Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/536/461/139391/
Timestamp: 2019-06-24 15:21:34
Document Index: 712884351

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent, 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976) :: Justia
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Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Petitioner, v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent, 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976)
Argued March 4, 1976. Decided June 10, 1976
In a decision dated April 28, 1975, an administrative law judge of the National Labor Relations Board found that Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation had engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ("the Act"). She issued a cease and desist order and also ordered the reinstatement of the eight complainants. The decision and order of the administrative law judge was adopted by the Board with a relatively minor modification, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 124, and this appeal followed.
1. The termination on August 2, 1974, of eight named employees the complainants before the Board was effected by Stone & Webster "in order to discourage membership in and activities on behalf of the Union"1 and constituted discrimination "against employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment" and therefore was an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
2. "By following employees in the plant to prevent employee conversations about the Union" and "by maintaining surveillance of the conversations and activities of employee Union organizers," Stone & Webster interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(a) (1) of the Act.2
This evaluation of Stone & Webster's defense, however, reflects a misconception of the respective evidentiary burdens of the parties in cases of this nature. The Board has the burden of affirmatively showing improper motivation on the part of the company. See NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., supra at 807. But even "(w)hen the evidence of the charging party has raised a reasonable inference of discrimination, that inference may still be rendered unreasonable by the employer's excuse or justification . . . so that more evidence must be produced to establish the alleged discrimination." NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953) (citations omitted). In the instant case, Stone & Webster through the testimony of Mr. Doherty did present a substantial amount of basically unrefuted evidence as to the business reasons which they claimed motivated the decision to terminate these employees. It is true that Stone & Webster offered no original documentary evidence to complement the oral testimony. But it was not required to do so. Sayen v. Rydzewski, 387 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1967); Allen v. W. H. O. Alfalfa Milling Co., 272 F.2d 98, 100 (10th Cir. 1959); Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444, 446 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank J.). Mr. Doherty was subjected to cross-examination; his testimony was not contradicted, and it was not inherently improbable. Under these circumstances, the administrative law judge's rejection of this important evidence concerning economic necessity was not justified. White Glove Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Brennan, 518 F.2d 1271, 1273-76 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Ray Smith Transport Co., 193 F.2d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1951); Stone v. Stone, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 136 F.2d 761, 764 (1943). See also Kelly v. Jackson, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 419, 425, 8 L. Ed. 523 (1832). The Board neither directly challenged the accuracy of the evidence concerning economic necessity nor affirmatively showed that it was a cloak for actual discriminatory motivation.8
We turn now to the two remaining § 8(a) (1) violations which were found by the administrative law judge and sustained by the Board. These were: (1) Stone & Webster's following of employees in the plant to prevent conversations about the Union; and (2) the company's surveillance of conversations and activities of employee union organizers in order to discourage membership in or activities on behalf of the Union.
As for the remaining § 8(a) (1) violation found by the administrative law judge and sustained by the Board, which involved the company's alleged surveillance of the conversations of one Raia (a union organizer),12 we note that the finding was based in large part on the unrefuted testimony of Raia. This testimony was summarized by the administrative law judge as follows:
The administrative law judge also found that Stone & Webster had violated § 8(a) (1) "by promulgating and enforcing a rule prohibiting conversations about the Union during working hours for the purpose of discouraging Union membership and activities." The Board, however, did not sustain this part of the administrative law judge's decision