Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/4th/16/1081.html
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 19:20:33
Document Index: 766647980

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 11352', '§ 11352', '§ 1203', '§ 1213', '§ 1170', '§ 15', '§ 1445', '§ 1203', '§ 1203', '§ 1203', '§ 11352']

People v. Howard (1997) :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 4th › Volume 16 › People v. Howard (1997)
People v. Howard (1997)
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, [16 Cal. 4th 1084] Stan M. Helfman and Sharon G. Birenbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The following facts are taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinion. Cadelia Louise Howard (defendant) appeals from the San Francisco Superior Court's order revoking her probation and ordering execution of a four-year prison sentence. The court imposed that sentence on October 25, 1994, but suspended its execution after defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). (The record is unclear whether the parties agreed to the four-year sentence as part of a plea bargain resulting in the dismissal of the remaining counts. It is undisputed, however, that defendant did not challenge the four-year sentence on appeal after the court originally imposed it. Following imposition of sentence, defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, but she did not question the validity of her sentence on appeal.) [16 Cal. 4th 1085]
Eric Murphy, who owned the beauty shop at 5273 Third Street that adjoined defendant's premises, testified that he, too, was playing pool with defendant when the police arrived. Murphy said defendant was holding a pool cue, and nothing else, in her hands when the police came in and handcuffed her. [16 Cal. 4th 1086]
[1a] Defendant does not contend the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings that she violated both the express and implied terms of her probation by being in possession of cocaine on the evening of April 14, 1995, and that further probation was not appropriate. Her only contentions on appeal are: (1) on revoking her probation, the trial court had discretionary authority to reduce her previously imposed, but suspended, four-year prison sentence to the mitigated term of three years (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); and (2) the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the mitigating factors she presented at the probation revocation [16 Cal. 4th 1087] hearing. Our rejection of defendant's initial contention disposes of her appeal.
The proper disposition of this case rests upon the important distinction, in probation cases, between orders suspending imposition of sentence and orders suspending execution of previously imposed sentences. We must also consider whether our decision in People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 335 [14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 842 P.2d 100] (Karaman) has blurred that distinction and expanded trial courts' sentencing authority in probation revocation cases involving suspended execution sentencing orders.
[2] If the trial court in 1994 had originally suspended imposition of sentence before placing defendant on probation, the court unquestionably would have had full sentencing discretion on revoking probation. When the trial court suspends imposition of sentence, no judgment is then pending against the probationer, who is subject only to the terms and conditions of the probation. (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 370, 386 [1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102]; Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal. 2d 864, 871 [338 P.2d 182].) The probation order is considered to be a final judgment only for the "limited purpose of taking an appeal therefrom." (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 793, 796 [114 Cal. Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636].) On the defendant's rearrest and revocation of her probation, "... the court may, if the sentence has been suspended, pronounce judgment for any time within the longest period for which the person might have been sentenced." (§ 1203.2, subd. (c); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 435(b)(1) ["If the imposition of sentence was previously suspended, the judge shall impose judgment and sentence" in accordance with circumstances existing at time probation was granted and other proper sentencing considerations]. fn. 2 )
Reflecting these principles, section 1203.2, subdivision (c), recites that following the defendant's rearrest, and on revocation and termination of [16 Cal. 4th 1088] probation, "if the judgment has been pronounced and the execution thereof has been suspended, the court may revoke the suspension and order that the judgment shall be in full force and effect." (Italics added; see also rule 435(b)(2) ["If the execution of sentence was previously suspended, the judge shall order that the judgment previously pronounced be in full force and effect and that the defendant be committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections for the term prescribed in that judgment."].)
Therefore, section 1203.2, subdivision (c), and rule 435(b)(2), by their terms, limit the court's power in situations in which the court chose to impose sentence but suspended its execution pending a term of probation. On revocation of probation, if the court previously had imposed sentence, the sentencing judge must order that exact sentence into effect (People v. Chagolla (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1050-1051 [199 Cal. Rptr. 181] (Chagolla); accord, People v. Colado (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th 260, 262-264 [38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57] (Colado)), subject to its possible recall under section 1170, subdivision (d), after defendant has been committed to custody.
In Karaman, we acknowledged a narrow exception to the general rule depriving the court of authority to modify a sentence once it has been imposed and entered in the clerk's minutes. (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 352.) We must now decide whether the Karaman exception is broad enough to apply to probation revocation cases, thereby essentially eliminating the primary distinction between suspended imposition and suspended execution sentencing. [16 Cal. 4th 1089]
We noted that generally a trial court lacks jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant after execution of sentence has begun. (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 344.) We also acknowledged that a judgment for imprisonment ordinarily is deemed executed when a certified copy of the minute order or abstract of judgment is "furnished to the officer whose duty it is to execute the probationary order or judgment ...." (§ 1213; see Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 344-345; In re Black (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 881, 890 [59 Cal. Rptr. 429, 428 P.2d 293].) We explained that courts have no jurisdiction to increase a sentence after its formal entry into the court minutes. (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 350; see also People v. McAllister (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 519, 526-527 [102 P.2d 1072].)
We found no authority, however, forbidding a court from reducing a sentence previously imposed but temporarily stayed, if the sentence had not yet been executed by delivery of a commitment order. (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 350.) We observed that a statute vests the sentencing court with similar, postcommitment authority, "within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion ... [to] recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence." (§ 1170, subd. (d).) We recognized that this section is an exception to the common law rule that the court loses resentencing jurisdiction when execution of sentence begins. (Karaman, [16 Cal. 4th 1090] supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 351-352; see Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 442, 455-456 [279 Cal. Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063].) But we also noted that, "As a practical matter, to require a trial judge (who desires to resentence a defendant whose sentence has been stayed) to delay resentencing until the actual commencement of the defendant's prison term generally would entail a considerable waste of time and expense." (Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 352.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the defendant's sentence, concluding that Karaman did not apply to a probation revocation. "Karaman [16 Cal. 4th 1091] had nothing to do with a grant of probation and a later revocation, but rather with the mechanics of a short stay of execution of an imposed commitment to state prison, and the time at which jurisdiction to modify such an imposed sentence is lost." (Colado, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) The Colado court observed that the sentence initially imposed in the case had become "final," both because the defendant had not appealed the original judgment that imposed the sentence, and because the trial court's jurisdiction to modify the sentence had also expired once the clerk entered the judgment in the court's minute book. (Ibid.)
In the present case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with Colado, supra, 32 Cal. App. 4th 260, and concluded that the trial court had discretion to reduce sentence in a suspended-execution probation-revocation situation. The court acknowledged that rule 435(b)(2) appears to require the trial court, on revoking probation, to impose the exact sentence previously imposed. But the court deemed that rule inconsistent with Karaman's conclusion that the trial court's jurisdiction continues after sentence is pronounced and entered in the court minutes, until the time the court issues and delivers a commitment document to prison authorities.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Karaman was not a probation revocation case, but the court assumed that we intended to apply our holding to those cases. The court also recognized that Karaman was dealing with [16 Cal. 4th 1092] a sentence that was only briefly stayed and was not yet final on appeal. In the Court of Appeal's view, however, Karaman controlled the present case despite the substantial passage of time following imposition of sentence because the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over defendant probationer in "matters of sentencing." The court relied in part on section 1203.3, subdivision (a), a provision giving the trial court authority to modify or change the order suspending imposition or execution of sentence.
[3] Grant of probation is, of course, qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or imprisonment. Probation is neither "punishment" (see § 15) nor a criminal "judgment" (see § 1445). Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency in lieu of punishment (cf. In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 68, 81 [8 Cal. 4th 727a, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 876 P.2d 519]), and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature (see People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 1091, 1097 [2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 820 P.2d 278]).
[1c] Unlike the situation in Karaman, to which common law rules applied regarding retention of sentencing jurisdiction over the defendant, the authority to grant probation and to suspend imposition or execution of sentence is wholly statutory. (§ 1203, subd. (a); see In re Oxidean (1961) 195 Cal. App. 2d 814, 817 [16 Cal. Rptr. 193].) During the probationary period, the court retains jurisdiction over the defendant (see Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 345; § 1203.2a), and at any time during that period the court may, subject to statutory restrictions, modify the order suspending imposition or execution of sentence (§ 1203.3). Therefore, unlike Karaman, the [16 Cal. 4th 1093] court had authority to reduce a previously imposed but suspended sentence at any time prior to defendant's rearrest.
Defendant argues that the same "waste of time and expense" rationale adopted in Karaman could be applied to the present situation-why should [16 Cal. 4th 1094] the sentencing court be required to wait until actual commitment before it exercises its resentencing option under section 1170, subdivision (d)? The obvious answer is that the Legislature has directed that in probation revocation situations any reduction of sentence must occur at the postcommitment stage.
[4] Defendant perceives a conflict between section 1203.2, subdivision (c), and rule 435(b). She focuses on the statute's language stating that the court, in suspended execution cases, "may revoke the suspension and order that the judgment shall be in full force and effect." (Italics added.) She argues that the statute, unlike rule 435(b), allows the court discretion whether or not to reduce sentence in these cases. We think defendant misreads the statute. In our view, section 1203.2, subdivision (c), merely gives the court discretion, on revocation and termination of probation, either (1) to revoke the suspension of sentence and commit the probationer to prison for the term prescribed in the suspended sentence, or (2) to decline to revoke the suspension or to order confinement. If the court does order a prison commitment, however, both section 1203.2, subdivision (c), and rule 435(b)(2) consistently set forth the rule that the previously suspended judgment shall "be in full force and effect." [16 Cal. 4th 1095]
I mention this only to indicate a hope that the Legislature may consider expanding the statutory sentencing function of trial courts in this area. [16 Cal. 4th 1096]
In October 1994, after defendant Cadelia Louise Howard had pleaded guilty to one count of transporting cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), the superior court sentenced her to four years in state prison but suspended execution of this sentence and granted her probation on certain terms and conditions. In April 1995, defendant was arrested for possessing .26 grams of cocaine. In July 1995, after finding that defendant had violated the terms and conditions of her probation, the superior court revoked probation and ordered execution of the four-year prison sentence. At this hearing, no one mentioned the possibility of reducing the four-year term. [16 Cal. 4th 1097]
The majority's construction of section 1170(d) serves no discernible legislative purpose and is inconsistent with this court's reasoning in People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 335 [14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 842 P.2d 100]. There, the superior court had pronounced a sentence imposing a term in state prison but had stayed the sentence for one week to allow the defendant to settle his affairs. After the stay expired, the superior court modified the judgment to impose a lesser term. The People appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked authority to modify the judgment. On review, this court rejected the People's argument.
Citing section 1170(d), this court stated that denying a superior court authority to mitigate punishment in this situation would be "inconsistent [16 Cal. 4th 1098] with the modern statutory sentencing scheme, under which the Legislature explicitly has granted trial courts jurisdiction to mitigate a state prison sentence even after execution of a sentence has commenced." (People v. Karaman, supra, 4 Cal. 4th 335, 351, original italics.) We further reasoned: "As a practical matter, to require a trial judge (who desires to resentence a defendant whose sentence has been stayed) to delay resentencing until the actual commencement of the defendant's prison term generally would entail a considerable waste of time and expense. The Legislature, although limiting the resentencing provisions of section 1170, subdivision (d), to the postcommitment situation, has not otherwise imposed any such requirement, and we likewise decline to do so." (Id. at p. 352.) This statement was followed immediately by our holding that "where the sentence is to a term of imprisonment, the trial court retains jurisdiction, during the period a stay is in effect and at any time prior to execution of the sentence, to reconsider the sentence and vacate it or impose any new sentence which is not greater than the initial sentence, just as it may do so on its own motion pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), within 120 days after the court has committed the defendant to the prison authorities." (Ibid.)
The logic of this court's decision in People v. Karaman, supra, 4 Cal. 4th 335, applies with equal force to sentence reduction after revocation of probation. As the Court of Appeal aptly observed in this case, if a superior court decides after probation revocation that an execution-suspended sentence should be reduced, the court should be permitted to make that sentence reduction immediately, while the defendant is present in court, because requiring the court to wait until the defendant has entered the prison system and actually begun to serve the sentence, and to then bring the defendant back into court for a resentencing hearing, will result in the same "considerable waste of time and expense" that this court deplored in Karaman. To avoid this unnecessary inefficiency, this court concluded in Karaman that a trial court had authority to reduce the prison term of a defendant who had been granted a brief stay of execution and had not yet begun to serve the term. Similarly, to avoid a "considerable waste of time and expense," I conclude that at a single hearing a superior court may both revoke a defendant's probation and exercise its section 1170(d) authority to reduce the term of an execution-suspended sentence.
The majority argues that Karaman addressed "a situation that no statute directly controlled" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1093), whereas the situation at issue here-probation revocation of a defendant with an execution-suspended sentence-is controlled by Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 1203.2(c)), and by rule 435(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court (hereafter rule 435(b)(2)). Contrary to the majority, neither [16 Cal. 4th 1099] section 1203.2(c) nor rule 435(b)(2) precludes the sentencing court from exercising its section 1170(d) authority at the time probation is revoked. In particular, nothing in either provision requires that the defendant actually enter the prison system and begin to serve the sentence before the sentencing court may exercise its section 1170(d) authority to resentence the defendant to a lesser term.
A court is required to give reasons for sentence choices when it imposes sentence in the first instance. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 406(b).) Presumably, the superior court in this case gave reasons for its sentence choices when it pronounced sentence, the execution of which the court then stayed for the purpose of granting probation. If the court's statement of reasons was [16 Cal. 4th 1100] incomplete or erroneous, defendant had an adequate remedy by appeal. When the court later revoked probation and ordered execution of the sentence it had previously imposed, the court expressed no dissatisfaction with the sentence choices it had previously made and previously explained. In this situation, no additional explanation of the basis for the sentence is needed.
As the majority and I both recognize, section 1170(d) is the source of the superior court's authority, following probation revocation, to mitigate punishment by reducing the term of imprisonment mandated by an execution-suspended sentence. But section 1170(d) specifies that the court is to exercise this authority only "on its own motion, or ... upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the Board of Prison Terms." Thus, the Legislature has not given criminal defendants standing to move for a reduction of their sentences under section 1170(d). (People v. Pritchett (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 190, 193 [24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391].) If a defendant does request sentence reduction under section 1170(d), the court's denial of the request is not an appealable order because it does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. (Pritchett, supra, at p. 194.) In view of these unusual attributes of the section 1170(d) sentence-reduction authority, it would be highly incongruous to require a court to give reasons for not exercising that authority at the time of probation revocation, and neither defendant nor the Court of Appeal has cited any authority supporting the imposition of such a requirement. I would hold that no such requirement exists.