Source: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-10th-circuit/1735024.html
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 13:27:43
Document Index: 619823842

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 76', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 3533', '§ 1621', '§ 1746', '§ 401', '§ 76', '§ 76', '§ 9', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Kody BROWN; Meri Brown; Janelle Brown; Christine Brown; Robyn Sullivan, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. Jeffrey R. BUHMAN, Defendant–Appellant. Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund; Sound Choices Coalition, Inc.; Cato Institute, Amici Curiae.
Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.Parker Douglas, Utah Federal Solicitor, Utah Attorney General's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, appearing for Appellant. Jonathan Turley, George Washington University School of Law, Washington, DC (Adam Alba, Magleby & Greenwood, Salt Lake City, UT, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellees. Eugene Volokh, UCLA School of Law, Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic, Los Angeles, California, and Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, filed an amicus brief for Cato Institute. Lawrence John Joseph, Law Office of Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, DC, filed an amicus curiae brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund. Christian A. Kesselring, Wasatch Law Group, Heber City, Utah, filed an amicus curiae brief for Sound Choices Coalition, Inc.
This matter is before the court on the appellees' Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Upon consideration, any implicit request for panel rehearing is denied by the original panel members. For clarification, however, the panel has decided, sua sponte, to amend the original decision. A copy of the amended decision is attached to this order, and the clerk is directed to reissue the opinion nunc pro tunc to the original filing date.
The request for en banc rehearing and the amended opinion were also transmitted to all of the judges of the court who are in regular active service and who are not recused. As no member of the original panel or the en banc court requested that a poll be called, the petition for en banc review is denied.
KODY BROWN; MERI BROWN; JANELLE BROWN; CHRISTINE BROWN; ROBYN SULLIVAN, Plaintiffs–Appellees,
JEFFREY R. BUHMAN, Defendant–Appellant,
EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION & LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; SOUND CHOICES COALITION, INC.; CATO INSTITUTE, Amici Curiae.
14–4117
(D.C. No. 2:11–CV–00652–CW).
Parker Douglas, Utah Federal Solicitor, Utah Attorney General's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, appearing for Appellant.
Jonathan Turley, George Washington University School of Law, Washington, DC (Adam Alba, Magleby & Greenwood, Salt Lake City, UT, with him on the briefs), appearing for Appellees.
Eugene Volokh, UCLA School of Law, Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment Clinic, Los Angeles, California, and Ilya Shapiro, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, filed an amicus brief for Cato Institute.
Lawrence John Joseph, Law Office of Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, DC, filed an amicus curiae brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund.
Christian A. Kesselring, Wasatch Law Group, Heber City, Utah, filed an amicus curiae brief for Sound Choices Coalition, Inc.
Having struck the cohabitation prong, the court turned to the Statute's “purports to marry” prong, which states, “A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to many another person.” Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–101(1). The Utah Supreme Court had previously held that under this portion of the Statute, liability attaches when a couple hold themselves out as married, even if they do not profess to be legally married. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 732 (Utah 2006). The district court acknowledged Holm 's holding but concluded that “[u]nder this broad interpretation of the term ‘marry,’ the phrase ‘purports to marry another person’ raises the same constitutional concerns addressed in relation to the cohabitation prong.” Brown, 947 F.Supp.2d at 1192, 1226. It therefore adopted a “narrowing construction” that interprets “purports to marry” as “referring to an individual's claim of entry into a legal union recognized by the state as marriage.” Id. at 1231 (quoting Holm, 137 P.3d at 763 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).6 The court held that, as construed—with the cohabitation prong stricken and the “purport to marry” prong narrowed—the Statute survives constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 1233–34.
The district court vacated its judgment sua sponte on December 20, 2013, because it had not yet resolved “the status of the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 84. After ordering supplemental briefing, the district court, on August 27, 2014, held that Mr. Buhman had waived qualified immunity and prosecutorial immunity defenses by failing to plead them in his answer or argue them in the summary judgment briefing.8 The court “therefore f[ound] in favor of [the Browns] on their seventh and final count in the Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and [granted] summary judgment in their favor on this last remaining count.” App., Vol. 3 at 728.9 It construed the complaint to include a request for money damages but determined the Browns had “drop[ped]” this request in their supplemental briefing. Id. at 728.10 Accordingly, the court awarded the Browns only “attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,” id. at 730, which authorizes such fees and costs in § 1983 suits.
A plaintiff's standing at the time of filing does not ensure the court will ultimately be able to decide the case on the merits. An “actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1528, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Campbell–Ewald Co. v. Gomez, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016) (quotation omitted). Mootness deprives federal courts of jurisdiction. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1336, 185 L.Ed.2d 447 (2013); Schell v. OXY USA, Inc., 814 F.3d 1107, 1114 (10th Cir.2016) (“If a case is moot, we have no subject-matter jurisdiction.”).15
But the burden is not insurmountable, especially in the context of government enforcement. “In practice, [this] heavy burden frequently has not prevented governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices and mooting a case.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1116 (10th Cir.2010). Most cases that deny mootness following government officials' voluntary cessation “rely on clear showings of reluctant submission [by governmental actors] and a desire to return to the old ways.' ” Id. at 1117 (brackets and emphasis in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow) (quoting 13C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3533.6, at 311 (3d ed.2008)); see also Gessler, 770 F.3d at 908 (same).
“We review issues of standing de novo, accepting as true all material allegations of the complaint, and ․ construing the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Winsness, 433 F.3d at 732 (quotations and brackets omitted) (ellipsis in original). “We review mootness de novo as a legal question.” United States v. Fisher, 805 F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir.2015). Mootness in this case turns on whether, following Mr. Buhman's May 22, 2012 declaration, his allegedly unconstitutional conduct could “reasonably be expected to recur,” which is “squarely a legal determination.” Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1188 n. 15 (11th Cir.2007).
We have addressed the standard of review for mootness based on voluntary cessation, stating that “courts must assess the likelihood that defendants will recommence the challenged, allegedly offensive conduct.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1122. We referred to this assessment as a “factual inquir [y]” and said “[o]ur review of this question is de novo.” Id. (quotation omitted).
As to mootness in this case, no evidentiary hearing was held, the parties did not contest the facts in each other's declarations, and the district court needed only to resolve the legal question of mootness, not resolve disputed issues of fact relating to justiciability. Whether our consideration of the underlying facts is plenary or deferential, we conclude the Browns faced no credible threat of prosecution once Mr. Buhman submitted his declaration announcing the UCAO Policy. At that point, their case became moot.
Voluntary cessation cannot moot an action seeking damages because damages compensate a party for past conduct, not ongoing or future conduct. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir.2005) (“The complaint, however, also includes a claim for nominal damages․ Unlike the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, this claim is not mooted by [defendant's voluntary cessation].”). But contrary to the district court's understanding, the Browns did not sue for damages and therefore do not seek compensation for any past injuries they may have suffered at the hand of Mr. Buhman. They seek relief only for the future harm of prosecution. If there is no credible threat of such harm, their case is moot. See Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir.2009) (“As the Supreme Court explained, ‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ․ if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974))).
Even assuming the UCAO Policy was a reaction to the Browns' suit, that does not necessarily make it suspect. A government official's decision to adopt a policy in the context of litigation may actually make it more likely the policy will be followed, especially with respect to the plaintiffs in that particular case. See Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir.2014) (“[W]e have indicated that mootness is more likely if ․ the case in question was the catalyst for the agency's adoption of the new policy ․” (quotation and brackets omitted)); Fed'n of Advert. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir.2003) (“[T]he City candidly admits that [a recent court] decision persuaded it to repeal the ordinance because of the risk of losing in the litigation. We find that the City's actions over the course of this litigation do not give rise to an expectation that it will reenact the challenged ordinance.”).
We see no basis to question Mr. Buhman's bona fides after he publicly adopted under penalty of perjury and submitted to the federal court the same prosecution policy that the chief law enforcement officer of the state had previously adopted. The risk that Mr. Buhman will revoke or ignore the UCAO Policy under these circumstances is minimal at best, and certainly not enough to sustain a live case or controversy. See Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988) (“If the likelihood [of recurrence] is small (it is never zero), the case is moot”).
If Mr. Buhman had announced only that his office had decided not to prosecute the Browns, the question of mootness would be closer. But he did much more than that. First, he announced an office policy that would prevent prosecution of the Browns and others similarly situated in the future. Second, the UCAO Policy is essentially the same as the AG Policy, which the district court considered sufficient to deny the Browns standing to sue the Governor and the Attorney General. Third, the UCAO Policy and the decision not to prosecute the Browns are contained in a declaration that was signed under penalty of perjury and submitted to the federal district court. Fourth, violation of the declaration would expose Mr. Buhman to prosecution for perjury or contempt. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (providing that “[w]hoever ․ in any declaration ․ under penalty of perjury ․ willfully subscribes as hue any material matter which he does not believe to be true ․ is guilty of perjury”); 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) (permitting a declaration made under penalty of perjury to substitute for a sworn declaration, oath, or affidavit); 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (empowering a federal court to “punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as ․ [m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions”). Under these circumstances, the Browns face no credible threat of prosecution from the Utah County Attorney.21
Mr. Buhman's May 12, 2012 declaration removed any credible threat of prosecution and mooted this case while it was pending in district court. Our mootness analysis could stop here. But apart from the foregoing, the Browns' case also became moot because their move to Nevada, their successive declarations, and the passage of time eventually eliminated Mr. Buhman's authority under Utah law to prosecute the Browns.
The Browns left Utah for Nevada in January 2011. They alleged in their complaint, filed in July 2011, that they could not “fully perform their religious practices outside of Utah and must return to Utah to engage in certain religious practices.” App., Vol. 1 at 22. They “expect[ed] to move back to Utah.” Id. According to an October 2011 declaration from Kody Brown, the Browns “travel[ed] back and forth to Utah to participate in religious and family activities.” Id. at 106. In another October 2011 declaration, Janelle Brown said that if the Statute were struck down, the Browns “would feel free to finally return to Utah and would certainly resume [their] open participation in [their] religious community.” Id. at 114. The district court wrote in its February 3, 2012 order on Defendants' motion to dismiss that “[o]nce the threat of prosecution is lifted, ․ [the Browns] expect to relocate to the State of Utah.” App., Vol. 2 at 247.
But circumstances changed. Mr. Brown subsequently told the district court in a July 2012 declaration—submitted two months after Mr. Buhman stated under oath that the UCAO had closed its case against the Browns—that “[w]e have decided to stay in Nevada in the foreseeable future to avoid uprooting our children again and subjecting them to the continued public recriminations made under the Utah law.” Id. at 487. The Browns have “continued ties to [Utah], including family and religious connections,” Mr. Brown said, but “[we] have settled ․ in Nevada where our children now go to school and where we are in the process of finalizing the purchase of new homes.” Id. Mr. Brown's declaration said “[t]he decision not to return to Utah was a difficult one for [his] family.” Id. There is nothing further in the record that suggests the Browns have reversed this decision. As the years have passed, these developments have made it increasingly difficult to conclude the Browns now face a credible threat of prosecution for past or future conduct even if Mr. Buhman had not adopted the UCAO Policy.22
First, as to the Browns' past conduct, Utah law provides “a prosecution for ․ a felony ․ shall be commenced within four years after it is committed.” Utah Code Ann. § 76–l–302(l )(a); see also id. § 76–7–101(2) (defining bigamy as a third-degree felony). The Browns have not lived in Utah for more than five years, and their post–2011 conduct in Nevada cannot subject them to liability in Utah. See Nevares v. M.L.S., 345 P.3d 719, 727 (Utah 2015) (“[U]nless a statute gives a clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” (quotation omitted)). The record does not reveal whether the Browns have traveled to Utah since October 2011, when Kody Brown signed his first declaration, or whether they “purported to marry” or “cohabited” there if they did. Nothing in the record indicates the Browns have violated the Statute in Utah within the four-year limitations period. It is therefore speculative at best that Mr. Buhman could prosecute the Browns for past conduct.
Second, Mr. Buhman will likely also be unable to prosecute the Browns for future conduct. In Dias, we held the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a Denver ordinance banning pit bull ownership because “none of the plaintiffs [then] reside[d] in Denver and none ha[d] alleged an intent to return.” 567 F.3d at 1176. They therefore did not face “a credible threat of future prosecution under the Ordinance.” Id. The Browns appear to be in the same position. Although the Browns may wish to move back to Utah some day, and although their declarations do not entirely foreclose the possibility that they will do so, they have announced their intention to remain in Nevada for “the foreseeable future.”23 Unless and until the Browns return to Utah, Mr. Buhman could not, based on the law and the record, prosecute them even if he wished to do so. For this independent reason, the Browns face no credible threat of prosecution.
Winsness represents a fact-specific application of the general rule that voluntary cessation moots a case when “the allegedly wrongful behavior c [an]not reasonably be expected to recur.” Already, 133 S.Ct. at 727 (quotation omitted). The district court in this case erred when it limited its analysis to weighing the “Winsness factors” and ignored the broader lesson of Winsness and Mink: that evidence supporting the veracity of the decision and the policy not to prosecute is important to the mootness analysis. That evidence need not be limited to the “Winsness factors.”
“If the district court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1128 n. 19 (quotation omitted). “When a ease becomes moot prior to final adjudication, the district court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment, and vacatur and dismissal of the judgment is automatic.” Id. (quotation, emphasis, and brackets omitted).
The proper disposition of this appeal, therefore, is to remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its judgment in favor of the Browns and dismiss this suit without prejudice.27
8. This holding was erroneous. Immunity defenses are not available—and therefore cannot be waived—in suits seeking relief against a public official only in his or her official capacity. Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1239 n. 1 (10th Cir.2015) (“The defense of qualified immunity is available only in suits against officials sued in their personal capacities, not in suits against ․ officials sued in their official capacities.”) (quotation omitted) (ellipsis in original); Lemmons v. Law Firm of Morris & Morris, 39 F.3d 264, 267 (10th Cir.1994) (“[N]either qualified nor absolute immunity precludes prospective injunctive relief except in rare circumstances not relevant here.” (emphasis in original)); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims and Defenses § 9.01[3] (3d ed. 2005) (“The common-law absolute and qualified immunities that have been recognized in § 1983 actions pertain to claims for monetary relief against state and local officials in their personal capacities. Neither the absolute nor qualified immunities extend to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983.”) (footnote omitted).
10. Our review of the complaint reveals no request for money damages. Nor could there be such a request, as the Browns sued Defendants in their official and not their individual capacities. With respect to state officials, such as Mr. Herbert and Mr. Shurtleff, “[s]ection 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n. 5 (10th Cir.2011) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 958 (6th ed. 2009) (“[D]amages actions pleaded against state officials in their ‘official capacity’ will ordinarily be dismissed as barred by the state's sovereign immunity․ When equitable relief is sought, the defendant official is ordinarily named in an official capacity.” (emphasis in original)).Assuming he is a municipal official, matters are more complicated as to Mr. Buhman. (If he is instead a state official, the Browns could not seek damages against him for the same reason they could not seek damages against Mr. Herbert and Mr. Shurtleff.)“The Supreme Court has determined that an official-capacity suit brought under § 1983 generally represents only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent, and as long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1168 n. 13 (10th Cir.2009) (quotations and brackets omitted). “To establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities or local government bodies, the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom (2) that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights.” Id. at 1168. Here, the Browns did not allege or attempt to prove in district court that Mr. Buhman acted in accordance with a Utah County policy or custom. Damages were therefore unavailable under § 1983. See Fallon, et al., supra, at 958–62 (explaining that “[d]amages actions against local government officers in their official capacities can go forward only [in] accordance with the rules governing local governmental liability described in” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), which conditions liability on action taken under an official policy or a de facto custom).
14. The Court has cautioned that the “time frame” description of mootness “is not comprehensive.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv's. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). In particular, “there are circumstances in which the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Id. Standing, unlike mootness, is also not subject to an exception for disputes that are “capable of repetition yet evading review,” which we discuss below. Id. at 191. These caveats, however, do not affect the general rule that “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 68 n. 22.
19. Based on the residual clause in the complaint's prayer for relief—which asks for “such other relief as [the district court] may deem just and proper”—the district court concluded the Browns had requested money damages. It relied on Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2001), where we held the plaintiff could seek injunctive relief because (1) his complaint requested “such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable,” and (2) “[i]n the pretrial order, the district court list[ed], as an issue of law, ‘[t]he nature and extent of any equitable relief to which Mr. Frazier may be entitled.’ ” 254 F.3d at 1251, 1255 (emphasis added) (last brackets in original). Analogizing to Frazier, the district court held the “just and proper” language in the Browns' complaint, plus its reference to various past injuries they allegedly suffered as a result of Mr. Buhman's conduct, were sufficient to plead damages. We think this analogy is too much of a stretch.We have been careful to limit Frazier to its facts—in particular, the complaint's reference to such other relief as the court deemed “just and equitable.” See Gulden v. Morrow, 92 F. App'x 663, 665–66 (10th Cir.2004) (unpublished) (distinguishing Frazier ); Romero v. City & Cty. of Denver Dep't of Soc. Serv's., 57 F. App'x 835, 838 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished) (same). Here, nothing in the prayer for relief's residual clause indicated a request for damages. “Just” and “proper” do not refer to monetary relief in the same way “equitable” can refer to injunctive relief. In addition, in Frazier we were “guide[d]” by an Eighth Circuit case that read similar language broadly because the plaintiff there had sued the defendant in his official capacity and so his “relief need[ed] to be in [injunctive] form to be effective.” See id. at 1254–55 (quoting Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.1999)). As explained in footnote 10, supra, by suing the Defendants only in their official capacities, the Browns may obtain only injunctive relief, not damages, for their § 1983 claims. The logic of Andrus therefore precludes reading the Browns' complaint to include a request for damages, as relief sought against Mr. Buhman in his official capacity would be effective only in injunctive form. Accord Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915, 921 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.2013) (“While it is true that Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c) allows a court to grant relief not specifically sought, we cannot save [the plaintiffs'] claim by reading the complaint's boilerplate prayer for ‘such other relief as [the Court] may deem just and proper’ as a request for monetary damages.” (quotation omitted) (first brackets added)).In any event, the Browns waived any request for damages before entry of the final judgment from which Mr. Buhman appeals. App., Vol. 3 at 654, 666–68. And the Browns have not renewed any request for damages on appeal. We therefore do not consider retrospective relief when assessing mootness.
23. This statement appears in Kody Brown's July 2012 declaration. Janelle Brown's October 2011 declaration was somewhat equivocal on this point, indicating the Browns would “feel free” to return to Utah if the Statute were invalidated. But Kody Brown's declaration, submitted nine months later, is more definitive. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (holding affidavits expressing intent to return to Egypt and Sri Lanka to observe threatened species were “simply not enough” to confer standing—“[s]uch ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require” (emphasis in original)).
25. In addition, the district court questioned the sincerity of Mr. Buhman's declaration because “[t]here is no evidence that the notice of the change in policy was given to the public generally or distributed within the county attorney's office.” App., Vol. 2 at 492; see also id. at 494 (“The failure to give public notice of the change in policy, however, adds to the concern that the action was taken primarily for purposes of this litigation.”). We fail to see the relevance of this fact. Prosecutors do not generally advertise their enforcement policies to the public, and Mr. Buhman's failure to do so in this case does not throw his credibility into doubt. Moreover, by filing his declaration and the UCAO Policy with the district court, the Policy became a public document.The district court's concern that Mr. Buhman has “not repudiate[d][sic] that punishment may be enhanced if a defendant were convicted under the [Statute] and another offense” is similarly misplaced. Id. at 494. The record indicates the UCAO has no evidence that the Browns have committed other crimes. Accordingly, the hypothetical possibility that they might one day be prosecuted for a collateral crime does not bear on (1) the credibility of Mr. Buhman's declaration or (2) the existence of a live controversy.
27. As explained above, the Browns' move to Nevada eventually also rendered this case moot. Whether or not this basis for mootness took effect before commencement of this appeal, Mr. Buhman's implementation of the UCAO Policy was independently sufficient to extinguish any live case or controversy as of May 2012, a year and a half before the district court granted summary judgment to the Browns and over two years before entry of final judgment. Because this case became moot “prior to final adjudication,” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1128 n. 19, vacatur and dismissal without prejudice are appropriate.
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