Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-11th-circuit/1603784.html
Timestamp: 2018-07-19 11:41:46
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2002242', '§\u20021001', '§\u2002242', '§\u20021001', '§\u20021001', '§\u20022255']

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STEPHEN HOUSE | FindLaw
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STEPHEN HOUSE
No. 10–15912 D.C. Docket No. 4:10–cr–00001–RLV–WEJ–1
Before BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLEW,* District Judge.
Stephen G. House, a former officer of the Federal Protective Service, appeals his convictions and sentences for eight counts of willfully depriving a person of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by a law enforcement officer, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and four counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. House raises seven issues on appeal: (1) whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support his convictions, (2) whether the district court erred in instructing the jury, (3) whether the district court improperly interjected itself into the trial, (4) whether the district court improperly excluded evidence, (5) whether the prosecutor improperly commented on House's decision not to testify, (6) whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, and (7) whether the cumulative effect of any errors deprived him of a fair trial. The first two issues are interrelated because the district court erred in instructing the jury that a traffic stop is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment whenever conducted by a law enforcement officer acting without jurisdiction or authority. The Supreme Court has ruled that a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion even if it is inconsistent with agency policy, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–16, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774–76 (1996), or state law, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173–76, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1605–07 (2008). The record nevertheless establishes that this error is harmless as to four of House's convictions for unreasonable seizures because the jury discredited House's accounts of probable cause or reasonable suspicion when it convicted him of making false statements in four incident reports. We affirm four of House's eight convictions for willful unreasonable seizures and affirm his four convictions for making false statements, but we vacate the remaining convictions for willful unreasonable seizures. All of House's other arguments fail. We remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 2010, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment that charged House with eight counts of depriving a motorist of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by a law enforcement officer, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and four counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Protective Service, 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Count one charged an unlawful traffic stop of Truman Padgett on July 28, 2006. Count two charged an unlawful traffic stop of Truman Padgett on November 28, 2006. Count three charged an unlawful traffic stop of Sonya Caravalho on February 26, 2007. Count four charged an unlawful traffic stop of Anthony Rivas on July 25, 2007. Count five charged submission of an incident report containing materially false statements regarding the stop of Rivas. Count six charged an unlawful traffic stop Joseph Kinnamont on April 30, 2008. Count seven charged an unlawful traffic stop of Davis Wibel on December 3, 2008. Count eight charged submission of an incident report containing materially false statements regarding the stop of Wibel. Count nine charged an unlawful attempted traffic stop of Daniel McFarland on January 9, 2009. Count ten charged submission of an incident report containing materially false statements regarding the stop of McFarland. Count eleven charged an unlawful traffic stop of Reginald Thompson on April 15, 2009. Count twelve charged submission of an incident report containing materially false statements regarding the stop of Thompson.
Three officers also testified that House had been reprimanded about violating agency policy regarding traffic stops on several occassions during his career with the Federal Protective Service. Andrews; John Curtis Glynn, Jr., a former District Director; and Shirley Reed, a Risk Management Branch Chief, each testified about personally explaining to House that his authority did not encompass stopping motorists for minor traffic violations outside federal property. Glynn testified that he had prepared a written reprimand of House for conducting a traffic stop without authority, but that he had not delivered the reprimand after meeting with House and warning him about agency policy regarding traffic stops. Glynn explained that his main concern had been that House understood the policy and recognized that violating that policy “could lead to a more severe action by [the Federal Protective Service].” Reed testified that, after she had received a report that House had conducted a traffic stop without authority, she spoke with House to ensure that he understood agency policy regarding traffic stops. Andrews testified that he received notice of an internal agency investigation of House premised upon allegations that House had conducted traffic stops without authority, and that House's right to drive his law enforcement vehicle home from work was temporarily suspended because of that investigation. Andrews stated that he had personally told House that “he had to stop” conducting traffic stops for minor traffic violations outside federal property and that he had specifically instructed House that, even in situations where House believed he was the target of road rage by other drivers, agency policy required him to allow local authorities to resolve the matter.
During his direct examination of Rivas, the prosecutor submitted into evidence the incident report House had filed regarding House's encounter with Rivas. House stated in the report that Rivas had merged into the far left lane of Interstate 75 in front of House's vehicle and had “jammed on his brakes”; that Rivas had spun sideways in front of House and forced House to “brake[ ] hard” and to veer into the emergency lane to avoid striking Rivas's vehicle; that House had activated his blue lights to prevent other traffic from striking him, at which point Rivas had pulled into the emergency lane; that House had remained on the highway, rolled down his window, and advised Rivas to drive more carefully; that Rivas had “continued driving in the emergency lane” and had swerved toward House's government vehicle twice, nearly striking the government vehicle; and that House had then activated his blue lights, pulled over, approached Rivas's vehicle and told Rivas that he had called local law enforcement. The prosecutor gave Rivas a copy of the report to reference while the prosecutor questioned him.
Joseph Kinnamont testified that, on April 30, 2008, he was driving in the left lane on Interstate 75, passing tractor trailer trucks that were traveling in the middle and right lanes, when House approached him from behind at a very high rate of speed in a marked law enforcement vehicle. House maneuvered his vehicle within four to five feet of Kinnamont's vehicle and flashed his headlights. Kinnamont understood that House wanted to pass him, but with a tractor trailer on one side of him and a guard rail on the other, Kinnamont could not move out of the lane. Kinnamont believed that he “had to be going over the speed limit to be passing the tractor trailers,” but he was not driving aggressively. House was driving quickly enough to “catch [ ] [Kinnamont] like [Kinnamont] was standing still.”
When the local law enforcement officers arrived, they questioned House and Kinnamont, and Kinnamont testified that House provided a false account of the encounter. The local law enforcement officers arrested Kinnamont, charged him with aggressive driving, impeding the flow of traffic, and following too closely, impounded his car, and took his driver's license. Kinnamont was released from jail five hours later, and the charges against him were eventually dropped. House filed a written report of his encounter with Kinnamont, in which he alleged that Kinnamont had been driving recklessly at the time of the encounter. Kinnamont testified that the report contained numerous false statements.
Reginald Thompson testified that, on April 15, 2009, he turned right from a business parking lot onto a four lane road after checking to make sure that there was no oncoming traffic and that he could pull out safely. He initially turned into an acceleration lane, where he “got up to speed,” and then merged into the right lane, traveling at a speed of 41 or 42 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone. After checking his mirrors and noting that the traffic in the left lane was “a good distance back,” he merged into the left lane, at which point House began approaching quickly from Thompson's rear in a law enforcement vehicle. House honked his horn at Thompson and passed Thompson on the right, traveling faster than the speed limit. A short while later, Thompson stopped behind House at a red light. When the light turned green, House continued driving with Thompson behind him through several intersections until they reached an area where the traffic thinned, and then House abruptly reduced his speed, forcing Thompson to pull over on the side of the road. House then parked his vehicle in front of Thompson's vehicle at an angle, blocking him in. Thompson did not believe he was free to leave because he could see from House's uniform that House was a police officer, House's vehicle was parked so as to prevent Thompson from driving his vehicle back onto the road, and House had a gun.
․ [A] valid traffic stop can in some circumstances turn into an unreasonable and therefore unlawful detention of the motorists. There is no bright line test to determine whether a lawful traffic stop has become unlawful detention. A police officer may detain a motorist for a reasonable period for the police officer to conduct the necessary investigation to determine what action he will take. In general, a police officer may detain a motorist long enough to allow the officer to write a traffic ticket and check into the motorist's background to see if there are any warrants and so forth outstanding. In determining whether a traffic stop has become so intrusive that the detention is no longer reasonable, you may consider factors such as the public interest served by the seizure, the nature and scope of the intrusion, [and] the objective facts relied upon by the officer in making the stop and detaining the motorist.
․ [A]n act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and deliberately and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids. That is with bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law. Although the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily and deliberately did an act that deprived a motorist of a protected right, it is not necessary for the government to prove the defendant was thinking in legal or constitutional terms. You [m]ay find the defendant acted with the required intent, even if you find he had no real familiarity with the constitution or with the particular constitutional rights involved. You must, however, find the defendant intended to do something that the constitution forbids.
We review jury instructions challenged in the district court “de novo to determine whether the instructions misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir.2009). “In contrast, jury instructions that are challenged for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error.” Id. at 1343. We review the failure to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion, which occurs only where the requested instruction “(1) was correct, (2) was not substantially covered by a charge actually given, and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to conduct his defense.” United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir.2007). Where a party expressly accepts a jury instruction, “such action constitutes invited error” and “serve[s] to waive [his] right to challenge the accepted instruction on appeal.” United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1337 (11th Cir.2005). We will not reverse a defendant's conviction based on a challenge to the jury charge unless we are “left with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.” Felts, 579 F.3d at 1343; Dohan, 508 F.3d at 993. “Jury instructions are subject to harmless error review.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1249 n.8 (11th Cir.2011). An error is harmless if the reviewing court is satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 (1967).
When we address a claim of cumulative error, we consider “all errors preserved for appeal and all plain errors” in the context of “the trial as a whole to determine whether the appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” United States v. Ladson, 643 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir.2011). “The total effect of the errors on the trial will depend, among other things, on the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and combined effect; ․ the strength of the government's case, and the length of trial.” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
House raises seven arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Second, he argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury. Third, he argues that the district court improperly interjected itself into the trial. Fourth, he argues that the district court improperly excluded evidence. Fifth, he argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on House's decision not to testify. Sixth, he argues in his reply brief that his counsel was ineffective. Seventh, he argues that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of a fair trial. We address each argument in turn.
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports House's Convictions.
1. Convictions for Willful Unreasonable Seizures
To prove a violation of section 242, the government had to present evidence that House acted “(1) willfully and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The federal right that House allegedly violated is the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures. See U.S. Const., amend. IV. To establish a deprivation of that right, the government must prove that a seizure occurred, that the seizure was unreasonable, and that the seizure constituted “governmental action”—that is, that the individual who effected the seizure was “acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official,” see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conduct “under color of law” satisfies the requirement of governmental action. Cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928–29 & n.9, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749 & n.9 (1982).
“[A] person is ‘seized’ ․ when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained” such that, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). A seizure is effected by force “when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied [,]” such as where a law enforcement officer pulls his vehicle “alongside [a] fleeing car and sideswipe[s] it, producing [a] crash” regardless of whether the officer intends “to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop” or “to produce a collision.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597–99, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381–82 (1989). A seizure by means of show of authority requires both a show of authority and submission to that authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628–29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551–52 (1991). That is, a government officer effects a seizure by means of a show of authority where “the officer's words and actions would have conveyed ․ to a reasonable person” that “he was being ordered to restrict his movement,” and those words and actions actually “produce his stop.” Id. Certain “circumstances ․ might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave,” including “the display of a weapon by an officer ․ or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. An arrest is the “quintessential” example of a seizure of the person. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 111 S.Ct. at 1550. In addition, “[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].” Whren, 517 U.S. at 809–10, 116 S.Ct. at 1772.
A traffic stop constitutes an unreasonable seizure if it is not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. at 1772; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.2003). But a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion even if it is inconsistent with agency policy, see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–16, 116 S.Ct. at 1774–76, or state law, see Moore, 553 U.S. at 173–76, 128 S.Ct. at 1605–07. Probable cause requires that “the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [the officer] ha[s] reasonably trustworthy information [be] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing” that the person seized is guilty of a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 (1964). Reasonable suspicion requires “some minimal level of objective justification,” meaning “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” that the person seized is guilty of a crime. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the scope of the traffic stop exceeds that of “an investigative stop of limited duration,” it constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless it is supported by probable cause. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145–46 (11th Cir.2004).
A person acts “willfully” for purposes of section 242 when he acts with “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law,” or “in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103, 105, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1036–37 (1945). This Court has recognized that a series of individual actions that “support an innocent explanation,” when “viewed in a vacuum,” may in combination provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to infer a defendant's intent. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 453 (11th Cir.1994). We have also explained that, in making findings of a defendant's intent, the defendant's “subsequent conduct may be considered if it supports a reasonable inference as to [his] prior intent.” United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir.2002).
An act is effected “under color of law” for purposes of section 242 if it is effected by a law enforcement officer acting “under pretense of law.” Screws, 325 U.S. at 111, 65 S.Ct. at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.” Id.; see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043 (1941) (“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”). Thus, a law enforcement officer acts under color of law “when he acts with authority possessed by virtue of his employment” with the government, Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1997), or “the manner of his conduct ․ makes clear that he was asserting the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private person.” Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100, 71 S.Ct. 576, 578 (1951) (holding that a jury could find that a private detective who was qualified as a special police officer had acted under color of law when he flashed his badge while committing a series of assaults).
a. Evidence of the Seizures
Regarding the encounter identified in count seven, Wibel testified on direct examination that he pulled over his vehicle “based on getting stopped by ․ two vehicles” after House and Beal had activated the emergency lights on their respective vehicles. This testimony entitled the jury to find that House seized Wibel by participating in a traffic stop of Wibel. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 809–10, 116 S.Ct. at 1772. The jury was entitled to credit this testimony and not the testimony of Wibel on cross-examination that suggested Beal's actions alone caused Wibel to stop. See Rixey v. W. Paces Ferry Hosp., Inc., 916 F.2d 608, 616 (11th Cir.1990) (“A jury is not required to accept ‘all or none’ of a witness's testimony․”).
In addition, Beal, the local law enforcement officer who participated in the seizure of Wibel, testified that he did not personally witness Wibel driving aggressively, that his only basis for stopping Wibel was House's radio dispatch report, that he had treated House's report as probable cause to stop Wibel because House was a law enforcement officer, and reports by law enforcement officers are treated differently than reports by private citizens. Beal also testified that he had arrested Wibel based on House's account of events and House's insistence that Wibel be arrested. Beal believed House's account of events because House was a law enforcement officer, and “generally a police officer is supposed to be held to a higher standard and give you the truth.” Beal's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that House effected the seizure of Wibel through a show of his authority as a law enforcement officer, at the time of Wibel's stop or his arrest. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 276 (1978) (holding that a false or misleading statement in a warrant affidavit may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment if the statement is “necessary to the finding of probable cause” required for the issuance of a warrant).
Regarding the encounter identified in count nine, McFarland testified that House was driving a marked law enforcement vehicle, that House activated his emergency lights, and that House escorted McFarland to the side of the road in a manner suggesting that House intended to conduct a traffic stop of McFarland. This testimony entitled the jury to find that House seized McFarland. That House abandoned his course of action before McFarland brought his vehicle to a complete stop is irrelevant because any “meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement” constitutes a seizure. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5, 104 S.Ct. at 1656 n.5.
b. Evidence that the Seizures Were Unreasonable
c. Evidence that House Acted Willfully
The government also offered sufficient evidence to establish that House acted “willfully” when he effected the seizures charged in counts four, seven, nine, and eleven. The right of motorists to be free from unreasonable seizures is “specific and definite”: it is defined “by the express terms of the Constitution” and has been “made specific” by Supreme Court “decision[s] interpreting the Constitution,” so that those who violate that right “are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with punishment.” Screws, 325 U.S. at 105, 65 S.Ct. at 1037; see Whren, 517 U.S. at 809–10, 116 S.Ct. at 1772 (explaining that a traffic stop is a seizure); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (discussing requirement of reasonable suspicion); Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. at 225 (discussing requirement of probable cause). The testimony of Rivas, Wibel, McFarland, and Thompson established a pattern of conduct by House in which he repeatedly seized motorists without regard for the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and then attempted to conceal his actions by making false statements in his incident reports. Padgett's, Caravalho's, and Kinnamont's testimony suggests that House's behavior during their encounters with him fit into this same pattern. The sheer number of unreasonable seizures that House effected, as well as his efforts to prevent his superiors' detection of his actions, entitled the jury to infer that House acted willfully when he effected the seizures charged in counts four, seven, nine, and eleven. McCarrick, 294 F.3d at 1291; Harris, 20 F.3d at 453.
d. Evidence that House Acted Under Color of Law
Finally, the government offered sufficient evidence to establish that House acted “under color of law” when he effected the seizures charged in counts four, seven, nine, and eleven. Rivas testified that House activated his emergency lights as he told Rivas to pull over, that House was wearing his uniform when he stopped Rivas, and that House identified himself to Rivas as a federal officer during the stop. Wibel testified that House activated his emergency lights as he and Beal pulled Wibel over to the side of the road. McFarland testified that House was driving a law enforcement vehicle and that House activated his emergency lights as he seized McFarland. Thompson testified that House was driving a law enforcement vehicle, and that House was wearing his uniform as he seized Thompson. Rivas's, Wibel's, McFarland's and Thompson's testimony entitled the jury to find that House was acting under color of law when he seized each of those four motorists. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043. To the extent that House effected the seizure of Wibel through Beal, Beal's testimony entitled the jury to find that House effected this seizure under color of law. Cf. Almand, 103 F.3d at 1514–15 (explaining that a law enforcement officer is probably acting under color of law when he uses “his status as a police officer” to induce another to act). That House may have overstepped his authority in effecting the seizures is no defense for his conduct. Cf. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111, 65 S.Ct. at 1040; Almand, 103 F.3d at 1513.
2. Convictions for Making False Statements
To convict House under section 1001, the government had to prove “(1) that a statement was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that it was material; (4) that it was made with specific intent; and (5) that it was within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” United States v. Boffil–Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 740 (11th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The false statement may take the form of an affirmative misrepresentation or the concealment of a material fact. Id. “Falsity through concealment exists where disclosure of the concealed information is required by a statute, government regulation, or form.” United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 526 (11th Cir.1996). A false statement is material if it “ha[s] a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”; proof of actual influence is not required. Boffil–Rivera, 607 F.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The specific intent required is the “intent to deceive by making a false or fraudulent statement.” United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503 (11th Cir.1982). An agency's jurisdiction encompasses “all matters confided to the authority of an agency or department,” and jurisdiction requires only that the agency possess “power to exercise authority in a particular situation.” United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 1946 (1984).
a. Evidence that House Made False Statements
b. Evidence that the False Statements Were Material
The government established the materiality of the false statements charged in counts five, eight, ten, and twelve through the testimony of Andrews and Dingman. Andrews testified that Federal Protective Service supervisors use these reports to determine whether the officers' conduct was authorized and because other law enforcement agents sometimes use the reports in connection with criminal prosecutions. Andrews explained that, for a report to be useful for either of these purposes, an officer must provide truthful information as to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the events documented in the report. Dingman offered similar testimony that an officer's provision of “a true and accurate factual account” of events in each police report he files is “material to his duties as a federal police officer.” He testified that the government uses the reports in deciding whether to initiate criminal prosecutions, that it was “very important” that a report include truthful information in relation to “all of the facts of the case, the who, what, when, where, and how of the case,” and that false statements in a report could ruin any case the government attempts to pursue based upon events described in that report. Andrews's and Dingman's testimony refutes House's argument that not all of the statements in the reports were material.
c. Evidence that House Acted with Specific Intent to Deceive
The government also presented sufficient evidence that House had the intent to deceive when he made the false statements charged in counts five, eight, ten, and twelve. Because “[s]pecific intent to defraud can be difficult to prove,” United States. v. Ethridge, 948 F.2d 1215, 1217 (11th Cir.1991), “[w]e have held that § 1001 convictions challenged on sufficiency of the evidence grounds can be affirmed based on a finding that a jury reasonably could infer from circumstantial evidence that the defendants acted knowingly and willfully,” United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685, 692 (11th Cir.1988); see also McCarrick, 294 F.3d at 1291; United States v. Hernando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570, 1581 (11th Cir.1986). Circumstantial evidence supports that inference here. Andrews, Glynn, Reed, and Dingman testified that the policy of the Federal Protective Service prohibited traffic stops for minor traffic violations outside of federal property, House was familiar with that policy, House had been reprimanded repeatedly and subjected to an internal agency investigation for violations of the policy, and House's vehicular privileges had been temporarily suspended as a result of the internal investigation. Andrews and Dingman testified that House was required to file an incident report each time he activated his emergency lights or conducted a traffic stop and that House's supervisors used those reports to determine whether his actions were permitted. Based on the testimony of Rivas, Wibel, McFarland, and Thompson, the encounters House reported violated agency policy. The jury could reasonably have inferred that House made false statements in the incident reports with the specific intent to deceive his supervisors to avoid further discipline for violations of agency policy.
d. Evidence that the Statements Were Within the Jurisdiction of a Federal Agency
B. The District Court Erred when It Instructed that a Seizure Effected Without Jurisdiction or Authority Violates the Fourth Amendment, but the District Court Did Not Otherwise Err in its Jury Charge.
1. Instructions Included in the Jury Charge
The district court misstated the law when it instructed the jury that a traffic stop is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is effected without jurisdiction or authority. The Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion even if it is inconsistent with agency policy, see Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–16, 116 S.Ct. at 1774–76, or state law, see Moore, 553 U.S. at 173–76, 128 S.Ct. at 1605–07. See also Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1275. The instruction by the district court allowed the jury to convict House for the unreasonable seizures charged in counts one, two, three, four, six, seven, nine, and eleven if they found that House lacked either (1) probable cause or reasonable suspicion, or (2) jurisdiction or authority to effect the seizures charged in those counts. That is, the district court instructed the jury that House could be convicted even if they found that he had probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
We need not decide whether the district court erred when it instructed the jury that an initially valid traffic stop could develop into an unreasonable detention, because that error is harmless as to House's remaining convictions for willful unreasonable seizures. The jury found that the seizures charged in counts four, seven, nine, and eleven were not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion so the jury would have had no occasion to apply the instruction in its consideration of those seizures. The instruction could not have contributed to the jury's verdict with respect to any of those four counts. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828.
2. Instructions Omitted from the Jury Charge
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on the issue of fair warning. “[T]he issue of whether a[law] is void for vagueness is a question of law for the court to determine,” which means that “defendants [are] not entitled to a ‘fair warning’ instruction to the jury.” United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1284 (11th Cir.1996).
C. The District Court Did Not Err in Its Management of the Trial.
1. Comment Regarding Legality of Seizure with Probable Cause
The district court did not plainly err when it made the comment at issue. “We will not reverse a conviction based upon comments of the trial judge unless the comments are so prejudicial as to amount to denial of a fair trial,” United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968, 973 (11th Cir.1991), and we have frequently held that a single isolated comment during a lengthy trial is insufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of a criminal conviction, see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1358 (11th Cir.2006); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 912–13 (11th Cir.2001). We are not convinced that either the district judge's comment alone or the combined impact of that comment and the prosecutor's questions affected the outcome of House's trial. The district court instructed the jury that they could not base their verdict on statements by the parties' attorneys or its own comments, except for its instructions to them regarding the applicable law, and we must assume the jury followed these instructions. United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir.1997). Nor are we convinced that the district judge's comment unduly influenced the jury during the presentation of the evidence. The district court had instructed the jury before the trial began not to allow their “first impressions” to “control” what they thought and not to “start making up [their] mind[s]” about the verdict until they had “heard the whole case.” And because the district court sustained House's objection to the prosecutor's question immediately after making the comment at issue, it is unlikely that the jury perceived the comment as an endorsement of the government's position. In any event, neither the district judge's comment alone nor the combined impact of that comment and the prosecutor's questions could have prejudiced House with respect to counts four, seven, nine, or eleven because, as we have already explained, the jury found that the seizures charged in those counts were not supported by probable cause.
2. Statement Regarding Production of Court Records
House argues that the district court erred when it stated that it would obtain the court records that explained the dismissal of Kinnamont's charges if the prosecutor did not have them before the trial was over because “the jury need [ed] to know” why the charges were dismissed. According to House, this statement amounted to a “direct[ion][to] the government as to the evidence it needed to prove to the jury.” House also contends that the district judge's insistence that the jury see the court records may have influenced the jury's determination of whether House had probable cause to stop Kinnamont. We disagree.
The district court did not plainly err. “A district court judge has wide discretion in managing the proceedings[;] he may comment on the evidence, question witnesses, elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented, and maintain the pace of a trial by interrupting or cutting off counsel as a matter of discretion.” United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have previously held that a district court did not abuse his discretion in managing the trial where he “found the testimony of a witness to be confusing and suggested to the government the manner in which it might be clarified.” Day, 405 F.3d at 1297. We are unpersuaded that the statement at issue here was sufficiently prejudicial to have denied House a fair trial. See Ramos, 933 F.2d at 973. The district court instructed the jury to “disregard anything [the district court] might have said during the trial” except its instructions on the law “in arriving at [their] decision concerning the facts of this case,” and “not [to] assume from anything [it] may have said during [the] trial” that it “ha[d] any opinion concerning any of the issues in [the] case.” These instructions precluded the jury from considering the statement at issue in appraising the evidentiary significance of the court records. The district court also instructed the jury to “rely only on the facts known to [House] before the stop was made” in determining whether House had probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a stop. This instruction precluded the jury from relying on the eventual dismissal of Kinnamont's charges in determining whether House had probable cause to stop Kinnamont. We must assume the jury followed all instructions given to them. Butler, 102 F.3d at 1196.
D. The District Court Did Not Err when It Excluded Evidence.
House contends that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded testimony concerning a traffic stop for which House had not been charged and testimony about Georgia law regarding traffic stops and arrests, but we disagree. Testimony concerning a traffic stop for which House had not been charged was irrelevant to any issue of fact before the jury, and the district court correctly excluded it. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402. The district court also correctly excluded testimony about Georgia law. “Domestic law is properly considered and determined by the court whose function it is to instruct the jury on the law; domestic law is not to be presented through testimony and argued to the jury as a question of fact.” United States v. Oliveros, 275 F.3d 1299, 1306–07 (11th Cir.2001).
E. There Was No Commentary on House's Failure to Testify.
F. House's Argument About Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Will Not Be Reviewed on Direct Appeal.
House argues for the first time in his reply brief that his counsel was ineffective for his failure to renew his motion for acquittal at the close of all the evidence, but “except in the rare instance when the record is sufficiently developed, we will not address claims for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal,” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “Instead, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised in a collateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Moreover, because House raised his claim of ineffective assistance for the first time in his reply brief, we would not review it even if the record were fully developed. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999).
G. There Was No Cumulative Error.