Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104050/united-states-vs-gaddis
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 08:24:27
Document Index: 179442707

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 2113']

United States Vs Gaddis - Citation 104050 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Gaddis - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104050
Case Number 424 U.S. 544
Respondent Gaddis
.....allow a jury to convict the accused of receiving and possessing the same money taken in the same bank robbery, and that, under milanovich v. united states, 365 u. s. 551 , remanding the case for a new trial was the appropriate appellate remedy. held: 1. a person convicted of violating 18 u.s.c. §§ 2113(a), (b), and (d) cannot also be convicted of receiving or possessing the robbery proceeds in violation of § 2113(c). heflin, supra at 358 u. s. 419 -420. pp. 424 u. s. 547 -548. 2. the court of appeals was mistaken in requiring a new trial as the remedy for the trial court's not having dismissed count 3 for lack of proof, since the error can be corrected by vacating the convictions and sentences under that count. milanovich, supra, .....
United States v. Gaddis - 424 U.S. 544 (1976)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976)
Respondents were indicated for entering a federally insured bank with intent to rob it by force and violence (Count 1) and robbing the bank by force and violence (Count 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), with possessing the funds stolen in the robbery (Count 3), in violation of § 2113(c), and with assaulting four people with dangerous weapons during the robbery (Counts 4-8), in violation of § 2113(d), and thereafter found guilty and sentenced on all counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, and ordered a new trial on the ground that, as held in Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415 , it was plain error to allow a jury to convict the accused of receiving and possessing the same money taken in the same bank robbery, and that, under Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 , remanding the case for a new trial was the appropriate appellate remedy.
1. A person convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (b), and (d) cannot also be convicted of receiving or possessing the robbery proceeds in violation of § 2113(c). Heflin, supra at 358 U. S. 419 -420. Pp. 424 U. S. 547 -548.
2. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in requiring a new trial as the remedy for the trial court's not having dismissed Count 3 for lack of proof, since the error can be corrected by vacating the convictions and sentences under that count. Milanovich, supra, distinguished. Pp. 424 U. S. 548 -549.
3. The sentences under Counts 1 and 2 should also be vacated. Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 . P. 424 U. S. 549 n. 12.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 424 U. S. 551 .
A federal grand jury in Georgia returned an eight-count indictment against the respondents Gaddis and Birt, charging them with entering a federally insured bank with intent to rob it by force and violence (Count 1) and robbing the bank by force and violence (Count 2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a); [ Footnote 1 ] with possessing the funds stolen in the robbery (Count 3), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c); [ Footnote 2 ] and with assaulting four people
with dangerous weapons during the course of the robbery (Counts 4 to 8), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). [ Footnote 3 ] At the ensuing trial, the Government's evidence showed that three armed men had, on March 6, 1974, robbed the National Bank of Walton County in Loganville, Ga., [ Footnote 4 ] and that the robbers, in making their getaway, had engaged in an exchange of gunfire with Loganville's lone police officer. The Government's evidence further showed that two of the three robbers had been Gaddis and Birt. [ Footnote 5 ] The jury found the respondents guilty on all counts of the indictment, and the trial judge sentenced each of them to aggregate prison terms of 25 years. [ Footnote 6 ] In imposing the prison sentences, the judge stated:
eight counts of the indictment. Specifically, the appellate court held that this Court's decision in Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415 , had made it clear tat "it is plain error to allow a jury to convict an accused of taking and possessing the same money obtained in the same bank robbery," and that, under this Court's decision in Milanovich v. United States, 365 U. S. 551 , "the proper appellate remedy is to remand for a new trial." 506 F.2d 352, 354. We granted certiorari because of the discordant views in the Circuits regarding the proper application of the Heflin and Milanovich decisions. [ Footnote 7 ] 421 U.S. 987.
358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 419 . In "subsection (c) . . . , Congress was trying to reach a new group of wrongdoers, not to multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves." Id. at 358 U. S. 420 . Thus, while there was in the present case a "merger" of the convictions under §§ 2113(a) and (d), Prince v. United States, 352
In Milanovich, there was evidence that the petitioner and her husband, "as owners of an automobile, transported three others under an arrangement whereby the three were to break into a United States naval commissary building with a view to stealing government funds," that she and her husband "were to remain outside for the return of their accomplices after the accomplishment of the theft," but that they "drove off without awaiting the return of their friends." [ Footnote 8 ] If believed by the jury, this evidence was clearly sufficient to support a verdict that the petitioner was guilty of robbing the naval commissary. [ Footnote 9 ] There was also evidence in Milanovich, however, of other and different conduct on the part of the petitioner -- that, about 17 days after the naval commissary robbery, she had obtained and appropriated silver currency taken in the robbery and concealed the same in a suitcase in her home. [ Footnote 10 ] If believed by the jury, this evidence was clearly sufficient to support a verdict that the petitioner was guilty of receiving and concealing the
stolen property. [ Footnote 11 ] The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that the petitioner could not be convicted for both stealing and receiving the same currency, and she was convicted and separately sentenced on both counts. This Court held that, under Heflin, the jury should have been instructed that the petitioner could not be separately convicted for stealing and receiving the proceeds of the same theft. Since it was impossible to say upon which count, if either, a properly instructed jury would have convicted the petitioner, and in view of the grossly disparate sentences imposed upon the petitioner and upon her husband (who was convicted only upon the larceny count), her convictions were set aside and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The present case is of a very different order. While the evidence was certainly sufficient to support a jury verdict that the respondents were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated bank robbery, there was no evidence whatever that they were guilty of receiving the proceeds "from the robber." Indeed, except for the evidence of asportation during the robbery itself, there was nothing to show that the respondents had ever received or possessed the bank's funds. Their share of the loot was, in fact, never found. Accordingly, the trial judge should have dismissed Count 3 of the indictment. His error in not doing so can be fully corrected now by the simple expedient of vacating the convictions and sentences under that count. [ Footnote 12 ]
present case. Situations will no doubt often exist where there is evidence before a grand jury or prosecutor that a certain person participated in a bank robbery and also evidence that that person, though not himself the robber, at least knowingly received the proceeds of the robbery. [ Footnote 13 ] In such a case, there can be no impropriety for a grand jury to return an indictment or for a prosecutor to file an information containing counts charging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), or (d), as well as of § 2113(c). [ Footnote 14 ] If, upon the trial of the case, the District Judge is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury upon both counts, he must, under Heflin and Milanovich, instruct the members of the jury that they may not convict the defendant both for robbing a bank and for receiving the proceeds of the robbery. He should instruct them that they must first consider the charges under § 2113(a), (b), or (d), and should consider the charge under § 2113(c) only if they find insufficient proof that the defendant himself was a participant in the robbery. [ Footnote 15 ]
365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 554 -555, n. 5.
In light of Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 , the concurrent sentences under Counts 1 and 2 should also be vacated, leaving the respondents under single 25-year prison sentences for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
The statement to the contrary in a dissenting opinion in Milanovich, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 558 , is incorrect.
If, on the other hand, the indictment or information charges only a violation of § 2113(c), it is incumbent upon the prosecution at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of that offense, and the identity of the participant or participants in the robbery or theft is irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's guilt. While a mechanistic reading of Heflin's language might not wholly support this rule, it is to be remembered that Heflin ultimately held no more than that a person could not be convicted and separately sentenced under § 2113(a), (b), or (d) and under § 2113(c), because § 2113(c) could not be used to "pyramid penalties." 358 U.S. at 358 U. S. 419 . Heflin did not purport to, and did not, add to or alter the statutory elements of the offense under § 2113(c).