Source: https://www.motorclaimguru.co.uk/blog/archives/04-2016
Timestamp: 2018-07-22 07:05:59
Document Index: 192927069

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.9', 'Art.9', 'Art.12', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.12', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.12', 'art.12', 'art.12', 'art.12', 'art.9', 'Art.12', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.9', 'art.7', 'in fine', 'art 4']

Conman used fake insurance policies to steal hire cars worth over £200k
A conman stole the identities of innocent people, took out fake motor insurance policies and posed as a care assistant who was the victim of a number of car crashes.
Naveed Shah (37) of Blackburn Road, Great Harwood, Lancashire, used the scam to try and steal hire cars – collectively worth £200,000 – that he booked when reporting the fake accidents.
He was caught after a sting operation was carried out by anti-fraud unit, APU Ltd, when he tried to hire a car from accident management firm, Accident Exchange.
Shah pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to make false insurance claims and steal courtesy cars at Preston Crown Court today.
He will return for sentencing on June 16. Judge H. Lloyd warned him that a custodial sentence is “most likely”.
Shah used the false identity details to make hire car bookings with claims firms. He would then change the delivery location at the last minute, typically asking for cars to be handed over in the North of England, often at medical facilities where he claimed to be working or visiting sick relatives.
He fabricated crashes in the South of England, East Midlands and West Midlands and, having obtained a hire car, would quickly dispose of it before adopting a different identity and targeting another hire company.
In total, over £200k worth of cars disappeared without trace, leaving the companies no way of uncovering the true identity of the fraudster.
After attempting to claim a hire car from Accident Exchange, anti-motor fraud specialist, APU Ltd, flagged the claim as suspicious and, with the assistance of leading international law firm Hill Dickinson Solicitors and its Netfoil database, was able to warn other insurers and hire companies of their concerns.
APU Ltd and its team of ex-Police and fraud intelligence officers launched a privately funded investigation including two staged ‘sting’ operations in which Shah was expecting delivery of a hire car but was greeted instead by APU investigators.
Lancashire Police officers were fully briefed and arrested a very surprised Shah on both occasions, with APU then handing over a portfolio of compelling evidence to help them uncover the whole extent of Shah’s offending.
On one occasion, APU Ltd operatives even followed Shah back into a hospital at which he claimed to be working and followed him for 45 minutes as he walked around the facility’s corridors.
APU’s Head of Investigative Services, Neil Thomas, said: “Shah had obviously figured out what he thought was a fool-proof way to steal cars. He’d use a false identity and payment cards to take out motor insurance policies on cars he never owned, and then report fictitious crashes.
This is different to other scams where fraudsters seek personal injury payments, instead Shah was intent on stealing the hire cars and has gone to great lengths to achieve this. In fact if it hadn’t been for way the various parties worked together with Lancashire police, I’m not sure his identity would ever have been uncovered.
“The fact that he has now pleaded guilty to conspiracy and other charges shows he is part of an organised team and not just a minor player who takes delivery of the cars.
“It was a cowardly and pre-meditated scam that affected the individuals whose identities he stole, as well as defrauding the claims companies of money, so I’m pleased that APU has played a key part in bringing him to justice.”
Peter Oakes, head of fraud at Hill Dickinson LLP, said: “This is another demonstrable success as a result of collaboration between APU and Hill Dickinson, driven by Netfoil intelligence and a robust, joined up approach to fraud prevention."
And the charges:
1. Between 1 Jan 2014 and 1 September 2014, that he conspired with person or persons unknown to falsely obtain motor insurance policies and make false claims for compensation in respect of car accidents that had not taken place and thereafter obtain the use of ‘courtesy’ motor vehicles.
2. Between 1 Jan 2014 and 1 September 2014, that he conspired with person or persons unknown to steal motor cars that had been hired as ‘courtesy’ cars.
He was granted bail by Her Honour H. Lloyd at Preston Crown Court to allow pre-sentence reports to be prepared and will appear at back at Preston at 10am on 16th June for sentencing where he was told a custodial sentence was ‘ most likely’.
In total 9 vehicles were stolen.
insurers’ own figures show how little motor fraud there really is, who is perpetrating the #fraud on who? #insurers defrauding consumers?
Just one quarter of one per cent of motor claims are actually proven to be fraudulent, the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) said yesterday after analysing the insurance industry’s own figures.
It claimed that distorted figures on fraud in motor claims have been “swallowed whole by the government” and used to target injured motorists.
“We have discovered motor insurance fraud is actually a fraction of the level so often touted by the insurance industry,” said APIL president Jonathan Wheeler.
“No fraud can ever be justified or condoned. But the fact that there is far less of it than we have all been led to believe, and that it is still being used to justify government proposals to abolish the right to compensation for some whiplash injuries, is an absolute scandal. The government has obviously fallen for the insurance industry’s smokescreen.
“A proper analysis of the insurance industry’s own figures shows that only 0.25 per cent of motor claims are actually proven to be fraudulent.
“That includes policy-holders over-egging their own claims, or making false declarations when they apply for insurance. Only a fraction of those will be whiplash claims – we don’t know how many for certain, because there are no industry figures on this.
“Yet the government claims that removing the right to compensation for some whiplash claims will fight fraud and reduce car insurance premiums.”
James Dalton, the Association of British Insurers’ director of general insurance policy, said: “The insurance industry’s fraud data stands up to scrutiny, which is more than APIL’s groundless assertions do.
“In 2014, insurers detected 67,000 fraudulent motor claims with a total value of £835m. That would represent a staggering additional cost to honest motorists if insurers weren’t cracking down on the cheats so we make no apology for doing so.
“We will continue to press for a compensation system which ensures that genuine claimants receive the compensation they are entitled to at proportionate cost, while protecting honest customers against those who continue to exploit the system through frivolous, exaggerated and fraudulent claims.
“And no doubt the lawyers will continue to complain as they see their lucrative gravy train in danger of hitting the buffers.”
IP Enterprise Court finds repair company infringed car trade marks. Do you advertise repairing a certain #brand ?
The IP Enterprise Court has held that a repair company infringed a figurative EU trade mark incorporating the text "BMW" and registered in relation to car maintenance and repair services on the basis of the use of an identical sign in relation to identical services and the taking of an unfair advantage. The company had displayed the sign at its premises, on a van and on business cards. It was likely that the average consumer would believe that the company's signs would be displayed only on and in the premises of an undertaking that maintained and repaired vehicles if the undertaking was authorised by the owner of the trade marks, BMW. (Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v Technosport London Ltd [2016] EWHC 797)
TECHNOSPORT LONDON LTD
GEORGE AGYETON
Gwilym Harbottle (instructed by Palmer Biggs Legal) for the Claimant
Charles Irvine (instructed by Hoffman-Bokaei) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 1-2 March 2016
(1) Community Trade Mark no. 000091835 in the form of the letters BMW ('the BMW Mark'), registered in respect of, among other things, the following services in Class 37: "maintenance and repair of cars, motors, engines and parts of these goods; cleaning of automobiles; installation services".
(2) Community Trade Mark no. 000091884 ('the Roundel'), a device mark in the following form:
The Roundel is registered in respect of, among other things, similar services in Class 37: "maintenance and repair of cars, motors and engines and parts of these goods; cleaning of automobiles; installation services".(3) International registration no. 1000463 ('the M Logo'), designating the European Union, a device mark in the following form:
The M Logo is registered in respect of, among other things, the following services in Class 37: "Repair and maintenance of motor vehicles and parts thereof and of engines for motor vehicles and parts thereof; tuning of motor vehicles and engines."TLL's uses of signs
The BMW Mark
(1) (i) Mr Agyeton has worn a shirt bearing a sign identical or similar to the BMW Mark in the course of providing TLL's repair and maintenance services;
(ii) Mr Agyeton and/or TLL have owned a Twitter account with the name @TechnosportBMW.The Roundel
(2) TLL has displayed a sign the same as, or similar to the Roundel on
(i) a facia board on the exterior of the Original Premises (which is also shown on the defendants' website at www.technosport.co.uk ('TLL's Website'));
(ii) in the interior of the New Premises particularly on a banner displayed in the reception area,
(iii) on the outside of a van used to conduct the business, and
(iv) on business cards distributed to customers.The M Logo
(3) One or both defendants have displayed two signs on TLL's website, one of which is identical or similar to the M Logo, the other similar to it.
Art.9(1)(a) and (b)
Art.9(1)(c)
Art.12(b) and (c)
Limitation of the effects of a Community trade markA Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using in the course of trade:
(1) Did TLL's use of each of the signs, in the manner in which they were used by TLL, convey to the average consumer (and a substantial proportion of the relevant public) nothing more than that TLL was a specialist in the repair and maintenance of BMW vehicles, using genuine BMW spare parts?
(2) In the case of the BMW Mark and the Roundel, did TLL's use of the corresponding signs without due cause take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the Trade Marks?
(3) Did BMW consent to TLL's use of any of the signs in manner complained of?
(4) Was Mr Agyeton jointly liable with TLL for trade mark infringement and passing off if TLL is found liable?
The message conveyed by TLL's use of the signs
"…it is always a leap of faith with independent BMW garages but George [apparently Mr Agyeton] and his team have my vote."In another forum, other individuals discussed the quality of TLL's services. This forum, called 'the M3cutters' displayed a roundel sign. In October 2013 an individual asked how much TLL charged for a piece of maintenance work that another contributor to the forum had mentioned. This individual said that TLL were not far from him and he was "looking for a good Indy". A response shortly afterwards recommended both TLL and a garage in Cambridge, adding that the downside with the Cambridge garage was "the BMW rates".
"…customers who visit my workshop are normally through a word-of-mouth recommendation from existing customers. When new customers visit the workshop, they are in no way confused as to whether this is BMW dealership or independent specialists. The majority of my network of clients come from BMW forums where people recommend [TLL] as a good and reputable independent specialist."Assuming, as Mr Agyeton said, that customers before 2011 knew that TLL was not an authorised dealer, those who visited TLL from 2012 onwards, when the roundel sign appeared, would in large part have come on the recommendation of an existing customer and apparently would have been told in advance of visiting TLL that it was an independent specialist. Therefore the belief on the part of three of TLL's customers that it was an independent dealer, as was explained to them, proves nothing with regard to the message conveyed by the roundel sign to an unprompted average consumer.
"[45] Where a third party's advertisement suggests that there is an economic link between that third party and the proprietor of the trade mark, the conclusion must be that there is an adverse effect on that mark's function of indicating origin. Similarly, where the advertisement, while not suggesting the existence of an economic link, is vague to such an extent on the origin of the goods or services at issue that reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet users are unable to determine, on the basis of the advertising link and the commercial message attached thereto, whether the advertiser is a third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or whether, on the contrary, it is economically linked to that proprietor, the conclusion must be that there is an adverse effect on that function of the trade mark (Google France and Google, paragraphs 89 and 90, and Portakabin, paragraph 35)."
The M Logo
Did TLL's use of the BMW Mark and the Roundel without due cause take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the Trade Marks?
"[125] Unfair advantage. The Court of Justice described taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of a trade mark in Case C-487/07 L'Oréal SA v Bellure NV [2009] ECR I-5185 at [41] as follows:
'As regards the concept of 'taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark', also referred to as 'parasitism' or 'free-riding', that concept relates not to the detriment caused to the mark but to the advantage taken by the third party as a result of the use of the identical or similar sign. It covers, in particular, cases where, by reason of a transfer of the image of the mark or of the characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, there is clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation.'
[126] The Court of Justice explained the correct approach to determining whether unfair advantage has been taken of the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark in that case as follows:
'44. In order to determine whether the use of a sign takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the mark's reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned. As regards the strength of the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the Court has already held that, the stronger that mark's distinctive character and reputation are, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it. It is also clear from the case-law that, the more immediately and strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the sign is taking, or will take, unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark or is, or will be, detrimental to them (see, to that effect, Intel Corporation, paragraphs 67 to 69).
45. In addition, it must be stated that any such global assessment may also take into account, where necessary, the fact that there is a likelihood of dilution or tarnishment of the mark.
49. In that regard, where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation, to ride on the coattails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark."
[127] It is clear both from the wording of Article 5(2) of the Directive and Article 9(1)(c) of the Regulation and from the case law of the Court of Justice interpreting these provisions that this aspect of the legislation is directed at a particular form of unfair competition. It is also clear from the case law both of the Court of Justice and of the Court of Appeal in this country that the defendant's conduct is most likely to be regarded as unfair where he intends to take advantage of the reputation and goodwill of the trade mark. Nevertheless, in Jack Wills Ltd v House of Fraser (Stores) Ltd [2014] EWHC 110 (Ch), [2014] FSR 39 at [80] I held that there is nothing in the case law to preclude the court from concluding in an appropriate case that the use of a sign the objective effect of which is to enable the defendant to benefit from the reputation and goodwill of the trade mark amounts to unfair advantage even if it is not proved that the defendant subjectively intended to exploit that reputation and goodwill."This case
"[39] Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive embody a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark and accordingly define the rights of proprietors of trade marks in the Community: Silhouette [1999] Ch 77, 97, 98, paras 25 and 29.
[40] Article 5 of the Directive confers on the trade mark proprietor exclusive rights entitling him, inter alia, to prevent all third parties 'not having his consent' from importing goods bearing the mark. Article 7(1) contains an exception to that rule in that it provides that the trade mark proprietor's rights are exhausted where goods have been put on the market in the EEA by the proprietor or 'with his consent'.
[41] It therefore appears that consent, which is tantamount to the proprietor's renunciation of his exclusive right under article 5 of the Directive to prevent all third parties from importing goods bearing his trade mark, constitutes the decisive factor in the extinction of that right.
[42] If the concept of consent were a matter for the national laws of the member states, the consequence for trade mark proprietors could be that protection would vary according to the legal system concerned. The objective of 'the same protection under the legal systems of all the member states' set out in the ninth recital in the Preamble to Directive 89/104, where it is described as 'fundamental', would not be attained.
[43] It therefore falls to the court to supply a uniform interpretation of the concept of "consent" to the placing of goods on the market within the EEA as referred to in article 7(1) of the Directive.
[45] In view of its serious effect in extinguishing the exclusive rights of the proprietors of the trade marks in issue in the main proceedings (rights which enable them to control the initial marketing in the EEA), consent must be so expressed that an intention to renounce those rights is unequivocally demonstrated.
[46] Such intention will normally be gathered from an express statement of consent. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that consent may, in some cases, be inferred from facts and circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods on the market outside the EEA which, in the view of the national court, unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor has renounced his rights.
[47] The answer to the first question referred in each of Cases C-414/99 to C-416/99 must therefore be that, on a proper construction of article 7(1) of the Directive, the consent of a trade mark proprietor to the marketing within the EEA of products bearing that mark which have previously been placed on the market outside the EEA by that proprietor or with his consent may be implied, where it is to be inferred from facts and circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to the placing of the goods on the market outside the EEA which, in the view of the national court, unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor has renounced his right to oppose placing of the goods on the market within the EEA."See also Dalsouple Société Samuroise du Caoutchouc v Dalsouple Direct Limited [2014] EWHC 3963 (Ch); [2015] ETMR 8, at [38].
"You have not been licensed or otherwise authorized to use our trademarks in the course of your trade. Your use of our trademarks creates the impression that you are connected with or approved by our company, which is not the case. This misleading indication is likely to cause confusion between our respective businesses and damage the goodwill of BMW AG. Your infringement of our trademark rights therefore cannot be allowed to continue."
Joint liability of Mr Agyeton
Identicality or similarity of the marks and signs
(1) The Roundel was infringed by TLL pursuant to art.9(1)(a) and 9(1)(c) of the Trade Mark Regulation by reason of the pleaded uses of its roundel sign complained of by BMW.
(2) The M Logo was infringed pursuant to art.9(1)(a) by reason of TLL's use of the M logo sign on its earlier website and pursuant to art.9(1)(b) by reason of the use of the M logo sign on its later website.
(3) The BMW Mark was not infringed by TLL.
(4) TLL has no defence to its infringements pursuant to art.12(b) or (c).
(5) TLL is liable for passing off in relation to its use of its roundel sign and its M logo signs.
(6) Mr Agyeton is jointly liable with TLL for its acts of infringement of two of the Trade Marks and for passing off.
The claimant ('BMW') is a manufacturer of motor vehicles which are sold in this country and elsewhere under that well known mark.
The first defendant ('TLL') is a company dealing in the repair and maintenance of cars, mostly BMWs. It trades in North West London, formerly at 5 Adrian Avenue, Staples Corner, London NW2 1LW ('the Original Premises') and now at Unit 2, Horseshoe Close, London NW2 7JJ ('the New Premises') to which the business moved at the end of 2012.
TLL has used 'BMW', i.e. signs identical to BMW's trade marks, in the course of its business. BMW alleges that in so doing TLL has infringed those trade marks and passed off its services as being associated with, or approved by, BMW.
TLL denies both infringement and passing off. In broad terms it says firstly that its use of the signs did no more than accurately convey the message that TLL was a garage specialising in the maintenance and repair of BMW cars. Secondly, TLL argues that BMW had in any event authorised TLL to use the trade marks.
The second defendant ('Mr Agyeton') is the sole director and shareholder of TLL. BMW alleges that he is jointly liable with TLL.
Three registered trade marks are relied on (collectively 'the Trade Marks'):
The following uses of the Trade Marks have been pleaded by BMW:
Allegations of other uses of signs by TLL cropped up during the trial but it is enough for me to consider the uses pleaded.
BMW alleged that the uses of the signs complained of were in each case an infringement of its corresponding Trade Mark pursuant to art.9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 ('the Trade Mark Regulation') and, in the case of the BMW Mark and the Roundel, also art.9(1)(c) of the Trade Mark Regulation.
BMW alleges that TLL's uses of signs referred to above were likely to lead a substantial proportion of the public or trade to believe that TLL's services were those of BMW, or were associated in the course of trade with BMW. In effect this meant that customers and potential customers of the TLL would be caused to believe that TLL was an approved BMW dealer.
Mr Irvine, who appeared for the defendants, did not dispute that the signs complained of were each either identical or similar to the Trade Mark that the sign was alleged to infringe, and that the services for which they were used were identical or similar to the services in respect of which the Trade Marks were registered. Thus the elements of infringement under both art.9(1)(a) or 9(1)(b) were satisfied subject to the two matters I summarised above. First, TLL argued that its use of the signs was not liable to affect the functions of the Trade Marks. This was because the signs as used by TLL would in each case have conveyed to the average consumer that TLL was a specialist in the repair and maintenance of BMW vehicles, using genuine BMW spare parts. It was common ground that such a message would have been accurate. Secondly, TLL said that BMW had given its consent to the use of the signs.
In relation to art.9(1)(c) Mr Irvine submitted that a further element of infringement was missing, namely that the uses of signs complained of (the BMW and roundel signs) had not taken unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the Trade Mark concerned.
The defendants also relied on art.12(b) and (c) of the Trade Mark Regulation which provides as follows:
Mr Irvine argued that TLL's use of the signs was to indicate a characteristic of TLL's services, namely that genuine spare parts were used (art.12(b)). The use was necessary to indicate the intended purpose of its services, namely that it repaired BMW cars (art.12(c)). But he also submitted that in this case the defence under art.12(b) and (c) stood or fell with his submission under art.9(1) that, as used by TLL, the signs complained of conveyed to the average consumer that TLL was a specialist in the repair and maintenance of BMW vehicles using genuine BMW spare parts. Art.12 therefore did not raise any distinct issue.
Mr Irvine said that the message conveyed to the average consumer (in the trade mark sense) by the signs in issue would be the same as the message conveyed to a substantial proportion of the relevant public in the context of BMW's claim for passing off. There was therefore a large overlap with trade mark infringement. Mr Irvine said that if the message was as the claimants alleged, and there had been no consent by BMW to TLL's use of the signs, it followed that there had been a misrepresentation by TLL. The remaining elements of passing off (goodwill and damage) were satisfied and so TLL would then be liable for passing off.
Pursuant to this, Mr Irvine summarised the issues I had to resolve. He said that they were the following:
Mr Harbottle, who appeared for BMW, did not dissent from this summary of what remained in dispute between the parties, save in one regard. He said that if, which BMW did not accept, there had ever been any consent to what TLL was doing, that consent had been withdrawn before the start of these proceedings.
It was common ground that there are two types of dealer who specialise in the repair and maintenance of BMWs: those that are authorised by BMW and those that are not – often referred to as 'independent' dealers. Joanne Walsh, brand protection manager for BMW (UK) Limited ('BMW UK') explained that in the UK the former have a contractual relationship with BMW UK and the latter do not. Use of the Trade Marks by authorised dealers is governed by a formal licence from BMW through a contract with BMW UK. There is no such licence granted to independent dealers.
However, the fact that there was no formal licence to dealers such as TLL does not answer TLL's main point. In particular BMW concedes, as it must, that certain use of the BMW Mark will not engage art.9. TLL advertising itself to be "The BMW Specialists" on a facia at the front of its premises is an obvious example because in that context the use is not liable to affect any of the functions of the trade marks, see BMW AG v Deenik (Case C-63/97) [1999] ECR I-905 at [37]-[38] and L'Oréal SA v Bellure NV (Case C-487/07) [2009] ECR I-5185 at [57]-[58]. The sign 'BMW' in such a context does not indicate anything inaccurate about the origin of any goods or services provided by BMW, nor does it affect the other functions of the BMW Mark: the guarantee of quality and the functions of communication, investment and advertising. The sign was part of the accurate message that the services offered by TLL involved particular expertise in relation to BMW vehicles.
Mr Irvine submitted that the same applied to all TLL's uses of the BMW sign and also in relation to the roundel and M logo signs as used by TLL. None of them conveyed to the average consumer anything more than that the services provided by TLL were for BMW vehicles and that TLL were specialists in providing maintenance and repair services for BMWs, using genuine BMW parts.
With regard to the roundel sign, Mr Irvine relied on the evidence of Mr Agyeton and in particular copies of pages from forums on the internet exhibited by Mr Agyeton in which users of car repair services stated their views of the services offered by a number of garages, including TLL. In one of these, in December 2011 an individual in London asked about TLL, identified as "a BMW specialist garage" in North London, wondering whether anyone had experience of its services. One reply came in April 2012, in which the respondent highly recommended TLL and said this:
This indicates that two individuals who were familiar with TLL knew that it was not an authorised dealer and a third, who may or may not already have known, was told that it was an independent dealer. But it does not prove anything about their perception of the message conveyed by the roundel sign used by TLL, never mind the perception of the average consumer. Mr Agyeton said that TLL's roundel sign was not used on the facia outside the Original or New Premises, on the banner inside either premises or on the van before 2012. (The date of first use on the business cards was not established.) In his witness statement he said this:
BMW's primary position was that subject to an exception to which I will come, no lawful use could be made of the Roundel by car dealers unless the dealer was authorised. I was directed to agreements which authorised dealers must sign which limits the manner of their use of the Roundel. Mr Harbottle submitted that it was common ground that the average consumer would distinguish authorised dealers from independent dealers, that in fact only authorised dealers displayed the Roundel on and in their premises (with rare infringing exceptions) and it was therefore to be inferred that the average consumer had become educated to believe that the Roundel signified an authorised dealer.
It turned out that BMW was not in a position to take the simple stance that all use of the Roundel in relation to vehicle repairs invariably conveyed to the average consumer that the repairer was authorised by BMW. TLL was supplied with articles to promote the use of genuine BMW spare parts and the packaging for these bore the Roundel. Ms Walsh explained that this was a Genuine Parts Initiative Kit ('GPIK') which was issued to authorised dealers in 2013. It contained items for the dealer, such as a guide, and items which would be passed on to customers such as car air fresheners and key rings. These items had the Roundel on them and the words "Genuine BMW Parts". Ms Walsh said that BMW UK was aware that the authorised dealers would pass on GPIKs to independent dealers with whom they had a relationship, i.e. to whom they supplied BMW parts and did not suggest that this was done without the authority of BMW.
It follows that from 2013 the average consumer, at least in the UK, would have been aware that independent dealers supplied some goods bearing the Roundel promoting genuine BMW spare parts.
The only evidence from consumers of car repair and maintenance services was that concerning the TLL customers and forum users whom I have discussed above, who probably knew in advance of seeing the roundel sign at TLL that TLL was an independent dealer. There was no primary evidence from actual consumers that would shed light on the view taken by the notional average consumer regarding the roundel sign used by TLL. I must nonetheless reach a view on the message conveyed by that sign on the evidence available, bearing in mind that the well established qualities of the average consumer: reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect.
Mr Harbottle referred me to Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer plc [2011] E.C.R. I-8625. This concerned the use by Marks & Spencer of Interflora's trade mark INTERFLORA and variants on that word as keywords on the Google search engine, with the result that individuals using 'Interflora' in a Google search were liable to be presented with an advertisement from Marks & Spencer offering a fresh flower delivery service. The issue in relation to art.9(1)(a) of the Trade Mark Regulation, broadly, was whether Marks & Spencer were using 'Interflora' as sign in relation to the relevant goods and services within the meaning of that article. The Court of Justice held that a trade mark proprietor is entitled to prevent a competitor from using his trade mark as a keyword in an internet referencing service where such use is liable to have an adverse effect on one of the functions of a trade mark, including in particular the function of indicating origin. The Court said this:
Mr Harbottle submitted that an analogy can be drawn between the average consumer's perception of whether there is an economic link between the advertiser and the trade mark proprietor in the circumstances of Interflora and the average consumer's perception of the message conveyed by a trade mark in circumstances such as the present case. I agree. If TLL's use of its roundel sign conveyed a message which was vague, such that the average consumer would have been unable to determine whether there was an economic link between TLL and BMW – specifically whether TLL was an authorised dealer of BMW – I must conclude that TLL's use of its roundel sign adversely affected the function of the Roundel trade mark and thus infringed BMW's trade mark rights.
I take the view and find that it is likely that the average consumer had come to believe that the Roundel would only be displayed on and in the premises of an undertaking which maintains and repairs vehicles if that undertaking was authorised by BMW – because that will have been the almost invariable experience of actual consumers. Even if that had not been the case, at the least TLL's use of the roundel sign on and in its premises would have caused the average consumer to wonder whether TLL was an authorised dealer and thus would have affected the origin function of the Roundel mark.
In relation to this, I think that the average consumer would distinguish between a roundel sign displayed on the outside of a garage or prominently inside the premises, on the one hand, from, on the other hand, a similar sign either on the packaging of spare parts supplied by the garage or on a promotional item, particularly where there are also displayed the words 'Genuine BMW Parts'. The former will convey that the services offered by the garage are authorised. The latter will indicate that the spare parts supplied by the garage come from BMW.
The position is similar in relation to the M Logo. Bettina May, who is internal legal counsel on trade mark, designs and legal issues at BMW, said that the right of dealers in the UK to use the Trade Marks is only granted by means of sub-licences to authorised dealers via BMW UK. The licence is subject to a number of restrictions as to the manner of use of the Trade Marks and does not permit authorised dealers to sub-license independent dealers. So the M Logo will only have been used by authorised dealers, save for the unlawful use by TLL and other unlicensed users from time to time. Unsurprisingly, BMW has a policy of restraining unlicensed use. It is likely that actual consumers, and thus the average consumer, would have taken TLL's use of its M logo signs to mean that TLL was an authorised dealer. I would add that had TLL's use of its M logo signs gone no further than giving the average consumer cause to wonder whether it was an authorised dealer, this would still have been sufficient to affect adversely the origin function of the M Logo.
BMW's pleaded allegations of infringement of the BMW mark concerned the use of the mark in conjunction with TLL's trading name 'Technosport'. Specifically, Mr Agyeton wore a shirt on the breast of which appeared TECHNOSPORT and beneath it BMW. TLL also owns a Twitter account with the name '@TechnosportBMW'. BMW's case was that authorised BMW dealers tend to style themselves by reference to their name immediately followed by BMW. There were examples in the evidence, including 'Stephen James BMW', 'Berry BMW Chiswick' and 'Hexagon BMW'. Mr Agyeton conceded that many authorised dealers presented their trading names alongside BMW in this way. For BMW, Ms Walsh said that the use of the BMW Mark on Mr Agyeton's shirt was not in accordance with the manner of use permitted to authorised dealers.
BMW's argument in relation to the BMW Mark was more subtle and to my mind more flimsy. It was based on the assertion that while the average consumer would not believe that 'BMW' conveys any implication of authorised use in general, it does when immediately attached to a dealer's name. It also conveys that implication where used in a manner which, according to the strictures contained in the contracts with authorised dealers, is not permitted use – such as the manner of representation on Mr Agyeton's shirt. In my view, the burden of establishing that the average consumer's perception of BMW signs embraced such subtleties would require more evidence than BMW produced. It would probably need evidence from actual consumers. I find that TLL's use of its BMW signs did not convey to the average consumer any implication of TLL being an authorised dealer.
The reputation of the BMW Mark and the Roundel within the meaning of art.9(1)(c) was common ground. Mr Irvine also accepted that in the event I were to decide that TLL's use of its BMW and roundel signs took unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the corresponding Trade Marks, there would have been no due cause for so doing. The issue was just whether unfair advantage had been taken.
Arnold J considered the concept in Enterprise Holdings Inc v Europcar Group UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 17 (Ch); [2015] F.S.R. 22:
Mr Agyeton's evidence in cross-examination was that he had used the roundel sign at TLL's premises because it was good for business. He wanted people to see that TLL's business was connected with BMW, though he conceded that TLL's prominent use of the words 'BMW Specialist' meant that the TLL roundel could have added nothing so far as that message was concerned. Mr Agyeton received correspondence from BMW UK in October 2006 which stated that he was not permitted to use BMW's trade marks, to which I will return. In cross-examination Mr Agyeton said that the letter made him realise that BMW was not happy about TLL using the roundel sign, but he used it because was trying to enhance TLL's business in selling the products. He was adamant that this did not mean that he was representing TLL as an authorised dealer.
Notwithstanding Mr Agyeton's claimed intention, I have found that the roundel signs used by TLL did convey to the average consumer that TLL was an authorised dealer. As Arnold J stated in Enterprise Holdings, it is the objective effect of the use of the mark that matters, not the user's subjective intention. TLL's use of its roundel signs therefore took unfair advantage of the repute of the Roundel. In any event, even on Mr Agyeton's claimed subjective view, the roundel signs gave TLL an enhanced ability to trade – apparently an advantage which was something more than being recognised as just a specialist in BMWs. Whatever that something might have been in Mr Agyeton's eyes, it does not seem to have been justified. On that basis also, I think TLL was using the roundel signs to take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the Roundel trade mark.
The position is different in respect of the BMW Mark. I have found that TLL's use of 'BMW' did not convey to the average consumer anything more than that TLL traded or specialised in the maintenance and repair of BMW cars. Mr Agyeton said that his wearing the shirt which BMW complained about "put the ribbon on it", but what he meant by that was not explored. In my view it is by itself insufficient to show that this use of 'BMW' took unfair advantage of the repute or distinctive character of the BMW Mark.
In the absence of express consent by a trade mark proprietor to use his mark, consent will be inferred in only very limited circumstances. In Zino Davidoff SA v A&G Imports Ltd (Joined Cases C-414 to 416/99) [2002] Ch 109 the Court of Justice considered 'consent' within the meaning of art.7 of Directive 89/104/EEC ('the Trade Mark Directive') but indicated that the same considerations applied in relation to all of arts. 5 to 7 of the Trade Mark Directive, equivalent to arts. 9, 12 and 13 of the Trade Mark Regulation:
The defendants did not suggest that BMW had given express consent. They therefore faced the considerable burden of establishing facts which unequivocally demonstrated that BMW had renounced its right to oppose TLL's use of the Trade Marks. The evidence TLL advanced was that individuals from BMW UK and from authorised dealers had visited TLL's premises, that they must have been aware of TLL's use of the Trade Marks and had made no complaint about it.
It is not necessary for me to investigate this. Ms May's unchallenged evidence was that in the UK licences under the Trade Marks could only be granted by BMW UK with BMW's consent, that there had been no such consent other than in relation to authorised UK BMW dealers and that such dealers did not have authority to grant sub-licences. There was therefore no consent given by BMW to TLL to use the Trade Marks and no demonstration by BMW, unequivocal or otherwise, that there was.
Furthermore Mr Agyeton knew that there had been no consent from BMW. In a letter dated 20 December 2006, BMW (not BMW UK) wrote to TLL, drawing attention to its trade marks, enclosing a list of them, and drawing attention to its goodwill. BMW made its position clear:
Mr Agyeton accepted that having received that letter he knew in December 2006 that in BMW's view TLL was infringing BMW's trade marks. He later said that by late 2011 or early 2012, when he put up the facia on the Original Premises with the roundel on it, he had forgotten about BMW's letter. Although Mr Agyeton may have forgotten the details of that letter, I find it hard to believe that he had forgotten the basic message: use of BMW's trade marks by TLL, including the Roundel and M Logo, would infringe.
After investigations by BMW which led these proceedings, but before they were started in June 2014, BMW's solicitors wrote to TLL and Mr Agyeton on 10 October 2013. This gave more detailed information regarding the acts to which BMW objected, broadly those which form the basis of these proceedings. Well before the proceedings started Mr Agyeton could have been in no doubt at all that he had no consent to use the Trade Marks.
In cross examination Mr Agyeton accepted that he was the guiding mind of TLL and that in effect he and TLL were one and the same. Mr Irvine conceded in closing that on that evidence Mr Agyeton would be jointly liable with TLL in respect of any trade mark infringements or passing off by TLL.
Counsel on both sides submitted that TLL's liability for passing off stood or fell with its liability for infringement of the Trade Marks (see above). I need therefore say nothing about passing off, save this. Had I found that the message conveyed by TLL's use of its roundel and the M logo signs in each case did no more than render the average consumer unable to determine whether there was an economic link between TLL and BMW, as opposed to causing the average consumer to take the view that there was such a link, on that evidence I would have concluded that there had been no passing off by TLL, see Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] RPC 40, at [111] and Phones 4U Ltd v Phone4U.co.uk.Internet Ltd [2007] RPC 5, at [16].
Because it made no practical difference, counsel did not explore whether the roundel signs and the M logo signs used by TLL were identical or similar to, respectively, the Roundel and the M Logo trade marks. Both the trade marks were registered in relation to services identical to those provided by TLL (see above). To my eye, in each case the roundel sign used by TLL was identical to the Roundel as registered by BMW. It is hard to tell from the print of TLL's earlier website in the evidence whether the M logo sign used on that website was identical to the M Logo as registered, but I am prepared to assume that it was. The M logo sign on TLL's later website was similar to the M Logo as registered.
Pilkington Glass charged with running a cartel in relation to the supply of windscreens. OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERALKOKOTTdelivered on 14 April 2016 (1)Case C‑101/15 P
III – Background to the dispute
A – Facts and administrative proceedings
10. Pilkington is one of the leading global manufacturers of glass, and in particular of automotive glass.
11. According to the findings of the General Court, Pilkington, along with other undertakings operating in this sector, was guilty of entering into a cartel which consisted of agreements relating to contracts for the supply of automotive glass parts to all the large vehicle manufacturers in the EEA. It consisted of agreed pricing and supply strategies of the cartel participants, which were aimed at maintaining an overall stability for each undertaking’s position on the market concerned. In that regard the cartel participants monitored the decisions taken during these meetings and contacts, and agreed correcting measures with each other.
12. The automotive glass cartel operated in the EEA from 10 March 1998 to 11 March 2003, although individual undertakings in the cartel participated for differing periods — in Pilkington’s case it was from 10 March 1998 to 3 September 2002. It was a single and continuous infringement.
13. On 18 April 2007, in the course of the administrative procedure, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections to a number of cartel participants, including Pilkington. The oral hearing conducted by the Commission took place on 24 September 2007. After consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Agreements and Dominant Positions, on 12 November 2008 the Commission issued the decision at issue.
14. In Article 1 of the decision at issue it finds that various undertakings — including Pilkington (Article 1(c)) — had infringed Article 81 EC and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, in that they participated in a number of agreements and/or courses of conduct in the automotive glass sector in the EEA.
15. The fines imposed on individual undertakings for their participation in the cartel are set out in Article 2 of the decision at issue. In the case of Pilkington, this was 370 million euros, for which the appellants are jointly and severally liable (Article 2(1)(c)). By amending Decision dated 28 February 2013, which corrected certain calculation errors, this amount was reduced to 357 million euros. (8) In accordance with Article 2(2) of the decision at issue the fine was payable within three months of publication of that decision, in euros.
16. Several of the addressees of the decision at issue sought legal protection at first instance by way of actions for annulment before the General Court.
17. As regards the Pilkington group of companies, at first instance Pilkington Group Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Ltd, Pilkington Automotive Deutschland GmbH, Pilkington Holding GmbH and Pilkington Italia SpA (‘applicants’ or ‘appellants’) brought an action before the General Court jointly against the Commission, by application dated 18 February 2009.
18. In its judgment of 17 December 2014, the General Court dismissed this action, but ordered the Commission to pay 10% of Pilkington’s costs. (9) Apart from that, the Court ordered all the costs of the proceedings at first instance to be borne by the applicants.
IV – Proceedings before the Court of Justice
19. By document dated 27 February 2015 the appellants jointly lodged the present appeal against the judgment of the General Court.
20. The appellants claim that the Court should:
– set aside the judgment in Case T‑72/09, to the extent that it dismisses the action raised against Article 2(1)(c) of the decision at issue,
– reduce the fine imposed on the appellants by Article 2(1)(c) of the decision at issue, and
– order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the appellants in these proceedings.
21. For its part, the Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the appeal, and
– order the appellants to pay the costs of these proceedings.
22. The appeal was examined before the Court on the basis of written pleadings and, on 2 March 2016, at a hearing.
V – Analysis of the pleas in law
23. In its appeal Pilkington does not pursue all the issues which formed the subject matter of the proceedings at first instance. Instead, the legal debate in the appeal is restricted to questions concerning the calculation of the fine. In this regard, the appellants rely on three pleas in law, of which the first concerns the turnover to be taken into account (see directly below, section A), the second the applicable euro exchange rate in determining the 10% upper limit (under section B), and the third a variety of general legal principles and considerations based on the rule of law (section C).
A – Turnover to be taken into account in calculating the fine (first ground of appeal)
24. The first ground of appeal is directed against paragraphs 201 to 227 (and in particular paragraphs 217 to 227) of the judgment under appeal. Its subject is the type of turnover which may form the basis for calculating a fine within the meaning of point (a) of paragraph 1 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. The appellants complain that the General Court wrongly agreed with the Commission’s approach, under which supplies by Pilkington under contracts concluded in the period before the infringement started could also be taken into account, even if these contracts were not re-negotiated during the period of the infringement. Thus, they claim, the General Court relied on an interpretation of point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines which was erroneous in law.
25. Under point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines, in determining the basic amount of the fine to be imposed, the Commission will take the value of the undertaking’s sales of goods or services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic area within the EEA.
26. Thus, point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines is intended to set as a starting point for calculating the fine to be imposed on an undertaking an amount which reflects the economic importance of the infringement and the relative weight of the undertaking (according to the settled case-law of the Court, (10) which in turn draws heavily on the wording of point 6 of the Guidelines). By contrast, turnover which does not have any real connection to the scope of the cartel’s operation in the EEA is to be excluded. (11)
27. In the present case, the core of the dispute revolves around whether there must be some type of causal connection between the cartel’s machinations and the individual elements of turnover taken into account in calculating the fine. The appellants are of the view that at least sales of automotive glass on which, the cartel necessarily had no influence should be disregarded as those sales took place pursuant to contracts which were concluded prior to the start of the infringement — supposedly under normal competition conditions — and were not re-negotiated during the period of the infringement. They consider that taking such sales into account overstates the importance of the cartel.
28. This is by no means a theoretical issue or a technical detail: if such sales by Pilkington were left out of the basis for calculating the fine, according to the appellants the fine imposed by the Commission would have to be reduced by around 49 million euros.
29. As attractive as this reasoning of the appellants regarding the interpretation of point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines may at first glance appear, it does not stand up to closer consideration.
30. This is because the wording of point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines is itself drawn as widely as possible: it concerns all goods or services supplied by the relevant cartel member to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic area within the EEA. Point 5 of the same Guidelines uses similar general wording, by stating that the fine must be determined on the basis of the value of the goods or services which have been supplied and to which the infringement relates.
31. As the Court has already made clear, if one included in the term ‘turnover’ in point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines only sales in respect of which it is established that they were actually affected by the cartel, that would be to interpret the provision too narrowly. (12) Therefore, according to the case-law in setting the basic amount of a fine it is not necessary positively to prove that the elements of turnover individually brought into account as the basis of calculation were actually affected by the infringement. (13)
32. Admittedly, the concept of turnover in point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines cannot be extended so far as to encompass sales outside the scope of the relevant cartel. (14) However, to the extent that, as in the present case, it concerns sales which have in any event taken place on the relevant market, these are automatically part of the basis of calculation for the basic amount of the fine. (15) Contrary to what Pilkington submits, such sales are by no means outside the scope of the cartel.
33. The sales referred to are a useful reference point for the damage to competition in the EEA inflicted by the cartel, and in particular by Pilkington, because they give an indication of the economic importance of the cartel on the relevant market and the relative weight of Pilkington within the cartel, just as points 6 and 13 of the 2006 Guidelines and the case-law of the Court in relation thereto requires. (16)
34. If one were to exclude part of the sales made on the relevant market from the calculation of the fine, as the appellants submit, this would in many cases artificially reduce the economic effect of the cartel and therefore run diametrically opposite to the purpose of points 6 and 13 of the 2006 Guidelines (17) (for completeness see also points 4 and 5 of those Guidelines). This is because the full scope of a cartel cannot reasonably be depicted by selectively having regard to only individual elements of the turnover achieved by the cartel participants on the relevant market.
35. In particular, the approach favoured by the appellants overlooks the fact that one of the main purposes of many cartels — including the one at issue in the present case — is to divide the market among the cartel participants or to maintain their market shares at an agreed level. This stabilisation effect, which the Court has very rightly emphasised, (18) naturally benefits the whole activity of the cartel participants on the relevant market. In this connection, as the Commission very persuasively emphasises, even the manipulation of a few transactions can be enough to achieve the effect sought by the cartel participants on the whole market. If, however, the unlawful object of the cartel and thus the ‘criminal energy’ of the cartel participants encompasses the entire market, then all sales made on that market must also be taken as a basis for calculating the fines.
36. Accordingly, the conclusive factor is not whether the undertakings concerned are proved to have — or even may possibly have — acted collusively in relation to each individual transaction carried out. Nor is the decisive factor whether and to what extent the anti-competitive result pursued by these undertakings by means of the cartel in fact came about. (19) Instead, it is sufficient that a distortion of competition on the relevant market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC (now Article 101 TFEU) was the object or effect. (20) In such a case, in principle the whole of the turnover achieved on that market by the cartel participants is to be included in calculating the basic amount of the fine.
37. In addition, the administrative effort that would be involved in assessing each of the sales made on the relevant market by the cartel participants would be completely disproportionate. In most cases the amount of turnover to be taken into account in calculating fines comes from numerous transactions in relation to which it appears hardly practicable to assess each one as regards whether it was — actually or potentially — affected by the collusive practices of the cartel participants. This applies all the more so because cartels are characterised by a culture of secrecy among the participating undertakings which ought not to be ‘rewarded’ when it comes to calculating fines. (21)
38. Accordingly, all in all the only thing that is material is that the sales to be taken into account in calculating the basic amount of fines were made on the relevant market. (22) This is because it is precisely this turnover, deriving from the sale of goods in respect of which the infringement was committed, that is best able to reflect the economic importance of that infringement. (23) In this way it can be ensured that an appropriate punishment is imposed which contributes to the effective enforcement of the competition rules in the European Economic Area (on this point see points 4 and 5 of the 2006 Guidelines).
39. It follows from this that the first ground of appeal must be rejected.
B – The applicable exchange rate for calculating the 10% upper limit on the fine (second ground of appeal)
40. The second ground of appeal is directed against paragraphs 410 to 423 of the judgment under appeal, and concerns the upper limit applicable under EU law on the fine (also called the ‘ceiling’), as laid down by the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. According to that provision, the fine imposed on an undertaking is not to exceed 10% of its total turnover in the preceding business year.
41. In the opinion of the appellants, the judgment under appeal infringes this provision because the Court determined the exchange rate for converting pounds sterling (24) into euros in a manner that was wrong in law. If the Court had not, like the Commission before it, taken the average exchange rate of the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) during Pilkington’s last full business year preceding the decision at issue, and had instead used the actual daily exchange rate at the time the Decision was adopted (as Pilkington preferred), the 10% upper limit, and therefore the fine on Pilkington, would have been lower.
42. The background to the complaints being made here is that Pilkington’s parent company is established in the United Kingdom and for that reason the turnover of the whole Pilkington group, which provides the basis of calculation in the present case, was determined in pounds sterling. By contrast, fines imposed by the Commission under EU law to punish cartel activity are expressed in euros. There is therefore a need to convert between currencies in order to ascertain whether the fine imposed exceeds the 10% ceiling of Pilkington’s total turnover in its last full business year preceding the adoption of the decision at issue.
43. The appellants submit, without being contradicted, that Pilkington’s total turnover in its business year from 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 was GBP 2.614 billion. Accordingly, the starting point for calculating the 10% ceiling for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 was a value of GBP 261.4 million (10% of GBP 2.614 billion).
44. If, like the Commission and the General Court, one takes the European Central Bank’s published average exchange rate for that period (GBP 1 = EUR 1.415), this produces a ceiling of EUR 370.1 million. If, by contrast, one takes the actual exchange rate of the European Central Bank for 12 November 2008, the day on which the Commission adopted the decision at issue (GBP 1 = EUR 1.2149, or EUR 1 = GBP 0.82310), (25) this would produce a significantly lower ceiling, namely EUR 317.5 million.
45. Thus, on the former approach the fine imposed by the Commission in the amount of EUR 357 million is clearly below the 10% ceiling, (26) but on the latter approach, by contrast, it would exceed the 10% ceiling by almost EUR 40 million. Thus, it is precisely this difference of around EUR 40 million which is at stake when the parties are in dispute as regards the choice of the correct exchange rate in the context of the second ground of appeal. It is necessary to decide whether the fall in value of the pound sterling in comparison with the euro as recorded in the period up to the adoption of the decision at issue goes to Pilkington’s benefit or, on the contrary, is an exchange rate risk which Pilkington has to bear.
2. The complaints put forward by Pilkington
46. Whereas the appellants expressly recognise the Commission’s right to set the fines it imposes under antitrust law pursuant to Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 in euros, they regard the General Court’s analysis in relation to the relevant exchange rate for calculating the 10% cap as erroneous in law.
47. Their complaints in this regard against the judgment under appeal can be categorised essentially by reference to two themes: first, the Court misunderstood the purpose of the 10% ceiling (see below, section a), and second, it did not meet the requirements of equal treatment and legal certainty (see further below, section b).
a) The purposes of the 10% upper limit
48. The 10% ceiling which is laid down by the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 brings into the calculation of fines an element which has a distinct and autonomous objective by comparison with the basic criteria of gravity and duration of the infringement. (27) It is appropriate to take into account the ability of the undertakings concerned to pay, and to prevent the imposition of fines which are excessive or disproportionate. (28)
49. Within the framework of the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the decisive factor is the capacity of an undertaking to make payment at the time when it is identified as responsible for the infringement and a financial penalty is imposed on it by the Commission. (29)
50. Undoubtedly, the capacity of an undertaking to make payment would best be taken into account by assessing it as at the particular date on which the Commission adopted the decision imposing a fine. However, this would cause the Commission entirely insurmountable practical difficulties: first, at the time the decision imposing a fine is adopted it is normally the case that there are no published up-to-date turnover figures for the undertaking concerned, or they are in any event not available in certified, and thus reliable, form. Second, the Commission’s internal decision-making procedures — in particular consulting the Advisory Committee, as required by the legislation, (30) but also the need for internal reflection on the appropriateness, method of calculation and amount of the penalty in the individual case (31) — mean that it is inevitably impossible to present and process new figures up to the last day.
51. The EU legislature took this fact into account and in the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 provided that the reference value for capacity to make payment was to be one-tenth of the total turnover of the undertaking concerned in the business year preceding the decision imposing the fine. (32) In a way, for the purpose of calculating the fine the legislation deems an undertaking’s capacity to pay to correspond to that indicated by its audited turnover figures for the last full business year preceding the adoption of the decision imposing the fine. Normally, it may be expected that the capacity of an undertaking to make payment which has been assessed in this way in the weeks or months up to the adoption of the decision imposing the fine has not significantly changed, and the turnover figures of its last full business year thus retain their usefulness.
52. However, if a particular fraction (10%) of the total turnover of the undertaking concerned in its last full business year constitutes the legislative reference amount for its capacity to make payment, the average exchange rate applicable during the reference period must also be determinative for the currency conversion. It is only this exchange rate which permits an assessment of the turnover figures in the context from which they emerge, given that this best reflects the economic realities which prevailed at the time. (33) That was rightly pointed out by the General Court. (34)
53. If one wanted to convert at a different exchange rate from a later period, this could significantly undermine the usefulness of such turnover figures: the application of a new exchange rate to old figures would ultimately be nothing other than comparing apples and pears.
54. Nor do the judgments of the Court cited by the appellants reveal anything that might indicate that it is necessary to apply a later exchange rate — namely the up-to-date exchange rate as at the time the decision imposing the fine is adopted.
55. Admittedly, in some cases the Court has in fact recognised that the 10% ceiling was also able to protect the undertakings concerned from exchange rate fluctuations to a certain extent. (35) However, this is not an independent purpose of the ceiling, but rather a feature of the protection offered by the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 to the undertakings concerned against excessive and disproportionate fines. (36)
56. Apart from that, the cases analysed in the case-law to date concerned changes in currency exchange rates before the end of the reference period to which the 10% ceiling under paragraph 2 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 is linked. (37) Thus, the Court was also looking back to earlier periods and not, as Pilkington submits in the present case, forward to the weeks and months after the end of the last business year before the decision imposing the fine was adopted.
57. Unlike with ‘looking forward’, there are good reasons for ‘looking back’: first, the period between the cessation of the infringement and the last business year preceding the adoption of the decision imposing a fine is normally several years, and thus is naturally more likely to be affected by exchange rate fluctuations causing changes in the capacity of undertakings to make payment than the weeks and months in dispute in the present case which directly precede the decision imposing a fine. Second, it is only in ‘looking back’ that one can find reliable figures which, along with the exchange rates applicable to them for currency conversion, are available in sufficient time to be taken into account by the Commission in making its decision.
58. The only basis in the case-law which might point to a ‘looking forward’ approach, and thus to some sort of relevance of up-to-date exchange rates, is to be found in the relatively old judgment of the Court of First Instance in Sarrió v Commission. Specifically, in that case the Court ensured ‘that the amount of the fine converted into national currency at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time when the Decision was published does not exceed 10% of the applicant's total turnover in [the last business year preceding the Decision]’. (38)
59. So far as can be seen, however, this approach has not been followed. Nor do I believe that that is a route the Court should take now.
60. Apart from the fundamental objection, already mentioned, that if one applies an up-to-date exchange rate then old turnover figures are converted using a new exchange rate which does not emanate from the same period, it appears to me that the reference by the Court of First Instance in Sarrió vCommission to the time of publication of the decision is wholly unsuitable and impracticable. Normally, publication of the decision in cartel cases occurs long after they are adopted, sometimes even years later. Thus, the Commission would have to have clairvoyant powers indeed if it wanted to take into account such a future exchange rate at the time it made its decision. Nor is it apparent how the exchange rate which happens to prevail on the day the decision is published is supposed to give any indication as to the capacity of the undertaking concerned to make payment at the much earlier time at which the Commission imposes a fine on it and collects it.
61. To my mind, the solution to the problem about which the appellants complain is to be sought at a different level altogether, namely in the budgetary law of the European Union: if it should prove that the capacity of an undertaking to make payment — whether owing to exchange rate fluctuations or other reasons — has reduced significantly between the end of its last business year and the time the decision imposing the fine is adopted by the Commission, budgetary law provides suitable mechanisms for dealing with any risk that the undertaking might be overburdened when the fine imposed by the Commission is collected. (39) These mechanisms enable solutions tailored to the particular case to be worked out, and range from allowing generous periods of time for payment to complete or partial waiver, while always taking proper account of potential distortions of competition (on this point see in particular Articles 89 and 91 of the rules of application for the general budget of the Union (40)).
62. Nor, contrary to the submission made by Pilkington at the oral hearing, does the fact that the mechanisms provided for by the general budget of the Union apply only in extreme cases militate in any way against this solution. This is because all ‘normal’ risks connected with capacity to make payment, including in particular the normal exchange rate risk, must be borne by the undertakings concerned themselves. (41) I will return to this later. (42)
63. Against this background, the appellants’ arguments based on the purpose of the 10% ceiling do not hold up.
b) The requirements of equal treatment and legal certainty
64. In addition, in the present case the appellants also raise the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty. In their opinion, these principles too mean that the currency conversion should take place not at the average exchange rate for Pilkington’s last full business year before the decision at issue but at the up-to-date exchange rate as at the time the decision was adopted.
i) The principle of equal treatment
65. First, the appellants consider that the General Court’s appraisal is contrary to the principle of equal treatment. According to them, all undertakings must be treated equally, independently of the currency of their accounts. The General Court allegedly misunderstood this.
66. The principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. (43) It cannot be interpreted and applied differently depending on the area of law in question.
67. According to consistent case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified. (44)
68. It is nothing more than an application of the principle of equal treatment when the Court recognises specifically in relation to determining fines under antitrust law that the 10% ceiling under the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 is a limit which is the same for all undertakings. (45)
69. With regard to the problem which is of interest in the present case, it is first to be observed that the capacity of one of these undertakings to make payment may of course still be subject to certain fluctuations between the end of its last business year and the day a decision imposing the fine is adopted. Such fluctuations may derive for example from unexpected reductions in turnover, but they could also be caused by changes in currency conversion, especially where an undertaking — regardless of where it is established — makes a large proportion of its turnover in foreign currencies.
70. In this respect all undertakings find themselves in the same situation and are also treated equally by the EU legislature: this is because under paragraph 2 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 such fluctuations in capacity to make payment are not taken into account in relation to calculating the 10% ceiling, regardless of whether the undertakings concerned account for their turnover in euros or in another currency. Therefore, in this regard there can be no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.
71. Admittedly, for undertakings which account for their turnover not in euros but in a foreign currency the cost of paying a fine may be subject to more severe fluctuations due to variations in exchange rates between their last business year and the day of the Commission’s decision imposing the fine than it is for those undertakings which maintain their accounts in euros. Therefore, in this respect the situation of undertakings established outside the euro area may differ from that of those established within the euro area.
72. However, one cannot infer, simply from the fact undertakings established outside the euro area may suffer more from fluctuations in their liquid assets caused by exchange rate movements than those established within the euro area, that they are entitled to a new, up-to-date assessment of their capacity to make payment at the time the Commission adopts its decision imposing a fine, on the basis of the up-to-date exchange rate applicable at that time.
73. This is because such currency-related fluctuations are the result of the exchange rate risk which every undertaking has to bear itself. (46) An undertaking which establishes itself outside the euro area knowingly assumes the risk of unfavourable currency movements just as much as it enjoys any advantages from favourable currency movements. It is unacceptable for such an undertaking to selectively transfer to the public only potential disadvantages of being established outside the euro area on the basis of the principle of equal treatment.
74. By way of aside it may be observed that even prior to the introduction of the euro not all undertakings operating in the internal market were subject to the same exchange rate risks. It is admittedly correct that, at that time, the Commission had to undertake a currency conversion for all undertakings before imposing fines on them, whereas today this is necessary only for undertakings established outside the euro area. Nonetheless, even before the introduction of the euro, depending on the Member State in which they were established undertakings had to deal with different degrees of currency fluctuations and therefore with different degrees of exchange rate risk.
ii) The principle of legal certainty
75. Second, the appellants claim that the General Court has misunderstood the principle of legal certainty. In their opinion, every undertaking must be able to predict in its own currency the financial consequences which are to be expected by a fine imposed by the Commission.
76. The principle of legal certainty is a general principle of EU law, which requires inter alia that rules involving negative consequences for individuals be clear and precise and their application predictable for those subject to them. (47) The persons concerned must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly. (48)
77. In the same vein, the Court has explained specifically in relation to the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 that fines imposed by the Commission under this provision are subject to a quantifiable and absolute ceiling, so that the maximum amount of the fine that can be imposed on a given undertaking can be determined in advance. (49)
78. Inevitably, an element of prognosis is inherent in the concept of predictability. Prognoses are more reliable if made on the basis of data already ascertained from the recent past than on the basis of data which is as yet unknown.
79. There can therefore be no doubt that an undertaking is better able to predict the 10% ceiling on fines under the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 that will apply to it if this upper limit is calculated by reference to the average exchange rate of its last full business year and is not based on a future exchange rate, which, although up-to-date at the time the decision imposing a fine is adopted, is not available at all in advance.
80. Accordingly, the General Court emphasised, (50) entirely correctly, that the application of the ECB’s average exchange rate for an undertaking’s last full business year prior to the adoption of the decision imposing the fine is clearly more suitable for ensuring legal certainty than relying on the exchange rate at a future point in time, namely the day on which the decision imposing the fine is adopted.
81. This is because the average exchange rate referred to is fixed from the end of the relevant business year and does not change thereafter, whereas the up-to-date rate depends on arbitrary events in the future, specifically on the time the Commission chooses to adopt its decision imposing a fine and on the economic circumstances at that time. Thus, if the average exchange rate is used as a basis then every undertaking against which the Commission proceeds because of a breach of antitrust law can calculate precisely, in advance of the decision which concludes the proceedings, the highest amount in euros of any fine which may have to be paid.
82. The appellants object that undertakings which do not account for their turnover in euros are less able to predict the financial cost of any fines which may be payable under antitrust law than undertakings which account in euros.
83. However, this uncertainty results from the exchange rate risk which undertakings established outside the euro area must always bear, as already mentioned. (51) That is not all: in relation to potential liabilities a forward-looking undertaking must always take precautions in the currency in which those liabilities will fall to be paid in the future. To that extent there is no material difference between a fine under antitrust law which may be going to be imposed by the Commission and any potential liabilities under civil law which may arise for the undertaking concerned in proceedings before national courts.
84. If an undertaking is pursued by the Commission in proceedings under Regulation No 1/2003 as a suspected cartel participant, it is in its own interest during the proceedings to build reserves in euros on the basis of its own turnover figures for its most recent business year in respect of any fine which it may have to pay, or at least to ensure, by means of agreements with financial institutions, that at the time the decision imposing the fine is issued it will have the necessary liquid funds in euros, of up to the 10% upper limit under paragraph 2 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003.
85. If the undertaking concerned does not take such precautions, then it is ultimately entering into a speculative venture as regards exchange rate movements and knowingly accepts the risk that it will be able to obtain the funds to pay any fine on less favourable conditions than it would have at the end of its last full business year preceding the decision imposing the fine.
86. As the Court has already held in another context, currency fluctuations are an element of chance which may produce advantages and disadvantages. (52) The very existence of such currency fluctuations is not such as to render inappropriate a fine lawfully fixed. (53)
87. All in all, therefore, when carrying out a currency conversion for the purpose of determining the 10% upper limit for fines under antitrust law, taking the average exchange rate for the last full business year of the undertaking concerned preceding the adoption of the decision imposing the fine infringes neither the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 nor the general principles of equal treatment and legal certainty. The General Court’s conclusion to that effect (54) is free of errors in law. The second ground of appeal is thus unfounded.
C – Various general legal principles and considerations concerning the rule of law (third ground of appeal)
88. The third ground of appeal raises various general legal principles and considerations concerning the rule of law, the appellants alleging that the General Court has breached them. By this ground, the appellants challenge on the one hand paragraphs 396 to 402 of the judgment under appeal, and on the other paragraphs 434, 438 and 440 to 444 thereof. In doing so, the first part of the third ground of appeal relates only to the legal requirements that arise out of the principles of equal treatment and proportionality (see section 1 below), whereas the second part concerns the General Court’s unlimited jurisdiction (see section 2 below).
89. The study by a business consultancy which was adduced by Pilkington in the proceedings at first instance plays a significant role in the appellants’ arguments in relation to both parts of this ground of appeal. The appellants are of the view that it is possible to infer from this study that in consequence of the fine imposed by the Commission, Pilkington’s financial situation has been significantly worsened.
90. I say immediately that the General Court’s approach in relation to this study was entirely appropriate and is not liable to any criticism in law. The General Court correctly took that study into account only for the purpose of its unlimited jurisdiction, within the framework of which it was entitled to take into account facts and evidence which emerged only after the decision under appeal had been adopted. (55) By contrast, and also entirely correctly, the General Court left that study out of account in assessing the lawfulness of the decision at issue, because for that purpose the only matters which may be taken into account are those which were available to the Commission at the time it adopted its decision. (56)
1. The principles of equal treatment and proportionality (first part of the third ground of appeal)
91. First, the appellants complain that the General Court misunderstood the legal requirements of the general principles of equal treatment and proportionality. They complain of a ‘glaring disparity’ in the impact which the fines imposed by the Commission mean for individual cartel participants. Pilkington itself considers that it has been punished much more harshly than the other participants in the cartel, because the fine imposed on it is a much larger proportion of its total turnover than is the case with the other participants, who had a wider product range.
92. Rightly, in this connection the General Court recalled (57) that the final amounts of the fines for the undertakings concerned need not reflect all differences between them in terms of their overall turnover or their relevant turnover. (58) Except for the 10% upper limit laid down by paragraph 2 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the calculation of fines under antitrust law is not a mechanical exercise in which the penalty must have a specific relationship to the respective total turnover of each of the undertakings concerned.
93. It is, admittedly, correct that in the exercise of its discretion when imposing fines under letter (a) of the first paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 the Commission does not have an entirely free hand, but is subject to judicial supervision as regards whether it has observed the general principles of EU law and the fundamental rights guaranteed at Union level, (59) in particular the principles of equal treatment and proportionality. (60)
94. However, in the present case the General Court misunderstood the legal requirements of neither of those principles.
a) The legal requirements of the principle of equal treatment
95. First, as already explained, (61) the general principle of equal treatment requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified.
96. In the normal case, when punishing cartel infringements the principle of equal treatment is satisfied if all cartel participants are dealt with by reference to the same criteria as regards the calculation of the fines imposed on them, (62) so that, in qualitative terms, in relation to a single cartel offence two different standards are not applied. (63) On its own, the fact that the fine ultimately imposed on one undertaking amounts to roughly 10% of its total turnover, in other words approaches the upper limit fixed by legislation (paragraph 2 of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003), whereas the percentage turns out lower for other cartel participants, does not constitute an infringement of the principle of equal treatment. (64)
97. In the present case, the appellants nonetheless seek special treatment for Pilkington so that the fine imposed on them is reduced to a lower percentage of their total turnover. Correspondingly, they complain that the General Court withheld this special treatment from them.
98. A departure from the classic method for calculating fines may be justified if the method of calculation applied by the Commission on the basis of the 2006 Guidelines does not sufficiently differentiate between the fines imposed on individual cartel participants having regard to the duration and gravity of their respective individual participation in the cartel and any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. (65) However, nothing suggests that this may be the case here, and the appellants have not made any submissions to this effect.
99. Whether, apart from that, Pilkington’s situation is materially different from that of the other cartel participants due to particular circumstances, and therefore necessitates special treatment as regards calculating the fine, is ultimately a matter of the assessment of the facts and the evidence. According to consistent case-law, (66) this is a matter for the General Court alone, and at the stage of an appeal before the Court of Justice is not to be considered anew, except where the facts or the evidence have been distorted, of which there is no complaint in the present case.
100. Purely for the sake of completeness, I mention in addition that it appears to me that Pilkington’s strong focus on automotive glass and its narrower (in comparison with the other cartel participants) product range are not in themselves sufficient to allow different standards to apply in calculating the fine on Pilkington. Instead, the Commission correctly points out that an undertaking such as Pilkington, which derives a particularly large part of its total turnover from products encompassed by the cartel, profited correspondingly more from any profit which the cartel participants were able to make out of their collusive behaviour. Against this background, it therefore is by no means unjust that the fine imposed by the Commission is a higher percentage of this undertaking’s total turnover than is the case as regards other cartel participants.
101. Nor is this conclusion called into question by the fact that in the past the Commission granted reductions in fines on an individual basis, in order to do justice to the characteristics of the business models of individual cartel participants. According to the Court’s consistent case-law, the Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not serve as a legal framework for the fines imposed in competition matters. (67)
102. As regards specifically the case of Almamet, relied upon by the appellants, the situation of that undertaking was characterised by features which do not apply to Pilkington to the same extent — at least according to the information before the Courts of the European Union. (68)
103. Thus, the complaint of an infringement of the legal requirements of the principle of equal treatment is to be dismissed as unfounded.
b) The legal requirements of the principle of proportionality
104. As regards the principle of proportionality, which, pursuant to Article 49(3) of the Charter, enjoys the status of a fundamental right, (69) there is no dispute that it has to be observed when fines are imposed for cartel infringements. (70)
105. In the present case, the appellants ultimately allege that the General Court overlooked the legal requirements of proportionality having regard to the relationship between the fine imposed by the Commission and Pilkington’s total turnover.
106. In principle, the 10% upper limit under the second paragraph of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, which has already been mentioned, (71) ensures that fines imposed by the Commission on cartel participants maintain a reasonable relationship to their respective capacity to make payment, and that no excessive or disproportionate fines are imposed. (72) If this upper limit is observed, it is assumed that the fine does not disproportionately burden the capacity of the undertaking concerned to make payment.
107. The mere fact that a fine is a financial burden — possibly even a significant one — on the undertaking concerned and may cause temporary weakness in its financial strength can by no means lead to the conclusion that the fine is disproportionately high. On the contrary, the penalty, in the form of the fine imposed on the undertaking, should be appreciable, in order that it has the intended specific and general deterrent effects (on this see also point 4 of the 2006 Guidelines). This aim would not be achieved if an undertaking could pay the fine imposed on it ‘out of petty cash’, so to speak.
108. If one accepted any weakening of the financial strength of the undertaking concerned which might be expected to occur in consequence of an antitrust fine as giving cause to reduce that penalty, this would moreover have the absurd consequence that the undertaking would be rewarded by an unjustified financial advantage for a serious infringement of the competition rules it had committed. (73) If an undertaking unexpectedly suffered payment difficulties, then, as already mentioned, (74) EU budget law provides for appropriate solutions.
109. Against this background, the complaint of an infringement of the legal requirements of the principle of proportionality is just as unfounded as the complaint as regards the principle of equal treatment.
2. Exercise by the General Court of unlimited jurisdiction (second part of the third ground of appeal)
110. Finally, by this third ground of appeal the appellants complain that the General Court did not exercise its unlimited jurisdiction under Article 261 TFEU in conjunction with Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 with the necessary intensity.
111. The basis of complaint is primarily what is said in paragraphs 442 and 443 of the judgment under appeal, where the General Court said that it would reduce a fine imposed by the Commission on the ground of the negative financial consequences faced by an undertaking only ‘in exceptional circumstances, where justified by an overriding interest’. (75) In the opinion of the appellants, by this statement the General Court unlawfully restricted itself to ‘a “light touch” review’ (76) in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction.
112. The exercise by the General Court of its unlimited jurisdiction is reviewed by the Court only for manifest error. (77) Errors of that kind must be assumed, first, where the General Court has failed to take into account the extent of its powers under Article 261 TFEU, (78) second, where it did not fully consider all the material points, (79) and, third, where it has applied incorrect legal criteria, (80) not least having regard to the principles of equal treatment (81) and proportionality. (82)
113. The complaint made in the present case by the appellants, that the approach to the ‘pleine jurisdiction’ was too superficial, falls into the first of the categories referred to: ultimately, the complaint against the General Court is that it did not take into account the extent of its powers under Article 261 TFEU. (83)
114. This jurisdiction is indeed very wide: under Article 261 TFEU the General Court is empowered, in addition to the mere review of the legality of the fine imposed by the Commission under antitrust law, to substitute its own decision as regards the amount of that fine for that of the Commission. (84) It may therefore cancel, reduce or increase the fine purely on the basis of considerations of expediency, without first having to set aside the decision appealed against. (85) It follows that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction does not necessarily presuppose a finding of an error in law.
115. In the present case the General Court was clearly aware of this possibility available to it under Article 261 TFEU. (86) The General Court by no means assumed that it could reduce the fine imposed by the Commission only in exceptional circumstances. Instead, it took the approach that such a reduction specifically on the ground of an alleged weakening in the financial strength of the undertaking concerned was appropriate only in exceptional circumstances.
116. In other words, in the present case the General Court certainly considered Pilkington’s submissions as regards the worsening of its financial strength, including the study of a business consultancy put forward by Pilkington. However, in that regard, not for — incorrectly understood — legal considerations, but only on the basis of considerations of expediency, did it decide against reducing the fine. This is particularly important if one has regard to the background against which the General Court discussed the ‘exceptional circumstances’: the General Court is led by the concern that the effectiveness of EU competition policy could suffer if antitrust fines did not cause a certain difficulty to the undertakings concerned. (87)
117. As indicated above, (88) such an approach gives no ground for complaint from a legal point of view. In addition, it is entirely consistent with the Commission’s approach to EU competition policy, as defined in its 2006 Guidelines. (89) Although such Guidelines cannot be binding on it, the EU judicature may nonetheless take inspiration from them in exercising its unlimited jurisdiction. (90)
118. Thus, all in all the General Court correctly understood its unlimited jurisdiction. In principle, the Court of Justice, as an appellate body, does not have power to make a more thorough assessment of the fine as regards its proportionality. It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that the Court may itself intervene, that is to say if ‘the level of the penalty is not merely inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate’. (91) However, there is no basis at all in the present case for believing there to be such a glaring and manifest disparity between infringement and penalty that would require correction by the Court of Justice as an appellate court.
119. The last part of the third ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. Thus, the whole of the third ground of appeal is unfounded.
D – Summary
120. Given that none of the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellants succeeds, the appeal as a whole is to be dismissed.
121. Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure provides that where the appeal is unfounded the Court is to make a decision as to costs.
122. It follows from Article 138(1) and (2) in conjunction with Article 184(1) of the Rules of Procedure that the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for; where there is more than one unsuccessful party the Court shall decide how the costs are to be shared. Since the Commission has applied for costs against the appellants and the latter have been unsuccessful in their pleas, they must be ordered to pay the costs. As they brought the appeal jointly, they must bear the costs jointly and severally.
123. On the basis of the above considerations, I propose that the Court should:
(2) order the appellants, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of the proceedings.
IPT to rise again #tax
The 0.5% rise is the second in less than a year and Chancellor said extra money raised would go towards flood protection.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, has increased insurance premium tax again from 9.5% to 10%. The increase follows on from the rise from 6% to 9.5% in the Summer Budget in July last year..
Trend of flat or falling first quarter premiums continues for fifth year.
The cost of motor insurance has stalled for the first time in a year, according to the latest Confused.com Car Insurance Price Index in association with Willis Towers Watson.
According to the findings, the average comprehensive premium held at £671 during the first quarter, even though price movements varied between segments.
Third party, fire and theft (TPFT) prices fell very slightly by £1, or 0.1% on average, to £1,128.
The first quarter price movements follow annual price rises in 2015 of 13.2% and 16.8% for comprehensive and TPFT cover respectively.
Even after the latest changes, average comprehensive prices have risen by £81 over the last 12 months to the end of March.
Duncan Anderson, global property and casualty pricing and product management leader at Willis Towers Watson, commented: "It's not that unusual for prices to plateau or fall in the first calendar quarter.
"Indeed, that's happened in each of the last five years, perhaps in part owing to competition for new car registrations, but most other indicators had been pointing to a continuation of across-the-board rate increases."
The researchers found that the effect of this quarter's rate changes on individual comprehensive policyholders varied considerably.
Young drivers of 21 and under - with the exception of 18-year-olds - experienced some of the highest quarterly increases, contrary to recent quarters in which they have typically received some of the most favourable price changes. Meanwhile, 25 and 55-year-olds enjoyed an average first quarter price decrease of 2.6%.
On a regional basis, the biggest decreases of 1.7% were in the North West of England, while prices rose by over 2% for drivers in the Scottish Borders and Central and North Wales.
Variations in pricing treatment were more marked at postcode level, with average prices falling by over 6% in Falkirk while simultaneously increasing by over 6% in Galashiels and Kirkwall.
Anderson continued: "Whether the overall market trends mark the start of a turn in pricing strategy remains to be seen, because drilling down in to the first quarter numbers suggests that insurers were, in some cases, reversing recent prior changes in rates.
"One chink of light for insurers is that claims submitted to the Ministry of Justice Claims Portal have fallen slightly relative to the previous year in each of the last three reported months.
"Against that, record road traffic volumes, the small further increase in Insurance Premium Tax announced in the March Budget and underlying repair cost inflation driven by new technologies are all potential factors that could force average prices up again."
Steve Fletcher, head of data services at Confused said: "The fact that comprehensive car insurance premiums have remained static over the quarter was not unexpected - insurers regularly cut prices in January, which has a knock-on effect for the remainder of the quarter.
"However, the situation should not be taken for granted. Insurance prices have been rising at a steady pace for the last 24 months, and the last few months are unlikely to be indicators of a period of stagnation."
House of Lords - holds 10 minute debate on whiplash; work on reforms is developing; fraud is at root of issue,or is it?#lazy #insurers
At 2.37pm yesterday (1 March) the House of Lords held a ten minute debate on the subject of whiplash claims in the UK
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have any plans to meet representatives of the insurance industry to discuss their treatment of claims for whiplash injuries.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con):
My Lords, meetings have been held with representatives’ groups from both claimant and insurer sectors at both ministerial and official level to discuss the reforms announced in the Chancellor’s Autumn Statement.
Ministers and officials are continuing to engage with interested stakeholders as work on the detail of the Government’s whiplash reform programme develops.
Lord Hayward:
When my noble friend next meets representatives of the industry, will he ask them to explain cases such as that of Mr John Elvin of Watford?
Mr Elvin was involved in a negligible traffic incident where there was no apparent damage to either vehicle. At the first opportunity, he notified his insurers – esure - that he was subject to what he believed was going to be a false whiplash and damage claim.
Despite a series of requests, esure has given no indication that it has investigated this case in any way.
Is this not an example of the reason why the industry is known in this country as “the whiplash capital of the world”? It is the consumer who ultimately pays for this cavalier attitude.
Lord Faulks:
My noble friend is quite right to draw the House’s attention to the very major problem of the significant increase in the number of claims and our large number of claims in comparison with other European countries.
One of the reasons that insurers give for settling these claims is that it costs them too much to fight the case. Of course, if our plans to raise the small claims limit to £5,000 come into effect, this will no longer continue to be a valid reason for not contesting claims.
Anyone who is notified of what sounds suspiciously like a fraud should not do anything to encourage it.
If individuals are invited to take part in such an endeavour, they are potentially committing a criminal offence.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD):
My Lords, the Minister referred to the court costs. Have the coalition’s policies of banning referral fees produced any results? Has the number of frauds gone down? Are there any statistics on that as yet, following the Insurance Act 2015?
The Government are attacking this problem on a number of different fronts. Referral fees is one; the LASPO reforms is another; and there is the MedCo portal, which means that all whiplash injuries must go via a neutral evaluation with limited costs.
All are contributing to a decrease in the number of whiplash claims, but there are still too many, and we still feel that there is fraud at the root of all this.
Lord Beecham (Lab):
My Lords, of course no one would defend fraudulent claims, whether for whiplash or other injuries. However, the raising of the small claims limit to £5,000 will represent a further reduction of access to justice to people and even businesses of modest means with valid claims.
Given that the Government claim the insurance industry—in which motor insurers alone receive £15 billion a year in premiums—will save £1 billion from the increased limit, having already saved £7 billion in the last four years, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that any further savings from their latest surrender to the industry’s interests will be substantially passed on to policyholders?
Or is this to compensate the industry for the insurance tax levy increase, which it will no doubt in any case pass on to policyholders?
There is no question of the Government surrendering to the insurance industry, as the noble Lord puts it. The insurers already announced that they will reduce the premiums to insurance companies by £50.
We will watch insurance companies very carefully to see whether they translate their promises into action.
Of course, as all noble Lords will know, insurance is a highly competitive world. All of us will have been irritated by the invitations to compare the market. Ultimately, the market should prevail.
Lord Walton of Detchant (CB):ABP - former President of the British Medical Association (BMA)
My Lords, the whiplash phenomenon is thought to occur usually when a vehicle is struck heavily from behind, with the result that the passenger or driver in the vehicle that is hit has a sharp flexion of the neck followed by a sharp hyperextension.
If it happens that the individual in question already has disc degeneration in the neck, there is no doubt at all that this may on occasions result in actual damage to the spinal cord with significant physical results.
However, in the great majority of so-called whiplash cases, no organic abnormality can be detected.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that some of the claims for whiplash injuries are spurious.
Having said that, is it not time yet again for the Government and the medical profession experts in this field to come together to see if they can promulgate some objective means of assessing the significance of these claims?
The noble Lord, with his experience as a neurologist, highlights the complicated nature of this injury and the fact that it is not usually detectable on scans.
He also made the point about pre-existing degenerative injury. The effort to achieve some sort of consensus among medical experts has been helped by the MedCo portal.
It is remarkable how many of the reports now have a more favourable prognosis than used to be the case before it was introduced.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con):
I declare my interests as set out in the register.[ABP - he was a senior partner at the national law firm Beachcroft Wansbroughs, now called DAC Beachcroft]
Will my noble friend the Minister accept that there is serious concern not only in this House but also in the insurance industry at the way in which we have allowed a situation where 80% of all personal injury claims are said to be whiplash claims?
Will he find some way of stopping these cold calls? One of my colleagues just had a cold call from a claims management company calling itself the “Department of Compensation”. Will my noble friend please get across to everyone that these people are potentially committing a very serious criminal offence?
My noble friend is, of course, absolutely right. The Government are determined to stamp down on this. Legislation is already in place, primarily enforced by the Information Commissioner’s Office. The Government have recently consulted on bringing forward secondary legislation to require all direct marketing callers to provide their calling line identification. Individuals can have a Telephone Preference Service installed on their telephones and we are also exploring the possibility of call-blocking devices for vulnerable consumers.
When somebody rings me, as they do from time to time, inviting me to take part in a fraud, I endeavour to extract details from them without revealing the position I hold. Unfortunately, my voice appears to cause them only to put down the phone.
Lord Dubs (Lab):
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that the rate of whiplash claims in Britain is 20 times as high as it is in France? Have we something to learn from our friends across the channel?
It is surprising that that comparison should take place at this particular time in the political weather. The noble Lord is quite right. Some 9%, or 225,000, of bodily injuries in France were whiplash, but 76%, or 375,000, in the United Kingdom were.
A report commissioned by a trade body in Northern Ireland has claimed that the use of “pattern” car parts is putting lives in danger on our roads.
The report, carried out by by consultant engineer Alan Deering and commissioned by the Northern Ireland Bodyshop Alliance (Niba) says that the quality and performance of non-original parts compared to original equipment manufacturer (OEM) parts was “stark”.
“In this substantive study, and from the analysis and testing undertaken, it is my opinion that there were notable differences between OEM and non-OEM parts tested which may affect performance, and, ultimately, the safety of drivers and pedestrians,” Deering told The Irish Times.
“If it were my own car, I would request OEM parts. I would certainly feel more comfortable with these than if non-genuine parts were fitted as the best quality can only be assured in this instance.”
The parts used – in this instance, body panels – were subjected to rigorous mechanical, chemical and microscopic testing to determine the findings. Each of the various parts tested were installed in a Ford Focus, a Volkswagen Golf and a Peugeot 206.
Niba chairman Richard Hastings said that “the study highlights the real dangers involved for drivers, pedestrians, and cyclists in Northern Ireland, where it appears that, after vehicles have been involved in a collision, insurance companies are trying to cut costs by having non-genuine parts fitted rather than the manufacturer’s parts.“This report underlines our assertion that the practice, which can compromise the cars’ safety integrity, is completely flawed.
“Drivers who have been unfortunate to have been involved in a collision – no matter who is at fault – should also be concerned that the practice can often affect the vehicle resale value and limit or invalidate the car’s warranty.”
It seems that pressure is being put on vehicle repairers to use cheaper “pattern” parts by the insurance industry.
Profits from motor insurance have plummeted in recent years following a period of cut-throat competition for cheaper premiums. In order to keep premiums some way affordable, and boost profits, it seems that insurers are putting the squeeze on body shops to use cheaper material.
“Some insurance companies may say that using non-genuine parts allows them to offer lower policy prices. However, any small savings could be lost thanks to the non-genuine parts devaluing the overall price of your car and increasing the bill for future repairs because they don’t provide adequate structural integrity in an accident,” Hastings said.
“When it’s a choice between lives and profit – there really is no contest.”
Three years ago, Axa Insurance was accused by the BBC of pressurising repairers to use cheaper substandard parts in order to drive down the cost of repairs. At the time, Axa responded to the accusation by saying that “the parts that we use meet exacting EU safety standards and do not compromise the safety or resale value of the vehicle following the repair.
“Axa’s priority is to ensure that our customers’ vehicles are repaired to a very high standard and that repairs are carried our quickly and efficiently to ensure that our customers are back on the road as soon as possible following a claim.”However, the NIBA report states there is a genuine concern that pattern parts simply do not have the same structural integrity as original parts.
The reports said “real differences existed between the genuine and non-genuine panels tested which could affect how well they fit and which could reduce their performance in an impact situation”.
The use of non-original parts was thrown into stark relief last year when such components were blamed for the spate of fires suffered by Opel Zafira people carriers.
BY DAVE WILSON - AUGUST 8, 2007
Important Note: this blog post was originally written in 2007 and has been updated regularly ever since because of the ever-changing nature of the insurance market and ownership of brands. The most recent update is January 2016, and all information should be correct as at that date, but will remain subject to change and may well become outdated before the next update.
Some time ago, we wrote a blog post about a spat between Direct Line and Confused, in which the owners of the little wheeled telephones accused the comparison websites of a host of misdemeanours.
One of the complaints that Direct Line made about the aggregators was about the ownership of the comparison sites, suggesting, we suppose, that perhaps the price comparison sites might be biased in favour of their owners.
What many people don’t realise is that many of the competing brands of insurance advertising on your TV screens every day are all owned by a relatively few companies, and very little mention is made of the links between them.
Direct Line have been very quick to point out the following ownership issues with the aggregators, but after reading the whole of this post, you might decide that they have been lobbing stones from their own glass dwelling.
Confused.com owned by Admiral. Yes, that Admiral. They also own elephant.co.uk, Bell Direct and Diamond, the womens car insurance specialist, and Gladiator for commercial vehicle insurance.
GoCompare are “independent” but since early 2015 has been part of the esure group.
Compare the Market is owned by Budget. This one is a bit naughty, as all of the brands quoted are Budget group companies – but they don’t make that obvious – they also ownDial Direct, “Local Broker“, ibuyeco, Quote Mart, and Junction who run the insurance arms of the M&S Bank, RAC Insurance, Post Office, HSBC, Lloyds Bank, Halifax, andSantander.
So much for the main price comparison sites, what about some of the other big insurance brands?
Esure group, owner of GoCompare, also owns Sheilas’ Wheels, First Alternative, Esure Broker and Sheilas’ Wheels Broker
Aviva is one of the well-known insurers who only deal direct, or do they? Aviva owns theGeneral Accident brand.
Hastings Insurance owns Hastings Direct, People’s Choice and Insure Pink
There are more like this, but finally we come to…
RBS Group – the Royal Bank of Scotland Group includes our old friends Direct Line, plusChurchill, Privilege, NIG, Green Flag, and all of the below trading names!
RegisteredU K Insurance Limited06/08/1974
TradingATS Euromaster Motor Insurance11/01/2012
TradingBMW Fleet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingBMW Insurance11/01/2012
TradingChurchill Car Insurance12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Home Insurance12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Insurance12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Insurance policies12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Pet Insurance12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Travel Insurance12/12/2011
TradingChurchill Van Insurance12/12/2011
TradingCitroen Insurance11/01/2012
TradingDialDirectFinance22/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Car Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Commercial Vehicle Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line for Business22/12/2011
TradingDirect Line fuel & go22/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Home Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Insurance policies12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Pet Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Select22/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Travel Insurance12/12/2011
TradingDirect Line Van Insurance12/12/2011
Tradingdirectline.com22/12/2011
TradingEgg Insurance11/01/2012
TradingGreen Flag Motoring Assistance22/12/2011
TradingLombard25/05/2012
TradingLombard Direct Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingLombard Direct Motor Insurance11/01/2012
TradingLombard Vehicle Management Fleet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingMBNA Car Insurance11/01/2012
TradingMBNA Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingMINI Cover11/01/2012
TradingMINI Insurance11/01/2012
TradingMint Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNational Insurance and Guarantee Corporation12/12/2011
TradingNationwide Car Insurance12/12/2011
TradingNationwide Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNationwide Home Insurance Essentials11/01/2012
TradingNatwest Fleet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNatwest Home Response 2411/01/2012
TradingNatwest Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNatwest One Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNatwest Pet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingNIG12/12/2011
TradingNIG Insurance12/12/2011
TradingNIG Insurance policies12/12/2011
TradingPeugeot Insurance11/01/2012
TradingPrivilege22/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Breakdown22/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Business Insurance11/01/2012
TradingPrivilege Car Insurance12/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Home Insurance12/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Insurance12/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Insurance policies12/12/2011
TradingPrivilege Motor Insurance11/01/2012
TradingPrivilege Plus20/08/2008
TradingPrudential Car Insurance12/12/2011
TradingPrudential Home Insurance12/12/2011
TradingRoyal Bank Insurance11/01/2012
TradingRoyal Bank of Scotland Fleet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingRoyal London Home Insurance12/12/2011
TradingRoyal London Motor Insurance12/12/2011
TradingRoyal London Pet Insurance12/12/2011
TradingRoyalties Insurance11/01/2012
TradingSainsbury’s Car Insurance11/01/2012
TradingSainsbury’s Home Insurance31/01/2012
TradingSainsbury’s Premier Car Insurance11/01/2012
TradingSainsbury’s Premier Cover Home Insurance31/01/2012
TradingThe National Insurance and Guarantee Corporation12/12/2011
TradingThe One Account Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingUlster Bank Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingVirgin One Home Insurance11/01/2012
TradingVirgin Pet Insurance11/01/2012
TradingYourcar InsuranceOf course, we’re sure none of those brand affinity deals count as middle men, at least to Direct Line’s way of thinking. And I’m sure Direct Line think that everyone must know that they are part of a larger insurance group, otherwise they wouldn’t have made such a big fuss over the ownership of the price comparison sites. And we’re sure that none of the RBS Group would ever use a price comparison site, much less run one, given the arguments put forward so forcefully by Direct Line.
That must be another company that started up the now-defunct tescocompare.com, then,registering the domain name and taking out a trademark. And it must be a different RBS Insurance “whose brands include Direct Line and Churchill, is understood to have invested millions of pounds in the venture”. Sure enough, when tescocompare launched with a whole load of RBS Group brands offering quote comparisons “that you can’t get anywhere else” (although no Direct Line, of course) along with a large quota of HBOS companies. The service has since ceased trading.
All this makes me very grateful to work for a family owned specialist car insurancecompany – my life would be very confusing if I had to reconcile multiple sets of brand values that were pulling in different and mutually contradictory directions!
But for the customer – beware and make sure that when you ring round you are actually getting quotes from more than one company. And if you call us on 0330 123 1232 (or 0800 369 8590 free from a landline), we’ll impartially check our panel of over 40 insurance schemes.
Had an insurance claim cancelled or refused and want to know why?check your claims history.
What is CUE?The Claims and Underwriting Exchange (CUE) is a central database of motor, home and personal injury/industrial illness incidents reported to insurance companies, which may or may not give rise to a claim. CUE is managed by not-for-profit company Insurance Database Services Limited (IDSL) on behalf of its member organisations. These include all major insurers and many self insured organisations such as local authorities, passenger carriers and transport companies.
CUE was established in 1994 to help keep down premiums for honest policyholders by preventing multiple claims fraud and the misrepresentation of claims histories. There are currently over 32 million claims records available to subscribers.
Individuals wishing to review information which may be held about them on the database should view the Data Protection information below.
click here to go to there site.
VW reportedly reaches deal in US over emissions
Volkswagen has reached a deal with authorities in the United States to settle the case over its cheating of diesel emissions tests that would involve it paying each affected customer $5,000 (€4,422), Germany's Die Welt newspaper reported.
Citing unidentified sources close to the negotiations, Die Welt said the agreement would be presented to Judge Charles Breyer in San Francisco tomorrow, avoiding a trial.
Earlier today, the possibility of a settlement had boosted the carmaker's shares by 6.6%, the biggest gain in Germany's benchmark DAX index.
A US federal judge last month gave VW and regulators until tomorrow to agree on a fix for nearly 600,000 diesel cars on US roads implicated by VW's emissions test-rigging scandal.
The company does "not believe any expedited hearing or bench trial is appropriate or required", according to the agenda for the hearing at the San Francisco district court about VW's progress towards reaching a deal with the US Environmental Protection Agency.
The plaintiffs - a committee representing thousands of consumers who say they were tricked into buying polluting diesel vehicles - proposed an expedited hearing or bench trial, or an expedited "all issues" trial including punitive damages.
However, the owners of affected cars should receive $5,000each in compensation and VW will separately have to pay to fix their vehicles, the paper said.
Earlier two sources familiar with the matter said VW would substantially increase the amount of money set aside to cover its emissions test cheating scandal from the €6.7 billion currently earmarked.
Europe's biggest carmaker will make provisions for a double-digit billion-euro amount in its 2015 results on 28 April, the sources said, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.
One said the German company might not pay a dividend to shareholders on the results and if it did, it would be less than €1 per share.
Volkswagen paid out €4.80 per common share and €4.86 per preference share on 2014 results.
http://m.rte.ie/news/2016/0420/783183-volkswagen/
You couldn't leave a note! One in 10 who prang another car while parking drive off without telling the owner.
Scratching other cars and clipping vehicles with doors are most common
More than a quarter said they'd bumped into a bollard in the last 12 months
Half of drivers are more aggressive behind the wheel
Co-op finds young drivers want fewer parking manoeuvres in the test
Returning to your car to find a scratch, dent or chip is an infuriating experience that's made even more teeth-grinding when the offending driver flees without leaving a note.
But it appears to be becoming a common occurrence with 12 per cent of motorists saying they'd had a minor bump when trying to park last year.
Nearly a third of motorists quizzed by OSV said they'd had a small prang with another car, but more than one in ten of these didn't let the other driver know about their misdemeanor.
Bump and bolt: 12 per cent of drivers who admitted to bumping another car when trying to park in the last year said they drove away without leaving a note for the other driver, a recent survey found.
These figures are the result of a survey of 1,000 UK motorists by OSV, an independent vehicle supply firm.
It said that 29 per cent of drivers admitted they'd rubbed another vehicle at low speeds when trying to park.
However, 12 per cent drove off without leaving their details or an apology for the unsuspecting car owner.
Clipping door mirrors was the most common offence when trying to squeeze through a tight gap, while almost half of those quizzed said a passenger of theirs had clipped another vehicle when opening a door.
Passengers also take their fair share of the blame when it comes to causing accidents while parking, it appears.
More than a quarter of drivers said they'd stuck a bollard when trying to park last year
One in five drivers claimed that their prang had been caused by being distracted by a passenger in the vehicle.
But it's not just other cars drivers are bumping into.
Bollards are hit most often, with 27 per cent of surveyed drivers admitting to clipping one.
A further 15 per cent said they've hit a garage door, while others have done damage at homes by hitting gates and walls, 12 per cent and 10 per cent of surveyed drivers respectively.
Worryingly, five per cent have even managed to make contact with a lamp post.
OSV joint-company Director, Debbie Kirkley, said: ‘It’s disappointing to see that so many motorists are prepared to leave the scene of an accident without taking responsibility or leaving any contact details.
‘Admittedly, this research is based upon minor bumps and scratches, so it’s feasible to think that it’s not worth the effort when many of us have had to cover the costs of damage inflicted on our own cars by other people.
'However, common courtesy and simply saying sorry can go a very long way.
‘I think the main issue is that people often feel embarrassed when they’ve been responsible for a minor accident, and we all have the inbuilt flight mechanism.
TOP 5 REASONS DRIVERS GIVE FOR HAVING A PARKING PRANG 20% - Passenger distraction
17% - Pedestrian blocked their view or necessitated a change of direction
11% - Pressure from other drivers made their attempt to park too quickly
7% - Distracted by a mobile phone
3% - A loud noise made them jump and misjudge the manoeuvre
'Who wants to live with a guilty conscience though? I’d much rather swallow my pride and face the embarrassment! After all, I’d appreciate the gesture myself if roles were reversed.’
One reason that didn't appear in the list of excuses for having a parking prang was aggressive driving. However, more than half of motorists have said they act differently behind the wheel.
Recent research from Churchill Car Insurance found that 57 per cent of drivers admitted to acting more aggressively when driving than they would normally.
Churchill compared displays of aggression on the road with those in person and found that while 31 per cent had sworn at strangers in the car, only 12 per cent had done so face-to-face.
The figures for shouting at other car drivers were similar, too – 26 per cent of the 2005 motorists questioned had shouted at others while driving but less than half (12 per cent) had done so in person.
Psychologist Donna Dawson said: 'One of the reasons drivers exert such different behaviours when on the road is the belief that their behaviour is justified by the circumstances – we tell ourselves ‘the other driver caused me to react this way due to their bad driving'.
'In other words, I am a perfectly reasonable person, reacting normally to another person’s bad behaviour.'
A third of young motorists want to see changes made to the driving test to better prepare them, but parking is one element they'd like to see less of
However, could the reason for clipping other cars or bumping into bollard be due to a lack of ability behind the wheel?
A new study from the Co-operative Insurance has found that over a third (36 per cent) of the UK’s young drivers don’t believe that the driving test is fit for purpose as it doesn’t fully prepare them for driving after passing their driving test.
The report, based on a combination of data for over 60,000 17 to 25-year-olds and a survey of 1,000 drivers in the same age bracket, found that young motorists wanted to see motorway driving, examination at night and a mandatory number of lessons added to driving test restrictions.
Nearly two fifths of 17 to 25-year-olds also called for sat nav training to be included in the driving test.
That said, parking manoeuvres were highlighted as elements to the test young drivers wanted to see omitted.
Nearly a third wanted the 'reverse around a corner' section of the test removed, and nearly one in five hoped to see parallel parking taken out of the test.
DRIVING TEST CHANGES 17 to 25-YEAR-OLD DRIVERS WANT TO SEE
Include motorway driving 76%
Include day and night time driving 57%
Mandatory number of lessons before taking test 50%
Include all manoeuvres 50%
Remove unnecessary questions from the theory test 45%
Include driving with a sat nav 39%
Less minor faults should be allowed 37%
Remove the reverse around a corner element 29%
More minor faults should be allowed 27%
Remove the parallel parking element 19%
Remove the emergency stop element 15%
James Hillon, Director of Products at the Co-operative Insurance, said: 'Newly qualified drivers today are facing busier road conditions than any other generation.
'It’s extremely important for road safety that anyone who passes their driving test, regardless of age, feels comfortable and equipped to drive on the roads unsupervised.
'It is no secret that errors made on the roads unfortunately can have catastrophic consequences for road users and communities.'
Read more: http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/cars/article-3540082/One-10-prang-car-parking-drive-without-telling-owner.html#ixzz46TR8MKKO
FRAUDSTER GIVEN £10 FINE
A crash for cash fraudster who made thousands from the UK’s biggest ever car insurance scam has been ordered to pay back just £10.
Stephen Pegram who was jailed in January for six months for his part in the £750,000 racket, has been ordered to pay back just £10 of the sum he personally benefitted from.
Stephen Pegram was responsible for £19,000 worth of fraud in the so-called ‘crash for cash’ operation, which involved the deliberate damaging of vehicles operated from a garage based in Blackwood.
Prosecutors had been seeking to recover £5,250 from Stephen Pegram – the sum thought to have directly benefited him. But Cardiff Crown Court was told the defendant, who is currently in jail, had no assets.
Known as the biggest car insurance fraud ever investigated in the UK, there have been a total of 82 convictions since the scam was discovered, thanks to CCTV footage discovered by police.
The crash for cash scam revolved around garage business St David’s Crash Repair, also known as Easifix, run by the Yandell family in Pengam, Blackwood.
RAC - number of children convicted of driving without insurance rises by 21% in two years
Nearly 1,000 children were convicted of driving with no insurance in 2014, a rise of more than a fifth (21%) since 2012, according to a Freedom of Information request made by the RAC to the DVLA.
In 2014, 991 under 17s were caught driving on public roads without insurance, a rise of 169 over just two years – despite these individuals not even being old enough to hold a licence. And the problem is a male-dominated one, with 32 times as many convictions in 2014 of boys (961) as girls (30).
The youngest child convicted of driving without insurance was an 11-year-old boy, whereas the youngest female was a girl aged 12. Twelve boys aged 12 were convicted in contrast to just one 12-year-old girl and there were 27 boys aged 13, compared to just one girl.
Non-licence holders
Among drivers of all ages who did not hold valid driving licences and were caught without insurance, the conviction rate has also remained stubbornly high – rising 6% from 14,466 in 2012 to 15,307 in 2014. In total – taking in full, provisional and non-licenced holders – 100,323 people were convicted in 2014, which is a 6% reduction compared to 106,233 in 2012.
Even among those motorists holding full licences, men are three and a half times more likely to be convicted of driving without a valid insurance policy than women: in 2014, there was a total of 45,838 male convictions, compared to just 12,879 female convictions. However, there was a 9% fall in the total number of convictions among men that hold full driving licences – from 50,454 in 2012 to 45,838 in 2014.
Male full licence holders 65 and over
Some of the largest rises in convictions were among male full licence holders aged 65 and over; in this age group, convictions rose 23% from 809 (2012) to 992 (2014). Convictions involving women of the same age group grew 19% from 148 to 176 cases.
The oldest man holding a full licence and convicted of driving with no insurance in 2014 was aged 94, while the two oldest women were aged 88.
RAC Insurance director Mark Godfrey said:
“In trying to discover how many people have been convicted of driving without insurance, we found there is a shocking number of children who are caught driving before they’re even old enough to apply for a provisional licence, let alone have proper instruction.
“Sadly, we may have little choice but to accept there will always be a minority of young males who will be prepared to drive without a licence or insurance. The fact that the number convicted has remained so high suggests a greater focus is needed to work with this group, so they understand better the risks and potential consequences of their actions.
“It also continues to be the case that men, and indeed boys, are far more likely to be convicted of driving without insurance than women or girls.
“But what is especially worrying is that these figures are really only the tip of the iceberg as the insurance industry estimates there are in the region of one million uninsured drivers on the road. This means only a tenth of drivers thought to be breaking the law in this way have been caught.
“Insurance is a mandatory driving requirement for good reason; it’s there to protect drivers, as well as their passengers and other road users and property owners. Anyone who drives without insurance is not only breaking the law, they are also selfishly putting others, as well as themselves, at financial and legal risk.
“The rise in the number of qualified male drivers aged over 65 being caught is, however, a surprise. With an ageing population, there are now more older men driving – numbers rose by about 4% between November 2012 and March 2014,** but the number of male convictions between 2012 and 2014 grew at more than five times that rate.
“On a positive note there has been a notable reduction in the number of men of any age holding full or provisional licences being caught, with a 7% fall of 5,146 convictions. The figures for non-licence holders, however, have remained stubbornly high since 2012.
“The alarming increases revealed in this Freedom of Information request are all the more significant when you consider that the number of dedicated roads policing officers has declined by 23%, or 1,279 officers between 2010 and 2014, meaning there are fewer officers to catch offenders.
“This fact has not been lost on drivers with 60%*** of motorists believing there are insufficient numbers of police officers on the roads to enforce driving laws, and as a result there is little chance of law-breakers being caught and prosecuted for anything other than speeding or running a red light, offences that tend to be enforced via cameras.
“The recent double rise in Insurance Premium Tax by the Chancellor is unlikely to be helpful in reducing the numbers of uninsured drivers. Insurers will inevitably pass the increased IPT cost on to the motorist and higher premiums may encourage some, particularly younger drivers, to break the law.
“Young people already pay the largest insurance premiums of all and this will only make things worse for them by making it even more expensive to gain the independence and work opportunities that having a car brings.
“We urge the Government to treat telematics ‘black box’ car insurance policies that encourage young people to drive more safely to be exempt from IPT, or failing that for them to be given a lower rate which lessens their overall insurance costs.”
Interview: David Marock, Group CEO, Charles TaylorBy Peta Fuller | News | 20 April 2016
He's a CEO with £24m burning a hole in his pocket but Charles Taylor boss David Marock isn't in a great hurry to spend it.
After a rights issue in March 2015, the professional services firm gathered around £28.9m after expenses, then used the funds to purchase insurance software provider Fadata for just north of €5m in July last year.
“We’ll have around £24m or so still available for acquisitions directly from what we raised then, in addition, we have access to further funds. Our constraint isn’t going to be our ability to fund a deal now, our constraint is actually finding a deal where the company feels like a good strategic fit,” Marock said.
It is the combination of ‘fit’ and price that has kept the firm cautious on more acquisitions, not the possible deals he sees coming across his desk.
“I always used to feel we were seeing the dregs, bluntly, and then over time we just increasingly have seen better,” he said.
“There are some players out there, be it private equity or very large commercial organisations, that are just willing to pay over the odds. As an organisation we’re ultimately quite financially prudent, and as a consequence that’s been our challenge, if you like.”
He said the publicly-listed company is having discussions in “a number of areas” but wouldn’t be drawn on which, adding it was looking at support services, adjusting and management, as well as on the life side.
“We’ve beefed up our team internally in a variety of different ways, so that we have the capacity to both investigate those opportunities and then, assuming one of them comes off, to then be able to integrate it into our business, post-acquisition,” he said.
“We’ve got the capacity to do it, we’ve got the funds to do it, and it’s just a question of time, when the right opportunity converts.”
Consolidation on the rise
The insurance services industry at large is going through some consolidation but in comparison to moves in other sectors in previous years, such as the broking sector, Marock says it is far slower.
“If I look at what Towergate did, it probably consolidated faster. And, as a space, it probably isn’t happening as fast as that. But the direction of travel is clearly that way,” he said.
“My sense is to really get full value, whether it’s an existing core business or whether it’s an acquisition. You have to spend the time and energy to integrate the people, to make it part of our business, to get the culture right for long-term success. Otherwise, you just end up being an amalgamation of independent firms.”
According to Marock given the fragmentation globally of insurance support services, the size as well as the company’s approach is driving its success.
In its 2015 results, profits at Charles Taylor grew in all sectors based on prior year figures, with group revenue up to £143.4m (2014: £122.4m), except for loss adjusting, which faced a tough year across the wider market.
Despite bringing in £59m in revenue (2014: £56.1m), the segment saw operating profit decline from £2.2m in 2014 to £1.7m. However, Marock said the general environment has been benign.
“If you look at Charles Taylor Adjusting, the revenues in that business are actually growing every year for the last number of years. And if you think about many other adjusting businesses whose revenues have fallen off a cliff, you’ve got to ask why is that happening? And it’s because our clients, even when there’s less work around, are choosing to say, ‘I still want to have the best people managing us in the most professional way, serving our clients,’ he said.
The 2014 acquisition of Knowles Loss Adjusters, a move Marock said fitted “culturally” with the company but targeted comparatively smaller losses, pushed up revenue for the firm.
When it comes to future acquisitions in this sector, both geographic and technical skills will be strong drivers but he added: “We’re very careful that what we’re not looking to be is a mainstream commodity play.”
“Right now, we’re looking at things that are smaller. But when I say smaller, it’s relative to what we typically do. Ultimately, for us, we need to be able to differentiate ourselves by the quality of our people, by our technical expertise, by our passion for client service. Those things have to really matter, both to the people we’ve got, but also to the clients that we use. So we’re going to only look to play in areas where that makes sense.”
Globally the company expanded in 2015 with a loss adjusting office in Rome, an outpost in Montreal and Cape Town, with the latter opening earlier this year.
“Where we can see it’s a natural addition in a geographic sense, we’d look at it,” he added on future acquisitions.
Profitability not a driver of outsourcing
Forecasts ahead for the general insurance market, as well as the European Court of Justice ruling on VAT for outsourced claims handling, could prompt downturns in the market.
However, this is not something Marock is concerned about. “You don’t come to us for high volume outsourcing type arrangements. You come to us because you want technical expertise, because it’s important how it gets done,” he said.
“So I’m not implying it’s insignificant, but it’s going to matter more if the person made that decision on a pure price basis.”
Fraudsters steer away from motor as casualty fraud almost triples in five years
Organised casualty fraud claims saw a significant spike from 2010 to 2014 as the government tightened up on whiplash and motor fraud, according to a new report.
The research by insurance law firm BLM and the Institute of Directors showed instances of casualty claims rose from 7,403 in 2010 to almost 20,000 in 2014.
While government policy was a factor, the rise in fraudulent claims was supported by several economic factors including increased migration, improving technology and medical science and the rise in retirement age.
Technology was also identified as a key catalyst of future claims, both commercially and domestically, with projections suggesting there will be 26 billion connected devices by 2020.
There will be a significant insurance risk for both businesses and individuals as the number of smart devices increase.
Sarah Hill, partner and head of fraud at BLM, said such advances have proven to be a double-edged sword.
“While the Internet of Things (IoT) is hailed as enabling new types of working, and promises to disrupt our home lives, it is also set to cause issues from quality control in manufacturing to employers’ health and safety regulations,” Hill said.
“All of these represent significant risks to insurers at present, and it is imperative that companies look at all avenues to alleviate this pressure, from supporting their employees with ergonomic equipment to familiarising themselves with the latest health and safety regulations.”
Court victory for insurer in £236,724 Ferrari credit hire dispute
​http://www.insurancetimes.co.uk/court-victory-for-insurer-in-236724-ferrari-credit-hire-dispute/1418030.article
Two brokers lose permission to carry out regulated activities under FCA
Brokers David Michael Sayer and Lester Evans have lost their Part 4A permission to undertake regulated activities under the Financial Conduct Authority after failing to pay overdue balances.
D.M. Sayer & Co owed the FCA a total of £1,222.96, comprising of periodic fees and levies, which had been due for payment by 6 September 2015.
Meanwhile, Lester Evans owed a total of £1, 694.44, which had been due for payment by 12 September 2015.
The FCA sent warning notices to D.M. Sayer & Co and Lester Evans in respect of their outstanding fees on 11 February and 26 January, respectively.
Parliament and Treasury Committee’s power ‘greatly strengthened’ in hiring process of FCA CEO
The House of Commons’ and the Treasury Committee’s influence on the appointment and dismissal of the FCA’s CEO has been heightened, according to the latter’s chair, Andrew Tyrie.
Tyrie, pictured, said: “Parliament’s, and the [Treasury] Committee’s, influence over the appointment and dismissal of the Chief Executive of the FCA has been greatly strengthened by the arrangements set out in the Chancellor’s letter.
“Parliament will now be better placed to safeguard the FCA from interference – or the perception of interference – by the Treasury or Treasury Ministers.”
In a letter written to Tyrie yesterday (19 April), Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne said a “scrutiny is important and welcome” in the process for the appointment of the FCA’s CEO.
Osborne said: “I will therefore ensure that appointments to the CEO of the FCA are made in such a way to ensure the Treasury Committee is able to hold a hearing, after the appointment is announced but before it is formalised.
“Should the Treasury Committee recommend in its report that the appointment be put as a motion to the whole House, the government will make time for this motion and respect the decision of the House.”
Osborne added that he will seek to change the legislation governing the FCA CEO position to make it a fixed, renewable 5-year term.
“This would not apply to Andrew Bailey, who I recently announced as the new head of the FCA, but would first apply to his successor,” he said
Bailey, CEO of the Prudential Regulation Authority, was appointed as the FCA’s CEO in January, and will begin his role on 1 July.
The PRA subsequently named its insurance executive director Sam Woods as Bailey’s successor at that organisation.
﻿John O’Roarke gets £10m share of £39m award to LV= GI bosses
John O’Roarke gets £10m share of £39m award to LV= GI bosses,They joys of working in insurance eh?
Deferred MoT tests mean MORE dangerous cars
Steph Savill MBA, FIMI Chartered MarketerEntrepreneur & consultant improving motoring services for women and gender balance in auto industry
Deferred MoT tests mean MORE dangerous carsApr 20, 2016
After lurking in the motor industry wings for several years, our Government is once again discussing changes to the first MoT test. To defer this from three years to four.
There will be some motorists who will celebrate this possibility as a means to save them time, money and even garage visiting stress.
And we can expect the motor industry to rail against this on behalf of the many MoT centres that'll be adversely affected by fewer MoT tests for them to earn out of. After investing in the necessary and expensive facilities the DVSA required of them.
But what other issues might be afoot I wonder?
The purpose of MoTsSurely the main purpose of the MoT relates to road safety?
Which it seems the Government doesn't get.
For example, they don't seem to get the significance of licensing ALL mechanics, despite the level of complaints about garage services and the common-sense link between mechanical incompetence, business ethics and dangerous cars.
And clearly they don't get the message that the latest MoT statistics are spelling out. That 40% of cars fail their first formal road worthiness check, aka the MoT, as is (DVSA 2014 stat) - with safety related defects including lighting and signalling (30%), suspension (18%), brakes (17%) and tyres (10%).
Neglected cars are dangerousIpso facto, if these cars were allowed to drive for a further 12 months, regardless, they'd be potentially dangerous for longer on our roads.
Add to this the increasing number of motorists buying cheap PCP fuelled cars encouraged by sales messages like 'Just add fuel and go...' As if new cars don't come with maintenance responsibilities for the car driver or that new cars don't use consumables like tyres in the same way as M0T-aged cars do.
Rest assured I am no fan of any nanny-like state but when it comes to road safety issues, I am no fan of any Government that applies blinkers in this area.
But then I remember that fewer MoTs also means less VAT for our Exchequer?
MoT Sanity Will Surely Prevail?I no longer believe that sanity always prevails when it comes to legislation. The EU Gender Directive, for example, and its impact on car insurance premiums for safe women drivers has taught me to look at future such initiatives with a high degree of cynicism.
Could lengthening the MoT period shore up new car sales in the UK by shortening the life cycle of neglected cars? Or is there unfathomable EU involvement in the UK wings I wonder?
Over to the UK motor industry to make a solid business case for ALL motorists to preserve the road safety status quo. We're counting on you to put us first guys. Or to tell us the REAL behind the scenes issues we might not know enough about yet...
PS: One of our major concerns is to do with tyre safety awareness levels among women drivers. Please read our advice in this respect and by all means get in touch if you would like to support our promotional plans for Tyre Safety Month in October 2016.
Go to https://www.foxyladydrivers.com/ to find out more about Steph Saville and Foxy ladies owners club.
Picking your next car? Our unique Car Chooser is here to help... | No thanksTop 10 tips for staying safe when buying a car
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Tony Abbott of Reactiv Media CREDIT: BEN LACK FOR THE TELEGRAPH
16 APRIL 2016 • 7:47PMHe drives a £200,000 McLaren sports car, has just bought a 25-room mansion in the Home Counties and at the end of the month will marry his business partner at The Savoy.
But not everybody will be delighted by Tony Abbott’s success, including the 6.5 million people who each year are plagued by nuisance calls made by his company Reactiv Media.
The company was fined £75,000 by the official watchdog for making intrusive phone calls, but has so far refused to pay.
The Sunday Telegraph can disclose how Mr Abbott has exploited a legal loophole to avoid paying the fine. He has put Reactiv Media into the hands of receivers, leaving the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) and other creditors out of pocket.
The move will not stop Mr Abbott, 44, continuing his lucrative cold-calling business. The call centre, based in a market town in West Yorkshire, is being run through another of Mr Abbott’s companies, called Flip It Marketing, which was only set up last September.
The ICO spent a year and a half investigating Reactiv Media for making unsolicited nuisance calls, before fining the company £50,000 in July 2014, which was later increased to £75,000.
Reactiv Media employees cold-called home owners to sell insurance, conduct lifestyle surveys and seek out potential claimants who had been mis-sold PPI. Its database contains eight million phone numbers. Almost two years on, the fine, which Reactiv Media contested, remains unpaid.
An investigation last month by The Telegraph disclosed that 14 out of 20 companies penalised by the ICO for nuisance calls have gone bust or declared themselves insolvent to avoid the fine. Reactiv Media, if it goes into liquidation, would be the 15th.
The directors of those companies, who have no personal liabilities, are free to start up new firms carrying out the same practices.
Reactiv Media is also under investigation by the Ministry of Justice over its conduct in seeking claims against banks for mis-selling PPI.
Mr Abbott shows no apparent sign of being damaged financially by the investigations.
In the autumn, he bought a former nursing home in Surrey which he is converting into a home for himself and Stephanie Bell, a one-time employee who is a co-director of Reactiv Home Limited, one of Mr Abbott’s 16 other companies, and soon to become his second wife. Miss Bell is sole director of two other companies based at Mr Abbott’s call centre.
article care of the telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/16/legal-loophole-that-lets-millionaire-carry-on-cold-calling/
Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) - survey of drivers convicted of ‘hit and run’ reveal 16-22% 'ran' because there was no damage to the vehicles
Why do drivers fail to stop and report an accident? New research shows why drivers ‘hit and run’:
• Almost half (45%) of ‘hit and run’ drivers would not have left the scene of the accident if they had known that by doing so they were committing an offence
• Younger drivers are more likely to leave the scene of an accident because they are uninsured, have been drinking, are scared of the consequences, or panic
• Older drivers are more likely to leave the scene of an accident if they don’t think the accident is serious enough to report
An interim independent research report, conducted by the Department of Criminology at the University of Leicester, is starting to identify the reasons why motorists ‘hit and run’. The research has been commissioned by Motor Insurers Bureau (MIB) which compensates the innocent victims of accidents with uninsured and ‘hit and run’ drivers.
Survey responses from 19,071 drivers convicted of ‘hit and run’ offences revealed the following:
• 50% did not think the accident was serious enough to report or they did not think that they had to report the accident (of this, 29% did not think it was serious enough and 21% were unaware of their responsibility to report an accident).
• 45% of those convicted would have stopped and reported the incident if they had known that they had committed an offence by leaving the scene of the accident.
• 16 to 34 year olds were more likely to leave the scene of an accident because they were not insured, they had been drinking, were scared of the consequences or they ‘panicked.
• Older drivers (over 34 years old) were more likely to leave the scene if they did not think the accident was serious enough to report.
• 6% of younger drivers (aged 16 -34) said that nothing would have made them stop and report the accident - they were determined to get away with the offence.
Factors that would make drivers report an accident
Respondents were also asked to state what factors might have made them report the accident immediately after it happened. In summary the four main reasons were: 
- If it was known an offence had been committed (45 to 56%)
- If a pedestrian had been hurt (38 to 47%)
- If there was damage to another vehicle (32 to 40%)
- If it had been known penalty points would be received (19 to 24%).
The public plays an important role in tracing ‘hit and run’ drivers: over 50% of respondents were traced through pedestrians and other drivers who witnessed the accident.
Department for Transport (DfT) data highlights that in 2014 there were a total of 163,554 road traffic accidents where an injury was sustained and in just over 10% of these accidents a ‘hit and run’ driver was involved. There are serious consequences for drivers who leave the scene of an accident** and often their victims and families suffer potentially long-term physical and emotional impacts which can have significant financial implications.
Successful interventions have been implemented by the government, MIB and the insurance industry to tackle the issue of uninsured driving and as a consequence of these, MIB estimates that the number of uninsured drivers has fallen from 2 million in 2005 to 1 million in 2016. The MIB is concerned that a reduction of a similar scale has not emerged with ‘hit and run’ drivers.
Despite the obvious consequences of ‘hit and run’ offences there is a lack of academic-based research which identifies driver behaviours and motivations. This insight could be used to develop interventions and preventative strategies.
Ashton West OBE, Chief Executive of MIB, explained:
“Being involved in an accident can be an unsettling and traumatic experience which is made worse when the other driver doesn’t stop. There is a real need to understand why there are so many ‘hit and run’ accidents.
“Until now we have focused very much on dealing with the problem of driving without insurance. Whilst the level of uninsured driving in the UK has halved in the last 10 years, the number of claims reported to the MIB from ‘hit and run’ incidents has not fallen by anywhere near this amount.
“We are working to raise awareness of ‘hit and run’ offences and the impact on society with the ultimate aim of bringing the number of incidents down. The completion of this independent research will provide useful insights which we will share with the government, police, the insurance industry and other interested bodies so that we can take action to tackle this problem together.”
Commenting on the interim findings Dr Matt Hopkins, Senior Lecturer at the University of Leicester, said:
“As relatively little previous work in relation to ‘hit and run’ accidents has included any personal engagement with offenders, this research is fairly novel.
“Of course, these findings have to be treated with caution, but they do begin to highlight some of the reasons why drivers leave the scene of an accident. For a number of drivers there is clearly confusion about the legal requirement to report an accident, but importantly, some differences are observed between younger and older drivers that could be developed into preventative strategies. Further work is required to gain more detailed understanding of driver motivations to leave the scene from across a range of accident types. This is where the next stage of the research will focus.”
For a copy of University of Leicester's interim report click here.
For a copy of the MIB's infographic of report statistics click here.
28 Million Fixed Penalty Notices Issued In 10 Years
Number of Fixed Penalty Notices issued in the United Kingdom, plus the most common offences and most prolific regions.Drivers most commonly punished for speedingBritain's motorists received 28 million Fixed Penalty Notices between 2002 and 2012 most typically for speeding, Direct Line confirmed. The insurance company - based on its analysis of Home Office data – said that 15,299,039 people were caught speeding within the time frame. Other common categories of offence included:
obstruction, waiting and parking (5,640,089),
seat belt (2,030,079),
neglect of traffic signs and directions and pedestrian rights (2,010,625),
use of hand-held mobile phone (1,067,411),
licence, insurance and record keeping (852,488),
vehicle test and condition (464,492),
lighting and noise (212,736),
careless driving excluding use of hand-held mobile (128,808),
other such as load related (67,036).
Gus Park, Direct Line's Commercial Director of Motor Insurance, said: The analysis highlights that millions of drivers are being penalised each year for flouting the most obvious of traffic laws, such as speeding. Careless drivers put lives at risk and are also a major source of concern and irritation for those motorists that abide by the law.”
Fixed Penalty Notices by regionDrivers in Police Force region Suffolk were the most frequent offenders per-thousand, at 362. They were followed by their counterparts within: South Wales (351), Merseyside (341), Gwent (339), Lincolnshire (324), North Wales (324), Cumbria (320), Warwickshire (317), Dorset (312) and finally Avon & Somerset (324).
Fixed Penalty Notice explainedThe AA explained that: “A fixed penalty notice is a conditional offer – you can accept guilt, pay the fine, take the points and the matter will be closed - or you can reject the offer in which case you will be summonsed to appear in court”. Furthermore, there are 2 types relating to motoring offences: endorsable and non-endorsable.
An endorsable notice typically – but not exclusively – incorporates 3 licence penalty points plus a £100 fine. Endorsable offences include: exceeding the speed limit, failing to stop at a red traffic light, using a hand-held mobile phone and not having third party insurance (or better).
A non-endorsable notice never includes penalty points, but there is typically a £50 fine (sometimes higher or lower). Offences include: driving without an MOT, failing to comply with traffic signs such as “give way”, and not wearing a belt.
Fixed Penalty Notice is “absolutely necessary”, say policeThe Association of Chief Police Officers' Suzette Davenport claimed, in 2013, that such power are: “Absolutely necessary to deal with drivers who are putting people’s lives at risk and police will not hesitate to enforce them.”
She added: “The vast majority of drivers are law abiding, but some are still not getting the message.”
article care of ​http://www.motoring.co.uk/car-news/28-million-fixed-penalty-notices-issued-in-10-years_67665?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=motoring-180416