Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20090227_0000180.MPA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-24 11:27:33
Document Index: 747954022

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1109', '§ 1133', '§ 1951', '§ 9802', '§ 1182', '§ 1001', '§ 1331', '§ 1367']

| New Life Homecare, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan
New Life Homecare, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan
NEW LIFE HOMECARE, INC; J.R., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL PARENT AND GUARDIAN, DAWN E. LITCHEY; A.R., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS NATURAL PARENT DAWN E. LITCHEY, AND DAWN E. LITCHEY, INDIVIDUALLY,v.BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN, AND BLUE CARE NETWORK OF MICHIGAN, DEFENDANTS
Before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment (Doc. 11). Having been fully briefed and argued, the matter is thus ripe for disposition.
The case grows out of the refusal of the defendant, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan ("Blue Cross"), to purchase medications to treat Minor Plaintiffs A.R. and J.R. ("minor plaintiffs") for hemophilia from Plaintiff New Life Homecare. Blue Cross administers the minor plaintiffs' insurance policy, which is provided for them through their fathers' employment with General Dynamics Corporation.
A.R. and J.R., the minor plaintiffs in this case, suffer from hemophilia, a genetic disorder marked by a deficiency in essential blood-clotting proteins in a patient's body.*fn1 Patients treat their condition by using a number of injectable medications which aid in the blood-clotting process. These medications, which come in a variety of formulations, are generally referred to as "factor."*fn2 J.R., who is A.R.'s older brother, suffers from a more severe form of the disease. He has developed an "inhibitor" to factor that often prevents the medication from working. His disease is more debilitating as a result, and he requires different, more extensive and more often emergency treatment than his brother. Since August 1, 2008, they have received these medications through a home-delivery pharmacy, Accredo (also known as Hemophilia Health Services), which provides them their medications at home on both a regular and emergency basis. Formerly, the minor plaintiffs received their home-care medications through Plaintiff New Life, another licensed pharmacy that specializes in care for those with hemophilia and other blood-related diseases. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in unfair practices in order to sever their relationship with New Life and replace it with Accredo. They also contend that the services provided by Accredo are inferior and fail to provide them with necessary ancillary services, such as counseling, pastoral support, and medical devices. Combined with a longer delivery time for emergency medications, plaintiff alleges, Accredo's service is substandard and endangers their health.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court on July 31, 2008. (Doc. 1). Count I raises a breach of fiduciary duty claim pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132(A)(2). Count II is a claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) for breach of duties owed to Plaintiff New Life. New Life alleges that defendants have not provided payment for valid claims submitted pursuant to the minor plaintiffs' policy. Count III is a state law conversion action, contending that Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield has refused to reimburse New Life for valid claims. This count seeks nearly $4 million in damages. Count IV, brought pursuant to the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, alleges that defendants engaged in a scheme to obstruct, delay and affect commerce and the movement of specialty drugs from wholesalers to New Life and from New Life to the Minor Plaintiffs. Count V alleges discrimination based on health status in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 9802(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1), contending that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their medical condition by refusing to provide them with services from New Life. The minor plaintiffs also seek monetary damages as compensation for the discrimination they allegedly faced from defendants' conduct.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction (PI) on July 31, 2008. (Doc. 2). The court set a date for a hearing on the TRO (Doc. 4), but the parties informed the court that they had entered into a partial settlement agreement and no hearing on the application was necessary. (Doc. 10). On September 30, 2008, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and for summary judgment. (Doc. 11).
On October 3, 2008, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for a TRO and PI. (Doc. 13). The court held a hearing on this motion on October 8, 2008. At the close of the hearing, the court ordered the parties to file briefs on their positions. On November 4, 2008, the court issued a memorandum and order denying the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. (Doc. 36). The parties then filed additional briefs on the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court held argument on that motion on February 4, 2009, bringing the case to its present posture.
Because this case is brought pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). The court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the United States Constitution.").
When a 12(b)(6) motion is filed, the sufficiency of a complaint's allegations are tested. The issue is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, support a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and give the pleader the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can fairly be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the alternative, defendants seek summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Int'l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts ...