Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19800313-842778
Timestamp: 2017-01-20 18:21:20+00:00
Document Index: 215481706

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 161", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation partielle du rôle ; Frais et dépens - demande rejetée (deuxième requérant)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8427/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-03-13;8427.78 Parties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATIQN/REQUÃTE NÂ° 8427/78
X . v/the NETHERLAND S X . c/PAYS-BA S DECISION of 13 March 1980 on the admissibility of the applicatio n DÃCISION du 13 mars 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : Length of proceedings concerning the determination of a divorced father's right of access to h!s child, with the dismissal of a request to provisionally authorise a meeting during the proceedings . (Complaint declared admtssible) : Refusal by cou rts to grant to a divorced fathe r .Article8ofhCnv the right of access to his child, as the latter might be subject to stress given the /act that the mother objects . (Complaint declared admissible) .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de ta Convention : DurÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure en fixation du droit de visite d'un pÃ©re divorcÃ© Ã son enfant, avec rejet d'une demande d'autoriser provisoirement une rencontre durant la procÃ©dure . (Grief dÃ©c/arÃ© recevable) . A rticle 8 de la Convention : Refus des tribunaux de reconnaÃ®tre Ã un pÃ©re divorcÃ© un droit de visite 8 son enfant, au motif que celui-ci pourrait Ãªtre exposÃ© Ã des tensions vu l'opposition de la mÃ¨re . (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
I(ran Ã§ais : voir p . 232)
The facts of the case as submitted by ihe applicant may be summarised as follows : The applicant is a Netherlands citizen, born in 1936 and presently residing in O ., Federal Republic of German y From the statements and documents submitted, it appears that the applicant's marriage, concluded in May 1959 and out of which a son wa s
born in 1971, gradually broke down and in 1974 led to his wife's instituting divorce proceedings . On . . . September 1974 the Regional Court in Amsterdam pronounced the divorce . The proceedings concerning the guardianship of the child were adjourned on . . . November 1974 avaiting the advice of the Council for the Protection of Children . In December 1974 the applicant asked the court to make a provisional visiting arrangement as regards his son . This requesi was repeated in March 1975 . By letter of . May 1975 the Council for the Protection of Children submitted its opinion to the Regional Court and stated that, according to the applicant's ex-wife, he was a psychiatric patient, a sadist and had had to serve a prison sentence of two months for smashing in her windows . The Court was further informed that no contact had been established with the father as he refused to come to the Netherlands for a discussion and that his correspondence was almost incomprehensible . The opinion also stated that his ex-wife agreed to his seeing the child from time to time . The Report concluded that the custody of the child should be awarded to the mother . The applicant submits that he did not see this report until . . . October 1977 and contests some of the findings made in it . On . . . May 1975 the Regional Court ruled accordingly . It further appointed the father of the applicant's ex-wife as co-guardian on the ground that the applicant was living abroad . No provisional visiting arrangement was ordered . According to the applicant he then endeavoured with the help and on the advice of private persons and authorities, to reach a friendly settlement of the matter : for instance, on the advice of the Council he had asked the police in the locality of his ex-wife's residence to use their good offices to secure his access to his son . However, this was without success . In early 1978 the applicant wrote to the Council for the Protection of Children requesting its intercession in establishing contact between his son and himself, as he had to undergo a serious operation . On . . . May 1978 the Council replied that it had contacted the mother who refused to co-operate as, in her opinion, the applicant's request for contact with his son should not be considered as showing interest in the child, but as an attempt to frustrate her newly established life . The Council, however, suggested that he should apply to the Juvenile Judge in Amsterdam for a visiting arrangement . . . June.Byletrof 1978 the applicant informed the Council that h e would follow this suggestion and asked it to submit its opinion on an immediate visiting arrangement to the Juvenile Judge in order to save time . On . . June 1978 the applicant requested the Juvenile Judge to make a visiting arrangement in such a manner that it would not have a detrimenta l
effect on the child ; in his view the child had a right to know his father . He further pointed out that he had to undergo a serious operation and would like to see the child beforehand . By letter of . . . July 1978 the Council for the Protection of Children informed the applicant that it had not been asked by the Juvenile Judge for its opinion on the case and would therefore wait until the judge asked for it . On . . . August 1978 the Juvenile Judge decided to adjourn further examination of the case until December, pending the opinion of the Council for the Protection of Children . As soon as he was informed of the decision, the applicant asked his lawyer to request the Juvenile Judge to arrange for an immediate encounter with his son as a provisional measure in view of the fact that further delay would be unreasonable and that any postponement of the operation until December could not be justified . Subsequently the lawyer submitted a request to that effect to the Juvenile Judge asking him to speed up the proceedings for the reasons given by the applicant . The lawyer was, however, informed that the judge did not intend to grant this request . The opinion of the Council for the Protection of Children was submitted on . . .November 1978 . It stated inter alia that the applicant had not seen his son since 1974 and that co-operation by the applicant's ex-wife and her present husband was not to be expected ; moreover, a Medical Educational Bureau (medisch opvoedkundig bureau) which had been asked to examine the situation with a view to a visiting arrangement had refused its assistance . The Council, therefore, concluded that, although the applicant's request for a visiting arrangement was reasonable, it should be dismissed . A copy of the opinion was sent to the applicant's lawyer, the applicant was only allowed to take note of its contents at the Youth Office in B ., Federal Republic of Germany . The lawyer challenged the opinion in a letter addressed to the Juvenile Judge stating, inreralia, that the unwillingness of the applicant's ex-wife and her husband to co-operate could not be used as a valid reason for refusing the request, all the more so as the applicant had proposed that great care be taken in making any visiting arrangement ; furthermore, it was wholly unsatisfactory that the Medical Education Office had refused its assistance . It was turther stated that the applicant had postponed the necessary operation hoping that in the meantime he could have established contact with his son . On . . . December 1978 the Juvenile Judge in Amsterdam ruled that the applicant's request, although reasonable, should be dismissed . The Judge stated that, although contact between the parent to whom guardianship ha d
not been awarded and his children under age should generally be possible and the Council for the Protection of Children was prepared to assist, the applicant's ex-wife refused any co-operation for a visiting arrangement, even for a single contact . Therefore, it was to be expected that, if a visiting arrangement were to be made, the boy's interests would be harmed . . May 1979 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision On with the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam stating that in the circumstances of the case a trial contact with the child could have been established at the beginning of the proceedings whereafter the Council for the Protection of Children would have had ample time to deliver its opinion . Moreover, in view of the applicant's state of health, valuable time had been lost because of the procedure followed . It was further submitted thai the Juvenile Judge's decision lacked reasons as the mother's refusal to co-operate was an invalid ground for rejection . By decision of . . . June 1979 the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam dismissed the applicant's appeal . It stated that in principle, for a harmonious development, a child must have contact with both parents, to enable identification with the parent to whom guardianship has not been awarded . However, there were exceptions to the rule in cases where, as in the present case, a conflict appeared to exist between the parents . In such cases, to order a visiting arrangement would lead to tension in the family of the parent to whom the guardianship was awarded and to a loyalty conflict on the part of the child . Such a situation would not be in the interests of the child and it was not necessary to determine which parent was responsible for this tension, since the interest of the child to grow up without unnecessary tension should prevail . The Court finally pointed out that the child had not seen his father since 1974, that he had a harmonious family life and considered the present husband of the mother as his father . As he intended to lodge an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court the applicant sought the advice of a lawyer competent in these matters . The lawyer, however, advised him that such an appeal in the circumstances of his case would not have any prospects of success . The applicant then had difficulties in finding a lawyer who would be prepared to formally lodge the appeal on his behalf but, finally, the acting Dean appointed one . On . . July 1979 the lawyer submitted the appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court which dismissed it on . . February 1980 . It held inter alia that the applicant was incorrect in thinking that the judge, when considering the request of a parent not having the custody of the child to make a visiting arrangement on the basis of Section 161 (5) of the Civil Code may onl y
dismiss such requests on the grounds of extraordinary circumstances to be found exclusively in the person of that parent . The judge must rather have regard to circumstances which are certain to constitute a danger to the health and morals of the child or to induce a serious disturbance of the balance of his mind The Court further held that the interest of that parent clearly should not be left aside, but, as the Court of Appeal had rightly considered, the interest of the child comes first ; moreover, the applicant's above stand was not supported by any rule of law . COMPLAINTS The applicant complaints that his son, now eight years old, and aware of his father's existence, may nevertheless be susceptible to feelings of hatred towards him hindering the development of a lasting affection as his father was being described to him as an angry bogey-man who will destroy everything . In his opinion, if no quick action is taken, irreparable damage to the child and himself would be done contrary to the child's interests . For this reason he had asked the Council for the Protection of Children and the local police at his ex-wife's residence for their assistance in obtaining access to his son but without success . It was only then that he asked the Juvenile Judge to establish a first contact between himself and his son before pursuing the proceedings with a view to making a visiting arrangement . He then states that the measure ot awarding the guardianship of the child to one of the parents ought not to be abused by that parent in order to satisfy feelings of revenge . Furthermore, under Netherlands law it is the judge who makes the visiting arrangements, but, in fact, such determination seems to be dependent on the will to co-operate of the parent to whom the guardianship is awarded . He cannot understand that the courts, whilst admitting that his request for a visiting arrangement was reasonable and that, in principle, a child should have contact with both parents, still dismissed his request on the ground that the mother, who originally agreed to his seeing his son from time to time, refused to co-operate . The applicant further stresses that it is an indefeasible right of the father to have at least one personal contact with his child, under reasonable circumstances, at the beginning of the proceedings as othenvise he will have to remain in the background as a bogey-man causing feelings of fear for the child . Such a situation would surely not be in the interests of the child . He also refers to the conclusions of the Parliamentary Commission appointed to comment on certain newly drafted rules of family law, where it was stated that in cases of divorce, children had an indefeasible right to have contact with both parents . While relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant submits that a father could never realise the right of access to his child under this Articl e
when, despite all his attempts to establish such contact in the most reasonable way without doing harm to the child, it could be frustrated by the mother refusing to co-operate . In his opinion, it was wrong that only the interest of the child should count, while the right of the father is wholly ignored . The applicant further considers it unfair that when being forced to start court proceedings in order to seek his right under Article 8 he has to bear the very high costs involved . In this connection he refers to the acts ot desperate fathers recently committed in the Netherlands which received a lot of publicity in the press . Finally, the applicant complains that the Juvenile Judge had unduly delayed the proceedings despite his request to speed them up in view of the serious operation which he had to undergo .
The applicant further invokes Articles 3, 6 111 and 13 of the Conventio n
THE LA W The applicant has complained that the refusal by the Netherlands 1 Courts to make an arrangement for contact between himself and his son has interfered with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention . The applicant stated that he cannot understand that the courts, whilst admitting that his requests for a visiting arrangement were reasonable, and that in principle a child should have contact with both parents still dismissed his request on the ground that the mother, who originally agreed to his seeing his son from time to time, refused to co-operate and that the making of such arrangement would, therefore, not be in the interests of the child . The Government contended that when deciding in the present case that the application for access should be dismissed, the cou rts took into account ihe fact that, if they granted the application, the child might be subjected to tensions and conflicting loyalties which could endanger his welfare . In the Government's view, this special circumstance justified the dismissal of the application for access . The Commission first observes that, according to its established caselaw, the right to family life also contains the right of a parent to have access to or contact with his child on the understanding that the State may not interfere with the exercise of that right otherwise than in accordance with the strict conditions set out in paragraph 2 of the Article (cf . decision on admissibility of Applications Nos . 911/60, Coll . 7, p . 7 and 7911/77, DR 12, p . 192) . As to the present complaint, the Commission finds that it raises important and complex questions with regard to the applicalion of Article 8 o f
the Convention . These questions include that of whether the relevant Netherlands legislation in itself restricts the applicant's right of access to, or contact with, his child beyond the limits set out in Article 8, and, furthermore, whether, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the actual dismissal of the applicant's request for access to his child by the Netherlands Courts unjustifiably interfered with the exercise of his rights under that provision . 2 . The applicant has further complained that, in the circumstances of his case, the proceedings before the Juvenile Judge and the Court of Appeal were not conducted "within a reasonable time" as required by Article 6 111 of the Convention . He alleged that the unreasonable length of these proceedings has not only done irreparable harm to him, as the father, and his son due to the continuing lack of contact, but was also not justified in view of the serious operation which he has to undergo . The respondent Government observed that, in view of the importance of the decision to be taken, the Juvenile Judge could not be said to have taken unreasonably long to deal with the case, all the more so as the Judge had asked for the advice of the Council for the Protection of Children (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) . The applicant has furthermore complained that the principle of "equality of arms", embodied in Article 6, has been violated by reason of the fact that he did not receive a copy of the opinion of the Council for the Protection of Children, but was only allowed to read it . 3 The above complaints raise substantial issues which cannot, in the present state of the file, be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 121 of the Convention . Furthermore, the Commission is satisfied that no other grounds for declaring them inadmissible have been established .
The Commission therefore, without prejudging the merits, DECLARES THIS APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant nÃ©erlandais, nÃ© en 1936 est actuellement domiciliÃ© Ã O ., RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne . Des dÃ©clarations et documents qu'il a produits, il appert que son mariage, conclu en 1959 et dont un fils lui est nÃ© en 1971, a progressivement fait faillite et conduit Ã¨n 1974 son Ã©pouse Ã entamer une action en divorce . Le tribunal rÃ©gional d'Amsterdam prononÃ§a le divorce en 1974 . Le rÃ©glement de la garde de l'enfant fut reportÃ© en novembre 1974 en attendant l'avis du Conseil de protection de l'enfance . En dÃ©cembre 1974, le requÃ©rant demanda au rribunal d'ordonner des mesures provisoires concernant le droit de rendre visite Ã son fils . Il renouvela sa demande en mars 1975 . Par lettre du . . . mai 1975, le Conseil de protection de l'enfance prÃ©senta au tribunal rÃ©gional un avis indiquant que, selon son ex-Ã©pÃ´use, le requÃ©rant Ã©tait un malade mental et un sadique et qu'il devait purger une peine de prison de deux mois pour avoir dÃ©foncÃ© les fenÃªtres de son ex-femme . Le tribunal fut ultÃ©rieurement informÃ© qu'aucun contact n'avait pu Ã©tre Ã©tabli avec le pÃ¨re, qui se refusait Ã venir aux Pays-Bas pour discuter de l'affaire et dont la correspondance Ã©tait quasi incomprÃ©hensible . L'avis du Conseil indiquait Ã©galement que l'ex-Ã©pouse Ã©tait d'accord pour que .le requÃ©rant voie l'enfant de temps 9 autre . Le rapport concluait que la garde de l'enfant devait Ã©tre confiÃ©e Ã la mÃ©re . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend n'avoir vu ce rapport que le . . . octobre 1977 et il en conteste d'ailleurs certaines constatations . Le . . . mai 1975, le tribunal rÃ©gional rendit une dÃ©cision conforme . En outre, il nomma co-tuteur le pÃ¨re de l'ex-Ã©pouse du requÃ©rant au motif que ce dernier vivait Ã l'Ã©tranger . II ne prit aucune mesure provisoire quant aux visites . Le requÃ©rant affirme qu'il s'efforÃ§a alors, avec l'aide et les conseils de diffÃ©rentes personnes et organisations, de parvenir Ã un rÃ©glement amiable de l'affaire : c'est par exemple sur la suggestion du Conseil de protection de l'enfance qu'il demanda Ã la police du lieu de rÃ©sidence de son ex-Ã©pouse d'user de ses bons offices pour lui permettre de voir son fils . Mais ses efforts ne furent pas couronnÃ©s de succÃ©s . Au dÃ©but de 1978, le requÃ©rant Ã© crivit au Conseil de protection de l'enfance, en le priant de s'entremettre pour Ã© tablir un contact entre son fils et lui-mÃ©me, car il devait subir une grave intervention chirurgicale .
Le . . . mai 1978, le Conseil rÃ©pondit qu'il s'Ã©tait mis en rapport avec la mÃ¨re et que celle-ci refusait sa coopÃ©ration car elle estimait que la demande du requÃ©rant d'entrer en contact avec son fils ne devait pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme la manifestation d'un intÃ©rÃ©t pour l'enfant mais comme une tentative de la part du requÃ©rant de faire Ã©chouer son ex-femme dans sa nouvelle vie . Le Conseil proposait toutefois au requÃ©rant de s'adresser Ã Amsterdam au juge pour enfants pour obtenir la reconnaissance d'un droit de visite . Par lettre du . . juin 1978, le requÃ©rant informa le Conseil qu'il allait suivre cette suggestion et le pria, pour gagner du temps, de soumettre au juge pour enfants son avis quant aux arrangements Ã prendre dans l'immÃ©diat concernant un droit de visite . Le . . . juin 1978, le requÃ©rant demanda au juge pour enfants de rÃ©gler ce droit de visite de maniÃ¨re Ã ne pas nuire Ã l'enfant . Il estimait que ce dernier avait le droit de connaÃ®tre son pÃ©re . Il souligna en outre que, devant subir une imervention chirurgicale grave, il aimerait voir son fils avant . Par lettre du . . . juillet 1978, le Conseil de protection de l'enfance informa le requÃ©rant que le juge pour enfants ne lui ayant pas demandÃ© son avis sur l'affaire, il attendrait d'Ã¨tre sollicitÃ© par le juge . Le . . . ao0t 1978, le juge pour enfants dÃ©cida d'ajourner Ã dÃ©cembre I'examen de l'affaire en attendant de recevoir l'avis du Conseil de protection de l'enfance . DÃ©s qu'il fut informÃ© de cette dÃ©cision, le requÃ©rant pria son avocat de demander au juge pour enfants d'organiser immÃ©diatement, Ã titre de mesure provisoire, une rencontre avec son fils, Ã©tant donnÃ© que tout nouveau dÃ©lai serait dÃ©raisonnable et qu'il ne serait pas justifiÃ© de repousser l'intervention chirurgicale jusqu'au mois de dÃ©cembre . L'avocat prÃ©senta alors en ce sens une demande au juge pour enfants, le priant de diligenter la procÃ©dure pour les raisons donnÃ©es par son client . L'avocat fut toutefois informÃ© que le juge n'avait pas l'intention d'accÃ©der Ã cette demande . Le Conseil de protection de l'enfance donna son avis le . . . novembre 1978 . Il a dÃ©clarÃ© notamment que le requÃ©rant n'avait pas vu son fils depuis 1974 et que l'on ne pouvait s'attendre Ã une coopÃ©ration de l'ex-Ã©pouse du requÃ©rant ni de son nouveau mari ; en outre, un service mÃ©dico-pÃ©dagogique, priÃ© d'Ã©tudier la situation en vue de l'organisation d'un droit de visite, avait refusÃ© son assistance . Le Conseil concluait qu'il fallait rejeter la demande, bien qu'elle fÃ»t raisonnable, de rÃ©glementation du droit de visite du requÃ©rant . Une copie de l'avis fut adressÃ©e Ã l'avocat du requÃ©rant, mais ce dernier ne fut autorisÃ© qu'9 prendre note de son contenu Ã l'Office de la jeunesse de B ., en RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne .
_233 -
L'avocat attaqua cet avis dans une lettre adressÃ©e au juge pour enfanis, dÃ©clarant notamment que la mauvaise volontÃ© de l'ex-Ã©pouse du requÃ©rant et de son mari Ã coopÃ©rer ne constituait pas un motif valable de refuser d'accÃ©der Ã la demande, d'autant que le requÃ©rant avait suggÃ©rÃ© la plus grande prudence en organisant son droit de visite et qu'en outre, il Ã©tait dÃ©plorable que le service mÃ©dico-pÃ©dagogique ait refusÃ© son aide . Il dÃ©clara en outre que le requÃ©rant avait retardÃ© l'opÃ©ration chirurgicale nÃ©cessaire dans l'espoir qu'entre temps il aurait pu Ã©tablir un contact avec son fils . Le . . . dÃ©cembre 1978, le juge pour enfants d'Amsterdam dÃ©cida qu'en dÃ©pit du caractÃ¨re raisonnable de sa demande, le requÃ©rant devait Ã©tre dÃ©boutÃ© . Il dÃ©clara que s'il Ã©tait gÃ©nÃ©ralement possible d'organiser des contacts entre le parent Ã qui la garde n'a pas Ã©tÃ© confiÃ©e et ses enfants mineurs et bien que le Conseil de protection de l'enfance fÃ»t prÃªt Ã y contribuer, l'ex-Ã©pouse du requÃ©rant se refusait Ã toute coopÃ©ration pour organiser mÃªme une seule visite . II fallait donc s'attendre Ã ce que le fait de prendre des dispositions quant au droit de visite nuise aux intÃ©rÃ©ts de l'enfant . Le . . . mai 1979, le requÃ©rant interjeta appel de cette dÃ©cision devant la cour d'appel d'Amsterdam en dÃ©clarant qu'Ã©tant donnÃ© la siluation, un premier contact avec l'enfant aurait pu Ãªtre tentÃ© au dÃ©but de la procÃ©dure, aprÃ¨s quoi le Conseil de protection de l'enfance aurait amplement eu le temps de donner son avis . En outre, du point de vue de l'Ã©tat de santÃ© du requÃ©rant, un temps prÃ©cieux a Ã©tÃ© perdu en raison de la procÃ©dure suivie . Il faisait valoir en outre que la dÃ©cision prise par le juge des enfants n'Ã©tait pas motivÃ©e puisque le refus de la mÃ¨re n'Ã©tait pas une raison valable de rejeter la demande . Par dÃ©cision du . . . juin 1979, la cour d'appel d'Amsterdam rejeta l'appel du requÃ©rant . Elle dÃ©clara qu'en principe, pour pouvoir se dÃ©velopper harmonieusement, un enfant doil certes avoir des contacts avec ses deux parents pour permettre le processus d'identification avec celui Ã qui la garde n'a pas Ã©tÃ© confiÃ©e . Toutefois, cette rÃ©gle souffre des exceptions lorsque, comme en l'espÃ©ce, il semble y avoir conflit entre les parents . En pareil cas, rÃ©gler un droit de visite conduirait 9des tensions dans la famille du parent Ã qui la garde a Ã©tÃ© confiÃ©e et Ã un conflit de loyautÃ© chez l'enfant . Une telle situation serait contraire aux intÃ©rÃ©ts de l'enfant . Il n'Ã©tait pas nÃ©cessaire de dÃ©terminer auquel des parents ces tensions Ã©taient imputables, puisque, ce qui devait primer, c'Ã©tait l'intÃ©rÃªt de l'enfant Ã grandir Ã l'abri de tensions inutiles . Le tribunal souligna enfin que l'enfant n'avait pas vu son pÃ¨re depuis 1974, qu'il avait une vie familiale harmonieuse et considÃ©rait l'actuel mari de sa mÃ©re comme son pÃ©re .
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Le requÃ©rant, qui avait l'intention de se pourvoir en cassation auprÃ©s de la Cour suprÃªme, pris les conseils d'un avocat compÃ©tent en la matiÃ©re . Celui-ci lui indiqua que, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ¨ce, un pourvoi n'aurait aucune chance de succÃ©s . Le requÃ©rant rencontra alors des difficultÃ©s Ã trouver un avocat disposÃ© Ã introduire pour lui un pourvoi et c'est finalement le bÃ¢tonnier qui en dÃ©signa un . Le . . . juillet 1979, l'avocat introduisit un pourvoi en cassation devant la Cour suprÃªme . Ce pourvoi fut rejetÃ© le . . . fÃ©vrier 1980 . La Cour dÃ©clara notamment que c'Ã©tait Ã tort que le requÃ©rant soutenait qu'en examinant la demande prÃ©sentÃ©e par le parent non investi de la puissance paternelle en vue d'obtenir la fixation d'un droit de visite sur la base de l'article 161, paragrahe 5 du Code civil, le juge ne peut rejeter la demande qu'en raison de circonstances extraordinaires tenant exclusivement Ã la personnalitÃ© de ce parent . Le juge doit avant tout tenir compte des circonstances qui constitueront Ã coup sOr un danger pour la santÃ© et le moral de l'enfant ou entraineront des troubles graves dans son Ã©quilibre mental . La Cour dÃ©clara au surplus qu'il ne fallait Ã©videmment pas nÃ©gliger l'intÃ©rÃ©t de ce parent mais que, comme la cour d'appel l'avait estimÃ© Ã juste titre c'est l'intÃ©rÃ©t de l'entant qui primait ; pour le surplus, la thÃ¨se du requÃ©rant ne trouvait aucun appui dans la loi . GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint que son fils, qui a atteint l'Ã¢ge de huit ans et qu i connait l'existence de son pÃ©re, puisse nÃ©anmoins Ãªtre amenÃ© Ã Ã©prouver de la haine Ã son Ã©gard, ce qui entrave le dÃ©veloppement d'une affection durable car le pÃ©re a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©crit Ã l'enfant comme une sorte de croquemitaine irascible capable de tout dÃ©truire . Il estime quant Ã lui que si l'on ne prend pas trÃ©s rapidement les mesures nÃ©cessaires, il en rÃ©sultera pour l'enfant et pour lui-mÃªme un prÃ©judice irrÃ©parable, contrÃ¢ire aux intÃ©rÃ©ts de l'enfant . C'est pourquoi il a demandÃ© au Conseil de protection de l'enfance et Ã la police du lieu de rÃ©sidence de son ex-Ã©pouse de l'aider Ã entrer en contact avec son fils, mais sans y rÃ©ussir . C'est alors seulement qu'il a demandÃ© au juge pour enfants de mÃ©nager un premier contact entre son fils et lui-mÃªme avant de poursuivre la procÃ©dure en fixation des modalitÃ©s du droit de visite . Le requÃ©rant affirme ensuite que l'octroi de la garde de l'enfant Ã l'un des parents ne doit pas donner lieu Ã des abus de la part du parent qui l'exerce, afin d'assouvir un dÃ©sir de vengeance . De plus, selon la loi nÃ©erlandaise, c'est le juge qui doit fixer les modalitÃ©s du droit de visite alors qu'en l'espÃ¨ce cette dÃ©cision semble dÃ©pendre de la volontÃ© de coopÃ©ration du parent Ã qui la garde a Ã©tÃ© confiÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant ne comprend pas comment les tribunaux, qui admettent pourtant le caractÃ©re raisonnable de sa demande en fixation du droit de visite et qui reconnaissent qu'en principe un enfant doit avoir des contacts avec ses deux parents, puissent encore rejeter cett e
demande au motif que la mÃ©re, qui Ã©taitinitialement d'accord pour que lui-mÃªme voie son fils de temps Ã autre, refuse maintenant de coopÃ©rer . Le requÃ©rant souligne en outre que c'est pour le pÃ¨re un droit indÃ©fectible que d'avoir, en dÃ©but de procÃ©dure, au moins un contact personnel avec son enfant, dans des conditions raisonnables, faute de quoi, il lui faudra rester dans l'ombre comme un croquemitaine terrorisant l'enfant . Il est Ã©vident qu'une telle situation n'est pas favorable Ã l'enfant . Le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã©galement aux conclusions de la commission parlementaire chargÃ©e d'Ã©tudier certaines dispositions nouvelles du droit de la famille, oÃ¹ il est spÃ©cifiÃ© qu'en cas de dlvorce les enfants jouissent du droit indÃ©fectible d'avoir des contacts avec leurs deux parents . Invoquant l'article 8 de la Convention, le requÃ©rant fait valoir qu'un pÃ©re ne pourra jamais obtenir le droit de visite effectif que lui reconnaÃ®t cet article si, malgrÃ© ses efforts pour Ã©tablir ce contact de la maniÃ©re la plus raisonnable et sans nuire Ã l'enfant, la mÃ©re peut l'en frustrer en refusant de coopÃ©rer . C'est Ã son avis une erreur de n'envisager que l'intÃ©rÃªt de l'enfant et de mÃ©connaitre totalement le droit du pÃ¨re . Le requÃ©rant estime en outre injuste d'Ãªtre obligÃ© de supporter les frais trÃ¨s Ã©levÃ©s qu'implique la procÃ©dure judiciaire qu'il est obligÃ© d'engager pour faire valoir le droit que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 8 . Il Ã©voque 9 cet Ã©gard les actes commis rÃ©cemment aux Pays-Bas par des pÃ©res dÃ©sespÃ©rÃ©s et dont la presse s'est largement fait l'Ã©cho . Enfin, le requÃ©rant se plaint de ce que le juge pour enfants ait indÃ»ment retardÃ© la procÃ©dure, bien qu'il ait demandÃ© de la diligenter en raison de la grave intervention chirurgicale qu'il devait subir . Le requÃ©rant invoque en outre les articles 3, 6 paragraphe :1, et 13 de la Convention . . . .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que le refus des tribunaux nÃ©erlandais de rÃ©gler les modalitÃ©s des contacts avec son fils porte atteinte aux droits que lui reconnaÃ®t l'article 8 de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant estime incomprÃ©hensible que, bien qu'ils admettent que :sa demande en fixation du droit de visite est raisonnable et qu'en principe un enfant doit avoir des contacts avec ses deux parents, les tribunaux aient nÃ©anmoins rejetÃ© sa requÃ©te au motif que la mÃ¨re qui, Ã : l'origine, .Ã©tait d'accord pour que le pÃ©re voie son fils de temps Ã autre, a refusÃ© de coopÃ©rer, de sorte que l'organisation de ce droit de visite neserait pas dans l'intÃ©rÃ©t de l'enfant .
Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient qu'en dÃ©cidant, en l'espÃ¨ce, de rejeter la demande en fixation du droit de visite, les tribunaux ont estimÃ© qu e - 236 -
s'ils faisaient droit Ã la demande, l'enfant pourrait Ã©tre soumis Ã des tensions et Ã des conflits de loyautÃ© pouvant nuire Ã son bien-Ãªtre . Le Gouvernement estime que celte circonstance particuliÃ©re justifiait le rejet de la demande . La Commission observe tout d'abord que, selon sa jurisprudence constante, le droit Ã la vie familiale comporte le droit pour un parent de rendre visite Ã son enfant ou d'entretenir des contacts avec lui, Ã©tant entendu que l'Etat ne peut porter atteinte Ã l'exercice de ce droit que dans les strictes limites fixÃ©es au paragraphe 2 de cet article (cf . dÃ©cisions sur la recevabilitÃ© des requÃ¨tes NÂ° 911/60, Rec . 7, p . 7, et NÂ° 7911/77, D .R . 12, P . 192) . Quant au prÃ©sent grief, la Commission estime qu'il soulÃ©ve des questions importantes et complexes concernant l'application de l'article 8 de la Convention . Au nombre de celle-ci figure celle de savoir si la lÃ©gislation nÃ©erlandaise pertinente restreint le droit de visite du requÃ©rant ou ses contacts avec son enfant au-delA des limites fixÃ©es par l'articlÃ¨ 8, et celle de savoir si, vu les circonstances de l'espÃ©ce, le rejet par les tribunaux nÃ©erlandais de la demande du requÃ©rant en vue d'Ã©tablir des contacts avec son enfant portait atteinte injustifiable Ã l'exercice des droits que lui reconnait cette disposition . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre que, dans les circonstances de l'espÃ©ce, la procÃ©dure dutribunal pour enfants et de la cour d'appel n'a pas Ã©tÃ© menÃ©e Â« dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable Â» comme l'exige l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . Il allÃ©gue que la longueur excessive de ces procÃ©dures n'a pas seulement causÃ© un dommage irrÃ©parable Ã lui-mÃªme, en tant que pÃ©re, et Ã son fils, en raison de l'absence de contacts entre eux, mais aussi qu'elle n'Ã©tait pas justifiÃ©e vu l'intervention chirurgicale grave qu'il devait subir . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a fait valoir qu'Ã©tant donnÃ© l'importance de la dÃ©cision Ã prendre, on ne peut pas considÃ©rer que le juge pour enfants ait dÃ©raisonnablement tardÃ© Ã trancher l'affaire, d'autant que le juge avait demandÃ© l'avis du Conseil de protection de l'enfance . (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre que le principe Â« d'Ã©galitÃ© des armes Â», consaorÃ©par l'article 6, a Ã©tÃ© enfreint, puisqu'il n'a pas reÃ§u copie de l'avis donnÃ© par le Conseil de protection de l'enfance mais a seulement Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã le lire . 3 . Ces griefs soulÃ©vent des questions de fond et ne sauraient en l'Ã©tat actuel du dossier, Ãªtre rejetÃ©s comme manifestement dÃ©pourvus de fondement, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . En outre, la Commission n'a constatÃ© l'existence d'aucun autre motif d'irrÃ©cevabilitÃ© .
Par ces motifs, la Commissio n DECLARE LA REQUETE RECEVABLE, rÃ©servÃ© .
tout moyen de fond Ã©tantOrigine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 13/03/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page