Source: https://forum.msfraud.org/post/3-rules-for-defeating-banks-motion-for-summary-judgment-4750240
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 19:30:47
Document Index: 513312452

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 673', '§ 673', '§ 673', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

3 RULES FOR DEFEATING BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - MSFraud.org Mortgage Servicing Fraud Forum
3 RULES FOR DEFEATING BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ann 1275848372
By Richard Shuster Esq.
Rule One: Always Bring a Court Reporter: In most (but by no means all) foreclosure cases if the bank wins their summary judgment motion then the bank wins their case and the Court will set a sale date in 30 to 90 cases. A foreclosure defense lawyer should consider the bank’s motion for summary judgment to be equivalent of a trial. If the motion is lost, the homeowner is unlikely to get a second chance. Since the summary judgment is a critical part of the case it is ESSENTIAL that the homeowner’s attorney bring a court reporter to the hearing. By having a court reporter there is a record of the proceedings. If the judge males an erroneous ruling either by disregarding applicable case law (controlling legal precedent) or disregarding evidence or lack of evidence then the homeowner will need a record of what happened in order to appeal the judge’s ruling.
Some judges do not like presiding over foreclosure cases. Some judges fell that if the homeowner did not pay the mortgage then the bank should win. One judge in Southwest Florida even commented to the press the rapid processing of foreclosure cases was necessary so that real estate prices would stabilize. If there is no court reporter at the hearing the judge can rule against the homeowner and know that the homeowner will be unable to appeal. If a court reporter is present the judge knows that if he or she does not follow the law the judge may be reversed on appeal by a higher appellate Court. Most judges hate being reversed on an appeal. For a judge, being reversed means a higher Court writes an ruling saying the judge made a mistake. Rulings of Florida’s appellate Courts are published in the Florida Law Weekly and Florida Law Weekly Supplement which is mailed to every Court in the state and sent by subscription to most Florida law firms.
Rule Three: Do not waive objections: In the hearing where a Miami sole practitioner lost the case, the lawyer asked the Court to continue the summary judgment hearing because the bank had not provided discovery responses. Florida appellate courts have consistently held that summary judgment motions should not be heard until discovery is complete. The Court refused the continue the summary judgment. The judge rejected the last minute oral request for a continuance and explained the homeowners lawyer that if the bank did not provide discovery responses then the homeowner’s lawyer should have filed a motion to compel. The judge also felt that a motion for continuance should have been in writing and served long before the summary judgment hearing. If the homeowners lawyer was counting on a continuance perhaps the did not prepare as hard for the hearing. The solo should have reviewed their file when they received the motion for summary judgment and prepared a motion to compel if discovery was still outstanding.
The foreclosure lawyers in the Miami, Plantation, and Melbourne offices of Shuster & Saben, begin preparing for summary judgment the moment we open the file. Our discovery is planned and drafted for the purpose of defeating the lender’s motion for summary judgment and winning cases for our clients. When lender’s do not provide the discovery we ask for we follow through with motion to compel. Most homeowners cannot successfully defeat summary judgment without an attorney. When hiring counsel the homeowner should act as soon as possible so that their lawyer has time to conduct discovery prior to the summary judgment hearing.
Posted by Richard Shuster at 9:27 AM 0
Mike H 1275856369
To defeat a motion for summary judgement, the defendant must prepare
and file and "affidavit in opposition to motion for summary judgement" which
must be notarized and sworn to under oath stating with precision each and
every point the defendant disagrees with in the plaintiff's motion. It should
also contain exhibits proving the defendants contention that the plaintiff
is not entitled to summary judgement because there are matters of fact
and law still at issue.
William A. Roper, Jr. 1275881691
I want to concur with the suggestions of both Mr. SHUSTER and Mike H., though I would slightly vary the focus of what Mike is suggesting by pointing out that what is essential is to get defensive summary judgment evidence into the record in admissible form.
Mr. SHUSTER approaches this same point in his discussion about the necessity of either getting the discovery in or showing that discovery is incomplete, to include an admissible showing that the defense is diligent in seeking to complete discovery, to include, where necessary, a motion to compel.
In a summary judgment setting, a party can typically rely upon only affidavits and discovery responses to defeat the motion.
Mike H. is correct to point out and suggest the advisability of getting affidavits filed. But very often a defendant is going to be lacking in first hand knowledge of some of the key facts of the case to give a useful affidavit which can be of greatest use.
This is why discovery can be so critical!
Ann 1275885155
To help defeat Summary Judgment, defendant can strike all Plaintiff's Affidavits as hearsays:
Ann 1275885747
INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB, Case No.: 2009-CA-XXXX
JANE DOE, et. al.,
DEFENDANT JANE DOE’S
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Upon information and belief in the above-referenced paragraphs, granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment prior to resolution of Defendants Motion to Dismiss, prior to Plaintiff providing the requested discovery and prior to resolving the disclosed issues of fact would be improper and premature as there are still clear issues of fact which preclude a proper summary judgment at this time, including the material and pertinent issue of whether Plaintiff has proper standing to bring this action.
In the state of Florida, there is extensive established law that prevents summary judgment from being granted when there are outstanding issues of material fact. Johnson v. Boca Raton Community Hosp., Inc., 985 So.2d 141, Murphy v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Lake Wales, Inc., 974 So.2d 565. A “material fact,” for summary judgment purposes, is a fact that is essential to the resolution of the legal questions raised in the case, Continental Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III Ltd. Partnership, 758 So.2d 1214.
“Under the Florida state court procedure, the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the “slightest doubt” is raised” West’s Florida Practice Series, 4 Fla. Prac., Civil Procedure R. 1.510(2008-2009 ed.). Dreggors v. Wausau Ins. Co., 995 So.2d 547, held that on a motion for summary judgment, unless and until material facts at issue presented to the trial court are so crystallized, conclusive, and compelling as to leave nothing for the court’s determination but questions of law, those facts, as well as any defenses, must be submitted to the jury for resolution. Christian v. Overstreet Paving Co., further explains that if the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, or possibility of issue, or if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue may exist, summary judgment is improper, 679 So.2d 839.
In the summary judgment proceeding, the movant bears the burden at all times of clearly and unequivocally establishing right of summary judgment, and judgment may not be granted if any controverted issue of material facts exists or if proofs supporting motion fail to overcome every theory upon which, under pleadings, adversary’s position might be sustained, Haley v. Harvey Building, Inc., 168 So.2d 330.
In the motion for summary judgment hearings, if there is any doubt about the possibility of material issues of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. “If the record reflects even the possibility of a material issue of fact, or if different inferences can be drawn reasonably from the facts, the doubt must be resolved against the moving party and summary judgment must be denied,” RNR Investments Ltd. Partnership v. Peoples First Community Bank, 812 So.2d 561.
The mere fact that Defendant did not raise factual issues through affidavit in opposition prior to hearing on motion for summary judgment should not preclude Defendant from being able to assert those issues of fact at the hearing. The “mere fact that evidence concerning intent of parties is uncontroverted does not necessarily mean that there is no genuine issue as to this material fact, and that summary judgment is thus proper, if uncontroverted evidence is lawfully susceptible of two or more conflicting inferences,” Marshall v. Gawel, 696 So.2d 937. Existence of a reasonable inference contrary to that asserted by the non-moving party should not result in the entry of summary judgment, but rather should be left to the jury to determine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the inferences suggested by the moving party, Corbitt v. Kuruvilla, 745 So.2d 545. (even where facts are uncontroverted, summary judgment is not available if different inferences can be reasonably drawn from uncontroverted facts) Albelo v. Southern Bell, 682 So.2d 1126. A case which further establishes the standard for necessary documents in evidence is Flaherty v. Metal Products Corp., 83 So.2d 9, which explains that “where there are numerous issues on questions of fact and nothing in record before court by way of deposition, affidavit, admission, or otherwise upon which court could have determined that answers in allegation, if a sufficient defense, were in fact true, court’s order, even if construed as final summary judgment holding there was no issue of material fact, could not be sustained.”
It is axiomatic that Summary Judgment may not be granted unless the moving party is able to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43-44 (Fla. 1966); Kemper v. First Nat'l Bank of Dayton, Ohio, 277 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Where discovery is not complete, the facts are not sufficiently developed to enable the trial court to determine whether genuine issues of material facts exist. See Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Thus, where discovery is still pending, the entry of Summary Judgment is premature. See Smith v. Smith, 734 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)("Parties to a lawsuit are entitled to discovery as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure including the taking of depositions, and it is reversible error to enter summary judgment when discovery is in progress and the deposition of a party is pending."); Henderson v. Reyes, 702 So. 2d 616, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(reversing the entry of Summary Judgment where depositions had not been completed and a request for the production of documents was outstanding.); Collazo v. Hupert, 693 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding that a trial court should not entertain a motion for summary judgment while discovery is still pending); Spradley v. Stick, 622 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to resolve conflicting issues of fact, but rather to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, and if so, the court must deny the motion, Trustees of Internal Imp. Trust Fund v. Lord, 189 So.2d 534, see also Jack Drury & Associates, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 203 So.2d 361.
“Parties to a lawsuit are entitled to discovery as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, including the taking of depositions, and it is reversible error to enter summary judgment when discovery is in progress and the deposition of a party is pending. See Sica v. Sam Calliendo Design, Inc., 623
In short, as the court states in Williams, summary judgments should be sparingly granted and only in those cases where there remains no genuine issue of any material fact, and if there are issues of fact and the slightest doubt remains, a summary judgment cannot be granted, Williams v. City of Lake City, 62 So.2d 732.
In addition to the issues raised by the Defendant's pending discovery and motion to dismiss, Defendant contends that the actual promissory note that is in the courts file is not the original and is a fraud. On January 21, 2010, Defendant viewed the document in the court file that is alleged to be the original note. Defendant compared that document to the copy of mortgage loan documents that she received at the time of closing which are still in her possession. The copy and the original were made of the same paper – same weight, color, feel, look and size. The one in the court file is on clearly different paper than the copy. Additionally, Defendant is an expert at recognizing her signature. She closely examined her alleged signature on the document in the court file and found that to be lacking in authenticity as her original signature would leave an impression in the paper, which is not present in the document in the court file. Additionally, Defendant's recollection is that a black ink pen was used to sign her name, not blue, as is reflected in the document in the court file. (Exhibit A, Affidavit of Defendant JANE DOE .
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Honorable Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems necessary and just.
George Gingo, 879533
321-383-1105 Fax
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail, this 22ND day of January, 2010, to Anissa Bolton, 1800 N.W. 49th Street, Suite 120, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309.
OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY
INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, FSB, Case No.: 2009-CA-20189 CINS
EXHIBIT A TO DEFENDANT JANE DOE’S
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I, JANE DOE , hereby swear as follows:
2. This declaration is based upon my personal knowledge, and if called upon as a
witness in this matter I could competently testify to the facts as set forth below.
3. On January 21, 2010, I viewed the document in the court file that is alleged to be the original note. I compared that document to the copy of mortgage loan documents that I received at the time of closing which are still in my possession. I was given the copy at the closing, at which time I very carefully compared the copy to what was to be the original. I found that the copy and the original were made of the same paper – same weight, color, feel, look and size. When I viewed the alleged note in the court file I found it is on clearly different paper than the copy.
4. Additionally, I am an expert at recognizing my signature. When I closely examined “my” alleged signature on the document in the court file I found it to be lacking in authenticity as my original signature would leave an impression in the paper, which is not present in the document in the court file. Additionally, my recollection is that I signed in black ink, not blue, as is reflected in the document in the court file.
5. I believe that the alleged note in the court file contains a forgery of my signature and the document is fraudulent.
Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on January 22, 2010, by JANE DOE .
_____Personally known
_____Produced Identification
Type of identification produced _________________________________
ann 1275931076
To win the Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has to file their Affidavits. To fight against SJ, Defendants should strike Plaintiff's Affidavits and file them before the hearing date. Here is a sample of Florida Motion to Strike and its Memorandum. The UCC rules is applicable nationwide.
Merger to Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National
Association, Solely in its Capacity as Trustee,
Under the Pooling And Servicing Agreement
Dated September 1, 1999, Home Equity Loan
Asset Backed Certificates, Series 1999-3,
John Smith al.,
COMES NOW the Defendant, John Smith , and pursuant to Rule 1.140(f) moves this honorable Court to strike the documents placed into the court file on October 17, 2009
Attached to the Complaint was a photocopy of the May 21, 1999 promissory note obligating the Defendant to the "original lender" APPROVED, and a photocopy of an alleged allonge assigningthe note from "Approved Residential Mortgage Inc." (hereinafter "APPROVED") to "NorwestBank Minnesota N.A. As Trustee For Provident Bank Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3"(hereinafter "NORWEST"). There was no documentation filed with the complaint connectingthe note or mortgage to the named Plaintiff WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. (hereinafter "WELLS FARGO"). The Plaintiff at that time sought reestablishment of the original note which it claimedwas "lost, destroyed or stolen."
be the "Original Note" along with two allonges, one allonge being identical to the allonge filed with the Complaint, purportedly assigning the note to NORWEST, and the other allonge titled NOTE ALLONGE, which was not initially filed with the complaint, allegedly assigning an attached note from the Plaintiff WELLS FARGO to itself as trustee (hereinafter "WELLS FARGO allonge"). Copies of the note and allonges are attached as Exhibit B.
of Mortgage which assignment was executed on August 20, 2004 and filed into the Hernando County official records on September 9, 2004, a copy of which is attached herewith as Exhibit A.
4. Regardless of the document's title, the said Assignment of Mortgage assigned both the note and mortgage constituting the subject or res of this action to The Provident Bank, Inc., reading as follows in pertinent part:
assign, transfer and set over to: THE PROVIDENT BANK, INC., ...The described Mortgage, together with the certain note(s) described therein with all interest, all liens, and any rights due or to become due thereon..."
5. On February 16, 2010 the Defendant inspected the alleged "Original Note" placed in the file and denies its authenticity and that of the purported signature thereon (see "Affidavit of Defendant, Samuel Clay Adams In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" filed concurrently herewith and incorporated herein by reference thereto.
6. On the same date the Defendant observed that while there is generous room on the Note itself for indorsement, there is no indorsement on the Note, and the allonges filed with the note were not attached affixed to the note prior to filing.
7. Further the indorsements on the allonges were never verified by affidavit or testimony, were undated and unauthenticated by any corporate seal or stamp. Even if the alleged "original note" filed by the Plaintiff on October 17, 2008 is ruled to be authentic, it remains unenforceable because the alleged allonges are rendered invalid for violation of the rule of affixation to the note and authentication pursuant to F.S. § 673.2041(1) and Booker v. Sarasota Inc., 707 So.2d 886 (Fla.App. Dist.1 03/06/1998):
"The allonge, ultimately filed with the court had never previously been verified by affidavit or testimony, nor had it been provided to the court or to Booker in the form of an amended complaint. A Florida court may not consider an unauthenticated document in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, even where it appears that the such document, if properly authenticated, may have been dispositive. See Tunnell v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)."
8. Furthermore, even if the alleged "original note" filed by the Plaintiff on October 17, 2008 is ruled to be authentic, it remains unenforceable because the alleged allonges are contradicted and invalidated by competing evidence entered by the Plaintiff in the recorded
Assignment of Mortgage (Exhibit A), showing another named signatory assigning both the note and mortgage to Provident Bank on August 20, 2004. This fact is corroborated by the aforementioned affidavit of title attorney Gregory D. Clark, Esq., filed concurrently herewith and fully incorporated herein by reference thereto. The allonges filed on October 17, 2008 are therefore not valid and must be stricken.
9. Furthermore the WELLS FARGO allonge filed on October 17, 2008 is a sham on its face as it allegedly assigned the res to itself, was not filed with the Complaint, and the
Plaintiff can not be allowed to amend the record with exhibits that did not exist when the action was filed.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, John Smith , respectfully moves this court to strike the alleged "original note" along with the allonges filed therewith on October 17, 2008.
Regarding the note and allonges in this instant case: while there is generous room on the Note itself for indorsement, there is no indorsement on the Note, and the allonges were not previously affixed to the note. Further the indorsements on the allonges were never verified by affidavit or testimony, were undated and unauthenticated by any corporate seal or stamp.
Even if the alleged "original note" filed by the Plaintiff on October 17, 2008 is ruled to be authentic, it remains unenforceable because the alleged allonges are rendered invalid for violation of the rule of affixation to the note and authentication pursuant to F.S. § 673.2041(1) and Booker v.Sarasota Inc., 707 So.2d 886 (Fla.App. Dist.1 03/06/1998):
[17] Contrary to other arguments now advanced by Sarasota, Inc., the trial court could not simply assume that Sarasota, Inc. held the note, or that the photocopy of an allonge, filed after the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, was of appropriate evidentiary value. Booker has correctly pointed out that in order to be the real party in interest on a promissory note, the plaintiff must be the holder of the note. See Troupe v. Redner, 652 So. 2d 394, 395-396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Here, the allonge, attached to the complaint, and referred to by Sarasota Inc.'s affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment, showed an assignment of the note from an institution other than Citizens and Builders. The allonge, ultimately filed with the court had never previously been verified by affidavit or testimony, nor had it been provided to the court or to Booker in the form of an amended complaint.
A Florida court may not consider an unauthenticated document in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, even where it appears that the such document, if properly authenticated, may have been dispositive. See Tunnell v. Hicks, 574 So. 2d 264, 266
[19] "An allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof." Black's Law Dictionary 76 (6th ed. 1990). Florida's Uniform Commercial Code does not specifically mention an allonge, but notes that "for the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is part of the instrument. § 673.2041(1), Fla. Stat. (1995)." Federal rulings on the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in regard to the negotiation and enforcement of negotiable instruments are applicable to this issue in that the UCC is in effect enacted into the Florida statutes.
In Adams v. Madison Realty & Development Inc., 853 F.2d 163
[32] Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code incorporated many portions ofits predecessor, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), drafted in 1896 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. By 1924, the NIL had been adopted in every state. See 2 F. Hart & W. WiIlier, Commercial Paper Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.06, at 1-25 to -26 (1988). When it was transplanted into the 1956 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, the indorsements provision was altered in only a minor respect. Section 31 of the NIL had specified that a proper indorsement "must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto." The Code substituted the words "so firmly affixed as to become a part thereof" for the phrase "upon a paper attached thereto."...
[34] A holder in due course must take the instrument for value, in good faith,and without notice that it is overdue, that it has been dishonored, or that a claim or defense to it exists on the part of any person. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1). But preliminarily, a person seeking to become a holder in due course must satisfy the threshold requirements for becoming a "holder," the critical issue on this appeal. [35] The Code defines a holder as one 'who is in possession of . . . an instrument . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order." U.C.C. § 1- Defendant's Motion to Strike Note and Allonges - page 5 of 6
201(20). Mere ownership or possession of a note is insufficient to qualify an individual as a "holder." The instrument must be obtained through a process the Code terms "negotiation," defined as "the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a holder." U.C.C. § 3-202(1). If the instrument is payable to order -- as is the case with the notes here -- negotiation is accomplished "by delivery with any necessary indorsement." Id.
[36] In explaining the requirement that the indorsement be on or firmly affixed to the instrument, the Official Comment states that the Code "follows decisions holding that a purported indorsement on a mortgage or other separate paper pinned or clipped to an instrument is not sufficient for negotiation. The indorsement must be on the instrument itself or on a paper intended for the purpose which is so firmly affixed to the instrument as to become an extension or part of it. Such a paper is called an allonge." U.C.C. § 3-202 Official Code
[38] The Code's requirement that an indorsement be "firmly affixed" to its instrument is a settled feature of commercial law, adopted verbatim by every American state, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. See 5 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-202:2, at 416 (3d ed. 1984) (citing codifications). With a unanimity unusual in decisional law, the directive has been faithfully observed.
[39] The historical origins of the provision have been chronicled to the days of the Law Merchant. See Pribus v. Bush, 118 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 173 Cal. Rptr. 747
749 (1981). The practice of multiple indorsements which accompanied the growth in commerce eventually led to acceptance of the use of allonges. See id.; Estrada v. River Oaks Bank & Trust Co., 550 S.W.2d 719, 725 (Tex. Ct. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even today, however, numerous jurisdictions permit allonges only where, because of multiple indorsements, no additional space for signatures remains on the negotiable instrument. See, e.g., Pribus, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 751; Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Raines, 125 Ga. App. 263, 187 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1972). But see Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, 723-24 (1863) (allonge permitted even where space remains on note).
[40] When the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code replaced the term "attached" in the NIL with the phrase "firmly affixed," they intended to make the use of allonges more difficult. See Hills v. Gardiner Savings Institution, 309 A.2d 877, 880-81 (Me. 1973); Estrada, 550 S.W.2d at 728; 5 Anderson, supra, § 3-202:05. Courts have advanced two justifications for the firmly-affixed requirement. The California Court of Appeals reasoned that the provision serves to prevent fraud, remarking that a signature innocently placed upon an innocuous sheet of paper could be fraudulently attached to a negotiable instrument in order to simulate an indorsement. Pribus, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 750. But cf. Lamson v.Commercial Credit Corp., 187 Colo. 382, 531 P.2d 966, 968 (1975) (allonge consisting of two legal sheets stapled to two small checks held valid because signing on checks valid themselves would have been impossible; "stapling is the modern equivalent of gluing or pasting").
[41] The affixation requirement has also been cited for its utility in preserving a traceable chain of title, thus furthering the Code's goal of free and unimpeded negotiability of instruments. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared it "indispensably necessary" that negotiable instruments "should carry within them the indicia by which their ownership is to be determined; otherwise, their value as a circulating medium would be largely curtailed, if not entirelydestroyed." Haug v. Riley, 101 Ga. 372, 29 S.E. 44, 46 (1897). See also Crosby, 16 Wis. at 724 (permanently attached indorsements to instrument "travel with it wherever it might go"). Chancellor Hawkland writes that it would be "unreasonable to impose upon the indorsee the risk that the present holder or a prior holder had negotiated the instrument to someone not in the apparent chain of title by virtue of a separate document." 4 W. Hawkland & L. Lawrence, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 3-202:05 (1984).
ann 1275931103
Karen Delose 1287258342
Diane Dixon of Litton Loan signed as VP of Fremont Investment and Loan with an Assignment of Foreclosure after the Summary Judgement from Fremont with MERS as Nominee--the Notary of this Assignment Doc is Brenda McKinzy in Texas, but Fremont Investment and Loans is in California--also, Diane Dixon is also VP of Litton Loan Servicing--the foreclosure suit is dated Dec, 2007--Fremont went bankrupt June, 2008, the Assignment of Foreclosure by VP Diane Dixon of Fremont is dated July, 2008, and Christopher Spradling of Litton signed off on the Affidavitt of Indebtedness on my law suit for foreclosure. Also, Fremont lost the note Dec., 2007, but my attorney said there is a copy of it in the file now. Now, Fremont has a new attorney, and Diane Dixon signed off on the transfer as VP of Litton Loan Servicing in October, 2010. Anyone else dealing with these people please e-mail me.
upgrade 1288911201
Where is a good place to find an example of a Motion to Strike Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for Ohio? Ann's information was great, but peppered with Florida case law (duh?
Angelo 1288918931
Ann or anybody else for that matter
Does anybody have some good samples of oppositions for summary judgement for NY. It seems like there arent many good pleadings in my courthouse. I know that florida is ground zero for this mess, but there has to be somebody with great pleadings w ny case law to share.