Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2d/56/708.html
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 14:33:13
Document Index: 344797717

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 20500', '§ 803', '§ 5', '§ 12', '§ 1060', '§ 4', '§ 8', '§ 51', '§ 6', 'art 6', '§ 23220', '§ 23240', '§ 23263', '§ 23202']

San Ysidro Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 2d › Volume 56 › San Ysidro Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court
The San Ysidro Irrigation District (hereinafter referred to as the district) was duly chartered in 1911 under the Irrigation District Law of the State of California (now Wat. Code, §§ 20500-29978) and at all times since, the district has been the sole supplier of water to a heretofore unincorporated area known as the City of San Ysidro. On September 13, 1957, the City of San Diego (hereinafter referred to as the city) annexed all of the territory lying within the boundaries of the district. This was the "South Bay Annexation," the validity of which was unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court of the United States (Hazelton v. City of San Diego (July 25, 1960) 183 Cal. App. 2d 131 [6 Cal. Rptr. 723]; cert. den. 366 U.S. 910 [81 S. Ct. 1084, 6 L.Ed.2d 235]). At no time since the annexation has the city attempted to furnish water to the inhabitants within the boundaries of the district.
In January 1961 the city brought an action for declaratory relief against the district and its board of directors for an adjudication that the district was dissolved by operation of law on September 13, 1957, when the district was annexed to the city. The city also sought in the action a preliminary and a permanent injunction enjoining the district and its directors from entering into any contracts for the construction of any new water lines and facilities and from disposing of any [56 Cal. 2d 712] assets of the district. The city's complaint alleged that the district does not have an adequate supply of water and that such supply of water as is available to the district is not of the quality required by state laws and regulations. It further alleged that the city has requested the district's board of directors to turn over the facilities and assets of the district to the city so that the city could serve the inhabitants of the district with an adequate supply of water but this request has been refused; that the inhabitants and property owners of the district are suffering irreparable damage by reason of the service of "inadequate and unpotable water" by the district; and that the city will suffer irreparable damage if the district is permitted to continue its usurpation of the city's functions. It also alleged that the district threatened to and would, unless enjoined, construct substandard water facilities within the district's boundaries, and so within the city's boundaries.
The district and its directors then moved for dismissal of the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, filing the following documents: (1) a motion to strike the complaint upon the ground that the court was without jurisdiction in the matter, under sections 23202 and 27401 of the Water Code, requiring the assent of the Secretary of the Interior to the dissolution of any irrigation district having a contract with the United States for the delivery of water; the supporting affidavit stated that the required assent had not been given and named three governmental agencies for which the district was obligated to supply water; (2) a demurrer on the ground of lack of capacity to sue and failure to state a cause of action in that quo warranto was the exclusive means to test the validity of the existence of the district and its board of directors, and (3) a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the legislative and administrative acts of public officers until it was judicially determined that the district had been [56 Cal. 2d 713] dissolved. After hearing on February 9, 1961, the court denied the district's motions and overruled the demurrer; and granted the city's request for a preliminary injunction. Thereupon the district and its directors petitioned for this writ of prohibition, claiming that unless restrained by this court, respondent court will proceed to trial on the case on its merits and enforce the preliminary injunction to petitioners' irrevocable injury.
The main question in dispute is whether quo warranto is the exclusive remedy for attacking the validity of the existence of an irrigation district, as petitioners maintain, or whether a declaratory relief action is likewise available as a proper method of determining the legal existence of the district, as the city maintains. Declaratory relief has been granted in two cases where the plaintiff sought an adjudication as to whether a public district was dissolved by operation of law when the territory embraced by the boundaries of the district was entirely included within an incorporated city. (City of Escalon v. Escalon Sanitary Dist. (1960) 179 Cal. App. 2d 475 [3 Cal. Rptr. 889]; Dickson v. City of Carlsbad (1953) 119 Cal. App. 2d 809 [260 P.2d 226].) In the Dickson case the court cited the well- settled rule that "there cannot be at the same time, within the same territory, two distinct municipal corporations exercising the same powers, jurisdiction and privileges" and accordingly "where one municipal corporation is annexed to another the annexing city takes over the functions of the annexed municipality, and the latter by virtue of the annexation is extinguished and its property, powers, and duties are vested in the corporation of which it has become a part." (119 Cal.App.2d at p. 812; see also Allied Amusement Co. v. Bryam, 201 Cal. 316, 320 [256 P. 1097]; In re Sanitary Board of East Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 158 Cal. 453, 457 [111 P. 368].) The Escalon case cited and quoted from Dickson, 179 Cal.App.2d at pages 478-480, as decisive. Neither the Dickson nor Escalon case discusses the matter of quo warranto.
Petitioners argue that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy (Code Civ. Proc., § 803; 41 Cal.Jur.2d, Quo Warranto, § 5, p. 614; § 12, p. 624), citing Keech v. Joplin (1909) 157 Cal. 1, 14 [106 P. 222]; Wilson v. City of San Bernardino (1960) 186 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611 [9 Cal. Rptr. 431]; Coe v. City of Los Angeles (1919) 42 Cal. App. 479, 481 [183 P. 822]; Jaques v. Board of Supervisors (1914) 24 Cal. App. 381, 385 [141 P. 404]; and Metcalfe v. Merritt (1910) 14 Cal. App. 244, 247 [56 Cal. 2d 714] [111 P. 505]; that the existence of a public corporation cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding by private individuals (Reclamation District No. 542 v. Turner (1894) 104 Cal. 334, 335 [37 P. 1038]; Quint v. Hoffman (1894) 103 Cal. 506, 507 [37 P. 514, 777]) but only in a proceeding in quo warranto at the suit of the state. With the exception of the Wilson case, all the cases cited by petitioners were decided prior to the adoption of the declaratory relief statute in 1921. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1060 et seq.) In the Wilson case plaintiff as a taxpayer brought an action for declaratory relief against a city and a water district, seeking a declaration that the city was not a part of the district as the result of an election. He also sought an adjudication as to his and other taxpayers' rights and duties, and to have the district restrained from levying or assessing taxes on property within the city. The trial court found that "a proceeding in quo warranto was the required action to be taken to test the questions here raised and that the attorney general has never consented to bringing this action," and "[j]udgment was entered denying plaintiff relief." (186 Cal.App.2d at p. 606.) The District Court of Appeal approved this finding, citing 41 California Jurisprudence 2d 614, section 5, where it is said that the "statutory proceeding in the nature of quo warranto generally affords the exclusive remedy as to matters coming within its scope" and thus "a proceeding in quo warranto by or on behalf of the state is the exclusive remedy for challenging the due incorporation ... or ... for attacking the regularity of the organization of a municipal or other public corporation such as a reclamation, irrigation, or protection district. ..."
[1] "In the absence of constitutional or statutory regulations [56 Cal. 2d 715] providing otherwise, quo warranto proceedings are the only proper remedy in cases in which they are available ... for example ... the sole and exclusive remedy by which the legality of the existence and organization of a corporation ... private ... municipal ... or other public corporation ... irrigation ... district may be questioned and attacked. ..." (74 C.J.S., Quo Warranto, § 4, pp. 179-181; also 44 Am.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 8, p. 94; Walling v. Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 228 Iowa 503 [292 N.W. 157]; Coulter v. Reese, 261 Ala. 660 [75 So. 2d 608]; La Salle County Water Dist. No. 1 v. Guinn (Tex.Civ.App.) 40 S.W.2d 892; State ex rel. Wallen v. Miller, 202 Tenn. 498 [304 S.W.2d 654].) [2] The underlying theory is that municipal corporations "are delegated agencies of the state government and their existence as such should not be subject to indirect attack at the caprice of private interests, but should be open to question only in a direct proceeding in the interest of the public." (44 Am.Jur., Quo Warranto, § 51, p. 123; Crowl v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. App. 214, 216-217 [292 P. 985].) It has been said that the declaratory judgment law does not change the situation and was not intended to strike down the public policy involved in the quo warranto statute. (Note 18 A.L.R.2d 1255, 1279-1280; cf. Birmingham Bar Assn. v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650 [196 So. 725, 732].)
[3] "It has been held repeatedly that actions for declaratory relief involve matters of practice and procedure only and are not intended in any way to enlarge the jurisdiction of courts over parties and subject- matter. ... Such statutes are intended to provide an additional procedure for utilizing the existing jurisdiction of the courts." (Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 21 Cal. 2d 399, 403 [132 P.2d 804]; also 15 Cal.Jur.2d 105, § 6; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal. App. 2d 32, 36 [245 P.2d 676]; Independent Laundry v. Railroad Com., 70 Cal. App. 2d 816, 821 [161 P.2d 827]; Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Caminetti, 59 Cal. App. 2d 501, 505 [139 P.2d 691].) [4] Under section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respondent court would not have jurisdiction of an action attacking the validity of the district unless brought by the Attorney General at the instance of the city; and therefore [56 Cal. 2d 716] the present declaratory relief action would not be proper under that section.
See also City of Oakland v. Hogan (1940) 41 Cal. App. 2d 333, where it was said at pages 344-345 [106 P.2d 987]: "Section 811 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the right to a board of supervisors or the legislative body of a municipal corporation, in the name of the county or in the name of the municipality, to bring an action in quo warranto for unlawful holding etc. [of a wharf operated by certain individuals] within the territorial limits of the county [or] municipal corporation ... without the presence of the attorney-general appearing 'in the name of the people of this state.' "
While section 811 applies in terms to proceedings "against any person who usurps...," the word "person" may in [56 Cal. 2d 717] proper cases include governmental bodies. So in State v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 17 Cal. 2d 699 [111 P.2d 651], it was held that the word "person" in Streets and Highways Code, section 680, authorizing the Department of Public Works to require the removal of structures on state highways, embraces a municipal water district. See also Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 21 Cal.2d at page 402.
[7] Petitioners argue that since the district is a public agency created under legislative authority, it cannot properly be said to be exercising a "franchise ... which is of a kind that is within the jurisdiction of such board or body [the legislative body of the city] to grant or withhold." However, the district is exercising a franchise for the distribution of water within the territory which it serves, and that territory is now entirely within the territorial limits of the city. Petitioners admit in their supplemental brief that "local legislative bodies may grant franchises for public utilities which are within the jurisdiction of the particular city and which are desired as a means of providing services to the inhabitants of that city." While the city cannot create an irrigation district such as petitioner district, the district is exercising a franchise within the territorial limits of such city for the distribution of water, and the franchise so exercised is "of a kind that is within [its] jurisdiction ... to grant or withhold." [8] Since the franchise exercised by the district falls within the express terms of section 811, no good reason appears why the city might not proceed by quo warranto under that section against the district to establish that it now "unlawfully holds or exercises" that franchise. This being so, declaratory relief is equally available to it since the maintenance of the action for declaratory relief does not "in any way ... enlarge the jurisdiction of courts over parties and subject-matter." (Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 21 Cal. 2d 399, at p. 403.)
[9] Petitioners also argue that the declaratory relief action brought by the city can result in a multiplicity of suits and will not result in a final determination of the district's existence.petitioners assert that even if the city lost the present case, the district's existence could be later attacked by the Attorney General in quo warranto or in innumerable [56 Cal. 2d 718] actions for declaratory relief by private citizens. Since, however, the city is expressly authorized by section 811 to maintain quo warranto in this case, the judgment which is obtained herein will be a final and conclusive one on all parties.
Neither of these statutes appears to have any bearing on petitioners' jurisdictional attack. Section 23202 does not specify that the assent of the Secretary of the Interior is a condition precedent to the bringing of suit nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Whatever effect this section might have would arise in the trial in the determination of whether the district was dissolved in consequence of annexation to the city. [11] Moreover, section 23202 is part of chapter 2 of division 11, part 6, of the Water Code involving the joint cooperation of the United States with districts in the delivery and distribution of water to districts under relevant acts of Congress.provision is made for approval of contracts with the United States by an election (§§ 23220-23224); for assessments within the district to pay the United States according to the contract between the United States and the district (§§ 23240-23245); and for the borrowing of money by the district from the United States to finance the construction of [56 Cal. 2d 719] facilities within the district (§ 23263). Reasonably construed, it would seem that this chapter 2 of the Water Code (including § 23202) refers to contracts with the United States concerning major construction projects rather than relatively minor contracts for the district's supply of water to small governmental installations as here involved near the border of San Ysidro. To construe this chapter 2 otherwise would result in endless applications for the prior consent of the Secretary of the Interior before any action for dissolution or enlargement of a district could be brought, though the contract be only one relating to a water supply for a federal post office or other commonly found governmental agency in a district. Such purpose would not coincide with a practical interpretation of the Legislature's intent in enacting these statutory provisions.
Petitioners finally contend that the temporary restraining order, which has now become a preliminary injunction, was in excess of respondent court's jurisdiction as it prohibits substantially all legislative functions of the district's directors. They cite Nickerson v. County of San Bernardino, 179 Cal. 518, 522 [177 P. 465]; Glide v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 21, 24 [81 P. 225]; and French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604 [80 P. 1031, 2 Ann.Cas. 756, 69 L.R.A. 556], holding that courts may not interfere with legislative or discretionary functions of a municipal body as distinguished from ministerial acts. But in the cited cases the acts of the particular board or legislative body involved were within the jurisdictional discretionary powers vested in the board as a functioning entity. These cases did not concern a situation where actions in excess of [56 Cal. 2d 720] jurisdiction of a municipal board may be enjoined. [13] If the district was in fact dissolved by operation of law by annexation to the city, then all activities of the district's directors would be in excess of their jurisdiction. [14] This principle of law is recognized in Glide v. Superior Court, supra, 147 Cal. 21, at page 23, where it is said: "Courts of equity do interfere, and are justified in their interference, in cases where municipal corporations or inferior boards or tribunals are acting, or proposing to act, in excess of their jurisdiction and without authority."