Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/911/1422/143505/
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 01:21:02
Document Index: 220644649

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 1503', '§ 7206', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 7206', '§ 371', '§ 7206', '§ 1503', '§ 3161', '§ 3162']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Arthur P. Tranakos, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Pilgrim, Defendant-appellant, 911 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Arthur P. Tranakos, Defendant-appellant.united Stat...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Arthur P. Tranakos, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. William Pilgrim, Defendant-appellant, 911 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1990)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 911 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1990) Aug. 15, 1990
Arthur Tranakos and William Pilgrim appeal their convictions for conspiring to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and obstructing justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Tranakos also appeals a conviction for preparing and presenting fraudulent tax returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). We affirm.
In October 1983, Judge Kane dismissed the indictment for prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223, 234 (D. Wyo. 1983). We reversed. United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1985). The defendants moved for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, Lowell Anderson died. The motion was denied, and the final mandate issued on May 1, 1986.
The defendants claim that the seventy days within which the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, required that they be brought to trial elapsed1 between the hearing before Judge Johnson in January 1987 and the reassignment of the case to Judge Anderson in March 1988.2 The government contends that the period was excluded from the time calculation by section 3161(h) (1) (F), which excludes " [a]ny period of delay resulting from ... any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." The defendants respond that no motion was pending, and that section 3161(h) (1) (F) should not apply to these facts anyway.
"I have filed a motion to dismiss Count [s] 7 and 8, Your Honor, and ... I don't want to withdraw those motions yet, but I'm still trying to conduct discovery.... But if you'll just hold that I might try to reurge that later...."R.Supp. Vol. II at 34-35.3 This motion remained pending until Judge Anderson denied it on April 19, 1988.
Clearly, no nonexcludable time elapsed as to Tranakos between 1987 and 1988. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1) (F). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (7), any "reasonable period of delay" excludable as to one defendant is excludable as to his or her codefendants. In determining whether it is reasonable to apply this delay to Pilgrim as well, we must weigh the "relevant circumstances." United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1986).
One important factor is that Pilgrim was free on bond. See United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d 902, 917 (10th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 881 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 837, 107 L. Ed. 2d 833 (1990); United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d at 1516.
Also, "the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources in trying multiple defendants in a single trial" must be considered. United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d at 1514. Where "the government will recite a single factual history, put on a single array of evidence, and call a single group of witnesses," a single trial is preferred. United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d at 916. This is such a case, for the defendants were charged with a single conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 945 (10th Cir. 1987).
The defendants contend that section 3161(h) (1) (F) does not apply to this case because it excludes delays "resulting from" pending pretrial motions, and this delay actually resulted from the lack of a presiding judge. However, the exclusions in section 3161(h) are automatic, so no inquiry into the true cause of a delay is proper. United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1442-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 195 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008, 107 S. Ct. 3235, 97 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987); United States v. Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 105 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Matsushita, 794 F.2d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Henderson, 746 F.2d 619, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 321, 106 S. Ct. 1871, 90 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1986); United States v. Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368, 1371-72 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Brim, 630 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 966, 101 S. Ct. 3121, 69 L. Ed. 2d 980 (1981).
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 106 S. Ct. 1871, 90 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1986), compels us to apply section 3161(h) (1) (F) automatically. For one thing, the Court quoted with apparent approval the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the exclusion so applies. See id. at 327, 106 S. Ct. at 1875 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 746 F.2d at 622); see also id. 476 U.S. at 332, 106 S. Ct. at 1877 (referring to the period between filing and hearing as "automatically excludable under Sec. 3161(h) (1) (F)").
Moreover, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the First Circuit in United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1985), and remanded it for further consideration in light of Henderson. United States v. McAfee, 479 U.S. 805, 107 S. Ct. 49, 93 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1986). In that case, a pretrial motion was filed, but not taken under advisement for an unreasonably long time. Also, the defendant waived his rights under the Act. The First Circuit held that section 3161(h) (1) (F) excludes only reasonably necessary delays, so not all of the time consumed by the motion in question was excludable. United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 431 (1st Cir. 1984). The court also held that Speedy Trial Act rights are nonwaivable, but a delay actually caused by an attempted waiver should be excluded. Id. at 434. On appeal after remand, the court held that the delay was caused not by the defendant's waiver, but by an "administrative mixup" which prevented the district court from realizing that the case required his attention. United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d at 145-46.
The Supreme Court held in Henderson that section 3161(h) (1) (F) applies to the entire period a motion is pending. See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. at 330, 106 S. Ct. at 1876. After McAfee was vacated and remanded, the defendant argued that section 3161(h) (1) (F) did not apply because the delay had resulted not from the pretrial motion but from the administrative breakdown. The court disagreed.
"First, there would have been no remand in Pringle except for our rule that (F) only permitted reasonably necessary delay. Second, the Court's holding that ' [t]he provisions of the Act are designed to exclude all time that is consumed in placing the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion' must include time consumed because of an administrative mixup. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent: 'There is no requirement that the hearing be held promptly, and the reason for the delay is irrelevant.' "
United States v. McAfee, 808 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. at 331, 334, 106 S. Ct. at 1877, 1878). If section 3161(h) (1) (F) only excluded delays actually caused by pretrial motions, McAfee would not have been vacated.
The defendants also contend that the delay between their indictment and trial violated their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is assessed by balancing the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether the delay prejudiced the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). " [N]o single factor is 'either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.' " Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir.) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936, 107 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986).
The length of the delay is "a triggering mechanism;" only if the period is "presumptively prejudicial" need we inquire into the other factors. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2191. Starting from the date of the indictment, United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 963 (10th Cir. 1987), the delay in this case was nearly six years. While a longer delay is tolerable for a complex conspiracy than for an ordinary crime, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, this delay clearly triggers consideration of the other factors. See United States v. Hay, 527 F.2d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1975) (further analysis triggered by seventeen-month delay in prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 1666, 48 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1976); see also, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 852 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1988).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (footnote omitted).
Delay due to the unavailability of a necessary individual is justified, so the delay caused by codefendant Ellsworth's unavailability shall not be weighed against the government. United States v. Redmond, 546 F.2d 1386, 1388-89 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S. Ct. 1645, 56 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1978).
The same is true of the delay caused by the interlocutory appeal. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S. Ct. 648, 656, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1986).
The difficulty in finding a judge to handle the case weighs against the government. United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 856 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954, 98 S. Ct. 1586, 55 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1978)); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 254 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1979).
The remaining delays are attributable to motions filed and continuances sought by the defendants. These delays do not weigh against the government. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 316-17, 106 S. Ct. at 656-57 (quoting United States v. Auerbach, 420 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905, 90 S. Ct. 2195, 26 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1970)); United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856, 869 (10th Cir. 1982).
We are unimpressed by a defendant who moves for dismissal on speedy trial grounds when his other conduct indicates a contrary desire. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 314-15, 106 S. Ct. at 655-56; see also, e.g., Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1032, 109 S. Ct. 842, 102 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1989). These defendants did not want a speedy trial; they were only interested in delaying the trial or avoiding it altogether. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 535, 92 S. Ct. at 2194.
Two types of prejudice are relevant in this case: anxiety of the defendant and impairment of the defense. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. We presume some prejudice from the fact that the defendants lived for six years "under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety," id. at 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2194. United States v. Huffman, 595 F.2d 551, 558 (10th Cir. 1979). The defendants also claim that their ability to defend themselves was impaired by co-conspirator Lowell Anderson's death and prosecution witness Thomas Woodward's poor memory.
They contend that Anderson, had he survived, would have testified on their behalf, but they have not "stated with particularity ... what exculpatory testimony would have been offered." United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S. Ct. 3180, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1976). Because they "offer [ ] no proof as to how [Anderson], if present, would testify," United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 857, they have failed to show the required "causal relationship between [Anderson's death] and the prejudice claimed," Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d at 257 n. 10. The death of the central figure in the conspiracy, without more, does not establish prejudice. See United States v. Lane, 465 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 1972).
Nor can they claim prejudice from the failure of Woodward's memory. Prejudice occurs only when "defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193 (emphasis added). If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened...." Id. at 521, 92 S. Ct. at 2187, (emphasis added). The failure of a prosecution witness's memory does not support a claim that the Sixth Amendment was violated. See United States v. Tercero, 640 F.2d 190, 195 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084, 101 S. Ct. 871, 66 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1981); United States v. Mulligan, 520 F.2d 1327, 1333 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 919, 96 S. Ct. 1123, 47 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1976); United States v. Shepherd, 511 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 514 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Walker v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972, 94 S. Ct. 3179, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1144 (1974); United States v. Heinlein, 490 F.2d 725, 729 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Morris, 230 Mont. 311, 749 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1988); State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah 1987).6
The Sixth Amendment was not violated. While the delay was quite substantial, most of it was justified. The defendants did not seek a speedy trial, and they have shown little prejudice.7 II.
Both defendants argue that their conspiracy convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Neither defendant denies the existence of a conspiracy to defraud the United States, but each claims not to have been part of the conspiracy. " 'The connection of the defendant to the conspiracy need only be slight, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that connection beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1294 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038, 101 S. Ct. 617, 66 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1980)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 836, 109 S. Ct. 99, 102 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1989). The evidence may be circumstantial. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1987). A defendant who acts in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy may be presumed to be a knowing participant. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1987); see United States v. Pack, 773 F.2d 261, 265-66 (10th Cir. 1985).
Tranakos argues that the conspiracy count should have been dismissed under United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980, 104 S. Ct. 2363, 80 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1984), where the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 of defendants who sold foreign trusts similar to those sold by the defendants herein because "the legality of the tax shelter program ... was completely unsettled by any clearly relevant precedent on the dates alleged in the indictment." Id. at 1428.
The Ninth Circuit has since limited Dahlstrom to defendants who merely advocate tax strategies of debatable legality, as opposed to those who actually assist others in effectuating those strategies. United States v. Krall, 835 F.2d 711, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1987); see United States v. Schulman, 817 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1042, 108 S. Ct. 362, 97 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1987); United States v. Russell, 804 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., concurring). Tranakos did more than advocate the trusts, so he can draw no support from Dahlstrom. See United States v. Vreeken, 803 F.2d 1085, 1091 & n. 2 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S. Ct. 955, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1987).
Of course, the government still must show that the law clearly prohibited this conduct. United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S. Ct. 782, 98 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1988). The trusts were shams to the extent they purported to redirect income, for the putative beneficiary of each trust exercised full control over the putative corpus. Sandvall v. Commissioner, 898 F.2d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Krall, 835 F.2d at 714; Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984). The use of sham transactions to avoid tax liability has long been prohibited. See, e.g., United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 450, 93 S. Ct. 1080, 1086, 35 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1973); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40, 69 S. Ct. 1210, 1212-13, 93 L. Ed. 1659 (1949); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15, 50 S. Ct. 241, 241, 74 L. Ed. 731 (1930).
In addition, Tranakos contends that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 7206(2) cannot stand because the Woodwards altered the returns he prepared before filing them. This argument misstates the evidence.
R.Vol. VIII at 283-84, 313. Tranakos concedes that Roeske lied to the grand jury, but argues that he himself did not "endeavor [ ] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice," 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
One who proposes to another that the other lie in a judicial proceeding is guilty of obstructing justice. United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 973 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1985). The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as much as it does direct commands. See United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 141-43, 41 S. Ct. 260, 260-61, 65 L. Ed. 553 (1921); United States v. Arnold, 773 F.2d 823, 834 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d 1175, 1181 (5th Cir. 1983). A reasonable finder of fact could have decided on this evidence that Tranakos suggested to Roeske that Roeske falsely tell the grand jury that he had no Montana bank accounts.
Finally, Pilgrim contends that the district court erred when it refused to sever the charge of obstructing Woodward's grand jury testimony from the conspiracy count. The government responds that the motion was properly denied because it was too vague. A defendant seeking a severance of counts must show " 'the specific testimony he will present about one offense, and his specific reasons for not testifying about others, to justify severance.' " United States v. Hernandez, 829 F.2d 988, 991 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1013, 108 S. Ct. 1486, 99 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1988); see also United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 291 (10th Cir. 1983).
" [T]aking the witness stand could prove incriminating on the conspiracy count. As just a few examples, Pilgrim might be cross-examined as a lawyer about his knowledge of ethics, trust law, or tax law; about the numerous other events the government contends implicate him in the conspiracy charged; and about other statements Woodward alleges that bear on Defendant Pilgrim's knowledge of the conspiracy."
A sufficiently specific severance motion calls upon the district court to decide whether or not " 'the claim of prejudice is genuine and ... to weigh the considerations of "economy and expedition in judicial administration" against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying.' " United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d at 291 (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964)) (footnotes omitted)). The decision is within the court's sound discretion. United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1988).
The court did not abuse its discretion. The suggested prejudice was not substantial.8 The increase in judicial efficiency from joining the obstruction count with the conspiracy count, when the former was one of the overt acts underlying the latter, was significant. See, e.g., United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1353 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dounias, 777 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Benz, 740 F.2d 903, 912 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817, 106 S. Ct. 62, 88 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1985).
They also contend that the indictment should have been dismissed for a failure to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a), which provides that "the appropriate judicial officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall ... set the case for trial on a day certain." We reject this argument. The Act provides no remedy for a violation of section 3161(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (providing remedies for violations of sections 3161(b) and 3161(c) only). Section 3161(a) is not an independent requirement; it is merely part of the process by which the court can fulfill the Act's time limits. See H.R.Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 7401, 7421-22
Inexplicably, the transcript of this hearing was not included in the original record on appeal. We had to supplement the record before a decision could be rendered. While our rules encourage the omission of superfluous material, see 10th Cir.R. 10.2, proceedings "necessary" to a party's position must be included, Fed. R. App. P. 10(b) (1), (3)
"Our method of [deciding whether or not to apply the exclusion to Pilgrim] is not one of mathematical calculation, but one that considers the purpose of the Speedy Trial Act, the facts of the case, the status of the defendant, and the recommendations of the Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act. As a result, we do not express section 3161(h) (7)'s 'reasonable period' as a fixed span of time, the running of which forces dismissal of an indictment...."
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d at 917. Still, we note that other courts have excluded comparably long delays under section 3161(h) (7). See, e.g., United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 F.2d at 912 (thirteen months); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 921 (8th Cir.) (seventeen months), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S. Ct. 382, 88 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1985).
Some courts, without discussing the issue, have considered claims that the dimming of a prosecution witness's memory prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258, 263 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982). Also, the California Supreme Court has held that the failure of a prosecution witness's memory should be considered, but this holding was under the state constitution. See State v. Hill, 37 Cal. 3d 491, 209 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325, 327, 691 P.2d 989, 991, 993 (1984)