Source: https://casetext.com/case/holmes-v-united-states-bd-of-parole
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 17:12:30
Document Index: 332837295

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1361', '§ 2201', '§ 20', '§ 1361', '§ 139', '§ 1361', '§ 217']

Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243 | Casetext
Holmes v. United States Bd. of Parole
541 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1976)
Holmesv.United States Bd. of Parole
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh CircuitSep 10, 1976
Solomon v. Benson
The question raised in this appeal is whether a federal prisoner is entitled to a due process hearing prior…
A prisoner suffers serious additional penalties when, as the result of Correction Authority and Parole Board…
holding that prisoners do not become residents of their district of incarceration for venue purposes
Summary of this case from Roman-Salgado v. Holder
noting that issuance of a writ of mandamus "is controlled by equitable principles"
Summary of this case from Mt. St. Helens Mining Recovery v. U.S.
Decided September 10, 1976. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied December 28, 1976.
John Marshall Meisburg, Jr., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Samuel K. Skinner, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellants.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, SWYGERT, Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable William J. Campbell, United States Senior District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation.
The question in this appeal is whether a federal prisoner is entitled to procedural due process prior to being labeled a "Special Offender," a designation that results in "special handling" during confinement.
Auckland Holmes, convicted of possession and sale of heroin in the Northern District of Illinois, was sentenced to twenty years in prison. Upon his incarceration at the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, Holmes was classified as a special offender by the Bureau of Prisons pursuant to Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 7900.-47. After spending six years at Terre Haute, Holmes was transferred to the Federal Correctional Institution at Lexington, Kentucky, a facility better suited for treatment of Holmes' respiratory condition.
The plaintiff then filed a complaint in the district court in August 1975. Jurisdiction was predicated on the Mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Declaratory Judgment statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202. Holmes alleges that his classification as a special offender was arbitrary and capricious and that as a result of the classification the Parole Board denied his parole and furlough and delayed his transfer to the medical facility at Lexington. He also asserts that his demand for a hearing in order to learn upon what evidence the special offender classification was based and to contest that evidence was denied. Furthermore, he alleges he has been a model prisoner and has received favorable reports in his files from prison authorities. He requests the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to remove the classification; to afford him the privileges afforded other prisoners; to give full consideration to his application for parole without considering the special offender classification; and for other appropriate relief. The district court denied the Government's motions for dismissal or in the alternative for change of venue and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. In addition to holding that due process was required in the procedure by which a person is classified as a special offender, the district court delineated a set of procedures required prior to such a designation. These procedures include: (1) a written notice prior to the designation containing a brief description upon which the contemplated designation is based; (2) the opportunity to have the assistance of retained counsel, to be heard in person, to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses called by either or both defendants; (3) appointment of a hearing officer who does not have personal knowledge upon which the special offender designation is based; (4) written findings by the hearing officer if the officer should determine that a special offender classification is warranted, and submission of such determination and findings to the Bureau of Prisons; and (5) the opportunity for review of the hearing officer's determination that the special offender classification is warranted by the Chief of Classification and Parole at plaintiff's institution of incarceration, by the warden of the institution, and by the Bureau of Prisons.
Thompson v. Groshens, 475 F.2d 127 cert. denied,414 U.S. 82594 S.Ct. 127 38 L.Ed.2d 58
Holmes was transferred to the medical facility in Lexington, Kentucky, shortly after the filing of this lawsuit; therefore, any claim to compel transfer is moot. The delay in processing Holmes' application for transfer is attributable to the procedures described for approving the transfer application and will thus necessarily accompany any request for transfer. The request for declaratory judgment relief, therefore, is not moot. See Preisser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975), and Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974).
The first question pertains to the appropriateness of a writ of mandamus in this case. The writ, although legal, is controlled by equitable principles, and its issuance is dependent largely upon judicial discretion. The availability of both administrative and judicial remedies must be considered as alternatives to issuance of the writ. U.S. ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 57 S.Ct. 855, 81 L.Ed. 1272 (1937); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 691 (7th Cir. 1975). Such alternative remedies, however, must be "capable of affording full relief as to the very subject matter in question." Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Government challenges both the jurisdiction of the district court over the claim and the appropriateness of granting mandamus relief. Three elements are applicable to test the appropriateness of granting mandamus: a clear right in the plaintiff to the relief sought; a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and no other adequate remedy available. Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 1555, 36 L.Ed.2d 310 (1973). Their coexistence is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction. See Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 775 (5th Cir. 1969).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is required prior to the issuance of mandamus relief. See Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972). This is consistent with the dictates that mandamus will not issue if an alternative fully adequate remedy exists. In addition, where an administrative decision is involved, exhaustion is more applicable to allow completion of administrative treatment of the particular problem. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 20.01 et seq. (3d ed. 1958, 1970 Supp.) When prison administration is involved and fair procedures are available, a prisoner can often obtain expeditious review and relief without the necessity of seeking a remedy through the courts. Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1974).
Exhaustion also has been required prior to seeking habeas corpus relief. Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974).
This is not a case, however, where a party seeking judicial relief by mandamus bypassed an available administrative procedure, City of Highland Park, supra, or truncated the procedure without pursuing the process to its end, Beale, supra. True, Holmes did not follow the administrative grievance procedures prescribed by the Bureau of Prisons' policy statement in order to make his demands known to the Bureau. A denial of this demand, however, had already been rendered, not by the first or second party in the review procedure, but by the office which would be the ultimate decision maker in the review procedure. To compel Holmes to resort to an administrative procedure that terminates with an appeal to a party in the highest level who has already rejected his request "would be to demand a futile act." Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1519 (1968); U.S. ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, 483 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1973).
The plaintiff's complaint recited that he demanded a hearing before the defendants during which he could learn of and contest the evidence against him upon which his classification was made and that his attorney received a letter from the Bureau of Prisons stating that he would not be given a hearing. The letter to which the complaint refers is signed by the Acting General Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons, although the letter recites that plaintiff's letter demanding a hearing was originally addressed to William Brittain and was referred to the Assistant General Counsel for reply. The letter unequivocally refused Holmes' request for a hearing. The denial itself was based not on the failure of Holmes to follow the prescribed procedure, but was rather founded on the very merits of Holmes' request.
The Government also argues that mandamus relief is inappropriate because Holmes is attacking his "conditions of confinement" and such an attack may properly be made by habeas corpus. We are not convinced by the Government's reliance on Preisser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), that habeas corpus is available to a federal prisoner attacking the "conditions of confinement." The Court raised more questions regarding the availability of habeas corpus to attack conditions of confinement than it answered. Indeed, there is conflicting dicta in this circuit with respect to this question. See, e. g., Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720, 726 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. Harris, 465 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1972); U.S. ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Kniess, 251 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1958). Assuming, however, that habeas is available, we hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting mandamus relief. See Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d at 769.
The Government moved to transfer this case either to the district of Holmes' incarceration or to Washington, D.C. The basis of the request for transfer to Holmes' district of incarceration was that Holmes' action was actually a habeas corpus suit and was required to be brought where the plaintiff is confined.
Under the designation of special offender, Holmes has been compelled to live with a stigma that affects his opportunities for furlough and parole. A transfer or a dismissal by this court without prejudice so that Holmes could file an action under section 2241 would serve only to perpetuate a gross injustice in favor of preserving judicially formulated niceties which are neither required nor jurisdictional. We do not countenance such a result.
A transfer or dismissal may indeed be ludicrous in view of the fact that this court would be required to face the same due process issue on appeal from the district court in Indiana.
In accordance with our position, we note that several other circuits have deemed the mandamus remedy appropriate to challenge conditions of confinement. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Taylor v. Blackwell, 418 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1969); Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 296, 410 F.2d 995 (1969); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Toles v. Katzenback, 385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 662, 88 S.Ct. 2292, 20 L.Ed.2d 1353 (1968); Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966). Most of these cases were brought in the district of confinement with the warden named as defendant, but we think that mandamus is all the more appropriate in this case because Holmes' attack "is in effect [here] challenging a nationwide policy of the Bureau of Prisons rather than the conditions of confinement in a single penitentiary." Kahane, 527 F.2d at 493 n. 1. It is this challenge to national officials which eliminates "[the] spectacle of the warden of a large federal prison being answerable for prison conditions under § 1361 to district judges scattered from Maine to Hawaii and Florida to Alaska . . . ." Kahane, 527 F.2d at 496 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
The Government further contends that jurisdiction in the district court did not exist because proper venue did not lie under 28 U.S.C. § 139(e). Holmes' complaint states that he is a resident of Chicago, Illinois, and is presently incarcerated at Terre Haute, Indiana. We see no reason for purposes of venue under section 1391 to ascribe to Holmes the residence of his district of incarceration rather than the district of his domicile. Accordingly, we hold that venue existed in the district court under section 1391(e)(4). Accord, Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Ellingsburg v. Connett, 457 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1972).
Constitutional obligations as well as statutory duties are included within the perimeters of 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See, e. g., Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972). In cases charging a violation of constitutional rights, mandamus should be construed liberally. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 851 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974). We agree with the Government that this case on its merits presents constitutional issues of a complex nature; however, this fact alone does not affect jurisdiction. We find the statement of the Third Circuit in Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, sub nom., Mathews v. Mattern, 425 U.S. 987, 96 S.Ct. 2196, 48 L.Ed.2d 812 (1976), to be applicable to the case at bar:
The complexity and novelty of the issues on the merits, however, do not necessarily deprive the federal courts of mandamus jurisdiction. A determination with respect to jurisdiction involves a threshold inquiry into whether the plaintiff has alleged a cause of action under the particular jurisdictional statute. 519 F.2d at 156. [Emphasis in original.]
Although many rights and privileges usually available to the ordinary citizen are not available to prisoners, "an iron curtain is not drawn between prisons of this country and the Constitution," Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1975). Among those rights available is the right of procedural due process in cases involving certain prison disciplinary proceedings, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); revocation of probation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); involuntary transfer of a prisoner to an institution for the criminally insane, U.S. ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); statement of reasons for denial of parole, U.S. ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975).
The authority to classify, treat, and transfer a federal prisoner is delegated to the Attorney General. This general power has been redelegated to the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. 95(d), 0.96(c). The special offender classification was created by Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 7900.-47 (April 30, 1974). The purpose of the policy statement is to "provide policy guidelines on a system to identify and tabulate information on certain special categories of offenders who require greater case management supervision than the usual case."
A staff member is assigned by the warden of each prison to coordinate the special offender operation. Institution staff make the initial determination of special offenders based upon "Court records, information from the Central Office, or other reliable information." After a prisoner is determined to be within the special offender category, a copy of the determination is sent to the Central Office in Washington, D.C., for confirmation. At no time is a prisoner afforded a formal notice of his consideration for his classification, nor is he notified of the factual basis for his classification. Although theoretically he may have administrative remedies, it is questionable whether they serve a practical function in view of the fact that the classification has already been approved by those at the top of the review ladder. The court in Catalano characterized such review as "at best these provide merely a review `on the records.'" Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.C.Conn. 1974).
Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 7900.47.
We disagree with the Government's contention that the effect of the special offender classification system is only procedural. A special offender may not be transferred or participate in community programs without prior approval from the Central Office, which results in "inordinate delays" compared with other prisoners' ability to personally request such transfers before a prison advisory committee or a caseworker. The resulting delay is particularly burdensome when, as here, the purpose of the request for transfer was to obtain medical treatment.
At oral argument, counsel for the Government informed us that delays often range from one to three months.
With respect to furloughs, Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 7300.12c (July 23, 1974) provides that furloughs will ordinarily not be granted for persons identified with large scale criminal activity. In light of the purposes of furlough as set out in the Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement, this restriction may be devastating to the social, moral, and economic rehabilitation of the prisoner and his family.
(2) Exceptions — Ordinarily, furloughs will not be granted for persons identified with large scale criminal activity, for offenders convicted of serious crimes against the person, for persons whose presence in the community would attract undue attention or create unusual concern, or for persons obtaining medical or dental treatment not funded by the Bureau of Prisons. Any approvals for these exceptional cases must follow specific guidelines.
The Attorney General may extend the limits of the place of confinement of a prisoner as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe he will honor his trust, by authorizing him, under prescribed conditions to —
The special offender classification also affects a prisoner's prospects for release on parole. Those special offenders whose designation is based on participation in organized crime may be designated as "original jurisdiction" cases by the Regional Director of the Board of Parole, 28 C.F.R. § 217(a), (b)(2) (1974). All such applications are submitted to the Board for consideration en banc. Although the Board does review the underlying evidence upon which the special offender designation is based, the inmate's opportunity to challenge is the designation at this stage is minimal. See Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 994 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1975).
Holmes was designated an "original jurisdiction" case by the Board of Parole pursuant to this section.
In so holding we reject the Government's argument that, assuming the special offender designation does result in denial of furlough, transfer, or parole, such a result does not require due process because no prisoner possesses a "right" or "entitlement" to these conditions of confinement. This court's recent decision in U.S. ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), supports our rejection of this right/privilege dichotomy. In Richerson, we held that due process required that reasons be given for the denial of parole release. At the core of our holding was the idea embodied in our statement in King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1343 (7th Cir. 1975):
The Government's argument is based on its interpretation of Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). It is clear in light of U.S. ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), that this interpretation is not followed in this circuit. For a discussion of what we believe to be the correct approach to this issue see Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350, and Cardaropoli, supra at 995 n. 10.
Accord, Childs v. United States Board of Parole, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 511 F.2d 1270 (1974); U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015, 95 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed.2d 289; Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350. Cf. Scott v. Kentucky Board of Parole (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1031, 96 S.Ct. 561, 46 L.Ed.2d 409; Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1976).
In King, we held that the Administrative Procedure Act applied to parole release proceedings and required a statement of reasons for denial. The inapplicability of the Act to state prisoners required courts in this and other circuits to deal with the due process clause as requiring reasons for denial.
[A] substantial argument can be made that some modicum of due process should attend the denial of the expectation of conditional freedom on parole inasmuch as its termination after having been granted inflicts a "grievous loss" of a "valuable liberty."
Our holding here is not inconsistent with the recent cases of Meachum v. Fano, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), and Montayne v. Haymes, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). In Meachum and Montayne, the Court denied the due process claim because no state law or practice conditioned transfer upon the occurrence of specified events. Here, however, the repeated denials and delay in processing Holmes' request for transfer, and his continued commitment in an institution inadequately furnished with medical facilities for treating his respiratory condition violated Holmes' clear right to adequate medical attention.
In Wolff the Court concluded with respect to cross-examination and confrontation that "[T]he better course at this time, in a period where prison practices are diverse and somewhat experimental, is to leave these matters to the sound discretion of the officials of state prisons." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 569, 94 S.Ct. at 2981. The Court recently reaffirmed this preference in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1560, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976): "Mandating confrontation and cross-examination except where prison officials can justify their denial on one or more grounds that appeal to judges, effectively preempts the area that Wolff left to the sound discretion of prison officials."
b. Purposes of Furlough — Furloughs may be granted for such purposes as: