Source: http://docs.dos.ny.gov/coog/ftext/F15627.htm
Timestamp: 2014-10-22 06:24:33
Document Index: 431591568

Matched Legal Cases: ['§87', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§87', '§89']

FOIL-AO-15627
We are in receipt of your September 2, 2005 request for an advisory opinion concerning the availability of certain documents which were the subject of a decision by Justice Charles Ramos in People v. Grasso, Index No. 401620/04 (Supreme Court, New York County, April 4, 2005). Based on the materials you provided, your request to the Attorney General involved "[t]ranscripts and/or notes of interviews conducted in the preparation of ‘Report to the New York stock Exchange on Investigation Relating to the Compensation of Richard A. Grasso’" transmitted to his office, along with "[o]ther supporting materials transmitted to [his] office in connection with said report, as referenced in the footnotes to the report." Your request was denied on the ground that such documents were compiled for law enforcement purposes and disclosure would interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings.
The transcript of proceedings before Justice Ramos, which you submitted to this office, reflects Justice Ramos’ decision to deny the New York Stock Exchange’s motion to mark interview memos confidential. The memos were produced by the NYSE during its internal investigation and interview of 60 or 70 witnesses (id., at 34-40). Not having a copy of the above referenced Report, it is not clear whether the documents you requested from the Attorney General are the same as the interview memos Justice Ramos refused to declare confidential on April 4, 2005. Nevertheless, we offer the following remarks.
It is emphasized at the outset that the Freedom of Information Law is based upon a presumption of access. Stated differently, all records of an agency are available, except to the extent that records or portions thereof fall within one or more grounds for denial appearing in §87(2)(a) through (i) of the Law. The Attorney General relies on paragraph (e)(i) to deny access, which states that an agency may withhold records that:
i. interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings..."
From our perspective, the exception quoted above is limited in its application. First, we believe that it pertains only to records that were "compiled for law enforcement purposes." There are many instances in which records are prepared in the ordinary course of business but later are used in or are relevant to a law enforcement investigation. In our view, the character of the records does not change due to their significance to an investigation. For instance, in a case in which minutes of meetings of a municipal board were subpoenaed by a district attorney for presentation before a grand jury and were later requested under the Freedom of Information Law, the court rejected the district attorney’s contention that the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, because the minutes were prepared in the ordinary course of business and had been accessible to the public prior to their use in an investigation, they were no less accessible thereafter merely because they were being used in conjunction with an investigation (King v. Dillon, Supreme Court, Nassau County, December 19, 1984). Second, even when records have been compiled for law enforcement purposes, the ability to deny access is limited to those portions of the records which if disclosed would result in the harmful effects described in subparagraph (i). As the transcript reveals, while present at the hearing, the Attorney General’s Office failed to object to Justice Ramos’ determination that the records were not confidential. It seems, therefore, that the issue of whether there is any appreciable impact on the Attorney General’s functions has already been judicially determined and cannot validly be asserted at this time.
With regard to the remainder of the documents requested, it is questionable whether materials collected by the NYSE and transmitted to the Attorney General in the same manner as the interview memos may be protected from disclosure pursuant to §87(2)(e)(i). No evidence was offered by the Attorney General to suggest that disclosure would interfere with the investigation of or judicial proceeding involving Mr. Grasso. In fact, as we understand the situation, the records were disclosed to the defendant, Mr. Grasso. If that is so, it is difficult to envision how or the extent to which §87(2)(e) could serve as a basis for denying access. Although not relied on by the Attorney General at the hearing or in denial of your request, §87(2)(e)(iii) permits an agency to withhold records "compiled for law enforcement purposes and which if disclosed", would "identify a confidential source or disclose confidential information relating to a criminal investigation." In consideration of the kinds of records at issue, this office has in the past advised that §87(2)(e)(iii), as well as two other exceptions, may be pertinent in ascertaining rights of access or, conversely, an agency’s authority to deny access. Those other exceptions are §87(2)(b) and (f), which respectively permit an agency to withhold records insofar as disclosure would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" or "could endanger the life or safety of any person."
In many instances, the deletion of names or other identifying details is sufficient to protect privacy and safety and to safeguard against the possibility of identifying a witness or informant. Based on the information you have provided, however, the Attorney General did not consider or assert those exceptions. That being so, we offer the following remarks relative to the appeal process following a denial of a request for records. The Freedom of Information Law provides direction concerning the time and manner in which agencies must respond to requests. Specifically, §89(3) of the Freedom of Information Law states in part that:
"If circumstances prevent disclosure to the person requesting the record or records within twenty business days from the date of the acknowledgement of the receipt of the request, the agency shall state, in writing, both the reason for the inability to grant the request within twenty business days and a date certain within a reasonable period, depending on the circumstances, when the request will be granted in whole or in part." Based on the foregoing, an agency must grant access to records, deny access in writing, or acknowledge the receipt of a request within five business days of receipt of a request. When an acknowledgment is given, it must include an approximate date within twenty business days indicating when it can be anticipated that a request will be granted or denied. If it is known that circumstances prevent the agency from granting access within twenty business days, or if the agency cannot grant access by the approximate date given and needs more than twenty business days to grant access, however, it must provide a written explanation of its inability to do so and a specific date by which it will grant access. That date must be reasonable in consideration of the circumstances of the request.
In an effort to enhance compliance with and understanding of the Freedom of Information Law, a copy of this opinion will be forwarded to Ms. Stacey B. Rowland.
cc: Stacey B. Rowland