Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca9/c366610/united-states-v-anthony-martin-nolan-allen-hall-searcy-baker-andrews
Timestamp: 2020-08-05 11:16:01
Document Index: 376708739

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 1952', '§ 1952']

united-states-v-anthony-martin-nolan-allen-hall-searcy-baker-andrews, Ninth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
united-states-v-anthony-martin-nolan-allen-hall-searcy-baker-andrews , 599 F.2d 880 ( 1979 )
There is nothing in the Fourth Amendment that imposes a requirement of the type urged by Andrews. In United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 97 S. Ct. 658, 50 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1977), the Court stated:
An application for an order authorizing a wiretap must include the " identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted". 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). The judge to whom the application is submitted may enter an order authorizing a wiretap if the application shows that "there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit" an offense enumerated in § 2516. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a). In United States v. Kahn,415 U.S. 143, 150-155, 94 S. Ct. 977, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the investigative agency does not have to name in its application a probable converser who it does not have probable cause to believe is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. The Court later held in Donovan that § 2518(1)(b)(iv) does require the investigative agency to name in its application Every probable converser who it has probable cause to believe is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. 429 U.S. at 423-28, 97 S. Ct. 658. In effect, Andrews now urges us to hold that § 2518(1)(b)(iv) and (3)(a) require that Only those for whom such probable cause is shown may be named in the application. We disagree.
A restriction that the investigative agency can name in its application only those for whom probable cause exists is not consistent with the policy of Title III. The provisions of Title III were designed to accommodate two competing policy objectives: (1) the authorization of electronic surveillance as a weapon against organized crime; and (2) the protection of individual privacy. Kahn, 415 U.S. at 151, 94 S. Ct. 977. Section 2518(8)(d) of the Act requires that each person named in the application be given notice (which is denominated as an "inventory") within a reasonable time after the entry of the authorization order or the denial of the application, which shall contain the fact of the entry of the order, the date of the entry and the fact that during the period, wire and oral communications were or were not intercepted. It is mandatory to send the notice to those persons named in the application, but it is discretionary as to whether notice is to be sent to persons not named in the application. Therefore, the policy of protecting persons from unreasonable invasions of privacy is furthered by naming in the application all those persons likely to have their conversations intercepted, whether or not probable cause exists as to them, because those persons will benefit from the mandatory statutory notice requirements. In cases where probable cause is doubtful as to some conversers, an investigative agency should be encouraged to name more, rather than fewer, persons in the application.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 S. Ct. 408, 417, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966). We cannot believe that Congress intended to create a similar dilemma for law enforcement agencies attempting to follow the guidelines of § 2518.
As discussed in the previous section, the DEA was required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) to name in its wiretap application each probable converser who it had probable cause to believe was committing an offense. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 423-28, 97 S. Ct. 658. Additionally, those persons named in the wiretap applications are entitled to the inventory, designed to inform the persons of the filing of the application, whether an order was entered and, if so, the dates of the wiretap and whether oral communications were intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). However, in Donovan, the Supreme Court held that §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and (8)(d) do not play substantive roles in the statutory framework to substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures; and therefore that failure to comply fully with those provisions does not invalidate an order authorizing a wiretap. 429 U.S. at 432-39, 97 S. Ct. 658.
There is a suggestion in Donovan that suppression would be justified if government agents Intentionally withheld the names of suspects from its application. 429 U.S. at 436, n. 23, 97 S. Ct. 658. There is no indication of such conduct in this case.
We next consider whether Andrews was entitled to suppression under the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i) on the ground it was unlawfully intercepted. Whether suppression is required under the statute is determined from the provisions of Title III rather than from the exclusionary rule developed to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974). We have earlier held that the naming of an expected converser against whom there may not have been probable cause does not vitiate the order. There is nothing in the express provisions of the statute which requires that an innocent and immaterial misstatement in the application for wiretap authorization invalidates the wiretap order. See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156-58 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied sub nom. Grimes et al. v. United States, 423 U.S. 966, 96 S. Ct. 426, 46 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1975) (reasonable and good faith effort to comply with the minimization requirements). The misstatement in the application for the wiretap authorization, which was both innocent and immaterial, does not entitle Andrews to suppression under either Fourth Amendment or statutory standards.
The appellants also contend that the duration of the wiretaps was not properly minimized, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). The length of time during which a wiretap is used is a crucial factor in determining whether there has been reasonable minimization of communications intercepted. United States v. Chavez, 533 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911, 96 S. Ct. 2237, 48 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1976). In this case, the longest wiretap on any one set of telephones was that placed on Johnson's phones. The initial wiretap and the extension of the wiretap together extended over a period of 37 days. In light of the significance of Johnson's involvement in the conspiracy and the state of the investigation at the time the extension was granted, we think this period was reasonable. The wiretaps on the other phones were used only for brief periods of time and were also reasonable.
We have found no decisions of this circuit which lend support to the government's position that the distribution of drugs or an agreement to distribute drugs is "facilitated" by a purchaser of the drugs. In each case in which we have upheld a conviction for facilitation, the defendant's role in the distribution of drugs has been far more substantial than that of a buyer for personal consumption. E. g., United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied sub nom. Grimes et al. v. United States, 423 U.S. 996, 96 S. Ct. 426, 46 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1975) (conspirator); United States v. Padilla, 525 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975) (conspirator/seller); United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1975) (conspirator; United States v. Veon, 474 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1973) (sellers).
In Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 28 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1971), the Supreme Court approved the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Rewis v. United States, 418 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that a gambler whose participation in a gambling business was only that of a bettor, and not a proprietor, could not be found guilty of acting with intent to facilitate the unlawful gambling activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The Supreme Court agreed that "intent to . . . facilitate" requires more than a mere "desire to patronize the illegal activity". Rewis, supra 401 U.S. at 811, 91 S.Ct. at 1059. Therefore, a mere customer did not facilitate the business he patronized. This interpretation of the ambiguous term "facilitation" was supported in the opinion by the legislative history behind the statute in question, and by reference to the general principle that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity . . .". Accord, United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S. Ct. 515, 522, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971). Our circuit has since applied this interpretation of the term "facilitation" under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 in United States v. Gibson Spec. Co., 507 F.2d 446, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1974). A difference in the nature of the illicit business should not change the basic principle enunciated by the Supreme Court and by our circuit that a mere customer's contribution to the business he patronizes does not constitute the facilitation envisioned by Congress.
Dixon challenges the trial court's refusal to grant his request for a severance, or alternatively, a mistrial. The denial of a motion for severance is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied sub nom. Myers v. United States, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S. Ct. 1526, 55 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1978). Neither a denial of a severance motion nor a denial of a motion for mistrial will be overturned absent a clear showing of prejudice. See United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1977). Dixon has not shown that he was entitled to a severance nor that he ultimately suffered any prejudice from the joint trial. On the record before us we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying Dixon's request.
Dixon also contends that the admission into evidence of guns that were seized from his residence constituted reversible error. He argues that the guns were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The guns were, however, relevant to show Dixon's involvement in the narcotics trade. See United States v. Wiener, 534 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820, 97 S. Ct. 66, 50 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1976). Whether the prejudicial effect of evidence so far outweighs its probative value that the evidence should be excluded is a determination in which the trial court is given wide discretion. E. g., United States v. Mahler, 452 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069, 92 S. Ct. 1517, 31 L. Ed. 2d 801 (1972). Under the facts of the present case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the weapons. See Wiener, 534 F.2d at 18.
Andrews also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of contraband. The record shows that Andrews was arrested alone in the car in which the contraband was found, the contraband lying in a bag behind the front seat. From this evidence and the other surrounding circumstances in evidence, the finder of fact could rationally conclude that Andrews was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Irion, 482 F.2d 1240, 1245-48 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1026, 94 S. Ct. 454, 38 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1973).
DocketNumber： 77-1272
Citation Numbers： 599 F.2d 880
james-wintfored-rewis-v-gaming-activities-as-bettor-rather-than-united , 418 F.2d 1218 ( 1969 )
United States v. Daniel Dee Veon , 474 F.2d 1 ( 1973 )
United States v. Walter Eugene Irion, United States of ... , 482 F.2d 1240 ( 1973 )
united-states-v-gibson-specialty-company-and-patrick-zurla-united-states , 507 F.2d 446 ( 1974 )
United States v. Alfonso S. Padilla, United States of ... , 525 F.2d 308 ( 1975 )
United States v. Umberto Jose Chavez , 533 F.2d 491 ( 1976 )
United States v. Walter Swiderski and Maritza De Los Santos , 548 F.2d 445 ( 1977 )
United States v. Robby Dean Hole , 564 F.2d 298 ( 1977 )
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