Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020170213525/THOMAS%20v.%20JOHN%20A.%20YOUDERIAN%20JR.,%20LLC
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 10:26:56
Document Index: 435499794

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692', '§ 1692']

THOMAS v. JOHN A. YOUDERIAN JR., LLC | Civ. No. 2:16-CV-01408-KM-MAH. | 15 U.S.C. 1692 Fair Debt Collection Act | Leagle.com
BRITTON THOMAS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff,
JOHN A. YOUDERIAN JR., LLC; JOHN A. YOUDERIAN JR. AND JOHN DOES 1 TO 10, Defendants.
(a) Defendants made false, deceptive or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e;
(b) Defendants made false representations of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A);
(c) Defendants made false representations that services rendered or compensation may be lawfully received, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B);
(d) Defendants threatened to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5);
(e) Defendants used false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collection a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)
(f) Defendants used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f;
(g) Defendants attempted to collect any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); and
(h) Defendants failed to properly disclose the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1).
[S]tanding consists of three elements. Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id., at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S., at 180-181, 120 S.Ct. 693.
The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements. FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990). Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must "clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating" each element. Warth, supra, at 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197.
Congress has long provided plaintiffs with the right to seek redress from debt collectors for the very conduct alleged here. See Nickelodeon, 827 F. 3d at 274. Indeed, in the short time since Spokeo was decided, district and circuit courts around the country have rejected similar challenges to standing in FDCPA cases. See, e.g., Blaha, 16-cv-2291 (Slip Op., Nov. 10, 2016); Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 Fed. Appx. 990 (11th Cir. 2016); Prindle v. Carrington Mort. Servs., LLC, 3:13-cv-1349, 2016 WL 4369424 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2016); Daubert v. Nra Group, LLC, 3:15-cv-718, 2016 WL 4245560 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016); Lane v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 15-cv-10446, 2016 WL 3671467 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016); Quinn v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 16-cv-2021, 2016 WL 4264967 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2016).
The FDCPA unambiguously grants recipients of debt-collection letters (such as Plaintiffs) a right to be free from abusive collection practices. In other words, the FDCPA "create[s] a private duty owed personally to" a consumer to refrain from using false, deceptive, or misleading means or representations in attempting to collect a debt. See Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1554 (Thomas, J., concurring). Because Plaintiffs have a personal statutory right to be free from abusive debt-collection practices, and because Plaintiffs have alleged facts plausibly showing Defendant violated that right, Plaintiffs "need not allege any additional harm." See id. at 1549 (emphasis omitted).
Although the least sophisticated debtor standard is "lower than the standard of a reasonable debtor," it "preserv[es] a quotient of reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care." Id. (quoting Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir.2000)). In so doing, it "give[s] effect to the Act's intent to `protect[ ] the gullible as well as the shrewd.'" Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir.2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 453).
The standard is an objective one, meaning that the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated debtor would be. See Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding, 766 F.3d 98, 103 (1st Cir.2014) ("[T]he FDCPA does not require that a plaintiff actually be confused."); Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We apply an objective test based on the understanding of the `least sophisticated consumer' in determining whether a collection letter violates section 1692e."). Thus, "the FDCPA enlists the efforts of sophisticated consumers . . . as `private attorneys general' to aid their less sophisticated counterparts, who are unlikely themselves to bring suit under the Act, but who are assumed by the Act to benefit from the deterrent effect of civil actions brought by others." Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).
5. I further understand that any amount left unpaid for more than 30 days will be considered delinquent, and may be referred to a collection agency or attorney. . . .
6. If my account is referred to a collection agency and/or attorney for collection, I agree to be responsible for the payment of an additional collection fee in an amount equal to 30% of my outstanding balance, inclusive of accrued interest. I also understand there is a $15.00 returned check fee should, a check be returned for any reason.
FootNotes 1. For purposes of this opinion, citations to the record will hereinafter be abbreviated as follows:
• "AC" — Amended Complaint, ECF no. 9
• "Br." — Brief in Support of Defendants John A. Youderian, Jr., LLC and John A Youderian, Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, ECF no. 12-1
• "Opp." — Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF no. 14 John A. Youderian, Jr., LLC and John A. Youderian, Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
• "Reply" — Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendants John A. Youderian, Jr., LLC and John A. Youderian, Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
16. The "convenience fee" cases have generally found a viable FDCPA claim where there was a communication announcing an invalid convenience fee. An Eastern District of New York case conveniently collected some of the relevant authorities on the merits of such claims:
In those cases, the defendants did actually attempt to collect allegedly improper fees from the plaintiff's in debt collection letters or by some other means. See Campbell v. MBI Associates, Inc., 98 F.Supp.3d 568, 571, 579-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on a Section 1692f(1) claim arising from a statement in the debt-collection letter, "There will be a $5.00 processing fee for all credit cards"); White v. Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, No. 15-CV-438 (JTC), 2015 WL 6455142, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2015) (denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Section 1692f(1) claim based on allegations that a defendant attempted to collect "attorneys' fees and other costs that were unauthorized by law or an agreement between the debtor and the creditor"); Acosta v. Credit Bureau of Napa Cty., No. 14 C 8198, 2015 WL 1943244, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2015) (denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Section 1692f(1) claim based on a letter to the plaintiff stating that she could pay her debt "via Credit Card ($14.95 Chase Receivables processing fee where applicable)"); Weast v. Rockport Fin., LLC, 115 F.Supp.3d 1018, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a Section 1692f(1) claim where defendant notified the plaintiff by letter that she would be charged an additional $3.00 convenience fee if she made a payment using a credit or debit card); Quinteros v. MBI Associates, Inc., 999 F.Sup.2d 434, 436, 437-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that the plaintiff stated a Section 1692f(1) claim based on a debt collection letter stating, "Our office accepts Visa, MasterCard and American Express which you may pay over the phone or online at www.paymbi.com. There will be a $5.00 processing fee for all credit cards or checks over the phone"); Hallmark v. Cohen & Slamowitz, LLP, 293 F.R.D. 410, 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss a claim by a consumer that a debt collector violated Section 1692f(1) by attempting to charge him $140 in court fees, in addition to his underlying debt); Shami v. Nat'l Enter. Sys., No. 09-CV-722 RRM VVP, 2010 WL 3824151, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010) (denying a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss a Section 1692f(1) claim based on a collection letter stating, "Transaction fees will be charged if you use the automated phone system or the internet to make payment on this account").