Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/87/1235/610768/
Timestamp: 2019-10-18 01:59:20
Document Index: 239959877

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 9', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1346', '§ 51', '§ 1983']

Terence George Kelly, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Hilda T. Serna, Robert R. Michelotti, Mona Polen Jerkins,raleigh J. Lopez, Steven R. Wisebram, Craig A.gillen, Each Individually, United Statesof America, Defendant-appellees, 87 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1996 › Terence George Kelly, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Hilda T. Serna, Robert R. Michelotti, Mona Polen Jerki...
Terence George Kelly, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Hilda T. Serna, Robert R. Michelotti, Mona Polen Jerkins,raleigh J. Lopez, Steven R. Wisebram, Craig A.gillen, Each Individually, United Statesof America, Defendant-appellees, 87 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1996)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 87 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1996) July 11, 1996
Terence G. Kelly, an attorney, represented two defendants charged with drug offenses. During the course of that representation, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) received information that Kelly, himself, was involved in the criminal drug activity. Kelly was indicted by a grand jury, charged and convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and one count of aiding, abetting, and counseling the possession with intent to distribute cocaine. His conviction was reversed on appeal to this court. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989).
In this action, Kelly asserts that, during the course of their investigation of him, the DEA agents violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, and that his arrest and prosecution were illegal and his conviction invalid. These allegations state a claim for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971).
This circuit has not yet decided what statute of limitations is applicable in a Bivens action. All of the circuits which have considered this issue have decided that the same statute of limitations applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should apply to Bivens actions. Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995); Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1793, 131 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1995); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080, 109 S. Ct. 2099, 104 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1987).
We agree with this result. Bivens actions are quite similar to those brought under § 1983. As we noted in Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995), "The effect of Bivens was to create a remedy against federal officers, acting under color of federal law, that was analogous to the section 1983 action against state officials. Thus, courts generally apply § 1983 law to Bivens cases." We reserved judgment on this issue in Abella, but we decide now to join our sister circuits and hold that a Bivens action is governed by the same statute of limitations as would a § 1983 action in that court.
In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court directed that the state limitation period applicable to personal injury actions should be applied to all actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In accord with Wilson, we held in Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1987), that the Georgia two-year personal injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions in a Georgia district court. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's application of the Georgia two-year personal injury limitations period to the Bivens claims in this case was correct.
A statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Accrual of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a question of federal law. Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716. Recently the Supreme Court dealt with this issue in the context of § 1983 actions for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2373, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). Analogizing such actions to those for malicious prosecution, the Court held:
Id. at ----, 114 S. Ct. at 2374 (internal citations omitted).
We have previously held that the Heck rule applies equally to a Bivens claim. Abella, 63 F.3d at 1065. Accord Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, in Bivens actions which challenge the validity of a conviction, the cause of action accrues when the underlying conviction is reversed.
Kelly cites Prince v. Wallace, 568 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1978), in support of his argument. In that case, after Prince's conviction was reversed, a petition for certiorari was filed and denied. A motion for reconsideration of the denial was then filed. In considering the timeliness of Prince's subsequent § 1983 complaint, the Fifth Circuit wrote, that "under the facts of the instant case", the limitations period did not begin to run until the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 1178.
Furthermore, we find no support for Kelly's theory. On the contrary, most cases which have interpreted Heck assume that "reversal" means the date upon which the appeals court issues its opinion reversing a conviction. See e.g., Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1995); Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139 (2d Cir. 1995); Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 1994); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1994); and McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Heller v. Plave, 743 F. Supp. 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Prince as support for this proposition).
Kelly alleges the criminal prosecution against him was instituted without probable cause through a constitutionally and factually defective investigation calculated to harass, intimidate, and abuse and was conducted in a prejudicial manner. He claims that the acts and omissions of the DEA officers proximately caused the malicious prosecution. The district court entered summary judgment against him, holding that upon the undisputed facts of the case, there was sufficient probable cause as a matter of law to support Kelly's prosecution. We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Fitzpatrick v. Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993).
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), state law determines the liability of an individual defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305, 112 S. Ct. 711, 714-15, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1992); Newmann v. United States, 938 F.2d 1258, 1261 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1991). In Georgia, an action for malicious prosecution is governed by O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40, which provides:
We have considered whether "termination" of the criminal proceedings does not occur upon the date we reverse, but upon the issuance of the mandate, which would allow for the expiration of the time period for filing a petition for rehearing or of the denial of such a petition. Although Fed. R. App. P. 36 clearly treats our opinion and its entry on the docket as the "judgment," it might be argued that no "reversal" has occurred until the mandate issues
Traditionally, setting aside a conviction and remanding for re-trial or dismissal was termed a "vacation" of the conviction; "reversal" of a conviction meant no re-trial was permitted. In this context, the Supreme Court's use of the term "reversal" is appropriate to signify the termination of criminal proceedings. As courts have come to use these terms without regard to this distinction, however, we take this opportunity to make clear that by "reversal" we mean without the possibility for retrial. Cf. Smith v. Holtz, 879 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (§ 1983 claim accrued when claimant discharged from state custody and retrial barred rather than on date of prior order reversing conviction); Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1995) (conviction set aside by grant of habeas corpus not a "termination" where state could retry claimant). Where retrial is not an option, reversal is a termination of the prosecution