Source: http://openjurist.org/138/f3d/1410/united-states-v-sanchez
Timestamp: 2016-05-04 10:15:41
Document Index: 135549828

Matched Legal Cases: ['art, 923', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 924', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 851']

138 F3d 1410 United States v. Sanchez | OpenJurist
138 F. 3d 1410 - United States v. Sanchez HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series138 F.3d
138 F3d 1410 United States v. Sanchez 138 F.3d 1410
11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1257
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Miguel SANCHEZ, Jose Manuel Duran, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 95-5546.
Outrageous Government Conduct--This Court recognizes the defense of outrageous governmental conduct, a defense interrelated with the sentencing manipulation theory. This defense focuses on the tactics employed by law enforcement officials to obtain a conviction for conduct beyond the defendant's predisposition. The question, however, is whether the methods comport with the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1642-43, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) ("While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, ... the instant case is distinctly not of that breed") (citation omitted). United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir.) ("Whether outrageous governmental conduct exists 'turns upon the totality of the circumstances with no single factor controlling' and the defense 'can only be invoked in the rarest and most outrageous circumstances.' "), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S.Ct. 563, 83 L.Ed.2d 504 (1984). The government contends and neither Sanchez nor Duran dispute that they failed to seek dismissal of the indictment in the district court on the ground of outrageous governmental conduct, and their appeal of this issue is therefore barred. Defendants would not prevail even were we to reach the merits of their claim. While the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized the possibility that government involvement in a criminal scheme might be so pervasive that it would be a constitutional violation, that standard has not yet been met in any case either before the Supreme Court or this Court. See United States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633 (1982). Government infiltration of criminal activity is a recognized and permissible means of investigation, see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. at 1643; United States v. Puett, 735 F.2d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir.1984), and frequently requires that the government agent furnish something of value to the criminal. See Puett, 735 F.2d at 1335. The fact that government agents may supply or sell illegal drugs or provide other essential services does not necessarily constitute misconduct. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1649-50, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976). Moreover, challenges to the "reverse sting" method of police investigation have been rejected by this Court on numerous occasions. See United States v. Savage, 701 F.2d 867, 869-70 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Gianni 678 F.2d at 960; United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1314-15 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2929, 73 L.Ed.2d 1330 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.1984).
Sentencing Entrapment--Sentencing entrapment is the claim that "a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped into committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment." United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 967, 111 S.Ct. 1599, 113 L.Ed.2d 662 (1991). See United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103,1106 (9th Cir.1994) (citing the definition in Stuart); see generally Defending a Sentence: The Judicial Establishment of Sentencing Entrapment and Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1359 (May 1997). The focus of sentencing entrapment is the predisposition of the defendant to commit the greater offense. The government alleges that this issue was not properly preserved on appeal. Notwithstanding the government's position, defendants' claim must fail as a matter of law because this Circuit has rejected sentence entrapment as a viable defense. See United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 123, 136 L.Ed.2d 73 (1996).
Sentencing Factor Manipulation--While sentencing entrapment focuses on the defendant's predisposition, sentencing factor manipulation focuses on the government's conduct. "It requires us to consider whether the manipulation inherent in a sting operation, even if insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense, ... or due process claim, ... must sometimes be filtered out of the sentencing calculus." United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir.1992) (coining the phrase). Such a claim points to "the opportunities that the sentencing guidelines pose for prosecutors to gerrymander the district court's sentencing options and thus, defendant's sentences." Connell, 960 F.2d at 194.
Several circuits have recognized some form of sentencing manipulation as an arguably valid defense, see United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir.1994); and United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir.1993), while the Tenth Circuit analyzes such claims under an outrageous conduct standard, see United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 331, 136 L.Ed.2d 244 (1996); and the Seventh Circuit has rejected the defense outright, see United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 158, 136 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). No court of appeals has overturned a conviction or departed downward on the basis of a sentencing manipulation claim. This Court has not addressed this theory directly, the only reference to the defense being made in United States v. Miller where we merely observed that defendant failed to make clear the distinction between his sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation arguments in the context of that case. 71 F.3d 813, 818 & n. 2. It does not appear from the record that this basis for a downward departure from sentencing was raised below, but even assuming it were properly before us on this appeal, defendants would not prevail. The fact that the government's fictitious reverse sting operation involved a large quantity of drugs does not amount to the type of manipulative governmental conduct warranting a downward departure in sentencing.
Amount of Drugs Used for Sentencing--The defendants argue that because there was no actual cocaine involved, their sentences were invalid under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), a penalty provision that refers to offenses involving five kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. They argue the penalty applies only to substantive offenses and not to conspiracy offenses. Their argument is defeated by the plain language of the conspiracy statute 21 U.S.C. § 846, which provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy...." We need not heed defendants' suggestion to consult the legislative history of the penalty provisions of section 841(b) where the language of the statute clearly expresses the legislative intent. See United States v. Rush, 874 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir.1989).
Guillermo Diaz challenges his conviction and sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government concedes that Diaz cannot be convicted under section 924(c)'s use prong after Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), and its progeny, but the question presented here is whether the conviction is valid under the statute's "carry" prong. While we have held that a firearm in a glove compartment of an automobile has been "carried," see United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 241, 136 L.Ed.2d 170 (1996), we have not addressed the issue whether a firearm transported in the trunk would be "carried" under the statute. The other circuits are split on this issue. The First Circuit, faced with virtually identical facts, determined that firearms transported in the trunk of a vehicle to a drug deal were carried for purposes of section 924(c). United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir.1997), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 621, 139 L.Ed.2d 506 (1997). As the court observed in Cleveland, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, "while not explicitly deciding the issue one way or the other, appear to be leaning toward adopting the same approach," see, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 103-04 (5th Cir.) (a pre-Bailey case holding that the circuit's cases requiring showing that gun within defendant's reach during commission of drug offense did not apply when gun "carried" in a vehicle), cert. denied sub nom., Ramirez-Carranza v. United States, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1990, 118 L.Ed.2d 587 (1992); United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1327-28 (5th Cir.1996) (post-Bailey case upholding defendant's conviction under section 924(c)(1) for "carrying" gun that was within his reach in car but not stating that accessibility was requirement); and United States v. Willis, 89 F.3d 1371, 1377-79 (8th Cir.), (relying on pre-Bailey case law to hold that transporting firearm in passenger compartment of vehicle satisfies "carry" prong of section 924(c)(1) but not addressing weapon's accessibility), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 273, 136 L.Ed.2d 196 (1996); Cleveland, 106 F.3d at 1067. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held to the contrary, requiring that the firearms be immediately accessible. See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-78, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 135, 136 L.Ed.2d 83 (1996); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623-24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 136, 136 L.Ed.2d 84 (1996); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 318, 136 L.Ed.2d 233 (1996).
While this question is presently pending before the Supreme Court in two consolidated cases United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir.1997) (firearm in trunk of vehicle), and United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir.1997) (firearm in glove compartment), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 621, 139 L.Ed.2d 506 (1997), we are inclined to follow the lead of the First, Fifth and Eighth Circuits until a decision from the Supreme Court to the contrary. Turning to the facts of this case, we hold that where the evidence established that defendant transferred the firearms to the trunk of the car of the confidential informant and then traveled in the car to meet the co-defendants prior to the planned invasion, the section 924(c) carrying requirement is met.
As for Diaz's attack on witnesses' testimony, any weaknesses in the testimony of the confidential informant or contradictions in the testimony of the agents that testified involve credibility decisions that are matters for the jury. See United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552,1557 n. 3 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied sub nom. Perez-Aguilera v. United States, 515 U.S. 1145, 115 S.Ct. 2584, 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995). The jury's verdict indicates it found these witnesses credible.
Defendant Jose Manuel Duran claims that because neither the government nor the court complied with the procedural requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851, he was erroneously sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment. Duran was sentenced to life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which provides in relevant part that a defendant who commits a violation involving 5 kilograms or more of cocaine or 1000 kilograms of marijuana after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.
The procedure for establishing prior convictions in 21 U.S.C. § 851 requires that the United States Attorney file an information with the court and serve a copy to defendant or his counsel stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. § 851(a)(1). Once the information is filed, the court shall, after conviction but before sentencing, inquire of the defendant whether he affirms or denies that he had been previously convicted as alleged in the information and inform defendant that any challenge to a prior conviction must be made before sentence is imposed. § 851(b). To challenge the validity of any conviction, defendant must file a written response to the information. Once the response is filed and served on the government, the court must hold a hearing to determine any issues raised by the response that would except the defendant from any increased punishment. The United States attorney has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact, and at the request of either party, the court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. § 851(c)(1).
If defendant claims that a conviction alleged in the information was obtained unconstitutionally, he shall "set forth his claim, and the factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to the information. The person shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on any issue of fact raised by the response." Any challenge to a prior conviction, not raised by response to the information before an increased sentence is imposed in reliance thereon, shall be waived, unless good cause is shown for the failure to make a timely challenge. § 851(c)(2). The language of the statute is mandatory, requiring strict compliance with the procedural requirements of sections 851(a) and (b). See United States v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466, 1481 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Sikes v. United States, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct. 972, 112 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1991).
21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) & (2).
Miguel Sanchez alleges the district court erred in failing to depart downward from his sentence based on the following factors: his age and maturity at the time the prior offenses were committed, the fact that the crimes were committed within two years of each other, and that his offense level was augmented by the career offender provision. See United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440 (3d Cir.1993) (downward departure justified under section 4A1.3 when a defendant's criminal history category significantly over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's past conduct and future threat to society). The court acknowledged that a 30-year sentence was harsh but found that the two prior felonies were serious and that departure in this case would not be appropriate. Absent an allegation that the court erred in concluding it lacked authority to depart downward, we are without grounds to review the district court's refusal to depart downward. See United States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 919 (11th Cir.1993). Regarding Sanchez's claim that his prior conspiracy offenses should not have been counted toward his Career Offender status, it is not clear from the record that these offenses were part of the calculation, but if they were, such use would be valid. See United States v. Weir, 51 F.3d 1031, 1032 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1120, 116 S.Ct. 928, 133 L.Ed.2d 856 (1996). Sanchez's argument that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was not raised in district court and we decline to consider it here.