Source: https://casetext.com/case/keeney-v-united-states-2
Timestamp: 2019-12-15 14:31:48
Document Index: 517709488

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 192', '§ 102', '§ 288', '§ 7', '§ 288']

Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843 | Casetext
Keeney v. United States
218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
Keeneyv.United States
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia CircuitAug 26, 1954
Weinstock v. United States
279 U.S. 263, 298, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929). See also the opinions in this court in Bowers v. United…
In order to convict, the government must plead and prove that the questions the witness would not answer were…
Decided August 26, 1954. Petition for Rehearing In Banc Denied October 22, 1954.
Mr. Frank J. Donner, New York City, of the bar of The Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Mr. Joseph Forer, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. John D. Lane, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U.S. Atty., William Hitz and Lewis A. Carroll, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. William R. Glendon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at time record was filed, entered an appearance for appellee.
Appellant, a former employee of the United Nations, was a witness before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate. She was asked whether anyone in the State Department had aided her in obtaining employment with the United Nations. She did not answer, and asserted a privilege not to answer by reason of the Charter and the Staff Rules of the United Nations. On the theory that she had "refused" to answer, she was prosecuted for contempt of Congress. Rev. Stat. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192. The District Court overruled her claim of privilege and she was convicted. United States v. Keeney, D.C., 111 F. Supp. 233.
So far in this opinion I speak only for myself. But we all agree that appellant's conviction must be reversed because of errors in the admission of evidence. The government had to prove that the question the Subcommittee asked was "pertinent to the question under inquiry" before the Subcommittee, i.e. to the subject of "subversive activities". If the Supreme Court had not ruled otherwise, we should have thought this a matter for the jury to decide, like any other element of the crime with which the appellant was charged. But the Supreme Court has squarely held that the "question of pertinency under § 102" is a question for the court. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692. Cf. Bowers v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 81, 202 F.2d 447, 449. Since pertinency did not concern the jury, the court erred in permitting the jury to hear testimony about the appellant's activities which bore only on pertinency and tended strongly to prejudice the jury. Appellant's counsel repeatedly objected to the taking of such testimony in the jury's presence. We disagree with the government's contention that counsel "invited" the error and that, for this reason, it does not require reversal.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge (concurring).Page 846
From the very outset the jury heard the appellant linked to a nefarious, worldwide Communist movement, with her associates numbered among those performing acts of espionage and sabotage even as they purloined secrets of the United States in favor of the Russian government. "[These matters] were of a character to inflame the minds of the jury against the defendant . . . and it would be a matter of grave doubt whether, by the most pointed and vigorous language, the court would have been able to lead the jury to cast it out of their minds. . . . [We] cannot but feel that the poison inherent in such evidence must have done its work." Zinkhan v. District of Columbia, 1921, 50 App.D.C. 312, 314, 271 F. 542, 544.
". . . The matter for determination in this case was whether the facts called for by the question were so related to the subjects covered by the Senate's resolutions that such facts reasonably could be said to be `pertinent to the question under inquiry.' It would be incongruous and contrary to well-established principles to leave the determination of such a matter to a jury. [Citing cases.]" (Emphasis supplied.)
Cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 1894, 154 U.S. 447, 488, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 1137, 38 L.Ed. 1047, where the Court said: "If, as we have endeavored to show, this proceeding makes a case or controversy within the judicial power of the United States, the issue whether the defendants are under a duty to answer the questions propounded to them, and to produce the books, papers, documents, etc., called for, is manifestly not one for the determination of a jury. The issue presented is not one of fact, but of law exclusively."
Defense Counsel: "We will make that request, Your Honor, that it be heard out of the presence of the jury," and in further colloquy added "We have no objection, of course, to his making a statement in respect to facts which are ultimately for your decision. . . ." Whether counsel thus invited the opening statement which followed or not, the outline of the Government's case was inevitably highly prejudicial to the defendant. At its conclusion, the defense moved for a mistrial because "the underground and overground Communist activities, and the acts of espionage, sabotage and subversive activities, and of Silvermaster and Ullman, are all intentionally prejudicial to the defendant and far outside the scope of the issues in this case." The motion was denied. When the trial judge ruled during the bench conference that testimony as to pertinency would be received in the presence of the jury, it is probable that he had no foreknowledge as to the nature of the evidence which the Government intended to offer. The opening statement, however, was permitted to be received by the jury without admonition or explanation of the purpose for which the appellant's purported personal history and background were to be put in evidence. It must have had a disastrous effect so far as the defendant was concerned. The jury had been told that appellant had been very closely associated with Communist activities, that she had associated with important members of the Communist underground and overground, that she and her husband became close acquaintances and fraternized with one Silvermaster and one Ullman who were well known "as alleged espionage agents working for the Russian government in obtaining secrets from our Government," that she had been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations whose ramifications were to undermine the security of the United States and to accomplish certain activities of the Institute in foreign affairs that would "line us and them up with the Soviet Union." It seems scarcely possible that defense counsel who had requested that such proposed testimony be heard out of the presence of the jury could have expected any such opening statement as has been summarized. At its conclusion prompt objection was voiced which was renewed as various aspects of the case unfolded.
The witness testified that the Committee was attempting to learn a number of facts about the Institute of Pacific Relations, how it operated, what it sought to accomplish, and the degree to which it had accomplished it. "The Institute of Pacific Relations was an institution which had been taken over by Communists and was being operated for their purposes." The Institute had sought to place and had in fact placed "its persons" in high places in government and elsewhere in positions of influence. The Committee came across the name of Mary Jane Keeney in a document which had been seized from the files of the Institute; the document indicated that appellant was active in the Washington Advisory Committee of the Institute; and "the Committee found that Mrs. Keeney had a long record of what appeared to be Communist affiliation —"
"The Court. Objection overruled. This testimony is not given as proof of any fact, but merely as proof of the pertinency of the inquiry. . . ."
Cited to us are the United Nations charter, its rules and interpretations, and section 7(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669, 22 U.S.C.A. § 288 et seq. The question asked does not lead us within the fold of privilege so predicated. There is not the slightest suggestion at any stage that by virtue of her official position the appellant gleaned knowledge from the official files as to how her employment came about. On the contrary, after her conviction, the appellant took the witness stand and was sworn and testified ". . . I do not know to whom the United Nations wrote for references, because that information is never disclosed to the applicant, to the Secretariat. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of questioning by the trial judge the following occurred:
When a witness before the Senate committee, if appellant did not know the answer to the question, all she had to say was "I don't know" — if she did not know. If, either before obtaining employment with the United Nations or after such employment had been terminated, she learned — other than from official sources — that someone in the State Department had aided her in obtaining employment she was bound to answer "Yes." If she had personal knowledge — other than from official sources — that no one in the State Department had been of "aid" in her procuring employment, she was bound to answer "No."
The International Organizations Immunities Act, § 7(b), 59 Stat. 671, 22 U.S.C.A. § 288d(b), provides: "Representatives of foreign governments in or to international organizations and officers and employees of such organizations shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions as such representatives, officers, or employees. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) This witness was not subjected to suit or legal process relating to acts performed by her in her official capacity. There is no need to give strained and extended interpretation to the very useful Immunities Act which by its terms has no application here.
After trial when the very question was put to her, with her own particular qualification she answered "I don't know." She specified "that information is never disclosed to the applicant. . . ." When she applied for employment in the United Nations she "did not know anyone in the State Department." "Q. Did anyone intercede for you? A. Not to my knowledge."
At the same time it seems to me that this witness's course might not be deemed by a jury to be a refusal to answer. She said in reply to the question that she could not answer under the Staff Rules, etc. She applied to the Secretariat for a ruling, and when the ruling was received she answered the Subcommittee as far at it permitted her to do so. Her answer then was, in effect, that she did not know of any aid from State Department personnel, and she explained why. We discussed this question in a different context in Bart v. United States and there pointed out, citing cases, that the offense of contempt for refusal to answer is a deliberate and intentional refusal. We remarked: "If a witness interposes an objection or query to the propriety of a question, e.g., its pertinency, he may not be refusing to answer." And again we remarked: "Whether a witness means to refuse to answer is a question to be determined from all the circumstances. Like the element of intent in every criminal case it is a question of fact, determinable by the jury, if there be a jury, under appropriate instruction and definition by the court." It seems to me that the same reasoning applies to the case at bar. The question whether Mrs. Keeney deliberately and intentionally refused to answer, or merely raised a question as to her ability to answer under binding legal compulsions, was a question to be determined by the jury from all the circumstances.
1952, D.C. Cir., 91 U.S.App.D.C. 370, 203 F.2d 45, certiorari granted, 1954, 347 U.S. 1011, 74 S.Ct. 872.
91 U.S.App.D.C. at page 373, 203 F.2d at page 48.