Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/415/724/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-06 05:59:39
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6831', '§ 6833', '§ 6830', '§ 2', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6490', '§ 6401', '§ 6830', '§ 311', '§ 6430', '§ 6430', '§ 2500', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6830', '§ 6831', '§ 6830', '§ 6833']

Storer v. Brown (full text) :: 415 U.S. 724 (1974) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Storer v. Brown
Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724 (1974)
U.S. Supreme CourtStorer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)Storer v. BrownNo. 72-812Argued November 5, 1973Decided March 26, 1974*415 U.S. 724APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
The California Elections Code forbids ballot position to an independent candidate for elective public office if he voted in the immediately preceding primary, § 6830(c) (Supp. 1974), [Footnote 1] or if he had a registered affiliation with a qualified political party at any time within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974). The independent candidate must also file nomination papers signed by voters not less Page 415 U. S. 727 in number than 5% nor more than 6% of the entire vote cast in the preceding general election in the area for which the candidate seeks to run. § 6831 (1961). All of these signatures must be obtained during a 24-day period following the primary and ending 60 days prior to the general election, § 6833 (Supp. 1974), and none of the signatures may be gathered from persons who vote at the primary election. § 6830(c) (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of these provisions is challenged here as infringing on rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and as adding qualifications for the office of United States Congressman, contrary to Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution.
Prior to the 1972 elections, appellants Storer, Frommhagen, Hall, and Tyner, along with certain of their supporters, filed their actions [Footnote 2] to have the above sections of the Elections Code declared unconstitutional and their enforcement enjoined. Storer and Frommhagen each sought ballot status as an independent candidate for Congressman from his district. [Footnote 3] Both complained about the party disaffiliation requirement of § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), and asserted that the combined effects of the provisions were unconstitutional burdens on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Hall and Tyner claimed the right to ballot position as independent candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. They Page 415 U. S. 728 were members of the Communist Party, but that party had not qualified for ballot position in California. They, too, complained of the combined effect of the indicated sections of the Elections Code on their ability to achieve ballot position.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968), the Court held that, although the citizens of a State are free to associate with one of the two major political parties, to participate in the nomination of their chosen party's candidates for public office and then to cast their ballots in the general election, the State must also provide feasible means for other political parties and other candidates to appear on the general election ballot. The Ohio law under examination in that case made no provision for independent candidates, and the requirements for any but the two major parties qualifying for the ballot were so burdensome that it was "virtually impossible" for other parties, new or old, to achieve ballot position for their candidates. Page 415 U. S. 729 Id. at 393 U. S. 25. Because these restrictions, which were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, severely burdened the right to associate for political purposes and the right to vote effectively, the Court, borrowing from other cases, ruled that the discriminations against new parties and their candidates had to be justified by compelling state interests. The Court recognized the substantial state interest in encouraging compromise and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will represent a majority of the community, and in providing the electorate with an understandable ballot, and inferred that "reasonable requirements for ballot position," id. at 393 U. S. 32, would be acceptable. But these important interests were deemed insufficient to warrant burdens so severe as to confer an effective political monopoly on the two major parties. The First and Fourteenth Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause of the latter, required as much.
In challenging § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), appellants rely on Williams v. Rhodes and assert that, under that case and subsequent cases dealing with exclusionary voting and candidate qualifications, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969), substantial burdens on the right to vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential to serve a compelling state interest. These cases, however, do not necessarily condemn § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974). It has never been suggested that the Williams-Kramer-Dunn rule automatically invalidates every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate. Nor could this be the case under our Constitution, where the States are given the initial task of determining the Page 415 U. S. 730 qualifications of voters who will elect members of Congress. Art. I, 2, cl. 1. Also Art. I, 4, cl. 1, authorizes the States to prescribe "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives." Moreover, as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. In any event, the States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates.
The judgment in Dunn v. Blumstein invalidated the Tennessee one-year residence requirement for voting, but agreed that the State's interest was obviously sufficient Page 415 U. S. 731 to limit voting to residents, to require registration for voting, and to close the registration books at some point prior to the election, a deadline which every resident must meet if he is to cast his vote at the polls. Subsequently, three-judge district courts differed over the validity of a requirement that voters be registered for 50 days prior to election. This Court, although divided, sustained the provision. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U. S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U. S. 679 (1973).
Later, the Court struck down similar Illinois provisions aimed at the same evil, where the deadline for changing party registration was 23 months prior to the primary date. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973). One consequence was that a voter wishing to change parties could not vote in any primary that occurred during the waiting period. The Court did not retreat from Rosario or question the recognition in that case of the States' strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding. Although the 11-month requirement imposed in New York had been accepted as necessary for an effective remedy, the Court was unconvinced that the 23-month period established Page 415 U. S. 732 in Illinois was an essential instrument to counter the evil at which it was aimed.
"The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 442; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 32. In so doing, the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. Although we have no way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here, we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots. Page 415 U. S. 733 Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 442."
The requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary is expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents. Indeed, the independent candidate must be clear of political party affiliations for a year before the primary; the party candidate must not have been registered with another party for a year before he files Page 415 U. S. 734 his declaration, which must be done not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the primary. § 6490 (Supp. 1974).
After long experience, California came to the direct party primary as a desirable way of nominating candidates for public office. It has also carefully determined which public offices will be subject to partisan primaries and those that call for nonpartisan elections. [Footnote 4] Moreover after long experience with permitting candidates to run in the primaries of more than one party, California forbade the cross-filing practice in 1959. [Footnote 5] A candidate in Page 415 U. S. 735 one party primary may not now run in that of another; if he loses in the primary, he may not run as an independent; and he must not have been associated with another political party for a year prior to the primary. See §§ 6401, 6611. The direct party primary in California is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election process, [Footnote 6] the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. The State's general policy is to have contending forces within the party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences. The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intra-party feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively.
Section 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) carries very similar credentials. It protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party. Page 415 U. S. 736
We conclude that § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) is not unconstitutional, and Storer and Frommhagen were properly barred from the ballot as a result of its application. [Footnote 7] Cf. Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U. S. 1032 (1972). Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly unconstitutional, Storer and Frommhagen were still properly barred from having their names placed on Page 415 U. S. 737 the 1972 ballot. Although Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 34, spoke in terms of assessing the "totality" of the election laws as they affected constitutional rights, if a candidate is absolutely and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates. The concept of "totality" is applicable only in the sense that a number of facially valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to constitutional rights. The disaffiliation requirement does not change its character when combined with other provisions of the electoral code. It is an absolute bar to candidacy, and a valid one. The District Court need not have heard a challenge to these other provisions of the California Elections Code by one who did not satisfy the age requirement for becoming a member of Congress, and there was no more reason to consider them at the request of Storer and Frommhagen or at the request of voters who desire to support unqualified candidates. [Footnote 8] Page 415 U. S. 738
Beyond the one-year party disaffiliation condition and the rule against voting in the primary, both of which Hall apparently satisfied, it was necessary for an independent candidate to file a petition signed by voters not less in number than 5% of the total votes cast in California at the last general election. This percentage, as such, does not appear to be excessive, see Jenness v. Fortson, supra, but, to assess realistically whether the law imposes excessively burdensome requirements upon independent candidates it is necessary to know other critical facts which do not appear from the evidentiary record in this case. Page 415 U. S. 739
It is necessary in the first instance to know the "entire vote" in the last general election. Appellees suggest that 5% of that figure, whatever that is, is 325,000. Assuming this to be the correct total signature requirement, we also know that it must be satisfied within a period of 24 days between the primary and the general election. But we do not know the number of qualified voters from which the requirement must be satisfied within this period of time. California law disqualifies from signing the independent's petition all registered voters who voted in the primary. In theory, it could be that voting in the primary was so close to 100% of those registered, and new registrations since closing the books before primary day were so low, that eligible signers of an unaffiliated candidate's petition would number less than the total signatures required. This is unlikely, for it is usual that a substantial percentage of those eligible do not vote in the primary, and there were undoubtedly millions of voters qualified to vote in the 1972 primary. But it is not at all unlikely that the available pool of possible signers, after eliminating the total primary vote, will be substantially smaller than the total vote in the last general election, and that it will require substantially more than 5% of the eligible pool to produce the necessary 325,000 signatures. This would be in excess, percentage-wise, of anything the Court has approved to date as a precondition to an independent's securing a place on the ballot, and in excess of the 5% which we said in Jenness was higher than the requirement imposed by most state election codes. [Footnote 10] Page 415 U. S. 740
Because further proceedings are required, we must resolve certain issues that are in dispute in order that the ground rules for the additional factfinding in the District Court will more clearly appear. First, we have no doubt about the validity of disqualifying from signing an independent candidate's petition all those registered voters who voted a partisan ballot in the primary, although they did not vote for the office sought by the Page 415 U. S. 741 independent. We have considered this matter at greater length in American Party of Texas v. White, see post at 415 U. S. 785-786, and we merely repeat here that a State may confine each voter to one vote in one primary election, and that, to maintain the integrity of the nominating process, the State is warranted in limiting the voter to participating in but one of the two alternative procedures, the partisan or the nonpartisan, for nominating candidates for the general election ballot.
Second, the District Court apparently had little doubt that the California law disqualified anyone voting in the primary election, whether or not he confined his vote to nonpartisan offices and propositions. [Footnote 11] The State of California asserts this to be an erroneous interpretation of California law, and claims that the District Court should have abstained to permit the California courts to address the question. In any event, the State does not attempt to justify disqualifying as signers of an independent's petition those who voted only a nonpartisan ballot at the primary, such as independent voters who themselves were disqualified from voting a partisan ballot. See § 311 (Supp. 1974). With what we have before us, it would be difficult to ascertain any rational ground, let alone a compelling interest, for disqualifying nonpartisan voters at the primary from signing an independent candidate's petition, and we think the District Court should reconsider the matter in the light of tentative views expressed here. Under the controlling cases, the District Court may, if it is so advised, abstain and permit the California courts to construe the California statute. On the other hand, it may be that adding to Page 415 U. S. 742 the qualified pool of signers all those nonpartisan voters at the primary may make so little difference in the ultimate assessment of the overall burden of the signature requirement that the status of the nonpartisan voter is, in fact, an insignificant consideration not meriting abstention. [Footnote 12]
Third, once the number of signatures required in the 24-day period is ascertained, along with the total pool from which they may be drawn, there will arise the inevitable question for judgment: in the context of California politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity, and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate's qualifying for any office under § 6430, but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter. One of the difficulties will be that the number of signatures required will vary with the total vote in the last election; Page 415 U. S. 743 the total.disqualifying vote at the primary election, and hence the size of the eligible pool of possible signers will also vary from election to election; also to be considered is the relationship between the showing of support through a petition requirement and the percentage of the vote the State can reasonably expect of a candidate who achieves ballot status in the general election.
As a preliminary matter, it would appear that the State, having disqualified defeated candidates and recent defectors, has in large part achieved its major purpose of providing and protecting an effective direct primary system, and must justify its independent signature requirements chiefly by its interest in having candidates demonstrate substantial support in the community so that the ballot, in turn, may be protected from frivolous candidacies and kept within limits understandable to the voter. If the required signatures approach 10% of the eligible pool of voters, is it necessary to serve the State's compelling interest in a manageable ballot to require that the task of signature gathering be crowded into 24 days? [Footnote 13] Of course, the petition period must end at a reasonable time before election day to permit nomination papers to be verified. Neither must California abandon its policy of confining each voter to a single nominating act -- either voting in the partisan primary or a signature on an independent petition. But the question remains whether signature gathering must Page 415 U. S. 744 await conclusion of the primary. It would not appear untenable to permit solicitation of signatures to begin before primary day and finish afterward. Those signing before the primary could either be definitely disqualified from a partisan vote in the primary election or have the privilege of canceling their petition signatures by the act of casting a ballot in the primary election. And if these alternatives are unacceptable, there would remain the question whether it is essential to demonstrate community support to gather signatures of substantially more than 5% of the group from which the independent is permitted to solicit support. [Footnote 14]
Appellees insist, however, that the signature requirements for independent candidates are of no consequence, because California has provided a valid way for new political parties to qualify for ballot position, an alternative that Hall could have pursued, but did not. Under § 6430, new political parties can be recognized and qualify their candidate for ballot position if 135 days before a primary election it appears that voters equal in number to at least 1% of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared to the Page 415 U. S. 745 county clerks their intention to affiliate with the new party, or if, by the same time, the new party files a petition with signatures equal in number to 10% of the last gubernatorial vote. [Footnote 15] It is argued that he 1% registration requirement is feasible, has recently been resorted to successfully by two new political parties now qualified for the California ballot, and goes as far as California constitutionally must go in providing an alternative to the direct party primary of the major parties.
It may be that the 1% registration requirement is a valid condition to extending ballot position to a new political party. Cf. American Party of Texas v. White, post, p. 415 U. S. 767. But the political party and the independent candidate approaches to political activity are entirely different, and neither is a satisfactory substitute for the other. A new party organization contemplates a state-wide, ongoing organization with distinctive political character. Its goal is typically to gain control of the machinery of state government by electing its candidates to public office. From the standpoint of a potential supporter, affiliation with the new party would mean giving up his ties with another party or sacrificing his own independent status, even though his possible interest in the new party centers around a particular candidate for a particular office. For the candidate himself, it would mean undertaking the serious responsibilities of qualified party status under California law, such as the conduct of a primary, holding party conventions, and the promulgation of party platforms. But more fundamentally, the candidate, who is, by definition, an independent and desires to remain one, must now consider himself a party man, Page 415 U. S. 746 surrendering his independent status. Must he necessarily choose the political party route if he wants to appear on the ballot in the general election? We think not.
So ordered. Page 415 U. S. 747
For the nomination of all candidates to be voted for at the general election, a direct primary shall be held at Page 415 U. S. 748 the legally designated polling places in each precinct on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in the immediately preceding June.
This chapter does not prohibit the independent nomination of candidates under the provisions of Chapter 3 Page 415 U. S. 749 (commencing at Section 6800) of this division, subject to the following limitations:
(c) If on or before the 135th day before any primary election, it appears to the Secretary of State, as a result of examining and totaling the statement of voters and their political affiliations transmitted to him by the county clerks, that voters equal in number to at least 1 percent of the entire vote of the State at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared their intention to affiliate with that party; or Page 415 U. S. 750
No candidate's name shall be printed on the ballot to be used at a direct primary unless a declaration of his Page 415 U. S. 751 candidacy is filed not less than 83 and not more than 113 days prior to the direct primary.
When a group of candidates for presidential electors designates the presidential and vice-presidential candidates for whom all of the group pledge themselves to vote, the names of the presidential candidate and vice-presidential candidate designated by that group shall be printed on the ballot. Page 415 U. S. 752
Nomination papers shall be signed by voters of the area for which the candidate is to be nominated, not less in number than 5 percent nor more than 6 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding general election. Nomination papers for Representative in Congress, State Senator or Assemblyman, to be voted for at a special election to fill a vacancy, shall be signed by voters in the district not less in number than 500 or 1 percent of the entire vote cast in the area at the preceding Page 415 U. S. 753 general election, whichever is less, nor more than 1,000.
At a primary election only a nonpartisan ballot shall be furnished to each voter who is not registered as intending to affiliate with any one of the political parties participating in the primary election; and to any voter registered as intending to affiliate with a political party participating in a primary election, there shall be furnished only a ballot of the political party with which he is registered as intending to affiliate. Page 415 U. S. 754
Any name written upon a ballot shall be counted, unless prohibited by Section 18603, for that name for the Page 415 U. S. 755 office under which it is written, if it is written in the blank space therefor, whether or not a cross (+) is stamped or made with pen or pencil in the voting square after the name so written.
The Court's opinion in these cases, and that in American Party of Texas v. White, post, p. 415 U. S. 767, hold -- correctly, Page 415 U. S. 756 in my view -- that the test of the validity of state legislation regulating candidate access to the ballot is whether we can conclude that the legislation, strictly scrutinized, is necessary to further compelling state interests. See ante at 415 U. S. 736; American Party of Texas v. White, post at 415 U. S. 780-781; for, as we recognized in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 393 U. S. 30 (1968), such state laws
"governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. [618, 394 U. S. 634 (1969)]; United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 390 U. S. 582-583 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 406-409 (1963). And once it be determined that a burden has been Page 415 U. S. 757 placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect compelling state interests is upon the party seeking to justify the burden. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 357 U. S. 525-526 (1958)."
The California statute absolutely denies ballot position to independent candidates who, at any time within 12 months prior to the immediately preceding primary election, were registered as affiliated with a qualified political party. Intertwined with Cal.Elections Code §§ 2500-2501 (1961), which require primary elections Page 415 U. S. 758 to be held five months before the general election, § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) plainly places a significant burden upon independent candidacy -- and therefore effectively burdens as well the rights of potential supporters and voters to associate for political purposes and to vote, see Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 393 U. S. 30; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 405 U. S. 143 (1972) -- because potential independent candidates, currently affiliated with a recognized party, are required to take affirmative action toward candidacy fully 17 months before the general election. Thus, such candidates must make that decision at a time when, as a matter of the realities of our political system, they cannot know either who will be the nominees of the major parties, or what the significant election issues may be. That is an impossible burden to shoulder. We recognized in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 393 U. S. 33, that
The cases of appellants Storer and Frommhagen pointedly illustrate how burdensome California's party disaffiliation rule can be. Both Storer and Frommhagen sought to run in their respective districts as independent Page 415 U. S. 759 candidates for Congress. The term of office for the United States House of Representatives, of course, is two years. Thus, § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) required Storer and Frommhagen to disaffiliate from their parties within seven months after the preceding congressional election. Few incumbent Congressmen, however, declare their intention to seek reelection seven months after election and only four months into their terms. Yet, despite the unavailability of this patently critical piece of information, Storer and Frommhagen were forced by 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) to evaluate their political opportunities and opt in or out of their parties 17 months before the next congressional election.
The Court acknowledges the burdens imposed by § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) upon fundamental personal liberties, see ante at 415 U. S. 734, but agrees with the State's assertion that the burdens are justified by the State's compelling interest in the stability of its political system, ante at 415 U. S. 736. Without § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), the argument runs, the party's primary system, an integral part of the election process, is capable of subversion by a candidate who first opts to participate in that method of ballot access, and later abandons the party and its candidate selection process, taking with him his party supporters. Thus, in sustaining the validity of § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), the Court finds compelling the State's interests in preventing splintered parties and unrestricted factionalism and protecting the direct primary system, ante at 415 U. S. 736. [Footnote 2/2] Page 415 U. S. 760
"Nor do we have reason for concluding that the device California chose, § 6830(d) (Supp. 1974), was not an essential part of its overall mechanism to achieve its acceptable goals. As we indicated in Rosario, the Constitution does not require the State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims. To conclude otherwise might sacrifice the political stability of the system of the State, with profound consequences Page 415 U. S. 761 for the entire citizenry, merely in the interest of particular candidates and their supporters having instantaneous access to the ballot."
Moreover, less drastic means -- which would not require the State to give appellants "instantaneous access to the ballot" -- seem plainly available to achieve California's objectives. First, requiring party disaffiliation 12 months before the primary elections is unreasonable on its face. There is no evidence that splintering and factionalism of political parties will result unless disaffiliation is effected that far in advance of the primaries. To the contrary, whatever threat may exist to party stability is more likely to surface only shortly before the primary, when the identities of the potential field of candidates and issues Page 415 U. S. 762 become known. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 33. Thus, the State's interests would be adequately served and the rights of the appellants less burdened if the date when disaffiliation must be effected were set significantly closer to the primaries. Second, the requirement of party disaffiliation could be limited to those independent candidates who actually run in a party primary. Section 6830(d) (Supp. 1974) sweeps far too broadly in its application to potential independent candidates who, though registered as affiliated with a recognized party, do not run for the party's nomination. Such an independent candidate plainly poses no threat of utilizing the party machinery to run in the primary, and then declaring independent candidacy, thereby splitting the party.
I also dissent from the Court's remand, in the case of appellants Hall and Tyner, of the question concerning the constitutionality of the petition requirements imposed upon independent candidates. Under the relevant statutes, Hall and Tyner, candidates for President and Vice President, were required to file signatures equal to 5% of the total vote cast in California's preceding general election. § 6831. However, the pool from which signatures could be drawn excluded all persons who had voted in the primary elections, including voters who had cast nonpartisan ballots. § 6830(c) (Supp. 1974). Furthermore, circulation of the petitions was not permitted until two months after the primaries, and the necessary signatures were required to be obtained during a 24-day period. § 6833 (Supp. 1974). The Court avoids resolving the constitutionality of these election laws by remanding to the District Court for further proceedings. On remand, the District Court is directed to determine (1) the total vote cast in the last general election as a predicate Page 415 U. S. 763 to computation of the 5% of signatures required by the statutory provision, and (2) the size of the pool to which appellants were required to limit their efforts in obtaining signatures. The Court reasons that these findings are necessary to a determination
If such a remand were directed in the cases of Storer and Frommhagen I could agree, for in those cases there is a complete absence of data necessary to facilitate determination of the actual percentage of available voters that appellants Storer and Frommhagen were required to secure. A remand in the case of Hall and Tyner, however, is unnecessary, because the data upon which relevant findings must be based are already available to us. The data are cited by the Court, ante at 415 U. S. 742 n. 12 and at 415 U. S. 744 n. 14. Evaluated in light of our decision in Jenness v. Fortson, supra, the data leave no room for doubt that California's statutory requirements are unconstitutionally burdensome as applied to Hall and Tyner. Official voting statistics published by the California Secretary of State indicate that 6,633,400 persons voted in the 1970 general election. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, General Election, November 7, 1972, p. 6. Appellants were required to secure signatures totaling 5% of that number, i.e., 331,670. The statistics also indicate the size of the total pool from which appellants were permitted to gather signatures. The total number of registered voters on September 14, 1972 -- the last day appellants were permitted to file nomination petitions -- was 9,953,124. See Secretary of State, Report of Registration, September 1972, p. 8. Of that number, 6,460,220 Page 415 U. S. 764 registered voters could not sign petitions because they had voted in the 1972 primary elections. See Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, Consolidated Primary Election, June 6, 1972, pp. 3, 23. Thus, the total pool of registered voters available to appellants was reduced to approximately 3,492,904, of which the required 331,670 signatures was 9.5%. [Footnote 2/3]
We there upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's election laws requiring potential independent candidates to gather the signatures equal to 5% of the total eligible electorate at the last general election for the office in question. However, candidates were given a full six months to circulate petitions and no restrictions were placed upon the pool of registered voters from which Page 415 U. S. 765 signatures could be drawn. In that circumstance, we found that Georgia imposed no unduly burdensome restrictions upon the free circulation of nominating petitions. We noted:
California seeks to justify its election laws by pointing to the same substantial interests we identified in Jenness, of insuring that candidates possess a modicum of support, and that voters are not confused by the length of the ballot. But in sharp contrast to the election laws we upheld in Jenness, California's statutory scheme greatly restricted the pool of registered voters from which appellants Hall and Tyner were permitted to draw signatures. The 5% requirement, in reality, forced them to secure the signatures of 9.5% of the voters permitted by law to sign nomination petitions. Moreover, unlike Georgia's six-month period for gathering signatures, Page 415 U. S. 766 the California election laws required appellants to meet that State's higher percentage requirement in only 24 days. Thus, even conceding the substantiality of its aims, the State has completely failed to demonstrate why means less drastic than its high percentage requirement and short circulation period -- such as the statutory scheme enacted in Georgia -- will not achieve its interests. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court dismissing these actions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.