Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/797/1222/104748/
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 20:52:54
Document Index: 278134376

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 117', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 106', '§ 1292', '§ 101']

Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., Dentcom, Inc., Edwardjaslow, Rand Jaslow, and Joseph M. Cerra.appeal of Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., Edward Jaslow,rand Jaslow, and Dentcom, Inc, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1986 › Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., Dentcom, Inc., Edwardjaslow, Rand Jaslow,...
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., Dentcom, Inc., Edwardjaslow, Rand Jaslow, and Joseph M. Cerra.appeal of Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., Edward Jaslow,rand Jaslow, and Dentcom, Inc, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) Argued March 3, 1986. Decided Aug. 4, 1986
The district court ruled for Whelan Associates on all grounds. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985). It found that Elaine Whelan was the sole author of the Dentalab system (and, hence, that Rand Jaslow was not a co-author) and that the contract between Strohl and Rand Jaslow, see supra n. 2, made clear that Strohl would retain full ownership over the software. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1318-19. The court thus concluded that Whelan Associates' copyright in the Dentalab System was valid, and that Dentcom's sales of the Dentalab program were violations of that copyright.10 Id. at 1320.
The court also found that Rand Jaslow had not created the Dentcom system independently, and that the Dentcom system, although written in a different computer language from the Dentalab, and although not a direct transliteration of Dentalab, was substantially similar to Dentalab because its structure and overall organization were substantially similar. Id. at 1321-22. (The district court's opinion on this point is described infra at 1238-39). This substantial similarity, in conjunction with Rand Jaslow's acknowledged access to the Dentalab system, led the district court to conclude that each sale of the Dentcom program by Dentcom11 violated Whelan Associates' copyright on the Dentalab system. The court therefore awarded Whelan Associates damages for these copyright infringements, and enjoined Dentcom from selling any more copies of the Dentalab or Dentcom programs. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1322-23. The court also held that plaintiffs had exclusive use of the term "Dentalab," and enjoined defendants from using either "Dentalab" or "Dentlab" in their business. Id. at 1324-25.
The parties filed a series of post-trial motions, primarily concerned with damage calculations and attorneys fees. Upon the district court's disposition of these motions, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the defendants filed their notices of appeal.12 On appeal, they raise a single issue: whether the district court erred in its finding that the Dentcom program infringes the copyright of plaintiffs' Dentalab system.
As the programmer learns more about the problem, she or he may begin to outline a solution. The outline can take the form of a flowchart, which will break down the solution into a series of smaller units called "subroutines" or "modules,"15 each of which deals with elements of the larger problem. See Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 500-01 (1986). A program's efficiency depends in large part on the arrangements of its modules and subroutines; although two programs could produce the same result, one might be more efficient because of different internal arrangements of modules and subroutines. Because efficiency is a prime concern in computer programs (an efficient program being obviously more valuable than a comparatively inefficient one), the arrangement of modules and subroutines is a critical factor for any programmer. In the present case, the Dentalab program had numerous modules pertaining to inventory, accounts receivable, various dentist-patient matters, and payroll, among others. See App. at 1588-1698 (showing flowcharts of subroutines). Some of the modules were simple; others were quite complex and involved elaborate logical development.
A. The elements of a copyright infringement action--To prove that its copyright has been infringed, Whelan Associates must show two things: that it owned the copyright on Dentalab, and that Rand Jaslow copied Dentalab in making the Dentacom program. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980, 97 S. Ct. 492, 50 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1976); 3 Nimmer On Copyright Sec. 13.01 (1985) [referred to hereinafter as "Nimmer"]. Although it was disputed below, see supra 1228, the district court determined, and it is not challenged here, that Whelan Associates owned the copyright to the Dentalab program. We are thus concerned only with whether it has been shown that Rand Jaslow copied the Dentalab program.
As it is rarely possible to prove copying through direct evidence, Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970), copying may be proved inferentially by showing that the defendant had access to the allegedly infringed copyrighted work and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc., supra; Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863, 96 S. Ct. 122, 46 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The district court found, and here it is uncontested, that Rand Jaslow had access to the Dentalab program, both because Dentalab was the program used in Jaslow Labs and because Rand Jaslow acted as a sales representative for Whelan Associates. See Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1314.22 Thus, the sole question is whether there was substantial similarity between the Dentcom and Dentalab programs.23
B. The appropriate test for substantial similarity in computer program cases--The leading case of Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946), suggested a bifurcated substantial similarity test whereby a finder of fact makes two findings of substantial similarity to support a copyright violation. First, the fact-finder must decide whether there is sufficient similarity between the two works in question to conclude that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted work in making his own. On this issue, expert testimony may be received to aid the trier of fact. (This has been referred to as the "extrinsic" test of substantial similarity. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d at 1164-65.) Second, if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the fact-finder must decide without the aid of expert testimony, but with the perspective of the "lay observer," whether the copying was "illicit," or "an unlawful appropriation" of the copyrighted work. (This has been termed an "intrinsic" test of substantial similarity. Id.) The Arnstein test has been adopted in this circuit. See Universal Athletic Sales Co., 511 F.2d at 907.
The district court heard expert testimony. See supra 1228; infra at 1246-1248. It did not bifurcate its analysis, however, but made only a single finding of substantial similarity. See Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1321-22. It would thus appear to have contravened the law of this circuit. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we believe that the district court applied an appropriate standard.
The ordinary observer test, which was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases involving computer programs on account of the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to most members of the public. See Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1264, 1285-88 (1984). Cf. Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S.Cal. L. Rev. 385 (1981) (criticizing lay observer standard when objects in question are intended for particular, identifiable audiences). Moreover, the distinction between the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same person for each step: that person has been exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or "forget" that evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the "forgetting" can be effective when the expert testimony is essential to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question.
On account of these problems with the standard, we believe that the ordinary observer test is not useful and is potentially misleading when the subjects of the copyright are particularly complex, such as computer programs. We therefore join the growing number of courts which do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible. See E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985); Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 Copyright L.Rep. (CCH) p 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (enunciating bifurcated test, but relying entirely on expert testimony); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (relying entirely on expert testimony to find substantial similarity); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 ("If [expert testimony] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness ... may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."). That was the test applied by the district court in this case.24
It is well, though recently, established that copyright protection extends to a program's source and object codes. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1982) (source code); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983) (source and object code), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S. Ct. 690, 79 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1984); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (object code). In this case, however, the district court did not find any copying of the source or object codes, nor did the plaintiff allege such copying. Rather, the district court held that the Dentalab copyright was infringed because the overall structure of Dentcom was substantially similar to the overall structure of Dentalab. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1321-22. The question therefore arises whether mere similarity in the overall structure of programs can be the basis for a copyright infringement, or, put differently, whether a program's copyright protection covers the structure of the program or only the program's literal elements, i.e., its source and object codes.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1) extends copyright protection to "literary works," and computer programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of copyright. See H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5659, 5667. The copyrights of other literary works can be infringed even when there is no substantial similarity between the works' literal elements. One can violate the copyright of a play or book by copying its plot or plot devices. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (13 alleged distinctive plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars may be basis for a finding of copyright violation); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc., 562 F.2d at 1167 (similarities between McDonaldland characters and H.R. Pufnstuf characters can be established by " 'total concept and feel' " of the two productions (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-55 (2nd Cir. 1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations"). By analogy to other literary works, it would thus appear that the copyrights of computer programs can be infringed even absent copying of the literal elements of the program.26 Defendants contend, however, that what is true of other literary works is not true of computer programs. They assert two principal reasons, which we consider in turn.
A. Section 102(b) and the dichotomy between idea and expression--It is axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas. This rule, first enunciated in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 25 L. Ed. 841 (1879), has been repeated in numerous cases. See, e.g., Mazur v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, 74 S. Ct. 460, 470, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954) ("Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea--not the idea itself." (citation omitted)); Universal Athletic Sales Co., 511 F.2d at 906; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926); see generally A. Latman, The Copyright Law 31-35 (5th ed. 1979); 1 Nimmer Sec. 2.03 [D]. The rule has also been embodied in statute. Title 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) states:
1. A rule for distinguishing idea from expression in computer programs--It is frequently difficult to distinguish the idea from the expression thereof. No less an authority than Learned Hand, after a career that included writing some of the leading copyright opinions, concluded that the distinction will "inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 San.Fern.Val.L.Rev. 109, 126 (1980) (arguing that there can be no meaningful distinction between idea and expression). Although we acknowledge the wisdom of Judge Hand's remark, we feel that a review of relevant copyright precedent will enable us to formulate a rule applicable in this case. In addition, precisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law generally. In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture and development. See U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8 (Copyright Clause) (giving Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings").27
The Court's test in Baker v. Selden suggests a way to distinguish idea from expression. Just as Baker v. Selden focused on the end sought to be achieved by Selden's book, the line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question. In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea. Cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783 (C.D.Ca.1983) ("Apple seeks here not to protect ideas (i.e. making the machine perform particular functions) but rather to protect their particular expressions ..."), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.28
Consideration of copyright doctrines related to scenes a faire and fact-intensive works supports our formulation, for they reflect the same underlying principle. Scenes a faire are "incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable ... in the treatment of a given topic." Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 176, 74 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1982). See also See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983). It is well-settled doctrine that scenes a faire are afforded no copyright protection.29
Fact intensive works are given similarly limited copyright coverage. See, e.g., Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488; Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981). Once again, the reason appears to be that there are only a limited number of ways to express factual material, and therefore the purpose of the literary work--telling a truthful story--can be accomplished only by employing one of a limited number of devices. Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488. Those devices therefore belong to the idea, not the expression, of the historical or factual work.
Although the economic implications of this rule are necessarily somewhat speculative, we nevertheless believe that the rule would advance the basic purpose underlying the idea/expression distinction, "the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws." Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253 (quoting Kalpakian) ; supra n. 27. As we stated above, see supra at 1231, among the more significant costs in computer programming are those attributable to developing the structure and logic of the program. The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection beyond the literal computer code,31 would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of new computer devices that accomplish the same end.
The principal economic argument used against this position--used, that is, in support of the position that programs' literal elements are the only parts of the programs protected by the copyright law--is that computer programs are so intricate, each step so dependent on all of the other steps, that they are almost impossible to copy except literally, and that anyone who attempts to copy the structure of a program without copying its literal elements must expend a tremendous amount of effort and creativity. In the words of one commentator: "One cannot simply 'approximate' the entire copyrighted computer program and create a similar operative program without the expenditure of almost the same amount of time as the original programmer expended." Note, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 1290 (footnote omitted). According to this argument, such work should not be discouraged or penalized. A further argument against our position is not economic but jurisprudential; another commentator argues that the concept of structure in computer programs is too vague to be useful in copyright cases. Radcliffe, Recent Developments in Copyright Law Related to Computer Software, 4 Computer L.Rep. 189, 194-97 (1985). He too would therefore appear to advocate limiting copyright protection to programs' literal codes.
Finally, one commentator argues that the process of development and progress in the field of computer programming is significantly different from that in other fields, and therefore requires a particularly restricted application of the copyright law. According to this argument, progress in the area of computer technology is achieved by means of "stepping-stones," a process that "requires plagiarizing in some manner the underlying copyrighted work." Note, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 1292 (footnote omitted). As a consequence, this commentator argues, giving computer programs too much copyright protection will retard progress in the field.
The mere idea or concept of a computerized program for operating a dental laboratory would not in and of itself be subject to copyright. Copyright law protects the manner in which the author expresses an idea or concept, but not the idea itself. Albert E. Price v. Metzner, 574 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Copyrights do not protect ideas--only expressions of ideas. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975). There are many ways that the same data may be organized, assembled, held, retrieved and utilized by a computer. Different computer systems may functionally serve similar purposes without being copies of each other. There is evidence in the record that there are other software programs for the business management of dental laboratories in competition with plaintiff's program. There is no contention that any of them infringe although they may incorporate many of the same ideas and functions. The 'expression of the idea' in a software computer program is the manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication.
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1320 (emphasis added). We agree. The conclusion is thus inescapable that the detailed structure of the Dentalab program is part of the expression, not the idea, of that program.
Our conclusion is supported by SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), the only other case that has addressed this issue specifically, in which the court found that a program's copyright could extend beyond its literal elements to its structure and organization. In SAS, plaintiffs supported their allegation of copyright infringement of their computer program with evidence of both literal and organizational similarities between its program and the alleged infringer. Id. at 822, 825-26. The court found a copyright infringement, and although it did not discuss in detail its evaluation of the evidence, it is apparent that the organizational similarities of the programs were relevant to its decision. After a brief discussion of the programs' literal similarities, the court said:
Our solution may put us at odds with Judge Patrick Higginbotham's scholarly opinion in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), which dealt with the question whether the "input formats" of a computer program--the configurations and collations of the information entered into the program--were idea or expression. The court held that the input formats were ideas, not expressions, and thus not protectible. Synercom did not deal with precisely the materials at issue here--input formats are structurally simple as compared to full programs--and it may therefore be distinguishable. However, insofar as the input formats are devices for the organization of data into forms useful for computers, they are similar to programs; thus, Synercom is relevant and we must come to grips with it.
B. The CONTU Report--Defendants' second argument against copyright protection for non-literal elements of computer programs relies not on venerable principles of copyright law, but on the report of a special congressional commission. In 1974, concerned that the rapidly developing field of computer technology was outpacing the extant copyright laws, Congress passed Pub. L. 93-573, Sec. 201, 88 Stat.1873 (1974) creating the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study and report on the problems and issues of new technology and copyright.
In 1976, before CONTU reported its findings to Congress, Congress passed a new copyright law to replace the one that had prevailed since 1909. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). The new law's only explicit accommodation to computer technology was 17 U.S.C. § 117, which dealt with copyright issues arising upon certain uses of computer programs not in issue here.
CONTU Report at 1. Congress responded to these suggestions in the 1980 Computer Software Copyright Act by adding a provision to 17 U.S.C. § 101 defining computer programs, see Pub. L. No. 96-517, Sec. 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101) (quoted supra n. 13). It also replaced the old Sec. 117 with a new Sec. 117 outlining users' rights of adaptation.
Even if the CONTU Report had advocated a strict limitation of the copyrightability of computer programs, defendants' argument would still fail, for the CONTU Report is not binding on us in this case. Defendants correctly note that some courts have treated the CONTU Report as a surrogate legislative history. See, e.g., Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 n.7 (D. Mass. 1984) ("The CONTU Report ... comprises the entire legislative history of Sec. 117."); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 n. 6. The courts have said this because Congress adopted the CONTU Report's recommendations without alterations and without any committee reports. Defendants argue that this court, too, is bound by the CONTU Report for the same reason.
Defendants' description of the file structures is indeed correct. Dr. Moore himself described a computer's file as "a storage place for data, and it's really no different in a computer than it is in a file drawer, it's like a manila folder that contains all the data on a particular subject category in a computer." App. at 682. (Another analogy, particularly accessible to lawyers, is to a very complex cataloguing structure like the structure of Lexis or Westlaw without any entries yet made.) Defendants' legal conclusion is not correct, however. Although some courts have stated that the meaning of Baker v. Selden is that blank forms cannot be copyrighted,40 this circuit, like the majority of courts that have considered the issue,41 has rejected this position and instead have held that blank forms may be copyrighted if they are sufficiently innovative that their arrangement of information is itself informative. Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1250. See also Manpower, Inc. v. Temporary Help of Harrisburg, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (upholding copyrightability of form for vacation schedules).42
It is true that screen outputs are considered audio-visual works under the copyright code, see Williams Electronics, 685 F.2d at 874; Midway Manufacturing Co., 564 F. Supp. at 749 (distinguishing audiovisual copyright in display of videogame from copyright in program that creates the audiovisual display), and are thus covered by a different copyright than are programs, which are literary works, see supra at 1233. It is also true that Whelan Associates asserts no claim of copyright infringement with respect to the screen outputs. But the conclusion to be drawn from this is not, as defendants would have it, that screen outputs are completely irrelevant to the question whether the copyright in the program has been infringed. Rather, the only conclusion to be drawn from the fact of the different copyrights is that the screen output cannot be direct evidence of copyright infringement. There is no reason, however, why material falling under one copyright category could not be indirect, inferential evidence of the nature of material covered by another copyright.
Thus, the question is whether the screen outputs have probative value concerning the nature of the programs that render them sufficient to clear the hurdles of Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 403. The defendants argue that the screen outputs have no probative value with respect to the programs because many different programs can create the same screen output. Defendants rely on Stern Electronics Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 855 ("many different computer programs can produce the same 'results,' whether those results are an analysis of financial records or a sequence of images and sounds."), and Midway Manufacturing Co., 564 F. Supp. at 749 ("it is quite possible to design a game that would infringe Midway's audiovisual copyright but would use an entirely different computer program."). Neither court, however, was presented with the question that faces us today, the evidentiary value of screen outputs in a suit for infringement of the underlying program.44
This argument has force, but we feel that it is ultimately unpersuasive. In the first place, the defendants point to no place in the record where they objected to testimony about the screens' similarities. Our independent review of the record has revealed no such objections. See, e.g., App. at 681-82 (Dr. Moore testifying about screen similarities without objection from defendants). Therefore, because this could not be plain error, the objection was waived. Second, even if the objection had not been waived, we do not believe that admission of the evidence relating to screen similarity suffices for a Rule 403 exclusion. Screen outputs are not so enticing that a trier of fact could not evaluate them rationally and with a cool head. The party against whom the screen outputs are introduced can easily explain their limited probative value. Given the substantial deference with which we review the district court's decision on this matter, see McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 922 (3d Cir. 1985), and the parties' ample opportunities to advance their arguments before the district court, we do not believe that the district court committed error in considering the evidence relating to screen outputs.
The premise does not apply in other areas of copyright infringement. There is no general requirement that most of each of two works be compared before a court can conclude that they are substantially similar. In the cases of literary works--novels, movies, or plays, for example--it is often impossible to speak of "most" of the work. The substantial similarity inquiry cannot be simply quantified in such instances. Instead, the court must make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about the character of the work as a whole and the importance of the substantially similar portions of the work. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, ---- - ---- & ---- n. 8, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2233-34 & 2233 n. 8, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1985); Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir.) ("When analyzing two works to determine whether they are substantially similar, courts should be careful not to lose sight of the forest for the trees."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 176, 74 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1982); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d Cir.) (warning against same danger), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841, 101 S. Ct. 121, 66 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1980). See also Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947) (finding copyright violation for copying of 20% of plaintiff's film); In re Personal Computers and Components Thereof, 1983-84 Copyright L.Dec. (CCH) p 25,651 at 18,931 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Mar. 9, 1984) (18%-25% identity is sufficient for substantial similarity). Compare Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (similarity uncontested by defendants where four notes out of 100 measures and two words out of 45 were identical) with Jewel Music Publishing Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (finding no substantial similarity where three bars of an eight-bar line were identical and the line appeared 24 times in both songs).
Computer programs are no different. Because all steps of a computer program are not of equal importance, the relevant inquiry cannot therefore be the purely mechanical one of whether most of the programs' steps are similar. Rather, because we are concerned with the overall similarities between the programs, we must ask whether the most significant steps of the programs are similar. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, supra, 564 F. Supp. at 753. This is precisely what Dr. Moore did. He testified as follows:
We have described the testimony of Dr. Moore and Mr. Ness, see supra 1227; see also infra 1247-48, and it is recounted in the district court opinion, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. at 1316. The district court explained its evaluation of the evidence as follows:
A. Well, I think it should be clear, it was clear to me from going through these programs that there is a very marke [d] similarity between the two, that they, item by item, are doing pretty much the same thing with the same fields in the same files, and accomplishing roughly the same results.
APPENDIX A ORDER ENTRY PROGRAMS Dentcom PC Systems Dentalab System Primary Menu, choose (1) Primary Menu, choose (1) Production MENU Production SCHEDULING Production menu choose (1) Production Menu, choose (1) ORDER ENTRY ORDER ENTRY ORDER ENTRY program DL1000 program (Order entry) "ENTER ACCOUNT NAME KEY: "ENTER ACCOUNT OR NAMEKEY" _________________________________ "Check CUSTMAST for valid customer. Check CUSTMAST for valid customer. If Read CUSTMAST file on this customer. valid, read CUSTMAST file for this customer If yes, increment order # in ORDERS Increment sequential order no. in ORDERS. Display customer name, address. Display entry screen, patient shade, Display entry screen (6.6), patient mould, shade, remake, call Dr.? remake, call Dr.? case/span #, Drs. request date, final case Pan #, Dr's. request date. statut T, F, B, R. IS THIS SCREEN CORRECT? If yes ask for first department number. Ask for first department number. Display Display dept. order screen (P10) (list of dept. order screen (6.8-6.11) (list of items item in this dept. from ITEMMAST) in this dept. from ITEMMAST) User entry choices User entry choices System adds days in dept. from COMPANY System adds days in dept. (DAYVAL) to to present date to find due out date. Time present date to find due out date. System is of AM. "Noon" or PM. System computes workload for dept/day out by accummulates case load by product of item product of load factor X quantity. load factor X quantity. ITEMMAST ITEMMAST Adds this to load already in DEPTLOAD Add this to load already in DAYVAL for *1248_ for date out. date out.
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the district court inadvertently identified the letter as dated September 30, 1978). Although no representative of Jaslow Lab ever signed either agreement, the district court found that Jaslow Lab had, through its conduct, accepted the terms of the letter. Id. at 1310.
The district court inadvertently referred to this as the letter of January 31, 1983. See Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982), which prescribes copyright holders' exclusive rights, forbids the copying of copyrighted works. The independent creation of even identical works is therefore not a copyright infringement, and independent creation is a complete defense to a claim of copyright infringement. See also Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.) ("the law imposes no prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at the precise combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted.")
The appeal is from the court's injunction preventing defendants from selling the Dentcom program. The court has not yet entered a final judgment covering pre- and post-trial damages. Our jurisdiction is thus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1)
Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), gives a more technical rendering, defining a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
The discussion in this paragraph draws heavily from Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1723, 1724-25 (1983)
We ignore the distinction between "high level language" and "assembly language," see Note, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1723, 1725 (1983), which is not relevant to the issues in this case. Both of these may be referred to as "source codes." See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp, 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S. Ct. 690, 79 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1984)
There are three other facets of program creation, debugging, documentation, and maintenance. Although none of these functions are at issue in this case, in the interest of completeness we shall describe them here. After the object code has been completed, the program must be "debugged" and documented. Debugging, or error removal, is frequently a lengthy process, for any moderately difficult task may require a fairly detailed and complex program. See D. Bender, supra, Sec. 2.06 [e]. The program demands arduous debugging not only because of its complexity, but also because of its delicacy. Even slight and perhaps obvious errors can hinder a program, for a computer has no way of recognizing errors. Like a perfect soldier, it takes instructions without questioning them
The district court found, inter alia, that Rand Jaslow "had surreptitiously and without consent of either Strohl Systems or Whelan Associates obtained a copy of the [Dentalab] source code," 609 F. Supp. at 1314, and that he had "utilized the source code in his attempt to develop the IBM-PC Dentcom program," id. at 1321
This circuit has once used the single substantial similarity inquiry advocated here in a computer copyright case. See Williams Electronics v. Arctic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding substantial similarity in computer programs without mentioning the Arnstein test). Williams did not explain why it did not use the bifurcated Arnstein test, nor did it distinguish Universal Athletic Sales. To the extent that Williams did these things sub silentio, our holding today is merely a ratification of Williams on this point
Because the first argument involves solely a question of law, our review is plenary. The second argument involves questions of fact, and we therefore apply the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821, 825 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1982); International Luggage Registry v. Avery Products, 541 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1976)
Professor Nimmer distinguishes two ways that one work might be substantially similar to another: comprehensive nonliteral similarity, and fragmented literal similarity. 3 Nimmer at Sec. 13.03 [A]. See also Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting distinction); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984). The titles are suggestive of their meanings: comprehensive nonliteral similarity means "a similarity not just as to a particular line or paragraph or other minor segment, but [that] the fundamental essence or structure of one work is duplicated in another," 3 Nimmer at 13-20.1, while fragmented literal similarity means occasional, but not complete, word-for-word similarity, id. In Professor Nimmer's terminology, we are concerned here only with comprehensive nonliteral similarity
See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S. Ct. 2040, 2044, 45 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1975); Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253 (Sloviter, J.) ("the line must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in consideration 'the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.' " (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971))).
See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S. Ct. 513, 83 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1984); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d at 143; Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)
Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 979 (explaining the scenes a faire doctrine as follows: "Because it is virtually impossible to write about a particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain 'stock' or standard literary devices, we have held that scenes a faire are not copyrightable as a matter of law."); cf. Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d at 691 (" [I]f the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality of copyrights may result ...")
Even if the product of the alleged infringer's efforts is a mixture of old and new elements, that would not protect it from the charge of infringement. Parodies, for example, mix copied elements with originality, yet they can violate the copyright of the work being parodied. See generally Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After Betamax, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1395 (1984)
See also Mooers, Computer Software and Copyright, 7 Computing Surveys ---, 50 (March 1975) ("Also included in the 'expression' is the sequence, choice, and arrangement of descriptive elements...."). Two commentators have criticized Synercom for its refusal to permit sequencing and ordering in the computer context to constitute expression. See Pierce, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 30 Copyright Law Symposium 1, 19 (1983) (Synercom "stands alone ... [in denying] copyright protection when the sequence and arrangement of data had been expressed by others in different ways." (footnote omitted)); Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 525 (1986) (criticizing Synercom on the ground that "sequence and arrangement are expression that is separable from the underlying utilitarian purpose of the [input] formats, which is to enable the user to communicate with the computer program." (footnote omitted)). The notewriter concluded that "copyright law should ... recognize that organizing and connecting the modules and subroutines is a protectible act of authorship." Id. at 526
It is not clear whether the end sought to be accomplished by the input formats involved in Synercom could be accomplished with different sequences and orders. Compare 462 F. Supp. at 1013 ("there are many ... possible choices of computer formats, and the decision among them [is] arbitrary") with id. at 1014 ("The 'idea or principle' behind the forms in question, and the 'method or system' involved in them, [are] no more or less than the formats."). Moreover, as noted above, the input formats involved in Synercom are not identical to the structures of computer programs that concern us here
See, e.g., Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801, 68 S. Ct. 101, 92 L. Ed. 380 (1947); Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785, 64 S. Ct. 782, 88 L. Ed. 1076 (1944)
See, e.g., Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.--East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976) (gas station account books held copyrightable), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908, 97 S. Ct. 2973, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1092 (1977); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clarke, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650, 652, 655 (N.D. Ill.) ("a combined calendar, appointment, diary and information book" is "much more than a mere diary," and is thus copyrightable), aff'd per curiam, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1974); Harcourt Brace & World Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (answer sheets for recording multiple choice achievement and intelligence test answers held copyrightable). See also 1 Nimmer Sec. 2.08 [D]; id. Sec. 2.18 [C] (articulating and endorsing the "narrow" reading used by these courts, as contrasted by the "broad" reading illustrated in Brown, supra, and Taylor Instrument, supra) ; A. Latman, The Copyright Law 29-31 (5th ed.1979) (collecting cases)
To the extent that the regulations do impose a per se rule against the copyrightability of blank forms, they have been criticized, see 1 Nimmer Sec. 2.08 [D]; id. at Sec. 2.18 [C], and have not been followed, see supra n. 41 (collecting cases).
Judge Rosenn believes that ordinarily and in the circumstances of this case, screen outputs have no probative worth in determining whether one computer program is copied from another. Different program codes in different computer languages are capable of producing identical screen outputs. To the extent that the district court relied on the screen outputs as evidence of copying, he believes it erred. He concludes such error was harmless, however, in light of all the evidence of copying, the access to and use of the plaintiff's source code, the similarity in the structure of the programs and in the flow charts. This court will not reverse a district court's factual determination in a non-jury trial where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support it, other than the challenged evidence. DeLaval Turbine, Inc. v. West India Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1974).