Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FCO%2020110923050/U.S.%20v.%20MITRANO
Timestamp: 2017-06-26 03:41:22
Document Index: 323174475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 228', '§ 228', '§ 458', '§ 2', '§ 228', '§ 5']

U.S. v. MITRANO | 658 F.3d 117 (2011) | Leagle.com
658 F.3d 117 (2011)
U.S. v. MITRANO
No. 09-2482.
Citing Case 658 F.3d 117 (2011)
Peter MITRANO, Defendant, Appellant.
Heard June 7, 2011.
Decided September 23, 2011.
Judith H. Mizner , Assistant Federal Public Defender, for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe , Assistant United States Attorney, with whom John P. Kacavas , United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Perez-Melendez, 599 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2010); see also United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir.2009) ("We review preserved challenges to sufficiency of the evidence de novo.").
A trial court must enter a judgment of acquittal when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is insufficient to sustain a conviction. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). "If a reasonable jury could have found that the government had proven each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction." Perez-Melendez, 599 F.3d at 40 (quoting United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 7 (1st Cir.2009)). "We have described this standard of review as `formidable,' and defendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle on appeal." Id. (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir.2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mitrano first contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for "willfully" failing to pay child support. The willfulness standard used in 18 U.S.C. § 228 was borrowed from the statutes criminalizing willful failure to pay taxes. United States v. Smith, 278 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir.2002). Accordingly, courts should interpret willfulness in the context of child support obligations in the same way that courts have interpreted it in the context of felony tax provisions. Id. at 38. Willfulness is "a voluntary and intentional act in the context of a defendant's ability to pay." Id. (emphasis omitted). It is not a crime to fail to comply with the statute based on a good faith misunderstanding of its requirements. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). Mere disagreement with the law, however, is not a defense. Id. at 202 n. 8, 111 S.Ct. 604.
Mitrano argues that he did not willfully fail to pay child support because he had a good faith belief that the underlying child support order was invalid.3 See United States v. Kerley, 544 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir.2008) ("A defendant found to have acted willfully may negate willfulness by showing . . . that, because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good faith belief that he was not violating the legal duty.") (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. 604). "A good faith belief need not be objectively reasonable to negate willfulness." Id. Mitrano stresses the strength of his belief, which he says shows the absence of the willfulness required under 18 U.S.C. § 228. He also argues that continuing to maintain his position in the face of its rejection by a multitude of courts is not inconsistent with holding a good faith belief, citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), as an example of a case in which a position which previously had been rejected by many courts ultimately prevailed.
Given the number of courts that repudiated Mitrano's claims and appeals, we find that the jury reasonably could have refused to accept that Mitrano actually held a good faith belief that the child support order was void. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04, 111 S.Ct. 604 ("Of course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties"); United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2006) (jury "acted well within its proper province" by rejecting a "somewhat fanciful claim" advanced by the defendant). The jury also could have reasonably concluded that even if Mitrano had a good faith belief that the order was void, it was only because he intentionally avoided re-evaluating his position in light of all the courts which rejected it—in other words, as we discuss later, he willfully blinded himself to his legal duty to pay child support.
Smith, 278 F.3d at 37. Significantly, however, the government only needs to prove that the defendant was able to pay some portion of his child support obligation. Id. at 40 n.5.
But Mitrano contends that in determining his ability to pay child support, we can consider only his income, not his assets. In support of this proposition, he cites to New Hampshire's child support guidelines and cases interpreting them. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 458-C; In re Jerome, 150 N.H. 626, 632, 843 A.2d 325, 330 (2004); In re Plaisted, 149 N.H. 522, 526, 824 A.2d 148, 151 (2003). Our determination as to whether the government met its burden of demonstrating Mitrano's ability to pay is not constrained by state law governing the calculation of the amount of child support a parent must pay. In the context of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is limited to whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it supports the jury's conclusion that Mitrano had the ability to pay at least some portion of his child support obligation. See Smith, 278 F.3d at 40 n. 5. We find that it does.
As we have already noted, Mitrano argued at trial that he did not willfully fail to pay his child support. To reflect this defense theory, Mitrano's counsel requested a jury instruction to the effect that if the defendant believed in good faith that he was not subject to the underlying order, even if he was mistaken, he committed no crime. The district court agreed to give the good faith instruction but stated that "the only way I can give your good faith and lack of knowledge of law instruction is if I give willful blindness with it." So the question before us is whether the willful blindness instruction was appropriate.
Mitrano contends that because he conceded at trial that he knew about the child support order, the district court should not have instructed the jury on willful blindness. He says that such an instruction is appropriate only in cases in which a defendant intentionally avoids learning of a legal requirement. The government responds that the evidence supported the instruction because it showed that Mitrano "undertook a deliberate course of ignoring the multiple court rulings holding that the child support order against him was valid and enforceable."
"This Court has utilized both de novo and deferential standards of review" when reviewing claims that a court erred in providing the jury with a willful blindness instruction. Azubike, 564 F.3d at 66 n. 5. The level of scrutiny may depend on the nature of the challenge. See id. We need not determine the issue in this case, because applying either standard, the evidence supported the district court's decision to charge the jury on willful blindness. See id.; United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 85 (1st Cir.2006).
"A willful blindness instruction is appropriate if (1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3) the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge." Azubike, 564 F.3d at 66. "In determining whether the facts suggest the type of deliberate avoidance warranting a willful blindness instruction, `we must consider whether the record evidence reveals flags of suspicion that, uninvestigated, suggest willful blindness.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mitrano's argument with respect to the second Azubike requirement fares no better. He asserts that because there was no evidence showing that he had failed to consult current law, the facts did not suggest that he engaged in a conscious course of deliberate ignorance. Admittedly, he did not claim ignorance of the child support order, or of the decisions rejecting his position. But he did, and still does, claim ignorance of the fact that the child support order imposes on him a legally binding obligation to pay child support. Claiming not to know of the legal obligation after it had been determined in twelve decisions issued by six different courts in four different states and two federal districts, acting over a course of more than seven years, clearly suggested that Mitrano engaged in a "conscious course of deliberate ignorance." See Azubike, 564 F.3d at 66. Accordingly, the district court properly charged the jury on willful blindness.
Mitrano did not object to the guidelines calculation at sentencing and therefore we review for plain error. United States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2007). To vacate his sentence under the plain error standard, Mitrano must show that "(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was clear and obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) the error impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.2007)). The third factor, whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, "translates, in the sentencing context, into the requirement of `a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence.'" Id. at 83 (quoting United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir.2009)).
The government bears the burden of proving loss by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Curran, 525 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir.2008). In calculating the amount of loss, the district court needs to make only a reasonable estimate of the amount of loss. Id. A party "dissatisfied with the sentencing court's quantification of the amount of loss in a particular case must go a long way" to have it set aside. Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398, 407 (1st Cir.1995)).
The Sentencing Guidelines define the loss amount as "the amount of child support that the defendant willfully failed to pay." U.S.S.G. § 2J1.1 cmt. n. 2. As we have just described, the evidence showed that Mitrano had sufficient income-earning potential and assets to pay his child support obligation, but that he made no payments. The district court could properly have relied on that evidence to find that the government met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Mitrano willfully failed to pay the entire amount of overdue child support. Accordingly, it did not err by using the entire amount due to calculate Mitrano's guideline sentencing range.4
FootNotes 1. In 2004, a New Hampshire court sent Kelly $14,000, which had been posted to secure Mitrano's release after he was arrested on an unrelated matter.
3. Mitrano did not testify at trial. His belief came into evidence through Kelly's testimony. She testified that "[h]e always said he didn't have to pay, that this order is void as a matter of law, and no one agreed with him, but he always said it's void as a matter of law. He didn't say he couldn't pay. He said he doesn't have to pay."
4. Mitrano's reply brief contends that the district court erred by including interest in the amount of loss used to calculate his sentence. We need not reach the issue because it made no difference in this case. Mitrano was sentenced to 24 months, the statutory maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 228(c)(2), based on U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1. He has failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have received a lower sentence if interest had been excluded from the loss amount calculation. See Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d at 83.