Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca3/c572147/no-90-6051
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 19:19:04
Document Index: 25483589

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 881', '§ 1331', '§ 1291', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 881', '§ 881', '§ 881', '§ 881', '§ 1607', '§ 1609', '§ 1618', '§ 1316', '§ 1608', '§ 1316', '§ 1614']

No. 90-6051, Third Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
23 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 235
Assistant United States Attorney James Catterson (Catterson) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents David Toracinta and John Peluso (collectively "the Agents") appeal the order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss appellants' complaint against them on the grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. Irwin Schrob, his wife Barbara Schrob, and Matawan Building Supplies (Schrob)1 filed a complaint containing claims arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). Therein they allege that the seizure of Matawan Building Supplies (Matawan) by Catterson and the Agents violated their constitutional rights. Matawan was seized after Catterson filed an in rem civil action seeking forfeiture of 100 percent of the shares of Matawan and certain real and personal property under the civil forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (West 1981 & Supp.1991), and seeking an ex parte application for a seizure warrant directing the United States Marshal Service to seize the property.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all allegations in the pleadings must be accepted as true and the plaintiff, Schrob, must be given the benefit of every favorable inference that can be drawn from those allegations. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 n. 1 (3d Cir.1987) (citations omitted).
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp.1991). We have appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory order denying Catterson's and the Agents' claims to absolute or qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine espoused in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).4 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a district court's denial of absolute immunity is an appealable interlocutory order. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1982). The Court has also held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985). Thus, we assert jurisdiction over the district court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity under the Cohen doctrine.5
On the jurisdictional problem that the district court's failure to craft such an order creates, we believe that the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Banker's Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S. Ct. 1117, 55 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1978) (per curiam) is controlling. Although the district court in Banker's Trust failed to file a judgment separate from its opinion, rather than a separate order as in this case, see id. at 382 n. 1, 98 S.Ct. at 1119 n. 1, the Court's rationale is instructive. The Supreme Court said:
Initially, we must address two immunity issues. We must first identify which allegations against Assistant United States Attorney Catterson involve core prosecutorial functions and can thereby be dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity under the Supreme Court's decisions in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976) and Burns v. Reed, --- U.S. ---, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991).6 We will then address those allegations requiring the submission of further proofs on remand. We will remand these remaining claims to the district court, recognizing the rights of Catterson and the Agents to prove that their actions are protected by qualified immunity. The district court can more appropriately decide these issues on summary judgment, after supplementation of the record.
While Burns and Imbler both concerned claims against state prosecutors under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, courts have generally relied upon the principles developed in the case law applying section 1983 to establish the outer perimeters of a Bivens claim against federal officials. It would be "untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2909, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978); see Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir.1976).
We begin our analysis with recognition of "[t]he presumption ... that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties," Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1939, and that the Supreme Court has been "quite sparing" in its recognition of absolute immunity. Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538, 542, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988)). The Supreme Court has outlined a "functional" approach to immunity issues. Id.; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811, 102 S.Ct. at 2734. Under this approach, "we examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 224, 108 S.Ct. at 542; see Mireles v. Waco, --- U.S. ---, 112 S. Ct. 286, 288, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) ("relevant inquiry is the 'nature' and 'function' of the act, not the 'act itself' "). Our inquiry centers on the nature of the official behavior challenged and not the title or status of the officer.
(1) creation and filing of the in rem complaint; (2) preparation of and application for the seizure warrant; (3) participation in the ex parte hearing for the issuance of the seizure warrant; and (4) actions surrounding the seizure, retention and release of the Matawan property. If any of the allegations of the complaint involve prosecutorial functions protected by absolute immunity under the principles enunciated in Imbler and Burns, they must be dismissed without reference to the type of behavior complained of. "[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to constant dread of retaliation." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. at 994 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S. Ct. 803, 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950)).
Post-Imbler decisions have generally upheld prosecutorial immunity in cases involving the initiation of a prosecution, or the indictment or filing of charges against an individual. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1081 (E.D.Pa.1980); Coggins v. Carpenter, 468 F. Supp. 270, 283-84 (E.D.Pa.1979). A prosecutor's alleged failure to properly investigate before initiating a prosecution is also conduct within the scope of absolute immunity. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 345 & n. 12 (3d Cir.1989) (absolute immunity from allegation of instituting grand jury proceedings without investigation and without good faith belief that any wrongdoing occurred); Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir.1979) (alleged failure to investigate prior to filing information protected by absolute immunity).
The issue in this case is whether the rationale of Imbler applies to a prosecutor's initiation of an in rem civil proceeding for the forfeiture of criminal property. See United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir.) (in rem forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 is civil proceeding), reh'g denied, 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.1989). Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the scope of prosecutorial immunity in a civil proceeding, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978), the Court recognized that "there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability" and granted absolute immunity to federal attorneys in an administrative agency action. Id. at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 2911-12 (citations omitted). In Butz, the Department of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint seeking to revoke or suspend the registration of a commodity futures commission merchant for failure to maintain minimum financial requirements. After an unsuccessful enforcement proceeding by the Department, the merchant brought a Bivens action for damages against various federal officials, including Department of Agriculture attorneys who prosecuted the proceeding. Id. at 481-83, 98 S.Ct. at 2897-99. The Court, stating that "[t]he cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location," id. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913, granted absolute immunity to the Department of Agriculture attorneys performing functions analogous to those of a prosecutor. The Court said:
The proceeding in this case, filing an action against guilty property, is even more intimately connected with the criminal process than the administrative agency hearing in Butz. The purpose of the forfeiture provisions is to seize property linked to criminal drug transactions. In rem forfeiture is based on the fiction that the property itself is guilty of a crime. See CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-84, 94 S. Ct. 2080, 2090-92, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1974). All "right, title, and interest" in the property vests in the United States "upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture." 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp.1991).
Furthermore, an Assistant United States Attorney is not only a prosecutor, but also the government's advocate in civil litigation. See Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832 (9th Cir.1991) (absolute immunity extended to Internal Revenue Service attorneys in civil enforcement proceedings); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1532-33 & n. 18 (10th Cir.1988) (official entitled to absolute immunity for alleged failure to initiate civil or criminal complaint); Flood v. Harrington, 532 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir.1976) (absolute immunity for government attorneys in civil enforcement action); see also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.) (child services worker absolutely immune for initiating and pursuing civil child dependency proceedings), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829, 108 S. Ct. 98, 98 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1987). From the policy perspective of protecting the judicial process announced in Imbler and Butz, there should be no distinction between a prosecutor acting as the government's advocate in a criminal or civil proceeding. Exposing a prosecutor to personal liability for initiating an in rem proceeding may cause him to hesitate before carrying out his duty to confiscate the proceeds of drug transactions.
Justice Scalia, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, considered whether absolute immunity attached to the prosecutor's decision to apply for the search warrant. Id. at 1947-48 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). At common law, he said, there was no immunity for procuring a search warrant. Justice Scalia compared the prosecutor's role in seeking a search warrant to the prosecutor's role in seeking an indictment as discussed in Imbler, and to the role of the policeman in seeking an arrest warrant. Id. at 1949 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986), the Supreme Court declined to extend absolute immunity to a policeman's actions in seeking an arrest warrant because it "is further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment." Id. at 342-43, 106 S.Ct. at 1097. Justice Scalia found that "[t]he act of procuring a mere search warrant is further removed still." Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1949 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
When the prosecutor's conduct consists of purely investigative matters, courts have declined to apply absolute immunity. See Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 1942-45 (no absolute immunity for prosecutor's giving of advice to police during investigation); Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir.1980) ("a prosecutor who assists, directs or otherwise participates ... in obtaining evidence prior to an indictment undoubtedly is functioning more in his investigative capacity than in his quasi-judicial capacities of 'deciding which suits to bring and ... conducting them in court' ") (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424, 96 S.Ct. at 992), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct. 1353, 67 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1981).
Although this Court has often stated that a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when engaged in purely investigative activities, this Court has never been asked to clarify the gray areas between prosecutorial and investigative activity. See, e.g., Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 993 (3d Cir.1980) (per curiam); Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 566 (3d Cir.1977); cf. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir.1979) (qualified immunity for Attorney General's decision to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances during investigation and remand for further fact-finding on entitlement to absolute immunity), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct. 3147, 69 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1981). Further, no court, to our knowledge, has ever considered prosecutorial immunity in the context of a civil forfeiture. We look for guidance to the decisions of other federal courts granting or denying absolute or qualified immunity to prosecutors seeking search or arrest warrants.
There is a conflict among the cases addressing absolute immunity in the context of the prosecutorial decision to seek an arrest or search warrant. See generally Annotation, Immunity of Prosecutor From Suit, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 640 (1984 & Supp.1990). In Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 107 S. Ct. 1910, 95 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1987), the Josephs asserted that the prosecutor's conduct--making false statements to support a complaint, arrest warrant and a search warrant, participation in an unlawful search, and malicious prosecution--constituted investigative activities not protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 553. The court found that the decision to file a criminal complaint and seek issuance of an arrest warrant were quasi-judicial duties involved in "initiating a prosecution." Id. at 555 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995). The court found that "securing the person of the defendant is part of initiating a prosecution and should be insulated. 'Without the presence of the accused, the initiation of the prosecution would be futile.' " Id. at 556 (quoting Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 438 (10th Cir.1983) (prosecutor seeking arrest warrant entitled to absolute immunity)).12 With respect to the prosecutor's actions in seeking issuance of the search warrant, the court in Patterson recognized that such conduct involves initiating a prosecution, as well as the investigatory function of obtaining evidence prior to an indictment. The court held that a further factual inquiry was necessary to determine the role in which the activity was conducted. Id. at 556-57.
Several courts have drawn a distinction between a prosecutor's actions in obtaining a search warrant prior to the filing of a complaint or indictment and subsequent to such a filing. In Maxfield v. Thomas, 557 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Idaho 1983), the court held that the prosecutor's actions in drafting and applying for a search warrant after the filing of a criminal complaint were entitled to absolute immunity, while opining in dicta that a pre-complaint application would have constituted investigatory conduct entitled only to qualified immunity. Id. at 1129; cf. Ehrlich v. Giuliani, 910 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir.1990) (prosecutor's post-indictment actions in obtaining order to freeze assets for forfeiture protected by absolute immunity). In McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C.Cir.1982), suit was brought against a state prosecutor alleging, inter alia, that he prepared arrest and search warrants that were unconstitutional. The court found that preparation of the warrants and participation in the search and seizure were not core prosecutorial functions because "they involve[d] not the protected decision to initiate prosecution, but rather the earlier, preliminary gathering of evidence which may blossom into a potential prosecution." Id. at 320; cf. Liffiton v. Keuker, 850 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1988) (prosecutor's application to court for wiretap warrant prior to indictment was investigative and not prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity).
In Ehrlich v. Giuliani, in granting absolute immunity, the court analogized the seizure of property to a prosecutor's act of seeking an arrest warrant. In Ehrlich, an investor brought a Bivens action against two federal prosecutors who inadvertently froze his investment account for forfeiture purposes under RICO. The prosecutors froze the account subsequent to an indictment of a person with the same first and last name as the investor. Ehrlich, 910 F.2d at 1221. The court found that the prosecutors were engaged in more than investigative activity: "One of the most important duties of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal proceeding is to ensure that defendants, or in this case the assets, are present at trial." Id. at 1223. The Supreme Court has also analogized the seizing of property to the indictment of a criminal defendant. United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564, 103 S. Ct. 2005, 2012, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1983). Like an arrest warrant, a seizure warrant is necessary to assure the availability of property subject to forfeiture and the warrant effectuates the arrest of the property.
"[T]he decisional process ... of judicial line-drawing ... can [also] be aided by an examination of the policies underlying the question at issue." Wilkinson, 484 F.Supp. at 1083. Thus, our decision is also "influenced by the functions immunity serves." See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1239 (7th Cir.1990), vacated, --- U.S. ---, 112 S. Ct. 40, 116 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1991). We believe that under the unique procedures of forfeiture, the seizure warrant is an integral part of the forfeiture complaint and the decisions to file the complaint and seek the warrant should be considered as one. The "investigative" label placed on a prosecutor's actions in seeking arrest and search warrants does not apply in the forfeiture context. We also believe that the procedural safeguards under the forfeiture laws reduce the need for private damage actions as a means of redressing unconstitutional conduct by a prosecutor. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913.
Schrob's challenge to Catterson's participation in the seizure warrant hearing is easily disposed of.14 The district court erroneously stated that if, as alleged, Catterson told a "bald faced lie" to the judge in applying for the seizure warrant, he "can't be immune." App. at 26. Prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 400-02 (2d Cir.1926), summarily aff'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S. Ct. 155, 72 L. Ed. 395 (1927). The Supreme Court, and this Court, have held that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony in a judicial proceeding. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-27, 96 S.Ct. at 992-93; Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.1976); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (policeman who gave perjured testimony at criminal trial entitled to absolute immunity).
Catterson does not dispute the absence of common law immunity for his actions concerning the retention and alleged mismanagement of the seized property. We too believe that Catterson's management of and negotiations concerning return of the property are not directly related to the judicial process. Instead, he was acting in an administrative role. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544 (judge entitled only to qualified immunity when performing administrative functions). In Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir.1982) (per curiam), the defendant was arrested for murder and his tools and vehicle were seized as evidence. Sometime during his trial, the vehicle was sold for a fraction of its value to pay the sheriff department's storage expenses, and the tools were retained after the trial. See id. at 1343. The court held that the prosecutor was entitled to only qualified immunity from the defendant's due process challenge under section 1983 for his role in managing the post-trial disposition of seized property not used as evidence. The court said that "[a] prosecutor's knowledge that he may be liable if he participates in the illegal sale of seized property will not make him hesitate to initiate a case or introduce seized property as evidence." Id. at 1346; see also Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 476 (10th Cir.1985) (prosecutor acts in administrative role in managing post-trial disposition of seized property and thus receives only qualified immunity), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106 S. Ct. 882, 88 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1986).
Consistent with our conclusion that when a prosecutor acts outside of the "judicial process," he acts outside the protection of absolute immunity, Catterson is entitled only to qualified immunity for his alleged actions in managing and retaining the Matawan property, negotiating a release from liability, and making false statements to the press. Catterson will be shielded from liability if his "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (citations omitted); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).18 Since a motion to dismiss is determined from the face of the complaint, Catterson must be given an opportunity on remand to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the "objective reasonableness of his conduct," or that he had no involvement in the actions alleged. The limited record before this Court precludes us from making such a determination. See Brown v. United States, 851 F.2d 615, 619-20 (3d Cir.1988) (record provided insufficient basis for resolution of qualified immunity issue on appeal).
The Agents contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint does not specifically or adequately allege any conduct by the Agents that violated Schrob's constitutional rights. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.1988) (complaint must provide "a modicum of factual specificity, identifying the particular conduct of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S. Ct. 1338, 103 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1989). It is not clear from the complaint whether the Agents actually drafted or filed the in rem complaint, sought the seizure warrant, participated in the seizure, mismanaged the seized property, negotiated a release from Schrob or made false statements to the press. The district court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Catterson acted "in cahoots" with the Agents. App. at 26. Because we must review the complaint in the light most favorable to Schrob on this motion to dismiss, see D.P. Enters., Inc., 725 F.2d at 944, we will reject at this stage the Agents' contention that the complaint "fails to specify any conduct by [the Agents] that violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable agent should have been aware." See Brief for Appellants at 18.
Catterson and the Agents have raised in their brief for the first time a subsidiary argument concerning the legal sufficiency of Schrob's Bivens claim. Brief for Appellants at 15 n. 6. We took jurisdiction over this case under the Cohen collateral order doctrine to resolve only the immunity question. See Notice of Appeal, App. at 81-82. We follow the direction of the Supreme Court that "[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 805 n. 10, 820 n. 36, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2731 n. 10, 2739 n. 36, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982) (declining to resolve sufficiency of Bivens claim while considering immunity question under collateral order doctrine). The legal sufficiency of a Bivens cause of action is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction which may be considered by this Court at any time. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2409, 76 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1983). Even if Catterson and the Agents had sought to dismiss the Bivens claim in the district court for failure to state a claim, instead of solely on immunity grounds, the district court's denial of this motion would not be an appealable final order
The procedural difference between absolute and qualified immunity is significant. Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, while an official with qualified immunity must establish that "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)
Property subject to civil forfeiture is seized pursuant to process issued under the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, or in the same manner as provided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b) (West 1981 & Supp.1991). The provisions of the customs laws relating to seizure, forfeiture, the disposition of seized property, and remission and mitigation of forfeiture are also applicable. See id. § 881(d). If the value of the seized property does not exceed $500,000, the property is subject to administrative forfeiture. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (West Supp.1991). The government must post notice of such seizure. Id. A person claiming an interest in the property has several options. The claiming party can do nothing, in which case the property forfeits to the government. See id. § 1609 (West Supp.1991). The party can petition the appropriate governmental official for remission and return of the seized property. See id. § 1618 (West Supp.1991); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.79-1316.80 (1991). This remedy allows the government and claimant to resolve the dispute informally, rather than in a judicial forfeiture proceeding. See United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 245-46, 106 S. Ct. 610, 612-13, 88 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1986). Generally, once the government has made an administrative determination on the petition, courts have no power to review that decision. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S. Ct. 1752, 84 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1985); McCoy v. United States, 758 F. Supp. 299, 302 (E.D.Pa.1991). Alternately, the claiming party can file a claim and bond for costs thereby requiring the government to seek judicial forfeiture in a court hearing. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1608 (West Supp.1991); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1316.75-1316.77 (1991). A claiming party could also offer to pay the value of the seized property in order to obtain a release of the property. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1614 (West Supp.1991)
DocketNumber： 1402
Citation Numbers： 948 F.2d 1402
United States v. Von Neumann , 474 U.S. 242 ( 1986 )
Alfred R. Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics , 463 F.2d 88 ( 1972 )
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Figueroa v. DEA , 7 F.3d 218 ( 1993 )
Miller v. U.S. Attorney ( 1997 )
Mamdouh Hussein v. State of NJ ( 2010 )
James J. Giuffre v. Nicholas Bissell Richard Thornburg ... , 31 F.3d 1241 ( 1994 )
John Humphries v. Mary Houghton ( 2011 )
Kenneth E. Carver v. Leonard Heisner , 986 F.2d 1424 ( 1993 )
No. 91-5669 , 967 F.2d 929 ( 1992 )
Robert J. Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San ... , 968 F.2d 865 ( 1992 )
Burke H. Mendenhall and Plaza-Hill Realty Corporation v. ... , 59 F.3d 685 ( 1995 )
Susan Lynn Roberts v. Charles Timothy Kling , 104 F.3d 316 ( 1997 )
Charlotte Juide v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan, Robert Lane,... , 107 F.3d 870 ( 1997 )
Michael James Armstrong v. United States , 89 F.3d 832 ( 1996 )