Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170601_0000703.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-07-17 01:29:36
Document Index: 57200793

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 2255', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2255']

THOMAS W. HARRIS, Defendant.
The defendant Thomas W. Harris moves to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551(2015)[1]. (Dk. 186). Mr. Harris was convicted on pleas of guilty to counts one through five of the indictment that charged him with three counts (1, 3 and 5) of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act robbery) and two counts (2 and 4) of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Possession of a firearm during a crime of violence), and he was sentenced to a total term of 360 months custody. (Dk. 159). Mr. Harris filed a direct appeal which was dismissed. (Dk. 179). This is the first § 2255 motion filed by Mr. Harris.
Mr. Harris asks the court to vacate his § 924(c) convictions because he believes his three Hobbs Act robbery convictions do not meet the definition of a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3). Specifically, he contends a § 1951(a) and (b)(1) Hobbs Act robbery conviction does not require proof of violent physical force as required by § 924(c)(3)(A). As for any fallback argument by the government that his Hobbs Act robbery convictions qualify under the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B), Mr. Harris relies on Johnson and its holding that such language is unconstitutionally vague.
A two-step inquiry resolves whether Colorado's robbery statute requires physical force as that term is used in the ACCA: we must identify the minimum “force” required by Colorado law for the crime of robbery and then determine if that force categorically fits the definition of physical force. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (“Because we examine what the state conviction necessarily involved ... we must presume that the conviction ‘rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts' criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.” (alterations in original) (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court has reminded us that in construing the minimum culpable conduct, such conduct only includes that in which there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility” the state statute would apply. Id. at 1685 (citation omitted). Decisions from the state supreme court best indicate a “realistic probability, ” supplemented by decisions from the intermediate-appellate courts.
844 F.3d at 1264. The Tenth Circuit in Harris referenced both Johnson, 559 U.S. at 143, and Justice Scalia's concurrence in United States v. Castleman, __U.S.__, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1421-22 (2014), in arriving at an “understanding of ‘physical force' in mind-that is, physical force means violent force, or force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person . . . .” 844 F.3d at 1265-66. Thus, “the categorical approach requires us to consider the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction of the predicate offense (in this case, a Hobbs Act robbery), and then to consider whether such conduct amounts to a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).” United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 139 (2nd Cir. 2016). In deciding whether a Hobbs Act robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause, the Second Circuit similarly said:
One final point remains. Critically, the Supreme Court has made clear in employing the categorical approach that to show a predicate conviction is not a crime of violence “requires more than the application of legal imagination to [the] . . . statute's language.” Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). As relevant here, there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, ” that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence. Id. To show that a particular reading of the statute is realistic, a defendant “must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the ... courts in fact did apply the statute in the ... manner for which he argues.” Id. To that end, the categorical approach must be grounded in reality, logic, and precedent, not flights of fancy. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-85, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (noting that “focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the [relevant] statute is not an invitation to apply ‘legal imagination' to the ... offense” (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815)).
First, and not the least, is the Tenth Circuit's recent unpublished decision in United States v. Moreno, 665 Fed.Appx. 678 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016), in which the circuit panel denied a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from the district court's holding on essentially the same arguments made by Mr. Harris here. Mr. Moreno argued that his predicate Hobbs Act robbery offense did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements definition of § 924(c)(3)(A) and that the residual clause in § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. The district court ruled that the Hobbs Act robbery offense charged in count one qualified as a crime of violence “because it ‘has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.'” 665 Fed.Appx. at 679. Mr. Moreno appealed the denial of his § 2255 motion and his COA request. The Tenth Circuit affirmed finding that reasonable jurists would not disagree with the district court's assessment of Mr.
Moreno's constitutional claims:
We agree. The elements of Count 1-particularly the definition of robbery, which requires use of actual or threatened force or violence- parallel the requirements for finding a &ldquo;crime of violence&rdquo; under &sect; 924(c)(3)(A). Thus, Count 1 provided the necessary crime of violence to support Mr. Moreno&#39;s guilty plea on Count 2. Mr. Moreno&#39;s challenges under Johnson do not change our analysis because Count 1 qualifies as a ...