Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/743/428/364672/
Timestamp: 2017-10-21 10:29:04
Document Index: 563953016

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 921', '§ 921', '§ 901', '§ 921', '§ 921']

Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Unitedstates Department of Labor, Petitioner, v. Georgia Congleton, Respondent, 743 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
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Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Unitedstates Department of Labor, Petitioner, v. Georgia Congleton, Respondent, 743 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 743 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1984)
Argued June 6, 1984. Decided Sept. 13, 1984
Thomas Congleton married the respondent in 1927. He died in January, 1967, at the age of 67. On October 15, 1971, respondent filed a claim for widow's benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (the Act), 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. The claim was denied by the Social Security Administration in June, 1974, and the denial was affirmed by the Department of Labor in August, 1979.
Based on the above evidence, the a.l.j. issued a decision and order awarding benefits in accordance with 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (5), which provides a rebuttable presumption of entitlement to benefits for a widow whose husband had been engaged in coal mine employment for twenty-five years or more. The Board affirmed the a.l.j.'s decision on December 16, 1982, and the Director's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Board on April 12, 1983. On appeal, the Director challenged the a.l.j.'s findings that (1) the respondent was entitled to the twenty-five year presumption, and (2) that the Director had failed to rebut the presumption.
30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (5); Sec. 411(c) (5) of the Act.
The a.l.j. found that the miner worked "well over twenty-five years" in the coal mines. This finding of fact can be upheld only if it is supported by substantial evidence. Haywood v. Secretary, 699 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1983). However, it is critical to the appellate review process that the a.l.j. clearly set forth the rationale for his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Section 557(c) (3) (A) of the Administrative Procedures Act mandates that "... all decisions shall include a statement of--(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record ..." (emphasis added). The courts have respected this requirement by remanding cases where the reasoning for the a.l.j.'s conclusion is lacking and therefore presents inadequate information to accommodate a thorough review. See, e.g., Maxey v. Califano, 598 F.2d 874, 875, 876 (4th Cir. 1979); Schaaf v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 157 (3rd Cir. 1978); Arnold v. Secretary, 567 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1977).
The dissent argues that "we ought not to be 'disposed to overturn a sound decision if the agency's path, although not ideally clear, may be reasonably discerned,' " slip op. at 12, (quoting Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 623 F.2d 740, 746 (2d Cir. 1980)), and further asserts that "one can readily see that ALJ Egan was pursuaded by Mrs. Congleton's evidence ..." Id. While the majority agrees with the dissent's basic premises in this respect, we remain steadfast in our conviction that an a.l.j.'s conclusory opinion, which does not encompass a discussion of the evidence contrary to his findings, does not warrant affirmance. For even in applying the deferential standard of "substantial evidence," the reviewing court must take into account the evidence of record that detracts from as well as supports the challenged findings of fact. See Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 464, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); Richardson v. Secretary, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978). In the instant case, the evidence presented was simply too vague and conflicting to support the decision in the form rendered by the a.l.j.
The medical evidence in the instant case unequivocally established that the deceased miner was not suffering from the disease at the time of his death. The medical records of the decedent's treating physicians, Drs. Cooper and Hare, detailed a long history of serious heart disease, but were completely devoid of any reference even inferring any chronic lung impairment. To the contrary, during one examination (date unknown), Dr. Hare noted that the miner's "lungs were clear as to auscultation and percussion." In addition, the miner's death certificate listed only myocardial infarction as the cause of death. While the death certificate by itself would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption, see 20 C.F.R. Sec. 727.204(d) (4), the certificate, when paired with the extensive medical records of the miner's own treating physicians which contain absolutely no indication that the miner was suffering from pneumoconiosis, constitute sufficient grounds for rebuttal.3
Georgia Congleton, widow of the deceased underground coal miner, Thomas Congleton, filed her claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., on October 15, 1971. The petitioner, who is the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, United States Department of Labor, in accordance with the Act and applicable regulations, referred the case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for a formal hearing. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas G. Egan, conducted an evidentiary hearing, taking the testimony of witnesses and admitting exhibits. The ALJ rendered his Decision And Order--Award of Benefits on November 13, 1980. It reads as follows:
This matter involves a claim by the widow of a coal miner who had, prior to his death on January 17, 1969, completed a work record in excess of 25 years in the mines. Squarely at issue, then, is the application of Section 411(c) (5) of the Act. The pertinent section reads, in part, "In the case of a miner who dies on or before the date of the enactment of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 who was employed for 25 years or more in one or more coal mines before June 30, 1971, eligible survivors of such miner shall be entitled to the payment of benefits ... unless it is established that at the time of his or her death such miner was not partially or totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis." (section 411(c) (5)).
Under Section 411(c) (5) of the Act and its implementing regulation 20 CFR Sec. 727.204, those who would contest the widow's claim must establish that the miner was not partially disabled at the time of death.
The chest X-ray of April 14, 1964, (D-14) wherein there is no diagnoses of pneumoconiosis is not alone sufficient to rebut the presumption of entitlement. (727.204(d) (3)) The same is true of the death certificate which does not mention pneumoconiosis, Sec. 725.204(d) (4).
With respect to his threshold finding of the required period of coal mine work to invoke the presumption of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (5), the ALJ credited the testimony and affidavits of Thomas Congleton's family, neighbors and co-workers, all of which supported a finding that Congleton was employed as a coal miner more or less continuously (with only seasonal layoffs and a few years of other employment) from 1922 through 1958, a period of 36 years. He therefore did not consider it necessary to identify the exact length of service in the mines since it was clearly in excess of 25 years.
Counsel for the petitioner argues that Mrs. Congleton's testimony and the statements of the other affiants were too vague and not sufficiently consistent to permit a finding of 25 years service. Also, it is claimed that the Social Security earnings records for January 1937 through December 1969, introduced in evidence, only reflected nine and a half years of coal mining during that period. However, neither of these factors establish the lack of substantial evidence necessary to overturn the findings of an ALJ. See, e.g., Haywood v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 699 F.2d 277, 285 (6th Cir. 1983).
Although " [a] bald conclusion, unsupported by reasoning or evidence, is generally of no use to a reviewing court," Maxey v. Califano, 598 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1979), and a court should not have to speculate as to an ALJ's reasoning process, Schaaf v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978), we ought not to be "disposed to overturn a sound decision if the agency's path, although not ideally clear, may reasonably be discerned." Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 623 F.2d 740, 746 (2d Cir. 1980). Here, one can readily see that ALJ Egan was persuaded by Mrs. Congleton's evidence, the thrust of which showed that her late husband had spent most of his working life in Kentucky coal mines operating a cutting machine that churned up great amounts of coal and rock dust. It is likewise apparent that the ALJ did not find the Social Security records dispositive of the issue. We should agree with both of these findings.
Collins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1177, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1984). Here, one can hardly say that the results of a medical examination taken nearly five years before the patient's death will be strongly probative of his condition immediately prior to his demise. Moreover, the fact that Congleton was being treated by Dr. Hare for a more immediate threat to his life (i.e., the heart condition) would logically explain the failure to explore or treat another, less critical malady, namely, pneumoconiosis, which the decedent unquestionably had. This is borne out by Dr. Carl Cooper, Congleton's treating physician from 1964 until his death, who stated in 1980:
In sum, there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that the presumption of entitlement to black lung benefits was rebutted, much less to require such a finding as a matter of law as the Court holds today. Even assuming the ALJ could have found sufficient rebuttal evidence in this record, a contrary conclusion was certainly not precluded. "The reviewing court may not set aside an inference because it finds the opposite one more reasonable, or because it questions its factual basis." Peabody Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Board, 560 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 801, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947)). This Court should not impose its own view of the evidence rather than follow the factual findings of an ALJ which are supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1980). The only question in this case was whether there is such evidence in the record as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that the 25-year presumption was not rebutted. See Prater v. Harris, 620 F.2d 1074, 1084 (4th Cir. 1980).
Congress, in amending the original Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in 1972, intended the Act "to be liberally construed in favor of the miners to insure compensation in worthy cases despite the extreme difficulty of proving the existence of pneumoconiosis by clinically certain medical evidence." Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1977). Five years later, the Act was again amended to further expand the means by which entitlement to benefits could be established, including a rebuttable presumption that a person who had worked as a coal miner for 25 or more years was partially or totally disabled due to black lung disease at the time of his death. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-239, Sec. 3(a) (3), 92 Stat. 96 (1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (5) (1982)).
H.R.Rep. No. 95-151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 237, 241. The majority, in concluding that the absence of sufficient medical evidence of pneumoconiosis in the record served to rebut Mrs. Congleton's presumed entitlement to benefits, has transposed the evidentiary burdens intended by Congress, and negated the whole point of section 921(c) (5)--to relieve the survivors of coal miners who labored for 25 years or more of the difficult burden of proving partial or total disability due to black lung disease at the time of death, and to permit denial of benefits only if the Government proves such disability did not exist.
Over 13 years have elapsed since Mrs. Congleton filed her claim on October 15, 1971, and it has not yet been conclusively determined. Petitioner ought not to be proud of this record. I would affirm the decision of the ALJ, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, awarding black lung survivor's benefits to this claimant, and deny the petition for review filed by the petitioner who should have supported the decision. The petitioner should be bound by the decision of the ALJ affirmed by the three member Benefits Review Board, which allowed benefits to Mrs. Congleton. The Act grants no power to petitioner either to award or deny benefits, nor does the Act require petitioner either to approve or disapprove such benefits. There is a serious question whether petitioner even has standing to petition this Court for review of the decisions of the Benefits Review Board. It is most unusual and unprecedented for the director of an agency to petition for review of his own agency's decisions. See I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Board, 542 F.2d 903, 908 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1976). This is a very important case, and respondent Georgia Congleton should petition this Court for rehearing in banc, or a judge of this Court should so move.
Although the negative X-ray report submitted into evidence was also indicative of the absence of pneumoconiosis, it did not bear the name or qualifications of the technician who took the film nor the physician who interpreted it, and therefore does not meet the requirements for the admission of X-ray evidence as found in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.102(c). As a result, the X-ray has no evidentiary value and cannot be considered by this court, as 20 C.F.R. Sec. 718.102(e) states that " [n]o chest X-ray shall constitute evidence of the presence or absence of pneumoconiosis unless it is in substantial compliance with the requirements of this section ..."