Source: http://tnzoning.blogspot.com/2013/
Timestamp: 2020-02-22 10:09:12
Document Index: 133181469

Matched Legal Cases: ['§4', '§8', '§8', '§103', '§208', '§13', '§208', '§208', '§13', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208', '§208']

Tennessee Zoning & Land Use: 2013
Nollan and Dolan involve a special application of this [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine that protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property the government takes when owners apply for land-use permits . . .
Land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would like to take. By conditioning a building permit on the owner's deeding over a public right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensation. So long as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to the government's demand, no matter how unreasonable. Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.
There have been a number of interesting new land use cases over the last 20 or 30 days, both here in Tennessee and across the country as a whole. Over the next couple of weeks, I’ll try to address some of the more interesting cases. Today will start with a very interesting legislative and testimonial immunity case, Issa v Benson, (Tenn. App. June 24, 2013). A developer seeking a zoning change in Chattanooga sued a City Councilman for defamation, alleging that the Councilman had falsely accused the developer of offering him a bribe to support the zoning change. The Councilman later informed the Council, during argument concerning the zoning change on the floor of the Council, and not surprisingly, the zoning change was defeated. In addition, there was an earlier conversation between the two men where the developer warned that he would have to contest in court any decision denying the zoning change and the Councilman responded that if there was a lawsuit filed, he would testify that the developer had offered him a bribe in order to gain his support.
After the zoning change was defeated, the developer filed a defamation lawsuit and the Councilman filed a motion to dismiss based on both legislative and testimonial immunity (the court calls the latter litigation privilege). First, the court makes clear that the legislative immunity applies to lesser legislative bodies, such as local County and municipal legislatures. The developer tried to argue first that because there may have been a violation of the Open Public Meetings Act that was not an appropriate legislative session and therefore the privilege did not attach. Further he argued that bribery was beyond the bounds of the privilege itself.
The court found both arguments unavailing. First, the applicability of the Open Public Meetings Act was irrelevant to the issue of legislative immunity. Even if there had been a violation of the act, that would not render comments made by a local legislator potentially actionable. The privilege applied regardless of the Open Public Meetings Act.
Second, while certainly bribery is illegal and not to be condoned, the court noted that in a bribe had been offered, the other members of the local legislative body would be interested in that and it would certainly have an effect on the proposed legislation. As a result, the comments concerning the alleged bribery or well within the protection of the privilege and no liability could result.
Finally, the developer’s allegations concerning the earlier meeting took place outside the context of a legislative Council meeting. As a result, the developer argued that the legislative immunity did not apply. The court however ruled that there was a “litigation privilege” or as I usually call it, a testimonial immunity. The court held that since the developer had threatened litigation, the comments of the legislator were protected as “preliminary to proposed or pending litigation.” Since there was a threat of a lawsuit, this comment about the alleged bribery, was preliminary to the defamation lawsuit which was in fact file. As a result, the comments were protected by virtue of the litigation privilege or testimonial immunity.
A final couple of notes are in order. First, you might be wondering whether a witness in a zoning board hearing is protected by the testimonial immunity. In fact, they are. In Evans d/b/a Riverwood Riding Academy of Nashville v Nashville Banner, 1988 WL 105718 (Tenn. App. 1988), the court held:
Tennessee courts have extended this privilege to meetings of local legislative bodies, and to "quasi-judicial" proceedings conducted by state departments and agencies . . . Zoning boards are generally considered to be "quasi-judicial" bodies having "quasi-judicial" functions. The Tennessee Supreme Court has followed the general rule. The Court has held that a county board of adjustment is acting as a "quasi-judicial" body when it grants a zoning variance. It has also held that "determinations made by a Board of Zoning Appeals are administrative determinations, judicial or quasi-judicial in nature."
The policy underlying the privilege is to encourage the public to speak freely at public, governmental hearings without the fear of a defamation suit. Local boards of zoning appeals take actions which affect not only . . . homes and neighborhoods but also the quality of people's lives. When these boards hold hearings, all interested persons should feel free to express their views without fear of a recriminating lawsuit. To this end, statements made at a public governmental meeting should be absolutely privileged.
Of course, the same safeguards of relevance apply in hearings conducted by local zoning boards that apply to full-fledged trials or legislative proceedings. Thus, before the privilege will apply, the statements must be related to the subject matter of the hearing.
Since the witness who testified against the applicant at the zoning board hearing was immunized, and the newspaper articles describing the hearing faithfully recounted the details, neither the witness who testified nor the newspaper which published the report had any liability for defamation.
Finally, one wonders what the Tennessee Anti-Slap Act of 1997, Tenn. Code Ann. §4-21-1001, adds in this context. The protection purportedly offered by the statute seems less inclusive than the common law rule described above. As a result, it’s not entirely clear what the impact of the 1997 statute really is.
Generally, we can conclude that a defamation action against either a local legislator or a witness before a local zoning board or planning commission (or legislative body) is likely privileged. In the case of the witness, the testimony must have been generally relevant to the issues before the administrative body, but assuming that, no defamation action can be successfully maintained.
Labels: legislative immunity, testimonial immunity
The Tennessee Court of Appeals released an interesting opinion on Wednesday relating to the well-known Islamic Mosque controversy in Murfreesboro. As you may recall, the Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission approved a site plan for the development of the mosque. A group of neighbors sued the planning commission alleging various constitutional law violations as well as a violation of the Tennessee Open Public Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §8-44-101 et seq. Fisher v Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission, Tennessee Court of Appeals, May 29, 2013; copy posted here.
The trial court dismissed all claims but the Open Public Meetings Act challenge and refused to issue a temporary injunction. But after the final hearing, concluded that there was in fact a violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, and enjoining the county from issuing any further permits with respect to the development of the property.
As the Court of Appeals explained, shortly after the trial court's final decision, suit was filed in federal court under the terms of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and a federal court in Nashville issued a mandatory injunction requiring the County to allow completion of the mosque.
The appeal in this case was brought by the county itself, concerned that the trial court’s determination that it had violated the Open Public Meetings Act might have a lasting effect on how it conducted business. The trial court had concluded that at least under the circumstances of this particular case, the use of the Murfreesboro Post to give notice was inappropriate, and that the terms of the notice in the Post under the circumstances was also deficient.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court first examined the issue of mootness, concerned that because the federal court had already ruled that construction could be completed under the terms of the federal act, that the case no longer could serve as a means of providing relief. The court however concluded that because of the public interest in this matter, that the exception to the mootness doctrine applied.
As anyone who has ever dealt with the Tennessee Open Public Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §8-44-101 knows, the statute is not particularly helpful in so far as understanding what notice must be given. In fact, §103 only indicates that “adequate public notice” must be given. There’s not a whole lot of direction there.
But as the Court of Appeals points out, the adequate public notice is of the meeting, not of the items on the agenda of the meeting. The trial court seemed to conclude that because of the great public interest in the Islamic Mosque, that there was some higher degree of notice which must’ve been provided by the county. Of course, it’s difficult for the county to know before hand which cases may engender the most public interest. There must be some basic notice which is adequate under the terms of the statute, and which does not change based on the nature of the application.
In any event, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that the notice did not specify that the Islamic Mosque would be considered on the agenda within the terms of the notice, was not a defect.
In addition, the court also concluded that the circulation of the Murfreesboro Post was too small and limited to suffice in terms of adequate public notice. However, in a similar case involving the Nashville Record, the Court had looked at four factors in order to conclude that it was a newspaper sufficient for the purposes of notice. Those included (1) whether it is published at regular intervals; (2) whether it is intended for circulation among the general public; (3) whether it contains matters of general interest; and (4) is it in the form of a newspaper? The court concluded that the Murfreesboro Post met these requirements and summarized:
In reaching the conclusion that publication in the MURFREESBORO POST was insufficient, the trial court cited evidence “that few opportunities existed for those who lived near the proposed site to receive a copy of the MURFREESBORO POST because there was no home delivery in the area, and the nearest free distribution rack was some three miles away.” The evidence also showed, however, that the newspaper was published weekly, was intended for circulation to the general public, and contained matters of general interest. Over 21,000 copies were distributed throughout the county on Sundays in May 2010. This was the customary location for the county planning commission’s notices, and any interested person could obtain a copy at a distribution rack or on the newspaper’s website. We conclude that the county’s publication of the notice in the MURFREESBORO POST was sufficient under the [Open Public Meetings Act].
The failure to publish the agenda, and the use of the Murfreesboro Post, both were sufficient under the terms of the Open Public Meetings Act. The court reversed the trial court to the extent that it had held that the notice given contravened the act, but upheld the other holdings of the trial court.
Labels: Open Public Meetings Act, RLUIPA, site plan
I mentioned back in late April that there were two local decisions of the Davidson County Chancery Court dealing with the standing of the local government to sue its own board of zoning appeals. One of our judges ruled that Metro Nashville could sue its own zoning board, while another ruled the other way. I have just obtained a copy of the latter decision, and it is posted here for review.
It is likely that both cases will be reviewed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals so that they can be decided consistently.
Labels: permitted use
TNCPA §208(e): No Expansion on After-Acquired Property
In our last post, we discussed two of the principal exceptions to the Tennessee Non-Conforming Property Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §13-7-208, specifically subsections (f) and (j). To summarize, the act simply doesn’t apply to a premier type resort city (Gatlinburg), nor do subsections (g), (h), and (i) apply to home rule municipalities. A list of those home roominess Pawleys is included with the last post.
In a similar vein, this post will briefly discuss a significant restriction on the generally favorable treatment given non-conforming properties by the act. That restriction is found at TNCPA §208(e), which reads as follows:
Subsections (b)-(d) apply only to land owned and in use by such affected business, and do not operate to permit expansion of existing industry or business through the acquisition of additional land.
Therefore, while a non-conforming property is permitted to continue, including replacement and repairs, as desired under subsection (b)(1); to expand, including the construction of additional facilities under subsection (c); and to destroy and rebuild under subsection (d)(1); the continuation, expansion, or reconstruction cannot take place on after a acquired property. Once the property becomes legally non-conforming, purchase of any additional property cannot be used in a manner which expands the non-conforming activities.
There is a case directly on point. 421 Corporation v Metro Nashville, 36 SW 3d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), involves the proposed expansion of an adult entertainment establishment (“The Purple Onion”) located at 2807 Nolensville Road in Nashville. The owner had purchased some additional property adjacent to the Purple Onion and wanted to expand the operations of the establishment into the adjacent buildings. The city refused issue a permit, and on appeal to the Metro Board of Zoning Appeals, the denial was upheld. An appeal was taken to Davidson County Chancery Court where the zoning board decision was affirmed, and the same result was obtained before the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
The owner’s argument was that his application was made pursuant to the Metro Zoning Ordinance and its language was less restrictive than the state statute. Judge Koch, writing for the court, concluded that the territorial restriction was mandatory and that even if the local ordinance could be interpreted so as to permit such an expansion it conflicted with the state statute and was not permissible. As a result, the decision of the lower court and the zoning board were both upheld.
As a final footnote, this subsection (e) was part of the original 1973 Tennessee Non-Conforming Property Act. The original act was comprised, generally speaking, of what is now §208 (b)(1), (c), (d)(1), and (e). In addition, with regard to both subsections (b) and (d), additional language was later added which necessitated new numbered paragraphs. In each instance, the retained paragraph became (1), and the new language is included in the paragraph marked (2). In the case of subsection (b), the newly added language deals with off-premise signs and in the case of subsection (d), the newly added language deals with multifamily residential land use.
In our next post, we’ll take a look at a couple of provisions of the act which are not used all that often.
New construction of crematoria, either as an accessory to an existing funeral home or freestanding, continues to be controversial. Last month, in Loudon, Tennessee, an application for a special exception for a crematorium was deferred by the local zoning board. Recently, Knoxville adopted tighter restrictions on operation and placement of crematoria. There been several instances of requests in and around Nashville which have raised neighborhood concerns.
Knoxville’s new regulations made most existing crematoria legally non-conforming. It also evidently had the effect of allowing an existing funeral home to add a crematorium.
Certainly, requests for cremation services are on the increase in the funeral industry. Regulations which adequately protect surrounding land uses from adverse impact are obviously worthwhile. However, much of the concern may be attributable more to actual operations rather than external impact. Regulations of the internal operation are best left to the state agencies charged with that responsibility.
Take a look at the recent news article found here.
We’ve been discussing, over the last week or so, the Tennessee Non-Conforming Property Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §13-7-208 (TNCPA). Last time we considered the expansion of a non-conforming property under §208 (c); in this post, we will take a look at the demolition/reconstruction of a non-conforming property under §208 (d).
Section 208 (d) allows the destruction and reconstruction of any structures on the non-conforming property. There is one important additional requirement that is not present in either §208 (b) or (c), and that is that the demolition/reconstruction must be “necessary to the conduct” of the commercial or industrial business. Under certain circumstances then, it may be best simply to expand under §208 (c) rather than destroy/reconstruct under §208 (d); sometimes business necessity is difficult to prove. Further, guidance from the courts has not been clear on what constitutes business necessity for this purpose. I believe that the business necessity test should be leniently construed, otherwise it actually encourages the property owner to expand the business rather than tear down and reconstruct. Let’s take a quick example.
If I have a business that makes widgets and I’d like to tear down my building and build a new one to improve efficiency and output, I would normally have to show business necessity under §208 (d). But suppose I simply decide to build a new building and leave the first one standing (assuming I have sufficient room on the property). I use the new building to make my widgets, and convert the original building to office and storage space. I submit that this expansion is permitted under §208 (c), and I need not make any showing of business necessity under §208 (d). But in effect, my business has expanded more than I actually needed, and to the extent that any case can be made that the use of the property is inconsistent with the surrounding land uses, the situation is probably even worse than if I had torn down the original building and replaced it with another. Thus perhaps a lenient position with regard to business necessity is called for.
Furthermore, under §208 (i), not only must the demolition and reconstruction be necessary for the continuation of the business, but in addition, the reconstructed facilities must comply with the bulk regulations contained in the zoning ordinance. Section 208 (i) expressly mentions setbacks, height, bulk, or requirements as to the physical location of a structure upon the site as existing zoning regulations which must be met if reconstructed under subsection (d). Again, compliance with these bulk regulations is often difficult and frequently the best advice is to simply expand under subsection (c) as opposed to reconstructing under subsection (d). Remember that under subsection (d), the reconstructed buildings must meet the bulk regulations. But under subsection (c), any additional facilities constructed do not need to meet the bulk regulations, and only in fact need to avoid becoming a nuisance. Obviously, the latter is a much lower standard to meet.
There is an express exception concerning off-site signs in subsection (i); the bulk regulations do not apply to reconstructed off-premise signs. There remains a significant question in my mind as to whether this distinction is constitutionally reasonable. It seems difficult to come up with an explanation as to why an off-site sign need not comply with the bulk regulations when another structure, such as, for example, an on-site sign does.
But perhaps my constitutional concern is groundless. Perhaps §208 (i) doesn’t really apply in the first place. Take a look at the final proviso of subsection (g)(4) which provides in part: the restrictions of subsection (i) shall apply only “if the property owner intentionally and voluntarily abandons the non-conforming use of the property.” It is difficult to make any sense of this whatsoever. Subsection (g) (4) deals with discontinuation clauses and we will discuss it in detail in a later post. Why suddenly, at the end of the subsection, there is a reference to subsection (i) is hard to fathom. Furthermore, subsection (i) would ordinarily require that a property demolished and then reconstructed comply with the bulk regulations. Yet subsection (g) indicates that if the owner does not intentionally abandon the use, subsection (i) is inapplicable.
Seemingly, this makes no sense. If the property owner has demolished the structures on the property with the intent of rebuilding pursuant to subsection (d), then there is certainly no present intent to voluntarily abandon the non-conforming property. Yet, if there is no such intent, subsection (i) seems inapplicable. If that is true, then when would it ever apply?
Or is it possible that the statutory intent was that subsection (i) applied only after some period of inactivity. Again, that doesn’t help us much. If that’s the answer, then any owner wishing to invoke the protection of the statute and remove the restrictions of subsection (i), would simply cease operations for a few days or months and then begin the reconstruction process. If inactivity is necessary in order to invoke the proviso, that is easily done and once again it simply undermines the entire intent behind subsection (i).
One other interesting comment is worth noting here. Let’s assume for a moment that the use of the property was permitted but the regulations which changed had only to do with the location of the structure on the property, that is, the bulk regulations were changed. For example, perhaps the local government now requires a greater setback from the street, or a larger side yard. Assume further that the non-conforming activity stops, perhaps because of a fire rendering the interior of the building unusable. The owner intends to demolish and reconstruct the entire building but allows it to sit for a year before applying for a building permit. Does subsection (i) permit the reconstruction of the building at the same location in violation of the bulk regulations? It would appear not. Even under subsection (g)(4)’s final proviso, the bulk regulations do not apply only if the property owner abandons the non-conforming use of the property. Since the use of the property in this hypothetical actually conforms, it would appear that the bulk regulations apply to the new construction. These are some very strange and convoluted statutory provisions. Hopefully, the courts will at some point give us additional instruction and how they are to be applied.
In the meantime, we can say that with regard to §208 (d) a non-conforming property can be demolished/reconstructed if the reconstructed facilities are necessary to the continuation of the business. It may be that the reconstructed buildings must comply with the bulk regulations of the local zoning ordinance, although this is unclear. Furthermore, it is certainly true that the destruction/reconstruction of an off-site sign need not comply with the local bulk regulations, but that any expansion of an off-site sign (under §208 (c) or (d)) must comply with the provisions of §208 (h) regarding the permitted size of any expansion.
Posted by George Dean at 6:00 AM 4 comments:
A couple of years ago, I posted a comment on an interesting sign case involving a spray-painted message on the front of a home in the town of Cary, North Carolina. You can find that post here.
The town lost in front of the trial court, which concluded that the sign ordinance violated the First Amendment. The town appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and recently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court, concluding that the sign ordinance was constitutional after all.
The Court of Appeals applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and concluded that the sign ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Finding that the Town’s stated interests in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety are substantial, and that the Sign Ordinance does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests, the Court concluded that the ordinance passes constitutional muster, as its size, color and positioning restrictions do no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy.
It is an interesting case, well worth review.
Brown v Town of Cary, 2013 WL 221978 (4th Cir. Jan 22, 2013)
Labels: First Amendment, signs