Source: https://rshlawfirm.com/category/land-use/
Timestamp: 2020-04-03 20:35:18
Document Index: 136039174

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 37', '§1983', '§1983', '§ 1983', '§11', '§11', '§ 11', '§245', '§245', '§25']

Land Use | Law Offices of Ryan Henry, PLLC
BOA appeal moot due to relocation of shed built in setback says Fort Worth Court of Appeals
Posted on December 19, 2019 by Ryan Henry
Oak Point Board of Adjustment v. Jeff Houle, 02-19-00068-CV, (Tex. App – Fort Worth, Dec. 12, 2019)
This is a board of adjustment appeal where the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the Board’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case.
The City of Oak Point has a zoning ordinance establishing a 50-foot front-yard setback in the residential neighborhoods. Houle, a resident, complained about the variance to the set-back granted to his neighbor, Bobby Pope. Pope received a permit and built a shed, but due to a miscalculation, it was built in the setback. The Board of Adjustment (BOA) granted the variance. Houle attempted to challenge it by suit in the county court at law. The BOA filed a plea to the jurisdiction which was denied. It appealed.
The BOA advised Pope had since moved the shed out of the setback. By variance, the BOA effectively excepted Pope’s shed from the front-yard setback requirement. Houle’s petition seeks to undo that exception. However, the variance expressly stated that should the shed ever be moved, the variance would be nullified, which is exactly the relief requested by Houle. The shed’s relocation means that Houle has obtained the relief he sought by his claims, and a judicial determination cannot have any practical legal effect on an existing controversy rendering his lawsuit moot. None of Houle’s arguments asserting why the suit remains live apply. As a result, the plea should have been granted.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Justices Gabriel, Birdwell, and Womack. Opinion by Justice Womack. Docket page with attorney information found here.
Posted in Board of Adjustment, Land Use
Austin Court of Appeals holds Austin’s short-term rental regulations unconstitutional (assembly clause also declared fundamental right entitled to strict scrutiny)
Posted on December 6, 2019 by Ryan Henry
Ahmad Zaatari v City of Austin, 03-17-00812-CV (Tex. App. — Austin, Nov. 27, 2019).
This is a dispute regarding the City of Austin’s regulation on short-term rental properties. The Austin Court of Appeals reversed-in-part and affirmed-in-part the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. [Comment: This is a 43-page opinion and 18-page dissent. So, the summary is a bit longer than normal]
In 2012, Austin adopted an ordinance amending its zoning and land-development codes to regulate Austinites’ ability to rent their properties as short-term rentals. Several other amendments occurred at different times adjusting the definitions and scope of the codes until, in 2016, Property Owners sued the City for declaratory and injunctive relief to declare the regulations unconstitutional. The Property Owners (which also included the State of Texas as a party) moved for summary judgment while the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the Property Owner’s MSJ, denied the City’s plea, but granted the City’s summary judgment. Everyone appealed.
The City’s plea to the jurisdiction challenges the State’s standing to intervene in this dispute, the Property Owners’ standing to bring claims on behalf of tenants, and the ripeness of the underlying claims. The court held the State’s standing to intervene in this matter is unambiguously conferred by the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act which states when the validity of a statute or ordinance is brought, the attorney general of the state must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be heard. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.006(b). The court next held the underlying matters were ripe because some provisions of the 2016 ordinance took effect immediately, while others were not effective until 2022. Facial challenges to ordinances are “ripe upon enactment because at that moment the ‘permissible uses of the property [were] known to a reasonable degree of certainty.’” The court held the City’s alleged constitutional overreach itself is an injury from which the Property Owners and the State seek relief. Further, governmental immunity does not shield the City from viable claims for relief from unconstitutional acts. As a result, the plea was properly denied.
The court next determined the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, which mainly deal with the public dispute over short-term rentals. The State and the Property Owners filed traditional motions for summary judgment on their claims regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Texas Constitution prohibits retroactive laws. The State contends that the ordinance provision terminating all type-2 operating licenses is retroactive because it “tak[es] away th[e] fundamental and settled property right” to lease one’s real estate under the most desirable terms. While disagreeing on the effect, the City conceded the ordinance retroactively cancels existing leases. Not all retroactive laws are unconstitutional. The Court held the regulation operates to eliminate well-established and settled property rights that existed before the ordinance’s adoption. Upon reviewing the record the court held the City made no findings to justify the ordinance’s ban on type-2 rentals and its stated public interest was slight. Nothing in the record demonstrates this ban would address or prevent any listed concerns, including preventing strangers in the neighborhood, noise complaints, and illegal parking. In fact, many of the concerns cited by the City are the types of problems that can be and already are prohibited by state law or by City ordinances banning such practices. Further, for four years the City did not issue a single citation to a licensed short-term rental owner or guest for violating the City’s noise, trash, or parking ordinances. The purported public interest served by the ordinance’s ban on type-2 short-term rentals cannot be considered compelling. Private property ownership is a fundamental right. The ability to lease property is a fundamental privilege of property ownership. Granted, the right to lease property for a profit can be subject to restriction or regulation under certain circumstances, but the right to lease is nevertheless plainly an established one. Based on the practices performed in Austin over the years, short-term rentals have a settled interest and place in the City. The City’s ordinance eliminates the right to rent property short term if the property owner does not occupy the property. As a result, the regulations are unconstitutionally retroactive.
The court then addressed the Property Owner’s claim the regulations violated their right to assembly under the Texas Constitution. After a lengthy analysis, the court held the Texas Constitution’s assembly clause is not limited to protecting only petition-related assemblies and the judicially created “right of association” does not subsume the Texas Constitution’s assembly clause in its entirety. The right is a “fundamental right” for constitutional analysis purposes and must be examined under a strict scrutiny analysis. The regulation sections challenged limited the number of persons at a rental at any one time, the hours of the day a rental could be used, number of permitted leaseholders, and various other congregation related activities. The City already has various nuisance ordinances in place to address the negative effects of short-term rentals on neighbors. As a result, the City failed to establish a compelling interest that justifies a different ordinance which is not narrowly tailored. The City has not provided any evidence of a serious burden on neighboring properties sufficient to justify the additional regulations, which therefore violate the assembly clause of the Texas Constitution.
The court reversed that part of the district court’s judgment granting the City’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and denying the Property Owners’ and the State’s motions for summary judgment. It rendered judgment declaring specific sections of the City Code void.
Justice Kelly dissented asserting 1) the sections were not unconstitutionally retroactive (with analysis), 2) the Assembly Clause assures Texans the fundamental right to peaceably gather for purposes of meaningful civic discourse without fear of retribution – not to have short-term rentals (which are assembly-neutral zoning regulations that have a rational basis), 3) loud noise, obstructing infrastructure, flouting law enforcement, public disturbances, threats to public safety- all these may make an assembly non-peaceable and can be regulated, and 4) the majority opinion is also out of step with Texas “fundamental right” precedent (i.e. declaring rights fundamental, and thus beyond ordinary democratic give-and-take, is a weighty matter, unjustified in this case).
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Kelly. Opinion by Chief Justice Rose. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kelly found here. Docket page with attorney information found here.
Posted in Agency, Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Injunction, Land Use, Sovereign Immunity
Fort Worth Court of Appeals holds injunctive relief not available to stop enforcement of ordinance regulating gas/oil production
The Town of Flower Mound, Texas, et al. v. EagleRidge Operating, LLC, 02-18-00392-CV, (Fort Worth, Aug. 22, 2019)
This is an interlocutor appeal in a temporary injunction case where the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the zoning restriction on oil/gas equipment at issue was a penal statute and no vested property right existed, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction.
Plaintiffs took over operation of a series of oil/gas wells in the Town. The Town passed an ordinance regulating operations, the removal of waste water and hours of operation. The ordinance stated as part of its purpose that natural gas drilling and production operations involve or otherwise impact the Town’s environment, infrastructure, and related public health, welfare, and safety matters. In 2018 Plaintiff filed 3 actions with the board of adjustment (BOA) and board of oil and gas appeals (OGA) regarding variances, which were denied. The Town issued several criminal citations for after hour operation and failure to remove wastewater. The Plaintiff sought a TRO and injunction to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance, which was granted. The Town, BOA and OGA appealed.
The basic test as to whether a law is penal is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to an individual. A public wrong involves the “violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community, and are considered crimes; whereas individual wrongs are infringements of private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals, and constitute civil injuries.” When an ordinance’s primary purpose is to protect the welfare of a municipality’s citizens, it “is clearly addressing a wrong to the public at large” and is a penal. The court held the zoning ordinance was penal in nature. To be entitled to injunctive relief, the Plaintiff had the burden to demonstrate irreparable injury to a vested property right. Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, allegations of injury to an interest in real property does not equate to irreparable injury of a vested property right. Increases in operating costs does not equate to irreparable harm to their mineral interests. Loss of profitability, alone, also does to equate to irreparable harm to their mineral interest. As a result, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of such a penal ordinance. Under sections of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code chapter 211 (dealing with BOA and appeals), no injunction is textually available for an appeal from the BOA to a district court, only from an official to the BOA. The Legislature made a distinction between a restraining order and an injunction, and no injunctive relief is available under Chapter 211 for an appeal to district court from a BOA decision.
Chief Justice Sudderth concerned in a majority of the opinion, but dissented as to the interpretation under Chapter 211. He opinioned a temporary restraining order is a stopgap, placeholding measure to preserve the status quo 14 days, just until a litigant’s application for temporary injunction can be heard. For practical purposes, depriving the trial court of the ability to extend the restrained enforcement makes little sense.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Sudderth, Justice Gabriel, visiting Judge Wallach. Memorandum opinion by visiting judge Wallach.
Posted in Board of Adjustment, Declaratory Judgments, Injunction, Land Use, Litigation, Zoning
City not liable for takings claim because of alleged failure to enforce ordinances against neighboring property owner/developer
Posted on November 7, 2018 by Ryan Henry
City of Mason v. William Robin Lee, et al. 04-18-00275-CV (Tex. App. – San Antonio, Nov. 7, 2018).
This is an interlocutory appeal in a regulatory takings case where the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the takings claims.
The Zeschs’ trust asserted they owned property adjacent to or downhill from property owned by Tyler and Reyeses. The City approved a minor plat and Reyeses began constructing a single-family residence. The Zeschs assert the development caused increase water runoff damaging the property. Additionally, the Zeschs assert the construction generated nuisance level noise and dust. They assert the City committed a regulatory taking by approving the plat, then refusing to enforce various City ordinances against Reyeses. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which was denied. The City took this interlocutory appeal.
The court first noted a justiciable controversy still exists even though the Zeschs settled with Tyler and Reyes and now own the property since a question remains as to whether the Zeschs’ property was damaged due to the City’s actions. Next, to state a valid takings claim, a plaintiff generally must allege: (1) an intentional governmental act; (2) that resulted in his property being taken; (3) for public use. The crux of the Zeschs claims is that the City failed to impose applicable regulations to the subdivision and to the property owned by the Reyeses. The Texas Supreme Court and the Fourth Court have recognized “the law does not recognize takings liability for a failure to” act. A municipality’s failure to enforce applicable zoning ordinances and special permit restrictions does not constitute a regulatory taking. The court also cited to precedent noting that if the government’s alleged affirmative conduct is nothing beyond allowing private developers to use their property as they wish, the more appropriate remedy is a claim against the private developers rather than a novel taking claim against the government. Interestingly, in a footnote, the court held that the Penn Central analysis (applicable when a regulation unreasonably interferes with a property owner’s use and enjoyment of the property) does not apply in this type of case because the Zeschs were not complaining of regulations applied to them, but of the lack of regulations applied to others. No intentional conduct occurred so the plea should have been granted.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Justice Martinez, Justice Chapa and Justice Rios. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rios. The docket page with attorney information can be found here.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Eminent Domain, Injunction, Land Use, Sovereign Immunity, Takings
City’s denial of plat application citing inconsistencies with “general plan” of city, without more, is insufficient and therefore vested rights are implicated
Posted on July 12, 2018 by Ryan Henry
The Village of Tiki Island, et al. v. Premier Tierra Holdings Inc., 14-18-00014-CV (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.], July 10, 2018)
This is an interlocutory appeal in a land-use case were the 14th Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
This case has gone up and down the appellate ladder already. Prior summary found here. Premier sought to develop property for a mixed-use marina project. Premier submitted a plat application which included up to one hundred residential units and up to 250 dry stack enclosed boat slips. The City had no meaningful land-use regulations or platting or subdivision regulations. Five days later the city enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting dry boat storage, limiting heights and set-backs, and restricting rental dates and parking. The City then rejected the plat application as being inconsistent with the new ordinance. Premier next sought a rezoning application as a planned unit district, which was denied. It also sought several plat amendments which were denied. Premier filed a mandamus and sought declaratory relief asking the court to approve the original plat application and successive plat applications based on vested rights under chapter 245 of the Texas Local Government Code. It further brought a takings claim. The City Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction which was denied. The City Defendants appealed.
Chapter 245 creates a system by which property developers can rely on a municipality’s regulations in effect at the time the original application for a permit is filed. It freezes” the rules at the time the original application for a permit is filed, and limits the rights of a city to “change the rules in the middle of the game.” Chapter 212 of the Texas Local Government Code deals with plat approval and requires plats to conform to the “general plan” of the city and for extensions of utilities and roadways. The City’s assertion that it relied on a pre-existing “general plan” of the City in denying the original plat application was rejected as the City did not provide, in the record, evidence of such a plan or what its framework would have been. Chapter 212 plans must be adopted after public hearings, which is not evident in the record. A vague reference to a general plan of the city is insufficient for plea purposes and a fact question exists preventing the plea. Further, Chapter 245 expressly authorized a declaratory judgment suit to establish Chapter 245 rights. As to the takings claim, the court held Premier alleged facts to support a takings claim based on the denial of its vested rights in the project.
If you would like to read this legal opinion, click here. Justice Christopher, Justice Donovan and Justice Wise. Opinion by Justice Wise.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Land Use, Litigation, Mandamus, Procedure, Sovereign Immunity, Takings, Vested Rigths
Zoning amendment was not retroactive and property owner had no vested interest in perpetual use of his property for a specific purpose says Dallas Court of Appeals
Posted on June 20, 2018 by Ryan Henry
Hinga Mbogo, et al. v. City of Dallas, et al. 05-17-00879-CV (Tex. App. – Dallas, June 19, 2018)
This is an appeal from an order granting the City Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction in a constitutional challenge to zoning laws. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of the plea.
Hinga leased land and opened a general repair shop on Ross Avenue in Dallas, Texas, in 1986. At that time, the City’s zoning ordinances allowed automobile-related businesses on Ross Avenue. After performing a study which found automobile-repair shops were a concern in the area based on the connected roads and services in the area, the City amended its zoning ordinance in 1988 prohibiting such uses. At that time, Hinga was fully aware that continuing his business became a “nonconforming use.” In 1991, Hinga purchased the property, expanded and upgraded knowing the property was nonconforming. In 2005 the City again amended the zoning ordinance and codified specific provisions related to non-conforming uses and provided deadlines. A property owner could appeal to the board of adjustment to extend deadlines to comply with the requirements. The BOA gave Hinga a new compliance date of April 13, 2013. Hinga then received a zoning change and SUP which expired in 2015. Hinga applied for a new SUP in February 2016, which was denied. The City filed suit seeking a permanent injunction to prevent operations and sought fines of $1,000 per day. Hinga counterclaimed and brought in various City officials. The City defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which was granted. Hinga appealed.
Hinga argues the City’s ordinances, as applied to him, are unconstitutionally retroactive. A retroactive law is one that extends to matters that occurred in the past. Hinga asserted in 2005 and 2013 he had no notice the City would at some point make his use illegal. However, a law is not retroactive because it upsets expectations based in prior law. Further, there are strong policy arguments and a demonstrable public need for the fair and reasonable termination of nonconforming property uses. In 2005 the City’s ordinance change allowed the owner of a nonconforming use to apply for a later compliance date if the owner would not be able to recover his investment in the use by the designated conformance date. The ordinance did not change any use but rather, it prospectively altered a property owner’s future use of the property. The 2013 ordinance likewise set a deadline for when it expired. As a result, the ordinances are not retroactive. Additionally, the court noted not all retroactive laws are unconstitutional. Here, any interest that Hinga had in the use of his property is not “firmly vested.” There is no bright-line rule and, generally speaking, an individual has no protected property interest in the continued use of his property for a particular purpose. The process provided likewise did not deprive Hinga of due process or single him out in any respect. The City allowed Hinga to run a business from 1991 through 2015 as either a nonconforming use or under a SUP; however, his use became illegal once his SUP expired. Hinga’s position under his takings argument appears to be that any restriction on his desired use of the property results in unconstitutional damage or destruction to his property. That is simply not the case as he had no vested right to perpetual, guaranteed use of his property in a specific way. As a result the plea was properly granted.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Justice Bridges, Justice Myers and Justice Schenck. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bridges. The docket page with attorney information can be found here.
Posted in Board of Adjustment, Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Eminent Domain, Injunction, Land Use, Sovereign Immunity, Takings, Ultra Vires, Vested Rigths, Zoning
City immune from claims it misapplied its own ordinances or procedures, but not for TOMA claims
Posted on May 31, 2018 by Ryan Henry
Peter Schmitz, et al v. Town of Ponder, Texas, et al. 02-16-00114-CV, (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, May 10, 2018).
This is a substituted opinion. Summary of original opinion found here. This is an appeal from a final judgment against the Plaintiffs who attempted to force the Town to enforce its zoning laws against other property owners.
In 2014 the Denton County Cowboy Church (“Church”) purchased property zoned single family residential under the Town of Ponder’s zoning ordinance. The Church’s property is adjacent to the Plaintiffs’ property. According to Ponder’s comprehensive plan, the Plaintiffs’ properties are designated for future low-density residential zoning. In 2015 the Church began construction of an arena. The Town issued a building permit for an open arena. Plaintiffs sued the Church and Town of Ponder, seeking injunctions prohibiting the Church from continuing construction. They also brought claims under §1983 for due process, takings, and equal protection violations. The Town and Church both filed pleas to the jurisdiction which the trial court granted. The Plaintiff appealed.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (“UDJA”) does not waive immunity of a governmental entity when no ordinance is being challenged. The City maintains immunity for claims seeking a declaration of the claimant’s statutory rights or over a claim that government actors have acted outside the law—ultra vires. However, the majority of the Plaintiff’s requested declarations would establish that the Town, not the individual committee or council members, violated or misapplied its own ordinances or procedures, rendering its actions arbitrary and unreasonable. The Town maintains immunity from such claims. The ordinances further did not waive the Town’s immunity by authorizing suit for enforcement. With no UDJA claim, requests for permanent injunction are also not viable. Liability against a governmental unit for private-nuisance injuries arises only when governmental immunity is clearly and unambiguously waived, which is not the case here. However, immunity is waived under the Texas Open Meetings Act (“TOMA”) so the TOMA claims are remanded. The court stressed that the waiver of immunity under TOMA does not apply to the extent Plaintiffs seek more than injunctive relief or a declaration that the Town’s actions were voidable under TOMA only. Under Plaintiffs’ §1983 claims, a regulatory taking can occur when governmental action unreasonably interferes with a landowner’s use and enjoyment of his property. However, the Plaintiffs claims challenge the process in which the Town enforced its ordinances, not the substance of the enforcement. Plaintiffs have no protected property interest in the manner in which the Town enforced or failed to enforce its ordinances against the Church, rendering their claim under § 1983 not viable. And while the Town argued RLUIPA preempted their enforcement of certain matters of the ordinances, RLUIPA does not implicate jurisdiction so is not proper to raise in a plea. The court then analyzed the claims against the Church and ultimately held some claims survived and were remanded.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Justice Gabriel and Justice Pittman. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel. The attorneys listed for the Plaintiffs are Gregory Sawko and Robert E. Hager. The attorneys listed for the Town are Matthew Butler and John F. Boyle Jr.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Injunction, Land Use, Litigation, Procedure, Religious Freedom, Sec. 1983, TOMA
Trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to City in vested rights and declaratory judgment case
Patsy B. Anderton, et al. v. City of Cedar Hill, 05-17-00138-CV (Tex. App. – Dallas, May 25, 2018)
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a judgment for the City of Cedar Hill (“City”) in a case involving a non-conforming use in a specific zoning district.
This case went up and down the appellate latter in one appeal already. The Andertons purchased an existing landscaping and building materials business—a commercial rather than local retail business—that operated on Lots 5 and 6, about the time the City rezoned the area to a retail zone. The Andertons requested a zoning change to make their legal non-conforming use a legal conforming use, which the City denied. Several years later the City filed a declaratory petition and sought civil penalties against the Andertons prohibiting them from operating the existing business on the lots. The Andertons counterclaimed under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Chapter 245 for vested rights and inverse condemnation. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the City’s summary judgment motions and denied the Andertons’ motions. The Andertons appealed the first time and won a partial remand. However, afterwards, the City passed two zoning amendments making the lots lawful. The City sought attorney’s fees for the claims it won in the first appeal and filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the Andertons’ remaining counterclaims. The trial court denied the plea and went to trial on the attorney’s fee issue. The trial court later entered a final judgment on remand, dismissing the Andertons’ claims for non-conforming use rights in Lots 5 and 6 as moot and awarding the City its attorney’s fees. The Andertons appealed.
The court first held, given the zoning amendments, at the time it rendered judgment, the trial court had no practical ability to alter the legal relationship between the parties. As a result, the Andertons’ claim as to the non-conforming use status was moot and the trial court was obliged to dismiss barring some valid exception. There are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of mootness: (1) the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review; and (2) the collateral consequences doctrine. The record did not reflect any evidence indicating the City was likely to rezone the property back to retail only, so the first exception does not apply. Theoretical possibility is not sufficient to satisfy the test. The “collateral consequences” doctrine applies to the narrow circumstances when vacating the underlying judgment will not cure the adverse consequences suffered by the party seeking to appeal that judgment. The Andertons, however, do not argue, and the record does not reflect, any concrete disadvantages or disabilities that will persist should their claim be dismissed as moot. So, the judgement is affirmed as to the Andertons’ counterclaims. As to the award of attorney’s fees, the UDJA does not condition the entitlement to fees on prevailing party status. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law affirmatively indicate the trial court awarded the City its attorney’s fees as “equitable and just based on the claims asserted in this case, the objectives sought by the parties and the outcome of this case” and not as a “prevailing party.” However, not withstanding, the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees. As in cases involving only a modicum of success in the context of the prevailing party statute, even fees supported by uncontradicted testimony may be “unreasonable” in light of the amount involved, the results obtained, and in the absence of evidence that such fees were warranted due to circumstances unique to the case. After going through the win/loss points and going through each lot in the case, the appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. Panel consists of Justice Lang, Justice Fillmore and Justice Schenck. Opinion by Justice Schenck. The attorney listed for Patsy Anderton is Arthur J. Anderson. The attorneys listed for the City are Ronald G. Macfarlane Jr., James W. Morris Jr., and Terry D. Morgan.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Injunction, Land Use, Litigation, Procedure, Vested Rigths
Water District property entitled to tax exempt status even though District rents to private business on river front
Tarrant Appraisal District v. Tarrant Regional Water District 02-17-00042-CV (Tex. App— Fort Worth, January 25, 2018)
The Tarrant Appraisal District (“TAD”) asserted part of the property owned by the Tarrant Regional Water District (“TRWD”) was not “used for public purposes” and therefore was not tax exempt. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing TAD’s suit. [This is a 37 page opinion, but has excellent language on “public purpose” definitions applicable to governmental entities. Sorry, but long opinion equals long summary in comparison.]
TRWD acquired property in connection with a federal control project. Undertaken in concert with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the program’s purpose was to control flooding on the Clear Fork Trinity River. A portion of the property was not used directly for flood control but was used for public trails, common areas, and river access. In an effort to counteract a lack of use outside of certain areas along the trails and “to encourage development of river-facing businesses on TRWD’s property and adjoining properties,” TRWD determined it would improve and lease to chef Tim Love’s River Shack, LLC to run a restaurant on the river front property. River Shack pays TRWD rent based on a percentage of its annual sales and “[a]ll income received by TRWD from the [lease] is deposited into the general fund of TRWD and used exclusively for [] TRWD’s public purposes.” TAD asserted the property was not exempt from taxation. TRWD followed the procedures in the Tax Code to challenge the decision, ending in district court. TRWD filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. TAD appealed.
TRWD is a governmental entity created under statute. TRWD is authorized to make and enforce reasonable rules that are necessary to accomplish TRWD’s “authorized purposes,” which include (i) regulating “all recreational and business privileges on any . . . body of land . . . owned . . . by the district,” (ii) promoting “state or local economic development,” and (iii) stimulating “business and commercial activity in the district.” TRWD is further permitted to provide for or participate in the acquisition, construction, development, operation, or maintenance of recreational facilities intended to promote economic development. TAD contends the Tax Code should control over the TRWD authorization statutes and applies only when public property is used exclusively for the use and benefit of the public. TRWD asserts its creation is dictated by the Texas Constitution and it serves a public purpose as a matter of law. Interestingly, the court, after going through a detailed analysis of the Texas Constitution, statutory construction principles, and the Tax Code, held the Tax Code controls, but the property is exempt as a matter of law.
The court ends up holding unconstitutional, as a local law, a portion of the uncodified statute authorizing TRWD’s creation and authority. The result being the Tax Code controls for purposes of determining the exemption. Under §11.11(a) of the Texas Tax Code, a property is exempt from taxation if it is used for a public purpose. The court declined to adopt TAD’s interpretation that it must be used “exclusively” for public purposes with no simultaneous use benefiting an individual private business. The court compared other statutes and constitutional provisions where the legislature expressly inserted “exclusive-use” language. TAD’s argument “has no basis in the text” of either the Tax Code or its constitutional counterpart for exclusivity. Whether property is used for public purposes is a highly fact-specific question that must be answered on a case-by-case basis. The court held “[c]ontrary to TAD’s overly-narrow characterization, the Property is not some run-of-the-mill strip mall that TRWD developed merely for retail purposes. River Shack no doubt operates a business for profit, but that is only one facet of a larger project that, at its core, unquestionably has a public purpose.” TRWD entered into the lease with River Shack “to encourage development of river-facing businesses on TRWD’s property and adjoining properties.” The property “was intended and designed as a trail amenity to provide the public with recreational enhancements ancillary to the public’s use of the Trinity Trails system.” Thus, the evidence conclusively demonstrates, TRWD leased the property to River Shack in connection with its optimistic plan to develop it for economic and recreational purposes. With its pavilion, common areas, and location adjacent to the Trinity Trails, and developed and leased for economic and recreational purposes, the property is used for public purposes as a matter of law.
If you would like to read the opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Walker, Justice Meier and Justice Gabriel. Memorandum opinion by Justice Meier. The attorney listed for Tarrant Regional Water District is Steven K. Hayes. The attorneys listed for Tarrant Appraisal District of Harris is Catherine Jane Alder and Todd A. Clark.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Land Use, Tax
Trial court properly denied injunctive request to prohibit City from relocating administrative offices
Leslie E. Barras and Historic Orange Preservation Empowerment, Inc. v. The City of Orange, Texas, et al, 09-16-00073-CV (Tex. App— Beaumont, November 17,2016)
This is an appeal from the denial of an injunctive request to prevent the City from relocating its administrative offices.
In 1996, within the City’s Comprehensive Master Plan, the City determined its administrative offices should be centralized in the Old Town Center of the City. In 2016 the City purchased and made plans to move some of its offices outside of the Old Town Center. Historic Orange Preservation Empowerment, Inc. (“HOPE”) sued for injunctive relief to prevent the move. The trial court denied the injunctive relief and HOPE appealed.
HOPE argues the CITY is required to amend the City Charter because it requires that “[n]o subdivision, street, park, or any public way, ground or space, public building or structure or public utility, whether publicly or privately owned which is in conflict with the comprehensive plan shall be constructed or authorized by the City.” HOPE asserts this makes the comprehensive Plan mandatory and not simply a guide. However, the Plan expressly provides that it is “a guide to the physical development of Orange[,]” and it states that it is “a tool for elected and appointed officials and city staff to guide decision making for growth and development issues.” After analyzing the Plan, the court held it is a guiding document only. Additionally, the parts of the Plan relating to the location of the City’s administrative offices were never adopted by ordinance. The Charter applies only to legislation through ordinance, not resolution. The resolution passed by City Council to move its facilities is therefore not in conflict with the Comprehensive Master Plan. As a result, the trial court properly denied the injunctive relief.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. The panel includes Chief Justice Mckeithen, Justice Horton, and Justice Johnson. Justice Horton delivered the opinion of the court. Attorneys for HOPE are listed as Jamie Matuska, Leslie Barras and David W. Starnes. Attorneys for the City are listed as Guy Goodson, John Cash Smith, and Kate Leverett.
Posted in Declaratory Judgments, Injunction, Land Use, Zoning
City immune from delay in zoning approval due to City Attorney’s mistaken understanding of municipal boundary line
City of Floresville, et al. v. Starnes Investment Group, LLC, 04-16-00038 (Tex.App— San Antonio, September 28,2016)
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction in a case where a city employee mistakenly informed a property developer they were outside city limits. The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the denial and dismissed the claims.
Starnes Investment Group, LLC (“Starnes”) began looking at property to develop as a commercial recreational vehicle park. Starnes filed a rezoning application to allow for the RV park. The City Attorney advised the property was outside of the City limits and not subject to zoning restrictions. However, after Starnes purchased the property and the City completed a map digitization initiative, it discovered the property was partially inside and partially outside of the City limits. The City ultimately approved a zoning change application to allow the RV park. However, Starnes still sued. The premise of Starnes’s lawsuit is that it was harmed by the City’s delay in approving its zoning application and delay in providing water and sewage due to the misunderstanding. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction which the trial court denied. The City appealed.
The first issue the court resolved was procedurally, the trial court granted the City’s special exceptions and denied the plea in the same order. While Starnes filed an amended petition, it did so after the denial of the plea. However, since the plea is jurisdictional, the court considers all of the matters during the appeal, including those which were not before the trial court at the time of the original order. Next, a governmental entity does not have immunity from a valid takings claim. In a takings case, “the requisite intent is present when a governmental entity knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to result.” A taking cannot rest on the mere negligence of the government. Moreover, “[w]hen damage is merely the accidental result of the government’s intentional act, there is no public benefit and the property cannot be said to have been taken or damaged for public use.” Starnes’s amended petition alleges no facts that the information was the result of anything more than either a mistake or negligence on the City Attorney’s part. As a result, there is no takings claim. Next, to state a valid due process or due course of law claim, a plaintiff must first allege the existence of a protected right. Starnes’s zoning application merely sought a governmental benefit to which it was not already entitled. As such, Starnes only had an expectation of the governmental benefit which is not a protected property right. To assert an equal protection claim, the deprived party must establish two elements: (1) that it was treated differently than other similarly-situated parties; and (2) it was treated differently without a reasonable basis. Other than a conclusory statement that it was treated differently from others similarly situated, Starnes failed to allege any facts describing similarly situated parties. As a result, there is no equal protection violation. Chapter 245 of the Texas Local Government Code (often referred to as a vested rights/grandfather statute) creates a narrow exception enforcing changing regulations stating, after receiving a development application or plan, a regulatory agency changes its land-use regulations, the agency cannot enforce such a change. Starnes does not point to any change in the City’s existing “orders, regulations, ordinances, rules, expiration dates, or other properly adopted requirements” that occurred after Starnes filed its zoning application. The property was always partially in and partially outside of the City limits. An employee’s mistaken belief of the location of the boundary line is not a change in adopted regulation. Additionally, Chapter 245 is enforceable only through mandamus, injunctive or declaratory relief, none of which Starnes sought. Finally, Starnes had the opportunity to, and did in fact, amend its pleadings in the trial court after the City filed its special exceptions. The court need not provide any further opportunity to amend. The court reversed and rendered in favor of the City.
If you would like to read this opinion click here. The Panel includes Chief Justice Marion, Justice Barnard and Justice Pulliam. Chief Justice Marion delivered the opinion of the court. Attorneys representing the parties can be found on the docket page here.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Land Use, Sovereign Immunity, Takings, Zoning
City’s billboard registration fee determined to be unconstitutional tax
Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. d/b/a Reagan National Advertising v. City of Austin, Texas; and Marc A. Ott, being sued in his Official Capacity 03-15-00370-CV (Tex. App.- Austin, June 15, 2016)
This is a case to determine whether a billboard registration fee was a unconstitutional tax. The court held the fee was an fact a tax and unconstitutional.
Reagon owns and operates various billboards subject to the City’s registration requirements. The City raised the registration fee from $110 per year to $200 per year but had no studies or surveys to support the increase. Afterwards, several City employees conducted surveys and determined the costs could be covered in a range from $140 per year to $352, although Reagan had an expert opinion noting the proper costs should be closer to $42 per year. Reagon sued in federal court. However, the federal judge determined that since the fee actually qualified as a “tax” the federal court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a state tax under the Tax Injunction Act. After the federal judge dismissed the case, Reagon sued in state court. After a bench trial the trial court dismissed Reagon’s claims and Reagon appealed.
The first issue addressed was whether Reagon was precluded by the statute of limitations to bring suit. The Court of Appeals held under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 16.064 Reagon filed suit 60 days after the federal judgment “became final.” While the federal court signed the judgment in 2011, the City’s motion for new trial extended the deadline to determine finality. Once the motion for new trial was denied, the judgment became final 30 days afterwards, which then started the 60 day deadline (i.e 90 days after motion for new trial is denied). Therefore the limitations is tolled. Next the court determined that since the federal judge had to make a determination as a matter of law that the registration fee was a tax in order to determine jurisdiction, that issue was fully and vigorously litigated in federal court. Therefore, the state court is precluded by res judicata from reconsidering that issue. And since no statute authorizes such a tax, the tax is unconstitutional.
To read the opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Rose, Justice Pemberton and Justice Field. Justice Field issued the Memorandum Opinion. Attorney for Marc A. Ott, being sued in his Official Capacity is Ms. Patricia L. Link. Attorneys for Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. d/b/a Reagan National Advertising are Ms. Elizabeth Von Kreisler, Mr. B. Russell Horton and Ms. Taline Manassian. Attorneys for the City of Austin are Mr. Henry Gray Laird III and Ms. Patricia L. Link.
Posted in Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Land Use, Separation of Powers, Sign Regulation, Ultra Vires
If you have a case involving Chapter 245 vested rights, zoning changes, and distance restrictions on alcohol sales read this 71 page opinion
FLCT, Ltd. and Field Street Development I, Ltd. v. City of Frisco, Texas, 02-14-00335-CV (Tex. App.- Fort Worth, May 26th 2016)
Owners are two partnerships that own adjacent property in Frisco. FLCT’s tract is located on the actual corner; Field’s tract is located directly east of FLCT’s. In both 2006 and 2007, the City’s zoning ordinance permitted property owners in the C-1 district to sell beer and wine “by right.” However, no public school was located within three hundred feet. After Owners submitted a preliminary site plan for an expanded facility, Frisco ISD began negotiating with Owners to purchase the southernmost part of FLCT’s and Field’s tracts for an elementary school. Before Owners closed on the sale to Frisco ISD in 2009, they filed an amended preliminary site plan application with the City. The City Council then amended the zoning ordinance. Owners then sold a portion of the property to 7-Eleven which conditioned the sale on the ability to obtain all permits (including selling beer and wine). The City asserted 7-Eleven could not sell alcohol at that location. The City then went through several ordinance amendments to adjust and prohibit alcohol sales near churches, schools, and hospitals. 7-Eleven eventually sued under §11.37(d) of the alcoholic beverage code seeking an order requiring the City Secretary to make the statutory certification. Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. § 11.37(d) (West Supp. 2015). However, the City Secretary certified the area was in a dry region. Owners submitted a vested rights petition to the City under Chapter 245 of the Texas Local Government Code asserting they began developing the property at time alcohol sales were permitted so their rights vested at that moment to forever be able to sell alcohol at that location. The trial court granted the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and the Owners appealed.
First, the court held Chapter 245 provides the authority for a declaratory judgment action to enforce a landowner’s rights. Owners are seeking a determination of the existence and extent of their rights to develop and use the Property. As a result, the plea should not have been granted as to the Chapter 245 claims. Next the court analyzed the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code and held not only does it permit a city to enact distance regulations it also allows the city to grant variances as to enforcement of those distance requirements. Accordingly, the code does not pre-empt the City’s enactment and enforcement of the distance requirements, which means the Owners are not limited to the relief under the TABC. Here, Owners have raised both a constitutional claim and a vested property rights claim in the form of a declaratory judgment, which is specifically authorized by statute. They are not seeking to appeal any action by the TABC or any action in connection with a pending permit, so again, no pre-emption. The TABC does not provide the exclusive remedy for Owners’ claims based on the City’s enforcement of the distance requirements with respect to the Property. Next, the Owners contend the City’s zoning changes are void as they did not provide individual notice to property owners. However, such notice is only applicable for changes in zoning classifications, not other types of zoning changes. The court analyzed the term “classification” and held the legislature intended that if a city (either through its zoning commission or city government) wishes to consider a zoning district or boundary change to a discrete piece of property, it is to ensure that owners of surrounding properties that would be affected by the change have notice and an opportunity to participate in any hearing regarding that change. Here, the City’s December 2012 zoning ordinance purported to place restrictions on the types and places where businesses could sell alcohol within five different districts where alcohol sales were then permitted. Thus, this was not a rezoning of classification applicable only to the Property itself; the Property was still included in the C-1 district after the passage of the ordinance. In other words, the City’s interpretation is correct and this was not a “classification” change requiring individual notice. Next, the City contended that it could not issue a “permit” for alcohol so no vested right applies to its sale. However, Chapter 245 also applies to certificates. The certificate required by the City Secretary qualifies. Further, the Owner’s claims are not predicated on the continued operation of a particular type of business but on use restrictions and, thus, they are not excluded on that basis from §245.001’s definition of project. The court agreed with Owners’ contention that the amended ordinance affected the C-1 district by imposing additional restrictions on alcohol sales that had not previously been imposed. Accordingly, the Owners’ pleadings and evidentiary facts show that the exemption in §245.004(2)(i.e. no vested right for certain zoning classifications) does not preclude their remaining Chapter 245 claims. Next the court concluded that the preliminary site plan originally applied for contained sufficient notice it intended to include alcohol sales. Further, a regulatory taking can occur when government action unreasonably interferes with a landowner’s use and enjoyment of the property. After analyzing the facts and a detailed analysis of the legal standards, the court held facts were sufficiently pled and established to confer jurisdiction for a regulatory taking claim. As a result, the trial court order granting the plea is affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part and remanded.
To read the opinion click here. Panel consists of Chief Justice Livingston, Justice Walker and Justice Sudderth. Opinion issued by Chief Justice Livingston. Attorney for FLCT, Ltd. Is Arthur J. Anderson. Attorney for City of Frisco is Richard Abernathy and Field Street Development I, Ltd. is represented by Arthur J. Anderson.
Posted in Agency, Constitutional Challenge, Declaratory Judgments, Health and Safety, Land Use, Litigation, Preemption, Sovereign Immunity, Takings, Vested Rigths
Texas Supreme Court holds the accommodation doctrine applies to groundwater leases
Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v City of Lubbock, 14-0572 (Tex. May 27, 2016)
This is a dispute over a groundwater lease owned by the City and whether the accommodation doctrine (which is founded in oil and gas law) applies. The Texas Supreme Court held that it does.
Coyote Lake Ranch is used primarily for agriculture, raising cattle, and recreational hunting. In 1953, the Ranch sold a groundwater lease to the City of Lubbock to help it combat a massive drought. In 2012, the City announced plans to increase water-extraction efforts on the Ranch, possibly drilling as many as 20 test wells. The Ranch objected noting that mowing or removing vegetation from the surface causes destructive wind erosion, exacerbated by cattle tromping over mowed paths. According to the Ranch, wind, drought, and grazing cattle prevent grass from growing back, particularly in the areas the City mowed. The trial court enjoined the City from further efforts to drill wells. The Court of Appeals reversed holding the accommodation doctrine did not apply.
An oil-and-gas lessee has an implied right to use the land but must exercise that right with due regard for the landowner’s rights. This is the accommodation doctrine. It has never before been extended to a groundwater lease. The Court analyzed the lease language and noted that the different interpretations presented by the parties provide extremes on both sides. The Ranches interpretation could severely restrict the City’s drilling activities if the City could only drill where the Ranch deemed appropriate. The City’s interpretation would mean it has an all but an absolute right to use the surface heedless of avoidable injury, although it must answer for damages caused to the surface. Going back to the concept of mineral separation interests the Court held the mineral and surface estates must exercise their respective rights with due regard for the other’s rights. After going through the history of the accommodation doctrine, the Court held the doctrine should be applied to groundwater leases. The Court then noted the injunction was too prohibitive, however, and remanded the case for further processing in the trial court.
Chief Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, Justice Devine and Justice Brown joined. Justice Boyd delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice Willett and Justice Lehrmann joined.
Posted in Contracts, Land Use, Public Works, Uncategorized
Trial court properly dismissed various claims brought against Board of Adjustment
Glen Sumner v. Board of Adjustments of City of Spring Valley Village, Texas; The City of Spring Valley Village Texas, Art Flores, and Rickie Prichard 14-15-00149-CV (Tex. App- Houston [14th Dist.], May 17th 2016).
This is a board of adjustment and takings case where the 14th Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all Plaintiff’s claims.
Spring Valley Village adopted a zoning ordinance which states “[i]t shall be the responsibility of each owner . . . to maintain the drainage patterns of adjacent property owners or landowners caused either by direct diversion of water on the land or by failure to adequately accommodate new or changed drainage patterns…” Sumner owns a home in Spring Valley. Sumner asserts Prichard bought the adjoining property with the intent to build a new house. The plans called for the elevation of Prichard’s property and changed the drainage. Sumner believed Prichard’s plans would change the natural flow of surface water onto his property in violation of the zoning ordinance. The City’s building official issued a permit for an irrigation system to Prichard consistent with the site plans. Sumner filed an application with the Board of Adjustment relating to the building official’s permit. The Board unanimously rejected Sumner’s protest. Sumner sued the building inspector and the City. The trial court signed a single order dismissing all claims against the building inspector; dismissing Sumner’s petition for writ of certiorari; and granting the City’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the severance to separate the City Defendant’s from Prichard, making its order final. Sumner appealed.
The Court of Appeals first held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the severance. The claims could have been asserted as an independent lawsuit and they are not so interwoven that they involve identical facts and issues. Next the court held Sumner did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the building inspector because the pleadings show Sumner was complaining about a certificate of occupancy, not an irrigation permit. Since Sumner did not timely challenge the certificate with the Board, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider it. Regarding the takings claim, although district courts typically are courts of general jurisdiction, the Legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over inverse condemnation claims in the Harris County Courts at Law for this particular area of the State. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §25.1032(c) (West Supp. 2015). The Court next held Sumner did not properly allege an ultra vires claim under his plead facts. Sumner claims monetary damages for past acts which is not allowed. He further seeks control of future actions, however, such claims are not ripe as there is no indication Prichard intends or will submit any future plans. As a result, the trial court properly dismissed all claims, although the mechanism it uses was adjusted by the Court of Appeals (i.e. certain claims should have been dismissed under the plea, not the MSJ).
For the full opinion click here. Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby and Brown. Memorandum Opinion issued by Justice Busby. Attorneys listed for the City defendants are Dennis S. Dresden and Andrea Chan. Glen Sumner represented himself.
Posted in Board of Adjustment, Constitutional Challenge, Land Use, Litigation, Official/Qualified Immunity, Procedure, Sovereign Immunity, Takings, Ultra Vires, Zoning
First Court of Appeals holds service on pro se of MSJ via email address on file with court was proper service
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School district failed to establish unauthorized contract, even with TEA report declaring contract was executed in violation of procurement laws
Nurse who reported believed violation of overtime restrictions to legal department deemed not to have reported to proper agency under Whistleblower Act
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