Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104200/territory-guam-vs-olsen
Timestamp: 2018-05-23 07:32:11
Document Index: 46032279

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 3', '§ 22', '§ 1424', '§ 3', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 2']

Territory of Guam Vs Olsen - Citation 104200 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Territory of Guam Vs. Olsen - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104200
Case Number 431 U.S. 195
Appellant Territory of Guam
territory of guam v. olsen - 431 u.s. 195 (1977) u.s. supreme court territory of guam v. olsen, 431 u.s. 195 (1977) territory of guam v. olsen no. 76-439 argued march 29, 1977 decided may 23, 1977 431 u.s. 195 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus provision of § 22 of the 1950 organic act of guam that the district court of guam "shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the [guam] legislature may determine" held not to authorize the guam legislature to divest the district court's appellate jurisdiction under the act to hear appeals from local guam courts, and to transfer that jurisdiction to the newly created guam supreme court, but to empower the legislature to.....
Territory of Guam v. Olsen - 431 U.S. 195 (1977)
U.S. Supreme Court Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195 (1977)
Provision of § 22 of the 1950 Organic Act of Guam that the District Court of Guam "shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the [Guam] legislature may determine" held not to authorize the Guam Legislature to divest the District Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Act to hear appeals from local Guam courts, and to transfer that jurisdiction to the newly created Guam Supreme Court, but to empower the legislature to "determine" that jurisdiction only in the sense of the selection of what should constitute appealable causes. This conclusion is supported not only by the text of § 22, which expressly authorizes only a "transfer" of the District Court's original local jurisdiction, but also by the absence of any clear signal from Congress that it intended to allow the Guam Legislature to foreclose appellate review by Art. III courts, including this Court, of territorial courts' decisions in federal question cases; by the Act's legislative history; and by the fact that, if the word "determine" were read as giving Guam the power to transfer the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to the Guam Supreme Court and at the same time to authorize Guam to deny review of the District Court's decisions by any Art. III tribunal, Congress would have given Guam a power not granted to any other Territory. Pp. 431 U. S. 199 -204.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 431 U. S. 204 .
"There is hereby created a court of record to be designated the 'District Court of Guam,' and the judicial authority of Guam shall be vested in the District Court of Guam and in such court or courts as may have been or may hereafter be established by the laws of Guam. The District Court of Guam shall have, in all causes arising under the laws of the United States, the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States as such court is defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code, and shall have original jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam, jurisdiction over which has not been transferred by the legislature to other court or courts established by it, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the legislature may determine. The jurisdiction of and the procedure in the courts of Guam other than the District Court of Guam shall be prescribed by the laws of Guam. [ Footnote 1 ]"
In 1951, under the authority of the Organic Act, the Guam Legislature created three local courts for local matters and defined cases appealable from those courts to the District Court. [ Footnote 2 ] That structure continued without substantial change for 23 years until 1974, when the Guam Legislature adopted the Court Reorganization Act of 1974. Guam Pub.L. 12-85. The former Island, Police, and Commissioners' Courts were replaced by a Guam Superior Court with
"original jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of Guam, civil or criminal, in law or equity, regardless of the amount in controversy, except for causes arising under the Constitution, treaties, laws of the United States and any matter involving the Guam Territorial Income Tax. [ Footnote 3 ]"
The Act also repealed the provisions of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure governing appeals to the District Court, [ Footnote 4 ] and created the Supreme Court of
Guam. The Act transferred to the Supreme Court essentially the same appellate jurisdiction as had previously been exercised by the District Court, providing that the Supreme Court "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from the judgments, orders and decrees of the Superior Court in criminal cases . . . and in civil causes." Pub.L. 12-85, § 3. Other provisions of the Reorganization Act amended various territorial laws to change the references to the Supreme Court of Guam from the Appellate Division of the District Court as the appellate court. Respondent was convicted of criminal charges in the Superior Court, and appealed to the District Court of Guam. The District Court dismissed the appeal on the authority of a divided panel decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that the 1974 Court Reorganization Act validly divested the District Court of its appellate jurisdiction and transferred that jurisdiction to the newly created Supreme Court. Agana Bay Dev. Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, 529 F.2d 952 (1976). In this case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overruled en banc [ Footnote 5 ] the panel decision in Agana Bay and reversed the dismissal of respondent's appeal. 540 F.2d 1011 (1976). The Court of Appeals held that
amended, 65 Stat. 726, [ Footnote 6 ] but Congress has not similarly provided for appeals from judgments of the Supreme Court of Guam. In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals held that § 22(a) did not authorize the transfer of the District Court's appellate Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Guam because, under existing statutes,
We emphasize at the outset that the 1974 Court Reorganization Act in no respect affects the exclusive [ Footnote 7 ] original federal
48 U.S.C. § 1424(a). Decisions in such cases brought in the District Court are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or to this Court. [ Footnote 8 ] The question presented for decision here rather concerns appeals to the District Court from decisions of local courts in cases arising under local law. The language we must construe immediately follows in the same sentence, providing that the District Court
"shall have original jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam, jurisdiction over which has not been transferred by the legislature to other court or courts established by it, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the legislature may determine. "
We first observe that Congress used different language in its grant of power to the Guam Legislature over the District Court's original jurisdiction from its grant of power over that court's appellate jurisdiction. The Act expressly provides that original jurisdiction might be " transferred " to "other court or courts" created by the legislature. As to appellate jurisdiction, however, the wording is that the District Court "shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the legislature may determine. " The question immediately arises why, if Congress contemplated authority to eliminate the District Court's appellate jurisdiction by transferring it to a local court, Congress did not, as in the case of "original jurisdiction," explicitly provide that appellate jurisdiction too might be " transferred. " Moreover, if Congress contemplated such a broad grant of authority, it might be expected that it would have referred, as in the case of original jurisdiction, to "other court or courts" that would be established to assume the appellate jurisdiction
transferred from the District Court. Clearly, the word "determine" is not used as a synonym for "transfer," and it is not obvious that the power to "determine" the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court includes the power to abolish it by "transfer" to another court. We fully agree with Judge Kennedy, dissenting in Agana Bay, 529 F.2d at 959, that Congress used "determine" because Congress "more likely intended to permit the local legislature to decide what cases were serious enough to be appealable," and we note that the Guam Legislature found no broader authority in the term for the 23 years from 1951 to 1974. We therefore conclude that Congress expressly authorized a "transfer" of the District Court's original jurisdiction, but withheld a like power respecting the court's appellate jurisdiction, empowering Guam to "determine" the District Court's appellate jurisdiction only in the sense of the selection of what should constitute appealable causes. [ Footnote 9 ]
Third, if the word "determine" is to be read as giving Guam the power to transfer the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and, by the same stroke, to authorize Guam to deny review of the court's decisions by any Art. III tribunal, Congress has given Guam a power not granted any other Territory. Congress has consistently provided for appellate review by Art. III courts of decisions of local courts of the other Territories. [ Footnote 10 ] What history there
decision is perhaps unprecedented in our history. The Court today abolishes the Supreme Court of Guam, a significant part of the system of self-government established by some 85,000 American citizens through their freely elected legislature. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
The Court's error, in my view, lies in its misinterpretation of the Organic Act of Guam. I do not doubt that Congress has the authority in the exercise of its plenary power over Territories of the United States, Art. IV, § 3, to reverse Guam's decision to reorganize its local court system. In this case, however, Congress has plainly authorized enactment of the challenged legislation, while there has been no corresponding delegation to this Court of the congressional power to veto such laws. Because "our judicial function" is limited "to apply[ing] statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what Congress might have written," United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562 , 343 U. S. 575 (1952), I must respectfully dissent.
In reaching its decision, the Court focuses exclusively on the meaning of the second half of the second sentence of § 22(a) of the Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 389. [ Footnote 2/2 ] With all respect, this approach ignores the horse while concentrating on minute details of the cart's design. If the sentences of § 22(a)
The Court relies on the fact that this interpretation of the Organic Act might insulate decisions of the local courts that involve questions of federal constitutional or statutory law from review in Art. III courts, something which other territorial charters have apparently not granted. With respect to the latter point, it is worth noting that Guam is a small and isolated possession that Congress might well have wished to give unusual autonomy in local affairs. No doubt, too, Congress' sense of the proper way to govern far-distant citizens has changed considerably in recent decades from the expansionist ethic which prevailed when Hawaii was annexed, the Spanish possessions (including Guam) ceded, and the Virginia Islands purchased. It is thus not surprising to find a broad authorization for self-government granted by the Organic Act passed in 1950. And it speaks well for the good sense of the people of Guam that they observed the functioning of the judicial system on their island for 23 years before deciding that a local appellate court would best serve their needs. This hiatus, therefore, does not indicate that Guam lacked the power to act, as the Court assumes, ante at 431 U. S. 201 , but rather that the people deemed it unwise at that stage in their development to do so. Moreover, as careful analysis of the relevant sections of other territorial charters demonstrates, see Agana Bay Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, 529
If there are constitutional problems with this interpretation of the Organic Act, see ante at 431 U. S. 201 -202, 431 U. S. 204 , they do not arise from the action of the Guam Legislature in creating a local appellate court. Rather, they stem from the absence of a statute expressly providing for appeals from the Guam courts to an Art. III tribunal. As petitioner notes, Brief for Petitioner 15-19, Congress has, in its dealings with Guam, historically reacted to the developing legal needs of the island, rather than anticipating them. See, e.g., Corn v. Guam Coral Co., 318 F.2d 622, 624-627 (CA9 1963). This is not surprising; since the Organic Act did not set up a local court structure, it was impossible for Congress to foresee the manner in which the system as actually established would mesh with the Art. III courts. Most recently, Congress authorized Guam to design a local court system as part of the drafting of a new constitution, recognizing that it would thereafter be necessary to enact legislation "regulating the relationship between the local courts of Guam and the Federal judicial system." Pub.L. No. 94-584, 90 Stat. 2899, § 2(b)(7).
In view of the willingness of Congress to accommodate both the aspirations of the people of Guam and the requirements of federal jurisdiction, I think there is no need to search for constitutional questions where none yet exist. [ Footnote 2/3 ] In the meantime, we should not eviscerate the court system carefully devised by the people of Guam in the exercise of their right of self-government.