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Making the Law Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation | Matthias Klatt | download
Main Making the Law Explicit: The Normativity of Legal Argumentation
Legal argumentation consists in the interpretation of texts. Therefore, it has a natural connection to the philosophy of language. Central issues of this connection, however, lack a clear answer. For instance, how much freedom do judges have in applying the law? How are the literal and the purposive approaches related to one another? How can we distinguish between applying the law and making the law? Making the Law Explicit provides answers by means of a complex and detailed theory of literal meaning. It is a new legal method that is being introduced, assisting in the further development of the law. It is so far unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but the book shows that this new method helps in solving some of the most crucial puzzles in jurisprudence. At its center, the book addresses legal indeterminism and refutes linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy. It spells out the normative character of interpretation as emphasized by Joseph Raz and, with the help of Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify skepticism. On the contrary, it supports the claim that legal argumentation can be objective, and maintains that statements on the meaning of a statute can be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly. The thesis on which this book is based was the recipient of the European Award for Legal Theory in 2002
Pages: 303 / 321
ISBN 10: 1841134910
ISBN 13: 978-1-84113-491-8
Series: European Academy of Legal Theory Series
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 1 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
Legal argumentation consists in the interpretation of texts. Therefore, it
has a natural connection to the philosophy of language. Central issues of
this connection, however, lack a clear answer. For instance, how much
freedom do judges have in applying the law? How are the literal and the
purposive approaches related to one another? How can we distinguish
between applying the law and making the law?
This book provides answers by means of a complex and detailed theory
of literal meaning. A new legal method is introduced, namely the further
development of the law. It is so far unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but it is shown that this new method helps in solving some of the
most crucial puzzles in jurisprudence.
At its centre the book addresses legal indeterminism and refutes
linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy. It spells out the normative character of interpretation as emphasised by Raz and, with the help of
Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of
interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify scepticism. On the contrary, it supports the claim that legal argumentation can
be objective, and maintains that statements on the meaning of a statute can
be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly.
This book breaks new ground in transferring Brandom’s philosophy to
legal theoretical problems and presents an original and exciting analysis of
the semantic argument in legal argumentation. It was the recipient of the
European Award for Legal Theory in 2002.
European Academy of Legal Theory Series: Volume 7
Job: Klatt
Division: Prelims_edited
Date: 19/8
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 2 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
Professor François Ost
Professor Luc Wintgens
edited by Mark Van Hoecke & Francois Ost
edited by Luc Wintgens
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 3 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:32:22 2008
The Normativity of Legal
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 4 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
© Matthias Klatt 2008
Matthias Klatt has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, to
ISBN-13: 978-1-84113-491-8
CPI Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 5 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of course, leave this
or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. An
indefinite sense—that would really not be a sense at all. Here one thinks
perhaps: if I say ‘I have locked the man up fast in the room—there is only
one door left open’—then I simply haven’t locked him in at all; his being
locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: ‘You haven’t done
anything at all’. An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 99)
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JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 7 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
This book is the English translation of a German monograph (Matthias
Klatt (2004), Theorie der Wortlautgrenze. Semantische Normativität in der
juristischen Argumentation, Baden-Baden, Nomos). For the purposes of
this edition, the introduction was added and the first and third chapters
were slightly shortened. The German book had benefited from the inspiring advice of Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. Robert Alexy (University of Kiel) and
Professor Dr. Ralf Dreier (University of Göttingen) as well as from the long
lasting support by the German National Academic Foundation. It received
the European Award for Legal Theory 2002.
This edition was made possible by generous support from the Warden
and Fellows of New College, the Young Academy and Hart Publishing.
The translation was provided with great care and skill by Jörg Rampacher
and Neil Mussett. It further profited from most valuable advice by
Professor Dr. Dres. h. c. Stanley L. Paulson (Washington University, St.
To all these people and institutions I owe my profound thanks.
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The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording
A. Interpretation as a Legal Method
B. Judicial Development of the Law
C. Why the Differentiation Matters
A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy
(i) The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach
(ii) Law-Applying Versus Law-Making
(iii) The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law
B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible?
A. The Concept of Indeterminacy
B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness
(i) Higher-order Vagueness
(ii) The Significance of Interpretation in the Law
C. Scepticism in Law
A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy
B. The Dworkin–Fish Controversy
C. ‘B’ Semantics versus ‘KP’ Semantics
D. The Objectivity of Law Defended
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The Limits of the Wording in Hermeneutic Legal Theory
A. The Reception of Ontological Hermeneutics in Legal Theory
(i) The Limits of the Wording and Pre-Judgements
(a) Ontological Prerequisites for the Understanding of
(b) Significance for the Application of Law in General
(c) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
(ii) Limits of the Wording and Typology
(iii) The Limits of the Wording and the Analogicity of
B. Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation
A. The Clarification of the Limits of the Wording by Koch,
Rüßmann, and Herberger
(i) Establishing and Assigning Meaning
(ii) Classification of Unclear Usage Rules
(b) Inconsistency
(iii) The Limits of the Wording According to Koch,
B. The Role of the Limits of the Wording in Alexy’s Theory
of Legal Argumentation
(i) The Discursive Character of Interpretation
(ii) Main Features of the Theory of Legal Argumentation
(a) Internal Justification and the Word Usage Rule
(b) External Justification and Semantic Arguments
A. Basic Premises of Structuring Legal Theory
B. Criticism of New Hermeneutics
C. Criticism of the Theory of Legal Reasoning According to
Koch and Rüßmann
D. Criticism of Alexy’s Theory of Legal Argumentation
E. Structuring Legal Theory and the Limits of the Wording
(i) The Limits of the Wording as a Result of the
Concretisation of Rules
(ii) Binding Effects of Legal Culture
(iii) The Limits of the Wording as the Limits of the
Normative Program
(iv) The Role of the Limits of the Normative Program
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Structuring Legal Theory—Summary
A. State of Research
(i) The Hermeneutic Position
(a) Pre-Judgements and Typology
(b) Arguments in Support of the Hermeneutic Position
(1) Argument of Ontological Hermeneutics
(2) Argument of Analogicity
(3) Argument of Procedural Correctness
(4) Argument of Normative Necessity
(ii) The Analytic Position
(a) Establishing and Assigning Meaning
(b) Arguments for the Analytic Viewpoint
(1) Argument of Clear Cases
(2) Argument of the Empirical Discernibility of
(3) Argument of Possible Corrections
(iii) The Structuring Legal Theory Position
(a) Putting Rules in Specific Terms and the Limits of
the Normative Program
(b) Arguments in Support of Structuring Legal Theory
(1) Argument of the Indefiniteness of the Legal Text
(2) Argument of Legal Culture
(iv) Arguments Against the Limits of the Wording
(a) Argument of Practical Ineffectiveness
(b) Argument of Necessary Failure
(c) Argument of the Lacking Normative Necessity
(d) Argument of Reversal
(e) The Language Game Argument
(1) Argument of Openness
(2) Argument of Innovation
(3) Argument of Context Dependency
(4) Argument of Circularity
(f) Argument that Meaning Remains Unclarified
(1) Argument of Objectivism
(2) Argument of Features Semantics
(3) Argument of the Incorrect Reception of the
(4) Argument of Excessive Commitment
(5) Argument of the Impossibility of the Empirical
Determination of Meaning
(i) Analytic Versus Post-Positivistic Legal Theory
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(ii) A Critical Look at Structuring Legal Theory
(b) Circularity
(c) Normal and Exceptional Cases
(d) Commitment to the Majority Opinion
(e) Inconsistency
(iii) Controversial Issues
A. Meaning Scepticism and the Indeterminacy Thesis
B. Meaning as a Problem of the Philosophy of Language
C. Language-Philosophical Theories of Meaning
(i) Classification in Categories
(a) Referent, Idea, and Behaviour
(b) Realism and Anti-Realism
(ii) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
D. An Integrative Theory of Meaning
A. The Concept of Semantic Normativity
(i) The General Thesis of Normativity
(ii) The Three Conditions for Normativity Theories
(a) The Condition of Anti-Reductionist Supervenience
(b) The Condition of Internality
(c) The Condition of Possible Semantic Mistakes
(iii) Four Strategies of Arguing Semantic Normativity
(a) Normativity and Truth
(b) Normativity and Internal Relation
(c) Normativity and Rationality
(d) Normativity and Regularity
(1) Semantic Normativity According to the
(2) Objection of the Analytic Priority of
(3) Objection of the Incoherence of Prescriptivity
and Constitutivity
(iv) Normativity and Connection Thesis
B. Brandom’s Linguistic Normativity
(i) Normative Pragmatics
(a) Anthropologic Basis and Implicit Normativity
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(b) Normative Attitudes and Sanctions
(c) Result: Principle of Instituting Norms through
(ii) Inferential Semantics
(a) The Pragmatic Priority of Propositional Meaning
(b) Meaning and Material Inference
(c) Result: The Principle of the Normative Significance
of Conceptual Systems
(iii) Interlocking Normative Pragmatics and Inferential
Semantics in a Discursive Practice Model
(a) Commitment and Entitlement as Deontic Statuses
(b) Three Types and Three Dimensions of Inferential
(c) The Deontic Score-keeping Model
(d) Propositional Meaning in Discursive Practice
(iv) Theory of the Meaning of Subsentential Expressions
(c) Results of the Theory of the Meaning of
Subsentential Expressions
C. Objections against the Theory of Normativity
(i) Kripke’s Theory of Rule-Following
(a) Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox
(b) Kripke’s Sceptical Solution
(1) Normativity and Agreement
(2) Naturalism, Reductionism, and Regress
(ii) The Objection of Semantic Holism
(a) The Doctrine of Semantic Holism
(b) WVO Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism
(1) The Central Chains of Argument
(2) Reversibility and the Status of Logical Laws
(3) Dummett’s Argument of the Possibility of
(4) Canonical Standards in Moderate Holism
(iii) The Objection of the Impossibility of Analyticity
(a) Analyticity, Aprioricity, Modality
(b) WVO Quine’s Word and Object
(1) Relativity and Normativity
(2) Analyticity’s Triadic Relativity
(3) OLOL Analyticity
D. Result for the Normativity of Linguistic Meaning
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A. The Concept of Objectivity
B. Objectivity as Reference
(i) Reference and Inference
(ii) Frege’s Analysis of Picking out Objects
(iii) Reference and de re Ascriptions
(iv) Doxastic Gap and Objectivity
(v) Reference and Interpersonal Anaphora
C. Objectivity as Intersubjectivity
(i) The Social Perspectival Character of Conceptual Content
(ii) The Paradox of Relative Objectivity
D. Objections to the Objectivity Theory
(i) Quine’s Objection of the Indeterminism of Reference
(ii) The Objection of the Special Role Played by
(iii) Wright’s Objection of the Impossibility of a
Conventional Objectivity Theory
(a) Subjective Attitude and Objective Status
(b) The Possibility of Communal Errors
(iv) The Objection of Incompatibility
(v) The Objection that There Is No Objective World
E. Conclusion on the Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
A. The Three Dimensions of Linguistic Meaning
B. The Universality Challenge
C. Scope and Role of Language-Analytical Discourse
Addressing the Three Central Issues
A. Clear and Unclear Cases
(i) The Relevance in Legal Theory of the Distinction
Between Clear and Unclear Cases
(ii) The Concept of the Clear Case
(a) Semantic Clarity and Juridical Clarity
(b) Constitutive Clarity and Epistemic Clarity
(iii) Semantic Clarity in Accordance with the Model of
(a) Semantic Clarity in the First Inferential Dimension
(b) Semantic Clarity in the Second Inferential Dimension
(c) Semantic Clarity in the Third Inferential Dimension
(iv) The Existence of Semantically-Clear Cases
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(v) Limitations in Hard Cases
(vi) Result on the First Issue
B. The Epistemic Openness of the Meaning of Norms
(i) Rejection of the Critical Arguments
(ii) Confirmation of the Argument of Epistemic Openness
(a) Semantic Normativity and Rules for the Use of
(b) Semantic Object-Relatedness and the Theory of
Meaning of Koch and of Rüßmann
(c) The Objection of the Reification of the Law
(iii) Result on the Second Issue
C. The Objectivity of the Meaning of Norms
D. Result Regarding the Three Central Issues
A. The Relationship Between Semantic Clarity and
Semantically-Unclear Meaning
B. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantic
(i) The Function of Rules for the Use of Words in the
(ii) Semantic Limits in the First Linguistic Dimension
(a) The Four Limits of Inferential Relations
(1) Conditional Commitment Limit
(2) Conditional Entitlement Limit
(3) Consequential Commitment Limit
(4) Consequential Entitlement Limit
(5) The System and Function of the Inferential
(b) The Inferential Limits at Subsentential Level
(iii) Semantic Limits in the Second Linguistic Dimension
(iv) Semantic Limits in the Third Linguistic Dimension
(v) The System of Semantic Limits
C. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive
(i) The Classification of Semantically-Unclear Cases in
(a) The Concept of Vagueness
(b) The Concept of Ambiguity
(c) The Concept of Inconsistency
(d) The Concept of Evaluative Openness
(e) Result on the Classification of Unclear Cases
(ii) Semantic Limits in the Case of Vagueness
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(a) Connection Between the Three-Candidate Model
and the Model of Rules for the Use of Words
(1) Preliminary Considerations
(2) The Scheme of the Positive Limits of the
(3) The Scheme of the Negative Limits of the
(b) The System of Semantic Limits with Vagueness
(iii) Semantic Limits with Ambiguity
(iv) Semantic Limits with Evaluatively-Open Concepts
D. Result on the Theory of the Limits of the Wording
B. The Rehabilitation of Semantic Argumentation in the Law
C. The Objectivity of Legal Rulings
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If the assignment of legislative power to parliament is to be otherwise than
fictional, the process of interpretation must be divorced so far as may be from
that of legislation.1
NGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL philosophy has long struggled with
how to differentiate legislation and adjudication. Traditionally, the
judiciary is supposed to interpret and to apply the law rather than
invent and make new law, the latter task being exclusively reserved for the
legislature. This old ideal of the judges as ‘bouche de la loi’ was rigidly
adhered to in England, for example, during the ‘age of strict literalism’,
that is, between 1830 and 1950.2 The judiciary was seen as merely the
enforcing agent for decisions already made by the legislature. According to
this view, adjudication did not involve any creativity. Rather, it consisted of
mere retrieval of the ‘fixed’ meaning of a norm. This can be called the
discovery model of judicial interpretation, in which the accompanying
literalist method of legal reasoning exercises near-absolute predominance.
This old ideal, however, was abandoned long ago, and the relevance of
literalism has diminished along with it. Nowadays, the inevitability of
judicial law-making is widely accepted. This modern understanding of
adjudication stems from insights into the indeterminacy of law and the
vagueness of language. There is no ‘heaven of concepts’ from which judges
can derive the meaning of norms for particular cases.3 As interpretation is
dependent on reasons, it is necessarily relative to a normative perspective,
and therefore entails the possibility of change. These characteristics undermine the notion of interpretation as retrieval.4
So far, so good. The problems start when we move beyond this point,
and they are alarmingly far-reaching and challenging. Once judicial lawmaking is accepted, the very foundations of our constitutional order come
under attack. Nothing less than the possibility of the rule of law is at stake.
ER Hopkins, ‘The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule’ (1937) 15 Canadian Bar
Review 689.
EA Driedger, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd edn (Toronto, 1994) 80; A
Lester, ‘English Judges as Law Makers’ (1993) Public Law 269 at 273 fn 22. For a lucid and
comprehensive analysis of the age of strict literalism, see S Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von
Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung und ihrer historischen Grundlagen (Tübingen, 2001) 780–962.
Cf HLA Hart, ‘Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modern Analytical Jurisprudence’ in
HLA Hart (ed), Essays in Juriprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, 1983).
J Raz, ‘Interpretation without Retrieval’ in A Marmor (ed), Law and Interpretation.
Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford, 1995) 174 f.
Division: Introduction
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 2 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
Legal indeterminacy needs to be constrained if ‘rule of law’ values such as
stability, predictability and certainty are to amount to more than mere
words. Yet it is wholly unclear where such constraints are to be found.
Moreover, the vagueness of language directly affects the claim to
correctness which is of necessity inherent in legal reasoning.5 If propositions on meaning in general are not inter-subjectively valid, how could
propositions on the meaning of a norm be so? And if propositions on the
meaning of a norm cannot be objective, how then can legal reasoning be
so? If propositions in legal reasoning cannot be objective, the latter loses its
claim to correctness.
Whenever adjudication fills in the indeterminate contours of legal
provisions—especially, but not only, in the context of a constitutional
interpretation—it answers questions that in a democracy should be
answered by the people or their representatives, not by a judicial elite.6 So,
while on the one hand, the general features of language and reasoning seem
to make judicial legislation unavoidable, on the other hand it is vital that
democracy provides for limits on this legislative role if one is to avoid
reaching highly sceptical conclusions about the law’s rationality. Jurisprudence has yet to provide adequate or convincing limits.
This book sets out to tackle this problem. It provides answers to the
question of how the indeterminacy of law can be accepted without
drawing far-reaching sceptical conclusions about the objectivity and rationality of legal reasoning. It addresses the legitimacy of adjudication.
In evaluating the adequacy of a theory of legal reasoning, two criteria
have been suggested as arguably the most important.7 The first is whether
the theory offers an account of how interpretation can be constrained
which would amount to an answer to the question of indeterminacy. The
second criterion is whether the constraints imposed by a theory of legal
reasoning provide a plausible answer to the question of authority.
This book acknowledges the overriding importance of these two criteria,
and aims to do justice to them by defending limited or moderate indeterminism. Legal indeterminism can stem from many causes, but among the
most prominent is the vagueness of language. This is labelled ‘semantic
indeterminism’ here, indicating that the source of indeterminism is meaning. Thus, linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy are at the
heart of the book. The entire second chapter is devoted to the philosophy
of language, and spells out the normative character of interpretation as
See R Alexy, ‘Law and Correctness’ in MDA Freeman (ed), Current Legal Problems
(Oxford, 1998) 205.
Cf F Schauer, ‘Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution’ (2004) 92 California
Law Review 1061 f.
N Stoljar, ‘Survey Article: Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority. Some Recent
Controversies in the Philosophy of Law’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 470 at 494
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 3 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
emphasised by Joseph Raz.8 With the help of Robert Brandom’s normative
pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of interpretation from a
normative perspective does not at all justify scepticism. On the contrary, it
supports the claim that legal reasoning can be objective. It is maintained
here that statements on the meaning of a statute can be right or wrong, and
take on inter-subjective validity accordingly. In that respect, this book
breaks new ground in applying Brandom’s philosophy squarely to theoretical legal problems.
The central constraint on legal interpretation developed in this book
relies on a specific doctrine in German legal reasoning, namely the doctrine
of the limits of the wording. This book therefore provides a detailed
account of, in Lord Steyn’s words, ‘what meanings the language is capable
of letting in’.9 English readers should be careful to note that this doctrine
does not maintain that the judge’s task ends with the limits of the wording.
Rather, the limits of the wording separate two distinct kinds of application
of the law, namely interpretation and development of the law. The latter is,
as a technical term, unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it will
be argued that this is a serious disadvantage because it generates the
inability to solve some of the crucial puzzles in jurisprudence. This book
therefore introduces a new and important judicial method to AngloAmerican jurisprudence.
The remainder of this introduction explores in some detail the issues
mentioned so far. First, it introduces the German concept of the limits of
the wording, which plays a predominant role in the book (I). Secondly, the
English law-making process is analysed (II). Particular attention is paid to
the lack of a clear distinction between interpretation and invention and,
most importantly, to the new function of the judiciary under the Human
Rights Act 1998. Thus, it will become clear that the German doctrine is
much clearer and more precise as to the distinction between interpretation
and invention than the English doctrine, and in this respect is superior to it.
The third part anchors the doctrine of the limits of the wording in
European legal methodology (III), while the fourth spells out how this
doctrine amounts to a significant defence of the possibility of the rule of
law (IV). Next, the sceptical challenge of indeterminism and vagueness is
addressed, and it is argued that the doctrine of the limits of the wording
reduces indeterminism to a negligible level, so that far-reaching sceptical
consequences can be avoided (V). Overall, the doctrine of the limits of the
wording has important implications for the rationality and objectivity of
legal reasoning, as debated by Dworkin, Fish, Stavropoulos and others,
Cf Raz, ‘Interpretation without Retrieval’ (n 4 above) 174 f.
J Steyn, ‘Does Legal Formalism Hold Sway in England?’ (1996) 49 Current Legal
Problems 42. See also LH Hoffmann, ‘The Intolerable Wrestling with Words and Meanings’
(1997) 114 South African Law Journal 656.
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and some of these implications are discussed in a preliminary way (VI).
The introduction ends with an overview of the three main chapters of the
book (VII).
Based on the doctrine of the limits of the wording, the German theory of
legal ‘argumentation’ distinguishes sharply between two sets of methods,
namely interpretation (A) and judicial development of the law (B).
Interpretation as a Legal Method
Every application of law requires some act of interpretation. In its wide
sense ‘interpretation’, which refers to the simple necessity of some form of
understanding, is a ubiquitous and unavoidable feature of every lawapplying activity.10
Interpretation as a legal method is concerned with ‘interpretation in the
strict sense’, which can be defined as the understanding of a legal text that
allows for some doubt with regard to its meaning or proper application.
‘Interpretation in the strict sense’ begins with a question and ends with a
choice between different possible constructions.11 This choice is made by
means of argument, and this establishes a close connection between
interpretation and argumentation. This connection has been formulated by
Robert Alexy in the shortest possible form: ‘Interpretation is argumentation’.12
Legal interpretation is distinguished from other types of interpretation
by its normative and institutional character.13 Its normative character
stems from the claim to correctness inherent in every proposed interpretation.14 Its institutional character is rooted in both the authoritative objects
of interpretation (statutes, sub-statutory enactments, etc) and the subjects
who interpret—most prominently the judiciary.
Methods of interpretation are arguments. Interpretive arguments can be
classified in many different ways.15 German theory of legal argumentation
N MacCormick, ‘Arguing About Interpretation’ in N MacCormick (ed), Rhetoric and
the Rule of Law. A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford, 2005) 121.
R Alexy, ‘Juristische Interpretation’ in R Alexy (ed), Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Studien
zur Rechtsphilosophie (Frankfurt am Main, 1995) 73.
Ibid, 73 f.
R Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationalen Diskurses
als Theorie der juristischen Begründung (Frankfurt am Main, 1978) 264 ff, 428 f; Alexy,
‘Law and Correctness’ (n 5 above) 205.
Cf MacCormick, ‘Arguing About Interpretation’ (n 10 above) 124 f.
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 5 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
has discussed the so-called canons of interpretation ever since the time of
Savigny.16 Alexy distinguishes between six canons: The semantic argument
concerns the linguistic usage of a term; the genetic argument refers to the
intention of the legislator; the historical argument uses facts concerning the
history of the legal problems under discussion; the comparative argument
looks at different legal systems; the systematic argument examines the
position of a norm or single term in a legal text; and the teleological
argument considers the purpose, aims and goals of a legal norm.17
Judicial Development of the Law
The defining characteristic of judicial interpretation is that all canons can
be considered only within the outer boundaries of ‘the limits of the
wording’. As soon as an application of a legal norm cannot be reconciled
with its wording, this application is not an interpretation but rather a
further development of the law. Therefore, semantic limits enable the
separation between the interpretation of the law and the further development of the law.18 Every application of a statute within the scope of the
possible meaning of its wording is interpretation. Every application beyond
this is a development of the law. Such developments of the law are either
analogies, which extend application beyond the scope of the possible
meaning, or teleological reductions, which constrict the application to a
smaller scope than the meaning allows.19 This is known as ‘reading in’ and
‘reading down’, respectively, in English legal methodology.
Every interpretation changes the law and, in that sense, develops it.20
This is development in the broad sense, from which we have to distinguish
development in the narrow sense.21 The latter’s characteristic is that the
decision is not within the semantic limits of the wording of a statute.
FK von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts. Band 1 (Berlin, 1840) 212 ff.
R Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as
Theory of Legal Justification (Oxford, 1989) 234–44.
See K Engisch and T Würtenberger, Einführung in das juristische Denken, 9th edn
(Stuttgart, 1997) 100 n 47; H-J Koch and H Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre. Eine
Einführung in die Grundprobleme der Rechtswissenschaft (München, 1982) 182; K Larenz
and C-W Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3rd edn (Berlin, 1995) 143. Most
unclear is BVerfGE 35, 263 (278 f): ‘The judges do not have to stop at the wording of a norm.
Their binding to the statute (Art 20 III, Art 97 I Basic Law) does not mean a binding to its
letter, implying a strict literal rule, but a binding to the spirit and the purpose of the law.
Interpretation is a means by which judges explore the content of a legal norm with regard to
its place in the whole legal system, without being restricted by the formal wording of the
statute’. (Translated by MK) Equally unclear is BVerwGE 40, 78 (81).
For these and two additional subdivisions (extinction and creation of a norm), see
Alexy, ‘Juristische Interpretation’ (n 11 above) 91.
Cf TAO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford, 2000) 179 f on a similar distinction.
Date: 13/8
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It is important to note that the doctrine of the limits of the wording does
not mean sticking to strict textualism. Textualism equates the literal
meaning of a statute with its only significant meaning.22 In stark contrast,
the German doctrine, although arguing for a rehabilitation of the semantic
argument in legal interpretation, introduces development as a distinct legal
method, which allows for far-reaching activity on the part of the judges. It
has long been established that the limits of the wording do not constitute
the limits of judicial activity.23 The German Federal Constitutional Court
accepted development as a distinct method of legal argumentation in its
famous ‘Princess Soraya’ case.
Justice is not identical with the aggregate of the written laws. Under certain
circumstances law can exist beyond the positive norms which the state enacts …
The judge’s task is not confined to ascertaining and implementing legislative
decisions. He/she may have to make a value judgement (an act which necessarily
has volitional elements); that is, bring to light and implement in his/her decisions
those value concepts which are inherent in the constitutional legal order, but
which are not, or not adequately, expressed in the language of the written laws
… Where the written law fails, the judge’s decision fills the existing gap by using
common sense and general concepts of justice established by the community.24
All this means that in German doctrine, interpretations that are impossible
on the basis of the wording are not necessarily ruled out. Rather, they may
be admissible as ‘further development of the law’.
Why the Differentiation Matters
One could assume, then, that the distinction between interpretation and
development was merely a matter of labelling and categorising different
judicial activities. In fact, many legal systems do not sharply distinguish
judicial development from interpretation. However, this differentiation is
extremely important, for both constitutional and methodological reasons.25
Apart from these reasons, there is one important link to the limits of the
judiciary that should be spelled out here. The limits of the judiciary
(regardless of how its activities might be labelled) matter for obvious
On textualism, see Stoljar, ‘Survey Article: Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority’ (n 7 above) 480.
BVerfGE 34, 269; 35, 263; 49, 304; 65, 182; 71, 354; 82, 6.
BVerfGE 34, 269 (Soraya) at 287. Cf DP Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence
of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd edn (Durham NC, 1997) 125.
See p 18 below. Zimmermann is therefore mistaken in maintaining that the distinction
was a ‘disputed though practically irrelevant question’; see R Zimmermann, ‘Statuta Sunt
Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Perspective’ (1997) 56
Cambridge Law Journal 321.
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Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning
reasons. These limits are indirectly addressed when judicial development is
defined, and it is precisely this indirect connection that makes it so
important to distinguish development from mere interpretation. Directly,
the doctrine of the limits of the wording does not concern the limits of
development, but the concept of it. The doctrine clarifies by means of
conceptual arguments when legal reasoning leaves the realm of interpretation and must be classified as a distinct form of legal reasoning, namely
‘development’. However, clarifying the concept of development has significant implications for clarifying its limits. Defining the entry into development as a legal method enables us to clarify the exit as well. The limits of
development, and thus the limits of the judiciary, are dependent on a clear
concept of development. Thus, the limits of the wording indirectly help us
to analyse the limits of the judiciary more clearly.
INTERPRETATION AND INVENTION IN ENGLISH LEGAL
Statutory Interpretation and Democracy
Two central issues lack a clear answer in English theory of legal reasoning.
First, the relation between the literal and the purposive approaches in
statutory interpretation (i); secondly, the relation between applying the law
and making the law (ii). The solutions which have been proposed so far are
imprecise. A clearer and more satisfactory answer to both problems can be
found in the doctrine of the limits of the wording (iii).
The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach
Statutory interpretation consists of the construction and application of
provisions adopted by legislatures.26 One of the most crucial issues related
to this activity is how much weight to attach to the purposes as opposed to
the wording of particular provisions. This issue is closely related to the rule
of law. For American textualists, for example, statements of purpose tend
to be vague and encourage judges to follow their own policy views under
the guise of ‘discovering’ the legislator’s ‘intent’.27 These scholars, then,
emphasise the priority of the text in order to delimit judicial discretion.
Cf K Greenawalt, ‘Constitutional and Statutory interpretation’ in JL Coleman, S
Shapiro and KE Himma (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of
Law (Oxford, 2002) 271.
A Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation. Federal Courts and the Law. An Essay (Princeton
NJ, 1997) 18–23.
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Contrary to the conventional view,28 English law is not based on
extreme textualism. This view applies only to the age of strict literalism
(1830–50).29 The leading idea of this age is expressed in Lord Halsbury’s
statement that the draftsman of a statute was the worst person in the world
to interpret a statute because he was likely to be unconsciously influenced
by what he meant rather than by what he had said.30 Nowadays, English
judges are no longer prepared to follow plain meanings if they lead to a
manifest injustice.31 The purposive approach has been on the rise since the
The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view
of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the
language. The court now adopts a purposive approach.32
Under this regime of telos, the words of the statute have only prima facie
primacy, which is relatively weak. The following quotation from Lord
Clyde illustrates how, according to the purposive approach, although the
words of the statute are taken as a starting point, they are subject to
amendments, extensions or restrictions:
My Lords, it is an elementary rule in the interpretation and the application of
statutory provisions that it is to the words of the legislation that attention must
primarily be directed. Generally it will be the ordinary meaning of the words
which will require to be adopted. On appropriate occasion it may be proper as a
matter of interpretation to adopt extended meanings to words or phrases,
particularly if thereby the purpose of the legislation can be best effected or the
validity of the legislation preserved. On other occasions it may be appropriate to
adopt a strict or narrow meaning of the language used.33
See Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (n 2
above) 5–11 with many further references.
Even in this period, the literal rule was applied in a differentiated manner rather than
mechanically, cf ibid 798–844.
Hilder v Dexter [1902] AC 474 (HL) 477.
‘If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment, we are bound
to them in their ordinary sense, even though it do [sic] lead, in our view of the case, to an
absurdity or manifest injustice’. Abley v Dale (1851) 11 CB 378, 391.
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) 617.
Murray v Foyle Meats Ltd [1993] 3 WLR 356 (HL) 360. Cf Re British Concrete Pipe
Association [1983] 1 All ER 203 at 205 (Donaldson MR): ‘Our task … is to construe the
1969 Act, and in so doing, the prima facie rule is that words have their ordinary meaning. But
that is subject to the qualification that if, giving words their ordinary meaning, we are faced
with extraordinary results which cannot have been intended by Parliament, we then have to
move on to a second stage in which we re-examine the words and see whether they must in all
the circumstances have been intended by Parliament to have a different meaning or a more
restricted meaning’.
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The main problem with these considerations is that the issue is totally
unresolved as to which criteria determine whether there is ‘appropriate
occasion’ to depart from the words, and, if so, in what direction the
departure should take place.
Moreover, the predominance of the literal rule has not yet waned as
much as one would infer from the above statement by Lord Clyde.
Although the courts have extended statutory provisions explicitly beyond
the wording since the 1980s,34 numerous cases show that the literal
approach is ‘still alive and flourishing’.35 Most remarkably, the House of
Lords is still reluctant to extend statutory provisions beyond their wording,
as the following example from 1998 demonstrates:
It may be perfectly proper to adopt even a strained construction to enable the
object and purpose of legislation to be fulfilled. But it cannot be taken to the
length of applying unnatural meanings to familiar words or of so stretching the
language that its former shape is transformed into something which is not only
significantly different but has a name of its own. This must particularly be so
where the language has no evident ambiguity or uncertainty about it.36
What matters here is that English legal reasoning theory has no criteria
that determine where an admissible ‘strained construction’ ends and where
a transformation into a ‘significantly different shape’ begins. Overall, the
inconsistent practice of the courts nowadays shows a serious lack of both
orientation and legal certainty. English legal doctrine and the courts
oscillate unpredictably between the literal and the purposive approaches.
Law-Applying Versus Law-Making
The literal approach usually rests on the honourable, yet most unconvincing, attempt to completely separate law-applying and law-making, as the
following quotation from Lord Brougham illustrates:
If we depart from the plain and obvious meaning on account of such views, we
in truth do not construe the Act but alter it … are really making the law and not
interpreting it.37
This view of a complete separation is based on the discovery model of
judicial interpretation, which restricts the judiciary to retrieving the law
Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (n 2
above) 1014, with further reference in n 366.
M Zander, The Law-Making Process, 6th edn (Cambridge, 2004) 146 f with regard to
Shah v Barnet London Borough Council [1983] 1 All ER 226; Griffith v Secretary of State for
the Environment [1983] 2 WLR 172; Reynolds [1981] 3 All ER 849, Lees v Secretary of State
for Social Services [1985] 2 All ER 203; R v Broadcast Complaints Commission, ex p Owen
[1985] 2 All ER 522.
Clarke v Kato [1998] 1 WLR 1647 (HL) 1655 (Lord Clyde).
Gwynne v Burnell (1840) 6 Bing NC 453 at 561.
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and denies it the authority to change it, since that authority lies exclusively
with the legislature. As was shown earlier, both the discovery model and
the complete separation thesis have now become part of the history of
ideas. It is widely acknowledged today that judges make law. Yet scholars
still stick to the old ideal:
When judges interpret the law, they often have to rely on considerations about
that which the law is there to settle, yet—within certain limits—they can still be
said to be following the law, not inventing it.38
The question whether there is scope for substantive disagreement in law runs
parallel to the question of the limits of law, once put in terms of fidelity (to the
law) versus repair (of it), and more recently in terms of interpretation versus
invention.39
Throughout jurisprudence, there is a desperate search for the ‘limits of
interpretation’.40 Even the classical acknowledgement of the inseparability
of law-making and law-applying is immediately followed by, and indeed
more noted for, a statement of limitation:
I recognise without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do
so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.41
On the basis that judges do ‘legislate’, viz change and develop the law, the
problem of separation is still vital. When does a judgment belong to the
category of ‘molecular motion’, and when does it become a ‘molar
motion’? When does a judgment fill the interstices of the existing fabric of
the law, and when does it change that fabric itself? Anglo-American
jurisprudence does not provide satisfactory answers to these questions.
This is alarming, as any sensible adherence to the distinction between
law-applying and law-making indeed requires an answer to these questions; otherwise it must be abandoned.
Symptomatic of this worrying lack of clarity in Anglo-American jurisprudence is its unsound position on the analogy. While English courts are
increasingly prepared to extend statutory provisions beyond their wordings,42 the classical view that the filling of gaps amounts to a naked
A Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory, 2nd edn (Oxford, 2005) 122.
N Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Oxford, 1996) 127.
M Stone, ‘Focusing the Law: What Legal Interpretation Is Not’ in A Marmor (ed), Law
and Interpretation. Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford 1995) 34–43. See, however, Hart’s
postscript: ‘It will not matter for any practical purpose whether in so deciding cases [ie by
making the best moral judgement, MK] the judge is making law in accordance with morality
… or alternatively is guided by his moral judgements as to what already existing law is
revealed by a moral test for law’. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1994)
Southern Pacific Company v Jenson (1917) 244 US 205 at 221.
above) 1014 fn 366.
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usurpation of the function of the legislature ‘under the thin disguise of
interpretation’43 is still alive. In Clarke v Kato, the House of Lords
dismissed the analogy because such an extension was the task of the
legislature.44
These contradictory statements illustrate that it is still an unsettled issue
whether judges should be authorised to fill gaps by means of analogies.
Moreover, Anglo-American jurisprudence does not provide precise criteria
for distinguishing extensive interpretation from judicial law-making.45
Gummow, for example, dedicates a separate section to ‘analogy’, yet does
not separate it clearly from interpretation, as his phrase ‘analogical
interpretation’ indicates.46 Lücke maintains that the distinction between
analogy and extension is ‘useful and indeed necessary’, but at the same
time claims that extensions beyond the letter amount to interpretation
rather than analogy.47 English judges frequently label extensions beyond
the letter as ‘construction’.48
Raz notes that the courts do not take much trouble to identify the exact
borderline between application and innovation, and often move imperceptibly from one function to another.49 Yet he is more precise in his analysis
when arguing that applying law and making law form a ‘strong continuity’
because very similar types of argument are relevant to both purposes. In
spite of this ‘intricate interconnection’, Raz does not conclude that this
distinction should be abandoned. Rather, he maintains that law-making
and law-applying are ‘conceptually distinct’. Therefore, Raz also adopts a
somewhat unstable position because he maintains a distinction whose
possibility is not sufficiently defended.50
Magor and St Mellons v Newport Corpn [1951] 2 All ER 839 (Lord Simonds).
Clarke v Kato [1998] 1 WLR 1647 (HL) 1655, 1660 (Lord Clyde).
Cf Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (n 2
above) 1134.
WMC Gummow, Change and Continuity. Statute, Equity, and Federalism (Oxford,
1999) 11 ff, 16.
HK Lücke, ‘Statutory Interpretation: New Comparative Dimensions’ (2005) 54 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 1023 at 1030 and fn 41.
See, for example, Jones v Wrotham Park Estates [1980] AC 74 (HL) 105 (Lord
Diplock): ‘I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal
meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the
purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains
one of construction; even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not
expressly included in it’.
J Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, 1979) 207–9.
For an analysis of judicial discretion, explaining the law-making power of judges, see
M Klatt, ‘Taking Rights Less Seriously. A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion’ (2007) 20
Ratio Juris 506.
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The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law
It is suggested here that Anglo-American jurisprudence can come to terms
with the aforementioned two problems in a uniform manner. Both the
relation between the purposive approach and the literal approach, and the
relation between law-making and law-applying, can be clarified by introducing a method that is absent in Anglo-American jurisprudence, namely
the judicial development of the law. To recapitulate: the judicial development of the law is defined as the application of a norm that goes beyond its
The notion that judges develop the law is of course familiar to
Anglo-American jurisprudence, yet judicial development has not been
analysed sufficiently as a legal method distinct from interpretation. Not
long ago, the responsibility of judges to further develop common law was
acknowledged while simultaneously being denied with regard to statute
law.51 Later, it was discussed whether the common law could carry policies
inherent in statutes beyond the words of statutes.52 Nowadays, as
Vogenauer has shown, the courts will develop the law further within
certain limits even in areas of the law which are exclusively of statutory
origin.53
Judicial development remains nebulous in Anglo-American jurisprudence. It does not yet have the status of a separate legal method.
Anglo-American jurisprudence pursues an all-or-nothing approach: either
application or legislation, either strict literalism or freedom due to purposive considerations. To draw sharp distinctions between extensive interpretation and analogy and between restrictive interpretation and purposive
reduction, and thus between interpretation and judicial development of the
law, would provide a much clearer, more complex and more subtle
account. Such clearness matters, as the two problems discussed above
Judicial development, then, is the missing middle term between interpretation and judicial legislation that would enable Anglo-American jurisprudence to solve these problems by supplying formal rules about how courts
may extend or restrict rules contrary to their wording. Introducing the
‘Judges … have a responsibility for the common law, but in my opinion they have none
for statute law; their duty is simply to apply it and not to obstruct’. P Devlin, ‘Judges and
Lawmakers’ (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 1 at 13.
Lücke, ‘Statutory Interpretation: New Comparative Dimensions’ (n 48 above) 1031.
above) 1134–47. Cf Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc [1969] 1 QB 616 (QBD) 638
(Donaldson J): The courts ‘are not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of
legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing’.
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judicial development of the law as a distinct legal method depends on
introducing its defining feature, namely the doctrine of ‘the limits of the
wording’.
Human Rights Act: What is Possible?
The doctrine of the limits of the wording is even more important to English
law if we look not at the general theory of statutory interpretation, but at
a specific provision recently incorporated into English law, namely section
3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). It provides that
‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
It has been noted that this provision requires construing the enactments in
question according to the wider European system of purposive construction, and thus ‘drastically alters existing methods’ in English law.54 It is a
novelty within the English legal tradition and establishes a ‘far reaching
new approach to the construction of statutes’.55 It is no wonder that it has
spawned an extensive literature.56
What matters here is that it brings about a need to clarify the distinction
between law-making and law-applying. Lord Hope considered that ‘the
rule is only a rule of interpretation. It does not entitle the judges to act as
legislators’.57 Lord Woolf was engaged in ‘finding the boundary between
re-interpretation and legislation’.58 Kavanagh pointed out that reliance on
this distinction has been the most prominent way of separating legitimate
from illegitimate adjudication in the emerging case law under the HRA.59
Even more important, the search for a distinctive criterion has so far
ended up with the limits of the wording.60 This return to issues of language
in statutory interpretation is most remarkable, given that the literal
F Bennion, ‘What Interpretation Is “Possible” Under Section 3(1) of the Human Rights
Act 1998?’ (2000) Public Law at 91.
R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 (HL) para 78 (Lord Hope).
R Clayton, ‘The Limits of “What’s Possible”: Statutory Construction under the Human
Rights Act’ (2002) European Human Rights Law Review 559 at 560 with bibliography in fn
R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 (HL) para 108 (Lord Hope).
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Secretary of State for
the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] QB 48 (HL) 76 f.
A Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the
Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 259 at 260, with
references in fn 14.
Note the following statement from the former president of the German Federal
Constitutional Court: British courts have applied ‘a kind of implicit constitution-conformable
interpretation. This means that if the wording of the statute so allows, the court will interpret
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 14 SESS: 11 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
approach was about to vanish into thin air not long ago. The limits of the
wording mark the limits of ‘so far as it is possible’ in section 3(1) of the
HRA.61 Section 3(1) is not applicable where the suggested interpretation is
‘contrary to expressed statutory words’.62 It has been underlined in this
context that judges are bound by the wording.63 In determining the limits
of the ‘possible’, case law has found the outer boundary in an outright
contradiction between statutory wording and its proposed interpretation.64
Going against the express words of the statute would go beyond judicial
interpretation and enter the realm of judicial legislation.65
The details, however, are still unsettled:
Does ‘possible’ refer to the literal meaning, or does it also allow for a strained
meaning, and if so to what extent?66
And this is precisely the point on which this book purports to shed light.
All in all, it is submitted here that the German doctrine of the limits of the
wording is extremely helpful in clarifying not only the relationship between
interpretation and invention (above A), but also the exact boundaries of
what is ‘possible’ under section 3(1) of the HRA (above B). It helps in
establishing both the scope and the limits of judicial creativity in statutory
Thus, the intensive and heated discussion in German legal theory about
whether it is at all possible to state ‘boundaries of meaning’ very much
matters to English legal theory. In fact, this contested doctrine is even more
important to English than to German law, since the new English approach
parliamentary legislation in such a way as to avoid a violation of fundamental principles’
(emphasis added). J Limbach, ‘The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2001) 64
Modern Law Review 1 at 6.
TR Arden, ‘The Interpretation of UK Domestic Legislation in the Light of European
Convention on Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 165 at 168.
In Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) [2002] 2 AC 291 (HL)
313–14, para 41 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837 (HL) para 59 (Lord Steyn).
Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the
Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 59 above) 271.
R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 (HL) para 108 (Lord Hope); R (H) v London North and
East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal [2000] QB 1 (HL) 10 (Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers); R v Lambert [2001] 3 WLR 206 (HL) paras 79–81 (Lord Hope).
Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 59 above) 276.
Bennion, ‘What Interpretation Is “Possible” Under Section 3(1) of the Human Rights
Act 1998?’ (n 54 above) 77.
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Towards A Common European Approach
under section 3(1) of the HRA treats the wording as an absolute limit
whereas the limits of the wording are not absolute in German doctrine.67
The legitimacy and limits of judicial development of the law are important
issues at European level as well.68 Roman legal systems do not recognise a
doctrine of the limits of the wording.69 In particular, French70 and Dutch71
legal theories speak of a ‘floating crossover’ between interpretation and
analogy, or even consider them a unity. European legal systems take quite
different views on the existence of limits of the wording. This fact leads to
problems with regard to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
Therefore, the doctrine of the limits of the wording can be seen as a
touchstone for any unification of national doctrines of interpretation that
would amount to a common European approach.72 This is even truer in
It should be noted, however, that English doctrine labels the German ‘judicial
development of the law’ as ‘interpretation’; the reading in and reading down of statutory
wording is not separated from interpretation in England. See Arden, ‘The Interpretation of
UK Domestic Legislation in the Light of European Convention on Human Rights Jurisprudence’ (n 61 above) 171; Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and
Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (n 59 above) 279.
Concerning the competence of the ECJ to further develop the law, see K-D Borchardt,
‘Richterrecht durch den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’ in A Randelzhofer, R
Scholz and D Wilke (eds), Gedächtnisschrift für Eberhard Grabitz (München, 1995) 29; W
Dänzer-Vanotti, ‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (1992) Recht
der Internationalen Wirtschaft 733; U Everling, ‘Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ (2000) Juristenzeitung 217; J Ukrow, Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung durch den EuGH. Dargestellt am Beispiel der Erweiterung des Rechtsschutzes des
Marktbürgers im Bereich des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes und der Staatshaftung (BadenBaden, 1995).
Cf W Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung. Band III:
Mitteleuropäischer Rechtskreis (Tübingen, 1976) 690.
French courts label their method ‘interpretation’ even when they clearly decide contra
legem, see F Ferrand, Cassation française et révision allemande. Essai sur le contrôle exercé en
matière civile par la Cour de cassation française et par la Cour fédérale de Justice de la
République Fédérale d’Allemagne (Paris, 1993) 318. Accordingly, French legal theory does
not apply the criterion of the limits of the wording, nor does it acknowledge any difference
between interpretation and analogy or reduction, see ÉEH Perreau, Technique de la
jurisprudence en droit privé (Paris, 1923) 260. For an exception, however, see Gény, who
distinguishes interprétation de la loi from création de droit: F Geny, Méthode d’interprétation
et sources en droit privé positif. Essai critique, 2nd edn (Paris 1919) 304, 314 f. See also L-J
Constantinesco, Das Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Baden-Baden, 1977) 807; H
Rabault, L’interprétation des normes. L’objectivité de la méthode herméneutique (Paris,
1997); Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (n 2
above) 289–91.
W Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung. Band I: Frühe und
religiöse Rechte, Romanischer Rechtskreis (Tübingen, 1975) 564–72.
For an account of the problems of such unification arising from divergent legal
traditions, see Everling, ‘Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ (n
68 above) 222; P Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45
JOBNAME: Klatt PAGE: 16 SESS: 10 OUTPUT: Tue Aug 19 16:30:03 2008
view of recent research that undermines the traditional view of fundamentally different European approaches to statutory interpretation, and posits
a fundamental unity instead.73
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) follows the French doctrine and
does not distinguish between interpretation and development; interprétation and justification embrace both.74 The Court is reluctant to go beyond
the wording when simply applying norms that allow for an encroachment
or a sanction.75 In general, the Court assumes that even in cases of clear
law-making it is only constructing and interpreting.76
In view of this practice, it has been suggested that the doctrine of the
limits of the wording does not matter in Community law. Herbert finds his
doubts about semantic arguments empirically confirmed by the jurisdiction
of the ECJ.77 Herberger analyses the example of a vertical direct effect of
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 74. More optimistic is K Langenbucher,
‘Vorüberlegungen zu einer europarechtlichen Methodenlehre’ in T Ackermann and A Arnold
(eds), Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 1999. Tradition und Fortschritt im Recht
(Stuttgart, 2000) 67, 70; Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem
Kontinent (n 2 above) 1295–1308.
above) 1295–1308.
Cf ECJ 23 March 2000, Case C-208/98 Berliner Kindl v Siepert, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 2000, 1323, paras 17 f; ECJ 23 April 1986, Case 294/83 Les Verts v
Parlament, Slg 1986, 1339, paras 23–5. See also J Anweiler, Die Auslegungsmethoden des
Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Frankfurt am Main, 1997); J Bengoetxea,
The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice. Towards a European Jurisprudence
(Oxford, 1993) 112 ff, 141 ff; A von Bogdandy, ‘Beobachtungen zur Wissenschaft vom
Europarecht. Strukturen, Debatten und Entwicklungsperspektiven der Grundlagenforschung
zum Recht der Europäischen Union’ (2001) Der Staat 3 at 19; Borchardt, ‘Richterrecht durch
den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’ (n 68 above) 37; Dänzer-Vanotti,
‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (n 68 above) 743; H Kutscher,
‘Thesen zu den Methoden der Auslegung des Gemeinschaftsrechts aus der Sicht eines Richters
‘ in Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (ed), Begegnung von Justiz und Hochschule am 27. und 28. September 1976. Berichte (Luxemburg, 1976) I-7 ff; T Millett, ‘Rules of
Interpretation of E.E.C. Legislation’ (1989) Statute Law Review 163 at 172 f; Vogenauer, Die
Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (n 2 above) 366 fnn 169–72.
ECJ Case 16/70 Nemocout, Slg 1970, 921 (932); Case 169/80 Gondrand Frères, Slg
1981, 1931 (1942); Case C-314/91 Weber, Slg 1993, I-1093 (1111). Cf Anweiler, Die
Auslegungsmethoden des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (n 74 above)
Cf Dänzer-Vanotti, ‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (n
68 above) 734 n 4.
M Herbert, ‘Buchbesprechung “Bruha/Seeler, Die Europäische Union und ihre
Sprachen”’ (2001) Der Staat 637 f.
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directives, and maintains that it is not the distinction between interpretation and development that matters, but arguments based on principles.78
And Everling insists that the distinction is merely one of terminology.79
Against these arguments, it is maintained here that the doctrine of the
wording is important at European level for four reasons. First of all, even
the ECJ begins nearly every judgment with a consideration of semantic
arguments.80 Secondly, Community law does entail norms prohibiting
analogies81; but such norms would make no sense if analogies could not be
distinguished from extensive interpretations. Thirdly, all reasons that
support the doctrine of the limits of the wording at national level are valid
at European level as well. And finally, the important boundary of competence between the Member States and the Community can be drawn with
the help of the limits of the wording.82
All in all, the limits of the wording have the same importance and
relevance in European law that they have in domestic law.83 Therefore, the
ECJ’s tendency not to distinguish between interpretation and development
has to be countered.84
M Herberger, ‘Eine Frage des Prinzips. Auslegung, Rechtsfortbildung und die Wirksamkeit nicht umgesetzter Richtlinien’ in P Forstmoser (ed), Rechtsanwendung in Theorie und
Praxis. Symposion zum 70. Geburtstag von Arthur Meyer-Hayoz (Basel, 1993) 42 f.
Everling, ‘Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ (n 68
above) 218. See also Borchardt, ‘Richterrecht durch den Gerichtshof der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften’ (n 68 above) 37.
Case 23 March 1982, Rs. 55/81 Levin, Slg 1982, 1035, para 9; ECJ 11 November
1997, Case C-251/95 Sabèl v Puma, Slg 1997, I-6191 para 18.
The doctrine nulla poena sine lege is part of European law, see Art 7 of the ECHR and
ECJ Case C-63/83 Regina v Kent Kirk, Slg 1984, 2689. The relation between the Community
and the Member States is also guided by a prohibition of analogy, Art 5 of the EC Treaty. Cf
K Langenbucher, ‘Vorüberlegungen zu einer europarechtlichen Methodenlehre’ in T Ackermann and A Arnold (eds), Jahrbuch junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 1999. Tradition und
Fortschritt im Recht (Stuttgart, 2000) 76 f.
S Grundmann and K Riesenhuber, ‘Die Auslegung des Europäischen Privat- und
Schuldvertragsrechts’ (2001) Juristische Schulung 529 at 535.
Ibid, 530. A specific problem stems from the multilingualism of the Community. The
number of interpretative variants is augmented by the number of official languages, Cf
Anweiler, Die Auslegungsmethoden des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (n 74
above) 146–72. Grundmann and Riesenhuber suggested that the limits of the wording are
transgressed if an alleged interpretation is incompatible with all text variants, see Grundmann
and Riesenhuber, ‘Die Auslegung des Europäischen Privat- und Schuldvertragsrechts’ (n 82
above) 535.
Dänzer-Vanotti, ‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’ (n 68
above) 734; Grundmann and Riesenhuber, ‘Die Auslegung des Europäischen Privat- und
Schuldvertragsrechts’ (n 82 above) 535. Cf, however, ECJ 11 July 1985, Case 107/84
Commission v Germany, Slg 1985, 2655 para 12.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RULE OF LAW DEFENDED
The aim of this section is to underline the great constitutional importance
of the doctrine of the limits of the wording. This doctrine is the very
touchstone of nothing less than the possibility of the rule of law.
‘Methodological questions are constitutional questions’.85 This is particularly true for the doctrine of the limits of the wording. The realisation
of both democracy and the rule of law are dependent on the existence of
semantic limits. The principle of democracy entails the separation of
powers. Any application of a norm beyond its wording is problematic as
far as the separation of powers is concerned. The German Federal Finance
Court reported the following legal opinion:
The judgment of the Court of lower instance had infringed the principle of the
separation of powers. The judiciary was bound to the clear wording of the
statute and was not authorised to realise their own political opinions by means
of an exchange of concepts.86
Also, the limits of the wording secure the prohibition of an analogy in
malem partem in criminal law, as the German Federal Constitutional Court
The prohibition of an analogy reserves the creation of criminal offences strictly
to the legislature. It rests not only upon the value of predictability as required by
the rule of law, but also on the principle of democracy and the consequential
responsibility of the legislator, moreover on the principle of the separation of
powers and its aim to mitigate all state authorities, and lastly on the idea that
criminal law has by necessity to remain fragmentary in order to protect the
freedom of the individual.87
Rüßmann distinguishes three different ways of understanding how judges
are bound by the law. He concludes that the only correct way is that which
identifies the binding of the judges to the limits of the wording.88 The
doctrine of the limits of the wording is among the most important
embodiments of the binding of judges. It activates stricter justification
requirements for legal judgments. For example, analogies are admitted
only if there is a gap in the law which contradicts the overall plan of the
statute and if the ratio legis is applicable to the case under consideration.89
B Rüthers, Rechtstheorie. Begriff, Geltung und Anwendung des Rechts (München,
1999) 401.
BFHE 192, 316 (320), translated by MK.
BVerfGE 73, 206 (247), translated by MK.
H Rüßmann, ‘Sprache und Recht. Sprachtheoretische Überlegungen zum Gesetztesbindungspostulat’ in J Zimmermann (ed), Sprache und Welterfahrung (München, 1978) 229.
Koch and Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre (n 18 above) 260. For an example
see BFHE 192, 316.
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The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness
The doctrine of the limits of the wording functions as a means of
limiting the interpretive power of the judiciary, and regulates the allocation
of the legislative power in a state.
Moreover, rule of law values such as stability, predictability and certainty depend upon the limits of the wording.90 A legal judgment can be
evaluated properly only if the application of the law is categorised either as
interpretation or as development. Based on the prohibition of state
authorities acting arbitrarily, the German Federal Constitutional Court
recognises a general necessity for especially justifying any transgression of
the limits of the wording:
The prohibition of state authorities acting arbitrarily demands with regard to the
constitutional binding of the judges to law and justice a justification even of a
judgment in the last instance insofar as the judgment departs from the clear
wording of a statute, unless the reason for this departure is already known by the
parties or otherwise readily identifiable.91
It is also important that the limits of the wording restrict not only the
extension of a norm, but also the ‘reading down’ of a norm to a narrower
scope.92 It also limits the adjustment of legal concepts to general changes in
society. The wording of a norm demarcates the boundary of any interpretation that aims at reconciling the norm with constitutional requirements.93 The realisation of fundamental constitutional principles is
contingent on the existence of semantic limits. Thus, the doctrine of the
limits of wording is one of the most important interfaces between the
constitution and legal methodology.
THE SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE: INDETERMINACY AND
The doctrine of the limits of the wording is closely linked to the more
fundamental problem of legal indeterminism (A). One main source of legal
indeterminism is vagueness of meaning (B). All in all, linguisticphilosophical arguments loom large in legal scepticism (C).
MacCormick, ‘Arguing About Interpretation’ (n 10 above) 126 f; N Stoljar, ‘Survey
Article: Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority. Some Recent Controversies in the
Philosophy of Law’ (2003) 11 Journal of Political Philosophy 482. Cf JL Coleman and B
Leiter, ‘Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority’ in A Marmor (ed), Law and Interpretation.
Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford, 1995) 229–33.
BVerfG NJW 1993, 1909, translated by MK.
BGHSt 43, 237 (238).
BVerfGE 101, 312 (329); 95, 64 (93); dissenting vote in BVerfGE 85, 69 (78).
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The Concept of Indeterminacy
There are several types of legal indeterminacy, and these differ in terms of
their justification and scope. As for the concept of indeterminacy, three
distinctions are decisive.94
First, we need to distinguish between special and general indeterminism.
Special indeterminism looks at special features of the law, and focuses on
alleged inconsistencies and gaps. General indeterminism stems from the
indeterminism of meaning and semantic scepticism. The doctrine of the
limits of the wording is concerned with semantic scepticism, and thus with
general indeterminism. For this reason, special indeterminism is excluded
Secondly, causal indeterminism has to be distinguished from indeterminism of justification. Causal indeterminism investigates the indeterminism
between causes and judgments and denies the possibility of explaining
judgments by reference to causes. Indeterminism of justification analyses
the reasons for judgments and denies the possibility of justifying judgments
by reference to reasons. The doctrine of the limits of the wording concerns
the significance of semantic arguments in the external justification of
judgments.95 Therefore, indeterminism of justification is analysed here.
Thirdly, indeterminism of compliance can be distinguished from indeterminism of content. Indeterminism of compliance arises when a norm leaves
latitude for more than one possible method of compliance. Indeterminism
of content means that the content of the norm is unclear. Here, we are
concerned with the indeterminism of content.
Vagueness as Boundarylessness
Among the most popular arguments supporting legal indeterminism is the
argument of vagueness. This argument is a very complex one, and it
stretches across many areas of philosophy. This book addresses only
semantic grounds for the vagueness of a legal norm.
Based on semantic vagueness, legal scholars have advanced highly
sceptical claims about the possibility of rational justification in the law in
general and about the doctrine of the limits of the wording in particular.
These debates are essentially linguistic and philosophical in nature, and
hence the entire second chapter of this book addresses linguisticphilosophical questions that borrow from Wittgenstein, Kripke, Quine,
Cf Coleman and Leiter, ‘Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority’ (n 90 above)
On internal and external justification, see Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation (n
17 above) 221–86.
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and Brandom. In this introduction we look briefly at only two issues, as
they highlight both some of the main points of this book and the relevance
of vagueness to the doctrine of the limits of the wording. These are the
problem of higher-order vagueness (i) and the problem of the significance
of interpretation in the law (ii).
Vagueness is a major challenge to the assertion that the philosophy of
meaning can provide the means to defend the doctrine of the limits of the
wording. Analytical legal methodology in Germany has developed the
so-called ‘three-candidates’ model to cope with semantic vagueness.
According to this model, the objects to which a legal term refers can be
categorised into positive candidates to which the term undoubtedly refers,
negative candidates to which the term undoubtedly does not refer, and
neutral candidates where there is doubt whether the term refers to them.96
On the basis of this categorisation, the model can defend certain limits of
the wording, even for vague terms.97
However, such a model faces the problem of higher-order vagueness—
the borderlines between the three categories may be vague themselves. It is
exactly this point that Raz objected to in Dworkin: the claim that
vagueness is ‘continuous’ and ‘boundary-less’,98 such that it would be
impossible to draw sharp distinctions between any number of categories in
the same way as the doctrine of the limits of the wording.
The problem of higher-order vagueness has attracted considerable attention, and it is in fact the most worrying problem of vagueness for any
theory of legal argumentation, as Endicott underlines: ‘The feature of
vague language that is most difficult for legal theories to accommodate is
higher-order vagueness’.99
If the problem of higher-order vagueness could be solved, vagueness as a
whole would no longer be a serious challenge to legal theory. And it is a
central aim of this book to defend exactly this solution. It will be argued
that, on the basis of Robert Brandom’s philosophy of meaning, it is indeed
possible to break the circle of higher-order vagueness.100 With the aid of
Koch and Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre (n 18 above) 195.
M Herberger and H-J Koch, ‘Zur Einführung: Juristische Methodenlehre und Sprachphilosophie’ (1978) Juristische Schulung 813.
Cf J Raz, The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, 1979) 73 f; M
Sainsbury, ‘Concepts without Boundaries’ in R Keefe and P Smith (eds), Vagueness. A Reader
(Cambridge MA, 1997) 251.
Endicott, Vagueness in Law (n 20 above) 74.
See p 259 ff below.
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Brandom’s default and challenge structure of normative commitments, the
doctrine of the limits of the wording can be maintained even for vague
concepts.101
In analysing and defending vagueness as a central challenge to legal theory,
Endicott aims to defend a so-called ‘simple account’ of interpretation in the
law as an alternative to more ambitious accounts of interpretation. With
his ‘simple account’, he maintains that interpretation has a minor but
significant role in adjudication; in fact, Endicott denies that identifying the
law is generally an interpretive task at all.102
In defending the doctrine of the limits of the wording, this book
acknowledges the great significance of interpretation in law, and thus
supports Dworkin’s rather than Endicott’s view. When Endicott argues that
the law can be often be understood ‘without any creative activity’, he
disregards even the insights of legal hermeneutics, most notably Gadamer’s
works on the hermeneutic conditions of understanding.103 The omnipresence of interpretation is inevitable, and any denial of this fact is not only
illusory but misses the potential of rationality that lies in a profound
analysis of the process of interpretation.
Legal sceptics have argued on a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic
grounds against the possibility of the rule of law. The determinacy of
language is defended here with the doctrine of the limits of the wording.
Thus, only linguistic grounds for legal scepticism are considered and
rebutted in this book.
Legal sceptics hold not only that meaning is not fixed on enactment of a
statute, but that it evolves in the process of understanding and applying the
law.104 What is more, they take this process to be extremely dynamic and
influenced, if not entirely determined, by subjective and emotional factors.
See p 270 below.
Endicott, Vagueness in Law (n 20 above) 159, 167.
HG Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd edn (London, 2004). See p 33 ff below.
Sunstein and Eskridge have argued for a dynamic theory of legal interpretation, see
WN Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge MA, 1994); CR Sunstein,
‘Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State’ (1989) 103 Harvard Law Review 405. For a
discussion of evolutionary versus fixed meaning, see Greenawalt, ‘Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation’ (n 26 above) 275–7.
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The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning
Kennedy, for example, claims that judges are ideological players, and that
adjudication is based on ideological, strategic preferences.105
Hart and Sacks conceive of interpretation as the ‘creative elaboration of
meaning by judges’.106 Similarly, Structuring Legal Theory (SLT) in Germany makes far-reaching claims about the influence of the interpreter on
the meaning of a text. It claims that the meaning of a norm is not a
pre-interpretive standard, and therefore cannot restrict interpretation. As
Müller says,
‘[t]here is no magical language with an objective meaning-content or any
unquestionable propositions … An interpretation always just substitutes new
text for preceding text’.107
This deconstruction of the theory of the limits of the wording has
significant consequences. If the meaning of a norm is not only not fixed but
also not even able to determine the application of the norm in some way,
several constitutional principles, such as democracy, the rule of law and the
separation of powers, would have to be abandoned.
If SLT and legal scepticism were sound, then any assertion about the
meaning of a statute would dissolve into a multitude of relativistic
interpretations. For purely semantic reasons, we would have to admit that
our attempts at justifying legal verdicts are, at best, monumental feats of
self-deception and, at worst, deliberate ploys of judges to mask their
usurpation of legislative power. Thus, any notion of a doctrine of limits of
the wording would be illusory. In defending this doctrine, this book also
refutes semantic indeterminacy grounds for far-reaching legal scepticism
and thereby defends the possibility of the rule of law.
The legitimacy of legal judgments depends upon the rationality and
objectivity of legal reasoning and the social reality of which it forms a part
(A). Legal objectivity was a central issue in the famous debate between
Dworkin and Fish (B). As far as semantic grounds for objectivity are
concerned, we argue here that Brandomian semantics are superior to
Stavropoulos ‘KP’ semantics (C).
D Kennedy, ‘Strategizing Strategic Behaviour in Legal Interpretation’ (1996) Utah Law
Review 785.
HM Hart and AM Sacks, The Legal Process. Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (Westbury NY, 1994) 1415.
F Müller, ‘Observations on the Role of Precedent in Modern Continental European
Law from the Perspective of “Structuring Legal Theory”’ (2000) 11 Stellenbosch Law Review
426 at 435. SLT suggests a different concept, namely the limits of the norm-programme. See F
Müller, Juristische Methodik, 7th edn (Berlin, 1997) 183, 201. For a critical discussion of this
view as well as the overall approach of SLT, see p 73 ff below.
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Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy
Many of those who doubt the objectivity of law108 and the rationality of
adjudication are motivated by scepticism about the objectivity of language
in general. However, the problem of the objectivity of law is not only
linguistic-philosophical in character, but touches on one of the most
fundamental questions in general philosophy: Is there objective truth? The
problem of the limits of the wording is closely related to the problems of
the existence of legal truths and of the possibility of legal mistakes. Thus, it
is related to the objectivity of social reality and of the possibilities and
limits of rationality. To what extent is objective social reality possible solely
because humans think that it is and act accordingly?109 Can judges make
mistakes about the law? Are there correct answers in the law?
The problem of the limits of the wording is related to the debate on
Habermas’s new concept of truth110 and to the renaissance of American
pragmatism.111 What is at stake is how the speakers of a language make up
a common reference to reality. The problem of the limits of the wording
concerns the possibility of a common language in the context of a factual
plurality of world pictures, language games, forms of life and cultures.
This book raises the issue of the existence and cognition of objective,
universal, timeless and mind-independent features of language. Postmodern scepticism, subjectivism, emotivism and projectivism deny the possibility that propositions about the law can be rational. This debate is part
of the wider debate on the objectivity of evaluative propositions, be they
ethical, interpretive or aesthetic in nature.112 Insights into the interpretive
power challenge the possibility of rational legal argumentation that contrasts with open-ended ideological disputes about the fundamental values
and terms of social life. Koch and Rüßmann highlight that
the explosiveness of this confession lies in the fact that the legitimacy of legal
judgments becomes increasingly problematic if the judgment cannot be justified
by reference to the content of a legal norm.113
For a bibliography of the abundant writing on this topic see B Leiter, Objectivity in
Law and Morals (Cambridge, 2001) 331–49.
JR Searle, Mind, Language and Society. Philosophy in the Real World (London, 2000)
111–34.
J Habermas, ‘Richtigkeit vs. Wahrheit. Zum Sinn der Sollgeltung moralischer Urteile
und Normen’ (1998) 46 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 179.
W Egginton and M Sandbothe, The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy. Contemporary
Engagements between Analytic and Continental Thought (Albany, 2004).
Cf R Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy
& Public Affairs 87 f.
Koch and Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre (n 18 above) 23.
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The Dworkin–Fish Controversy
Dworkin and Fish have been engaged in a long debate on the objectivity of
legal interpretation.114 Fish’s criticism focuses on Dworkin’s idea of the
chain novel and on the constraints on the different participants in this
shared enterprise.115 Fish claims that Dworkin fails to warrant the objectivity of judgements about how the novel is to be continued. Fish
challenges Dworkin with the choice of either abandoning the claim of
objectivity or adopting a kind of semantic realism.116 A similar objection
has been made by Raz, who claims that there were only two options: to
demonstrate the absolute certainty of an alleged interpretation, and to
admit that everything is open to endless re-interpretation.117
Stavropoulos has shown that these choices fail to recognise an ‘objective
conception of the practice’ as a third option and therefore do not represent
an exhaustive set of alternatives.118 The semantic theory developed in this
book elaborates such an objective conception of the practice, based on
Brandom’s normative pragmatics. It therefore supports Dworkin’s position
The semantic theory developed in this book dovetails with Dworkin’s
theory, as it spells out in detail how judgements of interpreters may impose
obligations upon other judgements. The notion of ‘internal objectivity’
defended by Dworkin is analysed here in greater depth by reference to
Brandom’s philosophy. ‘Internal objectivity’ claims that an agent’s propositions can function as criteria to evaluate the correctness of further
propositions of the same and other agents.119 It will be shown that within
a given conceptual scheme objective restrictions can indeed control interpretations.
R Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 527; R Dworkin,
‘My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk About Objectivity
Any More’ in WJT Mitchell (ed), The Politics of Interpretation (Chicago, 1983) 287; R
Dworkin, ‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality’ in M Brint and W Weaver (eds),
Pragmatism in Law and Society (Boulder CO, 1991) 359; S Fish, ‘Working on the Chain
Gang. Interpretation in Law and Literature’ (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 551; S Fish,
‘Wrong Again’ (1983) 62 Texas Law Review 299; S Fish, ‘Still Wrong after All These Years’
(1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 401; S Fish, ‘Almost Pragmatism. The Jurisprudence of Richard
Posner, Richard Rorty and Ronald Dworkin’ in Brint and Weaver (eds), Pragmatism in Law
and Society at 47.
Dworkin, ‘My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk
About Objectivity Any More’ (n 114 above) 288–97; R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London,
1986) 234 f; R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford, 1986) 151 f, 167–77; Dworkin,
‘Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality’ (n 114 above) 376 f.
Fish, ‘Still Wrong after All These Years’ (n 114 above) 408.
See J Raz, ‘Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain’ (1986) 74 California Law Review
1103 at 1110 f; Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (n 39 above) 136 f, 159.
Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (n 39 above) 159.
On this concept of internal objectivity see M Iglesias Vila, Facing Judicial Discretion.
Legal Knowledge and Right Answers Revisited (Dordrecht, 2001) 120.
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Dworkin’s turn towards constructive interpretation is taken by many
scholars to demolish the dichotomy between creating and discovering the
law.120 Raz objects that the augmented interpretive attitude does not take
seriously the context of the law as an authoritative mode of communication between law-makers and citizens.121 Yet Dworkin simultaneously
claims to defend the idea of objectivity in judicial decision-making.
If his critics were right, then this latter claim would be illusory. It is,
however, maintained here that it is indeed possible to have it all: to
maintain both the idea of objectivity and the dichotomy between interpretation and invention within Dworkin’s theory of interpretation. Thus, in
this respect also, the semantic theory defended here supports Dworkin’s
triumphal escape from false choices.
B Semantics versus KP Semantics
In the context of defending claims for the objectivity of legal reasoning,
Stavropoulos has suggested supplementing Dworkin’s theory with a certain
semantic theory, called Kripke-Putnam semantics or KP semantics. Brandomian semantics, by contrast, are proposed in this book with the same aim,
namely of supplementing Dworkin, but they are richer and more powerful
than KP semantics.
KP semantics and Stavropoulos’s defence of Dworkin’s view on substantive disagreement in legal discourse both rest on legal things being
real-world properties rather than mere conventional facts.122 There is,
however, no reality of legal propositions apart from legal practice itself.
Meaning in law does not reflect or directly relate to anything but the meaning
others have given to legal propositions or legal concepts.123
It is the central weakness of Stavropoulos’s book that, in his search for
greater objectivity, he completely abandons the conventional and pragmatic basis of meaning. Therefore, it focuses on one aspect of meaning
only: It is a theory of content only, while a full theory of meaning must also
explain application.124
It is precisely these weaknesses that are avoided by Brandomian semantics. The latter spell out how the legal concepts that underlie our practices
M Powers, ‘Truth, Interpretation, and Judicial Method in Recent Anglo-American
Jurisprudence’ (1992) 46 Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 120.
Raz, ‘Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain’ (n 117 above) 1103.
Cf JE Penner, ‘Nicos Stavropoulos: Objectivity in Law’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review
747 at 748.
A De Moor, ‘Nothing Else to Think? On Meaning, Truth and Objectivity in Law’
(1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 345 at 360.
Penner, ‘Nicos Stavropoulos: Objectivity in Law’ (n 122 above) 749.
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are to be understood, and elaborate with great analytical power the ‘joint
commitments’125 in an interpretive community that allows for legal propositions being correct or false.
In addition to their pragmatic analysis, they accommodate the main
points of KP semantics. Brandomian semantics incorporate an explanation
of the reference to objects as a necessary condition of any theory of
meaning. While KP semantics oppose conventional or pragmatic theories
and look at reference as a sufficient condition for explaining meaning,
Brandomian semantics are both pragmatic and reference-based, and therefore a much richer and more potent theory than KP semantics.
The Objectivity of Law Defended
Brandomian semantics support the epistemic conception of interpretation,
which holds that interpretation is linked to knowledge and understanding,
and can produce correct answers and true judgements.126 Most importantly, Brandomian semantics are able to explain and defend the paradox
of Dworkin’s theory that the restrictions controlling interpretation are
internal to conceptual schemes and thus agent-dependent, but still objective in the sense of restricting the agents.127
The doctrine of the limits of the wording is looked at here as a
touchstone for the possibility of objectivity and rationality in legal discourse. The Brandomian theory of meaning supports the view that legal
propositions can indeed be objective and rational.
This section provides an overview on the contents of this book. This
includes some remarks on the general scientific approach (A) and an
overview of the three main chapters (B–D).
A theory of legal argumentation can be called ‘specific’ if it investigates the
structures and conditions of the interpretation of specific kinds of norm.
Cf De Moor, ‘Nothing Else to Think? (n 123 above) 362.
On the epistemic conception of interpretation, see M Iglesias Vila, Facing Judicial
Discretion. Legal Knowledge and Right Answers Revisited (Dordrecht, 2001) 112.
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 115 above) 234–6; Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 115
above) 152–4, 168; R Dworkin, ‘Law, Philosophy and Interpretation’ (1994) 80 Archiv für
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 468.
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An example is the theory of constitutional interpretation.128 This book
analyses the structure and conditions of legal argumentation