Source: http://ma.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20160408_0001397.MA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 02:49:39
Document Index: 281521525

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10']

The defendant, Michael Boyd, was convicted on counts of an indictment charging two sentencing enhancements, one as a second-time offender, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 ( d ), and one under the Massachusetts armed career criminal (ACC) statute,[1] see G. L. c. 269, § 10G ( c ), both premised on an underlying conviction of unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 ( c ). The Commonwealth moved for sentencing consistent with the fifteen- to twenty-year term of imprisonment required by the ACC statute, while the defendant recommended a lesser punishment, also within the range afforded by the ACC statute.[2] See G. L. c. 269, § 10G ( c ). The defendant was sentenced to a term of from fifteen to seventeen years in State prison on the ACC enhancement and was not sentenced on the second offender enhancement.
The defendant appealed from the ACC conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to support a sentence enhancement under that provision. In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court agreed, reversing the conviction and remanding the case for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 85 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 5 N.E.3d 1 (2014). The Appeals Court's decision ostensibly left the defendant with convictions of unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, which carries a sentencing range of from eighteen months to life, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 ( a ), ( c ); and the second offender enhancement conviction for the same offense, which carries a mandatory term of imprisonment in State prison of between five and seven years, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 ( d ).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 249, 13 N.E.3d 989 (2014), decided one month after the resentencing in the present case, we established that, absent legislative intent to the contrary, " a defendant may be sentenced under only one sentencing enhancement statute," even if he or she was convicted pursuant to multiple such provisions. The Commonwealth, however, is free to charge a defendant under multiple sentencing enhancement statutes, and if it secures multiple convictions, it may, prior to sentencing, " exercise its prosecutorial prerogative to decide which enhancement provision will apply ... by entering a nolle prosequi of all but one sentencing enhancement count." Id. at 254. Because in Richardson the Commonwealth had not exercised its nolle prosequi authority prior to sentencing, and because the judge sentenced the defendant under two sentencing enhancement provisions, we remanded the case for resentencing, concluding that, " [w]here ... the Commonwealth ...