Source: http://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/page/2/
Timestamp: 2013-06-20 07:23:45
Document Index: 146812814

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§1', '§1', '§2', '§2', '§3']

Judicial Appointment to the General Court: Judge Dimitrios Gratsias
After the difficulties surrounding the appointment of a judge from Greece to the General Court (about which see here), a brilliant appointment appointment has been made.
Judge Dimitrios Gratsias has been appointed to the General Court, to replace Judge Mihalis Vilaras, from October 25, 2010 to August 31, 2016. A short resume of Judge Gratsias is available here.
A replacement for Judge Valeriu Ciucă from Romania still needs to be appointed.
Congratulations to Judge Gratsias!
After a long break, we are back!
Many thanks to our patient readers for sticking with us.
November 12, 2010 in Weblogs | Permalink
There's been quite a lot of activity on appointments of judges to the Court of Justice and, especially, the General Court lately. They are the first appointments to be made under the new procedure laid down in Article 255 TFEU which states that a panel should give an opinion on the suitability of the candidates. For our previous posts on that procedure, see here.
First, the Court of Justice.
Ms Alexandra Prechal from the Netherlands was appointed on May 31, 2010 by the representatives of the Governments of the member States to replace Judge Christiaan Timmermans for the remainder of his term of office which ends on October 6 2012. Judge Prechal's appointment is effective June 10 2010. You can find the appointment decision here.
Interestingly, the decision appointing Judge Prechal expressly states in its second recital that the panel set up by Article 255 TFEU gave a favorable opinion on her suitability as a judge of the Court of Justice.
Congratulations to Judge Prechal!
Next, the General Court. And this is where things look a bit strange.
On June 9, 2010 the Council prepared a draft decision noting that the term of office of 14 judges of the General Court is due to expire on August 31 2010. The draft decision noted that the Governments of the member States had proposed to reappoint 11 of those 14. The list of those proposed for reappointment included Judge Czúcz from Hungary, as he had been nominated by the Hungarian government for reappointment on November 30, 2009 (Council Document 17563/09). On January 22, 2010, the Greek government had nominated for appointment Mr Christos Vassilopoulos to fill the slot to fall vacant with Judge Vilaras's retirement from the General Court (Council Document 6125/10). But his name never appears again.
On June 21, 2010, the Council prepared a draft decision noting that the term of office of 14 judges of the General Court is due to expire on August 31 2010 (Council document 10952/10). Those not proposed for reappointment were Judge Ciuca (from Romania), Judge Meij (from the Netherlands), Judge Vilaras (from Greece) who were to leave the General Court at the expiry of their terms. The draft decision noted that the Governments of the member States had proposed to reappoint 11 of those 14. Judge Czúcz from Hungary was on the list of those to be reappointed.
On June 23, 2010, the Council prepared another draft decision (Council document 10952/1/10 Rev 1) which mentioned this time that the Governments of the member States had proposed to reappoint 10 of the 14 judges. Curiously, Judge Czúcz (from Hungary) was omitted from the list of those to be reappointed. The second recital to the draft decision states that the panel set up by Article 255 TFUE "has given an opinion on the suitability of the aforementioned ten judges" to be reappointed.
On June 24, 2010, the representatives of the Governments of the member States decided to reappoint 10 of the 11 judges listed in the draft of June 9 (Council Document 10952/2/10 Rev 2). Like in the draft of June 23, the second recital to the decision states cryptically that the panel set up by Article 255 TFUE "has given an opinion on the suitability of the aforementioned eleven judges" to be reappointed. Eleven, not ten judges. That list of 11 included Judge Czúcz but the recital continues that after the opinion was given, Judge Czúcz's application was "withdrawn". In contrast with the decision appointing Judge Prechal to the Court of Justice, there's no specific mention of a "favorable" opinion. What is one to make of that ?
But then Judge Czúcz returns to the fray as on July 1st 2010, the Hungarian government nominates him for reappointment to the General Court (Council document 11908/10).
Finally, on July 7, 2010 (Council Document 11912/10), the representatives of the Governments of the member States decided to reappoint Judge Czúcz. They also appoint Mr Marc van der Woude (from the Netherlands) as judge of the General Court who thus takes up the position vacated by Judge Meij. Their appointments take effect from September 1st 2010 for a term of six years until August 31 2016. As in the previous drafts, the decision contains the same cryptic recital mentioning "an opinion" of the Panel on the "suitability" of those proposed.
Anyway, congratulations to those appointed and reappointed!
July 08, 2010 in Institutional | Permalink
State Aid Procedure, Access to File and Transparency: Case C-139/07 P The Court of Justice has handed down a controversial judgment in Case C-139/07 P Commission v. Technische Galswerke Ilmenau GmbH. It held that the EU institutions may refuse under Regulation 1049/2001 to grant members of the public access to documents concerning the review of State aids because of a general presumption that disclosure of those documents would undermine investigation activities. Rather oddly, it held that such a general presumption may arise from the fact that the specific procedures applicable to the review of State aid allow only a very limited access to the documents on the file to the Member state granting the aid.
The facts are rather specific to this case and may be the source of the trouble. In December 1998, Germany notified the Commission of various measures designed to give financial aid to Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau (TGI). The Commission adopted a decision on June 12 2001 finding that the financial assistance granted constituted State aid incompatible with the common market. TGI brought an action for the annulment of that decision which was dismissed.
Then, in July 2001, the Commission opened a second formal investigation procedure in relation to aid granted by Germany to TGI, particularly a bank loan. In March 2002, TGI applied under Regulation 1049/2001 for access to all the documents in the Commission's files regarding State aid cases concerning TGI. By decision of May 28 2002, the Commission rejected the request for access, on the ground that disclosure of those documents would be likely to undermine the protection of the purposes of inspections and investigations, invoking the exception to the right of access laid down in Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001.
TGI brought an action before the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of that Commission decision.
In its judgment in Case T-237/02 Technische Galswerke Ilmenau GmbH v. Commission [2006] ECR II-5131, the General Court annulled the decision refusing access holding that the Commission had failed to examine each document covered by the request for access in a concrete, individual manner.
The Commission then appealed that judgment in this case.
The Court of Justice's judgment on appeal is interesting because it highlights the relationship between particular rules on access to file that may - or not - be contained in specific procedural regulations, such as Regulation 659/1999, and the general right of the public to have access to documents under Regulation 1049/2001.
The Court recalled that having been adopted on the basis of Article 255(2) EC, Regulation No 1049/2001 is designed to confer on the public as wide a right of access as possible to documents of the institutions. But that right of access is subject to certain limits based on reasons of public or private interest. It also recalled that in order to justify refusal of access to a document the disclosure of which has been requested, it is insufficient, in principle, for that document to fall within an activity mentioned in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The institution concerned must also supply explanations as to how access to that document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article (Joined Cases C‑39/05 P and C‑52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I‑4723, paragraph 49). (See our post on that case here).
The Court went on that it has acknowledged that the EU institution can in principle to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature (Sweden and Turco, paragraph 50).
But where does such a presumption come from ? As regards procedures for reviewing State aid, such general presumptions may arise from Regulation No 659/1999 and from the case-law concerning the right to consult documents on the Commission’s administrative file. Regulation No 659/1999, and its Article 20, do not lay down any right of access to documents in the Commission’s administrative file for interested parties in the context of the review procedure opened in accordance with Article 108(2) TFEU.
By contrast, holds the Court, Article 6(2) of Regulation 659/1999 provides that comments received by the Commission in the context of the said review procedure are to be submitted to the Member state concerned, the latter then having the opportunity to reply to those comments within a given time-limit. The procedure for reviewing State aid is, in view of its general scheme, a procedure initiated in respect of the Member State responsible for granting the aid, and the Commission cannot, without infringing the rights of the defence, use in its final decision information on which that Member State was not afforded an opportunity to comment (Joined Cases C‑74/00 P and C‑75/00 P Falck and Acciaierie di Bolzano v Commission [2002] ECR I-7869, paragraph 81).
The Court then draws the conclusion that the interested parties, except for the Member State responsible for granting the aid, do not have a right under the procedure for reviewing State aid to consult the documents on the Commission’s administrative file. Account must be taken of that fact for the purposes of interpreting the exception laid down by Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001. If those interested parties were able to obtain access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, the system for the review of State aid would be called into question.
In a paragraph that must surely be described as weird, the Court held: "It is true that the right to consult the administrative file in the context of a review procedure, opened in accordance with Article 88(2) EC, and the right of access to documents, pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001 are legally distinct, but the fact remains that they lead to a comparable situation from a practical point of view. Whatever the legal basis on which it is granted, access to the file enables the interested parties to obtain all the observations and documents submitted to the Commission, and, where appropriate, adopt a position on those matters in their own observations, which is likely to modify the nature of such a procedure."
And thus concludes that for the purposes of interpreting the exception laid down in Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation 1049/2001, the General Court should, in the judgment under appeal, have taken account of the fact that interested parties other than the Member state concerned in the procedures for reviewing State aid do not have the right to consult the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, and, therefore, have acknowledged the existence of a general presumption that disclosure of documents in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of investigation activities.
The problem with this judgment is that the applicant requesting the documents under Regulation No 1049/2001 was an "interested party" in the State aids procedure (in fact the beneficiary of the aid) and thus had very limited access to the file under Regulation 659/1999. The Court seems to want to prevent interested parties improving their position in a round about way by using the public access rules in Regulation 1049/2001. But under Regulation 1049/2001 anyone, including interested parties, have a general right to obtain documents and need not plead any special interest in seeking them.
July 04, 2010 in State aid, Transparency | Permalink
The Court of Justice has handed down an important judgment in Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform upholding the legality of Regulation 717/2007 - the Roaming Regulation.
Anyone who has used a mobile phone in Europe over the past few years knows that calling or receiving calls in a different country from that in which the subscription or plan was taken out knows that it is an extremely costly business. Prohibitively expensive, in fact. The EU institutions acted by adopting the Roaming Regulation fixing maximum charges that mobile phone operators may charge. The regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC (now, Article 114 TFEU). Not surprisingly, the leading mobile operators hated the regulation and the very idea that they could no longer rip-off the consumer simply because he or she was making or taking calls in a foreign country. Consequently, they challenged the measures taken by the British authorities to implement the Roaming Regulation before the English High Court. The English court then referred two questions on the validity of the Roaming Regulation itself to the Court of Justice.
The first question referred asked whether Article 95 EC was the proper legal basis for the regulation. The Court of Justice answered that it was. The Court considered first the general legal parameters surrounding the use of Article 95 EC as a legal base. It recalled that the object of measures adopted on the basis of Article 95(1) EC must genuinely be to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market (Case C‑491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paragraph 60, and Case C-217/04 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I‑3771, paragraph 42) 5for our previous post on that case, look here). The existence of disparities between national rules and the abstract risk of infringements of fundamental freedoms or distortion of competition is not sufficient to justify the choice of Article 95 EC as a legal basis, the EU legislature may have recourse to it in particular where there are differences between national rules which are such as to obstruct the fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal market (Case C‑380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I‑11573, paragraph 37) or to cause significant distortions of competition (Case C‑376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I‑8419, paragraphs 84 and 106).
Article 95 EC can also be used, the Court stated, if the aim of the measure is to prevent the emergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them (Germany v Parliament and Council, paragraph 38, and Case C‑301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-593, paragraph 64; United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, paragraphs 60 to 64).
Also, where an act based on Article 95 EC has already removed any obstacle to trade in the area that it harmonizes, the EU legislature can adapt that act to any change in circumstances or development of knowledge having regard to its task of safeguarding the general interests recognized by the Treaty (British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, paragraphs 77 and 78).
The Court held, in paragraph 43 of United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, that by using the expression ‘measures for the approximation’ in Article 95 EC the authors of the Treaty intended to confer on the EU legislature a discretion as regards the method of approximation most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields with complex technical features. Provided that the conditions for recourse to Article 95 EC as a legal basis are fulfilled, the EU legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that consumer protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made (see, regarding public health protection, Germany v Parliament and Council, paragraph 88; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, paragraph 62; and Joined Cases C‑154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I-6451, paragraph 30).
The Court examined the content of Regulation 717/2007 in the light of those parameters.
It found that the object of Regulation 717/2007 is to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market and that it could be adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC.
The Court states that the level of retail charges for international roaming services, when the regulation was adopted, was high and the relationship between costs and charges was not such as would prevail in fully competitive markets. That high level of retail charges had been regarded as a persistent problem by public authorities and consumer protection associations throughout the EU and attempts to solve the problem using the existing legal framework had not had the effect of lowering charges. In those circumstances, the EU legislature was actually confronted with a situation in which it appeared likely that divergent national measures would be adopted with the aim of lowering retail charges, but without affecting wholesale charges. Such a development could however have caused significant distortions of competition and disrupted the orderly functioning of the EU-wide roaming market, which justified the adoption of a regulation on the basis of Article 95 EC in order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market.
The second question referred to the Court of Justice concerned the proportionality of the measure.
The Court held that the Roaming Regulation was proportionate.
It first recalled that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles of EU law and requires that measures implemented through EU law provisions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (Joined Cases C‑453/03, C‑11/04, C‑12/04 and C‑194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I‑10423, paragraph 68).
With regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions the Court has accepted that in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political, economic and social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and evaluations. Thus the criterion to be applied is not whether a measure adopted in such an area was the only or the best possible measure, since its legality can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (Case C‑189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I‑5689, paragraphs 82 and 83; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, paragraph 123; Alliance for Natural Health and Others, paragraph 52; and Case C‑558/07 S.P.C.M. and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 42).
Even though it has a broad discretion, the EU legislature must base its choice on objective criteria. Furthermore, in assessing the burdens associated with various possible measures, it must examine whether objectives pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators (Joined Cases C‑96/03 and C‑97/03 Tempelman and van Schaijk [2005] ECR I‑1895, paragraph 48; Case C‑86/03 Greece v Commission [2005] ECR I‑10979, paragraph 96; and Case C‑504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow [2006] ECR I‑679, paragraph 37).
The Court found that before the Commission proposed the regulation, it carried out an exhaustive study of alternatives and evaluated the economic impact of various types of regulation. The average retail charge for a roaming call in the EU at the time the regulation was adopted was high (EUR 1.15 per minute, which was more than five times higher than the actual cost of providing the wholesale service) and the relationship between costs and prices was not such as should have prevailed in fully competitive markets. The tariff provided for in the regulation is significantly below that average charge and is set in relation to the ceilings for the corresponding wholesale charges, so that the retail charges reflect more accurately the costs incurred by providers. In those circumstances, an intervention limited in time in a market that is subject to competition, which makes it possible, in the immediate future, to protect consumers against excessive prices, such as that at issue, is proportionate to the aim pursued, even if it might have negative economic consequences for certain operators.
Finally, the Court examined whether Regulation 717/2007 complied with the principle of subsidiarity. It held that it did.
It recalled that, as regards Article 95 EC, it held had that the principle of subsidiarity applies where the EU legislature uses it as a legal basis, inasmuch as that provision does not give it exclusive competence to regulate economic activity on the internal market (British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, paragraph 179).
In this particular case, given the interdependence of retail and wholesale charges, the EU legislature could legitimately take the view that a common approach at EU level was necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market, thus allowing operators to act within a single coherent regulatory framework.
June 08, 2010 in Consumer protection, Institutional | Permalink
Students, Free Movement, Discrimination and Restrictions: Case C-73/08
The Court of Justice has handed down an important and interesting judgment on the right of a member State to restrict the number of students coming from other member States. In its judgment in Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and others v. Gouvernement de la Communauté française the Court held that a member State could restrict the number of students from other member States enrolling in certain medical and paramedical courses if such a restriction was justified in order to protect public health. In so doing the Court seems to back-track a bit on its previous case law on the free movement of students. Here's the story. Belgium has an odd system which divides responsibility within the state for education between the "Flemish community" and the "French community". The French community, which provided well regarded higher education courses attractive to students from France, saw a significant increase in the number of students from other member States, in particular France, enrolling in its institutions of higher education, in particular in nine medical or paramedical courses. The French Community considered that too many students from France were attending classes in Belgium and adopted the decree of June 16 2006. That decree obliged universities and schools of higher education to limit the number of students not considered as resident in Belgium who may register for the first time in one of the over-subscribed nine medical or paramedical courses. The decree limits the total number of non-resident students, for each university and for each course, to 30 % of all enrollments in the preceding academic year. Once that percentage has been reached, the non-resident students are selected, with a view to their registration, by drawing lots.
A group of students sought annulment of the decree in the Belgian Constitutional Court. That Court referred a number of question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the decree with EU law.
The Belgian court asked first whether EU law precludes legislation of a Member State which restricts the number of non-resident students who may enroll for the first time in medical and paramedical courses at higher education establishments, where that member State faces an influx of students from a neighboring member State and where the result of that situation is that too few students resident in the first member State graduate from those courses.
The Court of Justice held that Articles 18 and 21 TFEU preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which limits the number of non-resident students who may enroll for the first time in medical and paramedical courses at higher education establishments, unless - and this is the important bit - the referring court, having assessed all the relevant evidence submitted by the competent authorities, finds that that legislation is justified in the light of the objective of protection of public health.
The Court began by recalling that EU law allows the member States the power to organize their education systems and of vocational training – pursuant to Articles 165(1) and 166(1) TFEU – as they please But they must, when exercising that power, comply with EU law, in particular the provisions on the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the member States (Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz [2007] ECR I‑6849, paragraph 70, and Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan and Bucher [2007] ECR I‑9161, paragraph 24). Thus the states are free to opt for an education system based on free access – without restriction on the number of students who may register – or for a system based on controlled access in which the students are selected. However, where they opt for one of those systems or for a combination of them, the rules of the chosen system must comply with European Union law and, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.
The Court then continued by recalling the applicable provisions of the Treaty. Article 21(1) TFEU provides that every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. Also, the Court’s case-law makes clear that every citizen of the Union may rely on Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, in all situations falling within the scope of EU law, those situations including the exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 21 TFEU to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraph 24; Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraphs 32 and 33; and Case C‑158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I‑8507, paragraphs 36 and 37). Clearly, the prohibition of discrimination also covers situations concerning the conditions of access to vocational training, and that both higher education and university education constitute vocational training (Case C‑147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, paragraphs 32 and 33).
Consequently, the students in question in the main proceedings may rely on the right, enshrined in Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, to move and reside freely within the territory of a Member State, such as the Kingdom of Belgium, without being subject to direct or indirect discrimination on ground of their nationality.
Did the Belgian decree discriminate against the non Belgian residents ?
The Court confirmed that the non resident students were in fact discriminated against. The Court recalled that unless objectively justified and proportionate to the aim pursued, a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically liable to affect nationals of other member States more than nationals of the host State and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage (Case C-195/98 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund [2000] ECR I-10497, paragraph 40). In the cases in the main proceedings, the decree of June 16 2006 provides that unrestricted access to the medical and paramedical courses covered by that decree is available only to resident students, that is those who satisfy both the requirement that their principal residence be in Belgium. The students who do not satisfy those conditions, by contrast, enjoy only restricted access to those institutions, since the total number of those students is in principle limited, for each university institution and for each course, to 30% of all enrollments in the preceding academic year. Once that percentage has been reached, the non-resident students are selected, with a view to their registration, by drawing lots.
But was the discrimination justified?
The Court recalled that to be justified, the measure concerned must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the legitimate objective it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (Case C-527/06 Renneberg [2008] ECR I‑7735, paragraph 81, and Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 25).
The Court found that the discriminatory measure was not justified by the need to reduce an excessive burden on the educational system. It also found that the justification advanced relating to the homogeneity of the system was in this case the same as that relating to the need to preserve the quality of the health system provided in the French Community. The Belgian government submitted that it was impossible to increase the total number of students taking the courses concerned and that the non resident are likely to return to their home states thus causing a shortage of qualified practitioners in Belgium.
The Court held that hat a difference in treatment based indirectly on nationality may be justified by the objective of maintaining a balanced high-quality medical service open to all, in so far as it contributes to achieving a high level of protection of health (Case C-169/07 Hartlauer [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 47). It stated as a matter of principle that it is for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what extent such legislation satisfies those conditions (Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 15, and Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I‑12575, paragraph 82).
In order to assist the referring court, the Court of Justice noted that it cannot be ruled out that a reduction in the quality of training of future health professionals may ultimately impair the quality of care provided in the territory concerned, since the quality of the medical or paramedical service within a given area depends on the competence of the health professionals who carry out their activity there. It also cannot be ruled out that a limitation of the total number of students in the courses concerned – in particular with a view to ensuring the quality of training – may reduce, proportionately, the number of graduates prepared in the future to ensure the availability of the service in the territory concerned, which could then have an effect on the level of public health protection. A shortage of health professionals would cause serious problems for the protection of public health and that the prevention of that risk requires that a sufficient number of graduates establish themselves in that territory in order to carry out there one of the medical or paramedical occupations covered by the decree at issue in the main proceedings.
Consequently, the Court of Justice leaves it open to the national court to find that the discrimination can be justified relatively easily in this case and uphold the decree in question. In doing so, the Court seems more liberal than in its previous case law, presumably because the university courses lead to qualifications for health professionals.
One final and interesting point. The Court of Justice considered the preliminary reference in the light of primary, Treaty law. But it did also consider whether Directive 2004/38 of April 29 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory applied.
It held that it cannot be ruled out that the situation of some of the applicants in the main proceedings may be covered by Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, which applies to every citizen who resides in the territory of the host Member State in accordance with that directive for four reasons:
- first, the students in question in the main proceedings are citizens of the Union;
- second, the fact that they do not exercise any economic activity in Belgium is irrelevant, since Directive 2004/38 applies to all citizens of the Union irrespective of whether they exercise an economic activity as an employee or as a self-employed person in the territory of another Member State or whether they do not exercise any economic activity there;
- third, it cannot be ruled out that some of the applicants concerned in the main proceedings already resided in Belgium before deciding that they would like to enrol in one of the courses concerned,
- fourth, Directive 2004/38 applies ratione temporis to the cases in the main proceedings. The member States were obliged, first, to implement that directive before April30 2006. Second, the decree at issue in the main proceedings was adopted after that date, on 16 June 2006. In addition, it is common ground that the students in question in the main proceedings applied for enrollment in the institutions of higher education concerned for the academic year 2006/07, and that their enrollment was refused on the basis of that decree. Their request must therefore have been refused after April 30 2006.
However, as the Court was not in possession of all the facts which would enable it to hold that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings also falls within Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, it held that it is for the referring Belgian court to assess whether that provision actually applies in the cases in the main proceedings.
June 06, 2010 in Citizenship, Discrimination, Persons: Free movement | Permalink
May 20, 2010 in Antitrust, Fundamental rights, Weblogs | Permalink
Consumer Collective Redress: Comments of EESC
The European Economic and Social Committee has published an interesting opinion on the Commission's Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress (or class actions, to call it by another name). For a brief explanation of what a Green Paper is, see here, and here's a list of all the Green Papers published to date.
The opinion supports the idea that collective redress should be introduced into EU legislation by means of a directive.
On the other hand, the EESC wishes to avoid the introduction of US-style class actions and states:
"Any EU legal measure adopted should reflect European cultural and legal traditions, have compensation as its only goal and establish a fair balance between parties leading to a system that safeguards the interests of society as a whole. The Com­mittee fully supports the Commission’s suggestion that whichever measure is adopted to institute a judicial collec­tive redress mechanism in all Member States ‘should avoid elements which are said to encourage a litigation culture such as is said to exist in some non-European countries, such as punitive damages, contingency fees and other elements’. Also the EESC prefers an opt-in system to collective action to an opt-out system.
The opinion makes interesting reading and contains a wealth of references on EU consumer law.
Meanwhile, the Commission's work on collective redress and damages for antitrust violations is not progressing much. You can find documents on that here and the EESC's opinion of 2006 here.
May 18, 2010 in Consumer protection, Litigation | Permalink
We need to catch up on some juicy judgments!
A while back, the Court of Justice declared in Case C-518/07 Commission v. Germany that Germany had breached Article 28 §1 of Directive 95/46/EC on data protection because the authorities it had established to monitor the processing of personal data were subject to state scrutiny and thus were not completely independent as required by that provision.
The judgment is a bit of a surprise.
Article 28 of Directive 95/46, entitled ‘Supervisory authority’, provides:
While German law makes a distinction depending on whether or not data processing is carried out by public bodies, it provides that all the authorities responsible for monitoring the application of the Directive are subject to some kind of scrutiny or other by Federal or State bodies.
The Commission considered that subjecting those authorities to State scrutiny was contrary to Article 28 §1 of the Directive. It considered that the requirement that the supervisory authorities exercise their functions ‘with complete independence’ must be interpreted as meaning that a supervising authority must be free from any influence, whether that influence is exercised by other authorities or outside the administration. Germany on the other hand disagreed with the Commission and considered that Article 28 §1 of Directive 95/46 requires the supervisory authorities to have functional independence only: Those authorities must be independent of bodies outside the public sector which are under their supervision and that they must not be exposed to external influences.
The Court held in favor of the Commission.
It held that contrary to what Germany submitted, there is nothing to indicate that the requirement of independence concerns exclusively the relationship between the supervisory authorities and the bodies subject to that supervision. On the contrary, it found that the concept of ‘independence’ is complemented by the adjective ‘complete’, which implies a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect external influence on the supervisory authority.
The Court also held that the supervisory authorities provided for in Article 28 of Directive 95/46 are the guardians of the fundamental rights and freedoms in respect of data privacy. In order to guarantee that protection, the supervisory authorities must ensure a fair balance between, on the one hand, observance of the fundamental right to private life and, on the other hand, the interests requiring free movement of personal data. The guarantee of the independence of national supervisory authorities is intended to ensure the effectiveness and reliability of the supervision of compliance with the provisions on protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. It was established not to grant a special status to those authorities themselves as well as their agents, but in order to strengthen the protection of individuals and bodies affected by their decisions. It follows that, when carrying out their duties, the supervisory authorities must act objectively and impartially. For that purpose, they must remain free from any external influence, including the direct or indirect influence of the State or the Länder, and not of the influence only of the supervised bodies.
May 15, 2010 in Institutional, Privacy | Permalink
There's a proposal to amend the Lisbon Treaty and its Protocol n° 36 already!
It concerns the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). At present there are 736 members. When the European elections were last held, in June 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon was not yet in force and thus those elections had to take place according to the rules in force at the time and that meant having 736 members. Article 14 §2 TEU, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, provides that there will be 750 members plus the President, with a maximum of 96 members per member State.
At its meeting on December 11 and 12, 2008 the European Council declared (at page 14) that in the event of the Treaty of Lisbon only entering into force after the European elections in June 2009, transitional measures would be adopted as soon as possible in order to increase the number of MEPs until the end of the 2009-2014 legislative period, in accordance with the numbers agreed at the time of the Intergovernmental Conference 2007. The declaration explicitly states that the total number of MEPs will rise from 736 to 754 until the end of the 2009-2014 legislative period. It also states that the modification should enter into force, if possible, in 2010.
Consequently, Spain has proposed to the Council, under the procedure for amendment of the Treaty set out in Article 48 §2 TEU, to revise the Treaty to increase the number of MEPs by 18 bringing the total to 754 until the end of the 2009-2014 parliamentary term. According to that procedure, it is possible to amend the Treaty without convening a full-blown Convention and simply convene a conference of the representatives of the member States.
According to the Spanish procedure, the number of seat in the European Parliament will be increased as follows:
- Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom get one more MEP each;
- France, Austria and Sweden get two extra MEPs each,
- and Spain gets four extra.
The proposal, if adopted, aims to enter into force in December 1st 2010. It sets out how the extra MEPs should be selected:
(a)	either in ad hoc elections by direct universal suffrage in the member State concerned, in accordance with the provisions applicable for elections to the European Parliament;
(b)	or by reference to the results of the European elections from June 4 to 7 2009;
(c)	or by designation by the national parliament of the Member State concerned from among its members of the requisite number of members, according to the procedure determined by each of those ember States.
The Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs adopted a report on April 12 2010 approving the Spanish proposal.
The Commission has recently given its favorable opinion - COM (2010) 189 final - on the Spanish proposal pursuant to Article 48 §3 TEU.
We'll see what happens in the end.
May 04, 2010 in Institutional | Permalink