Source: http://dcwatch.com/election/init20m.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 17:58:29
Document Index: 526115860

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1171', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1172', '§ 1171', '§ 1175', '§ 1175', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1175']

DC BOEE, Motion to Dismiss Complaint, May 24, 20006
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DOROTHY BRIZILL, et al., Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, Defendant.
BARRY JERRELS, et al., Intervenor-Defendants
Civil Action No. 06ca 3939
Judge Judith E. Retchin
Next Event: Initial Conference (9/15/06)
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
Comes now the Defendant, District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics by and through its undersigned counsel of record and, pursuant to Superior Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), hereby moves this Court to dismiss this action on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendant upon which relief can be granted. The legal and factual grounds supporting this Motion to Dismiss are set forth in Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which is attached hereto.
Kenneth J. McGhie,
Terry Stroud (D.C. Bar #465884)
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
The District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, Defendant in this action, by undersigned counsel, herein sets forth the Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss filed today. As discussed further below, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed.
On April 10, 2006, Barry Jerrels ("the Proponent") submitted an initiative measure entitled the "Video Lottery Terminal Initiative of 2006" ("Initiative Measure No. 69")1 to the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics ("the Board").2 On April 12, 2006, the Board sent copies of Initiative Measure No. 69 and notice of the proper subject hearing concerning the same to all members of the D.C. Council, the Office of the D.C. Attorney General, and the Office of the General Counsel for the D.C. Council for comments on the validity of the measure. On April 18, 2006, the D.C. Attorney General sent correspondence to the Board indicating his opinion that "[Initiative Measure No. 69] is a proper subject for an initiative in the District." The General Counsel for the D.C. Council submitted no comments regarding the validity of the measure.3
Initiative Measure No. 69 was published in the D.C. Register (Vol. 53 p. 3200) on April 21, 2006, along with notice that a public proper subject hearing regarding Initiative Measure No. 69 would be held during the Board's regularly scheduled meeting on Wednesday, May 3, 2006, and that, if the measure was accepted as a proper subject, the Board would also undertake to formulate its short title and summary statement at that time.
On Wednesday, May 3, 2006, the Board conducted a proper subject hearing on Initiative Measure No. 69. At that time, the Board heard statements from interested parties, including the Plaintiffs, as to whether Initiative Measure No. 69 was a proper subject of initiative. After entertaining various objections to Initiative Measure No. 69 on proper subject grounds, the Board accepted the measure as a proper subject on that date. After passing the motion to accept Initiative Measure No. 69 as a proper subject of initiative, the Board proceeded to draft the formulations for Initiative Measure No. 69's short title and summary statement, taking into consideration comments from all interested parties, including the Plaintiffs. The Board's formulations were published in the May 12, 2006 edition of the D.C. Register (Vol. 53 p. 4016).
On May 22, 2006, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint with this Court, asking it to direct the Board to reject Initiative Measure No. 69.
The Plaintiffs in this case ask this Court to direct the Board to reject Initiative Measure No. 69 on the grounds that "the Board should have held a separate and separately advertised hearing to review the Short Title, Summary Statement, and Legislative Text of the initiative that it prepared" and that "[Initiative Measure No. 69] is not a proper subject for an initiative[.]" Plaintiffs' Complaint ("Compl.") at 6. The specific proper subject claims put forth by the Plaintiffs are that Initiative Measure No. 69 "(a) seeks to amend or overturn a federal law, which is contrary both to the Home Rule Act and the U.S. Constitution; (b) requires the appropriation of funds; and (c) seeks to exercise mayoral authority, which violates the Home Rule Act." Compl. at 4. In response, the Board asserts that Initiative Measure No. 69 meets all proper subject, formulation, and notice requirements as set forth in the laws governing the initiative process of the District of Columbia, and that it was processed in accordance with such laws.
The Plaintiffs in this matter have submitted to this Court a petition for review of the Board's acceptance of, and formulations regarding, Initiative Measure No. 69. They also seek a writ of mandamus directing the Board to reject the same.
The scope of review for this honorable Court is limited. This Court should, consistent with the basic principles of administrative law, defer to the Board's expertise, and give great weight to the Board's interpretation of the statute and regulations unless the Board's rationale is not supported by substantial evidence and/or is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. See Pendleton v. D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 449 A.2d 301, 307 (D.C. 1982). Moreover, in Allen v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 663 A.2d 489 (D.C. 1995), the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that "[i]nsofar as the Board's legal conclusions are concerned, we must defer to its interpretation of the statute which it administers, and, especially of the regulations which it has promulgated, so long as that interpretation is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with the legislative purpose." Id., at 495.
B. Petition for Writ of Mandamus
This jurisdiction recognizes that "[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ and should only be used in `exceptional circumstances'[.]" Stebbins v. Stebbins, 673 A.2d 184,191 (D.C. App. 1996). The moving party must "show that its right to the issuance of the writ is `clear and indisputable'." Id. The Petitioner can not make such a showing. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied.
II. THE BOARD'S CONSOLIDATION OF THE INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 69 PROPER SUBJECT AND SHORT TITLE AND SUMMARY STATEMENT FORMULATION HEARINGS WAS PROPER
The D.C. Election Code charges the Board with the responsibility of formulating the language of an initiative measure that will appear on the ballot in an election. To that end, the Board must "[p]repare a true and impartial summary statement" which "express[es] the purpose of the measure[,]" and which does not "intentionally create prejudice for or against the measure[.]" D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(1). The Board must also "[p]repare a short title for the measure" which will allow voters to "identify readily the initiative ... measure and to distinguish it from other measures which may appear on the ballot[.]" D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(2).
The Plaintiffs in this case have not alleged that the Board failed in its formulation obligations under the election statute; rather they assert that the Board failed to properly advertise and hold the formulation hearing. The Plaintiffs maintain that the Board is required to conduct a "two-step process in which, after the Board approves an initiative as a proper subject, it prepares its own Short Title, Summary Statement, and Legislative Text[,] and that "[o]nly then can it advertise the Short Title, Summary Statement, and Legislative Text that it has prepared and hold a separate public hearing on them." Compl. at 3.
The election act places no such temporal restrictions on the Board. D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c) provides that the Board must formulate a short title and summary statement for an initiative measure "[w]ithin 20 calendar days of the date on which the Board accepts an initiative or referendum measure[.]" It does not dictate that there is a set period of time which must lapse between the date of the Board's acceptance of a measure and the Board's formulation of that measure's short title and summary statement. Instead, it merely provides a statutory deadline by which the Board must have completed its formulations. That is to say that, because the Board formally accepted Initiative Measure No. 69 as a proper subject on May 3, 2006, it was legally obligated to formulate its short title and summary statement no later than May 23, 2006. The Board has done exactly that. The Board conducted the two-step process that the Plaintiffs rightfully assert it is obligated to perform. That it executed those two steps on the same day is no basis whatsoever for rejecting the measure.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not - and can not -- assert that there was not sufficient advance notice of the Board's intent to conduct a consolidated hearing. As stated earlier, the Board published notice of its intent to conduct such hearing in the April 21, 2006 edition of the D.C. Register, nearly two weeks prior to the hearing. The Plaintiffs were not only apprised of the hearing in a timely fashion, but they also attended and served as active participants in the proceedings as well.
Interestingly, Plaintiff Brizill did not raise the argument regarding the propriety of a consolidated hearing when she challenged Initiative Measure No. 68, the "Video Lottery Terminal Initiative of 2004" in this court, even though the Board similarly held a consolidated hearing with respect to that measure. See Argo v. D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics, Civil Action No. 04-4740 (Super. Ct. June 29, 2004).
III. THE BOARD PROPERLY DECLINED TO ENTERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES TO THE LEGISLATIVE TEXT OF INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 69
Plaintiffs allege that the Board acted improperly when it "refused to hear any testimony on the Legislative Text of the initiative, and said that examination of the Legislative Text was beyond its purview and powers[.]" Compl. at 4. This claim must fail for two reasons: 1) the Board did not refuse to hear testimony on the legislative form of Initiative Measure No. 69; and 2) the Board is not empowered to make the changes to the legislative text that were voiced at the hearing.
D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(3) requires the Board to "[p]repare in the proper legislative fond, the proposed initiative or referendum measure ... which shall conform to the legislative drafting format of acts of the Council of the District of Columbia." This provision speaks only to the form and not the substance of a proposed measure. In fact, the Board is precluded from making all but technical changes to an initiative measure prior to its circulation. See Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board, 441 Aid 889, 900 (D.C. 198 1)( "Convention Center")("The Initiative Procedures Act interprets [provision that the Board "shall submit an initiative measure without alteration"] to permit the Board to make technical, but not substantive, changes before circulation to assure `proper legislative form. "')(citations omitted).
The testimony Plaintiffs presented to the Board at the May 3, 2006 hearing concerning the legislative text had nothing to do with the format of the measure, but rather with its substance. Plaintiff Brizill sought to have the Board delete all references within Initiative Measure No. 69 to the "Anacostia Economic Development Corporation," and include a definition that would specify the precise site of the Video Lottery Terminal facility called for under the measure. These changes would amount to more than the mere "technical changes" that the D.C. Court of Appeals said were permitted in Convention Center. Accordingly, the Board was justified in not making the alterations proposed by Plaintiff Brizill; to have done so would have required the Board to act in excess of its authority.
IV. INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 69 IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF INITIATIVE
The District of Columbia Code provides that the Board must reject any proposed initiative measure which is not a proper subject for an initiative.4 In making a proper subject determination, the Board analyzes, inter alia, whether the measure would unlawfully appropriate funds, negate or limit a budget request act, and/or violate the provisions of either the D.C. Home Rule Act or the D.C. Human Rights Act. If the Board dines that a measure is proper in light of the governing law, it must accept the measure and proceed to the next phase of the initiative process. Based on its own analysis of the measure, as well as on the comments received by the D.C. Office of the Attorney General and the Office of the General Counsel for the D.C. Council, the Board properly determined that Initiative Measure No. 69 is a proper subject of initiative and, as such, may be presented to the voters for their approval or disapproval.
A. Initiative Measure No. 69 does not amend or repeal a federal law that is national in scope in contravention of the Home Rule Act
Plaintiffs argue that Initiative Measure No. 69 is not a proper subject of initiative because it would amend or repeal the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq.,5 and therefore violate the Home Rule Act. Initiative Measure No. 69 would not amend, repeal, or conflict with the Johnson Act, but rather is wholly consistent with this law, and is therefore a proper subject of initiative in the District of Columbia.
The Board recognizes that "[a]bsent express or implied limitation, the power of the electorate to act by initiative is coextensive with the power of the legislature to adopt legislative measures," Convention Center, 441 A.2d at 897 (D.C. 1981), and that, because the Home Rule Act precludes the D.C. Council from legislating in certain areas, the electorate, too, is barred from enacting laws in those areas. See D.C. Code § 1-206.02(a). Thus, neither the D.C. Council nor the electorate may "[e]nact any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress, which concerns the functions or property of the United States or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District[.]" D.C. Code § 1-206.02(a)(3). The question this court must resolve, then, is whether Initiative Measure No. 69 would amend or repeal a federal statute that is not limited in application to the District, and thus be an improper subject of initiative. The Board submits that it would not.
1. Initiative Measure No. 69 would not repeal the Johnson Act
The Gambling Devices Act provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to any place in a State or a possession of the United States from any place outside of such State or possession[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 1172(a). It exempts from its operation, however, the transportation of gambling devices into states where such gambling devices are specifically enumerated as lawful in a state statute. See id. The Gambling Devices Act includes the District of Columbia in the definition of the term "state." See 15 U.S.C. § 1171(b). Therefore, the Gambling Devices Act makes clear that it permits the various states, as well as the District of Columbia, to enact laws that legalize gambling and permit the use of gambling devices.
Initiative Measure No. 69 is precisely the kind of "state" statute that is contemplated by the exemption provision of the Gambling Devices Act. It would amend the District's current gaming law to authorize the licensing of Video Lottery Terminals ("VLTs"). If enacted, entities that are awarded licenses under Initiative Measure No. 69 would be authorized to acquire and own certain VLTs, and would further be allowed to install, maintain, and operate VLTs and conduct VLT operations in the District of Columbia. With the passage of Initiative Measure No. 69, there would be a District statute which legalizes and permits the use of a particular gambling device, and the District would thus be on par with other states that have legalized gambling and that are, therefore, exempt from the application of the Gambling Devices Act.
2. Initiative Measure No. 69 would not impact federal legislation which is "national" in its reach
In 1962, when the Gambling Devices Act took effect, Congress was still vested with exclusive legislative authority over the District of Columbia. (The Home Rule Act, which was passed to "relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local matters,"6 would not be enacted until 1973.) In this respect, Congress' relationship with the District was a unique one in that the former held responsibility for governing the latter with respect to even the most local of matters, such as street closings. The only other jurisdictions that were subject to the same type of Congressional dominion were federal possessions, such as Guam, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands. These jurisdictions, unlike the states, were subject to a very particular brand of federal authority, and it is therefore not surprising that they would have been singled out in the Gambling Devices Act as locales in which the possession and use of certain gambling devices was prohibited. See 15 U.S.C. § 1175.7
But it is precisely the fact that these particular jurisdictions were enumerated in the Gambling Devices Act that dictates that the provision making it unlawful to use or possess certain gambling devices in the District is not national in its reach, but is essentially a local law, and can therefore properly be amended. Unlike the federal drug rehabilitation statute at issue in McConnell v. United States, 537 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1988) that was applicable to federal defendants in every jurisdiction in the United States, and therefore unsusceptible to amendment or repeal via initiative, 15 U.S.C. § 1175 is limited only to those jurisdictions over which the Congress maintains ultimate legislative authority. It is, therefore, not legislation which is national in scope, i.e., applicable in each and every United States jurisdiction, and its amendment or repeal - which, again, is not effected by Initiative Measure No. 69 - is therefore proper under the Home Rule Act.
Finally, it must also be noted that courts in this jurisdiction have recognized that "[pre-election constitutional] review [of proposed initiatives] is imprudent," Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1997)("Hessey 1"), and that initiatives need not be "held constitutional by either the Board or the Superior Court before [they] may be classified as a `proper subject."' Id. It is further recognized that "the court's jurisdiction should be very sparingly exercised, and that in the great majority of cases the court in its discretion should decline to consider pre-election challenges to the constitutionality or legality of an initiative." Id.; see also Committee for Volun. Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1997).
This matter does not present the "extreme case" in which a court would be acting appropriately and efficiently by engaging in a pre-election constitutional review, such as one in which an initiative proposed to establish a particular religion as the District's official religion. Initiative Measure No. 69 is devoid of such an obvious and extreme affront to established constitutional principles. Accordingly, this court should decline at this juncture to entertain Plaintiffs' challenge to its legality.
B. Initiative Measure No. 69 does not appropriate funds
The Plaintiffs argue that Initiative Measure No. 69 is not a proper subject of initiative because it a law appropriating funds. The Plaintiffs claim that this is so because "the initiative imposes costs and expenses on the District of Columbia and would require an appropriation of funds." Compi. at 5. These "costs and expenses" would arise, the argument goes, because the "duties mandated, required, and imposed by this initiative could clearly not be accomplished by the Lottery Board with its present staff, expertise, equipment, and resources." Id.
In proffering this argument, the Plaintiffs ignore well-established legal precedent concerning initiatives that elucidates that proponents of initiative measures may propose laws that would establish new and substantive programs, but not the funding for the programs. In the first case involving the "law appropriating funds" exception to the right of initiative, the D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the D.C. Council adopted the exception out of a concern that "the electorate not use the initiative to launch the appropriations process." Convention Center, 441 A.2d at 912 (D.C. 1981). That court fully recognized that the Council intended that the initiative right be used as a means by which the electorate could authorize substantive programs, but that it did not intend for it to also confer the authority to require the Council to seek funding for such programs. Accordingly, it concluded that the exception serves to prohibit "the electorate from using the initiative to: 1) adopt a budget request act or make some other affirmative effort to appropriate funds[.]" Id. at 913-914(emphasis added). The court also concluded, however, that the exception was not intended to bar "initiatives that would authorize (but not fund) a new project, ... or prohibit future budget requests," id. at 893, and that it did "not appear to proscribe initiatives with a prospective fiscal effect only." Id. at 915.
It may very well be the case that Initiative Measure No. 69 would require funding in order to effectively achieve its purposes, i.e., have a "prospective fiscal effect," but that fact is not sufficient to render it an improper subject of initiative. Initiative Measure No. 69 must be found to, by its terms, "intrude upon the discretion of the Council to allocate District government revenues in the budget process," Hessey v. Board of Elections and Ethics, 601 A.2d 3, 20 (D.C. 1991)("Hessey IF), by seeking to fund its substantive program, notwithstanding the authority of the District's elected officials to identify and allocate revenues, and otherwise act as the guarantors of responsible fiscal management in the District. Initiative Measure No. 69 does not attempt to fund itself in any way. Therefore, it does not violate the "laws appropriating funds" exception to the initiative right.
C. Initiative Measure No. 69 does not encroach upon mayoral authority and thereby conflict with the Home Rule Act
The Plaintiffs mount a "separation of powers" attack on the Board's acceptance of Initiative Measure No. 69, mischaracterizing its licensing procedure as an infringement on the Mayor's licensing authority. By erroneously assuming that the Council cannot require the Lottery Board to award a license based in part on situs requirements through legislation, the Plaintiffs also erroneously surmise that the electorate cannot do so through initiative.
Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1990)("Hessey III") controls when the powers of coordinate branches are allegedly in conflict under the terms of a proposed initiative measure. Hessey III held that an initiative that created an administrative agency with the authority to appeal tax assessments by the Mayor did not impermissibly infringe on the Mayor's responsibility for the assessment of taxable property. The Court of Appeals engaged in separation of powers analysis, and concluded "that the responsibility for tax assessments conferred on the Mayor by Congress is left essentially intact, and hence is not impermissibly burdened, by the proposed initiative." Hessey III, 584 A.2d at 6. "[T]he question was always whether a particular measure impermissibly undermine[s]' the powers of the Executive Branch, or disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions[.]" Id. (citations omitted). Initiative Measure No. 69 does not undermine the Mayor's licensing authority because it is not an executive or administrative prerogative as the Plaintiffs suggest, but rather an imperative duty to award licenses to citizens who fulfill legal qualifications.
The Plaintiffs take issue with situs as a legal qualification for licensing; however, they fail to articulate how the Mayor's authority is impinged upon and usurped. The Mayor is still authorized to grant licenses based on the situs qualifications. The situation is akin to the Mayor's inability to refuse to award a lottery sales agent license to a legally qualified applicant. Essentially, the Mayor is not hampered in his ability to carry out his duties.
The Council can always establish new licenses and prescribe the qualifications necessary to obtain those licenses, and the Mayor is vested with the responsibility of granting the licenses to applicants that meet the legal requirements. Initiative Measure No. 69 does not upset the balance between the coordinate branches by placing a restrictive sites qualification in light of its stated purpose.
Initiative Measure No. 69 complies with and fully satisfies all applicable statutory requirements prescribed for the initiative process in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the Planitiffs' request that this Court direct the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics to reject Initiative Measure No. 69 should be denied, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint should be granted.
1. The short title of Initiative Measure No. 69 was changed to the "Video Lottery Terminal Gambling Initiative of 2006" at the Board's formulation hearing on May 3, 2006.
2. The Proponent had previously submitted another draft of Initiative Measure No. 69. This version was withdrawn by the Proponent when it was brought to his attention that the General Counsel for the D.C. Council had concerns that the measure contained provisions that would render the measure a "law appropriating funds" in violation of District law governing initiatives. The current version of Initiative Measure No. 69 no longer contains the provisions of the original measure which were found to represent violations of initiative law.
3. See note 2 supra.
4. See D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(b)(1).
5. The Johnson Act was amended in 1962 by the Gambling Devices Act, and is now commonly referred to by that title. Hence, the terms "Johnson Act" and "Gambling Devices Act" are used interchangeably here.
6. D.C. Code § 1-201.02(a).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 provides that "[i)t shall be unlawful to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, transport, possess, or use any gambling device in the District of Columbia, in any possession of the United States, within Indian country as defined in section 1151 of title 18 or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 7 of title 18, including on a vessel documented under chapter 121 of title 46 or documented under the laws of a foreign country."
I hereby certify that on May 25, 2006, copies of the foregoing Defendant's Motion to Dismiss were delivered by hand to:
DOROTHY BRIZILL, 1327 Girard St. NW, Washington D.C. 20009
THELMA JONES, 2217 T Pl. S.E., Washington D.C. 20020
ANTHONY MUHAMMAD 1609 21st Pl. S.E. Washington D.C. 20001
BAACH ROBINSON & LEWIS PLLC, Jeffery D. Robinson, Esq. 1201 F St. N.W., Suite 500, Washington D.C. 20004-1225
Terry D. Stroud
Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the record herein, and for good cause shown, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Motion should be, and is hereby GRANTED.
Superior Court Judge Judith E. Retchin
DOROTHY BRIZILL, 1327 Girard St. NW, Washington D.C. 20009 Tel. and Fax. (202) 234-6982
Jeffrey D. Robinson, Esq., BAACH ROBINSON & LEWIS PLLC, 1201 F St. N.W., Suite 500, Washington D.C. 20004-1225 Tel.: (202) 833-8900 Fax: (202) 466-5738
Terri D. Stroud, DC Board of Elections and Ethics One Judiciary Square 441 4th Street, NW, Suite 270N Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 727-2194 Fax: (202) 628-5952