Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/219/426/532220/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 20:10:51
Document Index: 345342539

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 557', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 902', '§ 910', '§ 910', '§ 910', '§ 3121']

James J. Flanagan Stevedores, Incorporated; Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Limited, Petitioners, v. John C. Gallagher; Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Respondents, 219 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2000 › James J. Flanagan Stevedores, Incorporated; Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Limited, Petitioner...
James J. Flanagan Stevedores, Incorporated; Signal Mutual Indemnity Association, Limited, Petitioners, v. John C. Gallagher; Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, Respondents, 219 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2000)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 219 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2000)
The employer argues that the ALJ's finding that Gallagher was entitled to temporary partial disability benefits during the two specified periods of time is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to discuss and consider6 much of the relevant evidence in violation 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (3) (A) of the Administrative Procedures Act, which provides, in relevant part, that:
As the employer acknowledges, the Fourth Circuit has held that CRB payments are wages under § 902(13) if earned through work but not if earned by disability credit. Universal Maritime Service Corp. v. Wright, 155 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 1998).11 Our research indicates that this Court has yet to address this issue; however, we recently had the occasion to interpret the meaning of "wages" under § 902(13) in a different context. See H.B. Zachry Company v. Quinones, 206 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2000). In Quinones, the question was whether the value of meals and lodging which was exempt from withholding of federal income tax constituted "wages" under § 902(13) of the LHWCA. We rejected the argument that "any advantage" received from the employer is included as wages because that would render the phrase "and included for purposes of any withholding of tax" superfluous. We concluded that § 902(13) was clear on its face inasmuch as " [i]t provides that `wages' equals monetary compensation plus taxable advantages." Therefore, we held that § 902(13) excluded from its definition of "wages" the value of tax-exempt meals and lodging. Id. at 479. The rule we glean from Quinones to apply here is that for a CRB to constitute a wage, it must be considered either monetary compensation or a taxable advantage. Ultimately, we conclude that a CRB is a wage.
Of course, the precise issue before us is not whether the original purpose of the container royalty trust fund has been thwarted, but, rather, whether a CRB falls within the definition of wages under § 902(13). The employer in the Fourth Circuit case raised a similar contention, i.e., that the CRB payments must reflect a fixed rate of pay in order for them to be compensation for services. 155 F.3d at 325. There, the Court recognized that the local contract specified that the container royalty fund was to be used only for cash disbursements to longshoremen and that traditionally the trustees had paid royalties to those who worked 700 or more hours in the contract year. Id. at 325. Relying on the hours-worked requirement, the court reasoned that " [i]f these payments are paid for services, regardless of the quantity of services, they meet the first requirement." Id.
The employer argues that using the number 48 as a divisor violated the mandate of § 910(d) (1). Section 910(d) (1) provides that the "average weekly wages of an employee shall be one fifty-second part of his average annual earnings." The ALJ chose the number 48 as a divisor because Gallagher had allegedly lost 4 weeks of work in 1994 due to a previous injury.
We do not read the employer's argument as challenging the factual finding that Gallagher lost four works of week in 1994 due to a previous injury. In light of the discretion given the ALJ under § 910(c),14 we believe that the ALJ's decision to carve out the four-week period of lost work facilitated the goal of "mak [ing] a fair and accurate assessment" of the amount that Gallagher "would have the potential and opportunity of earning absent the injury." Gatlin, 936 F.2d at 823. As such, we are persuaded by Gallagher's argument that the apparent violation of § 910(d) (1) was harmless.
The employer further asserts that the ALJ's determination of the attorney's hours, fee rate, and expenses used in calculating the award were unreasonable. In support of this assertion, the employer refers us to previously filed briefs, presumably before the ALJ and BRB. By failing to include these arguments in the body of their brief, the employer, in effect, has abandoned them. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-225 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) (9) (requiring the argument section of the appellant's brief to contain "contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record . . . .").19
Cf. NYSA-ILA Container Royalty Fund v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 847 F.2d 50, 52-53 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that payments to longshoreman from a containerization fund were wages within the meaning of FICA and FUTA); STA of Baltimore--ILA Container Royalty Fund v. U.S., 621 F. Supp. 1567 (D. Md. 1985) (holding that CRB distributions are wages under 26 U.S.C. § 3121, which defines wages as all remuneration for any service, because a longshoreman is not eligible for the payments until he had worked the requisite number of hours), aff'd, 804 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1986).