Source: http://www.michbar.org/e-journal/022113.cfm
Timestamp: 2014-03-09 21:02:01
Document Index: 309240613

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', 'art 117', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19', '§ 19']

Search	Thursday, February 21, 2013
Case Summaries e-Mail to a Friend Printer Friendly Version	Today's e-Journal includes summaries of three Michigan Court of Appeals published opinions under Banking/Real Property, Environmental Law/Municipal, and Wills & Trusts. Cases appear under the following practice areas:
Issues: Action to recover a purported deficiency consisting of amounts not included in a "full credit bid" at a foreclosure sale; Whether the trial court properly granted defendants-Boggs' motion for summary disposition; Nuculovic v. Hill; Houghton Lake Lodging Investments Limited Partnership (HLL)(mortgagor); New Freedom Mtg. Corp. v. Globe Mtg. Corp.; Bank of Three Oaks v. Lakefront Props.; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Erb; Whether the defendants remained liable under the note and mortgage for HLL's liabilities because plaintiff's final bid was not a "full credit bid" since it did not include the unpaid taxes, insurance premiums, and escrow amounts; Whether the defendants remained liable for the insurance premium payments it made before the foreclosure sale; Whether the plaintiff-Bank provided any notice of deficiency to HLL; Whether the defendants remained liable for all taxes, insurance premiums and escrow amounts regardless of whether HLL remained liable because the guaranties contained broad language requiring defendants to pay all of HLL's obligations even those that were discharged
Case Name: Citizens Bank v. Boggs
e-Journal Number: 53975
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Jansen, Whitbeck, and Borrello
In this action to recover a purported deficiency consisting of amounts not included in a "full credit bid" at a foreclosure sale, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that the defendants-Boggs were not liable for the unpaid taxes paid by the plaintiff-Bank after the foreclosure sale. The court reversed the trial court's determination that defendants were not liable for any insurance premium payments made by the Bank before the foreclosure sale, and remanded for further proceedings as to this question. The alleged deficiency was comprised of unpaid taxes and insurance premiums that the mortgagor-HLL failed to pay into escrow as required by the note. After HLL defaulted, the Bank foreclosed on the property by advertisement and made a successful bid to fully satisfy HLL's outstanding principal and interest, plus the foreclosure costs. The Bank then sued the Boggs, the guarantor of HLL's loan obligations, for unpaid taxes and insurance premiums. The Bank admitted that it did not actually pay the taxes on the property until well after the foreclosure sale when it resold the property to a third party, but did present evidence to show that it paid at least some of the premiums before the sale. On appeal, the Bank argued, inter alia, that the defendants remained liable under the note and mortgage for HLL's liabilities because its final bid was not a "full credit bid" since it did not include the unpaid taxes, insurance premiums, and the escrow amounts. It was undisputed that Bank's bid included all of the outstanding principal balance, as well as all accrued interest and foreclosure costs. This is the "quintessential definition of a full credit bid." However, "our courts have recognized that a mortgagor may remain liable for taxes and insurance premiums paid by the mortgagee before the foreclosure sale." The Bank argued that defendants were liable for the unpaid taxes that became due before the foreclosure sale, in spite of the fact that the Bank did not actually pay these taxes until it sold the property to a third party. While HLL's property taxes were to be paid regularly and held in escrow, the Bank conceded that it did not actually incur these costs until it sold the property well after the foreclosure sale. As the Supreme Court noted in Erb, "where taxes are paid by the mortgagee or purchaser after the foreclosure sale, a bill in equity will not lie to reforeclose the mortgage for the taxes nor to impress and enforce a lien for them against the property." Because the Bank did not pay the taxes before the date of the sale, this liability was extinguished by the foreclosure. The trial court, inter alia, properly granted defendants summary disposition as to the unpaid taxes. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
Issues: Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant's convictions of two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm; People v. Ericksen; People v. Parcha; People v. Brown; People v. Harrington; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13 at 25 points; People v. Harmon; Whether the trial court properly departed from the sentencing guidelines; People v. Smith; People v. Babcock; People v. Abramski; People v. Kahley; Whether the trial court adequately explained how it determined the extent of the departure Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: People v. Ayers
e-Journal Number: 53841
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Sawyer, Markey, and M.J. Kelly Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and considering the dangerousness of a firearm, the court held, inter alia, that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that defendant intended to do great bodily harm to the two officers. The case stemmed from the attempted robbery of a pharmacy. Defendant and a female companion hatched the plan to rob the pharmacy. They planned to steal prescription drugs from the pharmacy. In furtherance of this plan, defendant and his companion stole two firearms from the home of the woman's parents while they were sleeping. Defendant had previously stolen a gun from his father. They then drove to the pharmacy, and defendant drove his vehicle through the pharmacy's front door. Shortly after, the police arrived, and a confrontation occurred. Defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he specifically intended great bodily harm. Officer W testified that defendant raised his hand and pointed a gun directly at him, and Officer S saw that defendant had a gun in his hand. W yelled out to S that defendant had a gun, ran for cover, and heard what he believed to be three gunshots. S heard W yell that defendant had a gun, then he, too, heard three gunshots. S testified that the gunshots did not come from defendant's companion. S testified that defendant also pointed the gun in the direction of his patrol car. S told him to drop the gun and then shot at defendant three or four times. Defendant fired back at him three or four times. Michigan State Police forensic scientist T testified that the location of a bullet hole in the pharmacy ceiling was consistent with someone's shooting in the direction of W. He also testified that holes in the counter, a skip mark on the window, and a .38 caliber bullet lodged between windowpanes were consistent with someone's attempting to shoot S. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the court held that it was sufficient to show that defendant assaulted the two officers by firing a gun in their direction. This same evidence was sufficient to find that defendant intended to inflict great bodily harm when he fired the weapon at the officers. That a bullet did not actually hit the victim did not negate defendant's intent. Both officers feared for their lives and took cover to avoid being hit. Affirmed.
Full Text Opinion	Issues: Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Dendel; Denial of motion for an evidentiary hearing; People v. Ginther; People v. Unger; Failure to request that K's plea agreement be unsealed and to call witnesses as to the plea agreement; People v. Davenport; Failure to request prior statements of witnesses; Failure to object to hearsay and "other acts" evidence; People v. Pickens; Whether the failure to produce the requested plea agreement details violated Brady v. Maryland; People v. Cox; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v. Bennett; "Civic duty" argument; People v. Bahoda; Sentencing; People v. Abramski; People v. Smith; People v. Babcock
Case Name: People v. Laginess
e-Journal Number: 53784
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Talbot and Wilder; Concurring in result only - Stephens
In this case where the defendant was convicted by a jury of acceptance of a bribe by a public official, the court held inter alia, that the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming and that the difficulty of explaining the $5,000 in his account around the same date as the alleged bribe occurred made the case difficult for defense counsel. Based on the record presented the court could not conclude in light of all the circumstances, that trial counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" and defendant made no showing that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. The criminal conduct in this case occurred during a time when defendant was a member of a City Council. For several weeks, the City Council was involved in the process of choosing a new healthcare provider for city employees and retirees. Several different companies were bidding on the contract and making presentations to the mayor and council as part of the bidding process. The prosecution alleged that defendant accepted a $5,000 bribe from K, a representative of one of the bidding companies in exchange for his vote to award that vendor the contract. K testified that he paid defendant $5,000 to vote in favor of awarding the contract to his company. K also testified that before a City Council vote, he met defendant behind a bar near city hall and gave him $5,000 cash in an envelope. Defendant, who had earlier been adamantly opposed to awarding K's company the contract, ultimately voted to do just that. Defendant testified that he had changed his mind based on advice from several people, including several city attorneys. On appeal, defendant contended among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to move to unseal K's plea agreement, in spite of the fact that counsel was aware of at least some of the details of the plea agreement. Defendant argued that counsel should have to unseal the plea agreement so that he would know the "parameters" and extent of K's cooperation and "the considerations he may have been getting for it." The prosecution contended that it disclosed the terms of the plea agreement to defense counsel. The record showed that trial counsel used the agreement to impeach K's testimony at some length. During cross-examination trial counsel also questioned K about the parameters of the agreement. Also, from the trial record, counsel was aware K received concurrent five year sentences for some of the counts to which he pleaded guilty. At trial, the jury heard K admit that he had about 13 convictions including at least 3 for embezzlement and 2 for failing to file his income taxes with intent to defraud, and 1 for false pretenses. Trial counsel also impeached K regarding the terms of the plea agreement. Thus, the court could not find that the alleged error of defense counsel deprived him of a substantial defense. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing. Affimed.
Issues: Local regulation of septage waste; Part 117 of the Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)(MCL 324.110701 et seq.); Whether NREPA Part 117 preempted the defendant-Township's ordinance requiring septage service providers to deliver all septic tank waste collected in the Township for treatment at a specified county facility; MCL 324.11715(1); MCL 324.11708; Ordinance preemption; People v. Llewellyn; Enforcement of the Legislature's unambiguously stated intent to permit local regulation within certain parameters; Johnson v. Recca; Michigan Septic Tank Association (MSTA)
Case Name: Gmoser's Septic Serv., LLC v. Charter Twp. of E. Bay
e-Journal Number: 53974
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Fitzgerald, Meter, and M.J. Kelly Since the defendant-Township's ordinance imposed stricter requirements on the disposal of septage taken from within the Township than NREPA Part 117, the court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Part 117 did not preempt the Township's ordinance. The intervening plaintiff-MSTA argued that Part 117 preempted the Township's ordinance requiring septage service providers to deliver all septic tank waste collected from within the Township for treatment at the septage treatment facility operated by the defendant-County through the defendant-County Board of Public Works. The trial court concluded that the ordinance was specifically authorized under MCL 324.11715(1) and thus, not preempted under Part 117. The court noted that the Township's Septage Control Ordinance directly conflicted with the Legislature's statutory scheme in several respects and as such, "courts would typically infer that the Legislature intended to preempt the Township's ordinance." However, this was "not a typical case." While the Legislature "enacted a comprehensive and statewide scheme for the regulation of septage servicers and the disposal of septage, it also specifically limited the preemptive effect of its statutory scheme." In MCL 324.11715(1), the Legislature provided that "Part 117 does 'not preempt an ordinance of a governmental unit that prohibits the application of septage waste to land within that governmental unit or otherwise imposes stricter requirements than this part.'" Thus, it expressed a clear policy choice - "if a local government adopts an ordinance that conflicts with the Legislature's statutory scheme, that ordinance will not be preempted if it is a qualified ban on land application or if it imposes stricter requirements on septage disposal than that stated under the statutory scheme." Under the Township's ordinance, "the servicer's duty to dispose of septage at a receiving facility is triggered whenever the servicer takes septage from any location within the Township," and the servicer can only satisfy its duty by hauling the septage to a specific receiving facility - the one operated by the County. The ordinance did not lessen the duty imposed by the state regulatory scheme. Rather, it "requires servicers to always use a receiving facility and to use the specific receiving facility designated by the Township. These requirements are plainly stricter than that imposed by the Legislature in Part 117 - the requirements have a stricter trigger for the duty to use a receiving facility and a stricter method for complying with that duty." Thus, the requirements were not preempted by Part 117. The court affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendants summary disposition on the MSTA's preemption claim. Full Text Opinion	Insurance
Issues: Automobile negligence; Action for first-party benefits and third-party negligence; Whether plaintiff was an "innocent" party; Whether fraud or misrepresentation in the application process can serve as a defense to plaintiff's claims; Hammoud v. Metro Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.; Roberts v. Titan Ins. Co. (On Reconsideration) Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Price v. McCullough
e-Journal Number: 53823
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Ronayne Krause, Cavanagh, and Boonstra The court held that a trier of fact could conclude that plaintiff was complicit in his mother's misrepresentations to obtain insurance coverage at a favorable rate and thus, was actively involved in defrauding defendant-Auto Club. Thus, the court held that because there are genuine questions of material fact, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to plaintiff. Plaintiff was driving a 1996 car that collided with a vehicle driven by defendant-McCullough. The car was insured by Auto Club through a policy procured by his mother, S. The car was titled and registered to S, who lived in Clinton Township. Plaintiff lived in Detroit. S was the only driver listed on the policy. Plaintiff and S both claimed that plaintiff's use of the vehicle was limited and that the vehicle was garaged at S's residence. However, these claims conflicted with records from an interlock device that plaintiff had installed on the car because of restrictions on his license as a result of "drinking and driving." The interlock device was installed on the vehicle in 2008, and remained there until after the accident. In order to operate the vehicle, plaintiff had to blow into the device periodically. S testified in her deposition that she operated the vehicle only when plaintiff was a passenger. Ultimately, in response to defendants' motion for summary disposition, plaintiff admitted that his and his mother's deposition testimony "establish[ed] that Plaintiff was the only one whom [sic] drove the vehicle while the interlock device was on the vehicle[.]" The records from the interlock device showed an average of more than 10 engine starts a day. Plaintiff brought this action for first-party benefits against Auto Club and a third-party negligence claim against McCullough. The sole issue on appeal concerned whether fraud or misrepresentation in the application process could serve as a defense to plaintiff's claims. The trial court agreed with plaintiff that because any misrepresentations were made by S and not by plaintiff personally, plaintiff was an "innocent" party and Auto Club could not use the misrepresentations as a basis for rescinding the policy. There was no dispute that plaintiff did not personally make any misrepresentations to Auto Club. However, a party is not necessarily "innocent" as to a misrepresentation solely because he or she did not personally and directly utter it. Applying the law as stated in Hammoud and Roberts, a party's "innocence" does not depend on whether the party directly made misrepresentations to the insurer. Here, Auto Club's adjuster testified that plaintiff stated that S purchased the car for him and insured it for him. Plaintiff stated that S was helping him out because he was a student and he could not afford his own vehicle. Reversed and remanded.
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Fitzgerald, Meter, and M.J. Kelly Since the defendant-Township's ordinance imposed stricter requirements on the disposal of septage taken from within the Township than NREPA Part 117, the court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Part 117 did not preempt the Township's ordinance. The intervening plaintiff-MSTA argued that Part 117 preempted the Township's ordinance requiring septage service providers to deliver all septic tank waste collected from within the Township for treatment at the septage treatment facility operated by the defendant-County through the defendant-County Board of Public Works. The trial court concluded that the ordinance was specifically authorized under MCL 324.11715(1) and thus, not preempted under Part 117. The court noted that the Township's Septage Control Ordinance directly conflicted with the Legislature's statutory scheme in several respects and as such, "courts would typically infer that the Legislature intended to preempt the Township's ordinance." However, this was "not a typical case." While the Legislature "enacted a comprehensive and statewide scheme for the regulation of septage servicers and the disposal of septage, it also specifically limited the preemptive effect of its statutory scheme." In MCL 324.11715(1), the Legislature provided that "Part 117 does 'not preempt an ordinance of a governmental unit that prohibits the application of septage waste to land within that governmental unit or otherwise imposes stricter requirements than this part.'" Thus, it expressed a clear policy choice - "if a local government adopts an ordinance that conflicts with the Legislature's statutory scheme, that ordinance will not be preempted if it is a qualified ban on land application or if it imposes stricter requirements on septage disposal than that stated under the statutory scheme." Under the Township's ordinance, "the servicer's duty to dispose of septage at a receiving facility is triggered whenever the servicer takes septage from any location within the Township," and the servicer can only satisfy its duty by hauling the septage to a specific receiving facility - the one operated by the County. The ordinance did not lessen the duty imposed by the state regulatory scheme. Rather, it "requires servicers to always use a receiving facility and to use the specific receiving facility designated by the Township. These requirements are plainly stricter than that imposed by the Legislature in Part 117 - the requirements have a stricter trigger for the duty to use a receiving facility and a stricter method for complying with that duty." Thus, the requirements were not preempted by Part 117. The court affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendants summary disposition on the MSTA's preemption claim. Full Text Opinion	Negligence & Intentional Tort
This summary also appears under Banking
Full Text Opinion	This summary also appears under Tax
Issues: Claim involving the Michigan Condominium Act (MCA)(MCL 559.101 et seq.); Whether the trial court had jurisdiction; Paulson v. Secretary of State; In re Wayne Cnty. Treasurer; Statutory interpretation; MCL 205.731(a) (granting the Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT) exclusive and original jurisdiction over certain matters); MCL 205.707 (real property involved in a petition for foreclosure); MCL 211.78k(2) & (3)(correctness of the property's unpaid taxes); In re Petition of Wayne Cnty. Treasurer for Foreclosure; Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. China Twp.; In re Petition for Foreclosure; Whether the validity of the tax at issue depended on whether the subject property is a general common element or an individual condo unit; MCL 559.231(1); MCL 559.104; MCL 559.107(2); MCL 559.106(5); Whether the property at issue is a nontaxable common element; Paris Meadows, LLC v. City of Kentwood Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: In re Petition of Emmet Cnty. Treasurer for Foreclosure
e-Journal Number: 53793
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Sawyer, Markey, and Whitbeck
The court held that Paris Meadows supported its conclusion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the respondent-Condo Association (CA)'s claim that the subject property was a nontaxable general common element. The petitioner-County Treasurer filed a petition for foreclosure in the trial court identifying the properties forfeited for unpaid taxes. The petition described the property as a detached garage owned by the CA. The CA filed an objection to the petition claiming that the delinquent taxes were invalid because the property was a detached garage owned by the CA and that the delinquent tax was illegally levied. Nothing in the record established that the property was leased or assigned to any unit of the CA during the taxation period. The trial court held a hearing and held that the property did not qualify as a limited common element but was a "general common element, the value of which needed to be spread across all of the units in the CA." The trial court dismissed the foreclosure petition. The court concluded that resolution of the case required the reconciliation of two conflicting statutes. On one hand, MCL 205.731(a) grants the MTT exclusive and original jurisdiction over a "proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency related to assessment, valuation rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization under the property laws of this state." The authority of "the MTT is effective notwithstanding the provisions of any statute, charter, or law to the contrary." Under MCL 205.707, if a person claiming an interest in a parcel of property identified in a petition for tax foreclosure challenges the validity or correctness of that property's unpaid taxes, MCL 211.78K(2) & (3) grants the trial court authority to hear the objections. The court recently addressed the apparent conflict between the statutory jurisdiction of the trial court and that of the MTT in In re Petition of Wayne Cnty., where the court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over tax forfeiture challenges that do not require any findings of fact - the trial court has jurisdiction of such cases that require only a construction of law. Here, the validity of the tax at issue depended on whether the property is a common element or an individual condo unit. The MCA mandates that "[s]pecial assessment and property taxes" be "assessed against the individual condo units . . . and not the total property of the project or any other part of the project . . . ." The MCA defines "limited common elements" as a "portion of the common elements reserved in the master deed for the exclusive use of less than all of the co-owners," and "general common elements" as "the common elements other than the limited common elements." The court held that the MTT had exclusive jurisdiction in this tax dispute. Respondent challenged the assessment of a tax to a particular parcel of property. The determination of whether the property was improperly assessed as an individual condo unit, was an issue that fell within the MTT's jurisdiction, not that of the trial court. Reversed.
Issues: Docket No. 308914 - Termination of the respondent-mother's parental rights as to six of her children under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), (3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if children are returned); In re Fried; In re Terry; In re Utrera; In re Rood; In re Mason; Docket No. 310219 - Termination of respondent's parental rights as to another child under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (3)(j); In re Smith; Anticipatory neglect; In re AH
Case Name: In re Gill/Mingo/Williams/Mingo-Williams
e-Journal Number: 53835
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Whitbeck, Saad, and Shapiro Holding that the DHS made sufficient efforts to reunite the respondent-mother with her seven minor children, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights. In Docket No. 308914, respondent argued that DHS's services were inadequate because they did not adequately address her "long-standing depression issues." However, the record clearly indicated that respondent received individual and group therapy over a period of several years to address her mental health issues. She complained that "[t]here is no indication that the petitioner made a referral for [her] to receive a psychiatric assessment to determine whether psychotropic medications would ease her depression." However, the record clearly showed that respondent was referred for a psychological evaluation. She did not argue that further assessment might have concluded that drug therapy was warranted. Further, she testified at trial that she was satisfied with the absence of medication and that she has been able to cope with her depression by adding recreational activities to her schedule - by going to the movies or a restaurant. As to Docket No. 310219, respondent correctly observed that the only services provided by DHS were the attempts to schedule hospital visitations with the newborn. However, "[p]ursuant to MCL 712A.19a(2)(c), the prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a child's sibling is a circumstance under which reasonable efforts to reunite the child and family need not be made." Respondent's parental rights in Docket No. 308914 were terminated on 1/27/12, and her parental rights in Docket No. 310219 were terminated on 4/2/12. Also, §§ 19b(3)(i) provides that "[t]he court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . [p]arental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect . . . and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful." Here, the trial court stated - "[A]nd I do have to go back again to the prior termination regarding her other children, that this just shows to the Court that she is going to be unable to provide any kind of care, this little guy needs chronic care, 24/7 care, in and out of the hospital." Respondent failed to show error on the part of the trial court.
Full Text Opinion	Issues: Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); In re Trejo Minors; The children's best interests; In re Mason
Case Name: In re Walker/McIntyre
e-Journal Number: 53847
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Ronayne Krause, Cavanagh, and Boonstra The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-mother's parental rights to her two minor children where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and termination was in the children's best interests. Respondent argued that her tardy participation in court-ordered services was sufficient evidence to preclude the trial court from finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statutory grounds were satisfied. She also argued that she was attempting to find housing and secure employment. However, as the trial court noted, the conditions that led to this adjudication were respondent's homelessness, unemployment, substance abuse, and her abandonment of the children to her mother's care for extended periods of time. Further, despite repeated attempts by the DHS to assist respondent, she persistently failed to participate in the numerous offered services, continued to use marijuana, and failed to visit the children. She also was involved in several legal problems during the pendency of this action, including that she was incarcerated for a period of time, was subject to an arrest warrant for probation violations - which she ignored for several months, and was ticketed for driving on a suspended license. Respondent also remained homeless and unemployed. Affirmed.
Issues: Declaratory relief; Whether appellee-Mark Perry's suit for declaratory relief constituted a challenge to the Trust within the meaning of the Trust's forfeiture clause - (aka a "terror clause") (Section 4.4); In re Reisman Trust; Farr v. Whitefield; The Michigan Trust Act; MCL 700.7113; In re Kostin; Saier v. Saier; Shavers v. Attorney Gen.; Jurisdiction; Federated Ins. Co. v. Oakland Cnty. Rd. Comm'n; MCR 7.203(A); MCL 700.7801, MCL 700.7812, MCL 700.7901, and MCL 700.7902
Case Name: In re Miller Osborne Perry Trust
e-Journal Number: 53973
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Fitzgerald, Meter, and M.J. Kelly The court held, inter alia, that appellee-Mark Perry's suit for declaratory relief did not constitute a challenge to the Trust as stated in the Trust's terror clause under Section 4.4. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant-Susan Perry's request to have Mark's interest forfeited. Miller Osborne Perry established the Trust in 1/93. Susan Perry, acting as the trustee for the Trust, is Miller's daughter and Mark's aunt. Miller died in 3/10. After discovering evidence that his aunt may have had a questionable influence over Miller during his final years, Mark petitioned the trial court for declaratory relief. Specifically, he asked the trial court to determine whether he had "probable cause" to challenge the Trust's 2006 amendments under MCL 700.7113. Susan asked the trial court to find that Mark's request for declaratory relief constituted a "contest" of the Trust under Section 4.4 thus, triggering the terror clause. The trial court denied Mark's request for a declaratory judgment, but also found that his petition was not a contest or challenge under Section 4.4. Under Section 4.4, Miller did not provide that a beneficiary would forfeit his or her right under the Trust if the beneficiary filed any legal action - however tangentially related to the Trust. Instead, he provided that only a beneficiary who contests or challenges the Trust's admission to probate or who challenges a provision will forfeit his or her rights under the Trust. With his suit, Mark stated that he was not challenging the Trust itself. Also, in his allegations, he did not ask the trial court to pass judgment on any term within the Trust, did not allege that the terror clause was actually invalid, and did not seek monetary relief. He did, however, ask the trial court to order that "the existence of probable cause renders unenforceable the terror clause" in his prayer for relief. Because he stated in the body of his petition that he was not actually challenging the Trust - and the terror clause is a provision in the Trust - the trial court would have no authority to grant the requested relief. Thus, this request did not transform his petition into a legal challenge to the Trust. When the petition was examined as a whole, it was clear that Mark asked the trial court to examine his evidence and determine whether that evidence would give him probable cause - as that phrase is understood under MCL 700.7113 - if he were to challenge the Trust. That was, he essentially posed a hypothetical scenario to the trial court and asked it to advise him about the probable application of a statute - MCL 700.7113 - to his proposed scenario. For that reason, he likely failed to allege a justiciable controversy. The only question before the court was whether the trial court properly found that Mark's petition did not amount to a challenge that triggered the terror clause. When his petition was read as a whole, the court held that it was clear that Mark did not actually challenge the Trust in any of the ways specified under the terror clause. Affirmed.