Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/692/141/379489/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 12:05:12
Document Index: 760219764

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1806', '§ 1806', '§ 1801', '§ 2510', '§ 2518', '§ 2511', '§ 1802', '§ 1806', '§ 2518']

United States of America v. David Belfield, Aka Daoud Salahuddin Ali Abdul-mani, Aka Leecurtis Manning, Appellant.united States of America v. David Belfield, Aka Daoud Salahuddin Horace Anthony Butler,aka Ahmed Rauf, Appellant, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1982 › United States of America v. David Belfield, Aka Daoud Salahuddin Ali Abdul-mani, Aka Leecurtis Manni...
United States of America v. David Belfield, Aka Daoud Salahuddin Ali Abdul-mani, Aka Leecurtis Manning, Appellant.united States of America v. David Belfield, Aka Daoud Salahuddin Horace Anthony Butler,aka Ahmed Rauf, Appellant, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
Argued Oct. 5, 1982. Decided Nov. 5, 1982
Meanwhile, on 8 October 1981 the Government filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a judicial determination of the legality of the surveillance, as authorized in 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). The Government asked for an ex parte determination based on an in camera Exhibit containing the logs of the overhears, the application for surveillance and supporting papers, and the orders of USFISC with respect thereto. In support of this request, the Attorney General filed a declaration stating that disclosure of these materials or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States. Appellants filed a response requesting disclosure and an adversary hearing.
Any evidence obtained or derived from the electronic surveillance may be used in a criminal proceeding only in accordance with the procedures outlined in 50 U.S.C. § 1806. First, authorization to use the information in a criminal proceeding must be obtained from the Attorney General.20 Then, the Government must notify the court in which the criminal proceeding is pending and the "aggrieved person" against whom the information will be offered.21 The aggrieved person may make a motion to suppress on the ground that the surveillance was illegal.
Appellants claim first that the district court's failure to disclose the Exhibit and hold an adversary hearing was an abuse of discretion under FISA. Appellants argue on analogy with Alderman v. U.S.26 that " [q]uestions as to the legality of surveillance conducted under FISA are far too complex to be determined without disclosure and adversary proceedings."27 In other words, appellants argue that in every case "such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance."28
In sum, the district court's decision to pass upon the legality of the surveillance based upon an ex parte examination of an in camera Exhibit was in keeping with the procedures contemplated by Congress when it enacted FISA.30 B. Constitutional Claims
Congress was also aware of these difficulties. But it chose to resolve them through means other than mandatory disclosure. In FISA Congress has made a thoroughly reasonable attempt to balance the competing concerns of individual privacy and foreign intelligence. As noted, oversight of electronic surveillance is provided by all three branches of government. Appellants are understandably reluctant to be excluded from the process whereby the legality of a surveillance by which they were incidentally affected is judged. But it cannot be said that this exclusion rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Four judges have now examined the Exhibit and determined that it amply supports the determination of legality originally made by the USFISC judge and that the minimization procedures approved in the original order have been followed. Those four judges have also specifically found that appellants' participation is not "necessary to a determination of the legality of the surveillance."A claim that disclosure and an adversary hearing are constitutionally required goes directly contrary to all pre-FISA precedent on point. In this circuit and in others, it has constantly been held that the legality of electronic, foreign intelligence surveillance may, even should, be determined on an in camera, ex parte basis. In U.S. v. Lemonakis,35 this court stressed that " [i]n a field as delicate and sensitive as foreign intelligence gathering," as opposed to domestic, criminal surveillance, "there is every reason why the court should proceed in camera and without disclosure" to determine the legality of a surveillance.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. IV 1980)
For a detailed history of warrantless electronic surveillance, see Intelligence Activities, vol. 5, The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1975) (statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi) [hereinafter cited as Hearings ]; S.REP. NO. 95-604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1116 (1980)
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928). Even when, in the late 1930's, the Federal Communications Act's prohibition against unauthorized disclosure of wire communications was held to prevent court use of government wiretaps, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937), and of the fruits of government wiretaps, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939), the Justice Department continued to employ warrantless electronic surveillance in cases involving national security or threat to human life. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 85-87 (statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi). The use of ordinary search warrants would not have been practicable for electronic surveillance, since such warrants must be served before the search is conducted
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a), (b). Much valuable intelligence information, and even some counterintelligence information, has nothing to do with the contemplated commission of a crime. Furthermore, notice that the surveillance has been conducted, even years after the event, may destroy a valuable intelligence advantage
For example, a warrant is not required in exigent circumstances. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967)
389 U.S. at 358 n. 23, 88 S. Ct. at 515 n. 23.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) provided as follows:
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323-24, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2139-40, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972)
Id. at 322, 92 S. Ct. at 2139
Id. at 321-22, 92 S. Ct. at 2138-39
See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914-15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S. Ct. 1004, 71 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1982); U.S. v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890, 98 S. Ct. 263, 54 L. Ed. 2d 175 (1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. U.S., 419 U.S. 881, 95 S. Ct. 147, 42 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S. Ct. 1490, 39 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1974). In Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1685, 48 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1976), the plurality suggested in dicta that this type of warrantless surveillance might be unconstitutional
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1805(e)
See Id. Sec. 1804(a) (1)-(11)
Id. Sec. 1805(a) (3). Cf. Id. Sec. 1801(i) (defining "United States person")
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)
394 U.S. 165, 89 S. Ct. 961, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1969)
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976) (the contents of an intercepted communication may not be used in any proceeding unless the aggrieved person is first furnished with a copy of the application and court order authorizing the interception)
485 F.2d 941, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S. Ct. 1586, 39 L. Ed. 2d 885 (1974)
516 F.2d 594, 606 n. 14 (en banc) (plurality opinion) ("a trial judge may initially determine in camera whether a surveillance is lawful"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S. Ct. 1685, 48 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1976)
See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S. Ct. 920, 66 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1981); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 607 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881, 95 S. Ct. 147, 42 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-27 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S. Ct. 1490, 39 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1974)
The Supreme Court never decided, pre-FISA, what procedures the district courts were to follow in making a threshold determination of the lawfulness of electronic surveillance. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314, 89 S. Ct. 1163, 1165, 22 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court did suggest, however, that adversary proceedings and full disclosure were not necessarily required "for resolution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance." Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316, 317, 89 S. Ct. 1099, 1100, 22 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1969) (per curiam). To the contrary, such protection will not be required when the task is such that in camera procedures will adequately safeguard the "aggrieved party's" constitutional rights. Id. at 317-18, 89 S. Ct. at 1100-01. See also United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S. Ct. 920, 66 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1981).