Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/20/981/523247/
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 18:33:42
Document Index: 551054542

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1251', '§ 1365', '§ 1313', '§ 1313', '§ 1313', '§ 1313', '§ 1313']

Alaska Center for the Environment; Northern Alaskaenvironmental Center; Southeast Alaskaconservation Council; Trustees Foralaska, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Carol M. Browner,* Administrator, United Statesenvironmental Protection Agency; Epa Region X;dana A. Rasmussen, Regionaladministrator, Defendants-appellants, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1994 › Alaska Center for the Environment; Northern Alaskaenvironmental Center; Southeast Alaskaconservation...
Alaska Center for the Environment; Northern Alaskaenvironmental Center; Southeast Alaskaconservation Council; Trustees Foralaska, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Carol M. Browner,* Administrator, United Statesenvironmental Protection Agency; Epa Region X;dana A. Rasmussen, Regionaladministrator, Defendants-appellants, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) Argued and Submitted Jan. 31, 1994. Decided March 30, 1994
The background of this action and the statutory scheme of the CWA are excellently summarized in the district court's first published opinion in this case granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and holding that the EPA was in flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of the Act. Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D.Wa.1991) ("ACE I "). As the district court explained, the CWA was passed in 1972 to " 'restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' " 762 F. Supp. at 1424 (quoting the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251). Its laudable but unattained goal was to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. Id.
To aid in enforcement of the Act, Sec. 505(a) authorizes citizens to bring suit in federal court against the EPA for failing to perform a mandatory "act or duty" set forth in the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). The plaintiffs filed this suit pursuant to that section, alleging that the EPA had not performed mandatory duties under the statute to protect the waters of Alaska from further degradation. In their successful motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs demonstrated that the EPA had engaged in a pattern of total inaction in carrying out its duties under the CWA that extended over a period of approximately 12 years.
The provisions of the CWA at issue in this lawsuit set forth a specific process for attaining an acceptable water quality level in areas where technology-based methods of combating pollution from specific point sources have proven inadequate. Under the statutory scheme, states are required to identify the specific waters that remain polluted despite the point source controls, and designate them as "water quality limited." These states are then required to establish a priority ranking for their water quality limited segments, and establish TMDLs, the maximum amount of pollutants a water body can receive daily without violating the state's water quality standard, according to that ranking. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d) (1) (A), (C). The Act requires the states to develop these lists of water quality limited segments and TMDLs and submit them to the EPA periodically; however, the first such submission was due no later than June 26, 1979.1
Upon receipt of the state's listings, the CWA requires the EPA to review the state's submissions within 30 days and either approve or disapprove them. If the EPA disapproves of the state's identification of water quality limited segments or its listing of TMDLs, the agency must establish its own list of water quality limited segments and TMDLs within 30 days. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2).
In June of 1992, the district court entered its order setting forth the remedy deemed necessary to cure the EPA's deficiencies. Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D.Wa.1992) ("ACE II "). In pertinent part, the district court ordered:
Plaintiffs have sought and received from the district court an order requiring state-wide compliance with the Clean Water Act. In order to establish standing to bring a particular suit, a plaintiff must prove (1) a concrete, particularized injury in fact; (2) a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a decision in the plaintiff's favor. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). The EPA argues that the plaintiffs here have failed to prove "injury in fact" with respect to most of the specific water bodies in Alaska, and that the plaintiffs' injuries are not likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in this case.
The district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs need not shoulder such a burden. Plaintiffs established that they were adversely affected by the inadequate water quality of a representative number of waters throughout the state of Alaska. Their injury is the result of EPA's failure to comply with the CWA to establish TMDLs for the State of Alaska; the CWA imposes no narrower obligation. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2) ("If the administrator disapproves [the State's identification of TMDLs], he shall ... identify such waters in each state...." (emphasis added)). In addition, it is significant that the remedial scheme of the CWA not only requires the EPA to establish TMDLs but to do so on a prioritized basis throughout the state, "taking into account the severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of such waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A). Hence, for CWA regulatory purposes, all waters within a state are interrelated. It would be contrary to congressional directive to permit individual plaintiffs or a federal court to deal with only a fraction of the waters and, in effect, impose their own prioritization upon the EPA by limiting the scope of an ordered remedy to specific streams of paramount concern to the parties before the court.
In its published opinion in ACE II, the district court explained the remedial action it ordered, fully addressing the same contention the EPA raises in this appeal. The EPA argues that the district court exceeded its remedial powers under Sec. 505 of the CWA when it ordered the EPA "to submit to the court its report" on the adequacy of water quality monitoring in Alaska, and to "propose a [long-term] schedule for the establishment of TMDLs" for Alaskan waters. ACE II, 796 F. Supp. at 1381. The EPA stresses that the language of the CWA does not specifically require it to prepare or present a report on water quality monitoring, and further contends that the statute relegates the pace at which TMDLs shall be established entirely to the EPA's discretion.
The district court has broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to remedy an established wrong. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1982). In this case the established wrong is the failure of the EPA to take any steps to establish the TMDLs mandated by Congress for more than a decade. In tailoring the relief granted, the district court correctly recognized that in order to bring about any progress toward achieving the congressional objectives of the CWA, the EPA would have to be directed to take specific steps. In selecting the remedy that it did, the district court acted with great restraint in requiring only that steps undeniably necessary to the development of TMDLs in Alaska be accomplished by deadlines that are far more lenient than those contained within the CWA itself.
Carol M. Browner, the current Administrator of the EPA, is substituted for the former administrator William K. Reilly. See Fed.R.App.Pro. 43(c) (1)
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2) provides that "each state shall submit ... [TMDLs] to the administrator from time to time, with the first such submission not later than 180 days after the date of publication of the first identification of pollutants under section 1314(a) (2) (D) of this title." June 26, 1979, fell 180 days after the date of publication of the first identification of pollutants under Sec. 1314(a) (2) (D)
The EPA also relies on Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990) and PETA v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 917 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1990), in support of its contention that ACE lacks standing to seek state-wide relief in this case. Contrary to the EPA's suggestion, however, Lujan and PETA are not cases in which a court limited the scope of its ordered remedy to the specific areas for which the named plaintiffs could demonstrate injury. Rather, in both of those cases, the courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege that they were injured in any way by the defendant's action or lack thereof