Source: https://www.ali.org/publications/show/torts-intentional-torts-persons/
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 12:08:19
Document Index: 762938665

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 7', '§ 12', '§ 13', '§ 14', '§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 18', '§ 19', '§ 20', '§ 30', '§ 31', '§ 32', '§ 30', '§ 33', '§ 34', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 12', '§ 20', '§ 30', '§ 17', '§ 20', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 105', '§ 105', '§ 106', '§ 107', '§ 111', '§ 112', '§ 113', '§ 114', '§ 115', '§ 116', '§ 117', '§ 118', '§ 119', '§ 120', '§ 121', '§ 122', '§ 101', '§ 104', '§ 105', '§ 101', '§ 104', '§ 105']

This work focuses on the major avenues of recovery for physical and emotional harm to persons. It revises coverage of intentional torts in the Restatement Second, Torts.
Reporter: Kenneth W. Simons Boston University School of Law, Boston, MA
Associate Reporter: Ellen S. Pryor UNT Dallas College of Law, Dallas, TX
254 pages, 2019, #1R3ITPTD4
Reporters’ Memorandum xxiii
DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT
§ 3. Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact 1
a. The contact is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity 1
b. The actor’s primary purpose is that the contact will be highly offensive to
the other’s sense of dignity 6
c. The Restatement Second Caveat concerning liability when the actor knows
that the contact will offend the plaintiff’s “abnormally acute” sense
of dignity 8
Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons
(§§ 1, 4, 5, and 7)
§ 1. Battery: General Definition 23
f. Requirement of absence of consent 23
g. Fault as to absence of consent 25
h. No liability for minor contacts that are clearly socially justifiable 25
§ 4. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm 32
e. Requirement of absence of consent 32
§ 5. Assault 32
j. Requirement of absence of consent 32
§ 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition 34
k. Requirement of absence of consent 34
§ 12. Categories of Consent That Preclude Liability 41
a. History 42
b. Categories of consent that preclude liability 42
c. The significance of consent 42
d. Problematic “implied consent” terminology 43
e. Burden of proof 43
f. Role of judge and jury 45
g. Relationship between consent to an intentional tort and assumption
of the risk of negligence 46
§ 13. Actual Consent: Definition and Conditions 50
a. History 50
b. Actual consent requires willingness 51
c. Two forms of actual consent 52
d. What must the person be willing to permit? 53
e. Actual consent does not require communication of willingness to the actor 55
f. Sexual conduct 56
g. Actual consent includes additional requirements of scope, capacity,
absence of duress, and absence of substantial mistake 56
§ 14. Actual Consent: Scope Conditions 62
a. History 63
b. Actual consent extends to conduct that is not substantially different in
nature from the conduct that the person is willing to permit 63
c. Conditions upon actual consent 64
d. Revocation of actual consent 66
e. Actual consent ordinarily precludes recovery even if the conduct
consented to is a crime 67
f. Actual consent does not preclude liability if the actor violates a
protective statute 69
g. Actual consent does not extend to past conduct 69
h. Sexual conduct 70
§ 15. Actual Consent: Requirements of Capacity, Absence of Duress, and
Absence of Substantial Mistake 77
a. History 78
b. Incapacity to consent 78
c. Substitute consent 80
d. Duress caused by the actor 81
e. Substantial mistakes known to actor or caused by actor’s
fraud or misrepresentation 82
f. Mistakes that do not vitiate actual consent 84
g. Alternative legal remedies 85
h. Sexual conduct 85
§ 16. Apparent and Presumed Consent 93
a. History 93
b. Distinguishing apparent and presumed consent from actual consent 93
c. Apparent consent under Subsection (a) need not be based on the words or
affirmative conduct of the plaintiff 96
d. Presumed consent under Subsection (b) 97
e. Medical treatment 101
f. Participation in athletic and recreational activities 102
g. Sexual conduct 104
§ 17. Emergency Doctrine 115
a. History 115
b. Rationale 115
c. Scope 116
d. Actor has no reason to believe plaintiff would not have consented 120
e. Role of judge and jury 121
f. Relationship to gratuitous rescue and gratuitous provision of medical care 121
g. Relationship to “emergency doctrine” in judging an actor’s negligence 121
h. Relationship to necessity defense 123
i. Burden of proof 123
§ 18. Consent to Sexual Conduct 129
a. History 129
b. Relationship to other consent and battery provisions 129
c. Actual consent: willingness, revocation, capacity, fraud, and duress 130
d. Apparent and presumed consent 134
e. Express unwillingness or “No means no.” 135
f. Affirmative consent 137
§ 19. Medical Treatment Without Legally Effective Consent as Battery 151
a. History 151
b. Legally insufficient consent as a battery or as negligence? 151
c. Consequences of treating inadequate consent as battery or as negligence. 153
Scope Note 161
TOPIC 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PRIVILEGES
§ 20. General Principles for Privileges 164
a. General principles 165
b. Purpose of actor 165
c. Triggering conditions 165
d. Both necessity and proportionality are required 165
e. Reasonableness in two senses 165
f. Honest and reasonable beliefs 166
g. Reasonable beliefs under the circumstances 166
h. Reasonable vs. correct beliefs 167
i. Apportionment when conduct exceeds privilege 168
j. Effect of actor’s privilege on privilege of others 168
k. Risk to innocent third parties 168
l. Burden of proof 168
TOPIC 3. DEFENSE OF ACTOR’S INTEREST IN POSSESSION OF
Scope Note 172
§ 30. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion 173
a. History and scope 173
b. Intrusion 173
c. In order to prevent or terminate intrusion 174
d. Persons privileged to defend property 175
e. Intrusion is not privileged 175
f. Effect of intruder’s or actor’s mistake regarding the
existence of a privilege 176
g. Necessity of request by actor that other desist unless failure
to make request is justified 178
h. Reasonable belief that intrusion is occurring or imminently will
occur and can be prevented only by the means used 179
i. Reasonableness of means used 182
j. Effect of excessive force 183
k. Use of force, assault, or confinement threatening death or serious
bodily harm 184
l. Negligent exercise of privilege 185
m. Role of judge and jury 186
n. Burden of proof 186
§ 31. Privilege to Defend Land or Personal Property from Intrusion by
Use of a Mechanical Device 192
a. History and scope 192
b. Mechanical device 193
c. Most cases of harm from mechanical devices are properly brought
as negligence claims, not as intentional torts 193
d. Not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm 195
e. Harm to a third person 195
f. Reasonableness of device 195
g. Necessity of warning or customary use 197
h. Role of judge and jury 197
§ 32. Scope of Privilege to Regain Possession of Land or Personal Property 199
a. History 200
b. Actor has no privilege to regain dispossessed land 200
c. Rationale for narrow right to recapture personal property in
“fresh pursuit.” 201
d. How possession was obtained by the other 201
e. Actor’s right to possession of the personal property 203
f. Preventing intrusion versus regaining possession 204
g. Mistakes regarding the conditions justifying the privilege 204
h. The actor reasonably believes that the other is about
to remove the property from the actor’s presence 205
i. Paragraphs (4)-(7) should be applied consistent with § 30 207
j. Judge and jury role 209
§ 33. Liability to Third Person for Unintentional Harm 211
a. History and rationale 211
b. Strict liability 212
§ 34. Privilege to Defend Third Person’s Land or Personal Property 213
a. History and rationale 213
Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 4 215
Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text 223
Tentative Draft No. 4 contains § 3 (Battery: Definition of Offensive Contact) and §§ 1, 4, 5, and 7 (Consent Provisions for Specific Intentional Torts to Persons) of Chapter 1, Definitions; §§ 12-19 of Chapter 2, Consent; § 20 of Chapter 3, Topic 1, General Principles for Privileges; and §§ 30-34 of Chapter 3, Topic 3, Defense of Actor’s Interest in Possession of Land and Personal Property. Except for §§ 17-19 of Chapter 2 and §§ 20 and 30-34 of Chapter 3, the draft was approved by the membership at the 2019 Annual Meeting, subject to the discussion at the Meeting and to the usual editorial prerogative. There was insufficient time to consider the remaining material. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.
254 pages, 2019, #1R3ITPTD4E
156 pages, 2018, #1R3ITPTD3
Project Status at a Glance; Foreword; Reporters’ Memorandum; CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS OF INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS; TRANSFERRED INTENT: § 7. False Imprisonment: General Definition, § 8. False Imprisonment: What Constitutes a Confinement, § 9. False Imprisonment: Confinement by Assertion of Legal Authority, § 10. Participation in an Intentional Tort; Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 3; Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text
Tentative Draft No. 3 contains §§ 7 – 10 of Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent. The draft was approved by the membership at the 2018 Annual Meeting (except for § 7(d) and Comment k, for which approval was not yet sought), subject to the discussion at the Meeting and the usual editorial prerogative. The approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text of the entire project is published.
156 pages, 2018, #1R3ITPTD3E
154 pages, 2017, #1R3ITPTD2E
a. The contact offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity 1
b. The actor knows that the contact is highly offensive to the plaintiff 4
c. “Purpose to offend” as an alternative to § 3(b) 8
§ 7. False Imprisonment 27
a. History and nomenclature 27
b. Rationales for liability for false imprisonment 27
c. Intent to confine 28
d. Transferred intent 29
e. Comparison to negligence liability 30
f. Liability for omission to release from confinement 30
g. Awareness of confinement is ordinarily required 33
h. Awareness of confinement not required if confinement causes bodily harm 33
i. Factual cause and scope of liability 36
j. Privileges to confine without the other’s consent 36
k. Requirement of absence of consent 37
l. Criminal false imprisonment and kidnapping compared 38
m. Relationship to constitutional torts 38
§ 8. What Constitutes a Confinement 68
a. History 68
b. Confinement: general considerations 68
c. Physical and temporal scope of confinement 69
d. Alternative methods of confinement 70
e. Confinement by actual or apparent physical barriers 71
f. Confinement by physical force or physical restraint 72
g. Confinement by threat of immediate physical force or of
immediate physical restraint 73
h. Confinement by causing duress 76
i. Threats and forms of pressure that are not sufficient for confinement 77
§ 9. Confinement by Assertion of Legal Authority 101
b. Assertion of legal authority as a mode of confinement 101
c. Relationship to “wrongful arrest” or “false arrest.” 102
d. Rationales 103
e. What constitutes an assertion of legal authority 103
f. Submission to assertion of legal authority 105
g. Plaintiff believes that he or she might have a duty to comply or
fears adverse legal consequences 107
h. Plaintiff need not believe that the actor has the legal authority
that he or she asserts 108
i. Overlap between § 8(b) and (c) and § 9 110
j. Wrongful prosecution of criminal proceedings, wrongful use of civil
proceedings, and abuse of process distinguished 111
Appendix A: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 2 123
Appendix B: Other Relevant Black-Letter Text 125
Appendix C: Black-Letter Consent Sections from Preliminary Draft No. 4 129
Tentative Draft No. 2 contains Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent. At the 2017 Annual Meeting, a motion to strike the knowledge provision in § 3(b)(i) passed, and the Reporters accepted a motion to add the words “sole or principal” before “purpose” in § 3(b)(ii) as a friendly amendment. The material in this draft will be submitted for approval at a future Annual Meeting.
200 pages, 2015, #1R3ITPTD1
Chapter 1 - Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons; Transferred Intent
§ 101. Battery: General Definition [§ 101(d) of the black letter is for discussion only]
§ 102. Battery: Required Intent
§ 104. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm [§ 104(b) of the black letter is for discussion only]
§ 105. Assault [§ 105(c) of the black letter is for discussion only]
§ 106. Intentional (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Harm
§ 107. False Imprisonment
§ 111. Categories of Legally Effective Consent
§ 112. Actual Consent
§ 113. Conditions that Render Actual Consent Ineffective
§ 114. Conditions that Limit the Scope of Actual Consent
§ 115. Apparent Consent
§ 116. Substitute Consent
§ 117. Implied-in-Law Consent [or “Constructive” Consent]
§ 118. Emergency Doctrine
§ 119. Consent to Medical Treatment
Chapter 3 - Privileges
§ 120. Self-Defense and Defense of Others
§ 121. Privilege to Arrest or Detain
§ 122. Other Privileges
Appendix: Black Letter of Tentative Draft No. 1
This draft includes Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent, of which Sections 101-105;110 were submitted for approval. These sections, with the exceptions noted below, were approved by the membership at the 2015 Annual Meeting, subject to discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative. This approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text is published. The following was subject to discussion only and is not considered approved material: Chapter 1 § 101(d), and Comments f, g; § 104(b), and Comment d; and § 105(c), and Comment j.
200 pages, 2015, #1R3ITPTD1E
This draft includes Chapter 1, Definitions of Intentional Torts to Persons: Transferred Intent, of which Sections 101-105 were submitted for approval. These sections, with the exceptions noted below, were approved by the membership at the 2015 Annual Meeting, subject to discussion at the meeting and to editorial prerogative. This approved material may be cited as representing the Institute’s position until the official text is published. The following was subject discussion only and is not considered approved material: Chapter 1 § 101(d), and Comments f, g; § 104(b), and Comment d; and § 105(c), and Comment j.