Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98341/aeronautical-ind-dist-lodge-727-vs-campbell
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 19:01:46
Document Index: 672418693

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 308', '§ 8', '§ 308', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Aeronautical Ind Dist Lodge 727 Vs Campbell - Citation 98341 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Aeronautical Ind. Dist. Lodge 727 Vs. Campbell - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/98341CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-20-1949Case Number337 U.S. 521AppellantAeronautical Ind. Dist. Lodge 727RespondentCampbellExcerpt:.....collective bargaining agreement between his union and the employer had been modified so as to give union chairmen top seniority in the event of layoffs. within one year after his reemployment, the veteran was laid off temporarily, although union chairmen who had less time with the company were retained. the employer refused to compensate the veteran for the period of the layoff.
the veteran's rights under § 8 of the act were not infringed. pp.
337 u. s. 522
three veterans sued for compensation for the period of a layoff, alleged to have been in violation of their rights under the selective training and service act of 1940. the district court gave judgment for the veterans. a labor union, which had been allowed to intervene to..... Judgment:
Three veterans sued for compensation for the period of a layoff, alleged to have been in violation of their rights under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The District Court gave judgment for the veterans. A labor union, which had been allowed to intervene to protect its labor contract, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment. 169 F.2d 252. This Court granted certiorari. 335 U.S. 869.
337 U. S. 529
We brought this case here, 335 U.S. 869, to resolve a conflict of views between two Courts of Appeals in their interpretation of the rights given to veterans of World War II by § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, 54 Stat. 885, 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. App. § 308. Three veterans brought this suit for compensation for the period of a layoff while employed at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, a respondent here. The facts controlling the legal claims of all three may be represented by the circumstances attending Kirk's employment and layoff. [
The petitioner, Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge No. 727, was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the employees at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. In September, 1941, the union had negotiated an agreement with Lockheed covering the range of subjects touching conditions of employment typical of such agreements in the aircraft industry. This agreement was in effect when Kirk was employed in August, 1942, by Vega Aircraft Corporation, which afterwards was merged with Lockheed. He joined the union, and has remained a member throughout this controversy. He left Lockheed two years later to enter the Army, from which he was honorably discharged in January, 1946, and was restored to his job at Lockheed in accordance with § 8(a) of the Selective Service Act. 54 Stat. 885, 890, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 308(a). While Kirk was in military service, his union made a new agreement with Lockheed modifying
the terms of the 1941 agreement in various particulars. Crucial to the issue here was a change in the seniority provisions of the former agreement. The change provided that "Union Chairmen who have acquired seniority shall be deemed to have top seniority as long as they remain Chairmen." [
] In plain English, this means that, thereafter, employees who served as
In the latter part of June, 1946, and within a year after Kirk's reemployment, it was necessary to lay off employees in Kirk's industrial unit. These layoffs followed the conventional sequence of seniority, time for military service being duly credited, with the exception that union chairmen were retained in accordance with the 1945 agreement even though they had less time with the company than those who were laid off, veterans or not. Kirk was among those laid off, and the retention as union chairmen of men who were junior to him is the basis of his claim that § 8 of the Act had been infringed. [
] Kirk
was brought back to work within a month, but Lockheed refused to pay him for the time he was laid off. For this sum, he brought this suit. Petitioner Union was allowed to intervene in order to protect its labor contract. Judgment went for Kirk, and the Union alone took the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court affirmed the judgment, [
] 169 F.2d 252, holding that § 8 of the Act forbade disregard of length of employment, so far as veterans are affected, in enforcing provisions in a collective agreement for the retention of union chairmen in the event of layoffs regardless of their length of service. In so holding it ran counter to a series of decisions in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp.,
162 F.2d 448;
Koury v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp.,
162 F.2d 544;
DiMaggio v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp.,
162 F.2d 546, and
Payne v. Wright Aeronautical Corp.,
162 F.2d 549.
It is of the essence of collective bargaining that it is a continuous process. Neither the conditions to which it addresses itself nor the benefits to be secured by it remain static. They are not frozen, even by war. Thus, under the Act, the veteran accumulates time toward his seniority while in the service; he also becomes the beneficiary of
those gains the achievement of which is the constant thrust of collective bargaining. In other words, the Act gives him the status of one who has been "on furlough or leave of absence," but uninterruptedly a member of the working force on whose behalf successive collective agreements are made. In this way, the Act protects the furloughed employee from being prejudiced by any change in the terms of a collective agreement because he is "on furlough," but he is not to be favored as a furloughed employee as against his fellows. This is the essence of our decision in
Barring legislation not here involved, seniority rights derive their scope and significance from union contracts, confined as they almost exclusively are to unionized industry.
See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls,
331 U. S. 53
, note 21. There are great variations in the use of the seniority principle through collective bargaining bearing on the time when seniority begins, determination of the units subject to the same seniority, and the consequences which flow from seniority. All these variations disclose limitations upon the dogmatic use of the principle of seniority in the interest of the ultimate aims of collective bargaining. Thus, probationary conditions must often be met before seniority begins to operate; sometimes it becomes retroactive to the date of employment; in other
instances, it is effective only as from the qualifying date; in some industries, it is determined on a company basis; in others, the occupation or the plant is taken as the unit for seniority determination; sometimes special provisions are made for workers in key positions, and then again these factors are found in varying combinations.
Williamson & Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining, 100-102 (1945); Harbison, Seniority Policies and Procedures as Developed through Collective Bargaining 1-10 (1941).
These considerations are decisive of the case. The agreements made by the Union with Lockheed represent familiar developments in the process of collective bargaining which the Selective Service Act presupposes, and in the context of which it must be placed. Kirk's rights, including seniority, before he entered the service were derived from the agreement of 1941. So, likewise, were his rights, including seniority, as an employee on furlough
In the ordinary and orderly course of formulating the terms of employment, the 1945 agreement between the union and Lockheed in some directions modified the provisions of the 1941 agreement. A labor agreement is a code for the government of an industrial enterprise and, like all government, ultimately depends for its effectiveness on the quality of enforcement of its code. Because a labor agreement assumes the proper adjustment of grievances at their source, the union chairmen play a very important role in the whole process of collective bargaining. Therefore it is deemed highly desirable that union chairmen have the authority and skill which are derived from continuity in office. A provision for the retention of union chairmen beyond the routine requirements of seniority is not at all uncommon, and surely ought not to be deemed arbitrary or discriminatory. [
] The fact that it may involve, as in Kirk's case, the temporary layoff of a
Lockheed, the respondent in the District Court, did not appeal. But, since the judgment was not merely for money damages, but also involved the construction of the collective agreement, the union had the right to appeal.
328 U. S. 281
Greenman, Getting Along With Unions 26 (1948); Union Agreements in the Cotton-Textile Industry, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bull. No. 885 28 (1946); Thomas, Automobile Unionism 56 (1941); Collective Bargaining Provisions, Seniority Provisions, U.S. Dept. of Labor 28-29 (1948); Collective Bargaining in the Office, American Management Assn., Research Rep. No. 12 72. The advantage of this modification in seniority according to length of service in the plant is "the mutual interest of union and management in preserving the continuity of the bargaining and grievance adjustment personnel." Seniority Provisions in Union Agreements, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Serial No. R. 1308 7 (1941). While there is not complete agreement on the advantage of seniority for union chairmen, it is certainly within the area of collective bargaining.
Williamson and Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining 101-103 (1945);
Greenman, Getting Along With Unions 85-86 (1948). The National War Labor Board recognized