Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/564/496/83122/
Timestamp: 2019-07-19 10:05:28
Document Index: 92393254

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 503', '§ 7', '§ 503', '§ 503', '§ 73', '§ 703']

Pleasant Broadcasting Company, Appellant, v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee.pleasant Broadcasting Company, Petitioner, v. Federal Communications Commission and United States Ofamerica, Respondents.wiyn Radio, Inc., Petitioner, v. Federal Communications Commission and United States Ofamerica, Respondents, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1977 › Pleasant Broadcasting Company, Appellant, v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee.pleasant Br...
Pleasant Broadcasting Company, Appellant, v. Federal Communications Commission, Appellee.pleasant Broadcasting Company, Petitioner, v. Federal Communications Commission and United States Ofamerica, Respondents.wiyn Radio, Inc., Petitioner, v. Federal Communications Commission and United States Ofamerica, Respondents, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
Argued March 23, 1977. Decided Aug. 1, 1977
* Section 503(b) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970), added by the Communications Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-752, § 7(a), 74 Stat. 894-95, provides the FCC with authority to assess forfeitures of up to $1,000 per violation against any broadcast licensee who "willfully or repeatedly fails to observe any of the provisions of (the Communications) Act or of any rule or regulation of the Commission prescribed under authority of (the) Act. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1) (B). Assessment of a forfeiture must be preceded by written "notice of apparent liability," setting forth the nature of the alleged violation, and by an opportunity for the licensee to show in writing why he should not be held liable. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2).1
In Nos. 76-1511, 76-1593, Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Commission imposed a $500 forfeiture on Pleasant Broadcasting Co. for "repeatedly violating a Commission rule requiring that the operating power of broadcast stations be maintained at a level not exceeding 105 per cent of the authorized amount. 47 C.F.R. § 73.267(b) (1). In its response to the notice of apparent liability, Pleasant had conceded the fact of violation, explaining that the over-power operations, asserted by the Commission to have occurred on 26 occasions on twelve separate dates in October 1974, had resulted from Pleasant's use of an erroneous method for measuring output power. Pleasant contended, however, that use of this method stemmed from a misunderstanding of the Commission's rules, and was terminated upon notice from the Commission that Pleasant was operating in violation of those rules. Pleasant argued that, in light of these circumstances, it had engaged only in a single, continuing violation of the over-power regulation, and not a "repeated" violation within the meaning of section 503(d) (1) (B) of the Communications Act.
As we recently had occasion to observe, "an impressive line of authority supports the . . . proposition that, even where Congress has not expressly conferred exclusive jurisdiction, a special review statute vesting jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off other courts' original jurisdiction in all cases covered by the special statute." Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 319, 551 F.2d 1270, 1279 (1977); see, e. g., Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans,379 U.S. 411, 420-22, 85 S. Ct. 551, 13 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1965); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 543-45, 66 S. Ct. 712, 90 L. Ed. 839 (1946). And section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970), specifies that "(t)he form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute," except where such review is unavailable or inadequate. Thus, absent strong evidence to the contrary in the legislative history, or a showing that the special review mechanism is unavailable or inadequate, we must assume that the mechanism selected by Congress a trial de novo in the district court is the exclusive means for review of a forfeiture order entered by the Commission.
The fact that section 504(a) does not expressly provide for initiation of review by aggrieved licensees in no way renders the district court an inadequate forum. If, notwithstanding the protection furnished by section 504(c), a licensee is suffering from demonstrably adverse consequences from government delay in initiating the collection proceeding, we assume that the licensee could bring a declaratory judgment action against the United States in the district court, and that all issues of fact and law presented by the licensee would be subject to the trial de novo procedure set forth in section 504(a). See, e. g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826 (1941); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937).
(b) (1) Any licensee or permittee of a broadcast station who
(D) violates section 317(c) or section 509(a) (4) of this title, or
For example, petitioners could be required, as a precondition of filing a petition for review, to pay the amount of the proposed forfeiture into the registry of the court of appeals, with the stipulation that the court would return the money in the event of a successful challenge to the Commission's order, but pay the sum over to the United States Treasury if the order is upheld. This system would have the advantage of eliminating the "double-layer" of review in cases in which the person subjected to the forfeiture order is willing, in effect, to waive his right to a trial de novo in the district court. On the other hand, the review function would be split between two courts, with some danger of forum-shopping and of challenges being brought in the court of appeals in cases in which review cannot in fact take place on the basis of the administrative record. See generally Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 57, 61 (1975)
We express no view on the constitutional adequacy of the procedures which, under the current statutory scheme, precede imposition of a forfeiture order by the Commission. See Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 172, 515 F.2d 397, 403 (1975); id. 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 183-84, 515 F.2d at 414-15 (statement of Judge Bazelon as to why he voted to grant rehearing en banc)