Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/581/
Timestamp: 2016-05-05 05:00:13
Document Index: 753668347

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1408', '§ 1408', '§ 1408', '§ 1408', '§ 1408', '§ 1408']

Mansell v. Mansell :: 490 U.S. 581 (1989) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Mansell v. Mansell 490 U.S. 581 (1989)
U.S. Supreme CourtMansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989)Mansell v. MansellNo. 87-201Argued January 10, 1989Decided May 30, 1989490 U.S. 581Syllabus
Held: The Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. In light of § 1408(a)(4)(B)'s limiting language as to such waived pay, the Act's plain and precise language establishes that § 1408(c)(1) grants state courts the authority to treat only disposable retired pay, not total retired pay, as community property. Appellee's argument that the Act has no preemptive Page 490 U. S. 582 effect of its own, and must be read as a garnishment statute designed solely to limit when the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse, and that, accordingly, § 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "disposable retired or retainer pay" only because payments under the statutory direct payment mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that term, is flawed for two reasons. First, the argument completely ignores the fact that § 1408(c)(1) also uses the quoted phrase to limit specifically and plainly the extent to which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, each of § 1408(c)'s other subsections imposes new substantive limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay, and it is unlikely that all of the section, except for § 1408(c)(1), was intended to preempt state law. Thus, the garnishment argument misplaces its reliance on the fact that the Act's saving clause expressly contemplates that a retiree will be liable for "other payments" in excess of those made under the direct payment mechanism, since that clause is more plausibly interpreted as serving the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the mechanism displaced state courts' authority to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism. Appellee's contention that giving effect to the plain and precise statutory language would thwart the Act's obvious purposes of rejecting McCarty and restoring to state courts their pre-McCarty authority is not supported by the legislative history, which, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create new benefits for former spouses and to place on state courts limits designed to protect military retirees. Pp. 490 U. S. 587-594.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 490 U. S. 595. Page 490 U. S. 583