Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/395786312/Santa-Clara-County-Board-of-Supervisors-Cindy-Chavez-and-David-Cortese-Use-Courts-For-Prior-Restraint-on-Speech
Timestamp: 2019-08-19 06:09:12
Document Index: 364251171

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART 13', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 15', '§ 54950', '§ 54952', '§ 54953', '§ 54954', '§ 166', '§ 1466', '§ 166', '§ 166', '§ 2', '§ 54950', '§ 54953', '§ 54952', '§ 54954']

Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors - Cindy Chavez and David Cortese Use Courts For Prior Restraint on Speech | Plea | Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution
Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors Cindy Chavez and Dave Cortese, along with County Counsel, James Williams sought and obtained restraining orders against a civil society activist who was critical of them in their elected positions. Jonathan Grossman of the Sixth District Appellate Program lodged a writ claiming not only was the order unconstitutional, it violated First, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights after the lawyer appointed by the county proved to be ineffective counsel.
saveSave Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors - Cindy Ch... For Later
United States v. Waller, 10th Cir. (2007)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LEODEGARIO BASCUGIN
Oran Young v. United States, 433 F.2d 626, 10th Cir. (1970)
State v. Simmons, Ariz. Ct. App. (2015)
United States v. Uzuegbunam, 4th Cir. (1997)
United States v. Santistevan, 10th Cir. (2011)
The United States of America, Ex Rel. James Farnsworth, Relator-Appellant v. Robert E. Murphy, Warden of Auburn State Prison and the People of the State of New York, 254 F.2d 438, 2d Cir. (1958)
United States v. Miguel Familia, 3rd Cir. (2010)
United States v. McKinney, 10th Cir. (2010)
United States v. Trusdale, 10th Cir. (2003)
United States v. Strickland, 4th Cir. (2009)
ART 13 People vs Sabilul.pdf
IN THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 18AP002333
v. (Trial Ct. No.
VICTOR MERAS, C1769315)
The Honorable Richard Loftus, Judge
Jonathan Grossman 154452
(408) 241-6171; fax (408) 241-2877
jonathan@sdap. org
Victor Meras
TABLE OF CONTENTS . .. .................... . ............ -i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . ..... .. . .. . . . .. . . . ...... . ... .... -iii-
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENTOFTHECASE . ............. . ..................... 1
STATEMENTOFTHEFACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR MOVING TO
DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE THE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
WERE UNLAWFUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Petitioner was Entitled to Effective Assistance of Counsel to
Pursue Defenses Before Pleading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Trial Counsel Failed to Seek or be Prepared to Argue Dismissal
of the Contempt Charges Due to There not Being a Lawful
Comi Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C.. There Could be no Tactical Reason for Failing to Seek to
Dismiss the Contempt Charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
D. Failure to Move to Dismiss was Prejudicial . .. .. . . . . . . . 13
II. THECOURT'SORDER THAT APPELLANTSTAY AWAYFROM
THE BOARD WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND
OVERBROAD, AND IT AMOUNTED TO PRIOR RESTRAINT OF FREE
SPEECH .......... . . .. .... ... ... . .. . .. . .... . . . ........... 14
CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT ... . . . . . .... . .......... . . 17
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E -MAIL AND U.S. MAIL . . . . . . ... .. .. . 18
Anderson v. Superior Court (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 1240 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
413 U.S. 601 ... . .. ..... . . ........ . ..... . .......... 8,15
Citizens United v. Federal Elec. Com. (20 10)
558 U.S. 310 .......... . ........... . ......... . ... .. .. 11
Hassell v. Bird (2018)
5 Cal.5th 522 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Hili v. Lockhart (1985)
474 U.S. 52 ....... .. ....... .. ..... .. ... . .... . .... . .. 14
Hinton v. Alabama (2014)
571 U.S. 263 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
In re Cassil (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 1081 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
In re E.O. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1149 .. .. . . . .. .. . . ... .... . .. .. .. . ..... 10
In re Ivey (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 793 . . .. . .. . . . ..... .. ................ 6,14
13 Cal.4th 552 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875 7,15
In re Williams (1969)
1 Cal.3d 168 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
In re Wilson (1992)
3 Cal.4th 945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Lockhartv. Fretwell (1993)
506 U.S. 364 .......... . ...... .. . ..... ............... 14
402 U.S. 415 . .. .... ... ..... . ............. .. ......... 12
Padilla v. Kentucky (20 10)
559 U.S. 356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
People v: Asbury (1985)
173 Cal.App.3d 362 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
People v. Gonzalez (1996)
12 Cal.4th 804 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
People v. Harrisson (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 637 .... .. .. ............. .. ......... 8, 15
People v. Johnson (1993)
20 Cal.App.4th 106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
People v. Ledesma (1987)
43 Cal.3d 171 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
People v. Leon (20 10)
181 Cal.App.4th 943 ... . . ... .. .............. .. ...... . . 10
People v. Maguire (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 1022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
People v. Perez (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 380 .... . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .... ....... . .. 8,10
People v. Pope ( 1979)
23 Cal.3d 412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
TABLE OF AUffiORITIES (CONTINUED)
People v. Selga (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
People v. Williams ( 1999)
21 Ca1.4th 335 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
People v. Young ( 1956)
138 Cal.App.2d 425 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Presley v. Georgia (20 10)
558 U .S. 209 . . .. . ................ ... . . ... . .. . .. .. . .. 10
507 U .S. 292 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Smith v. Lewis (1975)
13 Cal.3d 349 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Smith v. M ahoney (9th Cir. 2010)
611 F.3d 978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
466 U .S. 668 . .... .. . . . . .. . .... . .................. 3,4, 13
United Siates v. Hook (6th Cir. 1986)
781 F.2d 1166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
553 U.S. 285 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
art. I, § 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... . . . . .. . . . 11
art. I, § 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... . . . . .. . . . 11
art. I,§ 7 . ........................ . . .. . .... . . . . . .. . 7,15
art. I, § 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... . . . . .. 3,7, 15
First Amendment ... ........... . ......... .. ... .... . . 7,11
Sixth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Fomteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,7,15
Govenunent Code
§ 54950 .. . .......... .. ............. . ... .. .... ..... . 12
§ 54952 ......... .. ........ . ... . . .............. .. . . . 12
§ 54953 . ... ..... .. .. ................. . .... . ........ 12
§ 54954.3 ... . . ... . . ..... . ........................... 12
§ 166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,6
§ 1466 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- Vl-
This is an appeal from the judgment following a plea of no contest. It
is appealable under Penal Code section 1466, subdivision (b)(1).
A complaint was filed on July 24, 2017. (CT 1-2.) As amended, it
alleged appellant committed four counts of contempt (Pen. Code, § 166, subd.
(a)(4)) by not staying at least 300 yards away from Cindy Chavez, David
Cortese, James Williams, and David Leon on or about June 6, 20 17 as required
by orders "lawfully issued by a court." (CT 3-5.)
On March 26, 2018, appellant pled no contest to count one. The
remaining three counts and an alleged violation of probation were dismissed.
He was placed on two years informal probation and ordered to serve four days
with credit for four days. As a condition of probation, the court ordered he
stay 200 yards away. (CT 37.)
A notice of appeal was filed on April3, 2018. (CT 38-39.)
Appellant has been a civil social activist, which includes political
activism and speaking at local government meetings, and is also known as
Victorius Alexander. (CT 10.) According to the police report in the cowt file,
appellant was ordered to stay 300 yards away from board of supervisor
meetings and ce1tain members ofthe board (Cindy Chavez and David Cortese)
and certain members of the county staff (James Williams and David Leon).
Rhonda Schroeder, 1 who was the division manager of board operations at the
Office of the Clerk and knew appellant from prior board meetings, was outside
the County Administration Building on personal business at about 11 a.m. on
June 6, 2017. (CT 10.) Three of the people protected by the orders were at
the board meeting, except Leon who was on the tenth floor. (CT 10.)
Sclu-oeder reported she saw appellant parked across the street from the San
Jose Police Department and walked to the County Re-Entiy Center. (CT 9.)
The program manager of the Re-Entry Center said appellant had
checked in on May 30 but did not make an appointment, and so he was not
receiving services. (CT 9-10.) It was determined appellant was 135 yards
Schroeder' s name was redacted from the police report in the court
file, but the People's Motions in Limine identify her. (CT 29.)
from the County Administration Building, which included the District
Attomeys Office. (CT 12.)
DISMISS THE ALLEGATIONS BECAUSE THE PROTECTIVE
ORDERS WERE UNLAWFUL.
F~r appellant to be guilty of contempt for violating a court order, there
must be a lawful court order. The protective orders were not lawful. Trial
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the case based on the orders
A~ Petitioner was Entitled to Effective Assistance of Counsel to
Pursue Defenses Before Pleading.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by article
I, section 15 of the California Constitution, entitling a defendant to "the
reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his [or her] diligent,
conscientious advocate." (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215;
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684.) This is measured by
objective standards of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
(Strickland, at p. 688.)
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that
( 1) counsel's representation was deficient in that it fell short of prevailing
professional standards of reasonableness; and (2) there is a "reasonable
possibility that but for counsel's errors, the result of the case would have been
different." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. atp. 687.) On appeal, it must also be
shown that there was no reasonable explanation for trial counsel's conduct.
(People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)
Trial counsel has a duty to know the law. (In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal. 4th
945, 955-956 [ineffective for failing to do legal research to exclude evidence];
United States v. Hook (6th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 1166, 1172, fn. 8.) " An
attomey' s ignorance of a point oflaw that is fundamental to his case combined
with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential
example of unreasonable performance under Strickland." (Hinton v. Alabama
(2014) 571 U.S. 263, 274; Smith v. Lewis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 349, 358.)
"Criminal defense attomeys have a duty to investigate carefully all defenses
of fact and law that may be available to the defendant . . . Counsel should
promptly advise his client of his rights and take all actions necessa1y to
preserve them." (Pope, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at p . 425, intemal quotation marks
omitted.) Thus, trial counsel has a duty to make meritorious motions that
would have an effect on the case (Wilson, at pp. 955-956) and to make proper
objections. (In re Jones (1996) 13 Ca1.4th 552, 571-573 ; People v. Asbury
(1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 362, 365-366).
A defendant is also entitled to the effective assistance of counsel before
deciding whether to plead guilty or no contest. (Padilla v. Kentucky
(2010) 559 U.S. 356, 364 ["Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a
defendant is entitled to ' the effective assistance of competent counsel.' "].)
"Before entering his plea, [a defendant is] 'entitled to rely upon his counsel to
make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and
laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should
be entered.' [Citation.] The attorney's role in investigating the facts and
researching the applicable law prior to advising the petitioner to plead
becomes particularly important because of the serious consequences of a guilty
plea[, which] ... is itself a conviction." (In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 168,
175.) Thus, counsel has been found to be ineffective for failing to investigate
and challenge charges that could be defeated. (People v. Maguire (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1022, 1028 ["Defense counsel have the obligation to investigate
all defenses, explore the factual bases for defenses [citation] and the applicable
law. [Citation]."]; People v. Young (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 425 [counsel not
prepared to proceed]; Smith v. Mahoney (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 978, 986-
989.)
B. Trial Counsel Failed to Seek or be Prepared to Argue
Dismissal of the Contempt Charges Due to There not Being
a Lawful Court Order.
Trial counsel failed to move to dismiss the charges on the ground the
comt orders were invalid. Penal Code section 166, subdivision (a)(4) states
it is a misdemeanor when the defendant engages in"[w]illful disobedience of
the terms as written of any process or comt order or out-of-state court order,
lawfully issued by a court, including orders pending trial." (Emphasis added.)
"As a general rule, the elements of contempt include (1) a valid order, (2)
knowledge of the order, (3) ability to comply with the order, and (4) willful
failme to comply with the order." (In re Ivey (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 793, 798,
citing Anderson v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1245 and In
re Cassil (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.) There must be valid orders.
(Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4); People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal.4th 804,
816-819.) A "person to whom an injunction applies is not baned from
collaterally attacking the injunction' s validity in a contempt proceeding.
(People v. Gonzalez (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 804, 818.)" (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5
Cal.5th 522, 553, fn. 3 (cone. opn. ofKiuger, J.).)
Although the lawfulness of the protective orders is an element the
prosecution must prove at trial, it is also a pme issue of law which a court
could consider before trial. In this respect, the issue is similar to whether an
offense occuned within the statute of limitations, which could be challenged
in a pretrial motion to dismiss as well as at trial. (Cf. People v. Williams
(1999) 21 Ca1.4th 335, 341.)
There were two set of protective orders. One was from criminal case,
case no. C1516422. 2 The second set of protective orders came from civil court
in case nos. 17CH007411 through CH007414. In each case, the court ordered
appellant to stay 300 yards away from the board of supervisor meetings and
the four named people. (CT 6, 9.)
The orders were overbroad. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California
Constitution guarantee no person shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property
without due process of law. (In Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)
"[T]he right to be free from Government confinement ... is the very essence
of the lib~rty protected by the Due Process Clause." (Reno v. Flores (1993)
507 U.S. 292, 346.) "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute [or
order] is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech." (United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 292.) A court order
Appellant was also on probation in cases nos. C1368704, C1516422,
C1634024, C1509055, and C1363599. Following a violation of probation,
a similar ·stay away order was made as a condition of probation, which were
challenged on appeal in case nos. 17AP002214, 17AP002215, 17AP002216,
17AP002244, 17AP002283 . However, violating a condition ofprobation cannot
be grounds for contempt. (People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 120;
People v. Johnson (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 106, 111.)
"is constitutionally overbroad when it substantially limits a person's tights and
those limitations are not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition.
[Citation.] It is not enough to show the govemment' s ends are compelling; the
means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends. A state may restrict
a constitutional right, but only when the resttiction is nanowly drawn ....
Since laws regulating expression pose a particular danger of abuse, they are
carefully scrutinized. [Citation.]" (People v. Harrisson (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 637, 641-642; accord, Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 413
U.S. 601, 612.)
The distance of 300 yards was too sweeping. "Many courts [and
county services] are located in govemment complexes that house a vatiety of
public agencies. These may include a county law library; a public defender's
office . .. . " (People v. Perez (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) The board
of supervisors meets at 70 West Hedding Street in San Jose. (CT 9.) The
County Administration Building was where most of the county's services are
located, including the District Attorney' s Office. Within 300 yards are the San
Jose Police Department, and the County Re-Entry Center, which provided
rehabilitative services for former inmates. (CT 9, 12.) Also within 300 yards
were Hall of Justice (the main criminal comthouse), the Main Jail, the Public
Defenders Office, the Alternative Defenders Office, the Civic Center Parking
Garage, the Almy National Guard recruitment station, and the county tax
collector. Appellant could be found to have violated the orders simply because
he was required to attend court, went to the police to report a crime, consulted
with his lawyer, found himself arrested, or went to the County Re-Entry
Center for services.
This was also in the county civic center, an area where political
demonstrations have been held. A main line of the light rail system ran within
300 yards, as did major bus lines and main streets. The Guadalupe Freeway
(State Route 87) came within 300 yards of the County Administration
Building. Petitioner could be found to violate the orders simply by driving
down a limited-access freeway, though he would be in no position to access
the board of supervisors or the protected parties. His ability to simply get
around was greatly hampered by the courts' orders.
It did not save the day that the board of supervisors normally met on
Tuesday mornings. It also had special meetings at any given time. Further,
the court ordered petitioner to stay away from board members and staff
members, There were committee meetings, and the named people had offices
at the County Administration Building. Leon, for example, was in an office
on the tenth floor. (CT 10.) Petitioner effectively could not be in the San Jose
county civic center while the building was open. He could be in violation of
the orders by being in the area after hours simply because a one of them was
The protective orders banned petitioner from engaging in needed county
services. It also prohibited him from attending comt, even if he was a
defendant, witness, victim, or juror. A person cannot be banned from a comt
proceeding generally without cause particular to the fair administration of
justice in the comtroom. (Presley v. Georgia (2010) 558 U.S. 209, 213.) An
order, such as a condition of probation, banning a person from a county
courthouse, especially if he or she is a victim or witness, is unconstitutional
unless th~re is specific evidence that the proceedings would be unfair if the
person is present. (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-1158;
People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952-954; Perez, supra, 176
Cal.App.4th at p. 385.) The court's orders were infum because there was
never a suggestion appellant tried to intimidate a witness or otherwise tamper
with court proceedings.
The absurdity of the protective orders was illustrated by the facts of this
case. On the day in question, he was walking from a parked car to the Re-
Entry Center, where services for former inmates were offered. (CT 10.)
While he was not technically a client because he needed to make an
appointment (CT 9-10), for many indigent defendants without reliable phone
service, the only means of making an appointment was to appear in person to
do so. There was no evidence he was aware the board was meeting or that his
presence had anything to do with the board. His encounter on the street with
a county employee who worked for the board occuned only because the
employee happened to step outside to tend to a personal matter. (CT 10.)
In setting probation, the comt in this case recognized the 300 yard
distance was too broad when it ordered as a condition of probation in this case
that appellant stay only 200 yards away so that he could benefit from services
at the Re-Entry Center, which are a little more than 200 yards from the County
Administration Building. (CT 37.)
The orders were overbroad also because they served as an unwananted
infringement on his right to petition, speech, and to assemble. These rights are
core political rights under the First Amendment. (See also Cal. Const., art. I,
§§ 2, 3.) "Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. [Citations.]
Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others. [Citations.] As instruments to censor,
these categories are intenelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content." (Citizens
Unitedv. Fed. Elec. Com. (2010) 558 U.S. 310, 340.) The First Amendment
did not permit banning appellant from board of supervisor meetings or even
picketing in front of a government building simply because he was often a
critic of government policy and had an oversized prop at one meeting.
The protective orders amounted to an injunction prohibiting appellant
from speaking at county meetings or protesting at the county civic center. As
such it amounted to impetmissible prior restraint of protected speech. An
"injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication,
constitutes an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights."
(Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) 402 U.S. 415, 418.) "Any
prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption'
against its constitutional validity." (Jd. at p. 419.) In that case, an
organization was leafleting and picketing to create panic in the community of
nonwhites moving into the neighborhood. However distasteful or hurtful the
tactics were, the protesters engaged in free speech that could not be banned by
an injunction or a restraining order. (Ibid.)
The orders also violated state law. Under the Brown Act or Open
Meeting Law (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.), all county and city meetings must
be open to the public. (Gov. Code, § 54953, subd. (a).) This includes the
board of supervisors and its committees. (Gov. Code, § 54952, subd. (a) &
(b).) "Every agenda for regular meetings shall provide an opportunity for
members of the public to directly address the legislative body on any item of
interest to the public . . . " (Gov. Code,§ 54954.3, subd. (a).) The comt could
not fashion an order depriving appellant of this right.
The courts' protective orders were not valid.
C. There Could be no Tactical Reason for Failing to Seek to
Dismiss the Contempt Charges.
Since a motion to dismiss the contempt charges would have been
granted, there was no tactical reason for not bringing the motion. This was not
a case where the defendant snatched up a favorable offer early in the
proceeding. The complaint was filed on July 24, 2017. (CT 1-2.) By January
18, 2018, violation of probation matters were pending in other cases where it
was recommended appellant be ordered to serve 45 days in jail and have the
term of probation extended. (CT 18-19.) March 26, 2018, was the day set for
jury trial. (CT 24.) This was the day appellant pled. (CT 37.) No written
motions in limine were submitted by trial counsel. The case had been pending
for nine months and was about to go to trial had appellant not pled. There
could be no satisfactory explanation why a motion to dismiss was never
D. Failure to Move to Dismiss was Prejudicial.
In order to show prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.) In making this determination, "a court should presume, absent
challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the
judge or jury acted according to law." (Ibid.) When there is a plea, the
defendant must show he would not have pled had trial counsel acted
competently. (Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 59; Lockhart v. Fretwell
(1993) 506 U.S. 364, 369.)
There are only two possible defenses to contempt charges: (1) there
was not a willful failure to comply with the order, and (2) the order was not
lawful. (lvey, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p . 798.) Based on the police report,
a witness placed appellant within 300 yards of the board meeting. (CT 37.)
Trial counsel submitted no papers to the court suggesting he had any witnesses
to refute the allegation. Appellant complained on the day of trial that
witnesses had not been subpoenaed to testify. (2RT 303-304.) Appellant
waited nine months before pleading. This demonstrated he wished not to be
convicted but did so when conviction appeared to be inevitable. Had there
been a motion to dismiss the contempt charges because they were unlawful at
any point during the nine month pendency of the case, there would have been
nothing for appellant to plead to.
II. THE COURT'S ORDER THAT APPELLANT STAY AWAY
FROM THE BOARD WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND
OVERBROAD, AND IT AMOUNTED TO PRIOR RESTRAINT OF
Even if the restraining orders were valid, the condition of probation that
appellant stay 200 yards from the board of supervisors and the four named
people was constitutionally overbroad. Although there was no objection to the
conditions of probation, a claim that they are unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad based on undisputed facts can be raised on appeal. (Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal. 4th at pp. 885-887.) Again, the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California
without due process of law. (ld. at p. 890.) "A probation condition is
constituti'onally overbroad when it substantially limits a person's rights and
those limitations are not closely tailored to the purpose of the condition."
(Harrisson, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 641-642; see also Broadrick, supra,
413 U.S. at p. 612.)
The court decided to order appellant stay 200 yards, instead of 300
yards, from the board and the protected people because certain services at the
Re-Entry Center would have been off limits to appellant for no just reason.
(2RT 314-315, 318-319.) As explained above, however, there were other
impmtant services that were still offlimits by the 200 yard order, and banning
appellant from the services make the order unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. He still cannot go to the district attorneys office ifhe were a victim
or witness or had other lawful business there. He could not go to court at the
Hall of Justice. He could not go the San Jose Police Station or the county jail.
He would technically be in violation of probation just for being arrested. He
cannot use vital modes of transportation or demonstrate at the county center.
Accordingly, the matter must be remanded for the comt to modify or strike the
For the foregoing reasons appellant Victor Meras, also known as
Victorius Alexander, respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
ey for Appellant
I, Jonathan Grossman, certify that the attached APPELLANT'S
OPENING BRIEF contains 3895 words.
Executed under penalty of perjwy at San Jose, California, on December
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY E-MAIL AND U.S. MAIL
Case Name: People v. Meras Case No.: 18AP002333
I declare that I am over the age of 18, not a party to this action and my
business address is 95 S. Market Street, Suite 570, San Jose, California 95113.
On the date shown below, I served the within APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF to the following parties hereinafter named by:
_x_ BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION- I transmitted a PDF version
of this document by electronic mail to the party(s) identified on the
attached service list using the e-mail address(es) indicated.
Served electronically via E-Mail:
District Attorney' s Office
San Jose; CA 95110
motions_dropbox@dao. sccgov.org
_x_ BY MAIL - Placing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope
with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at San
Jose, California, addressed as follows:
Superior Court - Appeals
San Jose,~ CA 95110
3306 Allen Way
San Clara, CA 95051
I declare under penalty of perjury the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
this I!; th day of December 2018, at San Jose, California.
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