Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/55188728/CREW-v-Office-of-Administration-Regarding-Lost-White-House-Emails-9-18-2008-Brief-for-Appellee
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 14:22:42
Document Index: 200051537

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n105', '§ 552', '§ 1291', '§ 502', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 552', '§ 1331', '§ 1291', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 4', '§2', '§2', '§4', '§4', '§4', '§ 502', '§ 4342', '§4', '§3', '§5', '§3', '§ 301', '§ 302', '§ 501', '§4', '§2', '§2', '§2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 109', '§ 110', '§ 105']

CREW v. Office of Administration: Regarding Lost White House Emails: 9/18/2008 - Brief for Appellee | Freedom Of Information Act (United States) | Discovery (Law)
CREW v. Office of Administration: Regarding Lost White House Emails: 9/18/2008 - Brief for Appellee
On May 23, 2007, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a lawsuit against the Office of Administration (OA), a component of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), in the District Court of the District of Columbia. The complaint requested a preliminary injunction to compel the OA to respond to a CREW Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The lawsuit is based on a FOIA request regarding over five million lost White House emails generated between March 2003 and October 2005. On April 27, 2007 the OA agreed to expedite CREW's FOIA request, but then failed to produce the documents, therefore prompting the lawsuit.
enregistrerEnregistrer CREW v. Office of Administration: Regarding Lost W... pour plus tard
[NOT YET SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT]
No. 08-5188
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.
GREGORY G. KATSAS Assistant Attorney General
JEFFREY A. TAYLOR United States Attorney
(202)514-5089
(202)514-4825
Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7535 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530
Plaintiff in the district court, and appellant in this appeal, is Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington.
Defendant in the district court, and appellee in this appeal, is the Office of
Administration, a component of the Executive Office of the President.
Judicial Watch, Inc., was amicus curiae in support of plaintiff in the district
court, and is amicus curiae in support of appellant in this appeal.
The ruling under review is the decision in Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington v. Office of Administration, Civil Action No. 07-964 (CKK)
(D.D.C. June 16, 2008) (Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly). The ruling is reported at
559 F. Supp. 2d 9, and is reproduced in the Joint Appendix at JA 322-61.
C Related Cases.
This case has not been before this or any other Court. Counsel for appellee
are not aware of any related cases.
I. Statutory Background: The FOIA And Its Definition Of"Agency"
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint And The Government’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings
B. OA’s Motion To Dismiss And The District Court’s Decision Granting That Motion
THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION IS NOT AN "AGENCY" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOIA
OA Has No Substantial Independent Authority And Its Function Is To Advise And Assist ’
Plaintiff Demonstrates No Relevant Similarities Between The Administrative Office And Any Component Of The EOP That This Court Has Deemed A FOIA Agency
Armstrong v. EOP, 877 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1995)
* Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
3, 8, 17, 23, 25, 28
Brune v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
Kissinger v. Reporters Committee For Freedom Of The Press,
445 U.S. 136 (1980)
* Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23-28
* Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Envtl. Quality., 636 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1992)
* Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
* Sierra Club v. Andros, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir.), rev’d on other grounds,
442 U.S. 347 (1978)
* Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
* Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 23, 24, 28
5, 7-10, 13, 16, 17,24, 27, 34
*Authorities chiefly relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
3 u.s.c. §
105 (b)( 1 )
5 u.s.c. § 552(0
U.S.C. § 1291
U.S.C. § 502
41C.F.R. Ch. 101
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)
Executive Order 12028 § 2 Executive Order 12028 § 3(a) Executive Order 12028 § 4 Executive Order 12028 § 4(a) Executive Order 12028 § 4(d) Executive Order 12028 § 5 Executive Order 12122 § 4(d)
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 14 (1974) H.R. Rep. No. 1635, 87 th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962)
14, 26 19, 20, 26 15, 26
In this action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), plaintiff
invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 552 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. See JA 14 (Complaint, ¶3). On June 16, 2008, the district court entered
final judgment, dismissing the case in its entirety. JA 322 (Order); JA 323-61
(Memorandum Opinion). Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on the same
date. JA 362; see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
This Court has appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Whether the Office of Administration, a component of the Executive Office
of the President, is an "agency" within the meaning of the FOIA.
Plaintiff, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, brought this
FOIA action against the Office of Administration ("OA"), seeking disclosure of
specified records. The Office of Administration filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that it was not an agency within the meaning of the FOIA. After allowing limited
jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted the Government’s motion, and
dismissed the case. JA 322-61. Plaintiff appeals.
I. Statutory Background: The FOIA And Its Definition Of "Agency."
Subject to enumerated exceptions, the FOIA generally requires Government
agencies to make records publicly available upon request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
For purposes of the FOIA, the term "agency" is defined to "include[] any
executive department~ military department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the
Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent
regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).
In adopting the current definition of FOIA in 1974, Congress codified this
Court’s decision in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which had
interpreted the previous definition to exclude parts of the Executive Office of the
President that served only to advise and assist the President and did not wield
°°substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions." Id. at
1073, 1075. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 14 (1974); see also Armstrong v.
Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553,558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint And The Government’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings.
The Office of Administration is a component of the Executive Office of the
President ("EOP"). Initially established by President Carter in 1977, OA provides
administrative support and services to units within EOP. JA 327-28.
In April 2007, plaintiff sent two FOIA requests to OA seeking records
relating to OA’s potential loss of email documents. The Office acknowledged
receipt of the FOIA requests, and granted plaintiff’s demand for expedited
processing. In May 2007, when there had not yet been any production of records,
plaintiff filed this action in district court, seeking an order compelling disclosure
of the requested materials, and interim injunctive relief. JA 325.
In June 2007, pursuant to a stipulated schedule, OA made its first response
to plaintiff’s FOIA requests, producing 50 pages of responsive documents and
withholding other potentially responsive records pursuant to underlying FOIA
exemptions. In conjunction with its response, OA also informed plaintiff that it
was not. an "agency." within the meaning of FOIA, but was nevertheless electing to
process plaintiff’s FOIA requests "as a matter of administrative discretion." JA
326. In a second response to plaintiff’s FOIA requests in August 2007, OA
advised that it had located and was withholding additional potentially responsive
documents, and reiterated that it was not an "agency" subject to FOIA. Ibid.
OA subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it was not an agency as that
term is defined in the FOIA. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting among other
things that the question whether OA was a FOIA agency was jurisdictional, and
seeking jurisdictional discovery prior to judicial resolution of OA’s FOIA status.
See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Sept. 4, 2007), at 20 & nn. 23, 24. The district court, in February 2008, denied
OA’s motion without prejudice, allowing the parties to conduct "very limited
discovery - which might be considered jurisdictional in nature." JA 326.
Pursuant to the court’s discovery orders, OA produced to plaintiff over
1,300 pages of documents, and plaintiff took the deposition of OA’s Director.
Ibid. OA also provided a declaration of its General Counsel, addressing OA’s
position regarding its FOIA status over time. JA 175,327.
B. OA’s Motion To Dismiss And The District Court’s Decision Granting That Motion.
After discovery, OA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, on the basis that it was not a FOIA "agency" and that the district court
therefore lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s FOIA action. After briefing by the
parties, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the
motion and dismissing the case. JA 322-61.
Noting that the FOIA’s definition of"agency" was intended to codify
S oucie, su_u_p_r~, the district court emphasized that "[f]ollowing Soucie’s lead,
’every one of the EOP units that [the D.C. Circuit has] found to be subject to FOIA
has wielded substantial authority independently of the President.’" JA 343
(quoting Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). After a
thorough review of the record, the court concluded that the "OA is not an agency
subject to the FOIA," because "OA lacks the type of substantial independent
authority that the D.C. Circuit has found indicative of agency status for other EOP
components when applying the Soucie criteria, and because the nature of OA’s
delegated authority is dissimilar to that of other EOP units that have been found to
be agencies subject to the FOIA." JA 342.
The court observed that, under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, which
created OA, and ensuing Executive Orders, OA is empowered to provide a broad
range of administrative services to EOP components, but is not invested with any
authority beyond providing such services within EOP. JA 348. Indeed, as the
district court pointed out, the applicable Executive Orders make explicit that OA’s
Director "shall not be accountable for the program and management
responsibilities of units within [EOP]: the head of each unit shall remain
responsible for those functions." Ibid. (quoting Executive Order 12122, § 4(d)).
The court considered the evidence of OA’s actual functions, acknowledging
that "[t]hese activities certainly demonstrate that OA has substantial operations, as
does the fact that OA employs over 200 individuals and is organized along seven
different organizational lines." JA 350-51. OA’s activities, however, including
contracting for supplies and services, do not demonstrate that it has any
"’substantial independent authority’ to direct executive branch officials,
~possess[es] any delegated regulatory authority to supervise agencies,’ or has the
~power to issue formal, legally authoritative commands to entities or persons
within or outside the executive branch.’" JA 351 (quoting Meyer v. Bush, 981
F.2d 1288, 1292, 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The court contrasted the powers of the Office of Administration with those
of the Office of S~ience and Technology and the Council on Environmental
Quality, two EOP components that this Court has found to fall within the FOIA’s
definition of agency. "Significantly," the court stated, OA °"does not oversee and
coordinate federal programs, as does the Office of Science and Technology, or
promulgate binding regulations, as does the Council on Environmental Quality.’"
JA 351 (quoting Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854); see also Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Council on Envtl. Quality., 636 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that CEQ
is a FOIA agency). "Nor does OA, like the Office of Management and Budget,
have statutory duties to report to Congress." JA 351 (citing Sierra Club v.
Andrus, 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 442 U.S. 347
"Instead," the court stressed, "OA performs a variety of administrative
functions for EOP components, and the OA Director is specifically relieved of
substantive responsibility for those units." JA 351. Thus, while recognizing that
the specific context bearing upon an EOP component’s FOIA status will vary with
the entity at issue, the court indicated that this case was perhaps most comparable
to Sweetland, where this Court held that the Executive Residence was not a FOIA
agency, because the "staff of the Executive Residence exercises none of the
independent authority that we found to be critical in holding other entities that
serve the President to be agencies subject to FOIA." JA 345 (quoting Sweetland,
60 F.3d at 854); JA 346. For these reasons, "the [c]ourt conclude[d] that, because
OA serves only to assist and advise the President, and does not exercise
substantial independent authority, it is not an agency subject to the FOIA, pursuant
to the factors in Soucie." JA 352.
The district court noted that OA had previously considered itself to be
subject to the FOIA, but explained that the Office’s earlier view did not alter the
analysis. JA 356-58. As the court observed, this Court in Armstrong concluded
that the National Security Council ("NSC") was exempt from FOIA
notwithstanding that NSC had at times considered itself within FOIA, explaining
that "NSC’s prior references to itself as an agency are not probative on the
question before the court - whether the NSC is indeed an agencY within the
meaning of the FOIA." JA 356-57 (quoting Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 566).
Similarly, "OA’s own assessment of its legal status under the FOIA * * * is not
dispositive." JA 358.
As the district court explained, placement of an entity within the Executive
Office of the President does not take it outside the scope of the FOIA when such
an entity can "act directly and independently beyond advising and assisting the
President." Meyer, 981 F.2d at 1292 (citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075). However,
"in cases involving units of the Executive Office that lacked substantial
independent authority, we have consistently rejected the claim that they were
subject to the FOIA." Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854.
Applying these standards, the district court correctly concluded that the
Office of Administration is not an "agency" because it exercises no substantial
independent authority over matters of public or regulatory policy and has no
function beyond its mandate to provide administrative support to the President.
Unlike those EOP components that this Court has held are FOIA agencies, OA has
no authority to issue guidelines to federal agencies, to coordinate and evaluate
federal programs, to oversee activities of federal agencies, or to perform other
significant statutory duties.
The 1977 Message of the President transmitting the underlying
Reorganization Plan to Congress explained that the changes to EOP’s structure,
including the creation of OA, "are based on the premise that the EOP exists to
serve the President and should be structured to meet his needs." JA 81 (Message
of the President). The OA’s charter documents establish the Office as a
centralized administrative unit within the Executive Office of the President, .whose
Director is appointed by and answerable to the President. The Administrative
Office provides no services to other parts of the Executive Branch or to Congress,
and it cannot plausibly be thought to "wield[] substantial authority independently
of the President," Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854, the hallmark of every unit of the EOP
that this Court has deemed a FOIA agency.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the district court’s ruling misapprehends the
governing analysis. As the district court recognized, it was required to determine
whether, regardless of its placement with the EOP, the Administrative Office
exercises substantial independent authority. Contrary to plaintiff’s understanding,
the OA’s ability to enter into contracts as a means of providing administrative
services within EOP does not constitute the type of substantial independent
authority discussed in this Court’s decisions. Nor, as the district court explained,
is it relevant that the OA serves the President by providing administrative services
generally within the EOP rather than directly and exclusively to the President
Plaintiff likewise errs in urging that it was entitled to additional discovery.
Plaintiff, in district court, argued that the court could not grant the government’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings because a component’s status as an
"agency" is jurisdictional. In response, the court permitted plaintiff limited
discovery on that question, including the deposition of the Director of the Office
of Administration. In a reversal of position, plaintiff now argues that the issue of
agency status was not jurisdictional, and that the court could not allow merely
"jurisdictional" discovery. Plaintiff has plainly waived that argument and, under
any standard, the discovery permitted by the district court would not constitute an
The district court’s determination that OA is not an "agency" with the
meaning of the FOIA presents a legal issue reviewable de novo. The court’s
discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Islamic Am. Relief
Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
A. OA Has No Substantial Independent Authority And Its Function Is To Advise And Assist The President.
1. In enacting the current definition of agency, Congress codified this
Court’s analysis in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which, as
the district court noted, "interpreted the original definition of’agency’ under the
FOIA to include ’any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in
the exercise of specific functions,’ id. at 1073, and concluded that the
Office of Science and Technology was an agency because its ’sole function was
[not] to advise and assist the President,’ id. at 1075." See JA 339.
In concluding that the Office of Science and Technology was an agency,
notwithstanding its inclusion in the EOP, this Court in Soucie emphasized that the
OST had inherited its independent authority "from the National Science
Foundation, to which Congress had delegated ’some of its own broad power of
inquiry,’ and tha t’[w]hen the responsibility for program evaluation was
transferred to the OST, both the executive branch and members of Congress
contemplated that Congress would retain control over information on federal
programs accumulated by the OST, despite any confidential relation between the
Director of the OST and the President.’" JA 343 (quoting Soucie, 448 F.2d at
1075). As this Court observed in Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1995), OST "was subject to FOIA because it had independent authority to evaluate
federal scientific programs, initiate and support research, and award scholarships."
Id. at 854 (citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075); see also Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d at
1292 ("Although we acknowledged that OST advised and assisted the President,
we emphasized that OST also had inherited from the National Science Foundation
’substantial independent authority,’ such as evaluating federal programs, initiating
and supporting research, and awarding scholarships.").
2. As these decisions make clear, an entity wielding substantial independent
authority may be an agency for purposes of FOIA notwithstanding its placement in
the EOP. "By contrast, in cases involving units of the Executive Office that
lacked substantial independent authority, we have consistently rejected the claim
that they were subject to the FOIA." Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854. OA wields no
That OA exists to provide administrative support and assistance to the
President, and has no substantial independent authority, is plain from OA’s charter
documents. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, issued by President Carter,
"established in the Executive Office of the President the Office of Administration
which shall be headed by the President." JA 79 (Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1977, §2).
The Reorganization Plan declared: "The Office Of Administration shall provide
components of the Executive Office of the President with such administrative
services as the President shall from time to time direct." Ibid. The Director of the
Office of Administration, who is appointed by the President, serves "as chief
administrative officer of the Office of Administration." Ibid.
The Message of the President transmitting the Reorganization Plan to
Congress explained that the changes to EOP’s structure, including the creation of
OA, "are based on the premise that the EOP exists to serve the President and
should be structured to meet his needs." JA 81 (Message of the President). The
Message explained that "[t]he EOP has never before been organized as a single,
unified entity serving the President," and that OA, as a new, centralized
administrative unit, would be "[a] base for an effective EOP budget/planning
system through which the President can manage an integrated EOP." JA 86
(Message of the President).
Executive Order 12028, also issued in 1977, effectuated OA’s
establishment, providing that OA’s Director "shall report to the President" (EO
12028, §2); "shall be responsible for ensuring that [OA] provides units within
[EOP] common administrative support and services" (ibid.); and, "[s]ubject to
such direction or approval as the President may provide or require, shall (1)
organize [OA], (2) employ personnel, (3) contract for supplies or services, and (4)
do all other things that the President, as head of [OA], might do." (id., §4). As
amended by Executive Order 12122 in 1979, EO 12028 specifies, however, that
OA’s "Director shall not be accountable for the program and management
responsibilities of units within [EOP]; the head of each unit shall remain
responsible for those functions." EO 12028, §4(d), as amended by EO 12122.
The contrast with the creation of the OST, discussed in Soucie., is evident.
This Court emphasized the understanding of the House Committee on Government
Operations that establishment of OST would facilitate the transmission of
information to Congress. The Committee declared that "[w]ith the creation of the
new office the Director will become available to Congress and provide us with
more information than we now obtain." Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No.1635, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962)).
The Office of Administration provides no analogous assistance to any part
of the Government outside of the EOP. Nor does OA have any substantive
authority over any component within EOP. As noted, OA’s "Director shall not be
accountable for the program and management responsibilities of units within
[EOP]; the head of each unit shall remain responsible for those functions." EO
12028, §4(d).
As the district court recognized, this Court has never held a part of the EOP
to constitute an agency absent such Substantial independent authority. JA 343; see
Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854 ("[E]very one of the EOP units that [the D.C. Circuit
has] found to be subject to FOIA has wielded substantial authority independently
of the President.") (citing ~, 981 F.2d at 1292). As noted, the Office of
Science and Technology was held to be a FOIA agency because it had "the
independent function of evaluating federal [scientific] programs." Soucie, 448
F.2d at 1075. The Council on Environmental Quality was deemed a FOIA agency
because various Executive Orders have authorized it to "issue guidelines to federal
agencies," "coordinate federal programs related to environmental quality," "issue
regulations to federal agencies for implementing all of the procedural provisions
of [the National Environmental Policy Act]," and oversee certain activities of
other federal agencies. JA 343; Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Envtl.
Quality., 636 F.2d 1259, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see Rushforth v. Council of
Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Similarly, the Office
of Management and Budget is subject to the FOIA’s disclosure requirements
because it has the authority to "assemble, correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the
requests for appropriations of the several departments or establishments," and "in
addition to its multitudinous other management, coordination, and administrative
functions," it "has a statutory duty [to Congress] to prepare the Budget." Sierra
Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895,902 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
By the same token, the absence of substantial independent authority has
signaled that. a component of the EOP is not an agency under the FOIA. Thus, the
Council of Economic Advisers is not a FOIA agency because it does "not possess
any delegated regulatory authority to supervise agencies," Meyer, 981 F.2d at
1293, and has "no []power to issue formal legally authoritative commands to
entities or persons within or without the executive branch," id. at 1292; see
Rushforth, 762 F.2d at 1043. Likewise, the National Security Council is not a
FOIA agency because it does not exercise "meaningful non-advisory authority" in
coordinating the activities of the various agencies with national security
responsibilities. Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 565. And, the Executive Residence is
exempt from FOIA because it is exclusively dedicated to assisting the President in
maintaining his home and carrying out his various ceremonial duties, and "does
not oversee and coordinate federal programs * * * or promulgate binding
regulations." Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854.
The Office of Administration, like the CEA, the NSC, and the Executive
Residence, does not direct or supervise components of the Executive Branch and
does not exercise "substantial independent authority" over regulatory and/or
public policy matters. And, unlike the heads of OST, CEQ, and OMB, the
President’s appointment of the OA Director is not subject to Senate confirmation.
See 31 U.S.C. § 502 (OMB); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342 (CEQ), 6612 (OST). Instead,
much like the Executive Residence, which supports the President by maintaining
his home and assisting him in his ceremonial duties, OA supports the President by
performing purely administrative functions for EOP
Like the Executive
Residence’s non-substantive, supporting role, OA similarly is "not accountable for
the program and management responsibilities" of the EOP units it supports. EO
12028, §4(d) (as amended).
B. Plaintiff Demonstrates No Relevant Similarities Between The Administrative Office And Any Component Of The EOP That This Court Has Deemed A FOIA Agency.
1. Plaintiff fails entirely to demonstrate any material similarities between
the Administrative Office and those components of the EOP that this Court has
previously held to be FOIA agencies. Although plaintiff baldly asserts that "OA is
an agency because its does not advise and assist the President," Appellant’s Br. at
27, it cannot demonstrate that OA possesses relevant authority with regard to any
other part of the Executive Branch. Plaintiff’s argument, instead, is that the OA
does not provide services directly to the President but performs its work for the
EOP generally. See EO 12028, §3(a) (OA provides common administrative
support and services to EOP components "except for such services provided
primarily in direct support of the President" ); see also id. §5.
This argument fundamentally misunderstands the relevant analysis. As the
district court noted, while plaintiff"is correct that OA’s charter documents do not
generally authorize OA to provide administrative services in direct support of the
President," "this distinction does not establish that OA performs functions beyond
advising and assisting the President." JA 348. "Instead, OA’s charter documents
and President Carter’s message to Congress make clear that OA’s function is to
support, i.e., assist, the President indirectly by providing efficient, centralized
administrative services to the components within EOP." Ibid. (emphasis in
Whether or not OA provides the full complement of administrative services
to the White House Office that it provides to other EO components is beside the
point. OA is a Presidential creation established to combine administrative support
operations into a central unit within EOP so that EOP can better serve the
President’s needs. JA 81, 86 (Message of the President). As OA has explained to
Congress, OA’s mission is to provide the necessary administrative support "so that
policy-making staff elsewhere in the EOP can focus on national policy decisions
without having the distractions caused by routine administrative services." JA 67
(Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration, Fiscal Year 2006
Moreover, as the district court also emphasized (JA 348), EO 12028
specifically authorizes OA to provide direct support to the President upon the
request of White House Office: "The Office of Administration shall, upon
request, assist the White House Office in performing its role of providing those
administrative services which are primarily in direct support of the President." EO
12028, §3(a). And, OA has, in fact, provided such direct support. See JA 348-49
(citing examples).
As the district court recognized, the issue in determining the status of an
EOP component is not how directly it provides services to the President but the
extent to which it provides services to Congress and exercises authority over other
parts of the Executive Branch. Thus, as this Court observed in Meyer, the Office
of Science and Technology "was a FOIA agency precisely because it could act
directly and independently beyond advising and assisting the President." Mez~,
981 F.2d at 1292; see Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075 ("By virtue of its independent
function of evaluating federal programs, the OST must be regarded as an agency
subject to the Freedom of Information Act."). In contrast, the OA provides
services to the President, directly and indirectly, within the EOP.
Plaintiff mistakenly asserts that, under the district court’s reasoning, "the
entirety of the executive branch could be deemed a non-agency, as every agency at
least indirectly assists the President in carrying out his agenda." Appellant’s Br.
18. This assertion underscores the extent to which plaintiff fails to come to grips
with the relevant inquiry. The Soucie test concerns the relative roles of offices
within the EOP. If such offices provide services only within the EOP and exercise
no substantial independent authority, tl-iey do not fall within the FOIA. That
analysis has no applicability to agency employees who, by definition, assist an
agency in the performance of its duties.
The full extent of plaintiff’s mistaken analysis is demonstrated by its
contention that, that under the district court’s reasoning, the General Services
Administration ("GSA") would not be a FOIA agency because it provides services
that might ultimately be characterized administrative in nature. Appellant’s Br.
30. Plaintiff fails to note the obvious-unlike OA, GSA was established by
Congress, as an "agency in the executive branch," 40 U.S.C. § 301, and, by statute,
the head of GSA is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, 40 U.S.C. § 302. GSA also possesses its own substantive authority with
respect to federal agencies and third parties, including congressionally delegated
authority to promulgate binding regulations. See, e , 40 U.S.C. §§ 501,521,
541,581, 3302; 41 C.F.R. Ch. 101.
As the district court noted (JA 350-51), plaintiff mistakenly seeks to
establish substantial independent authority by noting that OA can enter into
contracts for supplies and services, including agreements with federal agencies.
As the court explained, however, the.cited contracts are~ simply examples of
administrative services performed for the EOP. They concern matters such as
arrangements for financial management services, the reimbursement of expenses
incurred by the President’s attendance at events sponsored by a federal agency,
and the provision of limited administrative services (e , phone services) for
f~deral entities present on the White House complex for purposes of supporting
EOP. See JA 330-32; Appellant’s Br. 9. For example, OA has an agreement with
the Department of the Navy, pursuant to which the Navy pays OA for AT&T voice
systems operation and maintenance, because the Navy operates the White House
Mess executive dining rooms located on the White House complex. See JA 332.
If OA couid not enter into these types of contracts, it would be poorly
placed to perform its role of providing administrative support and services within
EOP. Indeed, as noted above, OA’s charter documents specifically provide that
"[s]ubject to such direction or approval as the President may provide or require,
the Director [of OA] shall * *
§4(a).
* contract for supplies or services." EO 12028,
2. Plaintiff’s analysis of Meyer v. Bush, Appellant’s Br. 28-31, is similarly
wide of the mark. This Court in Meyer articulated a three-part formulation for
"appl[ying] Soucie" and °°determining whether those who both advise the
President and supervise others in the executive branch exercise ~substantial
independent authority’ and hence should be deemed an agency subject to the
FOIA." Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 558; see Me_M
e_y~,
981 F.2d at 1293. The Court in
that case ultimately determined that President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory
Relief"was not a body with °substantial independent authority’ to direct executive
branch officials. The various cabinet members of the Task Force were
unquestionably officers who wielded great authority as heads of their departments.
But there is no indication that when acting as the Task Force they were to exercise
substantial independent authority, nor in fact, did they do so." Id. at 1298.
As the district court noted, the question confronted by ~ in analyzing a
federal task force composed in part of agency heads is not presented here. See JA
341-42. Similarly, this Court did not apply the three-part test in Sweetland, a case
decided after Me2_~, in determining that the staff of the Executive Residence was
not subject to FOIA because "[t]he staff does not oversee and coordinate federal
programs * * * or promulgate binding regulations." Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 854.
As the district court also explained, ~’s three-part test for applying the
Soucie standards to the problems posed by an inter-agency task force did not
supplant the analysis generally applicable in determining the status of an EOP
component. Thus, just as OA is not an "agency" under Soucie itself, it is also not
an "agency" under Me2~er’s elaboration of Soucie. See JA 342 ("Ultimately, the
court concludes that OA is not an agency subject to the FOIA under either rubric,
because OA lacks the type of substantial independent authority that the D.C.
Circuit has found indicative of agency status for other EOP components when
applying the Soucie criteria, and because the nature of OA’s delegated authority is
dissimilar to that of other EOP units that have been found to be agencies subject to
the FOIA.").
Application of the three considerations set out in ~ demonstrates that
plaintiff’s argument fails on any terms. In Me2_~, the Court considered whether
an entity (1) has "a self-contained structure;" (2) "how close operationally" the
entity is to the President, and (3) "the nature of its delegation from the President."
e_y_~,
981 F.2d at t 293. These "three factors are not necessarily to be weighed
equally; rather, each factor warrants consideration insofar as it is illuminating in
the particular case." Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 558.
There is no question that OA has "a self-contained structure." Mey_~, 981
F.2d at 1293. OA maintains a staff of about 200 employees and is organized along
the lines of seven offices, with each office having its own defined functions. See
JA 330; JA 221 (Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration,
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget). As this Court has explained, however, "while a definite
structure may be a prerequisite to qualify as an establishment within the executive
branch * * * not every establishment is an agency under the FOIA." Armstrong,
90 F.3d at 558 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Even when an office
"has a structure sufficiently self-contained that the entity could exercise
substantial independent authority, * * * [t]he remaining question is whether the
[entity] does" possess such authority. Id. at 560. Thus, for example, while this
Court determined that the NSC has a self-contained structure, it nevertheless
concluded that NSC does not have substantial independent author.ity so as to
qualify as an "agency" under FOIA. See id. at 560, 565.
The district court found that the second Meyer factor, OA’s operational
proximity to the President, placed weight on both sides of the scale. JA 354. On
the one hand, recognizing that OA is "headed by the President" (JA 79 (Reorg.
Plan No. 1 of 1977, §2)) and that OA’s Director "report[s] to the President" and is
"subject to such direction and approval as the President may provide or require"
(EO 12028, §§2, 4), the court concluded that "OA is organizationally close the
President." JA 354. This conclusion militates in favor of exclusion of OA from
the FOIA. On the other hand, the court stated, OA "appears to lack the same type
of operational proximity to the President" as certain other EOP components, such
as the National Security Council. Ibid.
The district court found most relevant in this context the third factor in the
Meyer analysis, the nature of OA’s delegated authority. JA 354-55. As the court
reiterated, far from wielding any substantial independent authority, OA’s only
delegated authority is to provide administrative support and assistance within
EOP, including direct support to the President. See JA 79 (Reorg. Plan No. 1 of
1977, §2); EO 12028, §§ 2, 3(a). Indeed, even the performance of its purely
administrative functions is subject to Presidential approval. See EO 12028, §§ 2,
4. Like the staff of the Executive Residence, the district court pointed out, OA has
no program or policy responsibilities, nor does it have any power to issue formal,
legally authoritative commands to entities or persons outside EOP. OA exists
solely to advise and-assist the President on administrative matters internal to EOP,
and, under settled principles, OA does not meet FOIA’s definition of "agency."
See JA 355-56. ~
Contrary to plaintiff’s thesis, this analysis attaches no disproportionate
significance to one of the three criteria noted in Meyer. See Appellant’s Br. 28-
31. Those factors, which were developed to assess the status of an inter-agency
task force, are a means for determining the issue of whether a body exercises
substantial independent authority, and they are useful only insofar as they
illuminate that issue in a particular case. In any event, the district court
exhaustively reviewed all possible questions suggested by ~ (JA 352-56), and
concluded that "the nature of OA’s delegated authority is entirely dissimilar to that
~ In concluding that the Executive Residence is not a FOIA agency, this Court in Sweetland noted that, "[e]ven though [applicable statutes] impose relatively specific obligations on Residence staff with respect to the public property and furniture in the White House, they also indicate that these duties must be carried out ’under the direction of the President,’ 3 U.S.C. § 109, or ’with the approval of the President.’ 3 U.S.C. § 110." Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 855. This Court added that, "[c]ontrary to [plaintiff’s] assertions, these provisions do not empower the Executive Residence staff to manage the President’s home without regard to the President’s wishes[,] [n]or are they inconsistent with section 105(b)(1)’s general command that such employees ’shall perform such official duties as the President may prescribe.’ 3 U.S.C. § 105(b)(1)." Ibid. To the extent plaintiff here seeks to resuscitate analogous arguments (see Appellant’s Br. 16- 17), Svceetland mandates their rejection. See JA 345.
of the other EOP components that the D.C. Circuit has found to be agencies
subject to the FOIA." JA 355. Having determined that OA is not an agency under
Soucie, the district court properly rejected plaintiff’s contention that a different
result was mandated by Me_M
See JA 352 ("The court is compelled to reach the
same conclusion - that OA is not an agency subject to the FOIA - when it applies
the three-factor test set forth in Me2_e£.").
3. Plaintiff insists that OA should nevertheless be deemed a FOIA agency
because it previously considered itself to be one. See Appellant’s Br. 22-24. As
the district court noted, this Court faced a similar issue in Armstrong, in holding
that the National Security Council is not a FOIA agency notwithstanding that, on
prior occasions, NSC had held itself out as subject to the FOIA. As this Court
explained, "NSC’s prior references to itself as an agency are not probative on the
meaning of FOIA." Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 566. This Court recognized that,
"quite simply, the Government’s position on that question has changed over the
years," and an entity’s earlier stance that it was covered by FOIA (and the Federal
Records Act) "should not be taken to establish as a matter of law that [it] is subject
to those statutes." Ibid.
As OA’s General Counsel explained in a declaration in the record (JA 175-
79), "the issue of whether OA meets the FOIA definition of ’agency’ first surfaced
soon after the district court’s decision in Armstrong v. EOP, 877 F. Supp. 690
(D.D.C. 1995)." JA 176-77 (Medaglia Decl’n, ¶5). "Since that time, whether OA
met the FOIA definition of an agency was from time to time a subject of
discussion between and among the Department of Justice, OA, and the White
House Counsel’s Office." Ibid.
The-record explains further that, in 2006, "the White House Counsel’s
Office requested the legal advice of the Office of Legal Counsel (’OLC’) of the
Department of Justice regarding OA’s status under FOIA." JA 177 (Medaglia
Decl’n, ¶6). "On several occasions during this deliberative process, although not
consistently, OA included language in its FOIA responses advising the requesters
that OA was processing their requests as a matter of administrative discretion."
JA 177 (Medaglia Decl’n, ¶7). The final decision that OA is not subject to FOIA
was made in August 2007, "after OA and the White House Counsel’s Office
received [an] OLC[] memorandum formally memorializing its legal advice." JA
177 (Medaglia Decl’n, ¶8). 2
2 As OA’s General Counsel noted as well, "the decision that OA is not subject to the FOIA is also a decision that OA is subject to the PRA [Presidential Records Act], and not the FRA [Federal Records Act]." JA 178 (Medaglia Decl’n,
Against this backdrop, the district court properly recognized that the
Government’s position had evolved over time, but that its change in position was
not dispositive for purposes of determining OA’s FOIA status. Especially "[i]n
light of the similarities between this case and Armstrong," JA 357, the court
committed no error in concluding that "while OA’s past functioning under the
FOIA" is undisputed, "it is also insufficient by itself to establish that OA is, as a
matter of law, an agency subject to the FOIA." JA 358.
4. Finally, plaintiff contends that the district court should have permitted
further discovery, and unduly limited discovery because it treated as jurisdictional
the question whether OA is an "agency" under FOIA. See Appellant’s Br. 31, 35.
Plaintiffs cannot properly challenge the district court’s characterization of
the discovery as directed to a jurisdictional question. In its district court
pleadings, plaintiff itself characterized the "agency" question as jurisdictional.
Indeed, when OA initially filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff
opposed the motion, arguing among other things that whether OA was an agency
under FOIA was jurisdictional in nature, and that jurisdictional discovery was
called for prior to any judicial determination that OA fell outside FOIA. See
¶11). Thus, "[o]nce the final decision was reached that OA is not subject to, and will no longer comply with, FOIA, OA began implementing its PRA status." JA 178 (Medaglia Decl’n, ¶12).
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Sept.
4, 2007), at 20 & nn. 23, 24 (citing Kissinger v. Reporters Committee For
Freedom Of The Press., 445 U.S. 136 (1980)). 3 Having taken the position in the
district court that the agency question was jurisdictional, and having, in addition,
successfully obtained jurisdictional discovery on that basis, plaintiff has waived
the ability to take a contrary position in this Court. See generally Roosevelt v. E.I.
958 F.2d 416, 419 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("it is not
our practice to entertain issues first raised .on appeal").
In any event, plaintiff demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the district
court’S discovery limitations. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477
F.3d 728,737 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("The district court has broad discretion in its
handling of discovery, and its decision to allow or deny discovery is reviewable
only for abuse of discretion.") (quoting Brune v. IRS., 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)). As the court explained in setting out the scope of discovery,
plaintiff’s discovery requests encompassed a range of issues that were cumulative,
not in dispute, and already addressed by the record. See JA 107-08, 137-38. For
3 Similarly, when plaintiff opposed OA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff nowhere suggested that the issue before the court was not jurisdictional. See Plaintiff’s Opposition To Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (May 9, 2008).
example, while plaintiff suggests that the district court permitted insufficient
discovery regarding "services OA provides within the EOP" (Appellant’s Br. 39),
the record c~ntains evidence on that topic, see JA 283-84 (financial management
services); JA 293-94 (procurement agreements); JA 302 (common support to EOP
components), and, as the district court observed, "there is no dispute that OA
provides extensive administrative services to all EOP components." JA 137
(Discovery Order). If, after obtaining discovery, plaintiff believed that discovery
restrictions had materially undermined its ability to respond to the government’s
dispositive motion, it was incumbent upon it to make that argument to the district
court. It did not. See Plaintiff’s Opposition To Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss
For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (May 9, 2008).
That plaintiff made no sucl-i argument is unsurprising. The issue on which
the court permitted discovery was, however characterized, the dispositive issue
before the court. Pursuant to the court’s discovery orders, OA turned over 1,300
pages of documents in response to plaintiff’ s requests for document production.
JA 327. Plaintiff also sought and obtained the deposition of OA’s Director, Alan
R. Swendiman. See JA 138 (Discovery Order). In his deposition, Mr. Swendiman
testified concerning OA’s role and organization, the role and status of OA’s
Director, and the relationship between OA and various entities within and outside
EOP. See JA 277-306 (Swendiman Deposition). Mr. Swendiman also noted that,
as Director of the Office of Administration, he held the title of Special Assistant to
the President, and he reported to the President through the Deputy Assistant to the
President for Management and Administration. See JA 278-79 (Swendiman
In complaining that Mr. Swendiman did not fully answer every question to
its satisfaction, plaintiff misses the more fundamental point that a judicial order
mandating the deposition of OA’s Director does not reflect an overly narrow
discovery process. And, while plaintiff suggests that it should have been able to
depose other OA personnel (Appellant’s Br. 36-37), its brief specifies no
particular official who might have been able to provide additional, relevant
information. 4
Moreover, in conjunction with the requested jurisdictional discovery, the
district court also required OA to provide a declaration of its General Counsel, M.
Elizabeth Medaglia. See JA 175 (Medaglia Declaration). In her declaration, Ms.
Medaglia explicitly addressed various legal questions pertaining to OA’s position
4 In district court, plaintiff asked to depose four particular OA employees:
OA’s Director, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Information Officer, and its prior FOIA officer. JA 138. OA’s objections and the district court’s discovery orders explained why deposition of these multiple OA staff members was not warranted. See JA 119-23,138.
regarding its FOIA status over time. See JA 175-79. That OA was required to
provide a declaration of its General Counsel, over and above the deposition of its
Director, further refutes plaintiff’s contention that the discovery it obtained was
unduly restrictive in scope.
The record shows that plaintiff was able to obtain discovery relating to, inter
alia, OA’s general procurement activities (see JA 296), its agreements with federal
agencies for the provision of specific services (see JA 298), and the OA Director’s
requests to various agencies for non-reimbursable details of qualified individuals
(see JA 295). As the Government urged in the district court, 5 no discovery of any
kind was needed in order to resolve the question presented, whether OA is an
"agency" within the meaning of FOIA. See, e
g~.,
Sweetland, 60 F.3d at 853
(affirming district court judgment, at motion to dismiss stage, that Executive
Residence is not a FOIA °°agency"). The district court nevertheless afforded
plaintiff ample discovery on the issue in question. Plaintiff waived its challenge to
5 See Defendant’s Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings (Aug. 21, 2007); Defendant’s Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 9 n.3 (Apr. 25, 2008) ("Although OA continues to believe under D.C. Circuit precedent that the issue of its °agency’ status under FOIA can be decided on the pleadings alone, * * * OA will cite to factual evidence developed during discovery as further support that OA is not a FOIA agency as a matter of law.").
the scope of that discovery, and the discovery rulings would not, in any event,
.constitute an abuse of discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be
I hereby certify that this brief is in compliance with Rule 32(a)(7) of the
Federal Rules of.Appellate Procedure. The brief contains 7439 words, and was
prepared in 14-point Times New Roman font using Corel WordPerfect 12.0.
THOMAS M. BONDY Attorney for Appellee
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of September, 2008, I served the
foregoing Brief for Appellee by causing one original and 15 copies to be delivered
by hand to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
and two copies to be delivered by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following counsel:
Anne L. Weismann Melanie T. Sloan Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 1400 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 450 Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202)408-5565
Citoyens pour la responsabilité et l'éthique à Washington
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