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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 4', '§ 18', '§ 867', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 851', '§ 2', '§ 12', '§ 2', '§ 12', '§ 15', '§ 2', '§ 15', '§ 6', '§ 9', '§ 13', '§ 862', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 15']

ELDER V. BRANNAN, 341 U. S. 277 (1951) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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ELDER V. BRANNAN, 341 U. S. 277 (1951)
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Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277 (1951)
(c) The Commission's retention regulations, adopted pursuant to § 12 of the Act, can hardly be deemed invalid for making a distinction on the basis of tenure when they reflect a longstanding definition of "competing" groups, when they were issued by the agency which proposed the statutory language finally adopted, and when Congress indicated no intent whatsoever to supply a new standard. P. 341 U. S. 285. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In actions brought against the Secretary of Agriculture by two veterans who sought to be restored to their former positions in the Department, the District Court granted the motion of the Secretary for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause. 87 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 184 F.2d 219. This Court granted cross-petitions for certiorari. 340 U.S. 928. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the District Court, p. 341 U. S. 289. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We treat these cases together, as did the courts below, and shall refer to Elder and Furman as petitioners. Petitioners are honorably discharged veterans, and as such are concededly entitled to whatever benefits the Act affords. They were appointed associate attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture in July and August, 1943. At the time of their appointments, a civil service regulation was in effect under which all appointments as attorneys were to be limited to the duration of the war plus six months, and persons so appointed were not to acquire a classified (competitive) civil service status. On May 29, 1947, petitioners and eighteen other attorneys in the Department were notified chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
While these actions were pending, the Department came into additional funds, and several attorneys not reached for separation resigned voluntarily or transferred. The Department then rehired nine of the attorneys previously separated, the first of whom took office on October 27, 1947. Some of the attorneys rehired were nonveterans with a lower reduction in force retention priority than that possessed by petitioners at the time all were separated. On this ground, the latter amended their complaints before the District Court to allege in addition that they had been deprived of a preferential right to "reemployment" or "reinstatement." The Secretary moved for a summary judgment, and the District Court granted the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment that petitioners' separation from the service was lawful. But it found that the allegations concerning violation of reemployment or reinstatement rights were well founded. The court chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that they had acquired a classified civil service status, and were thus entitled under the regulations to retention preference over all nonveterans. [Footnote 1] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis added.) The regulations first define "competing" employees on the basis of tenure of employment. The highest priority is given Group A, which includes (1) employees having classified civil service status, and (2) those holding positions excepted from examination requirements and whose appointments are without time limitation. Group B, second in retention priority, includes employees without classified status or whose appointments are limited to the duration of the war plus six months. Group C is composed of employees appointed for one year or less. The regulations then classify employees within each group on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Court made a similar examination in Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U. S. 323 (1948). The decision in that case upheld that retention preference regulations insofar as they granted veterans with classified status an absolute priority over nonveterans of the same status regardless of length of service. The Court stated that, in the light of all pertinent history "no other interpretation of [§ 12] . . . can fairly be reached." Id. at 334 U. S. 336. Since "length of service" and "tenure of employment" appear as parallel terms in the body of § 12, it can be argued that, if the proviso eliminates length of service as a barrier to veterans' chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
preference, it also eliminates tenure. But this ignores a crucial difference in the historical treatment of these two factors. Executive orders and Civil Service regulations prior to 1944 had consistently disregarded length of service in giving veterans preference over nonveterans with the same tenure -- a fact stressed in the Hilton case. Id. 334 at 334 U. S. 336-337. On the other hand, the regulations had just as consistently distinguished "competing" groups on the basis of tenure, and had confined the scope of veterans' preference to employees of the same group. As early as 1932, the Commission provided that reduction in force was to be carried out in inverse order of tenure, permanent employees to be separated last. [Footnote 2] The rule was still in force at the time the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 was passed. 5 CFR (Supp. 1943) § 12.304.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Act is barren of any indication that this long established separation of "competing" employees on the basis of tenure was to be broken down and subordinated to veterans' preference. In general, the Act was designed to "give legislative sanction to existing veterans' preference" and to "give some additional strength" to that preference. [Footnote 3] Additional rights granted were specifically brought to the Congress' attention. One addition which was stressed, for example, was the third proviso of § 12, which grants preference to veteran employees of an agency when that agency is replaced or any of its functions transferred to another chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
administrative body. [Footnote 4] But in the only interpretive discussion of the proviso here involved, Commissioner Flemming stated that it "simply continues what has been in practice throughout the entire Federal service since 1923." [Footnote 5] More important, two bills earlier proposed by veterans' organizations would have specifically granted the right which plaintiffs claim in this case -- absolute preference in retention regardless of tenure. [Footnote 6] These bills were rejected in favor of § 12 as enacted, the language of which was proposed by the Commission itself. [Footnote 7] In sum, the Commission's retention regulations can hardly be called invalid for making a distinction on the basis of tenure when they reflect a longstanding definition of "competing" groups, when they were issued by the agency which proposed the statutory language finally adopted, and when Congress indicated no intent whatsoever to supply a new standard.
Two further points remain. Petitioners contend that, apart from § 12, veterans were given an absolute preference by § 4 of the Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 413, and that the preference so granted was carried over by the saving clause in § 18 of the 1944 Act. 5 U.S.C. § 867. The flaw in this argument, as the court below pointed out, is that § 4, by its terms, was confined to the classified civil service. Its features were subsequently applied, under Executive Orders, within the unclassified service, but, as indicated above, temporary appointment veterans never had retention preference over permanent tenure nonveterans. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Alternatively, petitioners contend that § 2 of the 1944 Act, in and of itself, extends absolute preference to veterans with limited tenure. 5 U.S.C. § 851. But it seems apparent that § 2 gives no specific preference rights at all. The section contains only a general statement of policy, a listing of preferred groups, and a specification of federal positions covered. It provides that "preference shall be given" in certification for appointment, appointment, reinstatement, reemployment, and retention; it does not delineate what that preference shall be. The details are spelled out in subsequent sections of the Act, retention preference being governed by § 12. Cf. Hilton v. Sullivan, supra. Section 2 was described throughout the legislative history as merely "defining the groups to whom preference was to be granted." [Footnote 8]
The complaint that plaintiffs were wrongfully denied preference in rehiring rests solely on the allegation that the Department reemployed attorneys with a lower classification on the retention register. The Court of Appeals concluded that this allegation, not denied by the Secretary, was sufficient to state a cause of action under the statute. It held that § 2 of the statute granted "reinstatement and reemployment" preference rights, and that these rights were measured by the retention preference regulations under § 12. 87 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 120, 184 F.2d 219, 222 (1950). Neither of these holdings withstands analysis. Section 2, as has been indicated, grants no specific rights except insofar as it may be thought chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There is no persuasive reason why the provisions of § 15 are not applicable in this case. Petitioners make a two-fold argument to the contrary: (1) that their right was to preference in "reinstatement," rather than in "reemployment," and that "reinstatement" preference is granted and governed by § 2; (2) that § 15 applies only to the competitive civil service, from which attorneys chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
were excepted by regulations taking effect May 1, 1947. 12 Fed.Reg. 2839, 5 CFR (Supp. 1947) § 6.4. Even if valid, the first contention is of no help to petitioners. "Reinstatement" -- to the extent it had any peculiar meaning in civil service parlance prior to the time that 1944 Act was passed -- meant reemployment of a person upon formal request of the appointing officer. 1 Fed.Reg. 602, 5 CFR §§ 9.1, 9.101 (1939). [Footnote 9] The preference accorded veterans was that they might be reinstated without time limit, whereas a request for reinstatement of nonveterans had to come within specified periods after their separation. The term was not confined to reappointment to a position formerly held. An involuntarily separated employee could be reinstated in any part of the service, and the Commission was authorized to provide for similar reinstatement of any classified status employee. The apparent analogue of this type of reemployment is contained in § 13 of the 1944 Act, which provides that any preference eligible "who has resigned or who has been dismissed or furloughed" may be appointed to any position for which he is eligible "at the request of any appointing officer." 5 U.S.C. § 862. Petitioners would interpret § 2 as creating an entirely new and absolute right of preference in "reinstatement," not dependent upon the request of the appointing officer. Such an interpretation would not only stretch § 2 beyond its apparent and intended scope, but would, in effect, strike § 15 off the books, since no veteran would ever chanroblesvirtualawlibrary