Source: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/bia-precedent-chart-d-i
Timestamp: 2017-07-27 00:51:07
Document Index: 203579423

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 236', '§1231', '§241', '§ 1225', '§ 1229', '§ 1003', '§ 1236', '§ 1236', '§ 1236', '§ 1226', '§ 1236', '§ 3', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§ 1226', '§1226', '§ 287', '§ 245', '§ 1182', '§ 3', '§ 1255', '§1251', '§ 1251', '§ 3', '§ 1251', '§ 1251', '§ 921', '§ 1227', '§1251', '§ 1251', '§ 851', '§ 1101', '§ 1229', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 1229', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§1252', '§ 1252', '§1252', '§1252', '§ 1229', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1255', '§ 1252', '§ 1229', '§ 3', '§3', '§1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§3', '§ 1182', '§ 1182', '§ 1542', '§ 1227', '§ 1182', '§ 1182']

BIA Precedent Chart D-I | EOIR | Department of Justice
BIA Precedent Chart D-I
(1) The Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from a district director’s custody determination that was made after the entry of deportation or removal pursuant to 8C.F.R. Â§ 236.1 (1999), regardless of whether the alien formally initiated the review.
(2) An alien subject to a final order of deportation based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, who is unable to be deported, may be eligible for release from detention after the expiration of the removal period pursuant to section 241(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1231(a)(6) (Supp. II 1996).
(3) Where an alien seeking review of a district director’s post-final-order custody determination failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the release would not pose a danger to the community pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Â§241.4(a) (1999), the district director’s decision to continue detention was sustained.
An alien who is initially screened for expedited removal under section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1225(b)(1)(A) (2000), as a member of the class of aliens designated pursuant to the authority in section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), but who is subsequently placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229a (2000), following a positive credible fear determination, is eligible for a custody redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge unless the alien is a member of any of the listed classes of aliens who are specifically excluded from the custody jurisdiction of Immigration Judges pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Â§ 1003.19(h)(2)(i) (2004).
(1) “Custody,” as the term is used in the regulation at 8 C.F.R. Â§ 1236.1(d)(1) (2008) relating to requests for amelioration of the terms of release from custody, requires actual physical restraint or confinement within a given space.
(2) The respondent, who requested “amelioration of the terms of release” from an Immigration Judge following his release from detention by the Department of Homeland Security with conditions requiring an electronic monitoring device and home confinement, was “released from custody” within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. Â§ 1236.1(d)(1).
(3) The Immigration Judge lacked jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s request for amelioration of the terms of his release under 8 C.F.R. Â§ 1236.1(d)(1) where the respondent had been “released from custody” more than 7 days prior to his request.
(1) An Immigration Judge has authority under section 236(a)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(a)(2)(A) (2006), and 8 C.F.R. Â§ 1236.1(d)(1) (2009) to review and consider whether to modify the conditions of release imposed on an alien by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).
(1) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.19(i)(2), published as a final rule in 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,448-49 (1998), the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s filing of a Form EOIR-43 (Notice of INS Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination) provides an automatic stay of an Immigration Judge’s order releasing an alien who is charged with removal under one of the mandatory detention grounds set forth in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996), even where the Immigration Judge has determined that the alien is not subject to section 236(c)(1) and has terminated the removal proceedings on that charge.
(1) For purposes of determining the custody conditions of a lawful permanent resident under section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226 (Supp. II 1996), and 8 C.F.R. Â§3.19(h)(2)(ii) (1999), a lawful permanent resident will not be considered "properly included" in a mandatory detention category when an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals finds, on the basis of the bond record as a whole, that it is substantially unlikely that the Immigration and Naturalization Service will prevail on a charge of removability specified in section 236(c)(1) of the Act.
(3) When an Immigration Judge’s removal decision precedes the determination, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.19(h)(2)(ii), whether an alien is "properly included" in a mandatory detention category, the removal decision may properly form the basis for that determination.
(4) An automatic stay of an Immigration Judge’s release order that has been invoked by the Service pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.19(i)(2) is extinguished by the Board’s decision in the Service’s bond appeal from that release order.
(1) Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. Â§1226(c) (Supp. II 1996), does not apply to aliens whose most recent release from custody by an authority other than the Immigration and Naturalization Service occurred prior to the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules.
A criminal alien who is released from criminal custody after the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(c) (Supp. V 1999), even if the alien is not immediately taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service when released from incarceration.
(1) An alien who has been apprehended at home while on probation for criminal convictions is subject to mandatory detention under section 236(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(c)(1) (2000), regardless of the reason for the most recent criminal custody, provided it can be ascertained from the facts that he was released from criminal custody after October 8, 1998, the expiration date of the Transition Period Custody Rules.
(1)The language of section 236(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(c)(1) (2006), does not support limiting the non-DHS custodial setting solely to criminal custody tied to the basis for detention under that section.
(1) The Attorney General has broad discretion in bond proceedings under section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1226(a) (2000), to determine whether to release an alien on bond
(1) In a custody redetermination under section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1226(a) (2000), where an alien must establish to the satisfaction of the Immigration Judge that he or she does not present a danger to others, a threat to the national security, or a flight risk, the Immigration Judge has wide discretion in deciding the factors that may be considered.
Matter of Fatahi, 26 I&N Dec. 791 (BIA 2016)
In determining whether an alien presents a danger to the community at large and thus should not be released on bond pending removal proceedings, an Immigration Judge should consider both direct and circumstantial evidence of dangerousness, including whether the facts and circumstances present national security considerations. Terrorists
The mandatory detention provisions of section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1226(c) (Supp. IV 1998), do not apply to an alien who was convicted after the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules (“Transition Rules”), but who was last released from the physical custody of state authorities prior to the expiration of the Transition Rules and who was not physically confined or restrained as a result of that conviction.
Until an alien who is arrested without a warrant is placed in formal proceedings by the filing of a Notice to Appear (Form I-862), the regulation at 8 C.F.R. Â§ 287.3(c) (2011) does not require immigration officers to advise the alien that he or she has a right to counsel andthat any statements made during interrogation can subsequently be used against the alien.
(2) The regulations at 8 C.F.R. Â§Â§ 245.2(a) and 236.4 (1994) grant limited jurisdiction to the Immigration Judge in exclusion proceedings to adjudicate adjustment applications that have been denied by the district director, but only if the alien, after first having been inspected and admitted into the United States, had applied to adjust status and then departed the country under a grant of advance parole.
An applicant for asylum who departed the United States after having been granted an advance authorization for parole, and who, on his return, was paroled into this country under the provisions of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1182(d)(5) (Supp. V 1993), was properly placed in exclusion proceedings following the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s denial of his application for asylum and revocation of his parole. Navarro-Aispura v. INS, 53 F.3d 233 (9th Cir. 1995); and Barney v. Rogers, 83 F.3d 318 (9th Cir. 1996), distinguished.
The regulatory language at 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.23(b)(4)(iii)(B) (1998) contains no time or numerical limitations on aliens who wish to file a motion to reopen exclusion proceedings conducted in absentia.
A returning applicant for legalization under section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1255a (1988 & Supp. III 1991), may not, by virtue of his membership in the class action suit of Catholic Social Services v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D.Cal.1988), aff'd sub nom. Catholic Social Services v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993), successfully file a motion to terminate exclusion proceedings based on the doctrine set forth in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
An alien convicted of attempting or conspiring to commit a firearms violation is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1251(a)(2)(C) (1994), which applies retroactively to convictions entered before, on, or after October 25, 1994. Matter of Hou, 20 I&N Dec. 513 (BIA 1992), superseded.
(1) Where the statute under which an alien was convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Board of Immigration Appeals looks to the record of conviction, and to other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense of which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
(2) A police report, standing alone, is not part of a "record of conviction," nor does it fit any of the regulatory descriptions found at 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.41 (1995) for documents that are admissible as evidence in any proceeding before an Immigration Judge in proving a criminal conviction, and it therefore should not be considered in determining whether the specific offense of which an alien was convicted constituted a firearms violation.
(1) Where the statute under which an alien has been convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Immigration and Naturalization Service must establish through the record of conviction, and other documents admissible as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, that the specific offense of which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994).
(1) Where the statute under which an alien has been convicted encompasses offenses that constitute firearms violations and offenses that do not, the Board of Immigration Appeals will look beyond the statute, but only to consider such facts which appear from the record of conviction, or other documents admissible under federal regulations as evidence in proving a criminal conviction, to determine whether the specific offense for which the alien was convicted constitutes a firearms violation within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1251(a)(2)(C) (1994).
(1) In removal proceedings, the antique firearm exception in 18 U.S.C. Â§ 921(a)(3) (2006) is an affirmative defense that must be sufficiently raised by an alien charged under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1227(a)(2)(C) (2006), as an alien who has been convicted of an offense involving a firearm.
(1) In order to establish deportability under section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1251(a)(4)(C)(i) (1994), the Immigration and Naturalization Service has the burden of proving by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the Secretary of State has made a facially reasonable and bona fide determination that an alien’s presence or activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.
(1) Section 241(a)(4)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1251(a)(4)(A)(i) (1994), which provides for the deportability of any alien who after entry has engaged in Aany activity to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage,@ does not require evidence that the alien was either engaged in an act of espionage or was convicted of violating a law relating to espionage.
(2) An alien who has knowledge of, or has received instruction in, the espionage or counter-espionage service or tactics of a foreign government in violation of 50 U.S.C. Â§ 851 (1994), is deportable under section 241(a)(4)(A)(i) of the Act.
For purposes of section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1101(f)(6) (1994), false oral statements under oath to an asylum officer can constitute false testimony as defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Phinpathya v. INS, 673 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 464 U.S. 183 (1984).
(1) Because an application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1229b(b)(1) (2000), is a continuing one for purposes of evaluating an alien’s moral character, the period during which good moral character must be established ends with the entry of a final administrative decision by the Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals.
An alien who has made a false claim of citizenship may be considered a person who is not of good moral character, but the catch-all provision of section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1101(f) (2006), does not automatically mandate such a finding.
An alien cannot establish good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012), if, during the period for which it is required, he or she gives false testimony under oath in proceedings before an Immigration Judge with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits. IN ABSENTIA PROCEEDINGS
The conduct underlying an alien’s arrest and incarceration does not constitute “fault” within the meaning of section 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2006), which provides that an order of removal issued at a hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded if the alien was in Federal or State custody at the time of the scheduled hearing and the failure to appear was “through no fault of the alien.”
An order of deportation issued following a hearing conducted in absentia may be rescinded under section 242B(c)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(c)(3)(Supp. V 1993), where an alien properly establishes that his failure to appear was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel which amounts to "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act.
Neither an alien’s long-standing minor illness existing prior to a grant of voluntary departure nor an allegation of serious illness to others, including family members, establishes the requisite exceptional circumstances under section 242B(f)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(f)(2) (1994), in the absence of evidence specifying how such circumstances resulted in the alien’s failure to depart, which renders him or her ineligible for certain forms of discretionary relief from deportation under section 242B(e)(2) of the Act.
An alien failed to establish that a serious headache he suffered on the day of his deportation hearing amounted to exceptional circumstances to excuse his failure to appear within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(f)(2)(1994), where he gave no explanation for neglecting to contact the Immigration Court on the day of the hearing and did not support his claim with medical records or other evidence, such as affidavits by persons with knowledge regarding the extent and seriousness of the alien’s headache and the remedies he used to treat it.
An alien who claimed that his failure to appear at his deportation hearing resulted from an “illegible hearing date” on the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) failed to establish by sufficient evidence that he received inadequate notice of the hearing under section 242B(c)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1252b(c)(3)(B)(1994), or that his absence was the result of exceptional circumstances under section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act.
(1) The provisions of section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b (1994), apply any time an alien, whose presence has not been excused by the Immigration Judge, fails to appear for a deportation hearing after proper notice has been issued pursuant to section 242B, regardless of whether the issue of deportability has already been addressed or resolved and regardless of whether the alien has someone else appear on his behalf.
An alien seeking to reopen in absentia proceedings based on her unsuccessful communications with her attorney did not establish exceptional circumstances pursuant to section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), where she failed to satisfy all of the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff'd, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to the 180-day statutory limit for the filing of a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order of deportation under section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
The Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an in absentia order in removal proceedings where section 240(b)(5)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229b(b)(5)(C) (Supp. II 1996), provides that such an order may only be rescinded by filing a motion to reopen with the Immigration Judge. Matter of Gonzalez-Lopez, 20 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1993), followed.
(1) Under section 242B(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993), service of the Order to Show Cause (Form I-221) must be given in person to the respondent or, if personal service is not practicable, such notice must be given by certified mail to the respondent or to his counsel of record, if any, with the requirement that the certified mail receipt be signed by the respondent or a responsible person at the respondent’s address to accomplish personal service. Matter of Huete, 20 I&N Dec. 250 (BIA 1991), followed.
(1) Under section 242B(e)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(e)(3) (1994), an alien who has received oral notice in the alien’s native language or in another language the alien understands and written notice in the final order of deportation of the consequences for failing to appear for deportation, and who nevertheless fails to appear for deportation at the time and place ordered, other than because of exceptional circumstances, is ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1255 (1994), for a period of 5 years after the date the alien was required to appear for deportation.
(1) Language contained in the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221), which provides that notice of deportation hearings will be sent only to a respondent’s last known address and that failure to provide an address may result in an in absentia hearing, is a reasonable construction of the notice requirements set forth in section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b (1994).
(1) When an alien fails to appear at removal proceedings for which notice of the hearing was served by mail, an in absentia order may only be entered where the alien has received, or can be charged with receiving, a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) informing the alien of the statutory address obligations associated with removal proceedings and of the consequences of failing to provide a current address, pursuant to section 239(a)(1)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1229(a)(1)(F) (Supp. V 1999).
(2) The regulations at 8 C.F.R. Â§ 3.13 (2002) do not require that the notice to appear or notice of hearing in removal proceedings be sent to the alien or the alien’s attorney of record by regular mail, as opposed to certified mail.
(1) The regulation at 8 C.F.R. Â§3.23(b)(4)(iii) (1998) imposes no time or numerical limitation on aliens seeking to reopen deportation proceedings conducted in absentia pursuant to section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§1252(b) (1988). Matter of Mancera, 22 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 1998), reaffirmed.
(2) When an alien seeks to reopen deportation proceedings conducted in absentia pursuant to section 242(b) of the Act, it is appropriate to apply the “reasonable cause” standard, not the “exceptional circumstances” standard set forth in section 242B of the Act, 8U.S.C. Â§ 1252b (Supp. II 1990).
(1) Where an alien who did not receive oral warnings of the consequences of failing to appear at a deportation hearing pursuant to section 242B(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1252b(a) (1994), moves to reopen deportation proceedings held in absentia under section 242B(c) of the Act in order to apply for a form of relief that was unavailable at the time of the hearing, the rescission requirements prescribed by section 242B(c)(3) of the Act are not applicable. Instead, the motion to reopen is subject to the regulatory requirements set forth at 8 C.F.R. Â§Â§3.2(c) 3.23(b)(3) (1998).
(1) An alien may be rendered inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006), on the basis of a conviction for possession or use of drug paraphernalia.
(2) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Act based on a drug paraphernalia offense may qualify for a waiver of IN ADMISSIBILITY under section 212(h) of the Act if that offense “relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”
(1) An alien who willfully and knowingly makes a false representation of birth in the United States on a passport application is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006), for making a false representation of United States citizenship.
(2) The respondent, who was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Â§ 1542 (2006) for falsely representing that she was born in the United States on an application for a passport, is removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006), as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of her adjustment of status under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act.
Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779 (BIA 2016)
(3) Avoiding removal proceedings qualifies as a “purpose” within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Act. Material Support for a Terrorist Organization (Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)
Matter of M-H-Z-, 26 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2016)
(1) A single act of soliciting prostitution on one’s own behalf does not fall within section 212(a)(2)(D)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Â§ 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2006), which provides for the IN ADMISSIBILITY of an alien who “procured . . . prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution.”
Waiver of Inadmissibility for Nonimmigrants
Immigration Judges do not have authority to adjudicate a request for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012), by a petitioner for U nonimmigrant status. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL