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Timestamp: 2016-10-23 14:49:04
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Matched Legal Cases: ['UKHL ', 'UKPC ', 'UKHL ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'UKSC ']

⭐MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS
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1 INDEX 1. Elements of Negligence p2 2. Negligence in a Motor Vehicle Accident p2 3. Breach of the Duty of Care pp Contributory Negligence p3 5. Apportionment of Damages p3 6. Damages p3 7. Particulars of Negligence in the Court Process pp Claims for Damages for Negligence pp4-18 (a) Windscreen of the defendant's motor vehicle struck with a rock causing the windscreen to go opaque defendant lost control of his motor vehicle and caused damage to another vehicle p4 (b) Driver required to apply brakes prior to collision whether mechanical failure of truck pp4-5 (c) Motorist driving over hatched area on carriageway forming lane prematurely pp5-6 (d) Motorist turning in front of oncoming vehicle whether apportionment of liability appropriate pp6-7 (e) Concertina-type collision driver of first car sued drivers of second and third cars negligence proved by first driver unable to prove claim against other drivers pp7-8 (f) Vehicle struck from behind vehicle accelerated forward striking another vehicle vehicle then struck another four vehicles causation whether driver s actions were a reasonable response in the circumstances whether driver acted negligently after colliding with the vehicle in front agony of the moment decision contributory negligence whether magistrate in error in finding first driver liable whether magistrate in error in adopting the all or nothing approach pp8-9 (g) Property damaged one vehicle fled scene two occupants seen in fleeing vehicle pp9-10 (h) Roundabout two vehicles entering at same time right of way whether vehicle making right hand turn vehicle moving laterally when unsafe p10 (i) Collision between right turning and oncoming vehicles right turning vehicle stopped in intersection for a few seconds opportunity for oncoming vehicle to stop pp10-11 (j) Motor Vehicle accidentally reversed collided with vehicle to rear pp11-12 (k) Collision between two motor boats both travelling on a river at speed head-on situation one driver pulled to right as per navigation regulations other driver pulled to left 'agony of the moment' decision pp12-13 (l) Stationary vehicle on freeway at night hazard lights not operating driver unaware of location of switch to activate hazard lights collision with another vehicle pp13 (m) Mobile car wash collision between part of car wash and car car to stop when red lights on lights not easily seen view of scene by Magistrate Res ipsa loquitur pp14-15 (n) Truck turning left overtaken on left by other vehicle overtaking in breach of regulation truck driver gave way to two vehicles on the left did not see third vehicle pp15-16 (o) Motor vehicle collision on narrow country road driver s forward vision obscured by bend in road driver travelling at km/h collision with vehicle reversing with driver s side wheels on edge of bitumen pp16-17 (p) Motor vehicle collision between two vehicles in intersection controlled by traffic lights pp Duty of Care pp18-22 (a) Participation by plaintiff with defendant in illegal enterprise agreement to drive while disqualified pp18-20 (b) Duty of care collision involving a stolen motor vehicle p20 (c) Intersection controlled by traffic control signals duty of driver crossing on green light pp Cases involving Contributory Negligence Apportionment pp22-27 (a) Collision involving a motor car and a heavy truck assumption by truck driver that other driver would yield right of way pp22-23 (b) Contributory negligence must be pleaded p23 (c) Intersection controlled by traffic control signals duty of driver crossing on green light p24 (d) Colliding with rear of vehicle in front front vehicle almost stationary beyond a dangerous blind crest both drivers negligent apportionment 80/20% pp24-25 (e) Large truck blocking roadway truck not well lit dark and raining truck struck by vehicle travelling along roadway question of negligence whether apportionment appropriate pp25-26 (f) Finding by magistrate that one party liable for the collision whether magistrate bound to conclude driver guilty of contributory negligence pp Claims for Cost of repairs etc pp27-37 (a) Claim for cost of repairs and loss of no claim bonus complainant indemnified by insurance company for cost of repairs pp27-28 (b) Claimant sought from other party the amount of the excess which was paid a release was signed in full and final settlement pp28-29 (c) Motor vehicle under hire-purchase agreement whether amount due from hirer under such agreement recoverable as damages from defendant p292 (d) Vehicle not repaired at hearing date award made whether interest should be allowed pp29-30 (e) Repairer authorised to repair vehicle solicitors authorised to recover damages pp30-31 (f) Collision between motor vehicle and tram economic loss sustained by tramway operator operational performance penalties payable by tramway operator to third party pp31-33 (g) Defendant admitted driving negligently legislative prohibition on charging for or recovering repair costs from owner where vehicle repaired without written approval pp33-34 (h) Whether magistrate erred in admitting evidence of insurance assessors finding that plaintiff liable for damage caused in the accident pp34-35 (i) Question of quantum application of principles for measuring damages finding by magistrate that plaintiff had not sustained the loss claimed pp Foreseeability pp37-38 Motor vehicle collided with a pole driver's wife a passenger received both physical and mental injuries wife pregnant gave birth to child passenger's mother required to look after her daughter lost income and travelling expenses incurred by mother as a result pp Elements of Negligence The elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach and consequent damage. The legal or ultimate burden of proof lies on the plaintiff in relation to each element. That is, the plaintiff must satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that the damage to the plaintiff's motor car had been caused by negligence on the part of the defendant, by a failure on the part of the defendant to exercise reasonable care in the management and control of his/her motor car in all the circumstances. In Ridge v Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2; (1963) 1 QB 539; [1964] AC 40; [1963] 2 All ER 66; [1963] 2 WLR 935 Lord Reid observed that [t]he idea of negligence is... insusceptible of exact definition. 2. Negligence in a Motor Vehicle Accident "1. In a motor vehicle accident, the act of negligence and the damage to the vehicle usually occur at the same time. At that moment, the owner becomes entitled to sue the negligent driver for the loss. The established rules governing what losses can be recovered by the owner of the damaged vehicle from the negligent driver were stated by the House of Lords in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384; [2002] 1 QB 216. Acco rding to those rules, where the vehicle is commercially repairable (not a write-off), the owner is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of repairing it. In the words of Lord Hobhouse, the measure of loss is the expenditure required to put [the vehicle] back into the same state as it was before the accident : ibid AC 406; see also Burdis v Livsey [2002] UKPC 34; [2003] QB 36, [84]; [2002] All ER (D) 155; [2002] 3 WLR 762; [2003] RTR 22 per Aldous LJ, Tuckey and Jonathan Parker LJJ concurring. 2. P rior to the vehicle being repaired, the vehicle may be destroyed by some later unrelated act. The vehicle may be repaired without cost by the owner themselves, a friend or a relative. It may lie in waste and never be repaired at all. It may be given away, traded in as-is on another vehicle or sold off for its post-accident value. The law of damages does not interfere with the owner s freedom of choice in this regard. Whatever choice the owner makes, the loss represented by the reasonable cost of repairing the vehicle is recoverable against the negligent driver. That is the law s assessment of the damage caused by the negligence of that driver. 3. In some cases, the claim may not be for the cost of repairing the vehicle, but for consequential losses. One common example is a claim by an owner for hiring a substitute vehicle while repairs are being carried out. Such cases can raise complications." Per Bell J in Tehan v Saric [2010] VSC 175; MC 18/2010, 23 April Breach of the Duty of Care The classic exposition of the principles relating to breach of the duty of care is that of Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40; (1980) 29 ALR 217; (1980) 54 ALJR 283; (1980) 60 LGRA 106; 47 Aust Torts Reports , as follows (at CLR 47-48): 2 In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer3 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man's response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant's position. 4. Contributory Negligence "Actionable negligence is the breach of a duty of care owed to another which is a cause of the other to suffer injury or damage. On the other hand, contributory negligence is principally a failure to take care for the safety of one's own person or property, rather than being in breach of a duty owed to another. See Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co [1951] AC 601; [1951] 2 All ER 448; [1951] 2 TLR 137; Trinidade and Cane Law of Torts in Australia, 2nd Ed A breach of a duty of care owed to another can, however, in circumstances amount to contributory negligence. See Noall v Middleton [1961] VicRp 43; [1961] VR 285. A finding of no contributory negligence negatives both matters". McDonald J in Keep v Pozzebon [1994] VicSC 507; MC 51/ Apportionment of Damages The High Court in Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Limited [1985] HCA 34; (1985) 59 ALR 529; (1985) 59 ALJR 492 at 494; [1985] Aust Torts Reports said: "The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant on their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, that is of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man... and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage... It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination. The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case. For example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance." 6. Damages "1. It is trite law that when goods are damaged by the negligence of a tortfeasor, the owner of the goods suffers an immediate and direct loss in consequence of the damage sustained and a cause of action accrues to the owner to recover that loss. The basic pecuniary loss recoverable by an owner in that circumstance is the diminution in the value of the damaged goods, on the principle that the owner is entitled to be put back, so far as money can do it, into the same position as if the damage had not occurred. 2. In the case of negligent damage to a car, the authorities establish that if the car is wrecked completely as the result of the collision, the loss that the owner is entitled to recover from the tortfeasor will normally be measured by the cost of replacing the car with another car of comparable type and condition, with an allowance in favour of the tortfeasor for the value of the car in its damaged condition. 3. If the car is repairable, the measure of loss will usually be the costs of repair but if the costs of repair exceed, or would exceed, the market value of the car, a question arises as to whether it is reasonable for the owner to incur the expenditure in repairing the car or whether the reasonable option is to replace the car. Ordinarily, the owner can recover the cost of repairs or the value of the car, whichever is the less. In each case, the onus is on the owner to satisfy the Court on the evidence as to which of the measures of damages is reasonable in the circumstances and as to the amount of damages to which the owner is entitled by the application of that method." Per Davies J in Zogiannis v Stevens [2012] VSC 264; MC 23/ Particulars of Negligence in the Court Process "A Magistrate erred in finding that the particulars of negligence are required to be stated in order of importance. Close examination of the facts indicates the Magistrate did not find as a matter of law that this was a procedural or substantive requirement. He did make observations that the same was a matter of good sense and with the latter comment I concur. But had he found there was a legal requirement to state particulars in any form of priority, then indeed he would have been wrong. The Magistrates' Courts Civil Procedure Rules Order 9 which largely reflect the Supreme Court Rules operates as a code in pleading matters. The rules do not require, and cannot in any way be interpreted as to require, the particulars of negligence to be set out in any form or order. All that 34 is required is that those particulars upon which the party intends to rely be recited with clarity. Undoubtedly, it would be preferable for practitioners to recite the particulars of negligence in a way which brings the issues clearly before the court in as expeditious a manner as possible. The vexation of the Magistrate is understandable but it is not, as a matter of law, correct. However the Magistrate went on from those comments to pass further remarks about purported negligence on the defendant's solicitors' part. These remarks were wholly gratuitous and, in my view, incorrect as a matter of law. It follows that he could have raised in the defendant's mind a very clear implication that he was being ill-served by his solicitor and legal advisers, when in fact he was not. Per Nathan J in Baldwin v Goodman Fielder & Mills Pty Ltd [1991] VicSC 2; MC 22/1991, 17 January Claims for Damages for Negligence (a) Windscreen of the defendant's motor vehicle struck with a rock causing the windscreen to go opaque defendant lost control of his motor vehicle and caused damage to another vehicle HELD: 1. It was reasonably open to the Magistrate to take the view that the defendant's action in mistakenly placing his foot on the accelerator was the cause of the collision, and was itself the result of the defendant's shock and loss of control of his car arising from the large rock striking his windscreen and injuring his passenger, and rendering his windscreen opaque, and that this mistake on the part of the defendant was not inconsistent in all the circumstances with the exercise of reasonable care in the management of his car. 2. The exercise by a motorist of reasonable care does not imperatively require that he shall drive his car on the assumption that his windscreen is liable to be struck at any moment by a large rock flung by some unruly bystander, nor does it imperatively require that if his windscreen is hit by a large rock he must nevertheless make no mistake in the operation and control of his brakes and accelerator, notwithstanding his own shock and the general agony of the moment. The law does not require a motorist to be perfect. The appropriate defendant should have been the hurler of the rock. Per Newton J: "... Evidence, which the Stipendiary Magistrate accepted, established that when the defendant's car was travelling in a westerly direction along Little LaTrobe Street at about 15 or 20 miles per hour and was about 55 to 60 feet to the east of the complainant's car (which was stationary) a person threw a large rock through the windscreen of the defendant's car and injured his passenger; this evidence further established that the defendant was dazed by this incident, and could not see properly since his windscreen had gone white, and that the defendant lost control of his car and in attempting to apply the foot brake mistakenly put his foot on the accelerator, with the result that his car increased speed and struck the complainant's car about one second later.... it was reasonably open to the Stipendiary Magistrate to take the view that the defendant's action in mistakenly placing his foot on the accelerator was the cause of the collision, and was itself the result of the defendant's shock and loss of control of his car arising from the large rock striking his windscreen and injuring his passenger, and rendering his windscreen opaque, and that this mistake on the part of the defendant was not inconsistent in all the circumstances with the exercise of reasonable care in the management of his car. The exercise by a motorist of reasonable care does not imperatively require that he shall drive his car in Little LaTrobe Street on the assumption that his windscreen is liable to be struck at any moment by a large rock flung by some unruly bystander, nor does it imperatively require that if his windscreen is hit by a large rock he must nevertheless make no mistake in the operation and control of his brakes and accelerator, notwithstanding his own shock and the general agony of the moment. The law does not require a motorist to be perfect. As at present advised, I would venture to say that the appropriate defendant in this case would have been the hurler of the large rock. But perhaps his identity is unknown, or he is bereft of financial resources. The order nisi will be discharged with costs fixed at $120." Per Newton J in Ford v Brent [1971] VicSC 33; MC 04/1971, 25 February5 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS (b) Driver required to apply brakes prior to collision whether mechanical failure of truck A claim for damages for negligence when there was a collision between plaintiff's vehicle and defendant's truck when travelling in opposing directions at the end of one-lane bridge. The plaintiff, moving slowly had almost crossed the bridge. The defendant, travelling at mph veered to one side on a muddy surface and skidded crosswise into the plaintiff. He explained that his wheels locked because of mechanical failure. Police evidence substantiated that his wheels were fixed and immovable after the accident. Trial judge found that the wheel lock was probably caused by hard braking. HELD: 1. The trial judge was probably right when he said that where a defendant sought to escape from a situation where on the face of it he was negligent, by alleging some mechanical failure for which he was not responsible that in that case there was a burden on him to adduce some evidence to support his contention. However, given the justifiable findings of fact which concluded the case against the appellant, the trial judge's observation on the law as to onus played no part in his determination. 2. Furthermore, there was not any evidence of mechanical failure causally related to the accident to require consideration by the tribunal of fact. Accordingly, onus in those circumstances was irrelevant. Per Reynolds J: "It is submitted that where His Honour went on to say, as I have quoted, 'It has been put to me that there was some mechanical failure. The onus would be on the defendant to establish this.', that His Honour has misdirected himself in law and a new trial is called for. His Honour had already made a finding that the defendant had to apply his brakes so hard that the wheels locked, and it is not suggested nor can it be suggested that in making this finding he had misdirected himself in point of onus. If the learned District Court Judge was intending to deny by what he said that the onus of establishing negligence on the part of the defendant was upon the plaintiff from the first to last, then what His Honour said in my opinion, was incorrect. If His Honour meant no more than that where a defendant seeks to escape from a situation where on the face of it he was negligent, by alleging some mechanical failure for which he was not responsible that in that case there is a burden on him to adduce some evidence to support his contention, His Honour was probably right. In the present case what His Honour said was of no moment. His Honour had already made justifiable findings of fact which concluded the case against the appellant, and His Honour's observation on the law as to onus played no part in his determination. Furthermore, there was not, in my opinion, any evidence of mechanical failure causally related to the accident to require consideration by the tribunal of fact. Onus in these circumstances was irrelevant." Per Reynolds J (with Hutley and Bowen JJ A in the NSW Court of Appeal) in Blackman v Commissioner For Main Roads (NSW) MC 23/1974, 30 October (c) Motorist driving over hatched area on carriageway purpose of hatched area forming lane prematurely A motorist drove his vehicle over a diamond or triangular area of white diagonal stripes on the surface of the carriageway and came into collision with a vehicle on his left. In a claim for damages arising out of the collision, it was open to the Court to find the motorist 70% negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and in forming a third lane prematurely in that the carriageway was clearly marked otherwise. Per O'Bryan J: "... The collision occurred in Centre Road, a short distance west of the intersection, which is controlled by traffic lights. Some distance west of the intersection, the carriageway is divided into four traffic lanes, two being for east-bound traffic and two being for west-bound traffic. As a motorist approaches Warrigal Road from the west, the two lanes become three lanes, the lane adjacent to the centre of the road being a 'right turn only' lane. There was a diamond, or triangular, shaped area of roadway marked with white diagonal stripes approximately eight metres wide by 63 metres long adjacent to the centre, indicating a lane change some distance west of the intersection. I shall refer to this area as "the hatched area". 56 The accident occurred more or less on the hatched area when the vehicle being driven by Dale in an easterly direction was struck on the nearside front by a vehicle being driven by Russell in a general southerly direction.... The relevant Road Traffic Regulations did not prohibit a motorist driving over the hatched area. Consequently, Dale was not guilty of a breach of the Road Traffic Regulations, so as to provide prima facie evidence of negligence. The learned Magistrate appears to have decided that, at the time of the collision, Dale was guilty of negligence because he was driving along the hatched area when the collision occurred. He determined that, as a prudent motorist, Dale should not have been on the hatched area and because Dale was in an area when the accident occurred in which a reasonably prudent driver would not have been, Dale was guilty of negligence.... The carriageway, at the point of collision, was marked and used by prudent motorists as a two-lane carriageway. In travelling easterly at 20 kilometres an hour in an unauthorised third lane, Dale took a considerable risk. He failed to keep a proper lookout for traffic attempting to cross the carriageway from his left. I believe Dale inevitably had to be found guilty of negligence because he prematurely made a third line of traffic and failed to keep a proper lookout. A finding of negligence was open to the Magistrate. Mr Wilson submitted that, were I to conclude that no error of law occurred in the finding of negligence, the Magistrate was in error in apportioning 70% of the blame against him. Mr Wilson relies upon Russell ' s clear breach of Regulation 607, which requires a driver entering a highway from land abutting on the highway to give way to all vehicles travelling in either direction. I am faced with a finding of negligence on the part of both parties which is supportable by the evidence and an apportionment of responsibility for the accident made by the learned Magistrate. It is no easy task to disturb an apportionment of negligence made by a Magistrate, who has heard the evidence and seen the witnesses. On the one hand, Mr Wilson relies upon Russell's failure to 'give way' to Dale's vehicle. Yet Russell had safely negotiated two lines of vehicles and was entitled to assume that his main danger would come from the east from vehicles entering Centre Road at Warrigal Road and not from a motorist making a third line of traffic prematurely. No doubt, Russell failed to keep a proper lookout. Again, Dale was pursuing an unorthodox manoeuvre, making a third line of traffic and driving over a hatched area serving to warn of a change in lanes ahead. He also failed to keep a proper lookout. Each party, therefore departed from the standard of care expected of a prudent motorist. I am not persuaded, on the evidence, that no reasonable Magistrate could apportion liability 70/30 against Dale.... Perhaps the apportionment against Dale might have been less but the test is not what I might have done, rather, it is whether a Magistrate, acting reasonably, could not have reached the decision he did. In my opinion, none of the grounds argued have been made out and the order nisi should be discharged with costs." Per O'Bryan J in Dale v Russell [1984] VicSC 491; MC 23/1986, 30 October (d) Motorist turning in front of oncoming vehicle whether apportionment of liability appropriate Where a motorist (confused by the presence of a left-turning vehicle) turned across the path of oncoming traffic and collided with an oncoming vehicle, it was open to the Court to find 100% liability on the part of the motorist making the turn. Per Nathan J: "Matters as to impact damage indicating the events of the collisions are of peripheral value, and the contradictions referred to by Mr Walsh indicate a lively legal mind but in no way displace the heavy onus borne by him. The contradictions in the evidence to which he referred are contrived, the inconsistencies as to damage as put by Mr Mitchell are tortured, and the plain facts of the matter show through the affidavit material. The photographs, part of the exhibits, support Mr Mitchell's contentions. He was not seriously eroded in terms of credit according to the affidavit material, and his story is entirely plausible. Once I accept that view I must then examine whether a Magistrate could reasonably come to the view of finding one hundred percent liability on Mrs Haddad's part, or whether on the face of the evidence an apportionment should have ensued. I am satisfied that the story given by Mr Mitchell of a vehicle turning across his path, resulting in him braking and skidding into the said vehicle does not necessarily incur any liability on his part. A reasonable Magistrate could properly conclude that the initiating factor of all the damages which followed was the commencement of the right hand turn across the path of Mr Mitchell's vehicle. It is of no satisfaction to Mrs Haddad that a court or another Magistrate might have come to a different view in respect of apportionment. 67 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS If it was reasonable in those circumstances for the Magistrate so to conclude, then indeed the onus placed upon the applicant has not been discharged. I merely observe that on the view of the facts which I am of the view the Magistrate could have arrived at then indeed he was perfectly entitled not to apportion liability. Matters of motor car collisions are often a matter of passion and pride, and I suspect there have been elements of that in this case. Be that as it may, the law does not decide issues on that basis, but upon the evidence which is presented before it. I am perfectly comfortable, in fact more than satisfied, that the learned Magistrate did not make a manifest error on the material before him." Per Nathan J in Haddad v Mitchell MC 27/1987, 14 May (e) Concertina-type collision driver of first car sued drivers of second and third cars negligence proved by first driver unable to prove claim against other drivers 1. Where, in a tortious action by a complainant against two defendants a complainant is able to prove negligence generally but unable to prove negligence specifically on the part of one or other or both defendants, the complainant is entitled to a determination notwithstanding the court's difficulty in deciding the question of liability and the degree of contribution (if any) between the defendants. Hummerstone v Leary (1921) 2 KB 664, referred to. 2. Accordingly, a Magistrate was in error in dismissing a claim on the ground that the complainant, whilst proving negligence in general, had not proved negligence against one or the other or both defendants. Per Nathan J: "... It was undisputed that the damage to the complainant's vehicle arising out of the collision with Nichol arose because his car had been struck in the rear by Stanley. If Stanley was not forced into striking Fraser by Vitkus, then the damage must have been caused by Stanley alone.... The overwhelming weight of the evidence was that either Stanley or Vitkus caused Fraser's damage. There simply can be no other conclusion. To leave a complainant without remedy because of indecision as to whether the fourth car in the concertina struck the third car before it in turn struck the second car which struck the first car is to illustrate the difficulties of decision-making, but not the impossibility of it.... By isolating the cases against both defendants the Magistrate failed to deal with a legal issue before him. He found as a fact that it was either the negligence of Stanley or Vitkus which caused Fraser's damage; the fact of the tort being committed was therefore not in dispute. The only issue was the degree of contribution between them; and this was an issue to which, as a matter of law, the Magistrate had to address his mind. The difficulties of disposing of the claims as between defendants was used as a platform to deny a blameless complainant a civil remedy. Moreover, the difficulties do not appear to have been insurmountable. Every day of the week Magistrates must decide between competing stories, as was the case here between Stanley and Vitkus. Some extrinsic evidence was available. The plaintiff has established the threshold issue of negligence. The issue was which one of two persons was responsible. Of facts similar to these and by reference to earlier English authority, viz Hummerstone v Leary (1921) 2 KB 664, Menzies J said, p151: "The argument proceeds that in any case where the proper conclusion is that injury was caused by the negligence of one or other or both of two persons, each of them, having failed to disprove his own negligence, is to be regarded not only as having been guilty of negligence but, in the absence of any evidence upon which to apportion the blame between the two negligent persons, the conclusions must be drawn that they were equally responsible. This argument fails because of the distinction that must be drawn between an action by a plaintiff against two defendants when there is evidence that one or other or both were negligent, and an action by a plaintiff against a defendant when all that can be said at the end of the case is that there was negligence on the part of one or other or both the parties. In the former case, the plaintiff is entitled to a determination because he has made out a prima facie case against defendants sued not merely jointly but in the alternative; in the latter case, the whole of the evidence leaves open the question whether the injury was caused by the plaintiff's own negligence without any negligence on the part of the defendant".... As I have already observed, the case before me proceeded on the basis that negligence had been 78 established. It is a rare and exceptional case in which the weight of the evidence will speak from the affidavit material so as to compel a conclusion that a magistrate's decision was wrong as being contrary to it. However, for the extensive reasons given above, I am satisfied that that part of the ground 1 is made out and the order absolute should be made on that basis. Further, I am satisfied that the magistrate was in error in directing himself that the despatch of the case required the complainant to prove the order of collisions (as between Stanley and Vitkus and Stanley and Fraser). I do so for the reasons already given and for this additional one, the collision between Vitkus and Stanley may have been immaterial, so far as Fraser's damage was concerned. It is unnecessary to pronounce upon ground 3." Per Nathan J in Fraser v Vitkus & Stanley [1989] VicSC 554; (1989) 10 MVR 103; MC 64/1989, 13 November (f) Vehicle struck from behind vehicle accelerated forward striking another vehicle vehicle then struck another four vehicles causation whether driver s actions were a reasonable response in the circumstances whether driver acted negligently after colliding with the vehicle in front agony of the moment decision contributory negligence whether magistrate in error in finding first driver liable whether magistrate in error in adopting the all or nothing approach. C., the driver of a motor vehicle collided with the rear of a taxi. Immediately following the impact, the taxi accelerated forward some distance colliding with another vehicle and then went further and collided with another four vehicles. At the hearing, counsel for C. indicated that the question of contributory negligence was not open and that it was an all or nothing situation. The magistrate found that C. was wholly liable for the damage to the taxi. Upon appeal HELD: Appeal dismissed. 1. The magistrate was not in error in finding that the actions of the taxi driver in accelerating into the car in front were a reasonable response in all the circumstances, and in particular, in the context of the emergency, dilemma or stress created by the initial impact. Once the magistrate found that the taxi driver s actions were caused by C. s negligence and they were a reasonable response to the situation created by that negligence, there was no room for the suggestion that there was a break in the chain of causation. The magistrate was conscious of the subsequent events which occurred and it could not be said that the approach adopted by the magistrate was not open. 2. In relation to the question of contributory negligence, although this was pleaded, it was expressly disavowed in favour of an all or nothing approach to be based on the agony of the moment authorities. In view of the fact that contributory negligence may be dealt with by apportionment and the court is now free to lay blame where properly it should fall, because of the express abandonment of contributory negligence, the magistrate was not in error in failing to deal with the issue of contributory negligence. Per Nettle J: " I also reject the appellant's third proposition, because I consider that there was evidence of primary facts from which it was open to infer that the act of acceleration was the result of reaction under stress to the initial impact. 18. That is not to say that I would have reached the same conclusion. But that is not the point. The question on this appeal is not whether I regard the actions of the taxi driver as a reasonable reaction to the situation created by the appellant's negligence. The question is whether it was open to the Magistrate as a matter of law to reach the view that they were [4]. I consider that it was. It accords with everyday experience that people react instinctively to an episode of extreme stress in ways which would be regarded as irrational in other circumstances. That does not mean that their conduct is unreasonable. In the cool detachment of hindsight it may seem an irrational reaction to a rear end impact to apply the accelerator rather than the brake. But that does not mean that it is necessarily an unreasonable response to press the wrong pedal in the state of excitement and fear which is capable of being engendered by a car accident. To suggest that it must be otherwise, which after all is what the appellant's argument amounts to, is to depart from the realities of ordinary human behaviour. 19. The fourth proposition necessarily falls with the third. Once it was found that the taxi driver's action was caused by the appellant's negligence, and was a reasonable response to the situation created by that negligence, there was no room for the suggested break in causation [5] That is enough to dispose of this appeal. In case it matters, however, I should say that in the course9 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS of the hearing before the Magistrate and again before me this morning, considerable reference was made to the so-called agony of the moment doctrine [6] and to the degree of latitude which it affords. 21. The Magistrate more than once articulated the concept in terms that a plaintiff in a case of this kind (scil. an agony of the moment case) is to be afforded a degree or even a considerable degree of latitude before his or her reaction to the agony will be adjudged unreasonable. It was suggested that the use of those expressions bespoke a misconception on the part of the Magistrate that a plaintiff was entitled to recover even if his or her reaction to first impact were something less than reasonable. 22. I do not consider that the Magistrate made any error of the kind suggested. It appears plain to me that his invocation of the concepts of "latitude" and "considerable latitude" did no more than recognise, as a common sense matter of fact, that in some circumstances a defendant's negligence may be regarded as being responsible for the production of what would otherwise be regarded as an aberrant response. In the view of the Magistrate it was responsible, and in my view it was open to his Worship so to conclude. 23. The final aspect of the matter which warrants attention is the question of contributory negligence. It will be remembered that although contributory negligence was pleaded, in the course of final submissions before the Magistrate it was expressly disavowed in favour of an all or nothing approach to be based on the agony of the moment authorities. It may be thought that if the Magistrate had been invited to consider the question of contributory negligence he could have found that there was some negligence on the part of the taxi driver. The agony of the moment doctrine, somewhat like the last opportunity rule, originated as a mechanism to ameliorate the excesses of rules relating to contributory negligence before the enactment of apportionment legislation. So long as contributory negligence was a complete defence to a claim, it was understandable that courts would attempt to excuse contributory negligence as the results of the agony of the moment or of a failure of another to exploit the last opportunity to avoid calamity. Now that contributory negligence may be dealt with by apportionment, there is not the same need to go to those lengths; for the court is now free to lay blame where properly it should fall [7]...." [4] See Young v Paddle Bros Pty Ltd [1956] VicLawRp 6; [1956] VLR 38 at 41; [1956] ALR 301, Spurling v Development Underwriting (Vic) Pty Ltd [1973] VicRp 1; [1973] VR 1 at 11; (1972) 30 LGRA 19 and S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1998] 1 VR 83, especially in the judgment of Phillips JA at pages [5] See and compare March v Stramare [1991] HCA 12; ( ) 171 CLR 506, 517; (1991) 99 ALR 423; (1991) 65 ALJR 334; (1991) 12 MVR 353; [1991] Aust Torts Reports , 515; Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare [1992] HCA 27; (1992) 176 CLR 408, 428; (1992) 107 ALR 617; (1992) 66 ALJR 550; [1992] Aust Torts Reports ; Medlin v State Government Insurance Office [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1 at 6; (1995) 127 ALR 180; [1995] Aust Torts Reports ; (1995) 69 ALJR 118. [6] See Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law, 5th edition at pages 142, 143 and 184; Fleming, The Law of Torts, ibid; Jones v Boyce [1816] EWHC KB J75; (1816) 1 Stark. 493, 171 ER 540; Ansell v Arnold (1963) SASR 355; United Uranium No Liability v Fisher (1955) ALR 99 at 133; The Bywell Castle (1879) 4 PD 219; 41 LT 747; and British School of Motoring Ltd v Simms [1970] 1 All ER 317. [7] See Fleming, The Law of Torts 9th edition at pages ; March v Stramare, supra at Per Nettle J in Cook v Velkray Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 361; MC 25/2002, 23 August (g) Property damaged one vehicle fled scene two occupants seen in fleeing vehicle Where the owner of a motor car was shown to have been in it together with some other person when it was being driven, in the absence of evidence to the contrary it was open to draw the inference that the motor car was being driven by the owner. Per Brooking J: "In February 1989, Stephen Allen went fishing at Sorrento from the vicinity of the aquarium, leaving his car parked near the boat ramp. On his return he found that someone had damaged his car by running into the front of it. Allen obtained the number of the other vehicle on his return to the shore, finding the number written on a piece of paper under the windscreen of his car. That note had been put under the windscreen, I am afraid, not by the delinquent driver but by an observant and public-spirited bystander, who had seen the incident and taken the number of the offending vehicle, a car registered number DOB-932, which had been towing a trailer with a boat on it and had backed into the parked car, damaging it with the rear of the trailer.... If a person who owns a car is shown to have been in it together with some other person or persons at a time when it was being driven, then, in the absence of anything in the evidence tending against the view that the owner was driving, the likelihood is, as a matter of common sense and common experience, that the owner was driving the car, exercising his right to drive his own car rather than surrendering that right to a companion.... The question is whether it was open to the learned Magistrate to infer that the defendant was 910 the driver of his car. This question can be sub-divided into two questions by asking whether it was open to the Magistrate to infer that the defendant was one of the two men in the car and whether it was open to him to infer that of those two men it was the defendant who was the driver. I have no doubt that it was, to say the least, open to the learned Magistrate to infer that the appellant was one of the two men in his car at the time of the accident and that of those two men it was he who was the driver, having regard to his ownership of the car and to the absence of any evidence to suggest that he had permitted his companion to drive, with the result that it was the companion who was driving at the time of the accident. If a person who owns a car is shown to have been in it together with some other person or persons at a time when it was being driven, then, in the absence of anything in the evidence tending against the view that the owner was driving, the likelihood is, as a matter of common sense and common experience, that the owner was driving the car, exercising his right to drive his own car rather than surrendering that right to a companion.... Per Brooking J in Milionis v Tifran Pty Ltd (1991) 14 MVR 573; [1991] VicSC 479; MC 31/1991, 13 September (h) Roundabout two vehicles entering at same time right of way whether vehicle making right hand turn vehicle moving laterally when unsafe 1. Where two vehicles enter a roundabout from the same point of entry, neither is to be regarded as approaching the other from the right nor doing a right hand turn. 2. Where, in a roundabout, two vehicles entered at the same point, one moved laterally and collided with the rearward right hand side of the other, it was open to a magistrate to find that the driver of the vehicle moving laterally was liable for the damage caused. Per Hayne J: "... I interpolate that both parties conceded that the bare fact that there was demonstrated to have been a breach of the regulations did not of itself demonstrate negligence. (See Tucker v McCann [1948] VicLawRp 40; (1948) VLR 222). However that may be, I am of the view that the analysis contended for by the appellant is flawed in both respects. Both vehicles having entered the round-about from the same entry, once in the round-about, I do not consider that either is to be regarded as having approached the other from the right. Nor do I consider that it is correct to say that within the roundabout one vehicle is to be regarded as doing a right-hand turn simply because that vehicle sought to exit from the round-about at exit four. Within the round-about, which was where this accident occurred, I consider that the conduct of the parties could be regarded by the magistrate as being governed by regulation 507. That is to say, as being governed by the obligation not to move laterally out of their lane, or line of traffic, unless it was safe to do so. I do not say that the magistrate must have reached such a conclusion. I say only that it was open to the magistrate to reach such a conclusion on the evidence before him. As I said when describing the magistrate's findings, as recounted by the appellant, the magistrate found that the appellant left her lane at some stage. In my view, that finding was open to the magistrate on the evidence below. I should add that that finding was open if only because the uncontroverted evidence below was that the respondent's vehicle was struck on the right-hand side towards the rear. It may then have been open to a magistrate to conclude that the appellant had tried to turn into the path of the respondent when the respondent was ahead of her. In any event, in all the circumstances, I do not consider that it can be said that the appellant has shown that no reasonable magistrate could have found that the accident was caused wholly by the appellant. Accordingly, I consider that the appeal should be dismissed." Per Hayne J in Baffsky v Mangos & Anor MC 47/1992, 24 August (i) Collision between right turning and oncoming vehicles right turning vehicle stopped in intersection for a few seconds opportunity for oncoming vehicle to stop Where the driver of a vehicle began to make a right-hand turn then stopped for an appreciable period of time and an oncoming vehicle came from a service road, proceeded into the intersection and collided with the other vehicle, it was open to a Magistrate to conclude that the driver of the oncoming vehicle was wholly negligent in failing to keep a proper look-out and drive at a reasonable speed in the circumstances. 1011 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS Per Hayne J: "... I therefore proceed on the basis that the Magistrate found that the second respondent began to make his right hand turn at a time when it was safe to do so, and that he was then forced to stop because a car came from the service road and proceeded into the intersection. There was some suggestion in the evidence that the Magistrate's findings were made in two parts, the second part being made in response to questions asked of the Magistrate by counsel. Whether this is so or not, it is, I think, clear that the Magistrate sought to explain the finding that he had made by finding in effect that the appellant was, at the time that the second respondent commenced his right hand turn, sufficient distance away from the intersection for it to be safe for the second respondent to commence the turn, and that the appellant was at that time in a position where he had time enough to stop to prevent the accident.... In my view it is implicit in the finding that when the defendant started to move it was apparently safe to turn, that the appellant was then far enough away to stop to avoid a collision There was, in my view, evidence on which the Magistrate could make that finding.... As to the first of the two points made, namely that the Magistrate should have found that the second respondent failed to keep a proper lookout, I think it very important to recall what it was that the Magistrate did find. His finding was, in effect, that the accident was caused wholly by the negligence of the appellant because the appellant had not kept a proper lookout. His finding was, in effect, that the respondent had been stopped sufficiently long in the position where he was for the appellant to have seen the vehicle and to have stopped before hitting the vehicle. Indeed his finding was that the appellant "had enough time to stop to prevent the impact had he been keeping a proper lookout and driving at a reasonable speed, and therefore the plaintiff was negligent and caused the accident." The question of what caused this accident is a question of fact. We are told by the High Court in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; ( ) 171 CLR 506; (1991) 99 ALR 423; (1991) 65 ALJR 334; (1991) 12 MVR 353; [1991] Aust Torts Reports that where negligence is in issue, causation is essentially a question of fact to be answered by reference to common sense and experience. Thus the question of what caused this accident was essentially a question of fact for the Magistrate to determine on the basis of the evidence before him. There was, in my view, evidence upon which he could conclude that the plaintiff did have enough time to stop to prevent the impact, had he been keeping a proper lookout and driving at a reasonable speed, and there was therefore evidence upon which he could conclude that it was the plaintiff's negligence that caused the accident. If that is so, the question of whether the defendant ought to have seen the plaintiff's vehicle sooner than he did is, I think, nothing to the point..." Per Hayne J in Pangalos v ATC & Bourke MC 52/1992, 7 October (j) Motor Vehicle accidentally reversed collided with vehicle to rear Where the driver of a motor vehicle accidentally slipped the vehicle's transmission into reverse, the car reversed and collided with the front of the vehicle behind thereby causing damage, it was not reasonably open for a magistrate to conclude that the driver reversing was not negligent. Per Ashley J: "... According to the plaintiff, the defendant's vehicle unexpectedly reversed into the front of her stationary vehicle. According to the defendant, his vehicle stalled. He then restarted the vehicle, which had automatic transmission, whilst the transmission lever was in the "neutral" or "park" position. Whilst the lever remained in that position the plaintiff's vehicle ran into the rear of his stationary vehicle. The Magistrate accepted the plaintiff's account, thereby finding that the defendant's vehicle had reversed into the front of the plaintiff's motor car. He nonetheless found that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. This appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiff is against that finding. It is said that a finding of "no negligence" in the circumstances that I have described was not reasonably open. That is the test that must be applied in these circumstances. It appears that the Magistrate found that the reason whereby the defendant's vehicle reversed was that the defendant, having started his vehicle which had been stalled, had then slipped the transmission into "reverse" accidentally. It seems also that the Magistrate found that there was no intent on the part of the defendant to put his car into reverse, and that the Magistrate also said that he did not know why the defendant had slipped the car into reverse. It is not altogether clear from the affidavit material why the Magistrate said that he did not know why the defendant had done what he did. It may be that he intended to say no more than that what had 1112 happened was not intentional, and was accidental. Certainly, his finding that the car had gone into reverse because the transmission had been accidentally put into reverse provides a quite adequate explanation of what had occurred, and why it occurred. It appears to me that the Magistrate reached a conclusion that, on the circumstances before him, was not reasonably open. It may be that he was misled by his references to the conduct of the defendant being not intentional and accidental. But be that as it may, I find it impossible to conclude that a finding of negligence as against the defendant should not have been made upon the facts found...." Per Ashley J in Carisbrooke v Ranford [1992] VicSC 629; MC 05/1993, 7 December (k) Collision between two motor boats both travelling on a river at speed head-on situation one driver pulled to right as per navigation regulations other driver pulled to left 'agony of the moment' decision Whilst driving a speed boat on the Murray River 30 metres from the bank and at km/h, G. was faced with an oncoming speed boat driven by M. Believing that M. would observe the Navigation Regulations and move to the right, G. continued at the same speed until 5 metres from M's boat when he pulled to the right. M. pulled his boat to the left and the two boats collided causing damage. In subsequent proceedings, a magistrate apportioned G.'s liability as 25% in that he could have taken evasive action given the available reaction time of 2-3 seconds. Upon appeal against the apportionment HELD: Appeal upheld. Apportionment set aside. Finding of negligence against G. set aside. In the circumstances, G. was confronted with an agony of the moment situation where he had only seconds to determine upon a course of action. His actions in complying with the Regulations and turning to the right were understandable. Accordingly, the magistrate was in error in finding that the collision was in any way caused by any negligence on G.'s part. Per Coldrey J: "... Insofar as they are relevant to these appeals, the Magistrate's findings of fact are as follows. At all material times the appellant Groves was travelling on his starboard (i.e. correct) side of the river in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9(a) of the regulations, whilst the respondent Mason was travelling on his port (i.e. wrong) side of the river. Each was travelling 30 metres from the New South Wales bank of the river and at the same speed of between kilometres per hour. Groves first saw the boat driven by Mason adjacent to a bend in the river and some 50 metres from his boat. He continued at the same speed in the belief that Mason would move to the right (i.e. starboard) as required by Rule 14 of the regulations in order to avoid a collision. When Groves' vessel was about five metres from that driven by Mason, the former driver, observing that the latter had not altered the course of his vessel, took his foot off the accelerator, almost immediately re-applied it, accelerated and, at the same time, turned to the right. At the same approximate time Mason pulled his boat to the left. The two vessels thereupon collided with the front of the bow of Groves vessel striking the right lower side of the bow of that driven by Mason. On the basis of these factual findings the learned Magistrate held that Mason was negligent in that he: (i) failed to keep a proper look-out. (ii) failed to observe the other vessel until almost the last moment. (iii) was in breach of Rules 5, 9(a) and 14 of the regulations. The approach of the Courts to such a situation is exemplified by the case of Vayne v State Government Insurance Commission (SA) [1991] SASC 2730; (1991) 13 MVR 446 at 448. That was a case in which the Full Court of South Australia considered a head on collision between two motor vehicles. In the course of delivering a judgment with which the other members of the Court concurred, King CJ stated: "... it is to be remembered that the defendant was confronted with what could be fairly described as a desperate situation. He had a vehicle coming towards him on the incorrect side of the road, placing him in imminent peril. He reduced his speed and endeavoured to manoeuvre his vehicle in a way which seemed to him, in the agony of the moment, to be the best way of avoiding the accident. The inclination to move to the right was perfectly understandable when he was faced with a vehicle coming directly at him on the incorrect side of the road. Likewise, however, his indecision that the manoeuvre was too dangerous and that he should veer to the left was also understandable and, in my view, correct. I cannot blame the defendant for not stopping. To stop would have placed him in a sitting-duck position, directly in the path of the oncoming vehicle, and I think it would be unreasonable to expect a driver to place himself in that position." 12 I agree with the submission of Mr O'Callaghan that the reasoning employed in this case is apposite to the present situation where Groves, who was driving on the correct side of the Murray River at a13 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS permitted speed and keeping a proper look-out, was confronted with a fast travelling boat on the wrong side of the river, with only seconds to determine upon a course of action. In these circumstances the finding of the Magistrate that the conduct of the appellant Groves up until the time he swerved to starboard constituted negligence is, in my view, untenable, as is the finding that he was in breach of Rule 8 of the regulations. The ultimate course of action taken by Groves in turning his boat to starboard in accordance with the requirements of rule 14 of the regulations, whilst equally falling under the umbrella of action taken in the agony of the moment, constitutes, in itself, an unimpeachable manoeuvre. To impugn it as unreasonable because Groves should not have assumed that Mason would comply with the regulations is to impose upon the reasonable man a prescience which has no basis in logic or law. In summary, therefore, given the urgency of the situation, negligence could not be attributed to Groves for failing to stop, for failing initially to alter course, for decelerating or, thereafter, for taking appropriate and legally specified evasive action. It follows from the foregoing that I am of the view that the Magistrate was in error in finding that this collision was in any way caused by the negligence of the appellant, Groves." Per Coldrey J in Groves v Mason [1992] VicSC 332; MC 54/1992, 5 August (l) Stationary vehicle on freeway at night hazard lights not operating driver unaware of location of switch to activate hazard lights collision with another vehicle Where, on a wet night, a motorist left a stationary vehicle on a freeway so as to cause an obstruction and failed to operate the vehicle's hazard lights being unaware of the location of the operating switch, and a collision occurred causing damage, it was open to a magistrate to find that the driver of the stationary vehicle was negligent in not knowing where to activate the hazard lights and that the failure to activate the hazard lights caused the accident. Per Hayne J: "... In my view, it was open to the Magistrate to conclude, as a matter of commonsense and experience, that the failure of Stevenson to activate his hazard lights caused the accident. The finding of the Magistrate that there was no negligence on the part of Kinali also, of course, required consideration of all of the evidence. There was evidence called from not only the drivers, but also two other witnesses. One, who had been a passenger in Kinali's cab, gave some evidence of what he saw immediately before the collision, in particular, evidence of how far the cab then was from Stevenson's car, but it seems that he was unable to say whether there were other vehicles to the left of the cab. The question confronting the Magistrate, when considering whether Kinali was negligent, was whether Kinali had acted in breach of duty, or whether he had, as the Magistrate was to put it, "Taken every step to avoid a stationary obstruction on the roadway in front of him". That, of course, required consideration of whether the Magistrate accepted the evidence of Kinali, that the car in front had diverged suddenly, leaving the obstruction ahead of him, with him having nowhere to go because of the traffic on his left. It required consideration of the speed at which Kinali was travelling, and required consideration of the conditions that then obtained. It required consideration of the distance that Kinali was travelling behind the car in front of him. In the end it required consideration of what steps could have been taken to avoid what was a sudden and unexpected hazard. The appellant submitted that the only conclusion open to the Magistrate was that Kinali must have been travelling too fast or too close to the car ahead. Now, it may be, as the respondent submitted, that this argument of the appellant proceeds from the premise that there was no negligence on the part of Stevenson in failing to have his hazard lights on, and thus that there was no basis for the conclusion that the car ahead might have diverted earlier. It is significant, as the respondent points out, that there is no suggestion recorded in the material relating to the cross-examination of Kinali, that a case was put to Kinali that he was travelling either too fast or too close to the car ahead of him. It may then be that the case now put on appeal is one that was never put below. However that may be, the question confronting the Magistrate was essentially a question of fact, dependent for its outcome upon consideration of all of the evidence that was before the Magistrate, evidence which I have not heard, and of which I have necessarily only an imperfect record. In my view, it is not demonstrated that no reasonable Magistrate could have reached the conclusion he did. It was a conclusion that was open on the evidence below. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed." Per Hayne J in Stevenson v Kinali [1992] VicSC 658; MC 10/1993, 14 December14 (m) Mobile car wash collision between part of car wash and car car to stop when red lights on lights not easily seen view of scene by Magistrate Res ipsa loquitur Upon payment of a fee, F. drove her car into a mobile car wash owned by T. P/L. When a red light is displayed, a metal bar prevents a vehicle from moving past a certain point. F. gave evidence that she saw no red light before her car collided with the bar causing damage to the bar and the hydraulic system of the car wash. During the hearing, the magistrate declined to have a view of the car wash. At the end of the evidence, he dismissed the claim on the basis that T. P/L had not proved that F. had failed to keep a proper look-out for the red light. Upon appeal HELD: Appeal dismissed with costs. 1. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of law which facilitates proof of negligence where there is a paucity of evidence about an event which ordinarily does not happen without negligence. As the facts were known in the present case, the rule had no application. The question was whether T. P/L proved negligence against F. on the known facts. On the evidence, the magistrate s conclusion was reasonably open. 2. A view of the scene may be held by a magistrate for the purpose of understanding the evidence but not for the purpose of deciding the case. A magistrate is not compelled to have a view. In the present case, a view of the car wash to look at the position of the red light may have produced a conclusion based on the view rather than the evidence given by the witnesses. Accordingly, the magistrate was correct in declining to have a view. Per O'Bryan J: "... Before turning to the facts it is convenient to dispose of a point raised by counsel for the appellant which is outside the questions of law relied upon by the appellant. During the hearing, on two occasions, counsel for the appellant invited the Magistrate to view the mobile car wash "given that the major issue in contention appeared to be whether the lights could or could not be seen". The Magistrate declined to do so. Counsel faintly argued in this Court that the Magistrate should have had a view of the locus in quo presumably to help resolve conflicts in the evidence. In my opinion the learned Magistrate very correctly declined to do so. A view of the locus in quo may be held for the purpose of understanding the evidence but not for the purpose of deciding the case. It would be unwise in most instances for the fact finder to treat a view as evidence. The High Court in Scott v The Shire of Numurkah [1954] HCA 14; 91 CLR 300; [1954] ALR 373 cautioned against the result of a view replacing the evidence. The learned Magistrate was entitled to have a view but was not compellable to do so. In my opinion, a view would have been most unwise for there was a real risk that the Magistrate might have reached conclusions based upon what he saw or did not see and not upon what the witnesses said they were able to see or not see. The learned Magistrate agreed with counsel for the plaintiff in the Court below that the failure of the respondent to see the red light "was the critical point of the case". The learned Magistrate said that the failure to see the red light was either due to negligence or "the red light is hard to see and/or could not be seen". He said that he was satisfied on the evidence that the red light is not easily seen and the appellant's case failed. This finding was challenged in the first question of law as unreasonable. I am unable to accept the submission that it was not reasonably open to the Magistrate to find as he did that the red light is not easily seen. The appellant's evidence did not identify where the red light was positioned. Two witnesses said that it was hard to see or could not be seen. In my opinion, the learned Magistrate was entitled to regard the visibility of the red light "as the critical point of the case" and to conclude that the appellant had failed to establish that the respondent failed to keep a proper look out for the light. Had the respondent seen the red light in time or, if a reasonable person ought to have done so, and proceeded to drive forward, inevitably a finding of negligence would have been made by the Magistrate. The first question of law is not made out. Counsel for the appellant argued that negligence ought to have been found upon another two bases. Firstly, in not seeking instructions when the respondent was unsure as to how the car wash operated. Secondly, in driving at an excessive speed. The short answer to this argument is that these particulars of negligence were not pleaded and not raised in the Court below. They were, therefore, not the subject of any finding by the Magistrate. Counsel for the appellant did not press strongly the second question of law. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of law which facilitates proof of negligence where there is a paucity of evidence about an event which ordinarily does not happen without negligence. The rule simply establishes a prima facie case of negligence and avoids an injustice because a plaintiff is unable to explain the event. 1415 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS Where the facts are known, as they were in the present case, the inquiry is whether negligence has been established on the known facts. The plaintiff carried the burden of proof at the end of the case, the burden did not shift to the defendant. The res ipsa rule had no application. The second question of law is misconceived, in my opinion, and is not made out. The order of the Court is: appeal dismissed with costs." Per O'Bryan J in Tasandy Pty Ltd v Franjic [1994] VicSC 360; MC 50/1994, 24 June (n) Truck turning left overtaken on left by other vehicle overtaking in breach of regulation truck driver gave way to two vehicles on the left did not see third vehicle P. s driver T., pulled up at traffic lights behind two other vehicles. To T. s right was a prime mover with a large trailer attached driven by K. When T. reached the front of K. s trailer, T noticed the left-hand indicators on K. s truck were on. When the traffic lights turned to green, T. moved forward but stopped at the stop line because K. s truck was turning left and a collision was imminent. T. sounded the horn for some time but the truck continued to turn left and the rear of the trailer struck the driver s door and front corner of T s vehicle causing damage. At the hearing the magistrate found K. 100% to blame. On appeal HELD: Appeal dismissed. 1. By T. moving her car forward and passing to the left of K. s truck, T. was in breach of Reg. 502(5)(b) which provides that a driver of a vehicle must not overtake or pass to the left of a vehicle displaying the sign: DO NOT OVERTAKE TURNING VEHICLE. 2. However, a breach of a regulation is no more than a piece of evidence to be considered with all other evidence when a court determines the ultimate questions. It is to be weighed in the evidence and given such weight as is proper in all the circumstances of the case. Tucker v McCann [1948] VicLawRp 40; (1948) VLR 222, applied. 3. Given that two vehicles in front of T. had moved forward and cleared the intersection, T. reasonably expected that K. would also allow T. to move forward and clear the intersection. The failure by K. to see T. s car and avoid colliding with it was a breach of the duty of care. 4. Contributory negligence is principally a failure to take care for the safety of one s own person or property, rather than being in breach of a duty owed to another. Nance v British Columbia Electric Ry. Co [1951] AC 601; All ER 448; [1951] 2 TLR 137, applied. 5. Whilst T. was in breach of the regulation in moving forward, it was not reasonably apparent that this would create a situation of danger. On all of the evidence it was open to the magistrate to conclude that there was no contributory negligence on the part of T. Per McDonald J: "... If it is established by other evidence that a regulation relied on was breached, that is a fact which must be taken into account when determining whether in all the circumstances the party who breached the same was negligent or guilty of contributory negligence. A breach of a regulation is no more than a piece of evidence to be considered with all other evidence when a court determines the ultimate questions before it. It is to be weighed in the balance with all other evidence before the court and given such weight as is proper in all the circumstances of the case. Tucker v McCann [1948] VicLawRp 40; (1948) VLR 222 at The magistrate accepted the evidence of Ms Trentin, as he was clearly entitled to do. He found she had stopped three cars back from the corner, level with the front of the trailer. At this time the lights to her and the appellant were red and the vehicles were stationary. She moved forward, following the cars in front of her, when the lights turned to green. On the evidence of the appellant, he had observed a vehicle to his left at the intersection. This was one of the vehicles in front of Ms Trentin. His evidence was that when the lights changed, he allowed this vehicle in the left-hand lane to "clear the intersection before executing (his) left-hand turn". He said further that before executing the turn, he "again looked in (his) mirror and saw nothing and he then executed (his) turn". It was open to the magistrate to conclude on the evidence that the appellant's vehicle remained stationary while the first car on its left cleared the intersection and until the appellant looked again in his mirror observing nothing, including that which he had previously observed, a white car at the rear of his trailer.... The failure to observe the respondent's motor car, either when the appellant's vehicle was stationary at the lights and before he commenced to execute his turn, or during it, and the failure to take steps 1516 to avoid the collision which would have been open to him had he observed the car, constituted a breach of the duty of care that the appellant owed to Ms Trentin, having regard to the position in which her car was on the road. At the relevant time, as found by the magistrate, Ms Trentin sounded her horn "loud and long". This warning was heard by another driver on the road who was called as a witness. It was open on the evidence to conclude that this warning was either not heard when it ought to have been heard or not paid attention to by the appellant. It was open on the evidence for the magistrate to conclude that this negligence, when applying the test of common sense, experience and making a valued judgment, was a cause of the collision. See March v Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12; ( ) 171 CLR 506; (1991) 99 ALR 423; (1991) 65 ALJR 334; (1991) 12 MVR 353; [1991] Aust Torts Reports The fact that this movement must have commenced at a time when the appellant's vehicle was stationary and when there were other cars in the left-hand lane, and in such circumstances it would have been open to find that the driver of the respondent's vehicle had grounds to reasonably expect that the presence of her car would have been observed and that the driver of the heavy vehicle, although signalling to turn left, was remaining stationary while the other cars moved forward. This was a relevant matter in assessing this issue. The magistrate found that Ms Trentin stopped her car when she realised there was a danger. It was open to the magistrate to infer that she realised that there was a danger and stopped when the appellant moved his vehicle forward and commenced to execute a left turn. As referred to, on the evidence she was then stationary for some time giving warning of her position and presence. It was open to the magistrate to conclude that when she was moved forward, it ought not to have been reasonably apparent to her that her action would create a situation of danger. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that notwithstanding that the action of Ms Trentin in moving the respondent's vehicle forward when the appellant's vehicle was stationary constituted a breach of the regulation, that fact, when viewed with all the other relevant evidence, it was open to the magistrate to conclude that there was no negligence on her part in the relevant sense. Even assuming that the actions of Ms Trentin which constituted a breach of the regulation was a failure to take reasonable care for her own safety and the property of the respondent, the facts in this case provide a good example of why the "but for" test should not be a definitive test of contributory negligence in the circumstances of this case. March v Stramare Pty Ltd (supra). I am satisfied that even had the magistrate on the facts found that there was contributory negligence on the part of Ms Trentin, it would have been open to him, when applying the test of common sense, experience and making a valued judgment, to conclude that such actions were not a cause of or contributed to the happening of the collision in the circumstances in which and when it occurred as appeared from the evidence. For those reasons, the appeal should be dismissed." Per McDonald J in Keep v Pozzebon [1994] VicSC 507; MC 51/1994, 1 September (o) Motor vehicle collision on narrow country road driver s forward vision obscured by bend in road driver travelling at km/h collision with vehicle reversing with driver s side wheels on edge of bitumen M., who was driving his motor vehicle at 80-90km/h on a narrow country road and approaching a corner with limited visibility, collided with S s. vehicle which was reversing possibly with its driver s side wheels on the edge of the bitumen. At the hearing, the Magistrate found M. to be 100% negligent. Upon appeal HELD: Appeal dismissed. It was open to the magistrate to conclude that it was negligent for M. to approach this corner of the road at a speed which did not enable him to stop before colliding with S s vehicle. It was also open to the magistrate to find that S. was not negligent in the circumstances. Per Harper J: "... It was, in my opinion, also open to His Worship to conclude that, as a matter of law, it was negligent to approach this corner of Back Glenlyon Road at a speed which did not enable the oncoming vehicle, on its driver first becoming aware of the respondent's car, to stop the oncoming vehicle before colliding with that car. A driver who is confronted by a bend in a narrow country road which obscures his or her forward vision, and who is therefore also confronted by the possibility of an unseen obstacle ahead, may only be able to avoid colliding either with that obstacle or with oncoming traffic by stopping before the obstacle is reached. 16 It was open to the magistrate to find that this was the position faced by the appellant shortly before his collision with the respondent's car. It is a short and (given appropriate findings of fact as to such things as speed and distance) legitimate step to hold that the appellant was negligent in not stopping before that collision. His Worship may not, in the words which I have quoted, have expressed the applicable law with the utmost felicity; but I am satisfied that any lack of felicity does not evidence an17 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS appellable mistake. Until the appellant had been found in breach of a duty of care to the respondent, the question of the respondent's duty is in my opinion irrelevant. Of course, the respondent's behaviour and in particular his execution of the reversing manoeuvre in which he was engaged at the time of the collision is of immediate and direct relevance in determining whether or not the appellant acted negligently. Once that decision has been properly made, the issue of the respondent's contributory negligence, or the issue of any breach by the respondent of his duty to the appellant, may fall for determination. I can find no fault with His Worship's approach to the law in this regard. Motor vehicle collisions give rise to issues of fact which the courts often find very difficult to resolve. Not least among the problems is the very human tendency to filter the facts through one's subconscious to the extent that when they relodge themselves in the conscious memory they become very different to the reality. It is not necessarily the case that this phenomenon occurred with the recollection of either the respondent or the appellant here. My point is only that, because the memory is a very fallible instrument with which to reconstruct the truth, the task which confronts the courts in discovering the truth is often immensely difficult. The result, regrettably but understandably, is that litigants sometimes feel very disappointed about the results of the litigation. Doubtless this applies to the appellant in this case. That is not to say that I think that the magistrate was wrong in his findings of fact. This is an appeal on a question of law only; it is therefore not in my power to inquire for myself into the other aspect of the case. I merely acknowledge the importance which litigants commonly attach to the outcome of motor vehicle cases, as indeed to litigation in general. For the reasons which I have endeavoured to state, it is my opinion that this appeal must fail." Per Harper J in Murer v Scott [1996] VicSC 131; MC 20/1996, 2 April (p) Motor vehicle collision between two vehicles in intersection controlled by traffic lights Two vehicles collided in an intersection controlled by traffic control signals. One vehicle turned in front of an oncoming southbound vehicle. The driver of the turning vehicle claimed that she had a green arrow in her favour. The other driver said she had a green light in her favour. On the hearing of the claim, the magistrate found that the driver of the turning vehicle had a green arrow at the time of entering the intersection. He said that there being no clear evidence as to the state of the lights, the driver of the turning vehicle was negligent and was liable for the damage. Upon appeal HELD: Appeal dismissed. It was open to the magistrate to find that there could not have been a green arrow if there was a green light facing the southbound traffic. The magistrate s finding as to the state of the lights could not have been made if the southbound vehicle had entered on a red light. Further, the reference by the magistrate to the obligation on the driver of a turning vehicle would not have applied if that vehicle had turned on a green arrow. In the circumstances, the decision of the magistrate was open on the evidence. Per Eames J: " The fact contributory negligence was not expressly pleaded does not seem to me in all the circumstances of this case to be of importance. The Magistrates' Court is not a court of pleadings and it would have been open to argue contributory negligence had it been appropriate to do so Although His Worship appears to have decided the case without having regard to the state of the lights it must follow from his findings that he did not conclude that the respondent's vehicle entered against a red light, because, as he found, there could not have been both a green arrow and a green light facing the two vehicles at the same time. 20. There was an obvious explanation for the accident which the evidence would have supported, namely, that with respect to the northbound vehicles, and vehicles also intending to turn right into Alexandra Parade, the sequence was that first both a green light and a green arrow would be displayed, but that after some vehicles had turned right the green arrow would cease to be displayed and at the moment a green light would face both north and also southbound vehicles in Nicholson Street. Northbound vehicles intending to turn right would then have to give way to on-coming southbound vehicles. 21. That sequence of lights and that possible explanation was put to the appellant in cross-examination by counsel for the respondent. In her evidence she said, "I looked up when I was just passing the white line and it was a green arrow." Later she was asked, "So what I am putting to you is that you did see the car in front, you looked up before you entered the intersection and you saw that there 1718 18 was a green arrow, that while you were in the intersection you saw a green light, but at that stage it wasn't a green arrow?" She replied, "On the point of my vehicle entering the intersection I had a green arrow, that I can say." She was asked, "And what I am putting to you is that you proceeded into the intersection on the assumption there was a green arrow and you failed to give way to the other vehicle, which is what you were meant to do?" She said, "I was turning right and I had the green arrow." 22. Those responses, in my view, are entirely consistent with the witness only being confident that there was a green arrow as she first moved into the intersection, not later. 23. His Worship's findings, which I noted earlier, seem to me to have recognised that that was the limit of the positive assertion made in cross-examination, and to have constituted a finding that that was the extent of the actual state of the observations made by the witness at the relevant time. 24. In expressing himself in terms that, "There being no clear evidence as to the state of the lights," and "an obligation of a turning vehicle evaporates if there is an arrow turn applicable to that car, but that just cannot be determined from the evidence", those statements must be read with His Worship's finding that there could not be a green arrow if there was a green light facing the southbound traffic. Thus, despite the words he unfortunately chose, his finding could not have been made if the respondent's vehicle had entered on a red light. 25. The verdict, therefore, can be supported by the evidence and also by those findings of fact which I have identified as being explicitly and impliedly made by His Worship. Furthermore, as counsel for the respondent noted, there was a good deal of other evidence to support the contention that the appellant had failed to keep a proper look-out at the time. To have spoken of the "higher obligation" of the turning vehicle was potentially (and, probably, actually) confusing, but it followed an acknowledgment that such an obligation would not have applied if that vehicle had turned on a green arrow." Per Eames J in Goh v Berry Street Incorporated [2001] VSC 341; MC 40/2001, 29 August Duty of Care (a) Participation by plaintiff with defendant in illegal enterprise agreement to drive while disqualified The parties, two youths, took a car on a jaunt from Adelaide to Port Augusta and shared the driving. Each knew that the other was disqualified from holding a driver's licence, and would be committing the offence of driving while disqualified. During the trip, negligent driving by the appellant caused an accident in which the respondent was injured. He sued the appellant in the Supreme Court of South Australia, where at first instance the trial judge dismissed the action on the ground that the appellant owed no duty of care to the respondent because they were engaged in a joint illegal enterprise. However, this decision was reversed by the Full Court, and a verdict entered for the respondent for $30,500. On appeal to the High Court HELD: (i) Per Mason, Jacobs, Murphy and Aickin JJ (Barwick CJ dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed, since there was no defence to the respondent's action that his injury occurred while he was aiding and abetting the appellant in the commission of the offence of driving while disqualified. (ii) Per Mason, Jacobs and Aickin JJ: There was no absolute rule that participants in a joint illegal enterprise owed no duty of care to each other. However, a plaintiff's case would fail when the joint illegal enterprise in which he and the defendant were engaged was such that the court could not determine the particular standard of care to be observed. Before the court would say that the appropriate standard of care was not permitted to be established there must be such a relationship between the act of negligence and the nature of the illegal activity that a standard of care owed in the particular circumstances could only be determined by bringing into consideration the nature of the activity in which the parties were engaged. Progress and Properties Ltd v Craft [1976] HCA 59; (1976) 135 CLR 651; (1976) 12 ALR 59; 51 ALJR 184, followed; Smith v Jenkins [1970] HCA 2; (1970) 119 CLR 397; (1970) ALR 519; 44 ALJR 78, distinguished. Bondarenko v Sommers (1968) 69 SR (NSW) 269; [1968] 1 NSWR 488; 79 WN (NSW) 615; Henwood v Municipal Tramways Trust (SA) [1938] HCA 35; (1938) 60 CLR 438; [1938] ALR 312; Godbolt v Fittock (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 617; [1964] NSWR 22; 80 WN (NSW) 1110; Andrews v Nominal Defendant (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 85; [1965] NSWR 1614, considered.19 PPUZZARD v WALSHEY KAVANAGHv OIABANK OF NEW SIOUTH WALES v MUR- MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISIONS In the present case the court was able to determine the appropriate standard of care, since the facts concerning the joint illegal enterprise had no bearing on the standard of care reasonably to be expected of the driver. (iii) Per Murphy J: The defence of illegality should be confined strictly, so that, where the plaintiff's offence was statutory, recovery would be denied only where denial of recovery was statutory policy, and not because the court, for reasons of policy, declined to adopt a standard or recognize a duty of care. Otherwise, recovery should be denied only where there was a voluntary assumption of the risk. (iv) Per Barwick CJ (dissenting): Where there was a joint venture to do an act punishable by fine or imprisonment, no narrow or pedantic view should be taken of the nature and scope of the arrangement between the parties when applying the principle of Smith v Jenkins, and the consequence to one of the participants of any act done in furtherance of the arrangement or in obtaining the benefit of having carried it out should not give rise to a cause of action. The relationship of those participants should not be regarded as giving rise to relevant rights or duties. Per Jacobs J (Mason and Aickin JJ agreeing): "2. The recent decision of this court in Progress Properties Ltd v Craft [1976] HCA 59; (1976) 135 CLR 651; (1976) 12 ALR 59; 51 ALJR 184 was not before the Supreme Court of South Australia when it gave its decision. The basis of the principle whereby in some cases a defence of illegality may be raised in an action for negligence was there examined. In my reasons for judgement, with which Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ agreed, I said: 'A plea of illegality in answer to a claim of negligence is a denial that duty of care arises out of the relationship of particular persons one to another. An illegal activity adds a factor to the relationship which may either extinguish or modify the duty of care otherwise owed. A joint illegal activity may absolve the one party from the duty towards the other to perform the activity with care for the safety of that other. That, it seems to me, is the effect of Smith v Jenkins [1970] HCA 2; (1970) 119 CLR 397; (1970) ALR 519; 44 ALJR 78. Where there is a joint illegal activity the actual act of which the plaintiff in a civil action may be complaining as done without care may itself be a criminal act of a kind in respect of which a court is not prepared to hear evidence for the purpose of establishing the standard of care which was reasonable in the circumstances. A court will not hear evidence nor will it determine a standard of care owing by a safe blower to his accomplice in respect of the explosive device. This is an example which gives no difficulty, but other cases can give difficulty in classification' (ALR at 73; ALJR at 190). I adhere to that statement. I think that it is correct to base the defence upon a denial of a duty of care in the particular circumstances rather than upon a denial of remedy for a breach of the duty of care. A legal duty of care pre-supposes that a tribunal of fact can properly establish a standard of care in order to determine whether there has been a breach of the duty of care. If the courts decline to permit the establishment of an appropriate standard of care then it cannot be said that there is a duty of care. 3. Before the courts will say that the appropriate standard of care is not permitted to be established there must be such a relationship between the act of negligence and the nature of the illegal activity that a standard of care owed in the particular circumstances could only be determined by bringing into consideration the nature of the activity in which the parties were engaged. The two safe blowers provide the simplest illustration. What exigencies of the occasion would the tribunal take into account in determining the standard of care owed? That the burglar alarm had already sounded? That the police were known to be on their way? That by reason of the furtive occasion itself a speed of action was required which made it inappropriate to apply to the defendant a standard of care which in lawful circumstances would be appropriate? The courts will not engage in this invidious inquiry. The reason is no doubt based on public policy. If, then, no standard of care can legally be determined, it cannot be said that there is any duty of care On the other hand in Andrews v Nominal Defendant (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 85; [1965] NSWR 1614 the fact that the plaintiff had permitted the driver of the vehicle to drive that vehicle when it was unregistered and uninsured was held not to be a bar. I would base this conclusion upon the ground that the fact of the vehicle being unregistered and uninsured did not bear upon the question whether or not the degree of care exer cised by the driver was in the circumstances reasonable. 10. In the present case the driver of the car was disqualified from driving and therefore his driving of the car was an offence; the passenger knew that the driver was disqualified and aided and abetted him in driving whilst so disqualified. The question is what bearing have those facts on the standard 1920 of care reasonably to be expected of the driver? The answer is none whatsoever. I would dismiss the appeal." Per Jacobs J (Mason and Aickin JJ agreeing) in Jackson v Harrison [1978] HCA 17; (1978) 138 CLR 438; 52 ALJR 474; 19 ALR 129 (Noted 52 ALJ 703); MC 27/1978, 16 May (b) Duty of care collision involving a stolen motor vehicle The defendant escaped from a juvenile detention centre and stole a car and its keys from a garage. The garage reported the theft of the car but not of the keys. When the defendant attempted to use a stolen credit card at a service station, the attendant reported it to the police, who gave chase. A high speed chase ensued, resulting in the defendant colliding with a car driven by the plaintiff. At the time of the collision the police car had slowed down. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, the police, the juvenile authorities and the garage were all negligent. HELD: The defendant was clearly negligent. The police were not liable as they had discontinued their active pursuit and had driven with due care having regard to the circumstances. The juvenile authorities were not liable because the accident on the day following the defendant's escape was too far removed from the alleged negligence of custodial care. The garage was not liable as the accident was too remote and could not have been reasonably foreseen. Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] AC 1004; [1970] 2 All ER 294; [1970] 2 WLR 1140; [1970] 1 Lloyds Rep 453; 114 Sol Jo 375, HL, considered. [Halsbury's Laws (3rd edn.), Vol. 28, para. 4 Canada.] O'Reilly v C and The Canadian Indemnity Co. (1978) 3 WWR 145; MC 60/1978. (c) Intersection controlled by traffic control signals duty of driver crossing on green light 1. A motorist has no absolute right to enter an intersection merely in compliance with a green light. However, in determining the respective duties of the drivers, the position of the motorist entering on a green light is somewhat stronger than that of the driver entering against a red light. 2. Whether there has been a breach of the duty of care by the driver with the right of passage depends on whether that driver: (a) should have seen the other driver; (b) ought reasonably to have anticipated the possibility of a collision; and (c) could have done anything useful to avoid the collision. 3. In this case there was no liability for the driver with the green light. Per Wood J: "... While it may be accepted that a defendant who enters an intersection with a green light in his favour will not always be blameless if he collides with another vehicle in the intersection, the traffic control signal is a powerful factor in his favour. This is a matter, to my mind, which is well demonstrated by prior decisions. Each of course is a decision based on its own facts, and it would be unwise and unjustified to seek to extract a statement of general principle from them. Nevertheless the course of judicial reasoning discloses the common sense view which is to be applied in such cases. Reliance was placed by counsel for the plaintiff on the well-known passage in Sibley v Kais [1967] HCA 43; (1967) 118 CLR 424; [1968] ALR 158; 41 ALJR 220, where, in a joint judgment, the court said at CLR 427 in relation to the traffic rules imposed by statutory Regulation in Western Australia: "These Regulations in nominating the vehicle which has another vehicle on its right as the give-way vehicle are undoubtedly salutary and their breach is deservedly marked with criminal penalties. But they are not definitive of the respective duties of the drivers of such vehicles to each other or in respect of themselves: nor is the breach of such Regulations conclusive as to the performance of the duty owed to one another or in respect of themselves. The common law duty to act reasonably in all the circumstances is paramount. 20 The failure to take reasonable care in given circumstances is not necessarily answered by reliance upon the expected performance by the driver of the give way vehicle of his obligations under the Regulations; for there is no general rule that in all circumstances a driver can rely upon the performance by others of their duties, whether derived from statutory sources or from the common law. Whether or not in particular circumstances it is reasonable to act upon the assumption that View more
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