Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/201711691/On-the-Virtues-of-Inconclusiveness-The-Egyptian-Constitution-of-2014
Timestamp: 2016-12-03 07:19:54
Document Index: 547436646

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 54', 'art. 57', 'art. 58', 'art. 62', 'art. 64', 'art. 73', 'art. 75', 'art. 92', 'art. 7', 'art. 204', 'art. 204', 'art. 193', 'art. 226']

On the Virtues of Inconclusiveness: The Egyptian Constitution of 2014
BrowseInterestsBiography & MemoirBusiness & LeadershipFiction & LiteraturePolitics & EconomyHealth & WellnessSociety & CultureHappiness & Self-HelpMystery, Thriller & CrimeHistoryYoung AdultBrowse byBooksAudiobooksArticlesSheet MusicBrowse allUploadSign inJoinJanuary 2014Op-Med
In December 2013, a draft of Egypt’s new constitution was approved by the members appointed by President Adli Mansour to the committee charged with amending the 2012 constitution (the Committee of the Fifty, or C-50). The referendum on the draft was held on January 14-15, 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections are to follow. The process has already had important international ramifications, with the United States most likely restoring its annual $1.5 billion military aid to the country. While the pros and cons of the text are widely discussed, what of its inconclusiveness? This may prove less harmful than expected. Members of the C-50 could not agree on a number of key provisions, and the easiest path was to simply leave those matters undecided. Will the effects of this strategy on the political system necessarily be ruinous? On the contrary, this inconclusiveness — which the examples below substantiate — might actually guarantee the text a longer life and allow for more mature, consensual choices in the not-sodistant future.
Even a cursory look at the text of the 2014 constitution shows that it left many matters for the legislators to decide, not only in the domain of fundamental rights, but also in that of institutional design. As concerns rights, allowing only legislators to define their content and regulate their exercise had already historically shifted from a guarantee against the encroachment of government regulatory powers to a means to curtail those very rights. When first introduced, clauses requiring a certain issue to be regulated only through an act of parliament (réserve de loi) prevented regulation (and hence encroachment) by the monarch or the executive (branded as the enemies of rights par excellence.) History has shown, however, that parliaments can also curtail fellow citizens’ rights, and the executive-legislative continuum has further emptied the guarantee and strengthened the claim that the legislative has a constitutional prerogative to regulate fundamental rights. In the 2014 constitution, the parliament’s prerogative to regulate fundamental rights is still exemplified in the provisions on pre-trial detention (art. 54(4)); privacy of correspondence
(art. 57); home searches (art. 58); limitations to freedom of movement (art. 62), religion (art. 64), assembly (art. 73), and association (art. 75 ff.); etc. Here the text follows the path of previous constitutions, but also introduces a fuse that could avoid the short-circuiting of the system of fundamental rights as a whole: a general provision prohibiting legislation regulating the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms from affecting the core and essence of such rights (art. 92). Whether this fuse will have enough breaking capacity will be evaluated on its application by the Constitutional Court, thus placing the responsibility for limiting the abusive practices of state authorities on the court. Drafters also left significant matters of institutional design to be decided by legislators. In a first example, designation of the Sheikh al-Azhar — the head of the most prestigious Sunni religious institution in Egypt (and beyond) — is left to legislators (art. 7(3)). The alternative solutions were either to have the sheikh elected by the Body of Senior Scholars at al-Azhar, or appointed by the president. The former solution would have progressively guaranteed that the sheikh’s appointment would be the expression of an independent institution of religious learning, whereas the latter would have guaranteed continuity maintaining state control over the country’s main religious institution. A clear choice regarding the separation of church and state was therefore avoided by the drafters. Contrary to popular belief, lack of this separation in Egypt has traditionally meant that state authorities encroach on religious authorities, not the other way around. Second, the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians is left up to the legislature to expand (art. 204(3)). The provision begins with a general statement that military trials of civilians are prohibited except in a wide range of cases listed in art. 204(2). The paragraph following it, however, further allows the law to regulate the crimes listed in the earlier paragraph, and “other areas” where military courts have jurisdiction. Military trials of civilians have been a bone of contention in Egypt for decades, especially after 2011. The drafters decided to open with a strong statement, but have left the door open for the old practices to either continue or be curtailed. Third, the number of members of the Constitutional Court is left up to parliament decide (art. 193(1)). The provision simply states that the court is composed of a president and
Contrary to popular belief, lack of this separation in Egypt has traditionally meant that state authorities encroach on religious authorities, not the other way around.
a “sufficient” number of members. Court-packing schemes were employed when the court displayed some degree of non-alignment with the presidency in the 1990s, with the president deciding to appoint additional “loyal” members to shift the balance in his favor. The 2013 constitution took a clear stance on court-packing, and set the number at 11 members, but the drafters of the 2014 constitution have decided to leave this vague Are inconclusive provisions on key aspects of institutional design enough to weaken the entire endeavor? If a final, entrenched decision on all key issues of institutional design (and fundamental rights) is a desideratum, then the 2014 constitution falls short of expectations in a number of areas. One of the main arguments in favor of rigid constitutions put forward by Sunstein is precisely that these texts take certain issues off the agenda of ordinary politics, with the drafters deciding them once and for all.1 Considering the experience of Eastern Europe, the same author, together with Holmes, concedes that, in the context of a transition, a higher degree of flexibility could benefit the development of ordinary politics.2 The Egyptian Constitution of 2014 does not opt for flexibility and has a fairly rigid amendment process (art. 226), but the areas in which drafters produced inconclusive provisions allowing legislators to step in might foster the engagement of ordinary politics with these issues. Moreover, the political capital that drafters had at their
1 Cass R. Sunstein, “Constitutionalism and Secession,” in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 1991), p. 633-670. 2 Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, “The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe,” in Sanford Levinson (ed.), Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 275-306.
disposal was rather scarce due to the limited legitimacy they could claim. Allowing contentious issues to be de-entrenched by appointed and homogeneous drafters in favor of elected and (possibly more) diverse legislators could thus allow more representative politics during this turbulent transition to seek temporary arrangements within the framework of a permanent constitution.
Gianluca P. Parolin is an assistant professor in the Law Department of the American University in Cairo, Egypt; adjunct at Cairo University; and visiting at the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies in Rome. He has also been a global fellow at New York University Law School, and visiting associate at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
On the Virtues of Inconclusiveness: The Egyptian Constitution of 2014 by German Marshall Fund of the United States6 viewsEmbedDownloadDescriptionThis policy brief explains why the new Egyptian constitution leaves many points unresolved.This policy brief explains why the new Egyptian constitution leaves many points unresolved.Interests: Types, Government & PoliticsRead on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.Copyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentShow moreShow less
RelatedIDP, OJC () Jurisdição Constitucional e a Omissão Legislativa Infraconstitucional - Eslovêniaby alainremyThesun 2009-02-17 Page01 King Thanks PMby Impulsive collectorKALYAN SIR_ SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.pdfby R Aditya Vardhana ReddyPreambleby Jammy MolinaVishweshwariah Compiled Notesby anurag1309L. Chandra Kumar Memoby AlishaДокумент Microsoft Office Word (3)by Livia PuriciCopy of Salient Features of the Constitutionby saravmbaemergency..........by Roshni KhanThe armed forces personnel versus article 33by LAW MANTRAPublic Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan - [2008] 1by syakira_aminudinConsti Final by NLainie OmarIndian Political System - 1by Salil AggarwalMisuse of Power Under Article 356by Rutvik ShuklaSalient Features of Indian Constitutionby rahajs54106504 Salient Features of Indian Constitutionby Pallawi PriyamwadaSalient Features of the Constitution of Indiaby vipultandonddn7th Amendment_full Text_The Daily Starby tanz777Full text of 7th amendment verdictby Nicholas GomesArticle 2-Aby Shamshad RasoolIndian Constitution Schedule IIIby Aryan Classes130628-G.H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to -Kevin Rudd PM-Education Funding - Etcby Gerrit Hendrik Schorel-HlavkaLegal Researchby Reyryan AporConstitutionby fmurphyPacifico Agabin & Oscar Franklin Tan - A Liberal Interpretation of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (2015)by Facebook.com/OscarFranklinTanrtiby Krishan Tewaryfianlsby Angelo Von N. AdiaoFederation Systemby KhanWasimSimilar to On the Virtues of InconclusivenessIDP, OJC () Jurisdição Constitucional e a Omissão Legislativa Infraconstitucional - EslovêniaThesun 2009-02-17 Page01 King Thanks PMKALYAN SIR_ SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.pdfPreambleVishweshwariah Compiled NotesL. Chandra Kumar MemoДокумент Microsoft Office Word (3)Copy of Salient Features of the Constitutionemergency..........The armed forces personnel versus article 33Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan - [2008] 1Consti Final Indian Political System - 1Misuse of Power Under Article 356Salient Features of Indian Constitution54106504 Salient Features of Indian ConstitutionSalient Features of the Constitution of India7th Amendment_full Text_The Daily StarFull text of 7th amendment verdictArticle 2-AIndian Constitution Schedule III130628-G.H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to -Kevin Rudd PM-Education Funding - EtcLegal ResearchConstitutionPacifico Agabin & Oscar Franklin Tan - A Liberal Interpretation of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (2015)rtifianlsFederation SystemConst India2608On the Virtues of Inconclusiveness