Source: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/425/352/case.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 10:12:37
Document Index: 715537667

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 3', '§ 1002', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

Department of the Air Force v. Rose - 425 U.S. 352 (1976) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Case	U.S. Supreme CourtDepartment of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)Department of the Air Force v. RoseNo. 74-489Argued October 8, 1975Decided April 21, 1976425 U.S. 352CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents, student editors or former student editors of the New York University Law Review researching Page 425 U. S. 355 disciplinary systems and procedures at the military service academies for an article for the Law Review, [Footnote 1] were denied access by petitioners to case summaries of honor and ethics hearings, with personal references or other identifying information deleted, maintained in the United States Air Force Academy's Honor and Ethics Code reading files, although Academy practice is to post copies of such summaries on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy and to distribute copies to Academy faculty and administration officials. [Footnote 2] Thereupon, respondents brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against petitioners, the Department Page 425 U. S. 356 of the Air Force and Air Force officers who supervise cadets at the United States Air Force Academy (hereinafter collectively the Agency). [Footnote 3] The District Court granted petitioner Agency's motion for summary judgment Page 425 U. S. 357 -- without first requiring production of the case summaries for inspection -- holding in an unreported opinion that case summaries, even with deletions of personal references or other identifying information, were "matters . . . related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency," exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552(b)(2) of the statute. [Footnote 4] The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 552(b)(2) did not exempt the case summaries from mandatory disclosure. 495 F.2d 261 (1974). The Agency argued alternatively, however, that the case summaries constituted
exempted from mandatory disclosure by § 552(b)(6). The District Court held this exemption inapplicable to the case summaries, because it concluded that disclosure of the summaries without names or other identifying information would not subject any former cadet to public identification and stigma, and the possibility of identification by another former cadet could not, in the context of the Academy's practice of distribution and official posting of the summaries, constitute an invasion of personal privacy proscribed by § 552(b)(6). Page 425 U. S. 358 Pet. for Cert. 32A. The Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, stating that it "ignores certain practical realities" which militated against the conclusion "that the Agency's internal dissemination of the summaries lessens the concerned cadets' right to privacy, as embodied in Exemption six." 495 F.2d at 267. But the court refused to hold, on the one hand, either
The District Court made factual findings respecting the administration of the Honor and Ethics Codes at the Academy. See Pet. for Cert. 28A-29A, nn. 5, 6. Under the Honor Code, enrolled cadets pledge: "We will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among us any Page 425 U. S. 359 one who does." The Honor Code is administered by an Honor Committee composed of Academy cadets. Suspected violations of the Code are referred to the Chairman of the Honor Committee, who appoints a three-cadet investigatory team which, with advice from the legal adviser, evaluates the facts and determines whether a hearing before an Honor Board of eight cadets, is warranted. If the team finds no hearing warranted, the case is closed. If it finds there should be a hearing, the accused cadet may call witnesses to testify in his behalf, and each cadet squadron may ordinarily send two cadets to observe.
At the announcement of the verdict, the Honor Committee Chairman reminds all cadets present at the hearing that all matters discussed at the hearing are confidential, and should not be discussed outside the room with anyone other than an honor representative. A case summary consisting of a brief statement, usually only one page, of the significant facts is prepared by the Committee. As we have said, copies of the summaries are posted on 40 squadron bulletin boards throughout the Academy, and distributed among Academy faculty and administration officials. Cadets are instructed not to read the summaries, unless they have a need, beyond mere curiosity, to know their contents, and the reading Page 425 U. S. 360 files are covered with a notice that they are "for official use only." Case summaries for not-guilty and discretion cases are circulated with names deleted; in guilty cases, the guilty cadet's name is not deleted from the summary, but posting on the bulletin boards is deferred until after the guilty cadet has left the Academy.
Our discussion may conveniently begin by again emphasizing the basic thrust of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). We canvassed the subject at some length three years ago in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 410 U. S. 79-80 (1973), and need only briefly review that history here. The Act revises § 3, the public disclosure section, of the Administrative Procedure Act, S U.S.C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). The revision was deemed necessary because
Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79. Congress therefore structured a revision whose basic purpose reflected "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information Page 425 U. S. 361 is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965) (hereinafter S.Rep. No. 813). To make crystal clear the congressional objective -- in the words of the Court of Appeals, "to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny," 495 F.2d at 263 -- Congress provided in § 552(c) that nothing in the Act should be read to "authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated. . . ." Consistently with that objective, the Act repeatedly states "that official information shall be made available to the public,' `for public inspection.'" Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79. There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure. They are nine in number, and are set forth in § 552(b). But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. "These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). . . ," Mink, supra at 410 U. S. 79, and must be narrowly construed. Vaughn v. Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 343, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (1973); 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 193, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (1975); Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 157, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (1971). In sum, as said in Mink, supra, at 410 U. S. 80:
"Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands. Subsection (b) is part of this scheme, and represents the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses. As the Senate Committee explained, it was Page 425 U. S. 362 not"
No final action was taken on S. 1666 in the 88th Congress; the Senate passed the bill, but it reached the Page 425 U. S. 363 House too late for action. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 415 U. S. 18 n. 18 (1974). But the bill introduced in the Senate in 1965 that became law in 1966 dropped the "internal management" exemption for matters required to be published in the Federal Register and consolidated all exemptions into a single subsection. Thus, legislative history plainly evidences the congressional conclusion that the wording of Exemption 2, "internal personnel rules and practices," was to have a narrower reach than the Administrative Procedure Act's exemption for "internal management" matters.
"2. Matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency: operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure, but this exemption would not cover all 'matters of internal management' such as employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures which are withheld under th