Source: http://fredericborel.blogspot.com/2014/08/patterson-v-dominos-pizza-s204543.html
Timestamp: 2017-10-24 05:57:00
Document Index: 733045355

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31005', '§ 20001', '§ 1127', '§ 6', '§ 12920', '§ 12940']

Frédéric Borel: Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, S204543
Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, S204543
Franchising (in California & other states): the franchisor, which sells the right to use its trademark and comprehensive business plan, can expand its enterprise while avoiding the risk and cost of running its own stores. The other party, the franchisee, independently owns, runs, and staffs the retail outlet that sells goods under the franchisor’s name. By following the standards used by all stores in the same chain, the self-motivated franchisee profits from the expertise, goodwill, and reputation of the franchisor. In the present case, a male supervisor employed by a franchisee allegedly subjected a female subordinate to sexual harassment while they worked together at the franchisee’s pizza store. The victim, who is the plaintiff herein, sued the franchisor, along with the harasser and franchisee. The plaintiff claimed that because the franchisor was the “employer” of persons working for the franchisee, and because the franchisee was the “agent” of the franchisor, the latter could be held vicariously liable for the harasser’s alleged breach of statutory and tort law. We granted review to address the novel question dividing the lower courts in this case: does a franchisor stand in an employment or agency relationship with the franchisee and its employees for purposes of holding it vicariously liable for workplace injuries allegedly inflicted by one employee of a franchisee while supervising another employee of the franchisee? The answer lies in the inherent nature of the franchise relationship itself. The imposition and enforcement of a uniform marketing and operational plan cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility for employees of the franchisee who injure each other on the job. The contract-based operational division that otherwise exists between the franchisor and the franchisee would be violated by holding the franchisor accountable for misdeeds committed by employees who are under the direct supervision of the franchisee, and over whom the franchisor has no contractual or operational control. It follows that potential liability on the theories pled here requires that the franchisor exhibit the traditionally understood characteristics of an “employer” or “principal” i.e., it has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees. (See Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 124 (Vernon) [considering “the ‘totality of circumstances’ that reflect upon the nature of the work relationship of the parties”].)
Here, the franchisor prescribed standards and procedures involving pizza-making and delivery, general store operations, and brand image. These standards were vigorously enforced through representatives of the franchisor who inspected franchised stores. However, there was considerable, essentially uncontradicted evidence that the franchisee made day-to-day decisions involving the hiring, supervision, and disciplining of his employees. Plaintiff herself testified that after the franchisee hired her, she followed his policy, and reported the alleged sexual harassment to him. The franchisee suspended the offender. Nothing contractually required or allowed the franchisor to intrude on this process. Plaintiff highlights the franchisee’s testimony that a representative of the franchisor said the harasser should be fired. But, consistent with the trial court’s ruling below, any inference that this statement represented franchisor “control” over discipline for sexual harassment complaints cannot reasonably be drawn from the evidence. The uncontradicted evidence showed that the franchisee imposed discipline consistent with his own personnel policies, declined to follow the ad hoc advice of the franchisor’s representative, and neither expected nor sustained any sanction for doing so.
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision overturning the grant of summary judgment in the franchisor’s favor. After a hearing, the trial court issued a lengthy statement of decision granting summary judgment for Domino’s on all counts. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Domino’s was not vicariously liable on any claim alleged in the complaint. Patterson’s action against Domino’s was dismissed. the Court of Appeal found a triable issue of fact on Domino’s role as an “employer” or “principal” for vicarious liability purposes. The judgment that had been entered in Domino’s favor was reversed. We granted Domino’s petition for review. The issue was limited to determining a franchisor’s potential vicarious liability for wrongful acts committed by one employee of a franchisee while supervising another employee of the franchisee. . (Killion, Franchisor Vicarious Liability — The Proverbial Assault on the Citadel (2005) 24 Franchise L.J. 162, 165 (Citadel); see Shelley & Morton, “Control” in Franchising and the Common Law (2000) 19 Franchise L.J. 119, 121; (Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship (2008) 28 Franchise L.J. 23, 24; under the business format model, the franchisee pays royalties and fees for the right to sell products or services under the franchisor’s name and trademark. In the process, the franchisee also acquires a business plan, which the franchisor has crafted for all of its stores. (Catch 22, supra, 40 Ind. L.Rev. 611, 615-616.) This business plan requires the franchisee to follow a system of standards and procedures. A long list of marketing, production, operational, and administrative areas is typically involved. (See Control, supra, 19 Franchise L.J. 119, 121.) The franchisor’s system can take the form of printed manuals, training programs, advertising services, and managerial support, among other things. (Catch 22, supra, 40 Ind. L.Rev. 611, 616.) (See Corp. Code, § 31005, subd. (a) [defining a “ ‘franchise’ ” under the Franchise Investment Law, which regulates the offer and sale of franchises, as a contractual right granted to a franchisee, in exchange for a franchise fee, to engage in a business which offers, sells, or distributes goods or services, and which is operated under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor and substantially associated with the franchisor’s trademark]); see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 20001, subd. (a) [setting forth a similar definition of “ ‘franchise’ ” in the California Franchise Relations Act, which regulates the renewal, transfer, and termination of franchises]; see, generally, Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1297-1301. The business format arrangement allows the franchisor to raise capital and grow its business, while shifting the burden of running local stores to the franchisee. The systemwide standards and controls provide a means of protecting the trademarked brand at great distances. (King, Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of their Franchisees (2005) 62 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 417, 423 (Vicarious Liability).) The goal — which benefits both parties to the contract — is to build and keep customer trust by ensuring consistency and uniformity in the quality of goods and services, the dress of franchise employees, and the design of the stores themselves. (Blair & Lafontaine, Understanding the Economics of Franchising and the Laws That Regulate It (2006) 26 Franchise L.J. 55, 59-60; Control, supra, 19 Franchise L.J. 119, 121.) Federal trademark law plays some role in this process. (See Fournaris, The Inadvertent Employer: Legal and Business Risks of Employment Determinations to Franchise Systems (2008) 27 Franchise L.J. 224 (Inadvertent Employer) [stating that federal law “obligates a licensor of trademarks, such as a franchisor, to protect the integrity of its registered and unregistered marks by monitoring their use, as well as the quality of the goods and services bearing such marks”]); Vicarious Liability, supra, 62 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 417, 468 [noting trademark may be deemed “abandoned” under federal law if licensor fails to exercise sufficient control over its use by licensee]; see also, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 [defining when trademark is deemed “abandoned”]; 1 Browne, Cal. Business Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 2014) Trademarks, § 6.128, pp. 6-87 to 6-90 [discussing defense of “abandonment” in trademark infringement suits]. In the typical arrangement, the franchisee decides who will work as his employees, and controls day-to-day operations in his store. (Inadvertent Employer, supra, 27 Franchise L.J. 224.) Domino’s franchisees are known to be particularly well motivated. (See Catch 22, supra, 40 Ind. L.Rev. 611, 616, fn. 45.) According to Devereaux, the company has an “internal” selection system. Most of its franchisees have been the manager of a Domino’s pizza store for at least one year, and have completed training as both a manager and a franchisee; the venerable respondeat superior rule provides that “an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment.” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 208, italics added.) The doctrine contravenes the general rule of tort liability based on fault. (Ibid.) Under certain circumstances, the employer may be subject to this form of vicarious liability even for an employee’s willful, malicious, and criminal conduct. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296-299.) We know of no decision by a California court addressing a franchisor’s statutory or common law liability under FEHA for sexual harassment claims made by one employee of a franchisee against another employee (or supervisor) of the franchisee. Nor has this court decided whether a franchisor may be considered an “employer” who is vicariously liable for torts committed by someone working for the franchisee; Patterson contends, based on the foregoing principles and authorities, that operating systems like the one used by Domino’s protect far more than trademark, trade name, and goodwill, and deprive franchisees of the means and manner by which to assert managerial control. Like the instant Court of Appeal, she reasons that the degree of control exercised by franchisors like Domino’s makes each franchisee the agent of the franchisor for all business purposes, and renders each employee of the franchisee an employee of the franchisor in vicarious liability terms. We disagree. We conclude as follows:
The “means and manner” test generally used by the Courts of Appeal cannot stand for the proposition that a comprehensive operating system alone constitutes the “control” needed to support vicarious liability claims like those raised here. As noted, a franchise contract consists of standards, procedures, and requirements that regulate each store for the benefit of both parties. This approach minimizes chain-wide variations that can affect product quality, customer service, trade name, business methods, public reputation, and commercial image. (See generally Citadel, supra, 24 Franchise L.J. 162, 164 [noting that the problem with applying the traditional agency model to determine vicarious liability in the franchising context is that franchising is “all about controls”]; Control, supra, 19 Franchise L.J. 119, 120 [calling for a clear distinction between “two fundamentally different concepts of control” — the control implicit in the franchise relationship, which should not necessarily warrant vicarious liability, and day-to-day operational control, which might warrant vicarious liability]; Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique (1993) 1993 Colum. Bus. L.Rev. 89, 91 [observing that the traditional agency model does not work well in determining the vicarious liability of a franchisor because there must be some franchisor control “over the means of performance”]; Laufer & Gurnick, Minimizing Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for Acts of Their Franchisees (1987) 6 Franchise L.J. No. 4, 3 (Minimizing) [maintaining that the “control required for a franchise to exist is not inherently sufficient to establish an actual agency”].) More to the point, there are sound and legitimate reasons for business format contracts like the present one to allocate local personnel issues almost exclusively to the franchisee. As we have explained, franchisees are owner-operators who hold a personal and financial stake in the business. A major incentive is the franchisee’s right to hire the people who work for him, and to oversee their performance each day. A franchisor enters this arena, and becomes potentially liable for actions of the franchisee’s employees, only if it has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees. Thus, the mere fact that the franchisor has reserved the right to require or suggest uniform workplace standards intended to protect its brand, and the quality of customer service, at its franchised locations is not, standing alone, sufficient to impose “employer” or “principal” liability on the franchisor for statutory or common law violations by one of the franchisee’s employees toward another. Any other guiding principle would disrupt the franchise relationship. (See generally Inadvertent Employer, supra, 27 Franchise L.J. 224 [observing that franchisees “control the day-to-day operations of their franchised businesses,” including the right to “hire and fire their own employees”]; Ellis & Alcantar, Franchisor Liability for the Criminal Acts of Others (1998) 18 Franchise L.J. 11, 12 [asserting that a franchisor should not be held liable for injurious acts of a franchisee’s employees “if it does not control personnel decisions,” including hiring and firing]; Vicarious Liability, supra, 62 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 417, 467 [noting that the franchise relationship “ ‘sets out a detailed scheme of control between two autonomous businesses’ ”]; Minimizing, supra, 6 Franchise L.J. 3, 6 [suggesting that franchise contracts “normally” give the franchisee control over the hiring and firing of employees].) Finally, nothing we say here is materially at odds with the analysis that would apply if we examined plaintiff’s three FEHA claims in terms of the principles developed under this statutory scheme outside of the franchising context. In general, FEHA is designed to prevent and deter unlawful employment practices, and to redress their adverse effects. (§ 12920.5; State Dept., supra, 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1044.) Essential to plaintiff’s statutory claims is the existence of “an employment relationship.” (Vernon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 127.) In other words, and as noted above, Domino’s statutory liability for the acts of sexual harassment that allegedly occurred at the Sui Juris store depends on whether Domino’s was an “employer” of both plaintiff and the harasser, Miranda. (§ 12940, subds. (h) [retaliation for reporting sexual harassment], (j)(1) [sexual harassment], (k) [failure to take preventative steps].) There are few California cases defining an “employer” under the FEHA provisions invoked here. But, it appears, traditional common law principles of agency and respondeat superior supply the proper analytical framework under FEHA, as they do for franchising generally. Courts in FEHA cases have emphasized “the control exercised by the employer over the employee’s performance of employment duties.” (Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1626, citing Vernon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 124-125; accord, McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 283, 301-302.) This standard requires “a comprehensive and immediate level of ‘day-to-day’ authority” over matters such as hiring, firing, direction, supervision, and discipline of the employee. (Vernon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 127-128.)
As discussed above, Domino’s lacked the general control of an “employer” or “principal” over relevant day-to-day aspects of the employment and workplace behavior of Sui Juris’s employees. Application of the FEHA test for determining an employment relationship produces no different result in this franchising case than the one we have already reached. Plaintiff is mistaken to the extent she implies that the contrary is true. Here, the Court of Appeal erred in finding a triable issue of fact on whether an employment or agency relationship existed as a prerequisite to holding Domino’s strictly or vicariously liable for Miranda’s alleged sexual harassment of Patterson. At least two courts in other states have recently upheld summary judgment for Domino’s, as a franchisor, because it did not possess sufficient supervisorial control to be held vicariously liable on an agency or employment theory for torts committed by employees of a Domino’s franchisee. Such was the case despite evidence of standard Domino’s contracts and reference guides closely related to those at issue here. (See Rainey v. Langen, supra, 998 A.2d 342, 350-351; Viado v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, supra, 217 P.3d 199, 209.) Patterson, like the Court of Appeal opinion in the instant case, quotes language from an older decision that reached the opposite result. (Parker v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., supra, 629 So.2d 1026, 1029 [describing Domino’s reference guide as “a veritable bible for overseeing a Domino’s operation”].) Consistent with the exclusive control vested in Sui Juris over its own employees, neither the contract nor the MRG empowered Domino’s to establish a sexual harassment policy or training program for Sui Juris’s employees. Nor was there any procedure by which Sui Juris’s employees could report such complaints to Domino’s. In fact, the topic did not appear in the franchise documents at all. According to the testimonial evidence, Poff exercised sole control over selecting the individuals who worked in his store. He did not include Domino’s in the application, interview, or hiring process. Nor did anyone attempt to intervene on Domino’s behalf. It was Poff’s decision to hire Patterson as a new employee and to otherwise retain the existing staff when he bought the franchise.
Evidence about the training of Sui Juris’s employees is more nuanced, but did not indicate control over relevant day-to-day aspects of employment and employee conduct. It appears the parties did not follow the literal language of the contract placing sole responsibility on Sui Juris for handling all training programs for its employees. Domino’s provided new employees with orientation materials in both electronic and handbook form. Such programs supplemented the training that Poff was required to conduct. However, with respect to training employees on how to treat each other at work, and how to avoid sexual harassment, it appears that Sui Juris, not Domino’s, was in control. There was no evidence that the training programs Domino’s placed on the PULSE computer system covered these subjects. What is clear is that Poff implemented his own sexual harassment policy and training program for his employees. He adopted a zero tolerance approach, among other things. Poff held meetings in which he personally and vigorously trained his managers about sexual harassment. He also installed his policy on the PULSE computer system for other employees to view. No Domino’s representative, including Lee, trained Sui Juris employees on sexual harassment. Nothing in the record indicates that any Domino’s representative reviewed Poff’s sexual harassment policy, discussed its substance with Poff or his employees, or observed any training sessions at the store.
Of particular relevance is that Poff’s sexual harassment policy and training program came with the authority to impose discipline for any violations. The record shows that Poff, not Domino’s, wielded such significant control. No reasonable inference can be drawn that Domino’s, through Lee, retained or assumed the traditional right of general control an “employer” or “principal” has over factors such as hiring, direction, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees. Hence, there is no basis on which to find a triable issue of fact that an employment or agency relationship existed between Domino’s and Sui Juris and its employees in order to support Patterson’s claims against Domino’s on vicarious liability grounds. Nothing we say herein is intended to minimize the seriousness of sexual harassment in the workplace, particularly by a supervisor. (See State Dept., supra, 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1048.) Nor do we mean to imply that franchisors, including those of immense size, can never be held accountable for sexual harassment at a franchised location. A franchisor will be liable if it has retained or assumed the right of general control over the relevant day-to-day operations at its franchised locations that we have described, and cannot escape liability in such a case merely because it failed or declined to establish a policy with regard to that particular conduct. Our holding is limited to determining the circumstances under which an employment or agency relationship exists as a prerequisite to pursuing statutory and tort theories like those alleged against the franchisor here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed (Baxter, J., with three concurring Justices and three dissenting) (Cal. S.Ct., 28.08.2014, S204543, Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza).
Contrat de franchise (en droit californien et dans d’autres états) : le franchiseur vend le droit d’utiliser sa marque commerciale et son business plan. Il peut de la sorte étendre son activité entrepreneuriale tout en évitant les risques et les coûts qui résulteraient de l’exploitation propre de ses enseignes. L’autre partie au contrat, le franchisé, détient et opère en tant qu’indépendant l’une de ces enseignes qui écoule des produits sous le nom du franchiseur. Le franchisé s’occupe aussi de la politique du personnel. En se conformant aux standards utilisés par tous les magasins de la même chaîne, un franchisé motivé profite de l’expertise, de la clientèle et de la réputation du franchiseur. Dans la présente affaire, un supérieur hiérarchique masculin, travaillant pour le compte du franchisé, aurait soumis sa collaboratrice subordonnée à du harcèlement sexuel pendant leur activité pour le compte du franchisé. La victime a ouvert action contre le franchiseur directement, ainsi que contre le prétendu harceleur et contre le franchisé. La victime soutient qu’au plan juridique, le franchiseur peut être tenu indirectement responsable des actes du harceleur, considérant d’une part que le franchiseur était l’employeur des personnes travaillant pour le franchisé, et d’autre part que le franchisé était l’agent du franchiseur. La Cour Suprême de Californie juge que même si la nature du contrat de franchise implique que le franchiseur impose au franchisé un plan uniforme de marketing et d’opérations, dont ledit franchiseur contrôlera la bonne exécution, il n’en découle pas automatiquement une responsabilité du franchiseur pour les dommages que s’infligent en cours d’emploi les employés du franchisé. Le contrat de franchise serait violé si l’on considérait le franchiseur comme responsable des actes contraires au droit commis par des employés sous la supervision directe du franchisé, et sur lesquels le franchiseur n’a de contrôle ni contractuel ni opérationnel. Il en découle ici qu’une responsabilité du franchiseur requiert que le franchiseur se trouve dans la position d’un employeur ou d’un « principal » (au sens du droit du contrat d’agent) telles que ces deux notions sont traditionnellement comprises, soit que le franchiseur détienne ou exerce un droit de contrôle général portant sur des facteurs tels que l’engagement du personnel du franchisé, la direction, la supervision, la discipline et le licenciement de ces employés, ainsi qu’un droit de contrôle sur les aspects relevants du comportement au jour le jour de ces employés sur la place de travail. Est à considérer à ce niveau la totalité des circonstances relatives à la nature des relations de travail entre les parties. En l’espèce, le franchiseur a prescrit des standards et des procédures s’agissant du produit commercialisé (la fabrication et la livraison de pizzas), des opérations générales d’un point de vente particulier, et de l’image de la marque. L’application effective de ces standards par les différents point de vente est vigoureusement contrôlée et mise en œuvre par des représentants du franchiseur, chargés d’inspecter les points de vente. Cependant, le dossier contient de nombreuses preuves, essentiellement non contestées, que c’est bien le franchisé lui-même qui prend les décisions au jour le jour impliquant l’engagement, la surveillance, et les sanctions relatifs au personnel des restaurants. La demanderesse, en l’espèce, s’est plainte de harcèlement sexuel auprès de son franchisé (qui l’avait engagée et instruite), lequel a suspendu le prétendu harceleur. Au plan contractuel, rien n’exigeait l’intrusion du franchiseur dans cette suite d’événements. Rien ne lui aurait non plus contractuellement permis de le faire. Pour toutes ces raisons, la Cour Suprême de Californie renverse la décision de la cour d’appel, laquelle avait renversé la décision de première instance accordant jugement selon la procédure sommaire en faveur du franchiseur. (La cour d’appel avait considéré qu’il existait en l’espèce des questions de fait devant être jugée, de sorte qu’un jugement sommaire n’était pas possible). La présente décision de la Cour Suprême se réfère à plusieurs ouvrages de doctrine traitant du droit du contrat de franchise. Dans un contrat de franchise-type, le franchisé paye des royautés et des frais contre le droit de vendre des produits ou des services sous la raison sociale et la marque du franchiseur. Le franchisé reçoit également un business plan préparé par le franchiseur pour tous ses établissements de vente. Ce plan contient usuellement une longue liste de standards et de procédures à respecter, portant sur des domaines aussi divers que le marketing, la production, le domaine opérationnel et administratif. En droit californien, le contrat de franchise est régi par des dispositions spéciales du Code des sociétés et du Bus. & Prof. Code. En particulier, le renouvellement, le transfert et la fin du contrat de franchise sont régis par la loi californienne « California Franchise Relations Act ». De manière générale, le droit des marques (qui relève du droit fédéral) joue un rôle dans le domaine du contrat de franchise. Ainsi par exemple le droit fédéral oblige un donneur de licence portant sur une marque, tel un franchiseur, de protéger l’intégrité de ses marques enregistrées ou non, en surveillant leur usage, ainsi que la qualité des biens et services portant sur lesdites marques. Selon le droit fédéral, le droit à la marque peut être considéré comme abandonné si le donneur de licence n’exerce pas un contrôle suffisant sur l’usage de la marque par le preneur de licence. Et toujours dans le cadre du contrat de franchise typique, c’est le franchisé qui choisit ses employés et qui contrôle l’activité quotidienne dans son point de vente. Par ailleurs, la vénérable règle connue sous le nom de « respondeat superior » prévoit qu’un employeur peut être tenu indirectement responsable pour les actes illicites commis par un employé dans le cadre de son emploi. Cette règle contrevient à la règle générale de la responsabilité civile, basée sur la notion de faute. Sous certaines circonstances, l’employeur peut être sujet à cette forme de responsabilité indirecte même pour une conduite intentionnelle, « malicieuse » ou criminelle de l’employé. Avant la présente affaire, les cours de Californie n’ont pas eu l’opportunité de se prononcer sur la responsabilité du franchiseur basée sur le droit du travail fédéral (FEHA, au sens formel ou selon ce que la Common law permet d’obtenir de cette loi fédérale) quand un employé du franchisé se plaint de harcèlement sexuel de la part d’un autre employé du même franchisé, fut-il ou non son supérieur hiérarchique. La Cour Suprême de Californie n’a pas non plus tranché la question de savoir si un franchiseur peut être qualifié d’employeur, indirectement responsable des actes illicites commis par une personne employée par un franchisé. Il est fondamental d’observer qu’il existe des raisons fondées et légitimes pour laisser au franchisé exclusivement la gestion et le règlement des questions de ressources humaines qui se posent au lieu de son point de vente. Les franchisés sont à la fois des propriétaires et des opératifs qui détiennent un intérêt personnel et financier dans leur affaire. Une de leurs motivations majeures consiste dans leur droit d’engager eux-mêmes leur personnel, et de superviser eux-mêmes le travail quotidien de leurs employés. Un franchiseur entre dans le domaine du franchisé et devient potentiellement responsable pour les actes des employés du franchisé s’il a retenu ou s’il a assumé un droit de contrôle général portant sur les questions d’engagement de personnel, de direction, de supervision, de discipline, de licenciement, de comportement quotidien des employés sur la place de travail. Ainsi, le simple fait que le franchiseur se soit réservé le droit d’exiger ou de suggérer des standards uniformes applicables sur le lieu de travail en vue de protéger sa marque et la qualité du service clientèle n’est pas à lui seul suffisant pour entraîner une responsabilité d’employeur ou de principal (au sens du contrat d’agence) pour des violations légales ou de la Common law commises par un employé du franchisé contre un autre employé de ce même franchisé. Enfin, sous l’angle de l’application de la FEHA, la Cour observe que rien dans ce qui précède n’est contradictoire avec une analyse qui serait faite de l’application de la FEHA dans un autre contexte que celui du contrat de franchise. De manière générale, le but de FEHA consiste à prévenir et à dissuader des pratiques illégales dans le cadre du droit du travail, et de sanctionner dites pratiques illégales. Les prétentions d’un demandeur basées sur FEHA impliquent l’existence d’une relation de travail. Dans la présente affaire, pour appliquer FEHA, il serait nécessaire que le franchiseur soit l’employeur à la fois de la demanderesse et de son prétendu harceleur. La jurisprudence californienne qui définit la notion d’employeur au sens de FEHA est rare. Mais il apparaît que les principes traditionnels du droit de l’ »agency » et de la notion de respondeat superior, déduits de la Common law, apportent l’analyse à mettre en œuvre sous l’angle de FEHA (comme ils l’apportent dans le cadre du contrat de franchise). Dans les actions FEHA, les Tribunaux ont mis en évidence l’importance du contrôle exercé par l’employeur sur l’exécutions des obligations de l’employé dans la relation de travail. Cette notion implique une autorité quotidienne effective, sans intermédiaire, sur des questions telles que l’engagement, la résiliation, la direction, la supervision et la discipline des employés. Comme relevé, le franchiseur, dans la présente espèce, ne disposait pas de la possibilité d’un contrôle général portant sur les activités quotidiennes des employés de son franchisé. Il est de la sorte à distinguer d’un employeur ou d’un « principal » au sens du contrat d’agence. Par conséquent, la cour d’appel s’est trompée en affirmant l’existence d’une question de fait susceptible d’être débattue en procédure et portant sur la question de savoir s’il existait ou non une relation de travail ou d’agence préexistante permettant de tenir le franchiseur directement ou indirectement responsable des actes de harcèlement d’un employé du franchisé contre un autre employé de ce même franchisé. Et en l’espèce, aucun document contractuel ne permettait au franchiseur d’établir une politique en matière de harcèlement qui serait applicable dans les points de vente. Aucune procédure n’était en outre en place par laquelle les employés du franchisé auraient pu rapporter de telles pratiques. Cependant, s’agissant de la question de la formation des employés portant sur la manière de se comporter avec les collègues, et sur la manière d’éviter tout harcèlement sexuel, il apparaît en l’espèce que le franchisé était en charge, et non le franchiseur. Il ne fait pas de doute en l’espèce que le franchiseur a mis en œuvre sa propre politique en matière de harcèlement sexuel et sa propre politique de formation pour ses employés. Il a adopté à ce sujet le principe de la tolérance zéro. Et rien au dossier n’indique que le franchiseur aurait revu la politique du franchisé en matière de harcèlement sexuel. Il est à relever que dans sa politique, le franchisé disposait et dispose de l’autorité de sanctionner les manquements. D’où la conclusion qu’il n’existe pas de base permettant de juger que la question d’un contrat de travail ou d’une relation d’agence pouvait être débattue en procédure, comme déjà indiqué précédemment. La Cour précise qu’elle n’entend en l’espèce nullement minimiser le caractère sérieux du harcèlement sexuel sur la place de travail, particulièrement si le harcèlement est le fait d’un supérieur hiérarchique. La Cour précise aussi que dans d’autres situations le franchiseur peut être tenu responsable des actes du franchisé ou des employés du franchisé, soit celles où le franchiseur détient un droit de contrôle sur les activités quotidiennes au lieu de travail du franchisé. Peu importe à cet égard que le franchiseur exerce ou non son droit.
Labels: Agency relationship, California Law, Employment relationship, Franchising (in California), Tort, Trademark and Franchising, Triable issue of fact, Vicarious liability