Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98536/stefanelli-vs-minard
Timestamp: 2017-11-24 02:08:00
Document Index: 209281769

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 43', '§ 1979', '§ 43', '§ 1979', '§ 43', '§ 1291', '§ 1441']

Stefanelli Vs Minard - Citation 98536 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Stefanelli Vs. Minard - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98536
Case Number 342 U.S. 117
Appellant Stefanelli
Respondent Minard
.....8 u.s.c. § 43 (civil rights act), petitioners sought an injunction against the use, in pending state criminal proceedings against them in new jersey, of evidence claimed to have been obtained by an unlawful search by state police. held: the district court properly dismissed the complaints. pp. 342 u. s. 117 -125. 2. federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. pp. 342 u. s. 120 -125. 184 f.2d 575, affirmed. in suits brought by petitioners under r.s. § 1979, 8 u.s.c. § 43, to enjoin the use, in a state criminal trial, of evidence claimed to have been obtained by an unlawful search by state police, the district court.....
Stefanelli v. Minard - 342 U.S. 117 (1951)
U.S. Supreme Court Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951)
Held: the District Court properly dismissed the complaints. Pp. 342 U. S. 117 -125.
2. Federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. Pp. 342 U. S. 120 -125.
In suits brought by petitioners under R.S. § 1979, 8 U.S.C. § 43, to enjoin the use, in a state criminal trial, of evidence claimed to have been obtained by an unlawful search by state police, the District Court dismissed the complaints. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 184 F.2d 575. This Court granted certiorari. 341 U.S. 930. Affirmed, p. 342 U. S. 125 .
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . . [ Footnote 1 ]"
Petitioners invoke our decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 . The precise holding in that case was
Id. at 338 U. S. 33 . Although our holding was thus narrowly confined, in the course of the opinion, it was said:
Id. at 338 U. S. 27 -28. There was disagreement as to the legal consequences of this view, but none as to its validity. We adhere to it. Upon it is founded the argument of petitioners.
State's enforcement of its criminal law. E.g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 ; Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S. 45 ; Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 ; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 . It has received striking confirmation even where an important countervailing federal interest was involved. Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9 ; Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U. S. 36 ; Maryland v. Soper (No. 3), 270 U. S. 44 . [ Footnote 2 ]
These considerations have informed our construction of the Civil Rights Act. This Act has given rise to differences of application here. Such differences inhere in the attempt to construe the remaining fragments of a comprehensive enactment, dismembered by partial repeal and invalidity, loosely and blindly drafted in the first instance, [ Footnote 3 ] and drawing on the whole Constitution itself for its scope and meaning. Regardless of differences in particular cases, however, the Court's lodestar of adjudication has been that the statute "should be construed so as to respect the proper balance between the States and the federal government in law enforcement." Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 , 325 U. S. 108 . Only last term, we reiterated our conviction that the Civil Rights Act "was not to be used to centralize power so as to upset the federal system." Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651 , 341 U. S. 658 . Discretionary refusal to exercise equitable power under the Act to interfere with State criminal prosecution is
one of the devices we have sanctioned for preserving this balance. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 . And, under the very section now invoked, we have withheld relief in equity even when recognizing that comparable facts would create a cause of action for damages. Compare Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 , with Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 .
Id. at 319 U. S. 163 . [ Footnote 4 ] No such irreparable injury, clear and imminent, is threatened here. At worst, the evidence sought to be suppressed may provide the basis for conviction of the petitioners in the New Jersey courts. Such a conviction, we have held, would not deprive them of due process of law. Wolf v. Colorado, supra.
once begun. If the federal equity power must refrain from staying State prosecutions outright to try the central question of the validity of the statute on which the prosecution is based, how much more reluctant must it be to intervene piecemeal to try collateral issues. [ Footnote 5 ]
The consequences of exercising the equitable power here invoked are not the concern of a merely doctrinaire alertness to protect the proper sphere of the States in enforcing their criminal law. If we were to sanction this intervention, we would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law -- with its far-flung and undefined range -- would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review, if need be, to this Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconstitutionality in the impaneling and selection of the grand [ Footnote 6 ] and petit [ Footnote 7 ] juries, in the failure to appoint counsel, [ Footnote 8 ] in the admission of a confession, [ Footnote 9 ] in the creation of an unfair trial atmosphere, [ Footnote 10 ] in the misconduct of the trial court [ Footnote 11 ] -- all would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution
of local crime in local courts. To suggest these difficulties is to recognize their solution. [ Footnote 12 ]
Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 .
We recently commented on the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legislation in United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70 , 341 U. S. 74 , and Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651 , 341 U. S. 657 .
"In these respects, the case differs from Hague v. CIO, supra, at 307 U. S. 501 -502, where local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the complainants and in many instances forcibly deported them from the state without trial."
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, at 319 U. S. 164 .
Congress has consistently demonstrated concern that the orderly course of judicial proceedings should not, in the absence of compelling circumstances defined by statute, be broken up for the piecemeal determination of the issues involved. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (appeals from "final decisions" of the district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (removal of "separable controversies"), and cf. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 .
See Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 .
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 .
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 .
See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 .
See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 .
See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 .
Mr. Justice Murphy, Mr. Justice Rutledge, and I voted in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , that evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure should be excluded from state as well as federal trials. In retrospect, the views expressed by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge grow in power and persuasiveness. I adhere to them. I therefore think that any court may with propriety step in to prevent the use of this illegal evidence. To hold first that the evidence may be admitted, and second that its use may not be enjoined, is to make the Fourth Amendment an empty and hollow guarantee so far as state prosecutions are concerned.