Source: http://openjurist.org/975/f2d/1120/united-states-v-c-lara
Timestamp: 2015-11-25 14:27:17
Document Index: 34339694

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1324', '§ 2', '§ 1324', '§ 2', '§ 3147', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3742', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 3742']

975 F2d 1120 United States v. C Lara | OpenJurist
975 F. 2d 1120 - United States v. C Lara HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 975 F.2d.
975 F2d 1120 United States v. C Lara 975 F.2d 1120
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Yolanda C. LARA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-2733.
Catherine Allen-Jones, Houston, Tex. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.
Kathlyn G. Snyder, Paula Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. Attys., Ronald G. Woods, U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Sentenced on a guilty plea for immigration-related violations, Yolanda C. Lara appeals her sentence. Concluding that the district court erred in applying the sentencing guidelines in one particular, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
Following an investigation triggered by an anonymous tip, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested and charged Lara and her codefendant, Andres Ramos-Flores, with transporting and harboring undocumented aliens. The typical scenario provided for Lara and Ramos-Flores to transport aliens from Brownsville to Houston, where they were hidden and detained while they contacted relatives living in the United States who were to wire their "fees" via Western Union to Lara and Ramos-Flores. These fees were usually $400 per person.
The investigation included a surveillance of an apartment in Houston where the aliens were housed. The surveillance team observed Lara, Ramos-Flores, and three Hispanic females leave the apartment and enter a vehicle registered to Lara. The INS agents followed and then stopped the vehicle. The Hispanic females were all undocumented; each stated that she had paid Lara and Ramos-Flores $400 to smuggle her into the United States.
Lara admitted to transporting undocumented aliens from Brownsville to Houston and to hiding them in her Houston apartment. When a consent search was conducted of that apartment, the INS agents found one documented female and three female undocumented aliens, a .357 revolver and ammunition, and Western Union money transfer forms. Lara directed the agents to a house on Johnson Street, where more undocumented aliens were found. One of the aliens told the agents that she and twelve others had been transported to Houston by Lara and Ramos-Flores and that each had paid her $400 fee.
Lara pled guilty to a six-count indictment: Three counts charged her with illegally concealing, harboring, or shielding from detection transported aliens in the United States, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; three counts charged her with illegally transporting aliens and aiding and abetting, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The government filed a notice of intention to seek an enhancement of the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3147.1 The district court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). At the sentencing hearing, the court solicited objections to the PSI's factual findings. The government presented none. Lara requested the court to consider the credibility of one declarant in assessing her statements; the court agreed to do so.
The district court then entertained objections to the PSI's application of the sentencing guidelines. The government objected to the recommendation that Lara's sentence not be enhanced. The district court adopted the PSI's recommendation and refused to enhance.
Lara objected to a number of factors cited as possible grounds for an upward departure, including the large number (approximately forty) of undocumented aliens involved; the extortive aspect of the smuggling operation; the discharge of a firearm in the commission of the offense; psychological harm to one of the undocumented aliens; and enhancement by analogy to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7. This last suggestion was based upon the scenario that the Brownsville offense was committed while Lara was on release for the instant charges and in the sentencing on that offense, the government had failed to seek enhancement under section 3147. The PSI suggested the propriety of enhancement for the first offense by an upward departure in such an instance. In addition, Lara objected to the lack of recommendation in the PSI for a two-point reduction in her offense level for acceptance of responsibility, as well as to the increase in her criminal history category by virtue of the Brownsville conviction.
After hearing these objections, the district court accepted the calculations set forth in the PSI establishing an offense level of 9 and a criminal history category of II, based upon a criminal history score of 2, yielding a guidelines range of 6-12 months. The court rejected Lara's request for a two-point reduction of the offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
The district court then employed U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 by analogy to support an upward departure for the extortionate element of Lara's offense and used section 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(iii), also by analogy, to support a departure for the firearm-related element. The court also applied section 2J1.7 by analogy, despite having earlier rejected the government's motion for an enhancement under section 3147, to increase the offense level an additional three points. The above departures raised the base offense level to 26, which combined with the criminal history category of II to yield a new range of 70-87 months.
Based upon that range, the court sentenced Lara to a term of incarceration of 60 months on counts 1 through 6, with the first 27 months imposed for counts 2 through 6 to run consecutively with the 60-month term for count 1. The term of incarceration on all six counts totaled 87 months.
Our review of Lara's challenge is controlled by Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). We must remand on a showing that the district court relied upon an invalid factor at sentencing, absent our finding that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the court's selection of the sentence imposed, and that the sentence was reasonable. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1120-21. In conducting our inquiry, we must accept the factual findings of the district court unless clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the application of the guidelines for errors of law. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989).
III. Departure by Analogy to Section 2B3.2.
A sentencing court has the power, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), to impose a sentence outside the range established by a proper application of the guidelines, provided it finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp.1992)). Our determination on appeal follows a two-pronged inquiry:
First, was the sentence imposed either in violation of law or as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f)(1). If the court concludes that the departure is not the result of an error in interpreting the Guidelines, it should proceed to the second step: is the resulting sentence an unreasonably high or low departure from the relevant guideline range? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f)(2).2
Williams, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1120. We review findings of fact that underlie the court's sentence under a clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp.1992); Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 221.
Applying the first prong of the inquiry, we find that the departure based upon the extortive aspects of Lara's conduct was imposed neither in violation of law nor as the result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, which direct sentencing courts to
treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure may be warranted.
U.S.S.G. ch. I, pt. A(4)(b), at 1.5-1.6 (policy statement). We find that the district court's decision to depart upward in this case was amply supported by the record.
The "heartland" of the typical section 2L1.1 offense, the offense to which Lara pled guilty, includes the profit-making element of Lara's scheme. Beyond this, however, section 2L1.1 appears to have accounted for no other aggravating conduct in cases involving the smuggling, transporting, or harboring of an illegal alien. Specifically, we are told, "[t]he Commission has not considered offenses involving ... dangerous or inhumane treatment. An upward departure should be considered in those circumstances." U.S.S.G. §