Source: https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/cartels-laws-and-regulations/italy
Timestamp: 2019-02-15 23:14:23
Document Index: 341920348

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 101', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 1', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 101', 'Art. 15', 'Art. 33', 'Art. 396', 'Art. 134', 'Art. 353', 'Art. 501', 'Art. 10', 'Art. 7', 'Art. 14', 'Art. 8', 'Art. 140']

Cartels 2018 | Italy | Laws and Regulations | GLI
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Cartels 2018 | Italy
Overview of investigative powers in Italy
In Italy, cartels are prohibited by Art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and Art. 2 of Italian Law No. 287/1990 (the “Competition Act”). Such provisions ban agreements, concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings, which, directly or indirectly, prevent, restrict or distort competition, including, inter alia, those that: (i) fix purchase or resale prices or other contractual conditions; (ii) limit or restrict production, market outlets or market access, investment, or technological process; and (iii) share markets or sources of supply.
Art. 101 TFEU applies when the agreement is capable of affecting trade between Member States, while Art. 2 of the Competition Act applies when the practice affects the domestic market or a substantial part of it.
The Italian Competition Authority (“ICA”) is entrusted with the public enforcement of the above provisions. Typically, the ICA tends to apply Art. 101 TFEU even when the alleged cartel has a purely national dimension. In fact, Art. 2 of the Competition Act is currently applied only when the conduct under investigation has a very limited geographic impact. In any event, in practice, this distinction has no particular relevance, given that, pursuant to Art. 1(4) of the Competition Act, the latter must be interpreted in accordance with EU competition law.
Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Competition Act, the ICA is entitled to impose pecuniary sanctions on the undertakings involved in a cartel, which range up to 10% of their worldwide consolidated turnover. No fines (or any other punitive measures, including criminal sanctions) can be levied on individuals.
The ICA’s decisions may be appealed before the Regional Administrative Tribunal for Latium (“TAR Lazio”) within 60 days from their publication (or notification). The judgment of first instance can be further appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court (“Consiglio di Stato”).
Also national civil courts are entitled to directly apply Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 2 of the Competition Act, in connection with stand-alone or follow-on actions (private enforcement). The recent Legislative Decree No. 3/2017 (the “Damages Decree”, see infra), which implemented the Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages under national and EU competition law in Italy, has strengthened the private enforcement regime in Italy and is expected to increase the number of actions for damages.
The ICA may initiate a cartel investigation ex officio, following a third-party complaint, or a leniency application.
The Competition Act entrusts the ICA with significant investigative powers, among which, the possibility to request documents or information to undertakings or individuals, and to carry out dawn raids at the companies’ premises. Failure to provide the requested documents/information, without a legitimate justification, may result in a fine up to €25,823. Providing false documents/information may result in a fine up to €51,645.
Dawn raids are conducted by the ICA’s officials together with the Italian financial police (“Guardia di Finanza”). Typically, dawn raids are carried out immediately after the opening of an investigation which, at the time of the inspection, is not publicly known yet. In fact, the ICA’s officials generally notify the company of both the inspection decision and the opening decision, which describes the alleged restrictive practice and the scope of the investigation.
The ICA’s officials do not need previous judicial authorisation to carry out a dawn raid, nor are they required to wait for the arrival of the company’s internal or external legal counsel in order to start the activities. They can access the entire premises and check and seize both paper and electronic documents. However, the ICA’s officials cannot seize documents covered by legal privilege, nor can they inspect private locations.
During dawn raids, the officials may also request oral clarifications to the employees. Even though there is a general duty to cooperate during the investigation, the employees may refuse to answer any questions if the replies would lead to a self-incrimination. Moreover, in the event the employee is not fully aware of the requested information, the ICA generally accepts written replies submitted a few days after the inspection.
The inspection activities are summarised in the minutes of the dawn raid, which include the list of the seized documents and the oral clarifications provided during the inspection.
From November 2016 to December 2017, the ICA concluded seven cartel proceedings, imposing overall fines equal to approximately €394 million.
In Case I792 – Gare ossigenoterapia e ventiloterapia, the ICA sanctioned three distinct bid-rigging conducts relating to public tenders for the supply of home oxygen therapy and ventilotherapy services. Sanctions totalled approximately €47 million (with the highest individual fine, levied on Vivisol, equal to approximately €10 million).
In Case I742 – Tondini per cemento armato, the ICA sanctioned a cartel in the market for concrete steel rods and welded mesh and imposed fines equal to approximately €140 million (with Ferriere Nord sanctioned by approximately €43.5 million).
In Case I793 – Aumento prezzi cemento, the ICA found that the main cement producers (and the relating association of undertakings) had entered into a cartel aimed at partitioning the Italian market and collusively increasing the price of cement. Sanctions totalled approximately €184 million (with Italcementi sanctioned by approximately €84 million).
In Case I796 – Servizi di supporto e assistenza tecnica alla PA nei programmi cofinanziati dall’UE, the ICA concluded that the main consultancy companies (KPMG, EY, PwC and Deloitte) rigged a public tender for the supply of certain technical assistance services for the use of European Structural Funds. Overall sanctions amounted to approximately €23 million, with the highest fine, equal to approximately €8.5 million, levied on EY.
In Case I794 – ABI/SEDA, the ICA found that the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and 11 banks had entered into a restrictive agreement in connection with the adoption of the system remunerating the SEPA Electronic Database Alignment (SEDA), a banking ancillary service to SEPA payments. However, the ICA did not impose any sanctions, taking into account the non-severe nature of the infringement and the fact that, during the proceedings, the parties had developed a new remuneration system, endorsed by the ICA, which had replaced the one under scrutiny.
Finally, two Art. 101 TFEU proceedings were closed by the ICA without ascertaining the existence of any infringement.
In Case I791 – Mercato del noleggio autoveicoli a lungo termine, which concerned an alleged unlawful exchange of information between undertakings providing long-term car rental services, the ICA closed the investigation after the adoption of the Statement of Objections (“SO”) and the final hearing, concluding that the evidence in its possession did not support the finding of an anticompetitive practice.
Similarly, Case I802 – RC Auto, initiated following certain public statements made by two insurance companies, which suggested the existence of an alleged collusive conduct in the car insurance market, was closed by the ICA without ascertaining any antitrust infringement. In particular, already in the SO, the ICA concluded that the investigation had not revealed any anticompetitive conduct.
In the same reference period, the ICA opened 11 proceedings concerning alleged violations of Art. 101 TFEU and/or Art. 2 of the Competition Act. Five of these investigations do not seem to strictly qualify as cartels, since they respectively concern:
The alleged foreclosure effect stemming from the exclusivity clauses included in the agreements entered into by the companies managing the taxi service in Rome and Milan and their members (see Case I801A – Servizio di prenotazione del trasporto mediante taxi – Roma, and Case I801B – Servizio di prenotazione del trasporto mediante taxi – Milano).
The alleged anticompetitive effect stemming from the creation of a cooperative joint venture entrusted with the task of realising and installing optical fibres in some Italian cities (see Case I799 – Tim-Fastweb-Realizzazione rete in fibra).
The restrictive impact of certain provisions included in a Regulation adopted by an association of undertakings (see Case I812 – F.I.G.C. regolamentazione dell’attività di direttore sportivo, collaboratore della gestione sportiva, osservatore calcistico e match analyst).
An alleged resale price maintenance conduct by a supplier in the online sale of stoves to its distributors (see Case I813 – Restrizioni alle vendite online di stufe).
The outstanding proceedings initiated in the last 12 months appear to concern typical cartel infringements, such as:
Alleged bid-rigging in connection with the supply of heli-rescue services and the prevention of forest fires (see Case I806 – Affidamento appalti per attività antincendio boschivo).
Alleged bid-rigging in connection with the provision of facility management services (see Case I808 – Gara CONSIP FM4-Accordi tra i principali operatori del facility management).
Alleged market-sharing and price-increase agreements in the markets for corrugated board sheets and cardboard packaging (see Case I805 – Prezzi del cartone ondulato).
Alleged collusion in the supply of leasing and financial services for the purchase of car vehicles (see Case I811 – Finanziamenti auto).
Alleged collusion in the sale of TV broadcasting rights of Serie A and Serie B football matches outside Italy (see Case I814 – Diritti internazionali).
Alleged bid-rigging in connection with the supply of collection and disposal of medical waste services (see Case I816 – Gara SO.RE.SA. rifiuti sanitari Regione Campania).
In relation to the ICA’s recent practice, the following key issues should be highlighted:
The ICA has increased its enforcement activity, opening several Art. 101 TFEU proceedings and heavily sanctioning the involved undertakings. The ICA’s investigations have covered a broad range of markets, from “traditional” industrial products (cardboard packaging, cement), to more sophisticated services (technical assistance, facility management, and leasing and financial services).
Particularly important has been the ICA’s activity in fighting collusion in public tenders (bid rigging). The ICA is closely cooperating with the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority (“ANAC”) in ascertaining the existence of unlawful practices, which prevent the optimal realisation of public interests and increase public expenditure (see, e.g., Cases I808 and I806, as well as Case I785 – Gara Consip servizi di pulizia nelle scuole, closed in December 2015, with overall sanctions equal to €114 million, and ultimately confirmed by the Consiglio di Stato with its judgments No. 740, 927 and 928/2017).
The ICA is attaching growing relevance to antitrust compliance programmes which, if effectively implemented, can lead to a reduction of the fine up to 15% (see Cases I792, I793 and I796, where the ICA took into account the proper and timely adoption of an antitrust compliance programme to reduce the fines; conversely, in Case I742, no discounts were granted, because the programmes had been adopted after the issuance of the SO).
The ICA is an independent administrative authority, entrusted with the power to ascertain potential antitrust infringements and impose sanctions. The ICA thus enjoys a quasi-judicial role. Therefore, the right of defence of the undertakings involved in a cartel investigation needs to be adequately protected.
In particular, the ICA has to ensure that the undertakings have access to the documents and information included in the investigation file. However, based on a confidentiality request by an interested party, the ICA may either prevent undertakings from accessing certain documents (or part of documents), provided that they do not include inculpatory evidence, or defer their access until the SO has been issued (this is the case, e.g., for leniency statements). The ICA’s decision preventing or deferring access to certain documents needs to be adequately motivated and can be appealed before the administrative courts (see, ex multis, the TAR Lazio judgment No. 12445/2017).
The ICA’s recent trend shows growing attention vis-à-vis the undertakings’ substantive defences brought in the course of the proceedings, which are typically developed in the written reply to the SO and in the final hearing before the ICA’s Board.
Clear evidence of this trend is the fact that two recent investigations (Cases I791 and I802) were closed without ascertaining an Art. 101 TFEU infringement, and that, in Case I794, no sanctions were levied. In particular, in Cases I791 and I794, the parties were able to persuade the ICA’s Board, in their written and oral pleas, that their conduct did not qualify as anticompetitive (Case I791), or did not constitute a serious antitrust infringement (Case I794).
This ICA’s attitude has also been emphasised by the ICA’s Chairman, Mr. Pitruzzella, in the ICA’s 2017 Annual Report. In particular, Mr. Pitruzzella recalled the clear distinction between the investigative phase, carried out by the ICA’s officials, and the decision-making power, which is exclusively reserved to the ICA’s Board, which properly balances and assesses the inculpatory evidence and the undertakings’ substantive defences and may overturn the accusations outlined in the SO.
The leniency programme was introduced in Italy in February 2007, through the ICA’s adoption of an ad hoc Notice (the “Leniency Notice”, subsequently amended in July 2013). According to the Leniency Notice, the first undertaking providing information and evidence to the ICA, which is decisive to ascertain the existence of an undisclosed cartel, possibly through an inspection, benefits from the full immunity from the fine.
The immunity is not granted if the ICA is already aware of the cartel. In this case, the undertaking may benefit from a reduction of the fine, generally up to 50%, if the evidence submitted, due to its nature or degree of detail, significantly strengthens the set of evidence already in the ICA’s possession, and appreciably contributes to prove the existence of the cartel.
Despite the advantages granted to the applicants, the leniency programme has not been frequently used by undertakings in Italy. In fact, since 2007, only five cartel investigations have been opened following a leniency application. The immunity was also granted by the ICA in other two proceedings, initiated ex officio, in light of the cooperation provided by one of the involved undertakings.
Given the confidential nature of a leniency application, which is not publicly disclosed in the ICA’s opening decision, it is not possible to state if any of the pending cartel proceedings have been initiated based on a leniency application. However, it cannot be ruled out that the ICA’s recent enhanced activity in cartel enforcement may also be a consequence of leniency applications.
The role played by the leniency programme in cartel enforcement has been (indirectly) recognised also by the Italian legislator while adopting the Damages Decree. In fact, Art. 4(5) of the Damages Decree prevents leniency statements, and the documents enclosed to such statements, from being subject to a disclosure order or, in any event, from being submitted to a civil court in an action for damages.
The rationale of this prohibition clearly aims at protecting the enforcement of the leniency programme, which would be seriously jeopardised if the leniency statements and relating evidence could be subsequently used against the applicant in an action for damages.
Moreover, pursuant to the Damages Decree, the immunity leniency applicant also benefits from a partial derogation from the general rule whereby each undertaking participating in a cartel infringement may be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the damages suffered by a third party. In fact, the immunity leniency applicant is jointly and severally liable only towards its direct and indirect purchasers, unless the other injured parties cannot obtain full compensation from the other cartelists.
Unlike EU competition law, the Competition Act does not provide for the possibility to close proceedings with an administrative settlement.
The only possibility to close proceedings in a “negotiated” manner is through the adoption of commitments, as provided by Art. 14-ter of the Competition Act. The ICA continues to apply this instrument also in Art. 101 TFEU proceedings, unless the practice under scrutiny qualifies as a “hard-core” restriction. In such case, consistent with EU Regulation No. 1/2003, the ICA is prevented from accepting commitments, as proceedings will likely be closed with the imposition of a fine.
The use of commitments was particularly relevant in recent Case I794, which, as noted, concerned an alleged restrictive agreement relating to the remuneration system for the SEPA Electronic Database Alignment (SEDA). The commitments proposed by the parties during the investigation, which consisted, inter alia, in an alternative remunerating system based on multilateral interchange fees, were rejected by the ICA, which maintained that the conduct under scrutiny qualified as a “hard-core” violation. Nevertheless, the parties initiated a parallel proceeding with the ICA, with a view to defining an alternative remuneration system in an open and transparent manner.
At the end of the investigation, the ICA concluded that the conduct at stake did not qualify as a serious Art. 101 TFEU violation. In its assessment, the ICA appreciated the parties’ availability to change the remuneration system and affirmed that the new remuneration system met the conditions set forth in Art. 101(3) TFEU. Therefore, even though the ICA formally rejected the commitments, it positively appreciated the parties’ proposed behaviour, which justified, together with other elements, the non-imposition of any sanctions.
Third parties may file a complaint with the ICA, alleging the existence of a cartel. There are no procedural or substantive formalities. The ICA does not have any legal obligation to open an investigation following a third-party complaint. It is thus advisable that a complaint be particularly detailed and accurate, in order to stimulate the ICA’s intervention.
Moreover, given that the ICA is also entrusted with the competence to scrutinise and sanction unfair commercial practices, a complaint may also be assessed from this perspective and potentially lead to the opening of an investigation for an alleged violation of the Consumer Code (Legislative Decree No. 206/2005, as subsequently amended).
The ICA’s decision refusing to open an investigation needs to be adequately justified and can be appealed by the complainant, who needs to prove that the decision jeopardised its interests.
In Italy, third-party complaints play a very important role in cartel enforcement. For instance, the recent Cases I792 and I793, which led to the imposition of fines, were opened following third-party complaints. Moreover, based on the content of the ICA’s opening decisions, also the pending Cases I816, I814, and I806 appear to have been initiated following third-party complaints.
Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Competition Act, the ICA may impose fines ranging up to 10% of the undertaking’s worldwide consolidated turnover.
In determining the amount of the fine, the ICA takes into account the principles laid down in Law No. 689/81 (e.g., the gravity and duration of the infringement), as well as the specific criteria set forth in the ICA’s Guidelines on the method of setting fines (the “Fining Guidelines”), adopted in October 2014.
The Fining Guidelines’ calculation process can be summarised as follows: the ICA first establishes the basic amount of the fine, which consists in a gravity amount (up to 30% of the value of goods or services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates, sold by the involved undertaking during the last full year of its participation in the infringement) multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement. In case of secret cartels, the gravity amount is, in principle, no lower than 15%. Moreover, for the most serious infringements (such as cartels) the ICA may also include in the basic amount the entry fee, an additional fixed sum comprised between 15% and 25% of the value of sales.
The basic amount of the fine can be adjusted in order to take into account certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Each of the aggravating/attenuating circumstances may normally result in an increase (or decrease) of the basic amount of up to 15%, and the overall adjustment for all applicable aggravating or mitigating circumstances should not exceed 50%. Exceptionally, in case of recidivism, the basic amount may be increased up to 100%. Similarly, in case of participation in the “amnesty plus” programme (i.e., cooperating with the ICA in the detection of an infringement different than the one forming the object of the investigation), the basic amount may be reduced up to 50%.
The amount of the fine so resulting may be increased up to 50% when the involved undertaking has a significant worldwide turnover or belongs to a large group. An increase is also possible in order to take into account the illegal profits stemming from the infringement, if they can be estimated.
If the above steps lead to an amount exceeding the 10% statutory cap, the fine is reduced accordingly.
Thereafter, the Fining Guidelines take into account: (i) the applicability of the leniency discounts; and (ii) the involved undertaking’s inability to pay, which arises when the fine would irremediably jeopardise the latter economic profitability, potentially determining its exit from the market.
Finally, the ICA retains the possibility to depart from the Fining Guidelines when this is required by the specific circumstances of the case, e.g., imposing a symbolic fine.
The fine imposed by the ICA shall be paid within 90 days from the notification/publication of the decision. Undertakings may also request the ICA to pay the fine by instalments, especially if they are facing financial difficulties.
Once the payment deadline has expired, the statutory interests apply for the first semester of delay. If the fine is not paid after nine months (90 days + six months), a penalty interest equal to 10% of the fine applies for each semester of delay, which supersedes the statutory interest.
In practice, approximately 30 days after the expiration of the 90-day deadline, the ICA sends a letter informing the insolvent undertaking that its credit resulting from the unpaid fine will be transferred to the Fiscal Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate), which will then initiate the enforcement procedure.
Pursuant to Art. 33 of the Competition Act, the ICA’s decisions may be appealed before the TAR Lazio within 60 days from their notification or publication. The TAR Lazio may rule both on factual and legal issues. The judgment of first instance may be subsequently appealed, on questions of law only, before the Consiglio di Stato, within 30 days from its notification, or three months from its publication. Each of the TAR Lazio and Consiglio di Stato judgments are generally issued in approximately one year.
Exceptionally, pursuant to Art. 396 of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgments rendered by the Consiglio di Stato may be appealed before the Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) for questions of jurisdiction or competence, as well as for revocation.
In the judicial review of the ICA’s decisions, the rules set forth in the Procedural Administrative Code (Legislative Decree No. 104/2010) apply.
The claimant may request the application of interim measures, alleging that the execution of the ICA’s decision (including the sanction imposed) before the adoption of the final judgment would seriously and irreparably damage its position. The administrative courts typically adopt a rather strict approach vis-à-vis the application of interim measures.
As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the judicial review consists in a control of legality of the appealed decision based on a potential lack of jurisdiction, violation of law, and/or misuse of power. Accordingly, even though the administrative courts may exercise effective control on the factual, legal and economic assessment carried out by the ICA, they cannot replace the latter analysis with a new one. This aspect has been repeatedly criticised, especially in light of the growing complexity of the ICA’s analysis, which often includes detailed economic evaluations.
The control of legality carried out by the Italian administrative courts in connection with the ICA’s decisions has constantly been very thorough and has led to the annulment of various of the ICA’s decisions (recently, see the TAR Lazio judgments No. 12811, 12812, 12814 and 12816/2016, relating to Case I790 – Vendita diritti televisivi Serie A 2015-2018; and the TAR Lazio judgments No. 4743 to 4758/2017, relating to Case I777 – Tassi sui mutui nelle province di Bolzano e Trento).
Pursuant to Art. 134 of the Procedural Administrative Code, the administrative courts enjoy full jurisdiction in connection with the assessment of the fines imposed by the ICA and, thus, are entitled to annul or reduce them.
In some recent cases, the administrative courts have (significantly) reduced the sanctions levied by the ICA. For instance, with its judgments No. 9050, 9057, 9062/2017, the TAR Lazio reduced the fine imposed to certain undertakings involved in Case I783 – Accordo tra operatori del settore vending; with its judgments No. 11885, 11886 and 11887/2017, the TAR Lazio reduced the fine imposed to undertakings involved in Case I780 – Mercato del calcestruzzo in Veneto; and with its judgments No. 11984, 11985, 11986 and 11987/2017, the TAR Lazio reduced the fine imposed to undertakings involved in Case I784 – Ecoambiente-Bando di gara per lo smaltimento dei rifiuti da raccolta differenziata. Similarly, with its judgment No. 4733/2017, the Consiglio di Stato reduced the fine imposed to the undertakings involved in Case I782 – Gare per servizi di bonifica e smaltimento di materiali inquinanti e/o pericolosi presso gli arsenali di Taranto, La Spezia ed Augusta.
Italian law does not provide for any criminal sanctions in connection with antitrust infringements.
However, certain forms of cartels might also constitute a criminal violation. For instance, bid-rigging is prohibited under Art. 353 of the Criminal Code, and market manipulation is sanctioned under Art. 501 of the Criminal Code.
The recent ICA’s focus on bid-rigging cases is also the result of increased cooperation between the ICA, the Guardia di Finanza, the ANAC, and the Public Prosecutor. Based on public information, the above institutions heavily cooperated in connection with the pending investigation concerning an alleged bid-rigging in the public tender for the supply of facility management services (see Case I808). The investigation has led to the opening of three parallel proceedings by each of the ICA, the ANAC, and the Public Prosecutor of Rome.
Along this line, on January 10 and 11, 2018, the ICA signed two distinct cooperation agreements with each of the Public Prosecutor of Rome and the Public Prosecutor of Milan, respectively. The documents aim at enhancing cooperation between these public institutions, with a view to more effectively detecting and fighting criminal and anticompetitive practices in the public sector.
In particular, the documents established a cooperation framework that would allow the ICA and the Public Prosecutors to exchange information relating to administrative/criminal proceedings initiated by each of the above institutions in a more efficient and timely manner. The Public Prosecutors are entitled to send to the ICA (upon request or spontaneously) documents relating to a criminal investigation (including requests of supervision measures and indictments) that may be of relevance in connection with antitrust proceedings. In turn, the ICA may send to the Public Prosecutors – or may be requested to send – any documents (including, e.g., leniency statements) which might give rise to a criminal violation.
In exchanging the above documents, the ICA and the Public Prosecutors need to protect the confidential nature of the information, and avoid any conduct that may jeopardise their respective investigations.
The ICA actively cooperates with competition authorities of other jurisdictions (including, in particular, the EU Commission) and is a member of both the European Competition Network (ECN) and the International Competition Network (ICN).
As outlined in public speeches by the ICA’s Chairman, coordination between European competition authorities is increasingly important, given the growing number of antitrust issues with a cross-border impact (see, e.g., the “Big Data”) and the need to ensure a common approach within the European Union.
In Italy, private antitrust enforcement is not yet fully developed, even though there appears to be an increasing awareness by the undertakings participating in a cartel of the risks to be exposed to individual or collective actions for damages.
Follow-on actions are more frequent than stand-alone initiatives. In particular, the prior intervention of the ICA seems to serve as an incentive for potentially-harmed undertakings (or individuals) to initiate a private action.
In this scenario, the adoption of the Damages Decree constitutes a major improvement, which will likely increase the number of follow-on damage actions.
In particular, Art. 10 of the Damages Decree entitles any legal or natural persons who suffered damages from an antitrust infringement to initiate a private action. These actions fall within the mandatory jurisdiction of the Specialized Sections in Company Law of the Civil Court of the three main Italian judicial districts, namely, Milan, Rome and Naples, which are competent on a territorial basis. The judgments of first instance may be appealed before the competent Court of Appeals both on questions of facts and law, and, subsequently, before the Corte di Cassazione on questions of law only.
Furthermore, the Damages Decree introduced certain rules to reduce the burden of proof of plaintiffs in follow-on actions. In particular, pursuant to Art. 7(1), the ICA’s finding of a cartel infringement (confirmed after judicial review) is binding on civil courts in case of damages actions, in relation to the nature of the infringement and its actual, personal, temporal and territorial scope. This means that the claimants do not need to demonstrate the anticompetitive nature of the challenged conduct before the competent court.
Moreover, Art. 14(2) of the Damages Decree established a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a direct causal link between a challenged cartel conduct and the alleged damages. Accordingly, a potential claimant does not need to prove that the cartel gave rise to damages. There is, in fact, a reversal of the burden of proof and it is up to the defendant(s) to show that the contested conduct did not produce any damages.
Finally, the claimant has to demonstrate before the competent civil court that it actually suffered damages, and quantify them.
Damages arising from an anticompetitive conduct are assessed based on general civil law provisions. This means that they are limited to the claimant’s actual loss and may also be awarded ex aequo et bono by the court, if a precise amount cannot be established.
The Damages Decree recognised the concept of “passing on”, which may be alternatively used: (i) by the defendant, to object that the plaintiff passed on the overcharge resulting from the infringement and, thus, that the latter did not suffer any damages; or (ii) by an indirect purchaser claiming damages, to allege that the overcharges stemming from the illegal conduct were ultimately passed on him.
Specific provisions were also introduced in connection with the disclosure of documents. The court may order the parties or third entities to disclose any relevant evidence. However, documents covered by legal privilege cannot be disclosed, and the court should ensure that any confidential information included in the disclosed evidence is adequately protected. The order may also concern documents included in an ICA’s investigation file. However, as previously noted, leniency statements, documents enclosed to such statements, and settlement submissions are fully protected and cannot be produced in a civil action.
Finally, pursuant to Art. 8 of the Damages Decree, damages actions are subject to a limitation period of five years. Such period starts running when the anticompetitive conduct has ceased and the claimant is – or, using reasonable care, should be – aware of: (i) the conduct and its anticompetitive nature; (ii) the identity of the infringing companies; and (iii) the fact that the conduct at stake caused harm to the claimant. The limitation period is suspended during the ICA’s proceedings, until one year after the adoption of the final infringement decision or the closing of the proceedings.
In Italy, collective damage actions (based on the opt-in system) are also possible. In particular, Art. 140-bis of the Consumer Code entitles consumers to act, through associations or committees, to seek, inter alia, damages for certain breaches of contract or torts, including anticompetitive conduct. The provisions set forth in the Damages Decree also apply to class actions.
To date, no class actions requesting antitrust damages have been certified by the competent courts. However, based on public information, it appears that certain small business trade unions are promoting among their members (mostly, small hauliers) a collective action to claim damages from the truck manufacturers involved in the cartel sanctioned by the EU Commission (see the Decision of July 19, 2016, case AT.39824 – Trucks). Technically, the action does not qualify as a “class action”, which can be put forward by consumers only, but, given its relevance, may constitute one of the first examples in Italy of a collective claim brought by the alleged victims of a cartel.
Currently, no major reforms are publicly being discussed in connection with cartel enforcement.
However, there is an ongoing debate among antitrust experts and practitioners on the possibility to introduce a specific settlement procedure, similar to that adopted at the EU level, which, in certain circumstances, might simplify the ICA’s administrative proceedings.
Another possible development is linked to the EU Commission’s Proposal for a Directive providing Member State’s competition authorities with more effective enforcement powers (the so-called “ECN+ Directive”). The Proposal, presented in March 2017, is currently under discussion. If adopted, the ECN+ Directive would, inter alia, introduce common principles to harmonise leniency regimes in the EU Member States, as well as entitle national competition authorities to conduct inspections in premises other than the business premises, and enforce decisions imposing fines in foreign EU Member States.
The implementation of the ECN+ Directive would likely require a legislative amendment of certain provisions of the Competition Act.
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