Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/9/1553/540670/
Timestamp: 2019-06-24 23:58:15
Document Index: 67479026

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', 'art 4700', '§ 1331', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 47000']

Gilbert Pearson, the Surviving Natural Parent of Teresalouise Pearson; Phyliss Pearson, the Surviving Naturalparent of Teresa Louise Pearson; Tonia Bovee, the Survivingspouse of Glenn Archie Bovee, Deceased and Surviving Motherof Heath Bovee, Deceased, and Korrina Bovee; Korrina Bovee,surviving Daughter of Glenn Archie Bovee, Deceased Andsurviving Sister of Heath Bovee, Deceased, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. United States of America, by and Through the Department Ofinterior, Bureau of Land Management and Departmentof the Army, Defendant-appellee, 9 F.3d 1553 (9th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1993 › Gilbert Pearson, the Surviving Natural Parent of Teresalouise Pearson; Phyliss Pearson, the Survivin...
Gilbert Pearson, the Surviving Natural Parent of Teresalouise Pearson; Phyliss Pearson, the Surviving Naturalparent of Teresa Louise Pearson; Tonia Bovee, the Survivingspouse of Glenn Archie Bovee, Deceased and Surviving Motherof Heath Bovee, Deceased, and Korrina Bovee; Korrina Bovee,surviving Daughter of Glenn Archie Bovee, Deceased Andsurviving Sister of Heath Bovee, Deceased, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. United States of America, by and Through the Department Ofinterior, Bureau of Land Management and Departmentof the Army, Defendant-appellee, 9 F.3d 1553 (9th Cir. 1993)
Argued and Submitted Aug. 10, 1993. Decided Oct. 28, 1993
We review de novo the district court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction. See Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1499 (9th Cir. 1989). It is "well-established law that ... jurisdictional defenses," such as the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, "cannot be waived by the parties and may be raised for the first time on appeal or even raised by a court sua sponte." Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 701 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).
In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), we use a two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function exception applies. First, we consider "whether the challenged action is a matter of choice for the acting employees: ' [T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow' " and the employee fails to follow that course of action. Prescott, 973 F.2d at 703 (quoting Summers v. United States, 905 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1990)). Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element of judgment, we must determine whether that judgment "is of a kind that the discretionary function was designed to shield." Id. (internal quotation omitted). The discretionary function was designed to protect from review decisions "susceptible to policy analysis." United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 (1991).
The United States government is protected by the discretionary function exception for the BLM's decision not to fence the land adjacent to U.S. 95 or otherwise prevent wild horses and burros from crossing the highway, notwithstanding the BLM's knowledge of accidents involving such animals on U.S. 95. First, no federal statute, regulation, or policy requires the BLM to fence federal grazing land adjacent to highways. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq.; 43 C.F.R. Part 4700; Cibola-Trigo Herd Area Management Plan, Final 1980, ("Management Plan");1 Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Program Guidance, 1983 ("Program Guidance"). Furthermore, we have previously determined that the Burros Act, though creating a duty on the part of the BLM to remove wild horses and burros that stray onto private land upon request,2 "does not require the BLM to prevent straying in the first instance." Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986).
Second, the BLM's decision to leave the land adjacent to U.S. 95 unfenced and not prevent wild horses and burros from straying onto the highway is susceptible to the type of policy considerations protected by the discretionary function exception. See Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 1989) (government need not "prove that it considered these [policy] factors and made a conscious decision on the basis of them"). The BLM has discretion to balance the safety gains to be achieved by fencing the highway, against the congressional directives to: (1) consider the wild horses and burros in the area where they are presently found as an "integral part of the natural system of the public lands," 16 U.S.C. § 1331; (2) manage the "wild free-roaming horses and burros in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands," 16 U.S.C. § 1333; (3) keep management activities "at the minimum feasible level" to avoid " 'zoolike' developments," 16 U.S.C. § 1333; Fallini, 783 F.2d at 1346 (quoting S.Rep. No. 92-242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2149, 2151-52); and (4) manage the wild horses and burros "with the goal of maintaining free-roaming behavior," while considering the other uses of the public and adjacent private land. 43 C.F.R. §§ 47000.0-6(c), 4710.3.
The BLM's decision to leave U.S. 95 unfenced and allow wild horses and burros to cross the highway is readily distinguishable from cases where an agency is alleged to have ignored an established safety policy rather than to have balanced competing considerations. Compare Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991) (agency decision to install overhead ground wires at certain places and not others was not made in disregard of safety considerations), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1473 (1992), with Summers, 905 F.2d at 1215-16 (agency failure to identify and warn of danger of hot coals on park beaches was not a balanced policy decision, but rather a departure from established safety policy); ARA Leisure Services Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987) (agency decision to design and construct road without guardrails was grounded in social and political policy, but agency failure to maintain road in safe condition was not grounded in policy). The BLM's discretionary decision not to prevent wild horses and burros from crossing U.S. 95 is not subject to "judicial second-guessing." United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).