Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2003_documents/03me63ma.htm
Timestamp: 2013-12-08 10:15:17
Document Index: 510516722

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 501', '§ 209', '§ 2413', '§ 317', '§ 213', '§ 228', '§\n229', '§ 232', '§ 231', '§ 235', '§ 228', '§ 231', '§ 1502', '§ 229', '§ 231', '§ 2413', '§ 209', '§ 228', '§\n228', '§ 317', '§ 213']

C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, and CALKINS, JJ.
J., and LEVY, J.
STONEWOOD TRANSPORT CLIFFORD, J.
[¶1] Ronald and Susan Mahar, individually
and as parent and next friend of Kelsey Snowman, appeal from a summary judgment
entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Mead, C.J.) in favor of defendant StoneWood Transport. The Mahars' complaint, filed against
StoneWood and Frederick J. Linfield, arose out of the actions of Linfield who,
in December of 1998, assaulted and threatened the Mahars on Route 9 between
Bangor and Aurora. The Mahars
contend that summary judgment was improperly entered in favor of StoneWood on
their claims alleging (1) that StoneWood negligently hired and supervised
Linfield as an employee and/or as an independent contractor, and (2) that
StoneWood is vicariously liable for the actions of Linfield as the employer or
principal of Linfield. The Mahars
contend that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are disputed
issues of material fact, and also contend that the court improperly awarded
costs to StoneWood. Finding no
StoneWood Transport, a division of StoneWood Investments, is a trucking company
incorporated and managed in New Brunswick. Beginning in 1994, StoneWood periodically retained
Linfield's services on a part-time basis. In 1996 and 1997, Linfield signed contracts with StoneWood to provide
transportation services on essentially a full-time basis.
[¶3] On December 5, 1998, Linfield was
driving east on Route 9 to McAdam, New Brunswick from Bangor. The Mahar family was also traveling
east on Route 9 after a shopping trip to Bangor. The Mahars approached Linfield's flatbed truck and drove
behind him for several miles. At
some point, Linfield turned on his rear-facing floodlights, which induced the
Mahars to flash their headlights to show Linfield that their high beams were
not on. This sequence of events
repeated periodically until the vehicles reached Aurora and Linfield suddenly
stopped his truck to block the road.
[¶4] Linfield exited his truck with a three
to four foot long pipe, and approached the Mahars' car in a threatening manner
while screaming obscenities and holding the pipe above his head like a baseball
bat. The driver of another truck,
behind the Mahars, began to yell at Linfield, who ran back to move his truck,
thereby allowing the Mahars to continue traveling on Route 9. Linfield caught up to the Mahars,
however, and followed them closely for approximately fifty miles until a local
police officer pulled Linfield over.
As a result of his conduct, Linfield was convicted of disorderly conduct (Class
E), in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501 (1983 & Supp. 2002); criminal
threatening (Class D), in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209 (1983); and driving
to endanger (Class E), in violation of 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2413(1) (1996). He was sentenced to a term of six
months in prison, all but forty-five days suspended, and placed on probation
for one year. Linfield's license
to operate a vehicle in Maine was also suspended for 180 days. StoneWood terminated his services.
[¶6] The Mahars sued Linfield and StoneWood,
alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress against Linfield, and
seeking damages against StoneWood for the negligent hiring and supervision of
an employee/independent contractor, and vicarious liability for Linfield's
actions. [¶7] The Mahars
filed this appeal following the entry of a summary judgment by the Superior
Court in favor of StoneWood on all of their claims against StoneWood, and the
allowance by the Superior Court of StoneWood's bill of its costs.[1]
[¶8] On appeal from a summary judgment, we
consider only the portions of the record referred to, and the material facts
set forth, in the M.R. Civ. P. 56(h) statements to determine whether there was
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the successful party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001
ME 77, ¶ 4, 770 A.2d 653. We
examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 11, 765 A.2d 571, 575; see
Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784
A.2d 18, 21‑22 ("Summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy. . .
. It is simply a procedural device
for obtaining judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without
fact-finding.").
[¶9] The Mahars contend that the Superior
Court erred in entering summary judgment for StoneWood because StoneWood had
notice of Linfield's propensity for erratic behavior, based on prior complaints about Linfield's dangerous
driving.[2] The Mahars argue that StoneWood's
decision to allow Linfield to operate a flatbed following those complaints
demonstrates StoneWood's failure to follow its own procedure and, from this
failure, a trier of fact could find that StoneWood acted negligently in its
supervision of Linfield. We
[¶10] We have not yet recognized the
independent tort of negligent supervision of an employee. See Napieralski v. Unity Church of
Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶¶ 6, 10,
802 A.2d 391, 392-93 (refusing to recognize tort of negligent supervision); see
also, e.g., Hinkley v. Penobscot Valley Hosp.,
2002 ME 70, ¶ 16, 794 A.2d 643, 647 (avoiding recognition of negligent
supervision and deciding case on other grounds); Santoni v. Potter, 2002 F. Supp. 2d 14, 28 (D. Me. 2002)
(observing "[t]he Maine Law Court has never recognized the tort of negligent
supervision"); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 9, 692 A.2d 441, 443-44 (declining to
recognize tort of negligent supervision).
[¶11] Even were we to adopt negligent
supervision as an independent tort, as the Mahars urge, the facts of this case
do not support such a cause of action. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 317 (1965);[3]
(Second) of Agency § 213 (1958).[4] The prior actions of Linfield of which
StoneWood was aware did not involve acts of violence, and would not support a
finding that StoneWood should have foreseen Linfield's assault on the Mahars. Although the evidence might support a
finding of forseeability as to a minor traffic violation, Linfield misused the
vehicle to threateningly follow the Mahars for fifty miles. Moreover, the Mahars' cause of action
against StoneWood is based on the totality of Linfield's conduct, and the total
damages resulting from that conduct. The Mahars have made no attempt to separate Linfield's threatening
pursuit of the Mahars along Route 9 from the pipe assault that preceded it. See generally Barter v.
Boothbay/Boothbay Harbor Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
564 A.2d 766, 768 (Me. 1989) (noting "a plaintiff
seeking legal relief must plead all theories of recovery then available to
him") (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court correctly entered summary judgment for StoneWood
on the claim for negligent supervision.
[¶12] In contending that StoneWood should be
held vicariously liable for Linfield's conduct, the Mahars challenge the
Superior Court's findings that (1) Linfield worked as an independent
contractor for StoneWood, rather than as an employee,[5]
and (2) even if Linfield was an employee, his actions were outside the scope of
his employment. Specifically, the
Mahars fault the Superior Court for its failure to cite facts or law to support
its decision, and argue that the issues of Linfield's poor driving habits and
whether Linfield acted within the scope of his employment are for a jury to
[¶13] Maine applies the Restatement (Second) of Agency to
determine the limits of imposing vicarious liability on an employer. See McLain v. Training & Dev.
Corp., 572 A.2d 494, 497 (Me. 1990). Specifically, section 228 of the
Restatement provides that a master may be vicariously liable for the actions of
its agent when the agent's conduct was within the "scope of employment."
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 provides:
of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to
of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it s different in kind
from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
recent First Circuit opinion interpreting Maine's use of section 228 provides
an instructive explanation: [A]cts
relating to work and done in the workplace during working hours are within the
scope, see [Restatement (Second)] §§
229, 233, 234; negligent performance of duties is within the scope, see
[Restatement (Second)] §§ 232-233, while
serious intentional wrongdoing is outside it, see [Restatement (Second)] § 231 & cmt. a.; and the
motivation of the employee (to serve the master's interests or his own) is
often an important element, see [Restatement
(Second)] §§ 235-236.
v. Brown, 158 F.3d 605, 609-10 (1st Cir.
1998); see Nichols v.
Land Transp. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d. 25, 27
(D. Me. 1999) ("[A]ctions that are done with a private, rather than a
work-related, purpose to commit wrongdoing are outside of the scope of
employment and render the motivation of the employee, in performing the act at
issue a crucial, immunity-related fact."), aff'd, 223 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2000). [¶15] In further defining "scope of
employment," subsection (2) of section 228 requires that the agent's conduct
occur within "authorized time or space limits." Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 228 (1958). This requirement relates to whether the agent's act was foreseeable, and
establishes the principle that "the master should not be held responsible for
the agent's conduct when that conduct is outside the contours of the employment
relationship." Nichols, 103 F. Supp. 2d. at 27. [¶16] In Nichols, a trucking company was sued for the stabbing of a
motorist by one of its driver-employees. Id. Concluding that the stabbing was
outside the scope of employment, the court observed that the employee was not
authorized to leave his truck to stab a motorist, and doing so clearly
demonstrated his motivation to serve his personal interests, rather than those
of the trucking company. Id. at 27. Although Comment a to Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 231 (1958) recognizes that a master may reasonably
anticipate a servant's minor crimes in the carrying out of the master's
business, serious criminal activity, such as brandishing a knife and stabbing a
motorist, are both unexpected and different from what is expected from servants
in a lawful occupation. Nichols, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
Assault against and threatening of a family is serious criminal conduct that is
unanticipated and very different from conduct that StoneWood would reasonably
expect from Linfield. Contrary to
the Mahars' contentions, Linfield's poor driving record, without more, did not
render his actions against the Mahars foreseeable. Like the driver-employee in Nichols, Linfield was not authorized to leave his truck to
assault the Mahars, nor was he authorized to follow up the assault by harassing
them on the highway. Moreover, it
is clear that Linfield's motive for assaulting and harassing the Mahars was
unrelated to any interest of StoneWood. Linfield's actions against the Mahars were well outside the scope of his
employment relationship with StoneWood.
[¶18] The Mahars also contend that the
Superior Court erred in failing to address StoneWood's liability pursuant to
section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency because they allege that Linfield was aided in
accomplishing the assault by the existence of his agency or employment
relationship with StoneWood.
[¶20] Although we have discussed section 219
(2)(d), see id., we
have not yet expressly adopted it. Section 219(2)(d), however, is not a broad enough extension of employer
liability on which to base StoneWood's liability for Linfield's assaultive and
threatening conduct in this case.
[¶22] The Mahars rely on language in Costos
v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1998) to argue for
the application of section 219(2)(d) to the facts of this case. The Costos court found the defendant
innkeeper liable for the actions of its employee who improperly entered the
room of a female guest using a duplicate room key and sexually assaulted
her. 137 F.3d at 50. The court held the employer liable for
the agent's tort because it "was accomplished by an instrumentality, or through conduct
associated with the agency status." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). [¶23] The Costos decision has been the
subject of some criticism.[6] In that case, the employee acted deceitfully by using his
position as an employee to learn the room number of the female guest, and by
misusing a duplicate key to enter her room. Costos, 137 F.3d at 47. In this case, however, Linfield did not purport to act on
behalf of StoneWood, and he engaged in no misrepresentation or deceit; rather,
he committed an assault and thereafter drove in a threatening manner.
[¶24] Although StoneWood
assigned a driving route to Linfield and partially owned Linfield's truck,[7] neither Linfield's pipe
assault against the Mahars, nor his threatening pursuit of them were related to
StoneWood in any way. Moreover,
the Mahars based their action against StoneWood on the totality of Linfield's conduct;
their complaint does not distinguish Linfield's assault with the pipe from his
subsequent pursuit. Accordingly,
the Mahars have not demonstrated that Linfield's tortious conduct was aided by
the existence of his relationship with StoneWood within the meaning of section
219(2)(d). See Barter, 564 A.2d at 768.
[¶25] Finally, the Mahars contend that the
Superior Court wrongly awarded costs to StoneWood, arguing that such costs,
including those incurred for depositions and medical records, are unreasonable
under the circumstances. [¶26] We review a decision to award costs for
an abuse of discretion. Nicholson
v. Nicholson, 2000 ME 12, ¶ 10, 747 A.2d
588, 591. M.R. Civ. P. 54(d)
authorizes costs to the prevailing party, and subsection (g) specifically
allows for costs on depositions. M.R. Civ. P. 54(g) ("No costs shall be allowed unless the court finds
that the taking of the deposition was reasonably necessary, whether or not the
deposition was actually used at trial."). Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 1502-C (2003) also, under certain circumstances,
provides for the allowance of other discretionary costs such as medical
reports. [¶27] The disputed costs for depositions and
medical reports were reasonable given that the plaintiffs claimed that
defendant Linfield caused negligent infliction of emotional distress and
engaged in outrageous and malicious conduct for which they claimed StoneWood
Transport was vicariously liable. The Superior Court acted within its discretion when granting StoneWood's
with whom LEVY, J., joins, concurring and dissenting.
I concur with that portion of the Court's
opinion which concludes that there is no cause of action based on negligent
supervision. I also concur with
the Court's conclusion that there are sufficient disputes as to material facts
to preclude a finding that Linfield was not an employee of StoneWood. With Linfield's employment relationship
with StoneWood established for purposes of our analysis, I respectfully dissent
from the Court's conclusion that there is no dispute as to material fact that
StoneWood's driver was acting outside the scope of his employment while he was
driving StoneWood's truck. [¶29] The case is before us for review of a
correctly points out that, in such reviews, the evidence stated or referenced
in the parties' statements of material facts must be construed most favorably
to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Court's opinion ¶ 8 (citing Johnson
v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12,
¶ 11, 765 A.2d 571, 575). If any
reasonable view of the evidence would create a dispute of fact as to whether,
at the time of the incidents in question, Linfield was acting within the scope
of his employment, then summary judgment must be denied. [¶30] There is no dispute that the primary
purpose of Linfield's employment was to drive a truck, that StoneWood partially
owned, at times and on routes designated by StoneWood. There is also no dispute that at the time
Linfield threatened and then pursued the Mahars, Linfield was driving the truck
on StoneWood's business, on the route selected by StoneWood. We can hope that StoneWood does not
want its drivers to operate their vehicles negligently or improperly in the
course of driving their routes. But that desire for proper driving at all times does not render
principals immune from liability for employees' acts of negligence or
impropriety that occur in the scope of their employment. Negligent and improper acts do occur in
the course of driving within the scope of a professional driver's
employment. [¶31] The Court acknowledges, as it must, that
acts relating to work and done in the workplace during working hours, even if
done negligently, are acts within the scope of employment. Court's opinion ¶¶ 13-14 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 229,
232-34 (1958); Lyons v. Brown,
158 F.3d 605, 609‑10 (1st Cir. 1998)). The Court also cites to Comment a of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 231 indicating that an employer may reasonably anticipate, and thus be
civilly liable for, an employee's minor crimes committed in carrying out the
employer's business, but that the employer may not be viewed as expecting and
thus may not be civilly liable for serious criminal activity such as
brandishing a knife or stabbing a motorist. Court's opinion ¶ 16 (citing Nichols v. Land Transp.
Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d
25, 27-28 (D. Me. 1999), aff'd
223 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2000)). While the Court asserts otherwise, the crimes arising from Linfield's
fifty-mile pursuit of the Mahars, Class E driving to endanger, 29-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2413(1), and Class D criminal threatening, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209,
certainly fall within the category of minor crimes addressed in the
Restatement, crimes the employer could reasonably anticipate may occur in the
[¶32] The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228
(2) Conduct of
a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from
that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little
[¶33] The standards stated in subsection (2) are essentially the
same as the standards stated in subsection (1). Subsection (2) states what must be proven to escape from a
"within the scope of employment" determination, while subsection (1) states
what must be proven to bring an employee's actions within the "scope of
employment" definition.
[¶34] While
the issue may be close, for purposes of this analysis, Linfield's initial stop
and threats in Aurora are assumed to be outside the scope of his employment
under subsection (2) of section 228. However, once Linfield resumed driving, his actions reverted to conduct
within the scope of employment. There can be no dispute that Linfield's following the Mahars at
perilously close distances for fifty miles on his assigned StoneWood route
meets the criteria of subparagraph (a), (b) and (c) of the scope of employment
definition in subsection (1) of section 228. StoneWood can prevail on summary judgment under subsection
(1) only if it can establish, without dispute as to material fact, that
Linfield's actions were "unexpectable." See Restatement (Second) of Agency §
228(1)(d). The combination of
Linfield's prior record and common driving practices prevent StoneWood from
seriously contending that Linfield's actions were, without dispute,
"unexpectable." [¶35] Although the laws prohibit it, many
drivers of cars and trucks drive too fast and some follow too close in the
course of their driving for business or pleasure. When damages are caused by such violations of the rules of
the road, employers are liable for the poor driving of their employees in the
course of their employment. The
employer is not exempt from liability because they do not condone the
employee's poor driving or because the employee may have committed some other
more egregious tort, outside the scope of his employment, some miles back up
[¶36] Turning
to subsection (2) of section 228, there can be no dispute that Linfield's
conduct, driving StoneWood's truck, was exactly the conduct for which he was
employed. Further his conduct
occurred within the time and on the route where StoneWood assigned Linfield to
drive the truck. While driving the
truck too fast or following another vehicle too closely might not have been
"actuated by a purpose to serve the master," this limitation in subsection (2)
must be qualified by the sections and comments of the Restatement cited by the
Court. Those sections and comments
recognize that both negligence and minor criminal acts committed in the course
of a regular employment activity are within the scope of employment and can
subject an employer to liability. [¶37] The Mahars' burden here is not to prove
conclusively that Linfield was acting within the scope of his employment. They only need to establish that there
is a dispute of fact as to whether Linfield acted within the scope of his
employment when he followed the Mahars closely for fifty miles on his assigned
route. The Court characterizes
Linfield's actions as "threatening pursuit" or "harassing them on the
highway." Attaching such characterizations
to Linfield's actions does not take his actions out of the scope of his
employment any more than characterizing his actions as "negligent following" or
"dangerous driving" would bring his actions within the scope of his employment. But the resort to characterizations of
the facts of driving too fast and following too close demonstrates at least a
dispute as to material facts that a jury, not opinion writers, must resolve.
[¶38] This is not a case where, as in Nichols, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 28, a trucker
stabbed a motorist. Here,
Linfield's actions involved the type of minor crimes in carrying out the
employer's business that Nichols
indicates may be anticipated and may subject the employer to civil
liability. 103 F. Supp. 2d at
28. Nor is this a case like Costos
v. Coconut Island Corp.,
137 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998), where a hotel employee, using a duplicate room
key, entered the room of a female guest and sexually attacked her. 137 F.3d at 50. In Costos, the First Circuit determined, on those
facts that the tortious acts occurred within the scope of employment. [¶39] Here, the facts make an even stronger
case for the determination that the conduct occurred within the scope of
employment, because the relationship between the offending acts and the
employment is much closer. The
tortious acts occurred during the course of the exact activity, driving on a
specific route, that was the principal activity of StoneWood's employment. If these tortious acts committed while
driving are not within the scope of a truck driver's employment, then, perhaps,
few tortious acts committed by a professional driver while driving would, in
the Court's view, be acts within the scope of employment. The law that employers are responsible
for the tortious acts by their employees committed while driving in the course
of their employment has served us well in the past. It should continue. Because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Linfield was
acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued the Mahars, summary
judgment should not have been granted.
[¶40] The Court's opinion indicates that even
if liability were established for some of Linfield's activities, summary
judgment would still be appropriate because the Mahars have failed to differentiate
damages arising from activities for which there might be liability from the
damages arising from activities for which there is no liability. Court's opinion ¶¶ 11 & 24. The Court appears to be saying that an
employee's committing a first tortious act outside the scope of employment
renders the employer immune from liability for subsequent tortious acts that
may be within the scope of employment, unless the plaintiff assumes the burden
of differentiating the damages attributable to those subsequent tortious acts.
[¶41] The Court's position that the plaintiff
has the burden to differentiate damages for events for which there is liability
from damages for events for which there is no liability, or forfeit their
entire claim, changes the law. It
is a significant departure from the law we have stated in cases such as Lovely
658 A.2d 1091 (Me. 1995). In Lovely, we held that where it may be difficult
or impossible to apportion damages between causes for which a defendant is
responsible and causes for which a defendant is not responsible, the burden to
differentiate and the risk of failure to differentiate damages for a single
injury rests with the defendant. Id. at 1092-94.
[¶42] If we assume that StoneWood is not liable
for damages arising from Linfield's initial stop and threats to the Mahars,
this does not excuse StoneWood from responsibility for the subsequent
continuing trauma to the Mahars which occurred after the Mahars and Linfield
resumed their trips toward Calais. The great bulk of the damages likely arise from this terrifying one-hour
ordeal on a dark highway, where StoneWood's truck followed the Mahars at
perilously close distances until it was stopped by a law enforcement
officer. These damages, arising
after the trip resumed, are significant. The stop and threats may be considered aggravating factors for the
subsequent damages, enhancing the Mahars' fears of what StoneWood's driver
might do to them on the road to Calais. The fact that it might be difficult to rationally distinguish the
damages arising from the initial contact from the much larger amount of damages
arising from the subsequent trip, cannot justify denial of recovery for all
damages, particularly at this summary judgment stage of the proceedings. [¶43] At trial, the Mahars will have the burden
of proving, by preponderance of the evidence, those damages that are
proximately caused by the actions of StoneWood's employee within the scope of
his employment. Merriam v.
Wanger, 2000 ME 159, ¶¶
8-10, 757 A.2d 778, 780-81; Crowe v. Shaw, 2000 ME 136, ¶ 10, 755 A.2d 509, 512. StoneWood is not excused from liability
for all damages because some of Linfield's actions causing damages may have
been outside the scope of his employment. Any risk of failure to differentiate damages rests with StoneWood. See Lovely, 658 A.2d at 1092-94.
[¶44] There are disputes of material fact as to
whether Linfield was acting as an employee of StoneWood. There are disputes of material fact as
to whether some or all of Linfield's actions were within the scope of
StoneWood's employment. There are
disputes as to material fact as to whether Linfield's actions, while acting
within the scope of his employment, caused damages to the Mahars and as to what
the proper amount of these damages might be. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been granted. [¶45] I would vacate the judgment in favor of
StoneWood and remand for the trial of the facts of this case.
Anthony D. Pellegrini, Esq. Paul W. Chaiken, Esq. (orally)
& Winchell, LLC
O Box 1401
ME 04402-1401
F. Kellogg, Esq. (orally)
J. Badger Jr., Esq.
Whitman, Large & Badger
O Box 2429
ME 04402-2429
The Superior Court entered judgment in favor of StoneWood pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Mahars' claims against Linfield remained pending.
In 1995, StoneWood received a telephone call complaining about Linfield tailgating. In 1997, StoneWood received a letter complaining generally of Linfield's driving and, in 1998, a phone call complaining about Linfield speeding. Linfield, thereafter, also received a ticket for speeding in October of 1998. Although StoneWood's Employee Manual provided that the receipt of two public complaints constituted grounds for dismissal, Linfield was only placed on probation for six months.
[3] Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 317 (1965) provides:
master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if:
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the
master or upon which the servant
is privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and (b)
knows or has reason to know that he has
the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control. [4] Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213
(1958) provides:
person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to
liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless;
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or
in failing to make proper regulations;
(b) in the employment of improper persons or
instrumentalities in work involving
in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent,
negligent or other tortious conduct by persons,
whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control. [5] The Superior Court termed Linfield an "independent contractor" rather than an "employee." Determining whether an individual worked as an "independent contractor" or as a formal "employee" for a particular employer is made pursuant to an eight-factor test, with "control" being the most important factor. Murray's Case, 130 Me. 191, 154 A. 352 (Me. 1931). The ability of StoneWood to (1) continuously assign work to Linfield; (2) approve, reject, or terminate any assistant Linfield hired; (3) require Linfield to check in on a regular basis; (4) require Linfield to follow their "Rules and Regulations" as provided by the Broker's Contract; (5) require Linfield to attend safety seminars; and (6) place Linfield on probation for violating their rules/regulations, demonstrate that StoneWood retained substantial control over Linfield's conduct. At the very least, there was a material issue of fact in dispute precluding a finding, for purposes of summary judgment, that Linfield was not an employee. The Superior Court's error in concluding as a matter of law that Linfield was not an employee is, however, harmless because Linfield was acting outside the scope of his employment when assaulting the Mahars.
At least one critic notes that the First Circuit's "instrumentality" analysis does not delineate the scope of "instrumentality." Combs, supra, at 1112 ("By ignoring the properly narrow scope of aided‑by‑agency-relation liability, the Costos court eroded traditional principles of agency law."); see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998) ("[I]n a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the employment relation: Proximity and regular contact afford a captive pool of potential victims.").
The truck was licensed and registered in the joint names of StoneWood and Linfield.