Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/127185699/State-v-Kuhlman
Timestamp: 2014-08-30 01:50:15
Document Index: 182473570

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 169', '§ 169', 'art. 1', '§474', 'art. 1', '§ 474', '§169', '§169', '§ 169', '§ 410']

P. 1State v. KuhlmanState v. KuhlmanRatings: (0)|Views: 3
|Likes: 1Published by MN Senate Transportation & Public Safety Committee & Finance DivisionState v. KuhlmanState v. KuhlmanMore info:Published by: MN Senate Transportation & Public Safety Committee & Finance Division on Feb 25, 2013Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttp://www.scribd.com/doc/127185699/State-v-Kuhlman02/25/2013pdftextoriginal State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Daniel Alan Kuhlman, Respondent.A06-568SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
729 N.W.2d 577 ;
2007 Minn. LEXIS 175
April 5, 2007, FiledPRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] Court of Appeals
State v. Kuhlman, 722 N.W.2d 1, 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 138 (2006).
Minneapolis Code of Ordinances sections 474.620 to474.670, which make the owner of a motor vehicle guiltyof a petty misdemeanor if the vehicle is photographedrunning a red light, are invalid because they are inconflict with the Minnesota Traffic Regulations, andspecifically with
Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 4(a)
(2006),and
Minn. Stat. § 169.022
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: LoriSwanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, Mary EllenHeng, Minneapolis, MN.ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: Howard I. Bass,Bass & Peck, PLLC, Burnsville, MN.ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS GROUP: Faison T.Sessoms, Jr., Minnesota Association of Criminal DefenseLawyers, Minneapolis, MN.
HANSON, Justice. PAGE, J., took no part inthe consideration or decision of this case.
[*578]Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.HANSON, Justice.In September 2004, the Minneapolis City Councilenacted Minneapolis Code of Ordinances sections474.620 to 474.670, which authorized photo enforcementof traffic control signals. The Minneapolis police beganenforcing the new ordinance in July 2005, and on August11, 2005, one of the cameras photographed a car as itfailed to stop at a red light at the intersection of WestBroadway Avenue and Lyndale [*579] Avenue North.The Minneapolis Police Department mailed a citation tothe registered owner of the car, respondent [**2] DanielAlan Kuhlman, for violating the ordinance. Kuhlmanchallenged the ordinance, arguing that it conflicted withstate law and violated the due process rights of registeredowners. The district court granted Kuhlman's motion todismiss without reaching the constitutional issues,holding that the ordinance conflicted with state law. Thecourt of appeals affirmed the dismissal.
State v. Kuhlman,722 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. App. 2006)
. We affirm.Ordinance section 474.640 penalizes an owner of amotor vehicle whose car is photographed running a redlight: "If a motor vehicle is operated in violation of section 474.630 [running a red light] and the violation isdetected by a recorded image taken by an automatedtraffic law enforcement system,
the owner of the vehiclePage 1
or the lessee of the vehicle is guilty of a pettymisdemeanor." Minneapolis, Minn., Code art. 1, §474.640 (2004) (emphasis added). The ordinance furtherprovides, in section 474.660 entitled "Evidence," that(a) In the prosecution of a violation, asset forth by section 474.640, captured byan automated traffic law enforcementsystem, prima facie evidence that thevehicle described in the citation [**3] wasoperated in violation of this section,together with proof that the defendant wasat the time of such violation the owner orlessee of the vehicle, shall constitute inevidence a rebuttable presumption thatsuch owner or lessee was the person whocommitted the violation. The presumptionshall be rebutted if the owner or lessee:(1) Provides a swornaffidavit delivered byUnited States mail to thecity or agency that he orshe was not the owner orlessee of the vehicle at thetime of the allegedviolation and provides thename and current addressof the person operating themotor vehicle at the time of the violation; or(2) Submits a copy of apolice report showing thevehicle had been reportedas stolen in a timelymanner before the date of the violation.(b) If the city or agency finds that theperson named in the citation was notoperating the vehicle at the time of theviolation or receives evidence underparagraph (a)(1) of this section identifyingthe person driving the vehicle at the timeof the violation, the city or agency shallissue a citation to the identified driverthrough the United State mail, no laterthan fourteen (14) days after receipt of this[**4] information.Minneapolis, Minn., Code art. 1, § 474.660 (2004).Section 660(a)(1) suggests that an owner will remainliable, even if he or she provides the name of anotherperson who operated the vehicle, unless the owner alsoproves that he or she was not the owner at the time of thealleged violation. But an affidavit submitted byMinneapolis police in response to Kuhlman's motion todismiss states that police will not issue a citation to boththe vehicle owner and the person the vehicle owneridentifies as the driver, and acknowledges that courtscannot convict both the owner and driver of the sameviolation. At oral argument, the state further explainedthat if a vehicle owner identifies another person as thedriver, the ordinance charge against the owner would bedismissed and the driver would be charged, but the driverwould not be charged under the ordinance because theordinance only provides for owner liability, not driverliability. Instead, the driver would be charged under theMinnesota Traffic Regulations ("the Act"),
Minn. Stat.ch. 169
(2006), which imposes liability [*580] on motorvehicle drivers for red-light violations.
See Minn. Stat. §169.06 [**5]
, subds. 4(a)
(2006).The Act also requires that its provisions "shall beapplicable and uniform throughout this state and in allpolitical subdivisions and municipalities."
Minn. Stat. §169.022
(2006). The Act does not provide owner liabilityfor traffic light violations.The district court dismissed the state's case againstKuhlman, deciding that the Minneapolis ordinanceconflicts with the Act. The district court reasoned that theordinance and the Act cover the same subject matter butthat the Minneapolis ordinance provides fewer "dueprocess protections" than are guaranteed to vehicleowners who are prosecuted under the Act. The MinnesotaCourt of Appeals affirmed the district court, reasoningthat (1) an owner-liability ordinance would impedestate-wide uniformity and therefore conflicts with theAct; and (2) because the ordinance actually seeks topenalize drivers, rather than owners, it again conflictswith the statute because the ordinance imposes a lesserburden of proof on the state.
Kuhlman, 722 N.W.2d at 6-8 .The question before us is very narrow, whether theAct, and specifically
Minn. Stat. §§ 169.06 [**6] and
, preempt the Minneapolis ordinance. This is aPage 2729 N.W.2d 577, *579; 2007 Minn. LEXIS 175, **2
Peterson v. BASF Corp., 675 N.W.2d 57, 69 (Minn. 2004)
vacated and remanded on other grounds
544 U.S. 1012
(mem.)(2005).Generally, "municipalities have no inherent powersand possess only such powers as are expressly conferredby statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powerswhich have been expressly conferred."
Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966)
. Minneapolis is ahome-rule-charter city with a general welfare clause, andas such has some power to enact traffic regulations, butthose traffic regulations are not valid if they are inconflict with state law.
See Minn. Stat. § 410.015
State v. Sugarman, 126 Minn. 477, 479, 148 N.W. 466,467 (1914)
.To consider whether the ordinance conflicts with theAct, we begin with
, which imposesa uniformity requirement on traffic regulationsthroughout the state:The provisions of this chapter shall[**7] be applicable and uniformthroughout this state and in all politicalsubdivisions and municipalities therein,and no local authority shall enact orenforce any rule or regulation in conflictwith the provisions of this chapter unlessexpressly authorized herein.We have held that this "provision requiring uniformityand statewide application clearly showed the legislativeintent to preempt this field except for the limited localregulation the statute expressly permitted."
Mangold, 274 Minn. at 359, 143 N.W.2d at 821
see also Duffy v. Martin, 265 Minn. 248, 252, 121 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1963)
("In order to provide uniformity in traffic regulationsthroughout the state, our legislature has prohibited theenactment of ordinances by municipalities in conflictwith state statutes, at least since 1911, except whereexpressly authorized." (footnote omitted)). But we havefurther held that even though the state has preempted thefield of traffic law, " 'no conflict exists where theordinance, though different, is merely additional andcomplementary to or in aid and furtherance of the statute.'"
City of St. Paul v. Olson, 300 Minn. 455, 456, 220 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1974)
[**8] (quoting
Mangold, 274 Minn. at 352, 143 N.W.2d at 817 ). If the ordinance coversspecifically what the statute covers generally, [*581] itdoes not conflict with the statute.
Id. at 457, 220 N.W.2d at 485
.We have applied the preemption doctrine in thecontext of traffic regulations in three principal cases,
Olson, Duffy, and State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959)
, the defendant, chargedwith violating a Saint Paul ordinance prohibitingunreasonable acceleration, challenged the ordinance onthe ground that it conflicted with state law.
300 Minn. at 455-56, 220 N.W.2d at 484-85
. We determined that theordinance did not conflict with state law because statelaw contained a general prohibition against carelessdriving and unreasonable acceleration was one form of careless driving.
Id. at 456-57, 220 N.W.2d at 485
.Because the ordinance covered specifically what thestatute covered generally, we held that the ordinance didnot conflict with state law.
, a district court had given jury instructionsin a civil action relating to the actions [**9] drivers musttake before moving a parked car.
265 Minn. at 251-52,121 N.W.2d at 345-46 . The state statute required that theperson should not move a vehicle " 'unless and until suchmovement can be made with reasonable safety.' "
Id. at 251, 121 N.W.2d at 346 . The Minneapolis ordinance usedthe same standard, but also required the person to give ahand signal.
Id., 121 N.W.2d at 346 . We held that theMinneapolis ordinance was invalid because it "adds arequirement that is absent from the statute."
Id. at 254-55,121 N.W.2d at 347-48 . We emphasized that "[t]hepurpose of uniformity required by our statutes is toenable a driver of a motor vehicle to proceed in all partsof the state without the risk of violating an ordinance withwhich he is not familiar."
Id. at 255, 121 N.W.2d at 348 .In
, the defendant was convicted without a jury of violating an Edina ordinance for driving anautomobile while intoxicated.
256 Minn. at 436, 98 N.W.2d at 814
. The Edina city charter allowed for trialwithout a jury for ordinance violations.
Id. at 436, 98 N.W.2d at 814
. A statute [**10] also prohibited drivingwhile intoxicated, making it a criminal offense and thusaffording a defendant the right to a jury trial.
Id. at 437 &n.2,
98 N.W.2d at 815
& n.2. A related statute alsoprovided a presumption of innocence, requiring that thestate prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and providedprotection against double jeopardy.
Id. at 438, 98 N.W.2d at 815
. We noted that although the legislature favoredPage 3729 N.W.2d 577, *580; 2007 Minn. LEXIS 175, **6