Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/413/329/36252/
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 03:59:03
Document Index: 22412508

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1625', '§ 1622', '§ 456', '§ 1625', '§ 456', '§ 1625', '§ 1624', '§ 1626', '§ 1604', '§ 456']

United States of America, Appellee, v. John Steven Rundle, Appellant, 413 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1969 › United States of America, Appellee, v. John Steven Rundle, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. John Steven Rundle, Appellant, 413 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 413 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969) July 8, 1969
The board must function according to statutory requirements and the administrative regulations governing its procedure. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 75 S. Ct. 397, 99 L. Ed. 453 (1955). Congress has provided:
On May 12, three days after this call, the University notified the board by Form 109 that Rundle was a full-time student. We conclude that at least in the circumstances of this case, the University's certification was sufficient to establish under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) that Rundle was in fact "satisfactorily pursuing" his schooling. United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3 Cir. 1953). As the government concedes in its brief:
However, in view of the fact that the evidence conclusively shows that at the time Rundle received his induction order in May, he was pursuing his education and upon certification of that fact to the board under 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15(b) and the statute 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(i) (2)2 the board was nonetheless required to reopen and reconsider his I-A classification and cancel his induction order 32 C.F.R. § 1625.14. See United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d at 890 (3 Cir. 1953). To hold otherwise would be to permit a board to disregard a mandatory duty to reopen by simply delaying consideration until the registrant's status has changed sufficiently so that he is no longer entitled to the requested reclassification. Indeed, a board's delay might in itself cause a change in a registrant's status. The local board's delay, coupled with both its evident reluctance to grant a I-S classification and the outstanding induction order might well have caused Rundle to conclude that registration for summer school was a futile act. For the same reason, Rundle's subsequent withdrawal of his request for a I-S deferment on June 23 and his application then to be considered for a I-A-O status cannot affect the board's mandatory duty under the regulations to reopen and consider anew his classification.
The reopening and reconsideration of a classification have significance independent of the reclassification itself. This was recognized in Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9 Cir. 1967), where Senior Circuit Judge Harvey Johnsen held that the local board had erred in refusing to reopen a classification when it had "shortcut the situation, without purporting to reopen," by proceeding directly to a consideration on the merits of the probative elements in the registrant's file. Noting that the board had thereby eliminated the registrant's rights to appear personally and to appeal, Judge Johnsen stated:
"For a local board to be able to effect a discrimination of such substance * * * would seem to us to constitute a matter of basic unfairness and hence to be, in the language of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S. Ct. 693, 694, 98 L. Ed. 884, and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168, 84 S. Ct. 1187, 1190, 12 L. Ed. 2d 218, `so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'" Id. at 976-977.
Failure to follow administrative procedures for reopening classification has been consistently held to be a violation of due process. Davis v. United App. § 456(i) (2)2, the board was none-States, 410 F.2d 89 (8 Cir. 1969); United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7 Cir. 1967); Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9 Cir. 1967); Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880 (5 Cir. 1955). The argument that Rundle was not "prejudiced" by the failure to do so is unavailing. The evidence of prejudice is conclusive here.
Secondly, by refusing to reopen Rundle's classification under § 1625.3(b), he has been deprived of his right to a personal appearance before the board (32 C.F.R. § 1624.1) and the right to appeal to the state board (32 C.F.R. § 1626.2). As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted in United States v. Vincelli, 215 F.2d 210, 213 (2 Cir. 1954):
See also Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9 Cir. 1967); Stain v. United States, 235 F.2d 339 (9 Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3 Cir. 1953).
Denial of procedural and substantive rights cannot be justified by subsequent events. Cf. United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 250 (7 Cir. 1967.) Had these rights — the reopening of his classification and the attendant cancellation of his induction order — been afforded the registrant, no one can predict what subsequent events might have turned out to be. However, we need not theorize about such possible events, for as stated in United States v. Simmons, 348 U.S. 397 at 406, 75 S. Ct. 397 at 402, 99 L. Ed. 453.
The defendant also alleges that he was denied due process by the board's failure to meet formally and consider his application for a I-A-O classification. The board rejected Rundle's I-A-O application as not timely filed, without a meeting, by telephone vote, since Rundle's induction order had already been issued. We do not need to pass upon the board's action here in view of our reversal on other grounds.3 However, the true significance of this rejection is that if the induction order had been properly recalled by reason of the I-S reclassification in May, at a time Rundle was clearly entitled to it, it is conceded the board would properly have had to consider by formal meeting and quorum vote whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing for a I-A-O status. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1604.52a(d) and 1625.2. See United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968).
In Ellis v. Hershey, 302 F. Supp. 347 (E. D.Mich. April 30, 1969), second year law students brought a class action seeking injunctive relief from the board's refusal to grant them I-S deferments under § 456(i) (2). Judge Kaess granted the injunction and wrote:
"* * * The language of a statute is the best and most reliable index of its meaning and where the language is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of its construction. Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (C.A. 9, 1967), 384 F.2d 126, cert. den. 390 U.S. 950, 88 S. Ct. 1041, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1142.