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Anderson Vs Celebrezze - Citation 105500 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
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anderson v. celebrezze - 460 u.s. 780 (1983)
an ohio statute requires an independent candidate for president to file a statement of candidacy and nominating petition in march in order to appear on the general election ballot in november. on april 24, 1980, petitioner anderson announced that he was an independent candidate for president. thereafter, on may 16, 1980, his supporters tendered a nominating petition and statement of candidacy, satisfying the substantive requirements for..... Judgment:
Ohio's early filing deadline places an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of petitioner Anderson's supporters. Pp.
460 U. S. 786
(a) In resolving constitutional challenges to a State's election laws, a court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the interests asserted by the State to justify the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of these interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. Pp.
(b) The Ohio filing deadline not only burdens the associational rights of independent voters and candidates, it also places a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral process. A burden that falls unequally on independent candidates or on new or small political parties impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment, and discriminates against those candidates and voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties. And in the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest, because the President and Vice President are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation, and the impact of the votes cast in each State affects the votes cast in other States. Pp.
460 U. S. 790
(c) None of the three interests that Ohio seeks to further by its early filing deadline justifies that deadline. As to the State's asserted interest in voter education, it is unrealistic in the modern world to suggest that it takes more than seven months to inform the electorate about the qualifications of a particular candidate simply because he lacks a partisan label. Moreover, it is not self-evident that the interest in voter education is served at all by the early filing deadline. The State's asserted interest in equal treatment for partisan and independent candidates is not achieved by imposing the early filing deadline on both, since, although a candidate participating in a primary election must declare his candidacy on the same date as an independent, both the burdens and benefits of the respective requirements are materially different, and the reasons for early filing for a primary candidate are inapplicable to independent candidates in the general election. And the State's asserted interest in political stability amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition generated by independent candidates who have previously been affiliated with a party, an interest that conflicts with First Amendment values. The Ohio deadline does not serve any state interest "in maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" for the Presidency, because Ohio's Presidential preference primary does not serve to narrow the field for the general election.
, distinguished. The deadline is not drawn to protect the parties from "intraparty feuding," and may actually impair the State's interest in preserving party harmony. Pp.
460 U. S. 796
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
460 U. S. 806
the Ohio Revised Code. [
] Three days later, Anderson and three voters, two registered in Ohio and one in New Jersey, commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates. The District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment and ordered respondent to place Anderson's name on the general election ballot. 499 F.Supp. 121 (1980).
campaign; it also was adequately vindicated by another statute prohibiting a defeated candidate in a party primary from running as an independent. [
The Secretary of State promptly appealed and unsuccessfully requested expedited review in both the Court of Appeals and this Court, but apparently did not seek to stay the District Court's order. [
] The election was held while the appeal was pending. In Ohio, Anderson received 254,472 votes, or 5.9 percent of the votes cast; nationally, he received 5,720,060 votes or approximately 6.6 percent of the total. [
The Court of Appeals reversed. It first inferred that the Court's summary affirmances in
Sweetenham v. Rhodes,
318 F.Supp. 1262 (SD Ohio 1970),
409 U.S. 942 (1972), and
352 F.Supp. 328 (ED Ky.1970),
409 U.S. 943 (1972), had implicitly sustained the validity of early filing deadlines. Then, correctly recognizing the limited precedential effect to be accorded summary dispositions, [
] the Court of Appeals independently
In other litigation brought by Anderson challenging early filing deadlines in Maine and Maryland, the Courts of Appeals for the First and Fourth Circuits affirmed District Court judgments ordering Anderson's name placed on the ballot.
See Anderson v. Quinn,
495 F.Supp. 730 (Me.),
634 F.2d 616 (CA1 1980);
Anderson v. Morris,
500 F.Supp. 1095 (Md.),
636 F.2d 55 (CA4 1980). [
] The conflict among the Circuits on an important question of constitutional law led us to grant certiorari. 456 U.S. 960 (1982). We now reverse.
(1972). Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions "to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose." Therefore, "[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters."
The impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights. [
] Writing for a unanimous
(1958), Justice Harlan stated that it
In our first review of Ohio's electoral scheme,
(1974). The right to vote is "heavily burdened" if that vote may be cast only for major party candidates at a time when other parties or other candidates are "clamoring for a place on the ballot."
Ibid.; Williams v. Rhodes, supra,
. The exclusion of candidates also burdens voters' freedom
of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallying point for likeminded citizens. [
415 U. S. 730
(1974). To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects -- at least to some degree -- the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. [
Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any "litmus paper test" that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.
Storer, supra,
. Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U. S. 173
(1979). The results of this evaluation will not be automatic; as we have recognized, there is "no substitute
for the hard judgments that must be made."
Storer v. Brown, supra,
An early filing deadline may have a substantial impact on independent-minded voters. In election campaigns, particularly those which are national in scope, the candidates and the issues simply do not remain static over time. Various candidates rise and fall in popularity; domestic and international developments bring new issues to center stage, and may affect voters' assessments of national problems. Such developments will certainly affect the strategies of candidates who have already entered the race; they may also create opportunities for new candidacies.
A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity 87-89 (1971). Yet Ohio's filing deadline prevents persons who wish to be independent candidates from entering the significant political arena established in the State by a Presidential election campaign -- and creating new political coalitions of Ohio voters -- at any time after mid to late March. [
] At this point, developments in campaigns for
If the State's filing deadline were later in the year, a newly emergent independent candidate could serve as the focal point for a grouping of Ohio voters who decide, after mid-March, that they are dissatisfied with the choices within the two major parties. As we recognized in
"[s]ince the principal policies of the major parties change to some extent from year to year, and since the identity of the likely major party nominees may not be known until shortly before the election, this disaffected 'group' will rarely, if ever, be a cohesive or identifiable group until a few months before the election. [
important third-party candidacies in American history were launched after the two major parties staked out their positions and selected their nominees at national conventions during the summer. [
] But under § 3513.25.7, a late-emerging Presidential candidate outside the major parties, whose positions on the issues could command widespread community support, is excluded from the Ohio general election ballot. The "Ohio system thus denies the
disaffected' not only a choice of leadership, but a choice on the issues as well."
Not only does the challenged Ohio statute totally exclude any candidate who makes the decision to run for President as an independent after the March deadline, it also burdens the signature-gathering efforts of independents who decide to run in time to meet the deadline. When the primary campaigns are far in the future and the election itself is even more remote, the obstacles facing an independent candidate's organizing efforts are compounded. Volunteers are more difficult to recruit and retain, media publicity and campaign contributions are more difficult to secure, and voters are less interested in the campaign. [
It is clear, then, that the March filing deadline places a particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio's independent-minded voters.
460 U. S. 791
. As our cases have held,
it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status. [
Clements v. Fashing,
457 U. S. 957
457 U. S. 964
(1982) (plurality opinion), quoting
ment. It discriminates against those candidates and -- of particular importance -- against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties.
Clements v. Fashing, supra,
-965 (plurality opinion). By limiting the opportunities of independent-minded voters to associate in the electoral arena to enhance their political effectiveness as a group, such restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in the marketplace of ideas. Historically, political figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many of their challenges to the
have, in time, made their way into the political mainstream.
-251 (1957) (opinion of Warren, C.J.). [
] In short, the primary values protected by the First Amendment -- "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"
(1964) -- are served when election campaigns are not monopolized by the existing political parties. Furthermore, in the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions [
] implicate a uniquely important
national interest. For the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation. Moreover, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States. [
] Thus, in a Presidential election, a State's enforcement of more stringent ballot access requirements, including filing deadlines, has an impact beyond its own borders. [
] Similarly, the State has a less important interest in regulating Presidential elections than state-wide or local elections, because the outcome of the former will be largely determined by voters beyond the State's boundaries. This Court, striking down a state statute unduly restricting the choices made by a major party's Presidential nominating convention, observed that such conventions serve
419 U. S. 490
(1975). The Ohio filing deadline challenged in this case does more than burden the associational rights of independent voters and candidates. It places a significant state-imposed restriction on a nationwide electoral process.
There can be no question about the legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a general election. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly identified that interest as one of the concerns that motivated the Framers' decision not to provide for direct popular election of the President. [
] We are persuaded, however, that the State's important and legitimate interest in voter education does not justify the specific restriction on participation in a Presidential election that is at issue in this case.
and often weeks for even the most rudimentary information about important events to be transmitted from one part of the country to another in 1787, [
] today even trivial details about national candidates are instantaneously communicated nationwide in both verbal and visual form. Second, although literacy was far from universal in 18th-century America, [
] today the vast majority of the electorate not only is literate but also is informed on a day-to-day basis about events and issues that affect election choices and about the ever-changing popularity of individual candidates. In the modern world, it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that it takes more than seven months to inform the electorate about the qualifications of a particular candidate simply because he lacks a partisan label.
Our cases reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues. In
405 U. S. 358
This reasoning applies with even greater force to a Presidential election, which receives more intense publicity. [
] Nor are we persuaded by the State's assertion that, unless a candidate actually files a formal declaration of candidacy in Ohio by the March deadline, Ohio voters will not realize that they should pay attention to his candidacy. Brief for Respondent 38. The validity of this asserted interest is undermined by the State's willingness to place major party nominees on the November ballot even if they never campaigned in Ohio.
It is also by no means self-evident that the interest in voter education is served at all by a requirement that independent candidates must declare their candidacy before the end of March in order to be eligible for a place on the ballot in November. Had the requirement been enforced in Ohio, petitioner Anderson might well have determined that it would be futile for him to allocate any of his time and money to campaigning in that State. The Ohio electorate might thereby have been denied whatever benefits his participation in local debates could have contributed to an understanding of the issues. A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism. As we observed in another First Amendment context, it is often true "that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them."
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U. S. 770
The consequences of failing to meet the statutory deadline are entirely different for party primary participants and independents. The name of the nominees of the Democratic and Republican Parties will appear on the Ohio ballot in November even if they did not decide to run until after Ohio's March deadline had passed, but the independent is simply denied a position on the ballot if he waits too long. [
] Thus, under Ohio's scheme, the major parties may include all events preceding their national conventions in the calculus that produces their respective nominees and campaign platforms, but
the independent's judgment must be based on a history that ends in March. [
Neither the administrative justification nor the benefit of an early filing deadline is applicable to an independent candidate. Ohio does not suggest that the March deadline is necessary to allow petition signatures to be counted and verified or to permit November general election ballots to be printed. [
] In addition, the early deadline does not correspond
to a potential benefit for the independent, as it does for the party candidate. After filing his statement of candidacy, the independent does not participate in a structured intraparty contest to determine who will receive organizational support; he must develop support by other means. In short, "equal treatment" of partisan and independent candidates simply is not achieved by imposing the March filing deadline on both. As we have written, "[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike."
Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss the State's interest in political stability, that was the primary justification advanced by respondent in the District Court, 499 F.Supp. at 134, and it is again asserted in this Court. Respondent's brief explains that the State has a substantial interest in protecting the two major political parties from "damaging intraparty feuding." Brief for Respondent 41. According to respondent, a candidate's decision to abandon efforts to win the party primary and to run as an independent "can be very damaging to state political party structure." Anderson's decision to run as an independent, respondent argues, threatened to "splinter" the Ohio Republican Party "by drawing away its activists to work in his
independent' campaign."
at 37;
Ohio's asserted interest in political stability amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition-- competition for campaign workers, voter support, and other campaign resources -- generated by independent candidates who have previously been affiliated with the party. [
evaluation of this interest is guided by two of our prior cases,
Storer v. Brown.
we squarely held that protecting the Republican and Democratic Parties from external competition cannot justify the virtual exclusion of other political aspirants from the political arena. Addressing Ohio's claim that it "may validly promote a two-party system in order to encourage compromise and political stability," we wrote:
-32. Thus, in
we concluded that First Amendment values outweighed the State's interest in protecting the two major political parties.
we upheld two California statutory provisions that restricted access by independent
and that destruction of "the political stability of the system of the State" could have "profound consequences for the entire citizenry." 415 U.S. at
. Further, we approved the State's goals of discouraging "independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel."
we recognized the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventing "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism." But we did not suggest that a political party could invoke the powers of the State to assure monolithic control over its own members and supporters. [
] Political competition that draws resources away from the major parties cannot, for that reason alone, be condemned as "unrestrained factionalism." Instead, in
we examined the two challenged provisions in the context of California's electoral system. By requiring a candidate to remain in the intraparty competition once the disaffiliation deadline had passed, and by giving conclusive effect to the winnowing process performed by party members in the primary election, the challenged provisions were an essential part of "a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot." Moreover, we pointed out that the
policy "involves no discrimination against independents."
Ohio's challenged restriction is substantially different from the California provisions upheld in
As we have noted, the early filing deadline does discriminate against independents. And the deadline is neither a "sore loser" provision nor a disaffiliation statute. [
] Furthermore, it is important to recognize that
upheld the State's interest in avoiding political fragmentation in the context of elections wholly within the boundaries of California. [
] The State's interest in regulating a nationwide Presidential election is not nearly as strong; no State could singlehandedly assure "political stability" in the Presidential context. The Ohio deadline does not serve any state interest in "maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" for the Presidency, because Ohio's Presidential preference primary does not serve to narrow the field for the general election. A major party candidate who loses the Ohio primary, or who does not even run in Ohio, may nonetheless appear on the November general election ballot as the party's nominee. In addition, the national scope of the competition for delegates at the Presidential nominating conventions assures that "intraparty feuding" will continue until August.
11, at 87-88. The same analysis, of course, is applicable to a "dissident group" that coalesces around an independent candidate, rather than attempting to form a new political party.
"For even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty.
. 'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.'
371 U.S. [415],
[(1963)]. If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties."
Anderson's name had been entered in the Republican primary in Ohio and 26 other States before he made his decision to run as an independent, and he actually competed unsuccessfully in nine Republican primaries. Nevertheless, the parties agree that his timely withdrawal from the Ohio primary avoided the application of the State's "sore loser" statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3513.04 (Supp.1982), which disqualifies a candidate who ran unsuccessfully in a party primary from running as an independent in the general election.
499 F.Supp. 121, 135, 140 (SD Ohio 1980); 664 F.2d 554, 556, n. 3 (CA6 1981).
After the Court of Appeals denied a motion for expedited appeal, respondent filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in this Court, together with a motion to expedite consideration of the petition. The motion and the petition were both denied before the election in November, 1980. 448 U.S. 914 and 918 (1980). Even though the 1980 election is over, the case is not moot.
See Storer v. Brown,
The Court of Appeals quite properly concluded that our summary affirmances in
Sweetenham v. Gilligan
Pratt v. Begley
were "a rather slender reed" on which to rest its decision. 664 F.2d at 560. We have often recognized that the precedential effect of a summary affirmance extends no further than "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions." A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment.
440 U. S. 182
-183 (1979);
see Fusari v. Steinerg,
-392 (1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring). Neither
involved state-imposed filing deadlines for Presidential candidates.
, O.T. 1972, No. 70-48, p. 4 (independent candidates for U.S. House of Representatives); Juris.Statement in
O.T. 1972, No. 70-15, p. 5 (independent candidates for Governor of Ohio and U.S. House of Representatives). Further,
arose on review of the District Court's refusal to grant injunctive relief placing appellants on the ballot. The court relied at least in part on appellants' failure to take steps to become candidates before the primary, a date 90 days after the challenged filing deadline, or indeed to tender nominating petitions at any time before filing suit.
at 30. In
the District Court dismissed a complaint seeking declaratory as well as injunctive relief, concluding that the early filing deadline was reasonable, but it could have refused to place appellants on the ballot on the equitable ground that they had not submitted nominating petitions until more than two and a half months after the party nominees were chosen in the primary. 352 F.Supp. at 329.
As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, our remand in
Mandel v. Bradley, supra,
does not control this case. Plaintiff, who had sought to run as an independent candidate for United States Senator from Maryland, challenged a Maryland code provision imposing both an early filing deadline and a numerical signature requirement. Neither of the parties addressed the constitutionality of the filing date standing alone. The District Court improperly relied on a prior summary affirmance by this Court to strike down the restriction, and failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits. We remanded for factual findings.
at 177-178. On remand, the District Court found that the early filing deadline imposed unconstitutional burdens on the plaintiff.
Bradley v. Mandel,
449 F.Supp. 983, 986-989 (Md.1978).
Anderson also prevailed on First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause grounds in
Anderson v. Hooper,
498 F.Supp. 898, 905 (NM 1980), and on state law grounds in
Greaves v. Mills,
497 F.Supp. 283 (ED Ky.1980),
rev'd in part on other grounds,
664 F.2d 600 (CA6 1981).
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have considered the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate state interests.
See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes,
Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, supra.
("The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot, and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes");
(Harlan, J., concurring in result) ("[B]y denying the appellants any opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the President is selected, the State has eliminated the basic incentive that all political parties have for conducting such activities, thereby depriving appellants of much of the substance, if not the form, of their protected rights");
We have upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. The State has the undoubted right to require candidates to make a preliminary showing of substantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot, because it is both wasteful and confusing to encumber the ballot with the names of frivolous candidates.
cf. Storer v. Brown,
-746;
(1977) (remand to assess burden placed by State's signature-gathering requirements on independent candidates). The State also has the right to prevent distortion of the electoral process by the device of "party raiding," the organized switching of blocs of voters from one party to another in order to manipulate the outcome of the other party's primary election.
cf. Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U. S. 59
-6 (1973).
We have also upheld restrictions on candidate eligibility that serve legitimate state goals which are unrelated to First Amendment values.
See Clements v. Fashing,
See American Party of Texas v. White, supra,
-781;
Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, supra,
-189 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring);
Five individuals were able to qualify as independent Presidential candidates in Ohio in 1980. 499 F.Supp. at 143-144. But their inclusion on the ballot does not negate the burden imposed on the associational rights of independent-minded voters. These candidates -- Gus Hall of the Communist Party, Richard Congress of the Socialist Workers Party, Deirdre Griswold of the Workers World Party, Ed Clark of the Libertarian Party, and Barry Commoner of the Citizen's Party -- represented ideologically committed minor parties which did not proceed through the "minor party" provisions of the Ohio Election Code. Their candidacies corresponded to the protected First Amendment interests of some Ohio voters. But, unlike Anderson's, they were unlikely adequately to satisfy the voting and associational interests of voters whose independent political leanings crystallized as a result of developments in the course of the primary campaigns.
Developments in the Law -- Elections, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1143, n. 130 (1975) ("From the standpoint of potential supporters, minor parties and independent candidates differ in that the latter are free from ties and obligations to party organizations, and support for them is not so total a commitment of political allegiance because it does not require renunciation of major party affiliation").
Our focus on the associational rights of independent-minded voters distinguishes the burden imposed by Ohio's early filing deadline from that created by the California disaffiliation provision upheld in
App. to Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as
10a-12a; Bickel,
11, at 87.
See Bradley v. Mandel,
449 F.Supp. at 986-987 (findings of fact of three-judge District Court on remand from this Court).
405 U. S. 144
, the Court noted that the disparity in voting power created by high candidate filing fees
Indeed, the impact fell on an undetermined number of voters.
405 U. S. 149
. Yet the filing fees were unconstitutional because of the
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 774-775 (1978). As Professor Tribe explains, although candidate eligibility requirements may exclude particular candidates, it remains possible that an eligible candidate will "adequately reflect the perspective of those who might have voted for a candidate who has been excluded."
at 774, n. 2. But courts quite properly
Developments in the Law -- Elections,
12, at 1218, and n. 5.
In addition, because the interests of minor parties and independent candidates are not well represented in state legislatures, the risk that the First Amendment rights of those groups will be ignored in legislative decisionmaking may warrant more careful judicial scrutiny.
at 1136, n. 87;
see generally United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
V. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 278-303 (3d ed.1952). As Professor Bickel has observed,
11, at 79-80.
The Constitution expressly delegates authority to the States to regulate the selection of Presidential electors. U.S.Const., Art. II, § 1;
see McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U. S. 35
(1892). But, as we have emphasized,
Willams v. Rhodes,
In approximately two-thirds of the States and the District of Columbia, filing deadlines for independent Presidential candidates occur in August or September. The deadlines in a number of other States are in June or July. Anderson was barred by early filing deadlines in Ohio and four other States; he succeeded in obtaining court orders requiring placement on the ballot in all five.
460 U. S. 784
664 F.2d at 563-564.
See William v. Rhodes, supra,
393 U. S. 43
-44 (Harlan, J., concurring in result) ("The [Electoral] College was created to permit the most knowledgeable members of the community to choose the executive of a nation whose continental dimensions were thought to preclude an informed choice by the citizenry at large").
1 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 250-287 (1916).
K. Lockridge, Literacy in Colonial New England 1-43, 72-87 (1974); L. Soltow & E. Stevens, The Rise of Literacy and the Common School in the United States: A Socioeconomic Analysis to 1870, pp. 28-57 (1981).
Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell,
"It is suggested that a write-in procedure, under § 18600
without a filing fee would be an adequate alternative to California's present filing fee requirement. The realities of the electoral process, however, strongly suggest that 'access' via write-in votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the ballot. . . . [A candidate] relegated to the write-in provision would be forced to rest his chances solely upon those voters who would remember his name and take the affirmative step of writing it on the ballot."
415 U. S. 719
Indeed, in the 1980 Presidential election, only 27 votes were cast in the State of Ohio for write-in candidates. 14 America Votes,
4, at 317.
This particular interest in "political stability" must not be confused with the interest that is implicated by rules designed to prevent "party raiding,"
That interest, sufficient to sustain the challenged restriction in
(1973), is applicable only to party primaries; but this case involves restrictions on access to the general election ballot. Nor is it the same interest that justifies a rule disqualifying a person who voted in a party primary from signing a petition supporting the candidacy of an independent. Such a rule reflects a
415 U. S. 743
see American Party of Texas v. White,
Section 3513.25.7 is a filing deadline, not a "sore loser" statute. It blocks access to the general election ballot 75 days before the primary, at a time when, by definition, no candidate has yet lost the party primary. Ohio has a separate "sore loser" statute, which is admittedly inapplicable to Anderson because he made a timely withdrawal from the Ohio Republican primary.
Furthermore, as the District Court observed, "it is clear that R.C. 3513.257 acts as a disaffiliation provision only by mere happenstance, not by any reasonably discernible legislative design." 499 F.Supp. at 135.
Hall and Tyner, the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates, apparently complied with the one-year disaffiliation provision.
election of a President], the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and
leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object.
146 U. S. 27
Ohio also offers
different routes to the general election ballot. Should a candidate decide to seek the nomination of a political party participating in Ohio's primary election by capturing delegate votes for the party's national convention, the candidate must file a declaration of candidacy and a nominating petition bearing signatures from 1,000 members of the party; the filing must occur no later than the 75th day before the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June of the election year (in 1980 the date was March 20). Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3513.05 (Supp.1982). Of course, because a political party has earned the right to put on the ballot a candidate chosen at its national convention, a candidate seeking the nomination of that party could forgo the Ohio primary process and, if he should win at the national convention, still be placed on the ballot as a party candidate. If a candidate chooses to run as a nonparty candidate, he must file, by
Today the Court holds that the filing deadline for nonparty candidates in this statutory scheme violated the First Amendment rights of 1980 Presidential hopeful John Anderson and Anderson's supporters. Certainly, absent a court injunction ordering that his name be placed on the ballot, Anderson and his supporters would have been injured by Ohio's ballot access requirements; by failing to comply with the filing deadline for nonparty candidates Anderson would have been excluded from Ohio's 1980 general election ballot. [
] But the Constitution does not require that a State allow any particular Presidential candidate to be on its ballot, and so long as the Ohio ballot access laws are rational and allow nonparty candidates reasonable access to the general election ballot, this Court should not interfere with Ohio's exercise of its Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, power. Since I believe that the Ohio laws meet these criteria, I dissent.
In support of its conclusion that Ohio's filing deadline "may have a substantial impact on independent-minded voters,"
, the Court explains that,
. In addition, the Court says:
460 U. S. 792
. Finally, the Court intimates that the effect of the filing deadline for nonparty candidates is that election campaigns are "monopolized by the existing political parties."
460 U. S. 794
. While, if true, these findings might provide a basis for finding a substantial impact on nonparty candidates and their supporters, the Court's conclusions are simply unsupported by the record in this case.
Anderson makes no claim, and thus has offered no evidence to show, that the early filing deadline impeded his "signature-gathering efforts." That alone should be enough to prevent the Court from finding that the deadline has such an impact. A statute "is not to be upset upon hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good upon the facts as they are."
235 U. S. 26
(1914). What information the record does contain on this point leads to a contrary conclusion. The record shows that, in 1980, five independent candidates submitted nominating petitions with the necessary 5,000 signatures by the March 20 deadline, and thus qualified for the general election ballot in Ohio.
-792, n. 12. The Court of Appeals found that this number of nonparty candidates was not unusual in Ohio. 664 F.2d 554, 565, n. 14 (1981). The importance of this kind of evidence was noted in
(1974), where the Court said:
. The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from "past experience" in this case is that a "reasonably diligent independent candidate" choosing to take Ohio's nonparty route has little
difficulty in obtaining the necessary signatures in a timely fashion.
The Court's intimation that the Ohio filing deadline infringes on a nonparty candidate who makes the decision to run for President after the March deadline is similarly without support in the record. [
] Certainly, if such candidates emerge, the Ohio deadline will prevent their running in the general election as nonparty candidates. Just as certainly, however, Anderson was not such a candidate. Anderson formally announced his candidacy for the Presidency on June 8, 1979 -- over nine months before Ohio's March 20 deadline. And the record does not reveal the existence of any other individual
Thus, Ohio's filing deadline does not create a restriction "denying the franchise to citizens," such as those faced by the Court in
(1969) (emphasis omitted),
(1969) (per curiam),
398 U. S. 419
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
(1972). Likewise, Ohio's filing deadline does not create a restriction that makes it "virtually impossible" for new-party candidates or nonparty candidates to qualify for the ballot, such as those addressed in
the Court was faced with a California statute prohibiting an independent candidate from affiliating with a political party for 12 months preceding the primary election. This required a prospective candidate to decide on the form of his candidacy at a date some eight months earlier than Ohio requires. In upholding, in the face of a First Amendment challenge, this disaffiliation statute and a statute preventing candidates who had lost a primary from running as independents, the Court determined that the laws were "expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of various routes to the ballot," 415 U.S. at
, and that the statutes furthered "the State's interest," described by the Court as "compelling," "in the stability of its political system."
. The Court explained its holding, saying:
"[The disaffiliation statute] carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot.
It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an 'independent' candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
"A State need not take the course California has, but California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government.
The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison).
It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling, and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late, rather than early, decision to seek independent ballot status. . . .
[T]he Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest
-736 (emphasis added). The similarities between the effect of the Ohio filing deadline and the California disaffiliation statute are obvious.
Refusing to own up to the conflict its opinion creates with
the Court tries to distinguish it, saying that it
460 U. S. 803
. The Court asserts that the Ohio filing deadline is more like the statutory scheme in
which was designed to protect "
two particular parties -- the Republicans and the Democrats -- and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly.'"
460 U. S. 802
we squarely held that protecting the Republican and Democratic Parties from external competition cannot justify the virtual exclusion of other political aspirants from the political arena."
But see Buckley v. Valeo,
(1976) (per curiam)). "Ohio's asserted interest in political stability," says the Court, "amounts to a desire to protect existing political parties from competition."
460 U. S. 801
. But this simply is not the case. The Ohio filing deadline in no way makes it "virtually impossible," 393 U.S. at
, for new parties or nonparty candidates to secure a position on the general election ballot. It does require early decisions. But once a decision is made, there is no claim that the additional requirements for new parties and nonparty candidates are too burdensome. In fact, past experience has shown otherwise. What the Ohio filing deadline prevents is a candidate such as Anderson from seeking a party nomination and then, finding that he is rejected by the party, bolting from the party to form an independent candidacy. This is precisely the same behavior that California sought to prevent by the disaffiliation statute this Court upheld in
The Court makes other attempts to distinguish this case from the obviously similar
case. The Court says Ohio has no interest in preventing "intraparty feuding," because, by the nature of the Presidential nominating conventions "
intraparty feuding' will continue until August."
460 U. S. 804
] This is certainly no different than the situation in
Essentially all of the battles for party nominations in California would have taken place during the 12 months before the party primaries -- the period during which an independent candidate had to be disaffiliated with any party.
upheld the State's interest in avoiding political fragmentation in the context of elections wholly within the boundaries of California. The State's interest in regulating a nationwide Presidential election is not nearly as strong."
(footnote omitted). The Court's characterization of the election simply is incorrect. The Ohio general election in 1980, among other things, was for the appointment of Ohio's representatives to the electoral college. U.S.Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Court throughout its opinion fails to come to grips with this fact. While Ohio may have a lesser interest in who is ultimately selected by the electoral college, its interest in who is supported by its own Presidential electors must be at least as strong as its interest in electing other representatives. While the Presidential electors may serve a short term and may speak only one time on behalf of the voters they represent,
their role in casting Ohio's electoral votes for a President may be second to none in importance.
is not controlling, since, in that case, the Court held that the California disaffiliation statute was not discriminatory because party candidates were prohibited from affiliating with another political party for the 12 months preceding the primary election. The Court says that Ohio's filing deadline does discriminate against nonparty candidates. But merely saying it is so does not make it so. As explained later, nonparty candidates and party candidates wishing to participate in Ohio's primary election must file on the same date. It is true that party candidates can obtain a place on the general election ballot without participating in the primary by obtaining a party's nomination at its national convention. But this is a benefit given to the party, and only incidentally received by the winning party candidate; it provides no benefit to one who seeks, but fails, to obtain a party nomination. On the whole, party candidates have a more difficult chore in getting a place on the general election ballot than do nonparty candidates; a fact of which Anderson and other unsuccessful rivals for the 1980 Republican nomination are doubtless aware. Nonparty candidates, if they file in time and submit the necessary nominating petitions, are assured of a place on the ballot; party candidates must win a party nomination.
In a final attempt to distinguish
the Court argues that, even if Ohio is serving some interest in preventing "intraparty feuding," the filing deadline is "both too broad and too narrow"; the Court even argues that the filing deadline may, in fact, impair this interest.
460 U. S. 805
. The Court claims that the effect of the deadline is too broad because it applies "to independent candidates who have not been affiliated in the recent past with any political party."
Its effect is too narrow because it "does not prohibit independent candidacies by persons formerly affiliated with
a political party, or currently participating in intraparty competition."
The Court says the filing deadline may impair the States' interest in preserving political stability because it may force independent-minded voters "
to create minor parties without first attempting to influence the course taken by a major one.'"
(quoting A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity 87-88 (1971)). But each of these criticisms could have been asserted against the California disaffiliation statute.
The point the Court misses is that, in cases like this and
we have never required that States meet some kind of "narrowly tailored" standard in order to pass constitutional muster. In reviewing election laws like Ohio's filing deadline, we have said before that a court's job is to ensure that the State "in no way freezes the
but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political life."
(1971). If it does not freeze the
then the State's laws will be upheld if they are "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and [are] in no sense invidious or arbitrary."
See also Marston v. Lewis,
(1973) (per curiam);
(1982). The Court tries to avoid the rules set forth in some of these cases, saying that such rules were "applicable only to party primaries," and that "this case involves restrictions on access to the general election ballot."
, n. 29. The fallacy in this reasoning is quite apparent: one cannot restrict access to the primary ballot without also restricting access to the general election ballot. As the Court said in
Storer v. Brown:
The Ohio filing deadline easily meets the test described above. In the interest of the "stability of its political system,"
, Ohio must be "free to assure itself that [a nonparty] candidate is a serious contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of community support."
415 U. S. 746
. This interest alone is sufficient to support Ohio ballot access laws, which require that candidates for Presidential electors choose their route early, thus preventing a person who has decided to run for a party nomination from switching to a nonparty candidacy after he discovers that he is not the favorite of his party. But this is not the only interest furthered by Ohio's laws.
. Admitting that the Constitutional Convention in 1787, in establishing the electoral college and providing plenary authority to the States for election of its members to the college, had a heightened awareness of the importance of an informed electorate, the Court tells us how times have changed in the past 200 years, and how the problem of ensuring an informed electorate is no longer so great. The Court explains:
460 U. S. 797
give its voters as much time as possible to gather information on the potential candidates would seem to lead to the contrary conclusion. There is nothing improper about wanting as much time as possible in which to evaluate all available information when making an important decision. Besides, the Court's assertion that it does not take 7 months to inform the electorate is difficult to explain in light of the fact that Anderson allowed himself some 19 months to complete this task; and we are all well aware that Anderson's decision to make an early go of it is not atypical. The Court's reliance on the quote from
, that campaign spending and voter education occur "largely during the month before an election" cannot be taken seriously when applied to Presidential campaigns. I see no basis whatsoever for the Court's conclusion that "[t]his reasoning applies with even greater force to a Presidential election."
460 U. S. 798
-15. This is especially true in the context of candidates for President.
Burroughs v. United States,
664 F.2d at 564. [
The Court seems to say that, even if these interests would otherwise be served by Ohio's filing deadline, they are "undermined by the State's willingness to place major party nominees on the November ballot even if they never campaigned in Ohio."
. The Court fails to follow its own warning that "
[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.'"
). Underlying the Court's entire opinion is the idea that "independent candidates" are treated differently than candidates fielded by the "major parties." But this observation is no more productive than comparing
any political party, major, minor, or otherwise,
can qualify for a position on Ohio's general election ballot and have that position held open until later in the election year. The reasonableness of this approach is fairly obvious. Political parties have, or at least hope to have, a continuing existence, representing particular philosophies. Each party has an interest in finding the best candidate to advance its philosophy in each election.
See Cousins v. Wigoda,
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
(1981). The Court suggests that, if such a procedure is so important for political parties, then followers of a particular candidate should also have more time.
460 U. S. 800
, n. 27. This argument simply does not wash. Any group of like-minded voters, if they are of sufficient numbers, is free to form a political party and ensure more time in selecting a candidate to express their views. But followers of a particular candidate need no time to find such a representative; they are organized around that candidate. Such followers have no real organized existence in the absence of that particular candidate.
Comparing party candidates and nonparty candidates is somewhat more useful, but does not change the result. Any candidate wanting to pursue his place on the Ohio general election ballot through Ohio's preliminary procedures must file at the same time. Nevertheless, should an individual who has not filed a statement of candidacy be chosen by a political party as its nominee, Ohio does not attempt to keep that candidate off of its general election ballot. To the extent that this is an advantage to the successful party candidate, however, it is a benefit given to the party, which the party candidate only receives incidentally. [
Anderson would not have been totally excluded from participating in the general election since Ohio allows for "write-in" candidacies. The Court suggests, however, that this is of no relevance, because a write-in procedure "is not an adequate substitute for having the candidate's name appear on the printed ballot."
460 U. S. 799
, n. 26. Until today, the Court had not squarely so held, and in fact, in earlier decisions, the Court had treated the availability of write-in candidacies as quite relevant.
It would seem that realistically speaking, there is little chance in these modern times of a serious candidate for the Presidency making his decision to run after the spring of the election year. We might judicially take notice that it is presently the spring of the year preceding an election year, and numerous candidates have already thrown their hats into the campaign ring. For proof of a contrary point, the Court cites by reference to the candidacies of Martin Van Buren in 1848, James B. Weaver in 1892, Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and Robert La Follette in 1924.
, n. 13. The most obvious response is that the method of Presidential campaigning has so changed since the last of these campaigns that such candidacies are not as likely to arise today. It also should be noted that most, if not all, of these men decided to seek the Presidency far in advance of their actual nomination. Finally, none of these individuals were elected in the years in question, and those who split from their political parties may well have been responsible for the election's going to a different party, a result which this Court, in
said States were at liberty to try to avoid.
The Court seeks comfort from the idea that the filing deadline is not a "sore loser" statute which prevents a candidate who is defeated in a primary from running as an independent candidate.
, n. 31. But the effect of the deadline in this case is much the same. Under the Court's approach, so long as a candidate pulls out of his party race before the votes of the party are counted, he must be recognized as a "newly emergent independent candidate" whose candidacy is created by a dramatic change in national events. To the contrary, I submit that such a candidate is no more than a "sore loser" who ducked out before putting his popularity to the vote of his party.
The Ohio Legislature's decision is not that different from the decision by the Federal Government requiring television networks to provide early access for Presidential candidates. Recently, in
(1981), this Court held that, under the Federal Communications Act, a Presidential candidate had a right to television access as early as December, 1979, some 11 months before the election.