Source: http://openjurist.org/456/us/742
Timestamp: 2015-04-18 23:51:56
Document Index: 73391010

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 210', '§ 210', '§ 210', '§ 101', '§ 2611', '§ 3201', '§ 2621', '§ 2622', '§ 2622', '§ 2623', '§ 303', '§ 3203', '§ 113', '§ 114', '§ 2624', '§ 2621', '§ 2623', '§ 3203', '§ 2633', '§ 3207', '§ 2631', '§ 3205', '§ 2633', '§ 3207', '§ 2633', '§ 3207', '§ 2621', '§ 3203', '§ 2627', '§ 3208', '§ 824', '§ 210', '§ 4', '§ 1252', '§ 2', '§ 2601', '§ 2601', '§ 210', '§ 824', '§ 824', '§ 292', '§ 77', '§ 210']

456 US 742 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi | OpenJurist
456 U.S. 742 - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi	Home456 us 742 federal energy regulatory commission v. mississippi
456 US 742 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi 456 U.S. 742
102 S.Ct. 2126
72 L.Ed.2d 532
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, et al., Appellants,v.MISSISSIPPI et al.
No. 80-1749.
See 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 15.
(a) To assert that PURPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not regulate "commerce," or because it does not have "a substantial effect" on such activity, disregards the specific congressional finding in § 2 of PURPA that the regulated activities do have an immediate effect on interstate commerce. Pp. 754-755.
(b) The legislative history amply supports the congressional conclusion that limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas, and of the relationships between cogenerators and electric utilities, was essential to protect interstate commerce and the Nation's economy. Pp. 756-758. 2. The challenged provisions do not trench on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Pp. 758-771.
(a) Insofar as § 210 authorizes the FERC to exempt qualified power facilities from state laws and regulations, it does nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way. Because of the substantial interstate effect of such activity, Congress may pre-empt the States completely in the regulation of retail sales by electric and gas utilities and of transactions between such utilities and cogenerators. With respect to § 210's requirement that state authorities implement FERC's rules, the statute and its implementing regulations simply require state commissions to settle disputes arising under the statute, the very type of adjudicatory activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967. Pp.759-761.
(b) The "mandatory consideration" provisions of Titles I and III do not involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi's sovereign powers or set a mandatory agenda to be considered in all events by state legislative or administrative decisionmakers, but simply establish requirements for continued state activity in an otherwise pre-emptible field. Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2389, 69 L.Ed.2d 1. Pp. 761-770.
(c) Similarly, the procedural requirements of Titles I and III do not compel the exercise of a State's sovereign power or purport to set standards to be followed in all areas of the state commission's endeavors. If Congress may require a state administrative body to consider proposed federal regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field, it may require the use of certain procedural minima during that body's deliberations on the subject. Pp.770-771
Sol. Gen. Rex E. Lee, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Alex A. Alston, Jr., Jackson, Miss., for appellees.
[Amicus Curiae Information from page 744-745 intentionally omitted]
In this case, appellees successfully challenged the constitutionality of Titles I and III, and of § 210 of Title II, of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA or Act). We conclude that appellees' challenge lacks merit and we reverse the judgment below.
* On November 9, 1978, President Carter signed PURPA into law.1 The Act was part of a package of legislation,2 approved the same day, designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.
At the time, it was said that the generation of electricity consumed more than 25% of all energy resources used in the United States. S.Rep.No.95-442, p. 7 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 7659. Approximately one-third of the electricity in this country was generated through use of oil and natural gas, and electricity generation was one of the fastest growing segments of the Nation's economy. S.Rep.No.95-361, p. 32 (1977). In part because of their reliance on oil and gas, electricity utilities were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency in the use of their generating capacities; each of these factors had an adverse effect on rates to consumers and on the economy as a whole. S.Rep.No.95-442, at 9. Congress accordingly determined that conservation by electricity utilities of oil and natural gas was essential to the success of any effort to lessen the country's dependence on foreign oil, to avoid a repetition of the shortage of natural gas that had been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs.
PURPA's Titles I and III, which relate to regulatory policies for electricity and gas utilities, respectively, are administered (with minor exceptions) by the Secretary of Energy. These provisions are designed to encourage the adoption of certain retail regulatory practices. The Titles share three goals: (1) to encourage "conservation of energy supplied by . . . utilities"; (2) to encourage "the optimization of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources" by utilities; and (3) to encourage "equitable rates to . . . consumers." §§ 101 and 301, 92 Stat. 3120 and 3149, 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), 15 U.S.C. § 3201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).3 To achieve these goals, Titles I and III direct state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to "consider" the adoption and implementation of specific "rate design" and regulatory standards.
Section 111(d) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d), requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider the use of six different approaches to structuring rates: (1) promulgation, for each class of electricity consumers, of rates that, "to the maximum extent practicable," would "reflect the costs of . . . service to such class"; (2) elimination of declining block rates;4 (3) adoption of time-of-day rates;5 (4) promulgation of seasonal rates;6 (5) adoption of interruptible rates;7 and (6) use of load management techniques.8 The Act directed each state authority and nonregulated utility to consider these factors not later than two years after PURPA's enactment, that is, by November 8, 1980, and provided that the authority or utility by November 8, 1981, was to have made a decision whether to adopt the standards. § 2622(b). The statute does not provide penalties for failure to meet these deadlines; the state authority or nonregulated utility is merely directed to consider the standards at the first rate proceeding initiated by the authority after November 9, 1980. § 2622(c).
Section 113 of PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 2623, requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider the adoption of a second set of standards relating to the terms and conditions of electricity service: (1) prohibition of master-metering in new buildings;9 (2) restrictions on the use of automatic adjustment clauses;10 (3) disclosure to consumers of information regarding rate schedules; (4) promulgation of procedural requirements relating to termination of service; and (5) prohibition of the recovery of advertising costs from consumers. Similarly, § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 3203, requires consideration of the last two standards—procedures for termination of service and the nonrecovery of advertising costs—for natural gas utilities. A decision as to the standards contained in §§ 113 and 303 was to have been made by November 1980, although, again, no penalty was provided by the statute for failure to meet the deadline.
Finally, § 114 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2624, directs each state authority and nonregulated utility to consider promulgation of "lifeline rates"—that is, lower rates for service that meets the essential needs of residential consumers—if such rates have not been adopted by November 1980.
Titles I and III also prescribe certain procedures to be followed by the state regulatory authority and the nonregulated utility when considering the proposed standards. Each standard is to be examined at a public hearing after notice, and a written statement of reasons must be made available to the public if the standards are not adopted. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b) and (c)(2), and §§ 2623(a) and (c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3203(a) and (c). "Any person" may bring an action in state court to enforce the obligation to hold a hearing and make determinations on the PURPA standards. 16 U.S.C. § 2633(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(1).
The Secretary of Energy, any affected utility, and any consumer served by an affected utility is given the right to intervene and participate in any rate-related proceeding considering the Title I standards. 16 U.S.C. § 2631(a). Under Title III, the Secretary alone has the right to intervene. 15 U.S.C. § 3205. Any person (including the Secretary) who intervenes or otherwise participates in the proceeding may obtain review in state court of any administrative determination concerning the Title I standards, 16 U.S.C. § 2633(c)(1), and the Secretary has the right to participate as an amicus in any Title III judicial review proceeding initiated by another. 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(2). The right to intervene is enforceable against the state regulatory authority by an action in federal court. 16 U.S.C. § 2633(b); 15 U.S.C. § 3207(a)(2).
Despite the extent and detail of the federal proposals, however, no state authority or nonregulated utility is required to adopt or implement the specified rate design or regulatory standards. Thus, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(a) and 2623(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 3203(a) all provide: "Nothing in this subsection prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated . . . utility from making any determination that it is not appropriate to implement [or adopt] any such standard, pursuant to its authority under otherwise applicable State law." Similarly, 16 U.S.C. § 2627(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 3208 make it clear that any state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility may adopt regulations or rates that are "different from any standard established by this [subchapter or] chapter."
Section 210 of PURPA's Title II, 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3, seeks to encourage the development of cogeneration and small power production facilities.11 Congress believed that increased use of these sources of energy would reduce the demand for traditional fossil fuels. But it also felt that two problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating facilities: (1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power to, the nontraditional facilities,12 and (2) the regulation of these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility authorities imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional facilities and thus discouraged their development.13
Pursuant to this statutory authorization, FERC has adopted regulations relating to purchases and sales of electricity to and from cogeneration and small power facilities. See 18 CFR pt. 292 (1980); 45 Fed.Reg. 12214-12237 (1980). These afford state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities latitude in determining the manner in which the regulations are to be implemented. Thus, a state commission may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect to FERC's rules.14
In April 1979, the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service Commission, appellees here, filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against FERC and the Secretary of Energy, seeking a declaratory judgment that PURPA's Titles I and III and § 210 are unconstitutional. App. 3.15 Appellees maintained that PURPA was beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that it constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.16
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that in enacting PURPA Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. App. to Juris. Statement 1a. The court observed that the Mississippi Public Service Commission by state statute possessed the "power and authority to regulate and control intrastate activities and policies of all utilities operating within the sovereign state of Mississippi." Id., at 2a. Relying on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936), the court stated: "There is literally nothing in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution which authorizes or justifies the federal government in taking over the regulation and control of public utilities. These public utilities were actually unknown at the writing of the Constitution." App. to Juris. Statement 4a. Indeed, in the court's view, the legislation "does not even attempt to regulate commerce among the several states but it is a clear usurpation of power and authority which the United States simply does not have under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." Id., at 7a.
Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), the court also concluded that PURPA trenches on state sovereignty.17 It therefore pronounced the statutory provisions void because "they constitute a direct intrusion on integral and traditional functions of the State of Mississippi." App. to Juris. Statement 8a-9a. For reasons it did not explain, the court also relied on the guarantee of a republican form of government, U.S.Const., Art. IV, § 4, and on the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2. App. to Juris. Statement 2a, n. 1, and 9a.
FERC and the Secretary of Energy appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 274, n. 15, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2359, n. 15, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 452 U.S. 936, 101 S.Ct. 3077, 69 L.Ed.2d 950 (1981).
We readily conclude that the District Court's analysis and the appellees' arguments are without merit so far as they concern the Commerce Clause. To say that nothing in the Commerce Clause justifies federal regulation of even the intrastate operations of public utilities misapprehends the proper role of the courts in assessing the validity of federal legislation promulgated under one of Congress' plenary powers. The applicable standard was reiterated just last Term in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981): "It is established beyond peradventure that 'legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality . . . .' Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 [96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752] (1976). . . . A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Id., at 323-324, 101 S.Ct., at 2382.18
Despite these expansive observations by this Court, appellees assert that PURPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not regulate "commerce"; instead, it is said, the Act directs the nonconsenting State to regulate in accordance with federal procedures. This, appellees continue, is beyond Congress' power: "In exercising the authority conferred by this clause of the Constitution, Congress is powerless to regulate anything which is not commerce, as it is powerless to do anything about commerce which is not regulation." Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S., at 297, 56 S.Ct., at 866. The "governance of commerce" by the State is to be distinguished from commerce itself, for regulation of the former is said to be outside the plenary power of Congress.19
It is further argued that the proper test is not whether the regulated activity merely "affects" interstate commerce but, instead, whether it has "a substantial effect" on such commerce, citing Justice REHNQUIST's opinion concurring in the judgment in the Hodel cases, 452 U.S., at 311-312, 101 S.Ct., at 2391. PURPA, appellees maintain, does not meet this standard.
The difficulty with these arguments is that they disregard entirely the specific congressional finding, in § 2 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2601, that the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate commerce. Congress there determined that "the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of congressional authority under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce require," among other things, a program for increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electricity utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity consumers, as well as a program to improve the wholesale distribution of electric energy, and a program for the conservation of natural gas while ensuring that rates to gas consumers are equitable. 16 U.S.C. § 2601. The findings, thus, are clear and specific.
The Court heretofore has indicated that federal regulation of intrastate power transmission may be proper because of the interstate nature of the generation and supply of electric power. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 92 S.Ct. 637, 30 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972). Our inquiry, then, is whether the congressional findings have a rational basis. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 277, 101 S.Ct., at 2360; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S., at 323-324, 101 S.Ct., at 2382.
The legislative history provides a simple answer: there is ample support for Congress' conclusions. The hearings were extensive. Committees in both Houses of Congress noted the magnitude of the Nation's energy problems and the need to alleviate those problems by promoting energy conservation and more efficient use of energy resources. See S.Rep.No.95-442, at 7-10; H.R.Rep.No.95-543, vol. I, pp. 5-10 (1977); H.R.Rep.No.95-496, pt. 4, pp. 3-7, 125-130 (1977).20 Congress was aware that domestic oil production had lagged behind demand and that the Nation had become increasingly dependent on foreign oil. Id., at 3. The House Committee observed: "Reliance upon imported oil to meet the bulk of U. S. oil demands could seriously jeopardize the stability of the Nation's economy and could undermine the independence of the United States." Ibid. See H.R.Rep.No.95-543, vol. I, at 5-6. Indeed, the Nation had recently experienced severe shortages in its supplies of natural gas. Id., at 7. The House and Senate Committees both noted that the electricity industry consumed more than 25% of the total energy resources used in this country while supplying only 12% of the user demand for energy. S.Rep.No.95-442, at 7-8; H.R.Rep.No.95-496, pt. 4, at 125. In recent years, the electricity utility industry had been beset by numerous problems, id., at 129, which resulted in higher bills for the consuming public, a result exacerbated by the rate structures employed by most utilities. S.Rep.No.95-442, at 26. Congress naturally concluded that the energy problem was nationwide in scope,21 and that these developments demonstrated the need to establish federal standards regarding retail sales of electricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage conservation and more efficient use of scarce energy resources. Seeid., at 24-32; H.R.Rep.No.95-496, pt. 4, at 131-133, 136-138, 170-171.
Congress also determined that the development of cogeneration and small power production facilities would conserve energy. The evidence before Congress showed the potential contribution of these sources of energy: it was estimated that if proper incentives were provided, industrial cogeneration alone could account for 7%-10% of the Nation's electrical generating capacity by 1987. S.Rep.No.95-442, at 21, 23.
We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this respect. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra. Indeed, the utilities involved in this very case, Mississippi Power & Light Company and Mississippi Power Company, sell their retail customers power that is generated in part beyond Mississippi's borders, and offer reciprocal services to utilities in other States. App. 93-94. The intrastate activities of these utilities, although regulated by the Mississippi Public Service Commission, bring them within the reach of Congress' power over interstate commerce. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S., at 458, 92 S.Ct., at 641; New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 454 U.S. 331, 102 S.Ct. 1096, 71 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982).22
Even if appellees were correct in suggesting that PURPA will not significantly improve the Nation's energy situation, the congressional findings compel the conclusion that " 'the means chosen by [Congress are] reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' " Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 276, 101 S.Ct., at 2359, quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262, 85 S.Ct. 348, 360, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964). It is not for us to say whether the means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice. It is sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and electric utilities, was essential to protect interstate commerce. That is enough to place the challenged portions of PURPA within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.23 Because PURPA's provisions concern private nonregulated utilities as well as state commissions, the statute necessarily is valid at least insofar as it regulates private parties. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 286, 101 S.Ct., at 2365.
Unlike the Commerce Clause question, the Tenth Amendment issue presented here is somewhat novel. This case obviously is related to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), insofar as both concern principles of state sovereignty. But there is a significant difference as well. National League of Cities, like Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975), presented a problem the Court often confrontss the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from generally applicable federal regulations. In PURPA, in contrast, the Federal Government attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. To an extent, this presents an issue of first impression.
A. Section 210. On its face, this appears to be the most intrusive of PURPA's provisions. The question of its constitutionality, however, is the easiest to resolve. Insofar as § 210 authorizes FERC to exempt qualified power facilities from "State laws and regulations," it does nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way. Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the regulation of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in the regulation of transactions between such utilities and cogenerators. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1520, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945). The propriety of this type of regulation—so long as it is a valid exercise of the commerce power—was made clear in National League of Cities, and was reaffirmed in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.: the Federal Government may displace state regulation even though this serves to "curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important." 452 U.S., at 290, 101 S.Ct., at 2367.
Section 210's requirement that "each State regulatory authority shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, implement such rule (or revised rule) for each electric utility for which it has ratemaking authority," 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(1) (emphasis added), is more troublesome. The statute's substantive provisions require electricity utilities to purchase electricity from, and to sell it to, qualifying cogenerator and small power production facilities. § 824a-3(a). Yet FERC has declared that state commissions may implement this by, among other things, "an undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [PURPA]." 18 CFR § 292.401(a) (1980). In essence, then, the statute and the implementing regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission. See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. §§ 77-1-31, 77-3-5, 77-3-13(3), 77-3-21, 77-3-405 (1973).
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947), is instructive and controlling on this point. There, the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, created a treble-damages remedy, and gave jurisdiction over claims under the Act to state as well as federal courts. The courts of Rhode Island refused to entertain such claims, although they heard analogous state causes of action. This Court upheld the federal program. It observed that state courts have a unique role in enforcing the body of federal law, and that the Rhode Island courts had "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action." 330 U.S., at 394, 67 S.Ct., at 814. Thus the state courts were directed to heed the constitutional command that "the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state," id., at 393, 67 S.Ct., at 814, " 'and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.' " Id., at 392, 67 S.Ct., at 813, quoting Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57, 32 S.Ct. 169, 178, 56 L.Ed. 327 (1912).
So it is here. The Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURPA, and it can satisfy § 210's requirements simply by opening its doors to claimants. That the Commission has administrative as well as judicial duties is of no significance.24 Any other conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the preeminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation, cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-341, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816), and the congressional determination that the federal rights granted by PURPA can appropriately be enforced through state adjudicatory machinery. Such an approach, Testa emphasized, "flies in the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation," and "disregards the purpose and effect of Article VI of the Constitution." 330 U.S., at 389, 67 S.Ct., at 812.
B. Mandatory Consideration of Standards. We acknowledge that "the authority to make . . . fundamental . . . decisions" is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 851, 96 S.Ct., at 2474. Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (State Supreme Court speaks as sovereign because it is the "ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of law"). It would follow that the ability of a state legislative (or, as here, administrative) body—which makes decisions and sets policy for the State as a whole—to consider and promulgate regulations of its choosing must be central to a State's role in the federal system. Indeed, the 19th-century view, expressed in a well-known slavery case, was that Congress "has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it." Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107, 16 L.Ed. 717 (1861).
Recent cases, however, demonstrate that this rigid and isolated statement from Kentucky v. Dennison —which suggests that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as co-equal sovereigns—is not representative of the law today.25 While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 1635, 52 L.Ed.2d 166 (1977), there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions. In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975), for example, state executives were held restricted, with respect to state employees, to the wage and salary limitations established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979), acknowledged a federal court's power to enforce a treaty by compelling a state agency to "prepare" certain rules "even if state law withholds from [it] the power to do so." Id., at 695, 99 S.Ct., at 3079.26 And certainly Testa v. Katt, supra, by declaring that "the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state," 330 U.S., at 393, 67 S.Ct., at 814, reveals that the Federal Government has some power to enlist a branch of state government—there the judiciary—to further federal ends.27 In doing so, Testa clearly cut back on both the quoted language and the analysis of the Dennison case of the preceding century.28
Whatever all this may forebode for the future, or for the scope of federal authority in the event of a crisis of national proportions, it plainly is not necessary for the Court in this case to make a definitive choice between competing views of federal power to compel state regulatory activity. Titles I and III of PURPA require only consideration of federal standards. And if a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals. As we have noted, the commerce power permits Congress to pre-empt the States entirely in the regulation of private utilities. In a sense, then, this case is only one step beyond Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., supra. There, the Federal Government could have pre-empted all surface mining regulations; instead, it allowed the States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal standards. In the Court's view, this raised no Tenth Amendment problem: "We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role." 452 U.S., at 290, 101 S.Ct., at 2367. "[T]here can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a regulatory program." Id., at 288, 101 S.Ct., at 2366.
Similarly here, Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal standards.29 While the condition here is affirmative in nature—that is, it directs the States to entertain proposals—nothing in this Court's cases suggests that the nature of the condition makes it a constitutionally improper one. There is nothing in PURPA "directly compelling" the States to enact a legislative program. In short, because the two challenged Titles simply condition continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals, they do not threaten the States' "separate and independent existence," Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76, 19 L.Ed. 101 (1869); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580, 31 S.Ct. 688, 695, 55 L.Ed. 853 (1911), and do not impair the ability of the States "to function effectively in a federal system." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S., at 547, n.7, 95 S.Ct., at 1795, n.7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 852, 96 S.Ct., at 2474. To the contrary, they offer the States a vehicle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern.
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States that of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards—may be a difficult one. And that is particularly true when Congress, as is the case here, has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default. Yet in other contexts the Court has recognized that valid federal enactments may have an effect on state policy—and may, indeed, be designed to induce state action in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress' regulatory authority. Thus in Oklahoma v. CS