Source: http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-jorge-m-32075
Timestamp: 2015-08-01 18:08:38
Document Index: 204119052

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 12280', '§ 12276', '§ 20', '§ 12275', 'art 4', '§ 12220', '§ 12220', '§ 12031', '§ 12020', '§ 12275', '§ 12020', '§ 11500']

In re Jorge M. - 23 Cal.4th 866 S074270 - Mon, 07/31/2000 | California Supreme Court Resources	Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library
Home > Opinions > In re Jorge M.	Citation 23 Cal.4th 866
In re Jorge M.
In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 , 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466; 4 P.3d 297
(The Court of Appeal, Second Dist., Div. Four, No. FFN_208677.)
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec, Sanjay T. Kumar, John R Gorey and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. [23 Cal.4th 869]
We agree with the Court of Appeal that section 12280(b), an alternative felony/misdemeanor punishable by up to three years in state prison (see §§ 17, subd. (b), 18), was not intended to define a strict liability offense. We disagree, however, that actual knowledge regarding the firearm's prohibited characteristics is required. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the public safety goals of the AWCA. Effective enforcement of that law demands, instead, that a conviction be obtainable upon proof of negligent failure to know, as well as actual knowledge of, the weapon's salient characteristics; the People must prove, that is, that a defendant charged with possessing an unregistered assault weapon knew or reasonably should have [23 Cal.4th 870] known the characteristics of the weapon bringing it within the registration requirements of the AWCA. Because the record of this case contains sufficient evidence to prove the requisite mens rea, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal reversed the section 12280(b) finding for insufficient evidence. Relying heavily on the persuasive authority of Staples v. United [23 Cal.4th 871] States (1994) 511 U.S. 600 [114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608] (Staples), in which the United States Supreme Court held conviction under a federal firearms possession law required proof the defendant knew the features of the gun that brought it within the criminal prohibition, and People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271] (Simon), in which this court held conviction under a law proscribing the sale or purchase of securities by misrepresentation required proof the defendant knew or should have known the false or misleading nature of the representation, the Court of Appeal held that conviction under section 12280(b) requires proof the defendant "knew that the weapon possessed characteristics which brought it within the statutory definition of an assault weapon." The Court of Appeal, without elaborating the point, further asserted there was "no evidence" of such knowledge in this case.
[1a] The AWCA, inter alia, requires registration of assault weapons, sets time periods for such registration, prohibits the possession of unregistered assault weapons, restricts the circumstances under which even registered assault weapons may be possessed (including a prohibition on their possession by minors) and allows exceptions to these restrictions by permit on good cause shown. (§§ 12280, 12285, 12286.) At the time of the minor's charged offense, the restricted firearms included only those defined as assault weapons in section 12276 and those declared to be assault weapons pursuant to section 12276.5. fn. 2 The definition in section 12276, subdivisions (a) through (c), consists of a list, one item of which is "SKS with detachable magazine." (§ 12276, subd. (a)(11).) The question on review, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeal correctly held that the finding the minor possessed an unregistered assault weapon, in violation of section 12280(b), required proof the minor knew the weapon was an SKS with a detachable magazine. fn. 3 To answer that question we must decide whether knowledge of the characteristics bringing a firearm within the AWCA is an element of section 12280(b)'s bar on possession. [23 Cal.4th 872]
That the statute contains no reference to knowledge or other language of mens rea is not itself dispositive. [2a] As we recently explained, the requirement that, for a criminal conviction, the prosecution prove some form of guilty intent, knowledge, or criminal negligence is of such long standing and so fundamental to our criminal law that penal statutes will often be construed to contain such an element despite their failure expressly to state it. "Generally, ' "[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." ...' (People v. Simon[, supra,] 9 Cal.4th 493, 519 ..., citations omitted.) In other words, there must be a union of act and wrongful intent, or criminal negligence. (Pen. Code, § 20; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 801 [299 P.2d 850].) 'So basic is this requirement that it is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication.' (People v. Vogel, supra, at p. 801, fn. omitted.)" (People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 876 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970].)
Equally well recognized, however, is that for certain types of penal laws, often referred to as public welfare offenses, the Legislature does not intend that any proof of scienter or wrongful intent be necessary for conviction. "Such offenses generally are based upon the violation of statutes which are purely regulatory in nature and involve widespread injury to the public. (People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1057-1058 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 348].) 'Under many statutes enacted for the protection of the public health and safety, e.g., traffic and food and drug regulations, criminal sanctions are relied upon even if there is no wrongful intent. These offenses usually involve light penalties and no moral obloquy or damage to reputation. Although criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is regulation rather than punishment or correction. The offenses are not crimes in the orthodox sense, and wrongful intent is not required in the interest of enforcement.' (People v. Vogel, supra, "46 Cal.2d at p. 801, fn. 2.)" (People v. Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 876-877.)
[1b] Whether section 12280(b) can properly be categorized as a public welfare offense, for which the Legislature intended guilt without proof of any scienter, is a question of first impression to which the answer is not obvious. On the one hand, the AWCA, including section 12280, is clearly aimed at protecting public safety by regulating and restricting the possession of assault weapons. (See § 12275.5 ["The Legislature hereby finds and [23 Cal.4th 873] declares that the proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state. The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions on the use of assault weapons and to establish a registration and permit procedure for their lawful sale and possession."]; see also Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482-486 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581].) On the other hand, the penalties imposed under section 12280(b), an alternative felony/misdemeanor (a "wobbler"), are not "light" (People v. Vogel, supra, "46 Cal.2d at p. 801, fn. 2), and a degree of "moral obloquy or damage to reputation" (ibid.) necessarily attaches to a felony conviction. In view of the weighty penalty, it is not patently true that "the primary purpose of the statute[] is regulation rather than punishment or correction." (Ibid.) As the text and penal nature of section 12280(b) do not provide a clear answer to our question, a fuller examination is required.
The AWCA's origins and legislative history are reviewed in detail in Kasler v. Lockyer, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pages 482-487 (Kasler). Suffice it to [23 Cal.4th 874] say here the legislation, enacted in 1989, was prompted by the belief that assault weapons posed a real, severe and growing threat to public safety, urgently requiring regulation and restriction to reduce the number of such weapons finding their way into the hands of street gangs, drug dealers and the mentally ill. The legislative history indicates that while few knowledgeable observers questioned the existence or gravity of the assault weapons problem, several individuals expressed significant reservations about the remedial measures proposed. In particular, the generic definition of assault weapon contained in the bills under consideration concerned many. Witnesses at the hearing conducted by the Assembly sitting as a Committee of the Whole (see Kasler, supra, at pp. 482-483) complained the bills would "throw the baby out with the dishwater [sic]" by including too many semiautomatic rifles that had legitimate uses, and that it was, in practice, impossible to formulate a generic definition that would include military-style weapons but exclude legitimate sporting guns. (1 Assem. J. (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) pp. 449, 451.) When the law's final compromise form, containing a definition by list rather than a generic description, obtained approval from key political figures, Governor Deukmejian, who had expressed misgivings about the generic approach (see Kasler, supra, at p. 487), was quoted as saying, "The result of our efforts have been to clarify provisions of the laws and to provide more certainty regarding which guns are covered." (Deukmejian, Roberti Agree on Weapons Bill, San Diego Tribune (May 4, 1989) p. BFN_2, reprinted in Forsyth, Assault Weapons in California: a Case Study in Issue Management and the Media (1989) p. 8.)
On the other hand, the legislative statement of purpose in section 12275.5 includes, as its last sentence, the following: "It is not, however, the intent of [23 Cal.4th 875] the Legislature by this chapter to place restrictions on the use of those weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities." As the AWCA restricts only certain semiautomatic weapons, one could infer the Legislature believed those it left unrestricted did have significant sporting or recreational uses. In this sense, as the minor argues, the AWCA was clearly not premised on the view that "all semiautomatic firearms were henceforth suspect and to be possessed only at the risk of subjecting oneself to criminal liability."
We turn, therefore, to the AWCA's broader statutory context. The AWCA was codified as chapter 2.3 of title 2 of part 4 of the Penal Code. Title 2, which encompasses sections 12000 through 12809, is entitled Control of Deadly Weapons and contains numerous provisions aimed at controlling the ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other dangerous weapons. Among these provisions are: section 12020, punishing as a wobbler the possession of any of a long list of weapons, including short-barreled shotguns and rifles, undetectable firearms, explosive bullets, nunchakus, shurikens, multiburst trigger activators, concealed dirks or daggers, blackjacks and [23 Cal.4th 876] lipstick case knives; section 12021, which, inter alia, punishes as a felony the ownership or possession of firearms by convicted felons; section 12025, punishing as a misdemeanor, wobbler, or felony, depending on the circumstances, the carrying of a concealed firearm; section 12031, punishing as a misdemeanor, wobbler, or felony, depending on the circumstances, the public carrying of a loaded firearm; section 12220, which, inter alia, punishes as a felony the possession of a machine gun; section 12303, punishing as a wobbler the possession of a destructive device; and section 12320, punishing as a wobbler the knowing possession of armor-piercing handgun ammunition.
In a number of cases predating the AWCA's 1989 enactment, Courts of Appeal construed various of these weapons laws as not requiring knowledge of the characteristics bringing the weapon within the statutory restriction or prohibition. (See People v. Corkrean (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 35, 37-41 [199 Cal.Rptr. 375] [§ 12220; knowledge gun fires automatically not an element of anti-machine-gun law]; People v. Daniels (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 340, 343-345 [257 P.2d 1038] [same for predecessor to § 12220]; People v. Harrison (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 115, 120 [81 Cal.Rptr. 396] [§ 12031, subd. (a); knowledge gun is loaded not an element of misdemeanor offense of carrying loaded firearm in vehicle]; People v. Azevedo (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 235, 239-241 [207 Cal.Rptr. 270] [§ 12020, subd. (a); knowledge of sawed-off shotgun's contraband character not an element].) fn. 6
The Attorney General observes that some of these decisions rely on the statutes' lack of a requirement the defendant "knowingly" possess the weapon. (See, e.g., People v. Daniels, supra, "118 Cal.App.2d at pp. 344-345.) The Legislature, his argument continues, at the time it enacted the AWCA, was presumably aware of this "uniform" interpretation of the deadly weapons laws and, therefore, by again omitting any express reference to the possessor's knowledge, must have intended to impose liability without any element of scienter. The minor responds that the AWCA is distinguishable from sections 12020 and 12220, in that the latter restrict all machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, explosive ammunition and the like, while the [23 Cal.4th 877] AWCA restricts only selected semiautomatic weapons and expressly disavows (in the last sentence of § 12275.5, quoted earlier) any intent to restrict other semiautomatic weapons with legitimate sporting uses. fn. 7
For two reasons, we agree with the minor that the pre-1989 Court of Appeal decisions on deadly weapons laws are not compelling evidence the Legislature intended section 12280(b) to lack any scienter element. First, the precedential history is not as clear or definitive as the Attorney General portrays it. As of 1989, this court had not ruled on whether knowledge of the weapon's illegal characteristics was an element of any of the state's deadly weapons laws; the few statements we had made on the subject, moreover, did not point clearly to liability without any scienter. Thus, in People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593 [186 Cal.Rptr. 485, 652 P.2d 42], while rejecting the claim a convicted felon in possession of a firearm must know of his legal status to violate section 12021, we stated that "the crucial question is whether the defendant was aware that he was engaging in the conduct proscribed by that section." (Italics added.) Similarly, in Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851, 868 [76 Cal.Rptr. 642, 452 P.2d 930], construing a San Francisco gun registration law, we stated, " 'The only knowledge required is knowledge of the character of the object possessed; knowledge that the possession is illegal is unnecessary.' " (Italics added.) At the same time, in the related area of criminal penalties for possession of controlled substances, we had consistently construed such laws to require knowledge of the character of the substance possessed, despite the absence in the statutes of mens rea language. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215 [95 Cal.Rptr. 530, 485 P.2d 1146]; People v. Winston (1956) 46 Cal.2d 151, 158-161 [293 P.2d 40]; see also People v. Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 875-880 [citing additional cases on transportation, sale and cultivation of drugs, and adopting same construction for crime of manufacturing methamphetamine].) One Court of Appeal, in an appeal from convictions for possession of a sawed-off shotgun (§ 12020) and possession of morphine [23 Cal.4th 878] (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11500), had generalized the scienter rule for possession as follows: "It is, of course, true that to establish unlawful possession of a contraband object it must be shown that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the object with knowledge of its presence and contraband character." (People v. Prochnau (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 22, 30 [59 Cal.Rptr. 265], italics added.) Thus, as of 1989, the appellate decisions regarding the scienter required for possessory offenses, including those involving deadly weapons, were not uniform in result. The Legislature in that year would not, therefore, necessarily have assumed that a felony offense punishing simple possession of a weapon would be construed as a strict liability crime if the statute failed to include any language of scienter.
Second, as the minor suggests, the Legislature may have regarded the statutory prohibitions construed in the Attorney General's cited Court of Appeal decisions as significantly distinguishable from the AWCA. Those decisions rest in part on the belief that sawed-off shotguns and machine guns are so easily distinguishable, and so patently tailored to criminal activity, that unknowing and innocent possession is unlikely. (See People v. Azevedo, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 240 [sawed-off shotguns described as members of "a class of instruments normally used only for criminal purposes"]; see also id. at p. 241 [court concludes "[i]t is not a heavy burden for a person who knowingly possesses a sawed-off shotgun to first determine the dimensions of that weapon or otherwise possess it at his or her own peril"]; People v. Daniels, supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at p. 345 ["No doubt the Legislature felt that possession of a machine gun could hardly be had without knowledge that the object was in fact a machine gun"].) In contrast, while the drafters and enactors of the AWCA clearly regarded as particularly dangerous, because of their criminal use, the assault weapons to be restricted, they also recognized that the enumerated weapons belonged to the larger class