Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/building-material-construction-teamsters-union-v-farrell-30787
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 11:32:18
Document Index: 50756702

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 158', '§ 3500', '§ 16', '§ 3', '§ 3500', '§ 3502', '§ 3504', '§ 3504']

Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell - 41 Cal.3d 651 - Thu, 04/03/1986 | California Supreme Court Resources
Home > Opinions > Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell
Citation 41 Cal.3d 651
Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell
Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 688; 715 P.2d 648
The relevant facts are not in dispute. One vacant, full-time position and one filled, part-time position in class 7355, "Truck Driver," were deleted from the Laguna Honda Hospital budget for fiscal year 1980-1981 by the Department of Public Health of the City and County of San Francisco (DPH). At the same time, three new full-time positions in class 7524, "Institutional Utility Worker," were added to the Laguna Honda budget. The duties of the eliminated truck driver positions were to be performed by the new utility workers. The truck drivers were in plaintiff union's bargaining unit, but the utility workers were not. [41 Cal.3d 656]
Plaintiff contends the MMBA required defendants to give prior notice of, and meet and confer about, three related actions: (1) the elimination of the [41 Cal.3d 657] truck driver positions at Laguna Honda; (2) the reassignment of truck driver duties to institutional utility workers, who were outside appellant's bargaining unit; and (3) the transfer of Metaxas to a full-time job at San Francisco General. Plaintiff argues that these actions were taken unilaterally and were therefore in violation of the MMBA.
It is clear that plaintiff was not given "reasonable written notice" prior to the employee reorganization at Laguna Honda Hospital, and defendants do not contend otherwise. Plaintiff's requests to "meet and confer" about the reorganization after it had been completed were also denied. [1a] The [41 Cal.3d 658] issue is therefore whether the reorganization was within the "scope of representation."
[2] In construing the arguably vague, overlapping provisions of section 3504, we consider federal as well as California precedents. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616 [116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971].) Federal decisions have frequently guided our interpretation of state labor provisions the language of which parallels that of federal statutes. (Ibid; Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 391 [113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453].) Here, the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" was taken directly from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 158(d)). (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, at pp. 615-616.) Although the NLRA does not contain wording similar to the second key phrase in section 3504 -- which excepts the "merits, necessity, or organization" of government services from the scope of representation -- this phrase was added by the Legislature to incorporate the limitations on the scope of mandatory bargaining that had been developed by the federal courts in their interpretations of the NLRA. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, at p. 616.) Thus, because the federal precedents reflect the same interests as those underlying section 3504, they furnish reliable authority in construing that section. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, at pp. 616-617; San Jose Peace Officer's Assn. v. City of San Jose (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 935, 943 [144 Cal.Rptr. 634].) fn. 2 [41 Cal.3d 659]
[3] For an action by an employer to fall within the scope of representation, and thus be subject to the mandatory bargaining requirements of the MMBA, it must have a significant effect on the "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" of the bargaining-unit employees. (Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N.L.R.B. (4th Cir. 1967) 387 F.2d 542, 548; see Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 223 [13 L.Ed.2d 233, 245-246, 85 S.Ct. 398] (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.).) It is clear that the permanent transfer of work away from a bargaining unit often has a significant effect on the wages, hours, and working conditions of bargaining-unit employees. (See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at pp. 209-211 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 237-239]; Road Sprinkler Fitters Local U., etc. v. N.L.R.B. (D.C.Cir. 1982) 676 F.2d 826, 833-834; Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community Services Dist. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 116, 119 [119 Cal.Rptr. 182].) Courts have found violations of the duty to bargain, for example, when an employer has transferred bargaining-unit work to an independent contractor (e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at p. 209 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 237-238]; Amcar Division, ACF Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir. 1979) 592 F.2d 422, 428; International Union, U.A., A. & A. Imp. Wkrs. v. N.L.R.B. (D.C. Cir. 1967) 381 F.2d 265, 266, cert. den., 389 U.S. 857 [19 L.Ed.2d 122, 88 S.Ct. 82]) or to established or newly hired employees outside the bargaining unit (see, e.g., Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. N.L.R.B. (1st Cir. 1981) 652 F.2d 1055, 1088; Office and Professional Emp. Int. U., Local 425 v. N.L.R.B. (D.C.Cir. 1969) 419 F.2d 314, 316). fn. 3
The employer is required to bargain, however, only if the work transfer adversely affects the bargaining unit in question. (Road Sprinkler Fitters Local U., etc. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 676 F.2d at p. 831; see Office and Professional Emp. Int. U., Local 425 v. N.L.R.B., supra, 419 F.2d at p. 321; International Union, U.A., A. & A. Imp. Wkrs. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 381 F.2d at p. 266.) It is clear that a bargaining unit is adversely affected when a work transfer results in layoffs or the failure to rehire bargaining-unit workers who would otherwise have been rehired. (See Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 207 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 236-237]; Amcar Division, ACF Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 592 F.2d at p. 428.) Adverse effects, however, have also been found when bargaining-unit [41 Cal.3d 660] employees have lost the opportunity to perform overtime or other types of highly paid work (e.g., Office and Professional Emp. Int. U., Local 425 v. N.L.R.B., supra, at p. 31; Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community Services Dist., supra, at p. 119) or even when the laid-off employees have been rehired at similar jobs but the bargaining unit itself was reduced in size (e.g., International Union, U.A., A. & A. Imp. Wkrs. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 381 F.2d at p. 266).
[5] Even when the action of an employer has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees, the employer may yet be excepted from the duty to bargain under the "merits, necessity, or organization" language of section 3504. If an action is taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision, it is within the scope of representation only if the employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question. (First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB (1980) 452 U.S. 666, 686 [69 L.Ed.2d 318, 335-336, 101 S.Ct. 2573]; see Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [143 Cal.Rptr. 255].)
[1b] In the case at bar, defendants similarly terminated employment positions and reassigned work outside the bargaining unit. The new utility workers were apparently hired to undertake the same work as plaintiff's workers had previously done, and to perform that work under similar conditions. Defendants contend that Fibreboard and other similar cases cited by plaintiff, are "obviously distinguishable" because they "involved wholesale subcontracting out of services formerly performed by employees." We believe, however, that Fibreboard cannot be so easily dismissed. As noted above, the principal purposes of the MMBA's mandatory bargaining requirements are to promote communication between public employers and employees and to improve personnel management. (§ 3500.) Defendants give no reasons why these purposes are not served here as well as in cases involving "wholesale subcontracting." They also ignore the fact that the holding in Fibreboard has been extended to include situations that do not [41 Cal.3d 661] involve "wholesale subcontracting." (See, e.g., Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 652 F.2d 1055; Office and Professional Emp. Int. U., Local 425 v. N.L.R.B., supra, 419 F.2d 314.)
California cases have also recognized that the transfer of bargaining-unit work to nonbargaining-unit employees is a proper subject for negotiation. (See Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community Services Dist. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 116, 119 [119 Cal.Rptr. 182]; cf. Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 726, 738-739 [201 Cal.Rptr. 1, 677 P.2d 1170].) In Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community Services Dist., supra, at page 119, a public employer unilaterally adopted a new policy requiring the use of temporary employees for overtime work, effectively depriving the regular employees of their customary priority in seeking such work. Because the workload and compensation of the regular employees were affected, the court held that section 3505 required the community service district to meet and confer with employee representatives before the new policy could be implemented. (Ibid.)
Defendants seek to distinguish Dublin by claiming that plaintiff has not alleged or proven that the decisions herein had any effect on matters within [41 Cal.3d 662] the scope of representation. The facts are otherwise. First, Metaxas, a member of plaintiff's bargaining unit, lost his part-time job because of defendants' decision to reassign bargaining unit work outside the unit. The fact that he was offered a full-time position elsewhere does not mean he was not significantly affected. The job offered was at a different location, involved different work hours, and would have required him to quit a lucrative part-time position, thereby reducing his overall weekly earnings. Second, the actions also had an effect on the bargaining unit itself, because one and one-half bargaining-unit positions were eliminated from the Laguna Honda budget.
[6] Defendants next argue that even if their actions had an adverse effect on the bargaining unit, the decision to transfer the work outside the unit fell [41 Cal.3d 663] within the "fundamental managerial policy" exception to the MMBA. Federal and California decisions both recognize the right of employers to make unconstrained decisions when fundamental management or policy choices are involved. In his concurrence in Fibreboard, Justice Stewart declared that management decisions that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control" or are "fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise" should be excluded from the mandatory bargaining requirements of the NLRA. (Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 223 [13 L.Ed.2d at p. 246] (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.).) Thus federal cases have held an employer need not bargain about a decision to shut down a plant for economic reasons (N.L.R.B. v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co. (3d Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 191), nor about a decision to cancel a contract with a customer, even though layoffs result from such cancellation (First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB (1981) 452 U.S. 666, 686 [69 L.Ed.2d 318, 335-336, 101 S.Ct. 2573]). When an employer makes a fundamental management decision that significantly affects the wages, hours, or working conditions of its employees, a balancing test applies: the employer's need for unfettered authority in making decisions that strongly affect a firm's profitability is weighed against the benefits to employer-employee relations of bargaining about such decisions. (Ibid.)
This court has noted that the phrase in section 3504 excepting the "merits, necessity, or organization" of government services from the scope of representation was intended to incorporate this "general managerial policy" exception from the federal cases into the MMBA. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d 608, 616.) Thus, in State Assn. of Real Property Agents v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 206 [147 Cal.Rptr. 786], the court held there was no violation of meet and confer requirements when an employer unilaterally decided that layoffs would be necessary because of budget reductions and meet and confer discussions with employees were only held regarding the method of implementing the layoffs.
Respondents draw an analogy to the cases allowing fundamental management decisions to be made unilaterally even when layoffs result from such decisions. Decisions to close a plant or to reduce the size of an entire workforce, however, are of a different order from a plan to transfer work duties between various employees. The former directly affect the amount of work that can be accomplished or the nature and extent of the services that can be provided, and are therefore "fundamental management" decisions. The decision to transfer bargaining-unit work to nonunit employees in this case had no effect on the services provided by the hospital, but directly affected [41 Cal.3d 664] the wages, hours, and working conditions of the hospital employees. Thus, the work transfer was a suitable subject for collective bargaining.
Defendants also claim that their action was a fundamental policy decision that is exempt from the bargaining requirements of the MMBA. They rely primarily on Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931 [143 Cal.Rptr. 255], and San Jose Peace Officer's Assn. v. City of San Jose (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 935 [144 Cal.Rptr. 638]. In Berkeley, the city unilaterally allowed a member of the citizen's police review commission to attend police department hearings regarding citizen complaints against police and to send a member of the department to review commission meetings. The court held that this type of important policy decision could be made without conferring with the representative of the police officers. (Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley, supra, at p. 937.) Similarly, in San Jose, the court approved the city's unilateral change of policy concerning the use of deadly force by its police; the new policy limited the use of such force to situations in which a life was at stake. The court considered the change to be a fundamental policy decision excepted from mandatory bargaining. (San Jose Police Officer's Assn. v. City of San Jose, supra, at pp. 948-949.)
[7a] Next, defendants contend certain provisions of the San Francisco Charter are incompatible with the meet and confer requirements of sections [41 Cal.3d 665] 3504.5 and 3505. Section 3.661, subdivision (a), of the San Francisco Charter provides that "The [civil service] commission shall classify, and from time to time may reclassify, in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of the employment, and training and experience required, all places of employment in the departments and offices of the city and county .... [¶] The commission shall also, in accordance with duties and responsibilities, allocate, and from time to time may reallocate, the positions to the various classes of the classification." Defendants also note that while the San Francisco Administrative Code has a meet and confer provision that is similar to section 3505 of the MMBA, it specifically states that it does not supersede the provisions of the charter. (San Francisco Admin. Code, § 16.215, subd. (a).)
[8] It is well settled that statutes should be construed in harmony with other statutes on the same general subject. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 307 [162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859]; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) This rule applies even when interpreting provisions in different codes. (Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 679 [131 Cal.Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749], overruled on other grounds by Frink v. Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 180 [181 Cal.Rptr. 893, 643 P.2d 476]; Fishman v. Fishman (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 815, 821 [173 Cal.Rptr. 59].) [9] It is also settled that when the terms of a statute or charter may reasonably be construed to avoid conflict with a constitutional provision, they will be so read. (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 942 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669], cert. den., 401 U.S. 1012 [28 L.Ed.2d 549, 91 S.Ct. 1266]; Lubey v. City and County of San Francisco (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 340, 347-348 [159 Cal.Rptr. 440].) The same rule of construction applies to a potential conflict between a statute and charter provision.
[7b] The relevant section of the San Francisco Charter clearly gives the civil service commission the authority to "reclassify" and "reallocate" employment positions in city government. It is far from clear, however, that this power conflicts with the meet and confer provisions of the MMBA. First, although the MMBA mandates bargaining about certain matters, public agencies retain the ultimate power to refuse to agree on any particular issue. (Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 334-336 [124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609], cert. den., 424 U.S. 943 [47 L.Ed.2d 349, 96 S.Ct. 1411].) Thus the power to reclassify employment positions is not necessarily inconsistent with the requirement to meet with employee representatives and confer about reclassifications before the changes are implemented. Second, there is no language in the charter that specifically exempts the civil service commission from having [41 Cal.3d 666] to meet and confer before reclassifying positions. Indeed, the wording of the charter that the commission "may reclassify ... all places of employment" (italics added) is permissive, and gives no clear instruction that reclassification decisions must rest solely with the commission. Finally, the language of the charter is somewhat ambiguous in that it is not completely clear the power to reclassify or reallocate employment positions necessarily encompasses the power to divert specific duties from one employment classification to another, let alone that that power must be exclusive.
We also note that when the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA have previously been challenged on the ground that they conflict with other legal or contractual provisions, courts have generally found no such antagonism. In People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591 [205 Cal.Rptr. 794, 685 P.2d 1145], the city claimed the MMBA's meet and confer requirements were incompatible with its constitutional right to propose charter amendments; the amendments related to the discipline of city employees, and thus were matters within the scope of representation as defined in section 3504. We held that although the California Constitution (art. XI, § 3, subd. (b)) clearly gives cities the right to propose charter amendments, this right is compatible with the mandate to meet and confer before proposing amendments concerning the terms and conditions of public employment. (People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach, supra, at p. 601.)
Similarly, in Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55 [151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249], we decided that the MMBA's meet and confer requirements were not inconsistent with a county charter provision requiring the county civil service commission to hold public hearings before amending its layoff rules. Rather, the commission was required to hold public meetings and engage in meet and confer negotiations with employment representatives before it could amend such rules. (Id. at pp. 65-66.)
The cases that are most directly in point, however, are divided on the extent to which the meet and confer provisions of the MMBA are compatible with the powers of government agencies to take actions that directly affect the hours, wages, or other working conditions of their employees. In Independent Union of Pub. Service Employees v. County of Sacramento (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 482 [191 Cal.Rptr. 206], the court interpreted an agreement between the county and the union that provided the county "the exclusive right to ... assign its employees ...." When the county unilaterally assigned custodial employees to a different shift, the employees' representative demanded that the county meet and confer about the shift [41 Cal.3d 667] change. The county claimed that its exclusive right to assign employees made meeting and conferring unnecessary. The court stated: "The power to 'assign' employees is not inconsistent with the meet and confer requirement. As long as the County meets and confers in good faith, it may assign its employees however it sees fit." (Id. at p. 487.)
By contrast, in American Federation of State etc. Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 356 [122 Cal.Rptr. 591], the court found that provisions of the county charter were incompatible with the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA. The charter provided that the civil service commission shall prescribe rules for "the classification of all positions in the classified service ...." While we need not decide whether the court was correct in holding that the particular charter provision and employee relations ordinance were in conflict with the MMBA, we note that the majority of cases display a preference for construing local laws to be adaptable to the meet and confer requirements of the MMBA when a reasonable reading of such laws would allow it.
"'Courts examine the defense of waiver carefully in order to ensure the protection of a party's rights, especially when these rights are statutorily based.'" (Independent Union of Pub. Service Employees v. County of Sacramento, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d 482, 488, quoting Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1011 [175 Cal.Rptr. 105].) Federal courts use two basic tests when considering claims that a union has waived its right to bargain with an employer: some follow the rule that a waiver must be made in "clear and unmistakable" [41 Cal.3d 668] language (see, e.g., Office and Professional Emp. Int. U., Local 425 v. N.L.R.B., supra, 419 F.2d at p. 321; International Union, U.A., A. & A. Imp. Wkrs. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 381 F.2d at p. 267), and others look beyond the language of the contract and consider the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether there was a waiver of rights (see, e.g., Radioear Corporation (1974) 214 NLRB 362). In California, the "clear and unmistakable" language test has been preferred in cases involving public employees. (See, e.g., Independent Union of Pub. Service Employees v. County of Sacramento, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 488; Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 1011.)
I respectfully dissent. The majority hold that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) requires local public agencies to "meet and confer" with representatives of the recognized employee bargaining unit before eliminating employment positions in that unit and reassigning the duties of [41 Cal.3d 669] those positions to employees outside the unit. In my view, the MMBA is inapplicable to such managerial decisions, and I fear that imposing the act's requirements in such situations will unduly burden the day-to-day operation of state and local governmental entities.
"The [MMBA] (Gov. Code, §§ 3500-3510) provides local government employees the right to organize collectively and be represented by an employee union on 'all matters of employer-employee relations' with public agencies. ([Id.], § 3502.) This right to representation 'encompasses "but [is] not limited to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" ([id.], § 3504).' (Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 388 [113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453].)
"Appellant contends that the department of public health's reorganization and reclassification of the class 7355 truck driver positions at Laguna Honda Hospital is a 'matter within the scope of representation' of the MMBA, when the duties formerly performed by employees within the bargaining unit are still performed, but by nonbargaining unit employees. Thus, appellant contends that pursuant to Government Code section 3504.5 and section [41 Cal.3d 670] 3505, the city was obligated to notify appellant and to meet and confer with appellant prior to deleting the truck driver positions from the 1980-1981 budget and prior to reorganizing and reclassifying the duties of those positions to institutional utility worker, class 7524.
"Respondents argue that the budget deletion and reclassification actions at issue relate to the 'merits, necessity, or organization' of the health 'service' provided by respondents at Laguna Honda Hospital. (Gov. Code, § 3504.) There was then no notification or meet and confer obligation on respondents' part as to appellant because respondents' actions were within the express 'management prerogatives' exception to coverage by the MMBA. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616 [116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971].)
"The cases have consistently set a high standard in determining the existence of a 'managerial prerogative' under the MMBA. (Solano County Employees' Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 263 [186 Cal.Rptr. 147].) [This court] has stated that to promote peaceful adjudication of disputes, '[w]e ... must be careful not to restrict unduly the scope of the arbitration by an overbroad definition of "merits, necessity or organization."' (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615, italics in original.)
"The court in San Jose Peace Officers Assn. v. City of San Jose (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 935, 948 [144 Cal.Rptr. 638], determined that the San Jose Police Department's decision concerning the correct use of force by its police officers was not a term or condition of employment, but a managerial policy decision within the 'exception delineated in Section 3504.' Thus, a change in the police department's regulations was not subject to the meet and confer requirement under the MMBA.
"The San Jose court correctly considered the decisions in Fibreboard Corp. v. Labor Board (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 223 [13 L.Ed.2d 233, 245, 85 S.Ct. 398, 6 A.L.R.3d 1130] (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.), and Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pages 616-617, 620-621, [41 Cal.3d 671] which stated that decisions which are clearly within the realm of managerial discretion and which 'impinge only indirectly,' or do not 'primarily involve,' the terms or conditions of employment are not subject to meet and confer requirements. The court further noted that the court in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. N.L.R.B. (4th Cir. 1967) 387 F.2d 542, 548, required that managerial decisions have a 'significant or material' relationship to working conditions in order to be subject to meet and confer requirements. The San Jose court stated at 78 Cal.App.3d 945: 'Requiring that the decision have a "significant or material" relationship to working conditions (Westinghouse, supra) is substantially the same as requiring that the decision "primarily" involve working conditions (Fire Fighters, supra). This is also consistent with Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion in Fibreboard Corp., supra, that decisions "which impinge only indirectly" upon a subject of bargaining are not the subject of collective bargaining.'
"The San Jose court also looked at whether the decision at issue was 'inextricably interwoven with important policy considerations,' to determine that the correct use of police force was a managerial decision not subject to meet and confer. (San Jose Peace Officers Assn., supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 935, 946.)
"Similarly, the court in Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 [143 Cal.Rptr. 255], considered whether meeting and conferring on the issue in that case 'would place an intolerable burden upon fair and efficient administration of state and local government.' If so, '[s]uch decisions [could] not and should not be within the "scope of representation" by public employee associations.'
"[I also would hold that] respondents' actions of reorganization and reclassification of the duties formerly performed at Laguna Honda Hospital by class 7355 truck drivers to class 7524 institutional utility workers were [41 Cal.3d 672] not subject to notification and meet and confer requirements under the MMBA.
"[I] agree with the trial court and respondents that the holding in American Federation of State, etc. Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 356 [122 Cal.Rptr. 591], is applicable to the instant case. In American Federation, the union sought a peremptory writ mandating the county to negotiate the reclassification of certain positions. The court held that under the Los Angeles County Charter and the local employee relations ordinance, the job reclassification was 'clearly excepted' from the meet and confer requirements set out in the MMBA and also set out in the local employee relations ordinance. (American Federation, supra, at p. 363.)
"Appellant argues that contentions analogous to those made in American Federation were made and rejected ... in People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591 [205 Cal.Rptr. 794, 685 P.2d 1145]. However, [I] find that Seal Beach is distinguishable from the instant case. [41 Cal.3d 673]
"'[A] public agency must meet and consult with any recognized employee representative prior to adopting (or modifying) rules and regulations themselves, but it need not do so when determining whether an individual proposed bargaining unit is appropriate under rules previously adopted.' (Service Employees Internat. Union v. City of Santa Barbara (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 459, 469 [178 Cal.Rptr. 89].) Under section 1 of the existing memorandum of understanding between the City and County of San Francisco and appellant, for fiscal year 1980-1981, the city was specifically not precluded from transferring a particular classification to another 'more appropriate unit,' and there was no meet and confer requirement for such action. fn. 1 [I] find that under those existing rules, the city was also not required to meet and confer with appellant before reorganizing and reclassifying one and one-half positions within a particular classification simply because such action affected the size of appellant's bargaining unit.
"[I] note that appellant also relies upon the holdings in Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802 [165 Cal.Rptr. 908], and Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55 [151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249]. As in the Seal Beach holding, both [41 Cal.3d 674] cases involved the issue of whether meet and confer was required prior to adopting amendments to existing rules. As noted earlier in this opinion, there is no issue in this case as to any changes in existing rules. Thus, both holdings can also be distinguished.
­FN 2. We have also noted, however, that by adding the words "including but not limited to" before the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," the Legislature may have broadened the scope of representation under the MMBA beyond that of the federal statute. (Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept., supra, 11 Cal.3d 382, 391 [113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453]; see Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts (1972) 23 Hastings L.J. 719, 749.) Thus, while federal precedents provide reliable authority in interpreting the scope of section 3504, "they do not necessarily establish the limits of California public employees' representational rights." (Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept., supra, at p. 391; Solano County Employees' Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 259-260 [186 Cal.Rptr. 147]; see Independent Union of Public Service Employees v. County of Sacramento (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 482, 488 [195 Cal.Rptr. 206].) Because the work transfer complained of in this case falls clearly within the scope of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA, we do not consider here whether the state provision extends public employees' representational rights beyond the rights of employees governed by the NLRA.
­FN 3. When work transfers are found to be within the scope of representation, the employer "must bargain with respect to the decision to remove work from the bargaining unit employees, not merely its effects on the employees." (Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 652 F.2d at p. 1088.)
­FN 4. As there was an adverse effect on one of the employees as well as on the bargaining unit as a whole, we need not consider whether such an effect on the unit alone would be significant enough to constitute a violation of the MMBA.
­FN 1. Section 1 of the memorandum of understanding between and for the City and County of San Francisco and appellant, for fiscal year 1980-1981, provided: 'The City acknowledges that the Union has been certified by the Municipal Employee Relations Panel or the Civil Service Commission as the recognized employee representative, pursuant to the provisions as set forth in the City's Employee Relations Ordinance for the following classification: [¶] 7355 Truck Driver[.] [¶] This Section is included in this [memorandum] for informational purposes only and shall not be interpreted to preclude the City from transferring a particular classification to a more appropriate unit, if circumstances so require.'"
Thu, 04/03/1986 41 Cal.3d 651 Review - Criminal Appeal Opinion issued
1 BUILDING MATERIAL & CONSTRUCTION TEAMSTERS' UNION, LOCAL 216, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOHN C. FARRELL, as Controller, etc., et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
2 JOHN C. FARRELL, as Controller, etc., et al. (Defendants and Respondents)
Apr 3 1986 Opinion: Reversed
SCOCAL, Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell , 41 Cal.3d 651 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/building-material-construction-teamsters-union-v-farrell-30787) (last visited Monday August 10, 2020).