Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102807/chicago-n-w-r-co-vs-transportation-union
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 13:45:09
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 152', '§ 1331', '§ 4', '§ 104', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 101', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 156', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 5', '§ 155', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 5', '§ 101']

Chicago and N W R Co Vs Transportation Union - Citation 102807 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Chicago and N.W. R. Co. Vs. Transportation Union - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102807
Case Number 402 U.S. 570
Appellant Chicago and N.W. R. Co.
Respondent Transportation Union
chicago & n.w. r. co. v. transportation union - 402 u.s. 570 (1971) u.s. supreme court chicago & n.w. r. co. v. transportation union, 402 u.s. 570 (1971) chicago & north western railway co. v. united transportation union no. 189 argued january 18, 1971 decided june 1, 1971 402 u.s. 570 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit syllabus petitioner railroad brought this suit (after formal procedures of the railway labor act had been exhausted) to enjoin a threatened strike by respondent union, charging that the union had failed to perform its obligations under § 2 first of the railway labor act "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of.....
U.S. Supreme Court Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971)
1. Sec. 2 First was intended to be not just a mere exhortation, but an enforceable legal obligation on carriers and employees alike. Pp. 402 U. S. 574 -578.
2. The obligation imposed by § 2 First, which is central to the effective working of the Railway Labor Act, is enforceable in the courts, rather than by the Mediation Board, as is clear from the Act's legislative history. Pp. 402 U. S. 578 -581.
3. Sec. 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit the use of a strike injunction where that remedy is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the duty imposed by § 2 First. Pp. 402 U. S. 581 -584.
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK, DOUGLAS, and WHITE, JJ., joined, post, p. 402 U. S. 584 .
The Chicago and North Western Railway Co., petitioner in this action, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin a threatened strike by the respondent, the United Transportation Union. The substance of the complaint was that in the negotiations between the parties over work rules, the Union had failed to perform its obligation under § 2 First of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." [ Footnote 1 ] Jurisdiction was said to rest on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1337. The Union in its answer contended that §§ 4, 7, and 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, 72, 29 U.S.C. § § 104, 107, 108, [ Footnote 2 ] deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to issue a strike injunction and that, in any event, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. [ Footnote 3 ] The District Judge, having heard evidence and argument, declined to pass on whether either party had violated § 2 First. In an unreported opinion, he concluded that the question was a matter for administrative determination by the National Mediation Board and was nonjusticiable; he further ruled that §§ 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the Union's threatened strike. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 422 F.2d 979, construing § 2 First as a statement of the purpose and policy of the subsequent provisions of the Act, and not as a specific requirement anticipating judicial enforcement. Rather, in that court's view, the enforcement of § 2 First was solely a matter for the National Mediation Board. Id. at 985-988. We granted certiorari to consider this important question under the Railway Labor
Act, on which the lower courts had expressed divergent views. [ Footnote 4 ] For reasons that follow, we reverse.
For at least the past decade, the Nation's railroads and the respondent Union or its predecessors have been engaged in an off-and-on struggle over the number of brakemen to be employed on each train. We find it unnecessary to describe this history in any great detail, either generally or with particular reference to petitioner. Accounts at earlier stages may be found in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U. S. 284 , 372 U. S. 285 -288 (1963); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 225 F.Supp. 11, 14-17 (DC), aff'd, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 331 F.2d 1020 (1964); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron Barberton Belt R. Co., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 670, 385 F.2d 581, 588-592 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 127 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 383 F.2d 225 (1967); and see the opinion of the court below, 422 F.2d at 980-982, and n. 4. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the parties have exhausted the formal procedures of the Railway Labor Act: notices, conferences, unsuccessful mediation, refusal by the Union to accept the National Mediation Board's proffer of arbitration, termination of mediation, and expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period of § 5 First, 45
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369 , 394 U. S. 377 -378 (1969). It is not surprising that such is the case. As one leading commentator has said, in connection with the duty under
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1401, 1412-1413 (1958). We recognized this to be true when we said in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U. S. 477 , 361 U. S. 484 485 (1960), that "the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to recognize the union." Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937), furnishes an early illustration of this principle in connection with the duty to "exert every reasonable effort" under the Railway Labor Act. In that case, the railroad refused to recognize a union certified by the National Mediation Board as the duly authorized representative of its shop workers, and instead sought to coerce these employees to join a company union. The employees sought and obtained an injunction requiring the railroad to perform its duty under § 2 Ninth to "treat with" their certified representative; the injunction also compelled the railroad "to exert every reasonable effort" to make and maintain agreements with the union. This Court affirmed that decree, explicitly rejecting the argument that the duty to exert every reasonable effort was only a moral obligation. This conclusion has been repeatedly referred to without criticism in subsequent decisions. [ Footnote 5 ]
The conclusion that § 2 First is more than merely hortatory finds support in the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act as well. As this Court has often noted, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was, and was acknowledged to be, an agreement worked out between management and labor, and ratified by the Congress and the President. [ Footnote 6 ] Accordingly, the statements of the spokesmen for the two parties made in the hearings on the proposed Act are entitled to great weight in the construction of the Act. [ Footnote 7 ]
"it is [the parties'] duty to exert every reasonable effort . . . to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the abrogation of agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce. In other words, the legal obligation is imposed, and, as I have previously stated, and I want to emphasize it, I believe that the deliberate violation of that legal obligation could be prevented by court compulsion. [ Footnote 8 ]"
"We believe, and this law has been written upon the theory, that in the development of the obligations in industrial relations and the law in regard thereto, there is more danger in attempting to write specific provisions and penalties into the law than there is in writing the general duties and obligations into the law and letting the enforcement of those duties and obligations develop through the courts in the way in which the common law has developed in England and America. [ Footnote 9 ]"
Given that § 2 First imposes a legal obligation on the parties, the question remains whether it is an obligation enforceable by the judiciary. We have often been confronted with similar questions in connection with other duties under the Railway Labor Act. [ Footnote 10 ] Our cases reveal that, where the statutory language and legislative history are unclear, the propriety of judicial enforcement turns on the importance of the duty in the scheme of the Act, the capacity of the courts to enforce it effectively, and the necessity for judicial enforcement if the right of the aggrieved party is not to prove illusory.
(1953). We think that, at least to this extent the duty to exert every reasonable effort is of the essence. [ Footnote 11 ]
300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 550 . Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act explicitly requires district courts to determine whether plaintiffs have "failed to make every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute out of which the request for the injunction grows. [ Footnote 12 ] We have no reason to believe that the district courts are less capable of making the inquiry in the one situation than in the other.
that the question whether a party had exerted every reasonable effort was committed by the Railway Labor Act to the National Mediation Board, rather than to the courts. We believe that the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act rather plainly disproves this contention. It is commonplace that the 1926 Railway Labor Act was enacted because of dissatisfaction with the 1920 Transportation Act, and particularly with the performance of the Railroad Labor Board. While there were many causes of this dissatisfaction, one of the most prominent was that, because of its adjudicatory functions, the Board effectively lost any influence in attempting to settle disputes. Throughout the hearings on the bill which became the 1926 Act, there are repeated expressions of concern that the National Mediation Board should retain no adjudicatory function, so that it might maintain the confidence of both parties. [ Footnote 13 ] And as the Court noted in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 , 320 U. S. 303 (1943), when Congress in 1934 gave the Board power to resolve certain jurisdictional disputes, it authorized the Board to appoint a committee of neutrals to decide the dispute
Only last Term, we referred to the fact that "the Mediation Board has no adjudicatory authority with regard to major disputes." Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142 , 396 U. S. 158 (1969). In light of these considerations, we think the conclusion inescapable that Congress intended the enforcement of § 2 First to be overseen by appropriate judicial means, rather than by the Mediation Board's retaining jurisdiction over the dispute or prematurely releasing the parties for resort to self-help if it feels such action called for. [ Footnote 14 ]
We turn finally to the question whether § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [ Footnote 15 ] prohibits the use of a strike injunction in all cases of violation of § 2 First. The fundamental principles in this area were epitomized in International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 , 367 U. S. 772 -773 (1961): .
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, expresses a basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor unions. We have held that the Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
338 U. S. 232 . However, the policy of the Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right."
Similar statements may be found in many of our opinions. [ Footnote 16 ] We consider that these statements properly accommodate the conflicting policies of our labor laws, and we adhere to them. We find it quite impossible to say that no set of circumstances could arise where a strike injunction is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the command of § 2 First. Accordingly, our prior decisions lead us to hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not forbid the District Court from even considering whether this is such a case. [ Footnote 17 ] If we have misinterpreted the congressional purpose, Congress can remedy the situation by speaking more clearly. In the meantime, we have no choice but to trace out as best we may the uncertain line of appropriate accommodation of two statutes with purposes that lead in opposing directions. [ Footnote 18 ]
We recognize, of course, that our holding that strike injunctions may issue when such a remedy is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the duty to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements falls far short of that definiteness and clarity which businessmen and labor leaders undoubtedly desire. It creates a not insignificant danger that parties will structure their negotiating positions and tactics with an eye on the courts, rather than restricting their attention to the business at hand. Moreover, the party seeking to maintain the status quo may be less willing to compromise during the determinate processes of the Railway Labor Act if he believes that there is a chance of indefinitely postponing the other party's resort to self-help after those procedures have been exhausted. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 380 -381; cf. Hearings, supra, n 8, at 17, 50, 100 (Mr. Richberg); id. at 190 (Mr. Robertson). Finally, the vagueness of the obligation under § 2 First could provide a cover for freewheeling judicial interference in labor relations of the sort that called forth the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place. [ Footnote 19 ]
of differing political makeup and differing views on labor relations --rather than restrict our examination to those pieces of legislation which are in accord with our personal views of sound labor policy. See Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 , 398 U. S. 250 (1970).
E.g., Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 , 325 U. S. 721 -722, n. 12 (1945), adhered to on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 (1946); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 , 321 U. S. 306 -307 (1944); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330 , 362 U. S. 339 (1960); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 , 367 U. S. 758 (1961); Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U. S. 650 , 380 U. S. 658 (1965); Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142 , 396 U. S. 149 , 396 U. S. 151 (1969).
E.g., International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 , 367 U. S. 758 (1961).
See, e.g., Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142 , 396 U. S. 151 n. 18, 152 n.19, 396 U. S. 153 n. 20 (1969).
While we have no occasion to determine whether § 2 First requires more of the parties than avoidance of "bad faith" as defined by Judge Magruder in Reed & Prince, supra, we note two caveats. First, parallels between the duty to bargain in good faith and the duty to exert every reasonable effort, like all parallels between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, should be drawn with the utmost care, and with full awareness of the differences between the statutory schemes. Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369 , 394 U. S. 383 (1969). Second, great circumspection should be used in going beyond cases involving "desire not to reach an agreement," for doing so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against governmental interference with the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements. See n 19, infra.
See Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 562 -563; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232 , 338 U. S. 237 (1949); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 , 343 U. S. 774 (1952); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 , 353 U. S. 41 -42 (1957); cf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 338 -339; id. at 362 U. S. 360 -364 (dissenting opinion); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 , 353 U. S. 458 (1957).
Section 2 First was reenacted in 1934, two years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Act of June 21, 1934, c. 691, 48 Stat. 1185. In the event of irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the earlier, general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and those of the subsequent, more specific provisions of § 2 First, the latter would prevail under familiar principles of statutory construction. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 563 .
machinery of the Railway Labor Act, to arbitrate disputes between various carriers and unions over the number of brakemen required on trains and the necessity of firemen on diesel locomotives. Insofar as is here pertinent, Board 282's award ultimately led to elimination of approximately 8,000 brakemen's jobs across the Nation. By its terms, however, the award expired January 25, 1966. Prior to expiration, the Union served upon the Railway notices under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 156, [ Footnote 2/1 ] which called for reestablishing many of the brakemen's positions eliminated by Board 282 by changing the existing agreements to require not less than two brakemen on every freight and yard crew. The Railway reciprocated by serving upon the Union a § 6 notice requesting an agreement that would make crew size a matter of managerial judgment. The parties held conferences under § 6 without reaching agreement. The National Mediation Board attempted to mediate the dispute pursuant to § 5, 45 U.S.C. § 155, [ Footnote 2/2 ] failed, and proffered
arbitration pursuant to the same section. After the Union declined to accept arbitration, the National Mediation Board terminated its jurisdiction. Since no emergency board was appointed by the President under § 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160, [ Footnote 2/3 ] after the 30-day cooling-off period of § 5 had run, [ Footnote 2/4 ] the Act's prohibition against resort to self-help measures lapsed.
"(b) The defendant has insisted that any agreement on the C&NW; be no more favorable to the C&NW; than agreements reached on the other railroads upon which the BRT served like notices;"
In answering these questions particular attention must be paid to the legislative history of the Act. Railway labor dispute-settlement law has undergone a long legislative evolution which this Court has previously explored. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 , 367 U. S. 750 -760, and nn. 10-12 (1961); see also Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930); Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601 (1959); Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142 (1969). Much of the experimentation prior to passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 proved unsuccessful. Recognition that growing unrest in the railway industry had created a situation with potentially grave public consequences, led the President, in three messages to Congress between 1923 and 1925, and both the Republican and Democratic Parties, in 1924, to call for unprecedented cooperation between carriers and unions. H.R.Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1926); S.Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1926); Hearings on
Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180) before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 21-22, 90, 98, 197 (1926) (hereinafter Hearings). These basically antagonistic forces were urged to sit down and develop a workable solution for settling disputes in their industry in order to minimize the rupture of the public services that they provided. The legislative product devised by the parties themselves, which Congress enacted in 1926 as-the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, was a unique blend of moral and legal duties looking toward settlement through conciliation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, presidential intervention, and finally, in case of ultimate failure of the statutory machinery, resort to traditional self-help measures. The cooperation involved was unparalleled in this country's labor history. It was felt significant to all involved that the parties themselves had worked out a solution and had presented it to Congress. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
The outstanding feature of the bill was that it was voluntary -- Congress, the carriers, and the unions all recognized that there were very few enforceable provisions, and still fewer judicially enforceable ones. [ Footnote 2/6 ] In testimony before Congress, Mr. Richberg, the major spokesman for the unions, stated,
Since the Act was the product of months of discussion between the carriers and unions and since Mr. Richberg's testimony was uncontradicted by the representatives of the carriers, [ Footnote 2/7 ] it seems fair to say that the above testimony evidences an understanding on the part of the unions, carriers, and Congress that the duty "to exert every reasonable effort" was judicially enforceable at least to the extent of requiring the parties to sit down at the bargaining table and talk to each other. This is exactly what this Court held in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937). That case was an equitable action brought by the Federation to force the Railway to bargain with it. The carrier, despite the Mediation Board's certification of the Federation as the bargaining agent of the employees, had continued to deal only with its company union. This Court held that the duty to exert every reasonable effort to reach agreement, which had been held to be without legal sanction in the context of the previous Act, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1923),
300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 515 -545.
323 U. S. 192 (1944), [ Footnote 2/8 ] this Court has held that
Id. at 323 U. S. 202 -203. Recently, in Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142 (1969), this Court held that the Act's status quo requirement, which "is central to its design," could be enforced by judicial authority. Id. at 396 U. S. 150 . While, in each of these instances, the Court found specific, positive statutory mandates for judicial interference, the underlying cohesiveness of the decisions lies in the fact that, in each instance, the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement. That is, unless the unions fairly represented all of their employees; unless the employer bargained with the certified representative of the employees; unless the status quo was maintained during the entire range of bargaining, the statutory mechanism could not hope to induce a negotiated settlement. In each case, the judicial involvement was minimal and in keeping with the central theme of the Act -- to bring about voluntary settlement. In each case the "collective bargaining agents stepped outside their legal duties and violated the Act which called them into being. . . ." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330 , 362 U. S. 338 (1960).
Terminal Assn. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1 , 318 U. S. 6 (1943) (footnote omitted). It is clear to me that the duty to exert every reasonable effort was agreed upon to make effective the duty of the carrier to recognize the union chosen by the employees -- in other words, it is essentially a corollary of the duty. Such a duty does not contemplate that governmental power should, after failure of the parties to reach accord, be added to the scales in favor of either party and thus compel the other to agree upon the aided party's terms. Rather, at that point, impasse was to free both parties
to resort to self-help. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U. S. 477 , 361 U. S. 484 -486 (1960). As Mr. Richberg had testified,
presence of economic weapons in reserve. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, supra at 361 U. S. 488 -489. As the statutory machinery nears termination without achieving settlement, the threat of economic self-help and the pressures of informed public opinion create new impetus toward compromise and agreement. If self-help can now effectively be thwarted by injunction and by drawn-out court proceedings after the termination of the entire bargaining process, or worse yet, at each step thereof, the threat of its use becomes impotent, indeed.
Since there is no specific mandate for an injunction in the circumstances presented by this ease, the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are applicable. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. at 300 U. S. 563 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 , 353 U. S. 401 (1957).
"The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, expresses a basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor unions. We have held that the Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 51 .; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232 . However, the policy of the Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right."
International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 772 -773.