Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-williams-1625
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 18:37:32
Document Index: 573774414

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 16', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 924', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 2119', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 924', '§ 2119', '§ 242', '§ 242', '§ 704', '§ 404']

U.S. v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423 | Casetext
343 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003)
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United States Court of Appeals, Fifth CircuitAug 14, 2003
Defense counsel did not object, and we review Plato's challenge to this testimony for plain error.See United…
United States v. Chaparro-Luna
See id. Instead, jurors were the ones who needed to decide whether to believe Agent Talavera's testimony that…
holding that district court erred under Rule 704 by allowing the officers' testimony about the reasonableness of the shooting
holding that trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify whether force was reasonable
holding in § 242 case that the district "court erred under rule 704 by allowing the officers' testimony about the reasonableness of the shooting"
No. 02-60519.
Filed August 14, 2003. Revised September 8, 2003.
Jennifer Levin (argued), David Kevin Flynn, PHB, App. Sec., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, Jack Brooks Lacy, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Thomas E. Royals (argued), Royals Mayfield, Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.
John Williams, a deputy sheriff, shot an apprehended, unarmed suspect in the back. A jury convicted him of deprivation of the suspect's rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On appeal, Williams primarily argues that the firearm conviction cannot stand because the civil rights count is not a "crime of violence." He also challenges the civil rights conviction on various evidentiary and procedural grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.
Williams argues that his firearm conviction must be vacated because deprivation of rights under color of law, § 242, is not a "crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). We review for plain error, because Williams did not object on this ground in the district court. United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2002). Because there is no error at all, we affirm the firearm conviction.
"Plain error review is very limited. There must be `error' that is `plain' and that affects `substantial rights,' and even then we have discretion not to correct the error unless it `seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 189 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).
Section 924(c)(1) states that "any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . uses . . . a firearm . . . shall, . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Williams obviously discharged a firearm during and in relation to the deprivation of Hall's rights. He contends, though, that deprivation of rights under color of law, § 242, is not a "crime of violence." Section 924(c)(3) defines "crime of violence," in relevant part, as a felony offense that either "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), or "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense," 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B).
We use the so-called categorical approach when applying these definitions to the predicate offense statute. "The proper inquiry is whether a particular defined offense, in the abstract, is a crime of violence[.]" United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). We do not consider the facts underlying Williams's conviction; his actual conduct is immaterial. Instead, we examine only the statutory text of § 242 to determine whether it satisfies the definition of § 924(c)(3).
Section 924(c)(3) is materially identical to the generic definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16. The only difference is that § 16(a) applies to misdemeanors, whereas § 924(c)(3)(A) applies only to felonies.
That is easier said than done. Section 242 is one long sentence with three clauses separated by two semicolons. The first clause states the three basic elements of any § 242 offense — (1) wilful (2) deprivation of a federal right (3) under color of law — and sets the maximum term of imprisonment at one year. The second clause increases the maximum to ten years if the deprivation results in "bodily injury" or "include[s] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire." The third clause increases the maximum to life imprisonment or the death penalty if the deprivation results in death or involves certain enumerated serious felonies.
To be precise, the first clause identifies other elements — e.g., deprivation on account of race, color, or alienage and deprivation within certain geographic locales — but they are not disputed in this case.
Williams and the government disagree about which clause of § 242 we should examine; Williams argues that we may look only to the first. If he is correct, we must reverse the firearm conviction, because the offense defined by the first clause — wilful deprivation of rights under color of law — is not a "crime of violence." These facts do not satisfy the definition in § 924(c)(3)(A), because they do not include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Nor do they satisfy the definition in § 924(c)(3)(B), because they do not, by their nature, involve a substantial risk of physical force.
We recognize that, as a practical matter, § 242 prosecutions almost always involve an excessive use of force by a law enforcement officer. Yet, there are far too many hypothetical ways wilfully to deprive one of rights under color of law without using force — for example, stealing ballots from a predominantly minority precinct or depriving a criminal defendant of legal counsel — to hold that the first clause of § 242 "by its nature" involves a substantial risk of force.
The government counters that we also should examine the second clause, because Williams was indicted, convicted, and sentenced pursuant to it. If the government is correct, we must affirm the firearm conviction, because the additional fact in the second clause — bodily injury or use of a dangerous weapon — creates a separate offense that necessarily satisfies either § 924(c)(3)(A) or (B).
"[C]ausing bodily injury necessarily includes the element of use of physical force." United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2003). The use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon obviously creates a substantial risk of physical force.
Thus, Williams and the government essentially dispute whether § 242 defines three separate offenses or one offense with two sentence enhancements. And with that, they have bought "a ticket to Apprendi-land." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). Traditionally, an "offense" was defined by its "elements," i.e., facts necessary to support a conviction for the offense. These "elements" had to be pleaded in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of an "offense." A "sentence enhancement," on the other hand, could be based on additional "sentencing factors," which a judge could find by a preponderance of the evidence.
The landmark case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), altered this traditional understanding. Now, "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quotation marks omitted). After Apprendi, terms such as "offense" and "elements," and "sentence enhancement" and "sentencing factors," are "conclusions, not reasons for a conclusion." United States v. Gonzales, 327 F.3d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2003). A court must not carelessly toss these labels around, but instead must examine concretely how all the facts in the statutory text affect the sentence. If a fact increases the statutory maximum, it may be called an "element"; if not, it may be called a "sentencing factor." "What matters, though, is the effect of the fact on the statutory maximum." Id. at 420.
We could not hold otherwise without flagrantly violating the rule of Apprendi. Were we to declare that § 242 defines a single "offense" with two sentence enhancements, that holding would mean that the facts in the second and third clauses are not "elements" and thus need not be pleaded in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It would mean, for example, that Williams could have been sentenced to ten years even if the government had not pleaded and proved bodily injury or use of a dangerous weapon. We reject this flatly unconstitutional result.
See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-52, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (applying the canon of constitutional doubt to hold that the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, defines three separate offenses, not one offense with two sentence enhancements). Although Jones preceded Apprendi by a year, the rule of Apprendi "was foreshadowed by [the Court's] opinion in Jones[.]" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In fact, the rule of Apprendi is a quotation from Jones. See id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215).
Our decision in United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950, 123 S.Ct. 395, 154 L.Ed.2d 296 (2002), also demonstrates that § 242 defines three separate offenses. In Harris, the defendant appealed the sufficiency of the evidence for his § 242 conviction. He was indicted and convicted pursuant to the second clause of § 242. Id. at 868-69. On appeal, he argued that he had not caused the victim's injuries. Id. at 869-70. We noted that " the particular crime charged in the indictment required `bodily injury' or `the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon.'" Id. at 870 (first emphasis added). In the next sentence, we explained that "[t]he trial court's instructions to the jury correctly described this element of the crime." Id. (emphasis added). We concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant used a "dangerous weapon," hence we did not need to consider whether he caused bodily injury. Id. Harris inescapably treats the second clause of § 242 as a separate offense. The defendant faced a single § 242 count. If § 242 did not define multiple offenses, we would not have identified the "particular crime charged" because the defendant could have faced only the basic § 242 offense. Furthermore, we explicitly called the facts in the second clause an "element" of the crime. To reiterate, this characterization means that those facts must be pleaded and proved, which in turn means that they define a separate "offense." Indeed, under Harris they must be "elements" of a separate "offense," because one can violate (the first clause of) § 242 without inflicting bodily injury or using a dangerous weapon.
In Apprendi-land, therefore, § 242 defines three separate offenses, not one offense with two sentence enhancements. From his sentence and indictment, we know that Williams was indicted for and convicted of the offense defined in the second clause of § 242. As we explained earlier, this offense is unquestionably a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3). We therefore affirm his firearm conviction.
Section 242 effectively defines the basic offense of deprivation of rights under color of law and two aggravated offenses, which one might call a deprivation resulting in bodily injury or involving a dangerous weapon and a deprivation resulting in death or involving certain serious felonies. Cf. United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying this reasoning to the similar statute of 18 U.S.C. § 2119), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1604, 155 L.Ed.2d 341 (2003).
Our use of the indictment does not violate the categorical approach. Where a single statute contains multiple offenses, some of which are a "crime of violence" and others which are not, we may examine the indictment to determine the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). We use the indictment not to determine whether the defendant's particular conduct actually involved violence, but merely to identify the statutory offense of which the defendant was convicted. Once we identify that offense, we then examine its statutory text without reference to the defendant's particular conduct, to decide whether the offense is a "crime of violence." See United States v. Calderon-Pena, 2003 WL 21665000, at *7-*8, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 14348, at *20-*21 (5th Cir. July 17, 2003).
Williams contends that the court violated FED.R.EVID. 704 by allowing Barfield, Cooper, and Billings to testify that the shooting was not reasonable. He did not, however, object on this basis in the district court, so we review this argument under the even more deferential plain error standard. United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3791 (June 6, 2003) (No. 02-1811).
Williams argues that, for two reasons, these answers were impermissible opinion testimony. First, he contends that the officers' testimony violated rule 704(b), which prohibits experts from testifying that a criminal defendant "did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime." FED. R.EVID. 704(b). Although the officers did not testify as experts, Williams argues that their opinion testimony about the reasonableness of the shooting should be treated as expert testimony because it was "based on . . . specialized knowledge within the scope of [FED.R.EVID.] 702." FED.R.EVID. 701. Second, Williams contends that the officers' testimony violated rule 704(a), which prohibits any witness, expert or lay, from testifying to a legal conclusion. United States v. Izydore, 167 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing FED.R.EVID. 704(a)).
Even if we treat the officers' testimony about the reasonableness of the shooting as expert testimony, that testimony would not violate rule 704(b), because the officers did not testify to Williams's mental state. To be sure, an element of any § 242 offense is deprivation of a federal right, in this case an unreasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause. The reasonableness of a use of force, though, is no more a mental state than is action under color of law or bodily injury. The requisite mental state of any § 242 offense is wilfulness, about which the officers did not testify. Thus, the testimony did not violate rule 704(b).
This court's precedent confirms that rule 704(b) applies to traditional mental states or conditions such as intent, knowledge, and insanity, not substantive determinations such as reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir. 2002) (testimony regarding knowledge), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 869, 154 L.Ed.2d 789 (2003); United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1996) (testimony regarding insanity); United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (testimony regarding wilfulness), modified, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1987).
On the other hand, the court erred under rule 704(a) by allowing the officers' testimony about the reasonableness of the shooting. Rule 704(a) "does not allow a witness to give legal conclusions." Izydore, 167 F.3d at 218. See 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 704.02[4] (Matthew Bender 2002). Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause is a legal conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, we are confident that this error did not affect the outcome of Williams's trial.
The evidence against Williams was overwhelming. The officers' brief opinions followed their damning factual testimony about the circumstances of the shooting. Windom, Mrs. Hall, and Hall corroborated the officers' factual testimony without improperly opining on reasonableness. No one, on the other hand, corroborated Williams's testimony, which itself contradicted his prior written statements. Moreover, even if the jury uncritically accepted the officers' opinion testimony, this did not necessitate a guilty verdict, because the reasonableness of the shooting was not the ultimate issue; the jury still could have acquitted Williams, for example, by finding that he did not act wilfully. Izydore, 167 F.3d at 218.
We have affirmed convictions based on the strength of the evidence as a whole, notwithstanding opinion testimony admitted in violation of rule 704. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d at 663 (holding that error was harmless); Izydore, 167 F.3d at 218 (holding that error, if any, was harmless).
Williams contends that the court improperly admitted character evidence in violation of FED.R.EVID. 404(b). The government wanted Hall to testify that he fled from Williams because he knew that Williams previously had shot another suspect. Hall objected. The government explained that this testimony would help the jury to understand why Hall, an unsympathetic victim, fled from Williams. The court ruled that Hall could testify to his knowledge of the shooting but not to the surrounding circumstances, including whether Williams had shot the suspect in the back or whether the shooting was justified. Thus, Hall testified that he feared Williams "because I knowed he had shot a guy in Hollandale." Immediately after he left the stand, the court gave the jury a thorough limiting instruction on this testimony.
Hall alleged that Williams shot the suspect in the back. Williams admitted to having shot a suspect before, but denied shooting him in the back.
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes. . . ." FED.R.EVID. 404(b). "To determine whether `other acts' evidence was erroneously admitted, first we must determine whether the evidence was intrinsic or extrinsic." Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156. See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 404.02[11] (Matthew Bender 2002).
Extrinsic evidence must satisfy rule 404(b), whereas "[i]ntrinsic evidence does not implicate Rule 404(b)." Id. Evidence of another act is "intrinsic" if it and "evidence of the crime charged are `inextricably intertwined' or both acts are part of a `single criminal episode' or the other acts were `necessary preliminaries' to the crime charged." Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under this definition, Hall's testimony about an old and unrelated shooting is plainly extrinsic evidence subject to rule 404(b).
As for the other requirements of rule 403, Williams does not seriously contend that this single line of minor testimony could have confused the issues, misled the jury, wasted time, or resulted in cumulative evidence. FED.R.EVID. 403. The court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the testimony under rule 404(b).
Williams also contends the court abused its discretion by allowing Hall to testify that he feared Williams might plant drugs on him. To justify this fear, Hall proposed to testify that he had heard that Williams had planted drugs on other suspects. The court ruled that Hall could state his fear but could not testify to any hearsay allegations of Williams's planting drugs on suspects. Thus, Hall testified only that he feared Williams might "throw down drugs on [me] when [I was] stopped." Because this testimony refers only to Hall's unsupported belief, not any other act by Williams, it cannot violate rule 404(b).
Williams further argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by forcing Williams, through a series of rhetorical questions, to call the other witnesses liars. "In reviewing an assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, this [c]ourt employs a two-step analysis." United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 152 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 959, 121 S.Ct. 1488, 149 L.Ed.2d 375 (2001). We initially must determine whether "the prosecutor made an improper remark." Id. The government concedes that the prosecutor acted improperly by asking Williams about the other witnesses' veracity. United States v. Thomas, 246 F.3d 438, 439 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2001).
"[T]he second step is to evaluate whether the remark affected the substantial rights of the defendant." Wise, 221 F.3d at 152. When applying this standard, we "consider three factors: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction." Wyly, 193 F.3d at 299 (quotation marks omitted). All three factors lead us to conclude that the improper questioning did not affect Williams's substantial rights.
Third, "the evidence of guilt was overwhelming." Id. Williams does not dispute that he shot an unarmed man in the back. His testimony contradicted his prior written statements. Six eyewitnesses (Billings, Barfield, Windom, Cooper, Mrs. Hall, and Hall) expressly contradicted Williams's fantastic testimony that Hall made any threatening movements. Four eyewitnesses (Billings, Barfield, Windom, and Hall) testified that Williams shot Hall while Hall was facing the other direction and standing motionless with his arms raised. Cartlidge testified that Williams admitted to shooting Hall out of frustration or anger. Williams gave no "reason for the jury to disbelieve th[is] substantial incriminating testimony." United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Tellingly, Williams offers no examples of a court of appeals' reversing a conviction because a prosecutor improperly questioned a defendant about another witness's veracity. This court has disapproved this tactic at least twice, but did not reverse for that reason in either case. Thomas, 246 F.3d at 439 n. 1; United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1997). The First and District of Columbia Circuits have affirmed convictions despite identical misconduct, which they dismissed as merely stating the obvious or as minimally important. Sullivan, 85 F.3d at 751; Boyd, 54 F.3d at 872 (plain error review). Even in Williams's main cases, the Second and Ninth Circuits disapproved of this tactic, but reversed the conviction because of other, more serious errors. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1987). The questioning, though inappropriate, is not reversible error.
Williams also asserts that in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly vouched for Barfield's credibility. The prosecutor did not intimate personal knowledge of Barfield's credibility, but merely reminded the jury that Barfield began cooperating with the government before receiving a plea agreement and asked it to infer, altogether reasonably, that the agreement did not alter Barfield's testimony. This kind of request for a favorable inference from record evidence is not improper vouching, especially because Williams had attacked Barfield's credibility. United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Williams argues that the prosecutor violated his due process rights during rebuttal closing arguments by stating that Barfield would be sentenced to at least five months' imprisonment under his plea agreement. We review de novo an alleged due process violation, United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 888, 123 S.Ct. 137, 154 L.Ed.2d 149 (2002), and conclude that the comments did not violate Williams's due process rights.
In closing argument, Williams's counsel hammered away at Barfield's testimony. He contended that Barfield lied to obtain a sweetheart plea agreement. In his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor countered this argument in several ways. First, he noted that Barfield was only one of three officers who testified against Williams. Next, he reminded the jury that Barfield revealed to the government the events to which he later testified before he received a plea agreement. Finally, the prosecutor disagreed that Barfield's agreement was generous. Specifically, she stated, "He's going to jail, ladies and gentleman. He is going to jail. There is no chance for him not to go to jail. . . ."
Williams's counsel objected here, but the court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then stated, "[Barfield] told you that what his understanding of what that plea agreement was and what his deal was, was that he can go to jail still for up to two years, absolutely will go for at least five months. Somewhere in between there. It will be up to the court. What a deal." The court, however, later sentenced Barfield to six months' home confinement.
"When the `reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the] general rule of Brady [ v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)]." United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1395 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). This rule applies to "any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution." Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155, 92 S.Ct. 763. A Giglio violation usually occurs when a cooperating witness denies having a plea agreement and the prosecutor fails to correct the misstatement. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 2002). A prosecutor violates Giglio, however, if he denies the existence or misrepresents the terms of a plea agreement. Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 1974).
To prove a due process violation, Williams must establish that the prosecutor knowingly made a false and material statement during the rebuttal closing. Cf. Mason, 293 F.3d at 828 (explaining standard for knowing use of false testimony). Williams has not satisfied this standard, because the prosecutor did not misrepresent Barfield's plea agreement. Rather, she merely explained its terms, which call for five months' to two years' imprisonment. Even if she somewhat overzealously asserted that "[t]here is no chance for him not to go to jail" and "[he] absolutely will go for at least five months," these statements must be read in context, where the prosecutor also explained that the court ultimately would decide Barfield's sentence.
Moreover, Barfield did not get away scot-free; home confinement, like imprisonment, is a kind of confinement, and Barfield received a sentence within the agreed range. This situation therefore differs in kind, not merely in degree, from cases in which the prosecutor and cooperating witness conceal from the jury the existence of the plea agreement altogether. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151-53, 92 S.Ct. 763; Mason, 293 F.3d at 828-29; United States v. Bigeleisen, 625 F.2d 203, 208 (8th Cir. 1980).