Source: http://openjurist.org/360/us/672
Timestamp: 2013-12-13 20:14:15
Document Index: 361565905

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4411', '§ 7203', '§ 4412', '§ 7272', '§ 4401', '§ 4412']

360 US 672 Ingram v. United States | OpenJurist
360 U.S. 672 - Ingram v. United States	Home360 us 672 ingram v. united states
360 US 672 Ingram v. United States 360 U.S. 672
79 S.Ct. 1314
3 L.Ed.2d 1503
Horace INGRAM, L. E. Smith, Mary Law et al., Petitioners,v.UNITED STATES of America.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 959 .
See 80 S.Ct. 42.
Mr. Wesley R. Asinof, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioners.
Mr. J. Dwight Evans, Jr., Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The petitioners and twenty-two others were indicted and tried for conspiracy to evade and defeat the payment of the federal taxes imposed on lottery operations. The petitioners and six others were convicted.1 Their convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 259 F.2d 886. Certiorari was granted to examine the scope of the conspiracy statute in the context of these provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 358 U.S. 905, 79 S.Ct. 234, 3 L.Ed.2d 227.
At the trial it was established by overwhelming evidence that the petitioners had engaged with numerous others in a closely organized and large-scale operation of the numbers game in Atlanta, Georgia, during the years 1954 to 1957, the period covered by the indictment.2 That activity is a criminal offense under Georgia law.3 The evidence also established in intricate detail that the participants in this large-scale enterprise had, through a variety of carefully planned stratagems, made every effort to conceal its operation.4 Finally, the evidence showed that none of the petitioners had paid any of the federal taxes in question. There was no direct evidence to show that any of the petitioners knew of these taxes.
In addition to the conspiracy count, the indictment under which the petitioners were tried also contained two additional counts charging them with the substantive offenses of willful failure to pay the special tax imposed by § 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code,5 in violation of § 7203 of the Code,6 and of failure to register as required by § 4412 of the Code,7 in violation of § 7272 of the Code.8 The trial took place subsequent to the announcement of this Court's decision in United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 77 S.Ct. 1138, 1 L.Ed.2d 1394, and the district judge correctly instructed the jury that conviction of the substantive offenses would be justified only as to any defendants found to be 'writers,' 'bankers,' or to have 'a proprietary interest in such lottery operation.' Two of the petitioners, Ingram an d Jenkins, were found guilty on both substantive counts and do not question these convictions, conceding the sufficiency of the evidence to show that Ingram was the banker and that Jenkins had a proprietary interest in the enterprise. The evidence showed that the other two petitioners, Smith and Law, were relatively minor clerical functionaries at the headquarters of the operation, and they were acquitted on the substantive counts.
In sum, what this record presents then is a picture of a large-scale and profitable gambling business conducted in Atlanta over a period of several years by petitioners Ingram and Jenkins. He business involved many participants, including the petitioners Smith and Law. It was a business made criminal by the laws of Georgia, and everyone in the organization participated in trying to keep its operation secret. Ingram and Jenkins were liable for the federal taxes imposed by §§ 4401 and 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code and willfully failed to pay them. They were required by § 4412 of the Code to register with the official in charge of the Internal Revenue District, and they failed to do so. Smith and Law were not themselves subject to any of the taxes here involved. The question presented is whether this factual foundation is sufficient to support a conviction of the petitioners, or any of them, for conspiracy to attempt to evade or defeat federal taxes, 'the gravest of offenses against the revenues.' Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499, 63 S.Ct. 364, 368, 87 L.Ed. 418. We hold that it was sufficient as to Ingram and Jenkins, and insufficient as to Smith and Law.
As to Ingram and Jenkins, the record is clear. They were entrepreneurs in a vast and profitable gambling business. They were clearly liable for the special taxes and registration requirements that the Federal Government has imposed upon the operators of that kind of business. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754. Not only did they willfully fail and neglect to pay these taxes, but they conspired to conceal the operation of the business and the source of the income upon which the tax is imposed.
In Spies v. United States this Court had occasion to consider the quantum and type of evidence required to support a conviction for the substantive offense of attempting to defeat or evade federal taxes as contrasted with the lesser proof required to convict of the isd emeanor of willfully failing to file a return or to pay a tax. It was there said:
'Willful but passive neglect of the statutory duty may constitute the lesser offense, but to combine with it a willful and positive attempt to evade tax in any manner or to defeat it by any means lifts the offense to the degree of felony.
'Congress did not define or limit the methods by which a willful attemp