Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19990901/9298.htm
Timestamp: 2018-09-21 02:16:40
Document Index: 169377316

Matched Legal Cases: ['§9541', '§5917', '§5916', '§5916', '§806', '§5917', '§5917', '§804', '§234', '§1386', '§3', '§582', '§805', 'art, 536', '§5944', '§2297', '§87', '§9545', '§ 5916']

J-92-98
David Chmiel,
162 Capital Appeal Docket
entered on March 14, 1995 in the Court of
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County at 83-CR-748
Argued ARGUED : April 27, 1998
After the jury's verdict in the first trial, David Chmiel filed counseled post-trial motions as well as a pro se petition alleging that Attorney Kennedy had been ineffective for, inter alia, making no effort to locate alibi witnesses, discouraging him from taking the stand, and failing to request an accomplice instruction as to Martin Chmiel's testimony. The trial court appointed new counsel, stayed the post-trial motions, and held an evidentiary hearing (treated as a hearing pursuant to the then-effective Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9551) on the ineffectiveness claims. Following the hearing, at which Attorney Kennedy testified, the trial court denied David Chmiel's post-trial motions and formally imposed the sentence of death.
Prior to the retrial, David Chmiel (hereinafter "Chmiel") filed an omnibus motion requesting, inter alia, that the trial court preclude the use at trial of the testimony given by Attorney Kennedy at the evidentiary hearing in 1988.See footnote 1 The basis for the motion was that such testimony had impermissibly disclosed confidential attorney-client communications. Opposing the motion, the Commonwealth argued that Attorney Kennedy's testimony should be admitted for impeachment purposes in the event that Chmiel decided to take the stand. The trial court denied Chmiel's motion to preclude use of the testimony.
Chmiel maintained that he had not been in the vicinity of the Lunario residence when the murders were committed and that he had "never . . . told anybody anything different . . . ." The prosecutor then asked:
Chmiel's positive answer to the prosecutor's question was apparently a mis-statement on his part, because immediately thereafter he asserted that he had gone to the Lunario residence only on the two occasions mentioned earlier. Cross-examination continued as follows:
Q: At [the evidentiary hearing] did you hear Mr. Kennedy testify as follows . . . . He's talking about different versions that you gave him. Do you remember him saying that you gave him three different versions of what happened? Do you remember him saying that?
Q: Do you remember him saying, "The first version [given by Chmiel] of what had happened . . . on the night of September the 21st . . . included an admission by him that he was at the scene of the murder not for the purpose of robbing or killing but was there to case the joint. At that time the notes indicate that he saw a shadow, that he perceived it to be, at least he thought it to be his brother Marty, and that he called out, 'Marty', that the shadow ran down an alley of the Lunario house which he was casing, got into . . . a car that Dave said he thought belonged to Tom Buffton. And [he gave] a description, I think it was a Toyota, a brown Toyota owned by Thomas Buffton." . . . Now do you recall Mr. Kennedy testifying that way under oath?
A: I'm saying--I can't say he's lying. I'm saying I did not tell him that.
Q: Three. As a matter of fact the version . . . that you testified to yesterday is Version No. 2?
A: That's what he said--
Q: So in other words this is just a pure fabrication? This is something that Mr. Kennedy dreamed up out of his imagination that you were there at 1:00 o'clock in the morning on the scene . . . ?
Q: Okay. Do you recall him saying this . . . . And he's talking about a conversation that he had with you where he's questioning you . . . . ["]Now tell me where you were at that period of time . . . ." This is Mr. Kennedy testifying.
"We started at, I think I asked him to start at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, and minute by minute he told me where he was . . . the whole day until . . . [he] ends up in front of the Lunario house at or around the time the murders were being committed. I said, 'Oh, my God, how do we handle this?'
A: Yes, according to Mr. Kennedy--
Q: Now, do you recall that Mr. Kennedy said it wasn't until February the 11th of 1984 that you suddenly said, . . . Whoops, I made a mistake. I wasn't there and I can account for all the different times. And I got witnesses lined up, right? Five months later you told him that?
Q: That's what he said, but he's a lier [sic]?
A: He is lying. He said it at a hearing where I was questioning his effectiveness . . . .
Five months later you come up with Story No. 2 which is: I was wrong about that. I wasn't on the scene, that I was at these other locations because you had time to get people together to put you at other locations, isn't that right?
Q: And he said that, I don't know what to do with this man. He's giving me three different stories. I can't put him on the stand to lie when he told me three different things. Isn't that what he said?
A: Yes, at that time--
Q: Okay. Let me refer to page 462 of the notes. The testimony of Mr. Kennedy under oath. Okay. He says several months later you told him, "He knows who did the murders but he won't say who did it. Naturally at this point I got a little excited, I pressed him on it. He identified the killers as two men and one woman. My notes indicate who did it. And he now says that Marty told him on September the 21st, 1983, the day after the killings, or the afternoon of that day of the killings, . . . that he, Marty, Tom Buffton, and Judy, I'm not sure who Judy was, did it. That Marty Chmiel, this is now coming five months later and it's a, 'me, too' defense. Marty said Dave did it, and five months later Dave says, Oh, Marty did it. He told me he did it." Do you remember him testifying to that?
Q: And do you remember him saying on page 464, "I didn't know what he would say on the stand because now I have three versions: A. He was up there to case the joint; B. He wasn't up there but Marty--that he wasn't up there and he was at his friend's house; and, C. Marty did it.["] . . . [D]o you remember him testifying to that?
Chmiel mounts a two-pronged attack upon the Commonwealth's use of Attorney Kennedy's testimony. First, he argues that Attorney Kennedy's disclosures were excessive in scope and improper given their procedural context. Second, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to utilize Attorney Kennedy's testimony at the second trial. As the basis for this claim, Chmiel asserts that the Commonwealth's use of Attorney Kennedy's testimony violated 42 Pa.C.S. §5917, the codification in the criminal context of the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. In addition, he contends that the testimony did not meet the requirements for admissibility established by this Court in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992). Finally, he asserts that admission of the testimony violated his state and federal constitutional rights to confront the witnesses against him, to be protected against compelled self-incrimination, to have the assistance of counsel, and to be afforded procedural due process.
ll. Prior Counsel's Disclosure of Confidential Communications
It is undisputed that Chmiel's conversations with Attorney Kennedy were, and absent waiver would have continued to be, protected against compelled disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. Section 5916 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §5916, sets forth the privilege as it pertains to criminal matters in Pennsylvania.
42 Pa.C.S. §5916. Although now embodied in statute, the attorney-client privilege is deeply rooted in the common law. Commonwealth v. Sims, 513 Pa. 366, 373, 521 A.2d 391, 394 (1987); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 124, 511 A.2d 1327, 1333 (1986). Indeed, it is the most revered of the common law privileges. Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 124, 511 A.2d at 1333.
Nevertheless, a party who attacks the competence of his or her counsel cannot rely on the attorney-client privilege to prevent counsel from responding to such attack. Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512, 519, 260 A.2d 745, 748 (1970); Doll v. Loesel, 288 Pa. 527, 533, 136 A. 796, 798 (1927); Commonwealth v. Warren, 264 Pa. Super. 274, 279 n.6, 399 A.2d 773, 776 n.6 (1979); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 206 Pa. Super. 317, 322, 213 A.2d 223, 226 (1965). In effect, the client's attack on the competence of counsel serves as a waiver of the privilege as to the matter at issue.See footnote 2
Moreover, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that Chmiel is correct, his claim would have established, at most, a basis for disciplinary proceedings against Attorney Kennedy. The rules that govern the ethical obligations of the legal profession (presently, the Rules of Professional Conduct) do not constitute substantive law. In re Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. 429, 441 n.5, 521 A.2d 422, 428 n.5 (1987); Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 535, 482 A.2d 215, 217 (1984); see also Rost v. State Board of Psychology, 659 A.2d 626 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (addressing, in a disciplinary proceeding, a psychologist's breach of the duty of confidentiality), appeal denied, 543 Pa. 699, 670 A.2d 145 (1995). In addition, the discussion entitled "Scope" which precedes the Rules themselves states that "these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege." Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
Next, Chmiel challenges the trial court's finding that "the Defendant, by filing a PCHA petition in his first trial and including as grounds his prior counsel's failure to obtain alibi witnesses, opened the door for Attorney Kennedy's testimony . . . ." According to Chmiel, he filed a post-trial motion alleging ineffectiveness, not a PCHA petition, and therefore the trial court's decision to designate the evidentiary hearing as a PCHA hearing was error. The gravamen of Chmiel's argument, apparently, is that it is the PCHA designation that determines whether counsel can reveal the confidences of a former client.
lll. The Commonwealth's Use at Trial of Prior Counsel's Testimony
Having determined that Attorney Kennedy was properly allowed to testify as to otherwise privileged communications from Chmiel in order to rebut Chmiel's allegations of ineffectiveness, we turn to the fundamental issue in this case: Was it error for the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to introduce such testimony into Chmiel's second trial? This is a question of first impression not only in this Commonwealth, but, apparently, in almost all other jurisdictions as well.See footnote 3
Before addressing Chmiel's arguments on this issue, we must determine the use that was made of the challenged testimony. As noted earlier, the Commonwealth asserted prior to trial that it would introduce the testimony for the purpose of impeaching Chmiel if he chose to testify, and in fact the Commonwealth did utilize the testimony for that purpose. Chmiel argues, however, that the testimony was effectively offered as substantive evidence since the trial court did not give any limiting instruction to the jury.See footnote 4
Obviously one example of Chmiel's "false and contradictory statements" was the varying accounts of his whereabouts contained in the testimony of Attorney Kennedy, which testimony was read to the jury by the prosecutor during his cross-examination of Chmiel.See footnote 5 Thus, the jury could fairly have found, based on the court's instruction, that such testimony constituted evidence tending to prove Chmiel's consciousness of guilt--in other words, substantive evidence. In light of this instruction, we do not agree with the trial court that Attorney Kennedy's testimony was used only for the purpose of impeachment.
As the Commonwealth acknowledges, the evidence in question involved two declarants, Chmiel and Kennedy, and was therefore hearsay within hearsay, or double hearsay. If double hearsay is to be admissible, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently established. Commonwealth v. Scott, 503 Pa. 624, 630, 470 A.2d 91, 94 (1983). This requirement is satisfied where each statement comes within an exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa. Super. 145, 158-59, 448 A.2d 568, 575 (1982); Packel and Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence §806 (1987) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Evidence].
A. Admissibility of Former Testimony Under 42 Pa.C.S. §5917
42 Pa.C.S. §5917. As noted earlier, Section 5917 codifies, in the criminal context, the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. See Pennsylvania Evidence §804.1.
the issue remain the "same" in both proceedings . . . . This requirement is in accord with the common law rule that "the issues in the first proceeding and hence the purpose for which the testimony was there offered, must have been such that the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony now offered." McCormick, Evidence §234 at 491 (1954); 5 Wigmore, §§1386-88 (3rd ed. 1940).
Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 449 Pa. 599, 601 n.3, 296 A.2d 768, 770 n.3 (1972) (additional citations deleted). Addressing Section 5917's predecessor statute, the Act of May 23, 1887, P.L. 158, §3, 19 P.S. §582, the wording of which was in pertinent part identical to that of Section 5917, this Court interpreted the statute as requiring that the issues at both proceedings be "substantially the same." Velasquez, 449 Pa. at 601, 296 A.2d at 770.See footnote 6
The issue at the second trial, as at the first, was Chmiel's guilt or innocence of three charges of first-degree murder. The issue at the evidentiary hearing was Attorney Kennedy's effectiveness in defending Chmiel against those charges at the first trial. Central to both issues was Chmiel's credibility: Was he to be believed when he testified concerning his whereabouts on the night in question? As Attorney Kennedy's testimony on this issue was decidedly negative, Chmiel's motive for cross-examining Attorney Kennedy is readily apparent.
In the present case, prior counsel was found to have been ineffective at the first trial only because he did not request a particular jury instruction. Counsel's failure in that regard did not taint the evidence offered at the first trial. In any event, it was not testimony from the first trial that was introduced at the second trial, but prior counsel's testimony from the evidentiary hearing. Although prior counsel's ineffectiveness made such hearing necessary, it did not taint the testimony offered there.See footnote 7 Thus, neither case law nor logic warrants the extension of Mangini to the present situation.
Next, Chmiel argues that, under this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), Attorney Kennedy's ineffectiveness hearing testimony was inadmissible at trial because it was based on the attorney's notes of his conversations with Chmiel. We disagree.
Lively limited the rule of Brady by holding that a prior inconsistent statement of a non-party witness may be used as substantive evidence only if it was given under highly reliable circumstances: 1) under oath at a formal legal proceeding; 2) reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or 3) recorded verbatim contemporaneously with the making of the statement. Id. at 471, 610 A.2d at 8.
Chmiel did make prior inconsistent statements, in the form of his statements to Attorney Kennedy; and those statements were effectively allowed into evidence at his second trial. Chmiel, however, was not a non-party witness. To the contrary, he was the defendant, and his statements to Attorney Kennedy were admissible under the hearsay exception for party admissions. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 456 Pa. 505, 508, 321 A.2d 372, 373 (1974); see also Galloway, 302 Pa. Super. at 158, 448 A.2d at 575.
Pennsylvania Evidence §805 (footnotes omitted). In sum, as the reliability concerns underlying Brady and Lively are not present here, the Brady-Lively precedents pose no barrier to the admissibility of Attorney Kennedy's testimony.
Chmiel argues that even if the Commonwealth's use at trial of Attorney Kennedy's testimony surmounted the statutory and common law bars to admissibility, it cannot overcome the hurdle of constitutionality. Among the constitutional rights violated by the use of such testimony, Chmiel contends, was the right, guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution See footnote 8 and Article I, Section 9 See footnote 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, to confront the witnesses against him.
Although the hearsay rules and the federal Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, the overlap is not complete. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1933 (1970). The United States Supreme Court "has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that 'a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.'" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (1980) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1076 (1965)).
In Roberts, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay." Id. at 65, 100 S. Ct. at 2538. First, it establishes a "rule of necessity": in the usual case, "the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." Id. Second, once the declarant is shown to be unavailable, the Clause requires that the declarant's statement be shown to bear adequate "indicia of reliability" if it is to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 66, 100 S. Ct. at 2539.
Chmiel also maintains, correctly, that this Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause of our state Constitution as being more stringent than its federal counterpart, 536 Pa. 180, 187, 638 A.2d 953, 956-57 (1994).
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 527 Pa. 472, 478, 594 A.2d 281, 283-84 (1991). He does not assert that Section 5917 violates the state constitutional provision, however, but only that the procedure at issue in this case did not meet the requirements of Section 5917. In Section III.A, supra, we have found that argument to be meritless. Moreover, as this Court observed in Ludwig, "we have recognized exceptions to the constitutional right to confrontation . . . only in those instances in which the accused has already had the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him face to face." Id. at 480, 594 A.2d at 284. Chmiel had such an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this issue requires no further consideration.
Chmiel also argues that the use of Attorney Kennedy's testimony at his second trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to be protected against compelled self-incrimination.See footnote 10 He contends that through the compelled disclosure of the statements that he had made in confidence to Attorney Kennedy, "Kennedy became Chmiel incriminating himself."
Id., 6 Pa. Super. at 104, quoted with approval in Boyle, 498 Pa. at 498, 447 A.2d at 256.
Of similar import, although involving a different privilege, is the case of Commonwealth v. Santiago, 541 Pa. 188, 662 A.2d 610 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1053, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996). The defendant in that case argued that the trial court had erred in admitting psychiatric testimony, introduced in his first trial where insanity was the defense, into his second trial, where he did not assert such a defense. Citing its earlier decision in Boyle, this Court concluded that "because Appellant voluntarily waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege, 42 Pa.C.S. §5944, by pursuing an insanity defense in his first trial, he may not reclaim the privilege in a subsequent trial." Id. at 197-98, 662 A.2d at 614 (footnote omitted).
The importance of the right to counsel requires that we give careful consideration to Chmiel's argument. For at least thirty-five years the right to counsel has been recognized as a fundamental right, one that is essential to the goal of ensuring that every criminal defendant receives a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1963). Moreover, "[i]t is axiomatic that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel." Commonwealth v. Kale, 331 Pa. Super. 155, 161, 480 A.2d 291, 294 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1980)). It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, if a defendant in Chmiel's situation chooses not to seek the effective representation to which he is entitled because he fears that the price of success will be his compelled self-incrimination, through the testimony of prior counsel, upon retrial.
The rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege suggests that there is reason for such concern. The purpose of the privilege is not to further the fact-finding process, but to foster a confidence between attorney and client that will lead to a trusting and open dialogue. Sims, 513 Pa. at 374, 521 A.2d at 394; Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 125, 511 A.2d at 1334. As explained by Professor Mechem in his treatise on the law of agency:
The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosures to the attorney of the client's objects, motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attorney's honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance. Based upon considerations of public policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential communications and disclosures, made by a client to his legal adviser for the purpose of obtaining his professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privileged;--that the attorney shall not be permitted, without the consent of his client,--and much less will he be compelled--to reveal or disclose communications made to him under such circumstances.
Sims, 513 Pa. at 373-74, 521 A.2d at 394 (quoting 2 Mechem on Agency §2297 (2d ed. 1914)); Maguigan, 511 Pa. at 124-25, 511 A.2d at 1333-34 (quoting same); Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138, 148, 338 A.2d 584, 589 (1975) (quoting same).
It has been suggested that the reluctance of clients to disclose unfavorable information to counsel is even more pronounced in the criminal field. "In criminal cases, the difficulty of obtaining full disclosure from the accused is well known, and would certainly become an absolute impossibility if the defendant knew that the lawyer could be compelled to report what he had been told." 1 McCormick on Evidence §87 (4th ed. 1992). The critical importance of the attorney-client privilege to the administration of the criminal justice system is indicated not only by its ancient lineage, but also by its codification in statute. "[T]he existence of a statutory privilege is an indication that the legislature acknowledges the significance of a particular interest and has chosen to protect that interest." Commonwealth v. Wilson, 529 Pa. 268, 282, 602 A.2d 1290, 1298, cert. denied, 504 U.S. 977, 112 S. Ct. 2952 (1992).
Given the concerns that mandate recognition of an attorney-client privilege, it is not unrealistic to suggest that use of testimony of prior counsel as in this case would have a chilling effect on defendants' exercise of their right to the effective assistance of counsel. Knowing of the possibility that his counsel may ultimately be required to testify against him,See footnote 11 a defendant may decide that counsel cannot be trusted with the most damaging information concerning his case; or he may decide not to challenge counsel's effectiveness, fearing that his ability to mount a successful defense at a second trial has been fatally undermined by the admissibility of his communications to prior counsel. The fundamental unfairness of requiring a defendant to choose either of those options is illustrated by the present case: the situation that such a choice seeks to avoid--the admission at a second trial of prior counsel's evidentiary hearing testimony--has occurred precisely because prior counsel was shown to have been ineffective.
Arguably a defendant can avoid such an undesirable result by limiting his disclosures to his attorney, or by raising only such ineffectiveness claims as will not lead to the disclosure of incriminating statements. Such argument, in our view, presupposes an unrealistic degree of foresight on the part of the defendant and unreasonably restricts his ability to prepare an adequate defense.
Our decision requires that we vacate the judgment of sentence imposed upon David Chmiel and remand for a new trial. In doing so, we note that "there is little difference as far as the Constitution is concerned between permitting prior inconsistent statements to be used only for impeachment purposes, and permitting them to be used for substantive purposes as well." Green, 399 U.S. at 164, 90 S. Ct. at 1938 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968)). Given the extremely prejudicial nature of a defendant's prior inconsistent statements as testified to by the defendant's former counsel, we conclude that to ask the jury to consider former counsel's testimony for the purpose of impeachment but not as substantive evidence would be to ask the impossible. Accordingly, Attorney Kennedy's testimony shall not be utilized for any purpose at retrial.
Mr. Justice Castille files a dissenting opinion in which Madame Justice Newman joins.
Footnote: 1 This was a motion in limine, although not styled as such. See generally Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 531 Pa. 582, 584, 614 A.2d 684, 685 (1992).
Footnote: 2 As amended in 1995, the Post Conviction Relief Act specifically provides that "[w]hen a claim for relief is based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground of relief, any privilege concerning counsel's representation as to that issue is automatically terminated." 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(d)(3) (emphasis added). Although this statutory provision was not in effect in 1988, when the evidentiary hearing on Chmiel's ineffectiveness claims was held, there was already implicit in the case law the limitation that a client's attack on his former counsel's competence waived the privilege only as to the matter in dispute. See Doll, 288 Pa. at 533, 136 A. at 798 (finding that attack on attorney's integrity rendered admissible "at least part" of his testimony despite privileged nature of communications disclosed); Warren, 264 Pa. Super. at 279 n.6, 399 A.2d at 776 n.6 (finding that trial court had properly overruled appellant's objection, based on attorney-client privilege, to introduction at PCHA hearing of letter from appellant to former attorney, where letter confirmed attorney's testimony that appellant had sought to plead guilty in order to expedite sentencing); see also Commonwealth v. Ferri, 410 Pa. Super. 67, 75, 599 A.2d 208, 212 (1991) (finding that admission of former counsel's testimony was proper, where privileged communications were disclosed only to extent necessary to authenticate and establish chain of custody of non-privileged physical evidence), appeal denied, 534 Pa. 652, 627 A.2d 730 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994).
Footnote: 3 The Court of Appeals for the Third District of California considered the issue generally in State v. Dennis, 177 Cal. App. 3d 863, 223 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1986). In that case, the court acknowledged that when a defendant asks the trial court to set aside a jury verdict on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel, he waives the attorney-client privilege as to the matters that he places in issue. Nevertheless, the court observed, "the information that defendant will be required to disclose in support of a new trial motion may conceivably lighten the burden which the prosecution bears in bringing about a conviction upon a new trial and therefore defendant's right against self incrimination is implicated." Id. at 874, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 243. Thus, the court reasoned that to require a defendant to demonstrate prior counsel's ineffectiveness on the record was to risk imposing on the defendant "a compulsive sanction against the exercise of the self incrimination privilege." Id. at 874, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44. In order to relieve defendants of such an untenable choice, the court held that a defendant "must be granted use immunity for disclosures he may make in support of a motion for a new trial on grounds of ineffectiveness of trial counsel." Id. at 876, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
Footnote: 4 Defense counsel did not ask for a limiting instruction, either at the time of cross-examination or prior to the court's charge to the jury. As this is a capital case, we conclude that the issue has not been waived. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26 n.3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n.3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S. Ct. 2444 (1983). Moreover, as will be discussed, defense counsel did object to the "consciousness of guilt" instruction that was given by the court on this issue.
Footnote: 5 In requesting the second of the quoted instructions, the Commonwealth explained that "what we are talking about there is the three versions that [Chmiel] gave with respect to Mr. Kennedy." The trial court suggested that the instruction would apply to the defendant's statements to his brother Martin. Over defense counsel's vigorous objection, the trial court agreed to include the Commonwealth's point for charge in its instructions.
Footnote: 6 See id. (holding, in case of defendant who obtained new trial on murder charge after having pled guilty, that testimony of unavailable witness from degree of guilt hearing was admissible at trial because in both proceedings the issue was whether defendant had acted with premeditation and without provocation); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 299 Pa. Super. 113, 122-23, 445 A.2d 174, 178-79 (1982) (holding that testimony of unavailable witness from witness's own trial was admissible at defendant's trial, as both had asserted entrapment defense involving same informant). Cf. Commonwealth v. Munchinski, 401 Pa. Super. 300, 316, 585 A.2d 471, 479 (1990) (holding that testimony from trial of unavailable witness and former co-defendant was not admissible at defendant's trial, as witness had presented insanity defense and Commonwealth's opportunity to cross-examine was limited to that issue alone), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 618, 600 A.2d 535 (1991); Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 332 Pa. Super. 315, 332, 481 A.2d 632, 640 (1984) (holding that transcript from Canadian extradition hearing was not admissible at the defendant's trial in Pennsylvania on criminal charges, despite adversarial nature of extradition hearing, because interests of Canadian authorities at hearing were substantially different from those of Commonwealth at trial).
Footnote: 7 The fact that the evidentiary hearing was necessitated by prior counsel's ineffectiveness is nevertheless relevant to our disposition in another respect. See Section III.C, infra.
Footnote: 8 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."
Footnote: 9 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face . . . ."
Footnote: 10 "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."
Footnote: 11 By happenstance, this case presents a situation in which prior counsel, having died, was not available to testify at the defendant's retrial. In the more usual scenario, prior counsel will be available to testify in person against the defendant.
The majority holds that to allow the now deceased counsel's testimony from a prior ineffectiveness hearing to be used to impeach appellant at his second trial would violate appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The majority reasons that allowing the use of such testimony would result in criminal defendants having the Hobson's choice of deciding whether to disclose information covered by the attorney- client privilege for the purpose of proving an ineffectiveness claim, knowing that the disclosures could be used against them in a later proceeding, or to refrain from bringing an ineffectiveness claim, thereby possibly giving up their right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In so holding, the majority is effectively permitting appellant to resurrect a waived attorney-client privilege in order to prevent counsel's sworn testimony from the ineffectiveness hearing to be used to impeach appellant's perjurious testimony at his second trial. I respectfully dissent because subsequent use of this testimony (which was initially obtained pursuant to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and made part of the public record on a meritless ineffectiveness claim) does not implicate appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The right to effective assistance of counsel does not encompass the right later to testify falsely under oath once the ineffectiveness claim has been asserted.
Initially, appellant sought to prevent the disclosure of his trial counsel's testimony, arguing that the attorney-client privilege barred such disclosure.See footnote 1 It is axiomatic that the attorney-client privilege is intended to foster candid communications between legal counsel and the client so that counsel can provide legal advice based upon the most complete information possible from the client. The historical concern has been that, absent the attorney-client privilege, the client may be reluctant to fully disclose all the facts necessary to obtain informed legal advice if these facts may later be exposed to public scrutiny.
The attorney-client privilege, however, is not an absolute privilege. The privilege is not available to protect attorney-client communications where the client attacks the effectiveness of the attorney's representation. Loutzenhiser v. Doddo, 436 Pa. 512, 518, 260 A.2d 745, 748 (1970). In addition, once the attorney-client communications have been disclosed to a third party, the privilege is deemed waived. See United States v. Fisher, 692 F.Supp. 488, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(any voluntary disclosure by the holder of the privilege that is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship thereby waives the privilege).
First, appellant himself has defeated the notion that he would not bring a claim of ineffective assistance knowing that his attorney might be allowed to provide impeachment testimony against him if he won a retrial and then tried to change his defense. Quite simply, appellant did bring an ineffectiveness claim under such circumstances. It is inconceivable to me that this Court would order a new trial on the basis of a "chilling" of appellant's Sixth Amendment right when appellant quite clearly exercised that right as vigorously as it can be exercised. Moreover, it is equally inconceivable that any criminal defendant in appellant's situation would ever decline to bring a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance on the grounds that such a course of action might impair the defendant's freedom of imagination in the event that the defendant won a new trial. I do not believe I am making a bold prediction when I suggest that defendants will find the alternative of death by lethal injection to be less palatable than the prospect of bringing a claim of ineffective assistance while knowing that they will not be able to concoct a new story inconsistent with what they have already told their attorneys. Consequently, I believe that the Majority's concerns related to the putative chilling effect on appellant's Sixth Amendment rights are logically unsound.See footnote 2
Second, I am troubled by what I perceive to be the policy ramifications of the Court's decision. It is beyond peradventure that the attorney-client privilege is waived when a criminal defendant brings a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially, the Court's decision today resuscitates the already-waived attorney-client privilege under the guise of protecting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and concomitant right to seek a new trial. What the Court is really protecting, however, is not the right of a criminal defendant simply to seek a new trial, but rather the right to seek a new trial in which he is free to commit perjury without consequences. The attorney-client privilege should not provide a cloak of immunity for such a nefarious purpose. Once the privilege is waived for purposes of an ineffectiveness claim, it should remain waived for purposes of cross-examination in a second trial, rather than act as a shield which prevents the factfinder from being exposed to the defendant's naked perjury. The purpose of the privilege is to promote candor with one's attorney; the only situation in which an attorney will be called as an impeachment witness is a situation like this in which the defendant has already abused the concept of candor (by lying to either the attorney, the court, or both) and, therefore, subverted the very basis for assertion of the privilege in the first place. To be succinct, judicial expansion of the traditional attorney-client privilege is inappropriate at best when the very point of the expansion seems to be to facilitate the deception of the judicial system itself by prevaricating defendants. Accordingly, I believe that policy considerations militate heavily against the decision of the Majority.
Madame Justice Newman joins this dissenting opinion.
Footnote: 1 The attorney-client privilege is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5916.
Footnote: 2 To the extent that the Majority rests its decision on the chilling effect on a defendant's ability to be candid with his attorney in the first instance, I would note again that the unsettled state of the law in this area did not exactly impair appellant from testing out with his attorney the various versions of his defense. Moreover, affirmation in this matter would have no chilling effect whatsoever on the ability of any criminal defendant to be candid with his attorney, since the only purpose behind the Commonwealth's use of trial counsel as an impeachment witness was to show either that appellant was not candid with his attorney or else that he was not candid with the Court under oath. If appellant tells his attorney the truth and tells the Court the truth on retrial, then there will be no purpose to calling the attorney as an impeachment witness, and the spirit of full candor will be vindicated. By prohibiting the attorney from testifying in these circumstances, this Court necessarily condones one of two things: either a duplicitous relationship between the defendant and his trial counsel or a duplicitous relationship between the defendant and the Court.