Source: http://al.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140909_0000992.NAL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-09-26 05:23:12
Document Index: 259537051

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 410', '§ 416']

DEBRA CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff,
The plaintiff, Debra Cunningham, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Plaintiff's application was denied by an ALJ on September 30, 2010. The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review, vacated the ALJ's opinion, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. After a second hearing, an ALJ issued a decision on October 4, 2011, denying Plaintiff's application for DIB. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision final. As such, Ms. Cunningham timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Cunningham was fifty years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") decision, and she graduated from high school and earned an associate degree in 2003. (Tr. at 62.) Her past work experiences include employment as a cashier, inventory clerk, inventory controller, insurance salesperson, and owner of a consignment shop. (Tr. at 62, 242-43, 274-75, 278, 283-87.) She stopped working and closed her consignment shop in September 2008 because of her "condition and because of the economy." (Tr. at 273.) Ms. Cunningham claims that she became disabled on September 20, 2008, due to bipolar disorder, past drug addiction, suicidal tendencies, and "undiagnosed physical conditions"-bad hips/knees, varicose veins, and swayback spine/lower back problems. (Tr. at 273.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; See also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). If he or she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant's impairments fall within this category, he or she will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") will be made, and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant's impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ first found that Ms. Cunningham has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability, September 20, 2008, through her date of last insured, December 31, 2008. (Tr. at 33.) Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's mild scoliosis and arthralgia are considered "severe" based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. ( Id. ) However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. ( Id. at 35.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following RFC: to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except that she could never climb a ladder, rope, or scaffold, and could only occasionally climb ramps or stairs. ( Id. ) Based on a hypothetical describing Plaintiff's RFC for a modified range of light work, the ALJ elicited testimony from a Vocational Expert ("VE") that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as an inventory controller and inventory clerk, cashier, insurance salesperson, and owner of a consignment shop. ( Id. ) The ALJ determined that these jobs do not require Plaintiff to perform any work-related activities precluded by her RFC. ( Id. ) The ALJ stated that Plaintiff could perform this work as she actually performed it and as it is generally performed in the national economy. (Tr. at 36.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability, ' as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from her alleged onset date of disability of September 20, 2008, through her date of last insured of December 31, 2008." ( Id. )
On appeal, Ms. Cunningham limits her challenge to whether the ALJ erred in 1) finding her mental impairments non-severe; and 2) finding that she could perform her past relevant work.
A. The ALJ's Finding that Plaintiff's Mental Impairments were Non-Severe
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "had no discretion to overrule the findings of the previous ALJ" who had found at step two of the sequential evaluation process that she had a mental impairment that was severe. As noted, Plaintiff's application was denied by an ALJ on September 30, 2010. In that decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar disease and mild scoliosis, although ultimately finding that she was not disabled. The Appeals Council granted Plaintiff's request for review, vacated the ALJ's opinion, and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. Specifically, the Appeals Council found that the ALJ made errors of law when he found at step two that Plaintiff had severe physical and mental impairments, but had failed to include any significant physical or mental limitations when he determined Plaintiff's RFC at step four. The Appeals Council ordered a remand to further evaluate, among other things, "the claimant's mental residual functional capacity and her ability to perform past relevant work." (Tr. at 113.) The remand order instructs the ALJ to "further evaluate the claimant's mental impairment in accordance with the special technique described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a, documenting application of the technique in the decision by providing specific findings and appropriate rationale for each of the functional areas described in 20 § C.F.R. 404.1520a." (Tr. at 114.) On remand, a different ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have any mental impairments that were severe. Plaintiff contends that the Appeals Council's remand order adopted the ALJ's finding that she has a severe mental impairment, so the second ALJ erred when he found on remand that she had no severe mental impairments.
Social Security regulations provide that, in the event the Appeals Council orders a remand, the ALJ "shall initiate such additional proceedings and take such other action... as is directed by the Appeals Council in its order of remand. The Administrative Law Judge may take any additional action not inconsistent with the order of remand." 20 C.F.R. § 410.665(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1477(b) (noting that an ALJ "shall take any action that is ordered by the ...