Source: http://mo.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170705_0001216.EMO.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-08-18 10:56:56
Document Index: 26531415

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 1957', '§ 371', '§ 2255', '§851', '§ 851']

CARL ALEXANDER, Petitioner,
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Carl Alexander's Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [ECF No. 42]. In his Motion, Petitioner Carl Alexander (“Petitioner”) requests the Court grant early release pursuant to United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
In 2004, Petitioner was convicted of (1) Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine and Phencyclidine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; (2) Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) and 2; and (3) Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of 240 months.
Petitioner's appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on June 15, 2006. United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1143 (2007). Petitioner's Motion for Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence was denied May 20, 2009 [ECF No. 18]. His Application for a Certificate of Appealability was denied October 1, 2010 [ECF No. 33]. On July 18, 2012 Petitioner's Motion under Rule 60d)(3) Requesting the Courts Pre-existing Power to Set Aside a Judgment for Fraud was denied [ECF No. 41]. Petitioner has exhausted all other forms of relief in this matter, including a request for clemency, which was not granted by the President of the United States.
In his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b)(6) Motion, Petitioner asks “the government, in the spirit of fairness, to use its prosecution power to withdraw the §851 enhancement filed against him the morning of [his] trial” [ECF No. 42 at 4]. Petitioner relies on the “Holloway Doctrine” as justification to vacate and subsequently lower his previously imposed sentence [ECF No. 48 at 2]. He contends his case represents “the extraordinary circumstances that might warrant the extraordinary remedy crafted by Judge Gleeson” in United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). [ECF No. 42 at 3].
The Government responded to Petitioner's motion by claiming Rule 60(b)(6) vests wide discretion in courts, but it asserted “relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in ‘extraordinary circumstances'” [ECF No. 48 ¶ 5]. In the Holloway case, the Government argues resentencing occurred only because the Government consented to vacating two of defendant's convictions. In the present case, the Government has not given its consent to vacate any of Petitioner's convictions or his 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancements. The Government asserts there are no “extraordinary circumstances” supporting or justifying Petitioner's motion to vacate his sentence under Rule 60(b)(6) [ECF No. ¶ 10].
FRCP 60(b) sets out the legal mechanism for setting aside a Final Judgment as follows:
b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it ...