Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/711/831/302152/
Timestamp: 2019-12-07 17:12:32
Document Index: 142536322

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 922', '§ 2778', '§ 123', '§ 5861', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 2024']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael Paul Udofot, Appellant, 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael Paul Udofot, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Michael Paul Udofot, Appellant, 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 711 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1983) Submitted Jan. 14, 1983. Decided June 30, 1983. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 11, 1983
On April 9, 1982, an indictment was returned, charging Udofot, in Count I, of knowingly delivering to a common carrier firearms and ammunition for shipment in interstate and foreign commerce without notifying the carrier that firearms and ammunition were being shipped, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(e), 924(a) and, in Count II, of knowingly and willfully exporting and attempting to export firearms and ammunition without first having obtained an export license, in violation of 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778(b) (2), 2778(c) and 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.01, 127.
The seminal case on the issue of specific intent in federal firearms laws is United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971). In Freed the Supreme Court held that there was no requirement of specific intent or knowledge in cases charging the defendant with receiving or possessing a firearm not registered to him under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Relying on Freed, courts have repeatedly refused to read a specific intent requirement into other firearms statutes. See United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (18 U.S.C. § 922(h)); United States v. Powell, 513 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a) (1), 1202(a) (1)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 853, 96 S. Ct. 99, 46 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1975); United States v. Ruisi, 460 F.2d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir.) (18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914, 93 S. Ct. 234, 34 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1972). The rationale adopted by these cases is that Congress will not be presumed to have required specific intent as an element of the crime where the purpose of the statute is the regulation of dangerous objects such as firearms. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. at 607-10, 91 S. Ct. at 1117-18.
Appellant attempts to distinguish these cases by arguing that section 922(e) requires that a person "knowingly" deliver a firearm to a carrier for interstate or foreign shipment. The use of the word "knowingly" in section 922(e) does mean that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he was delivering firearms to the carrier. Appellant incorrectly assumes, however, that the word "knowingly" requires that the Government must also prove a specific intent to violate the law. In the absence of statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, Congress' use of the word "knowingly" in a criminal statute aimed at regulating dangerous objects does not itself abrogate the ancient maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. See United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563, 91 S. Ct. 1697, 1700, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1971); United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1980). In the statute at issue here, the word "knowingly" modifies the verb "to deliver," which it immediately precedes. There is no reference to "law," "violating the law," or similar language which "knowingly" could be read to modify.4 Nor is there anything in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to impose a specific intent requirement in this particular section of the Gun Control Act. Here, as in other sections of the Act, Congress' main concern was to control the unchecked movement of firearms and ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce which undermines legitimate efforts to impose reasonable restrictions upon their possession and use. See United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S. Ct. 1947, 40 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1974); H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4410, 4411-15, 4420. Finding no evidence from which to infer a specific intent requirement, we accordingly decline to do so here.
This result is consistent with cases that have interpreted the meaning of the word "knowingly" in other sections of the Gun Control Act. In Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34, 38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010, 93 S. Ct. 454, 34 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1972); United States v. Cornett, 484 F.2d 1365, 1368 (6th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Beebe, 467 F.2d 222, 226 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904, 94 S. Ct. 1607, 40 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1974), the Eighth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits respectively held that section 922(a) (6), which prohibits a purchaser from "knowingly" making a false statement of a material fact intended or likely to deceive the dealer, does not require a showing that the defendant "knowingly" violated the law, but simply requires proof that the defendant "knowingly" made a false statement. Similarly, in United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit construed section 922(m), which prohibits a person from "knowingly" failing to maintain a firearms transaction record, as requiring only a showing that the defendant knew that he did not complete the required forms.
United States v. Behenna, 552 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1977), which are cited by appellant, do not establish otherwise. In United States v. Behenna, involving a conviction for violating section 922(a) (6), the court remanded for retrial because the district court never presented the jury with the ultimate factual issue of whether the defendant knew he was not a resident of South Carolina and therefore knowingly misrepresented his status. The court did not allow the defendant to defend on the ground that he did not know that it was illegal to make false statements. In United States v. Haddad, the court merely held that section 922(h) (1), proscribing receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon, was not unconstitutionally vague because the wording of the statute made clear that knowledge was not an element of the crime and that mere receipt was sufficient. Although the court observed that "Congress made knowledge an element of other portions of section 922," the court never suggested that the use of the word "knowingly," by itself, creates a specific intent requirement.
Finally, appellant attempts to analogize this case with United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 1768, 76 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1983), which construed the word "knowingly" in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b). In Marvin we held that the trial court should have given a specific intent instruction that the Government had to prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids. Nonetheless, we do not find any meaningful analogy between Marvin and the case at bar. The statute in Marvin was directed at the unlawful use, transfer, acquisition, alteration, or possession of food stamp coupons. It did not, as the statute does here, seek to regulate dangerous or harmful objects, which implicate a different set of considerations. See generally United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565, 91 S. Ct. 1697, 1701, 29 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1971). Dissimilarities also exist in the language of the two statutes. In Marvin an ambiguity existed because the word "knowingly" could be read to modify the verbs that it immediately preceded, or the entire remainder of the clause in which it appeared.5 There is no such ambiguity here.
In United States v. Williams, 485 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S. Ct. 1947, 40 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1974), the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument identical to that urged by appellant, stating:
See also United States v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (dictum); United States v. Burton, 351 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835, 94 S. Ct. 178, 38 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1973). We agree that to comply with the passenger exception of section 922(e), a passenger must give the carrier at least actual notice that the item to be transported is a firearm or ammunition.7 Although the district court does not phrase the notice requirement precisely in these terms, we do not find its elaborations of this concept to be in error. In the first paragraph of the instructions quoted above, the district court states that the exception refers to open delivery of the firearm into the custody of the pilot, "notifying him of the firearm." We read the instruction as doing no more than requiring that the pilot be made aware that a firearm is delivered to him. If the firearm is delivered into the custody of the pilot, common sense would indicate that the pilot would identify it as such. The additional phrase makes sure that the pilot is aware that a firearm is delivered to him, and this would be particularly appropriate in situations where the identity of the article might be ambiguous, as in the case of a firearm concealed in some other object or conceivably a firearm delivered in a case or other container. If the firearm by its appearance to the pilot does not make evident that it is a firearm, notice to the pilot that it is a firearm does nothing more than establish the clarity of the delivery of the firearm, as required by the exception.
We conclude by observing that an instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S. Ct. 396, 400, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S. Ct. 442, 443, 70 L. Ed. 857 (1926). Although the instructions could have been worded differently, when viewed as a whole, they accurately and adequately define the essential elements of the offense, and the two paragraphs that are the subject of Udofot's complaint do not inject matters that are prejudicial to him. Thus, we find no merit to the charge of error here.8
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from Udofot's luggage pursuant to a search warrant. The affidavit in support of the search warrant contained details of the investigation, including information pertaining to the custom agent's x-raying of appellant's luggage at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. Appellant argues that the x-raying was an illegal search that tainted the subsequent search warrant, and cites a number of cases for the proposition that luggage, once seized, requires a warrant to be searched. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977); United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911, 99 S. Ct. 3102, 61 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1979); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). This case, however, differs from all those since it falls within the well-recognized "border search exception" to the warrant requirement.
Under the border search exception, the Government's sovereign authority to protect itself justifies a warrantless search without probable cause of persons crossing the United States' border and of their personal effects. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73, 99 S. Ct. 2425, 2430, 61 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1979); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618-19, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 1979-80, 52 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1977); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973). Such searches may be conducted at international border checkpoints or their functional equivalents. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 272-73, 93 S. Ct. at 2539 (search reasonable at international airport because functional equivalent of border); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 1617, 71 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1982). Although courts traditionally have employed the border search exception to uphold warrantless searches of persons or objects entering the United States, the rationale behind this exception applies with equal force to persons or objects leaving the country: the Government has an interest in protecting some interest of United States' citizens, the individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border, and the individual will be searched only because of his membership in a morally neutral class. See United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1976) (Lay, Wright & Kilkenny, JJ.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917, 98 S. Ct. 2261, 56 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1978). In California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1518, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1974), the Supreme Court noted approvingly in dictum that "those entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment ...." [Emphasis added.] Subsequently, the Second Circuit has relied on the Supreme Court's statement to hold squarely that the border search exception applies to items leaving as well as entering the country. United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S. Ct. 920, 66 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1981); United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979); accord, United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d at 665-67.
Appellant also argues that section 922(e) is unconstitutionally vague and that it violates due process because it does not require that the defendant be put on notice of the required behavior. We find both of these arguments to be without merit.10 The statute is not unconstitutionally vague because, in reading its language, one could reasonably understand that delivery of a concealed firearm into the custody of a common carrier was proscribed. See United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S. Ct. 594, 597-98, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1963). Nor does the statute violate due process as applied to appellant. Unlike Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957), upon which appellant relies, this case involves active, not passive, conduct--the delivery of firearms and ammunition to a common carrier for interstate and foreign shipment--as well as obvious circumstances suggesting the need for inquiring into the applicable legal restrictions. See United States v. Keuylian, 602 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). The firearms and ammunition involved in this case posed a potential threat to the lives of passengers, and were no less dangerous than the narcotics involved in United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 42 S. Ct. 301, 66 L. Ed. 604 (1922). Moreover, Udofot had extensive exposure to various regulations pertaining to the transfer and movement of weapons in the United States. Not only had he filled out city forms for the guns he purchased, but also had the mandatory waiting period and the export licensing requirements explained to him. The record also shows that, at the time Udofot checked his luggage in with Northwest, a bulletin was posted at the ticket counter announcing in conspicuous print and bold colors that firearms in checked baggage must be declared and unloaded.11 Finally, it appears that Udofot was a frequent international traveler and knew that carry-on luggage was screened for firearms. Under these circumstances, the fact that the transportation of dangerous weapons and ammunition on a common carrier is strictly regulated should have come as no surprise to appellant. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1118, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1971); United States v. Keuylian, 602 F.2d at 1043.
Finally, appellant argues that the conduct of the government agents was so unconscionable and outrageous as to violate due process. He argues that " [r]ather than trying to prevent the crime, the Government agents remained silent, waiting to arrest and prosecute for a crime unwittingly committed and readily preventable." Although the conduct of law enforcement officials could rise to such a demonstrable level of outrageousness as to bar a conviction, see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952) (forced stomach pumping to obtain morphine capsules), the instant case is distinctly not of that kind. The government agents were engaged in ordinary undercover activities and in fact encouraged Udofot to obey the export laws. Their conduct was reasonable and well within the bounds of due process.