Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/85540/spies-vs-illinois
Timestamp: 2017-06-25 09:46:31
Document Index: 266185195

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 274', '§ 46', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 9564', '§ 468', '§ 7278', '§ 709']

Spies Vs Illinois - Citation 85540 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Spies Vs. Illinois - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/85540CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-02-1887Case Number123 U.S. 131AppellantSpiesRespondentillinoisExcerpt:
spies v. illinois - 123 u.s. 131 (1887)
it is well settled that the first ten articles of amendment to the constitution of the united states were not intended to limit the powers of the..... Judgment:
, affirmed to the point that when a challenge by a defendant in a criminal action to a juror for bias, actual or implied, is disallowed, and the juror is thereupon peremptorily challenged by the defendant and excused, and an impartial and competent juror is obtained in his place, no injury is done the defendant if, until the jury is completed, he has other peremptory challenges which he can use.
, affirmed to the point that the right to challenge is the right to reject, not the right to select a juror, and if from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is maintained.
that, as thus interpreted, the statute did not deprive the persons accused of a right to trial by an impartial jury; that it was not repugnant to the Constitution of Illinois nor to the Constitution of the United States, and that if the sentence of the court after conviction should be carried into execution, they would not be deprived of their lives without due process of law.
"It shall be sufficient cause of challenge of a petit juror that he lacks any one of the qualifications mentioned in Section 2 of this act, or if he is not one of the regular panel, that he has served as a juror on the trial of a cause in any court of record in the county within one year previous to the time of his being offered as a juror, or that he is a party to a suit pending for trial in that court at that term. It shall be the duty of the court to discharge from the panel all jurors who do not possess the qualifications provided in this act as soon as the fact is discovered,
if a person has served on a jury in a court of record within one year, he shall be exempt from again serving during such year unless he waives such exemption;
that it shall not be a cause of challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of the crime with which the prisoner is charged if such juror shall state on oath that he believes he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence,
that in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion) shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case if he shall upon oath state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement."
) Because in this case the protection, privilege, right and immunity of a previous uniform construction [
] of the Constitutions of the State of Illinois relating to the impartiality of jurors, and an opinion touching the prisoner's guilt, to remove which evidence would be required, were denied to the defendants, whereby they were deprived of "the equal protection of the laws," it being held in this case as against the petitioners by said Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, but without overruling, modifying or calling in question any of such prior opinions and decisions of said court, that the prior opinion of the proposed juror concerning the guilt of the accused, though firm and deeply seated, based on reports fully believed to be true, and though said opinion was of such a nature as would require evidence, and even strong evidence, for its removal, did not render such person disqualified to sit as a juror for the trial of this case and these petitioners.
) Because although the Supreme Court of Illinois had uniformly accorded to other persons accused of crime the protection in the selection of a jury of excluding from the jury, as disqualified by reason of partiality, favor or bias, persons who confessed a prejudice against the class of persons to which the defendants confessedly belonged, and had uniformly held that the accused had the right to interrogate proposed jurors fully, so as to ascertain whether such prejudice was so strong as to probably affect their verdict, and also to advise the accused with reference to determining whether to exercise a peremptory challenge, [
] and although the record showed that the petitioners claimed the same "protection of the law" in the selection of the jury, and asked that persons be excluded therefrom who confessed that they had a prejudice against persons belonging to the classes or societies called socialists, communists, and anarchists, to some of which defendants
) Because, although the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois had theretofore uniformly held that it was improper and illegal for the representative of the people, in argument to the jury, to go outside of the record, to make unsustained charges against the defendants, and to indulge in vituperation and abuse of the accused, and had held that for such improprieties the cause should be reversed, [
] yet in the case at bar, as appeared from the record, the prosecuting attorney was allowed by the trial court, in the face of objection made, to travel entirely outside of the record and to make as against the defendants, on trial for life, charges and statements having no foundation in the evidence in the record, and was also permitted to indulge in violently denunciatory and abusive language toward the accused.
) Because the counsel for the prosecution had been allowed by the trial court, against the petitioner's objection, to refer to the failure of some of the defendants to testify, and the
) That the petitioners, Fielden, Parsons, and Spies, were put upon the stand as witnesses in their own behalf; that thereupon, under pretence of cross-examination, the representatives of the state were permitted, over the objection and protest of those petitioners, to ask of them various questions, which said petitioners were required by the court to answer, which questions were not by way of cross-examination, but were upon entirely original and new matter, not referred to nor alluded to upon the direct examination in any way whatever, whereby the said petitioners were compelled to give testimony against themselves under such pretence of cross-examination, when on trial for a capital offense, and which testimony said petitioners were also compelled to give, and the same was received, as against all of the petitioners, who were jointly on trial, and were sought to be charged with the crime of murder, as the result of an alleged conspiracy to which the petitioners were claimed to be parties; that the Supreme Court of the Illinois had theretofore uniformly held that an accused person who took the stand as a witness in his own behalf was entitled to be protected in cross-examination, and that the cross-examination must be confined to the subject matter of the direct examination, and
) That it appeared from the record that the houses and business places of the petitioners were forcibly and violently entered, and searched by the officers of the state interested in the prosecution, without any warrant whatever for such action, such entries and searches being made long after the alleged murder charged against the petitioners; that in connection with such forcible entries and searches, various articles of property belonging to different of the petitioners were seized without warrant or authority by the said representatives of the state, which articles of property were offered and received in evidence in the trial court over the objection and exception of the petitioners, whereby the petitioners, through such unlawful conduct upon the part of the representatives of the state, were through their property and effects compelled to give evidence against themselves. The petition particularly referred in this connection to questions put to Spies with reference to a letter and postal addressed to him by Johann Most, which, it was alleged, had been unlawfully taken from Spies' desk by the representative of the state, and it was averred that the introduction of this letter was in contravention of the principles laid down by this Court. [
] This was averred to have been done contrary to the provisions of the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of the 10th section of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Illinois.
) That the act of the Illinois of March 27, 1874, Hurd's ed., 1885, 427, § 274, was as follows:
That under this act, petitioners claimed on the trial that mere advice, not to do the particular crime charged, but advice to a general revolutionary movement, having in view a change in the existing order of society, by public speech, writing or printing, could not make the petitioners guilty of a particular murder of an individual or individuals never advised nor committed by them, but that in order to establish their guilt in such a case, such alleged general advice must be accompanied by some encouragement, aiding, abetting or assisting to the particular act -- in other words, that there must be some physical act, as distinguished from mere general advice, as theretofore held by the Supreme Court of the Illinois; [
] but the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the trial court in overruling this claim of the petitioners and thus denied them their said privileges and immunities.
) That the petitioners had asked the trial court to give certain instructions in regard to the right of peaceable assemblage which are set forth in the petition; that that court refused to give them, and that their refusal had been sustained by the Supreme Court, whereby they had denied to the petitioners the right, privilege and immunity of peaceable assemblage claimed by them, contrary to the law of the land, and whereby was denied to them that due process of law guaranteed to them under the federal Constitution.
There were also allegations that certain instructions of the court relating to a conspiracy between the petitioners, relating to the cross-examination of the defendants and their witnesses in respect to their being "socialists," "anarchists," &c.;, and in regard to the opinions which they entertained, whether
socialistic, communistic, or anarchical, were, in view of c. 38, § 46, of the Criminal Code of Illinois
law, in violation of Section 10, Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States and of Section 11 of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Illinois; also allegations that certain other instructions relating to the weight of evidence and the proof of a conspiracy were given in violation of the same provisions in the Constitution of the United States, but these points were not pressed in the briefs or arguments.
"while summoning talesmen from among bankers, capitalists, wholesale and retail merchants, brokers, board of trade dealers, clerks, salesmen &c.;, he excluded in his selections substantially
Following the precedent in
Twitchell v. The Commonwealth,
7 Wall. 321, we have permitted this motion to be made in open Court, at the suggestion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, to whom the application was first presented, on account of the urgency of the case and its importance. But, as was said in that case, "writs of error to the state courts have never been allowed as of right" -- that is to say as of course -- and it is the duty of him to whom an application for such a writ is made to ascertain, from an examination of the record of the state court,
whether any question reviewable here was made and decided in the proper court below, but whether it is of a character to justify us in bringing the judgment here for reexamination. In our opinion the writ ought not to be allowed by the Court if it appears from the face of the record that the decision of the federal question which is complained of was so plainly right as not to require argument, and especially if it is in accordance with our own well considered judgments in similar cases. That is in effect what was done in
7 Wall. 321, where the writ was refused because the questions presented by the record were "no longer subjects of discussion here," although, if they had been in the opinion of the court "open," it would have been allowed. When, under § 5 of our Rule 6, a motion to affirm is united with a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, the practice has been to grant the motion to affirm when "the question on which our jurisdiction depends was so manifestly decided right that the case ought not to be held for further argument."
118 U. S. 195
121 U. S. 282
. The propriety of adopting a similar rule upon motions in open court for the allowance of a writ of error is apparent, for certainly we would not be justified as a court in sending out a writ to bring up for review a judgment of the highest court of a state, when it is apparent on the face of the record that our duty would be to grant a motion to affirm as soon as it was made in proper form.
That the first ten articles of amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the national government alone, was decided more than a half century ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered to since.
32 U. S. 552
46 U. S. 434
18 How. 71,
59 U. S. 76
20 How. 84,
61 U. S. 91
5 Wall. 475,
72 U. S. 479
9 Wall. 274,
76 U. S. 278
Pearson v. Yewdall,
95 U. S. 294
95 U. S. 296
96 U. S. 101
104 U. S. 79
116 U. S. 265
"It shall be sufficient cause of challenge of a petit juror that he lacks any one of the qualifications mentioned in § 2 of this act, or, if he is not one of the regular panel, that he has served as a juror on the trial of a cause in any court of record in the county within one year previous to the time of his being offered as a juror, or that he is a party to a suit pending for trial in that court at that term. It shall be the duty of the court to discharge from the panel all jurors who do not possess the qualifications provided in this act as soon as the fact is discovered,
that it shall not be a cause of challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of the crime with which the prisoner is charged, if such juror shall state on oath that he believes he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence,
that in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression, based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion) shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall upon oath state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement. "
, it was decided by this Court that when
Interpreted in this way, the statute is not materially different from that of the Territory of Utah which we had under consideration in
Hopt v. Utah, ubi supra,
and to which we then gave effect. As that was a territorial statute passed by a territorial legislature for the government of a territory over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, it came directly within the operation of Article VI of the Amendments, which guaranteed to Hopt a trial by an impartial jury.
52 U. S. 459
. No one at that time suggested a doubt of the constitutionality of the statute, and it was regarded both in the territorial courts and here as furnishing the proper rule to be observed by a territorial court in impaneling an impartial jury in a criminal case.
A similar statute was enacted in New York, May 3, 1872, Session Laws of 1872, c. 475, 9 N.Y.Stat. at Large, Edmonds, 2d ed. 373; in Michigan, April 18, 1873, Acts of 1873, 162, Act 117; Howell's Stat., § 9564; in Nebraska, Comp.Stat.Neb. 1885, p. 838; Criminal Code § 468, and in Ohio, Rev.Stat.Ohio 1880, § 7278. The constitutionality of the statute of New York was sustained by the Court of Appeals of that state in Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164, 172, decided June 10, 1873, and that of Ohio in
16 Ohio St. 328. So far as we have been able to discover, no doubt has ever been entertained in Michigan or Nebraska of the constitutionality of the statutes of those states respectively, but they have always been treated by their supreme courts as valid both under the Constitution of the United States and under that of the state.
Stephens v. People,
38 Mich. 739, 741;
Ulrich v. People,
39 Mich. 245;
Murphy v. State,
15 Neb. 383.
Indeed, the rule of the statute of Illinois, as it was construed by the trial court, is not materially different from that which has been adopted by the courts in many of the states without legislative action.
5 Cush. 295;
Holt v. People,
13 Mich. 224;
State v. Fox,
25 N.J.Law 566;
Oslander v. Commonwealth,
3 Leigh 780;
State v. Ellington,
7 Iredell 61;
Smith v. Eames,
3 Scammon 81.
an elaborate note to this last case in
, we said "that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by" a challenge to a juror, in a criminal case, on the ground that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the issues to be tried,
Even if the court was wrong in saying that it did not appear that the Most letter was one of the papers illegally seized, it still remains uncontradicted that objection was not made in the trial court to its admission on that account. To give us jurisdiction under § 709 of the Revised Statutes, because of the denial by a state court of any title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" at the proper time, and in the proper way. To be reviewable here, the decision must be against the right so
set up or claimed.
As the supreme court of the state was reviewing the decision of the trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court, because the supreme court was only authorized to review the judgment for errors committed there, and we can do no more. This is not, as seems to be supposed by one of the counsel for the petitioners, a question of the waiver of a right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, but a question of claim. If the right was not set up or claimed in the proper court below, the judgment of the highest court of the state in the action is conclusive, so far as the right of review here in concerned. The question whether the letter, if obtained in the manner alleged, would have been competent evidence, is not before us, and therefore no foundation is laid under this objection for the exercise of our jurisdiction.
3 Scammon 76;
Gardner v. People,
3 Scammon 83;
Vennum v. Harwood,
1 Gilman 659;
Baxter v. People,
3 Gilman 368;
Neely v. People,
13 Ill. 685;
Gray v. People,
26 Ill. 344;
Collins v. People,
48 Ill. 146;
Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Adler,
56 Ill. 344.
Winnisheik Ins. Co. v. Schueller,
60 Ill. 465;
Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Buttolf,
69 Ill. 347;
Lavin v. People,
69 Ill. 303.
Fox v. People,
96 Ill. 71;
Hennies v. Yodel,
87 Ill. 242.
Cox v. People,
82 Ill. 191 at page 192.