Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/519/357
Timestamp: 2013-12-07 23:05:25
Document Index: 157739712

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1980', '§40', '§296', '§1985', '§1985', '§40']

Paul SCHENCK and Dwight Saunders, Petitioners, v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK, et al. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews Paul SCHENCK and Dwight Saunders, Petitioners, v. PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK, et al.
519 U.S. 357117 S.Ct. 855137 L.Ed.2d 1 (519 U.S. 357117 S.Ct. 855137 L.Ed.2d 1, 519 U.S. 357117 S.Ct. 855137 L.Ed.2d 1)
Argued: Oct. 16, 1996.
Decided: Feb. 19, 1997.
Respondents, upstate New York abortion doctors and clinics and an organization dedicated to maintaining access to abortion services, filed a complaint in the District Court seeking to enjoin petitioners, other individuals, and three organizations from engaging in blockades and other illegal conduct at the clinics. The record shows that, before the complaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters marched, stood, knelt, sat, or lay in clinic parking lot driveways and doorways, blocking or hindering cars from entering the lots, and patients and clinic employees from entering the clinics. In addition, smaller groups of protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by, among other things, milling around clinic doorways and driveway entrances, trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and surrounding, crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing, shoving, and yelling and spitting at women entering the clinics and their escorts. On the sidewalks outside the clinics, protesters called "sidewalk counselors'' used similar methods in attempting to dissuade women headed toward the clinics from having abortions. The local police were unable to respond effectively to the protests due, in part, to the fact that the defendants harassed them verbally and by mail. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), and later, after the protests and sidewalk counseling continued, a preliminary injunction. As relevant here, injunction provisions banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet . . . of . . . doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of clinic facilities'' ("fixed buffer zones''), or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities'' ("floating buffer zones''). Another provision allowed two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones, but required them to "cease and desist'' their counseling if the counselee so requested. In its accompanying opinion, the District Court, inter alia, rejected petitioners' assertion that the injunction violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed.
On September 24, 1990, respondents filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of New York against fifty individuals and three organizations-Operation Rescue, Project Rescue Western New York, and Project Life of Rochester. The complaint alleged that defendants had consistently engaged in illegal blockades and other illegal conduct at facilities in the Western District of New York where abortions were performed. (For convenience, we refer to these facilities as "clinics'' throughout.) The complaint alleged one federal and six state causes of action: conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions or other family planning services of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of Rev.Stat. §1980, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3); discrimination against and harassment of women seeking abortions and other family planning services, in violation of N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §40-c (McKinney 1992) and N.Y. Exec. Law §296 (McKinney 1993); trespass; tortious interference with business; tortious harassment; false imprisonment; and intentional infliction of emotional harm. The complaint alleged that a large blockade was planned for September 28, and requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop it. The complaint also sought a permanent injunction and damages.
The District Court found that the local police had been "unable to respond effectively'' to the protests, for a number of reasons: the protests were constant, overwhelming police resources; when the police arrived, the protesters simply dispersed and returned later; prosecution of arrested protesters was difficult because patients were often reluctant to cooperate for fear of making their identity public; and those who were convicted were not deterred from returning to engage in unlawful conduct. In addition, the court found that defendants harassed the police officers verbally and by mail, including the deputy police chief. Also harassed were people who testified against the protesters and "those who invoked legal process against'' the protesters. This, testified the deputy police chief, "made it more difficult for him to do his job.'' Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y. v. Project Rescue Western N. Y., 799 F.Supp. 1417, 1426-1427 (W.D.N.Y.1992). See also id., at 1431 (" There has been substantial uncontradicted evidence that defendants' activities are intended, and do in fact, prevent and hinder local police from protecting the right of women to choose to have an abortion'').
On September 27, 1990, three days after respondents filed their complaint and one day before the scheduled large-scale blockade, the District Court issued a TRO. The parties stipulated that the TRO might remain in force until decision on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction. In pertinent part, the TRO enjoined defendants from physically blockading the clinics, physically abusing or tortiously harassing anyone entering or leaving the clinics, and "demonstrating within 15 feet of any person'' entering or leaving the clinics. As an exception to this 15-foot "buffer zone'' around people, the TRO allowed two sidewalk counselors to have "a conversation of a nonthreatening nature'' with individuals entering or leaving the clinic. If the individuals indicated that they did not want the counseling, however, the counselors had to "cease and desist'' from counseling.
Alleging that Project Rescue and five individual defendants (including petitioner Schenck) breached the TRO on five separate occasions from late October 1990 through December 1990, respondents sought four contempt citations. A fifth contempt citation for a 1991 incident was sought against petitioner Schenck and another individual defendant. Throughout 1991 and into 1992, the District Court held 27 days of hearings in these contempt proceedings, and issued opinions concluding that five of the six incidents justified a finding of civil contempt.
In February 1992, after hearing 12 additional days of testimony, the District Court issued the injunction, parts of which are challenged here. The relevant provisions are set forth in the margin.
Although the injunction largely tracked the TRO, there were significant changes. First, while the TRO banned "demonstrating . . . within fifteen feet of any person'' entering or leaving the clinics, the injunction more broadly banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of such facilities'' ("fixed buffer zones''), or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities'' ("floating buffer zones''). In addition, the injunction clarified the "cease and desist'' provision, specifying that once sidewalk counselors who had entered the buffer zones were required to "cease and desist'' their counseling, they had to retreat 15 feet from the people they had been counseling and had to remain outside the boundaries of the buffer zones.
In its opinion accompanying the preliminary injunction, the District Court stated the relevant inquiry as whether respondents had established (i) that they would be irreparably harmed if the injunction was not granted and (ii) that they were likely to succeed on the merits. The court held that the irreparable harm requirement was met, because "those women denied unimpeded access to the clinics cannot be compensated merely by money damages. Injunctive relief alone can assure women unimpeded access to the clinics.'' Id., at 1428. The court also held that respondents were likely to succeed on at least three of their claims. First, relying on New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (C.A.2 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990), the court held that women seeking abortions constituted a protected class under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), and that their constitutional right to travel between States and to choose to have an abortion was likely infringed by defendants, in violation of §1985(3). Second, the court held that the same conduct that infringed this class of women's constitutional rights under §1985(3) "clearly violates N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §40-c.''
799 F.Supp., at 1431. Finally, the court held that in light of the "overwhelming evidence that defendants have repeatedly trespassed upon the clinics' property in the past and may continue to trespass in the future,'' respondents had shown a likelihood of success on their trespass claim. Id., at 1432. Having already found likelihood of success on these claims, the court chose not to address respondents' other four state-law claims. Id., at 1432, n. 11.
In analyzing defendants' assertion that the injunction violated their First Amendment right to free speech, the court applied our standard "time, place, and manner analysis,'' asking whether the speech restrictions in the injunction (i) were content neutral, (ii) were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (iii) left open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id., at 1432 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500-2501, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)). The court held that the injunction was content neutral because "it merely restricts the volume, location, timing and harassing and intimidating nature of defendants' expressive speech.'' 799 F.Supp., at 1433. The court held that the injunction served three significant governmental interests-public safety, ensuring that abortions are performed safely, and ensuring that a woman's constitutional rights to travel interstate and to choose to have an abortion were not sacrificed in the interest of defendants' First Amendment rights.
As to narrow tailoring, the court explained that the 15-foot buffer zones "around entrances and . . . around people and vehicles seeking access . . . are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics will not be impeded, and will be able to determine readily where the entrances are located.'' Id., at 1434. The court added that the buffer zones would also provide the benefit of "preventing defendants from crowding patients and invading their personal space.'' Ibid. The court explained the "cease and desist'' provision-allowing two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones but requiring them to "cease and desist'' their counseling if the counselee asked to be left alone-as "an exc