Source: http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/garza1345.htm
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 12:52:39
Document Index: 89814448

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

Final/Last Words: “I want to thank all of my family and friends for supporting me. I love you and I’m glad y’all are by my side through this whole thing. I know it’s hard for y’all. Thank God for you being there for me. It’s not easy, this is a release. Y’all finally get to move on with your lives.” Internet Sources:
Garza, Robert Date of Birth: 05/15/1982 DR#: 999466 Date Received: 12/18/2003 Education: 8 years Occupation: Laborer
Date of Offense: 09/05/2002 County of Offense: Harris
Prior Prison Record: #1090018 on a 2 year sentence from Hidalgo County for escape. Summary of Incident: On 09/05/2003, in Hidalgo County, Texas, Garza and co-defendants killed four Hispanic females by firing into the victims' car. It was later discovered that Garza and his co-defendants were members of the Tri City Bomber Gang, carrying out orders to murder one of the females who was a witness to their weapons activity. Co-Defendants: M. Reyna, G. Guerra, R. Medrano, A. Medrano, J. Cordova, J. Juarez, M. Bocanegra, S. Solis, J. Martinez, J. Ramirez, H. Garza, R. Saucedo, R. Cantu Race and Gender of Victim: Hispanic/Females Texas Attorney General
AUSTIN – Pursuant to an order entered by the 398th District Court in Hildago County, Robert Gene Garza is scheduled for execution after 6 p.m. on September 19, 2012.
In 2003, a Hildago County jury found Garza guilty of murdering Maria De La Luz Bazaldua Cobbarubias, Dantizene Lizeth Vasquez Beltran, Celina Linares Sanchez, and Lourdes Yesenia Araujo Torres.
Eyewitnesses saw the vicious assault on Ms. Cobbarubbias’ car, though no one could conclusively identify the shooters. Witnesses saw two men wearing black repeatedly fire into the vehicle. The police later recovered sixty-one spent shell cases from the scene. All but one of the women suffered gunshot wounds. Four of them – Cobbarubias, Beltran, Sanchez, and Torres – died.
After riddling the victims’ car with bullets, the men got into the vehicle that had followed the women and sped away. The gunmen abandoned their vehicle a few miles away after it had run out of gas. Police investigation uncovered many false leads and unsubstantiated rumors about the four murders. Their attention soon turned to members of a local criminal gang involved in murder, robbery, drug running, assault, and theft. Information led the police to believe that a leader of the [local criminal gang] who was serving time for attempted murder had ordered a hit on Ms. Rodriguez because she had witnessed a shooting in Garcia’s Bar and later testified against him. In carrying out that hit, the gunmen who intended to kill Ms. Rodriguez slaughtered the victims by mistake.
Informants pointed to Garza as a possible gunman. Garza was a member of the [local criminal gang] with tattoos attesting to his gang affiliation. The police believed that Garza had also been involved in the January 4, 2003, gang-related killing of six people in nearby Edinburg, Texas. In that crime – known colloquially as the Edinburg massacre – the [local criminal gang] orchestrated a fake police assault on two houses in a failed attempt to steal drugs. On January 24, 2003, the police arrested Garza and questioned him about his involvement in the Edinburg massacre. He confessed. Two days later, an officer from the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office interviewed him about his role in the Donna killings. Garza wrote a statement confessing that he helped prepare for the murders and followed the gunmen to the trailer house, but he did not admit to being one of the shooters. Garza wrote that he and another man “received instruction[s] to carry out a hit that resulted in the death of four [women]. The hit was organized for us.” After getting vehicles and a gun, Garza followed another car to the crime scene, saw two fellow gang members get out, and “then shots rang out.” The two cars drove away, until the car Garza was in broke down. The gang leader who ordered the hit “was mad ‘cause it wasn’t done right.”
In September 2002, a Hildago County grand jury indicted Garza for murdering Maria De La Luz Bazaldua Cobbarubias, Dantizene Lizeth Vasquez Beltran, Celina Linares Sanchez, and Lourdes Yesenia Araujo Torres. A Hildago County jury found Garza guilty of capital murder. After the jury recommended capital punishment, the court sentenced Garza to death. Judgment was entered Dec. 17, 2003.
On April 31, 2007, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Garza’s direct appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence. Garza did not appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Garza also sought to appeal his conviction and sentence by filing an application for a state writ of habeas corpus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On Sept. 10, 2008, the high court denied Garza’s application for state habeas relief.
Robert Gene Garza, 30, was executed by lethal injection on 19 September 2013 in Huntsville, Texas for the gang-related murder of four women. On the evening of 4 September 2002, six women were working at Garcia's Bar in Donna, a town in the Rio Grande valley, east of McAllen. After the bar closed at midnight, they rode together in a Pontiac Grand Am to their trailer home outside of town. After the car stopped, but before anyone could exit, dozens of gunshots were fired into the car. Four of the women - Maria Cobarrubias, Danitzene Beltran, Celina Sanchez, and Lourdes Torres - died. Karla Ramos survived gunshot wounds to her arm and leg. Magda Vasquez was uninjured. Donna police officer Alejandro Martinez was the first officer to arrive at the scene. Witnesses told him that a Chevrolet Blazer had been parked close to the trailer at the time of the shooting. The vehicle was white, had paper license tags, and no hubcaps. Martinez, finding that the crime occurred outside Donna city limits, contacted the Hidalgo County sheriff's office. Investigators with that office recovered 61 bullet casings from the scene. The rounds were 9mm and 7.76mm. Investigators also found an abandoned, out-of-gas Chevrolet Blazer matching the description given to Officer Martinez a few miles from the trailer park. It had been reported stolen a few days earlier. It contained some items of clothing that did not belong to the vehicle's owner, including a red bandana with white markings. Based on statements taken from the surviving victims, authorities investigated three men who had been in Garcia's Bar on the night of the shooting, but they were unable to find any evidence connecting any of them to the crime. They also investigated several other bar patrons and pursued some anonymous tips, but after a few weeks, they were left with no suspects. On 5 January 2003, four months after the murders, six people were found shot to death in two houses on a semi-rural cul-de-sac in Edinburg, also in Hidalgo County. The incident, known locally as the "Edinburg Massacre," immediately drew comparisons with the Donna slayings from the public and the media. Police investigated the TriCity Bombers gang, or T.C.B., for the killings. Through their investigation, several members of the gang, including Garza, then 19, became suspects in the Donna slayings. Prosecutors advanced the theory that the Donna killings were ordered by T.C.B. leader Jesus Carlos Rodriguez, who was awaiting trial for an attempted murder committed at Garcia's Bar on 31 March 2001. Two women, Nora Rodriguez and Mercedes Quintero, had witnessed the incident and had been called to testify. Both women lived at the trailer park where the murders were committed. Nora Rodriguez was also the manager of Garcia's Bar. Prosecutors said that the hitmen made a mistake and killed the wrong targets. On 26 January, Garza was taken to the Hidalgo County sheriff's office, where he gave a confession. Garza stated that he had been instructed concerning an arranged hit, and on 5 September, he received instructions that the hit was to be carried out that day. At approximately 7 p.m., Ricardo Martinez picked up Garza and Mark Anthony Reyna in a four-dour sedan, either a Buick Cutlass or Regal. They then picked up a fourth person, later identified as Guadalupe Guerra, but who Garza simply called "Manny." An AK-47 assault rifle, a TEC-9 handgun, and another 9mm handgun were in the trunk of the vehicle. According to Garza's confession, the men drove by Garcia's Bar, then went to pick up a second vehicle, which had been stolen. Garza and Reyna got in the second vehicle and waited for "them" to come. They later saw two vehicles drive by - a Grand Am and the Buick - and followed them. When the vehicles stopped, Martinez and Guerra got out of the Buick and started shooting. They then left the scene and abandoned the Buick. They drove around in the second vehicle until it "broke down," then they left on foot. Garza added that "Rocha" - J.C. Rodriguez - "was mad 'cause it wasn't done right." Investigators recovered a TEC-9 from a gang member's grandparents' house and determined that it fired 18 of the 9mm casings recovered from the scene. Three 7.76mm Chinese-made SKS military rifles were found at a gang member's friend's house. Firearms specialist Tim Counce testified that he could not "identify or eliminate" any of the SKS rifles as murder weapons. He further testified that the SKS rifles could appear to be AK-47s to the untrained eye. Detective Roberto Alvarez testified that the TriCity Bombers identified themselves by the colors red and black and often carried and wore red shirts and bandannas. Robert Garza had a tattoo on his chest with the words "Tri City Bomber" and the initials "T.C.B.", along with various other tattoos on other body parts, signifying his membership in the gang. In pre-trial proceedings, Garza's lawyers attempted to prevent his confession from being admitted into evidence. In an amended statement, Garza wrote that he did not commit the crime, and only "wrote what the investigators told me, to get things I wanted." Garza stated that he was told that if he confessed, he would be allowed to make some phone calls, would be allowed to see his pregnant wife, and would be released from "the hole" to the general jail population. In response, investigator Juan Sifuentes testified that he offered no favors or promises to Garza for his confession. Garza did get to make some phone calls and see his wife, Sifuentes said, but that was independent of his statement. Sifuentes said he had nothing to do with where prisoners were kept in the jail. The judge ruled against Garza and allowed his confession to be admitted. Two trailer park residents who witnessed the shooting testified that it was committed by two men wearing black clothing.
Under Texas law, a defendant can be found guilty of capital murder for being a party to a killing if he intended to kill the victim or "anticipated that a human life would be taken," even if he did not directly cause the victim's death. A jury found Garza guilty of capital murder in December 2003 and sentenced him to death. He was also convicted of committing capital murder while engaging in organized criminal activity and given a second death sentence. He was also given a life sentence for the attempted capital murder of the surviving victims. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Garza's first capital murder conviction and death sentence in January 2007. The second capital murder conviction was also affirmed, but the appeals court vacated that death sentence, and he was subsequently given a life sentence. All of Garza's subsequent appeals in state and federal court were denied. Texas Department of Criminal Justice records name Garza as a co-defendant in the Edinburg killings, but he was not brought to trial for them. Three men - Humberto Garza, Rodolfo Medrano, and Juan Ramirez - received death sentences in that case, and are currently on Texas' death row in Livingston. No information on the three men Garza named as accomplices in the Donna murders - Mark Anthony Reyna, Guadalupe Guerra, and Ricardo Martinez - was available for this report. In an interview from death row in July 2013, Garza denied involvement in either of the multiple murders. "I wasn't there. I didn't kill nobody," he said. He did, however, acknowledge that he was aware of a planned hit by his gang. "I had knowledge of it, you know, prior to it, so probably I'm at fault for not preventing it." "I lived the life of a thug," Garza said. "I was in the streets. I was a gang member, you know." Garza said he regretted the suffering he had caused. "Definitely, I feel remorse for the family, for the victim, for the victim's children, for my family, I mean for everybody," he said. "Not just for that case, but for my whole past, the people I've hurt in my past." Garza said he has grown and changed during his ten years on death row. "I think I'm a totally different person today than I was back then," he said. While in prison, Garza received two additional 8-year sentences for aggravated assault on a public servant. Garza's execution was delayed for about two hours as the U.S. Supreme Court considered his final appeal, which he filed on his own. Gaza expressed love to his family in his brief last statement. He did not address or acknowledge the victims' families. The lethal injection was started, and he was pronounced dead at 8:41 p.m. Some death-penalty watchers had been speculating that Garza's execution would be the last one performed in Texas using the chemical pentobarbital. Companies that manufacture the sedative - long used for animal euthanasia and legal human euthanasia - object to its use in executions, and have banned its sale to state prisons. Other states have had to switch to other drugs for their lethal injections, but Texas had enough of a supply on stock to last to September. That stock, however, expires this month. A spokesman for the Texas prison system said yesterday that the state will continue to use pentobarbital. He did not disclose how the prison will obtain its supply. Texas has another execution scheduled for September, and four more through the end of the year. When U.S. states began performing executions via lethal injection in the 1980s, they used a series of three drugs, the first of which was sodium thiopental. In 2011, the only lab manufacturing sodium thiopental stopped exporting it to the U.S., so the death-peanlty states have switched to pentobarbital.
HUNTSVILLE - A former South Texas street gangster was executed Thursday evening for his involvement in an ambush in which four women were gunned down 11 years ago.
Robert Gene Garza, 30, was the 12th inmate executed this year in Texas.
Garza smiled and blew a kiss to friends and relatives as they entered the death chamber. In a brief final statement, he thanked them for coming and said he loved them.
He was pronounced dead at 8:41 p.m., 26 minutes after a dose of pentobarbital began flowing into his arms.
A longtime member of a Rio Grande Valley gang known as the Tri-City Bombers, Garza insisted a statement admitting his participation in the September 2002 shootings in Hidalgo County was made under duress and improperly obtained.
But prosecutors said Garza orchestrated the plan to silence the women, who he thought had witnessed another gang crime.
"I really didn't have anything to do with the scenario the state was providing," Garza told The Associated Press recently from death row. "I think they were just trying to close his case … and they needed somebody."
Evidence later showed the women were killed by mistake.
HUNTSVILLE — A former South Texas street gang member was executed Thursday evening for his involvement in a gang ambush where four women were gunned down 11 years ago. Robert Gene Garza, 30, became the 12th condemned inmate executed this year in Texas, which carries out capital punishment more than any other state. Garza smiled and blew a kiss to friends and relatives as they entered the death chamber. In a brief final statement, he thanked them for coming and told them he loved them. “I know it’s hard for you,” he said. “It’s not easy. This is a release. Y’all finally get to move on with your lives.” He was pronounced dead at 8:41 p.m. CDT, 26 minutes after a lethal dose of pentobarbital began flowing into his arms. A member of a Rio Grande Valley gang known as the Tri-City Bombers even before he was a teenager, Garza insisted a statement to police acknowledging his participation in the September 2002 shootings in Hidalgo County was made under duress and improperly obtained. But prosecutors said Garza orchestrated the gang’s plan to silence the women, who Garza thought had witnessed another gang crime, and was present when several gang members opened fire on the women when they arrived at their trailer park home after work at a bar. “I really didn’t have anything to do with the scenario the state was providing,” Garza told The Associated Press recently from death row. “I guess since we are gang members, they got me involved through the gang. “I think they were just trying to close his case … and they needed somebody.” Evidence later would show the women were killed by mistake. The gang member in the other crime never went to trial because he accepted a plea deal and prison term. Garza, who was arrested in late January 2003, was convicted under Texas’ law of parties, which makes a non-triggerman equally culpable. Evidence showed Garza was a gang leader, told his companions how to do the killings, was present when the shootings took place and “in all likelihood was a shooter but is downplaying his part,” Joseph Orendain, the Hidalgo County assistant district attorney who prosecuted him, said this week. In February, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review his case. His lawyer, Don Vernay, said appeals were exhausted. Garza filed his own last-day appeals Thursday to the high court, arguing his trial attorneys failed to obtain from his mother testimony jurors should have been allowed to hear that he stayed in the gang because he feared retaliation if he quit. He also contended his trial court judge earlier this week improperly refused his request to withdraw his execution date. Garza argued the state should assure him the lethal dose of pentobarbital to be used in his punishment was chemically effective and obtained legally. Texas prison officials have said their inventory of pentobarbital is expiring this month. Texas prison officials said Thursday that they will continue to use the same drug but wouldn’t say how the state will replace its supply. “We have not changed our current execution protocol and have no immediate plans to do so,” Texas Department of Criminal Justice spokesman Jason Clark said in a statement to The Associated Press. Garza also was charged but never tried for participating in what became known in the Rio Grande Valley as the Edinburg massacre, the January 2003 slayings of six people at a home in the city. In the case that sent him to death row, Garza was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the slayings of the four women. Evidence showed they were living in the U.S. without legal permission just outside Donna, about 15 miles southeast of McAllen. In his statement to investigators, which Garza insisted was coerced, he said he carried out the “hit” with three other gunmen in two vehicles who opened fire on six women in their parked car. Killed were Maria De La Luz Bazaldua Cobbarubias, Dantizene Lizeth Vasquez Beltran, Celina Linares Sanchez and Lourdes Yesenia Araujo Torres. Two others survived. Another Texas inmate is set to die next week.
Maria Cobarrubias, Danitzene Beltran, Celina Sanchez, Lourdes Torres , Jimmy Almendariz, 22, Jerry Hidalgo, 24, Ray Hidalgo, 30, Juan Delgado Jr., 32, Juan Delgado III, 20, Ruben Castillo, 32
On the evening of September 4, 2002, Maria De La Luz Bazaldua Cobarrubias, Danitzene Lizeth Vasquez Beltran, Celina Linares Sanchez, Lourdes Yesenia Araujo Torres, Karla Espino Ramos, and Magda Torres Vasquez were working at Garcia's Bar in Donna, Texas. When the bar closed at midnight, Cobbarubias gave the other women a ride to their trailer home. She drove south on Business 83, turned onto Valley View Road, and then parked close to the women's trailer. Before anyone had a chance to get out of the vehicle, shots were fired. Cobbarubias, Beltran, Sanchez, and Torres sustained multiple gunshot wounds and died from their injuries. Ramos sustained gunshot wounds to her arm and leg, but survived. Vasquez did not sustain any physical injuries. Alejandro Martinez of the Donna Police Department was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He determined that the shooting had actually occurred just outside the Donna city limits and contacted the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office. Several witnesses told Martinez that a Chevrolet Blazer had been parked close to the trailer at the time of the shooting. The vehicle was white, had paper plates, and did not have any hubcaps. Investigators with the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office recovered sixty-one spent bullet casings from the trailer park, which were of two different sizes: 9 millimeter and 7.76 x 39 millimeter. Most of the casings were recovered from a driveway located directly behind where the victim's Pontiac Grand Am was parked. Investigators also impounded a Chevrolet Blazer a few miles from the trailer park. The vehicle was white, had paper plates, and did not have any hubcaps. It had been reported stolen a few days earlier. Several items of clothing that did not belong to the vehicle's owner were recovered from the vehicle, including a red bandana with white markings. The vehicle had run out of gas. Juan Antonio Quintero, a neighbor, testified that he saw two people at the time of the shooting. One of them was short and "chubby" and the other one was tall and "skinny." Both of them were wearing black. He noticed that the short person was holding a gun that "looked like a TEC-9." He testified that he could not see their faces, but thought one of them "resembled" Vasquez's boyfriend, Jesse Munoz. Carlos Villarreal, J.A. Quintero's guest, told investigators that he saw two people at the time of the shooting. One of them appeared to be between 5'10'' and 5'11'' and 160 pounds. The other person was 5'8'' and 250 pounds. At trial, prosecutors introduced Robert Garza's booking sheet which showed that he was 5'11'' and 160 pounds. Investigator Juan Sifuentes testified that, because of information they had received, patrons at Garcia's Bar were suspected in the shooting. Ramos told investigators that Abraham Martinez Tienda, who had been in Garcia's Bar on the evening of the shooting, shot the women. Vasquez told investigators that she suspected her boyfriend, Juan Rudolfo Barrones, who had been in Garcia's Bar on the evening of the shooting. Another suspect was Antonio Francisco Conteras, because he had followed the victim's car to the trailer park on the evening of the shooting. Sifuentes testified that they investigated Tienda, Barrones, and Conteras, but could not find any evidence linking them to the shooting. They also investigated several other bar patrons and pursued tips they received from the Crime Stoppers program. However, this investigation did not lead anywhere, and after a few weeks they were left with no suspects. In January 2003, Abraham Osequera and Marco Antonio Mendez told investigators that they believed that members from their criminal street gang, the TriCity Bombers, the "T.C.B.," could be involved. They gave investigators information pointing towards T.C.B. members Jesus Carlos Rodriguez and Mark Anthony Reyna. Also, investigators received information from J.A. Quintero and his aunt, Mercedes Quintero, implicating the T.C.B. Through further investigation, other T.C.B. members emerged as possible suspects including Garza, Rudolfo Medrano, Guadalupe Guerra, and Ricardo Martinez. The State's theory of the case was that J.C. Rodriguez, who was serving time for attempted murder, ordered "a hit" on Nora Rodriguez and M. Quintero because they had been called to testify against him, but that the wrong women were killed by mistake. N. Rodriguez testified that she and M. Quintero witnessed J.C. Rodriguez commit the attempted murder on March 31, 2001, and were called to testify about the incident. To support this theory, the State introduced a judgment showing that J.C. Rodriguez was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for an attempted murder committed on March 31, 2001. On January 26, 2003, Garza was taken to the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing a waiver, Garza gave a statement describing his own involvement in "a hit" which "resulted in the death of four Donna womans." Garza explained that the "hit was organized for us" and that someone left a four-door "Cutlass or Regal" at Plaza Mall to be used in "the hit." Garza was "hoping it would be left alone," but on September 5, 2002, he received instructions "that the hit was to be carried out that day." At approximately 7:00 p.m., Martinez picked up Garza and Reyna in a four-door vehicle. Garza saw that Martinez had an AK-47, a TEC-9, and a nine-millimeter handgun in the trunk of the vehicle. They picked up a fourth person, "Manny," and drove "around Donna to see the bar which was located on old [highway] 83." Then they left Donna to pick up a "second vehicle," which had been stolen. Garza and Reyna got into the second vehicle and waited in the "middle of nowhere" until they saw "them" coming. They saw two vehicles pass by, a "Grand Am" and Manny's and Martinez's vehicle, and followed them to "a big house" or an "apartment complex." Martinez and Manny got out of their vehicle and started shooting. Garza saw that Manny "shot as he ran" and Martinez shot "as he stood." After the shooting, they left the scene and abandoned the four-door vehicle "in the middle of nowhere." Then they left the weapons in the trash where they could pick them up the next day. They drove around in the second vehicle for a while until it "broke down," and they left on foot. Finally, Garza stated that: "Apparently Rocha was mad 'cause it wasn't done right." Medrano, who kept weapons for the T.C.B., told investigators that he knew where the weapons used in the Donna shooting were located. He directed investigators to a black box he kept in his grandparents' house. Also, he directed investigators to the residence of fellow T.C.B. member Robert Zamora, Jr. Zamora subsequently took investigators to his friend Nicholas Montez's residence. Firearms specialist Timothy Counce testified that a TEC-9 gun, which had been seized at Medrano's grandparents' house, fired eighteen of the nine-millimeter cartridge casings found at the scene. Further, Counce testified that he had been unable to "identify or eliminate" three Chinese-manufactured SKS military assault rifles, which had been seized at Montez's residence, as having fired the 7.76 x 39 millimeter cartridge casings found at the trailer park. The SKS rifles could appear to be AK-47 rifles to the untrained eye. Detective Roberto Alvarez testified that the T.C.B. was a highly organized criminal street gang that was connected with various crimes including murder, robbery, assault, burglary, and theft. Members identified themselves by the colors red and black; they often carried red bandannas, drove red cars, and wore red t-shirts. They commonly used a hand symbol and tattoos to show their affiliation with the gang. Alvarez testified that photographs depicting Garza wearing red shirts and making the T.C.B. hand symbol confirmed his affiliation with the T.C.B., as did photographs of his tattoos. The tattoo photographs showed the words "Tri City Bomber" and the initials "T.C.B." on his chest, the words "tri" and "city" and a bomb with a fuse on his right shoulder blade, the initials "T.C.B." on his right leg, the nickname "bones" and a skull on his right arm, and a small bomb on his left arm. Over counsel's objection, Garza was required to take off his shirt and display his tattoos to the jury. Garza v. State, Unpub. LEXIS 340 (Tex.Crim.App. April 30, 2008). (Direct Appeal)
This trial involved the gang-related, "pseudo-cop" robbery-homicide of six men, some of whom were members of the "Texas Chicano Brotherhood," a rival gang of the "Bombitas" or "Tri-City Bombers" gang to which appellant belonged.
In the early morning hours of January 5, 2003, police responded to a 911 call and found the bodies of six men at 2915 East Monte Cristo Road in Edinburg. There were two houses on the property that were separated by a dirt driveway. Police found the body of Jerry Hidalgo in the kitchen of the larger house that was located on the west side of the driveway (the "west-side house"). 7 He was lying face down on the floor and his hands and legs were bound with extension cords. He had sustained numerous gunshot wounds, and there was a bullet hole in his back and blood around his head. The living room had been ransacked, and it appeared that someone had rummaged through one of the bedrooms, leaving the mattress standing on its side.
The body of Juan Delgado, III, was lying face down in the grass outside the front door of the smaller house on the east side of the driveway (the "east-side house"). He had suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the back of his neck. As they entered the house, police discovered the bodies of Juan Delgado, Jr., who had been shot in the back and head, and Jimmy Almendarez, who had suffered multiple gunshot wounds, including a fatal head wound. The bodies of Ray Hidalgo and Ruben Castillo were in another room. Ray had sustained two gunshot wounds to the head and was missing an eye. Ruben had suffered multiple gunshot wounds including shots to the buttocks. The "east-side house" had also been ransacked, and the victims' pockets had been pulled out.
Police received information about a "pseudo-cop" robbery and took various suspects into custody, including appellant. Following his arrest, appellant gave a statement in which he admitted that he was a "captain" of the Tri-City Bombers, and that he and several other gang members put together a plan to steal what they believed was a significant amount of marihuana from the rival gang. He described his planning of the robbery and its ultimate execution, but denied being one of the actual killers. He stated that he and another gang member had "dropped off" the robbers at the murder scene and then picked them up afterwards.
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court violated the federal and state constitutional protections against double jeopardy by subjecting him to multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. 8 Appellant admits that he did not make a double-jeopardy objection at trial. However, because of the "fundamental nature of the double-jeopardy protections," a double-jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal (1) when the undisputed facts show the double-jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and (2) when enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interest. 9
8 U. S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Const. art. I, § 14. Appellant also claims that "[c]ollateral estoppel bars the conviction and sentence in the second prosecution styled 'Count Two.'" This claim is multifarious. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). It is also without merit. As discussed herein, appellant was convicted and sentenced on both counts in a single proceeding. There was no "second prosecution."
9 Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 642-643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Count One of the indictment alleged that appellant
. . . did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the deaths of Jimmy Almendariz, Juan Delgado, III, Jerry Eugene Hidalgo, Juan Delgado, Jr., Ruben Castillo, and Ray Hidalgo, by shooting them with a firearm, and said murders were committed during the same criminal transaction[.]
Count Two of the indictment alleged that appellant:
. . . did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the deaths of Jimmy Almendariz, Juan Delgado, III, Jerry Eugene Hidalgo, Juan Delgado, Jr., Ruben Castillo, and Ray Hidalgo, by shooting them with a firearm, and the defendant was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery of Jimmy Almendariz, Juan Delgado, III, Jerry Eugene Hidalgo, Juan Delgado, Jr., Ruben Castillo, and Ray Hidalgo, and the defendant did then and there commit said capital murder as a member of a criminal street gang[.]
10 Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a).
11 Tex. Penal Code §§ 7.02(a) and 7.02(b).
With regard to Count One, the jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder and assessed a life sentence. With regard to Count Two, the jury found appellant guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced appellant to death.
The double-jeopardy clause protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense following acquittal or conviction. 13 It also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 14 Here, the "multiple prosecutions" aspect is not implicated because appellant was convicted and sentenced in a single proceeding. 15 Thus, we are concerned only with the "multiple punishments" aspect in this case. 16 A multiple-punishments claim can arise in two contexts: (1) the lesser-included-offense context, in which the same conduct is punished twice-once for the basic conduct, and a second time for that same conduct plus more; and (2) punishing the same criminal act twice under two distinct statutes when the legislature intended the conduct to be punished only once. 17
13 Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
16 We recently addressed a "multiple punishments" double-jeopardy claim for one of appellant's co-defendants. Ramirez v. State, No. AP-75,167, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 610 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2007) (not designated for publication). Ramirez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in two separate counts. In Ramirez, as in the present case, one count alleged murder in the course of robbery under Section 19.03(a)(2) and one count alleged the murders of more than one person during the same criminal transaction under Section 19.03(a)(7). 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 610 at *15. In Ramirez and in this case, both counts arose from the same conduct on the same date involving the same victims. Id. We held in Ramirez that the same evidence that formed the basis for "the same criminal transaction" element in one count also formed the basis for the robbery element in the other count and that there was only one "allowable unit of prosecution" under the statute in that circumstance. 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 610 at *15. We held that Ramirez had been subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double-jeopardy, and we reversed his conviction and vacated his death sentence on one of the counts. 2007 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 610 at *15.
17 Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
18 Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 510 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. ref'd); Honeycutt v. State, 82 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
19 Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
20 Id. at 338.
21 Appellant's appeal from his murder conviction and life sentence in Count One, Garza v. State, No. 13-05-00397-CR, is currently pending in the Thirteenth Court of Appeals. Because appellant's capital murder conviction and death sentence in Count Two is retained as "the most serious offense," the Thirteenth Court of Appeals may consider reversing appellant's murder conviction on double-jeopardy grounds.
In point of error two, appellant argues that the trial court "erred in imposing death as a sentence where the jury returned verdicts of both not guilty and guilty of capital-murder, under the same factual basis." In point of error three, he complains that the charge and verdict form failed to inform the jurors "whether a murder of more than one person in the same transaction would include a murder in the course of a robbery." Appellant's arguments are based on the faulty premise that his murder conviction in Count One amounted to an acquittal of the capital-murder alleged in Count Two.
Appellant also asserts that "the Eighth Amendment requires that it be the death verdict that is set aside." As we have already stated, when a defendant is convicted of two offenses that are the "same" for double-jeopardy purposes, the "most serious" offense is retained and the other conviction is set aside. 22 The "most serious offense" test is not an "arbitrary rule," as appellant argues. One reason that we apply the "most serious offense" test to double- jeopardy violations is to eliminate arbitrariness in determining "greater" and "lesser" offenses. 23 Because appellant's points of error two and three are without merit, we overrule them.
22 Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d at 337.
23 Bigon v. State, S.W.3d , , Nos. PD-1769-06 & PD-1770-06, 252 S.W.3d 360, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1, at *30-31 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2008).
In point of error four, appellant claims that counsel "failed to preserve his right (1) not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; (2) to have his guilt case decided by jurors who were informed that the second count of the indictment was included in the first; and (3) to have his acquittal of capital-murder [in Paragraph 1 of the indictment] given preclusive effect over the later conviction [in Paragraph 2 of the indictment] for the same offense." However, we have already agreed with appellant's double-jeopardy argument, and he does not provide any additional argument or authorities to support an argument that his trial counsel were ineffective under the second and third prongs of his claim. These additional claims are inadequately briefed. 24 Point of error four is overruled.
In point of error six, appellant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. He specifically focuses on the veniremembers who were selected to serve on the jury, arguing that counsel failed to "diligently question [them] about their position, thoughts and feelings about the death penalty for any murder, let alone multiple murder." He also complains that defense counsel failed to ask them if they "could consider a life sentence as the proper punishment for the murder of more than one person in the same transaction." He asserts that "the result of the punishment phase of the trial [was] unreliable" because "the jury members' thoughts and feelings about the death penalty were either unknown, or were so biased in favor of the prosecution, the result of their deliberations was a foregone conclusion."
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. 25 "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 26 To show deficient performance, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel's representation fell below the standard of professional norms. 27 To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 28
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
27 Id. at 688.
28 Id. at 694.
29 Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Appellant has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. The result of the jury's deliberations was not "a foregone conclusion," given that it found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of murder and assessed a life sentence in Count One. Point of error six is overruled.
In point of error five, appellant claims that the trial court was biased against him because, after allowing defense counsel to conduct an inadequate voir dire, it seated a "biased jury which was unable to consider life imprisonment as a proper punishment." However, as discussed above, the jurors consistently answered during voir dire that they could consider the full range of punishment and that they were not predisposed on punishment because there were multiple victims.
Buried within point of error five in his brief is appellant's claim that the trial court was biased because it allowed defense counsel to proceed to trial without retaining any experts. He alleges that "[b]y sanctioning Defense Counsel's neglect, with regard to defense experts, the Court helped create an unfair trial for [appellant]." 35
During pre-trial proceedings on February 10, 2005, the State informed the trial court that defense counsel had not provided "notice of experts" as requested. The following exchange occurred:
Court: They are requesting your list.
Defense Counsel: I don't have experts. I'm not going to have any experts.
Court: You are not going to be calling anybody?
The trial court then asked the parties to approach the bench for an off-the-record discussion. We do not know the substance of that conversation, and the matter was not mentioned again. Absent a clear showing of bias, a trial court's actions will be presumed to have been correct. 36 Appellant has not made a clear showing of trial-court bias. Point of error five is overruled.
In point of error seven, appellant complains about the capital-murder application paragraph in the Count Two jury charge. He alleges that (1) he was denied his right to the presumption of innocence, (2) the State was relieved of its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) the language in the application paragraph "conveyed to the jury the court's opinion on the merits of the case."
The jury charge in Count Two defined capital-murder as murder "in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of Robbery." 37 The capital-murder application paragraph contained two alternative theories of liability, the first authorizing the jury to convict appellant as a party under Section 7.02(a) , and the second authorizing the jury to convict appellant as a conspirator under Section 7.02(b). The "party" portion required the jury to find that the co-defendants "intentionally and knowingly cause[d] the deaths" of the victims "by shooting them with a firearm" and that one or more of the co-defendants "were then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery" of the victims. It authorized the jurors to convict appellant as a party if they found that
. . . the Defendant, HUMBERTO GARZA, then and there knew of the intent, if any, of one or more of the said CO-DEFENDANTS, to rob the said JIMMY ALMENDARIZ, JUAN DELGADO, III, JERRY EUGENE HIDALGO, JUAN DELGADO, JR., RUBEN CASTILLO, and RAY HIDALGO, and the Defendant acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by one or more of the said CO-DEFENDANTS by encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid one or more of the said CO-DEFENDANTS, to commit the offense of Murder of the said JIMMY ALMENDARIZ, JUAN DELGADO, III, JERRY EUGENE HIDALGO, JUAN DELGADO, JR., RUBEN CASTILLO, and RAY HIDALGO, by being leader of the gang giving the okay to commit the offense, by planning the offense, by ordering gang members to commit the offense, by calling Creeper to bring the weapons, by selecting certain gang members to participate in the offense, by gathering the gang members at Juanon's house, by planning to approach the victims' location from the empty field North of the victims' location, by explaining the victims' location to the group, by calling Bones to participate, by calling Ram to participate, by calling Rick to participate, by calling Kito to participate, by calling Perro to participate, by calling Little Sal to participate, by calling Marcial to participate, by arranging transportation to and from the victims' location, by driving participants to the victims' location, or by driving participants from the victims' location . . .
40 Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
41 Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 108 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1990).
The language in the capital-murder application paragraph tracked the statutory language contained in Sections 7.02(a) and 7.02(b). Appellant's gang membership was raised by the evidence. The gang names and activities detailed in the charge reflected the State's theory; however, the inclusion of these details did not endorse that theory, nor were they presented as "established facts." The jurors were clearly instructed to find appellant guilty of capital-murder only if they found the stated elements "from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." The wording of the charge was not an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Point of error seven is overruled.
In point of error eight, appellant argues that Apprendi and Ring 42 mandate that future-dangerousness "must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by the current statutory requirement of a 'probability' of future-dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a much lower standard." In points of error nine and ten, he argues that Article 37.071 violates due process and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts that the misleading use of the undefined term "probability" permits the jury to find future-dangerousness based on a standard less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
43 Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
In points of error sixteen and seventeen, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's affirmative finding on the future-dangerousness special issue. In points of error eighteen and nineteen, appellant contends that the trial court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by sentencing him to death without legally or factually sufficient evidence of future-dangerousness.
We do not conduct factual sufficiency reviews of the future-dangerousness special issue. 50 In evaluating legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's finding and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 51
50 McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
51 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
52 In its determination of the future-dangerousness special issue, the jury is entitled to consider all of the evidence presented at both the guilt and punishment stages of trial. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 507 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 627, 169 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2007).
In point of error twenty, appellant claims that Article 37.071 violates the Fourteenth Amendment by implicitly placing the burden on the defendant to prove mitigation, rather than requiring the jury to make a finding against the defendant on that issue beyond a reasonable doubt. He also asserts that the aggravating factor of future-dangerousness must be alleged in the indictment before the State can seek the death penalty. In support of these claims, he cites Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely v. Washington. 53 We have previously rejected these claims, 54 and appellant does not persuade us that our prior cases were wrongly decided. Point of error twenty is overruled.
53 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).
54 Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 535 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282, 169 L. Ed. 2d 206 (2007); Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
In points of error twenty-one through twenty-six, appellant argues that Article 37.071 violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He claims that the mitigation special issue "forces jurors to weigh the aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances," and, as a result, it "does not provide a means for jurors to give effect to the mitigating circumstances warranting a life sentence," it "shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to warrant a life sentence," and it "does not require jurors to consider mitigating circumstances alone in determining whether a life sentence is warranted."
The jury's consideration of aggravating circumstances in deliberating on the mitigation issue is permitted, but not required. 55 Article 37.071 does not shift the burden of proof to the accused to prove a mitigating circumstance. 56 We have consistently declined to hold Article 37.071 unconstitutional for failing to assign a burden of proof on the mitigation special issue. 57 Points of error twenty-one through twenty-six are overruled.
55 Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
56 Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
57 Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926, 126 S. Ct. 2982, 165 L. Ed. 2d 989 (2006); Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 549-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
59 Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558-59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
60 Prystash, 3 S.W.3d at 536.
61 Id. (quoting Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
62 Id. at 537.
JUDGES: PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined. WOMACK, J., dissented. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Juan Antonio Quintero, a neighbor, testified that he saw two people at the time of the shooting. One of them was short and "chubby" and the other one was tall and "skinny." Both of them were wearing black. He noticed that the short person was holding a gun that "looked like a TEC-9." He testified that he could not see their faces, but thought one of them "resembled" Vasquez's boyfriend, Jesse Munoz.
Carlos Villarreal, J.A. Quintero's guest, told investigators that he saw two people at the time of the shooting. One of them appeared to be between 5'10'' and 5'11'' and 160 pounds. The other person was 5'8'' and 250 pounds. The State introduced the appellant's booking sheet which showed that the appellant was 5'11'' and 160 pounds.
In January 2003, Abraham Osequera and Marco Antonio Mendez told investigators that they believed that members from their criminal street gang, the TriCity Bombers, the "T.C.B.," could be involved. They gave investigators information pointing towards T.C.B. members Jesus Carlos Rodriguez and Mark Anthony Reyna. Also, investigators received information from J.A. Quintero and his aunt, Mercedes Quintero, implicating the T.C.B. Through further investigation, other T.C.B. members emerged as possible suspects including the appellant, Rudolfo Medrano, Guadalupe Guerra, and Ricardo Martinez. The State's theory of the case was that J.C. Rodriguez, who was serving time for attempted murder, ordered "a hit" on Nora Rodriguez and M. Quintero because they had been called to testify against him, but that the wrong women were killed by mistake. 4 N. Rodriguez testified that she and M. Quintero witnessed J.C. Rodriguez commit the attempted murder on March 31, 2001, and were called to testify about the incident. To support this theory, the State introduced a judgment showing that J.C. Rodriguez was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for an attempted murder committed on March 31, 2001.
In his statement, the appellant admitted that he carried out "a hit" with Martinez, Reyna, and Manny, which "resulted in the death of four Donna [wo]mans." On September 5, 2002, they went to a bar in Donna located "off old [highway] 83." They followed a "Grand Am" to a "big house" or "apartment complex." Martinez and Manny were in a four-door vehicle that had several weapons in its trunk, including an AK-47 and a TEC-9. The appellant and Reyna were in a second, stolen vehicle, which later "broke down." The appellant saw that Manny "shot as he ran" and Martinez "as he [stood]." Afterwards, they left the scene and abandoned both vehicles. They left the weapons in the trash so that they could retrieve them later. The State presented corroborating evidence that a shooting took place in the early morning hours of September 5, 2002, in a trailer park located in Hidalgo County just outside the Donna city limits. At least sixty-one shots had been fired at a parked Pontiac Grand Am. There were six women inside the vehicle and four of them died. The women worked at Garcia's Bar, located off Business 83 in Donna, and had just returned from work when the shooting occurred. The forensic evidence also corroborated the appellant's statement. Counce testified that a TEC-9 fired eighteen of the nine-millimeter casings found at the scene. Also, he testified that three SKS rifles, which looked like AK-47 rifles, could have fired some of the 7.76 x 39 millimeter casings found at the scene. This was consistent with the appellant's observation of an AK-47 and a TEC-9 in the shooters' trunk. Also, the State showed that the TEC-9 gun was recovered from T.C.B. member Medrano's grandparents' house and that Medrano stored weapons for the T.C.B. The appellant complains that witnesses at the scene identified other suspects as the shooters. However, under the law of the parties, the State was not required to prove that the appellant was one of the shooters. Also, the State showed that several of the other suspects were eliminated through further investigation. Finally, the appellant actually matched one of the witness's description of one of the shooters.
The appellant also complains that he stated that they used a four-door Cutlass or Regal, but that the State proved that the shooters used a Chevrolet Blazer. He argues that investigators did not find any evidence linking him to the Chevrolet Blazer. However, the appellant described the use of two vehicles in his statement, and only one of them was identified. The unidentified second vehicle was described as a stolen vehicle that "broke down." The State showed that the Chevrolet Blazer was stolen and had run out of gas. The State also showed that the appellant was a member of the T.C.B., that members of the T.C.B. wore red bandannas to identify themselves, and that a red bandanna not belonging to the vehicle's owner was recovered from the Chevrolet Blazer.
In his first point of error, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress his statement given to investigators on January 26, 2003. The appellant claims that his statement was obtained in violation of Articles 38.21 and 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution. The appellant argues that the statement was involuntary because it resulted from "several substantial promises made and granted to [a]ppellant by the authorities." He complains about three specific promises purportedly made by investigators: (1) that he would be allowed to make telephone calls; (2) that he would be allowed a private contact visit with his pregnant wife; and (3) that he would be released from "the hole" to the general population. At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of witnesses as well as the weight to be given their testimony. 13 The trial judge may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a witness's testimony. 14 HN4Go to the description of this Headnote.This Court is not at liberty to disturb any fact finding that is supported by the record. 15
At the pre-trial hearing, the following amendment to the appellant's statement, which had been mailed to Investigator Sifuentes on July 24, 2003, was admitted into evidence: 16
I am adding this to the statement just to make it clear that I did not com[mit] this crime. I only wrote what investigators told me, to get things I wanted. I wrote this statement to get a visit with my wife Jennifer M. Garza in person (contact visit). I got a meal, and I was in the hole like everybody else who got arrested with me on 1-24-03. But I wrote what they told me to write so they could also move me out of the hole to regular population. But I just want to make it clear I don't know nothing about the murders. I only write what investigators told me for my be[n]efits, in exchange. Now I know the [serious]sness of the whole situation and know that it was wrong to write what they told me to get these things that are not a[l]lowed in the jail.
The prosecutor asked Sifuentes if he made any promises in exchange for the statement, and Sifuentes answered "No." The prosecutor specifically asked if he promised the appellant telephone calls or a private contact visit with his wife in exchange for his statement, and Sifuentes answered "No." Defense counsel asked Sifuentes if he promised that the appellant would be moved from "the hole" in exchange for giving the statement. Sifuentes answered "No, huh-uh. That's -- that's detention, and we don't have anything to do with that."
In making its determination, the trial court chose to believe Sifuentes's testimony and to disbelieve the appellant's testimony. Because, the trial court's findings are supported by the record, they will not be disturbed on appeal. Point of error one is overruled.
17 See Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In the multiple punishment context:
[T]he Blockburger test is no more than a rule of statutory construction, useful in discerning the legislative intent as to scope of punishment where the intent is not otherwise manifested. The Blockburger test does not operate, however, to trump "clearly expressed legislative intent." 44 The State argues that the Legislature had clearly indicated its intention that defendants be susceptible to punishment both for organized criminal activity and for any underlying offense they may commit. Again, we agree. 44 Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), quoting Blockburger, supra, at 368.
In determining whether jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of constitutional claims, we "view[ ] the petitioner's arguments through the lens of the deferential scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 772 (5th Cir. 2000). "Under § 2254(d), when reviewing a claim adjudicated by a state court on the merits, we pay deference to the state court's decision regarding that claim, unless the decision [is] contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . . [is] based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2)). "Factual findings are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence." Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Garza's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is governed by the clearly established law set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). HN4Go to the description of this Headnote.Pursuant to Strickland, to have been entitled to relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Garza had to show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687.
To demonstrate prejudice, petitioner "must show . . . a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. And the "likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (citation omitted).
Lastly,HN7Go to the description of this Headnote."[t]he pivotal question" for federal court review is "whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This [question] is different from asking whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard." Id. at 785. Thus, we will only issue a COA if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's conclusion that the state court's application of Strickland was reasonable.
Garza needed to convince the state habeas court that, but for counsel's alleged failure to investigate the voluntariness of his statements or challenge their admission, that the "likelihood of a different result was substantial." We conclude that fairminded jurists would not find debatable the district court's holding that the state habeas court was not unreasonable in denying relief on this basis under Strickland.
Garza next contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present any mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of his trial. Garza contends that in the light of the overwhelming aggravating evidence presented by the State - e.g., Garza was a member of a street gang, had an extensive juvenile record, and had attempted to escape custody during his trial - trial counsel should have, at a minimum, called to testify two psychologists who had examined Garza and whose appointment trial counsel had requested for preparing a mitigation defense. Garza asserts that presenting no evidence on mitigation cannot be considered a "strategic decision" exempt from challenge under Strickland.