Source: http://fgppr.com/news-archives/
Timestamp: 2018-02-20 09:50:46
Document Index: 500488506

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349', '§ 349']

News Archives - Foran Glennon Palandech Ponzi & Rudloff: Attorneys at Law
On January 25th and 26th, Charles Rocco and Paul Ferland conducted a workshop at the Loss Executives Association’s 87th Annual Meeting and Educational conference in St. Petersburg, Florida. Mr. Rocco and Mr. Ferland were joined in the workshops by John Kinneary, Executive General Adjuster – Property Claims at AEGIS Insurance Services, Inc.
The workshop, titled “Deposition Guidelines for Insurance Adjusters,” was held once each day, and was focused on helping insurance adjusters to understand the basics of a deposition, how to prepare for a deposition, and how to conduct themselves during a deposition. In addition, the workshop reviewed the significant differences between a percipient witness deposition and the deposition of a corporate representative under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state court rules of civil procedure.
The workshop was well-attended and received overwhelmingly positive feedback from those in attendance. Thank you to LEA for letting us be a part of this conference, as well as everybody that attended one of the workshops! We look forward to the opportunity to do it again in the future!
Charles Rocco and Rodrigo Tordecilla Obtain Summary Judgment on $2.6 Million Dollar Hurricane Sandy Claim
Charles Rocco and Rodrigo Tordecilla obtained summary judgment on behalf of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (“FFIC”) in a case filed by homeowners, Mark and Esther Stern (the “Plaintiffs”). The litigation arose out of a claim for alleged damages to a residential property in Monsey, New York (the “Property”), caused by Hurricane Sandy on October 29, 2012. The Property was covered by a homeowner insurance policy (“Policy”) issued by FFIC. FFIC issued three denials, in 2013, for portions of the claim based on certain exclusions in the Policy. The adjustment of the remaining portions of the claim continued. Plaintiffs eventually filed a lawsuit against FFIC in October of 2016. The lawsuit sought a declaration that Plaintiffs’ losses, incurred as a result of Hurricane Sandy, were covered under the Policy, and that FFIC was obligated to pay Plaintiffs for their losses.
The Policy contained a suit limitation provision, which required Plaintiffs’ to bring a lawsuit against FFIC “within two years after the occurrence.” The Policy defined “occurrence” as “accidental loss and damage to covered property which occurs during the policy period and is caused by one or more causes of loss we cover.” FFIC moved for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’ failure to commence a lawsuit within two years after the occurrence. Plaintiffs’ opposition attacked the authenticity of the copy of the Policy submitted by FFIC with its motion, and argued that the suit limitation provision was ambiguous. Further, Plaintiffs argued that FFIC did not make its final coverage decision until April 1, 2015. Thus, even if the suit limitation provision applied, it accrued from April 1, 2015. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, their lawsuit filed in October of 2016, was within the Policy’s two year suit limitation.
Judge Robert M. Berliner of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Rockland, found that FFIC’s motion “established [FFIC’s] prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” The Court noted that FFIC effectively refuted Plaintiffs’ attack on the authenticity of the Policy. The Court acknowledged FFIC’s argument that Plaintiffs’ own admissions in the complaint, including references to the terms of the Policy, proved the Policy’s authenticity. Likewise, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ claim of ambiguity, and agreed with FFIC’s argument that the action was time-barred, pursuant to the Policy. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that Plaintiffs were unable to substantiate their allegation that FFIC denied the claim on April 1, 2015. Accordingly, the Court held that the lawsuit was untimely regardless of whether the suit limitation period commenced on October 29, 2012 (the date of the loss), or in 2013 (during which FFIC issued the three denial letters). Based on the foregoing, the Court found the action time-barred, and granted FFIC’s motion for summary judgment.
Charles Rocco, Tom Orlando, and Venice Yoo Win Appeal in Dispute over Deductible Interpretation in Sandy Claim.
https://www.law360.com/insurance/articles/783825/attorney-client-privilege-derailed-by-custom-and-practice
Paul Ferland and Venice Yoo Obtain Dismissal of an $18 Million Dollar Claim for Violations of New York General Business Law § 349
Paul Ferland and Venice Yoo obtained dismissal on behalf of Bankers Standard Insurance Company (“Bankers Standard”) of an $18 million dollar claim for violations of New York General Business Law § 349 (“GBL § 349”), in a coverage litigation arising out of Superstorm Sandy (“Sandy”). Federal Judge Joanna Seybert in the Eastern District of New York agreed with Bankers Standard’s argument that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege consumer-oriented conduct, as required to maintain a claim under GBL § 349. Accordingly, the $18 million claim was dismissed.
Plaintiff, Yucel Edebali, sued Bankers Standard in connection with his insurance claim for property damage caused by Sandy and a subsequent vandalism claim. Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, violations of GBL § 349, and declaratory relief. In support of his GBL § 349 claim, Plaintiff alleged that Bankers Standard engaged in deceptive conduct in handling Plaintiff’s Sandy claim. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he did not rent an alternative premises after Sandy because he relied on Bankers Standard’s representation that it would rent a house for him. When Bankers Standard did not rent another house for him, Plaintiff alleged that Bankers Standard’s denial of his claim for alternative living expenses was improper. In an attempt to meet GBL 349’s consumer-oriented conduct requirement, Plaintiff alleged that this kind of deceptive conduct has the potential to affect the public at large as procuring alternative premises for insureds is a common practice of insurance companies.
Bankers Standard moved to dismiss the GBL § 349 on the ground that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to sufficiently allege that Bankers Standard’s conduct was directed at consumers. Bankers Standard argued that the fact that other consumers may have purchased similar policies and that some of them may have dealt with Bankers Standard’s claim department is not, standing alone, enough to meet the statute’s consumer-orientation requirement. Judge Seybert agreed with Bankers Standard, finding no factual allegations in the complaint to suggest that the parties’ dispute was anything more than a private contractual dispute. Therefore, Plaintiff’s $18 million dollar GBL § 349 claim was dismissed in its entirety.
Brian Devilling and Matt Ponzi obtained dismissal of all claims against an excess property insurer in the District Court of Jefferson County, Kentucky. The insured sought damages in excess of $1 million arising from a fire loss, and argued that it was entitled to sue its excess insurer before its primary insurer paid policy limits. The court disagreed, dismissing the case against the excess insurers and holding that primary limits must be exhausted before filing suit against an excess insurer.
Bridget Liccardi and Michael Foran recently won summary judgment on behalf of an insurer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The case involved a $5 million fire loss claim. The insured argued that it was entitled to replacement cost value coverage, since it has replaced its damaged commercial property with residential investment property. On the eve of trial, the court granted summary judgment for the insurer, holding that residential investment property is not “like kind and quality” in comparison to the damaged commercial property. Thus, the insurer was not obligated to pay replacement cost value under the policy.
Charles J. Rocco, Malcolm Reilly and Mara Hsiung of the New York office recently secured partial summary judgment on behalf of ACE American Insurance Company (“ACE”) and Torus Specialty Insurance Company (“Torus”) (collectively, the “Insurers”) in New York Supreme Court. Judge Cynthia Kern held in favor of the Insurers on the application of the Special Flood Deductible for a Named Storm. This litigation stems from an $86 million insurance claim made by The Howard Hughes Corporation (“HHC”) for damage caused by Superstorm Sandy at the South Street Seaport in New York City. In a motion for partial summary judgment, HHC argued that the Policy’s general $100,000 deductible should apply to the loss rather than the Special Flood Deductible for a Named Storm (approximately $7.7 million). Although HHC recognized that Superstorm Sandy was a Named Storm, it maintained that the Special Flood Deductible was inapplicable because the damage was caused by storm surge, not by flood. In support of its argument, HHC relied upon a definition of “flood” from an occurrence provision of the Policy that excluded storm surge caused by a Named Storm. The Insurers responded by pointing out that the definition of “flood” upon which HHC relied was limited to the occurrence provision of the Policy and was inapplicable to the Policy’s deductible provisions. Moreover, HHC’s interpretation would render the Special Flood Deductible for a Named Storm meaningless, as it could never be triggered. Judge Kern agreed with the Insurers’ interpretation, and granted partial summary judgment to the Insurers.