Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/46817720/Federal-peremptory-Challenge-1-1-1
Timestamp: 2019-07-23 14:12:58
Document Index: 335898349

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 351', 'Art. 4', '§1', 'art. 2', '§ 2382', '§ 2', '§ 111', '§ 3231', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1443', '§ 2000', '§\n1985', 'Art. 2', '§ 7', 'Art. 2', '§\n21', 'Art. 2', '§ 22', 'Art. 2', '§ 30', '§ 241', '§1331', '§1343', '§2201', '§1983', '§2403', '§ 1981', '§70', '§ 1983']

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NOTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Raymond G. Chapman, individually ) Case No. 04-CV-0722-CVE-PJC
and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, )
vs. ) AGGRAVATED CUSTODIAL
) INTERFERENCE
The State of Oklahoma: )
) Governor
Brad Henry; )
W.A. Drew Edmondson (Attorney General); )
Joseph Watt (Chief Justice, Okla. Supreme Court); )
I, Raymond G. Chapman do not give up or release any of my rights.
Further acts by Judge Mark Barcus, which violate my rights will be reported to, Governor Brad
Henry, Sen. Scott Pruitt, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Counsel Office of
Professional Responsibility, Attorney General Drew Edmondson, Federal Judicial Center,
and Court of Appeals for the Circuit in compliance with 128 U.S.C. § 351 et. seq. 2
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE County of Tulsa and within the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma, being duly sworn, deposes and says: That Raymond G. Chapman, is Sui
Juris to the within action. That Mark Barcus and Kyle Haskins are Judges, in a hearing in the aforesaid
action is pending to whom it is assigned, is prejudiced against the party, so that affiant has not, can not,
or believes that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judges, court
commissioner, or referee as described herein. That the aforementioned judges are acting in conspiracy
with Jodi Johnson Baker (an attorney) and Rosemarie L. Damilao (former girlfriend) to deprive
Chapman of his duly protected Constitutional rights and that this court’s continual denial of their
intervention in this matter as co-defendants is the denial of the protections of Chapman’s Constitutional
rights. That the lower court has no lawful authority to issue any order which violates the Supreme law of
the land. That the Oklahoma Bar Association is bound by duty and the rules as given by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, to discipline those attorneys which violate either written law or the Rules of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.
This court cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants civil rights; Robert Craig
Waters. Tort and Insurance Law Journal, Sup. 1986 21 n3, p509-516.
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme law of the land” and “the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding”. The first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that all entities have the
mandatory right of an adequate, complete, effective, fair, full, meaningful and timely access to the court.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Due Process and equal
protection rights, therefore any violation of these provisions by a judge, as outlined in the U.S.
Constitution deprives that person from acting as a judge under the law and is then acting not as a judge
but as a private citizen which subsequently then forces that court to lose subject matter jurisdiction, at
which point the judge loses any immunity enjoyed. Understandably, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly
and repeatedly, held that any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101, S. Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980). “Where there is no jurisdiction,
there is no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.” Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall, 335. 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). Accordingly, an act done in complete absence of
all jurisdiction cannot be a judicial act and therefore destroys immunity.
Although certain acts may be of a judicial nature and therefore entitles a judge to immunity, the
jurisdictional vacuum (that is, absence of all jurisdiction) the second prong necessary to absolute judicial
immunity, is missing. Stump v. Sparkman, id., 435 U.S. 349.
The principle of law was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as “Courts are constituted by authority and
they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in
contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but
simply void, and this is even prior to reversal.” [Emphasis added]. Valley v. Northern Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920). See also Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189, (1850); Elliot
v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).
“A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by a court
that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.” Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E.2d 756, (Va.
“ When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary but is
mandatory”. Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364, U.S. 155 (1966), cited also in Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 644,
“Constitutional ‘rights’ would be of little value if they could be indirectly denied”. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 491; 86 S.Ct. 1603, “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no ‘rule’ making or legislation which would abrogate them.”
See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 p. 442, “An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed”.
Warnock v. Pecos County, Texas, 88 F3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996) states, “Eleventh Amendment does not
protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged the state officials acted in
violation of federal law”.
Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S.Ct. at 261 (1882):
“No man [or woman] in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it”.
“It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office,
participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives”.
Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 678, 694; “Acts in excess of
judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the
requirements of fairness and due process”. Also see Gonzales v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
(1983) 33 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 374.
“Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy” Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S.
Under Article I, Section 9 & 10 respectively prohibits judicial immunity stating “No title of Nobility
shall be granted by the United States” and “No state shall…grant any title of Nobility”.
All judges are required to take an oath of office and are solemnly committed thereto by that oath
pursuant to Article VI cl. 3 “to support this Constitution” and any judge who does not comply with his
oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in
violation of the supreme law of the land. The Supreme Court has stated that “No state legislator or
executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
support it” See in Re. Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (188); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.
Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed 257 (1821).
“A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to
immunity from civil action for his acts” Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938).
"[S]ince Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment
provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal
right under the color of state law. Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a
state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States." Id., at 159-160. (Emphasis supplied). Ex parte Young, like Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378
(1932), involved a question of the federal courts' injunctive power, not, as here, a claim for monetary
damages. While it is clear that the doctrine of Ex parte Young is of no aid to a plaintiff seeking damages
from the public treasury, Edelman v. Jordan, supra; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327
U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life
Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944), damages against individual defendants are a permissible
remedy in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office. Myers v. Anderson,
238 U.S. 368 (1915). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973). In some situations a damage remedy can be as effective a redress for the
infringement of a constitutional right as injunctive relief might be in another."
Accordingly, in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), it is well established that, quite apart from the
guarantee of equal protection, if a law “impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional.” Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76
Mark Barcus- Upon her departure from Chapman's home, Damilao illegally stole the parties minor
child from Chapman without any type of court order either granting Damilao custody or restricting
Chapman's time with his son. Chapman commenced filings with the state court and the case was
assigned to Judge Mark Barcus. Chapman filed at least two writs and numerous other filings to get into
the court quickly in order to see his son, all of which were denied by Barcus. After approximately 2.5
months, Chapman finally got in to court and Barcus subsequently assessed child support against
Chapman with an automatic arrearage despite the fact that Chapman was trying feverishly to see his
son. Barcus additionally restricted Chapman's time with his son without any form of proof other than
mere accusation against Chapman. This automatic arrearage opened the door for a contempt of court
of which Chapman was later illegally found guilty of in Haskins court (See Below). The time missed
between Chapman and his son was never addressed by Barcus nor was Damilao ever punished.
Chapman, who was Pro Se was most definitely the victim of blatant discrimination by Barcus for
Chapman asserting his rights. To further substantiate this claim Chapman asserts that Barcus has further
ruled against Chapman each and every time Chapman has been in court. The transcripts of the
proceedings can and will be supplied upon request or at trial in this matter.
Chapman, citing Alva State Bank and Trust Co. v. Dayton, 1988 OK 44, 755 P2d 635
argued his financial privacy status upon the hearing of his Motion to Quash Damilao's subpoena of
Chapman's financial records. Despite Chapman's Motion to Quash concerning his financial records and
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment, Barcus nonetheless ordered Chapman's motion overruled
and allowed Chapman's private records into the public record. ¶12 of the Alva case states: “In ordering
the production of records in a manner other than that provided by statute, the trial court acted in a
manner not authorized by, and contrary to law”. See Art. 4, Okla. Const. §1. See also, Luger v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed 482 (1982); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349(1969). In ¶12 Congress has specifically proscribed
certain governmental access to one's financial records “except under limited circumstances.” The Right
to Financial Privacy Act limits this access to 1. if the customer authorizes such disclosure 2. the records
are disclosed in response to an administrative subpoena or summons 3. the records are disclosed in a
response to a search warrant 4. disclosed in a judicial subpoena 5. in response to a formal written
request. Even records subject to a judicial subpoena “are limited to subpoenas authorized by law where
the records are part of a legitimate law enforcement inquiry (in this case, there was no law enforcement
inquiry and Chapman was not being investigated for any illegal activity).
¶8 In Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P2d 284, 92 A.L.R.2d 891 (1961), the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized the right of a customer to be secure in his/her business papers as one of the
inherent and fundamental precepts of the banking relationship. In reviewing decisions by various courts,
the Court recognized the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of “the right of the people to be secure in
their...papers...” and that this right extended to the inviolate status of bank accounts against unreasonable
¶11 The right to privacy has been defined as the “claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others”. The guarantee of security found in art. 2, ¶ 30 of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers encompasses the people's right to preserve confidentiality in their personal papers. This
security,which must be strictly construed, is a fundamental, constitutional right applicable to both civil
and criminal actions. See United States v. Freie, 545 F2d. 1217, 1223 (9th Cir 1976); Djowharzadeh v.
City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., supra at 616-20; Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696
P.2d 527-28 (1985).
It is the fundamental axiom of the court's jurisprudence that a citizen must have a cognizable
expectation of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 58, L.Ed.2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, the court recognized “the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person. 410 U.S. 113, 170.
Title 6 Section 2204 of the Oklahoma Financial Privacy Act outlines the criteria in which the court
must use in order to issue a subpoena for the financial records of an individual citizen.
A. A court of competent jurisdiction, state agency or legislative committee may issue a subpoena for a
customer's financial records only if such subpoena is authorized by law.
There is no law which allows for financial disclosure of bank statements within the state of Oklahoma
for anything other than criminal activity and Chapman was certainly not being investigated for criminal
The determination for the admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the trial court's discretion. The
trial court's discretion will be overturned only if there is clear abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Hill, 627
F. 2d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir. 1980).
An individual has a right to a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly where as is contained
herein a conspiracy is charged. individual conspirators should be tried together. Hines, Supra at 732.
Despite false allegations from Damilao in Barcus' court, and despite an expert witness testifying in
behalf of Chapman, Barcus illegally diagnosed Chapman from the bench as having some type of issue
with alcohol. This was done completely contrary to the expert witnesses' true and accurate testimony in
Chapman's behalf. A judicial officer, making a diagnosis from the bench [for something of which he is
not trained in], is construed as a non-judicial act and is unconstitutional and illegal. The first prong of
the functional approach asks whether the function is one “normally performed by a judge.” (a diagnosis
from the bench is not something of which a judge would normally have within his scope of practice, as a
judge is versed in law only and is therefore not capable of a diagnoses of any medical condition and
should be bound to rely on duly trained professionals). Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Also see Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F2d 262 (6th Cir. 1984). Barcus has at this point lost all subject matter jurisdiction and all
decisions rendered thereafter are illegal and therefor punishable by law. Barcus has waived all
immunitydue to loss of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore all jurisdiction is lost.
Furthermore, the framers of the Constitution had in no way granted immunity to judicial officers and
this same immunity isn't among any written law passed by the Congress of the United States, therefore
judicial immunity is not absolute. See Bracey v. Gramley, 519 U.S. 1074, 117 S.Ct. 726 (1997).
Barcus has held Chapman to a much high standard than attorney Baker in his child custody proceedings
by making Chapman hold to standards that the attorney Baker is obviously not held. Chapman has
asserted his rights numerous times only to be overruled by Barcus thereby violating Chapman's right to
a fair and impartial trial. These violations are done brazenly and without regard to Chapman's rights and
this court can in no way “assume” that either Barcus or Haskins have not waived immunity as outlined
in a previous order from this court. If this court attempts to assert the immunity for these individuals,
then this court is then acting as the attorney for the two which is also acting in concert with the
conspiracy for the deprivations of Chapman's Constitutional rights. This court then loses subject matter
jurisdiction in the matter and can render no additional orders. See above in reference to judicial
misconduct. If Constitutional violations are the norm instead of the exception the Constitution isn't a
valid authority and the Judicial is no longer bound by that authority and it would be at that point that
the United States is no longer a free country but a monarchy of which the forefathers warned against.
The simple fact remains, while a Judge may issue orders to control his court, he has no lawful authority
to issue any order which violates the Supreme Law of the Land. The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution states that all entities have the mandatory right of an adequate, complete, effective, fair, full
meaningful and timely access to the court. If this were not indeed the case, why have it in the
Constitution in the first place? This is clearly directed to the judiciary which obviously the judiciary has
evidently chosen to ignore.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the interest of parents in the care,
custody and control of their children, is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by the court, Troxel V. Granville, USC, (2000). "Parents have a liberty interest of the
custody of their children, hence, any deprivation of that interest by the state must be accomplished by
procedures meeting the requirements of due process." Hooks v Hooks, United States Court of Appeals
(1985). Indeed, the right to rear one's children is so firmly rooted in our culture that the Unites States
Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Hawk v. Hawk, Tennessee Supreme Court, (1993). The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees Due Process and Equal Protection to all.
Kyle Haskins- An Oklahoma state judge engaged in an egregious discrimination against Chapman by
illegal acts of practicing law from the bench. In a hearing held on May 5th, 2005 in Haskins court,
Chapman was attending an attorney fee hearing. The opposing attorney, Jodi Johnson Baker proceeded
to give her opening statement. At its' conclusion and without Chapman's attorney's opening, Haskins
proceeded to inform Chapman's attorney of the statute which had evidently been pre-determined and on
which the court was going to rely to determine the outcome of the proceeding. This mention of the
statute by Haskins was never mentioned by Baker in this proceeding thereby making Haskins guilty
violation of Chapman's duly protected constitutional provisions and making Haskins guilty of
practicing law from the bench. Haskins further aggravated the situation and clearly abused his authority
by conducting ex-parte communication with Chapman's state court attorney two days later, while
Chapman's attorney was in Haskins court in an unrelated case and without a scheduled hearing. This
was done in open court yet neither Chapman nor the opposing side was present, in clear violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Chapman's right to a fair trial. Haskins additionally forced a pro-bono case
[on Chapman's state court attorney] by duress (for something Chapman allegedly said outside the
judge's court the next day of which Chapman's attorney had no knowledge of ). Thereby, additionally
violating that same attorney's rights under the Fifth Amendment. This is not only unethical but
additionally renders it useless to have this same attorney act in Chapman's behalf due to his probable
fear of additional retribution from the court. This fear will undoubtedly make Chapman's attorney less
than aggressive in Chapman's case and it's this unwarranted fear which has caused Chapman
unnecessary attorney expense of which Haskins should be held accountable.
The practice of law from the bench is a brazen illegal and negates Chapman's right to a fair hearing,
as does the illegal ex-parte communication as well as the unscheduled hearing. Again, as with Barcus
above. Haskins has lost all jurisdiction in the case and any determination to the rights of Chapman are
void and the door is wide open for suit sanctions against Haskins under authority 42 U.S.C. Section
1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. Section 1986).
“Judgments entered where a court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were
otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside,” Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt,
S.D.N.Y. 1994, 158 F.R.D. 278. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.. Any judge or attorney who does not report another judge for treason as
required by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason. 18 U.S.C. § 2382. The award of
attorney fees levied against Chapman after these unconstitutional acts are therefore illegal and should be
rendered void. Haskins had also found Chapman guilty of Contempt of court for non-payment of child
support without Haskins first doing fact finding upon a no contest agreement by Chapman for payment
of an illegal arrearage of which Barcus put Chapman in automatically in a previous hearing for child
custody and child support (See above). This unconstitutional act was done purposely and is further
deprivation of Chapman's right to fair treatment under the law.
Title 18, U.S.C. Section 242; Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law: This statute makes it a crime
for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to willfully deprive or
cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the U.S. . This law further prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute,
ordinance, regulation or custom to willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different
punishment, pains or penalties, then those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such
Acts under “color of law” include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the
bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their
lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under “color of any
law,” the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the
performance of his/her official duties. This definition includes, in addition to law enforcement officials,
individuals such as Mayors, Council persons, Judges, Nursing Home Proprietors, Security Guards, etc.,
persons who are bound by laws, statutes, ordinances or customs.
Jodi Johnson Baker OBA #19498 has conspired against Chapman and in concert with Barcus, Haskins
and Damilao in order to deprive Chapman of his Constitutional rights. Baker has alluded to certain
issues which are not only for purposes of defamation but to prejudice the court. Her blatant acts are
wholly unconstitutional and lack the professional decorum bestowed on a professional attorney at law.
The Oklahoma State Bar Association's standards of professional conduct and civility prescribe
principles that Baker, as a professional attorney, routinely disregards. While it would be impossible,
within this document, to recite the exhaustive list of Baker's uncivil and unprofessional efforts, a review
of the record reveals numerous examples for the Court's consideration, which can and will be provided
to this court upon request.
While the Oklahoma Bar standards are “voluntary” by their terms, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power
to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates”.
Chambers v. NASCO Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227
(U.S. 1921). See generally Jaen v. Coca-Cola Co., 157 F.R.D. 146, 152-53 (D.P.R. 1994)(discussing
role of civility in litigation). If one does not report the criminal activities of judges within the system,
they become principals in that same criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2, 3 and 4.
Baker, as counsel for Damilao had instructed Damilao to hide Chapman's and Damilao's son from
Chapman in violation of 43 O.S. § 111.2 of the Oklahoma Statutes. This statute gives Chapman the
authority for an action at law against this illegal criminal activity. Additionally, Damilao had stolen
some of Chapman's belongings to the knowledge and/or consent of Baker in violation of Rule 4.1 of
the “Code of Conduct for Attorneys” for the state of Oklahoma. Baker has violated numerous
provisions of the “Rules” such as: Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Person; DR-7-102 (A) (1); DR-
7-106 (C) (2); Rule 8.4 Misconduct; Rule 8.4 (a)-(f), DR-1-102 (A). In state v. Raskin, 1982 OK 39 ¶ 16
642 P. 2d 262 the court outlines their task to “protect the public and to preserve the public confidence
in the legal profession and in the judiciary that licenses them...”.
Baker is in further violation of the following: Rule 1.1 Competence' Rule 1.2 Assisted client in conduct
that she knew was criminal; Misleading Legal Argument; Rule 1.6 Aiding in illegal activity; Rule 3.4
Fairness to Opposing Party; Rules 3.5; Rule 4.4 Does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of
a third person; DR-7-102 (A) (1) Taken action to harass; Rules 5.1, 8.1, 8.3 and 8.4. Accordingly,
referencing State of Oklahoma Ex. Rel Oklahoma Bar Association v. Darril Lonnie Holden 895 P. 2d
707 which states in part: “¶ 16 Attorney misconduct related to the parent-child relationship is a serious
Baker has violated the following provisions of the Constitution: Article III Section 2; Article IV Section
2 ans 18 USC § 3231; 28 USC § 1331; 28 USC § 1343; 28 USC § 1443; 28 USC § 2000b; 42 USC §
1985, 1986, 1988, 2000b and 2000b-2 of the United States Code.
The provisions of the Oklahoma Constitutional violations are: Art. 2 § 7 Due Process of Law; Art. 2 §
21 Self-Incrimination-Double Jeopardy; Art. 2 § 22 Liberty of Speech and Press (Baker alluded to
Chapman's “Pro-Se Manual” in Barcus' court which served no purpose other that to prejudice the
court); Art. 2 § 30 Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (Due to the unlawful aquirement of Chapman's
This court is under duty to impose punishment under 18 USC § 241 and 242 in the kidnapping and/or
assisted kidnapping of Chapman's son. This, as well as other law as outlined herein.
Baker has additionally mentioned in each respective court the things of which Chapman complains of
about Baker. These mentions of complaints against Baker being brought to the attention of the judges
have no other purpose that to harass Chapman and polarize the judge against Chapman, which Chapman
asserts has worked to Baker's advantage thus far.
Rosemarie L. Damilao has conspired against Chapman and in concert with Barcus, Haskins and Baker
in order to deprive Chapman of his Constitutional rights. Damilao has alluded to certain issues which
are for purposes to defame Chapman and further to prejudice the court. Damilao has committed blatant
perjury in court on numerous occasions and has caused directly and/or indirectly grievous harm to
Chapman and his son. The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, has recognized that
matters involving marriage, procreation, and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental
“liberty” interests protected by the Constitution.
While there has been absolutely no proof (where no proof exists) that Chapman has committed harm to
his son in any capacity, it has also not been proved in any capacity whatsoever that Damilao is the better
parent of the two. It's blatantly obvious that Chapman's constitutional protections are being disregarded
and perhaps and more likely than not due to the fact that he was a pro se litigant and also more than
likely his status as a male dealing with a child custody issue. It's no secret and a typical occurrence
within the courts for the mother (female) to be given custody over the father (male). This is gender
discrimination and an illegal and unconstitutional act continually perpetuated by the courts.
Historically at common law, judicial immunity does not insulate from damage liability those private
persons who corruptly conspire with a judge. 604 F.2d. 976.
As previously stated, Damilao stole the parties child in order to deny Chapman his Constitutional rights
to the care and companionship of his son. This was done openly and brazenly and evidently at the
blessing of the court. Damilao has committed numerous acts of perjury in open court and on the record
so that Chapman's rights would be denied. Although Chapman has in no way ever harmed his son,
nor would he ever harm his son, Damilao still alluded to that allegation in open court and on the record.
Damilao has worked in conspiracy with the above parties to deny Chapman his rights and this court
has the obligation and duty to receive the facts upon a trial of the merits and punish the responsible
Damilao has tried to have Chapman incarcerated in the Tulsa County jail for the illegal, automatic
arrearage in which Chapman was placed in furtherance of the denial of his rights as well as his personal
This is an extraordinarily important case, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of two crucial
components in the State of Oklahoma’s divorce and custody machinery.
In considering this case, this Court will address the precise degree to which due process and equal
protection constrain state actions which implicate the liberty of a parent to exercise their parental rights
in their parent-child relationship.
The liberty of a parent to freely exercise their parental rights has been described by the Supreme Court
of the United States as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” which “ the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 66 (2000). There
is arguably no more important liberty interest.
This case is about exactly how far Oklahoma state procedures may go before they cross the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional action that affects the liberty interest of every parent in every
Oklahoma divorce and custody case. Oral argument will invigorate the deliberative process with
appreciation for the implications which flow from where the Court determines the Constitution draws
Accordingly, Chapman requests oral argument.
Jurisdiction exists in the District Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331, for constitutional questions, 28 U.S.C.
§1343, for civil rights actions, and under 28 U.S.C. §2201, for declaratory judgment relief, in respect of
1. The District Court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion by failing to hold that, as
between parents who are both “fit”, each parent is vested with a liberty interest in “fundamental”
2. The District Court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion by failing to apply the
correct standard of review, strict scrutiny, to state action which implicates liberty interests and
3. The District Court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion by finding no
redressability if Oklahoma's standard family practices were unconstitutional.
This case presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Oklahoma's Family Law. The challenge
is grounded in the long history of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court holding, in a variety of fact
situations, that parental rights are “basic civil rights” [1] and a “fundamental” type of “liberty” protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.[2]
The operation of Oklahoma family law constitutes state action which directly implicates the liberty of
each parent in every Oklahoma custody case to exercise their parental rights without undue state
interference. Strict scrutiny legal analysis of these statutes in pari materia with the Constitution reveals
state action which crosses the line between constitutional and unconstitutional, because the state
procedures implicate and alter parental rights without the due process and equal protection required by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for fundamental rights.
In his Popovich dissent, Senior Judge Ryan expressed pointed concerns related to due process issues
being raised on appeal for the first time in oral argument by an amicus and an intervener, not the
principle parties, and without development and briefing in the District Court. Popovich v. Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, 276 F.3d 808, ___ (6th Cir. 2002) en banc
cert. denied ____.
Unlike Popovich, from the inception of this case all three aspects of Fourteenth Amendment protection
of fundamental rights have been extensively developed and briefed in this District Court.
On September 17, 2004 Petitioner filed an initial complaint (District Court case 04-CV-722-EA-C)
under numerous provisions of the United States Code, facially challenging Oklahoma Family Law
practices for inter alia violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, only one among
The District Court immediately dismissed on the basis that Petitioner sought an injunction specific to his
state court action. Objections and responses were exchanged.
On April 21, 2005 Petitioner filed an amended complaint raising the same legal issues, while removing
all of the underlying fact based 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims and adding several defendants. By removing
the fact based claims and damage requests, and adding certain defendants, the case was simplified into a
general constitutional challenge.
Various motions and responses related to dismissal under abstention doctrines and challenges to Federal
Court jurisdiction followed.
On June 20, 2005, after additional briefing and objections, the District Court dismissed the action based
in part on Plaintiff's supposed out of time filing of his Response to the state's Motion to Dismiss.
Chapman was never sent a copy of the motion and stated accordingly to the court, nevertheless, despite
the numerous hours of time spent on these pleadings, this court simply deemed the state's Motion to
Dismiss as confessed. Although this court may dismiss a claim, it may not disregard the right of citizens
seeking redress against the state and should reconsider the last order of confession. For this court to
simply dismiss a claim of Constitutional violations for something as simple as not filing an answer to
something which Chapman never received is a miscarriage of justice.
Chapman hereby asks the District Court to enter an order withdrawing the original dismissal, and filed a
Certificate of Constitutional Question directed to the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma.
Chapman asks the District Court enter an order which thoroughly reviews the legal authorities and asks
that it conclude: (1) various abstention doctrines are not applicable; (2) that the federal court has
jurisdiction to entertain this action; and (3) that the State of Oklahoma and all added parties should be
joined as parties to the action. (4) That the practice of family law in Oklahoma deprives citizens of their
duly protected Constitutional rights.
The District Court should enter an order joining the State of Oklahoma as a party defendant along
with all parties (Plaintiffs and Defendants) aforementioned. In response to Chapman's suit, the State of
Oklahoma would not consent to defend their laws and aggressively asserted sovereign immunity under
the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Again, various motions and responses followed, including
additional challenges to the validity of the federal action.
To date, the case has been fully briefed, with several briefs noting various social studies data on the
detrimental affects of divorce on minor children. While the named defendants in the case offered no
brief, the State of Oklahoma as amicus filed a brief in opposition to Petitioner (hereinafter “the
Oklahoma Merits Brief”), actually a de facto defendant’s brief because the other named defendants filed
On June 20, 2005 the District Court entered an order deeming the state's Motion to Dismiss as confessed
pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f) thereby dismissing the action.
C. The Constitutional Question
The constitutional question, requested by Chapman of the District Court should note in a Certificate of
Constitutional Question directed to the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, as follows.
“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2403(b), the Court hereby gives you notice that Plaintiff has filed the above-
captioned action to challenge the constitutionality of Oklahoma family and divorce law with respect to
the asserted effect of these rules and statutes to permit an Oklahoma domestic relations court to deprive
a biological parent, in a divorce or paternity situation, of equal custodial parent status without a finding
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent so deprive[d] is an unfit parent.”
This question contains the elements of a constitutional challenge on each of three Fourteenth
Amendment grounds: (1) procedural due process (“effect of this rule and statute… without a finding by
clear and convincing evidence”); (2) substantive due process (“to deprive a biological parent…of…
custodial parent status”); and (3) equal protection (“to deprive…equal…status”). Distilled to its
essence, the certified question reads as follows.
“Plaintiff has filed the… [constitutional] action to the challenge the… effect of this rule and statute… to
deprive a… parent… of equal custodial parent status without a finding by clear and convincing
evidence… the parent… is… unfit.”
In various contexts, parental rights have found protection in the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Few other rights in American jurisprudence, criminal or civil,
have found such sweeping Constitutional protections. Plaintiff brings this action to the Northern
District of Oklahoma (Tenth Circuit) seeking Constitutional protection for the liberty interests and
fundamental rights of parents in Oklahoma custody cases.
This District Court’s Merits Decision and Merits Reconsideration failed to recognize the “fundamental”
nature of the parental rights of each parent in a custody action. Instead, this court concluded simply
that “The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to show cause for his failure timely to respond to defendants'
motion to dismiss. For this reason, pursuant to Local Rule7.1(f), the motion to dismiss is hereby deemed
confessed. The Court will consider it accordingly” ORDER Dated June 20, 2005.
Having been so willing to dismiss Plaintiff's claim this court has erred in addressing the original intent
of Plaintiff's action which is the Constitutional question of family court in the state of Oklahoma. First
each fit parent in a custody action is vested with “fundamental” parental rights. Because this Court did
not recognize “fundamental” parental rights, the Court should not simply dismiss Plaintiff's claim on a
mere technical flaw when there is contention as to the service of process from the state. Just because the
state says that it was sent doesn't make it true. The court should allow the suit to proceed and thereby
apply the strict scrutiny standard of review to the Oklahoma scheme to determine if it is constitutionally
In dismissing the claim, the Court not only ignored the fact that both the United States Supreme Court in
Troxel and the Sixth Circuit in Popovich a mountain of other courts have recognized that divorce and
custody actions implicate a parent’s “fundamental” rights, but also the fact that the State of Oklahoma
(acting as de facto defendant) has conceded the same point in this case. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000); Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, 276 F.3d
808, ___ (6th Cir. 2002) en banc cert. denied ____; .
Appellant does not say the state cannot apportion the parental rights as between the parents, but he does
challenge the Statutes in pari materia with judicial decisions (or opinions, if you will) and procedure as
legally insufficient as a matter of constitutional law. The issue is not so much what Oklahoma family
law in pari materia with judicial opinion does, but when and how it does it:
in an ex parte proceeding, before any hearing on the merits, on the basis of only affidavit evidence
considered by the state court without either confrontation or cross- examination of witnesses,
with the post-deprivation remedies requiring an evidentiary hearing without a clear standard for
regaining the rights already lost.
For any reasonable jurist who is respectful of due process and equal protection, the ex parte aspect of the
procedure alone should signal alarms, but most especially because, for the parent who loses the race to
the courthouse, the process directly implicates and alters the fundamental liberty interest of the parent in
the care, custody, and control of the child(ren).
In precisely the type of situation that is presented by the Oklahoma scheme, the U.S. Supreme Court has
overruled "short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review" that otherwise may forever
defeat re-dressability. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n , 219 U.S. 498,
515 (1911).[3]
Plaintiff contends that each parent possesses “fundamental liberty interests” and “basic civil rights”
which can only be modified, altered, or infringed by the application of specific Fourteenth
Amendment protections, including notice and evidentiary hearing with clear and not arbitrary
The way Oklahoma Law in pari materia with Judicial opinion operates, every Oklahoma custody action
implicates fundamental parental rights because the scheme commands custodial and noncustodial
designations. When an Oklahoma court makes these legal conclusions without parental wrongdoing, it
is an alteration (if not an abrogation) of the fundamental nature of the rights. Changing one parent’s
status and designation to “custodial” and another to “non custodial” is an “abridgement” of the
“fundamental” and “basic civil right” for the parent designated “non-custodial.”
The State of Oklahoma, recognizes the legal requirement for strict scrutiny of state actions which
implicate “fundamental” rights. Strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review in this and every case in
which fundamental rights are implicated by state action.
“[S]trict… scrutiny… [is] appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental
constitutional rights… [S]trict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a heavy burden of
justification, that the State must demonstrate that its [system affecting fundamental liberties] has
been structured with precision, and is tailored narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it
has selected the "least drastic means for effectuating its objectives...” (footnotes and quotes omitted)
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
I. The Court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion by failing to hold that, as
“In determining which rights are fundamental, Judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their
personal and private notions[;]… it cannot be said that a Judge's responsibility to determine whether a
right is basic and fundamental in this sense vests him with unrestricted personal discretion.” Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 n7 (1965) (A case dealing with marriage relationship privacy); [4]
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 66 (2000) (The liberty interest at issue in this case--the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children--is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court... [I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.) After this sweeping declaration, supported by substantial
legal authority, the Troxel Court then goes on to apply the “history and traditions” test.
Citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), the court stated that “… in
analyzing the safeguards needed in child custody proceedings”, the Due Process Clause requires a
balancing of "the private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures
used will lead to erroneous decisions." It is substantive due process jurisprudence, which protects
“fundamental liberty” interests, requires justice, accuracy, and the removal of arbitrary [6] decision-
making that minimizes the “risk” of procedures which “lead to erroneous decisions”:
In Lassiter, the Court said that… alteration of parental rights requires procedural safeguards under
the Due Process Clause in order to insure "… accuracy and [justice]…," and [to avoid a parent
being]… “erroneously deprived of his or her child."
The Court improperly ignored the procedural due process requirements of Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F. 2d.
935 (6th Cir. 1985). The fundamental nature of parental rights does not go away in the context of a
custody adjudication.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a single parent (a father) does not have the same
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as "other parent[s]". Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 647 (1972). The Court noted the State’s assertion that Stanley did not have the same Fourteenth
Amendment protections as “other parent[s]” [7] and then compared Stanley's rights to those of "other
parents". The conclusion of the case demonstrates that Stanley, as a single father, had a fundamental
liberty interest analogous to "other parent[s]". The Stanley Court continues:
“[A]s a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before
his children were taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other
parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stanley at 649.
Justice Kennedy recently noted that there is at least general, if not unanimous, agreement that parental
rights are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[T]here is a beginning point that commands general, perhaps unanimous, agreement in our separate
opinions: As our case law has developed, the [parent] has a constitutional right to determine, without
undue interference by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The parental right
stems from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (citations
omitted).” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Kennedy, dissent)
Justice Kennedy then notes the problems with State Court custody proceedings:
“These [issues] include ... the protection the Constitution gives parents against state-ordered visitation
but also the extent to which federal rules for facial challenges to statutes control in state courts. These
matters, however, should await some further case…”
“It must be recognized, of course, that a domestic relations proceeding in and of itself can constitute
state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a
[parent] to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated. The best
interests of the child standard has at times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable
results. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 2, and n. 2
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Mar. 20, 1998)… Our system must confront… the reality that litigation can
itself be so disruptive that constitutional protection may be required; and I do not discount the possibility
that in some instances the best interests of the child standard may provide insufficient protection to the
parent-child relationship.” Troxel 530 U.S. at 101.
The general consensus of the U.S. Supreme Court that parental rights are Fourteenth Amendment
protected liberty interests is addressed below by the nine Justices from Troxel, id:
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Ginsburg, and Breyer (plurality)
The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.
Souter (concurring)
I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, whose facial
invalidation of its own state statute is consistent with this Court's prior cases addressing the substantive
interests at stake… We have long recognized that a parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing,
companionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Citations omitted).
I agree with the plurality that this Court's recognition of a fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children resolves this case. Our decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.
510 (1925), holds that parents have a fundamental constitutional right to rear their children, including
the right to determine who shall educate and socialize them.
Stevens (dissenting)
It has become standard practice in our substantive due process jurisprudence to begin our analysis with
an identification of the "fundamental" liberty interests implicated by the challenged state action.
[We] are of course correct to recognize that the right of a parent to maintain a relationship with his or
her child is among the interests included most often in the constellation of liberties protected through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in
caring for and guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest--absent exceptional
circumstances--in doing so without the undue interference of strangers to them and to their child…
(Citations omitted). [8]
In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the "unalienable
Rights" with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims "all Men ... are endowed by their
Creator." [9] And in my view that right is also among the "othe[r] [rights] retained by the people" which
the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to deny or
disparage."
The Court was presented with controlling legal authority, on the point that parental rights are a
“fundamental liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Failing to
recognize the fundamental nature of the parental rights at stake, the Court simply dismisses the claim on
The District Court has improperly dismissed what Appellant suggests is the natural conclusion of due
process and equal protection being properly applied to fundamental liberty interests with fit parents --
with proper protection of their rights, shared or joint custody would be naturally follow.
Parents have a fundamental right… with which… the State may not interfere unless it proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the exercise of that right harms his/her child(ren) or at least creates a
substantial risk of such harm… This claim is that any parent of either gender relegated to non-custodial
status by an ‘allocation’ of parental rights has been thereby deprived of a fundamental right which
should be protected by the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff rightly asserts that because parental rights are fundamental, the Court should not indulge the
usual presumption of constitutionality for state statutes; rather, the statute should be subject to strict
scrutiny and the State should be required to show that any infringement it makes on the parental right is
justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored.
Oklahoma's law does exactly what was prohibited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stanley, id. It allows
the first party to the courthouse the opportunity to seize the fundamental liberty interests of the other
parent without an(y) opportunity to first rebut any evidence or claims against them. The State of
Oklahoma likely concedes that it is pitting two individuals with equal fundamental rights against each
Here we have the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Plaintiff Chapman,
thousands of Oklahoma parents and the State of Oklahoma in agreement that parental rights are
“fundamental” in nature; however, the Courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny to the Oklahoma scheme.
II. The Court erred as a matter of law and thereby abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct
standard of review, strict scrutiny, to state action which implicates liberty interests and fundamental
The nation’s history and traditions require the courts to draw definite lines around parental rights and to
remove arbitrary or vague perimeters. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality) (“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines
but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values
that underlie our society…’ Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is firmly rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.” (citations and footnotes omitted)). "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979) (Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of…
family… with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that
course). Describing the due process evaluation in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the
Supreme Court declared in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (unanimous):
The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart from the putative father's pecuniary interest
in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for
noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has
stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded
them constitutional protection. Just as the termination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, so
too does their imposition. (citations omitted)
“[W]hat procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-651
(1972). Procedural due process issues require a two-step analysis: (1) whether there is a constitutionally
protected interest and (2) what process is required to protect the interest. Jackson v. City of Columbus,
194 F.3d 737, 745, 749 (6th Cir., 1999).[11] Consistent with Tenth Circuit authority, there is a parallel
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (a case challenging the
constitutionality of a civil statute on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Grounds), requiring the
“familiar two-stage analysis”;
“We must first ask whether the asserted individual interest[s] are encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of "life, liberty or property"; if protected interests are implicated, we then must
decide what procedures constitute "due process of law." (citations omitted) Id. at 672.
Then “consideration of three distinct factors”:
"First, the private interest that will be affected…; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest…and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the [state] interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (citations omitted) Id. at 675. [12]
The Due Process clause is directed specifically at the states themselves, imposing restrictions upon
Ohio’s power to deprive liberty or property. These restrictions are designed to provide a reasonable
assurance of accurate fact-finding. ''The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in
the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is to 'instruct the fact finder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication.''' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan concurring)). See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652
(1975) (nem. con. – no dissents) (“[A] father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected
right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the children he has sired and raised,
[which] undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection’”
citing from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). “The ‘right to be heard before being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve… criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
1. Rule 75(N) and the problem with ex parte (pendent lite) proceedings
Parental rights possess substantive due process requirements and associational privacy rights. These
same parental rights are also a source of procedural due process protections. [13] Hooks v Hooks, 771
F.2d 935 (6th Cir., 1985) ([A]ny deprivation of a parent’s liberty interest in the custody of their children
must be accomplished by the requirements of due process.
This procedural “first strike” rule can so completely disadvantage the excluded party that they may
never be able to sufficiently recover, financially, emotionally, or otherwise, to maintain a sufficient
defense later. A post-deprivation remedy is insufficient where the litigant’s “footing” to challenge the
initial action is disadvantaged. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1982).
The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation to Oklahoma law in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 550 (1965) (per curiam), after holding that in an uncontested judicial proceeding, the failure to give
a parent notice of trial implicates the parent’s fundamental rights and deprives the parent of due process,
so as to render the judicial action constitutionally invalid. The Court then turned to whether or not a
post-judgment hearing to set aside the constitutionally invalid decree served to cure its constitutional
invalidity, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, by noting that: “…[t]he Texas Court of Civil
Appeals … held, in accord with its understanding of the Texas precedents, that whatever constitutional
infirmity resulted from the failure to give the petitioner notice had been cured by the hearing
subsequently afforded to him upon his motion to set aside the decree.” The Supreme Court did not
agree, holding that when a defendant has been denied procedural due process resulting in a
constitutionally defective judgment, a post-judgment hearing will not cure the constitutionally defective
judgment. The reasoning of the Supreme Court, in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551-553, is as
Had the petitioner been given the timely notice which the Constitution requires, the Manzos, as the
moving parties, would have had the burden of proving their case as against whatever defenses the
petitioner might have interposed. It would have been incumbent upon them to show not only that
Salvatore Manzo met all the requisites of an adoptive parent under Texas law, but also to prove why the
petitioner's consent to the adoption was not required. Had neither side offered any evidence, those who
initiated the adoption proceedings could not have prevailed.
Instead, the petitioner was faced on his first appearance in the courtroom with the task of overcoming an
adverse decree entered by one judge, based upon a finding of nonsupport made by another judge. As the
record shows, there was placed upon the petitioner the burden of affirmatively showing that he had
contributed to the support of his daughter to the limit of his financial ability over the period involved.
The burdens thus placed upon the petitioner were real, not purely theoretical. For "it is plain that where
the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome." Yet these burdens would not have been
imposed upon him had he been given timely notice in accord with the Constitution.
A fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity to be heard." It is an opportunity which
must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The trial court could have fully
accorded this right to the petitioner only by granting his motion to set aside the decree and consider the
case anew. Only that would have wiped the slate clean. Only that would have restored the petitioner to
the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place. His
motion should have been granted. (citations omitted)
The Supreme Court emphasizes the consequences where required due process procedure is denied. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970), due process required an oral pre-deprivation hearing in a
welfare benefits matter (property deprivation), holding that some property rights require immediate
“[A] recipient… not permitted to present evidence… orally, or to confront or cross-examine adverse
witnesses [creates omissions that] are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures.”
Goldberg, at 268.
Title 43 under Oklahoma statute is used to justify uprooting an ex parte litigant from family, children,
home, income, and personal property in the home. Oklahoma law does not so necessarily require that
any allegation of danger or harm be present. If it did, it would be insufficient when considering the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-9410 (2004) (all concurring) in
a case of a wife’s hearsay testimony against her husband, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). [14] In Crawford, the Supreme Court upheld the confrontation clause and
its historical background of the “right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (citations
Crawford v. Washington denies the state’s claim to accept hearsay or ex parte proceedings, i.e., “without
oral hearing” and “upon satisfactory proof by affidavit” (Rule 75(N)). Much of the Crawford decision
described the history of the repeated, persistent, and consistent abuses which occur when “trial by
affidavit” is allowed. Crawford v. Washington noted that due process does require an oral hearing and
affirms Plaintiff’s contention that Oklahoma law is facially unconstitutional as written. Post
adjudication remedies are insufficient to remedy the initial deprivation under these laws, just to regain
the implicated rights. The litigant to win the race to the courthouse generally obtains all of the rights
and property, where the opposing party is subject to a different standard just to reclaim what has already
been taken away without their knowledge.
For criminal defendants the Due Process Clause has been interpreted to provide that "an accused has a
right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975). Parties in civil litigation have an
analogous due process right to be present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in the
process unless their exclusion furthers important governmental interests.[15] Further, those who fail to
appear in court may not be sanctioned for failing to appear until they have been accorded due process.
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972). These guarantees are protective of equal justice and fair
treatment before the courts. U.S. v. Tennessee, No. 98-6730, 2003 FED App.
"It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law impinges upon a
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively
unconstitutional." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right,
it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored
to effectuate only those interests.”).
In the unique situation of divorcing parents, pitting two individuals with equal fundamental rights
against each other, it is unconstitutional for the state to break the tie by allocating custody.
The foundational Fourteenth Amendment case, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880) (unanimous),
was decided contemporaneously with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
acts 1 and 2 (i.e. 42 U.S.C.§ 1981 et. seq.). This case speaks to the interplay between the Equality and
Due Process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Fourteenth Amendment is “to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion… The prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power…
[A] State cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to [state] power.
[State] rights do not reach to that extent... [P]rohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed to
the States.” Id. at 346.
“A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities… The constitutional provision,
therefore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are
exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by
virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty,
without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the
constitutional inhibition… This must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning…
[T]he constitutional amendment was ordained for a purpose. It was to secure equal rights to all
persons, and, to insure to all persons the enjoyment of such rights.” Id. at 347.
“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-374 (1886) (unanimous). The guaranty of "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws." Id. at 369. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-266 (1983), the Supreme Court
addressed a parental rights challenge to adoption proceedings and noted:
The concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. The sovereign may not
draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective... [I]t may not subject men and women to disparate treatment when there
is no substantial relation between the disparity and an important state purpose (citations omitted).
"...A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to… equality of rights with every
other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right… enjoying all the
rights and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Between fit
parents, the only way the state of Oklahoma can support the breaking of equal fundamental rights,
without first providing them sufficient Fourteenth Amendment protections, is through the exercise of
personal value judges, biases, or prejudices. This violates constitutional protections:
“The question… is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are
permissible considerations for removal of [a] child from the custody of its natural [parent]. We have
little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither
can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (unanimous).
“Maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance.” Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 381 (1979).
"[T]hough the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable;
that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be
oppression." --Thomas Jefferson
“Hooks is a procedural due process case; it does not address the substantive rights of parents between
themselves in the divorce context. Without doubt, Hooks and the Supreme Court authority which it
cites do insist that procedural due process standards be observed when a parent is deprived of the
custody of his or her children.”
The District Court relies heavily upon two dissents from the recent Troxel decision to defeat the notion
that parents must be afforded significant Fourteenth Amendment protections in divorce and custody
actions. Rarely if ever, are sound decisions, affecting such pivotal components of any legal contest,
based significantly upon two dissents from the same case.
Just as in the trial court did in Howard v. Grinage, No. 94-2234, 1996 FED App. 0130P (6th
Cir.1996) [17] the District Court creatively applied criminal substantive standards, even though this case
clearly addresses “fundamental liberty interests, basic civil rights,” and “procedural due process”
The Due Process Clause has a procedural component and a substantive one. The two components are
distinct from each other because each has different objectives, and each imposes different constitutional
limitations on government power…
A procedural due process limitation, unlike its substantive counterpart, does not require that the
government refrain from making a substantive choice to infringe upon a person's life, liberty, or
property interest. It simply requires that the government provide "due process" before making such a
decision. The goal is to minimize the risk of substantive error, to assure fairness in the decision-
making process, and to assure that the individual affected has a participatory role in the process.
The touchstone of procedural due process is the fundamental requirement that an individual be given
the opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful manner." See Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721
F.2d 550, 563, aff'd , 470 U.S. 532 (1985)… [T]he right to a hearing prior to the deprivation is of
constitutional stature and does not depend upon the nature of the right violated. The rationale for
granting procedural protection to an interest that does not rise to the level of a fundamental right
lies at the very heart of our constitutional democracy: the prevention of arbitrary use of
Substantive due process… serves the goal of preventing "governmental power from being 'used
for purposes of oppression,'" regardless of the fairness of the procedures used. See Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (citation omitted). Substantive due process serves as a vehicle to
limit various aspects of potentially oppressive government action. For example, it can serve as a
check on legislative enactments thought to infringe on fundamental rights otherwise not explicitly
protected by the Bill of Rights; or as a check on official misconduct which infringes on a "fundamental
right”…
Procedural due process claims do not implicate the egregiousness of the action itself, but only question
whether the process accorded prior to the deprivation was constitutionally sufficient. And although the
existence of a "protected" right must be the threshold determination, the focus of the inquiry centers on
the process provided, rather than on the nature of the right . However, where the governmental
decision causing a deprivation is made without any process where one is required, the inquiry
shifts to the nature of the conduct causing the deprivation… [T]he failure to provide due process,
where the government is constitutionally required to do so, is in itself an arbitrary and unfair use
of official power.
In short, substantive due process prohibits the government's abuse of power or its use for the
purpose of oppression, and procedural due process prohibits arbitrary and unfair deprivations of
protected life, liberty, or property interests without procedural safeguards.
The doctrinal distinctions undergirding the limitations each component imposes partly explain the
different standards the Supreme Court has said are necessary to state a violation under each of the two
components of the Due Process Clause. Although both substantive and procedural due process
violations must "deprive" an individual of a protected constitutional interest, and the deprivation must
be "arbitrary in the constitutional sense," Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992),
each imposes upon a plaintiff a different burden to state a cognizable claim.” Id.
B. Salerno Test for a Statutory Challenge
The test contained within United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) should control in relation to its
recognition of fundamental parental rights. A careful reading of Salerno in context, reaffirms the
Plaintiff’s point. In the beginning of Salerno, the Court appears frustrated by the extensive measures
enacted to comply with any test of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause when it stated
that a statute “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render it wholly invalid…”
(1) The case addressed a criminal bail bond matter.
(2) The Court engaged in a review three separate times of the considerable procedural due process
protections (Id. at 742-43, 747-48, 751-52) concluding, “We think these extensive safeguards suffice
to repel a facial challenge.”
(3) The “clear and convincing evidence” standard was applied. Id. at 742.
(4) The statutes in question did not provide “unbridled discretion” Id. at 742.
(5) The statute contained appropriate “compelling interests” Id. at 749. The statute under review was
narrowly tailored to the public interest and safety by applying only to those who posed a danger to
(6) The statute was narrowly tailored to affect those interests Id. at 750 (“individuals who have been
arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses”).
Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions concur; these decisions support Chapman’s contentions of the
requisite Fourteenth Amendment requirements for parental rights. “[N]either Congress nor a State can
validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S.
489 (1999); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 732-733 (1982). [18]
The Court did not properly begin its required review of the interests before the court, in compliance with
the standards set forth in widely accepted Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence.
C. Whether “void for vagueness” or “arbitrary” in terms of a fundamental liberty there is little or no
The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (unanimous). [20]
Federal Courts have struck down laws demonstrating vagueness in relation to parental termination
actions. Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976). Where parental termination was provided for under statutes that noted parents could be
found "...unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child..." the vagueness
doctrine was applied to determine they were unconstitutional. [21] A regulation which “either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning... violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (nem. con.). [22] In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985), the application of vagueness was asserted pursuant to an attorney in jeopardy of losing his
license, and not a criminal matter. “[P]erhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent
vagueness test should apply.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)
(nem. con.)
III. It is axiomatic in law that a “right without a remedy is no right at all” and that “where one is
assailed, there he may defend.” Henry Campbell Black, American Constitutional Law §70 (4th Ed.,
West Pub. 1927) (A right without a remedy is no right at all, and a constitution without a competent
judicial arbiter of what lies fair and foul under its strictures is no constitution at all). Not long after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the concept that a right requires
a remedy is at the very heart and foundation of American Jurisprudence (Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S.
409, 414 - 416 (1897) (unanimous):
“The principle… lies at the foundation of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence. Wherever one is
assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the liability and the right are inseparable.
This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as such by the common intelligence and conscience of
all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an
opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any
other tribunal.” Id. at 414
“Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's defense? If the
legislative department of the government were to enact a statute conferring the right to condemn the
citizen without any opportunity whatever of being heard, would it be pretended that such an enactment
would not be violative of the constitution? If this be true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that
the judicial department-the source and fountain of justice itself-has yet the authority to render lawful
that which, if done under express legislative sanction, would be violative of the constitution. If such
power obtains, then the judicial department of the government, sitting to uphold and enforce the
constitution, is the only one possessing a power to disregard it. If such authority exists, then, in
consequence of their establishment, to compel obedience to law, and to enforce justice, courts possess
the right to inflict the very wrongs which they were created to prevent.” Id. at 416.
“The very essence of civil liberty… consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection… [E]very right, when withheld, must have remedy, and every injury its proper redress…
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
In conjunction with this inherent principle of American jurisprudence, where fundamental liberty is
concerned, it is the state, and not the party to an action that bears the responsibility of proving their
infringements are constitutional. In this unique area of the law, the normal presumption of
constitutionality and of the burden to demonstrate constitutionality falls first to the state, that nature of
the case itself shifts. [23] “It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a
law ‘impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is
presumptively unconstitutional.’” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980). “Fundamental liberty”
and “basic civil rights” fall into that special category of substantive due process where "governmental
deprivations of life, liberty or property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the
procedures employed” (citation omitted) Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir.
1992); Zablocki v. Radhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (When a statutory classification significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.)
Once an injury is demonstrated, that affects “fundamental” and “basic” rights is shown to have its
origins in a statutory construction, the state must then, as a matter of law, demonstrate that its statutes
are properly constructed pursuant to the test outlined in both Zablocki and Salerno.
A. Additional remedies
1. The lack of Due Process injures rights which are remedied by removing the source of the ongoing
The Court erred in not considering that the lack of due process creates a justiciable injury with real
avenues of redress.
As the court held in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) “[t]he Due Process Clause was intended
to secure an individual from an abuse of power by government officials.” See also, Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (noting that the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent
government officials " 'from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression'").
[24]Fundamental rights are substantive rights and must be free of "arbitrary and capricious" action
by the government itself or its actors. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir.,
2001) ("[T]he due process guarantee… protect[s] citizens from the arbitrary exercise of…
power…") (citations omitted); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (The "substantive
component of the Due Process Clause is violated by [government] action… when it [is] arbitrary
[25] ). In other words, the "arbitrary and capricious" standard set forth in Pearson is simply another
formulation of, but is no less stringent than, the more traditional "shocks the conscience" standard…
The State government’s freedom ''to regulate procedure of its courts in accordance with it own
conception of policy and fairness” are only valid so long as they do not “offend… some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'' Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). [26] Substantive due process affords only those protections
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
This legal authority establishes that some of the re-dressable injuries created by a lack of due process are
to “secure an individual from abuse of power…,” prevent offending “some principle of justice,” and to
remove an “instrument of oppression.” The Tenth Circuit has found that due process is to prevent the
“arbitrary exercise of… power,” and “arbitrary and capricious action.” Therefore, striking down
Oklahoma's provisions which lack due process redresses the “abuse of power,” controls the “exercise
of… power,” prevents “arbitrary and capricious action,” and removes oppression--, all of which restore
the “principle of justice.”
This is real and tangible relief as a litigant would be secure from the many injuries caused by the lack of
due process. Preventing the State of Oklahoma from operating under statutory law which does not
contain the requisite constitutional protections for “fundamental liberty interests” and “basic civil rights”
provides prospective relief.
Plaintiff’s “due-process allegation does not implicate the merits of the [state court] decree, only the
procedures leading up to it.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently corrected a very narrow redressability interpretation by the Fourth
Circuit Court noting that the deterrent effects directed at the cause of the injury was a sufficient basis for
redress. Cf. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). (“For a plaintiff who
is injured or threatened with injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that
effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress. Civil
penalties can fit that description. Insofar as they encourage defendants to discontinue current violations
and deter future ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs injured or threatened with injury as a result
of ongoing unlawful conduct.”) Id.
In this case, the cause of the injury had been so permanently removed as to be utterly impossible to be
re-created. However, Oklahoma still continues to this day to operate its oppressive procedures under the
laws and within their courts and continues applying a different standard during post deprivation
proceedings to regain the rights that were taken without any notice or opportunity to be heard under that
same law. Should this Court find Oklahoma’s statutory scheme to be unconstitutional, jointly or
severally, and should the State of Oklahoma continue with the application of unconstitutional law
unabated, then various remedies, including contempt actions and injunctions, may be sought “to
discontinue current violations and deter future ones…”
A favorable decision by the court declaring the statutes in this case inconsistent with Fourteenth
Amendment requirements, and then enjoining the statutory operation, provides the ability to ask the
state (and not the federal courts) to reconsider its own initial order, and any post adjudication
adjustments to that reconsidered order, under constitutionally compliant Fourteenth Amendment
This provides true redress to be able to demand that the state operate under laws and procedures that are
not “arbitrary, abusive, oppressive, or capricious” while providing for the requisite “accuracy,” “equity
and justice” contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In fact, freedom from
abuse and oppression is so compelling that the Revolutionary War, the Declaration of Independence, the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other significant historical and constitutional
milestones have occurred to redress various forms of oppression in America. Requiring the State of
Oklahoma to afford its citizens the protections of the U.S. Constitution, through Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process, is compelled by the Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Parental rights have been described in the strongest constitutional terms of any rights in our Nation’s
jurisprudence. They have been repeatedly deemed to be “natural, essential, fundamental, vital,
inalienable, and basic.” This certainly does not encompass the universe of legal descriptions that various
courts have offered in describing these important constitutional rights. The “careful description” of the
“liberty interest at issue” includes the fundamental rights to “care, custody, and control,” which are
implicated in every single Oklahoma custody action. There are no exceptions, whether it is the initial
pendent lite, ex parte deprivation under the law, the determination by a different evidentiary standard in
open court to regain the previously deprived liberty interest, and every post trial determination of an
adjustment to the original order under the law implicates the exact same liberty interests.
Oklahoma law in pari materia with judicial personal opinion (legislating from the bench) is flagrantly
unconstitutional on its face because it explicitly denies the right to an oral pre-deprivation hearing and
explicitly denies a constitutionally compliant evidentiary standard at the point of the constitutionally
protected right’s implication.
Perhaps most troubling from an Equal Protection, Equal Application, and Due Process standpoint is
the different legal standard applied to all post deprivation remedies. Where the initial action implicates
the fundamental liberty interest on the strength of nothing but an ex parte affidavit, the Court had a duty
to analyze the different standards applied to arbitrarily classified litigants at different stages in the
process, e.g., eEx parte rights deprivation upon the strength of an affidavit, and at a later evidentiary
hearing in open court to reclaim the seized right, being almost impossible.
Oklahoma law creates an injury which is obviously “capable of repetition, yet evades review”. Its
effects are immediate, irrevocable, destructive of liberty because, even if the excluded parent ultimately
prevails, the time in the “care, custody, and control” of the minor children is forever lost. This lost time
with the child(ren) can never be recovered, no matter what post-judgment remedial avenues are offered.
Plaintiff strongly urges the Court to review Plaintiff's concerns, declare Oklahoma family law in pari
materia with forcing personal opinion from the bench, facially unconstitutional as a violation of both the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
The Court has frequently emphasized that parental rights are worthy of constitutional protections. The
rights…to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential’…‘basic civil rights of man’, Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ‘[T]he liberty…to direct the upbringing and education of children,’…are
among ‘the basic civil rights of man.’ (citations omitted)(Stevens concurring); Thornburgh v. American
Coll. Of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747, 773 (1986); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503
(1965) [T]he rights of fatherhood and family were regarded as “essential” and “basic civil rights of
man” (Burger and Rehnquist dissent); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 461 (1973).
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) ([F]undamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate… because they have not been
model parents…); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)(The fundamental liberty interest at issue… is
perhaps the oldest of the liberty interests recognized by this Court… [I]t cannot now be doubted that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178 -179
(1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 -633 (1953).
"[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash , 301 U. S. 389, 393 (1937); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.458,
464 (1938); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 , 1 S.Ct. 307 (1882). See also Ohio Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U. S.292, 307 (1937) (we "do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights").
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any state...They
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both...18 U.S.C. Civil Rights.
Finally, no one can lawfully act beyond the Supreme Law of the Land, judge or otherwise and the mere
contention of that point is in itself an unconstitutional act. No judge may act against the lawful rights of
a citizen of the United States, especially in a flagrant and brazen manner because of immunity. This
court is bound by Constitutional authority to hold the above parties responsible for their actions of
WHEREFORE, the undersigned Plaintiff, Raymond G. Chapman, individually, and also on behalf of all
persons similarly situated in this action (together, “the Class”), respectfully moves this Court grant
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration for all reasons set forth herein, to hold responsible (and rightfully
so) the transgressors of the state laws and the Constitutions of the state of Oklahoma and the United
States as described herein, to address and remedy the unconstitutional acts performed daily within the
Oklahoma courts in order to set the future course of the proceedings accordingly for the innocent
citizens of the state of Oklahoma and for all other relief that is just and proper under the premises.
Raymond G. Chapman
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times,
receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the
2) The Bill of Rights:
3) Amendment X
4) Amendment I
5) Amendment VI
6) 3SUPREMACY CLAUSE - "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
Const. art. VI, Paragraph 2." Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 862 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1050 (1993).
7) 4A voidable order is an order that must be declared void by a judge to be void; a void order is an
order issued without jurisdiction by a judge and is void ab initio and does not have to be declared void
by a judge to be void. Only an inspection of the record of the case showing that the judge was without
jurisdiction or violated a person’s due process rights, or where fraud was involved in the attempted
procurement of jurisdiction, is sufficient for an order to be void. Potenz Corp. v. Petrozzini, 170 Ill.
App. 3d 617, 525 N.E. 2d 173, 175 (1988). In instances herein, the law has stated that the orders are
void ab initio and not voidable because they are already void.
8) 5In its order granting all Petitioners motions and denying all Respondents motions the district court
begins its analysis by setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against an individual state actor as
(1) Chapman possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the court were intentional;
(3) the judge of the court acted under color of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the court caused the constitutional deprivation.
Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (emphasis added). The court also
stated that, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that :
(3) This policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference to Chapman’s constitutional right; and;
9) REQUEST FOR A FORMAL INQUEST
Impeachment is a matter of incomparable gravity. Even to discuss it is to discuss overturning the
electoral will of the people. For this reason, the Framers made clear, and scholars have long agreed, that
the power should be exercised only in the event of such grave harms to the state as "serious assaults on
the integrity of the processes of government." Charles L. Black, Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39
(4) Did the Judge abuse the power of his office..
10) Title 42 USC Section 1983 Laws: Cases and Codes :
U.S. Code: Title 42 : Section 1983
Sec. 1983. - Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is
A. The right of the people peaceably to assemble.
B. To petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
C. The right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.
D. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
E. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.
F. No one has to witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
G. Private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
H. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
I. Informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
J. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
K. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
L. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
M. The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
N. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
O. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
P. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude- over the age of 18 or
because of gender.
Q. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
11) Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241
I. Laws: Cases and Codes: U.S. Code: Title 18: Section 241
This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her
having exercised the same).
It further makes it unlawful for two or more persons to go in disguise on the highway or on the premises
of another with the intent to prevent or hinder his/her free exercise or enjoyment of any rights so
Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both; and if death results, or if such
acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term
of years, or for life, or may be sentenced to death.
12) Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242
Laws: Cases and Codes: U.S. Code: Title 18: Section 242
This statute makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.
This law further prohibits a person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to
willfully subject or cause to be subjected any person to different punishments, pains, or penalties, than
those prescribed for punishment of citizens on account of such person being an alien or by reason of
his/her color or race.
Acts under "color of any law" include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the
lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under "color of any
law," the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the
persons who are bound by laws, statutes ordinances, or customs.
Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results or
if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire
shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results, or if such acts include
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life,
13) Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245 Federally Protected Activities Laws: Cases and Codes : U.S. Code :
Title 18 : Section 245
1) This statute prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference, or attempt to do so, by force or
threat of force of any person or class of persons because of their activity as:
a) A voter or person qualifying to vote...;
b) A participant in any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided or administered
2) Prohibits willful injury, intimidation, or interference or attempt to do so, by force or threat of force of
any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin and because of his/her activity as:
c) An applicant for private or state employment, private or state employee; a member or applicant for
membership in any labor organization or hiring hall; or an applicant for employment through any
employment agency, labor organization or hiring hall;
f) A patron of any public accommodation, including hotels, motels, restaurants, lunchrooms, bars, gas
stations, theaters...or any other establishment which serves the public and which is principally engaged
in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises.
3) Prohibits interference by force or threat of force against any person because he/she is or has been, or
in order to intimidate such person or any other person or class of persons from participating or affording
others the opportunity or protection to so participate, or lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to
participate in any of the benefits or activities listed in items (1) and (2), above without discrimination as
to race, color, religion, or national origin.
shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results or if such acts include
abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life or may be
14) Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1001 Fraud and False Statements United States Code
Section1001. Statements or entries generally
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully -
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
15) 18 USC Sec. 1203 TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Laws: Cases and Codes: U.S. Code: Title 18: Section 1203
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever, whether inside or outside the United
States, seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to
compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the person detained, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be
punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall
be punished by death or life imprisonment.
16) United States Code TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section 2234. Authority exceeded in executing warrant. Whoever, in executing a search warrant,
willfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than one year. U.S. Code as of: 01/02/01
Section 2235. Search warrant procured maliciously. Whoever maliciously and without probable cause
procures a search warrant to be issued and executed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
Section 2236. Searches without warrant. Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United
States or any department or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the United States,
searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such dwelling without a warrant directing such
search, or maliciously and without reasonable cause searches any other building or property
without a search warrant, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $1,000; and, for a subsequent
offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(b) Arresting or attempting to arrest a person committing or attempting to commit an offense in his
presence, or who has committed or is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a felony; or
17) Title 42 USC Section 1983 Laws: Cases and Codes: U.S. Code: Title 42: Section 1983
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be
a statute of the District of Columbia
18) Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141 Pattern and Practice
Laws: Cases and Codes: U.S. Code: Title 42: Section 14141
This civil statute was a provision within the Crime Control Act of 1994 and makes it unlawful for any
governmental authority, or agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of
any governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, the
Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.
19) CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD
ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS
HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSER UNDER THE 6TH
AMENDMENT. DCF, THE AAG AND THE STATES ATTORNEY MUST NOW COMPLY WITH
THE 6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES.
(a) That a child is in immediate and present danger of abuse by a family or household member,
based on the BURDEN OF PROOF.
20) Parental Due Process Act of 2005
1st Session 2005 BILL
This shall be cited as the "Parental Due Process Act of 2005."
(1) Parental rights are so fundamental to the human condition so as to be deemed inalienable.
Termination of parental rights equals or exceeds the detriment of criminal sanctions.
(2) The "liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests" recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Troxel v.
Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). Moreover, the companionship, care, custody, and management of a
parent over his or her child is an interest far more precious than any property right. May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533, (1952). As such, the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
(3) State and local family services, child protective agencies, and courts have not recognized the rights
of parents as inalienable, and, as a result, have failed to provide fundamental due process rights in the
investigation and legal proceedings to determine abuse, neglect, and the termination of parental rights.
(b) PURPOSE- The purpose of this Act is to provide core fundamental due process rights to parents
whose parental rights are subject to termination.
(c) SCOPE- The scope of this Act applies to any case in which parental rights are subject to termination
in a program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.
(1) "Hearing" means any judicial or administrative hearing;
(2) "Law enforcement officer" means an employee, the duties of hose position are primarily the
prevention, investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses
against the criminal laws, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred to a
supervisory or administrative position, or serving as a probation or pretrial services officer;
(3) "Agency" means any state or local government;
(4) "Duress" consists of:
a. Unlawful confinement of the person of the party, or of the husband or wife of such party, or of an
ancestor, descendant, or adopted child of such party, husband, or wife;
c. Confinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or fraudulently made unjustly
harassing or oppressive.
(5) "Actual fraud" consists of any of the following acts, committed by a party, or with his connivance,
with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into an agreement or to rely upon
it to his detriment:
b. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that
which is not true, though he believes it to be true;
(4) "Undue influence" consists of:
a. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent
authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage
(5) "Malice" means conduct that is intended by the person described in subdivision (a) to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct that is carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others;
(6) "Emergency" means exigent circumstances in which immediate action is required to prevent the
imminent physical injury or death of a child.
(a) Upon the request of a parent, guardian or custodian, the right to have proceedings open to the public
shall be guaranteed in the following circumstances:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a judge may, upon consideration of written motion and papers filed
in opposition, exclude the public if it is determined, by a preponderance of the evidence that the safety
of the child would be in jeopardy by a public hearing. If the public is excluded from the hearing, the
following people may attend the closed hearing unless the judge finds it is not in the best interests of the
Upon the request of a parent, guardian or custodian, the right to a trial by jury shall be guaranteed in the
In placing the legal custody or guardianship of the person of a child with an individual or a private
agency, a court shall take into consideration the religious, cultural, moral and ethnic values of the child
or of his/her parents, if such values are known or ascertainable by the exercise of reasonable care.
Except in the case of an emergency, any law enforcement officer, agent or employee for a state's health
and welfare department or child protective services, or mental health professional, who interviews a
child for the purposes of investigation, shall electronically and/or digitally cause to be made an audio
and visual recording of all planned questioning of, and planned interviews with, children. All recordings
made pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available to the parent; guardian or custodian of a child
not later than ten days prior to any hearing to terminate parental rights or to determine if a child is or has
(a) Only evidence that is competent, material and relevant may be admitted in a fact-finding hearing.
(b) Any determination at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing that a respondent did an act or acts
must be based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, an uncorroborated confession made
(a) In that removal of a child from a home for even brief periods is an extreme hardship on families,
upon the request of a parent, guardian or custodian, the right to a speedy trial shall be
guaranteed in the following circumstances:
(b) A hearing, as described in subsection a, shall be conducted within thirty days of any type of removal
of a child. In the event that the thirtieth day falls on a legal holiday or other day when the court is not in
session, the hearing shall be conducted prior to the thirtieth day. In no event shall a hearing be
conducted beyond the thirtieth day after the removal of a child if the right to a speedy trial has been
The rights of a parent or guardian as described in this Act cannot be waived, neither can parental rights
be terminated, if said waiver is due to:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the civil immunity of juvenile court social workers,
agents or employees of a state's health and welfare department or child protective services or law
enforcement official authorized to initiate or conduct investigations or proceedings shall not extend to
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any prosecutor, investigator, agent or employee of a
state's health and welfare department or child protective services who induces a parent to waive any of
his or her rights under this Act by:
In the case of a determination by a court or jury of any violation of a parent's rights under this Act,
damages shall be presumed.
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988 (b) and (c)) (concerning
the award of attorney's and expert fees) shall apply to cases brought or defended under this Act.
If any provision of this Act or of an amendment made by this Act, or any application of such provision
to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the amendments
made by this Act, and the application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be
6Amendment V
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
Physiological Examination is an infringement on my rights as a parent, Custody Evaluation,
Reunification services, Child Protective Services, Family Maintenance Services are simply an
infringement on my rights to Privacy and of my home and property under the 4th amendment of the
7All Rights are expressly reserved at all times and no rights are waived at any time. Under no order or
circumstances do I willingly give up my rights. Any violation of my rights, is subject to the penalties
under the law and maybe tried as violations under color of law for any party who attempts to violate my
rights as a free man, never a slave and always a Citizen of the United States with immunities and rights
Signed________________________________________ Date____________________________
Raymond G. Chapman, Sui Juris
Reserving All Rights—Giving up None
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