Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v42/42-039.html
Timestamp: 2016-08-28 05:28:35
Document Index: 167647860

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2424', '§ 2424', '§ 5596', '§ 7701', '§ 5596', '§ 7701', '§ 5596', '§ 5596', '§ 7701', '§ 5542', '§ 5542', '§ 5542', '§ 5543', '§ 5542']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] 42:0599(39)NG - - AFGE, National Border Patrol Council and National INS Council and Justice, INS - - 1991 FLRAdec NG - - v42 p599
[ v42 p599 ] 42:0599(39)NG
42 FLRA No. 39
NATIONAL BORDER PATROL COUNCIL AND NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE COUNCIL
0-NG-1726
Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and concerns
the negotiability of four proposals regarding the
implementation of the Agency's drug testing program.(1)
Proposals 1 and 6 require the Agency to provide employees
who are required to undergo a "reasonable suspicion" drug test
with various forms of written justification for that test
within 24 and 48 hours, respectively, after testing. We find
that Proposals 1 and 6 constitute negotiable procedures under
section 7106(b)(2) of the Statute. Section C of Proposal 3 provides that employees who are
Union representatives will not be improperly denied official
time to represent employees concerning matters involving the
Agency's drug testing plan. We find that section C of Proposal
3 is negotiable.
Proposal 4 provides for the presence of Union
representatives when the Agency identifies which employees will
be randomly drug tested. We find that that aspect of Proposal
4 is negotiable. Proposal 4 also establishes procedures by
which the Union will verify the computerized process used by
the Agency to randomly select employees for drug testing. The
record is not sufficient for the Authority to make a
negotiability determination concerning the verification
procedures described in Proposal 4. Therefore, the petition
for review as to section A and section C, subsections 1-3, of
Proposal 4 is dismissed.
The Agency contends that the Union's petition for review
is untimely. We find that the Union's petition for review is
As a result of negotiations concerning the Agency's
implementation of Executive Order No. 12564, the parties
reached "a partial agreement." Agency's Statement of Position
(Agency's Statement) at 2. However, the Agency rejected
several of the Union's proposals on the basis that the
proposals either were nonnegotiable or reopened matters already
agreed to in the parties' Master Agreement. The Union sought
assistance from the Federal Service Impasses Panel (the Panel). However, after being advised by the Agency of the negotiability
dispute between the parties, the Panel declined to assert
jurisdiction. See Exhibit B to Agency Statement (Panel's
response dated October 3, 1988).
By letter dated June 19, 1989, the Union "request[ed] the
Agency's allegation that the obligation to bargain does not
extend to certain language proposed to be bargained." Attachment to Petition for Review at 1. The Agency received
the Union's request for an allegation of nonnegotiability on
June 27, 1989. As of July 20, 1989, the Union had not
"received the requested allegations" of nonnegotiability. Petition for Review at 1. On July 20, 1989, pursuant to
section 2424.3 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations, the
Union filed a petition for review with the Authority concerning
the proposals at issue in this case. The Union received the
Agency's allegation of nonnegotiability on July 21, 1989, after
the Union filed its petition for review.
The Agency states that the Authority determined in
Commander, Carswell Air Force Base, Texas and American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 1364, 31 FLRA 620
(1988) (Commander, Carswell AFB) that the Panel may resolve
some duty to bargain issues in an impasse resolution
proceeding. The Agency contends that:
[G]iven the need for an agency to timely assert
in its response to a union request to the Panel
that the Panel does not have jurisdiction to
consider the union's proposals because they
raise unresolved negotiability issues, and the
Panel's concomitant obligation to render a
decision in the face of such an assertion
regarding its jurisdiction, there is simply no
longer any valid reason to characterize the
agency's assertions in this instance as [an]
'unsolicited'" allegation of nonnegotiability.
Agency's Statement at 8. The Agency asserts that "a
subsequent Panel decision . . . to reject one or more
proposals submitted by the union on the grounds they raise
unresolved negotiability questions should be held to
trigger the union's obligation to file under section
7117(c)(2) of the Statute within 15 days." Id.
The Agency argues that it had no obligation to
respond to the Union's request for an allegation of
nonnegotiability in this case because the Agency's "written
statement of management's position before the Panel
regarding the fact that the proposals at issue here raised
unresolved negotiability issues[,] taken [together with]
the Panel's subsequent rejection of the Union's request . .
. on jurisdictional grounds, constituted an agency
'allegation' of nonnegotiability within the meaning of
[section 7117(c)(2)]." Id. at 11. Because the Union did
not file its petition for review within 15 days of the
Panel's October 3, 1988 denial of the Union's request for
assistance, the Agency contends that the petition for
review is untimely.
A petition for review must be filed within 15 days of
the date of service of an agency's written allegation of
nonnegotiability. 5 C.F.R. § 2424.3. A union "shall
request such allegation in writing[.]" Id. However, a
union is not required to file a petition for review of an
unrequested allegation of nonnegotiability. Rather, "the
union may ignore such unsolicited allegation and instead
elect to request in writing a written allegation of
nonnegotiability from the [a]gency" at a later time. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 422 and
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Colorado River Agency, 34 FLRA 721, 723 (1990) (quoting
1931 and Department of the Navy, Naval Weapons Station,
Concord, California, 24 FLRA 512, 513 (1986) (Naval Weapons
Station) (where the agency's unsolicited allegation of
nonnegotiability was made in the context of a Panel
proceeding). Therefore, the Union in this case could
ignore the Agency's unsolicited allegation of
nonnegotiability made in the proceedings before the Panel
and elect to request an allegation at a later time. We disagree with the Agency's position that
Commander, Carswell AFB compels the conclusion that an
allegation of nonnegotiability provided by an agency in an
impasse proceeding at the Panel's request triggers a
union's obligation to file an appeal before the Authority
concerning negotiability issues not resolved by the Panel. In Commander, Carswell AFB, the Authority held that if the
Panel and interest arbitrators can resolve a duty to
bargain issue which arises in a negotiation impasse by
applying existing Authority case law, they have authority
under the Statute to do so. That decision did not suggest
that an allegation of nonnegotiability made by an agency in
a Panel proceeding constitutes a written allegation of
nonnegotiability which triggers a union's obligation to
file a negotiability appeal under section 7117(c)(2) of the
Statute. See Naval Weapons Station, 24 FLRA at 513. Therefore, we reject the Agency's argument, based on
Commander, Carswell AFB, that it had no obligation to
nonnegotiability because its statement of position before
the Panel was a written allegation of nonnegotiability,
within the meaning of section 7117(c)(2), which triggered
the Union's obligation to file a negotiability appeal under
section 7117(c)(2) of the Statute. See American Federation
of Government Employees, National Border Patrol Council and
National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council and
Service, 40 FLRA 521, 523-25 (1991), petition for review
filed sub nom. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. FLRA, No. 91-4525 (5th Cir. June
The Union requested an allegation of nonnegotiability
on June 19, 1989. When the Agency failed to respond to the
Union's request for an allegation concerning the
nonnegotiability of the proposals as of July 20, 1989, the
Union filed a petition for review with the Authority. Because the Agency failed to respond to the Union's request
for an allegation of nonnegotiability, the time limit in
section 7117(c)(2) of the Statute for filing a
negotiability appeal does not apply. Naval Weapons
Station, 24 FLRA at 514. Therefore, the Union's petition
for review is timely filed.
The Agency filed a Statement of Position setting
forth the reasons supporting management's assertion that
the proposals at issue are nonnegotiable or not properly
before the Authority. The Union filed a response to the
Agency's statement of position. The Agency also filed a
supplemental brief responding to the Union's assertions
that the proposals are negotiable under section 7106(b)(3)
of the Statute as appropriate arrangements. The Agency
maintains that the supplemental brief is necessary because
"the Union had made a blanket alternative argument that all
of its proposals constituted 'appropriate arrangements'
within the meaning of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute
without identifying any of the adverse effects of the
exercise of reserved rights which they intended to
ameliorate." Agency's Supplemental Brief at 1. The Union
objects to the Agency's supplemental brief. Because the
Union asserted in its petition for review that the
proposals constitute appropriate arrangements and because
the Agency had an opportunity to respond to those claims in
its statement of position, we have not considered the
Agency's unsolicited supplemental brief. See 5 C.F.R. § 2424.8 (the Authority will not consider unauthorized
supplemental submissions by a party unless such submission
is requested by the Authority or unless, upon a party's
written request, the Authority in its discretion grants
permission to file such submission).
Also, during the pendency of this case, the Federal
courts issued several decisions concerning agency drug
testing programs. On December 14, 1989, the parties in
this case (and parties in similar drug-related cases) were
directed by the Authority to file supplemental briefs
addressing the applicability to this case of recent Federal
court decisions cited in the Order and other court
decisions on drug testing programs. Both the Union and the
Agency filed a supplemental brief.
An employee may be subject to testing on the
basis that management has a reasonable suspicion
that the employee is using illegal drugs, as
identified in the INS Drug Free Workplace Plan,
on or off duty. Upon written request, an employee who has been tested on the basis of
reasonable suspicion will be provided a copy of
the written justification (which may include
such matters as the dates and times of reported
drug related incidents, reliable/credible
sources of information, and the rationale
leading to the test) for such testing no later
than the end of the day. In the event the
employee is sent for testing after 12:00 PM
(Noon), the Service shall have until 12:00 PM
(Noon) the following day to provide a copy of
the written justification to the employee.
The decision to direct an employee to report for
reasonable suspicion testing, in accordance with
the INS Drug Free Workplace Plan, shall be based
on articulable information, facts, and
circumstances which would lead supervision to
believe that reasonable suspicion exists that
the employee is using illegal drugs, as
identified in the Drug Free Workplace Plan.
An employee in the Service may be subject to
testing on the basis that management has a
reasonable suspicion that the employee is using
illegal drugs as identified in the INS Drug Free
Workplace Plan, on or off duty. Upon request,
an employee who has been tested on the basis of
the factual observations upon which the testing
has been based, in accordance with Article 15B
of this Agreement. Such documentation should
normally be made available to the employee
within 48 hours. The decision to direct an
employee to report for reasonable suspicion
testing, in accordance with the INS Drug Free
Workplace Plan, shall be based on articulable
facts and circumstances which led supervision to
believe that the employee uses illegal drugs.
The Agency acknowledges the Union's statement
that Proposals 1 and 6 do not apply to random
testing. Agency's Statement at 12. However,
the Agency argues that if Proposals 1 and 6 "are
intended to preclude drug testing of employees
in [testing designated positions] except in
those circumstances where there is a 'reasonable
suspicion' the particular employee to be tested
is or has been using illegal drugs, they are
inconsistent with section 3(a) of E.O. 125654
and, thus, with section 7117(a)(1) of the
Statute." Agency's Statement at 15.
The Agency states that "Proposals 1 and 6
ostensibly permit management to order employees
suspected of using illegal drugs to report
immediately to a specimen collection site and
provide a specimen without first receiving a
copy of 'written justification' for such
testing." Id. The Agency maintains that the
written justification required by the Union's
proposal "may often necessarily reveal facts
which the employee not only has no immediate
need to know, but which if prematurely revealed,
impair further investigation" of the employee or
other employees. Id. at 18. The Agency states
that "management may have good reason not to
contemporaneously disclose most, if not all, of
the information in its possession which would
provide 'reasonable cause' to order the employee
to submit to testing." Id. The Agency contends
that Proposals 1 and 6 would require the
concerning ongoing security investigations and,
thereby, would interfere with the Agency's right
to determine its internal security practices
The Agency also contends that Proposals 1 and
6 interfere with the Agency's right to assign
work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. The Agency argues that "given the command
structure set out by management for confirming
the existence of 'reasonable suspicion,'" Proposals 1 and 6 would "require as a practical
matter, that either the employee's first or
second line supervisor create a 'written
justification.'" Id. at 21-22. The Agency
asserts that even if the proposals did not
require that those tasks be performed by the
employee's first or second-line supervisors,
they would interfere with management's right to
assign work. The Agency states that to be
consistent with Proposals 1 and 6, the written
justification must be completed within the time
frames established by the proposals. The Agency
argues that by dictating when that particular
work is to be performed, Proposals 1 and 6
The Agency also states that even if the
Department of Justice and the Agency's drug
testing plans already require that written
justification be provided employees within the time frames established in the proposals,
Proposals 1 and 6 are still nonnegotiable. The
Agency argues that the fact that the Agency has
chosen to exercise its reserved rights in the
form of a written order or regulation does not
make the Union's proposals negotiable.
The Agency contends that Proposal 1 directly
interferes with management's right to discipline
under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the Statute and
contravenes 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) and § 7701(c)(2)(A). The Agency states:
Proposal 1 does not, on its face[,] preclude
management from making use of a positive test
result from a specimen obtained as the result of
"reasonable suspicion" testing as the basis for
an adverse action in the circumstance where
management fails to provide a copy of the
"written justification" to the employee within
the tight time limits prescribed. However, the
clear import of the proposal is that the Union
would, in challenging any subsequent adverse
action in such a circumstance on the employee's
behalf, assert that the action would have to be
set aside if management had, indeed, failed to
meet these deadlines. That is, the purpose of
the proposal is to create a tripwire over which
management will frequently . . . have occasion
to fall so that the employee can assert that
management committed a "harmful error" within
the meaning of 5 U.S.C. section 7117(c)
requiring the action to be set aside.
Agency's Statement at 24. The Agency argues
that the Union cannot create a contractual
procedure which, if violated, would serve to
negate an adverse action where management's
failure to follow the procedure "could not have
any effect on the employee's ability to defend
himself against an adverse action based on a
positive test result." Id. at 26. The Agency
asserts that because any failure by the Agency
to provide written justification to an employee
within the time limits prescribed in Proposals 1
and 6 "could not have any effect on the
employee's ability to defend himself against an
adverse action based upon a positive test
result[,]" such a requirement directly
interferes with the Agency's right to discipline
and contravenes 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) and § 7701(c)(2)(A). Id. at 26.
The Agency also asserts that if the Union
"attempt[s] to argue that management could
provide whatever time was necessary to complete
the written justification and transmit it to the
employee merely by delaying its order to the
employee to report to a collection site . . .
our response would be that it must be
rejected[.]" Agency's Statement at 27. The
Agency argues that any delay in ordering an
employee to submit a specimen in a situation
where the employee is suspected of working under
the influence of illegal drugs will reduce the
Agency's ability to detect the drug use and,
thereby, directly interfere with management's
rights to determine internal security practices.
Finally, the Agency contends that Proposals 1
and 6 are not "appropriate arrangements" for
the Agency's rights under section 7106(a)(2)(A)
of the Statute. The Agency asserts that
Proposals 1 and 6 are "'procedural' in nature
rather than constituting 'arrangements.'" Id.
at 23. The Agency argues that the Authority's
"appropriate arrangements" test in National
24 (1986) is "based on a misreading of the
Statute." Id. See also id. at 56-59. The
Agency states that, in any event, it is unable
to address the Union's contention that the
proposals are appropriate arrangements under the
test set forth in Kansas Army National Guard
because the Union has not described the adverse
effects the proposals were designed to offset.
In its supplemental brief, the Agency states
that recent Supreme Court decisions on drug
testing are pertinent to this case because "they
directly address the government's compelling
interest in enabling responsible supervisors to
detect and penalize and/or deter government
employees . . . who use illegal drugs" and
"they also address the undesirable effect on
serving that interest which would be created by
requiring an extensive diversion of supervisory
and managerial resources for the purpose of
documenting facts to establish 'reasonable
cause' to test employees in critical positions."
Agency's Supplemental Brief in Support of Agency
Statement of Position (Agency's Supplemental
Brief) at 20. The Agency argues that because
the Supreme Court found the Government's
interest "to be so 'compelling' as to outweigh
the employee's privacy interest under the Fourth
Amendment [of the United States Constitution],"
it follows that any Union proposal which would
amend the Agency's internal security practices
"so as to severely limit management's ability to
carry out such testing most effectively" cannot
constitute a negotiable procedure or an
appropriate arrangement within the meaning of
section 7106(b)(2) and section 7106(b)(3),
respectively. Id. at 17-18.
The Agency maintains that there is an
inherent conflict between Proposals 1 and 6 and
"the thrust of the Supreme Court's rulings." Id. at 18. The Agency argues that the proposals
would create excessive burdens on Agency
managers and "frequently require management to
divert scarce supervisory . . . resources away
from contemporaneously arising operational needs
no matter how pressing these other needs are." Id. at 19. The Agency asserts that the
Authority is "constrained" by the Supreme
Court's reasoning in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989) (Von
Raab) to reject the Union's assertion that the
proposals do not excessively interfere with the
exercise of the Agency's rights to determine its
internal security practices and to assign work. Id. at 25-26.
The Union states that "Proposals 1 and 6
involve only that kind of drug testing which is
based on 'reasonable suspicion.' They do not
apply to other kinds of testing, such as random
testing[.]" Union's Response to Agency's
Statement of Position (Union's Response) at 13. According to the Union, the effect of Proposals
1 and 6 is "to institute the requirement that a
pre-testing standard exists, in this case
reasonable suspicion, upon which determinations
to subject employees to drug testing must be
based." Id. The Union asserts that the Agency
has failed to demonstrate how Proposals 1 and 6
would violate management's rights under section
7106(a) of the Statute. The Union also contends
that Proposals 1 and 6 are appropriate
the exercise of the Agency's right to test
employees for illegal drug use.
The Union maintains that without articulable
information to suspect an employee of illegal
drug usage, employees might be subject to
harassment and intimidation by Agency officials
and, therefore, would be adversely affected by
the Agency's exercise of its right to implement
a reasonable suspicion testing program. The
Union also maintains that reasonable suspicion
testing adversely affects employees because it
is an intrusion on employees' privacy and is
"extremely personally embarrassing"; "tends to
stigmatize the employee in a way random testing
. . . does not, regardless of the outcome of the
testing"; and damages the employee's
relationship with the employer because the tests
may be the basis for disciplinary action and
performance based action. Id. at 15-16.
"In weighing the balance of interests between
employees and [the Agency]" to determine whether
any alleged interference with the Agency's right
to assign work would be excessive, the Union
states that "[b]y their unambiguous terms, the
proposals require that employees 'be provided
with' the required information. They do not
address which individuals . . . would be
responsible for providing the information. Thus, . . . the proposals have nothing to say
about the Agency's past or future determinations
as to who would provide the information." Id.
The Union asserts that Proposals 1 and 6 do
not interfere with the Agency's internal
security practices and do not compromise
security investigations. The Union states that
Proposal 1 "permits the employer significant
latitude in providing the justification[.]" Id.
at 19. The Union explains that where ongoing
investigations involving others are involved,
the written justification required in Proposal 1
could be tailored to exclude the names of other
suspects or witnesses. "At the same time, the
justification would at least provide the
employee with the due process protection of
knowing why she or he was directed to undergo
the testing, and, therefore, would reduce
instances in which testing [is] directed
improperly." Id. The Union also states that
the requirement in Proposal 6 that the employee
be provided a copy of factual observations upon
which reasonable suspicion testing is based
"both provides the employee with minimal due
process protection and allows the [Agency] to
protect ongoing investigations and witnesses." Id. at 20.
The Union argues that establishing a time
frame for providing the written justification
for reasonable suspicion testing does not
interfere with management's rights. The Union
states that under Proposals 1 and 6, employees
will "undergo testing first [and] receive the
reason(s) later." Id. The Union maintains that
the requirement that employees be given the
reasons for their selection for reasonable
suspicion testing is not to establish a basis to
show harmful error exists. The Union states
that "Proposals 1 and 6 would not alter the
already-existing availability of or requirements
for the defense of 'harmful error.'" Id. at 21.
The Union claims that the effect of Proposals
1 and 6 on the exercise of management's right
rights is minimal when compared to the benefit
provided employees. The Union asserts that the
Proposals 1 and 6 would not: (1) prevent the
Agency from directing employees to undergo
reasonable suspicion testing; (2) designate the
Agency official to provide the employee
information concerning the reasons for the
testing; (3) require that testing be delayed
until written justification is provided; or (4)
preclude the imposition of discipline. B. Analysis and Conclusions
We find that Proposals 1 and 6 are consistent
with Executive Order 12564. We also find that
Proposals 1 and 6 do not directly interfere with
the Agency's rights to determine internal
security practices, assign work or discipline
employees. Rather, Proposals 1 and 6 constitute
negotiable procedures under section 7106(b)(2)
of the Statute. 1. The Meaning of the Proposals
Proposals 1 and 6 do not concern the Agency's
random drug testing program. The proposals
concern only the Agency's plan to test an
employee based on a reasonable suspicion that
the employee is using illegal drugs. The plain
wording of Proposals 1 and 6 acknowledges that
an employee may be tested based on a reasonable
suspicion that the employee is using illegal
drugs. Proposals 1 and 6 provide that an
employee designated for drug testing based on a
reasonable suspicion of drug use will be
provided "written justification" or
"documentation" supporting the Agency's
reasonable suspicion within 24 hours under
Proposal 1 or 48 hours under Proposal 6. Proposals 1 and 6 also provide that the
reasonable suspicion supporting the Agency's
decision to test an employee shall be based on
articulable information, facts, and
circumstances which would lead the Agency to
believe that an employee has used illegal drugs.
2. Proposals 1 and 6 Are Consistent
with Executive Order No. 12564
We reject the Agency's contention that
Proposals 1 and 6 are inconsistent with section
3(a) of Executive Order 12564 because the
proposals preclude random drug testing of
employees. We first note that Executive Order
12564 authorizes, but does not require, random
testing. National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 15 and Department of the Army,
U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical
Command, Rock Island Illinois, 30 FLRA 1046,
1054 (1988) (Rock Island I), decision on remand
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local
15 and Department of the Army, U.S. Army
Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Rock
Island, Illinois, 33 FLRA 436 (1988) (Rock
Island II), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom.
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Aberdeen
Proving Ground v. FLRA, 890 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Aberdeen Proving Ground), decision on
remand National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 15 and Department of the Army, U.S. Army
Island, Illinois, 35 FLRA 936 (1990) (Rock
Island III). The Executive Order also
authorizes, but does not require, reasonable
suspicion testing, post-accident testing, and
applicant testing. Executive Order 12564,
sections 3(c)(1), (2) and (d). Consequently,
even assuming that the Agency correctly
interpreted the proposals, the proposals would
not be inconsistent with the Executive Order. Id.
In any event, the Agency has misinterpreted
the effect of the proposals. As we stated
above, Proposals 1 and 6 prescribe only certain
steps management must take when it orders a
"reasonable suspicion" drug test. "They do not
testing[.]" Union's Response at 13. Accordingly, we conclude that Proposals 1 and 6
are consistent with the Executive Order.
3. Proposals 1 and 6 Do Not
Interfere with the Agency's Right to Determine
An agency's plan to test employees for use of
illegal drugs is an internal security policy. See Rock Island I, 30 FLRA at 1054-60. The
disclosure of information that pertains to the
implementation of that internal security policy,
insofar as disclosure would compromise that
aspect of the policy involving identification of
employees who use illegal drugs, would directly
interfere with an agency's right to determine
internal security practices under section
7106(a)(1) of the Statute. National Federation
of Federal Employees, Local 2050 and
Environmental Protection Agency, 36 FLRA 618,
639 (1990) (EPA II). However, proposals which
merely require an agency to notify employees of
matters concerning their conditions of
employment do not directly interfere with an
agency's rights under section 7106 and are
of the Statute. Id. at 635. See also National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2050 and
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 35 FLRA
706 (1990) (EPA I) (Proposal 3, which required
that the union be provided an opportunity to
review the content of the agency's security
bulletins, did not interfere with the agency's
internal security practices and constituted a
negotiable procedure).
Even assuming that the Agency's decision to
conduct reasonable suspicion testing constitutes
an exercise of management's right to determine
its internal security practices under section
7106(a)(1), we find that Proposals 1 and 6 do
not directly interfere with that right. Proposals 1 and 6 only require the Agency to
notify employees of the reasons supporting the
Agency's reasonable suspicion that an employee
is using illegal drugs after the employee has
been tested based on that reasonable suspicion. The Union states that the proposals permit the
Agency "significant latitude" in providing
written justification for reasonable suspicion
testing. Union's Response at 19. The plain
wording of Proposals 1 and 6 and the record
before us confirm the Union's statement as to
the effect of the proposals. Although Proposal
1 provides that "written justification . . . may
include such matters as the dates and times of
reported drug related incidents,
reliable/credible sources of information, and
the rationale leading to the test," Proposal 1
does not mandate that each of those matters be
included in every written justification provided
employees. Union's Response at 19 (emphasis in
original). In fact, the Union specifically
states that "where ongoing investigations
involving others were involved, the written
justification could be tailored to exclude names
of such other suspects and witnesses[.]" Id.
We agree with the Union that the Agency
retains the latitude under Proposals 1 and 6 to
provide notices to employees that are consistent
with the Agency's security policies. Proposals
1 and 6 only require the Agency to provide an
employee with justification or reasons
supporting the Agency's reasonable suspicion
that the employee is using illegal drugs. The
proposals do not require the Agency to disclose
every detailed fact in support of those reasons. Thus, where the Agency has legitimate security
concerns relating to the disclosure of
information, the proposals do not preclude the
Agency from preparing the written justification
to exclude the information which, if disclosed,
would compromise the Agency's security plan or
We also note that section 3.c(3) of Federal
Personnel Manual (FPM) Letter 792-19 provides
that "[w]here testing is based on reasonable
suspicion, each agency should promptly detail in
writing the circumstances which formed the basis
of its determination that reasonable suspicion
exists to warrant the testing." Section 4.c of
FPM Letter 792-19 provides that "[e]mployees
being tested under conditions outlined in
section 3c will also receive notice of the
circumstances leading to the decision to test
them for illegal drug use." Further, the requirement in Proposal 6 that a
reasonable suspicion be based on articulable
facts does not amount to a requirement that the
Agency disclose each articulable fact to an
employee after the employee has undergone a drug
test. Rather, the effect of that requirement in
Proposal 6 is to define the reasonable suspicion
standard as a belief based on articulable facts
In EPA II, we found that, even assuming that
a proposal requiring only that the agency notify
the union of incidents that could pose a threat
to employees' well-being concerned internal
security matters, the proposal would not
interfere with management's rights to determine
internal security practices. Rather, that
proposal constituted a negotiable procedure
under section 7106(b)(2). The proposal in EPA
II did not prescribe any action which the agency
must take to deal with the incidents listed in
the proposal nor did the proposal preclude the
agency from taking any action it determined was
necessary as a part of its internal security
policies to respond to the incidents. Id. at
634. See also EPA I, 35 FLRA at 717-18.
Consistent with EPA I and EPA II, we find
that, by requiring the Agency to notify
employees of the reasons why they were directed
to undergo reasonable suspicion testing,
Proposals 1 and 6 do not hamper the Agency's
ability to prevent the unwarranted disclosure of
security information and, therefore, do not
directly interfere with the Agency's right to
determine internal security practices. Rather,
Proposals 1 and 6 constitute negotiable
procedures under section 7106(b)(2) of the
Statute. See EPA II, 36 FLRA at 635; EPA I, 35
FLRA at 717-18. See also International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Union and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, 33 FLRA 711, 732 (1988)
(Proposal 10, first sentence, which required the
agency to inform an employee in writing as to
why he or she was designated as an "essential"
employee, should management decide on such a
designation, "does not interfere with any
management rights"); National Association of
Government Employees, Local R1-144 and
Department of the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems
Center, 29 FLRA 471 (1987) (Naval Underwater
Systems Center) (a proposal requiring the agency
to provide an employee "persuasive reasons" as
to why he or she was selected for furlough did
not substantively interfere with the Agency's
right to lay off employees but merely
established a procedure for the agency to follow
in the exercise of that right), enforcement
denied as to other matters sub nom. Department
of the Navy, Naval Underwater Systems Center v. FLRA, 854 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); AFSCME, Local
2027 and ACTION, 27 FLRA 191 (1987) (Chairman
Calhoun concurring) (Proposal 1, requiring the
agency to provide a repromotion eligible who is
not selected from a best qualified list
"persuasive reasons" for nonselection, was
negotiable because it merely established a
procedure for management to follow in the
exercise of its rights to hire and select).
4. Proposals 1 and 6 Do Not
The Agency contends that by requiring written
justification, Proposals 1 and 6 amount to an
assignment of work to either the first or
second-line supervisor and, therefore, directly
interfere with the Agency's right to assign work
under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. We
reject this contention.
Proposals 1 and 6 require only that the
Agency provide employees with a written
justification. Even assuming that the proposals
had the consequence of necessitating the
assignment of an employee to prepare a written
justification, the proposals do not determine
who will prepare the written justification. The
Agency asserts that "given the command structure
set out by management for confirming the
existence of 'reasonable suspicion,'" Proposals
1 and 6 would require that either the employee's
first or second-line supervisor create a written
justification. Agency's Statement at 21-22. However, the proposals do not require the Agency
to follow its command structure. The proposals preserve the Agency's right to
determine who will prepare a written
justification. Proposals establishing
procedures that an agency will follow in
exercising its rights under the Statute will not
be found to be nonnegotiable because they
require the agency to assign someone to
implement the procedure. See National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2099 and
Department of the Navy, Naval Plant
Representative Office, St. Louis, Missouri, 35
FLRA 362, 368 (1990) (Naval Plant Representative
Office) ("To bar the negotiation of procedures
that would otherwise be negotiable under section
7106(b)(2) because they entail the assignment of
work to agency personnel would nullify section
7106(b)(2) and overlook the explicit purpose and
intent of that subsection."). Because Proposals
1 and 6 establish a procedure that the Agency
will follow in exercising its right to test
employees for illegal drugs as part of its plan
to secure and safeguard its property and
personnel and because the proposals do not
impermissibly specify who will implement the
procedure, we find that Proposals 1 and 6 do not
work. See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Social Security Administration,
Northeastern Program Service Center and American
Federation of Government Employees, National
Council of Social Security Administration
Payment Center Locals, Local 1760, 36 FLRA 466,
473-74 (1990).
Further, the Agency has failed to establish
that by requiring that written justification be
provided within a specific time period,
Proposals 1 and 6 interfere with its right to
assign work. Contrary to the Agency's
assertion, nothing in the proposals would
"require management to divert scarce supervisory
(and other, e.g., messenger and government
vehicle) resources away from contemporaneously
arising operational needs[.]" Agency's
Statement at 19. As we stated above, Proposals
1 and 6 establish a procedure and do not
assign work. The proposals preserve the
Agency's discretion to determine who will be
assigned to implement that procedure. We will
not find a procedure like the one in Proposals 1
and 6 nonnegotiable merely because an agency
must assign someone to implement that procedure. See Naval Plant Representative Office, 35 FLRA
5. Proposal 1 Does Not Interfere
with the Agency's Right to Discipline
The Agency acknowledges that where management
fails to provide an employee a written
justification for reasonable suspicion testing
within the time limits prescribed in the
proposal, "Proposal 1 does not on its face,
preclude management from making use of a
positive test result from a specimen obtained as
a result of 'reasonable suspicion' testing as a
basis for an adverse action." Agency's
Statement at 24. Nevertheless, the Agency
maintains that the effect of Proposal 1 is to
require the Agency to set aside a disciplinary
action based on a positive drug test result if
the Agency failed to follow the procedure in
Proposal 1 when it ordered the drug test based
on "reasonable suspicion." We find that the
Agency has failed to demonstrate that Proposal 1
affects in any way its right to discipline
employees under section 7106(a)(2)(A) of the
The Agency claims that under Proposal 1, a
failure to provide written justification to an
employee amounts to "harmful error" and,
thereby, "create[s] a contractual procedure
which, if violated, would serve to negate an adverse action in the circumstances where . . .
[there is a] failure on management's part to
provide such a written justification within the
prescribed time limits." Agency's Statement at
26. The Union states that "nothing in the
proposals even contemplates 'harmful error[.]'" Union's Response at 21. The Union also states
for the defense of 'harmful error.'" Id. We find that the Agency's interpretation of
Proposal 1 is not supported by the plain wording
of the proposal or the record. Proposal 1
cannot reasonably be interpreted as requiring a
determination by MSPB or an arbitrator that
failure to provide the specified information
constitutes "harmful error." Proposal 1
establishes a procedure under section 7106(b)(2)
of the Statute. Whether a failure to comply
with this, or any other negotiable procedure,
would constitute "harmful error" would depend on
the facts of a given case and the application of
5 U.S.C. §§ 5596(b) and 7701(c)(2)(A) to the
facts of that case. Consequently, we conclude
that the Agency has failed to demonstrate that
Proposal 1 contravenes 5 U.S.C. §§ 5596(b) and
7701(c)(2)(A).
Further, the Agency asserts that "while the
Authority has held that the harmful error rule
does not apply to disciplinary actions involving
suspensions of 14 days or less, this is, with
due respect, an erroneous conclusion of law." Agency's Statement at 26 (citation omitted). The harmful error rule provides that an agency's
decision on an adverse action or
performance-based action may not be sustained if
"harmful error" is shown in the application of
the agency's procedures in arriving at the
decision. Department of the Air Force, Griffiss
Air Force Base and American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2612, 34 FLRA 712
(1990) (Griffiss Air Force Base). The case
before us does not raise the issue of whether
the harmful error rule should be applied to
disciplinary actions of 14 days or less. Therefore, we decline to address the Agency's
assertion concerning the Authority's application
of the "harmful error" rule. However, we note
that in Griffis Air Force Base the Authority
reaffirmed its decision that the harmful error
rule of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c) does not apply to a
suspension of 14 days or less. See also U.S.
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics
Command, Hill Air Force Base, Utah and American
Federation of Government Employees, 34 FLRA 986
We conclude that Proposals 1 and 6 are
consistent with Executive Order No. 12564 and do
not directly interfere with the Agency's rights
to determine internal security practices,
assign work, or discipline employees. Rather,
Because we find that Proposals 1 and 6
constitute procedures which do not directly
interfere with the Agency's rights, it is
unnecessary to determine whether they are
appropriate arrangements as asserted by the
Union. See Naval Underwater Systems Center, 29
FLRA at 473. See also International Plate
Printers, Die Stampers and Engravers Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, Local 2 and Department
Printing, Washington, D.C., 25 FLRA 113, 118
A. The Service will grant reasonable official
time to union representatives, who are involved
in employee representation regarding any matter
C. The representative shall suffer no loss of
pay or benefits as a result of carrying out
his/her representational responsibilities as
defined in A. above.
[Only the underlined portion is in dispute.]
The Agency contends that Proposal 3 is
inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. § 5542 because it is
"too broad and too vague" and, consequently,
would require the Agency to pay an employee
overtime compensation for the time the employee
is engaged in representational activities. Agency's Statement at 45. The Agency states
that under Proposal 3, "employees acting as
[Union] representatives, [who] might otherwise
have been in a position to have been called for
regularly scheduled [5 U.S.C.] section 5542
overtime assignments but for their
representational duties," would receive overtime
compensation for the time that they had to forgo
opportunities to work overtime in order to carry
out their representational responsibilities. Id. at 46. The Agency maintains that Proposal 3
would require that the employee be compensated
at the overtime rate for the time spent on
representational activity so that the employee
"suffer[s] no loss of pay or benefits as a
result of carrying out his/her representational
responsibilities." Id. The Agency asserts that
the Agency cannot pay employees overtime
compensation for time spent performing
representational duties that otherwise would
have been spent by the employees performing
hours of work on overtime, without violating 5 U.S.C. § 5542.
The Union states that Proposal 3
"contractually require[s] . . . that employees
who are [Union] representatives not be
improperly denied official time (in this
instance that is synonymous with not lose pay or
benefits) to represent employees on matters
involving the Drug Free Workplace Plan." Union's Response at 27. The Union asserts that
the Agency has misinterpreted Proposal 3. The
Union states that "[t]he Agency Head apparently
interprets [Proposal 3] as relating specifically
to instances in which union representatives who
perform representational activities during hours
which are outside their regularly scheduled
workweek would claim entitlement under [Proposal
3] to overtime for those hours. That
interpretation is incorrect." Id. at 25.
The Union states that Proposal 3 "does not by
its facial meaning nor by [the Union's] intent,
attempt to broaden the circumstances under which
overtime compensation or compensatory time can
be provided to union representatives governed by
5 U.S.C., Chapter 55 or the Fair Labor Standards
Act." Id. at 26. According to the Union,
Proposal 3 "would exclude time spent on
representational activity from the computation
of [administratively uncontrollable overtime
(AUO)] so that employees would be neither
advantaged nor disadvantaged by having been
engaged in representational activity in the
computation of their "average' number of hours
of AUO worked[.]" Id. The Union maintains that
the Agency has the discretion to determine how
AUO computations will be made, and that
discretion is not sole and exclusive. The Union
argues that "as with official time for
negotiations, representation time related to the
Drug Free workplace program is within the
Agency's discretion to exclude when computing
AUO." Id.
Proposal 3 provides that employees who are
Union representatives will not be improperly
denied official time to represent employees on
matters concerning the Agency's Drug Free
Workplace Plan. We find that Proposal 3 is
The plain wording of Proposal 3 provides that
the employees engaged in representational
activities shall not suffer a loss in pay or
benefits as a result of their representational
activities. Nothing in the wording of the
proposal requires the Agency to provide overtime
compensation to employees serving as Union
representatives for the time that they would
have to forgo opportunities to work overtime in
order to carry out their representational
responsibilities. Moreover, Proposal 3 would
not require the Agency to provide official time
for hours that an employee is not in a duty
status or to pay employees overtime for
representational activities that occur when an
employee is not in an overtime duty status.
Overtime compensation is paid pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a), which provides that all hours
of work officially ordered and approved in
excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an
administrative workweek are overtime work
entitling the employee to overtime compensation
or, where appropriate under 5 U.S.C. § 5543, to
compensatory time off. However, a union
official's performance of representational
activities on nonduty time outside regular work
hours is not the performance of hours of work
officially ordered or approved that constitutes
overtime work for which overtime pay or
compensatory time off can be granted. See U.S.
Service and National Weather Service Employees
Organization, 36 FLRA 352, 358 (1990) (National
Weather Service); Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio, 2750th Air Base Wing and American
Federation of Government Employees, Local No.
1138, 23 FLRA 390, 392 (1986) (Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base). To be entitled to overtime
compensation for representational activities
performed outside of regular duty hours, the
employee/representative must be in an overtime
duty status (at the direction of the agency)
when the event arose which called for the
performance of representational functions. Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Warner
Robins, Georgia and American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 987, 23 FLRA 270
(1986) (Warner Robins Air Logistics Center). Therefore, a proposal providing for the payment
of overtime compensation for employees engaged
in representational activity outside of their
normal duty hours is nonnegotiable. American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO and
Environmental Protection Agency, 21 FLRA 635,
637-38 (1986) (Proposal 2).
The Union states that Proposal 3 is intended
to be implemented consistent with the law
governing the granting of official time. The
Union also states that Proposal 3 "does not, by
its facial meaning nor the [Union's] intent,
Act." Union's Response at 26. We find that the
Union's explanation of Proposal 3 is consistent
with the wording of that proposal and that
Proposal 3 is consistent with the requirements
in law concerning the granting of overtime for
representational activities. The Agency has not established that Proposal
3 requires the payment of overtime compensation
in a manner inconsistent with 5 U.S.C. § 5542. The Agency also has failed to establish that
Proposal 3 is inconsistent with any other law
governing the granting of official time. We
find that by providing that employees engaged in
representational activities shall receive the
same pay and benefits that they would be
entitled to if they were performing work in a
regular duty status, Proposal 3 is consistent
with legal requirements concerning the payment
of overtime compensation for representational
activities. See National Weather Service, 36
FLRA at 358; Warner Robins Air Logistics Center,
23 FLRA at 271. Finally, we note that the Union argues that
in law and regulation concerning the payment of
AUO. The Agency states that, to the extent that
Proposal 3 provides that employees shall not
lose the benefit of AUO pay because they are
engaged in representational activity, the Agency
does not dispute that Proposal 3 can be
implemented consistent with the requirements in
law and regulation concerning the payment of
AUO. See Agency's Statement at 45-46. In light
of the Union's and the Agency's statements, we
find that there is no dispute between the
parties that Proposal 3 is consistent with
applicable law and regulations concerning the
payment of AUO. Therefore, we need not address
the Union's arguments concerning AUO.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that
A. One union representative from each Council
will be authorized to be present at the time
random selections for drug testing are made, for
the purpose of verifying the validity of the
selection process. The Service agrees to pay
all associated travel and per diem.
B. One union representative from each Council
will be authorized to make an on site inspection
of the laboratories, facilities, and procedures
of the company selected as the analysis
contractor, on a quarterly basis. All travel
and per diem costs shall be borne by the
C. Each Council shall be permitted to have an
on site observer present whenever random
selections are to be made. The union shall
receive a ten (10) working day advance notice
that random selections are to be made and the
location(s) where the selection(s) will be made. The union observers will be in an on-duty
status. Any travel and per diem costs
associated with a union observer's presence for
selections will be borne by the employer.
The verification procedures shall include but
1. Verifying the fact that there was no data
stored in the computer which would
contaminate the random selection process once
the program was loaded into the computer for
2. Verifying the accuracy and integrity of
the random selection computer software;
3. Verification of the relative accuracy of
the employee data base from which the random
selections will be made;
4. Witnessing the generation of the random
selection list from the computer at a
distance from which identification of
individual names would not be possible;
5. At the time random computer selections
are made both the on-site union and
management officials will observe the list
being generated and sign the back of each
page of a copy of the computer generated
list. The union officials will not have
access to the names on the list at that time.
6. The signed copies of the list will be
sealed in an evidence envelope and signed by
the parties present. It will then be secured
7. Upon completion of the testing of all
individuals on the list who are to be tested,
but not later than sixty days from the date
the list was generated, management will
provide the secured list to the Presidents of
each Council.
The Agency describes its random selection procedure
The [Agency] will use a program in a computer
located in its Washington Headquarters offices
to generate a random list of employees in
[testing designated positions (TDPs)] to be
tested. It is anticipated that, at least
initially, a list of 100 names will be generated
each time a list is called for. The employees
occupying TDPs will be given a separate
additional code in the [Agency's] central
personnel data bank for this purpose so they can
be distinguished from other employees in the
[Agency's] personnel data base who are not in
TDPs. The lists generated will be nationwide. In the interest of security, these lists will
not be generated at fixed intervals, but rather
at irregular unannounced, intervals throughout
the year. The names of employees selected will
be sent to responsible supervisors at the duty
sites where the employees selected are located,
and, on days prearranged with the collection
site contractors, the employees will be ordered
to report to the nearest one of 70 collection
Agency's Statement at 47-48.
The Agency states that section A and section
C of Proposal 4 are "couched in such vague terms
that it is difficult to determine what the Union
intends thereby. Therefore, . . . the Authority
is, in accordance with precedents, obliged to
decline to pass on their negotiability." Agency's Statement at 49 (citations omitted).
In the alternative, the Agency contends that
section A and section C (including subsections
1-7) of Proposal 4 violate the Agency's right to
determine internal security practices under
section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. The Agency
argues that section A and section C would
"directly involve the Union here in the
development and implementation of the selection
process" of the Agency's random drug testing
program and, thereby, interfere with the
Agency's right "to determine how it will secure
its random selection process." Id. at 49-50. The Agency also argues that section A and
section C interfere with the Agency's right to
section 7106(a)(1) because those sections would
require management to warn the Union of drug
testing in advance of the random selection
process. The Agency asserts that "such
forewarning will serve to put unit employees in
[testing designated positions] who are subject
to random selection . . . [on notice] that a
list is to be generated, leading them to draw
the reasonable inference that selections for
random testing will soon follow." Id. at 50. The Agency argues that notice to employees of an
impending selection will allow employees who use
illegal drugs to curtail their consumption
during this high risk period and destroy the
"maximum deterrent and detection effect" of the
random testing program. Id.
The Agency contends that section B of
Proposal 4 does not concern the conditions of
employment of unit employees within the meaning
of 7103(a)(14) of the Statute. The Agency
states that section B establishes that Union
representatives will be involved in the
inspection of certified drug testing
laboratories. The Agency asserts that "the
Secretary of [Health and Human Services (HHS)]
or his designees have the exclusive
responsibility for conducting inspections of the
certified laboratories that federal agencies are
obliged to use in order to determine whether
they are continuing to meet the standards set
out in the guidelines." Id. at 51 (citing
sections 3.2(b) and 3.13 of the final
Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. at 11, 970). The
Agency argues that Union representatives are not
qualified to conduct laboratory inspections. The Agency maintains that any inspection by
Union representatives would be "totally
redundant" and would "open up the possibility of
a conflict between the conclusions of HHS'
inspectors and those reached by Union
inspectors." Id. The Agency asserts that "the
inspections could not have any impact on the
conditions of employment of unit employees." Id. at 52.
"Proposal 4 applies to random drug testing
under the [Agency's] Drug Free Workplace Plan." Union's Response at 30. The Union states that
the procedures in Proposal 4 do not involve the
Union in "either the development or
implementation of the [random] selection
process." Id. at 34. The Union asserts that
Proposal 4 does not interfere with the Agency's
right to determine internal security practices
"[i]nasmuch as [Proposal 4] enables the [Agency]
to maintain the purpose of its internal security
practice, which is to assure randomness and
confidentiality until employees are directed to
undergo urinalysis testing[.]" Id. at 35.
Proposal 4 refer[s] to utilizing a software
program to verify random selection, as distinct
from the Agency's random selection program and
employee data base. The Union's copy of the
verification program would be run at the
beginning of a random selection procedure and
would provide a measure of assurance that the
computer had been programmed to draw randomly
and would do so from input data which accurately
reflected the group of employees whom the
[Agency] determined to subject to the random
Union's Response at 32.
The Union states that Proposal 4 allows a Union
representative to be present when the list of employees
randomly selected for testing is generated. The Union
maintains that the procedures in Proposal 4 do not
"permit[] a [U]nion representative to see or retain
possession of the list of selectees. Rather, they require
only that the list be generated, signed on the back without
being read, and sealed until after the selectees have been
tested." Id. at 35. After testing resulting from each
round of selections has occurred, Proposal 4 would allow
the Union to review the list generated by the verification
program to: (1) verify the "identities of persons who have
been selected for testing;" (2) "verify that the correct
employees' names are entered[;]" and (3) "make[] sure the
computer has been told to randomly select items from the
data base, while preserving to management the possession of
the contents of the data base." Id. at 34-35.
The Union argues that the requirement in Proposal 4
that the Agency provide the Union 10 days' advance notice
that random selections will be made in the near future
would not provide employees advance notice of the date of
the actual testing. The Union maintains that sections A
and C of Proposal 4 "do not indicate that selections would
occur at any particular time because the [Agency] would be
free to sit on the lists until it wanted to run the
urinalysis tests." Id. at 36. The Union asserts that the
Agency's argument that the notice requirement is
nonnegotiable because "warning employees about imminent but
unspecified urinalysis testing dates would lead employees
to 'curtail their consumption'" is without merit. Id. The
Union states that "the purpose of random testing, as an
exercise of internal security practices under the Drug Free
Workplace programs and E.O. 12564, is specifically to deter
illegal drug use[,]" and that Proposal 4 "actually
furthers, rather than interferes with, the deterrent effect
of random drug testing systems." Id. at 36-37 (footnotes
The Union contends that the requirement in section B
that the Union be allowed to inspect the certified drug
testing laboratory is negotiable. The Union maintains that
section B does not concern or affect the authority of HHS
inspectors to determine whether laboratories conducting
drug testing of Federal employees are in compliance with
Government-wide regulations. The Union states that
"inspections by union officials aren't purported
substitutes for [HHS] inspections." Id. at 37. The Union
contends that "[t]he quarterly inspections which [the
Union] is proposing is an appropriate arrangement and a
procedure to verify testing is being conducted
competently." Id. at 38. The Union also argues that
"[b]ecause there is no requirement that [the Agency] modify
its contract with a laboratory in any way as a result of
[section B], there is no interference with the [Agency's]
right to make determinations with respect to contracting
out." Id.
1. The Effect of the Proposal
The Agency has determined that it will use a computer
program to generate a list of employees in testing
designated positions for random drug testing. The Agency
also has determined how the testing will be implemented
once the list is generated. Sections A and C of Proposal 4
provide for the presence of Union representatives when the
Agency generates the list of employees randomly selected
for drug testing by computer. The Union representatives
will be responsible for verifying the validity of the
selection process "to assure the random testing is, in
fact, random rather than targeted against pre-determined
individuals." Petition at 6. The verification envisioned
by the Union does not involve the Union in "either the
development or implementation of the random selection
process." Response at 34.
Subsections C.1, C.2 and C.3 of Proposal 4 "refer to
utilizing a verification software program, which would be
developed and provided to both [the Agency] and the
[U]nion." Petition at 6. The Union's copy of the program
would be run at the beginning of the Agency's random
selection procedure to ensure that "the computer had been
programmed to draw randomly and would do so from input data
which accurately reflected the employees who [the Agency]
determined to subject to the random testing." Id. Subsections C.4 and C.5 of Proposal 4 provide that Union
representatives will witness the generation of the list of
randomly selected employees from the computer at a
sufficient distance to prevent identification of the names
of employees. Once the list is generated, Union
representatives will sign the back of each page of the
list. Subsection C.6 of Proposal 4 provides that the
signed list will be sealed in an envelope which shall be
signed by the Union and Agency representatives present and
then secured by the Agency. Subsection C.7 provides that
when all the individuals on the list have been tested, "but
not later than 60 days from the date the list was
generated," the Agency shall provide the list to the Union.
Section B of Proposal 4 provides the Union
opportunities to inspect the laboratory contracted by the
Agency to perform drug testing analyses on bargaining unit
employees' urine samples.
2. Management's Right to Determine Internal Security Practices
It is well established that an agency's use of random
testing as a part of its drug testing program constitutes
an exercise of management's right to determine its internal
security practices. Rock Island I, 30 FLRA 1046 (1988).
We must examine the requirements of Proposal 4 to
determine whether they directly interfere with the Agency's
right under section 7106(a)(1) to implement a random drug
3. Sections A and C
The Agency asserts that sections A and C of Proposal
4 "are intended to involve the Union here in the
development and implementation of the [random] selection
process" and, therefore, "would interfere with management's
right under section 7106(a)(1) to determine how it will
secure its random selection process." Agency's Statement
at 49 and 50. We find that sections A and C establish
procedures to be followed in connection with the random
selection process of the Agency's drug testing program and,
therefore, are negotiable. (a) Union Representatives at Random Selection Sessions
Under the procedures established in sections A and C
of Proposal 4, Union representatives are to be present when
the computer generates the list of employees randomly
selected for drug testing. The Union representatives will
be present only to witness the generation of the list of
employees from the computer and not to participate in the
computer operations that generate the list.
The Agency has not shown how the presence of Union
representatives to witness the generation of a list of
employees from the Agency's computer interferes with the
Agency's ability to develop and implement its random
selection process. For example, the Agency does not
contend that during the random selection sessions the
Agency will be engaging in discussion of and deliberation
on the selection of employees or other aspects of the
implementation of the drug testing program. Compare
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1437 and
United States Army Armament Research, Development and
Engineering Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, 35 FLRA
1052, 1061-62 (1990) (proposal requiring the appointment of
a union observer on the rating and ranking panel would
involve the union in management's internal deliberative
process and, therefore, interfered with the agency's right
to select under section 7106(a)(2)(C)). Rather, as the
Agency acknowledges, the selection process is a purely
The record indicates that the Agency's decisions
concerning the development and implementation of the random
selection process occur before the Agency schedules a
session to generate the list of employees randomly selected
to be tested. Therefore, the Union would participate in
the random selection process only after the Agency's
internal deliberative process concerning the development
and implementation of the random selection process has been
completed. See Department of the Army, 7th Infantry
Division (Light), Fort Ord, California and American
Federation of Government Employees, 34 FLRA 916, 926 (1990)
(proposal applied only after the agency's internal
deliberative process concerning application of performance standards has been completed; consequently, the proposal
did not permit the union to interject itself into the
agency's internal deliberations concerning the performance
appraisal process).
We find that the portion of sections A and C of
Proposal 4 which provides for the presence of a Union
representative when the lists of employees randomly
selected for testing is generated by the Agency's computer
does not interfere with the Agency's right to develop and
implement its random selection process as part of its plan
to secure or safeguard its personnel, its physical
property, and its operations. See National Federation of
Federal Employees, Forest Service Council and U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Washington,
D.C., 40 FLRA 174, 180-85 (1991) (Proposal 5, which
provided for the presence of a union representative as an
observer during the collection of urine specimens for drug
testing, would have no effect on the agency's decision or
ability to conduct drug tests and, therefore constituted a
negotiable procedure), petition for review filed sub nom.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service v. FLRA, No.
91-1275 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 1991).
Also, sections A and C do not establish any criteria
governing the exercise of the Agency's right to establish a
random drug testing program that restrict the range of an
agency's discretion pursuant to its right to determine
internal security practices. Therefore, sections A and C
do not place a substantive limitation on the exercise of
the Agency's rights. Because the Agency has not
demonstrated how the presence of Union representatives at
the random selection sessions directly interferes with any
management right, we conclude that the requirement in
sections A and C of Proposal 4 for Union representation at
random selection sessions is negotiable.
(b) Verification of the Selection Process
Section A and subsections 1-3 of section C of
Proposal 4 provide that Union representatives present at
random selection sessions will be responsible for
verifying: (1) that there is no data stored in the
computer which would contaminate the random selection
process once the program is loaded into the computer; (2)
the accuracy and integrity of the random selection computer
software; and (3) the relative accuracy of the data base
from which random selections are made. We find that
subsections 1-3 of section C do not interfere with the
Agency's ability to develop a random drug testing program. However, we are unable to determine from the wording of
Proposal 4, and the Union's explanation, how the
verification program required by section A and subsections
1-3 of section C would affect the Agency's ability to
determine the policies or to take the actions that will
ensure the security of the random drug testing program. Consequently, we are unable to determine whether and to
what extent section A and subsections 1-3 of section C
interfere with the Agency's right under section 7106(a)(1)
to determine its internal security practices. Therefore,
we will dismiss the petition for review as to section A and
subsections 1-3 of section C of Proposal 4.
Management's right under section 7106(a)(1) to
determine its internal security practices includes the
right to determine the policies and to take the actions
which are part of its plan to secure or safeguard its
personnel and physical property and to prevent the
disruption of its operations. See National Treasury
Employees Union and the U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C., 38 FLRA 79, 83 (1990). We find that this
right also encompasses the policies that management adopts
and the actions it takes to protect the integrity of the
random selection process, including computer equipment and
software used in that process.
The Agency argues that the verification procedures
would involve the Union in the development and
implementation of the random selection process. The
verification procedures in sections A and C do not require
the Agency to randomly select employees by computer. Sections A and C also do not provide for Union
participation in the development of a computerized random
selection process. However, if the Agency implements a
computerized random selection process, sections A and C
require the Agency to incorporate procedures that will
allow the Union to verify the randomness of the selection
process. Under those procedures, the Agency is required to
develop and give the Union a copy of a random selection
verification software program. Requiring the Agency to
provide the Union with a copy of a verification software
program after it has been developed by the Agency does not
interfere with the Agency's ability to develop that
software program or any other aspect of the computerized
random selection process. Therefore, we reject the
Agency's argument that by requiring the Agency to give the
Union a copy of a verification software program, sections A
and C would involve the Union in the development of the
Agency's random selection process.
However, we are unable to determine whether the use
of a verification software program would directly interfere
with the Agency's right to ensure the security of the
random selection process. Under sections A and C, as
explained by the Union, the Union's copy of the Agency's
verification software program will be run in the Agency's
computer to verify the random selection program and the
computer data base at the beginning of each random
selection session. However, the Union does not describe
the verification program required by the proposal and we
are, therefore, unable to assess how that program would
work. We are unable to determine, for example, whether a
verification program could be developed that would
accomplish the objectives required by the Union without
also affecting in some manner the confidentiality of the
random selection process. That is, we are unable to
determine whether the use of such a verification program
would permit the Union to obtain information that would
compromise the security of the process in order for the
Union to be assured that there is no extraneous data in the
computer, that the data base is accurate, or that the
program does in fact generate names on a random basis. If a verification program could be developed that
would accomplish the objectives required by the Union and
would not, by its use, affect or compromise the random
selection process, the use of such a program would not
appear to pose a risk to the security of the Agency's
random selection process. On the other hand, if the use of
such a program would affect or compromise the random
selection process, requiring the use of the Union's copy of
that program would directly interfere with management's
right to determine its internal security practices. The record does not contain sufficient information
for us to make the findings necessary to determine the
nature or extent of the security risk to the Agency's
operations and property. We are unable to determine how
the proposed verification program would work. Therefore,
we are unable to determine the impact of sections A and C
on the Agency's ability to safeguard its operations and its
property from damage, because we are unable to assess the
nature of the verification software program to be developed
by the Agency and the effect of using that program on the
Agency's random selection process. In National Federation of Federal Employees, Local
2058 and U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, Installation
Support Activity, 31 FLRA 241, 254-55 (1988) (Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Installation Support Activity) (Proposal
9), the Authority dismissed the union's petition for review
as to a proposal which provided that the computer used to
select employees for random drug testing would be
programmed by a disinterested individual and "monitored by
union representation." Id. at 254. Because the union did
not define what it intended by the phrase "monitored by
union representation," the Authority found that the
proposal could be interpreted to give the union a right to: (1) receive information concerning the implementation of
the random selection process and, thus, could be
negotiable; or (2) be directly involved in the development
and implementation of the selection process, in which case
the proposal would be nonnegotiable. There was nothing in
the record on which the Authority could base a decision as
to which interpretation was intended by the union. Therefore, the Authority dismissed the petition for review
as to that proposal.
The record in this case does not contain sufficient
information for us to determine whether verification of the
accuracy of the Agency's random selection process can be
accomplished, pursuant to the disputed portions of Proposal
4, without interfering with the Agency's ability to
safeguard its operations and property. Nor does the record
contain sufficient information concerning the Agency's
computer process and the verification software program to
allow us to determine the impact of the Union's use of the
verification program on the Agency's ability to ensure the
security of its random selection process. Because the
process described in section A and subsections 1-3 of
section C, we will dismiss the petition for review as to
section A and section C, subsections 1-3, of Proposal 4. See id. at 255.
(c) Notice of Random Selections
Section C of Proposal 4 requires the Agency to give
the Union 10 working days' notice of random selections. Section C requires notice of the session at which random
selections will be made, but does not require the Agency to
provide the Union at that session with the names of the
employees selected. Under subsection 7 of section C, the
names of employees selected in a random selection session
need not be disclosed until testing is completed, but not
later than 60 days from the date the names were generated
at the session. The Agency does not specifically object to subsection
7 of section C. Moreover, the Agency does not address the
relationship between the 10-day notice requirement of
section C and the 60-day period for the disclosure of the
list of names set forth in subsection 7. Rather, the
Agency states only that the requirement of a 10-day notice
to the Union prior to the generation of a list of names
provided in section C of Proposal 4 "will serve to put unit
employees in TDPs who are subject to random selection . . .
[on notice] that a list is to be generated, leading them to
draw the reasonable inference that selections for random
testing will soon follow." Agency's Statement at 50. The
Agency argues that the notice requirement is "destructive
of the element of surprise required to give random testing
its maximum deterrent and detection effect." Id.
Contrary to the Agency's argument, sections A and C
of Proposal 4, to the extent that they provide that the
Union be notified of random selection sessions, do not
require advance notice of drug tests. Compare American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 3457 and U.S.
Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service,
Southern Administrative Service Center, New Orleans,
Louisiana, 37 FLRA 1456 (1990) (Proposals 1-9) (Member
Talkin concurring) (Minerals Management Service) (proposals
requiring 24-hour advance notice of a drug test found to be
nonnegotiable). The Agency is only required to notify the
Union of random selection sessions. There is no
requirement in the proposal that random selection sessions
must occur at any specific time prior to the actual testing
of employees selected during the sessions. The Agency
states that in the interest of security, random selection
sessions will not be scheduled at fixed intervals, but
rather at irregular unannounced, intervals throughout the
year. The Agency also states that the lists generated in
the random selection sessions will be nationwide.
Thus, if employees were made aware of the notice to
the Union concerning a random selection session, they would
only know that testing of the employees selected in the
upcoming session would not occur for at least 10 days. However, because random selection sessions will be
scheduled at irregular unannounced intervals and would
involve Agency employees nationwide, employees would not
know which employees would be selected during the upcoming
session or which had already been selected in a previous
session. The Agency has not identified any situation in
which notice to the Union of a random selection session
would result in notice to particular employees that they
will tested at a particular time. In fact, the notice
received by the employees as a result of sections A and C
is no more than the notice they receive by virtue of the
existence of a random drug testing program. That is,
notice to the Union would merely indicate that testing of
employees may occur somewhere in the Agency at anytime. With respect to the first random selection session, notice
to the Union also would not interfere with the Agency's
rights because section 4(a) of Executive Order 12564
mandates that the Agency provide employees 60 days' notice
of the implementation of its drug testing program. The
Agency has the discretion to schedule the first session
during the 60-day notice period and generate several lists
of employees to be tested in any manner it deems necessary
to protect the randomness of its drug testing program.
We find that the notice requirement in sections A and
C preserves the Agency's ability to schedule drug testing
of employees in a manner that is not "destructive of the
element of surprise required to give random testing its
maximum deterrent and detection effect." Agency's
Statement at 50. Therefore, we conclude the notice
requirement does not interfere with the Agency's right
under section 7106(a)(1) to conduct random drug testing. Compare American Federation of Government Employees,
Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 38 FLRA 1068
(1990) (Proposal 4) (Member Talkin dissenting) (proposal
requiring the agency to provide specified information to
employees 60 days in advance of the date on which they will
be tested for illegal drugs directly interfered with
agency's right to determine its internal security
practices), petition for review filed as to other matters
sub nom. U.S. Department of Education v. FLRA, No. 91-1219
(D.C. Cir. May 10, 1991).
We note that the Agency does not specifically address
whether, by providing that the Union be given the lists of
employees selected for testing in a random selection
session "not later than sixty days from the date the list
was generated," subsection C.7 would directly interfere
with some aspect of the Agency's internal security plan. As to when the Agency will conduct drug tests after random
selection sessions, the Agency states that "testing will
probably follow closely after selections are made." Agency's Statement, Exhibit A at 7. In light of the
Agency's statement and in the absence of an allegation that
subsection C.7 interferes with some aspect of the Agency's
internal security plan, we presume that the Agency does not
dispute that subsection C.7 can be implemented consistent
with the Agency's plan for randomly testing employees for
drug use. Because the Agency does not specifically allege
that the 60-day disclosure requirement in subsection C.7
compromises the Agency's internal security, we find that
there is no basis for the Authority to conclude that
subsection C.7 directly interferes with the Agency's
exercise of its rights to determine the Agency's internal
4. Section B--Laboratory Inspections
First, we find that the record is sufficient for us
to determine the meaning and effect of section B of
Proposal 4. Section B provides the Union opportunities to
inspect the laboratory with which the Agency has contracted
for the performance of drug testing analyses on bargaining
unit employees' urine samples. Therefore, we reject the
Agency's contention that section B should be dismissed
because it "merely provides for inspections for the sake of
inspections, . . . [and] is too vague to evaluate." Agency
Statement at 56.
(a) Conditions of Employment
We conclude that section B of Proposal 4 concerns the
conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. In
deciding whether a matter involves a condition of
considers whether the record establishes that there is a
direct connection between the matter and the work situation
or employment relationship of bargaining unit employees. United States Department of Health and Human Services,
Social Security Administration, Region X, Seattle,
Washington, 37 FLRA 880, 886 (1990).
Section B addresses the Agency's program to test
bargaining unit employees for illegal drugs. It provides
the Union opportunities to inspect the laboratory with
which the Agency has contracted for the performance of drug
testing analyses on bargaining unit employees' urine
samples. The laboratory referenced in section B will
determine whether a bargaining unit employee's test for
illegal drug use is positive or negative. The results of
the laboratory's analyses will be submitted to the Agency
and will have a direct bearing on matters affecting
employees' employment relationship, including providing
potential grounds for disciplinary action. Therefore, we
find that there is a direct connection between the subject
matter of the proposal and the work situation or employment
relationship of bargaining unit employees. We conclude
that section B of Proposal 4 concerns a matter pertaining
to the conditions of employment of bargaining unit
employees. See also Rock Island I, 30 FLRA at 1074-75. (b) Contracting Out
The Agency's contends that section B directly
interferes with the Agency's right to make determinations
with respect to contracting out under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute. The Agency states that section B "would
clearly require the [Agency] to attempt to modify its
existing contract to provide for union 'inspections,['] and
by implication seek to cancel that contract and solicit
bids from substitute contractors with union visitation
rights as part of the contract requirements." Agency's
Statement at 54. We find that the Agency's interpretation
of section B is not reasonable given the wording of section
B and the Union's statement of intent.
The wording of section B merely provides that Union
representatives will be authorized to make on-site
inspections of the laboratories contracted by the Agency to
perform drug testing analyses. Section B does not
explicitly or implicitly require the Agency to modify an
existing agreement with a contracting laboratory to allow
the Union to make an on-site inspection of the laboratory. Further, the Agency has provided no evidence in the record
to show that there exists a contract which would have to be
modified if section B were agreed to by the parties. The
Agency has failed to show that section B directly
interferes with the Agency's relationship with a
contracting laboratory or directly interferes with its
right to contract out in any other way. We find no support
in the record for the Agency's contention that section B
would require the Agency to cancel its contract with the
laboratory and solicit bids from substitute contractors
with union visitation rights as part of the contract
requirements. Therefore, we reject those arguments. Compare Rock Island I, 30 FLRA at 1063 (proposal requiring
the agency to contract out drug testing work only to
certified or qualified test personnel imposed a substantive
limitation on management's right to contract out its drug
testing work and thus directly interfered with the agency's
right to contract out work under section 7106(a)(2)(B)).
We conclude that the Agency has failed to establish
that, by providing for on-site inspections of drug testing
laboratories by Union officials, section B directly
with respect to contracting out under section 7106(a)(2)(B)
of the Statute. Because we find that section B does not
directly interfere with management's right to contract out,
we do not reach the Union's claim that section B
constitutes an appropriate arrangement within the meaning
of section 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.
(c) Internal Security
The Agency contends that section B interferes with
management's right to determine internal security practices under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute. The Agency states
that "the employer's right to determine its internal
security practices reserved by section 7106(a)[(]1) of the
Statute would extend to policing the contractor's
performance with regard to adherence to the [final]
Guidelines." Agency's Statement at 55. Essentially, the
Agency argues that inspection of the drug testing
laboratory is an exercise of the Agency's right to
determine internal security practices and "what the Union
proposes here would clearly reflect the exercise of that
management right." Id. at 56.
Under the final Guidelines, on-site laboratory
inspections relating to the granting or maintaining of
certification are performed by qualified inspectors
designated by HHS. See Section 3.2(b) and 3.20 of the
final Guidelines, at 53 Fed. Reg. 11986, 11989 (1988). The
final Guidelines do not establish a right for either agency
officials or union representatives to participate in
inspections incident to the certification of laboratories,
nor do they preclude agency officials or union
representatives from participating in those inspections. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Forest
Service Council and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest
Service, Washington, D.C., 40 FLRA 174, 179-80 (1991)
(Forest Service), petition for review filed sub nom. United
States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service v. FLRA,
No. 91-1275 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 1991). Moreover, the final
Guidelines do not prevent agencies from reaching an
agreement with the laboratory that agency officials may
attend inspections conducted by the qualified inspectors or
conduct any other types of inspections that are in
accordance with the final Guidelines. See id.
In Forest Service, we held to be negotiable a
proposal providing that the union may designate a
representative as an observer to participate in an on-site
inspection of a drug testing laboratory whenever agency
officials participate in that inspection. We found that
the proposal would not prevent HHS from conducting the
on-site inspections by qualified inspectors provided for
under section 3.20 of the final Guidelines. Moreover,
because the final Guidelines do not prohibit agency
officials or union representatives from participating in
those inspections, we found that the proposal did not
require something that is precluded by the final Guidelines
by allowing a Union representative to participate only
where Agency officials participate. We also found that the
final Guidelines permit agencies and laboratories to agree
that a Union representative would also be allowed to
accompany the Agency officials as an observer in on-site
laboratory inspections and that such an agreement is not
precluded by section 3.20 of the final Guidelines.
Section B of Proposal 4 in this case provides for
quarterly on-site inspections by Union officials of the
laboratory, facilities, and procedures of the contractor
selected by the Agency to perform drug testing analyses. Like the proposal in Forest Service, section B would not
prevent HHS from conducting the on-site inspections by
qualified inspectors provided for under section 3.20 of the
final Guidelines. Likewise, inasmuch as the inspections
proposed in section B are not intended as substitutes for
HHS' inspections for laboratory certification, the Agency's
argument that the Union officials are not qualified to
conduct laboratory certification inspections is not
relevant and, therefore, is rejected. Also, to the extent that section B may be interpreted
to allow independent laboratory inspections by Union
officials, we find that the Agency has not cited any
provision of law, rule, or regulation that prevents the
parties from agreeing to independent laboratory inspections
by Union officials. As stated above, sections 3.2(b) and
3.20 of the final Guidelines, governing the certification
of drug testing laboratories, specifically provide for
on-site inspections of laboratories and do not preclude the
participation of union officials. Moreover, HHS recognized
that laboratories "may be willing to provide escorted tours
to union officials to illustrate the quality of their
processes." 53 Fed. Reg. at 11,977 (commentary to the
final Guidelines). See also Section 2.4(a)(1) of the final
Guidelines (allowing access to drug testing laboratories by
personnel authorized to conduct inspections on behalf of
Federal agencies for which the laboratory is engaged in
urine testing and "escorted" access to laboratories by
"authorized visitors"). Thus, the final Guidelines do not
provide that Union officials may inspect laboratories only
as observers on HHS inspections or only with Agency
officials present. Rather, under the final Guidelines,
laboratories may provide union officials an opportunity to
tour the laboratory independent of HHS inspections and
without agency officials.
We find that the Agency has not demonstrated that, by
providing for laboratory inspections by Union officials,
section B is inconsistent with any law, rule, or
regulation. Therefore, consistent with Forest Service, we
conclude that section B of Proposal 4 is negotiable.
The Agency shall, upon request, or as otherwise
agreed to by the parties, bargain on Proposal 1, section C
of Proposal 3, section C, subsections 4-7 of Proposal 4,
and Proposal 6.(2) The petition for review is dismissed as
to section A and section C, subsections 1-3 of Proposal 4.
have footnotes.) 1. The Union withdrew its petition for review as to Proposal
2, sections A and B of Proposal 3, and Proposal 5. See Union's
Response at 23-24. Accordingly, those proposals are not before
us and will not be considered in this decision.2. In finding those proposals to be negotiable, we make no