Source: https://m.openjurist.org/637/f2d/354
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 11:46:34
Document Index: 785838292

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3796', '§ 3701', '§ 3796', '§ 3759', '§ 511', '§ 201', '§ 3721', '§ 1491', '§ 1346', '§ 1406', '§ 1406', '§ 3701', '§ 3701', '§ 3797', '§ 3701']

637 F2d 354 Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of United States | OpenJurist
637 F. 2d 354 - Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of United States
637 F2d 354 Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of United States
637 F.2d 354
Elaine Easley RUSSELL, Petitioner,
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION OF the UNITED
Claimant petitions this court for direct review of the administrative denial of survivor's death benefits under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796-3796c (1976) ("PSOBA"). The Government has made a motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion is well-founded. Our ultimate disposition is to transfer this cause to the United States Court of Claims.
PSOBA was passed as an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L.No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (amended version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq. (1976)) ("Crime Control Act"). PSOBA provides, inter alia, that, "In any case in which the Administration (i. e., LEAA) determines ... that a public safety officer has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty, the Administration shall pay a benefit of $50,000 ... to the surviving spouse of such officer...." 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796(a) (1976). Claimant is the widow of a police chief who suffered a heart attack and died shortly after physically subduing and arresting a disorderly person. LEAA denied the widow's claim on the ground that, although Chief Russell's death had been precipitated by a traumatic event, the traumatic event did not qualify as a compensable traumatic "injury" within the meaning of PSOBA.1
Federal courts of appeals are not courts of general jurisdiction; they possess only the jurisdiction conferred upon them by acts of Congress. See, e. g., AF of L v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 404, 60 S.Ct. 300, 301, 84 L.Ed. 347 (1940); Dillard v. HUD, 548 F.2d 1142, 1143 (4th Cir. 1977); 9 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 110.01 (2d ed. 1980). PSOBA, however, contains no express judicial review provision and its legislative history does not discuss the matter. As a consequence, claimant advances 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) (1976), the general appellate review provision enacted with the original Crime Control Act in 1968, Pub.L.No. 90-351, § 511(a), 82 Stat. 206 (1968). The statute, unchanged since passage, provides in relevant part:
Under the Crime Control Act as originally passed, only "States and units of general local government" were eligible for LEAA funding. See Pub.L.No. 90-351, §§ 201, 301, 82 Stat. 198, 199 (1968), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3721, 3731 (1976).2 These, then, must have constituted the sole referents for "applicant" and "grantee" as first used. Our basic point is that the subsequent passage of PSOBA cannot be construed as having effected any change in this regard.
We recognize that the Supreme Court has enunciated a strong presumption against precluding judicial review, see Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 501, 97 S.Ct. 2411, 2418, 53 L.Ed.2d 506 (1977); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 1857, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510-1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), but find no call for invoking that presumption here. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. III 1980), "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded upon ... any Act of Congress...." Pursuant to this general authorization, the Court of Claims has already exercised jurisdiction upon a number of occasions to review PSOBA denials. See, e. g., Budd v. United States, No. 82-80C (Ct.Cl. Nov. 14, 1980); Harold v. United States, 634 F.2d 547 (Ct.Cl. 1980). The Court of Claims, of course, is free of the $10,000 jurisdictional limit which applies in federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (Supp. III 1980).4
In Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 250, 58 L.Ed.2d 238 (1978), this court held that "(a)lthough (§ 1406(c)) purports to limit the transfer power to the district court", the court of appeals may also effect the transfer directly. This procedure "not only furthers the policies behind § 1406, but also comports with the precepts of judicial economy". Id.
Pub.L.No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (amended version at 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1976)).
On December 27, 1979, Congress enacted the Justice System Improvement Act, an extensive reorganization and revision of the statutes governing LEAA and other related federal arms. Pub.L.No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq. (Supp. III 1980) ("Justice Act"). The Justice Act expressly provides that it "shall not affect any suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against the Government before December 27, 1979". 42 U.S.C. § 3797(e) (Supp. III 1980). Since the current proceeding was commenced prior to that date, the Justice Act has no direct bearing upon the problem before us. It is important to note, however, that the contextual evidence in the new law is even stronger in support of the proposition that PSOBA beneficiaries do not fall within the ambit of the appellate review provision. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701, 3712, 3741-3744, 3751, 3761, 3771-3773, 3782-3785, 3791, 3796-3796c (Supp. III. 1980)