Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/955/254/448335/
Timestamp: 2019-07-16 22:53:52
Document Index: 377405166

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1251', '§ 1344', '§ 231', '§ 706', '§ 230', '§ 230', '§ 1344', '§ 230']

James City County, Virginia, Plaintiff-appellee, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, United Statesarmy Corps of Engineers, Defendants-appellants,southern Environmental Law Center, Virginia Wildlifefederation, National Wildlife Federation,chesapeake Bay Foundation, Amici Curiae, 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1992 › James City County, Virginia, Plaintiff-appellee, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, U...
James City County, Virginia, Plaintiff-appellee, v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, United Statesarmy Corps of Engineers, Defendants-appellants,southern Environmental Law Center, Virginia Wildlifefederation, National Wildlife Federation,chesapeake Bay Foundation, Amici Curiae, 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992)
Argued Oct. 1, 1991. Decided Jan. 29, 1992
We review a judgment of the district court overturning a determination by the Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") pursuant to section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. 758 F. Supp. 348. The EPA vetoed a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers which would have permitted James City County, Virginia, to build a dam and construct a water reservoir on Ware Creek. We hold that the district court properly overturned the EPA's veto, but erred in failing to remand the case to the EPA for further proceedings.
The complex statutory and regulatory scheme involved here requires some preliminary discussion. Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act gives the Army Corps of Engineers primary responsibility for issuing the permit required by the County. It states that "The Secretary [of the Army, acting through the Corps of Engineers,] may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings [,] for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
In the regulations the EPA has issued to govern its veto determinations, "unacceptable adverse effect" is defined as an "impact on an aquatic or wetland ecosystem which is likely to result in significant degradation of municipal water supplies (including surface or ground water) or significant loss of or damage to fisheries, shellfishing, or wildlife habitat or recreation areas." 40 C.F.R. § 231.2(e). This regulation also provides that, "In evaluating the unacceptability of such impacts, consideration should be given to the relevant portions of the section 404(b) (1) guidelines...." Id.
* In our review of the district court's conclusion that there were no practicable alternatives, we are guided by the same standards that controlled the district court's evaluation of the EPA's Final Determination. The Administrative Procedures Act provides that when a court reviews an administrative agency's action on the record of a hearing provided by statute, that action can only be set aside if it is "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E).5 Since, in our view, the EPA's finding that the County had practicable alternative water sources was not supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the district court's holding in this respect.
Except as provided under section 404(b) (2), no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental consequences.
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). The regulation provides further that "An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project purposes." 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2).
The County concedes, as it must, that remands are generally appropriate when a court finds that the stated basis for an agency's action is inadequate. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524-25, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1202, 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978). It argues, however, that a remand is not appropriate in this case for several reasons.
The Recommended Determination equivocated with regard to the three dam alternative. It stated that " [w]e believe that this option continues to present serious environmental consequences. However, in the context of impact minimization [,] the three dam option should have received more attention."
In our view, this is the proper standard of review for the EPA's section 404(c) determination, in light of the statutory requirements of notice and opportunity for public hearings, as well as the requirement that "The Administrator shall set forth in writing and make public his findings and his reasons for making any determination under this subsection." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). But see Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089, 109 S. Ct. 1556, 103 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1989) (reviewing a section 404(c) veto decision by the EPA under the arbitrary and capricious standard). Even were we to review EPA's action under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, however, we would reach the same conclusions that we reach herein
The district court concluded that EPA had relied upon a presumption that practicable alternatives exist because of a mistaken belief that the proposed reservoir would "not require access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill its basic purpose (i.e., is not 'water dependent')...." 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (3). After reviewing the EPA's Final Determination, we are not persuaded that EPA applied the presumption in this case. While parts of the Final Determination seem to require the County to prove that alternatives are not available, EPA makes its findings without explicitly invoking the presumption. Moreover, like the district court, we are persuaded that this project is water dependent, and conclude that the presumption does not apply