Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/367643487/Marcos-Antonio-Acosta-Quirch-A044-971-669-BIA-Dec-1-2017
Timestamp: 2020-08-13 06:07:53
Document Index: 8380266

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n316', '§ 1003', '§ 812', '§ 810', '§ 812', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 777', '§\n812', '§ 806', '§ 777', '§\n806', '§\n812', '§ 316', '§\n812', '§ 212', '§\n212', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 240', '§\n212', '§ 240', '§ 1240', '§ 212', '§ 812', '§\n812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§\n812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§\n810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 810', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 810', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 1003', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 806', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 46', '§\n346', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§\n316', '§ 316', '§ 1003', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 812', '§ 810', '§\n806', '§ 316', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 1003', '§ 1003']

Marcos Antonio Acosta Quirch, A044 971 669 (BIA Dec. 1, 2017) | Removal Proceedings | Burglary
In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the termination of proceedings upon finding that simple vehicle flight under Fla. Stat. Ann. 316.1935(2) was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board stated that the statute did not require reprehensible conduct because it did not require the accused to endanger others or drive recklessly. The decision was issued by Member Roger Pauley.
enregistrerEnregistrer Marcos Antonio Acosta Quirch, A044 971 669 (BIA De... pour plus tard
328 vues17 pages
United States v. Charles Gene Maines, 920 F.2d 1525, 10th Cir. (1990)
unit 3 introduction to criminal law
Trial Order of Events
Criminal law Burglary
Fox-lsicoff, Tammy Jean OHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel - KRO
Rfkin & Fox-lsicoff, P.A. 18201 SW 12th St.
1110 Brickell Ave Miami, FL 33194
Name: ACOSTA QUIRCH, MARCOS AN ... A 044-971-669
Cite as: Marcos Antonio Acosta Quirch, A044 971 669 (BIA Dec. 1, 2017)
File: A044 971 669 - Miami, FL Date:
In re: Marcos Antonio ACOSTA QUIRCH
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Tammy J. Fox-Isicoff, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS: Olga Villa
The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") appeals from an Immigration Judge' s
decision, dated June 15, 2017, terminating removal proceedings against the respondent. The
appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent, a nativ.e and citizen of Cuba and a lawful permanent resident of the
United States, was convicted in 2012 of "simple vehicle flight" in violation of FLA. STAT. ANN.§
316.1935(2) (hereafter "section 316.1935(2)"). The issue on appeal is whether this conviction
renders the respondent removable under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude ("CIMT').1 We review that legal issue de novo. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l (d)(3)(ii).
To determine whether section 316.1935(2) defines a CIMT, we employ the "categorical
approach," which "requires us to focus on the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of
being prosecuted under the statute of conviction, rather than on the facts underlying the
respondent's particular violation of that statute." Matter of Silva-Trevino (Silva-Trevino Ill),
26 l&N Dec. 826, 831 (BIA 2016) (citing Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013)). To
involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and a
culpable mental state. Id. at 834. For CIMT purposes, a culpable mental state is one which requires
deliberation or consciousness, such as intent, knowledge, willfulness, or recklessness.
Matter ofDiaz-Lizarraga, 26 l&N Dec. 847, 849 (BIA 2016).
Section 316.1935(2) requires a culpable mental state-i.e., willfulness. Thus, the dispositive
issue is whether the actus reus of the offense is ''reprehensible" enough to make it a CIMT.
Conduct is "reprehensible" in the pertinent sense if it is '"inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in
general."' Matter ofSilva-Trevino III, 26 I&N Dec. at 833.
1 The respondent has several other convictions, but the Immigration Judge found that they do not
render him removable. The DHS has not challenged that determination; thus, we confine our
analysis to the respondent's conviction under section 316.1935(2).
A044 971_ 669
A{all relevant times, section 316.1935(2) has provided as follows:
Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an
authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other
jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights
activated commits a felony of the third degree ....
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained, "[t]he elements of
the crime are: '(1) an officer in a law enforcement patrol vehicle, with its jurisdictional markings
prominently displayed and its siren and lights activated, orders the motorist to stop; and (2) the
motorist willfully flees or attempts to elude the officer."' See United States v. Coronado-Cura,
713 F.3d 597, 598 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The operative phrase "flees or attempts to
elude" is not statutorily defined, but its ordinary meaning connotes active and deliberate evasion
rather than passive non-cooperation. This distinction is confirmed by the fact that one who merely
"refuse[s] or fails to stop" a vehicle in compliance with a police officer's order is guilty of a lesser,
misdemeanor offense under section 316.1935(1 ).
The most relevant Board precedent in this context is Matter ofRuiz-Lopez, 25 l&N Dec. 551
(BIA 2011), which upheld a CIMT charge premised on a respondent's Washington conviction for
driving a vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of
others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. Like the Washington statute at issue
in Ruiz-Lopez, section 316.1935(2) requires that the accused attempt to "elude" a pursuing police
vehicle, not merely fail to stop when ordered. In other contexts, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly
recognized the serious danger presented by such conduct. See United States v. Coronado-Cura,
713 F.3d at 599 (holding that section 316.1935(2) is a "crime of violence" aggravated felony and
noting that "'vehicle flight from a law enforcement officer is an extraordinarily risky enterprise'
because it ordinarily results in a 'dangerous confrontation between the offender and the law
enforcement officer."') (quoting in part United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1296-97
(11th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015)). Based on the intrinsic danger of vehicular flight from police, the OHS urges us to reverse
the Immigration Judge and sustain the CIMT charge.
As the Immigration Judge determined, however, Ruiz-Lopez is distinguishable here because
section 316.1935(2) does not require that the accused flee or attempt to elude the pursuing officer
by driving in "wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others." A driver who
attempts to evade police pursuit is guilty of violating section 316.1935(2) even if he does not
endanger others or drive recklessly. Indeed, as the Immigration Judge noted, it is precisely the
absence of such aggravating factors that distinguishes simple vehicle flight under section
316.1935(2) from aggravated vehicle flight under section 316.1935(3) (U at 12, June 15, 2017).2
2 Aggravated vehicle flight under section 316.1935(3) occurs when a driver flees or attempts to
elude a pursuing marked police vehicle and, in the course of doing so, "[d]rives at high speed, or
in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property ...."
A044 971.669
In Ruiz-Lopez, we emphasized that our finding of moral turpitude resulted from a "building
together" or accumulation of various elements, no one of which would necessarily have been
sufficient in itself to establish the baseness of the offense. See 25 I&N Dec. at 556 (quoting in part
Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I&N Dec. 1188, 1196 (BIA 1999)). We explained, "when a person
deliberately flouts lawful authority and recklessly endangers the officer, other drivers, passengers,
pedestrians, or property, he or she is· 'engaged in seriously wrongful behavior' that violates the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to society." Id. (emphasis added). The
determinative question here, then, is whether a driver who "deliberately flouts lawful authority"
without endangering anyone has so far deviated from the accepted rules of morality as to justify a
CIMT charge. We think not.
Like the Washington statute at issue in Ruiz-Lopez, section 316.1935(2) is-at heart-a
"resisting arrest" statute. Accord Matter ofRuiz-Lopez, 25 l&N Dec. at 555. And this Board and
the Eleventh Circuit have recognized that resistance of or interference with a law enforcement
officer is not "reprehensible" enough to qualify as a CIMT unless some aggravating element is
present, such as the use or threatened use of violent physical force or a deadly weapon against the
officer. See Cano v. US. Att 'y Gen., 709 F.3d 1052, 1054-55 (11th Cir. 2013); Matter ofDanesh,
19 l&N Dec. 669, 670-73 (BIA 1988); Matter of Logan, 17 l&N Dec. 367, 368-69 (BIA 1980).
Simple vehicle flight is a serious crime and we have no wish to minimize the danger posed to
police officers by uncooperative drivers. Indeed, we have no doubt that many individual violations
of section 316.1935(2) involve moral turpitude. Under the categorical approach, however, we are
concerned only with the elements of the offense and the minimum conduct that has a realistic
probability of being prosecuted under them. When those elements are considered within the
context of our precedents, we conclude that they do not define sufficiently reprehensible conduct
to justify CIMT treatment. More precisely, the elements of section 316.1935(2) require neither
the use of a deadly weapon against the officer-as in Matter of Logan-nor the use of force or
violence upon the officer-as in Cano or Matter of Danesh-nor a "wanton or willful disregard
for the lives or property of others"-as in Matter ofRuiz-Lopez. Accordingly, we will dismiss the
DHS's appeal and affirm the Immigration Judge's decision terminating the removal proceedings.
The following order shall be issued.
Marcos Antonio ACOSTA QUIRCH ) IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
A# 044-971-669 )
CHARGES: Section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, in that Respondent is an alien who has
been convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving
moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit such a crime.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT ON BEHALF OF DEPARTMENT
Tammy Jean Fox-Isicoff, Esq. Olga Villa, Assistant Chief Counsel
Rifkin & Fox-Isicoff P.A. Department of Homeland Security, ICE
1100 Brickell Avenue, Suite 600 18201 SW 12th Street, Suite 200
Miami, FL 33131 Miami, Florida 33194
Marcos Antonio Acosta Quirch (Respondent) is a native and citizen of Cuba who
adjusted his status to Lawful Permanent Residency on June 30, 1996. See Exhibit 1, Notice to
On November 15, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) filed a Notice to
Appear (NTA) against Respondent. The filing of the NTA commenced proceedings and vested
jurisdiction with the Court. 8 CFR § I 003.41.14(a). The NTA has been admitted into evidence
The NTA alleges that Respondent is not a citizen or national of the United States and that
he is a native and citizen of Cuba. Further, the NTA alleges that Respondent was accorded
lawful permanent resident status on June 30, 1996 and that on September I I, 2016, Respondent
arrived at the Miami International Airport and applied for admission. Allegations four (4)
through eight (8) related to the following convictions:
Allegation 4: On November 2, 2005, Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court of
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida for Grand Theft 3rd
DegreeNehicle in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(2)(C)(6) and Burglary/Unoccupied
Conveyance irt violation of Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(B). See Exhibit 2, Department of Homeland
Security's November 28, 2016 Notice of Filing, pages 231-275.
Allegation 5: On March 16, 2006, Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida for Grand Theft 3rd DegreeNehicle in
violation of Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(2)(C)(6) and Burglary/Unoccupied Conveyance in violation of
Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(B). Id at 169-230.
Allegation 6: On January 17, 2012, Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida for Burglary/Unoccupied Conveyance
in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(B) and§ 777.011, Petit Theft in violation of§
812.014(2)(E), and Criminal Mischief in violation of§ 806.13(l)(B)(2) and§ 777.011. Id at
123-168.
Allegation 7: On January 12, 2012, Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit for Miami-Dade County, Florida for Criminal Mischief in violation of§
806.13(1)(8)(3), Grand Theft 3rd DegreeNehicle/Attempt in violation of Fla. Stat.§
812.013(2)(C)(6) and Fleeing/Elude PO/Lights+ Sirens in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 316.1935(2).
Id. at 17-64.
Allegation 8: On January 12, 2012, Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court of the
806.13(1)(B)(3) and Grand Theft 3rd DegreeNehicle in violation of Fla. Stat.§
812.013(2)(C)(6). Id. at 65-122.
OHS charged Respondent with removability under INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i) for having been
At his master calendar hearing on November 28, 2016, Respondent admitted allegations
one (1) through three (3) relating to Respondent's nationality, citizenship and adjustment of
status, as well as allegation nine (9) relating to his arrival in the United States on September 11,
2016. However, Respondent denied allegations four (4) through eight (8) relating to the five (5)
alleged criminal convictions. Respondent also denied inadmissibility under INA§
212(a)(2)(A)(i).
On February 1, 2017, Immigration Judge (IJ) Barry Chait found that OHS did not bear its
burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was inadmissible
under INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i) and terminated removal proceedings. DHS filed a timely appeal on
March I, 2017.
On May 19, 2017, the Board oflmmigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case to the
Immigration Court. The BIA instructed the IJ to "apply the proper framework as set forth in
Mathis and Matter ofSilva-Trevino in determining whether the OHS has met its burden in
establishing the respondent's removability for a crime involving moral turpitude as based on one
(or more) of his convictions." See Decision of Board of Immigration Appeals, page 2.
This Court has reviewed DHS's and Respondent's briefs on appeal, as well as
Respondent's May 26, 2017 Memorandum in Support of Termination of Proceedings and
Addressing Categorical Analysis as it Pertains to the Remand by the BIA. See Exhibits 6-8.
The record in this proceeding consists of documentary exhibits one (1) through five (5).
At this stage, the case turns on a purely legal issue, so no testimonial evidence has been
provided. All documentary evidence have been considered in their entirety regardless of whether
specifically mentioned in this decision.
Exhibit 1: NTA dated November 14,2016 containing the sole charge of INA
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)
Exhibit 2: DHS's Notice of Filing dated November 28, 2017 containing Form
1-213 and records of conviction to support allegations four (4)
through eight (8)
Exhibit 3: Respondent's Motion to Terminate Removal Proceedings filed
Exhibit 4: DHS's Opposition to Motion to Terminate filed December 23,
Exhibit 5: Respondent's Response to DHS's Opposition to Motion to
Terminate filed January 4, 2017
Exhibit 6: Initial Brief on Appeal (filed by OHS with the BIA on April 17,
Exhibit 7: Respondent's Brief in Support of the Decision of the Immigration
Judge Terminating Removal Proceedings (filed with the BIA on
April 28, 2017)
Exhibit 8: Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Termination of
Proceedings and Addressing the Categorical Analysis as it Pertains
to the Remand by the BIA
Exhibit 9: BIA's Decision Remanding to the Immigration Judge dated May
III. REMOVABILITY
DHS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent is subject to removal
as charged. No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence. INA§ 240(c)(3)(A).
B. Factual Findings on Allegations in Notice to Appear
Respondent admits allegations one (1) through three (3) and allegation nine (9) contained
within the NTA. Respondent denies allegations four (4) through eight (8). See Exh. 1.
Exhibit two (2) unequivocally demonstrates that Respondent was convicted of the
offenses listed in allegations four (4) through eight (8) and that the convictions are final. Based
on the evidentiary record, I find that as a matter of fact, allegations four (4) through eight (8) are
true by evidence that is clear and convincing.
C. Statement of Law on Removability
DHS alleges that Respondent is an arriving alien and he is inadmissible under INA §
212(a)(2)(A)(i) because he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). DHS
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent is subject to removal as charged.
No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based on reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence. INA§ 240(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.§ 1240.8(a).
ii. Ground of Removability- § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)
The BIA has described a CIMT as a "nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules
of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in
general." Matter ofPerez-Contreras, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992) (citation omitted). A
finding that a crime is a CIMT requires "reprehensible conduct committed with some degree of
scienter," whether specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness. Matter of
Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. 754, 757 (BIA 2009); see also Matter ofSilva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550,
553 n.3 (AG 2015).
To determine whether a particular conviction is a CIMT, the Court must apply the
categorical approach. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013); Donawa v. US.
Attorney Gen., 735 F.3d 1275, 1280 n.3 (IIth Cir. 2013). Under the categorical approach, the
Court determines whether the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits
within the generic definition CIMT, rather than the facts of the particular prior case. Moncrieffe,
133 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007) (citing Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600 (1990)); see also Ge/in v. US. Att '.Y ·Gen., 837 F.3d
1236, 1241 (llth Cir. 2016) (Under the categorical approach, we consider only the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the offense, rather than the specific facts underlying the
defendant's case). Thus, a state offense is a categorical match to a generic federal offense only if
a conviction under the state statute necessarily involved facts equating to the generic of the
federal offense. Id.
· The Court conducts the categorical approach by comparing the elements of the statute
forming the basis of the respondent's conviction with the elements of the generic definition of a
CIMT. See United States v. Lockett, 810 F.3d 1262, 1266 (1 lth Cir. 2016). The elements of an
offense are the "constituent parts of a crime's legal definition"-what the jury must find beyond
a reasonable doubt or what a defendant necessarily admits when pleading guilty. Mathis, 136 S.
Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). In contrast, facts "need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a
defendant." Id. Where a statute covers any more conduct than the generic offense, it is not a
categorical match. Id. However, there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to. conduct that falls outside the generic
definition of a crime. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685; Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007)); Matter of Ferreira, 26 I&N Dec. 415 (BIA 2014).
When comparing the state statute against the generic federal definition of a CIMT, the
Court "must presume that the conviction 'rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts'
criminalized" by the statute. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (alterations in
original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)). If the statute punishes
only actions that involve moral turpitude, then it is categorically a CIMT. See Matter of Ortega­
Lopez, 26 I&N Dec. 99, 100 (BIA 2013). However, if a situation exists in which the relevant
statute may apply to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, the Court may not
categorically treat all convictions arising under that statute as CIMTs. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549
U.S. at 185-88, 193.
When a Court finds that a st�.tute is not categorically a CIMT, then the Court must
determine whether the statute is divisible. See Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1266. A statute is divisible
"when a statute lists multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively creates 'several different ..
.crimes[.]'" Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct.2276, 2285(2013)(quoting Nijhawan v. Holder,
129 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009)); see also Spaho v. United States, 837 F.3d 1172, 1177 (11th Cir.
2016) ("A state statute is divisible when it lists a number of alternative elements that effectively
create several different crimes.") (citation and quotation omitted). When determining whether a
statute is divisible, the Court must turn to state case law to determine if the alternatives in a statute
are essential elements prescribed by the statute. See United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1346
(11th Cir. 2014) ("[ C]ourts conducting divisibility analysis in this circuit are bound to follow any
state Court decisions that define or interpret the statute's substantive elements ....").If the statute
is not divisible, then the inquiry ends and there can be no finding of a CIMT. See Lockett, 810
F.3d at 1267; see also Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1305-06.
If the statute is "divisible," the Court applies the "modified categorical approach."
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249; Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, 2283; see Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. at
822-24. A statute is divisible if it sets out one or more elements of t11e offense in the alternative
and not all_ of the alternatives meet the generic federal definition. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.
Under the modified categorical approach, the Court may examine the record of conviction,
which includes the charging document, plea, verdict or judgment, and sentence.Id. at 2284-85.
This examination allows the Court to determine what crime, with what elements, a [respondent]
was convicted of. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. The Court then compares that particular crime to
the generic offense. Id.
The Court will apply the aforementioned analytical framework to Respondent's
iii. Grand Theft in the_ Third Degree - Fla. Stat. § 812.014(2)(C)(6)
Respondent was convicted of grand theft in the third degree in in violation of Fla. Stat. §
812.014(2)(C)(6) on three (3) occasions. See Exhibit 2, pages 17, 65, 213. The statute states, in
A person commits theft if he er she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to
obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or
permanently (a) [d]eprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit
from the property [or] (b) appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the
use of any person not entitled to the use of the property.
Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(1) (2016).
From the plain words of the statute, it is evident that section Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(1)
captures permanent and temporary takings. Id.; Daniels v. State, 587 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1991)
(finding that "the specific intent necessary for theft is the intent to steal, not the intent to
permanently deprive an owner of his property" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
see also Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847, 852 n.8 (BIA 2016) (acknowledging that
Florida expressly permits a conviction for theft on a showing of intent to temporarily deprive). .
The Court therefore presumes that Respondent's conviction rested upon the least culpable
conduct criminalized by the statute-theft committed with the intent to temporarily deprive the
owner of property. Accordingly, the Court examines whether Florida theft, when committed with
the intent to temporarily deprive, is a CIMT. See Ge/in, 837 F.3d at 1240-41.
Until recently, the BIA held that in order for a taking to be a theft offense that involved
moral turpitude, the relevant inquiry was whether a permanent taking was intended. See Matter
of Grazley, 14 l&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973) ("Ordinarily, a conviction for theft is considered
to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended."); see also Matter ofR-, 2
l&N Dec. 819, 828 (BIA 1947) ("It is settled law that the offense of taking property temporarily
does not involve moral turpitude."); see generally Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 l&N Dec. at 849-50
(discussing the history of the Board's theft CIMT jurisprudence). The BIA ordinarily required
"a literal intent to permanently deprive in order for a theft offense to. be a crime involving moral
turpitude." Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. at 854. Temporary takings were therefore not
considered CIMTs. See Grazley, 14 I&N Dec. at 3�3.
However, in a pair of recent decisions, the BIA clanfied its jurisprudence and held that a
theft offense is a CIMT "if it involves an intent to deprive the owner of his property either
permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded."
Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&NDec. at 853; �Matter of Obeya, 26 l&N Dec. 856, 859 (BIA 2016). The
BIA clarified that an offense may be a CIMT despite the fact that it "does not require the accused
to intend a literally permanent taking." Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 l&N Dec. at-852. A "temporary"
taking may constitute a CIMT if the offense encompasses a substantial erosion of the owner's
property rights. Id. at 853. Consequently, the BIA's new approach focuses on whether a taking
is substantial or de ininimis, with only the former constituting a CIMT. Id. at 854. To illustrate
the distinction, the BIA used the examples of joyriding and short-term borrowing of jewelry as
de minimis takings that do not involve an intent to permanently deprive. Id. at 853-54. By
contrast, the BIA views "more serious cases in which property is taken 'temporarily' but
returned damaged or after its value or usefulness to the owner has been vitiated" as CIMTs based
on the owner's substantially eroded property rights. Id at 854; see also Obeya, 26 I&N Dec. at
Turning to the Florida theft statute, the Court tl_ierefore must analyze if a "temporary"
taking in Florida constitutes a theft offense such that it encapsulates only "circumstances where
the owner's property rights are substantially eroded." Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. at 853. In
other words, the Court must determine whether Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(1) captures de minimis
offenses like joyriding or borrowing a ring for a short time, which would establish that the least
culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction does not categorically match to a theft CIMT.
See Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. at 831; Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. at 853-54; see also Ge/in,
837 F.3d 1240-42.
A review of Florida case law establishes that Florida prosecutes and convicts de minimis
takings, where a substantial erosion of property rights did not occur, under Flat Stat.§
812.014(1), such as in the case of joyriding a vehicle, the temporary use of a bike for one hour,
or the temporary use of another's fire extinguisher.1 See, e.g., State v. Dunmann, 427 So. 2d 166,
167 (Fla. 1983); R. C. v. State, 481 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Peoples, 760 So. 2d
at 1143. Notably, in State v. Dunmann, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Florida's
prior joyriding statute had been subsumed under section 812.014, the current theft statute. 427
So. 2d at 167; see also Stephens v. State, 444.So. 2d 498, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(''Dunmann's holding that the 'joyriding' statute has been subsumed within the omnibus theft
statute necessarily means that the offenses of theft and temporary unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle possess identical elements."). Consequently, unlike the generic CIMT theft offenses
under Diaz-Lizarraga, the Court concludes that Florida's theft statute does not require the
prosecutor to prove the defendant had "an intent to deprive the owner of his property either
Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. at 853. Therefore, as the Florida theft statute includes de minimis
takings (as part of the intent to temporarily deprive), the least culpable conduct criminalized by
the statute is not morally turpitudinous and the statute is thus categorically overbroad. See Silva­
Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. at 831.
Since Florida's theft statute is not a categorical match, the Court next determines whether
Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(1) is divisible to determine if there are alternative elements which may
1 The Court recognizes that on one occasion, in T.l.M v. State, 155 So. 2d 749, 751-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000),
the Court stated, "We do not agree with the state, that a momentary taking, for only a second or two, constitutes the
specific intent necessary to temporarily appropriate the School Board's property as defined under section
812.014(1)." However, in that case, the momentary taking was exceptionally de minimis: a child grabbing a fire
extinguisher off the wall an� throwing it at someone. Id. Significantly, in a later case, the Court found a temporary
taking sufficient where the defendant used a fire extinguisher to beat a corrections officer. Peoples v. State, 760 So.
2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
categorically match as a CIMT. See Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1266. However, state case law dictates
that the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive constitutes a single indivisible element
under Fla. Stat. § 812.014. See Daniels, 587 So. 2d at 462 (finding that "the specific intent
necessary for theft is the intent to steal, not the intent to permanently deprive an owner of his
property" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)
14.1 (1999). Moreover, under Florida law, a jury need not determine whether the deprivation or
appropriation was temporary or permanent. See T.L.M v. State, 755 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, the disjunctive "temporanly or permanently" language in the
statute presents alternative means rather than elements of the offense which must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, Fla. Stat.§ 812.014 is not divisible and the court may not
proceed to the modified categorical approach. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284--86, 2290; see
also Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016).
Since Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(1) punishes conduct that does not involve moral turpitude and
is not divisible, the court finds that Respondent's convictions under Fla. Stat. § 812.014(2)(b) are
not a CIMTs. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290; Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1266.
iv. Burglary of an Unoccupied Conveyance-Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b)
Respondent was convicted of burglary of an unoccupied conveyance in violation of Fla.
Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b) on two (2) occasions. See Exh. 2, pages 123, 231. The statute states in
(4) Burglary is a felony of the third degree .. . if, in the course of
committing the offense, the offender does not make an assault or
battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous
weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or remains in a:
(b) Conveyance, and there is not another person in the
conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains.
Fla. Stat. § 810.02(4)(b) (2016). Section 810.02(1) of the Florida Statutes defines a "burglary"
occurring after July 1, 2001, as "[e ]ntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the
intent to commit an offense therein . ..."Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b). In addition, Fla. Stat. §
810.011(3) defines "conveyance"as "any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad vehicle or car,
trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car."
The BIA has long held that burglary may or may not involve moral turpitude. See Matter
ofM-, 2 I&N Dec. 721, 723 (BIA 1946) (explaining, for example, that placing one's foot across
a threshold would constitute burglary, but this act is not inherently base, vile, or deprave). As
such, burglary under Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b) is not categorically a CIMT because it is overly
broad and delineates presumably any "offense,"thus including offenses that do not involve
moral turpitude.2 See Ortega-Lopez, 26 l&N Dec. at 100 (noting that if the statute punishes only
2 The Court notes that, in the case ofa burglary ofan occupied dwelling, the BIA has held that the "conscious and
overt act ofunlawfully entering or remaining ir. an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit [any] crime" is
actions that involve moral turpitude, then it is categorically a CIMT); see also Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. at 185-88, 193 (noting that when a statute applies to conduct that does not involve
moral turpitude, the Court cannot categorically treat all convictions arising under that statute as
CIMTs).
Since the Florida burglary statute is not categorically a CIMT, the court must determine
whether the statute is divisible. See Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1266. In determining divisibility, the
Court focuses "primarily on the statutory text." Id. (citing Howard, 742 F.3d at 1346). Fla. Stat.
§ 810.02 states, in relevant part, that a defendant may be convicted if he intended to commit any
offense after entering a conveyance. See Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(1)(b) (stating that burglary means
"entering ... a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein.") (emphasis added).
The plain language of the statute does not delineate alternative elements, which means the statute
is indivisible. Cf Spaho, 837 F.3d at 1177 (noting the statute had six alternative elements and
was therefore divisible). The Florida burglary statute is not divisible; therefore, there are no
alternative separate crimes that could constitute a CIMT and the Court may not proceed to the
modified categorical approach. See Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1267; see also Fajardo, 659 F.3d at
1305-06.
Since Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b) punishes conduct that does not involve moral turpitude
and is not divisible, th:e Court finds that Respondent's convictions under Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b)
are not CIMTs. See Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2290; Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1266.
v. Criminal Mischief- Fla. Stat.§ 806.13
Respondent was convicted of criminal mischief in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 806.13 on
three (3) occasions, which states in relevant part that:
(1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and
maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property
belonging to another . . . .
Fla. Stat.§ 806.13 (2002). To obtain a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 806.13, the state must prove
the following elements: (1) "the defendant injured or damaged specified property," (2) "the
property belonged to another," and (3) "the injury or damage was inflicted willfully and
maliciously." Sanchez v. State, 909 So. 2d 981, 984-85 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Fla. Std.Jury
Instr. (Crim.) 12.4.
The BIA has held that the damage to or destruction of property with malicious intent
involves moral turpitude. Matter of N-, 8 l&N Dec. 466, 467-68 (BIA 1959); Matter of M-, 3
I&N Dec. 272, 274 (BIA 1948); Matter ofC-, 2 l&N Dec. 716, 719 (BIA 1947). In contrast,
damage to or destruction of property with a mens rea of mere negligence, carelessness, or
presumed to be morally turpitudinous because a burglar's intrusion "invites a violent defensive response from the
resident." Matter ofLouissaint, 24 l&N Dec. 754, 758-59 (BIA 2009) (finding that burglary of an occupied
dwelling under Florida law is a CIMT) (emphasis added). 'However, in the instant case, Respondent's conviction is
with regard to burglary of an unoccupied conveyance, and not an occupied dwelling, and thus the rationale of
Louissant does not apply. See Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b); see also Louissaint, 24 I&N Dec. at 758-59. Where burglary
does not involve an occupied dwelling, however, it may only still be classified as a CIMT if the crime that the alien
intended to commit during the burglary is a CIMT. See M-, 2 l&N Dec. at 723 (BIA 1946) (citations omitted).
recklessness does not involve moral turpitude. Matter of N-, 8 I&N Dec. at 468; Matter of M-, 3
I&N Dec. at 274; Matter of B-, 2 I&N Dec.867, 8'68-69 (BIA 1947); Matter ofC-, 2 I&N Dec.
at 720 ("If the statute is so broad that it covers gross negligence, we think that the offense cannot
be regarded as inherently base, vile or depraved.").
Here, the "willfully and maliciously" element of Fla. Stat. § 806.13 requires intentional,
knowing, and purposeful damage or destruction of the property of another. MH v. State, 936
So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Fla. Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) 12.4 ("Willfully" means
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely."Maliciously" means wrongfully, intentionally, without
legal justification or excuse and with the knowledge that injury or damage will or may be caused
to another person or the property of another person.); Sanchez, 909 So.2d at 985; Matter of J.G.,
655 So.2d 1284, 1285 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1995) (The offense of criminal mischief requires that
the actor possess the specific intent to damage the property.of another). Thus, to obtain a
conviction, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant damaged or
destroyed property with malice.MH., 936 So.2d at 4 (explaining that a conviction under this
statute requires an act that was committed wantonly or maliciously and that an accidental act
does not fall within the statute). Since Fla. Stat.§ 806.13 requires an intentional and wrongful
act, the Court finds that the scienter requirement for a CIMT is satisfied. Leal, 26 I&N Dec.at
21; MH, 936 So. 2d at 4.
While the requisite mens rea may be met under the "willfully and maliciously" element
of Fla. Stat.§ 806.13, the statute of conviction must also include reprehensible conduct to
constitute a CJMT. Jd. The BIA has held that malicious damage to or destruction of property
constitutes reprehensible conduct when coupled with an aggravating factor, such as the use of
explosives or the killing or injury of animals. Matter of R-, 5 I&N Dec. 612, 616-17 (BIA 1954)
(determining that a conviction involving "wantonly, willfully and maliciously, by ... explosive
substances ...destroys, attempts to destroy, damages or injures any property" amounted to a
CIMT); Matter of M-, 3 I&N Dec. at 273-74 (determining that a conviction involving
"maliciously or wantonly kill, wound, disfigure, or injure any animal, the property of another"
was a CIMT). However, where a statut� prohibiting malicious damage to or destruction of
property punishes a broad range of conduct, but does not include an aggravating factor, and
entails only limited damage or loss of property, the statute does not involve reprehensible
conduct. Matter of N-, 8 I&N Dec. at 467-68 (finding that a crime involving "unlawfully,
maliciously and mischievously destroys or injures any real or personal property ...to the value
of less than $100" was not a CIMT).
Here, the Florida statute at issue does not include reprehensible conduct. The statute
under which Respondent was convicted penalizes damage or destruction of property by "any
means ... including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of
vandalism thereto." Fla. Stat. § 806. l 3(1)(a). This statute has been applied to punish conduct that
the Court considers to be reprehensible.3 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 20 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1945)
3 The analysis in this paragraph is influenced by the reasoning of the BIA in an unpublished decision, Matter of
Patrana, No. A025 441 027, 2014 WL 7691444, at *4 (BIA Dec. 22, 2014). Unpublished BIA decisions are not
binding precedent on Immigration Courts. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(g) ("By majority vote of the permanent [BIA]
members, selected decisions of the [BIA] rendered by a three-member panel or by the [BIA] en bane may be
designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues."); see also Matter ·of
Echeverria, 25 I&N Dec. 512, 519 (BIA 201 l ). However, unpublished BIA decisions may be persuasive. Here, the
(punishing the disfiguring and/or killing of an animal); Martin v. State, 183 So. 634 (Fla. 1938)
(punishing the act of destroying property by burning); Parker v. State, 169 So. 411 (Fla. 1936)
(punishing the maiming of animals). However, it has also been applied to punish conduct that
this Court does not find to be inherently reprehensible. See, e.g., G.H v. State, 599 So. 2d 231
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (punishing damage to a vehicle imposed by key scratches); D.B. v.
State, 559 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990) (punishing destruction of a chest of drawers);
Koenig v. State, 214 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (punishing damage to a public
telephone booth). Thus, the statute is overbroad. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. Moreover, the
statute does not require the existence of an additional aggravating factor that would render it a
CIMT under the BIA's precedent. Matter ofR-, 5 I&N Dec. at 616-17; Matter ofM-, 3 I&N
Dec. at 273-74. Consequently, Fla. Sta.§ 806.13 is not categorically a CIMT.
Since Fla. Stat. § 806.13 potentially punishes both conduct is and is not a CIMT, the
Court must determine whether the statute is divisible. The plain language of the statute states that
criminal mischief is committed when a person intentionally injures or damages property that
belongs to another. Sanchez, 909 So. 2d at 984-85; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 12.4. Upon
review of the statutory text, it is clear that the statute does not contain alternative elements.
Spaho, 837 F.3d at 1177. As such, the statute is not divisible. Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1267; Fajardo,
659 F.3d at 1305-06.
Accordingly, Fla. Stat.§ 806.13 does not categorically proscribe only reprehensible
conduct, is overly broad, and it is not divisible. Thus it does not constitute a CIMT. Descamps,
133 S. Ct. at 2290; Lockett, 810 F.3d at 1267; Leal, 26 l&N Dec. at 21.
vi. Fleeing/Eluding - Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(2)4
On January 17, 2012, Respondent was convicted of fleeing/eluding a law enforcement
officer who employed his/her lights and sirens in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 316.1935(2). The
authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other jurisdictional
markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated commits a
felony of the third degree . . .
Fla. Stat.§ 316.1935(2) (2004). T o obtain a conviction under Fla. Stat.§ 316.1935(2), the state
must prove the following: (1) the defendant was operating a vehicle upon a street or highway in
Florida; (2) the defendant, knowing he had been directed to stop by a duly authorized law
enforcement officer, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude a law enforcement officer;
BIA's reasoning is detailed, well-supported by case law, and ultimately persuasive in concluding that criminal
mischiefin violation ofsection 806.13 of the Florida Statutes is not a CIMT.
4 Respondent argues that OHS waived the right to argue that fleeing or eluding under Fla. Stat. § 316.9135(2)
constitutes a CIMT, as it did pose the argument before the Immigration Court when the issue was litigated in
November and December of2016. However, the BIA decision on remand instructs the Court "apply the proper
framework as set forth in Mathis and Matter ofSilva-Trevino in determining whether the OHS has met its burden in
establishing the respondent's removability for a crime involving moral turpitude as based on one (or.more) ofhis
convictions." In the interest ofleaving no issue unaddressed, the Court will analyze whether Respondent's
conviction under Fla. Stat. § 316.9135(2) constitutes a CIMT.
and (3) the law enforcement officers was in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle with
agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle and with
siren and lights activated. US. v. Coronado-Cura, 713 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2013); Fla Std. Jury
Instr. (Crim.) 28.7. While the requisite mens rea (willfulness) is sufficient to constitute a CIMT,
the issue of whether the actus reus constitutes reprehensible conduct remains.
The BIA has held that fleeing/eluding law enforcement with aggravating factors
constitutes a CIMT. Matter ofRuiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011) (holding that a
conviction under Washington Rev. Code§ 46.61.024 for driving a vehicle in a manner indicating
a wanton or willful disregard for lives or property of others while attempting to elude a police
vehicle after being given a signal by police to stop constitutes a CIMT); see also Cano­
Oyarzabal v. Holder, 774 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that a conviction under Wis. Stat.§
346.04(3) for operating_ a vehicle to flee or elude an officer by willful or wanton disregard of
such signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the traffic
officer or other vehicles or pedestrians constitutes a CIMT); see also Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d
737 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a conviction under Ill. Stat. 625 ILCS 5/11-204.l(a)(l) for
operating a vehicle to flee or attempting to elude a peace officer, after being given a visual or
audible signal by a peace officer and such flight or attempt to elude is at a rate of speed at least
21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit constitutes a CIMT). All of these cases contain an
aggravating factor as an element, such as wanton or willful disregard for the safety of others,
causing bodily harm or excessive speed. Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3) contains several aggravating
factors, but the statute under which Respondent was convicted, Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(2), does not
contain any aggravating factors.
The Court is not aware of any precedent for holding that a fleeing/eluding offense
without an aggravating factor such as wanton or willful disregard for the safety of others, bodily
injury or excessive speed constitutes a CIMT. The Court identified one unpublished decision
that analyzes Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(1), which punishes the operator of a vehicle, who has
knowledge that he has been ordered to stop such vehicle hy a duly authorized law enforcement
officer, who willfully refuses or fails to stop the vehicle in compliance with such order or, having
stopped in knowing compliance with such order, willfully flees in an attempt to elude the officer.
Matter of Qazi, 2009 WL 3818032 (BIA 2009). 5 Like Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(2), Fla. Stat.§
316.9135(1) does not contain an aggravating factor. The BIA held that a conviction under Fla.
Stat.§ 316.9135(1) does not constitute a CIMT pursuant to the first two analytical steps set forth
in Silva-Trevino. In this case, the BIA remanded the case for the IJ to analyze the offense under
step three of the Silva-Trevino framework. However, since that time, the third step of the Silva­
Trevino framework has been vacated. Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550 (BIA 2015). Therefore,
under the limited two-step process, the Court must find that Respondent's conviction does not
constitute a CIMT.
5 Unpublished BIA decisions are not binding precedent on Immigration Courts. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 1003. l(g) ("By
majority vote of the permanent [BIA] members, selected decisions of the [BIA] rendered by a three-member panel
or by the [BIA] en bane may be designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or
issues."); see also Matter ofEcheverria, 25 l&N Dec. 512, 519 (BIA 2011) However, unpublished BIA decisions
may be persuasive. Here, the BIA evaluated a different subsection of the statute under which Respondent was
convict�d, namely Fla. Stat.§ 316.9135(1) (Respondent was convicted under Fla. Stat.§ 316.9135(2)). The Court
finds the decision persuasive with regard to explaining Florida's statutory scheme and hierarchy of fleeing/eluding
Pursuant to the two-step process approach that is available to this Court (the categorical
and modified categorical approaches), the Court must find that Respondent's conviction under
Fla. Stat.§ 316.9135(2) is not a CIMT.
Under the framework set forth in Mathis, the Court finds that Respondent's convictions
for grand theft in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 812.014(2)(C)(6}, burglary of an unoccupied
conveyance in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 810.02(4)(b}, criminal mischief in violation of Fla. Stat.§
806.13 and Fleeing/Eluding in violation of Fla. Stat.§ 316.9135(2) do not constitute CIMTs.
Therefore, Respondent is not removable under INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i).
In light of the foregoing, the following order is entered:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent is NOT INADMISSIBLE pursuant to
INA§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Removal Proceedings be
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APPEAL RIGHTS: Both parties have the right to appeal this decision. A notice of appeal must
be filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals within thirty calendar days of the issuance date
oft his decision. 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.38(b). If the final date for filing the notice of appeal occurs on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the time period for filing will be extended to the next business
day. Id. If the time period expires and no appeal has been filed, this decision becomes final. 8
C.F.R.§ 1003.38(d).
APPEAL DATE: July 17, 2017
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