Source: http://openjurist.org/996/f2d/1
Timestamp: 2015-08-30 14:16:29
Document Index: 786509132

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7703', '§ 791', '§ 7701', '§ 7703', '§ 794', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7703', '§ 2000', '§ 7703', '§ 7703', '§ 7703', '§ 7703']

996 F2d 1 Nunnally v. Maccausland | OpenJurist
996 F. 2d 1 - Nunnally v. Maccausland Home
996 F2d 1 Nunnally v. Maccausland 996 F.2d 1
61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,327, 2 A.D. Cases970, 2 A.D.D. 273,4 NDLR P 112
Odessa NUNNALLY, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.Charles MacCAUSLAND, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 92-2302.
Submitted March 26, 1993.Decided June 10, 1993.
Odessa Nunnally on brief pro se.
A. John Pappalardo, U.S. Atty., and Karen L. Goodwin, Asst. U.S. Atty., on brief for appellee.
Plaintiff, a former federal employee, appeals pro se from the district court's decision granting summary judgment to defendant. The district court found that plaintiff's suit was barred by her failure to comply with the 30-day limitations period set forth in the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). Plaintiff argued that because of a mental incapacity during the tolling period, the district court should have permitted her suit to proceed under the doctrine of "equitable tolling."
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that she was discharged from her position with the Defense Logistics Agency ("DLA") after 31 years' service because of a mental handicap, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the case was referred to Magistrate-Judge Ponsor. The magistrate found that plaintiff had earlier sought administrative review of her claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), as permitted by the CSRA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7702. Following an adverse decision by the MSPB, plaintiff failed to seek further review in the courts, or in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), until well after expiration of the 30-day period permitted for such suits in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2).1 The magistrate held that the CSRA's 30-day time limit was "jurisdictional," and thus not subject to equitable enlargement. Even if subject to tolling, however, the magistrate held that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief. Plaintiff objected to the magistrate's legal conclusions, moved to supplement the record with additional affidavits, and renewed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The district judge allowed supplementation, but declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. Without directly ruling on the amenability of the statute to tolling, the district judge held that even if tolling were an available legal option, plaintiff's mental illness would not warrant enlargement of the limitations period.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1), claims of handicap discrimination are governed by the procedure set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act ("EEOA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Since plaintiff was a classified civil service employee, her claim is also controlled by the procedures established for federal employees under the CSRA.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the statutory filing deadline applicable to federal employee suits under the EEOA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c),2 are subject to equitable tolling. Irwin v. Veteran's Admin. Regional Office, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). While the opinion presents some interpretive difficulties, it states that statutory filing deadlines governing suits against the Government "are subject to the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants." Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. at 457; see Oropallo v. United States, n. 5, 994 F.2d 25, 29 n. 5.
The CSRA limitations period in issue here is not only similar to, but intersects with, the EEOA provision directly addressed in Irwin. Together the two statutes provide a series of interdependent supplementary and parallel channels for federal employees seeking administrative review of claims alleging prohibited discrimination.3 The statutes expressly cross-reference one another, conditioning the number and sequence of open avenues of administrative and court review on the employee's status and the nature of the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) to (c); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703.
Plaintiff here initially sought review of her termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7702.4 Her case was assigned to an administrative judge who affirmed the agency. She then had an option to seek further review before the MSPB's full Board, a district court, or the EEOC. She chose full Board review, and her petition was denied. Again, plaintiff faced an option. She had thirty days to seek review in a district court or in the EEOC. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). It was at this juncture, the government contends, that she took a late step not subject to equitable tolling. She filed her petition with the EEOC nine months late (which the EEOC treated as an untimely appeal and denied) and filed in the district court a little more than three months after that. Had plaintiff instead initially sought EEOC review, and then taken a late step from the EEOC to court, the case would have been on all fours with the facts in Irwin.
We see no principled reason for failing to extend Irwin's rebuttable presumption to the instant filing deadline. The only arguments to the contrary below were similar to those rejected in Irwin, and the government has not renewed them here. Allowing equitable tolling of one but not the other of these interrelated administrative steps could encourage untoward forum shopping, especially in light of the short time periods involved. Cf. Johnson v. Burnley, 887 F.2d 471, 477 (4th Cir.1989), reh'g granted en banc, (in pre-Irwin decision involving same statutes, "it makes no sense to provide the possibility of equitable tolling of the 30 day deadline for one plaintiff but not the other merely because of the different procedural routes taken ... prior to their arrival in federal district court.")
Accordingly, we join those courts which have held, under the authority of Irwin, that the limitations period in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) may be subject to equitable tolling in an appropriate case. See Williams-Scaife v. Department of Defense Dependent Schools, 925 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that Irwin effectively overruled all prior Ninth Circuit cases which had denied equitable tolling under statutes and regulations relating to federal employee discrimination suits, including one which had denied tolling under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), Lofton v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir.1986)); Ware v. Frank, 1992 WL 19861, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1398 (E.D.Pa.1992) (5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) is subject to equitable tolling under Irwin ), aff'd without op., 975 F.2d 1552 (3d Cir.1992); Doberstein v. St. Paul Dist. of IRS, 1992 WL 42930, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2391 (D.Minn.1992) (5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) subject to equitable tolling under Irwin ). We are aware of only one decision since Irwin which argues to the contrary. Dean v. Veteran's Admin. Regional Office, 943 F.2d 667, 669-70 (6th Cir.1991), vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1255, 117 L.Ed.2d 486 (1992). However, in Dean the instant issue was not a dispositive one, and the court there faced a prior panel's, pre-Irwin, decision. "If we were writing on a clean slate, we might well be persuaded [otherwise]." Dean, 943 F.2d at 670. While we are mindful, too, of the