Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/85120197/Intellectual-Property-Notes-Outline
Timestamp: 2016-08-24 22:38:24
Document Index: 412382771

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 757', '§ 39', '§ 1831', '§ 1', '§43', '§ 105', '§ 102', '§ 103', '§ 102', '§ 757', '§ 1', '§ 1831', '§ 39', '§ 1', '§ 16601', '§ 1', '§ 757', '§ 757', '§ 757', '§102', '§101', '§103', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§102', '§ 103', '§ 103', 'art 2', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§287', '§ 1127', '§ 43', '§ 2', '§ 43', '§ 14', '§ 1064', '§ 1052', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 70', '§ 1052', '§1051', '§ 1051', '§43', '§ 1125', '§ 1125', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§101', '§101', '§ 105', '§ 103', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§101', '§204', '§301', '§101', '§203', '§107', '§106', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§107', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§ 109']

BrowseUploadSign inJoinBooksAudiobooksComicsSheet MusicWelcome to Scribd! Start your free trial and access books, documents and more.Find out moreINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COREI. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1 A. Philosophical Basis for Intellectual Property ............................................................................................ 1 B. Overview of U.S. and international Intellectual Property Legal Systems ................................................. 1 II. Trade Secrets............................................................................................................................................... 3 A. Defining Trade Secrets ............................................................................................................................. 3 Uniform Trade Secret Act - § 1(4) (RCW 19.108 in Washington) ........................................................ 3 Torts § 757 comment b (Restatement of the Law) ............................................................................. 3 Unfair Competition § 39 (Restatement of the Law (Third)) ................................................................ 4 18 USC § 1831. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE (on behalf of a foreign entity) ............................................. 4 B. Reasonable Measures .............................................................................................................................. 4 C. Disclosure of Trade Secrets; Non-Disclosure Agreements ....................................................................... 5 How Trade Secrets get out there: ....................................................................................................... 5 Residuals Clause: ................................................................................................................................. 6 D. Trade Secrets and Employees (Modern Mobility) .................................................................................... 6 NDA and some issues: ......................................................................................................................... 6 Covenants Not to Compete and some issues: Reasonableness .......................................................... 6 Assignment of Inventions Clauses ...................................................................................................... 6 Non-Solicitation Agreement ............................................................................................................... 6 Inevitable Disclosure – looking at the UTSA Section 2(a) ................................................................... 7 E. Proper and Improper Means of Discovery ............................................................................................... 7 "Misappropriation" means UTSA § 1(2): ............................................................................................. 7 Liability for Disclosure or Use of Another's Trade............................................................................... 8 Improper ............................................................................................................................................. 8 Breach of Confidentiality .................................................................................................................... 9 Proper means include: AKA Defenses to Misappropriation................................................................ 9 F. Remedies ................................................................................................................................................ 10 Injunctive Relief ................................................................................................................................ 10 Damages - USTA ................................................................................................................................ 10 Punitive Damages and Attorneys’ Fees............................................................................................. 10
III. Patents .................................................................................................................................................. 11 A. Patentable Subject Matter ..................................................................................................................... 11 B. Novelty and Statutory Bars .................................................................................................................... 12 Conception ........................................................................................................................................ 13 Reduces to Practice (RTP) = .............................................................................................................. 13 Diligence............................................................................................................................................ 13 AIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 14 C. Utility ...................................................................................................................................................... 14 D. Non-obviousness .................................................................................................................................... 16 1: Prior Art: scope and content (different from Novelty a bit) ......................................................... 16 2: Differences between the Prior Art and the Claims at Issue .......................................................... 17 3: PHOS in the pertinent Art ............................................................................................................. 17 Obvious or Not? ................................................................................................................................ 18 E. Disclosure, proof of possession .............................................................................................................. 18 35 USC 112 paragraph 1.................................................................................................................... 18 Written Description .......................................................................................................................... 18 Enablement ....................................................................................................................................... 19 Best Mode: ........................................................................................................................................ 19 F. Patent Rights and Claim Interpretation .................................................................................................. 19 35 U.S.C. 271 Infringement of patent. .............................................................................................. 19 Claim Writing: ................................................................................................................................... 19 Claim Interpretation.......................................................................................................................... 20 Cannons of Claim Interpretation ...................................................................................................... 20 G. Non-Utility Patents ................................................................................................................................. 20 Section 112, paragraph 6 .................................................................................................................. 20 H. Infringement; Doctrine of Equivalents ................................................................................................... 20 Literal Infringement .......................................................................................................................... 20 Doctrine of Equivalents ..................................................................................................................... 21 Prosecution History Estoppel ............................................................................................................ 22 Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents ....................................................................................................... 24 Indirect Infringement ........................................................................................................................ 24 I. Defenses ................................................................................................................................................. 24 Invalidity............................................................................................................................................ 24 Experimental Use .............................................................................................................................. 24 Inequitable Conduct.......................................................................................................................... 25 Exhaustion of Patent Rights .............................................................................................................. 25 Patent Misuse ................................................................................................................................... 25 J. Remedies ................................................................................................................................................ 26 Injunctive Relief ................................................................................................................................ 26 Damages ........................................................................................................................................... 26 Willful Infringement .......................................................................................................................... 27
IV.Trademarks .............................................................................................................................................. 28 A. Protectable Subject Matter .................................................................................................................... 29 Cases ................................................................................................................................................. 29 Qualitex v. Jacobson (1995) – Color ........................................................................................ 29 Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., (5th Cir. 1983) – Descriptive Fish-Fri ........... 29 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 US 205 - Supreme Court 2000 ............... 30 Source Identifying Function .............................................................................................................. 30 Trade Dress ....................................................................................................................................... 30 Taco Cabana v. Two Pesos, Inc. (1991) – inherently distinctive?? REaLLy?!?!TOTALITY ......... 30 Distinctiveness; Categories of Marks ................................................................................................ 31 GENERIC TERM ......................................................................................................................... 31 DESCRIPTIVE TERM .................................................................................................................. 32 SUGGESTIVE TERM ................................................................................................................... 32 ARBITRARY OR FANCIFUL TERMS ............................................................................................. 32 Unprotectable Symbols..................................................................................................................... 32 B. Establishing Trademark Rights ............................................................................................................... 33 Use .................................................................................................................................................... 33 Registration ....................................................................................................................................... 33 C. Ownership .............................................................................................................................................. 34 Priority .............................................................................................................................................. 34 Zazu Designs v. L'Oreal, S.A.(7th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................. 34 Assignment ....................................................................................................................................... 35 Loss of Right ...................................................................................................................................... 35 D. Standard Infringement ........................................................................................................................... 36 1: Ownership of a Valid Mark ........................................................................................................... 36 2: In Commerce ................................................................................................................................. 36 3: The Alleged Infringer Use .............................................................................................................. 36 4: The Mark or a Similar Symbol ....................................................................................................... 36 5: In Connection with selling or marketing of Goods or Services; AND ............................................ 36 6: Likelihood of Confusion, Mistake, or Deception (gets an injunction) ........................................... 36 A: Necessary Showing of Confusion ......................................................................................... 36 B: Factors for Determining Likelihood Confusion .................................................................... 36 E. “False Designation of Origin and False Descriptions Forbidden” §43(a)… ............................................. 37 False Advertising ............................................................................................................................... 37 Cybersquatting .................................................................................................................................. 37 F. Dilution ................................................................................................................................................... 37 THE CLAIM......................................................................................................................................... 38 Definition of Elements ...................................................................................................................... 38 Exclusions, Defenses ......................................................................................................................... 38 G. Defenses ................................................................................................................................................. 38 Parody ............................................................................................................................................... 39 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog – Chewy Vuitton! Parody, and DILUTION 39 Genericide ......................................................................................................................................... 39 Murphy Bed v. Interior Sleep Systems - GENERICIDE .............................................................. 39 Functionality ..................................................................................................................................... 39 TrafFix v. Marketing Displays – Necessary Element, Patent  Trademark ............................ 39 Naked Licensing ................................................................................................................................ 39 Fair Use ............................................................................................................................................. 39 Mattel v. MCA Records – “Come on Barbie, Let’s Go Party!” .................................................. 39 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting – Fair Use does not require Confusion analysis ....... 40 H. Remedies ................................................................................................................................................ 41 Lindy Pen Co v. Bic – Fair Use does not require Confusion analysis ....................................... 41 Big O Trie Dealers, Inc v. Goodyear – analysis ........................................................................ 41
........................... ............................................................ Substantial Similarity...................................... Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability ............. 52 Display Right ...... 56 Limitations on Computer Programs ................................. Acuff-Rose Music................................................................................ TO the JURY! ................ v.................................................... Koons ................................................................ Universal City Studios..................................................................................................... 510 U................... 47 Transfers ........ Publishers v................. 52 Fair Use .......... 53 Blanch v................................................................................................ Reid ............ Parody Good…Really?! ........................ Rural Telephone Service Co......................C... Nation Enterprises............................................................................... 1987) – BIKE RACK ....................................... 46 17 U................................................................ Other Limitations on Exclusive Rights ..................... Fair Use.......................................................................... 46 Who is the original Author?: .C............... Inc............................................................................................. 56 Grokster v......................................................... 56 E....................... (1st Cir............ 46 Term of Copyright ................................................. 51 Anderson v.............................................................C.............................................................. Inc.. 539 (1985)....................... 44 Baker v.....................................................................................S..... § 105 – Government Works NOT protectable ................. 51 Sony and Grokster ................... Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 569 (1994) – Satire Bad.....................................S............................... Lee ....................................................................... Copyright......... 43 Feist Publications v............ 43 A.........................S............................ 52 D........................................................................ v................................... 43 17 U.......................................................... METHOD OF OPERATION ........................S.........................................(2d Cir......................................Bigger Better Bookkeeping...... § 102 (a) ....... 44 Lotus Dev............................ Inc................................................. Procter & Gamble.................................... ............................................... § 103 (a) – Infringing Works Not Protectable ...........................S.................................... Corp....... (1991) The ORIGINAL Phone Book .................. MGM ............................................................................................................. 45 17 U..................... 44 Morrissey v........................................... Exclusive Rights ............. 49 Nichols v................. Stallone – ............................................................................................................................................. Borland Int’l.......... 471 U.. Copyright Ownership...................................................................................................................................... Remedies ........................................ Selden (1879).......................................V...............................................................S...Software... 56 Defenses Other ........... 43 17 U...................................................... (US 1996)............................................... 47 Aalmuhammed v.......................... 45 Brandir International................. 55 First Sale ................ IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY ....................... 51 Adaption Right ...............................................PROTECTABLE .......................................................................... 58 Copyright Infringement and Remedies ....................... 58 Property Like ..................................................... 56 F.... 55 Compulsory License for Nondramatic Musical Works ................................. 46 Community for Creative Non-Violence v............................................ 52 Harper & Row........ 48 Termination Right .............................. 49 C.. 56 Other Limits on Exclusive Rights ............................ Copyrightable Subject Matter ..................................... 52 Performance Right ......................................................................................... 58 Liability .......... 56 Sony v............................................ 49 Arnstein v............................................................................................................................. 50 Reproduction Rights.................. § 102 (b) – NOT PROTECTABLE ............ 53 Campbell v................................................................ 46 B.....C............................................... 58
.... 51 Distribution Right ........ Porter – Is there infringement? Access................. Universal Pictures Corporation .......................................................................................................................... 1967) – LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPRESSIONS .. Inc....................................................................
and international Intellectual Property Legal Systems
1) Foreign Infringement a) NTP v.P. good will -Utilitarianism. then build the framework that will create it. think of the society you want. -A priori: John Rawls. Selling of Parody. added value -Hegel. but unprotected material? -Bike Rack. personhood.
Is the plaintiff using it‘s IP to attack related.P.S. Philosophical Basis for Intellectual Property
The Types of Intellectual Property: -not created with a large amount of foresight -the types have large gaps where material may simply lack protection -the alternative truth is that many materials are subject to multiple protections First Principles: -I.CONTROL What deserves Intellectual Property protections? -the line between Abstract Ideas and Procedures. investment. Public Policy. et cetera -the bell curve example. can we shut down blackberry?! iv) Importance of claim drafting b) Eolas v. order. reputation. Mixtures. incentives -Social Planning: William Fisher.
A. limiting public health aims -Locke. protections too weak. Microsoft (CAFC 2005) i) Foreign sales 1
. Overview of U.I. protections too strong. open piracy -I. from behind the veil of ignorance . whether its students or judges
B. RIM (CAFC 2005) i) System and Method claims (1) At least one step of the method took place in Canada (2) Email routing system ii) Compare 35 USC 271(a) and 35 USC 271(f)(1) (1) GENERAL: the infringement has to occur in the country (2) EXCEPTION: an intent to infringe abroad iii) Injunction vs.
AT&T (U.S. prepare for change!
.‘s reach 2) International Intellectual Property a) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Comparative Patent Law THE UNITED STATES REST OF THE WORLD First to Invent* First to File Grace period Absolute Priority
--Publication** --Public use --Sale
Few prior user rights* No opposition Best mode
More Prior User Rights Post-grant opposition No best mode
b) The America Invents Act i) Patent Law Reform. 2007) i) ―Golden Masters‖ ii) In Europe.c) Microsoft v. they made copies of AT&T‘s golden master iii) HELD: copying occurring in Europe not within the U.S.
. 2 The ‗generally known‘ standard refers to the subgroup of persons that would typically know such information. not to reveal its secrets to the public. Exit Interviews Theoretical Basis for Trade Secrets: -Property: Locke sort of idea -Tort: regulates through risk of criminal and civil liability-Contract: NDAs. Inc. Defining Trade Secrets
A modicum of secrecy beyond public information… Uniform Trade Secret Act . that: (i) derives independent economic value1.
Indicators of Value: value to plaintiff‘s business. construed favorably to appellant. The court concluded that the inferences from the facts. counts. or process*.108 in Washington) "Trade secret" means information.II. like chemical engineers. who was a former employee of a bankrupt company that initially dealt with appellant's trade secrets in order to build a furnace for the appellant. method. Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs). were that appellant wished only to profit from its secrets in its business dealings. 790 F. programmers.
Information Workers. such as in a trade journal.
*intended to include the concept of ―know-how‖
Torts § 757 comment b (Restatement of the Law) 1) ―continuously used in one‘s business‖ that gives its owner (NOT single. device. development costs. v. technique. security costs. such as the knowledge that a line of research is unfruitful. other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. and the like. actual or potential. including a formula. oncontract) -Unfair Competition Law: anti-trust. and not being readily ascertainable by proper means3 by. from not being generally known2 to. 3 Something is readily ascertainable is the information is available relatively easily and cheaply. expert testimony. pattern. Fourtek. Inc. ephemeral events) 2) ―an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competition who do not know or use it‖ 3) so long as the information was in fact a secret.2d 1195 – specs for furnace Held: Zinc-recovery furnace design company.§ 1(4) (RCW 19. program. the FTC as the referee in a grand boxing match
A. compilation. and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. terms of employment (work for hire vs. Metallurgical Industries. improper acquisition (they really wanted the information). licensing (willingness of others to pay). Even negative value.
destroys." The broader definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use. v. artifice. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE (on behalf of a foreign entity)
―The definition of "trade secret" contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade secret be "continuously used in one's business. sketches. replicates. photocopies. Because a trade secret need not be exclusive to confer a competitive advantage. sends. or foreign agent.000.
B. or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3). or both. Telex Corp. 510 F. mails. or conceals.000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years. knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated. knowingly— (1) steals.— Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $10. or conveys a trade secret. be fined not more than $500. communicates.— Whoever. except as provided in subsection (b). different independent developers can acquire rights inthe same trade secret. transmits. for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could be of great value to a competitor. foreign instrumentality. photographs.
18 USC § 1831. (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3). Reasonable Measures
Reasonable security measures are themselves indicative of a trade secret and its value. or possesses a trade secret. Cf. carries away. Trainings Passwords Access Logs Physical Access Restrictions ―need to know basis‖ NDA NDA as an element of other contracts Network Access Cover things up (just plain cloth) Stamping of Documents.000. 1975) per curiam. Types of Measures Guidelines.S. Signage Beware Cleaning Staff
. alters. buys. intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government. downloads. 802 (1975) (liability imposed for developmental cost savings with respect to product not marketed). draws.Unfair Competition § 39 (Restatement of the Law (Third)) A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others. (2) without authorization copies. or by fraud.. or deception obtains a trade secret. (3) receives. takes. duplicates. uploads. cert. or without authorization appropriates. (b) Organizations.‖ Comments to Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4).2d 894 (CA10. IBM Corp. or converted without authorization. delivers. obtained. The definition includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint. dismissed 423 U. and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. shall.
Reynolds. so the plaintiff wished to quit paying royalties on something that was no longer a trade secret. (1959) – Royalties. independent of the contingency of disclosure. exception is computer programs. Reasonable Measures Held: Summary judgment is rarely if ever appropriate for determining whether measures were reasonable Facts: Plaintiff.Determining Reasonableness NOT Cost Prohibitive (Posner‘s argument) Industry Standards Commensurate with the Secret‘s value Common Sense (What might actually keep the information a secret?) ―Facts and Circumstances‖ Overuse of a measure devalues its purpose Rockwell Graphic Systems. for as long as plaintiff manufactured and sold the antiseptic compound. Embedded into a product on the open market (which creates the possibility of reverse engineering). v. a competing manufacturer. a manufacturer of newspaper printing presses and supplier of parts. because clever engineer can figure out the code (―decompiling‖). Inc. for the purpose of health and safety Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. duty to protect specifications Held: the proprietor of an IMAX movie theater had a duty to IMAX to protect the specifications of the projector as trade secrets from a competitor who was attempting to reverse engineer the IMAX technology
C. sued Defendant Corporation. Cinema Technologies (1998) – IMAX. and defendant president. Reasoning: the plain language of the contract defined and stipulated that the royalties would be paid. DEV (1991) – Summary Judgment. for misappropriation of trade secrets Reasoning: the mere fact that plaintiff gave piece part drawings to vendors who made parts for plaintiff did not forfeit trade secret protection IMAX Corp. at specified amounts. John J. Listerine Held: plaintiff could not escape that obligation simply because the secret was discovered by a third party or by the general public. v. 5
. solution is ‗terms of agreement‘ aka ‗click-wrap‘ Independent Creation Inadvertent Disclosure To Governments. a former employee of plaintiff. Facts: contract provided that inventor would receive periodic royalty payments. Disclosure of Trade Secrets. Non-Disclosure Agreements
How Trade Secrets get out there: Publishing (which destroys trade secret status). Third party leaked the information. Inc. v.
Perry v.2d 885. Robb (1995) 33 Cal. Non-Solicitation Agreement Business to Business: no poaching Business to Employee: no soliciting customers for employment Holdover.Residuals Clause: -tactics: how they are used.App.5 also applies to members of limited liability companies. (Hilb. It applies when a shareholder "sells" their stock to another for valuable consideration. Services v. for what purposes. Trailer Clauses Regulations.. Royal & Hamilton Ins. 1824-1825. Assignment of Inventions Clauses -general rule: if hired for that purpose.4th 1812.) The typical scenario is when a shareholder sells or disposes of their stock. 111 Wash.
D. and lost profit are recoverable in Washington. time lag. 1989). Type of Work Restrained 1) Is the restraint no greater than necessary to protect the legitimate business interests of the employer? 2) Is the restraint unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the employee’s legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood? 3) Is the restraint contrary to sound public policy? Washington: Breach of contract damages. belongs to employer. Duration. 766 P. Geographic Scope. California: Business & Professions Code § 16601 creates an exception permitting lawful noncompete agreements for company owners. Employee Handbooks Prevention: Keep Employees Happy!!!
. liquidated damages. A new section 16602. if not hired for that purpose. Trade Secrets and Employees (Modern Mobility)
NDA and some issues: -does the employee receive consideration for signing one? -cannot restrict information that an employee or partner already knew? Covenants Not to Compete and some issues: Reasonableness Because proving misappropriation can be difficult to prove. Moran. then belongs to the employee but the employer has a shop right.2d 1096 (Wash.
a competitor to Pepsi‘s ―All Sport. Reasoning: Language of UTSA Section 2(a). given that the new and old employers were competitors. looking for other places an employee could fit in the receiving company. Redmond.html. (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use5. manufacturer of Gatorade. or (C) before a material change of his [or her] position. or (B) at the time of disclosure or use. but not all states. finds a coherent expression in a case out of the 7th Circuit.Inevitable Disclosure – looking at the UTSA Section 2(a) Settlement possibility. Proper and Improper Means of Discovery
"Misappropriation" means UTSA § 1(2):
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means. a competitor to Pepsi‘s ―All Sport. Redmond. There was no allegation. but Trade Secrets used
. And given the inevitability of such disclosures. the former employer was not limited to sitting around and waiting until there was an actual or even threatened use of those trade secrets before the former employer could seek legal redress. had access to many company trade secrets and confidential information. PepsiCo. or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.com/inevitable.
―The principle behind this doctrine is that an employee with knowledge of a former employer‘s trade secrets would ―inevitably‖ disclose the same to the new employer since the nature of the new job would lead to such disclosures. ―The doctrine. Inc. who left that employ to go to work for the Quaker Oats Company (also sued). in his employ with PepsiCo. v. 5
Smith v. that former employer could prevent the employee from taking that job and prevent the new employer from hiring the employee merely because the employee had such knowledge that would ―inevitably‖ be disclosed. in his employ with PepsiCo. however.‖ Redmond. (7th Circuit) – ―Inevitable Disclosure‖ All Sport  Gatorade4 Held: Redmond estopped from working for Quaker Oats (maker of Gatorade) Facts: Former PepsiCo employee. v. No Purchase. Dravo (1953) – Business up for Sale. That case involved a former PepsiCo employee. knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it. Redmond. manufacturer of Gatorade. had access to many company trade secrets and confidential information. PepsiCo. William Redmond. There was no allegation. knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. who left that employ to go to work for the Quaker Oats Company (also sued).‖ The case also involved other drink beverages in which the 2 companies competed. William Redmond. that he or Quaker used or intended to use that knowledge. that he or Quaker used or intended to use that knowledge. which has been adopted in some. Under this doctrine. ―threat‖ of disclosure
E. or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret. however.‖ http://www.ivanhoffman. Inc.
Christopher. Time. In general they are means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct. if one uses physical force to take a secret formula from another's pocket.I. v."‖ No productive work to gain the knowledge (really just free-riding) "f. Flyover though not illegal.
. Place." Restatement of Torts § 757.Liability for Disclosure or Use of Another's Trade Restatement of the Law — Torts § 757. A complete catalogue of improper means is not possible. Thus. or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him. Examples of such means are fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. or (c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other. or breaks into another's office to steal the formula. comment f at 10 (1939). eavesdropping or other espionage.2d 1012)." Restatement of Torts § 757. But HN7means may be improper under this rule even though they do not cause any other harm than that to the interest in the trade secret. tapping of telephone wires. but the ROOF was not covered. Reasoning: ―The Supreme Court of that state has declared that "the undoubted tendency of the law has been to recognize and enforce higher standards of commercial morality in the business world. (431 F. One who discloses or uses another's trade secret. Such conduct is also an improper means of procuring the secret under this rule. or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake Improper E. his conduct is wrongful and subjects him to liability apart from the rule stated in this Section. is liable to the other if: (a) he discovered the secret by improper means. comment f at 10 (1939). and Circumstances. Facts: Reasonable Measures taken to cover the factory during its construction. was immoral and therefore improper. without a privilege to do so. Du Pont at 1016. – Business Morality Held: Standard of ―means which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct. The discovery of another's trade secret by improper means subjects the actor to liability independently of the harm to the interest in the secret. Improper means of discovery.
Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret. General debate around whether parties should be allowed to contract against reverse engineering. However. 2. No Purchase.D. 4. the term "reverse engineering" is not a talisman that may immunize the theft of trade secrets. by starting with the known product and working backward to find the method by which it was developed. Discovery by independent invention.
." as opposed to being obtained by virtue of a confidential relationship with an employer. The acquisition of the known product must. and not through the confidential relationship established with the maker or owner of the product. Seeley Mach. but Trade Secrets used Held: Misappropriation because circumstances in which information was revealed gave rise to an implied duty of confidentiality.‖ HN 38. Facts: Smith had a great business idea but passed away (patent applications essentially inventing modern freight practices). Just reverse engineer in Europe. Supp. Dravo (1953) – Business up for Sale. Reverse engineering a product to determine its design specifications is therefore permissible so long as the means used to get the information necessary to reverse engineer is in the public domain. Dravo does not purpose the business. Obtaining the trade secret from published literature. that is. (244 F. Inc. Discovery by "reverse engineering".Y 2003)) ―Trade secret law does not offer protection against discovery by so-called reverse engineering. 2d 19 (N. Observation of the item in public use or on public display. but then makes similar Reasoning: NDA is not the only way to establish a confidential relationship.Breach of Confidentiality Smith v.. Kadant. v. 5. Inc. followed by interest to buy the business expressed by Dravo. The relevant inquiry is whether the means to obtain the alleged trade secret were proper or "honest. also be by a fair and honest means.N. such as
purchase of the item on the open market for reverse engineering to be lawful. of course..
Proper means include: AKA Defenses to Misappropriation
USTA Actual losses (restitution) + Defendant‘s wrongful profits (unjust enrichment) + ongoing royalty – any overlap = Misappropriation Damages Punitive Damages and Attorneys’ Fees Willful and Malicious may justify treble damages (likely double) as well as attorneys‘ fees. Preliminary or Permanent TRO Until Public Knowledge
Damages . but for the misappropriation.
Injunctive Relief An attempt to return the trade secret holder to the position they would have been in.F.
Discoveries. subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 1980) – bacteria which metabolizes crude oil Held: Statutory subject matter is ―anything under the sun that is made by man‖. then we would not need the patent office 11
. product-by-process Product (cover tangibles): machine. Mass 1817. cancer mouse) Plant Design (non-functional) Un-patentable: Laws of Nature. I section 8
A. Printed Matter Inventions useful solely in connection with atomic weapons.C. violations of ordre publique (the public conscious). machine. Judge Story)). may obtain a patent therefor. Physical Phenomena. product-by-process.C. isolations or purifications. Lewis (C.D. or any new and useful improvement thereof. living organisms (e. composition of matter.
MAKE. ―Immoral‖ inventions (Lowell v. sequence of steps may be crucial. manufacture. manufacture. Inventions involving or taking place within the human body Diamond v. ―Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process. fall within the category of ‗composition of matter‘ Facts: Recombined various parts of bacteria Reasoning: If Congress could predict all that would be invented and then patented. in that disclosure for the public good gives the discloser monopoly rights for a limited time.g. 101 Inventions patentable.S. Research by Solow -most economic growth is driven by (1) R&D and (2) education Research by Romer -investments in R&D do not decrease their returns to scale (not subject to diminishing returns) Aristotle rejected the patent system because he believed it would cause change ―The Congress shall have the power… to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.‖ Process (covers methods): ―use‖ patent. Chakrabarty (U.S. USE. by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries‖ Art. Patentable Subject Matter
Patentable: 35 U.III. or composition of matter. Abstract Ideas. Patents are the opposite of trade secrets.
called certiorari premature. even if unaware of the reference. Mulford (1911 Judge Learned Hand) – purified adrenaline has new uses Held: After removal and purification. but new uses of an old product do not elude the prior art preclusion Anticipates every element of the proposed patent must be in a single previous patent in order to anticipate Critical Date Is the patent anticipated as of the the date of invention
. Includes undisclosed patents pending review by USPTO Prior Art ―the inherency doctrine‖. Reasoning: does new things once completely isolated. until the America Invents Act Anticipation §102(a)(e) was already in public use (including secret use for commercial purposes) or had been published Reference Beware Publication (ANYWHERE)! Presentation! Unpatentable. adrenalin ―became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.S. Signature – business methods patentable Facts: Numbers in. but the process had practical utility Bilski v. 1948) – Held: Combining bacteria ―is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence it is not patentable‖ Facts: Mixed bacteria for the purpose of cultures. Prometheus (2010) – forthcoming! To answer this blood methodology issue
B. but the SCOTUS said this isn‘t the only test! LabCorp v. 2005) – checking blood compared against a chart Held: Refused to answer.‖ Facts: Removing adrenalin completely from tissues. Kappos (2010) – method for hedge-funding Held: Not patentable…Machine Transformation test is not the ONLY test! Reasoning: because (1) represents machine (2) no transformation of matter One or the other in order to patentable.S. State Street v. Parke-Davis v. Numbers out. Novelty and Statutory Bars
§101 ―new and useful‖ §103 and §102 language Judged by date of invention. Mayo v. Public access sufficient to constitute a bar.Funk Brothers v. no need to be widespread. Metabolite (U. Kalo (U. That was a good ground for a patent. new process for making old product is patentable.
within one year of filing elsewhere
is protected. could be lost for lack of reasonable diligence in prosecuting the patent learned of the invention from someone else. Xrtp.S. was the diligence continuous through Y Griffith v. but public use tends to be broad
Conception The conception of a species counts as conception of an entire genus Reduces to Practice (RTP) = Physical embodiment or performance Complete embodiment RTP of one species counts as conception of an entire genus Diligence Actual activity or a legitimate excuse during the entire relevant period Priority based on date of invention. the inventor has year to file her application. Facts:
for a patent on an aminocarnitine compound
Other nations‘ patent regimes are less forgiving on this point than the US.
. Yc. Xc. Kanamaru (CAFC 1987) – Griffith took a break. suppress. Yrtp.).S. Not entitled to a patent if a fully operable conception of the invention is communicated to the applicant. once an invention becomes public use or on sale (in U. or hide precludes patentability must file in the U. conceal.Priority Derivation
§102(g) §102(f) §102(b)6 §102(c) §102(g) §102(d)
Loss of Right Abandonment Concealment Foreign
another inventor had priority. diligence broken? Held: Kanamaru gets the patent because the Griffith took a break (because he was waiting for grant money and help from the right post-doctoral fellow).
or to facilitate private assassination. Utility
General: ―Utility means more than a mere curiosity.D.In re Hall – Dissertation is Prior Art
AIA Section 102(g) will be eliminated: (g)(1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291. or (2) before such person's invention thereof. from a time prior to conception by the other. or concealed it. there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention. or a frivolous or trifling article not aiding in the progress nor increasing the possession of the human race. or concealed.
C. but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice.C. or to promote debauchery.‖ -Prof. Beneficial or Moral: Lowell v. to the extent permitted in section 104. that before such person's invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned. suppressed. another inventor involved therein establishes. William Robinson Specific: an invention must actually perform its intended function.‖
. the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned. a scientific process exciting wonder yet not producing physical results. Lewis (C. suppressed. In determining priority of invention under this subsection. Judge Story) Held: Patents lack utility if used to ―poison people. Mass 1817.
Orange Bang (CAFC 1999) – Swirly Juice Machine Held: Patentable! Patent office does not consider issues of morality. Moral. while the machine serves juice from a box below. Improvement over the prior art. Facts: The machine shows this swirling juice above a fountain that is actually florescent poison. Facts: Basically. incentivizing research.
. Specific Utility: the utility is related to the claimed inventive aspects 2. Therefore his invention wasn't useful. Manson came up with the process to make the steroid. Immoral is for Congress to decide.Juicy Whip v. Reasoning: Goes to the underlying policy for requiring utility: progress of society. it‘s just a hunting license which would hurt downstream research. and as of yet they have not made morality an element of patentability. Substantial Utility (no throw-away utility) 3. no. Reasoning: Argument against (not holding) is that this is deceptive. which can find the Whole gene Held: EST (fragment gene) not patentable. Inspired by worries of the ―tragedy of the anti-commons‖ One Use to get the patent to Exclude Every Use. why. 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines Inventions must have 1. Dissent: The line is more towards knowing what something does. Brenner v. Patent Utility does not equal FDA Utility Different standard for Utility for different technologies: yes. but didn't have the foggiest idea what the steroid could possibly be used for. Manson (SCOTUS 1966) – A Protein without a Purpose (that is. USE) Held: The Utility being patented must be KNOWN. In re Fisher (CAFC 2005) – Fragment of a gene. Credible Utility: an operable function. how? Patents are kept away from the Human Body.
where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.2d 894 (Fed. In the inventing process.S.D. 3d 1475. predictable solutions. (1) Throwing darts versus a finite number of Identified. KSR affirmed the logical inverse of this statement by stating that § 103 bars patentability unless “the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Cir. This section‘s headings come from the case Graham v. The inverse of this proposition is succinctly encapsulated by the Supreme Court’s statement in KSR that where a skilled artisan merely pursues “known options” from a “finite number of identified. the prior art of the involved member will not prejudice patentability In re Kubin – Obvious-to-try
To be clear. however. at 421. Kubin revives the O'Farrell analysis of obvious to try and carves-out two factual situations where obvious-to-try analysis should not apply.” obviousness under § 103 arises. 1 (1966) – Spring loaded shank for plow Held: Quantum of difference to warrant patentability? Balance the headings. (2) Exploring new technology versus improving known and predictable technology: [An] impermissible “obvious to try” situations occurs where 'what was “obvious to try” was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation. Going forward. predictable known options: In such circumstances. 1: Prior Art: scope and content (different from Novelty a bit) Obviousness is judged from the point of view from a PHOSIA against prior art that is ―reasonably pertinent‖ based on whether the reference falls. Facts: Previous patent. what are similar endeavors (as in. courts should not succumb to hindsight claims of obviousness.”
. 1481 (2004)). but ultimately his own previous patents shot him in the foot.‖ In re Paulsen (30 F. 550 U. Hohn Deere Co. 853 F.' (Quoting O'Farrell). 1988). where a defendant merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities. the question in this long-running debate will be "when is an invention that was obvious to try nevertheless nonobvious?" (quoting In re O’Farrell. Again.. patented improvements.S. toothbrushes and hairbrushes probably face similar issues)? If inventors work together or company‘s collaborate. Kubin does not hold that an invention that was "obvious to try" was necessarily obvious under Section 103(a). 383 U. Non-obviousness
Measured by the PHOSITA who has encyclopedic knowledge of all prior art. ―within the field of the inventor‘s endeavor. Held that was obvious.
which is more likely. Educational level of active workers in the field
. not in the prior art. The invention is old-school biotech: isolating and sequencing a human gene that encodes for a protein. and the application explicitly states that the DNA and Protein sequence may be obtained through "conventional methodologies known to one of skill in the art. the court finds that neither of the O'Farrell exceptions apply." Likewise. People do this in high school now.Application: In this case. Prior art solution to those problems 3. Sophistication of the technology 5. the protein in question had already been identified and the prior art suggested that the protein plays an role in human immune response. Is the combination of the elements obvious to a PHOSIA? 3: PHOS in the pertinent Art Factors to consider in who this person is: 1.
In re Dembiczak -
2: Differences between the Prior Art and the Claims at Issue Option 1: There is a new element to the Patent. Rapidity with which innovations are made 4. Would the missing element have been obvious to a PHOSIA? Option 2: All elements are somewhere in the prior art (not any one patent). Types of problems encountered in the art 2.
Obvious or Not? Technical, Economic, and Motivational perspectives. Again, PHOSITA Secondary factors courts have looked at: 1. Commercial Success (or was it just marketing) 2. Long-felt but unresolved need (e.g. trade journal suggests it) 3. Failure of others 4. Industry Acquiescence 5. Copying (others are copying the patent in question) 6. Unexpected results or properties of claimed invention 7. Skepticism of experts KSR v. Teleflex, (U.S. 2007) – Computerized Pedal Held: TSM is just one of many tests. Obvious development! Facts: Teaching Suggestions Motivations!
E. Disclosure, proof of possession
Specification must include: Written description of the invention sufficient to Prove that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention as of priority date Enable a PHOSITA to carry out the claims without resort to undue experimentation 35 USC 112 paragraph 1 ―The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode (enablement) contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.‖ Written Description Actual reduction (constructive reduction) to practice, description of invention in possession, symbolic representations, or deposit of the invention (which happens with biological patents which are beyond current understanding in a sense). Gentry Gallery v. Berkline (CAFC 1998) ―[claims] may be no broader than the supporting disclosure…‖ Ariad v. Eli Lilly (CAFC 2010; en benc) – SPECIFIC written description 1. ―Since its inception, this court has consistently held that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from enablement…which we now affirm‖ 2. ―Specifically, the description must ―clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.‖‖ 3. No categorical claims, only specifics. 18
Enablement Must describe the to the public how to use and make the invention. Judged with respect to a PHOSITA Each and every claimed embodiment must be enabled. The Incandescent Lamp Patent (US 1895) Some failure rate is acceptable Without undue experimentation by a PHOSITA: quantity of experimentation, amount of direction presented, nature of invention, state or prior art, …. OTHERS, get creative litigator! Best Mode: statutory requirement, doesn‘t have to be only, doesn‘t have to be explicit (AIA, still requires Best Mode, but failure no longer triggers invalidity) Judged not by PHOSITA, but by the subjective belief of the patent submitter. If element makes for the best mode, it must be disclosed. ‗best mode‘ itself doesn‘t apply to each element, if there is another source for the element
F. Patent Rights and Claim Interpretation
35 U.S.C. 271 Infringement of patent. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. (b) Induces infringement (c) contributory infringement (d) activities by patent owner that do not limit infringement (e) apply for FDA approval of a generic version of patented drug (f) exportation of components to make infringement (g) importation of product produced elsewhere Claim Writing: 1. Preamble 2. Transition Phrase a. Open: comprising, including, containing, mixture b. Closed: consisting of c. Ambiguous: consisting essentially of, having, is 3. Body (list of elements) Standard cannons of interpretation are used by the court to interpret a patent, which in turn determines its scope and decides whether there is literal infringement. The meaning of a word within in a patent should be driven largely by its use in the patent.
Claim Interpretation Phillips v. AWH Corp (CAFC 2005)(en benc) Interpretive Sources: Intrinsic Evidence: claim language, ordinary meaning, other claims, claims in related patents Patent Specification: can point away from ordinary or dictionary meaning Prosecution History: Patentee‘s negotiation with PTO over claim nmeaning binding Extrinsic Evidence: Permissible if intrinsic evidence not dispositive, sources can be dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, experts Cannons of Claim Interpretation 1. -Where intrinsic evidence unambiguously sets out claim scope, it controls 2. -There is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language 3. -General and technical dictionaries can be used to determine ordinary meaning 4. -A claim term may be read with reference to the specification but a limitation/expansion from the specification should not be read into the claim 5. -If possible, a claim should be construed to encompass a disclosed embodiment of the invention 6. -Claims should be construed to uphold their validity unless their clear language shows otherwise 7. -Where a claim is susceptible to a broad and narrow construction, the narrow should be adopted 8. -The presumption of claim differentiation may be overcome by intrinsic and relevant extrinsic evidence
G. Non-Utility Patents
Section 112, paragraph 6 Means plus Function Claims "An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."
H. Infringement; Doctrine of Equivalents
Literal Infringement Equivalent in both the ‗trees‘ and the ‗forest‘. Literal Infringement: Explicit or inherent infringement of each element Larami Corp. v. Amron, 27 US.PQ.2d 1280 – DETACHABLE V. THEREIN Supersoaker. Held: (deciding the countersuit) Does the SUPERSOAKER infringe Claim 1 of the Esposito patent? No. To infringe a claim of a patent the product in question must infringe all elements of the claim. Here the SUPERSOAKER's water chamber is 20
which extends to structural equivalents. a pump…for building up an appreciable amount of pressure in said chamber for ejecting a stream of liquid therefrom an appreciable distance substantially forwardly of said toy…. detachable reservoir and shot water by releasing a valve. Linde Air Products Co. cannot be said to contain an arrangement "along the same axis. the difference between the limitation in the accused device and the limitation literally recited in the patent claim may be found to be "insubstantial" if the limitation in the accused device: 1. Inc.C. articulated in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. then the patentee is estopped from later arguing that the surrendered coverage is insubstantially different from the literally claimed limitation.. (1950). is whether the difference between the limitation in the accused device and the limitation literally recited in the patent claim is "insubstantial. while the doctrine of equivalents for ¶ 6 21
.external. Under prosecution history estoppel. § 112 ¶ 6.
In the United States. The SUPERSOAKER. 3. the doctrine of equivalents is limited by prosecution history estoppel. if the patentee abandoned through an amendment to the patent application certain literal claim coverage (e. the doctrine of equivalents analysis is applied to individual claim limitations. but Claim 1 described a toy with "an elongated housing [case] having a chamber therein for a liquid [tank]. and defendants counter-sued for infringement of a patent assigned to them by Gary Esposito. air pump and outlet nozzle along the same axis.. Does the SUPERSOAKER infringe Claim 10 of the Esposito patent? No. See Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. Under the triple-identity test. v.g.[3] The United States also has a statutory equivalents doctrine that is codified in 35 U. Most of the claims of Esposito's patent described using electricity to produce lights and sounds in a water gun.[1] The legal test. It performs substantially the same function In substantially the same way To yield substantially the same result as the limitation literally recited in the patent claim. Hilton Davis Chem.
Doctrine of Equivalents In the United States." One way of determining whether a difference is "insubstantial" or not is called the "triple identity" test. 2. with its external reservoir. by narrowing the literal scope of the patent claim)." The Esposito patent also included Claim 10 describing an arrangement of a tank..[2] Other more arcane limitations such as the ensnarement defense tend to be more difficult to apply. (1997).S. not to the invention as a whole." Facts: Plaintiff Larami manufactured a line of patented SUPERSOAKER water guns that stored water under pressure in an external. Larami sued defendants Alan Amron and Talk To Me Products. 4. Co. However. which does not meet the "chamber therein" element of Claim 1.
devices now used "in machinery as diverse as sewing equipment and the Thunder Mountain ride at Disney 22
. Shoketsu (U. Unforeseeable. Hilton Davis (U. "The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.[4] Winans v. 1977) – Held: All elements rule." Rehabilitates doctrine of equivalents. as before. At the moment of application. the structural equivalents of ¶ 6 only extends to equivalents available at issuance and disclosed in the application. Denmead (U. 1853) – Historical Beginning Held: ___ Facts: ___ Graver Tank v. Linde Air (U.extends to technological equivalents developed after the issuance of a claim.S. Triple Identity Test: Function. Result Facts: ___ Warner-Jenkinson v. Festo v.S. Way. "After amendment. then the patentee is estopped from claiming infringement on the unamended patent. 1950) – Held: Look at literal infringement first. Unforeseeable protected by the Doctrine of Equivalents. Apply the Triple Identity Test ELEMENT BY ELEMENT
Prosecution History Estoppel If an amendment is made to an application during prosecution to narrow a claim in order to preserve patentability.S. Facts: Petitioner Festo Corporation patented magnetic rod-less cylinders for moving objects in a conveying system.S. Held: Does modification because of patentability concerns during the patent process provide a complete bar to the patentee against claiming infringement through equivalents because of procedural history estoppel? No. there are some things about the area of technology that are unimaginable and therefore beyond patent drafting expectations. Although a patentee by modifying a patent in response to patentability concerns explicitly gives up claims of equivalents in the modified material. language remains an imperfect fit for invention. the estoppel bar is flexible rather than rigid." The burden is still on the patentee to show that the equivalents are not excluded by estoppel in the modification. 2002) – Prosecution history estoppel – Foreseeability criterion.
 That's known as the Dedication Doctrine. but the claims only talked about using aluminum for a substrate. o The Appellate Court found that the Dedication Doctrine was good law. RES appealed.  See Maxwell v.S. Festo modified the patents in response to the PTO's objections regarding patentability and prior art." During the patent process. (86 F. Johnson & Johnson Associates Inc. adding a limitation that the inventions contain a pair of sealing rings with a lip on each side. they dedicated any unclaimed substrates (like copper) to the public. o The Court noted that if an inventor makes a broad claim that gets struck down and they are forced to settle for a narrow claim. KF: Respondents SMC later began using a similar device with a two-way lip on the cylinder.  See Graver Tank v.  The Doctrine of Equivalents says that a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an equivalence between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Int'l Trade Comm'n (145 F.  The Appellate Court reversed. 23
.  So. Linde Air Products Co. J. putting it outside the literal claim of the Festo patents. o The Court found that in order for the Dedication Doctrine to apply there has to be multiple distinct embodiments in the specification where only one is claimed.World.  RES began manufacturing very similar circuit boards that used steel as a substrate. Inc. things in the denied claim are not considered dedicatedlike the things they didn't claim at all. and that it was mean to discourage patent applicants from presenting a broad disclosure in the specification and then filing narrow claims to stop the USPTO from examining the broad claims that could have been claimed by the broad specification.3d 1317 (1998)). o Johnson & Johnson argued that the differences between steel and aluminum were very minor. 605 (1950).3d 1098 (1996)). v. R. o RES argued that when Johnson & Johnson willfully limited their patent to aluminum. (339 U. but only a narrow range claimed.S. – Aluminum substrates. o The Trial Court found that the Doctrine of Equivalents applied. Baker. not a single broad embodiment with a narrower claim. and so it was infringing via the Doctrine of Equivalents. o The specification said that a number of materials could be used as the substrate.. Johnson & Johnson sued for infringement. don't follow Magnex where there was a broad range of a chemical disclosed in the specification. Foreseeable Steel  Johnson & Johnson applied for a patent on method for printing circuit boards. which basically says that anything disclosed in the specification but not claimed must be meant to be dedicated to the public.E.  The Trial Court found for Johnson & Johnson. follow Maxwell where there were two different ways to tie shoes together but Maxwell only claimed one. v. Inc. and YBM Magnex.
Calco (U. Factual issue is whether the catheter could be used for more than just coronary angioplasty.  Therefore the Dedication Doctrine applies and Johnson & Johnson cannot assert the Doctrine of Equivalents against RES. Actual Knowledge. Advance Cardiovascular (U. SEB (U. Experimental Use ―Truly Narrow‖ Exception The Federal Circuit held that experimental use protects only actions performed ―for amusement. Equitable doctrine invented by courts to avoid finding infringement. Active Inducer: inducing another to infringe 2.‖ 24
Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents Never been upheld by the CAFC.
The Court looked at the wording of Johnson & Johnson specification. Water Technologies v. Indirect Infringement 1.S.S. Contributory Infringement: purchasing and then using to-order parts which infringe Bard v. Johnson & Johnson shouldn't be allowed to apply it against RES.S.
35 USC §287(c) Protection for ―medical practitioners‖ for ―medical activities‖ Invalidity Attack the underlying validity of the original claim. especially in looking for new references. making summary judgment inappropriate. 1988) – Held: ―While proof of intent is necessary. Since the Doctrine of Equivalents is mostly limited to unforeseeable differences. (intent?) Held: section 271(b): ―actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another‘s direct infringement. Since Johnson & Johnson had disclosed those materials.‖ Global-Tech v. they must have meant to dedicate them to the public. 1990) – sell of catheter for method patent. to satisfy idle curiosity. or for strictly philosophical inquiry.‖ Summary: If there is sufficient evidence of non-infringing uses than summary judgment is not appropriate in contributory infringement action. In a concurrence it was argued that the Dedication Doctrine is really nothing more than a foreseeability argument. which explicitly said that steel and nickel could be used as a substrate. direct evidence is not required. but never claimed them. Clearly Johnson & Johnson foresaw the use of steel since they talked about it. 2011) – Held: Willful Blindness vs.
Patent Misuse Motion Picture Patents Co. purchase of another product). Inc. Cir. field-of-use restrictions. LG Electronics. Held: Cannot tie other products to licensing a patent Congress softened this holding with 271 (d) section 4. the owner of the physical product is allowed to make repairs. It‘s a matter of repair in contrast to reconstruction. For example. making a license conditional (to acquisition of another patent. allowing nonstaples to be tied to a license. think of the app market with smart phones. Hollister (Fed. Universal Film Manufacturing Company Et Al. the exhaustion doctrine prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with respect to the patents substantially embodied by those products. unenforceable. or both! Kingsdown Medical Consultants v. It can truly be beneficial to all parties to allow experimentation on a patented product. Quanta Computers.Interesting point here about user innovations. These concepts also limit post-sale control of the article or product. (U. in and of itself. is not enough for a finding "intent to deceive" during the patent prosecution process Exhaustion of Patent Rights Implied license and First Sale. V. Example of when NOT to enforce a patent. and because the License Agreement authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in suit.
Inequitable Conduct Duty of Candor Inequitable conduct renders the entire patent either invalid. Once an item has been sold involving the patented technology. non-metered license. 1988) Summary: Gross negligence. grant-back clause. one not implying the other Not patent misuse to refuse to license a patent Considerations of market power
.S. Other Patent Misuses: Licensing: refusal to license. v. 1990) – Held: Because the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to method patents. Patent Suppression Patent Misuse versus Antitrust: they are different. Inc.
S.N.D.S. 1985) i) ―the public policy (cue prong 4) at issue in patent cases is the ‗protection of rights secured by valid patents‘‖ b) Vitamin v. 1970) 4) Lost Profits (hard to prove) a) Panduit v. Tex. Stahlin (6th Cir.Y. Mass. 1990) a) ―[The] law requires a careful assessment of all market influences when determining lost profit or reasonable royalty. American Maize CAFC 1999) c) ―Market Share‖ rule 26
. Plywood (S. U. Mass. 2006). to get an injunction it used to be automatic for patent law. Stahlin (6th Cir.‖ 3) Reasonable Royalty (the floor for Patent damages) a) Panduit v. 1978) i) Hypothetical negotiation b) Georgia Pacific v. Eastman (D. Remedies
Injunctive Relief 1) Patent as Property rule a) caveat ebay v.J. American (2nd Cir. WARF (9th Cir 1944) i) Health related Patent 3) Preliminary Injunction a) Z4 Technologies v. Kodak (D. 1974) i) Compulsory License (1) Liability Rule Damages 1) Patent as liability rule 2) Polaroid v.D. Microsoft (E. 1978) i) Four-factor test for lost profits (1) Royalties received ii) Lost profits available if there are ―no adequate substitutes‖ b) Price Erosion i) Grain Processing v. but now is subject to this analysis: (1) Irreparable injury (2) Inadequacy of damages (3) Balancing the hardship of injunction on either party (4) Public Interests. 2006) i) Injunction factors 4) Permanent Injunction a) Foster v. 2) Policy a) Polaroid v. MercExchange (U.
alleged infringer had an obligation to seek a patent opinion b) Willful infringement triggers treble damages c) Upon judgment of infringement.i) State v. willfulness implied by i) Negative patent opinion letter ii) No patent opinion letter iii) Withholding patent opinion letter under attorney-client privilege 2) Knorr-Bremse v. Dana (CAFC 2004) 3) In re Seagate Technology (CAFC 2007)
. Mor-Flo (CAFC 1995) d) Lost sales of unpatented components or products e) Post-expiration sales Willful Infringement 1) Pre-Knorr-Bremse a) Upon notice of infringement.
Estoppel.g. as an individual‘s name or descriptive term (e. Arbitrary. Fanciful) (2) Secondary Meaning (Descriptive) (3) Generic c) Use i) Actual Use ii) ―Intent-to-Use‖ iii) Registration d) Famous Mark? 2) Infringement? OR a) False Designation of Origin? OR b) Dilution 3) Defense? a) Fraudulent Registration b) Abandonment c) Use of the Mark to Misrepresent the Source d) Fair Use.g. fish-fry penumbra) e) Rights of a Junior User of a mark subsequently registered by a Senior User f) Violations of Antitrust Laws g) Mark is Functional h) Equity.
1) Valid Mark a) Protectable Subject Matter b) Distinctive i) Classification (1) Inherently Distinctive (Suggestive. Acquiescence i) Nominative Use (product can‘t be identified without the mark. Boston Marathon) j) Parody (only in some courts) First Principles INDICATION OF SOURCE – IMPROVED TRANSACTION COSTS – GOOD WILL – COMPETITION – SURVEYS MEASURE ―USE‖
.IV. including Laches. e.
. the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 does not permit registration of color alone as a trademark.A. or device. Why is trade mark protection better than just trade dress? Trademark law helps the holder of a mark in many ways that "trade dress" protection does not. Zatarain's.provided that it has acquired secondary meaning in the market. 2. Jacobson (1995) – Color Held: The Lanham Act permits the registration of a trademark that consists. 1057(b) (prima facie evidence of validity and ownership). Facts: Petitioner Qualitex Company has for years colored the dry cleaning press pads it manufactures with a special shade of green-gold. suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are automatically protected upon registration. purely and simply. and generic terms are unprotectable even if they have acquired secondary meaning. 1065 (incontestible status). whereas the Chick-Fri was a newer product. name. Trade Dress. Service Marks. Qualitex won in the District Court. but the Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment on the infringement claim because. in its view." Is the Mark descriptive? 1. Inc. Using the dictionary meaning test. so Zatarain's sued for trademark infringement. and length and manner of use. Qualitex registered its color as a trademark and added a trademark infringement count to the suit it had previously filed challenging Jacobson's use of the green-gold color. symbol. or any combination thereof. v. "Fish-Fri" means frying fish.. Under the "imagination test." "[i]t simply does not require an exercise of the imagination to deduce that 'Fish-Fri' is used to fry fish. (5th Cir. Thus. 1124 (ability to prevent importation of confusingly similar goods). Collective Marks.C. Certification Marks Cases Qualitex v. After respondent Jacobson Products (a Qualitex rival) began to use a similar shade on its own press pads. Inc. 1983) – Descriptive Fish-Fri Held: Plaintiff Zatarain's has a trademark for "Fish-Fri" but not "Chick-Fri" batters. Oak Grove began marketing "fish fry" and "chicken fry" batters.S. "Proof of secondary meaning is an issue only with respect to descriptive marks. 1072 (constructive notice of ownership). See 15 U. Oak Grove Smokehouse. advertising.‖ 15 USC § 1127 Types of: Trademarks. of a color . Protectable Subject Matter
A mark must be a ―word. one can easily find reasons why the law might provide trademark protection in addition to trade dress protection. Fish-Fri had developed secondary meaning based on sales.
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.S.
Does Oak Grove have a fair use right to use the trademark? Held Yes.” Surveys and proof of Marketing Efforts. 189 (1920). Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be relevant and persuasive on the issue. Aloe Creme Laboratories.Supreme Court 2000 Held: We hold that. Inc. v. Two Pesos.
“In assessing a claim of secondary meaning.Ed. However..Ct." Coca-Cola Co.3. Tertium Quid (no effing idea) Taco Cabana v. Zatarain's has no legal claim to an exclusive right in the original.. so long as such use will not tend to confuse customers as to the source of the goods. a product's design is distinctive. but rather must distinguish a source from other sources in the market. the major inquiry is the consumer's attitude toward the mark. Inc. The judgment of the Second Circuit is reversed. Two Pesos was free to copy a few functional elements. requires secondary meaning). Oak Grove and Visko's are still free to use the words 'fish fry' in their ordinary. in an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 143. and therefore protectible. descriptive sense of the term. 113. only that penumbra or fringe of secondary meaning is given legal protection. "Although the trademark is valid by virtue of having acquired a secondary meaning. Product Packaging (assumed inherently distinctive). Functionality: rather non-functionality is the test. 41 S. only upon a showing of secondary meaning. Two Pesos. ―up to the jury‖ 1.
Trade Dress Trade dress was defined in the Taco Cabana. case (1991) as ―the total image of the business‖ Types of: Product Design (assumed NOT inherently distinctive. Two Pesos was barred from duplicating the entire combination of the elements that creates Taco Cabana′s overall image. 423 F. descriptive sense. (1991) – inherently distinctive?? REaLLy?!?!TOTALITY The totality of functional elements to create something non-functional. Samara Brothers." Wal-Mart Stores.2d at 849. therefore. The mark must denote to the consumer "a single thing coming from a single source. Since the Court would not protect individual functional elements. Inc. -Must create a ―separate and distinct commercial impression‖ as an indicator of source for consumers in order to be a mark. Source Identifying Function -A symbol does not have to identify the exact source. 254 U.
. 529 US 205 . v. Inc. 114. 146. 65 L. Koke Co. Other manufacturers (competitor’s need test) would likely use the name to describe fish-frying batters have actually used the term for some time. Inc. v. must be also be a combination
a. to support a finding of secondary meaning.
courts have held that a mark can be distinctive in one of two ways. Inc. 272 F. the products are similar. Such terms as aspirin and cellophane have been held generic and therefore unprotectable as trademarks.. v.capable of identifying products or services as coming from a specific source. Distinctiveness: ―.
4. 44 S. Eli Lilly & Co.2d at 11. v. S.2d 75 (2d Cir. This ruling is important because it represents enhanced protection by increasing the likelihood of a new business obtaining protection of its image.2.. 1161 (1924).Inc. 15 U. functionality. by analogy. In the context of word marks. v. 596 F..S.
Distinctiveness. The Court disagreed and concluded that no statutory reason existed to place a time-limit on acquiring secondary meaning. 68 L. v. 615. Generic terms can never attain trademark protection. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.[*]‖ Wal-Mart Stores. the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself. or "suggestive" ("Tide" laundry detergent) are held to be inherently 211*211 distinctive. the mark's registration is subject to cancellation. rather than the product itself. even if it is not inherently distinctive. Categories of Marks ―In evaluating the distinctiveness of a mark under § 2 (and therefore. Two Pesos argued that the holder of a protected trade dress that did not have secondary meaning b.2d 4. Waxed Products Co.
had an unfair advantage. a mark is inherently distinctive if "[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source. 505 (S. The Consumer Reaction Test: would the reasonable consumer look at the mark and know the product or service? Abstraction  Better Protection.
a. 2d 4.Y.1976). v. 851. 844. 526. identifying infringements. n. Inc. "fanciful" ("Kodak" film). SeeAbercrombie & Fitch Co. Hunting World. A generic term connotes the "basic nature of articles or services" rather than the more individualized characteristics of a particular product. but also inherently distinctive. The court ruled Taco Cabana′s trade dress did contain descriptive elements.2d at 115. Hunting World. 85 F. Was something in the mark part of what the consumer was seeking in purchasing the product or service? GENERIC TERM is "the name of a particular genus or class of which an individual article or service is but a member.D.2d at 1183. 456 U. overall image. and the products in question are sold to the same market through similar media channels.. First. The totality of the
dress was not merely descriptive.C.. 596 F. which occurs when.. 265 U. 537 F. Likelihood of confusion: similarity between the trade dresses exists. 537 F. Vision Center.. 31
.‖ a. Inc. Samara Brothers. Furthermore.." Ibid. Inc. Inc. 529 US 205 ." Vision Center.N.. under § 43(a)).
3. (cannot overcome functionality aspects) a. American Heritage. Second. 528. courts have applied the now-classic test originally formulated by Judge Friendly. in which word marks that are "arbitrary" ("Camel" cigarettes). 616. DuPont Cellophane Co. "in the minds of the public. 617 F.2d at 115. Lanham Act § 14. 10-11 (CA2 1976)." Inwood Laboratories. William R.1936) (cellophane).Ct.. Warner & Co.Soweco. 494 F.Supreme Court 2000.Ed. v. a mark has acquired distinctiveness.S. distinctiveness.1921) (aspirin). 11 (1982). 9 (2d Cir. if at any time a registered trademark becomes generic as to a particular product or service. Secondary meaning: It exists when the public recognizes the source of the product or image. See Bayer Co. v. Ownership. § 1064(c) (1976). if it has developed secondary meaning.. Ives Laboratories. United Drug Co.
Inc. 15 U. while a descriptive term may be elevated to trademark status with proof of secondary meaning.S.2d at 9 n. v. Inc. arbitrary and fanciful marks are protectable without proof of secondary meaning. 596 F. A suggestive mark is protected without the necessity for proof of secondary meaning.Vision Center. § 1052(f). See id. Deceptively Mis-descriptive Marks: Likely to Cause Confusion with an Existing Mark: Functional Matter: essential to the use or purpose of the device. SUGGESTIVE TERM suggests.2d at 115 n.2d at 11516. odor. 11 (citing 3 R. § 2(f). or ingredients. rather than describes." Vision Center.S. Aloe Creme Laboratories.4 (3d ed. affects the cost or quality of the device. 596 F. As this court has often noted.2d at 11. Soweco. Geographic References. 210 F. 791*791 however. 15 U. 494 F. Weil. Inc. Vision Center. Lanham Act § 2(e)(1).2d 453 (2d Cir.Y. The Law of Unfair Competition. Milsan. 617 F. the distinction between descriptive and generic terms is one of degree.DESCRIPTIVE TERM "identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service. dimensions. The term "Kodak" is properly classified as a fanciful term for photographic supplies. Vision Center. Abercrombie & Fitch. The distinction has important practical consequences. "Ivory" is an arbitrary term as applied to soap. some particular characteristic of the goods or services to which it applies and requires the consumer to exercise the imagination in order to draw a conclusion as to the nature of the goods and services.S.2d at 1184. Vision Center. 319 (1930) ("Kodak"). See Douglas Laboratories. and "Vision Center" in reference to a business offering optical goods and services.2d at 117.1954). Trademarks and Monopolies § 70. Copper Tan. American Heritage. 243 N. Descriptive terms ordinarily are not protectable as trademarks. The term "Coppertone" has been held suggestive in regard to sun tanning products. 423 F. 596 F. 1969)).2d at 115 n. v.596 F. § 1052(e)(1) (1976). 506. by acquiring a secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public. Surnames. a generic term may never achieve trademark protection.2d 845 (5th Cir.C. 617 F. Inc.
Unprotectable Symbols …until they acquire secondary meaning. v.2d at 11. Primarily Geographically Deceptively Mis-descriptive Marks: materially deceptive to consumers Suggesting False Connection: Immoral or Scandalous Matter: 32
.2d at 1184. 494 F. Soweco. they may become valid marks. Examples of descriptive marks would include "Alo" with reference to products containing gel of the aloe vera plant. function. however. ARBITRARY OR FANCIFUL TERMS bear no relationship to the products or services to which they are applied. 596 F. such as its color.1970).11.2d at 115. Like suggestive terms.. see Eastman Kodak Co. or exclusive use by one seller would put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage. 137 Misc. 537 F.6.. American Heritage.C. Callman.
Use GOODS: must have the trademark on goods which are sold or transported SERVICE: must be displayed or in advertisements Prior use of the mark does not count against the owner. and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. date of first use. Necessary for incontestability. Greater remedies. but reduced use can be a consideration in the infringement analysis. IN COMMERCE: defined as ―all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress‖ Demonstrate a continuing effort to establish the ark as a source identifier. that applicant is the actual owner of the mark. Primary Register Benefits of: filing constitutes constructive use. Broader protection against unauthorized importation. Yields constructive notice of ownership. Owner may use ® (which was already the case with unregistered mark). It will show up in searches by others. Intent-to-use application: bona fide intent to use. and that no other person has a right to use such mark in commerce. ―prima facia evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of registration o the mark. including disclaimers by the applicant for generic elements of the mark. Incontestability: essentially. only establishes a priority date (only bona fide use allows an owner to enforce a mark).‖ 15 USC 1127. cannot just sit to retain the option of use. Then the process and back-and-forth with the examining attorney of the USPTO begins. date of first use in commerce. applicant‘s domicile and citizenship. the goods or services connected to the mark.‖ 15 USC 1111. Registration Supplemental vs. after five years.
. drawing of the mark. the registrant does not need to show secondary meaning. verified statement to truth of application‘s contents.Disparaging Marks: litigation is ongoing on whether WASHINGTON REDSKINS falls into this category Government Symbols: Names or Likenesses of Individuals: is the person well known enough that consumers would interpret the name or likeness as an endorsement?
B. The application requirements: 15 USC 1051. The use must be ―bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade. nationwide in effect.
Illinois which had registered the trade name as a service name in Illinois. L'Oreal repeatedly called and visited to see if the salon 34
." Here selling a few products to friends in other states was not enough to provide national trademark protection absent registration.A. necessary to establish priority ***Descriptive Marks have the priority date of when the mark attained secondary meaning.(7th Cir. The priority date will still be the date of use as opposed to any subsequent date of filing. to use a trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register hereby established by paying the prescribed fee and filing in the [PTO]. a United States licensee of L'Oreal in France. held a federal trademark registration for the name for clothing." Facts: Comair.
Zazu Designs v.C. OWNERSHIP FOLLOWS CONTROL OF USE Priority Actual Use: is the use required to support registration. L'Oreal paid Riviera Slacks $125. … But use sufficient to register a mark that soon is widely distributed is not necessarily enough to acquire rights in the absence of registration. L'Oreal searched and found that Riviera Slacks.S. any knowledge L'Oreal may have had of ZHD's plans is irrelevant. S. to hold otherwise would penalize entities for gathering knowledge and "ignorance would be rewarded. "Only active use allows consumers to associate a mark with particular goods and notifies other firms that the mark is so associated. only use does. The Lanham Act allows only trademarks 'used in commerce' to be registered. Does L'Oreal's knowledge of ZHD's intention to create hair products prevent it from using the ZAZU name? Held No. §1051(a). Constructive Use: is established by the date of an ―intent-to-use‖ application." Intent establishes no right to a mark. 15 USC § 1051 (b)(1) ―A person who has a bona fide intention. Ownership
15 USC 1055. 15 U. and it suggested ZAZU. 1992) Held: Do ZHD's sale of hair products under the ZAZU name before L'Oreal's registration give it national trademark rights? Held: No.‖ Analogous Use: advertising. L'Oreal also found Zazu Hair Designs (here "ZHD"). trade publications. Inc. Registration is not however. under circumstances showing the good faith of such person. a hair salon in Hinsdale. L'Oreal. L'Oreal hired Wordmark to come up with a name. wanted to market hair coloring products. "Because the mark was not registered for use in conjunction with hair products. or other marketing.000 for a covenant not to sue if L'Oreal used the name.C.
.‘ Loss of Rights Through Mark Becoming Generic: public perception of a category. But use sufficient to register a mark that soon is widely distributed is not necessarily enough to acquire rights in the absence of registration. "A service mark can be infringed by its use on a closely related product. ZHD stated that it did not. Reasoning: ―In finding that ZHD'S few sales secured rights against the world. permit the vendor to register the mark. many of whom came from out of state. such that use of the mark by the transferee will not mislead consumers? Courts in finding an assignment invalid may enjoin the transferee from enforcing the mark. L'Oreal knew of ZHD's intent. Other Ways to Lose Significance as a Mark: loss of significance (if licensing mark for use by another. conditional plans to resume using a mark are insufficient to overcome the assumption of ‗intent not to resume. Permitting widespread infringement (especially if some are licensees and others are not) can constitute abandonment."
Assignment Must be in a signed writing. after all. or consider the mark abandoned. ZHD had more than de minimis use. Loss of Right INTENT TO ABANDON: Use Discontinued with Intent Not to Resume Use: vague. but intended to do so. which hold that a single sale. so it acted out of bad faith—it paid Riviera Slacks to preclude its acting on its intention. When marketing efforts are TOO effective. 1986 after having shipped some of its ZAZU product across state lines to be able to make the federal application. Will the transferee deliver substantially the same product to consumers. Unbeknownst to L'Oreal. you need to make sure that the licensee will meet the standards for which the mark has stood). L'Oreal applied for a federal registration on June 12. rather than good. ZHD had started selling some hair products to its customers in the store and had shipped some samples to friends in Texas and Florida. combined with proof of intent to go on selling. and clothing is a lot farther from hair products than is a hair salon.sold hair products.‖ (fails to distinguish de minimus use and de minimus intent) Cudahay: By ordering lots of bottles and making sales to customers. the district court relied on.
5: In Connection with selling or marketing of Goods or Services. Defendant‘s good faith in adopting its own mark 7. v. Post-Sale Confusion (like impressing your friends with a fake rolex). 3. 4. 3: The Alleged Infringer Use This sense of the word ‗use‘ is broader than the one required to establish Trademark rights. What about intent? As a matter of infringement. Likelihood Confusion Held: 1954 Slickcraft is using this name until 1969. 4: The Mark or a Similar Symbol Must actually use the mark. even advertising has counted. Proximity of the products in the marketplace 4. AND The goods or services need to be materially similar to those of the allegedly infringed mark. SOUND. LOOKS AT BOTH MARKS A: Necessary Showing of Confusion 1. 2: In Commerce As broad as Congress‘ power to regulate interstate commerce. 1979) – Slickcraft and Sleekcraft. or Deception (gets an injunction) A probability (not mere possibility) of confusion. (9th Cir.D. but still must somehow be used to indicate source. MEANING 3. Standard Infringement
1: Ownership of a Valid Mark Valid Mark? Incontestable status? Section A of Trademarks pretty much covers this. but just imagine that the relevant consumer would also get puns and references. 2. circular yes. Quality of Defendant‘s product 8. Reverse Confusion (making the first product seem like a knock-off of the second to market) B: Factors for Determining Likelihood Confusion 1. Matters in 36
. Sleekcraft was new starting in late 1968. Degree of Similarity between the Marks: SIGHT. Likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap. Initial Interest Confusion (using another‘s mark as a foot-in-the-door technique). Strength of Plaintiff‘s Mark 2. 6: Likelihood of Confusion. it‘s usually just strict liability. Sleekcraft Boats. Actual Confusion (GETS YOU DAMAGES) 6. Mistake. Care and Sophistication of the Relevant Consumers AMF INC. expand the product brand 5. Appellate court overturned the federal court looking the above 8 factors. Implied Endorsement.
determining remedies. symbol. characteristics. Limited Remedy Court jury-rigs a limited remedy. regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion.
E. ―False Designation of Origin and False Descriptions Forbidden‖ §43(a) – and other forms of infringement…
Lanham Act Section 43(a) – Protects registered and unregistered marks (1) Any person who. Remedy here is to begin labeling more clearly. qualities. or any combination thereof. or commercial activities by another person. and products. uses in commerce any word. term. .
F. of competition. which-(A) is likely to cause confusion. commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark. shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who . . …dilution protection law aims to protect sufficiently strong trademarks from losing their singular association in the public mind with a particular product… --Wikipedia
. . design. or association of such person with another person. or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion. Dilution
Starts with the Famous Mark and looks to what elements of it are being diluted. or to deceive as to the affiliation. or any container for goods. sponsorship. misrepresents the nature. Subject to the principles of equity. . or false or misleading representation of fact. or as to the origin. or device. or any false designation of origin. or to cause mistake. name. or approval of his or her goods. false or misleading description of fact. or of actual economic injury. the owner of a famous mark . Sleekcraft was required to use its logo on all advertising. shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. services. on or in connection with any goods or services. connection. services. or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods. or commercial activities.
criticizing. Violations of Antitrust Laws 7. of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source (aka a parody cannot be TMed itself!!!) for the person‘s own goods or services. (B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. and (4) association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark OR likely to harm the reputation of the famous mark. including Laches. or facilitation of such fair use.
Exclusions. Acquiescence 9." Id. Defenses (A) Any fair use. Estoppel. (2) defendant has commenced using a mark in commerce that allegedly is diluting the famous mark. Rights of a Junior User of a mark subsequently registered by a Senior User 6. dilution by tarnishment as the "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark. Equity. Mark is Functional 8. as an individual‘s name or descriptive term (e. or (ii) identifying and parodying. fish-fry penumbra) 5. § 1125(c)(2)(C). Use of the Mark to Misrepresent the Source 4." dilution by blurring: as the "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.
G. e. including use in connection with— (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services. Parody (only in some courts) 38
. Definition of Elements
FAMOUS MARKS ONLY: “A mark is "famous" when it is "widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark‘s owner. (C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. (3) similarity between the defendant‘s mark and the famous mark gives rise to an association between the marks. Abandonment 3.g. Fair Use. including a nominative or descriptive fair use." Id. Boston Marathon) 10. § 1125(c)(2)(B).THE CLAIM (1) plaintiff owns a famous mark that is distinctive. Fraudulent Registration 2. Defenses
1. or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.g. Nominative Use (product can‘t be identified without the mark.
DILUTION: It is dilutive. Haute Diggity Dog – Chewy Vuitton! Parody. Protected as a NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH. and DILUTION Held: "'just enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point of parody." Through a detailed analysis of likelihood of confusion factors. dictionaries. Genericide A generic term is one for which the primary significance to the relevant consuming public is to identify. Let’s Go Party!” Held: TITLE: titles are not usually indicative of a source but rather what the subject matter of the art. ARTISTIC RELEVANCE allows fair use.GENERICIDE Held: necessary to refer to the product. media use Murphy Bed v. v. Poor Xerox!! Evidence: third-party generic use of the term. Barbie Girl is protected as a parody under the trademark 39
Fair Use Could be 1st amendment.. can be right to DESCRIBE.Playmate of the Year could refer to herself as such based on Fair Use. Patent  Trademark Held: 1) Essential to the functioning of the product 2) Effect on cost or quality.A. but fair use exception.' but stop well short of appropriating the entire marks that LVM claims. MCA Records – “Come on Barbie. Parody Louis Vuitton Malletier S. it is the artistic speech which is then being sold. Mattel v. 3) put competitors at a disadvantage? those two springs are necessary to make the spring-up sign. for a purchaser to have faith that the product will do what it is supposed to. Held: ….
Functionality TrafFix v. Interior Sleep Systems .
Naked Licensing Don Donuts v. the court emphasized differences in the parties' marks and marketing to support its affirmation of the lower-court decision. Marketing Displays – Necessary Element.
S. Lasting demanded that KP stop using the term. Constitution NB: Parody must be of the mark being played on. claiming it infringed its trademark. KP sued Lasting in the U. Both respondent Lasting Impression I. and. entered summary judgment in favor of KP on Lasting's counterclaim. and Lasting counterclaimed. The U. Patent and Trademark Office the trademark "Micro Colors" in white letters within a black square. A Dr. without considering the issue of the likelihood of consumer confusion. claiming KP had infringed it. District Court for the Central District of California.S. (KP) have used the phrase "micro color" or its variants in marketing their products. The Supreme Court granted KP's petition for certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the courts of appeals on the significance of the issue of consumer confusion to the defense of fair use.S. Inc. seeking a declaratory judgment that its language did not infringe the mark.doctrine of nominative use and under the First Amendment to the U.S. finding that KP had used the mark only descriptively and had employed the term before KP registered the mark. v. Lasting – Fair Use does not require Confusion analysis NB: Plaintiff‘s burden is to show likelihood of confusion. The District Court. stylized typeface. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Held: The Court ruled that a defendant in a trademark infringement action raising the affirmative defense of fair use has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of consumer confusion. After KP produced advertising with the term "microcolor" in a large. because otherwise it‘s just being used to ―initial interest‖ KP Permanent Make-Up. Suess style poem cannot be used to make fun of airplane food. Inc.
. (Lasting) and petitioner KP Permanent Make-Up. Lasting registered with the U. concluded that KP had made out the affirmative defense of fair use of the mark. Inc. holding that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the fair use defense without considering the issue of consumer confusion.
and marketing channels are convergent.[1] Thus. Lindy Pen Co v.8 million in punitive damages. 782 F.‖ INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION CITE!!! See Park 'N Fly.‖ ―Even if a customer realized at the time of delivery that the pens delivered were not the pens supposedly ordered. and no intent to capitalize). Goodyear – analysis Finally. Big O claims the only way it can be restored to the position it was in before Goodyear infringed its trademark is to conduct a corrective advertising campaign. COST OF FIXING INFRINGEMENT Big O also asserts the evidence provided the jury with a reasonable basis for determining the amount of damages. Bic – Fair Use does not require Confusion analysis ISSUE: Is Bic infringing Lindy‘s Auditor mark? Held: ―We remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an order enjoining Bic from using the word "Auditor's" on or in connection with its pens. services provided are identical. Big O asserts the evidence supporting the fact of damages falls into two categories: (1) Goodyear's enormous effort to adopt. there is a likelihood of confusion despite no evidence of actual confusion. 41
Big O Trie Dealers. Remedies
General Rule in most circuits now is that lost profits do not require willful infringement (intent). We additionally instruct the district court to order an accounting and to award damages and other relief as appropriate. and absorb Big O's trademark virtually destroyed Big O's ability to make any effective use of its "Big Foot" trademark and (2) Goodyear's false statements that "Bigfoot" was available only from Goodyear created the appearance of dishonesty and wrongful conduct by Big O thereby harming its reputation within the trade and with the public. the customer might decide not to bother to return and exchange the pens at that late stage. use. Goodyear spent approximately $10 million on its "Bigfoot" advertising campaign.2d at 1509 (where marks are virtually identical. Goodyear contends Big O failed to prove either the fact or the amount of damages. We agree with the district court that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of the fact of damages.8 million in compensatory damages and $16. weak mark. Big O insists it should be compensated for the advertising expenses necessary to dispel the public confusion caused by Goodyear's infringement.H. Inc v. Goodyear challenges the jury's verdict awarding Big O $2.
.8 million award: (1) there were Big O Tire Dealers in 28 percent of the states (14 of 50) and 28 percent of $10 million equals the amount of the award. and (2) the Federal Trade Commission generally orders businesses who engage in misleading advertising to spend approximately 25 percent of their advertising budget on corrective advertising and this award is roughly 25 percent of the amount Goodyear spent infringing on Big O's trademark.Big O advances two rationales in support of the $2.
§ 102 (a) . Inc. reproduced. in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
Copyright A. from which they can be perceived. (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works. a person‘s identity.C. and (8) architectural works.V. now known or later developed.PROTECTABLE (a) Copyright protection subsists. including any accompanying words.
Beyond slavish copying
. in accordance with this title. purely mechanical works.. including any accompanying music. Copyrightable Subject Matter
17 U. (7) sound recordings. words and short phrases. but does exclude everyday conversation and behavior. (5) pictorial. graphic. Works of authorship include the following categories: Feist Publications v.
ORIGINAL WORK HURDLE 1) Independently created by the author. AND 7 2) demonstrate a modicum of creativity. and sculptural works. Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) The ORIGINAL Phone Book Held: ―copyright…extend[s] only to those components that are original to the author‖ NOT infringement to snag a list of names and numbers simply arranged alphabetically. DERIVATIVE WORK HURDLE 1) Transformative
Authorship: scope is very broad. either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Fixed Medium: the moment of attachment of copyright protection.S. (3) dramatic works. (4) pantomimes and choreographic works. and works with no human author. AUTHORIZED FIXATION
(1) literary works: (2) musical works. or otherwise communicated.
(US 1996).S.S. None of the source code or machine code that generated the menus was copied. Borland Int’l. Nation Enters. the object of the other is use. PROC: The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision. By the time the lawsuit ended." Lotus petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. ―The object of the one is explanation. § 102 (b) – NOT PROTECTABLE (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea.'" No Disclosure. concept. the menu hierarchy is an un-copyrightable "method of operation. 556 (1985). METHOD OF OPERATION FACTS: Borland released a spreadsheet product." The court agreed with the district court that an alternative menu hierarchy could be devised.C.. Selden (1879).Software. Quattro Pro's code contained a copy of Lotus's menu hierarchy in which each command was represented by its first letter instead of its entire name.17 U. Baker v. No Examination (by the PTO). but the names of the commands and the organization of those commands into a hierarchy were virtually identical. 539. or embodied in such work.Bigger Better Bookkeeping.‖ Lotus Dev. Corp. system. that had a compatibility mode in which its menu imitated that of Lotus 1-2-3. holding that exclusive rights to the "useful art" (in this case bookkeeping) described in a book was only available by patent.
. and Microsoft's Excel spreadsheet had emerged as the main challenger to Lotus 1-2-3. method of operation. but argued that despite this. the Supreme Court stated that "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression. or discovery. Inc. a competing product. principle. Quattro Pro." which allowed it to execute Lotus 1-2-3 keyboard macros. agreeing with Borland's legal theory that considered the menu hierarchy a "method of operation. Quattro Pro also contained a feature called "Key Reader. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's opinion in a 4-4 anonymous tie vote. explained. v. In Harper & Row Publishers. Borland had sold Quattro Pro to Novell. Supreme Court case to fully explain this doctrine. with Justice Stevens recusing. process. IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY Held: this was the first U. v. illustrated. 471 U. Lotus's petition for a rehearing by the full court was denied. procedure.S. the description itself was protectable by copyright. Inc. regardless of the form in which it is described. In order to support this feature.
Brandir appealed. Inc. Cascade argued that Brandir could not copyright the bike racks because they weren't works of art. The racks were featured in design magazines and won an award from the Industrial Designers Society.S. (1st Cir. "if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations. Conversely. Procter & Gamble. the appearance of an icon).The Lotus decision establishes a distinction in copyright law between the interface of a software product and its implementation. and utilitarian items (aka useful articles) are not copyrightable. they were utilitarian." Here sweepstakes rules can only be be described in a limited number of expressions. Cascade began copying the bike racks. 1967) – LIMITED NUMBER OF EXPRESSIONS HELD: Plaintiff Morrissey created a set of rules for a promotional sweepstakes contest. the artist aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. where design elements can be identified as reflecting the 45
. v. and are capable of existing independently of. as is therefore not protectable by copyright. as they would effectively allow cornering the market on those subjects.(2d Cir. The expressions of such narrow subjects are not copyrightable. Duff Bailey. However. Although in general the exact expression of an idea is copyrightable. The Appellate Court looked to 17 U. and defendant Procter & Gamble took those rules. The Appellate Court affirmed. Brandir International. and used them in their own sweepstakes. "We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated. Morrissey v. Brandir sued for copyright infringement. Story: Sculpture…when a friend. §101 and found that works with utilitarian features are only copyrightable to the extent that the design features "can be identified separately from. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. The implementation is subject to copyright. Are sweepstakes rules copyrightable subject matter? Held Aldrich: No." This separablity can be either physical or conceptual. was at Levine's home and informed him that the sculptures would make excellent bicycle racks. 1987) – BIKE RACK CONCEPTUAL SEPARABILITY. The public interface may also be subject to copyright to the extent that it contains expression (for example. Held: Brandir designed a sleek new metal bike rack. the utilitarian aspects of the article. G. a subject can be so narrow that it "necessarily requires" one of a small number of forumlations to express. a bicycle buff and author of numerous articles about urban cycling. the set of available operations and the mechanics of how they are activated are not copyrightable. The Court interpreted §101 to mean that. CANNOT © FUNTIONAL ASPECTS USEFUL ARTICLE. This standard allows software developers to create original clones of copyrighted software products without infringing the copyright.C. The Trial Court found for Cascade. changed a few words.
ii) Sub-question Scope: a little bit of Agency law (1) Whether the work is of the type that ‗EE is employed to perform (2) Work occurs substantially within authorized work hours.
.designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences." Basically. § 105 – Government Works NOT protectable Legal document? Necessary to follow the law? Would the work exist if money couldn‘t be recouped?
B. conceptual separability exists. OR i) Sub-question Employment: employee or independent contractor? (1) Hiring party‘s right and actual control over means and methods of production (2) Source of instruments and tools (3) Location of production (4) Duration of relationship (5) Whether Hiring party can assign or delegate additional tasks (6) Hiring party‘s say over when and how long to work (7) Method of payment (8) Hiring party‘s role is hiring and paying assistants (9) Whether work is a regular part of Hiring party‘s business (10) Whether Hiring party is a business (11) Provision of employee benefits (12) The tax treatment of the hired party.C. at least in part.C. the courts must look at the features of a work and decide if the creator chose those features for design reasons or aesthetic reasons.S. AND (3) Work‘s purpose. is to serve the employer. Copyright Ownership
Who is the original Author?: 1) Individual Works a) copyright vests with fixation b) Who was in charge? That Titanic example 2) Made for Hire a) Prepared in scope of employment.S. 17 U. § 103 (a) – Infringing Works Not Protectable ―protection for a work employing pre-existing material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully‖ 17 U.
Eventually the sculpture was finished and CCNV paid $15k.Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Larson about the musical RENT a) Each author contributed copyrightable expression. but Reid retained significant creative control.C. AND b) Each author intended to be a joint author when the work was created. Reid argued that he was a co-author of the sculpture.S. §101(1) because CCNV was the motivating force behind the sculpture's production. Aalmuhammed suggested script revisions. and filed a certificate of copyright registration. Lee 202 F3d 1227 (9th Cir. offered direction to some actors. because under that clause the parties must "expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. The Appellate Court reversed. Aalmuhammed v. the credits listed Aalmuhammed as a technical consultant. He wanted to be considered a co-author. but instead was an independent contractor. They contracted with a sculptor named Reid to make the sculpture. AND ii) Falls into one of the nine categories. CCNV provided input on what the sculpture was to entail. Procedure: Trial Court found for Reid. b) The Work is: i) Specially ordered or commissioned. Reid 490 U. but Reid donated his time. 1999) Aalmuhammed was an expert on Malcolm X. 730 (1989) Held: CCNV wanted a sculpture to illustrate the plight of the homeless. Note that Reid could not have been covered by §101(2) (works prepared by an independent contractor). Therefore Reid's contribution did not make him a co-author since it was just work for hire. Therefore it did not meet the definition of a work for hire under §101(1) (works prepared by an employee). However." The US Supreme Court affirmed.S. and helped with editing. when they announced plans to take the sculpture on a multi-city tour. CCNV appealed. CCNV paid for the materials. When the movie was released. AND iii) The parties sign an agreement designating it to be a work made for hire iv) NB: at a minimum. so he sued. CCNV appealed. The Trial Court found that the sculpture was a work for hire under 17 U. The Appellate Court found that Reid was not an employee of CCNV. He was hired by Lee to be a consultant for a movie about Malcolm X. CCNV argued that they paid for the sculpture and were the ones who directed its creation. Reid refused to give up possession of it. a party is likely entitled to an implied license 3) Joint Authors –Thomas v.
It was strictly work for hire. §101 and noted that in order to be a co-author of a joint work. a person must "make an independently copyrightable contribution" to the whole work.the man who is the effective cause of that. the Court found that Aalmuhammed was not an author. Aalmuhammed appealed. there was never an intent on the part of Lee or the movie's producers to make Aalmuhammed a co-author. and arranging the place where the people are to be . The Trial Court found for Lee. However. The Appellate Court affirmed. Sarony (111 U. Ownership of a copy of the copyright is not ownership of the copyright. First to File system! 2) Exclusive Licenses a) Requires writing 3) Nonexclusive Licenses 4) Open Source Licenses and Creative Commons 48
.C.S. The Court found that it was good public policy to restrict the definition of author.S. 53 (1884))." The Court found that Aalmuhammed was not 'superintending' anything. The Court looked to Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. Lee controlled all aspects of the movie. Transfers 1) Selling the Copyright a) Transfer defined broadly in 17 USC §101 b) Requires writing 17 USC §204(a) c) Recordation with US Copyright Office. It would be absurd to find that Aalmuhammed was author when Lee was not. 17 USC §301(d). the movie's director. The Court noted that even Lee was under contract with the movie studio in a work for fire arrangement and so was not even an author himself.Aalmuhammed argued that his contributions to the film were significant enough to make the work a joint work. In addition. The Appellate Court looked to 17 U. 4) Collective Works a) look to definition in 17 USC §101 b) rights in collective work limited to that work and revision i) What constitutes a revision is a likely point of litigation. Otherwise people like Lee would never consult others because they'd be worried about losing control of the rights. who has actually formed the picture by putting the person in position. He was working for Lee. v. which held that an author (of a photograph) is "the person who has superintended the arrangement. That would make the arts less accurate and interesting. The Court found that Aalmuhammed's contributions to the work were enough to be independently copyrightable.
1946) Arnstein was a songwriter who had published a number of popular songs. Arnstein argued that Porter had 'stooges' fooling Arnstein around and had even ransacked his apartment and stole some of his unpublished songs! Porter argued that he had never heard any of Arnstein's songs and that he came up with his songs himself (aka independent creation). So they remanded the case for a jury trial. there are two elements to establishing infringement: There must be evidence that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work.‖ overall artistic slant. The Trial Court found that Porter's songs were not substantially similar. TO the JURY! 154 F. The Trial Court found for Porter in summary judgment. Porter – Is there infringement? Access. Arnstein appealed. …8 3) Was the copying improper? Arnstein v. He sued for copyright infringement. let‘s reconsider things after 35 years…
C. Substantial Similarity. 2) Copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. plaintiff must show: 1) Ownership of a valid copyright.
Different circuits balance this differently. The Appellate Court found that generally.2d 464 (2d Cir. balancing of: a) ACCESS to the allegedly infringed work b) SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR to the allegedly infringed work i) Objectively: element by element. The Appellate Court reversed and remanded. et cetera ii) Subjectively: ―hunch. Exclusive Rights
To establish infringement. but the objective and subjective overlay is fairly common
. There must be evidence that the works are substantially similar.‖ Jacobsen v. Katzer b) Creative Commons Restrictions i) Non-Commercial Use ii) No Derivative Works iii) Share Alike – any new work carries with it the licensing terms of the first Termination Right 17 USC §203. The Court relied on the testimony of expert witnesses about the similarity of the songs. The Court found that whether two songs were substantially similar enough to constitute copyright infringement was a matter of fact for a jury to decide.a) General Public License (GPL) i) ―…because permission to use the code is conditioned on compliance with the license. expert testimony. He claimed that another songwriter named Porter had plagiarized some of his songs.
If the defendant took so much from the plaintiff. It follows that the less developed the characters. and assuming that novelty is not essential to a copyright. but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household. it is impossible to set a firm boundary demarcating the line between work and ideas. there is no monopoly in such a background. but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected.‖ Abstraction Test: But when the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ. However. writing for the Court. apart from their expression. the theme was too generalized an abstraction from what she wrote. Though the plaintiff discovered the vein. stating. or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. or else an infringer could get away with copying by making trivial changes. there was no infringement. Even so. Characters not protectable: ―If Twelfth Night were copyrighted. or Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species. and especially upon a play. as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity. and at times might consist only of its title.Nichols v. the less they can be copyrighted. It was only a part of her "ideas. but an abstract of the whole." to which. "her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play. as the ideas that are copied are really universal concepts and stock characters.‖ (emphasis added). The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about. The question then is whether the part taken was 'substantial'. Upon any work. its content went to some extent into the public domain. Universal Pictures Corporation Judge Learned Hand." In this case. so defined."
. granting that the plaintiff's play was wholly original. it may well have been because her amazing success seemed to prove that this was a subject of enduring popularity. his property is never extended. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play. it is quite possible that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe. a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well. she could not keep it to herself. noted that protection of literature cannot be limited to the exact text. …. he said. that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly. as more and more of the incident is left out. since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas. decision is more troublesome.
Δ discussed his script on the Today Show. In July 1984. No. The court concluded that the Δ‘s script and movie did not infringe any copyright protection of the π Rocky IV treatment. is a famous actor who starred in and wrote the scripts for Rocky I. Issue: Was the Δ script and eventual movie a copyright infringement on the π treatment that he had written before Δ wrote the script? In order for a π to win a copyright infringement claim. the Cold War. wrote a treatment entitled Rocky IV. π requested compensation for the alleged use of his treatment in the forthcoming Rocky IV movie. Attempting to sell ads to copyright holders themselves. The studio executives suggested that he sign a release to relieve MGM from liability stemming form use of the treatment. NOT TRANSFORMATIVE Facts: Δ. Same work in a new medium. Δ informed the press that he intended to write a fourth movie and was thinking about making it based off of world events. Stallone. In 1982. Δ completed the Rocky IV script in October 1984 and the film was released in November 1985. Anderson v.
. after viewing Rocky III. who had no connection to the previous movies or the Δ. Unlike Sony. Thus. Π (who is an attorney and was accompanied by an attorney) met with MGM executives to discuss the possibility of his treatment being used as the basis for the Rocky IV script. π.Reproduction Rights Sony and Grokster Bad Facts: Making money from advertisement. The treatment incorporated the characters that Δ created in the previous movies. In April 1984. Luring consumers from Napster. In June 1982. Spin-offs. & III. II. Leading to the induced Adaption Right Derivative Works: Sequels. Grokster’s money is dependent on use of the program for infringement as opposed to purchase of the program itself. Π felt that Δ was discussing the story that he had written. and maybe having it involve a United States fighter going to Russia to fight the Russian Red. π must prove that he owns the copyright and that the Δ copied the π‘s copyrighted work. Stallone – unprotect-able b/c derivative work of other copyright. the court granted the Δ‘s motion for summary judgment.
‖ The court came to this conclusion because the movies revolve around the characters. the fair use of a copyrighted work. and no reasonable jury could find that Rocky IV is a picturization of π script. Next. the court found that the characters were so highly developed and central to the movie that they constituted the ―story being told. scholarship. the court said that the π treatment is an infringing work that is not entitled to copyright protection. The court thus concluded that the Rocky characters are delineated so extensively that they are protected from bodily appropriation when taken as a group and transposed into a sequel by another author. including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section. is not an infringement of copyright.‖ The court concluded that since Δ owns the copyrights for the first three Rocky movies. comment. Other Limitations on Exclusive Rights
Fair Use §107. Also. their development. the court said that Rocky IV is not substantially similar to π treatment. First. he has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and that Δ treatment is an unauthorized derivative work and that π actually infringed Δ copyright. The court also stated that π did not put forth any evidence to rebut the Δ‘s showing that Rocky characters are so highly delineated that they warrant copyright protection. the court said that the interrelationships between the characters are the central parts of all of the movies. or research. The court reasoned that the characters in the Rocky movies are some of the most recognizable and one of the most highly delineated groups of characters in modern American cinema. Fair Use. The court said that the same evidence which supports the findings of delineation of the characters supports the findings that the characters are the ―story being told. teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use).
Distribution Right Importation Right: The Grey Goods Problem Performance Right Very broad! Display Right
D. Second. and their relationships and does not revolve around intricate plots or story lines.Reasoning:
The court granted the Δ motion for summary judgment based on two separate grounds. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use ―Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [17 USC § §106 and 106A]. for purposes such as criticism. news reporting. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-52
Publishers v. AND 4. Pretty Woman. Reasoning: Unpublished. The lower court rejected fair use and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Mr. 510 U. 569 (1994) – Satire Bad. Acuff-Rose Music refused to grant the band a license but 2 Live Crew nonetheless produced and released the parody.1. "Oh.000 words. 300 of 200. did the rap version decrease the potential licensing value of the original?
. purpose and character of the use. Facts: The members of the rap music group 2 Live Crew—Luther Campbell. demanding a more nuanced analysis (ouch!).S. 3.
Campbell v. effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Nation Enterprises. Fresh Kid Ice. but was also commercial use | The Nation could reported and copied unprotected facts. nature of the copyrighted work. but the crux of the work.S." a parody based on Roy Orbison's rock ballad. including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes. 471 U. Is the parody more likely to be fair use than a parody that simply took material to freeride on the efforts of others? Reasoning: Parody must borrow from the original | Parody was transformative | Criticism and comment is highly protected fair use The Court on remand wanted a finding of whether there was a showing of market harm. amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. Parody Good…Really?! The weird argument: why didn‘t you choose this other song? Only Allusion. The Nation then included a verbatim quotation of President Ford‘s thoughts at the time of pardoning Nixon." The group's manager asked Acuff-Rose Music if they could license Roy Orbison's tune for the ballad to be used as a parody. Facts: The Nation Magazine got a copy of President Gerald Ford‘s autobiography just prior to its publication date. Mixx and Brother Marquis—composed a song called "Pretty Woman. 2. 539 (1985). The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.‖ Harper & Row. but chose to use protected expression | The portion taken was ―the heart of the work‖ | Specific harm was shown with Time‘s cancellation of its prepublication excerpts. key factor against fair use | News is favored fair use. Acuff-Rose Music. not parody.
. holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song under § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U. Souter reasoned that the "amount and substantiality" of the portion used by 2 Live Crew was reasonable in relation to the band's purpose in creating a parody of "Oh. § 107). the Court found that the more transformative the new work. "the nature of the copyrighted work". 2 Live Crew copied excessively from the Orbison original. and it is the heart at which parody takes aim. Looking at the final factor.' that heart is what most readily conjures up the song for parody.S. as a matter of law. The Court did find the third factor integral to the analysis. and that market harm for purposes of the fourth §107 factor had been established by a presumption attaching to commercial uses. since the two works serve different market functions. in any event. The majority reasoned "even if 2 Live Crew's copying of the original's first line of lyrics and characteristic opening bass riff may be said to go to the original's 'heart. Luke Skyywalker Records. holding that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair under the first of four factors relevant under § 107. producing otherwise distinctive music. that. 464 U. the less will be the significance of the other three factors. by taking the "heart" of the original and making it the "heart" of a new work. ―When looking at the purpose and character of 2 Live Crew's use. The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew.C. a work's commercial nature is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character. Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and its record company. of America v. quoting Sony Corp. While Acuff-Rose found evidence of a potential "derivative" rap market in the very fact that 2 Live Crew recorded a rap parody of "Oh. finding that 2 Live Crew thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics. the Court said. Pretty Woman". The court found that. the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in finding a presumption or inference of market harm (such as there had been in Sony). Universal City Studios. Parodies in general. since the artistic value of parodies is often found in their ability to invariably copy popular works of the past.S. 417.Procedure:
Almost a year later. 2 Live Crew had taken too much under the third § 107 factor. Pretty Woman" and another rap group sought a license to 54
1) //SONY
. finding that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that.‖ Justice Souter then moved onto the second § 107 factor. Inc. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. will rarely substitute for the original work. finding it has little merit in resolving this and other parody cases." The Supreme Court then looked to the new work as a whole. for copyright infringement. after nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold. The Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals analysis as running counter to this proposition.
the size of the objects pictured." Blanch v.‖ However. an ―appropriation artist―. created a collage entitled ―Niagara‖ which depicts four pairs of women‘s legs with the feet pointing downwards superimposed over images of ―confections … with a grassy field and Niagara Falls in the background. to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.‖ Also. Koons Issue: ―[t]he question is whether Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch‘s image. their details. noting that artists "ask for criticism. In fact.‖ Koons‘s painting had an ―entirely different purpose and meaning – as part of a massive painting commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space. Koons described his work as using popular images for commentary on the ―social and aesthetic consequences of mass media.‖ parody v. the Court found no evidence that a potential rap market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew's parodic rap version. but only want praise. is entitled.‖ Jeff Koons. ―Niagara‖ passes the transformative test ―almost perfectly‖ because Koons changed the original copyrighted picture‘s ―colors. satire: ―parody needs to mimic an original to make its point.‖ The work was commissioned by Deutsche Bank and the Guggenheim Museum. one of the sets of legs in the painting was originally part of a photograph taken by a professional fashion and portrait photographer. without the authority of the copyright owner. and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim‘s … imagination. or any person authorized by such owner. Courts will not ―find a transformative use when the defendant has done no more than find a new way to exploit the creative virtues of the original work.‖
First Sale 17 USC § 109 ―…the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title. and published in Allure magazine in 2000.‖ Limits regarding Sound Recordings 55
. rather than using it merely to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh. the medium.record a rap derivative. in this case. the Court found that it was unlikely that any artist would find parody a lucrative derivative market. and ―crucially. whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.‖ In his collage. the background against which it is portrayed.
For one potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard. First Amendment: used to say that there never was infringement. We adopt it here.Limits regarding Computer Software Importation Compulsory License for Nondramatic Musical Works Limitations on Computer Programs Other Limits on Exclusive Rights Defenses Other 1. It does so both (A) because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs. Might be effective toward fair use 5. Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability
Sony v. is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. Inequitable Conduct: fraud in the course of registration 4. We are. Illegal. and (B) because the District Court's factual findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use. in order to resolve this case we need not give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. of course. we need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement. but doesn‘t protect infringing expression. Obscene: not really that big of a deal. In order to resolve that question. Moreover. noncommercial time-shifting in the home. the inducement rule. we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the District Court a significant number of them would be noninfringing. mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging 56
. as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement. holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.‖ Authorized Time-Shifting Unauthorized Time-Shifting Grokster v. Universal City Studios. Immoral. Rather. however it is understood: private. too. License and/or Consent: 3. ―The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses. Inc. is a sensible one for copyright. MGM ―For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule. Independent Creation and Expression: at the same time 2. because ‗who cares?‘
Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution. if not exclusive. mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. support liability in themselves. StreamCast's internal documents made constant reference to Napster.the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential. just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe. Accordingly.‖ 57
. it advertised its OpenNap program to Napster users. but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear. and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. each company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright infringement. including copyrighted movies and software programs. Second. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants' failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to monitor their users' activity. the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use. and it attempted to divert queries for Napster onto its own Web site. its software's function is likewise comparable to Napster's.‖ Three features of this evidence of intent are particularly notable. the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising revenue becomes. The unlawful objective is unmistakable. premises liability on purposeful. Grokster and StreamCast's efforts to supply services to former Napster users. n. by directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software. we think this evidence underscores Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their users' infringement. As the record shows. Grokster's name is apparently derived from Napster. the market comprising former Napster users. The inducement rule. indicate a principal. this evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM's showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software. S. such as offering customers technical support or product updates.[12] Third. it initially distributed its Morpheus software through an OpenNap program compatible with Napster. intent on the part of each to bring about infringement. at 439. First. and its Morpheus software functions as Napster did except that it could be used to distribute more kinds of files. there is a further complement to the direct evidence of unlawful objective. Since the extent of the software's use determines the gain to the distributors. It is useful to recall that StreamCast 940*940 and Grokster make money by selling advertising space. the more the software is used.. 464 U. it too initially offered an OpenNap program. deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files.[13] This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent. culpable expression and conduct. 19. which the record shows is infringing. instead.
000 for willful infringer
. and State officials for infringement of copyright 512. 508. $$$$$$$$$ i. Remedies
Chapter 5 Copyright Infringement and Remedies
             501. 507. 505. 509. Infringing goods seized and impounded Liability c. 502. MAX: $150.F. 510. MAX: $30. Compulsory licensing d. Determination of reasonable license fees for individual proprietors 2
Property Like a. MIN: $200 for an innocent infringer ii. instrumentalities of States. 506. MIN: $750 for non-innocent infringer iii.000 for non-innocent infringer iv. 511. (lack of moral rights) e. Injunctive relief b. 503. Limitations on liability relating to material online 513. Infringement of copyright Remedies for infringement: Injunctions Remedies for infringement: Impounding and disposition of infringing articles Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits Remedies for infringement: Costs and attorney's fees Criminal offenses Limitations on actions Notification of filing and determination of actions Repealed1 Remedies for alteration of programming by cable systems Liability of States. 504.
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