Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/200904/?pg=31
Timestamp: 2018-11-19 20:05:07
Document Index: 668241480

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 21', '§ 21', '§ 13', '§ 13']

and 751(C)] for defendant’s burden.
43. § 13-703(C). State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), 123 P.3d 662, 666 (Ariz. 2005); State v. Gretzler, 659 P.2d at 13. And see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (“state capital sentencing system must … permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime”).
44. § 13-703.01(A) [§ 13-752(A)]. Defendant has a right to make statements in allocation, ARIZ.R. CRIM. P. 19. 1(d)( 7) before the charge to the jury, which if they go beyond a plea for mercy may subject him to cross-examination (i.e., if disputes evidence). State v. Garza, 63 P.3d at 1019. Defendant also has a right to speak before a sentence is pronounced. Rule 26. 10(b)(l).
45. Pursuant to § 13-1105(D), first-degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment, which is defined at § 13- 703(A) to be death, life or natural life. The natural life option applies to murders committed on and after July 17, 1993. Before that the only two possible sentences were death or life with possible parole after 25 years flat (or 35 if victim under 15). The 35-year aspect applies to murders committed on and after May 16, 1985. See 1993 Sess. Laws Ch. 153 § 1 and 1985 Sess. Laws Ch. 364, § 8. Where the trial court is the sentencing tribunal it need not make any specific finding before imposing natural life. State v. Fell, 115 P.3d 594, 601 (Ariz. 2005).
46. § 13-703.01(K) [§ 13-752(K)]. The new jury does not retry the guilt or aggravation issues.
47. § 13-703.01(J) [§ 13-752(J)]. The new jury does not retry the guilt issue. The defense is not allowed in a resentencing procedure to put in evidence before the new jury of residual doubt (i.e., evidence to show he did not commit the crime the first jury has convicted him of). State v. Harrod, 183 P.3d 519 (Ariz. 2008).
48. § 13-703.01(J) and (K) [§ 13-752 (J) and (K)]. There is no presumption for life or death.
49. Once aggravating circumstances are proved, neither the state nor the defendant has the burden
of proof with regard to whether the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. State v. Garza, 163 P.3d at 1020; State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), 123 P.3d at 666 (“neither party bears the burden” of persuasion in the penalty stage). It is each juror’s duty to consider the aggravation and mitigation and make a discretionary sentencing decision.
50. A. R.S. § 13-703.01(G) [§ 13-752(G)] permits a jury to consider any factors that are offered— no matter who offers them—when considering mitigation. State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833, 848 (Ariz. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 663 (2006). Moreover, § 13-703(D) [§ 13- 751(D)] provides that any evidence admitted during the guilt phase of the trial is admitted for purposes of the sentencing proceedings. Id. Thus a jury may return a verdict of life even if the defendant decides to present no mitigation at all. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), 123 P.3d at 665; State v. Van Adams, 984 P.2d 16, 31 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000).
51. State v. Pandeli, 161 P.3d 557, 570 (Ariz. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1228 (2008). But cf. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 179 (2006) (states can permit death sentence even where there is equipoise).
52. A. R.S. § 21-222. Note that this statute is followed by § 21-223, which deals with the punishment for direct contempt where a summoned juror fails to attend which can entail a body attachment and a fine up to $500. Jurors also receive $12 a day and an average daily mileage amount of $17.74 or 44. 5 cents a mile average round trip per day for jurors appearing downtown (approximately 21miles each day). Jurors not used the first day only receive mileage. The jury commissioner’s prescreening of prospective jurors for time only and excusing those for whom lengthy service might pose a hardship does not violate the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment or defendant’s due process rights in a first-degree murder case. State v. Wooten, 972 P.2d 993, 998-99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied. See also State v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593, 638 (Ariz. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993). Judges trying capital cases usually do the time prescreening themselves because of requests by defense counsel to be present in the jury meeting room, which is cumbersome, and to avoid any issues on a possible appeal. Of interest is that on July 19, 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court (A. O. 2008-61) approved the new Maricopa County Alternative Juror Summoning Plan, which is designed to reduce excessive commutes for jurors by summoning most jurors from zip codes closest to a court complex. The first panels chosen under this plan report on Nov. 15, 2008.
53. In a capital trial, jurors may be “death qualified.” State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1144 (Ariz. 2004), which also holds the use of a questionnaire is in discretion of the court. This refers to the process of questioning prospective jurors on their views of the death penalty and their ability to follow the trial court’s instructions in light of those views. In this process, jurors may be removed for cause if their opposition to the death penalty will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts impartially. Jurors who are opposed to the death penalty will not be removed for cause if they avow that they will conscientiously apply the law to the facts of the case. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), holds that in evaluating a prospective juror’s ability to be impartial in a capital case requires detailed questioning. A typical Morgan question is does anyone believe that all persons convicted of first degree murder should receive the death penalty? Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), requires that prospective jurors be given general information about the crime and the duty of the jury in sentencing. Witherspoon questions involve asking jurors’ views about the death penalty and any reservations they may have. Pursuant to Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 n. 5 (1985), a capital case juror should be excused when his or her views would prevent or “ substantially impair” the performance of the jury’s duty to follow the law. Accord State v. Jones, 4 P.3d 345, 357 (Ariz. 2001), cert. denied, 532
U. S. 978 (2001). Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007) (expands Witt principles to permit exclusion of a prospective juror for cause who indicated he could follow the law but would only impose the death penalty in severe situations). Counsel during voir dire may examine potential jurors on their basic beliefs, views, biases and prejudices concerning the death penalty, as well as their general views concerning aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances that must be considered in determining whether to impose a sentence of life or death. The court, however, will not allow questions of potential jurors that will elicit their views on specific types of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the court will preclude questioning by counsel that relates to specific case facts/ information, including questions that “groom” or “condition” prospective jurors to certain evidence that may be presented or commits them to taking certain positions depending on actual or hypothetical facts situations. State v. Johnson, 133 P.3d 735 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 559 (2006); State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1024 (2006). See also State v. Bocharski, 189 P.3d 403 (Ariz. 2008), on all these issues.
54. Rule 18. 4(c)(l)(i) provides for 10 peremptory challenges for both sides in a capital case. Permitting prosecutors to speak to the panel first on voir dire is not improper, State v. Garza, 163 P.3d at 1013, but often the parties stipulate to go first with every other juror or panel.
55. § 13-703.01(M) [§ 13-752(M)]; Rule
18. 5(i).
56. State v. Villalobos, CR2004-005523, trial began Feb. 11, 2008, and ended by sentencing on April 15, 2008; State v. Cunningham, CR2004-048263, trial began Oct. 23, 2007, and ended Feb. 27, 2008; State v. Maldonado, CR2003-017983, first trial began Jan. 9, 2006, and ended Oct. 4, 2006, in a mistrial (new trial began April 16, 2008, and still continuing as of Sept. 15, 2008).
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