Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/948/711/286424/
Timestamp: 2020-04-01 12:34:33
Document Index: 719503180

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7703', '§ 5596', '§ 2', '§ 1295', 'art:\n28', '§ 2412', '§ 2412', '§ 2000', 'art, 461', '§ 105', '§ 2412']

Hong-yee Chiu, Plaintiff-appellee, v. the United States, Defendant-appellant, 948 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Federal Circuit › 1991 › Hong-yee Chiu, Plaintiff-appellee, v. the United States, Defendant-appellant
Hong-yee Chiu, Plaintiff-appellee, v. the United States, Defendant-appellant, 948 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 948 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Oct. 29, 1991
The present appeal concerns an award of attorney fees incurred for litigation of a dispute over the elimination of Chiu's position by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) via Reduction-in-Force (RIF), which occurred in 1978. After losing in the Civil Service Commission proceedings, Chiu filed suit in the United States Court of Claims pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b) (1) (1978) (amended 1982). The Court of Claims remanded to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which had become the administrative review tribunal, for reconsideration in light of a newly obtained deposition, that of Chiu's supervisor, Dr. Jastrow, the NASA official responsible for proposing the RIF of Chiu's position. On remand, the MSPB reviewed Dr. Jastrow's conduct and ruled that the RIF did not accord with the relevant regulations in that Dr. Jastrow had been motivated to eliminate Chiu personally because of Dr. Jastrow's dissatisfaction with Chiu's work rather than because of a need to eliminate the position he occupied. Accordingly, the MSPB directed NASA to reinstate Chiu with full back pay and benefits, which was done. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Chiu then filed an application with the Claims Court1 for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1982) (BPA), and the EAJA, and the issue of attorney fees has been the sole focus of this litigation since 1982. The Claims Court initially denied Chiu's application for attorney fees. See Chiu v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 18 (1984) (Yannello, J.). The Claims Court concluded that the BPA did not support an award of attorney fees and that an award of attorney fees under the EAJA was not warranted because the position of the government in the litigation before the court was "substantially justified." Id. at 23-24. Chiu appealed to this court which affirmed on the basis of the opinion of the Claims Court. Chiu v. United States, 770 F.2d 180 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). Chiu followed with a petition for rehearing in banc. On the day Chiu's petition was denied in banc consideration, President Reagan signed into law an amendment to the EAJA which provided that the "position of the United States" included the "action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based" as well as the position taken by the United States in the litigation. See Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c) (2) (B), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (1985). As a result of this amendment and this court's subsequent decision in Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (in banc), which ruled that the new standard applied to all cases pending on the date of the enactment and placed the burden on the government to justify its position, this court vacated its judgment denying Chiu's attorney fee application and remanded the case for reconsideration. See Chiu v. United States, 887 F.2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Table).
The government appeals the judgment both as to entitlement and quantum. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (3) (1988).
A trial court's decision to award attorney fees under the EAJA, and its determination of the amount of such an award, are discretionary. On appeal, decisions concerning attorney fees are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-63, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2545-49, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988). Thus, only if the trial court erred in interpreting the law or exercised its judgment on clearly erroneous findings of material fact, or its decision represents an irrational judgment in weighing the relevant factors can its decision be overturned. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1570-72, 6 USPQ2d 1010, 1015-16 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Bissell, J., additional views); Oliveira v. United States, 827 F.2d 735, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J., 747, 762-63 (1982). Upon review of the Claims Court's entitlement and quantum determinations in the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on entitlement, but that the Claims Court's calculation of the inflation factor is contrary to law.
The EAJA provides a specific waiver of sovereign immunity to enable persons who prevail in certain suits brought against the government to an award of attorney fees incurred in challenging the government's action in court. Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S. Ct. 97, 78 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1983). Section 2412(d) (1) provides, in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A). Absent this or some other specific statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, attorney fees may not be recovered in suits against the United States.2 Escobar v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 935 F.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1991); Spencer v. National Labor Relations Bd., 712 F.2d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908, 80 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1984). There is no dispute in this case as to Chiu's status as a "prevailing party." Thus, Chiu is entitled to an award of attorney fees unless the court finds "special circumstances" which make an award unjust or that the government's position is "substantially justified." Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1466. The government pressed arguments on both "special circumstances" and "substantial justification" to the Claims Court but prevailed on neither. On appeal, the government has dropped its "special circumstances" argument and urges only that we rule that the Claims Court abused its discretion in finding the position of the government not "substantially justified." We cannot hold, however, that the Claims Court's determination of no substantial justification was an abuse of discretion.
What meaning to ascribe to the statutory language that the "position of the United States" must be "substantially justified" is not readily apparent. As indicated previously, in 1985 the EAJA was amended to clarify the meaning of "position of the United States." Subparagraph (1) (B) of section 2412(d) was revised to read:
Similarly, subparagraph (2) (D) was added to reflect that
Prior to this amendment, this court had interpreted the "position of the United States" for purposes of evaluating whether a claimant was entitled to attorney fees to be limited to the position the government took during the litigation phase of the challenged government action. See Olsen v. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 35 F.2d 558, 561 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1982). The 1985 amendment clarified that, when assessing whether to award attorney fees incurred by a party who has successfully challenged a governmental action in a particular court, the entirety of the conduct of the government is to be viewed, including the action or inaction by the agency prior to litigation.
Until clarified by the Supreme Court, appellate courts were similarly split as to the meaning of the phrase "substantially justified." Compare Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1467-68 (position must be "clearly reasonable") and Spencer, 712 F.2d at 558 (position must be slightly more than reasonable) with Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983) (position must have reasonableness in law and fact) and Ramos v. Haig, 716 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1983) (position must be reasonable). However, the Supreme Court in Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550, mandated:
The phrase "action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based" does not include unauthorized acts of employees which would not be subject to judicial review. That is not, however, the case here respecting Jastrow's action which was deemed the action of the agency in the ruling on the merits. No record evidence indicates that the NASA officials who implemented the RIF made a decision independently, that is, apart from Jastrow's recommendation. Judge Andewelt specifically found such evidence of independent action to be lacking. Chiu, 17 Cl.Ct. at 339. The government in its brief refers to the findings in the Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA) decision that the evidence before the NASA officials at the time they approved the RIF supported that action, the Civil Service Commission Board's declining to review that decision, and the Court of Claims' opinion remanding to the MSPB.5 However, all of the evidence relied upon by the FEAA in rejecting Chiu's initial appeal was predicated not on the NASA official's independent conclusions as to the propriety of the RIF; rather, the FEAA based its decision to uphold the RIF solely on Dr. Jastrow's stated reasons. The FEAA concluded, " [t]here is no question that appellant's position was abolished because Dr. Jastrow decided he could no longer afford to fund the position at the possible expense of other projects deemed by him to be of greater importance to the agency's mission." Appeal of Hong-Yee Chiu, Docket No. DC035190019 at 5 (FEAA 1978) (emphasis added). Only after the matter reached the Court of Claims were Dr. Jastrow's motivations to rid the agency of a specific nonproductive employee rather than to eliminate a position revealed.
In this regard, this case bears a striking resemblance to another recent case decided by this court, Exxon v. United States, 931 F.2d 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991), wherein this court held that a successor judge assigned to take over a case after remand from this court was not required by law of the case, RUSCC 52,6 or any other authority, to give any particular deference to a predecessor judge's findings of ultimate fact which were not examined in, relied on, or otherwise necessary to the decision in a prior appeal. In Exxon, Chief Judge Smith took over for former Chief Judge Kozinski after remand from this court. The case involved the allowability of a tax deduction on income tax of certain assets lost in Fidel Castro's takeover of Cuba. Whether Exxon qualified for the deduction turned entirely on whether Exxon's Cuban-based subsidiary became insolvent on June 30 or July 1, 1960. Chief Judge Kozinski had found that June 30 was the date of insolvency, and thus that Exxon was not entitled to the deduction. On appeal this court reversed, but did not address Chief Judge Kozinski's findings of fact as to the date of insolvency. On remand, Chief Judge Smith took over the case and decided first that the appeal which reversed Chief Judge Kozinski implicitly determined that the insolvency occurred on July 1 and thus concluded that he was bound by law of the case. The government appealed this decision, and this court reversed and remanded again because the prior appellate decision had not explicitly or implicitly addressed the question of Exxon's date of insolvency and thus the law of the case doctrine did not obtain. On this remand, Chief Judge Smith decided the question of the date of insolvency anew, and concluded that Chief Judge Kozinski's original findings as to the date of insolvency were based on a faulty analysis and that the date of insolvency was July 1. The government appealed again and argued that Chief Judge Smith was constrained to follow his predecessor's fact findings under either the law of the case or unless those findings were found to be clearly erroneous in accordance with RUSCC 52(a). We upheld Chief Judge Smith and in so doing explained the inapplicability of law of the case:
Jamesbury [Corp. v. Litton Industrial Products, Inc.], 839 F.2d [1544] at 1551, 5 USPQ2d [1779] at 1784 [Fed. Cir. 1988] (quoting Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1979)). Here, as Chief Judge Smith explicitly stated in his opinion, the amended finding of ultimate fact was based upon a mathematical analysis of bond data submitted by the parties, and did not rely upon the weighing of conflicting testimony or evaluation of the credibility of witnesses who appeared before Chief Judge Kozinski. Exxon [Corp. v. U.S. ], 19 Cl.Ct. at 761 [1990]. In this situation, Chief Judge Smith was as free to alter his predecessor's finding of ultimate fact as Chief Judge Kozinski himself would have been.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (A). The government's disagreement with the Claims Court's determination of the applicable hourly rate centers on the upward adjustment made to reflect increases in the cost of living during the litigation.
To adjust the base rate of $75 per hour for increases in the cost of living as provided by the EAJA, the court must first set a base date from which increases in the cost of living may be calculated. While the government once advanced the date of reenactment of the EAJA in 1985 as the base date in case after case, it now appears to have accepted that the original date of enactment of the statute, October 1, 1981, is the appropriate starting date. See Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548, 549 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507, 107 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1989); Ramon-Sepulveda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 863 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988); Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1336 (8th Cir. 1988); Trichilo v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 823 F.2d 702, 705-07 (2d Cir. 1987); Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Claims Court here correctly used that date for computation of the fee rate COLA, excluding a COLA for services rendered before that date. See Chiu, 18 Cl.Ct. at 570.
The next step for computing a COLA to the fee rate is establishing the end date or dates. The Claims Court used a single end date, namely the date judgment was entered granting the EAJA fee award, June 28, 1989. The government takes issue with use of that date, which is particularly significant here inasmuch as the attorney's services were in large part performed much earlier. The government's position is that any COLA after the date the attorney's services are rendered, i.e., post-performance, constitutes an award for delay in receipt of fee reimbursement. Per the government, such adjustment contravenes the no-interest rule reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S. Ct. 2957, 92 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1986). We agree. The EAJA does not authorize increases to the hourly rate in the nature of interest payments. Further, the no-interest rule obtains here to limit the COLA to the date on which legal services were performed and fees thereby incurred.
In Shaw, the Supreme Court invoked the no-interest rule to bar recovery of interest on an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Court set forth in Shaw two principles which are crucial to the disposition of this case. First, the Court soundly rejected any distinction between types of awards for purposes of the no-interest rule so long as the award compensated for the time value of money. Id. at 321-22, 106 S. Ct. at 2965. The second proposition is that no award in the nature of interest against the United States is permitted unless expressly and unambiguously authorized by statute. Id. at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2966. Here, the post-performance adjustment to the attorney fee rate constitutes payment for the time value of money and, thus, the no-interest rule bars the award unless expressly and unambiguously authorized in the EAJA. We are further convinced that the EAJA does not mandate such adjustments to the hourly fee rate.
In including the post-performance time period within the COLA to the EAJA fee rate, the Claims Court characterized this adjustment as one that offsets the decrease in the value of the $75 fee limitation due to inflation until the decision was rendered that fees are to be paid by the government. See Chiu, 18 Cl.Ct. at 571. We agree that adjustment to the EAJA fee rate for post-performance periods has this effect. This characterization, however, clearly implicates the no-interest rule. As the Supreme Court stated in Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 2965:
" [T]he character or nature of 'interest' cannot be changed by calling it 'damages,' 'loss,' 'earned increment,' 'just compensation,' 'discount,' 'offset,' or 'penalty,' or any other term, because it is still interest and the no-interest rule applies to it." United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 207 Ct. Cl. 369, 389, 518 F.2d 1309, 1322 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 [96 S. Ct. 1506, 47 L. Ed. 2d 761] (1976).
Id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2965 (emphasis added). In the usual fee relationship, a preperformance COLA implicates no delay factor in receipt of moneys. Prior to services being performed, there is no obligation to pay and no fee incurred, except possibly in unusual circumstances not present here. Thus, in the pre-performance period there is no delay in receipt of moneys for attorney fees; an adjustment in the ceiling price for inflation during that period does not compensate for any delay; and such an adjustment can not properly be characterized as interest. Therefore, the COLA provision in the EAJA need not overcome the no-interest rule in order to permit the fee cap to be raised with respect to legal services performed thereafter.
Thus, the Claims Court's analysis was flawed in discerning no difference in allowance of an adjustment for inflation whether pre- or post-performance. The latter situation implicates the no-interest rule, the former does not. See, e.g., Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Griffin & Dickson v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 1, 10 & n. 9 (1990) (Rader, J.); Cox Constr. Co. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 29, 37 (1989); Kunz Constr. Co. v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. 431, 439 (1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Due to the applicability of the no-interest rule, to determine whether post-performance time periods may be included in adjusting the EAJA fee rate, we must look for explicit authorization. As the Supreme Court explained in Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318, 106 S. Ct. at 2963:
In analyzing whether Congress has waived the immunity of the United States, we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign, see McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 [72 S. Ct. 17, 19, 96 L. Ed. 26] (1951), and not enlarge the waiver " 'beyond what the language requires.' " Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 [103 S. Ct. 3274, 3278, 77 L. Ed. 2d 938] (1983), quoting Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 [47 S. Ct. 289, 291, 71 L. Ed. 472] (1927). The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness upon these usual rules.
" [T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed." United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S., at 659 [67 S. Ct. 601, 604, 91 L. Ed. 577] [1947].
The Claims Court viewed the EAJA language of section 2412(d) (2) (A) which expressly permits the court to determine that "an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher [than $75 per hour] fee," as sufficient authorization for the court to include an adjustment for post-performance time periods "so long as the hourly rate allowed does not exceed 'prevailing market rates.' " See Chiu, 18 Cl.Ct. at 570-72. We do not agree that this language meets the exacting standard required to grant the Claims Court such discretion. It must be borne in mind that the statute before us is a fee shifting statute not a damage award statute. Further, the statute concerns an adjustment of a $75 cap on attorney fees set with respect to all fees, market rate or not, incurred in 1981. Clearly, the statute does not contemplate full recoupment. See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554. That is the point of the cap. It even more clearly does not contemplate recoupment of delay damages.
Were there any doubt on this interpretation, the language of the statute is at best ambiguous, and in accordance with the no-interest rule, awards in the nature of interest are not permitted except where the statutory mandate is unequivocal. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318, 106 S. Ct. at 2963; Doyle v. United States, 931 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that an adjustment to the attorney fee rate cap to compensate for the plaintiff's economic loss due to delay is not a "cost of living" adjustment to the fee cap within the meaning of section 2412(d) (2) (A) of the EAJA. Thus, Chiu's EAJA attorney fee rate COLA can include only pre-performance time periods.
Chiu cites a number of cases from the District of Columbia Circuit and one Third Circuit case in an effort to support the inclusion of post-performance time inflation. None of these cases persuade us to a different result. With respect to the cases from the District of Columbia Circuit, that circuit adheres to the view that COLA's to the EAJA fee rate are restricted to the date services are performed. See Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 844 F.2d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 776 F.2d 1066, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1985). However, that circuit adopted a position permitting adjustment to the fee rate for delay in receipt of fees as a "special factor." See Wilkett, 844 F.2d at 875-77 & nn. 4 & 5; Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1985). That position, however, has been expressly discredited by the Supreme Court in Underwood, 487 U.S. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554, where the Supreme Court limited the cognizable "special factors," for purposes of fee rate increase, to those that are not of "broad and general application." It is not urged here that delay between the time that debt for legal services is incurred and the time an award under the EAJA is obtained may be deemed a "special factor," and we believe, in any event, it would suffer from the same no-interest defect as a COLA for post-performance inflation.
With respect to the Third Circuit case, Garcia v. Schweiker, 829 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1987), Chiu is correct that in that case the court refused to limit the COLA to the fee rate to the time services were rendered. The court in Garcia premised its conclusion on the belief that the agency should not reap the benefits of any inflation during litigation, and that attorneys should not have the purchasing power of their fees eroded by inflation. Id. at 402. We respectfully disagree with the position taken by the Third Circuit in Garcia. While the Third Circuit is correct that the agency "reaps the benefits" of any delay between the time services are performed and the time of award under the EAJA, the Third Circuit failed to acknowledge and discuss Shaw and the no-interest rule, which expressly serves the purpose of permitting the government to occupy an apparently favored position by protecting it from claims for interest that would prevail against private parties.9 Shaw, 478 U.S. at 317-18, 106 S. Ct. at 2962-63. In light of the no-interest rule, as well as the restrictive interpretation given the EAJA by the Supreme Court subsequent to Shaw in Underwood, the ambiguity as to whether the statutory authorization for COLA's to the EAJA fee rate includes post-performance time periods which constitute delay until receipt of a fee award must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. In this case, the COLA to the EAJA fee rate is required to be calculated from October 1, 1981 to the date services are performed, and the Claims Court had no discretion to extend the COLA end date beyond the performance date. Consequently, the Claims Court's quantum determination must be remanded for redetermination.10
As a final point, the government raises the Supreme Court's footnote in its recent decision of Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 110 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1990), and argues that the attorney fee quantum determination must be remanded and redetermined to consider reductions to the fee award for the fee litigation phase of the Claims Court proceedings. In Commissioner v. Jean, the Supreme Court held that only one finding of no "substantial justification" was required under the EAJA to permit a fee award for the entire proceedings before that court, including litigation over the EAJA fee award. In a footnote, however, the Court indicated that its decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), required
Jean, 110 S. Ct. at 2321 n. 10. The Claims Court did not have the benefit of Jean at the time it rendered its quantum determination. In light of the need for remand to redetermine quantum, we agree with the government that any such quantum redetermination should take heed of the Supreme Court's Jean decision, particularly with regard to that portion of the fee litigation attributable to the government's contesting inclusion in the COLA to the fee rate an adjustment for post-performance inflation.
The trial division of the U.S. Court of Claims was reorganized as the U.S. Claims Court effective October 1, 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, Title I, § 105, 96 Stat. 25, 27. Chiu thus filed his application for fees in December of 1982 with the Claims Court while the merits suit had been before the Court of Claims
The EAJA even includes a specific clause stating that the Claims Court constitutes a "court" for purposes of attorney fee awards thereunder. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (F)
This exercise, to a certain extent and as the Supreme Court recognized in Underwood, 487 U.S. at 557-63, 108 S. Ct. at 2545-49, is quintessentially discretionary in nature. For instance, whether the government was substantially justified overall where in litigation it depended on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and a party prevails on a substantive aspect of the agency's action which gave rise to the litigation necessarily involves an apples to oranges comparison. It is for the trial court to weigh each position taken and conclude which way the scale tips, and as an appellate court we must be wary not to redistribute these weights among different positions unless a serious error in judgment has been made
RUSCC 52 is the Claims Court counterpart of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52
We disagree also that the focus of the inquiry should be on the attorneys. The EAJA is designed to reimburse the litigant, not protect attorneys from fee erosion. See, e.g., Phillips v. General Servs. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (fee paid to prevailing party under EAJA, not to attorney); Naekel v. Department of Transp., FAA, 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (pro se litigant not entitled to EAJA award because intended to reimburse prevailing party for attorney fees incurred); Merrell v. Block, 809 F.2d 639, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Crooker v. Environmental Protection Agency, 763 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1985) (same)