Source: https://casetext.com/case/w-pa-soc-workers-v-conn-gen-life
Timestamp: 2019-10-22 06:18:23
Document Index: 68172755

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 27', '§ 11', '§ 4', '§ 552', '§ 3503', '§ 7', '§ 3503', '§ 3503', '§ 2', '§ 3503']

W. Pa. Soc. Workers v. Conn. Gen. Life, 512 Pa. 23 | Casetext
W. Pa. Soc. Workers v. Conn. Gen. Life
512 Pa. 23 (Pa. 1986)
W. Pa. Soc. Workersv.Conn. Gen. Life
Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaOct 6, 1986
New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B
This Court further takes judicial notice of the fact that this decline has been accompanied and caused by the…
Coatesville Dev. v. United Food Wkrs
Reargument before the court en banc was granted, and the parties were given permission to file supplemental…
holding that, although Pennsylvania constitution provides more expansive protection of free speech than federal constitution, it does not confer right to solicit signatures for gubernatorial candidate's nominating petition in privately owned shopping mall
Summary of this case from United Food Comm. v. Crystal Mall
holding that a private shopping mall was not a public forum, so that individuals had no constitutionally protected right to solicit signatures for political purposes on the premises
Summary of this case from Philadelphia Fraternal Order v. Rendell
recounting origin and evolution of Article I rights during post-colonial period
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, Allegheny County, No. GD 82-09493, Nicholas P. Papadakos, J.
Jon Pushinsky, Pittsburgh, for appellants.
Eric A. Schaffer, Kenneth C. Kettering, Douglas Y. Christian, Reed, Smith, Shaw McClay, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Appellants are a political committee, its chairman, gubernatorial candidate and a campaign worker. They appeal by allowance a Superior Court order, 335 Pa. Super. 493, 485 A.2d 1, affirming Allegheny County Common Pleas. Common Pleas had dismissed their suit for a mandatory injunction directing appellee, owner of a shopping mall, to cease interfering with appellants' political activities on appellee's premises. Appellants claim that they have the right, under the Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantees of free speech and petition, to collect signatures on the gubernatorial candidate's nominating petition in privately-owned shopping malls and that appellee cannot deny them access to its mall for that purpose.
Appellant claims rights under Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Art. I, § 2 states:
Appellants' claim no rights under the United States Constitution. They concede that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution only protects the right of free speech against governmental restraint, not against the actions of private property owners whose property is being used for a private purpose. This concession is required by the authoritative holdings of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972).
In the spring of 1982, appellants began a drive to collect signatures on nominating papers in an effort to place a candidate on that November's gubernatorial ballot. They sought permission to solicit signatures and educate the public about their cause in a shopping mall known as South Hills Village. South Hills Village is a large enclosed shopping mall in suburban Pittsburgh. The mall contains approximately one million square feet of enclosed space, hosts some 126 stores and is circumscribed by a 5000-vehicle parking lot. It was opened in 1964; appellee has owned it since 1982. The mall has a uniform policy of forbidding all political solicitation and appellants' request was denied. Rather than risk criminal prosecution by soliciting signatures in the face of this policy, appellants filed a complaint in equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. They sought to enjoin appellee from enforcing its no political solicitation policy on the ground that it violated their speech and petition rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const., art. I, §§ 2, 7, 20.
The crux of appellants' argument is that the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution set out at footnote 1 of this opinion, at 1332, provide greater free speech and petition rights than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. They assert that these greater rights include the right to solicit signatures and educate the public about their political cause in a privately-owned shopping mall.
In our federal system, the Constitution of the United States provides a minimum level of protection for individual rights. A state constitution may, however, provide greater protection for those rights. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). We have recognized that Pennsylvania may afford greater protection to individual rights under its Constitution. Commonwealth v. Tate, supra; R. Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law, 116-19 (1985).
We note in this connection that two conflicting individual rights are implicated in this case, viz. "property" and "political speech." Art. I, § 1 guarantees "certain inherent and indefeasible rights" including the right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property[.]" For the reasons set forth below, the absence of governmental action on this record makes it unnecessary for us to balance these interests, as appellants contend.
V. That that part of the constitution of this commonwealth called "A declaration of the rights of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania," requires alterations and amendments, in such manner as that the rights of the people, reserved and excepted out of the general powers of government, may be more accurately defined and secured[.] . . ."
Considering the foregoing history, we conclude that the Declaration of Rights is a limitation on the power of state government. Accord R. Woodside, supra, at 113. The Pennsylvania Constitution did not create these rights. The Declaration of Rights assumes their existence as inherent in man's nature. It prohibits the government from intefering with them and leaves adjustment of the inevitable conflicts among them to private interaction, so long as that interaction is peaceable and non-violent. This Court has consistently held this view, that the Pennsylvania Constitution's Declaration of Rights is a limit on our state government's general power. O'Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 22 A.2d 25 (1941). Commonwealth ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 193 A. 628 (1937); Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 33 A. 67 (1895). It has also followed this premise in holding that particular sections of the Declaration of Rights represent specific limits on governmental power. Thus, in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961), the Court held that Article I, Section 7 prevents Commonwealth agencies from imposing prior restraints on the communication of thoughts and opinions of individuals. Therein we stated:
Id., 405 Pa. at 88, 173 A.2d at 62.
For similar language see Willing v. Mazzocone, 482 Pa. 377, 393 A.2d 1155 (1978) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (dealing with art. I, § 7); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (dealing with art. I, § 27).
We believe, however, the adjustment of these rights among private parties is not necessarily a matter of constitutional dimensions. If it were, significant governmental intrusion into private individuals' affairs and relations would be likely to routinely occur. This intrusion itself would deprive individuals of important rights of freedom. Free people regulate their private affairs through individual adjustment. We should be wary of insulating that development against legislative, judicial or private change by enshrining a particular position in the text of the constitution. Social and economic developments require a flexible legal framework which can adapt to them. Our common law provides such a framework.
The drafters of the constitution assumed the existence of a body of civil law, common and statutory, which governs violations of rights and breaches of duties between individuals. Constitutions, long-lasting and difficult to change, primarily govern relationships between an individual and the state. The civil law, which must permit flexible and continuing development as society changes, primarily governs relationships between individuals.
The 1776 Constitution established courts for the settlement of disputes between individuals and guaranteed the right to jury trial consistent with former practice. Pa. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 11; Frame of Government, §§ 4, 25. See also Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 A. 574 (1936); Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862).
The social and economic development with which we are concerned here is the ongoing substitution of enclosed shopping malls for individual retail stores clustered in downtown shopping areas. These stores were themselves substitutes for the open sheds of the colonial market which was generally located on public ground. Despite these developments in the past two hundred years, common law has not yet given an individual the general right to enter upon the private property of another. Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232 (1952); Hobbs v. Geiss, 13 S R 417 (1826). Moreover, even if invited for one purpose, the invitee has no recognized right to engage in another activity against the landowner's wishes. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970). Here, the public at large, including appellants, were invited to South Hills Village for commercial purposes: shopping, dining and entertainment. Political solicitation was uniformly forbidden.
Appellants' argument that shopping malls have usurped the function of "Main Street, U.S.A." and town business districts is not lost on us. Both statistics and common experience show that business districts, particularly in small and medium sized towns, have suffered a marked decline. At the same time, shopping malls, replete with creature comforts, have boomed. These malls have begun to serve as social as well as commercial outlets for the communities they serve. Young people often come to a mall to socialize with their peers. Older people come to enjoy the parklike atmosphere offered in many malls or to view displays erected in the corridors. Members of the community have an opportunity by chance or design to mix, meet and converse. However, these social benefits are ancillary to the commercial purpose of shopping malls and do not involve organized campaigns on particular issues by political or special interest groups. Law and sociology are not coextensive. Though shopping malls may fulfill some of the societal functions of the traditional main street or town market place, we do not believe that this makes them their legal equivalent. Nor does it yet require them to provide a political forum for persons or groups with views on public issues, so long as the owner does not grant unfair advantage to particular interests or groups by making his premises arbitrarily available to those he favors while excluding all others. See Commonwealth v. Tate, supra.
This caveat does not apply to non-political, charitable groups. A mall owner may pick and choose among them because political solicitation is not involved.
Appellants argue that our decision in Commonwealth v. Tate, supra, controls this case. We agree that it controls. However, it does not help these appellants. In our view, it demonstrates a limiting rationale for applying our constitution's rights of speech and assembly to property private in name but used in fact as a forum for public debate. In Tate, a private institution of higher learning sponsored a community anti-crime symposium which included a speech by then FBI Director Clarence Kelley. The symposium was open to the public; in fact, the public was encouraged to attend. Appellants, the Lehigh-Pocono Committee of Concern (LEPOCO), sought to peacefully protest against Director Kelley because of his refusal to supply them with information they had requested under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1982), and to protest generally against FBI policies. The College summarily denied LEPOCO's request for a permit; apparently no criteria for granting or denying permits existed. On the day of Director Kelley's speech, members of LEPOCO entered the campus and peacefully distributed leaflets near the auditorium. Twice college officials and the police asked them to leave; they refused. The protesters were arrested for defiant trespass, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b). We held that LEPOCO members had a right to speak freely without fear of criminal conviction under art. I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because the college had made itself into a public forum and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(2) provided a defense to a charge of defiant trespass in those circumstances.
Tate relies in part on Section 3503(c)(2) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(2), which states:
Muhlenberg College not only permitted the public to walk its campus freely and use many of its facilities; it also permitted the Muhlenberg Board of Associates to hold public events on campus for the benefit of the community, thereby enhancing the college's reputation. But the "Citizens' Crusade Against Crime" in March of 1976 did more than benefit the community and college. It also provided a public forum for the Director of the F.B.I., then a controversial public figure. . . ..
Through public advertisements, the Board of Associates assembled a public audience on the Muhlenberg College campus to hear F.B.I. Director Kelley present his views. In these circumstances, the college could not, consistent with the invaluable rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and petition constitutionally guaranteed by this Commonwealth to its citizens, exercise its right of property to invoke a standardless permit requirement and the state's defiant trespass law to prevent appellants from peacefully presenting their point of view to this indisputably relevant audience in an area of the college normally open to the public.
Similarly, the company town analysis embraced by the United States Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946), is inapplicable. The United States Supreme Court has not applied the Marsh rationale to shopping malls as a matter of federal constitutional law. Hudgens v. NLRB, supra; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra. We believe that refusal is correct and find it persuasive under our own constitution. The appellant in Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, sought to distribute religious literature on the streets of Chickasaw, Mississippi. Chickasaw was a company town; it was fully owned by a private corporation. All solicitation was forbidden by the town's management. Appellant refused to leave and was arrested for criminal trespass. The United States Supreme Court found that the town of Chickasaw performed all of the normal municipal functions, and other than the fact that the land was titled to a private corporation, it was indistinguishable from a municipality. 326 U.S. at 502-03, 66 S.Ct. at 276-77. The Court held that an entity which functions as a municipal government cannot abridge constitutionally-guaranteed rights regardless of the town's ownership. 326 U.S. at 507-09, 66 S.Ct. at 279-80.
We are aware that the Supreme Court of California has held that the petition and free speech provisions of its constitution confer a positive right to solicit signatures for political purposes in a privately owned shopping mall. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff'd. 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). Those provisions are substantially the same as our own. Although the facts of Pruneyard are almost identical to this case, the Pruneyard rationale is grounded in California law. The California Court, after generally observing that free speech and petition rights are very important in California, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 858-59, 592 P.2d at 345-46, pointed to provisions of the California Constitution similar to ours and held them more expansive than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 153 Cal.Rptr. at 859, 592 P.2d at 346. We agree with the California Court that these rights are basic and important. We also believe the text of our constitution, like theirs, indicates a more expansive protection than the First Amendment. Indeed, we implicitly recognized that in Tate. However, we cannot agree with Pruneyard's holding that the state, as a matter of positive law, may constitutionally interfere with a private person who uniformly precludes political activities on his property.
Pruneyard, supra, dealt with a large enclosed shopping mall with a uniform no political solicitation policy. A group of high school students sought to collect signatures on a petition opposing an United Nations resolution condemning "Zionism." The students were asked to leave by the mall's security officers and brought a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the mall's regulation. 153 Cal.Rptr. at 855, 592 P.2d at 342.
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech and press." Cal. Const., art. I, § 2.
The highest courts of other jurisdictions are divided on this issue. In a plurality decision, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the speech and petition provisions of the Washington Constitution were modeled on the California Constitution and entered an order consistent with Pruneyard. Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has also held that its state constitution confers a right to solicit signatures in a shopping mall. Batchelder v. Allied Stores International, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983). It based its decision on the right to petition and seek office. The language of this section of the Massachusetts Constitution is substantially different from the language in Article I, Section 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court did not reach the free speech provision.
Article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states:
Unlike California, Massachusetts and Washington, other sister jurisdictions in addressing these situations have reached the result we do today. We believe that their position is more nearly correct. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984), held that the Connecticut Constitution did not confer a right to solicit signatures in a privately owned shopping mall. The court rejected the Pruneyard analysis and held that the history of the Connecticut Constitution shows that their Declaration of Rights is a restraint on the government and does not confer positive rights. The court also refused to exercise the state's police power, in deference to the legislature.
In Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court also found no right to solicit signatures in a shopping mall under its constitution. The court held that the Michigan Constitution is a restraint on governmental inteference with rights. It discussed and rejected both Pruneyard, supra, and Alderwood, supra, and refused to invade the legislature's domain by exercising the state's police powers.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also considered this question. State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981). The court held that it would not find a state constitutional right to solicit signatures in a privately owned shopping center parking lot. However, the opinion did not discuss the issue at length.
Underlying the California Supreme Court's decision is an analysis of its constitution in terms of positive law. That jurisprudential theory is inconsistent with our constitution's historical basis in natural law. The California rationale also seems to assume that a mall owner may freely exclude all political solicitation, including solicitation on behalf of generally approved groups and ideas, without suffering commercial harm at the hands of competitors who would seek to increase good will and customers by inviting local organizations with generally approved political or social programs into their confines. We are not prepared to make that assumption. We believe that in the area of individual right the forces of competition are more likely than government inteference and regulation to open up our malls to peaceful political activity by all groups. The Tate analysis facilitates this adjustment.
Every citizen of this country and Commonwealth has a right to hold whatever political, religious, social and philosophical beliefs and viewpoints that he or she chooses, and should also be free to entertain similar-minded persons on their own private property and domain without interference from others. Muhlenberg College is a private corporation and, as such and like all other private citizens of this Commonwealth, should have the right to invite whom it wishes onto its own property and to exclude any other private persons from entering on that property. To carve out exceptions to this right and to engage in the majority's "balancing" of constitutional interests vis-a-vis private citizens creates for property owners confusion and uncertainty in the law, and chills the exercise of property rights.
On the whole I agree with the outline of the grand scheme of governmental powers described in the plurality opinion. The federal government possesses limited powers delegated by the states and enumerated in the United States Constitution. The state government possesses general powers founded on the authority of the people, with the exception of certain matters as to which the powers of the state are limited and the rights of the people are declared inviolable. I further agree that our Constitution's Declaration of Rights, and each of its sections, primarily governs relationships between the individual and the state, by way of setting limits on the state government's general power; the civil law primarily governs relationships between and among individuals. Where conditions evidence a need for something more than individual ad hoc adjustment of rights, it is ordinarily for the legislature to fashion a priori rules of conduct, and for the courts to assess conduct post hoc according to established normative precepts.
As does the plurality opinion, I find Tate distinguishable at least insofar as it involved the affirmative defense to a charge of defiant trespass found in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b). See at 1336, n. 5. This statute expresses the legislative judgment, of the type discussed above, that in some conditions private property interests are not protected by the power of the state to impose criminal penalties. Those conditions are that the property was "at the time open to members of the public" and that the actor "complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining on the premises."
In the present case we need say no more than this: the individual property owner has determined not to allow any persons onto its property for purposes of solicitation; the legislature has not seen fit to regulate the right of property ownership so as to require an owner to permit entry for these purposes; and no tenet of the common law either directly or by analogy establishes the asserted speech and assembly rights as preeminent over the right of maintaining the close of private property. The Appellants, therefore, have no affirmative legal right to enter the appellee's property on which the injunction sought could have been granted.
Neither am I prepared to accept the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981) under the present facts.
The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court persuasively argues that, unlike its federal counterpart, the Declaration of Rights contained in Article I of our Constitution "assumes their existence as inherent in a man's nature." At 30. I join in the conclusion that "[t]hese rights are specifically reserved to the people; each inhabitant of the Commonwealth, . . . ." (emphasis added). At 31. Thus, the limitation in federal constitutional decisions to matters involving "state action" is not applicable in an analysis where it is alleged that one of these rights conferred under our constitution has been violated. See Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner of Commonwealth, 505 Pa. 571, 585, 482 A.2d 542, 549 (1984). (Language of Pennsylvania Constitution, not "state action" test, controls its applicability.) To this extent, I am in complete agreement with the view expressed in the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court.
Private ownership is a generic term for many different relationships. For instance, it embraces residences, nonprofit ventures, and purely commercial ventures; it also encompasses different levels of public involvement. In this instance we are faced with the type of private ownership which is comparable to the main commercial area in a given community, a place that has traditionally been an accepted forum for the appropriate expression and exchange of ideas, political and otherwise. The mere fact that it is privately owned should not be the controlling factor in the judgment to be made in this decision. Political expression, even though it may be unpopular at any given time, is certainly one of the rights that fall within the penumbra of rights articulated under our Declaration of Rights. When it is established that it is done in an unobtrusive and orderly fashion, without harrassment to those who do not wish to engage in such an exchange, I do not find the basis for concluding that the mere fact that the area is privately owned would necessarily preclude the activity.