Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/1998/980050.html
Timestamp: 2019-05-22 19:09:58
Document Index: 273020702

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 50', '§ 50', 'art:1', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396', '§ 1396']

Estate of Victoria Jane Thompson, Deceased :: 1998 :: North Dakota Supreme Court Decisions :: North Dakota Case Law :: North Dakota Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › North Dakota Case Law › North Dakota Supreme Court Decisions › 1998 › Estate of Victoria Jane Thompson, Deceased
Estate of Victoria Jane Thompson, Deceased
Filed Dec. 22, 1998
1998 ND 226In the Matter of the Estate of Victoria Jane Thompson, Deceased
[¶8] When Nathaniel Thompson began receiving medical assistance benefits, N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 provided, in part:On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was sixty-five years of age or older when he received such assistance, the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent following his sixty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against the decedent's estate . . . . No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent's surviving spouse . . . .
Effective August 1, 1995, N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 was amended to provide in part:1. On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or older when the recipient received the assistance, and on the death of the spouse of such a deceased recipient, the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient following the recipient's fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against the decedent's estate . . . .2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent's surviving spouse, if any . . . .
[¶9] When Nathaniel Thompson died on November 20, 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1988) provided in part:(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except--. . . .(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such assistance, from his estate.(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any . . . .
[¶10] Effective October 1, 1993, after Nathaniel Thompson's death, but before Victoria Thompson died on September 14, 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1994) was amended to provide in part:(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals:. . . .(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate . . . .. . . .(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any . . . .. . . .(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual--(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and(B) may include, at the option of the State . . . any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
[¶11] The personal representative contends the plain meaning rule of statutory construction requires reversal because 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) does not allow recovery of medical assistance benefits from the estate of a recipient's spouse. He argues:It contains a general blanket prohibition on the recovery and recoupment of correctly paid medical assistance benefits ("no . . . recovery . . . may be made"). Id. It then goes on to provide several exceptions to this general prohibition ("except that the State shall seek . . . recovery . . . in the case of the following individuals"). Id. The statute does not then allow recovery from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but only from the estate of the recipient. Id.
However, the "plain meaning" of the very broad definition of the recipient's estate in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) must also be considered. That definition gives the State the option to include in the recipient's "estate" from which it may recover medical assistance benefits after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse anyreal and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
[¶12] The court in In re Estate of Craig, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 911 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993), has also construed the 1993 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b):The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub.L. 103-66), signed into law on August 10, 1993, amended the estate recovery provisions of the Federal Medicaid law. This Act gives the States, at their option, the power to recover against a spouse's estate, but only against the recipient's assets that were conveyed through joint tenancy and other specified forms of survivorship.
[¶14] Furthermore, consideration of the purpose of the estate recovery provisions also warrants rejection of the personal representative's construction. "Allowing states to recover from the estates of persons who previously received assistance furthers the broad purpose of providing for the medical care of the needy; the greater amount recovered by the state allows the state to have more funds to provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). That broad purpose is furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a recipient's assets and recover them from the estate of a recipient's surviving spouse. Also, Senate and conference committee reports reflect an intent to require states to attempt estate recoveries of medical benefits and to allow states a wide latitude in seeking estate recoveries:Present LawStates have the option to recover the costs of all Medicaid expenditures from the estates of deceased Medicaid claimants who were at least 65 years old when they were eligible for Medicaid. . . . Current law does not specify a definition of estate.Committee ProposalExtends current law as a mandate on all states. Provides a minimum definition of estate as including all real and personal property and other assets included within estate as defined by state laws governing treatment of inheritance. Allows states to expand the definition of estate to include other real or personal property or other assets in which the individual had any legally cognizable title or interest at the time of death, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assignee of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement.
Senate Report No. 103-36, 103rd Cong., 1st Session (1993). Medicaid Estate Recoveries (Section 13612). -- Requires States to recover the costs of nursing facility and other long-term care services furnished to Medicaid beneficiaries from the estate of such beneficiaries. . . . At the option of the State, the estate against such recovery is sought may include any real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including the home.
[¶16] The personal representative contends, even if the 1993 version of the federal statute is construed to allow recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse, the department's claim in this case is not legally supportable. He argues:In 1992 even the state statute did not purport to allow recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient of such benefits. Therefore, the Department is seeking to apply the post-1995 version of Section 50-24.1-07 to a claim which arose in 1992 (upon the payment of all benefits to Nathaniel Thompson). This is a classic example of an attempted, inappropriate retroactive application of a statute.
However, this Court has said "[a] statute is not retroactive because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation or because part of the requisites of its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing." Public Sch. Dist. No. 35 v. Cass County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 123 N.W.2d 37, 40 (N.D. 1963). The obligation to repay the medical assistance benefits Nathaniel Thompson received arose when he received them:[T]he obligation to repay, if any, arises upon receipt of the benefits, i.e., prior to the decedent's death. Although the Department's ability to enforce the claim was tolled until Hooey's death, the obligation was incurred by Hooey during her lifetime.
[¶18]Dale V. Sandstrom
[¶20] The Honorable Carol Ronning Kapsner was not a member of the Court when this case was heard and did not participate in this decision.Footnotes: