Source: http://sc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20191104_0002797.DSC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-08-11 19:59:05
Document Index: 600543696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 922', '§ 922', '§ 1951', '§ 924', '§ 2255']

FindACase™ | Gamble v. United States
Dajon Saleem Gamble, Petitioner,
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Dajon Saleem Gamble's (“Petitioner's”) pro se [ECF No. 86] motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence (“motion to vacate”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Also pending is the Government's [ECF No. 104] motion for summary judgment, Petitioner's [ECF No. 98] motion to appoint counsel, and Petitioner's [ECF No. 102] motion to dismiss the indictment, conviction, and sentence.
Petitioner's motion to vacate alleges two grounds for relief including an allegation that he instructed his counsel to file a direct appeal despite having waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement and at sentencing. Petitioner's signed appeal waiver [ECF No. 77] suggests Petitioner did not want to appeal. However, the Court is constrained by Petitioner's sworn statement that he requested that an appeal be filed anyway. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007). Under the mandates of Poindexter and the unique circumstances of this case, the Court sees little harm in forgoing an evidentiary hearing on this issue and granting Petitioner a belated appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons explained more fully below, the Court grants Petitioner's motion to vacate as to ground two only and grants Petitioner a belated appeal.[1]
On September 26, 2017, Petitioner was indicted in a single count indictment. [ECF No. 15] with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Thereafter, on October 24, 2017, Petitioner was indicted in a superseding indictment [ECF No. 38] with three counts. Count one alleged Petitioner was a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e). Count two alleged a Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Count three alleged Petitioner used or carried a firearm during the crime of violence alleged in count two in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
On January 8, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty to count one (felon in possession of a firearm) and count two (Hobbs Act robbery) pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, which provided for a stipulated sentencing range of 92 to 104 months in prison. On April 26, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to 100 months in prison consistent with the terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. At sentencing, Petitioner signed a waiver of appeal indicating that he did not want to appeal. See [ECF No. 77]. Judgment was filed on May 2, 2018.
Petitioner filed the instant pro se motion to vacate on April 8, 2019.
Petitioner's motion to vacate alleges claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are constitutional in nature and therefore are properly asserted under § 2255. The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Constitution. amend VI. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require that counsel be effective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970)). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland that (1) his “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, ” id. at 688; and (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. A court applying the Strickland test may apply either prong first and does not need to analyze both prongs of the test if petitioner makes “an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.