Source: http://ipbiz.blogspot.in/2013/09/
Timestamp: 2018-05-27 13:15:53
Document Index: 459655878

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 103', '§ 282', '§ 271', '§ 271', '§ 1021', '§ 1636', '§ 1639', '§ 1638', '§ 1644', '§ 1638', '§ 1670', '§ 103', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112']

IPBiz: September 2013
Meadwestvaco v. Rexam
We find that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment of nonobviousness in favor of plaintiffs
MeadWestVaco Corporation and MeadWestVaco Calmar,
Inc. (collectively “MWV”), the assignees of the ’132
and ’819 patents, and therefore vacate the summary
judgment of nonobviousness. However, we affirm the
district court’s claim constructions, denial of Rexam’s
motion to exclude, and findings of infringement. We also
find that Rexam and Valois waived their indefiniteness
arguments by failing to pursue them at trial. Accordingly,
we affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand for
Prior to trial, MWV moved for, and the district court
granted, summary judgment of nonobviousness of the
asserted claims of both patents. Summ. J. Op., 809 F.
Supp. 2d at 474. Valois and Rexam both opposed summary
judgment, arguing that material issues of fact
necessitated a trial.
prior art are such that the subject matter would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
The central problem with the district court’s analysis
is that it fails to treat claims 15 and 19, which are not
limited to fragrance products, differently from the asserted
fragrance-specific claims.4 Obviousness, like other
grounds of invalidity, must be analyzed on a claim-byclaim
basis. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936,
942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that all grounds of invalidity
must be evaluated against individual claims, as
required by the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 282). The
district court’s analysis of the secondary considerations of
nonobviousness involved only fragrance-specific uses, but
the claims now at issue are not fragrance-specific, and
“‘objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commensurate
in scope with the claims which the evidence is
offered to support.’” Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 544
F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Grasselli,
713 F.2d 731, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). (...)
In addition to not analyzing claims 15 and 19 separately
from the fragrance-specific claims, the district court
resolved material issues of fact in favor of MWV, which is
inappropriate at the summary judgment stage. See
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (reversing grant of summary judgment of nonobviousness
for failure to view facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party). For example, Valois
presented evidence contradicting MWV’s claims of commercial
success. Valois Br. 47 (explaining that at least
one large customer elected not to use the more expensive
invisible tube). Valois also cast doubt on MWV’s teaching
away evidence by presenting evidence that EFEP was
marketed for use in “water purification systems, biomedical
tubing, catheters, and food products.” Id. at 43-
44 (citing Daikin presentation materials). Finally, Valois
put forth evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art—a
polymer engineer—would not have believed EFEP was
Sunovion v. Teva and Dr. Reddy's
The CAFC reversed:
Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Sunovion”) appeals
the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment
that Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd. and Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories, Inc. (collectively “Reddy”) do not infringe
claims 1, 2, and 8 of Sunovion’s U.S. Patent 6,444,673 (the
“’673 patent”). Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc., No. 09-1302, 2013 WL 211289 (D.N.J. Jan. 17,
2013). Because we conclude that, although the district
court did not err in construing the asserted claims,
Sunovion was entitled to a judgment of infringement as a
matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), we reverse.
This case involved enantiomers:
Stereoisomers are molecules that have the same
molecular formula or atomic composition, but which are
arranged differently in space. Enantiomers are a pair of
stereoisomers that are non-superimposable mirror images
of each other and often have distinct physical properties.
In organic chemistry, enantiomeric pairs include
compounds that have one or more stereogenic centers, i.e.,
carbon atoms with four different substituent atoms or
groups of atoms. Those compounds are thus said to be
To distinguish between different enantiomers of the
same compound, chemists use various naming conventions.
Enantiomers are sometimes called optical isomers
because a pure enantiomer rotates plane-polarized light
in a particular direction. If the light rotates clockwise,
then that enantiomer is labeled as dextrorotatory; its
counterpart will rotate the light counterclockwise and is
labeled levorotatory. A different nomenclature system
labels each stereogenic center “(R)” or “(S)” according to a
set of scientific rules. A racemate (or racemic mixture) is
an equal mixture of two enantiomers and therefore is not
optically active (i.e., will not rotate plane-polarized light
in either direction because its constituent enantiomers
cancel each other out).
A declaration was involved:
Following a Markman hearing, the district court
construed the claim term “essentially free” to mean “less
than 0.25% of [the] levorotatory isomer.” Sunovion
Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 09-1302
(D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2012), ECF No. 417 (“Markman Opinion”).
The court found that there was no plain meaning
for the disputed term and thus focused on intrinsic evidence,
including the prosecution history of the patent,
because it was undisputed that neither the claims nor the
written description defined what degree of enantiomeric
purity of the dextrorotatory isomer was “essentially free”
of the levorotatory isomer. Id. at 5–6. The court held that
Sunovion was bound by its own definition of the invention
as containing less than 0.25% of the levorotatory enantiomer
through a declaration submitted by named coinventor
Roussel and through amendments and arguments
made during prosecution.
The district court accordingly granted Reddy’s renewed
motion for summary judgment of noninfringement.
Sunovion, 2013 WL 211289, at *6. The court found that
the eszopiclone products that Reddy presumes to market
would likely be “outside the infringing range of less than
0.25% of levorotatory isomer” because of Reddy’s internal
manufacturing guidelines and the Cappuccino certification
in which it pledged to constrain the amount of levorotatory
isomer to not less than 0.3%, despite the contrary
representations made to the FDA in Reddy’s amended
ANDA specification.
The CAFC affirmed the district court on claim construction:
The term “essentially free” appears only in the claims
of the ’673 patent and does not appear anywhere in the
written description. Except for the claims, the specification
is devoid of any reference to the degree of enantiopurity
of the claimed dextrorotatory isomer of zopiclone.
The written description refers to the subject of the
claimed invention merely as the dextrorotatory isomer of
zopiclone, distinguished from the racemate, which is by
definition a 50/50 mixture of the two enantiomers. ’673
patent col. 1 ll. 24–35. However, the prosecution history
of the application that matured into the ’673 patent
demonstrates that the applicants repeatedly and consistently
defined their claimed invention to be as exhibited by
Example 1. The only other example in the patent, Example
2, briefly describes a pharmaceutical formulation of
the active product, id. col. 4 ll. 5–15, not another example
of the dextrorotatory isomer. (...)
The applicants’ repeated and consistent attribution of
the purity level of less than 0.25% levorotatory isomer to
“the invention” and “the instant invention” thus gives
meaning to the term “essentially free.” Verizon Servs.
Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“describ[ing] the features of the ‘present
invention’ as a whole . . . limits the scope of the
invention”); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357
F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (limiting claim terms to
an embodiment that was “repeatedly and consistently
describe[d]”).
As to infringement
Sunovion argues that Reddy’s amended ANDA
specification itself controls the issue of infringement
because it expressly defines Reddy’s product in a way that
directly addresses the infringement question (i.e., eszopiclone
with 0.0–0.6% levorotatory isomer), which includes
the “less than 0.25%” purity range that would allow
Reddy to sell infringing products. Appellant Br. 53–54.
We agree with Sunovion. Although no traditional patent
infringement has occurred until a patented product is
made, used, or sold, under the Hatch-Waxman framework,
the filing of an ANDA itself constitutes a technical
infringement for jurisdictional purposes. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 676 (1990). But the ultimate infringement question
is determined by traditional patent law principles and, if
a product that an ANDA applicant is asking the FDA to
approve for sale falls within the scope of an issued patent,
a judgment of infringement must necessarily ensue. See
Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed.
What Reddy has asked the FDA to approve as a regulatory
matter is the subject matter that determines
whether infringement will occur, and the fact that Reddy
either tells the court that its manufacturing guidelines
will keep it outside the scope of the claims or has even
filed a declaration in the court stating that it will stay
outside the scope of the claims does not overcome the
basic fact that it has asked the FDA to approve, and hopes
to receive from the FDA, approval to market a product
within the scope of the issued claims.
SD Ohio reversed by CAFC in fee- shifting issue in Buckhorn v. Orbis
Buckhorn v. Orbis
Defendant ORBIS Corporation (“ORBIS”) appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the South- ern District of Ohio denying its motion for fees, costs, reasonable attorney fees, and expenses. In denying the motion, the district court found that a settlement and license agreement’s fee provision did not apply when Plaintiffs allegedly had “no knowledge of the [settlement and license agreement] at the time the litigation was initiated.” Further, the district court stated that it would be unconscionable to require Plaintiffs to pay fees and costs under that settlement and license agreement.
On appeal, ORBIS challenges the district court’s rul- ings regarding the applicability and unconscionability of the fee-shifting provision in the settlement and license agreement. For the reasons below, we reverse the district court’s denial, and remand for further proceedings.
Of California law:
“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2013). Under California law, a contract may be the basis for an award of fees to a prevailing party for a tort related to a contract when the type of claim is within the scope of the provision. Gil v. Monsano, 121 Cal. App. 4th 739, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the fee provision entitled the prevailing party to an award of fees and costs “[i]n any litigation based on a controversy or dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its interpretation.” J.A. at A951.
To determine whether a contract permits the award of fees, we review its terms in view of California principles of contract interpretation. Under California statutory rules of contract interpretation, “[a] contract must be so inter- preted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 2013). For contracts reduced to writ- ing, “the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone.” Id. § 1639. Further, “[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” Id. § 1638. In addition, “[t]he words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage.” Id. § 1644.
The district court erred by denying ORBIS’s motion for fees and costs based solely on the fact that the Buckhorn plaintiff was unaware of the Ropak-Xytec Agreement when it instituted the infringement action against ORBIS and OMH. (...)
The “clear and explicit” language of the fee provision does not require knowledge of either the Agreement or the scope of rights thereunder at the time the litigation was initiated. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638.
As to unconscionable :
Under California law, an unconscionable contract or- dinarily involves both a procedural and a substantive element: (1) oppression or surprise due to unequal bar- gaining power, and (2) overly harsh or one-sided results. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689–90 (Cal. 2000). Determining unconsciona- bility requires the application of a “sliding scale” between procedural and substantive unconscionability. Id. at 690. Further, “[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the con- tract or any clause of the contract to have been uncon- scionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (empha- sis added); see also Am. Software, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1391 (“[t]he critical juncture for determining whether a con- tract is unconscionable is the moment when it is entered into by both parties-not whether it is unconscionable in light of subsequent events”). (...)
The district court erred by basing its finding of unconscionability on events taking place after Ropak and Xytec entered into their agreement rather than at the time they entered it. (...)
An analysis of events surrounding the time the par- ties entered into the contract shows that the fee provision was not unconscionable; indeed, Schoeller does not seri- ously contend that it was. In assessing the procedural element, we find no oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. “‘Op- pression’ arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and ‘an absence of meaningful choice.’” A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Ct. App. 1982) (citations omit- ted). “‘Surprise’ involves the extent to which the suppos- edly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Id. The Ropak-Xytec Agreement involved negotiations between sophisticated business parties that worked out a six-page settlement and license agreement involving multiple patents, royalty payments over a million dollars to Schoeller’s predecessor-in- interest, and a reciprocal fee provision to resolve future disputes. As such, we determine that the procedural inquiry provides little support for a finding of unconscion- ability.
While dilatory conduct on the part of ORBIS during discovery may impact the reasonableness of the fee award, any discovery delays by ORBIS do not make its request to enforce its contractual right to fees “uncon- scionable.” On remand, the district court may factor the conduct of ORBIS and OMH into its analysis of the rea- sonableness of any fee award; it may not, however, refuse to make an award given the unambiguous terms of the contract.
The news started with Secretary Kerry speaking to the Israelis about the deal with Syria. Margaret Brennan gave a news report from Geneva on the agreement, which would have Syria's chemical weapons destroyed by mid-2014. Flooding in Colorado. Two storms in Mexico: Manuel and Ingrid. A statue to commerate the victims of the bombing at the 10th Street Baptist Church, 50 years ago.
Within the story by Mason on the Glock, there was a picture of US Patent No. 4,825,744. The inventor of the Glock had no prior experience in guns, and took a fresh look. The Glock has only 34 components.
The almanac was on the birth of Fay Wray, on Sept. 15, 1907.
Nancy Giles had talked with Bobbi Brown back in 1991, when Brown's business took off. Brown had a completely different view of lipstick than the then current providers. Leonard Lauder recognized the importance and baught her company.
Sunday Morning noted the death of Calvin Coolidge ("Cal") Worthington.
Bill Flanagan provided a repeat of his "no problem" editorial on the problem with "no problem." Of relevance to stories on Sept. 15, Flanagan mentioned "Thank you for giving me your kidney."
The moment of nature by Spiriva was on flamingos at Lake Bogoria in Kenya.
before the court held oral argument in the case. Since
Pronova brings this suit pursuant to the provisions of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
seeking only prospective relief, any issues regarding
the ’077 patent are now moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower
court is reversed and the case is remanded with orders to
enter judgment in favor of appellants.
Link for Pronova v. Teva: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/12-1498.Opinion.9-10-2013.1.PDF
design patent invalid on summary judgment and also
dismissing BDI’s trade dress claims with prejudice. See
High Point Design LLC v. Buyer’s Direct, Inc., No. 11-CV-
4530, 2012 WL 1820565 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (“Final
Decision”). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the
grant of summary judgment of invalidity, vacate the
dismissal of BDI’s trade dress claims, and remand for
When assessing the potential obviousness of a design
patent, a finder of fact employs two distinct steps: first,
“one must find a single reference, a something in existence,
the design characteristics of which are basically the
same as the claimed design”; second, “[o]nce this primary
reference is found, other references may be used to modify
it to create a design that has the same overall visual
appearance as the claimed design.” Durling v. Spectrum
Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Under the first step, a court must both “(1) discern the
correct visual impression created by the patented design
as a whole; and (2) determine whether there is a single
reference that creates ‘basically the same’ visual impression.”
Durling, 101 F.3d at 103. The ultimate inquiry in
an obviousness analysis is “whether the claimed design
would have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill
who designs articles of the type involved.” Id., quoted in
Apple, 678 F.3d at 1329.
Although obviousness is assessed from the vantage
point of an ordinary designer in the art, “an expert’s
opinion on the legal conclusion of obviousness is neither
necessary nor controlling.” Avia Grp., 853 F.2d at 1564.
That said, an expert’s opinion may be relevant to the
factual aspects of the analysis leading to that legal conclusion.
See Peterson Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Publ’g, Inc., 740
F.2d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated on other
grounds by Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing
and Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1177–78 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“In civil litigation involving a design [patent], an
expert’s testimony is most helpful, as in the determination
of obviousness with respect to any other type of
invention, to explain the technology, the scope and content
of the prior art, the differences between the prior art
and the invention, and the level of skill in the art.”). For
that reason, the district court erred by categorically
disregarding the Rake Declaration. See Final Decision,
2012 WL 1820565, at *5.
We now turn to what we conclude were additional errors
in the district court’s application of the two-step
analysis set forth in Durling.
Finally, we turn to secondary considerations, which
the district court did not address in the Final Decision.
This court has held that “evidence rising out of the socalled
‘secondary considerations’ must always when
obviousness.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Hupp v. Siroflex of
Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Invalidity
based on obviousness of a patented design is determined
on factual criteria similar to those that have been
developed as analytical tools for reviewing the validity of
a utility patent under § 103, that is, on application of the
Graham factors.”). Here, BDI alleged both commercial
success of the claimed design as well as copying. To the
extent that the obviousness of the ’183 patent remains at
issue on remand, the district court should address any
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment of obviousness and remand the case
link: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/12-1455.Opinion.9-9-2013.1.PDF
At upper left on the page, the heading SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY. The title, Ideas on Soot Formation Spark Controversy is printed in almost sensationally large type, large enough that the six words require two lines. The article is in three columns, and the center column text on the first page is broken about a third of the way down with the designation NEWS ANALYSIS between two horizontal set offs.
Lee Cowan, not Charles Osgood, hosted the stories for September 8. The cover story, done by Cowan, was on the "art of the fake", featuring Ken Perenyi (author of Caveat Emptor). Honoring genuine talent is one thing, but how about the imitators? Copying Buttersworth. Second, Mark Strassman on Freda Kelly, secretary to the Beatles. Third, Mo Rocca on Woodrow Wilson. Tracy Smith on Billy Crystal. Jeff Glor, Dave Edelstein, and Steve Hartman on a weight lifter.
Headlines Obama will speak on Syria, Tokyo gets 2020 Olympic Games. Der Spiegel on NSA. Weather: mild in northeast.
Almanac. Minnesota Mining does Scotch tape on September 8, 1930. Richard Drew. See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scotch_Tape
Faith Salie does editorial on vocal fry / creaky voice.
Lava lamp 50th. Edward Craven-Walker of Britain invented the lava lamp in 1963.
Steve Hartman on Jonathan Stoklosa.
Jeff Glor on Urban Dove.
Edelstein on "Short Term 12."
Moment of nature. Great Falls, Virginia.
From Soverain decided by the CAFC:
Of dependent claims at issue:
We cannot discern for ourselves any
independent basis for their validity. We therefore affirm
the holding of invalidity of these claims as well.”); see also
SIBIA Neurosciences, 225 F.3d at 1359 (“in this appeal,
SIBIA has failed to argue the validity of the dependent
claims separately from the validity of claim 1. Thus,
these claims do not stand on their own, and given our
determination that claim 1 is invalid, the remaining
dependent claims must fall as well.”).
On this rehearing, Soverain has not provided any new
information concerning the specific limitation of claim 35.
The inclusion of an additional known element from a
similar system, as set forth in claim 35, is subject to
review on established principles, as summarized in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)
(an unobvious combination must be “more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions”). The supplemental briefing reinforces
the absence of dispute that that the element in claim 35 is
in the CompuServe Mall prior art.
The district court was reversed in Trading Technologies
In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff-Appellant Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“TT”) appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment that (i) the asserted claims of TT’s U.S. Patents 7,676,411 (the “’411 patent”), 7,693,768 (the “’768 patent”), 7,904,374 (the “’374 patent”), and 7,685,055 (the “’055 patent”) are invalid for failure to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112; and (ii) prosecution history estoppel bars TT from asserting the ’055 patent against software products that include certain display functions. The district court premised both holdings on deference to our prior decision in Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“eSpeed”), which considered two related pa- tents from TT’s portfolio.
We conclude that eSpeed does not control the issues presented in this appeal, and the district court’s rulings based on that case are therefore incorrect. Accordingly, and as described more fully below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
As described, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as to the invalidity of most claims of TT’s ’411, ’768, ’374, and ’055 patents, holding that our prior decision in eSpeed rendered those claims invalid as a matter of law for failing to satisfy the written description requirement of § 112.
TT argues that the district court relied on portions of eSpeed that dealt solely with interpreting the term “stat- ic” in the related ’132 and ’304 patents without determin- ing or addressing the scope of the patents’ shared disclosure. Noting that the sufficiency of a patent’s writ- ten description presents a question of fact, TT faults the district court for relying entirely on eSpeed rather than conducting its own analysis of whether any of the claims at issue find adequate written description support under § 112. TT contends that, on the merits and apart from any misapplication of eSpeed, the claims of the ’411, ’768, ’374, and ’055 patents satisfy the written description requirement.
Bayer’s proposed construction broadly covers a class of enzymes defined by their function of causing cleaving of the side chain of 2,4-D, while its written description structurally identifies just one gene sequence and the enzyme it encodes. We have not articulated a comprehen- sive and precise formulation for identifying when such a combination runs afoul of Section 112(a)’s written- description requirement; indeed, we have counseled against “bright-line rules” in this area. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). But we have indicated the primacy of structural identification for inventions in certain areas like the one at issue here, and when we have adverted to the possibil- ity of other means of identification, we have focused on whether such alternative means sufficiently correlate with structure. See, e.g., Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, No. 2012-1433, 2013 WL 3779376, at *14 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2013); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1121, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“functional descriptions of genetic mate- rial can, in some cases, meet the written description requirement if those functional characteristics are ‘cou- pled with a known or disclosed correlation between func- tion and structure, or some combination of such characteristics’”) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen- Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002));
posted by Lawrence B. Ebert at 3:32 AM 0 comments