Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US20070106621?ie=ISO-8859-1
Timestamp: 2015-03-06 08:36:07
Document Index: 109556826

Matched Legal Cases: ['arty 1', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 1', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 4', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 3', 'arty 1', 'arty 2', 'arty 3', 'arty 4', 'arty 1', 'arty 2']

Patent US20070106621 - Computerized dispute resolution system and method - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsA method and system for automated bargaining is disclosed. The method and system are used in testing non-equal values in normal rounds for satisfaction of a condition. If the condition is not satisfied in the normal rounds, power round values are tested for satisfaction of a power round condition. If...http://www.google.com/patents/US20070106621?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US20070106621 - Computerized dispute resolution system and methodAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS20070106621 A1Publication typeApplicationApplication numberUS 11/549,437Publication dateMay 10, 2007Filing dateOct 13, 2006Priority dateAug 6, 1998Also published asCA2542156A1, CN1894708A, EP1692644A2, EP1692644A4, US7831480, US7831523, US7840440, US8150775, US8335746, US20050080723, US20070118486, US20080065558, US20080126254, WO2005040982A2, WO2005040982A3Publication number11549437, 549437, US 2007/0106621 A1, US 2007/106621 A1, US 20070106621 A1, US 20070106621A1, US 2007106621 A1, US 2007106621A1, US-A1-20070106621, US-A1-2007106621, US2007/0106621A1, US2007/106621A1, US20070106621 A1, US20070106621A1, US2007106621 A1, US2007106621A1InventorsJames Burchetta, Charles BrofmanOriginal AssigneeBurchetta James D, Brofman Charles SExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManReferenced by (13), Classifications (24), Legal Events (3) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetComputerized dispute resolution system and method
It will now further be evident that alternative arrangements can combine the use of a facilitator to prompt for the use of a power round or only use the facilitator for a power round. In one scenario, the facilitator might be the one who suggests the power round after a series of unsuccessful rounds. In another instance, the facilitator might suggest changing the criteria for a power round without suggesting a particular change. This would allow for a greater possibility for agreement while not inviting either party to speculate regarding their opposite party's proposals. Thus, the intervention by the facilitator would not affect the neutrality of the system. In yet another instance, the facilitator could intervene immediately upon a power round being �bought� to, for example, provide a statement derived from the tabulated data from prior agreements. By way of example, a seller buys a power round in return for a $300 decrease in bargained payment. In this power round, the offer from the last round will be compared against a new counter-offer. The last offer was $10,000, the last counter-offer was $11,800, so the difference is $1,800. Assume that, in order to reach agreement, the offer and counter-offer must be within $1,200. The facilitator intervenes with a factual statement, derived from the tabulated data, that: �Over 75% of similar transactions to yours have completed for between $8,500 and $11,000 in this jurisdiction� or �Your last offer/counter-offer was off by more than 15% from the average agreement paid on similar transactions in your jurisdiction.� Having received one of these prompts, the seller drops the counter-offer to $11,000 and the transaction reach agreements. In this example, the payment is normally calculated as the median of the offer and counter-offer which satisfied the criteria. Since the agreement resulted from a $10,000 offer and a $11,000 counter-offer, the median is $10,500. However, since the agreement resulted from a power round bought by the seller for a $300 reduction, the bargained payment would be reduced by $300 to $10,200. Although in the basic arrangement, the agreement criteria may also differ among rounds, in some instances it is desirable to enforce a mandatory tier structure, which changes the criteria applied, based upon the counter-offer or offer amount. For example, the system can be set up so that for a counter-offer or offer below $10,000, the agreement criteria may be one or both of 30% or $2,500. If either the offer or counter-offer equals or goes over $10,000, the criteria changes to 30% or $5,000. If either the offer or counter-offer equals or exceeds $25,000 the criteria may change to one or both of 35% or $8,000. Of course, the specific cut-off point, range within which a criteria applies, or the particular percentage and/or differential amount used within a range may vary from system to system or bargaining transaction to bargaining transaction. Moreover, in some instances it may be desirable to allow one or more parties to specify the particulars for one or more of the above. Depending upon the implementation, it is possible for a particular counter-offer to fall within one range and an offer to fall in another range. In that transaction it is preferable to require that the differential between either a) max exposure and minimum gain satisfy the broadest criteria, or b) actual differential between offer and counter-offer satisfy the broadest criteria. Alternatively, prioritizing the usage of exposure/gain versus offer/counter-offer, prioritizing one criteria over another, or requiring satisfaction of both criteria can be employed. In some instances, particularly when the agreement amount is calculated to be the median, usage of a tiered arrangement can result in an agreement amount being higher than a maximum exposure or, depending upon the other options employed go below the minimum gain. An example of such a scenario is shown in Table 2. TABLE 2 Submission Criteria Specifics $10,000 �A� 30% or $2,500 $10,000 �B� 30% or $4,000 $85,000 �C� 35% or $10,000 Counter- Round Offer offer Criteria Exposure/Gain Result 1 $6,000 A $6,900 No Agreement $13,000 B $11,050 No Agreement 2 $8,000 A $9,200 Agreement $12,000 B $10,200 Agreement In the above scenario, criteria A applied in both rounds for both offers because they never exceeded $10,000. Similarly, criteria B applied in both rounds for the counter-offers because they both were greater than $10,000. There was no agreement in round 1 because neither the actual offer and counter-offer nor the exposure/gain met the specified criteria. In round 2, an agreement was reached because the $4,000 differential criteria was met by the offer and counter-offer and both the A and B criteria were satisfied by the exposure/gain differential. Since the exposure/gain governs the maximum to be paid or minimum to be received, using the median of the $8,000 offer and $12,000 counter-offer would result in a payment of $10,000. However, since the maximum exposure based upon the $8,000 offer is $9,200, the payment amount will be set equal to that exposure rather than the median. In the reverse transaction, the payment amount would be no less than the minimum gain. As a further alternative with the tiered arrangement, if the maximum exposure and minimum gain are equal, that condition could be used as a further or alternative agreement criteria. Depending upon the implementation a match between minimum gain amount and maximum exposure could be set automatically trigger an agreement and override any other specified criteria. In the transaction of a match between exposure and gain, that value would also override the payment amount calculation. As described herein, sponsors and agents may maintain an account with the provider of the bargaining system if they expect to submit transactions for bargaining with some regularity. However, it is well known agents can take high commissions for bargained transactions as well as fees, expenses and/or disbursements. Advantageously, since the system is directly accessible to non-agents on-line, for example, via the internet or telephone, bargaining is directly available to the individual without the normal risks or problems which can arise from a person acting as their own agent. As a result, sellers and opposite parties may each benefit in one or more of the following ways. There are four potential buyer benefits which can specifically result from a buyer directly initiating entry of their transaction for automated bargaining in the first instance. First, since the system does not deal with personalities or sales tactics, only the bottom line, a buyer need not be sophisticated, knowledgeable in sales tactics or a capable negotiator in order to obtain an acceptable agreement. Second, the buyer is not subject to a commission or other costs, although they might be charged some �engagement fee� as evidence of good faith or to discourage the submission of insincere transactions. In keeping with the on-line implementation aspect, the engagement fee will likely be chargeable to a credit card number submitted by the directly engaging party. Alternatively or additionally, the engagement fee could be returnable if an agreement is reached, for example, if a sponsor agrees to pay a fixed fee if the transaction is negotiated using the system or an agreement is reached using the system. Third, the transaction may be resolved much faster than would be the transaction through conventional bargaining routes since the buyer has greater control over the bargaining since they present the counter-offers rather than authorizing an agent to reach agreement for no less than a specified amount. Finally, in some instances, a seller may be unaware of the potential value of their transaction and thus submit counter-offers, leading to agreement, well below what the buyer would pay thorough conventional bargaining channels. There are also at least four potential benefits when a seller initiates the automated bargaining process for a given transaction. First, as with buyers, since the system does not deal with personalities or sales tactics, only the bottom line, a seller need not be sophisticated, knowledgeable in sales tactics or a capable negotiator in order to obtain an acceptable agreement. Secondly, in some instances, a buyer may also be unaware of the potential value of their transaction and thus submit counter-offers, leading to agreement, well above what the seller could have received thorough conventional bargaining channels. Further, since a seller can engage the system directly, rather than through an agent, the prospect of a quick agreement goes up because delays due to backlogs or inattentiveness of agents to smaller transactions in favor of larger ones are eliminated. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, use of the system may result in the seller receiving their payment faster and/or more conveniently. Parties can be attracted to the system using conventional print, radio and television media, word of mouth, links on websites, partnerships with portals or web based companies, and/or through affinity program arrangements. For example, airline companies may offer incentives in the form of discounts on tickets to buyers who directly engage the system. Alternatively, affinity programs can be arranged with entities such as airlines or credit card companies so that, if an agreement is reached, the seller will receive frequent flyer mileage or a debit card for the amount of the agreement. Other suitable partnerships and affinity arrangements can be set up, for example, with entities in the travel, investment, banking, automobile, publishing, housing or big ticket item businesses. Depending upon the particular circumstance a payment between bargaining system provider and the affinity program partner may be involved. Another optional variant provides a further incentive to a party to initiate entry of a transaction for automated bargaining. In this variant, if initial entry of a transaction is a result of a direct contact, the party submitting the transaction is identified as an initiator. The system logs that fact for later use if an agreement is reached. The rounds proceed according to the particular implementation used. If an agreement is reached in a particular round however, instead of calculating an agreement amount according to the normal formula, a transaction bargaining payment using a different formula is used which favors the initiator or alternatively a windfall amount adjustment is made to the normal payment amount which would normally be used when there was no �initiator�. An example of a no �initiator� instance is when the transaction is first submitted by an agent who has an account with the system. Depending upon the implementation, it may be desirable to require the buyer to �escrow� proceeds such that if an agreement is reached, the risk of post-agreement default is reduced. One way this can be accomplished, for small matters, is by putting through a charge in a specified escrow amount on their charge/credit or debit card. Another way to accomplish this purpose is to require the person to transfer funds from an account they hold into an escrow account maintained expressly for this purpose. In order to reasonably assess the amount necessary for escrow, the system can utilize the transaction information provided to identify similar transactions where agreements have been reached and, using that information, calculate an estimation of the required escrow amount sufficient to meet an agreement, if reached. The system is also preferably set up to credit any overage amount back to the buyer's credit card or account if the agreement figure reached is less than the escrow. By way of example, a seller seeking to sell an antique sees an article on a consumer oriented website about automated transaction bargaining. This causes the seller to go to the identified website which acts as an Internet interface to an automated bargaining system. The seller submits the transaction to the system and is charged an engagement fee of $75. Since the seller directly contacted the system and the opposite party's agent has not previously submitted this particular transaction to the system, the seller is flagged in the system as an initiator. At some time thereafter, the insurer agrees to also use the system for that transaction. The parties agree to a number of rounds and an agreement criteria, submit their respective values and the transaction reach agreements as a result of the analysis in the second round. The system is set up so that a normal payment amount would be the median of the value submitted by the opposite parties. However, as part of the calculation function, the system identifies that the initiator flag is set for the seller. As a result, the payment is calculated differently so as to provide a windfall benefit to the seller. For example, the seller may receive the offer amount, an amount specified by a new formula, some percent in excess of the median amount, a fixed amount bonus, or the median might be used in place of the lower of the offer or counter-offer in the particular formula, so as to provide a higher payment to the seller relative to what the seller could have obtained in the normal transaction. In a similar vein, if two parties to a transaction are both individuals and the opposite party is the initiator, the �windfall� would be in the form of a reduced payment amount relative to a normal payment amount. In still other implementations, the �windfall� may only be invoked if there is an initiator and the counter-offer and offer have crossed or pass each other, i.e. in one round the offer is less than the counter-offer and in the next round the offer is more than the counter-offer. In such a situation, the simplest windfall benefit to set the bargained payment to the initiator seller equal to the full offered amount rather than the calculated normal payment amount. Conversely, the simplest windfall for the initiator opposite party is to set the payment they will make equal to the counter-offer. It will be recognized that the specific windfall adjustment will depend upon the particular implementation used. Accordingly, the important aspect is that the system keeps track of whether a particular party is an initiator and there is some benefit which can accrue to the initiator when an agreement is reached. A further advantage flowing, in part, from the on-line nature of the system is the ability to automatically provide immediate payment to a seller or initiate an immediate transfer of the bargained payment or value when an agreement is reached. The system FIG. 7 is a simplified system variant which includes an interface 72 to effectuate payment to the seller automatically. For example, the interface 72 may be to a payment card account system such that if an agreement is reached, and the seller is a registered cardholder the seller's credit/debit/charge/entertainment card is automatically credited with the agreement amount. Similarly, if the seller has a smart card, stored value card, online creditable purse or module, or other on-line accessible way for the recipient to automatically (and preferably directly) receive the transfer, the system may be configured to automatically credit it with the agreement amount. Given the numerous ways known to transfer or receive value on-line and the rate of growth in new ways to do so, it will be appreciated that the basic principle is the automatic provision or transfer of value, not the particular scrip, protocol or device used to do so. Alternatively, the seller may provide the system with an account number into which a wire transfer of the funds may be automatically transferred. In some instances, the interface is merely a pre-configured vehicle for communicating with an authority in order to inform the authority that a transfer is to be made. In this manner suitable arrangements may be made so that the system can convert the agreement into a non-monetary payment-in-kind or transfer. For example, through an arrangement with an airline frequent flyer program, or other program offering �points�, the agreement can be converted into the appropriate amount of miles or points. Alternatively, the agreement may involve a non-monetary agreement figure which can automatically initiate a transfer of stocks, bonds, commodities, precious metals, gems, etc., lodged with an escrow agent. In such transactions, the value provided by the opposite party must be at least equal to the highest offer they will present. In the event of an agreement, the appropriate amount is calculated as the agreement figure and automatically transferred to the seller. For example, in the transaction of stocks, the shares will be automatically registered in the name of the seller. In the transaction of precious metals, an account will be automatically opened in the seller's name and a suitable amount will automatically be credited to that account. It will be recognized that, consistent with the description herein, automated bargaining would be extensible to apply to other payment-in-kind situations in a straightforward manner. It may also be desirable to implement the system such that, in response to an agreement, an automatic transfer of title or an ownership interest in something is initiated, for example in the case where the transaction is for real property and the payment may be made by transfer of title in the property from one to the other party. In such a transaction, suitable documents authorizing the transfer will be executed but not filed. If an agreement is reached, the system will automatically notify the appropriate entities and provide the necessary documents to effectuate the transfer with a minimum of seller involvement. Additionally variants may initiate issuance of some insurance product, such as an annuity or a fully paid up insurance policy in the agreement amount. One possible drawback to a system which allows a seller to directly engage the system is the seller's potential fear that, even if an agreement is reached, agent or attorney involvement may be required in order to consummate the agreement. Advantageously, the system may be optionally constructed to address that concern. In particular, the system may be constructed to automatically generate agreement documents when an agreement is reached. As described above, when the parties engage the system one or more of the parties provide transaction specific information. The system contains a number of templates which can be used to generate agreement documents appropriate for the transaction. For example, an agreement and/or release can be generated by extracting the appropriate information provided for the transaction and incorporating it into the template. Similarly, if sufficient information is provided for a transaction currently pending in a court, the system can use a suitable template to generate a stipulation and/or order of dismissal with prejudice, in accordance with the requirements of the particular jurisdiction. Once generated, the document can be accessed in a form conducive to printing and immediate execution or in a text format which allows further additions and/or modifications to be made to conform to local rules or custom. In the broadest sense, the on-line document feature can be likened to an having an automated clerk make a trip to the local stationary store for the appropriate legal form and type in the appropriate information. Alternatively, particular jurisdictions may restrict the form and type of document provided. As a result, the system is preferably constructed so as to take into account any such limits and restrictions within that jurisdiction and provide all appropriate disclaimers in that regard. Multiparty Aggregation Options Many multiparty bargains can be directly handled as a group of two party bargains as set forth above. However, in some transactions, particularly when the transaction involves a single entity against a group of entities for a transaction, aggregation of the group's individual offers or counter-offers can simplify processing. Depending upon the particular system, the aggregation can be fully or partly blind to some or all of the parties. For example, if a seller has a transaction against three separate parties (collectively �the group�), the group can be linked such that the system will still accept individual submissions from each. However, once received, individual submissions from each member of the group will be added to corresponding submissions of the others in the group to form one or more sets of aggregate values. The system is �fully blind� because the individual members of the group are not informed that the aggregation is being performed. An aggregate value is used in the system as if it was an offer or counter-offer submitted by a single entity. In this system, an �AggregateValues� module can be created which sums individual values from different entities sharing a common opposite party for a transaction. The system will compare the aggregate value against an opposing offer or counter-offer as described above. In other words, once aggregated, the bargaining can proceed as if it was a two party bargaining�because from the system perspective at that point, it is. It is important to note that, as with the two party bargaining, values submitted by all members of the group are not disclosed to their opposite party. Similarly, the system does not disclose the opposite party's submission to any member of the group. Depending upon the particular system configuration, the submissions from individual members of the group may not be disclosed to any other member of the group. In the transaction of a fully blind aggregation arrangement, individual submissions are not revealed to anyone other than the party making that submission. An example of a fully blind bargaining is shown in Table 3 TABLE 3 Reach agreement if (aggregate)offer is at least 75% of counter-offer Fully Blind (i.e. Party 1, 2 & 3 and seller do not know offers are combined. EXAMPLE 1: ROUND 1 Buyer (s) Seller Party 1 Offer $10,000 Party 2 Offer $15,000 Party 3 Offer $35,000 Total $60,000 Counter-offer = $65,000 Transaction reach agreements for $62,500 Party 1 contributes $10,416.67 (10,000/62,500 � $62,500) Party 2 contributes $15,625.00 (15,000/62,500 � $62,500) Party 3 contributes $36,458.33 (35,000/62,500 � $62,500) EXAMPLE 2: ROUND 1 Buyer Sellers Party 1 Counter- $25,000 offer Party 2 Counter- $18,000 offer Party 3 Counter- $35,000 offer Offer = $70,000 Total $78,000 Transaction reach agreements for $74,000 Party 1 receives $23,718 Party 2 receives $17,077 Party 3 receives $33,205 A partially blind arrangement allows the group access to each other submissions. To prevent escalation in submissions by one individual based upon the submission of another on the group, it is desirable to only allow an individual access to the submissions of others in the group after all the individual values have been submitted and the values have been locked against withdrawal or change. An example of this type of partially blind bargaining is shown in table 4: TABLE 4 Reach agreement if counter-offer and offer differ by less than $2,500 Partially Blind (i.e. Party 1, 2 & 3 know each others offers after all submitted) ROUND 1 Buyer (s) Seller Party 1 Offer $5,000 Party 2 Offer $12,000 Party 3 Offer $9,000 Party 4 Offer $11,500 Total $37,500 Counter-offer = $50,000 NO AGREEMENT ROUND 2 Buyer (s) Seller Party 1 Offer $10,000 Party 2 Offer $15,000 Party 3 Offer $10,000 Party 3 Offer $13590 Total $48,500 Counter-offer = $45,000 Transaction reach agreements for counter-offer amount of $45,000 Party 1 contributes $9,278.35 Party 2 contributes $13,917.53 Party 3 contributes $9,278.35 Party 4 contributes $12,525.77 Another partially blind arrangement allows the group to fully collaborate on a collective submission. In this transaction, the opposite party is informed that the offer or counter-offer is being submitted on behalf of party 1, party 2, etc. The opposite party then has the option of accepting or declining. If the opposite party accepts, and an agreement is reached, the transaction will be completed for all parties in the group and their opposite party. An example of this type of multiparty bargaining is shown in table 5. TABLE 5 Reach agreement if (aggregate) offer is at least 75% of counter-offer Partially Blind (i.e. Party A, B & D collectively submit offers as single values and seller is informed, �You have a transaction against Entities A, B, C & D. Offers are being submitted by Entity A on behalf of Entities A, B & D. Entity C declines to participate, if an agreement is reached you may be able to independently pursue your transaction against Entity C.� Round Aggregate Offer Seller's counter-offer Result 1 $100,000 $295,000 No Agreement 2 $110,000 $230,000 No Agreement 3 $120,000 $160,000 Reach agreement for $140,000 4 $128,000 $140,000 Entities A, B and D can then work out among themselves the apportionment, specify an apportionment so that the system will calculate an amount owing for each, or apportion the amount equally among all participants. In still another variant, once presented with the list of parties making up the group, the opposite party has the option of declining to negotiate with the group, but designating some members of the group with whom they will negotiate as a group. In this manner, a seller gets the ability to �opt out� one or more particular buyers, so as to attempt to bargain individually with them, and a buyer gets to opt out one or more sellers, to prevent one or more individuals, for example, those with a history of failing to provide the bargained for item. The aggregations may also be independently performed on both sides of a transaction. Thus, a group may submit offers for comparison against another group's counter-offers. Depending upon the particular implementation, the aggregation arrangement on one side of the transaction need not be the same as the aggregation performed on the other side of the transaction. In other words, offers may be submitted partially blind for comparison against counter-offers aggregated in a fully blind arrangement. In any transaction, if an agreement is reached, if the group whose submissions were aggregated will pay on the transaction, the payment will preferably be on a pro-rata proportional share. Alternatively, in some implementations, the members of the group can specify a payment allocation other than on a pro-rata basis. If the group is made up of individual parties who will receive payment, depending upon the particular system, the parties will each receive their respective counter-offers, rather than some median. Alternatively, additional modules can be created which perform more complex apportionment or allocation of payments to sellers. Additional Options Since the internet is a globally accessible media, particular embodiments may include a �ConvertEquateLocalCurrency� module created to allow opposite parties to submit offers or counter-offers in their local currency for comparison, even if the offers are submitted in one currency and the counter-offers in another. In this manner, each party can deal with a currency with which they are comfortable, thereby making the bargaining even more user friendly. Where disparate currencies are used, to analyze the offers and counter-offers the system will convert the all the currencies specified to a common currency, which may or may not be the same currency as the offers and counter-offers, for comparison. By way of example, if the offers were submitted in Japanese Yen and counter-offers submitted in Italian Lira, the system might use Yen, Lira, or some third currency, for example U.S. Dollars, Euros, or even Thai Bhat, depending upon the particular implementation. In a similar vein, an arrangement may be made with a currency exchange entity so that, if an agreement is reached, the seller can be paid in the currency of choice, irrespective of the currency the opposite party used to submit offers. For example, a Greek national submitting offers or counter-offers in U.S. dollars may specify automatic payment by crediting their Athens bank account in Drachmae. Other optional features include a �StructurePayment� module which will calculate a structured payment from the agreement amount in accordance with specific guidelines submitted buy a party. In this manner, spendthrift sellers can protect themselves by specifying that the payment not be provided as a lump sum, but rather incrementally over time. Coupled with one of the above payment options, the agreement could advantageously make monthly transfers to a stored value module, a credit card, a bank or brokerage account, quarterly payments to an insurance policy, or such other arrangements as the system provider can arrange. Other optional features include the use of different types of communications links (e.g. optical cables or wireless connections); distributed databases; state machines; combinations of secure and non-secure servers; distributed processing; or implementing certain options such as indicators or particular functions in hardware vs. in software and vice versa. Similarly, the principles may be implemented using different types of storage such as tape, solid state, optical, magneto-optical, etc., instead of, or in addition to those described herein. It should be understood that the above description is only representative of illustrative embodiments. For the convenience of the reader, the above description has focused on a representative sample of all possible embodiments, a sample that teaches the principles of the invention. The description has not attempted to exhaustively enumerate all possible variations or even combinations of those variations described. That embodiments may not have been presented for a specific portion of the invention, or that further undescribed embodiments may be available for a portion, is not to be considered a disclaimer of those embodiments. One of ordinary skill will appreciate that many of those undescribed embodiments, involve differences in technology rather than differences in the application of the principles of the invention. It will be recognized that, based upon the description herein, most of the principles of the invention will be transferable to other specific technology for implementation purposes. This is particularly the transaction when the technology differences involve different specific hardware and/or software. Accordingly, the invention is not intended to be limited to less than the scope set forth in the following transactions and equivalents. Referenced byCiting PatentFiling datePublication dateApplicantTitleUS7685073 *Jul 28, 2003Mar 23, 2010Baker Paul LMethods for negotiating agreement over concealed terms through a blind agentUS7818229Mar 9, 2006Oct 19, 2010Apollo Enterprise Solutions, Inc.Method for future payment transactionsUS7831480Oct 13, 2006Nov 9, 2010Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized transaction bargaining systemUS7831523 *Oct 13, 2006Nov 9, 2010Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized dispute resolution system and methodUS8150773Oct 30, 2007Apr 3, 2012Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized dispute resolution system and methodUS8150774Oct 30, 2007Apr 3, 2012Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.System and method for providing automated dispute resolution between or among multiple partiesUS8150775Oct 30, 2007Apr 3, 2012Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized transaction bargaining system and methodUS8335746Oct 30, 2007Dec 18, 2012Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized transaction bargaining system and methodUS8494970Oct 30, 2007Jul 23, 2013Cybersettle Holdings, Inc.Computerized dispute resolution system and methodUS8504468Oct 19, 2005Aug 6, 2013Apollo Enterprise Solutions, Inc.System and method for compiling information for resolving transactionsUS8510214Oct 19, 2005Aug 13, 2013Apollo Enterprise Solutions, Inc.System and method for resolving transactionsUS8768826Oct 19, 2005Jul 1, 2014Apollo Enterprise Solutions, Inc.System for resolving transactionsUS20130110731 *Oct 26, 2011May 2, 2013Lead WeyOnline Dating System* Cited by examinerClassifications U.S. Classification705/80, 705/1.1International ClassificationG06Q30/00, G06Q10/00, H04L9/00, G06Q99/00Cooperative ClassificationG06Q30/08, G06Q50/188, G06Q20/10, G06Q40/00, G06Q40/08, G06Q40/04, G06Q30/06, G06Q30/0641, G06Q30/0619European ClassificationG06Q30/08, G06Q20/10, G06Q50/188, G06Q30/06, G06Q40/08, G06Q40/00, G06Q30/0641, G06Q40/04, G06Q30/0619Legal EventsDateCodeEventDescriptionMay 9, 2014FPAYFee paymentYear of fee payment: 4Dec 5, 2012ASAssignmentFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:CYBERSETTLE, INC. F/K/A CYBER$ETTLE.COM, INC.;REEL/FRAME:029410/0500Effective date: 20121204Owner name: CYBERSETTLE HOLDING, INC., CONNECTICUTFree format text: SECURITY AGREEMENT;ASSIGNOR:CYBERSETTLE HOLDING, INC.;REEL/FRAME:029410/0743Effective date: 20121204Owner name: BROFMAN, CHARLES S, NEW YORKMay 8, 2007ASAssignmentOwner name: CYBERSETTLE HOLDINGS, INC., NEW YORKFree format text: CONFIRMATORY ASSIGNMENT;ASSIGNORS:BROFMAN, CHARLES S.;BURCHETTA, JAMES D.;REEL/FRAME:019260/0414Effective date: 20070402Owner name: CYBERSETTLE HOLDINGS, INC., NEW YORKFree format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:BROFMAN, CHARLES S;BURCHETTA, JAMES O.;REEL/FRAME:020279/0505;SIGNING DATES FROM 20070402 TO 20070420RotateOriginal ImageGoogle Home - Sitemap - USPTO Bulk Downloads - Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - About Google Patents - Send FeedbackData provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent Services