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Ex Part Moussazadeh (Original) :: February, 2012 :: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Decisions :: Texas Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Ex Part Moussazadeh
Justia.com Opinion Summary: Defendant pled guilty to the offense of murder without an agreement for punishment. On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment (Moussazadeh I). Thereafter, defendant filed an application for habeas relief and the court denied relief because defendant "failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his plea was induced by a misunderstanding of the applicable parole law which formed an essential element of the plea agreement." (Moussazadeh II). Defendant filed a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus (Moussazadeh III) that asserted that trial counsel's mistaken advice regarding parole eligibility rendered his plea involuntary. The court concluded that Padilla v. Kentucky was not applicable to the facts before the court and its decisions in Ex part Evans and Moussazadeh II were incorrect. The court disavowed its prior decisions in those cases to the extent that they (1) required parole-eligibility misinformation to form an essential part of the plea agreement in order to make a showing of an involuntary plea that resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon such misinformation and (2) failed to appropriately recognize the distinction between parole eligibility and parole attainment. Accordingly, upon reconsideration, the court granted relief. Moussazadeh III was dismissed.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by EmailORIGINAL | CONCURRING IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
OF TEXAS NOS. AP-76,439 and AP-74,185
EX PARTE MAX MOUSSAZADEH,
Applicant ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Cochran, and Alcala,
JJ., joined. Keller, P.J., filed a concurring opinion. Meyers, J.,
did not participate. O P I N I O
N Applicant pled guilty to the offense of murder
without an agreement for punishment. The trial court accepted the
plea and sentenced applicant to seventy-five years' incarceration.
On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. Moussazadeh v. State, 962 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.
App.--Houston [14th] 1998, pet. ref'd)(Moussazadeh
I). Thereafter, applicant filed an application for habeas
corpus relief. In a published opinion, we denied relief because
applicant "failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that his plea was induced by a misunderstanding of the applicable
parole law which formed an essential element of the plea
agreement." Ex parte Moussazadeh, 64 S.W.3d 404, 413 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002)
(Moussazadeh II, #AP-74,185). Applicant filed a subsequent
application for writ of habeas corpus, Moussazadeh III,
#AP-76,439, that asserts that trial counsel's mistaken advice
regarding parole eligibility rendered his plea involuntary. We
ordered the subsequent application filed and set for submission.
After applicant filed the subsequent application, he also filed a
suggestion for reconsideration that asks this Court, on its own
motion, to reconsider its decision in Moussazadeh
This Court, on its own initiative, may
reconsider a prior denial of habeas corpus relief. Tex. R. App. P.
79.2(d). We now reconsider, on our own initiative, the claim raised
in applicant's second application for writ of habeas corpus,
Moussazadeh II, (1) and
grant relief. Applicant's subsequent application, Moussazadeh
III, is dismissed.
In Moussazadeh II, we discussed how
applicant, under indictment for a capital murder committed on
September 12, 1993, pled guilty to the reduced offense of murder
without a sentencing agreement. Applicant, a juvenile at the time
of the offense, served as "look-out" while one of his three
co-defendants shot and killed a man during a robbery.
Moussazadeh II, 64 S.W.3d at 406-07. While initially
rejecting the state's offer of a guilty plea to the lesser offense
of murder, ultimately applicant agreed to plead guilty to murder
without a punishment agreement. The agreement included applicant's
promise to testify at a co-defendant's trial, which he did.
Id. at 407-09. During that testimony, applicant indicated
that he understood that, in pleading guilty to the murder offense
and because of parole-eligibility laws, he was facing a
significantly lesser term of imprisonment than he would have faced
if convicted of capital murder. Id. at 408-09. After the
co-defendant's trial ended, applicant was sentenced to seventy-five
years' incarceration without a deadly-weapon finding. Id.
Applicant's claim in his previous writ
application, which we now reconsider, asserted that "counsel's
gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility rendered applicant's
guilty plea involuntary." He argued that "the matter of parole
eligibility was implicitly incorporated in [his] plea agreement."
He also argued that his "guilty plea was involuntary even if the
matter of parole eligibility was not implicitly incorporated in the
plea agreement." We quote from our opinion in Moussazadeh
It is quite possible that no one in this
proceeding knew that the parole law had changed dramatically just
11 days before this robbery-murder. Applicant's parole eligibility
is measured by the law in effect on the date of the offense. Under
the law effective until September 1, 1993, a person
serving a life sentence for capital murder was not eligible for
parole until serving a flat 35 years. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art.
42.18, § 8(b)(2). After September 1, 1993, that person was
not eligible for parole until serving a flat 40 years. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(2) (effective Sept. 1, 1993). Under
the law effective until September 1, 1993, a person whose
conviction included a deadly weapon finding was not eligible for
parole until he had served a flat one-fourth of his sentence, up to
a maximum of 15 years. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(3).
After September 1, 1993, a person whose conviction
contained a deadly weapon finding was required to serve a flat
one-half of the sentence up to a maximum of 30 years. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(3) (effective Sept. 1, 1993). Under
convicted of murder (but whose conviction did not contain a deadly
weapon finding) was eligible for parole when his good time plus
flat time equaled one-quarter of the sentence up to 15 years. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(3). After September 1,
1993, a person convicted of murder was not eligible for parole
until he had served one-half of his sentence or 30 years. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(3) (effective Sept. 1,
1993). The affidavits submitted by both applicant and
his trial counsel with his habeas application state that they did
not know of these statutory changes. Indeed, we may fairly infer
from the record that the judge, prosecutor, and [the
co-defendant's] counsel shared the same misunderstanding. However,
neither trial counsel's nor applicant's affidavits state that the
prosecutor agreed to make applicant's parole eligibility a term or
essential element of the plea agreement. There is no evidence that
the prosecutor ever discussed any specific term or particular
percentage of the sentence that he believed applicant should or
would serve in return for the prosecutor's dropping the charges
from capital murder to straight murder. In sum, we are unable to
find any evidence that proves the prosecutor or judge caused
applicant to plead guilty based upon an incorrect understanding of
Texas parole law. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 409-10.
In Moussazadeh II, we held that a
finding that parole eligibility formed an essential part of a plea
agreement must be founded upon the express terms of the written
plea agreement itself, the formal record at the plea hearing, or
the written or testimonial evidence submitted by both the
prosecution and the applicant in a habeas proceeding. Id.
at 412. We were "unable to conclude . . . that parole eligibility
played any part, implicit or explicit, in the plea agreement made
between the prosecution and applicant." Id. at 413. We
therefore "den[ied] applicant relief because he . . . failed to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his plea was
induced by a misunderstanding of the applicable parole law which
formed an essential element of the plea agreement." Id.
Acknowledging our prior holdings that a guilty plea is not rendered
involuntary simply because the defendant received and relied upon
erroneous advice of counsel concerning parole eligibility, and that
both parole eligibility and parole attainment are highly
speculative future facts, we likewise rejected applicant's
contention that his plea was involuntary regardless of whether the
parole eligibility misinformation was implicitly incorporated into
the plea agreement. Id. at 413-14.
The circumstances surrounding applicant's
conviction are not in dispute. Prior to applicant's plea, trial
counsel advised applicant about his parole eligibility, and that
advice was incorrect. As we stated in Moussazadeh II, "The
affidavits submitted by both applicant and his trial counsel with
his habeas application state that they did not know of these
[recently effective] statutory changes [in the parole-eligibility
law]. Indeed, we may fairly infer from the record that the judge,
prosecutor, and counsel for [the co-defendant against whom
applicant testified] shared the same misunderstanding."
Moussazadeh II, 64 S.W.3d at 410.
Counsel's advice can provide assistance so
ineffective that it renders a guilty plea involuntary. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)(quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); "voluntariness of the
plea depends on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'"). A guilty
plea is not knowing or voluntary if made as a result of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Ex parte Burns, 601 S.W.2d 370, 372
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A defendant's decision to plead guilty when
based upon erroneous advice of counsel is not done voluntarily and
knowingly. Ex parte Battle, 817 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). See also Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452,
459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ("When counsel's representation falls
below this [Strickland] standard, it renders any resulting
guilty plea involuntary.").
Applicant's initial application contended that
"counsel's gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility rendered
applicant's guilty plea involuntary," "the matter of parole
eligibility was implicitly incorporated in [his] plea agreement,"
and that his "plea agreement was involuntary even if the matter of
parole eligibility was not implicitly incorporated in the plea
agreement." Applicant now asks this Court to reconsider his
application in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___,
130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), and overrule our previous decisions in
Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), and
Moussazadeh II.
The state contends that Padilla has no
bearing upon the Court's disposition of applicant's claim and that
Ex parte Evans and Moussazadeh II are "still
based upon sound logic regarding parole eligibility and parole
attainment as being highly speculative circumstances that does
[sic] not render a guilty plea involuntary."
We conclude that both applicant and the state
are partly correct: Padilla is not applicable to the facts
before us, and our decisions in Ex parte Evans and
Moussazadeh II were incorrect. We now disavow our prior
decisions in Ex parte Evans and Moussazadeh II to
the extent that they (1) require parole-eligibility
misinformation to form an essential part of the plea agreement in
order to make a showing of an involuntary plea that resulted from
ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon such misinformation
and (2) fail to appropriately recognize the distinction between
parole eligibility and parole
We have previously held that, because of the
extremely speculative nature of parole attainment, advice from
counsel concerning parole does not render a plea involuntary.
Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d at 279. However, Evans
stated that, because "eligibility for parole is a fluctual [sic]
societal decision; highly subject to change," id. at 278,
an applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
parole eligibility was an affirmative part or essential element of
the plea bargain. (2)
Id. This is an incorrect statement of the
law. While the general eligibility rules for parole may change over
time, the eligibility rules remain the same for a given conviction.
Likewise, an inmate who was eligible for mandatory release at the
time of the offense remains eligible for mandatory release on that
conviction, even if that offense subsequently becomes eligible for
only discretionary mandatory release. "The statute in effect when
the holding offense is committed determines an inmate's eligibility
for release on mandatory supervision or parole." Ex parte
Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Evans held that, because parole attainment was
speculative, its "legal importance on the subject of voluntariness
of a guilty plea" should be "discounted." Ex parte Evans,
690 S.W.2d at 279. Then, based on its incorrect statement of law,
Evans made an erroneous logical leap and applied the same
standard to parole eligibility. As a result, Evans held
that erroneous advice as to either parole eligibility or parole
attainment would not render a plea involuntary. Id. In
Moussazadeh II, we further conflated the concepts of
eligibility and attainment. Although one can determine current parole
eligibility with some degree of certainty, it is really parole
attainment that is significant to a plea bargaining defendant. It
matters very little that a person is eligible for parole in one
year on a ten year sentence if virtually no one is being paroled in
less than seven or eight years on a ten year sentence. It is for
this reason that we have termed parole attainment "too speculative
to warrant being given effect upon" a defendant's guilty
plea. 64 S.W.3d at 413, quoting Evans,
Contrary to our prior decisions, there are
considerable, concrete distinctions between parole
attainment and parole eligibility. Parole
attainment is indeed highly speculative, due to various factors
associated with circumstances surrounding an individual prisoner's
parole application, such as the prisoner's behavior in prison, the
composition and attitude of the parole board, the identity and
attitude of the governor, the population of the prison system, and
regulations governing "good time." See Ex parte Carillo,
687 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Miller, J.,
concurring). The question of parole eligibility, however, elicits a
straightforward answer because an applicant's parole eligibility is
determined by the law in effect on the date of the offense. Ex
parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d at 459. The statutes that govern
the punishment of a particular offense control the issue of parole
eligibility and are not subject to alteration, absent legislative
amendment. Even in the event of a legislative amendment making a
law more stringent, an applicant is subject only to the law
governing parole eligibility at the time the offense was committed.
See Ex parte Alegria, 464 S.W.2d 868, 874-75 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (retroactive application of parole statute that
increased defendant's cumulation of years required for parole
eligibility violated ex post facto clauses of United
States and Texas Constitutions). (3)
Parole-eligibility requirements are direct consequences because
they are a definite and largely automatic result of a guilty plea.
See Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). Parole attainment, on the other hand, is not governed
by statute and is granted at the discretion of the parole
On a claim of involuntary plea, the standard
for the analysis of harm under the Strickland protocol as
expressed in these cases may be stated generally as "but for the
erroneous advice of counsel, the applicant would not have plead
guilty." Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d at 458. See
also Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999); Ex parte Stephenson, 722 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. Crim
When deciding whether to accept or reject a
plea offer, a defendant will likely consider the actual minimum
amount of time he will spend incarcerated. In order to properly
consider his options, a defendant needs accurate information about
the law concerning parole eligibility. Although we continue to
recognize the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences, we now hold that the question of whether parole
eligibility forms an affirmative part or essential element of the
plea agreement is not determinative of this Court's
deficient-performance inquiry under Strickland.
To obtain habeas corpus relief on a claim of
involuntary plea, an applicant must meet both prongs of the
Strickland standard: (1) counsel's performance "was
deficient; and (2) that a probability exists, sufficient to
undermine our confidence in the result, that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel['s] deficient performance." Ex
parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In the
context of involuntary plea, the "different outcome" is choosing
not to plead and instead choosing to go to trial.
Counsel's performance is deficient if it is
shown to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Id. at 51; Strickland, supra, at 687-88. The
constitutionally appropriate level of reasonableness is defined by
the practices and expectations of the legal community and
prevailing professional norms therein. Strickland, supra,
at 688. In situations in which the law is not clear, counsel should
advise a client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
other serious consequences. When a serious consequence is truly
clear, however, counsel has an equally clear duty to give correct
advice. Both failure to provide correct information and providing
incorrect information violate that duty.
The terms of the relevant parole-eligibility
statute are succinct and clear with respect to the consequences of
a guilty plea. Based upon the date in which the instant offense was
committed, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.18 § 8(b)(3) clearly and
succinctly provided that "a person convicted of murder was not
eligible for parole until he had served one-half of his sentence or
thirty years." Moussazadeh II, supra, at 409. Applicant's
counsel could have easily determined the applicable
parole-eligibility requirements simply by reading the text of the
statute. Instead, applicant's counsel failed to inform him of
changes in the parole-eligibility statutes that essentially doubled
the length of time he must serve before becoming eligible for
parole. The fact that the amendments took effect only eleven days
before the offense is of no consequence. (4)
The performance of applicant's counsel was deficient: the
consequences of applicant's plea could have been easily determined
by reading the applicable statute. Parole-eligibility requirements
are presumptively mandatory, and applicant's trial counsel provided
incorrect advice. We conclude that applicant has sufficiently
proved that his counsel was constitutionally deficient.
The portion of applicant's sentence that must be served before
he becomes eligible for parole was double the portion that he was
led to believe he must serve. Based on applicant's affidavit of
January 13, 1997, (5) we also
conclude that applicant would not have pled guilty if he had known
the actual time he would have to serve, and thus prejudice is
shown. We find that the habeas court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are supported by the record and agree that
relief should be granted.
Accordingly, upon reconsideration, we grant
relief. The judgment in this cause is hereby vacated, and applicant
is remanded to the custody of the Harris County Sheriff to answer
the charges set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue
an appropriate bench warrant within ten days after the mandate of
this Court issues. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the
trial court and to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
correctional institutions division. Delivered: February 15, 2012
1. Applicant's first application sought an out-of-time appeal,
which we granted. Ex parte Moussazadeh, No. AP-72,200
(Tex. Crim. App. delivered October 25, 1995) (not designated for
publication). Such an initial application seeking an out-of-time
appeal does not constitute a challenge to the conviction and does
not bar subsequent writ applications. Ex parte McPherson,
32 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
2. See also Ex parte
Trahan, 781 S.W.2d 291, 292-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (written
plea memorandum reflected that applicant would become eligible for
parole consideration after having served one-fourth of sentence;
habeas relief available when that was not the law and terms of plea
agreement were impossible to fulfill).
3. A law that changes the
punishment for a crime after the crime has been committed is an
unconstitutional ex post facto law only if it inflicts a
greater punishment than did the previous law. Ex parte
Tate, 471 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)(op. on
reh'g); Ex parte Scott, 471 S.W.2d 54, 55-6 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971). "[A] statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in
force at the time a crime was committed cannot be regarded as
ex post facto with reference to that crime." Rooney v.
North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905).
4. Parole eligibility is not
speculative. In this case, parole eligibility was statutorily
determined and, at the time of the plea, there was no speculation
about those statutory terms. Those terms of parole
eligibility were clear, succinct, and explicit. It appears
that all parties involved were unaware that parole eligibility had
changed significantly just a few days before the commission of the
5. "Had
Judge Azios, Mr. Jones, or Mr. Cogdell told me that a murder
conviction would require me to serve aggravated time of one-half of
my sentence, up to a maximum of 30 years, even without a deadly
weapon finding, I would not have accepted the plea
bargain." Justiaon