Source: http://caccp.blogspot.com/2016/12/
Timestamp: 2017-08-19 03:27:43
Document Index: 552386688

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 170', '§ 170', '§ 425', '§ 425', '§ 425', '§ 473', '§ 397', '§ 399']

111 North Hill Street: December 2016
No Extra § 170.6 Strike After Interlocutory Reversals
McNair v. Superior Court, No. B275282 (D2d3 Dec. 23, 2016)
This case concerns the ability of a party who has already filed on peremptory strike under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6 to file a new one after a successful interlocutory anti-SLAPP appeal. In a pleasingly brief and cogent opinion by Justice Aldrich, the Court of Appeal says no.
Labels: (a)(2), 170.6, anti-SLAPP, interlocutory appeals, mcnair, ncaa, peremptory strike, superior court, writ review
Integrated Dynamic Sols. v. Vitavet Labs, Inc., No. B268311, (D2d2 Dec. 22, 2016)
Plaintiff in this case won a preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to specifically perform a contract under which Defendant was to give Plaintiff access to some computer code. Defendant claims that the injunction was “mandatory” in that it altered the status quo, and that effectively permitted the PI to usurp the final adjudication of the case.
But that’s not right. While the preliminary injunction, in ordering delivery, might be construable as mandatory, that didn’t make it impermissible. If Defendant ultimately wins at trial, presumably Plaintiff will have to give back the code and pay out of the bond whatever loss was caused by an improvidently granted motion.
Labels: bonds, california code of civil procedure, integrated dynamic solutions, mandatory injuctions, preliminary injunctions, vitavet labs
Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, No. G052660 (D4d3 Dec. 22, 2016)
From when does the sixty-day clock to file an anti-SLAPP motion run under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(f)?
Labels: 425.16(f), anti-SLAPP, california code of civil procedure, morris cerullo world evangelism, newprot harbor ventures, SLAPP
Dual Diagnosis Treatment Cntr. v. Buschel, No. G053046 (D3d2 Dec. 20, 2016)
The trial court in this case denied an anti-SLAPP motion addressed to libel claims brought against the publisher of a drug treatment community newsletter. The claims were based on the newsletter’s republication of a story from the OC Register that reported that a drug treatment facility was not properly licensed in California. The Court of Appeal affirms, holding that the licensure status of an individual treatment facility, without more, is not a public issue sufficient for the claims to arise from protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(3). That provision protects written statements in a public forum, but only to the extent that they relate to a public issue.
Labels: (e)(3), 425.16, anti-SLAPP, buschel, california code of civil procedure, dual diagnosis treatment center, issue of public concern, pubic issue
A jury in this case rendered an apparently nonsensical damages verdict that could not be squared with the instructions and the verdict form. But in response to Plaintiff’s new trial motion on inadequate damages, the trial judge ruled that the court could not “substitute its judgment for that of the jury” and that “declarations were necessary to determine what the jury actually did.”
Labels: 13th juror, california code of civil procedure, crown castle, damages, inadequate damages, juror affidavits, new trial, ryan
Wilson v. Cable News Network, No. B264944 (D2d1 Dec. 13, 2016)
This case is basically a retread of 2013’s Hunter v. CBS case.
There, the Court of Appeal said that committing employment discrimination against a newscaster is “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute because it is “conduct in furtherance” of First Amendment Activity as defined under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(e)(4). Except in this case the talent is off-air, and the discrimination (and retaliation) is on the basis of disability. Plus, it goes the other way.
Labels: (e)(4), 425.16, anti-SLAPP, california code of civil procedure, CNN, conduct in furtherance, hunter, wilson
569 E. Cnty. Blvd LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, No. D068538 (D4d1 as modified Dec. 29, 2016)
This is on rehearing of from this prior opinion.
The lawsuit is a quintessential SLAPP. Developer sued Activist group for gettin’ up in its business and “interfering” with its prospective economic advantage. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1125 (1999) (“The paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended to chill the defendants’ continued political or legal opposition to the developers’ plans. The favored causes of action in SLAPP suits are defamation, various business torts such as interference with prospective economic advantage, nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (quotes and alterations omitted)) The trial court got that and struck the claim. This appeal is only about how much fees Activist’s lawyers get.
Labels: 569 East County Blvd., anti-SLAPP, attorney fees, Backcountry Against the Dump, lodestar, reasonable rates, SLAPP
Driscoll v. Granite Rock Co., No. H370662 (D6 Nov. 30, 2016)
This is a rare class action (wage & hour) that actually went to trial. Nothing procedural at issue. But a noteworthy event nonetheless.
Labels: class actions, Driscoll, graite rock, trials
Condon v. Daland Nissan, Inc., No. A145613 (D1d1 Nov. 29, 2016)
The Parties’ arbitration agreement contains a provision that permits a de novo arbitration before a three-arbitrator panel if a single arbitrator gives an award of $0 or over $100k. Plaintiff wins $180k, but the arbitral body refuses to constitute a de novo panel based on the fact that it doesn’t have appellate rules. On confirmation of the award, the superior court similarly declines to order a de novo arbitration.
But they were both wrong.
The parties agreed to a de novo arbitration (not an arbitration appeal) if the original results fell outside an agreed band. The original arbitration did, in fact, result in an award over the band. The fact that the arbitral body didn’t have specific appellate rules doesn’t brook otherwise. So the trial court erred in refusing to compel the parties to use the de novo procedure they had agreed to.
Labels: arbitration appeals, arbitration awards, arbitration rules, condon, Daland Nissan
Evans v. Am. Optical Corp., No. B265222 (D2d4 Nov. 22, 2016)
Evidentiary issues raised in an appeal after a defense verdict in an asbestos case.
Labels: 352, admissible, american optical corp., asbestos, california evidence code, conditional relevance, evans, irrelevant, old evidence
Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corp., No. B244383 (D2d4 Nov. 21, 2016)
This is a really long-pending wage and hour class action. Way back in 2011, while the case was pending trial, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Dukes v. Walmart, which substantially raised the bar for class certification under the Federal Rules. Relying on Dukes, defendants moved to decertify. The trial court granted the motion back in 2012, and the case has been pending appeal since then. But then the California Supreme Court decided Brinker—which focuses the class cert inquiry in wage and hour claims on whether the employer had an illegal policy—and the U.S. Supremes decided Tyson—which permits the use of statistical proof in class actions, albeit only in certain contexts.
After examining a whole pile of precedent decided after the trial court’s decertification order, the Court of Appeal rules that the trial court erred in decertifying the class. The big issue in the case was whether Plaintiff employees—security guards—could be required to eat on-duty meals under the governing wage order. The resolution of that issue could be addressed, per Brinker, to whether the Employer had a policy that unlawfully required on-duty meals, even when they were not merited by the relevant test. Framed that way, common issues predominate. And other issues—such as whether employees signed agreements necessary to make the eligible for on-duty meals—could be decided broadly by dividing the class into subclasses depending on which of a few versions of the Employer’s employment agreement were signed by each class member.
The court goes on to apply the same analysis for plaintiffs rest break and wage statement claims.
Labels: brinker, class certification, decertification, dukes, lubin, wackenhut, wage and hour
Med. Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com, No. D068523 (D4d1 as modified Dec. 16, 2016)
This case fronts a question that I wrote about three years ago in connection with a post on 2013’s Trapp v. Neimann: When a complaint fails to allege any conduct at all by a particular defendant, does that defendant have a valid anti-SLAPP motion if the fleshed-out counts against other defendants arise from protected activity? Those were the facts of Trapp, but the court didn’t address the issue. It did, however, find the first prong of the SLAPP analysis was met in an unsatisfyingly truncated analysis, of which I was kind of doubtful.
Labels: 425.16, anti-SLAPP, arising from, libel, medical marijuana, project CBD, trapp
CCP § 473(b) Covers a Default from Failure to Pay Transfer Fees.
Gee v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No C077077 (D3 as modified December 6, 2016)
When Plaintiffs case was transferred from Sacto to Fresno counties on motion of Defendant, she was—possibly erroneously—ordered to pay the transfer fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 397 or 399.* But when the case landed in Fresno, her lawyer never tendered the fees. Defendant moved to dismiss under § 399(a), which permits a court to dismiss an action with prejudice if fees go unpaid for 30 days. Plaintiff didn’t file an opposition or respond to the tentative (which was to grant) and the case was dismissed.
Labels: 1008, 397, 399, 473(b), california code of civil procedure, gee, greyhound lines, reconsideration, transfer, transfer fees
Peer Review Does Not Insulate Discrimination Claim
Armin v. Riverside Cmty. Hosp., No.G052125 (D4d3 as modified Dec. 16, 2016)
There have been a bunch of cases over the past few years involving the intersection of the anti-SLAPP statute, public university hospital peer review processes, and discrimination claims brought by doctors whose admittance privileges are governed by peer review processes.
Labels: 1278.5, 425.16, anti-SLAPP, arising from, armin, retaliation, riverside community hospital, SLAPP
Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s Inc., No. A145283 (D2d5 Nov. 16, 2016)
In Iskanian v. CLS Trans. L.A., 59 Cal. 4th 348 (2014), the Supreme Court held that Labor Code Private Attorney General Act claims cannot be sent to arbitration under an arb agreement that includes a class action waiver. The gist is that PAGA claims more or less belong to the government in a qui tam-like capacity. That being the case, the matter can’t go to arbitration unless the government consents. That logic holds true for non-class PAGA claims, as much as it does for representative actions. Which resolves this appeal, in which Defendant unsuccessfully moved to send Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim to arbitration.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 12:00 PM No comments:
Labels: arbitration, bloomindales, class action waivers, iskanian, paga, tanguilig
Capital Builders Hardware, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd., No. B271987 (D2d2 Nov. 16, 2016)
The court here holds that interlocutory orders of Worker’s Compensation ALJs aren’t appealable. They are not appealable to the Worker’s Comp. Appeal Board. And they are not appealable from there to the Court of Appeal. So the writ of review is vacated. In reaching this result, the court parts ways with Alvarez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 187, Cal. App. 4th 575 (2010), which suggests that at least some kinds of orders might be subject to interlocutory review.
Labels: aljs, capital builders hardware, interlocutory appeals, WCAB, workers compensation
Soria v. Univision Radio, L.A., Inc, No B263224 (D2d7 Nov. 15, 2016)
The court here reverses a summary judgment in an employment case. The opinion mostly deals with employment law stuff. But there’s two worthwhile procedural points in the footnotes.
First, the moving defendant in this case filed a “reply separate statement,” attaching a depo transcript. The trial court struck the filing and sustained an objection to the testimony. (There is, in fact, no such thing as a reply separate statement.) But for some inexplicable reason, the trial court nonetheless relied on the transcript in granting SJ. In the absence of a cross appeal on the evidentiary ruling, however, the Court of Appeal declines an invitation to consider the testimony on appeal.
Second, Plaintiff is suing on two theories of disability discrimination. Either she’s being discriminated against because she’s disabled, or because she’s not but her employer thinks she is. There’s a footnote that says that because plaintiff’s claims represent two factual theories of the invasion of a single primary right, if either theory presents a viable claim, summary judgment shouldn’t have issued. No quibble with the rule. But its not really clear why the right not be discriminated against because you are disabled necessarily implicates the same right against discrimination because you are perceived as disabled. A case could be made either way. But the court just says that it’s the same right. Probably because that’s easier than actually trying to explain the incomprehensible morass that is primary rights doctrine. So I suppose it is. Today anyway.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 10:25 AM No comments:
Labels: claim soria, evidence on reply, primary rights doctrine, separate statement, univision
Posted by Michael Shipley at 1:56 PM No comments:
Posted by Michael Shipley at 3:19 PM No comments:
Maas v. Superior Court, No. S225109 (Cal. Nov. 7, 2016)
Habeas corpus in California state court is procedurally complicated. But generally speaking, when a writ is first petitioned for in a superior court, the court decides whether the petition states a prima face case for relief or if it is barred by some procedural issue. Sometimes this decision is assisted by informal briefing from the government. If the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court issues an order to show cause, which then requires the government to make a formalized response called a “return.”
Posted by Michael Shipley at 9:04 PM No comments:
Labels: 170.6, habeas, judicial assignments, maas, peremptory strikes, superior court
Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP, No. D068865 (D4d1 Nov. 4, 2016)
Plaintiff—a California native living at the time in NYC—returned a cell phone to a T-Mobile store in New York. In the process of refurbing the phone, an employee of the Refurber found some apparently sensitive pictures of Plaintiff on the phone and posted them to her Facebook wall. Plaintiff sued T-Mobile, four companies related to the refurbing, and those companies’ parent for invasion of privacy and related torts. Refurbers moved to quash service of lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court granted.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 6:10 PM No comments:
Labels: agency, alter ego, california code of civil procedure, daimler, general jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, strasner, touchstone wireless & repair
ZF Micro Devices, Inc. v. TAT Capital Partners, Ltd., No. H040776 (as modified Nov. 30, 2016)
This case deals with an interesting issue on the statute of limitations. To what cross-claims does the relation-back doctrine apply to toll a limitations period? Does it only apply to compulsory cross-claims, or to permissive ones too?
Posted by Michael Shipley at 10:48 AM No comments:
Labels: 426.10, 426.30, 431.70, counterclaim, cross-claim, relation back, statutes of limitations, tat capital partners, tolling, zf micro devices
Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., No. B234271 (D2d3 Nov. 3, 2016)
This is our third go-round on this case, having covered the original D2 opinion and the Supreme Court’s partial reversal. The Supremes held that Brandt fees—fees incurred by an insured in its effort to obtain wrongfully denied coverage—should count in the denominator for the 9:1 or 10:1 ratio that more or less limits the ratio between actual and punitive damages under the constitutional Gore/State Farm due process framework.
On remand, the court runs through a full analysis on the puni award, finding that although the jury award of $19 million on a compensatory award of $35,000 and 12,500 in Brandt fees was out of whack, a punitive award of ten times that sum—$475,000—would hold up under Gore/State Farm. So the court vacates the new trial award that pertained to the remittitur and orders the trial court to amend the judgment to reflect punitives of $475,000.
Posted by Michael Shipley at 12:56 AM No comments:
Labels: brandt fees, california supreme court, nickerson, punitive damages, remand, stonebridge life insurance
Indus. Waste & Debris Box. Serv., Inc. v. Murphy, No A142388 (D1d2 Oct. 28, 2016)
Defendant is a waste and recycling consultant. On behalf of Client, it wrote a report about recycling rates that was positive for Client but questioned the veracity of Client’s Competitor’s statements about how much of the waste it collected was ultimately recycled. Client ultimately submitted the report to a local government in Sonoma County, resulting in Client getting a waste hauling contract that Competitor previously held. Competitor sued Defendant for defamation and other similar causes of action.
If you haven’t yet guessed where this is going, you might be new to California.
Labels: (e)(2), (e)(4), 425.16, 425.17(c), anti-SLAPP, california code of civil procedure, commercial speech exception, industrial waste and debris box service, murphy, protected activity