Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100561/iron-workers-vs-perko
Timestamp: 2017-02-26 04:58:58
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Iron Workers Vs Perko - Citation 100561 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize iron Workers Vs. Perko - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/100561CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnJun-03-1963Case Number373 U.S. 701Appellantiron WorkersRespondentPerkoExcerpt:.....exercise of state jurisdiction is not precluded, because the matter is clearly not subject to the labor board's cognizance. [
] the basis of this contention is respondent's claim that he was a job superintendent, and thus a "supervisor" within the meaning of the act, [
] at the time of the alleged tort, and that he was thus excluded from the scope, operation, and protection of federal law. there are, we
page 373 u. s. 706
believe, two independent and conclusive answers to this argument, both of which establish that this matter falls squarely within the preemption principles declared in
even if it is conceded that a job superintendent is a supervisor, it is..... Judgment:
Iron Workers v. Perko - 373 U.S. 701 (1963)
Local No. 207, International Association of Bridge, Structural
and Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perko
Argued April 23-24, 1963
The case arguably involved an unfair labor practice over which the National Labor Relations Board would have exclusive jurisdiction, and the State Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction.
International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales,
373 U. S. 702
(a) The exercise of state jurisdiction cannot be sustained on the ground that respondent was a "supervisor," within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, since it appeared that he worked sometimes as a regular ironworker, sometimes as a foreman, and sometimes as a superintendent, and it is entirely possible that the Board might conclude that a foreman, under the facts of this case, is an employee, and that a man whose status fluctuates, as respondent's did, is entitled to claim the protection afforded employees under the Act. Pp.
373 U. S. 706
(b) Even if it be assumed that respondent was not an employee, but was solely a supervisor, there is a sufficient probability that the matter would still have been cognizable by the Board so as to compel the relinquishment of state jurisdiction, since it may well
Page 373 U. S. 702
be that a union's insistence on discharge of a supervisor for failure to comply with union rules would violate § 8(b)(1)(A) by tending to coerce nonsupervisory employees into observing those rules, and, if a union forces an employer to discharge a supervisor, such conduct might well violate § 8(b)(1)(B) because it coerces the "employer in the selection of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." Pp.
373 U. S. 707
This case, involving a suit by a union member against a local union, raises issues of federal preemption similar to those considered in
Local 100, United Assn. of Journeymen v. Borden, ante,
373 U. S. 690
In the present case, the respondent, Jacob Perko, filed a complaint in a state court against Local 207 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Union and certain of its officers, petitioners here, seeking damages under state common law. He alleged that, for several years, he had been a member in good standing of the iron workers local, and had been employed "as a foreman" by the William B. Pollock Company; that the defendants, without justification, had conspired to deprive him of the right to continue
Page 373 U. S. 703
to work "as a foreman;" that, pursuant to this conspiracy, they had demanded that the company discharge him from his duties "as superintendent and foreman;" that, as a result, he had been discharged, and defendants had since prevented him from obtaining work "as a foreman in ironwork by representing that plaintiff's foreman's rights had been suspended;" and that he was entitled to damages for past and future loss of earnings in the amount of $75,000.
168 Ohio St. at 162, 151 N.E.2d at 744. In answer to the union's argument that federal law precluded the exercise of state jurisdiction, the court stated that there was no federal preemption with regard to a state action "to recover damages for a common law tort, which is also an unfair labor practice," citing
At trial, a verdict was directed for petitioners, but this ruling was reversed on appeal, and a second trial was held. The evidence at this trial showed that Perko had generally worked for the company as a "foreman" or "superintendent;" [
] that, in December, 1953, he was working as
Page 373 U. S. 704
a superintendent on a particular project; that, in that capacity, he gave instructions to boilermakers with respect to performance of certain phases of the work that the iron workers claimed; and that, following this incident, Perko was charged by members of petitioner local with assisting boilermakers in violation of the union's rule, [
] and was found guilty, fined and suspended from membership. The fine, however, was later suspended, and Perko was placed on probation, being permitted to resume payment of dues.
The jury brought in a verdict of $25,000 for Perko, and the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Ohio App., 187 N.E.2d 407. That court rejected again the contention that the State was without jurisdiction, and held on the merits that, although "there is very little that supports the cause sued on here," the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed an appeal "for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved." 173 Ohio St. 576, 184 N.E.2d 100. We granted certiorari, 371
Page 373 U. S. 705
U.S. 939, to consider the petitioner's claim that the State lacked jurisdiction over this dispute by virtue of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168.
At the outset, we note that, for the reasons set forth in
Borden, ante,
, the rationale of the
case does not support state jurisdiction here, and we need not now consider the present vitality of that rationale in the light of more recent decisions. As in
the crux of the action here concerned alleged interference with the plaintiff's existing or prospective employment relations, and was not directed to internal union matters. Indeed, the state court itself observed that "Plaintiff is not attempting to secure any redress for loss of rights as a member of the union."
373 U. S. 703
. Thus, there was no permissible state remedy to which the award of consequential damages for loss of earnings might be subordinated.
Respondent contends, however, that, in any event, the exercise of state jurisdiction is not precluded, because the matter is clearly not subject to the Labor Board's cognizance. [
even if it is conceded that a job superintendent is a supervisor, it is at least reasonably arguable that a foreman, as that term has been used in this case, is an "employee" within the meaning of the Act, since his function is apparently to transmit instructions, not to originate them.
See, e.g., New York Shipping Assn.,
116 N.L.R.B. 1183. Perko, in his complaint, alleged that he had worked for many years "as a foreman," that the actions of the defendant were designed to cause his discharge "as superintendent and foreman," and that he was subsequently prevented from obtaining employment "as a foreman." The evidence indicated that Perko sometimes worked for Pollock as a regular iron worker in a gang, sometimes as a foreman, and sometimes as a superintendent.
It is evident that this case presents difficult problems of definition of status, problems which we have held are precisely "of a kind most wisely entrusted initially to the agency charged with the day-to-day administration of the Act as a whole."
Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Interlake Steamship Co.,
370 U. S. 173
370 U. S. 180
. It is entirely possible that the Board might conclude that a foreman under the facts of this case is an employee, and that a man whose status fluctuates, as Perko's seemingly did, is entitled to claim the protection afforded employees under the Act. Given such a conclusion, Perko's complaint -- that the petitioners caused his discharge and prevented his subsequent employment as a foreman as well as a superintendent -- falls within the ambit of the unfair labor practices prohibited by §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2)
Page 373 U. S. 707
of the Act. [
] And since petitioners' actions apparently resulted from Perko's violation of a union rule, there is a reasonable likelihood that on these premises the Board would have found such unfair labor practices to have been committed.
the discussion in the
373 U. S. 694
even if it be assumed that Perko was not an employee but was solely a supervisor, there is a sufficient probability that the matter would still have been cognizable by the Board so as to compel the relinquishment of state jurisdiction. It has been held that discharge of a supervisor for failure effectively to coerce employees into renouncing their union affiliation constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(1) because such a discharge would reasonably cause nonsupervisory employees to fear that they might meet the same fate if they adhered to the union; and, in such instances, the Board has been sustained in ordering reinstatement of the supervisor with back pay.
National Labor Relations Board v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc.,
213 F.2d 209;
cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Better Monkey Grip Co.,
243 F.2d 836. So here, it may well be that a union's insistence on discharge of a supervisor for failure to comply with union rules would violate § 8(b)(1)(A) because it would inevitably tend to coerce nonsupervisory employees into observing those rules. If so, it would surely be within the Board's power under § 10(c) to order the union to reimburse the supervisor for lost wages.
Page 373 U. S. 708
Moreover, if a union forces an employer to discharge a supervisor, such conduct may well violate § 8(b)(1)(B) because it coerces the "employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances."
Cf. International Typographical Union v. Labor Board,
278 F.2d 6,
aff'd in part by an equally divided Court,
365 U. S. 705
284 F.2d 893. Whether a "job superintendent" like Perko has sufficient responsibilities with regard to grievances to bring this section into play cannot be ascertained on this record, and, in any event, would be a question for initial determination by the Board. But the probability that such a violation of § 8(b)(1)(B) might have occurred, especially in view of Perko's role in the inter-union dispute that gave rise to the present controversy, is certainly not insignificant.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK dissent for the reasons stated in their dissent in No. 541,
373 U. S. 698
The rule provided that "any member that leaves the iron workers to go in as a boilermaker
or assist them in any way
will be fined $500." (Emphasis added.)