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Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 840', 'Art. 854', 'Art 840', 'art 6', 'art.888', 'Art 840', 'art 6', 'art.888', 'Art 840']

Art 840-853 cases
BrowseInterestsStay InformedCareerPersonal GrowthFiction & BiographiesHealth & FitnessLifestyleCultureBrowse byBooksAudiobooksNews & MagazinesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoin[G.R. No. 8927. March 10, 1914. ] ASUNCION NABLE JOSE ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIA IGNACIA USON ET AT SYLLABUS 1.WILLS; INTERPRETATION; SUCCESSION OF SISTERS AND NIECES. — The following clauses appeared in a will. It was held that the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters take per capita and in equal parts. The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read as follows:jg "First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said property exists at my husband’s death, it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs. "Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doña Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left two daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puzon; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issue had by our deceased father Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."cralaw virtua1aw library The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they had been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sisters should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one-sixth to be divided among said children equally. This appeal taken from the judgment entered upon that finding, appellants asserting that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives. We are of the opinion that the appellant’s contention is well founded. We see no words or phrases in the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned court below. On the other hand, we find expression which seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces. The court below based its construction upon the theory that the other construction would be "an admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would be more favored than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children."cralaw virtua1aw library As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband’s death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions. In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will by name "so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."cralaw virtua1aw library We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrix’s intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended. The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the property passing under the codicil hereinabove referred to, the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
and the same has become final.B. ID.B. LEGITIME. 1967.B. HELD: Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the lower court. Flordelis and Tirso. has been included. was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of S. JUDICIAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION. its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem. as heir. — Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of S. that vests title in the distributees.B. Nor does the fact that M. that the court may accept or reject. ID. and was not null and void under said article. but of heirs (without distinction between forced. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited..B. 6. REYES. to be null and void ab initio because the distributee. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament. L-17818. ID. since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties. since there was here no preterition. the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. PARTITION. B. was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was
. — Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) provided that "a partition in which a person was believed to be an heir without being so. and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament.B. or total omission of a forced heir. Azucena. impinged on the legitime of M.. or descendants. — That M.B.. had been instituted heir in the late decedent’s last will and testament together with M.. ID. was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. MINORITY OF HEIR DOES NOT IMPLY THAT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTER DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION." Based on this Article. S. and the condition of S. 5. the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal. ITS EFFECT.B. 2. decedent’s daughter. — Even without the (questioned) project of partition the distribution could stand since it was in conformity with the probated will of the deceased. voluntary or intestate ones).. hence. LUCILA MILAGROS BARRETTO DATU SYLLABUS 1. the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of B. No. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. as daughter of the testator. once final.B.B. S.[G. 4. did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of B. Where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate. CIVIL LAW. ID.] TIRSO T. and it is that judicial decree of distribution. v. unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. but once it had become final. shall be null and void.B. it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled. ID. as guardian of the minors. while untrue. This view is erroneous.. 3.B. for B. B. JUDICIAL DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION. ALLOTMENT OF SMALLER SHARE THAN LEGITIME DOES NOT INVALIDATE INSTITUTION OF HEIR. was at a liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. COMPROMISE ON CIVIL STATUS PRESUPPOSES SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSY THROUGH MUTUAL CONCESSION OF PARTIES. ARTICLE 1081 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1889 (then in force) CONSTRUED. — Independently of a project of partition which is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate. the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. against the provisions whereof no objection had been made.R. Jr. was not a daughter of the decedent. — While the share (1/2) assigned to S.. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children. January 20. the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one.. S.
9. 22443.000. in its Civil Case No. being the share of plaintiff’s wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San Roque. however.
. widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes. and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago. 2057. she prepared a project of partition. abovementioned. Hagonoy. Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First instance of Bulacan. By virtue thereof. being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court. 1936.. cannot bind his wards. In the meantime... 1084. Rizal.. Said project of Partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22. 7. Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. — Granting that there was fraud. which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. ID. dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. 10. mother of plaintiff’s wards.. Maria Gerardo. ID. 41423. being an act of disposition and not of administration. ID. and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces.without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province. — The proceeding for probate is one in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested.. WAIVER OF RIGHTS BY GUARDIAN DOES NOT BIND HIS WARDS. Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee. Pampanga and Bulacan. GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE. Even then.ph "‘This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond.com. through the publication of the notice and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. 8858. PROBATE PROCEEDING. 2991. 32989. Bulacan. GUARDIAN. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18. Lucia Milagros Barretto Datu. Pampanga. As a consequence. 6277. relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery. Bulacan. instead of an independent action the effect of which. valued at more than P200. Hagonoy. 6500. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. the properties received by his deceased wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto. would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. 31046. ID. 6501. ID. 27285.. The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:jgc:chanrobles. — The only instance in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. 1939. was reserved for his widow. located in the barrio of San Roque. ID. the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglamentary period. — An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian. ID. NATURE OF. and Bulacan. 8. SUIT BASED ON FRAUD SHOULD BE BROUGHT WITHIN 4 YEARS FROM ITS DISCOVERY. if successful. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 57403 and 12507/T-337. covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. consisting of lots in Manila. consisting of real properties in Manila. guardian of said minors. A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. in the City of Manila.
which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto. who was then a minor. Upon her death. all the properties received by her from Bibiano’s estate. and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library The Court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one. and from the latter’s children and successors. Hence. but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership. However. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee. 1948. not only of the project of partition but of the decision of the court based thereon as well. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court. both surnamed Barretto. the later will was allowed and the first rejected. which affirmed the same. in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. 1 Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto’s last will and testament together with defendant Milagros. And it concluded that.Everything went well since then. Salud Barretto. in the second. has been included. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto. Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto. Hence.third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code. she instituted Salud and Milagros. she was entitled to recover from Salud. for being a spurious heir. plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto. Milagros Barretto. it was discovered that she had executed two wills.com. as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo. the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto’s counterclaim. in the first of which. not only of the fishpond under litigation. of such free part. and. this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant. as her heirs. Hence.’" Finding for the defendant (now appellee). shall be null and void.ph "A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow. Maria Gerardo died on March 5. it denied defendant’s prayer for damages. as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto. she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants). thereby directly attacking the validity. the lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. this action for the recovery of one-half portion thereof. as stated at the beginning of this opinion. at least. the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one. hence. without being so. Thus. his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent.
. the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo.
643. its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem. voluntary or intestate ones). That case is authority for the proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud. or total omission. of a forced heir. Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. or descendants. But. 2028). even without it. the defendant-appellee’s argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. Rules of 1940. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children. argued for the appellee that since the court’s distribution of the estate of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow. Saminiada v. since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889. but of heirs (without distinction between forced. and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament. Revised Rules of Court). so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled. and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs. that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator’s former marriage. 92 Phil. based on a compromise. Saminiada v. and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs. where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise agreement. a proceeding. is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate that the court may accept or reject. Mata. While the share (1/2) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros. This view is erroneous. the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto. Hence. invoked by appellee. against the provisions whereof no
. Section 750. Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. and must stand or fall with it. was consummated" (cas. 629. 63 Phil. as its own name implies. 322. however. unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. in fact. Reyes. since there was here no preterition. Rule 90. Akutin. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. independently of a project of partition which. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament. Rule 91. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. Mata does not apply. and the same has become final. it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Comia v. upon petition filed in due time. Article 1809. is not at all applicable. 426. Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto). the distribution could stand.and was not null and void under said article. the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. 72 Phil. but once it had become final. but actually consummated. the decree of distribution can have no greater validity than that of the basic partition. however. At any rate. the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal. Moreover. being in the nature of a judgment by consent. In the case before us. nor were any findings of fact or law made. Art. for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. is invoked in support of the proposition. long before the decree was attacked. since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto. Act 190. It is. Civil Code of the Philippines. 436). once final. that vests title in the distributees. was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court’s decree of distribution. For this reason. at p. while untrue. It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate. cit. Neri v. and it is that judicial decree of distribution. And while a compromise over civil status is prohibited.
ph "If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene. in force in 1939.) The mere statement in the project of partition that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court. it was the court’s duty to do so. ." (Italics supplied) That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Such estate. In fact. 157). Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. through the publication of the notice prescribed by Section 630 C. Barretto Datu. so far as such will may operate upon it.’ (See also in re Estate of Johnson. these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings. which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto. Ortuzar. shall be disposed of according to such will. 895. and such letters testamentary or of administration.. 89 Phil. consequently. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceedings may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 640. Estate.ph ". still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings. Passing upon a like issue. therefore. pp. or letters of administration with the will annexed. instead of an independent action the effect of which."cralaw virtua1aw library It is well to observe. 45 Phil. and the residue. section 640. 94 Phil. the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period. that:jgc:chanrobles.. 39 Phil. 156. Paredes. Even then. apparent on the record of the testate proceedings. 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested. no ground for the contention that the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.objection had been made. As this court has held in Manolo v. for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Sec. "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc. if any. and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them. had not yet been terminated and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian. would be. Act 190. 3 and 5. shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands.com. Reports. the court shall grant letters testamentary. Rule 97. Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the project of partition. does not mean that the guardian had not yet been appointed. and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. therefore. 156. can not escape the
. as in the instant case. — When a will is thus allowed. shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.) ’A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres. after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration. as this Court expressly declared in Reyes v. and. How Administered. not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well.) There is no reason why. no irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition.com. if successful. 741 and 742:jgc:chanrobles. The claim is not true.C. (Secs. by analogy. It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition."cralaw virtua1aw library So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she. 47 Phil. There is. this Court ruled in Ramos v. 938. Appeal. pp. at this juncture.’ (Santos v.P. 446 (Am’d. Rules of Court. . Rec. it meant that the guardianship proceedings.
27). can not bind his wards. knew that she was not Bibiano’s child. Maria Gerardo. In the second place. she became of age five years later. her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father’s estate and the four-year period of limitation started to run. who are the real parties in interest. granting that there was such fraud. can be held liable therefor. Castro. in 1944. we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto. as prayed for in the complaint. Act 190). being an act of disposition. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants’ predecessor. the minor children of Salud. which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel. and for the accounting of the fruits thereof. p. the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellee’s rights and entitles her to relief. 142). Let the records be returned to the court of origin. and neither Salud nor her minor children. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumerated in said decision. the same can not bind the wards.
. Plan Psu-4709). Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child. who was solely responsible. covered by TCT No. the action was already barred when in August 31. and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. In order to evade the statute of limitations. Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife. and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto’s estate. the trial court made no mention of such promise in the decision under appeal. In fact. is not void for being contrary to either articles 1081 or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889. Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24). There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise. 49629. It follows that the plaintiffs’ action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due course. her action still became extinct in 1950. 136. Wherefore. in its Civil Case No. therefore. On that year. with instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. Salud. duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939. appellants herein. and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian. conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee’s Brief. No costs. Salud Lim Boco Barretto.jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father’s estate. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made. being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos v. to expire in 1948 (Section 43. it was the widow. and not of administration. In resume. 4. In the first place. relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its discovery. Clearly. so that if fraud was committed. 55 Phil. (2) that Milagros Barretto’s action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations. In fact.
died leaving a will executed on March 5. a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines. In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. is not in any way related to me. after deducting the legacies.R.
. and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100. named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia. U. 1966. saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons. from all information I have now resides in Egpit. . No. who had been judicially declared as such after his death. Bernard Daney). AZNAR v. or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitimate of Helen Garcia. Christensen. No. 1964. . I give. which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees. the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the executor. is exhausted. deceased. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28. that I have but ONE (1) child. and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan). MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN Edward E. which said court found to be valid under the law of California. L-11484) In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased’s estate. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled. the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3. ADOLFO C. 1951. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. now married to Eduardo Garcia. the following clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case: "3. and this Court.] IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.S. L-16749) On October 29. nor has she been at any time adopted by me.R. June 30. Christensen contains. Philippines. "7.00). who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago. the trial court approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the will. the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank. reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law. wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. Digos. and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN. The declaration was appealed to this Court.[G. and who. The will of Edward E. this time by Lucy Duncan. and was affirmed in its decision of February 14. on January 31. on the sole question of whether the estate. I declare . California. among others. and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as provided by said law (G. Philippine Currency. 1954.A. "4. and no descendants except my above-named daughter.600). 665 Rodger Young Village. and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate. devise. about eighteen years of age and who. 1964. L-24365.R. 1958 (G. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants. The case is once more before us on appeal. Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon. Los Angeles. CHRISTENSEN. who is now residing at No. notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen. equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. Davao. No. Helen Garcia appealed form the order of approval. 1963. should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares. dated June 30.
remainder. Bakersfield. remainder and residue of my property with the same force and effect as if I had originally so given. Bernard Daney now residing. that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia. at No. Mexico.A. that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue. JOSEPH C. remainder and residue of my property. U. which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. during her lifetime. The preterition or omission of one. of Los Angeles. Barbara Borton Philips. then and in that event. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause. one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister. which reads: "ART. Los Angeles. and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate. or to the heirs of any of them who may die before my own decease.. Carol F. 2124. provided further. resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code. Provided. devised and bequeathed it to her.A. of whatsoever kind or character. California. then. but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime.. now residing at No. under both Articles 906 and 918. and one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother. some.S."cralaw virtua1aw library Thus. devise and bequeath. which provides:j "ART. California.. the share of my estate devised to her herein I give. namely: Mrs. but left to her a legacy nevertheless. 918. and. that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at anytime prior to her decease having living issue. share and share alike. I give. Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code. of Mexico City.S. of Manhattan Beach. either by not naming him at all or. CARRIE LOUISE C. Elizabeth Borton de Treviño.A. the share of any of the three above named who may predecease me.. and residue of my property and estate. and wheresoever situated. appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. and Article 906 of Article 815. shall annul the institution of heir." Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia. and appellee now maintains. share and share alike. BORTON."12. or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line. but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Mrs. although less than the amount of her legitime. Twentieth Street. California. California. or which is not one of those set forth in this Code. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will. the life interest herein given shall terminate.S. is not proved. of Bakersfield. however. or for a cause the truth of which. further. U. I hereby give. while mentioning
. of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever. she was in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918." library The trial court ruled. CHRISTENSEN. then. all the income from the rest."caw virtua1aw library On the other hand. U. according to appellant. 665 Rodger Young Village. Borton die before my own decease. that should my sister Mrs. Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime. California. devise and bequeath all the rest.S. personal and/or mixed. and in that event. shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited.A. and bequeath to my daughter. and provided. if contradicted.S. and in that event. 854. Carol Louise C. devise. whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. and Joseph Raymond Christensen. U. a compulsory heir in the direct line. and if so terminated. as aforesaid. unto my well-beloved daughter. Ruggaver. but is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code. real. then I give. devise and bequeath to her children. U. the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest. to go in equal parts to the descendants of the deceased.A..
respectively. 74 Phil.00. son. This substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate. be granted to him in his capacity as heir.00 The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. Civil Code). Et." later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. It was held that Article 815 applied.. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan. that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851. That decision is not here applicable.him as father.600. a titulo de heredero? In other words. The contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will cannot be sustained. and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by h is first marriage. 774. Without deciding this point. according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely. Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January 16. nor assigning to him some part of the properties. One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. 777. we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. (6 Manresa. May 25. Akutin. should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased Edward E. but only that the legitimate be completed. 1932." as by legacy. Vol. for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime. particularly that which says that it can
. 1895. is cited by appellees in support of their theory of preterition. by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly. because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage. pp.) The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wished of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. in which event she would inherit in full ownership. at least.00 While the classical view. 2. unless prior to her decease she should have living issue." In the case at bar the testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia. gave an affirmative answer to the question. some of them. 441. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her status as such is denied — but is given a legacy of P3. The decision of this Court in Neri. since it is not one of the issues raised before us.600. 1917.0 — p. and limited her share to a legacy of P3. v. Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 937). but left her a legacy of P3. otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. 436) and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI. he left nothing to them or. and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. 438. who alone was expressly recognized by him. that is. 185. etc. Although no reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositorappellant. Al. One point deserves to be here mentioned.600. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. In each one of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime. and April 23. but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter. she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. pursuant to the Roman law. The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title.
Costs against appellees in this instance. and the case is remanded with instructions to partition as submitted by the executor-appellee. WHEREFORE. 864 Civil Code).never burden the legitime (Art. is hereby set aside. which means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple. and the case is remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this decision. approving the project of partition as submitted by the executor. the order of the trial court dated October 29. 1964. is hereby set aside.
. in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. by giving the oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime. after deduction all debts and charges. which shall not include those imposed in the will of the decedent.appellee. equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate. that is.
. No. ID.. 5. ID. some of them. EFFECT OF PRETERITION. of annulling the institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total intestacy. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman nor this court has ever said so. then the provisions of articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution. ID. it must be observed
.R.[G. with total preterition of B. ID. and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage. INSTITUTION OF HEIRS DISTINGUISHED FROM LEGACIES AND BETTERMENTS. v.. — According to the findings of fact in this case. SYLLABUS 1. — The theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and. But article 851 applies only in cases of unfounded disinheritance. With reference to article 814. LEGACIES AND BETTERMENTS SHOULD BE RESPECTED IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE NOT INOFFICIOUS OR EXCESSIVE. ID. ID. In the instant case. and a general from a special provision. accordingly. and in his will he leaves all his property to A. ID. and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict legitime? If the court does the first. 47799. Held: That this is a case of preterition governed by article 814 of the Civil Code. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. Article 817 is merely a general rule inapplicable to specific cases provided by law. The effect. no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will. A and B. 1943.. there are in the will provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons some specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras.. if the second. according to article 814. such testamentary provisions shall be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or excessive. 3. therefore. instead of construing. which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case. it applies articles 851 or 817. 2. And the remaining provisions contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by article 817.. ID. — The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments.. ] Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN. 817. will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. Upon these facts. ID. Respondents.. shall the court annul entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a total intestacy. If. he left nothing to them or. This. May 21. if adopted. one-third of free disposal and one-third of betterments. the whole property of the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. or shall it merely refuse the bequest left to A. 4.. giving him two-thirds. this court would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code. at least. that is. it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. AND 851 OF THE CIVIL CODE. the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage. it applies article 814. — The annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the whole will.. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly... and all are agreed that the present case is not one of disinheritance but of preterition. RESPECTIVE SCOPE OF ARTICLES 814. ID. ELEUTERIO NERI ET AL. Petitioners. ID. aside from the institution of heirs. which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open. plus one-half of the other third as strict legitime. This theory. such as that of preterition or disinheritance. — The following example will make the question clearer: The testator has two legitimate sons. ID. however.
. ID. (Act No. its special purpose is to establish a specific rule concerning a specific testamentary provision.. Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts and when there are two acts upon the same subject. In such instance.. — It is clear. the institution of heirs in a case of preterition.) 8. The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is where legacies are made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828). such meaning of its words and phrases as has been intended by the framers thereof shall be adopted. ID. are entitled to inherit in accordance with the law of intestate succession. therefore. This conclusion is erroneous. ID.. secs. It should be borne in mind.. and from all these the conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code regarding the total nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete. ID.. It confuses form with substance. One of these objects cannot be made to merge in the other without mutilating the whole article with all its multifarious connections with a great number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the matter of succession. and in that wise the special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined... If thus construed it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. ID. And this is contrary to the most elementary rule of statutory construction. including the omitted ones. which is made the main and specific subject of article 814.. ID. 296 U. In construing several provisions of a particular statute. effect should be given to both if possible (Posadas v. It must be observed. if. ID.. should his acceptance be pure and simple. the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or betterments. the testamentary disposition containing the institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety and all the forced heirs. — As regards testamentary dispositions in general. it may also
. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. "HEREDERO" UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND "HEIR" UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. ID. ID. National City Bank. its specific purpose completely defeated. ID. namely.. and that the "heir" under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code. that article 814 refers to two different things which are the two different objects of its two different provisions. but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the subject matter of article 814 of the Civil Code. and when general and particular provisions are inconsistent. The first is also different from a betterment which should be made expressly as such (article 828). that although article 814 contains two different provisions. ID. 190. the general rule is that all "testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious or excessive" (article 817). ID.. the latter shall prevail over the former. in construing article 814. 497). 287 and 288. Its other provision regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions (articles 815 and 817) and signifies merely that it also applies in cases of preterition. is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure. otherwise it is in force. ID. 7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. 6.. S. ID.that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. ID. the special object of said article would be destroyed.. But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a testamentary disposition containing an institution of heirs in a case of preterition. ID.. ID. that in construing and applying a provision of the Civil Code. ID. in this connection.. — The word "heir" as used in article 814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure. ID.. Again. 9. according to article 814. It is thus evident that. such construction shall be adopted as will give effect to all. — It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code. further. then it shall be deemed repealed..
the trial Court said that "it does not appear clear. What is important and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name nor the moment of its effectiveness under the Code of Civil Procedure. Rosario and Celerina. the trial Court found: "It is contended."cralaw virtua1aw library This is in connection with the property. furthermore. with preterition of the children by his first marriage. The findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals are contrary to respondents’ first contention. but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title. the herein petitioners. Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs. As to money advances. personal." It is true that Eleuterio appears to have received. This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage. the herein respondents. It appears that Nemesio Chaves is indebted in the amount of P1. But clause 8 of the will is invoked wherein the testator made the statement that the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they had borrowed from him which he condoned in the will. This Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy. Agapita. Since. its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. even assuming that there has been a preterition. and. The children of the first marriage are Eleuterio. 17. Agripino. Getulia (who died a little less than eight years before the death of her father Agripino Neri. clear that Eleuterio has received his share out of the properties left by his father. the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them. but the question of whether there has been a donation or not is apparently left for decision in an independent action. and 18."cralaw virtua1aw library Concerning Getulia who died about eight years before the death of her father Agripino Neri. real or in cash. that Celerina and Rosario received their shares in the estate left by their father Agripino Neri Chaves.be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code. in the amount of P500 as appears in Exhibits 14 and 15. real or personal."cralaw virtua1aw library From these findings of the trial Court it is clear that Agapita. therefore. With respect to Agripino and Agapita. were not a part of the estate of the latter. the trial court said that "it is not.000. and to that effect Ignacia Akutin has been appointed special administratrix for the purpose of instituting such action. the parcels of land which they have occupied. 4. left by the deceased. Rosario and the children of Getulia had received from the testator no property whatsoever. however. 1. therefore. parcel of land No. as a donation from his father. and (2) that. As to Eleuterio. 19-A and 19-B. Getulia. leaving seven children). A motion for reconsideration has been filed by the respondents on the ground (1) that there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received their shares in the property left by the testator. this is an
. according to the trial Court. that the children of Agripino Neri Chaves in his first marriage received money from their father. Celerina in the amount of P120 as appears in Exhibits 19. in the amount of P155 as appears in Exhibits 16. Agripino. therefore. "are a part of public land which had been occupied by Agripino Neri Chaves."cralaw virtua1aw library And with respect to Rosario and Celerina. the trial Court found that "neither Getulia nor her heirs received any share of the properties.
"that this parcel containing 182. the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage. the said land is still claimed to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the second marriage. thereby acquiring title and interest therein by virtue of occupation and not through inheritance. it is clear that the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion thereof has been given to the children of the first marriage. This is. respondents seem to agree that article 814 of the Civil Code is the law applicable but. "It is stated by the court and practically admitted by the appellants that a child of the first marriage named Getulia. for as shown on Tax Declaration No." It is true that in the decision of the Court of Appeals there is also the following paragraph: "As regards that large parcel of land adjoining parcel No.issue of fact tried by the Court of First Instance.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of the first marriage. which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open."cralaw virtua1aw library This paragraph is but a corroboration of the finding made by the Court of Appeals that no property has ever been advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage. 814. "The preterition of the widower or widow does not annul the institution. some of them. 1 was alleged by the children of the second marriage to have been advanced by the testator to the children by his first marriage. omitted shall retain all
." says that Court. which are as follows: "Since all the parcels that corresponded to Agripino Neri y Chaves are now in the administrator’s possession. Upon the second question propounded in the motion for reconsideration. And the Court of Appeals added that "apparently. The preterition of one or of all of the forced heirs in the direct line. we can rely only upon the findings of fact made by the latter Court.6373 hectares is now assessed in the names of some of the children of the first marriage. he left nothing to them or. whether living at the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. shall annul the institution of heirs. Exhibit 11-g. 9395. the owners of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos. Exhibit 11-g. for otherwise the children by the second marriage would not lay a claim on it. It is not true that this parcel containing 182. 9395. did not receive any share of the property of her father. as appears in the inventory filed in court. These three articles read: "ART. the children of both marriages. accordingly. at least. Agripino Neri y Chaves abandoned the said land and that later on some of the children of the first marriage possessed it. and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage. but the legacies and betterments shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious. 2. "It is not true. but the person. for as shown on Tax Declaration No. but the Court of Appeals belied this claim." which is another way of stating that the property could not have been advanced by the testator to the children by the first marriage. the said land is still claimed to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the second marriage. or her heirs after her death. they confuse article 814 with articles 817 and 851 and other articles of the Civil Code." that is. it is contended that after the court had denied the registration thereof. 1. and we are reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals upon a question of law regarding that issue. a case of preterition governed by article 814 of the Civil Code. the owners of the property are Agapita Neri de Chaves y Hermanos. Apparently. The large parcel of land adjoining parcel No. We conclude. in their discussion as to the effect of preterition. therefore. that according to the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals.
such as that of preterition or disinheritance." He then proceeds to comment upon the wisdom of the distinction made by law. solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios. "Preteridos. and all are agreed that the present case is not one of disinheritance but of preterition. shall we annul entirely the institution of heir in favor of A and declare a total intestacy. adquieren derecho a todo. segun el caso. But article 851 applies only in cases of unfounded disinheritance. or for a cause the truth of which. A and B. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman nor this Court has ever said so."cralaw virtua1aw library The following example will make the question clearer: The testator has two legitimate sons. If. the institution of heirs is null in toto whereas in case of disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the legitime of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. and 837 of this Code. no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will. however. 835. These comments should be read with care if we are to avoid misunderstanding. then the arguments in support of the distinction. in so far as the institution affects the legitime of the disinherited heirs. giving two views thereon. 817. or shall we merely refuse the bequest left to A. the reason being that article 814. but the legacies. that is. giving him two-thirds. whereas in case of disinheritance (article 851). the property bequeathed by universal title to the instituted heirs should not be merely reduced according to article 817. such testamentary provisions shall be effective and the legacies and mejoras shall be respected in so far as they are not inofficious or excessive. betterments. one third of free disposal and one-third of betterments. and lastly a possible defense against said arguments. according to article 814. with total preterition of B. of annulling the institution of heirs will be necessarily the opening of a total intestacy. Manresa. starts expounding the meaning of the law with an illustration. 851. and awarding B only the remaining one-half of the strict legitime? If we do the first. The effect. plus one-half of the other third as strict legitime. He says that in case of preterition (article 814). intestate succession should be opened in connection therewith under article 814. we apply article 814. but instead. for instance. and in his will he leaves all his property to A.the rights granted to him by articles 834. the nullity is partial. shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. 836. one in favor of article 814 and another evasive. And after stating that the Spanish jurisprudence has not as yet decided squarely the question. rige con preferencia al 817. or which is not one of those stated in the four following articles. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause. He first lays the view contrary to the distinction made by law. Testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious or excessive. is not shown. "como especial en el caso que le motiva. that is. Upon these facts. aside from the institution of heirs. if the second. He further makes it clear that in cases of preterition. the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always carry with it the ineffectiveness of the whole will. therefore. the whole property of the deceased having been left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. Article 817 is merely a general rule inapplicable to specific cases provided by law." "ART. if contested. Of course. In the instant case. he concludes that the construction which may rightly be given to article 814 is that in case of preterition. we apply articles 851 or 817."cralaw virtua1aw library "ART. the institution shall become operative. and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid in so far as they are not prejudicial to said legitime.
. desheredados. with an allusion to two resolutions of the Spanish Administrative Direction. the nullity of the institution of heirs is total. "If the forced heirs omitted die before the testator. there are in the will provisions leaving to the heirs so instituted or to other persons some specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras.
And this is contrary to the most elementary rule of statutory construction.But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by article 817. It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code. With reference to article 814. that although article 814 contains two different provisions. secs. the testamentary disposition containing the institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety and all the forced heirs. which is made the main and specific subject of article 814. further. are entitled to inherit in accordance with the law of intestate succession. its special purpose is to establish a specific rule concerning a specific testamentary provision. But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. if. and a general from a special provision. is not synonymous with the term "heir" under
. Thus. This theory. it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code. namely. including the omitted ones. which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. according to article 814. 190. the general rule is that all "testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitime of the forced heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same in so far as they are inofficious or excessive" (article 817). the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or betterments. But this general rule does not apply to the specific instance of a testamentary disposition containing an institution of heirs in a case of preterition. in construing article 814. therefore. (Act No. its specific purpose completely defeated. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. the special object of said article would be destroyed. accordingly. It is thus evident that. instead of construing. In such instance. The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is where legacies are made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828). the latter shall prevail over the former. It is clear. will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. The first is also different from a betterment which should be made expressly as such (article 828). The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments. would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. the institution of heirs in a case of preterition. then the provisions of articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution. In construing several provisions of a particular statute. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. if adopted. such construction shall be adopted as will give effect to all. It should be borne in mind. that article 814 refers to two different things which are the two different objects of its two different provisions. Its other provision regarding the validity of legacies and betterments if not inofficious is a mere reiteration of the general rule contained in other provisions (articles 815 and 817) and signifies merely that it also applies in cases of preterition.) The question herein propounded has been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in a case wherein a bequest by universal title was made with preterition of heirs and the theory was advanced that the instituted heirs should be treated as legatarios. it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. One of these objects cannot be made to merge in the other without mutilating the whole article with all its multifarious connections with a great number of provisions spread throughout the Civil Code on the matter of succession. 287 and 288. As regards testamentary dispositions in general. and in that wise the special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. and when general and particular provisions are inconsistent.
"cralaw virtua1aw library It is these provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that have affected substantially articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. that those two articles are in force. section 1 of which reads as follows: "Sections seven hundred and fifty-five. but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title. but this in no wise can prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the subject-matter of article 814 of the Civil Code. and seven hundred and sixty of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety. It confuses form with substance. and no provision is therein made for him. seven hundred and fifty-seven."cralaw virtua1aw library "SEC. and it appears that such omission was made by mistake. Share of child or issue of child omitted from will. that in construing and applying a provision of the Civil Code.the Code of Civil Procedure.
. or for issue of a deceased child. 2141. such child shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate. Share of child born after making will. There can be no possible doubt. such meaning of its words and phrases as has been intended by the framers thereof shall be adopted.. but they have been expressly repealed by Act No. It must be observed.six. or the issue of such child. or accident. Repeals by implication are not favored by the courts and when there are two acts upon the same subject. otherwise it is in force. therefore. unless it is apparent from the will that it was the intention of the testator that no provision should be made for such child. there were in the Code of Civil Procedure sections Nos. effect should be given to both if possible (Posadas v. The word "heir" as used in article 814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 755 and 756 which read: "SEC. entitled ’An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands are hereby repealed and such provisions of the Civil Code as may have been amended or repealed by said sections are hereby restored to full force and effect. such child. What is important and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name nor the moment of its effectiveness under the Code of Civil Procedure. and from all these the conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code regarding the total nullity of the institution of heirs has become obsolete. its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. to be assigned to him as in the case of intestate estates. seven hundred and fifty. and that the "heir" under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code. and the share of such child shall be assigned to him as in cases of intestate estates. If thus construed it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. in this connection." (Italics ours. Furthermore. seven hundred and fifty-eight.) Among the provisions of the Civil Code which are thus expressly restored to full force are undoubtedly articles 814 and 851. it may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code. This conclusion is erroneous. Again. — When a child of a testator is born after the making of a will. 755. 756. should his acceptance be pure and simple. Article 1080 of the Civil Code that is also invoked deserves no consideration except for the observation that it has no relevancy in the instant case. 497). then it shall be deemed repealed. — When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children. shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate. Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs. 296 U. National City Bank.
332). Without reconsidering the correctness of the ruling laid down in these two cases. 1782). and to that effect is the decision of this Court sought to be reconsidered. This is also in consonance with the presumptive intention of the testator. the total nullity of the testamentary disposition would have the effect. Gaz. the testator would at least give his friend the portion of free disposal. the thought of the testator that the children by his first marriage should not receive less than the children by his second marriage. It was. Escuin (11 Phil. It may fairly be presumed that. not of depriving totally the instituted heir of his share in the inheritance. And this is contrary to the manifest intention of the testator. In the second case. the effect would be a total deprivation of the friend of his share in the inheritance. In the Escuin case. Motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. We have never lost sight of the ruling laid down in that case which has been reiterated in Eleazar v. There is certainly a difference between a case of preterition in which the whole property is left to a mere friend and a case of preterition in which the whole property is left to one or some forced heirs.
. p. Preterition. we will note that the doctrine stands on facts which are different from the facts in the present case. under such circumstances... Eleazar (37 Off. therefore. generally speaking. the deceased left all his property to his natural father (not a forced heir) and his wife with total preterition of an acknowledged natural child. is due merely to mistake or inadvertence without which the testator may be presumed to treat alike all his children. and.Our attention is directed to the case of Escuin v. And specially is this true in the instant case where the testator omitted the children by his first marriage upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. in the Eleazar case the deceased left all his property to a friend with total preterition of his father and wife. If the testamentary disposition be annulled totally in the first case. but of placing him and the other forced heirs upon the basis of equality.
On the disposition of the testator’s property. Thus.R. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. Concepcion. 1985 (Rollo. 72706. (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. Branch XIII (Cebu City). Filipino. Cebu City. widower. 108-109) are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library On May 29. 29). it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs. October 27. Flores. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. p. lands. No. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in AC-G. ACAIN v. namely: Anita. 1985 (Rollo. Fernandez. all the money properties. 1987. the will provided: "THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No. IAC. 591-A-CEB. The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: "WHEREFORE. 05744 promulgated on August 30. and the appointment of a certain Atty. p.] CONSTANTINO C. 591-A-CEB and its Resolution issued on October 23.chanrobles law library After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25. with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No.[G. docketed as Special Proceedings No. Said motion was denied by the trial judge. lands and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN. 72) denying respondents’ (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. de Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings. The will contained provisions on burial rites." library The antecedents of the case. Quirina. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17. p. (Rollo." Obviously. p. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents’ petition and ordered the trial court to
. 591-A-CEB (Rollo. Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. 591-ACEB. VIRGINIA A. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo. p. pp. the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region. Constantino. respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11. 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII. now Court of Appeals. Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita. Antonio and Jose all surnamed Acain. Concepcion. of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street. 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo. house. 1985. After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court. In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me.R. payment of debts. a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary. 31) submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter’s widow Rosa Diongson Vda. SP No. is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. Ignacio G. houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me to his children. Laura. on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio. 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A.
(Art. (E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code that suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar. Respondents’ Memorandum was filed on September 22. 1985 (Rollo. What the testator says will be the law. Under Article 39 of P. 591-ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line.D. though mentioned. The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been preterited. The preterition or omission of one. It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual. Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator." and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line. Fernandez." library Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein. p. but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs. Insofar as the widow is concerned. or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line. 1986 (Rollo. (D) DICAT TESTATOR ET ERIT LEX. 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo. Civil Code) However. Respondents’ Comment was filed on June 6. Proc. 854. although she is a compulsory heir. (F) As an instituted heir. No. Court of Appeals. the institution shall be effectual. and (G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. be admitted to probate. His motion for reconsideration having been denied. they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. 1986. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator. explicitly expressed in his will. Maninang v. This is what matters and should be inviolable. 17 SCRA 450 [1966]. the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29. Stated otherwise. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 854. pp.R.dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. No. for she is not in the direct line. or. p. 153). On August 11. shall annul the institution of heir. p. some. Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for Petitioner. 603. (B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate. there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance. 6). petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent Court’s decision on December 18. without prejudice to the right of representation. (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore. 8-9). whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for the Petitioner. Nuguid. adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in
. 1986. (A) The petition filed in AC-G. 157). No. known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. 591-A-CEB.
D. and Bautista v. neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. 110 SCRA 465 [1981]. Court of Appeals. Maninang v. 139 SCRA 206 [1985]). the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must. except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of judicial authority (People v. As stated by respondent Court. Court of Appeals. 125 SCRA 137 [1983]). Special Proceedings No. as already stated above. the general rule is that the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will. as cited in Nuguid v. 591-CEB is for the probate of a will. or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Maninang v. supra. Villanueva. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). de Bacang v. 117 SCRA 573 [1982]. Nuguid).amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. Petitioner is not the appointed executor. however. de Caldito v. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected. Sarmiento.the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Sumilang v. Leonidas. Akutin. or in the will. supra. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. No legacies or devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. Comendador Construction Corporation v. the due execution thereof. proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. 129 SCRA 522 [1984]. the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain. At the outset. supra. We now deal with another matter. Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Ramagosa. intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will . Ramagosa. Segundo. 128 SCRA 308 [1984]. Co Chuan Seng v. Nuguid. Carefully worded and in clear terms. and Nepomuceno v. 17 SCRA 449 [1966]. Nuguid. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be. 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado. Hence. 114 SCRA [19821). In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
. speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (D. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed. defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. mejora o donacion" (Manresa. Civil Code). Cayetano v. 74 Phil. Court of Appeals. petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal. Court of Appeals. he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. Vda. Court of Appeals. 114 SCRA 478 [1982]. They are. necessarily. 21 SCRA 1369/1967). However. be respected.
" In Saguimsim v. Thus. plus added anxiety. supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. p. amounting to lack of jurisdiction. plus added futility. supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal. committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case. Result: waste of time. supra). In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. is not inflexible and absolute. (Vda. On the contrary. expense. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. the probate court should meet the issue. induced by practical considerations. Court of Appeals. and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo. the Court harkens to the rule
. The Court upheld the probate court’s order of dismissal. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15. Under exceptional circumstances. 591-CEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings. de Bacang v. 109). Court of Appeals. (2) he is merely a universal heir. effort. supra). p. Leonidas. effort. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. expense. Leonidas. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. Court of Appeals. The Court said: "We pause to reflect. It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21. 158).The rule. and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion. supra. the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Nuguid. this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable. supra. In Nuguid v. 1985 (Rollo. the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy. Nuguid. Nuguid v. supra). These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. this litigation will be protracted. in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will. 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo. p. however. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents. The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. And for aught that appears in the record. probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. nothing will be gained. 32). For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will. Proceedings No. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. In Cayetano v. It would have meant a waste of time. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. (Nepomuceno v. Nuguid v.
supra). SO ORDERED. a petition for certiorari may be entertained.
.that in the broader interests of justice. the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30. 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED. Court of Appeals. law library PREMISES CONSIDERED. (Maninang v. particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23.
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