Source: https://openjurist.org/217/f3d/399/andrew-mackey-v-michael-dutton-warden
Timestamp: 2019-02-20 09:04:47
Document Index: 15531473

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2253', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2253', '§ 2253', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

217 F3d 399 Andrew Mackey v. Michael Dutton, Warden | OpenJurist
217 F. 3d 399 - Andrew Mackey v. Michael Dutton, Warden
217 F3d 399 Andrew Mackey v. Michael Dutton, Warden
Andrew Mackey, Petitioner-Appellant,
Michael Dutton, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 99-5352
Decided and Filed: June 28, 2000
Rehearing Denied July 26, 2000
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville; No. 93-01012--Robert L. Echols, Chief District Judge.
Third, documents detailing Mackey's problems while in the military and his honorable discharge therefrom were attached, including a report prepared by anexamining psychiatrist dated July 13, 1970. This report indicated with regard to Mackey's mental status: "[He] related in a slow, confused but cooperative manner. Affect was inappropriate. He seemed quite worried and depressed. Could not do serial sevens and was not oriented to person, place, and time. Intelligence estimated at below normal." J.A. at 62 (Kurtz Report).
This Term, however, the Supreme Court held this view to be incorrect. In Slack v. McDaniel, --- U.S. --- , 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000), the Supreme Court held that "when a habeas corpus petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition after April 24, 1996 (the effective date of AEDPA), the right to appeal is governed by the certificate of appealability (COA) requirements now found at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)." Id. at 1600. Therefore, with respect to appeals initiated after the effective date of AEDPA in habeas proceedings commenced prior to that date, pre-AEDPA law governs the appellate court's review of the trial court's ruling3while AEDPA's requirement of a certificate of appealability governs the right to appeal. Although in the instant case the district court granted a certificate of probable cause rather than a certificate of appealability, the issues involved in this appeal each satisfy the standard for issuance of a certificate of appealability, and so we proceed to review the merits of Mackey's two claims.
A trial court's failure to grant a continuance to enable a defendant to exercise his constitutionally protected right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance may, in some circumstances, constitute a denial of due process. See Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1986). "When a denial of a continuance forms a basis of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not only must there have been an abuse of discretion but it must have been so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional principles of due process." Brown v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bennett, 793 F.2d at 774) (internal quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2000) (No. 99-1264).5 To warrant habeas relief, "[t]here must also be some showing that granting the continuance would have furthered the court's attempt to secure a just determination of the cause." Bennett, 793 F.2d at 775. We have considered the following factors in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to due process by a denial of a motion for a continuance: "the diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony." Id. at 774 (quoting Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, Mackey has not established that Dr. Conroy's testimony would have been favorable to his defense of insanity. Because Mackey failed to make an offer of proof, the only indication of Dr. Conroy's expected testimony that the trial court had before it was the 1970 report. The 1970 report, however, did not speak to the ultimate issue -- legal insanity at the time the offenses were committed in 1974. In Matlock v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985), we held that no due process violation occurred when the trial court limited the testimony of the defense's expert witness because the excluded testimony would not have supported a defense of insanity under Tennessee law. See id. at 1243. As in Matlock, Mackey has presented no evidence that Dr. Conroy's testimony would have gone to his inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. See Spurlock v. Tennessee, 368 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tenn. 1963) (stating the test for determining the question of criminal responsibility that was followed in Tennessee until 1977: "[I]f a person at the time of the commission of an alleged crime has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and quality of the particular act or acts constituting the crime and to know whether they are right or wrong, he is responsible if he commits such act or acts, whatever may be his capacity in other particulars; but if he does not possess this degree or capacity, then he is not so responsible." (quotation omitted)); cf. Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the trial court's denial of a short continuance in order to secure the attendance of the defendant's only expert witness on his insanity defense violated the defendant's right to due process, where the expert would have testified that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense for which he was being tried). Moreover, Dr. Conroy's 1970 report was read aloud at trial9. To the extent, therefore, that Dr. Conroy's diagnosis of schizophrenia in 1970 would have been relevant to Mackey's legal insanity in April of 1974, the jury was provided with that information.10
In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), the Supreme Court announced the test for evaluating a defendant's competency to stand trial: "[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rationalas well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Id. at 402 (latter two alterations in original). The conviction of a defendant who is legally incompetent violates a defendant's right to due process of law. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Additionally, a court's failure to make a proper competency inquiry where there is substantial evidence of a defendant's incompetency violates due process by depriving the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385-86; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (explaining that Robinson held "that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial"); Pate v. Smith, 637 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Once a reasonable doubt arises as to the competence of a person to stand trial, the issue must be decided on the basis of a hearing."). Although the Supreme Court has never "prescribe[d] a general standard with respect to the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to require resort to an adequate procedure" for determining competency, the Court has explained that "evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but . . . even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient." Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 180.
Before addressing the merits of Mackey's claim, we must determine whether the state trial court's finding that there was no convincing evidence to suggest Mackey's incompetency is a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to the former 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)12. We have explained that "[t]hepresumption of correctness accorded to state court findings 'only applies to basic, primary facts, and not to mixed questions of law and fact,' and it 'applies to implicit findings of fact, logically deduced because of the trial court's ability to adjudge the witnesses' demeanor and credibility.'" Combs, 205 F.3d at 277 (quotation omitted). Of course, "the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery," Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1995), and in this circuit some confusion surrounds the characterization of the competency determination. Today we hold that, pursuant to recent Supreme Court precedent, the competency determination should be treated as a question of fact for purposes of § 2254(d).
In Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam), however, the Court treated competency as a factual determination entitled to § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness. In Fulford, on the morning of trial the defendant's counsel asked the trial court to appoint a commission to inquire into the defendant's competency. The state trial court refused to order a competency hearing, explaining in two per curiam opinions that there was insufficient likelihood of the defendant's incompetency to warrant appointing a commission. The Fifth Circuit granted the defendant habeas relief, but the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "the Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its own judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that of the Louisiana courts -- a prerogative which 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not allow it." Id. at 113. The Court explained: "Before a federal habeas court undertakes to overturn factual conclusions made by a state court, it must determine that these conclusions are not 'fairly supported by the record.' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). Under this standard we have not the slightest hesitation in saying that the trial court's conclusion as to Fulford's competency was 'fairly supported by the record.'" Id. at 117.13
The question we must decide is "[w]hether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is beingreviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial." Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir.) (quoting Pate, 637 F.2d at 1072) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983). Applying § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness, we conclude that the state trial court's competency determination is fairly supported by the record and is therefore entitled to complete deference.
The former 28 U.S.C. § 2253 provided that "[a]n appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause." AEDPA amended this portion of § 2253 to provide: (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from--
At the trial, on cross-examination Mackey's counsel asked Dr. Cheatham if he had reviewed Dr. Conroy's report prior to his examination of Mackey. Dr. Cheatham answered that he had, and upon defense counsel's request he then read the diagnosis from the report to the jury: Yes, sir, the diagnosis -- and I'm quoting from this form -- is "schizophrenia, chronic, undifferentiated type, moderate, manifested by flattened affect, autistic ideation, hallucinations, delusions, ideas of reference and persecution, apprehensiveness, withdrawal, feelings of unreality, and a lack of insight or much sound judgment in an immature, inadequate person of long-term schizoidal orientation.["]
In a concurrence, Justice White objected to the majority's characterization of the issue of competency as a question of fact. Justice White, citing Drope and Robinson, explained: Our cases have treated the ultimate question whether a defendant is competent to stand trial as at least a mixed question of law and fact. Our precedents notwithstanding, the Court today reverses the Court of Appeals on the strength of the conclusion that "the trial court's conclusion as to Fulford's competency was 'fairly supported by the record.'" But since competency is not a purely factual question, § 2254(d)(8) and its "fairly supported" standard are inapplicable. The Court offers no explanation whatsoever for the failure to follow Drope and Pate, and it would certainly not be appropriate to overrule these cases summarily.
In his brief, Mackey assumes that competency is a factual finding, but he nevertheless argues that this case fits within two of § 2254(d)'s exceptions. He first contends that the exception set forth in § 2254(d)(6) applies because he "did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding." In the instant case, the state trial court held a hearing on Mackey's motion for a psychiatric evaluation, but, finding that Mackey presented no convincing evidence of incompetency, it declined to order a psychiatric evaluation or any further competency hearings. Mackey does not premise his argument on any defect in the state court hearing on his motion; rather he argues that § 2254(d)(6) applies because no evidentiary hearing on the question of his competency was held. Second, Mackey argues that "the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing" pursuant to the exception contained in § 2254(d)(3). This argument, too, is based solely on the trial court's refusal "to hold an evidentiary hearing at which counsel for Mr. Mackey could have the opportunity to put facts into evidence on the issue of his competency." Pet'r Br. at 40. However, Mackey's arguments were implicitly rejected by the Court in Fulford. In Fulford, the state trial court received evidence on the defendant's motion for a psychiatric evaluation, but it refused to order a further inquiry into the defendant's competency. Despite the fact that no evidentiary hearing on competency had been conducted by the trial court, the Supreme Court accorded the trial court's competency determination a presumption of correctness. Fulford, 462 U.S. at 117.