Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/526/813/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-05-20 23:13:38
Document Index: 95067770

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 842', '§ 844', '§ 858', '§ 841', '§ 288', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 922', '§ 841', '§ 848']

RICHARDSON v. UNITED STATES - 526 U.S. 813 - 1999 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 526 > RICHARDSON v. UNITED STATES 526 U.S. 813 (1999) > Full Text
Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Wax-
*Wendy Sibbison, David M. Porter, and Edward M. Chikofsky filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.
The question before us arises out of the trial court's instruction about the statute's "series of violations" requirement. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal to instruct the jury that it must "unanimously agree on which three acts constituted [the] series of violations." App. 21. Instead, the judge instructed the jurors that they "must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses," while adding, "[y]ou do not ... have to agree as to the particular three or more federal narcotics offenses committed by the defendant." Id., at 37. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial judge's instruction. 130 F.3d 765, 779 (1997). Recognizing a split in the Circuits on the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 822 (CA3 1996) (en banc) (jury must unanimously agree on which "violations" constitute the series), with United States v. Hall, 93 F. 3d 126, 129 (CA4 1996) (unanimity with respect to particular "violations" is not required), and United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 350-351 (CADC 1994) (same). We now conclude that unanimity in respect to each individual violation is necessary.
In this case, we must decide whether the statute's phrase "series of violations" refers to one element, namely a "series," in respect to which the "violations" constitute the underlying brute facts or means, or whether those words
United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 490 (1997). In this case, that language may seem to permit either interpretation, that of the Government or of the petitioner, for the statute does not explicitly tell us whether the individual violation is an element or a means. But the language is not totally neutral. The words "violates" and "violations" are words that have a legal ring. A "violation" is not simply an act or conduct; it is an act or conduct that is contrary to law. Black's Law Dictionary 1570 (6th ed. 1990). That circumstance is significant because the criminal law ordinarily entrusts a jury with determining whether alleged conduct "violates" the law, see infra, at 822, and, as noted above, a federal criminal jury must act unanimously when doing so. Indeed, even though the words "violates" and "violations" appear more than 1,000 times in the United States Code, the Government has not pointed us to, nor have we found, any legal source reading any instance of either word as the Government would have us read them in this case. To hold that
The CCE statute's breadth also argues against treating each individual violation as a means, for that breadth aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would risk. Cf. Schad v. Arizona, supra, at 645 (plurality opinion). The statute's word "violations" covers many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees of seriousness. The two chapters of the Federal Criminal Code setting forth drug crimes contain approximately 90 numbered sections, many of which proscribe various acts that may be alleged as "violations" for purposes of the series requirement in the statute. Compare, e. g., 21 U. s. C. §§ 842(a)(4) and (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (providing civil penalties for removing drug labels) and 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) (Supp. III) (simple possession of a controlled substance) with 21 U. S. C. § 858 (endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the drug laws) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (possession with intent to distribute large quantities of drugs). At the same time, the Government in a CCE case may well seek to prove that a defendant, charged as a drug kingpin, has been involved in numerous underlying violations. The first of these considerations increases the likelihood that treating violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of each violation, will cover up wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do. The second consideration significantly aggravates the risk (present at least to a small degree whenever multiple means are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that where there is smoke there must be fire.
The Government's arguments for an interpretation of "violations" as means are not sufficiently powerful to overcome the considerations just mentioned, those of language, tradition, and potential unfairness. The Government, emphasizing the words "continuing series," says that the statute, in seeking to punish drug kingpins, focuses upon the drug business, not upon the particular violations that constitute the business. Brief for United States 18-19. The argument, however, begs the question. Linguistically speaking, the statute punishes those kingpins who are involved in a "continuing series of violations" of the drug laws. And Congress might well have intended a jury to focus upon individual violations in order to assure guilt of the serious
Nor can the Government successfully appeal to a history or tradition of treating individual criminal "violations" as simply means toward the commission of a greater crime. The Government virtually concedes the absence of any such tradition when it says that the statute "departed significantly from common-law models and prior drug laws, creating a new crime keyed to the concept of a 'continuing criminal enterprise.'" Id., at 18. The closest analogies it cites consist of state statutes making criminal such crimes as sexual abuse of a minor. State courts interpreting such statutes have sometimes permitted jury disagreement about a "specific" underlying criminal "incident" insisting only upon proof of a "continuous course of conduct" in violation of the law. E. g., People v. Gear, 19 Cal. App. 4th 86, 89-94, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 263-267 (1993) (continuous sexual abuse of a child); People v. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 69-71, 689 N. E. 2d 335, 343-344 (1997) (criminal sexual assault of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse of a minor); State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 391-392, 556 A. 2d 112, 129 (1989) (committing an act likely to impair the health or morals of a child); Soper v. State, 731 P. 2d 587, 591 (Alaska App. 1987) (sexual assault in the first degree). With one exception, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 288.5(a) (West Supp. 1998), the statutes do not define the statutory crime in terms that require the commission of other predicate crimes by the defendant. The state practice may well respond to special difficulties of proving individual underlying criminal acts, People v. Gear, supra, at 90-92, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 264-265, which difficulties are absent here. See infra, at 823-824. The cases are not federal but state, where this Court has not held that the Constitution imposes a jury-unanimity requirement. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S., at 366 (Powell, J., concurring). And their special subject matter indicates that they represent an exception; they do not represent a general
In fact, federal criminal law's treatment of recidivism offers a competing analogy no more distant than the analogy the Government offers. See Garrett v. United States, supra, at 782 (the statute originated in a "recidivist provision ... that provided for enhanced sentences"). If one looks to recidivism, one finds that commission of a prior crime will lead to an enhanced punishment only when a relevant factfinder, judge, or jury has found that the defendant committed that specific individual prior crime. Where sentencing is at issue, the judge, enhancing a sentence in light of recidivism, must find a prior individual conviction, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 4A1.1, 4B1.1 (Nov. 1998), which means that an earlier factfinder (e. g., a unanimous federal jury in the case of a federal crime) found that the defendant committed the specific earlier crime, §§ 4A1.2(a)(1), 4B1.2(c). Where a substantive statute is at issue, for example, a statute forbidding a felon's possession of a firearm, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g) (1994 ed. and Supp. II!), the relevant precondition, namely that the gun possessor be a felon, means at a minimum that an earlier factfinder (e. g., a unanimous federal jury in the case of a federal crime) found that the defendant in fact committed that earlier individual crime. The Government's interpretation is inconsistent with this practice, for it, in effect, imposes punishment on a defendant for the underlying crimes without any factfinder having found that the defendant committed those crimes. If there are federal statutes reflecting a different practice or tradition, the Government has not called them to our attention, which suggests that any such statute would represent a lesser known exception to ordinary practice. Cf. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S., at 633 (plurality opinion) ("[I]t is an assumption of our system of criminal justice ... that no person may be punished criminally save upon proof of some specific illegal conduct").
The dissent, but not the Government, argues that the prosecution will now have to prove that the defendant derived substantial income or resources from, and that five persons were involved with, the specific underlying crimes the jury unanimously agrees were committed. See post, at 830. To the extent the dissent suggests that those other statutory requirements must be satisfied with respect to each underlying crime, it is clearly wrong. Those requirements must be met with respect to the series, which, at a minimum, permits the jury to look at all of the agreed-upon violations in combination. Even if the jury were limited to the agreedupon violations, we still fail to see why prosecutions would prove unduly difficult. The dissent writes as if it follows from its reading that conviction under the CCE statute depends on specific proof of specific sales to specific street-level users. See post, at 832. That is not true. A specific transaction is not an element of possession with intent to distribute under 21 U. S. C. § 841. It would be enough to present testimony, like that of Michael Sargent partially recounted by the dissent, showing that the defendant supplied a runner in his organization with large quantities of drugs on or about
The Court today reasons that the first enumerated element in the subparagraph is not an element at all; instead, it is shorthand for some number of other elements corresponding to the individual violations in the series. The jury
Nowhere in the text of the statute or its legislative history does Congress show an interest in the particular predicate violations constituting the continuing series. Rather, the CCE offense is aimed at what Congress perceived to be a peculiar evil: the drug kingpin. The Court's observation that there is a tradition requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law, ante, at 818, simply restates the question presented. The Court has made clear in an earlier case that Congress did not "inten[d] to substitute the CCE offense for the underlying predicate offenses in the case of a big-time drug dealer," but rather intended "to permit prosecution for CCE in addition to prosecution for the predicate offenses." Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773, 785, 786 (1985). The CCE statute provides a specific remedy to combat criminal organizations, in large part because of the perceived inade-
The remaining elements of the CCE definition likewise target drug kingpins. With respect to the requirement of action in concert with five or more other persons, every Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has concluded that the element aims the statute at enterprises of a certain size, so the identity of the individual supervisees is irrelevant. See, e. g., United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 255 (CADC 1992) (per curiam) (panel including Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Clarence Thomas, JJ.); United States v. Garcia, 988 F.2d 965, 969 (CA9 1993); United States v. Moorman, 944 F.2d 801, 803 (CAll 1991); United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159 (CA6 1991); United States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (CA5 1989); United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (CA3 1989); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1074-1075 (CAl1987); United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358,364 (CA7 1985). As for the remaining elements, it is undisputed that the jury need not agree unanimously on whether the defendant was a supervisor as opposed to an organizer or other manager, because the leader-
The Court seems to proceed on the assumption that any three small transactions involving a few grams will establish the requisite series. That is not so. In my view, the necessary consequence of the Court's ruling is that the three specific crimes must themselves be the ones, in the words
In addition, the individual violations making up a continuing series may not always be easy to prove with particularity. The Court assures us that "witnesses should not have inordinate difficulty pointing to specific transactions." Ante, at 823. It then asks the rhetorical question: "Or, if they do have difficulty, would that difficulty in proving individual specific transactions not tend to cast doubt upon the existence of the requisite 'series'?" Ibid. Quite apart from the point already mentioned that the continuing series must relate to the elements of action in concert and receipt of substantial income, the answer to that question is "no." The evidence in this case so demonstrates.
State course-of-conduct crimes provide an analog to the federal CCE statute. A crime may be said to involve a continuing course of conduct because it is committed over a period of time, like kidnaping, harboring a fugitive, or failing to provide support for a minor. In such cases, the jury need not agree unanimously on individual acts that occur during the ongoing crime. See generally, e. g., B. Witkin &
Having failed to confront the acknowledged purpose of the statute, the Court invokes the principle of constitutional doubt. Just last Term we warned that overuse of the doctrine risks aggravating the friction between the branches of Government "by creating (through the power of precedent) statutes foreign to those Congress intended, simply through fear of a constitutional difficulty that, upon analysis, will evaporate." Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 238 (1998). As discussed in Part II, infra, the CCE statute in my view passes constitutional muster. Yet the
There is no indication that Congress had any concerns about the statute's constitutionality. The Court seems to imply the contrary by citing Garrett for the proposition that Congress "sought increased procedural protections for defendants" in making CCE a separate crime, ante, at 820 (paraphrasing Garrett, 471 U. S., at 783-784). Taken in context, the passage from Garrett supports neither the Court's reading of the statute nor its invocation of constitutional doubt. Garrett held the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar prosecution for the CCE offense after a prior conviction for one of the underlying predicate offenses. The passage in question discussed the debate in Congress over whether to impose enhanced punishments for drug kingpins by means of a separate offense or by means of a sentencing factor. The House Report cited by the Court noted that an amendment by Representative Dingell "made engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise a new and distinct offense with all its elements triable in court." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1444, pt. 1, p. 84 (1970). That is of course true, but it begs the question presented in this case, namely, whether the existence of a series is itself an element, or whether the individual offenses in that series are elements. To say that the jury must agree unanimously on the elements provides no guidance in determining what those elements are. The competing provision from Representative Poff, moreover, which would have treated engaging in a CCE as a sentencing factor, was also adopted, with the result that "both approaches are contained in the statute." Garrett, supra, at 784 (citing 21 U. S. C. §§ 848,849,850). There is thus no reason to think Congress thought it necessary for the jury to agree on which
The CCE statute does not in any way implicate the suggestion in Schad that an irrational single crime consisting of, for instance, either robbery or failure to file a tax return would offend due process. See id., at 633, 650. Although the continuing series may consist of different drug crimes, the mere proof of a series does not suffice to convict. The Government must also prove action in concert with five or more persons, a leadership role for the defendant with respect to those persons, and substantial income or resources derived from the continuing series. The presence of these additional elements distinguishes the CCE statute from a simple recidivism statute, notwithstanding the Court's attempt to draw an analogy between the two. See ante, at 822.
With regard to the fundamental fairness of the alternative means of satisfying the continuing series element, the plurality opinion in Schad indicated that the Court should look to see whether the alleged predicate offenses making up the series in each particular case are morally equivalent. The alternative means of fulfilling an element "must reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpabil-
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