Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/al-saadoon-and-mufdhi-merits-judgment/
Timestamp: 2018-05-25 22:41:16
Document Index: 151167285

Matched Legal Cases: ['EWCA ', '§ 144', '§ 136', '§ 123', '§ 144', 'Art 2', 'Art 3', 'Art 2', 'Art 3', 'Art 2', 'Art 2']

EJIL: Talk! – Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi Merits Judgment
Home EJIL Analysis Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi Merits Judgment
https://www.ejiltalk.org/al-saadoon-and-mufdhi-merits-judgment
The Court has now clearly held that Article 2 ECHR provides for a non-refoulement obligation: there can be no extradition if a serious risk of the death penalty is established, period. Recall, however, the UK government’s argument that the applicants in this case were not held in the UK, but in Iraq, and that the UK had a legal obligation to transfer them to Iraqi authorities. In the UK’s view, this necessitates that the non-refoulement obligation be qualified to take into account these exceptional circumstances, and the fact that the UK would otherwise be forced to violate its obligations towards Iraq. (Such was also the approach of the Court of Appeal in R (B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ([2004] EWCA Civ 1344).
This is how the Court now approached the matter:
These three paragraphs are crucial in explaining the Court’s approach to possible norm conflicts. Witness, first, how it blows both hot and cold. In para. 126 it allows for the possibility of taking into account other international obligations when interpreting the ECHR, in order to avoid possible conflict. This, of course, what the Court actually did in both Al-Adsani and in Bosphorus. Then in para. 127 it however reiterates the importance of the ECHR regime, implying that it does not avoid norm conflicts lightly. Finally, in para. 128 the Court quite rightly points out that a norm conflict also existed in Soering between the UK’s obligations under the ECHR and its obligations under the US extradition treaty, but that this was not grounds enough for reading down the ECHR.
My only quibble is with the Court’s statement that the ECHR obligations ‘was held to override’ the UK’s obligations towards the US. This is simply untrue, at least if the word ‘override’ is to be taken as implying a hierarchical relationship. The ECHR is certainly not superior law to a bilateral treaty with a non-state party. Rather, the two treaties were in an unresolvable norm conflict, with the only possible solution to that conflict being political in nature, for example a renegotiation of either one – see more here, esp. at 16-21.
Having now outlined its approach to norm conflicts, and having held that Articles 2 and 3 ECHR now generated a non-refoulement obligation with respect to the death penalty as such, the issue to be decided was whether this obligation should apply any differently to UK troops in Iraq. The Court said no:
The Court’s judgment is in my view exactly right. But it bears noting how the legal judgment actually depends entirely on an underlying value judgment as to the importance and nature of Article 2 and 3 rights, and the non-refoulement obligation which protects them. It is also interesting to see how the Court attempts to somewhat narrow down its holding, though I think not entirely persuasively. First, para. 137 could be taken as implying some sort of lex prior, that the Convention only ‘prohibits’ the conclusion of contrary agreements which post-date it. This is not necessarily the case. A century-old extradition treaty, for example, could just as easily run afoul of the ECHR, and the result should in my judgment be no different. Second, the Court’s discussion of diplomatic asylum in paras. 139-140 might perhaps suggest that a different approach should be warranted in an embassy case. Again, however, the fact that a state’s conflicting obligations might be clearer does not necessarily make them more important.
What I do find somewhat strange is the Court’s ruling that because there was a violation of Article 3, there was no need for it to decide whether there was a violation of Article 2 and Protocol 13 (paras. 144-145). Bearing in mind all that it said with regard to non-refoulement under Article 2, the finding of a violation under Article 3 necessarily implies a violation of Article 2. Perhaps I am missing something, but I don’t see how it could be the case otherwise.
The Court then moved to non-refoulement under Article 6, but did not find a violation, holding that no serious risk of a flagrant denial of a fair trial in Iraq was established (paras. 149-50). More interestingly, it then examined the UK’s refusal to obey the interim measures that it had indicated:
162. As stated above, the Court’s approach in interpreting the Convention must be guided by the fact that its object and purpose as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. It has found that the decisions of the United Kingdom authorities to refer the applicants’ cases to the Iraqi courts in December 2005 and to transfer them physically to Iraqi custody on 31 December 2008, without having first received any binding assurance that they would not be subjected to the death penalty, put them at real risk of being executed. It has further found that, as a matter of principle, it was not open to the respondent State to enter into an agreement or arrangement with another State which conflicted with its obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13. Finally, it has found that the Government have failed to establish that there were no realistic or practicable means available to them by which to safeguard the applicants’ fundamental human rights. In these circumstances, the “objective impediment” claimed by the Government, namely the absence, on 31 December 2008, of any available course of action consistent with respect for Iraqi sovereignty other than the transfer of the applicants, was of the respondent State’s own making.
163. Moreover, the Government have not satisfied the Court that they took all reasonable steps, or indeed any steps, to seek to comply with the Rule 39 indication. They have not informed the Court, for example, of any attempt to explain the situation to the Iraqi authorities and to reach a temporary solution which would have safeguarded the applicants’ rights until the Court had completed its examination.
164. It is true that from June 2008 the Government began to make approaches to the Iraqi authorities, initially to ascertain from the President of the IHT what steps would be effective under Iraqi law and practice to reduce the risk of the applicants receiving the death sentence (see paragraphs 50-54 above). Subsequently, in July 2008 the Government contacted the Iraqi prosecutors and requested them to inform the IHT that the Government were opposed to the death penalty and that neither of the families of the two murdered soldiers wished it to be imposed (see paragraph 86 above). These contacts may or may not have contributed to the IHT’s decisions to amend the charges against the applicants (see paragraphs 86-88 above); this is not a matter on which the Court is able to speculate. However, as the domestic courts also found, the Government’s approaches to the Iraqi authorities prior to the transfer of the applicants on 31 December 2008 were not sufficient to secure any binding assurance that the death penalty would not be applied and the applicants remained at real risk when the United Kingdom decided not to comply with the Court’s indication under Rule 39. The Government’s efforts in 2009 to persuade the Iraqi authorities not to use the death penalty came after the applicants had left United Kingdom jurisdiction and therefore at a time when the United Kingdom authorities had lost any real and certain power to secure their safety. Moreover, to date no binding assurance that the death penalty will not be applied has been given and the applicants’ fate remains uncertain.
165. In conclusion, the Court does not consider that the authorities of the Contracting State took all steps which could reasonably have been taken in order to comply with the interim measure taken by the Court. The failure to comply with the interim measure and the transfer of the applicants out of the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction exposed them to a serious risk of grave and irreparable harm.
166. In the admissibility decision of 30 June 2009 (see paragraph 7 above) the Court joined the question of the admissibility of Article 13 to the merits. Having now examined the merits, and having found in connection with Article 34 that there was no objective justification for the transfer, it reaches the conclusion on similar grounds that the effectiveness of any appeal to the House of Lords was unjustifiably nullified as a result of the Government’s transfer of the applicants to the Iraqi authorities. The Court therefore finds the complaint under Article 13 admissible and it finds violations of Articles 13 and 34 of the Convention.
So far the judgment was unanimous, but here Judge Bratza partially dissented:
The majority of the Chamber have found the Government’s non-compliance with the Rule 39 indication to be unjustified on two principal grounds. It is said that there was no “objective impediment” to compliance with the interim measures since the absence on 31 December 2008 of any available course of action consistent with respect for Iraqi sovereignty other than the transfer of the applicants was of the respondent State’s own making. Secondly, it is said that the Government have not satisfied the Court that they took all reasonable steps, or indeed any steps, to seek to comply with the Rule 39 indication, not having informed the Court of any attempt to explain the situation to the Iraqi authorities or to reach a temporary solution which would have safeguarded the applicants’ rights until the Court had completed its examination.
I am not convinced by either of these points. As to the former, the question whether there was an objective impediment to compliance with an interim measure must be assessed at the time when the measure was applied, in this case 30 December 2008. At that time there existed, as the Court of Appeal found, an objective legal impediment to continuing to detain the applicants and refusing to surrender them to the Iraqi authorities. The fact that, had the United Kingdom obtained the necessary assurances from those authorities some four years before, the applicants could have been safely transferred in December 2008, while undoubtedly relevant in the context of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, does not in my view affect the question which falls to be examined under Article 34. As to the latter point, while there are strong reasons to believe that the relevant assurances could have been obtained before the referral of the applicants’ case to the Iraqi courts, the lack of success of the efforts made after June 2008 would clearly suggest that there was no realistic prospect of obtaining such assurances or achieving a temporary solution at a time when the expiry of the Mandate was imminent, a point confirmed by the evidence of Mr Watkins before the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 56 and 66).
For these reasons, while agreeing that in the circumstances of this case the surrender of the applicants violated their rights under Article 3, I would not find it either necessary or appropriate to hold that there had additionally been a violation of Article 34 of the Convention.
With the greatest respect for Judge Bratza, the majority does have it right here. Yes, the UK had a legal obligation to comply with the Iraqi request – but it still had an ECHR obligation to reject it. As the Chamber rightly pointed out, this norm conflict was entirely of the UK’s own making. It was free to choose which obligation to honour, and which it violate. It made its choice, and that choice invariably ran afoul of the Court’s interim measures. It is only if Article 34 was interpreted as creating a justification for non-compliance in cases of potential norm conflict that the result could be otherwise – but I see no reason why Article 34 should be interpreted that way
Finally, as for remedies, the Court ordered the UK government as follows:
171. In the present case, the Court has found that through the actions and inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the applicants have been subjected to mental suffering caused by the fear of execution amounting to inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3. While the outcome of the proceedings before the IHT remains uncertain, that suffering continues. For the Court, compliance with their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention requires the Government to seek to put an end to the applicants’ suffering as soon as possible, by taking all possible steps to obtain an assurance from the Iraqi authorities that they will not be subjected to the death penalty.
However, though it did award the applicants costs, it did not award them any damages, ruling that a finding of violation was sufficient just satisfaction. Bearing in mind the magnitude of the violations, this is perhaps not entirely satisfactory – yet this is what the Court frequently does in order to soften the blow somewhat for the government, particularly when the applicants themselves are probably some quite nasty, nasty people.
In sum, this was a judgment well worth the wait. We’ll see now whether the UK will ask for a referral to the Grand Chamber – it probably will. It should be noted that if the Grand Chamber takes the case, it can deal both with the Article 1 jurisdiction issue and with the merits. I personally don’t think that the Grand Chamber would rule any differently on the merits, but the extraterritorial application issue may be revisited, for better or for worse (probably worse). Most importantly, the Grand Chamber will be holding hearings in the Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda cases on 9 June this year, and they also raise questions of extraterritorial application and norm conflict. Exciting times ahead in the ‘Al-‘ cases!
Further commentary will follow.
« EU denies preferences to produ...
Habib v Commonwealth of Austra... »
thanks for your interesting and very timely contribution – as usual.
“What I do find somewhat strange is the Court’s ruling that because there was a violation of Article 3, there was no need for it to decide whether there was a violation of Article 2 and Protocol 13 (paras. 144-145). Bearing in mind all that it said with regard to non-refoulement under Article 2, the finding of a violation under Article 3 necessarily implies a violation of Article 2. Perhaps I am missing something, but I don’t see how it could be the case otherwise.”
I agree with you that there is something unclear here, but I don’t think that – as the court construed it – a violation of Article 3 necessarily implies a violation of Article 2. Rather, they both may apply.
One way to read the judgment is that instead of finding a violation of non-refoulement under a ‘Soering expansion’ of Article 2 [as ‘amended’ after Protocol 13], the Court decided that Article 3 itself was directly engaged because ‘through the actions and inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the applicants have been subjected, since at least May 2006, to the fear of execution by the Iraqi authorities’ (§ 144). Indeed, ‘It is reasonable to assume that this fear caused the applicants intense psychological suffering’ (§ 136).
So all the discussion on Article 2 preceding this was mainly to rebut the argument that the ‘fear of death penalty’ could not engage Article 3 because Article 2 expressly provided for the death penalty exception. Now that we are not in Soering years anymore, and Protocol 13 is here, we can:
1) *not only* have a ‘Soering-type’ expansion of Article 2 itself (as it was done with Article 8, and others), so that a ‘non-refoulement’ obligation becomes embedded in Article 2 (and Article 1 protocol 13) (§§ 123-125 of the judgment);
2) *but also* now interpret Article 3 ill-treatment as including the fear of execution by death penalty (§ 144).
Why the court thought that it had to choose between 1) and 2), rather than applying both, is, as you say, a bit puzzling. This may perhaps be because the Soering-type expansion is already ‘jus praetorium’ (albeit a consistently followed and welcome addition to Convention obligations), and the court prefers to stick to ‘clearer’ substantive obligations such as ‘plain’ suffering under Article 3 when it has a choice to do so?
And now to my second comment.
Why didn’t the court even mention Behrami? Why would K-FOR action ‘under UN auspices’ be attributable to the UN, while detentions in Iraq, also authorized by the Security Council, not be attributed? Of course Behrami is wrong, as you and I and the rest of the world have been saying since, but shouldn’t one expect at least a passing remark on the question of attribution? Do we take this as a big silent ‘oh, sorry, we got that wrong’ kind of thing? Or am I missing something?
I agree entirely on your point (1), as to the conceptual distinction between Art 2 and Art 3 non-refoulement. My problem is with the facts: if Art 2 non-refoulement applies whenever there is a serious risk that the death penalty may be imposed, then all that the Court said on Art 3 non-refoulement necessarily implies, to my mind, that Art 2 was also violated. It is, dare I say, obvious, if the law is what the Court said it is in para. 123. I just don’t see why they thought it unnecessary to rule on Art 2, when they basically did it already.
As for (2), you are quite right that Behrami is potentially applicable. Indeed, I am sure that in Al-Jedda we will see it raise its ugly head again – the Court will then have the option of saying (i) that the actions of UK troops in Iraq are in fact attributable to the UN, to expected massive outcry; (ii) that Behrami is wrongly decided (fat chance, at least so soon); (iii) distinguishing Behrami on the facts, i.e. Iraq from Kosovo, on rather unpersuasive grounds, as the House of Lords did in Al-Jedda.
I am now totally speculating here, but the Chamber in Al-Saadoon didn’t mention Behrami probably because the parties didn’t raise it, and it most certainly wasn’t going to raise of its own volition – but I may be wrong, of course.
March 2, 2010 at 18:32
Addendum: Silly me. Unless I’m wrong, at the time of the transfer the UN authorization for UK troops had already expired. The UK troops were present in Iraq solely on the basis of Iraq’s consent. So even if UN authorization was relevant attribution (and it is not), it was no longer there on the facts.
March 2, 2010 at 19:28
It seems to me that S/RES/1790 (2007) was meant to be in force until 31 December 2008 (“reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force as set forth in resolution 1546 (2004)”), but I don’t recall at all if and when in 2008 (was it perhaps sometime in June?) the Iraqi government decided to withdraw its consent under point 2 of the same resolution and a new legal foundation for the troops’ presence was agreed only by the Iraqi government.
I can’t find no other 2008 UNSCR resolution which is relevant, as 1830 (2008) only speaks of UNAMI, not the MNF and 1859 (2008) concerns other stuff.
So, not silly you. I think.
March 3, 2010 at 0:15
[…] Auf Al-Saadoon beim Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) habe ich schon hingewiesen. Da ging es, wie gesagt, um zwei Iraker, die von den Briten im Irak gefangen genommen wurden und sich jetzt dagegen wehren, an die irakische Justiz überstellt zu werden, wo ihnen die Todesstrafe droht. Der EGMR hat ihnen Recht gegeben. Das Urteil kann man gar nicht hoch genug schätzen. Mehr dazu hier. […]
ECHR Al Saadoon case: risk of death penalty amounts to cruel and degrading treatment « The Lift – Legal Issues in the Fight against Terrorism
[…] For thorough comments on the Judgment see Marko Milanovic on EJIL blog […]