Source: https://casetext.com/case/mullinax-v-state-24
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Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756 | Casetext Search + Citator
Mullinax v. State
(ii) “Anxiety and concern of the accused are always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual…
Rackoff contends that most of the delay in reaching trial was caused by the state, and that the reason for…
Full title:MULLINAX v. THE STATE
Date published: Apr 30, 2001
545 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 2001)
545 S.E.2d 891
Murder. Thomas Superior Court. Before Judge Altman
J. David Miller, District Attorney, Robert R. Auman, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ruth M. Bebko, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Charles Michael Mullinax was convicted of malice murder and theft by taking a motor vehicle, resulting from the strangulation death of Lindsey Strickland. We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence, but remand to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Mullinax's claim that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.
The crimes occurred on April 5, 1998. An indictment was returned on September 9, 1999, charging Mullinax with malice murder and theft by taking a motor vehicle. Trial commenced on May 15, 2000, and on May 19, 2000, Mullinax was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced on the same day to life imprisonment, plus ten years. (Since the court did not specify otherwise, the sentences are to run concurrently. OCGA § 17-10-10.) On June 16, 2000, trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. On December 11, 2000, the trial court granted counsel's petition to withdraw, and on the same day, new counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Mullinax. The case was docketed in this Court on January 3, 2001, and oral argument was heard on March 12, 2001.
1. Mullinax challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of both murder and theft by taking a motor vehicle under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
(a) Although largely circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to have found Mullinax guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder.Jackson v. Virginia, supra. The jury was authorized to consider evidence that the victim was last seen alive with Mullinax; his conduct and conflicting explanations on the night of her disappearance; his access to the area where the struggle ensued and the body was found; his subsequent inculpatory statements; and his admission that the two had argued on the night of her murder. See generally Gordon v. State, 273 Ga. 373 (1) ( 541 S.E.2d 376) (2001); Brinson v. State, 268 Ga. 227 (1) ( 486 S.E.2d 830) (1997).
(b) Likewise, the conviction for theft by taking an automobile was constitutionally supportable. The evidence was uncontroverted that Mullinax was in possession of the victim's car before and after her murder, and that he claimed ownership of the car. The day after the murder, Mullinax relinquished the keys to the victim's grandfather and informed him of the car's location. Theft by taking is committed when one "unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property." OCGA § 16-8-2. "Deprive" is defined as permanently or temporarily withholding the property of another without justification. OCGA § 16-8-1 (1) (A). Intent to use the property of another without the owner's authorization evinces an intent to commit a theft. Sorrells v. State, 267 Ga. 236 (1) (b) ( 476 S.E.2d 571) (1996); Smith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 356 (2) ( 323 S.E.2d 257) (1984). Clearly, Mullinax could not have obtained the owner's permission to drive the automobile following her death.
Mullinax was arrested in Florida on April 6, 1998; he waived extradition and was taken into custody in Georgia on April 9, 1998. An application for bond filed the next month was denied. After Mullinax had been incarcerated for more than 90 days without indictment, he again applied for bond, claiming entitlement under OCGA § 17-7-50. The motion was granted and bond was set at $250,000. His pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the amount as excessive was denied. He appealed to this Court, which found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to reduce the bond. Mullinax v. Powell, 271 Ga. 112 (2) ( 515 S.E.2d 839) (1999).
under the four-part test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 ( 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101) (1972), considering (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. . . . The fourth factor requires the court to consider three interests: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and (iii) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. 416, 417 (2) ( 490 S.E.2d 91) (1997).
In this case, the 25-month delay from arrest to trial triggers a threshold finding of presumptive prejudice, requiring an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730 (1) ( 438 S.E.2d 626) (1994) (27-month delay raises threshold presumption of prejudice). Accord Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, n. 8 ( 534 S.E.2d 796) (2000) (29-month delay); Johnson, supra at 268 Ga. 416 (21-month delay); Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 803 (2) ( 450 S.E.2d 821) (1994) (27-month delay); Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625 (1) ( 216 S.E.2d 839) (1975) (50-month delay between indictment and guilty plea); Nealy v. State, 246 Ga. App. 752 (3) ( 542 S.E.2d 521) (2000) (18-month delay). Once the inquiry is initiated, the length of delay is considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis.Jackson v. State, supra at 272 Ga. 782, n. 8.
In Mullinax's favor is the fact that he did repeatedly assert his right to a speedy trial. Thus, the pivotal factor in this case is the prejudice prong of Barker. In Boseman, supra, we held that a 27-month delay by itself was insufficient to raise an inference of actual prejudice. But to establish prejudice, the defendant must "show actual anxiety and concern and specific evidence of how the delay impaired his ability to defend himself." (Emphasis supplied.) Johnson, supra at 418, citing Boseman. Mullinax makes the generalized assertion that the defense is necessarily impaired when a defendant is incarcerated, and he claims that the oppressive period of pretrial incarceration heightened his anxiety and concern. Assuming arguendo that the 25-month delay in this case constituted "oppressive pretrial incarceration," see Boseman, supra at 733 (1) (d), Mullinax has failed to show that he suffered undue anxiety or concern attendant to that incarceration. Anxiety and concern of the accused "`is always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing is not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor.'"Boseman, supra at 733, quoting LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 410, § 18.2 (1984). Nor has Mullinax offered evidence as to the specific manner in which his defense was impaired, "the most important prejudice component of the speedy trial equation." Boseman, supra at 734 (2). Though the 25-month delay between arrest and trial is troubling, the prejudice to Mullinax is not of constitutional magnitude. Thus, the prejudice factor is balanced in favor of the State. Weighing all the Barker factors, we hold that Mullinax was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
3. It is asserted that the trial court violated OCGA § 24-9-20 by admitting character evidence which suggested that Mullinax had lied to friends about his age and background, and that he failed to grieve for the victim.
The evidence cited by defendant was relevant to the case and was not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it only incidentally placed his character in issue. See Ware v. State, 273 Ga. 16 (2) ( 537 S.E.2d 657) (2000); Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. 457 (2) ( 396 S.E.2d 888) (1990).
4. Any challenge to the inadmissibility of evidence of an argument between the defendant and the victim a week prior to her death was not objected to below and is not properly before the court. See Stratton v. State, 257 Ga. 593 (3) ( 362 S.E.2d 47) (1987).
5. Mullinax claims that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Because his current counsel was retained after trial counsel had filed a notice of appeal, and after 30 days had elapsed from the judgment of conviction and sentence, there was no opportunity to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the trial level. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for appropriate findings concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. McCulley v. State, 273 Ga. 40 (4) ( 538 S.E.2d 340) (2000).