Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/852/290/451019/
Timestamp: 2019-07-20 07:59:28
Document Index: 241399765

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1400', '§ 1415', '§ 1412', '§ 794', '§ 794', '§ 1412']

Ronald Lachman and Mary Ann Lachman, on Behalf of Benjaminlachman, a Minor, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Illinois State Board of Education; East Maine Schooldistrict 63; and Maine Township Special Educationprogram, Defendants-appellees, 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988) :: Justia
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Ronald Lachman and Mary Ann Lachman, on Behalf of Benjaminlachman, a Minor, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Illinois State Board of Education; East Maine Schooldistrict 63; and Maine Township Special Educationprogram, Defendants-appellees, 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988)
Argued Feb. 11, 1988. Decided July 18, 1988
Benjamin Lachman is a profoundly deaf seven-year-old child who resides within the district boundaries of the East Maine, Illinois School District No. 63 ("the school district"). The school district is a member of the Maine Township Special Education Program ("MSTEP") and through MSTEP contracts with Northern Suburban Special Education District to provide services for its hearing-impaired students through a Regional Hearing Impaired Program ("RHIP"). Since the time Benjamin became eligible for participation in the RHIP pre-school program, in September, 1984, his parents and the school district have disagreed as to the manner in which his education should be facilitated. That disagreement eventually led the Lachmans to initiate this private cause of action as provided for by Sec. 615(e) (2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 ("EAHCA" or "the Act").1
The district court fashioned its analysis along the lines of the Supreme Court's interpretation, in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District Board of Education, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982), of the procedural and substantive requirements imposed by the EAHCA. The critical portion of the district court's substantive analysis is set forth below.
It is well established that in reviewing the outcomes reached through the Secs. 1415(b) and (c) administrative appeals procedure, a district court is to make an independent decision as to whether the requirements of the Act have been satisfied. That decision is to be based on a preponderance of the evidence, giving due weight to the results of those state administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2). See School Board of the County of Prince William, Virginia v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S. Ct. at 3051). See also Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1986); Bonadonna v. Copperman, 619 F. Supp. 401, 407-08 (D.N.J. 1985); Flavin v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 553 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D. Conn. 1982). The district court's determination that the IEP proposed for Benjamin by the school district constituted a free appropriate public education as required by the EAHCA is founded on its application of the relevant provisions of the Act to the facts attendant to Benjamin's circumstance. We review the determination of that mixed question of law and fact de novo. See Bryan v. Warden, Indiana State Reformatory, 820 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Shaw v. De Robertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Scarpelli v. George, 687 F.2d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Gregory v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1987) ("whether the school district's proposed IEP was a 'free appropriate public education' as required by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act is a mixed question that we review de novo "); Wilson v. Marana Unified School District No. 6 of Pima County, 735 F.2d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1984).
The district court correctly ascertained that Rowley, supra, is the definitive Supreme Court pronouncement to date as to the standards a school district must meet in order to satisfy its Sec. 1412(1) obligation to provide all handicapped students with a free appropriate public education. In Rowley, the Court directed the lower courts to engage in the following two-part inquiry in suits, like the present one, brought under Sec. 615(e) (2) of the Act.
First, [the court must inquire whether] the State has complied with the procedures set forth in the Act [.] And second, [the court must ask] is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.
458 U.S. at 207, 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (footnotes omitted). Appellants do not contend that the appellee education officials failed to comply with the procedures set forth in the Act.4 Accordingly, we need not address the first part of the Rowley test. In determining whether the IEP proposed by the school district secures to Benjamin the right to a free appropriate free public education guaranteed him by Sec. 612(1) of the Act, our analysis will be limited to the second Rowley inquiry.
Examination of the district court opinion reveals that it considered the focal point of the disagreement between the Lachmans and the school district to be a question of whether Benjamin's education can best be facilitated by utilization of the cued speech technique or the total communication concept. The Lachmans dispute that inference by the district court. They perceive that the outcome-determinative question in this case is whether the challenged IEP fails to satisfy the Act's Sec. 612(5) requirement that "to the maximum extent appropriate" Benjamin, as a handicapped child, be "educated with children who are not handicapped," and that he be removed from the regular classroom environment and placed in a special class only to the extent that "the nature or severity of [his] handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B).5
In Rowley, the Supreme Court was not directly confronted with a claim that the Sec. 1412(5) (B) mainstreaming goal had not been satisfied. In that opinion, the Court made only a passing reference to the "preference" for mainstreaming handicapped children reflected in Sec. 612(5) (B) of the Act. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202-03, 102 S. Ct. at 3049. Thus, the Lachmans claim that the district court erred because, in applying the Rowley test for satisfaction of the Act's general (Sec. 612(1)) requirement that Benjamin be provided a free appropriate public education, it failed to adequately address the issues raised by the Sec. 1412(5) (B) preference for mainstreaming handicapped children. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202-03, 102 S. Ct. at 3049. See also Springdale School District # 50 of Washington County v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927, 103 S. Ct. 2086, 77 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983).
Rowley makes clear that "once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the State." 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S. Ct. at 3052. The mainstreaming preference articulated in Sec. 1412(5) (B) is one of the "requirements of the Act" referred to in the above excerpt from Rowley. Because the parties' disagreement as to the extent to which Benjamin is to be mainstreamed is inexorably intertwined with their disagreement as to the choice between the cued speech and total communication methodologies, we must first ascertain which of those issues, if any, predominates here.
In order to divine the true crux of the dispute that prompted the present cause of action, we must establish the nature of the mainstreaming obligation created by Sec. 1412(5) (B) and clarify the relationship of that statutory language to the general Sec. 1412(1) requirement that handicapped children be provided with a free appropriate public education. Several post-Rowley decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as well as a small number of reported district court opinions, have addressed this topic.
In Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S. Ct. 196, 78 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1983), the Sixth Circuit observed that:
The remainder of the relevant reported case law pertaining to Sec. 1412(5) (B) reflects a perception that the mainstreaming preference the statutory provision creates was not meant by Congress to be implemented in an unqualified manner. Instead, it is clear that the courts considering this issue have determined that the Act's mainstreaming preference is to be given effect only when it is clear that the education of the particular handicapped child can be achieved satisfactorily in the type of mainstream environment sought by the challengers to the IEP proposed for that child. See A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School District, 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 144, 98 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1987) (holding that Sec. 1412(5) "significantly qualifies the mainstreaming requirement by stating that it should be implemented 'to the maximum extent appropriate,' and that it is inapplicable where education in a mainstream environment 'cannot be achieved satisfactorily.' ") See also Mark v. Grant Wood Area Education Agency, 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S. Ct. 1579, 94 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1987) (rejecting "the view that the mainstreaming provisions of the Act are satisfied only if a handicapped child is educated in the same classroom with non-handicapped children"); Maher, 793 F.2d at 1483 ("the EAHCA does not compel localities to place handicapped students in regular education classes, but only in the least restrictive setting consistent with their needs and those of other students."); Johnston by Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502, 1508-09 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding no violation of the Act's mainstreaming goal where the transfer of a handicapped child from a regular classroom to a special education classroom was necessary and appropriate); Taylor v. Board of Education of Copake-Taconic Hills Central School District, 649 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (N.D.N.Y.1986) ("in some instances, a special facility will constitute the least restrictive environment for a particular handicapped child").
We are convinced that appellants' effort to characterize the sole, true issue in this case as whether the proposed IEP satisfies the Sec. 1412(5) (B) mainstreaming preference is misdirected. Undoubtedly, this case does present a valid question of whether the IEP proposed by the school district and affirmed by the Illinois State Board of Education would result in Benjamin being mainstreamed to the "maximum extent appropriate" as contemplated by Sec. 1412(5) (B). However, on careful examination, it becomes apparent that a determination of whether the IEP proposed for Benjamin provides for mainstreaming to the maximum extent appropriate can be made only within the context of the methodology employed to facilitate his education.
The degree to which a challenged IEP satisfies the mainstreaming goal of the EAHCA simply cannot be evaluated in the abstract. Rather, that laudable policy objective must be weighed in tandem with the Act's principal goal of ensuring that the public schools provide handicapped children with a free appropriate education. See Wilson, 735 F.2d at 1183. A major part of the task of local and state officials in fashioning what they believe to be an effective program for the education of a handicapped child is the selection of the methodology or methodologies that will be employed. "The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardians of the child." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (emphasis supplied) quoted in Northwest R-1 School District, 813 F.2d at 164.
On the facts of this case, it is clear that the Sec. 1412(5) (B) issue of mainstreaming is subsumed by the parties' disagreement as to methodology. In the absence of the parties' difference of opinion as to that question of educational methodology, there would be no disagreement between them as to the extent of mainstreaming that could presently be achieved for Benjamin. Given the nature of the disagreement between the parties and the concomitant thrust of the Lachmans' cause of action, we can only conclude that the district court did not err when it framed its substantive analysis in a manner closely tracking the Rowley opinion, without expressly addressing the Sec. 1412(5) (B) mainstreaming issue.
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable education methods upon the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents and guardians of the child.... [I]t seems highly unlikely that that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding brought pursuant to Sec. 1415(e) (2).
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08, 102 S. Ct. at 3052-53 (citation omitted). See also Hudson v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1987); Northwest R-1 School District, 813 F.2d at 164; Gregory, 811 F.2d at 1311; Rettig v. Kent City School District, 720 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1201, 104 S. Ct. 2379, 81 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1984).
The district court expressly found that defendant/appellee education officials had complied with the Act. Our review leads us to the same conclusion. Rowley and its progeny leave no doubt that parents, no matter how well-motivated, do not have a right under the EAHCA to compel a school district to provide a specific program or employ a specific methodology in providing for the education of their handicapped child. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S. Ct. at 3051. See also Wilson, 735 F.2d at 1178, 1182 (the states "have the power to provide handicapped children with an education they consider more appropriate than that proposed by the parents."); Northwest R-1 School District, 813 F.2d at 164; Gregory, 811 F.2d at 1311; Rettig, 720 F.2d at 466; Springdale School District # 50, 693 F.2d at 43. It is clear that the IEP proposed by the school district is based upon an accepted, proven methodology for facilitating the early primary education of profoundly hearing-impaired children. Further, nothing in the record indicates that the proposed IEP does not provide that Benjamin will be educated in a regular classroom environment to the maximum extent appropriate as required by Sec. 612(5) (B) of the Act. Given these findings, we conclude that the proposed IEP will provide Benjamin Lachman with a free appropriate public education as required by Sec. 612(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.8
Appellants' complaint also alleges violations of the Illinois School Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, p 14-8.02 and Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Appellants did not advance any substantive argument as to either statute before the district court or in their briefs submitted to this Court. The district court did not address either of these two alternate claims. "Collateral allusions to a legal issue do not require the court to decide difficult questions." Bonds v. Coca Cola Co., 806 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1986), quoted in Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1988). " [A]n issue expressly presented for resolution is waived if not developed by argument." Anderson, 836 F.2d at 349 (citing Hunter v. Allis Chalmers, 797 F.2d 1417, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986)). Because of appellants' failure to offer any substantive argument or case law citation in support of their assertion that a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794 has transpired, we can only deem that claim to have been waived. Further, because we have before us no additional argument pertaining to the provision of the Illinois School Code cited by appellants, we cannot engage in a separate analysis of the Lachmans' state law claim
Appellants also cite to the regulations of the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Department of Education, 34 C.F.R. Secs. 300.550-556, promulgated under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B). Those regulations are intended to ensure that the states satisfy the mainstreaming preference articulated by Sec. 1412(5) (B) by providing for the education of handicapped children in the least restrictive environment possible
Roncker also cites the cost of providing the services necessary to facilitate the education of a handicapped child in a non-segregated environment as a relevant consideration in determining whether, in a particular case, the Act's mainstreaming preference has been satisfied. Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). The school district has not raised cost as a defense here. Therefore, we need not consider that factor in our analysis
Appellants' contention that the IEP proposed for their son by the school district reflects a philosophical disagreement with the mainstreaming objective of Sec. 1412(5) (B) is not supported by the evidence. The challenged IEP calls for Benjamin to be placed in a regular classroom, fully-mainstreamed environment for approximately half or nearly half of the school day. During the time he is not fully mainstreamed, Benjamin is to be placed in a self-contained classroom within a regular school. The Act's preference for mainstreaming does not require that a school district reject intermediate degrees of mainstreaming when such a placement is otherwise justified by a handicapped child's educational needs. See Wilson v. Marana School District No. 6 of Pima County, 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the school district's unwillingness to fully mainstream Benjamin at this time rests squarely on its policy determination that, at the current time, his education can best be facilitated through use of the total communication methodology