Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2003_documents/03me134ja.htm
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 09:57:37
Document Index: 510373930

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 353', '§ 322', '§ 111', '§ 353', '§ 218', '§ 218', '§ 353', '§ 353', '§ 4572', '§ 218', '§ 214', '§ 214']

JANDREAU v. SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS
Decision: 2003 ME 134
Docket: WCB-03-19
SUPERMARKETS, INC., et al.
[¶1] Both Diane
Jandreau and Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., appeal from a decision of a hearing
officer of the Workers' Compensation Board (McCurry, HO), granting Jandreau's petition to remedy discrimination. Shaw's contends that it was error to
conclude that its termination of Jandreau's employment pursuant to a facially
neutral six-month absenteeism policy constituted discrimination in violation of
39-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (2001). Jandreau contends that the hearing officer erred in permitting Shaw's to
offset the backpay award by the amount of compensation already paid. Because we agree with Shaw's that the
hearing officer erred in finding discrimination pursuant to section 353, we
vacate the decision and do not reach Jandreau's contentions related to the
nature of the remedy for that discrimination. I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Jandreau began employment by Shaw's in
1994 and was working in its bakery in 1996 when she suffered a work-related
injury to her lower back. She
returned to work in the bakery after her injury with medically required work
restrictions. She reinjured her
back in January 2000 while lifting baking trays. [¶3] Jandreau left work following the 2000
injury and underwent physical therapy. She testified that she was approved to return to work by her doctor in
July 2000, subject to work restrictions that precluded repetitive bending or
twisting, prolonged sitting or standing, lifting greater than twenty pounds, or
working longer than four hours a day. Shaw's informed Jandreau that it could
not accommodate her work restrictions and terminated her from employment in
July 2000, pursuant to a long-standing policy providing for the termination of
part-time employees who have been absent from work for six months, regardless
of the reason for the absence. [¶4] In November 2000, five months after the
termination, Shaw's offered Jandreau reinstatement as a grocery bagger, which
she declined. In a previous decree
involving these parties, which is not the subject of this appeal, a hearing
officer of the Board granted Jandreau's petition for review and awarded her
continuing 100% partial incapacity benefits. The hearing officer found that Jandreau had not unreasonably
refused a bona fide job offer of work without good and reasonable cause,
because the work proffered in November 2000 was not within her work
restrictions.[1]
[¶5] Jandreau filed a separate petition to
remedy discrimination pursuant to section 353 in November 2001. In the decision and subsequent findings
of fact and conclusions of law that are the subject of this appeal, the hearing
officer found that Jandreau's absence from work for six months prior to her
termination was due to her work-related injury. The hearing officer concluded that although Shaw's applied a
facially neutral termination policy, [t]he
effect of applying that policy here . . . was to penalize the injured employee
because of her exercise of her right to be out of work where the employer could
not accommodate her restrictions. Shaw's policy was facially neutral, but its actions in terminating Ms.
Jandreau were not only "rooted substantially and significantly," in Ms.
Jandreau's exercise of her rights under the Act, Shaw's actions were solely
based upon her exercise of those rights.
(quoting Lindsay v.
Great N. Paper Co., 532 A.2d 151, 153 (Me.
1987)). As a remedy for the
discrimination, the hearing officer ordered "back pay from July 26, 2000,
to the present and continuing until [Jandreau] is reinstated, less the workers'
compensation paid to her, and she is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee." [¶6] Both parties filed petitions for
appellate review, which were granted and consolidated for appeal pursuant to
39-A M.R.S.A. § 322 (2001).
Application of Section 353 to an Employer's Facially Neutral Termination Policy
[¶7] Section 353 of the Act prohibits discrimination against employees "in any way for testifying or asserting any claim" under the Act. [2] The hearing officer relied on two of our decisions—Lindsay, 532 A.2d at 153-54 and Delano v. City of S. Portland, 405 A.2d 222 (Me. 1979)—in concluding that the application of Shaw's facially neutral termination policy toward Jandreau constituted a violation of section 353. We conclude that these precedents do not support a finding of discrimination in this case. [¶8] In Delano, the employee was reclassified to a lower pay scale after refusing to
perform part of his duties in his post-injury employment that contained a risk
of re-injury. 405 A.2d at
223-24. We determined that there
is no per se discrimination when an employer makes a bona fide employment
decision according to the employee's post-injury ability to work, even though
the employee's inability to work may result from a work-related injury. Id. at 228-29. Because the "reclassification [was] based on the lack of bona fide
qualification for the higher classified occupation," the employer's
reclassification was not discriminatory. Id. at 229.
[¶9] In contrast with Delano, we found in Lindsay that an employer's facially neutral absenteeism
policy was discriminatory and contrary to section 353. Lindsay, 532 A.2d at 153. The employer, Great Northern Paper, had a "no fault"
absenteeism policy whereby employees with a certain number of unexcused
absences, regardless of the reason for those absences, were penalized with a
two-week suspension without pay. Id.
at 152. Due, in part, to Lindsay's previously unexcused absences
and, in part, to his work-related absences, Lindsay was suspended without pay
for fourteen days. Id.
held that the suspension without pay was discriminatory pursuant to former 39
M.R.S.A. § 111 (1989), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at
39-A M.R.S.A. § 353), containing substantially similar language to current
section 353. Lindsay, 532 A.2d at 153. Although the absenteeism policy was facially neutral, we
found that it was discriminatory as applied to Lindsay "because it label[led]
his rightful absence because of a work-related injury as an unexcused
absence." Id. Unlike Delano, where the employee was prevented by an injury from
performing a job, the employee in Lindsay was able to return to his pre-injury employment. Id. at 152. Therefore, the
suspension in Lindsay served no
other purpose than to penalize the employee for missing work as a result of a
work injury. Id. at 153. [¶11] Since the hearing officer's decision in this case, we have had another opportunity to consider the application of section 353 to a facially neutral termination or discipline policy in Laskey v. Sappi Fine Paper, 2003 ME 48, 820 A.2d 579. In Laskey, the employee was able to return to his pre-injury job for several years after his injury, the only difference in his work capabilities being: "(1) he needed help more frequently than others because of his weight lifting restriction; and (2) his assignments were affected somewhat by his inability to work more than eight hours a day." Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 820 A.2d at 580. As part of an overall downsizing effort, the employer instituted a policy that employees with work restrictions, who were not able to perform essential functions of their job, would no longer have their work restrictions accommodated and would be terminated. Id. ¶ 5, 820 A.2d at 580.
[¶12] We affirmed the hearing officer's
finding that the termination was not related substantially and significantly to
the employee's exercise of his rights under the Act, but was based on bona fide
employment considerations. Id. ¶ 15, 820 A.2d at 582. We rejected the employee's assertion that it is
discrimination to terminate an employee on the basis of work restrictions that
are the result of a work-related injury, stating: "[t]hat interpretation would
make any employment action due to a work restriction arising from a
work-related injury a prohibited discrimination."[3] Id. ¶ 13, 820 A.2d at 582.
[¶13] The facts in this case fall squarely
within the rationale of Laskey and Delano, and are distinguishable from Lindsay. Unlike
the employee in Lindsay, who was
physically capable of returning to work after his injury, Jandreau has
consistently maintained that she cannot return to her pre-injury employment,
nor can she perform the alternative work that the employer offered to her. Given the nature of her injury, the
six-month time period mandated in Shaw's absenteeism policy was a reasonable
amount of time for Shaw's to make a nondiscriminatory employment decision to
terminate Jandreau based on her physical incapacity to return to work. Neither the Act nor our decisions
require an employer to keep an employee on the books indefinitely when the
employee can no longer meet the requirements of a job. Accordingly, we conclude that the
decision to terminate Jandreau was not discrimination prohibited by section 353
because it was based on legitimate employment considerations directly bearing
on the employee's physical ability to return to work.[4]
B. Employer's
Obligation to Accommodate an Employee's Work Restrictions
[¶14] Relying on 39-A M.R.S.A. § 218 (2001),
Jandreau contends that although she cannot return to her pre-injury job and
cannot perform the alternative job that was offered to her, Shaw's has a duty
to take greater steps to accommodate her work restrictions and return her to
work. Indeed, section 218
establishes an employer's obligation under certain circumstances to reinstate
and make reasonable accommodations for the physical condition of an injured
employee.[5]
[¶15] However, the protections of section 218 do not automatically apply whenever there is a work-related injury, but are invoked only "[u]pon petition of an injured employee." 39-A M.R.S.A. § 218. Jandreau's view that an employer must, in effect, honor the requirements of section 218 in every workers' compensation case, even when the employee has not filed a petition for reinstatement, is contrary to the plain language of the statute, and we have previously rejected this interpretation. Dahms v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., 2001 ME 145, ¶ 9 n.3, 782 A.2d 774, 777; Dufour v. Internal Med. Assocs., 1998 ME 169, ¶ 7 n.4, 713 A.2d 339, 341; Thompson v. Claw Island Foods, 1998 ME 101, ¶¶ 4-6, 713 A.2d 316, 317-18.
[¶16] In the absence of a petition requesting
reinstatement, employers are encouraged by the Act to accommodate work-related
injuries and return employees to work, but are not required to do so.[6] We decline Jandreau's invitation to
read into the anti-discrimination statute a requirement that the employer must
create light-duty employment for an employee in the absence of a petition by
the employee for reinstatement pursuant to section 218. Before the
strict reciprocal rights and responsibilities of section 218 are imposed, the
employee must first make a positive assertion of a willingness to return to
work by filing a petition seeking reinstatement. Jandreau has not filed such a petition.
[¶17] Shaw's employment decision to terminate
Jandreau was nondiscriminatory because it was based on Jandreau's physical
incapacity to return to work, and not due to her "testifying or asserting any
claim" under the Act. 39-A
M.R.S.A. § 353. In addition,
because Jandreau has not sought reinstatement in accordance with section 218,
Shaw's was not under a duty to take steps to accommodate Jandreau's work
restrictions and return her to work. For these reasons, we vacate the hearing officer's decision. The
Decision of the hearing officer is vacated and remanded to
the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings consistent with this
Doris V.R. Champagne
[1] Shaw's filed a petition for appellate review from the 2000 decision, and we summarily vacated the decision and remanded in light of Morse v. Fleet Fin. Group, 2001 ME 142, ¶¶ 4, 13, 782 A.2d 769, 774 (employee cannot show entitlement to 100% partial incapacity benefits based on a partially incapacitating injury and personal characteristics, absent some evidence, e.g., work-search evidence, that work is unavailable in the labor market as a result of the injury). On remand, the hearing officer reduced Jandreau from 100% to 75% partial incapacity benefits.
Section 353 states: An
formal hearing under section 315, but any hearing officer who has previously rendered
39-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (2001). [3]
We also noted that our conclusion with respect to the Workers' Compensation Act did not foreclose the employee from bringing an action pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572 (2002). Laskey v. Sappi Fine Paper, 2003 ME 48, ¶¶ 13-14, 820 A.2d 579, 582.
The hearing officer would not have been precluded from finding discrimination if there had been other evidence of a discriminatory motive or intent. The hearing officer did not make such a finding, nor do we see any evidence to support such a finding in the record.
Section 218 provides:
petition of an injured employee, the board may require, after hearing, that the employee be
reinstated as required by this section.
Reinstatement rights. When an employee has suffered a
compensable injury, the employee is entitled, upon request, to reinstatement to
the employee's former position if the position is available and suitable to the
employee's physical condition. If
the employee's former position is not available or suitable, the employee is
entitled, upon request, to reinstatement to any other available position
suitable to the employee's physical condition.
Reasonable accommodation required. In order to
accommodate the placement of an injured employee as required under this
section, the employer must make reasonable accommodations for the physical
condition of the employee unless the employer can demonstrate that no
reasonable accommodation exists or that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the employer. In
determining whether undue hardship exists, the board shall consider:
A. The size of the employer's business;
B. The number of employees employed by the employer;
C. The nature of the employer's operations; and
Time period; discrimination prohibited. The employer's
obligation to reinstate the employee continues until one year, or 3 years if
the employer has over 200 employees, after the date of the injury. Any employer who reinstates an
employee under this section may not subsequently discriminate against that
employee in any employment decision, including decisions related to tenure,
promotion, transfer or reemployment following a layoff, because of the
employee's assertion of a clam or right under this Act. Nothing in this subsection may be
construed to limit any protection offered to an employee by section 353.
Limitations. This section does not obligate an
employer to offer an injured employee employment or reemployment in:
A. Supervisory or confidential positions within the meaning
of the 29 United States Code, Section 152; or
B. Any position for which the employee is not qualified.
Failure to comply. The employer's failure to comply with
the obligations under this section disqualifies the employer or insurance
carrier from exercising any right it may otherwise have to reduce or terminate
the employee's benefits under this Act. The disqualification continues as long as the employer fails to offer
reinstatement or until the employee accepts other employment.
If any injured employee refuses to accept
an offer of reinstatement for a position suitable to the employee's physical
condition, the employee is considered to have voluntarily withdrawn from the
work force and is no longer entitled to any wage loss benefits under this Act
during the period of refusal.
39-A M.R.S.A. § 218 (2001) (emphasis added).
Employers can reduce their obligation to pay incapacity benefits by the amount of earnings pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 214(1)(B), (C) (2001). Moreover, pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 214(1)(A) (2001), an employer can terminate benefits during the period of refusal when an employee unreasonably refuses a good faith offer of bona fide employment.