Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/292/313/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-04 22:23:18
Document Index: 253414326

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 258', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1679', '§ 10', '§ 2']

Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi (full text) :: 292 U.S. 313 (1934) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
U.S. Supreme CourtPrincipality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)Principality of Monaco v. MississippiNo. ___, originalArgued March 5, 1934Decided May 21, 1934292 U.S. 313MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DECLARATION
The proposed declaration sets forth four causes of action. Two counts are upon bonds known as Mississippi Planters' Bank Bonds, dated March 1, 1833, the first count being upon eight bonds of $1,000 each, due March 1, 1861, and the second count upon two bonds of $1,000 each, due March 1, 1866, all with interest at 6 percent per annum. The remaining two counts are upon bonds known as Mississippi Union Bank Bonds, the third count being on twenty bonds of $2,000 each, dated June 7, 1838, due February 5, 1850, and the fourth count upon twenty-five bonds of $2,000 each, dated June 6, 1838, due February 5, 1858, all with interest at 5 percent per annum. In each count, it was alleged that the bonds were transferred and delivered to the Principality at its legation in Paris, France, on or about September 27, 1933, as an absolute gift. Accompanying the declaration and made a part of it is a letter of the donors, dated September 26, 1933, stating that the bonds had "been handed down from their respective families who purchased them at Page 292 U. S. 318 the time of their issue by the State of Mississippi;" that the state had
(4) that the proposed litigation is an attempt by the Principality "to evade the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;" (5) that the proposed declaration does not state a controversy which is "justiciable under the Constitution of the United States and cognizable under the jurisdiction of this Court;" (6) that the alleged right of action "has long since been defeated and Page 292 U. S. 319 extinguished" by reason of the completion of the period of limitation of action prescribed by the statutes of Mississippi; that the plaintiff and its predecessors in title have been guilty of laches, and that the right of action, if any, is now and for a long time has been stale.
that this provision was incorporated in the Constitution of 1890 (§ 258), and that, since its adoption, no foreign state could accept the bonds in question as a charitable donation in good faith. Page 292 U. S. 320
The Principality relies upon the provisions of § 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States that the judicial power shall extend to controversies "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens or Subjects" (Clause 1), and that in cases "in which a State shall be Party" this Court shall have original jurisdiction (Clause 2). The absence of qualification requiring the consent of the state in the case of a suit by a foreign state is asserted to be controlling. And the point is stressed that the Eleventh Amendment Page 292 U. S. 321 of the Constitution, providing that the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit against one of the United States "by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign state," contains no reference to a suit brought by a foreign state.
Similarly, neither the literal sweep of the words of Clause 1 of § 2 of Article III nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment permits the conclusion that, in all controversies of the sort described in Clause 1 and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a state may be sued without her consent. Page 292 U. S. 322 Thus, Clause 1 specifically provides that the judicial power shall extend
Manifestly we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting states. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the postulate that states of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, [Footnote 1] shall be immune from suits without their consent save where there has been "a surrender of this Page 292 U. S. 323 immunity in the plan of the convention." The Federalist, No. 81. The question is whether the plan of the Constitution involves the surrender of immunity when the suit is brought against a state, without her consent, by a foreign state.
"The next case provides for disputes between a foreign state and one of our states, should such a case ever arise, and between a citizen and a foreign citizen or subject. I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided, in these courts, between Page 292 U. S. 324 an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the parties. If they consent, provision is here made."
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind, and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union. Unless therefore there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that there is no color to pretend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. Page 292 U. S. 325 The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident it could not be done without waging war against the contracting state, and to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting right of the state governments, a power which would involve such a consequence would be altogether forced and unwarrantable. [Footnote 4]"
It is true that, despite these cogent statements of the views which prevailed when the Constitution was ratified, the Court held, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, over the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Iredell, [Footnote 5] that a state was liable to suit by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country. But this decision created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted. As the Amendment did not in terms apply to a suit against a state by its own citizen, the Court had occasion, when that question was presented in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, (a case alleged to arise under the Constitution of the United States), to give elaborate consideration to the application of the general principle of the immunity of states from suits brought against them without their consent. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the Court and, in view of the importance of the question, we quote at length from that opinion to show the reasoning which Page 292 U. S. 326 led to the decision that the suit could not be maintained. The Court said (134 U.S. pp. 134 U. S. 12 et seq.):
"The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . . "Page 292 U. S. 327
In the case of South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, 192 U. S. 318, the Court observed that the expression in the opinion in Hans v. Louisiana of concurrence in the views announced by Mr. Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia could not be considered as a judgment of the Court in view of the point which Hans v. Louisiana actually decided. But South Dakota v. North Carolina did not disturb the ruling in Hans v. Louisiana or the principle which that decision applied. Page 292 U. S. 328 South Dakota v. North Carolina was a suit by one state against another state, and did not present the question of the maintenance either of a suit by individuals against a state or by a foreign state against a state. As a suit by one state against another state, it involved a distinct and essential principle of the constitutional plan which provided means for the judicial settlement of controversies between states of the Union, a principle which necessarily operates regardless of the consent of the defendant state. The reasoning of the Court in Hans v. Louisiana with respect to the general principle of sovereign immunity from suits was recently reviewed and approved in Williams v. United States, supra.
1. The establishment of a permanent tribunal with adequate authority to determine controversies between the states, in place of an inadequate scheme of arbitration, was essential to the peace of the Union. The Federalist, No. 80; Story on the Constitution, § 1679. With respect to such controversies, the states by the adoption of the Constitution, acting "in their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the people," waived their exemption from judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court over the parties in such cases was thus established Page 292 U. S. 329 "by their own consent and delegated authority" as a necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 176 U. S. 16-17; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 180 U. S. 240-241; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 185 U. S. 142-144; 206 U. S. 206 U.S. 46, 206 U. S. 83-85; Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565.
4. Protected by the same fundamental principle, the states, in the absence of consent, are immune from suits brought against them by their own citizens or by federal corporations, although such suits are not within the explicit Page 292 U. S. 330 prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment. Hans v. Louisiana, supra; Smith v. Reeves, supra; Duhne v. New Jersey, supra; Ex parte New York, No. 1, supra.
The question of the right of suit by a foreign state against a the Union is not limited to cases of Page 292 U. S. 331 alleged debts or of obligations issued by a state and claimed to have been acquired by transfer. Controversies between a state and a foreign state may involve international questions in relation to which the United States has a sovereign prerogative. One of the most frequent occasions for the exercise of the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over controversies between states of the Union has been found in disputes over territorial boundaries. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra, p. 37 U. S. 737. Questions have also arisen with respect to the obstruction of navigation, South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4; the pollution of streams, Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208; 200 U. S. 200, and the diversion of navigable waters, Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367; 289 U. S. 289 U.S. 395, 289 U. S. 400. But, in the case of such a controversy with a foreign power, a state has no prerogative of adjustment. No state can enter "into and Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" or, without the consent of Congress, "into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power." Const. Art. I, § 10. The National Government, by virtue of its control of our foreign relations, is entitled to employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect such an international settlement as may be found to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement of arbitration, or otherwise. It cannot be supposed that it was the intention that a controversy growing out of the action of a state, which involves a matter of national concern and which is said to affect injuriously the interests of a foreign state, or a dispute arising from conflicting claims of a the Union and a foreign state as to territorial boundaries, should be taken out of the sphere of international negotiations and adjustment through a resort by the foreign state to a suit under the provisions of § 2 of Article III. In such a case, the state has immunity from suit without her consent, and the National Government is protected by the Page 292 U. S. 332 provision prohibiting agreements between states and foreign powers in the absence of the consent of the Congress. While, in this instance, the proposed suit does not arise a question of national concern, the constitutional provision which is said to confer jurisdiction should be construed in the light of all its applications.