Source: http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170518_0000573.NIN.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-18 16:24:54
Document Index: 178760579

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 2113', '§ 922']

The Defendant, Charles R. Seals, is serving a sentence for armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Defendant now seeks to vacate his conviction and sentence under § 924(c). His Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [ECF No. 176] is predicated on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The Defendant maintains that armed bank robbery can no longer be a predicate offense for a § 924(c) conviction.
In one part, he argues that the holding in Johnson necessarily rendered the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. That argument has merit. See United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague). However, it is not necessary to rely on the residual clause in this case because bank robbery under § 2113(a) and (d) is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause. See United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904, 908-10 (7th Cir. 2016).[1]
The Supreme Court has defined the phrase “physical force” to require no more than “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)[2] (citing Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2016). In Armour, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that robbery by intimidation under § 2113(a) does not satisfy the elements clause of § 924(c), holding that, even presuming the conviction rested on the least serious acts that could satisfy the statute, “bank robbery under § 2113(a) inherently contains a threat of violent physical force.” 840 F.3d at 908-09 (“A bank employee can reasonably believe that a robber's demands for money to which he is not entitled will be met with violent force of the type satisfying” the Supreme Court's definition). The Supreme Court has also held that “the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm” is a use of force. United States v. Castleman, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014) ((interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)). For similar reasons, the Defendant's remaining proposed scenarios, such as releasing hazardous chemicals, or locking up a person in a room without food or water, would satisfy the use of force standard. See United States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that “withholding medicine causes physical harm, albeit indirectly, and thus qualifies as the use of force under Castleman”).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Armour also forecloses the Defendant&#39;s argument that subsection (d) bank robbery can be satisfied without the strong physical force required by the 2010 Johnson case. See Armour, 840 F.3d at 908-09 (holding that the “victim's fear of bodily harm is necessarily fear of violent physical force that is inherent in armed bank robbery”). This is so because the ...