Source: http://mo.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190930_0001942.EMO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-04-08 22:51:10
Document Index: 412771848

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 401', '§ 1381', '§ 636', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

ROBIN E. SANDERS, Plaintiff,
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying the application of Plaintiff Robin E. Sanders (“Plaintiff”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. (the “Act”). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner will be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that she has been unable to work since April 9, 2015. (Tr. 15, 177-84). In her application, Plaintiff alleged that the following conditions limited her ability to work: anxiety, depression, fibromyalgia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), diabetes, migraines, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, chronic pain, spasms, GERD, and hypothyroidism. (Tr. 208). Her application was initially denied on August 19, 2015. (Tr. 111-12). Following a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Act. (Tr. 15-27). Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, and on February 9, 2018, the Appeals Council declined to review the case. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
With regard to Plaintiff's testimony, work history, and medical records, the Court accepts the facts as provided by the parties in their respective statements of facts and responses. The Court will address specific facts related to the issues raised by Plaintiff as needed in the discussion below.
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities”; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), which is “the most a claimant can do despite [his or her] limitations.” Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can return to his past relevant work, by comparing the claimant's RFC with the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next step. Id. At Step Five, the Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy; if the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that she is disabled. Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that, given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012).
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, April 29, 2015; that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of fibromyalgia, somatoform disorder, pseudoseizures, headaches, diabetes mellitus type II, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, anxiety disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, (“PTSD”), and mood disorder; and that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404[2], Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 15-18). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), except that she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally balance; should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and areas with poor ventilation; should avoid even moderate exposure to work hazards such as unprotected heights and being around dangerous moving machinery; can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions consistent with unskilled work; can tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but only small numbers and for short periods of time; can handle no tandem tasks; can perform work that is done relatively independently, but no work completely alone; and can tolerate minimal, superficial interaction with the general public. (Tr. 20). The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past relevant work.[3] (Tr. 25). However, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform the occupations of office helper (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 239.567-010, 72, 000 jobs in the national economy), mail clerk (DOT No. 209.687-026, 92, 000 jobs in the national economy), and marker (DOT No. 209.587-034, 271, 000 jobs in the national economy). (Tr. 26). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from April 28, 2015, through the date of her decision. Id.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to find Plaintiff's diagnoses of osteoarthritis in both knees and her bulging disc with accompanying sciatic nerve pain to be medically determinable severe impairments at Step Two of her analysis. Plaintiff contends that the symptoms associated with these diagnoses would have affected the RFC assessment. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erroneously discounted the opinion of her treating physician, Sudhansu Kothary, M.D. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err by failing to find Plaintiff's knee problems or bulging disc to be “severe.” The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ properly considered and explained the weight given to the opinion evidence, and there was substantial evidence in the record to support the RFC. Because ...