Source: http://openjurist.org/135/f3d/182/aponte-matos-v-toledo-dvila
Timestamp: 2017-08-22 05:43:55
Document Index: 698249739

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1291', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

135 F3d 182 Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dvila | OpenJurist
135 F. 3d 182 - Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dvila
135 F3d 182 Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dvila
135 F.3d 182
Rafael APONTE MATOS, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
Pedro TOLEDO DVILA, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
Entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo and we take the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. See Acosta-Orozco v. Rodriguez-de-Rivera, 132 F.3d 97, 98(1st Cir.1997).
In May of 1995, Aponte Andino, Andino Serrano, Rafael Aponte Matos (Andino Serrano's husband), and Iris Teresa filed this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and against the federal officials under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). They alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.1995). We will affirm if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In order to overcome defendants' motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs must come forward with "specific, provable facts which establish that there is a triable issue." Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.1994). For a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992).
Qualified immunity protects both federal and state officials from liability for damages in a civil rights action if "a reasonable officer could have believed [his actions] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [acting] officer[ ] possessed." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). There are two aspects to this standard. The first inquiry is whether the constitutional right asserted by plaintiffs was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The second, if the right was clearly established, is whether a reasonable officer in the same situation would "have understood that the challenged conduct violated that established right." Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1373 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st Cir.1990)). If the first level of the analysis yields a determination that the asserted constitutional right was not clearly established at the relevant time, then we need not proceed to the second prong; there is qualified immunity. See Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (1st Cir.1997).
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that the use of false statements to obtain a warrant, where the false statements are necessary to the finding of probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. As the Franks Court noted, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment itself contemplates the affiant's truthfulness:
438 U.S. at 164, 98 S.Ct. at 2681 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).
Franks involved a challenge to a warrant in a criminal proceeding and set forth the elements of a challenge: there must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth on the part of the affiant; these allegations must be supported by an affidavit or sworn or otherwise reliable statements; the allegations must point specifically to the portion of the warrant application claimed to be false and must have a statement of supporting reasons; and the material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard must be necessary to establish probable cause. See id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-85. It is not enough to allege negligence or innocent mistake. See id. This court has consistently followed the Franks rule. See, e.g., United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1006 (1st Cir.1993).
An officer who obtains a warrant through material false statements which result in an unconstitutional search may be held personally liable for his actions under § 1983.2 "It has long been clearly established that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is violated when 'a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in a warrant affidavit if the false statement is necessary for a finding of probable cause.' " Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676). See also Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.1984) (noting plaintiff's civil rights claim that federal agent intentionally misrepresented facts necessary to obtain warrant).
The force of the Franks rule in a § 1983 action is reinforced by the decision of the Supreme Court this term in Kalina v. Fletcher, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997). In that case, the Court held that a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity for making false statements in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, and may be personally liable for such actions. See id. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 505-06.
It is difficult to think of what more could be said by the plaintiffs to raise a question as to the truth of Laboy's statements in the affidavit that two men carrying a weapon entered the plaintiffs' house.4 The plaintiff who was home at the time says that did not happen. Plaintiffs also suggest that Laboy had a motive to lie: he wanted access to the house to see if there was a "narco-treasure" there, as the information from Agent Plichta suggested.5 And finally, plaintiffs note, when the house was searched, no illegal weapon was found. This evidence tends to contradict Laboy's statement in the affidavit that he saw two men, one with an illegal weapon, entering the house, and that, based on his observation and experience, this meant the house was illegally being used for custody of firearms. That statement was essential to the probable cause determination. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77.
The unlawful computer search claim against Plichta is not properly before us, as plaintiffs failed timely to perfect an appeal from the district court's entry of summary judgment on that claim. On May 29, 1996, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order granting summary judgment to Plichta on the computer search claim,7 and entered partial judgment dismissing the claim. This was a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), and was immediately appealable to this court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a) required plaintiffs to file a notice of appeal from that final judgment within 60 days. Plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal in this case until May 5, 1997, long after the 60 day deadline had passed.8
In 1993 it was undoubtedly "clearly established" that a search must not exceed the scope of the search authorized in the warrant. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1986) ("By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the [Fourth Amendment particularity] requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit."); cf. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2310, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) ("If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant ... the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more."). But to state the rule is not to answer the question of when the search does in fact exceed the warrant.
Plaintiffs' evidence is insufficient to show that the officers who carried out the search are not entitled to immunity. All plaintiffs offer is that when the officers began their search, they "questioned" plaintiffs Andino Serrano and Aponte Andino as to the whereabouts of two million dollars in hidden drug money. There is no evidence that the officers searched anywhere in the house that they otherwise could not have searched for a weapon. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) ("A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found...."). The Ross Court provided an illustration pertinent here: "A warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found." Id. at 821, 102 S.Ct. at 2171. Further, at least for immunity purposes, an officer could reasonably think that weapons are more likely to be in a house if there are millions of dollars hidden in the house as well, and that the question was sufficiently related to the warrant. The topic of questioning during an encounter which itself does not violate the Fourth Amendment is not so clearly defined against the officers as to deprive them of immunity. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (officers do not violate Fourth Amendment by approaching individual in public place and posing questions); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Fourth Amendment not violated when officers ask questions of individuals without particularized suspicion, where reasonable person would not feel obligated to answer). There is no suggestion that the searching officers ordered or forced plaintiffs to answer the questions, and plaintiffs were free not to answer. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 421 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement not violated where officer asks driver questions unrelated to initial justification for stop, and driver voluntarily answers questions and consents to search).
Plaintiffs assert that the officers who conducted the search violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by failing to announce their presence and identify themselves as police before they entered the house by breaking down the door with an ax. The district court acknowledged that "upon approaching the entrance to the home, the officers never announced their presence or their purpose." It did not, however, rule on the claim that this was a violation of plaintiffs' rights, see Richards v. Wisconsin, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (Fourth Amendment does not permit blanket exception to knock and announce rule); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (failure to knock and announce forms part of reasonableness inquiry), nor do we. Even assuming that there is, on these facts, a right to have the police knock and announce, the asserted right was not clearly established as being of constitutional dimension at the time the alleged violation occurred.
As Richards makes clear, Wilson neither announced an absolute knock-and-announce rule nor created categorical exceptions to the rule for felony drug cases. In Richards, the court found that a no-knock entry into a hotel room was justified where the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the occupant would destroy the evidence if given the opportunity. See Richards, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1422. We do not reach the question of whether it is reasonable for officers, armed with a warrant to search for weapons, to fail to announce they are police before they enter the area to be searched, because we resolve this on immunity grounds.
Plaintiffs' basic theory may be sound but their arguments seek shelter in the wrong doorway. Plaintiffs point us to the substantive due process "shocks the conscience" standard announced in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). But an "excessive force" claim that arises in the context of a search or seizure is "properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1867-68, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (expressly rejecting the Rochin "shocks the conscience" test where the claim arises in the context of an investigatory stop). "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; see also Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants, 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir.1995) ("[A] viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant's actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.").
We will assume that there may be searches carried out in such an excessive manner that they are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It is also true that the typical "excessive force" claim arises in the context of an arrest and generally involves physical contact and injury to the arrestee. Here, there was no arrest, no physical force was used on any of the plaintiffs, and none sustained physical injury. To the extent there can be such a claim in the absence of physical force, the plaintiffs themselves stated in their depositions that the searching officers conducted themselves in an orderly manner once inside the home. Under these circumstances, we doubt any Fourth Amendment violation at all has been stated, let alone one unreasonable enough to overcome official immunity. See Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir.1988) (in § 1983 suit, excessive force claim was not sustainable where there was no evidence of physical injury).
Supervisory liability under § 1983 "cannot be predicated on a respondeat theory, but only on the basis of the supervisor's own acts or omissions." Seekamp v. Michaud, 109 F.3d 802, 808 (1st Cir.1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). There is supervisory liability only if (1) there is subordinate liability, and (2) the supervisor's action or inaction was "affirmatively linked" to the constitutional violation caused by the subordinate. See id. (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988)). That affirmative link must amount to "supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence, or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference." Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902.
Plaintiffs offer evidence that defendant Haddock pressured his subordinates to execute at least three search warrants every month. They also offer documents they claim prove Laboy's history of misconduct, including a 1989 Puerto Rico Supreme Court case criticizing Laboy for having acted irresponsibly in a criminal case in 1985. See El Pueblo v. Heriberto Carrasquillo Morales, 123 P.R. Dec. 690 (1989). That Haddock may have exerted pressure on his staff to execute search warrants is not evidence he acquiesced in or callously disregarded the making of false statements to a judicial officer. And while a supervisor's failure to take remedial actions regarding a miscreant officer may result in supervisory liability where it amounts to "deliberate indifference," see Diaz v. Martinez, 112 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997), a judicial opinion citing Laboy as irresponsible in something he did nine years before the events at issue here does not establish such indifference.
Plaintiffs also alleged in their complaint that the officials conducting the search deprived plaintiffs of their right to counsel during the search. They alleged that their lawyer was outside of the house, but the police would not allow counsel to be with her clients inside. Plaintiffs do not present this claim as a specific issue on appeal, nor develop any argument regarding the claim, and it is deemed waived. See King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 970 (1st Cir.1997) (collecting cases)
This is similar to, and derives from the same constitutional source as, the claim that an officer reasonably should have known that facts alleged in support of a warrant application were insufficient to establish probable cause. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)
The parties' briefing sometimes characterizes the Franks issue as an issue of whether there was a pretextual search. We reject that conceptualization of the legal doctrines involved. The Franks rule is as we have stated it; not whether the search was pretextual. Under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus, inquiry into an officer's subjective motivations is rarely appropriate. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, ----, 117 S.Ct. 417, 419, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-14, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)