Source: http://openjurist.org/442/f2d/56/consolidated-freightways-corporation-of-delaware-v-admiral-corporation
Timestamp: 2017-05-27 12:29:16
Document Index: 309280918

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1322', '§ 316', '§ 316', '§ 317', '§ 322', '§ 3', '§ 812']

442 F2d 56 Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Admiral Corporation | OpenJurist
442 F. 2d 56 - Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Admiral Corporation HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 442 F.2d.
442 F2d 56 Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Admiral Corporation 442 F.2d 56
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.ADMIRAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Rehearing Denied May 14, 1971.
Francis James Higgins, Edward H. Hickey, John P. Scotellaro, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant; Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad & Burns, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
George W. Hamman, Robert F. Finke, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee; Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
* Admiral does not contend that the provision for prepayment by Rogers altered the contractual terms of the bills of lading and relieved it, as consignee, from any obligation of payment of the freight charges. Instead, Admiral urges that notwithstanding any such liability, plaintiff is estopped to collect the freight charges in this case.
"[e]stoppel could not become the means of successfully avoiding the requirement of the Act as to equal rates, in violation of the provisions of the statute."
The testimony showed that "prepared" meant paid in advance by the shipper or to be billed to the shipper. After Rogers became affiliated with Intercontinental Transport Company early in 1966, some of the bills of lading showed that the shipper was "Intercontinental for Wm. A. Rogers," but Rogers was shown as the party to be billed
Pursuant to the powers delegated by Congress under Section 223, the Interstate Commerce Commission enacted regulations governing credit extensions by motor carriers, billing practices, and payments of bills for freight charges. 9 C.F.R. § 1322.1 contains the Commission's limitations on credit extended by motor carriers:
Section 216(d) (49 U.S.C. § 316(d)) states the general prohibition against making, causing or giving "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage" to any shipper by an interstate motor vehicle carrier. In order to enforce this policy, Congress empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to adjust unlawful rates and charges, 49 U.S.C. § 316 (e), (f). Congress also required published tariffs stating applicable rates, thus insuring uniformity of charges and permitting parties liable for payment to check the legality of the payment demanded. 49 U.S.C. § 317. In addition to agency intervention, Congress also created criminal penalties for discriminatory conduct, and authorized civil actions for redress in federal courts. 49 U.S.C. § 322
49 U.S.C. § 3(2); see also Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 812, 814-817
The remainder of the Section excepts credit extensions favoring the United States Government and its political subdivisions, and provides special rules governing liability in cases of agency by the consignee on behalf of another where additional transportation charges are necessary. These provisions are inapplicable to the instant controversy
In light of our holding on estoppel, we need not consider plaintiff's contentions concerning Rogers' inability to pay
[I]f a shipment is accepted, the consignee becomes liable, as a matter of law, for the full amount of the freight charges, whether they are demanded at the time of delivery, or not until later. His liability satisfies the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act.
24 Stat. 379 et seq.; see Huntington, "The Marasmus of the I.C.C.: The Commission, the Railroads and the Public Interest," 61 Yale L.J. 467, 470-71 (1952)
See Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456 et seq.; Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 543 et seq.; Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 472 et seq