Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/475/469/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-05-27 12:03:07
Document Index: 566081306

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 309', '§1983', '§ 1983', 'arts 475', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Bertold Pembaur is a licensed Ohio physician and the sole proprietor of the Rockdale Medical Center, located in the city of Cincinnati in Hamilton County. Most of Pembaur's patients are welfare recipients who rely on government assistance to pay for medical care. During the spring of 1977, Simon Leis, the Hamilton County Prosecutor, began investigating charges that Pembaur fraudulently had accepted payments from state welfare agencies for services not actually provided to patients. A grand jury was convened, and the case was assigned to Assistant Prosecutor William Whalen. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Shortly thereafter, several Cincinnati police officers appeared. The Deputy Sheriffs explained the situation to them and asked that they speak to Pembaur. The Cincinnati police told Pembaur that the papers were lawful and that he should allow the Deputy Sheriffs to enter. When Pembaur refused, the Cincinnati police called for a superior officer. When he too failed to persuade Pembaur to open the door, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On April 20, 1981, Pembaur filed the present action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the city of Cincinnati, the County of Hamilton, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Much of the testimony at the 4-day trial concerned the practices of the Hamilton County Police in serving capiases. Frank Webb, one of the Deputy Sheriffs present at the clinic on May 19, testified that he had previously served capiases on the property of third persons without a search warrant, but had never been required to use force to gain access. Assistant Prosecutor Whalen was also unaware of a prior instance in which police had been denied access to a third person's property in serving a capias and had used force to gain entry. Lincoln Stokes, the County Sheriff, testified that the Department had no written policy respecting the serving of capiases on the property of third persons, and that the proper response in any given situation would depend upon the circumstances. He too could not recall a specific instance in chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, Pembaur challenged only the dismissal of his claims against Whalen, Hamilton County, and the city of Cincinnati. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 691. [Footnote 5] As we read its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that a single decision to chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 463 U. S. 692. Primarily, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The conclusion that tortious conduct, to be the basis for municipal liability under § 1983, must be pursuant to a municipality's "official policy" is contained in this discussion. The "official policy" requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible. [Footnote 8] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Indeed, any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the principles underlying § 1983. To be sure, "official policy" often refers to formal rules or understandings -- often but not always committed to writing -- that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Having said this much, we hasten to emphasize that not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the municipality to § 1983 liability. Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. [Footnote 10] The fact that a particular official -- even a policymaking chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
official -- has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 822-824. [Footnote 11] The official chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable. [Footnote 12] Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority, and of course, whether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law. However, like other governmental entities, municipalities often spread policymaking authority among various officers and official bodies. As a result, particular officers may have authority to establish binding county policy respecting particular matters and to adjust that policy for the county in changing circumstances. To hold a municipality liable for actions ordered by such officers exercising their policymaking authority is no more an application of the theory of respondeat superior than was holding the municipalities liable for the decisions of the City Councils in Owen and Newport. In each case, municipal liability attached to a single decision to take unlawful action made by municipal policymakers. We hold that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where -- and only where -- a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We might be inclined to agree with respondent if we thought that the Prosecutor had only rendered "legal advice." However, the Court of Appeals concluded, based upon its examination of Ohio law, that both the County Sheriff and the County Prosecutor could establish county policy under appropriate circumstances, a conclusion that we do not question here. [Footnote 13] Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 309.09(A) (1979) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The court found that there was a city policy respecting the use of force in serving capiases, as well as a policy of aiding county police. It based this conclusion on the testimony of Cincinnati Chief of Police Myron Leistler, who stated that it was the policy of his Department to take whatever steps were necessary, including the forcing of doors, to serve an arrest document. 746 F.2d 341-342; see also Tr., Mar. 14-Mar. 17, pp. 43-45, 46-47. The court remanded the case for a determination whether Pembaur's injury was incurred as a result of the execution of this policy. 746 F.2d 342.
There is no question in this case that petitioner suffered a constitutional deprivation. The Court of Appeals found, and respondent concedes, that the entry and search of petitioner's clinic violated the Fourth Amendment under Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981). See 746 F.2d 340, n. 1; Brief for Respondents 11. Respondent never challenged, and has in fact also conceded, that Steagald applies retroactively to this case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27. We decide this case in light of respondent's concessions.
The forcible entry made in this case was not then illegal under federal, state, or local law. The city of Cincinnati frankly conceded that forcible entry of third-party property to effect otherwise valid arrests was standard operating procedure. There is no reason to believe that respondent county would abjure using lawful means to execute the capiases issued in this case or had limited the authority of its officers to use force in executing capiases. Further, the county officials who had the authority to approve or disapprove such entries opted for the forceful entry, a choice that was later held to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Vesting discretion in its officers to use force and its use in this case sufficiently manifested county policy to warrant reversal of the judgment below. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In this case, however, the Sheriff and the Prosecutor chose a course that was not forbidden by any applicable law, a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
With respect to both the merits of the constitutional claim and the county's liability for the unconstitutional activities of its agents performed in the course of their official duties, there can be no doubt that the Congress that enacted the Ku Klux Act in 1871 intended the statute to authorize a recovery in a case of this kind. When police officers chopped down the door to petitioner's premises in order to serve capiases on two witnesses, they violated petitioner's constitutional rights. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981), chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
makes it perfectly clear that forcible entry to a third party's premises to execute an arrest warrant is unconstitutional if the entry is without a search warrant and in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. [Footnote 2/2] In my view, it is not at all surprising that respondents have "conceded" the retroactivity of Steagald. For Steagald plainly presented its holding as compelled by, and presaged in, well-established precedent. [Footnote 2/3] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Similarly, if we view the question of municipal liability from the perspective of the Legislature that enacted the Ku Klux Act of 1871, the answer is clear. The legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend to impose civil liability on municipalities for the conduct of third parties, ante at 475 U. S. 478-479, and n. 7, merely confirms the view that it did intend to impose liability for the governments' own illegal acts -- including those acts performed by their agents in the course of their employment. In other words, as I explained in my dissent in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 471 U. S. 835-840 (1985), both the broad remedial purpose of the statute and the fact that it embodied contemporaneous common law doctrine, including respondeat superior, require a conclusion that Congress intended that a governmental entity be liable for the constitutional deprivations committed by its agents in the course of their duties. [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, in construing the scope of §1983, the Court has sometimes referred to "considerations of public policy." [Footnote 2/5] To the extent that such "policy" concerns are relevant, they also support a finding of county liability. A contrary construction would produce a most anomalous result. The primary responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of the residents of Hamilton County from the officers of Hamilton County should rest on the shoulders of the county itself, rather than on the several agents who were trying to perform their jobs. Although I recognize that the county may provide insurance protection for its agents, I believe that the primary party against whom the judgment should run is the county itself. The county has the resources and the authority that can best avoid future constitutional violations and provide a fair remedy for those that have occurred in the past. Thus, even if "public policy" concerns should inform the construction of § 1983, those considerations, like the statute's remedial purpose and common law background, support chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, I agree that the municipal officers here were acting as policymakers within the meaning of Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). As the city of Cincinnati freely conceded, forcible entry of third-party property to effect an arrest was standard operating procedure in May, 1977. Given that this procedure was consistent with federal, state, and local law at the time the case arose, it seems fair to infer that respondent county's policy was no different. Moreover, under state law as definitively construed by the Court of Appeals, the county officials who opted for the forcible entry "had the authority to approve or disapprove such entries." Ante at 475 U. S. 485 (WHITE J., concurring). Given this combination of circumstances, I agree with JUSTICE WHITE that the decision to break down the door "sufficiently manifested county policy to warrant reversal of the judgment below." Ibid. Because, however, I believe that the reasoning of the majority goes beyond that necessary to decide the case, and because I fear that the standard the majority articulates may be misread to expose municipalities to liability beyond that envisioned by the Court in Monell, I join only Parts 475 U. S. S. 477|>II-A of the Court's opinion and the judgment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's allegation of a constitutional violation rests exclusively on Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981), decided four years after the entry here. In Steagald, we held that an officer may not search for the subject of an arrest warrant in a third party's home without first obtaining a search warrant, unless the search is consensual or justified by exigent circumstances. In 1977, the law in the Sixth Circuit was that a search warrant was not required in such situations if the police had an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the person to be arrested was within the home to be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The only way to transform this search -- legitimate at the time -- into a constitutional violation is to apply Steagald retroactively. This would not be a startling proposition if all that petitioner sought was retroactive application of a new rule of criminal law to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction. [Footnote 3/1] But petitioner seeks something very different -- retroactive application of the new rule of criminal law announced in Steagald to his subsequent civil lawsuit. Even if one accepts the proposition that a new rule of criminal law should be applied retroactively to create a basis for civil liability under § 1983, [Footnote 3/2] existing principles of retroactivity for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When viewed in light of these factors, retroactive application of Steagald is not justified. First, Steagald overruled past Courts of Appeals precedent, and the decision had not been foreshadowed in opinions of this Court. The governing law in three Federal Circuits permitted searches of third parties' homes pursuant to an arrest warrant, see supra at 475 U. S. 493, and earlier decisions of this Court arguably supported such searches. [Footnote 3/3] Second, the "purpose" of Steagald was to clarify the application of the Fourth Amendment to such searches, not to provide for money damages. Finally, retroactive chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We ought to be even more wary of applying new rules of Fourth Amendment law retroactively to civil cases than we are with new rules of civil law. The primary reason for imposing § 1983 liability on local government units is deterrence, so that, if there is any doubt about the constitutionality of their actions, officials will "err on the side of protecting citizens' rights." Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 445 U. S. 652 (1980). But law enforcement officials, particularly prosecutors, are in a much different position with respect to deterrence than other local government officials. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 424 U. S. 425 (1976). Their affirmative duty to enforce the law vigorously often requires them to take actions that legitimately intrude on individual liberties, often acting "under serious constraints of time and even information." Ibid. While law enforcement officials, as much as any other official, ought to "err on the side of protecting citizens' rights" when they have legitimate doubts about the constitutionality of their actions, they should not be deterred from doing their duty to enforce the criminal law when they have no such doubts. In this case, for example, Sixth Circuit law expressly authorized the Prosecutor's decision. Because a court engages in the same balancing of interests in a Fourth Amendment case that is required, with much less deliberation, of law enforcement officials, they are justified in relying on the judgment of the applicable federal court. Under these circumstances, there was nothing that should chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For these reasons, Steagald should not be applied retroactively. Consequently, petitioner has no constitutional violation of which to complain. I therefore would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. [Footnote 3/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 690. This case presents the opportunity to define further what was meant in Monell by "official policy." Proper resolution of the case calls for identification of the applicable principles for determining when policy is chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ante at 475 U. S. 484. Apparently that recitation of authority is all that is needed under the Court's test, because no discussion is offered to demonstrate that the Sheriff or the Prosecutor actually used that authority to establish official county policy in this case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Focusing on the nature of the decision distinguishes between policies and mere ad hoc decisions. Such a focus also reflects the fact that most policies embody a rule of general applicability. That is the tenor of the Court's statement in Monell that local government units are liable under § 1983 when the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 690. The clear implication is that policy is created when a rule is formed that applies to all similar chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Applying these factors to the instant case demonstrates that no official policy was formulated. Certainly, no rule of general applicability was adopted. The Court correctly chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Similarly, nothing about the way the decision was reached indicates that official policy was formed. The prosecutor, without time for thoughtful consideration or consultation, simply gave an off-the-cuff answer to a single question. There was no process at all. The Court's holding undercuts chanroblesvirtualawlibrary