Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/520/1011/271844/
Timestamp: 2020-07-09 05:48:19
Document Index: 352908322

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 654', '§ 654', '§ 654', '§ 654', '§ 654', '§ 655', '§ 654', '§ 654']

Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, v. Butler Lime and Cement Companyandoccupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Respondents, 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1975 › Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, v. Butler Lime and Cement Companyandoccupational S...
Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, v. Butler Lime and Cement Companyandoccupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Respondents, 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975) Argued April 24, 1975. Decided Sept. 5, 1975
The Secretary of Labor has petitioned this court to review the decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) in the case of Butler Lime & Cement Company (Butler), OSAHRC Docket No. 855 (Sept. 24, 1974).1 In that decision, the Commission, by a 2-1 vote, affirmed an administrative law judge's order that had vacated a citation and proposed penalty issued by the Secretary to Butler. The citation alleged a "serious" violation of section 5(a) (2) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2).2
After an inspection of Butler's yard and the job site following the Kapperman incident, the Secretary of Labor issued Butler a citation4 for a serious violation of section 5(a) (2).5 Butler had allegedly failed to comply with safety standard 29 C.F.R. 1910.180(j), which provides in pertinent part:
Commissioner Cleary dissented. He alone focused on Butler's safety instructions, which he deemed inadequate. He pointed out that Butler's manager, in the course of his fifteen-minute chat with Kapperman, had not explained to the driver that electricity can arc nor had he instructed Kapperman to keep his truck boom at least ten feet away from power lines. The Commissioner stated that "in finding that the accident occurred because Kapperman failed to use common sense and judgment, I believe that the administrative law judge erroneously shifted responsibility for compliance from (Butler) to the electrocuted employee, Kapperman." The display of the safety poster and the presence of the two-way radio in the truck cab were insufficient methods of implementing the safety standards. In sum, Butler had violated section 5(a) (2) when its employee put the truck boom within eight to ten feet of the 4800-volt power lines in noncompliance with the standard. This was a "serious" violation. A reasonably diligent employer would have foreseen the danger to Kapperman.
Second, the decisions at the Commission level address themselves to the foreseeability of the incident as it actually occurred rather than to the foreseeability of the general danger of coming within ten feet of power lines, i. e., the danger which was the subject of promulgated standard 1910.180(j). "(S)ection 17(k) (does not) requir(e) any actual death or physical injury for a violation to occur." Brennan v. OSAHRC, 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974). An employer must take reasonable precautionary steps to protect its employees from reasonably foreseeable recognized dangers that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical injury. And precautionary steps, of course, include the employer's providing an adequate safety and training program. See the "general duty" clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1).9 See also Lebanon Lumber Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 184 (March 19, 1973), reported in 1 (BNA) OSHC 1165.
Section 5(a) (2), or, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2), provides:
The law judge mentioned a line of Commission decisions where the Commission refused to attribute to the employer the act of an employee in breach of a regulation or in breach of 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) because "the employee's act was forbidden by the employer's work rule, generally effectively enforced . . .." (Emphasis added.) That the law judge did not base his order on this line of decisions is further evidence that he made no finding as to the adequacy or inadequacy of Butler's safety program
An employer's duties under the Act flow from two sources. First, under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2), it must conform to the detailed health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under 29 U.S.C. § 655. (See n. 5, supra.) Second, where no promulgated standards apply, the employer is subject to the general duty to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1). Specific, promulgated standards preempt the general duty clause, but only with respect to hazards expressly covered by the specific standards. See National Realty, supra, at 1261
The Secretary contends that Butler should at least be held responsible for a non-serious violation of 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2). (The Act provides for three grades of violations, depending upon the "level of gravity" of the particular violation. Those gradations are de minimis violations, non-serious violations, and serious violations.) The Commission majority did not rule on this point, although the concurring Commissioner did remark that he did not find a non-serious violation "in order that the case may be decided and for the reason that in the circumstances of this case the difference between no violation and a technical violation is merely a legal nicety." On remand, the Commission no doubt will consider this matter. Cf. Brennan v. OSAHRC, 494 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1974) ("Thus the hearing examiner's section 17(k) rationale is irrelevant to any determination of whether or not the Secretary had established a violation, de minimis or simpliciter"); Lee Way Motor Freight v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975)