Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/08/05-2130.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-22 19:13:53
Document Index: 613961407

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

05-2130 -- Fernandez v. Mora-San Miguel Electric Cooperative -- 08/29/2006
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (45909 bytes) (37354 bytes)
MARK FERNANDEZ; DON ABREU,
MORA-SAN MIGUEL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.; FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; LUCERO PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, LTD.; CARL ARMIJO, in his individual and official capacities,
MORA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; ERNESTO GONZALES; LEVI ALCON; YVETTE ALCON,
No. 05-2130
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1334 RB/WDS)
Michael E. Mozes, Law Offices of Michael E. Mozes, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellants.
David A. Rammelkamp, Elizabeth A. Heaphy, Rammelkamp, Muehlenweg & Cordova, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee Lucero Professional Services, Ltd.
A. First, both Fernandez and Abreu assert that LPS violated the EPPA. The district court granted summary judgment to LPS on the grounds that the EPPA only covers "employers" and that LPS was not an "employer" as defined by that statute. Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This court reviews "the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court." Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). "[W]e view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
Other courts have adopted the "economic reality" test to determine whether a polygraph examiner is an "employer" for purposes of the EPPA. This test focuses on whether "as a matter of economic reality, that person or entity exerts some degree of control over the employer's compliance with EPPA." Rubin v. Torneau, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 247, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). It stems from cases interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act, which defines "employer" the same way as the EPPA. See id. at 252 ("Just as the phrase 'acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee' is applied to effect FLSA's purpose, so too, . . . must it be applied to effect EPPA's purpose--restricting the use of lie detectors in the work place."). Given Congress's use of the same language in defining the term "employer" in the two statutes, and because we agree with the reasoning of other courts that have adopted this test, we approve using the economic reality test in evaluating whether a polygraph examiner is an "employer" for purposes of EPPA.
Calbillo v. Cavender Oldsmobile, Inc., 288 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). Like the Fifth Circuit, we "do not, and need not, further define the scope of the 'economic reality' test" to consider whether LPS qualifies as an employer. Id.
Appellants also suggest that LPS advised the Co-op how employees should be selected for the polygraphs. Again, this inference is too attenuated to support liability. The record indicates that Lucero stated that he could not test Co-op employees as Leger originally requested, and that he would perform tests if requested by law enforcement and the individuals to be tested were identified by law enforcement. There is no suggestion that Lucero suggested or identified the specific employees to be tested, directly or indirectly. This situation is distinguishable from the examiner having a role in selecting the particular employees to be tested. Cf. Rubin, 797 F. Supp. at 253 (noting that the examiner allegedly "represented it would inform [the employer] which employees could be examined lawfully"). Thus, this factor also does not support imposing liability on LPS.
We have found only one case discussing the "advice" factor in any detail. In Rubin v. Torneau, Inc., the examiner, who was also an investigator, was hired to investigate missing inventory. 797 F. Supp. at 248. He allegedly assured the employer he would identify which employees could lawfully be polygraphed and he would conduct the examinations in compliance with the EPPA. Id. at 248-49, 253. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, the court determined the examiner might qualify as an employer and declined to dismiss the case.(1) Id. at 253.
The only other case allowing a claim against a polygraph examiner to proceed because the examiner may have exercised "some degree of control over the employer's compliance with the EPPA" does not explain exactly what the examiner did. James v. Professionals' Detective Agency, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1995). That case involved a motion to dismiss, and the complaint made the appropriate allegations of employer status. Id. The court suggested that, if the evidence did not show that the examiner did more than administer the tests, the examiner should file a motion for summary judgment. Id.
In contrast to the situation in Rubin, Lucero did not make any assurances to the Co-op about EPPA compliance, and LPS was not hired to ensure EPPA compliance. Notably, Lucero's contacts with the Co-op were through the Co-op's attorney, whose duty it was to advise the Co-op about its legal responsibilities. See Calbillo, 288 F.3d at 728 n.4 (stating that it was not reasonable to infer that the employer looked to the polygraph examiner for legal advice, when the employer had hired attorneys to advise it). Further, the statements were in the nature of gratuitous comments, not so much about EPPA compliance, as explanations why LPS would not assist the Co-op. In Calbillo, the Fifth Circuit declined to find employer status for an examiner, despite inferring from the record that the examiner "may have answered the attorneys' questions regarding the technical procedures involved in performing a polygraph examination and he might have even discussed some of the general requirements under the EPPA and the Secretary's regulations." 288 F.3d at 728 n.4.
Appellants contend that Lucero should have known the arrangement was a sham to allow the Co-op to circumvent the EPPA, arguing "from the very beginning LPS knew that the Cooperative was the driving force behind the polygraphs. LPS then worked with the Cooperative to satisfy the employer's request for these polygraphs." Aplt. Br. at 17. So long as LPS did not involve itself sufficiently to be considered an "employer," however, whether it knew or should have known that the arrangement was a sham is not relevant to its liability under the EPPA. Simply put, if LPS is not an "employer," it is not subject to EPPA liability. An examiner is not necessarily liable merely because a particular examination violated the EPPA. See Calbillo, 288 F.3d at 728 (affirming summary judgment for examiner); Fallin v. Mindis Metals, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 834, 840 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (granting summary judgment to examiner).
Abreu asserted a state-law tort claim that Armijo, the DAO, and the MCSO conspired to violate his constitutional rights. As relevant on appeal, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Armijo and the DAO, holding that the state had not waived its sovereign immunity against such claims. Specifically, the court determined that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act's (NMTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity for the actions of a "law enforcement officer" did not apply to Armijo. This court reviews a defense motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Soc'y of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, 416 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2005). "As with a ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we uphold a dismissal only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id. (quotation omitted).
The NMTCA preserves sovereign immunity against tort claims for state governmental entities and public employees acting in the scope of their duties, except as specifically waived. N.M. Stat. § 41-4-4(A). It waives sovereign immunity for tort claims involving the conduct of a "law enforcement officer." Id. § 41-4-12. The statute defines "law enforcement officer" as "a full-time salaried public employee of a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty by the governor." Id. § 41-4-3(D). Abreu's claim against the DAO must rest on its potential liability for Armijo's conduct, because an agency cannot be "a full-time salaried public employee" as required by the definition of "law enforcement officer." See Dunn v. McFeeley, 984 P.2d 760, 766 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
The New Mexico approach pays more deference to the statutory definition than Abreu implies. The New Mexico courts take the definition as their starting point, examining whether the particular defendant's primary duties fit into any of the statutory criteria. In Anchondo v. Corr. Dep't, 666 P.2d 1255, 1257 (N.M. 1983), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated, "[i]n determining whether a person is involved in law enforcement work, this Court has adhered to the concept of traditional law enforcement activities," which it indicated "include preserving the public peace, preventing and quelling public disturbances, [and] enforcing state laws, including but not limited to the power to make arrests for violation of state laws." It is the employee's primary duties which are the crux of the inquiry. "The statutory requirement that the defendants be law enforcement officers does not focus on the defendants' specific acts at the time of their alleged negligence. Instead it simply requires that the defendants' principal duties, those duties to which they devote a majority of their time, be of a law enforcement nature." Weinstein v. City of Santa Fe, 916 P.2d 1313, 1317 (N.M. 1996).
Further, even if a public employee is authorized to exercise some of the traditional functions of law enforcement officers, he or she does not necessarily come under the waiver provision. In Dunn v. New Mexico, 859 P.2d 469, 472 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), the court held the Director of the Motor Vehicle Division was not a law enforcement officer, even though he was statutorily invested with the power to act as a peace officer to enforce the Motor Vehicle Code, because his duties primarily involved administrative matters. In Vigil v. Martinez, 832 P.2d 405, 411-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), the court held that probation and parole officers were not "law enforcement officers"; although they occasionally held persons in custody and had some powers of arrest, neither was a principal duty.
The New Mexico appellate court has held, in other circumstances, that non-attorney employees of the DAO were not "law enforcement officers." See Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Att'y's Office, 734 P.2d 794, 801 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that employees who processed paperwork to notify detention center of indictment and warrant were not involved in holding accused persons in custody so as to be considered "law enforcement officers"); see also Coyazo v. New Mexico, 897 P.2d 234, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "law enforcement officer" does not include "district attorneys in their prosecutorial role" because they do not engage in traditional law enforcement activities).
Looking solely at the pleadings, judgment for appellees was warranted, as Abreu's complaint merely states that Armijo is the "chief investigator" for the DAO. Aplt. App. at 71. It does not allege that Armijo is a "law enforcement officer" or describe his duties to show that he fits within § 41-4-12's waiver. Cf. Dunn v. McFeeley, 984 P.2d at 767 ("[O]ur appellate courts have repeatedly found that a connection to law enforcement activity, even being a member of the law-enforcement team, is insufficient by itself to make one a law enforcement officer; the person's duties must directly impact public order.").
Even if we were to look beyond the pleadings, the record does not indicate that Armijo is a "law enforcement officer" for purposes of the NMTCA. Armijo testified that his "main job is to assist the attorneys in preparation for preliminary hearings, grand juries, trial, assist different agencies with their investigations, help on search warrants." Aplt. App. at 448. He supervises the assignments of a deputy and two investigators. Id. at 449. He also accepts assignments from district attorneys, the DAO office manager, the director of the pre-prosecution diversion program, and DAO finance people. Id. These facts do not support an inference that Armijo's primary duties are holding persons in custody, maintaining public order (except in the sense of putting criminals behind bars that Coyazo rejected, 897 P.2d at 236), or making arrests for crimes.
Abreu argues that the district court erred in stating he had presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Our review indicates, however, that there was no error in the district court's evaluation. Abreu seems to be advocating a "joint action" theory of § 1983 liability. See Sigmon v. CommunityCare HMO, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000) (construing conspiracy argument as assertion of a "joint action" theory). "When a plaintiff seeks to prove state action based on a conspiracy theory, a requirement of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal." Id. at 1126 (quotation omitted; ellipsis in original). Abreu must demonstrate "a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences." Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 702 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation and alteration omitted).
On appeal, Abreu provides no record cites for the evidence that he claims creates a genuine issue of material fact. In addition, he largely relies on a general statement, saying, "[n]either time nor space allow for a complete rendition of the facts Abreu genuinely disputed and upon which the district court inappropriately interpreted in granting Armijo summary judgment on the § 1983 conspiracy claim." Aplt. Br. at 25. These types of unsupported argument do not justify reversal. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Without a specific reference, we will not search the record in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence which might require submission of the case to a jury." (quotation omitted)).
Even if Abreu had properly supported his argument, the facts do not appear sufficient for a jury to find a single, unlawful plan. The evidence might establish a common goal of taking polygraphs, but not necessarily of taking polygraphs for the Co-op in violation of the EPPA.III.
1. Contrary to appellants' argument, Rubin involved a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not summary judgment.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2006/08/05-2130.htm.