Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/484/343/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-05-24 12:54:25
Document Index: 73346088

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1441', '§ 621', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 626', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1447', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 5535']

Petitioners removed the case from state court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which allows a defendant to remove an action that falls within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts. [Footnote 1] Petitioners stated that the entire lawsuit fell within the original jurisdiction, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 346
and hence within the removal jurisdiction, of the District Court because the complaint stated a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the state law claims in the complaint were pendent to this federal law claim. Respondents did not contest the removal.
After granting the motion to amend, the District Court remanded the remaining claims to the state court in which respondents initially had filed the action. Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon University, Civ. Action No. 84-2285 (Oct. 10, 1985). In its opinion, the District Court first examined whether any provision of the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451, supported a remand. The court noted that two sections of the statute authorize district courts to remand after removal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a court shall remand any case that "was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction"; [Footnote 2] under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), a court may remand any claim that is both independently nonremovable and "separate and independent" of the claim providing the basis for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 347
removal of the case. [Footnote 3] The court held that § 1447(c) did not apply, because the removal was jurisdictionally proper, and that § 1441(c) did not apply, because the remaining state law claims in the case, although independently nonremovable, were pendent to, rather than separate and independent of, the federal law claim that had provided the basis for removal. The District Court then stated that, in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), this Court had suggested that a district court could not remand a removed case or claim without specific statutory authorization. The District Court noted, however, that a number of appellate decisions since Thermtron had approved the remand of removed pendent state law claims when the federal law claim providing the basis for removal had been eliminated from the suit. The court found these later decisions persuasive, and consequently opted to remand respondents' remaining state law claims.
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and a divided panel granted the petition. [Footnote 4] 41 FEP Cases 1046 (1986). Both the majority and the dissent agreed with the District Court's conclusion that neither § 1447(c) nor § 1441(c) authorized a remand in this case. The majority, after noting a division among the Circuits on the question, held that, under Thermtron, this absence of statutory authorization precluded the District Court from ordering a remand. The dissent chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 348
countered that Thermtron's admonition against remanding removed cases to state court without specific statutory authorization did not extend to cases involving pendent jurisdiction. The dissent noted that, under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, a district court has discretion to dismiss without prejudice cases involving pendent claims, and argued that fairness, efficiency, comity, and common sense supported the authority of removal courts to remand such cases as well.
The modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction stems from this Court's decision in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966). Prior to Gibbs, this Court had recognized that considerations of judicial economy and procedural convenience justified the recognition of power in the federal courts to decide certain state law claims involved in cases raising federal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 349
questions. See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, 289 U. S. 243-247 (1933). The test for determining when a federal court had jurisdiction over such state law claims was murky, however, and the lower courts experienced considerable difficulty in applying it. [Footnote 6] In Gibbs, the Court responded to this confusion, and the resulting hesitancy of federal courts to recognize jurisdiction over state law claims, by establishing a new yardstick for deciding whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a state law claim brought in a case that also involves a federal question. The Court stated that a federal court has jurisdiction over an entire action, including state law claims, whenever the federal law claims and state law claims in the case "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and are "such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 725. The Court intended this standard not only to clarify, but also to broaden, the scope of federal pendent jurisdiction. See ibid. (stating that the prior approach, at least as applied by lower courts, was "unnecessarily grudging"). According to Gibbs, "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants" support a wide-ranging power in the federal courts to decide state law claims in cases that also present federal questions. Id. at 383 U. S. 726.
At the same time, however, Gibbs drew a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear state law claims and the discretionary exercise of that power. The Gibbs Court recognized that a federal court's determination of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 350
state law claims could conflict with the principle of comity to the States and with the promotion of justice between the litigating parties. For this reason, Gibbs emphasized that "pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." Ibid. Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state law claims remain, [Footnote 7] the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Id. at 383 U. S. 726-727. As articulated by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.
In the case before us, respondents' complaint stated a single federal law claim and a number of state law claims. The state law claims fell within the jurisdiction of the District Court to which the action was removed because they derived chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 351
from the same nucleus of operative fact as the federal law claim: CMU's dismissal of William Boyle. Under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine set forth in Gibbs, however, the District Court had to consider throughout the litigation whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the case. When the single federal law claim in the action was eliminated at an early stage of the litigation, the District Court had a powerful reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction. The question that this case presents is whether the District Court could relinquish jurisdiction over the case only by dismissing it without prejudice, or whether the District Court could relinquish jurisdiction over the case by remanding it to state court as well.
As many lower courts have noted, [Footnote 8] a remand generally will be preferable to a dismissal when the statute of limitations on chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 352
the plaintiff's state law claims has expired before the federal court has determined that it should relinquish jurisdiction over the case. In such a case, a dismissal will foreclose the plaintiff from litigating his claims. This consequence may work injustice to the plaintiff: although he has brought his suit in timely manner, he is time-barred from pressing his case. [Footnote 9] Equally important, and more easily overlooked, the foreclosure of the state law claims may conflict with the principle of comity to States. The preclusion of valid state law claims initially brought in timely manner in state court undermines the State's interest in enforcing its law. The operation of state statutes of limitations thus provides a potent reason for giving federal district courts discretion to remand, as well as to dismiss, removed pendent claims. [Footnote 10] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 353
Petitioners argue that the federal removal statute prohibits a district court from remanding properly removed cases involving pendent claims. This argument is based not on the language of Congress, but on its silence. Petitioners note that the removal statute explicitly authorizes remands in two situations. By failing similarly to provide for remands of removed cases involving pendent claims, petitioners assert, Congress intended to preclude district courts from remanding such cases. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 354
Indeed, one section of the removal statute strongly suggests that, had Congress decided to address the proper disposition of removed cases involving pendent claims, Congress would have authorized the district courts to remand them. In 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), Congress dealt with the situation in which a claim that would be removable if sued upon alone is joined with one or more "separate and independent" claims that are not themselves removable. The section provides that the entire case may be removed, and that the district court, in its discretion, may either adjudicate all claims in the suit or remand the independently nonremovable claims. See n. 3, supra. This section is not directly applicable to suits involving pendent claims, because pendent claims are not "separate and independent" within the meaning of the removal statute. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 341 U. S. 12-14 (1951) (interpreting the "separate and independent" clause). The section, however, clearly manifests a belief that, when a court has discretionary jurisdiction over a removed state law claim and the court chooses not to exercise chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 355
its jurisdiction, remand is an appropriate alternative. Thus, the removal statute, far from precluding district courts from remanding pendent state law claims, actually supports such authority. [Footnote 11]
The language from Thermtron that petitioners cite, viewed in isolation, is admittedly far-reaching, but it loses controlling force when read against the circumstances of that case. The chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 356
Thermtron decision was a response to a clearly impermissible remand, of a kind very different from that at issue here. In Thermtron, the District Court had no authority to decline to hear the removed case. The court had diversity jurisdiction over the case, which is not discretionary. Thus, the District Court could not properly have eliminated the case from its docket, whether by a remand or by a dismissal. In contrast, when a removed case involves pendent state law claims, a district court has undoubted discretion to decline to hear the case. The only remaining issue is whether the district court may decline jurisdiction through a remand, as well as through a dismissal. The Thermtron opinion itself recognized this distinction by stating that federal courts have no greater power to remand cases because of an overcrowded docket than they have to dismiss cases on that ground. Id. at 423 U. S. 344. The implication of this statement, which is confirmed by common sense, is that an entirely different situation is presented when the district court has clear power to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Thermtron therefore does not control the decision in this case. [Footnote 12] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 357
Page 484 U. S. 358
See, e.g., In re Romulus Community Schools, 729 F.2d 439; Kaib v. Pennzoil Co., 545 F.Supp. 1267, 1271 (WD Pa.1982).
Petitioners argue that the federal courts do not need discretion to remand, because they can retain jurisdiction over any case in which the statute of limitations has expired. See Brief for Petitioners 20. At least one Court of Appeals has made the identical argument. See Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 909. This solution to the problem of an expired statute of limitations, however, is far from satisfying. Under petitioners' suggested approach, district courts would retain jurisdiction over cases that, apart from the statute-of-limitations concern, properly belong in state courts. There is no reason to compel or encourage district courts to retain jurisdiction over such cases when the alternative of a remand is readily available.
After some six months of discovery, the Boyles moved to delete their age discrimination claim and to remand the case to state court, explaining that their age discrimination claim had proved to be "not tenable. " Apparently, the Boyles had only then discovered that their failure to file a timely age discrimination charge with a federal or state agency precluded them from asserting a claim under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d), 633(b). Counsel for the Boyles explained before this Court that his principal reason for seeking the remand was to avoid a prompt trial on the state claims. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. He perceived that the opportunities for extracting a favorable settlement from Carnegie-Mellon would be greater if the case were remanded, because the state court dockets in Allegheny County were considerably more congested than the federal court dockets in the Western District of Pennsylvania. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 359
Congress has enacted two statutory provisions governing remands from federal court to state court: 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which requires the remand of cases removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c), which permits the remand of "separate and independent" claims that are "not otherwise within [the district court's] original jurisdiction." The latter provision does not apply to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 360
pendent claims such as those asserted here. There would have been little reason for Congress to have enacted either § 1447(c) or § 1441(c) had Congress perceived the federal courts to possess an inherent authority to remand claims that might better be decided by the state courts. The Court thus renders § 1441(c) wholly superfluous, in contravention of the prevailing rule that courts "should not and do not suppose that Congress intended to enact unnecessary statutes." Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740 (CA10 1977) (en banc); see also United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 348 U. S. 538-539 (1955); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295 (CA5 1987) (citing United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534 (1940)); Ziegler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 379, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (1976).
"[l]ower federal courts have uniformly held that cases properly removed from
Page 484 U. S. 361
state to federal court within the federal court's jurisdiction may not be remanded for discretionary reasons not authorized by the controlling statute."
"If the plaintiff could, no matter how bona fide his original claim in the state court, reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal jurisdiction the defendant's supposed statutory right of removal would be subject to
Page 484 U. S. 362
the plaintiff's caprice. The claim, whether well or ill-founded in fact, fixes the right of the defendant to remove, and the plaintiff ought not to be able to defeat that right and bring the cause back to the state court at his election."
The Court's decision has the peculiar result of treating plaintiffs who bring suit in federal court less favorably than plaintiffs who bring suit in state court. If the Boyles had commenced this suit in federal court and their federal claims were later dismissed, the Federal District Judge could only have dismissed the remaining pendent claims or decided those claims himself. Because the Boyles instead commenced this suit in state court, however, the District Judge had the additional option of ordering a remand. The principal advantage to plaintiffs of this third option is that their state claims are less likely to be dismissed as time-barred. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 363
Accordingly, plaintiffs with claims arising under both federal and state law now will be encouraged to bring suit in state court, even when the state courts are as overburdened as those in Allegheny County are alleged to be, rather than in the federal courts that have been described as the "primary guardians" of federal rights. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 415 U. S. 463 (1974). In addition, defendants who are able to afford the costs and delays associated with a one-way trip to federal court, but not the additional costs and delays associated with a round-trip, may now be discouraged from exercising their statutory right to removal in cases involving both federal and state claims. [Footnote 2/2]
There is some incongruity in the Court's invocation of federal-state "comity" in support of a holding whose principal effect will be to relieve plaintiffs from state statutes of limitations. See ante at 484 U. S. 352. It seems unnecessary for this Court to protect plaintiffs whose federal claims prove "not tenable" from the operation of state statutes of limitations when the States have shown themselves capable of achieving the same result through saving clauses similar to that enacted by Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5535(a) (1982). [Footnote 2/3] Neither the parties nor the courts below have suggested that the Boyles would not have been protected by the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 484 U. S. 364
Pennsylvania saving clause had their federal claims been dismissed involuntarily, rather than at their own behest. [Footnote 2/4]