Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/121/615/481369/
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 13:50:12
Document Index: 727910694

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 228', '§ 228', '§ 8', '§ 7202', '§ 7203', '§ 7202']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Williams, Jr., Defendant-appellant, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1997 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Williams, Jr., Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Daniel Williams, Jr., Defendant-appellant, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997) Sept. 8, 1997
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and HENDERSON and GIBSON* , Senior Circuit Judges.
In December 1994, Appellant was charged with one count of willfully failing to pay a past due support obligation. Appellant consented to trial before a magistrate judge.3 Evidence at trial demonstrated that Plaintiff had never voluntarily paid any money toward his support obligation; all money credited towards that obligation had been the result of court orders, garnishments, and interceptions of his federal income tax refunds. He testified that he had insufficient means to pay his support obligations, and barely earned enough to survive. Recognizing that the crux of the case hinged on his decision not to work in the medical field, Appellant testified as to his reasons for leaving that profession. He explained that he left the medical field because " [a]t that time, it seemed very unlikely that I could come to a compromise with my wife on salvaging the marriage and I chose to do something else with my life. If the divorce was not to be contested successfully, that I would choose another career." R:2-154. He also testified that he had wanted to leave the medical field on several occasions, but had never done so because it "wasn't a good time to leave." At the time of trial, Appellant's past-due child support obligations totaled in excess of $75,000.
28 U.S.C. § 228(a) declares that " [w]hoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished" as set forth elsewhere in the statute. A "past due support obligation" is any sum ordered pursuant to a state law requiring payment for the support and maintenance of a child (or a child and parent living together) that is either greater than $5,000 or has been unpaid for more than one year. 28 U.S.C. § 228(b). Appellant contends that Congress exceeded its authority under both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. We address these arguments in turn, mindful that Appellant's failure to raise these issues at trial reduces our review to a search for plain error; however, there is "no plainer error than to allow a conviction to stand under a statute which Congress was without power to enact. In essence, the statute was void ab initio, and consequently, the district court below lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to that charge." United States v. Walker, 59 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 547, 133 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1995).
The Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States ...." Relying principally on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995), Appellant contends the CSRA exceeds Congress' authority. To the contrary, we believe that the CSRA easily falls within the bounds of permissible legislation described by Lopez.
Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbade "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 514 U.S. at 550, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. The Supreme Court confirmed that there are three broad areas that fall within the Commerce Clause's jurisdictional grant:
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30 (internal citations omitted). Appellant bases his arguments on the third category and contends that his child support obligations do not substantially affect interstate commerce. However, Lopez's third, " 'affecting commerce' test was developed in our jurisprudence to define the extent of Congress's power over purely intra state commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial inter state effects." United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 670, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733, 131 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1995). Resort to category three was necessary in Lopez because possession of a firearm near a school (the crime at issue in that case) did not involve an instrumentality of, or have a connection to, interstate commerce.
The same cannot be said in this case. Even though Appellant's obligation to pay child support did not arise out of a typical business transaction, it still involves interstate commerce because Appellant's obligation to pay money crossed state lines. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256, 85 S. Ct. 348, 356, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964); see also 379 U.S. at 271, 85 S. Ct. at 364 (Black, J., concurring) ("Nor is 'Commerce' as used in the Commerce Clause to be limited to a narrow, technical concept. It includes not only, as Congress has enumerated in the Act, 'travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication,' but also all other unitary transactions and activities that take place in more States than one.").
The issue does not turn on the mere fact that Appellant lives in a state different from his children. Though true, it is the implication of this fact that is telling: "the difference in location of obligor and obligee requires that the satisfaction of the debt be through interstate means," United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1567, 137 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1997), and satisfaction of the obligation necessarily requires resort to some method of traversing state lines. See also United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 784, 136 L. Ed. 2d 727 (1997). This feature (which is a required element of the crime defined by the CSRA) qualifies as interstate activity and may be regulated by Congress. We thus join the other Circuits that have held that the CSRA falls within the second Lopez category as a proper exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003-04 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 753, 136 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1997); Mussari, 95 F.3d at 790-91; Sage, 92 F.3d at 106-07.5 2. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that " [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Appellant contends the CSRA runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment because the power to regulate familial relations lies with the States, as evidenced by the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Appellant's argument fails for three reasons.
First, the Tenth Amendment reserves to the States those matters that are not delegated to the federal government. As discussed above, the CSRA is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, and Congress's "valid exercise of authority delegated to it under the Constitution does not violate the Tenth Amendment." Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, "the domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court ..., divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2214, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992). Obviously, the CSRA does not require federal courts to issue, modify, or otherwise consider divorce, alimony and child custody or support decrees. The CSRA is best understood as part of the scheme for enforcing child support decrees, and the "domestic relations exception" does not apply to efforts to enforce valid decrees issued by state courts. Id. at 701-02, 112 S. Ct. at 2214. Finally, the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction generally applies to the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts and does not apply when Congress has specific authority to enact legislation. See id. at 696, 112 S. Ct. at 2211 (observing that federal jurisdiction in domestic matters arising from the District of Columbia held to be proper); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19, 67 S. Ct. 13, 15, 91 L. Ed. 12 (1946) (affirming conviction of religious believers in polygamy for violating Mann Act because " [t]he fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference by Congress with the police powers of the States. The power of Congress over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is plenary;...."). For these reasons, the CSRA does not violate the Tenth Amendment's reservation of State power.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence that he acted willfully in refusing to pay his child support obligations. "We will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence in a non-jury trial unless, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005, 112 S. Ct. 640, 116 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1991). Appellant contends that he currently lacks the financial resources to pay his obligations. There is little doubt that this is true; under the facts of this case, however, Appellant's inability to pay does not automatically entitle him to a judgment of acquittal.
As the intent element in a criminal statute, the meaning of the term "willful" depends greatly upon its context. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659, 126 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1994). Criminalization of the willful failure to pay is not new to the criminal code; it appears frequently in the tax statutes. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (1994) (willful failure to "collect ... and pay over" tax); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1994) (willful failure to pay estimated tax). The House Report to the CSRA also made specific reference to these provisions:
The operative language establishing the requisite intent under [the CSRA] is "willfully fails to pay." This language has been borrowed from the tax statutes that make willful failure to collect or pay taxes a Federal crime, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7202, 7203. Thus, the willful failure standard of [the CSRA] should be interpreted in the same manner that Federal courts have interpreted these felony tax provisions. In order to establish willfulness under those provisions, the government must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time the payment was due the taxpayer possessed sufficient funds to enable him to meet his obligation or that "the lack of sufficient funds on such date was created by (or was the result of) a voluntary and intentional act without justification in view of all of the financial circumstances of the taxpayer." United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1975). The willfulness element in the tax felony statutes requires proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, and thus describes a specific intent crime. U.S. v. Birkenstock, 823 F.2d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 1987). The word "willfully" under the tax felony statutes imports a bad purpose or evil motive. U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361, 93 S. Ct. 2008, 2017, 36 L. Ed. 2d 941 (1973). The Committee intends that the willful failure standard of [the CSRA] be given similar effect as the willful failure standard contained in these tax felony provisions.
"Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1991). Our focus in this case is on the third element, which is typically met by proving that the defendant had the ability to fulfill his obligation and refused to do so. Here, Appellant lacked the ability to do so, but his inability was due to purposeful acts taken specifically to deprive him of his ability to pay his child support obligations. As declared in United States v. Poll (which was cited with approval in the House Report), willfulness can be proven if "the lack of sufficient funds on such date was created by (or was the result of) a voluntary and intentional act without justification in view of the financial circumstances of the taxpayer." 521 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1975). The reasonableness of this rule is obvious: " [o]therwise, a recalcitrant taxpayer could simply dissipate his liquid assets at or near the time when his taxes come due and thereby evade criminal liability." United States v. Tucker, 686 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S. Ct. 492, 74 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1982); see also United States v. Ausmus, 774 F.2d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 1985).
Even if the third test were employed and a substantial effect on interstate commerce were required, the outcome would be the same. In determining whether such an effect exists, courts traditionally rely heavily upon Congressional findings. E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32; Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995). Congress made extensive findings regarding the effect of delinquent child support obligations on interstate commerce, causing at least one Court of Appeals to hold that the CSRA qualifies under Lopez's third category. See United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30-31 (3d Cir. 1997) (petition for certiorari filed June 3, 1997); see also Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400 n. 6 ("For similar reasons, we agree ... that the CSRA fits within the third Lopez category and therefore does not violate the commerce clause."); Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1004 ("The CSRA also may be upheld because it regulates activities that are substantially related to and substantially affect interstate commerce.")