Source: http://spotidoc.com/doc/192632/ab-c-the-cold-calculus-of-cash-and-carbon
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:53:58
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The cold calculus of
cash and carbon
How to navigate the climate negotiations
 The shape of a new global climate deal
in Paris at the end of 2015 is emerging
 It will involve a compact hub, with a set
of side agreements (‘spokes’)
 Warsaw needs to kick-start the process
and agree the rules of the game
Small Hub, Big Spokes
As temperatures drop in the Northern hemisphere, the 2013
negotiations of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Warsaw (11-22
November). This year, the COP 19 talks will need to spell
out how countries are going to achieve a new agreement in
December 2015. We believe that many lessons have been
learned from previous attempts (notably at Copenhagen in
2009) – not least the need to aim for compact ‘hub’
agreement within the UNFCCC, bolstered by an array of
‘spokes’ in terms of side-agreements, potentially outside the
+44 20 7991 6778
Three interlocking packages will be needed for 2015 to be a
success – and Warsaw can help by setting the right level of
ambition and agreeing the rules of the game. First, carbon
cuts need to be accelerated pre-2020: we highlight 10 actions
with positive economic benefits, prioritising energy
efficiency, fossil fuel subsidy reform and the introduction of
a shadow cost on carbon across the OECD. Second, the
framework for long-term cuts needs to be agreed: we set out
the ‘ABCDE’ of successful design. And third, climate
finance from public and private sources needs to be
deployed at scale: the Green Climate Fund (GCF) needs to
receive some actual cash fast and the system-level barriers
that prevent private flows have to be resolved.
To make this all happen, we set out the seven steps that
negotiators will need to take between now and December
2015, with initial offers next year followed by review and
revision in 2015. We also identify two wildcards which
could influence events over the next two years. The first is
how the embryonic agenda on loss and damage evolves, and
the second is whether a transformational bilateral China-US
deal on coal could be delivered.
The Warsaw Wheel
 Negotiators gather in Warsaw as the climate agenda begins a
cyclical upswing in sentiment
 Warsaw needs to deliver clarity on how carbon and financial
commitments will be packaged through to 2015
 Governments then need to spend 2014 designing and presenting
their first quantified commitments for achieving a deal
Warsaw: not just a coal COP
This year’s global climate negotiation (COP 19) is
being hosted by Poland in Warsaw. Many have
feared that this could be the ‘coal COP’. The host
country draws over 50% of its energy demand
from coal. This is considerably higher than the EU
and the USA and stands only third after South
Africa and China (Chart 1). But Poland has cut its
GHG emissions by 32% in the first Kyoto period
which ended last year and is on track to meet its
2020 targets as part of the European Union.
Yet, the coal theme could prove apposite. Coal is the
most carbon intensive of fuels – and the downward
pressures on coal (notably in China and the USA)
Boosting pre-2020 ambition
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2013
Four years after the inconclusive Copenhagen
summit, there is emerging clarity that a successful
outcome in Paris will form a wheel – with a compact
‘hub’ agreement and a set of side agreements or
‘spokes’, sometimes negotiated outside the formal
UNFCCC process. What Warsaw needs to do is
agree the ‘rules of the game’ for what governments
have to deliver in terms of carbon and cash over the
Doing the carbon two step
Chart 1:Share of coal in the energy mix (2011)
are one of the four ‘horsemen of hope’ we have
identified as helping to drive a new upswing in the
climate agenda: the others being energy efficiency,
science & impacts and carbon pricing. In most, we
have seen positive trends since Doha – except
pricing where Australia’s decision to scrap its carbon
tax represents a step backwards.
Global emissions are still going up – though at a
slower rate at last. But they have to peak before
2020. To do this, governments need to build
alliances that can deliver wider economic and
environmental reforms and can cut GHGs fast.
We identify 10 ideas, prioritising extra action on
energy efficiency, slashing fossil fuel subsidies
and introducing a shadow price on carbon across
The ‘ABCDE’ of post-2020 deal
The core of the Paris deal will be the architecture for
post-2020 emission cuts. To make progress, we
believe that five principles need to be in the minds of
governments as they negotiate the post-2020
agreement and draw up the pledges they will make
will mobilise private capital flows, a key ‘spoke’ of
We identify seven stepping stones to a legally
binding agreement in Paris (Chart 2).
Agreeing the 'rules of the game' (Warsaw,
Initial offers made by climate leaders before the
Climate Summit (September 2014) and in the
run-up to Lima CoP
Draft elements for the global agreement
resolved (Lima, December 2014)
(v) Equity – respecting both responsibility and the
International review of initial offers (first half of
Presentation of draft legal text (May 2015)
According to the Climate Policy Initiative, global
climate finance was valued at USD359bn in 2012.
But USD1trn in climate finance will be needed each
year from 2010 to 2030. A critical dimension will be
expanding flows into developing countries, ideally
exceeding the USD100bn target. Three measures can
help to start closing the gap. Industrialised countries
need to specify their ‘follow-on finance’ for 20132015. As part of this, the Green Climate Fund needs
to receive real cash during 2014. And policymakers
need to focus on the financial market reforms that
Revised offers in response to the review
(second half of 2015)
Convergence of new offers and final
refinements in the Paris Agreement
(i) Adequacy - meet the 2°C goal
(ii) Bravery – inject real leadership
(iii) Comparability – be transparent and
(iv) Dynamism – enable progressive tightening of
commitments from 2020 to 2050
Beyond these, two wildcards stand out for us: how
the embryonic ‘loss and damage’ agenda evolves,
and the potential for a transformative bilateral
deal on coal between China and the USA.
Chart 2: The seven steps required to achieve a global climate deal in 2015
2. Run-up to Lima 2014:
Initial offers made by
Warsaw (CoP 19) 2013
1. Nov 2013: Agreeing
4. First half 2015:
Lima (CoP 20) 2014
3. Dec 2014: Draft
5. May 2015: Draft
7. Dec-2015:
Paris (CoP 21) 2015
6. Second half 2015:
 The Warsaw talks start as emissions continue to rise, but at a slower rate
 Positive trends over the past year include China-US cooperation,
accentuation of measures to control coal and new science
 Set against this are negative pressures, notably Australia’s moves to scrap
its carbon scheme and political pressure in the EU on the cost of action
Nearer the cliff, but slowing
The annual climate negotiations provide a
seasonal opportunity to take stock of the climate
agenda. Last year, ahead of the Doha CoP18 talks,
we highlighted how the global economy was
heading for a ‘climate cliff’ – like a fictional
Roadrunner, overshooting the 2°C target. Then we
highlighted four ‘horsemen of hope’ which could
keep the road to a low-carbon economy open:
Coal: the convergence of factors bearing down on
Efficiency: the untapped potential to raise the rate
of efficiency improvement
Chart 3: Global CO2 emissions up, but growth rate down
Impacts: the growing awareness of the reality of
Pricing: the re-emergence of carbon pricing as a
Since then, global CO2 emissions hit a historical
high in 2012, but with a lower rate of growth, half
the decadal average (Chart 3). Strategically, the
signals on these four factors have been mixed –
with pressure on coal continuing in both China
and the USA. The efficiency momentum has
slowed, but again with China moving ahead.
Awareness of climate impacts has been maintained
– and new IPCC science has laid the basis for more
strategic action. It is in the area of carbon pricing,
however, that progress is weakest, with the new
Australian government moving to scrap its carbon
tax system. This has been partially offset by positive
moves in China and Korea and signs that ETS
reform in the EU will finally move ahead (Chart 4).
Chart 4 The Four Horsemen of Hope: 2012 and 2013 Compared
Total CO2 emissions (LHS)
Decade avg. growth rate (RHS)
The elephants begin to dance
Between them, China and the USA account for
40% of global emissions – and there actions will
be central to a global deal. Since Doha, the dance
between these two ‘carbon elephants’ – has
become more sophisticated, with concerted action
to curb emissions of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) a
major non-carbon GHG (see China & the US:
clearing the air, 26 June 2013).
Domestically, the Obama Administration has
given increased priority to climate change, and
focused on using existing regulatory instruments
such as the Clean Air Act rather than hope for
Congressional support. In China, the new
leadership has demonstrated increased desire to
tackle issues which affect social stability –
corruption and the environment. Dealing with
high profile air pollution crisis will have carbon
and climate co-benefits. China has also been the
prime driver behind the energy efficiency theme,
highlighted with the State Council’s plan to grow
the efficiency and environmental sector by 15%
p.a. to 2015 (see China’s RMB4.5trn green boost,
13 August 2013). We believe that this could
herald a host of measures including fiscal
incentives, preferential policies and financial
opportunities in the form of green bonds.
Clamping down on Coal
Both China and the US have chosen
environmental regulation as the tool of choice in
tackling climate – and coal is bearing the brunt of
the regulation. The US EPA has moved from
‘snail’s pace’ to ‘centipede pace’ as it tries to
expedite carbon pollution rules for the power
sector (see US: new rules cap coal emissions,
25 September 2013). The Obama Administration
has ended US federal financing for coal projects
internationally on a bilateral basis, and was also a
driving force behind the World Bank’s stringent
new policy on coal, which will now only be
financed in ‘rare circumstances’.
The Chinese authorities – at both central and
increasingly at local level – are facing the
realisation that air pollution reduction cannot be
achieved without cutting coal (see Air pollution
causes cancer, 25 October 2013). A major shift
away from coal and into gas is taking place in
major cities and the discussion on long-term coal
consumption caps is gathering momentum.
Soothing trade tensions
The flare-up in trade tensions from 2012 in rare
earths, renewables and aviation has mostly died
down with fairly positive resolutions, in our view.
Market sentiment was boosted by the EU and
China solar agreement in July which set a
minimum price and quota for Chinese imports of
solar panels. China continues to increase its solar
installation target (now 35 GW by 2015),
deploying excess capacity in the domestic market.
Popular awareness of climate disruption has
continued at a high level since Doha. Published in
September, the Climate Asia survey found that in
China 78% of the 5,062 people surveyed felt that
climate change is happening and 74% didn’t feel
prepared for an extreme weather event.
Furthermore, 81% are feeling the impact of the
environment on health. Across the USA, recent
polling from the Yale Center on Climate
Communications has highlighted a variability in
concern – but with clear majorities
acknowledging the reality of climate change:
87% of San Fransiscans believe it is happening
and 67% of these believe it is caused by human
action; this falls to 70% and 49% in Columbus
(Ohio), and 70% and 44% in Texas.
We believe that this popular awareness will be
strengthened by increasing attention to climate
change over the next two years, not least through
successive reports from the IPCC. Its first volume
on the Science of Climate Change was crystal
clear that global warming is “unequivocal” and
that “human activities are extremely likely to be
the dominant cause” (see IPCC: Science, Impact,
Forecasts, 27 September 2013).
The IPCC report also provided greater clarity on
the available carbon budget to achieve the 2°C
target. The IPCC set a one trillion tonne
(1,000GtC) budget for the amount of carbon that
the global economy can emit by the end of the
century and have a two-thirds probability of
meeting the target (see Chart 5). But only 269GtC
remains – a fraction of the 779GtC stored in the
world’s coal, oil and gas reserves (see Investing
within a carbon budget, 30 September 2013).
From a negotiating perspective, the carbon budget
invokes hard choices in terms of allocations
between countries, a core equity issue throughout
the UNFCCC’s history. Given that industrialised
countries have consumed the largest per capita
share of the budget, developing countries are
insistent that what’s remaining should be
allocated with ‘historical responsibilities’ in mind
– a point recently re-emphasised by Brazil. From
a popular perspective, however, the carbon budget
provides clarity to an often amorphous agenda –
and has helped to redefine climate risks for
investors (see Coal and Carbon, 21 June 2012 and
Oil & Carbon Revisited, 25 January 2013).
A bump in the road to pricing
The slow upward trend in pro-climate sentiment is
not all one-way. Although China and Korea have
followed through on commitments to introduce
carbon trading schemes, Australia’s new
government has started to execute its pre-election
pledge to remove key parts of the country’s lowcarbon landscape. This includes repealing its
carbon tax–the first time that a country has moved
backwards on carbon pricing.
In Europe, there is a noticeable pushback against
the perceived costs of green taxes and clean power,
notably in France (where protests have halted the
eco-tax on trucks) and the UK, where changes to
energy tariffs are expected in the Autumn
Statement on 4 December, potentially switching
consumer levies to general taxation. In Germany,
dealing with the cost of the renewable electricity
surcharge is one of the four priorities of the new
Coalition. We have highlighted how Germany
could both meet its 2020 climate targets and cut
energy costs by boosting efficiency measures – but
we have yet to see a shift in policy priority from
the supply to the demand-side (see Where next for
the Energiewende? 13 September 2013). In our
view, Europe has still to design a climate strategy
suited for austerity (see Rejuvenating Europe’s
climate, 1 November 2013).
Chart 5 The diminishing carbon budget is significantly lower than the carbon embedded in fossil fuel reserves
For >66% chance of limiting warming to
2°C, the gross carbon budget since
1880 is 1,000GtC. Subtract the 531GtC
spent to 2011 & non-CO2 forcings, the
remaining budget is only 269GtC.
Carbon embedded in fossil
Note: For reference, one tonne of carbon corresponds to 3.67tCO2. Source: IPCC AR5 SPM, IEA WEO 2012.
 Warsaw needs to inject urgency into the twin track negotiating
process, pre-2020 and post-2020
 We highlight 10 ways of getting early reductions, prioritising
energy efficiency, fossil fuel subsidies and shadow carbon pricing
 We also lay out the ‘ABCDE’ of getting an effective post-2020
agreement, delivering a vision of zero net emissions
First step: pre-2020 action
Industrialised world: still far off
Staying true to the 2°C target means hitting ‘peak
carbon’ before 2020 and steadily reducing
thereafter (see Peak Planet, 25 March 2013).
Work stream 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group of
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP2)
is dedicated to the pre-2020 agenda. Central to
this was the estimate made in the last IPCC back
in 2007 that industrialised countries (Annex 1)
would need to cut their GHG emissions by
25-40% from 1990 levels by the end of this
Chart 6: Poor performance: selected Annex 1 CO2 emissions
E mission chang e (1 990-201 2)
E mission chang e (2 005-201 2)
Intensi ty chan ge(1990 -2012)
Intensi ty chan ge (2005-20 12)
decade. By the end of 2012, however, only a 7.7%
reduction in CO2 emissions has been achieved,
based on the latest data from the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency. Chart 6
shows key countries such as Australia have
actually increased their CO2 emissions by almost
60%. The EU is on track to meet its 20% target;
the USA is set to achieve its goal of a 17% cut
below 2005 levels, but is still emitting more than
1990. Only Russia among the major Annex 1
countries is on course to deliver the required cuts but as a result of the economic collapse of the
Soviet Union, not by policy design.
Chart 7: Emissions up, intensity down: BASIC CO2 emissions
E mission chang e ( 1990-2 012)
E mission chang e ( 2005-2 012)
Intensity chan ge(199 0-2012 )
Intensity chan ge (2005- 2012)
Note: Intensity is carbon emissions per unit of GDP, GDP at constant 2005 USD,
Source: Trends in Global CO2 Emissions- 2013 report, PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, Thomson Reuters Datastream
Worse still, the proportion of global CO2
emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol has
fallen from 27.5% in the first period ending last
year to 12.5% in the 2nd period from 2013-2020:
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia have
joined the USA outside Kyoto. In addition, Russia
and other former Soviet bloc nations remain
displeased by the way in which Kyoto2 was
agreed in Doha, impacting on the pace of
negotiations this year for the new agreement.
Emerging world: more to come
Since 2009, however, emerging economies have
also stepped forward, so that 90 countries from
both North and South have made carbon
commitments covering 80% of global emissions.
The emerging economy pledges focus on
reductions in emissions relative to GDP (carbon
intensity) or a ‘business as usual’ projection.
Chart 7 illustrates that China’s performance is
perhaps the most eye-catching: a 293% increase in
absolute emissions since 1990, but a 54% cut in
carbon intensity, better than all the Annex 1
But there are still countries that have yet to join
the carbon cutting consensus, representing the
remaining 20% of global emissions. Many of
these are oil-producing nations, often high income
and with high per capita emissions: going into the
2015 talks it is increasingly unfeasible for these
affluent nations to stand aside (Chart 8).
Chart 8: High carbon, but no targets yet (2010)
Total emissions (LHS)
MntCO2
Per Capita emissions (RHS)
Middle East S Arabia
ex S Arabia
tCO2/ capita
Source: Note: Middle East includes Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates and few other smaller countries Saudi Arabia Source: World Bank
Closing the carbon gap
All this means that the world is facing a widening
carbon gap between what is needed for 2°C by 2020
and what will happen even if all existing pledges are
implemented fully. According to UNEP, global
emissions in 2010 were around 49GtCO2e, and will
rise to 52-56GtCO2e if pledges are met (a big if).
This leaves an 8-12Gt gap.
So far in the negotiations, governments have stuck
to their traditional positions and offered little
innovation. The BASIC countries Brazil, South
Africa, India, and China met last month and
reiterated that the ever-shrinking Kyoto Protocol
should be the main mechanism for increasing
ambition pre-2020. The USA, by contrast,
highlighted the absence of 20% of global
emissions from pledges (Table 1).
At this stage in the negotiations, it is not surprising
that governments are keeping their cards close to
Table 1: Stuck in the Past? Negotiating positions of key countries at Warsaw on increasing pre-2020 ambition
BASIC Reiterated that the pre-2020 ambition must be addressed primarily through the implementation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and urged
developed countries to take the lead, in accordance with their historical responsibilities and as required by science
China Reiterates that work under the Duran Platform to be guided by principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities
Calls for developed countries to commit at least 25-40% reduction by 2020 below 1990 levels. No new commitment for developing countries
Supports that developed countries to collectively reduce emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020; calls for 15-30% reduction by developing countries by 2020
below current emissions predictions. Reaffirmed its conditional emission cuts of 30% by 2020
India Enhanced action based on the CBDR principle. Enhanced ambition in the 2012-2020 period to be consistent with science
Encourages parties to come forward to make 2020 emission reduction pledges, and highlighted the 20% of global emissions still not covered by pledges
Source: UNFCCC, EU Council, Joint Statement at 17th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change
their chest. But this now needs to change – with a
focus on building alliances outside of the formal
UNFCCC process. In Table 2, we list ten possible
ways of delivering carbon reductions as a cobenefit of wider economic and environmental
reforms. These are drawn from a range of sources,
such as the IEA’s ‘four for 2°C’ proposals (see
Climate football anyone? 11 June 2013), along
with Ecofys’ set of ideas to ‘wedge the gap’. We
estimate that these measures could curb 68GtCO2e by 2020 – all driven by a wider rationale
beyond just carbon. We believe that three ideas
look specially promising:
Deploying cost-effective energy efficiency
measures in buildings, industry and transport
offers immense economic and energy security
benefits along with the fastest way of cutting
carbon. We argue that the annual Clean Energy
Ministerial process should seize on this
opportunity to deliver some real world outcomes
and design practical ways of delivering
components of the 1.5-2.0GtCO2e of potential at
its 2014 and 2015 events.
2. End fossil perversity
The consensus on the need to end perverse
subsidies that encourage fossil fuel consumption
is almost unanimous at the international level: the
G-20, the IEA, the IMF, the OECD and the World
Bank are all calling for change. The key is to
achieve ‘reform without riots’ by switching the
subsidies to focus on the ‘double low’: providing
affordable low-carbon access to energy for lowincome groups. Here, we believe that the G-20
needs to show that it has some real muscle in this
area and deliver quantitative cuts by its next
3. An OECD shadow price for carbon
It is relatively easy for organisations dominated
by industrialised countries to focus on ending
fossil fuel subsidies – because most of the
subsidies are operated by emerging economy
energy producers. The rich world also needs to
demonstrate that they are serious about changing
course – and putting a price on carbon. We know
that the politics of carbon pricing in the real
economy is often tough to tackle. But one way of
steering government policy and sending a longterm signal to business, citizens and investors
would be to ensure that across the OECD all
governments deployed a ‘shadow carbon price’ in
key policy decisions. The UK already has a real
world floor price of GBP16/t (USD25) in 2013
which rises to GBP30/t (USD48) in 2020. In the
USA, a “social cost of carbon” is used by the EPA
and other federal agencies to estimate the climate
impacts of rulemakings. Earlier this year,
President Obama raised the SCC to USD40/t in
2015 (using a 3% discount rate and 2011 dollars);
this rises to USD46/t in 2020. We believe that the
introduction of a USD40/t shadow price in all
government decisions across the OECD is feasible
by 2015 and would send a clear market signal.
Second step: post-2020 action
The core of the Durban agreement in 2010 was
the establishment of negotiations to complete a
new agreement in 2015 to take effect from 2020.
In the process, this is the ADP1 Workstream, and
covers carbon reduction (mitigation), along with
adapting to climate impacts as well as the means
of implementation (finance & technology) and
MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification).
Table 2: Ten measures to boost pre-2020 ambition
What's the issue / driver?
Energy efficiency could be the largest contributor to global
China has proposed to reduce energy use per unit of GDP by at least 3.7% in 2013
Extra efficiency measures could reduce global energy
GHG reduction by 2020 by introducing energy performance
In the EU, the new Energy Efficiency Directive entered into force in December 2012 and emissions by 1.5-2GtCO2e (IEA/UNEP). Only a small group
standards for new heating and cooling equipment, lighting and should yield 15% energy savings by 2020. The US has proposed to develop post-2018 fuel of nations would need to collaborate to drive up standards
appliance in buildings; more efficient industrial motors; and
for building, industrial and transport technologies.
economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles.
tighter fuel economy standards for transport.
2. End new sub-critical Global coal demand needs to peak by 2020 in a 2°C scenario Internationally, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank have launched strict new Emissions could be reduced by 640MtCO2e with no new
according to the IEA. The most effective place to start is energy policies that rule out financing for sub-critical coal. Emission performance standards sub-critical plants and limited use of existing ones (IEA).
through the prohibition of new sub-critical coal power plants
are also being introduced in the UK and have been proposed by the US EPA. China would account for 30% of emission savings, followed
and the retirement of old plants that have repaid their costs.
by the USA and India.
3. Phase out of fossil
Fossil-fuel subsidies of cUSD525bn encourage excess In 2009, the G20 committed to phase out ‘inefficient’ fossil fuel subsidies over the medium
A partial phase-out would cut emissions by 360MtCO2
emissions: 15% of global emissions receive a USD100/t
term; this year’s G20 summit announced ‘voluntary peer review’ of this commitment.
(IEA); this could rise to 2GtCO2e (UNEP).
subsidy, whereas only 8% face a carbon price.
The IEA, IMF, OECD and the World Bank have also committed their support.
4. Cut Oil & Gas flaring
Around 1.1GtCO2e of methane was released by upstream oil Regulations exist in many countries to control flaring, but these are not effectively enforced. Reducing flaring by half would cut GHGs by 570MtCO2e in
& gas in 2010, c3.7% of energy-related emissions.
Russia, the Middle East, the US and Africa (IEA).
5. Curb air pollution
Fossil-fuels in power generation, industry and transport are The IARC has recently classified outdoor air pollution and particulate matter as carcinogenic
No clear estimate globally of the co-benefit potential.
also a major source of local air pollution: cutting smog will also
to humans. Domestically, China’s Air Pollution Prevention Plan will cap the use of coal in
usually curb carbon emissions.
key regions and accelerate the closure of obsolete plant.
6. Halve Deforestation Deforestation accounts for 16% of global GHGs, and reducing
Regional carbon markets in California, Japan and Brazil could provide offset demand, Halving global deforestation has the potential to achieve
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) offers alongside climate finance from major donors. Domestic programmes, such as in Brazil, have
emission reduction benefits of 1.8GtCO2e (Ecofys).
considerable pre-2020 potential.
achieved substantial progress through improved enforcement via satellite technology.
7. Make planes and
Aviation and shipping account for 5.3% of global GHGs and The ICAO agreed for a global market-based scheme to reduce aviation GHG emissions by Potential emission savings from global aviation with a fuel
ships pay their way
are increasing rapidly
2016, for implementation by 2020.
efficiency target of 2% p.a. is 56MtCO2 (HSBC).
The Climate and Clean Air Coalition working with cities to reduce black carbon and other Reducing black carbon emissions could reduce radiative
8. Deal with black
Black carbon is increasingly regarded as the 2nd most
damaging GHG after CO2. Global non-CO2 emissions are short-lived air pollutants. The US-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG) agreed in forcing equivalent to a cut in GHGs of 1GtCO2e (Ecofys).
expected to increase >70% over the next two decades.
July to develop control measures for black carbon emissions
9. Eliminate HFCs
HFC use has grown rapidly as replacements for ozone- On the back of US-China agreement in June to tackle HFCs bilaterally, the G-20 agreed to
Gradual phase out of HFCs could reduce emissions by
depleting substances (ODS), but they have a high Global amend the Montreal Protocol to curb HFCs in September 2013. However, India has opposed
0.3GtCO2e (Ecofys).
Warming Potential. HFC emissions are projected to rise to 3.5
the use of the Montreal Protocol to control HFCs arguing the UNFCCC is the right forum.
to 8.8 GtCO2e in 2050.
10. Set a shadow carbon OECD governments could agree to apply a shadow carbon Beyond the volatile carbon markets, the UK has set a carbon floor price starting at GBP16 No estimate yet of the impact of an OECD-wide shadow
price in all government decision-making, similar to the US (cUSD25) in 2013, rising to GBP30 (cUSD48). The US EPA’s social cost of carbon starts at
price across the OECD
EPA’s carbon price used in rulemakings.
USD40 in 2015 (using a 3% discount rate and 2011 dollars); this rises to USD46 in 2020.
Note: *Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Source: German Watch Short-term Mitigation ambition pre-2020-July 2013, UNEP, The emissions gap report, November 2013; IEA,Redrawing the Energy Map, June 2013, Ecofys Closing the 2020 emissions gap, August 2012, EPA, HSBC
Historically, the world has oriented around a goal
of halving emissions by 2050. In the wake of the
recent IPCC report with its punishing carbon
budget, the OECD has called for a ‘pathway to
achieve zero net greenhouse emissions globally
by the second half of the century’. What Warsaw
needs to do is agree on the formula that will share
out this challenge across the countries of the
world. The rapid growth in emissions from
emerging economies since 1990 means that today
developing and developed countries are
responsible for roughly equal shares of
cumulative GHGs since the Industrial Revolution.
To this, must be included the reality of climate
impacts so that any long-term programme has to
expect a disrupted world.
Once again, governments have made their initial
submissions, which we set out in Table 3. And
once again, there’s very little movement from
traditional negotiating positions.
The ‘ABCDE’ of a 2015 agreement
To make progress, we believe that five principles
need to be in the minds of all governments as they
negotiate the deal and draw up the pledges they
will make over the next two years:
(i) Adequacy: Governments must be clear that
what they are putting forward individually will
reasonably add up to the global goal of staying
below 2°C goal.
(ii) Bravery: Since no government is doing
enough, political leaders will need to inject some
bravery into the discussions, not just submitting
the lowest offers.
(iii) Comparability: It’s also crucial that
government submissions use agreed accounting
frameworks, are transparent and quantifiable;
(iv) Dynamism: The agreement will be
bookended with commitments for 2020-2025 and
also for 2050. But it will also need to have a
process for successive tightening of commitments
(see IDDRI, Possible Elements of the 2015 Legal
Regime, 2013)
(v) Equity: The 2015 agreement is applicable to
all. But that does not mean that the old chestnut of
CBDR can be wished away. Countries need to
specify what equity principles they are applying
so that their effort is adequate and fair.
Table 3: Negotiating positions of key countries at Warsaw on increasing post-2020 ambition
Emphasized that the structure and design of the 2015 agreement should be in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities
Proposes that the agreement on the post-2020, enhanced action should be in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)
Developed countries to undertake ambitious, legally binding and economy-wide emission reduction targets in accordance with their historical responsibilities and
capabilities and as demanded by science; commitments to be mainly implemented through domestic actions. Practical actions on adaptation post 2020 shall be further
enhanced building on existing institutional arrangements
Reaffirms its objective for developed countries to collectively reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990
Calls for the 2015 agreement to be legally binding based on global participation and informed by science
Calls for all parties to formulate ambitious mitigation commitments for the 2015 agreement, including a timetable to prepare their proposed commitments in 2014
Calls for immediate ratification by Annex 1 parties to CP2 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP); increase their mitigation targets under KP by 2014
Annex I Parties must continue to take emission reduction objectives, while non-Annex I Parties will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions
Calls for implementation of institutional mechanism for ‘loss and damage’ as agreed in the Cancun Adaptation Framework and at Doha
Takes into account the G8 proposal to achieve at least 50% emission reduction by 2050; aggregate emission reduction by developed countries by 80% or more by
2050 compared to 1990/ more recent years. Focus on Nationally-determined commitments (emission reduction target and all possible measures) under internationally
common accounting rules
Urges nations to justify global climate treaty commitments. Specific commitments by the parties should be nationally determined. Calls for integration of
adaptation into national planning and development
 USD6trn in investment is required annually to drive the low-carbon
economy, an additional USD1trn to business as usual
 Public finance can help to reduce risk and increase returns; the
GCF needs to ‘get cash fast’ to make its mark
 Policy reforms of financial systems will also be needed to mobilise
private capital at scale
Follow up funding needed
UN talks on climate finance have a distinctly split
personality. At one moment, the discussion
focuses on the aggregate level of investment
required from all sources to deliver a low-carbon,
climate resilient economy. Then, the discussion
quickly subsides into a focus on ‘climate aid’:
flows of public funds from North to South.
The latest estimates from the World Economic
Forum suggest that USD6trn per annum is
required to invest in the low-carbon economy
through to 2030. This means that an additional
Chart 9: Private trumps public: climate finance in 2012
USD1trn in ‘green’ capital will need to be found:
this investment will provide net positive returns
(notably in terms of energy savings). But extra
upfront financing is nonetheless required. At
present, according to the Climate Policy Initiative
(CPI), global climate finance amounted to just
USD359bn in 2012, a decline from USD364bn in
2011. Private investment accounted for 62% of
this and the vast bulk of funds (95%) went to lowcarbon allocations. So far, however, the public
sector is totally dominant in adaptation (Chart 9).
As for ‘climate aid’, the industrialised countries
have more than met the Copenhagen pledge to
Chart 10: How policy can reduce risk and increase returns
Attractive lowcarbon project
Infeasible lowcarbon project
Note: Private sector investment in adaptation was not estimated. Source: Climate
Policy Initiative, October 2013
Source: Catalysing Climate Finance, UNDP 2011
deliver USD30bn in ‘fast start finance’ to
developing countries between 2010 and 2012.
Overall FSF commitments have been USD36bn,
although this is not ‘new and additional’ to
traditional aid flows.
The next challenge is to deliver USD100bn in
climate finance flows to developing countries per
year by 2020. But there is no agreement on how
the split between public and private should be
made, or indeed what counts as climate finance.
The absence of follow-on public finance
commitments is also striking with only a handful
of EU countries making voluntary contributions
of EUR5.5bn (USD7.6bn) at Doha last year.
At Warsaw, developed countries will need to
specify the ‘follow up finance’ they will provide
for the next triennium of 2013-2015. And as part
of the pledging process in 2014 countries will
need to clarify the ways in which ‘climate aid’
will be provided beyond 2015. A particular focus
will be placed on public funding for adaptation –
an area where private flows are more difficult to
mobilise. South Africa, for example, has stated
that it is expecting a total of USD5-7bn per year
by 2015 in adaptation flows to developing
countries, rising to USD28-67bn by 2030.
How to mobilise private cash
Increasing flows of finance to developing
countries is essential not just for the politics of a
deal, but also to accelerate the low-carbon
transition and protect vulnerable communities. It
is striking that 90% of total finance flows into
developing countries still come from public
sources, according to the CPI.
No absolute shortage of capital exists, but the risk:
reward ratio is not yet strategically compelling for
private sector institutions. Over time,
development banks and policymakers have
developed a strong body of experience on how
public funds can be used to reduce the risks facing
private investors and/or increase their returns.
Chart 10 shows schematically how energy policy
instruments can serve this function (for example,
through the use of a feed-in tariff). The left hand
column of Table 4 also profiles a range of
instruments that can perform a similar function.
On the right hand side of the table are the range of
financial system issues which investors and
financiers have found create barriers to
investment. Increasingly, institutions are
recognising that climate policy and financial
Table 4: How to use policy measure to mobilize private climate finance
Transaction Level: reducing risk/increase capital at the project level
System level: changing the structural incentives in favour of low-carbon
Co-investment: The core function of development banks is to provide debt
and equity, which helps ‘crowd in’ private capital. For example, concessional
funds from international financial institutions were crucial to the successful
deployment of the first concentrated solar power (CSP) plants in Morocco.
Credit guarantees: Export finance can be deployed to reduce the risks of
investors in clean energy. Denmark’s EKF guaranteed the position of a Danish
pension fund for the Jädraås onshore wind project in Sweden.
First loss arrangements: This enables public finance to take a higher risk
slice and leverage in private capital. KfW’s: Global Climate Partnership Fund
(GCPF) has used this model to attract institutional investors.
Credit enhancement: Public funds can be used to enhance the credit of a
bond to attract investors. The Europe 2020 Bond Initiative uses EU funds
deployed by the EIB to improve the credit rating of infrastructure.
Credit lines: Development banks extend loans to financial intermediaries,
which then finance sub-projects. The EBRD has launched a USD20m credit
line supporting energy efficiency improvements in households and enterprises.
Policy risk insurance: Policy risk is a major barrier to investment. The first
‘climate policy’ risk insurance contract for a REDD project was provided by the
OPIC to Terra Global Capital in Cambodia.
Pipeline priming Public finance can help to fund the upfront costs of project
development. The: US-Africa Clean Energy Facility provides project
preparation assistance of USD20m.
Market behaviour: Short-termism, for example, represents a critical barrier to
incorporating climate and sustainability factors. Greater transparency about long-term
performance, improved governance, better contract design and tax / subsidy
measures can help.
Responsibilities: Fiduciary duty is often interpreted in ways that stifle integration of
climate risks. Baker & McKenzie has found that trustees’ understanding of climate
risks was advanced, but action taken to manage climate risk had been very limited.
Capital allocation: A low-carbon economy is capital intensive – and there are
concerns that Basel III will cut the capacity of banks to provide long-term credit and
Solvency II will hinder insurance company allocations.
Incentives: Fiscal subsidies are often provided for savings, pensions and investment
without regard to the environmental or long-term impact. To receive fiscal subsidy,
funds should demonstrate substantially better than market climate performance.
Risk: Standard measures of transaction, institutional and market level risk routinely
ignore environmental or climate factors. For example, stranded asset risks are not
incorporated into equity or fixed income pricing.
Information: In spite of significant improvements, most companies do not disclose
even basic climate information. Few financial institutions report on their Scope 3
‘financed emissions’.
Innovation: Positive innovation in capital markets is often constrained by small but
significant regulatory barriers (eg development of a green bond securitisation market).
See Bonds & Climate Change: State of the Market 2013, June 2013.
Source: Climate Policy Initiative, HSBC
needs to become compatible – one of the key
‘spokes’ to the 2015 agreement.
The GCF - Get Cash Fast
After two years of design, the Green Climate
Fund (GCF) is finally close to opening for
business. It will start its ‘resource mobilisation
process in mid-2014. Its success in fund-raising
will be a critical barometer for the success of the
talks. Currently, it has raised just 0.049% of the
USD100bn 2020 annual target.
 2014 will be the year of the initial offers (for most) – and 2015 the
year of review, refinement and resolution
 Politics in various jurisdictions will inevitably disrupt this timeline,
 Two wildcards could also impact proceedings: ‘loss and damage’
and bilateral relations between China and the USA
Seven steps to an agreement
Step 1: Agreeing the 'rules of the game'
The Warsaw (COP 19) must agree the process by
which countries make their offers of carbon
reductions and, where relevant, cash. This needs
to include guidance on what is to be included so
that offers converge to meet the 2°C goal in a
principled and practical manner. Offers will need
to be comparable, and the process of review will
need to be agreed.
Step 2: Initial offers made by climate leaders
also be expected to make their own offers. After
the Summit, further pledges will need to be made,
taking advantage of the IPCC’s Synthesis report
in October to align offers with the science. The
key is that most countries have made their offers
before the Lima CoP in December.
Step 3: Draft elements for the global agreement
At the Lima CoP, the draft negotiating text needs
to be pulled together into a manageable length,
and further pressure put on countries that are
holding out in terms of their offers.
(run-up to Lima 2014 Summit)
Step 4: International review (first half of 2015)
Ban-ki Moon has urged world leaders to come to
the UNSG’s Climate Summit in September 2014
with their pledges. We can expect ‘climate
leaders’- potentially the EU and key middle
income countries such as Colombia, Mexico and
South Korea - to make their initial offers in
advance so as to raise the stakes of overall
ambition. Countries that are part of Kyoto2 could
make their pledges as upward revisions to existing
protocol commitments. The GCF will also need to
receive a credible – USD5bn? –first multi-year
commitment. Cities, business and finance will
The goal of a review process should be to provide
all countries with clear conclusions about overall
adequacy and fairness of the offer, and analysis of
the distribution of effort among countries. For the
USA, their initial offer will be presented as a ‘best
effort’, with consultation having limited impact.
For South Africa, the outcome of the review will
be to ‘encourage and compel’ governments to
adjust their offers. This process will be guided by
the Periodic Review, which is tasked with
evaluating the 2°C target during 2013-2015.
Step 5: Draft legal text (by May 2015)
India: General elections
The draft legal text has to ready six months in
advance of the Paris CoP. It needs to be clear and
concise, with scope for side-agreements to be
added and final numbers on the commitment to be
inserted in Paris.
The general parliamentary elections will be held
in May 2014. Coalition building thereafter will
likely distract political attention. India could still
submit its proposal for enhanced ambition by the
Lima negotiations in December.
Step 6: Revised offers (second half of 2015)
Revised offers are likely to be submitted by
countries all the way through to the COP 21
Similarly, the next South African general election
will be held between April–July 2014 to elect a
new National Assembly, as well as new provincial
legislatures in each province. Thus it is unlikely
that South Africa will present its proposal much
before COP 20 in December 2014.
Step 7: The Paris Agreement (December 2015)
This is where all the strands should converge: a
framework agreement (the ‘hub’), with separate
decisions on key supporting issues (the ‘spokes’)
and a consolidated set of commitments on carbon
Table 5 on page 17 provides more detail on the
timetable on the road to Paris.
Expect political turbulence
This tight timetable will inevitably be subject to
major political forces across the world, which
could delay or disrupt the process – or galvanise it
with new energy. Key political milestones include
elections in two major industrialised country blocs
and three of the four BASIC countries in 2014.
EU: Parliament elections
EU parliament elections will be held towards the
end of May 2014. Any EU offer needs to be
agreed before the elections in order to send a
strong signal of the bloc’s ambition for additional
pre-2020 efforts, its post-2030 target and its
contribution to the financial package, via climate
finance and carbon markets. Environment
ministers from 13 EU members including the UK,
Germany, France, Italy and Spain have proposed
that the EU should put an ambitious emissions
reduction offer on the table during the September
2014 UN Climate Summit.
Brazil: General elections
General elections will be held in Brazil in October
2014 to elect a president and a National Congress.
This is unlikely to have a major impact on the
direction of climate policy, but could certainly
delay submission.
US: Mid-term elections
Mid-term elections in the US will be held in
November 2014 where the whole House of
Representatives and a third of the Senate will be
chosen. As a result, it is highly unlikely that US
will submit its pledges before the end of 2014.
Any delay from the US could also discourage
other major economies from coming forward,
notably those in the BASIC group.
In addition to these scheduled political events, we
see two potential wildcards in the talks.
A new addition to the climate agenda is ‘loss and
damage’ – effectively compensation for climate
disruption in developing countries. Last year in
Doha, the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) and Least Developed countries (LCD)
demanded the creation of an “international
mechanism on loss and damage”. This was
opposed by richer nations, but a compromise was
agreed to establish institutional arrangements in
Warsaw. The details on exactly how developing
countries could seek redress were buried under a
“range of approaches, methods and tools”.
Not surprisingly, there is a considerable gap
between definitions of what constitutes loss and
damage, and how restitution can be made from the
perceived instigators of climate change
(developed countries) and those that suffer the
impacts (developing countries). Developed
countries fear unlimited legal liability and
developing countries fear unbearable climate
costs. If AOSIS and the Least Developed
Countries – the conscience of the COP – feel that
they are not getting satisfaction then this could
sour the negotiations. Equally, if the USA feels it
is being pushed into a legal corner then it could
divert much needed diplomatic attention from the
We believe that these so far modest steps could
provide a platform for a more transformative deal
on coal. This could involve many of the elements
we highlighted in our 10 ideas for boosting pre2020 ambition, such as agreements by the two
countries to phase out state subsidies for coal
production and use, and cutting the use of subcritical coal through coordinated introduction of
pollution standards. In addition, substantial
funding could be mobilised for a serious joint
technology initiative on CCS, as well as
cooperation on natural gas development. A
bilateral deal of this type could help to spur a
breakthrough at the multilateral level by showing
that there is a practical pathway out of high
carbon dependence.
A China-US Deal on Coal?
As discussed earlier, China and the USA are the
two ‘carbon elephants’ and are starting to work in
a structured way on climate co-operation. The
US-China Climate Change Working Group
(CCWG) was formed in April 2013 and mentions
key initiatives to tackle climate change which
include black carbon (see Super pollutants in
China & the US, 23 July 2013). The CCWG was
also tasked with managing each country’s HFCs.
Table 5: Timeline of selected key climate events through to 2015
Detail/ Outcome
IEA, World Energy Outlook
World Energy Outlook 2013 will incorporate the latest climate and energy projections through to 2035
UNFCCC (CoP19)
COP 19 in Warsaw will need to agree the rules of the game for 2015
EU, Council Meeting
The Council meeting might consider approval of the carbon market back-loading plan
EU, 2030 targets
EU Communication on 2030 climate and energy targets
EU, Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)
Requirement that 3% of floor area of central government buildings to be renovated takes effect
California's cap and trade programme to be linked with that of Quebec
Davos will have one day dedicated to climate change
The C40 Mayors Climate Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa
EU Council to agree the 2030 climate and energy policies
International, IPCC AR5
Working Group II to release its findings on climate impacts, adaptation and vulnerability
Working Group III to release its report on strategies to drive low-carbon mitigation
World Bank, IMF Spring Meeting
2014 Spring Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group at Washington DC, USA
Member States to submit their National Energy Efficiency Action Plans; together with long-term building strategy
Apr –Jul
South Africa, General Elections
The general election will elect a new National Assembly and new provincial legislatures in each province
EU, Parliament Elections
The election will be crucial to determine whether the populist pushback vs green measures will intensify
The general elections to shape future course of social, political and environmental reforms
The 40th G8 summit to be held in Russia
EU Commission will assess whether EU is on track to achieve its target energy savings
US, GHG standards
The US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) to propose GHG standards for existing power plants
First sessional meeting in 2014 on global climate negotiations
UN heads of State summit will meet in New York to forge to mobilize political will for 2015 global deal
Brazil, General Elections
General elections will be held in Brazil in October 2014 to elect a president and a National Congress
World Bank, IMF Annual Meeting
2014 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group at Washington DC, USA
The final Synthesis Report of AR5 will be released in Copenhagen, Denmark
US, mid-term elections
Mid-term elections will be held: the whole House of Representatives, and a third of the Senate will be chosen
The next G20 Summit will take place in Australia focussing on global economy, financial regulation, poverty
reduction and sustainable development
3-14 Dec
UNFCCC (CoP20)
The annual UN Climate Change conference will take place in Lima
ETS planned to commence on 1 Jan 2015
South Africa, Carbon Tax
South Africa plans to tax carbon emissions, but with some exemptions to protect industry and jobs
The general election will elect 56th parliament of the UK
UK, General Elections
International, UNFCCC
Draft negotiating text for 2015 global climate deal is expected
3-14 Jun
First sessional meeting in 2015 on global climate negotiations
Legislative elections are scheduled to be held in Mexico in July 2015
Canada, General Elections
The 42nd Canadian federal election is scheduled
Poland, General Elections
Legislative elections will be held by October 2015
The 2015 G20 Summit will take place in Turkey
International, UNFCCC (CoP 21)
The annual UN Climate Change conference framing the global climate agreement will take place in Paris, France
recommendation(s) or views contained in this research report: Nick Robins, Zoe Knight and Wai-shin Chan
This report is dated as at 07 November 2013.
All market data included in this report are dated as at close 06 November 2013, unless otherwise indicated in the report.
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