Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104963/united-states-vs-turkette
Timestamp: 2018-05-21 12:40:36
Document Index: 169243077

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§1962', '§ 47', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 192', '§ 1964', '§ 1961', '§ 1961']

United States Vs Turkette - Citation 104963 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Turkette - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104963
Case Number 452 U.S. 576
Respondent Turkette
united states v. turkette - 452 u.s. 576 (1981) u.s. supreme court united states v. turkette, 452 u.s. 576 (1981) united states v. turkette no. 80-808 argued april 27, 1981 decided june 17, 1981 452 u.s. 576 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit syllabus chapter 96 of title 18 of the united states code, entitled racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations (rico), was added to title 18 by the organized crime control act of 1970. title 18 u.s.c. § 1962(c), which is part of rico, makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or.....
United States v. Turkette - 452 U.S. 576 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)
Held: The term "enterprise," as used in RICO, encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. Pp. 452 U. S. 580 -593.
that the second category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first. Pp. 452 U. S. 580 -582.
(b) With respect to § 1962(c), an "enterprise" is not a "pattern of racketeering activity," but is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. In order to secure a conviction, the Government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." Pp. 452 U. S. 582 -583.
(c) Applying RICO to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises does not render any portion of the statute superfluous, nor does it create any structural incongruities within the statute's framework. On the contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the more incongruous position. Pp. 452 U. S. 583 -587.
(d) Nothing in RICO's legislative history requires a conclusion that the statute is limited in its application to legitimate enterprises. In view of the purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 to eradicate organized crime in the United States, it cannot be said that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, to only the infiltration of legitimate business. Pp. 452 U. S. 588 -593.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 452 U. S. 593 .
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 9152, 84 Stat. 991. The question in this case is whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to include within the definition of "enterprise" those organizations which are exclusively criminal. 632 F.2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. [ Footnote 1 ] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
Count Nine of a nine-count indictment charged respondent and 12 others with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise [ Footnote 2 ] engaged in interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering activities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962 (d). [ Footnote 3 ] The indictment described the enterprise as
In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102 , 447 U. S. 108 (1980). Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing "plain" or "unambiguous" language. Also, authoritative administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled, absurd results are to be avoided, and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631 , 436 U. S. 643 (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563 , 380 U. S. 571 (1965). We nevertheless begin with the language of the statute.
The Court of Appeals, however, clearly departed from and limited the statutory language. It gave several reasons for doing so, none of which is adequate. First, it relied in part on the rule of ejusdem generis, an aid to statutory construction problems suggesting that, where general words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically enumerated. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed.1973). The Court of Appeals ruled that, because each of the specific enterprises enumerated in § 1961(4) is a "legitimate" one, the final catchall phrase -- "any union or group of individuals associated in fact" -- should also be limited to legitimate enterprises. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. The rule of ejusdem generis is no more than an aid to construction, and comes into play only when there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578 , 446 U. S. 588 (1980); United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87 , 423 U. S. 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 , 297 U. S. 128 (1936). Considering the language and structure of § 1961(4), however, we not only perceive no uncertainty in the meaning to be attributed to the phrase, "any union or group of individuals associated in fact," but we are convinced for another reason that ejusdem generis is wholly inapplicable in this context.
"any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." The Court of Appeals assumed that the second category was merely a more general description of the first. Having made that assumption, the court concluded that the more generalized description in the second category should be limited by the specific examples enumerated in the first. But that assumption is untenable. Each category describes a separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute -- those that are recognized as legal entities and those that are not. The latter is not a more general description of the former. The second category itself not containing any specific enumeration that is followed by a general description, ejusdem generis has no bearing on the meaning to be attributed to that part of § 1961(4). [ Footnote 4 ]
This conclusion is based on a faulty premise. That a wholly criminal enterprise comes within the ambit of the statute does not mean that a "pattern of racketeering activity" is an "enterprise." In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes, a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements may, in particular cases, coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. T he "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government. [ Footnote 5 ]
affects interstate commerce as well as the acquisition of an interest in or control of any such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a) and (b). [ Footnote 6 ] The Court of Appeals concluded that these provisions of RICO should be interpreted so as to apply only to legitimate enterprises. If these two sections are so limited, the Court of Appeals held that the proscription in § 1962(c), at issue here, must be similarly limited. Again, we do not accept the premise from which the Court of Appeals derived its conclusion. It is obvious that §§ 192(a) and (b) address the infiltration by organized crime of legitimate businesses, but we cannot agree that these sections were not also aimed at preventing racketeers from investing or reinvesting in wholly illegal enterprises and from acquiring through a pattern of racketeering activity wholly illegitimate enterprises such as an illegal gambling business or a loan-sharking
Similarly, the Court of Appeals noted that various civil remedies were provided by § 1964, [ Footnote 7 ] including divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, restrictions on future activities by violators of RICO, and treble damages. These remedies it thought would have utility only with respect to legitimate enterprises. As a general proposition, however, the civil remedies could be useful in eradicating organized crime from the social fabric, whether the enterprise be ostensibly legitimate or admittedly criminal. The aim is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains. See infra at 452 U. S. 591 -593. Even if one or more of the civil remedies might be inapplicable to a particular illegitimate enterprise, this fact would not serve to limit the enterprise concept. Congress has provided civil remedies for use when the circumstances so warrant. It is untenable to argue that their existence limits the scope of the criminal provisions. [ Footnote 8 ]
Finally, it is urged that the interpretation of RICO to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises will substantially alter the balance between federal and state enforcement of criminal law. This is particularly true, so the argument goes, since included within the definition of racketeering activity are a significant number of acts made criminal under state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). But even assuming that the more inclusive definition of enterprise will have the effect suggested, [ Footnote 9 ] the language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress was well aware that it was entering a new domain of federal involvement through the enactment of this measure. Indeed, the very purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the problem, which was of national dimensions. That Congress included within the definition of racketeering activities a number of state crimes strongly indicates that RICO criminalized conduct that was also criminal under state law, at least when the requisite elements of a RICO offense are present. As the hearings and legislative debates reveal, Congress was well aware of the fear that RICO would "mov[e] large substantive areas formerly totally within the police power of
the State into the Federal realm." 116 Cong.Rec. 35217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). See also id. at 35205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva); id. at 35213 (comments of the American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 329, 370 (1970) (statement of Sheldon H. Eisen on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). In the face of these objections, Congress nonetheless proceeded to enact the measure, knowing that it would alter somewhat the role of the Federal Government in the war against organized crime and that the alteration would entail prosecutions involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state law. There is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371 , 435 U. S. 379 -380 (1978).
Section 904(a) of RICO, 84 Stat. 947, directs that "[t]he provisions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." With or without this admonition, we could not agree with the Court of Appeals that illegitimate enterprises should be excluded from coverage. We are also quite sure that nothing in the legislative history of RICO requires a contrary conclusion. [ Footnote 10 ]
Id. at 923. [ Footnote 11 ] The various Titles of the Act provide the tools through which this goal is to be accomplished. Only three of those Titles create substantive offenses, Title VIII, which is directed at illegal gambling operations, Title IX, at issue here, and Title XI, which addresses the importation, distribution, and storage of explosive materials. The other Titles provide various procedural and remedial devices to aid in the prosecution and incarceration of persons involved in organized crime.
the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs," id. at 922-923, would be immune from prosecution under RICO so long as the association did not deviate from the criminal path. Yet these are among the very crimes that Congress specifically found to be typical of the crimes committed by persons involved in organized crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III), and as a major source of revenue and power for such organizations. See Hearings on S. 30 et al. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1969). [ Footnote 12 ] Along these same lines, Senator McClellan, the principal sponsor of the bill, gave two examples of types of problems RICO was designed to address. Neither is consistent with the view that substantive offenses under RICO would be limited to legitimate enterprises:
This is not to gainsay that the legislative history forcefully supports the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. The point is made time and again during the debates and in the hearings before the House and Senate. [ Footnote 13 ] But none of these statements requires the negative inference that Title IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized and existing for criminal purposes. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768 , 441 U. S. 775 (1979); United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 377 .
Id. at 602. [ Footnote 14 ] Undoubtedly, the infiltration
Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587 , 364 U. S. 596 (1961) (footnote omitted). There being no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here, the rule of lenity does not come into play. See United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122 , 423 U. S. 145 (1975), quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18 , 333 U. S. 25 -26 (1948) (" The canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. . . . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the "narrowest meaning"; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers'"); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 , 445 U. S. 60 -61 (1980).
See also, e.g. 115 Cong.Rec. 827 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("Organized crime . . . uses its ill-gotten gains . . . to infiltrate and secure control of legitimate business and labor union activities"); 116 Cong.Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("illegally gained revenue also makes it possible for organized crime to infiltrate and pollute legitimate business"); id. at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("[RICO] is designed to root out the influence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions of dollars of illegally obtained money is channeled"); id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("loan sharking paves the way for organized criminals to gain access to and eventually take over the control of thousands of legitimate businesses"); id. at 35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("[Title IX . . . will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic wellbeing of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself . . ."); S.Rep. No. 91-617, supra, at 78-80; H.R.Rep. No. 1574, supra, at 5 ("The President's Crime Commission found that the greatest menace that organized crime presents is its ability through the accumulation of illegal gains to infiltrate into legitimate business and labor unions"); Hearings on Organized Crime Control before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 170 (1970) (Department of Justice Comments) ("Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime, and, like the previous title, to reach the criminal syndicates' major sources of revenue ") (emphasis supplied).