Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/158356414/Property-Case-Reviewer
Timestamp: 2018-12-10 18:10:39
Document Index: 602140262

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.420', 'Art. 552', 'Art. 448', 'Art. 448', 'Art. 546', 'Art.4', 'Art 381', 'Art. 1623', 'Art 493', 'Arts 539', 'Art. 531']

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Case Title Davao Sawmill v. Castillo August 7, 1935 Malcolm, J.
Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng e Hijos July 31, 1935 Villa-Real, J.
Lopez v. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc. February 28, 1958 Felix, J.
Quick Facts A lessee placed machinery in a building erected on land belonging to another, with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass on the lessor on the expiration of the lease. Lessee also treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of 3rd persons Mabalacat Sugar Co. obtained from D a loan secured by a 1st mortgage on 2 parcels of land “with all its buildings, improvements, mill, steel reailway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or is a necessary complement of said […] or that may in the future exist in said lots.” After some months, MSC bought additional machinery and equipment to increase its capacity. Petitioner advanced the amount for the addt’l equipment, with promise to be reimbursed. Orosa proposed to Lopez to invest in a theatre business, which would be erected on O’s land. Lopez refused, but agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction. Payment, as agreed, would be upon demand and not COD. Lopez was paid only a portion of the amount. As Lopez was demanding payment, O obtained a bank loan by mortgaging the theatre to pay for the balance due L. However, the theater was already mortgaged to PNB Sps. Valino owned and possessed a house of strong materials In Grace Park Subd, Caloocan, which they purchased on installment from PRC. Wife purchased rice with AISC as surety, and as counter-guaranty, executed a chattel mortgage on their house. At that time, the land was still in PRC’s name. After completion of payment of purchase price, TCT in Valino’s name was secured. Then, to secure an indebtedness, executed a REM over the lot and house in favor of Iya. Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Tumalads over their house of strong materials located at 550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot 6-B and 7-B, Block 2554, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio and Simeon defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract. As highest bidder, the Tumalads were issued the corresponding certificate of sale. On 18 April 1956, the Tumalads commenced Civil Case 43073 in the municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house
Held/Ratio/Doctrine The machinery unit must be classified as a personal property. Machinery which is movable in its nature becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as an agent of the owner. The installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central constitutes a permanent improvement, which subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon.
Associated Ins. & Surety Co. v. Iya May 30, 1958 Felix, J.
Appellant’s contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which it was constructed is without merit, because while it is true generally that real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what constitutes real property, could mean only one thing: that a building is by itself an immovable property A building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. It cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it was constructed belongs to another. As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage, the execution of a CM on a building is invalid and a nullity, the registration of the chattel notwithstanding. Certain deviations from the rule in Lopez and Iya, however, have been allowed for various reasons. Hence, if a house belonging to a person stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be mortgaged as a personal property as so stipulated in the document of mortgage. It should be noted, however that the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house to be a chattel, a conduct that may conceivably estop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. Unlike in the Iya cases, Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatreand Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery and Williamson, wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage, it is the defendantsappellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the
be vacated and its possession surrendered to them, and for Vicencio and Simeon to pay rent of P200.00 monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered. MC ruled in favor of Tumalad Nearly a year after the foreclosure sale the mortgaged house had been demolished on 14 and 15 January 1957 by virtue of a decision obtained by the lessor of the land on which the house stood. To be able to secure financial accommodations from the petitioner, the private respondent discounted and assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables, a chattel mortgage was executed over machinery found in the factory of the private respondent. As the private respondent failed to pay, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Nonetheless, the sheriff was unable to seize the machinery. This prompted petitioner to file an action for replevin. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the return of the drive motor, after ruling that the machinery may not be the subject of a chattel mortgage, given that it was an immovable under the provisions of Article 415. The same was attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it from the plant would be to drill the ground. The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila. Meralco's electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by respondent at intervals, from its hydroelectric plant in the province of Laguna to the City of Manila. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it. The City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax under Tax.
validity of the chattel mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corp v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. May 16, 1983 De Castro, J.
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out that the machinery may be considered as personal property, and subject to a chattel mortgage. If a house may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, what more a machinery, which is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. Tumalad doctrine applies.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co. January 31, 1964. Paredes, J.
The SC ruled that Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered personality because they were removable and merely attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled. Furthermore, they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation v. CBAA May 31, 1982. Aquino, J.
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, Republic Act No. 387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in the soil while the valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer. The tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Pipelines were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the Manila Enterprises Industrial Corporation. The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines are attached to the tanks and required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks. This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The building or shed, the elevated water tank, the car hoist under a separate shed, the air compressor, the underground gasoline tank, neon lights signboard, concrete fence and pavement and the lot where they are all placed or erected, all of them used in the pursuance of the gasoline service station business formed the entire gasoline service-station. The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become
Meralco v. CBAA May 31, 1982 Aquino, J.
The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In so far as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil, it is in a sense a machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code. The SC ruled that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to realty tax because they were considered real property.
Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. CBAA May 31, 1982 Aquino, J.
The Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements". SC hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Benguet Corp. v. CBAA January 29, 1993 Cruz, J.
the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. Benguet Provincial Assessor: Assessed real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declaration Nos. 8471 (1985) and 10454 (1986). The tax exemptions of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 of PD 745 was withdrawn by PD 1955. Benguet Corp.: Appealed the decision to the LBAA of Benguet. CBAA: held that the bldgs of petitioner used as dwellings were exempt from real property tax pursuant to PD 745. LBAA: affirmed taxability of the bunkhouses. On appeal, CBAA held the exemption was withdrawn so petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption with the Fiscal Incentives Review Board. Benguet: LGUs don’t have any authority to levy realty taxes on mines pursuant to Sec. 52 of PD 463 and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code. Sol Gen: Benguet is estopped from raising the question of lack of authority as it was never raised before.
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources.
(1) The provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources Dev’t Decree of 1974 (PD 463) and Sec. 5 (m) of the Local Tax Code are mere limitations on the taxing power of LGUs; they are not pertinent to the issue before the SC. They cannot affect the imposition of the real property tax by the national government. Although LGUs are charged with fixing the rates of real property tax, it does not follow that they also have the authority to determine WON they can impose the tax. It is the national government that levies real property tax. When LGUs are required to fix the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the national government in the enforcement of the real property tax code. The delegation of taxing power is not even involved since the tax has already been imposed and the LGUs are just mandated to enforce it. If the SC were to sanction the interpretation of Benguet, then necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be covered, and there would be no need for congress to specify “Real Property Tax Code, as amended” instead of stating clearly realty tax exemption laws. The intention is to limit the application of the “exception clause” only to those given by the Real Property Tax Code. The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations -insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements -- as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of the government. Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2, Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently under the waters of
title and possession over the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred (P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per square meter.
Usero v. CA
Respondents build a concrete fence between their property and the property of the petitioners. Petitioners assailed the building of the said fence on the ground that the property was theirs.
Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The mere fact that there are water lilies on the space filled with water proves that there is a permanent stream of water or a creek there. The petitioners also failed to prove their claim of ownership. Art.420 – The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. Being public water, a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. Accordingly, the petitioners may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the erosion of their property. The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against the municipality Validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and bldgs thereon – If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The capacity in which the property is held is dependent on the use which it is intended and devoted.
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo March 25, 1926 Villamor, J. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga March 28, 1868 Bengzon, J.P., J.
Municipal council of Iloilo failed to pay Tantoco the purchase price of 2 strips of land, which it appropriated for road widening. By virtue of a writ of execution, the sheriff attached “two autotrucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini St., and other structures, plus the market RA 39 converted municipality of Zamboanga to a city, and provided that bldgs. And properties abandoned shall be paid for by the City at a price fixed by the AG (PhP 1,294,244) RA 711: del Norte/del Sur  funds, assets, and other properties shall be divided equitable between the 2. AG apportioned assets: 54.39% to Norte, 45.61% to Sur ExecSec then issued a ruling holding that Norte had a vested right as owner of the properties given to the City and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. Finance Sec authorized CIR to deduct 25% from City’s IRA to be credited to Norte. RA3039  all bldgs, etc, belonging to the former province and located within the City, free of charge, in favor of the City. On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring
Salas v. Jarencio August 30, 1972 Esguerra, J.
In the absence of a deed or title to any land claimed by the City as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation
the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets containing a total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. RA 4118 was passed which subdivided said lot for resale by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants. - The City of Manila made a complete turn-about. The City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing RA 4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
of the municipality. Such property is held in trust for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purpose. RA 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. It was enacted upon formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The foregoing sequence of events clearly indicates a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land involved. Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. The portion of the city street subject to petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property of the State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. A corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance by the SB is needed before any money of the municipality may be paid out. Article 5 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that “lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their fishing nets and depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his successors the ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into public land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form and manner established by the law.
Cebu Oxygen & Acytelene Co. v. Bercilles August 29, 1975 Concepcion, Jr. J.
The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street. Through a resolution, it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land but his application was dismissed. In a civil case, petitioner was held liable to private respondents. Alias writ of execution was granted on the funds of the municipality in the hands of the treasurers. Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding 71 of the City of Manila, GLRO. Record 373, were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of Cabangis. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of the proceeding. Up to the month of February 1927 nobody had declared lot 39 for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro Gil, in behalf of Cabangis, declared lot 40 for such purpose. Defendant allegedly constructed a house on the plaintiff’s land.
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez June 25, 1984 Relova, J. Government of the Phil. Islands v. Cabangis March 27, 1929 Villa-real J.
Hilario v. Salvador
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery
April 29, 2005 Callejo, Sr. J.
Defendant refused to vacate the property in Romblon, Romblon.
Sampayan v. CA January 14, 2005 Garcia, J.
Santos v. Ayon May 6, 2005 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Vasquez siblings filed a complaint for forcible entry against Sampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. The lot was allegedly owned and possessed by the Vasquez’s deceased mother [Cristita Quita]. – Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur Sampayan: Maria Ybanez, the overseer of Sps. Terrado [lot’s true owners], gave him permission to enter subject lot. Davao City: Ruben Santos filed a complaint for illegal detainer against sps. Ayon. Santos is the registered owner of 3 lots situated at Lanzona Subd, Ayons are registered owners of adjacent land. Previous occupant of the property built a building which straddled both the lots. Ayons using the building as a warehouse. Santos informed respondents that the building occupies portion of his lot, but he let them use it. Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints before MCTC (Jordan, Guimaras). H alleged that she owns the lot (inherited from parents) and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct houses therein. When she demanded that they leave, they refused.
of possession over the real property as owner while an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess – it is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In this case, it was an accion publiciana. The action of the petitioners does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They alleged that they are co-owners thereof, and are entitled to possession. In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land or building and that he was deprived thereof by means, force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses tp vacate upon demand made by the owner. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary – it is enough that plaintiff has a better right or possession; in forcible entry, defendants, by force intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from an accion publiciana and from an accion reinvindicatoria is that UD is limited to the question of possession de facto. A UD suit together with forcible entry are the 2 forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property The phrase “unlawful withholding” has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issure is the better right of possession [possession de jure], and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession [possession de facto]. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the
Ganila v. CA June 28, 2005 Qusiumbing, J.
Ross Rica Sales Center v. Ong August 16, 2005 Tinga, J.
Petitioners bought land from Mandaue Prime, which bought the same from respondent Ong. MTC granted petitioners’ ejectment suit and ordered respondent to vacate the premises.
Peralta-Labrador v. Buarin August 25, 2005 Ynares-Santiago, J.
San Felipe, Zambales Petitioner alleges that she is the owner of a lot, having purchased it from Sps. Pronto. In 1990, DPWH constructed a road, thereby separating a portion from the rest of P’s lot. Sometime in 1994, respondent Bugarin forcibly took possession of the small portion and refused to vacate the same. Thus, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership. Respondent: He has been in possession since 1955. Sps Seriña filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against Caballero and his tenants Sps. Donela (Cagayan de Oro City). P alleged that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual possession for 35 years of a parcel of land. Sometime in 1982, they allegedly discovered that C was caliming ownership over the land and offering it for sale or mortgage. Felisa Montalbo inherited land from her father, which she exchanged with that of her aunt, Andrea. After the exchange, A donated half the land to daughter Margarita. Margarita and husband occupied the land continuously in the concept of owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer of property in their names, he submitted the deed of exchange. Perezes then accused sps. Nicolas and Andrea of falsifying the deed of exchange Galang spouses owned 2 lots, which they mortgaged. Their son Dionisio redeemed the lot in his own name despite that fact that the funds came from his 5 sisters. After a cadastral survey of the lots, CFI ordered the issuance of OCTs solely in Dionisio’s name. the heirs of D’s sisters claim that the 6 Galang siblings partitioned the lots in an unnotarized affidavit
issue of ownership is generally unessential. Forcible entry is a quieting process, and the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land.
Seriña v. Caballero August 17, 2004 Callejo Sr., J.
In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Boundaries set forth in complaint not the same as in the Deed of Sale Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Perezes dialed to prove ownership of land.
Perez v. Mendoza July 28, 1975 Muñoz-Palma, J.
Dizon v. CA January 6, 1993. Padilla, J.
The properties belonged solely to Dionisio and not in co-ownership with his sisters. Dionisio’s ownership had been judicially confirmed by the CGI, which involved a proceeding in rem and hence, “binding on the whole world.” Moreover, the sisters objected only 61 years after the issuance of the OCT. Violation of the 5th amendment. The Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated
US v. Causby May 27, 1946 Douglas, J.
Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation.
Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
Lunod v. Meneses 11 Phil. 128
Plaintiffs own farmlands situated near a lake. Meneses owns a fishpond and piece of land between the lake and a river. The plaintiffs claim the existence, in favor of their rice fields, of a statutory easement permitting the flow of water over Meneses’ land. This allowed water collected upon their land and the lake to flow through Meneses’ land and into the river. Plaintiffs’ lands were flooded and their plantations destroyed.
Bachrach v. Seifert October 12, 1950 Ozaeta, J.
The deceased Emil Maurice Bachrach left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach. In his last will and testament made varius legacies in cash and willed all the fruits and usufruct the remainder of his estate (after payment of legacies, bequests and gifts) to his wife’s enjoyment. The will further provided that upon the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his estate shall be divided share and share alike by and betweenhis legal heirs, to the exclusion of his brothers. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On 10 June 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. The lower court granted the petition and overruled their objection. Siefer and Elianoff appealed. Sugar planters of TS mortgaged their lands in order to secure the debts of TS against PNB. As compensation for the risk the planters took, TS undertook to give them a bonus equal to 2% of the debt secured. Bachrach filed a case against TS, asking for Ledesma’s credit bonus as a payment for the latter’s debt to Bachrach. TS answered that Ledesma’ s credit bonus had been purchased by another. PNB alleged that it had
Meneses cannot block the flow of water. Art. 552 (A637, NCC): Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them. Neither may the owner of the lower estate construct works preventing this easement, nor one of the higher estates works increasing this burden. In addition, under the land of waters, Meneses had no right to construct the works which blocks the passage through his land and the outlet to the river. Having done so, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he violated the law. Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. Further, Articles 474 provides that " Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last.” Article 475, on the other hand, provides that “When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right. When it consists of the enjoyment of the benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or commercial enterprise, the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall have the same consideration. In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in accordance with the rules prescribed by the next preceding article." A dividend, whether in the from of cash or stock, is income or fruit and consequently should go to the usufructuary rather than the owner of the shares of stock in usufruct. Dividend is declared only out of the profits of a corporation and not out of its capital.
Bachrach v. Talisay-Silay September 17, 1931 Romualdez, J.
A bonus paid by the mortgage-debtor to another who had mortgaged his land to secure the payment of the debtor’s obligation to a bank is not a civil fruit of the mortgaged property. Such bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote and accidental relation to the land. It is not income delivered from the property but a compensation granted for the risk assumed by the owner of the property.
Bernardo v. Bataclan November 28, 1938 Laurel, J.
preferential right to the bonus because such bonus would be civil fruits of the land that Ledesma mortgaged. Bernardo bought a parcel of land only to discover that Bataclan is possessing the same. LC held Bataclan to be a possessor in good faith and thus entitled to reimbursement with right of retention subject to Bernardo’s 2 options whether to sell the land to Bataclan, but Bataclan was unable to pay and so the land was sold at a public auction. The court removed Bataclan’s right of retention. Lower court rendered judgment holding Hilario as the legal owner of a property, but ceded to Ignacio the ownership of the improvements he built on the same land. Hilario was given the option to reimburse Ignacio for the improvements or to sell the land to Ignacio. Hilario exercised neither option. Spouses Valentino were told by mother of wife to construct a residentioal house only to find out later that the land did not belong to the mother but to the Santos sps. Who sold the same to Sarmiento. Dumlao’s kitchen encroached on 34sq.m. of Depra’s property. Depra filed an unlawful detainer. LC found Dumlao to be a builder in GF, and ordered a forced lease on the parties. Depra, instead of accepting rentals, filed for quieting of title Tecnogas discovered that portions of its buildings and wall were occupying Uy’s land. The wall was presumably erected by the former owners. Tecnogas offered to buy the land by Uy refused. Uy then caused canal to be dug along the wall, causing it to collapse. Homestead Application Lot belonged to Dolorico II, Ortiz’s ward located in Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon. Dolorico II named as successor and heir his uncle Dolorico, then died. All this time Ortiz was in possession and cultivation of the property. Dolorico relinquished rights over property in favour of Comintan and Zamora. Court found Ortiz to be in good faith, but held the public bidding to be valid. If petitioner was not found to be the winner, Comintan and Zamora are to reimburse him for P13,632. Ortiz is to retain possession until the amount is paid. Respondent Judge discovered that after the decision of the lower courts, Ortiz collected tolls on portion of the land even if he had not introduced any improvements on said portions estimated to amount to P25,000.
When Bernardo opted to sell the land to Bataclan, he lost his right to retention over the said property. When, in the face of a conflict between the rights of an owner and a BPS in good faith, the owner opts to sell the land to the BPS who is subsequently unable to pay, the BPS loses his right of retention. Since the option to remove or demolish improvement is given to the LO and it is limited to paying for the improvement or selling his land to the BPS, he cannot refuse to exercise his right of choice and compel the builder to remove or demolish the improvement. He is entitled to such removal only when after choosing to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. Sps. Valentino may not be ejected from the land, because they were builders in GF. The owner of a building erected in GF on a land owned by another is entitled to retain possession of the land until he is paid the value of the building. The municipal court has no authority to impose a “forced lease.” The owner of the land on which the improvement was built by another in GF is entitled to removal of improvement only after LO has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same. There is no question that when P purchased the land from Pariz Ind., the buildings and other structures were already in existence. As such, the supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in GF. petitioner is NOT entitled to fruits while Comintan and Zamora have yet to pay the indemnity due him. Before possession is legally interrupted, possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits. This right ceases upon defects being known. This is known as a right to retention, for the creditor to obtain payment of a debt. Also we must consider that tolls were collected from portions with no improvements of petitioner, therefore he really has no right to said fruits
Ignacio v. Hilario April 30, 1946. Moran, C.J.
Sarmiento v. Agana April 30, 1984 Melencio-Herrera, J. Depra v. Dumlao May 16, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J.
Tecnogas Phil. Mfg. Corp. v. CA February 10, 1997 Panganiban, J. Ortiz v. Kayanan July 30, 1979 Antonio, J.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the fruits of the property while the P13,632 has yet to be paid, this being considered as civil fruits. Geminiano v. CA July 24, 1996 Davide, Jr. J. Pleasantville Dev’t Corp v. CA February 1, 1996 Panganiban, J. Lot originally owned by G’s mom. On one portion of the lot stood G’s unfinished house, which they sold to PR. Then, G’s mom executed a contract of lease a portion of the lot, including the portion on which the house stands. Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land, Lot 9, from Pleasantville Dev’t Corporation in Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant. · Upon completing all payments and securing a TCT in his name, Jardinico discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. · It appears that Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CT Torres Enterprises Inc (CTTEI), the real estate agent of Pleasantville. · Under the Contract to Sell, Kee could and did possess the lot even before the completion of payments. · Zenaida Octaviano, CTTEI’s employee, was the one who mistakenly pointed out Lot 9 (instead of Lot 8) to Kee’s wife. Thereafter, Kee built his residence, a store, an auto repair shop, and other improvements on the lot. · Jardinico confronted Kee after discovering that the latter was occupying Lot 9. Kee refused to vacate, hence Jardinico filed an ejectment suit with damages. RTC: Kee is a builder in bad faith. Assuming arguendo that Kee was acting in good faith, he was nonetheless guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot, and was thus liable for rental. CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the “mix-up” when he began construction of the improvements. The erroneous delivery was due to the fault of CTTEI and thus imputable to Pleasantville, the principal. Felices was the grantee of a homestead over 8has. He conveyed in conditional sale to Iriole a portion of his homestead of more than 4has. The conveyance expressly stipulates that after the lapse of 5 years or as soon as may be allowed by law, the vendor or his successors would execute in vendee’s favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in question. 2 years after the sale, F tried to recover from I, but the latter refused to allow it unless he was paid the alleged value of improvements he had introduce therein. Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot in Kamias and built a four-door Private respondents cannot be considered possessors nor builders in GF – being mere lessees, they knew that their occupation was temporary. Kee = builder in GF The roots of the controversy can be traced in the errors committed by CTTEI when it pointed the wrong lot to Kee. · Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and he is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, Pleasantville has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. · At the time he built the improvements on Lot 9, Kee believed that the said lot was the one he bought. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Pleasantville failed to prove otherwise. · Violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner’s cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach) but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Felices v. Iriole May 26, 1995
The rule of A453 invoked by I cannot be applied to the instant case for the reason that the improvements in question were made on the premises only after F had tried to recover the land in question from him, and even during pendency of this action in the lower court. Hence, he built the improvement in BF.
Nuquid v. CA
Pecson is a builder in good faith. Nuguid is the landowner.
two-storey apartment building. He failed to pay realty taxes, so the LOT was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, and later to the Sps. Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. Case 1: Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale. SC: Sps. Nuguid owned the lot, while Pecson still owned the building (May 5, 1993). Case 2: Nuguids sought delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building, i.e., they want to acquire the building. SC (Nov. 15, 1993): 1. Art. 448, NCC: Case is apposite as when the landowner is the BPS who then later loses ownership through sale; 2. Current market value of the building should be the basis of the indemnity; 3. Pecson entitled to retain ownership of the building and the income therefrom; 4. CA erred in upholding TC’s determination of indemnity (P53,000.00 construction cost) and in also ordering Pecson to account for rent. 5. Remanded to TC for determination of CMV. Case 3 (Case at bar): CMV = P400,000. Pecson already received P300,000 from Sps. Nuguid; balance of P100,000 paid thereafter. TC directed Sps. Nuguid to also pay P1.34 million for rentals from Nov. 1993 to Dec. 1997 (@ P28K/mo.) Thus, petition. The Republic opposed the registration of lots adjacent to the property of R on the ground that they merely transferred their dikes further down the Meycauayan river bed, such that if there is any accretion to speak of, it was man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
· Art. 448, NCC entitles landowner (Nuguid) to either appropriate the building upon payment of indemnity or sell the land. Nuguid sought appropriation. · Art. 546, NCC entitles the BPS to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses, and the right of retention until full reimbursement is made. · However, until the payment of indemnity is full, the BPS (Pecson) has a RIGHT of RETENTION (which includes the right to the expenses and the right to the fruits) as a builder in good faith. Thus, he cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. The landowner is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the BPS in good faith.
Republic v. CA October 12, 1984 Gutierrez Jr., J.
What R claims as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the river by reclamation caused by their having transferred their dikes towards the river bed. Being a portion of the bed of said river, the lots are of the public dominion and not registerable under the LRA. A457 requisites: concurrence of (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers. -- #2 is indispensable. This includes all deposits caused by human intervention. The accretion does not ipso facto become registered like the land to which it is attached. Ownership of land is different from registration. Ownership is governed by the civil code while the imprescriptibility of registered land is governed by the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts. To obtain the protection of imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures must be observed. The fact remains that the Grandes have not sought registration of the alluvial property in dispute up to the time they filed an action against respondents. Because of this, said accretion is not protected by imprescriptibility.
Grande v. CA June 30, 1962 Barrera, J.
Grande siblings are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), Isabela by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui who in turn inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name the land is registered. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the said river, so much, so that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded t a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposite of 19,964 sq. meters more or less had been added to
Meneses v. CA July 14, 1995 Quiason, J. Navarro v. IAC 1997
the registered land. On Jan. 25, 1958, the siblings instituted a case to The Court of Appeals have acquired evidence that respondent Calalungs quiet title against private respondent Calalungs and alleged that they were in open and continuous possession of the accretion since 1933 or were in former peaceful possession of said alluvial deposit when 1934 up to the time the action against them was filed. The prescriptive respondents encroached the land claiming ownership. period in this applied in this case is 10 years and not 30 since the law – The trial court ruled in favor of the Grandes ratiocinating that, by applicable is Act 190 and not the Civil Code. Respondents’ possession accession the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code the original estate is registered, the accretion consequently is were not yet in force. automatically registered too. There can also be no acquisitive prescription in favor of the Calalungs since the land is already registered. The action to claim land by the owners which is registered is imprescriptible. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court thus this appeal by the Grandes. Darum issued to Meneses OCTs and free patents over lots, which were found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing. Pascual claimed ownership to a parcel of land claiming that it was an accretion to his property. Navarro opposed saying that such property has always been part of public property. Subject property is situated between 2 rivers and is fronted by the Manila Bay. If the land in dispute was formed by the action of the 2 rivers, then it is an accretion, hence owned by Pascual. If it were formed by the action of Manila Bay, then it is foreshore land, hence part of public domain The property is foreshore land, hence part of public domain. The property is an accretion of on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or arm of the sea, as such, the disputed property is, under Art.4 of 1886 Spanish Law of Waters, public domain Riparian owners, are strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering seashore or lake or other tidal waves. The alluvium, by mandate of A457, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but ut is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd person. B’s contention is impressed with merit. The law speaks of the natural change in the course of the stram, and of the ripoarian owner is entitled to compensation for damge to or loss of property due to natural causes, there’s all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means. BUT, since he has been given an equivalent lot, he is no longer entitled under the principle of unjust enrichment. According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during the highest floods. This being the case, the subject land couldn't have been sold to Manalo, being part of the public domain.
Baes v. CA July 6, 1993 Cruz, J.
The government dug a canal on a protion of land owned by Baes to streamline the Tripa der Callina creek. In exchange for such portion, B was given a lot with an equal area. When B had his lots resurveyed and subdivided, the area of the old creek bed was included such that his landholdings increased. Upon petition by the gov’t TC ordered status qui prior to resurvey. However, B contends that under A461, the area of the old creek should belong to him because it says that once the river bed has been abandoned, the owners of the land invaded by the river’s new course automatically become the owner of the abandoned bed. Judge Taccad owned a parcel of land—on the west, bordering on the Cagayan River, on the east, the national road. The western portion would occasionally go under the waters and reappear during the dry season. Manalo purchased the land. A relocation survey was conducted during the rainy season, so the survey didn't cover the submerged land. The sketch would show that the river branches through the west and east, leaving a strip of land. The land was then surveyed into two 2 lots. One of these is being claimed by Manalo
Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan
through accretion. SVE sought to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven or wandered from its pasture lands into the adjoining lands of Lucasan. Lucasan himself admitted such commixtion although he says that SVE had already retrieved its animals. Which belongs to whom can no longer be determined.
Lucasan willfully caused the commixtion such that A383 (now $73) he will be held to forfeit his own cattle. No actual evidence that the 823 missing cattle were taken by Lucasan, but in view of the proof that his men, on 2 occasions, drove away more than 30 heads, it may be presumed that the others must have also been driven away subsequent or prior occasions. One who has stole a part of the stolen money must have taken the larger sum lost by the offended party. If the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share. Art 381 of the CC prescribes that “if by will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the later case the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according o the value of the things mixed or commingled.” In the present case, since the number of kilos in a cavan has not been determined, only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and sold shall be distributed proportionately between Santos (398.49 cavans) and Tiongson (525.52 cavans) or the value thereof at the rate of P3/cavan.
Santos v. Bernabe November 6, 1929 Villa-real, J.
Olviga v. CA
Urbano Santos (778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay) and Pablo Tiongson (1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay) both deposited in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe palay with the same grade and quality. However, it does not appear which sack belongs to Santos and which is owned by Tiongson. There were no marks or signs, nor were they separated from each other. · Tiongson filed a case against Bernabe for the recovery of the palay he deposited in his warehouse. The writ of attachment for the said palay was granted and the attachable property of Bernabe including the 924 cavans and 31.5 kilos palay found in his warehouse were attached, sold in public auction and the proceeds delivered to Tiongson. · Santos then intervened contending that Tiongson cannot claim the 924c & 31.5k palay because by asking for the attachment thereof, he impliedly acknowledged that the same belonged to Bernabe and not to Tiongson. Also because, some of these palay could be those deposited by Santos. Olviga was able to register a title of a parcel of land in his name. Glor sps. Filed an action for reconveyance since they had previously purchased the land and were the real and actual occupants of the land. CA ruled that action by Glor sps is one for quieting of title that does not prescribe.
Pingol v. CA September 6, 1993 Davide, Jr. J.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a “DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND” in favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was
An action for reconveyance: (a) Prescribes in 10 years if the plaintiff is not in possession of the property and if the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust. The point of reference is the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the title over the property. (b) Is IMPRESCRIPTIBLE if the person claiming to be an owner is in actual possession of the property. Here, the right to seek reconvenyance in effect seeks to quiet title. Although the private respondents’ complaint before the trial court was denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title. That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly
Titong v. CA March 6, 1998 Romero, J.
acknowledged before a notary public. Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion, designated as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties prepared a subdivision plan which was approved by the Land Registration Commission. Francisco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972.On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on the contract price. Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession of Donasco’s heirs. On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for “Specific Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction” against the spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners herein) before the RTC of Caloocan City. The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal. Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-ininterest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
insisted that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective. A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Under A476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
Portic v. Cristobal April 22, 2005 Panganiban, J.
In 1968, spouses Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door apartment from Sps. Alcantara even though they’re aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said property for P200k. Cristobal’s down payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between them states: That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
Pardell v. Bartolome November 18, 1912 Torres, J.
rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse) A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not able to pay on the due date. A suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title. Case among co-owners, used to be three, but the survivor were strongest were two women, male did not survive. He died. They were quarrelling over their inheritance, among which is a house, in the same heritage city or village part of vigan. See how a house owned in common was to be used. One sister was asking for accounting of fruits of the house.
Each coöwner or tenant in common of undivided realty has the same rights therein as the others; he may use and enjoy the same without other limitation except that he must not prejudice the rights of his coöwners, but until a division is effected, the respective parts belonging to each cannot be determined; each coöwner exercises joint dominion and is entitled to joint use. For the use and enjoyment of a particular portion of the lower part of a house, not used as living quarters, a coöwner must, in strict justice, pay rent, in like manner as other people pay for similar space in the house; he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space which, if rented to a third party, would produce income. Until a cause instituted to determine the liability of the rest of the coöwners for repairs and improvements made by one of their number is finally decided and the amount due is fixed, the persons alleged to be liable cannot be considered in default as to interest, because interest is only due from the date of the decision fixing the principal liability. If the plaintiff formed a partnership, they are liable for the payment of the IT; whereas of there was merely a community of property, they are exempt. According to the facts, the plaintiffs organized a partnership fo civil nature because each of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win. Sale not valid. The A was undivided common property of the plaintiffs and one of the defs. This common ownership was acquired by occupancy. None of them had any right to sell, there being an express agreement to the contrary. Sale having been made without others’ consent, the same shall have no effect except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them. Petitioner’s Master Deed provides that a member of the Condominium corporation shall share in the common expenses of the condominium project. This obligation does not depend on the use or non-use by the member of the common areas and facilities of the Condominium. Whether or not a member uses the common areas or facilities, these areas and facilities will have to be maintained. Expenditures must be made to maintain the common areas and facilities whether a member uses them frequently, infrequently or never at all.
Gatchalian v. CIR April 29, 1939 Imperial, J.
Punsalan v. Boon Liat January 10, 1923 Avanceña, J.
Twin Towers Condo v. CA February 27, 2003 Carpio, J.
15 individuals made contributions to purchase a sweepstakes ticket registered in Gatchalian’s name. the ticket won 3rd prize. G was then required to file the corresponding ITR covering the prize. They failed to pay. CIR issued a warrant of distraint and levy, to avoid embarrassment the 15 paid under protest. This happened a 2nd time for the balance. The 15 then demanded refund. 22 fishermen agreed to be the sole owners of 2 ½ sacks of ambergris found in the belly of a whale and they agreed that none could sell without the others’ consent. Teck, who knew of the ambergris proposed the seizure of contraband opium, which was actually the ambergris. The ambergris having been seized and loaded and brought to Zamboanga along with Ahmad, who was left in charge. Teck then proceeded to offer to purchase the A to which Ahmad refused but was later on convinced as he was promised protection from his co-owners. TTCC filed a complaint with the SEC against ALS and Litonjua praying that the latter be ordered to pay solidarilty the unpaid condominium assessments and dues with interests and penalties covering the 4 quearters of 1986 & 1987 and the first qtr of ’88.
Resuena v. CA March 28, 2005 Tinga, J.
Cruz v. CA April 15, 2005 Tinga, J.
Adoracion + children filed a case against Summit + Arnel (sib). They alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of land, albeit it was only in Arnel’s name. They actually already partitioned thae property, as shown by deed.
A co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them, but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Resp’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since the petitioners weren’t able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same. Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or e-judicial partition of the properties owned in common; partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. To be considered a co-owner, one “must have a spiritual part of a thing which is not physically divided, or each of them is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Plaintiffs have such right. With the amount of individual contribution undetermined, the law presumes that all of them contributed proportionately. Simple majority rule.
Lavadia v. Cosme May 9, 1941 Diaz, J.
Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay November 1, 1930 Ostrand, J.
6 pious women (A, B, C, D, E, F) bought jewelry from the Image of Our Lady of Guadalupe. D had initial custody, then E, then the various descendants of E, and finally C. C wanted to make the Bishop of Lipa custodian, the plaintiffs (F and the heirs of A, B, C) objected and designated F as the custodian thereof. TC: inasmuch as the plaintiff are the owners of 4/6 parts pro indiviso of the jewels, and defendants (heirs of D & E), only 2/6, they have the right to determine who should be entrusted with the custody. After the death of the owner of land in Q, his widow and 3 of his children executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of the predecessor-ininterest of DTL. The term was for 20 years, extendible for a like period at lessee’s option. Further stipulated that at the termination of the original period or its extension, lessors might purchase all the buildings on the land at a price to be fixed by experts, but if the lessors should fail to do that, the lease would continue for another 20. The lease contract was not signed by 2 of the co-heirs. In 1920, the heirs made an EJ partition of the inheritance, and among other things, the land here in Q fell to the share of plaintiffs. The co-heirs that didn’t sign the lease contract brought this action to recover possession. Angela, Nieves and Antonio co-owned a parcel of land. They entered into a MoA that no CO shall sell, alienate, or dispose of his co-ownership without first giving preference to the other CO. Angela asked that the contract be rescinded and the property be partitioned stating the at MoA is void
In this case only a small majority of the co-owners executed the lease here in Q.
Tuason v. Tuason April 2, 1951 Montemayor, J.
The MoA, far from violating the legal prohibition that forbids a CO from being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of CO and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds among the CO. the obligation imposed in the MoA to preserve the CO until all lots shall have been sold is a mere incident to the main object.
Mariano v. CA May 28, 1993 Nocon, J.
Verdad v. CA April 29, 1996 Vitug, J Ramirez v. Ramirez September 29, 1967 Concepcion, CJ
Gosengfiao owned a parcel of land. During his lifetime, he obtained a loan secured by a REM over the land. Upon his death, he was survived by his wife and children. The loan was unpaid and thus, the REM was foreclosed. The land was redeemed by the mother and later sold the same, together with the other children. Grace knew of the sale and sought annulment of the sale. ZV is the buyer of the questioned lot. PR Socorro seeks to legally redeem the property and traces her title to her late mom-in-law
1. The right to redeem is not lost in the absence of any written notice of the sale by the vendors. The 30-day period has not begin to run. 2. The redemption of a co-owner inures to the benefit of all co-owners.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendants for the partition of a parcel of land situated at the Northwestern corner of Escolta street and Plaza Sta. Cruz, manila – 1/6 to the plaintiff and 5/6 to the defendants Manuel Uy & Sons expressed its conformity to the partition, “if the same can be done without great prejudice to the interests of the parties”. Defendant Butte agreed to the partition prayed for. The other defendants objected to the physical partition of the property in question, upon the theory that said partition is “materially and legally” impossible and “would work great harm and prejudice to the co-owners. P and D are brothers. They bought a house for their father. Deed of sale and title was only in D;s name, because P was disqualified from obtaining SSS loan. After dad died, P wanted to sell the property and divide the proceeds to themselves. D refused. Fortunato De Ape—1 of the 11 heirs of deceased—allegedly sold his part of the inherited land to one Lumayno as evidenced by a RECEIPT. Lumayno wanted to register the claimed sale transaction, she demanded that Fortunato execute the corresponding deed of sale and to receive the balance of the consideration. Fortunato denied Lumayno’s claim and insisted that what they had was an EXPIRED contract of LEASE. He never sold his share in Lot-A to Lumayno and that his signature appearing on the purported receipt was forged. Guzman, an American citizen, died and left some real properties to his widow and son (both American citizens( the widow then assigned all her rights to her son over her share in the 6 parcels of land. The son then sold them to Cataniag (Filipino). Halili, the owner of the adjoining lot, questioned the constitutionality of the transfers of property and claimed ownership based on A1621. Petitioners were the original owners of four parcels of land on which stands the Ten Commandments Building. On Aug 6, 1979, they sold 1/5 of their undiided shares to their mother, Adela Blas, who in turn sold her
The written notice of sale is mandatory for the tolling of the 30-day redemption period. Notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status. Where, as in this case, no evidence was introduced to support the claim that a physical division of the property will cause inestimable damage to the interest of the co-owners thereof, a court order requiring it decision was proper. Since the segregation of the property in question inured to the benefit not only of P but also of D, both parties must defray the incidental expenses.
Aguilar v. CA October 26, 1993 Bellosillo, J. Vda. de Ape v. CA April 15, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned Although a partition might have been informal, it is of no moment for even an oral agreement of partition is valid and binding upon the parties
Halili v. CA March 12, 1998 Panganiban, J.
Halili cannot exercise LR. The subject land is urban in character. H has no right to invoke LR since A1621 presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.
Francisco v. Boiser May 31, 2000 Mendoza, J.
Art. 1623 requires that the written notification should come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. It is the notification from the seller, which can remove all doubts as to the fact of
1/5 share to Zenaida Boiser, another sister of petitioners. On August 5, 1992, petitioner received a summons issued by the court based on a civil case filed by the respondent where the latter is demanding for her share in the rentals being collected from the tenants of the building. Maintaining that the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun to run because the vendor never informed her and her co-owners about the sale to the respondent, petitioner now seeks to exercise her right to redemption. Respondent counters by saying that petitioner knew about the sale as early as May 30, 1992, because on that date, she wrote a letter to the petitioner informing her of the sale. Sale of lots to Carvajal were made while the petition for partition filed by Ecaristo was still pending
the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale, the seller is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to the vendee has been given.
Carvajal v. CA February 25, 1982 Teehankee, J.
Pamplona v. Moreto March 31, 1980 Guerrero, J.
Sps. Flaviano Moreta and Monica Maniega acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495-1496. during their marriage, they begot six children. More than 6 years after the death of his wife, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his deceased wife and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership could be effected executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495. After the death of Flaviano Moreto, plaintiffs-heirs of Monica Maniega demanded on the defendant-spouses to vacate the premises on the ground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot as it belongs to the conjugal partnership and Monica was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs-heirs. Brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr., leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26 hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of land. The lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the leased property. In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died. Later on, plaintiff as lessee and defendant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement was signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and defendant shows
Unless the partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over the definite portion and cannot dispose. Upon death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate. He cannot alienate a specific part of the thing in common to the exclusion of other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented by an ideal portion. Co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself a definite portion owned in common until partition by agreement or by judicial decree. Before partition, co-heir can only sell his successional rights. After his wife’s death, the husband became entitled to ½ of the entire property, with only ½ belonging to the heirs. They hold the property as co-owners. At the time of the sale, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano, the surviving husband and the heirs of his deceased wife. Aticle 493 of the NCC is square in point. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered the three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Art 493 of the NCC allows the alienation of the co-owner of his part in the co-ownership. The effect of such alienation or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership In short, a co-owner can enter into a contract of lease insofar as to his interest. Therefore, he can also cancel such lease without the consent from the other co-owner.
Castro v. Atienza October 17, 1973 Teehankee, J.
that Felisa Cruz Vda. De Castro, widow of Tomas de Castro, was intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity as representative of the heirs of Tomas de Castro. Felisa Cruz Vda. De Castro refused to sign. Defendant did not pay P2,500.00 which he should have paid on December for payment was made by plaintiff’s counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the present action. There was conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would attend to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza. Lot 802 of the Cadastral survey of Rosario, covered by OCT RO-2720 (N.A.), was originally owned by the late spouses Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were survived by their children namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On 28 October 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot 802 consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque. On 29 October 1951, Lorenzo Perez, Crispina Perez and Emilia P. Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, Ricardo Perez, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Gumersindo, Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, Jr., executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot 802 to Crispina Perez. On 30 December 1959, Crispina Perez and her children, Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena Pajimula (and Ciriaco Pajimula), the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot 802 with an area of 958 square meters. Leonora Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-owner of lot 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an area of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed of sale, which was executed on 28 October 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the co-owners, in her favor. The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod (Lot 62-B of Subdivision plan LRCPsd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the name of plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants’ conjugal property, the Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and
Estoque v. Pajimula July 15, 1968 Reyes, JBL, J.
The lower court held that the deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by Estoque was different from that of the Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper. Article 1620, which provides that “A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other coowners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common,” does not apply.
Diversified Credit v. Rosado December 24, 1968 Reyes, JBL, J.
Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it cannot be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of conversion of the wife’s share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of the construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.
PNB v. CA June 25, 1980 Guerrero, J.
Sunset View Condominium v. Judge Campos April 27, 1981 Fernandez, J.
vacate the land in litigation; to pay P100.00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating of the premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys’ fees and costs. After the death of her husband, Rosa mortgaged the entire property to PNB. The title to this property was still under proceedings but was subsequently awarded to the spouses a year after the mortgage. The mortgage to PNB, however, was not annotated. Meanwhile, she defaulted with her obligation to Manila Trading, and her share was sold at a public auction. Petitioner filed for the collection of assessment and insurance premiums against private respondent. The latter aver that every purhcaser of a condo unit, even if not yet fully paid, is a holder of separate interest and is automatically a shareholder.
After husband’s death, the property is supposed to be under co ownership of Rosa and children. She is entitled therefore to only half. By herself alone, she can’t mortgage the whole property.
Capitle v. de Gaban June 8, 2004 Carpio-Morales, J.
Fabian inherited from his dad 2 parcels of land. F died inteste in 1919, survived by 4 sons, J, Z, Fr, and M. After F’s death, J occupied and cultivated the property until his death in 1950. Petitioners (heirs of other brothers) now filed for partition. Ramos was a holder of a possession information title which he later conveyed to Romero. Romero applied for the registration of the land.
Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation will be conveyed only in a proper case. Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder of the condominium corporation. The Condominium Act leaves to the Master Deed the determination of when the shareholding will be transferred to the purchaser of a unit, as clearly provided in the deed in this case. Ownership of a unit, therefore, is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in the condominium corporation By necessary implication, the "separate interest" in a condominium, which entitles the holder to become automatically a share holder in the condominium corporation, as provided in Section 2 of the Condominium Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. The private respondents, consequently, who have not fully paid the purchase price of their units and are not owners of their units nor members or shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation. The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest as exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing of the case at bar, ownership by prescription had vested in them. The occupancy of a part of the land with an instrument giving color of title is sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under a claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, IF the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. The rule on constructive possession does not apply when the major portion of the disputed property has been in the adverse possession of homesteaders and their heirs. It is still part of the public domain until the patents are issued. A person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of acquisition by which it is invalidated. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good
Ramos v. Dir. Of Lands November 19, 1918 Malcolm, J.
Director v. CA June 29, 1984 Aquino, J. Kasilag v. Roque December 7, 1939 Imperial, J.
A land was occupied by 40 tenants during the Spanish regime. They were granted homestead applications. Bruno died during the Spanish regime and was survived by 7 children. Bruno’s nephew obtained a tax declaration for the land. Judge issued a decree for registration of land in name of Bruno’s heirs. Emiliana Ambrosio was issued a homestead patent. A TCT was subsequently issued. It is prohibited to sell or encumber a land obtained through homestead 5 years from its issuance. K entered into a contract
loan wherein she mortgaged the improvement on the lands as security. 2nd agreement: verbal whereby EA conveyed to K the possession of the land. To secure payment of loan, Reyes mortgaged to the bank several pieces of property and pledged part of his property. The latter goods were delivered to the depository. Garcia obtained a favorable judgment against Reyes’ property. Garcia requested the sheriff to seiz the goods from the warehouse. Children were invited by the parents to occupy the latter’s 2 lots. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict terminated this situation. Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to remain on the property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies. 2 roads :One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other as the Dacuman- Toreno road The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca That more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca- Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda That on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question Defendants in their answer averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private property of defendants That they have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so The court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription It was only in 1911-1913 that toll was being collected; apparently done to raise funds for its repair
faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. Kasilag is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. It can be concluded therefore that Kasilag’s ignorance of Sec 116 is excusable and may be a basis of good faith. There was a perfect contract of pledge and the depositary was placed in the possession of the goods after the symbolic transfer by means of delivery to him of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were kept. The sheriff, then, could not have legally levied upon the property. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is deleted. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. If owner of a tract of land, to accommodate the public, permits them to cross his property, it is not his intention to divest himself of ownership or to establish an easement. Such possession is not affected by acts of possessory character which are merely tolerated.
Banco Español Filipino v. Peterson February 6, 1907 Torres, J. Macasaet v. Macasaet September 30, 2004 Panganiban, J.
Cuaycong v. Benedicto March 13, 1918 Fisher, J.
Astudillo v. PHHC Spetember 22, 1976 Aquino, J. Peran v. CFI October 13, 1983 Melencio-Herrera, J. Yu v. Honrado August 21, 1980 Aquino, J. Cordero v. Cabral July 25, 1983 Abad-Santos, J. Fabie v. Gutierrez-David December 12, 1945 Ozaeta, J. Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur v. Samar Mining Co., Inc. February 27, 1971 Zaldivar, J. Baluran v. Navarro September 30, 1977 Munoz-Palma, J.
Mitra bought a lot from PHHC in 1961. The said lot gas been occupied by Astudillo uninterruptedly since 1957. PHHC ignored her requests for the cancellation of the title in favor of Mitra and for the resale to her. Jose Evasco owns an unregistered land. He executed an EJ partition of it among his 5 heirs, incl. Alejandro. He allowed and tolerated his niece Encarnacion to erect a house on a portion of his lot. In ’72, Alejandro sold the lot. Encarnacion refused to vacate. Marcelo Steel Corp sold 42 metric tons of scrap engine blocks to Refuerzo, an alleged swindler. The latter then sold them to the Yu spouses. The purchase was in GF. Court then issued warrant for seizure of the goods. Felipa and her children filed a complaint that a portion of the land they inherited from husband was illegally possessed by Victoria et al. Petitioner Josefa is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses in Binondo and Ongpin, under the ninth clause of the will of deceased Rosario. As the mining claims and the mill of Samar are located inland and at a great distance from the loading pt/pier site, it devided to construct a gravel road; Samar then filed with Bureau of Lands & of Forestry misc. lease app’n for a road right of way; given temporary permit; however, execution of the lease contracts have been held in abeyance by CTA Spouses Domingo Paraiso and Fidela Q. Paraiso were the owners of a residential lot of around 480 square meters. On or about February 2, 1964, the Paraisos executed an agreement entitled “BARTER” whereby as party of the first part they agreed to “barter and exchange” with spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran their residential lot with the latter’s unirrigated riceland, of approximately 223 square meters without any permanent improvements. On May 6, 1975 Antonio Obendencio filed a complaint to recover the above-mentioned residential lot from Avelino Baluran claiming that he is the rightful owner of said residential lot having acquired the same from his mother, Natividad Paraiso Obedencio, and that he needed the property for purposes of constructing his house thereon inasmuch as he had taken residence in his native town, Sarrat. Obedencio accordingly prayed that he be declared owner of the residential lot and that defendant Baluran be ordered to vacate the same forfeiting his (Obedencio) favor the improvements defendant Baluran had built in bad faith. At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their stipulation of facts. It was likewise admitted that the aforementioned residential lot was donated on October 4, 1974 by Natividad Obedencio to her son Antonio Obedencio, and that since the execution of the agreement of February 2, 1964 Avelino Baluran was in possession of the
As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over the disputed lot. The State’s solicitude from the destitutes and the have -nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations pf property, public or private. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by mere tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. The acquirer and possessor in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner, until a competent court rules otherwise. Such possession in good faith is equivalent to title and every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession (Arts 539 and 559) Good faith ceases when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons, they shall reimburse the fruits received. A usufructuary of the rents, as a corollary to the right to all rents, to choose the tenant and to fix the amount of the rent, necessarily has the right to choose himself as the tenant, provided that the obligations he has assumed towards the owner of the property are fulfilled. It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the LO and not by a usufructuary.
The use of the term “barter” in describing the agreement of February 2, 1964, is not controlling. The stipulations in said document are clear enough to indicate that there was no intention at all on the part of the signatories thereto to convey the ownership of their respective properties; all that was intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer the material possession thereof. With the material ion being the only one transferred, all that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the property of another. A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes rights and obligations already existing. The right of “mater ial possession” granted in the agreement of February 2, 1964, ends if and when any of the children of Natividad Paraiso, Obedencio would reside in the municipality and build his house on the property. Inasmuch as the condition opposed is not dependent solely on the will of one of the parties to the contract the spouses Paraiso but is part dependent on the will of third persons, Natividad Obedencio and any of her children, the same is valid. the plaintiff or respondent Obedencio could not demand for the recovery of possession of the residential lot in question, not until he acquired that right from his mother, Natividad Obedencio, and which he did acquire when his mother donated to him the residential lot on October 4, 1974. In view of the ruling that the “barter agreement” of
residential lot, paid the taxes of the property, and constructed a house thereon with an value of P250.00. On November 8, 1975, the trial Judge Ricardo Y. Navarro rendered a decision.
NHA v. CA April 13, 2005 Carpio, J.
Proc. 481 set aside a portion of land in QC owned by NHA as reserved property for the NGC. Proc. 1670 removed a 7-hectare portion from the NGC and gave MSBF usufructuary rights over this 7has. MSBF occupied the land, but exceeded from the 7 has. Then, MSBF leased a portion of the area to BGC
February 2, 1964, did not transfer the ownership of the respective properties mentioned therein, it follows that petitioner Baluran remains the owner of the unirrigated riceland and is now entitled to its Possession. With the happening of the resolutory condition provided for in the agreement, the right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and each is entitled to a return of his property. A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provision on usufruct; a usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interests – a usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides The road is clearly a servitude voluntarily constituted in favor of the community under Art. 531. Having been devoted by NNSC to the use of the public in general, the road is charged with public interest. And while so devoted. NNSC may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private persons. Since the construction of the church, there had been a side door in the wall through which the worshippers attending mass enter and leave, passing and entering the land in question. As this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed since the church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period the Municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by persons who attend services held by the church. Easement of light and view go together. Acquisition of easements is by title or by prescription. The visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence. Existence of the apparent sign had the same effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of the light and view upon death of original owner. An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous
North Negros v. Hidalgo October 31, 1936 Recto, J.
Municipality of Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro March 29, 1916 Torres, J.
Across its properties, NNSC constructed a road connecting the mill site with the provincial highwat. NNSC made the road accessible to the public, a toll fee being charge in case of motor vehicles, free for pedestrians. H owns a tuba saloon in an adjoining hacienda, and likeother people, he used to pass through connecting road. Because NNSCs worker’s usually got drunk from H’s saloon, NNSC sought to enjoin H from using the road. The municipality applied for registration of parcels of land claiming that there were owners since time immemorial. Bishop opposed saying that the church had been in possession also since time immemorial
Amor v. Florentino October 11, 1943 Bocobo, J.
Ronquillo v. Roco
Maria Florentino owned a house and camarin. The house had on the north side 3 widnows on the upper story and a 4th on the ground flr. Through these windows, the house receives light and air from the lot where the camarin stands. Maria made a will devising the house and lot to Gabriel and Jose, then the camarin to Ma. Encarnacion. ME sold the lot and warehouse to Amor. A destrotyed the warehouse and built a 2storey house Plaintiffs alleged that they have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years. Plaintiffs further claim that defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of the former. On May 12, 1953, the defendants and their men constructed a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which,
accordingly has impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way. On July 10, 1954 defendants planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way against the plaintiff’s protests and opposition. This prevented them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga. Encarnacion v. CA March 11, 1991 Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas. Petitioner owns the dominant estate while respondent owns the servient estate which stands between the dominant estate and the national road. When the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence, persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One- half meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation was asked and none was given for the portions constituting the pathway. It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway for his family and for his customers. Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January, 1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. The request was turned down by the two widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile. Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter parcel of land. During the trial, the attention of the lower courtwas called to the existence of another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant estate, hence, dismissing petitioner's complaint.
ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 620 and 622) Under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly the articles thereof aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way. The Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way, holding that where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
Valderrama v. North Negros December 18, 1925 Villamor, J.
V. et al executed a contract with Miguel Osorio where O afreed to install a sugar central of minimum capacity of 300 tons for grinding and milling a sugar cane grown by V. et al who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central all cane they might produce. A railroad was constructed on V et al’s land to transport the sugarcane. But V’s harvest fell short.
1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar company for the construction of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the servient estates can be transported on said railroad, because it is a wellsettled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by easement. That an easement being established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of the servient estates cannot limit its use to the transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to that effect. 2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons carrying goods pertaining to persons who aren’t wners of the servient estates and at all time the person entitled o the easement may please, for in such case the easement ontinues to be the same.
Ongsiaco v. Ongsiaco
Hacienda Esperanza Tercea de Pare was dissolved and partitioned among the Ongsiaco heirs (4/9) and the Santos heirs (5/9). O through notarial deed stated that S had been constructing dikes obstructing the natural flow of water to the prejudice of the co-owners. The classic battle of an avocado tree and a sarisari store of strong materials. Yolanda’s property behind A&S’s. at first, Y uses A’s property to get to the municipal road. Later on, she was barred. Eventually, S provided her with a passageway. Unfortunately, S’s property is a sari-sari store –long story short, ang haba ng tatahakin niyang daan [naks]para makarating sa municipal road. Hence, she filed an action for right of way through A’s property. The only obstruction in the proposed RoW is an avocado tree. Pacita D-C owns a 635sw.m. lot located in San Fernando, Pampanga ehich is almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway: N, W: business establishments S: Pineda’s land ENE: Phil. Rabbit  lies between chan and highway She used to have a passageway from Pineda’s but she fenced it off. Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road extends to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land
Quimen v. CA May 29, 1996 Bellosillo, J.
The dikes are continuous easements since it does depend upon the act of man, but is due to gravity. Being such, it is subject to the extinction to the non-user (20 years in the Old Code and 10 years in the New Code). Since, it was admittedly built in 1937 or 1938, the action is barred by prescription Where the easement may be established on any of the several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen but if these two circumstances don’t concur in a single interest, the way which will cause least damage should be used, even if it will not be shortest.
David-Chan v. CA February 26, 1997 Panganiban, J.
David-Chan not entitled to a RoW through PR’s property.
La Vista v. CA September 5, 1997 Bellosillo, J.
A legal easement is that which is constituted by law for public use and interest. A voluntary easement is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties. A voluntary easement of right of way could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
Vda. de Baltazar v. CA June 27, 1995 Romero, J.
to Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista Subdivision. La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private respondents Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latter’s predecessor-in- interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-ofway over Mangyan Road. La Vista contends that “mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it” Panganiban’s property was surrounded by Baltazar’s in front, and Calimon’s and Legazpi’s on the left and right, respectively. It was Baltazar’s property which fronts the national road. Panganiban sought the right of way through Baltazar’s. It was discovered that he was ed access through Legazpi and Calimon’s property when Baltazar closed his property.
only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.
Requisites that has to be complied with before the grant of a compulsory easement of right of way— 1. 2. 3. 4. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest There must be payment of the proper indemnity The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts
Sps. Dela Cruz v. Ramiscal February 4, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.
The subject matter of this case is a 1.10m wide by 12.6m long strip of lnd owned by Ramiscal which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 19th Ave., the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence and roof. Floro was the owner of a subdivision. Here comes Llenado who bought the adjoining subdivision lot, which was formerly Emmanuel Homes. A creek separates the property of Llenado from Floro. On the west side of Llenado’s property was a rice land. On the subdivision plan of Llenado’s property, there was a plan to construct an access road to McArthur Highway but no construction was made. With the two subdivisions, it was Floro’s which only had an access road. Floro ed usage of his access road pending negotiations but later on closed the property.
Floro v. Llenado
An easement of right of way can be established through continued use. This doctrine was enunciated in Ronquillo v Roco which held that an easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature since the dominant estate cannot be continually crossing the servient estate but can do so only at intervals. An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on the corporeal immovable property f another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something in his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. In CAB, petitioners failed to show by competent evidence that a voluntary easement was made. The use of the road lots by the Llenados during the month of March was by mere tolerance of Floro pending the negotiation of the terms & conditions of the right of way. Although such use was in anticipation of a voluntary easement, no such contract was validly entered into by reason of the failure of the parties to agree on its terms & conditions. The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
Lagazo v. CA March 5, 1998 Panganiban, J.
Bonsato v. CA July 30, 1954 Reyes, JBL, J. Gestopa v. CA October 5, 2000 Quisumbing, J. Austria-Magat v. CA February 1, 2002 De Leon Jr., J. Vitug v. CA March 29, 1990 Sarmiento, J.
Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent resident therein and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact to fix the requirements needed. Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was subsequently given and later, the land was donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property. The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol. Respondents sought the annulment of the deeds of donation on the ground that it wasn’t in compliance with the formalities of a will. The petitioners on the other hand claim that they are valid donations and that they were not donations mortis causa. Spouses Gestopa previously issued a deed of donation mortis cause in favor of Mercedes but subsequently, they issued another deed, now inter vivos, still in favor of Mercedes. Mercedes now seeks the donated property but the Gestopas claimed that she isn’t entitled to such, the donation being mortis causa. Comerciante had 5 children. She then bought a residential house and lot which she donated to her children. The deed contained an acceptance and irrevocability clause. Thereafter she executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Apolinaria. Romarico and Dolores had a joint account with Bank of American National Trust and Savings Assn. and a SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT wherein it was agreed that upon death of one of them, the surviving spouse would own the proceeds of the account. Romarico withdrew the said funds and used it to pay for estate tax, and now wants to acquire authority to dispose of other properties of his wife’s estate for reimbursement of the “advance” he made. The oppositor alleged that he is not entitled to the said reimbursement as the funds used, i.e. the funds of the Joint account, was part of the conjugal property. The Court upheld the SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENT. Kausapin argues that the deed of conveyance in favor of stepdaughter Maxima was in English and that it was not explained to her. The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat, who are childless, acquired three parcels of land. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair with Pedra Dacola, namely: herein defendants-appellees Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro and Lirafe, all surnamed Sumipat. On January 5, 1983, Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated "DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT- CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES" (the assailed document) in favor of defendants-appellees covering the three parcels of land (the properties).
The donation is simple and pure. There is no showing of any acceptance from Lagazo and thus, there has been no perfected donation.
If there has been no badge that it is a donation mortis causa, it should be considered as a donation inter vivos.
The existence of an acceptance clause in the deed shows that the donation is of inter vivos. There is no acceptance needed when it comes to donations mortis causa. The act of selling the subject property to petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke must be filed in court. NOT A CONVEYANCE MORTIS CAUSA = WILL - because the property conveyed is not exclusively owned by DOLORES NOT A DONATION INTER VIVOS a. It would take effect after death of one b. No conveyance of exclusive property of one spouse to the other
Hemedes v. CA Oct. 8, 1999 Gonzaga-Reyes, J. Sumipat v. Banga August 13, 2004 Tinga, J.
Mere preponderance of evidence is not sufficient to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.
Calicdan v. Cendana February 5, 2004 Ynares-Santiago, J.
It appears that on January 5, 1983 when the assailed document was executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick and bedridden; that upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placid a to sign on the assailed document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all about. After Lauro Sumipat’s death,his wife Placida, and defendants- appellees jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant. But as Placida’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal. The instant controversy involves a 760 square meter parcel of unregistered land located in Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed Calicdan. On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998. On June 29, 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages” against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.
Donation void. Notwithstanding, we find that respondent has become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. The registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the done. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the done must
Shopper’s Paradise Realty v. Roque January 13, 2004 Vitug, J.
In 1993, petitioner entered into a 25-year lease with deceased Dr. Roque over a parcel of land. When Dr. died, son Efren contended that dad had no authority to enter into agreements with petitioner because the properties had long been given to him by his parents through a DIV – duly notarized, but remained in Dr’s name.
satisfy. It is enough between the parties to a donation of an immpvable that the donation be made in a public document, but in order to vind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property.
Eduarte v. CA February 9, 1996 Francisco, J.
Pedro Calapine wants to revoke the donation he made to his nicece in 1984. Niece committed falsification of public document. Sps. Eduarte contends that the crime is neither one against the person nor property of the donor but against public interest. Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially partitioned the land donated to them. On the same date, she donated in favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the land, she fenced it and constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the fence, entered the premises and used the three lots. Despite demands for him to vacate, he refused to do so, prompting Directo to file a case against him and revoke the donation made by her. 1977: petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land in Calamba. Deed of donation also bears acceptance of done. Condition that it be used for the building of an institution for the homeless. 1980: for the purpose of generating funds for the erection of building, leased the donated property to Gonez wuth prior consent from donor. 1986: leased again to Jose Bostre, who used it as a ranch. In 1990, petitioners seek revocation. Respondent Mutya Victorio is the owner of the property in Panganiban Street, Santiago, Isabela where petitioners Chua and Yong Tian are lessees. In 1990, Victorio effected an ejectment suit against the petitioners who were not fulfilling their obligations as lessees, but a compromise agreement supervened this. In 1994, Victorio raised the rentals and petitioners did not comply with such payments. She then again moved for an ejectment suit. The RTC and CA ordered respondents to vacate the property. But this did not happen because respondents agreed as to the new rentals and there again continued occupation of the property.
The Supreme Court ruled that all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.
Noceda v. CA September 2, 1999 Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of Directo and considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesn’t require conviction of the donee, it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation.
Yulo and Sons v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo March 31, 2005 Garcia, J.
Considering that the donee’s act did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purposed, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach, which will not warrant revocation
Chua v. Victorio May 18, 2004 Ynares-Santiago, J.
The compromise agreement executed in 1991 is without moment as to petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, in 1994, the juridical relation between the parties was severed when the CA ordered ejectment of the petitioners. The lessor’s acceptance of the increased rentals in 1996 did not have the effect of reviving the earlier contract of lease. Upon the moment of acquiescence by respondents to the increased amount, an entirely new contract of lease was entered into, forging an entirely new juridical relation. Since payment of rent was made on a monthly basis, and pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code, the period of this lease contract was monthly. Upon the expiration of every month, the lessor could increase the rents and demand that the lessee vacate the premises upon non-compliance with increased terms.
In 1998, Victorio wanted to increase again the rentals. They again failed to pay such rents and respondent filed again for ejectment suit. Petitioners impugn such raises in rents, invoking the provisions of the compromise agreement that the two parties executed sometime in 1991. They contend that there can be no increase of more than 25% in a span of 4 years. The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations, such as contracts of lease. In addition to the general remedy of rescission granted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, there is an independent provision granting the remedy of rescission for breach of any of the lessor or lessee’s statutory obligations. Under Article 1659 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at his option, ask for (1) the rescission of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to remain in force. Payment of the rent is one of a lessee’s statutory obligations. The law grants the lessor the option of extrajudicially terminating the contract of lease by simply serving a written notice upon the lessee. This extrajudicial termination has the same effect as rescission. Rescission of lease contracts under Article 1659 of the Civil Code does not require an independent action, unlike resolution of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of said Code.
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