Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/06-219/
Timestamp: 2013-12-08 13:51:04
Document Index: 635630339

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1951', '§1951', '§1961', '§1961', '§34', '§702', '§111', '§617', '§3600', '§1346', '§1951']

WILKIE v. ROBBINS | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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No. 06219.Argued March 19, 2007Decided June 25, 2007
Plaintiff-respondent Robbinss Wyoming guest ranch is a patchwork of land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government. The previous owner granted the United States an easement to use and maintain a road running through the ranch to federal land in return for a right-of-way to maintain a section of road running across federal land to otherwise isolated parts of the ranch. When Robbins bought the ranch, he took title free of the easement, which the Bureau had not recorded. Robbins continued to graze cattle and run guest cattle drives under grazing permits and a Special Recreation Use Permit (SRUP) issued by the Bureau of Land Management. Upon learning that the easement was never recorded, a Bureau official demanded that Robbins regrant it, but Robbins declined. Robbins claims that after negotiations broke down, defendant-petitioners (defendants) began a campaign of harassment and intimidation to force him to regrant the lost easement.
Robbinss suit for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief now includes a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim that defendants repeatedly tried to extort an easement from him and a similarly grounded Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, claim that defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Ultimately, the District Court denied defendants motion to dismiss the RICO claim based on qualified immunity. As to the Bivens claims, it dismissed what Robbins called his Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim and his Fifth Amendment due process claims, but declined to dismiss a Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation for the exercise of Robbinss rights to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse to grant a property interest without compensation. It adhered to this denial on summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
1. Robbins does not have a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens. Pp. 923.
(a) In deciding whether to devise a Bivens remedy for retaliation against the exercise of ownership rights, the Courts first step is to ask whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding damages remedy. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367. But even absent an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed … to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. Ibid. Pp. 911.
(b) For purposes of step one, Robbinss difficulties with the Bureau can be divided into four categories. The first, torts or tort-like injuries, includes an unauthorized survey of the desired easements terrain and an illegal entry into Robbinss lodge. In each instance, he had a civil damages remedy for trespass, which he did not pursue. The second category, charges brought against Robbins, includes administrative claims for trespass and other land-use violations, a fine for an unauthorized road repair, and two criminal charges. Robbins had the opportunity to contest all of the administrative charges; he fought some of the land-use and trespass citations, and challenged the road repair fine as far as the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), but did not seek judicial review after losing there. He exercised his right to jury trial on the criminal complaints. The fact that the jury took 30 minutes to acquit him tends to support his baseless-prosecution charge; but the federal trial judge did not find the Governments case thin enough to justify attorneys fees, and Robbins appealed that ruling late. The third category, unfavorable agency actions, involved a 1995 cancellation of the right-of-way given to Robbinss predecessor in return for the Governments unrecorded easement, a 1995 decision to reduce the SRUP from five years to one, and in 1999, the SRUPs termination and a grazing permits revocation. Administrative review was available for each claim, subject to ultimate judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Robbins did not appeal the 1995 decisions, stopped after an IBLA appeal of the SRUP denial, and obtained an IBLA stay of the grazing permit revocation. The fourth category includes three events that elude classification. An altercation between Robbins and his neighbor did not implicate the Bureau, and no criminal charges were filed. Bureau employees videotaping of ranch guests during a cattle drive, though annoying and possibly bad for business, may not have been unlawful, depending, e.g., on whether the guests were on public or private land. Also, the guests might be the proper plaintiffs in any tort action, and any tort might be chargeable against the Government, not its employees. Likewise up in the air is the significance of an attempt to pressure a Bureau of Indian Affairs employee to impound Robbinss cattle. An impoundments legitimacy would have depended on whether the cattle were on private or public land, and no impoundment actually occurred. Thus, Robbins has an administrative, and ultimately a judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints. This state of law gives him no intuitively meritorious case for a new constitutional cause of action, but neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it. Pp. 1114.
(c) This, then, is a case for Bivens step two, for weighing reasons for and against creating a new cause of action, as common law judges have always done. Robbins concedes that any single action might have been brushed aside as a small imposition, but says that in the aggregate the campaign against him amounted to coercion to extract the easement and should be redressed collectively. On the other side of the ledger is the difficulty in defining a workable cause of action. Robbinss claim of retaliation for exercising his property right to exclude the Government does not fit this Courts retaliation cases, which involve an allegation of impermissible purpose and motivatione.g., an employee is fired after speaking out on matters of public concern, Board of Commrs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668and whose outcome turns on what for questionswhat was the Governments purpose in firing the employee and would he have been fired anyway. Such questions have definite answers, and this Court has established methods to identify the presence of an illicit reason. Robbins alleges not that the Governments means were illegitimate but that the defendants simply demanded too much and went too far. However, a too much kind of liability standard can never be as reliable as a what for one. Most of the offending actions are legitimate tactics designed to improve the Governments negotiating position. Although the Government is no ordinary landowner, in many ways it deals with its neighbors as one owner among the rest. So long as defendants had authority to withhold or withdraw Robbinss permission to use Government land and to enforce the trespass and land-use rules, they were within their rights to make it plain that Robbinss willingness to give an easement would determine how complaisant they would be about his trespasses on public land. As for Robbinss more abstract claim, recognizing a Bivens action for retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests, from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Pp. 1423.
2. RICO does not give Robbins a claim against defendants in their individual capacities. Robbins argues that the predicate act for his RICO claim is a violation of the Hobbs Act, which criminalizes interference with interstate commerce by extortion, along with attempts or conspiracies, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), and defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent … under color of official right, §1951(b)(2). Robbinss claim fails because the Hobbs Act does not apply when the National Government is the intended beneficiary of allegedly extortionate acts. That Act does not speak explicitly to efforts to obtain property for the Government rather than a private party, so the question turns on the common law conception of extortion, which Congress is presumed to have incorporated into the Act in 1946, see, e.g., Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393. At common law, extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what [is] now describe[d] as taking a bribe.  Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255. While public officials were not immune from extortion charges at common law, that crime focused on the harm of public corruption, by selling public favors for private gain, not on the harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on the Governments behalf. The importance of the line between public and private beneficiaries is confirmed by this Courts case law, which is completely barren of an example of extortion under color of official right undertaken for the sole benefit of the Government. More tellingly, Robbins cites no decision by any court, much less this one, in the Hobbs Acts entire 60-year history finding extortion in Government employees efforts to get property for the Governments exclusive benefit. United States v. Green, 350 U. S. 415, which held that extortion as defined in the [Hobbs Act] in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who obtains the property, does not support Robbinss claim that Congress could not have meant to prohibit extortionate acts in the interest of private entities like unions, but ignore them when the intended beneficiary is the Government. Without some other indication from Congress, it is not reasonable to assume that the Hobbs Act (let alone RICO) was intended to expose all federal employees to extortion charges whenever they stretch in trying to enforce Government property claims. Because defendants conduct does not fit the traditional definition of extortion, it also does not survive as a RICO predicate offense on the theory that it is chargeable under [Wyoming] law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, 18 U. S. C. §1961(1)(A). Pp. 2328.
, or a claim against the officials in their individual capacities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§19611968 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). We hold that neither action is available.
Plaintiff-respondent Frank Robbins owns and operates the High Island Ranch, a commercial guest resort in Hot Springs County, Wyoming, stretching across some 40 miles of territory. The ranch is a patchwork of mostly contiguous land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government. Its natural resources include wildlife and mineral deposits, and its mountainous western portion, called the upper Rock Creek area, is a place of great natural beauty. In response to persistent requests by environmentalists and outdoor enthusiasts, the Bureau tried to induce the ranchs previous owner, George Nelson, to grant an easement for public use over South Fork Owl Creek Road, which runs through the ranch and serves as a main route to the upper Rock Creek area. For a while, Nelson refused from fear that the public would disrupt his guests activities, but shortly after agreeing to sell the property to Robbins, in March 1994, Nelson signed a nonexclusive deed of easement giving the United States the right to use and maintain the road along a stretch of his property. In return, the Bureau agreed to rent Nelson a right-of-way to maintain a different section of the road as it runs across federal property and connects otherwise isolated parts of Robbinss holdings.
In May 1994, Nelson conveyed the ranch to Robbins, who continued to graze cattle and run guest cattle drives in reliance on grazing permits and a Special Recreation Use Permit (SRUP) issued by the Bureau. But Robbins knew nothing about Nelsons grant of the easement across South Fork Owl Creek Road, which the Bureau had failed to record, and upon recording his warranty deed in Hot Springs County, Robbins took title to the ranch free of the easement, by operation of Wyoming law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §341120 (2005).
When the Bureaus employee Joseph Vessels
discovered, in June 1994, that the Bureaus inaction had cost it the easement, he telephoned Robbins and demanded an easement to replace Nelsons. Robbins refused but indicated he would consider granting one in return for something. In a later meeting, Vessels allegedly told Robbins that  the Federal Government does not negotiate,  and talks broke down. Brief for Respondent 5. Robbins says that over the next several years the defendant-petitioners (hereinafter defendants), who are current and former employees of the Bureau, carried on a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing him to regrant the lost easement.
Robbins concedes that any single one of the offensive and sometimes illegal actions by the Bureaus officials might have been brushed aside as a small imposition, but says that in the aggregate the campaign against him amounted to coercion to extract the easement and should be redressed collectively. The substance of Robbinss claim, and the degree to which existing remedies available to him were adequate, can be understood and assessed only by getting down to the details, which add up to a long recitation.
In the summer of 1994, after the fruitless telephone conversation in June, Vessels wrote to Robbins for permission to survey his land in the area of the desired easement. Robbins said no, that it would be a waste of time for the Bureau to do a survey without first reaching agreement with him. Vessels went ahead with a survey anyway, trespassed on Robbinss land, and later boasted about it to Robbins. Not surprisingly, given the lack of damage to his property, Robbins did not file a trespass complaint in response.
Mutual animosity grew, however, and one Bureau employee, Edward Parodi, was told by his superiors to look closer and investigate harder for possible trespasses and other permit violations by Robbins. App. 128129. Parodi also heard colleagues make certain disparaging remarks about Robbins, such as referring to him as the rich SOB from Alabama [who] got [the Ranch]. Id., at 121. Parodi became convinced that the Bureau had mistreated Robbins and described its conduct as the volcanic point in his decision to retire. Id., at 133.
Vessels and his supervisor, defendant Charles Wilkie, continued to demand the easement, under threat to cancel the reciprocal maintenance right-of-way that Nelson had negotiated. When Robbins would not budge, the Bureau canceled the right-of-way, citing Robbinss refusal to grant the desired easement and failure even to pay the rental fee. Robbins did not appeal the cancellation to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) or seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §702.
In August 1995, Robbins brought his cattle to a water source on property belonging to his neighbor, LaVonne Pennoyer. An altercation ensued, and Pennoyer struck Robbins with her truck while he was riding a horse. Plaintiff-Appellees Supp. App. in No. 048016 (CA10), pp. 676681 (hereinafter CA10 App.); Pl. Exh. 2, Record 164166; Pl. Exh. 35a, id., at 102108. Defendant Gene Leone fielded a call from Pennoyer regarding the incident, encouraged her to contact the sheriff, and himself placed calls to the sheriff suggesting that Robbins be charged with trespass. After the incident, Parodi claims that Leone told him: I think I finally got a way to get [Robbinss] permits and get him out of business. App. 125, 126.
In October 1995, the Bureau claimed various permit violations and changed the High Island Ranchs 5-year SRUP to a SRUP subject to annual renewal. According to Robbins, losing the 5-year SRUP disrupted his guest ranching business, owing to the resulting uncertainty about permission to conduct cattle drives. Robbins declined to seek administrative review, however, in part because Bureau officials told him that the process would be lengthy and that his permit would be suspended until the IBLA reached a decision.
Beginning in 1996, defendants brought administrative charges against Robbins for trespass and other land-use violations. Robbins claimed some charges were false,and others unfairly selective enforcement, and he tookall of them to be an effort to retaliate for refusing the Bureaus continuing demands for the easement. He contested a number of these charges, but not all of them, administratively.
In the spring of 1997, the South Fork Owl Creek Road, the only way to reach the portions of the ranch in the Rock Creek area, became impassable. When the Bureau refused to repair the section of road across federal land, Robbins took matters into his own hands and fixed the public road himself, even though the Bureau had refused permission. The Bureau fined Robbins for trespass, but offered to settle the charge and entertain an application to renew the old maintenance right-of-way. Instead, Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which found that Robbins had admitted the unauthorized repairs when he sent the Bureau a bill for reimbursement. The Board upheld the fine, In re Robbins, 146 I. B. L. A. 213 (1998), and rejected Robbinss claim that the Bureau was trying to  blackmail  him into providing the easement; it said that [t]he record effectively shows … intransigence was the tactic of Robbins, not [the] BLM. Id., at 219. Robbins did not seek judicial review of the IBLAs decision.
In July 1997, defendant Teryl Shryack and a colleague entered Robbinss property, claiming the terms of a fence easement as authority. Robbins accused Shryack of unlawful entry, tore up the written instrument, and ordered her off his property. Later that month, after a meeting about trespass issues with Bureau officials, Michael Miller, a Bureau law enforcement officer, questioned Robbins without advance notice and without counsel about the incident with Shryack. The upshot was a charge with two counts of knowingly and forcibly impeding and interfering with a federal employee, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §111 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), a crime with a penalty of up to one year in prison. A jury acquitted Robbins in December, after deliberating less than 30 minutes. United States v. Robbins, 179 F. 3d 1268, 1269 (CA10 1999). According to a news story, the jurors were appalled at the actions of the government and one said that Robbins could not have been railroaded any worse … if he worked for the Union Pacific. CA10 App. 852. Robbins then moved for attorneys fees under the Hyde Amendment, §617, 111Stat.
2519, note following 18 U. S. C. §3600A, arguing that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. The trial judge denied the motion, and Robbins appealed too late. See 179 F. 3d, at 12691270.
In 1998, Robbins brought the lawsuit now before us, though there was further vexation to come. In June 1999, the Bureau denied Robbinss application to renew his annual SRUP, based on an accumulation of land-use penalties levied against him. Robbins appealed, the IBLA affirmed, In re Robbins, 154 I. B. L. A. 93 (2000), and Robbins did not seek judicial review. Then, in August, the Bureau revoked the grazing permit for High Island Ranch, claiming that Robbins had violated its terms when he kept Bureau officials from passing over his property to reach public lands. Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which stayed the revocation pending resolution of the appeal. Order in Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, IBLA 200012 (Nov. 10, 1999), CA10 App. 1020.
The next summer, defendant David Wallace spoke with Preston Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Indian Affairs who manages lands along the High Island Ranchs southern border, and pressured him to impound Robbinss cattle. Smith told Robbins, but did nothing more.
In this lawsuit (brought, as we said, in 1998), Robbins asks for compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Although he originally included the United States as a defendant, he voluntarily dismissed the Government, and pressed forward with a RICO claim charging defendants with repeatedly trying to extort an easement from him, as well as a similarly grounded Bivens claim that defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted, holding that Robbins inadequately pleaded damages under RICO and that the APA and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §1346, were effective alternative remedies that precluded Bivens relief. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on both grounds, 300 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (2002), although it specified that Bivens relief was available only for those constitutional violations committed by individual federal employees unrelated to final agency action, 300 F. 3d, at 1212.
On remand, defendants again moved to dismiss on qualified immunity. As to the RICO claim, the District Court denied the motion; as to Bivens, it dismissed what Robbins called the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and those under the Fifth Amendment for due process violations, but it declined to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation for the exercise of Robbinss right to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse any grant of a property interest without compensation. After limited discovery, defendants again moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The District Court adhered to its earlier denial.
). It held that Robbins had a clearly established right to be free from retaliation for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to exclude the Government from his private property, 433 F. 3d, at 765767, and it explained that Robbins could go forward with the RICO claim because Government employees who engag[e] in lawful actions with an intent to extort a right-of-way from [a landowner] rather than with an intent to merely carry out their regulatory duties commit extortion under Wyoming law and within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951. 433 F. 3d, at 768. The Court of Appeals rejected the defense based on a claim of the Governments legal entitlement to demand the disputed easement: if an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act. Id., at 769. Finally, the Court of Appeals said again that Robbins[s] allegations involving individual action unrelated to final agency action are permitted under Bivens. Id., at 772. The appeals court declined defendants request to determine which allegations remain and which are precluded, however, because defendants had not asked the District Court to sort them out. Ibid.
The first question is whether to devise a new Bivens damages action for retaliating against the exercise of ownership rights, in addition to the discrete administrative and judicial remedies available to a landowner like Robbins in dealing with the Governments employees.
403 U. S. 388, held that the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers had a claim for damages, and in the years following we have recognized two more nonstatutory damages remedies, the first for employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979)
, harm to military personnel through activity incident to service, United States v. Stanley,