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Timestamp: 2019-07-17 08:22:30
Document Index: 649987664

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 8']

JIM MCNEFF, INC. V. TODD, 461 U. S. 260 (1983) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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(a) In authorizing § 8(f) prehire contracts even though the union's majority status was not first established, Congress recognized that, because of the uniquely temporary, transitory, and sometimes seasonal nature of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner is engaged in the construction industry and, in September 1978, was a subcontractor on a jobsite in southern California. The general contractor was contractually bound to the Master Labor Agreement negotiated between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 12, and the Southern California General Contractors Associations. The Master Labor Agreement provided that work at the jobsite was to be performed only by subcontractors who had signed a labor agreement with the Union. [Footnote 1] The Master Labor Agreement also contained a union security clause requiring covered employees, including those of subcontractors, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Master Labor Agreement required petitioner to make monthly contributions to fringe benefit trust funds on behalf of each covered employee. [Footnote 4] From October, 1978, through chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court for the Central District of California granted respondents' motion for summary judgment and ordered payment of the unpaid trust fund contributions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 667 F.2d 800 (1982). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We first addressed the enforceability of a § 8(f) prehire agreement in Higdon. In response to the employer's violation of a prehire agreement, the minority union in that case picketed the employer for more than 30 days without filing an election petition. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that such picketing violated § 8(b)(7)(C). Section 8(b)(7)(C) was intended to ensure voluntary, uncoerced selection of a bargaining representative by employees; unless a union is the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit, it prohibits picketing to force an employer "to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees." In Higdon, we affirmed the Board's view that a prehire agreement does not make a union chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In upholding the Board's view that a union commits an unfair labor practice by picketing to enforce a prehire agreement before it has attained majority status, we noted in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Higdon that this view protects two interests that Congress intended to uphold when it enacted § 8(f). First, our holding in Higdon protects the § 7 rights of employees to select their own bargaining representative. [Footnote 8] To be sure, § 8(f) affects the § 7 rights of employees by allowing a minority union to reach an agreement with the employer setting the terms and conditions of employment. This is the direct and intended consequence of § 8(f) and, in any event, is limited by the final proviso in § 8(f) that permits employees -- and other parties mentioned in §§ 9(c) and (e) of the Act -- to challenge a prehire agreement at any time by petitioning the Board for a representative election. If, however, an employer could be compelled by picketing to treat a minority union as the exclusive bargaining agent of employees, the § 7 rights of those employees would be undermined to an extent not contemplated by Congress. As we noted in Higdon, 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 338, a union that is the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit does not commit an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing to compel compliance with a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, freeing a minority union from the confines of § 8(b)(7)(C) would grant that union power otherwise accorded only to certified bargaining representatives chosen by a majority of the affected employees. It is up to those employees to decide what organization, if any, will enter into a collective bargaining agreement on their behalf and have the consequent right to engage in picketing, if necessary, to enforce it; the union signatory to a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Neither does respondents' § 301 action trench on the voluntary and voidable characteristics of a § 8(f) prehire agreement. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is clear in this case that petitioner entered into the prehire agreement voluntarily. [Footnote 9] Moreover, although the voidable nature of prehire agreements clearly gave petitioner the right to repudiate the contract, it is equally clear that petitioner never manifested an intention to void or repudiate the contract. For the relevant period of time, [Footnote 10] the record shows conclusively that petitioner accepted the benefits of the prehire agreement and misled the union of its true intention never to fulfill its contractual obligations. Whatever may be required of a party wishing to exercise its undoubted right to repudiate a prehire agreement before the union attains majority support in the relevant unit, no appropriate action was taken by petitioner to do so in this case. [Footnote 11] Consequently, respondents' suit does not enervate the voluntary and voidable characteristics of the prehire agreement. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A § 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the union establishes majority status. However, the monetary obligations assumed by an employer under a prehire chanroblesvirtualawlibrary