Source: http://www.ipsofactoj.com/DecidedCases/international/2017/part04/int2017(04)-008.htm
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 19:31:57
Document Index: 559647787

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 4', '§2', '§3345', '§7', '§3346', '§3346', '§3348', '§153', '§153', '§3345', '§3346', '§3346', '§3345', '§3348', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§2', '§3345', '§153', '§153', '§1524', '§1525', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§3348', '§153', '§49', '§3345', '§3345', '§3345', '§151', '§3345', '§3346', '§3346', '§3347', '§3345', '§3349']

National Labour Relations Board vs SW General Inc (d.b.a. Southwest Ambulance) [USSC]
IpsofactoJ.com: International Cases [2017] Part 4 Case 8 [USSC]
(doing business as Southwest Ambulance)
(with whom Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined, delivering the opinion of the Court)
Article II of the Constitution requires that the President obtain “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” before appointing “Officers of the United States.” §2, cl. 2. Given this provision, the responsibilities of an office requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation – known as a “PAS” office – may go unperformed if a vacancy arises and the President and Senate cannot promptly agree on a replacement. Congress has long accounted for this reality by authorizing the President to direct certain officials to temporarily carry out the duties of a vacant PAS office in an acting capacity, without Senate confirmation.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S. C. §3345 et seq., is the latest version of that authorization. Section 3345(a) of the FVRA authorizes three classes of Government officials to become acting officers. The general rule is that the first assistant to a vacant office shall become the acting officer. The President may override that default rule by directing either a person serving in a different PAS office or a senior employee within the relevant agency to become the acting officer instead.
The Senate’s advice and consent power is a critical “structural safeguard[ ] of the constitutional scheme.” Edmond v United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) . The Framers envisioned it as “an excellent check upon a spirit of favouritism in the President” and a guard against “the appointment of unfit characters .... from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” The Federalist No. 76, p. 457 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The constitutional process of Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, however, can take time: The President may not promptly settle on a nominee to fill an office; the Senate may be unable, or unwilling, to speedily confirm the nominee once submitted. Yet neither may desire to see the duties of the vacant office go unperformed in the interim.
Congress revisited the issue in the 1860s, ultimately passing the Vacancies Act of 1868. The Vacancies Act expanded the number of PAS offices that the President could fill with acting officers. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15Stat. 168; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, 12Stat. 656. With that expansion came new constraints. The authority to appoint “any person or persons” as an acting officer gave way to a default rule that the “first or sole assistant .... shall” perform that function, with an exception allowing the President to instead fill the post with a person already serving in a PAS office. 15Stat. 168. And rather than six months of acting service, the Vacancies Act generally authorized only ten days. Ibid. That narrow window of acting service was later lengthened to 30 days. Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26Stat. 733.
During the 1970s and 1980s, inter-branch conflict arose over the Vacancies Act. The Department of Justice took the position that, in many instances, the head of an executive agency had independent authority apart from the Vacancies Act to temporarily fill vacant offices. The Comptroller General disagreed, arguing that the Act was the exclusive authority for temporarily filling vacancies in executive agencies. See M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate’s Confirmation Prerogative 2–4 (1998) (Rosenberg). Congress then amended the Vacancies Act to clarify that it applies to such agencies, while at the same time lengthening the term of permissible acting service to 120 days, with a tolling period while a nomination is pending. Id., at 3; see Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, §7, 102Stat. 988.
But tensions did not ease. By 1998, approximately 20 percent of PAS offices in executive agencies were occupied by “temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period .... without presidential submissions of nominations.” Rosenberg 1. These acting officers filled high-level positions, sometimes in obvious contravention of the Senate’s wishes. One, for instance, was brought in from outside Government to serve as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, immediately after the Senate refused to confirm him for that very office. Ibid.; see M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service, Validity of Designation of Bill Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 1–3 (1998). Perceiving a threat to the Senate’s advice and consent power, see Rosenberg 6, Congress acted again. In 1998, it replaced the Vacancies Act with the FVRA.
Section 3345(a) of the FVRA permits three categories of Government officials to perform acting service in a vacant PAS office. Subsection (a)(1) prescribes a general rule: If a person serving in a PAS office dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform his duties, the first assistant to that office “shall perform” the office’s “functions and duties .... temporarily in an acting capacity.”
Section 3345 also makes certain individuals ineligible for acting service. Subsection (b)(1) states: “Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section” if the President nominates him for the vacant PAS office and, during the 365-day period preceding the vacancy, the individual “did not serve in the position of first assistant” to that office or “served in [that] position .... for less than 90 days.” Subsection (b)(2) creates an exception to this prohibition, providing that “[p]aragraph (1) shall not apply to any person” serving in a first assistant position that itself requires the Senate’s advice and consent.
Other sections of the FVRA establish time limits on acting service and penalties for non-compliance. In most cases, the statute permits acting service for “210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs”; tolls that time limit while a nomination is pending; and starts a new 210-day clock if the nomination is “rejected, withdrawn, or returned.” §§3346(a)–(b)(1). Upon a second nomination, the time limit tolls once more, and an acting officer can serve an additional 210 days if the second nomination proves unsuccessful. §3346(b)(2). The FVRA ensures compliance by providing that, in general, “any function or duty of a vacant office” performed by a person not properly serving under the statute “shall have no force or effect.” §3348(d).
The National Labour Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is charged with administering the National Labour Relations Act. By statute, its general counsel must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S. C. §153(d).
In June 2010, the NLRB’s general counsel – who had been serving with Senate confirmation – resigned. The President directed Lafe Solomon to serve temporarily as the NLRB’s acting general counsel, citing the FVRA as the basis for the appointment. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to L. Solomon (June 18, 2010). Solomon satisfied the requirements for acting service under subsection (a)(3) of the FVRA because he had spent the previous ten years in the senior position of Director of the NLRB’s Office of Representation Appeals.
Solomon’s responsibilities included exercising “final authority” to issue complaints alleging unfair labour practices. 29 U.S. C. §§153(d), 160(b). In January 2013, an NLRB Regional Director, exercising authority on Solomon’s behalf, issued a complaint alleging that respondent SW General, Inc. – a company that provides ambulance services – had improperly failed to pay certain bonuses to long-term employees. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that SW General had committed unfair labour practices, and the NLRB agreed. 360 N. L. R. B. 109 (2014).
SW General filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It argued that the unfair labour practices complaint was invalid because, under subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA, Solomon could not legally perform the duties of general counsel after having been nominated to fill that position. The NLRB defended Solomon’s actions. It contended that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under subsection (a)(1), not to acting officers who, like Solomon, serve under (a)(2) or (a)(3).
The Court of Appeals granted SW General’s petition for review and vacated the Board’s order. It reasoned that “the text of subsection (b)(1) squarely supports” the conclusion that the provision’s restriction on nominees serving as acting officers “applies to all acting officers, no matter whether they serve pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3).” 796 F. 3d 67, 78 (CADC 2015). As a result, Solomon became “ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel once the President nominated him to be General Counsel.” Id., at 72.[2] We granted certiorari, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), and now affirm.
Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, if –
during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person –
We conclude that the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA. It is not, as the Board contends, limited to first assistants performing acting service under subsection (a)(1). The text of the prohibition extends to any “person” who serves “as an acting officer .... under this section,” not just to “first assistants” serving under subsection (a)(1). The phrase “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)” does not limit the reach of (b)(1), but instead clarifies that the prohibition applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that first assistants shall perform acting duties.
Start with “person.” The word has a naturally expansive meaning that can encompass anyone who performs acting duties under the FVRA. See Pfizer Inc. v Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978). Important as they may be, first assistants are not the only “person[s]” of the bunch.
Now add “under this section.” The language clarifies that subsection (b)(1) applies to all persons serving under §3345. Congress often drafts statutes with hierarchical schemes – section, subsection, paragraph, and on down the line. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v Nigh, 543 U.S. 50–61 (2004); L. Filson, The Legislative Drafter’s Desk Reference 222 (1992). Congress used that structure in the FVRA and relied on it to make precise cross-references. When Congress wanted to refer only to a particular subsection or paragraph, it said so. See, e.g., §3346(a)(2) (“subsection (b)”); §3346(b)(2) (“paragraph (1)”). But in (b)(1) Congress referred to the entire section – §3345 – which subsumes all of the ways a person may become an acting officer.
The rest of the FVRA uses the pairing of “person” and “section” the same way. Section 3346, for example, specifies how long “the person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345 may serve in the office.” (Emphasis added.) And §3348(d)(1) describes the consequences of non-compliance with the FVRA by referring to the actions “taken by any person who is not acting under section 3345, 3346, or 3347.” (Emphasis added.) No one disputes that both provisions apply to anyone serving as an acting officer under the FVRA, not just first assistants serving under subsection (a)(1).
Had Congress intended subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants acting under (a)(1), it could easily have chosen clearer language. Replacing “person” with “first assistant” would have done the trick. So too would replacing “under this section” with “under subsection (a)(1).” “The fact that [Congress] did not adopt [either] readily available and apparent alternative strongly supports” the conclusion that subsection (b)(1) applies to any acting officer appointed under any provision within §3345. Knight v Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 188 (2008) .
The dependent clause at the beginning of subsection (b)(1) – “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)” – confirms that the prohibition on acting service applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that the first assistant shall perform acting duties. The ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” is “in spite of,” or “without prevention or obstruction from or by.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1986); Black’s Law Dictionary 1091 (7th ed. 1999) (“Despite; in spite of”). In statutes, the word “shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 126–127 (2012). Subsection (a)(1) sets the rule that first assistants “shall perform” the vacant office’s “functions and duties .... in an acting capacity.” But the “notwithstanding” clause in subsection (b)(1) means that, even if a first assistant is serving as an acting officer under this statutory mandate, he must cease that service if the President nominates him to fill the vacant PAS office. That subsection (b)(1) also applies to acting officers serving at the President’s behest is already clear from the broad text of the independent clause – they are all “person[s]” serving “under this section.”
The Board takes a different view of the phrase “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1).” It begins by noting that §3345(a) uses three different subsections to “create three separate paths for becoming an acting official.” Reply Brief 2. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1), the Board continues, “applies ‘[n]otwithstanding’ only one of these subsections – ‘subsection (a)(1).’ ” Ibid. In the Board’s view, singling out subsection (a)(1) carries a negative implication: that “Congress did not intend Subsection (b)(1) to override the alternative mechanisms for acting service in Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).” Id., at 3.
We disagree. The Board relies on the “interpretive canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ‘expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned.’ ” Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United States v Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). If a sign at the entrance to a zoo says “come see the elephant, lion, hippo, and giraffe,” and a temporary sign is added saying “the giraffe is sick,” you would reasonably assume that the others are in good health.
“The force of any negative implication, however, depends on context.” Marx v General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 9). The expressio unius canon applies only when “circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.” Echazabal, 536 U.S., at 81. A “notwithstanding” clause does not naturally give rise to such an inference; it just shows which of two or more provisions prevails in the event of a conflict. Such a clause confirms rather than constrains breadth. Singling out one potential conflict might suggest that Congress thought the conflict was particularly difficult to resolve, or was quite likely to arise. But doing so generally does not imply anything about other, unaddressed conflicts, much less that they should be resolved in the opposite manner.
Suppose a radio station announces: “We play your favourite hits from the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s. Notwithstanding the fact that we play hits from the ’60s, we do not play music by British bands.” You would not tune in expecting to hear the 1970s British band “The Clash” any more than the 1960s “Beatles.” The station, after all, has announced that “we do not play music by British bands.” The “notwithstanding” clause just establishes that this applies even to music from the ’60s, when British bands were prominently featured on the charts. No one, however, would think the station singled out the ’60s to convey implicitly that its categorical statement “we do not play music by British bands” actually did not apply to the ’70s and ’80s.
Step back from the Board’s focus on “notwithstanding” and another problem appears: Its interpretation of subsection (b)(1) makes a mess of (b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) specifies that (b)(1) “shall not apply to any person” if
that person “is serving as the first assistant”;
the first assistant position is itself a PAS office; and
“the Senate has approved the appointment of such person” to that office.
The Board’s interpretation makes the first requirement superfluous, a result we typically try to avoid. Williams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (“It is .... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). If subsection (b)(1) applied only to first assistants, there would be no need to state the requirement in (b)(2)(A) that “such person is serving as the first assistant.” The Board proposes that Congress did so for clarity, but the same could be said of most superfluous language.
We agree, and it is not the way we read it. Under our reading, subsection (b)(1) has no effect on (c)(1). Subsection (b)(1) addresses nominations generally, prohibiting any person who has been nominated to fill any vacant office from performing that office’s duties in an acting capacity. Subsection (c)(1) speaks to a specific nomination scenario: When a person is “nominated by the President for reappointment for an additional term to the same office .... without a break in service.” In this particular situation, the FVRA authorizes the nominee “to continue to serve in that office.” §3345(c). “[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) . The general prohibition on acting service by nominees yields to the more specific authorization allowing officers up for reappointment to remain at their posts. Applying subsection (b)(1) to §3345(a) hardly compels a different result.
The Board contends that legislative history, purpose, and post-enactment practice uniformly show that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants. The text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v United States ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S. ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9). In any event, the Board’s evidence is not compelling.
The Board argues that subsection (b)(1) was designed to serve a specific purpose: preventing the President from having his nominee serve as an acting officer by making him first assistant after (or right before) a vacancy arises. Brief for Petitioner 38. The original draft of the FVRA authorized first assistants and PAS officers to perform acting service. Subsection (b) of that draft provided that if a first assistant was nominated to fill the vacant office, he could not perform that office’s duties in an acting capacity unless he had been the first assistant for at least 180 days before the vacancy. Several Senators thought the FVRA too restrictive. They asked to add senior agency officials to the list of potential acting officers and to shorten the 180-day length-of-service requirement in subsection (b). Their requests, the Board says, were granted; the final version of the FVRA included subsection (a)(3) for senior employees and shortened the length-of-service requirement to 90 days. There was no intent to extend the prohibition in subsection (b) beyond first assistants. Id., at 45–46.
The glitch in this argument is of course the text of subsection (b)(1). Congress did amend the statute to allow senior employees to become acting officers under subsection (a)(3). The only substantive change that was requested in (b) was to reduce the length-of-service requirement. Congress could have done that with a few tweaks to the original version of subsection (b). Instead, Congress went further: It also removed language that expressly limited subsection (b) to first assistants. And it added a provision – subsection (b)(2) – that makes sense only if (b)(1) applies to all acting officers. In short, Congress took a provision that explicitly applied only to first assistants and turned it into one that applies to all acting officers.
The Board protests that Congress would not have expanded the prohibition on nominees serving as acting officers after Senators asked to give the President more flexibility. See Brief for Petitioner 45–46. That certain Senators made specific demands, however, does not mean that they got exactly what they wanted. Passing a law often requires compromise, where even the most firm public demands bend to competing interests. See Ragsdale v Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81–94 (2002). What Congress ultimately agrees on is the text that it enacts, not the preferences expressed by certain legislators. See Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”).
The Board contends that this compromise must not have happened because Senator Thompson, one of the sponsors of the FVRA, said that subsection (b)(1) “applies only when the acting officer is the first assistant, and not when the acting officer is designated by the President pursuant to §§3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3).” 144 Cong. Rec. 27496 (1998). But Senator Byrd – the very next speaker – offered a contradictory account: A nominee may not “serve as an acting officer” if “he is not the first assistant” or “has been the first assistant for less than 90 .... days, and has not been confirmed for the position.” Id., at 27498. This is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history. See Milner v Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”).
Finally, the Board supports its interpretation with post-enactment practice. It notes that the Office of Legal Counsel and the Government Accountability Office have issued guidance construing subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants. And three Presidents have, without congressional objection, submitted the nominations of 112 individuals who were serving as acting officers under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). The Board contends that this “historical practice” is entitled to “significant weight” because the FVRA “concern[s] the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government.” Brief for Petitioner 49 (quoting NLRB v Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 6–7); internal quotation marks omitted).
In this context, Congress’s failure to speak up does not fairly imply that it has acquiesced in the Board’s interpretation. See Zuber v Allen, 396 U.S. 168, n. 21 (1969); Alexander v Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001). The Senate may not have noticed that certain nominees were serving as acting officers in violation of the FVRA, or it may have chosen not to reject a qualified candidate just to make a point about compliance with the statute. Either is at least as plausible as the theory that the Legislature’s inaction reflects considered acceptance of the Executive’s practice.
Our decision in Noel Canning – the chief opinion on which the Board relies – is a sharp contrast. That case dealt with the President’s constitutional authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, an issue that has attracted intense attention and written analysis from Presidents, Attorneys General, and the Senate. 573 U.S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–32). The voluminous historical record dated back to “the beginning of the Republic,” and included “thousands of intra-session recess appointments.” Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 8, 12). That the chronicle of the Recess Appointments Clause weighed heavily in Noel Canning offers no support to the Board here.
If an officer of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office –
notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity, subject to the time limitations of section 3346, if –
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any person if –
Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer who is nominated by the President for reappointment for an office in an Executive department without a break in service, to continue to serve in that office subject to the time limitations in section 3346, until such time as the Senate has acted to confirm or reject the nomination, notwithstanding adjournment sine die.
I join the opinion of the Court because it correctly interprets the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S. C. §3345 et seq. The dissent’s conclusion that the FVRA authorized the appointment in this case, however, implicates an important constitutional question that the Court’s interpretation does not: Whether directing Lafe Solomon to serve as acting general counsel of the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB or Board), without the advice and consent of the Senate, complied with the Constitution. I write separately to explain my view that the Appointments Clause likely prohibited Solomon’s appointment.
The Appointments Clause prescribes the exclusive process by which the President may appoint “officers of the United States.” United States v Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879); accord, Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (“[A]ll officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause .... No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions”). It provides that the President (U.S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2)
“[F]or purposes of appointment,” the Clause divides all officers into two classes – “inferior officers” and non-inferior officers, which we have long denominated “principal” officers. Germaine, supra, at 509, 511. Principal officers must be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. See Edmond v United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997). That process “is also the default manner of appointment for inferior officers.” Ibid. But the Clause provides a limited exception for the appointment of inferior officers: Congress may “by Law” authorize the President, the head of an executive department, or a court of law to appoint inferior officers without the advice and consent of the Senate. Ibid.
The FVRA governs the process by which the President may temporarily fill a vacancy in an Executive Branch office normally occupied by an officer of the United States. As relevant in this case, when a vacancy arises, the President may “direct” an official to “perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily.” 5 U.S. C. §§3345(a)(2), (3). That official may be an officer previously appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to any office, or certain high-ranking employees of the agency in which the vacancy arose. Ibid. The FVRA does not, however, require the President to seek the advice and consent of the Senate before directing the official to perform the functions of the vacant office.
The FVRA authorizes the President to appoint both inferior and principal officers without first obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate. Appointing inferior officers in this manner raises no constitutional problems. That is because the Appointments Clause authorizes Congress to enact “Law[s],” like the FVRA, “vest[ing] the Appointment of such inferior Officers .... in the President alone.” Appointing principal officers under the FVRA, however, raises grave constitutional concerns because the Appointments Clause forbids the President to appoint principal officers without the advice and consent of the Senate.
Because we interpret the FVRA to forbid Solomon’s appointment in this case, we need not confront these concerns. But the dissent’s contrary interpretation necessarily raises the question whether that appointment complied with the requirements of the Appointments Clause. That inquiry turns on two considerations:
whether the general counsel of the NLRB is an “Officer of the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and, if so,
whether he is a principal officer who can be appointed only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.[3]
In my view, the general counsel plainly is an officer of the United States. I also think he is likely a principal officer.
As an initial matter, the NLRB’s general counsel is an “officer of the United States” whose appointment is governed by the Appointments Clause. “Extensive evidence suggests” that, at the time of the framing, this phrase was understood to encompass “all federal officials with responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty.” Mascott, Whoare “Officers of the United States”? 70 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript, at 74, online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918952 (as last visited Mar. 17, 2017)); see also Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O. L. C. 73, 77 (2007) (an officer of the United States was originally understood to be an official who “hold[s] a position with delegated sovereign authority” and whose office was “ ‘continuing,’ ” rather than “ ‘incidental’ ” or “ad hoc”). And this Court has previously held that an “Officer of the United States” is “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Buckley, 424 U.S., at 126; see also Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477–540 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting cases addressing who counts as an officer).
The general counsel is an officer of the United States under both the probable original meaning of the Clause and this Court’s precedents. He is charged by statute with carrying out significant duties. He “exercise[s] general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board .... and over the officers and employees in the regional offices.” 29 U.S. C. §153(d). He has “final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuances of complaints .... and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board.” Ibid. The general counsel is effectively the Nation’s labour-law prosecutor and is therefore an officer of the United States. See Edmond, 520 U.S., at 666 (treating the general counsel of the Department of Transportation as an officer).
Although a closer question, the general counsel also is likely a principal officer. In Edmond, we explained that an “ ‘inferior’ ” officer is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id., at 663. That view is consistent with the original meaning of the term and with the practices of the early Congresses. See id., at 663–664; Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654–721 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Sheridan, supra, (Inferiour); 1 Johnson, supra, (Inferiour (def. 2)); 1 Webster, supra, (Inferior).[4] By contrast, a principal officer is one who has no superior other than the President.
The general counsel of the NLRB appears to satisfy that definition. Before 1947, the Board “controlled not only the filing of complaints, but their prosecution and adjudication” as well. NLRB v Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 117 (1987). The Labour Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61Stat. 136, however, “effected an important change” in the NLRB’s structure by “separat[ing] the prosecuting from the adjudicating function, to place the former in the General Counsel, and to make him an independent official appointed by the President.” Lewis v NLRB, 357 U.S. 10, n. 10 (1958). Congress thus separated the NLRB into “two independent branches,” Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S., at 129, and made the general counsel “independent of the Board’s supervision and review,” id., at 118; see also id., at 129 (Congress “decided to place the General Counsel within the agency, but to make the office independent of the Board’s authority”). Moreover, the general counsel’s prosecutorial decisions are unreviewable by either the Board or the Judiciary. NLRB v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975); Vaca v Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). Although the Board has power to define some of the general counsel’s duties, see 29 U.S. C. §153(d), and the general counsel represents the Board in certain judicial proceedings, see Higgins, Labour Czars – Commissars – Keeping Women in the Kitchen – The Purpose and Effects of the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 941, 967 (1998), the statute does not give the Board the power to remove him or otherwise generally to control his activities, see Edmond, supra, at 664 (“The power to remove officers, we have recognized, is a powerful tool for control”); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S., at 510 (holding that executive officials were inferior officers in large part because they were subject to a superior’s removal). Because it appears that the general counsel answers to no officer inferior to the President, he is likely a principal officer.[5] Accordingly, the President likely could not lawfully have appointed Solomon to serve in that role without first obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.
I recognize that the “burdens on governmental processes” that the Appointments Clause imposes may “often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable.” INS v Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) . Granting the President unilateral power to fill vacancies in high offices might contribute to more efficient Government. But the Appointments Clause is not an empty formality. Although the Framers recognized the potential value of leaving the selection of officers to “one man of discernment” rather than to a fractious, multimember body, see The Federalist No. 76, p. 510 (J. Cooke ed., 1961), they also recognized the serious risk for abuse and corruption posed by permitting one person to fill every office in the Government, see id., at 513; 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1524, p. 376 (1833). The Framers “had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked,” Chadha, supra, at 959, and they knew that liberty could be preserved only by ensuring that the powers of Government would never be consolidated in one body, see The Federalist No. 51, p. 348. They thus empowered the Senate to confirm principal officers on the view that “the necessity of its co-operation in the business of appointments will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the conduct of” the President. The Federalist No. 76, at 514; 3 Story, supra, §1525, at 376–377. We cannot cast aside the separation of powers and the Appointments Clause’s important check on executive power for the sake of administrative convenience or efficiency. See Bowsher v Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) .
That the Senate voluntarily relinquished its advice-and-consent power in the FVRA does not make this end-run around the Appointments Clause constitutional. The Clause, like all of the Constitution’s structural provisions, “is designed first and foremost not to look after the interests of the respective branches, but to protect individual liberty.” NLRB v Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks and bracket omitted). It is therefore irrelevant that “the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.” Free Enterprise Fund, supra, at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive” the structural provisions of the Constitution any more than they could agree to disregard an enumerated right. Freytag v Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) . The Judicial Branch must be most vigilant in guarding the separation between the political powers precisely when those powers collude to avoid the structural constraints of our Constitution.
Many high-level offices in the Executive Branch may be filled only by a person who has been nominated to the position by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA) cedes the Senate’s confirmation authority, partially and on a temporary basis, to allow executive agencies to continue to function when one of those high-level offices becomes vacant. It authorizes certain categories of officials to perform the duties of vacant offices on an acting basis. One of its provisions pulls back that authorization when an official has been nominated to fill the vacant office on a permanent basis. The scope of that provision is at issue here. I agree with the Court that the provision applies to first assistants to a vacant office who serve as acting officials automatically, by operation of the FVRA. I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the provision also applies to other officials who may serve as acting officials if the President directs them to serve in that capacity. The Court gives the provision a broader reach than the text can bear with no support from the history of, or practice under, the FVRA. I respectfully dissent.
As the Court explains, the FVRA governs vacancies in offices held by persons “whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 5 U.S. C. §3345(a). These are known as “PAS” offices. When an official in a PAS office “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office” the FVRA steps in. Ibid.; see also §3345(c)(2) (an “expiration of a term of office” makes an official unable “to perform the functions and duties” of the office).
Subsection (b)(1) takes away this authorization in a specific situation. It provides that, “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)” – the first assistant default rule – a person may not serve as an acting official while nominated to fill the office if the person was not the first assistant to the office for at least 90 of the 365 days preceding the vacancy. §3345(b)(1). The prohibition in subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a person serving as the Senate-confirmed first assistant to the vacant office. See §3345(b)(2).
As the Court observes, subsection (b)(1) contains some potentially broad language. The provision specifies when “a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section” – that is, §3345. The words “person” and “this section,” taken in isolation, could signal that the prohibition applies to subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1) and thus covers all acting officials. But context matters. And here, the context cabins those words and gives subsection (b)(1) a more limited reach.
The text of subsection (b)(1) contains a clear signal that its prohibition applies only to first assistants who automatically assume a vacant office under subsection (a)(1): It begins with the clause “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1).” A notwithstanding clause identifies a potential conflict between two or more provisions and specifies which provision will prevail. Under the familiar expressio unius est exclusio alterius interpretive canon, the choice to single out subsection (a)(1) – and only subsection (a)(1) – in this notwithstanding clause strongly suggests that the prohibition reaches, and conflicts with, subsection (a)(1), and only subsection (a)(1).
The rest of §3345 confirms this conclusion. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1) establishes who may not perform the duties of a vacant office. In doing so, it introduces a potential conflict with subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1), which identify four categories of persons who may perform the duties of a vacant office. By stating that its prohibition applies “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1),” subsection (b)(1) expressly states that its prohibition takes precedence over the default rule set out in subsection (a)(1). The omission of any reference to subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1), in spite of the parallel potential for conflict with those subsections, suggests that the omission was a “ ‘deliberate choice, not inadvertence.’ ” Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223–233 (2011) (quoting Barnhart v Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)). That choice means that subsection (b)(1) trumps subsection (a)(1) but not subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1).
Nothing about a notwithstanding clause renders it impervious to this established rule of statutory interpretation. The Court says that the rule has less force in the context of a notwithstanding clause because such a clause “confirms rather than constrains” the breadth of the provision to which it is attached. Ante, at 11. But the breadth of the attached provision is precisely the question here, and the clause’s specific reference to subsection (a)(1) and only subsection (a)(1) strongly supports reading the attached prohibition to limit only subsection (a)(1). See Preseault v ICC, 494 U.S. 1–14 (1990) (a reference to “ ‘this Act’ ” in a notwithstanding clause limited the scope of the attached provision (emphasis deleted)).
The text itself refutes the theory that subsection (b)(1) is more likely to conflict with subsection (a)(1) than the other subsections. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a person who served as the first assistant to the vacant office for more than 90 days in the year before the vacancy arose, §3345(b)(1)(A), or who serves as a Senate-confirmed first assistant to the office, §3345(b)(2). A person serving under subsection (a)(1) – by definition, only a first assistant – has a leg up in meeting those conditions and avoiding subsection (b)(1)’s prohibition altogether. Those serving under subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1) – PAS officials, senior agency officials, or officials whose terms in the vacant office have expired – do not. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1) is thus more likely, not less likely, to conflict with subsections (a)(2), (a)(3), and (c)(1).
Worse still, a broad interpretation of subsection (b)(1) renders subsection (c)(1) superfluous. Under subsection (c)(1), the President may designate a person whose term in an office has expired and who has been nominated to a subsequent term to serve as the acting official. It is unlikely, even implausible, that a person who serves out a set term will have served as the first assistant to her own office during the year before her term expired. Yet subsection (b)(1) requires such service before a person can serve as both an acting official and a nominee.[6] As a result, if subsection (b)(1) applies to all acting officials, it would prohibit what subsection (c)(1) expressly permits: acting service by a person nominated by the President to serve out a consecutive Senate-confirmed term in the vacant office. That is no way to read a statute.
Not a problem, the Court says. “[S]ubsection (b)(1) has no effect on (c)(1)” because subsection (c)(1) contains a specific rule about acting service by a nominee for a second term that, under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, controls over the general rule governing acting service by a nominee in subsection (b)(1). Ante, at 14. The Court’s reasoning on this point undercuts its opening claim that the words “person” and “under this section” in subsection (b)(1) must refer to “anyone who performs acting duties under the FVRA.” Ante, at 9. And it underscores why the “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)” clause in subsection (b)(1) is superfluous under the Court’s reading. The general authorization of acting service by a first assistant in subsection (a)(1) would yield to the specific prohibition on acting service by certain nominees in subsection (b)(1) even without the notwithstanding clause.[7]
And yet, this legion of would-be violations prompted no response. No evidence suggests that the Senate reacted by requiring any of those nominees to cease their acting service. Cf. Pet. for Cert. 28–29 (citing objections raised after the decision below). The failure to object is all the more glaring in light of the enforcement mechanism written into the FVRA. Section 3349 requires each Executive Branch agency to “immediately” notify the Comptroller General, who heads the Government Accountability Office, and both Houses of Congress of “a vacancy .... and the date such vacancy occurred,” “the name of any person serving in an acting capacity and the date such service began,” “the name of any person nominated to the Senate to fill the vacancy and the date such nomination is submitted,” and the date a nomination is acted upon. This provision leaves no doubt that Congress had all the information it needed to object to any FVRA violations it perceived.
The FVRA prohibits a limited set of acting officials – non-Senate confirmed first assistants who serve under subsection (a)(1) and did not serve as the first assistant to the vacant office for at least 90 of the 365 days before the vacancy arose – from performing the duties of a vacant office while also serving as the President’s nominee to fill that office. Reading the provision more broadly to apply to all acting officials disregards the full text of the FVRA and finds no support in its purpose or history. The Court prefers that reading. I respectfully dissent.
[1] A senior position is one that has a rate of pay equal to or greater than the minimum rate “for a position at GS–15 of the General Schedule.” 5 U.S. C. §3345(a)(3)(B).
[2] The FVRA exempts “the General Counsel of the National Labour Relations Board” from the general rule that actions taken in violation of the FVRA are void ab initio. 5 U.S. C. §3348(e)(1). The Court of Appeals “assume[d] that section 3348(e)(1) renders the actions of an improperly serving Acting General Counsel voidable” and rejected the Board’s argument against voiding Solomon’s actions. 796 F. 3d, at 79–82. The Board did not seek certiorari on this issue, so we do not consider it. In addition, the unfair labour practice complaint in this case was issued after the Senate had returned Solomon’s nomination the first time but before the President had renominated him to the same position. In the proceedings below, the Board did not argue that this timing made any difference, and the court assumed it had no bearing on the proper application of the FVRA to this case. Id., at 72, n. 3. We proceed on the same assumption.
[3] That Solomon was appointed “temporarily” to serve as acting general counsel does not change the analysis. I do not think the structural protections of the Appointments Clause can be avoided based on such trivial distinctions. Solomon served for more than three years in an office limited by statute to a 4-year term, and he exercised all of the statutory duties of that office. 29 U.S. C. §153(d). There was thus nothing “special and temporary” about Solomon’s appointment. United States v Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343(1898).
[4] In Morrison, the Court used a multifactor test to determine whether an independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S. C. §§49, 591 (1982 ed., Supp. V), was an “Inferior officer.” 487 U.S., at 671–672. Although we did not explicitly overrule Morrison in Edmond, it is difficult to see how Morrison’s nebulous approach survived our opinion in Edmond. Edmond is also consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning and therefore should guide our view of the principal-inferior distinction. See Calabresi & Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1018–1019 (2007).
[5] I think the general counsel would likely qualify as a principal officer even under Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) . See id., at 671–672.
[6] Subsection (b)(2)’s exception would not apply, as a person “nominated .... for reappointment for an additional term to the same office .... without a break in service,” 5 U.S. C. §3345(c)(1), will of course not be a Senate-confirmed first assistant to that office.
[7] SW General offers a different response that a person directed to perform the duties of a vacant office under subsection (c)(1) does not “serve as an acting officer,” §3345(b)(1). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. This also misses the mark. Like subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), subsection (c)(1) is located in §3345, titled, “Acting officer.” Div. C, §151(b), 112Stat. 2681–611. Like those subsections, it addresses who may fill a vacant office. See 5 U. S. C. §3345(c)(2). And like those subsections, it expressly subjects service to the time limits in §3346, which apply to “the person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345.” §3346(a). Moreover, relegating officials directed to serve under subsection (c)(1) to some statutorily unnamed, non-acting official status would muddle other provisions of the FVRA. See §3347(a) (making §§3345 and 3346 “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official” to serve in a PAS office); §3349(a)(2) (requiring reporting of “the name of any person serving in an acting capacity and the date such service began immediately upon the designation”).