Source: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Colorado_Republican_Federal_Campaign_Comm_v_Federal_Election_Comm
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 02:28:52
Document Index: 322170980

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 608', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441', '§ 441']

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996), Court Opinion
518 U.S. 604
116 S. Ct. 2309
135 L. Ed. 2d 795
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996)
Decided June 26, 1996[***797] Syllabus
[**2310] Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Party), a [***798] petitioner here, bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Party had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3), which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate." The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a facial challenge to the provision as a whole. The District Court interpreted the "in connection with" language narrowly and held that the provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. It therefore entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party, dismissing the counterclaim as moot. In ordering judgment for the FEC, the Court of Appeals adopted a somewhat broader interpretation of the provision, which, it said, both covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution.
59 F. 3d 1015, vacated and remanded.
JUSTICE BREYER, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE SOUTER, concluded that the First Amendment prohibits application of the Party Expenditure Provision to the kind of expenditure at issue here--an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate. Pp. 613-623.
(a) The outcome is controlled by this Court's FECA case law. After weighing the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views, against a "compelling" governmental interest in protecting the electoral system from the appearance and reality of corruption, see, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14-23 (per curiam), the Court has ruled unconstitutional FECA provisions that, inter alia, limited the right of individuals, [*605] id., at 39-51, and political committees, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497, to make "independent" expenditures not coordinated with a candidate or a candidate's campaign, but has permitted other FECA provisions that imposed contribution limits both when an individual or political committee contributed money directly to a candidate, and when they contributed indirectly by making expenditures that they coordinated with the candidate, see Buckley, supra, at 23-36, 46-48. The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure here at issue must be treated, for constitutional purposes, as an "independent" expenditure entitled to First Amendment protection, not as an indirect campaign contribution subject to regulation. There is uncontroverted direct evidence that the Colorado Party developed its advertising campaign independently and not pursuant to any understanding with a candidate. Since the Government does not point to evidence or legislative findings suggesting any special corruption problem in respect to political parties' independent expenditures, the Court's prior cases forbid regulation of such expenditures. Pp. 613-619.[***799] (b) The Government's argument that this expenditure is not "independent," but is rather a "coordinated expenditure," which this Court has treated as a "contribution" that Congress may constitutionally regulate, is rejected. The summary judgment record shows no actual coordination with candidates as a matter of fact. The Government's claim [**2311] for deference to FEC interpretations rendering all party expenditures "coordinated" is unpersuasive. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27, 28-29, n. 1, distinguished. These regulations and advisory opinions do not represent an empirical judgment by the FEC that all party expenditures are coordinated with candidates or that party independent and coordinated expenditures cannot be distinguished in practice. Also unconvincing are the Government's contentions that the Colorado Party has conceded that the expenditure here is "coordinated," and that such coordination exists because a party and its candidate are, in some sense, identical. Pp. 619-623.
(c) Because this expenditure is "independent," the Court need not reach the broader question argued by the Colorado Party: whether, in the special case of political parties, the First Amendment also forbids congressional efforts to limit coordinated expenditures. While the Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to consider this facial challenge by the failure of the parties and the lower courts to focus specifically on the complex issues involved in determining the constitutionality of political parties' coordinated expenditures, that lack of focus provides a prudential reason for the Court not to decide the broader question. This is [*606] the first case to raise the question, and the Court should defer action until the lower courts have considered it in light of this decision. Pp. 623-626.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded that, on its face, FECA violates the First Amendment when it restricts as a "contribution" a political party's spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with . . . a candidate." 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). The Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam), had no occasion to consider limitations on political parties' expenditures, id., at 58, n. 66, and its reasoning upholding ordinary contribution limitations should not be extended to a case that does. Buckley's central holding is that spending money on one's own speech must be permitted, id., at 44-58, and that is what political parties do when they make the expenditures that § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) restricts as "contribution[s]." Party spending "in cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with" a candidate is indistinguishable in substance from expenditures by the candidate or his campaign committee. The First Amendment does not permit regulation of the latter, see id., at 54-59, and it should not permit this regulation of the former. Pp. 626-631.
(a) The Court should decide the Colorado Party's facial challenge to § 441a(d)(3), addressing the constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures by political parties. That question is squarely before the Court, and the principal opinion's reasons for not reaching it are unpersuasive. [***800] In addition, concerns for the chilling of First Amendment expression counsel in favor of resolving the question. Reaching the facial challenge will make clear the circumstances under which political parties may engage in political speech without running afoul of § 441a(d)(3). Pp. 631-634.
(b) Section 441a(d)(3) cannot withstand a facial challenge under the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (per curiam). The anticorruption rationale that the Court has relied on is inapplicable in the specific context of campaign funding by political parties, since there is only a minimal threat of corruption when a party spends to support its candidate or to oppose his competitor, whether or not that expenditure is made in concert with the candidate. Parties and candidates have traditionally worked together to achieve their common goals, and when they engage in that work, there is no risk to the Republic. To the contrary, the danger lies in Government suppression of such activity. Pp. 644-648.[*607] [**2312] JUSTICE THOMAS also concluded in Part II that, in resolving the facial challenge, the Buckley framework should be rejected because there is no constitutionally significant difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: Both involve core expression and basic associational rights that are central to the First Amendment. Curbs on such speech must be strictly scrutinized. See, e. g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 501. Section 441a(d)(3)'s limits on independent and coordinated expenditures fail strict scrutiny because the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest in preventing the fact or appearance of "corruption," which this Court has narrowly defined as a "financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors," id., at 497. Contrary to the Court's ruling in Buckley, supra, at 28, bribery laws and disclosure requirements present less restrictive means of preventing corruption than does § 441a(d)(3), which indiscriminately covers many conceivable instances in which a party committee could exceed spending limits without any intent to extract an unlawful commitment from a candidate. Pp. 640-644.
Solicitor General Days argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Malcolm L. Stewart, Lawrence M. Noble, Richard B. Bader, and Rita A. Reimer[*608] .*
In April 1986, before the Colorado Republican Party had selected its senatorial candidate for the fall's election, that party's Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking Timothy Wirth, the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) charged that this "expenditure" [***801] exceeded the dollar limits that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act) imposes upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with" a "general election campaign" for congressional office. 90 Stat. 486, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(d)(3). This case focuses upon the constitutionality of those limits as applied to this case. We conclude that the First Amendment prohibits the application of this provision to the kind of expenditure at issue here--an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate.[*609] I
To understand the issues and our holding, one must begin with FECA as it emerged from Congress in 1974. That Act sought both to remedy the appearance of a "corrupt" political process (one in which large contributions seem to buy legislative votes) and to level the electoral playing field by reducing campaign costs. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-27 (1976) (per curiam). It consequently imposed limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, "political committees" (such as political action committees, or PAC's), and political parties could contribute to candidates for federal office, and it also imposed limits upon the amounts that candidates, corporations, labor unions, political committees, and political parties could spend, even on their own, to help a candidate win election. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 608, 610 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).[**2313] This Court subsequently examined several of the Act's provisions in light of the First Amendment's free speech and association protections. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981); Buckley, supra. In these cases, the Court essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views against a "compelling" governmental interest in assuring the electoral system's legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 256-263; NCPAC, supra, at 493-501; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193-199; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14-23. After doing so, the Court found that the First Amendment prohibited some of FECA's provisions, but permitted others.[*610] Most of the provisions this Court found unconstitutional imposed expenditure limits. Those provisions limited candidates' rights to spend their own money, id., at 51-54, limited a candidate's campaign expenditures, id., at 54-58, limited the right of individuals to make "independent" expenditures (not coordinated with the candidate or candidate's campaign), id., at 39-51, and similarly limited the right of political committees to make "independent" expenditures, NCPAC, supra, at 497. [***802] The provisions that the Court found constitutional mostly imposed contribution limits--limits that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money directly to a candidate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that they coordinate with the candidate, § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). See Buckley, supra, at 23-36. See also 424 U. S., at 46-48; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193-199 (limits on contributions to political committees). Consequently, for present purposes, the Act now prohibits individuals and political committees from making direct, or indirect, contributions that exceed the following limits:
(a) For any "person": $1,000 to a candidate "with respect to any election"; $5,000 to any political committee in any year; $20,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year; but all within an overall limit (for any individual in any year) of $25,000. 2 U. S. C. §§ 441a(a)(1), (3).(b) For any "multicandidate political committee": $5,000 to a candidate "with respect to any election"; $5,000 to any political committee in any year; and $15,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year. § 441a(a)(2).
FECA also has a special provision, directly at issue in this case, that governs contributions and expenditures by political parties. § 441a(d). This special provision creates, in part, an exception to the above contribution limits. That [*611] is, without special treatment, political parties ordinarily would be subject to the general limitation on contributions by a "multicandidate political committee" just described. See § 441a(a)(4). That provision, as we said in subsection (b) above, limits annual contributions by a "multicandidate political committee" to no more than $5,000 to any candidate. [1] And as also mentioned above, this contribution limit governs not only direct contributions but also indirect contributions that take the form of coordinated expenditures, defined as "expenditures made . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Thus, ordinarily, a party's coordinated expenditures would be subject to the $5,000 limitation.
[**2314] "Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, . . . political party [committees] . . . may make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office . . . ." § 441a(d)(1) (emphasis added).
After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, the