Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/600/1003/231178/
Timestamp: 2013-06-19 05:07:52
Document Index: 147725883

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 623', '§ 623', '§ 626', '§ 860', '§ 11', '§ 260', '§ 11', '§ 260', '§ 14', '§ 1988', '§ 216', '§ 12']

600 F.2d 1003: 20 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 29, 20 Empl. Prac.dec. P 30,028frank L. Loeb, Plaintiff, v. Textron, Inc., et al., Defendants :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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600 F.2d 1003: 20 Fair Empl.prac.cas. 29, 20 Empl. Prac.dec. P 30,028frank L. Loeb, Plaintiff, v. Textron, Inc., et al., DefendantsUnited States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. - 600 F.2d 1003
Argued Nov. 8, 1978.Decided June 21, 1979
3 Other courts have, to one extent or another, used the McDonnell Douglas analysis in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Hughes v. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 585 F.2d 918, 919 n.1 (8th Cir. 1978); Kentroti v. Frontier Air Lines, 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2254, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F.Supp. 715, 723 (E.D.N.Y.1978); Cf. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (McDonnell Douglas standards may be applied to age discrimination cases but not automatically)
4 This case does not involve an explicit age requirement, and does not raise any issues of the burden of proof when an employer asserts that age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" under 29 U.S.C. § 623
5 Although the employer has a burden of production rather than of persuasion, "The employer's defense must . . . be designed to meet the prima facie case . . .," International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 n.46, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), and must be sufficient, on its face, to "rebut" or "dispel" the inference of discrimination that arises from proof of the prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23, 97 S.Ct. 1843. A passing reference by just one of many witnesses to some deficiency in the plaintiff's job rating, for example, would be insufficient. Nor would it be enough to offer vague, general averments of good faith a plaintiff cannot be expected to disprove a defendant's reasons unless they have been articulated with some specificity. Cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (averments of good faith in individual selections cannot dispel prima facie case of systematic discrimination)
6 While an employer's judgment or course of action may seem poor or erroneous to outsiders, the relevant question is simply whether the given reason was a pretext for illegal discrimination. The employer's stated legitimate reason must be reasonably articulated and nondiscriminatory, but does not have to be a reason that the judge or jurors would act on or approve. Nor is an employer required to adopt the policy that will maximize the number of minorities, women, or older persons in his workforce. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). An employer is entitled to make his own policy and business judgments, and may, for example, fire an adequate employee if his reason is to hire one who will be even better, as long as this is not a pretext for discrimination
7 Elsewhere, however, the Court said that the prima facie case sustains an inference of discrimination only if defendants' acts are "otherwise unexplained," Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, and that an employer can "Dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing" by "articulat(ing)" a legitimate reason for its action, Id. at 578, 98 S.Ct. at 2950 (emphasis added)
8 Defendants argue that they were entitled to a directed verdict because Loeb failed to prove these facts. As such proof was not required, we do not discuss this contention
9 This is not to say that evidence of the race or age of complainant's replacement may not sometimes be probative of discrimination. In an age case, the probative value of evidence as to the age of complainant's replacement obviously will depend on complainant's own age and the age difference. Replacement of a 60 year old by a 35 year old or even a 45 year old within the protected class would be more suggestive of discrimination than replacement of a 45 year old by a 42 year old within the protected class or by a 39 year old outside it. Replacement by someone older would suggest no age discrimination but would not disprove it conclusively. The older replacement could have been hired, for example, to ward off a threatened discrimination suit. Cf. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579, 98 S.Ct. 2943 (balanced workforce does not preclude finding of specific act of discrimination); Rhode Island Minority Caucus, Inc. v. Baronian, 590 F.2d 372, 375-76 (1st Cir. 1979) (balanced group of voter registrars does not preclude finding of specific act of discrimination)
10 We can assume that, unless the employee's job has been redefined, the fact that he was hired initially indicates that he had the basic qualifications for the job, in terms of degrees, certificates, skills and experience
11 A replacement need not be sought from outside the company, of course, nor need he be designated formally as such
12 This is not to say that a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is the only possible prima facie case appropriate in a discrimination case. A complainant of requisite age who offered evidence that, when fired, his employer said, "I am firing you solely because I want someone younger," might not need anything more to make out a prima facie showing of discrimination. See discussion in Section II(A), and note 18, Infra
13 Here, of course, two elements of the McDonnell Douglas -type prima facie case, that Loeb was in the protected age group and was fired, were not contested. The record suggests too that the parties may have disputed the "replacement" element only because it was misunderstood
14 Although the Supreme Court has never discussed explicitly the significance of the prima facie case after the employer articulates a legitimate reason, we may assume that the evidence used to establish the prima facie case remains relevant, and can help sustain a verdict for the plaintiff if the employer's reason is discredited, but that any other evidence bearing on motive should also be considered. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580, 98 S.Ct. 2943
15 In McDonnell Douglas, it will be remembered, the defendant was entitled to reject the plaintiff because of his illegal activities, unless the plaintiff shouldered the burden of establishing that that reason was a pretext for race discrimination. 411 U.S. at 803-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817
16 In the unlikely event that there is a dispute over whether the employer has met his burden of production, it will be for the judge to decide whether defendant has stated a legitimate reason with such specificity as to require plaintiff to prove it to be a pretext. See notes 5 and 6, Supra
17 In a class action, proof of a pattern and practice of discrimination shifts to the defendant the burden of showing that individual members of the class were not the victims of discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843. In that situation, defendant's burden becomes one of persuasion, not merely production. Whether in a non-class action, proof of a prima facie case different from the McDonnell Douglas elements would require the defendant to do something other than produce a "legitimate reason" is a matter we need not decide now
18 That McDonnell Douglas is not a formulation for application in all private discrimination cases is further indicated by the Supreme Court's position in Furnco, that the prima facie case consists of proof of facts that, absent other explanation by the employer, make it "more likely than not" that a discriminatory motive was at work. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943. In view of the fact that the Court has never passed on the viability of the particular elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case outside the factory hiring setting, we caution against automatic reliance on those elements when the employment setting is such that their proof does not make discrimination a probability. For example, if a qualified black were turned down for a job for which there were 100 applicants for every opening and the practice, rather than being to hire the first qualified applicant who appeared, was to choose on the basis of qualifications, recommendations and subjective impressions gleaned from an interview, it would hardly seem "more likely than not" that the applicant was rejected because of race. Compare note 12, Supra
19 By this we mean a case in which the principal evidence of discrimination rests on the facts that plaintiff was discharged from an ongoing position despite the fact that he allegedly was fully qualified and performing well, and on an attempt to discredit the defendant's tendered reason as being a pretext
20 This assumes, of course, that defendant has stated a sufficient reason to meet his burden of production. If not, plaintiff need only prove the elements of the prima facie case to win, and the court should so charge
21 As noted earlier, it is for the judge to determine whether defendant has articulated a legitimate reason for its actions. See notes 5, 6, and 16, Supra. An affirmative finding necessarily implies that defendant could act for the reason advanced
22 See note 14, Supra, and accompanying text
23 We use this merely as an example, and do not mean to predetermine the charge to be given in the present case on remand. This will be for the judge to decide, in light of the evidence presented and the issues that emerge
24 See note 6, Supra; NLRB v. Eastern Smelting and Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670, 673 (1st Cir. 1979)
25 The ADEA makes it unlawful to take an adverse employment action "because of" a worker's age, 29 U.S.C. § 623, and its remedial provisions are directed at making whole workers who have suffered violations of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626, thus evidencing an intent to assist workers who would have been employed "but for" age discrimination. The Labor Department's regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c), indicate that the statute was intended to ensure that age was not "a determining factor." See Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F.Supp. 1299, 1321 (E.D.Mich.1976)
26 At argument, defendants suggested that the courts of appeals were unanimous on the question of the applicability of § 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260, to the ADEA. In their brief, however, we are cited to only one circuit court decision, Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1976), which so holds. Our own research has turned up no other circuit court decision on the issue, although a district court decision, Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F.Supp. 841, 844-45 (W.D.Okl.1976), is in accord with defendants' position. Several district courts have held that § 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 260, does Not apply to the question of liquidated damages under the ADEA. Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F.Supp. 199, 201 (D.Or.1977); Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 499, 504-05 (D.Del.1977); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 352 (W.D.Mo.1975)
27 "An act is done 'willfully' if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law." E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 14.06, at 384 (3d ed. 1977)
28 Congress in its recent amendments to the ADEA highlighted the "willful" test as the standard for imposing liquidated damages: "(The ADEA) includes liquidated damages (calculated as an amount equal to the pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecuniary losses arising out of a Willful violation of the ADEA." H.Conf.Rep.No.95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), Reprinted in (1978) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 528, 535 (emphasis added)
29 These payments would have extended over twelve years, and were conditioned on plaintiff's survival and Textron's continuing in business. We find nothing in the record to anchor the amounts that the court arrived at to be paid each year. Plaintiff's expert witness, Professor Rohr, testified that were plaintiff reinstated, he could reasonably expect to receive a total of $526,892 in total compensation, including salary, bonuses and stock savings contributions. The district court did not explain the basis for the figures it used and we do not know how it arrived at them. The total of $90,000 has no relation to the testimony of Professor Rohr or to the discounted value of his estimates
30 Plaintiff's attorneys also were awarded $42,500 under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The district court computed the award following the guidelines we adopted in King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977). This procedure was without error. Since a new trial is necessary, however, we cannot say at this time that plaintiff is the prevailing party. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1978). Final resolution of this issue must await the outcome of the new trial
31 Defendants state that substitute money judgments have never been awarded in an ADEA case, and have been awarded in limited amounts in only two Title VII cases, Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 E.P.D. P 11,427 (S.D.Ohio 1976) (six month's pay), and E.E.O.C. v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F.Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (one year's pay), Aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 395, 54 L.Ed.2d 277 (1977)
32 Senator Javits, a floor leader for the ADEA, stated: "The enforcement techniques provided by (the ADEA) are directly analogous to those available under the Fair Labor Standards Act; in fact, (the ADEA) incorporates by reference, to the greatest extent possible, the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." 113 Cong.Rec. 31254 (1967)
33 We would think that damages in lieu of reinstatement, unlike payments due as back wages and treated as unpaid minimum wages, if proper at all, would constitute an equitable rather than a legal remedy. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 & n.11, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)
34 Under traditional principles of contract law, courts normally do not enforce employment contracts with orders for specific performance. An employment contract may be enforced for its duration, however, as by ordering the employer to pay an unlawfully discharged employee the difference between his wages due under the contract until its term expires and the amount, if any, he is earning in a different job. D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 12.25, at 924-25 (1973)
35 We do not necessarily equate damages in lieu of reinstatement with liquidated damages, which are intended to cover damages that are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, where the value of reinstatement is highly speculative, the availability of a substantial liquidated damages award under the ADEA may be a proper consideration in denying additional damages in lieu of reinstatement