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Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985)
As a result of the shooting, Dr. Isaacs sustained severe injuries, including the loss of a kidney. He and his wife brought an action against the hospital and its insurance carrier, Truck Insurance Exchange (hereafter Exchange). The Isaacs alleged that the hospital failed to provide adequate security measures to protect its invitees and licensees against the criminal acts of third persons on its premises. Exchange was negligent, they contended, for participating in the hospital's decision to disarm its security guards. Plaintiffs [38 Cal. 3d 121] alleged that this decision directly contributed to the inadequacy of the security measures.
Hospital personnel conceded that the emergency room area was frequented by persons under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Dr. Charles Bergquist, [38 Cal. 3d 122] who was at the hospital on the night of the shooting, testified that upon entering the hospital that night, "many people [were] milling around ... drinking out of bottles and brown paper packages." Dr. Bergquist described the scene as "scary" and "physically threatening." He also testified that this was not unusual activity.
Finally, plaintiffs presented testimony from two experts in security matters. Both concluded that the hospital's security on the night of the shooting was "totally inadequate." They based their conclusions on (1) the insufficient number of guards, in view of the responsibilities assigned to them and [38 Cal. 3d 123] the size of the premises; fn. 4 (2) inadequate administration of the security force; (3) failure to arm the guards with defensive weapons; (4) inadequate television monitoring of the parking lot areas; (5) a lack of any means of communication with the police department on an emergency basis; and (6) an absence of signs warning that the area was guarded. One expert concluded that these aspects rendered the research parking lot "totally devoid of any deterrents or security" on the night of the shooting.
[1a] The primary question presented by this appeal is whether foreseeability, for the purposes of establishing a landowner's liability for the criminal acts of third persons on the landowner's property, may be established other than by evidence of prior similar incidents on those premises. Since foreseeability is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46 [123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36]), it is helpful to review the law in this area.
[2] It is well settled that an owner of land has a duty "to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of third persons which threaten invitees where the [owner] has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom." (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 114, 121 [52 Cal. Rptr. 561, 416 P.2d 793].) This duty is premised on the special relationship between the landowner and the invitee [38 Cal. 3d 124] (see Rest.2d Torts, §§ 314A, 315) and the general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of one's property (see Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a); fn. 5 Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 799, 806-807 [205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193]).
[5] Whether such a duty exists is a question of law to be determined on a case-by-case basis. (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 46.) [6] In considering whether one owes another a duty of care, several factors must be weighed, including: "'"[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences [38 Cal. 3d 125] to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]" (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; [citations].)'" (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 806.)
[7] It is clear that foreseeability is but one factor to be weighed in determining whether a landowner owes a duty in a particular case. "In this balancing process, foreseeability is an elastic factor. (2 Harper & James [Law of Torts (1956)] § 18.2, at p. 1026.) The degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the finding of a duty will thus vary from case to case. For example, in cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. [Citation.] On the other hand, in cases where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required." (Gomez v. Ticor (1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629-630 [193 Cal. Rptr. 600].) Thus, foreseeability is a somewhat flexible concept.
[1b] A recent line of Court of Appeal cases has rigidified the foreseeability concept in situations involving a landowner's liability for the criminal acts of third persons against invitees. Those cases have established the rule that "in the absence of prior similar incidents, an owner of land is not bound to anticipate the criminal activities of third persons, particularly where the wrongdoer was a complete stranger to both the landowner and the victim and where the criminal activity leading to the injury came about precipitously." (Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 37, 43 [176 Cal. Rptr. 320]; accord Anaya v. Turk (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 1092, 1099 [199 Cal. Rptr. 187]; Riley v. Marcus (1981) 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109 & fn. 2 [177 Cal. Rptr. 827]; Jamison v. Mark C. Bloome Co. (1980) 112 Cal. App. 3d 570, 578-580 [169 Cal. Rptr. 399]; Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc. (1976) 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 543 [134 Cal. Rptr. 29]; Rogers v. Jones (1976) 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 351-352 [128 Cal. Rptr. 404]; see also Jubert v. Shalom Realty (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6 [185 Cal. Rptr. 641].)
This rule is fatally flawed in numerous respects. First, the rule leads to results which are contrary to public policy. The rule has the effect of discouraging landowners from taking adequate measures to protect premises which they know are dangerous. This result contravenes the policy of preventing future harm. Moreover, under the rule, the first victim always loses, while subsequent victims are permitted recovery. Such a result is not only unfair, but is inimical to the important policy of compensating injured parties [38 Cal. 3d 126] (Peterson v. San Francisco Community Cffollege Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 814). Surely, a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held liable for criminal acts which occur on his property.
[1c] Finally, the "prior similar incidents" rule improperly removes too many cases from the jury's consideration. [9] It is well established that foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact. (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 49, 56 [192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947]; Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 46.) "It may be decided as a question of law only if, 'under the undisputed facts there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.' [Citations.]" (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 56.)
[1d] There is a general reluctance to remove foreseeability questions from the jury. (See Cohen v. Southland Corp. (1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 140-141 [203 Cal. Rptr. 572].) [10a] Foreseeability " 'is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful [person] would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.' [Citation.] One may be held accountable for creating even '"the risk of a slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent [person] would not do so."'" (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 57.)
[1e] Thus, foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and not by a rigid application of a mechanical "prior similars" rule. (Cf. [38 Cal. 3d 127] Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 57-58.) As this court has held, "what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm ... not its precise nature or manner of occurrence." (Ibid.) Prior similar incidents are helpful to determine foreseeability but they are not necessary. A rule that limits evidence of foreseeability to prior similar incidents deprives the jury of its role in determining that question.
A number of Courts of Appeal have properly recognized that evidence of prior similar incidents is not the sine qua non of a finding of foreseeability. (Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 329 [176 Cal. Rptr. 494]; Gomez v. Ticor, supra, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 630; see also Cohen v. Southland Corp., supra, 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 140-142.) These cases express the better view.
In Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., supra, 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, the plaintiff was raped and robbed in the lobby of her apartment building. She sued her landlords, alleging that they had notice that (1) the lock of the lobby entrance door was defective at the time of the attack, (2) the apartment building was in a "high crime area," and (3) that an assault and robbery had occurred previously in another common area of the building. The trial court sustained the landlords' demurrer without leave to amend. (Id., at pp. 325-326.)
Two Courts of Appeal have echoed similar concerns. (Gomez v. Ticor, supra, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 630; Cohen v. Southland Corp., supra, 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 140-142.) These courts have adhered to the Rowland analysis of landowner duty, weighing foreseeability with other factors. (See Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113; ante, at p. 124.) Both courts have also emphasized that foreseeability should be determined by the jury in light of all the circumstances.
In Gomez, robbers shot and killed their victim as he was returning to his car in the parking structure of an office building. Plaintiffs, the victim's [38 Cal. 3d 128] survivors, introduced evidence of the "high-crime character" of the neighborhood and of specific instances of theft and vandalism. Reversing summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Court of Appeal held that despite the plaintiffs' failure to present evidence of prior assaults on the premises, a question of fact remained as to the foreseeability of the attack. (145 Cal.App.3d at p. 632.)
In Cohen v. Southland Corp., supra, 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, a customer in a 7-Eleven store was shot while attempting to prevent an armed robbery. The customer sued the owner, the franchisee and an employee of the store, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to protect store patrons from assault or other threatening behavior by would-be robbers. (Id., at p. 134.)
The Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Since robberies had previously occurred at the particular store, fn. 6 and nighttime robberies of other 7-Eleven stores were frequent, the court held that the evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to foreseeability of the injury. (Cohen, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.) Noting the general reluctance to remove foreseeability questions from the jury, the court reasoned [38 Cal. 3d 129] that "[i]n the very operation of an allnight convenience store, defendants may be said to have created 'an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct,' thus increasing the foreseeability of injury resulting from third party misconduct ...." (Id., at pp. 140-141, quoting Prosser, Torts, supra, § 33, p. 174.)
A judgment of nonsuit removes the case from the trier of fact. For this reason, courts have traditionally taken a very restrictive view of the circumstances under which such a judgment is proper. [13] Thus, it is established that a trial court may not grant a defendant's motion for nonsuit if the plaintiff's evidence would support a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor. (Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 112, 117-118 [184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 649 P.2d 224, 35 A.L.R.4th 1036]; Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 389, 395 [143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155].) [38 Cal. 3d 130]
Further, two of the lights on the building adjacent to the research parking lot, which normally illuminated that area, were not working on the evening Dr. Isaacs was shot. Two witnesses testified that the research parking lot itself had poor lighting. "That a mugger thrives in dark places is a matter of common knowledge." (Slapin v. Los Angeles International Airport (1976) 65 Cal. App. 3d 484, 488 [135 Cal. Rptr. 296].) In addition, the research parking lot was devoid of any security at the time of Dr. Isaacs' shooting. This contrasted markedly with the security at another parking lot on the hospital's premises, where a security guard was stationed during shift changes and activity was monitored by a television camera. This information, all of which was known or should have been known to the hospital, was sufficient to provide notice of a risk of an assault in the research parking lot.
Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Dr. Isaacs' assault was not foreseeable. fn. 7 "'[J]ust as we may not [38 Cal. 3d 131] rely upon our private judgment on this issue, so the trial court may not impose its private judgment upon a situation, such as this, in which reasonable minds may differ.' [Citation.]" (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 59.)
[15] Once a court finds that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff, it is for the factfinder to decide whether the security measures were reasonable under the circumstances. (See Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p. 53.) The jury must decide whether the security was adequate. [38 Cal. 3d 132]
[18] Plaintiffs next challenge the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of incidents which occurred four years prior to the shooting of Dr. Isaacs. The trial court ruled that the cutoff point was three years. [38 Cal. 3d 133]
Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b) permits an expert to rely upon inadmissible evidence if it is "of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates ...." (See also 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, supra, § 29.4, pp. 1026-1027.) Plaintiffs' expert would clearly have been entitled to testify about information that he had read in a California Department of Justice report. However, what he learned from an unidentified contact in an [38 Cal. 3d 134] unidentified police department scarcely constitutes the sort of material that may be reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming his opinion. (Cf. People v. Odom (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 100, 115-116 [166 Cal. Rptr. 283].) On remand, the trial court should exclude this evidence.
[22] Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 362, 374 [182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822].) [23] The court must strictly construe the affidavits of the moving party and liberally construe those of his opponent. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 432, 437 [74 Cal. Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271].)
A defendant cannot be held liable for the defective or dangerous condition of property which it did not own, possess, or control. Where the absence of ownership, possession, or control has been unequivocally established, summary judgment is proper. (Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal. App. 3d 258, 269 [83 Cal. Rptr. 237]; Bill v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1014-1015 [187 Cal. Rptr. 625]; Peterson v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal. App. 2d 757, 773-777 [66 Cal. Rptr. 776]; see also Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 36 Cal. 2d 553, 555-557 [225 P.2d 522].)
Here, the vice president of Exchange declared that his company had no ownership or possessory interest in the hospital's premises and exercised no authority or control over the hospital's security practices. He further declared that Exchange took no part in deciding what security measures were to be implemented at the hospital, such as "the number, duties or weapons carried by [the] security officers." He concluded that the only relationship between Exchange and the hospital was that of insurer and insured. [38 Cal. 3d 135]
Plaintiffs' evidence strongly suggests that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the assault on Dr. Isaacs was foreseeable. Accordingly, the judgment of nonsuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. The summary judgment in favor of defendant Exchange is affirmed. [38 Cal. 3d 136]
FN 1. The trial judge ruled that any references to prior criminal activity would be limited to "assaultive crimes or thefts" which occurred in the parking lots or in the emergency room area, "and if there are any others I would not want reference to them unless we had a hearing outside the hearing of the jury."
FN 2. During shift changes for about a two-hour period, one guard was always stationed in the employee parking lot. The shooting occurred during one of these two-hour periods.
FN 3. The guards were originally permitted to carry firearms. In September of 1977, however, the hospital administration decided to disarm the guards. (See post, at p. 135.)
FN 4. In 1978, the hospital had a capacity of 565 beds and employed approximately 1,600 people. The hospital complex consisted of 25 to 30 acres, which included at least 5 parking lots. One of the experts opined that a security guard should have been stationed at each parking lot.
FN 5. Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: "Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself."
FN 6. The defendants had argued that the injury was unforeseeable because no prior injury-producing armed robberies had occurred at that 7-Eleven store. (157 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.)
FN 7. This is not to suggest that nonsuit will always be improper in such cases. The information available to the landowner must suggest that "he should reasonably [have] anticipate[d] careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons ...." (Rest.2d Torts, § 344, com. (f).) In addition, foreseeability must still be weighed with the other Rowland factors in determining whether a duty existed. (See post, at pp. 131-132.)
FN 8. In granting the hospital's motion for nonsuit, the trial court stated that plaintiffs had failed to introduce evidence as to causation. But as Bigbee makes clear, "[a]n affirmative finding on foreseeability by the jury would obviously establish ... a sufficiently 'close[] connection between the defendant[s'] conduct and the injury suffered.'" (Bigbee, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 59-60, fn. 14.) Thus, the erroneous foreseeability conclusion necessarily calls into question the trial court's conclusion on causation. In any event, the question of whether defendants' alleged breach of duty caused the injury was a factual one. (Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 44, 53 [150 Cal. Rptr. 722].) The evidence of foreseeability was sufficient to withstand a motion for nonsuit on the issue of causation. Thus, the trial court's finding on this point cannot be upheld.
FN 9. Evidence Code section 802 provides: "A witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter ... upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion. The court in its discretion may require that a witness before testifying in the form of an opinion be first examined concerning the matter upon which his opinion is based."
FN 10. Relying on out-of-state authority, plaintiffs argue that an insurer should be subject to liability "where it did not merely perform an insurance function [but] undertook to assume or participate in control over the affairs of its insured." Even assuming the applicability of that authority here, the facts do not support the contention. There was no evidence that Exchange had any degree of control over the affairs of the hospital. The evidence shows only that Exchange insured the hospital and may have at some point explained to the hospital the scope of that coverage. The question of whether liability arises from an insurer's participation in the affairs of its insured is not presented by this case.