Source: https://judicialview.com/Court-Cases/Copyright/Brownstein-v-Lindsay/55/596525
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 15:20:02
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1324', '§ 204', '§ 1324', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 1119', '§ 6', '§ 411', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 103', '§ 6', '§ 201', '§ 201', '§ 7', '§ 5', '§ 106', '§ 201', '§ 410', '§ 5', '§ 101', '§ 7', '§ 17', '§ 201', '§ 101', '§ 201', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 701', '§ 6', '§ 3', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 1331', '§ 6', '§ 411', '§ 1291', '§ 701', '§ 101', '§ 6', '§ 3', '§ 201', '§ 407', '§ 411', '§ 1324']

Judicial View > Federal Cases > Copyright > Brownstein v Lindsay
Home >> Federal Cases >> Copyright >> Brownstein v Lindsay
This case concerns Appellant Peter Brownstein’s claim under the Copyright Act seeking a declaratory judgment of joint authorship of an ethnic identification system that he created with Appellee Tina Lindsay, the Lindsay Cultural Identification Determinate (“LCID”). Lindsay purports to have conveyed the copyrights to the LCID to Appellee Ethnic Technologies (“E-Tech”). The contested work is a computer program that implements rules for identifying the ethnicity of proper names for the purposes of direct marketing. In addition to a declaration of his joint authorship, Brownstein sought an accounting of the profits from the ethnic identification system. In response, Appellees counterclaimed to cancel the copyright registrations that Brownstein had received for the system’s computer code, which was his contribution to the work.
After the District Court denied summary judgment, the case went to trial. At the end of Brownstein’s case, the District Court granted Appellees judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) on Brownstein’s joint authorship claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The District Court found that Brownstein’s claim was time-barred and that he could not succeed on the merits of his claim based on the evidence adduced at trial. The District Court severed Appellees’ counterclaim and later issued an opinion granting summary judgment to Appellees on their counterclaim.
This appeal presents two issues of first impression for our Circuit. The first is when a joint authorship claim under the Copyright Act arises and accrues and the second is whether courts have the authority to cancel copyright registrations. For the following reasons, we hold that an authorship claim arises and accrues when a plaintiff’s authorship has been “expressly repudiated”. We also hold that courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations. We will reverse both the District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to Appellees and its grant of summary judgment to Appellees on their counterclaim. Also, we will remand the case for a new trial.
Judge(s): Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
Related Categories: Civil Procedure , Technology
Joseph Greenaway, Jr.
Jay McDaniel McDaniel Law Firm
Thomas Howard Kirsch Gartenberg & Howard
hackensack, nj 07601 ii. the 1996 argument with raskin deposit copy. the ethn programs was only meant to provide “an example” says that “tap owns all rights, including copyrights” to the of law. fed. r. civ. p. 56(a). handle tap’s business affairs. he was so focused on the issue at the root of this case is whether brownstein 464 u.s. 16, 23 (1983). moreover, § 1324 would be warning” that would put an author on inquiry notice. it berrie & co., 290 f.3d 548, 563 (3d cir. 2002). of frauds and imputes him with knowledge of their language. brownstein). eventually, with tension building between the 11 in granting summary judgment to appellees on their expressly repudiate your co-author’s authorship is not to of e-tech, he never signed the agreements. in writing. 17 u.s.c. § 204(a); see barefoot architect, inc. v. registrations themselves and the law undergirding the to cancel the copyright registrations that brownstein had agreement, and the 2010 settlement agreement — involved them. validity of a copyright denotes ownership — a necessary there are several potential sources of express about whether the statute of limitations has run on his asserting in her counterclaim that she is the sole author of the covered the entire lcid, including brownstein’s ethn around december 1993, lindsay began devising the idea and trial, lindsay claimed that she directed brownstein on how to action had arisen. in our circuit, the discovery rule governs u.s.c. § 1324. employer, the magazine’s company, owns the copyright to his act had run since brownstein had adequate notice of his the 1997 software license is key because it is the first in granting summary judgment on appellees’ these standard consumer licensing agreements state brownstein’s claim was time-barred and that he could not ethn programs and lcid that he created as “derivative registrations. lcid is a joint work. when two or more people create a not based on the strict language of the agreement. may challenge an unfavorable decision by the copyright (app. 519-24 (settlement agreement ¶¶ 2.6, 3.3, 5.1.1, (lindsay and e-tech) and brownstein from related claims. 41 seen any storm warnings requiring him to investigate the brownstein filed for his own copyright registrations in was misled into finding that lindsay’s copyright registrations property” of e-tech, while the four others acknowledged that ownership interest in the lcid — his rights could co-exist ownership in her copyrights with brownstein and the other for the third circuit (which was referred to as the “tap system”), the 2010 settlement agreement did divest brownstein of any with an application for copyright registration. 17 u.s.c. §§ cancellation process and that aggrieved parties are without ethn programs that were not covered by the 1998 officer, employee or director in tap or as manager, partner, did she write “ethn programs” in the registration. superfluous if congress intended for courts to already have no end (and would cause raskin to later sue lindsay and signatories to the 2000 agreement, although brownstein see gaiman, 360 f.3d at 653; zuill, 80 f.3d at secured both copyright registrations on her own, without the 39 on june 1, 1997, lindsay unilaterally attempted to second registration had the same title and was marked as a identification determinate (“lcid”). lindsay purports to the work for her as a work for hire. or, as in gaiman and such a interestingly, her intention to grant an exclusive tech’s counterclaim to cancel brownstein’s copyright since that issue is not before us on appeal. to cancel copyright registrations. see xerox corp. v. apple plaintiff’s authorship would be nullified. likewise, as of 2005, the eastern district of michigan the date that lindsay registered her copyrights since, in listing in 1998, lsdi and raskin (lindsay and brownstein’s court erred because these were factual determinations that 41.) thus, while brownstein can be imputed with knowledge independent ownership rights in his ethn programs were that “the copyright was in her name because she initiated it the district court had authority to cancel brownstein’s interests in his computer code. but what the agreement the difference neither could the 1997 agreement or 2000 agreement. the testimony at trial, she admitted that her rules and a challenger to a plaintiff’s authorship could surreptitiously cover the eds. the copyrights, then lindsay would actually have to share except that it formally called the joint venture “ethnic semiconductor co., 307 f.3d at 781-82. agreement, and the 2000 agreement), the settlement of limitations running” because it is not adverse to a co- district court explained that “there is evidence that the authorship field of the registration application. she also at oral argument, appellees contended that the post- employment or for a commission.8 misguided. lindsay, herself, admitted as much at trial. she judgment to appellees on their counterclaim. also, we will favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question of 5.1.2).) specifically, this 2010 settlement agreement vitiated authorship claim was without merit” in deciding the rule 50 for our purposes, the two are interchangeable. registration was entitled “an ethnic determinant system — directed would be erroneous under the governing law.’” id. proper names for the purposes of direct marketing. in (1st cir. 1997) (holding that copyright registration puts the iii. the 1997 software license ‘127 registration, and might be claiming sole authorship of derivative works are works that build upon and iii. analysis 17 virtue thereof, his ethn programs) against lindsay and e- which was then pending, 2) forced brownstein to relinquish whole. since brownstein, alone, wrote the code, the only lcid. venture and the counterparty, cmr, “acknowledge at all fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 663, 667 (3d cir. 1990) (“‘the elements of a copyright define the scope of brownstein’s and lindsay’s copyrights. general authority with respect to copyright registrations, it 256:1 (“[the] lcid had to have programs.”)).) in schedule circuit judges. whether a printer’s contribution to the printing of a map gave associates); app. 702-06 (2002 agreement with wells of the lcid created thereafter, an open question remains write.”)).) on the other hand, brownstein had to use his own world on constructive notice of ownership); diamond v. cause of action begins to accrue. the discovery rule is a noted earlier, it is doubtful that tap or e-tech ever had interest in derivative versions of the lcid to the extent that director or employee of e-tech”. it says nothing specifically with few exceptions, a deposit copy must be submitted tech was marred by three lawsuits: the first initiated by lsdi should not be required to investigate every whisper and rumor such an exclusive conveyance. as with tenants in common of in the 1996 argument, which brownstein recounted in repudiation (which it characterized as the date of injury) to be printout of brownstein’s code to the copyright office for the may 25, 2010 settlement agreement (the “2010 exclusive ownership over the lcid. as long as his as will be noted infra, the district court’s assumption was therefore, the district court reasoned, even if he was not 15 real property, a co-author can transfer or assign the rights to this concession means that appellees admit that brownstein including the ethn programs”, that act would not vest matters. 3 reaffirms that the authority to cancel copyright registrations lcid. this required that lindsay do something that copyrights cover the eds “which may be called [the] lcid”, cancellation of such a registration” — thus, it only applies to as mentioned above, brownstein had copyrights lindsay had insinuated in some of her testimony at trial. the computer program that would predict the ethnicity of a peter brownstein, lindsay had hoped that tap would own the lcid and be author’s contribution need not be equal for them to have an which would serve an “archival function” in the event of application referenced a “computer process” and “codes” exclusive ownership of the lcid by stating that her two that language only renamed the eds (which is all her exclusive license and does not negate the other co-author’s venture “ethnic technologies, llc”). (app. 631.) the 8 copyright § 6.11; davis, 505 f.3d at 99-100. he also had copyrights to whatever new generations of the repudiated brownstein’s authorship were inappropriately for party — unauthorized creation of a derivative work, which would be to the eds, of which she was the sole author. if most decisively, there is no statutory authority in the in order to reach the issue of when brownstein’s transfer ownership of the lcid through the trio of licensing f.3d at 1370. for repudiation to be express, it must be plain. tech diminish the value of the copyright to the co-owners.”). issued thereunder, all actions taken by the register of this appeal presents two issues of first impression for brownstein was not a signatory to the license, nor was he code a number of computer programs that did everything license, those two agreements rise and fall with the 1997 raskin demanded that she turn over the copyright registration relevant programs as belonging exclusively to tap.” (app. f.3d at 100-01 (“a co-owner may grant a non-exclusive a work for hire requires that the work be made by an ‘127 registration and several fields of the registration at oral argument, appellees conceded that brownstein 360 f.3d at 652. unlike brownstein, the plaintiffs in those brownstein and lindsay worked together at future the underlying work retain their rights to their original work. by tap. the strongest language from this agreement only lindsay’s registrations covered the entire lcid, she would steam, they both left lsdi in june 1997. history, and copyright office regulations); leegin creative cir. 2000); merchant v. levy, 92 f.3d 51, 53, 56 (2d cir. schedule a).) commands to perform the functions listed in the code. declared very little expressly about lindsay’s copyrights: it wrote “[a]dditional ethnic categories, additional rules, names, accordingly, her registrations could not claim ownership of marketing research, inc. (“cmr”), to create e-tech, a joint b. express repudiation based on these potential sources of express 13 office in a cancellation matter by challenging its decision in nimmer on copyright § 6.03. thus, if person a writes lyrics computer, inc., 734 f. supp. 1542, 1549 (n.d. cal. 1990) have no effect on brownstein’s copyrights and ownership claim would still fail on the merits. turn her rules into computer code. (app. 1051 (trial tr. registrations, standing alone, could not have repudiated (d.c. civ. action no. 3:10-cv-01581) 1. the rule 50(a) ruling from the bench (brownstein’s brownstein’s ethn programs as a “deposit copy” for the under the copyright act seeking a declaratory judgment of potential violation of his rights when his authorship has been authorship claim arises and accrues when a plaintiff’s interest he had in tap and e-tech. but, if tap and e-tech nothing about brownstein’s authorship of his computer code. zuill, this would happen if lindsay directly sent brownstein a the statute of limitations running and, if the plaintiff did not 37 e-tech “owns all rights, including copyrights” to the e-tech address systems, inc.).) one of these agreements (“except as provided by section 706 (b) and the regulations zuill v. shanahan, 80 f.3d 1366, 1370 (9th cir. 1996). “joint work”, they become co-authors and co-owners of the that 1997 software license — she signed both as the for the reasons that follow, the district court should not have may not be plain that his authorship rights have been out a specific power of cancellation, this provision only belief, the 2000 agreement did not vest e-tech with affect the ownership rights of his co-author. 1 nimmer on authority. section 701, which describes the functions of the program that implements rules for identifying the ethnicity of years and [until after] all of the other ensuing events without 33 tap system, which is the “exclusive property of tap”. rule 50(a) is plenary. beck v. city of pittsburgh, 89 f.3d 2. the effect of lindsay’s and brownstein’s copyright the 2010 settlement agreement only quashed brownstein’s the question of when a cause of action claiming co-ownership explained that this was her intention because the software ownership interest in the lcid. thus, contrary to lindsay’s that right. registration serves primarily to create a record of trademarks. 15 u.s.c. § 1119 (“in any action involving a interest in his ethn programs and the lcid. accordingly, saying anything about it?” (app. 1130 (trial tr. 336:15-16).) 1997 versions of the lcid are derivative works and that, co-author, the second issue was whether his joint authorship foible of lindsay’s plans. thomas s. howard, esq. [argued] (app. 2769 intend that their contributions be combined. 1 nimmer on contribution to the work. of how the eds would be implemented, not to claim registration does not establish the copyright, which attaches at court’s rule 50(a) grant of judgment as a matter of law on they contained were scripts of written commands that would to a song and intends for a composer to write the score, entitled “an ethnic determinant system — knowledge and would remain a co-author and co-owner because copyright that another has declared himself the author of his asked to be one. it joint authorship of the map or whether such contributions 563-64. authorship. in deciding both of these issues, the district there is no such general cancellation provision in the and settlement agreements turn on what was originally and because the non-exclusive license presumptively does not issue is to be made by the court, as [appellees] seek to the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the things from denmark, 290 f.3d at 563-64. if the original respect to “original designs”.15 due to the district court’s conflation of the eds and have no authority to cancel copyright registrations because 38 brownstein composed the score. the exception to this joint in fact, the 1997 agreement states that the joint the most significant difference between her two registrations succeed on the merits of his claim based on the evidence (summ. j. op. at 5).) language does not state that lindsay was the exclusive author agreement listed lindsay and brownstein as executive 6 action arises since a plaintiff cannot experience storm sole author of the eds, as an independent work of the lcid, ethn programs with her second copyright registration, the could not have conveyed brownstein’s ownership interest in more importantly, as just established, a registration does not through printing were works for hire. this is the first time this express repudiation rule spawned from a ninth area of joint authorship under the copyright act. in andrien while courts may not directly cancel copyright registrations, oppressed shareholder lawsuit relieved brownstein of any ethn programs. nomenclature does not affect the substance or content of a on march 22, 2010, brownstein filed his complaint in lindsay and brownstein also decided to register the registrations ownership interest. 1 nimmer on copyright § 6.10; see the deposit copy did not expand the scope of her second brownstein, the next question is what rights were conveyed that brownstein had constructive knowledge that lindsay brownstein’s consent in a writing with his signature. even if tr. 339:10-24).) in particular, the district court found that the 1997 agreement (which partnered tap with of these agreements as a 50% owner of tap and an executive 31 or owner of the entire lcid. it vaguely calls lindsay the as described previously, a co-author is allowed to grant a contributed a non-trivial amount of creative expression to the leather prods., inc. v. m.m. rogers & co., no. 94-4644, see gaiman, 360 f.3d at 654-55. but see saenger org., inc. geographic location). these rules became known as the further suggests that courts have no general authority to author of the lcid (including his ethn computer programs) opinion until a superseding agreement in 2000 formally named the ______________ light most favorable to brownstein, it is also plausible that importantly, this concession also means that appellees be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most expressly repudiated brownstein’s rights since, by their plain 781-82 (9th cir. 2002) (holding that cancellation of a 44 factual determinations that should have been left for a jury. of her system. lindsay refused, which infuriated raskin to 11 customers between 2000 and 2005, which satisfies the statute whole or the ethn programs. notably, lindsay’s first authorship in the record.” (app. 1133 (trial tr. 339:5-12).) 2 district court’s assumption is belied by the copyright general inquiry notice rule, which states that a claim accrues her rules and brownstein’s ethn programs). (app. 663 brownstein, et, tap and cmr . . . are the sole owners of the brownstein was on inquiry notice of his authorship claim apply for copyright registration of the plaintiff’s work to start programs as the deposit copy and described the eds as “[a] he filed an oppressed shareholder lawsuit against lindsay to him because he believed that lsdi was the rightful owner 40 co-author of the underlying work and has an ownership the lcid to tap without his consent in a signed writing. at there was also the replevin claim that the district court latest. 1996). many of these cases analogize co-authors of even apply since lindsay’s copyright registrations and statutory indication whatsoever that courts have such 307 f.3d at 212-13; dam things from denmark, 290 f.3d at lindsay. she argues that, by disowning any “right, title and 80 f.3d at 1370; gaiman, 360 f.3d at 654; davis, 505 f.3d at safekeeping (and was only sent a deposit receipt in return), not compensated for the express purpose of writing code for at 438-39. consequently, prospective plaintiffs have no duty joint authorship because co-authors are not expected to repudiation too thin. the act of registering a copyright does the programs are called the ethn programs because they be sought from the copyright office). we agree. software license. since the software license did not transfer able to exploit it freely. lindsay was the only signatory to state court, and the third initiated by him in federal court. derivative work of the first, so it, too, only covered the eds. had no authority to cancel brownstein’s copyright authority to cancel copyright registrations because there is no thus, if the settlement language governed the boundaries of brownstein’s copyright registrations. license purported to give tap an exclusive license to the provides courts with the general authority to cancel design under this chapter, the court, when appropriate, may employee of tap or e-tech; nor was he commissioned to lindsay’s registrations did not extend to the lcid as a convey exclusive rights, his co-author can convey the same registration is an administrative function.14 36 co-author of the lcid. interests or referencing her actual copyright registrations. the agreements declaring lindsay as the sole author of the in zuill, the plaintiffs’ joint authorship was expressly v. the 1998 settlement agreement out in text, just as one might write out a recipe or driving become e-tech, a non-exclusive license to use the lcid and applied here, brownstein’s injury occurred whenever non-exclusive license to the lcid to tap (and, subsequently, lindsay intended for the eds to be combined with the both as the copyright holder and the representative of tap. registration. 17 u.s.c. § 411(b). but a list of requirements is codes . . . [d]escription of computer process included” in tech’s offices. lindsay and e-tech filed a counterclaim to lindsay’s argument is the 1998 lsdi settlement agreement, assumed that her copyright registrations covered the entire 28 brownstein took affirmative steps to protect his joint would, therefore, cover any post-1998 generations of the this case concerns appellant peter brownstein’s claim the creation of the work. 17 u.s.c. § 201(a). for this reason, indivisible joint rights she inherently had in the eds and the the ninth circuit, seventh circuit, and second circuit from his joint authorship of the lcid, and replevin of directions. the system would use this set of rules to run a times that the original tap system [the lcid] remains the (app. 631.) as discussed above, the 1997 software license in sum, brownstein’s copyrights and ownership the 2010 settlement agreement is of little help to herself out as the sole author of the lcid. (app. 1133 (trial until she gave her 2010 deposition. (app. 1133 (trial tr. also implicitly provide the criteria for courts to cancel a about his rights as co-author of the lcid or sole author of the that lindsay was claiming sole authorship of the lcid, as far ______________ with respect to transferring the ownership of a joint district court granted appellees judgment as a matter of law 257:19-22 (“at my direction. i told him exactly what to proceeded to cancel brownstein’s copyright registrations indication of the second registration’s scope was also two university plaza agreements purport to grant licenses, while some purport to have adopted an “express repudiation” rule, such that a joint stated 1) that lindsay and brownstein would not claim rights inures to the employer or commissioner. 17 u.s.c. § 201(b). (app. 639.) lindsay and nelson were also the only assocs., inc. v. mctigue, 531 f.3d 38, 48 (1st cir. 2008). at we held that a plaintiff would be able to discover his injury lsdi management and the duo, and their venture gaining lcid in the agreement by declaring that “lindsay, nelson, the only set of rights to which lindsay could have conveyed and tap retaining the rights to the eds (and any derivative the lcid as a joint work with her rules. further, even if her c. questions remaining for the jury misnomer did not necessarily serve as a storm warning of were preserved. co., 534 u.s. 438, 452-53 (2002); russello v. united states, copyright registrations. incorporates the original work, constitutes an infringement of ______________ author’s interest in the joint work. 360 f.3d at 653-54. brownstein signed five of these agreements with e-tech did not actually interfere with brownstein’s ownership rights. and lindsay were co-authors of the lcid up until its 1997 lindsay expressly repudiated his joint authorship of the u.s.c. § 103. while the original work may be copyrightable, 43 dismissed, but brownstein has not appealed this decision. copyrights under this title are subject to the provisions of the software license and possibly the assignment of lindsay’s the work, rather than from any sort of agreement between the as an e-tech executive, brownstein executed five instance, this would occur if brownstein became aware that jay r. mcdaniel, esq. [argued] was named the lcid. the result was that lindsay was the throughout this whole time, brownstein let lindsay identification system. in response, appellees counterclaimed brownstein’s authorship and ownership of these derivative therefore, brownstein has no rights to these improved establish the criteria for obtaining a copyright registration, lcid) were not affected by the series of agreements, except collaborator creates his contribution to the work as part of his independently copyrightable work that is based upon a the district court considered the date of express subsumed in his positions in tap or e-tech. further, as nevertheless, it was not until march 2010 that we will address each of these three issues in turn — the district court further ruled that brownstein was the merits. member, officer, director or employee of e-tech”. (app. becomes a non-exclusive license. id. § 6.10; see davis, 505 testimony at trial is internally inconsistent, lindsay is still list of rules and names, which gave brownstein “[q]uite a bit september 1998, with lsdi retaining rights to the ethn that the copyright act and copyright office regulations do exclusive ownership of the lcid in lindsay. brownstein 1. inquiry notice of brownstein’s authorship claim seeking a declaration that he is a co-author of the lcid. work, each entitled to “undivided ownership in the entire fed. r. civ. p. 50(a). the district court found that iv. the 1997 agreement and the 2000 agreement which may be called lcid.” (app. 1132 (trial tr. 338:5-9).) semiconductor co. v. microchip tech. inc., 307 f.3d 775, copyright office, explicitly states that “[a]ll administrative authority to invalidate brownstein’s copyright registrations. work. see gaiman, 360 f.3d at 659 (providing the example copyrights in a compensation contract reviewed by the 6 works is a factual question that must be decided by a jury. number of agreements to form new business entities to or modifications thereof), referred to as the “lsdi program”, (“eds which may be called lcid”) — the district court in of a copyright accrues.” diamond v. gillis, 357 f. supp. 2d step further to conclude that lindsay could unilaterally 2000 agreement did convey all of tap’s assets to the joint 37 c.f.r. § 201.7, as evidence that congress intended for brownstein a storm warning that lindsay was repudiating his later that year, lindsay and brownstein decided to she held a copyright to his ethn programs or the lcid as a see dam things from denmark, a/k/a troll co. aps v. russ 2 the copyright office. 37 c.f.r. § 201.7(a) (“cancellation is 29 merely “‘prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright copyrightable work itself. 2 nimmer on copyright § 7.17. of the copyright.”)).) this stretches the meaning of express accordingly, the only way for truly exclusive rights to be and raskin, all of which showed that lindsay was holding that brownstein had no authorship interest in the lcid or his authority. also, there is substantial indication that courts do advanced in their answer and which we find to be in error. executive at lsdi, had a confrontation over the copyright programs” and “system data” of the lcid were “irrevocably but it is not for a settlement agreement to define the scope of system. authorship claim more than three years prior to filing his united states court of appeals a. the discovery rule see syntek emanate from the rights conveyed in the 1997 software owned the e-tech system, the agreements were not asserting “lsdi program”. lindsay claims that it decreed her we follow the “discovery rule” in determining when a counsel for appellant agreement actually did was give the joint venture, what would may also use the work or grant similar licenses to other users promote the lcid and to transfer ownership of the lcid to granted summary judgment on the counterclaim because it ethnic determinate system (“eds”) — they could be written right to perform or display the copyrighted work. 17 u.s.c. § brownstein’s counsel conducted his direct examination. 2. the summary judgment opinion (lindsay and e- bunge, 632 f.3d 822, 827 (3d cir. 2011). 25 license to use the work unilaterally, because his co-owners district court licensing agreements (including the 1997 software license, 26 1997 agreement and 2000 agreement, the 1998 settlement repudiated. 1996 argument between lindsay and lsdi’s raskin, the trio processing to turning lindsay’s rules into computer code. specified, are the responsibility of the register of (app. 663 (software license agreement, june 1, 1997).) a 14 courts have an oversight role in the administrative functions whether brownstein was a co-author of the lcid, whether for the district of new jersey commented that “[t]here is surprisingly sparse precedent on novel beyond the original work and the author or authors of beginning llc v. marvel characters, inc., 716 f.3d 302, 317 (2d cir. judgment is plenary. william a. graham co. v. haughey, settlement would not affect the lawsuit leading to this appeal, to adjudicate the grounds of cancellation because they are by looking at first names, last names, suffixes, prefixes, and with the terms of the 1997 agreement. tap or as manager, partner, member, officer, director or registrations to hold for safekeeping — he claims that he iv. conclusion technologies (“e-tech”). the contested work is a computer not have such authority. counterclaim and later issued an opinion granting summary framework concedes that the eds and the ethn programs joint authorship of the lcid, an accounting of the profits copyright act that gives courts any general authority to joint work of the lcid without brownstein’s consent and on copyright § 5.03; marco v. accent publ’g co., 969 f.2d this does not mean that courts have no place in the work is copyrightable, then the original author or authors brownstein had conceded that lindsay’s copyright license to the joint work without the consent or involvement settlement agreement”) from the new jersey state court same title. copyright registration no. txu 778-127 (the transferred ownership of the lcid before 1998 without we disagree. the more apt inquiry is whether any statement otherwise, it does not say much in her favor. (1st cir. 2007); roger miller music, inc. v. sony/atv publ’g, agency that is not a party to the litigation to take an lindsay and brownstein were equal owners of tap and the result, this 1996 argument did not necessarily provide the underlying work. 17 u.s.c. § 106; 1 nimmer on since the 1997 agreement and 2000 agreement both settlement agreement, which the district court paraphrased parties agreed to combine cmr’s technology with the lcid technologies); app. 721-27 (2005 agreement with central vii. brownstein’s e-tech licensing agreements (2000- holder of the lcid, but this would only be an assumption and and did all the work and spent her own money and time to do “threshold determination as to the ownership of the works at “2000 agreement”) largely mirrored the 1997 agreement, programs, with each new generation of programs being a created with appellee tina lindsay, the lindsay cultural random list of names from a direct mailing database. the plaintiff “sufficient information of possible wrongdoing to brownstein not only had the copyright registrations in his exclusive rights — in effect, such an exclusive license ascribe meaning to the exclusion. barnhart v. sigmon coal technologies, llc” and the combined system “e-tech”. llc, 477 f.3d 383, 389-90 (6th cir. 2007). similar to the functions and duties under this title, except as otherwise the general authority to cancel copyright registrations. under these facts, lindsay could have only conveyed a porzellanfabrik g.m.b.h. & co. kg., 510 f.3d 77, 88-89, 91 under rule 50(a) on brownstein’s joint authorship claim. and wrong in another: the post-1997 versions of the lcid other an excellent writer); childress v. taylor, 945 f.2d 500, u.s.c. § 201(b). brownstein was both an officer and document with a declaration of the defendants’ sole lcid became known as the tap system. ethn programs and that all of the lcid and its derivatives b. brownstein’s copyrights and copyright registrations partner with one of their former employers, consumers brownstein also points to the cancellation regulation, moreover, other language in the agreement controverts any 13 (summ. j. op. at 5).) the district court also found that 4 3 8 clearly enumerates the requirements for cancellation of even though brownstein is a co-author of the lcid brownstein was the sole author of the ethn programs, as is a joint work formed from the combination of the lcid and masquerade novelty, inc. v. unique indus., inc., 912 f.2d (settlement agreement ¶ 3).) 9 the rule. see cambridge literary props., ltd. v. w. goebel declarations that he was the “sole” owner of the contested could have done so in equally express statutory language. knowledge and rule/exception basis”, which thus, the fact that lindsay submitted brownstein’s initialed three corrections made to the agreement. (app. 640- fact to be decided by the jury. as mentioned, lindsay’s cancel brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations to the since graham does not establish when a cause of notice by these agreements but, viewing the evidence in the 23 invalidate the registration because [brownstein] had no right court was in error ab initio. we hold that courts have no appeal from the united states interest in his ethn programs (and, by virtue thereof, the 15 his work. a “copyright”, as a right, vests immediately upon (quoting macleary v. hines, 817 f.2d 1081, 1083 (3d cir. registrations, if anything, are merely placeholders for the communicated not merely that she is the author, but that she . . . .’” id. (quoting 17 u.s.c. § 410(c)). counsel for appellees ownership over certain computer code referred to as the in january 1994, lindsay enlisted brownstein to turn because “there is no evidence to support this claim of co- our circuit. the first is when a joint authorship claim under words before he knew the identity of the composer who co-author. the copyright act’s “statute of frauds” requires know of a 1997 software license purportedly granting tap exclusive copyrights and her copyright registrations likely 7 copyrights to tenants in common of real property. see zuill, did not identify the work to which she was claiming 12 bring an action under the copyright act and serves as proof a critical nuance is that lindsay’s assertion of her sole former employer) sued tap in the district of new jersey improve a previous work, such as a remix of an old song. 17 too, would not have disturbed brownstein’s rights. and the new jersey state court oppressed shareholder lawsuit conveyed to tap in this software license. the 1997 software 1547, 1549-50 (3d cir. 1992); see also warren freedenfeld for two or more people to become co-authors, each nimmer on copyright § 5.03. in such a case, authorship identity, list services direct, inc. (“lsdi”).1 in the fall of 1996, lindsay and tom raskin, an she was claiming that she was the sole author of the lcid in and e-tech in the superior court of new jersey. this the remainder of brownstein’s relationship with e- are based on any version of the lcid to which he is a co- thus, the author has the exclusive right to produce derivative decide on remand. counterclaim, the district court ordered the cancellation of 339:5-9).) from this, the district court concluded not only of her co-author — but such a license is treated like a non- agreements only related to the eds and brownstein is only accomplish what. where lindsay said that she commissioned brownstein to do code in the form of the deposit copy does not establish that a derivative work is copyrightable on its own basis. id.; 1 the work be commissioned. 17 u.s.c. § 101; see 1 nimmer modifications thereof (the “lsdi program”) and 2) that they the distinguishing and critical fact is that the e-tech system discover the registration until three years thereafter, the (holding that registration of a song qualified as express (app. 12-13 (summ. j. op. at 4-5).) the district court nimmer on copyright § 7.16. concerned with, and has never claimed authorship of, the e- programs. the creation of the work and it also allows the author to bring court decided two factual issues. the first issue was whether that courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations. author must contribute some non-trivial amount of creative, registered mark the court may determine the right to whisper or rumor also does not stir up the type of “storm venture, but this also did not disturb brownstein’s ownership the district court’s reliance on the deposit copy as an shareholder lawsuit, in which she confirmed what brownstein 27 tap systems, inc. (“tap”) to commercialize the lcid. knowledge of it. the district court also concluded that there adversely affected by lindsay’s actions. repudiation of brownstein’s joint authorship of the lcid. settlement agreement equated the eds with the lcid of two co-authors, one a professor with brilliant ideas and the programming code for the lcid that he claims that he did not language, they only covered the eds. as discussed above, registration process. lindsay’s copyright registrations only further, a close look at the agreement shows that the ownership and, at that time, raskin and lsdi were not yet see, e.g., gary friedrich enters., llc, 716 f.3d at 318-19; ruling was that the statute of limitations under the copyright “right, title and interest” in tap and e-tech, including the v. evidence in this case contradict[ed]” brownstein’s testimony a copyright must not be confused with the act of registering lindsay the sole author of the lcid. despite her subjective no. 12-2506 & 12-4471 does not secure or create a copyright, as a right, or guarantee computer programs. (see app. 668 (software license graham co., 568 f.3d at 438. in william a. graham co., we 1 authorship rule is the “work for hire” rule, where a actually says is that brownstein forfeited his rights and “due diligence” that his rights had been violated. william a. consulting, inc., 307 f.3d 197, 212-13 (3d cir. 2002); dam “‘127 registration”). as such, the second registration was for concluded that courts have no inherent or statutory authority her copyrights or her copyright registrations.13 ownership of the lcid until 2009. authorship of the lcid by filing the instant lawsuit seeking system of lindsay’s rules and brownstein’s computer code herself as the only author of the registration, she was the 2010 settlement agreement from the new jersey circuit case, zuill v. shanahan, 80 f.3d 1366 (9th cir. 1996). 14 an agreement or if brownstein overheard a conversation cancel copyright registrations. it is surely indicative that 17 u.s.c. § settlement agreement with lsdi. work of the lcid but, instead, only the eds, then her lawsuit. exclusive property, which is accurate and undisputed. william patry, patry on copyright § 17:108. in fact, there is registration by including brownstein’s ethn programs. not a co-author of the lcid or of his computer programs matter of law. the following day, the district court heard grant tap ownership of the lcid (the combined system of works” of his first set of ethn programs and the lcid. courts to cancel copyright registrations. while § 201.7(b) incorrect because the 1998 settlement agreement could not 1996, lindsay received a second copyright registration to the district court had jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. a. lindsay’s copyrights and copyright registrations the lcid, which are distinct works with distinct copyrights, it author. it is possible that the post-1997 versions of the lcid joint authorship of an ethnic identification system that he “copyright holder” without describing her specific copyright 42 pivotal to this case is distinguishing an author’s it bears noting that there is a provision in the the moment of creation. consequently, lindsay’s copyright work, a co-author cannot transfer the ownership interest of his infringement and help elucidate her copyrightable work. id. computer code he drafted to form the lcid. moreover, this our circuit has rarely had occasion to venture into the claim did not begin to accrue until march 22, 2007, at the all the other potential sources of repudiation — the extended the discovery rule to copyright actions, noting that expressly repudiated by his co-author. see zuill, 80 f.3d at copyright registration is an administrative remedy that must it.” (app. 2744-45 (brownstein aff. ¶ 31).) this argument 1370-71; gary friedrich enters., llc, 716 f.3d at 317-19; as stating that “tina lindsay obtained a certificate of thoughts or evaluations, brownstein’s rights were not the district court granted rule 50(a) judgment as a exclusive ownership lindsay would have been given over the never reviewed the registrations until many years later, statute of limitations began to run. deciding when employee within the scope of his or her employment or that company. unless they agree otherwise, the editor’s u.s.c. § 101 (defining a “joint work”); andrien, 927 f.2d at in february 2012, a jury trial was held in this action — in the agreements was hostile or adverse to brownstein’s his 1997 affidavit for the lsdi litigation, lindsay told raskin exclusively in his ethn programs as an independent work 1131 (trial tr. 337:13-15 (“in my view, the injurious act programs written up to that point (and any derivative works authorship claim, his cause of action began to accrue and the opinion granting summary judgment on appellees’ computer system process and data rules” in the nature of development at trial. 35 lcid expressly repudiated brownstein’s authorship rights. oppressed shareholder lawsuit 1) stated that the terms of the 17 u.s.c. § 201(b); 1 as of 1996, the ninth circuit observed that “[t]here is a designs and only to that chapter of the copyright act. 17 that the 1997 software license merely conveyed a non- authorship claim.7 acknowledged that the e-tech system was the “exclusive counterclaim to cancel brownstein’s two copyright some of the derivative versions of the lcid, he remains the property of tap.” (app. 633.) how could the property interest in the post-1997 versions of the lcid insofar as they lindsay and brownstein did much of their work on the most favorable to brownstein, the evidence presented at trial it also goes without saying that courts are authorized to 966, 971 (3d cir. 1996). “a motion for judgment as a matter matters. holding that federal courts have the authority to over its use of the lcid. that action eventually settled in mcdaniel law firm § 6.10. see davis, 505 f.3d at 98-100. the only caveat is 1. the lcid as a joint work see also aalmuhammed v. lee, 202 f.3d 1227, 1230-31 (9th copyrights started the statute of limitations running, the were created for tap and owned exclusively by tap. (app. the copyright act arises and accrues and the second is eight of our sister circuits had done the same. id. at 433-37. 30 repudiation, the district court made its rule 50(a) ruling the lcid as a result. in total, he waited 14 years from the material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one implicitly disclaiming brownstein’s joint authorship. (app. motion. (app. 13 (summ. j. op. at 5).) thus, it concluded affirmative action. a federal court’s finding that a copyright iteration. oral arg. at 17:10-19:00, 21:21-28 (july 10, 2013). that our circuit has faced a joint authorship claim squarely on summary judgment on appellees’ counterclaim to cancel copyright § 6.07; see gaiman v. mcfarlane, 360 f.3d 644, in granting appellees’ rule 50 motion, the district putative co-creators of the music and the co-creators saw a article, despite the fact that he created the article with his own unambiguously refers to the eds, her system of rules. her and non-exclusively in the lcid as a co-author. in addition, have had no authority to convey an exclusive license to the article written by an editor employed by the magazine’s v. nationwide ins. licensing assocs., inc., 119 f.3d 55, 66 a classic example of a work made for hire is a magazine lcid, which it found that tap and e-tech owned. (app. 13 physical copies of the ethn programs allegedly kept at e- is that the second registration included brownstein’s ethn b. the statute of limitations “specifically, the 1997 and 2000 agreements[] refer to the a matter of law to appellees and its grant of summary that authority resides exclusively with the copyright office. the judicial review attendant to the apa. 17 u.s.c. § 701(e) surprising lack of precedent on the question of when a cause 3. derivative works of the lcid repudiation rule. fusing these two concepts, the discovery incapable of invalidating underlying copyrights. while the gillis, 357 f. supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (e.d. mich. 2005) see davis, 505 f.3d at 99-100. original, or intellectual expression to the work and both must “right, title, and interest” as a “shareholder, officer, employee brownstein argues that the statute of limitations does not of authorship of the copyrighted work. separately copyrightable component of the e-tech system. it 1370-71; gaiman, 360 f.3d at 653; gary friedrich enters., involvement of brownstein, and listed herself as the only first arose and 2) when he should have known that a cause of declarations as sole author of her copyrights would have said associated with the copyright.4 lcid with brownstein. c. cancellation of brownstein’s copyright standard of review 3. the aftermath potential repudiation of his authorship. (appellant’s reply br. 11-15.) while it is true that lindsay’s through 1997 and possibly a co-author of derivative versions copyright § 6.03 [hereinafter nimmer on copyright]; see 17 those rights via the 2010 settlement agreement. moreover, although very similar to the 1997 agreement, the the second determination, while we adopt the express district court also concluded that the ethn programs were a. brownstein’s relationship with lindsay and e- lcid. the superseding december 28, 2000 agreement (the the ethn programs simply based on the contents of the ______________ that a co-author has acted adversely to the plaintiff’s status as (settlement agreement ¶¶ 1-3).) notably, the 1998 considered herself the sole author but also that he had actual brownstein’s ownership interest in the lcid as a joint work, when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered with two concepts are undoubtedly related,16 to the extent that the 1998 lsdi settlement agreement remained the property of the original owner? thus, all the 407(a), 408(b). a deposit copy does not necessarily limit the remand the case for a new trial. 7 _____________ 4 registrations covered the lcid and were entitled “the lcid, testified that the deposit copy did not reflect the scope of her defined by the statute actually occurred upon the registration place [him] on inquiry notice . . . of culpable activity.” id. at 136. this ownership interest vests from the act of creating that e-tech owned the copyrights to the lcid, which is a whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have have conveyed the copyrights to the lcid to appellee ethnic works or modifications thereof).5 by every indication, and given appellees’ concession, litigation settled in may 2010. during this period, would later write the music”). ownership of brownstein’s programs. (app. 1049 (trial tr. depends on two determinations: 1) when a cause of action adduced at trial. the district court severed appellees’ 2005. (app. 695-702 (2001 agreement with edith roman brownstein’s authorship claim, the district court issued an use. he controverted lindsay’s testimony on the stand when be read by a computer, which would then execute the 12 it is also telling that the lanham act explicitly parties to the settlement agreement. it is surely difficult to work. trial. we will also reverse the district court’s grant of his ownership interest in the joint work, but this does not settlement agreement), and the e-tech licensing agreements lcid because brownstein’s ethn programs were included lcid, which contests brownstein’s joint authorship of the 16 registration, order the cancellation of registrations, in whole 1998 settlement agreement, the subsequent generations of that the licensing author must account to his co-author for his (basing its decision on the copyright act, its legislative lcid during company time. in june 1996, they incorporated had not intuited until then: she had submitted brownstein’s cancellation of a copyright registration is certainly an technology. it said nothing that was adverse to brownstein’s authority to cancel his registrations, but we disagree. the peril of the district court’s rationale is apparent: such a determination would require additional factual 2013). thus, in assessing the accrual of a joint authorship registrations) counterclaim, the district court determined that it had the only be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to a material claim was barred by the statute of limitations because he was v. southern ocean county chamber of commerce, 927 f.2d 5 judgment to appellees on their counterclaim. a co-author.11 copyrights to their work for extra security. lindsay received series of agreements and the 1996 argument between lindsay [of discretion]” in how he coded the ethn programs. (app. 2. the progress of tap fargo); app. 707-13 (2002 agreement with penn media); of law under federal rule [of civil procedure] 50(a) ‘should once his rights have been violated. we need not determine whether post-1998 versions of the matter of law in favor of appellees on brownstein’s joint brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations. the district may indeed be derivative works but brownstein retains an protect her improved version of the eds, which carried the intellectual creativity to select the computer commands to copyright act that grants courts cancellation authority with programs that were considered the “lsdi program” in the received for the system’s computer code, which was his ethn programs. copyright § 3.04; dun & bradstreet software servs., inc., injurious act [of lindsay applying for copyright registration] authorship has been “expressly repudiated”. we also hold interest in the lcid be transferred to a new owner if it in federal court, the second initiated by him in new jersey could allow him to succeed on his joint authorship claim. vi. the 2010 settlement agreement of the copyright office. all actions of the copyright office foremost, the basis of the district court’s because it had “previously found . . . that [brownstein’s] co- a of the license, she wrote that the “series of computer repudiation). in gaiman, the seventh circuit held that the only extends to those parts of the derivative work that are brownstein was not a signatory to the agreement, which is the exploiting the lcid without remuneration to brownstein. 872 (the “‘872 registration”). later that year, in december preexisting work. 17 u.s.c. § 101. this litigation found this to be a critical fact.6 agreements (the 1998 settlement agreement and the 2010 her rules into computer code. this required brownstein to transfer ownership, but it is not at all clear which agreements 910 (trial tr. 116:8-10).) officers of the new venture (which was just called the “llc” agreements that she executed. the district court largely settlement agreements related to litigation with lsdi in 1998 should have been left to the jury. when viewed in the light entwined”. (app. 668 (software license agreement, with the second registration is that she included a copy of not repudiate co-authorship; put differently, the way to cancel copyright registrations. 17 u.s.c. § 101 et seq.; see 5 the september 18, 1998 settlement agreement (the after it granted appellees’ rule 50 motion on distinct work from the previous generation. the combined 21 §§ 1331, 1338, and 1367. we have jurisdiction under 28 when there were still genuinely disputed issues of material rule/exception basis”. copyright registration no. txu 730- tech system. administrative procedure act . . . .”). thus, aggrieved parties caused the register of copyrights to refuse registration,” but as a result, even if brownstein is not a co-author of employee of e-tech.” (app. 520-21 (settlement agreement kirsch, gartenberg & howard interest in the copyright to his work from the registration of by linsday and cmr’s executive, ginger nelson. the 1997 106; see davis v. blige, 505 f.3d 90, 98 (2d cir. 2007). as will also be discussed infra, a deposit copy must be sought an accounting of the profits from the ethnic 19 13 (summ. j. op. at 5).) the district court noted that, through the trio of agreements — all of the subsequent license her first copyright registration for the eds in february 1996, complaint. (app. 1127-34 (trial tr. 333:9-340:3).) as the like most courts, our circuit has never had the chance characterize this as a storm warning — if anything, it might over the years, brownstein improved and updated the ethn it does not actually give courts authority to cancel a copyright finally, we are in no way holding that courts are shall continue to be owned” by the defendant’s company. here, a deposit copy means that lindsay sent a physical repudiation — after all, brownstein would not have been ethn programs that brownstein developed remained under out one of these sources and leave the others for the jury to programs. if lindsay’s copyrights did not cover the joint “inseparable or interdependent” parts of a whole but each co- to own the putative copyrights and they were directly shown a that any transfer of an ownership interest must be signed and copyright act is three years for all civil actions.9 our sister circuits for guidance.10 brownstein testified first; lindsay was then called and under the “discovery rule”, the district court found as will be discussed infra, a derivative work is an limited to consulting the register of copyrights on such 13 ii. statement of jurisdiction and not call for judicial cancellation of registrations); syntek registration she had filed earlier that year for the eds, which once brownstein was on inquiry notice of his most favorable to brownstein, it is possible that he thought 568 f.3d 425, 437 (3d cir. 2009). summary judgment may not a grant of authority. section 411(b) states that “the court quizzically, brownstein argues that the district court had addition to a declaration of his joint authorship, brownstein 1997 agreement, and 2000 agreement), he did sign the two 5 december 2009, which covered his ethn programs. app. 714-20 (2003 agreement with merkle data copyrighted work. see gaiman, 360 f.3d at 654-55. a “1998 settlement agreement”) from the lsdi litigation 10 255:1-4).) cmr) fares no better in lindsay’s attempt to establish over the course of several years, lindsay executed a developing the rules for categorizing names by ethnicity (e.g., those entities. conveyed to a joint work is for all co-authors to consent to whether courts have the authority to cancel copyright put on inquiry notice that lindsay had disclaimed his co- authors or any act of registration with the copyright office. nimmer on copyright § 6.12. if a co-author attempts to district court framed it, “[w]hy did [brownstein] wait 14 exclusive license for the lcid to tap rather than declaring abrogated his ownership of the pre-1998 generations of the is the sole author or that brownstein is not a co-author.12 combination of which would be called the e-tech system. lsdi program. brownstein’s 2009 copyright registrations an action taken by the copyright office . . . .”). this only registrations. of the few courts to do so, several have could only have assigned the rights to her own ownership precedential to register the work, not because of some regulatory defect.” authorship claim was expressly repudiated when the see aalmuhammed, 202 f.3d at 1230-31. a copyright holder action arises for declaration of authorship, we must turn to district judge: honorable joel a. pisano interest as a “shareholder, officer, employee or director in a contract or agreement cannot alter copyrights or davis, 505 f.3d at 99-100. viewing the evidence in the light registration from the copyright office in 1996 for eds, programs. this false premise then led the district court one identification system. fpci later assumed a new corporate brownstein’s computer programs were not works for hire. 17 write the code by tap or lindsay. most importantly, he was are interdependent works, which comports with lindsay’s (filed: january 29, 2014) repudiation rule from our sister circuits to govern the first. brownstein suggests that the requisites of § 411(b), which u.s.c. § 1291. another independent work of the lcid, and they both had an brownstein’s code were inseparable. (app. 1050 (trial tr. [the rules and the computer code]”. (app. 1066 (trial tr. 18 rule will only apply once a plaintiff’s authorship has been a “derivative work” of the first registration.3 cambridge literary props., ltd., 510 f.3d at 91. person b who writes the score becomes a co-author in the expressly repudiate authorship. ownership rights remained intact, brownstein might not have our review of a judgment as a matter of law under investigate the copyright register for competing registrations. these programs became known as the ethn programs.2 22 success on the merits of a claim — it entitles an author to his ownership because they were derivative works of the 10 after the district court denied summary judgment, the interest in the copyrights to the ethn programs (and, by works for hire in granting summary judgment on appellees’ repudiation at play: lindsay’s copyright registrations, the only author. 80 f.3d at 1368. in gaiman, the plaintiff’s joint copyrights.” 17 u.s.c. § 701(a) (emphasis added). continued to employ the code created by brownstein, but recourse to the courts when faced with faulty registrations. authorship claim arises and an author is alerted to the had rights to lindsay’s copyrights. (app. 2768-69 covered) as the lcid, for the purposes of the agreement. by the series of license and settlement agreements. some claim, we will apply the discovery rule to the express equal stake in the work as a whole. 17 u.s.c. § 101; 1 with respect to licensing a joint work, each co-author to e-tech). such non-exclusive licenses to the lcid would interest” in e-tech, brownstein forfeited his ownership prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work, and the registrations. the district court found that it had authority to in 2009. appellees contend that blanket statements in some of the distinction case went to trial. at the end of brownstein’s case, the link in the chain of title that lindsay supposedly conveyed published version of the work with the defendant listed as the greenaway, jr., circuit judge. resides with the copyright office. lcid and his sole authorship of his ethn computer repudiated when the co-creator of hooked on phonics made 24 that there were sufficient “storm warnings” to brownstein (software license agreement, june 1, 1997).) by doing so, cmr’s own system. therefore, by declaring that e-tech shall request the register of copyrights to advise the court appellees’ favor. that he had no clue that lindsay was claiming to be the sole deposition testimony for the new jersey oppressed 132 (3d cir. 1991), we touched upon the issue in determining cancel registrations would essentially be declaring that the lindsay applied for and admit that the ethn programs were not works for hire, as which does not disturb the registration of a copyright. courts 2005) were named ethn04, ethn05, etc. the computer code 4. the license and settlement agreements hackensack, nj 07601-0000 cancel brownstein’s copyright registrations because the must consent to the creation of a derivative work by a third since zuill, only a smattering of circuit cases have endorsed the only witnesses called were brownstein and lindsay. “copyright holder” of the lcid and the agent of tap. copyright registrations by simply renaming a work since witness, appellees moved under rule 50 for judgment as a before: greenaway, jr., sloviter, and barry, is a co-author of the lcid, which depends on whether the that e-tech owns the copyrights to the e-tech system as its tech. this lawsuit was instigated by lindsay’s 2010 lcid, which included lindsay’s rules and brownstein’s as a “deposit copy” with her second registration. but the is entitled to convey non-exclusive rights to the joint work to analogize here, lindsay wrote the lyrics, while i. lindsay’s copyright registrations 272:15-20).) lindsay was the only signatory to the license, executed by brownstein (from 2000 until 2005). we will rule licensing agreements to e-tech customers between 2000 and reader might assume from this that she is the sole copyright intellectual creativity. author. she then gave brownstein a copy of the copyright was a non-exclusive license to the lcid from the 1997 lindsay did transfer her ownership of the eds to tap, that, shortly before trial. 1987)). a copyright is better described as a bundle of rights: 16 98-99. argued july 10, 2013 claim for joint authorship of the lcid) recites that “[i]n any action involving the protection of a counterclaim, which was an argument that appellees as one of our sister circuits has held, a copyright decided under rule 50(a) and should have gone to the jury. court under the apa. therefore, although lsdi retained rights to the ethn back as 1996. finding that lindsay’s act of registering her cases had no ownership interest in the entity that was claimed copyrights or authorship, explaining that the deposit copy of registrations interest in the lcid. 1 nimmer on copyright §§ 6.10, 6.11; assertions. in both the 1997 software license and her ethn programs, the “lsdi program”. 1003, 1006 (e.d. mich. 2005). without the consent of his co-author. 1 nimmer on copyright element to bring a copyright infringement action. see 1996 argument with raskin, the 1997 software license, the a. joint authorship registrations. for the following reasons, we hold that an brownstein’s authorship as a matter of law. authorship rights. see gaiman, 360 f.3d at 654; zuill, 80 1994 wl 761725, at *2 (c.d. cal. oct. 24, 1994) (observing nimmer on copyright § 3.04. derivative work protection company, when they began developing the ethnic venture between the two companies. a september 26, 1997 fair share of profits from any non-exclusive license. 1 the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, the right to provision but excluded it from another, we must generally warnings of a violation until his rights have been violated. id. registration, § 201.7(a) also clearly delegates that authority to copyright act. where congress has used language in one prospective clients, inc. (“fpci”), a direct mailing list the district court reasoned that “every . . . piece of is invalid, on the other hand, is a determination of ownership expressly repudiated since he can only be on inquiry notice authorship claim arose and accrued, we must first determine suite 400 of license agreements (the 1997 software license, the 1997 brownstein overheard and recounted in a 1997 affidavit. equal authorship interest in the lcid as a joint work of the lindsay’s copyright registrations could not have which brownstein actually signed and which gave lsdi aware of the lcid (they were only aware of the eds). as a administrative function, at least as much as issuing a letter which stated that she was the sole author of the lcid. in may 2009, brownstein left e-tech on bad terms. due to appellees’ concession that brownstein was a _____________ having defined the inherent copyrights of lindsay and we will reverse both the district court’s grant of judgment as lcid through his work on the ethn programs and that authorship. license to brownstein’s ethn programs, as part of the lcid, to ascertain the role of courts in the cancellation of copyright another field of the second registration. nowhere, though, 20 copyrights”. (app. 2772 (settlement agreement ¶ 18).) registration. id. if anything, this suggests that courts are not action.”). if congress had intended to grant courts the same as part of the lcid, then brownstein could not be divested of tr. 337:13-21).) the district court found it dispositive that 520-21 (settlement agreement ¶ 2.6).) brownstein was a co-author of the lcid. if he was deemed a ¶ 2.6).) there is no basis to argue that brownstein’s his interests in e-tech, and 3) released the defendants have confirmed for brownstein that his rights to the lcid before appellees’ counsel called lindsay as their own is plausible that brownstein might have been put on inquiry or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify declaratory judgment of his authorship of the lcid (and, by omitted). registration of a copyright, on the other hand, is agreement, schedule a).) in her testimony, lindsay example of the registered work. 17 u.s.c. §§ 407(a), 408(b). an exclusive license or transferred ownership on her own 658-59 (7th cir. 2004). the components must also be registration, standing alone, does not serve as repudiation of 507(b). here, brownstein must show that his joint authorship works. see dun & bradstreet software servs., inc. v. grace co-author of the lcid through 1997, lindsay could not have express repudiation since it was contingent on the rights held brownstein’s “right, title, and interest” as a “shareholder, and (2) copying by the alleged infringer.’”) (internal citations b. the district court proceedings work”. 1 melville b. nimmer & david nimmer, nimmer on i. background for the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district this instant action, which sought a declaratory judgment of registrations covered the lcid because he signed the 1998 express repudiation of brownstein’s co-authorship of the entitled “power of court over registration”, this provision possession but that he also had “actual knowledge” of the his claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and whether appellant civil claims under the copyright act. 17 u.s.c. § 411(a); 2 to investigate future causes of action. id. at 439. barred by the discovery rule and the statute of limitations, his these agreements would not have provided storm warnings of 54 main street also holds that the clock only starts running once a cause of 9 eds and the ethn programs. of action claiming co-ownership of a copyright accrues.” he testified that he automated lindsay’s manually inputted 504 (2d cir. 1991) (holding that a lyricist and composer of a 17 u.s.c. § 1324. in carving allowed e-tech to combine the lcid with cmr’s the agreement also acknowledged that tap owned the infringement action are (1) ownership of a valid copyright our review of a district court’s grant of summary license agreement (the “1997 agreement”) was signed only never had exclusive rights to brownstein’s ethn programs the agreement which presents the most potential for song were co-authors “even though the lyricist wrote the 32 submitted with most registrations in order to provide an police copyright registrations through authorship claims and joint authorship of the lcid. oral argument on the motion and ruled from the bench in _____________ if he was a co-author of the lcid. are subject to the administrative procedure act (“apa”) and most, tap owned lindsay’s ownership interest in the lcid. authorship to unspecified copyrights in an agreement is not an judicial branch has the authority to order a legislative branch they incorporate the underlying work. the extent of 438 (internal quotation marks omitted). the discovery rule with due diligence if there were “storm warnings” which gave evidence that the statute does not give courts any such infringement claims. as emphasized earlier, a registration follows that, if an action is not hostile to an author’s rights, it express repudiation could also occur if lindsay was defendant sent a letter to him which stated that “all rights . . . or director in tap or as manager, partner, member, officer, date of lindsay’s copyright registrations, 1996, to file a although brownstein did not sign any of the aforementioned versions of the lcid. appellees are correct in one respect tina lindsay; ethnic technologies ethn programs are derivative works of the lsdi program rights lindsay could have had to his code would flow through 34 exclusive ownership of the lcid and brownstein’s ethn register the copyright in your name. authorship claim. the statute of limitations under the order registration of a design under this chapter or the accordingly, the issues of whether these six sources expressly license was supposed “to mak[e] sure that tap owns both shareholder of tap and an officer of e-tech. he was not an was actually known as far back as 1996.” (app. 1131 (trial to certain computer programs and derivatives or discovery rule, the express repudiation rule looks for evidence brownstein’s joint authorship claim and remand for a new was no evidence that lindsay ever considered brownstein a 1. the beginning from rewriting a list of names into the proper data format for virtue thereof, the lcid). as mentioned, all tap possessed purpose of a copyright registration is “not to start the statute