Source: https://m.openjurist.org/431/f2d/100
Timestamp: 2019-08-25 13:18:41
Document Index: 119449804

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1333', '§ 1316', '§ 146', '§ 688', '§ 146', '§ 1', '§ 395', '§ 395', '§ 51', '§ 435', '§ 328', '§ 611', 'Art. 5526', '§ 442']

431 F. 2d 100 - Watz v. Zapata off-Shore Company
431 F.2d 100
John M. WATZ, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ZAPATA OFF-SHORE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant,
EATON YALE & TOWNE, INC., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant,
CAMPBELL CHAIN COMPANY, Fourth-Party Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee.
Watz sustained his injuries on board a vessel afloat in navigable waters. The conduct of which he complains, however, occurred on land with no demonstrated relationship to maritime affairs other than its impact here on Watz. The Plymouth, 1866, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 20, 18 L.Ed. 125, affirmed for American courts the view that "the jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts depends upon locality". 18 L.Ed. at 127. There the Supreme Court dealt with the reverse of our case: the conduct occurred within admiralty jurisdiction, but the damages did not. A fire caused by negligence on board a ship in navigable waters had spread to a wharf and buildings. Although it might appear that admiralty should be concerned with such seaside conduct, the Court declared, "The negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action; it is damnum absque injuria". Since the damages had occurred on shore, the fact that the cause of the injury originated within admiralty jurisdiction, according to the Court, "affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction", "the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters". 18 L.Ed. at 128. Where the "substance and consummation of the wrong were on board the vessel", on the other hand, admiralty jurisdiction would attach.
In Grant Smith-Porter Ship Company v. Rohde, 1922, 257 U.S. 469, 42 S.Ct. 157, 66 L.Ed. 321, 324, the Court announced, "The general doctrine that, in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the transaction, and in tort matters upon the locality, has been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as settled". Several courts have found the conclusion inescapable that locality is the determining factor and that
it is not the place where the negligent acts occur that is all important, but rather the place where the tort occurs. ¶ A tort is deemed to occur not where the wrongful act or omission has its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission produces such injury as to give rise to a cause of action.
McCall v. Susquehanna Electric Company, D.Md. 1968, 278 F.Supp. 209, 211 (negligent operation of a dam, an extension of land, which resulted in the capsizing of a boat, held within jurisdiction).10 Perhaps most notable are the air disaster cases where courts have found admiralty jurisdiction because the airplane fortuitously crashed into the sea although the alleged negligence was shore-based. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 3 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 758, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940, 84 S.Ct. 343, 11 L.Ed.2d 271.
Certainly this case meets such a test. Although the negligence and breach of warranty charged against Eaton occurred on land and, at least so far as the proof shows, were not maritime-oriented activity, Watz sustained his injuries on board the NOLA III while it was afloat in navigable waters, the Sabine River. Our earlier conclusion that Zapata owed Watz no warranty of seaworthiness does not defeat admiralty jurisdiction. That related primarily to the responsibility of the shipowner. For example, it is generally accepted that an uncompleted vessel does not offer the warranty of seaworthiness, see, e. g., Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 4 Cir. 1942, 132 F.2d 634, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 746, 63 S.Ct. 1030, 87 L.Ed. 1702, yet the Supreme Court has held that admiralty jurisdiction attaches to a tort occurring on board such a vessel when in navigable waters. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Company v. Rohde, supra.
Commentators11 and some courts,12 however, have suggested that more than a mere locality test should be necessary to occasion admiralty jurisdiction. Insofar as the justification for admiralty jurisdiction is "the national interest in a uniform judicial supervision of the maritime industry",13 it does seem anomalous to premise exercise of that jurisdiction solely on the locale of the injury. The American Law Institute has recommended that the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, be amended to include the sentence, "Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction does not include a claim merely because it arose on navigable waters". ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State & Federal Courts, Admiralty & Maritime Jurisdiction § 1316(a), p. 34 (1969). In addition to their recommendation of a statutory amendment, however, the Reporters contend that judicially the question is still open, that the Supreme Court is not committed to the "locality alone" test. Id. at 232. They base this conclusion on two factors: (1) the Court's locality language has been used only in cases excluding admiralty jurisdiction; (2) in Atlantic Transport. Company of West Virginia v. Imbrovek, 1914, 234 U.S. 52, 62, 34 S.Ct. 733, 735, 58 L.Ed. 1208, 1213, the Court raised doubt as to the requirement by stating:
If more is required than the locality of the wrong in order to give the court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime service, to navigation and to commerce on navigable waters, was quite sufficient.
The tort in this case seems sufficiently related to maritime affairs and commerce to satisfy most demands.14 The mishap occurred to one repairing a ship in preparation for its return to active maritime service. In dealing with tortious activity it is common to focus on the injury in determining the relationship of a claim to a forum. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 146 comment e (proposed official draft 1968). Of course a thorough reweighing of the appropriate limits of admiralty jurisdiction would require analysis of data regarding the principal orientation of the ship repair and conversion industry to determine admiralty's interest in its regulation, see Black, supra, at 276, and might well raise questions concerning the appropriateness of admiralty jurisdiction over personal injuries. Id. at 278. It might indicate that state courts could adequately manage cases such as the case before us where the "culpable" conduct occurred away from the sea and navigable waters and where the conduct has no demonstrated orientation towards maritime affairs. On the other hand, it might show that uniform regulation by admiralty is necessary to protect workers in maritime-related activities.
In this case we are not furnished with either the data or the arguments so to rework the traditional bounds of admiralty jurisdiction. And although the ALI Reporters may be accurate in their measure of the Supreme Court's commitment to "locality alone",15 the language of its decisions leaves us less room to manoeuvre. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Company v. Rohde (post-Imbrovek) stated:
Construing the first question as meaning to inquire whether the general admiralty jurisdiction extends to a proceeding to recover damages resulting from a tort committed on a vessel in process of construction when lying on navigable waters within a state, we answer yes.
257 U.S. at 477-478, 42 S.Ct. at 159, 66 L.Ed. at 325 — this despite the fact that "neither Rohde's general employment, nor his activities at the time, had any direct relation to navigation or commerce". 257 U.S. at 476, 42 S.Ct. at 158, 66 L.Ed. at 324.
We conclude that the district court had admiralty jurisdiction of Watz's complaint against Eaton. The Texas statute of limitations therefore does not apply. Instead, we look to the analogous limitations period of the Jones Act, which is three years. 46 U.S.C. § 688; Flowers v. Savannah Machine & Foundry Company, 5 Cir. 1962, 310 F. 2d 135. Since the action was brought after this statute had run, Watz bears the burden of proof with regard to the two elements counteracting a laches defense: excuse for the delay and lack of prejudice to the defendant. McMahon v. Pan American World Airways, 5 Cir. 1962, 297 F.2d 268, 270.
That no harm having been shown by reason of the delay for filing the plaintiff's cause of action and by reason that he did not prevent one witness or any evidence from being heard and by reason of the fact that all the defendants, Zapata Off-Shore Company and Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc., had notice within a matter of months after the occurrence that the doctrine of laches or limitations does not apply.
Travelers Insurance Company, carrier for both Zapata and Levingston, notified Eaton and its insurance company of the chain's failure on April 25, 1960. Eaton had notice by August 1961 that a claim might be asserted against it. Travelers furnished Eaton the hoist and chain without the defective link in July 1961. Although Eaton did not obtain the defective link until one week before trial, the testimony indicates that apparently it made no attempt to do so. We cannot term the district court's findings of no prejudice clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.
The district court, however, made no finding regarding excuse for the delay in bringing suit. In Watz's brief on appeal, he points to no evidence of such excuse except to say that the payment of compensation benefits encourages delay.
Three cases more recent than McMahon v. Pan American World Airways, however, have modified the importance of proving of an excuse for delay. In Molnar v. Gulfcoast Transit, 5 Cir. 1967, 371 F.2d 639, 642, this Court declared that "[a]lthough frequently classified as a separate element, the inexcusability of the delay is closely intertwined with the predominant factor of detriment or lack of detriment, and what is a thin excuse may turn out to be bearable because no harm is suffered" (citations omitted). Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 5 Cir. 1965, 344 F.2d 217, 220, held that unexcused delay without prejudice would not bar a suit. Crews v. Arundel Corporation, 5 Cir. 1967, 386 F.2d 528, 530, concluded that it was settled that "claims based on unseaworthiness are barred only if the delay in filing the libel beyond the three-year Jones Act limitation period is inexcusable and if the delay has prejudiced the defense of the suit" (emphasis original). Since proof of either absence of prejudice or excuse for delay will repel a claim of laches, we conclude that the absence of prejudice in this case justifies the district court's decision not to dismiss the suit for laches.
We proceed now to the substantive claims. Watz and Eaton couch their respective contentions primarily in terms of Texas law. Campbell advances Pennsylvania law in its brief. Traditionally, courts apply general principles of maritime law in cases subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Insofar as admiralty jurisdiction depends on locality, however, conflicts principles indicate that the conclusion need not inevitably follow. Although principles of negligence and legal cause are often approached in a general common law fashion in many American jurisdictions, we think it appropriate to indicate more specifically the factors that guide us here — in terms of what body of law applies and what that law is.
Conflicts principles suggest that "[i]n an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties * *" Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 146 (proposed off. draft 1968) (emphasis supplied). Where the tortious conduct and the injury occur in different jurisdictions, "the local law of the state of injury will usually be applied to determine most issues involving the tort". Id., Comment e, at p. 146. By analogy, admiralty principles apply to this action seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained on board a ship in navigable waters. On this reasoning then, we find Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 1959, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, applicable. There, where both the injury and the tortious conduct occurred on board ship, the Supreme Court ruled that the legal rights and liabilities were "measurable by the standards of maritime law". By the same token, that conclusion might be different should we find a significant policy of Texas — within whose boundaries the injury occurred — or of Pennsylvania — within whose boundaries the chain and hoist were respectively made and assembled — that would be frustrated by such an application.
Admiralty precedent lends partial support to these concerns of conflicts law. In Just v. Chambers, 1941, 312 U.S. 383, 390, 61 S.Ct. 687, 692, 85 L.Ed. 903, 908, the Supreme Court observed that "the maritime law was not a complete and perfect system and that in all maritime countries there is a considerable body of municipal law that underlies the maritime law as the basis of its administration". Enlarging on this point, the court in The S.S. Samovar, N.D. Calif.1947, 72 F.Supp. 574, 584, said:
As stated by the Supreme Court in the latest of these cases: "With respect to maritime torts * * * the State may modify or supplement the maritime law by creating liability which a court of admiralty will recognize and enforce when * * * not hostile to the characteristic features of the maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation." [citing Just v. Chambers]
By the same token, where the common law of a state in whose territorial waters a maritime tort occurs has been modified or supplemented so as to impose on manufacturers or builders a duty of care to persons not "in privity", a court of admiralty should recognize that duty and enforce the liability proximately resulting from a breach thereof, if adoption of the state rule "works no material prejudice to * * * maritime law."
We proceed first to discover what the maritime principles are. The source of substantive American admiralty law originally was the general maritime corpus that had grown up among the commercial nations. As time progressed, however, litigated problems narrowed to more peculiarly national issues. G. Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 1-16, pp. 41-42 (1957). Admiralty courts have felt free to cull what they considered the best principles from the decisions of various courts and from treatise and textwriters. See, e. g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Company, 2 Cir. 1964, 338 F.2d 708, cert. denied, Continental Grain Co. v. City of Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944, 85 S.Ct. 1026, 13 L.Ed.2d 963 (Friendly, J., taking from "all manner of `respectable' authority, Bohlen, Prosser, Seavey, and cases from California, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, not to mention English cases. Some are maritime and some are not. In the end, the rule applied is substantially the common law rule". J. P. Lucas, Admiralty: Cases & Materials, 328 (1969)). Thus, in Kermarec, the Supreme Court declared that the standard of care for a shipowner "must be decided in the performance of the Court's function in declaring the general maritime law, free from inappropriate common-law concepts". In fulfilling that function, the Supreme Court rejected the "semantic morass" of the common law and its "conceptual distinctions" "foreign to [admiralty's] traditions of simplicity and practicality". 358 U.S. at 630, 631, 79 S.Ct. at 410, 3 L.Ed.2d at 554, 555.
Although the process has afforded reasonably definable standards for shipowners, seamen, and others related to maritime contracts, the standards for a case such as ours are difficult "because cases brought in admiralty in which neither party is a shipowner or in some way related to a maritime contract are very rare".16 Lucas at 328. Perhaps one of the reasons is that an action for unseaworthiness against a shipowner appeals to plaintiffs since negligence need not be proved. 54 Geo.L.J. 1439 n. 2 (1966). On the other hand, some generally applicable principles have emerged. Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R., 2 Cir. 1932, 61 F.2d 767, 770, for example, incorporated into admiralty the doctrine of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 1928, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, that a tortfeasor was not chargeable for consequences to those to whom he owed no duty. Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Company, 3 Cir. 1945, 149 F.2d 98, aff'd, 1946, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099, adopted the principle of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 1916, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, and the Restatement of Torts § 395 (1934) disposing of privity.
The first question we deal with is the standard of care. With regard to Watz's claim against Eaton, the district court found that
[t]he chain hoist, after assembly, was tested by Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company and was found to be capable of lifting weights of one and one-half times its rated capacity, expressed in long tons, or 3360 pounds. Other tests, such as radiographic testing, ultra-sonic testing, dye-check testing, and magnafluxing testing could have revealed the imperfect weld. That the only test of the load chain and hoist sold by Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company was a straight lifting load test of one and one-half tons dead weight, and such test was not sufficient to reveal the defective weld in the link that failed.
That the link of the chain which was broken, broke above the hook of the chain hoist. That a one ton Yale & Towne Load King hand hoist is a dangerous object when a defect exists such as the defect in the link of chain, and resulted in an unreasonable risk by producing substantial bodily harm when used in the manner intended.
This case is in many respects similar to Sieracki as it was treated in the lower courts. In Sieracki a longshoreman sued the shipowner for unseaworthiness of the vessel. The shipowner impleaded two third-party defendants and the longshoreman thereupon amended his complaint to include a claim against them as well. These defendants were respectively the shipbuilder and the installer of a ten-ton boom and tackle. The boom and tackle had injured the longshoreman when the shackle supporting it broke. The third-party defendants contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish their negligence. They had purchased the shackle from another company (which in turn had purchased it from still another company). The third-party defendants also contended that they had taken off customary safeguards. But the Third Circuit concluded that "even if they had, that would not necessarily excuse them for while usage is relevant in determining whether reasonable care is exercised it is not conclusive in (with one or two exceptions) establishing compliance with the legal standard". 149 F.2d at 100. As the district court did here, the Third Circuit noted that the shackle had been subjected only to a lifting test, and that an x-ray or a tapping test would have disclosed the defect. "This conclusion, as would be expected, was not received with enthusiasm by the [third-party defendants]. Nevertheless, we think it is sound." Id.
Like the third-party defendants in Sieracki, Eaton does not receive the district court's conclusions here with enthusiasm. It argues that it did sufficiently test the chain: "(a) random samples of the chain were tested and pulled to destruction; (b) each chain was cut and visually inspected before it was installed on the chain hoist; and finally (c) each chain and chain hoist were then tested to see if the chain and chain hoist could hold 3360 pounds. * * *" Furthermore, Eaton contends that the evidence shows that other tests were too expensive or not reliable. But in all this Eaton faces the significant obstacle of showing the district court's findings to have been clearly erroneous. Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. There was specific expert testimony that other tests would have revealed a defective weld and that such tests are customarily used in the industry. We conclude that the district court's finding that sufficient care had not been used is not clearly erroneous. The standard of care violated by Eaton would not in this case vary if we applied the law of one of the states. And of course MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company extended the remedy for negligence beyond the immediate purchaser of a chattel. That case has become "so widely accepted as to be construed as a part of the general law of torts, maritime as well as common law". Sieracki, 149 F.2d at 100. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965). Watz therefore has a remedy against Eaton in admiralty. Furthermore, we agree with the Third Circuit in Sieracki that purchase of a component part from another source does not relieve a defendant from his liability as manufacturer.
Eaton contends, however, that the chain link was not defective. Partly this argument goes to the evidence and partly it goes to the question of legal cause. Eaton maintains that even if it be true that the link was only 42.6 percent fused, that factor did not produce the mishap and injury. It bases its argument on evidence that other links sustained their loads even when cut sixty percent through the weld, and on the district court's finding that the "imperfection in the weld would not have caused the accident but for the accompanying damage and injury to the chain caused by the external forces". There is ample evidence, however, to sustain the district court's conclusion that the defective weld contributed to the failure of the chain in this instance.
With regard to legal cause, Eaton argues that the abuse to which the hoist was subjected constituted a "new and independent cause, breaking the link of causation" and was not foreseeable. The district court found
That the worn place caused by external damage in the link which failed contributed to cause the failure of the link at the time of plaintiff's injury, but the failure at the time of plaintiff's injury would not have occurred but for the defective weld in the link of the load chain.
Prosser writes of such circumstances:
On its face, the problem is one of whether the defendant is to be held liable for an injury to which he has in fact made a substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of independent origin, for which he is not responsible. In its essence, however, it becomes again a question of the extent of the defendant's original obligation; and once more, the problem is not one of causation at all, since it does not arise until causation is established. It is rather one of the policy as to imposing legal responsibility. * * *
In general, this has been determined by asking whether the intervention or the later cause is a significant part of the risk involved in the defendant's conduct, or is so reasonably connected with it that the responsibility should not be terminated. It is therefore said that the defendant is to be held liable if, but only if, the intervening cause is "foreseeable."
Prosser on Torts, 3d ed. 1964, § 51, at 309-11. To deal with Eaton's argument, then, we should have to decide whether the abuse to which the hoist was subjected was foreseeable. On occasion, we have required a defendant to contemplate the future negligence of others. See, e. g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge, 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 684; Prosser at 313. But we cannot tell from this record whether hoistmakers can expect their hoists to be subjected to the abuse shown here.
It is not always necessary, however, to find intervening conduct specifically foreseeable. Courts have held tortfeasors responsible when their conduct threatens a particular sort of result and an unanticipated force intervenes to produce that result. Prosser at 326. Here, despite Eaton's protestations as to the carrying capacity of a 42.6 percent fused link, there was testimony that such a link was dangerous, increasing the likelihood of failure of the link, and that a prudent manufacturer would discard the link as unsafe and unsuitable for lifting a weight of up to 2000 pounds (the capacity of the hoist). Thus, the danger created by Eaton's conduct was the likelihood that this link would fail in lifting weights within the hoist's capacity. It did fail in just such a manner and the result was thus within the scope of Eaton's negligence.
This concept has already been incorporated into admiralty. In Kinsman Transit, Judge Friendly wrote:
We would find it difficult to understand why one who had failed to use the care required to protect others in the light of expectable forces should be exonerated when the very risks that rendered his conduct negligent produced other and more serious consequences to such persons than were fairly foreseeable when he fell short of what the law demanded.
338 F.2d at 723-724.17 The Restatement provides that "[i]f the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of that harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable". Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(1) (1965). Perhaps this principle has not previously been stated so specifically in admiralty.18 But in our view, Eaton's negligence is established, and we consider that the risk it created encompassed the sort of injury that occurred. We therefore do not impose on Eaton after-the-fact standards for its primary conduct. Finally, we see no significant policies of other states to be frustrated by this result.
We would reach the same result, moreover, by applying Texas law, the state in which this accident occurred. In Biggers v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 1957, 157 Tex. 351, 303 S.W.2d 359, 365, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed its rule that a tortfeasor "should have anticipated the danger to others created by his negligent act, and the rule does not require that he anticipate just how injuries will grow out of that dangerous situation". (Quoting from Sullivan v. Flores, 134 Tex. 55, 132 S.W.2d 110, 111). In Biggers, the tortfeasor was driving a bus at an excessive rate of speed in its own lane of traffic. An automobile proceeding in the opposite direction negligently knocked another automobile into the path of the bus. In the absence of either of the two factors, the accident would not have occurred. But the Texas Supreme Court concluded that "[i]f negligent and excessive speed [of the bus] proximately contributed to cause the collision it is immaterial to [its] liability that the negligence of [the negligent automobile driver] also contributed thereto or that such concurring cause may not have been reasonably foreseeable. It is a sufficient predicate of liability that the excessive speed of the bus was a substantial factor in bringing about the collision". 303 S.W.2d at 367 (citations omitted).19
Because we conclude that the district court properly held Eaton liable on the basis of its negligence we do not reach the issue of what warranty it owed Watz with respect to its hoist.20
Eaton v. Campbell
On the fourth-party complaint of Eaton against Campbell we confront first a jurisdictional challenge. Campbell maintains that "the fourth party complaint, predicated on theories of negligence and breach of implied warranty arising out a sale taking place in the State of Pennsylvania, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court".
Rule 14(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that "[w]hen a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party plaintiff may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences". In this case, Watz has asserted an admiralty claim under Rule 9(h) against Eaton and Eaton has brought in Campbell. Campbell's liability, if proved, arises out of the same occurrence as Eaton's: the injury to Watz on board the NOLA III.
Campbell bases its contention that jurisdiction does not exist on cases holding that Rule 14(c) carries forward the judicially-imposed requirement of Admiralty Rule 56 that a third-party action be maritime in character and that ancillary jurisdiction alone will not suffice. See, e. g., McCann v. Falgout Boat Company, S.D.Tex.1968, 44 F.R.D. 34. Without expressing any view on the correctness of a decision such as McCann, we note that the third-party complaint there was distinctly not maritime. In McCann, a seaman sued the shipowner for an injury sustained on board a ship. The shipowner impleaded the doctor who had later treated the injury in San Antonio, Texas, for negligence and malpractice in treatment of the injury. Using a locality test, the district court found that no admiralty jurisdiction existed over the impleader because the medical malpractice tort arose solely in San Antonio. In our case, on the other hand, the consequence of Campbell's conduct was injury on board the NOLA III. The same reasoning that led us to conclude that admiralty jurisdiction existed over Watz's claim against Eaton sustains admiralty jurisdiction over Eaton's claim against Campbell. And since the district court had admiralty jurisdiction, Campbell's claim to a jury trial was properly denied.
Campbell raises another threshold contention: that Eaton's action is barred by laches.21 In this regard, the district court found:
Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company was notified of the failure of the chain hoist in question on or about April 25, 1960, and received notice by August of 1961 that claim might be asserted against them by reason of the failure of the chain hoist. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company did not give notice of any kind [to] Campbell Chain Company until on or about the 22nd day of April 1968.
At the time Eaton Yale & Towne, Inc. gave notice to Campbell Chain Company, the records of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company with respect to the purchase of the chain had been destroyed in the ordinary course of business and no invoices or other records concerning such purchase were available. Likewise, at such time, the records of Campbell Chain Company with respect to the sale of the chain to Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company had been destroyed, as well as the specific inspections of chain sold in 1957, as well as detailed records with reference to the manufacture of the chain or any unusual incidents which might have occurred during the course of such manufacture.
These findings of fact suggest that the district court intended to hold that Campbell had sustained its defense of laches on Eaton's part. Yet although the district court found specifically that Zapata and Eaton had failed in their laches defenses, it made no finding with regard to Campbell and instead awarded Eaton recovery against Campbell. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the district court had approved a pre-trial stipulation by Eaton and Campbell that all issues with respect to Campbell's claim of "delayed notice, laches and limitations, and the effect thereof" would be postponed until after the trial of the other issues and that the district court would fix a date for taking relevant evidence when the "issues become material and decision required thereon".
We conclude in this context that we can make no decision on the question of laches. We vacate the district court's order of recovery against Campbell and remand for further proceedings. Unless the district court should find the parties waived the right to a hearing on these issues, they should be permitted to develop the evidence before the court.
Not knowing what will develop on the laches defense, however, we shall deal with the other issues in Eaton's claim against Campbell while the case is here.
The district court made the conclusion of law that "[t]he load chain was negligently manufactured. * * * Such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and damages". The parties have construed this finding as directed to negligence on the part of Campbell.
Thus the negligence found against Campbell differs to some extent from that found against Eaton. The district court found that Eaton "was negligent in failing to perform other tests which would have revealed the defective weld. * * *" No such specific finding was made with regard to Campbell. The pertinent factual findings with regard to Eaton and Campbell are contained in the same paragraph:
The chain and link in question were tested by Campbell Chain Company and found to be capable of bearing weights in excess of 8500 pounds. The rated capacity of the chain hoist was 2000 pounds. The chain hoist after assembly, was tested by Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company and was found to be capable of lifting weights of one and one-half times its rated capacity, expressed in long tons, or 3360 pounds. Other tests, such as radiographic testing, ultra-sonic testing, dye-check testing, and magnafluxing testing could have revealed the imperfect weld. That the only test of the load chain and hoist sold by Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company was a straight lifting load test of one and one-half tons dead weight, and such test was not sufficient to reveal the defective weld in the link that failed.
The apparent explanation for the district court's failure to make specific findings on the number of tests performed by Campbell and the adequacy of its tests is the court's finding, already quoted, that Campbell had destroyed the relevant records in the ordinary course of business. In other words, specific evidence of the sort relating to Eaton was not available regarding Campbell's procedures.22
Evidence did show and the district court did find, however, that the original weld on the link in question was defective. We have already approved the court's finding of a substantial connection between that defect and Watz's injuries. It is Campbell's argument, however, that no evidence shows in what manner Campbell was negligent either in its manufacturing or testing processes.
Certainly Eaton bore the burden of proof to show Campbell's negligence. But once it was proved that a defective weld had occurred during the manufacture of the chain by Campbell, we believe that the district court sitting as a finder of fact could reasonably infer negligence from that circumstantial evidence. Campbell objects that the pleadings and evidence did not specifically raise the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the district court did not refer to it. The evidence credibly established that responsible chain manufacturers attempt to avoid defective welds in the knowledge that they are dangerous. The finder of fact could reasonably infer that a defective weld would ordinarily not occur in the absence of negligence. We see no reason to invoke the Latin phrase here. We simply apply a rule of circumstantial evidence, not changing the burden of proof or casting presumptions against the defendant. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D & Comment (1965). For that matter, in viewing the district court's order as a whole, we think its finding that certain tests would have revealed a defective weld supports its conclusion of Campbell's negligence.
Our conclusion that Eaton's negligence was a legal cause of Watz's injury was based on the defective link's role in the mishap. Since we affirm the district court's finding that Campbell was negligent, we may also conclude that Campbell's negligence was a legal cause of Watz's injuries unless Campbell owed no duty to Watz or Eaton's negligence exonerates it. We believe that Watz was within the scope of the risk of Campbell's conduct. In the sense of foreseeability, a chain manufacturer selling chain to a hoistmaker must be held to knowing that one danger resulting from a negligently made chain is that it will break on the hoist thus dropping its load to the damage of the load and to the injury of anyone beneath it. Thus, Palsgraf, adopted into admiralty by Sinram, does not foreclose Campbell's liability. Our earlier discussion of legal cause disposes of any idea that Eaton's negligence should cure Campbell's.
Because we agree with the district court that on the evidence Campbell was negligent and that it thereby caused Watz's injury, we do not reach the issues whether it breached a warranty of reasonable fitness, whether such a warranty exists in admiralty, and if so to whom it extends, or the effect of the specifications on any such warranty.
We turn finally to the contribution and indemnity claim of Eaton against Campbell. Since we have concluded that both Eaton and Campbell were negligent, we have a case of joint tortfeasors. This Court has already held that the apparent prohibition of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corporation, 1952, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318, against contribution between joint tortfeasors in admiralty does not apply to a situation where Watz as plaintiff could have proceeded against both Eaton and Campbell and could have recovered damages from both. Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E. Dyer, 5 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 1131 [No. 28,706]. Halcyon is distinguished by the fact that there a statute precluded recovery by the plaintiff against the impleaded party.23 With Halcyon inapplicable, we agree with the district court that contribution was proper here. But Eaton argues for complete indemnity. It contends that its own negligence in failing to perform sufficient tests was passive whereas Campbell's negligence in manufacturing a defective chain was active.
We are hard put to label Eaton's negligence passive. The active-passive distinction, when made, usually contrasts the conduct of one who simply had custody of the cause of injury and failed to discover the danger created by another. But Eaton did not simply fail to discover a defect in Campbell's product. Here, as the district court found, Eaton constructed a hand hoist of which the chain was a component part. Eaton had an affirmative duty safely to manufacture the hoist, and the hoist included the chain. As the district court found, "a one ton Yale & Towne Load King hand hoist is a dangerous object when a defect exists such as the defect in the link of chain". Eaton's negligence was not simply its failure to perform sufficient tests, but "in placing in trade and commerce the hoist with load chain attached with the defective weld" (emphasis supplied). Consequently, the district court properly denied the claim of complete indemnity. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge, 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 684.
Roper involved a "mothballed" Liberty ship. "[H]er supplies, stores, nautical instruments, cargo gear and tackle were removed; her pipes and machinery were drained and prepared for storage; and her rudder, tail shaft and propeller were secured." Both her Coast Guard safety certificate and her license to operate had been withdrawn. In 1954, however, the Government decided to use some of the Liberty ship's holds for grain storage. The vessels were towed to loading facilities, filled with grain, and returned to the deactivated fleet. Then in 1956, this particular vessel was towed back to the loading facility and unloaded. Roper, an employee of Continental Grain, sustained injury during the unloading operations from a defective part of Continental's unloading equipment. The Supreme Court viewed the issue whether the ship was in navigation as a question of fact and refused to overrule the trial court's finding that it was out of navigation
InLawlor, the vessel was undergoing an annual overhaul. She had been in dry-dock but was moored in navigable waters at the time the accident occurred. Electric power and water were supplied from shore. A full crew of officers and men were aboard performing seamen's duties. No major or substantial changes or repairs had been required, and the shipowner was in general control of the vessel although the shipyard had control of the particular repair area where the mishap occurred. The Second Circuit found that Lawlor was protected by the warranty of seaworthiness.
InMoye, the shipyard had exclusive control of a barge. No representative of the owner nor crew was present. Although no major repairs or structural changes were involved, the barge required drydocking for repairs in its side and deckplating and hatch covers. We concluded that it owed no warranty of seaworthiness.
TheWest Court buttressed its conclusion by emphasizing that there was no uncertainty regarding the status of the ship. The vessel,
as anyone could see, was not in maritime service. She was undergoing major repairs and complete renovation, as the petitioner knew. Furthermore, he took his orders from the contractor, not the shipowner. He knew who was in control. This undertaking was not "ship's work" but a complete overhaul of such nature, magnitude, and importance as to require the vessel to be turned over to a ship repair contractor and docked at its pier for the sole purpose of making her seaworthy. It would be an unfair contradiction to say that the owner held the vessel out as seaworthy in such a case.
361 U.S. at 122, 80 S.Ct. at 192, 4 L.Ed. 2d at 165 (emphasis supplied).
For cases considered outside the bounds of the historical limits see Comment, Seamen & the Warranty of Seaworthiness in Maritime Injuries — Sieracki Today, 34 Tulane L.Rev. 572, 578-85 (1960)
Some commentators findRoper even more of a retreat. See, e. g., H. R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court § 611, at p. 174 (2d ed.1969); Comment, A New Look at the Unseaworthiness Doctrine: The Roper Case, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 519 (1962).
The position does find support inSieracki, however, for the Sieracki Court justified its extension of the warranty to longshoremen on the grounds that "[h]istorically the work of loading and unloading is the work of the ship's service, performed until recent times by members of the crew". 328 U.S. at 96, 66 S.Ct. at 878, 90 L.Ed. at 1107. "[T]he owner should not be free to nullify [the liability] by parcelling out his operations to intermediary employers whose sole business is to take over portions of the ship's work or by other devices which would strip the men performing its service of their historic protection." 328 U.S. at 95, 66 S.Ct. at 877, 90 L.Ed. at 1106. We too have said that "the limiting factor of tradition * * * requires that the injured shore-based worker be engaged in work traditionally that of a seaman, excluding those persons performing such tasks as making major repairs requiring drydocking or special skills". Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 5 Cir., 1969, 411 F.2d 279, 282 Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846, 90 S. Ct. 105, 24 L.Ed.2d 96. (Citations omitted).
Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, & the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cornell L.Q. 381 (1954), seriously attacks the Sieracki Court's reading of history. But West appears simply to take the Sieracki history as it stands.
This Circuit appears to have developed another doctrine with regard to repair contracts that would also exempt Zapata. Patterson v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 5 Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 883 states that the owner's warranty of seaworthiness does not extend to noncrew members regarding transitory conditions created by an outside repair crew during the course of substantial repairs to an existing unseaworthy condition when the transitory condition relates to the subject matter of the repair contractSee also Parker v. Cargill, 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 772. We think it preferable, however, to rely here on West's broader principles directing attention to the status of the ship, the extent of the work, and the pattern of the repairs.
Art. 5526, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stat
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 3 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 758, 765 (airplane crash into sea because of negligence in inspection and maintenance on land is within admiralty jurisdiction); Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir. 1933, 64 F.2d 201, cert. denied, 1933, 289 U.S. 751, 53 S.Ct. 695, 77 L.Ed. 1496 (blowing of automobile horn on land causing damage to barge when tug believed horn to be fog signalsheld, within admiralty jurisdiction); Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Burke, 5 Cir. 1933, 62 F.2d 1015 (negligently maintained telegraph wires not in or covered by navigable waters damaged ship's smokestack; held, within admiralty jurisdiction).
See, e. g., 1 Benedict, Admiralty 350-51 (6 Knauth ed. 1940). Other commentators are mentioned in ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State & Federal Courts, p. 232 (1969).
See, e. g., Smith v. Guerrant, S.D.Tex. 1968, 290 F.Supp. 111, noted in 44 Tulane L.Rev. 166 (1969); Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 6 Cir. 1967, 385 F.2d 962; Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc., D.Md. 1965, 255 F.Supp. 555; McGuire v. City of New York, S.D.N.Y. 1961, 192 F.Supp. 866.
Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique & Suggestions, 50 Colum.L.Rev. 259, 261 (1950)
Those cases which have demanded some maritime connection see note 12supra, have demanded only a minimum. They have refused to assume admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving swimmers, a person falling off a dock, a crane breaking and dropping a lift-truck into the water.
The apparent fact that "locality alone" has been used only to exclude admiralty jurisdiction is not particularly persuasive, since exclusion of admiralty jurisdiction on that basis seems no more sensible than its extensionSee, e.g., Swain, Yes, Virginia, There is an Admiralty: The Rodrique Case, 16 Loyola L.Rev. 43, 46 (1969); ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction, supra, at p. 230. And Imbrovek's invitation to doubt the test of locality alone seems qualified by Rohde.
Of three analogous cases which we have discovered, only one refers to the problem. In Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, a long-shoreman was injured on board ship when he stepped through the packaging of a bundle of doors. He sued the shipowner and the manufacturer of the doors. In that case's long journey through a Ninth Circuit three-judge panel (opinion and dissent), 9 Cir. 1966, A.M.C. 1081, en banc (opinion and dissent), 369 F.2d 324, the Supreme Court (per curiam vacating of the judgment), 1967, 388 U.S. 459, 87 S.Ct. 2115, 18 L.Ed.2d 1319, two law review comments, 66 Colum.L.Rev. 1190 (1961); 54 Geo.L.J. 1439 (1960) and remand 390 F.2d 353, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858, 89 S.Ct. 126, 21 L.Ed.2d 127, the issue was not mentioned. Nor was the issue framed specifically in terms of what admiralty law said. The case appears to have proceeded on undifferentiated common law principles
In McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 1952, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463, a longshoreman was injured by carbon tetrachloride fumes in a ship's hold. He sued the vessel's bareboat charterer and Dow Chemical, the manufacturer and shipper of the carbon tetrachloride. In discussing Dow's negligence, the court made no reference specifically to maritime or any other law.
But in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, D.Me.1947, 69 F.Supp. 609, a shipyard sued the manufacturer of a boom block for damage caused to its property when the block broke. Concluding that a maritime tort had occurred, the district court said "that the applicable principles of the law involved are a part of the general law of torts, maritime as well as common law".
Ours is not the tenuous relationship thatKinsman Transit admitted might be excluded. 338 F.2d at 725.
Butcf. Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E. Dyer, 5 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 1131 [No. 28,706]:
Moreover, in determining causation in maritime matters, the applicability of such doctrines as last clear chance and the interruption of negligence by a subsequent intervening negligence is questionable. "[T]he maritime court has been less ready than the shore courts to find that a subsequent wrongful act by one party breaks the chain of causation connecting the accident with the prior negligence of the other party." Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, p. 404 (1957). See also Commercial Transport. Corp. v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 7 Cir. 1967, 374 F.2d 813, 817.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B (1965):
Comment b, at p. 470:
This is to say that any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor has created or increased the recognizable risk, is always "proximate," no matter how it is brought about, except where there is * * * intentionally tortious or criminal intervention, and it is not within the scope of the risk created by the original negligent conduct.
Compare Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 6 Cir. 1969, 416 F.2d 217 with Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., D.Del. 1962, 204 F.Supp. 929; See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., S.D.N.Y. 1964, 231 F.Supp. 447; McCune, Maritime Products Liability, 18 Hastings L.J. 831 (1967).
Campbell also argues that the Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations bars Eaton's action. Since we have found admiralty jurisdiction, however, laches is the applicable standardSee text, part III, supra.
Prejudice, if any, deriving from this factor should more properly be considered on Campbell's laches defense
To the extent that Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 5 Cir. 1956, 230 F.2d 346, 354, cert. denied, Gulf Refining Co. v. Black Warrior Towing Co., 352 U.S. 832, 77 S.Ct. 49, 1 L.Ed.2d 52, is inconsistent with this result, we must treat it as controlled byHorton & Horton.