Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/700/1156/117304/
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 20:54:34
Document Index: 50951547

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1254', '§ 1105', '§ 1254', '§ 1105', '§ 1105', '§ 1254', '§ 1254']

Sebastian Diaz-salazar, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Board Ofimmigration Appeals, Respondents, 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1983) :: Justia
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Sebastian Diaz-salazar, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Board Ofimmigration Appeals, Respondents, 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1983) Argued Sept. 15, 1982. Decided March 1, 1983
Petitioner Sebastian Diaz-Salazar ("Diaz-Salazar") asks us to review the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") denial of his petition to stay deportation and to reopen deportation proceedings. Two consolidated petitions are before us: No. 82-1130, a petition for review of an oral denial of a motion to stay deportation, and No. 82-1610, a petition to review the denial of Diaz-Salazar's motion to reopen proceedings to consider whether his deportation should be suspended on grounds of extreme hardship pursuant to section 244 of the Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") also has filed a motion to dismiss the petition in No. 82-1130 for lack of jurisdiction and to reprimand petitioner's counsel and assess double costs. We grant the petition to dismiss No. 82-1130, but deny the motion to reprimand and assess costs. In No. 82-1610, we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen.
Petitioner, Sebastian Diaz-Salazar, entered the United States illegally in 1974 and has been living and working in Chicago since that time. The Immigration and Naturalization Service moved to deport him in September of 1980, and at an October hearing he was granted voluntary deportation within 90 days. Diaz-Salazar appealed the decision to deport him to the Board of Immigration Appeals and requested a joint hearing with the woman whom he considered to be his common-law wife.1 The BIA denied this appeal on February 4, 1981, and on March 27, the INS set the date of deportation for April 22, 1981. On April 3, 1981, Diaz-Salazar filed a petition for review with this court and obtained a stay of deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (3) (1976).
By late May, Diaz-Salazar had acquired seven years residence in the United States and thus became eligible to apply for suspension of deportation on grounds of extreme hardship pursuant to section 244 of the Immigration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254.2 In the months of June and July, he divorced his Mexican wife and legally married the woman with whom he had been living in Chicago. On August 6, 1981, he filed an application to suspend deportation pursuant to section 244, and on August 7, 1981, his previous petition before this court was dismissed as moot.
During the pendency of this appeal, the INS set January 29, 1982 as a new date for deportation. However, the INS apparently had not transmitted the record in the case to the BIA at this time; thus the BIA could not move forward expeditiously with the appeal. Diaz-Salazar's counsel therefore telephoned the BIA on January 25 to request a stay of deportation, but this request was orally denied. Counsel also filed a petition for habeas corpus, but it was denied by Judge Leighton on the grounds that the district court had no jurisdiction to review the case. On January 26, counsel filed a petition to review the oral denial of the motion to stay deportation, one of the two petitions which are before us for review (No. 82-1130). On March 30, 1982, the BIA formally denied Diaz-Salazar's motion to reopen, on the grounds that he had failed to establish a prima facie case that he would be able to obtain suspension of deportation pursuant to section 244. This denial is also before us for review (No. 82-1610), pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We shall consider these two petitions and the accompanying motion to dismiss in order.
Our jurisdiction to review orders of the BIA is limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) to "final orders of deportation." A denial of a stay of deportation is not such a final order. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 88 S. Ct. 1970, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1968); Reyes v. INS, 571 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1978). This court does not, therefore, have jurisdiction to review the oral denial of a request for the stay of deportation at issue in No. 82-1130.
A denial of a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is, on the other hand, a final order of deportation and thus reviewable by this court. Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18, 85 S. Ct. 156, 13 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1964). We will not overturn a decision of the BIA denying such a motion, however, absent an abuse of discretion. Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Tupacyupanqui-Marin v. INS, 447 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1971).
In order to prevail in a motion to reopen deportation proceedings for consideration under the extreme hardship standard of section 244, an alien must establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief under that section of the Immigration Act. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 141, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 1029, 67 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1980). Thus, unless Diaz-Salazar presented a prima facie case that he would be subjected to extreme hardship of the sort contemplated by section 244, the BIA was entirely within its allowable discretion in denying his petition to reopen. Moreover, the Wang case instructs us that the application of the extreme hardship standard in an individual case is a task allotted primarily to the INS and not to the courts. Id. at 144, 101 S. Ct. at 1031. Although the agency must consider all relevant factors in making its determination, there is no evidence here that the INS has failed to do so or that the agency abused its discretion in concluding that the facts of this case did not place it within the category defined as extreme hardship by the case law.
It is well established that economic hardship by itself does not constitute extreme hardship under section 244. See, e.g., Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1981). Moreover, economic conditions in an alien's homeland are not a dispositive factor in a suspension hearing. See, e.g., Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1982). Even the Ninth Circuit cases decided after the Wang decision, upon which petitioner relies, require that some factor beyond the general misery attendant upon deportation present itself in order to justify relief under the extreme hardship standard. Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981) (health problems of child); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (advanced age of petitioner); Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981) (separation of teenage son from divorced father and from completion of high school).
INS concedes that this court has jurisdiction to review the petition for review filed in No. 82-1610. The issue here is whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) abused its discretion in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, petitioner's motion to reopen his deportation hearing in order to apply for suspension of deportation pursuant to Section 244(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (i). The motion was supported by affidavits to the effect that petitioner is gainfully employed in this country, earning $20,000 a year, and he and his present wife have been living in the United States for more than seven years and are the parents of two minor children, both under three years of age, born in the United States and thus became citizens of this country. This is evidence of extreme hardship which the children and their father and mother would suffer if the father was deported. Affidavits were also submitted as to the excellent reputation and industry of petitioner, an emigrant with a third grade education from Mexico to this country and as to his gainful employment here, which he was unable to secure in Mexico. The economy, as a matter of common knowledge, is severely depressed in Mexico at the present time and the United States for some time has been confronted with serious problems in coping with unlawful migration of many unemployed Mexican citizens to this country, who crossed the broad borders of 2,000 miles between the two countries in order to obtain work and earn a living in the United States, which they could not obtain in Mexico. Petitioner also submitted to BIA a social evaluation of petitioner and his family by Ms. Luisa P. Maurer, MSW, with her resume attached thereto, which indicated that the deportation of petitioner would create an extreme hardship to petitioner, his wife and minor children and she would so testify at the hearing. BIA declined to reopen to hear this testimony of Ms. Maurer which was not previously available. BIA thus abused its discretion.1
In denying petitioner's motion to reopen the deportation proceedings for consideration of an application for suspension of deportation under Section 244(a) (i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, INS and the majority rely principally upon a Per Curiam decision of the Supreme Court in INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 101 S. Ct. 1027, 67 L. Ed. 2d 123, rehearing denied, 451 U.S. 964, 101 S. Ct. 2037, 68 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1981), Per Curiam. INS does not indicate that the Per Curiam related only to a ruling of the court not to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and give the case plenary consideration, and the case was never admitted to the Supreme Court for decision on its merits. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun voted to grant the petition for certiorari and give the case plenary consideration.
In Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980), the court sitting en banc stated:
The mere fact that an alien's child has been born in the United States does not entitle the alien to any favored status in seeking discretionary relief from deportation. E.g. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc). However, as we have repeatedly stated, the Board must consider what effect the deportation will have on the citizen child and whether the child will suffer extreme hardship. Because the nature and extent of hardship to a citizen child is difficult to discern without a hearing, circumstances that suggest that the alien's deportation would cause extreme hardship to his child warrant a hearing. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
In Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1981), the court stated:
Under Sec. 244(a), economic loss alone does not establish extreme hardship, but it is still a fact to consider in determining eligibility for suspension of deportation. Jong Shik Choe v. INS, 597 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1979); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978). In addition, the Board must consider personal and emotional hardships which result from deportation. Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d at 655. Included among these are the personal hardships which flow naturally from an economic loss--decreased health care, educational opportunities, and general material welfare. The most important single factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States. In fact, this court has stated that separation from family alone may establish extreme hardship. Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d at 593-94; Yong v. INS, 459 F.2d 1004, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972); see Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 104-05 (3rd Cir. 1979).
In Wright v. INS, 673 F.2d 153, 158 (6th Cir. 1982), the court not only granted the petition for review, it also set aside the order of deportation and remanded with instructions to dismiss the order to show cause, thereby terminating the deportation proceeding. The court stated:
In Rios-Pineda v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Etc., 673 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1982), the court held:
Where aliens following their entry without inspection had been physically present in United States continuously since May 1, 1974 and had met seven-year continuous presence requirement during pendency of appeal, where husband alien in addition to being homeowner had been gainfully employed since 1974, and where both aliens' children were born in United States and has resided there since birth, aliens were entitled to consideration and ruling on their claim that they were entitled to suspension of deportation on a proper motion to reopen. Immigration and Nationality Act, Sec. 244(a) (1), 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1254(a) (1).2
The order of the Board denying petitioner's motion to reopen his deportation hearing in order to apply for suspension of deportation pursuant to Section 244(a) (c) of the Act should be vacated and set aside, and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing and determination of the merits of the case.
Section 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254, provides that an alien who has been present in the United States for seven years and is of good moral character may apply for suspension of deportation on grounds of extreme hardship to himself or to his spouse or family members who are U.S. citizens or residents
Other pertinent decisions are Sida v. INS, 665 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1981); Prapavat v. INS, 662 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981); Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981); Hee Yng Ahn v. INS, 651 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981); Santana-Figuero v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978)