Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/899/1465/272209/
Timestamp: 2020-08-06 13:54:37
Document Index: 106339819

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7201', '§ 7206', '§ 7201', '§ 7206', '§ 7201', '§ 7201']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lawrence G. Declue, Defendant-appellant, 899 F.2d 1465 (6th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lawrence G. Declue, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Lawrence G. Declue, Defendant-appellant, 899 F.2d 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 899 F.2d 1465 (6th Cir. 1990) Argued Jan. 30, 1990. Decided Feb. 5, 1990
Defendant-appellant Lawrence DeClue appeals his conviction on three counts of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 with respect to his individual income tax returns for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977, and on two counts of willfully and knowingly making false statements on his corporate tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) with respect to corporate tax returns filed by him for fiscal years ending in 1976 and 1977.
On March 8, 1982, a federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Lawrence DeClue with three counts of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, with respect to his individual income tax returns for the years 1975, 1976, and 1977, and with two counts of subscribing to false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), with regard to corporate tax returns filed by him for fiscal years ending in 1976 and 1977. A warrant was issued for his arrest for income tax evasion.
The Supreme Court has held that a preindictment delay does not give rise to speedy trial concerns under the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2047-48, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). This court has held that a due process claim of excessive preindictment delay will fail unless the petitioner can show that the government had no valid reason for the delay or that some tactical advantage was sought to be obtained by the delay. Payne v. Rees, 738 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572, 574 (6th Cir. 1984).
In regard to postindictment delay, the United States Supreme Court has set out four factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), the Court stated that these factors are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant has asserted his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay. The Court noted that prejudice to the defendant must be considered in light of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect:
Id. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193.
In Barker, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction in which petitioner had not been brought to trial for murder until more than five years after he had been arrested. The Court found that the reason for and the length of delay between indictment and trial is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. The Court stated: "A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily...." 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. We find that in the circumstances of this case, any negligence on the part of the government in causing the length of the delay is outweighed by defendant's elusiveness, which initially precipitated the delay.
456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982).
In regard to impairment to his defense, appellant asserts prejudice in only the broadest terms. "Defendant was so hampered by events subsequent to the indictment, and by the loss of memory and records due to the passage of time, that he was unable to mount a defense." This court has held that loss of memory is an insufficient reason to establish prejudice to the accused. Payne, 738 F.2d at 121. Moreover, "substantial prejudice" must be shown by the accused. Id.; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 465, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). We find that appellant has made only general assertions and has failed to specify what records are unavailable that would aid his defense. The records provided to his accountants to prepare the tax returns were available at trial. The records allegedly kept by his friend Gran did not concern the tax years in question but covered the period from 1979 through 1981. For these reasons, we find that the effect of the passage of time on defendant's ability to present a defense does not amount to substantial prejudice.
The standard of appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is well settled. "It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942).
Appellant alleges that there is insufficient evidence to show that he willfully violated 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7206(1). Appellant argues that although the government was able to show a gross discrepancy in figures, it failed to show intentional criminal acts on his part.
Willfulness in a criminal tax case means "an intentional violation of a known legal duty." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12, 97 S. Ct. 22, 23, 50 L. Ed. 2d 12 (1976). We find that the record contains ample evidence of willfulness. DeClue filed a form 1040 for 1977 which contained no financial information and on which he had typed "object: self-incrimination." DeClue testified that he didn't owe any taxes for 1977, yet by the time he sent the protest return to the IRS, he had received 1099 forms from insurance companies showing receipt of over $35,000 in income for 1977. This income was not reported on the protest return nor was it reported on the amended return filed in August 1979. No tax return was filed for Mortgage Consultants for the year ending June 30, 1978. Thus, this income in 1977 was not reported on DeClue's corporate return either.
Agent Bridges analyzed all of the bank records for all of the deposits into the corporate bank account. She found that not all of the corporate gross receipts, calculated from the earned commission statements contained in the life insurance companies' 1099 forms, had been deposited in the corporate bank account or had been declared as personal income. Substantial understatements of taxes due and owing in comparison with the amount of gross receipts over the three-year period is evidence of DeClue's willful violation of the tax laws. This court stated in United States v. Garavaglia, 566 F.2d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 1977):
A taxpayer who relies on others to keep his records and prepare his tax returns may not withhold information from those persons relative to taxable events and then escape responsibility for the false tax returns which result. Willfulness may not be inferred from the understatement of income alone. However, when there is evidence of a consistent pattern of underreporting substantial amounts of income together with a failure to record all of the income, an inference of willfulness may be drawn. Holland v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. at 139, 75 S. Ct. 127 [at 137, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954) ].
We find that the testimony regarding the failure to file a corporate tax return in 1978 was properly admitted to impeach DeClue under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) and was not inadmissible evidence of the propensity to commit "other crimes" of tax evasion under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The government was entitled to prove that the $35,000 was unreported income for 1977, that DeClue had not reported it on a corporate return in 1978 as he claimed, and that he therefore was guilty of tax evasion for 1977. Evidence which is probative of the crime charged and does not solely concern uncharged crimes is not "other crimes" evidence. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 913 (8th Cir. 1985). For this reason, the decision of the district court to admit this evidence is affirmed.V.
The decision to allow an expert witness to testify is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Hanson v. Parkside Surgery Center, 872 F.2d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 1989).
We find that Bridges meets the criteria established by this court for the admission of expert testimony. United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977). Her degree and experience qualify her as an expert and she testified on a proper subject, conforming to a generally accepted explanatory theory. Tax due and owing is an essential element of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 and 7206(1) and must be proven by the government.