Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/443/463/246153/
Timestamp: 2020-08-12 01:02:15
Document Index: 336936431

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 921', '§ 921', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 921', '§ 1618']

United States of America, Appellee, v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible Starter Guns, Appellant.goodwin Lee, Doing Business As Westbury Sales Co., Appellant, v. David M. Kennedy, As Secretary of the Treasury, et al., Appellees, 443 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1971 › United States of America, Appellee, v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible...
United States of America, Appellee, v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible Starter Guns, Appellant.goodwin Lee, Doing Business As Westbury Sales Co., Appellant, v. David M. Kennedy, As Secretary of the Treasury, et al., Appellees, 443 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 443 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) Argued March 31, 1971
Michael F. Crawford, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Edward R. Neaher, U. S. Atty. for the Eastern District of New York, and David G. Trager, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
The only question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) which defines a firearm as "any weapon (including a starter gun) which * * * may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive" is unconstitutionally vague because of the words "may readily be converted." As applied to the facts of this case, we find no infirmity in the statute, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgments.
Lee was not a licensed dealer in firearms under the federal act, 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq. As 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) provides for the forfeiture of firearms imported contrary to the statute, i.e., by an unlicensed dealer, the central issue is whether the 16,179 starter guns which the government seized in 1969 at Lee's place of business in Westbury, Long Island, and which Lee had imported from the Molso Company in Como, Italy earlier that year, were firearms within the meaning of the statute.
"According to our experience, the Sample B [D/A #4] should not be accepted by Washington offices as it is not difficult to drill the barrels and make them suitable to shoot live ammunitions. The Sample A [D/A #3] should be suitable as it is quite impossible to drill out the steel inside the barrel."
We agree with Judge Bruchhausen's holding, 314 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N. Y.1970), that these guns, which could be converted to shoot live ammunition within three to twelve minutes, were readily convertible, and that Lee, an unlicensed dealer in firearms, could not lawfully import them. Consequently, they were subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d).1
We find the statute sufficiently definite. Its language clearly warns that "any weapon (including a starter gun)" which can be converted by a relatively simple operation taking only a few minutes is a "firearm" and subject to federal controls and seizure.
The test to be applied is whether the language conveys "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S. Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947). See also Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). If a statute is so vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," then it violates due process. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1923). Nevertheless, as Mr. Justice Black stated in a criminal case where, of course, the vagueness standard is most stringently applied:
"That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. * * * The Constitution does not require impossible standards." United States v. Petrillo, supra, 332 U.S. at 7, 67 S. Ct. at 1542.
The Gun Control Act clearly puts importers and others on notice that they must have a license if they place "readily" convertible starter guns on the market. The uncontroverted testimony of government witnesses conclusively shows that all eighteen of the samples which were tested were converted into instruments capable of discharging projectiles in twelve minutes or less. Reasonable men would surely agree that guns which can be so quickly transformed into dangerous weapons are "readily convertible," whatever else that term may mean. Especially in civil proceedings such as that here, the statutory standard is sufficiently definite.
Accordingly, we hold that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (3) is constitutional as applied to the facts of this case. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Petrillo, supra, 332 U.S. at 8, 67 S. Ct. at 1542: "The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more."
In any event the record fully supports the conclusion that Lee was well aware of the statute, that he had many years of experience as an importer of such devices, that he had notice of the shortcomings of D/A #4 if not of D/ #1, and that the guns he chose to import were readily convertible so as to be firearms subject to federal control and to seizure from an unlicensed dealer.2
We find it unnecessary to decide whether Judge Bruchhausen was correct in dismissing Lee's separate action on the basis of lack of subject matter and equitable jurisdiction. Lee's opportunity to defend in the government's forfeiture action may provide an adequate remedy at law, and 19 U.S.C. § 1618 may preclude judicial interference against the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to seized property. See United States v. Heckinger, 163 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1947)