Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/95752/o-donoghue-vs-united-states
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Document Index: 45792923

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 530', '§ 86', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 8', '§ 6', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 61', '§ 84', '§ 4921', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1']

O Donoghue Vs United States - Citation 95752 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize O'Donoghue Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/95752CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-29-1933Case Number289 U.S. 516AppellantO'DonoghueRespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:
o'donoghue v. united states - 289 u.s. 516 (1933)
cannot, under the constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office. pp.
289 u. s. 529
289 u. s. 551
2. the division of powers of government into..... Judgment:
2. The division of powers of government into three separate and distinct departments -- the legislative, the executive, and the judicial -- was not for convenience merely, but with the basic and vital object of precluding the commingling of these essentially different powers in the same hands. P.
3. The exceptions found in the Constitution do but emphasizs the generally inviolate character of this plan. P.
4. Equally as important as the separation is it that each department shall be kept completely independent, in the sense that its acts shall never be controlled by, or subjected directly or indirectly to, the coercive influence of either of the other two departments. P.
5. The anxiety of the framers of the Constitution to preserve this independence, especially of the judicial department, was manifested by the provision forbidding the diminution of the compensation of the judges of courts exercising the judicial power of the United States. P.
289 U. S. 531
6. The power to diminish the compensation of the federal judges was explicitly denied by the Constitution in order,
that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of the department which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce their means of support. P.
7. There rests upon every federal judge affected a duty to withstand any attempt, directly or indirectly, in contravention of the Constitution, to diminish this compensation, not for his private advantage, but in the interest of preserving unimpaired an essential safeguard adopted as a continuing guaranty of an independent judicial administration for the benefit of the whole people. P.
289 U. S. 533
8. The judges of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are of equal rank and power with those of the other inferior courts of the federal system, and plainly within the spirit and reason of the compensation provision. P.
289 U. S. 534
in matters affecting the operations of the general government in in various departments. P.
289 U. S. 535
11. Territorial courts are legislative courts, created in virtue of the national sovereignty or under Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution, vesting in Congress the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," and their judicial power is not and could not be derived from Art. III of the Constitution. P.
11. The so-called territories were parts of the outlying domain of the United States organized in preparation for their becoming states. The Constitution could not have intended that the judges appointed for such provisional and temporary governments should have permanent tenure and irreducible compensation. P.
289 U. S. 536
12. The District of Columbia, unlike the territories, is a permanent part of the United States -- the very heart of the Union -- over which Congress, under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, has permanent and exclusive power of legislation -- the combined powers of national and state governments where legislation is possible. P.
289 U. S. 538
13. Possession of the plenary power under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, does not preclude Congress from exercising in the District other appropriate powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, or authorize a denial to the inhabitants of any constitutional guaranty not plainly inapplicable. P.
289 U. S. 539
14. It is important to bear in mind that the District was made up of portions of two of the original states, and was not taken out of the Union by the cession. Prior thereto, its inhabitants were entitled to all the rights, guaranties, and immunities of the Constitution, among which was the right to have their cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III. It is not reasonable to assume that the cession stripped them of these rights, and that it was intended that, at the very seat of the national government, the people should be less fortified by the guaranty of an independent judiciary than in other parts of the Union. P.
289 U. S. 540
15. Because, for the reasons stated, the provisions of Art. III are not applicable to the territories, it does not follow that they are likewise inapplicable to the District, where these peculiar reasons do not obtain. P.
289 U. S. 541
16. The Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are permanent establishments-federal courts of the United States and parts of the federal judicial system. P.
289 U. S. 544
17. They are vested generally with the same jurisdiction as that possessed by the inferior federal courts located elsewhere in respect of the cases enumerated in § 2 of Art. III, and it logically follows that, where jurisdiction over these cases is conferred upon the courts of the District, the judicial power, since they are capable of receiving it, is
vested in such courts as inferior courts of the United States. P.
18. Subject to the guarantees of personal right in the Amendments and the original Constitution, Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District of Columbia with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a State has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts. P.
19. Since Congress has the same power under Art. III to ordain and establish federal courts in the District of Columbia as in a state, whether it has done so in any particular instance depends upon whether the judicial power conferred extends to the cases enumerated in that Article. If it does, the judicial power thus conferred is not, and cannot be, affected by the additional congressional legislation, enacted under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, imposing upon such courts other duties which, because that special power is limited to the District, Congress cannot impose upon inferior courts elsewhere. P.
289 U. S. 546
20. The conclusion to which the Court has come in this case is in accord with the continuous and unbroken practice of Congress from the beginning of the Government. P.
289 U. S. 548
21. Observations in
, touching the status of the courts of the District of Columbia, characterized as
obiter; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co.,
, qualified and distinguished. P.
22. General expressions in any opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. P.
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in which the claimants sought to recover sums withheld from their respective salaries by a ruling of the Comptroller General for the United States, based on his construction of an appropriation act which reduced the salaries of all judges except those "whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuation in office." This case was argued with
reported next after this one.
SPECIAL SALARY REDUCTIONS"
in 1893, and by the Supreme Court of the District and its predecessor courts from the establishment of the government; that therefore, in the organization of these courts, Congress acted in virtue of Art. III, and thereby constituted said courts inferior courts of the United States; that only to the extent that Congress has enlarged and extended the powers of said courts did that body act under any other than Art. III, and that they are nonetheless such inferior courts because, by reason of their location at the seat of government, Congress, under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17,
has conferred upon them powers and jurisdiction which it may not confer upon other federal courts. Each plaintiff avers a reluctance to institute a suit which may result in personal benefit to himself, but that he feels it a duty to the court, to the bar, to the citizens of the District of Columbia, and to the people of the United States to have the status of these important courts defined and settled as soon as possible.
The Constitution, in distributing the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate departments -- the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital,
Springer v. Philippine Islands,
-- namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands. And this object is nonetheless apparent and controlling because there is to be found in the Constitution an occasional specific provision conferring upon a given department certain functions which, by their nature, would otherwise fall within the general scope of the powers of another. Such exceptions serve, rather, to emphasize the generally inviolate character of the plan.
"ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the administration of their respective powers." 1 Story on the Constitution (4th Ed.) § 530. To the same effect, the Federalist (Madison) No. 48.
And see Massachusetts v. Mellon,
In framing the Constitution, therefore, the power to diminish the compensation of the federal judges was explicitly denied in order,
that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest degree by the temptation to cultivate the favor or avoid the displeasure of that department which, as master of the purse, would otherwise hold the power to reduce their means of support. The high importance of the provision, as the contemporary history shows, was definitely pointed out by the leading statesmen of the time. Thus, in the Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton said: "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." And in No. 79:
"Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature,
We need not pursue this phase of the subject further. It is fully discussed in
, where this Court (pp.
253 U. S. 248
-249) said:
And, after referring to statements from which we have quoted and others, the court added (p.
253 U. S. 253
motive that impelled Chief Justice Taney to protest against the attempt of the Treasury Department to exact a tax upon the compensation of the judges under an act of Congress passed in 1862, c. 119, § 86, 12 Stat. 472. 157 U.S.App. 701;
Evans v. Gore, supra,
253 U. S. 257
-259. The judges of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, as far back as 1788, in discharge of the same duty, directed to the members of the state assembly a "respectful remonstrance" against an act which had the effect of reducing their compensation. 4 Call 135, 141. In the course of the remonstrance, these judges said (pp. 143, 145):
The authority upon which all the later cases rest is
, where the opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. The pertinent question there was whether the judicial power of the United States described in Art. III of the Constitution vested in the superior courts of the Territory of
This view was accepted and followed in
et seq; United States v. McMillan,
165 U. S. 504
165 U. S. 510
Romen v. Todd,
A sufficient foundation for these decisions in respect of the territorial courts is to be found in the transitory character of the territorial governments. In the
this Court, after stating that the Constitution had secured the independence of the judges of courts in which might be vested the judicial power of the United States by an express provision that they should hold office during good behavior and their compensation should not be diminished during their continuance therein, concluded (pp.
141 U. S. 187
-188):
And, in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in
182 U. S. 293
, these decisions are said to grow out of the "presumably ephemeral nature of a territorial government."
In this connection, the peculiar language of the territorial clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution, should be noted. By that clause, Congress is given power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Literally, the word "territory," as there used, signifies property, since the language is not "territory or property," but "territory or
property." There thus arises an evident difference between the words "
territory" and "
territory" of the United States. The former merely designates a particular part or parts of the earth's surface -- the imperially extensive real estate holdings of the nation; the latter is a governmental subdivision which happened to be called a "territory," but which quite as well could have been called a "colony" or a "province." "The Territories," it was said in
First National Bank v. County of Yankton,
, "are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States." Since the Constitution provides for the admission by Congress of new states (Art. IV, § 3, cl. 1), it properly may be said that the outlying continental public domain, of which the United States was the proprietor, was, from the beginning, destined for admission as a state or states into the Union, and that, as a preliminary step toward that foreordained end -- to tide over the period of ineligibility -- Congress, from time to time, created territorial governments, the existence of which was necessarily limited to the period of pupilage. In that view, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the makers of the Constitution could never have intended to give
The impermanent character of these governments has often been noted. Thus, it has been said, "The territorial state is one of pupilage, at best,"
30 F. 112, 115; "A territory, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, is an inchoate state,"
20 F. 298, 305; "During the term of their pupilage as Territories, they are mere dependencies of the United States."
18 Wall. 317,
85 U. S. 320
, the Court characterizes them as "the temporary territorial governments."
Over this District, Congress possesses "the combined powers of a general and of a state government in all cases where legislation is possible."
. The power conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, is plenary, but it does not exclude, in respect of the District, the exercise by Congress of other appropriate powers conferred upon that body by the Constitution, or authorize a denial to the inhabitants of any constitutional guaranty not plainly inapplicable. Circuit Judge Taft, afterwards Chief Justice of this Court, speaking for himself, Judge Lurton, afterwards an associate justice of this Court, and Judge Hammond, in
75 F. 742, 756, 757, after reciting the foregoing clause and the organization of the District under it, said:
127 U. S. 550
Downes v. Bidwell, supra
[162 U.S. 244], in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Brown at pp.
182 U. S. 260
,-261 of, it is said:
it does not follow that they are likewise inapplicable to the District where these peculiar reasons do not obtain. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in the
case, certain principles applicable to the situation with which we are dealing are enumerated. Among them (pp.
182 U. S. 289
-292) are these:
And then follows almost immediately, at p.
, the observation already quoted that the decisions in respect of the inapplicability of the third Article of the Constitution to the territorial courts grow out of the "presumably ephemeral nature of a territorial government."
In the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Brown, following the quotation which we have already made, it is said (p.
182 U. S. 266
"As the only judicial power vested in Congress is to create courts whose judges shall hold their offices during good behavior, it necessarily follows that, if Congress authorizes the creation of courts and the appointment of judges for a limited time, it must act independently of the Constitution and upon territory which is not part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution. . . . It is sufficient to say that this case [
American Insurance Company v. Canter, supra
] has ever since been accepted as authority for the proposition that the judicial clause of the Constitution has no application to courts created in the territories, and that, with respect to them, Congress has a power wholly unrestricted by it. "
No less significant in this respect is the decision in
145 U. S. 576
. In that case, it was held that a writ of error would not lie to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District sitting in appellate review of the conviction of a person of a capital crime. The government contended that the writ would
not lie because the Supreme Court of the District was not a court of the United States within the intent and meaning of the Act of Congress of February 6, 1889, c. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, which provided that, in capital cases tried before "any court of the United States," the final judgment could be reviewed by this Court upon a writ of error.
McAllister v. United States, supra,
was cited in support of that contention, but this Court said: " . . . It is to be remembered that that case referred to territorial courts only." And the contention of the government in this respect was rejected, the writ being dismissed on a different ground.
the Chief Justice gave as a conclusive reason why the territorial courts were not constitutional courts vested with the judicial power designated in Art. III of the Constitution that: "They are incapable of receiving it." It is not hard to justify this observation in respect of courts created for a purely provisional government to serve merely between events, but the District Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are permanent establishments -- federal courts of the United States and part of the federal judicial system.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner,
274 U. S. 154
-156:
see Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States,
285 U. S. 390
judicial power under Art. III. In respect of them, we take the true rule to be that they are courts of the United States, vested generally with the same jurisdiction as that possessed by the inferior federal courts located elsewhere in respect of the cases enumerated in § 2 of Art. III. The provision of this section of the article is that the "judicial Power shall extend" to the cases enumerated, and it logically follows that, where jurisdiction over these cases is conferred upon the courts of the District, the judicial power, since they are capable of receiving it, is
vested in such courts as inferior courts of the United States.
The fact that Congress, under another and plenary grant of power, has conferred upon these courts jurisdiction over nonfederal causes of action, or over
-judicial or administrative matters, does not affect the question. In dealing with the District, Congress possesses the powers which belong to it in respect of territory within a state, and also the powers of a state.
-443. "In other words," this Court there said,
"it possesses a dual authority over the District, and may clothe the courts of the District not only with the jurisdiction and powers of federal courts in the several states, but with such authority as a state may confer on her courts.
Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co.,
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra,
U.S. 225;
The matter has been well stated by Mr. Justice Groner, speaking for the District Court of Appeals in
Pitts v.
60 App.D.C.195, 197, 50 F.2d 485, 487, a case which we had occasion very recently to cite (
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, supra,
285 U. S. 391
And see also James v. United States,
38 Ct.Cls. 615, 627-631, which this Court on appeal disposed of on another ground, saying it was unnecessary to decide the constitutional question.
U.S. 401.
The conclusion to which we have come is in accord with the continuous and unbroken practice of Congress from the beginning of the government. In 1801 (c. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105), Congress established the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, the judges thereof to hold office during good behavior, giving the court and the judges the same powers as were vested in the Circuit Courts of the United States and the judges thereof. In 1863, that court was superseded by, and its jurisdiction conferred upon, the present District Supreme Court (c. 91, 12 Stat. 762), the judges to hold their offices during good behavior. Many acts of Congress refer to these courts as "courts of he United States." In the District Code, passed March 3, 1901 (c. 854, 31 Stat. 1189), it is provided, § 61, that the Supreme Court of the District "shall be deemed a court of the United, states." And § 84 provides that it "shall have and exercise the same powers and jurisdiction as the other district courts of the United States." In
, it was contended that the District Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction of a case arising under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because it was not a district court of the United States within the meaning of that act, but this Court held that the contention had been adversely disposed of by
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, supra,
and in a footnote at p.
276 U. S. 325
, attention was called to the fact that suits to enjoin patent infringements under R.S. § 4921 are entertained by the Supreme Court of the District solely by virtue of its general powers as "a District Court of the United States."
The District Court of Appeals was established in 1893 (c. 74, 27 Stat. 434), the judges to hold office during good behavior. Congress invariably has fixed the same salaries for the judges of the Supreme Court of the District as for the judges of the District Courts of the United States sitting elsewhere, and the salaries of the judges of the District Court of Appeals the same as for the judges of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. When one has been increased, the other has been increased in like amount. Indeed, the congressional practice, from the beginning, recognizes a complete parallelism between the courts of the District and the District and Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States.
See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, supra,
generally, and especially the language already quoted.
The government relies almost entirely upon the decision of this Court in
. In that case, we held that the Court of Customs Appeals was a legislative court, not a constitutional court under Art. III of the Constitution. In the course of the opinion, attention was called to the decisions in respect of the territorial courts, and it was said that a like view had been taken in respect of the status and jurisdiction of the courts provided by Congress for the District of Columbia. This observation, made incidentally, by way of illustration merely and without discussion or elaboration, was not necessary to the decision, and is not in harmony with the views expressed in the present opinion. "It is a maxim not to be disregarded," said Chief Justice Marshall in
Two cases are cited in support of the dictum in the
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., supra,
Postum Cereal Co. v. Calif. Fig Nut Co.,
case we have already discussed. It simply holds that, in virtue of its dual power over the
District, Congress may vest nonjudicial functions in the courts of the District. We find nothing in that decision which cannot be reconciled with what we have here said. In the case of
Postum Cereal Co.,
the Court follows the
case in holding that administrative or legislative functions may be vested in the courts of the District, but adds that this may not be done with any federal court established under Art. III of the Constitution. Taken literally, this seems to negative the view that the superior courts of the District are established under Art. III. But the observation, read in the light of what was said in the
case in respect of the dual power of Congress in dealing with the courts of the District, should be confined to federal courts in the states as to which no such dual power exists, and, thus confined, it is not in conflict with the view that Congress derives from the District clause distinct powers in respect of the constitutional courts of the District which Congress does not possess in respect of such courts outside the District.
not courts established under § 1 of Art. III of the Constitution, but are established under the broad authority conferred upon the Congress for the government of the District of Columbia by paragraph 17 of § 8 of Art. I. Hence, the limitations imposed by § 1 of Art. III with respect to tenure and compensation are not applicable to judges of these courts. The special authority conferred for the government of the District of Columbia necessarily includes the power to establish courts deemed to be appropriate for the District (
), including the power to fix and alter tenure and compensation. It is a power complete in itself, and derives nothing from § 1 of Art. III. It is a power not less complete, but essentially the same, as that which is conferred upon the Congress for the government of territories.
. It is not a dual power in the sense that it is derived from two sources -- that is, both from Art. III and also from the constitutional provision for the government of the District, but is dual only in the sense that the latter provision confers an authority so broad that it enables the Congress to invest the courts of the District not only with jurisdiction and powers analogous to those of federal courts within the states, but also with jurisdiction and powers analogous to those which states may vest in their own courts. As the courts of the District do not rest for their creation on § 1 of Art. III, that creation is not subject to any of the limitations of that provision. Nor would those limitations, if considered to be applicable, be susceptible of division so that some might be deemed obligatory and others might be ignored. If the limitations relating to courts established under § 1 of Art. III applied to the courts of the District of Columbia, they would necessarily prevent the attaching to the latter courts of jurisdiction and powers of an administrative
sort. It is only because the Congress, in establishing the courts of the District of Columbia, is free from the limitations imposed by § 1 of Art. III that administrative powers can be, and are, conferred upon them.
279 U. S. 450