Source: http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/cluster-munition-monitor-2017/contamination-and-clearance.aspx
Timestamp: 2017-11-19 08:49:00
Document Index: 786317278

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7', 'Art7']

Azerbaijan*[1]
* Contamination exists or is suspected to exist in areas outside of government control.
** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, where any cluster munition contamination is likely within mined areas.
As of 1 August 2017, a total of 26 states and three other areas are contaminated by cluster munition remnants.[3] This includes 12 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, one signatory, and 13 non-signatories. It is unclear whether one State Party and one signatory are contaminated.[4]
State Party Mozambique reported completion of clearance in December 2016.[5]
In 2016, unexploded submunitions were found in signatory Angola, and in non-signatories Georgia and Tajikistan. All three countries were suspected to have a residual threat but, prior to these new discoveries, had no specific locations of suspected or confirmed contamination.
Little changed in the global understanding of the extent of the problem during 2016. The size of contaminated areas is not known in approximately half of the cluster munition-affected states. In 2016, clearance operators in several states and other areas continued to identify previously unknown areas of contamination.
New use increased contamination in Syria and Yemen in both 2016 and 2017, and in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016. Alleged new use in Iraq (2017), Libya (2016–2017) and Somalia (early 2016) may have also resulted in increased contamination.
In 2016, at least 88km2 of contaminated land was cleared, with a total of at least 140,000 submunitions destroyed during land release (survey and clearance) operations.[6] However, this estimate is based on incomplete data. It represents a 25% increase on the land cleared and 16% increase on the number of submunitions destroyed in 2015. Between 2010 and 2016, a total of more than 535,000 submunitions were destroyed and at least 425km2 of land was cleared worldwide. In 2016, a decrease in recorded cluster munition-contaminated areas was reported in only one State Party, Croatia, and in two non-signatories, Serbia and South Sudan, as well as two other areas, Kosovo and Western Sahara.[7]
Only one State Party, Croatia, appears on track to meet its Article 4 clearance deadline, four States Parties are not on track, and it is unclear whether the remaining States Parties will meet their deadlines.
Conflict and insecurity in 2016 and 2017 impeded land release efforts in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia) and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen).
The convention entered into force for Colombia and Somalia in 2016. Colombia has reported that it is in the process of establishing the location and extent of any cluster munition contamination.[8] The extent of contamination in Somalia is not known. As of 1 August 2017, Somalia had not submitted its initial transparency report, which was due in August 2016.
The extent of contamination remains unknown in the most heavily contaminated countries in the world: Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Survey efforts are being made to improve understanding of the problem. In Syria, the extent of cluster munition use and the high number of casualties mean that contamination has significantly increased. However, the ongoing conflict prevents survey. (See the cluster munition ban and casualties sections of the Syria country profile for further details.)
In only three countries and two other areas did the total reported size of cluster munition-contaminated areas decrease during 2016 as a result of land release (survey and clearance) efforts: Croatia, Serbia, and South Sudan, along with other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara. However, in South Sudan and Western Sahara is it thought that undiscovered areas of contamination exist, so the reported size of contamination may increase in the future. The reported size of contamination in the remaining countries did not decrease because either the extent of contamination is unknown, no clearance took place, or previously unknown areas were identified.
Previously unknown or unreported contaminated areas were identified in 2016 in Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara. Prior to this, there were no suspected or confirmed contaminated areas in Angola, Georgia, or Tajikistan.
New contamination was reported in 2016 and 2017 in Syria and Yemen. New use was also alleged in Iraq in 2017, Libya in both years and in Somalia in early 2016.[9] In 2016, the use of cluster munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in additional contamination of approximately 2km2.[10] In Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the extent of any new contamination is not known as insecurity prevents or hampers survey and clearance.
The data contained in the following table is drawn from various sources. Those that appear to be most accurate and complete have been used.[11]
Notes: * Mid-2016 data; ** See Democratic Republic of the Congo above; States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; convention signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics.
The information provided in the table below draws on data provided in Article 7 transparency reports, by national programs, and by mine action operators. There are sometimes discrepancies between these sources. Where this is the case, the data that appears to be most reliable is used and a note has been made. For an explanation of land release terminology, see “Improving clearance efficiency: land release,” in Cluster Munition Monitor 2015.
Almost one-third of global cluster munition clearance in 2016 took place in Lao PDR, where 30.17km2 of contaminated land was cleared and 106,636 submunitions destroyed.
Note: TS = technical survey; CHA = confirmed hazardous area; BAC = battle area clearance.
Note: N/R = not reported; NTS = non-technical survey; TS = technical survey; SHA = suspected hazardous area; CHA = confirmed hazardous area.
Note: TS = technical survey; CHA = confirmed hazardous area.
Develop a national plan, building upon existing structures, experiences, and methodologies.[12]
Eight States Parties have completed the clearance of their cluster munition-contaminated areas under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
State Party Mozambique reported the completion of clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in December 2016.[13] Seven States Parties have in previous years completed the clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants: Albania, the Republic of the Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Norway, and Zambia. One signatory, Uganda, and one non-signatory, Thailand, also completed clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in previous years.
In signatory DRC, verifications are required before a formal declaration of completion is made.
This section examines the progress of States Parties against their Dubrovnik Action Plan commitments on the clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants.[14]
States Parties are required to provide an assessment of the extent of the problem of cluster munition contamination within two years of the First Review Conference or two years after entry into force of the convention for each State Party (refer to the table “Estimated cluster munition contamination” above for existing knowledge of extent of the problem). By the end of 2016:
Four states—including the most heavily contaminated states—had a poor understanding of the problem.
The two States Parties that have a very good understanding of the problem are Croatia and Germany. In Croatia, all known contamination is contained within confirmed hazardous areas.[15] In Germany, survey of the military training area was completed in 2015,[16] although the results were not made available to the public.
The six States Parties that have a fairly good understanding of the extent of the problem are Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, Montenegro, and the UK. In two states, Afghanistan and Lebanon, many of the cluster munition-contaminated areas are known, but there may be other contamination that is as yet undiscovered.[17] Most of BiH’s cluster munition-contaminated areas are suspected hazardous areas that require survey to either confirm or release.[18] Montenegro has two suspected areas that have yet to be surveyed.[19] Two states, Chile and the UK, know the locations of all contaminated areas, but the extent of contamination within those areas is not known. The UK has affirmed that, on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, no areas known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants exist outside areas already suspected of being contaminated with landmines or ERW.[20] However, it does not know the extent of cluster munition contamination within these areas. Chile has not reported conducting any survey of the four military training areas that it suspects are contaminated.
The four States Parties that have a poor understanding of the extent or location of the cluster munition problem are Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Somalia. Lao PDR is the world’s most contaminated country, and the extent of affected areas is not known. It has now taken steps to improve its understanding, as in 2016 it committed to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021.[21] Although Iraq has confirmed more than 207km2 of cluster munition contamination, the true extent is not known, and conflict and insecurity continued to prevent efforts to better define the problem in 2016.[22] Although Chad and Somalia are contaminated by cluster munitions, they have not recorded any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas.
In accordance with their Article 4 obligations, through their Article 7 transparency reports, six States Parties reported on measures to provide risk education and/or to prevent civilian access to areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants through marking and fencing in 2016: BiH, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.[23]
In Germany and the UK, all cluster munition contamination is fenced and marked. In Germany, the areas are completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to the area.[24] The UK has conducted comprehensive perimeter-marking of mined areas potentially containing cluster munition remnants.[25]
In most affected States Parties, a humanitarian and/or socio-economic impact of contamination is reported to varying degrees, indicating the need for greater efforts to fulfill this action.[26] In several states, cluster munition remnants continue to cause casualties (see the casualties chapter for further details).
Despite the requirement to have a plan in place within one year of the First Review Conference or by entry into force of the convention for that State Party, no State Party has presented a strategic plan that is resourced and on track.
The only State Party that appears to be on track towards its Article 4 clearance deadline is Croatia, although its mine action plan does not specifically address cluster munition remnants.
Three States Parties have specific plans for survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants, but it is not clear that they are on track to complete clearance by their Article 4 deadlines: Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Montenegro. Afghanistan has prepared a number of plans for clearing cluster munition remnants, but implementation has been taken over by other priorities and hampered by insecurity.[27] At the end of 2016, Afghanistan circulated a proposal to donors to complete clearance of all known cluster munition contamination.[28] Lebanon’s 2011–2020 mine action strategic plan originally aimed to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants by 2016, but its first mid-term review concluded that it would not be possible to complete clearance before 2020.[29] Lebanon is in the process of conducting a second mid-term review to reflect more accurately its expected cluster munition clearance completion date. This review is due to be completed in 2017.[30] Montenegro’s plan to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants is not funded.[31]
Two States Parties are working toward developing specific cluster munition clearance plans: BiH and Lao PDR. BiH is in the process of developing a new strategy for 2018–2025 that should contain a plan and timeframe for the completion of cluster munition clearance. The process is due for completion by the end of 2017.[32] Lao PDR plans to complete a survey by the end of 2021, which should provide the basis upon which a clearance plan can be developed.[33] However, this will not be achieved within the Article 4 clearance deadline, and an extension request will need to be submitted.
Germany reports that it plans to complete clearance operations in early 2020, ahead of its Article 4 deadline. However, it has not presented a detailed plan, and meteorological conditions and environmental protection laws limiting burning periods could lead to delays.[34]
Four States Parties do not have a cluster munition clearance strategy in place. They have not indicated an intention to develop such a plan, nor whether they expect to meet their Article 4 deadlines: Chad, Chile, Iraq, and the UK. Chad’s mine action plan notes that it adhered to the Convention on Cluster Munitions but does not detail plans to survey and clear cluster munition contamination.[35] Chile has not presented a plan for how it will achieve its Article 4 clearance deadline, and as of mid-2017, survey and clearance had not commenced. Iraq does not have a strategic plan for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, and in the context of ongoing conflict and other security and humanitarian imperatives, cluster munition clearance does not rank as a priority. As any cluster munition contamination in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is contained within existing minefields, the UK needs to present detailed plans and timelines for completing demining operations in order to demonstrate how it intends to meet its Article 4 deadline.
The convention entered into force on 1 March 2016 for Colombia and Somalia. As of mid-2017, they had not developed a clearance plan. Colombia reported in May 2017 that it is in the process of establishing the location and extent of any contamination, but it did not provide details of any plan or activities.[36] Once the necessary assessment and survey have been conducted, Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations. In 2015, Somalia developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” which aims to support the government in fulfilling its Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munition obligations. However, a specific strategy to address cluster munition remnants has not been presented.[37]
Each State Party is required to “record and provide information to the extent possible on the scope, extent and nature of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.” (For details of the extent to which states have a knowledge of the contaminated areas under their jurisdiction, see Action 3.1 above.)
The quality of reporting on survey and clearance is variable, and has not improved significantly overall in 2016. Of those States Parties that conducted survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2016, only Croatia, Mozambique, and the UK had clear, consistent land-release data across the different sources.
Discrepancies between survey and clearance data provided by mine action centers, operators, and Article 7 reports were found in Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon. In BiH’s reporting, land release by technical survey was not disaggregated from land released through clearance.
Germany’s efforts to tackle its cluster munition problem are unclear, because it has not published the results of its survey.
As of 1 August 2017, Chad, Chile, Mozambique, and Somalia had not provided Article 7 transparency reports covering calendar year 2016. Chile has not reported since 2013.
Action 3.7—Apply practice development[38]
In 2016, the following States Parties reported using technical and/or non-technical survey to confirm, reduce, or cancel hazardous areas: BiH, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mozambique. These are the same States Parties as in 2015. In Iraq, however, although survey was used to confirm contamination, there were no reports of land being canceled or reduced through survey. In Lao PDR, the introduction of cluster munition-specific survey continued to greatly improve the efficiency of clearance. While the total area cleared in Lao PDR decreased significantly in 2016 compared with 2015, the number of submunitions destroyed increased significantly.[39]
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides support to mine action programs in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Somalia.[40] In Lebanon, it supports the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2016, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) provided an advisor in Lao PDR; provided personnel to the mine action center in Lebanon to support capacity-building; and in collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided support to strategic planning in BiH. In Mozambique, UNDP’s budget ended in mid-2016, causing concern for the country’s ability to maintain a capacity to address residual contamination.[41] In Colombia, the Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS planned to transfer its responsibilities to the mine action center by the end of 2017.[42]
International NGOs provided support to mine action programs, by providing capacity-building support on standards (particularly on land release) and information management, as well as directly conducting clearance operations and mine risk education in 2016. International NGOs were active in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Somalia.
Croatia, which is on track toward its Article 4 clearance obligations, did not receive international capacity-building or operational support in 2016, nor did Germany and the UK. In Chile, where no cluster munition survey or clearance has yet taken place, there was no international support in 2016.
Since 2015, Lebanon has been collaborating with the GICHD to manage and coordinate the Arab Regional Cooperation Programme for Mine Action.[43]
(For information about funding for cluster munition survey and clearance, please see the Support for Mine Action sections of the online country profiles.)[44]
In general, non-signatories have a poor understanding of the extent of their contamination. In 11 of 13 non-signatories (84%), as well as in one signatory, the extent of contamination is not known.[45] This compares to five of the 12 States Parties (42%).[46]
In 2016, no data on survey or clearance was available for two non-signatories (Iran and Syria) and land release results were not comprehensive in four non-signatories (Cambodia, Libya, Ukraine, and Vietnam).
All States Parties and signatories have a mine action program, authority, center, or other institution responsible for mine action. Non-signatory Syria does not have a national mine action program, authority, or center. Ukraine, also a non-signatory, has several bodies responsible for mine action, but as of mid-2017 was still in the process of establishing an appropriate national mine action institutional structure.[47]
In 2016 and 2017, conflict has hindered land release activities in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen). These are the same countries that were affected by conflict in 2015, and little has changed in the overall picture since then.
Afghanistan continued to report that some cluster munition-contaminated areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity.[48] In Iraq, cluster munition clearance was not a priority. Dense contamination by improvised mines inflicting casualties and delaying the return of civilian populations was the top imperative, resulting in slower progress on cluster munition survey and clearance.[49] There are unconfirmed reports that Somalia experienced new cluster munition contamination in 2016, in addition to older suspected contamination, which has been reported to pose an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.[50] However, no overview of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants exists in Somalia, and, as of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[51] In September 2016, two mine action staff were killed and one injured in a shooting incident.[52]
In Libya, the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) describes the following challenges to implementation: the high level of contamination; ongoing conflict and the continued presence of the non-state armed group Islamic State; the difficulty in convincing internally displaced persons to delay their return until the ERW threat is addressed; security and access to priority areas continues to be problematic; limited ERW and improvised explosive device (IED) disposal capacity in Libya; the vast geographical area; and the shortfall in governmental and international support.[53] International mine action operations inside Libya are severely constrained by insecurity. In 2016, international mine action clearance operators continued to focus their efforts on capacity-building and training of national actors, much of it taking place outside the country.[54]
In South Sudan, a resurgence in violence forced mine action operations to close in the second half of 2016.[55] Cluster munition contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During 2016, UNMAS documented numerous examples of cluster munition and explosive items preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.[56] A fear of ERW reportedly prevented internally displaced persons from returning home.[57] The amount of cluster munition-contaminated land that was cleared in 2016 doubled, despite insecurity. This was the result of a decision to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, due to the need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities.[58] In 2016, three mine action staff were killed and three injured by gunshot wounds when their vehicles were ambushed.[59]
Sudan continued to report that some cluster munition-contaminated areas cannot be accessed due insecurity and conflict.[60]
In Ukraine, the heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.[61] The State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), which is responsible for humanitarian demining, suffered severe losses to buildings and vehicles during the conflict.[62] The OSCE Project Coordinator and Danish Deming Group (DDG) therefore provided the SESU with equipment and training in 2016 to support their operational capacity.[63]
Systematic land release is not possible in the two countries—Syria and Yemen—that experienced heavy new cluster munition contamination in 2016 and into 2017. The humanitarian impact in both countries is high (see their respective mine action and casualty country profiles for further details). In Syria, there is no national mine action program and international operators were unable to operate in 2016. Non-state armed groups and volunteers have conducted clearance immediately after fighting has occurred, despite a lack of adequate training, equipment, and resources.[64] In Yemen, a priority was given to reducing the emergency threat of explosive weapons and providing relief to heavily affected communities.[65] However, clearance, which is conducted by the Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), is hampered by a lack of equipment or training specific to cluster munition remnants.[66]
In Azerbaijan and Georgia, there may be cluster munition contamination in areas that are not under government control, where mine action cannot take place.[67]
In 2016, conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in April resulted in a need for emergency clearance of approximately 2km2 of contaminated areas.[68] In Western Sahara, the expulsion of civilian staff members of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by Morocco resulted in the suspension of UNMAS-contracted demining activities east of the Berm from 20 March to 15 September 2016.[69] Cluster munition strike areas located inside the buffer strip east of the Berm are inaccessible for clearance.[70]
Where discrepancies between data sources exist, only one source has been utilized—usually the mine action center. (For complete information on all states, including details of data variations, please refer to the online mine action country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)
Afghanistan’s cluster munition contamination dates from use by Soviet and United States (US) forces and blocks access to agricultural and grazing land.[71] Most cluster munitions used by the US in late 2001 and early 2002 were removed during clearance operations in 2002–2003, guided by US airstrike data.[72] As of May 2017, Afghanistan recorded 5.57km2 of cluster munition-contaminated areas, and contamination is probably more widespread than reported.[73] During 2016, the level of recorded contamination remained unchanged at 6.86km2.[74] The land cleared in 2016 was previously unrecorded.[75] Land release was hampered by insecurity in affected areas and a downturn in funding.[76]
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) cluster munition contamination results from Yugoslav use in the 1992–1995 conflict after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Cluster munitions were also used by NATO forces in Republika Srpska.[77] Sixty communities across seven cantons are affected by 1.12km2 of confirmed hazardous area and 7.3km2 of suspected hazardous area.[78] The total amount of confirmed hazardous areas increased slightly in 2016. During 2016, four organizations conducted cluster munition technical survey and/or clearance: the BiH Armed Forces and the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, and NGOs Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Pro Vita.[79]
Chad is believed to be contaminated bycluster munitions used by France and Libya in the 1980s, but the full extent of contamination is not known. No cluster munition survey or clearance was undertaken in 2016. There was evidence of cluster munition contamination in 2015, as three cluster munition remnants were discovered and destroyed, and civilian casualties were reported as a result of an accident with a submunition.[80] The National Demining Center (Centre National de Déminage, CND) operates demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International operated in Chad in 2016.[81]
Chile hasreported military training areas totaling 97km2 that are suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. As of mid-2017, Chile had not reported conducting any survey or clearance of the cluster munition-contaminated areas, nor had it reported on any steps taken to elaborate a work plan. Chile has not submitted any Article 7 transparency report since 2013.
The convention entered into force for Colombia on 1 March 2016. In 2009 and 2010, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that cluster munitions had been used in the past.[82] The impact of any cluster munition contamination is believed to be minimal. In August 2016, and again in May 2017, Colombia reported that it was in the process of establishing the location and extent of any contamination.[83] Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations once the requisite assessment and survey has been taken.
Croatia is contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1990s conflict that followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.[84] By the end of 2016, 1.74km2 of land across three counties was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, a reduction of 0.19km2 from 2015. Clearance was completed in Split-Dalmatia county in 2016.[85] In Croatia, clearance is conducted by the state-owned operator MUNGOS and commercial demining companies.[86]
Germany reportedin June 2011 that it had identified areas suspected of containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Non-technical survey resulted in a suspected area of approximately 11km2.[87] The area is completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to it.[88] Survey was completed in 2015, and results formed the basis for subsequent preparatory work in 2016, including the preparation of a fire protection system.[89] Clearance operations commenced in March 2017.[90]
The extent of Iraq’s cluster munition contamination is not known. Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas of central and southern Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraq reports that cluster munition remnants in confirmed hazardous areas cover a total of 207km2 across nine central and southern governorates: 95% is in just the three governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.[91] The northern Kurdish region is reported to only have residual, scattered cluster munition contamination.[92] In 2016, survey and clearance were conducted by the civil defense and the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) South, along with humanitarian operators Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), NPA, and MAG.[93] Mine action operations were overshadowed by conflict, and data deficiencies hindered an accurate determination of progress.
Lao PDR is the world’s most heavily contaminated state as a result of cluster bombs used by the US between 1964 and 1973, including more than 270 million submunitions.[94] The scale of contamination is not known. As of April 2017, there was 352km2 of confirmed contamination,[95] but actual contamination is much higher. In 2016, Lao PDR committed to a nationwide survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021.[96] In 2016, the total cluster munition-contaminated land cleared represented a significant reduction compared to the previous four years, in part as a result of the increased focus on survey.[97] However, the number of submunitions destroyed was the highest recorded in any year, which might indicate that clearance activities were better targeted to avoid clearance of uncontaminated land.[98] In 2016, operators included five humanitarian operators—one national, UXO Lao, and four international (HALO Trust, Handicap International, MAG, and NPA)—as well as several international and national commercial operators.
Lebanon’s four southern regions are affected by contamination resulting from cluster munitions use by Israel during the July-August 2006 conflict, while some parts of the country are also contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1980s.[99] Previously unknown contaminated areas continued to be discovered in 2016, predominantly in southern Lebanon.[100] At the end of March 2017, Lebanon had almost 18.2km2 of confirmed cluster munition contamination.[101] Cluster munition remnants continue to affect agriculture.[102] Cluster munition clearance in 2016 was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), MAG, and NPA; national operator Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD); and the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Montenegro’s cluster munition contamination is the result of NATO airstrikes in 1999.[103] A non-technical survey conducted in 2012–2013 identified approximately 1.7km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in two municipalities and one urban municipality.[104] The contamination mainly affects infrastructure and utilities, accounting for 63% of the affected land, with agriculture accounting for another 30%. One area remains unsurveyed.[105] No land release operations had taken place as of May 2017.[106]
Mozambique’s remaining 1.2km2 of cluster munition contamination was identified and cleared in 2015 and 2016. Mozambique informed the Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit of completion of cluster munition clearance in December 2016. Mozambique stated in 2014 that there was limited use of cluster munitions during its 1977–1992 civil war.[107] During surveys conducted in 2015 with the intention of confirming the absence of cluster munition remnants, six areas with a total size of nearly 0.74km2 of confirmed cluster munition contamination were identified.[108] Clearance of these areas began in January 2016. In 2016, additional areas were identified and cleared.[109] NPA was the only operator conducting cluster munition survey and clearance in 2015–2016.[110]
The convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 March 2016. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces reportedly used cluster munitions in clashes with Somali Armed Forces along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War.[111] In 2016, BL-755 submunitions were discovered, the result of alleged use by Kenya that year.[112] Cluster munition contamination is suspected in southcentral Somalia and Puntland, but the extent is not known. As of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[113] No survey or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2016. Somalia had not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report as of 1 August 2017.
United Kingdom (UK).There may be an unknown number of cluster munition remnants on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas as a result of use of cluster munitions by the UK against Argentine positions in 1982. Most cluster munition contamination was cleared in the first year after the conflict.[114] The UK affirmed in 2015 that no areas known to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants exist outside areas already suspected of being contaminated with landmines or ERW, which are all marked and fenced.[115] In 2015 and 2016, land release was conducted by BACTEC. No submunitions were found during clearance operations in 2016.[116]
The full extent of the Cambodia’s contamination is not known. Cluster munition contamination is the result of the intensive US air campaign during the Vietnam War that concentrated on the country’s northeastern provinces along its border with Lao PDR and Vietnam.[117] In 2011, Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodia’s northern Preah Vihear province, which resulted in additional contamination of approximately 1.5 km2.[118] On the basis of a baseline survey of eight eastern provinces, the estimated area affected by cluster munition remnants was 365km2 as of May 2017—almost 78% of total ERW contamination amounting to more than 469km2. The survey showed that 56% of the cluster munition problem is located in the provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng.[119] Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants in eastern Cambodia are undertaken mainly by the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), NPA, and MAG. The armed forceshave conducted clearance in cluster munition-affected areas but they have not reported the extent and results of their operations. In 2016, Cambodia greatly increased the release of cluster munition-contaminated land, compared to the previous year.
South Sudan. From 1996 to 1999, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan.[120] New use of cluster munitions by an unidentified party resulted in additional contamination in 2014 of Jonglei state.[121] At the end of 2016, contamination was suspected across eight of 10 states.[122] However, ongoing insecurity, particularly in Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), prevents access to confirm or address cluster munition contamination.[123] UNMAS oversees mine action and supports the capacity development of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).[124] Four international NGOs (DCA, DDG, MAG, and NPA) and four commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management, Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited, and the Development Initiative) operated in 2016. The amount of cluster munition-contaminated land cleared doubled in 2016 compared with 2015, despite a resurgence in violence that forced the closure of mine action operations in the second half of 2016.[125] A decision was made to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, in order to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities.[126]
Syria. Cluster munitions have been used extensively since 2012, but the full extent of contamination is not known. During an UNMAS rapid assessment in 2016, communities in Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Rural Damascus governorates reported the presence of cluster munition remnants.[127] Prior to the current conflict, the Golan Heights was contaminated by UXO, including unexploded submunitions. There is no national mine action program in Syria. UNMAS deployed a team to southern Turkey in August 2015, and as of March 2017 its focus was on coordination, impact survey, and risk education.[128] Conflict in many governorates has prevented access by mine action organizations. Non-state armed groups and volunteers have conducted clearance immediately after fighting has occurred, despite a lack of adequate training, equipment, and resources.[129]
Ukraine. The full extent of contamination from cluster munitions used by both government and pro-Russian armed opposition forces in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk from mid-2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire is not known. Prior to 2014, cluster munitions had never been used in Ukraine. Mine action operators consist of Ukrainian government authorities, three international NGOs (DDG, Fondation Suisse de Deminage, and HALO Trust) and a national NGO, Demining Team of Ukraine. Only HALO reported survey and clearance of cluster munition contamination in 2016.[130] The clearance results of the government operators were not provided. The UN-led humanitarian coordination system has a mine action sub-cluster, which sits under the Global Protection Cluster.[131] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the GICHD are providing support to establish mine action legislation, policies, coordination, and information management.[132] NATO experts are also supporting the development of the armed forces’ demining capacity.[133]
Vietnam is one of the most cluster munition-contaminated countries in the world as a result of the US use of cluster munitions in 1965–1973 in 55 provinces and cities.[134] The US military also abandoned substantial quantities of cluster munitions.[135] There is no accurate assessment of contamination and no clear data on land release. The Army Engineering Corps has conducted most clearance in the country over the past few years, but as in past years they did not provide data for 2016. Three international NGOs (DDG, MAG, and NPA) conducted survey and clearance in 2016, with increased results.
Yemen. Since the start of the latest conflict in March 2015, intensive air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition have resulted in significant contamination that poses a threat to the civilian population.[136] The Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has identified heavy cluster munition contamination in Saada governorate as well as contamination in Amran, Hodaida, Mawit, and Sanaa governorates, including in Sanaa city.[137] Cluster munition contamination has also been reported in Hajjah governorate.[138] Most is in areas of ongoing conflict and the full extent is not known. Contamination also results from use in 2009 and perhaps earlier. There are some 18km2 of suspected contamination with submunitions in the northern Saada governorate predating the current conflict.[139] All survey and clearance is conducted by YEMAC. In 2016, YEMAC conducted clearance in nine governorates tackling high-threat, high-impact spot tasks, but it did not conduct systematic clearance.[140]
Kosovo is affected by cluster munitions used by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Armed Forces in 1998–1999 and by a NATO air campaign in 1999.[141] After demining operations finished in 2001, the UN reported the problem as virtually eliminated.[142] However, subsequent surveys since 2008 have identified contaminated areas.[143] At the end of 2015, areas of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Kosovo doubled from the size reported at the end of 2014, due to the identification of previously unrecorded contamination. By the end of 2016, the total size reported had decreased slightly.[144] Land release was conducted by the Kosovo Security Forces, HALO Trust, and NPA. The capacity of the two international NGOs increased in 2016.[145]
Most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s cluster munition contamination dates from use in 1992–1994 during armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Almost 72km2 affects all regions with more than 75% of the contamination located in three regions: Askeran, Martuni, and Martakert.[146] Survey and clearance was conducted by HALO Trust. In 2016, 2km2 of new contamination was estimated to have resulted from use of cluster munitions in the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April.[147] HALO Trust’s survey teams and the de facto authority conducted rapid survey and clearance close to populated areas.[148] Surface contamination clearance of this new contamination was completed in 2016, and subsurface clearance of agricultural land was completed in February 2017.[149]
Western Sahara. Morocco used cluster munitions against Polisario Front forces during their conflict from 1975 to 1991. Previously undiscovered cluster munition contamination continued to be found in 2016.[150] New strike areas are expected to be found in the future as mine action activities continue and additional information is received from local populations.[151] Some cluster munition contamination is located inside the buffer strip and is inaccessible to clearance operators.[152] A UN Mine Action Coordination Centre is responsible for managing mine action in Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has a local center (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is supported by the UN and is responsible for coordinating mine action activities east of the Berm and for land release activities.[153] Dynasafe MineTech Limited was the only operator tasked with conducting cluster munition survey and clearance during 2016. UNMAS-contracted demining activities were suspended from 20 March to 15 September 2016, following the expulsion of civilian staff members of MINURSO by Morocco.[154]
[1] Contamination exists or is suspected to exist in areas outside of government control.
[2] The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
[3] States Parties with cluster munition remnants: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Chile, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Montenegro, Somalia, and the United Kingdom (UK); signatory: Angola; non-signatories: Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen; and other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.
[4] It is unclear whether there is cluster munition contamination in State Party Colombia. The last known contaminated area in signatory Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was cleared in May 2017. Verification is required before a formal declaration of completion is made.
[5] Response to questionnaire by Mozambique’s National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, IND), received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 25 April 2017; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 23 March 2017.
[6] In some countries, some clearance results were not reported. In addition, in some countries—particularly those experiencing conflict—informal clearance took place and was not recorded.
[7] In South Sudan and Western Sahara, there may be other undiscovered areas of contamination, so the actual extent of contamination may have not decreased. In addition, Sudan reported in 2016 that seven of its nine contaminated areas had been cleared in 2011–2013, leaving approximately 2km2 of remaining contamination. However, it gave no details of the size of areas cleared. Emails from Hatim Khamis Rahama, Technical Advisor, National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 14 June 2017; and from Ali Abd Allatif Ibrahim, NMAC, 18 May 2017.
[8] Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (initial report submitted in August 2016), Form F; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[9] See chapter on Cluster Munition Ban Policy in this report. For Nagorno-Karabakh, see Cluster Munition Monitor 2016.
[10] HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016, bit.ly/HALOclearsKarabakh16.
[11] See the relevant mine action country profiles online for detailed information and sources, available on the Monitor website, the-monitor.org/cp.
[12] Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 4.
[13] Response to questionnaire by Mozambique’s IND, received by email via Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 25 April 2017; and email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 23 March 2017.
[14] Cluster Munition Monitor does not report on Action 3.4, “Be inclusive when developing the plan.” For Action 3.6, “Provide support, assist and cooperate,” please see the Support for Mine Action profiles and annual Landmine Monitor reports.
[15] Email from Nataša Mateković, Assistant Director and Head of Planning and Analysis Department, Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), 22 March 2017.
[16] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 19 April 2017; and Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[17] Interviews with the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) implementing partners, Kabul, May 2013; emails from Brig. Gen. Elie Nassif, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 12 May, 17 June, and 2 July 2015.
[18] Email from Tarik Serak, Head, Department for Mine Action Management, BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 26 May 2016.
[19] NPA, “Cluster Munition Remnants in Montenegro,” July 2013, p. 26, bit.ly/NPARemnantsMontenegro; interview with Milovan Joksimović, Directorate for Emergency Situations, Podgorica, 15 May 2017; and email, 15 June 2017.
[20] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 1 July 2015.
[21] The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
[22] Emails from Ahmed Al-Jasim, Iraqi Department of Mine Action (DMA), 6 April and 23 May 2017.
[23] “Convention on Cluster Munitions Draft 7MSP Progress Report – monitoring progress in implementing the Dubrovnik Action Plan,” submitted by the President of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, undated, covers the period 1 July 2016 until 30 June 2017, bit.ly/7MSPprogressReport. The Cluster Munition Monitor does not report on mine risk education.
[24] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form F, 20 April 2015, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[25] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 27 May 2009, bit.ly/UKstatement09.
[26] In Chile and Germany, the contamination is at military training ranges. In the UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas), areas are marked and fenced.
[27] Email from Mohammed Wakil, MACCA, 1 May 2016; and Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[28] “Proposal for Complete Removal of the Known Cluster Sub-munitions Contamination in Afghanistan,” December 2016.
[29] LMAC, “Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013,” August 2014, bit.ly/LMACreview13.
[30] Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[31] Interview with Milovan Joksimović, Directorate for Emergency Situations, Podgorica, 15 May 2017.
[32] Email from Goran Zdrale, BHMAC, 17 May 2017; and interview with Saša Obradovic, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 10 May 2017.
[33] NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
[34] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 19 April 2017.
[35] The National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), “Mine Action Plan 2014–2019,” May 2014, p. 4, bit.ly/HCNDplan1419.
[36] Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[37] “Badbaado Plan: Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management proposal outlined by the Federal Government of Somalia – Ministry of Internal Security and Somalia Explosive Management Authority,” HMSWQ/31/8/15/025, 31 August 2015; and email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), 14 June 2016.
[38] This action requires that, “States parties will promote and continue to explore methods and technologies which will allow clearance operators to work more efficiently with the right technology to achieve better results as we all strive to attain as quickly as possible the strategic goal of a world free of cluster munitions and its remnants, while also making full use of existing methods and technologies that have proven to be effective.” Dubrovnik Action Plan, Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, undated, p. 13.
[39] See table above, “Cluster Munition Land Release in States Parties.”
[40] See UNMAS Program list at www.mineaction.org/programmes.
[41] Skype interview with Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
[42] Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 5 November 2015.
[43] Email from Anna-Lena Schluchter, containing data from Rana Elias, Focal point for Lebanon, GICHD, 21 June 2017.
[44] Available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
[45] Whether there is contamination or the extent of it is not known in non-signatories Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Iran, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen, and in signatory Angola.
[46] Whether there is contamination or the extent of it is not known in States Parties Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Somalia, and in signatory Angola.
[47] “Mine Action in Ukraine,” Side-event presentation by Lt. Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and interviews, in Geneva, 19 February and 20 May 2016.
[48] Email from Mohammed Wakil, Chief of Staff, MACCA, 1 May 2016.
[49] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 23 May 2017.
[50] Statement of Somalia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2–5 September 2014, bit.ly/7MSPSomalia.
[51] UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia,” undated.
[52] Email from Tom Griffiths, HALO Trust, 31 May 2017.
[53] PowerPoint presentation by Mohammad Turjoman, LibMAC, at the National Programme Director’s Meeting, Geneva, 8 February 2017.
[54] Email from Lyuba Guerassimova, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 28 February 2017; Implementing Partners Coordination Meeting, Tunis, 19 January 2017; and emails from Lutz Kosewsky, Danish Deming Group (DDG), 22 February 2017; and from Catherine Smith, Handicap International (HI), 22 February 2017.
[55] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 10 May 2017; and from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
[56] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” undated.
[58] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 7 June 2017.
[59] Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Danish Refugee Council, “Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan,” 12 April 2016, bit.ly/DRCSouthSudan16; and emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 10 May 2017, and 21 October 2016.
[60] NMAC, “Updated Work Plan to Meet Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Article Five Extended Deadline by April 2019,” 29 April 2016, bit.ly/NMACplanSudan16.
[61] Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017; and from Henry Leach, Head of Programme, DDG Ukraine, 29 May 2017.
[62] Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015, bit.ly/14MSPUkraine.
[63] Emails from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May and 17 June 2016; and from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016.
[64] See for instance, UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” updated March 2016; and presentation by Raed Al Saleh, Director, Syria Civil Defence, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, 6 September 2016.
[65] UNDP, Support to Eliminate Mines and Explosive Remnants of War, Annual Progress Report 2016 (Yemen, 2017), p. 6.
[66] Interviews with Stephen Bryant, UNDP, Geneva, 6 February 2017; and with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 9 June 2017.
[67] In Azerbaijan, around one fifth of the territory is occupied by Armenia. In Georgia, South Ossetia is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO clearance operators.
[68] HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016 bit.ly/HALOclearsKarabakh16; and email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.
[69] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8; R. Gladstone, “Morocco Orders U.N. to Cut Staff in Disputed Western Sahara Territory,” The New York Times, 17 March 2016, bit.ly/NYTMorocco16; and What’s in Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO Adoption,” 26 April 2016, bit.ly/WSaharaMeeting.
[70] The buffer strip is an area 5km wide, east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated, bit.ly/WSaharaCeaseFire
[71] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15 April 2013, bit.ly/CMCintersessional13Afghanistan.
[72] HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Mines Action Canada, Ottawa, May 2009), p. 27; and interviews with demining operators, Kabul, 12–18 June 2010.
[73] Emails from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, Operations R&D Manager, UNMAS/DMAC, 10 and 15 May 2017; and interviews with MACCA Implementing Partners, Kabul, May 2013.
[74] “Proposal for Complete Removal of the Known Cluster Sub-munitions Contamination in Afghanistan,” undated but 2016, p. 18, document received from DMAC by email, 19 February 2017.
[75] Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, UNMAS/DMAC, 10 May 2017.
[76] Email from Mohammed Wakil, Chief of Staff, MACCA, 1 May 2016.
[77] NPA, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Sarajevo, undated but 2010, provided by email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 3 June 2010.
[78] Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
[79] Email from Goran Zdrale, BHMAC, 17 May 2017.
[80] Chad, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Forms F and H bit.ly/CCMArt7database; and email from Llewelyn Jones, Director of Programmes, MAG, 31 May 2016.
[81] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 2 May 2016; and HI, “Landmine Clearance Efforts Begin in Chad,” undated, bit.ly/HIclearsChad.
[82] C. Osorio, “Colombia destruye sus últimas bombas de tipo racimo” (“Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs”), Agence France-Presse, 7 May 2009; and Ministry of National Defense presentation on cluster munitions, Bogotá, December 2010.
[83] Colombia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (initial report submitted in August 2016), Form F; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[84] CROMAC, “Mine Action in Croatia and Mine Situation,” undated, www.hcr.hr/en/minSituac.asp.
[85] Email from Nataša Mateković, Assistant Director and Head of Planning and Analysis Department, CROMAC, 22 March 2017.
[86] Email from Nataša Mateković, CROMAC, 20 June 2017; and Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[87] Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form F, 20 April 2015, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[88] Ibid.; and Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2012, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[89] Email from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 19 April 2017; and Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[90] Emails from official from the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, German Federal Foreign Office, 19 April and 13 June 2017; and Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[91] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.
[92] Emails from Khatab Omer Ahmad, Planning Manager, Directorate General of Technical Affairs, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 8 April 2017.
[93] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 4 May 2017.
[94] “US bombing records in Laos, 1964–73, Congressional Record,” 14 May 1975; NRA, UXO Sector Annual Report 2009 (Vientiane, 2010), p. 13, bit.ly/NRAUXOrep09; and Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database.
[95] Information provided by Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 27 April 2017.
[96] NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
[97] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.
[99] LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011, bit.ly/LMACstrategy11; and responses to NPA questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 12 May and 17 June 2015.
[100] Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database; and emails from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, LMAC, 24 April and 9 June 2017.
[101] Email from Brig.-Gen. Nasr, LMAC, 24 April 2017.
[102] MAG, “Cluster Munition Contamination in Lebanon using survey data,” September 2014, p. 4, bit.ly/MAGLebanoncontamination.
[103] NPA, “Cluster Munition Remnants in Montenegro,” July 2013, p. 21, bit.ly/NPARemnantsMontenegro.
[104] Montenegro, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form F; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form F, bit.ly/CCMArt7database; and NPA, “Cluster Munition Remnants in Montenegro,” July 2013, p. 26, bit.ly/NPARemnantsMontenegro. There is a discrepancy in the locations reported as contaminated between the Article 7 reports and NPA.
[105] Email from Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, 16 June 2015.
[106] Interview with Milovan Joksimović, Directorate for Emergency Situations, Podgorica, 15 May 2017.
[107] Statement by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, IND, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 4 September 2014.
[108] Skype interview with Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
[109] Emails from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016, and 23 March 2017.
[110] Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
[111] UNMAS, “UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019,” undated, provided by email from Kjell Ivar Breili, Project Manager, Humanitarian Explosive Management Project, UNMAS Somalia, 7 July 2015; and email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Somali National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), 17 April 2013.
[112] UN Security Council, “Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171–173.
[113] UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia,” undated.
[114] Letter to Landmine Action from Lt. Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.
[115] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 1 July 2015.
[116] Interview with an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, London, 16 March 2017; and email, 2 June 2017.
[117] South East Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in D. McCracken, “National Explosive Remnants of War Study, Cambodia,” NPA in collaboration with CMAA, Phnom Penh, March 2006, p. 15; HRW, “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” April 2008, bit.ly/HRWCMinAsiaPacific; and HI, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions (HI, Brussels, November 2006), p. 11, bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007.
[118] Aina Ostreng, “Norwegian People’s Aid clears cluster bombs after clash in Cambodia,” NPA, 19 May 2011, bit.ly/NPACambodia2011.
[119] Email from Prom Serey Audom, Assistant to the Secretary General, CMAA, 2 May 2017.
[120] Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 23 August 2014, bit.ly/CMMSSudanBanPolicy14. See also, UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26, bit.ly/UNMISSReport14.
[121] UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also, UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26, bit.ly/UNMISSReport14.
[122] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017.
[123] UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” January 2017.
[124] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, 2012, p. iv, bit.ly/SSudanMineActionPlan1216.
[125] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 10 May 2017; and from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.
[126] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 7 June 2017.
[127] UNMAS/NPM, “Rapid Assessment on Mine Action,” November 2016, pp. 6–7.
[128] UNMAS Programme, “Syria,” updated March 2017, www.mineaction.org/programmes/syria.
[129] See for instance, UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” updated March 2016; and presentation by Raed Al Saleh, Director, Syria Civil Defence, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, 6 September 2016.
[130] Email from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust, 24 May 2017.
[131] UN Ukraine, “Joint UN Mission to Assess Mine Action Needs in Ukraine,” 25 January 2016, bit.ly/UNMissionMineActionUkraine.
[132] “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine, at the 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016; and email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE Project Coordinator, 26 June 2017.
[133] National Security and Defence Council and the SESU, “Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges,” Ukraine Side-event, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Operations UNIFIER,” undated.
[134] “Vietnam mine/ERW (including cluster munitions) contamination, impacts and clearance requirements,” presentation by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
[135] Interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
[136] UNDP, “Grant Progress Report for the period 1 October 2015–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016.
[137] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 February 2016; and with Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP, Geneva, 6 February 2017.
[138] Amnesty International, “Yemen: children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb ‘minefields,’” 23 May 2016, bit.ly/AmnestyYemen23May2016.
[139] Email from Ali al-Kadri, General Director, YEMAC, 20 March 2014.
[140] UNDP, Support to Eliminate Mines and Explosive Remnants of War, Annual Progress Report 2016 (Yemen, 2017), p. 8; and “YEMAC productivity February – December 2016,” received from the UNDP by email, 5 April 2017.
[141] See, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), “UNMIK OKPCC EOD Management Section Annual Report 2005,” Pristina, 18 January 2006, p. 2; and ICRC, Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo (Geneva, revised June 2001), pp. 6 and 15, bit.ly/ICRCERWinKosovo01.
[142] “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001,” Mine Action Coordination Cell, Pristina, undated but 2002, p. 1.
[143] HALO Trust, “Failing the Kosovars: The Hidden Impact and Threat from ERW,” 15 December 2006, p. 1.
[144] Emails from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 12 April 2016, and 20 February 2017.
[145] Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 20 February 2017.
[146] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.
[147] HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016, bit.ly/HALOclearsKarabakh16.
[148] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.
[149] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.
[150] Email from Virginie Auger, UNMAS, 15 March 2017.
[151] Emails from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 23 May 2016; and from Gordan Novak, AOAV Western Sahara, 25 July 2014.
[152] The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated, bit.ly/WSaharaCeaseFire.
[153] Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014; and email, 25 February 2014.
[154] “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8, http://www.undocs.org/S/2017/307; R. Gladstone, “Morocco Orders U.N. to Cut Staff in Disputed Western Sahara Territory,” The New York Times, 17 March 2016, bit.ly/NYTMorocco16; and What’s in Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO Adoption,” 26 April 2016, bit.ly/MINURSOWSahara16.