Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102356/street-vs-new-york
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1257', '§ 42', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 1425', '§ 136', '§ 52', '§ 63', '§ 1425', '§ 4', '§ 176', '§ 3', '§ 700', '§ 1015', '§ 771', '§ 3', '§ 172']

Street Vs New York - Citation 102356 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Street Vs. New York - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/102356CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnApr-21-1969Case Number394 U.S. 576AppellantStreetRespondentNew YorkExcerpt:
street v. new york - 394 u.s. 576 (1969)
appellant, having heard a news broadcast of the shooting of james meredith, a civil rights leader, took an american flag which he owned to a street corner near his home in new york and ignited the flag. he was arrested and thereafter charged by information with malicious mischief for violating § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, of the new york penal law, which makes it a crime publicly to mutilate or "publicly [to] defy . . . or cast contempt upon [any american flag] either by words or act.".....Judgment:
1. Appellant has met the burden of showing that the federal question of constitutionality of the "words" part of the statute was adequately raised in the state courts, by appellant's motion to dismiss in the trial court and his briefs in the appellate courts. Pp.
394 U. S. 581
2. The application of § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, to appellant was violative of rights of free expression assured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it permitted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag. Pp.
394 U. S. 585
(a) Appellant's conviction must be set aside if it could have been based solely upon his words, or upon both his words and his act, and if a conviction on such a basis would be unconstitutional.
(131);
(1945). Pp.
(b) The record here is insufficient to eliminate the possibility that appellant's words were the sole basis of his conviction or that he was convicted for both his words and his deed. Pp.
394 U. S. 588
(c) Appellant's conviction under § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for speaking she did could not be constitutionally justified on the basis that the words he uttered (1) constituted incitement to others to commit unlawful acts; (2) were so inflammatory as to provoke violent retaliation by others; (3) were (apart from the content of the ideas they conveyed) likely to shock passers-by; or (4), in the light of
Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
(1943), constituted failure by the appellant to manifest the respect which every citizen must show the flag. Pp.
394 U. S. 590
"publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]." [
] He was given a suspended sentence. We must decide whether, in light of all the circumstances, that conviction denied to him rights of free expression protected by the First Amendment and assured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.
-277 (1964).
Appellant was tried before another Criminal Court judge, sitting without a jury, and was convicted of malicious mischief in violation of § 1425, subd. 16, par. & 2. [
] He was subsequently given a suspended sentence. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed without opinion. Leave was granted to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, and, after plenary consideration, that court unanimously affirmed. 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967). We noted probable jurisdiction.
Street argues that his conviction was unconstitutional for three different reasons.
he claims that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is overbroad, both on its face and as applied, because the section makes it a crime "publicly [to] defy . . . or cast contempt upon [an American flag]
he contends that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is vague and imprecise because it does not clearly define the conduct which it forbids.
he asserts that New York may not constitutionally
The New York Court of Appeals did not mention in its opinion the constitutionality of the "words" part of § 1425, subd. 16, par. d. [
] Hence, in order to vindicate our jurisdiction to deal with this particular issue, we must inquire whether that question was presented to the New York courts in such a manner that it was necessarily decided by the New York Court of Appeals when it affirmed
appellant's conviction. If the question was not so presented, then we have no power to consider it.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(2), 1257(3);
326 U. S. 206
-207 (1945). Moreover, this Court has stated that, when, as here, the highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal question, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Anderson, supra; Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. McGuire,
196 U. S. 128
196 U. S. 131
The issue whether a federal question was sufficiently and properly raised in the state courts is itself ultimately a federal question, as to which this Court is not bound by the decision of the state courts. [
] However, it is not entirely clear whether, in such cases, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether the state court has "bypassed the federal right under forms of local procedure" or whether we should decide the matter "
Ellis v. Dixon,
349 U. S. 458
(1955). In either event, we think appellant has met the burden of showing that the issue of the constitutionality of the "words" part of 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was adequately raised in the state trial court. The motion quoted above explicitly referred to appellant's words. Appellant's counsel termed appellant's overall activity a "demonstration" or "protest," terms which encompass words as well as conduct. Indeed, if appellant's intention was to protest alleged governmental inaction in connection with the shooting of James Meredith, his words were an essential element, for, without them, no one would have known the object of his protest.
To the extent that the matter is governed by New York law, we have found no New York statutes or decisions which require that an issue be raised in the trial court with greater specificity than occurred here. In fact, in
People v. McLucas,
15 N.Y.2d 167, 172, 204 N.E.2d 846, 848 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals held that, when an appellant claims "deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right" New York appellate courts may review the correctness of a jury charge even though the appellant failed to except to the charge in the trial court. The Court of Appeals reached this result despite the fact that § 42a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure then required that an exception be taken "expressly" if the issue of the correctness of a jury charge was to be preserved for appellate review. In the present case, the right asserted by appellant was surely "fundamental," and, under New York law, a less precise objection was required than to a Jury instruction. [
Insofar as the question of sufficient presentation is one for our independent decision, the controlling principle was set forth in the leading case of
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman,
his raising of the issue in the two appellate courts. [
] We therefore conclude that the question is properly before us.
We next consider whether it is our duty to reverse if we find, as we do in Parts III and IV,
that Street's words could have been an independent cause of his conviction and that a conviction for uttering such words would violate the Constitution.
That such is our duty is made apparent by a number of decisions of this Court. In the leading case of
283 U. S. 367
has been consistently followed. In
. The rule was again applied in
325 U. S. 1
325 U. S. 36
, n. 45 (1945);
337 U. S. 5
-6 (1949), and
354 U. S. 311
It is true that, in the present case the general verdict was rendered by a judge, not a jury. However, if the ground of the judge's decision cannot be ascertained from the record, then the danger of unconstitutional conviction is not significantly less than in the cases just discussed.
Cf. Thomas v. Collins,
323 U. S. 528
-529 (1945). Nor would it be appropriate to remand the case to the trial judge for a
explanation of the grounds of his decision.
Cf. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,
334 U. S. 653
(1948). Hence, we conclude that the case is governed by the rule of
and that appellant's conviction must be set aside if we find that it could have been based solely upon his words and that a conviction resting on such a basis would be
Moreover, even assuming that the record precludes the inference that appellant's conviction might have been based
on his words, we are still bound to reverse if the conviction could have been based upon
his words and his act. This is made apparent by
Thomas v. Collins, supra.
The Court in that case noted that Thomas had been cited for contempt because, during a meeting, he allegedly had violated a court restraining order both by soliciting a single individual to join a union and by soliciting all nonunion men present. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the State's contention that the judgment could be sustained on the basis of the individual solicitation alone. The Court said:
"The motion for the fiat in contempt was filed and the fiat itself was issued on account of both invitations. The order adjudging Thomas in contempt was in general terms, finding that he had violated the restraining order, without distinction between the solicitations set forth in the petition and proved as violations. The sentence was a single penalty. In this state of the record, it must be taken that the order followed the prayer of the motion and the fiat's recital, and that the penalty was imposed on account of both invitations. The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to neither.
Cf. Williams v. North Carolina,
-529. (Footnotes omitted.) Finding that a conviction based upon the general solicitation could not stand, the Court reversed the entire conviction. [
appellant here was charged with two acts violative of the statute: burning a flag and publicly speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the flag, and evidence was introduced to show the commission of both acts. Here too the verdict was general and the sentence a single penalty. Hence, unless the record negates the possibility that the conviction was based on both alleged violations,
dictates that "[t]he judgment . . . must be affirmed as to both or as to neither."
We take the rationale of
to be that, when a single-count indictment or information charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having done both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as "intertwined" and have rested the conviction on both together.
-541. There is no comparable hazard when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on findings of guilt on certain of those counts, [
] for, in such instances, there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits, and separately from the others.
the conviction could have been based on both his words and his burning of the flag. As
teaches, we cannot take the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals as obviating our duty to examine the record for ourselves in order to ascertain whether the conviction may have rested upon such grounds. The sworn information which charged appellant with the crime of malicious mischief, and which is quoted more fully
394 U. S. 579
, recited not only that appellant had burned an American flag, but also that he "[did] shout,
The State argues that appellant's words were, at most, used to establish his unlawful intent in burning the flag. [
] However, after a careful examination of the comparatively brief trial record, we find ourselves unable to say with certainty that appellant's words were not an independent cause of his conviction. While it is true that, at trial, greater emphasis was placed upon appellant's
In the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that any of these interests may constitutionally justify appellant's conviction under § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for speaking as he did. We begin with the interest in preventing incitement. Appellant's words, taken alone, did not urge anyone to do anything unlawful. They amounted only to somewhat excited public advocacy of the idea that the United States should abandon, at least temporarily, one of its national symbols. It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from imposing criminal punishment for public advocacy of peaceful change in our institutions.
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I),
379 U. S. 546
-552 (1965);
372 U. S. 237
-238 (1963);
-5 (1949);
354 U. S. 318
-319 (1957). Even assuming that appellant's words might be found incitive when considered together with his simultaneous burning of the flag, § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, does not purport to punish only those defiant or contemptuous words which amount to incitement, and there is no evidence that the state courts regarded the statute as so limited. Hence, a conviction for words could not be upheld on this basis.
See, e.g., Yates v. United States, supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.
Nor could such a conviction be justified on the second ground mentioned above: the possible tendency of appellant's words to provoke violent retaliation. Though it is conceivable that some listeners might have been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words, we cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of "fighting words" which are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."
(1942). And even if appellant's words might be found within that category, § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is not narrowly drawn to punish only words of that character, and there is no indication that it was so interpreted by the state courts. Hence, this case is again distinguishable from
Chaplinsky, supra,
in which the Court emphasized that the statute was "carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression. . . ."
See also Terminiello v. Chicago, supra.
Again, such a conviction could not be sustained on the ground that appellant's words were likely to shock passers-by. Except perhaps for appellant's incidental use of the word "damn," upon which no emphasis was placed at trial, [
] any shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (I), supra; Edwards v. South Carolina, supra; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
(1940). And even if such a conviction might be upheld on the ground of "shock," there is again no indication that the state courts regarded the statute as limited to that purpose.
Finally, such a conviction could not be supported on the theory that, by making the above-quoted remarks about the flag, appellant failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly be demanded of every citizen. In
(1943), this Court held that to require unwilling school children to salute the flag would violate rights of free expression assured by the Fourteenth Amendment. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote words which are especially apposite here:
319 U. S. 641
-642. (Footnote omitted.) We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed "freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary," and the "right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order," encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.
Since appellant could not constitutionally be punished under 1425, subd. 16, par. d, for his speech, and since we have found that he may have been so punished, his conviction cannot be permitted to stand. In so holding, we reiterate that we have no occasion to pass upon the validity of this conviction insofar as it was sustained by the state courts on the basis that Street could be punished for his burning of the flag, even though the burning was an act of protest. Nor do we perceive any basis for our Brother WHITE's fears that our decision today may be taken to require reversal whenever a defendant is convicted for burning a flag in protest, following a trial at which his words have been introduced to prove some element of that offense. Assuming that such a conviction would otherwise pass constitutional muster, a matter about which we express no view, nothing in this opinion would render the conviction impermissible merely because an element of the crime was proved by the defendant's words, rather than in some other way.
391 U. S. 369
We add that disrespect for our flag is to be deplored no less in these vexed times than in calmer periods of our history.
Cf. Halter v. Nebraska,
(1907). Nevertheless, we are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested on a form of expression, however distasteful, which the Constitution tolerates and protects.
N.Y.Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16, par. & (1909). In 1967, § 1425, subd. 16, was superseded by § 136 of the General Business Law, which, in par. d, defines the offense in identical language.
N.Y.Laws 1965, c. 1031, § 52.
Only last Term, this Court held, in
390 U. S. 633
, n. 2 (1968), that the case of a New York appellant was not moot even though the time for revocation of his suspended sentence had expired, because it was possible that his license to operate a luncheonette might be withdrawn in consequence of his conviction. Here there is an actual, rather than merely a potential, threat that appellant will be deprived of his employment, albeit only temporarily. This Court also held last Term, in
-58 (1968), that the case of a New York appellant who had fully served his misdemeanor sentence was not moot, because he apparently could not have brought his case to this Court before completion of his sentence and because the conviction could be used for impeachment and sentencing purposes in future criminal proceedings. Appellant Street similarly was unable, despite diligent prosecution of his appeals, to bring his case here within a year of his sentencing. He is subject to all of the collateral penalties to which Sibron was liable. Hence, both
dictate that this case is not moot.
See, e.g., Parker v. Illinois,
333 U. S. 574
(1900); R. Robertson & F. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States § 63 at 112 n. 1 (R. Tolfson & P. Kurland ed.1951), and other cases there cited.
We find unpersuasive the State's argument that appellant's omission to raise the question of the constitutionality of the "words" provision is shown by his failure at any stage to invoke the exclusionary rule of
(1966), with respect to the admission of his words into evidence. For the State concedes that appellant's words were probative at least with respect to his unlawful intent in burning the flag,
Brief for Appellee 45-46, and appellant therefore would have had reason to invoke
even had he believed the "words" part of the statute to be irrelevant.
There can be no doubt that the Court's disposition in
including its decision to reverse the conviction and not simply to remand for resentencing, was carefully considered. The case was originally argued during the 1943 Term, but was ordered to be restored to the docket and reargued the following Term, with the parties directed to brief,
the question whether the general solicitation was a basis of Thomas' conviction.
See, e.g., Claassen v. United States,
142 U. S. 140
The State also contends that appellant's words could not have been a ground of conviction because they obviously were not spoken "publicly," as required by § 1425, subd. 16, par. d. However, although appellant testified that he spoke solely to a police officer, the officer himself gave evidence from which the trial judge might have concluded that appellant's remarks were made either to or within hearing of a small crowd.
394 U. S. 578
-579. Moreover, the sworn information recited that appellant "shout[ed]" his words on a city street, thereby apparently satisfying the statutory requirement that the words be said "publicly."
I dissent from the reversal of this judgment not only because the Court in my opinion has strained to bring this trial within
"We are called upon to decide whether the deliberate act of burning an American flag in public as a 'protest' may be punished as a crime. [
"May New York State constitutionally impose penal sanctions upon an individual charged with destroying or damaging an American flag in an attempt to dramatize his concern with social conditions existing in the country? [
"May the State of New York constitutionally impose penal sanctions upon one who is charged with publicly and deliberately desecrating an American flag as a means of dramatizing his dissatisfaction with social conditions existing within our Country? [
ground, holding that it is impossible to determine the basis for appellant's conviction. In my opinion a reading of the short trial record leaves no doubt that appellant was convicted solely for burning the American flag.
From the beginning to the end of the proceedings below the parties placed only two matters in issue: (1) is burning the flag protected symbolic speech and (2) did appellant burn the flag for the purpose of casting contempt upon it or did he burn it in a dignified manner? [
] The information alleged that
"Court: You say
is a form of demonstration?"
"Mr. Goldstick, continuing: I refer Your Honor to page 6 of my brief, referring to the United States Code that a flag, when it is in such a condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by
"Now, under the supremacy clause, if there is any conflict with any statute the Federal statute takes precedence; if a State law is in conflict with a Federal law the Federal law takes precedence. The Federal law provides you may
an American flag; therefore, New York State is without power to make a complaint and convict a man for the
of an American flag. "
"Court: Motions denied. The question here would be whether he
it because it was in such poor condition that it should be
or if it was an illegal demonstration."
concerns the manner in which the flag is to be displayed, and, in § 4(j), 56 Stat. 380, 36 U.S.C. § 176(j), mandates that the flag, when no longer a fitting emblem for display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning. At the time of appellant's trial, the federal prohibition of flag desecration, which in all material particulars was identical to New York's, applied only to the District of Columbia, and could therefore not have preempted state legislation on the same subject. [
We are told by the Court that, at least in part appellant's conviction rests on his words. If it does, the trial record is strangely silent, for the State made no attempt to prove that appellant's words were heard by the crowd. Appellant insisted that he spoke only to the officer, yet the New York statute requires that the accused's flag desecration be public. The State argues, without contradiction by appellant, that words spoken to a policeman would not be spoken publicly for purposes of the statute. [
] I think it evident that appellant's words were mentioned in the indictment and introduced at trial only to show that he burned the flag with an intent to desecrate it, a necessary element of the State's case. In the absence of such evidence, the State would have proved
that appellant burned a flag but would have left open the possibility that the burning was designed to destroy it in a dignified manner. The fact that appellant's words supplied an element of the State's case does not mean that he was convicted for uttering these words.
See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U. S. 498
line of cases allows us to avoid deciding whether flag burning is protected by the First Amendment. This case does not fit the
would impinge upon First Amendment freedoms. Since the jury charge was disjunctive,
Miss Stromberg could be convicted if the jury found that she conducted the ceremony for any of the three statutorily prohibited goals, it was possible that her conviction rested totally upon an act entitled to constitutional protection. Presumably, given the jury's general verdict, it could have convicted Miss Stromberg for raising a red flag solely as a symbol of opposition to organized government, but not as either an invitation to anarchistic action or an aid to propaganda of a seditious character.
is that, if there is any possibility the general verdict below rests on speech or conduct entitled to constitutional protection, then the conviction must be reversed. The
analysis cannot be applied to appellant's conviction as the factual patterns in the two cases are distinct. The record leaves no doubt that appellant did burn the flag. Nor can appellant argue that his act was not an act of desecration. The trial judge emphatically stated that the issue was whether appellant burned the flag to destroy it in a dignified manner or to cast contempt upon it. Appellant's conviction therefore must be based upon a finding that he desecrated the flag by burning and neither he nor the Court suggests otherwise. We are not confronted with a jury trial and the consequent inability to determine the basis for the verdict below. The trial judge, at the very outset of the trial, made known his view that appellant's motivation for burning the flag was the probative issue. Combining this act of burning with a verbalization of the reasons for it does not allow the Court to avoid determining the constitutionality of appellant's conduct. Since there can be no claim that appellant was convicted for his speech,
My analysis is confirmed by an examination of the other cases upon which the Court relies.
(1942), presents a factual pattern identical to
Williams, a resident of North Carolina, obtained a Nevada divorce and then remarried in Nevada. Upon his return to North Carolina, Williams was convicted of bigamous cohabitation. The jury was charged that it could convict Williams if it found either that he procured the divorce based upon substituted service or that he went to Nevada not to establish a
residence, but rather to obtain a divorce through a fraud upon the Nevada courts. Holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required North Carolina to respect Williams' Nevada divorce even though acquired by substituted service, the Court reversed Williams' conviction, since it was possible that the jury found the divorce was not procured by fraud, yet convicted Williams. Under this state of facts, the conviction could have been based upon the acquisition of a divorce North Carolina was constitutionally compelled to honor.
(1949), reflects the same approach. Terminiello was charged with disorderly conduct. The jury was allowed to convict if it found that Terminiello's speech either stirred the public to anger or constituted "fighting words." Since only the latter may be constitutionally prohibited, the Court reversed. It was possible that the jury found that Terminiello's speech merely stirred the public to anger, yet convicted him. Terminiello could have been convicted for constitutionally protected conduct; he was therefore entitled to a reversal.
(1957), also conforms to this pattern. Charged with a violation of the Smith Act, Yates was convicted under instructions which made either "advocacy" or "organizing" a statutory violation. The Court decided that the jury instruction with regard to the organizing charge was erroneous; since the jury could have convicted Yates
Relying also on
(1945), the Court holds that, even if
323 U. S. 587
. My reading of
indicates, however, that
does not serve as justification for the Court's disposition of this case. [
a union organizer was held in contempt, fined, and imprisoned for disobeying a state court order enjoining him from violating a Texas statute. The statute required that labor organizers register with and procure an organizer's card from a designated Texas official before soliciting memberships in labor unions. Without either registering or procuring a card, the organizer made a speech before a group of workers. He extolled the virtues of union membership in general terms and also asked a specific individual to become a union member. As I read the case,
holds that both the general solicitation and the solicitation of a named individual were within the protection of the First Amendment:
323 U. S. 534
-535. Having so held, it was unnecessary for the Court to determine if an individual solicitation could have been enjoined. The union organizer therefore was entitled to relief without regard to whether his conviction was based upon the general or the individual solicitation.
and the cases based upon it do not allow us the luxury of refusing to treat appellant's claim that the burning of the flag as a protest is worthy of constitutional protection.
I am in complete agreement with the general rule that this Court should not treat broad constitutional questions when narrow ones will suffice to dispose of the litigation. However, where only the broad question is presented, it is our task and our responsibility to confront that question squarely and resolve it. In a time when the American flag has increasingly become an integral part of public protests, the constitutionality of the flag desecration statutes enacted by all of the States [
] and Congress [
] is a matter of the most widespread concern. Both those who seek constitutional shelter for acts of flag desecration perpetrated in the course of a political
"Mr. Goldstick: Before I cross-examine, I move to dismiss both charges upon the ground the People failed to make out a
upon the ground the People failed to prove a
"A. I said: 'If they do what they had [
] to Meredith, we don't need this flag.'"
People v. Street,
20 N.Y.2d 231, 234, 229 N.E.2d 187, 189 (1967).
4 U.S.C. § 3. Federal legislation enacting flag-desecration prohibitions on a national scale was not passed until July 5, 1968, two years after appellant's trial. This legislation specifically does not preempt state flag-burning statutes.
82 Stat. 291, 18 U.S.C. § 700(c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
It appears that the New York courts would so construe their legislation.
See People v. La Sister,
9 Misc.2d 518, 170 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Ct.Spec.Sess.1958);
cf. State v. Peacock,
138 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942).
I need not consider to what extent the
Court's implicit assumption that Thomas could test the constitutionality of the restraining order without first attempting to secure judicial relief is inconsistent with
388 U. S. 307
388 U. S. 336
It passes my belief that anything in the Federal Constitution bars a State from making the deliberate burning of the American flag an offense. It is immaterial to me that words are spoken in connection with the burning. It is the
of the flag that the State has set its face against.
(1949). In my view, this quotation from the
case precisely applies here. The talking that was done took place "as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute" against burning the American flag in public. I would therefore affirm this conviction.
judgment; since the conviction might logically have been for speech alone or for both words and deeds, and since, in either event, the conviction is invalid, the judgment of the New York courts must be set aside without passing upon the validity of a conviction for burning the flag. [
] I reach precisely the opposite conclusion; before Street's conviction can be either reversed or affirmed, the Court
reach and decide the validity of a conviction for flag burning.
I reject first the Court's suggestion that we must assume from the trial court's judgment -- which was that, "on the charge of Malicious Mischief the defendant is convicted" -- that Street might have been convicted for speech alone. True, the complaint referred to both burning and speaking and the statute permits conviction for either insulting words or physical desecration. But surely the Court has its tongue in its cheek when it infers from this record the possibility that Street was not convicted for burning the flag, but only for the words he uttered. It is a distortion of the record to read it in this manner, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE convincingly demonstrates. But even if it were fair to infer that he was convicted for speaking as well as burning, it is sheer fancy to conclude that the trial court convicted him for speech alone, and acquitted him of flag burning. The appellant does not seriously argue such a claim; his major point is that he
convicted for burning as a protest, and that such a conviction cannot stand. The Court of Appeals of New York characterized the issue before it as whether the defendant could be validly convicted for burning the flag as a protest. Moreover, without clear indication
from the state courts, I would not assume that the particular words which Street spoke in this case would be deemed within the coverage of the statute. In any event, if Street was convicted for speaking, he most certainly was also convicted for flag burning. Hence,
(1931), and like cases to which I adhere, have no application by their own terms.
I reject also the proposition that, if Street was convicted for both burning and talking, his conviction must be reversed if the speech conviction is unconstitutional. The Court initially cites
(1945), for the rule that, where two acts violative of a statute are charged, a verdict of guilty on both acts and a single sentence must be reversed if conviction for either act is invalid. This has never been the prevailing rule in this country or in this Court, either before or after
Thomas v. Collins.
The Court in that case cited no authority for the proposition other than
Stromberg and William.s v. North Carolina,
(1942), neither of which announced that rule. I am not convinced that the rule stated by the
Court was necessary for reversal, but whether dictum or not the rule on which the Court relies today is at odds with many cases in this Court.
Claassen v. United States,
142 U. S. 146
-147 (1891), speaks for the law at that time:
"And it is settled law in this court, and in this country generally, that, in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only.
7 Cranch 339,
11 U. S. 344
4 How.
45 U. S. 250
Snyder v. United States,
112 U. S. 216
112 U. S. 609
; 1 Bishop Crim. Pro. § 1015; Wharton Crim.Pl. & Pract. § 771."
(1959), the Court was equally clear. There, the defendant was indicted in five counts for contempt in refusing to answer questions put by a congressional committee. The case was tried to a court without a jury and upon conviction under all counts a general sentence of six months' imprisonment and a fine of $200 was imposed. Because the conviction on at least some of the counts was warranted, the judgment was affirmed. Relying on
among other cases, the Court said:
360 U. S. 115
. (Footnote omitted.) There are a host of other cases to the same effect. [
Recognizing the aberrance of
the Court now gives that case a new and more confusing gloss. The general finding of guilt for both speaking at a meeting and for an individual solicitation was reversed, we are told, because the speech and solicitation were intertwined, making it uncertain that there was or would have been a judgment of guilty on the solicitation alone. Aside from the fact that
itself said the penalty was imposed for
both violations,
the rationale which the Court extracts from the facts and judgment in that case hardly qualifies as a constitutional standard to be applied willy-nilly in all cases where there is a general verdict on a count charging dual violations. The Court is capable of more discriminating judgment than to insist on its newly fashioned doctrine in a case like Street's where it is so clear that there was at least a conviction for a public burning of the American flag.
The Court is obviously wrong in reversing the judgment below because it believes that Street was unconstitutionally convicted for speaking. Reversal can follow only if the Court reaches the conviction for flag burning and finds that conviction, as well as the assumed conviction for speech, to be violative of the First Amendment. [
] For myself, without the benefit of the majority's thinking if it were to find flag burning protected by the First Amendment, I would sustain such a conviction. I must dissent.
E.g., Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U. S. 641
-642, n. 1 (1946);
297 U. S. 438
250 U. S. 619
160 U. S. 197
-203 (1895);
159 U. S. 669
153 U. S. 595
153 U. S. 608
(1894). This Court has recognized the applicability of the same rule to court-martial proceedings,
183 U. S. 384
-387 (1902); to forfeiture actions,
112 U. S. 217
(1813), and to civil cases under state law,
United States v. Gainey,
380 U. S. 63
(1965), the Court applied the related concurrent sentence rule to a general sentence on a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several counts.
Transcript of Record 48-50, No. 13, October Term, 1964.
Arguably, under today's decision, any conviction for flag burning where the defendant's words are critical to proving intent or some other element of the crime would be invalid, since the conviction would be based in part on speech. The Court disclaims this result, but without explaining why it would not reverse a conviction for burning where words spoken at the time are necessarily used to prove a case and yet reverse burning convictions on precisely the same evidence simply because on that evidence the defendant might also have been convicted for speaking. The Court's seemingly narrow holding may be of potentially broader application, particularly in view of
as now rewritten by the Court.
necessarily be defeated by a claim that they conflicted with the rights of the owner of the regulated property.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
If a state statute provided that it is a misdemeanor to burn one's shirt or trousers or shoes on the public thoroughfare, it could hardly be asserted that the citizen's constitutional right is violated. If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government's fiscal policies, for example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would prevail against the State's claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire. This is because action, even if clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that is given to speech alone.
-304 (1940). It may be subjected to reasonable regulation that appropriately takes into account the competing interests involved.
The test that is applicable in every case where conduct is restricted or prohibited is whether the regulation or prohibition is reasonable, due account being taken of the paramountcy of First Amendment values. If, as I submit, it is permissible to prohibit the burning of personal property on the public sidewalk, there is no basis for applying a different rule to flag burning. And the fact that the law is violated for purposes of protest does not immunize the violator.
States flag for purposes of advertising.
(1907). Statutes prescribe how the flag may be displayed; how it may lawfully be disposed of; when, how, and for what purposes it may and may not be used.
4 U.S.C. § 3; 56 Stat. 377, c. 435, 36 U.S.C. §§ 172-177. A person may "own" a flag, but ownership is subject to special burdens and responsibilities. A flag may be property, in a sense; but it is property burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions. Certainly, as
Halter v. Nebraska, supra,
held, these special conditions are not
arbitrary or beyond governmental power under our Constitution.