Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/695/765/443516/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 17:53:28
Document Index: 43923479

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 784', '§ 1962', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 1961', '§ 1963']

United States of America v. Dickens, Albert, Appellant.united States of America v. Pittman, Fred, Jr., Appellant.united States of America v. Washington, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Persons, Lonnie, Appellant.united States of America v. Upshaw, Dewey, Appellant.united States of America v. Cooper, Robert, Robert Cooper, A/k/a Mubarak Rai Ali, Appellant.united States of America v. Monroe, Keith, Appellant.united States of America v. Conerly, Alvin, Alvin Conerly, Also Known As Hijr, Appellant.united States of America v. Lawson, Willie Lee, Willie Lee Lawson, A/k/a Acqueel, Appellant.united States of America v. Grey, Claude, Ahmed Muhammad, A/k/a Claude Grey, Appellant.united States of America v. Skinner, Raymond, Raymond Skinner, Also Known As Rafeeq, Appellant.united States of America v. Thompson, Walton Earl, Appellant.united States of America v. Clark, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Brunson, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Kreps, Sheldon, Appellant.united States of America v. Moses, Rosco, Appellant.united States of America v. Dickens, Ronald, Appellant, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1983 › United States of America v. Dickens, Albert, Appellant.united States of America v. Pittman, Fred, Jr...
United States of America v. Dickens, Albert, Appellant.united States of America v. Pittman, Fred, Jr., Appellant.united States of America v. Washington, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Persons, Lonnie, Appellant.united States of America v. Upshaw, Dewey, Appellant.united States of America v. Cooper, Robert, Robert Cooper, A/k/a Mubarak Rai Ali, Appellant.united States of America v. Monroe, Keith, Appellant.united States of America v. Conerly, Alvin, Alvin Conerly, Also Known As Hijr, Appellant.united States of America v. Lawson, Willie Lee, Willie Lee Lawson, A/k/a Acqueel, Appellant.united States of America v. Grey, Claude, Ahmed Muhammad, A/k/a Claude Grey, Appellant.united States of America v. Skinner, Raymond, Raymond Skinner, Also Known As Rafeeq, Appellant.united States of America v. Thompson, Walton Earl, Appellant.united States of America v. Clark, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Brunson, James, Appellant.united States of America v. Kreps, Sheldon, Appellant.united States of America v. Moses, Rosco, Appellant.united States of America v. Dickens, Ronald, Appellant, 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 695 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1983)
Argued Oct. 18, 1982. Decided Dec. 15, 1982. As Amended Jan. 27, 1983
In November of 1981 a jury convicted all 17 defendants of numerous violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). In this appeal, defendants challenge their convictions and claim that the Government drafted and prosecuted the indictment in a manner calculated to "chill" their First Amendment rights. They also contend that the district court erred in failing to question each prospective juror concerning his attitude toward Black Muslims and brutal murders of law enforcement officers, in failing to instruct the jury that the defendants' race and religion were irrelevant and impermissible factors to consider during jury deliberations, and in failing to compel each of their lawyers to participate in the trial, even though the defendants had specifically directed their lawyers to do nothing. Several defendants have also raised issues pertaining only to them. After careful review of the record in light of applicable law, we affirm.
The First Amendment, which guarantees individuals freedom of conscience and prohibits governmental interference with religious beliefs, does not shield from government scrutiny practices which imperil public safety, peace or order. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637 (1890).11 For example, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878), the Supreme Court, denying Mormons exemption from anti-bigamy laws, held that overtly criminal conduct could not be justified as religious practices. See also United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977) (no exception in Hobbs Act to sanction extortions committed for religious purposes).12
On the other hand, although the Government has a compelling interest in enforcing its criminal laws and vindicating violations thereof, where that purpose directly or indirectly imposes a substantial burden upon protected First Amendment rights the Government must accomplish that goal with the least restrictive means. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). For example, in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967), the Government charged the defendant with a violation of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1) (D), which interdicted employment in a defense facility by anyone belonging to a "Communist-action" organization. The Supreme Court sustained the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, which it found overbroad in its proscription of legal as well as illegal association. The Court concluded:" [W]hen legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a 'less drastic' impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms."
Id. at 268, 88 S. Ct. at 425.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Government, in enforcing the RICO statute, could not have used "less restrictive" means. To secure a conviction under RICO, the Government needed to prove the existence of an "enterprise" and a connected "pattern of racketeering activity."13 An enterprise can be proved by evidence that individuals not only associated together through a formal or informal "ongoing organization" but also functioned as a "continuing unit" for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. A pattern of racketeering activity can be proved by evidence of the defendants' participation in the required number of racketeering acts committed by the enterprise. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1981). See also United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, at 923 (3d Cir. 1982) (" [t]o establish a 'pattern' of racketeering activity, the Government must prove that at least two of these acts occurred within a ten-year period").
" [I]n light of the testimony which I have heard now from ... some five witnesses, it would have been impossible for the government to present this case without any reference to the New World of Islam or to the ranks of the organization or to the roles within that organization of various people on trial here.
Although the Constitution does not require, by its explicit wording, that prospective jurors be questioned concerning possible racial or religious bias, Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S. Ct. 1017, 47 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1976), the Supreme Court, in its supervisory capacity over federal courts, has ruled that where a defendant requests such an inquiry, the trial judge should do so, Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 68 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1981), particularly where the circumstances suggest a "significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the] trial." Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 596, 96 S. Ct. at 1021. See also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S. Ct. 848, 35 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1973) (the trial court might have asked such a question in light of the defendant's contention that the indictment constituted retaliation for his civil rights activities).
In the case at bar, the defendants contend that, in light of the prior state prosecutions for the predicate offenses, the Government pressed these RICO charges as a means to try the admittedly racist New World organization. Hence, a question relating to racial prejudice would have been proper. However, at trial the defendants failed to request such a question. Coupled with the district court's general inquiries relating to bias, omitting to ask this specific question during voir dire did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. United States, 409 U.S. 915, 93 S. Ct. 247, 34 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1972) (pre-trial request for such a question must be renewed at time of voir dire).
Although the district court directed defendants to submit points for charge, defendants did not request the district court to give such an instruction then or immediately prior to jury deliberation, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. In its interpretations of this rule, this court has concluded that, unless there has been a timely objection at trial, a defendant cannot raise the issue on appeal unless he can show that the error in the instruction was "such as to involve a manifest miscarriage of justice." United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 690 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S. Ct. 440, 13 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1964). See also United States v. Grasso, 437 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920, 91 S. Ct. 2236, 29 L. Ed. 2d 698 (1971) (no "plain error"); United States v. Restaino, 405 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904, 89 S. Ct. 1012, 22 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1969) (in absence of timely objection, defendant cannot raise issue on appeal "unless he establishes that the ... charge constituted plain error"). We find no such "plain error" or "manifest miscarriage of justice" here. The district court's general instructions to the jury emphasized the importance of fairness and impartiality.16 The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give this instruction. See United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119, 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Elam v. United States, 406 U.S. 969, 92 S. Ct. 2424, 32 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1972) (burden rests upon defendants to object to error at "earliest possible opportunity").
Defendants also assign as error the district court's failure to compel defendants' counsel to participate in the trial, despite each defendant's express direction to his lawyer to the contrary. The defendants claim that the court's refusal violated the public's right to a fair trial and the defendants' rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel.17 The district court, granting the defendants' request to be absent, reasoned that requiring disruptive behavior from the defendants to justify exclusion from the courtroom made little sense but requested counsel for each defendant to remain in court throughout the trial on a "stand-by" basis. Unlike many situations, in which the defendants desire to represent themselves, the defendants in the case at bar did not wish anyone, including themselves, to represent their interests. They preferred, instead, to rely upon the presumption of innocence. Thus, cases relied upon by the defendants, dealing with lack of counsel or the parameters of self-representation, can be distinguished. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971), for example, approved the appointment of stand-by counsel for a defendant who chose to represent himself. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger, upon which defendants rely heavily, simply noted that the appointment of stand-by counsel to represent a recalcitrant defendant, whose uncensored and unrestrained exclamations to the trial judge resulted in a finding that the defendant was in contempt of court, rested within the sound discretion of the trial judge; the Sixth Amendment did not require as much. Id. at 468, 91 S. Ct. at 506. No other justice joined in this concurrence, which antedated Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).
Id. at 820-21, 95 S. Ct. at 2533 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court distinguished a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel from the state's alleged right to compel him to accept a lawyer he does not want even though
Id. at 834, 95 S. Ct. at 2540. A fortiori, if the Sixth Amendment does not require the participation of "compulsory counsel" to assist a defendant representing himself, then a defendant who validly waives the right to counsel and objects to a lawyer's involvement in his defense on First Amendment grounds cannot be forced to accept his services without transmogrifying the protection from restraint embodied in both Amendments into shackles of restraint.
Moreover, requiring counsel to have participated over the defendants' objections would have raised a host of other difficulties. In Wiggins v. Estelle, 681 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), for example, the trial court compelled the defendant, who had validly waived his right to counsel, to accept a stand-by, court-appointed public defender. Although the court permitted the defendant to represent himself, stand-by counsel forcibly interposed his unsolicited assistance into the defense to the point where the court of appeals considered the intrusion a violation of the defendant's right to represent himself. Similarly, a trial court, finding that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was "uninformed" and therefore invalid, might deny the defendant's request to represent himself, even though he claimed that his religion prevented him from accepting a lawyer's assistance. Thereafter, the defendant conceivably might bring a civil rights action in federal court against the court-appointed lawyer to recover damages and obtain equitable relief on the grounds that the unwanted legal representation had deprived him of his protected First Amendment rights.
In the case at bar, the defendants totally rejected participation in the trial in order to protect what they considered to be their First Amendment rights. They represented to the court that they perceived a conflict between the free exercise of their religion and the defense of the indictment. The district court could not simply ignore such an assertion, however much the court may have disagreed with their legal or philosophical analysis. The district court carefully advised each defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of no representation by counsel.18 See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982). The defendants admit on appeal that their waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. They clearly declared to the district court that they did not want to participate in the trial themselves or through counsel. To allow defendants to request no representation at trial and then on appeal to claim error in the court's grant thereof invites every accused haled into court to demand two trials. At the first trial he can refuse to participate, assess the prosecutor's case, await the verdict and, if unfavorable, appeal on the grounds that the court should have required his lawyer to defend him. At the second trial he can defend on the merits, having had a full preview and dress rehearsal from the first trial. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 201, 63 S. Ct. 549, 555, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943).
Having validly waived their right to the effective assistance of counsel, the defendants cannot complain now of the effect thereof. United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982). The district court properly refused to require counsel to participate after defendants had made knowing, intelligent and voluntary waivers, particularly since counsel were not restrained from pointing out possible errors affecting their clients and from moving the court to rectify such errors by appropriate instructions to the jury (see, e.g., N.T. 1155-59; 1168-71).
Defendant Cooper contends that the district court committed plain error in admitting into evidence guns which police had seized in a stairwell of the apartment building where he was staying temporarily. To prevail, Cooper must show that the search was illegal and that he had an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978). Assuming, arguendo, that Cooper's sojourn at the friend's apartment conferred upon him a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment itself, testimony clearly supported the district court's finding that the police officers discovered the weapons in a plastic bag on a staircase leading to the roof of the apartment building (N.T. 882-86). The district court found that the searched area was
Expecting privacy in a building staircase accessible to other tenants and the general public cannot be considered reasonable. In similar contexts, courts of appeals have rejected such claims of expected privacy where defendants have placed the seized evidence in public places. See, for example, United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981) (trash placed in a public area); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Gangadean v. United States, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 1645, 52 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1977) (cache of marijuana in open field); and United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 1362, 67 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1981) (aluminum foil package thrown outside apartment window onto building ledge).
A voluntary confession does not violate a defendant's due process rights. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). To be "voluntary," a confession must be the "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice ...." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961). To determine whether a confession meets this standard, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances under which the defendant made it. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 18 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1967).
In the case at bar, to establish "involuntariness," Lawson relies upon his leg wound and the length of time which elapsed between his arrest and confession. Defendant received a leg wound one week prior to his arrest. A police officer testified that the bandaged wound did not appear to need attention and that Lawson did not act as if it did. Lawson has not alleged that he asked for, and that the police denied, needed medical assistance. In addition, the lapse of nine hours between arrest and confession, alone, does not compel a finding of involuntariness. In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 1338, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1963), relied upon by Lawson, the police threatened the defendant with continued incommunicado detention and promised him access to his family only if he signed an inculpatory written statement. Lawson has made no such allegations.
The district court found Lawson's confession to be voluntary, and Lawson has not shown that finding to be clearly erroneous. See United States ex rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F.2d 1096 (3d Cir. 1970).
* Defendants Conerly, Cooper and Brunson urge that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b) the Government improperly joined them as defendants and that the district court erred in failing to sever certain counts of the indictment filed against them.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 allows the court to sever defendants or offenses which have been improperly joined in an indictment or information. The court may grant a severance when the defendant can show that the jury could not reasonably be expected to "compartmentalize" the evidence as it relates to him, United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), and that the failure to sever clearly and substantially prejudices him to the point of depriving him of a fair trial. United States v. Reicherter, supra. Where the Government charges multiple defendants with a single conspiracy, the interests of judicial economy usually favor a single trial. United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1981). The possibility that evidence will be admissible against some but not all defendants does not require severance. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914, 93 S. Ct. 233, 34 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1972).
However peripheral defendants perceive their participation, Congress intended RICO prosecutions to entrammel "even the smallest fish." United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826, 102 S. Ct. 116, 70 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1981). Neither a disparity in evidence nor the introduction of evidence more damaging to one defendant than another entitles the seemingly less culpable defendant to severance. United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. DeLarosa, supra.
Defendant Conerly has not made any showing that his co-defendants would have testified on his behalf at a separate trial. In view of their refusal to participate in their own defense, Conerly's undocumented representations to the contrary lack credibility. Such unsupported assertions do not suffice. United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1982), and United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 2248, 56 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1978).19
The Government presented some evidence linking each defendant to the conspiracy. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever these defendants. See United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832, 95 S. Ct. 56, 42 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1974).
Appellate courts, confronted with such a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, must determine whether "substantial" evidence supports the convictions. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of sustaining the jury's verdict. United States v. Sturm, supra; United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1978).
Section 1961(5) requires at least two acts of racketeering activity to comprise a "pattern" thereof. In United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S. Ct. 1484, 67 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981), this court held that the Government
The jury could have reasonably inferred from Thompson's meeting with Skinner that the two had discussed and planned the Trenton bank robbery. The jury also could have inferred that the ambiguous use of the word "they" in connection with the Miller's Rental robbery included Thompson. Admittedly, on cross-examination, these inferences may have been refuted or proven untenable. However, defendant Thompson did not test the credibility, question the accuracy or clarify the ambiguity in the testimony of Government witnesses.20 In addition, neither Brunson nor Thompson moved for judgments of acquittal and, therefore, they failed to preserve their right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the charges in the indictment. See United States v. Manos, 340 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1965). We have examined the record and, viewing the evidence against Brunson and Thompson in a light most favorable to the Government, we find no "plain error or defects affecting substantial rights." See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).21
Defendants Persons and Monroe contend that the Government failed to prove any connection between the enterprise and interstate commerce. Section 1962(c) requires that the enterprise engage in or conduct activities which affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100 S. Ct. 1015, 62 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1980). The enterprise, not the individual defendant, must be engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Joseph, 510 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1981), citing United States v. Vignola, supra. Even a minimal nexus will satisfy the statutory requirement. United States v. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1980), citing United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977). In the case at bar, testimony at trial showed that the enterprise's activities included the racketeering acts, which admittedly had an impact on interstate commerce. Therefore, the Government established the necessary connection between the enterprise and interstate commerce.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) and 1963(a)
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2
The defendants' refusal to participate also precluded the district court from conducting the inquiry mandated by Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981), which held that
18 U.S.C. § 1961.
The Sixth Amendment confers a personal right to a fair trial upon defendants, not the public at large, whose interests will be protected by the participants in the litigation. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979)
Also, we note that usually ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be raised on direct appeal. United States v. Sturm, 671 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
The decision to sever requires consideration of the likelihood of co-defendants testifying, the extent to which such testimony would be exculpatory, the extent to which the testifying co-defendant could be impeached, and judicial economy. United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Sica, 434 U.S. 862, 98 S. Ct. 191, 54 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1977)
In his brief to this court, Thompson suggests several questions which would have "cleared up this matter very easily." (Brief at 13) Thompson's refusal to participate foreclosed any opportunity for counsel to clarify the testimony by asking these questions. Cf. United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 1976) (" [a] defendant may be convicted of a substantive offense which he did not himself commit if it is clear that the offense was committed in furtherance of a conspiracy of which the defendant was a member").
Even assuming this court had adopted the rule of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that, in addition to the terms of Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), reversal may be required if there is a "manifest miscarriage of justice," see United States v. Casey, 540 F.2d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1976), this record does not demonstrate such a miscarriage of justice
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Millhouse v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S. Ct. 1256, 55 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1978), explicitly rejected this claim
Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing "substantial prejudice" occasioned by trial in the District of New Jersey. See United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855, 95 S. Ct. 101, 42 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1974). Defendants point only to newspaper articles dealing with the apprehension of several allegedly notorious subversives about the time of the trial and fail to show any connection between such articles and the instant indictment
Defendants also failed to show that these newspaper articles influenced or prejudiced the jurors against them. See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S. Ct. 267, 66 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1980). In fact, the district court specifically asked if any juror had "heard or read anything in connection with this case..." (N.T. 145)
The sentences which the district court meted out fell within the maximum allowed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (maximum fine of $25,000. or imprisonment for 20 years); section 2113(d) (maximum fine of $10,000. or imprisonment of 25 years). Therefore, the matter is not generally reviewable on appeal. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 63 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1980) (sentencing is a function traditionally vested in the trial courts).
In addition to the contentions specifically considered in this opinion, we have also considered other claims made by each defendant as listed in the attached Appendix and reject them. Several defendants attempted to raise issues by joining in all other motions "as applicable." Such a reference is insufficient to identify a claim raised on appeal. A defendant must specify the name and district court document number, if possible, of any motion in which he desires to join. United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 395 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 2020, 72 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Holt, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981), on rehearing on the issue of forfeiture, 681 F.2d 952 (1982) (en banc) ("adopt [ing] the arguments advanced by the co-defendants in support of those issues and any other issues they raised that may apply to him ... is not an appropriate challenge ..."). See also Klobuchir v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1981) (declining to reach certain issues which appellant did not present "properly or adequately" in his brief)