Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/19881068863F2d205_11024/BRADY%20v.%20TOWN%20OF%20COLCHESTER
Timestamp: 2017-03-29 20:59:51
Document Index: 545027846

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 15', '§ 1983']

BRADY v. TOWN OF COLCHESTER | 863 F.2d 205 (1988) | Leagle.com
863 F.2d
863 F.2d 205 (1988)
BRADY v. TOWN OF COLCHESTER
TOWN OF COLCHESTER, A municipal corporation in the State of Connecticut, Susan Marvin, in her capacity as Executrix of the Estate of Helen Gay, Individually and in her capacity as First Selectman of the Town of Colchester, Thomas E. Adams, James Cahill, Grace Downey, Joseph Kilrain, James Miller, Joseph Ous, Adam Piekarz, Donna Skawinski and Donald Standish, Individually and in their official capacities as members of the Colchester Zoning and Planning Commission, Joseph S. Sudik, Individually and in his official capacity as Colchester Building Inspector, and John S. Barnecki, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.
Wesley and Rosaria Brady appeal from so much of a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Blumenfeld, J., as dismissed their equal protection, due process, and first amendment claims1 against the Town of Colchester, the First Selectman of the Town of Colchester, members of the Colchester Zoning and Planning Commission, the Colchester Building Inspector, and the former Building Official and Zoning Enforcement Officer of the Town of Colchester. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims after concluding that the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there were any genuine issues of material fact underlying their claims against the defendants. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the grant of summary judgment with respect to the Bradys' first amendment and procedural due process claims. However, because we believe that the plaintiffs did produce sufficient evidence to support their equal protection and substantive due process claims, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to those claims and remand for further proceedings.
On December 17, 1984, Wesley and Rosaria Brady commenced a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, contending, inter alia, that the defendants had deprived them of "rights secured ... by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." Specifically, the Bradys claimed that the Republican-controlled Town of Colchester and interested town officials had conspired to deny them a building permit, a zoning permit, and the necessary certificates of occupancy to which they were legally entitled, solely in order to prevent them from renting the first floor of the subject property to the Democratically-controlled Borough of Colchester.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the defendant Barnecki, acting in conspiracy with the First Selectman, Helen Gay, as well as with the defendants Alfred Goldstein2 and CPZC chairman Thomas Adams, "falsely asserted" that the Norwich Avenue property had undergone a change in use in issuing the September 1983 cease and desist order, and that the building had in fact "been devoted to commercial use" for a "long time prior to its purchase," Complaint ¶ 14; (2) that Helen Gay, in conspiracy with the other defendants, ordered Barnecki "never to issue a certificate of occupancy" for the building, Complaint ¶ 20; and (3) that members of the CPZC, in refusing to allow them to proceed with work on the property, "repeatedly insisted that the plaintiff comply with unnecessary, unlawful and irrational conditions not required of other persons owning commercial property in the same section of Colchester," Complaint ¶ 25. In response, the defendants moved for summary judgment with respect to all of the Bradys' claims, and the district court granted their motion.
The defendants presented several arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. First, defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to state a legally sufficient or cognizable claim for which relief might be granted. Second, defendants argued that even if the plaintiffs had properly alleged a § 1983 claim, they had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a genuine and material factual dispute, such that would preclude the granting of summary judgment. Third, they contended that the determination of the Connecticut state court operated as res judicata with respect to the entire § 1983 claim.3 The defendants also raised two affirmative defenses, which the district court did not address.4 First, the defendants argued that because they could point to valid reasons for acting as they did, plaintiffs were precluded from challenging their decisions, given the strict standard for evaluating "mixed motive" actions of government officials articulated in Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Second, the defendants contended that to the extent they were being sued in their individual capacities, they were entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
After setting forth the standards applicable to summary judgment motions and the substantive law governing each of the plaintiffs' due process, first amendment, and equal protection claims, the district court found that "under no conceivable theory of a section 1983 claim [had] the plaintiffs established the existence of a material factual dispute that would entitle them to proceed to trial." Although the district judge acknowledged that plaintiffs are generally entitled to all inferences that are fairly supported by the evidence, he concluded that in this case, the Bradys' claims were based on nothing more than" `the gossamer threads of whimsey [sic], speculation and conjecture.'" While we agree that the evidence presented by the Bradys was not overwhelming, and that the district court properly dismissed some of appellants' claims, we nonetheless hold that the evidence before the court was sufficient to establish a material factual dispute with respect to the Bradys' substantive due process and equal protection claims.
Under the current formulation of the standards governing summary judgment motions, the moving party does not, however, bear the burden of proving that his opponent's case is wholly frivolous. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-26, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-55; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See generally Pierce, Foreward — Summary Judgment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 Brooklyn L.Rev. 279 (1987). In Celotex, the Supreme Court made it clear that in cases where the nonmovant will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial on an issue, the moving party's burden under Rule 56 will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Thus, the evidentiary burdens that the respective parties will bear at trial guide district courts in their determination of summary judgment motions.
In cases such as this one, where the moving party has attempted to demonstrate that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish his claim, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with persuasive evidence that his claim is not "implausible." See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. The question then becomes, is there sufficient evidence to reasonably expect that a jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In evaluating the sufficiency of the nonmoving party's evidence, however, courts must still proceed very cautiously. If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, and "[i]f ... there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party's] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment." In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538; see also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 ("[n]either do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment"). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the § 1983 claims raised by the plaintiffs and the evidence presented in support of each claim.
Before addressing appellants' substantive due process claim, we first briefly consider appellants' procedural due process claim. In order to establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must prove that he or she was deprived of "`an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner' for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As the district court noted, the Bradys could have sought meaningful review of the CPZC's decisions within the state judicial system, but chose instead to commence the present action. The district court held that "[t]he availability of such recourse, as a matter of law, precludes finding that the defendants' conduct violated plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment." On the facts of this case, we do not disagree. See Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 81, 85-86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984); Creative Env'ts. Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 n. 9 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989, 103 S.Ct. 345, 74 L.Ed.2d 385 (1982); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1916-17, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (deprivations of property attributable to unauthorized conduct of state officials do not violate due process clause if state law provides adequate post-deprivation remedy). Here, the Bradys could have availed themselves of a state forum to review the constitutionality of the defendants' actions, but chose not to do so. Hence, we conclude that appellants' procedural due process claim is without merit.
In the context of a zoning dispute, to state a claim under the fourteenth amendment for deprivation of "property" without due process of law a person must establish that he had a valid "property interest" in some benefit that was protectible under the fourteenth amendment at the time he was deprived of the benefit. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); G.T. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th Cir.1983) ("The starting point for our inquiry is to determine whether ... [appellant had] a `protectible property interest in the permit' sufficient to trigger federal due process guarantees." (citation omitted)). As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents v. Roth, however, "[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Constitution." To determine whether a property interest in some benefit rises to the level of a right protectible under the fourteenth amendment, courts therefore must look to "existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.
In Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.1985), which also involved a Connecticut zoning dispute, we stated that "the question of whether an applicant has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the issuance of a license or certificate [for fourteenth amendment purposes] should depend on whether, absent the alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood that the application would have been granted." Id. at 59. Applying the Yale Auto Parts test, we believe that if in fact the property was zoned and used commercially, appellants very likely would have been entitled to the benefit of the commercial use of their property but for the alleged improper conduct of the appellees. If appellants' property was not in fact undergoing a change in use by virtue of their decision to rent space to the Borough, then the appellees may very well have had no discretionary authority under Connecticut state law to interfere with the appellants' efforts to lease the premises to the Borough or prevent work thereon, and to force them to apply for various permits and certificates. See Sullivan v. Town of Salem, 805 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir.1986) (if property complied with applicable state and municipal requirements, then "there was no element of discretion or judgment remaining for the building Official to exercise" in determining whether to grant benefit requested); see also Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir.) (court reversed a grant of summary judgment rendered in favor of a municipal zoning board, where the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the municipal council's denial of a building permit was motivated by purely personal and political reasons), certs. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 134, 102 L.Ed.2d 107, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 176, 102 L.Ed.2d 145 (1988). Because we believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how the property was zoned and used during the period in question, and, consequently, as to whether the CPZC improperly determined that there was a "change in use" of the property and subjected the appellants to the various approval processes solely for the purpose of preventing the Borough of Colchester from occupying the first floor of the Brady building, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs had no protectible property interests under the fourteenth amendment.
Before we address the evidence regarding the zoning of the property, we first note that neither the appellees nor the appellants have come forward with clear-cut documentary evidence which conclusively establishes how the property was zoned in 1983. Still, both sides vigorously disagree on the answer to this arguably simple question. While it is true that appellees submitted a town zoning map upon the district court's request, the appellees did not indicate the location of the subject property on the map. Nor is the location of the property readily apparent, given that Norwich Avenue spans a significant portion of the proffered map. One can only wonder why, in this modern day and age, it was so difficult for either party — particularly the Town of Colchester itself — to ascertain the zoning of this particular piece of property, and to so enlighten the court. We are left to decide whether the district court drew the proper inferences from the record evidence with respect to the zoning of the property in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.
After examining the evidence, we believe that there is sufficient evidence to permit a finding that the subject property was zoned for commercial use rather than for residential use in September 1983, when the present dispute arose. Despite the district court's conclusory finding that the property at 14 Norwich Avenue was zoned "residential" at the time of purchase, the following assertions suggest (1) that the property was zoned commercial in September 1983, when the CPZC issued its cease and desist order; and (2) that the property was actually used for commercial purposes prior to its purchase.5 To begin with, the Bradys allege in paragraph 14 of their complaint that: "On July 13, 1983, the plaintiff Wesley R. Brady purchased a commercial building located at 14 Norwich Avenue in the Town of Colchester. This building had at one time been residential, but for a long time prior to its purchase had been devoted to commercial use." Complaint ¶ 14 (emphasis added). Appellees argue on appeal that the appellants should not be allowed to contest the district court's finding with respect to the zoning of the property because they did not specifically allege in their complaint that the property was zoned "commercial" when they bought it. These contentions are without merit. Although the appellants did not specifically allege that the property was "zoned" commercially when they purchased it, we believe that the above allegations regarding the longstanding "commercial use" of the property were sufficient to put the zoning of the building into issue. Moreover, in their moving papers, the appellees themselves discussed the zoning of the subject property, and the district court thereafter requested that the Town of Colchester submit a copy of its zoning map and zoning regulations to the court, both of which are now part of the record.
Finally, the fact that Brady purchased the building from a commercial entity, the Connecticut Realty Associates, and not from a residential owner, coupled with the fact that Wesley Brady testified at his deposition that Colchester Realty had had its office in the building from 1978 until 1983, when he purchased the property from the agency, lends support to the inference that it was zoned and used as a commercial property at the time the Bradys bought it.6 Although the appellees have come forward with some evidence to suggest otherwise — namely appellee Barnecki's statement in a deposition that he personally believed the property to have been zoned for residential use and to have been empty for over a year prior to the Bradys' purchase of it — we nevertheless believe that the foregoing record evidence is sufficient to permit a finding supporting appellants' contention that the property was zoned and used commercially prior to their acquisition of it, and, consequently, that it may not have been zoned or used residentially as the appellees claim.
The same evidence which supports a finding that the appellants had a protected property interest in the commercial use of their property also supports appellants' substantive due process claims. In zoning dispute cases, the principle of substantive due process assures property owners of the right to be free from arbitrary or irrational zoning actions. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.1987); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir.1983); Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.1983); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 66, 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F.Supp. 1216, 1218 (E.D.Mo.1987). In assessing appellants' claims, we are mindful of the general proscription that "federal courts should not become zoning boards of appeal to review nonconstitutional land use determinations." Town of Salem, 805 F.2d at 82. Nevertheless, "when a landowner's constitutional rights are infringed by local zoning actions, our duty to protect the constitutional interest is clear." Id. Herein, if the defendants had no authority under state law to revoke appellants' building permit, to demand that Brady apply for zoning permits and certificates of occupancy, and to subject him to the overall approval process, then a trier of fact could conclude that there was no "rational basis" for the CPZC's actions, and that, as a result, the CPZC violated appellants' rights to substantive due process. See Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 484 (5th Cir.) (en banc) ("federal judicial interference with a state zoning board's quasi-legislative decisions, like invalidation of legislation for `irrationality or arbitrariness,' is proper only if the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason for its decision"), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 3276, 91 L.Ed.2d 566 (1986).
We believe the district court was correct in finding that appellants' conduct was not protected as a first amendment right of freedom of association. The Supreme Court has recognized a freedom to associate with others "to pursue goals independently protected by the first amendment — such as political advocacy, litigation ... or religious worship." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 702 (1978). Appellants do not allege in their complaint that they rented their property to pursue political or other goals independently protected by the first amendment. Rather, as Wesley Brady has acknowledged, they rented their building to the Borough for purely commercial reasons. Therefore, since appellants failed to state a cognizable first amendment claim, we conclude that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment with respect to this claim.
FootNotes 1. Count Two of the plaintiffs' complaint also alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26; however, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed these claims as well. Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's dismissal of the antitrust claims in this appeal.
2. Alfred Goldstein is no longer a defendant in this action. Goldstein filed separate motions for summary judgment which the district court granted in their entirety, and the plaintiffs do not appeal from those decisions.
3. At trial, the district court considered and rejected the defendants' res judicata arguments. After reviewing the state court proceedings, the district court found that the stipulated state court judgment did not operate as res judicata because the judgment "did not specifically address the issue of whether the defendants' conduct amounted to a violation of [42 U.S.C. § 1983]." That decision is not challenged on appeal.
4. Judge Blumenfeld chose not to address these defenses in his opinion because he had concluded that "the motion [to dismiss was] properly granted on the basis of the other three grounds."
5. We are aware that questions as to how the Norwich Avenue property was actually "used" raise different but equally important issues than those raised by questions as to how the property was zoned. As we understand it, even if the property at 14 Norwich Avenue was zoned for commercial use, the property might still have been used only for residential purposes. And if the Bradys or their predecessors had only been using the property residentially at the time they sought to lease the first floor to the Borough, the mere change in the "use" of the property from residential to commercial might have necessitated a new certificate of occupancy, which they might not necessarily have been entitled to as a matter of right. Thus, any potential property rights only vested if the property was both zoned and used commercially prior to this dispute.
6. Brady also made an abortive attempt to submit evidence to the district court to support his claim that the subject property had been used commercially right up to the time he purchased it. Brady offered a photocopy of an affidavit submitted in 1983 in the state court proceedings in which the affiant stated that he had visited the premises at 14 Norwich Avenue prior to 1983 and that the building had housed business offices for several years. The district court, however, excluded the proffered affidavit, although the court's reasons for doing so are obscure.