Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/465/354
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 18:19:38
Document Index: 235072502

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924']

UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. ONE ASSORTMENT OF 89 FIREARMS. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. ONE ASSORTMENT OF 89 FIREARMS.
465 U.S. 354 (104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361)
[HTML] Syllabus Upon trial in Federal District Court, defendant Mulcahey, who asserted the defense of entrapment, was acquitted of charges of knowingly engaging in the business of dealing in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1). The Government then instituted this in rem action for forfeiture of the firearms involved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(d), which authorizes forfeitures of any firearms "involved in or used or intended to be used in, any violation of this chapter." Ordering forfeiture, the District Court rejected Mulcahey's defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel based on his earlier acquittal. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because the § 924(d) forfeiture proceeding was criminal and punitive in nature, it was barred by double jeopardy principles in view of Mulcahey's prior acquittal. Relying on Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684, the Court of Appeals also held that the forfeiture action was barred by collateral estoppel, because it was based upon the same facts as the earlier criminal action.
On January 20, 1977, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms seized a cache of firearms from the home of Patrick Mulcahey. Mulcahey was subsequently indicted on charges that he had knowingly engaged in the business of dealing in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1).
On the basis of his earlier acquittal, Mulcahey asserted the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina struck Mulcahey's defenses, reasoning that an in rem forfeiture proceeding under 18 U.S.C. 924(d) is remedial in nature and is therefore properly characterized as a civil proceeding. 463 F.Supp. 365, 367 (1978). The District Court then concluded that "the firearms here in question were involved in, used or intended to be used in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1). Such firearms are rendered subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 924(d), which forfeiture is hereby ordered." 511 F.Supp. 133, 139 (1980).
685 F.2d 913 (1982). The en banc majority relied upon two theories for its conclusion that the forfeiture proceeding against these firearms was barred by Mulcahey's prior acquittal, although it did not sharply distinguish between the two. Because the majority considered the § 924(d) forfeiture proceeding to be criminal and punitive in nature, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was barred by double jeopardy principles. Looking to Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 6 S.Ct. 437, 29 L.Ed. 684 (1886), as authority, the Court of Appeals also determined that the forfeiture action was barred by collateral estoppel, because it was based upon the same facts as the earlier criminal action. In dissent, four judges argued that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy should preclude forfeiture proceedings brought under § 924(d). 685 F.2d at 918-919 (Winter, J., dissenting). We granted certiorari, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1181, 75 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983), and we reverse.
In Coffey v. United States, supra, this Court held that a forfeiture action brought against certain distilling equipment was barred by the owner's prior acquittal on charges of removing and concealing distilled spirits with the intent to defraud the revenue. The Court stated that: "Where an issue raised as to the existence of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal proceeding, instituted by the United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such person, on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States, where, as against him, the existence of the same act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem. It is urged as a reason for not allowing such effect to the judgment, that the acquittal in the criminal case may have taken place because of the rule requiring guilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, on the same evidence, on the question of preponderance of proof, there might be a verdict for the United States, in the suit in rem. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and determined against the United States; and all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of guilt, is a punishment therefor. There could be no new trial of the criminal prosecution after the acquittal in it; and a subsequent trial of the civil suit amounts to substantially the same thing, with a difference only on the consequences following a judgment adverse to the claimant." Id., 116 U.S., at 443, 6 S.Ct., at 440.
This Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, disagreed. Although the taxpayer argued and the Government conceded that the factual matters at issue in the penalty proceeding had been litigated and determined in the prior criminal action, the Court concluded that "the difference in degree in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata." Id., at 397, 58 S.Ct., at 632. The Mitchell Court viewed the criminal acquittal as nothing more than a determination that the evidence in the criminal setting was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. See Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302, 34 S.Ct. 488, 492, 58 L.Ed. 967 (1914). The Court went on to state:
"That acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled. Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 17 S.Ct. 778, 782, 42 L.Ed. 127; Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630, 631, 632 47 S.Ct. 218, 71 L.Ed. 446. Compare Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 480, 481 31 S.Ct. 34, 35, 54 L.Ed. 1116." Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S., at 397-398, 58 S.Ct., at 632 (footnote omitted).
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense. The question for decision is thus whether the monetary penalty imposes a criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory interpretation." Id., at 399, 58 S.Ct., at 633.
In focusing on Coffey v. United States, the Court of Appeals appears to have overlooked the significance of Mitchell and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones. At the very least, Mitchell signaled that an acquittal of a criminal charge does not automatically bar an action to enforce sanctions by way of forfeiture of goods or other civil penalties. Whatever the validity of Coffey on its facts, its ambiguous reasoning seems to have been a source of confusion for some time. As long ago as Mitchell, this Court was urged to disapprove Coffey so as to make clear that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not bar a civil action for forfeiture even though based on the identical facts. Indeed, for nearly a century, the analytical underpinnings of Coffey have been recognized as less than adequate.
The time has come to clarify that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges. To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is hereby disapproved.
"Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on two levels. First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra 409 U.S., at 236-237 93 S.Ct., at 492-93. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-621 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376-78, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)."
Applying the first prong of the Ward test to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that Congress designed forfeiture under § 924(d) as a remedial civil sanction. Congress' intent in this regard is most clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established for enforcing forfeitures under the statute. Section 924(d) does not prescribe the steps to be followed in effectuating a forfeiture, but rather incorporates by reference the procedures of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U.S.C. 7321-7328. The Code in turn provides that an action to enforce a forfeiture "shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the United States District Court for the district where such seizure is made." 26 U.S.C. 7323. In contrast to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon seizure of a physical object. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2092, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974). In addition to establishing the in rem nature of the action, the Code authorizes a summary administrative proceeding for forfeiture of items valued at $2500 or less, for which notice of a seizure may be by publication. See 26 U.S.C. 7325. By creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfeitures under § 924(d), Congress has "indicated clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal, sanction." Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S., at 402, 58 S.Ct., at 634.
Moreover, § 924(d) is somewhat broader in scope than the criminal provisions of 18 U.S.C. 922. Section 924(d) subjects to forfeiture "any firearm or ammunition involved in or used or intended to be used in, any violation of the provisions of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. 924(d) (emphasis added). But section 922(a)(1), the substantive criminal provision under which Mulcahey was prosecuted, does not render unlawful an intention to engage in the business of dealing in firearms without a license; only the completed act of engaging in the prohibited business is made a crime. See n. 1, supra. Whatever the actual scope of the conduct embraced by § 924(d), it is apparent from the differences in the language of these two statutes that the forfeiture provisions of § 924(d) were meant to be broader in scope than the criminal sanctions of § 922(a)(1).
Finally, the forfeiture provision of § 924(d) furthers broad remedial aims. Section 924(d) was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 233, and later retained without alteration in the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. In enacting the 1968 gun control legislation, Congress "was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest." Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974). Accordingly, Congress sought to "control the indiscriminate flow" of firearms and to "assist and encourage States and local communities to adopt and enforce stricter gun control laws." H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1968), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, pp. 4410, 4413. Section 924(d) plays an important role in furthering the prophylactic purposes of the 1968 gun control legislation by discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms and by removing from circulation firearms that have been used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce. Keeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers is a goal plainly more remedial than punitive. Accordingly, we hold that Congress viewed § 924(d) forfeiture as a remedial civil sanction rather than a criminal punishment.
We now turn to the second aspect of our inquiry: "whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate" Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism. United States v. Ward, supra, 448 U.S., at 249, 100 S.Ct., at 2641. " 'Only the clearest proof' " that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress' manifest preference for a civil sanction. Id., at 249, 100 S.Ct., at 2641 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), we set forth a list of considerations that has proved helpful in the past in making such determinations.
See, e.g., United States v. Ward, supra, 448 U.S., at 249-251, 100 S.Ct., at 2641-42; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-538, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1873, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
Only one of the Mendoza-Martinez factorswhether or not the proscribed behavior is already a crimelends any support to Mulcahey's position that § 924(d) imposes a criminal penalty. The fact that actions giving rise to forfeiture proceedings under § 924(d) may also entail the criminal penalties of § 922(a)(1) admittedly suggests that § 924(d) is criminal in nature. But that indication is not as strong as it might seem at first blush. United States v. Ward, supra, 448 U.S., at 250, 100 S.Ct., at 2642. Clearly "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission," Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S., at 399, 58 S.Ct., at 633; indeed, it has done so on other occasions. Moreover, Congress in fact drafted § 924(d) to cover a broader range of conduct than is proscribed by the criminal provisions of § 922(a)(1). See supra, at 363-364. Because the sanction embodied in § 924(d) is not limited to criminal misconduct, the forfeiture remedy cannot be said to be co-extensive with the criminal penalty. What overlap there is between the two sanctions is not sufficient to persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature.
In short, an analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in no way undermines Congress' classification of the § 924(d) forfeiture action as a civil sanction. Mulcahey has failed to establish by the "clearest proof" that Congress has provided a sanction so punitive as to "transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 222, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956). We accordingly conclude that the forfeiture mechanism set forth in § 924(d) is not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature. Because the § 924(d) forfeiture proceeding brought against Mulcahey's firearms is not a criminal proceeding, it is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1) provides that:
18 U.S.C. 924(d) provides as follows:
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions." Id., at 168-169, 83 S.Ct., at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).