Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/398433553/Oct-1-Wright-Petition-for-Writ-Needs-Bookmarked-2
Timestamp: 2020-07-12 17:23:53
Document Index: 410004101

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 895', '§ 90', '§ 812', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§\n895']

Attorneys for the Petitioner | Hearsay | Evidence (Law)
Petitioner appeals the trial court’s August 30, 2018 Order Denying the Defendant’s Rule 3.190(b) Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Order”). App.2189-91. The Order is legally insufficient on its face and fails to comply with the mandates of Florida law. Specially, the Order fails to set forth any findings of fact to substantiate that the State has met its burden of tendering substantial, competent evidence to establish jurisdiction of the charges. App.2189-91. The trial court incorrectly applied a Fla. R. Crim. P. Rule 3.190(c)(4) standard to a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b) motion to dismiss challenging jurisdiction. App.2191. Florida law does not permit the trial court to deny a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the State filed a Traverse or relied on its own Information. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Because the State failed to tender any admissible evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, the trial court cited to the State’s Second Amended Information and Traverse in its Order. App.2190. The trial court incorrectly concluded that because there are issues of disputed fact, it could not grant the Defendants’ Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss. App.2191. Under Florida law, the State cannot fail to present any evidence at a hearing on a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss and still prevail. Escalante v. State, 165 So.3d 839, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). “When a criminal defendant challenges his 2 prosecution as untimely commenced, the State has the burden to establish that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 840. In order to defeat a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss, the State was required to tender admissible evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, upon which the trial court must “articulate a factual or legal basis supporting” the State met its burden of proof that the charges were timely commenced. Id. at 840.
Oct. 1 Wright Petition for Writ Needs Bookmarked (2)
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Continuous Trial Guidelines
United States v. Gregory Neary, 733 F.2d 210, 2d Cir. (1984)
APPELLATE CASE NO:
BLAIR L. WRIGHT,
OFFICE OF THE STATEWIDE PROSECUTOR, STATE OF FLORIDA,
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION - AN APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA TRIAL COURT CASE NO. 13-015742 CF 10A
Crane Johnstone, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 616060 2850 NE 55ft Place Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 cranejohnstone@ gmail.com
Robyn L. Sztyndor, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 0089253 2850 NE 55ft Place Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 (786) 395-1824
Claudia Pastorius, Esq. Fla. Bar No. 0113597 720 E. New Haven Ave. Suite 10 Melbourne, FL 32901 (321) 557-2643 claudiapastorius@ gmail.com
THE BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION
The State’s Extortionate Settlement Demand In the Companion Civil Case……………………………………………… 4
The June 21, 2018 Hearing………………………………………………….5
Rebecca Zaraya & Adam Skolnik, Esq. Testimony……………………
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b) RESTS ON THE STATE OF FLORIDA TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL CHARGES WITHIN THE REQUISITE STATUTE OF
II. THE STATE CANNOT RELY ON ITS INFORMATION AND A
WRITTEN TRAVERSE TO MEET ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN OF
PROOF TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
DEFEAT A FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b) MOTION TO
III. THE STATE CANNOT PROCEED ON A “CONTINUING OFFENSE”
THEORY OF THEFT AND IGNORE THE DATES OF PAYMENTS MADE
BY THE ALLEGED CONSUMER “VICTIMS” TO ARTIFICALLY EXTEND TIME-BARRED CHARGES INTO THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF
IV. REBECCA ZARAYA CANNOT SERVE AS A PREDICATE INCIDENT
UNDERLYING A SUBSTANTIVE RICO CHARGE BECAUSE IT IS
UNDISPUTED THAT SHE NEVER MET THE DEFENDANTS, THEREBY
NEGATING THE ELEMNT OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
V. THE STATE IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PURSUING ANY CHARGES REGARDING REBECCA ZARAYA OR ANY CONSUMER WHO COMPLAINED AS A RESULT OF THE STATE’S INJUNCTION & RECEIVERSHIP ORDER.………………………………………………… 31
VI. THE STATE SHOULD WELCOME DISMISSAL OF ALL
CHARGES WITH PREJUDICE AS SUCH A RULING IS IN CONFORMITY WITH JURISDICTIONAL MANDATES UNDER FLORIDA LAW.……….33
Akers v. State, 370 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
Bone v. State, 651 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
Cheffer v. Judge, Division “S,” 15th Judicial Circuit,
So.2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
Escalante v. State, 165 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA
1, 20, 23, 24
Fair v. Kaufman, 647 So.2d 167 (Fla. 2d DCA
Fleming v. State, 524 So.2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
Madry v. State, 969 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
Matos v. State, 961 So.2d 1077, 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
McPhee v. State, 254 So.2d 406 (Fla.1st DCA 1971)
Mead v. State, 101 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 1958)
Neal v. State, 697 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
Nelson v. State, 855 So.2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
O’Malley v. Mounts, 590 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
Outreach Housing, LLC v. Office of the Attorney General,
So.3d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA
Pontius v. State, 932 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
Rosen v. State, 757 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc.,
So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.3d DCA 1979)
Soto v. State, 892 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
State v. Brugman, 588 So.2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
State v. Diaz, 814 So. 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
2, 25, 26, 27
State v. King, 275 So.2d 274, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
State v. King, 282 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1973)
State v. Mack, 637So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
State v. Reyan, 145 So.3d 133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970)
Turtle 906 Lake Assocs., Ltd. v. Third Financial Services, Inc.,
So.2d 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988
U.S. v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987)
United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968)
United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b)
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)
§ 895.05, Fla.
1 - 6, 16 -24, 26, 32, 34
5, 12, 13, 14, 29
§ 90.801, Fla. Stat
§ 812.01(1)(2)(c)(1), Fla. Stat
……………8, 26, 27
Petitioner appeals the trial court’s August 30, 2018 Order Denying the
Defendant’s Rule 3.190(b) Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter “Order”). App.2189-91.
The Order is legally insufficient on its face and fails to comply with the mandates of
Florida law. Specially, the Order fails to set forth any findings of fact to substantiate
that the State has met its burden of tendering substantial, competent evidence to
establish jurisdiction of the charges. App.2189-91.
The trial court incorrectly applied a Fla. R. Crim. P. Rule 3.190(c)(4) standard
to a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b) motion to dismiss challenging jurisdiction. App.2191.
Florida law does not permit the trial court to deny a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction because the State filed a Traverse or relied on its own
Information. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Because the
State failed to tender any admissible evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, the trial
court cited to the State’s Second Amended Information and Traverse in its Order.
App.2190.
The trial court incorrectly concluded that because there are issues of
disputed fact, it could not grant the Defendants’ Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss.
App.2191.
Under Florida law, the State cannot fail to present any evidence at a hearing
on a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss and still prevail. Escalante v. State, 165 So.3d
839, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). “When a criminal defendant challenges
prosecution as untimely commenced, the State has the burden to establish that the
prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 840. In order to defeat
a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss, the State was required to tender admissible
evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, upon which the trial court must “articulate a
factual or legal basis supporting” the State met its burden of proof that the charges
were timely commenced. Id. at 840.
Because the State tendered zero evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, and
simply requested the trial court take judicial notice of the court record, the State
cannot defeat the Defendants’ Rule 3.190(b) as a matter of law. Neal v. State, 697
So.2d 903, 904-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Even if the State could rely on a Traverse
and its Second Amended Information to defeat a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss,
the State’s operative Information is fatally flawed under Florida law.
The State’s Second Amended Information pleads a “continuing offense”
theory of theft in an attempt to extend the time-barred charges into the five-year
statute of limitations. App.1427-35. The State’s continuing offense theory of theft
contained within the Second Amended Information is unsupported by Florida law.
State v. Diaz, 814 So.2d 466, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
THE BASIS FOR INVOKING JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3) & 9.100 and respectfully requests that this
Court issue a writ of prohibition ordering dismissal of the Second Amended
Information and discharge the Petitioner. “Prohibition is an appropriate method by
which a criminal defendant who asserts that [his] prosecution is barred by the statute
of limitations may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction to go forward.” Neal v.
State, 697 So.2d 903, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(citing Cheffer v. Judge, Division “S,”
15th Judicial Circuit, 614 So.2d 632, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).
Petitioner Wright was charged with four (4) counts predicated on grand theft
by the State of Florida on November 1, 2013. Defendant Wright was arrested on
November 7, 2013, and again on December 23, 2013 while he was baking Christmas
cookies with his family. App.374, 479-82, 934-35, 1193-1219, 1245-51. The alleged
instances of grand theft that underlie the State’s charges occurred squarely outside
the five-year statute of limitations.
In an effort to remedy this jurisdictional defect, the State pled a “continuing
offense” theory of grand theft, predicating this action on time-barred charges. The
Defendant challenged the State’s Second Amended Information under Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.190(b) claiming the conduct that gives rise to the State’s actions falls well
outside the governing statute of limitations, and the court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate the charges.
In an attempt to defeat the Defendant’s Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss, the
State filed a Traverse. App.83. The State also falsely stated the burden of proof rests
on the Defendants to prove the action was not timely commenced. App. 90, 204,
209, 212, 390, 351, 352, 353, 652, 760. Over the State’s objections, the trial court
held a hearing on June 21, 2018 on the Defendants’ Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss
whereby the Defendant presented sworn testimony from the General Counsel of
Global Client Solutions Bank (“GCS”) to testify to the last date of payment for each
of the consumers that serve as predicate acts in the State’s case. As testified to by
the GCS General Counsel, Brent Hampton, Esq., each of those payments fall
squarely outside the five-year statute of limitations. App. 654, 658, 659, 756–811.
Thus, without employing a continuing offense theory of theft, the action is time-
The State’s Extortionate Settlement Demand In the Companion Civil Case
The present action was referred to the Statewide Prosecutor’s Office to pursue
criminal charges in tandem with a related civil case initiated by the Office of the
Attorney General on October 13, 2008. 1 The same consumer complaints that
1 The State’s companion civil “consumer protection” case was commenced on October 13, 2008, and is predicated on the same consumers that underlie the State’s grand-theft and RICO charges in this criminal case. Despite knowing that the conduct that gives rise to the present criminal charges existed as of October 13, 2008 when the OAG filed its consumer protection case, the State waited 5 years & 18 days to file criminal charges against the Defendants. See The Office of the Attorney
underlie the State’s civil consumer protection case serve as predicate acts in this
In the companion civil case, the Defendant was given a settlement option to
pay $350,000 to the Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Protection Division,
to settle a civil FDUTPA case or the matter would be referred over for criminal
prosecution. Wright refused to succumb to the State’s extortionate demand, and the
State then filed charges. The unlawful judgment from the companion civil case was
appealed and adjudicated by this Court in the Defendants’ favor on July 12, 2017.
See Outreach Housing, LLC v. The Office of the Attorney General, 221 So.3d 691,
698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Upon referral from the OAG’s office, the State charged the Defendants with
Racketeering under section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes, Conspiracy to Commit
Racketeering under section 895(4), Florida Statutes, and Grand Theft under section
812.01(1)(2)(c)(1), Florida Statutes. The State waited more than 5 years and 18 days
after the OAG filed the companion civil case to charge the Defendants and, thus, the
conduct that gives rise to these charges is time-barred.
The June 21, 2018 Hearing
General v. Outreach Housing, LLC, bearing Case No. CACE-08-049280 currently pending in Broward County, Florida.
At the June 21, 2018 hearing to adjudicate the Defendants’ Rule 3.190(b)
motion to dismiss, the State tendered zero admissible evidence other than requesting
the trial court take “judicial notice of the trial court record,” the State’s Second
Amended Information, and the State’s Traverse. App.374, 934. None of these
inadmissible hearsay under section 90.801, Florida Statutes. Due to the State’s
failure to tender any evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, the trial court had no
admissible evidence submitted by the State to adjudicate the Rule 3.190(b) motion
to dismiss in the State’s favor. App.206-11, 343, 366-68.
The trial court rendered a legally deficient Order. App.2189-91. The trial court
ignored the requirement that it make findings of fact specific to the statute of
limitations in its Order. App.2191. Instead, the trial court improperly substituted a
Rule 3.190(c)(4) standard in its Order, and simply held “there are disputed issues of
fact.” App.2191. The Court held that it will “not put its self in the place of the jury
in order to make findings of fact.” App.2191.
Regardless, when a Defendant raises a Rule 3.190(b) jurisdictional challenge to
the State’s untimely commencement of criminal charges, the trial court is required
to make findings of fact that the State submitted substantial, competent evidence that
the alleged crime occurred within the requisite statute of limitations. In the present
matter, the trial court made no such findings because the State tendered no evidence
that permitted the trial court to do so. App.2190-91.
Instead, the Defendants alone called live witnesses at the June 21, 2018
hearing. The Defendants first called GCS General Counsel, Brent Hampton, Esq.
who testified to the last date that each consumer in named in the State’s charges
rendered payment to the Defendants’ company, Outreach Housing, LLC. App.773-
816. Brent Hampton, Esq. testified that the most recent date of payment made by
each of the alleged victims are as follows:
Within 5-Year SOL
Ulda Cher
Ethelina Irving
Dorel Hamilton
Angelique Terrelonge
Patrice Spychalla
English Campbell
Marie Sauvuer
Magalie Benjamin
M. Arugu
App.722-51, 773-806.
The last date of payments to the Defendants’ company for each of the alleged
victims all fall squarely outside the five-year statute of limitations. App.722-51, 773-
806. Even Arugu’s last payment on October 16, 2008 is 15 days outside the five-
year statute of limitations, which began on November 1, 2008 through November 1,
2013. Thus, without the State improperly extending these payments into the statute
of limitations through an unlawful “continuing offense” theory of theft, the charges
are time-barred. App.798.
Rebecca Zaraya & Adam Skolnik, Esq. Testimony
The Defendants’ then called a consumer of Outreach Housing, Rebecca
Zaraya, and her attorney Adam Skolnik, Esq. who rendered legal services to Ms.
Zaraya. App.812-58, 860-64, 865-98, 923-33. These live defense witnesses testified
that all contracted services were rendered to the client, Ms. Zaraya, when she was an
Outreach Housing client for a total of 14-days. App.812-58, 860-64, 865-98, 923-
In 2009, the OAG contacted the Office of Financial Regulation (“OFR”) to
open a meritless corollary civil case seeking an injunction and receivership to
forcibly close Outreach Housing. App.295-313. This court ordered injunction
prevented Outreach from further providing services to clients after January 28, 2009.
App.295-313. Ultimately, this frivolous OFR case was dismissed in Wright’s favor
on January 11, 2016. App.018.
On January 28, 2009, the OFR obtained an injunction against Outreach
Housing. App.295-313. This injunction closed the company and shut-down the
Outreach phones and website. App.881. After being unable to contact Outreach as a
result of the State’s receivership, many consumers filed complaints with the OAG.
App.881, 1072-87, 1088-1136. The State did not disclose that the State’s injunction
was the reason Outreach was closed, permitting these upset clients to believe
Outreach had voluntarily closed without notice to its clients. One of these confused
consumers was Rebecca Zaraya. App.881.
On January 31, 2009, Ms. Zaraya filed an internet complaint with the OAG
complaining she could not get in touch with anyone at Outreach Housing. App.282,
901, 923, 928-29. Zaraya complained that the Outreach Housing phone number rang
with no answer, the website was down, and the building was locked. Zaraya had only
been a client for 14 days at the time Outreach Housing was closed on January 28,
2009 by the State of Florida, Office of Financial Regulation.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Is it true at that time when you filed the complaint and when you gave sworn testimony in this case, you did not file a complaint with the State against Outreach because they were stealing money from you or committing fraud or engaging in deceptive practices, the reason you filed the complaint is because you could not get anyone on the phone and you were angry?
MS. ZARAYA: That's exactly right.
MR.JOHNSTONE: So for the record, is this your complaint where you say, "This is why I contacted the Outreach Housing Organization, but it seem I can't even reach them.· I'm unable to get them on the phone.· They won't return my calls"?
MS. ZARAYA: Yes.
App.865-934.
The State of Florida never informed Zaraya that the State’s own court ordered
injunction entered on January 28, 2009 by the Honorable Peter Weinstein, was the
sole reason Zaraya could not get in contact with Outreach. App.282, 901, 923, 928-
29. The State dishonestly allowed Zaraya, and numerous other Outreach clients, to
falsely believe the Defendants voluntarily closed without notice, abandoning the
clients. App.881, 1072-87, 1088-1136.
The State even enjoined Outreach Housing from informing clients of the
State’s court ordered injunction and receivership.
MR. JOHNSTONE: When you called the offices of Outreach Housing and you actually drove out there at one point --
MS. ZARAYA: I did.
MR. JOHNSTONE: -- did you know the reason they were not returning your phone calls is because the State of Florida had obtained an emergency order granting an injunction and shut the office down? Did you know that?
MS. ZARAYA: No, I didn't know that.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Did the State ever tell you that?
MS. ZARAYA: No, I didn't know that. I didn't know.
App.1044-62, 1072-87, 1088-1136.
As testified to by Adam Skolnik, Esq. at the June 21, 2018 hearing, despite
Zaraya being a client for only 14 days prior to the State’s closure of Outreach, Zaraya
received substantial litigation support services from Outreach Housing. App.458-63,
814-54, 1138-77. Outreach representatives met with Zaraya, sent a courier to her
home to pick up her mortgage paperwork, timely scanned and analyzed the
paperwork, obtained a detailed factual affidavit from Zaraya containing her pertinent
income history, the closing information on her property, and provided this analysis
to Zaraya’s attorney, Adam Skolnik, Esq. App.814-54.
Attorney Skolnik testified that after a consultation with Zaraya, he advised
that it was in Zaraya’s best interest to pursue a legal action in federal court suing
Wells Fargo for predatory lending practices and fraud. App.814-54, 1138-77. On
January 28, 2009, only 14 days after Zaraya had signed a contract with Outreach
Housing for services, her lawsuit was filed by Attorney Skolnik against Wells Fargo.
App.1138-77. The lawsuit relied upon the expert analysis provided by Outreach
Housing to Attorney Adam Skolnik, Esq. App.815-44, 1138-77.
Notably, Rebecca Zaraya has always testified that she never met either
Defendant, Blair Wright or Bryan Berry. She testified to speaking with some
Outreach Housing employees, but that she never met or spoke with Wright or Berry.
App.866. Thus, as a matter of law the State cannot attempt to use Rebecca Zaraya
as a predicate incident to leverage a Substantive RICO or theft charge against the
Defendants, because Zaraya testified she has never met either Wright or Berry.
App.866.
Zaraya testified that she paid a total of $884.97 on January 12, 2009 in
connection with Outreach Housing. App.868. From that total payment, the records
produced by Attorney Adam Skolnik establish that a payment of $350 was paid for
Zaraya’s federal court filing fee to sue Wells Fargo, $9 was paid as a lis pendens fee,
$230 was paid to Attorney Skolnik (which ended up being returned to the State’s
Receiver, Daniel Stermer, as a result of the State’s Receivership), $6 was paid in
courier fees, $60 in process services fees to serve Zaraya’s lawsuit. A total of
$229.97 was earned by Outreach Housing for services rendered that Ms. Zaraya and
Attorney Skolnik both testified she fully received. App.840-43, 851, 868, 882-88.
The total $229.97 paid to Outreach Housing was lawfully earned for the
substantial work performed, including but not limited to, gathering and analyzing
Zaraya’s mortgage documents, obtaining a client affidavit with income history and
lending practice information, providing SEC filings tracing analysis to Attorney
Skolnik to file Zaraya’s federal lawsuit. App.823-24. Outreach personnel also met
with Zaraya on multiple occasions to assist her in retaining legal counsel of her
choice. App.892-95. 889-90.
Accordingly, there is no factual basis, nor has there ever been any evidence
presented by the State to suggest that the $229.97 payment to Outreach from
Rebecca Zaraya was improper or unlawful. App.851, 889, 890, 895, 913, 915, 919,
921, 926, 927. There is also no support for the proposition that the payment was
unearned or that no services were provided. The State has wholly failed to tender
any admissible evidence of any criminal conduct in relation to Zaraya’s brief 14-day
relationship with Outreach Housing. App.851, 889, 890, 895, 913, 915, 919, 921,
926, 927.
Rebecca Zaraya unequivocally told his Honor Judge Merrigan in open court
that the State’s claim that she was a “victim” is made in bad-faith. As Ms. Zaraya
testified under oath she never met Mr. Wright or Mr. Berry and she is most certainly
not a “victim” of any crime:
MS. ZARAYA: This is the first time I ever met him.
MR. JOHNSTONE: What did he do to harm you or make you a victim in a criminal case?
MS. ZARAYA: Nothing.
App.885.
MR. JOHNSTONE: You are not a victim of Blair Wright, are you?
MS. ZARAYA: No, I'm not.
App.890.
MR. JOHNSTONE: I am just asking since you are the one who is being listed as a quote, "Victim", by the State?
MS. ZARAYA: I'm not victim.
MR. JOHNSTONE: I know you are not.
MS. ZARAYA: But they know now.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Everybody knows that. You told us under oath.
MS. ZARAYA: Exactly.
MR. JOHNSTONE: If I may, just to finish. I just want to know since they have listed you as a victim and prosecuted this man for years on this case, if you know what Outreach actually did for you above and beyond the initial interview and coming out to marshal all of the materials and bringing them back to you? Do you know what they did?
MS. ZARAYA: They helped me get out of a funny situation.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Tell the Judge that. What did they do for you?
MS. ZARAYA: Helped me get out the situation I was in.
MR. JOHNSTONE: They didn't steal money from you?
MS. ZARAYA: No, of course not.
App.895.
As testified to under oath by the State’s own alleged “victims” the State has been
maliciously prosecuting these charges in bad-faith for the past eleven (11) years:
MR. JOHNSTONE: I guess this is what I wanted you to establish with the Court. You are not saying you are a victim?
MS. ZARAYA: No, I'm not a victim.
MR. JOHNSTONE: You actually said a moment ago when you found out, you heard through conversations that Mr. Wright has been through
years and years of being persecuted and prosecuted by the State, you were appalled and you felt terrible?
MS. ZARAYA: Tremendous.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Did you tell the State, "Don't use me as a victim. I'm not a victim. I actually got everything that I paid for and more?"
MS. ZARAYA: Yes, they hear what I'm saying now.
MR. JOHNSTONE: Is that what you said?
MS. ZARAYA: Yes, they know what I'm saying.
App.927.
Ms. Zaraya honestly and sincerely stated under oath repeatedly that the State’s
conduct in this case in unethical and improper as it continues to maliciously pursue sham
charges against the defendants. Ms. Zaraya then made it clear that she does not want
to have anything to do with any charges against the defendants, who are innocent:
REBECCA ZARAYA: I said, "I don't want to have any part of this anymore. Leave this poor man alone. He is innocent."· And what happened to all of us over years -- it's like 11 years and it's a long time. This kind of nonsense has to stop. People have to -- people are so bias and they have to be unbias. I don't know what is going on today. It's terrible and I don't like it.
App.906.
The State tendered no evidence, not a single bank record or transaction receipt,
nor any testimony in opposition to Brent Hampton, Esq.’s sworn testimony
regarding the last dates of payments from the alleged “victims,” which clearly bar
jurisdiction of this matter. App.789-97. The State called no witnesses at the June 21,
2018 hearing. App.754. The State also stipulated on the record that the GCS account
statements read into the record by Mr. Hampton were accurate and complete records.
App.789-97, 801, 722-51.
The State unquestionably engaged in bad-faith by including Zaraya in their
App.1242-44.
proceeding on a continuing offense theory of theft to improperly extend time-barred
payments into the five-year statute of limitations. App.468-78. The State knew that
Zaraya’s complaint was against the State’s Receiver for closing down Outreach
Housing, and not against the Defendants. App.282.
Statewide Prosecutor Hogan stated on the record that she objected to having
to meet the State’s burden of proof to substantiate any criminal conduct had occurred
within the governing five-year statute of limitations:
STATEWIDE PROSECUTOR HOGAN: I just wish to renew our objection to this hearing again. And I also want to state that what the Court is asking us to do, or what the defense is asking us to do by virtue of this hearing is disclose our trial strategy, which we don't believe is necessary at this point nor do we intend to do that.
THE COURT: And I am going to maintain my prior ruling.
App.862-63.
Nonetheless, the State affirmed at the June 21, 2018 hearing that it understood
its burden of proof under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b), and it was prepared to meet the
requisite burden to establish jurisdiction of the charges during the hearing. App.761.
(“So King versus State, which is 282 So.2d 162, the defense relies on that for the
proposition that the burden of proving that we filed our case within the frame of the
statute of limitations, is on the State.
State.”)(emphasis added). Even so, the State wholly failed to meet its burden of
proof because it presented no evidence to substantiate jurisdiction of the charges,
aside from its own Second Amended Information and Traverse filed in the court
record. App.770, 934-35.
The State simply does not have the ability under a Rule 3.190(b) Motion to
Dismiss to request the court take judicial notice of its Traverse, and its facially
deficient Second Amended Information that relies on a “continuing offense” theory
of theft, and prevail. The State wholly failed to produce any authenticated bank
records, any live testimony at the June 21, 2018 hearing, or any other form of
admissible evidence that shows that any criminal conduct may have occurred during
the governing five-year statute of limitations. App.754, 934-35.
Oddly, the State’s cross-examination at the June 21, 2018 hearing of defense
witnesses was not predicated on the charges pending against the Defendants seeking
evidence of unlawful conduct to establish jurisdiction. App.808-11, 860-62, 898–
922. Instead, the State seemed to take out its frustration that the trial court permitted
a hearing at all, by making baseless accusations to smear defense counsel, and to
discredit the defenses’ witnesses, including Rebecca Zaraya, who is one of the
State’s alleged “victims” in the case. App.898–922.
The State’s bad-faith conduct in the prosecution of the Defendants in this case
is palpable. When defense counsel offered State emails into evidence at the June 21,
2018 hearing, the trial court improperly sustained the State’s objection on relevance
grounds. App.931-33. These State emails show the State attempted to suppress
exculpatory emails that unquestionably support a finding of bad-faith in including
Zaraya as a named “victim” over her own objections. App.931-33.
These improperly excluded emails unquestionably prove the State tried to
conceal exculpatory testimony by keeping the defense from learning that Zaraya had
given a sworn statement essentially exonerating Wright in 2009 App.931-33. A
finding of bad-faith is relevant to the proceedings when a Rule 3.190(b) motion to
dismiss challenges the State’s ability to tender substantial, competent evidence of
criminal conduct having occurred within the governing statute of limitations.
App.867-69.
Count III alleging Grand Theft against Jennifer Johnson is pled outside the
governing five-year statute of limitations. App.750-51, 798, 1215-16, 1335. Count
IV alleging grand theft as to Zaraya is similarly without merit as Zaraya’s complaint
was clearly leveraged against the State’s injunction and not against any conduct by
Wright or Berry, whom she had never even met or spoken to. App.866. Thus, these
counts must be dismissed as there has been no evidence tendered by the State to
support any criminal conduct having occurred from November 1, 2008 through
The State further argues that the Court cannot step in and dismiss any of the
Counts against either of the Defendants because there are facts that are in dispute
pursuant to the Traverse filed by the State of Florida. App.2191. At oral argument
on the motion, the State went so far as to suggest that the State needed to simply file
charges, any charges, claiming to fall within the five-year statute of limitations, even
if those charges were wholly unsubstantiated by any evidence. App.654, 658, 659,
756-811.
demonstrate the "provableness" of its charges prior to trial. App.760. Wright argued
in opposition that the State needn’t demonstrate the “provableness” of its charges,
but it was required to comply with its evidentiary burden under Rule 3.190(b), and
tender substantial, competent evidence that some form of criminal conduct occurred
within the governing five-year statute of limitations to establish jurisdiction.
App.760. The problem with the State's argument is that it is unsupported by Florida
law. The State failed to tender any evidence at all in this respect mandating all
charges be dismissed against Wright and Berry. App.770, 934-35.
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b) RESTS ON THE STATE OF FLORIDA TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL CHARGES WITHIN THE REQUISITE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The significant burden of proof to establish that the alleged crime occurred
within the statute of limitations rests firmly on the State. Escalante v. State, 165
So.3d 839, 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)(“[w]hen a criminal defendant challenges his
prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations.”); Soto v. State, 892 So.2d
1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Fleming v. State, 524 So.2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA
1988); State v. King, 282 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1973)(“Of course, ‘(t)he time within
which an offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation.
In fact, a most significant burden of proof is placed upon the State in order to proceed
once the jurisdiction of the Court is questioned through the raising of the Statute of
Limitations.”); see also Mead v. State, 101 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 1958) (statute of
limitations must be construed liberally in favor of defendants); Matos v. State, 961
So.2d 1077, 1077 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Pontius v. State, 932 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla.
4th DCA 2006(“The State did not carry its burden” to establish jurisdiction on a Fla.
R. Crim. 3.190(b) motion to dismiss); see also Akers v. State, 370 So.2d 81, 83 (Fla.
1st DCA 1979)(The State’s “failing to prove this jurisdictional fact it failed to carry
the burden of proof required of it by law. The trial court should have granted Akers’
motion for judgment of acquittal” under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b)).
II. THE STATE CANNOT RELY ON ITS INFORMATION AND A WRITTEN TRAVERSE TO MEET ITS EVIDENTIARY BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO DEFEAT A FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(b) MOTION TO DISMISS.
The trial court found in its Order that despite the State’s failure to tender any
admissible evidence at the June 21, 2018 hearing, that the State can rely on its
Second Amended Information and written Traverse to meet its burden of proof to
defeat the Defendants’ Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b) Motion to Dismiss. The trial court’s
ruling is in direct contravention to Second District Court of Appeal’s Opinions in
Neal and Escalante. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); see also
Escalante v. State, 165 So.3d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
As a matter of law, the Second District Court of Appeal has held that the State
cannot meet its burden of proof by merely relying on the face of its Second Amended
Information and a written Traverse. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905-07 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1997)(dismissing the State’s charges because “[e]ven if the prosecutor had
made his statement in testimony under oath, reporting facts developed by a third
party, or if the State had attempted to introduce the traverse into evidence, both
properly would have been rejected as inadmissible hearsay. § 90.801, Fla. Stat.”).
In adjudicating a Rule 3.190(b) Motion to Dismiss, the trial court is limited as
to what it may consider in determining whether the State has met its evidentiary
State v. Brugman, 588 So.2d 279, 279-80 (Fla. 2d DCA
1991)(holding that,
by attorney or
investigator on motion to dismiss a criminal charge do not establish facts, and the
failure of opposing counsel to object does not cure the deficiency because orders on
such a motion must be supported by substantial, competent evidence).
The same is true of the traverse or other out-of-court sworn statements, which
are simply filed with the court. These statements are inadmissible hearsay pursuant
to Section 90.801, Florida Statutes, and cannot be considered by the trial court as a
matter of law. “A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement.” Madry v.
State, 969 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)(citing § 90.801(2)(c), Fla. Stat.
At the June 21, 2018 hearing, the State did not provide any live testimony
from any witnesses, nor did tender any admissible evidence. App. 754. The only
submission tendered by the State at the June 21, 2018 hearing, were inadmissible
hearsay under Florida law. See § 90.801, Fla. Stat. The trial court is not permitted to
consider the State’s Second Amended Information and Traverse in determining
whether the State met its burden of proof to defeat a Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b) Motion
to Dismiss. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
At the June 21, 2018 hearing, the State also requested the trial court take
“judicial notice of the entire case file.” App.374. The trial court cannot take judicial
notice of the State’s file to meet its burden of proof of substantial, competent
evidence on Rule 3.190(b) Motion to Dismiss. Filing a document does not place it
in evidence. See Turtle 906 Lake Assocs., Ltd. v. Third Financial Services, Inc., 518
So.2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)(observing that the filing of a mortgage as an
appendix to a complaint does not obviate the need to admit it into evidence for
consideration of its content, and holding that pleadings are not themselves evidence);
see also Fair v. Kaufman, 647 So.2d 167, 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
“Even if the prosecutor had made his statement in testimony under oath,
reporting facts developed by a third party, or if the State had attempted to introduce
the traverse into evidence, both properly would have been rejected as inadmissible
hearsay. § 90.801, Fla. Stat.” Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905-06 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997)(holding that in deciding a Rule 3.190(b) motion to dismiss the trial court is
not permitted to consider out-of-court statements, out-of-court affidavits, or filings
in the case as these documents constitute inadmissible hearsay under Florida law.).
In Escalante, the Second District Court of Appeal directed the trial court to
“make specific findings based on the State’s evidence” and that “[i]f the State cannot
prove that it was Roblero Escalante's leaving the scene, as opposed to the accident
itself, that caused the death of the victim, then Roblero Escalante must be
discharged.” Escalante v. State, 165 So.3d 839, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
Here, the State has attempted to distinguish the requisite burden of proof noted
in Escalante by distinguishing the factual predicate of delayed service of the
charging document. However, the State’s legal analysis is completely misguided. In
Escalante, the State still had the substantial burden to set forth facts showing that it
could substantiate that the crime alleged, under the criminal theory on which it chose
to proceed, had occurred within the requisite statute of limitations. Id. at 841.
Florida law is well-settled in that the State always has the burden of proving
jurisdiction, which cannot be met by uncorroborated hearsay. See Neal v. State, 697
So.2d 903, 905-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)(even in a case where it could traverse
disputed facts, the State cannot rely on its traverse to meet its burden of proof on a
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b) motion to dismiss because it is hearsay).
In State v. King, 275 So.2d 274, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), aff'd, 282 So. 2d
162 (Fla. 1973), the State argued that its statute of limitations period should be
tailored to encompass its criminal theory of theft suggesting that an unlawful taking
did not occur until the defendant refused a demand for payment by the victim. Id. at
The Court held that under Rule 3.190(b), the State is required to submit
competent, substantial evidence to show an offense was properly charged within the
statute of limitations. The State cannot rely on conclusory denials in its Traverse to
meet this standard. The State must show not only show that it has substantial,
competent evidence that entitles it to allege that the statute of limitations has been
satisfied, it must also prove that the substance of its factual allegations would, in
good faith, substantiate the charged offense. The State admittedly failed to do either
Admittedly, the State has failed to set forth a reasonable theory of theft or to
clearly indicate through a presentation of evidence, what facts might enable it to
meet its burden of showing a theft crime occurred within the governing statute of
limitations. See Escalante v. State, 165 So.3d 839, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); State v.
King, 275 So.2d 274, 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
At the June 21, 2018 hearing, the State admittedly tendered no admissible
evidence to substantiate any viable theory of theft, money laundering, or any other
form of criminal conduct had occurred within the requisite statute of limitations. The
State plainly admits:
“Defense counsel is right about one thing: The State put on none of the evidence it intends to elicit before a finder of fact. There are two reasons for this: First, Rule 3 .190(b) motions are never about the sufficiency of evidence to sustain charges, they are always about timely commencement of the prosecution.”
App.1723.
The only submissions by the State were inadmissible hearsay that cannot meet
the State’s burden of proof to tender substantial, competent evidence necessary to
proceed to trial. The State has failed to meet its burden of proof as a matter of law
to establish jurisdiction, mandating dismissal of all charges.
III. THE STATE CANNOT PROCEED ON A “CONTINUING OFFENSE” THEORY OF THEFT AND IGNORE THE DATES OF PAYMENTS MADE BY THE ALLEGED CONSUMER “VICTIMS” TO ARTIFICALLY EXTEND TIME-BARRED CHARGES INTO THE FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Florida law is well-settled that the State cannot proceed on a “continuing
offense” theory of theft as it attempts to do in the present case to improperly extend
time-barred claims into the statute of limitations. State v. Diaz, 814 So.2d 466, 467
(Fla. 3d DCA 2002). In Diaz, the State charged the defendant with grand theft in
connection with 23 invoices. The State contended that all invoices were part of a
common scheme or plan to defraud the county and should be treated as a continuing
offense within the five-year statute. Id.
The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed based upon a plain reading of
section 812.014, Florida Statutes. Instead, the court concluded that each invoice was
separate taking, holding that the State failed to timely charge the defendant when
failed to tender any substantial, competent evidence of any unlawful taking within
the five-year statute of limitations. Id. at 466. The same pleading deficiencies exist
here. The State has not met its burden of proof to establish jurisdiction under Rule
3.l90(b) as it made no showing of any unlawful conduct from November 1, 2008
through November 1, 2013, the governing statute of limitations.
The Defendants are challenging the State on the same facial pleading
deficiencies which mirror those in Diaz. In light of this Rule 3.190(b) jurisdictional
challenge to the State’s Information, Florida law requires that the State tender
substantial, competent evidence to meet its jurisdictional burden, which it has not
done in the present case. The State's Summation expressly argues, "[t]he Court's own
records contain all the necessary evidence to carry the State’s burden." App.1719.
(Summation Paragraph 22)(emphasis added).
After hearing extensive argument, the trial court eventually entered an Order
denying the motion to dismiss. App.2189-91. In doing so, the trial court ignored
well-settled Florida law holding that theft is not a “continuing offense.”
court improperly permitted the State to proceed on a continuing offense theory of
theft, which this Court has previously rejected. Rosen v. State, 757 So.2d 1236 (Fla.
4th DCA 2000).
In State v. King, 282 So.2d 162, 166 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme
Court quoted favorably from the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970):
In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a given case several considerations guide our decision. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in
the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity. For these reasons and others, we have stated before 'the principle that criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose,' United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932).' United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968). We have also said that 'statutes of limitations normally begin to run when the crime is complete'…These principles indicate that the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances since…the tension between the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine is apparent; the latter, for all practical purposes, extends the statute beyond its stated term.' 410 F.2d at 1158.
In King, the Florida Supreme Court held that for the crime of larceny, the
crime is complete and committed upon the taking. King, 282 So.2d at 167. Thus, the
statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the taking. Id. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reaffirmed this principle. "A reading of section 812.014 Florida
Statutes (1987) does not suggest that the legislature intended grand theft to be a
continuing offense.” O’Malley v. Mounts, 590 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
In the present case, each Homeowner’s payment constituted a completed
“taking” at the time the payment was received by Outreach. The State is attempting
to treat grand theft as if it is a “continuing offense” to falsely extend time-barred
predicate acts into the November 1, 2008 to November 1, 2013 governing statute of
limitations. Compare First Amended Information Count III (alleging Defendant
intended to deprive Johnson of property “Beginning on or about October 15, 2008,
and continuing through November 3, 2008”), with Second Amended Information
Count III (alleging Defendant intended to deprive Johnson of Property “Beginning
on or about May 5, 2008, and continuing through on or about October 20,
2008”)(emphasis added). The State’s Second Amended Information fails to properly
plead a theft charge on its face, because it relies on a continuing offense theory of
grand theft, which is improper under Florida law. Bonel v. State, 651 So.2d 774, 776
(Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(citing Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977); State v. Mack,
637 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994))(the statute of limitations in a criminal
proceeding is to be liberally construed in favor of the accused).
Information, alleging transfers of money from any alleged victim that took place on
or after November 1, 2008, are not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
The testimony from GCS general counsel unequivocally stated the last dates of
payments for the alleged victims undisputedly fall outside the statute of limitations.
App.654, 658, 659, 756–811. Thus, there is no evidence that any grand-theft
occurred on or after the date of November 1, 2008 from these remaining alleged
victims to substantiate the allegations of Grand Theft within the five-year statute of
limitations governing the State’s charges. Thus, all charges must be dismissed with
prejudice under Florida law.
IV. REBECCA ZARAYA CANNOT SERVE AS A PREDICATE INCIDENT UNDERLYING A SUBSTANTIVE RICO CHARGE BECAUSE IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT SHE NEVER MET THE DEFENDANTS, THEREBY NEGATING THE ELEMNT OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION.
Organizations Act (RICO) prosecution the five-year statute of limitations begins
from the date of the last predicate act in which the defendant personally participated,
not the date of the last predicate act committed by the enterprise as a whole. See §
895.05(10), Fla. Stat.
In a substantive RICO prosecution, the gravamen of the "crime" is the pattern
of racketeering activity; that is, the individual predicate acts alleged to have been
committed by the defendant. The limitations period commences upon the date the
"crime" is completed which, for substantive RICO purposes, is the date of the last
charged predicate act committed by the individual defendant. State v. Reyan, 145
So.3d 133, 137-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); see also U.S. v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 714
(2d Cir. 1987)(holding that five-year statute of limitations applicable to prosecution
under section of RICO prohibiting conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of
racketeering activity commenced to run when defendant committed last overt act,
rather than when any member of group charged committed last overt act.”).
In a present case, there has never been any evidence that the individual
defendants personally participated in any manner regarding Rebecca Zaraya’s brief
14-day relationship with Outreach Housing. In fact, Rebecca Zaraya has always
testified she never met or spoke with Blair Wright or Bryan Berry. Zaraya
reconfirmed this fact at the June 21, 2018 hearing. App.866.
Accordingly, there is no evidence, nor has the State produced any evidence,
that the defendants personally participated in any criminal conduct relating to
Rebecca Zaraya. App.866. Thus, as a matter of law Zaraya cannot serve as a
predicate act under Count I for substantive RICO.
Due to the fact that all other predicate acts fall well outside the statute of
limitations and the State has tendered no admissible evidence to substantiate any
crime occurred within the statute of limitations, Count I must be dismissed as a
matter of law. App.754. The State’s utter failure to tender any admissible evidence
on June 21, 2018 to support that the Defendants’ personally participated in any
manner in respect to Rebecca Zaraya’s brief relationship with Outreach Housing,
renders Count I subject to mandatory dismissal.
V. THE STATE IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PURSUING ANY CHARGES REGARDING REBECCA ZARAYA OR ANY CONSUMER WHO COMPLAINED AS A RESULT OF THE STATE’S INJUNCTION & RECEIVERSHIP ORDER.
A legal principle of prohibiting catch-twenty-two or gotcha litigation has been
well memorialized under Florida law. This legal principle prohibits a party from
seeking legal relief from the trial court, and then later claiming the relief granted at
its request, was somehow improper or unlawful. State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446, 447
(Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(“In other words, ‘gotcha!’ maneuvers will not be permitted to
succeed in criminal, any more than in civil litigation.”)(citing Salcedo v. Asociacion
Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); McPhee v. State, 254 So.2d
406 (Fla.1st DCA 1971)).
Here, the State of Florida sought an Ex-Parte Injunction on January 28, 2009
to close Outreach Housing down and prevent it from rendering services to clients.
At the time, Rebecca Zaraya had only been an Outreach Housing client for 14 days,
but the undisputed evidence unequivocally shows she had received mortgage
analysis and trial consulting services from Outreach, and retained Attorney Adam
Skolnik, Esq. who filed a lawsuit on her behalf on January 28, 2009 against her
Rebecca Zaraya attended the June 21, 2018 hearing in person and testified on
the stand that she is not a “victim” and the State’s charges are meritless. App.851,
889, 890, 895, 913, 915, 919, 921, 926, 927. Thus, a matter of law the State has
failed to meet its requisite burden of proof under Rule 3.190(b) to substantiate
Zaraya’s inclusion in this case as a “victim”—allegations she herself expressly
denies. App.851, 889, 890, 895, 913, 915, 919, 921, 926, 927.
The State’s injunction prevented the Defendants from performing any further
services for the client homeowners or their retained attorneys as of January 29, 2009.
Zaraya’s complaint was in response to action taken by the State’s court appointed
Receiver—and not as a result of any conduct of the Defendants. App.295–313.
The State actually caused Ms. Zaraya’s complaint by enjoining Outreach from
continuing to provide further services to her. App.295–313. The State then arrested
Wright and Berry for complying with the State’s January 28, 2009 Injunction &
Receivership Order. App.295–313. The State cannot, as a matter of law, now assert
the defendants committed a crime by failing to render services to Zaraya when the
State sought a court ordered injunction to prevent Outreach from doing so. App.
“[T]his kind of tactic is unfair
This is little more than the ‘gotcha’ school
of litigation, roundly condemned in the cases.” Nelson v. State, 855 So.2d 132, 133,
n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Setting aside the clear entrapment defenses the State’s
conduct raises, the State is collaterally estopped from charging the Defendants with
criminal action for failing to render services the Defendants were enjoined by the
State from rendering.
VI. THE STATE SHOULD WELCOME DISMISSAL OF ALL CHARGES WITH PREJUDICE AS SUCH A RULING IS IN CONFORMITY WITH JURISDICTIONAL MANDATES UNDER FLORIDA LAW.
In Cochran, this Court set forth that “[t]he prosecuting attorney occupies a semi-
judicial position. He is a sworn officer of the government, with no greater duty
imposed on him than to preserve intact all the great sanctions and traditions of the
law. It matters not how guilty a defendant in his opinion may be, it is his duty under
oath to see that no conviction takes place except in strict conformity to law. His
primary considerations should be to develop the facts and the evidence for the
guidance of the court and jury, and not to consider himself merely as attorney of
record for the state, struggling for a verdict.” Cochran v. State, 711 So.2d 1159, 1163
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(quoting Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533 (1923)).
This Honorable Court further articulated the that a “prosecutor is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”
Id. at 1163 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
In the present case, the State has lost its way. It is apparent there is absolutely
no evidence to establish jurisdiction. The State entirely failed to tender any
admissible evidence to establish jurisdiction in this case. The State was required to
tender substantial, competent evidence that criminal conduct that occurred within
the requisite five-year statute of limitations. The State simply failed to meet its
burden. Accordingly, the trial court must dismiss all charges with prejudice against
Wright and Berry under Florida law.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, BLAIR L. WRIGHT, respectfully requests
this Honorable Court enter an order dismissing all charges filed against him in the
above-styled matter pursuant to the Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(b). The State of Florida
has failed to tender any admissible evidence to meet its burden of substantial,
competent evidence that any criminal conduct occurred within the requisite statute
of limitations, mandating dismissal of all charges pending against the Defendants
/s/ Crane Johnstone Crane Johnstone, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 616060 2850 NE 55ft Place Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 cranejohnstone@ gmail.com
/s/ Robyn Sztyndor Robyn L. Sztyndor, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 0089253 2850 NE 55ft Place Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 (786) 395-1824
/s/ Claudia Pastorius Claudia Pastorius, Esq. Fla. Bar No. 0113597 720 E. New Haven Ave., Suite 10 Melbourne, FL 32901 (321) 557-2643 claudiapastorius@ gmail.com
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the above and
foregoing Brief of Petitioner has been filed electronically with the Clerk of Court for
the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida Fourth District on Sept. 30, 2018,
and a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner has been delivered
by electronic service to the Respondent, the State of Florida.
/s/ Robyn L. Sztyndor Robyn L. Sztyndor, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 0089253
2850 NE 55th Place
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 (786) 395-1824
Crane Johnstone, Esq. Fla. Bar No.: 616060
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 cranejohnstone@ gmail.com
Claudia Pastorius, Esq. Fla. Bar No. 0113597 720 E. New Haven Ave. Suite 10 Melbourne, FL 32901 (321) 557-2643 claudiapastorius@gmail.com
FURTHER, WE HEREBY CERTIFY that this Answer Brief complies with
the font requirements of Rule 9.210 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and
is in the required font of Times New Roman 14.
(786) 395-1824
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