Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98774/rosenberg-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-01-19 13:39:32
Document Index: 586772297

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 32', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 10', '§ 1810', '§ 10', '§ 10']

Rosenberg Vs United States - Citation 98774 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98774
Case Number 346 U.S. 273
rosenberg v. united states - 346 u.s. 273 (1953) u.s. supreme court rosenberg v. united states, 346 u.s. 273 (1953) rosenberg v. united states no. ___, june 18 special term, 1953 argued june 18, 1953 decided june 19, 1953 346 u.s. 273 motion to vacate a stay syllabus the rosenbergs were convicted and sentenced to death for conspiring to violate the espionage act of 1917 by communicating to a foreign government, in wartime, secret atomic and other military information. the overt acts relating to atomic secrets occurred before enactment of the atomic energy act of 1946, but other aspects of the conspiracy continued into 1950. the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, and this court denied certiorari and rehearing......
Rosenberg v. United States - 346 U.S. 273 (1953)
U.S. Supreme Court Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953)
Held: the stay granted by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is vacated. Pp. 346 U. S. 277 -296.
1. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS had power to issue the stay. Pp. 346 U. S. 285 , 346 U. S. 288 , 346 U. S. 294 .
2. This Court has power to decide, in this proceeding, the question preserved by the stay granted by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and to vacate that stay. Pp. 346 U. S. 286 -287.
(a) That the full Court has made no practice of vacating stays issued by single Justices does not prove the nonexistence of the power; it only demonstrates that the circumstances must be unusual before the Court, in its discretion, will exercise its power. P. 346 U. S. 286 .
(b) The power exercised in this case derives from the Court's role as the final forum to render the ultimate answer to the question which was preserved by the stay. P. 346 U. S. 286 .
(c) In the unusual circumstances of this case, this Court deemed it proper and necessary to convene in Special Term to consider and act upon the Attorney General's urgent application. Pp. 346 U. S. 286 -287.
(d) This Court's responsibility to supervise the administration of criminal justice by the federal judiciary includes the duty to see not only that the laws are enforced by fair proceedings, but also that the punishments prescribed by the laws are enforced with a reasonable degree of promptness and certainty. P. 346 U. S. 287 .
3. The stay granted by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is vacated. Pp. 346 U. S. 288 -289.
(a) A stay should issue only if there is a substantial question to be preserved for further proceedings in the courts. P. 346 U. S. 288 .
(b) The question whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 rendered the District Court powerless in this case to impose the death penalty under the Espionage Act of 1917 is not substantial, and further proceedings to litigate it are unwarranted. Pp. 346 U. S. 285 -286, 346 U. S. 289 , 346 U. S. 289 -290, 346 U. S. 294 -296.
4. The Atomic Energy Act did not repeal or limit the penalty provisions of the Espionage Act. Pp. 346 U. S. 287 , 346 U. S. 289 , 346 U. S. 290 , 346 U. S. 294 -296.
(a) At least where different proof is required for each offense, a single act or transaction may violate more than one criminal statute. P. 346 U. S. 294 .
(b) The partial overlap of two statutes does not work a pro tanto repeal of the earlier act, unless the intention of the legislature to repeal the earlier statute is clear and manifest. Pp. 346 U. S. 294 -295.
(c) Instead of repealing the penalty provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, the Atomic Energy Act, by § 10(b)(6), preserves them in undiminished force. P. 346 U. S. 295 .
(d) Since the crux of the charge alleged overt acts committed before the Atomic Energy Act was enacted, that Act cannot cover the offenses charged, and the alleged inconsistency of its penalty provisions with those of the Espionage Act cannot be sustained. Pp. 346 U. S. 295 -296.
5. Although the question now urged as being substantial was raised and presented for the first time to MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS by counsel who have never been employed by the Rosenbergs, and who heretofore have not participated in this case, the full Court has considered it on its merits. The Court does not hold in this case that a waiver of this claim precluded its consideration. Pp. 346 U. S. 282 -283, 346 U. S. 288 -289.
6. In the circumstances of this case, in which the Rosenbergs were represented at their trial and in all subsequent proceedings by able and zealous counsel of their own choice, intervention by a stranger as "next friend," without authorization by the Rosenbergs and through counsel who had never been retained by them, is to be discountenanced. Pp. 346 U. S. 291 -292.
For opinion of the Court, delivered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, see post, p. 346 U. S. 277 .
For per curiam opinion, see post, p. 346 U. S. 288 .
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKS0N, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE MINTON, see post, p. 346 U. S. 289 .
For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE MINTON, see post, p. 346 U. S. 293 .
For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, see post, p. 346 U. S. 296 .
For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, see post, p. 346 U. S. 301 .
For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see post , p. 346 U. S. 310 . For appendix to opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS containing his opinion granting the stay, see post, p. 346 U. S. 313 .
The history of the proceedings in this unusual case is recited in the opinion of the Court, post, pp. 346 U. S. 277 -285.
On August 17, 1950, the defendants were indicted for conspiring to commit espionage in wartime, in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 32(a), 34. After a lengthy jury trial, they were found guilty, and, on April 5, 1951, they were sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ] A petition for rehearing was denied.
A petition for certiorari was filed here. It was denied on October 13, 1952. [ Footnote 2 ] A petition for rehearing was filed October 28, 1952. It was denied on November 17, 1952. [ Footnote 3 ]
§ 2255), to vacate the judgment and sentence. That motion (hereafter called the first § 2255 motion) did not challenge the power of the District Court to impose the death sentence. It was denied. [ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals
affirmed. A petition for rehearing was denied. [ Footnote 5 ] Certiorari was again sought here, and denied on May 25, 1953. The stay entered by the Court of Appeals was vacated by this Court on the same date. [ Footnote 6 ] On the same day, a petition for a stay, pending the consideration of a petition for rehearing, to be filed by June 9, 1953, was denied by THE CHIEF JUSTICE. A petition for rehearing was filed and was pending during the last week of the 1952 Term of the Court, the adjournment of the Term having been announced for June 15, 1953.
On June 12, 1953, an application for a stay or execution was filed with the Clerk of this Court and presented to MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, the appropriate Circuit Justice. This stay was requested to enable the Rosenbergs to seek review of the three most recent decisions of the Court of Appeals "within the time ordered by the applicable statute." MR. JUSTICE JACKSON referred this application to the full Court, with a recommendation that oral argument be heard on it. On June 15, 1953, the last session of the 1952 Term, the Court declined to hear oral argument on this application, and denied the stay. [ Footnote 7 ] The
pending petition for rehearing as to the May 25, 1953, denial of certiorari was also denied. [ Footnote 8 ] Thus, the Court had, in effect, disposed of all collateral attacks upon the sentence then pending in the courts -- as to the first § 2255 motion by adhering to its original denial of certiorari and as to the three subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals in the further collateral proceedings by denying a stay, a decision which showed that the Court saw no substantial question in those proceedings to be preserved for its further consideration.
of that day and denied the application. [ Footnote 9 ] The Special Term was then adjourned.
Late on June 15, 1953, counsel for the defendants applied to MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS for a stay. On June 16, 1953, counsel representing one Edelman, who described himself as "next friend" to the Rosenbergs, presented to MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS a petition for habeas corpus. That petition included a prayer for a stay. More than two months before their appearance before MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, Edelman's attorneys had asked counsel for the Rosenbergs to raise the very question which they urged upon MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. The argument was not adopted at that time by counsel for the defendants. [ Footnote 10 ] In
deliberation, the Court denied both motions, with MR. JUSTICE BLACK noting dissents, and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER appending a separate memorandum to each order. [ Footnote 11 ]
Stays are part of the "traditional equipment for the administration of justice." Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U. S. 4 , 316 U. S. 9 -10 (1942). The individual Justices of this Court have regularly issued them, and the exercise of that power is vital to the proper functioning of our jurisdiction.
( See post, p. 346 U. S. 321 .)
We turn next to a consideration of our power to decide, in this proceeding, the question preserved by the stay. It is true that the full Court has made no practice of vacating stays issued by single Justices, although it has entertained motions for such relief. [ Footnote 12 ] But reference to this practice does not prove the nonexistence of the power; it only demonstrates that the circumstances must be unusual before the Court, in its discretion, will exercise its power.
This brought us to the merits. Our decision was summarized in our per curiam opinion. [ Footnote 13 ] We held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 did not displace the Espionage Act. We held that this issue raised no doubts of such magnitude to require further proceedings before
More complete statements of the reasons for our decision are set forth in the opinions of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON [ Footnote 14 ] and MR. JUSTICE CLARK. [ Footnote 15 ] We need not reiterate here what has been said in those opinions. It is enough to add, that, in our view, the ultimate decision was clear. Accordingly, we vacated the stay.
344 U. S. 889 -890. The full text of the order reads:
"After further consideration, the Court has adhered to its denial of this petition for certiorari. Misconception regarding the meaning of such a denial persists despite repeated attempts at explanation. It means, and all that it means, is that there were not four members of the Court to whom the grounds on which the decision of the Court of Appeals was challenged seemed sufficiently important when judged by the standards governing the issue of the discretionary writ of certiorari. It also deserves to be repeated that the effective administration of justice precludes this Court from giving reasons, however briefly, for its denial of a petition for certiorari. I have heretofore explained the reasons that, for me, also militate against noting individual votes when a petition for certiorari is denied. See Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U. S. 982 ."
"Motions for leave to file briefs of National Lawyers Guild and Joseph Brainin et al. for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. The order of the United States Court of Appeals of February 17, 1953, granting a stay of execution is vacated. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, referring to the positions they took when these cases were here last November, adhere to them. 344 U. S. 889 . MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is of the opinion the petition for certiorari should be granted."
345 U. S. 989 . The full text of the order reads:
"Petition for rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Frankfurter deems it appropriate to state once more that the reasons that preclude publication by the Court, as a general practice, of votes on petition for certiorari guide him in all cases, so that it has been his 'unbroken practice not to note dissent from the Court's disposition of petitions for certiorari.' Chemical Bank Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U. S. 982 ; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912 ; Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200 , 339 U. S. 227 ; Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844; Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U. S. 921 ; Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U. S. 889 , 345 U.S. 965. Partial disclosure of votes on successive stages of a certiorari proceeding does not present an accurate picture of what took place."
346 U. S. 271 . The full text of the order reads:
346 U. S. 322 . The order denying a further stay read:
"MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER desires that it be noted that he too would deny the motion to reconsider the power of this Court to review MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' order to stay the execution, but not because he thinks the matter is free from doubt. See his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U. S. 578 , 318 U. S. 590 , in connection with Lambert v. Barrett, 157 U. S. 697 , and Carper v. Fitzgerald, 121 U. S. 87 ."
Post, p. 346 U. S. 288 .
Post, p. 346 U. S. 289 .
Post, p. 346 U. S. 293 .
We convened a Special Term of the Court to consider an application by the Attorney General (1) to review the stay of execution of Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg, granted by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS on June 17, 1953, or (2) for reconsideration and reaffirmance of this Court's order in No. 1, Misc., June 15 Special Term, 1953, Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg, petitioners v. Wilford L. Denno, Warden of Sing Sing Prison, denying a stay. ante, p. 346 U. S. 271 .
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER is of opinion that the questions raised for the first time yesterday before the full Court by the application of the Attorney General are complicated and novel. He believes that, in order to enable the Court to adjudicate these issues upon adequate deliberation, this application should be disposed of only after opportunity has been afforded to counsel for both sides to make an adequate study and presentation. In due course, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER will set forth more specifically the grounds for this position. **
** [ See post, p. 346 U. S. 301 .]
This stay is not and could not be based upon any doubt that a legal conviction was had under the Espionage Act. Application here for review of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the conviction was refused, 344 U.S. 838, and rehearing later denied, 344 U. S. 889 .
was made for stay until they could be heard. The application was referred to the full Court, with the recommendation that the full Court hold immediate hearing and, as an institution, make a prompt and final disposition of all questions. This was supported by four Justices, and failed for want of one more, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS recording his view that "there would be no end served by hearing oral argument on the motion for a stay." 345 U. S. 989 .
Edelman is a stranger to the Rosenbergs and to their case. His intervention was unauthorized by them, and originally opposed by their counsel. What may be Edelman's purpose in getting himself into this litigation is not explained, although inquiry was made at the bar. It does not appear that his own record is entirely clear, or that he would be a helpful or chosen champion. See Edelman v. California, 344 U. S. 357 .
That sentence, however, is permitted by law, and, as was previously pointed out, is therefore not within this Court's power of revision. 344 U. S. 889 , 889.
Human lives are at stake; we need not turn this decision on fine points of procedure or a party's technical standing to claim relief. Nor did MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS lack the power and, in view of his firm belief that the legal issues tendered him were substantial, he even had the duty to grant a temporary stay. But, for me, the short answer to the contention that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 may invalidate defendants' death sentence is that the Atomic Energy Act cannot here apply. It is true that § 10(b)(2) and (3) of that Act authorizes capital punishment only upon recommendation of a jury and a finding that the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States. 60 Stat. 755, 766, 42 U.S.C. § 1810(b)(2), (3). (Notably, by that statute the death penalty may be imposed for peacetime offenses as well, thus exceeding in harshness the penalties provided by the Espionage Act.) This prosecution, however, charged a wartime violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, under which these elements are not prerequisite to a sentence of death. Where Congress, by more than one statute, proscribes a private course of conduct, the Government may choose to invoke either applicable law: "At least where different proof is required for each offense, a single act or transaction may violate more than one criminal statute." United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. 43 , 344 U. S. 45 ; see also United States v. Noveck, 273 U. S. 202 , 273 U. S. 206 ; Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338 (1911). Nor does the partial overlap of two statutes necessarily work a pro tanto repealer of the earlier Act. Id.
There must be "a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new law and those of the old." United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188 , 308 U. S. 198 (1939). Otherwise, the Government when charging a conspiracy to transmit both atomic and non-atomic secrets would have to split its prosecution into two alleged crimes. Section 10(b)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act itself, moreover, expressly provides that § 10 "shall not exclude the applicable provisions of any other laws . . . ," an unmistakable reference to the 1917 Espionage Act. * Therefore, this section of the Atomic Energy Act, instead of repealing the penalty provisions of the Espionage Act, in fact preserves them in undiminished force. Thus, there is no warrant for superimposing the penalty provisions of the later Act upon the earlier law.
First. The Government argues that this Court has power to set aside the stay granted by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. I think this is doubtful. I have found no statute or rule of court which permits the full Court to set aside a mere temporary stay entered by a Justice in obedience to his statutory obligations. * Moreover, it is a commonplace for judges to grant stays in vacation. This is a healthy and necessary Court custom. There may have been prior instances where vacation stays of individual Justices have been set aside by the full Court before the next regular term, but no such cases have been pointed out in the Solicitor General's argument, and I have found none. So far as I can tell, the Court's action here is unprecedented.
an individual Justice has power to grant stays where substantial questions are raised. He not merely has power to do so; there is a serious obligation upon him to grant a stay where new substantial questions are presented. Where the life or death of citizens is involved, that obligation is all the heavier. Surely the Court is not here establishing a precedent which will require it to call extra sessions during vacation every time a federal or state official asks it to hasten the electrocution of defendants without affording this Court adequate time or opportunity for exploration and study of serious legal questions. It is not inappropriate to point out that, in Lambert v. Barrett, 157 U. S. 697 , decided in 1895 and never overruled, this Court held that it had no jurisdiction over an appeal from a habeas corpus order of a circuit judge entered in chambers. The stay order in this case derives from petitions for habeas corpus, and was entered by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in chambers.
lawyers had "waived" plain error. An illegal execution is no less illegal because a technical ground of "waiver" is assigned to justify it. Compare Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 , 306 U. S. 26 . After having seen the Court's order, I find that it appears to agree with this view.
entertain the application for a stay; [ Footnote 2/1 ] his power to consider a question, though raised by counsel not of record; his power to consider a question not heretofore urged, when it concerned the legality of a sentence. See Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163.
And the indictment charged that the conspiracy continued from 1944 to 1950. Such "averments of time in the indictment are expected and intended to be proved as laid." United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 , 218 U. S. 609 . Indeed, the judge told the jury:
It is suggested that the overt acts laid in the indictment all occurred before the effective date of the Atomic Energy Act, and that, hence, the indictment did not charge any offense committed after that effective date. But, again, the offense charged in the indictment was a conspiracy, not one or more over acts. [ Footnote 2/2 ] As the judge told the jury, they had to find a conspiracy in order to convict,
Surely it needs only statement that, with such a drastic difference in the authority to take life between the Espionage Act and the Atomic Energy Act, it cannot be left within the discretion of a prosecutor whether the judge may impose the death sentence wholly on his own authority, or whether he may do so only upon recommendation of the jury. Nothing can rest on the prosecutor's caprice in placing on the indictment the label of the 1917 Act or of the 1946 Act. To seek demonstration of such an absurdity, in defiance of our whole conception of impersonality in the criminal law, would be an exercise in self-stultification. The indorsement of an indictment, the theory under which the prosecutor is operating, his belief or error as to the statute which supports an indictment or under which sentences may be imposed, are all wholly immaterial. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382 , 168 U. S. 389 .
This much, at least, lies on the surface of an analysis of the two statutes. The Reports of this Court are replete with instances of marked division of opinion in construing criminal statutes; doubtful and ambiguous statutory language and like ambiguities in the interpretative materials that led to many of those divisions are certainly not more impressive, to say the least, than the ambiguities and difficulties here. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 ; Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 ; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 ; United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 ; United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70 ; United States v. Hood, 343 U. S. 148 .
Espionage Act, but seems, as I read it, to point to the view that, on facts like those of this case, the Atomic Energy Act may well be found to apply to the exclusion of the Espionage Act. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Newman, Control of Information Relating to Atomic Energy, 56 Yale L.J. 768.
It is worth noting that, under the Atomic Energy Act, it is very probably not necessary, since the Act, unlike the Espionage Act, does not make it a requirement, to prove overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Cf. Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 . If so, under the Atomic Energy Act, it would not have been necessary to allege or prove an overt act involving atomic espionage subsequent to 1946 in order to obtain a conviction on a conspiracy indictment such as the one here. It is not without significance that the relevance of this point was not considered by the Government in its argument or submission. This is significant not because it discloses a failure of counsel, but because to require consideration of this and other points within twenty-four hours after a complex of problems was first put forward is to presuppose omniscient lawyers.
"In order to determine whether an indictment charges an offense against the United States, designation by the pleader of the statute under which he purported to lay the charge is immaterial. He may have conceived the charge under one statute which would not sustain the indictment, but it may nevertheless come within the terms of another statute. See Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382 . On the other hand, an indictment may validly satisfy the statute under which the pleader proceeded, but other statutes not referred to by him may draw the sting of criminality from the allegations."
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 , 312 U. S. 229 .
" Differing penalty provisions: The difference can only be resolved by judicial decision. Fortunately, this raises problems within judicial proceedings as such, and does not pose any difficulties or dilemmas for the Commission in administering the Act."
When the motion for a stay was before me, I was deeply troubled by the legal question tendered. After twelve hours of research and study, I concluded, as my opinion ** indicated, that the question was a substantial one, never
The crime of the Rosenbergs was a conspiracy that started prior to the Atomic Energy Act and continued almost 4 years after the effective date of that Act. The overt acts alleged were acts which took place prior to the effective date of the new Act. But that is irrelevant for two reasons. First, acts in pursuance of the conspiracy were proved which took place after the new Act became the law. Second, under Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 , no overt acts were necessary; the crime was complete when the conspiracy was proved. And that conspiracy, as defined in the indictment itself, endured almost 4 years after the Atomic Energy Act became effective.
serves. I adhere to the views stated by Chief Justice Hughes for a unanimous Court in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 , 306 U. S. 26 -27:
** Attached hereto as an Appendix, post, p. 346 U. S. 313 .
"(2) Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully, having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with, any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, note or information involving or incorporating restricted data -- [ Footnote 3/1 ] "
"(A) communicates, transmits, or discloses the same to any individual or person, or attempts or conspires to do any of the foregoing, with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life ( but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States ); or by a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both;"
"(3) Whoever, with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation, acquires, or attempts or conspires to acquire any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, instrument, appliance, note or information involving or incorporating restricted data shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by death or imprisonment for life ( but the penalty of death or imprisonment for life may be imposed only upon recommendation of the jury and only in cases where the offense was committed with intent to injure the
United States ), or by a fine or of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both."
This question is presented to me for the first time on the eve of the execution of the Rosenbergs, without the benefit of briefs or any extended research. I cannot agree that it is a frivolous point or without substance. I may be that not every death penalty imposed for divulging atomic secrets need follow the procedure prescribed in § 10 of the Atomic Energy Act. If the crime was complete prior to the passage of that Act, possibly the old Espionage Act would apply. But this case is different in three respects: First, the offense charged was a conspiracy commencing before, but continuing after, the date of the new Act. Second, although the overt acts alleged were committed in 1944 and in 1945, the Government's case showed acts of the Rosenbergs in pursuance of the conspiracy long after the new Act became effective. [ Footnote 3/2 ]
Third, the overt acts of the coconspirator, Sobell, were alleged to have taken place between January, 1946, and May, 1948. But the proof against Sobell, as against the Rosenbergs, extended well beyond the effective date of the new Act. [ Footnote 3/3 ] In short, a substantial portion of the case
"In June, 1948, [Max] Elitcher decided to leave the Bureau of Ordnance to take a job in New York (R. 256). When he informed Sobell of his plans, the latter urged him not to do anything until he discussed the matter with Rosenberg (R. 256). * Pursuant to arrangements made by Sobell, Elitcher met Rosenberg and Sobell in midtown New York (R. 256-257). When Rosenberg was told about Elitcher's plans, he tried to persuade Elitcher to remain in Washington, stating that he needed a source of information in the Navy Department (R. 257). Rosenberg further stated that he had already made plans for Elitcher to meet a contact in Washington (R. 257). During this conversation, Sobell also attempted to persuade Elitcher to stay at the Bureau of Ordnance; he told Elitcher 'Well, Rosenberg is right, Julie is right; you should do that' (R. 257). **"