Source: http://openjurist.org/395/us/62
Timestamp: 2015-08-30 10:27:36
Document Index: 48165350

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 252', '§ 252', '§ 243', '§ 253', '§ 252', '§ 242', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 243', '§ 242', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 243']

395 US 62 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic | OpenJurist
395 U.S. 62 - Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic Home
395 US 62 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic 395 U.S. 62
89 S.Ct. 1519
23 L.Ed.2d 101
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Petitioner,v.Veljko STANISIC.
See 395 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 2125.
Joseph J. Connolly, Washington, D.C., for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
G. Bernhard Fedde, Portland, Or., for respondent.
This case involves the type of hearing to which an alien crewman is entitled on his claim that he would suffer persecution upon deportation to his native land. The Court of Appeals, 9 Cir., 393 F.2d 539, sustained the respondent crewman's contention that he must be heard by a special inquiry officer1 in a proceeding conducted under § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 Petitioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, argues that respondent's claim was properly heard and determined by a district director.3 We brought the case here, 393 U.S. 912, 89 S.Ct. 235, 21 L.Ed.2d 197 (1968), to resolve the conflict on this score between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (1967).
Respondent, a national of Yugoslavia, was a crewman aboard the Yugoslav vessel, M/V Sumadija, when it docked at Coos Bay, Oregon, in late December 1964. He requested and was issued a 'D—1' conditional landing permit, in accordance with 8 CFR § 252.1(d)(1) and § 252(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.4 Under these provisions, the Service may allow a nonimmigrant alien crewman temporary shore leave for
Section 252(b) makes no express exception for an alien whose deportation would subject him to persecution. However, § 243(h) permits the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of any alien to a country in which he would be subject to persecution, and analogously, 8 CFR § 253.1(e) then provided:5
Respondent immediately sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon,6 which, without opinion, temporarily stayed his deportation and referred the matter back to the District Director for a hearing on the merits of respondent's claim. On January 25, 1965, after a hearing at which respondent was represented by counsel and presented evidence, the District Director held that respondent 'has (not) shown that he would be physically persecuted if he were to return to Yugoslavia.' Appendix 22.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Stanisic v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 393 F.2d 539 (1968), holding that the matter was not res judicata because of a significant change of circumstances: the District Director's adverse determination in 1965, and the District Court's unappealed approval thereof, were based on the unstated premise that the M/V Sumadija was still in port;7 but now the ship had long since sal ed, and respondent still had not been deported. The court held that § 252(b) only authorized respondent's 'summary deportation aboard the vessel on which he arrived or, within a very limited time after that vessel's departure, aboard another vessel pursuant to arrangements made before * * * (his) vessel departed.' 393 F.2d, at 542—543. Since neither of these conditions was met, respondent could no longer be deported pursuant to the District Director's 1965 determination; he was entitled to a de novo hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242(b) of the Act.
At the outset, it is important to recognize the distinction between a determination whether an alien is statutorily deportable something never contested by respondent—and a determination whether to grant political asylum to an otherwise properly deportable alien.
Section 242(b) provides a generally applicable procedure 'for determining the deportability of an alien * * *.' Section 252(b) provides a specific procedure for the deportation of alien crewmen holding D—1 landing permits. Neither of these sections is concerned with the granting of asylum.
No statute prescribes by what delegate of the Attorney General, or pursuant to what procedure, relief shall be granted under these provisions. By regulation, the decision to grant parole pursuant to § 212(d)(5) rests with a district director, 8 CFR §§ 212.5(a), 253.2; and by regulation, the decision to withhold deportation of most aliens pursuant to § 243(h) is presently made by a special inquiry officer.8 8 CFR §§ 242.8(a), 242.17(c).
Prior to 1960, no regulation provided relief to an alien crewman whose D—1 landing permit was revoked but who claimed that return to his country would subject him to persecution. In United States ex rel. Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F.Supp. 491 (1960), a district court held that a crewman in this situation was entitled to be heard. The Service responded by promulgating 8 CFR § 253.1(e), supra, at 67, the regulation which it applied in the case at bar. 8 CFR § 253.1(e) is a hybrid. The grounds for relief are, for present purposes, identical to those of § 243(h) of the Act.9 However, because the Service adheres to the view that a crewman whose D—1 permit has been revoked is not 'within the United States' in the technical sense of that phrase, see Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958), it terms