Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/316/74/
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 17:11:32
Document Index: 33437753

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 206', '§ 212', '§ 206', '§ 206']

GREGG CARTAGE & STORAGE CO. V. UNITED STATES, 316 U. S. 74 (1942) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 316 > GREGG CARTAGE & STORAGE CO. V. UNITED STATES, 316 U. S. 74 (1942)
GREGG CARTAGE & STORAGE CO. V. UNITED STATES, 316 U. S. 74 (1942)
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Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74 (1942)
Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States
Argued March 4, 1942
316 U.S. 74
1. The provision of § 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, granting "grandfather" rights to common carriers "in bona fide operation on June 1, 1935, and since that time," requires that the service shall have been continuous (except for interruptions over which the carrier "had no control") from June 1, 1935, until the time of the hearing by the Commission on the application. P. 316 U. S. 78.
2. The Commission was warranted in holding as a matter of law that an interruption of service caused by the carrier's bankruptcy was not one over which the carrier "had no control" within the meaning of the Act, and it was not required to go behind the adjudication and examine into the particular causes of the bankruptcy. P. 316 U. S. 79. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 316 U. S. 75
3. The grandfather clause of the Motor Carrier Act is to be construed as extending only to carriers plainly within its term. P. 316 U. S. 83.
4. A purchaser of the grandfather rights of a bankrupt carrier stands in no better position with respect to such rights than did the bankrupt. P. 316 U. S. 82.
5. In this case, the interruption of service was of sufficient duration -- at least 69 days -- to establish that the earlier had not been in operation "since" June 1, 1935, within the meaning of § 206(a). P. 316 U. S. 83.
6. A claim that the delay of the Commission in acting upon an application under § 206(a) deprived the applicant of an advantage which he would have had under § 212(a) -- where such delay is not shown to have been arbitrary or discriminatory, nor, in view of the magnitude of the Commission's task in respect to applications under § 206(a), unreasonable -- is no ground for relief. P. 316 U. S. 83.
42 F.Supp. 266 affirmed.
Appeal from a District Court of three judges dismissing the complaint in a suit to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission denying an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 206(a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935.