Source: https://connecticut.lexroll.com/rodrigues-v-american-national-can-no-04043-crb-05-99-04-7-26-2000/
Timestamp: 2018-05-23 01:12:08
Document Index: 722082721

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31', '§31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§31', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 62', '§ 31', '§ 62']

RODRIGUES v. AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN, NO. 04043 CRB-05-99-04 (7-26-2000) | LexRoll (CT)
RODRIGUES v. AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN, NO. 04043 CRB-05-99-04 (7-26-2000)
LexRoll.com > LexRoll (CT) > Connecticut Workers Compensation Commission Opinions > RODRIGUES v. AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN, NO. 04043 CRB-05-99-04 (7-26-2000)
JOSE RODRIGUES, CLAIMANT-APPELLEE, CROSS-APPELLANT v. AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN, EMPLOYER and GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS, CROSS-APPELLEES
CASE NO. 04043 CRB-05-99-04 CLAIM NO. 700103056Workers’ Compensation Commission
The respondents were represented by Richard W. Lynch, Esq., Lynch, Traub, Keefe Errante, 52 Trumbull Street, P.O. Box 612, New Haven, CT 06506.
The claimant and the respondents have both petitioned for review from the April 30, 1999 Finding and Order of the Commissioner acting for the Seventh District. The claimant seeks certain corrections to the trier’s findings, while the respondents contend that the trier erroneously awarded the claimant temporary total disability benefits and § 31-308(a) benefits, along with temporary partial disability benefits at an incorrect rate. We affirm the trial commissioner’s decision.
With respect to the claimant’s work capacity, the claimant testified that his employer initially told him that there was no light duty work available at the plant when he was released for such work in August 1995. The following month, the American National Can factory shut down, and the claimant collected unemployment benefits for six months afterward. Meanwhile, he began looking for suitable work, but was unable to perform job searches consistently because he had no money and could not afford gasoline for his car or alternate transportation. The claimant also testified that he was able to answer a phone, drive, and engage in certain light tasks along with normal everyday activities. The commissioner determined that the claimant had done “his utmost in his efforts to find light duty employment subsequent to September 15, 1995,” and declared him to be entitled to temporary partial disability benefits. Findings, ¶ D. He declined, however, to award the claimant attorney’s fees or interest.[1] Both parties have filed petitions for review from that decision.[2]
A partially incapacitated claimant is entitled to benefits under §31-308(a) when he is able to do some work but unable to fully perform his customary work, resulting in a loss of income. Shimko v. Ferro Corp., 40 Conn. App. 409 (1996). The statute is designed to bridge the difference between the claimant’s pre- and post-injury wages, and full weekly compensation may be awarded where a claimant who has been restricted to light duty employment “is ready and willing to perform other work in the same locality [as his usual work] and no other work is available.” The respondents assert that the trier erred as a matter of law by concluding that the claimant qualified for full compensation under § 31-308(a), because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the claimant made a sincere effort to find work within his job restrictions.
As for the claimant’s remarks about not being able to do work because of his pain, the claimant (whose primary language is not English) said, “Before it looks like I could engage in some heavy work and that would not be a problem for me, but when I actually start doing that work — I can’t do it. The pain — I cannot work with pain.” Transcript, 27-28. This does not necessarily translate into a subjective disavowal of all work capacity, and the trier was not bound to conclude from this comment that the claimant was unprepared to accept a light duty assignment. Indeed, the commissioner was not required to rely upon that comment at all. SeePallotto, supra. Therefore, we disagree with the respondents’ allegation that the claimant was not entitled to § 31-308(a) benefits.
After the trier issued his decision, both parties raised issues concerning the amount of the claimant’s compensation rate. The claimant filed a Motion to Submit Evidence to Correct the Compensation Rate, which the trial commissioner granted. Pursuant to his May 25, 1999 order, an informal hearing was to be scheduled to discuss the issue. The respondents, meanwhile, have objected to the trier’s failure to include an offset in the compensation rate for the claimant’s collection of unemployment benefits and rental income. With regard to the former, though this board does not endorse double recovery by the claimant for any period of his disability, the respondents are not entitled to an offset based on the claimant’s collection of unemployment benefits. Instead, the claimant is responsible for reimbursing the Unemployment Compensation Fund pursuant to § 31-258 C.G.S. Foss v. Continental ForestIndustries, 5 Conn. Workers’ Comp.Rev.Op. 1, 4, 341 CRD-6-84 (Mar. 9, 1998). We cannot act on that agency’s behalf. The law controlling the rental income issue, meanwhile, is less settled. The claimant owns a house in Danbury, subject to a mortgage, in which there are two apartments that he leases to tenants. He stated that he receives $850.00 monthly for each rental unit, and manages the property himself, though the only physical chore that he testified to doing personally was vacuuming after a tenant moves out. Transcript, supra, 54. At the time of the formal hearing, both rental units were occupied.
Under § 31-308(a), a partially incapacitated employee “shall be paid a weekly compensation equal to seventy-five per cent of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by the injured employee before his injury . . . and the amount he is able to earn after the injury . . . .” The words “amount he is able to earn” do not restrict themselves to amounts received from an employer under § 31-275(10), or to wages as defined in § 31-310. Heene v. Professional Ambulance Service, Inc., 3743 CRB-6-97-12
(Jan. 8, 1999). That phrase suggests a broader scope, and we have held that private business endeavors operated outside the Workers’ Compensation Act may still provide earnings to a claimant within the meaning of § 31-308(a). Id.; see also, Granoff v. New Haven, 12 Conn. Workers’ Comp.Rev.Op. 166, 168, 1555 CRB-3-92-11 (Apr. 29, 1994) (claimant’s active operation of real estate business gave him a §31-307 earning capacity, and the portions of that income attributable to work activity “as opposed to his status as owner of the business” could be significant regarding claim for temporary partial benefits).
Unlike the word “income,” which is defined by § 31-284b(a) to include “all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment, including wages;” see Luce v. United Technologies Corp., 247 Conn. 126
(1998); the term “earnings” is not defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act either expressly or by reference to another word. The 5th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary is informative, however. It defines “earnings” as being broader in meaning than “wages” (which refers to compensation to employees), but still limited to “the gains of a person derived from his services or labor without the aid of capital; money or property gained or merited by labor, service, or the performance of something.” This concept of earnings as “active income” was applied in Granoff, supra, and Heene, supra, and has also been echoed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,Compensation of Harris v. SAIF Corp., 642 P.2d 1147 (Or. 1982); Connollyv. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 301 A.2d 109 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1973).
The respondents’ other argument on appeal is that the trier erred by awarding benefits corresponding to a disability period after July 1, 1996, when the claimant’s “treating physician, Dr. Vijay Patil,” rated him with a permanent partial impairment of the inguinal hypogastric nerve. Brief, 10. First, we note that the trial commissioner did not find Dr. Patil to be a treating physician, in large part because the respondents’ counsel doggedly objected to each of the claimant’s numerous attempts to introduce evidence that would have established such a fact. See February 3, 1998 Transcript, 31-40; June 15, 1998 Transcript, 38-39, 45. Second, whether or not the claimant has reached maximum medical improvement is a question of fact. Dextraze v. Lydall, Inc., 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp.Rev.Op. 52, 1615 CRB-2-92-12 (May 10, 1995). Dr. Patil’s report does not unequivocally state that the claimant would not benefit from further surgery, and even if it did say so, the trier would not be required to adopt its diagnosis. Pallotto, supra. Thus, we find no error concerning the issue of maximum medical improvement.
[1] The trier subsequently granted a portion of the claimant’s first motion to correct that read, “On his finding dated 4/30/99, the Commissioner failed to find the undersigned Claimant entitled to be awarded interest in compliance with Sec. 31-296. . . .” Though the claimant did not set forth proposed language for the corrected finding in that motion, we presume by the granting of this correction that the trial commissioner agreed with the claimant’s assertion that he was entitled to interest pursuant to § 31-296 for payments discontinued by the respondents without the approval of this commission.
[2] The claimant has moved to strike the respondents’ Motion to Correct and Reasons for Appeal because neither document was signed by the respondents’ attorney. Although Practice Book § 62-6 requires that counsel of record sign all papers filed with the appellate clerk, there is no serious dispute regarding the authenticity of these documents, nor has the claimant demonstrated prejudice from this omission. Thus, we deny the motion to strike. See § 31-301(e) (procedure in appealing from commissioner’s award is the same as appeal from Superior Court decision, where applicable); P.B. § 62-7 (appellate clerk may refuse papers presented in an incorrect form, but is not required to do so).