Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/755/99/51817/
Timestamp: 2020-04-08 19:22:46
Document Index: 167933394

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', 'art, 461', '§ 2000', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1988']

Harold Lampher and Gerald Richmond, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James B. Zagel, Individually and in His Capacity As Directorof the Department of Law Enforcement, and Daniel D. Doyle,individually and in His Official Capacity As State'sattorney of Winnebago County, Defendants-appellants, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1985 › Harold Lampher and Gerald Richmond, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James B. Zagel, Individually and in His...
Harold Lampher and Gerald Richmond, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. James B. Zagel, Individually and in His Capacity As Directorof the Department of Law Enforcement, and Daniel D. Doyle,individually and in His Official Capacity As State'sattorney of Winnebago County, Defendants-appellants, 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 755 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1985) Argued Sept. 26, 1984. Decided Feb. 14, 1985. As Amended Feb. 15, 1985
On May 27, 1981, plaintiff Lampher, the owner of a seized 1977 Chevrolet, filed this suit against James Zagel, Director of the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, and Daniel Doyle, State's Attorney of Winnebago County, Illinois, hereinafter referred to as "defendants." In his complaint filed under Sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985), plaintiff sought a declaration that Section 4-107(i) of Anti-theft article I of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code (ILL.REV.STAT. ch. 95 1/2, p 4-107(i) (1983)) was unconstitutional. This was the statute under which his motor vehicle had been seized by Zagel's Department on April 29, 1981. Lampher also sought the return of his automobile, damages and attorney's fees. On June 11th Gerald Richmond petitioned the district court to join the suit as a co-plaintiff and requested similar relief growing out of Zagel's Department's seizure of Richmond's 1978 Ford pickup truck on June 5, 1981. Both seizures were effected under the foregoing provision of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code because the manufacturers' identification numbers appeared to be altered. Both vehicles were returned to plaintiffs in October 1981.
In a second order, which was filed on December 15, 1983, and allowed attorney's fees to plaintiffs, Judge Roszkowski reiterated that regardless of the state court proceedings, plaintiffs prevailed in their federal court action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and he therefore awarded Lampher's counsel $4,050 and Richmond's counsel $4,537.50 as reasonable attorney's fees.
Defendants have asked us to set aside the awards of attorney's fees, although defendant Zagel recognizes that a plaintiff in a civil rights action will be considered a "prevailing party" and entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if he has succeeded on a significant issue achieving some benefit to his client (Zagel Br. 16). Section 1988 provides in pertinent part as follows:
On March 1, 1983, plaintiff Richmond filed a federal court brief arguing why the state statute was unconstitutional, why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was violated by defendants and requesting $4,940.50 in damages and $4,350 attorney's fees. On the next day plaintiff Lampher filed a similar brief seeking $4,075 in damages and $4,050 attorney's fees.
As noted, on October 13, 1983, the district court held that plaintiffs were entitled under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to recover reasonable attorney's fees for the time spent in federal and state court. On October 21, Lampher's counsel submitted a detailed fee petition showing the expenditure of 54 hours and that $75 per hour was usual and customary, thus entitling him to $4,050. Four days later, Richmond's counsel submitted a similar petition claiming 60.5 hours at $75 per hour or $4,537.50. Defendants filed objections to the payment of any fees on the ground that plaintiffs did not prevail in federal court and that in any event the court should substantially reduce the fees claimed. However, on December 15, the district judge rejected both arguments and approved the fees sought. In their briefs before us, defendants no longer challenge the amounts of the attorney's fees awarded but instead defendant Doyle argues that plaintiffs were not "prevailing parties" within 42 U.S.C. § 1988; both defendants additionally argue that "special circumstances" invalidate the awards. Nevertheless, we affirm.
* Defendant Zagel seemingly concedes that plaintiffs were prevailing parties because they succeeded "on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit," quoting from Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, which in turn was quoting with approval from Nadeau v. Heglemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (1st Cir. 1978) (Zagel Br. 16). See Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs ruled prevailing parties under the "generous standard" of Hensley) . This federal suit was filed on May 27, 1981, but rather than permitting the district court to determine the constitutionality of Sec. 4-107(i) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Code, defendant Doyle filed the state court suit on June 16, 1981, and on the following day successfully sought to have the district judge stay his hand until the state trial judge passed on the identical question. This maneuver, of course, forced the plaintiffs to litigate the matter in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County rather than in their chosen forum. After they won that suit, plaintiffs returned to federal court and litigated the constitutional question anew there, persuading Judge Roszkowski also to hold the statute unconstitutional.
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S. Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723, supports the district judge's award of these attorney's fees. There plaintiff Carey was held entitled to attorney's fees for work done in state administrative and judicial proceedings prior to her federal suit seeking attorney's fees as "the prevailing party" under Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)). Since "the prevailing party" is also the touchstone of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which similarly refers to "In any action or proceeding" (p. 4 supra), under New York Gaslight plaintiffs are entitled to the fees in question. As there explained, both the Title VII fee provision and Section 1988 are "legislation similar in purpose and design * * *." 447 U.S. at 71 n. 9, 100 S. Ct. at 2034 n. 9.
As in Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 525 (7th Cir. 1982), and Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 1982), certiorari denied, 461 U.S. 956, 103 S. Ct. 2428, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1315, not to provide compensation for counsel here would encourage bypassing state procedures by inhibiting counsel from appearing in state proceedings forced upon federal court litigants by state officials who persuade a federal court to abstain while the same subject matter is being considered in a subsequent state court suit. In the instant suit, if plaintiffs knew they would not be compensated for the hours spent in the case brought in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, they might well have decided against intervention there.
At the oral argument, we were urged not to award any fees for services plaintiffs performed in the state court. A similar situation prevailed in Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982), where the defendants persuaded the federal district court to abstain pending the outcome of a state court ruling on a new statute. There the Oregon state court ruled in favor of the state, but thereafter the state defendants adopted a rule giving plaintiffs some of the relief they had sought in their federal cause. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in New York Gaslight Club, supra, and the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Ninth Circuit permitted attorney's fees to be awarded to plaintiffs for services performed by their counsel in the Oregon court. In explaining its decision, the court of appeals stated that its result would further cooperation between state and federal courts in the protection of federal constitutional rights and that otherwise serious strains between the state and federal court systems might develop and encourage forum shopping and "interfere with the efficient allocation of issues and cases between the state and federal systems." 665 F.2d at 913.2 Since the circumstances in Bartholomew were virtually identical to those before us, the opinion in that case is especially persuasive. Moreover, the First Circuit also allowed attorney's fees recently on facts similar to this case. In Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1984), plaintiffs were required to defend a state declaratory judgment action which was brought by federal defendants immediately after they learned of plaintiffs' federal suit against them. The Court, citing Bartholomew and our Chrapliwy decision, awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees arising from the state court action because defense of said action "was a necessary part of plaintiffs' efforts to achieve their Sec. 1983 goal." Id. at 22. We are persuaded by our prior precedent and the reasoning of the First and Ninth Circuits that the district court's decision was correct.
Defendant Doyle cites only two cases in his effort to defeat the district court's fee decision: American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1981), and Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979), certiorari denied, 455 U.S. 961, 102 S. Ct. 1476, 71 L. Ed. 2d 681. However, the Bonnes court determined that plaintiffs there could recover attorney's fees as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even though the consent decree benefited both parties because, as here, "enforcement of civil rights legislation can best be achieved by encouraging the public to act as private attorneys general." The Bonnes test for determining who is a "prevailing party" was satisfied here since these fee claimants obtained a legal position (both in state and federal court) that gained them a benefit and relieved them of a burden. 599 F.2d at 1319. Moreover, their efforts in both tribunals contributed to the favorable outcome in a significant way. Ibid. Under Bonnes these plaintiffs were clearly prevailing parties.
In the American Constitutional Party case, defendant Doyle's only other authority, Judge Eugene Wright's opinion recognized that a plaintiff may recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even if he "does not obtain formal relief" or "does not prevail on all issues." 650 F.2d at 187. He also wrote that a plaintiff is entitled to fees if, as here, his "lawsuit 'acted as a catalyst which prompted the appellee [defendants here] to take action'." After pointing out the "generous attitude toward the award of fees" mandated by Congress in Section 1988, relief was denied because, unlike the present situation, the plaintiffs before the Ninth Circuit were unable to show any causal relationship between their litigation and a statutory amendment whose genesis had occurred in earlier years. 650 F.2d at 188. Here, as seen, plaintiffs' efforts in state and federal court did achieve their objective.
As an aid to the enforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 authorized the assessment of attorney's fees against these defendants to be paid by the State of Illinois regardless of defendants' personal immunity. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522.
Both defendants contend that "special circumstances" preclude the award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This judicial exception to the recovery of fees by the prevailing party apparently originated in 1968 in the per curiam opinion in Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263; see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, n. 17, 737-738, 100 S. Ct. 1967, n. 17, 1977.
Defendants have relied on five factors (Zagel Br. 19) to show special circumstances here. See supra, p. 4. Perhaps their major emphasis is upon good faith enforcement of Section 4-107(i) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act which they considered valid. However, these factors are not special circumstances that would support the denial of these fees. Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. State of Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1979). Even after the Appellate Court of Illinois invalidated the statute, defendants continued to urge its constitutionality and to hold the automobiles for the next two months, hardly a badge of good faith. In any event, as we observed in Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1981), "the good faith of the defendant [s] is irrelevant because 'the key issue is the provocative role of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, not the motivation of the defendant' " (quoting Nadeau v. Heglemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1980)) and, as here, "the defendant must not have acted wholly gratuitously" but in response to a plaintiff's claim. 656 F.2d at 266.3
To support their special circumstances concept, plaintiffs rely on three cases: Bonnes v. Long, supra, Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976), and Bush v. Bays, 463 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Va. 1978).
In Bush v. Bays, 463 F. Supp. 59, 66 (E.D. Va. 1978), plaintiffs were denied attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because they were not prevailing parties. The court added dicta in terms of Chastang finding special circumstances in that unlike the present plaintiffs, the Bush "plaintiffs' lawsuit was not a contributing factor to any of defendants' [significant] actions" and unlike Doyle and Zagel the defendants there acted with reasonable dispatch after learning of two adverse decisions. In contrast Doyle and Zagel resisted the adverse decision of the Appellate Court, Third District, in One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix. The Bush defendants "acted at all times in a manner consistent with their professed desire to distribute the maximum amount of food stamps coupons to every eligible applicant as quickly as possible" (463 F. Supp. at 66-67), while Doyle and Zagel continued to resist plaintiffs until they were unsuccessful in opposing the state trial court's vacating its first opinion in their favor.
This decision was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix, 89 Ill. 2d 506, 60 Ill.Dec. 934, 433 N.E.2d 1301 (1982)
See also Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1978), but cf. Webb v. County Bd. of Educ. of Dyer County, Tenn., 715 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983) (attorney's fees for services rendered in optional state administrative proceedings not available)