Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/324/215/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-07-24 00:51:52
Document Index: 373064996

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 3348', '§ 2', 'art, 43']

CANADIAN AVIATOR, LTD. V. UNITED STATES, 324 U. S. 215 - Volume 324 - 1945 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 324 > CANADIAN AVIATOR, LTD. V. UNITED STATES, 324 U. S. 215 (1945) > Full Text
On August 4, 1942, the petitioner, the owners of the steamship Cavelier, filed a libel in personam in admiralty in a federal district court against the United States to recover for damages to its ship, the Cavelier, alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of the United States Naval patrol boat, YP 249, a public vessel of the United States. The libel averred that, on July 7, 1942, the Cavelier, while en route from Canada to Jamaica, was ordered by United States Naval authorities to enter Delaware
The respondent, United States, appeared specially and sought to have the libel dismissed because it failed to state a cause of action for which the United States had consented to be sued. Petitioner, the libellant, opposed this action, relying on § 1 of the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which provided that a "libel in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States. . . ." [Footnote 5] The federal district court dismissed the libel on the ground that the accident alleged in the libel was not caused by the "negligent operation of the vessel," that the vessel was
The Public Vessels Act, 1925, was the last in a series of statutes directed generally at affording private vessel owners an adequate and efficient remedy for damages arising from negligent operation of ships owned by the United States. [Footnote 6] Prior to 1916, a private owner whose ship was
In The Lake Monroe, 250 U. S. 246, this Court held that this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity from suit subjected Shipping Board merchant vessels to proceedings in rem in admiralty. Since the arrest and seizure of a vessel incident to an admiralty proceeding in rem proved embarrassing, Congress, in 1920, adopted the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, [Footnote 8] which provided
At the time the Suits in Admiralty Act was being considered by Congress, it was proposed to extend its coverage
First: Respondent contends that § 1 of the Public Vessels Act authorizing suits against the United States "for damages caused by a public vessel" should be construed to apply only in cases where the public vessel is the "physical instrument" by which the "physical damage" is done -- e.g., collision; that therefore petitioner's libel does not lie under the Act. Such a construction narrowly limits the Act's relief. We conclude that such a narrow interpretation of the Act is not justifiable. While the general history of the Act as outlined above does not establish that the statute necessarily extends to the noncollision cases in view of the rule of strict construction of statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 312 U. S. 586; Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, supra, we think Congressional adoption of broad statutory language authorizing suit was deliberate, and is not to be thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation. See The Lake Monroe, 250 U. S. 246;
In 1924, H.R. 6989 was introduced in the House of Representatives, its provisions being similar [Footnote 17] to those of the Public Vessels Act as adopted, with this material difference: § 1 of that bill authorized suit against the United States "for damages caused by collision by a public vessel." (Italics added.) On reference to the House Committee on Claims, a substitute bill, H.R. 9535, was reported to the House. [Footnote 18] This bill provided for suits "for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States." This bill, with the latter phrase included, subsequently became the Public Vessels Act. This change in the language of the Act prior to its adoption convinces us that Congress intended to authorize suits in other than collision cases. The sponsors of the bill in both houses of Congress understood that it extended to cases where damage was done "by collision, or other fault of Government vessels and Government agents." [Footnote 19] Moreover, Congressional
The use of the phase "caused by a public vessel" constitutes an adoption by Congress of the customary legal terminology of the admiralty law which refers to the vessel as causing the harm, although the actual cause is the negligence of the personnel in the operation of the ship. Such personification of the vessel, treating it as a juristic person whose acts and omissions, although brought about by her personnel, are personal acts of the ship for which, as a juristic person, she is legally responsible, has long been recognized by this Court. United States v. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 43 U. S. 233-234; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 74 U. S. 68; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 157 U. S. 402-403; The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 170 U. S. 120; The Barnstable, 181 U. S. 464, 181 U. S. 467. That such was the meaning attributed to this phrase is further evidenced by § 2 of the Act, relating to venue, which provides that venue shall lie in the district "in which the vessel or cargo charged with creating the liability is found." 43 Stat. 1112. The consent to suit embodied in the Act thus extends to cases where the negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, and
The fact that the Committee reports on the bill state that the "chief purpose" of the Act is to authorize recovery in collision cases, that the departmental letters attached to the report consider principally the "collision" situation, does not require that the statute should be so limited. [Footnote 22] Respondent relies on The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, in which it was held that a Wisconsin statute imposing liability "for all damages . . . done to persons or property by such ship," Rev.St.Wis.1898, § 3348, did not apply to injuries suffered by a member of a ship's crew arising from the negligence of the master of the vessel, since the damage was not "done by the ship herself, as the offending thing. . . ." 189 U. S. 158, 189 U. S. 176. Since that case involved a suit by a member of the crew against his employer owner of the vessel, the holding in that decision on its facts is clearly inapplicable to the instant case. Moreover, the language in the Wisconsin statute is narrower in scope than that in the Public Vessels Act, 1925, which refers generally to "damages caused by a public vessel." Furthermore, the legislative history of the Public Vessels Act requires a different result insofar as the Osceola case interprets the Wisconsin statute to apply only to cases where the vessel is itself the physical cause of the damage. These latter two considerations serve also to distinguish The Vera Cruz, No. 2, 1884, 9 L.R., Prob.Div. 96. Respondent also relies on
Second: Petitioner, evidently relying on § 2 of the Act, states in its libel that it elects to have the action proceed on principles of in rem, as well as in personam, liability. [Footnote 23] As the Circuit Court of Appeals apparently holds that the Act does not authorize recovery on principles of in rem liability because of the statutory denial of a maritime lien, we turn to a consideration of this holding. Does the Public Vessels Act which authorizes filing of a "libel in personam," authorize the courts to apply principles of in rem, as well as in personam, liability in admiralty? [Footnote 24] As was indicated supra, this Court held that the Suits in Admiralty Act, which also authorizes filing of a "libel in personam," authorizes the courts to grant judgment on in rem, as well as in personam, principles, except that the government vessel was not subject to seizure or arrest.
272 U.S. 675, 272 U. S. 690-691.
Third: Since we hold that the Public Vessels Act was intended to impose on the United States the same liability (apart from seizure or arrest under a libel in rem) as is imposed by the admiralty law on the private shipowner, it remains to be considered whether petitioner states a valid cause of action under general principles of admiralty law, in rem and in personam. Petitioner alleges that the respondent's vessel, having undertaken to guide petitioner's boat, the Cavelier, through the waters at the entrance of the bay, did so in a negligent fashion, causing petitioner to strike a submerged wreck, that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of YP 249 and its crew. It needs no extended citation of authority to show that, where a tug negligently grounds its tow, the tug and its owner are liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Quickstep, 9 Wall. 665; The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113; The Temple Emery, 122 F. 180; The W. G. Mason, 142 F. 913; see The Caspian, 14 F.2d 1013; The Murrell, 200 F. 826; The Sally McDevitt v. The J. W. Paxon, 24 F. 302; The Rescue, 74 F. 847. [Footnote 30] The fact that the Cavelier was not fastened to the YP 249 by a tow rope is irrelevant. [Footnote 31] The libel avers that she was under
See also Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675; Ex parte Fassett, 142 U. S. 479, 142 U. S. 485; Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. v. Philadelphia & H. de G. Towboat Co., 23 How. 209, 64 U. S. 215-216; The Lyndhurst, 92 F. 681; The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 192 F. 27; The Campania, 203 F. 855; The Washington Irving, 250 F. 797; The Luke, 19 F.2d 923, aff'd, 19 F.2d 925; Coastwise Transportation Corp. v. United States, 43 F.2d 401; The J. C. Hart, 43 F.2d 566; The Favorita, 43 F.2d 569.
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