Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/725/471/58044/
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 05:30:03
Document Index: 31546864

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1951', '§ 812', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 841', '§ 952', '§ 641', '§ 812']

13 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 1524, 15 Fed. R. Evid.ser v. 100united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Armando Lopez-martinez, Defendant-appellant, 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1984 › 13 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 1524, 15 Fed. R. Evid.ser v. 100united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee...
13 Fed. R. Evid. Ser v. 1524, 15 Fed. R. Evid.ser v. 100united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Armando Lopez-martinez, Defendant-appellant, 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984) Argued and Submitted May 9, 1983. Decided Aug. 11, 1983. Rehearing Granted, Opinion Withdrawn,and Resubmitted Feb. 9, 1984
Lopez-Martinez appeals from his conviction on both counts of an indictment. Count 1 charged that he "did knowingly and intentionally import approximately 737.2 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 952 and 960(b) (1)." Count 2 charged that he "did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute approximately 737.2 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a) (1)." We affirm.
Lopez argues that it was error to give instruction 9 and to modify instruction 10 as the court did. The error is said to be that knowingly and intentionally importing marihuana, or possessing marihuana with intent to distribute, were not the offenses charged by the grand jury, which expressly charged that the drug was heroin. It is reversible error to instruct a trial jury that it can convict a defendant of an offense not charged by the grand jury, even though there is ample evidence that the uncharged offense was committed. Stirone v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252. There, the grand jury charged violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, by extortion, which obstructed the movement of sand into Pennsylvania. The trial judge, on the basis of evidence in the record, told the jury that it could convict if the commerce affected was the movement of steel from Pennsylvania to other states. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the instruction violated the defendant's right, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, "to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury." 361 U.S. at 217, 80 S. Ct. at 273. Our own decisions are to the same effect. United States v. Carlson, 9 Cir., 1980, 616 F.2d 446; Howard v. Daggett, 9 Cir., 1975, 526 F.2d 1388, 1390; see United States v. Kartman, 9 Cir., 1969, 417 F.2d 893.
Moreover, importing or possessing heroin and importing or possessing marihuana carry different penalties. Both drugs are listed in Schedule I of 21 U.S.C. § 812. Heroin, a derivative of opium, is a "narcotic drug." 21 U.S.C. § 802(16). Marihuana is not. 21 U.S.C. § 802(15). Thus heroin is listed at Schedule I(b) (10) of Sec. 812, while marihuana is listed at Schedule I(c) (10) of Sec. 812. The penalties prescribed in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) (1) (A) and 960(b) (1) for narcotic drug offenses are far more severe than those for marihuana offenses, prescribed in Secs. 841(b) (1) (B) and 960(b) (2). This lends some color to the argument.
We think, however, that Lopez's argument overlooks the framework of the statutes involved. In the case of unlawful importation, the applicable sections cited in the indictment are 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960(b) (1). Section 952(a) makes it "unlawful to import ... any controlled substance in schedule I ... of subchapter I of this chapter." Section 812 contains schedule I, in which both heroin and marihuana are listed, along with 79 other controlled substances. Section 960 first lists "Unlawful Acts." Under that heading, it provides, in pertinent part:
It next lists "Penalties." Under that heading, it provides, in pertinent part:(b) (1) In the case of a violation under subsection (a) of this section with respect to a narcotic drug in schedule I ..., the person ... shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or fined not more than $25,000, or both....
(1) (A) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I ... which is a narcotic drug, ... a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than $25,000, or both....
These statutes are much like statutes prohibiting theft. For example, Cal.Penal Code Sec. 484 provides that one who steals the property of another is guilty of theft. There are two degrees of theft, grand and petty (Sec. 486). The general rule is that if the value of the property taken exceeds $200, the crime is grand theft (Sec. 487); if the value is less, the crime is petty theft (Sec. 488). The punishment for grand theft is more severe than for petty theft (Secs. 489, 490). Yet knowledge of the value of the property is not an element of the offense of grand theft. All that is required is a taking of property, intentionally, and with knowledge that one is not entitled to it. See People v. Earle, 1963, 222 Cal. App. 2d 476, 477-78, 35 Cal. Rptr. 265. The Federal theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, is similar. See United States v. DiGilio, 3 Cir., 1976, 538 F.2d 972, 978; United States v. Ciongoli, 3 Cir., 1966, 358 F.2d 439, 441.
We restrict Davis to the principle that a defendant who has knowledge that he possesses a controlled substance may have the state of mind necessary for conviction even if he does not know which controlled substance he possesses. Cf. United States v. Moser, 509 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1975).
In Davis, the defendant thought that psilocybin mushrooms dosed with LSD were unfortified psilocybin. Both LSD and psilocybin are schedule I(c) hallucinogens under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), and the penalty is the same for both under Sec. 841(b) (1) (B).
The government cites cases refusing to consider tardy constitutional claims brought as challenges to underlying convictions. E.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 1973, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235. However, Lopez is not attacking the 1974 juvenile commitment. Instead, he seeks in the present case a determination that was never made, expressly or by necessary implication, in the 1974 proceeding. We need not consider the government's waiver or estoppel claim, however, because even if the 1974 arrest were illegal, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would not bar use of Lopez's 1974 post-arrest statement in his 1982 trial.
The rule that evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed "has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 1974, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561. See generally Walder v. United States, 1954, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503. If application of the rule in a particular situation "does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted." United States v. Janis, 1976, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046; see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351, 94 S. Ct. at 621.
Moreover, there is no suggestion here of any bad faith or collusion by the federal officers in the two arrests of Lopez. Eight years separate the two incidents; this is not a case where there are hints that the first investigation and prosecution might be planned to ensure the success of the second. We see nothing that persuades us that the officers of the 1974 arrest ever imagined that statements they elicited from Lopez then would be useful in proving his intent in a case involving another crime committed in 1982. Like the investigating officers in Janis, Raftery, and Tirado, the agents in 1974 did not have the later 1982 proceedings in their "zone of primary interest." Janis, 428 U.S. at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034.