Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104831/costle-vs-pacific-legal-foundation
Timestamp: 2018-03-20 23:14:53
Document Index: 698417961

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 1311', '§ 301', '§ 1342', '§ 301', '§ 1311', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 801', '§ 402', '§ 125', '§ 125', '§ 402', '§ 1342', '§ 101', '§ 1251', '§ 125', '§ 402', '§ 706']

Costle Vs Pacific Legal Foundation - Citation 104831 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Costle Vs. Pacific Legal Foundation - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104831
Case Number 445 U.S. 198
Appellant Costle
Respondent Pacific Legal Foundation
costle v. pacific legal foundation - 445 u.s. 198 (1980) u.s. supreme court costle v. pacific legal foundation, 445 u.s. 198 (1980) costle v. pacific legal foundation no. 78-1472 argued december 5, 1979 decided march 18, 1980 445 u.s. 198 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus section 402(a)(1) of the federal water pollution control act (fwpca) authorizes the administrator of the environmental protection agency (epa), "after opportunity for public hearing," to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements of the fwpca or such conditions as the administrator determines are necessary to carry out the.....
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation - 445 U.S. 198 (1980)
U.S. Supreme Court Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 (1980)
Section 402(a)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) authorizes the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), "after opportunity for public hearing," to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements of the FWPCA or such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the Act's goals and objectives. Implementing regulations provide for public notice of the proposed issuance, denial, or modification of a permit; direct the EPA Regional Administrator to hold a public hearing on the proposed action if he finds a significant degree of public interest; and permit any interested person to request an "adjudicatory hearing" after the EPA's determination to take the proposed action. Such a request will be granted if it "[s]ets forth material issues of fact relevant to the questions of whether a permit should be issued, denied or modified." Respondent city of Los Angeles (city) owns a sewage treatment plant that is operated under permits issued by the EPA pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established by the FWPCA. The city's current permit, as issued in 1975, conditioned continued discharges from the sewage treatment plant into the Pacific Ocean on the city's compliance with a schedule for achieving full secondary treatment of wastewater by October 1, 1979. In April, 1977, the EPA advised the city that it proposed to extend the expiration date of the 1975 permit for a second time, to December 17, 1979, with all other terms and conditions of the permit to remain unchanged. Notice of the proposed action was published in the Los Angeles Times, but neither the city nor any other party, including respondent Pacific Legal Foundation, requested a hearing or filed comments on the proposed extension, and the EPA Regional Administrator determined that public interest in the modification proposal was insufficient to warrant a public hearing. After respondent Kilroy's post-determination request for an adjudicatory hearing was denied on the ground that it did not set forth material
1. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the EPA is required to hold a public hearing on every NPDES permit action it takes unless it can show that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to dispute." Rather, the implementing regulations in question are fully consistent with the FWPCA's purpose to provide the public with an "opportunity" for a hearing concerning agency actions respecting water pollution control, and are valid. Pp. 445 U. S. 213 -216.
2. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the regulations in question were not applied properly in the context of this case. Pp. 445 U. S. 216 -220.
(a) Under the circumstances presented here, it was reasonable for the Regional Administrator to extend the permit's expiration date without further public hearing, on the grounds that the public had not exhibited a significant degree of interest in the proposed action, and that information pertinent to such a decision would not have been adduced if a hearing had been held. Pp. 445 U. S. 216 -218.
(b) The form of notice by newspaper publication was adequate. The city's argument that the notice was inadequate because its understanding of the compliance schedules was contrary to the EPA's was not pertinent to the agency's decision to extend the permit's expiration date. Pp. 445 U. S. 218 -219.
(c) The EPA did not err in failing to hold an adjudicatory hearing on the issues raised in respondent Kilroy's request because that request did not set forth material issues of fact pertinent to the question whether the permit's expiration date should be extended. Pp. 445 U. S. 219 -220.
Respondent city of Los Angeles owns and operates the Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant located in Playa Del Rey, Cal. Since 1960, the Hyperion plant has processed most of the city's sewage, and has discharged the wastes through three "outfalls" extending into the Pacific Ocean. The shortest outfall terminates about one mile from the coastline in 50 feet of water. It is operative only during emergencies caused by increased sewage flow during wet weather or by power failures at the pumping plant. The second outfall terminates about five miles out. Approximately 340 million gallons of treated wastewater are discharged every day into the ocean, at a depth of 187 feet, through that outfall. This wastewater receives at least "primary treatment," [ Footnote 1 ] but about
one-third of the flow also receives "secondary treatment" [ Footnote 2 ] by an activated sludge process. The third outfall terminates about seven miles from the coast. It is through this third outfall that the solids that have been removed during treatment are discharged into the ocean, at a depth of 300 feet. Prior to discharge, the solid materials, commonly referred to as sludge, have been digested, screened, and diluted with secondary effluent. App. 3.
The Hyperion plant is operated under permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (CRWQCB). Such permits are issued pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established by § 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPA), as added by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 880, and as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). [ Footnote 3 ] The FWPCA was enacted with a
86 Stat. 844, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 402(a)(1) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA, "after opportunity for public hearing," to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, notwithstanding § 301(a), upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements established in other sections of the Act, or such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the Act's goals and objectives. 86 Stat. 880, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). One of the requirements applicable to an NPDES permit for a publicly owned treatment works, such as the Hyperion plant, is specified in § 301(b)(1)(B). That provision requires such works in existence on July 1, 1977, to achieve "effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator." [ Footnote 4 ] 86 Stat. 845, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B).
40 CFR § 125.32(a) (1978). [ Footnote 5 ] That public notice "shall include at least": (1) circulation of the notice within the affected geographical area by posting in the post office and "public places" nearest the applicant's premises, or posting "near the entrance to the applicant's premises and in nearby places," or publication in local newspapers; (2) the mailing of notice to the permit applicant and "appropriate" federal and state authorities; and (3) the mailing of notice to any person or group who has requested placement on the NPDES permit mailing list for actions affecting the geographical area. Ibid.
Following the issuance of public notice the EPA Regional
The EPA and the CRWQCB first issued a joint permit to the city of Los Angeles for discharges of treated sewage
from the Hyperion plant in November, 1974. See App. 4. That permit, covering only the 1- and 5-mile outfalls, was issued following EPA publication of notice of its intent to issue a permit, an opportunity for the submission of written comments, and a public hearing. On August 18, 1975, the 1974 permit was rescinded by the federal and state authorities, and replaced with a permit covering all three outfalls. Id. at 3. The 1975 permit conditioned continued discharges from the Hyperion plant on compliance by the city with a schedule designed to achieve full secondary treatment of wastewater by October 1, 1979, and the gradual elimination of the discharge of sludge into the ocean over a 30-month period following "concept approval" of a plan for alternative disposal of the sludge. Id. at 17-19. [ Footnote 6 ]
In July, 1976, the EPA notified Los Angeles that its 1975 NPDES permit would expire on February 1, 1977, and that a new permit would be needed if discharges were to continue beyond that date. Record 44. The city filed an application for a new permit on July 30. Id. at 45-80. Thereafter, in September, 1976, the CRWQCB suggested to the EPA that the city's current permit might be extended for six months to take into account any effect of pending federal legislation that would modify the FWPCA's mandatory compliance dates
for achievement of effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment. Id. at 119. See n 4, supra. On January 24, 1977, after a public hearing, the EPA and the CRWQCB did extend the expiration date of the 1975 permit from February 1 to June 30, 1977, citing inadequate time to review the city's application for a new permit. App. 93. [ Footnote 7 ]
On April 26, 1977, the EPA advised the city that it again proposed to extend the expiration date of its NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, this time from June 30, 1977, to December 17, 1979. [ Footnote 8 ] All other terms and conditions of the
On June 10, 1977, the PLF filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the regional enforcement division of the EPA, seeking information concerning the proposed extension of the expiration date of the Hyperion permit and, specifically, whether that extension had been approved. Id. at 157. When informed by telephone on June 13 that the EPA's final determination had been made on June 2, and that a request for an adjudicatory hearing could be accepted only if filed that day, see 40 CFR § 125.36(b)(1), respondent Kilroy, represented by PLF attorneys, filed such a request. Under EPA regulations, Kilroy's request for a hearing, if granted, would automatically stay the effectiveness of the permit modification pending disposition of the request. § 125.35(d)(2).
Within 10 days of receiving Kilroy's request, the Regional Administrator responded by certified mail, stating his determination that the request did not set forth material issues of fact relevant to the question whether the permit should be extended. Thus, he concluded that Kilroy's request had not met the requirements of 40 CFR § 125.36(c)(1)(ii). The Regional Administrator did construe the request, however, as one raising issues of law relating to the appropriate interpretation to be given regulations that had been promulgated under the FWPCA. He therefore certified to the EPA's General Counsel three issues of law raised by the request. App. 166. [ Footnote 9 ] Before the General Counsel's ruling
on the certified issues of law was announced, respondents PLF and Kilroy, joined now by the city of Torrance, theretofore a stranger to the formal proceedings, filed a timely petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the Regional Administrator's action extending the expiration date of the Hyperion permit. A similar petition was filed by respondent city of Los Angeles. The petitions were consolidated for review. The Court of Appeals stayed the effect of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 permit, pending final disposition of the consolidated cases. Even though the city's NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, as modified by the EPA on June 2, 1977, stated that it expired December 17, 1979, the terms of the permit, other than those aspects of the compliance schedules requiring completion after January 1, 1977, have remained in effect, both through the Court of Appeals' stay and by operation of law. [ Footnote 10 ] The case, therefore, clearly has not become moot.
586 F.2d at 658-659 (footnotes omitted).
170 U.S.App.D.C. at 292, 516 F.2d at 1220.
The Court of Appeals distinguished decisions of this Court in which it was held that a failure to request a hearing constituted a waiver of any right thereto under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., and that an agency may place the burden of demonstrating that a case presents disputed issues of material fact on the party challenging the agency's action. 586 F.2d at 658-659, nn. 3 and 4 (discussing National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U. S. 388 , 423 U. S. 397 -398 (1976); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609 , 412 U. S. 620 (1973); and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 , 351 U. S. 205 (1956)).
586 F.2d at 659. With respect to such factors as the adequacy of the Palos Verdes or other landfill site, the ability of the city to acquire the capacity to transport sludge to that site within designated time limits, and the possible effect on navigable waters of land disposal of the sludge, the court stated: "[W]e can conclude unequivocally neither that the parties have no dispute about these matters nor that they do." Ibid. Thus, the court found itself unable to deny respondents an adjudicatory hearing on the ground that there was no dispute concerning the
The Administrator of the EPA petitioned this Court for review of the question whether § 402(a)(1) requires the EPA to conduct an adjudicatory hearing before taking action on an NPDES permit issuance or modification where, after notice of the proposed action, no one requested a hearing before the action was taken and the only request filed subsequently raised no material issue of fact. [ Footnote 11 ] We granted certiorari to review this important issue in a rapidly developing area of the law. 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
Initially, we must state our disagreement with respondents' characterization of the holding of the Court of Appeals. They argue that the court's decision was based on a finding that the EPA, in this case, did not comply with its own regulations governing public participation in the NPDES permit issuance process, rather than on a legal conclusion that the regulations
are invalid. We conclude, on the contrary, that, although the court did not explicitly hold the regulations to be invalid, its decision renders them essentially meaningless. Rather than permitting the Regional Administrator to decide, in the first instance, whether there is sufficient public interest in a proposed issuance or modification of a permit to justify a public hearing, 40 CFR § 125.34(a), and to limit any adjudicatory hearing to the situation where an interested party raises a material issue of fact, § 125.36(c)(1)(ii), the Court of Appeals would require the agency to justify every failure to hold a hearing by proof that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to dispute." 586 F.2d at 659. This holding is contrary to this Court's approval in past decisions of agency rules, similar to those at issue here, that have required an applicant who seeks a hearing to meet a threshold burden of tendering evidence suggesting the need for a hearing. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 620 -621, and cases cited therein.
Moreover, it is important to note that the regulations described in 445 U. S. supra, were designed to implement the statutory command that permits be issued "after opportunity for public hearing." § 402(a)(1), 86 Stat. 880, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). In the past, this Court has held that a similar statutory requirement that an "opportunity" for a hearing be provided may be keyed to a request for a hearing. See National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. at 423 U. S. 398 -399. [ Footnote 12 ] And only recently,
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519 , 435 U. S. 524 (1978).
Neither can we ignore the fact that, under the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, the EPA would be required to hold hearings on most of the actions it takes with respect to NPDES permit issuances and modifications. Hearings would be required even in cases, such as this, in which the proposed action only extends a permit's expiration date without at all affecting the substantive conditions that had been considered during earlier hearings. The Administrator advises us that, each year, the EPA grants about 100 requests for adjudicatory hearings under the NPDES program, issues about 2,200 permits, and takes thousands of actions with respect to permits. Brief for Petitioner 34-35; see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 834, n. 14 (CA7 1977). Affirmance of the Court of Appeals' rationale obviously would raise serious questions about the EPA's ability to administer the NPDES program. See Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 621 ; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112 , 430 U. S. 132 -133 (1977).
§ 101(e), 86 Stat. 817, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e).
The EPA's determination to modify the 1975 permit by extending its expiration date to December 17, 1979, was made following newspaper publication of the proposed action, including notice of an opportunity for submission of comments and hearing requests. Respondent Los Angeles received an individual notice of the EPA's tentative determination to extend the permit, and raised no objection. Respondents PLF and Kilroy, who argue that the EPA was aware of their interest in the Hyperion permit and their opposition to the Interim Sludge Disposal Project, could have received such individual notice if they had asked to be placed on the EPA's
Los Angeles argues that it was not given adequate notice of the proposed extension of its permit because it was never informed that the EPA regarded the federal "sludge-out" compliance schedule contained in the 1975 permit not to have been modified by subsequent orders of the CRWQCB. See n 6, supra. This argument was not addressed directly by the Court of Appeals. It would be appropriate, therefore, for this Court not to attempt to resolve it here, even if we had an adequate record to do so. More fundamentally, however, an additional reason dictates that the city's argument not be resolved in the context of this lawsuit at all. Los Angeles claims that the more lenient sludge-out schedule adopted by
The enforcement action seeks to enjoin the city from violating the conditions of its permit and to impose civil penalties against the city for past failures to comply with the permit's schedules. App. 181. It has been stayed by the Court of Appeals pending the outcome of this case. Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 13. The argument that the city raises here concerning its understanding of the compliance schedules will be resolved far more effectively in the Government's enforcement action than in the adjudicatory hearing the Court of Appeals would have awarded respondents in this case. [ Footnote 13 ] Furthermore, even if the city had raised its argument in a public hearing on the proposed permit extension, that argument would have had little relevance to the EPA's final determination, because the EPA's proposed action did not purport to change the substantive conditions that are the focus of the city's complaint.
Finally, respondents suggest that the EPA erred in not holding an adjudicatory hearing on the issues raised in respondent Kilroy's request. We agree with petitioner, however, who contends that Kilroy's request raised legal, rather
than factual, issues, and who notes that respondents treated the request in that fashion in arguing the issues Kilroy presented before the EPA's General Counsel. See n 9, supra. Even in their arguments before this Court, respondents have continued to raise factual issues that are relevant only to their contention that greater adverse effects on both the marine and land environment will result from the Interim Sludge Disposal Project than from the continued discharge of sludge into the ocean. If such issues had been raised in a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing, we agree with petitioner that the EPA could have taken the position that such issues, regardless of their merits, were not pertinent to a determination to extend the Hyperion permit's expiration date. That determination had no impact on the compliance schedule for "sludge-out" that already had long been in effect. [ Footnote 14 ]
In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the EPA is required to hold a public hearing on every NPDES permit action it takes unless it can show that the material facts supporting its action "are not subject to
The agency, by its regulations, describes "secondary treatment" as that treatment which will attain "the minimum level of effluent quality . . . in terms of . . . parameters [ sic ]." These so-called "parameters" (but compare any dictionary's definition of this term) are specified levels of biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, and pH values. 40 CFR §§ 125.58(r) and 133.102 (1979).
A general description of the original Federal Water Pollution Control Act passed in 1948, 62 Stat. 1155, the events that led to the 1972 Amendment, and the operation of the NPDES program, with particular emphasis on its implementation in California, is set forth in EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 , 426 U. S. 202 -209 (1976), and need not be repeated here.
On December 1, 1975, the CRWQCB issued an order modifying the city's compliance schedule for alternative sludge disposal. That order announced that "concept approval" had been given on October 1, 1975, and fixed definite dates for achieving the elimination of sludge discharge into the ocean. Total "sludge-out" was to be achieved by April 1, 1978. App. 51. In subsequent orders, the CRWQCB found that the city had failed to meet several deadlines for the submission of plans and specifications for various phases of the sludge discharge elimination project. The CRWQCB then modified the relevant compliance dates, and extended the deadline for total "sludge-out" to April 1, 1980. Id. at 57. The city has taken the position in this litigation that the CRWQCB's extension of the deadline for total "sludge-out" has been incorporated within the compliance schedule of the Hyperion plant's federal permit as well. See infra at 445 U. S. 218 -219.
To the extent the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary relied upon the decision in Independent Bankers Assn. v. Board of Governors, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 516 F.2d 1206 (1975), such reliance was misplaced. The passage from that opinion relied upon by the Court of Appeals itself demonstrates that the decision stands for the proposition that a party waives its right to an adjudicatory hearing where it fails to dispute the material facts upon which the agency's decision rests. See supra at 445 U. S. 212 .
Respondents' litigation strategy throughout the proceedings culminating in this opinion seems to have been based, at least in part, on a fear that the EPA may evade further public scrutiny of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 NPDES permit by issuing continued extensions of that permit, rather than acting upon the city's application for a new permit. See supra at 445 U. S. 205 -206. If that potential for evasion ever did exist, it was a limited one. Under § 402(b)(1)(b) of the FWPCA, the EPA could have set the expiration date for the initial 1975 permit as late as August,1980, and the agency actions that culminated in this lawsuit would have been unnecessary. Now that the outside date for extensions of the 1975 permit is approaching, any additional extension for purposes of avoiding further hearings on the permit's compliance schedules would have little practical impact. We note, as well, that Los Angeles, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (a reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed") may obtain judicial review of prolonged agency inaction with respect to its application for a new permit.