Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/348/528/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-06-16 01:20:05
Document Index: 647281936

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 347', '§ 405', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 347', '§ 405', '§405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 405', '§ 316', '§ 405', '§405']

CT:UNITED STATES V. MENASCHE, 348 U. S. 528 - Volume 348 - 1955 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 348 > CT:UNITED STATES V. MENASCHE, 348 U. S. 528 (1955) > Full Text
subjects preserved by the 1907 and 1917 immigration laws. [Footnote 2] Subsection (b), on the other hand, introduced an entirely new wrinkle by providing that, pending naturalization, petitions
The 1952 Act made the enumeration of matters preserved by subsection (a) more complete and all-inclusive by adding: "status," "condition," "right in process of acquisition," "liability," and "obligation." The change was undoubtedly prompted by several sets of inconsistent decisions dealing with the vague terminology in § 347(a) of the 1940 Act preserving "any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal." The first of these concerned the question whether the withdrawal of a declaration of intention to avoid service in the armed forces constituted an "act" existing under the prior law which continued to debar the alien from citizenship. Compare
Petition of Otness, 49 F.Supp. 220, with In re Urmeneta, 42 F.Supp. 138, and In re Samowich, 70 F.Supp. 273. A second and more significant conflict concerned inchoate rights to derivative citizenship, which, when proper conditions were met, required only the passage of time to ripen into full citizenship. When the 1940 Act changed certain of the conditions in this process, the question arose whether those whose time had begun to run before the 1940 Act took effect were to be governed by the old law or the new. The Second Circuit held that the new law applied, because § 347(a) of the 1940 Act did not extend to "a mere condition, unattended by any affirmative action." United States ex rel. Aberasturi v. Cain, 147 F.2d 449, 452. The Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia disagreed, construing the broad language of § 347(a) as covering "rights partly accrued" and "rights in process of acquisition." Bertoldi v. McGrath, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 2, 3, 178 F.2d 977, 978, 979. This latter conflict must have been paramount in the minds of Congress when the first subsection of the savings clause was broadened. See Analysis of S. 3455, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 361-1 and 361-2 (prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the committees of Congress considering this legislation). We conclude that Congress intended to adopt the principle of the Bertoldi case that "the new act should take effect prospectively." 86 U.S.App.D.C. 2, 178 F.2d at 978. This is, after all, no more than a reaffirmation of the principle underlying the less sweeping 1940 provision. In a report to the congressional committees considering this earlier section, it was said that the provision
they confer no special advantage on the alien declarant. [Footnote 4] But all this is immaterial. First, the congressional resolution of the Bertoldi-Aberasturi conflict indicates a willingness, at least in some situations, to preserve rights in process of acquisition without requiring affirmative action on the part of the alien. It could be argued in the present case that it was Menasche's residence, rather than his filing of the declaration, which gave rise to his rights under § 405(a). And this approach would have the virtue of eliminating the inequitable treatment envisaged by the Government as regards those special groups of aliens who did not have to file declarations as a prerequisite to citizenship. But, while our decision could be rested on this ground, it is sufficient here merely to refer to the provision in § 405(a), derived verbatim from § 347(a) of the 1940 Act, preserving the "validity" of declarations of intention "valid at the time the Act shall take effect."
those filed after the effective date of the new Act, is overcome by the broad sweep of § 405(a) and its direction that prior law applies unless the Act "otherwise specifically provide(s)." [Footnote 5] (Emphasis supplied.)
The approach of the courts in dealing with pending naturalization petitions alleged to be governed by the 1940 savings clause was generally to see whether petitioner's rights were saved by § 347(a), and then, if applicable, apply the two-year limitation of § 347(b). See In re Shaver, 140 F.2d 180; Petition of La Bella, 52 F.Supp. 980; Petition of Hirsch, 50 F.Supp. 638; In re McInnis, 50 F.Supp. 303. But cf. Petition of Ferrara, 43 N.Y.S.2d 244. Thus, § 347(a) was considered the source
of rights under the savings clause, and § 347(b) merely a special limitation on these rights. Indeed, there were two cases in which petitions for naturalization filed after the effective date of the 1940 Act were considered solely in relation to § 347(a). In re Samowich, 70 F.Supp. 273; Petition of Rothschild, 57 F.Supp. 814. These decisions ignored the supposedly obvious negative implications of § 347(b), and cast considerable doubt on the Government's present view that § 347(b) automatically removed from the coverage of prior law petitions filed after the effective date of the 1940 Act. Thus, the construction advanced by the Government concerning the relation between § 405(a) and §405(b) would not continue the relation between the predecessor provisions, but would actually be a marked departure. The only significant change made in subsection (b) by the 1952 Act was the deletion of the two-year time limit, and there is nothing to indicate that Congress, in making this change, intended to alter the entire structure of the savings clause by making § 405(b) the exclusive provision for naturalization petitions. See Analysis of S. 3455, supra. The few decisions considering this problem under the 1952 Act accord with the decisions of the District Court and Court of Appeals in the instant case, holding that § 405(a) preserves rights accruing in the pre-petition stages of the naturalization process. United States v. Pringle, 212 F.2d 878, aff'g Petition of Pringle, 122 F.Supp. 90; In re Jocson, 117 F.Supp. 528. We believe that Congress so intended.
The Government's contention that § 405(a) does not apply to any phase in the processing of naturalization petitions would defeat and destroy the plain meaning of that section. "The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save, and not to destroy." Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 301 U. S. 30. It is our duty "to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute," Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 107 U. S. 152, rather than to emasculate an entire section, as the Government's interpretation requires. Accordingly, we hold that respondent's inchoate right to citizenship is protected by § 405(a), and is not defeated by any implication stemming from § 405(b). All that remains, therefore, is to look to § 316(a), which imposes the new requirement of physical presence, to determine whether it "otherwise specifically provide[s]" that the new Act is to apply to respondent's situation. It is clear that it does not. Section 316(a) merely says that, "except as otherwise provided," the stated degree of physical presence shall be required, and this may be viewed as a reference, inter alia, to § 405(a), strengthening our conclusion that prior law applies. The District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in concluding that §405(a) preserved respondent's inchoate rights under the prior law, and their decisions are accordingly