Source: http://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctapun/0512/opa050149-1220.htm
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 18:50:07
Document Index: 384349388

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 1', '§ 645', '§ 15', '§ 2', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 645', '§ 15']

In the Matter of the Appeal of Mark and Lisa Fiedler from the decision of the Ashley Township Board, acting as the Board of Adjustment in denying an application for variance, Mark Fiedler and Lisa Fiedler, Appellants, and Mark Fiedler, et al., Respondents, vs. Ashley Township, by and through its Board of Supervisors, Appellant. A05-149, Court of Appeals Unpublished, December 20, 2005.
A05-149
In the Matter of the Appeal of Mark and Lisa Fiedler
from the decision of the Ashley Township Board,
acting as the Board of Adjustment in denying an application for variance,
Mark Fiedler and Lisa Fiedler,
and Mark Fiedler, et al.,
Ashley Township, by and through its Board of Supervisors,
File No. C4034267/C404522
Peter B. Tiede, Kelly S. Hadac, Murnane, Conlin, White & Brandt, 444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)
Jeffry C. Braegelmann, Gary W. Koch, Sara N. Wilson, Gislason & Hunter L.L.P., 2700 South Broadway, P.O. Box 458, New Ulm, MN 56073-0458 (for respondents)
This appeal is from a summary judgment determining that because appellant township did not provide respondents with written reasons for the denial of respondents’ variance application within 60 days after respondents submitted the application, the application was approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2002). We reverse and remand.
Since 1997, respondents Mark and Lisa Fiedler have owned and operated a hog feedlot. Appellant Ashley Township issued a site-plan permit to operate the feedlot in April 1997. On March 27, 2003, the Fiedlers submitted to the township an application for a permit to add to the feedlot a fifth hog-confinement barn. The Ashley Township Board considered the application at its regular meeting on April 8, 2003, and determined that the proposed expansion “will require a variance because it does not meet setbacks.” The township sent the Fiedlers a letter stating that the permit application could not be granted because it “is not in compliance with Ashley Township setbacks” and “will require a variance.”
On April 21, 2003, the Fiedlers submitted to the township an application for a variance to add the hog-confinement barn. The township board considered the application at a special meeting on May 12, 2003, and at the board’s regular meeting on May 13, 2003, the board voted to deny the Fiedlers’ variance application. The Fiedlers were present at the meeting. The township gave the Fiedlers a copy of their variance application on which “Denied” was handwritten next to the signatures of three board members.
The chairperson of the township board stated in an affidavit that, on May 13, 2003, the board filled out and adopted “Findings of Fact Supporting/Denying of Variance.”[1] The township board did not give the Fiedlers a copy of the “Findings of Fact Supporting/Denying a Variance,” which contained the board’s reasons for denying the variance application, until August 18, 2003, when a copy was mailed to the Fiedlers.
The Fiedlers appealed the variance denial to the district court and also brought a declaratory judgment action against the township seeking, among other things, an order granting the Fiedlers’ permit and/or variance application by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2002). The appeal and declaratory judgment action were consolidated. The Fiedlers moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the township filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Fiedlers based on its conclusion that the township failed to comply with Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2002), and, therefore, the Fiedlers’ variance application was approved by operation of law. The district court did not address the Fiedlers’ remaining claims. This appeal followed.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001).
When interpreting statutes, our function is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. If the statute is free from ambiguity, we look only at its plain language. However, if the statute’s literal meaning leads to an absurd result that utterly departs from the legislature’s purpose, we may look beyond the language and examine other indicia of legislative intent. If, by contrast, the statute’s unambiguous language merely produces a troubling result, we must apply it without reference to its drafting history.
Anker v. Little, 541 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. App. 1995) (citations omitted).
The statute in effect when the Fiedlers submitted their variance application on April 21, 2003, and when the township board denied the application on May 13, 2003, states:
Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2002). The statutory definition of “agency” includes a town. Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 1 (2002). The statute also provides that “[a]n agency response meets the 60-day time limit if the agency can document that the response was sent within 60 days of receipt of the written request.” Id., subd. 3(c) (2002).
The district court concluded that because the township did not provide the Fiedlers with written reasons for the denial of their application until more than 90 days after the Fiedlers submitted their application, the township did not comply with Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, and because the township did not comply with the statute, the application shall be approved. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on this court’s opinion in Demolition Landfill Servs., L.L.C. v. City of Duluth, 609 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000).
In Demolition Landfill, the 60-day statutory decision-making period had been extended as permitted under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 3(f) (1998), but it was undisputed that the period expired on April 16, 1999. Id. at 280. At a meeting on April 12, 1999, the city council voted on a resolution to grant a special-use permit to Demolition Landfill. Id. The resolution failed. Id. At the next meeting, held May 24, 1999, a resolution denying the permit application was introduced, and the council members voted on whether to approve the resolution. Id. The resolution passed. Id.
The issue before this court was whether the city council’s April 12 rejection of the resolution to grant the special-use permit constituted a denial of the permit under Minn. Stat. § 15.99. This court concluded that it did not and held that because Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, states that failure to deny a permit application within the statutory decision-making period mandates approval of the application, the application was approved. This court also stated:
[E]ven if we were to conclude that the refusal to approve the resolution granting the permit constituted a denial of the permit application, it is undisputed that no written reasons were given to [the applicant] when the council rejected the resolution granting the permit. The governing statute requires the agency to provide written reasons for a denial “at the time that it denies the request.” Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. Here, written reasons for rejecting the resolution granting the permit were provided within the resolution denying the permit that was adopted May 24.
Citing a portion of this language in Demolition Landfill, the district court concluded, “Since written reasons for a denial must be provided with the denial, and the Township did not provide Fiedlers with such reasons until more than 90 days later, this Court finds that the Township did not comply with Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2.” It appears that in reaching this conclusion, the district court interpreted the sentence in Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, “If an agency denies the request, it must state in writing the reasons for the denial at the time that it denies the request,” as meaning not just that the agency must state in writing reasons for the denial at the time of the denial, but that at the time of the denial, the agency must also provide the written reasons for the denial to the applicant.
The district court was understandably misled by this court’s statement in Demolition Landfill that “no written reasons were given to [the applicant] when the council rejected the resolution granting the permit.” 609 N.W.2d at 281. This language suggests that a written document must be given to the applicant.[2] But it is apparent from a careful reading of Demolition Landfill that the issue this court considered was not whether an agency’s written reasons for denying a permit must be given to the applicant at the time of the denial but was, instead, whether an agency must state written reasons for a denial at the time of the denial.
The language from Demolition Landfill that is quoted above appears in the opinion immediately after the court determined that the city council’s April 12 rejection of the resolution to grant the special-use permit did not constitute a denial of the permit under Minn. Stat. § 15.99. The quoted language then explains that even if the vote rejecting the resolution were a denial, the denial would not meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, because the council did not give the applicant written reasons for the denial when it rejected the resolution on April 12. The opinion then explains that written reasons for rejecting the resolution were not provided until May 24 when the city council adopted the resolution denying the permit application.
But even though the opinion states that written reasons were provided on May 24, nothing in the opinion suggests that on May 24 the city council provided the applicant with a copy of the written reasons. In fact, the opinion states that on May 24, “written reasons for rejecting the resolution granting the permit were provided within the resolution denying the permit,” 609 N.W.2d at 281 (emphasis added), which suggests that providing written reasons means making the reasons part of the resolution, rather than providing a copy of the resolution to someone. The distinction that the Demolition Landfill court draws between April 12 and May 24 is not that written reasons were not given to the applicant on April 12 but were given to the applicant on May 24; the distinction is that there were no written reasons on April 12, but there were written reasons on May 24.
Also, the Demolition Landfill court goes on to state:
Subdivision 2 [of Minn. Stat. § 15.99], at issue here, states that the consequence of not denying a request within 60 days is automatic approval. Immediately following this stated consequence, the subdivision mandates simultaneous, written reasons for the denial. Cf. R.A. Putnam & Assocs. v. City of Mendota Heights, 510 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. App. 1994) (“The requirement that contemporaneous findings be recorded prevents a city from offering after-the-fact justifications * * * unrelated to the actual reasons for the initial decision.” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994). We conclude therefore, that simultaneous, written reasons for a denial are mandatory and not directory.
This language demonstrates that the court was not considering whether providing the applicant with a copy of the written reasons for a denial at the time of the denial was mandatory; the court was considering whether stating the reasons for denial in writing at the time of the denial was mandatory. We conclude that this court did not determine in Demolition Landfill that at the time an agency denies a request, the agency must state in writing the reasons for the denial and provide the written reasons for the denial to the applicant; this court only determined that at the time an agency denies a request, the agency must state in writing the reasons for the denial.
We also conclude that the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, does not require an agency to provide an applicant with a copy of its written reasons for denying a request. The statute says only that an agency that denies a request “must state in writing the reasons for the denial at the time that it denies the request.” Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. The statute says nothing about what the agency must do with the written reasons. It does not require the agency to provide a copy of the written reasons to the applicant, or anyone else. Here, the township denied the Fiedlers’ request for a variance well within the 60-day period, and at the time it denied the request, it stated in writing the reasons for the denial. Therefore, the township met the requirements of the statute.
The Fiedlers argue:
It is illogical to conclude under the clear reading of the statute as a whole that the legislature on the one hand made it mandatory for an agency to provide written reasons for its denial at the time of denial and made it mandatory for the agency to provide the applicant with notice of its decision within 60 days, but on the other hand not require an agency to provide those written reasons to the applicant.
But we do not review a statute to determine whether it is logical. See State ex rel. Coduti v. Hauser, 219 Minn. 297, 303, 17 N.W.2d 504, 507-08 (1945) (declaring that the legislature is free to ignore logic and perpetrate injustice so long as it does not violate the constitution and that, absent ambiguity in the relevant statute, any remedy must be by amendment of the statute and not by construction (quotation omitted)). We look at the plain language of a statute to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Anker, 541 N.W.2d at 336. Only if the statute’s literal meaning leads to an absurd result that utterly departs from the legislature’s purpose may we look beyond the language and examine other indicia of legislative intent. Id. If a statute’s unambiguous language merely produces a troubling result, we must apply the language. Id.
Requiring an agency to state in writing the reasons for denying a request at the time the agency denies the request without also requiring the agency to provide the written reasons to the applicant whose request is denied does not lead to an absurd result that utterly departs from the legislature’s purpose. As this court noted in Demolition Landfill, requiring an agency to state the reasons for a denial in writing at the time of the denial can serve the purpose of preventing the agency from later offering after-the-fact justifications unrelated to the actual reasons for the denial. 609 N.W.2d at 282. See also N. States Power Co. v. City of Mendota Heights, 646 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Minn. App. 2002) (stating that the underlying purpose of Minn. Stat. § 15.99 “is to establish clear deadlines for local governments to take action on zoning applications”), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2002). This purpose can be accomplished without also requiring the agency to provide the applicant with a copy of the written reasons at the time of the denial, and not requiring an agency to do so does not utterly depart from the legislature’s purpose.
Furthermore, as the supreme court has stated, “it has long been the rule that ‘[w]here failure of expression rather than ambiguity of expression * * * is the vice of the enactment, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.’” State v. Lucas, 589 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1999) (quoting State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959)). Therefore, because the legislature omitted from Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, any requirement that an agency provide to an applicant written reasons for the agency’s denial of a request, we may not supply such a requirement under the guise of construction. See Green Giant Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995) (stating “[courts] will not supply that which the legislature purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks”).
The Fiedlers argue that amendments to Minn. Stat. § 15.99 that the legislature enacted in 2003 clarify that the legislature intended that written reasons be provided to an applicant at the time of a denial. In 2003, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, by adding the following language:
If a multimember governing body denies a request, it must state the reasons for denial on the record and provide the applicant in writing a statement of the reasons for the denial. If the written statement is not adopted at the same time as the denial, it must be adopted at the next meeting following the denial of the request but before the expiration of the time allowed for making a decision under this section. The written statement must be consistent with the reasons stated in the record at the time of the denial. The written statement must be provided to the applicant upon adoption.
2003 Minn. Laws ch. 41, § 1, at 322 (emphasis added).
Statutory amendments clarifying or defining previously undefined terms may be read into a statute retroactively. Carlson v. Lilyerd, 449 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 1990); see also Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 485 N.W.2d 702, 708 (Minn. 1992) (stating that while “[o]rdinarily” statutes are not applied retroactively, amendments seeking only to clarify “may be applied retroactively” because “the legislature is not changing its mind but is only making clear the legislative intent that was always there”) (citations omitted). But when the legislature changes a statute, the courts are to presume that the legislature intends a change in the law unless it appears that the legislature only intended to clarify the earlier statute. N. States Power Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 571 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn. 1997); see Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2004) (“No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.”). In the legislation that amended Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, the legislature expressly stated that the amendment became “effective June 1, 2003, for requests submitted on or after that date.” 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 41, § 2, at 323. This express statement that the amendment applies to requests submitted on or after June 1, 2003, refutes any argument that the legislature intended the amendment to retroactively apply as a clarifying amendment.
Because the township was not required under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, to provide the Fiedlers with a copy of the township’s reasons for denying the Fiedlers’ variance application, the district court erred when it concluded that the township failed to deny the application within 60 days and that the application was approved by operation of law. Therefore, we reverse and remand to permit the district court to consider the Fiedlers’ remaining claims.
I concur in the result of the majority but not its reasoning. Because I believe that the Ashley Township Board (Board) complied with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2002) on June 10, 2003 when it adopted its minutes denying the variance and setting forth in writing the reasons for its denial, I concur.
Section 15.99, subdivision 2 provides that, for this zoning request, the Board was required to take action within 60 days and to “state in writing the reasons for the denial at the time that it denies the request.” “An agency response meets the 60-day time limit if the agency can document that the response was sent within 60 days of receipt of the written request.” Id., subd. 3(c).
At the May 13, 2003 town board meeting, one of the Board members filled out a township form entitled “Findings of Fact Supporting/Denying a Variance” (variance form) in handwriting. The Board submitted an affidavit of one of its members stating that the variance form was “filled out and adopted by the Town Board on May 13, 2003.” On June 10, 2003, the Board adopted the minutes of the May 13th meeting (May minutes). The May minutes confirm that the Board denied the variance, and stated in writing that the reasons for denial were that it would cause “setbacks to neighboring residences” and “the site as it exists is non-conforming.”
The crux of this case is whether the Board complied with the requirement that, at the time of the denial, it “state in writing the reasons for the denial.” Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. As I read that statutory phrase, it requires two things, i.e., that the Board “state” its reasons for denial and that those reasons be expressed in writing. Id. The plain meaning of the word “state” is to “set forth in words; declare,” and to declare is defined as “[t]o make known formally or officially.” The American Heritage Dictionary 471, 1694(4th ed. 2000); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (words and phrases are construed according to their common and approved usage). Thus, I interpret the statutory phrase to “state in writing the reasons for the denial” to require that the reasons be in writing, and that those reasons be officially announced or published.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Board, I would agree that the variance form was adopted by the Board at its May meeting. But there is no evidence that the variance form was officially announced or published by the Board at that meeting. And the May minutes officially adopted by the Board in June do not adopt the variance form. Therefore, I would conclude that the Board did not officially announce or publish the written reasons for its denial at the May meeting. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Board complied with the statute at its May meeting.
But the Board’s adoption of the May minutes on June 10th did meet the requirements of the statute. The minutes adopted in June occurred within the sixty days required by the statute, and the minutes state the reasons for the denial. See Concept Properties, LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804, 827 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2005). And the minutes were officially announced or published at the meeting and were available to the public including respondents. Consequently, the Board complied with the statute at its June meeting.
[1] In their appellate brief, the Fiedlers contend that they “are in an impossible position of being unable to admit or deny whether or not the Findings were, in fact, written and/or adopted by the Town Board on May 13, 2003.” But the Fiedlers do not cite any evidence that contradicts the chairperson’s affidavit and establishes a genuine issue of fact whether the township board adopted the findings on May 13, 2003. See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69-70 (Minn. 1997) (genuine issue for trial must be established by “substantial evidence”).
[2] The specific statutory requirement is that an agency “must state in writing the reasons for the denial.” Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. The statute does not state that an agency must give or provide written reasons to the applicant, as Demolition Landfill suggests.