Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/596/950/447301/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 16:49:31
Document Index: 679137887

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 372', '§ 373', '§ 372', '§ 373', '§ 1', '§ 372', '§ 701', '§ 372']

Leroy v. Johnson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the Interior for the Unitedstates of America, Washington, D. C., Defendant-appellee, 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1979 › Leroy v. Johnson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the Interior for t...
Leroy v. Johnson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the Interior for the Unitedstates of America, Washington, D. C., Defendant-appellee, 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979)
Argued and Submitted Sept. 26, 1978. Decided April 19, 1979
In First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243, 46 S. Ct. 246, 70 L. Ed. 565 (1926) it was contended, as here, that the Secretary had misapplied the law of Oklahoma in determining the legal heirs of a decedent. The Supreme Court held, however, that the "final and conclusive" language in a predecessor statute to 25 U.S.C. § 372 precluded judicial review.
In Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 90 S. Ct. 1316, 25 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a determination by the Secretary under 25 U.S.C. § 373, involving testacy rather than intestacy, was subject to judicial review, since the "final and conclusive" language appearing in 25 U.S.C. § 372 was not repeated in § 373. In so holding the Supreme Court reaffirmed, in effect, First Moon, noting that "Congress quite plainly stated that the Secretary's action under § 1 (25 U.S.C. § 372) was not to be subject to judicial scrutiny." 397 U.S. at 607, 90 S. Ct. at 1322. In accord, see Tooisgah v. Kleppe, 418 F. Supp. 913 (W.D.Okl.1976). The foregoing is in our view dispositive of the matter.
The plaintiffs-appellants suggest that jurisdiction is conferred under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, that Act by its own terms does not apply where "statutes preclude judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). Although the modern view is that there is a presumption in favor of judicial review, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967), in our view First Moon and Tooahnippah clearly interpret 25 U.S.C. § 372 to preclude judicial review of a determination by the Secretary under that section. Nor do we regard the instant case as raising any constitutional issues, as was the situation in Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975). In Eskra the underlying dispute concerned the constitutionality of a state statute which was essential to the administrative decision. Here the plaintiffs Rely on an Oklahoma statute, and their complaint is that the Secretary simply misread and misapplied a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreting such statute. The rule of Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974), followed in Eskra, therefore has no application.