Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95900/detroit-trust-co-vs-thomas-barlum
Timestamp: 2016-12-10 16:50:55
Document Index: 558624193

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 8', '§ 911', '§ 951', '§ 922', '§ 954', '§ 2', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 18', '§ 20', '§ 33', '§ 20', '§ 953', '§ 952', '§ 87']

Detroit Trust Co Vs the Thomas Barlum - Citation 95900 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Detroit Trust Co. Vs. the Thomas Barlum - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95900CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnNov-05-1934Case Number293 U.S. 21AppellantDetroit Trust Co.RespondentThe Thomas BarlumExcerpt:
detroit trust co. v. the thomas barlum - 293 u.s. 21 (1934)
1. a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a mortgage on a ship in the absence of an act of congress conferring such jurisdiction. p.
293 u. s. 32
2. "preferred mortgages" of ships under the ship mortgage act of 1920 include deeds of trust securing bonds sold to the public, and, under that statute, are foreclosable exclusively in admiralty, with priority of..... Judgment:
2. "Preferred mortgages" of ships under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 include deeds of trust securing bonds sold to the public, and, under that statute, are foreclosable exclusively in admiralty, with priority of lien as therein prescribed, if indorsement upon ship's documents, recording, and other conditions expressed in the statute have been fulfilled. P.
3. The status of "preferred mortgages" does not depend upon application of the borrowed money to maritime use. This condition is not expressed in the Act, and cannot be implied. P.
293 U. S. 37
in view of the minute and explicit provisions of the Act; its legislative history, showing that the objective was to foster our merchant marine by making ship mortgages, including deeds of trust securing bonds, safe and attractive to investors, and the importance to this purpose of having the jurisdiction to foreclose in admiralty exclusively or in state courts exclusively determinable by precise statutory conditions, rather than by extrinsic criteria raising a host of questions as to the application of the proceeds of loans.
4. Congress, under Art. III, § 2, and Art. I, § 8, par. 18 of the Constitution, has paramount power to determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country, but, in so doing, it is necessarily restricted to the sphere of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the boundaries of which are determined by the exercise of the judicial power. P.
293 U. S. 42
5. In order to promote investment in shipping securities and thus to advance the maritime interests of the United States, Congress has power, by amendment of the maritime law, to regulate the priorities of mortgage and other liens on ships and to provide jurisdiction in admiralty for the enforcement of such mortgages.
Bogart v. The John Jay,
17 How. 399, considered. P.
293 U. S. 48
6. There is no ground for denying this power when the proceeds of the mortgage are used for other purposes than the direct benefit of the vessel. P.
293 U. S. 50
These are suits in admiralty to foreclose two mortgages given by the Barlum Steamship Company upon the vessels
Thomas Barlum
John J. Barlum,
respectively. The mortgages purported to be preferred mortgages under the Ship Mortgage Act 1920. 41 Stat. 1000-1006, 46 U.S.C. c. 25, §§ 911-984. The mortgagor, appearing as claimant, contended that the admiralty was without jurisdiction. The District Court overruled that contention, and, finding that all the requirements of that Act had been met, entered decrees of foreclosure and sale. 56 F.2d 455; 2 F.Supp. 733. In the case of the
the decree provided for the recovery by certain seamen, intervening libelants, of amounts due for wages, as preferred maritime liens. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees, holding that the suits should have been dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. 68 F.2d 946. This Court granted certiorari. 292 U.S. 619.
The mortgagor, at the time the mortgages were executed, was a close corporation, about four-fifths of its shares being owned by John J. Barlum, who was also interested in several nonmaritime enterprises. The mortgage in No. 13 on the
was executed in March, 1929, to petitioner, as trustee, to secure $200,000 of bonds which were purchased by petitioner with a definite understanding as to the application of the proceeds. Approximately $50,000 were to meet obligations secured by a prior mortgage upon the same vessel; about $100,000 were to take up loans of John J. Barlum and Thomas Barlum & Sons, a concern which was engaged in a nonmaritime enterprise, and the remainder, about $42,000, were to provide for repairs and for refitting the vessels
John J. Barlum.
was executed while the
was laid up.
The mortgage, in No. 14, on the
was executed in December, 1927, to petitioner, as trustee, to secure an issue of $200,000 of bonds purchased by petitioner with the understanding that, of the proceeds, petitioner was to retain about $82,000 to cover principal and interest on bonds of John J. Barlum secured by a mortgage on real estate, and about $10,000 to be applied on one of his notes. Most of the remaining proceeds, which were paid over to the mortgagor, was used to take up loans in connection with nonmaritime enterprises, only a small part being devoted to payments relating to the operation of the vessels.
Prior to the enactment of the Ship Mortgage Act 1920, the admiralty had no jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a mortgage on a ship.
17 How. 399,
58 U. S. 402
Schuchardt v. Ship Angelique,
19 How. 239,
60 U. S. 241
61 U. S. 400
88 U. S. 583
148 U. S. 15
] If jurisdiction in the admiralty of the present suits is to be maintained, it must be by reason of the application and validity of the provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act.
The grant of jurisdiction is found in subsection K (46 U.S.C. § 951), which provides:
"A preferred mortgage shall constitute a lien upon the mortgaged vessel in the amount of the outstanding mortgage indebtedness secured by such vessel. Upon the default of any term or condition of the mortgage, such lien may be enforced by the mortgagee by suit
The grant is thus one of exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the lien of a "preferred mortgage." If the mortgage is a preferred mortgage within the definition of the Act, jurisdiction is granted; otherwise not. "Preferred mortgages" are carefully defined in the detailed provisions of subsection D. [
] 46 U.S.C. § 922. The application
subdivision, the preferred status given by the provisions of subsection M, [
Subdivision (e) of subsection D provides that a mortgage which includes property other than a vessel "shall not be held a preferred mortgage" unless there is provision for the separate discharge of such property by the payment of a specified portion of the mortgage indebtedness; subdivision (f) of subsection D makes provision for the case of a mortgage covering more than one vessel. And where a mortgage covers property in addition to vessels, the Act is not to be construed as authorizing a proceeding
in admiralty to enforce the rights of the mortgagee in respect to such property. Subsection N, [
] 46 U.S.C. § 954.
and, referring to the plan of "creating a preferred mortgage," added that "the preferred status arises upon the recording of the mortgage as a preferred mortgage and its indorsement upon vessel's documents." There is no suggestion of any requirement as to the use, intended or actual, of the moneys borrowed upon the faith of the mortgage security. H.R. No. 1102, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 34; H.R. No. 1107, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31. [
] The measure was enacted in the terms thus proposed.
Given the standing of such mortgages in admiralty, which the Congress desired to establish, an omission of a provision as to the use of the moneys borrowed cannot be regarded as anomalous. An analogous principle has been recognized in relation to bottomry and
bonds. Thus, in the case of bottomry bonds, if the conditions of the bottomry attach, such bonds, when given by the owner of the vessel, have been held to be within the admiralty jurisdiction even if they are given to secure nonmaritime outlays. That view was emphatically stated by Justice Story in
The Draco,
2 Sumn. 157. There, jurisdiction of the District Court, sitting in admiralty, was challenged upon the ground that the bond in question was not a "fit foundation for a proceeding
p. 174. After a careful review of the historical conception of bottomry bonds, Justice Story concluded (
"In my opinion, there is not the slightest ground to uphold the doctrine that, in order to constitute a bottomry bond as such, in the sense of the maritime law, it is necessary that the money should be advanced for the necessities of the ship, or for the cargo, or for the voyage. Where it is given by the master,
it must, in order to have validity, be for the ship's necessities, for the implied authority of the master extends no farther. But where it is given by the owner as
dominus navis,
he may employ the money as he pleases. It is sufficient if the money be lent upon the bottom of the ship at the risk of the lender, for the voyage."
So, in the case of a
loan, it is not necessary that it should be made before the departure of the ship on the voyage, or that the money lent should be employed in the outfit of the vessel or invested in the goods on which the risk is run. It matters not, this Court
The lender is not presumed to lend "upon the faith of any particular appropriation of the money."
26 U. S. 437
Conard v. Nicoll,
4 Pet. 291,
29 U. S. 310
; 3 Kent's Com. 361, note (e);
The Draco, supra,
It is also to be noted that the jurisdiction granted to the admiralty by the Ship Mortgage Act is exclusive. If a mortgage is within the Act, there can be no suit to foreclose it in a state court; [
] if the mortgage is not within the Act, there can be no suit for foreclosure in the admiralty. It cannot be doubted that the Congress recognized the importance of basing the jurisdiction, as thus sought to be conferred, upon precise statutory conditions. We find no warrant for leaving it to be tested by extrinsic criteria, raising a host of questions as to the application of the proceeds of loans, in the solution of which the statute affords no aid.
The validity of the grant of jurisdiction.
The Congress rested its authority upon the constitutional provisions extending the judicial power "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and conferring upon the Congress the power to make all laws which shall be "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution all powers "vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Article III, § 2; article 1, § 8, par. 18. [
] This authority
was not confined to the cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in England when the Constitution was adopted.
-458. The limitations which had been imposed upon the high court of admiralty in the course of its controversy with the courts of common law were not read into the grant. But the grant presupposed a "general system of maritime law" which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country, and contemplated a body of law with uniform operation.
88 U. S. 574
-575. The Constitution did not undertake to define the precise limits of that body of law, or to lay down a criterion for drawing the boundary between maritime law and local law.
Boundaries were to be determined in the exercise of the judicial power in recognition of the purpose of the grant. "No State law can enlarge it, not can an act of Congress or rule of court make it broader than the judicial power may determine to be its true limits."
66 U. S. 527
. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that the maritime law should remain unalterable. The purpose was to place the entire subject, including its substantive, as well as its procedural, features, under national control. From the beginning, the grant was regarded as implicitly investing legislative power for that purpose in the United States. When the Constitution was adopted, the existing maritime law became the law of the United States "subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require."
- 387. The Congress thus has paramount power to determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country.
The Lottawanna, supra,
Ex parte Garnett,
141 U. S. 13
285 U. S. 39
289 U. S. 148
-149. But, in amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress necessarily acts within a sphere restricted by the concept of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
74 U. S. 641
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, supra; Crowell v. Benson, supra,
The Congress began the exertion of this authority at an early date. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Congress conferred upon the district courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction of all seizures under the laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States where the seizures were made on navigable waters within the respective districts. § 9, 1 Stat. 76, 77;
Waring v. Clarke, supra,
46 U. S. 458
9 Wheat. 421,
22 U. S. 427
. By the Act of June 19, 1813, 3 Stat. 2, the Congress declared that a vessel employed in a fishing voyage should be answerable for the fishermen's share of the fish caught, upon a contract made on land, in the same form and to the same effect as any other vessel is liable to be proceeded against for the wages of seamen.
Waring v. Clarke, supra.
Important illustrations of the exercise of congressional power are found in the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635, enacted for the purpose of encouraging investment in shipbuilding by limiting the venture of shipowners to the loss of the ship itself, or her freight then pending, in cases of damage occasioned without the owner's privity or knowledge (
13 Wall. 104;
); the extension, by the Act of June 26, 1884, § 18, 23 Stat. 57, 58, of the admiralty jurisdiction to proceedings for the limitation of liability, so as to include damages by a vessel to a land structure (
Cleveland Terminal R. Co. v. Steamship Co.,
222 U. S. 101
); the Act June 23, 1910, 36 Stat. 604,
providing for a maritime lien for repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel in her home port, to be enforced by a proceeding
22 U. S. 420
); the Act of March 30, 1920, 41 Stat. 537, providing for jurisdiction in admiralty of suits for damages from death caused by wrongful act and occurring on the high seas (
257 U. S. 243
); the Seamen's Act of 1915, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (
); the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33, 41 Stat 1007, amending § 20 of the act of 1915, thus bringing, in relation to seamen, into the maritime law rules drawn from the Federal Employers' Liability Act (
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, supra; Engel v. Davenport,
Panama Railroad Co. v. Vasquez,
271 U. S. 559
), and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (
Nogueira v. N.Y. N.H. & H.R. Co.,
Crowell v. Benson, supra
Of special significance in relation to the present question are the Acts of 1884 and 1910,
By the former, the admiralty jurisdiction in limitation proceedings was enlarged so as to embrace the liability for a nonmaritime tort. Although the damaged structure was on land, the injury was due to the operation of the vessel, and it could not be said that the Congress had stepped beyond the limits of its authority to amend the law in furthering its policy to encourage investments in ships.
Richardson v. Harmon, supra.
Compare The Blackheath,
195 U. S. 367
-368. The Act of 1910 created a lien to be enforced
for repairs or supplies to vessels in their home ports. The state of the law as it existed before
that enactment was fully described in
The J. E. Rumbell, supra.
For repairs or supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, a lien was given by the general maritime law, and could be enforced in admiralty, but, for repairs or supplies in the home port, no lien existed, or could be enforced in admiralty under the general law, independently of local statute. When the statute of a State gave a lien to be enforced by process
against the vessel for repairs or supplies in her home port, that lien, being similar to the lien arising in a foreign port under the general law, was deemed to be in the nature of a maritime lien, and therefore could be enforced in admiralty, and, in such case, the enforcement of the lien was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the United States sitting in admiralty. The result was that, where necessaries were furnished to a vessel in her home port, the vessel could not be sued in the federal courts under the general maritime law, for that law was not deemed to confer a lien, and could not be sued in a state court, for that court could not enforce the lien created by the state law, but the lien so given might be enforced in admiralty. [
] The Act of 1910 abolished the artificial distinction between repairs and supplies in a home port and those in a foreign port. While it created a lien where, in the absence of local provision therefor, none had theretofore existed, the change was not deemed to be inconsistent with the general principles of the maritime law, and it effected a substitution of a single federal statute for the conflicting state statutes.
Piedmont Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., supra.
The Act of 1910 also provided that it should not be necessary "to allege or prove" that credit was given to the vessel; previously, supplies furnished to the vessel at the home port, or on the owner's order, were presumed to be furnished upon his personal credit, and created no lien.
Respondent, in attacking the grant of jurisdiction by the Ship Mortgage Act, relies strongly upon the reasoning of the Court in
Bogart v. The Steamboat John Jay, supra,
which denied, under the former law, jurisdiction in admiralty to enforce payment of a mortgage upon a vessel. The Court there said that neither in England [
] nor in the United States had the admiralty courts exercised jurisdiction in questions of property between a mortgagee and the owner; that the foundation of the rule was "that the mere mortgage of a ship, other than that of an hypothecated bottomry," was a contract "without any of the characteristics or attendants of a maritime loan," and was made "without reference to navigation or perils of the sea;" that it was a security "to make the performance of the mortgagor's undertaking more certain;" that, while the mortgagor continued in possession of the ship, the mortgagee was disconnected "from all agency and interest in the employment and navigation of her, and from all responsibility for contracts made on her account;" that there was nothing maritime in the contract, and that from the organization of courts of admiralty and their modes of proceeding, they cannot secure to the parties to the mortgage "the remedies and protection which they have in a court of chancery."
But it did not follow, because this view was taken of the existing law, that the Congress was without power to amend the law so as to enable the admiralty courts to take cognizance of mortgages on ships, and to regulate priorities of liens, in order to promote investment in shipping securities and thus to advance the maritime interests of the United States. Indeed, in the
case, the Court seemed to recognize the existence of that constitutional authority. For the Court, in concluding its opinion, observed that the policy of commerce and its exigencies in England had given to its admiralty courts
The significance of this suggestion cannot be overlooked. The fact that mortgages on ships had not been considered to be maritime contracts was not conclusive as to the constitutional authority of the Congress to alter or supplement the maritime law in this respect, and thus to extend the admiralty jurisdiction "as experience or changing conditions might require," while keeping within a proper conception of maritime concerns. The ship, documented under the laws of the United States, is the instrumentality of our maritime enterprise, the prime object of our maritime policy. The ship, "from the moment her keel touches the water," becomes "a subject of admiralty jurisdiction;" she acquires personality; she becomes competent to contract, is individually liable for her obligations, and is responsible for her torts.
183 U. S. 426
183 U. S. 438
. The existence of the ship, the investments which make that existence possible, is the necessary postulate of maritime liens. We cannot fail to regard the encouragement of investments "in shipping and shipping securities" -- the objective of the Ship Mortgage Act -- as an essential prerogative of the Congress in the exercise of its wide discretion as to the appropriate development of the maritime law of the country. The regulation of the priorities of ship mortgages in relation to other liens, and the conferring of jurisdiction in admiralty in order to enforce this regulation, are appropriate means to that legitimate end.
The enlargement of the cognizance of mortgages of ships, in the admiralty courts in England, nearly one hundred years ago, to which the Court referred in the
case, was to remedy an evil which had been found to exist. The purpose was "to enable the Court to exercise its ordinary jurisdiction to the full extent." [
] That Act applied whenever the ship was "under arrest by process issuing from the high court of admiralty" or the proceeds of a ship so arrested had been brought into the registry of the court, and the court was invested with
"whether or not the ship or proceeds are under the arrest of the Court, and such jurisdiction may be exercised by an action
This response "to the exigencies of commerce" has had its counterpart in the legislation of other European States. It may be said that the "general maritime law" takes cognizance of mortgages of ships, provides for their registration, and establishes rules with respect to priorities. [
Prior to the Ship Mortgage Act, the right of the mortgagee to intervene as a claimant of proceeds of a vessel sold by process in the admiralty was recognized, and was frequently exercised.
Schuchardt v. Ship Angelique, supra; The Lottawanna, supra; The J. E. Rumbell, supra.
The distinction between such an intervention and an original proceeding by the mortgagee was no doubt controlling as a matter of jurisdiction and procedure under the law as it then existed, but it cannot be considered as establishing a criterion of the constitutional power of the Congress in defining jurisdiction and procedure. The Congress undoubtedly could determine the priorities that should be recognized by the admiralty court and, having that authority, the Congress could fix the conditions upon which mortgages of ships documented under the laws of the United States should have the priority specified. The grant of jurisdiction in admiralty to entertain a suit by the mortgagee, where the mortgage complies with the prescribed conditions, in order to enforce the permitted lien against the vessel, is, after all, but a provision of suitable machinery to give effect to the rights which the Congress has created.
of ships which comply with its rules, although the proceeds of the loans thereby secured are used for other purposes. The analogy of the decision by Justice Story in
as to bottomry bonds, and of the decisions of this Court in the
bonds, is apparent. If the maritime law does not require, as Justice Story held, that a bottomry bond, as such, must be given for the necessities of the ship or for the cargo or for the voyage, but that it is sufficient, when given by the owner, that the money be lent upon the bottom of the ship at the risk of the lender, for the voyage, and that, in such case, the owner is free to employ the money as he pleases; if, as this Court decided, in the case of a
loan, it is no objection that it is made after the departure of the ship, or that the money lent was not employed in the outfit of the vessel or invested in the goods on which the risk was run, or that the money was appropriated for purposes wholly unconnected with the voyage, we cannot see that an analogous provision with respect to ship mortgages is so far inconsistent with the fundamental principles of maritime law as to place such mortgages beyond the authority of the Congress in determining the admiralty jurisdiction. The contention to the contrary loses sight of the dominant purpose of the Act, a purpose which the Congress was competent to achieve. That purpose, we repeat, was to establish the worth of "shipping securities" in the interest of the merchant marine. In order to create public confidence in such securities, in obligations issued on the faith of ship mortgages, the Congress deemed it necessary not to hamper their issue or enforcement by compelling inquiries as to the application of loans, but to give a definite and assured character to such mortgages provided they met certain simple conditions. The Congress, in the exercise of its discretion, was entitled to consider the methods by which securities are issued to the public and
The authority of the Congress to enact legislation of this nature was not limited by previous decisions as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction. We have had abundant reason to realize that our experience and new conditions give rise to new conceptions of maritime concerns. These may require that former criteria of jurisdiction be abandoned -- as, for example, they were abandoned in discarding the doctrine that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to tidewaters.
23 U. S.
10 Wheat. 428.
The constitutional validity of the grant of jurisdiction by the Ship Mortgage Act has been sustained in
The Oconee,
280 F. 927, in
The Nanking,
292 F. 642, and in
The Lincoln Land,
295 F. 358. [
] We find no reason for reaching a contrary conclusion in the instant cases.
* Together with No. 14,
Detroit Trust Co., Trustee v. The John J. Barlum et al.,
See also The William D. Rice,
3 Ware, 134, 136;
The Martha Washington,
3 Ware, 245, 251;
The Sailor Prince,
1 Ben. 461, 466;
Morgan v. Tapscott,
5 Ben. 252;
Britton v. The Venture,
21 F. 928;
The Gordon Campbell,
131 F. 963, 965;
143 F. 460, 463;
147 F. 586, 589;
The Rupert City,
213 F. 263, 266.
(a) A valid mortgage which at the time it is made includes the whole of any vessel of the United States of 200 gross tons and upward, shall in addition have, in respect to such vessel and as of the date of the compliance with all the provisions of this subdivision, the preferred status given by the provisions of subsection M, § 953, if --"
"(f) If a preferred mortgage includes more than one vessel and provides for the separate discharge of each vessel by the payment of a portion of the mortgage indebtedness, the amount of such portion of such payment shall be indorsed upon the documents of the vessel. In case such mortgage does not provide for the separate discharge of a vessel and the vessel is to be sold upon the order of a district court of the United States in a suit
in admiralty, the court shall determine the portion of the mortgage indebtedness increased by 20 percentum (1) which, in the opinion of the court, the approximate value of the vessel bears to the approximate value of all the vessels covered by the mortgage, and (2) upon the payment of which the vessel shall be discharged from the mortgage."
Preferred maritime lien; priorities; other liens.
(a) When used hereinafter in this chapter, the term 'preferred maritime lien' means (1) a lien arising prior in time to the recording and indorsement of a preferred mortgage in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, or (2) a lien for damages arising out of tort, for wages of a stevedore when employed directly by the owner, operator, master, ship's husband, or agent of the vessel, for wages of the crew of the vessel, for general average, and for salvage, including contract salvage."
"(b) Upon the sale of any mortgaged vessel by order of a district court of the United States in any suit
in admiralty for the enforcement of a preferred mortgage lien thereon, all preexisting claims in the vessel, including any possessory common law lien of which a lienor is deprived under the provisions of subsection L, § 952, shall be held terminated, and shall thereafter attach, in like amount and in accordance with their respective priorities, to the proceeds of the sale, except that the preferred mortgage lien shall have priority over all claims against the vessel, except (1) preferred maritime liens, and (2) expenses and fees allowed and costs taxed, by the court."
"(b) This chapter shall not be construed, in the case of a mortgage covering, in addition to vessels, realty or personalty other than vessels, or both, to authorize the enforcement by suit
in admiralty of the rights of the mortgagee in respect to such realty or personalty other than vessels."
Benedict's Admiralty, 5th ed., §§ 87, 88.
See The Neptune,
3 Hagg. 129, 132.
statement of Dr. Lushington in
2 Wm. Rob. 217, 222.
The Netherlands, Maritime Law, Code of Commerce, 1838; France, Act of July 10, 1885, and Decree of June 18, 1886; Belgium, Laws of August 21, 1879, June 12, 1902, February 10, 1908, and September 4, 1908; Denmark, Maritime Law of April 1, 1892, Act 103 of April 29, 1913, also Act 57 of April 1, 1892; Italy, Maritime Law, Code of Commerce of 1883, and Mercantile Marine Code. 1866, as amended; Norway, Maritime Law of July 20, 1893, as amended by Acts of May 4, 1901, July 13, 1917, and July 9, 1920.
Constant, "The Law Relating to the Mortgage of Ships," Appendix A; "The Progress of Continental Law in the 19th Century," Georges Ripert, Maritime Law, Continental Legal History Series, p. 399.
The validity of the Act was not questioned in
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Northern Star,
271 U. S. 552
271 U. S. 555
-556, and its validity has been assumed in several decisions in the lower federal courts.
See The Egeria,
294 F. 791;
The Northern No. 41,
297 F. 343;
22 F.2d 329;
National Bank v. Enterprise Marine Dock Co.,
43 F.2d 547;
Consumers Co. v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
53 F.2d 972.