Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/434/254/247023/
Timestamp: 2020-04-01 09:20:42
Document Index: 730920697

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2312', '§ 5010', '§ 5017', '§ 5017', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 5010']

James Franklin Loar, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 434 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1970 › James Franklin Loar, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee
James Franklin Loar, Appellant, v. United States of America, Appellee, 434 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 434 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970) November 30, 1970
Richard A. Dier, U. S. Atty., Omaha, Neb., and William J. Tighe, Omaha, Neb., filed brief for appellee.
The appellant, James Franklin Loar, pleaded guilty in August, 1964, to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle). On September 14, 1964, he was sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b) and 5017(c). Under the Act, a person in custody must be conditionally released on or before the expiration of four years from the date of sentencing, and unconditionally released on or before the expiration of six years from such date. The court concededly gave no explanation of specific provisions of the Youth Corrections Act before accepting the plea. Under the Dyer Act, the appellant could have received a maximum of only five years.
Loar served time in federal correctional institutions until March 17, 1966, when he was released on parole. He was recommitted in April, 1968, for parole violation and served out the remainder of the six-year sentence permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c). On July 17, 1970, he was unconditionally released as required by § 5017(c).
The present appeal is from the denial of a § 2255 motion filed October 7, 1969. That motion alleged:
We need not consider the latter three allegations on a § 2255 motion since the appellant has now been unconditionally released. A motion attacking a sentence may be considered only if the appellant is still in custody. Azzone v. United States, 341 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1965); Bent v. United States, 340 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1965); Kistner v. United States, 332 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1964).
The primary thrust of the appellant's argument is that the District Court did not address the appellant personally to determine whether he knew the consequences of a guilty plea, in accordance with the rules enunciated in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969). McCarthy, however, is not to be applied retroactively, as this Court has recognized. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S. Ct. 1498, 23 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1969); Jarrett v. United States, 423 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1970. Thus, McCarthy has no application to the appellant's 1964 conviction.
"* * * [the] conviction and sentence were not invalid because the court did not itself engage in explanation of the nature and extent of the restraint to which he might be subjected under § 5010(b), if the fact was that he actually had knowledge and comprehension thereof in relation to his plea, or in relation to the subsequent sentencing proceedings where the circumstances thereof were such that it could rationally be concluded he was permitting this to have operation as to his plea."
Our order affirmed the District Court's denial of the appellant's motion to appeal in forma pauperis. James Franklin Loar v. United States of America, Misc. No. 351 (8th Cir. 1965, unpublished).