Source: http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/Jonathan_Wilson,_%27Mental_health:_update%27_(Legal_Action,_February_2019)?id=110220-2133
Timestamp: 2020-02-17 12:32:36
Document Index: 43361910

Matched Legal Cases: ['UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ']

[2018] UKSC 60!,
The Court of Appeal reversed the Upper Tribunal (UT) decision and agreed with the FTT decision that it had no such power (see [2015] UKUT 644 (AAC)!; April 2016 Legal Action 32 and [2017] EWCA Civ 194!; February 2018 Legal Action 29). The Supreme Court dismissed the patient’s appeal, deciding four to one that the MHA 1983 does not permit either the FTT under s73(2) or the secretary of state under s42(2) to impose conditions amounting to detention or a deprivation of liberty on a conditionally-discharged restricted patient.
[2018] UKSC 66!,
He met with mixed success. The Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) for Wales upheld the CTO, saying he was not deprived of his liberty and in any event the CTO framework must take precedence over any human rights issues. His appeal to the UT was successful, though the case was not remitted to the MHRT as by then he had been discharged from the CTO (see [2015] UKUT 480 (AAC)!; April 2016 Legal Action 31). The Court of Appeal decided that a CTO provides the power to provide for a lesser restriction of movement than detention in hospital that may nevertheless be an objective deprivation of liberty provided it is used for the specific purposes set out in the CTO scheme (see [2017] EWCA Civ 194!; February 2018 Legal Action 29).
The Welsh ministers also argued that the ‘acid test’ of deprivation of liberty (whether the person is under continuous supervision and control and not free to leave: Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19!) should be modified in cases where the object is to enhance rather than further curtail the patient’s freedom. This argument was also rejected because ‘purpose’ is not relevant to the question of whether there is a deprivation of liberty (also, Lady Hale stated that the Supreme Court was not being asked to decide on that issue).
[2018] EWHC 3103 (Fam)!,
Difficulties, though probably not insurmountable ones, may arise from the authorities on ‘long leash’ s17 leave (the most recent being KL v Somerset Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKUT 233 (AAC)!), the probable need for a care home to seek a concurrent deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) authorisation (MCA 2005 Sch A1 para 24, which conflicts with the policy), and the likelihood that the liberty protection safeguards (the proposed replacement for DoLS) will only allow deprivation of liberty to prevent harm to the cared-for person. It might have been simpler to have embraced the inherent jurisdiction idea as a counterpart to the Court of Protection’s powers over patients lacking capacity, and/or applied the long-term leave policy equally to patients with and without capacity.
The patient in this case (Mr Djaba) was detained in a ‘super seclusion suite’ in Broadmoor hospital and argued that his detention was not proportionate in a way that complied with ECHR article 5. The Court of Appeal decided that the tribunal’s powers were limited to assessing the statutory criteria (see [2017] EWCA Civ 436!; February 2018 Legal Action 30).
[2018] UKUT 250 (AAC)!,
This is a lower threshold than the capacity to conduct proceedings and is consistent with the approach in the Court of Protection, which ‘simply requires P to understand that the court has the power to decide that he/she should not be subject to his/her current care arrangements’ (RD v Herefordshire Council [2016] EWCOP 49! at para 86(1)(a)).
[2018] UKUT 120 (AAC)!,
In RM v St Andrew’s Healthcare [2010] UKUT 119 (AAC)!, the UT had previously held that when considering the ‘interests of justice’, the key test to be applied is whether or not non-disclosure of the document or information would allow the patient to make an effective challenge to detention. In RM’s case, without knowing that he was being covertly medicated the patient would have been unable effectively to challenge his detention, so the non-disclosure decision was set aside and remade.
[2018] UKUT 408 (AAC)!,
The UT in CM v Derbyshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKUT 129 (AAC)!; July 2011 Legal Action 36 summarised previous Administrative Court decisions as follows:
[2018] EWCA Civ 2852!,
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Administrative Court’s decision (for which, see [2017] EWHC 2311 (Admin)!; February 2018 Legal Action 31), concluding that the patient did not ‘cease to be detained’ or ‘leave hospital’ within the meaning of s117(1) when on leave, and so was not a person to whom s117 applied, and that the services provided did not constitute ‘after-care services’ within the meaning of s117(6). The Court of Appeal added (obiter) that it was difficult to see how s117 could have covered the mother’s costs in any event as there was no evidence that she was authorised to provide services on behalf of any clinical commissioning group or local authority.
[2018] EWHC 126 (Admin)!,
[2018] EWCA Crim 595!,
The Court of Appeal set out the following principles in relation to sentencing (at para 34) because previous guidance in R v Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45! (in relation to the order in which a judge should consider MHA 1983 ss37 and 45A, and the precedence allegedly given in that case to s45A) had been misunderstood:
vii. The regimes on release of an offender on licence from a s45A order and for an offender subject to s37/41 orders are different but the latter do not necessarily offer a greater protection to the public, as may have been assumed in [R v Ahmed [2016] EWCA Crim 670!] and/or or by the parties in the cases before us. Each case turns on its own facts.