Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/1983/39345-1.html
Timestamp: 2020-04-08 12:55:36
Document Index: 225151492

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 17', '§ 27', '§ 17', '§ 27', '§ 17', '§ 27', '§ 16', '§ 26', '§ 17', '§ 27', '§ 17', '§ 27']

Romine v. State :: 1983 :: Supreme Court of Georgia Decisions :: Georgia Case Law :: Georgia Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Georgia Case Law › Supreme Court of Georgia Decisions › 1983 › Romine v. State
251 Ga. 208 (1983)
305 S.E.2d 93
Appellant, Larry Romine, was indicted in Pickens County for the murder of his parents and the armed robbery of his mother. His case was tried under the Unified Appeal Procedure. The jury convicted him on all three counts and recommended that he be sentenced *209 to death.
He and Ginger met Thursday, March 19, 1981, shortly after 6:30 p. m., and spent that night in a motel. The next morning, appellant told Ginger, "I bet you mama and daddy didn't work today."
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence *210 with regard to his convictions. However, we have reviewed the evidence pursuant to Rule IV (B) (2) of the Unified Appeal Procedure and we conclude that the evidence supports appellant's convictions for armed robbery and two counts of murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. The "first proceeding," contemplated by Rule II (A) of the Unified Appeal Procedure, was conducted June 19, 1981. Motion hearings were thereafter conducted on August 5, September 25 and October 5, 1981. See Rule II (B) of the Unified Appeal Procedure. At the October 5 hearing, appellant's trial, originally scheduled for October, was continued until the March 1982, term of court.
All the facts alleged as a basis for the disqualification of Judge Mills were known prior to August 5, 1981. Appellant filed his motion six months later. Appellant's motion was untimely and the trial court *211 did not err in denying the motion to recuse or in denying appellant's request to allow another judge to hear the motion.
At 8:45 p. m. on the 29th, 45 completed interrogatories were furnished to appellant. Appellant then made another motion for continuance so that he could have additional time to examine the interrogatories. This motion was denied. Voir dire continued the next day and the jury was selected March 31.
The district attorney should have complied with the clear terms of the February 12 order. Nonetheless, his failure to do so was not *212 brought to the court's attention until immediately before the voir dire was scheduled to begin; the court thereafter did what it could to enforce compliance with its order, short of further delaying the case.
The trial began with voir dire Monday morning and ended Saturday evening. Court was in session, according to appellant, until 8:30 p. m. Monday, 9:00 p. m. Tuesday, 6:30 p. m. Wednesday, 7:00 p. m. Thursday, 10:00 p. m. Friday and 5:00 p. m. Saturday.
As noted by the trial court, "The verdict as prepared does not specify the statutory aggravating circumstances in the precise language as set forth in the charge." The charge had tracked the statutory language of OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2) (Code Ann. § 27-2534.1).[1]
*213 The court asked appellant's attorney, "Do you have any objection as [to] the form of the verdict and the manner in which it's written on the form, Mr. Thomas?" Counsel replied, "Not that I'm stating at this time, Your Honor, without waiving any." Nonetheless, at the district attorney's suggestion, the trial court dealt with the subject during the poll of the jury. The court asked each juror if the juror meant by his verdict that, as to Count 1, the jury found that the offense of murder of Avilee Romine was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of the additional capital felony, the armed robbery of Avilee Romine; and that, as to Count 3, the jury found that the murder of Roy Lee Romine was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of the additional capital felony, the murder of Avilee Romine. Each juror responded in the affirmative.
When a jury recommends a death sentence, it must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it has found beyond a reasonable doubt. OCGA § 17-10-30 (c) (Code Ann. § 27-2534.1). This written finding should recite all the essential, pertinent elements of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury. At a minimum, the jury's intent must be shown with sufficient clarity that this court can rationally review the jury's finding. Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (100 SC 1759, 64 LE2d 398) (1980).
First, he contends that as to Count 2, the death penalty for the murder of Roy Romine cannot be supported by the murder of Avilee Romine, because the crime and the supporting circumstance are the same capital felony, i.e., murder. Appellant contends that the supporting capital felony must be not only a different capital felony, but a different kind of capital felony, than the capital felony, for which the death penalty is imposed. We cannot agree. As we have held in the *214 past, OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2) (Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (2)) is applicable to multiple murders. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814 (16) (279 SE2d 650) (1981).
Second, appellant contends that since the two murders in this case were not simultaneous, one was not committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of the other. We do not agree that § (b) (2) requires simultaneity of action with regard to the two offenses. Gilreath v. State, supra; Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422, 431 (238 SE2d 12) (1977). As in Peek, the murders in this case "were committed by appellant in a relatively short period of time in what can be fairly viewed as one continuous course of criminal conduct. Thus, under the facts of this case, the jury was authorized in finding that the first murder was committed in the course of the second murder." Ibid.
The evidence shows the following: Avilee was paid by check on the afternoon of the day of her death. Less than three hours later, she was murdered by her son. Within the next few days, Avilee's paycheck and other papers were found in appellant's possession and the remains of her pocketbook were found in a trash barrel in which appellant had burned the contents of a box. The evidence demonstrates that appellant, "with intent to commit theft, [took] property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon ..." OCGA § 16-8-41 (a) (Code Ann. § 26-1902).
9. We find that the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury are supported by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (2) (Code Ann. § 27-2537); Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
(a) The court charged: "Ladies and gentlemen, you have found the Defendant Larry Romine guilty of the offenses of murder. It is now your duty to determine the penalty that shall be imposed as punishment for those offenses as prescribed by our law. In arriving at this determination, you are authorized to consider all of the evidence *215 received here in court as presented by the State and this Defendant throughout the entire trial. You are authorized also to consider all the facts and circumstances, if you find there to be any, in extenuation and mitigation of punishment presented by the Defendant and shown to you by the evidence in both phases of this trial."
In Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (9) at 334 (240 SE2d 833) (1977), we stated that the "failure to inform the jury that they were authorized to consider mitigating circumstances ... was in contravention ..." of the requirements of our death penalty law. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b)). The charge in this case was not subject to the defect discussed in Hawes, and there is no merit to appellant's contention that, under Hawes, the court should have used the word "required" instead of the word "authorized."
(b) The court charged: "Aggravating circumstances are those which increase the guilt of the Defendant or the enormity of the offense or ... its injurious consequences. Mitigating circumstances are those which do not constitute a justification or excuse for the offense in question but which in all fairness and mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame.
"... [I]f you see fit ... to recommend mercy for the Defendant then this recommendation is solely in your discretion and is not controlled by any rule of law. You may make such recommendation with or without reason. If this should be your finding, then the Court is required by law to sentence this Defendant Larry Romine to life imprisonment. In other words ... if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the State of Georgia has proved the existence of one or more of the aggravating circumstances given to you in this charge as to either or both counts, you nonetheless are not required to recommend that the Defendant Romine be put to death.
The trial court did not err, as appellant contends, in failing to *216 specifically instruct the jury that "as to mitigating circumstances [the jury] could consider anything, without limitation or definition." The court's instruction conveyed to the jury that its authority to recommend mercy was unlimited and not circumscribed by the court's definition of mitigating circumstances.
(c) Appellant contends the court's charge was deficient because it did not expressly forbid the jury from considering pre-trial gossip and rumors. We note that appellant failed to request such a charge. Moreover, the court told the jury: "You are also authorized to consider all the facts and circumstances, if you find any, regarding the gravity and the seriousness of the offense and your knowledge of the personal background of this Defendant, but only as shown to you by the evidence in both phases of this trial." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant's contention is meritless.
When the sentencing phase of the trial began Saturday morning, Ralph was absent. His absence was called to the court's attention by appellant's attorney, who asked for a continuance "for a period of time sufficient to allow us to determine the physical condition of Ralph Romine and secure his attendance at court." Asked for an offer of proof as to what Ralph would testify, appellant's attorney stated: "... Ralph Romine has come to my office on several occasions ... [H]e did not want his grandson electrocuted ... [H]e had very strong reservations about it. He tells me that the Lord has dealt with him in that matter and the taking of the life of his grandson will not bring back his son... He has expressed a tremendous desire to be able to tell the jury what his wishes are ..."
The district attorney responded to this offer of proof with the suggestion that nothing that Ralph had to say would be admissible. The court asked appellant's attorney if there were other matters to which Ralph would testify. Counsel said there were, but he could not be more specific because Ralph had planned to formulate his testimony after hearing the evidence presented at trial. The court denied the continuance.
*217 Immediately before appellant rested later that morning, after he had testified on his own behalf, appellant renewed his motion for continuance. The court asked, "[D]o you have any indication that it would be a short continuance?" Appellant's attorney answered, "I do not know, Your Honor."
The court then asked, "[D]o you have anything to add to your offer of proof, anything that would be admissible ... [Y]ou haven't told me anything yet that he would say that would be admissible. Now, that's what I'm waiting to hear. You're saying that he would express his wishes that Mr. Romine not get the death penalty. That would not be admissible." When counsel was unable to supplement his offer of proof, his renewed motion for continuance was denied.
It is clear that the largest factor in the court's denial of continuance was the court's belief that Ralph's testimony would not have been admissible in mitigation. This court, however, has consistently refused to place unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered in mitigation at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 584 (261 SE2d 379) (1979); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344 (28) (260 SE2d 60) (1979); Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 479 (246 SE2d 288) (1979); Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644 (3) (220 SE2d 922) (1975). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (98 SC 2954, 57 LE2d 973) (1978), which held that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." (Emphasis in original, footnotes omitted.) In Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98 (7) (274 SE2d 530) (1981), we held that, whether or not Lockett v. Ohio, supra, required it, in Georgia, a mother's testimony that she loved her son and did not wish to see him executed was admissible in mitigation in a death penalty case.
Ralph's testimony that he did not wish to see his grandson die would have been admissible in mitigation and the trial court's opinion to the contrary was wrong. Moreover, Ralph's testimony would have been particularly significant because he was closely *218 related not only to the appellant but also to the victims; unlike the mother in Cofield, Ralph was not viewing the case solely from appellant's perspective, and his opinion might well have been given considerable importance by the jury.
The trial court's denial of a continuance, premised as it was on *219 the court's failure to recognize that Ralph's testimony would have been admissible, coupled with the court's refusal to allow appellant an adequate opportunity to ascertain how long it would take to secure Ralph's attendance, was an abuse of discretion. His death sentences must therefore be set aside.
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Weltner and Bell, JJ., who dissent as to Division 11 and to the reversal.
[1] The court charged: "... as to Count One, the offense of murder of Avilee Romine was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of an additional capital felony, that being the armed robbery of said Avilee Romine ..." "As to Count Three, ... the offense of murder of Roy Lee Romine was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of an additional [capital] felony, that being the murder of Avilee Romine." Transcript, Vol. XIV, pp. 2231-32; Record, p. 336.