Source: http://court.com/tag/watch/
Timestamp: 2019-09-19 20:52:12
Document Index: 691597706

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1606', '§ 1605', '§ 1132', '§ 1132', '§ 2000', '§ 1117', '§ 1125', '§ 893', '§ 924', '§ 893', '§ 924', '§893', '§924', '§ 924', '§924', '§ 314', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 314', '§ 315', '§ 315', '§ 2255', '§ 9613', '§ 9622', '§ 1981']

Greetings and welcome to the last Relist Watch of the year. It’s been a time of great excitement for the Supreme Court bar. If it were not enough that the court is reconsidering basic doctrine, there have been exciting moves among the bar itself.
Let me get one non-relisted matter out of the way right at the beginning: The Supreme Court is set to consider at conference tomorrow a motion for a limited remand respondents in the census case filed to permit the lower courts to consider evidence that the Department of Commerce added the citizenship question for the very purpose of suppressing Hispanic participation. [Disclosure: Arnold & Porter is among the counsel to the plaintiffs in this case.] But we also have relists a-plenty: 19 of them. There’s something for everyone: abortion restrictions, the Lanham Act, jurisdiction over foreign states, antidiscrimination law, ERISA, a surprisingly basic Armed Career Criminal Act question and even something called the “Bob Richards” rule. Mind you, there are some relists that seem destined just to be “GVRd” — to have the petition granted, the judgment vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in light of some recently decided case. And, worse yet, some seem destined to have cert denied outright.
That’s all for October Term 2018. Thanks to Sam Callahan, Andrew Tutt and Graham White for helping me sort the wheat from the chaff before the dockets had been updated.
Republic of Sudan v. Owens, 17-1236
Issues: (1) Whether plaintiffs suing a foreign state bear a “lighter burden” in establishing the facts necessary for jurisdiction than in proving a case on the merits despite the Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary — at the urging of the solicitor general and the Department of State — in Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co.; (2) whether plaintiffs suing a foreign state can establish facts necessary for jurisdiction “based solely upon” the opinion testimony of so-called “terrorism experts,” when the record lacks admissible factual evidence sufficient to establish jurisdiction; and (3) whether the plaintiffs’ failure to prove a foreign state “either specifically intended or directly advanced” a terrorist attack is “irrelevant to proximate cause and jurisdictional causation,” when (i) the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s “terrorism exception” establishes jurisdiction over a foreign state only when the foreign state provided material support “for” a specified act of terrorism, and (ii) proximate causation requires a “direct relationship” between the defendant’s conduct and the resultant injury. CVSG: 05/21/2019.
(relisted after the June 20 conference)
Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 17-1268
Issues: (1) Whether a party who knowingly and intentionally twice defaults; acts to delay, and not in good faith; and affirmatively elects not to contest a nonjurisdictional legal issue before judgment may nevertheless demonstrate “extraordinary” and “exceptional” circumstances warranting appellate review of the forfeited nonjurisdictional legal issue post-judgment; and (2) whether, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies retroactively, thereby permitting recovery of punitive damages 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the statute. CVSG: 05/21/2019.
Republic of Sudan v. Opati, 17-1406
Issues: (1) Whether the term “extrajudicial killing” means a summary execution by state actors, as is consistent with international law and the statutory text, context and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a); (2) whether foreign sovereign immunity may be withdrawn for emotional-distress claims brought by family members of victims under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); (3) whether 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) provides the exclusive remedy for actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a), and forecloses state substantive causes of action previously asserted through the “pass-through” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1606; (4) whether the statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b) is jurisdictional in nature and, if it is not, whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit should nonetheless have heard Sudan’s limitations defense asserted through its timely, direct appeal; and (5) whether the undisputed fact of civil war, internal strife and partitioning of Sudan into two counties constitutes excusable neglect or extraordinary circumstances for vacatur under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CVSG: 05/21/2019.
Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 17-1712
Issue: (1) Whether an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary may seek injunctive relief against fiduciary misconduct under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) without demonstrating individual financial loss or the imminent risk thereof; and (2) whether an ERISA plan participant or beneficiary may seek restoration of plan losses caused by fiduciary breach under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) without demonstrating individual financial loss or the imminent risk thereof. CVSG: 05/21/2019.
Hall v. United States, 17-9221
Issue: Whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from charging, convicting and sentencing a person who has already been charged, convicted and sentenced in the court of a state for the same conduct.
Harris v. West Alabama Women’s Center, 18-837
Issue: Whether a state ban on dismemberment abortions is unconstitutional where there is a reasonable medical debate that alternatives to the banned procedure are safe.
(rescheduled before the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30, June 6 and June 13 conferences; relisted after the June 20 conference)
Babb v. Wilkie, 18-882
Issues: (1) Whether the statement in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) that “all personnel actions effecting employees or applicants for employment … in executive agencies as defined in Title 5 … shall be made free from any discrimination” permits federal-sector personnel actions that are not made free from any discrimination or retaliation, as long as discrimination or retaliation is not the but-for cause of the personnel action, or rather prohibits personnel actions where discrimination and retaliation is a factor; (2) whether Title VII bans retaliation in federal employment.
GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC, 18-1048
Issue: Whether the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards permits a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Lucky Brand Dungarees v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc., 18-1086
Issue: Whether, when a plaintiff asserts new claims, federal preclusion principles can bar a defendant from raising defenses that were not actually litigated and resolved in any prior case between the parties.
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 18-1195
Issue: Whether it violates the religion clauses or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution to invalidate a generally available and religiously neutral student-aid program simply because the program affords students the choice of attending religious schools.
Romag Fasteners Inc. v. Fossil Inc., 18-1233
Issue: Whether, under Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), willful infringement is a prerequisite for an award of an infringer’s profits for a violation of Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 18-1269
Issue: Whether courts should determine ownership of a tax refund paid to an affiliated group based on the federal common-law “Bob Richards rule,” as three circuits hold, or based on the law of the relevant state, as four circuits hold.
Shular v. United States, 18-6662
Issue: Whether the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the Act.
Hunter v. United States, 18-7105
Issue: Whether a post-2002 conviction for sale of cocaine or possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13 is a “serious drug offense” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) if, according to the Florida legislature, the state need not prove that the defendant “knew the illicit nature of the substance” he sold or possessed with intent to sell.
Patrick v. United States, 18-7797
Issue: Whether, in determining if a prior offense is a qualifying predicate conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act, courts should employ a categorical approach or a conduct-based approach.
Hayes v. United States, 18-7833
Issues: (1) Whether a post-2002 conviction for sale of cocaine or possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13 is a “serious drug offense” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) if, according to the Florida legislature, the state need not prove that the defendant “knew the illicit nature of the substance” he sold or possessed with intent to sell; (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in denying petitioner a certificate of appealability because the issue above is debatable among reasonable jurists.
Pressey v. United States, 18-8380
Issues: (1) Whether prior convictions under Fla. Stat. §893.13 qualify as “serious drug offenses” for purposes of the ACCA, §924(e)(2)(A)(ii); (2) whether Florida’s resisting-with-violence offense qualifies as an ACCA predicate, where that offense can be committed by only a minimal degree of force.
Wilson v. United States, 18-8447
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit erred in holding that the petitioner’s drug offense qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act where mens rea is not even an implied element of the definition of a “serious drug offense” in § 924(e).
Moody v. United States, 18-9071
Issue: Whether 18 U.S.C. §924(a) provides for criminal penalties to felons who possess firearms in interstate commerce absent proof that they knew of their felon status, or of the firearm’s movement in interstate commerce.
(relisted after the January 11, January 18, June 13 and June 20 conferences)
(relisted after the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30, June 6, June 13 and June 20 conferences)
(relisted after the May 9 and May 16 conferences; now held)
Kelly v. United States, 18-1059
Issue: Whether a public official “defraud[s]” the government of its property by advancing a “public policy reason” for an official decision that is not her subjective “real reason” for making the decision.
(relisted after the June 13 and June 20 conferences)
Filed Under: Supreme Court Tagged With: Relist, Watch
There will not even be a gesture at writing a full post with comical hyperlinks this week. Too many deadlines. So this week, you just get the questions presented for each of the dozen new relists. There are three related Affordable Care Act cases whose questions presented are a study in contrasts; three cases involving inter partes review of patents; a couple of immigration cases involving equitable tolling; two cases involving motions for reconsideration on habeas corpus review; a case involving allegations of fraud by public officials; and case raising the question whether a state can get copyright for annotations to its official code.
The court will issue grants on Monday. And if the past is any guide, the justices also will hold an as-yet-unscheduled conference on Monday. There, they will consider all the cases relisted for the first time after today’s conference before deciding which cases warrant further review and then clearing out of town for the summer later next week.
That’s all for this week. Thanks again to Tom Mitsch for compiling the relists, and thanks to him and Ben Moss for compiling the relists throughout October Term 2018. The old man will probably be compiling the cases alone on Monday. Be very afraid.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 18-776
Issue: Whether a request for equitable tolling, as it applies to statutory motions to reopen, is judicially reviewable as a “question of law.”
(relisted after the June 13 conference)
Dex Media Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP, 18-916
Issues: (1) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) permits appeal of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time bar did not apply; and (2) whether 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) bars institution of an inter partes review when the previously served patent infringement complaint, filed more than one year before the inter partes review petition, had been dismissed without prejudice.
Atlanta Gas Co. v. Bennett Regulator Guards Inc., 18-999
Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction to review the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review of respondent’s patent over respondent’s objection that it was time-barred; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred when it rejected the longstanding principle that a dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if a suit had never been brought, splitting the circuits.
Ovalles v. Barr, 18-1015
Issues: (1) Whether the application of a legal standard to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law or a pure question of fact that may be barred from judicial review; or, more specifically, (2) whether the criminal alien bar, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), tempered by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), prohibits a court from reviewing an agency decision finding that a movant lacked diligence for equitable-tolling purposes, notwithstanding the lack of a factual dispute.
Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 18-1023
Issues: (1) Whether—given the “cardinal rule” disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with “especial force” to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is “irreconcilable” with the former—an appropriations rider whose text bars the agency’s use of certain funds to pay a statutory obligation, but does not repeal or amend the statutory obligation, and is thus not inconsistent with it, can nonetheless be held to impliedly repeal the obligation by elevating the perceived “intent” of the rider (drawn from unilluminating legislative history) above its text, and the text of the underlying statute; and (2) whether—when the federal government has an unambiguous statutory payment obligation, under a program involving reciprocal commitments by the government and a private company participating in the program—the presumption against retroactivity applies to the interpretation of an appropriations rider that is claimed to have impliedly repealed the government’s obligation.
Superior Communications Inc. v. Voltstar Technologies Inc. , 18-1027
Issues: (1) Whether, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), a party may appeal the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s application of 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)’s time-bar provision made during its decision to institute inter partes review; and (2) whether 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) precludes the Patent Trial and Appeal Board from instituting inter partes review when the petitioner sought inter partes review more than a year after it was served with a patent infringement complaint that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
Moda Health Plan Inc. v. United States, 18-1028
Issue: Whether Congress can evade its unambiguous statutory promise to pay health insurers for losses already incurred simply by enacting appropriations riders restricting the sources of funds available to satisfy the government’s obligation.
Land of Lincoln Mutual Health Insurance Company v. United States, 18-1038
Issue: Whether a temporary cap on appropriations availability from certain specified funding sources may be construed, based on its legislative history, to abrogate retroactively the government’s payment obligations under a money-mandating statute, for parties that have already performed their part of the bargain under the statute.
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc., 18-1150
Disclosure: Vinson & Elkins LLP, whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, is among the counsel to the petitioner in this case. Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, is counsel to the respondent in this case.
Issue: Whether the government-edicts doctrine extends to—and thus renders uncopyrightable—works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.
Banister v. Davis, 18-6943
Issues: (1) Whether Gonzalez v. Crosby extends to post-judgment motions filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e); (2) whether, if Gonzalez does apply, a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion should toll the time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv); and (3) whether a pro se petitioner must be warned and given an opportunity to withdraw a post-judgment motion which has be recharacterized as a successive habeas petition if that recharacterization will affect his ability to file a timely notice of appeal.
Patton v. United States, 18-7449
Issues: (1) Whether a district court has the authority to reconsider the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 action in response to a prisoner’s timely post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e); and (2) whether, assuming that a prisoner’s notice of appeal would otherwise be timely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), the court of appeals’ subsequent decision that the post-judgment motion was, in substance, a successive “claim” for relief renders the appeal of the original judgment untimely and deprives that court of jurisdiction over the appeal.
(relisted after the March 22, March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30, June 6 and June 13 conferences)
(relisted after the January 11, January 18 and June 13 conferences)
(relisted after the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30, June 6 amd June 13 conferences)
I’ve got to be extremely summary this week because of the press of urgent work. First, we’ll dispatch the old business: Last week’s relists yielded five new grants (with the justices picking Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 18-1171, over its companion Charter Communications Inc. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 18-1185, to resolve an issue about the showing of causation required for a claim of discrimination in cable-carriage decisions). And we got a statement respecting denial from Justice Stephen Breyer in four-time relist al-Alwi v. Trump, 18-740, concerning the indefinite detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo.
That brings us to this week’s new business. There are no cases that have been relisted for the first time this week. But there’s a trio of closely watched cases that have been relisted for a second time … sort of. The federal government has three pending petitions involving the Trump administration’s decision to end the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals policy: Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 18-587, Trump v. NAACP, 18-588, and McAleenan v. Vidal, 18-589. The court relisted all three after the January 11 conference, and there they sat for five months. Court-watchers have speculated about what was going on; to me, it looked like the court was holding the cases for something on its merits docket, perhaps the census case, perhaps Azar v. Allina Health Services – both administrative law cases addressing steps the government must take to justify certain actions. Neither is clearly related to DACA, but the court has a pretty low threshold for holding a case if it might be affected. Because these cases have been set for conference after a long period of stasis, I would normally classify them as “released holds” rather than relists.
Recently, the court rejected the government’s request to expedite consideration of a fourth DACA petition, in which the government argued that there was an “urgent need for the[] prompt consideration” of the DACA petitions “before the Court’s summer recess.” By releasing the apparent hold on the first three DACA petitions and setting them for consideration this Thursday, the court has set the stage for the government to get what it sought in its motion – a decision before the summer recess on whether the court will hear the DACA cases, and, if cert is granted, briefing over the summer in preparation for a fall argument.
(relisted after the March 22, March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30 and June 6 conferences)
(relisted after the January 11 and January 18 conferences)
(relisted after the March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30 and June 6 conferences)
(relisted after the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23, May 30 and June 6 conferences)
Jordan v. City of Darien, Georgia, 17-1455
Issue: Whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law.
We’re now in a countdown to October Term 2018’s final conference, which I expect to be held June 24, just as the justices issue their last opinions and are about to leave town for the summer. There, they’ll consider all the cases relisted after the last scheduled conference of the term on June 20. Thus, we likely have just three installments after this one until we’re all finished. We’re not numerologists or anything but that number just keeps coming up. Three new relists were granted this week. And a thrice-relisted petition was granted and the judgment below vacated to consider the effect of intervening legislation. So this really is a thing — we’re not weird or anything.
And the streak continues, because this week there are precisely three new relists. Plus, I suppose, if you want to be super-technical, one more than three: Jordan v. City of Darien, Georgia, 17-1455. But that one doesn’t quite count. It raises a question the court recently resolved – whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. (Answer: yes). Because petitioner Dwight Jordan would appear to lose under that rule, the court may be determining whether there are complicating factors that might require remand or whether it should simply deny review.
With that, we move on to the three main relists. First: A group of Montana landowners own property within a site designated for cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), because of pollution caused by a now defunct copper smelter. They sued Atlantic Richfield Company in state court, seeking state-law “restoration damages” for cleanup activities beyond those that the Environmental Protection Agency had ordered in its CERCLA response plan. Atlantic Richfield said federal law pre-empted those claims, but the Montana Supreme Court disagreed. When Atlantic Richfield sought review in Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian, 17-1498, the Supreme Court called for the views of the solicitor general. Turns out that the solicitor general agrees with Atlantic Richfield that the Montana Supreme Court erred in holding those claims were not pre-empted. But he says “review would be premature at the present time” because the case is in an interlocutory posture and Atlantic Richfield might prevail on the merits, and he claims that deferring review “would have limited practical consequences” because EPA wasn’t a party to the litigation and isn’t bound by the Montana Supreme Court’s judgment. You will not be surprised to learn that Atlantic Richfield sees things slightly differently.
Second: Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits actions commenced more than three years after “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, 18-1116, concerns what showing must be made to start the clock on that three-year period. Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee, invested in the company retirement plan. Although the plan posted relevant documents online and told him they were there, he did not actually look at them, and he argues that he wouldn’t have understood the information they conveyed if he had. The petitioners, two Intel Corporation retirement plans, argue that it is enough that all of the information relevant to an alleged violation was disclosed to the plaintiff more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, even if the plaintiff chose not to read the material or does not recall whether he read it or not. Sulyma argues that because he did not have actual knowledge of events, or actual knowledge that the investments were imprudent, the three-year period did not begin running. The district court agreed with Intel, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit agreed with Sulyma. Intel seeks further review.
That brings us to new relist number three. McKinney v. Arizona, 18-1109, asks whether a court must apply current law when deciding, for the first time but long after the flawed original sentencing, whether the mitigating and aggravating evidence in a capital case warrants the death sentence. In 1993, James Erin McKinney was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a judge in Arizona. More than 20 years later, the 9th Circuit granted McKinney a conditional writ of habeas corpus, holding that Arizona courts had erred by failing to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence in violation of Eddings v. Oklahoma (namely, that McKinney suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by a traumatic childhood).
The case presents two questions. The first is whether a court must apply the law as it exists today, rather than as it existed at the time a defendant’s conviction first became final, when correcting a defendant’s sentence or conducting a resentencing. When McKinney was originally sentenced, a judge made factual findings that increased the maximum sentence. Now, after Ring v. Arizona, juries must find those facts. So McKinney argues that a jury must make the relevant findings now. The second question is whether the Arizona Supreme Court violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Eddings, and McKinney’s Sixth, Eighth, and 14th Amendment rights, by declining to remand his case for resentencing in the trial court rather than having an appellate court determine whether the sentence is correct.
(relisted after the May 30 conference)
Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian, 17-1498
Issues: (1) Whether a common-law claim for restoration seeking cleanup remedies that conflict with remedies the Environmental Protection Agency ordered is a jurisdictionally barred “challenge” to the EPA’s cleanup under 42 U.S.C. § 9613 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; (2) whether a landowner at a Superfund site is a “potentially responsible party” that must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action, even if the EPA has never ordered the landowner to pay for a cleanup; and (3) whether CERCLA pre-empts state common-law claims for restoration that seek cleanup remedies that conflict with EPA-ordered remedies. CVSG: 04/30/2019.
McKinney v. Arizona, 18-1109
Issues: (1) Whether the Arizona Supreme Court was required to apply current law when weighing mitigating and aggravating evidence to determine whether a death sentence is warranted; and (2) whether the correction of error under Eddings v. Oklahoma requires resentencing.
Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, 18-1116
Issue: Whether the three-year limitations period in Section 413(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which runs from “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation,” bars suit when all the relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff by the defendants more than three years before the plaintiff filed the complaint, but the plaintiff chose not to read or could not recall having read the information.
(relisted after the March 22, March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23 and May 30 conferences)
(relisted after the March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23 and May 30 conferences)
(relisted after the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9, May 16, May 23 and May 30 conferences)
(relisted after the May 9, May 16, May 23 and May 30 conferences)
(relisted after the May 23 and May 30 conferences)
Charter Communications, Inc. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 18-1185
That brings us to two related petitions: Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 18-1171, and Charter Communications, Inc. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 18-1185. Entertainment Studios Networks owns several television networks that it sought unsuccessfully to have carried on Comcast’s and Charter Communications’ cable systems. ESN then sued, claiming that the cable operators’ denial was based on a racist effort to disadvantage African-American-owned networks in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed ESN’s complaint, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed. The court ruled that Section 1981 does not require but-for causation, deepening an acknowledged conflict with other courts of appeals. It also held that ESN’s claim was plausible despite alternative explanations for Comcast’s conduct and the complaint’s failure to allege facts showing that the other companies with which the cable operators contracted were situated similarly to ESN. The cable operators seek to revisit the 9th Circuit’s decision.
Congress is fighting with the executive branch to try to obtain information this week. But here at Relist Watch, we’re just giving the stuff away.
A lot of throughput this week, as the Supreme Court disposed of five relists.
Most puzzling is City of Newport Beach, California v. Vos, 18-672, which asked whether the Americans with Disabilities Act requires law-enforcement officers to provide accommodations to armed, violent and mentally ill suspects as they bring them into custody. The Supreme Court took a case raising a similar question in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, but dismissed it as improvidently granted, and many thought the court was looking to finally resolve the question. Newport Beach had been relisted four times, suggesting that one of the justices at least had been exploring a dissent; perhaps he or she was talked out of it.
The Court decided that one-time relist Shabo v. Barr, 18-827, was not the vehicle it was looking for to decide an acknowledged circuit split on an important and recurring question: Whether courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review factual findings underlying denials of withholding (and deferral) of deportation in immigration cases.
Santos v. United States, 18-7096, is the Armed Career Criminal Act case in which the government confessed error. The court did as the government recommended and granted the petition, vacated the judgment below and remanded for reconsideration of the government’s position. Justice Samuel Alito dissented, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, saying that although the court might have had its doubts about the correctness of the judgment, they “share[d] no such doubt” about the validity of the defendant’s conviction.
Speaking of dissents: The court denied review in five-time relist Daniel v. United States, 18-460, the case seeking to revisit the oft-criticized Feres doctrine that bars servicemembers, or their estates, from bringing claims for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Thomas dissented. He argued that “Feres was wrongly decided.” And he claimed that Feres was having a distorting effect on the law because the desire to allow relief to members of the military has led the court in other cases to “twist[] traditional tort principles to afford them the possibility of relief.” He was referring, of course, to Air & Liquid Systems Corp v. DeVries, which held that an equipment manufacturer could be sued for liability for illness caused by asbestos the Navy had added to the equipment, and in which Thomas dissented.
And that is to say nothing of the grant in Ritzen Group Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 18-938. No, really – we’re going to say nothing about it. You can click on the hyperlink if you want to be reminded that the case involves whether an order denying a motion for relief from the automatic stay in bankruptcy is a final order subject to appeal. You aren’t going to hear it from me.
That brings us to this week’s new relists. Both Hernandez v. Mesa, 17-1678, and Swartz v. Rodriguez, 18-309, involve questions of liability for American law-enforcement officers who allegedly wrongfully shoot across the U.S.-Mexico border and kill Mexican nationals. The court first took Hernandez in 2016 to resolve whether a cross-border shooting violated the victim’s Fourth Amendment rights, and whether the agent would be entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that the shooting violated the victim’s Fifth Amendment rights. Four months after argument, the court basically punted; it vacated the decision below and remanded for further consideration in light of the recently decided Ziglar v. Abbasi, which tightened the standards for recognizing a federal cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.
Now Hernandez is back, accompanied by another case that raises the same issue – Swartz. The en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held in Hernandez that a Bivens remedy should not be extended to a claim arising from an injury to a foreign citizen in foreign territory. But a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held in Swartz that it should. The court called for the views of the solicitor general, who argues that certiorari “is warranted to resolve the conflict on that important question and to provide the lower courts additional guidance after this Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi.” The government says that Hernandez is the better vehicle, because it addressed whether a Bivens remedy is available for both Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, and Swartz only addressed Fourth Amendment claims. The odds of a grant are quite high after the solicitor general as amicus recommends review.
That’s all for this week. Thanks to Tom Mitsch for compiling the relists.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 17-1678
Issues: (1) Whether, when the plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law-enforcement officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth amendment rights for which there is no alternative legal remedy, the federal courts can and should recognize a damages claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics; and (2) whether, if the federal courts do not recognize such a claim, the Westfall Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as it pre-empts state-law tort suits for damages against rogue federal law-enforcement officers acting within the scope of their employment for which there is no alternative legal remedy. CVSG: 04/11/2019.
(relisted after the May 16 conference)
Swartz v. Rodriguez, 18-309
Issues: (1) Whether the panel’s decision to create an implied remedy for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the new context of a cross-border shooting misapplies Supreme Court precedent and violates separation-of-powers principles, when foreign relations, border security and the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment are some of the special factors that counsel hesitation against such an extension; and (2) whether, if the above “antecedent” question is answered in the negative, Agent Swartz is entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law applying the Fourth Amendment to protect a Mexican citizen, with no significant connection to the United States, who is injured in Mexico by a federal agent’s cross-border shooting. CVSG: 04/11/2019.
(relisted after the January 4, January 11, January 18, February 15, February 22, March 1, March 15, March 22, March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)
(relisted after the March 22, March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)
(relisted after the March 29, April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)
(relisted after the April 12, April 18, April 26, May 9 and May 16 conferences)