Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20131031_0008216.CA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-23 22:32:08
Document Index: 352709408

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 663', '§ 657', '§ 953', '§ 953', '§ 953', '§ 953', '§ 953', '§ 953', '§ 2040', '§ 3439', '§ 100', '§ 43', '§ 2556', '§ 11420', '§ 2104', '§ 2104', '§ 2104', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 3294', '§ 2104', '§ 1101', '§ 3294']

| In re Marriage of Burwell
In re the Marriage of BECKY and GARY BURWELL. BECKY BURWELL, Movant and Appellant,v.CYNTHIA BURWELL, Objector and Appellant.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION[*]
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. No. S1501-FL-591767 Susan M. Gill, Judge.
OPINION Poochigian, Acting P.J.
Here, the trial court failed to make findings sufficient to determine proper characterization of the proceeds. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order, and remand for further factual findings and application of the rules we set forth herein.[1]
In 1996, during the marriage of Becky J. Burwell[2] and Gary J. Burwell, a term life insurance policy was purchased (hereafter the “term life policy” or “the policy.”) Gary was the insured and Becky was the named beneficiary until October 7, 2008.
“3. transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether community, quasi-community, or separate, without the written consent of the other party or an order of the court, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life; and
“4. creating a nonprobate transfer or modifying a nonprobate transfer in a manner that affects the disposition of property subject to the transfer, without the written consent of the other party or order of the court. Before revocation of a nonprobate transfer can take effect, or a right of survivorship to property can be eliminated, notice of the change must be filed and served on the other party.”
A status-only judgment of dissolution was entered in August 2005, and the court retained jurisdiction over all other issues. In November 2006, [3] Gary married Cynthia Burwell (Cynthia).
In August 2008, Gary and Becky stipulated to a “further” judgment resolving some property issues. Though the stipulated judgment indicates that “the parties have reached an agreement with regard to the division of their marital property, ” five issues were explicitly reserved for a trial. One of the issues reserved for trial was “claims for breach of spousal fiduciary duty.”
The court also ruled that Gary owed Becky (1) $105, 195.49 in “back [spousal] support payments and interest”; (2) $125, 000 in attorney fees; (3) $1, 524, 531 in reimbursements and credits for Becky’s portion of community property less $44, 283.14 in Gary’s reimbursements; and (4) $95, 102 in previously ordered equalization payments.
Judge Susan M. Gill ruled on the motion in an order dated November 9, 2011. [4] It is from this order that both parties appeal.
Cynthia filed a notice of intent to move for a new trial, seeking an order “(1) setting aside the ruling signed on November 7, 2011, that awards one-half of the term life insurance proceeds to Becky [] and (2) granting [a] new trial.” (See fn. 6, post.)
Cynthia filed a motion to augment the appellate record with an October 22, 2009, transcript of testimony from the trial on reserved issues. Becky opposed the motion to augment and requested that we strike certain portions of Cynthia’s opening brief referencing the transcript and certain portions of appellant’s appendix, volume II. Becky contends these documents pertained to the trial on reserved issues before Judge Somers and were not before Judge Gill when she issued the appealed order. We granted the motion to augment the record, but did not “resolve the transcript’s relevance to any issue on appeal or whether the court will consider the reporter’s transcript on review.” We previously deferred ruling on Becky’s motion to strike pending further order of this court. We now deny it.[5] (See People v. Preslie, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 490-491.)
Appellate standing is conferred by section 902 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557; see Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) That statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny party aggrieved may appeal.…” (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) By its plain language, Code of Civil Procedure section 902 limits appellate standing in two important ways. To have appellate standing, one must (1) be a party and (2) be aggrieved. (Ibid.; see also Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.)
The California Supreme Court held in Carleson that “one who is legally ‘aggrieved’ by a judgment may become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 663.” (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 736.) As Becky argues in her motion, “Cynthia did not move to vacate the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 663.” But, Cynthia did file a motion seeking to “set aside” the subject order under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. [6] Thus, if the Carleson rule applies to any motion to vacate or set aside an order and is not limited to motions brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 663, then Cynthia would be a party of record for purposes of appellate standing. In accordance with the general rule that doubts as to standing are resolved in favor of the right to appeal (Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 13), we hold that the Carleson rule does apply here.
For the reasons explained below, we view the Supreme Court’s reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 663 in Carleson (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d 730)as merely identifying one type of motion to vacate that will confer “party” status on the movant for purposes of appellate standing. In this context, we see no relevant distinction between a motion seeking to set aside a decree (Code Civ. Proc., § 663) and a motion seeking to “vacate[]” a “decision” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657). Thus, we believe the most faithful application of Carleson would permit an appeal here, where the appellant moved to set aside the judgment in the lower court.
In all of these cases, there was no indication that a person must file a motion seeking to vacate the judgment under a particular statute. To the contrary, in Estate of Sloan, the court described Eggert and other cases as holding that a party must “move to vacate or otherwise formally oppose the judgment appealed from below.” (Estate of Sloan, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at p. 292, italics added.) Likewise, the remainder of the cases do not require the motion to vacate be made pursuant to any particular statute.[7]
Here, Cynthia’s motion sought to “set[] aside the ruling signed November 7, 2011..., ” and was therefore a motion seeking to vacate the order for purposes of the Carleson rule. Contrary to Becky’s contention in her motion to dismiss, Cynthia is a “party” for purposes of appellate standing. (See Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 736-737.) [8]
In Logan, the First District held that term life insurance policies only remain community property after separation for as long as community funds are used to pay the premium. (Logan, supra 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 325.) Otherwise, if the insured remains insurable, the term policy is not a divisible community asset because “the policy is of no value and the community has fully received what it bargained for.” (Id. at pp. 325-326.) In dictum, Logan indicated that “[i]f the insured becomes uninsurable during the term paid with community funds, then the right to future insurance coverage which cannot otherwise be purchased is a community asset to be divided upon dissolution.” (Id. at p. 325.) In Marriage of Spengler, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 288, the Third District agreed with the holding of Logan but disagreed with its dictum. (Marriage of Spengler, supra, at p. 293.)[9]
Conversely, in Biltoft v. Wootten (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 58 (Biltoft), the Fourth District held that proceeds from term life insurance “must be apportioned between community and separate property in the same ratio that the amount of premiums paid from community earnings bears to the amount of premiums paid from separate property.” (Id. at p. 62.) It rejected the notion “that no person has an interest in a term life insurance policy beyond the date the premium is due.…” (Id. at p. 61.) It disagreed with the argument that “each premium payment is a new contract, ” citing Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray (1931) 113 Cal.App. 729 (Modern Woodmen). (Biltoft, supra, at p. 61.)
With a few exceptions, we agree with Logan. The coverage and premium provisions of term life insurance policies “provide[] dollar coverage only for the specific term for which the premium was paid.” (Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 324.) Therefore, the characterization of the proceeds “will depend on the … premium for the final term of the policy.” (Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, 174 F.3d at p. 983.)[10] When the final premium is paid solely with community property, “the proceeds of the policy are community property.” (Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p 321.) Conversely, when the separate estate pays for the final premium with no help from the community, the proceeds are a separate asset. (Id. at pp. 321, 325.)
We believe Biltoft and Woodmen err in analyzing the relevant property interests at the wrong level of abstraction. That is, those opinions generally identify the property interest as the entire insurance policy. We believe the proper unit of analysis is the individual contractual rights conferred by the policy. As was said in an analogous context, “[t]he Court of Appeal’s … analysis rests on the erroneous legal assumption that [the asset] was … unitary and indivisible.… It is not.” (In re Marriage of Sonne (2010) 48 Cal.4th 118, 127.)[11] Similarly, a term life insurance policy is not a unitary and indivisible asset giving rise to a unitary and indivisible property interest. Rather, the relevant property interests are the individual enforceable contractual rights derived from the policy. (See Civ. Code, § 953; cf. Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 845 [“a contractual right is … a chose in action, a form of property (see Civ. Code, § 953)”].)
“An insurance policy is a contract between an insurer and an insured …, the insurer making promises, and the insured paying premiums, the one in consideration for the other, against the risk of loss.…” (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 44-45, citations omitted.)One of the insurer’s promises in a term life policy is the agreement to pay the policy proceeds if the insured dies between dates x and y. The payment of the subsequent premium is consideration for another promise from the insurer: to pay the proceeds if the insured dies between dates y to z. In other words, the “ ‘premium is the amount paid for … a certain period of coverage.’ ” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1324, italics added.)
Each premium payment gives rise to an enforceable contractual right of coverage for an additional period of time. As premiums are paid over the life of the policy, distinct property interests in coverage for various periods of time arise. Of those distinct property interests, only one is worth anything in hindsight: coverage for the term during which the insured dies. [12] Thus, the relevant inquiry is who obtained the specific contractual right to coverage for the final term, [13] and how. (Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, 174 F.3d at p. 983 [characterization of proceeds “will depend on the … premium for the final term of the policy”].)
Biltoft and Woodmen first reject the argument that each premium payment does not create a new contract. They are correct to discredit this notion. The relevant “property” is not a unitary and indivisible interest in the entire policy contract, but in the individual enforceable contractual rights derived from it. (See Civ. Code, § 953; cf. Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 845 [“a contractual right is … a chose in action, a form of property (see Civ. Code, § 953)”].) While each premium payment does not create a new contract, it does give rise to a new enforceable contractual right and thus a distinct property interest. By way of analogy, consider a one-year apartment lease. Each rent payment does not create a new lease, but paying January’s rent does not entitle a tenant to live there in October. [14]
Biltoft and Woodmen next assert “it would be unreasonable to hold that the payment of the premiums … would convert the entire proceeds.…” (Biltoft, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 61; Woodmen, supra, 113 Cal.App. at p. 732.) This is true, as far as it goes. The separate estate’s subsequent payment of the premium does not “convert” the community’s “proceeds.” But the point is they were never the community’s proceeds to begin with. The proceeds belong to whomever the insurance company is contractually obligated to pay. In other words, the valuable property interest is the enforceable contractual right to compel payment of the proceeds. (See Civ. Code, § 953; cf. Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 845 [“a contractual right is … a chose in action, a form of property (see Civ. Code, § 953)”].) In this context, that contractual right is the coverage during which the insured dies. The community did not acquire this contractual right. Instead, the community paid for, and received in full, a different contractual right: the right to be paid upon a contingency that ultimately failed. The important aspect of this contractual right is not that it has been converted or appropriated by the separate estate (it has not). The pivotal attribute of the community’s interest is its complete lack of value. It does not entitle its holder to the policy proceeds and never will. The right to be paid if the insured dies between January 1 and 31 becomes forever worthless on February 1 if the insured is alive. That is how term insurance works.
When the insured spouse becomes medically uninsurable during the community’s terms of coverage, his or her separate estate can only acquire subsequent terms of coverage by appropriating the community’s contractual right to renew. By definition, the uninsurable spouse would be unable to continue coverage without it. Thus, the acquisition of the final coverage term is dependent on both the separate estate’s payment of premiums and the community’s renewal right. Both the separate and community estates are contributing towards the purchase of subsequent coverage terms (including the all-important final coverage term). The community’s contribution is represented by the premiums it has paid over the life of the policy, which are the funds expended to acquire and retain the renewal right. Once the premiums are paid solely by separate funds, it is the separate estate that is maintaining the renewal right. Given the joint effort of community and separate assets in acquiring the relevant asset (i.e., the final coverage term), the proceeds obtained therewith must be apportioned. “[I]t is … well established that, upon separation of the parties or dissolution of marriage, one spouse is not entitled to appropriate a community asset for his or her own use without reimbursing the community for the value of the appropriated asset.” (Marriage of Elfmont, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1039 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, J.).)[15]
In this situation, where the insured spouse becomes uninsurable during a term paid for by the community, the proper apportionment of the proceeds is “between community and separate property in the same ratio that the amount of premiums paid from community earnings bears to the amount of premiums paid from separate property.” (Biltoft, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 62.)[16]
There is another scenario wherein the separate estate could appropriate the community’s contractual rights. Over time, a spouse may remain insurable but become more expensive to insure “because of advancing age or declining health.” (In re Marriage of Gonzalez, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 1025.)[17] That is why some term insurance policies, like the policy at issue here, provide for a cap on premiums during a particular period of time. With a cap provision, the premium for a particular term may not solely reflect actuarial considerations relative to the insured’s likelihood of dying during that term. The price may be “artificially” low in accordance with the premium cap. The cap has value when the premiums would otherwise exceed the maximum it allows.
The cap itself is a contractual right to be charged premiums at or below a maximum amount. Both the separate and community estates have paid premiums to maintain this contractual right. Thus, if the insured spouse renews the policy postseparation, and the premiums would have been higher without the premium cap, the insured spouse has necessarily appropriated property which the community acquired and helped maintain.[18]
As noted ante, the characterization of the proceeds as separate or community “will depend on the … premium for the final term of the policy.” (Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, 174 F.3d at p. 983.) In the case of lessened insurability, the final premium obligation is met by the joint effect of (1) the funds expended by the separate estate to pay the premium and (2) the “discount” embodied in the premium cap, which is a partial-community asset. Thus the community should receive a fraction of the proceeds based on two factors: (1) the community’s role in maintaining the contractual right to a premium cap; and (2) the premium cap’s role in the separate estate’s acquisition of the final term of coverage. That fraction would be calculated as follows:[19]
x (effective premium discount for final term of coverage)
(effective premium discount for final term of coverage)
For example, consider the following hypothetical. The community pays 50 percent of the premiums over the life of a policy. Without the premium cap, the insured spouse would have had to pay $1, 000 for the premium for the final coverage term. However, because of the premium cap, the insured spouse only had to pay a $400 premium for the final coverage term.
50% x $600 $300 3
$600 $400 $1, 000 10
In this scenario, the community wouỬld be entitled to three-tenths, or 30 percent, of the proceeds.
In sum, the proper characterization of term life insurance proceeds depends on a number of factors. The proceeds are entirely community when the final premium is paid solely with community property. (Logan, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 321.) The proceeds are entirely separate property when: (1) a separate estate has paid the final premium with separate funds; and (2) the insured spouse was insurable at the end of the last term paid for by community funds; and (3) either (a) the insured spouse’s health was such that he or she could have purchased a comparable policy at a comparable price when the separate estate began paying the premiums, or (b) the policy did not contain a premium cap when the separate estate began paying the premiums. The proceeds are part community and part separate where (1) the separate estate has paid the final premium with funds that are part community and part separate; or (2) the insured spouse has become medically uninsurable before he or she began paying the premiums with separate property; or (3) the insured spouse could not have purchased a comparable policy at a comparable price when he or she began paying the premiums with separate property. [20] (See appendix A, post.)
None of the parties’ remaining contentions alter this disposition, as we will now explain in the unpublished portion of the opinion.
WE CANNOT RESOLVE BECKY’S CLAIM ON CROSS-APPEAL THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO 100 PERCENT OF THE PROCEEDS AS THE SOLE VALID BENEFICIARY ON THE FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE US
There are a number of contentions that Becky raises on cross-appeal that we cannot address given that we remand for reconsideration of the characterization issue. Becky claims she is entitled to 100 percent of the proceeds because she is the effective beneficiary on the policy. She argues that while Gary purported to change the beneficiary from Becky to Cynthia, that designation was void because it violated the ATROs. (See Fam. Code, § 2040.) She also contends the designation is independently void because it was a fraudulent conveyance. (See Civ. Code, §§ 3439.04, 3439.07, subd. (a)(1).) As explained post, we cannot determine whether Becky is entitled to 100 percent of the proceeds on these theories.
Under the principles outlined in section II, ante, it is possible that Gary and Cynthia’s community estate has an interest in the insurance proceeds. If so, then Cynthia may have a right to some of the proceeds even though Gary’s change of beneficiary from Becky to Cynthia was voided by the trial court. Cynthia’s interest in the proceeds “may not be defeated by a gift of the policy proceeds to a third party named as beneficiary” without her consent. (See Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Cassidy (1984) 35 Cal.3d 599, 605.)[21] “The surviving spouse is therefore entitled to set aside his or her community share in life insurance proceeds even where the decedent spouse designated another person as beneficiary. [Citations] This rule applies to term life insurance policies.…” (Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (9th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 949, 955-956, abrogated on other grounds by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001) 532 U.S. 141.)
Thus, the resolution of Cynthia’s claim to 100 percent of the proceeds must await proper characterization of the proceeds.
IV.[*]
WE CANNOT RESOLVE CYNTHIA’S CLAIM THAT EVEN IF THE PROCEEDS MUST BE SPLIT, SHE SHOULD RECEIVE HALF
Cynthia claims that even if the trial court properly split the proceeds between Gary and Becky, it should have awarded Gary’s share to Cynthia. We cannot reach this claim either. If the proceeds were property of Gary and Cynthia’s community estate, then Cynthia herself is entitled to at least a portion of the proceeds. (See Prob. Code, § 100, subd. (a); see also part III, ante.) But if the proceeds are entirely property of Gary and Becky’s community estate, then Cynthia may not be entitled to the requested relief because the trial court voided the change of beneficiary. Therefore, this issue may need to be considered on remand depending on the ultimate characterization of the proceeds.
We note that the parties, in their opening appellant’s briefs, do not challenge the trial court’s finding that Gary violated the ATROs, nor its ruling that the change of beneficiary from Becky to Cynthia is void. Those rulings remain intact on remand. The trial court will determine the practical effect of those rulings, if any, once it characterizes the policy proceeds.[22]
V.[*]
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY LEAVING BECKY’S CREDITOR CLAIM AGAINST GARY’S ESTATE TO THE PROBATE COURT
As an alternative argument, Becky claims the trial court should have awarded her 100 percent of the proceeds because she was entitled to 50 percent for her portion of the community’s interest and 50 percent as a creditor of Gary’s estate. The family court did award Becky 50 percent as a member of the community, but left it to the probate court to adjudicate Becky’s creditor claim. Becky claims it was error for the court not to award her “the balance of the policy to offset [her] existing judgment.…”
First, we note that this particular issue may become moot depending on proceedings following remand. However, if on remand the court again arrives at the conclusion that Becky is entitled to less than all of the proceeds, then this issue will remain relevant. Therefore, we discuss it briefly. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 43.)
Becky’s postjudgment motion to adjudicate the life insurance proceeds was brought under Family Code section 2556. That section requires the court to “equally divide” omitted or unadjudicated community assets, “unless the court finds upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset.…” (Fam. Code, § 2556.) Because the trial court equally divided the asset, it necessarily did not find upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset. Instead, the court determined that Becky was entitled to 50 percent of the proceeds. It left the adjudication of Becky’s claim to the remainder of the proceeds on a debtor-creditor theory to the probate court. We find no abuse of discretion.
The family court would have likely violated due process if it had simply awarded the proceeds to Becky as a creditor without proper notice to other claimants against Gary’s estate. (See Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope (1988) 485 U.S. 478, 490.) Moreover, Becky provided no evidence to the trial court regarding the priority of her debt vis-à-vis other creditors. (See Prob. Code, § 11420.) It was appropriate for the family court to have the probate court determine the resolution of Becky’s claims as a creditor of Gary’s estate.
VI.[*]
Cynthia argues that Gary did not improperly fail to disclose the policy during the dissolution proceeding. She contends that the judicial council form for disclosures (Form No. FL-142), only contemplates disclosure of life insurance policies with a cash surrender value. And, because the policy had no cash surrender value, Gary’s failure to “specify” the term life policy was “consistent” with the form.
Disclosure requirements are set by statute, not by the format of judicial council forms. (See Fam. Code, §§ 2104, 2105.) The statutes require disclosure of “all assets in which the declarant has or may have an interest … regardless of the characterization of the asset … as community … or separate.” (Fam. Code, § 2104, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) The format of a judicial council form does not change statutory requirements for a particular filing. (Cf. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484 [“ ‘Adoption of Official Forms for the most common civil actions has not changed the statutory requirement that the complaint contain “facts constituting the cause of action” ’ ”].)
Even if the form’s wording had been determinative, Cynthia’s argument fails. At most, the form’s language regarding cash surrender value suggested the policy should not be listed in that particular section. But the form also had a section entitled “Other Assets.” In sum, the form does not prohibit the listing of life insurance policies with no cash surrender value, and the Family Code requires it. (See Fam. Code, § 2104, subd. (c)(1).) We see no basis for disturbing the trial court’s finding that Gary violated disclosure requirements.
VII.[*]
On cross-appeal, Becky contends that she should have been awarded 100 percent of the proceeds due to Gary’s failure to disclose. (See Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (h).) As the court found, Gary failed to disclose the term life policy and thereby violated his fiduciary duty.
When the court finds a breach of fiduciary duty, the remedies “shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or any amount equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed … in breach of the fiduciary duty.…” (Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (g).) When the breach “falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code, ” the remedies “shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 100 percent, or an amount equal to 100 percent, of any asset undisclosed.…” (Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (h).)
Here, the trial court did find that Gary breached his fiduciary duty by “fail[ing] to disclose the … policy pursuant to Family Code sections 2104 and 2105.” However, it awarded only 50 percent of the asset to Becky. Thus, the court impliedly found that Gary’s breach did not fall within the ambit of section 3294 of the Civil Code.
We review findings regarding “oppression, fraud, or malice” (Civ. Code, § 3294) under the “ ‘substantial evidence’ ” standard of review. (In re Marriage of Rossi (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 34, 40.) We review a trial court’s implied findings of fact under the substantial evidence test as well. (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 739.)
While Gary failed to disclose the policy on his disclosure declarations, he did state at his deposition: “I think I have a million-dollar policy.” Becky contends this “was not enough” because Gary had a duty to “augment his disclosures and to be strictly transparent.” We agree that Gary’s deposition testimony did not bring him into compliance with disclosure requirements under the Family Code. (See Fam. Code, §§ 2104, 2105.) But a 100 percent award under subdivision (h) requires finding a breach of fiduciary duty and oppression, fraud or malice. (Fam. Code, § 1101, subd. (h); Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Gary’s deposition testimony is relevant to the latter determination. While Gary’s deposition testimony did not preclude the trial court’s finding that he had breached his duty of disclosure, it similarly did not preclude the trial court from finding that the same breach was not a result of oppression, fraud or malice. To the contrary, Gary’s deposition testimony is substantial evidence supporting that implied finding. Therefore, we will not disturb it on appeal.
VIII[*]
Cynthia claims Becky’s motion to adjudicate the proceeds was barred by the statute of limitations. However, she failed to raise this issue below. It is clear that when a party fails to raise the expiration of the statute of limitations in the trial court, “such a waiver cannot be overcome on appeal even if the undisputed facts demonstrate that a timely challenge would have been meritorious as a matter of law.” (Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 266, 273, fn. 3; see also In re Marriage of Hanley (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1121.)
IX.[*]
Cynthia claims Becky is judicially estopped from claiming the proceeds are community property. Cynthia did not raise this argument below. “As a general rule, ‘issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.’ [Citations.] On a number of occasions, however, appellate courts have … permitted a party to raise belatedly ‘a pure question of law which is presented on undisputed facts.’ [Citations.]” (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.)
“Only when the issue presented involves purely a legal question, on an uncontroverted record and requires no factual determinations, is it appropriate to address new theories.” (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 820, 847 (Mattco Forge, Inc.) Judicial estoppel is not such an issue. “A trial court’s determination on the issue of estoppel is a factual finding....” (In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, 850.) Because the estoppel determination is factual, we cannot address it as a new theory on appeal. (See Mattco Forge, Inc., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 850.)
While Cynthia styles this argument as judicial estoppel in her opening brief, her counsel raised a similar but distinct contention at oral argument. She contends that Judge Somers had made an implied finding that the policy was separate property when he purportedly ordered Gary to reimburse Becky for premium payments. Even if we were to address this contention on its merits, it fails. The evidence Cynthia cites from the trial before Judge Somers pertains to reimbursements for various premiums paid from 2005 to 2008. Gary died in April 2010. As we explained above, the characterization of term life insurance proceeds “will depend on the … premium for the final term of the policy.” (Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, 174 F.3d at p. 983.) A threshold requirement for the application of collateral estoppel is that “the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) Even if the evidence cited by Cynthia and offered before Judge Somers properly raised the issue of whether the 2005 to 2008 premiums were paid with separate or community funds while Gary was alive, that issue is not identical to the one relevant here: the proper characterization of the policy’s proceeds once Gary died in 2010. Collateral estoppel does not apply.
Moreover, Cynthia’s estoppel argument assumes Becky claimed the policy was Gary’s separate property before Judge Somers. The record before us is not so clear. Before Judge Somers, Becky acknowledged that Gary was permissibly withdrawing $20, 000 from BCI, and giving $10, 000 of that sum to her. But, she alleged that Gary began taking out more than the agreed-upon $20, 000 per month from BCI. Believing the income generated by BCI was a community asset, Becky asked Judge Somers to reimburse her in connection with the amounts Gary withdrew in excess of the agreed-upon $20, 000 per month. Thus, Becky’s response to Cynthia’s estoppel argument on appeal is that she “made claims for payments made by the business that she believed were of a personal nature and not business related” and when she “could not identify the payment as business related, she simply included it in her list of items.” (Italics added.)
For example, Becky listed her claims for reimbursement in an exhibit offered before Judge Somers. Under the heading “Excess Amounts Paid to or for the Benefit of Gary J. Burwell from Burwell Concrete During Calendar Year 2007, ” Becky listed a $10, 000 transfer Gary allegedly made on January 8, 2007. Through one of Gary’s exhibits, it is shown that the $10, 000 was credited to an account from which multiple payments were made including a term life policy premium payment. Becky’s claim for reimbursement does not list the premium payment as a line item, only the $10, 000 transfer which Gary apparently used for many purposes, including paying the premium. On this record, we cannot find the character of policy proceeds was an issue litigated before Judge Somers or that Becky took inconsistent positions vis-à-vis the character of the policy.
The trial court’s order that the “term life insurance policy was a community asset of the parties” is vacated. The matter is remanded for further evidentiary proceedings to determine the proper characterization and distribution of the term life insurance policy proceeds in accordance with this opinion.
WE CONCUR: Franson, J.Peña, J., APPENDIX A.