Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97053/national-licorice-co-vs-labor-board
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 10']

National Licorice Co Vs Labor Board - Citation 97053 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize National Licorice Co. Vs. Labor Board - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97053CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMar-04-1940Case Number309 U.S. 350AppellantNational Licorice Co.RespondentLabor BoardExcerpt:
national licorice co. v. labor board - 309 u.s. 350 (1940)
1. substantial evidence sustains a finding by the national labor relations board that a particular union was the choice of a majority of employees, as bargaining representative of all at a time when their employer refused to deal with it as representative of employees who were not members of the union. p.
2. employees in a plant agreed individually with the..... Judgment:
(1) That the contracts were in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and were appropriate subjects for the remedial action of the Board authorized by § 10 of the Act. P.
(2) An order of the Board precluding the employer from taking any benefit of the contracts and from carrying out any of their provisions the effect of which would be to infringe rights guaranteed by the Act was valid, although the employees who made the contracts were not parties to the Board's proceeding. P.
(3) Such order does not foreclose the employees from taking any action to secure an adjudication upon the contracts, nor prejudge their rights in the event of such adjudication. P.
(4) Section 10(a) and (c) of the Act commits to the Board the exclusive power to decide whether unfair labor practices have been committed and, within the limits prescribed in that section, to determine what action the employer must take to remove or avoid their consequences. P.
(5) A provision of the order requiring the employer to post notice that the contracts with individual employees (who were not parties to the proceedings) are "void and of no effect" should be modified so as to say in lieu that the contracts were made in
violation of the Act, and that the employer will no longer offer, solicit, enter into, continue, enforce, or attempt lo enforce such contracts with its employees, but this without prejudice to the assertion by the employees of any legal rights they may have acquired under such contracts. P.
309 U. S. 367
(6) The Board has jurisdiction to deal with violations which, though not set up in the charge invoking its action, § 10(b), are continuations of violations there alleged, of the same class and for the same object. P.
On August 2, 1937, the Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union of America, Local Union No. 405, a labor organization, affiliated with the American Federation
On July 29th, a second meeting took place between representatives of the Union and the president and other officers of the company at which the petitioner declined to recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of all the employees, and declared that it would negotiate with the Union only as the bargaining representative of its members. The meeting adjourned without reaching any agreement. On August 2nd, the employees went out on strike. The plant was closed and not reopened
At a meeting with the Committee on September 10th, petitioner's president renewed proposals for a contract,
which he had made at the meetings with the Union representatives on July 20th and July 29th, stipulating for a five percent. wage increase, time and a half for overtime, and one week's vacation with pay. The Committee's only request related to pay for holidays and a reduction of the term of the contract from five to three years, which was granted with some modification. As finally agreed upon, the contract purports to be made between the petitioner, the Committee, and "each and every one of the employees." [
] Petitioner furnished the Committee members with mimeographed copies of the agreement, telling them to explain it to the best of their ability to the employees, and giving explicit instructions as to the manner in which the individual contracts were to be executed. There was testimony by a number of witnesses that petitioner's president informed the employees that he would not "protect their jobs and they would not get five percent if they did not sign the agreement." One group of fourteen employees asked for
From these subsidiary findings of fact, the Board concluded that petitioner, by refusing to bargain collectively with the Union on July 20th and July 29th and thereafter, had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(5) of the Act; that petitioner, by coercing and intimidating employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, and by persuading and coercing its employees to refrain from becoming members of the Union and to sign individual contracts of employment, had engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(1) of the Act, and that, by initiating, sponsoring, and dominating a labor organization of its employees, the Collective Bargaining Committee, it had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(1) and (2) of the Act. The
Upon a petition which challenged the authority of the Board to make so much of its order as related to the contracts with petitioner's employees, without making the employees parties to the proceeding, we granted certiorari October 9, 1939, because of the importance of the question in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act and because of an asserted misapplication of the principles of
U.S. 197. Of lesser moment are questions, also raised by the petition, [
] whether the Board's finding that the Union was still the authorized bargaining representative of a majority of petitioner's employees, is supported by substantial evidence and, if not, whether the Circuit Court of Appeals properly directed the Board to conduct an election to determine whether the Union still represents a majority of petitioner's employees, and, finally, whether the jurisdiction of the Board is limited to such unfair labor practices as are set up in the charge presented to the Board so as to preclude its determination that the creation of the Organization Committee and petitioner's contracts with individual employees involved unfair labor practices, since both occurred after the charge was lodged with the Board and after its complaint was served on petitioner.
Since the Court of Appeals has confirmed the findings of the Board, there is no occasion here to review the evidence in detail.
Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Interstate
206 U. S. 142
206 U. S. 154
206 U. S. 456
. It is enough, with the findings not challenged, that there is evidence that, by July 20th one hundred and nine of petitioner's one hundred and forty employees had signed applications for membership in the Union, designating it as the applicant's representative for collective bargaining, and that, on that date, negotiation began between petitioner and the Union representatives which was continued until August. The evidence shows that attempts by petitioner between that date and July 20th to circulate a petition among its employees nominating a committee to act as their collective bargaining representative failed. A few employees signed. Then, a number cancelled their signatures. The petition was returned to the petitioner's superintendent, and was destroyed by an assistant secretary of the company. There is testimony that, at the meeting with the Union representatives on July 29th, petitioner's president declined to recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of all the employees, and declared that he would negotiate with it only as the bargaining representative of the Union members, refusing to bargain with it as the representative of all the employees, a plain violation of the Act. §§ 8(5), 9(a). This was followed by petitioner's refusal, on August 2nd, to negotiate with Union representatives. There was also evidence from which the Board could have found that the negotiations on July 20th and July 29th were not entered into by the petitioner in good faith, and were but thinly disguised refusals to treat with the Union representatives.
In view of the evidence already noted of the choice of the Union as bargaining representative by a large majority of the employees between July 14th and 20th, of the complete failure of petitioner's efforts to disturb that representation between the 20th and the 29th, there was
But the petition raises the question whether the terms of the contract, as the Court of Appeals held, violate the National Labor Relations Act, and it challenges the authority of the Board because of the absence of the individual employees, as parties, to make any order respecting the contracts. The contracts, as the Board found, were
By the contract, each employee agreed not "to demand a closed shop or a signed agreement by his employer with any Union." This provision foreclosed the employee from bargaining for a closed shop or a signed agreement with the employer, frequent subjects of negotiation between employers and employees,
see Consolidated Edison Company v. Labor Board, supra,
306 U. S. 342
cf. Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U. S. 555
, note 7. In addition, the restriction upon the employee's right to ask a signed agreement extending only to agreements with "any union" is in plain conflict with the public policy of the Act to encourage the procedure of collective bargaining,
§ 1, since it discriminates against labor organizations by forbidding signed contracts with labor unions while it permits them with the individual workers.
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, supra,
It likewise forestalls collective bargaining with respect to discharged employees, first providing that a discharged employee may submit to the employer facts indicating that his discharge was unreasonable and then stipulating that the "question as to the propriety of an employee's discharge is in no event to be one for arbitration or mediation." The effect of this clause was to discourage, if not forbid, any presentation of the discharged employee's grievances to appellant through a labor organization or his chosen representatives, or in any way except personally.
Since the contracts were the fruits of unfair labor practices, stipulated for the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed by the Act, and were a continuing means of thwarting the policy of the Act, they were appropriate subjects for the affirmative remedial action of the Board authorized by § 10 of the Act.
Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra,
303 U. S. 265
. Hence, the Board was free by its order to direct that the appellant should take no benefit from the contracts unless it was without authority to act because the individual signers of the contracts had not been made parties to the proceeding. It is urged that, in the absence of the employees who signed the contract, the Board was powerless to declare it void and of no effect as to those employees, and that consequently it could make no order forbidding petitioner to make use of the contracts as the means of defeating the policy and purposes of the Act.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, supra,
is not decisive of this question. There, page
, after pointing out that the Board's
It is elementary that it is not within the power of any tribunal to make a binding adjudication of the rights
of parties not brought before it by due process of law.
cf. Arizona v. California,
298 U. S. 558
298 U. S. 571
-572. For that reason, there is no occasion to consider now how far the contract rights, if any, of the employees may be passed upon by the Board and their exercise restricted by its order in proceedings to which the employees have been made parties. As the Board's power can be effectively exercised only upon petitioner, the employees are entitled to notice and hearing only if the statute requires them to be made parties to the proceeding. Consequently the only question we are called on to decide is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the exercise of the Board's authority is such a departure from accepted modes of procedure as rightly to be regarded as beyond the power conferred on the Board by § 10 of the Act.
The proceeding authorized to be taken by the Board under the National Labor Relations Act is not for the adjudication of private rights.
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., ante,
, H.Rept. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. Committee on Labor, p. 24;
cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner,
280 U. S. 19
. It has few of the indicia of a private litigation, and makes no requirement for the presence in it of any private party other than the employer charged with an unfair labor practice. The Board acts in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by encouraging collective bargaining and by protecting the
The immediate object of the proceeding is to prevent unfair labor practices which, as defined by §§ 7, 8, are practices tending to thwart the declared policy of the Act. To that end, the Board is authorized to order the employer to desist from such practices, and, by § 10(c), it is given authority to take such affirmative remedial action as will effectuate the policies of the Act.
Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound, supra.
In a proceeding so narrowly restricted to the protection and enforcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the traditional rules governing the joinder of parties in litigation determining private rights. Ordinarily, where the rights involved in litigation arise upon a contract, courts refuse to adjudicate the rights of some of the parties to the contract if the others are not before it.
Carroll v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
94 F.2d 333;
cf. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Co.,
215 U. S. 33
215 U. S. 48
. Such a judgment or decree would be futile if rendered, since the contract rights asserted by those present in the litigation could neither be defined, aided, nor enforced by a decree which did not bind those not present.
But different considerations may apply even in private litigation where the rights asserted arise independently of any contract which an adverse party may have made with another, not a party to the suit, even though their assertion may affect the ability of the former to fulfill his contract. The rights asserted in the suit and those arising upon the contract are distinct and separate, so that the Court may, in a proper case, proceed to judgment without joining other parties to the contract, shaping its decree in such manner as to preserve the rights of those not before it.
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.,
10 F.Supp. 512,
76 F.2d 1002;
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Montana,
92 F.2d 693, 698;
Brogdex Co. v. Food Machinery Co.,
92 F.2d 787, 789;
Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v.Lawhead,
62 F.2d 928, 931, 932;
cf. Hamilton v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co.,
49 F. 412;
Howe v. Howe & Owen Ball Bearing Co.,
154 F. 820, 828;
Alcazar Amusement Co. v. Mudd & Colley Amusement Co.,
204 Ala. 509, 86 So. 209;
E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833;
Nokol Co. v. Becker,
318 Mo. 292, 300 S.W. 1108.
The Board's order runs only against petitioner. It directs that it shall cease recognizing the Committee as the representative of any of the employees for the purpose of dealing with petitioner concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work; that it shall not "give effect" to the contracts with its employees; that it notify each
In these respects, the order does not go beyond those in suits brought by the United States to restrain violations of the Sherman Act, where the injunction was broad enough to prevent the offender from carrying out contracts with persons not parties to the suits.
United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States,
258 U. S. 451
258 U. S. 456
306 U. S. 220
. Similarly, in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, the order restraining unfair methods of competition may preclude the performance of outstanding contracts by the offender. Such orders have never been challenged because the holders of the contracts were not made parties.
E.g. Butterick Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
4 F.2d 910;
Q.R.S. Music Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
12 F.2d 730;
J. W. Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
23 F.2d 41.
Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Co.,
Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, supra,
300 U. S. 539
System Federation No. 40 v. Virginian R. Co.,
11 F.Supp. 621, 623, the effect of the decree was to order the employer to deal exclusively with the Federation although the employer had a contract with an association not a party to the suit, found to be a dominated labor organization. In every case, the third persons were left free to assert such legal rights as they might have acquired under their contracts. But in all, the public right was vindicated by restraining the unlawful actions of the defendant even though the restraint prevented his performance of the contracts.
As the National Labor Relations Act contemplates no more than the protection of the public rights which it creates and defines, and as the Board's order is directed solely to the employer, and is ineffective to determine any private rights of the employees and leaves them free to assert such legal rights as they may have acquired under their contracts in any appropriate tribunal, we think they are not indispensable parties for purposes of the Board's order, and the statute does not require their presence as parties to the present proceeding, and there was no abuse of the Board's discretion in its failure to make them parties. [
] It is unnecessary to consider now to what extent
or by what procedure it would be necessary to make the employees parties to a proceeding pending before the Board in the event that it undertook to make an order directed to the employees foreclosing any asserted rights under their contracts in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
the procedure used in
261 U. S. 197
3. The amended charge, which initiated the present proceeding pursuant to § 10(b) of the Act, was lodged
Petitioner contends that the charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the complaint and subsequent proceedings, and that they are restricted to the specific unfair labor practices alleged in the charge.
See Labor Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co.,
98 F.2d 97. It argues that, in the proceedings before the Board, there was a fatal departure from the charge insofar as the Board's finding and order are concerned with the subsequent organization of the Committee and the signing of the employees' contracts. The argument is addressed only to want of power in the Board, and raises no question of unfairness to petitioner in the preparation and prosecution of his case.
Labor Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co.,
98 F.2d 97, 100, has been held to violate the Act in
Labor Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co., supra; Labor Board v. American Mfg. Co.,
106 F.2d 61, 66;
Matter of Atlas Bag & Burlap Co.,
1 N.L.R.B. 292;
Matter of Cating Rope Works, Inc.,
4 N.L.R.B. 1100;
Matter of Metropolitan Engineering Co.,
4 N.L.R.B. 542;
Matter of David E. Kennedy, Inc.,
6 N.L.R.B. 699;
Matter of Art Crayon, Inc.,
7 N.L.R.B. 102;
Matter of Eastern Footwear Corp.,
8 N.L.R.B. 1245;
Matter of American Numbering Machine Co.,
10 N.L.R.B. 536;
Matter of Centre Brass Works, Inc.,
10 N.L.R.B. 1060;
Matter of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
10 N.L.R.B. 288;
Matter of National Meter Co.,
11 N.L.R.B. 320.
Petitioner's brief assails the Board's order on numerous grounds not set up in his petition for certiorari. We limit our review to the questions specifically raised in the petition. Rule 38.
See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,
Orders of the Board have been upheld which direct the employer to cease giving effect to such contracts, although no notice was given to the company-dominated labor organizations or the employees.
98 F.2d 97, 99, 100;
Labor Board v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,
99 F.2d 930;
Labor Board v. Ronni Parfum, Inc.,
104 F.2d 1017;
Labor Board v. Stackpole Carbon Co.,
105 F.2d 167, 169;
Titan Metal Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board,
106 F.2d 254.
Contra: Labor Board v. Cowell Portland Cement Co.,
108 F.2d 198;
Labor Board v. Sterling Electric Motors, Inc.,
109 F.2d 194, 5 Labor Relations Reporter 600.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and I see no reason or occasion for the modification of the order. For, as stated in the