Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2019/07/
Timestamp: 2020-05-26 23:57:40
Document Index: 66075495

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 998', '§998', '§ 664', '§ 583', '§ 527', '§ 1032', '§ 128', '§ 1032', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 998', '§54960', '§ 1498']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : July 2019
Prevailing Party: Demurrer Sustained Without Leave Is Procedural Victory That Gives Rise To Civil Code Section 1717 Prevailing Party Fees
Appellate Court Modified Judgment Based On Small Costs Reduction By Lower Court In Order To Put The Case To Bed.
Plaintiff losing contractual breach claims after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend was later hit with an adverse $19,745 fees award based on a contractual fees clause (full fee request) and routine costs (except for a $180 reduction) in favor of prevailing defendant. The appellate court in Thicker Than Water, Inc. v. Sabhlok, Case No. A154064 (1st Dist., Div. 5 July 31, 2019) (unpublished) affirmed the fees/costs awards, with a small modification in the judgment. Defendant’s procedural win, which dismissed the case with prejudice, was a type of win which merits a prevailing party fee award. (Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1109 (1999).) However, at the hearing on the motion to tax/strike costs, the lower court reduced costs by $180 but did not issue an amended judgment. The appellate court modified it accordingly in order to avoid an unnecessary remand for this minor costs reduction. (Orthopedic Systems, Inc. v. Schlein, 202 Cal.App.4th 529, 547 (2011).)
Posted at 09:23 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 07:35 AM in Cases: Tort of Another | Permalink | Comments (0)
Section 1717: Lack Of Contractual Relationship With A Fees Clause Doomed Cross-Defendant’s Recovery Of Attorney’s Fees
Cross-Defendant Sought, But Did Not Get, $352,790.50 In Fees.
Cardiodiagnostic Imaging Inc. (Cardio), whose president was Mr. Kay, sued two parties who eventually took over a commercial leased space when Cardio encountered business problems. The two defendants denied that a business sale agreement had been reached with Cardio or Mr. Kay, but they brought a protective cross-complaint in the event a contract was found. Cardio and the defendant occupying its former space did have leases with a landlord, and the leases had fees clauses. The two defendants defensed the Cardio suit, dismissing their cross-complaint after the lower court found no business sale agreement had been reached. Mr. Kay then sought $352,790.50 in fees as the “successful” cross-defendant. The lower court denied the fee request.
The 2/1 DCA affirmed in Bledin v. Kay, Case No. B285852 (2d Dist., Div. 1 July 26, 2019) (unpublished).
The reason was the lack of a contract with any fees provision between Cardio and the two defendants. There were an email and a draft agreement, but no fees clause in either. Mr. Kay then argued that the lease fees clause provided him fee entitlement, but that did not work because (1) Kay was not a party to either lease; (2) the lease fees clauses did not encompass the cross-complaint claims; and (3) Kay never stood in the shoes of any party to the lease.
Posted at 08:07 AM in Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Section 998: Plaintiff Found Liable For $56,879.86 In Defense Post-Offer Costs In Automobile Collision Case
Plaintiff Failed To Beat $100,000 CCP § 998 Offer Made By Jointly And Severally Liable Defendants.
In Radich v. Foster, Case No. B288794 (2d Dist., Div. 1 July 25, 2019) (unpublished), two plaintiffs were injured from an automobile collision, suing the 20-year-old driver of one car and his parents (who owned the car). Plaintiffs claimed that defendants were jointly and severally liable for their injuries. The father was dismissed from the case along the way. Before an attorney was associated in by defendant mother, defendants driver and mother made two joint CCP §998 offers to the plaintiffs, one for $100,000 and one for $20,000, both of which were signed by the attorney later co-counseled into the case. Plaintiff Radich did not accept the joint offer of $100,000, while the other plaintiff did accept the $20,000 joint offer. Plaintiffs dismissed defendant mother from the case. Radich then won a jury verdict against defendant driver for $75,000 in noneconomic damages, plus routine, preoffer costs of $9,133.70 awarded by the trial judge. Driver filed to recover $56,879.86 in postoffer costs based on Radich not beating the $100,000 section 998 offer, which the lower court awarded. Radich appealed.
The 2/1 DCA rejected the challenges raised on appeal to the section 998 offer.
Even though the attorney making the offer was not formally in the case, the appellate court found that the client/defendant driver ratified the two joint offers and that this was a situation were Radich would have been wise to seek clarification of the offer if he was confused.
Radich then creatively tried to argue, by analogy to CCP § 664.6 [which requires client written consent to a settlement which can be turned into a settlement through a summary proceeding], that the offering party must sign the offer in order to make it valid. No, said the appellate panel. Section 998 only requires that the acceptance be signed by the party or party’s counsel, not the offer itself. The Court of Appeal was unwilling to engraft a requirement not set forth in section 998.
The joint offer was valid based on the joint and several liability theory being advanced against both remaining defendants, at the time of the offer, raised by Radich himself. (Brown v. Nolan, 98 Cal.App.3d 445, 451 (1979).)
Radich also failed to “beat” the 998 offer; he was not entitled to a credit for the separate $20,000 settlement and, even adding in the total requested preoffer costs (the entire $21,304, which was reduced down by the lower court in its award), Radich only got to $96,304—still short of the $100,000 offer.
Posted at 08:03 AM in Cases: Section 998 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Deeds Of Trust, Fee Clause Interpretation: Narrow Nature Of Lender Fee Clauses In Promissory Note And Deed Of Trust Did Not Allow Fee Recovery To Lender Based On Wrongful Foreclosure Tort Claims
Broader Fee Clauses Might Have Resulted In A Different Conclusion!
Byun v. Loma Linda University, Case No. E069549 (4th Dist., Div. 2 July 25, 2019) (unpublished), although unpublished, does offer some drafting tips to lenders where wrongful foreclosure cases are brought by borrowers, who prevail and then want to recoup some attorney’s fees.
Borrower lost a wrongful foreclosure, declaratory relief, cancellation of instruments, and quiet title action against lender after losing real property in a foreclosure sale. The defense prevailed at a bench trial, but the trial court denied the lender side’s request for attorney’s fees of $33,917.76 based on fees clauses under the promissory note and deed of trust. The note provided that the lender was entitled to recovery attorney fees and legal expenses incurred in connection with “hiring or paying someone else to help collect this Note if Borrower does not pay.” The deed of trust fees clause said this: “If Lender institutes any suit or action to enforce any of the terms of this Deed of Trust, Lender shall be entitled to recover such sum as the court may adjudge reasonable as attorneys’ fees at trial and upon any appeal.”
The 4/2 DCA affirmed. Analytically, it found that Civil Code section 1717 did not apply because it only dealt with contract actions, but that still left a consideration of whether the two fees clauses covered the non-contractual claims at issue. The appellate court concluded they did not, based on their narrow breadth. Lender conceded the note clause was not part of collecting on the note, but really only reached tort claims asserted by losing plaintiff. With respect to the deed of trust, the problem was that lender did not institute an action so that the fees clause was not triggered. However, the Court of Appeal, in distinguishing a different result in Jones v. Union Bank of California, 127 Cal.App.4th 542, 544 (2005), did suggest the result might have been very different had the fees clauses extended to “reasonable attorney fees, and all expenses in connection with the protection or realization of the collateral securing the Note” or “proceedings involving Guarantors that in any way affect the exercise by Lender of its rights and remedies hereunder.” Even unpublished decisions provide valuable drafting tips to future parties and litigants with respect to gaining fee recovery—in a word, use broad language!
Posted at 07:26 AM in Cases: Deeds of Trust, Cases: Fee Clause Interpretation | Permalink | Comments (0)
Prevailing Party: Defendants Winning Five-Year Mandatory Dismissal Were Prevailing Parties For Attorney’s Fee Recovery Request Based Upon Lease Fees Clause
Lower Court Erroneously Allowed Plaintiff To Voluntarily Dismiss Without Prejudice.
In Cole v. Hammond, Case No. B292331 (2d Dist., Div. 4 July 24, 2019) (partially published), a trial court denied a defense motion to dismiss the case with prejudice because it had not been tried within five years and granted plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice. The Second District, Division 4, on appeal, reversed those determinations, concluding that it was legally inevitable that the case had to be dismissed based on the five-year statute (CCP § 583.360, which can be very cruel at times). Once this occurred, defendants on remand could choose to move for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party given the existence of a fees clause in the parties’ rental agreement.
Posted at 07:17 AM in Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink | Comments (0)
Liens For Attorney Fees, Retainer Agreements: Broad Retainer Lien Language Relating To A Lien For General Representation Did Allow For Attorney’s Lien Claim Work
Also, Lien Claim Work Can Encompass Unrelated Work To A Specific Litigation Case.
In Callahan & Blaine v. Vogeler, Case No. G055912 (4th Dist., Div. 3 July 24, 2019) (unpublished), attorney-defendant in pro per balked at a contractual breach lawsuit brought by Callahan & Blaine—a well-known Orange County law firm—based on broad attorney lien language in the retention agreement: a lien on the client’s future recoveries, even if not representing the client, and with the lien reaching “general representation and litigation” which included the action at issue where a settlement was reached. Appellant’s technical arguments on why the attorney’s lien did not attach were dismissed because (1) the broad language did give C&B a claim to general representation work, and (2) an attorney’s lien asserted in an action need not be limited only to fees or costs related to that action (Bluxome Street Associates v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 206 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1152-1154 (1988)). Beyond that, C&B gave a discount on their lien in a settlement agreement releasing certain items, so equity did not favor appellant’s technical arguments to the contrary. Acting Presiding Justice Moore was the author of the 3-0 opinion.
Posted at 07:10 AM in Cases: Liens for Attorney Fees, Cases: Retainer Agreements | Permalink | Comments (0)
Reasonableness Of Fees, Special Fee Shifting Statute: Prevailing Defendant In Civil Harassment Proceeding Properly Awarded $10,000 In Fees And $1,100 In Costs
Trial Court’s Conclusion That $181,013.63 Request Was Unreasonable/Inflated Was Affirmed On Appeal.
Folks, we can reiterate that you need to make opening fee requests which are reasonable and bear some semblance of reality to the case involved, subject to aggressive tactics by the other side or complexity/longevity of the case which usually will justify a substantial fee request. The prevailing respondent learned that lesson hard in Felarca v. Worden, Case No. A153633 (1st Dist., Div. 4 July 19, 2019) (unpublished).
Petitioner filed a civil harassment restraining order against respondent, but she dismissed it before there was a merits ruling on her petition. Respondent moved to recover attorney’s fees under CCP § 527.6(s), which is a discretionary fee-shifting provision in favor of a prevailing party in a civil harassment proceeding, CCP § 1032 (costs shifting provision), and CCP § 128.5 (sanctions provision). Respondent sought $181,013.63 in fees, submitting redacted work descriptions and an invoice for work totaling $113,037.50. The lower court found the submission was unreasonable and inflated, awarding $10,000 in fees and $1,100 in costs under the section 527.6(s) fee-shifting provision. Both sides appealed, petitioner claiming that defendant did not prevail, and respondent claiming the fee award was woefully inadequate.
The fee determination was affirmed on appeal.
With respect to petitioner’s appeal, courts for section 527.6(s) fee-shifting purposes do use the CCP § 1032 prevailing party test (Adler v. Vaicius, 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777 (1993)); and, under that test, the respondent did prevail despite the voluntary dismissal. The lower court expressly found that the petition lacked substantial justification, was inspired by “politics,” and the whole matter was unreasonably prolonged by petitioner’s conduct. That was more than enough to establish prevailing party status in respondent’s favor.
Respondent did not gain traction on trying to get more fees. The lower court was not required to use the lodestar analysis in civil harassment proceedings. The severely redacted fee submissions made it impossible to review the work performed, not to mention that asking for such a substantial sum in a non-complex civil harassment proceeding presented the different case of an inflated fee request which allowed for a stark reduction. The appellate court ended with the observation that the lower court would have been within its right to deny the fee request altogether. This brings us to the moral of this story, one we have repeated frequently: when you make a fee submission, remember the nature of the case and what a trial judge will think when you present a greedy request!
Posted at 07:02 AM in Cases: Reasonableness of Fees, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
In The News . . . . Judge In Largest Ohio Libel Judgment Of $25 Million Awards Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Almost $6.3 Million In Attorney’s Fees And $300,000 In Expenses
Fee Award Included A Positive 1.5 Multiplier For Plaintiffs’ Counsel.
Gibson’s Bakery and its owners sued Ohio’s Oberlin College for libel/intentional infliction of emotional distress, winning a jury verdict of around $44 million (compensatory and punitive damages added together). Later, Lorain County Common Pleas Judge John Miraldi reduced the judgment to $25 million—Ohio’s largest libel judgment.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, two law firms and a sole practitioner, then requested attorney’s fees of $9.5-14.5 million for 14,400 in billable hours as well as $404,000 in expenses. Oberlin College countered that a proper fee award should be in the range of $2-2.25 million, although defense counsel admitted billing 15,600 hours on the case.
Judge Miraldi determined that the proper lodestar for plaintiffs’ attorney work was $4,180,930, which he increased to $6,271,395 based on a positive 1.5 multiplier enhancement. He also awarded $294,000 in expenses, about 75% of plaintiffs’ request.
Posted at 06:02 PM in Cases: Class Actions | Permalink | Comments (0)
Family Law: Section 271 Sanctions Of $1,000 Assessed Against Ex-Husband’s Counsel Was Reversed On Appeal
Section 271 Sanctions Can Only Be Awarded Against A Party; Proper Remedy Is To Seek CCP § 128.5 Sanctions Against Counsel.
A family law judge assessed Family Code section 271 sanctions of $1,000 against ex-husband’s attorney. That award was reversed in Martinez-Huff v. Huff, Case No. B284241 (2d Dist., Div. 3 July 18, 2019) (unpublished) because section 271 sanctions can only be assessed against a party, not a party’s counsel. (Burkle v. Burkle, 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 403 n. 7 (2006); Orange County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Superior Court, 129 Cal.App.4th 798, 808 (2005).) The proper remedy was to seek CCP § 128.5 sanctions against counsel, something which was not done. (In re Marriage of Daniels, 19 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110 (1993) [construing predecessor statute].)
Posted at 05:42 PM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 05:22 PM in Cases: Consumer Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Offeree, Although Might Prudently Ask For Clarification, Is Under No Legal Obligation To Ask For Clarification Of Section 998 Offer.
The defense in an automobile personal injury accident case involving two plaintiffs made a CCP § 998 offer to the more severely injured plaintiff which was conditioned upon “the execution and transmittal of a Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims by PLAINTIFF in favor of DEFENDANTS; that Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims to be drafted by counsel for the DEFENDANTS.” The trial judge, after the severely injured plaintiff obtained a favorable jury verdict, found the section 998 offer to be uncertain, awarding $29,000 in costs to plaintiff and denying the defense $160,000 in requested costs.
The Fourth District, Division 2 affirmed the uncertainty determination in Soliz v. City of Big Bear Lake, Case No. E067555 (4th Dist., Div. 2 July 16, 2019) (unpublished).
Relying on Sanford v. Rasnick, 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131-1132 (2016), the appellate court concluded that the offer was invalid because it was conditioned on an undescribed and unrevealed settlement agreement, unlike the situation in Fasberg Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal.App.4th 720, 765 (2007) where the section 998 offer included the proposed settlement agreement so that the offeree could evaluate the full terms of the 998 offer. The defense tried to argue that the offeree was obligated to seek clarification of the offer, but the 4/2 DCA panel found no such legal obligation to exist given that the offeror is responsible for ensuring that the 998 offer is valid. In response to the argument that not requiring the offeree to ask for clarification would discourage settlement of lawsuits, the Court of Appeal answered that this was untrue because an offeree risks that a lower court might find an offer to be valid if the offeree does not ask for clarification—in a word, the offeree also has risks in not seeking clarification.
Posted at 05:25 PM in Cases: Section 998 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: County’s Adherence To Privileges And Exemptions Until Last Moment Did Not Prevent California Public Records Act Petitioner From Receiving Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner Was A Catalyst For Production Of Requested Documents.
California Public Records Act has a fee-shifting statute in favor of a prevailing party petitioner under Government Code section 6259(d), one which is liberally construed in order to encourage governmental entities to produce documents to the public except for ones which fall under certain restrictions/exemptions. In Saint-Fleur v. County of Fresno, Case No. F075060 (5th Dist. July 15, 2019) (unpublished), plaintiff was declared the prevailing party and awarded fees against County, after the lower court ordered County to produce certain public records. County claimed that it had produced documents in response to previous litigation, but the record showed that it had claimed privileges/exemptions and only at the eleventh hour confirmed that the documents ordered to be produced had indeed been produced in other litigation. The Fifth District found the fee award appropriate given that petitioner could not have known this and was the catalyst for County’s confirmation about the nature of the responsive documents.
Posted at 05:19 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: Governmental District Properly Awarded $8,160 In Discretionary Attorney’s Fees Against Plaintiff Losing Brown Act Challenge
Plaintiff Wanted Agenda Detail Not Required Under The Brown Act.
In Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services Dist., Case No. C086760 (3d Dist. July 15, 2019) (unpublished), plaintiff’s Brown Act challenge against the District was blown out when the lower court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. The Brown Act has a discretionary fee-shifting provision by which a trial judge can award court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees where a defendant prevailed in the action and the court finds that the action was “clearly frivolous and totally lacking in merit.” (Gov. Code, §54960.5.) The lower court must provide some written findings on what conduct was found “sanctionable” under this provision. (Boyle v. City of Redondo Beach, 70 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1120 (1999).) The trial judge in Olson determined that the Brown Act did not require the agenda detail claimed by plaintiff, awarding $8,160 in discretionary fees to the District. That determination was affirmed on appeal because it was based on the record and the trial court’s tentative was detailed in showing why the agenda specification advanced by plaintiff was not required.
Posted at 05:15 PM in Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes | Permalink | Comments (0)
Intellectual Property: U.S. Court Of Federal Claims Senior Judge Lettow Awards Significant Attorney’s Fees, Expert Fees, And Costs In Favor Of Successful Patent Infringement Plaintiff And Against The USA
Senior Judge Found That Litigation Funding Did Not Divest Plaintiff From Fee Recovery And That AIPLA Survey Of Hourly Rates Was Most Relevant Starting Point For Gauging Rates.
Because litigation funding is becoming an increasingly used tool to allow plaintiffs to prosecute complex civil cases, we post on FastShip LLC v. U.S., No. 12-484C (U.S. Court of Federal Claims June 27, 2019), authored by Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.
In this case, plaintiff FastShip sued the U.S. for patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), which allows the patent owner to sue the U.S. under specified conditions for infringing a patent without a license. Plaintiff eventually won almost $6.5 million in damages, which actually became larger after an appeal and other activities. Plaintiff financed expenses partly through the use of a litigation funding entity (around $600,000). Plaintiff then moved to recover almost $7 million in attorney’s fees, almost $1.75 million in expert fees, and $2.43 million in costs (mainly electronic discovery and specialized computer display expenses).
The basis for fee entitlement was section 1498(a), which was amended in 1996, to allow recovery of an owner’s reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if the owner is an independent investor, a nonprofit organization, or an entity having less than 500 employees in a five-year period (which FastShip was), which costs are automatic if the action was pending for more than 10 years or if the court finds that the U.S.’s position was not substantially justified. Under this fee-shifting provision, Senior Judge Lettow awarded FastShip $6,178,288.29 in attorney’s fees and related costs (mainly expert fees, with $5,713,339.60 being the attorney’s fees component) and $1,229,679.07 in costs.
In doing so, he determined as follows:
FastShip was a real party allowed to recover fees and costs, with its utilization of litigation funding not making that entity the one who had to recover costs, reasoning that litigation funding in this instance allowed the plaintiff to take on the government in a daunting case fought hard on both sides;
Prelitigation administration activities do not count for calculating the 10-year automatic fee/costs time frame;
Based on pre-litigation positions and several mistaken litigation activities such as stubbornly relying on experts ultimately contradicting the U.S.’s positions, the government was not substantially justified in its defense of the case;
FastShip did not have to be successful on all subsidiary claims to be entitled to a fees and costs award;
The American Intellectual Property Law Association’s (AIPLA’s) hourly rate survey was found to be the most relevant and persuasive for patent attorney hourly rates; and
FastShip could not recover supplemental costs ad infinitum from each subsequent filing such that an omnibus supplemental request at the end was denied.
In a footnote, Senior Judge Lettow did observe that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have rules requiring the disclosure of litigation financing agreements with third parties that have a financial interest in the outcome, although nothing in these rules ban or disfavor litigation financing agreements.
Posted at 06:28 PM in Cases: Intellectual Property | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 07:58 PM in Cases: Discovery, Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Homeowner Associations: Homeowners Were Not Catalysts For Easement Agreement Assumption, Because They Wanted A More Expansive Amendment
HOA Was Prevailing Party Under Easement Agreement Fees Clause, Awarded Its Fully Requested $51,460 In Fees.
In Lemley v. Aliso Homeowners Assn., Inc., Case No. B288789 (2d Dist., Div. 3 July 3, 2019; posted July 5, 2019) (unpublished), HOA and homeowners got entangled in an easement agreement dispute in which homeowners wanted specific performance/declaratory relief to enforce an amendment to the agreement, while HOA defended on the principal grounds of mootness because it recorded an assumption of obligations in the original easement agreement. HOA won, was declared the prevailing party, and was awarded $51,460 in attorney’s fees under the easement agreement fees clause. Homeowners appealed, claiming they were actually the prevailing parties as the catalyst for the HOA’s easement agreement assumption. The appellate court affirmed the result below, determining that homeowners wanted an amendment, not an assumption, and that HOA did prevail by obtaining dismissal of homeowners’ suit. (In fact, homeowners’ failure to appeal the prior dismissal on the merits cemented that they were not the catalysts for the assumption by the HOA.)
Posted at 03:16 PM in Cases: Homeowner Associations | Permalink | Comments (0)
Section 1717: Borrower’s California Homeowners Bill Of Rights Claims Were Not “On The Contract” For Civil Code Section 1717 Fee Recovery Purposes
Borrower Did Not Invoke Directly The Terms of Agreements With Fee Clauses.
In Thomas v. Seterus, Inc., Case No. A155170 (1st Dist., Div. 2 July 2, 2019) (unpublished), lenders moved for post-trial attorney’s fees based on note and trust deed fees clauses against a borrower bringing claims based on the California Homeowners Bill of Rights (HBOR). Lenders sought to recoup $334,557.50 in fees, but the trial court concluded that borrower’s claims were not “on the contract” under Civil Code section 1717. The appellate court agreed. Even though the note and trust deed were in the background all along the way, borrower was careful only to invoke HBOR rather than invoking the fee clauses under the loan agreements.
Posted at 09:07 AM in Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 09:03 AM in Cases: Fee Clause Interpretation | Permalink | Comments (0)
Consumer Statutes, Multipliers: $327,782.75 Lemon Law Fee Award, Inclusive Of A 1.5 Positive Multiplier, Affirmed On Appeal Where $109,357.05 Was Compensatory Award
Plaintiff’s Counsel Showed Why Defense Maneuvers And Jury Verdict Made The Case Beyond A Typical Lemon Law Case.
We have said this frequently in the past on prior blogs, but for clients and practitioners defending Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act “lemon law” cases, you need to be attuned to fee exposure, including positive multipliers, when engaging in battle with an auto purchaser plaintiff.
Fuller v. FCA US LLC, Case No. B286224 (2d Dist., Div. 4 July 2, 2019) (unpublished) involved a situation where an auto purchaser plaintiff in a “lemon law” case obtained a jury award of $109,357.05, She then moved for attorney’s fees under a pro-plaintiff fee shifting statute, Civil Code section 1794(d) as well as a positive 1.5 multiplier. After expressing doubt about whether a multiplier was justified, the trial court awarded the lodestar and requested multiplier to the tune of $327,782.75.
The 2/4 DCA affirmed. Plaintiff’s counsel did a good job of showing why this was not a typical lemon law case based on strategic decisions made by defense counsel and getting the trial judge to admit she was surprised at the verdict (which showed good trial skills). The record at the fee hearing was crucial, getting the lower court to find this was not your typical lemon law case, resulting in a positive multiplier which the defense could not change on appeal.
Posted at 09:00 AM in Cases: Consumer Statutes, Cases: Multipliers | Permalink | Comments (0)
SLAPP: Mandatory Defense Award Of Only $1,875 In Fees For Five Hours Of Work Reversed
Appellate Court Had No Problem With $9,000 SLAPP Request For 24 Hours Of Work.
Just to show you that abuse of discretion is not an unlimited deferential standard of review, we post on Kohanbash v. Specialty Baking, Inc., Case No. B283117 (2d Dist., Div. 1 July 1, 2019) (unpublished). What happened in this case is that the lower court granted a successful SLAPP prevailing party only $1,875 in fees for five hours of work on the SLAPP motion, about an 80% reduction from the $9,000 in fees claimed for 24 hours of work. This case was not only reversed, but it was remanded with appellate instructions to grant the entire $9,000 fee request. The appellate court had real difficulty determining that five hours only in SLAPP work was all that should be compensated given that overall reasonableness of the fee request.
Posted at 08:55 AM in Cases: SLAPP | Permalink | Comments (0)