Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820713-917480
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 17:04:54+00:00
Document Index: 151364910

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 33", "l'article 3", "l'article 16", "l'article 5", "l'article 39", "l'article 38", "l'article 16", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 5", "l'article 16", "l'article 26", "l'article 16", "l'article 26", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 24", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 33", "l'article 6", "l'article 27", "l'article 6"]

ZAMIR c. ROYAUME-UNI
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche ZAMIR c. ROYAUME-UNI
Type d'affaire : DécisionType de recours : Partiellement irrecevable ; partiellement recevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9174/80Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-07-13;9174.80 Analyses : (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLEParties : Demandeurs : ZAMIRDéfendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9174/80 Mohammed ZAMIR v/the UNITED KINGDO M Mohammed ZAMIR c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 13 July 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 juillet 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 5, paragraph I, of the Conventlon Right to security ojperson . Degree of precision required by the legal provisioru governing the anest of a person with a view to his deportation so as to make this detention reasonably foreseeable . Artlcle 5, paragraph 4, of the Convention : !n deportation proceedings the grounds of which are moreover contested. do "habeas corpus" proceedings comply with the requirement of this provision ? Issue relating to the length ojproceedings concernirtg the lawfulness of detemion . in particular where the person concerned is released on bail pending these proceedings.
Artlcle 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention An individual cannot be considered as charged with a criminal offence solely on the ground that for the purpose of administrative proceedings he is qualifted as an illegal entrant . Article 26 of the Convention : !n the United Kingdom an appeal to the Adjudicator is not an effective remedv for rhose who complain about their detention pending removal and not about the removal as such .
Artlcle 5, peragraphe I, de la Conventlon : Droit Ã la sÃ»retÃ© . Question du degrÃ© de prÃ©cision requis des dispositions lÃ©gales autorisant la dÃ©tention d'une personne en vue de son expulsion pour que cette dÃ©tention soit raisonnablement prÃ©visible. Artlcle 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention S'agissant d'une procÃ©dure en vue d'expulsion pour un motijpar ailleurs contestÃ©, une procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus rÃ©pond-elle aux exigences de cette disposition ?
Question de la durÃ©e de l'examen d'un recours po rt ant sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention . notamment lorsque ('intÃ©ressÃ© est mis en libertÃ© sous caution au cours de cet examen . Article 6, peragraphe I, de la Conventlon : Une personne ne peut Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme Ã©tant sous le coup d'une accusation pÃ©nale du seul jait qu'aur ftns d'une procÃ©dure administrative elle est qualifiÃ©e d'immigrant irrÃ©gulier. Article 26 de la Conventlon : Au Royaume-Uni . le recours auprÃ¨s de t'autoritÃ© supÃ©rieure en niatiÃ¨re d'immigration (Adjudicator) n'est pas un recours e,ff+cace pour qui se plaint de sa dÃ©tention en vue d'expulsion et non de l'expulsion elle-ntÃ©m e
(%ranÃ§ais : voir p. 164)
The applicant . Mr Mohammed Zamir, was born on 3 March 1957 in Lahore and is a citizen of Pakistan . On 27 November 1980 he was removed trom the United Kingdom to Pakistan where he now lives . He is represented in proceedings before the Commission bv Mr Stephen Grosz, of Messrs . Bindman & Partners, Solicitors . London, who has submitted a power of attorney to this eRect . On 11 December 1972, aged 15, the applicant applied to the British High Commission in Islamabad for an Entrv Certificate to enable him to accompany his mother to join his father who had settled in the United Kingdom since 1962 . The application, at first refused, was ultimatelv granted on 25 November 1975 and his passport was stamped with a'visi bearing the words "settlement to join father" . It appears that when the applicant applied for an Entrv Certificate in 1972 he was given an application form in English . It was filled out by an agent and the applicant placed his thumb print on it . The printed form of application was headed by notes which applicants were asked to read carefully, One of these, note (d), stated that holders of Entry Certificates will be presunted by the intmigration oft-icer in the United Kingdont to be qualified for admission unless he discovers (a) that the Entrv Certificate was obtained by t'raudulent representations or by concealment of facts which the applicant knew to be material, (b) that a change of circumstances after issue has removed the basis of the holder's claim to admission . The form described the applicant as unntarried and going to join his father on whose income he would be supported . In the course of subsequent proceedings it was stated bv a Home Office immigration oflicer that on lodging his application he would have been given a - 154 -
copy of a handout setting out the basis on which children were admitted to the United Kingdom and containing the following statement : "Generallv, children aged 18 or over must qualify for admission in their own right ; but an unmarried and fully dependent son under 21 or an unntarried daughter under 21 who formed pa rt of the family unit overseas ntav be admitted if the whole family are settled in the United Kingdom or are being admitted for settlentent, and adequate suppo rt and accontntodation is available for thent in the United Kingdom ." (Para . 39 of Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entrv EEC and other Non-Contmonwealth nationals - H .C . Paper (1972-73) No . 81) . The applicant denies that such a handout was given to him . He furt her states that at the time such handouts were available only in English which he could not read, write, speak or understand . In the appficant's affidavit he adds that he could not recall any such handouts being read or explained to him . Prior to his travelling to the United Kingdom, his ntother, in accordance with custom, arranged for him to be married within the Pakistani contmunity . The ntarriage took place on 10 Februarv 1976 . He later stated that he had not informed the United Kingdom authorities in Islamabad of his forthcoming marriage, because the ntarriage was arranged some weeks after the issue of the Entry Certificate . However, he claims that after his marriage had taken place he returned to the British High Comntissioner to point out that his father's name was mis-spelt on his Entry Certificate . On being asked why he left the matter so long he explained to the officer through an interpreter, that he had been "busv getting ntarried" . No notice was taken of his statement .
On 2 March 1976 the appficant, then aged 18, arrived at London, with the 'visa' . He was not asked if he was married and did not volunteer the information . The immigration officer granted leave to enter the United Kingdom for an indetinite period and stamped the passport to this effect . In July 1978, bv which time a son had been born to the applicant in Pakistan . his wife applied for an Entry Certificate for herself and her son to join the applicant . The Entry Clearance Officer in Islamabad informed the Honte Oftice of the application and queried the lawfulness of the applicant's entry in March 1 976 . The applicant was then interviewed on 30 August 1978 . He said that he had not informed the entrv cleararce officer when he married because he did not think it was necessarv . On his entry into the United Kingdom, he had not mentioned his ntarriage to the immigration officer because he had not been asked any questions concerning this . On being asked how he could regard hintself as a dependent of his father when he had undertaken ntarriage, h e - 155 -
apparently admitted that he had come to the United Kingdom purely for work for himself and his wife . Following this interview the authorities concluded that by not revealing the fact of his marriage the applicant had gained leave to nullity and he was an illegal entrant under Section 33 (1) of the Immigration Act 1971' . The applicant was then arrested on 2 October 1978 and detained in Winson Green Prison, Birmingham, pursuant to paragraph 16 (2) of Schedule 2 ot' the 1971 Act" pending the giving of directions . The applicant, who was in receipt of legal aid, made an ex parte application to the Divisional Court (High Court) for a writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court adjourned the application so that notice could be given to the Home Office which was done bv notice of motion dated 24 October 1978 . The applicant remained in prison until 19 December 1978 when he was released on bail . His application was heard and dismissed by the Divisional Court on 14 March 1979 . An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 21 December 1979 . A further appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed on 17 Julv 1980 ssâ¢ . In the course of its decision, the House of Lords in a judgment delivere d b-v Lord Wilberforce, held that in an application for a writ of Habeas Corpus, the burden of proof rested on the applicant to show that his detention was unlawful . Fu rt hermore, it upheld the view expressed in both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal that leave to enter which has been obtained by deception is vitiated as not being "leave given in accordance with this Act" within the meaning of Section 3(1) (a) of the 1971 ACT**** . In this regar d
* 5 .33 ( I) slates inrer alia that an "illegal entrant" nteans a person unlawfully entering or seeking to enter in breach of a deportation order or of the immigration laws and includes also a penon who has so entered . â¢' This provision reads as follows : "A person in respect of whom direclions may be given under any of paragraphs 8 to 14 above may be detained under the authority of an immigration oRcer pending the giving of directions and pending his removal in pursuance of Ã¢nydi re ctions given . " Paragraphs 8- 14 conce rn the powers of immigration officers and the Secreta ry of State to remove persons refused leave to enter and illegal entrants . â¢â¢â¢ R . v . Secretary of State for the Home Department ex pane Zaniir . (1979) 2 ALL ER 849 ( Divisional Court), (1980) I ALL ER 641 (Court of Appeal) :(1980) 2 ALL ER 768 (Houso of Lords) . l'his provision reads as follows 3-(l) "Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where a person is not a pat rial (a) he .shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in accordance with this Act . . ."
ret'erence was made to the case of R . v . Secretary of State for the Home Departnient ex parte Hussain 1978 2 ALL ER 423 . The House of Lords proceeded to examine the scope of judicial review where the Secretarv of State or an immigration officer acting on his behalf decided that there had been deception . It rejected the applicant's submission that his detention could be considered lawful only if the court was satisfied that he was in tact guilty of deception and decided that the decision to remove the applicant and his consequent detention could only be attacked if it could be shown that there were grounds on which the Secretarv of State, through his officers, could have acted, or that no reasonable person could have decided as he did . In his elucidation of the policy factors underlving this standard of review, Lord WilberPorce stated as follows : "The immigration officer, whether at the stage of entry or at that of rentoval, has to consider a complex of statutory rules and non-statutory guidelines . He has to act on documentary evidence and such other evidence as inquiries may provide . Often there will be documents whose genuineness is doubtful, statements which cannot be verified, misunderstandings as to what was said, practices and attitudes in a foreign state which have to be estimated . There is roont for appreciation, even for discretion . The Divisional Court, on the other hand, on judicial review of a decision to remove and detain . is very differently situated . It considers the case on atÃ¯idavit evidence ; as to which cross-examination, though allowable, does not take place in practice . It is, as this case well exemplifies, not in a position to find out the truth between conFlicting statements : did the applicant receive notes, did he read them, was he capable of understanding them, what exactly took place at the point of entry . Nor is it in a position to weigh the materiality of personal or other factors present, or not present, or partially present, to the mind of the immigration authorities . It cannot possibly act as, in effect, a court ot' appeal as to the facts on which the immigration officer decided . What it is able to do, and this is the limit of its powers, is to see whether there was evidence on which the imniigration officer, acting reasonably, could decide as he did . " The House of Lords also rejected the applicant's submission that the immigrant's only duty was to answer truthfully any questions asked by the immigration officer and that he was under no duty to volunteer information . It held that :"an alien seeking entry into the United Kingdom owes a positive duty of candour on all material facts which denote a change of circumstances since the issue of the entry clearance . " Finally, the House of Lords concluded that the applicant was not candid in not revealing the fact of his ntarriage, a clear change of circumstances which was material to the immigration officer's decision and that in suc h - 157 -
circumstances the immigration officer had ample grounds for deciding that there had been deception . However, it added that if it were for the court to judge the matter for itself, it would still find that the applicant was guilty of deception since he presented his passport with the 'visÃ¢ stating "settlement to join father" when the applicant admitted that he had come to the United Kingdom "purelv for work for himself and his wife .' â¢ The applicant was removed from the United Kingdom on 22 November 1980 to Pakistan : An appeal from there to an Adjudicator against his removal as an illegal immigrant, pursuant to Section 16 (1) of the 1971 Act', was rejected on 4 December 1981 . Leave to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was refused on I I May 1982 .
COMPLAINTS AND SU6MISSION S Arllcle 5, paragraph I The'applicant complains that he is a victim of a practice Ã´f sunimary detention of illegal entrants and their removal, without adequate judicial control, which violates his right to security of person guÃ¢ranteed by Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention . The right to security of person guarantees to the individual protection from arbitrary arrest in circumstances where he is wholly blameless and it is intplicit in the said right that an individual ought to be able to foresee with a reasonable degree of certaintv the circumstances in which he is liable to be arrested and detained . It is further implicit in the right to sÃ¨curity of person that there shall be adequate judicial control of arrest and detention . In support of the above submissions the applicant relies on the followin g matters :
. (a) The uncerlaintv in the law relating to the definition of an illegal Ã©ntran t and to the ambit of the duty of disclosure . In this respect he makes the following points : - Prior to the decision in R . v . Secrefary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hussain 1978 2 ALL ER 423, the definition of illegal entrant was thought to extend onlv to those persons entering clandestinely . I n â¢ The relevani parts of this provision mad as follows : "-(1) . . . where directions are given under this Act for a person's removal from the United Kingdom . . . (a) on the ground that he is an illegal entrant . . . 'then he may appeal to an adjudicator against those directions on the grounds that in the facts of his case there was in law no power to give them on the ground on which they were given . : . "
that case the Court of Appeal held that an apparent leave to enter which had been obtained bv deception is vitiated and that a person who has so entered is an illegal entrant . Prior to this decision the commonly held view of the law was shared by the authorities whose official statements contributed to this view . In this regard the applicant has submitted inter alia various official statements from the Home Secretary and the Secretary to the House of Commons . - Prior to the decision of the Divisional Court in the applicant's case it was uncertain whether the duty of an entrant exceeded an obligation not to perpetrate any active or deliberate fraud when answering questions put by the immigration ofÃ¯icer . - The question of dutv of disclosure and the concept of continuing representation remained uncertain in the Court of Appeal . In the applicant's case the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the decision of the lower court holding that the presentation of his passport containing a visa amounted to a continuing representation as to his eligibility where an honest person would have informed the immigration officer of material changes in circumstances . However a ditPerentlv constituted Court of Appeal decided the case of Mangoo Khan on 13 February 1980 (6) .' In this case Lord Denning M .R . said a s . . . in a case such as the present, where the holder of an entry clearance presents himself, the immigration officer should examine hirri to 'see whether there has been a change of circumstances . It should not rest on the nian to disclose it . I would hold that there is no duty of disclosure . . ." - It was not until the applicant's case reached the House of Loiâ¢ds tha t
the existence and ambit of the duty of disclosure were established and Rhe uncertainties set out above removed . The House of Lords held that the said duty was wider than anvone, including the authorities, had argued for at any stage of the applicant's case . , (b) The uncertainty in the law relating to the relevant date to judge the eligibility of a person who seeks an entry certiFicate . Prior to the decision of the Divisional Court in the applicant's case, it was thought both by practitioners and by the authorities that the relevant date was that on which the application f'or an entrvi certificate was made . The court held that the relevant date was that on which the entry certificate is granted . Accordingly the applicant would not have known whether material changes in circumstances were those which related to eligibility for children under 18 (as he was when he applied) or for children over 18 (as he was when the entry certifigÃ¢te ~vas i granted) and would, if at all, have thought the former . (c) The uncertainty in the law relating to the materiality of marriage to an application of a son under 18 . Unlike paragraph 39, paragraph 38 of th e â¢ R . v . Secretary of State for the Home Depa rt ment, ex parte Khan, (1980) 2 ALL ER . 337-346
Rules did not provide that a son or daughter should be unmarried (7)-â¢ It was undecided whether it was an implicit requirement . Accordingly the applicant would not have known whether his marriage was material and would, if at all, have thought it was not . (d) The unreasonable burden which the above uncertain practice placed upon the applicant in tha t - he was expected to know what changes in circumstances were relevant to his eligibility although he had received no hand-out setting out the provisions of the Rules ; although such hand-outs were in English ; although he was 15 and relatively uneducated ; although at the time he might have read it he would have been interested onlv in the parts relating to children under 18 ; although he entered the United Kingdom some three and a half years after he would have read the hand-out ; although the basis of his eligibility in the Rules was uncertain : although during the course of being interviewed the applicant was subject to questioning on several matters to that he could not know what was relevant . - the applicant was entitled to assume that the immigration officer , who was better placed to know the Rules, would asks him about all matters relevant to his eligibility, and that he did not need to volunteer information which was not sought ; although at the time, and until the decision of the House of Lords, there was thought to be no duty in law to disclose information, at least in circumstances where this was not fraudulent . (e) The absence of anv judicial control of the power to detain and remove in that, for the reasons set out below : - An application for Habeas Corpus provided no sut7icient safeguard - An appeal under Section 16 of the Immigration Act 1971 could be lodged only after the applicant had been removed, he would not have been allowed to att end the hearing, and the procedu re was unfair to an appellant . Article 5, peragraph I (f ) The applicant's detention was not lawful within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1(t) . In the alte rn ative, it was not in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1 . In this respect the applicant refers to the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times case . The applicant repeats the above submissions that the legal rules relating to illegal ent ry , disclosure and mate ri ali ty were not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct . * Para . 38 of the Rules provided imer alia that children under 18 are to be admitted for settlement . . . if one parent is settled in the United Kingdom . . .
Artlcle 5, paragraph 4 The proceedings in the applicant's case to determine the lawfulness of his detention were not "speedy" within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 4 . (a) The applicant was detained on 2 October 1978 , (b) He applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus on 23 October 1978 . The application was adjourned to give notice to the Home Secretary, which was done the following day . (c) The applicant was released on bail on 18 December 1978, by which time his application had not been determined . (d) The application was determined by the decision of the Divisional court on 14 March 1979. (e) The period of 20 weeks and 2 days front 23 October 1978 to 14 March 1979, alternatively the period of 8 weeks from 23 October 1978 to 18 December 1978, were wholly excessive . It is l'urther submitted that the proceedings in the applicant's case did not involve a decision as to the "lawfulness" of his detention . - The applicant's removal and a fbrtiori his detention pending removal, is lawful in accordance with the domestic law of the United Kingdom only if he is in fact an illegal entrant . In anv other case there is in law no power to give directions for removal and accordinglv no power to detain .
- In order to comply with Article 5, paragraph 4 the court ought to have verified the substantivejustiflcation for the applicant's detention, that is, it ought to have satisfied itself that the applicant was, on the facts, an illegal entrant . Finally, it is submitted that the proceedings in the applicant's case did not afford him the fundamental guarantees of judicial procedure applied in matters ot' deprivation of libertv which are inherent in the notion of a "court" within the nieaning of Article 5, paragraph 4 . The procedure applicable in the applicant's case provided guarantees which are markedlv inferior to those existing in criminal matters in the member states of the Council of Europe . In this regard the following submissions are mad e - the onus of proof was on the applicant to show that his detention was unlawtul, so that once the Secretary of State had shown that he had reasonable grounds for deciding that the applicant was an illegal entrant, the applicant had to show that there was no evidence on which the Secretary of State could reach his decision, or that no reasonable person in his position could have reached it .
- the Court did not hear oral evidence and cross-examination to find out the truth between the conflicting statements as to, inter alia, what the applicant knew or ought to have known about his eligibility to enter and the relevance of his marriage, and as to what was said at his various interviews . As a result . and as the burden of proof was on the applicant, conflicts of evidence were decided in favour of the Secretarv of State . Article 6 The applicant complains that the finding that he was an "illegal entrant" constituted, in etfect, the determination of a "criminal charge" . Reference in this respect is made to various otTences provided for in Sections 24-26 of the 1971 Act . He claims in particular a breach of Article 6, paragraph 2, since the burden of proof lay on him to prove the lawfulness of his presence in the United Kingdom, and Article 6, paragraph 3 .d, since in the habeas corpus proceedings he could not cross-examine witnesses against him .
THE LA W The applicant complains that his detention pending removal from the United Kingdom as an "illegal entrant" was not "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" or "lawful" within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 1(t) of the Convention . He further complains under Article 5, paragraph 4, that he was not able to challenge the "lawfulness" of this detention "speedily" before a court as required by this provision . (1) Exhaustion of dornestic remedies The respondent Government submit that the application should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies since at the time the complaint was registered the applicant's appeal under Section 16 of the Immigration Act was still pending . In addition the applicant had at no stage raised the claim before the courts that he had in fact informed the British authorities in Islamabad about his marriage . The applicant no longer maintains this claim before the Commission and submits that an appeal under Section 26 cannot be regarded as a sufficient remedv for his complaint of unlawful detention under the Convention . . The Commission notes that an appeal to an Adjudicator under Section 16 of the 1971 Act is an appeal against removal from the United Kingdom . It does not enable a petitioner to challenge the "lawfulness" of his detention pending re moval which constitutes the main basis of the applicant's complaints under the Convention . In these circumstances the Commission considers tha t
the applicant has not failed to exhaust his domestic remedies in respect of the tacts which underlie his complaint as required under Art icle 26 of the Convention . (2) Article 5 The applicant complains that there has been a breach of his right to "security of person" or in the alternative that his arrest and detention were not "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" or "lawful" under Article 5, paragraph 1(t) . He submits in this respect, relying on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times Case (Judgment of 26 April 1979, paras . 48-50) that the legal rules governing his arrest and detention were not reasonably foreseeable or formulated with sufficient precision . He invokes in particular the uncertainty in the law relating to the definition of an illegal entrant and the scope of the duty of disclosure . The respondent Government contend that the relevant legal rules were sufficiently foreseeable and that the applicant's arrest and detention was justified under Article 5, paragraph I (f), as being the "lawful arrest or detention of a person . . . against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation" . The applicant further alleges that he was not able to challenge the "tawfulness" of his detention as required by Article 5, paragraph 4, since the courts did not exantine the question of whether he was an illegal entrant . He further complains that the national proceedings were not in conformity with ' the requirement in this provision that they take place "speedily" . The Government contend that to satisfy the requirements of Article 5, paragraph 4, it is not necessary that the court should be able to review the underlying justitication for the decision to deport but only that it determine the justification for the detention, i .e . that he is detained pending the implementation of the administrative decision to remove from the country . Furthermore they submit that in the circumstances of the case, having regard in particular to the possibility of applying at an earlier time for release on bail, the proceedings complied with the requirement of "speed" in Article 5, paragraph 4 . The Commission considers that the present application raises complex issues of law and fact in respect of Article 5, paragraphs I and 4, the deterniination of which should depend on an examination of the merits of the application . It therefore concludes that the applicant's complaints under these provisions are admissibte . (3) Article 6 . paragraph I Finallv, the applicant complains that he was effectively charged with a criminal ofl'ence since the finding that he was an illegal entrant is tantamount to an allegation of criminal conduct covered by Section 24, paragraph 1(a) of the 1971 Act . He also alleges a breach of Article 6, paragraph 2, since th e
burden of proot' lay on him to prove the lawfulness of his presence in the United Kingdom and in addition a breach of Article 6 . paragraph 3 (d) since he was unable to cross-examine witnesses against him . The Commission notes that the applicant was removed from the United Kingdom as an illegal entrant on the basis that he had gained entry into the countrv by deception . He was not formally charged with anv criminal offence under SS . 24-27 ol'the 1971 Act . It was considered bv both the authorities and the courts that his leave to enter the countrv was nullified bv his failure in his duty ot candour, so that he became an illegal entrant in breach of the immigration laws under S . 33 (I) of the Act . In these circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that the administrative process leading to his removal does not involve the determination ot a criminal charge . Nor can his rentoval be regarded as a disguised criminal penaltv . It follows therefore that Article 6 is not applicable in the present case . This complaint must accordingly be rejected as rnanit'estly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the application insofar as it raises issues under Article 6 of the Convention . DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAIT Le requÃ©rant . M . Mohammed Zamir, nÃ© le 3 mars 1957 Ã Lahore, est ressortissant du Pakistan . Le 27 novembre 1980 il fut expulsÃ© du Royaume-Uni au Pakistan, oÃ¹ il y vit actuellement . Dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Maitre Stephen Grosz, du cabinet Bindmann et Cie Ã Londres . qui a produit une procuration Ã cet effet . Le 11 dÃ©cembre 1972, alors qu'il Ã©tait Ã¢gÃ© de 15 ans, le requÃ©rant a dentandÃ© Ã la Haute commission britannique Ã Islamabad un visa qui lui perntettrait d'accompagner sa mÃ¨re et de rejoindre son pÃ¨re, Ã©tabli au Royaume-Uni depuis 1962 . Cette demande, d'abord rejetÃ©e, fut finalement accueillie le 25 novembre 1975 et un . visa â¢ portant les mots . Ã©tablissement en vue de rejoindre le pÃ¨re Â» fut apposÃ© sur-le passeport du requÃ©rant . - 164 -
Il semble que lorsque le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© un visa en 1972 . on lui ait fourni une formule de demande en anglais . Celle-ci fut remplie par un fonctionnaire et le requÃ©rant y apposa l'empreinte de son pouce . La formule imprimÃ©e de demande portait en en-tÃªte des notes que les demandeurs Ã©taient invitÃ©s Ã lire soigneusement . L'une d'elles, la note (d), stipulait que les dÃ©tenteun de visas seraient rÃ©putÃ©s, aux yeux du fonctionnaire des services d'immigration au Royaume-Uni, remplir les conditions d'admission, sauf s'il venait Ã dÃ©couvrir (a) que le visa avait Ã©tÃ© obtenu grÃ¢ce Ã des dÃ©clarations mensongÃ¨res ou Ã la dissimulation de faits dont le requÃ©rant connaissait l'intportance ;(b) qu'un changentent de situation aprÃ¨s la dÃ©livrance du visa avait supprimÃ© la justification de la demande d'admission du titulaire . Le forntulaire indiquait que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait cÃ©libataire et allait rejoindre son pÃ¨re, qui subviendrait Ã ses besoins . Au cours de la procÃ©dure ultÃ©rieure, un fonctionnaire des services d'immigration au ministÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur dÃ©clara que lorsque le requÃ©rant avait dÃ©posÃ© sa demande, on n'avait pas manquÃ© de lui remettre copie d'une note indiquant sur quelle base les enfants Ã©taient admis au Royaume-Uni et contenant le passage suivant : Â« En principe, les enfants Ã¢gÃ©s de 18 ans ou plus doivent remplir eux-nt@mes les conditions d'admission, mais un fils de moins de 21 ans, cÃ©libataire et totalement Ã charge, ou une fille cÃ©libataire de moins de 21 ans, qui faisait partie de la cellule faniiliale outre-mer, peuvent Ãªtre admis si toute la famille est Ã©tablie au Royaume-Uni ou y est admise en vue de son Ã©tablissement, et si au Royaume-Uni il existe des revenus et un logement suffisants pour eux . -
(Par. 39 de la dÃ©claration sur la lÃ©gislation sur l'immigration en vue du contr6le de l'entrÃ©e : resortissants des pays de la CEE et autres ne faisant pas partie du Commonwealth, document H C (1972-73) nÂ° 81) . Le requÃ©rant nie que pareille note lui ait Ã©tÃ© remise . En outre, d'aprÃ¨s lui, ces notes n'existaient Ã l'Ã©poque qu'en anglais, langue qu'il ne pouvait ni lire, ni Ã©crire, ni parler, ni comprendre . Dans une dÃ©claration Ã©crite sous serment, il ajoute ne pas se souvenir qu'une note lui ait Ã©tÃ© lue ou expliquÃ©e . Avant qu'il ne se rendit au Royaume-Uni, sa mÃ¨re, selon la coutume, avait arrangÃ© son mariage au sein de la communautÃ© pakistanaise . Ce mariage eut lieu le 10 fÃ©vrier 1976 . Le requÃ©rant a dÃ©clarÃ© par la suite qu'il n'avait pas informÃ© les autoritÃ©s britanniques Ã Islamabad de son prochain mariage parce que celui-ci avait Ã©tÃ© arrangÃ© quelques semaines aprÃ¨s que le visa lui eut Ã©tÃ© dÃ©livrÃ© . Toutefois, il prÃ©tend qu'aprÃ¨s son mariage, il est retournÃ© voir le haut comntissaire britannique pour prÃ©ciser que le nom de son pÃ¨re avait Ã©tÃ© mal orthographiÃ© sur son visa . Lorsqu'on lui a demandÃ© pourquoi il avait Ã©tÃ© si long Ã se manifester, il expliqua au fonctionnaire par l'intermÃ©diaire d'un interprÃ¨te qu'il avait Ã©tÃ© +occupÃ© Ã se marier . . Sa dÃ©claration ne fut mentionnÃ©e nulle part .
Le 2 mars 1976 le requÃ©rant . alors Ã¢gÃ© de 18 ans, arriva Ã Londres nanti du . visa . . On ne lui demanda pas s'il Ã©tait mariÃ© et il ne donna pas de lui mÃªme cette information . Le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration lui accorda l'autorisation de pÃ©nÃ©trer au Royaume-Uni pour une durÃ©e indÃ©terminÃ©e et tamponna le passeport Ã cet effet . alors que le requÃ©rant avait eu un fils au Pakistan . sa .Enjuilet1978 femme demanda un visa pour elle-mÃªme et son fits en vue de rejoindre le requÃ©rant . Le prÃ©posÃ© aux visas Ã Islamabad informa le ministÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur de la demande et s'inquiÃ©ta de la rÃ©gularitÃ© de l'entrÃ©e du requÃ©rant en mars 1976 . Le requÃ©rant fut interrogÃ© le 30 aoÃ»t 1978 . Il dÃ©clara ne pas avoir informÃ© le prÃ©posÃ© aux visas de son mariage parce qu'il n'avait pas pensÃ© que c'Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire . Au moment de son entrÃ©e au Royaume-Uni, il n'avait pas mentionnÃ© son mariage au fonctionnaire des services d'immigration, aucune question ne lui ayant Ã©tÃ© posÃ©e Ã ce sujet . Lorsqu'on lui demanda comment il pouvait se considÃ©rer comme Ã©tant Ã la charge de son pÃ¨re alors qu'il avait contractÃ© mariage, il admit apparemment qu'il Ã©tait venu au Royaume-Uni simplement pour y chercher du travail pour lui-mÃªme et son Ã©pouse . A la suite de cet entretien, les autoritÃ©s conclurent qu'en ne rÃ©vÃ©lant pas son mariage, le requÃ©rant avait obtenu frauduleusement l'autorisation de pÃ©nÃ©trer sur le territoire . En consÃ©quence, cette autorisation Ã©tait nulle et le requÃ©rant Ã©tait un immigranl irrÃ©gulier au regard de l'article 33 (1) de la loi de 1971 sur l'immigrationâ¢ . . Le requÃ©rant fut donc arrÃ©tÃ© le 2 octobre 1978 et dÃ©tenu Ã la prison de Winson Green Ã Birmingham, par application de l'article .16 . paragraphe 2 de l'annexe 2 Ã la loi de 1971 " en attendant des directives . Le requÃ©rant . qui bÃ©nÃ©ficiait de l'assistance judiciaire, prÃ©senta une demande ex parte d'habeas corpus Ã la Divisional Court (High Court) . La cour ajourna l'affaire de faÃ§on que notification pÃ»t en Ãªtre donnÃ©e au ministÃ¨re de l'intÃ©rieur, ce qui fut fait le 24 octobre 1978 . â¢ L'article 33 (1) stipule que l'expression Â«immigrant ir Ã©gutier . s'entend notammen t d'une personne qui pÃ©nÃ¨lre ou cherche Ã pÃ©nÃ©trer sur le ter ri toire irrÃ©guliÃ¨rement, en violation d'un arrÃ©tÃ© d'expulsion ou des lois sur l'immigration . et inclut aussi une pe rs onne qui a ainsi pÃ©nÃ©trÃ© sur le territoire : â¢â¢ Cette disposition est ainsi libellce Une personne au sujet de laquelle des directives ri squent d'Ãªtre p ri ses pa r :application de l'un quelconque des articles 8 Ã 14 ci-dessus peut Ãªtre dÃ©tenue sur l'ordre d'un fonctionnaire des services d'immigration en attendant les directiveset son expulsion en exÃ©cution des direclives donnÃ©es . . Les artictes 8 Ã 14 concernent les pouvoirs desfonctionnaires des services d'immigration et du minislre de refouler les personnes auxquelles l'auto ri sation d'entrer sur le terri loire est refusÃ©e . ainsi que les immigrants irrÃ©guliers
Le requÃ©rant demeura en prison laquelle il fut mis en libertÃ© provisoire . sa demande le 14 mars 1979 . Un ret rejetÃ© le 21 dÃ©cembre 1979 . Un au Lords fut Ã©cartÃ© le 17 juillet 19800 .
jusqu'au 28 dÃ©cembre 1978, date Ã La Divisional Court examina et rejeta ours devant la Court of Appeal fut re recours devant la Chambre de s
Dans son arrÃªt, prononcÃ© par Lord Wilberforce, la Chambre des Lords dÃ©clara que dans une demande d'habeas corpus, c'est au demandeur qu'il appartient de montrer que sa dÃ©tention est irrÃ©guliÃ¨re . Elle confirma en outre l'opinion exprimÃ©e tant par la Divisional Court que par la Court of Appeal d'aprÃ¨s laquelle l'autorisation de pÃ©nÃ©trer sur le territoire obtenue frauduleusement est entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© parce qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une -autorisation donnÃ©e conformÃ©ment Ã la prÃ©sente loi-, au sens de l'article 3(1) (a) de la loi de 1971" . Elle se rÃ©fÃ©rait Ã cet Ã©gard Ã l'affaire R . c . ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur ex parte Hussain 1978 2 ALL ER 423 . La Chambre des Lords passa Ã l'examen de l'Ã©tendue du contrÃ´le judiciaire dans le cas oÃ¹ le ministre ou un fonctionnaire des services d'intmigration agissant en son nom dÃ©cide qu'il y a eu fraude . Elle rejeta l'argument du requÃ©rant selon lequel sa dÃ©tention ne pouvait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme rÃ©guliÃ¨re que si le tribunal s'Ã©tait assurÃ© qu'il Ã©tait en fait coupable de fraude, et estima que la dÃ©cision de refouler le requÃ©rant ainsi que la dÃ©tention qui en avait rÃ©sultÃ© ne pouvaient Ã©tre attaquÃ©es que s'il pouvait Ãªtre dÃ©montrÃ© qu'il n'y avait aucun motif pour lequel le ministre, par le truchement de ses fonctionnaires, aurait pu agir, ou qu'aucune personne raisonnable n'aurait pu se prononcer comme il l'avait fait . En explicitant les principes rÃ©gissant l'Ã©tendue du contrÃ´le, Lord Wilberforce s'exprima comme suit :
â¢ Le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration, que ce soit au moment de l'entrÃ©e ou Ã celui du refoulement, doit envisager un ensemble de dispositions lÃ©gales et de directives . 11 doit agir au vu de preuves littÃ©rales et de tous autres Ã©lÃ©ntents que l'enquÃªte peut lui fournir . Il arrive souvent que l'authenticitÃ© de documents soit douteuse, que des dÃ©clarations ne puissent Ãªtre vÃ©rifiÃ©es, qu'il y ait des malentendus quant Ã ce qui a Ã©tÃ© dit, que les pratiques et les attitudes qui ont cours dans un Etat Ã©tranger doivent Ãªtre prises en compte . 11 y a place pour l'apprÃ©ciation, voire la discrÃ©tion .
* R .c . Ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur ex parte Zamir (1979) 2 ALL ER 849 (Divisional Court) . (1980) . I ALL ER 641 (Coun of Appeal) ;(1980) 2 ALL ER 768 (House of Lords) . â¢~ Cette disposition est ainsi libellÃ©e : 3-(1) .Sauf dispositions contraires de la prÃ©sente loi ou en application de celle-ci, lorsqu'une personne n'est pas un â¢palrial- ( note du traducteur : personne d laquelle a Ã©tÃ© reconnu le droit Ã¢ rÃ©sidence illimitÃ©e au Royaume-Uni) . â¢(a) elle ne peut pÃ©nÃ©trer au Royaume-Uni que si l'autorisation lui en est donnÃ©e conforrnÃ©ment Ã la prÃ©senie loi . . . .
La Divisional Court . en revanche, lorsqu'elle procÃ¨de au contrÃ´le judiciaire d'une dÃ©cision de refouler et de dÃ©tenir un individu . se place sur un autre terrain . Elle examine l'affaire au vu de dÃ©clarations sous serment pour lesquelles on ne procÃ¨de pas en pratique Ã un contre-interrogatoire, bien qu'il soit possible . Comme la prÃ©sente affaire le montre abondamment, la Divisional Court n'est pas Ã m@nte de dÃ©celer la vÃ©ritÃ© parmi des dÃ©clarations contradictoires : le demandeur a-t-il reÃ§u des notes, les a-t-il lues . Ã©tait-il capable de les comprendre . que s'est-il exactement passÃ© au moment de l'entrÃ©e . Elle n'est pas non plus Ã nt@me de peser l'importance des Ã©lÃ©ments personnels et autres que les services d'immigration se rappellent . en tout ou partie ou ne se rappellent nullement . En vÃ©ritÃ© . il lui est impossible de faire fonction de cour d'appel pour ce qui est des faits Ã partir desquels le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration s'est prononcÃ© . Ce qu'elle est en mesure de faire . et lÃ se situe la lintite de ses pouvoirs, c'est voir s'il existe des Ã©lÃ©ments Ã partir desquels ledit fonctionnaire . agissant raisonnablement, pouvait se prononcer comme il l'a fait . -
La Chambre des Lords rejeta aussi la thÃ¨se du requÃ©rant selon laquelle le seul devoir de l'immigrant Ã©tait de rÃ©pondre sans mentir Ã toute question posÃ©e par le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration et n'avait nullement le devoir de fournir des informations spontanÃ©ment . Elle a estimÃ© qu'un Â« Ã©tranger qui cherche Ã pÃ©nÃ©trer au Royaume-Uni a une obligation positive de franchise sur tous les Ã©lÃ©ments importants qui dÃ©notent un changement de situation depuis la dÃ©livrance du visa . . Enfin, la Chambre des Lords conclut que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas fai t acte de franchise en ne rÃ©vÃ©lant pas son mariage, changement manifeste de situation qui iniportait pour la dÃ©cision du fonctionnaire des services d'immigration . et que dans ces conditions celui-ci Ã©tait amplement fondÃ© Ã estimer qu'il y avait eu fraude . Elle ajouta toutefois que si la cour Ã©tait appelÃ©e Ã juger la question en soi, elle continerait Ã estinter que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait coupable de fraude puisqu-il avait prÃ©sentÃ© son passeport avec le â¢visa . dÃ©clarant Â«Ã©tablissement pour rejoindre le pÃ¨rea alors qu'il admettait Ãªtre venu au Royaume-Uni â¢sintplement pour y chercher du travail pour lui-mÃªme et son Ã©pouse . . Le requÃ©rant fut refoulÃ© du Royaume-Uni vers le Pakistan le 22 novembre 1980 . Un recours interjetÃ© depuis ce pays auprÃ¨s d'un fonctionnaire supÃ©rieur (Adjudicatorl contre ce refoulement en sa quafitÃ© d'imntigrant irrÃ©gulier, en vertu dc l'article 16 (I) de la loi de 1971 * , fut rejetÃ© le 4 dÃ©cenibre 1981 . L'autorisation d'interjetcr appel auprÃ¨s du tribunal d'appel en matiÃ¨re d'intmigration du refusÃ©e le I I mai 1982 . â¢ Les parties pertinentes de cei article sont ainsi libellÃ©es : . . . dans le cas oit des ordres sont donnÃ©es en vertu de la prÃ©sente loi en vue du refoulement d'un individu du Royaume-Uni . . . (a) au ntotif qu'il s'agit d'un imntigrant ir Ã©gulier . . . alors il peui introduire u n recours auprÃ¨s d'un fonctionnaire supÃ©rieur contre ces ordres au motif que dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, la loi ne donnait aucun pouvoir de les prendre pour la raison pour laquelle ils ont Ã©tÃ© pris . . . .
GRIEFS ET ARGUMENTATION Article 5 (1 ) Le requÃ©rant se prÃ©tend victime d'une pratique de dÃ©tention sommaire des immigrants irrÃ©guliers et de leur rÃ©foulement, sans contrÃ´le judiciaire appropriÃ©, qui viole son droit Ã la sÃ»retÃ© garanti par l'article 5 (1) de la Convention . Par ce droit Ã la stiretÃ©, tout individu jouit d'une protection contre l'arrestation arbitraire dans les cas oÃ¹ il est totalement irrÃ©prÃ©hensible et ledit droit implique que l'individu devrait Ãªtre en mesure de prÃ©voir avec une certitude raisonnable les circonstances dans lesquelles il risque d'Ãªtre arrÃªtÃ© et dÃ©tenu . Le droit Ã la sÃ»retÃ© implique aussi qu'il existe un contrÃ´le judiciaire appropriÃ© de l'arrestation et de la dÃ©tention . A l'appui des arguments ci-dessus, le requÃ©rant invoque les Ã©lÃ©ments suivants :
(a) l'incertitude de la loi pour ce qui est de la dÃ©finition d'un immigrant irrÃ©gulier et de l'Ã©tendue du devoir d'information . A cet Ã©gard, il avance les arguments suivants : - avant la dÃ©cision dans R .c . ministre de l'InlÃ©rieur ex parte Hussain 1978 2 ALL ER 423 . on estimait que la dÃ©finition de l'immigrant irrÃ©gulier ne visait que les personnes pÃ©nÃ©trant clandestinement sur le territoire . Dans l'affaire susmentionnÃ©e, la Court of Appeal a estimÃ© que l'autorisation apparente de pÃ©nÃ©trer qui a Ã©tÃ© obtenue frauduleusement est entachÃ©e de nullitÃ© et que la personne qui a ainsi pÃ©nÃ©trÃ© sur le territoire est un immigrant irrÃ©gulier . Avant cette dÃ©cision, la conceplion courante de la lÃ©gislation Ã©tait partagÃ©e par les autoritÃ©s dont les dÃ©clarations officielles allaient dans le mÃªme sens . A cet Ã©gard le requÃ©rant a produit entre autres diverses dÃ©clarations officielles du ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur et du SecrÃ©taire Ã la Chambre des Communes ; - avant la dÃ©cision de la Divisional Court dans le cas du requÃ©rant, o n ne savait pas au juste si le devoir d'un immigrant allait au-delÃ de celui de ne pas s'abstenir de toute tromperie dÃ©libÃ©rÃ©e lorsqu'il rÃ©pondait aux questions du fonclionnaire des services d'immigration ; - la question du devoir d'information et la notion d'exposÃ© continu des faits demeuraient incertaines Ã la Court of Appeal . Dans le cas du requÃ©rant, la Court of Appeal a confirmÃ© Ã l'unanimitÃ© la dÃ©cision de la juridiction infÃ©rieure d'aprÃ¨s laquelle la prÃ©sentation de son passeport contenant un visa constituait un exposÃ© continu des faits quant Ã son droit Ã pÃ©nÃ©trer au Royaume-Uni, alors qu'une personne honnÃªte aurait informÃ© le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration des changements importants de situation . Toutefoi s
une Court of Appeal composÃ©e diffÃ©remment s'est prononcÃ©e sur l'affaire Mangoo Khan le 13 fÃ©vrier 198 0* . Dans cette affaire, Lord Denning M .R . dÃ©clara : . . . .dans une affaire comme celle-ci, dans laquelle le titulaire d'un visa se prÃ©sente, le fonctionnaire des services d'immigration doit l'interroger pour savoir si un changement s'est produit dans sa situation . Ce n'est pas Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ© qu'il devrait incomber de le dire . Je dirais qu'il n'y a pas d'obligation d'information . . . - Ce n'est que lorsque l'affairedu requÃ©rant parvint Ã la Chambre des Lords que l'existence et l'Ã©tendue de l'obligation d'information ont Ã©tÃ© Ã©tablies et que les incertitudes indiquÃ©es ci-dessus ont Ã©tÃ© levÃ©es . La Chambre des Lords a estimÃ© que ladite obligation Ã©tait plus large que qui que ce soit, y compris les autoritÃ©s, l'avait jamais prÃ©tendu dans le cas du requÃ©rant . (b) L'incertitude de la loi quant Ã la date entrant en ligne de compte pour apprÃ©cier si une personne qui demande un visa remplit les conditions requises . Avant la dÃ©cision de la Divisional Court dans le cas du requÃ©rant, tant les agents d'exÃ©cution que les autoritÃ©s estimaient que la date pertinente Ã©tait celle Ã laquelle Ã©tait formulÃ©e la demande de visa . La Cour a estimÃ© que la date pertinente Ã©tait celle Ã laquelle le visa Ã©tait accordÃ© . Le requÃ©rant ne pouvait donc savoir si les changements importants de situation Ã©taient ceux qui concernaient les conditions Ã remplir par les enfants de moins de 18 ans (ce qui Ã©tait son cas lorsqÃ» il formula sa demande) ou par les enfants de plus de 18 ans (ce qui Ã©tait son cas lorsque le visa fut accordÃ©) et il aurait penchÃ© en tout cas pour la premiÃ¨re hypothÃ¨se . (c) L'incertitude de la loi quant Ã l'importance du mariage pour la demande d'un fils de moins de 18 ans . Contrairement Ã l'article 39 . l'article 38 des dispositions rÃ©glementaires ne stipulait pas qu'un fils ou une fille devait Ãªtre cÃ©libataire" . Personne ne s'Ã©tait prononcÃ© sur le point de savoir s'il s'agissait d'une exigence implicite . En consÃ©quence, le requÃ©rant ne pouvait savoir si le fait de son mariage revÃªtait de l'importance et edtout cas il aurait penchÃ© pour la nÃ©gative . (d) Le fardeau dÃ©raisonnable que la pratique incertaine ci-dessus faisai t peser sur le requÃ©rant en ce que : - il Ã©tait censÃ© savoir quels changements de situation avaient un e incidence sur les droits auxquels il pouvait prÃ©tendre alors qu'il n'avait reÃ§u aucune note indiquant les dispositions rÃ©glementaires en question ; alors que ces notes Ã©taient rÃ©digÃ©es en anglais ; alors qu'il avait 15 ans et avait assez peu d'instruction ; alors qu'Ã l'Ã©poque Ã laquelle il aurairpu les lire, il n'aurait Ã©tÃ© â¢ R .c . ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur, ex parte Khan, (1980) . 2 ALL ER . 337-346 . â¢â¢ L'article 38 de ces disposilions stipulait notamment que les enfants de moins de 18 ans doivent Ãªtre admis en vue de leur Ã©tablissement . . . si un parent est Ã©tabli au Royaume-Uni . . .
intÃ©ressÃ© que par les parties relatives aux enfants mineurs de 18 ans ; alors qu'il a pÃ©nÃ©trÃ© au Royaume-Uni quelque trois ans et demi aprÃ¨s qu'il avait lu la note ; alors que la base des droits auxquels il pouvait prÃ©tendre Ã©tait incertaine dans les dispositions rÃ©glementaires ; alors que l'impo rt ance du fait de son mariage Ã©tait ince rtaine ; alors qu'au cours de l'entretien, le requÃ©rant fut soumis Ã un interrogatoire sur plusieu rs questions sans intÃ©rÃªt de so rt e qu'il ne pouvait dÃ©mÃªler ce qui en avait . - le requÃ©rant pouvait lÃ©gitimement supposer que le fonctionnaire des se rv ices d'immigration, mieux placÃ© que lui pour connaÃ®tre les dispositions rÃ©glementaires . l'interrogerait sur toutes les questions prÃ©sentant un intÃ©rÃªt pour les droits auxquels il pouvait prÃ©tendre, et qu'il n'avait pas besoin de fournir de lui-mÃªme des informations qui n'Ã©taient pas demandÃ©es : alors qu'Ã l'Ã©poque et jusqu'Ã la dÃ©cision de la Chambre des Lords, on estimait qu'il n'y avait pas d'obligation lÃ©gale de divulguer des informations, du moins dans les cas oÃ¹ cette abstention n'Ã©tait pas dolosive . (e) L'absence de tout contrÃ´le judiciaire du pouvoir de dÃ©tenir et d'expulser une personne en ce que, pour les raisons susmentionnÃ©es : - une demande d'habeas corpus ne constitue pas une garantie suffisante : - un recours en vertu de l'article 16 de la loi de 1971 sur l'immigration ne pouvait Ãªtre introduit qu'aprÃ¨s que le requÃ©rant eut Ã©tÃ© refoulÃ©, celui-ci n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© autori sÃ© Ã attendre l'audience, et la procÃ©dure Ã©tait inique Ã l'Ã©gard de l'appelant .
Article 5 (1) (1) La dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant n'Ã©tait pas rÃ©guliÃ¨re, au sens de l'a rt icle 5(1) f) . A titre subsidiaire, elle n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e selon les voies lÃ©gales, au sens de l'article 5 (1) . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant renvoie Ã l'arr@t de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Sunday Times . Il rÃ©itÃ¨re l'argumentation ci-dessus selon laquelle les rÃ¨gles lÃ©gislatives relatives Ã une imniigration irrÃ©guliÃ¨re, Ã la divulgation et Ã l'importance des informations n'Ã©taient pas libellÃ©es avec suffisamment de prÃ©cision pour lui permettre de rÃ©gler sa conduite .
Article 5 (4 ) Dans le cas du requÃ©rant, la procÃ©dure destinÃ©e Ã dÃ©terminer la rÃ©gularitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention n'a pas Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e .Ã bref dÃ©lai ., au sens de l'article 5 (4) . a . Le requÃ©rant fut placÃ© en dÃ©tention le 2 octobre 1978 . b . II demanda une ordonnance d'habeas corpus le 23 octobre 1978 . L'examen de sa requÃªte fut ajournÃ© pour que notification fÃ»t donnÃ©e au ministre de l'IntÃ©rieur, ce qui fut fait le lendemain .
c . Le requÃ©rant fut mis en libertÃ© provisoire la 18 dÃ©cembre 1978, date Ã laquelle il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© sur sa demande . 11 fut statuÃ© sur la demande par la dÃ©cision de la Divisional Cou rt l e .d 14 mars 1979 . La pÃ©riode de 20 semaines et deux jours du 23 octobre 1978 a u .e 14 mars 1979, respectivement celle de huit semaines du 23 octobre 1978 au 18 dÃ©cembre 1978, furent absolument excessives . Le requÃ©rant soutient en outre que la procÃ©dure le concernant n'a pas compo rt Ã© de dÃ©cision sur la =rÃ©gularitÃ© - de sa dÃ©tention . Le refoulement du requÃ©rant et a fortiori sa dÃ©tention dans l'attente de celui-ci n'Ã©taient rÃ©guliers au regard du droit interne du Royaume-Uni que s'il Ã©tait en fait un immigrant irrÃ©gulier . Dans tout autre cas, la loi n'accorde aucun pouvoir de donner . des directives en vue du refoulement et en consÃ©quence aucun pouvoir de dÃ©tention . . - Pour se conformer Ã l'article 5 ( 4), la cour aurait dÃ» vÃ© ri fier la justification matÃ©rielle de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant . autrement dit, elle aurait dÃ» s'assurer que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait, au vu des faits, un immigrant irrÃ©gulier . Le requÃ©rant soutient enfin que la procÃ©dure dans son cas ne rÃ©pondait pas aux garanties fondamentales d'une procÃ©dure judiciaire appliquÃ©es en matiÃ¨re de privation de libertÃ© . et qui sont inhÃ©rentes Ã la notion de ~ tribunal . telle que l'entend l'article 5 (4) . La procÃ©dure applicable dans le cas du requÃ©rant assurait des garanties sensiblentent infÃ©rieures Ã celles existant en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dans les Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant prÃ©sente les arguments suivant s - c'est au requÃ©rant qu'incombait la charge de prouver que sa dÃ©tention Ã©tait irrÃ©guliÃ¨re, de sorte qu'une fois que le ministre eut dÃ©montrÃ© qu'il avait des motifs raisonnables de dÃ©cider que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait un immigrant irrÃ©gulier, le requÃ©rant devait dÃ©montrer qu'il n'y avait aucun Ã©lÃ©ment au vu duquel le ministre avait pu prendre cette dÃ©cision, ou qu'aucune personne raisonnable Ã sa place n'aurait pu la prendre . - La Cour n'a pas entendu des tÃ©moignanges et des contre-interrogatoires pour dÃ©couvrir la vÃ©ritÃ© parmi les dÃ©clarations contradictoires sur le point de savoir, notamment, si le requÃ©rant avait ou aurait dÃ» avoir connaissance des conditions Ã remplir pour pÃ©nÃ©trer sur le territoire et de l'importance du fait de son ma ri age, et quant Ã ce qui avait Ã©tÃ© dit Ã ses diffÃ©rents entretiens . Partant, et la charge de la preuve incontbant au requÃ©rant, les conflits de tÃ©moignage ont Ã©tÃ© tranchÃ©s en faveur du ministre .
Article 6 Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que la conclusion qu'il Ã©tait un . immigrant irrÃ©gulier . constituait en fait une dÃ©cision sur une .accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale . . II se rÃ©fÃ¨re Ã ce propos Ã diverses infractions visÃ©es aux articles 24 Ã 26 de la loi de 1971 . 11 allÃ¨gue en particulier une violation de l'article 6 (2), puisqu'il lui incombait de prouver la rÃ©gularit6 de sa prÃ©sence au RoyaunteUni, et de l'article 6(3) d), puisqu'au cours de la procÃ©dure d'habeas corpus il n'a pu contre-interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que sa dÃ©tention en vue de son refoulement au Royaume-Uni en qualitÃ© d'â¢immigrant irrÃ©gulierÂ» n'a pas respÃ©ctÃ© les .voies lÃ©galesÂ» et n'Ã©tait pas .rÃ©gulier ., au sens de l'article S(1) f) de la Convention . Il se plaint aussi, sur le terrain de l'article 5 (4), de n'avoir pas pu contester la â¢rÃ©gularitÃ©â¢ et sa dÃ©tention Ã bref dÃ©lai . devant un tribunal comme l'exige ladite disposition . 1 . Epuisement des voies de recours internes Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que la requÃªte doit ÃªtrÃ© rejetÃ©e pour non-Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes puisqu'Ã la date Ã laquelle elle fut enregistfÃ©e, le recours du requÃ©rant en vertu de l'article 16 de la loi sur l'immigration Ã©tait encore pendant . En outre, le requÃ©rant n'avait Ã aucun moment fait valoir devant les tribunaux qu'il avait en fait informÃ© les autoritÃ©s britanniques Ã Islamabad de son mariage . Le requÃ©rant ne maintient plus cet argument devant la Commission et soutient qu'un recours par application de l'article 26 ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme un recours efficace pour dÃ©tention irrÃ©guliÃ¨re au regard de la Convention .
La Commission relÃ¨ve qu'un recours devant un fonctionnaire supÃ©rieur (Adjudicator) en vertu de l'article 16 de la loi de 1971 est â¢un recours contre une expulsion du Royaume-Uni . Il ne permet pas au demandeur de contester la â¢ rÃ©gularitÃ© â¢ de sa dÃ©tention avant expulsion, ce qui constitue pour l'essentiel la base des griefs que le requÃ©rant tire de la Convention . Dans ces circonstances, la Comntission considÃ¨re que le requÃ©rant n'apas omis d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes pour ce qui est des faits Ã l'origine de sa plainte, comme l'exige l'article 26 de la Convention .
2 . Article 5 Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'il y ait eu violation de son droit Ã la â¢sGretÃ© . ou, Ã titre subsidiaire, que son arrestation et sa dÃ©tention ne respectaient pas .les voies lÃ©galesâ¢ ou n'Ã©taient pas .rÃ©guliÃ¨resâ¢ au regard de l'article 5 (1) f) .
S'appuyant sur l'arrÃªt de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans l'affaire Sunday Times (26 avril 1979, par . 48-50) il soutient Ã cet Ã©gard que les dispositions lÃ©gales rÃ©gissant son arrestation et sa dÃ©tention n'Ã©taient pas raisonnablement prÃ©visibles ni formulÃ©es avec assez de prÃ©cision . Il invoque en particulier l'incertitude de la loi pour ce qui est de la dÃ©finition d'un immigrant irrÃ©gulier et de la portÃ©e du devoir d'information . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient de son cÃ´tÃ© que les dispositions lÃ©gales pertinentes Ã©taient suffisamment prÃ©visibles et que l'arrestation et la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant se justifiaient au regard de l'article 5(1) f), parce qu'il s'agissait de al'arrestation ou de la dÃ©tention rÃ©guliÃ¨re d'une personne . . . contre laquelle une procÃ©dure d'expulsion ou d'extradition est en cours â¢ .
Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue en outre qu'il ne pouvait contester la .rÃ©gularitÃ© . de sa dÃ©tention, comme l'exige l'article 5 (4), puisque les tribunaux n'ont pas examinÃ© la question de savoir s'il Ã©tait un immigrant irrÃ©gulier . Il se plaint en outre que la procÃ©dure nationale ne rÃ©pondait pas Ã l'exigence du Â«bref dÃ©lai . posÃ©e par cette disposition . Le Gouvernement prÃ©tend que pour satisfaire aux exigences de l'article 5(4), il n'est pas nÃ©cessaire que le tribunal puisse contrÃ´ler la justification de la dÃ©cision d'expulser mais simplement qu'il s'assure de la justification de la dÃ©tention, c'est-Ã -dire qu'il examine si l'intÃ©ressÃ© est dÃ©tenu dans l'attente de l'exÃ©cution de la dÃ©cision administrative de l'expulser du pays . Il soutient encore que days les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce . eu Ã©gard en particulier Ã la possibilitÃ© de demander plus tÃ´t une libÃ©ration provisoire, la procÃ©dure s'est conformÃ©e Ã la cbndition du -bref dÃ©laiÂ» posÃ©e par l'article 5(4) . La Commission considÃ¨re que la prÃ©sente requÃªte soulÃ¨ve des questions complexes de droit et de fait sur le terrain de l'article 5 (1) et (4), qui, pour Ãªtre tranchÃ©es, appellent un examen au fond . Elle conclut donc que les griefs du requÃ©rant tirÃ©s de ces dispositions sont recevables . 3 . Article 6 (1 ) Enfin, lerequÃ©rant se plaint d'avoir Ã©tÃ© effectivement accusÃ© d'une infraction en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale . puisque la constatation qu'il Ã©tait un immigrant irrÃ©gulier revient Ã une allÃ©gation de conduite criminelle visÃ©e Ã l'article 24 (1) a) de la loi de 1971 . Il alb :gue aussi une violation de l'article 6 (2) en ce qu'il lui incombait de prouver la rÃ©gularitÃ© de sa prÃ©sence au Royaume-Uni, ainsi qu'une violation de l'article 6 (3) d) en ce qu'il n'a pu contre-interroger les tÃ©moins Ã charge . La Comniission note que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© expulsÃ© du Royaume-Uni en qualitÃ© d'immigrant irrÃ©gulier au motif qu'il avait obtenu frauduleusement une autorisation d'entrÃ©e dans le pays . Il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© formellement accusÃ© d'une infraction pÃ©nale par application des articles 24 Ã 27 de la loi de 1971 . Les services d'imntigration comme les tribunaux ont estimÃ© que l'autorisation qu'i l - 174 -
avait reÃ§ue de pÃ©nÃ©trer dans le territoire Ã©tait nulle en raison de son manquentenl Ã son devoir de franchise, de sorte qu'il Ã©tait devenu un . immigrant irrÃ©gulier violant les lois sur l'immigration, au sens de l'article 33 (1) de la loi . Dans ces circonstances, la Commission estime que la procÃ©dure administrative qui a cnnduit Ã xon expulsion n'entporle pas de dÃ©cision sur une accusation en niatiÃ¨re pÃ©nale . Son expulsion ne peut pas non plus Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme une sanction pÃ©nale dÃ©guisÃ©e . Il s'ensuit que l'article 6 n'est pas applicable en l'espÃ¨ce . Ce grief doit donc Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27 (2) de la Convention . Par cex ntotifs, la Commissio n 1 . DECLARE LA REQUÃ'fE IRRECEVABLE pour autant qu'elle se fonde sur l'article 6 de la Convention .
2 . DECLARE LA REQUÃTE RECEVABLE pour le surplus .
- 175-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/07/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page