Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/549/327/opinion.html
Timestamp: 2016-10-23 09:36:01
Document Index: 199158082

Matched Legal Cases: ['§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244', '§2254', '§2254', '§2244', '§2244', '§2244']

Lawrence v. Florida (Opinion by Justice Thomas) :: 549 U.S. 327 (2007) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Lawrence v. Florida
Lawrence v. Florida 549 U.S. 327 (2007)
Congress established a 1-year statute of limitations for seeking federal habeas corpus relief from a state-court judgment, 28 U. S. C. §2244(d), and further provided that the limitations period is tolled while an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” “is pending,” §2244(d)(2). We must decide whether a state application is still “pending” when the state courts have entered a final judgment on the matter but a petition for certiorari has been filed in this Court. We hold that it is not.
Petitioner Gary Lawrence and his wife used a pipe and baseball bat to kill Michael Finken. A Florida jury convicted Lawrence of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petty theft. The trial court sentenced Lawrence to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Lawrence’s conviction and sentence on appeal, and this Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998. 522 U. S. 1080.
On January 19, 1999, 364 days later, Lawrence filed an application for state postconviction relief in a Florida trial court.[Footnote 1] The court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, issuing its mandate on November 18, 2002. See Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121 (per curiam). Lawrence sought review of the denial of state postconviction relief in this Court. We denied certiorari on March 24, 2003. 538 U. S. 926.
While Lawrence’s petition for certiorari was pending, he filed the present federal habeas application. The Federal District Court dismissed it as untimely under §2244(d)’s 1-year limitations period. All but one day of the limitations period had lapsed during the 364 days between the time Lawrence’s conviction became final and when he filed for state postconviction relief. The limitations period was then tolled while the Florida courts entertained his state application. After the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate, Lawrence waited another 113 days—well beyond the one day that remained in the limitations period—to file his federal habeas application. As a consequence, his federal application could be considered timely only if the limitations period continued to be tolled during this Court’s consideration of his petition for certiorari. Then-applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed any argument that §2244’s statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of a petition for certiorari seeking review of a state postconviction proceeding. See Coates v. Byrd, 211 F. 3d 1225, 1227 (2000) (per curiam). Accordingly, the District Court concluded that Lawrence had only one day to file a federal habeas application after the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 421 F. 3d 1221 (2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. ___ (2006), and now affirm.
“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” §2244(d)(2).
If an application for state postconviction review were “pending” during the pendency of a certiorari petition in this Court, it is difficult to understand how a state prisoner could exhaust state postconviction remedies without filing a petition for certiorari. Indeed, AEDPA’s exhaustion provision and tolling provision work together:
“The tolling provision of §2244(d)(2) balances the interests served by the exhaustion requirement and the limitation period… . Section 2244(d)(1)’s limitation period and §2244(d)(2)’s tolling provision, together with §2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement, encourage litigants first to exhaust all state remedies and then to file their federal habeas petitions as soon as possible.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 179, 181 (2001) (final emphasis added).
In contrast to the hypothetical problems identified by Lawrence, allowing the statute of limitations to be tolled by certiorari petitions would provide incentives for state prisoners to file certiorari petitions as a delay tactic. By filing a petition for certiorari, the prisoner would push back §2254’s deadline while we resolved the petition for certiorari. This tolling rule would provide an incentive for prisoners to file certiorari petitions—regardless of the merit of the claims asserted—so that they receive additional time to file their habeas applications.
Lawrence also argues that equitable tolling applies to his otherwise untimely claims. We have not decided whether §2244(d) allows for equitable tolling. See ibid. Because the parties agree that equitable tolling is available, we assume without deciding that it is. To be entitled to equitable tolling, Lawrence must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing. Id., at 418.
Lawrence makes several arguments in support of his contention that equitable tolling applies to his case. First, he argues that legal confusion about whether AEDPA’s limitations period is tolled by certiorari petitions justifies equitable tolling. But at the time the limitations period expired in Lawrence’s case, the Eleventh Circuit and every other Circuit to address the issue agreed that the limitations period was not tolled by certiorari petitions. See, e.g., Coates, 211 F. 3d, at 1227. The settled state of
Fourth, Lawrence argues that his mental incapacity justifies his reliance upon counsel and entitles him to equitable tolling. Even assuming this argument could be legally credited, Lawrence has made no factual showing of mental incapacity. In sum, Lawrence has fallen far short of showing “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to support equitable tolling.
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the filing of a petition for certiorari before this Court does not toll the statute of limitations under §2244(d)(2). It also correctly declined to equitably toll the limitations period in the factual circumstances of Lawrence’s case. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Footnote 1 Lawrence contends that delays in Florida’s program for appointing postconviction counsel and other issues outside of his control caused 298 days to pass before Florida appointed an attorney who took an active role in his postconviction case. These facts have little relevance to our analysis. Lawrence did not seek certiorari on the question whether these facts entitle him to equitable tolling. Indeed, Lawrence was able to file his state postconviction petition on time in spite of these delays. And before this Court, he argues that his attorney mistakenly missed the federal habeas deadline, not that he lacked adequate time to file a federal habeas application.
Footnote 2 We have previously held that the word “State” modifies both the terms “post-conviction” and “other collateral review.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 172–174 (2001). The question, therefore, is whether “an application for State post-conviction or other [State] collateral review … is pending.” §2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).