Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/653/1220/313176/
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 22:12:14
Document Index: 167310252

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1491', 'art, 503', '§ 1983', '§ 3', '§ 7', '§ 25', '§ 25']

Cleo R. Herrera, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joann Yellow Bird, Deceased, Appellee, v. Clifford Valentine, Individually and As a Police Officer Ofthe Gordon, Nebraska, Police Department, and Thecity of Gordon, Nebraska, Appellants, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1981 › Cleo R. Herrera, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joann Yellow Bird, Deceased, Appellee, v. Cl...
Cleo R. Herrera, Special Administrator of the Estate of Joann Yellow Bird, Deceased, Appellee, v. Clifford Valentine, Individually and As a Police Officer Ofthe Gordon, Nebraska, Police Department, and Thecity of Gordon, Nebraska, Appellants, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981)
Submitted March 9, 1981. Decided July 13, 1981
Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits parties to amend their pleadings to adequately reflect the case as it was actually tried in the courtroom. The Rule authorizes the trial court to permit the amendment when an unpleaded issue is tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. The Rule also authorizes the court to permit the amendment when evidence is challenged as outside the scope of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). The purpose of the Rule is to "promote the objective of deciding cases on their merits rather than in terms of the relative pleading skills of counsel * * *." 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1491 at 454 (1971); see Wallin v. Fuller, 476 F.2d 1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 1973).
The City asserts that Yellow Bird's claim against it is based solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is clear that a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the acts of its employees. Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); cf. Parratt v. Taylor, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981); Cotton v. Hutto, 577 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1978); Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 904 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856, 97 S. Ct. 153, 50 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1976). Yellow Bird does not, however, assert that the City is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Her claim is that the City's failure to properly hire, train, retain, supervise, discipline and control Valentine and the other police officers directly caused her tortious injury. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 n.39, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1418 n.39, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980). Under that theory, Yellow Bird was obligated to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the City breached a duty owed to her and that that breach proximately caused the deprivation of her constitutional rights. See Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201-202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 577, 66 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1980); McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695-697 (10th Cir. 1979).
If a municipality fails to train its police force, or if it does so in a grossly negligent manner so that it inevitably results in police misconduct, "the municipality exhibits a 'deliberate indifference' to the resulting violations of a citizen's constitutional rights." Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I. 1978); cf. Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1978); Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1974). Moreover, a municipality's continuing failure to remedy known unconstitutional conduct of its police officers is the type of informal policy or custom that is amenable to suit under section 1983. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., supra, 436 U.S. at 690-691 & n.56, 98 S. Ct. at 2035-2036 & n.56.
* Section 1983 serves basically two functions: it deters future governmental action that violates persons' civil rights, Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445 U.S. at 651-652, 100 S. Ct. at 1415-1416; Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442, 96 S. Ct. 984, 1000, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976) (White, J., concurring), and it compensates the injured party. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978). When these two purposes are achieved, the substantive constitutional guarantee at stake is vindicated and the harmed party is made whole.
The Supreme Court has long viewed money damages as an appropriate remedy for redressing the loss of a person's civil rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-396, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2004-2005, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485, 23 S. Ct. 639, 641, 47 L. Ed. 909 (1903) (Holmes, J.). In order to fully vindicate the challenged guarantees and deter future conduct that threaten their practical significance, full compensation is necessary.7 ] To secure complete satisfaction, damage awards must take account of the intrinsic dimension that envelopes each substantive constitutional right. This concept is not a novel one. For example, the federal courts have traditionally compensated the intangible constitutional loss that results when a party's voting rights are infringed. See generally Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. Ed. 1281 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th Cir. 1919). Even if a plaintiff in a voting rights case cannot establish that the loss of his vote resulted in any consequential or actual injury, substantial nonpunitive damages are presumed to flow from the wrong itself. As Judge Walter Sanborn reasoned over sixty years ago,
A number of federal courts have recently ruled that substantial compensatory damages are recoverable when substantive constitutional rights have been violated. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-196 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916, 98 S. Ct. 3146, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1161 (1978) (damages available to persons arrested for peaceful demonstration); Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1281-1285 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (damages available to plaintiffs unlawfully arrested for demonstrating peacefully); Bryant v. McGinnis, 463 F. Supp. 373, 388 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (damages available when inmates' rights to practice their religion were denied); Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1979) (damages are presumed when inmate was racially segregated); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 770-772 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (damages given for unlawful arrest while plaintiff was delivering a lecture on the use of contraceptives). We believe this to be the proper rule.
The appellants assert that Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252, controls this case and prohibits an award for the violation of Yellow Bird's substantive constitutional rights, other than some nominal sum. We disagree. The holding in Carey was specifically limited to its facts. That case involved two students who were suspended from public schools for disciplinary reasons without any type of hearing in violation of the "procedural" requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Court, although noting that their procedural due process rights were infringed, nevertheless ruled that absent a showing by the two plaintiffs that some actual injury resulted from the violation, it would not presume damages. The Court distinguished the plaintiff's procedural due process case from defamation and related tort law cases in which it has applied the doctrine of presumed damages, based in part upon the "ambiguous" causal link that usually accompanies cases in the former class.
Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 264-265,8 98 S. Ct. at 1052-1053.
The Court stated that we must consider the nature of the interest that is sought to be protected by the particular constitutional guarantee that is infringed. Id. at 265, 98 S. Ct. at 1053. It also directed us to consider the common law of torts, which has as one of its guiding principles that persons must be fairly compensated for the injuries and losses they suffer as a result of violations of their legal rights. Id. at 267, 98 S. Ct. at 1054.
We turn now to the specific constitutional guarantees involved in the instant case, mindful that "(a) damages remedy against the defending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees, and the importance of assuring its efficacy is only accentuated when (among the wrongdoers) is the institution that has been established to protect the very rights * * * transgressed." Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445 U.S. at 651, 100 S. Ct. at 1415.
The Fourth Amendment creates an expectation of privacy and guarantees that citizens shall not be arrested without probable cause and reasonable grounds supporting the belief that they are committing a crime. See, e. g., Butler v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S. Ct. 82, 62 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1979); Dellums v. Powell, supra, 566 F.2d at 175-176; cf. Wyland v. James, 426 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The Fourth Amendment secures the citizens' substantive right to security from the government's unreasonable intrusions into privacy. See generally Comment, Presumed Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 192, 212-216 (1980).
Finally, a person taken into custody has a Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883-1884, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-473, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624-1627, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court reasoned that because a person can involuntarily make inculpatory statements during custodial interrogation, the right to counsel at that point in time provides the safeguard necessary to protect the criminal defendant's substantive right to remain silent and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise that right. Id. at 460, 472, 86 S. Ct. at 1620, 1626.
As noted, Carey also directs us to inquire whether the specific constitutional guarantee at stake has a common law analogue. The Court reasoned there that "(i)n some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules of damages directly to the § 1983 action." Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 258, 98 S. Ct. at 1049. In the instant case, the interests protected by the particular constitutional rights at issue are analogous to the interests protected by the common law dignitary torts.9 In cases involving invasions of dignitary rights, it is predictably difficult to place a value on the resulting injury. The injury that results from the invasion of dignitary expectations is often not an economic loss. Nevertheless, the common law has always redressed their breach with substantial damages. These damages are usually characterized as general damages the type that generally flow from the wrongful act. See D. Dobbs, Remedies § 3.2 at 138-139 (1973).
The general damages that may be recovered in the dignitary tort class of cases "do not require specific proof of emotional harm to the plaintiff * * *. Thus general damages for assault or false imprisonment and like torts are not dependent upon actual proof of such harm." Id. § 7.3 at 529. The value that is placed upon the dignitary loss is a question for the jury, subject, of course, to review by the courts. See Wayne v. Venable, supra, 260 F. at 66; Comment, Presumed Damages for Fourth Amendment Violations, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 192, 204-207 (1980). But see Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1242, 1282-1285 (1979) (legislation needed to set specific presumed damage awards for violations of civil rights); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 Yale L.J. 447, 465 (1978) (a liquidated damage sum should be awarded for violations of civil rights in addition to any actual damages).
The Court in Carey implicitly authorized the doctrine of presumed damages as it is applied to the dignitary torts of libel and defamation. The Court reasoned that in such cases injury is almost certain to result from the wrongful act, and that the specific injury is difficult to prove. Moreover, since the resulting injury is so likely, no purpose is served by requiring proof of this kind. Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 262, 98 S. Ct. at 1051.
In this case, Yellow Bird was deprived of certain substantive constitutional rights that have been recognized as implicit in the Constitution, and highly prized in our federal system. It is reasonable to assume that violations of Yellow Bird's Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process rights resulted in injury, just as injury is presumed to flow from an invasion of a person's dignitary rights in a voting rights case or a defamation action. The causal link between the wrongful deprivation of the substantive right and the resulting harm is anything but "ambiguous." See Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 263, 98 S. Ct. at 1052.
Id. at 198 (quoting Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929, 82 S. Ct. 366, 7 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1961)); see Richardson v. Communication Workers of America, 530 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824, 97 S. Ct. 77, 50 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1976). Our careful review of the record convinces us that the jury's award of $300,000 is not a plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result.
Taken Alive v. Litzau, supra, 551 F.2d at 198 (quoting Mainelli v. Haberstroh, 237 F. Supp. 190, 194 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1965)).10
Even if section 1988 creates such a cause of action, as appellants contend, it is clear that Nebraska's survival statute would save Yellow Bird's attorneys' fee claim. In Nebraska, causes of action generally survive the death of either party. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-1401, 25-1402 (Reissue 1979). The survival statute "declares in plain terms that suits instituted to redress a particular class of wrongs among them being certain injuries to the person and reputation shall abate by the death of the defendant, but that no other pending action shall abate for any cause." Webster v. City of Hastings, 59 Neb. 563, 81 N.W. 510, 512 (1900) (emphasis added) (construing the predecessor section to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1402 (Reissue 1979)). See also Sheibley v. Nelson, 83 Neb. 501, 119 N.W. 1124, 1125 (1909) (libel action not abated by plaintiff's death). This remains the law today. See Spradlin v. Myers, 200 Neb. 559, 264 N.W.2d 658, 660 (1978). Accordingly, we hold that Yellow Bird's claim for attorneys' fees survived her death. See, e. g., Burt v. Abel, 466 F. Supp. 1234 (D.S.C. 1979).11
Moreover, it is clear, by reviewing this record, that a hearing was not necessary. When serious factual disputes surround an application for attorney's fees, a hearing is required. But here, the only disputed issue could have been the question of duplication, and this is easily resolved by a careful review of the thorough and detailed time records and affidavits that were filed in support of the fee application. See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that "(a)n even stronger case for imposing liability for inaction occurs when the municipality fails to remedy a specific situation, the continuation of which causes a deprivation of constitutional rights." Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d 196, 201 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S. Ct. 577, 66 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1980)
Robert Barnes No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Clifford Valentine No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Terry Weil No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) City of Gordon No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Roger Etzelmiller No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Maxine Kozal No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) James Talbot No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) County of Sheridan No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No)
Robert Barnes No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Clifford Valentine Yes ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Terry Weil No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) City of Gordon Yes ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Roger Etzelmiller No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No) Maxine Kozal No ------------------------------------- (Yes or No)
Many substantive constitutional guarantees may be violated without accompanying consequential or "actual" injury. If consequential injury were the touchstone for substantial compensatory awards, many blatant constitutional violations would remain unredressed. See Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 976-977 & nn. 68-69 (1980)
Since Carey, several other federal courts have, likewise, understood that decision to be limited in its application. See Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016, 100 S. Ct. 668, 62 L. Ed. 2d 646 (1980); Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 615-616 (4th Cir. 1978); Mickens v. Winston, 462 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Va. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1979). In our view, Carey presents no bar to the recovery of substantial nonpunitive damages for violations of the substantive constitutional rights involved in the instant case
Citing nothing more than Fed. R. Civ. P. 25, the appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the substitution of Herrera as party plaintiff. We disagree, and conclude that it acted properly in ordering the substitution.
(1) D. Sorensen, Attorney $53,921.11 (2) C. Strickman, Attorney $ 7,535.42 (3) N. Tooby, Attorney $ 1,243.15 (4) J. Rhine, Attorney $12,630.00 (5) J. Leach, Attorney $15,364.92 (6) R. Swencionis, Para-legal $_________ (7) D. Clegg, Attorney $ 1,982.50 (8) T. Waller, National Jury Project $_________ (9) D. Wiley, National Jury Project $_________ (10) M. Rorick, Private Investigator $_________ (11) D. Moonshine, Attorney $ 2,232.31 (12) B. Michel, Law Student $_________ (13) C. Merrill, Attorney $ 357.50 (14) R. MacPherson III, Attorney $ 98.27 (15) B. Ellison, Attorney $ 39.00 (16) S. Karp, Attorney $ 97.50 (17) S. Gross, Attorney $_________ (18) R. Atkins, Law Student $_________ (19) T. Meyer, Attorney $_________ (20) M. Kolb, Attorney $_________ (21) S. Schear, Attorney $_________ __________ TOTAL AWARD: $95,501.68