.B.4.a. Authorization periods and procedures in these investigations are the same as for racketeering enterprise investigations. Id. § III.B.4.b and c. The FBI is required to report to DOJ's Counterterrorism Section and OIPR the progress of terrorism enterprise investigations within 180 days of their initiation and the results at the end of each year the investigation continues. Id. § III.B.4.f.
Did the SAC authorize an investigation after finding that the facts or circumstances in the written recommendation reasonably indicated that two or more persons were engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)?
Documentation of Racketeering Enterprise Investigation Predication
and Field Office Notifications to DOJ, USAOs, and FBIHQ
DOJ OCRS
FBIHQ re:
Field Office 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0
Field Office 3 4 4 4 0 0 1 0 0
Field Office 6 2 2 1 1 0 0 N/A N/A
Field Office 7 1 1 1 0 0 0 N/A N/A
Field Office 9 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Field Office 10 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0
Field Office 11 1 1 1 0 1 0 N/A N/A
Field Office 12 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
TOTAL (8) 14 14 12 4 2 5 1 1
A SAC may authorize a TEI (subject to FBI Headquarters' concurrence) after assuring that the facts or circumstances contained in a written recommendation reasonably indicate the existence of an enterprise as described in the Guidelines. General Crimes Guidelines § III.B.1.a. We found that all five TEIs satisfied the standard to open a terrorism enterprise investigation.
The General Crimes Guidelines require notice to FBI Headquarters after a SAC authorizes a terrorism enterprise investigation. Id. § III.B.4.a. We found that in all five cases we examined FBI Headquarters was appropriately and promptly notified of the case initiations.
The General Crimes Guidelines require that the FBI report to the DOJ Criminal Division's Counterterrorism Section and OIPR the progress of TEIs no later than 180 days after their initiation, and the results at the end of each year the investigation continues. Id. § III.B.4.f. The MIOG states that the results of the investigation must be furnished within 180 days to FBI Headquarters with a cover communication setting forth the status of the investigation, and the memoranda must arrive at FBI Headquarters at least ten days before the due date. MIOG § 100-3.1.1. We did not find documentation of this progress report in three of the four investigations that continued beyond 180 days, including one TEI that extended beyond one year. Moreover, the single field office that drafted a progress report submitted its report 39 days late.
A TEI may be authorized initially for up to one year and may be continued for additional periods each not to exceed one year. General Crimes Guidelines § III.B.4.b. Of the five cases we reviewed, only one continued for more than one year. The SAC authorized this investigation with FBI Headquarters' concurrence for periods less than one year and had approved seven extensions. In accordance with the General Crimes Guidelines, the SAC reviewed the case prior to the expiration of each extension and submitted all required authorization documentation to FBI Headquarters. However, the file did not contain evidence of either the 180-day progress report or the yearly progress reports to DOJ.
General Crimes Guidelines §§ III.B.4.a and b (emphasis added). When the revised General Crimes Guidelines were issued, the Attorney General described the rationale for the change:
MIOG § 100-2.3(3) (emphasis added). In light of the Attorney General's stated reasons for the revision of §§ III.B.4.a and b of the General Crimes Guidelines, the current MIOG provision regarding authorization of terrorism enterprise investigations appears to be inconsistent with the requirements of those Guidelines and, in practice, may undercut the rationale underlying this Guidelines revision.
(21) Institute measures to ensure consistency in meeting and documenting the notification and reporting requirements provided in §§ III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the General Crimes Guidelines, including requiring FBI field offices to maintain in the relevant investigative file documentation of the notice of the opening of criminal intelligence investigations to DOJ's Counterterrorism, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sections, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and the relevant U.S. Attorneys' Offices as required in racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism enterprise investigations. The FBI should also ensure that progress reports required by the Guidelines in terrorism enterprise investigations are provided to OIPR, DOJ's Counterterrorism Section, and FBI Headquarters.
(22) Discuss with DOJ how to reconcile § 100-2.3(3) of the MIOG, requiring Headquarters' concurrence with the initiation and renewal of terrorism enterprise investigations, with §§ III.B.4.a and b of the General Crimes Guidelines, which authorize field level initiation and renewal of these investigations.
Division Counsel's Views on Consultation
Regarding Part VI Authorities of the General Crimes Guidelines
17. Since May 30, 2002, have you been consulted regarding the authority to visit or attend any events for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities in the absence of leads, a preliminary inquiry, or a full investigation?
[AGG Section VI.A.2.]
Yes 51 65%
No 28 35%
Yes 50 96%
Yes 44 86%
Retaining the information 43 98%
Placing the information in a file 40 91%
Indexing the information 32 73%
Uploading the information into ACS 26 59%
I have provided advice regarding visits to any place and the attendance at any event open to the public for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities. 71 90%
I have provided advice on issues involving the intrusiveness of various investigative techniques. 67 85%
I have provided advice regarding online search activity and accessing online sites and forums. 51 65%
I have provided advice regarding general topical research. 48 61%
I have provided advice regarding the operation and participation in identification, tracking, and information systems regarding terrorist activities. 34 43%
I have provided advice regarding the preparation of general reports and assessments concerning terrorism and other criminal activities for purposes of strategic planning. 25 32%
Fully satisfactory 29 37%
Somewhat satisfactory 27 34%
Have not encountered 9 11%
Neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory 7 9%
Somewhat unsatisfactory 4 5%
Not satisfactory 3 4%
Yes 40 51%
No 39 49%
Yes 18 23%
No 61 77%
Visits to any place and attendance at any event open to the public to detect or prevent terrorist activities and retention of information obtained
(AGG Section VI.A.2.) 15 83%
Permissibility of disseminating information to law enforcement agencies and others
(AGG Section V.) 13 72%
Circumstances related to public demonstrations under which a terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated
(AGG Section III.B.1.c.) 8 44%
Performing general topical research
(AGG Section VI.B.1.) 5 28%
Conducting online search activity and access to online sites and forums
(AGG Section VI.B.2.) 5 28%
The choice of investigative techniques in preliminary inquiries
(AGG Section II.B.4.) 1 6%
Under the General Crimes Guidelines, the FBI must have particularized information to justify the checking of leads or initiating a preliminary inquiry or a full investigation. By contrast, the Part VI.A.2 authorities permit the FBI to visit public places or attend public events "on the same terms and conditions as members of the public" and only "for the purpose of detecting and preventing terrorist activities." General Crimes Guidelines § VI.A.2.
Division Counsel's Views on Consultation Regarding
Part VI.A.2 Authorities of the General Crimes
Guidelines and Clarity of Related FBI Guidance
NSI Guidelines, Introduction, § A.1.316 While the FBI's specific requirements for approval of threat assessments and documentation of information derived from the exercise of this authority are classified, we believe that the FBI should require at least equivalent measures for supervisory approval and documentation as are required for threat assessments under the NSI Guidelines.
(23) Require field level supervisory approval prior to the exercise of Part VI.A.2 authorities to visit public places or attend public events for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, absent exigent circumstances.
(24) Develop a standardized form or a short e-mail template to be completed by case agents to document their use of the Part VI.A.2 authorities.
(25) In light of the survey responses of Division Counsel, consider whether (a) field office practices since May 30, 2002, regarding predication, collection, record retention, indexing, and dissemination of Part VI.A information, and the practices regarding utilization of "zero files" or other files to capture Part VI.A information, are in conformity with the Guidelines and FBI guidance; (b) there is a need for further guidance on predication, collection, record retention, indexing, dissemination, or other issues; and (c) FBI Headquarters managers should have access to data reflecting use of Part VI.A.2 authorities in order to be satisfied that these authorities are used in conformity with the Guidelines.
A "sensitive criminal matter" is "any alleged criminal conduct involving corrupt action by a public official or political candidate, the activities of a foreign government, the activities of a religious organization or a primarily political organization or the related activities of any individual prominent in such an organization, or the activities of the news media; and any other matter which in the judgment of a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) should be brought to the attention of the U.S. Attorney or other appropriate official in the Department of Justice, as well as FBI Headquarters." GCI Guidelines § II.A.2 at B-70.
The "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001" (USA PATRIOT ACT) incorporates a new definition of "domestic terrorism," in order to correspond to the existing definition of "international terrorism." Domestic terrorism is defined to mean activities occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state and appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 18 mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).
The MIOG, however, provides that a full investigation of domestic terrorism may be authorized by a SAC only with concurrence of FBI Headquarters. MIOG § 100-2.3(3). This inconsistency between the Guidelines and the MIOG is discussed in Chapter Eight.
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Ashcroft Regarding the Attorney General Guidelines (May 30, 2002).
A staff statement issued by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States also stated that the pre-September 11 Guidelines were understood by some in the FBI as restricting their ability to access public places and public resources:
Agents we interviewed believed these limitations were too restrictive and adversely affected their intelligence investigations.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 9: Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11, at 8 (April 13, 2004).