Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/284/493/case.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-16 03:52:55
Document Index: 220101783

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 4', '§ 402', '§ 13', '§ 300', '§ 15', '§ 402', '§ 13', '§ 303']

SINGLETON V. CHEEK, 284 U. S. 493 - Volume 284 - 1932 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 284 > SINGLETON V. CHEEK, 284 U. S. 493 (1932) > Full Text
In the administration following the death of Mary Lucinda Singleton and the infant son of Lee Ray Jackson, the same court determined that petitioners were entitled to the disability insurance which accrued before the death of the insured, but that respondents were entitled to the commuted value of the insurance falling due after the death of the beneficiary, holding that the commuted balance of such insurance was payable to the estate of the insured, but vested in the heirs next surviving within the permitted class of beneficiaries designated by the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917, c. 105, Art. 4, § 402, 40 Stat. 398, 409, as amended by the Act of 1919, c. 16, § 13, 41 Stat. 371, 375, and by the World War Veterans' Act of 1924, c. 320, §§ 300, 303, 43 Stat. 607, 624, 625. The case was appealed to a state district court, where a different judgment was rendered. From that judgment, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, where it was twice heard. That court first sustained the petitioners' contention. Subsequently, upon rehearing, it held in favor of the respondents in respect of the commuted installments accruing after the death of the beneficiary, and in favor of petitioners as to those accruing before her death, following a decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Sutton's Executor v. Barr's Administrator, 219 Ky. 543, 293 S.W. 1075, in which that court had decided that the heirs of the insured in being at the time of the death of the beneficiary took the property, and not those who were heirs at the time of the death of the insured. [Footnote 1] 7 P.2d 140.
court in the original administration of the Jackson estate fixed the parties entitled to inherit all his estate "whether the assets were then in the hands of the administrator or later came into the possession of an administrator de bonis non," and that, when the widow died, these assets became assets of her estate, to be distributed among her heirs. By the second Oklahoma decision, this was reversed upon the authority of the very case which had been distinctly rejected in the first decision.
We are of opinion that the first decision was right, and the second wrong. Undoubtedly, by § 15 of the War Risk Insurance Amending Act of 1919, [Footnote 2] war risk insurance, after the death of the designated beneficiary, became payable to such person or persons within the permitted class of beneficiaries (enumerated in § 402, Act of 1917, as amended by § 13, Act of 1919) as would, under the laws of the state of the residence of the insured, be entitled to his personal property in case of intestacy. The second decision of the state supreme court therefore would have been entirely correct if no change had been made in the statute. But a radical change had been effected prior to the award of insurance made by the Veterans' Bureau on August 18, 1925. The Act of March 4, 1925, c. 553, 43 Stat. 1302, 1310, amended § 303 of the World War Veterans' Act of 1924 (which had, in turn, amended and modified the preceding acts) to read as follows:
The amendment, in express terms, was made retroactive so as to take effect as of October 6, 1917, a provision undoubtedly within the power of Congress, for the reasons stated by this Court in White v. United states, 270 U. S. 175.
By that amendment, the rule, which, upon the happening of the contingencies named in the prior acts, limited the benefit of the unpaid installments to persons within the designated class of permittees was abandoned, and "the estate of the insured" was wholly substituted as the payee. All installments, whether accruing before the death of the insured or after the death of the beneficiary named in the certificate of insurance, as a result became assets of the estate of the insured upon the instant of his death, to be distributed to the heirs of the insured in accordance with the intestacy laws of the state of his residence, such heirs to be determined as of the date of his death, and not as of the date of the death of the beneficiary. The state courts, with almost entire unanimity, have reached the same conclusion. [Footnote 3]
Cases in accord with the text: In re Young's Estate, 1 P.2d 523, 525; Garland v. Anderson, 88 Colo. 341, 346 et seq.; Condon v. Mallan, 58 App.D.C. 371, 372, 30 F.2d 995, 996; Tolbert v. Tolbert, 41 Ga.App. 737, 154 S.E. 655; In re Estate of Pivonka, 202 Iowa 855, 858, 211 N.W. 246; Robbins, Petitioner, 126 Me. 555, 140 A. 366; Woodworth v. Tepper, 152 Md. 332, 334, 136 A. 536; In re Dempster's Estate, 247 Mich. 459, 462-464, 226 N.W. 243; Williams v. Eason, 148 Miss. 446, 454-455, 114 So. 338; Matter of Storum, 220 App.Div. 472, 476, 221 N.Y.S. 771; Trust Co. v. Brinkley, 196 N.C. 40, 44, 144 S.E. 530; In re Estate of Pruden, 199 N.C. 256, 154 S.E. 7; Re Root, 58 N.D. 422, 428, 226 N.W. 598; Palmer v. Mitchell, 117 Ohio St. 87, 93, 158 N.E. 187; Ogilvie's Estate, 291 Pa. 326, 331-334, 139 A. 826; National Union Bank v. McNeal, 148 S.C. 30, 37, 145 S.E. 549; Whaley v. Jones, 152 S.C. 328, 333; 149 S.E. 841; Moss v. Moss, 158 S.C. 243, 246, 155 S.E. 597; Wade v. Madding, 161 Tenn. 88, 93, 28 S.W.2d 642; Eblen v. Jordan, 161 Tenn. 509, 515, 33 S.W.2d 65; Battaglia v. Battaglia, 290 S.W. 296, 298; Turner v. Thomas, 30 S.W.2d 558; In re Hogan's Estate, 297 P. 1007, 1008; Price v. McConnell, 153 Va. 567, 572, 149 S.E. 515; Stacy v. Culbertson, 160 S.E. 50, 51; Estate of Singer, 192 Wis. 524, 527, 213 N.W. 479. Cases either directly or apparently to the contrary: Sutton's Executor v. Barr's Administrator, 219 Ky. 543, 293 S.W. 1075; Sizemore v. Sizemore's Guardian, 222 Ky. 713, 2 S.W.2d 395 (the later Kentucky cases of Mefford v. Mefford, 231 Ky. 127, 21 S.W.2d 151, and Mason's Adm'r v. Mason's Guardian, 239 Ky. 208, 39 S.W.2d 211, 213, 214, apparently disagree with the earlier view); In re Estate of Hallbom, 179 Minn. 402, 229 N.W. 344; Tax Comm'n v. Rife, 119 Ohio St. 83, 162 N.E. 390; Fisher's Estate, 302 Pa. 516, 153 A. 736; In re Cross' Estate, 153 Wash. 459, 278 P. 414.
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