Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US8201215?dq=5,687,325
Timestamp: 2017-08-17 05:09:55
Document Index: 591297615

Matched Legal Cases: ['application No. 200780033359', 'application No. 07842066', 'application No. 201110162110', 'application No. 07841896', 'application No. 07842186', 'application No. 07842066', 'Application No. 200780033322', 'application No. 2007800333591', 'Application No. 200780033359', 'application No. 2009', 'application No. 11530556']

Patent US8201215 - Controlling the delegation of rights - Google Patents
The delegation of rights may be controlled in a number of manners. In an example implementation, a delegation authority assertion is formulated with a delegator principle, a delegatee principal, a verb phrase, a resource, and a delagation-directive verb. In another example implementation, a delegation...http://www.google.com/patents/US8201215?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US8201215 - Controlling the delegation of rights
Publication number US8201215 B2
Application number US 11/530,446
Also published as CA2657406A1, CA2657406C, CN101512962A, CN101512962B, EP2067299A1, EP2067299A4, US20080066159, WO2008031043A1
Publication number 11530446, 530446, US 8201215 B2, US 8201215B2, US-B2-8201215, US8201215 B2, US8201215B2
Inventors Blair B. Dillaway, Moritz Y. Becker, Andrew D. Gordon, Cedric Fournet
Patent Citations (119), Non-Patent Citations (107), Referenced by (4), Classifications (11), Legal Events (3)
Controlling the delegation of rights
US 8201215 B2
The delegation of rights may be controlled in a number of manners. In an example implementation, a delegation authority assertion is formulated with a delegator principle, a delegatee principal, a verb phrase, a resource, and a delagation-directive verb. In another example implementation, a delegation mechanism involving an assertor, a first principal, and a second principal enables a delegation to be specifically controlled. In yet another example implementation, a chained delegation mechanism enables explicit control of a permitted transitive chaining depth.
assertor says principal1 delegation-directive-verb “principal2 verb-phrase resource fact-qualifier1 . . . f” if fact1, fact2, . . . , factn, c1 . . . m,
wherein at least one of the facts1 . . . n includes an expression and the verb phrase, wherein the verb phrase comprises one of: a) a predicate portion and an expression portion, b) a can assert portion and a fact portion, or c) an alias portion and an expression portion, wherein “f”, “m”, and “n” are integers, and wherein “c” represents a constraint;
wherein at least one of fact1, fact2, . . . , factn includes an expression and a verb phrase, wherein the verb phrase comprises one of: a) a predicate portion and an expression portion, b) a can assert portion and a fact portion, or c) an alias portion and an expression portion, wherein “f”, “n”, and “m” are integers and wherein “c” represents one or more constraints; and
wherein at least one of facts1 . . . n includes an expression and the verb phrase, wherein the verb phrase comprises one of: a) a predicate portion and an expression portion, b) a can assert portion and a fact portion, or c) an alias portion and an expression portion, wherein “f”, “m”, and “n” are integers, and wherein “c” represents at least one constraint;
19. The system as recited in claim 16, wherein the first and second delegation-directive verbs comprise “can assertD” or “can sayD”, with “D” being set to zero (0) or infinity (∞).
20. The system as recited in claim 16, wherein the control further comprises a delegation-directive verb that is associated with a chaining depth indicator that is a positive integer value.
The delegation of rights may be controlled in a number of manners. In an example implementation, a delegation authority assertion is formulated with a delegator principal, a delegatee principal, a verb phrase, a resource, and a delegation-directive verb. In another example implementation, a delegation mechanism involving an assertor, a first principal, and a second principal enables a delegation to be specifically controlled. In yet another example implementation, a chained delegation mechanism enables explicit control of a permitted transitive chaining depth.
In a described implementation, facts are statements about a principal. Four example types of fact statements are described here in this section. First, a fact can state that a principal has the right to exercise an action(s) on a resource with an “action verb”. Example action verbs include, but are not limited to, call, send, read, list, execute, write, modify, append, delete, install, own, and so fort. Resources may be identified by universal resource indicators (URIs) or any other approach.
Example Implementations for Controlling the Delegation of Rights
Modern systems, especially distributed systems, often function more effectively when rights may be delegated between entities. This is manifested in a wide variety of functional situations. Example situations include, but are not limited to:
The ability for a user to delegate some portion of their resource access rights to an application executing on their behalf;
The ability for a manager to delegate some portion of its resource access rights to a subordinate or peer; and
The ability for an executing application to delegate its resource access rights to another application.
These types of delegations should typically be controlled in one or more of many various ways. For example, they may be allowed for only restricted periods of time, and they may need to be limited to the particular resources a delegatee needs to perform the intended function. Effective control over the ability to allow downstream delegation of rights can also be beneficial. In other words, it may be beneficial for a delegatee to further delegate downstream some or all of the access rights it has been granted.
A portion of the example assertion format 500 of FIG. 5 is reproduced in FIG. 8. However, principal portion 502 is replaced by an assertor portion 802, and the capacity for multiple or “m” constraints 512 is explicitly shown. It should be noted that the nomenclature “assertor”, “principal #1”, and “principal #2” is utilized herein to facilitate differentiation of respective parties in a delegation scenario. However, each party may be considered to be essentially and effectively a principal in the overall scheme of a described security language.
Thus, in a described implementation, example assertion format 800 includes an assertor portion 802, a says portion 504, a fact portion 508, an if portion 510, “n” conditional fact1 . . . n, portions 508(1 . . . n), and “m” constraint1 . . . m portions 512(1 . . . m). Fact 508 is realized as a delegation fact by including a delegation-directive verb 520. Examples included, by way of example but not limitation, “can assert”, “can say”, “can profess”, “may contend”, and so forth. Some delegation-related assertion examples set forth herein below use the specific example of “can assert” without loss of generality.
assertor says principal1 delegation-directive-verb “principal2 verb-phrase resource fact-qualfier1 . . . f” if fact1, fact2, factn, constraint1 . . . m.
Thus, in a described implementation, a program may include an application programming interface (API) for a delegation mechanism. The delegation mechanism is initiated by an assertor and enables a first principal to delegate a right to a second principal for the second principal to make at least one assertion. The delegation mechanism enables the delegation to be specifically controlled. For example, the delegation mechanism may enable a delegation to be controlled using any of factors 702-712.
As yet another example, delegation mechanism 600 may enable an assertor to specify at least one fact qualifier that restricts a manner in which the delegation or the right may be exercised. For instance, delegation authority assertion 614 may include a delegated fact 508(D) such as: “principal2 write resource_b [connectivity_mechanism]”, with a constraint 512 such as: connectivity_mechanism=LAN.
The resource(s) to which access is being delegated;
The right(s) that can be exercised on those resources;
The principal(s) to whom those rights are being delegated;
The ability of a delegatee to further delegate those, or a subset of those, access rights (e.g., via transitive chaining); and
Environmental restrictions (e.g., timespan, location, etc.) on the exercise of the delegated access rights (e.g., via fact qualifiers).
A delegation mechanism as described herein is capable of expressing these delegation control factors using a uniform declarative representation that allows specification of both delegation policy and delegate rights. As illustrated in FIGS. 5 and 8 and as described above, the general form of security assertions is leveraged to create an example form for delegation authority assertions 614 that enables the expression of controlled delegation policies. The example format is repeated here for convenient reference:
assertor says principal1 delegation-directive-verb “principal2 verb-phrase resource fact-qualifer1 . . . f” if fact1, fact2, factn, constraint1 . . . m.
A says B can assert “x read Foo [t1,t2]” if (t2−t1)≦8 Hrs.
By controlling the values that the variable ‘x’ may bind to, the set of principals who may be delegatees may be restricted. For example, equality and inequality constraints may be applied to the variable ‘x’.
A says p can assert “x v Foo” if p v Foo.
If B read|write Foo is true, then the above delegation policy implies A says B can assert “x read|write Foo”.
Delegation policies, such as the examples above, are combined with asserted capabilities to create a full delegation. In the example scenario of FIG. 6, delegation granting assertion 616 is an asserted capability. Given the policy (1) above, if B also asserts “B says C read Foo [0800,1200]”, then A would believe that C is allowed to read Foo during the indicated time span. Similarly, given policy (2) above and the two assertions, “A says B read Foo” and “B says C read Foo”, A would believe that C is allowed to read Foo.
(3) A says B can assert “x read Foo”;
(4) B says C can assert “x read Foo”; and
If one allows uncontrolled chaining, then thru logical deductions based on these statements, the answer to the question is yes. This affirmative answer is because one can conclude “B says D read Foo” is valid by deduction using assertions (4) and (5). Based on that deduction and assertion (3), one can conclude that “A say D read Foo” is valid. If, on the other hand, one disallows logical chaining thru deduced facts, then the answer to the question is no. When chaining is not allowed, one could only reach conclusions thru direct combination of assertion (3) with either assertion (4) or assertion (5), but not thru both (4) and (5).
In a described implementation, an example chaining delegation mechanism enables precise control over this type of logical chaining by introducing a ‘depth’ indicator or parameter that modifies the delegation-directive verb (e.g., can assert). If one wishes to disallow logical chaining, then the depth indicator has a value of zero, and assertion (3) is rewritten as:
(3.1) A says B can assert0 “x read Foo”.
(3.2) A says B can assert, “x read Foo”;
(4.2) B says C can assert0 “x read Foo”; and
Thus, in an example implementation, the depth indicator may be set to zero, infinity, or any positive integer. An example corresponding syntax is, respectively: can assert0, can assert∞, and can assertn. This enables unbounded delegation (e.g., with the infinity) or bounded delegation with a precise setting to any desired transitive chaining depth (e.g., 0, 1, 2, . . . ).
More specifically, using a “can assert” implementation, chained delegation may be implemented with nesting using an assertion comporting with a form of: A says B can assert0 x can assert0 y can assert0 z possesses group name=g. The preceding example is an explicit 3-level delegation. The number of delegation-directed verbs or level of nesting establishes the chaining depth. To reduce the use of depth indicators, either no chaining or unbounded chaining may be considered the default transitive chaining rule when there is not explicit indication. Nesting may also be used with depth indicators of positive integer values. Other combinations or derivations may be implemented.
FIG. 9 is a block diagram illustrating an example chained delegation mechanism 600C from a functional perspective along with an example chained delegation scenario. As illustrated, example chained delegation scenario includes assertor 602, principal #1 604(1), principal #2 604(2), . . . , principal #d 604(d). The variable “d” is an integer corresponding to the chaining depth. The delegation scenario also includes principal 606, right-granting ability 608, and right 610.
FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating two example format approaches 1000 for a chained delegation mechanism. Format 1000(1) illustrates a delegation format having a depth indicator, and format 1000(2) illustrates a delegation format utilizing nesting. By way of example only, the delegation-directive verb is realized using a “can assert” implementation in example format approaches 1000.
currentTime( )≦date
Admin says univ can assert∞ x is a student till date if
univ is a university
Admin says BoardOfEducation can assert∞ univ is a university
Admin says STS can assert∞ x has access from t1 till t2 if t2−t1≦8 hours
STS says STS2 can assert0 x has access from t1till t2 if t1≧Jan. 1, 2007
Depth-Bounded Delegation Type 714(3): In a described implementation, the delegation-depth subscript of the can assert keyword can only be 0 (no re-delegation) or ∞ (unlimited re-delegation). Nevertheless, such an example security language can express any fixed integer delegation depth by nesting can assert. In the following example, Alice delegates the authority over is a friend facts to Bob and allows Bob to re-delegate one level further.
Suppose Bob re-delegates to Charlie with the assertion “Bob says Charlie can assert∞ x is a friend”. Now, “Alice says Eve is a friend” follows from “Charlie says Eve is a friend”. Since Alice does not accept any longer delegation chains, Alice (in contrast to Bob) does not allow Charlie to re-delegate with
Accordingly, if it is assumed that the only assertions by Alice and Bob that mention the verbphrase x is a friend are those listed above, it can be shown that the result of the query Alice says x is a friend depends only of Charlie's assertions—not those of Doris for instance.
x is a delegator
Alice says Bob is a delegator
x is a delegator,
y possesses Email email,
email matches *@ fabrikam.com
The devices, actions, aspects, features, functions, procedures, modules, data structures, protocols, components, etc. of FIGS. 1-11 are illustrated in diagrams that are divided into multiple blocks. However, the order, interconnections, interrelationships, layout, etc. in which FIGS. 1-11 are described and/or shown are not intended to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the blocks can be modified, combined, rearranged, augmented, omitted, etc. in any manner to implement one or more systems, methods, devices, procedures, media, apparatuses, APIs, protocols, arrangements, etc. for controlling the delegation of rights.
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U.S. Classification 726/2, 726/9, 726/20, 726/4, 713/182, 726/26
Cooperative Classification G06F2221/2145, G06F21/62
European Classification G06F21/62
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