Source: http://digitalcollections.uncc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p16033coll20/id/4879/
Timestamp: 2020-03-29 07:02:24
Document Index: 344434758

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2']

Home Kelly Alexander, Sr. Papers Concerning the NAACP, 1948-1998 naacp-ms508-0211034-113
of blacks, while a white candidate is the
choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor
from Chandler Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the facts of
this case illustrate that tendency—blacks
preferred black candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter
of convenience, we and the District Court
may refer to the preferred representative
of black voters as the "black candidate"
and to the preferred representative of
white voters as the "white candidate."
Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and
race of candidate is often correlated is not
directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry. Under
§ 2, it is the status of the candidate as the
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate,
An understanding of how vote dilution
through submergence in a white majority
works leads to the same conclusion. The
essence of a submergence claim is that
minority group members prefer certain
candidates whom they could elect were it
not for the interaction of the challenged
electoral law or structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for
different candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of
racial bloc voting is relevant to a vote
dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by
blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it
shows that blacks prefer certain candidates
whom they could elect in a single-member,
black majority district. Bloc voting by a
white majority tends to prove that blacks
will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, only the
race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis.
See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60;
Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical? 98; Note, Geometry and Geography
Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members of their
own race or are hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites vote
for white candidates because the white candidates spent more on their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater name recognition than the
black candidates, fails for another, independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be the
primary determinant of the voter's ballot,
is inconsistent with the purposes of § 2 and
would render meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of
low socioeconomic status on a minority
group's level of political participation.
Congress intended that the Voting
Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political
opportunities that exist due to the vestigial
effects of past purposeful discrimination.
S.Rep. 5, 40; H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31
(1981). Both this Court and other federal
courts have recognized that political participation by minorities tends to be depressed
where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes. See, e.g., White v.
Regester, 412 U.S., at 768-769, 93 S.Ct., at
2340-2341; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 554 F.2d 139,
145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert, denied, 434
(1977). See also Verba & Nie 152. The
Senate Report acknowledges this tendency
and instructs that "the extent to which
members of the minority group . .. bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process," S.Rep.
29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
206 (footnote omitted), is a factor which
may be probative of unequal opportunity to
participate in the political process and to
elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in
order to win election in a multimember
district than in a single-member district.
See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp.
704. 720-721 (WD Tex. 1972), affd in part,
Title naacp-ms508-0211034-113
OCR Transcript 2776 106 SUPREME COURT REPORTER of blacks, while a white candidate is the choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor from Chandler Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate that tendency—blacks preferred black candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter of convenience, we and the District Court may refer to the preferred representative of black voters as the "black candidate" and to the preferred representative of white voters as the "white candidate." Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and race of candidate is often correlated is not directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry. Under § 2, it is the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is important. An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a white majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a submergence claim is that minority group members prefer certain candidates whom they could elect were it not for the interaction of the challenged electoral law or structure with a white majority that votes as a significant bloc for different candidates. Thus, as we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial bloc voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc voting by blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race of the candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should Representatives be Typical? 98; Note, Geometry and Geography 207. Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because they prefer members of their own race or are hostile to blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates because the white candidates spent more on their campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater name recognition than the black candidates, fails for another, independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race of the voter must be the primary determinant of the voter's ballot, is inconsistent with the purposes of § 2 and would render meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political participation. Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination. S.Rep. 5, 40; H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this Court and other federal courts have recognized that political participation by minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S., at 768-769, 93 S.Ct., at 2340-2341; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, Miss., 554 F.2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d 454 (1977). See also Verba & Nie 152. The Senate Report acknowledges this tendency and instructs that "the extent to which members of the minority group . .. bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process," S.Rep. 29, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 206 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money in order to win election in a multimember district than in a single-member district. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704. 720-721 (WD Tex. 1972), affd in part,
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