Source: http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/02/libya-challenges-the-admissibility-of-the-cases-against-gaddafi-and-al-senussi/
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by Kevin Jon Heller Libya has now brought a formal admissibility challenge under Article 19 of the Rome Statute. The motion, written by Philippe Sands, Payam Akhavan, and Michelle Butler, is a brilliant piece of work and stands a good chance of success. I’ll have much to say about the motion in the next few days, but in this post I want to focus on two aspects of it that I think work at cross-purposes: (1) its insistence that the absence of due process in a national proceeding does not make a case admissible before the ICC; and (2) its quite savage attack on the integrity of the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence.
May 2nd, 2012 - 1:13 AM EDT | Trackback Link | http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/02/libya-challenges-the-admissibility-of-the-cases-against-gaddafi-and-al-senussi/
9 Responses Hi Kevin,
at 9:02 am EST Ben Heath
Thanks for the comment. I contemplated art. 31(3)(c) when I was writing the article, but I ultimately concluded — and still believe — that it does not affect the analysis. States may well be obligated by human-rights law to provide fair trials to defendants they prosecute, but I do not see those obligations as “applicable in the relations between the parties” under the Rome Statute. First, Article 17 regulates the relationship between the ICC and the parties to the Rome Statute; it does not regulate the relationship between the various states parties themselves. Second, even if it did regulate the relationship between states, the plain meaning of Article 17 indicates that the drafters of the Rome Statute wanted to limit unwillingness and inability to situations that make it more difficult to convict the defendant; the travaux simply reinforce that plain meaning. By treaty, therefore, the drafters of the Rome Statute have made due process considerations inapplicable in whatever relationship exists between the states parties. Third, what rule of international law says that states must not only provide fair trials to defendants they prosecute, but must also respect due process in their relations with each other? Such a rule would invalidate every extradition treaty ever negotiated that adheres to the rule of non-inquiry. I think states would be surprised by that result!
Finally, as an aside, my basic view is that the VCLT is completely hermeneutically incoherent. Good neopragmatist that I am, I reject any theory of interpretation that would allow context — much less some kind of amorphous systemic context — to trump the intention of the drafters of a treaty, particularly where, as here, that intent is clear. The Rome Statute is a treaty; the drafters of the treaty specifically rejected the idea that the absence of national due process makes a case admissible. To me, that is the end of the story.
Thanks for the response. I like all three of your points, because I think they raise important issues about the scope of the norms one brings to the table in interpretation. Each got me thinking.
Your first point (art. 17 does not regulate the relations between parties) raises the interesting question of how art. 31(3)(c) is relevant to the interpretation of power-conferring rules in the constituent instruments of international organizations. Rules of international law are useful under art. 31(3)(c), your first point suggests, if they govern the same type of relationship as the provision to be interpreted. Thus, the commitments that states make to each other in the Rome Statute may be susceptible to interpretation using human rights law under 31(3)(c), but the relationship of states to the ICC is not. This would suggest that the powers of international organizations cannot be interpreted using other “relevant rules of international law,” unless those other relevant rules also govern the powers of IOs, specifically or generally. This is very interesting, and points to one of the problems associated with the fact that the VCLT was not drafted primarily with IO constitutions in mind.
I would suggest, however, that the phrase “applicable between the parties” qualifies the term “relevant rules.” It seeks to limit this category to rules “applicable” (which may or may not mean “binding”) to all (or some) of the parties creating a treaty. (WTO jurisprudence has some interesting debates on these points.) But once we decide that human rights norms are indeed “applicable” to the relations among the parties to the Rome Statute, then I would suggest that all provisions of the statute should be interpreted in light of these rules. I would make no distinction between power-conferring rules and reciprocal rules of conduct in this regard.
The second point you raise implicates the relationship among the trinity of elements in VCLT art. 31(1) (plain meaning, context, and O&P). If the plain meaning is clear, can you nonetheless modify your interpretation by reference to “context,” including art. 31(3)? Article 31 does not suggest a hierarchy. (Again, debates in the WTO on this.) And it would seem that, in the case of art. 31(3)(a), subsequent agreement should clearly be allowed to modify even obvious plain meaning. So why not art. 31(3)(c)? At this point, all we have left are normative arguments as to the value of various interpretive methods. Private law analogies would treat (a) and (c) differently, insofar as (a) refers only to later-in-time agreements, like the last-in-time rule. On the other hand, public law analogies, such as the general idea that states, as public entities, must take seriously their legal commitments, might point toward giving greater weight to “systemic” norms in interpretation.
I really like your third point for two reasons. I think, by invoking extradition, you raise an important data point that people like myself often fail to consider in this discussion. Second, I think, in a Kiobel-like manner, it goes directly to the question of the proper level of abstraction when invoking human rights norms to interpret other rules. But are the relations between states and the ICC like extradition relationships among states? We can always tell alternate stories, and grab from different parts of the treaty (as “context”). Extradition agreements, for example, likely do not contain any provision similar to Rome Statute art. 21(3), nor reference the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Your aside on the VCLT touches the most important questions in this discussion, and asks to what extent the parties are masters of their treaty. The two of us would likely come out on the same side had the parties drafted an article that stated “no considerations of due process shall enter into the admissibility discussion.” (Maybe one day such a provision will violate jus cogens?) But should they be required to say that? What are the costs of an ultra-clear-statement rule?
Thanks for this discussion. The briefs here give the ICC substantial room to avoid these questions. But it will be very interesting to see what the court will do.
at 10:57 am EST Ben Heath
Thanks for the explanation of the admissibility challenge, Kevin. If indeed the Court agrees with Libya, and Saif is convicted and sentenced to death after unfair proceedings, I fear that the general public will blame the ICC for allowing it to happen. It would take skilled PR efforts on the Court’s part to extinguish such perceptions. Then again, I’m not convinced the Libyan government is capable of securing Saif’s transfer from the Zintan authorities, which would render the point moot. 5.02.2012
at 11:10 am EST Dan
at 1:40 pm EST Jordan
I’m curious about an important point raised by Dan: Saif remains in the custody of the former rebels in Zintan, not the NTC. Further, the rebels in Zintan have consistently reiterated that they would like to see Saif tried there and not in Tripoli. Yet the admissibility challenge is from the government of Libya – ie. the NTC. Should the Pre-Trial Chamber take this into consideration when ruling on the admissibility of the case? 5.03.2012
at 7:42 am EST Mark Kersten
Thanks Kevin. That’s what I imagined. Very odd situation there. Only person who can give access to Saif is said to be the Libyan general prosecutor. But not even he has been able to persuade the Zintan rebels to send Saif to Tripoli. The Registry’s report also noted something I also hadn’t heard before and is very pertinent here: there are two Zintani rebel factions and only one is on good terms with the NTC. The other has Saif. 5.03.2012
at 8:55 am EST Mark Kersten