Source: http://www.torttalk.com/2013_02_01_archive.html
Timestamp: 2016-08-29 03:37:29
Document Index: 38610884

Matched Legal Cases: ['§51', '§51', '§51', '§8371', '§8371', '§8371']

TORT TALK: February 2013
I was recently invited by The Legal Intelligencer/Pennsylvania Law Weekly, for whom I write a regular civil litigation column, to participate in a series of video presentations for their website. In the first video clip generated, Pennsylvania Law Weekly staff reporter Ben Present and I discuss the emerging issue of social media law. In this installment, we discuss whether Facebook pages are discoverable.
This video is part of the paper's Social Media Law collection, which features news, analysis, videos and an interactive timeline on this growing area of law. Other clips are expected to follow. To view the first installment video clip on the discoverability of Facebook pages, click HERE.
I thank reporter Ben Present for inviting me to participate in this discussion.
Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel By Workers' Comp Claimant Upheld In his recent February 13, 2013 Memorandum and Order in the
case of Alpensjo v. Sandvik Materials
Technology, Inc., No. 2010-Civil-1277 (C.P. Feb. 13, 2013, Minora, J.),
Judge Carmen D. Minora of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas addressed
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff asserting the
theory of collateral estoppel based upon a final judgment rendered by a
worker’s compensation judge. This case arises out of a Complaint filed by the Plaintiff
alleging that Sandvik wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff's employment as a
violation of public policy in the context of a worker’s compensation
claim. The Complaint also alleged
defamation. According to the Opinion, the record before the Court
contained evidence of positive work reviews and advancement by the Plaintiff in
his employment up through the date of a December 11, 2008 motor vehicle
accident that left the Plaintiff impaired and unable to work. The Court noted that, up to the time of the
accident, there is no documents or testimony suggesting that Sandvik was
unhappy with the Plaintiff as their employee. After the accident, the Plaintiff was limited in his ability
to work and attempted, despite his condition, to at least work part-time
hours. By March of 2009, the Plaintiff
arrived at work and was advised that his employment was terminated. The Plaintiff, who was a Swedish citizen was
advised that he had 30 days to leave the country as his work Visa was set to
expire. The Court noted that the Plaintiff had a companion worker’s
compensation benefits claim proceeding after his motor vehicle accident as
well. In the worker’s compensation
claim, the worker’s compensation judge rendered a decision on the Plaintiff’s
claim. The Plaintiff asserted that the
worker’s compensation judge’s decision should act as collateral estoppel on
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in that Opinion
related to issues pending in his Court of Common Pleas action. The defense argued that the worker’s compensation decision should
not be deemed to be conclusive or be given preclusive effect as the Defendant had
no full and fair opportunity to litigate before the worker’s compensation
court. The Defendant also argued that
there was no identity of issues as required by the doctrine of collateral
With respect to this Court of Common Pleas decision, there
was an issue as to whether or to the worker’s compensation decision squarely
faced and resolved the central factual issue raised in the Court of Common Pleas
case, i.e., whether the Plaintiff was subjected to a retaliatory discharge from his
employment. Judge Carmen D. Minora
In his Opinion, Judge Minora provides a thorough review of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as well as the relationship of issues
raised in a worker’s compensation claim as related to a companion Court of
Common Pleas claim. After reviewing the
record before the Court, Judge Minora found that the elements necessary to
implement the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion were met in
the case before him. Judge Minora also
found that the worker’s compensation hearings were conducted with sufficient
protections and opportunity to be heard by Sandvik. Ultimately, the Court found that the parties of the worker’s
compensation case were identical to the parties in this Court of Common Pleas
case and that Sandvik had a full and fair opportunity to litigate at the
worker’s compensation hearing. Accordingly, Judge Minora found that certain factual determinations made
by the worker’s compensation judge were deemed to be conclusively established
between the parties for purposes of the Court of Common Pleas case and that the
Defendant was collaterally estopped from disputing these particular
issues. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s request for partial summary
judgment based upon a doctrine of collateral estoppel was granted. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision reviewing the
doctrine of collateral estoppel may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. I send thanks to the Foley Law Firm in Scranton, PA for bringing this
Judge Nealon Reviews Frye Expert Standard in FELA Case
In another FELA decision in the case of Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway Co. Inc., No. 2005-CV-1826
(C.P. Feb. 12, 2013 Nealon, J.), Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna
County Court of Common Pleas addressed a Frye
motion filed by the railroad Defendants to bar the opinion of the Plaintiff’s
expert. As you may recall from prior posts, these consolidated cases involve former
railroad workers seeking to recover damages under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51-60, for black lung disease allegedly caused
by occupational exposure to coal dust. In this particular matter, the Defendants filed a Frye motion asserting that the
Plaintiffs’ pulmonary expert admitted under oath during his trial deposition
that he did not observe the generally accepted methodology for diagnosing
pneumoconiosis (black lung disease), such that the expert’s opinion should be
deemed to be inadmissible under the standard set forth in the Frye decision. Judge Terrence R. Nealon
Judge Nealon granted the Defendant’s Motion after noting
that, during his trial testimony, the Plaintiffs’ expert identified the
generally accepted methodology for diagnosing black lung disease but acknowledged
that he did not follow that methodology in formulating his opinions. The Court also noted that the expert’s
opinions were not supported by any generally accepted diagnostic criteria.
Accordingly, the testimony was ruled inadmissible under Frye and Pa. R.C.P. 207.1. The Court therefore
granted the Defendant’s Frye motion
and ruled that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible. Judge Nealon’s opinion provides a thorough review of the
standard set forth under Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for the evaluation of novel scientific
evidence being offered by an expert. Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. Given the number of decisions issued in this
matter, please reference Dennis v.
Delaware and Hudson Railway (Frye standard) when requesting this Opinion.
In a January 31, 2013 decision in the case of Hoy v. Holmes, No. S-57-12, 107 Sch.L.R. 19 (C.P. Schuylkill Co. 2013 Domalakes, J.), Judge John E. Domalakes addressed a Defendant's Motion to Compel access to a Plaintiff's social media sites, including Facebook, in a motor vehicle accident case. Finding no factual predicate presented to allow for access to the Plaintiff's private pages on social media sites, the court denied the motion to compel without prejudice to the Defendant's right to present the motion again if a factual predicate was established.
Please let me know if you hear of any other Facebook Discovery decisions. Posted by
In its recent February 20, 2013 decision in the case of Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm, No. 35 MAP 2012 (Pa. 2013)(Majority: Castille, C.J., Eakin, J., Todd, J.)(Maj.Opinion by Saylor, J.)(Dissent by Baer, J. with McCaffery, J. joining)(Orie Melvin, J., did not participate), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that attorney fees are not
recoverable when the peer review process is followed under Section 1797 of the
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
As noted in this previous Tort Talk post, the Pennsylvania Superior Court had gone the other way and allowed for the recovery of attorney's fees in this scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.
This case provides a nice overview of the peer review process and challenges to the same. In this matter, an individual obtained treatment from a chiropractic office after a motor vehicle accident. State Farm submitted the chiropractor's medical bills to the peer review process and the result was a finding that certain treatments by the chiropractor were not reasonable and necessary. As such, the carrier refused further payments. In response, the chiropractic office filed suit and one of the main issues that went up to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the remedies permitted under the statute.
While the carrier appeared to agree that the medical provider may have been authorized to seek the recovery of the payments due plus interest under the statute, the carrier asserted that attorneys fees were not permitted under the plain language of the statute where a peer review was utilized prior to the denial of the payments.
The Supreme Court relied upon several reasons in coming to its decision that attorney's fees were not permitted. One such rationale was the Court's adherence to the American Rule that each party is responsible for its own attorneys fees absent statutory authorization to the contrary allowing the recovery of attorney's fees in a particular matter, an agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, or some other exception (none of which was found to exist in this matter).
While the Court agreed that Section 1797 is "neither comprehensive or a model of clarity," any change of the law in this regard in terms of attorney's fee-shifting should come from the General Assembly and not the Court. The Court went on to state that the "Legislature's failure to adjust Section 1797 over time as imperfections have been revealed by experience, while unfortunate, does not alter the functions ascribed to our branches of government."
Applying the statute as worded, the Court concluded that attorney's fees were not warranted where a peer review was utilized in the process.
The Majority's Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
The Dissenting Opinion in Herd Chiropractic v. State Farm can be viewed HERE.
I send thanks to Attorney Mark Martini of the Pittsburgh law firm of Robb Leonard Mulvihill for bringing this case to my attention. Attorney Martini and Attorney Robert Loch, of the same office, filed the amicus curiae brief for the Pennsylvania Defense Institute. Attorney Gary Drakas of Forry Ullman represented State Farm.
In the case of Murphy v.
Hampton et al, No. 2012-3855 (Centre Co. Feb. 14, 2013 Grine, J.), the court reviewed a matter involving a lawsuit
filed after a person was allegedly injured in an accident with a bus. The victim filed a lawsuit against the driver of the bus, the bus driver's
employer, Centre Area Transportation Authority, and Nationwide, the Plaintiff's underinsured
motorist (UIM) carrier.
The third party Defendants filed preliminary objections to the jointly filed Complaint.
The third party Defendants made assertions of (1) improper joinder under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2229(b) and (2) a need for severance
under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(b) because they would be
prejudiced by the introduction of insurance evidence at trial.
The trial court ruled in Murphy that the cases were not improperly joined as the
causes of action arose out of the same occurrence and the same operative facts. The court also noted that
joinder avoided inefficiency and the delay attendant with what would be nearly two identical trials. The court also noted that the joinder of the claims promoted judicial economy.
The trial court also found that
severance was not required and the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 411 under the circumstances presented.
Judge Thomas Wallitsch (Ret.) recently issued an Order in
the arbitration case of Bradigan v.
Progressive in which he denied a Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order
regarding an independent neuropsychological examination. Although this Order is not binding
precedent, it is noteworthy on the issue presented. In his Order, Judge Wallitsch stated that he found the
Opinion of Judge R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., in the case of Rotunda v. Petruska to be persuasive. Judge Wallitsch rejected an apparent argument by the defense that the testing, and therefore the results, of the neuropsychological examination may be altered by the presence of a third party in the room such as a representative of the Plaintiff's attorney's office. In his Order, Judge Wallitsch quoted Judge Wettick as stating, “the clear
language of the rule allows only examinations that are possible when counsel is
present. A trial court may not, in the
exercise of its discretion, provide for an examination outside the presence of
counsel. Through the promulgation of a
rule permitting counsel to be present, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
decided that the interest of the party to be examined in receiving the
protection afforded by the presence of his or her counsel outweigh the
interests of the parties seeking an examination that can only be conducted
outside the presence of a third party.” Although not cited, it appears that Judge Wallitsch (and
Judge Wettick) were referring to Pa. R.C.P. 4010. In his Order, Judge Wallitsch also confirmed that Plaintiff’s
counsel had agreed, as per the rules, that there would be no audio or video
recording of the neuropsychological evaluation. Anyone desiring a copy of this Order may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. I send thanks to Attorney Neil O’Donnell of
the O’Donnell Law Offices in Kingston, Pennsylvania for bringing this Order to
A Discussion on Joint Tortfeasor Releases Under the New Fair Share Act
I recently received an inquiry as to whether or not the cases now falling under the Fair Share Act, which applies to all incidents occurring on or after June 28, 2011, would required a different form of a joint tortfeasor release if the parties were inclined to enter such a settlement agreement in part. As I did not know the answer, I posted an inquiry on the Pennsylvania Defense Institute Member Listserve and also asked a few Plaintiff's attorneys for their thoughts on this novel issue.
I note that the most common
response was that most attorneys haven't changed their form joint tort releases despite the application of the new Fair Share Act in the more recent cases. The
thought remains that a proper pro rata joint tortfeasor release will still serve to immunize the
settling defendant from further indemnity exposure. It was also noted that, if the Fair Share Act applies to a given case, the court
may be required to mold the verdict based on the terms of the joint tortfeasor release. When I suggested that this topic would make a good CLE topic, one attorney advised that the PBI already has a CLE on the topic
titled "How to Properly Document a Settlement Agreement" and subtitled
"After the New Joint and Several Liability Law." The materials are
referenced at PBI No. 2012-7607.
Of course, the above should only serve as a start, and not an end, to any research or discussion on this novel question. Further research on the issue is recommended and this post should not be relied upon as a final answer to the question.
Fair Share Act,
In the matter of Franchetti
v. Ranieli, No. 7461 of 2010 (CP Luz. Co. 2012 Burke,
P.J.), President Judge Thomas F. Burke, Jr., granted a Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order and limited
a vocational expert’s examination to four (4) hours. President Judge Burke further compelled that the examination
would be conducted Interrogatories in a local venue and not in the vocational
expert’s office in Valley Forge, PA. In an Order entered by the Honorable Michael T. Vough in the
matter of Price v. Price, Auto Glass
Unlimited and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 13625 of 2010 (C.P. Luz. Co. 2012 Vough, J.), Judge Vough directed that a
vocational expert appear to testify and explain before the Court on the issue
of the location and requested length of his desired interview of the
Plaintiff. Reportedly, in response, the
vocational expert agreed to be guided by the restriction set by President Judge
Burke in Franchetti and the November
19, 2012 hearing on the Motion in the Price case was cancelled. In neighboring Lackawanna County, in the case of Marion v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Company, No. 11-CV-7451 (C.P.
Lacka. Co. 2012 Burke, D.M.), Attorney Henry Burke, in his capacity as the Lackawanna County Discovery Master, essentially adopted President Judge Thomas Burke’s position
from the Franchetti case. Judge Henry Burke restricted a vocational expert's examination
to five (5) hours, ordered that it take place at a local venue, and that a representative of Plaintiff’s
attorney’s office be allowed to be present (consistent with Rule 4010 and Rule
4010.1).
This CLE seminar promises an update on Auto Law and General Civil Litigation Law with a Big 80s flavor in terms of videos and clips. There will also be a presentation on shoulder and knee injuries by a local noted physiatrist. The last session will be a View from the Bench with Judge Carmen Minora of Lackawanna County and Judge Michael Vough from Luzerne County. The program has been approved by the Pennsylvania CLE Board for 2 Substantive Credits and 1 Ethics Credit.
and Daniel E. Cummins, Esquire
MOHEGAN SUN CASINO at POCONO DOWNS Thursday, April 18, 2013 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. 2 Substantive & 1 Ethics CLE Credits
1:00 – 2:30 pm: THE BIG 80s: AN UPDATE WITH A 1980s FLAVOR --1:00 – 1:45 pm: THE TORT TALK AUTO LAW UPDATE
Foley, Comerford & Cummins --1:45 – 2:30 pm: THE TORT TALK CIVIL LITIGATION UPDATE
Presenters: Malcolm L. MacGregor, Esq.
Presenter: Dr. John Kline, Physiatrist
Northeastern Rehabilitation Associates 3:45 – 4:00 pm: BREAK
Presenters: Lackawanna County Judge Carmen D. Minora
Luzerne County Judge Michael T. Vough COMPLIMENTARY COCKTAIL RECEPTION TO FOLLOW AT BREAKERS
Contact Dan Cummins at dancummins@comcast.net or 570-346-0745 for more information or to register.
Courtside Documents: http://www.courtsidedoc.com EPS Settlements Group: www.epssettlements.com Exhibit A: http://www.exhibitadigital.com Minnesota Lawyers' Mutual: http://www.mlmins.com Northeastern Rehabilitation Associates: www.nerehab.com Network Deposition Services: www.ndsreporting.com OPTiMO Information Technology: www.OPTiMO-IT.com RecordTrak: http://www.recordtrak.com Posted by
15th Annual Personal Injury Potpourri This CLE event is set to take place on April 16, 2013 at the Philadelphia Convention Center in Philadelphia, PA. My topic will be a "Comprehensive Civil Litigation Update."
Judge Nealon of Lackawanna County Addresses Several Issues Under Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
Judge Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas recently addressed a number of different issues in several opinions in the context of consolidated actions brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Below are summaries of the recent decisions:
In his recent January 25, 2013 decision in the case of Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway
Company, Inc., No. 2005-CV-1826 (C.P. Lacka. Co.
Pleas addressed a railroad Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to
dismiss four lawsuits by its former employees under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (“FELA”). The railroad
Defendants asserted that release agreements that were excluded by the employees
at issue barred their actions seeking to recover damages for black lung disease
allegedly caused by coal dust exposure.
In his decision, Judge Nealon noted that, under the more
stringent more federal standard governing the enforceability of releases under
the FELA, the language of the settlement release is strong, but not conclusive, evidence of the parties’ intent
and the critical inquiry is what employment-related risks were known to the
railroad employees at the time they signed their earlier releases. Ultimately, the court in this matter held that, in light of
the more demanding standard applicable to FELA releases, it was a jury question
as to whether the Claimants were aware of their black lung disease and its
relation to occupational coal dust exposure at the time they executed their
releases. As such, the railroad
Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment were denied. In his Opinion, Judge Nealon provides a thorough overview of
the validity of FELA releases making this Opinion one to have if you are faced
with such issues. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may
contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. Please reference this case as Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway (Enforceability of Releases). FELA's Statute of Limitations
In yet another decision issued by Judge Terrence R. Nealon
in the case of Fraynert v. Delaware and
Hudson Railway Company, Inc., No. 2005-Civil-2822 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Jan. 31,
2013 Nealon, J)(consolidated with Dennis case), Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed another issue arising under
six (6) consolidated claims brought pursuant to the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51-60. In this particular Opinion, the court addressed FELA’s three year
statute of limitations. The cases all involve alleged pulmonary injuries that were
allegedly negligently caused by occupational exposure to coal dust. This particular issue came before the Court by way of Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by the Railroad Defendants in all six (6)
cases. In their Motion, the Defendants
asserted that the occupational exposure claims were barred by FELA’s three year
statute of limitations. Ultimately, Judge Nealon granted the Railroad’s Motion for
Summary Judgment as to one Plaintiff based upon the federal version of the
“discovery rule.” The court found that
jury questions on the issues presented remained in the other five (5) cases and the Motions for Summary Judgment were denied in those cases.
Anyone desiring a copy of this case may shoot me an email at
dancummins@comcast.net. Given the number of Opinions I have in this
case, to assist me in locating and send to you this particular decision, please
reference Fraynert v. Delaware and Hudson
Railway (statute of limitations under discovery rule). New Matter//Affirmative Defenses
In yet another Opinion arising out of the railroad/FELA cases
pending before the court, Judge Terrence R. Nealon addressed the need to assert
affirmative defenses in order that such defenses may not be waived in the case
of Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway
Company, Inc., No. 2005-Civil-1826 (C.P. Lacka. Co. Feb. 8, 2013 Nealon,
J.). In this particular opinion, Judge Nealon addressed another
Motion for Summary Judgment by the railroad Defendant in this action under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §51-60.
In this case, the Defendant argued that an Asset Purchase
Agreement (APA) under which it acquired substantially all of the assets of the former
Delaware and Hudson Railway Company, barred the Plaintiff’s suits seeking to
recover non-economic damages for alleged pulmonary injuries negligently caused
by occupational exposure to dust. The
railroad Defendants contended that, under the terms of the APA, it did not
assume liability for the FELA claims at issue involving occupational exposures
during the periods of the Plaintiffs’ employment with the former Delaware and
Hudson Railway Company. However, Judge Nealon ruled that the Defendant’s summary
judgment argument based upon the Asset Purchase Agreement raised extrinsic
facts which, if true, would defeat Plaintiffs’ FELA claims even if the allegations
contained in their Complaints were accepted as true. Accordingly, this argument was found to constitute affirmative
defense that was waived unless timely raised in a new matter pursuant to Pa.
R.C.P. 1030(a). Since
the pleadings filed by the Defendants in these cases never asserted the
affirmative defense based upon the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Defendant
waived that defense and was, therefore, not entitled to summary judgment based
upon the Asset Purchase Agreement.
Judge Nealon’s Opinion provides a thorough overview of the
law pertaining to affirmative defenses and the waiver of those defenses that
are required to be pled under Pa. R.C.P. 1030. The Opinion also cautions
that Rule 1030(a) list but does not limit what may be pled as a New Matter
and, as such, there are other affirmative defenses not listed as Rule 1030 that
could be deemed to be a waivable defense. For example, the Court cites cases noting that the following
affirmative defenses can be deemed to be waivable in particular cases: Abandonment, Rescission, and a defense which
is premised upon a contractual limitation or provision. As such, this Opinion emphasizes the importance of raising
all possible defenses in the New Matter even if they are not listed as
affirmative defenses in Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a). The import of this rule is not limited to FELA cases.
Anyone desiring a copy of this Opinion may contact me at dancummins@comcast.net. Given the number of Opinions issued by the
Court in this particular case, when requesting a copy of this case, please reference
Dennis v. Delaware and Hudson Railway
Company, Inc. (affirmative defenses).
County decision by Judge
David Williamson in the case of Martz
v. JKS Mobile
Home Park, PICS Case No. 13-0091 (C.P. Monroe Co. Dec. 12, 2012 Williamson,
J.), the court entered summary judgment in favor of a Defendant in a trip and
fall case. By way of background, the Plaintiff alleged personal
injuries after having tripped and fallen in her own yard on a piece of metal
protruding out of the ground. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging
that the Defendant was liable because it breached its duty to her in failing to
keep the rear area of her leased lot free and clear of all dangerous
conditions. The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting
that there is no question of any material fact as to liability because the
Plaintiff had admitted at her deposition that she was in possession of the
leased premises at the time of her injury and that the Defendant had no notice of
the alleged defective condition. The Plaintiff attempted to raise genuine issue of material
fact as to possession and control of the area in which she fell. The court granted summary judgment after determining, from a
review of the Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, that she had maintained the
area for almost three (3) years and had even placed a fence around it. Based upon this testimony, the court
determined that the area was within her maintenance and control and that the
Defendant had no duty to make the area safe. The court also relied upon the Plaintiff’s deposition with
respect to her admission that even she did not know how long the object that
caused her to trip and fall was in her backyard. The Plaintiff had also only witnessed the
Defendant’s employees leave logs in or near her yard, which had nothing to do
with her fall. No other involvement by the Defendant with the Plaintiff's yard was indicated. As such, the court
determined that the Plaintiff had failed to show any breach of any duty by the
Defendant. Significantly, the court also rejected the Plaintiff’s
argument that a determination on summary judgment could not be made on
deposition testimony alone. The court
cited applicable law confirming that, since the Defendant had supported its
motion by using the deposition testimony of an opposing party and the
admissions contained therein, summary judgment could be granted on that basis
under Pennsylvania. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact the
Pennsylvania Law Weekly’s Pennsylvania Instant Case Service at 1-800-276-7427
and providing the above-referenced PICS Case Number and paying a small fee. Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions,” Pennsylvania Law Weekly, 30 PLW 103 (Jan. 29, 2013). Posted by
The United States Federal Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recently issued a decision granting in part and denied in part an
insurance company’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the bad faith case of Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
PICS Case No. 13-0136 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2012 Rice, J.). The matter arose out of an insurance dispute arising from
storm water damage. The Plaintiff sued
the Defendant insurance company for bad faith, fraud, and breach of
contract. The Plaintiff
sued Allstate for allegedly acting in bad faith by refusing to pay Plaintiff’s
full claim for benefits. However, the court
found that Allstate’s reliance upon estimates provided by an independent
adjuster assigned by Allstate was not unreasonable or
unfounded. The court also noted that the Plaintiff’s allegations of bad
faith based upon the alleged incompetency of the adjuster would, at best,
reflect allegations of mere negligence or bad judgment, neither of which was
sufficient to support a claim for bad faith in the sense of any alleged
dishonest purpose, ill will, or disregard for the truth by Allstate. Ultimately, the court granted the carrier’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff’s claims for bad faith and fraud. The court denied the carrier’s motion with
respect to the Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact the
and providing the above-referenced PICS Case Number and paying a small fee. Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions,” Pennsylvania Law Weekly 30 PLW 103 (Jan. 29, 2013). The Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co. Opinion may also be viewed online HERE.
Ski Resort's Release From Liability Upheld in Monroe County
In his recent December 6, 2012 decision, Judge Jonathan Mark of the
Monroe County Court of Common Pleas recently granted summary judgment in favor
of a ski resort in the case of Freeman v.
Camelback Ski Corp., PICS Case No. 13-0083 (C.P. Monroe Co. Dec. 6, 2012
Mark, J.). In this matter, the court ruled that the ski resort’s liability
release and agreement not to sue for injuries resulting from the act of skiing
or the use of the resort’s equipment or facilities contemplated and included
the Plaintiff’s action of walking in ski boots across a pathway from the rental
equipment building to the ski slopes. As such, the court granted the Defendant’s ski resort’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Under the liability release form signed by the Plaintiff
entitled “Rental Agreement and Agreement Not to Sue-PLEASE READ” was a clause
stating that the signor understood and assumed the risk of skiing and agreed
not to sue the Camelback Ski Resort for any injuries sustained as a result of
skiing or using Camelback’s equipment or facility. The Plaintiff was allegedly injured while wearing ski boots and
carrying skis when he left the rental office, walked across the courtyard, and
slipped and fell on a snow/path depression in the walkway. If the parties’ dispute over the scope and extent of the
liability release, the Plaintiff asserted that the release should only be
deemed to apply to injuries and damages associated with the activities of
skiing or snowboarding. The Plaintiff
also alleged that his fall on the walkway was an unexpected risk not specifically
covered by the release. The court disagreed and found the path upon which the
Plaintiff fell to be covered by the liability release. The court noted that the this party was used
for the purpose of getting the Plaintiff to the designated ski area, which was
the purpose for which he had rented equipment, paid fees, and signed the
release. The court also found an
inherent risk of skiing including the associated act of walking in ski boots to
and from the rental equipment office to the slopes while walking over snow
packed walkways. Based upon the above, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Defendant. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision may contact the
and providing the above-referenced PICS Case Number and paying a small fee. Source: “Digest of Recent Opinions,” Pennsylvania Law Weekly (30 PLW 103) (Jan. 29, 2013). Posted by
In her recent January 24, 2013 decision in the case of Katta v. GEICO, No. 2:11-CIV-729 (W.D.
Pa. Jan. 24, 2013 Conti, J.), Judge Joy Flowers Conti of the United States
District Court For the Western District of Pennsylvania addressed several bad
faith issues in the uninsured motorist context. By way of background, this matter arose out of a motor
vehicle accident during which an uninsured driver was involved in an accident
with the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The
Plaintiff filed a claim for uninsured motorist coverage under his insurance
policy with GEICO. Following an
inability to agree upon a valuation of the claims presented, the Plaintiff
filed suit claiming several violations of Pennsylvania state law, including a
claim for common law bad faith and a violation of the Pennsylvania bad faith
statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371. After discovery was completed, the Defendant filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment raising two issues. First, the defense asserted that Pennsylvania did not recognize a common
law claim for bad faith. Secondly,
GEICO argued that the agreed upon facts do not support a claim for bad faith
pursuant to the Pennsylvania bad faith statute. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part
and denied in part. The court denied the Defendant’s GEICO’s Motion for Summary
Judgment to the extent that it asserted that Pennsylvania did not recognize a
common law claim of bad faith. To the
contrary, the court in this matter found that Pennsylvania does indeed
recognize such a common law claim, citing Birth
Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001). However, the court granted the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the Plaintiff’s statutory bad faith
claim under 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371. After
thoroughly reviewing the law applicable to statutory bad faith claims, the
court found that the Plaintiff did not establish that the Defendant had
unreasonably undervalued the Plaintiff’s injuries. In this regard, the Plaintiff largely relied upon the fact that
the Plaintiff alleged that there was a lost wage claim of $17,770, which was
approximately 2 ½ times greater than the Defendant’s overall offer of $7,000.00 in settlement. The court noted that the evidence presented indicated that
the Defendant was not aware of the Plaintiff’s lost wages at the time that
offer was made. The court otherwise also noted that the Plaintiff failed to
identify any relevant legal authority supporting the Plaintiff’s argument that
a disagreement over the evaluation of the claim was sufficient to constitute
bad faith as a matter of law. To the contrary, the court in this matter found that,
viewing the record as a whole, the carrier had presented evidence that it had
acted reasonably with respect to the handling of the Plaintiff’s claim.
The court also noted that the Plaintiff did
not meet his burden of establishing clear and convincing evidence in bad
faith. More specifically, the records revealed uncertainties
surrounding the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and treatment such that the
Defendant was under no affirmative duty to even negotiate a settlement. While the Defendant did make an offer based upon its review
of the evidence, the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the
Defendant failed to consider all of the information available to it at the time
the offer was made. The court stated
that, even after the Defendant became aware of the Plaintiff’s alleged lost
wages, there still remained conflicting evidence about the extent of the Plaintiff’s
injuries in light of the IME completed and the evidence of the Plaintiff’s
subsequent accidents. The court reiterated
that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Defendant presented
in this matter. Rather, the facts
presented merely reflected a disagreement over the value of the Plaintiff’s
claims. As such, the Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment filed against the statutory bad faith claims under
42 Pa. C.S.A. §8371 was granted. Anyone wishing to review the Katta v. GEICO decision, may click HERE.
Tort Talk in the News! Click Here to View.
Totally unbeknownst to me, Tort Talk was selected as the "Blog of the Week" by www.NEPABlogs.org and was featured as such on the local news program PA Live! (WBRE - Channel 28) yesterday. What a nice surprise and honor! Click the above link to view.
I send thanks to Gary Willsch of At the Scene, Inc., a local professional investigative services company, for bringing this broadcast to my attention and sending me the link.
I also thank Harold Jenkins of www.NEPABlogs.org for selecting Tort Talk as the "Blog of the Week." Here's the LINK to the review of Tort Talk on that Blog.
Judge Williamson of Monroe County Addresses Several Post-Koken Issues At Once
In his recent decision in the case of Orsulak v. Windish, No. 55-Civil-2011 (C.P. Monroe Co. Jan. 14,
2013 Williamson, J.), Judge David J. Williamson of the Monroe County Court of
Common Pleas addressed several issues, including a Motion for Severance filed
by the Defendant insurance company, Penn National Insurance, in a post-Koken
matter involving claims of underinsured motorist benefits and bad faith. In its Motion, Penn National requested a severance of the
underinsured motorist claims from the breach of contract and bad faith
action. In the alternative, Penn
National requested a special procedure to be employed by the Court to ensure a
fair operation of the justice system under the facts presented. In another motion, Penn National sought the
preclusion of the introduction of any evidence of insurance at trial. Judge Williamson granted Penn National’s request for
severance of the breach of contract and bad faith claims from the UIM
claim. The judge agreed with the
carrier’s request that the breach of contract and bad faith claims be heard
after the UIM case is concluded. The Court agreed that discovery of
attorney/client communications that may be relevant in a bad faith action, but
not in a UIM claim, could be better protected, and the interest in justice
would be served if the matter was severed. Judge Williamson reasoned that while the bad faith claim
would be decided by the Court, the remaining claims involved jury issues. The Court noted that, if the cases remained
consolidated, evidence admitted before the jury in the bad faith claim for the
Court only to consider would likely only serve to confuse the jury and its role
in the proceedings. The Court also
noted that the disclosure of certain information for purposes of the bad faith
claim could serve to prejudice the jury against the insurance company
Defendant. Furthermore, if the cases
were severed, the jury could be shielded from any improper mentioning of
insurance. While agreeing with that
argument, the Court did note that it understood that members of the jury must
be, in this day in age, aware that automobile insurance issues are raised in
automobile accident matters. The Court also noted that, in this case, the Plaintiff’s
underlying third party liability claim against the tortfeasor and the breach of
contract UIM claim would be heard together and that the verdict and amount of
damages entered in that matter could ultimately make the companion bad faith
claim moot. The Court noted that if the
Plaintiff’s underlying claims are settled, or if a jury returned a verdict for
less than the policy limits of the UIM coverage, the bad faith claim would then
have no merit. Accordingly, the Court
found the interest of justice, fairness, and judicial economy mandated that the
be severed from the UIM claim. While the Court granted Penn National’s severance request,
it denied the request of the carrier that all proceedings in the bad faith
case, including discovery, be stayed pending the resolution of the UIM
claim. The Court found that to grant
such a request would unfairly delay the possible conclusion of all of the
proceedings. Judge Williamson also
noted that the Plaintiff had a right to move their cases to trial. The Court also noted that the fact that the UIM
claim may be settled or resolved for less than the policy limits, thereby
making the bad faith claim moot, was not sufficient reasons to freeze discovery
in the bad faith claim. The Court
additionally noted that the carrier did not show any actual prejudice that
would outweigh the Plaintiffs’ right to move this case along and have the bad
faith claim heard immediately, or as soon as possible, once the UIM claim is
tried to verdict. Judge Williamson stated that, while he saw no actual prejudice
at present, he did reserve the power to order restrictions on discovery if and
when prejudice is shown by way of a motion filed after discovery was served. Judge
Williamson stated that there were different ways that the Court could handle a
situation where prejudicial information of the carrier may be potentially exposed through discovery efforts. He rejected the request for a blanket
“freeze” of all matters in the bad faith claim until the UIM claim is
concluded. In so ruling, the Court
recognized that there may be some information contained in the carrier’s files
that the carriers should not be required to furnish until the resolution of the
UIM claim, “including statements regarding settlement strategy.” Lastly, the Court granted Penn National’s additional request
that the UIM claim be consolidated with the underlying tortfeasor claim. This request was granted in the interest of
judicial economy. The Court also granted the carrier’s additional Motion to
Preclude the Introduction of any Insurance during the course of trial. The Court also agreed that Penn National’s
name should not be mentioned during the course of the trial. However, the Court did agree that it would
be unfair not to identify counsel for Penn National who might appear at
trial. The Court stated that, not
identifying Penn National’s defense attorney could allow a jury to infer that
both defense counsel represents a tortfeasor. The Court felt that this would be improper as was previously held in the
Allegheny Court of Common Pleas case of Stepanovich
v. McGraw. As such, Judge Williamson felt that it would not be fair to
the Plaintiff to grant the carrier’s request for consolidation and then not
explain why the Penn National is defending the matter and is present in
addition to the tortfeasor. Accordingly, Judge Williamson noted that, if Penn National intended to
participate in the jury trial with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s
attorney, then Penn National would be identified at trial as an additional
party. However, if Penn National’s
plan was not to participate at trial than that carrier would not be
identified. I send thanks to Attorney Pete Speaker of the Harrisburg office of Thomas, Thomas & Hafer for forwarding this case to my attention. Anyone desiring a copy of this decision by Judge Williamson
in the case of Orsulak v. Windish may
contact me at dancummins@comcast.net.
I have updated the Post-Koken Scorecard with this case. That Scorecard can also always be reached at the Tort Talk website at www.TortTalk.com by scrolling down the right hand column of the blog and clicking on the date under the label, "Post-Koken Scorecard."
TORT TALK EXPO 2013 CLE SEMINAR IS JUST TWO AND A HALF MONTHS AWAY
The Tort Talk Expo 2013 CLE Seminar (April 18, 2013) is ONLY TWO AND A HALF MONTHS AWAY.
Registration is now open -- Seats are filling up quickly, and so is your calendar, so please consider registering now if you plan to attend.
This CLE seminar promises an update on Auto Law and General Civil Litigation Law with a Big 80s flavor in terms of videos and clips. There will also be a presenation on shoulder and knee injuries by a local noted physiatrist. The last session will be a View from the Bench with Judge Carmen Minora of Lackawanna County and Judge Michael Vough from Luzerne County. The program has been approved by the Pennsylvania CLE Board for 2 Substantive Credits and 1 Ethics Credit.
At The Scene, Inc.: http://www.atthescene.com/ Courtside Documents: http://www.courtsidedoc.com/
Settlements Group: www.epssettlements.com
Exhibit A: http://www.exhibitadigital.com/ Minnesota Lawyers' Mutual: http://www.mlmins.com/
OPTiMO Information Technology: www.OPTiMO-IT.com RecordTrak: http://www.recordtrak.com/