Source: https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2010/02/ip-update-vol-13-no-2-february-2010
Timestamp: 2017-12-12 04:43:11
Document Index: 627980883

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1', '§ 101', '§ 121', '§ 121', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 154', '§ 154', '§ 1', '§ 154', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 154', '§ 154', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 154', '§ 2', '§ 2']

IP Update, Vol. 13, No. 2, February 2010 | Publications | Thought Leadership | McDermott Will and Emery
IP Update, Vol. 13, No. 2, February 2010
Leigh J. Martinson Lynne Boisineau Stefan M. Meisner
Patents / Infringement - DSU Notwithstanding, Federal Circuit Finds Inducement May Be Based on Actions Taken in “Deliberate Disregard” of U.S. Patent
Patents / Damages - Only Licenses Involving the Patents-In-Suit Can Be Considered When Determining A Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement
Patents / Inequitable Conduct / Obviousness / Anticipation - Failure to Disclose Contradictory Statements Made in Another Forum Supports Inequitable Conduct Finding
Patents / Antitrust - A Combination of Non-Conclusory Factual Allegations Satisfies Twombly for a Sherman Act §1 Claim and Can Proceed to Trial
Patents / Claim Construction - Construction of Claim Term “Personal Action” in Elevator Patent Goes Down
Patents/ Obviousness Type Double Patenting - Retroactive Terminal Disclaimer Not Allowed and Safe Harbor Applies to Divisional of Divisional
Patents / Law Firm Disqualification - Federal Circuit Disqualifies Law Firm for Attorney Ethics Violation
Patents / Patent Eligible Subject Matter (§ 101) - Claiming Computer Readable Media
Patents / Patent Term Adjustment Calculations - Update: USPTO Announces Interim Procedure for Requesting Recalculation of Patent Term Adjustment Under Wyeth v. Kappos
Trademarks / Likelihood of Confusion - Go Team! University of Southern California’s “SC” Mark Dominates University of South Carolina
Copyrights / VARA / Unfinished Works - VARA Deals with Unfinished Business
Copyright - Google Held Liable for Copyright Infringement for Bulk Scanning of Books
Trade Secret/ Forum Non Conveniens - Even if Neither Party Resides in the District, Trade Secret Suit Venue Is OK
Patents / Inequitable Conduct / Obviousness / Anticipation
Stefan Meisner and Carrie Amezcua
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that a terminal disclaimer cannot be effective if it is filed after the expiration of the earlier patent. The Court determined that the safe harbor provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 121 apply to a divisional of a divisional. Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH and Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. and Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , Case No. 09-1032 (Fed. Cir., Jan. 25, 2010) (Linn, J.; Dyk, J., dissenting-in-part).
Boehringer sued Mylan for patent infringement after being notified by Mylan of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for generic pramipexole. The Mylan case was consolidated with an earlier action against Barr Laboratories. Mylan argued that the asserted claims of the patent in suit, the third in a chain of related patents, were invalid for obviousness-type patenting in view of an earlier issued patent. The district court agreed and held the patent in suit invalid for obviousness-type patenting. During the litigation, Boehringer filed a terminal disclaimer in the patent in suit over the earlier issued patent, which had already expired before the terminal disclaimer was filed. The district court deemed this “retroactive” terminal disclaimer inoperative. The district court also rejected Boehringer’s safe harbor theory of removing another earlier patent as an invalidating reference. Boehringer appealed both points.
In addressing Boehringer’s arguments with respect to the terminal disclaimer, the Federal Circuit noted that the “fundamental reason for the rule [of obviousness-type double patenting] is to prevent unjustified timewise extension of the right to exclude.” Here, Boehringer did not file its terminal disclaimer until long after the earlier patent had expired. The Court reasoned that “[b]y failing to terminally disclaim a later patent prior to the expiration of an earlier related patent, a patentee enjoys an unjustified advantage—a purported time extension of the right to exclude from the date of the expiration of the earlier patent. The patentee cannot undo this unjustified timewise extension by retroactively disclaiming the term of the later patent because it has already enjoyed rights that it seeks to disclaim.”
The Court, however, did overturn the district courts denial of the safe harbor provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 121. The arguments presented centered around the “as a result of” statutory language. The claims of Boehringer’s original application faced a multi-way restriction requirement. The patent in suit was technically a “divisional of a divisional.” The Court reasoned that the safe harbor provision applied because there was “consonance with the restriction requirement” as originally issued, even though the patent in suit included more than one group of the originally -restricted claims. Thus, because the patent in suit honored the lines of demarcation drawn by the examiner in the restriction requirement, the Court concluded that the safe harbor provision applied.
Practice Note: All terminal disclaimers should be filed during the pendency of the parent patent.
Patents / Law Firm Disqualification
Claiming Computer Readable Media
Refining its previous guidance regarding patent eligible subject matter, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a formal suggestion to applicants pursuing applications directed to computer readable media. The notice is available online at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/notices/101_crm_20100127.pdf.
In August 2009, the USPTO issued revised guidelines for examination of patent claims under Section 101 (see IP Update, Volume 12, No. 9). The revised guidelines continued to recognize Beauregard claims, for media bearing computer instructions, as a patent-eligible article of manufacture. However, in view of the Nuijten decision (see IP Update, Vol. 10, No. 10), which held that per se “signals” are ineligible for patenting under § 101, the USPTO indicated the phrase computer readable medium alone is too broad for § 101 eligibility. Instead, the guidelines indicated such claims must be directed to a non-transitory, tangible computer readable storage medium. The recent notice reiterates these points, explaining that the phrase computer readable medium, when broadly construed, covers both non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per se.
The notice specifically suggests that applicants add the limitation “non-transitory” to computer readable media claims in order to narrow such claims to exclude transitory embodiments that may be deemed ineligible in view of the Nuijten decision. The notice indicates that this amendment should be acceptable in the majority of applications. However, the notice cautions that in some applications, where the only disclosed embodiment is a signal per se, the specification may not support such an amendment.
Update: USPTO Announces Interim Procedure for Requesting Recalculation of Patent Term Adjustment Under Wyeth v. Kappos
On January 7, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that patentees, Wyeth and Elan Pharma International Ltd., were entitled to extended patent term adjustments (PTA) because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office misinterpreted the statute 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), which provides for patent term adjustment (PTA) for certain USPTO delays. Wyeth v. Kappos, (see IP Update, Vol. 13, No. 1). Soon after, the USPTO announced it would not seek further review of the Federal Circuit decision but would instead change “the manner in which [it would] calculate patent term adjustments” under § 154. The revised program will calculate overlapping days consistent with Wyeth and is expected to be completed by March 2, 2010. For now, the USPTO is providing patentees of patents issuing prior to March 2, 2010 the opportunity to request recalculation of PTA and will waive the fee and petition required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(d).
To take advantage of this optional interim procedure, a patentee must meet the following criteria: the patent must be issued prior to March 2, 2010; the sole basis for requesting reconsideration of PTA must be the USPTO’s pre-Wyeth interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A); a Request for Recalculation of Patent Term Adjustment in View of Wyeth form (PTO/SB/131) must be submitted within 180 days of the day the patent was issued. The form is available on the USPTO website at http://www.uspto.gov/forms/index.jsp.
The interim procedure does not apply to patents issued on or after March 2, 2010, to requests that the USPTO recalculate the PTA for alleged errors other than those identified in Wyeth or to any request for reconsideration of PTA that is filed later than 180 days after the patent was granted. Additionally, the interim procedure is not a basis for requesting a refund of the required fee in 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(e) for any previously filed request under 37 C.F.R. § 1.705, including requests that were based on the USPTO’s pre-Wyeth interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A). Furthermore, should a patentee wish to preserve its right to review of the USPTO’s patent term adjustment determination in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, it must also take the steps required under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3) and (b)(4) (i.e., within 180 days after grant of the patent) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.705 (i.e., within two months of issuance of the patent).
For patents issuing on or after March 2, 2010, a patentee may file under 37 C.F.R. § 1.705(d) a request for reconsideration of PTA.
Practice Note: To avoid a potential loss of a right to a civil action seeking reviewing of the USPTO’s determination of PTA, patentees who file a request using the optional interim procedure should docket a reminder of the deadline under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(3) and (b)(4) (i.e., within 180 days after grant of the patent) in the event that the USPTO’s PTA decision arrives after the 180 day time period.
Go Team! University of Southern California’s “SC” Mark Dominates University of South Carolina
The U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit affirmed a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) decision refusing registration of the University of South Carolina’s (South Carolina) “SC” design mark and granting summary judgment in favor of the University of Southern California (Southern Cal), while denying a counterclaim cancellation action filed by South Carolina attempting to cancel Southern Cal’s registration for its standard character “SC” mark. The University of South Carolina v. University of Southern California, Case No. 09-1064 (Fed. Cir., Jan. 19, 2010) (Wilken, Dist. J., sitting by designation) (nonprecedential).
South Carolina filed a trademark application for its “SC” logo, covering clothing goods such as hats, t-shirts, and uniforms. Southern Cal opposed South Carolina’s application, claiming a likelihood of confusion with its prior registrations for the “SC” block letter character mark and its “SC” design mark. South Carolina counterclaimed in an attempt to cancel the Southern Cal block letter registration under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, claiming Southern Cal’s “SC” mark suggested a false association with the state of South Carolina.
The TTAB refused registration of South Carolina’s mark due to a likelihood of confusion with Southern Cal’s registrations based on several DuPont factors. The TTAB determined the marks were legally identical and would appear on the same classes of goods in the same channels of trade. It also found that consumers would exercise little care in making decisions to purchase such goods. South Carolina challenged the TTAB’s findings of similar trade channels and the degree of care in making purchases, noting the absence of evidence of any actual confusion.
The Court found that the goods covered by Southern Cal’s block letter registration in Classes 6, 18 and 24 (key rings, tote bags, blankets, etc.) were sold through “University authorized” trade channels and, as such, Southern Cal’s and South Carolina’s marks would likely appear on similar goods in similar channels of trade. It held that confusion was likely.
The Court also found no substantial evidence to support the fact that goods would be purchased by less sophisticated consumers such as “new or casual fans,” but determined this to be harmless error. The Court noted that the marks being legally identical and appearing on the same classes of goods in the same trade channels were factors which, on their own, would support a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Additionally, the Court agreed with the TTAB that without evidence showing the marks commingled within retailers for a significant length of time, the fact that there was no evidence of actual confusion weighed only slightly in favor of South Carolina. Thus, the Court found a likelihood of confusion between the marks and refused registration of South Carolina’s “SC” mark.
Cancellation Based on False Association
While the TTAB denied South Carolina’s cancellation counterclaim finding the university was not an agent of the state and had no standing to assert the § 2(a) claim, the Court held that the TTAB took an unreasonably limited view of standing and found that the university did have a direct commercial interest in the cancellation proceeding. However, the Court still affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that South Carolina failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Southern Cal’s “SC” mark was “unmistakably associated” with and “pointed uniquely” to the state so as to create a false association. Rather, the Court found that Southern Cal demonstrated evidence that the “SC” initials refer to at least 16 other universities and colleges aside from the state. Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment against South Carolina.
Practice Note: While the Court technically only affirmed Southern Cal’s prior rights in the standard character “SC” mark in connection with its various enumerated goods and services, this decision appears to provide Southern Cal with grounds for future trademark infringement actions and/or dilution claims against any parties using the letters “SC,” simply by being the first to file an application for same. In light of the 16 other colleges and universities using the “SC” reference (as well as other non-academic entities potentially using same), this decision appears to have granted Southern Cal significant leverage in term of exploiting the “SC” letter combination.
Copyrights / VARA / Unfinished Works
The Paris Court of First Instance’s third chamber has ruled that Google Inc.’s bulk scanning of books for its Google Book Search website, done without permission from copyright holders, infringed the copyrights on hundreds of French books. Editions du Seuil v. Google Inc., T.G.I. Paris, 79 PTCJ 226, 1/1/10 (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 3ème Chamber, Dec 18, 2009).
The case raised the issue as to whether Google’s digitization of copyrighted works of French origin and making extracts of them available in response to searches without the permission of authors infringed copyright. The works in question were scanned in the United States and were made available from servers in the United States to users worldwide, including in France. Accordingly, Google argued that based on Article 5.2 of the Berne Convention, the American legal principle of “fair use” should apply. The French court did not accept the argument, holding that the law applicable to complex crimes committed on the internet was that of the state on whose territory the conduct at issue occurred. The court held that French law applied because France had the closest connection with the lawsuit: the plaintiffs were companies established in France and the case involved French authors’ works and French publishers. Further, the scanned material was aimed at readers in France, using a French language website “Google Livres” (http://books.google.fr).
The French court also rejected Google’s arguments that its then-pending settlement of U.S. class-action lawsuits filed by the U.S. Authors Guild, several authors and publishers should be enforceable in France and that book extracts on Google Livres should be considered informative, brief quotations and consequently legal.
The court addressed the issue whether Google should be held liable for making infringing copies under French copyright law. Google argued that it had never made full copies of any of the works and should benefit from an exception to French copyright law that allowed reproduction of short quotations from copyrighted works for informative purposes. However, under French law, the exception of short quotations requires some intellectual work and aim at illustrating the subject matter of the work in which it is incorporated. Accordingly, the court rejected the argument on the basis that Google had posted books’ entire cover pages, chose book extracts at random and harmed authors’ moral rights with some of the short quotations.
The court ordered Google to pay €300,000 in damages and interest to French publisher Seuil, Delachaux & Niestle and to American publisher Harry N. Abrams, both subsidiaries of the French group La Martinière. It also ordered Google to pay a nominal one euro to national publishers’ and authors’ association, Syndicat national de l’édition et à la Société des gens de lettres. In addition, Google was ordered to immediately take down posted excerpts of the publisher’s works and cease scanning and posting further excerpts on penalty of a further €10,000 for each day it delayed to remove the content from its site.
Practice Note: Given that in the French legal system an appeal leads to a new trial during which the appeals court would completely re-evaluate factual and legal issues, it is possible that the decision will be reversed. While the ruling may inspire publishers throughout Europe to file further lawsuits against Google in an attempt to obtain damages for copyright infringement, copyright laws in Europe differ from country to country and the French decision will have no legal effect on courts in other EU countries.
Trade Secret/ Forum Non Conveniens
Even if Neither Party Resides in the District, Trade Secret Suit Venue Is OK
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court dismissal of a trade secrets suit based on forum non conveniens, holding that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the public and private interest factors relevant to such determination. Neuralstem, Inc., v. ReNeuron, Ltd., Case No. 08-56546 (9th Cir., Feb. 9, 2010) (per curiam).
Neuralstem, a Maryland corporation, sued ReNeuron, an English corporation, in the central district of California for misappropriation of Neuralstem’s stem cell technology and breach of a joint venture agreement between the parties. The district court dismissed the action for forum non conveniens, concluding that England would be a more convenient forum for the action because most of ReNeuron’s former employees and many of the documents relevant to the action are located in England, neither of the parties resides in California and English law governed the joint venture agreement. Neuralstem appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. To dismiss an action for forum non conveniens, an adequate alternative forum must exist and a balance of private and public interest factors must support dismissal. The Ninth Circuit stated that while the district court properly found England to be an adequate alternative forum, the district court abused its discretion in weighing the private and public interest factors.
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court failed to properly regard private interest factors such as Neuralstem’s U. S. residency and choice of forum. The court also stated that the district court diminished the fact that Neuralstem’s claims rely on third-party witnesses and documentary evidence located in California and other U.S. locations and failed to require ReNeuron to meet its burden of proof that the evidence and witnesses located in England were of sufficient “materiality and importance.” Moreover, the court indicated that the district court failed to consider that the majority of documentary evidence located in England is within ReNeuron’s control and could be easily transported to any forum.
The Ninth Circuit also found fault with the district court’s analysis of public interest factors. The court stated that the central issue to the case was ReNeuron’s alleged breach of the contractual agreement; the purportedly breaching conduct occurred virtually exclusively in California and elsewhere in the United States. The court reasoned that even if the “principal locus” of the case did not occur in California, the court need only find an “identifiable interest” in the controversy. California has an “identifiable interest” in preventing illegal conduct within its borders.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that England was a more convenient forum for the action and remanded the case for further proceedings.