Source: https://casetext.com/case/click-v-state-6
Timestamp: 2019-03-24 09:22:58
Document Index: 667877037

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 21', '§ 13', '§ 128', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 2498', '§ 340', '§ 1023']

Click v. State, 695 So. 2d 209 | Casetext
695 So. 2d 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)
Clickv.State
Court of Criminal Appeals of AlabamaMay 9, 1997
December 20, 1996. Rehearing Denied February 28, 1997. Certiorari Denied May 9, 1997 Alabama Supreme Court 1961000.
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, William Page, J.
John Mark McDaniel and William P. Burgess, Jr., Huntsville, for Appellant.
The police questioned the appellant based upon information that he had been seen at the victim's house on the evening of the murder. The appellant told the police that he had known the victim for about eight years and that he mowed her grass. During the interrogation, the police determined that Click fit the description of a person who had been seen in the woods behind the victim's house on the day of the crime. The appellant was then informed of his rights. Thereafter, he admitted that he sprayed the victim with mace just before Carpenter beat her to death with the baseball bat. He also stated that he and Carpenter had taken money, drugs, and other items from the victim's house.
At approximately 11:00 P.M., Investigator Turner came into the interview room where appellant was being questioned and had a conversation with Investigator Sharp. Investigator Sharp then advised appellant of his juvenile Miranda rights. (R. 477-78, 672-73). Investigator Turner testified that the juvenile Miranda rights were read to Click immediately after he received information that the appellant matched the description of a person seen in the woods behind the victim's house the evening of the murder. Testimony of Investigators Sharp and Turner revealed that the appellant was not a suspect before they received this information. (R. 478.) After the appellant was advised of his Miranda rights at approximately 11:10 P.M., and before approximately 2:50 A.M. the following morning, he gave the investigators two more versions of his activities on the day of the murder. (R. 486-90.) The final version of his statement detailed his involvement in the homicide.
It is well established that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, (1966). However, the safeguards required by Miranda are required only if the defendant is in custody when questioned. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440, 444 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).
The appellant's second argument with regard to the Miranda issue is that he suffered from a mental illness that prevented him from voluntarily waiving his rights because, he says, he could not understand and comprehend the significance of those rights. The appellant cites that he was diagnosed with a mental disorder at the age of eight years old, that he had twice undergone inpatient treatment at the psychiatric unit at Mountain View Baptist Hospital in 1989, and that he was being treated with psychotropic and antidepressant drugs at the time of his arrest. (R. 597-607.) Additionally, Dr. James Merikangas, appellant's expert witness, testified at the suppression hearing that, in his opinion, the appellant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda warnings because he suffered from a mental illness. (R. 615-17.) Both Dr. Merikangas, who evaluated the appellant in 1993, and Dr. Sheila Clark, who was the psychiatrist at Mountain View Baptist Hospital who was treating the appellant before his arrest, had diagnosed the appellant with "schizo-affective" disorder.
Whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent depends on the particular facts and underlying circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused — i.e., the totality of the circumstances. Magwood v. State, 494 So.2d 124, 135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); Chandler v. State, 426 So.2d 477 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)); Myers v. State, 401 So.2d 288 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981.) The trial court need only be convinced from a preponderance of the evidence that a confession or inculpatory statement was voluntarily made. Magwood v. State, supra; Harris v. State, 420 So.2d 812 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). The finding of the trial court as to voluntariness will not be disturbed unless it appears contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Dill v. State, 600 So.2d 343, 368 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), aff'd, 600 So.2d 372 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 113 S.Ct. 1293, 122 L.Ed.2d 684 (1993); Magwood v. State, supra.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a search conducted after his questioning by the police because, he says, his confession was illegally obtained. Because we have already held that the appellant was properly informed of his rights before the incriminating statements that led to the discovery of the evidence were made, we also conclude that the evidence gathered by the police as a result of the statements was properly admitted by the trial court. See, Jones v. State, 362 So.2d 1303, 1314-1315 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (holding that evidence gathered as a result of a statement given during a legal arrest and interrogation was admissible, even though the defendant had alleged he was incapable of waiving his rights and that he was coerced into making his confession.) The appellant's argument with regard to this issue is without merit.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after the prosecutor requested permission for the victim's family to be excused from the courtroom before photographs of the victim were shown. The appellant contends that this request was a calculated effort to play on the sympathy of the jurors and to emphasize the photographs of the crime scene.
A party must show a high degree of necessity for a motion for a mistrial to be granted. "A motion for mistrial implies a miscarriage of justice and should only be granted where it is apparent that justice cannot be afforded." Dixon v. State, 476 So.2d 1236, 1240 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Young v. State, 416 So.2d 1109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). "A trial judge is allowed the exercise of broad discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared, because he is in the best position to observe the scenario, to determine its effect upon the jury, and to determine whether the mistrial should be granted." Dixon at 1240; Elmore v. State, 414 So.2d 175 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982.)
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) motion which alleged that the State used its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. His Batson challenge is based on four strikes by the State of black veniremembers.
Once it has been determined that a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the burden falls upon the proponent of the challenged strike to "articulat(e) a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried and which is nondiscriminatory." Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 623 (Ala. 1987) (emphasis in original); Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So.2d 1225, 1229 (Ala. 1992). The State gave the following reasons for the challenged strikes:
"MRS. MOQUIN [prosecutor]: With regard to juror 55, [S.D.], he stated that he was uncertain about the death penalty and had mixed feelings associated with it. In combination with that, he stated that he was uncertain, showed uncertainty, with regard to the burden of proof that the defense has with regard to the sanity issue. He stated that he was skeptical about accomplice testimony. I noticed that he is a Missionary Baptist and also a friend to a remaining juror, [Ms. J.] that's still remaining on the jury. For those reasons, Your Honor, I struck him.
"MRS. MOQUIN: With regard to [B.M.], number 68, I noticed from his information on his questionnaire, that he had studied for the ministry and divorced and that he rents his home. Because he has studied for the ministry, it is my understanding that he may be persuaded to vote against the death penalty because of some religious affiliations he might have from the study of ministry, might be more sympathetic to the issues of the defense, because he has been tied in the past to a religious study. He is divorced, and he rents his home, which shows to me he is of somewhat unstable background. He has been convicted of assault which was shown on his questionnaire. He was convicted of an assault previously and also, Your Honor, I noted he was Baptist and as a result of that, in combination with the study of the ministry, I felt he would not be a good juror for the state.
"MRS. MOQUIN: Number 64, [E.J.], my records show that he has been convicted of uttering obscene or lewd — he was convicted of either [making] obscene or lewd statements or obscene or lewd conduct previously, which he did not indicate on his questionnaire. Which shows to me he either selectively forgot that or he is lying to us when he answered his questionnaire. He did admit he had been convicted of public drunkenness in Limestone County, which I did not show on my records.
"THE COURT: How is that shown?
"MRS. MOQUIN: In his questionnaire he admitted he was.
"MRS. MOQUIN: And he was uncertain of the death penalty and [had] mixed feelings in association therewith.
"MRS. MOQUIN: With regard to number 93, [F.W.], he stated he was uncertain on the death penalty, in that as the court made clear to me, that he would not vote for it if the issue of the death penalty was placed on some type of ballot for him to vote on, which indicated to me that he had mixed feelings in association with the death penalty and therefore might not vote for the death penalty. He has been a juror. He indicated on his questionnaire he had been a juror in a prior criminal case and had voted that person not guilty, he was convicted of DUI in 1987 and previously consulted with Mark McDaniel with regard to some legal issue. For all those reasons, Your Honor, we struck those jurors."
Mr. McDaniel was one of the appellant's defense attorneys at trial.
The record reflects that the State struck juror number 55 because he had expressed reservations concerning the death penalty. " 'That a veniremember has reservations about the death penalty, though not sufficient for a challenge for cause, may constitute a race-neutral and reasonable explanation for the exercise of a peremptory strike.' " Fisher v. State, 587 So.2d 1027, 1036 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 587 So.2d 1039 (Ala.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992), quoting Smith v. State, 531 So.2d 1245, 1247-48 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); see also Walker v. State, 611 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). The court did not err in allowing this strike.
The State's reasons for striking juror number 68 were that he had a past assault conviction and that he had studied for the ministry. "We have repeatedly held that a veniremembers's connection with or involvement in criminal activity may serve as a race-neutral reason for striking that veniremember." Wilsher v. State, 611 So.2d 1175, 1183 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992). In addition, the fact that number 68 had studied for the ministry concerned the State with regard to his views on the death penalty. The fact that a veniremember is a preacher, pastor, or minister may constitute a sufficient reason for a preemptory strike. Fisher, 587 So.2d at 1037. Although the veniremember's prior assault conviction is a much more legitimate reason for striking him than the other, both reasons given by the State are sufficiently clear, specific, and race-neutral to support our affirmance of the trial court's decision with regard to juror number 68.
Veniremember number 93 expressed doubts about the death penalty and had a prior conviction for driving under the influence. Additionally, he had consulted defense counsel with regard to a legal issue in the past and had also served on a prior jury that had returned a verdict of not guilty. Again, the State's reasons for striking this juror are clear, specific, and race-neutral.
"MRS. MOQUIN [Prosecutor]: Okay now, the State — let me ask this this way, how many of you have not heard the phrase 'beyond a reasonable doubt'? I think every one of you [has] heard that phrase before and you understand in criminal cases the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. Are we all settled that that's the law? This is a capital case. Does anyone think that our burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a capital case is not high enough? Do you believe that perhaps the State would have to prove it to you to some type of mathematical certainty, or beyond all doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt? Would any of you make that burden higher on the State? Okay, I am going to ask for a commitment from you in that regard. Would you all agree not to hold the State to any higher burden than the law puts on the State, which is beyond a reasonable doubt? Do I have a commitment —
"MR. BURGESS [defense counsel]: I object to her asking for a commitment from the jury.
The appellant alleges that these were hypothetical questions that may have elicited a promise to return a guilty verdict and a recommendation of the death penalty. However, neither allegation is substantiated by the record. The questions went directly to the burden of proof that the jurors would apply to the evidence presented by the State in a capital case. "[I]n the exercise of peremptory strikes, either party has the right, within the trial court's discretion, to examine jurors on any matter which might tend to affect their verdict." Arthur v. State, 472 So.2d 650, 658 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 So.2d 665 (Ala. 1985); Ex parte Ledbetter, 404 So.2d 731 (Ala. 1981). "Questions concerning jurors' attitudes about capital punishment are not limited to those questions which would elicit information which would constitute grounds of a challenge for cause." Arthur, 472 So.2d at 658; Brown v. State, 288 Ala. 684, 685, 264 So.2d 553, 554 (1972).
"Generally, gruesome photographs of a victim's body are admissible into evidence in a criminal prosecution if they are correctly identified and authenticated and: (1) tend to shed light on, (2) strengthen, or (3) illustrate the truth of other testimony. Additionally, they are admissible if they have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove some material fact or issue in the case. Lewis v. State, 339 So.2d 1035, 1037 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1038 (Ala. 1976)."
Adkins v. State, 600 So.2d 1054 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied, 600 So.2d 1072 (1992).
Also, photographs that depict the character and location of external wounds on the victim's body are admissible even if they constitute cumulative evidence of an undisputed matter. Hines v. State, 365 So.2d 320, 321 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 322 (Ala. 1978); Lovett v. State, 491 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 491 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 1986). Moreover, the admission of photographs in a criminal prosecution is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Magwood v. State, 494 So.2d 124 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); Holland v. State, 424 So.2d 1387 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982).
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Charleen, there are people who are leaders and people who are followers. Is Shane Click a leader or a follower?
"MR. McDANIEL [defense counsel]: We object to that, Judge.
"Q: Charleen, in the times that you have been around Shane Click, who decided what you all would be doing?
"MR. BURGESS: I object to leading, Your Honor.
"A: Shane, at times.
"Q: Did you do what you were asked by Shane Click?
"A: We all agreed, but we all did things, yes ma'am.
"Q: What do you mean by that?
"A: Well, he usually came up with the ideas, but most of the time we usually agreed and we would do things.
"Q: Is there any reason why you would agree?
"MR McDANIEL: We object to that.
"Q: You can answer.
"A: We would enjoy the ideas he thought of at the time.
"Q: Pardon?
"A: Like play pool and we enjoyed that and it sounded like a cool idea, so we would go. It was something to do.
"Q: Did Shane Click tell you to do something you didn't want to do?
"A: I didn't want to go to his grandparent's house fourth of July.
"Q: Did you go?
"Q: Do you know whether or not Shane Click told Scott Carpenter to do things in your presence that he did not want to do?
"MR. BURGESS: We object to that.
"THE COURT: I sustain."
"Q: Were you afraid of Shane Click at that time?
"A: I don't think I was afraid of him. He was more intimidating.
"Q: And what do you mean by the difference between intimidating and afraid?
"A: I was not afraid he would hurt me, but mostly it was — we argued, you know, and I was afraid to do that. I didn't want to argue or get in a confrontation with him.
"MR. McDANIEL: We object. Immaterial and irrelevant.
"Q: Go ahead.
"A: He is bigger than me and more powerful. I just didn't want to."
The appellant argues that whether he decided what Charleen Bottorff and Scott Carpenter did while they were with him or whether he made them do things they did not want to was immaterial and irrelevant. The State prosecuted the appellant on a theory of complicity. The evidence tended to show that Scott Carpenter was the only person who struck the victim with the baseball bat. The State's theory of the appellant's case was that he rendered assistance in the victim's death through acts, words, encouragement, or support. In short, the State sought to prove that the appellant was a very persuasive person who masterminded the plot to kill Ms. McClure and convinced his friends to help him.
Under the test for relevancy employed in Alabama, "a fact is admissible if it has any probative value, however slight, upon a matter in the case." Jennings v. State, 513 So.2d 91, 97 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), citing C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 21.01(1) (3d Ed. 1977). " ' "The determination of the relevancy of a particular item of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and this court will not reverse unless that discretion has been . . . abused." ' " Jenkins v. State, 627 So.2d 1034, 1044 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992) aff'd, 627 So.2d 1054 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1388, 128 L.Ed.2d 63 (1994), quoting Jennings v. State, 513 So.2d 91.97 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), quoting, in turn, Wicker v. State, 433 So.2d 1190, 1198 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983). The court committed no error here.
However, even if Dr. Maier had relied on his conversation with Dr. Preston, there would have been no error in allowing into evidence an opinion based on this conversation. The Alabama rule is that a medical expert may give an opinion based in part upon the opinions of others, when those other opinions are found in medical records admitted into evidence. Ex parte Wesley, 575 So.2d 127, 128 (Ala. 1990); Nash v. Cosby, 574 So.2d 700 (Ala. 1990). "There is no reversible error if the facts upon which the opinion is based are admitted into evidence after the expert has testified. Ex parte Wesley at 129; Crawford v. Hall, 531 So.2d 874 (Ala. 1988). The record reflects that Dr. Preston later testified to the same facts as those upon which Dr. Maier allegedly relied. (R. 1106-43.) Accordingly, even if Dr. Maier relied on his conversation with Dr. Preston, the court did not err in allowing Dr. Maier's opinion testimony.
Dr. Maier offered no opinion during the guilt phase of the trial as to the appellant's mental state while he was incarcerated. He testified only to his opinion of the appellant's mental state at the time of the crime and he waived his Miranda rights. The court did not err in admitting Dr. Maier's expert opinion.
A specific objection by trial counsel is necessary to preserve error for appellate review. Reeves v. State, 456 So.2d 1156 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984). Additionally, the statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not specified at trial. Moss v. State, 545 So.2d 230, 231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).
"Q: [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: All right, sir. Based on the items you have designated to us, that you used to form that opinion, do you also have an opinion as to whether or not the intoxication from any of the substances that he outlined to you prevented him from knowing the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his act on that night?
"A: [By Dr. Maier]: It affected his judgment, but it did not affect his basic understanding of the difference between right from wrong.
"MR. BURGESS [defense counsel]: May we approach the bench?
"(The following occurred outside the hearing of the jury:)
"MR. BURGESS: We object to that statement and move the court to direct the jury to disregard it for the reason the ability — the statement between right and wrong is not the legal test for individuals excused from behavior due to mental defect or disease. The standard is whether he is unable to appreciate the quality and nature of, as a consequence of the mental illness, not the difference between right and wrong.
"THE COURT: Overruled. He can state his opinion. It may not be helpful, but he can state the opinion. That is — that is not the only opinion he has."
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Doctor, let me ask you this, again, the intoxication, if any, on the night in question, based on what you have told us so far that you based your opinion on, have you formed an opinion as to whether or not that intoxication prevented Jimmy Shane Click from appreciating the nature and wrongfulness of his actions that night?
"MR. BURGESS: That is not the proper standard for consideration of the involuntary intoxication.
This argument, in any case, is moot. If anything, the State's question regarding intoxication stated a less stringent standard for an intoxication defense than the law currently imposes. Voluntary intoxication, or intoxication caused by substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which is to cause intoxication he ought to know, is not a defense to a criminal charge. § 13A-3-2 Code of Alabama 1975. "Mere drunkenness, voluntarily produced, is never a defense against a criminal charge and can never palliate or reduce the grade of an offense, unless it is so extreme as to render impossible some mental condition which is an essential element of the criminal act." Gautney v. State, 284 Ala. 82, 88, 222 So.2d 175, 181 (1969).
The appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim's body that were taken during the autopsy. The appellant contends that the gruesome nature of the photographs prejudiced the jury.
The appellant alleges that the trial court erred by allowing investigators to testify as to his mental state at the time he made his statements. However, he has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. The following portions of the record are relevant with regard to this issue. The first two segments occurred during the State's direct and redirect examination of Investigator Wayne Sharp and the third occurred during the state's direct of Investigator Howard Turner.
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Let me ask you at this point, Wayne and ask you this, during the period of time that you had Shane Click in your office and talking with him, did he appear to lose the ability to talk to you in any way?
"MR. BURGESS: I object to what he appeared to lose.
"THE COURT: Overruled." (R. 491.)
"Q: Was there any time when you were with him when he appeared to you to lose touch with reality, not know where he was, oriented in time and space?
"MR. MCDANIEL: We object, Judge.
"THE COURT: Overruled." (R. 499.)
"Q: Did you ever see him lose any type of ability to know where he was or what was going on around him?
"MR. BURGESS: Objection.
"THE COURT: Overruled." (R. 553.)
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: So they did not have permission, according to his statement, to enter the residence?
"MR. BURGESS: I object to that. That's an improper characterization of his testimony and it is the conclusion of Mrs. Moquin.
"THE COURT: Overruled. Don't lead your witness.
"Q: You can answer that question.
"A: No, apparently they did not have permission.
"MR. BURGESS: I object to that and move to exclude.
The appellant first maintains in his brief to this court that the State's question should have been excluded because, he says, it was an improper leading question. The appellant's objection at trial — that the question was an improper conclusion of the prosecutor — was sustained after the witness answered and it was raised a second time. The argument that the question was improper as a leading question is not preserved for appeal because the appellant did not make this objection at trial.
" 'An adverse ruling is a preliminary requirement to preservation of error for appellate review. . . . Absent an adverse ruling the issue of the objection is not properly before the court.' " Hudgins v. State, 615 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993), quoting Van Antwerp v. State, 358 So.2d 782, 790 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 791 (Ala. 1978). When an appellant fails to obtain an adverse ruling, the issue is not preserved for review. Breckenridge v. State, 628 So.2d 1012 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993).
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: When would you, in your legal — in your law enforcement experience, ask somebody if they're intoxicated or high on drugs?
"A: I don't know of any time I would ask them. I don't know.
"Q: Would it be based on your observation that you would not talk to somebody because they're too intoxicated to talk to you?
"MR. BURGESS [defense counsel]: I object to what he may do on general occasions; that doesn't necessarily mean what he would do on this occasion. She is leading the witness and it is not material to this case.
"Q: You may answer.
"A: No, ma'am."
The State contends, and the record supports its contention, that during the cross-examination of Investigator Turner immediately preceding the exchange to which the appellant objects, the appellant's counsel asked the following questions:
"Howard, if you are — why do you make a determination or why do you make assessments as to whether someone is under the influence of alcohol or drugs when you're securing a statement from a suspect?"
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Of the two persons, who would you say was the smarter?
"MR. MCDANIEL: We object about mental operation, to testify about what these guys' I.Q. is.
"MRS. MOQUIN: He went to school with them. I think he can tell his opinion.
"A: Shane.
"Q: Was Shane much smarter than Scott?
"A: In my opinion, I would say, yes."
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 128.08 (4th ed. 1991). However the witness was not testifying that the appellant knew of any certain facts or had any particular feelings. The witness was simply giving his opinion that the appellant was smarter than his codefendant.
"Q[By Mr. Burgess, defense counsel]: Was there any kind of counsel with doctor — Mr. Smith?
"A: Mr. Pierce?
"Q: I am sorry, Dr. Pierce.
"A: I made an appointment with Shane and he interviewed Shane and after he interviewed Shane, he interviewed me and told me that he —
"MRS. MOQUIN: We object to what he told her as hearsay.
"THE COURT: You're speaking of — who is speaking now?
"A: Dr. Pierce.
"THE COURT: I sustain." (R. 827.)
"Q: Would you please tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what drugs he was taking?
"A: He was medicated once at Mountain View with Thorazine for an incident that occurred there.
"MRS. MOQUIN: We object to what he was medicated for.
"THE COURT: I sustain." (R. 831.)
"Q: And how did you come to know what mental illness he was diagnosed as suffering from?
"MRS. MOQUIN: We object, hearsay again.
"THE COURT: I sustain." (R. 833.)
"Q: And did you come to learn that he was diagnosed as having had a psychotic episode?
"MRS. MOQUIN: We object to what his diagnosis was.
"THE COURT: I sustain." (R. 839.)
"Q: And what was the purpose? What is your understanding of the reason for the release?
"MRS. MOQUIN: We object to her understanding of the release.
"THE COURT: Sustain." (R. 856.)
"Q: Was there some change made in the medication in May or June of 1992?
"A: Yes, the psychiatrist changed again and changed to Dr. James Hancock, and he began to move the medication slowly. He introduced Clonopin, I believe, Tegretol, some other drugs and finally he said to me, I think he needs' —
"MRS. MOQUIN: I object to what —
"THE COURT: I sustain." (R. 860.)
The appellant contends, for the first time on appeal that the testimony to which the State objected as hearsay was elicited for some other purpose than to prove the truth of the matter asserted and that, therefore, it was not hearsay and the trial court should not have sustained the objections. The appellant should have established at trial the reasons that the testimony would have been admissible. See Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84, 88 (Ala. 1982) (holding that the burden was on the party introducing the evidence to show that it is admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule). We hold that the trial court properly sustained the State's objections.
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Are you aware that there was an article in the newspaper, in the 'Dear Abby' report, where people had had dental surgery done that they were actually receiving radio transmissions through their fillings, sir?
"MR. BURGESS [defense counsel]: I object to that unless she is going to state a time or reference point for anything in 'Dear Abby' and when it was published and how it was disseminated.
"A: I read 'Dear Abby' frequently and am aware of that."
The appellant argues that the question propounded by the State was vague, uncertain, or ambiguous. We disagree. The question called for a yes or no answer. The witness, apparently knowing what the question referred to, answered affirmatively. We also must note that attorneys are given wide latitude in posing questions during crossexamination. Harris v. State, 632 So.2d 503 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), aff'd, 632 So.2d 543 (Ala. 1993), aff'd, 513 U.S. 504, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995); Mallett v. State, 594 So.2d 1297 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). The error, if any, in allowing the prosecutor to ask the question was harmless. However, there was no error by the trial court in allowing this question.
"Q [By Mrs. Moquin, prosecutor]: Dr. Preston, I need to know if you formed an opinion as to whether or not he could appreciate — if there was any kind of a mental illness that prevented him from being able to appreciate the nature or quality or wrongfulness of his actions on that night in question. Have you formed an opinion about that, sir?
"Q: And is it based on the litany of information that you provided to us thus far?
"Q: And what is that opinion?
"MR. BURGESS [defense counsel]: Object, Your Honor.
"A: My opinion regarding that is there was no mental illness that would have compromised his mental status at the time that I saw him, unless he had perhaps been under the influence of some sort of psycho-active substances, illegal — illegal substances.
"Q: All right, sir.
"MR BURGESS: We move to strike his response as being — compromised him when I saw him,' is not responsive to the question and move the jury be instructed to disregard [his testimony].
"THE COURT: I will overrule it on the Nichols v. State, [ 276 Ala. 209, 160 So.2d 619 (1964)] that gives both sides a lot of latitude where insanity is pleaded as a defense. Overruled."
The appellant's objection at trial was to the unresponsiveness of Dr. Preston testimony as appellant's mental state at the time he saw him when he was asked to give an opinion of the appellant's state of mind at the time of the murder. The appellant argues for the first time in brief to this court that the portion of Dr. Preston's testimony should have been excluded for reasons other than as nonresponsive. This issue, however, was not preserved for appeal. A statement of specific grounds waives all grounds not specified, and the court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial. Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987).
"Q [Mr. McDaniel, defense counsel]: Do you know who James Roy Accardi is?
"A: Assistant District Attorney.
"Q: Is he the one in charge of prosecuting your case?
"A: I don't know.
"Q: Have you ever had a conversation or meeting with Mr. Accardi and your lawyer present?
"Q: You went to Mr. Jim Accardi's office, the Assistant District Attorney, the one in charge with prosecuting your case along with Jamie Butler and gave them a statement?
"A: Yes sir." (R. 335-36.)
"Q: All right, fine. There have been no promises expressed or implied made by the State regarding any recommended sentence, is that right?
"Q: And done in February of 1992, correct?
"Q: Signed by Mr. James Roy Accardi, correct?
"A: Yes, sir." (R. 338.)
The fact that another assistant District Attorney was handling Bottorff's case was properly in evidence at the time of the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments.
"Write a letter to my boss. Tell my boss if you don't like those types of deals being made." (R. 1174.) The appellant voiced no objection to this remark during trial. When no objection is made following a prosecutor's allegedly objectionable remark, a claim of error based upon improper argument of counsel is not preserved for appellate review. Lee v. State, 562 So.2d 657, 666 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989); Thomas v. State, 622 So.2d 415 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), cert. quashed, 622 So.2d 420 (Ala. 1993).
"In order for a prosecutor's comments made during argument before the jury to require a new trial, the entire trial must have been so infected with unfairness as a result of these comments that the appellant was denied due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Hart v. State, 612 So.2d 520, 527 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), aff'd, 612 So.2d 536 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 953, 113 S.Ct. 2450, 124 L.Ed.2d 666 (1993). Any prejudice that might have resulted from the prosecutor's statement was dispelled by the trial court's instructions. Accordingly we hold that the court did not err in overruling the appellant's objection.
The appellant also argues that the prosecutor's statement that it looked to her like he had been doing "street drugs" long before he knew the victim was improper and that the trial court erred in allowing it. The appellant contends, and the record reflects, that he was eight years old when he first met the victim. (R. 834.) However, the record also reflects that appellant never objected to this remark during the trial. This issue is therefore not preserved for appellate review. Lee v. State, 562 So.2d 657 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989). Had the argument been properly preserved, the instructions to the jury from the trial court would have cured any error caused by this remark.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to bar the State from seeking the death penalty and to bar the death qualification of the jury. The appellant claims that the prosecution's election to seek the death penalty was arbitrary and discriminatory because, he says, the death penalty was not sought against his two codefendants. We hold that the issue is moot because the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. See, e.g. Beard v. State, 661 So.2d 789, 794 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995); Fox v. State, 602 So.2d 484, 488 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992).
The appellant's argument was rendered moot by the fact that the state elected to proceed against him on Count II of the indictment, and dismissed Count I. "Only the count upon which appellant was found guilty is subject to appellate review." Hammond v. State, 354 So.2d 280, 284 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. quashed, 354 So.2d 294 (Ala. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 823, 99 S.Ct. 91, 58 L.Ed.2d 115 (1978)
"(b) 'Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only be repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
" '3. The burden upon the defendant is to establish the issue of legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence and to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury. [Now, under Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-3-1(c), "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence."]
" '4. The question of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime is a matter to be determined by the jury from consideration of all the evidence.
" '6. However, opinion testimony, even of experts must be weighed by the jury and may not be arbitrarily ignored.
" Herbert v. State, 357 So.2d 683, 688-689 (Ala.Cr.App.[1978]) (Bracketed material added [in Dixon]), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 690 (Ala. 1978.)"
Dixon v. State, 668 So.2d 65, 69-70 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994).
Additionally, a two-part showing must be made by the defendant to meet the § 13A-3-1(a) test of insanity. "First, he must establish that he suffered from a serious mental disease or defect at the time of the crime. Second, his mental disease or defect must have prevented him from appreciating the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts." Ware v. State, 584 So.2d 939 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991) (emphasis added), citing United States v. Knott, 894 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873, 111 S.Ct. 197, 112 L.Ed.2d 158.
Clear and convincing evidence has been defined by this court in D.D.P. v. State, 595 So.2d 528, (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). We quote:
" 'Clear and convincing evidence is most easily defined as the evidentiary standard that lies somewhere between a preponderance of the evidence and evidence probative beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1807-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).' Matter of K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 995 (D.C.App. 1984). See generally 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); E.Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 340 (3rd ed. 1984); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1023 (1964)."
The State's final rebuttal witness, Dr. Frank Preston, was also the strongest witness for the state's position that appellant was able to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his actions at the time of Ms. McClure's murder. Dr. Preston testified that he had been treating the appellant from August 15, 1989, up until the time of the murder. (R. 1107.) He stated that during this time he saw the appellant every other week. (R. 1110, 1118.) Most importantly, Dr. Preston testified that he saw the appellant on July 24, 1990, the day of the murder. He stated that at that time there were no symptoms from the appellant's discontinuance from Lithium. (R. 1121.) He stated that the appellant was oriented and gave him no indication that he was suffering from an active psychotic episode. (R. 1121-22.) He further testified that the appellant was not in a psychotic state, that his ability to communicate was not compromised, that his thought processes appeared to be clear, and that there was no mental illness manifesting itself at that time in a way that would have compromised his mental status. (R. 1125.)
PATTERSON, McMILLAN, and LONG, JJ., concur.
"Quoting from Lawrence v. State, 409 So.2d 987 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
" ' "Specific objections or motions are generally necessary before the ruling of the trial judge is subject to review, unless the ground is so obvious that the trial court's failure to act constitutes prejudicial error. Ward v. State, 376 So.2d 1112 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), cert. denied, Ex parte Ward, 376 So.2d 1117 (Ala. 1979); Slinker v. State, 344 So.2d 1264 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977)." 409 So.2d at 989. (Emphasis added.)' "
Ex parte Purser, 607 So.2d 301, 302 (Ala. 1992).