Source: http://thefederalregister.com/2012/10/19/2012-25620.html
Timestamp: 2018-09-20 08:30:12
Document Index: 294796128

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 213', 'art 213', '§ 213', '§ 403', '§ 213', '§ 213', '§ 213', '§ 213', 'arts 214', '§ 213', '§ 213', 'arts 213', 'art 209', 'art 213', 'art 209', 'art 209', '§ 213']

Federal Register | Track Safety Standards; Improving Rail Integrity
[Docket No. FRA-2011-0058, Notice No. 1]
SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to amend the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safety of railroad operations by enhancing rail flaw detection processes. In particular, FRA is proposing minimum qualification requirements for rail flaw detection equipment operators, as well as revisions to requirements for effective rail inspection frequencies, rail flaw remedial actions, and rail inspection records. In addition, FRA is proposing to remove regulatory requirements concerning joint bar fracture reporting. This rulemaking is intended to implement section 403 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA).
DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by December 18, 2012. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent possible without incurring additional delay or expense.
(2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a public, oral hearing. However if FRA receives a specific request for a public, oral hearing prior to November 19, 2012, one will be scheduled and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in theFederal Registerto inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such hearing.
ADDRESSES: *Federal eRulemaking Portal:Go towww.Regulations.gov.Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
*Hand Delivery:Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions:All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Please note that all comments received will be posted without change towww.Regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. Please see the discussion under the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary Information section of this document.
Docket:For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go towww.Regulations.govat any time or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground floor, RoomW12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carlo Patrick, Staff Director, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6399); or Elisabeth Galotto, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20950 (telephone: 202-493-0270).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents for Supplementary Information I. Executive Summary II. Rail Integrity Overview A. Derailment in 2001 near Nodaway, Iowa B. Derailment in 2006 near New Brighton, Pennsylvania C. Office of Inspector General Report:Enhancing the Federal Railroad Administration's Oversight of Track Safety Inspections, February 24, 2009 D. General Factual Background on Rail Integrity E. Statutory Mandate To Conduct this Rulemaking III. Overview of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) IV. RSAC Track Safety Standards Working Group V. Track Inspection Time Study VI. Section-by-Section Analysis VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 C. Paperwork Reduction Act D. Environmental Impact E. Federalism Implications F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 G. Energy Impact H. Privacy Act Statement I. Executive Summary
•Defective Rails
FRA proposes to require that the railroad's rail inspection records include the date of inspection, track identification and milepost for each location tested, type of defect found and size if not removed prior to traffic, and initial remedial action as required by § 213.113. FRA also proposes that all tracks that do not receive a validinspection are documented in the railroad rail inspection records.
Table E1—Total Discounted Net Benefits for 20-Year Period Discount factor 7 percent 3 percent Four Hour Inspection Window $34,754,935 $46,982,768 Net Benefit 34,754,935 46,982,768
II. Rail Integrity Overview A. Derailment in 2001 Near Nodaway, Iowa
On March 17, 2001, theCalifornia Zephyr,a National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) passenger train carrying 257 passengers and crew members, derailed near Nodaway, Iowa. According to the NTSB, sixteen cars decoupled from the two locomotives and eleven cars went off the rails. Seventy-eight people were injured and one person died from the accident.SeeNTSB/RAB-02-01.
As a result of its investigation of the Nodaway, Iowa, railroad accident, the NTSB recommended that FRA require railroads to conduct ultrasonic or other appropriate inspections to ensure that rail used to replace defective segments of existing rail is free from internal defects.SeeNTSB Recommendation—02-5.
On October 20, 2006, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) train 68QB119 derailed while crossing the Beaver River railroad bridge in New Brighton, Pennsylvania. The train was pulling eighty-three tank cars loaded with denatured ethanol, a flammable liquid. Twenty-three of the tank cars derailed near the east end of the bridge, causing several of the cars to fall into the Beaver River. Twenty of the derailed cars released their loads of ethanol, which subsequently ignited and burned for forty-eight hours. Some of the unburned ethanol liquid was released into the river and the surrounding soil. Homes and businesses within a seven-block area of New Brighton and in an area adjacent to the accident had to be evacuated for days. While no injuries or fatalities resulted from the accident, NS estimated economic and environmental damages to be $5.8 million.SeeNTSB/RAB-08-9 through 12.
On February 24, 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a report presenting the results of its audit of FRA's oversight of track-related safety issues. The report made two findings. First, the OIG found that FRA's safety regulations for internal rail flaw testing did not require the railroads to report the specific track locations, such as milepost numbers or track miles that were tested during these types of inspections. Second, the OIG found that FRA's inspection data systems did not provide adequate information for determining the extent to which FRA's track inspectors have reviewed the railroads' records for internal rail flaw testing and visual track inspections to assess compliance with safety regulations. The OIG recommended that FRA revise its track safety regulations for internal rail flaw testing to require railroads to report track locations covered during internal rail flaw testing, and that FRA develop specific inspection activity codes for FRA inspectors to use to report on whether the record reviews FRA inspectors conduct were for internal rail flaw testing or visual track inspections.Enhancing the Federal Railroad Administration's Oversight of Track Safety Inspections,Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, CR-2009-038, February 24, 2009.
D. General Factual Background on Rail Integrity 1
1This section is primarily based on information from two sources:Progress in Rail Integrity Research,DOT/FRA/Ord-01/18, D. Jeong 2001; andI. H. H. A. Guidelines to Best Practices for Heavy Haul Railway Operations; Infrastructure Construction and Maintenance Issues, Section 4.3.1 Rail Defect Detection and Technologies,Carlo M. Patrick, R. Mark Havira, Gregory A. Garcia, Library of Congress Control No. 2009926418, 2009.
• Portable test process, which consists of an operator pushing a test device over the rail at a walking pace while visually interpreting the test data;
• Start/stop process, where a vehicle-based flaw detection system tests at a slow speed (normally not exceeding 20 mph) gathering data that is presented to the operator on a test monitor for interpretation;
• Chase car process, which consists of a lead test vehicle performing the flaw detection process in advance of a verification chase car; and
• Continuous test process, which consists of operating a high-speed, vehicle-based test system non-stop along a designated route, analyzing the test data at a centralized location, and subsequently verifying suspect defect locations.
The first Federal Track Safety Standards (Standards) were published on October 20, 1971, following the enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Public Law 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (October 16, 1970), in which Congress granted to FRA comprehensive authority over “all areas of railroad safety.”See36 FR 20336. FRA envisioned the new Standards to be an evolving set of safety requirements
subject to continuous revision allowing the regulations to keep pace with industry innovations and agency research and development. The most comprehensive revision of the Standards resulted from the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, Public Law 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (Sept. 3, 1992), later amended by the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4615 (Nov. 2, 1994). The amended statute is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20142 and required the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to review and then revise the Standards, which are contained in 49 CFR part 213. The Secretary has delegated such statutory responsibilities to the Administrator of FRA.See49 CFR 1.49. FRA carried out this review on behalf of the Secretary, which resulted in FRA issuing a final rule amending the Standards in 1998.See63 FR 34029, June 22, 1998; 63 FR 54078, Oct. 8, 1998.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20103, the Secretary may prescribe regulations as necessary in any area of railroad safety. As described in the next section, FRA began its examination of rail integrity issues through RSAC on October 27, 2007. Then, on October 16, 2008, the RSIA was enacted. As previously noted, section 403(a) of the RSIA required the Secretary to conduct a study of track issues known as the Track Inspection Time Study (Study). In doing so, section 403(b) required the Secretary to consider “the most current rail flaw, rail defect growth, rail fatigue, and other relevant track- or rail-related research and studies” as part of the Study. The Study was completed and submitted to Congress on May 2, 2011. Section 403(c) also required the Secretary to promulgate regulations based on the results of the study. As delegated by the Secretary,see49 CFR 1.49, FRA utilized its advisory committee, RSAC and its Rail Integrity Task Force, to help develop the information necessary to fulfill the RSIA's mandates in this area.
FRA notes that section 403 of the RSIA contains one additional mandate, which FRA has already fulfilled, promulgating regulations for concrete crossties. On April 1, 2011, FRA published a final rule on concrete crosstie regulations per this mandate in section 403(d). That final rule specifies requirements for effective concrete crossties, for rail fastening systems connected to concrete crossties, and for automated inspections of track constructed with concrete crossties.See76 FR 18073. FRA received two petitions for reconsideration in response to that final rule, and responded to them by final rule published on September 9, 2011.See76 FR 55819.
AAR; American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners; American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council; American Petrochemical Institute; American Public Transportation Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association; Amtrak; Association of Railway Museums; Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM); BMWED; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine Institute; Federal Transit Administration;* Fertilizer Institute; High Speed Ground Transportation Association; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Labor Council for Latin American Advancement;* League of Railway Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers; National Association of Railway Business Women;* National Conference of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association; NTSB;* Railway Supply Institute; Safe Travel America; Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte;* Sheet Metal Workers International Association; Tourist Railway Association Inc.; Transport Canada;* Transport Workers Union of America; Transportation Communications International Union/BRC; Transportation Security Administration; and United Transportation Union (UTU). *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
The Track Safety Standards Working Group (Working Group) was formed on February 22, 2006. On October 27, 2007, the Working Group formed twosubcommittees: the Rail Integrity Task Force (RITF) and the Concrete Crosstie Task Force. Principally in response to NTSB recommendation R-02-05,2 the task statement description for the RITF was to review the controls applied to the reuse of plug rail and ensure a common understanding within the regulated community concerning requirements for internal rail flaw inspections.
2After the accident in Nodaway, the NTSB recommended that FRA “[r]equire railroads to conduct ultrasonic or other appropriate inspections to ensure that rail used to replace defective segments of existing rail is free from internal defects.” NTSB Safety Recommendation R-02-5, dated March 5, 2002.
However, after the New Brighton accident, and in response to NTSB recommendations R-08-9, R-8-10, and R-08-11,3 the RITF was given a second task on September 10, 2008, which directed the group to do the following: (1) Evaluate factors that can and should be included in determining the frequency of internal rail flaw testing and develop a methodology for taking those factors into consideration with respect to mandatory testing intervals; (2) determine whether the quality and consistency of internal rail flaw testing can be improved and how; (3) determine whether adjustments to current remedial action criteria are warranted; and (4) evaluate the effect of rail head wear, surface conditions and other relevant factors on the acquisition and interpretation of internal rail flaw test results.
3After the New Brighton accident, the NTSB issued three additional safety recommendations dated May 22, 2008: (1) FRA should “[r]eview all railroads' internal rail defect detection and require changes to those procedures as necessary to eliminate exception to the requirement for an uninterrupted, continuous search for rail defects.” R-08-9; (2) FRA should “[r]equire railroads to develop rail inspection and maintenance programs based on damage-tolerance principles, and approve those programs. Include in the requirement that railroads demonstrate how their programs will identify and remove internal defects before they reach critical size and result in catastrophic rail failures. Each program should take into account, at a minimum, accumulated tonnage, track geometry, rail surface conditions, rail head wear, rail steel specifications, track support, residual stresses in the rail, rail defect growth rates, and temperature differentials.” R-08-10; and (3) FRA should “[r]equire that railroads use methods that accurately measure rail head wear to ensure that deformation of the head does not affect the accuracy of the measurements.” R-08-11.
• AAR, including the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., and members from BNSF, Canadian National Railway (CN), Canadian Pacific Railway (CP), CSX Transportation, Inc., The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS), NS, and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP);
• APTA, including members from Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
• ASLRRA (representing short line and regional railroads);
• John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center)
• NTSB; and
Nevertheless, the Working Group was unable to reach consensus on one item that FRA has elected to include in this NPRM. The Working Group could not reach consensus on the definition of “segment” length, which FRA proposes to be utilized in a new performance-based test frequency determination in § 213.237, “Inspection of Rail,” as discussed below.
On August 16, 2011, RSAC accepted task 11-02, which was generated in response to the RSIA and to address the recommendations of the Study. Specifically, the purpose of the task was “[t]o consider specific improvements to the Track Safety Standards or other responsive actions to the Track Inspection Time Study required by § 403 (a) through (c) of the RSIA and other relevant studies and resources.” The first meeting of the Working Group assigned to the task occurred on October 20, 2011, and a second meeting was held on December 20, 2011. At the third meeting on February 7-8, 2012, the AAR together with the BMWED stated that FRA had met its obligations under section 403(c) of the RSIA through its rulemakings on vehicle/track interaction (VTI), concrete crossties, and the proposals contained in this NPRM on rail integrity. They also stated that additional action on RSAC task 11-02 was unnecessary and recommended that the task should be closed. FRA took the proposal under advisement after the February meeting and conducted its own analysis as to the fulfillment of the mandates under section 403. FRA concluded that these statutory obligations were being fulfilled and on April 13, 2012, the Working Group approved a proposal to conclude RSAC task 11-02. On April 26, 2012, the full RSAC approved the proposal and closed RSAC task 11-02. The recommendation approved by the full RSAC is described below.
• Expanding the use of automated inspections;
• Developing additional training requirements for track inspectors;
• Considering a maximum inspection speed for track inspection vehicles; and
• Influencing safety culture through a safety reporting system.
The Study's first recommendation was that FRA consider expanding the use of automated inspections to improve inspection effectiveness. Specifically, the Study cited two specific track defects that are more difficult to detect through visual track inspection and could benefit from the use of automated inspection: rail seat abrasion (RSA) and torch cut bolt holes. Through discussion among the affected parties, it was determined that these areas of concern already had been covered under previous rulemaking and regulations. The Concrete Crossties final rule published on April 1, 2011, new § 213.234, “Automated inspection of track constructed with concrete crossties,” specifically employs the use of automated inspection “to measure for rail seat deterioration.” In addition, torch cut bolt holes have been prohibited on track classes 2 and above since 1999, which was codified in §§ 213.121(g) and 213.351(f), and they are easily identifiable through the rail flaw detection technology currently in use. Thus, the RSAC concluded that additional regulations to find such defects would be unnecessary.
The second recommendation the Study addressed was whether FRA should develop additional training requirements for track inspectors. RSAC found that it was unnecessary to generate additional training standards under RSAC task 11-02 for two reasons. First, the instant NPRM proposes to create a new § 213.238 to address an area of training that requires new standards. Proposed § 213.238 defines a qualified operator of rail flaw detection equipment and requires that each provider of rail flaw detection service have a documented training program to ensure that a rail flaw detection equipment operator is qualified to operate each of the various types of equipment currently utilized in the industry for which he or she is assigned, and that proper training is provided in the use of newly-developed technologies. Second, the recently published NPRM on Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-Related Railroad Employees, 77 FR 6412 (proposed Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 49 CFR parts 214, 232, and 243), proposes to require that employers develop and submit for FRA review a program detailing how they will train their track inspectors. As proposed in the NPRM, employees charged with the inspection of track or railroad equipment are considered safety-related railroad employees that each employer must train and qualify. The proposed formal training for employees responsible for inspecting track and railroad equipment is expected to cover all aspects of their duties related to complying with the Federal standards. FRA would expect that the training programs and courses for such employees would include techniques for identifying defective conditions and would address what sort of immediate remedial actions need to be initiated to correct critical safety defects that are known to contribute to derailments, accidents, incidents, or injuries.Id.,at 6415. The RSAC found that new requirements for the training of track inspectors were being adequately addressed by this proposed NPRM on employee training standards, and thus did not believe additional action was currently necessary in this area.
The third recommendation of the Study addressed whether track hi-rail inspection speed should be specified. The Study concluded that specifying limits to hi-rail inspection speeds could be “counterproductive.” With the currently-available data in this area, the RSAC concurred with the Study's recommendation, and determined that no further action needed to be taken in this area at this time. The RSAC found that the existing reliance on the “inspector's discretion” as noted in § 213.233, should generally govern track inspection speed. FRA notes that this point will be emphasized in the next publication of FRA's Track Safety Standards Compliance Manual. FRA also makes clear that, in accordance with § 213.233, if a vehicle is used for visual inspection, the speed of the vehicle may not be more than 5 m.p.h. when passing over track crossings and turnouts.
FRA notes that, in addition to addressing the Study's recommendations, RSAC task 11-02 also incorporated other goals Congress had for the Study, which are described in section 403(a), such as reviewing track inspection intervals and remedial action requirements, as well as track inspection and repair priorities. The RSAC concluded that FRA's recent and ongoing rulemakings are sufficiently addressing these areas and that no additional work is currently necessary. Specifically, the instant rulemaking is intended to amend inspection intervals to reflect a new performance-based inspection program, revise the remedial action table for rail, and alter inspection and repair priorities involving internal rail testing and defects such as a crushed head and defective weld. The Concrete Crossties final rule also established new inspection methods and intervals requiring automated inspection, as well as new remedial actions for exceptions that can be field-verified within 48 hours. Finally, in addition to other requirements, theVehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards (VTI) rulemaking, Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High Cant Deficiency Operations, 75 FR 25928 (proposed May 10, 2010) (to be codified at 49 CFR parts 213 and 238), is addressing track geometry, inspection, and VTI safety requirements for high speed operations and operations at high cant deficiency over any track class.
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis Section 213.3Application
FRA proposes to modify paragraph (b) to clarify the exclusion of track located inside a plant railroad's property from the application of this part. In this paragraph, “plant railroad” means a type of operation that has traditionally been excluded from the application of FRA regulations because it is not part of the general railroad system of transportation. In the past, FRA has not defined the term “plant railroad” in other regulations that it has issued because FRA assumed that itsStatement of Agency Policy Concerning Enforcement of the Federal Railroad Safety Laws, The Extent and Exercise of FRA's Safety Jurisdiction,49 CFR part 209, Appendix A (FRA's Policy Statement or the Policy Statement) provided sufficient clarification as to the definition of that term. However, it has come to FRA's attention that certain rail operations believed that they met the characteristics of a plant railroad, as set forth in the Policy Statement, when, in fact, their rail operations were part of the general railroad system of transportation (general system) and therefore did not meet the definition of a plant railroad. FRA would like to avoid any confusion as to what types of rail operations qualify as plant railroads. FRA would also like to save interested persons the time and effort needed to cross-reference and review FRA's Policy Statement to determine whether a certain operation qualifies as a plant railroad. Consequently, FRA has decided to define the term “plant railroad” in this part 213.
The proposed definition of the term “plant railroad” is consistent with FRA's longstanding policy that it will exercise its safety jurisdiction over a rail operation that moves rail cars for entities other than itself because those movements bring the track over which the entity is operating into the general system.See49 CFR part 209, Appendix A. Indeed, FRA's Policy Statement provides that “operations by the plant railroad indicating it [i]s moving cars on * * * trackage for other than its own purposes (e.g.,moving cars to neighboring industries for hire)” brings plant track into the general system and thereby subjects it to FRA's safety jurisdiction. 49 CFR part 209, Appendix A. Additionally, this interpretation of the term “plant railroad” has been upheld in litigation before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.See Port of Shreveport-Bossierv.Federal Railroad Administration,No. 10-60324 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished per curiam opinion).
Section 213.113Defective Rails
Paragraph (a).In this paragraph, FRA is proposing to clarify that only a person qualified under § 213.7 is qualified to determine that a track may continue to be utilized once a known defective condition is identified. FRA accepts the RSAC recommendation to add “or repaired” to paragraph (a)(1) to allow railroads to use recently-developed processes that remove the defective portion of the rail section and replace that portion utilizing recently-developed weld technologies commonly referred to as “slot weld” or “wide gap weld.” These processes allow the remaining portion of non-defective rail to remain in the track.
Paragraph (b).FRA is proposing to redesignate existing paragraph (b) as paragraph (d) and add a new paragraph (b) providing that railroads have a four-hour period in which to verify that a suspected defect exists in the rail section. This would apply only to suspected defects that may require remedial action notes “C” through “I,” found in the remedial action table. This wouldnotapply to suspected defects that may require remedial action notes “A,” “A2,” or “B.” The four-hour timeframe would provide the railroads flexibility to allow the rail flaw detector car to continue testing in a non-stop mode, without requiring verification of suspected defects that may require remedial action under notes “C” through “I,” when the track has to be cleared for train traffic movement. However, any suspected defect encountered that may require remedial action notes “A,” “A2, “or “B” would require immediate verification. This brief, deferred-verification period would also avoid the need to operate the detector car in a non-test, “run light” mode over a possibly severe defective rail condition that could cause a derailment while clearing the track.
Paragraph (c).Currently, the remedial action table and its notes are included under paragraph (a). FRA is proposing to add a new paragraph (c) to contain both the table and its notes, as revised. Specifically, FRA proposes revisions to the remedial action table regardingtransverse defects. FRA would place the “transverse fissure” defect in the same category as detail fracture, engine burn fracture, and defective weld because they all normally fail in a transverse plane. The RITF discussed the possible addition of compound fissure to this category as well, to combine all transverse-oriented defects under the same remedial action. However, FRA ultimately determined that “compound fissure” should not be included in this category because a compound fissure may result in rail failure along an oblique or angular plane in relation to the cross section of the rail and should be considered a more severe defect requiring more restrictive remedial action. In addition, FRA proposes that the header of the remedial action table for all transverse-type defects (i.e. compound fissures, transverse fissures, detail fractures, engine burn fractures, and defective welds) be revised to refer to the “percentage of existing rail head cross-sectional area weakened by defect,” to indicate that all transverse defect sizes are related to the actual rail head cross-sectional area, thus taking rail head wear into consideration. This is proposed to preclude the possibility that the flaw detector operator may size transverse defects without accounting for the amount of rail head loss on the specimen.
FRA's proposed revisions to the remedial action table would also reduce the current limit of eighty percent of the rail head cross-sectional area requiring remedial action notes “A2” or “E and H” to sixty percent of the rail head cross-sectional area. FRA reviewed the conclusions of the most recent study performed by the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., concerning the development of transverse-oriented detail fracture defects: “Improved Rail Defect Detection Technologies: Flaw Growth Monitoring and Service Failure Characterization,” AAR Report No. R-959, Davis, David D., Garcia, Gregory A., Snell, Michael E., September 2002. (A copy of this study has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.) The study concluded that detail fracture transverse development