Source: https://openjurist.org/195/f2d/964/united-states-mezei-v-shaughnessy
Timestamp: 2019-02-23 04:46:57
Document Index: 781562642

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 137', '§ 137', '§ 156', '§ 23', '§ 156', '§ 213']

195 F. 2d 964 - United States Mezei v. Shaughnessy
195 F2d 964 United States Mezei v. Shaughnessy
195 F.2d 964
Respondent, relying heavily on the majority Knauff opinion, contends that constitutional protection is never available to an excluded alien. The irrelevance of the Fifth Amendment to the procedure there challenged, however, was based not on the fact that Mrs. Knauff was an alien denied admission, but rather on the theory that an order of deportation is not punishment for a crime and so one denied entry is not deprived of either life, liberty, or property. This is a distinction long recognized in the cases. See, e. g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 723-724, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905. But where, as here, confinement is no longer justifiable as a means to effectuate removal elsewhere, then liberty as such is at stake and the mandate of due process of law may be invoked by all, "whether citizens, aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents." Rutledge, J., dissenting in Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41, 42, 66 S.Ct. 340, 360, 90 L.Ed. 499. The Fifth Amendment provides without qualification that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." It is not confined to the protection of citizens; and its provisions, by definition, "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070, 50 L.Ed. 220. They extend in fact to all whose presence here brings them within reach of the judicial and administrative processes of the United States Government. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796.
Thus the courts have held in the past that even a pending deportation does not make unavailable to aliens the privilege against self-incrimination, Schoeps v. Carmichael, 9 Cir., 177 F.2d 391, 400, certiorari denied 339 U.S. 914, 70 S.Ct. 566, 94 L.Ed. 1340; the right to reasonable bail, United States ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 177 F.2d 708; or the protection against cruel and unusual punishments, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140. Nor while residing here are they prohibited from appealing to the guaranties of freedom of speech, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103, or against unreasonable searches and seizures, United States v. Wong Quong Wong, D.C.Vt., 94 F. 832. We think it must follow that detention of a person in possession of a valid visa enabling him to reach our shores is justified only as a means necessary to carry out his lawful removal from the country. Wong Wing v. United States, supra, 163 U.S. at page 235, 16 S.Ct. at page 980. Hence where it no longer subserves this end and becomes instead nothing less than a device for imprisonment for past or suspected misdeeds without due process of law, it must violate the mandates of the Fifth Amendment. See Ex parte Eguchi, D.C.S.D.Cal., 58 F.2d 417.
Nor has Congress spoken to the contrary. The assumed executive power to confine non-resident aliens seeking entry is not specifically granted; rather it is inferred from 8 U.S.C.A. § 137 &#x2014; 4, providing for "temporary exclusion" of any alien who appears to the examining immigration authority to be subversive under 8 U.S.C.A. § 137. We are unable from this to infer a congressional conception of incarceration any broader than the exclusion process it was designed to effectuate. This would seem re-emphasized by the provisions of 8 U.S.C.A. § 156(a, b) made specifically applicable to deportation proceedings. By these it is provided that where the Attorney General is unable to effect the removal elsewhere of undesirable aliens within the continental United States, he cannot keep them confined beyond a period of six months, but must enlarge them, though under provisions for their supervision if he finds that necessary. Detention in warrant deportation cases is thus specifically limited in time. We think this indicates a legislative policy in line with constitutional mandates. That no explicit provision is applicable in exclusion proceedings against aliens not already admitted does not, we think, signify another policy as to such persons. Rather it reflects the normal situation that an alien excluded from our shores is not here to be indefinitely confined; it is simply not geared to the case, developed by necessity and legal theory, where an alien is constructively not here, although actually with us in physical presence for an indefinite stay. So judicial power to release an alien from a general "unreasonable detention" has been widely accepted by the district courts. See United States ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 88 F.Supp. 91, affirmed 2 Cir., 176 F.2d 249; In re Krajcirovic, D.C. Mass., 87 F.Supp. 379; Staniszewski v. Watkins, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 80 F.Supp. 132; United States ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, D.C.Mass., 47 F.Supp. 201.
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 525, which upholds the Attorney General's discretionary power to deny bail pending determination of deportability, as we read it, does not controvert our view, but, we believe, lends a measure of support to it. The Court's interpretation of § 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 8 U.S. C.A. § 156(a), is expressly traced to the opinions of this court in United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 2 Cir., 120 F.2d 762; United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 2 Cir., 169 F.2d 747; United States ex rel. Doyle v. District Director of Immigration & Naturalization, 2 Cir., 169 F.2d 753; and United States ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, supra, and supports the approach of this court in our prevailing and dissenting opinions in United States ex rel. Young v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 194 F.2d 474. Certainly, of itself, it does not broaden the right of restraint beyond all need of what it is designed to effectuate, but specifies that "Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure." 342 U.S. 538, 72 S.Ct. 533. The opinion is in fact quite carefully limited to the case in hand, perhaps because of the vigorous dissents on the part of four of the justices. So it states "that the problem of habeas corpus after unusual delay in deportation hearings is not involved in this case." 342 U.S. 546, 72 S.Ct. 537. A fortiori, it would seem, this postpones for the future final adjudication of the effect of unusual delay in carrying out of the administrative writ after the proceedings as to deportability have reached their conclusion.
The relator has also appealed from the District Court's enlargement order. He contends that the condition of a $5,000 performance bond and the limitation on his travel to the Southern District of New York are in conflict with an alleged right to complete release and further are unreasonable. As to the first, there can be no doubt that bond and movement limitations may be set under the general authority to impose conditions "upon the performance of which the continued liberty of the alien to reside within the bounds of this country may be made to depend." Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275, 33 S.Ct. 31, 32, 57 L.Ed. 218; Ex parte Lee Fong Fook, D.C.N.D.Cal., 74 F.Supp. 68, reversed on other grounds Lee Fong Fook v. Wixon, 9 Cir., 170 F.2d 245, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 914, 69 S.Ct. 604, 93 L.Ed. 1077; Anthony v. Hunter, D.C.Kan., 71 F.Supp. 823; and United States ex rel. Chong Mon v. Day, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 36 F.2d 278, are instances where the courts have set conditions of this nature on the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
But serious doubt may be entertained as to the reasonableness of all of the conditions here set. Their function is essentially to secure the reappearance of relator, should deportation subsequently become possible. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5, 72 S.Ct. 1. Thus the $5,000 bond may be, as alleged, unduly high; petitioner asserts his inability to satisfy it and there is no evidence that he is presently at large. Such a bond should not be of such an amount as substantially to defeat the relator's right to enlargement. And the restriction of his movements to the Southern District of New York seems especially severe in view of the fact that his wife, family, and home are located in Buffalo. Relator's final objection to the absence of a hearing prior to the order of deportation, however, is without substance in view of the holding in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra.
I believe that my brothers agree that Mezei, although he had been long lawfully resident in the United States, was not entitled, when he left in 1948, to reenter as an alien who had "temporarily departed"1; and that he was in precisely the same position as though this had been his first visit. United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279, 52 S.Ct. 143, 76 L.Ed. 291. I assume that we also agree that his presence at Ellis Island did not change his legal situation from what it had been when the inspector excluded him on the ship; he had not "entered" the United States and the order before us is one of "exclusion" and not of "deportation." Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 45 S.Ct. 257, 69 L.Ed. 585 (incidentally that was a far harsher case than this). So much taken for granted, the only question is whether an alien, who comes to this country and is lawfully excluded, may secure a qualified admission because there is no country which will accept him, for I shall take it that that is true of Mezei.
No constitutional question can arise. An alien, who comes to our shores and the ship which bears him, take the chance that he may not be allowed to land. If that chance turns against them, both know, or, if they do not, they are charged with knowledge, that, since the alien cannot land, he must find an asylum elsewhere; or, like the Flying Dutchman, forever sail the seas. When at his urgence we do let him go ashore &#x2014; pendente lite so to say &#x2014; we may give him whatever harborage we choose, until he finds shelter elsewhere if he can. Had Mezei never resided here, I wonder whether this would have been doubted, and, as I have said, we are forced to treat him as though he never had been a resident.
1. § 213(b), Title 8 U.S.C.A.