Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97837/catlin-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-05-27 06:34:49
Document Index: 738277295

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 225', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 128', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5']

Catlin Vs United States - Citation 97837 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
CatlIn Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97837
Case Number 324 U.S. 229
Appellant Catlin
catlin v. united states - 324 u.s. 229 (1945) u.s. supreme court catlin v. united states, 324 u.s. 229 (1945) catlin v. united states no. 419 argued february 1, 2, 1945 decided february 26, 1945 324 u.s. 229 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit syllabus 1. in a proceeding instituted by a petition in the district court for the condemnation of land under the war purposes act of 1917, a "judgment" entered upon a declaration of taking filed pursuant to the declaration of taking act of 1931, and a subsequent order denying the landowner's motion to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the petition, held not "final decisions" under § 128 of the judicial code, and therefore not appealable......
Catlin v. United States - 324 U.S. 229 (1945)
U.S. Supreme Court Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945)
1. In a proceeding instituted by a petition in the District Court for the condemnation of land under the War Purposes Act of 1917, a "judgment" entered upon a declaration of taking filed pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act of 1931, and a subsequent order denying the landowner's motion to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the petition, held not "final decisions" under § 128 of the Judicial Code, and therefore not appealable. P. 324 U. S. 232 .
2. The right of the landowner to challenge the validity of the taking for nonconformity with the prescribed statutory purposes was not abrogated by the Declaration of Taking Act, but the right of appeal in this relation may be exercised only when final judgment, disposing of the cause in its entirety, has been rendered. P. 324 U. S. 240 .
The proceeding is for the condemnation of land in Madison County, Illinois, under the War Purposes Act of 1917. [ Footnote 1 ] The question for review is whether orders entered in the
course of the proceedings are appealable as "final decisions" within the meaning of § 128 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 225(a). [ Footnote 2 ]
The petition for condemnation was filed in the District Court March 31, 1942. The same day, an order for immediate possession was entered ex parte. On November 12, 1942, pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act of February 26, 1931, [ Footnote 3 ] the Secretary of War filed a declaration and deposited in court $43,579.00 as the estimated compensation for Tract ED-7, to which petitioners assert ownership as trustees. The court thereupon entered "judgment," likewise ex parte, decreeing that title had vested in the United States upon the filing of the declaration and making of the deposit, also declaring the right of just compensation "now vested in the persons entitled thereto," and holding the cause open for further "orders, judgments and decrees."
Thereafter, on August 2, 1943, an order for service of process by publication was entered, and, in October following, petitioners moved to vacate the "judgment" and to dismiss the petition as to Tract ED-7. After this, the Government amended its petition, [ Footnote 4 ] and petitioners filed
an amended motion to vacate and dismiss, [ Footnote 5 ] which the court denied. From this order and the order entering the "judgment" on the declaration of taking, petitioners appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the orders not final decisions within § 128 and dismissed the appeal. 142 F.2d 781. We granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 696, in order to resolve conflict upon this question among several Circuit Courts of Appeals. [ Footnote 6 ]
We think the judgment was right. Petitioners' motions raised issues grounded in contentions that the taking was not for a purpose authorized by the War Purposes Act. [ Footnote 7 ]
Their right to appeal rests upon § 128 of the Judicial Code. This limits review to "final decisions" in the District Court. A "final decision" generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. St. Louis I.M. & S. R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24 , 108 U. S. 28 . Hence, ordinarily in condemnation proceedings, appellate review may be had only upon an order or judgment disposing of the whole case, and adjudicating all rights, including ownership and just compensation, as well as the right to take the property. This has been the repeated holding of decisions here. [ Footnote 8 ] The rule applies to review by this Court of judgments of state courts, in advance of determination of just compensation, although by local statute "judgments of condemnation," i.e., of the right to condemn particular property, are reviewable before compensation is found and awarded. Wick v. Superior Court, 278 U.S. 574-575; Public Service Co. v. Lebanon, 305 U.S. 558, 671; cf. Dieckmann v. United States, 88 F.2d 902. The foundation of this policy is not in merely technical conceptions of "finality." It is one against piecemeal
litigation. "The case is not to be sent up in fragments. . . ." Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337 , 147 U. S. 341 . Reasons other than conservation of judicial energy sustain the limitation. One is elimination of delays caused by interlocutory appeals.
The rule applies to proceedings under the War Purposes Act of 1917. [ Footnote 9 ] That act does not purport to change or depart from the generally prevailing rule concerning appeals in condemnation proceedings. It is an amended version of the 1890 act, under which, from its enactment to now, that rule has been applied, except in the three decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeals reaching the contrary result, where, however, the Declaration of Taking Act of 1931 also was involved. [ Footnote 10 ] The 1917 act purports to authorize no judgment except one "for the acquirement by condemnation of any land," etc., for the purposes specified or, necessarily, one finally denying this. The provision for the proceedings "to be prosecuted in accordance with the laws relating to suits for the condemnation of property of the States wherein the proceedings may be instituted . . . " had no purpose to make the right of appeal in such proceedings depend upon and vary with the local procedure in this respect, cf. Wick v. Superior Court, supra; Public Service Co. v. Lebanon, supra, or to incorporate
local ideas of "finality" in the application of § 128 to such suits. The language may be applied in other ways without introducing so much lack of uniformity into the application of § 128, if indeed the quoted provision has not been largely nullified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in all respects concerning appeals. [ Footnote 11 ]
Furthermore, the 1917 act contemplated emergency action to the extent that, upon the filing of the petition immediate possession might be taken and the lands occupied "for military purposes" during war "or the imminence thereof." This purpose, it seems clear, would be largely defeated if entry must be deferred until specific challenges to jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the petition are determined seriatim, not only by ruling of the trial court, but by separate appeals from each ruling which, if sustained, [ Footnote 12 ] would end the litigation, but, if lacking in merit, could only prolong it. We find neither in the language nor in the purposes of the 1917 act an intent to authorize departure from the general course of applying § 128 in condemnation proceedings.
We dispose shortly of the motion, or that part of it, which was directed at dismissal of the proceedings, insofar as it may require treatment separately from the motion to vacate the "judgment," if it does so at all. Had this motion been granted and judgment of dismissal been entered, clearly there would have been an end of the litigation, and appeal would lie within § 128. United States v. Carey, 143 F.2d 445; United States v. Marin, 136 F.2d 388. But denial of a motion to dismiss, even when the motion is based upon jurisdictional grounds, is not immediately reviewable. Cf. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21 . See also Dieckmann v. United States, 88 F.2d 902. Certainly this is true whenever the question may be saved for disposition upon review of final judgment disposing of all issues involved in the litigation or in some other adequate manner. As will appear, we think such a remedy is available in this case.
§ 1, which is the basis section, makes no express reference to appeals. [ Footnote 13 ] § 2 implies the contrary effect.
possession, [ Footnote 14 ] delayed by separate appeals over issues of title or taking. [ Footnote 15 ] Its right was rather to have these issues determined with others in the final judgment dispositive of the whole cause. This right, we think, was guarded by § 4 against being construed as having been abrogated, limited, or modified by virtue of the additional right conferred "to take possession and title in advance of final judgment. " (Emphasis added) Other provisions of the statute, as will appear, support the same conclusion.
Moreover, the statute does not purport in terms to authorize such a "judgment" as was entered in this cause or to make its entry the event upon which title is changed, if so summary a procedure could be valid. The "judgment" apparently was entered ex parte, prior to service of process or publication of notice. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 . By the terms of § 1,
"Upon the filing said declaration of taking [in the condemnation proceeding] and of the deposit in the court . . . , title . . . shall vest in the United States . . . and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States, and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and established by judgment therein. . . . [ Footnote 16 ] "
Some stress is placed upon the provisions of §§ 3 and 5 relating to irrevocable commitment of the United States to pay the amount ultimately to be awarded, [ Footnote 17 ] together
with the provision of § 1 authorizing award of more than the amount deposited as estimated compensation, as indicating a purpose to make the transfer of title irrevocable upon the filing of the declaration and the making of the deposit. [ Footnote 18 ] From the fact that the Government may become irrevocably committed to pay, it does not follow that the owner is irrevocably committed to submit to the taking, since the statute's terms are not in pari materia in this respect. Neither § 3 nor § 5 purports to bind the owner irrevocably. On the contrary, § 5 deals only with authority to expend appropriated funds for demolition of existing structures and construction of new ones, and the concluding proviso, requiring the opinion of the Attorney General that
"title has been vested in the United States or all persons having an interest therein have been made parties to such proceeding and will be bound by the final judgment therein "
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337 , 147 U. S. 341 ; Southern R. v. Postal Telegraph Co., 179 U. S. 641 , 179 U. S. 643 ; Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U. S. 251 , 243 U. S. 256 ; Washington ex rel. McPherson Bros. Co. v. Superior Court, 274 U.S. 726; Ornstein v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., 284 U.S. 572; cf. Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364 , 252 U. S. 370 ; United States v. Florian, 312 U.S. 656.
" Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken for the use of the United States, and the right to just compensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding and established by judgment therein, and the said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 6 percentum per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the property as of the date of taking, from said date to the date of payment; but interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into the court. No sum so paid into the court shall be charged with commissions or poundage."