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PERKINS V. HART, 24 U. S. 237 - Volume 24 - 1826 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 24 > PERKINS V. HART, 24 U. S. 237 (1826) > Full Text
PERKINS V. HART, 24 U. S. 237 (1826)
Perkins v. Hart, 24 U.S. 11 Wheat. 237 237 (1826)
Perkins v. Hart
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 237
This was an action of general indebitatus assumpsit, brought in the Circuit Court of Ohio for work and labor, care and diligence, by the plaintiff done and bestowed as an agent and attorney in exploring, showing, surveying, and selling, the lands of the defendant's testator; also in the searching of records, investigating titles, and in the payment of the taxes of the testator. The declaration contains the other general money counts. The plaintiff also filed what is styled an additional "bill of particulars"
Page 24 U. S. 238
for exploring, giving information of the situation and value, superintending law suit with Granger, attending to division with Mather's heirs, and for general superintendence of Hart's landed interest in Ohio (except for paying taxes), $3,500.
2. That the whole evidence, and the letters above cited constitute a special agreement defining the nature and extent of Perkins' agency and settling the subjects upon which he was to receive compensation and the amount of that compensation, the legal operation of which
Page 24 U. S. 239
agreement is to preclude Perkins from claiming compensation for anything done in the execution of his agency except according to the terms of that agreement.
"State the amount of commissions you shall expect me to pay on account of sales that shall be collected and remitted, but no commissions to be paid by me till the collections are made. Provided sales are made by me in exchange for lands, and if I should draw on you for the amount to be paid in lands at a price agreed on or otherwise if necessary, to be left with you to be ascertained; in such
Page 24 U. S. 240
case, what should you expect to charge on sales of that nature? Please be particular in stating your terms of agency, and make them as favorable as possible."
"Your observations in regard to the mode of selling new lands are doubtless sanctioned by experience, and I am happy to commit the agency of my property to your experience and good judgment, from whence I expect to derive peculiar advantage. "
Page 24 U. S. 245
It is not easy to understand what the defendant's counsel mean by the whole evidence. Upon examining the voluminous record sent up to this Court, we find that an active correspondence was carried on between Perkins and Hart from the year 1803 to 1816 upon the subject of Hart's
Page 24 U. S. 246
lands in Ohio, the payment of the accruing taxes on them, examining, surveying, and preparing them for sale, and of other services to be performed by Perkins in some way or other connected with those lands. If this be the evidence alluded to, there was no objection to submitting it to the court to say whether the whole of this written evidence, or any part of it, created a special contract, investing Perkins with the agency of Hart's land.
In the examination of the question whether there was a special agreement or not, we shall confine ourselves entirely to the three specified
Page 24 U. S. 247
letters, because we are of opinion, after an attentive perusal of all the others, that they furnish not the slightest ground for saying that any agreement was entered into which invested Perkins with the agency of Hart's lands. The letters addressed by Hart to Perkins treat him as an agent empowered to perform a variety of acts in relation to the lands of the former. But it was a limited agency created for particular purposes and as occasions required, but founded upon no special agreement which bound Perkins to perform any specified duties or Hart to remunerate the services he might perform otherwise than the law bound him upon the principle of a quantum meruit. The particular agency which the former was requested from time to time to assume, was to pay taxes, attend to law suits, examine the lands so as to enable Hart to judge of their value, and to have certain lots and townships surveyed as preparatory to a sale of them at a future period. The taxes were annually paid and other advances made by Perkins upon which he charged both a commission and interest, and these, it would seem, were punctually reimbursed when drawn for, although the charge of interest was sometimes complained of.
In Hart's letter of 14 January, 1812, he requests Perkins to give him his most favorable
Page 24 U. S. 248
terms of agency, to appoint sub-agents to do business where he, Perkins, might judge necessary, with such compensation as he might agree upon with them. The letter then proceeds as follows:
"My commission on sales made by me, the money collected and remitted, is eight percent. When contracts are made (as is sometimes the case), purchasers make a payment and then give up the land so as to be left without encumbrance to be sold again, 50 percent on such receipt. On these two items, the commission cash, as it has been cash received. In case the agency should be closed and a settlement made, and contracts remain on hand unsettled, then, in all those contracts that should be carried into effect, five percent commission, received in contracts, with a conveyance of the lands covered by the contract or contracts received. On sales made in exchange
Page 24 U. S. 249
for lands, &c., three percent commission, to be received either in contracts here or lands here at retail price. Always, as far as practicable, receive commissions in that which shall be similar to that in which it is charged."
These letters, we think, constitute a special agreement upon the subject of commissions to be paid by Hart to Perkins by way of compensation for his agency in the sale of lands. It is confined to that subject only. The first of these letters invites Perkins to state his most favorable terms of agency in the sale of Hart's lands. The answer contains those terms by stating the commissions which he should expect to receive upon sales made, and the amount collected and remitted upon sales made, and then abandoned by the purchaser after a partial payment of the purchase money; upon sales made but the amount not collected before the agency should be closed; and finally upon sales made by way of exchange for other property. The acceptance of these terms is sufficiently expressed in Hart's reply to this letter, by which he commits
Page 24 U. S. 250
to Perkins the agency of his property, the nature of which agency is too clearly explained by reference to the two preceding letters to leave the slightest doubt as to the meaning and extent of the contract which was thus entered into.
The second proposition is "That this special agreement was open and subsisting at the time the cause of action is supposed to have arisen." Now this proposition involves a mixed question of law and fact. If the contract was open and the action was founded on that contract, then the legal consequence insisted upon, "that Perkins cannot recover in this action," undeniably follows. But whether in point of fact it was open when the cause of action is claimed to have arisen -- that is, in the lifetime of W. Hart -- must depend upon the evidence in the cause, of which the jury were alone competent to judge. If the agreement was wholly performed by the plaintiff during the lifetime of Hart; if its further execution was put an end to before its completion by the act of Hart or by the agreement of both parties, then the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering in this action. Nay, further, if the contract was fully performed in relation to any one subject covered by it -- as for example by the sale, collection, and remittance of the purchase money for any one township or parcel of land -- the plaintiff might well maintain an action of indebitatus assumpsit for his stipulated compensation in cash on that transaction, and was not bound to wait until all the lands to which his agency extended were disposed of. Where the
Page 24 U. S. 251
agreement embraces a number of distinct subjects which admit of being separately executed and closed, it must be taken distributively, each subject being considered as forming the matter of a separate agreement after it is so closed. If, for instance, the agreement between a merchant and his factor be that the latter shall sell and remit the proceeds of all cargoes which the former shall consign to him upon a stipulated commission, it can hardly be contended that the factor cannot recover his commissions in this form of action upon the proceeds of a single cargo which have been remitted while there remain other cargoes yet undisposed of.
It may not be amiss to add that if the question reserved were whether the agreement was open and subsisting at the time this action was brought, we should be of opinion that the agency of Perkins having terminated by the death of Mr. Hart, the further execution of the agreement was put an end to by that event, and that consequently
Page 24 U. S. 252
it was not open when the action was brought. But the proposition is so stated as to refer to a period antecedent to the death of Hart.
It has been already stated that the three letters particularly referred to in this point did constitute a special agreement upon the subject of commissions to be paid to Perkins by way of compensation for his agency in the sale of Hart's lands. And it may be added that this agreement settles the subjects upon which Perkins was to receive compensation and the amount of that compensation. If so, there can be no question but that the legal operation of this agreement, as to every claim founded upon it, is to preclude Perkins from recovering any compensation which is not consistent with the terms of that agreement. For although in the cases before stated, in which the special agreement has been executed, or otherwise closed, a general indebitatus assumpsit may be maintained, it is nevertheless true that the special agreement may
Page 24 U. S. 253
be given in evidence by the defendant for the purpose of lessening the quantum of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.
Now it is impossible to contend with any
Page 24 U. S. 254
probability of success that Perkins was precluded by the special agreement from recovering, under the general counts, a compensation for those services or, indeed, for any other services rendered by him in his character of agent which are not strictly within the scope of the special agreement. But the point raised here is that he is precluded from claiming compensation for anything done in the execution of his agency except according to the terms of that agreement, although the services so rendered are not embraced by it.
If the paper found in this record, headed thus, "Perkins' account, on which the action is brought," which contains three items for commissions on as many sales of land, and three others for interest on those commissions, is to be considered as the original bill of particulars filed in the cause, it would seem to follow that the action was brought to recover as well those commissions as a compensation for general services not embraced by the special agreement.
Page 24 U. S. 255
Upon this state of the case, the conclusion of law insisted upon in this point would nevertheless be incorrect for the reasons already stated.
The difficulty of this point consists in the imperfect manner in which it is stated. The court may conjecture that the bill of particulars alluded
Page 24 U. S. 256
to is the paper just referred to, but whether it be so or not is by no means certain. If it be the bill intended, the difficulty still remains, as the general account is not stated or referred to so as to enable the court to decide whether it does or does not include the two items which it is supposed cannot be recovered in this action.
The rule is the same in principle at law; a settled account is only prima facie evidence of its correctness. It may be impeached by proof of unfairness or mistake in law or in fact, and if it be confined to particular items of account, it concludes nothing in relation to other items not stated in it.
Page 24 U. S. 257
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