Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100416_0005182.ECA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-03-30 11:12:07
Document Index: 78967799

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1632', '§ 17200', '§ 17200', '§ 1601', '§ 17200', '§ 22302']

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (Document #10)
On September 18, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an action in the Superior Court of California for the County of Kern. The first cause of action alleges a violation of California Civil Code § 1632. The second cause of action alleges a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 based on Defendants' fraudulent business practices. The third cause of action alleges a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 based on violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1601. The fourth cause of action alleges a violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 based on violations of California Financial Code § 22302. The fifth cause of action alleges fraudulent omission. The sixth cause of action requests injunctive relief. The seventh cause of action alleges breach of the covenant of good faith and failure dealing. The eighth cause of action alleges unjust enrichment. The ninth cause of action alleges failure to provide accounting. The tenth cause of action alleges negligence. The eleventh cause of action alleges breach of fiduciary duty. On October 20, 2009, Defendants removed the complaint to this court.
On October 27, 2009, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Defendants contends that none of the causes of action in the complaint can be asserted against Defendants, and as such, the complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants' motion.
On January 25, 2010, Defendants filed a reply brief.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all of the complaint's material allegations of fact are taken as true, and the facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Marceau v. Balckfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2008); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The court must also assume that general allegations embrace the necessary, specific facts to support the claim. Smith v. Pacific Prop. and Dev.
Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2008); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Although legal conclusions may provide the framework of a complaint, they are not accepted as true and "[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Supreme Court has explained:
In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is generally limited to reviewing only the complaint, but the court may review materials which are properly submitted as part of the complaint and the court may take judicial notice of public records outside the pleadings. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996);MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, under the "incorporation by reference" doctrine, courts may review documents "whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff's pleading." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2000). The "incorporation by reference" doctrine also applies "to situations in which the plaintiff's claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint." Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1076 (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Defendants request that the court take judicial notice of the deed of trust and other recorded documents concerning the property at issue in this action and the property's title. "In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court may look beyond plaintiff's complaint to matters of public record." Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the court will take judicial notice of the documents provided by Defendants.
A. Complaint's Alleged Facts
The complaint alleges that Defendants sell, procure, and facilitate a variety of home loans. The complaint alleges that the adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM") is the type of loan that is the subject of the complaint.
The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to disclose pertinent information in a clear and conspicuous manner to Plaintiff, in writing, as required by law when he obtained a loan. The complaint alleges that Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff that he could not actually qualify for the loan.
The complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair business acts and practices and failed to provide Plaintiff pertinent information required by law.
B. Facts of Which the Court Takes Judicial Notice
Plaintiff and his spouse, Claudia Villanueva, recorded a Deed of Trust with the Kern County Recorder's Office on the real property that is the subject of this dispute on or about September 28, 2006, as instrument number 0206240380. The real property is located at 11217 Baron Avenue, Bakersfield, CA 93312 ("Subject Property").
Plaintiff and Ms. Villanueva obtained a loan in the sum of $279,200.00 ("Loan") in connection with the Subject Property. The Loan was secured by a Deed of Trust ("DOT") encumbering the Subject Property that was recorded on or about September 28, 2006, with the Kern County Recorder's Office as instrument number 0206240318. The DOT identifies Plaintiff and Ms. Villanueva as the trustors, Jackie Miller as the trustee, Suntrust Mortgage ("Suntrust") as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary.
On April 3, 2009, an Assignment of the Deed of Trust ("Assignment") was recorded with the Kern County Recorder's Office as instrument number 0209047511. The Assignment assigns and transfers to Deutsche Bank National Trust CO as trustee for Long Beach ...