Source: http://beta.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/27.html
Timestamp: 2020-07-11 05:49:43
Document Index: 708369542

Matched Legal Cases: ['Application no. 47486', '§ 63', '§ 97', '§ 35', '§ 30', '§30', '§ 45', '§ 42', '§ 36', '§ 57', '§ 2']

27 A W KHAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 47486/06 [2010] ECHR 27 (12 January 2010)
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URL: http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/27.html
Cite as: [2010] Crim LR 502, (2010) 50 EHRR 47, [2010] INLR 567, 50 EHRR 47, [2010] ECHR 27, [2010] Imm AR 409
CASE OF A.W. KHAN v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
(Application no. 47486/06)
In the case of A.W. Khan v. the United Kingdom,
Having deliberated in private on 8 December 2009,
19. The applicant complained that the decision to deport him violated his right to respect for his family and private life under Article 8 of the Convention. Article 8 reads as follows:
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”21. The Government contested that argument.
The Government submitted that the decision to deport the applicant was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, namely, the protection of health and morals and the prevention of disorder and crime. The Government relied on the Court's jurisprudence, which had recognised the serious nature of drugs offences and found that they were capable of justifying “great firmness” on the part of the State (El Boujaïdi v. France, 26 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 VI; Baghli v. France, no. 34374/97, ECHR 1999 VIII; Dalia v. France, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 I).
The Government have accepted that the applicant's deportation would interfere with his private life as reflected in his relationship with his mother and brothers, and the Court endorses this view. The Court also recalls that, as Article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants such as the applicants and the community in which they are living constitutes part of the concept of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of a “family life”, and having regard to the considerable period of time he has lived in the United Kingdom, the expulsion of the applicant would therefore constitute an interference with his right to respect for his private life. The Court recalls that it will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is appropriate for the Court to focus on the “family life” rather than the “private life” aspect (see Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 § 63).
In immigration cases the Court has held that there will be no family life between parents and adult children unless they can demonstrate additional elements of dependence (Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, § 97, ECHR 2003 X; Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 31519/96, 7 November 2000). The Court does not accept that the fact that the applicant was living with his mother and brothers, or the fact that the entire family suffered from different health complaints, constitutes a sufficient degree of dependence to result in the existence of family life. In particular, the Court notes that in addition to his two brothers, the applicant also has three married sisters who live in the United Kingdom. It does not, therefore, accept that the applicant is necessarily the sole carer for his mother and brothers. Moreover, while his mother and brothers undoubtedly suffer from health complaints, there is no evidence before the Court which would suggest that these conditions are so severe as to entirely incapacitate them.
It is clear from the Court's case-law that children born either to a married couple or to a co-habiting couple are ipso jure part of that family from the moment of birth and that family life exists between the children and their parents (see Lebbink v. the Netherlands, no. 45582/99, § 35, ECHR 2004 IV). Although co-habitation may be a requirement for such a relationship, however, other factors may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship has sufficient constancy to create de facto family ties (Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1994, § 30, Series A no. 297 C). Such factors include the nature and duration of the parents' relationship, and in particular whether they had planned to have a child; whether the father subsequently recognised the child as his; contributions made to the child's care and upbringing; and the quality and regularity of contact (see Kroon, cited above, §30; Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994, § 45, Series A no. 290; Haas v. the Netherlands, no. 36983/97, § 42 ECHR 2004 I and Camp and Bourimi v. the Netherlands, no. 28369/95, § 36, ECHR 2000 X).
The principal issue to be determined is whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The relevant criteria that the Court uses to assess whether an expulsion measure is necessary in a democratic society have recently been summarised as follows (see Üner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410/99, §§ 57 - 58, ECHR 2006 ...):
“57. Even if Article 8 of the Convention does not therefore contain an absolute right for any category of alien not to be expelled, the Court's case law amply demonstrates that there are circumstances where the expulsion of an alien will give rise to a violation of that provision (see, for example, the judgments in Moustaquim v. Belgium, Beldjoudi v. France and Boultif v. Switzerland, [cited above]; see also Amrollahi v. Denmark, no. 56811/00, 11 July 2002; Yılmaz v. Germany, no. 52853/99, 17 April 2003; and Keles v. Germany, 32231/02, 27 October 2005). In the case of Boultif the Court elaborated the relevant criteria which it would use in order to assess whether an expulsion measure was necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. These criteria, as reproduced in paragraph 40 of the Chamber judgment in the present case, are the following:
- whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
- the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled.
- the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”
2. Holds that there would be a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the event of the applicant's deportation;
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,750 (one thousand seven hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into British Pounds at the rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant