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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 101', '§ 4331', '§ 102', '§ 4321', '§ 102', '§ 4332', '§ 102']

Kleppe v. Sierra Club (full text) :: 427 U.S. 390 (1976) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Kleppe v. Sierra Club
Kleppe v. Sierra Club 427 U.S. 390 (1976)
U.S. Supreme CourtKleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)Kleppe v. Sierra ClubNo. 75-552Argued April 28, 1976Decided June 28, 1976*427 U.S. 390CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Respondent environmental organizations, alleging a widespread interest in the rich coal reserves of the "Northern Great Plains region" (embracing parts of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota) and a threat from coal-related operations to their members' enjoyment of the region's environment, brought suit against petitioner officials of the Department of the Interior and other federal agencies responsible for issuing coal leases, approving mining plans, and taking other actions to enable private companies and public utilities to develop coal reserves on federally owned or controlled land. Respondents claimed that petitioners could not allow further development of coal reserves in the region without preparing a comprehensive EIS under § 102(2)(C) on the entire region, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court, on the basis of extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, held that the complaint stated no claim for relief, and granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. While accepting the District Court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals held, on the basis of the soon-forthcoming interim report of the Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP) (a study of the potential environmental impact from resource development in Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska) as well as other such studies of areas either inclusive of or included within the Northern Great Plains region, that petitioners "contemplated" a regional plan or program, and reversed and remanded with instructions to petitioners to inform the Page 427 U. S. 391 District Court of their role in the further development of the region within 30 days after the NGPRP interim report issued, and that, if they decided to control that development, an EIS would be required. The Court of Appeals also enjoined the Department of the Interior's approval of mining plans in one section of the region for which an EIS already had been prepared.
4. Respondents' contention as to the relationships of all proposed coal-related projects in the Northern Great Plains region does not require that petitioners prepare one comprehensive EIS Page 427 U. S. 392 covering such projects before proceeding to approve specific pending applications. Absent a showing that petitioners acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one comprehensive EIS on the entire region, it must be assumed that the responsible federal agencies have exercised appropriately their discretion to resolve the technical issue involved in determining the region, if any, with respect to which a comprehensive EIS covering several proposals is necessary. Pp. 427 U. S. 408-414.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 415. Page 427 U. S. 394
Respondents, several organizations concerned with the environment, brought this suit in July, 1973, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. [Footnote 2] The defendants in the suit, petitioners here, were the officials Page 427 U. S. 395 of the Department and other federal agencies responsible for issuing coal leases, approving mining plans, granting rights-of-way, and taking the other actions necessary to enable private companies and public utilities to develop coal reserves on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government. Citing widespread interest in the reserves of a region identified as the "Northern Great Plains region," and an alleged threat from coal-related operations to their members' enjoyment of the region's environment, respondents claimed that the federal officials could not allow further development without preparing a "comprehensive environmental impact statement" under § 102(2)(C) on the entire region. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The District Court, on the basis of extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, held that the complaint stated no claim for relief and granted the petitioners' motions for summary judgment. [Footnote 3] Respondents appealed. Shortly after oral argument but before issuing an opinion on the merits, the Court of Appeals in January, 1975, issued an injunction -- over a dissent -- against the Department's approval of four mining plans in the Powder River Coal Basin, which is one small but coal-rich section of the region that concerns respondents. 166 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 509 F.2d 533. An impact statement had been prepared on these plans, but it had not been before the District Court and was not before the Court of Appeals. In June, 1975, the Court of Appeals ruled on the merits and, for reasons discussed below, reversed the District Court and remanded for further proceedings. Page 427 U. S. 396 169 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 514 F.2d 856. The court continued its injunction in force.
The Northern Great Plains region identified in respondents' complaint encompasses portions of four States -- northeastern Wyoming, eastern Montana, western North Dakota, and western South Dakota. There is no dispute about its richness in coal, nor about the waxing interest in developing that coal, nor about the crucial role the federal petitioners will play due to the significant percentage of the coal to which they control access. The Department has initiated, in this decade, three studies in areas either inclusive of or included within this Page 427 U. S. 397 region. The North Central Power Study was addressed to the potential for coordinated development of electric power in an area encompassing all or part of 15 States in the North Central United States. It aborted in 1972 for lack of interest on the part of electric utilities. The Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, intended to recommend the best use of water resources for coal development in southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming, was suspended in 1972 with the initiation of the third study, the Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP).
In addition, since 1973, the Department has engaged in a complete review of its coal leasing program for the entire Nation. On February 17 of that year, the Secretary announced the review and announced also that, during study, a "short-term leasing policy" would prevail Page 427 U. S. 398 under which new leasing would be restricted to narrowly defined circumstances, and even then allowed only when an environmental impact statement had been prepared if required under NEPA. [Footnote 7] The purpose of the program review was to study the environmental impact of the Department's entire range of coal-related activities and to develop a planning system to guide the national leasing program. The impact statement, known as the "Coal Programmatic EIS," went through several drafts before issuing in final form on September 19, 1975 -- shortly before the petitions for certiorari were filed in this case. The Coal Programmatic EIS proposed a new leasing program based on a complex planning system called the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System (EMARS), and assessed the prospective environmental impact of the new program as well as the alternatives to it. We have been informed by the parties to this litigation that the Secretary is in the process of implementing the new program. [Footnote 8]
The major issue remains the one with which the suit began: whether NEPA requires petitioners to prepare an environmental impact statement on the entire Northern Great Plains region. [Footnote 9] Petitioners, arguing the negative, Page 427 U. S. 399 rely squarely upon the facts of the case and the language of § 102(2)(C) of NEPA. We find their reliance well placed.
The local actions are the decisions by the various petitioners to issue a lease, approve a mining plan, issue a right-of-way permit, or take other action to allow private activity at some point within the region identified by respondents. Several Courts of Appeals have held that an impact statement must be included in the report or recommendation on a proposal for such action if the private activity to be permitted is one "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within the meaning of § 102(2)(C). See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 404 05, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088-1089 (1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (CA10 1972). Page 427 U. S. 400 The petitioners do not dispute this requirement in this case, and indeed have prepared impact statements on several proposed actions of this type in the Northern Great Plains during the course of this litigation. [Footnote 10] Similarly, the federal petitioners agreed at oral argument that § 102(2)(C) required the Coal Programmatic EIS that was prepared in tandem with the new national coal leasing program and included as part of the final report on the proposal for adoption of that program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Their admission is well made, for the new leasing program is a coherent plan of national scope, and its adoption surely has significant environmental consequences.
But there is no evidence in the record of an action or a proposal for an action of regional scope. The District Court, in fact, expressly found that there was no existing or proposed plan or program on the part of the Federal Government for the regional development of the area described in respondents' complaint. It found also that the three studies initiated by the Department in areas either included within or inclusive of respondents' region -- that is, the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, the North Central Power Study, and the Page 427 U. S. 401 NGPRP -- were not parts of any plan or program to develop or encourage development of the Northern Great Plains. That court found no evidence that the individual coal development projects undertaken or proposed by private industry and public utilities in that part of the country are integrated into a plan or otherwise interrelated. These findings were not disturbed by the Court of Appeals, and they remain fully supported by the record in this Court. [Footnote 11] Quite apart from the fact that the statutory language requires an impact statement only in the event of a proposed action, [Footnote 12] respondents' desire for a regional environmental impact statement cannot be met for practical reasons. In the absence of a proposal for a regional plan of development, there is nothing that could be the subject of the analysis envisioned by the statute for an impact statement. Section 102(2)(C) requires that an impact statement contain, in essence, a detailed statement of the expected adverse environmental consequences of an action, the resource commitments involved Page 427 U. S. 402 in it, and the alternatives to it. [Footnote 13] Absent an overall plan for regional development, it is impossible to predict the level of coal-related activity that will occur in the region identified by respondents, and thus impossible to analyze the environmental consequences and the resource commitments involved in, and the alternatives to, such activity. A regional plan would define fairly precisely the scope and limits of the proposed development of the region. Where no such plan exists, any attempt to produce an impact statement would be little more than a study along the lines of the NGPRP, containing estimates of potential development and attendant environmental consequences. There would be no factual predicate for the production of an environmental impact statement of the type envisioned by NEPA. [Footnote 14] Page 427 U. S. 403
"attempts to control development by individual companies in a manner consistent with the policies and procedures of the National Page 427 U. S. 404 Environmental Policy Act of 1969."
Even had the record justified a finding that a regional program was contemplated by the petitioners, the legal conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals cannot be squared with the Act. The court recognized that the mere "contemplation" of certain action is not sufficient to require an impact statement. But it believed the statute nevertheless empowers a court to require the preparation of an impact statement to begin at some point prior to the formal recommendation or report on a proposal. The Court of Appeals accordingly devised its own four-part "balancing" test for determining when, during the contemplation of a plan or Page 427 U. S. 405 other type of federal action, an agency must begin a statement. The factors to be considered were identified as the likelihood and imminence of the program's coming to fruition, the extent to which information is available on the effects of implementing the expected program and on alternatives thereto, the extent to which irretrievable commitments are being made and options precluded "as refinement of the proposal progresses," and the severity of the environmental effects should the action be implemented.
The Court's reasoning and action find no support in the language or legislative history of NEPA. The statute clearly states when an impact statement is required, and mentions nothing about a balancing of factors. Rather, as we noted last Term, under the first Page 427 U. S. 406 sentence of § 102(2)(C), the moment at which an agency must have a final statement ready "is the time at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action." Aberdeen Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 422 U. S. 320 (1975) (SCRAP II) (emphasis in original). The procedural duty imposed upon agencies by this section is quite precise, and the role of the courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise. A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared. Such an assertion of judicial authority would leave the agencies uncertain as to their procedural duties under NEPA, would invite judicial involvement in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the agencies, and would invite litigation. As the contemplation of a project and the accompanying study thereof do not necessarily result in a proposal for major federal action, it may be assumed that the balancing process devised by the Court of Appeals also would result in the preparation of a good many unnecessary impact statements. [Footnote 15] Page 427 U. S. 407
Assuming that the Court of Appeals' theory about "contemplation" of regional action would permit a court to require pre-proposal preparation of an impact statement, the court's injunction against the Secretary's approval of the four mining plans in the Powder River Basin nevertheless would have been error. The District Court had found that respondents would not have been entitled to an injunction against any individual projects even if their claim of the need for a regional impact statement had been valid, because they had shown no irreparable harm that would result absent such an injunction and the record disclosed that irreparable harm would result to the intervenors who sought to carry out their business ventures and to the public who depended upon their operations. The Court of Appeals made no finding as to the equities at the time it originally entered the injunction; when it continued the injunction following its decision on the merits, it stated only that the "harm" justifying an injunction "matured" whenever an impact statement is due and not filed. But, on the Court of Appeals' own terms, there was, in fact, no harm. First, the Court of Appeals itself held that no regional impact statement was due at that moment, and it was uncertain whether one ever would be due. Second, there had been filed a comprehensive impact statement on the proposed Powder River Basin mining plans themselves, and its adequacy had not been challenged either before the District Court or the Court of Appeals in this case, or anywhere else. [Footnote 16] Thus, in simple equitable terms, there were Page 427 U. S. 408 no grounds for the injunction: the District Court's finding of irreparable injury to the intervenors and to the public still stood, and there were -- on the Court of Appeals' own terms -- no countervailing equities.
There are two ways to view this contention. First, it amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of the impact statements already prepared by the petitioners on the coal-related projects that they have approved or stand ready to approve. As such, we cannot consider it in this proceeding, for the case was not brought as a challenge to a particular impact statement and there is no impact statement in the record. [Footnote 17] It also is possible to view the Page 427 U. S. 409 respondents' argument as an attack upon the decision of the petitioners not to prepare one comprehensive impact statement on all proposed projects in the region. This contention properly is before us, for the petitioners have made it clear they do not intend to prepare such a statement.
We begin by stating our general agreement with respondents' basic premise that § 102(2)(C) may require a comprehensive impact statement in certain situations where several proposed actions are pending at the same time. NEPA announced a national policy of environmental protection and placed a responsibility upon the Federal Government to further specific environmental goals by "all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy." § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Section 102(2)(C) is one of the "action-forcing" provisions intended as a directive to "all agencies to assure consideration of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking." Conference Report on NEPA, 115 Cong.Rec. 40416 (1969). [Footnote 18] By requiring an impact statement, Congress intended to assure such consideration during the development of a proposal or -- as in this case -- during the formulation of a position on a proposal submitted by private parties. [Footnote 19] A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in some cases for an agency to meet Page 427 U. S. 410 this duty. Thus, when several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together. [Footnote 20] Only through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action. [Footnote 21]
"A. As a general proposition, and as determined by the Secretary, when action is proposed involving Page 427 U. S. 411 coal development such as issuing several coal leases or approving mining plans in the same region, such actions will be covered by a single EIS, rather than by multiple statements. In such cases, the region covered will be determined by basin boundaries, drainage areas, areas of common reclamation problems, administrative boundaries, areas of economic interdependence, and other relevant factors."
Id. at 20a-21a. Thus, the Department has decided to prepare comprehensive impact statements of the type contemplated by § 102(2)(C), although it has not Page 427 U. S. 412 deemed it appropriate to prepare such a statement on all proposed actions in the region identified by respondents.
Respondents' basic argument is that one comprehensive statement on the Northern Great Plains is required because all coal-related activity in that region is "programmatically," "geographically," and "environmentally" related. Both the alleged "programmatic" relationship and the alleged "geographic" relationship resolve, ultimately, into an argument that the region is proper for a comprehensive impact statement because the petitioners themselves have approached environmental study in this area on a regional basis. [Footnote 23] Respondents point primarily to the NGPRP, which they claim -- and petitioners Page 427 U. S. 413 deny -- focused on the region described in the complaint. [Footnote 24] The precise region of the NGPRP is unimportant, for its irrelevance to the delineation of an appropriate area for analysis in a comprehensive impact statement has been well stated by the Secretary:
Affidavit of Oct. 28, 1975, App. 191. As for the alleged "environmental" relationship, respondents contend that the coal-related projects "will produce a wide variety of cumulative environmental impacts" throughout the Northern Great Plains region. They described them as follows: diminished availability of water, air and water pollution, increases in population and industrial densities, and perhaps even claimatic changes. Cumulative environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement. Page 427 U. S. 414 But determination of the extent and effect of these factors, and particularly identification of the geographic area within which they may occur, is a task assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies. Petitioners dispute respondents' contentions that the interrelationship of environmental impacts is region-wide, [Footnote 25] and, as respondents' own submissions indicate, petitioners appear to have determined that the appropriate scope of comprehensive statements should be based on basins, drainage areas, and other factors. See supra at 427 U. S. 410-411. We cannot say that petitioners' choices are arbitrary. Even if environmental interrelationships could be shown conclusively to extend across basins and drainage areas, practical considerations of feasibility might well necessitate restricting the scope of comprehensive statements.
In sum respondents' contention as to the relationships between all proposed coal-related projects in the Northern Great Plains region does not require that petitioners prepare one comprehensive impact statement covering all before proceeding to approve specific pending applications. [Footnote 26] As we already have determined that there Page 427 U. S. 415 exists no proposal for region-wide action that could require a regional impact statement, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the judgment of the District Court reinstated and affirmed. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
While I agree with much of the Court's opinion, I must dissent from 427 U. S. which holds that the federal courts may not remedy violations of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. -- no matter how blatant -- until it is too late for an adequate remedy to be formulated. As the Court today recognizes, NEPA contemplates agency consideration of environmental factors throughout the decisionmaking process. Since NEPA's enactment, however, litigation has been brought primarily at the end of that process -- challenging agency decisions to act made without adequate environmental impact statements or without any statements at all. In such situations, the courts have had to content themselves with the largely unsatisfactory remedy of enjoining the proposed federal action and ordering the preparation of an adequate impact statement. This remedy is insufficient because, except by deterrence, it does nothing to further early consideration of environmental factors. And, as Page 427 U. S. 416 with all after-the-fact remedies, a remand for preparation of an impact statement after the basic decision to act has been made invites post hoc rationalizations, cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 401 U. S. 419-420 (1971), rather than the candid and balanced environmental assessments envisioned by NEPA. Moreover, the remedy is wasteful of resources and time, causing fully developed plans for action to be laid aside while an impact statement is prepared.
The premises of the Court of Appeals' approach are not novel, and indeed are rearmed by the Court today. Page 427 U. S. 417 Under § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), "the moment at which an agency must have a final [environmental impact] statement ready is the time at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.'" Ante at 427 U. S. 406, quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 422 U. S. 320 (1975) (first emphasis added). Preparation of an impact statement, particularly on a complicated project, takes a considerable amount of time. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U. S. 776, 426 U. S. 789 n. 10 (1976); Sixth Annual Report, Council on Environmental Quality 639 (1975). Necessarily, if the statement is to be completed by the time the agency makes its formal proposal to act, preparation must begin substantially before the proposal must be ready. In this litigation, for instance, the federal petitioners assert that a statement on the region in which respondents are interested would take more than three years to complete. Brief for Federal Petitioners 28 n. 22. Accordingly, since it would violate NEPA for the Government to propose a plan for regional development of the Northern Great Plains without an accompanying environmental impact statement, if the Government contemplates making such a proposal at any time in the next three years it should already be working on its impact statement.
But an early start on the statement is more than a procedural necessity. Early consideration of environmental consequences through production of an environmental impact statement is the whole point of NEPA, as the Court recognizes. The legislative history of NEPA demonstrates that, "[b]y requiring an impact statement, Congress intended to assure [environmental] consideration during the development of a proposal. . . ." Ante at 427 U. S. 409 (emphasis added). Compliance with this duty allows the decisionmaker to take environmental Page 427 U. S. 418 factors into account when he is making decisions, at a time when he has an open mind and is more likely to be receptive to such considerations. Thus, the final impact statement itself is but "the tip of an iceberg, the visible evidence of an underlying planning and decisionmaking process that is usually unnoticed by the public." Sixth Annual Report, Council on Environmental Quality 628 (1975).
While the Court's disapproval of this four-part inquiry precludes any future demonstration of it workability, the test is designed to allow judicial intervention only in the small number of cases where the need for work to begin on an environmental impact statement is clear Page 427 U. S. 419 and the agency violation blatant. [Footnote 2/1] And, indeed, the Court of Appeals refused to find a violation here, concluding instead that, on two of the four factors, the evidence was such as to negate the need for a prompt start on an impact statement. Page 427 U. S. 420
The Court begins its rejection of the four-part test by announcing that the procedural duty imposed on the agencies by § 102(2)(C) is "quite precise," and leaves a court "no authority to depart from the statutory language. . . ." Ante at 427 U. S. 406. Given the history and wording of NEPA's impact statement requirement, this statement is baffling. A statute that imposes a complicated procedural requirement on all "proposals" for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" and then assiduously avoids giving any hint, either expressly or by way of legislative history, of what is meant by a "proposal" or by a "major Federal Page 427 U. S. 421 action" can hardly be termed precise. In fact, this vaguely worded statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a "common law" of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created such a "common law." 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 336, 514 F.2d at 870-872. Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA's success. Of course, the Court is correct that the courts may not depart from NEPA's language. They must, however, give meaning to that language if there is to be anything in NEPA to enforce at all. And that is all the Court of Appeals did in this case.
169 U.S.App.D.C. at 45 n. 33, 514 F.2d at 881 n. 33, a position which the Court adopts today. Ante at 427 U. S. 412. And, most important, a federal Page 427 U. S. 422 court would intervene at all only when the four-part test indicated an abdication of the agency's statutory duty and the necessity for judicial intervention.
Lastly, the Court complains, since some contemplated projects might never come to fruition, the Court of Appeals' test might result "in the preparation of a good many unnecessary impact statements." Ante at 427 U. S. 406 (footnote omitted). Even bypassing the instances in which a project is dropped as a result of environmental considerations discovered in the course of preparing an impact statement, the Court's concerns are exaggerated. The Court of Appeals showed great sensitivity to the need for federal officials to be able "to dream out loud without filing an impact statement," 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 43, 514 F.2d at 879, and did not seek to disturb that freedom. Indeed, a major point of the four-part test is to avoid wasted effort -- including the wasted effort of enjoining an already proposed project to allow the belated preparation of an impact statement -- and the Court suggests, and I can imagine no reason why the test is unlikely to be successful in achieving that goal. Page 427 U. S. 423