Source: http://famguardian1.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/immunity.htm
Timestamp: 2017-04-28 23:48:41
Document Index: 84044449

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§2679', '§41', '§ 2679', '§ 2679']

42 U.S.C. § 1983 immunity questions has produced some curious inversions of the common law as it existed in 1871, when
§ 1983 was enacted. A conscientious prosecutor reading our cases should now conclude that there is absolute immunity for the decision to seek an arrest warrant after filing an information, but only qualified immunity for testimony as a witness in support of that warrant. The common-law rule was, in a sense, exactly opposite.
§ 1983 was enacted. (Indeed, as the Court points out,
Police Witness Immunity Under § 1983, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1433, 1454 (1989). By the time
§ 1983,” Comment, supra, at 1454,
§ 1983 very difficult. But both
§ 1983 jurisprudence that, for reasons of stare decisis, I would not abandon them now. Given those concessions,
immunity, see, e.g., Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 296-300 (1988), and qualified immunity, see, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 813-819 (1982), are designed to protect state and federal officials from civil liability for conduct that was within the scope of their duties or conduct that did not violate clearly established law. These doctrines short circuit civil litigation for officials who meet these standards so that these officials are not subjected to the costs of trial or the burdens of discovery. 457 U. S., at 817-818. For example, the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, allows the United States to substitute itself for a federal employee as defendant upon certifying that the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. 28 U. S. C. §2679(d). Nevada law contains analogous provisions. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§41.032, 41.0335-41.0339 (1996 and Supp. 1999). The employee who successfully claims
[1] Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306 (describing Harlow's standard as one of "objective legal reasonableness"). "A public official is not entitled to qualified immunity when the contours of the allegedly violated right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right." Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity "requires a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state official's conduct clearly established?
33 Immunity of Government Officers Sued as Individuals for Official Acts The general rule at common law was that in order for a government official to be protected by absolute immunity for common law torts, not only did the official have to be acting within the outer perimeter of his/her official duties, but the conduct at issue also had to be discretionary in nature. Westfall v. Irwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-298 (1988). In enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA), Congress abrogated this common law rule and extended absolute immunity for common law torts to all federal employees regardless of whether the conduct at issue was discretionary. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160 (1991). FELRTCA confers such immunity by making the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for all common law torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope of their office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). However, the immunity conferred by FELRTCA does not extend or apply to suits against federal employees for violation of the Constitution or federal statutes. Thus, government officials sued for constitutional torts continue to be protected only by qualified immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Where applicable, qualified immunity protects an official from trial and the burdens of litigation. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). [U.S. Attorney Manual, Title 4, Civil Resource Manual: 33 Immunity of Government Officers Sued as Individuals for Official Acts]