Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/967/596/464896/
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 07:48:39
Document Index: 499835185

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1291', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 8']

Rayme Vinson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Valdez and Douglas Griffin, Defendants-appellees, 967 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1992 › Rayme Vinson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Valdez and Douglas Griffin, Defendants-appellees
Rayme Vinson, Plaintiff-appellant, v. City of Valdez and Douglas Griffin, Defendants-appellees, 967 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1992)
Argued and Submitted May 5, 1992. Decided May 26, 1992
Rayme Vinson appeals the grants of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the City of Valdez, Alaska, and its City Manager, Douglas Griffin ("defendants"). After being discharged from his position as Chief of the Department of Emergency Services ("DES"), Vinson brought an action for violations of property and liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)1 , breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, retaliatory discharge, and violation of Alaska's Open Meetings Act. In two orders, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment and on motions for reconsideration, the district court granted defendant's motions for summary judgment on all claims and Vinson brought this timely appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). We affirm.
We review the district court's grants of summary judgment de novo. Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990). Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, we are to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court's interpretation of state law is subject to de novo review, giving no deference to the district court seated in the local jurisdiction. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1220-21 (1991); In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
To demonstrate a protectible property interest in continued employment, a plaintiff must show that he had a reasonable expectation or "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972). We look to state law, including city ordinances, to determine whether Vinson has a protectible property interest. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 & n. 7, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (1976). " [R]ules or regulations concerning discharge or express or implied promises" may also be considered. Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
"Under Alaska law, a person who is employed at the pleasure of his employer has no property interest in continued employment that is protected by due process." Canfield v. Sullivan, 774 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Breeden v. City of Nome, 628 P.2d 924, 926 (Alaska 1981) (internal quotations omitted). Section 5.3(b) of the City of Valdez Charter provides that administrative officers serve at the pleasure of the city manager. Vinson does not dispute that he is an administrative officer. Rather, he argues that there is no difference between "administrative officers" and "employees" for purposes of applying the Personnel Regulations. He points to a number of provisions in the City Code and Personnel Regulations that, on their face, appear to equate administrative officers with employees. See, e.g., City Code § 2-4 ("city manager shall have the power to appoint and remove officers and employees of the city"); Personnel Regulations § 1.03 (the regulations "apply to all employees subject to the authority of the city manager"). Personnel ordinances "must be construed so that each has meaning and the sections do not conflict with each other." Canfield, 774 F.2d at 1467 (quoting Stanfill v. City of Fairbanks, 659 P.2d 579, 581 (Alaska 1983)). Reading the City Charter, Code, and Personnel Regulations as a whole and construing them so as not to conflict, we find a clear distinction between administrative officers and employees with regard to termination of employment. To construe them otherwise would be to presume that the use of the terms "administrative officer" and "employee" in the City Charter is superfluous. Additionally, such a construction comports with typical public employment arrangements. Administrative officers, as higher level government officials, serve at the pleasure of the city manager, while other employees who are not high level officials are protected from arbitrary discharge. Further, the disciplinary action and termination and grievance procedures relied upon by Vinson were drafted to create a distinction between department heads and employees, indicating that the procedures apply to employees below the department head level only. See, e.g., Personnel Regulations § 9.
We also reject Vinson's argument that section 8.2 of the Personnel Regulations, providing for grievance procedures, modified his at-will employment agreement, thereby creating a protectible interest in continued employment. See Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska 1989) (employment manuals may modify at-will employment contracts). "Procedural requirements ordinarily do not transform a unilateral expectation into a constitutionally protected property interest." Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1984). A constitutionally protected interest is created only "if the procedural requirements are intended to be a 'significant substantive restriction' " on the decision-making authority of the decision-maker. Id. (citations omitted).
The grievance procedures do not place such limits on the authority of the city manager. The purpose of the grievance procedures is to allow employees "the opportunity to have the grievance reviewed for merit." Personnel Regulations § 8.301. In fact, section 1.03 of the Personnel Regulations provides that " [t]hese regulations shall serve as a guideline to the city manager in the exercise of this authority and nothing contained herein is intended to usurp, contravene or otherwise diminish that authority." Moreover, the text of the provision indicates that it was intended to apply to employees below the department head level. Thus, the grievance procedures do not alter Vinson's status as an administrative officer subject to discharge at the will of the city manager.
Vinson also argues that because Griffin initially instituted termination proceedings pursuant to Personnel Regulations, a mutually explicit understanding existed between Vinson and Griffin that modified Vinson's at-will status.2 See Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1988) (a demonstrated understanding between the employer and employee may provide the employee with a property interest sufficient to be accorded due process protection). The record contains no evidence of a mutual understanding between Griffin and Vinson that Vinson would be entitled to the procedural protections afforded to employees by the Personnel Regulations.
A liberty interest is implicated in the employment termination context if the charge impairs a reputation for honesty or morality. Matthews v. Harney County Or., School Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 1987). A public employee is entitled to procedural protection for a liberty interest in reputation when charges are made against him, in connection with termination of employment, that impose a "stigma of moral turpitude." Wheaton v. Webb-Petett, 931 F.2d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1991). Procedural protections of due process apply if: (1) the accuracy of the charge is contested; (2) there is some public disclosure of the charge; and (3) the charge is made in connection with termination of employment. Matthews, 819 F.2d at 891-92. No process is due if there is no public disclosure of the reasons for termination. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348, 96 S. Ct. at 2079.
Vinson failed to present affidavits, or any evidence, from which an inference could reasonably be drawn that defendants publicized the specific charges underlying his termination. Hence, he failed "to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (record contains no evidence that employer disseminated false and defamatory charges relating to plaintiff's termination). Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the liberty interest claim.
Under Alaska law, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing occurs if the employer discharges the employee in retaliation for conduct protected by public policy. Eldridge v. Felec Services, Inc., 920 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1990); Reed, 782 P.2d at 1158. We look to "the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, [to] its judicial decisions" to determine whether the employee's conduct is protected by public policy. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981)). Vinson has not cited, nor have we found, anything in the Constitution, statutes, or common law of Alaska to support Vinson's refusal to turn over to Griffin the file on the ongoing arson investigation. Therefore, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.