Source: http://www.openjurist.org/94/f3d/1095/united-states-v-ramirez
Timestamp: 2017-06-24 10:37:45
Document Index: 205982355

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 844', '§ 846', '§ 960', '§ 963', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 3553']

94 F3d 1095 United States v. Ramirez | OpenJurist
94 F. 3d 1095 - United States v. Ramirez HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series 94 F.3d
94 F3d 1095 United States v. Ramirez 94 F.3d 1095
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Pedro RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Argued May 16, 1996.Decided Sept. 4, 1996.
Mr. Ramirez was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On August 10, 1994, he entered a guilty plea and admitted possession, with intent to distribute, of 2,999.5 grams of cocaine.1 The presentence investigation report prepared by the United States Probation Office stated that the applicable guideline range was 57 to 71 months and that the mandatory minimum sentence was 60 months. The probation officer also submitted a supplemental report to the court, noting without comment the recent creation of the safety valve provision that allows imposition of a sentence without regard to the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
[D]efendant has failed to meet this criteri[on]. To the contrary, and despite several invitations from the government, defendant has refused (as is his right) to provide "all information and evidence" he has concerning his offense. Although defendant told the arresting agents (at the time that he was arrested) that he was meeting co-defendant Lopez and picking up the box (containing cocaine) at the direction of another individual, defendant declined to provide the agents with any information about his conversations with co-defendant Lopez or his dealings with Lopez. Similarly, defendant refused to provide information about the circumstance of this offense, e.g., why did he call Lopez at various times during the fall of [1993] and early 1993?; who told him to call Lopez on each occasion?; what did they discuss?; what did they discuss just prior to the arrests?; why did he visit Lopez' apartment building prior to January 18, 1994?; etc.
But, of course, this section says that's not a bar to someone getting 5C1.2 because someone can cooperate up to the time of sentencing.... I fully agree with the government that [Ramirez] stood on his rights. He didn't have to answer anything at the time of the arrest. But between now and the time of the arrest the defendant still hasn't provided [the government] ... and [Ramirez] was a particip[ant] in the conversation [with Lopez] and so he knows what was said.
In 1994, when Congress passed the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform Act ("MMSRA"), it included a "safety valve" provision that created more flexibility in sentencing by permitting defendants to be sentenced below the minimum sentences fixed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. Prior to the enactment of the MMSRA, a drug crime offender could obtain a sentence below the statutory minimum only when the government filed a motion for downward departure based on the defendant's substantial assistance. See 18 U.S.S.G. § 3553(e). The safety valve provision now allows a sentence below the statutory minimum for a defendant who may be less culpable and less knowledgeable than other codefendants, but who nevertheless is willing to provide all the information he has. That provision is intended to benefit "first-time, nonviolent drug offenders who were not organizers of criminal activity and who have made a good faith effort to cooperate with the government." United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 166, 171 (7th Cir.1996) (discussing legislative history of the statute and guideline).
In the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 844, § 846, § 960, or § 963, the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) set forth verbatim below:
We review the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Randy, 81 F.3d 65, 68 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Bush, 79 F.3d 64, 66 (7th Cir.1996). More specifically, we review a sentencing court's decision concerning a defendant's eligibility for a sentence reduction under § 5C1.2 for clear error. Thompson, 76 F.3d at 171; United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 144 (7th Cir.1995).
We cannot accept Mr. Ramirez's shifting-burden theory. The statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), duplicated in guideline § 5C1.2, does not support his position. Both the statute and the guideline state that the sentencing court must impose a guidelines-based sentence if it finds that the defendant meets the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Qualification for the safety valve provision is based, therefore, upon the district court's finding that the defendant has satisfied all five requirements in the provision. See United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 121 (6th Cir.1996). The court's conclusion in favor of the defendant necessarily depends upon the defendant's persuasive ability to demonstrate to the court that he is eligible for the reduced sentence. See Arrington, 73 F.3d at 148 (describing the defendant's "duty to satisfy the court" concerning the elements of § 5C1.2). To fulfill the last criterion, he must show the court that he "has truthfully provided to the Government all the information and evidence [he] has concerning the offense" for which he was convicted and any other offense that was part of the same plan or course of conduct. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5) (emphasis added). Moreover, the entirety of the information must have been given by the time of the sentencing hearing. In other words, he must prove that he truly cooperated with the authorities prior to sentencing. Nothing in the statute or its legislative history "specifies the form or place or manner of the disclosure," United States v. Montanez, 82 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir.1996), but truthful full disclosure there must be.
United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.1996).
The approach we take to the burden under § 5C1.2 is compatible with the view taken in other circuits. Other courts have disapproved similar attempts to shift the burden to the government. See United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir.) (finding it "anomalous to place the burden on the Government to solicit information from the defendant"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2537, 135 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1996); United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir.1996)(refusing to place on the government the burden of seeking out defendants for debriefing). The government does not bear a burden of seeking information from the defendant. Rather, the burden is on the defendant to come forward and to supply the government with full and truthful information. See Flanagan, 80 F.3d at 146 (concluding from the language of § 5C1.2 that "[t]here is no indication that the Government must solicit the information"). We agree with the Sixth Circuit, which refused to place on the government the onus of showing that the defendant's response was not truthful or complete. See Adu, 82 F.3d at 123-24. It reasoned that the defendant has the burden of proving his entitlement to the reduction, and that, if the government does not believe that the defendant truthfully disclosed all the information he possesses concerning the offense or related offenses, it may challenge the defendant's claim. The Sixth Circuit then held:
Id. at 125 (citing United States v. DeJesus-Gaul, 73 F.3d 395, 397 (D.C.Cir.1996)). We conclude that Mr. Ramirez had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his entitlement to the reduction under § 5C1.2.
The approach we take to the burden under § 5C1.2 also comports with the usual allocation of responsibility in departure cases. In general, the party seeking the departure from a presumptive guidelines sentence has the burden of proving that he meets the criteria for that adjustment. See Adu, 82 F.3d at 123-24; Flanagan, 80 F.3d at 146. When the departure is upward, the government has the burden; when it is downward, the defendant has the burden.2 It logically follows, under this analysis, that a defendant moving for a § 5C1.2 reduction would be responsible to prove his entitlement to it. See Ajugwo, 82 F.3d at 930 (stating that "the party seeking the downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence under the safety valve provision ... had the burden of proving that she met each of the five criteria"); Adu, 82 F.3d at 124 (same). Indeed, courts also have placed on a defendant seeking a § 5C1.2 departure specific responsibilities, such as the burden of acting affirmatively to provide the information he has, see Adu, 82 F.3d at 124; Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185-86; United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995) and of coming forward to supply the government with full and truthful information and evidence, see Arrington, 73 F.3d at 148; Flanagan, 80 F.3d at 146.
The placement of that burden on the defendant also comports with the purpose underlying this guideline. Section 5C1.2 was added to the guidelines "to benefit defendants who wished to cooperate with the government (and in fact did everything they could to cooperate)." Arrington, 73 F.3d at 148. Because it was meant to aid those less culpable defendants for whom a mandatory minimum sentence might seem harsh, it is not available to a defendant who is, for example, an "organizer" under guideline § 3B1.1. See United States v. Marshall, 83 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.1996). "In enacting the safety valve provision, we think Congress was aiming its leniency at low level defendants who did their best to cooperate to the extent of making full disclosure." Montanez, 82 F.3d at 522; see also Ivester, 75 F.3d at 184-85; United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 379 (10th Cir.1995); Rodriguez, 69 F.3d at 143; Wrenn, 66 F.3d at 3. We conclude that the language and purpose of the safety valve provision require that the defendant, not the government, prove the defendant's entitlement to that sentence reduction--which includes proof of complete and honest disclosure of information to the government. As Judge Boudin of the First Circuit succinctly stated, "[F]ull disclosure is the price that Congress has attached to relief under the statute, and the burden remains on the defendant to prove his entitlement." Montanez, 82 F.3d at 523 (emphasis added). The defendant must "persuade the district court that he has 'truthfully provided' the required information and evidence to the government." Id.; see also Flanagan, 80 F.3d at 146-47 (holding "that the defendant has the burden of ensuring that he has provided all the information and evidence regarding the offense to the Government"). As this court said in Arrington, 73 F.3d at 147, "to qualify for relief under § 3553(f), a defendant must demonstrate to the court that he has made a good faith attempt to cooperate with authorities." Although the defendant "is not required to provide information that the government expressly states it does not want, he must at least offer what he has." Id. at 148.
See United States v. Larkins, 83 F.3d 162, 168 (7th Cir.1996) (defendant bears burden of convincing court it could depart downward); United States v. Walls, 80 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir.1996) (government has burden of proof when seeking upward departure); United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 141 (7th Cir.1995) (defendant bears burden of establishing minor participant status to warrant downward departure)