Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/588/130/396117/
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 18:45:08
Document Index: 757804007

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 1']

Arthur Lee Norris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections,state of Florida, Defendant-appellee, 588 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1979 › Arthur Lee Norris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections,st...
Arthur Lee Norris, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections,state of Florida, Defendant-appellee, 588 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1979)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 588 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1979) Jan. 17, 1979
This is a habeas corpus case. The petitioner was convicted in state court of murder. He did not appeal. He later filed a petition in Florida state court seeking an out of time appeal because his attorney failed to initiate an appeal pursuant to Norris' instructions. The Florida court directed that a hearing be held to determine the petitioner's claim. At the hearing, the petitioner's trial attorney unequivocally testified that he told the petitioner about his right to an appeal and suggested that the petitioner appeal. The attorney also testified that the petitioner told him not to appeal. The attorney's law clerk testified that Norris had not requested an appeal be taken for him. Moreover, the court reporter present at sentencing testified that his notes reflected that the trial judge informed Norris that he had thirty days to appeal and that if he did not have any money to hire an attorney one would be supplied to him by the state. The petitioner testified that he had asked his attorney to seek an appeal, but his lawyer had told him his appeal was doomed to failure. Norris was not represented by counsel at the state proceeding. Based on this testimony, the state court denied Norris an out of time appeal. Norris v. Wainwright, 331 So. 2d 396 (2 Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1976).
The petitioner then filed this action in the United States district court. The district court, after a review of the state court proceedings, denied relief without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Although there is no constitutional right to an appointed counsel at a state habeas corpus action, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); Vandenades v. United States, 523 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5 Cir. 1975); Ardister v. Hopper, 500 F.2d 229, 233 (5 Cir. 1974); Stanley v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 8, 10 (5 Cir. 1969); Queor v. Lee, 382 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5 Cir. 1967), the petitioner argues that the lack of an attorney at the state proceeding automatically vitiates the respect due to a state proceeding under Townsend v. Sain, supra, and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).1 Therefore, Norris contends that the district court erred in not granting a new evidentiary hearing.
In support of his argument, Norris points to two sections of § 2254(d). First, Norris claims under § 2254(d) (5) the United States district court was required to hold a new evidentiary hearing because he was an indigent and the state court in deprivation of his constitutional rights failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the state court proceeding. Second, Norris claims that under § 2254(d) (6), the district court is required to hold another evidentiary hearing because he did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the state court proceeding.
The petitioner argues that, since § 2254(d) (5) requires a new hearing if the state in deprivation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner failed to appoint an attorney, there must necessarily be a constitutional right to an attorney in the state proceeding. Because we have determined that there is no such general right, this section does not require the district court to afford a new evidentiary hearing in every case that the petitioner did not have an attorney in the state proceeding. This court has upheld the failure to grant a new evidentiary hearing in a number of cases in which the petitioner did not have the aid of an attorney in the state proceeding. See, e. g., Farmer v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 22, 23 (5 Cir. 1973); Williams v. Smith, 434 F.2d 592, 594 (5 Cir. 1970); Ardister v. Smith, 433 F.2d 931 (5 Cir. 1970).
The petitioner's second argument calls for a different examination. We can easily imagine a case in which the absence of an attorney in the state proceeding would result in a concomitant lack of a full and fair hearing. Under these circumstances it would be incumbent on the federal district court to hold a new evidentiary hearing. However, there is no Per se rule that the lack of counsel at the state habeas corpus hearing requires a De novo evidentiary hearing in federal court. The test under § 2254(d) (6) is whether the lack of counsel in the state proceeding results in the lack of fundamental fairness. See, e. g., Ardister v. Hopper, 500 F.2d 229, 233 (5 Cir. 1974); Wesley v. Alabama, 488 F.2d 30 (5 Cir. 1974); Lane v. Henderson, 480 F.2d 544, 545 (5 Cir. 1973). See generally Gibson v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1045, 1052 (5 Cir. 1978), Addendum of Judge Rubin, § 1.
In the state court proceeding Norris claimed that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective because the attorney did not take a direct appeal pursuant to Norris' direction. Norris' contentions are similar to the ones advanced in Edge v. Wainwright, 347 F.2d 190 (5 Cir. 1965), Cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953, 87 S. Ct. 335, 17 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1966). In Edge the petitioner alleged that he had informed his attorney and the trial judge of his desire to take an appeal, but both had refused to help him prosecute an appeal. We held that if this allegation were found to be true, the petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus relief. 347 F.2d at 192. In the instant case, Norris would be entitled to relief if he could show that his attorney disregarded his instructions to appeal. Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5 Cir. 1974). Therefore, the sole issue at the state proceeding was whether the trial attorney disregarded Norris' instructions to take an appeal. See also Benoit v. Wingo, 423 F.2d 880, 883 (6 Cir. 1970); United States v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865, 871 (3 Cir. 1970).
The testimony of the court reporter specifically reveals that the trial judge informed Norris of his appellate rights. We need not determine if the trial attorney informed Norris of the complete Lumpkin litany since it is plain that the trial judge did so. We have held that this action by the trial judge is sufficient under Lumpkin. Esquivel v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 814, 815 (5 Cir. 1978). Indeed, we are of the opinion that it is a useful practice for the trial judge to always inform a convicted defendant of his appellate rights. See United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648 (2 Cir. 1969) (en banc), Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S. Ct. 929, 25 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1970).)
Under the sixth amendment an indigent defendant is denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when an appointed attorney fails to inform him of his appellate rights in accordance with Lumpkin v. Smith,supra. When this court decided Lumpkin we were not concerned with protecting the right to appeal, but rather we were concerned with the standards for effective assistance of counsel. The right to appeal is not a component of the sixth amendment nor is it a constitutional right we seek to protect for its own sake. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). Once an attorney has fulfilled his duty under Lumpkin, there is no further logical relationship between his client's rights under the sixth amendment and the client's decision not to appeal. A defendant's decision not to appeal cannot fairly be charged to his attorney as an obligation of the sixth amendment. A defendant properly informed of his appellate rights may not "let the matter rest," Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341, 344 (5 Cir. 1968), and then claim that he did not waive his right to appeal. See Huff v. Wainwright, 583 F.2d 744 (5 Cir. 1978).
Our result would be different if the right to appeal were an independent right found in the constitution4 such as the right to be free from self-incrimination and the right to trial by jury. If appellate review of a criminal conviction were a right given by the constitution, we would not allow a defendant to be precluded from appellate review unless he knowingly and voluntarily waived such review. The distinction is readily apparent in the requirement that waiver be found before the taking of a guilty plea, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), or the admission of a confession, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S. Ct. 1541, 6 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1961); Young v. Wainwright, 326 F.2d 255 (5 Cir. 1964).
Third Circuit : United States ex rel. O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865, 867-872 (3 Cir. 1970). (The appellant agreed with and acquiesced in his counsel's decision not to file an appeal. The appellant had knowledge of his appellate rights and participated in a discussion with his counsel about the possibility of appealing the conviction. On this record the Third Circuit found " 'relinquishment (and) abandonment of a known right' " Citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). See also United States ex rel. Beard v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 588 (3 Cir. 1970).)
Fourth Circuit : Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1158 (4 Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007, 90 S. Ct. 1235, 25 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1970). (Petitioner was totally unaware of his appellate rights, See Lumpkin v. Smith, supra. Fourth Circuit also found that since the petitioner did not know of his appellate rights he also did not waive his right to appeal. Subsequent Fourth Circuit cases do not turn on the waiver analysis. See, e. g., Shiflett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 433 F.2d 124 (1970), Reversed, 447 F.2d 50 (4 Cir. 1971) (en banc), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 994, 92 S. Ct. 1267, 31 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1972); Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168 (4 Cir. 1977); Willey v. Coiner, 464 F.2d 525, 526 (4 Cir. 1972); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 990 (4 Cir. 1972).)
Sixth Circuit : Bartley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 462 F.2d 610, 611 (6 Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1062, 93 S. Ct. 570, 34 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1972). (The Sixth Circuit stated without discussing whether waiver analysis is appropriate, "(T)he undisputed facts set forth in the affidavit of Attorney Redwine, one of petitioner's state court counsel, require the conclusion that petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived and relinquished his right to appeal.")
See also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S. Ct. 436, 50 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1976) (finding that Gary Gilmore had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any federal rights he might have asserted after a trial court had convicted him).