Source: http://ms.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140528_0000186.NMS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-19 14:46:14
Document Index: 164237886

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 2244', '§ 99', '§ 2244']

| Davis v. Oktibbeha County
Davis v. Oktibbeha County
ALICE DAVIS, Petitioner,v.OKTIBBEHA COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
This matter is before the court on motion of Respondent Oktibbeha County pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), [1] to dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Having considered the matter, the court finds the motion is well taken as explained hereafter.
Accordingly, unless the narrow exceptions of § 2244(d)(1)(B-D) apply, the AEDPA requires that a petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition be filed within one year of the date that the petitioner's judgment of conviction becomes final, subject to tolling for the period when a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief is pending in state court. See, e.g., Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 847 (1999); Sonnier v. Johnson, 161 F.3d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1998); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, n.1 (5th Cir. 1998) (§ 2244(d)(2) requires federal courts to toll the time spent in state court post-conviction litigation). Petitioner bears the burden of raising and showing that one of the narrow exceptions of § 2244(d)(1)(B-D) apply to his case. Here, petitioner has wholly failed to do so, and as a result, the court will determine whether the petitioner filed her petition within one year of a final judgment of conviction under 2244(d)(1)(A).
The Petitioner, Alice Davis, is in the custody of Mary Pippins, Warden of the Washington County Regional Correctional Facility in Greenville, Mississippi. Davis entered a guilty plea to one (1) count of sale of cocaine in the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County, Mississippi. On May 6, 2008, she was sentenced to serve twenty-four (24) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (Circuit Court No. 07-199-CR). (At that time, two (2) additional counts were retired to the files). By statute, there is no direct appeal from a guilty plea. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-101.[2]Therefore, Davis' judgment became final on June 5, 2008, and her federal habeas petition was due by June 5, 2009.
If Davis filed a "properly filed" application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) on or before June 5, 2009, it would have tolled the limitations period. See Grillete v. Warden, 372 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 2004); Flannagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1998). Rather, Davis filed a letter, which the court treated as a Motion for PCR, in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court on February 25, 2010 (signed February 9, 2010). That court filed an order on March 10, 2010, dismissing the motion (Circuit Court Case No. 2010-0076-CV). According to the records of the Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk's Office, Davis did not appeal the trial court's dismissal of the motion to that Court. As Davis' motion was filed after the expiration date, she is not entitled to any statutory tolling of the AEDPA's statute of limitations for the pendency of the post conviction motion.[3]
Under the "mailbox rule, " a Petitioner's pro se federal habeas petition is deemed filed on the date that she delivered the petition to prison officials for mailing to the district court. Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 401, reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 196 F.3d 1259 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1057, 120 S.Ct. 1564, 146 L.Ed.2d 467 (2000) (citing Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 376-78 (5th Cir. 1998)). The instant habeas petition was signed on September 12, 2013, and was stamped "filed" in this case on September 19, 2013. As such, the Petitioner's habeas petition was filed some 1, 560 to 1, 567 days beyond the June 5, 2009, deadline for filing her federal habeas petition. The Petitioner has given no valid explanation for the tardiness of her federal habeas petition, and she fails to present any "rare and exceptional circumstance" as to invoke equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 963 (2001); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, petitioner has not ...