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US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 413 > UNITED STATES DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE V. MORENO, 413 U. S. 528 (1973)
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BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 413 U. S. 538. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 545. chanrobles.com-red
The federal food stamp program was established in 1964 in an effort to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needy segments of our society. 7 U.S.C. § 2011. Eligibility for participation in the program is determined on a household, rather than an individual basis. 7 CFR § 271.3(a). An eligible household purchases sufficient food stamps to provide that household with a nutritionally adequate diet. The household pays for the stamps at a reduced rate based chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 530
In January, 1971, however, Congress redefined the term "household" so as to include only groups of related individuals. [Footnote 2] Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations rendering ineligible for participation in the program any "household" whose members are not "all related to each other." [Footnote 3] chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 531
Appellees in this case consist of several groups of individuals who allege that, although they satisfy the income eligibility requirements for federal food assistance, they have nevertheless been excluded from the program solely because the persons in each group are not "all related to each other." Appellee Jacinta Moreno, for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. They share common living expenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps to care for appellee. Appellee's monthly income, derived from public assistance, is $75; Mrs. Sanchez receives $133 per month from public assistance. The household pays $135 per month for rent, gas, and electricity, of which appellee pays $50. Appellee spends $10 per month for transportation to a hospital for regular visits, and $5 per month for laundry. That leaves her $10 per month for food and other necessities. Despite her poverty, appellee has been denied federal food assistance solely because she is unrelated to the other members of her household. Moreover, although Mrs. Sanchez and her three children were permitted to purchase $108 worth of food stamps per month for $18, their participation in the program will be chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 532
These and two other groups of appellees instituted a class action against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, and two other departmental officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 1971 amendment of § 3(e) and its implementing regulations. In essence, appellees contend, [Footnote 4] and the District Court held, that the "unrelated person" provision of § 3(e) creates an irrational classification in violation chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 533
of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Footnote 5] We agree.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low income households. The Congress hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized which will permit low income households to
Page 413 U. S. 534
purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade."
"[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the
Page 413 U. S. 535
public interest, justify the 1971 amendment."
Although apparently conceding this point, the Government maintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless be upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program. [Footnote 7] In essence, the Government contends that, in adopting the 1971 amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (1) that households with one or more unrelated members are more likely than "fully related" households to contain individuals who abuse the program by fraudulently failing to report sources of income or by voluntarily remaining poor; and (2) that such households are "relatively unstable," thereby increasing the difficulty of detecting such abuses. But even if we were to accept as rational the Government's wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the differences between "related" and "unrelated" households, we still could not agree with the Government's conclusion that the denial of essential chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 536
At the outset, it is important to note that the Food Stamp Act itself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3(e), aimed specifically at the problems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor. For example, with certain exceptions, § 5(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c), renders ineligible for assistance any household containing "an able-bodied adult person between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five" who fails to register for, and accept, offered employment. Similarly, §§ 14(b) and (c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and (c), specifically impose strict criminal penalties upon any individual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently. [Footnote 8] The existence of these provisions chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 537
necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that the 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent those very same abuses. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 405 U. S. 452 (1972); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 405 U. S. 353-354 (1972).
"The 'related household' limitations will eliminate many households from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is my understanding that the Congressional intent of the new regulations are specifically aimed at the 'hippies' and 'hippie communes.' Most people in this category can and will alter their living arrangements in order to remain eligible for food stamps. However, the AFDC mothers who try to raise their standard of living by sharing housing will be affected. They will not be able to
Page 413 U. S. 538
utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue o be eligible without giving up their advantage of shared housing costs."
Appellee Jacinta Moreno is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. The two share common living expenses, Mrs. Sanchez helping to care for this appellee. Appellee's monthly income is $75, derived from public assistance, and Mrs. Sanchez' is $133, also derived from public assistance. This household pays $95 a month for rent, of which appellee pays $40, and $40 a month for gas and electricity, of which appellee pays $10. Appellee spends $10 a month for transportation to a hospital for regular visits and $5 a month for laundry. That leaves her $10 a month for food and other necessities. Mrs. Sanchez and the three children received $108 worth of food stamps per month for $18. But under the "unrelated" person chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 539
provision of the Act, [Footnote 2/1] she will be cut off if appellee Moreno continues to live with her.
Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children, ages two to five. She and her husband took in a 20-year-old girl who is unrelated to them. She shares in the housekeeping. The Hejnys pay $14 a month and receive $144 worth of food stamps. The Hejnys comprise an indigent household. But if they allow the 20-year-old girl to live with them, they too will be cut off from food stamps by reason of the "unrelated" person provision. chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 540
The test of equal protection is whether the legislative line that is drawn bears "some rational relationship to a legitimate" governmental purpose. [Footnote 2/2] @ 406 U. S. 172. The requirement of equal protection denies government
I suppose no one would doubt that an association of people working in the poverty field would be entitled to the same constitutional protection as those working in the racial, banking, or agricultural field. I suppose poor people holding a meeting or convention would be under the same constitutional umbrella as others. The dimensions of the "unrelated" person problem under the Food Stamp Act are in that category. As the facts of this case show, the poor are congregating in households where they can better meet the adversities of poverty. This banding together is an expression of the right of freedom of association that is very deep in our traditions. chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 542
But for the constitutional aspects of the problem, the "unrelated" person provision of the Act might well be sustained as a means to prevent fraud. Fraud is a concern of the Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and (c). Able-bodied persons must register and accept work or lose their food. stamp rights. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c). I chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 543
could not say that this "unrelated" person provision has no "rational" relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however, with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment. People who are desperately poor but unrelated come together and join hands with the aim better to combat the crises of poverty. The need of those living together better to meet those crises is denied, while the need of households made up of relatives that is no more acute is serviced. Problems of the fisc, as we stated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 394 U. S. 633, are legitimate concerns of government. But government "may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens." Ibid.
The right of association, the right to invite the stranger into one's home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal with roughshod. If there are abuses inherent in that pattern of living against which the food stamp program should be protected, the Act must be "narrowly drawn," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 307, to meet the precise end. The method adopted and applied to these cases makes § 3(e) of the Act unconstitutional by reason of the invidious discrimination between the two classes of needy persons. chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 544
The "unrelated" person provision of the present Act has an impact on the rights of people to associate for lawful purposes with whom they choose. When state action "may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 545
associate" it "is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 460-461. The "right of the people peaceably to assemble" guaranteed by the First Amendment covers a wide spectrum of human interests -- including, as stated in id. at 357 U. S. 460, "political, economic, religious, or cultural matters." Banding together to combat the common foe of hunger is in that category. The case therefore falls within the zone represented by Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, which held that a waiting period on welfare imposed by a State on the "in-migration of indigents" penalizing the constitutional right to travel could not be sustained absent a "compelling governmental interest." Id. at 394 U. S. 631, 394 U. S. 634.
The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressional committee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation in question. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem with a rather blunt instrument, and, just as undoubtedly, persuasive arguments may be made that what we conceive to be its purpose will not be significantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. But questions such as this are for Congress, rather than for this Court; our role is limited to the chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 546
Admittedly, as the Court points out, the limitation will make ineligible many households which have not been formed for the purpose of collecting federal food stamps, and will, at the same time, not wholly deny food stamps to those households which may have been formed in large part to take advantage of the program. But, as the Court concedes, "[t]raditional equal protection analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with precise mathematical nicety,'" ante at 413 U. S. 538. And earlier this Term, the constitutionality of a similarly "imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act was challenged chanrobles.com-red
Page 413 U. S. 547
on grounds such as those urged by appellees here. In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973), the imposition of the rule on all members of a defined class was sustained because it served to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class of disclosure mechanisms chosen by Congress for consumer protection.