Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/238/456
Timestamp: 2016-02-08 17:28:46
Document Index: 467867284

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 17', '§ 8', '§ 3', '§ 8573', '§ 16', '§ 13', '§ 8584', '§ 9', '§ 8563', '§ 8584', '§ 8', '§ 22', '§ 9']

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. CLARK BROTHERS COAL MINING COMPANY. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. CLARK BROTHERS COAL MINING COMPANY.
238 U.S. 456 (35 S.Ct. 896, 59 L.Ed. 1408)
[HTML] Messrs. Francies I. Gowen, John G. Johnson, and F. D. McKenney for plaintiff in error.
This suit was brought in January, 1912, by the Clark Brothers Coal Mining Company (defendant in error) in the court of common pleas of Clearfield county, Pennsylvania, to recover damages for inadequate and unjustly discriminatory car service and supply. The complaint related to the action of the defendant company with respect to cars required for the transportation of coal from the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, in Clearfield county, and Falcon, Nos. 5 and 6, in Indiana county, Pennsylvania, between October, 1905, and April 30, 1907. A statute of Pennsylvania (act of June 4, 1883, P. L. 72, 4 Purdons 3906; see Const. Pa. 1873, art. 17) prohibits undue or unreasonable discrimination by any common carrier 'in charges for or in facilities for the transportation of freight within this state or coming from or going to any other state,' and provides that the carrier guilty of unjust discrimination shall be liable 'for damages treble the amount of injury suffered.'
This question must be answered in the negative. In determining whether commerce is interstate or intrastate, regard must be had to its essential character. Mere billing, or the place at which title passes, is not determinative. If the actual movement is interstate, the power of Congress attaches to it and provisions of the act to regulate commerce, enacted for the purpose of preventing and redressing unjust discrimination by interstate carriers, whether in rates or facilities, apply. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, state 51 L. ed. 295, 297, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 526, 527, 55 L. ed. 310, 320, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 108, 110, 56 L. ed. 1004, 1008, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 520, 56 L. ed. 1182, 1189, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 127, 57 L. ed. 442, 448, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Railroad Commission v. Taxas & P. R. Co. 229 U. S. 336, 57 L. ed. 1215, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; Illinois C. R. Co. v. De Fuentes, 236 U. S. 157, 163, 59 L. ed. , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275. Thus, in the case of Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 526, 527, 55 L. ed. 310, 320, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279, cotton seed cake which had been purchased by one Young at various places in Texas was shipped to him at the port of Galveston, where it was prepared for export. The court sustained the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to the transportation to Galveston, although between Texas points, it being an incident to the export movement, and held that the special privileges given by the Terminal Company to Young on the wharf were undue preferences. As the commodity was destined for export it made no difference, said the court, 'that the shipments of the products were not made on through bills of lading, or whether their initial points were Galveston or some other points in Texas.' In Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101, 108, 110, 56 L. ed. 1004, 1008, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 653, it appeared that the State Commission had established a rate on what was called 'lake cargo coal' transported from a coal field in eastern Ohio to ports in the same state on Lake Erie for carriage thence by lake vessels to other states. Ordinarily, the shipper had the coal transported 'upon bills of lading to himself, or to another for himself,' at Huron, Ohio. The rate covered the transportation to Huron and the placing of the coal on the vessels and trimming it for its interstate journey. In view of the proved nature of the movement, the court held that the action of the State Commission was an attempt directly to regulate interstate commerce, and the enforcement of the order of the State Commission was enjoined. Again, in Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 520, 56 L. ed. 1182, 1189, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, the complainant was a manufacturer in Minnesota and sold his commodity to purchasers in Indiana, the delivery being f. o. b. cars at Minneapolis for transportation to Indiana in the original unbroken packages, the freight being paid by the purchasers. Referring to an objection similar to the one here urged, the court said: 'In answer, it must again be said that 'commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.' Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398, 49 L. ed. 518, 525, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512, 51 L. ed. 295, 297, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159. It clearly appears from the bill that the complainant was engaged in dealing with purchasers in another state. His product, manufactured in Minnesota, was, in pursuance of his contracts of sale, to be delivered to carriers for transportation to the purchasers in Indiana. This was interstate commerce in the freedom of which from any unconstitutional burden the complainant had a direct interest.' In Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 127, 57 L. ed. 442, 448, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, it was found that the Powell Company bought lumber for export to different ports in Europe through the ports of Sabine and Port Arthur, both in Texas. To fill its export contracts, it purchased of the Sabine Tram Company a large amount of lumber, which according to the seller's option, was delivered f. o. b. cars at Sabine, Texas. There were separate bills of lading for delivery at Sabine to the Sabine Tram Company. Upon arrival at Sabine, the lumber was carried a short distance beyond the station to the dock, where it was unloaded from cars into water of the slip, ready for loading upon ships. The Sabine Tram Company had no connection with the further carriage. The railroad company collected, over protest, the rates fixed by tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Sabine Tram Company brought suit to recover the difference between the amount thus paid and the amount which would have been payable at the rate fixed by the State Commission. The court held that the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission was applicable, as the lumber was destined for export, and that, as the movement was one actually in the course of transportation to a foreign destination, the form of the billing to Sabine, and the transactions there, were not determinative.
1. The question whether the rule or method of car distribution practised by the railroad company as unjustly discriminatory was one which the Commission had authority to pass upon. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. R. Co. 215 U. S. 452, 54 L. ed. 280, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 215 U. S. 479, 54 L. ed. 291, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 304, 313, 57 L. ed. 1494, 1497, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co. 237 U. S. 121, 131, 59 L. ed. , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484. Further, by reason of the nature of the question involved in an attack upon the rule or method of the company in distributing cars, no action was maintainable in any court to recover damages alleged to have been inflicted thereby until the Commission had made its finding as to the reasonableness of the rule. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 441, 448, 51 L. ed. 553, 559, 562, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 215 U. S. 481, 493, 54 L. ed. 292, 297, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 222 U. S. 506, 511, 56 L. ed. 288, 290, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; United States v. Pacific & A. R. & Nav. Co. 228 U. S. 87, 107, 57 L. ed. 742, 749, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 304, 313, 57 L. ed. 1494, 1497, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co. 237 U. S. 121, 131, 59 L. ed. , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484. The Commission also had authority to make examination and report upon the amount of damages which the plaintiff had suffered from the unjust discrimination alleged in its complaint. We deem the provisions of the act to be clear upon this point. See §§ 8, 9, 13, 16. There is nothing in the act to suggest that the damages which may thus be ascertained are only those arising from unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory rates. Rules as to car distribution that are unjustly discriminatory are within the purview of § 3, and damages thereby occasioned, as well as those due to the exaction of unreasonable rates, arise from the violation of the act, and their ascertainment is within the scope of the Commission's authority See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois C. R. Co. 215 U. S. 452, 54 L. ed. 280, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 247, 257, 57 L. ed. 1472, 1476, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 304, 313, 57 L. ed. 1494, 1497, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 938; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co. 237 U. S. 121, 131, 59 L. ed. , 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484.
'Sec. 9. That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure herein provided for he or they will adopt. . . .' 24 Stat. at L. 382, chap. 104, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8573.
This provision defines the remedies to which a person in the situation of the plaintiff is entitled, and the terms of the provision clearly indicate that these remedies are exclusive. The express requirement of an election between the proceeding before the Commission and suit in the Federal court leaves no room for the conclusion that there is an option in such case to resort to the state court. Where the proceeding has been had before the Commission and reparation awarded, suit under § 16 (as amended in 1910 36 Stat. at L. 554, chap. 309, § 13, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8584) may be brought in either a state or a Federal court, but this is after the Commission's award has been made.
In Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co. 237 U. S. 121, 131, 59 L. ed. , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484, construing § 9, the court said: 'It will be seen that this section does more than create a right and designate the court in which it is to be enforced. It gives the shipper the option to proceed before the Commission or in the Federal courts. The express grant of the right of choice between those two remedies was the exclusion of any other remedy in a state court. . . . In Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 250, 57 L. ed. 1473, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 916, the same view of the statute was taken in discussing another, but related, question. This construction is also supported by the legislative history of the state. For while the Hepburn act 34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563, as a convenience to shippers, permitted suits on reparation orders to be brought in the Federal court of the district where the plaintiff resided or the company had its principal office; and while the act of 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 554, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8584), in further aid of shippers, permitted suits on reparation orders to be brought in state or Federal courts, it made no change in §§ 8 and 9, which, as shown above, gave the shipper the option to make complaints to the Commission or to bring suit in a United States court.' Referring to the proviso in § 22, with respect to the preservation of existing remedies, it was then pointed out that the proviso was not intended to nullify other parts of the act, but to maintain existing rights which were not inconsistent with those which the statute created. And, finally, with regard to a case such as the present one, where the Commission, at the instance of the injured party, has made its ruling as to the unreasonableness or unjustly discriminatory character of the practice attacked, the court thus defined the remedy available: 'Until that body' (the Commission) 'has declared the practice to be discriminatory and unjust, no court has jurisdiction of a suit against an interstate carrier for damages occasioned by its enforcement. When the Commission has declared the rule to be unjust, redress must be sought before the Commission or in the United States courts of competent jurisdiction, as provided in § 9.'
3. It is said that the present action is brought to recover damages caused by the violation or discriminatory enforcement of the carrier's own rule, and that in such case, no administrative question being involved, resort to the Commission was not necessary. And this, it is urged, was held in the Puritan Case. See also Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal Co. decided June 14, 1915 238 U. S. 275, 59 L. ed. , 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 760. The distinction, however, is apparent. In the cases cited the plaintiff had not invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission. In this case, it had done so. It went before the Commission, with its complaint under the act, assailing the rule of the company, and it secured from the Commission a finding as to the illegality of the rule and the violation of the act. This proceeding established the character of the claim so far as interstate transactions were concerned, and it could be prosecuted solely under the Federal statute. This follows necessarily from the supremacy of the Federal legislation in relation to interstate commerce. So long as the creative provisions of the Federal act did not appear to be involved, and the wrong was not disclosed in the aspect presented by the Commission's finding, the plaintiff was free to avail itself of common-law remedies or of those afforded by local statutes. But when, as a result of its own insistence upon its Federal right under the act, it appeared that the act had been violated and that the special remedial provisions of the act were applicable, it was not possible for the plaintiff to ignore the statute it had thus called into play, and disregard its provisions for the purpose of measuring relief by local standards. The Federal statute governed the plaintiff no less than the defendant. In the situation in which the plaintiff stood after the Commission's finding, that statute determined the extent of the damages it was entitled to recover with respect to interstate sales and shipments, and the plaintiff was not free to seek another remedy in the state court, and there to secure treble damages under the state statute with respect to the same transactions.