Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/alabama/alsdce/1:2011cv00265/49795/23
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 23:27:49
Document Index: 690479579

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 404', '§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 357', '§ 404', '§\n404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 327', '§ 323', 'art, 357']

Order entered that the decision of the Commissioner of SocialSecurity, denying Plaintiffs claim for a period of disability,disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income,be AFFIRMED for Oates v. Astrue :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Order entered that the decision of the Commissioner of SocialSecurity, denying Plaintiffs claim for a period of disability,disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income,be AFFIRMED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sonja F. Bivins on 9/21/2012. (mjn)
2012, the parties consented to have the undersigned conduct any
Oral argument was waived.
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income,
wherein he alleges that he has been disabled since January 10,
people, hear voices, mental.”
(Tr. 116-17, 157-164, 182, 192).
quarters of coverage to remain insured through March 31, 2008
(his “date last insured”), and that he was insured through that
(Id. at 33-34, 116-17, 183). His applications were denied
at the initial stage, and he filed a timely Request for Hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Id. at 118-19).
On August 11, 2009, ALJ Joseph T. Scruton (“the ALJ”) held
an administrative hearing, which was attended by Plaintiff, his
representative, and vocational expert Gail Jarrell.
(Id. at 30-
On August 25, 2009, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
Plaintiff has filed at least two previous applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
Plaintiff filed applications on September 30, 2003, which were
denied on December 5, 2003. Additionally, Plaintiff filed
applications on August 25, 2005, claiming an alleged disability
beginning on April 4, 2003. Hearings were held on June 14, 2007,
and September 6, 2007 before Administrative Law Judge R.G.
(Tr. 84).
In an unfavorable decision dated November
26, 2007, ALJ Goosens found that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(Id. at 79-103).
15-29).
Plaintiff’s request for review was denied by the Appeals Council
(“AC”)
accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
that this case is now ripe for judicial review and is properly
before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
Whether the ALJ erred in adopting the
conclusions of a non-acceptable state agency medical
source to support his RFC assessment and by not
ordering a consultative exam?
Whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider a prior
Agency decision, which found that Plaintiff cannot
perform his past relevant work?
Whether the ALJ erred by presenting an incomplete
hypothetical to the VE, and in failing to find
Plaintiff disabled under the Grids?
Plaintiff was born on November 29, 1957, and was fifty-one
(51) years of age at the time of the administrative hearing.
In the instant decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s
prior denials dated December 5, 2003, and November 26, 2007, are
“final,
Accordingly, he limited his decision to determining whether
Plaintiff was disabled from November 27, 2007, the day after the
unfavorable decision was issued, and he amended
Plaintiff’s onset of disability date. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff does
not challenge this temporal limitation in the instant case.
(Tr. 149, 157, 161, 182).
Plaintiff testified that he has a
(Id. at 35, 55).
Plaintiff reported that he started
experiencing back and neck pain after an automobile accident in
2003 and that he treats his back pain with cream and an electric
back warmer. (Id. at 35, 200). According to Plaintiff, he is
able to care for his personal needs, and is able to shop with
his mother, but he can do little else. (Id. at 38-9, 201).
1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). 3
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512,
process for determining if a claimant has proven his disability.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.4
alleged onset date.
The ALJ concluded that while
strain, diabetes mellitus, degenerative joint disease of right
specified, and substance abuse disorder, in partial remission,
they do not meet or medically equal the criteria for any of the
Subpt.
Relying on the record
evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform a range of light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). He can
occasionally climb stairs, ramps, ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds. He can occasionally
stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. He can
occasionally reach in all directions with
his non-dominant, right arm. He is able to
understand short, simple instructions. He is
limited to jobs that require dealing with
things rather than people. He is limited to
occasional interpersonal contact.
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff can “lift and carry
and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour workday, and sit for
six hours in an eight hour workday.”
utilized the services of a VE and determined that Plaintiff is
capable of performing his past relevant work (hereinafter “PRW”)
cleaner/housekeeper,
(Id. at 27, 67).
The ALJ found that, comparing
Plaintiff’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of his PRW,
In the alternative, the ALJ further
found that assuming arguendo that Plaintiff is not capable of
performing his PRW, Plaintiff can perform other jobs that exist
in significant numbers in the national economy, such as small
products assembler and sorter. Thus, he concluded that Plaintiff
The relevant evidence of record5 reflects that Plaintiff was
examined by Dr. Larry B. Thead on December 28, 2005, at the
request of the Agency.
(Id. at 231-35).
Plaintiff reported
that he injured his back in an automobile accident in 2003, and
that he has suffered with neck and back pain ever since.
On physical exam, the range of motion in Plaintiff’s extremities
was full, intact, and without tenderness or discomfort.
Flexion and extension testing revealed full range of
motion at the wrists and elbows.
Range of motion was
full and intact without tenderness or limitation to dorsal and
plantar flexion at the ankles bilaterally.
Plaintiff was able to rotate his body 65 degrees clockwise and
counterclockwise, and heel/toe walk and squat, but he was not
generated before Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, only that
evidence which is relevant to the issues before the Court is
Plaintiff’s neck and lumbar spine was noted, as was tenderness
of the paravertebral lumbar musculature.
paravertebral lumbar musculature.
Dr. Thead opined that
physical activities such as sitting, handling, limited walking,
standing, and carrying.”
(Id. at 234).
The record reflects that Plaintiff was treated by various
physicians at the VA Gulf Coast Health Care System (“VA Clinic”)
from at least March 2006 through April 2009. (Id. at 236-326,
353-472).
drug and alcohol abuse, and back pain. (Id.).
admitted for inpatient treatment at the VA from April 12 through
April 26, 2007 and from June 14 through June 18, 2007, due to
reports of homicidal thoughts and command hallucinations. (Id.
255-61,
Vamvakas during both hospitalizations.
During Plaintiff’s April admission, it was noted that he
had a goiter and was hyperthyroid.
(Id. at 259).
scan showed normal uptake and no imaging abnormalities.
Plaintiff was encouraged to follow up with his personal doctor.
Plaintiff’s right shoulder pain was explored with x-rays
and a CT scan, but no fracture was observed.
discharge, Plaintiff reported that he continued to have auditory
Dr. Vamvakas diagnosed psychotic disorder NOS,
rule out malingering, right shoulder pain, cocaine dependence,
associated any objective signs.
(Id. at 256-57).
Dr. Vamvakas
opined that mostly likely Plaintiff was malingering in order to
have access to the IP unit.
Dr. Vamvakas noted
antipsychotic medication and that there was nothing more to do
alcohol dependence, reported auditory hallucinations, rule out
malingering, and antisocial personality disorder.
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Doug Ewing at the VA in 2008.
During a February 2008 visit, Dr. Ewing observed that Plaintiff
psychosis was likely cocaine induced.
(Id. at 274-76).
Ewing assigned a GAF score of 45. (Id. at 276).
At Plaintiff’s
April 2008 visit, Dr. Ewing opined that Plaintiff’s mood was not
proportionally severe to account for psychotic hallucinations
395-98).
Plaintiff’s laboratory results taken on March 4, 2008, April 11,
2008 and December 10, 2008, were
negative for barbiturates,
amphetamine, cocaine, cannabinoid, opiates, and benzodiazepine.
(Id. at 379-80, 392-94, 403).
VA Clinic in 2009.
(Id. at 373-76).
While Plaintiff reported that he was still
Plaintiff was also treated at the
Plaintiff reported left sided back pain with occasional pain
extending down the left leg.
A straight leg raise test
was negative, and the range of motion in Plaintiff’s back was
Plaintiff was diagnosed with low back strain, was prescribed
Toradol, and directed to restrict from heavy lifting for one
Radiological imaging of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine
intravertebral disc space, vertebral body height, and overall
vertebral alignment were maintained.
L5 was noted.
Sacralization of
No evidence of pars interarticularis
At the request of the Agency, medical consultant Donald E.
Hinton, Ph.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Hinton”) reviewed Plaintiff’s
Psychiatric Review Technique and Mental RFC Assessment.
327-343). He diagnosed Plaintiff with Psychosis, NOS, antisocial
personality disorder, and alcohol and cocaine abuse. (Id. at
329, 334-35).
Dr. Hinton opined that Plaintiff is moderately
limited in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, and
in maintaining social functioning, that he is mildly limited in
activities of daily living, and he has not suffered not episodes
of decompensation.
(Id. at 337).
In the Mental RFC Assessment (Id. at 341-343), Dr. Hinton
opined that Plaintiff is able to understand, remember and to
carry out short and simple instructions, and that he is able to
opined that Plaintiff should not have general public as part of
a usual job duty.
Agency, reviewed Plaintiff’s file and completed a Physical RFC
Assessment. (Id. at 345-52). He listed Plaintiff’s diagnoses as
diabetes and low back pain, and opined that Plaintiff can lift
and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently,
stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit about
unlimited amount of time.
(Id. at 345-46).
He further opined
that Plaintiff is limited in that he can
ladders/ropes/scaffolds,
ramps/stairs,
frequently balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
(Id. at 347).
environmental, or communicative limitations.
(Id. at 348-49).
Dr. Ewing completed a Mental RFC Questionnaire on July 29,
2009, wherein he opined that Plaintiff has marked restrictions
of activities of daily living, an extreme degree of difficulty
complete tasks in a timely and appropriate manner, and that
decompensation in a work or work-like setting which cause the
exacerbation of signs and symptoms for a period lasting at least
Whether the ALJ erred in adopting the conclusions
of a non-acceptable state agency medical source
to support his RFC assessment and by not
(Id. at 473-74).
Agency disability examiner, Phillip Lambert, in a physical RFC
source. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ erred because he
did not rely on any medical evidence in determining Plaintiff’s
In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ did not
adopt the opinions contained in the assessment prepared by Mr.
employed by the State Disability Determination Services, the ALJ
psychologist, Dr. Hinton.
According to Defendant, it is clear
that the ALJ did not rely on the opinions of Mr. Lambert because
whereas the ALJ placed Plaintiff’s RFC range at the light level,
and in any event, RFC determinations are within the province of
the ALJ and are based on all relevant evidence and not just
Finally, the conclusions reached by the
physicians employed by the State Disability
Determination Services also supported the
finding of ‘not disabled.’ Although those
physicians were non-examining, and therefore
their opinions do not as a general matter
deserve as much weight as those of examining
or treating physicians, those opinions do
deserve some weight, particularly in a case
like this in which there exist a number of
other reasons to reach similar conclusions
(as explained throughout this decision).
ability to lift weight, sit, stand, push, and pull, among other
404-1545(b).
determining a plaintiff’s RFC lies with the ALJ and is based on
all of the evidence of record.
See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (ALJ has duty to assess the
residual functional capacity on the basis of all the relevant
credible evidence of record); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546, 416.946
(responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional
capacity lies with the ALJ). See also Foxx v. Astrue, 2009 U.S.
assessment must be based on all of the relevant evidence in the
findings, the effects of treatment, reports of daily activities,
statements.”), citing
SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5; Harris v.
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27514, *13 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7,
2008) (“[T]he law judge, as the factfinder, does not need an
regarding a claimant’s residual functional capacity.”).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, there is nothing in the
ALJ’s opinion that suggests that he believed Mr. Lambert to be a
assessment, Mr. Lambert determined that Plaintiff is capable of
work consisting of lifting and/or carrying 50 pounds
occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, standing and/or walking
“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine that he
or she can also do sedentary and light work.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(c).
and sitting about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, pushing and/or
pulling for an unlimited amount of time and that Plaintiff could
stoop, and frequently balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
consisting of lifting and carrying twenty pounds occasionally
and ten pounds frequently, standing and/or walking and sitting
for six hours in an eight hour workday and that Plaintiff can
occasionally climb stairs, ramps, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds,
occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl, and occasionally
reach in all directions with his non-dominant arm.
The ALJ’s
RFC determination is notably more restrictive than that of Mr.
Lambert, and this inconsistency belies any notion that the ALJ
relied on the assessment completed by Mr. Lambert or that he
gave it controlling or substantial weight.
For instance, Dr. Thead, who examined Plaintiff in December
2005, noted that Plaintiff’s range of motion was full and intact
without tenderness or limitation to dorsal and plantar flexion
at the ankles bilaterally, that Plaintiff’s gait was normal,
that Plaintiff could not touch his toes but could squat, and
tenderness of paravertebral lumbar musculature.
(Id. at 231-
Dr. Thead opined that Plaintiff would have no difficulty
performing work related physical activities.
addition, the physicians at the VA Clinic likewise never opined
doctors at the VA Clinic opined that some of Plaintiff’s mental
impairments were exaggerated or fabricated and that Plaintiff
could be malingering.
Moreover, when Plaintiff was examined on
November 20, 2007, by Scott Long, a physician’s assistant at the
VA, he was assessed
with low back strain, prescribed Toradol
and directed to refrain from heavy lifting for one week. (Id. at
Moreover, the results of the radiological imaging of
Accordingly, the undersigned concludes
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment.7
To the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have ordered
a consultative examination, his contention is without merit. The
ALJ is not required to order a consultative exam simply because
one is requested.
A consultative examination is appropriate
when the evidence as a whole, both medical and nonmedical, is
not sufficient to allow the ALJ to make a decision on the claim.
See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2001);
see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519(a)(2) (“When we purchase a
consultative examination, we will use the report from the
consultative examination to try to resolve a conflict or
Whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider a
prior Agency decision, which found that Plaintiff
cannot perform his past relevant work?
Plaintiff alleges, in a footnote, that the ALJ erred by
failing to consider a prior decision by the Agency that he is
unable to perform his PRW and cites 20 C.F.R. § 404.953 in
Defendant suggests that consideration of the prior
reopening the prior denial, and that the Court does not have
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s prior denial.
applications for benefits dated December 2, 2003, and November
judicata. The ALJ further noted that “[a]ny reference in this
decision to evidence prior to November 26, 2007 has been made
implicit or explicit finding of reopening of the prior denials.”
ambiguity if one exists.
We will also use a consultative
examination to secure needed medical evidence the file does not
contain such as clinical findings, laboratory tests, a diagnosis
or prognosis necessary for decision.”), 404.1519a(b) (“A
a decision on your claim.”); Jones v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 524, 526
(5th Cir. 1985). Here, the ALJ had no reason to order a
consultative examination because sufficient evidence was present
in the record for the ALJ to make a disability determination.
Generally, “[a] final decision by the [Commissioner] will
be deemed reopened if it is reconsidered on the merits to any
extent and at any administrative level.” Cherry v. Heckler, 760
omitted, emphasis added). Inasmuch as the first adjudication has
been given res judicata effect, typically, the medical evidence
from the previous application is not reevaluated. Robbins v.
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 895 F.2d 1223, 1224 (8th Cir.
1990). An exception is made where the prior medical evidence
deteriorating mental or physical conditions occurring after the
prior proceeding.” Id. Thus, regardless of the preclusive effect
of the prior proceeding, in this case, the ALJ was permitted to
use information gleaned from the prior decision “for historical
and continuity purposes” without reopening the previous action.
That said, the question before the Court is whether the
deciding Plaintiff’s instant applications.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 362 Fed. Appx. 71, 73 (11th Cir. Jan. 21,
2010), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
rejecting a prior ALJ’s finding that the claimant could not use
“[a]dministrative res judicata applies when the agency has
a ‘previous determination or decision ... about [a claimant’s]
rights on the same facts and on the same issue or issues, and
this previous determination or decision [had] become final by
404.957(c)(1); see also Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1255
(11th Cir. 2003).”
McKinzie, 362 Fed. Appx. at 73.
application involved a different time interval, the ALJ did not
err in declining to give preclusive effect to findings, made by
another ALJ in a prior administrative determination, that the
claimant could not use her arms or hands repetitively. See also
2009)(“Because
claimant]’s
current application is different from her previous application,
apply.”);
Astrue, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14118, *20-25 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 29,
2010) (finding that a prior unfavorable decision which provided
that the plaintiff’s RFC include a sit/stand option was not
In the case at hand, the finding by the ALJ in the prior
cleaner/housekeeper, was not binding on the ALJ who issued the
decision in the instant case because the prior case covered the
period from December 6, 2003, through the date of that decision,
November 26, 2007, whereas the focus in this decision was on the
period November 27, 2007, and forward. Thus, the ALJ did not err
in declining to give preclusive effect to the prior finding that
Plaintiff was not able to return to his PRW.
hypothetical to the VE, and in finding that
Plaintiff can return to his PRW?
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to pose a complete
propounded to the VE, the ALJ did not include the restriction
that Plaintiff can occasionally reach in all directions with his
non-dominant right hand. Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ
erred in finding that Plaintiff can perform his past work as
Titles (“DOT”) provides that reaching and handling are performed
frequently, or 1/3 to 2/3 of the time, in that occupation, but
the ALJ specifically found that he can only occasionally reach
in all directions with his non-dominant right hand.
also suggests that he should be found disabled under Rule 201.12
of the Grids.
According to Plaintiff, the VE, in response to a
limited Plaintiff to sedentary work, and
Rule 201.12 of the
Grids directs a finding of disabled for an individual who is his
transferrable skills and who can only perform sedentary work.
(“DOT”)
differentiate between right and left extremity reaching and that
Plaintiff’s limitation to no more than occasional reaching in
all directions with his non-dominant right arm does not mean
that Plaintiff could not engage in frequent reaching with his
cleaner/housekeeper. In other words, the Commissioner contends
that bilateral hand use is not needed to perform the job of
cleaner/housekeeper, and that Plaintiff may be able to utilize
his dominant left hand to
perform the frequent reaching and
handling as required by the cleaner/housekeeper position.
The law is clear that “[i]n order for a vocational expert’s
testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose
a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant's
impairments.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d
1253, 1270 (llth Cir. 2007)(quotation omitted). The ALJ is not
properly finds are unsupported. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (llth Cir. 2004).
hypotheticals to the VE.
Plaintiff is correct that in the first
restriction that limits Plaintiff to no more than occasional
Plus, the first hypothetical was based on the assessment by
Phillip Lambert, the single decision maker. As noted supra, this
assessment was implicitly rejected by the ALJ because in it, Mr.
medium level, whereas the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could
perform a range of light work.
Thus, the VE’s testimony in
regards to this hypothetical is of no moment because it is clear
that the ALJ did not rely upon it in reaching his decision.
In the second hypothetical presented to the VE, the ALJ
asked the VE to assume an individual of similar age, education
and prior work history as Plaintiff, and to assume that the
frequently; could sit, stand, or walk six hours out of an eight
hour work day; could occasionally climb stairs, ramps, ladders,
or scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and is
capable of understanding, remembering, carrying out short simple
instructions, and working in jobs dealing with things rather
While the VE testified that such an
individual could return to his past relevant work, this second
hypothetical did not include Plaintiff’s restriction on reaching
with his non-dominant right hand; thus, to the extent that the
ALJ relied upon the VE’s response to this hypothetical to find
that Plaintiff could return to his PRW, the ALJ erred because
the VE’s response was based on an incomplete hypothetical.
undersigned finds however that this error was not fatal because
the ALJ did not end his analysis at step four.
step five of the analysis, and determined that assuming arguendo
that Plaintiff cannot return to his PRW, other jobs exist in
substantial numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
In the third hypothetical
presented to the VE, the ALJ
modified the second hypothetical to include a restriction to
sedentary work and to include the restriction that Plaintiff can
only occasionally reach in any direction with his right nondominant arm.
In response to the third hypothetical, the VE
unskilled (§ 323.687-014).
The VE further testified that the
operator. (Id. at 68-72).
identified were sedentary, Rule 201.12 of the Grids directs a
finding of disabled for an individual of who is his same age,
has the same education and work history, but no transferrable
skills and who can only perform sedentary work.
assertion is misplaced.
The ALJ expressly observed:
If the claimant had the residual functional
capacity to perform the full range of light
work, a finding of “not disabled” would be
directed by Medical-Vocational Rule 202.13.
However, the claimant’s ability to perform
all or substantially all of the requirements
of this level of work has been impeded by
extent to which these limitations erode the
unskilled light occupational base, the [ALJ]
asked the vocational expert whether jobs
exist in the national
economy for an
education, work experience, and residual
(Id. at 28).
“[e]xclusive reliance on the grids is not appropriate either
when [1] [the] claimant is unable to perform a full range of
work at a given residual functional level or [2] when a claimant
has non-exertional impairments [i.e., impairments not related to
strength] that significantly limit basic work skills.”
v. Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232, 1242 (llth Cir. 2004) (emphasis in
In such cases, the claimant’s occupational base (the
number of jobs he is able to perform based on his RFC, age,
education and work experience) may be affected.
erosion in the occupational base.).
See S.S.R. 83-
Accordingly, in cases where
the occupational base may be affected, the ALJ is required to
make an individualized assessment and consult a VE to determine
whether there are jobs in the economy that the claimant can
See Phillips, 357 F. 3d at 1242-43.
limitations impeded his ability to perform a full range of light
base was impeded, the ALJ properly relied on the VE, as opposed
to the Grids, to determine the extent to which the limitations
eroded Plaintiff’s job base. The VE in turn identified a number
of jobs, some of which were classified by the DOT as “light”
which were actually performed at the sedentary level, which an
individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity could perform.
ALJ did not err in finding that other jobs exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Security, denying Plaintiff’s claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income,