Source: http://co.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150617_0001286.DCO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-07 22:10:27
Document Index: 354824591

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1692', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 1692', '§ 12', '§ 1692']

| Ramirez v. Vero Beach Financial Group, Inc.
Ramirez v. Vero Beach Financial Group, Inc.
ALISON RAMIREZ, Plaintiff,v.VERO BEACH FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. d/b/a/ VERO BEACH FINANCIAL, Defendant.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment filed May 20, 2015. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is granted.
I first address the procedural history of the case. On January 1, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action to enforce the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), and the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-101 et seq. ("CFDCPA"). On January 28, 2015, Plaintiff served Defendant with the summons, complaint, and civil cover sheet. (Mot. for Default J., Ex. 1.) Defendant was required to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint by February 18, 2015. Defendant failed to timely answer or otherwise respond to the complaint and has, to date, still not responded.
I find that the Complaint alleges a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction based on specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists if "(1) Defendant purposefully directed its activities at Colorado or its residents or acted in some other way by which it purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of conducting business in Colorado, and (2) Plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to Defendant's forum-related activities." Villanueva v. Account Discovery Sys., LLC, No. 14-cv-395-WYD-KLM, 2015 WL 148965, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2015). Here, Plaintiff is a Colorado resident. (Compl., ¶ 5.) Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, but is alleged to do business in Colorado. ( Id., ¶¶ 7-9.) I find that Plaintiff's allegations establish that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of doing business in Colorado by choosing to attempt to collect the debt that was incurred by Plaintiff and communicating via telephone and letter with Plaintiff in Colorado regarding same. ( Id., ¶¶ 17-34.) Moreover, I find that Plaintiff's claims arise out of or relate to Defendant's forum-related activities related to Defendant's efforts to collect the debt. Finally, I find that as Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Colorado through its debt collection attempts, the prospect of being haled into court here was reasonable. I find from the foregoing, that exercising jurisdiction over the Defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See also Villanueva, 2015 WL 148965, at *6-7.
Additionally, I find from the well-pleaded facts that Plaintiff has established a claim for relief under the CFDCPA. Plaintiff alleges that (1) she is a "consumer" and Defendant is a "collection agency" as those terms are used in the CFDCPA. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 15); (2) Defendant was attempting to collect a consumer debt as that term is used by the CFDCPA ( id., ¶¶ 18-25); and (3) the debt was assigned to Defendant for collection after the debt was in default ( id., ¶ 18.) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-105(3)(c) requires a collection agency's initial written communication with the consumer to include: ""FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE COLORADO FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, SEE WWW.AGO.STATE.CO.US/CADC/CADCMAIN.CFM." The Complaint alleges that Defendant's letter to Plaintiff, which was the initial written communication with her, did not contain this notice. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Further, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-105(3)(e) requires a collection agency's initial written communication with the consumer to include the following statement: "A consumer has the right to request in writing that a debt collector or collection agency cease further communication with the consumer. A written request to cease communication will not prohibit the debt collector or collection agency from taking any other action authorized by law to collect the debt." Again, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's letter did not include this notice. (Compl., ¶ 38.) Finally, the debt collector is required to be licensed as a collection agency with the State of Colorado. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-115(1)(a). The Complaint alleges that Defendant is not registered as a licensed collection agency. ( Id., ¶ 57.)
The analysis for the award of damages is identical under both Acts. The amount of statutory damages is awarded based upon "the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional...." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-14-113(2)(a). Under both Acts, the maximum amount of statutory damages is $1, 000.00. Id. "All that is required for an award of statutory damages is proof that the statute was violated, although a court must then exercise its discretion to determine how much to award, up to the $1, 000.00 ceiling.'" Villanueva, 2015 WL 148965, at *11 (quotation omitted). "Thus, a determination that Defendant has committed one violation of the FDCPA is sufficient for the Court to find in favor of Plaintiff as to statutory damages." Id. Exercising my discretion, I find that the maximum amount of statutory damages should be awarded under both Acts ($1, 000 per Act) based on the allegations of the Complaint and the fact that Defendant failed to respond to the merits of the Complaint.
Finally, I address Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees and costs. The FDCPA prescribes that a successful party is entitled to "the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). I find that Plaintiff is entitled to recover her reasonable attorneys' fees and costs because default has entered against Defendant and I have determined that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of the FDCPA. Plaintiff attached to her motion as Exhibit 2 an Affidavit of counsel Daniel J. Vedra attesting to the attorney fees. The motion and Affidavit show that Plaintiff's attorney expended 3.8 hours in prosecuting this action, including the time necessary to prepare this motion and fee petition. I find under the lodestar approach, see Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998), that expending 3.8 hours in drafting the complaint in this case, filing suit, and preparing the motion for fees was reasonable. I also find that counsel's hourly rate ($225.00 per hour for work on FDCPA cases) is reasonable and consistent with rates for attorneys with the same experience working on FDCPA cases. Thus, I grant the request for an award of $855.00 in attorney fees.
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter a default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $2, 000.00 in statutory damages. The default judgment shall also include an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $855.00 and costs in the amount of $435.00.