Source: http://slideplayer.com/slide/3980815/
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 00:51:21
Document Index: 671044764

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.7', 'Art. 9', 'Art. 10', 'Art. 11', 'Art. 114', 'Art. 114', 'Art. 26', 'Art. 114', 'Art. 114']

1 EU Financial Market Regulation: A Strategy of Raising Rivals' Costs Roland Vaubel Universität Mannheim Bruges Group Conference, London, 6 November ppt download
1 EU Financial Market Regulation: A Strategy of Raising Rivals' Costs Roland Vaubel Universität Mannheim Bruges Group Conference, London, 6 November 2010.
Published byClarence Heyward Modified over 2 years ago
Presentation on theme: "1 EU Financial Market Regulation: A Strategy of Raising Rivals' Costs Roland Vaubel Universität Mannheim Bruges Group Conference, London, 6 November 2010."— Presentation transcript:
1 1 EU Financial Market Regulation: A Strategy of Raising Rivals' Costs Roland Vaubel Universität Mannheim Bruges Group Conference, London, 6 November 2010
2 2 Recent EU Financial Market Regulations: Credit Rating Agencies (Regulation 1060/2009) European Systemic Risk Board (Regulation, Sept. 2010) European Banking Authority (Regulation, Sept. 2010) European Securities and Markets Authority (Regulation, Sept. 2010) European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (Regulation, Sept. 2010) Alternative Investment Fund Managers (Directive, Oct. 2010)
3 3 The European Banking Authority (EBA): 0.The Board of Supervisors is composed of the heads of the national supervisory authorities (plus non-voting members) and decides by qualified majority (in some cases even by simple majority). EBA may impose "technical standards" (Art.7). If the EU Commission and EBA believe that a national supervisory authority breaches EU law, EBA may "adopt an individual decision addressed to a financial institution... including the cessation of any practice" (Art. 9, Section 6).
4 4 3.If a qualified majority of the EU Council declares an emergency, EBA may "adopt individual decisions requiring competent authorities to take the necessary action in accordance with (EU) legislation" (Art. 10, Section 2). An emergency is defined as "adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European Union" (Section 1). If two or more national supervisory authorities disagree on the procedure or content of an action required by EU law, EBA may "take a decision requiring them to take specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle the matter, with binding effects for the competent authorities concerned" (Art. 11, Section 3). The Commission is to report in three-year intervals whether and how EBA's competencies ought to be increased.
5 5 Would any of these financial market regulations have prevented the outbreak or the severity of the financial crisis? No. The crisis did not break out in Europe – it emanated from the U.S. National crisis management in the UK and the other member states was satisfactory. There is no reason to believe that the EU would have done better. Cross-border banks like Fortis and Dexia were taken care of in bilateral or trilateral negotiations among the national supervisory authorities of the countries concerned (Benelux and France). To involve all 27 national authorities of the member states through EBA would have been less efficient. The crisis has not been caused by the hedge funds. The credit rating agencies were the first to call alarm (in August 2008).
6 6 Has the financial crisis shown that financial supervision ought to be centralised at the EU level? No. The crisis has not been caused by banks or regulators consciously taking excessive risks due to regulatory arbitrage. Instead, the crisis was due to two huge errors: i) the banks erroneously thought that their provisions against risk were sufficient, ii) the regulators erroneously thought that their regulations were sufficient. This twofold error was a necessary condition for the occurrence and severity of the crisis. Now that the error has been exposed, the banks and the national supervisory authorities are drawing the necessary lessons, and they have a perfectly sufficient incentive to do so.
7 7 Where error is the problem, three remedies are called for: i)More transparency in financial markets – a task that can be left to the national authorities, ii)Stronger precautions against risk, notably higher equity requirements – the task of Basel III, not the EU, iii)Diversity of regulatory experiments so that the best practice can be found and be imitated. Collective EU regulation suppresses this process of discovery and leads to overregulation – especially if it is decided by qualified majority.
8 8 Under qualified majority voting, the majority of highly regulated countries (say, France) have an incentive and the power to impose their high level of regulation on the minority of more market-oriented countries (say, the UK) in order to weaken the latter's competitiveness. In the political economy literature, this is called "the strategy of raising rivals' cost". The common level of regulation that is imposed on the minority is even higher than the level originally prevailing among the majority because the majority is no longer constrained by the competitive pressure from the minority.
9 9 Following the financial crisis, the French government has pursued the strategy of raising rivals' cost in a deliberate and consistent manner: Jacques de Larosière, a former Governor of the Banque de France, was appointed chairman of a "High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU" by the European Commission in 2008. Michel Barnier, a French politician, was appointed EU Commissioner for the internal market (including financial market regulation) by the President of the Commission in 2009. Jean-Paul Gauzès, member of the European Parliament for the French ruling party (UMP), was elected rapporteur for the legislation on financial market regulation (also in 2009). The three new EU Supervisory Authorities are modelled on the French "three-peaked approach" which is unique among the industrialised countries.
10 10 The strategy of raising rivals' cost in quotations: De Larosière Report: "The Group recommends intensifying co- ordinated efforts to encourage currently poorly regulated or "unco- operative" jurisdictions to adhere to the highest level international standards" (Recommendation 28, p. 66). Gauzès: "Dans un pays comme la France, il y a une vraie tradition de surveillance des institutions financières. L'avantage d'une supervision européenne serait d'étendre les mêmes règles partout" (Le Figaro, 7 July, 2010). Christine Lagarde (French Minister of Finance): "We need a City that plays by different rules" (Financial Times, 4 December, 2009). Nicolas Sarkozy in a speech in La-Seyne-sur-Mer: "Do you know what it means for me to see for the first time in 50 years a French European Commissioner in charge of the internal market, including financial services, including the City (of London)? I want the world to see the victory of the European model, which has nothing to do with the excesses of financial capitalism" (Times, London, 2 December 2009).
12 12 EU regulation by qualified majority voting? French governments have used the strategy of raising rivals' cost in other fields as well, e.g., in the regulation of labour markets and the arts market. In both fields, the level of regulation is high in France and low in the UK. The strategy of raising rivals' cost is supported by the Commission which thereby increases its power. The centralisation of financial regulation at the EU level is rejected by a majority of voters in nine member states which together command a blocking minority in the EU Council:
14 14 How can this strategy of raising rivals' cost be stopped? Commission and Council have claimed that EU financial regulation can be based on Art. 114 TFEU which permits qualified majority voting. Art. 114 requires that the regulations "have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market". The internal market is defined in Art. 26 TFEU as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured". But differences between the national financial regulations are perfectly compatible with the free movement of capital. They are process regulations, not product regulations.
15 15 Since the internal market article (114) and qualified majority voting do not apply to financial process regulation, the British government could have gone to court had it not voted for these regulations. However, the British government could demand a clarification of Art. 114 at the occasion of the next revision of the EU Treaties. The amendment would clarify that Art. 114 does not apply to process regulations, notably financial market regulations, because they are fully compatible with the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Last week the 27 governments of the EU member states have agreed that they will amend the Treaties to perpetuate the bail-out facility for the eurozone. This is an opportunity, not a nuisance, for the British government.
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