Source: https://bhbaipblog.wordpress.com/category/patents/
Timestamp: 2018-05-23 00:53:11
Document Index: 382687578

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1119', '§1119', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101']

Patents | bhbaipblog
April 29, 2013 · 4:31 am
Supreme Court To Decide On The Patentability Of Human Genes
By Katie Podein & Tommy Wang
Tagged as genetis, laws of nature, Myriad, patentability, Patents, Supreme Court
July 11, 2012 · 4:01 am
Supreme Court May Put a Stop to the “Hokey-Pokey” Approach to IP Ownership
You put your right foot in, and you shake it all about,
That’s what it’s all about![1]
On June 25, 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court granted YUMS’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Already, LLC dba Yums v. Nike, Inc., No. 11-982. This grant is important because its result may change federal court jurisdiction in both patent and trademark infringement declaratory judgment cases.
The “Question Presented,” according to YUMS, is as follows:
“Whether a federal district court is divested of Article III jurisdiction over a party’s challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises not to assert its mark against the party’s then-existing commercial activities.”
YUMS explains its logic in its STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
1. The issue cannot be resolved by litigation because it concerns the constitutional scope of Article III jurisdiction;
2. Both trademark registrations and issued patents are evidence of the exclusive rights granted to the owners;
3. Under 15 USC §1119, a person accused of infringement may ask a court to award judgment declaring that the mark is invalid;
4. When validity is challenged under §1119, the owner may be willing to settle and to include a broad covenant not to sue, as in the YUMS case below;
5. There may also be an argument that the court is divested of Article III jurisdiction because there are then no more claims of infringement, and this is often used as part of a litigation strategy;
6. The Ninth Circuit has a pattern of holding that a covenant not to sue does not divest the district court of Ariticle III jurisdiction (Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000);
7. The Supreme Court has followed the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning with respect to patent cases including Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993), and Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945);
8. The Federal Circuit stated its rule regarding dismissal after settlement in patent cases in Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059-60 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There, the Federal Circuit held that the patent owner can divest a federal court of Article III jurisdiction over the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity by promising not to sue. Judge Dyk has argued in a subsequent case against this “Super Sack” rule. See Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1350-55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
9. When the appeal was brought by YUMS, the Second Circuit stated that it was not persuaded that jurisdiction still exists. This meant that a plaintiff could file an infringement case and not have to deal with the issue of validity and enforceability of its mark if it covenanted not to sue before a judgment was issued. This interpretation is inconsistent with those followed by both the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, and can be viewed as a limitation of the power of federal courts in trademark cases.
If the Supreme Court agrees with YUMS and holds that once you are in court, you are there to the end, not withstanding a covenant not to sue, it may change litigation strategy for both patent and trademark owners; filing a complaint could become less like dancing the Hokey-Pokey and more like an actual commitment – and attorneys would then need to make full disclosure of that changed risk to their clients.
[1] Written by Roland Lawrence LaPrise, (with Charles Macak and Tafit Baker) 1950 Copyright Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
Elizabeth Swanson’s Century City practice includes all aspects of patent, trademark and copyright prosecution, trade secret management, and also includes infringement matters and litigation. Ms. Swanson has been practicing only IP law for over 22 years.
Filed under Patents, Trademarks
Tagged as covenants not to sue, declaratory judgment, Patents, trademark law
June 6, 2012 · 5:33 am
Supreme Court Provides Patent Litigators with a Retooled Argument in Prometheus
The United States Supreme Court recently provided litigators with a retooled weapon for invalidating patents in its Mayo Medical Labs et al v Prometheus et al (Supreme Court, 20 March 2012) (“Prometheus”) decision. 35 USC § 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
Typically, in litigation, patents are invalidated because the claimed matter is not patent-able based on §§ 102 and 103 (anticipation and obviousness, respectively) due to conflicting prior art, not because they are patent-ineligible based on §101. In fact, §101 is relatively rarely used by courts to invalidate patents.
The patent at issue in Prometheus claimed a patent in a method of finding the optimal level of a drug whose levels varied widely from patient to patient. The patent claimed the steps of (1) “administering a drug” to a patient and (2) “determining the [resulting metabolite] level”.
The first time that Prometheus was before the Federal Circuit, the Court applied the “machine or transformation test” to the matter and found the patent valid under that test. The case then went up to the Supreme Court, which determined in June 2010 that the “machine or transformation test” was not the sole test available, but that there were other available tests based on the plain language of §101. The case then was remanded to the Federal Circuit, which again found the patent at issue to be valid. When the case arrived before the Supreme Court for a second time in March 2012, the Court issued more language regarding invalidation under §101.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit: “The question before us is whether the [patent] claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws? We believe that the answer to this question is no.”
After examining each of the Prometheus claims individually, the Supreme Court summarized: “The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data from which they may draw an inference in light of the correlations. To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications of those regularities.”
Since Prometheus, there have been several decisions issued in patent cases that draw on or reference Prometheus. The district court in Washington, D.C. followed the Prometheus guidelines step for step and invalidated a method patent that used a computer to guide the selection of therapy for patients. In contrast, the Northern District of California validated a patent, stating that it did not run afoul of §101 because it did “more than recite an abstract idea and say ‘apply it’” (language quoted directly from the Supreme Court’s second Prometheus opinion).
So, litigators take note: Even if a method patent can be argued to satisfy the “machine or transformation test,” it still may be found invalid and ineligible for patent protection under §101 if the patent does little more than – in the Court’s opinion – restate a natural law.
Tagged as bio, machine or transformation, medical, Patents, Supreme Court