Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/348/176/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 01:59:28
Document Index: 444767586

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1292']

Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, (full text) :: 348 U.S. 176 (1955) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 348 › Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger › Case
This equitable action was brought in a state court for an accounting of the profits of a joint venture in construction under the National Housing Act, and was removed to a federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Under the joint venture agreement, Baltimore
McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 141 U. S. 665-666. [Footnote 2] Section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 84, provided that appeals in civil actions could be taken to the circuit courts only from final decrees and judgments. [Footnote 3] That requirement of finality has remained a part of our
The trial court's interpretation of the quoted contract clause and its order denying a stay could not be called a final decision under § 1291. It was as surely an interlocutory order as the District Court's order in Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 293 U. S. 451. [Footnote 5]
The provision for interlocutory appeals was first introduced in 1891, when the circuit courts of appeals were established as intermediate appellate courts. 26 Stat. 826. Section 7 of that Act allowed appeals from interlocutory orders in equity "granting or continuing" injunctions, but from those only. Additions to the class of appealable interlocutory orders were made from time to time until the enactment of § 1292 in its present form. [Footnote 6]
No discussion of the underlying reasons for modifying the rule of finality appears in the legislative history, although the changes seem plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence. [Footnote 7] When the pressure rises to a point that influences Congress, legislative remedies are enacted. The Congress is in a position to weigh the competing interests of the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of savings in time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on litigants. When countervailing considerations arise, interested parties and organizations become active in efforts to modify the appellate jurisdiction. [Footnote 8] This Court, however, is not authorized to approve or declare judicial modification. It is the responsibility of all courts to see that no unauthorized extension or reduction of jurisdiction, direct or indirect, occurs in the federal system. Shanferoke Corp. v. Westchester Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 293 U. S. 451. Any such ad hoc decisions disorganize practice by encouraging attempts to secure or oppose appeals, with a consequent waste of time and money. The
The point was made in the Enelow case that power to stay mere steps within the framework of the litigation before a court differs as to appealability from an injunction prohibiting proceedings in another court. This distinction was applied in Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U. S. 254. There, the insurance company brought a suit for reformation of the contract. The insured counterclaimed, seeking to enforce the contract as written, and demanded a jury trial; the company moved to strike the demand; the court granted the motion and set the case for trial to the court without a jury. The insured appealed, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. We affirmed, holding that the Enelow rule did not apply; that, since this was an equitable proceeding with a counterclaim to enforce the policy, the decision to hear the reformation issue first without a jury was only a decision as to how to try the case, and therefore was not an interlocutory order in the nature of an injunction. To the argument that the importance of a jury trial justified
The reliance on the analogy of equity power to enjoin proceedings in other courts has elements of fiction in this day of one form of action. The incongruity of taking jurisdiction from a stay in a law type, and denying jurisdiction in an equity type, proceeding springs from the persistence of outmoded procedural differentiations. Some simplification would follow from an assumption or denial of jurisdiction in both. The distinction has been
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 324 U. S. 233-234; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 34 U. S. 273.
This enlarged the English rule, for there, interlocutory appeals were allowed in equity, although not at common law. 1 Holdsworth's History of English Law 214; Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 540-548, 551. Section 22 was rigorously enforced. Rutherford v. Fisher, 4 Dall. 21; Young v. Grundy, 6 Cranch 51. Fragmentary appeals were denounced. Canter v. American Ins. Co., 3 Pet. 307, 28 U. S. 318; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 34 U. S. 273.
I think the District Court's order denying a stay is appealable because it is (1) "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and (2) a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of § 1292. As the Court admits, a collateral issue may be so severable and unrelated to central trial issues have a judgment on the collateral issue is considered "final" and appealable under § 1291, even though other important issues are left undecided. Given this common sense meaning, § 1291 authorizes the present appeal. For certainly, decision of whether a judicial, rather than an arbitration, tribunal shall hear and determine this accounting controversy is logically and practically severable from the factual and legal issues crucial to determination of the merits of the controversy. And this Court has held that § 1292 makes all stay orders appealable that have the substantial effect of interlocutory injunction orders. Ettelson v. Metropolitan