Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/305634754/The-Nationwide-Failures-of-Decommisioning-Regulation-Decommisioning-Trust-Funds-or-Slush-Funds
Timestamp: 2018-11-16 14:58:07
Document Index: 620099043

Matched Legal Cases: ['ART\t1', 'ART\t2', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§50', '§ 50', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 35']

The Nationwide Failures of Decommisioning Regulation: Decommisioning Trust Funds or Slush Funds? | Nuclear Regulatory Commission | Nuclear Power
The Nationwide Failures of Decommisioning Regulation: Decommisioning Trust Funds or Slush Funds? Comments Submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2016
The Nationwide Failures of Decommisioning Regulati...
Notice: Environmental statements; availability, etc.: Army Department; Jefferson Proving Ground, IN
Notice: Nuclear equipment and material; export and import: High-enriched uranium; export license application
Notice: Meetings: Industry Trade Advisory Committees&#8212; Small and Minority Business
policy of thor
Ml 110550923
Notice: Environmental statements; availability, etc.: Materials licenses; program-specific guidance about possession licenses for production of radioactive material using an accelerator; consolidated guidance
Notice: Reports and guidance documents; availability, etc.: Amergen Energy Co., LLC
WLC Report Final Revision
Circuit Analysis - Failure Mode and Likelihood Analysis
Notice: License Amendment Request to Revert to Operating Status from Restoration and Decommissioning Status
Notice: Meetings: EarthScope Science and Education Advisory Committee
Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Nationwide Failures of Decommissioning Regulation:
Decommissioning Trust Funds or Slush Funds?
Regulatory “Improvements” for Decommissioning
Prepared By: Fairewinds Energy Education Corp
EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY:
PART	1:	FINANCIAL	ISSUES:
THE	CONCEPT	OF	SAFSTOR
THE	COST	FORMULA	FOR	DECOMMISSIONING	ESTIMATES
INDEPENDENT	SPENT	FUEL	STORAGE	INSTALLATION	FACILITY	(ISFSI)	COSTS
SPENT	FUEL	STORAGE
GROWTH	PROJECTIONS	FOR	THE	DECOMMISSIONING	FUND
LLC	STATUS	–	NRC	AND	ENTERGY	STATEMENTS
AUDITING	THE	EXPENDITURES	FROM	THE	FUND
PART	2:	SAFETY	ISSUES:
USING	VERMONT	YANKEE	AS	AN	EXAMPLE,	FOUR	GLARING	SITE	SPECIFIC	SAFETY	ISSUES	HAVE	BEEN
IDENTIFIED	BY	FAIREWINDS.
1ST)	EMERGENCY	PLANNING
2ND)	REMOVAL	OF	THE	FUEL	IN	VERMONT	YANKEE’S	SPENT	FUEL	POOL
3RD)	STRONTIUM	CONTAMINATION	ON-SITE
4TH)	SITE	RELEASE	CRITERIA
The Atoms for Peace program began in earnest when the first U.S. commercial nuclear
power plant started generating electricity in Shippingport, Pennsylvania in 1957.1 Once
touted for its economic contribution to cheap energy, large atomic power plants
nationwide are now being permanently shuttered by their owners because atomic power
is significantly more expensive than sustainable methods of generating electricity2.
Now that local communities, state regulatory agencies, and many other stakeholders are
witnessing the progression of the first few large atomic reactor closures, it is evident that
existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations are woefully inadequate to
address the problems faced by the incipient closure of dozens more aged atomic plants.
The current and proposed NRC regulations do not follow federal regulations determined
by the Code of Federal Regulations, and instead are another financial subsidy for the
overly subsidized nuclear power industry. In this report, Fairewinds Energy Education
details how weak NRC regulations for atomic power plant decommissioning fail to create
a solid financial and technical foundation that would protect public health and welfare.
Fairewinds delineates the existing patchwork structure of NRC regulations that creates a
series of subsidies designed to minimize the cost to atomic power reactor corporations as
they permanently shutter atomic power reactors. These NRC sanctioned and industry
promoted subsidies that masquerade as regulations, simply marginalize decommissioning
efforts for decades to come thus creating an intergenerational transfer of risk. The atomic
power industry lobbyists and nuclear power corporations are using available NRC legal
precedents and regulatory loopholes to distort the true cost of atomic power and attempt
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/pa-heritage/atoms-for-peacepennsylvania.html
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/blogs/2015/04/renewables-vs-nuclear-dowe-need-more-nuclear-power.html
to minimize the real nuclear risk that exists in decommissioning of the industry’s aging
As more and more corporate atomic reactor owners realize that the nuclear plants they
seek to decommission do not comply with existing NRC decommissioning regulations,
the owners and the industry as a whole have approached the NRC to waive regulations
designed to protect the public through a process called “requests for exemptions”. The
atomic industry has a long history of approaching the NRC for “requests for exemptions”,
as noted by Vermont Congressional Representative Peter Welch:
“… the NRC has a history of facilitating the nuclear industry…”3.
The use of regulatory exemptions continues to provide a significant subsidy to the atomic
industry while risking public health and welfare and burdening towns, cities, and states
with the final burden of their toxic legacy.
The NRC issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, on November 19, 2015,
entitled Regulatory Improvements for Decommissioning Power Reactors4. Fairewinds’
review of the proposed changes clearly shows that the proposed changes are nothing
more than a disguise for yet another huge financial subsidy to the atomic industry at the
public’s expense. Even though the NRC attempts to claim the proposed regulatory
changes are “improvements”, these more lenient decommissioning regulatory loopholes
are simply an attempt by the NRC to change the public’s Decommissioning Trust Funds
into Decommissioning Slush Funds that are already being raided at will by the
corporations that own these atomic power plants.
Brattleboro Reformer, December 8, 2015, Vermont Yankee Concerns Addressed by
http://www.manchesterjournal.com/latestnews/ci_29217531/vermont-yankee-concernsaddressed-by-nrc-commissioner
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/11/19/2015-29536/regulatoryimprovements-for-decommissioning-power-reactors or http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/news/2015/15-078.pdf
Advance Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking (Anpr): Regulatory Improvements For
Decommissioning Power Reactors (November 19, 2015)
According to Vermont’s Congressman Peter Welsh, the use of the exemption process by
the NRC is not a legitimate use of Decommissioning funds as defined by NRC
…the use of the plant's decommissioning trust fund, which is intended
"for legitimate decommissioning activities consistent with the definition of
decommissioning under NRC regulations." Any use of the fund for
ancillary activities, such as site restoration or spent fuel management, by
the licensee requires a regulatory exemption.5
The charade that these newly proposed rule changes are so-called improvements was
disproved by NRC spokesperson Neil Sheehan, who publically stated:
The goal is to cut down on the large number of exemptions and
amendments that owners of decommissioning reactors seek, according to
Nuclear Regulatory Commission spokesman Neil Sheehan. “We’re
looking at codifying the rules so they don’t have to do it through
exemptions,” Sheehan said… Entergy Corp. recently secured an
exemption from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to use some of its
decommissioning trust fund to manage radioactive spent fuel at its
Vermont Yankee plant, which shut down in December. At the time, the
fund’s total stood at $664 million. “Such exemptions are not
unprecedented,” wrote Sheehan in an email.6
Fairewinds analysis shows that if the NRC is truly interested in improving the regulation
of the decommissioning process, it must return the control of the Decommissioning Trust
Funds to the individual State ratepayers who provided the funds in the first place. As
former NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford has said,
… States should be gaining clarity about decommissioning law and regulation
before plants retire rather than after. "Whether and when the land is to be suitable
for other uses ... is not fundamentally a federal matter," Bradford said. "I'm
perplexed that many States are so deferential to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission."7
November 21, 2015 Cape Cod Times
http://www.capecodtimes.com/article/20151121/NEWS/151129854/-1/NEWS39
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2015/10/8579839/new-york-nuclearplants-phase-out-challengingly New York Nuclear Plants Phase Out, Challengingly
Through its November 19, 2015 Advance Notice of Rulemaking, the NRC has created
the opportunity to truly protect the public’s role in the decommissioning process. The
improvements proposed by the NRC and its allies in the atomic industry do not protect
the public and should be rejected and replaced as Fairewinds’ analyses suggest in detail
Fairewinds’ assessment shows that there are several fundamental issues that must be
addressed on a national level to assure that Decommissioning Trust Funds do not become
Decommissioning Slush funds. The current regulatory changes the NRC has proposed
weaken existing public control of each atomic reactor’s decommissioning funds. In the
following sections of this report, Fairewinds proposes significant improvements to
current and proposed decommissioning regulation that would first protect the public, as
well as the towns, cities, and states that will be left with the toxic radioactive legacy of
atomic power, and not just feather the financial interests of the atomic industry.
The Federal Code of Regulations 10 CFR §50.75 is the foundation of the NRC’s
regulations covering nuclear power plant decommissioning. There are eight critical
financial issues associated with decommissioning nuclear power plants that stem from
problems with the NRC’s legal interpretation of 10 CFR §50.75.
1. The Concept Of SAFSTOR
2. The Cost Formula For Decommissioning Estimates
3. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Costs (ISFSI)
4. Spent Fuel Pool Storage
5. Growth Projections For The Decommissioning Fund
6. LLC Status – NRC And Entergy Statements
7. Sharing Of Excess Decommissioning Funds
8. Auditing The Expenditures From The Fund
The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR §50.75 provides for three decommissioning
options: rapid dismantlement, permanent entombment, and an intermediate concept
called SAFSTOR. While permanent entombment has not yet been applied in the United
States, and rapid dismantlement has been initiated occasionally, the new
decommissioning option of choice for the atomic industry has suddenly become
SAFSTOR. Memorialized in 10 CFR §50.75, the SAFSTOR approach to
decommissioning allows an energy corporation to wait 60 years before it must
completely dismantle the mothballed nuclear plant.
It is important to note that there is no basis in physics that led to this arbitrary conclusion
that 60 years is an acceptable amount of time to wait to decommission a nuclear power
plant. According to former NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko:
Jaczko said the 60-year time line doesn't make sense from a safety
perspective… One of the original rationales was that waiting that long was
necessary to minimize radiation exposure to workers…
"From a technical perspective and a safety perspective there really is no
rationale for a 60-year waste disposal." The real rationale, he said, is money.
"When you push people on these factors, they come back with 'We can't
decommission sooner because we don't have the money,'" Jaczko said.8
In reality then, SAFSTOR is a financial mechanism designed to allow nuclear power
plant owners to avoid paying for decommissioning costs while the plant operates, thereby
artificially lowering the true cost of atomic electricity and creating an intergenerational
transfer of risk and costs. SAFSTOR allows these corporations that may or may not even
exist in 60 years to place inadequate funds in the volatile financial market in hopes that
those funds will grow during the 60-year decommissioning hiatus to cover the
astronomical costs of decommissioning.
The atomic industry vehemently argues that SAFSTOR really is not a financial
mechanism, and claims instead that it is a method by which to protect corporate
personnel from exposure to increased doses of radiation by waiting 60 years to
decommission the plant. While it is true that radioactive material decays over time, the
benefits of dose reduction are largely accrued during the first 10 years after an atomic
plant shuts down. Cobalt-60 is the primary isotope causing significant exposure to
personnel during the first 10 years after shutdown. Since Cobalt-60 has a 5-year half-life,
only 25% of Cobalt-60 remains after 10 years. Therefore, the benefit of waiting to
decommission for 10 years is that radiation exposure to workers from Cobalt-60 will be
reduced by 75%, due to radioactive decay during that first decade. The latest claim made
by the nuclear industry is that by waiting 60 years, the collective exposure to nuclear
personnel could be minimized to approximately 300 Rem.
Truthfully, the actions of the nuclear industry while nuclear plants are operating belie
industry claims regarding dose reduction to personnel. An illustrative example occurred
in 2014 during a routine outage at the Entergy owned Palisades nuclear plant in Michigan.
Entergy had shut down Palisades for routine maintenance and its regularly scheduled
refueling outage. With long-standing and chronic aging management problems, Entergy
finally decided to make a major repair while still maintaining an extraordinarily short
refueling outage schedule. Entergy thus exposed 192 of its employees and independent
contractors to very high levels of radiation in order to get the Palisades nuclear plant back
into operation again as quickly as possible. The exposure to Entergy employees and
contractors at the end of the three week long rushed outage was approximately 115
Person-rem.9 Using BIER 7 projections, there is a one in ten chance that one of these
workers will receive cancer as a direct result of this exposure while working at Palisades.
As a result of its decision to subject its employees to significant radiation exposure,
Person-rem Physics measurement of radiation exposure radiation: Units for measuring
ionizing radiation – For expressing the collective dose to a population, the person-Sv and
person-rem are the units used. These units represent the product of the average dose per
person times the number of people exposed ( e.g., 1 Sv to each of 100 persons = 100
person-Sv = 10,000 person-rem).
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/452911/person-rem
Palisades was rapidly generating electricity, and profits were also flowing to Entergy.
While the nuclear industry continues to claim that employee and contractor exposure
should be minimized during decommissioning to a collective maximum of approximately
300 Rem during or after 60-years of SAFSTOR, the same industry has no remorse
regarding high levels of radiation exposure when returning a nuclear plant to the
profitable status of generating electricity leads to a collective 115 Rem exposure in only
It is apparent that the nuclear industry and the NRC have used the SAFSTOR option to
create a double standard for dose reduction during decommissioning compared to
At every step in the nuclear fuel chain, decommissioning costs have exceeded available
funds. These extra hidden costs, like those from the production of mill tailings from the
mining of uranium in Moab, Utah, and decommissioning of all nuclear facilities in the
nuclear fuel chain are called externalities. The externalities of decommissioning,
including the cleanup from leaking plants and their dismantlement, and the cost of mining,
milling, and fuel fabrication decommissioning (after mining, milling, and fuel
fabrication) are not factored into the price of nuclear power per kilowatt-hour when
compared with other energy production like solar, wind, geothermal, wave, etc.
The NRC facilitates the perceived reduction in nuclear production costs by allowing
power companies to exclude the cost of the above mentioned externalities when creating
trust accounts meant to serve as the decommissioning fund. Enabling the power
companies to present perceived lower nuclear power costs actually creates a subsidy for
the nuclear power industry and allows atomic power to appear to be a more competitive
method of generating electricity when compared against other electric generating
Furthermore, through the use of the SAFSTOR alternative, decommissioning funds are
routinely under-accrued during the lifetime operation of a nuclear power plant, so that
when the decision is made to permanently close an atomic facility enough funds to do so
are not available. The lack of dismantlement funds creates a situation where the effected
local communities are held hostage to the economics of sudden shut down and job loss.
If the SAFSTOR alternative were eliminated from NRC regulations, the
decommissioning funds would be fully accrued when each reactor is closed. This would
protect the local communities, stave off sudden job loss, because the transition during the
following ten-year period would provide deconstruction employment at the same time
that operating personnel are leaving the plant site.
1.1. Fairewinds believes that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should remove the
SAFSTOR 60-year option from 10 CFR §50.75. Although decommissioning and
dismantlement may not be entirely feasible in a short amount of time at some
rare locations, the economics show that allowing 60-years before
decommissioning is merely a hidden nuclear power subsidy that has been
memorialized into nuclear law in an effort to shift costs from the federal
government’s regulation of energy companies to the residents of the states in
which the nuclear plants have been built.
1.2. Fairewinds believes that the methods used by the NRC to accrue
decommissioning trust funds at all nuclear facilities, not just power reactors,
needs to be completely revised to reflect the actual costs without allowing
additional time for delayed cleanup. Present NRC methodology effectively
creates a generational transfer of costs and risks.
The formula the NRC has invented for nuclear decommissioning cost analysis is ordained
in 10 CFR §50.75. Unfortunately for the communities surrounding the shutdown plants,
the formula is simplistic and has no foundation in construction industry costs and
environmental remediation. Instead, the archaic formula relies upon the age of each
nuclear plant, the power level at which the nuclear plant was operated, and whether it is a
boiling water reactor (BWR) or pressurized water reactor (PWR). Most disturbingly the
so-called formula is not site specific, does not consider radiological leaks or other
environmental or radiological damage to the specific site environment, the cost of
massive site remediation, or the topographical and geological challenges in existence at
each site. Furthermore, the decommissioning formula created and applied by the NRC
has never correctly estimated the true cost to decommission any nuclear power plant in
Finally, the NRC formula provides no useful information for policy leaders at state and
federal levels. Knowing how much money is currently in a site’s decommissioning fund
and then arbitrarily comparing that fund balance against the formula presented in 10 CFR
§50.75 makes it is impossible for any governing or regulating body to make an informed
decision about when or how it may be possible to decommission any US atomic power
Vermont’s experience with Entergy’s decommissioning cost analysis of Vermont Yankee
and the lack of NRC fiscal oversight of the Vermont Yankee decommissioning trust fund
are proof that there is no transparent process in which the public is informed and able to
“On his first day in Office, President Obama signed the Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government, ushering in a new era of open and
accountable government meant to bridge the gap between the American
people and their government:
• The Administration is reducing the influence of special interests with
ethics rules that prevent lobbyists from coming to work in government
or sitting on its advisory boards. …
• …The Administration is empowering the public – through greater
openness and new technologies – to influence the decisions that
affect their lives.”10 [Emphasis Added]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/open/about
The NRC claims that it subscribes to President Obama’s signed Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government,11 so stating:
“The NRC Approach to Open Government: As an independent regulatory
agency that prides itself on openness, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is pleased to take an active role in President Barack
Obama’s Open Government Initiative, with its focus on open, accountable,
and accessible government. The NRC has a long history of, and
commitment to, transparency, participation, and collaboration in our
regulatory activities.”
And finally, the NRC confirms its commitment to public participation in its management
processes that are of paramount interest to the public stakeholders, be it citizens or state
and federal regulators in other state and federal agencies. Accordingly, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) claims it:
“considers public involvement in, and information about, our activities to be a
cornerstone of strong, fair regulation of the nuclear industry. We recognize the
public's interest in the proper regulation of nuclear activities and provide
opportunities for citizens to be heard. For that reason, consistent with The NRC
Approach to Open Government, the agency is committed to providing
opportunities for the public to participate meaningfully in the NRC's decision
making process.”12
Participation allows members of the public to contribute ideas and
expertise so that their government can make policies with the benefit of
information that is widely dispersed in society. [Emphasis Added] 13
Ironically, all the formulas and methodology for decommissioning atomic power reactors
predate this memorandum and have not been open to either discussion or stakeholder
intervention at any site in NRC jurisdiction. Moreover, much of the data listed on the
NRC website and in public pamphlets promoting NRC efforts were created as long as 15
years prior to President Obama’s signed Memorandum on Transparency and Open
http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/open.html
In order to provide a useful policymaking tool, it is time for the NRC to make financial
decommissioning information open to federal and state regulators, citizens,
environmental organizations and other stakeholders. It is long past time for the NRC to
take the steps that an executive order by President Obama directed it to do back in 2009,
and that the NRC claims on its website to have already done. It is time for other
regulators (state and federal) and all stakeholders to call for the NRC to conduct an
accurate cash flow analysis of the growth in the decommissioning trust fund of each plant
and site as compared to the cash withdrawals from that fund as they are incurred. With
the advent of Excel spreadsheets, this is a routine request applied to businesses
throughout the world; these are simple procedures that should be expected and required
of all nuclear plant licensees and nuclear energy corporations.
Fairewinds Associates has developed an Excel application spreadsheet to oversee the
Vermont Yankee decommissioning fund and the decommissioning process. The
methodology delineated in this spreadsheet enables the user to observe the rate of growth
of the decommissioning trust fund to grow at a rate of interest that is determined by the
user. The user(s) then apply the spreadsheet to calculate withdrawals from the
decommissioning trust fund balance based upon decommissioning activity cost schedules
that have been previously provided by the involved energy corporation; in this case that is
the Entergy Corporation for its Vermont Yankee nuclear plant. New yearly balances are
then created based upon growth of the fund and withdrawals from that fund.
Exhibit 1 to this report is a spreadsheet based upon a 5% rate of growth in the fund and a
3% rate of inflation for the costs associated with decommissioning. Being able to vary
these two rates (interest and inflation) then allows policymakers and other stakeholders to
make informed decisions about when decommissioning can commence.
The data in Exhibit 1 is based on information previously provided by Entergy. By
conducting such a cash flow analysis, Fairewinds has determined that sufficient funds
would be available for Entergy’s actual decommissioning of its Vermont Yankee nuclear
plant so that decommissioning work can begin in approximately 2026. Furthermore, the
decommissioning should be completed approximately by 2032.
A graphical representation of the data provided in Exhibit 1 may be found below:
Cash Flow Analysis Vermont Yankee Decommissioning
Without this Excel Spreadsheet tool, policymakers must trust the nuclear energy
corporation’s unaudited estimation as to when the fund may have adequate cash with
which to support commencement of a decommissioning project. An Excel spreadsheet
process of this type promotes transparency in the decommissioning process for the
stakeholders who will be most affected. This type of analysis does not create an undue
burden on the licensee, as Fairewinds and an independent consultant developed this basic
spreadsheet in less than 10 person-days of design effort.14
Therefore, local stakeholders and other state and federal regulators should insist that the
NRC flex its regulatory muscle and meet the letter of transparency as provided and
guaranteed in President Obama’s signed Memorandum on Transparency and Open
Government, by instituting such spreadsheet regulations upon the nuclear industry and its
energy corporations. Most likely, the nuclear energy companies will spend 100 times the
cost of development of such a spreadsheet system to support decommissioning decisions
nationwide in their initial legal challenges against such regulation. Rest assured that the
development of such an open and transparent system meant to protect the public is not an
undue burden on energy corporations who are NRC licensees.
Fairewinds recommends that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission rewrite 10 CFR
§50.75 to require a cash flow analysis at consecutive five-year intervals leading up
to the ultimate decommissioning of the reactor. This cash flow analysis will
provide policymakers with adequate information to determine when an atomic
reactor corporation will have the cash available to complete a decommissioning
project. Such an analysis will prove that full decommissioning and dismantlement
can commence less than ten years beyond final plant shutdown.
3. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Facility (ISFSI) Costs
Another disturbing problem that exists in the the NRC’s decommissioning regulation and
exemptions process is illustrated at Vermont Yankee now that the reactor is shut down.
In the Vermont Yankee Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) and
other planning documents, the NRC has allowed the calculations for the yearly
decommissioning costs and ISFSI to be muddled and comingled instead of kept separate
Fairewinds is prepared to share its Excel spreadsheet online for policymakers at the
NRC and in other states to use. However, the cost data in the spreadsheet is site-specific
and must be modified to reflect each atomic reactor’s actual costs and decommissioning
fund balances in this comparative analysis.
as delineated in 10 CFR §50.75. Nevertheless, Entergy has padded its cost estimates for
Vermont Yankee with proposed expenditures that have no relationship to the
decommissioning effort of the nuclear facility and site.
Specifically, Entergy is fully aware that it is illegal under existing NRC regulations to
fund an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at Vermont Yankee using
the decommissioning trust fund. As recently as February 9, 2015, Entergy acknowledged
that it is not authorized to raid the decommissioning trust fund to supply cash to build an
ISFSI as it has proposed to do in its PSDAR.
In the letter T. Michael Twomey, Vice President, External Affairs wrote to Kyle H.
Landis-Marinello, Vermont Assistant Attorney General and to Christopher Recchia,
Commissioner Vermont Department of Public Service Entergy said,
ENVY acknowledges that current NRC regulations do not permit ENVY to
use decommissioning funds for actual (i.e. non-planning) spent fuel
management activities.15
Another example of this muddled relationship between actual and inappropriate cost
shifting can be found in the 2012 Vermont Yankee decommissioning planning document
entitled Decommissioning Cost Analysis for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station.16 A literal reading of this Entergy document led Vermont State policymakers to
reach erroneous conclusions regarding the timing of Entergy’s program for
decommissioning Vermont Yankee. Decommissioning Cost Analysis for the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station speculates that the costs associated with decommissioning
Vermont Yankee are so excessive and exorbitant and that Entergy planned so poorly that
it will take at least 60-years for the underfunded trust fund to finally accumulate adequate
funds to address the excessive cost estimates of decommissioning the 40-year-old plant.
Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, Decommissioning
Trust, Entergy Letter of an Entergy letter to Vermont Assistant Attorney General Landis–
Marinello and to DPS Commissioner Christopher Recchia, February 9, 2015Page 3,
Decommissioning Cost Analysis for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (E111643-001, Rev. 1) prepared by TLG Services, Inc., February 2012.
TLG Services is a wholly owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation. Worse still is a
series of erroneous financial premises that Entergy and its for profit decommissioning
subsidiary TLG Services generate to reach its conclusions. These premises may be found
hidden in the footnotes and small print of the document. Specifically, Footnote 3 on page
viii states:
Projected expenditures for spent fuel management identified in the cost
analyses do not consider the outcome of the litigation (including
compensation for damages) with the DOE with regard to the delays
incurred by Entergy VY in the timely removal of spent fuel from the site.
As such, this analysis takes no credit for collection of damages, even
though utilities are now routinely being awarded such damages in the
courts. Collection of spent fuel damages from the DOE is expected to
provide the majority of funds needed for spent fuel management following
Furthermore, according to paragraph 3.4.1 on pages 7&8 of Section 3:
An ISFSI has been constructed within the protected area (PA) to support
continued plant operations. The ISFSI has a capacity of 36 dry storage
modules. As such, under the current assumptions for DOE performance, a
second ISFSI will be required to completely off-load the spent fuel pool at
the cessation of plant operations.
Construction, operation and maintenance costs for the ISFSI are included
within the estimates and address the costs for staffing the facility, as well
as security, insurance, taxes and licensing fees. The estimates include the
costs to purchase, load, and transfer the multipurpose spent fuel storage
canisters (MPCs) from the pool to the DOE or to/from the ISFSI. Costs are
also provided for the final disposition of the facilities once the transfer is
The impact of these two Entergy and TLG assumptions on the overall cost of
decommissioning the Vermont Yankee site is enormous. According to Table 6.1 of
Entergy’s 2012 Report, Summary of Decommissioning Cost Contributions17, the cost to
build the second ISFSI, and then load and transfer the spent fuel to the facility is 15 to
Summary of Decommissioning Cost Contributions, Table 6.1, DECOMMISSIONING
COST ANALYSIS for the VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
(Document E11-1643-001, Rev. 1) TLG Services, Inc., February 2012
17% of the entire cash outlay required for decommissioning the Vermont Yankee site and
exceeds $150,000,000. More importantly, Entergy plans to withdraw those funds early in
the decommissioning process thus draining the decommissioning fund, by reducing the
interest that can be accrued for plant dismantlement. Finally, Table C-118 entitled
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station: Scenario 1, 2012 Shutdown, SAFSTOR
Alternative, shows that Entergy/TLG also plans to extract an additional major charge to
the decommissioning fund of $61,000,000 ostensibly to guard the spent fuel and monitor
its radiation while it is stored on site.
While 10 CFR §50.75 does not adequately provide a means to determine the true cost of
decommissioning, the regulation is quite clear that funding for the Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation is simply not included as promulgated.
Even the NRC has publicly stated that the Decommissioning Trust Fund shall not be used
to fund an ISFSI. In a newspaper article entitled VY spent fuel plan gets nod (2/4/09:
Brattleboro Reformer), NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said,
The NRC rejected the request because trust fund money may only be used
for decommissioning work unless the funds are in addition to
decommissioning funds and if they have been earmarked for spent fuel
management, said Neil Sheehan, spokesman for the NRC.
Furthermore, in a private email from an attorney representing the Vermont Department of
Public Service to Mr. Gundersen dated January 19, 2011, both the NRC and the State of
Vermont acknowledge reactors should not be paying for an ISFSI from the
decommissioning fund without seeking and receiving a waiver (emphasis added):
From: "Hofmann, Sarah"
Subject: FW: questions to NRC
Date: January 19, 2011 11:39:29 AM EST
To: 'Arnie Gundersen'
Cc: "Miller, Elizabeth"
Table C-1 2a.4, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station: Scenario 1, 2012 Shutdown,
SAFSTOR Alternative, DECOMMISSIONING COST ANALYSIS for the VERMONT
YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (Document E11-1643-001, Rev. 1) TLG
Services, Inc., February 2012
Good morning Arnie. In response to your email this morning, I thought
I would see what NRC could give us for info on this issue. I asked
three questions of Doug Tift to ask of the decomm unit at NRC. Doug
is our state liaison to NRC. I asked the questions and he answered in a
phone call so I have typed his response below each question.
Could you pass on three questions for me to your decommissioning
(1) Are plants paying for an ISFSI upon decommissioning out of their
decommissioning trust funds?
A. They shouldn’t be paying for an ISFSI from the
decommissioning fund without getting an exemption.
(2) If so, is it necessary to get an exemption from NRC?
A. Yes, an exemption would be necessary
(3) Have any plants gotten exemptions to use money out of their
decommissioning trust funds for ISFSIs or any other spent fuel
management purpose?
A. Two plants asked for exemptions and then withdrew the
requests. No other plant has requested an exemption. They believe
others will but no others to date other than the two.
Director for Public Advocacy
Finally, it appears that the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding between the State of
Vermont and Entergy requires the approval of the Public Service Board to remove
decommissioning funds in order to build and maintain an ISFSI.
Finally, ENVY will seek Board approval for any disbursements from the
decommissioning trust fund, unless the disbursements are used for
decommissioning.19
Entergy’s own admissions, the legislative history of 10 CFR §50.75, as well as NRC,
DPS, and PSB comments clearly indicate that the intent of the decommissioning trust
Docket 6545, 6/13/2002: Board Order, Page 35, refers to footnote 64. Exhibit VY-42
@ Para. 7
fund is that it be used to decommission Vermont Yankee and not to be used to fund an
The owners of atomic reactors have applied to the NRC for an exemption from 10
CFR §50.75 to fund each reactor’s Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
(ISFSI). Fairewinds recommends that the NRC reject such exemptions, as there is
no basis in the statutory regulations of 10 CFR §50.75 for such funding to be
extracted from any reactor’s decommissioning fund. Furthermore, Fairewinds also
agrees that the Vermont Department of Public Service should file an appearance as
an intervenor/stakeholder with the NRC specifically rejecting such an exemption
4. Spent Fuel Storage
Many nuclear licensee energy corporations are seeking to fund their ISFSI by siphoning
off monies from trust funds strictly created for the actual decommissioning and
dismantlement of these plants. This new effort by energy corporations to raid established
decommissioning trust funds to pay for ISFSIs appears to be the beginning of a
nationwide trend by nuclear energy corporations. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
appears to be complicit in this process and is in fact providing a significant hidden
subsidy to the nuclear industry when it looks the other way by allowing public trust funds
to be raided in violation of the Code of Federal Regulations.
By delaying the nuclear fuel transfer into interim independent spent fuel storage facilities
using dry casks until a nuclear power plant is completely decommissioned, the nuclear
energy corporate licensees are avoiding spending corporate profits for the secure spent
fuel storage. This desire to not use their own corporate profits for fuel storage is the main
reason that large amounts of spent nuclear fuel will remain in overloaded spent nuclear
fuel pools when it would be much safer for the public as a whole if these used radioactive
fuel rods were safely stored in dry cask canisters rather in the much more vulnerable
swimming pool style unprotected fuel pools.
Nuclear energy corporations have real financial motivation to delay the transfer of spent
nuclear fuel from their spent fuel pools into dry cask storage because they do not want to
absorb those costs. If the energy corporations wait until the nuclear plant shuts down, the
history of NRC actions shows that the corporations can fully expect the NRC will grant
waivers and allow them to raid the individual trust funds of individual reactors. Then
these corporations can force the federal government to pay all the cost of moving nuclear
fuel to an alleged interim Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Several
nuclear energy corporations have already successfully achieved these exemptions from
NRC regulations and others are lining up to do it again through routine breach of contract
litigation against the Department of Energy.
Fairewinds is not alone in its observation that spent fuel storage is now being
inappropriately subsidized by the NRC’s application of its regulations through its
decision to grant waivers to nuclear corporations. Former NRC Chair Allison Macfarlane
and others have written extensively on the erroneous use of nuclear decommissioning
trust funds to subsidize spent fuel storage. In an extensive treatise entitled Reducing the
Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States, Macfarlane and
Because of the unavailability of off-site storage for spent power-reactor
fuel, the NRC has allowed high-density storage of spent fuel in pools
originally designed to hold much smaller inventories. As a result, virtually
all U.S. spent-fuel pools have been re-racked to hold spent-fuel assemblies
at densities that approach those in reactor cores. In order to prevent the
spent fuel from going critical, the fuel assemblies are partitioned off from
each other in metal boxes whose walls contain neutron-absorbing boron. It
has been known for more than two decades that, in case of a loss of water
in the pool, convective air cooling would be relatively ineffective in such a
“dense-packed” pool. …
Our central proposal is to move spent fuel into dry storage casks after it
has cooled for 5 years …
Nuclear power operators can be expected to balk at the extra cost of
moving spent fuel out of pools to on-site dry storage. As a result of
deregulation, many operators are no longer able to pass such costs through
to customers without fear of being undersold by competing fossil-fueled
power plants.20
Nuclear power reactor owners claim that their main concern about moving fuel from
spent fuel pools is to avoid worker exposure. However, as Fairewinds has delineated in
Section 1 above, the nuclear industry gives workers unnecessary radiation exposure in
large amounts in order to meet critical refueling efforts and repairs in the least amount of
time. While it is true radioactive material does decay slightly over time, the risk of
retaining spent fuel in pools remains real and significant, as proven in the tragedy at all
four spent fuel pools at Fukushima Daiichi.
The actions of the nuclear industry while their plants are operating belie their claims
regarding concerns of dose reduction to their personnel during the decommissioning. As
discussed above, during the 2014 Palisades refueling outage, 192 Entergy employees
received 115 Rem of collective exposure in only three weeks. The total exposure during
a 60-year long SAFSTOR decommissioning is expected to be a total of approximately
300 Rem. It is apparent then the nuclear industry and the NRC have a double standard
applied to dose reduction.
The factual reason nuclear licensees prefer to store spent nuclear fuel in the spent fuel
pool until decommissioning commences is that the deferral of moving fuel sooner allows
them to avoid spending operating revenues for dry cask storage. Instead of prompt
removal, those costs can be levied against the decommissioning trust fund. If those costs
were incurred when a nuclear reactor was operating, the balance sheets of the nuclear
corporations would be adversely affected. Granting waivers to allow nuclear energy
corporations to raid their decommissioning trust funds once an atomic reactor shuts down,
is a financial subsidy from the NRC to each nuclear reactor amounting to hundreds of
Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,
Macfarlane, 2003, Robert Alvarez, Jan Beyea, Klaus Janberg, Jungmin Kang, Ed Lyman,
Allison Macfarlane, Gordon Thompson, Frank N. von Hippel
http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/articles/fvhippel_spentfuel/rAlvarez_reducing
_hazards.pdf
millions of dollars. The NRC is allowing the public’s decommissioning TRUST funds
to become the owner’s decommissioning SLUSH funds.
The use of waivers by the nuclear industry to build and maintain their ISFSIs is
incompatible with the Code of Federal Regulations statute for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The NRC should not issue waivers for ISFSI construction
and maintenance, and the NRC should not allow changes to its regulations for this
purpose. The existing legal framework where owners sue the DOE for their ISFSI
costs allows the atomic reactor owners a proven cost recovery method without
raiding any decommissioning trust funds.
Based on data provided by the Vermont Department of Public Service, Fairewinds has
analyzed the growth in the Vermont Yankee (VY) decommissioning trust fund from 1995
until 2015. Fairewinds analyzed this 20-year period because this is the only publicly
available data regarding the Decommissioning Fund. During the timespan from 1995
until 2002, the trust fund was regulated by the Vermont utilities that originally built the
nuclear plant. In 2002 when the Entergy Corporation of Louisiana purchased VY, control
of the VY decommissioning fund was transferred to Entergy, where it currently remains.
From 1995 until 2002, the fund grew significantly for two reasons: first the fund’s capital
was invested, but the fund also had additional financial growth because Vermont
ratepayers contributed approximately $10 million to the fund each year. The rate of
growth during this initial seven-year period was approximately 6.5% per year, excluding
additional ratepayer contributions.
After Entergy took control of the fund in 2002 no further contributions were made to the
fund, and growth of the fund was due solely to stock market growth during the remaining
13-year time period. The compound rate of growth during the last 13 years was
approximately 5.8%
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission allows its nuclear energy corporations to estimate
that conservatively invested decommissioning funds will grow at approximately 5% per
year. During the 20-year period analyzed by Fairewinds, growth of the Vermont Yankee
decommissioning fund was slightly higher then the 5% per year that the NRC estimates
all funds will grow. However, 10 CFR §50.75 allows for a fund growth estimate of 5%
per year that seems to provide a reasonably conservative approximation of the fund
growth over extended periods.
10 CFR §50.75 specifies a 5% fund growth. Based on the data reviewed by
Fairewinds, the 5% growth rate is reasonably conservative for the 20 years of data
for Vermont Yankee. Given the fluctuations in the stock market, it should not be
The NRC has allowed numerous atomic reactor corporations to seek the financial shelter
of Limited Liability Corporations (LLC) beginning around 1990. Recent statements to
the press and at public meetings and legislative hearings in Vermont show that the NRC
and Entergy have a significant difference of opinion regarding the legal interpretation of
nuclear power plant decommissioning regulations and Entergy’s responsibilities as both
an LLC and as the owner of Vermont Yankee.
“We would not let Entergy walk away,” said Bruce Watson, chief of the NRC’s reactor
decommissioning office in Washington, D.C. on February 22, 2015, according to Times
Argus reporter Susan Smallheer.21
In an article written almost three weeks earlier, Smallheer also quotes two NRC officials,
Bruce Watson and Marc Ferdas, who “said Entergy Nuclear is responsible financially for
the plant’s decommissioning under the terms of its federal license to operate Vermont
Lack of Details in Cleanup Plan Draws Fire, Times Argus, February 22, 2015
Yankee. But they didn’t give specifics on how a company would be held liable 60 years
in the future if there were additional costs.”22
“Ultimately, it is a parent guarantee and legal responsibility,” Watson told Nancy Braus
of Putney” according to a January 30, 2015, article by Smallheer.
He [Watson] said he guessed Entergy will ultimately have to contribute to
the decommissioning fund, which currently amounts to about half of the
$1.24 billion needed.”
“They are legally responsible for the safety of the plant,” he emphasized.23
However, statements by Entergy during the same time period appear to be in stark
opposition to the NRC’s position regarding the decommissioning responsibilities of
Entergy and other energy corporations. Entergy does not believe it has any
responsibilities after the 60-year SAFSTOR period is over according to Dave Gram of the
Associated Press, who quoted Entergy Vice President Mike Twomey during a legislative
committee hearing on February 12, 2015.
An Entergy Corp. official said Wednesday the company is offering no
guarantees it will pay to decommission its retired Vermont Yankee nuclear
power plant if the job’s still not done by the end of a 60-year period.
Entergy Vice President Michael Twomey told members of two Vermont
legislative committees that if decommissioning isn’t done by the end of the
period, known in the nuclear industry as “SAFSTOR,” he expects there
would be litigation, with the state and Entergy taking different positions.
“There would probably be quite a bit of litigation about that,” Twomey told
a joint hearing of the House and Senate Natural Resources committees.
“We’d all have different points of view.”24
There is a disparity between the position taken by energy corporation Entergy compared
to the statutory authority of the NRC regarding corporate responsibilities for complete
NRC Deflects Queries on Yankee Costs, Times Argus, February 6, 2015
NRC Reassures Residents on Yankee Cleanup, Times Argus, January 30, 2015
Nuclear Plant Closing Costs Not Covered Past 60 years, Associated Press, February
decommissioning of their profitable nuclear power plants. The paradigm shift occurred
in 2002 when the NRC allowed Entergy, an energy corporation not a utility, to buy
Vermont Yankee as what the industry calls a stand-alone merchant plant.25 What was
disturbing to utility customers and to many intervenors was the fact that Entergy created a
Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) as the legal entity to purchase and operate the
nuclear plant. Limited liability corporations like Vermont Yankee are specifically
designed and created to limit the financial obligations (liability) of their parent
corporation, which in this case is Entergy. Early in the 21st Century, former NRC
commissioners and organizations such as Synapse Energy Economics in Cambridge, MA
alerted NRC regulators that allowing LLCs to own nuclear power plants was detrimental
to the safety and the financial health of the nuclear power plant.
Entitled FINANCIAL INSECURITY: The Increasing Use of Limited Liability Companies
and Multi-Tiered Holding Companies to Own Nuclear Power Plants, Synapse issued a
scathing report in August 2002 alerting regulators to the very issues that are now facing
Vermont in the proposed decommissioning and dismantlement of Entergy’s Vermont
Yankee nuclear plant.
Regarding Entergy, Synapse said in:
Finding No. 11 – Taxpayers may be at risk if nuclear plant owning
subsidiaries are unable to continue making safety-related or
decommissioning expenditures or pay retrospective Price-Anderson
Act premiums. In attempting to assure the Vermont Public Service Board
that the former owners of the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant and their
ratepayers are unlikely to be required to pay any shortfalls in
decommissioning funds, Entergy has noted that the NRC has on several
occasions said that the burden of paying any such shortfalls would fall on
A merchant power plant is a non-utility generation plant that sells electricity on a
wholesale basis to other companies, who then sell the power on a retail basis to individual
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. Under deregulation of electricity
generation, the developer of a merchant power plant is not guaranteed a return on its
investment and must compete in a free economic market to sell the power it can produce.
Both peaking facilities and base load facilities can operate as merchant power plants.
http://northpacific.infinite-software.com/Glossary/merchant_power_plant.html
NRC regulations do not specifically address the potential
liability of other parties in the event that the licensed owner
is unable to provide the funds required for
decommissioning. In the past, the NRC indicated that any
failure of the licensed owner to meet its decommissioning
funding obligations would result in a burden on taxpayers - presumably in the form of a publicly funded cleanup. See,
e.g., SECY-94-280 (Nov. 18, 1984), at 4. ("Such action
would either increase the potential risk to public health and
safety of the decommissioning process or would shift the
burden of decommissioning funding from ratepayers to
taxpayers.") (emphasis added); 61 Fed. Reg.
15427, 15428 (Apr. 8, 1996)("The liability of the licensee
to provide funding for decommissioning may adversely
affect protection of the public health and safety. Also, a
lack of decommissioning funds is a financial risk to
taxpayers (i.e., if the licensee cannot pay for
decommissioning, taxpayers would
ultimately pay the bill. (emphasis added).”26
As if to add insult to injury, Entergy VP Twomey contacted the Associated Press after its
report about the joint legislative meeting in an attempt to correct his previous statement.
Twomey said again, though, that he did not want Entergy committed to a
promise that it would cover the cost if the project isn’t done before the
2070s and funds are still short.
…He offered a hypothetical example: If during cleanup the site turned out
to be more contaminated than believed when Entergy bought the plant in
2002, the company might seek to share the costs with the group of New
England utilities that owned it previously.27
Once again, Entergy makes it clear that it will not accept complete responsibility as the
NRC Licensee that is ultimately responsible for site cleanup. In the 2002 MOU, Entergy
FINANCIAL INSECURITY: The Increasing Use of Limited Liability Companies and
Multi-Tiered Holding Companies to Own Nuclear Power Plants, Synapse Energy
Economics, Inc, August 7, 2002, Page 26
Vermont Yankee Official Expects Enough Money To Clean Site, February 27, 2015,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/27/vermont-yankee-official-expectsenough-money-to-cl/
bought Vermont Yankee from a group of utilities. Now in 2015, Mr. Twomey again
suggests that Entergy will litigate against the previous owners in the event the LLC does
not have enough funds to completely dismantle the reactor site.
While Vermont Yankee is one of five plants recently shut down and entering the early
stages of decommissioning (Kewaunee, VY, San Onofre 2 & 3, and Crystal River 3), of
these only Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee are so-called merchant plants owned by
Limited Liability Corporations that are presently being decommissioned. There will be
dozens more merchant nuclear plants needing to be decommissioned during the next
several decades. As such, Vermont Yankee is the test case for the issue of who is
responsible for the ultimate costs of decommissioning a merchant nuclear power plant:
the corporation that owned it and made all the profit or the taxpayers of a region, many of
whom never even used its electricity in the new, less regulated market.
It is imperative that the NRC clarify its existing regulations concerning Limited
Liability Corporations, so that Vermonters and others throughout the nation clearly
know the reality of the financial situation. Furthermore, as a regulator, the NRC
must use the current regulatory “improvement” process to support its verbal claims
that LLC owners are the only parties responsible for the ultimate costs of nuclear
reactors closures nationwide.
7. Auditing The Expenditures From The Fund
Merchant plants purchased by a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC), and created as a
new separate LLC, appear to have very few constraints in place to review, control, and
audit expenditures from any Decommissioning Trust Funds. For any nuclear reactors
that are owned by or created as a public utility, there are strict oversight rules and
financial controls in place that can be applied through public service commissions and
boards to monitor decommissioning trust funds and the decommissioning process.
However, it appears that while the NRC approved the LLC merchant plant concept, it
seems to have developed no such financial oversight methodology.
An example of an unaudited raid on a decommissioning trust fund can be identified at
Vermont Yankee. Entergy is the sole owner of a decommissioning firm called TLG
Services, a for-profit venture designed to capitalize on the decommissioning market.
Entergy has chosen to have TLG Services create all of the decommissioning reports
related to Vermont Yankee submitted to the date. If TLG Services manages the entire
decommissioning of Vermont Yankee, it will be able to mark up the services of
subcontractors while at the same time billing management fees for its efforts. Entergy
claims it was not making a profit and so shut down Vermont Yankee, and now it appears
well poised to make significant profits during the lengthy decommissioning process.
With a decommissioning firm as its wholly owned subsidiary, there is no incentive for
Entergy to seek competitive bids for decommissioning Vermont Yankee or to protect the
integrity of the decommissioning trust fund. There is also no incentive to take a
conservative approach and refund any remaining funds to the Vermonters who originally
put millions upon millions of dollars into the decommissioning trust fund. As delineated
previously, Entergy VP Michael Twomey has informed legislators that Entergy believes
it has no responsibilities for the site past the 60-year SAFSTOR timespan, even if the
decommissioning and dismantlement are not completed or the unmonitored trust fund is
found to be short of funds to complete the necessary cleanup.
While it is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who approved the LLC concept, the NRC
has historically limited its oversight to radiological issues and has not yet stepped in to
monitor or audit these new LLC decommissioning trust funds. Such NRC limitations and
lack of oversight allow Entergy unfettered access to VY’s decommissioning trust fund as
well as unmonitored and unaudited excess spending to occur at Vermont Yankee that
might actually derail radiological cleanup and environmental mitigation of the spreading
radioactive Strontium-90 leak.
Without the ability to audit the expenditures that are occurring and being withdrawn from
the decommissioning trust fund, neither the State of Vermont nor the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission have financial oversight relating to a trust fund that may easily exceed $1
billion and will desperately be needed to clean up and mitigate the environmental damage
created by radioactive isotopes near the Connecticut River and precious aquifers.
State ratepayers are stakeholders in the decommissioning process. It is therefore
appropriate that the NRC develop an audit function for every state to oversee
decommissioning expenditures.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must formalize a State audit function of
expenditures and withdrawals from each atomic reactor’s decommissioning trust
fund. The NRC has promised transparency during a decommissioning process
and there can be no greater need for transparency than to assure the funds are
properly spent. In the latest NRC proposed “improvements” to decommissioning
regulations, State Auditors should be allowed and encouraged to monitor
competitive bidding of the work associated with decommissioning.
Real safety issues are a significant concern to the families and children living near,
downwind, and downstream of atomic power reactors. Spokespersons for the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission have said that it does not approve decommissioning documents
like Vermont Yankee’s Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR), but
rather the NRC will simply accept the document from Entergy.28
Disturbingly, Entergy’s PSDAR is only a minimal attempt at meeting NRC regulations.
While using the wording of a standard form, often referred to as boilerplate, Entergy’s
The NRC Reactor Decommissioning Process – Post Shutdown Decommissioning
Activities Report (PSDAR) License Termination Plan (LTP) Nuclear Decommissioning,
Citizens Advisory Panel for Vermont Yankee January 28, 2015, Slide 20.
PSDAR lacks both technical and schedule specifics. As such, this PSDAR is a
completely useless tool for any review of implementation regarding the actual
decommissioning of Vermont Yankee or the use of the VY Trust Fund for that purpose.
NRC acceptance of the PSDAR without technical review and without scheduling and
financial details means that once again, the NRC is refusing to meet its statutory
responsibility to protect public health and safety as the people’s advocate. The NRC has
an obligation to the State in which an atomic reactor operates to assure that those plants
are promptly and safely decommissioned without unwarranted radiological contamination
of the environment and extended cleanup and mitigation costs passed on to ratepayers or
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should demand more technical and financial
specificity from plant owners and licensees before the PSDAR is approved rather
than merely accepted. To date, the NRC has refused to “accept” responsibility for
“approval” of the PSDAR. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the NRC to give the
PSDAR a rigorous technical and financial review rather than simply and
complacently accepting an unanalyzed document. It should not be the
responsibility of each State to provide more adequate detail about how the
decommissioning of its shut down atomic reactors will be completed. Transparency
during the decommissioning planning process is sadly lacking and requires
technical and financial specifics throughout the entire PSDAR for each atomic
Using Vermont Yankee as an Example, Four Glaring Site Specific Safety Issues
Have Been Identified By Fairewinds.
Emergency	Planning
The four ongoing disasters at Fukushima Daiichi have clearly shown the vulnerability of
nuclear power plants that have spent nuclear fuel stored in these overcrowded and
unprotected spent fuel pools. All cooling systems of the four spent fuel pools at
Fukushima Daiichi failed and boiled. One fuel pool almost boiled completely dry. The
seriousness of this atomic failure can be seen in the evacuation order made by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Americans living within 50 miles of Fukushima
Daiichi's spent fuel pools.
In stark comparison, we now look at the Vermont Yankee spent fuel pool that contains
much more highly radioactive waste than was held in any of the fuel pools at Fukushima
Daiichi. The fact that the unprotected pool at Vermont Yankee contains more Cesium137 than 700 nuclear warheads if exploded is shocking. Despite this ongoing risk,
Entergy sought and received NRC approval to dismantle its emergency plan and to
reduce inspection requirements on the ventilation system near the spent fuel pool.
Spent fuel pools continue to present a safety risk until the fuel is completely removed.
Based on the ongoing disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, the NRC appears to be applying
unrealistically low projected radioactive release values in order to support claims that
emergency plans can be reduced and ventilation requirements can be minimized. The
compromised fuel pools at Fukushima Daiichi were not the first fuel pools to leak and
face catastrophe. There was a significant leak and near disaster on January 25, 1994 at
Dresden Unit 1 in Illinois. While sitting in the minimally examined SAFSTOR mode, the
pipes froze at Dresden Unit 1 causing cooling water to drain out of the spent fuel pool.
Almost 60,000 gallons of water leaked into the basement of Dresden Unit 1 before a
watchman discovered the massive water leak. Had the water continued to leak for just
one more day, the entire Dresden site with three nuclear power plants would have had to
be evacuated due to gamma rays emanating from the unshielded spent fuel.
Based on the massive fuel pool leak at Dresden Unit 1 and the ongoing disaster at
Fukushima Daiichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4, it is clear that emergency plans must be
maintained until all of the fuel has been removed from the spent fuel pool and placed into
dry cask storage. SAFSTOR was not created with physics in mind or with adequate
review. As such the emergency plan must be maintained until all the fuel has been
placed securely and without incident into dry cask storage.
According to Susan Smallheer of the Times Argus:
[Commissioner] Recchia said the emergency planning zone didn’t have to
continue exactly as it did while the nuclear reactor was operating. …But he
said Entergy wants to shrink the zone by too much, to include just the
plant’s grounds.
Recchia and William Irwin, radiological health chief for the
Department of Health, said they objected to the “on-off switch” that
Entergy was adopting toward emergency planning for the communities
surrounding the plant.29 [Emphasis Added]
The requests being made by the energy corporations for relief from Emergency Planning
responsibility appears to emanate from analysis that if there were a radiation release from
an atomic reactor’s spent fuel pool, the radiation would not blow offsite, but would
willingly remain confined to the “Owner Controlled Area” immediately adjacent to the
now shutdown atomic reactor.
Fairewinds has many issues with the numerical data accepted by the NRC that have been
used to justify radiation release calculations manipulated to reach the nuclear industry’s
desired conclusion that atomic reactor emergency plans are no longer necessary.
Furthermore, there is a significantly serious flaw in any NRC decision to limit corporate
responsibly for emergency planning in the local communities surrounding atomic reactor
sites. If one accepts at face value that the owner of an atomic reactor can definitively
prove that no radiation could ever be released beyond the site boundary and no
emergency plan is therefore necessary, then it would also be logical to request that the
owner renounce its Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability insurance, since there is no
possibility of any radiation induced releases that might harm people living and working
in the vicinity of the reactor undergoing decommissioning. The entire nuclear power
Entergy Avoids Questions On Emergency Planning, Susan Smallheer, Times Argus,
http://tablet.olivesoftware.com/olive/Tablet/BarreTimesArgus/SharedArticle.aspx?href=
BTA%2F2015%2F02%2F28&id=Ar00906
investment community shields themselves from liability by retaining the publicly funded
Price-Anderson insurance, while at the same time minimizing corporate costs by
eliminating the emergency planning safety net.
To protect all nearby residents and visitors, the NRC should continue to require
operation of the complete emergency plan and its facilities, and also order the
ongoing operation of the important spent fuel ventilation system, until such time as
all of the spent fuel has been successfully removed from the pool and placed into dry
casks, and the casks have been placed on the ISFSI pad.
Removal	Of	The	Fuel	In	Vermont	Yankee’s	Spent	Fuel	Pool
Moving spent nuclear fuel and placing it into heavy canisters is a high-risk operation. In
2008, Vermont Yankee personnel already had one mishap while removing spent nuclear
fuel from the spent fuel pool. The brakes failed on the enormous crane used to lift the 100
ton spent fuel canister causing the fully loaded fuel canister to wobble uncontrollably.
Luckily, nothing crashed and broke and no radiation was released, however, this mishap
shows just how complicated and risky it is to move fully loaded canisters of spent fuel.
The consequences of such a disaster would be huge no matter when it is undertaken, so it
makes absolutely no sense to move spent nuclear fuel at any atomic reactor that does not
have an emergency plan is in place.
The NRC should limit the removal of any spent nuclear fuel at atomic reactors to
the specific times the population of civilians living nearby is at an absolute
minimum, and all emergency evacuation plans should remain in place until all
fuel has been stored in ISFSI.
Strontium	Contamination	On-Site
There have been numerous leaks of radioactive materials on sites across America. The
NRC calls these leaks “tritium leaks”. However, Cobalt 60, Cesium 137, and Strontium
90 have also been detected, including the detection of Strontium 90 at Indian Point,
Connecticut Yankee, and Vermont Yankee. In its 2010 supplemental report, the Vermont
Yankee Public Oversight Panel appointed by the Vermont Legislature determined that
inadequate maintenance practices at Entergy caused a leak in the Advanced Off-Gas
System.30 The Panel advised the State Legislature that the leak was caused by Entergy,
Limited resource allocation for non-safety systems might, therefore, be
systemic within Entergy.
The issue of inadequate application of resources takes on heightened
importance given Entergy’s status as an aging plant. Over the remainder
of Entergy’s operating life, the possibility of shutdown within a few
years can never be ruled out and will become a near certainty at some
If the events of the last few years are any guide, Entergy has a tendency
to focus expenditure on safety systems and systems of obvious reliability
importance while withholding resources from systems that it deems of
secondary reliability importance.
Beginning in approximately 2007, leaks in portions of the off-gas system began to
permeate the soil at the Vermont Yankee site. Then in 2010, monitoring wells identified
the presence of tritium in the subsurface water on the VY site. However, since the leak
began in the off-gas system, it was clear to many engineers and employees that other
isotopes including Cesium-137 (Cs-137) and Strontium-90 (Sr-90) would also be present.
In fact, Entergy did detect Co-60, Sr-90 and Cs-137 adjacent to and under the foundation
of the AOG (advanced off gas) building.
Reliability Assessment of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, July 20, 2010, page
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/jfo/envy/POP%20VY%20Supplemental%20Report%20072010.pdf
Now eight years after the leak actually began and five years after the leak was originally
discovered, Sr-90 has migrated and has been detected in a monitoring well. As
Fairewinds discussed when the leak was first discovered, Strontium-90 moves more
slowly in groundwater than tritium and thus migrates more slowly to other locations. The
belated discovery of Sr-90 in VY’s monitoring wells should not be a surprise to anyone
familiar with radiological migration on nuclear sites. We believe that this shows ongoing
contamination of the VY site by other radionuclides most likely released from the AOG
Leaked Strontium-90 has also been detected on the Indian Point site and in the
groundwater at the Connecticut Yankee atomic reactor in Haddam, Connecticut. These
leaks increase decommissioning costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. Connecticut
Yankee and its owners were totally unaware of the Strontium leak until decommissioning
and dismantlement was well underway. Unlike Connecticut Yankee, Vermont Yankee
and Indian Point have known for years that Sr-90 is in the soil beneath these two atomic
power plants. The movement of Sr-90 on both sites was also confirmed before the actual
decommissioning process was even begun.
Given that contamination by Strontium-90 and other isotopes has the potential to migrate
to nearby rivers and to adjacent aquifers, and will increase the cost of the
decommissioning by hundreds of millions of dollars, it is prudent to remove the source of
the Sr-90 now while there is still time to prevent additional site contamination and
migration of lethal isotopes. Strontium-90 is called a bone-seeker because it mimics
calcium and when ingested in food and/or water, the body cannot differentiate it from
calcium so it is absorbed into bones as if it were calcium. Early removal of the source of
Sr-90 is essential to lower the overall costs and efforts of the long-term cleanup of the site
and of decommissioning, and to protect public health and welfare in the communities
adjacent to these atomic power plants.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should require that the known sources of Sr90 be completely removed as soon as possible in order to protect the site water
table, aquifer, soil, and rivers and to mitigate the spread of Sr-90 and any other
migrating highly radioactive isotopes. Such action would minimize the
radiological risk to the general public and also lower the overall cost of
Site	Release	Criteria
In supervising the decommissioning of previous nuclear power, fabrication, and waste
sites, the overarching criteria applied by the NRC to consider former nuclear sites clean
and prepared for public access (“released for unrestricted reuse”) was the removal and
measurement of material to any items built to a depth of 3-feet. Unfortunately, recent
discoveries of Sr-90 below the 3-foot depth indicate that the NRC may allow significant
contamination to remain on site because its minimal criteria would be satisfied. This is
unacceptable at any reactor site’s fragile and vulnerable environment, and also where
flooding is a concern and could cause significant migration of any radioactive isotopes
remaining onsite.
Presently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission allows radiation to remain on a
dismantled atomic reactor site by releasing the site for public use if radiation
above a certain concentration in soil and groundwater is not found to a depth of
three feet. However, it is known that the strontium contamination has already
permeated to a depth more than 3-feet below grade at several sites. The NRC
must revise its site release criteria to include all radiation, not just that which
happens to be above an arbitrary 3-foot regulatory cut off.
In conclusion, Fairewinds determined that weak Nuclear Regulatory Commission
enforcement of nuclear power plant decommissioning regulations does not protect public
health and welfare as the Code of Federal Regulations has mandated the NRC to do.
Rather such lax enforcement creates a huge unaccounted financial subsidy for the nuclear
power industry and increase in radiological risk to present and future
generations. Moreover, we believe that the patchwork structure of NRC regulations
creates a series of subsidies designed to minimize each energy corporation’s cost to shut
down any atomic power reactor and marginalizes decommissioning efforts for decades
into the future, creating an intergenerational transfer of costs and risk. Finally, nuclear
energy corporations are ignoring externalities and using all available NRC exemptions to
distort the true costs of atomic power that exist in the decommissioning of each
corporation’s aging atomic reactor, and thereby minimize or totally discount, the real
radiation risks facing all of us for generations to come.
Exhibit 1 – VYRapidDecommissioningExhibit1
Exhibit 2 – Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee
Decommissioning Trust, Entergy Letter of an Entergy letter to Vermont Assistant
Attorney General Landis–Marinello and to DPS Commissioner Christopher Recchia,
VYRapidDecommissioningExhibit1.xlsx
VY	Decomissioning	Fund
Thousands	of	2011	dollars
Scenario	1,	2012	Shutdown,	SAFSTOR,	p.61
Fuel	Offsite	2045
Start	of	year	2012	SD	Entergy	2015	SD	Inflated	End	of	year	fund
Costs	2012	$
Inflation	Rate
621.706
536.139
523.050
508.266
607.859
527.245
Fund	Return	Rate
•-=-Entergy
320 Governor Hunt Rd .
(914) 272-3440
ttwomey@entergy.com
State of Vermont Office of the Attomey General
112 State Street - Drawer 20
Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee
Dear Mr. Landis-Marinello and Commissioner Recchia:
This letter responds to your January 26, 2015 letter to the Director of the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR") of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")'
regarding the December 30, 2014 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust
submitted to the NRC by Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC ("ENVY") and the Bank of New
York Mellon {"Trustee")'> Although your letter was addressed to the NRC and not to ENVY, we
do feel compelled to respond to a number of incorrect assumptions and assertions in your letter.
1. The Disbursement Notice and Actual Disbursement Complied With All Applicable
At the outset, we want to make clear that both the disbursement notice and the actual
disbursement from the ENVY decommissioning trust fund complied with all applicable NRC
requirements, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ("Vermont Yankee") Renewed Facility
Operating License conditions, and ENVY Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement ("Trust
Agreement"j3 provisions.
Letter from K Landis-Marinello and C. Recchia, State of Vermont, to W . Dean , NRC, "Docket 50-271 ;
Entergy's Pre-Notice of Disbursement from DecommiSSioning Trust" (Jan. 26 , 2015) ("State Letter').
Letter from C. Wamser, ENVY, and D. Ryan, Bank of New York Mellon , to W . Dean, NRC, ·PreNotice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust" (Dec. 30, 2014).
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC Master DecommiSSioning Trust Agreement for Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Station (July 31 , 2002).
Letter to K Landis-Marinello and C. Recchia
As an initial matter, the December 30 disbursement notice meets all applicable
regulatory requirements and is consistent in form and content with similar pre-disbursement
notices that other decommissioning sites have submitted to the NRC. Pursuant to Section 4.05
of the Trust Agreement, no payments from the trust (other than for ordinary administrative
expenses) may be made until the Trustee has first given the NRC 30 days' prior written notice of
payment. The Trustee is also prohibited from making any disbursements from the fund if the
NRR Director notifies the Trustee in writing of his or her objection to payment. ENVY and the
Trustee submitted a notice of disbursement for up to $18 million in decommissioning planning
costs on December 30, 2014. In accordance with Section 4.05 of the Trust Agreement, the
Trustee made no payments to ENVY during the 30-day period following the submittal of the
disbursement notice. That 30-day period ended on January 29, 2015, and neither ENVY nor
the Trustee received any notice of objection from the NRR Director.
Consequently, and as permitted by the Trust Agreement, on February 4, 2015, the
Trustee disbursed $12,143,197.21 from the ENVY qualified decommissioning trust fund account
and $32,915.54 from the non-qualified decommissioning trust fund account4 This initial
payment was for decommissioning planning costs ENVY incurred from the time of the plant
shutdown announcement in August 2013 through December 2014. Of the approximately $12
million incurred planning costs, $282,300.27 were related to operational spent fuel management
planning activities,'
2. NRC Regulations and the Trust Agreement Permit ENVY to Recover Spent Fuel
Management Planning Costs
Contrary to your assertions that NRC regulations prohibit ENVY from using
decommissioning trust funds for spent fuel management costs,6 NRC regulations and guidance
permit ENVY to recover costs associated with planning costs for both license termination and
spent fuel management activities. Under NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(8)(ii),
licensees may use up to 3 percent of the generic decommissioning funding amount specified in
Section 50.75 for "decommissioning planning." The NRC staff "recognizes that during planning
for decommissioning, it is necessary to consider activities leading to license termination and the
storage of spent fuel; therefore, the staffs interpretation of the appropriate use of these plannin~
funds will permit planning for all issues related to the decommissioning of the facility. "
Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate and permissible for ENVY to recover spent fuel
management planning costs from the trust fund.
With this $32,915.54 withdrawal from the non-qualified account, ENVY has exhausted the funds in
this account and is, therefore, closing the non-qualified sub-account.
In addition to the approximately $280,000 in operational spent fuel management planning costs,
ENVY has also incurred costs for dry storage planning activities. AHhough ENVY is permitted by
NRC regulations and the Trust Agreement to recover these dry storage planning costs from the trust,
and reserves all rights to do so, ENVY currently does not intend to seek reimbursement for such
costs from the trust fund.
State Letter at 2.
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.184, Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors, Rev. 1 at 6 (Oct. 2013)
(emphasis added) ("Reg. Guide 1.184").
The Trust Agreement likewise permits ENVY to recover spent fuel management
planning costs from the trust. Section 4.01 of the Trust Agreement states that "the Trustee shall
make payments out of the Funds ... for purposes of paying costs, liabilities and expenses of
Decommissioning." "Decommissioning" is defined in Section 1.010) of the Trust Agreement to
mean "the removal of the Station from service and disposal of its components in accordance
with Applicable Law." The Trust Agreement further defines the decommissioning process to
include "pre-shutdown activities related to the removal and disposal of the Station, including ...
planning ... and non-DOE spent fuel storage."· The Trust Agreement, therefore, expressly
allows the Trustee to make payments to ENVY for incurred costs related to pre-shutdown spent
fuel storage planning activities. Moreover, as noted above, the NRC staff interprets its own
regulations (i.e., the "Applicable Law") to allow licensees to recover spent fuel management
planning costs from their decommissioning trust funds 9 Therefore, ENVY's initial request to
recover decommissioning planning costs, of which a very small portion is related to spent fuel
management planning costs, is clearly permitted by the Trust Agreement's plain language.
Although your letter raises a number of other issues that are not directly relevant to
ENVY's initial disbursement request, several of the statements made in your letter do warrant a
3. The Trust Agreement Does Not Preclude the Use of Trust Funds for Spent Fuel
Management Activities Before Radiological Decommissioning Activities Are Complete
We disagree with your assertion that the Trust Agreement requires the Trustee "to
refrain from disbursing funds for anything other than radiological decontamination and
decomrrl1ssioning until those activities are complete."'° To the contrary, the Trust Agreement
authorizes disbursements for incurred spent fuel management costs before radiological
decontamination is completed." In particular, Section 4.01 of the Trust Agreement provides
that, "[o]nce Decommissioning is completed, the Trustee shall also disburse amounts in the
Funds in a manner designated in any Decommissioning Certificate for the purposes of paying
costs, liabilities and expenses of Docket 6545 Decommissioning Activities, Spent Fuel Costs
and Site Restoration Costs (each to the extent not included in Decommissioning)."" By
authorizing payment for spent fuel costs "to the extent not included in Decommissioning," the
Trust Agreement explicitly recognizes that spent fuel management costs will be paid from the
trust during "Decommissioning," as that term is defined in Section 1.010). Moreover, Section
4.06 of the Trust Agreement expressly confirms that disbursements are permitted under Section
4.01 for "Decommissioning costs including costs for decommissioning, spent fuel storage and
site restoration,,'3
Trust Agreement § 1.01 (j).
See Reg. Guide 1.184 at 6.
State Letter at 4.
ENVY acknowledges that current NRC regulations do not pennit ENVY to use decommissioning trust
funds for actual (i.e., non-planning) spent fuel management activfties. As the State is aware, ENVY
has requested an exemption from this restriction , which is pending before the NRC. See Letter from
C. Wamser, Entergy, to NRC, "Request for Exemptions from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR
50.75(h)(1)(iv)" (Jan. 6, 2015).
Trust Agreement § 4.01 (emphasis added).
Id. § 4.06 (emphasis added).
These sections in the Trust Agreement, which specifically provide that
"Decommissioning" costs include spent fuel costs , also refute the assertion in your letter that
trust funds cannot be disbursed for spent fuel costs until radiological decommissioning has been
completed. Although your letter cites to Exhibit 0 of the Trust Agreement as support for your
Exhibit 0 only defines the "Completion of
assertion, that citation is misplaced. 14
Decommissioning" for purposes of termination of the Trust under Section 5.01. Exhibit 0 does
not define "Decommissioning" or remove spent fuel costs from "Decommissioning," as that term
is used in Sections 1.010), 4.01 and 4.06 of the Trust Agreement'S Exhibit 0 states, "The
Completion of Decommissioning is defined for purposes of this Exhibit 0 as plant dismantlement
and decontamination to NRC standards plus the completion of additional activities agreed to or
imposed in the course of Docket No. 6545 before the Vermont Public Service Commission or
pursuant to any subsequent law or proceeding, but excluding spent fuel management and any
site restoration. "'· Exhibit 0 excludes spent fuel management from the "Completion of
Decommissioning" because the distribution of any excess trust funds would otherwise be
delayed until the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") had removed all the spent fuel from the
site, which could be decades after ENVY completes the radiological decommissioning of the
remainder of the site.
4. The Trust Agreement Does Not Preclude Reimbursement of Spent Fuel Management Costs
that ENVY Will Seek to Recover from the Department of Energy
Your letter also posits that the trust fund "can only be used to cover expenses that the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) does not have to pay," citing to the definition of
"Decommissioning" and Exhibit 0 17 Section 1.010) defines the decommissioning process to
include "pre-shutdown activities related to .... non-DOE spent fuel storage.,,18 In this context of
"pre-shutdown" (i.e., operating) activities, "non-DOE spent fuel storage" clearly refers to on-site
spent fuel storage as distinguished from the 1.0 mil per kWh of generation fee that all operating
nuclear generating facilities, including the Vermont Yankee plant, paid to the Nuclear Waste
Fund for spent fuel storage by DOE. The "non-DOE" reference in Section 1.010) thus does not
conflict with , or in any way override, Section 4.01's authorization to disburse trust funds for
spent fuel costs as a part of "Decommissioning." Exhibit 0 again only defines the "Completion
of Decommissioning" and not the authority to disburse funds from the trust which is provided by
Section 4.01 . Exhibit 0 merely specifies when any excess trust funds shall be distributed and
logically includes settlement or other resolution of Vermont Yankee's spent fuel cost claims
against DOE as events triggering such distribution.
State Letter at 5.
See Trust Agreement, Exh. D.
Id. , Exh . D. at Exh. 0-1 (emphasis in original). Exhibit D further provides that "Completion of
Decommissioning shall be deemed to have occurred for purposes hereof notwithstanding that the
Company [(ENVY)] may choose to re-use the Site, and portions of existing structures, systems and
components, and that spent fuel is not removed from the Site."
Leiter to K Landis-Marinello and C. Recchia
Lastly, your letter also makes a number of statements regarding the Vermont ratepayers'
interest in any remaining decommissioning trust funds.19 Your letter fails to recognize, however,
that the trust funds were collected by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation through
wholesale power contracts ''with each of its sponsoring utilities which obligate[d] such utilities to
purchase the output and capacity of the Vermont Yankee plant and to pay therefor 100% of
Vermont Yankee's costs , includin~ decommissioning" and that "[t]hese contracts ... have been
approved as rates by the FERC."2 As such, FERC has authOrity to determine the disposition of
any excess trust funds 21
ENVY is committed to completing the decommissioning of Vermont Yankee safely. We
are equally committed to using and managing ENVY decommissioning trust funds responsibly,
in accordance with the Trust Agreement and all applicable NRC requirements.
Please contact me with any questions. With kind regards, I am
4.~~AGcc:
Mr. Daniel H. Dorman
Regional Administrator, Region 1
2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100
King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713
Mr. James S. Kim, Project Manager
Mail Stop 08015
Washington , DC 20555
Mr. Glen Metzger
500 Grant Street, Room 1320
State Letter at 3-4.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Biennial Decommissioning Fund Status Report,
submitted to the NRC March 28, 2001 (NRC Accession # ML 010930102) at 2.
See 18 C.F.R. § 35.32(a)(7).
Documents Similar To The Nationwide Failures of Decommisioning Regulation: Decommisioning Trust Funds or Slush Funds?
api-284725299
Eduardo Madden
Siddhant Behuria