Source: http://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_social_security/
Timestamp: 2018-03-19 20:30:44
Document Index: 235695722

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2412', '§ 402', '§ 2412', '§ 3', '§ 2412', '§ 1988', '§ 2412', 'art 1', 'art, 535']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : Cases: Social Security
Social Security: Social Security Disability Claimant Winning Remand Erroneously Denied Attorney’s Fees Under EAJA By District Court
Government’s Position on Remand Issue Was Not Justified, Such That Later Litigation Position Rulings Were Irrelevant.
In Tobeler v. Colvin, Case No. 12-16392 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2014) (published), Social Security disability claimant had obtained a remand because a Social Security administrative law judge (ALJ) had disregarded competent lay witness on claimant’s symptoms without comment, a “no no” in this area of the law. Ultimately, however, the district court concluded that the ALJ’s error was harmless. Claimant then sought attorney’s fees for obtaining a remand, but the district court denied the request after finding that the government’s position was substantially justified because it prevailed on the remainder of the ALJ’s conclusions except for the lay witness testimony issue.
Machine signs 7,000 social security checks per hour with no writer’s cramp. December 14, 1939. Library of Congress.
The denial of fees was reversed because the district court abused its discretion in concluding the government’s position was substantially justified. The problem was that the government’s underlying position on the witness issue producing a remand was unjustified. Because fees had to be awardable on this point, it did not matter that government’s litigation position was ultimately sustained at later points in the case. Remanded to fix reasonable amount of fees.
Posted at 04:29 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0)
Social Security: Attorney’s Fees Award Under EAJA Erroneously Decided Because ALJ’s Decision Is “Position of the United States” For Determining If Government Was Substantially Justified In Its Position
Remand Was Ordered to Consider $15,000-Plus Fee Request.
In Meier v. Colvin, Case No. 11-35736 (9th Cir. July 23, 2013) (for publication), a social security disability benefits claimant suffered defeats at the administrative law level and the district court level, until the the Ninth Circuit in an earlier unpublished memorandum opinion reversed and remanded for a benefits award after determining the ALJ failed to provide reasons for rejecting certain proof submitted by claimant. Claimant then moved to recover over $15,000 in fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which has a fee-shifting provision mandating fees to a prevailing party other than the U.S. in any civil action unless the court finds that the position of the U.S. was “substantially justified.” The district court denied the requests, determining that the losses at the ALJ level showed there was sufficient governmental justification.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the fee denial, reasoning that the ALJ’s decision as adjudicator was a “position of the United States” just as the government’s litigation position in the action. It observed that the pertinent EAJA provisions (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(D)) make no distinction between an agency’s adjudicative and adversarial acts. Based on the earlier decision finding the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, this also established that the U.S. position was not “substantially justified.” Reversed and remanded to fix an award of fees and costs.
Posted at 05:14 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Social Security: Claimant’s Attorney Subject To Offset For EAJA Fee Award From Fee Recovery Allowed Under The SSA
Offset Applicable for Entire Work of Attorney During Litigation, Not Just Discrete Work.
Parrish v. Comm’r of Social Security Administration, Case No. 11-35332 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2012) (published) is an interesting case involving the interaction of Social Security Act (SSA) and Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provisions allowing attorneys to receive fees for successfully representing Social Security benefit claimants.
Above: New Social Security board member primps. August 23, 2937. Library of Congress.
SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1), limits fee recovery for attorneys representing successful claimants in federal court to 25% of the total past-due benefits conferred by the judgment, because the recovery comes out of the claimant’s benefits. In contrast, EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)-(2), allows fee recovery to the successful attorney determined by the time expended and the attorney’s hourly rate, subject to a specified cap, with the fees being paid by the government. However, because attorneys accepting an award above the section 402(b)(1) cap were subject to possible criminal sanctions under section 402(b)(2), Congress amended the EAJA in 1985 to add a savings provisions allowing attorneys to receive fees under both SSA section 402(b) and EAJA section 2412. (Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (uncodified.) But there is an important rub to this savings provision: a lawyer must offset any fees received under EAJA with any award that the attorney receives under SSA if the two were for the “same work”--adopted in order to avoid giving double compensation to attorneys.
In Parrish, controversy centered on this “same work” construct. The district court clearly awarded attorney a total fee award of $11,575 under EAJA (the aggregate of two awards), with the winning attorney filing a motion to seek $9,059.89 in fees under SSA (the statutory 25% maximum). Attorney requested a deduction of the first EAJA fee award of $6,575, but not the second EAJA fee award of $5,000. However, the district court found that both EAJA awards should be deducted, which exceeded the $9,059.89 SSA fee award such that no additional fees were warranted.
Attorney appealed, primarily arguing that only his work on the second appeal (not a successful first one) should be considered for offset purposes. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, determining that an attorney’s work throughout the case in representing a client should be considered under the “same work” construct. It found that the district court had correctly made the right deductions. Affirmed.
Posted at 04:30 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Social Security: U.S. Supreme Court Decides That Fee Awards Under Social Security Benefit Cases Belong To Client, Not Attorney
This Allows Offsetting for Client’s Debts to Government.
In our past posts of October 1, 2009 and February 25, 2010, we explored the United States Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in and oral argument with respect to Astrue v. Ratliff, Case No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 14, 2010), which concerned who owned payments in a Social Security benefit attorney’s fees award.
Ratliff held that an attorney’s fees award to a successful Social Security claimant under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is payable to the litigant, not the litigant’s attorney. So, that means the award is subject to an offset for any pre-existing debts which litigant owes to the Government. The high court also found its result was buttressed by cases interpreting the federal civil rights fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which contains virtually identical language to that employed in § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Posted at 12:12 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Social Security: U.S. Supreme Court Appears To Be Leaning To The View That Fee Awards Are Clients’ Property Subject to Governmental Offsetting
High Court Recently Hears Arguments in Astrue v. Ratliff.
In our October 1, 2009 post, we reported that the U.S. Supreme Court had accepted review of Astrue v. Ratliff, an Eighth Circuit decision. The issue for consideration was whether Social Security disability fee awards belong to clients, rather than their attorneys, so as to be subject to offsets for payment of debts owed to the government by clients.
Marcia Coyle, in her February 23, 2010 article “High Justices May Favor Clients Over Lawyers in Fee Shift Dispute” posted on The National Law Journal website, suggests that the majority of justices seemed to lean in favor of the position that the fee awards belong to the client in recent oral arguments in Astrue v. Ratliff. For example, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg appeared skeptical that attorneys could reap the benefit of the fee awards because, unlike other federal statutes, the Equal Access to Justice Act does not exempt fee payments from being subject to offsets. Stay tuned, it is likely that a decision will be rendered before the end of this year.
Posted at 08:48 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Marc And Mike’s Top Twenty Decisions For 2009
Part 1 of 2: First Ten Grouping—Nos. 11-20.
As noted in an earlier post, we have accumulated our “top 20” attorney’s fees decisions, recognizing that we limit the list to published decisions and that the order reflects nothing about the importance of the decision. Rather, we try to survey decisions of interest in different areas of the substantive law based on all the decisions we have examined during 2009. Without further ado, here we go.
20. Crawford v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3617989 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2009) (en banc)
Majority Author: Circuit Judge Fletcher; Concurring/Dissenting Author:
Circuit Judge Clifton; Dissenting Author: Circuit Judge Ben
Attorneys representing Social Security disability insurance claimants are presumptively entitled to fee awards under their contingency arrangements; majority reversed magistrate reductions of awards to only 6.68-11.61% of past-due benefits award.
(See our November 5, 2009 post on this decision.)
19. Krug v. Maschmeier, 172 Cal.App.4th 796 (lst Dist., Div. 4 Mar. 25, 2009)
Author: Presiding Justice Ruvolo
Prevailing defendants in civil harassment actions can recover discretionary attorney’s fees even if the underlying action was not frivolous or was not brought in bad faith.
(See our March 25, 2009 post on this decision.)
18. Garcia v. Santana, 174 Cal.App.4th 464 (2d Dist., Div. 7 May 28, 2009)
Majority Author: Justice Zelon; Concurring Author: Justice Woods;
Dissenting Author: Justice Jackson
Financial condition of indigent litigant is a factor to consider in assessing fees to a prevailing party in a Davis-Stirling Act action.
(See our May 28, 2009 post on this decision.)
17. In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009)
Unsecured creditor’s request for postpetition-incurred contractual/statutory fees, arising from prepetition claim, is allowable.
(See our June 23, 2009 post on this decision.)
16. Biltmore Associates, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 572 F.3d 663 (9th Cir.
July 10, 2009)
Author: Justice Kleinfield
Attorney’s fees, if other than sanctions or if not awarded for trustee wrongdoing, can only be awarded against trustee in a representative capacity.
(See our July 10, 2009 post on this decision.)
15. Center For Biological Diversity v. Marina Point Development Co., 566 F.3d
794 (9th Cir. May 14, 2009) (second amendment)
Majority Author: Circuit Judge Fernandez; Concurring Author: Circuit
Judge Rymer; Dissenting Author: Justice Kleinfield
Attorney’s fees were properly awarded under the Endangered Species Act even though underlying controversy was moot; court will not review the merits determination, if moot, for purposes of testing the fees award; concurring opinion suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court may want to review the issue.
(See our March 28, 2009 post on this decision.)
14. Alan T.S., Jr. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 238 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Mar.
Author: Presiding Justice Sills
Interesting discussion of problems that plague the family law court system, made in the course of reversing awards for failure to consider the relevant “need” factors under Family Code sections 2030 and 2032.
(See our March 21, 2009 post on this decision.)
13. Ramon v. County of Santa Clara, 173 Cal.App.4th 915 (6th Dist. May 4, 2009)
Author: Acting Presiding Justice Mihara
Plaintiff’s amicus curiae work in related action was proper basis for additional fee award under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (the private attorney general statute).
(See our May 4, 2009 post on this decision.)
12. Law Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang, 178 Cal.App.4th 869 (2d Dist., Div. 3
Oct. 27, 2009)
Author: Justice Aldrich
Trial courts have discretion to award or deny anti-SLAPP attorney’s fees to defendants in cases where plaintiffs dismiss their actions without prejudice.
(See our October 28, 2009 post on this decision.)
11. Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank, 2009 WL 3859491 (2d Dist., Div. 4
Author: Presiding Justice Epstein
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 sanctions cannot be granted unless a prior, unfiled “safe harbor” motion has set a definitive hearing date in the motion sent to the opponent.
(See our November 20, 2009 post on this decision.)
Our next top 10 will follow shortly before the New Year. Happy Holidays to everyone.
Posted at 04:12 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts, Cases: Consumer Statutes, Cases: Family Law, Cases: Private Attorney General (CCP 1021.5), Cases: Probate, Cases: Sanctions, Cases: SLAPP, Cases: Social Security, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Social Security: SSDI Claimant’s Attorneys Should Be Entitled To Contingency Arrangement Award Absent Unusual Circumstances
Ninth Circuit En Banc Panel Reverses Magistrates’ Reductions Below Requested Fees That Were Pegged To Contingency Arrangements (Albeit Lower).
We have told you faithful readers that we are purveyors to all substantive areas of the law. Here is an important one for litigants and practitioners in the area of attorney’s fees awarded to lawyers who successfully represent Social Security disability insurance (SSDI) claimants.
The case is Crawford v. Astrue (and another two consolidated appeals), Case Nos. 06-55822, 06-55954, & 06-56284 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2009) (for publication), heard by an 11- member en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit.
Under 42 U.S.C. section 406(b), a court entering judgment in favor of an SSDI claimant represented by an attorney must determine a reasonable attorney’s fees, not in excess of 25% of the total of the past-due benefits, which is paid by the SSDI claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002) rejected using a lodestar test in this area and instead held that primacy should be given to the contingency arrangement between attorney and client (no more than 25% of the awarded past-due benefits), reduced by such factors as substandard representation, dilatory conduct to increase the amount of the past-due benefits, or situations where there is a small amount of attorney time when comparatively analyzed against the benefits achieved. Well, this statutory section was at the center of the battle in Crawford.
Here is what happened in Crawford and related cases where benefits were awarded:
Continue reading "Social Security: SSDI Claimant’s Attorneys Should Be Entitled To Contingency Arrangement Award Absent Unusual Circumstances" »
Posted at 10:11 PM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Circuit Judge Fletcher, in dissent, believed the district judges and majority circuit judges did not respect the primacy of the contingency fee arrangements as far as awarding fees under Gisbrecht. She calculated that the attorneys received 53.5% to 73.3% less than the contingency contracts provided when compared to the actual fee awards. Circuit Judge Fletcher opined that the majority was resurrecting a lodestar calculation test that was previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Gisbrecht—but reversed subsequently by the Supreme Court.
Posted at 08:49 AM in Cases: Social Security | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)