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International Arbitration 2019 | North American Overview | ICLG
North American Overview: International Arbitration 2019
ICLG.com > Practice Areas > International Arbitration > North American Overview
II. Arbitration in the United States and Canada
A. Commercial Arbitration Climate
Both the United States and Canada have arbitration-friendly legal regimes, as well as experienced arbitration counsel and arbitrators. In addition, both countries host a number of important arbitral institutions. The United States is home to: the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) and its international arm, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”); JAMS; the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution; the New York International Arbitration Center (which does not administer arbitrations, but does provide arbitration hearing facilities); and the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). In Canada, arbitral institutions include: the ADR Institute of Canada; the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre (“BCICAC”); the Canadian Commercial Arbitration Centre; the ICC; and Arbitration Place.
B. Investment Arbitration Climate
Both the United States and Canada are signatories to a number of free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”).1 Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico provides for arbitration of investor-State disputes.2 BITs – known as Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (“FIPAs”) in Canada – also typically provide for arbitration of disputes.3
2. II. Arbitration in the United States and Canada
A. U.S. Arbitration Framework
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is the starting point for U.S. arbitration law.4 The FAA “declare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration”.5 The FAA applies to arbitrations related to interstate and foreign commerce and maritime transactions.6 State arbitral law is preempted by the FAA, but continues to apply to areas on which the FAA is silent.
The FAA consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 contains general provisions.7 Importantly, it recognises the validity of written arbitration agreements8 and provides judicial procedures for confirming and challenging arbitration awards.9 Chapter 2 implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”), subject to two reservations: the New York Convention only applies to: (i) awards made in other signatory nations (a reciprocity requirement); and (ii) disputes that are deemed “commercial” under U.S. law.10 The New York Convention thus provides the basic framework for domestic enforcement of most international arbitral awards. Chapter 3 of the FAA implements the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”).11 The Panama Convention supersedes the New York Convention where a majority of the parties are citizens of eligible Panama Convention signatory countries.12
As stated, the FAA applies only to written arbitration agreements involving interstate, foreign and maritime commerce. Such agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”.13 Accordingly, courts must look to state contract law to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement. However, arbitration provisions are considered to be “severable” from the remainder of a contract such that, “unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance”.14
The FAA does not provide many default rules, leaving the procedures for conducting arbitrations largely to the parties. The FAA does, however, set out a procedure for appointing an arbitrator in the absence of agreement by the parties.15 It also gives arbitrators the power to summon witnesses and to enlist the aid of U.S. courts in compelling their attendance.16
Kompetenz-kompetenz refers to a tribunal’s authority to rule on questions related to the scope of its own jurisdiction (i.e., questions of “arbitrability”). Under U.S. law, questions about whether an arbitration agreement is valid and covers the dispute at issue are presumptively for the court to decide.17 The exception is where the parties have agreed to grant the arbitrator the authority to decide such questions of arbitrability. This decision must, however, be established by “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence; “silence or ambiguity” is not sufficient.18 So-called “procedural” questions, on the other hand – i.e., whether “prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate” have been met – are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide.19
The grounds for vacating an arbitral award in the U.S. are very narrow. The FAA provides that arbitral awards may only be vacated upon a showing that: (i) “the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”; (ii) “there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators”; (iii) “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”; or (iv) “the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”.20 The FAA also allows courts to modify or correct arbitral awards where there was a material miscalculation or mistake, the arbitrators have ruled on a matter not submitted to them, or there is a problem of form with the award not affecting the merits.21
Before 2008, courts held that arbitration awards could also be set aside if the arbitral tribunal acted in “manifest disregard of the law”. In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court held that “§§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification”.22 Federal circuit courts split on whether the “manifest disregard” standard survived after Hall Street. In Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the Supreme Court declined to “decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10”.23 The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held that “manifest disregard” is no longer available as a ground for vacatur,24 but the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits continue to apply it.25 The First, Third and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged uncertainty as to whether “manifest disregard” survives and avoided its application by holding that the stringent standard, if available, has not been met on the facts.26 The circuits that continue to apply “manifest disregard” require proof of a clearly established legal principle that the arbitrator wilfully ignored.27
B. Canadian Arbitration Framework
Legislative authority in Canada is divided between the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures. Unlike in the U.S., however, provincial, rather than federal, legislation governs most commercial arbitrations. As such, parties wishing to arbitrate international disputes in Canada typically must look to provincial, rather than federal, law.
Fortunately, in the context of international commercial arbitration, there are few differences across provinces because the federal government28 and all Canadian provinces and territories29 have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with minor modifications. They have done so either by appending the Model Law as a schedule to provincial legislation,30 reproducing it as a stand-alone statute (in some cases with minor variations),31 or, in the case of Quebec (Canada’s only civil law jurisdiction), by incorporating it in the Code of Civil Procedure.32
Canada is also a signatory to the New York Convention,33 which has been implemented through both federal34 and provincial legislation.35 Unlike the U.S., Canada did not adopt the reciprocity reservation in the New York Convention, meaning that arbitral awards issued in jurisdictions that are not otherwise Contracting States may be enforced in Canada under the New York Convention. The federal government36 and common law provinces37 have, however, limited the application of the New York Convention to “differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial” in accordance with Article I(3) of the New York Convention. The Quebec Code of Civil procedure contains no such limitation and provides that “[c]onsideration may be given” to the New York Convention in interpreting the rules for recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards made outside Quebec.38
Procedural requirements for international commercial arbitration in Canada generally conform to the default rules in the Model Law. There are, however, certain important differences across provinces.
Most provincial statutes in Canada were enacted before the 2006 amendments to the Model Law and are based on the original 1985 text.39 While both versions of the Model Law require arbitration agreements to be in writing, the 2006 amendments provide that “[a]n arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means”.40 The 2006 amendments to the Model Law also updated the definition of “in writing” to expressly include electronic communications, including “data messages” and “electronic mail”.41 The 2006 amendments also contain provisions addressing applications for interim measures and preliminary orders.42
In 2014, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada recommended reform to provincial arbitration legislation, including the adoption of the 2006 Model Law amendments in each province.43 In 2017, Ontario repealed and replaced its international commercial arbitration legislation with a new act that appends the Model Law, as amended in 2006.44 The Ontario legislation also abrogated the effect of a 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision, which held that foreign arbitral awards are subject to Canadian statutes of limitation, which vary by province, when brought to Canadian courts for recognition and enforcement.45 The Ontario act provides that an application under the New York Convention or Model Law for recognition or enforcement shall be made within 10 years of the date of the award or the date on which the proceedings concluded.46 As a result, different limitation periods may apply depending on the province where recognition and enforcement is sought.47 On May 17, 2018, British Columbia followed suit, becoming the second Canadian province to modernise its international arbitration law by adopting the 2006 amendments to the Model Law.48
The Model Law on which provincial legislation is based contains default rules for the composition of the arbitral tribunal – one chosen by each party, and the third chosen by the first two appointed arbitrators – unless the parties have agreed otherwise.49 Upon request of a party, courts may intervene to appoint arbitrators if parties do not follow their chosen procedures or if a vacancy is not filled.50 The parties may challenge the appointment of an arbitrator only if there exist justifiable doubts as to her impartiality or qualifications, and may seek the court’s intervention in doing so.51 Parties may modify these and other rules by agreement.
In accordance with the Model Law, arbitrators in Canada have the discretion to request the production of documents. The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration often serve as a guide.52 Article 27 of the Model Law also provides for court assistance in collecting evidence.53
The Model Law provides that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction,54 and enumerates specific grounds on which a stay of court proceedings in favour of arbitration may be refused.55 The Supreme Court of Canada has embraced the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, holding that “in any case involving an arbitration clause, a challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator”.56 The only exceptions are where the jurisdictional challenge “is based solely on a question of law” or “a question of mixed law and fact . . . [which] require[s] only superficial consideration of the documentary evidence in the record”, in which case the jurisdictional challenge may be resolved by the court.57 Even if one of the exceptions applies, the court must “be satisfied that the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is not a delaying tactic and that it will not unduly impair the conduct of the arbitration proceeding” and may “allow the arbitrator to rule first on his or her competence” where it is “best for the arbitration process”.58
In recognition of the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, Canadian courts have held that a stay of court proceedings must be granted in favour of arbitration as long as it is “arguable” that the conditions under Article 8(1) of the Model Law have been met.59 Thus, “[w]here it is arguable that the dispute falls within the terms of the arbitration agreement or where it is arguable that a party to the legal proceedings is a party to the arbitration agreement then . . . the stay should be granted and those matters left to be determined by the arbitral tribunal”.60
The Model Law sets out the grounds for setting aside international arbitration awards, which include a party’s legal incapacity, defective notice, a tribunal acting outside its authority and improper composition of the tribunal.61 Both the Model Law and New York Convention set out grounds on which courts may refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign award. These grounds are identical to the Model Law grounds for setting awards aside, with the addition that recognition and enforcement may be refused if the party against whom the award is invoked furnishes proof that “the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made”.62 Furthermore, an award may be set aside, or recognition or enforcement refused, where: (i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the state; or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of the state.63
Canadian courts have strictly adhered to the enumerated grounds in the Model Law and New York Convention and held that there is no authority to review international arbitration awards for mere errors of law, for instance.64 Further, Canadian courts have held that there is a discretion to refuse to recognise and enforce an award even if one or more of the enumerated grounds for recognition and enforcement have been met, based on the permissive language in Article 34(2) of the Model Law.65
Canadian courts have construed the public policy provisions of the Model Law and New York Convention very narrowly. For instance, Ontario courts have held that the public policy ground “should be narrowly construed and should apply only where enforcement would violate our ‘most basic notions of morality and justice,’”66 such as where “the procedural or substantive rules diverge markedly from our own, or where there was ignorance or corruption on the part of the tribunal which could not be seen to be tolerated or condoned by our courts”.67
3. III. Recent Developments
1. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Proposed Rule Banning Mandatory Arbitration Clauses from Preventing Class Action Lawsuits Revoked
In May 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued a proposed rule for the public aimed at preventing mandatory arbitration clauses from blocking class actions in contracts of consumer financial products and services. The proposed rule would have required that companies that include arbitration clauses in their contracts: (1) include specific language provided by the CFPB that makes clear that the arbitration clauses cannot be used to stop consumers from being part of a class action in court; and (2) submit to the CFPB any claims filed and awards issued in arbitration. The proposed rule would have applied to most consumer financial products and services that the CFPB oversees, and in particular products and services related to markets that involve lending, storing and moving or exchanging money.68
The CFPB’s proposed rule was issued in the wake of the Supreme Court’s December 2015 ruling in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.69 The services agreement between DirecTV and its customers included a binding arbitration provision with a class arbitration waiver, which specified that the entire arbitration provision was unenforceable if the “law of your state” made class action waivers unenforceable, but also declared the arbitration clause was governed by the FAA. At the time that the respondents entered into the services agreement, the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,70 which provided that class arbitration waivers were unenforceable, was still in effect. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,71 the Supreme Court held that the Discover Bank rule was pre-empted by the FAA. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Breyer, a majority of the Court in Imburgia held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable.72 A dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice Sotomayor,73 noted that the majority’s decision, along with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions, “have predictably resulted in the deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses, and, turning the coin, they have insulated powerful economic interests from liability for violations of consumer-protection laws”.74
On November 1, 2017, President Trump signed a joint resolution passed by Congress disapproving the proposed CFPB rule. The CFPB published official notice removing the proposed rule from the Code of Federal Regulations on November 22, 2017.75
2. U.S. Supreme Court Finds Class Action Waivers in Employment Arbitration Agreements Enforceable
On May 21, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court held that employment arbitration agreements with class action waivers requiring individual arbitration are enforceable under the FAA, notwithstanding Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”),76 which protects employees’ rights to engage in concerted activities.77
By way of background, in 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”) ruled that mandatory arbitration agreements that effectively bar class or collective actions violate employees’ rights to engage in “concerted action”.78 Following the NLRB’s ruling, federal appellate courts began issuing conflicting opinions regarding the enforceability of mandatory class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements, with the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits following the NLRB’s approach,79 and the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits rejecting it.80
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court considered two questions: (1) whether the FAA’s “savings clause”, which allows courts to hold arbitration agreements unenforceable “upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”, applies;81 and (2) whether the NLRA’s guarantee of the right to engage in concerted activity overrides the FAA’s requirement that arbitration agreements be enforced. The majority opinion held that neither precluded class action waivers in employment contracts.
As to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the “savings clause” did not apply, reasoning that the clause only allowed for the invalidation of arbitration agreements on grounds that exist for the revocation of “any” contract, that is, generally applicable contract defences such as fraud, duress or unconscionability.82 As to the second question, the Supreme Court held that Section 7 of the NLRA did not contain language that would permit the Supreme Court to infer a congressional command to displace the FAA and outlaw arbitration with respect to employment contracts containing class action waivers. Specifically, the majority held that Section 7 of the NLRA concerns employees’ rights to organise unions and bargain collectively, not class or collective action procedures.83
Justice Ginsburg issued a dissent, arguing that collective and class actions to enforce workplace rights should be deemed “concerted activities” protected by the NLRA. Justice Ginsburg predicts that the “inevitable result” of the majority decision will be the “underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers”.84
Open questions remain as to what types of employee-based actions fall under the purview of Epic Systems. For instance, Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent that the majority opinion does not “place in jeopardy discrimination complaints asserting disparate-impact and pattern-or-practice claims that call for proof on a group-wide basis” that are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other laws that address class-based employment discrimination.85
Thus, much remains to be seen as to the full extent of Epic System’s impact on class action waivers and what claims, if any, remain outside the scope of such waivers in employment arbitration agreements.
3. Fourth Circuit Clarifies When Awards are “Mutual, Final, and Definite”
As discussed above, one of the grounds for vacatur under the FAA is that the award was so “imperfectly executed” that a “mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”.86 However, authority on when an award is “mutual, final, and definite” has been limited to date.
In Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sprint Communications Company L.P.,87 the Fourth Circuit addressed the “mutual, final, and definite” ground for vacatur. The parties entered into a Licence Agreement that mandated a panel of three appraisers to resolve disputes on amounts due in the event that the parties’ individual appraisers did not agree.88 The majority decision of the appointed appraisers expressly “reserve[d] . . . assent without prejudice or time limitation subject to [certain] extraordinary appraisal assumptions”.89 The majority decision led to further disputes, which were arbitrated before an AAA panel. The Fourth Circuit held that the majority decision of the appointed appraisers was not “mutual, final, and definite” under the FAA.90 The reservation of assent “without prejudice or time limitation” was fatal to any finding of finality; the appraiser “did not merely base his assent on certain assumptions, but rather reserved the right to withdraw his assent if his assumptions proved to be incorrect”.91 The Fourth Circuit held that this reservation “cannot be squared with any conception of ‘finality’”.92 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court and instructed the parties to return to arbitration and obtain a “final” arbitration award.
4. U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Independent Contractor Agreements qualify as “Contracts of Employment” Under the FAA
On January 15, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira that, due to a statutory exception contained in the FAA, independent contractors in the interstate transportation industry may not be subject to forced arbitration.93
The case involved a class action lawsuit in federal court against New Prime, an interstate trucking company, brought by Dominic Oliveira, who worked as one of its drivers.94 Pursuant to the parties’ contracts, Mr. Oliveira, similar to all of New Prime’s drivers, was classified as an independent contractor.95 Mr. Oliveira alleged that New Prime failed to pay its drivers the statutorily required minimum wage. In response, New Prime asked the court to compel arbitration according to the terms found in the parties’ agreements.96 The Supreme Court held that the lower court lacked authority under the FAA to order arbitration because Mr. Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime fell within an exception found in § 1 of the FAA.97
The Supreme Court explained that while a court’s authority under the FAA to compel arbitration according to the terms’ of the parties’ agreement “may be considerable, it isn’t unconditional”.98 Rather, § 1 of the FAA states that “nothing” in the FAA “shall apply to . . . contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”.99 Noting this exception, the Supreme Court held that the term “contracts of employment”, as understood by Congress when the FAA was enacted in 1925, meant not only contracts that reflected an employer-employee relationship, but any “agreement to perform work”.100 As a result, independent contractors qualify as performing work within the meaning of the FAA.101
Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the First Circuit, finding that the Court lacked authority under the FAA to order arbitration.102 Important to acknowledge, however, is this holding does not extend to all “agreements to perform work” involving independent contractors, but only those employment contracts involving workers engaging in foreign or interstate commerce.103
5. U.S. Supreme Court Prohibits the “Wholly Groundless” Exception to Questions of Arbitrability
On January 8, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. that when a contract delegates the question of the arbitrability of a particular dispute to an arbitrator, courts may not decide the arbitrability question themselves by determining that the particular dispute is “wholly groundless”.104
As discussed with respect to kompetenz-kompetenz, while it is presumptively true under U.S. law that courts decide questions of arbitrability, parties may agree to grant the arbitrator the authority to decide such questions so long as the decision to do so is established by “clear and unmistakable” evidence.105 However, some federal courts have attempted to carve out an exception to this ability to delegate arbitrability, taking it upon themselves to decide arbitrability if the particular underlying dispute is “wholly groundless”. 106
In Henry Schein, the Supreme Court decisively ends this practice, holding that the FAA does not contain a “wholly groundless” exception, and applying such an exception is inconsistent with the FAA.107 The Court then remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to address whether the parties had agreed by “clear and unmistakable” evidence to have an arbitrator decide the question of arbitrability.108
6. Ambiguous Contracts and Compelled Class Arbitration
On April 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, a 5-4 decision, that an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary “contractual basis” for compelling class arbitration.109
The case involves a putative class of employees of Lamps Plus, who after a data breach, sued Lamps Plus alleging a variety of state and federal claims.110 Since the Plaintiff, Mr. Varela, like most Lamps Plus employees, signed an arbitration agreement when he started work at the company, Lamps Plus moved to compel arbitration.111 Specifically, Lamps Plus moved to compel individual arbitration rather than arbitration on a classwide basis. The District Court granted the motion to compel arbitration, but it rejected Lamp Plus’s request for individual arbitration.112 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court. 113
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court invoked its 2010 decision in In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., where the Court held that an agreement must affirmatively authorise classwide arbitration, and that a court may not compel classwide arbitration when an agreement is “silent” on its availability.114 Expanding upon the holding of Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that Mr. Varela’s employment agreement with Lamps Plus was ambiguous as to whether classwide arbitration was authorised, and that the FAA “requires more than ambiguity to ensure the parties actually agreed to arbitrate on a classwide basis”.115
In her dissent, Justice Kagan invoked the “well-established” and “plain-vanilla” rule of contract interpretation that ambiguity is read against the drafter – in this case, Lamps Plus.116 Justice Kagan then chastised the majority for reaching the opposite conclusion, contending that there is no provision of the FAA indicating the intention to trump the general rules of contract interpretation.117
It remains an open question how explicit an agreement must be for parties to sufficiently authorise classwide arbitration.
7. Forum Non Conveniens & the New Restatement of U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration
Since 2007, the American Law Institute (ALI) has been working on a restatement of the law on the subject of U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration. The proposed final draft was approved by the ALI membership at the 2019 Annual Meeting.118 The scope of this comprehensive project includes “arbitration agreements, the judicial role in the U.S. and abroad, enforcement and preclusive effect of international arbitral awards rendered in the U.S. and abroad, and ICSID Convention arbitration”.119
Like other ALI publications, the Restatement does not only “restate” the law in the U.S., but rather it provides guidance when courts take different approaches on a particular legal question. One such example is the Restatement’s discussion on whether forum non conveniens is a defence to enforcement under the New York or Panama Conventions.120 Citing cases such as In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002), the Restatement recognises that U.S. “courts have traditionally been willing to entertain motions to dismiss enforcement proceedings based on forum non conveniens”, even if such motions are rarely granted.121 Despite this, the Restatement takes the position that “[a]n action for confirmation or enforcement under the New York and Panama Conventions as implemented by FAA Chapters 2 and 3 is not subject to stay or dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, whether brought in state or federal court. Stay or dismissal of an action to confirm or enforce a Convention award based on forum non conveniens would run afoul of the Conventions’ requirement that, absent a specific Convention defense to enforcement, Contracting States confirm and enforce such awards”.122
It is too soon to tell whether the Restatement’s position will impact how U.S. courts deal with forum non conveniens motions moving forward.
1. Class Action and Arbitration Legislation
In recent years, Canadian courts have grappled with the interplay between class action and arbitration legislation, particularly in the context of consumer claims. On one hand, the provincial class action legislation provides that the court must certify a putative class action where the requirements for certification have been met.123 On the other hand, both the domestic and international arbitration legislation in each province provides that court actions shall be stayed where parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes, with certain exceptions,124 and Canadian courts have consistently held that consensual arbitration should be endorsed and encouraged as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.125 The Supreme Court of Canada has generally resolved this tension in favour of arbitration and has recently held that any restriction of the parties’ freedom to arbitrate must be found in clearly expressed legislation.126
The debate over the interplay between class action and arbitration legislation started with parallel putative class actions in British Columbia and Ontario against a payday loan company. In each province, the plaintiffs alleged that arbitration agreements in their standard form loan agreements were “inoperative” or “invalid” within the meaning of the provincial domestic arbitration legislation because the class action statutes required the court to certify where the statutory criteria are met.127 The British Columbia and Ontario Courts of Appeal both held that whether a stay of a putative class action should be granted on the basis of a mandatory arbitration clause should be decided in the context of determining whether a class action is the preferable procedure for resolving the dispute, one of the statutory criteria for class certification in common law Canada.
Subsequently, in two cases from Quebec decided in 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada held that proposed class actions against Dell Computers and Rogers Wireless could not proceed in the face of mandatory arbitration clauses, ruling that arbitration is a substantive right that ousts the court’s jurisdiction.128 In Dell, the Supreme Court expressly endorsed the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, as discussed above.129 Following Dell and Rogers, the British Columbia and Ontario courts came to different conclusions on the effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions – decided in part based on the Quebec Civil Code – on the interplay between the provincial class action and arbitration legislation in each province. The B.C. Court of Appeal ordered a stay of a consumer class action against another cell phone company for alleged overbilling,130 while Ontario courts certified an Ontario class action against Dell for the sale of allegedly defective notebook computers.131
In the 2011 decision in Seidel v. Telus,132 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that statutory claims for unfair billing practices against a cell phone provider based on British Columbia’s consumer protection legislation could proceed despite a mandatory arbitration clause in the cell phone contracts. The decision was based on the wording of the British Columbia consumer protection legislation, which, according to the majority, “manifest[ed] a legislative intent to intervene in the marketplace to relieve consumers of their contractual commitment to ‘private and confidential’ mediation/arbitration”.133 While permitting the statutory claims to proceed in court, the majority made clear that “[t]he choice to restrict or not to restrict arbitration clauses in consumer contracts is a matter for the legislature” and that “[a]bsent legislative intervention, the courts will generally give effect to the terms of a commercial contract freely entered into, even a contract of adhesion, including an arbitration clause”.134
Recent decisions have demonstrated the willingness of Canadian courts to enforce arbitration agreements in a range of putative class proceedings in the absence of express legislative restrictions on the parties’ freedom to arbitrate. For instance, in Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc.,135 the Ontario Superior Court stayed a putative class action on behalf of Uber drivers alleging that the drivers were employees within the meaning of Ontario employment legislation and entitled to certain statutory employment benefits. The Court held that agreements between the drivers and Uber included an agreement to arbitrate in the Netherlands and stayed the action pursuant to the Ontario International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, which adopts the Model Law.136 The Court held that “the plain meaning of the words of the [provincial employment statute] do not preclude resort to arbitration” and that the “issue of whether employment claims are arbitrable is an issue subject to the competence-competence principle . . . to be determined in the first instance by the arbitrator”.137
In April 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada in TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman further indicated its willingness to enforce arbitration agreements in class contexts.138 The case involved a class action, comprised of both individual consumers and business customers, which alleged that the defendant systematically overcharged its wireless telephone consumers.139 While the parties agreed that the contract arbitration clauses would not prevent the consumer class members from pursuing their claims in the Ontario courts due to the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, the parties disagreed as to whether the non-consumer, business customers’ claims should be stayed in favour of arbitration.140 The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Consumer Protection Act only applied to individual consumers, and as such, courts have no discretion with whether to enforce arbitration agreements against business customers.141
2. Canada-European Union Trade Agreement
On October 30, 2016, Canada and the European Union signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”). CETA will establish an Investment Court System (“ICS”) to replace the investor-State arbitration provisions in previous bilateral investment agreements between EU Member States and Canada. On September 21, 2017, CETA entered into force provisionally, making most of the agreement (but not the ICS) applicable.142 The agreement, including the ICS dispute resolution provisions, will enter into force fully and definitively once ratified by all EU Member States.143
The ICS will be a permanent arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes arising from the breach of obligations under CETA.144 The tribunal will comprise 15 members appointed by a joint committee for a fixed term: five members will be Canadian nationals; five will be nationals of EU Member States; and five will be nationals of third-party countries.145 Cases will be presided over by three members of the tribunal.146
The ICS will combine the transparency of national courts with the expediency of arbitration. Like a court, the tribunals’ hearings will be open to the public, unless the tribunal determines that there is a need to protect confidential information.147 Documents such as expert reports and witness statements will be made publicly available.148 CETA provides that all members of the tribunal must possess the qualifications for appointment to judicial office in their home countries, or otherwise be “jurists of recognised competence”,149 and are subject to strict ethics and conflicts of interest rules.150 The rules specify a mechanism to challenge an arbitrator on the basis of a conflict of interest,151 and the documents related to the challenge of an arbitrator are made publicly available.152 There is also an appeal mechanism for the review of awards based on errors in the application of law, “manifest errors” in the appreciation of facts, including domestic law, or on the grounds set out in Article 52(1) of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention, such as corruption, a “serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure”, or failure to state reasons, among other grounds.153
In order to benefit from the efficiency of an arbitral forum, the rules permit the tribunal to expeditiously dismiss claims that are “manifestly without legal merit”154 or “unfounded in law”.155 The tribunal is generally required to issue an award within 24 months of the date a claim is submitted, failing which it is required to provide the parties with reasons for the delay.156 Costs are generally borne by the unsuccessful party.157
The ICS reflects a number of features to safeguard the sovereignty of States subject to its jurisdiction and protect their power to regulate in the public interest. For example, it limits the grounds on which an investor can challenge a State158 and does not provide the tribunal with the power to grant injunctive relief,159 avoiding the possibility that a government may be forced to change legislation or policy in response to investor suits. The tribunal’s final award is limited to monetary damages or restitution, and it cannot award punitive damages.160 Moreover, although it can order interim measures to protect certain rights of parties to a dispute, such as orders relating to the preservation of evidence, the tribunal cannot generally grant orders of attachment.161
CETA’s ICS provisions are among its most controversial, and nearly derailed efforts to sign the treaty.162 Yet on April 30, 2019, the European Court of Justice released an opinion stating that the system is compatible with EU law.163 This vindicated the ICS proponents who not only fought to preserve the ICS as an important feature of CETA, but are looking to apply its model beyond CETA, with ambitions of establishing a “Multilateral Investment Court” open to all countries that subscribe to its underlying principles.164 This reflects a view of the ICS as not only a specialised forum for trade disputes arising from CETA, but as an “important and radical change” in dispute resolution more broadly.165 Canada and the EU are committed to expeditiously implementing the Multilateral Investment Court “once a minimum critical mass of participants is established”.166
4. IV. Conclusion
The United States and Canada are each home to mature and arbitration-friendly legal regimes. Although the laws regarding arbitration continue to evolve, the United States and Canada remain important sites of international arbitration.
1. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, (Hyperlink) (listing free trade agreements to which the United States is a party); Global Affairs Canada, Trade and Investment Agreements, (Hyperlink) (listing free trade agreements to which Canada is a party).
2. See Final Text of NAFTA, Ch. 11 § B, (Hyperlink). On May 18, 2017, the U.S. government under President Trump formally notified Congress of its intention to initiate negotiations related to NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. At the time of publication, President Trump’s administration has announced its intention to withdraw the United States from NAFTA in favour of a new deal currently known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. This new treaty has not yet been ratified and NAFTA remains in effect. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (Hyperlink) north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta Government of Canada, North American free trade agreement (NAFTA) – Information on consultations, (Hyperlink).
3. See Global Affairs Canada, Trade and Investment Agreements, (Hyperlink).
4. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
5. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20–21 (2012) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
6. See 9 U.S.C. § 1.
7. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10.
10. 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; see also UNCITRAL, Status: Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (Hyperlink).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 305.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
14. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 7.
17. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002).
18. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
19. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 (emphasis omitted).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 11.
22. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).
23. Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010).
24. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
25. Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567–69 (7th Cir. 2015); Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012); Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2012); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2011); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2008).
26. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 63–65 (1st Cir. 2015); Bellantuono v. ICAP Secs. USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 173–74 (3d Cir. 2014); Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814, 818–19 (6th Cir. 2014).
27. See Renard, 778 F.3d at 567–68; Wachovia Secs., 671 F.3d at 483; Biller, 668 F.3d at 665; Jock, 646 F.3d at 121 n.1; Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 418; see also Raymond James Fin. Servs., 780 F.3d at 64; Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 174; Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 819–20.
28. Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 17 (Can.).
29. International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 233 (Can. B.C.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c I-5 (Can. Alta.); The International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.S., c I-10.2 (Can. Sask.); The International Commercial Arbitration Act, C.C.S.M., c C.151 (Can. Man.); International Commercial Arbitration Act 2017, S.O. 2017, c 2, Sched. 5 (Can. Ont.); Code of Civil Procedure, c C-25.01, Article 649 (Can. Que.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c 176 (Can. N.B.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c I-5 (Can. P.E.I.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 234 (Can. N.S.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c I-15 (Can. Nfld.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 123 (Can. Yukon); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c I-6 (Can. N.W.T.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c I-6 (Can. Nu.).
30. Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and the Northwest and Nunavut Territories.
31. British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Yukon Territory.
32. Code of Civil Procedure, c C-25.01, Article 649 (Can. Que.) (“[if] international trade interests, including interprovincial trade interests, are involved in arbitration proceedings, consideration may be given, in interpreting this Title, to the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 21 June 1985, and its amendments”.) Article 649 also provides that recourse may be had to documents related to the Model Law, including the Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its 18th session held in Vienna from 3 to 21 June 1985 and the Analytical Commentary on the draft Model Law contained in the report to the Secretary-General to the 18th session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Id.
33. New York Arbitration Convention, Contracting States, (Hyperlink).
34. United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c 16 (2nd Supp.) (Can.).
35. Most provinces have implemented the New York Convention in their international commercial arbitration statutes listed in note 29 above. British Columbia, Saskatchewan and the Yukon Territory enacted separate statutes implementing the New York Convention. See Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 154 (Can. B.C.); The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, 1996, c E-9.12 (Can. Sask.); Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 93 (Yukon).
36. United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c 16, s. 4(1) (Can.).
37. Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 154, s. 3 (Can. B.C.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c I-5, s. 2(2) (Can. Alta.); The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, 1996, c E-9.12, s. 5 (Can. Sask.); The International Commercial Arbitration Act, C.C.S.M., c C.151, s. 2(2) (Can. Man.); International Commercial Arbitration Act 2017, S.O. 2017, c 2, Sched. 5, s. 2(1) (Can. Ont.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c 176, s. 3(2) (Can. N.B.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c I-5, s. 2(2) (Can. P.E.I.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 234, s. 3(2) (Can. N.S.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c I-15, s. 3(2) (Can. Nfld.); Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c 93, s. 3 (Yukon); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c I-6, s. 4(2) (Can. N.W.T.); International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c I-6, s. 4(2) (Can. Nu.).
38. Code of Civil Procedure, c C-25.01, Article 652.
39. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, Article 7(2) (1985), (Hyperlink).
40. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, Article 7(3) (as amended in 2006), (Hyperlink).
41. Id., Article 7(4).
42. Id., Articles 17A-J.
43. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Final Report and Commentary of the Working Group on New Uniform Arbitration Legislation (March 2014), (Hyperlink).
44. International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c 2, Sched. 5 (Can. Ont.).
45. Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., 2010 SCC 19, ¶¶ 14–34 (Can.).
46. International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c 2, Sched. 5, s. 10 (Can. Ont.).
47. In Quebec, the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Model Law “and its amendments” may be given consideration in international commercial arbitrations. See Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, c C-25.01, Article 649 (Can.).
48. International Commercial Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c 233 (Can. B.C.).
49. Model Law, Articles 10–11.
50. Id. Articles. 11(3)–(4).
51. Id. Articles 12, 13.
52. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, (Hyperlink).
53. Model Law, Article 27.
54. Id. Article 16.
55. Id. Article 8(1).
56. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, ¶ 84 (Can.).
57. Id. at ¶ 85.
58. Id. at ¶ 86.
59. See, e.g., Haas v. Gunasekaram, 2016 ONCA 744 at ¶ 15 (Can.); Dancap Productions Inc. v. Key Brand Entertainment, Inc., 2009 ONCA 135 at ¶¶ 32–33 (Can.); Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem Int’l Ltd. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113 at ¶¶ 39–40 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
60. Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Ltd. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113 at ¶ 40 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
61. Model Law, Article 34(2)(a).
62. Id., Article 36(1)(a)(iv). See also: New York Convention, Article V(1)(e).
63. Model Law, Article 36(1)(b); New York Convention, Article V(2).
64. Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201 (Can. B.C.S.C.), aff’d [1991] 1 W.W.R. 219 (Can. B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 431 (Can.); Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones S.A. de C.V. v. STET International S.p.A. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 183 (Can. Ont. S.C.), aff’d (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 581 (Can.); 1552955 Ontario Inc. v. Lakeside Produce Inc., 2017 ONSC 4933 at ¶ 79 (Can.).
65. Popack v. Lipszyc (2016), 129 O.R. (3d) 321 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Consolidated Contractors Group S.A.L. (Offshore) v. Ambatovy Minerals S.A., 2017 ONCA 939 at ¶ 102 (Can.).
66. Belokon v. The Kyrgyz Republic et al., 2015 ONSC 5918 at ¶ 43 (Can.), aff’d, 2016 ONCA 981 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused sub. nom. Entes Indus. Plants Constr. & Erection Contracting Co. Inc. v. Kyrgyz Republic, 2017 CanLII 36656 (Can.) and 2017 CanLII 36653 (Can.), quoting Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., [1992] O.J. No. 257 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)). See also Depo Traffic v. Vikeda International, 2015 ONSC 999 at ¶¶ 45–47 (Can.).
67. Schreter v. Gasmac Inc., [1992] O.J. No. 257 at ¶ 50 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)).
68. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, May 5, 2016, (Hyperlink) (“CFPB Press Release”).
69. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
70. 36 Cal. 4th 148.
71. 563 U.S. 33.
72. Id. at 471.
73. Justice Thomas wrote his own short, dissenting opinion, holding that the FAA does not apply to proceedings in state courts. Id.
74. Id. at 477.
75. Final Rule, Arbitration Agreements, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, (Hyperlink) (last visited July 10, 2019).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
77. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. — (2018). The case was consolidated under Epic Systems from appeals arising out of the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
78. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2288 (2012).
79. N.L.R.B. v. Alternative Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2017); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157; Morris, 834 F.3d at 983–84.
80. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 2013); Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1018; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013).
81. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
82. Epic Sys., slip op. at 7.
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 29.
86. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
87. Norfolk S. Rwy. Co. v. Sprint Comm’cns Co. L.P., 883 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2018).
88. Id. at 420.
90. Id. at 423.
93. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 543–44 (2019).
94. Id. at 536.
97. Id. at 544.
98. Id. at 537.
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id. at 544.
103. Id. at 536.
104. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 528 (2019).
105. Id. at 530.
106. Id. at 529.
107. Id. at 531.
108. Id. at 531.
109. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019).
110. Id. at 1413.
114. Id. at 1412.
115. Id. at 1415.
116. Id. at 1428.
118. Restatement of The U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration (2019).
119. The American Law Institute, The U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration, (Hyperlink) (last visited July 10, 2019).
120. Restatement of The U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration § 4.27(b) (2019).
123. See, e.g., Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 50, s. 4 (Can. B.C.); Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 5 (Can. Ont.). The class proceedings legislation in all other common law provinces is very similar. The requirements for certification – called “authorization” in Quebec – are somewhat different, and are set out in Article 575 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure. See C.C.P., Article 575.
124. The grounds on which a stay may be refused in domestic arbitration legislation differ by province. For instance, British Columbia’s domestic arbitration legislation contains grounds similar to Article 8(1) of the Model Law, providing that “the court must make an order staying the legal proceedings unless it determines that the arbitration agreement is void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 55, s. 15(2) (Can. B.C.). By contrast, Ontario’s domestic arbitration legislation provides that the court may refuse a stay where a party entered into the agreement while under legal incapacity, the arbitration agreement is invalid, the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under Ontario law, the motion was brought with undue delay or the matter is a proper one for default or summary judgment. Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 7(2) (Can. Ont.).
125. Seidel v. TELUS Comm’cns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 at ¶ 89 (Can.) (Lebel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron JJ., dissenting, but not on this point).
126. Id. at ¶ 2.
127. See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Nat’l Money Mart Co. (2004), 203 B.C.A.C. 103 (Can. B.C.C.A.); Smith v. Nat’l Money Mart Co. (2005), 258 D.L.R. (4th) 453 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 528 (Can.).
128. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.); Rogers Wireless Inc. v. Muroff, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 921 (Can.).
129. Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 at ¶¶ 84–85 (Can.).
130. MacKinnon v. Nat’l Money Mart Co. (2009), 304 D.L.R. (4th) 331 (Can. B.C.C.A.); Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc. (2009), 267 B.C.A.C. 266 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
131. Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., (2009), 72 C.P.C. (6th) 158 (Can. Ont. S.C.), reconsideration denied, (2009), 76 C.P.C. (6th) 173 (Can. Ont. S.C.), aff’d (2010), 98 O.R. (3d) 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 75 (Can.). See also Wellman v. TELUS Comm’cns Company, 2017 ONCA 433 (Can.).
132. [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.).
133. Id. at ¶ 2.
134. Id. at ¶ 2.
135. 2018 ONSC 718 (Can.).
136. S.O. 2017, c. 2, Sched. 5 (Can. Ont.).
137. Heller, 2018 ONSC 718 at ¶ 65 (Can.).
138. TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19 (Can.).
142. European Commission on Trade, EU-Canada Trade Agreement Enters Into Force, (Hyperlink) doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1723.
144. European Commission on Trade, CETA chapter by chapter, Article 8.18, (Hyperlink).
145. Id. Article 8.27.
147. Id. Article 8.36.
148. Id. (referring to documents under Article 3(2) of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules).
149. Id. Article 8.27.
150. Id. Article 8.30.
151. Id. Article 8.30.
152. Id. Article 8.36.
153. Id. Article 8.28.
154. Id. Article 8.32.
155. Id. Article 8.33.
156. Id. Article 8.39.
157. Id. Article 8.39.
158. Id. Article 8.10; see also European Commission on Trade, CETA explained, (Hyperlink).
159. CETA Chapters, Article 8.34.
160. Id. Article 8.39.
161. Id. Article 8.34.
162. See, e.g., Paul Waldie, Investment Court System a sticking point for CETA critics, The Globe and Mail, Oct. 26, 2016, (Hyperlink).
163. Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 1/17 of the Court, April 30, 2019, (Hyperlink).
164. Government of Canada Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada & the European Union and its Member States, s. 6(i), (Hyperlink).