Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19820306-843578
Timestamp: 2017-01-24 01:50:20+00:00
Document Index: 74523528

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 3', 'arrêt ', "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 6"]

X. contre le ROYAUME-UNI
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche X. contre le ROYAUME-UNI
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Violation de P1-2 ; Non-violation de l'art. 3 ; Satisfaction équitable réservéeNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8435/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1982-03-06;8435.78 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) ACCUSATION EN MATIERE PENALE, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : le ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATTON/REQUEI'E NÂ° 8435/78 X . v/the UNITED KINGDOM X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 6 March 1982 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 6 mars 1982 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, paragreph I end Ar ticle 26 of the Conveutloo : . When the complaint is one of the length of criminal proceedings an application by the accused to accelerate the proceedings cannot be regarded as an effective remedy . Such an application would not have afforded redress f the violation complained oJ or which concerned the allegedly excessive length of the proceedings . As to the merits-the behaviour of the accused must be taken into consideration in order to assess the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings .
Arqcle 6, pazegrsphe 1, et artlcle 26 de la Convention : S'agissant de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . on ne saurait considÃ©rer comme un recours effectif une dÃ©marche par laquelle l'accusÃ© aurait pu faire avancer plus rapidement la procÃ©dure mais qui n'Ã©tait pas susceptible de redresser la violation allÃ©guÃ©e consistant en la durÃ©e prÃ©tendument excessive de celle-ci . Quant au fond, la conduite de l'accusÃ© doit Ã©tre prise en corssidÃ©ration pour apprÃ©cier le caractÃ¨re raisonnable de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure .
( jran V ais : voir p . 21)
The applieant* was arrested on 11 December 1972 and charged under legislation applicable to Northern Ireland with being in possession of a firearm and ammunition in suspicious circumstances . He was subsequently charge d
â¢ The applicant was represented before the Commission Newtownabbey (Antrim) .
by Professor K . Lindsay,
with three murders. However it was decided not to prosecute in respect of two of the murders and he was acquitted of the third on 14 February 1974 . He remained however in detention on remand on the possession of arms and amntunition charges unti( his re(ease on bail on 27 February 1974 . On 7 March 1978 the Director of Public Prosecutions entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the charges of possession of arms and ammunition .
THE LAW (Ex(ract ) 3 . (Finally] the Commission has considered the applicant's complaints concerning the duration of the proceedings relative to the alleged possession of the pistol and ammunition . He maintains that they lasted an unreasonable length of time . He has complained in particular of being held on bail for four years and has invoked Articles 3, 6 and 14 of the Convention . The respondent Government first maintain that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 of the Convention . They state that he could have applied to the court to fix a date for the hearing of the outstanding charges but that he did not do so . They submit that such an application "would have had the effect which the applicant claims he wanted, namely, the Court would have fixed a date for the trial and the prosecution would then have had to decide either to prosecute or to enter a nolle prosequi on the outstanding charges" . The applicant for his part appears to contest the existence of the remedy referred to by the Government, maintaining that it is the Attomey General who decides when sensitive cases come to trial . He also submits that he took necessary steps to have a date fixed for a trial to that he might become fiee to marry and emigrate . Having considered the applicant's submissions, the Commission sees no reason to doubt that the remedy referred to by the Govemment was available to the applicant and that he did not use it . The question remains, however, whether it was a remedy which he was obliged to use under Article 26 of the Convention . According to the case-law of the Commission and Court, and applicant must take use of thosÃ© remedies which are effective and sufficient, that is to say capable of providing redress for his complaints (see e .g . Application No . 7I2/60, Retimag v . the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 Collection of Decisions . p . 29, De Wilde (Vagrancy) Cases, Series A, No . 12, p . 33, para . 60) . The Commission has therefore considered whether the procedure referred to by the Government was an "effective and sufficient" remedy in respect of his complaint that the proceedings lasted an unreasonable time . For this purpose it has first considered what results could be obtained by using the procedure . It notes that the court should have fixed a date for the applicant' s
trial but could not have afforded any other redress . Thus all the applicant could have achieved would have been an acceleration of the criminal proceedings against him . The question therefore arises whether a procedure, which could have been used by an accused person during the course of a criminal process for the purpose of accelerating the proceedings, but which could not have had any other effect, is to be regarded as an effective and sufficient remedy in respect of a subsequent complaint that the proceedings lasted too long . In the Commission's view this question must be approached with due regard to the respective positions and functions of prosecution and defence in criminal proceedings in the Contracting States . The conduct of such proceedings is generally the exclusive responsibility of the prosecution and judicial authorities . Thus in the context of Article 6 of the Convention the Commission has held that it is "generally accepted" that an accused person is under no obligation to renounce his procedural rights or to co-operate in criminal proceedings against him (Application No . 4517/70, Huber v . Austria, Report of the Commission, Decisions and Reports 2, p . 27, para . 110) . Accordingly it held that, although the conduct of an accused is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the length of proceedings has been "reasonable" . the fact that he has adopted an unco-operative or obstructive attitude does not bar or defeat his claim under Article 6(1) (ibid . paras . 110 and 111) . Although in many States there are procedures whereby the accused can accelerate the proceedings, it is generally for him to decide, in complete freedom and in accordance with his own view of his best interests, whether to make use of them . If such procedures were held to be "effective and sufftcient remedies" which the accused had to exhaust before he could complain of the duration of the proceedings, he would effectively be required to step into the role of the prosecution and advance the proceedings against himself whenever the prosecution failed to do so sufficiently speedily themselves . In the Commission's view such a procedure, which can only advance the proceedings but cannot provide any concrete redress if they have been unduly delayed, cannot therefore be considered as an "effective and sufficient" remedy whose use is required by Article 26 of the Convention . Accordingly the procedure referred to by the Government was not one which the applicant was obliged to use under Article 26 of the Convention . The Government also maintain that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded . However the Commission notes that the applicant was charged with the relevant offences in December 1972 and that the charges remained outstanding until March 1978 when the nolle prosequi was entered . According to the Government the delay from February 1975 onwards was the result of an oversight . In the circumstances the Commission finds that an issue of substance arises under Article 6 (1) of the Convention as to whether th e
relevant charges were determined within a"reasonable time" . This part of the application cannot therefore be described as manifestly ill-founded and must be declared admissible .
RÃ©sumÃ© des faite pertlnente Le requÃ©rant* a Ã©tÃ© an@tÃ© le 11 dÃ©cembre 1972 et inculpÃ© de dÃ©tention d'armes et de munitions dans des circonstances suspectes, infraction prÃ©vue par la lÃ©gis(ation applicable en Irlande du Nord . Il fut par la suite inculpÃ© de trois rneurtres . Toutefois un non-lieu fut prononcÃ© pour deux d'entre eux et le requÃ©rant fut acquittÃ© du tmt'siÃ¨me le 14 fÃ©vrier 1974. Il demeura toutefois en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive du fait de l'inculpation de dÃ©tention d'armes et de munitions. jusqu'Ã sa mise en libertÃ© sous caution le 27 fÃ©vrier 1974 . Le 7 mars 1978. le parquet dÃ©cida de classer l'affaire en ce qui concer nait la dÃ©tention d'armes et de munitions .
(TRADUCTION) EN DROIT ( Extrait) 3 . La Commission a examinÃ© les griefs du reqÃ»Ã©rant re latifs Ã la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure concern ant l'accusation de dÃ©tention illÃ©gale d'un pistolet et de munitions. Selon lui, cette durÃ©e n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© raisonnable . Il se plaint notamment d'avoir Ã©tÃ© maintenu pendant quat re ans sous le rÃ©gime de la libertÃ© sous caution et invoque Ã cet Ã©gard les articles 3, 6 et 14 de la Convention . Le Gouvemement dÃ©fendeur soutient en p re mier lieu que le re quÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de re cours intemes comme l'exige l'article 26 de la Convention . En effet, le re quÃ©rant aurait pu demander au t ri bunal de fixer une date pour l'audience concernant les accusations en suspens, mais il ne l'a pas fait . Pareille demande . aurait eu l'effet recherchÃ© par le requÃ©rant : le t ribunal aurait fixÃ© une date pour le procÃ¨s, ce qui aurait alors obligÃ© le parquet Ã exercer ou Ã abandonner les pou rsuites sur les accusations restantes . . â¢ Le requÃ©rant Ã©tait reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par le professeur K . Lindsay, Newtownabbey (Antrim) .
Pour sa part, le requÃ©rant semble contester l'existence de la voie de recours indiquÃ©e par le Gouvemement car il appartiendrait au Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral de dÃ©cider du moment oÃ¹ les affaires dÃ©licates passent en justice . Il prÃ©tend Ã©galement avoir pris les mesures nÃ©cessaires pour faire fixer une date pour le procÃ¨s, de maniÃ¨re Ã pouvoir se marier et Ã©migrer . AprÃ¨s avoir examinÃ© l'argumentation du requÃ©rant, la Commission ne voit pas de raisons de douter que le recours indiquÃ© par le Gouvernement fÃ¹t ouvert au requÃ©rant, qui n'en a pas fait usage . Il reste nÃ©anmoins Ã dÃ©terrniner s'il s'agissait d'un recours que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait tenu d'exercer aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention . Selon la jurispmdence de la Commission et de la Cour, les requÃ©rants doivent faire usage des recours effectifs et suffisants, c'est-Ã -dire de nature Ã porter remÃ¨de Ã leurs griefs (voir par exemple . RequÃªte nÂ° 712/60, Retimag c/R .F .A ., Recueil de dÃ©cisions 8, p . 29 ; Affaire De Wilde (Vagabondage), SÃ©rie A, nÂ° 12, p . 33, par . 60) . La Commission a donc examinÃ© si la procÃ©dure indiquÃ©e par le Gouvernement Ã©tait une voie de recours â¢ effective et suffisante â¢ Ã l'Ã©gard du grief forrnulÃ© par le requÃ©rant quant Ã la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure . Aussi s'est-elle d'abord attachÃ©e aux rÃ©sultats susceptibles d'Ã©tre obtenus par le recours Ã cette procÃ©dure . Elle relÃ¨ve que le tribunal aurait certes pu fixer une date pour le procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant, mais sans apporter un autre redressement de la violation allÃ©guÃ©e . Tout ce que le requÃ©rant aurait pu obtenir aurait donc Ã©tÃ© une accÃ©lÃ©ration de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale engagÃ©e contre lui . La question se pose alors de savoir si la procÃ©dure qu'un accusÃ© aurait pu utiliser dans un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal, sans autre effet que celui de diligenter l'instance, doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un recours effectif et suffisant lorsqu'il s'agit d'un grief fortnulÃ© ultÃ©rieurement en raison de la durÃ©e excessive de la procÃ©dure . Selon la Commission, il faut aborder cette question eu Ã©gard aux situations et fonctions respectives de l'accusation et de la dÃ©fense dans un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal se dÃ©roulant dans un Etat partie Ã la Convention . Le dÃ©roulement de l'instance relÃ¨ve gÃ©nÃ©ralement de la responsabilitÃ© exclusive des organes de poursuite et de jugement . Aussi la Commission a-t-elle dÃ©clarÃ©, dans le contexte de l'article 6 de la Convention, qu'il est â¢ gÃ©nÃ©ralement admis . qu'un inculpÃ© n'est pas tenu de renoncer Ã ses droits en matiÃ¨re de procÃ©dure ou de coopÃ©rer Ã la conduite de la procÃ©dure menÃ©e contre lui (RequÃªte nÂ° 4517/70, Huber c/Autriche, Rapport de la Commission, D .R . 2, p . 45, par. 110) . Elle a dÃ©clarÃ© en consÃ©quence que mÃªme si la conduite d'un inculpÃ© est un Ã©lÃ©ment Ã prendre en considÃ©ration pour dÃ©terminer si la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure a Ã©tÃ© â¢ raisonnable â¢, le fait d'adopter une attitude de non-coopÃ©ration ou d'obstmction ne lui interdit pas d'invoquer l'article 6, paragraphe 1 (ibid ., par. 110 et 111) .
MÃ©me si de nombreux Etats ont instituÃ© des procÃ©dures permettant Ã un inculpÃ© d'accÃ©lÃ©rer la procÃ©dure, c'est gÃ©nÃ©ralement Ã l'intÃ© re ssÃ© qu'il appartient de dÃ©cider, en toute libertÃ© et selon l'idÃ©e qu'il se fait de ses intÃ©rÃªts, d'en faire usage ou non . Si l'on devait tenir ces procÃ©dures pour des â¢ recours effectifs et suffisants â¢, que l'inculpÃ© devrait exercer avant de se plaindre de la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure, cela reviendrait en fait Ã obliger l'inculpÃ© Ã endosser le r8le de l'accusation et Ã faire avancer la procÃ©dure engagÃ©e contre lui, mÃªme si l'accusation ne fait pas preuve elle-mÃªme de la diligence voulue . Aux yeux de la Commission, pareille procÃ©dure, qui ne peut qu'accÃ©lÃ©rer l'instance sans fournir un rÃ©el remÃ¨de si elle a Ã©tÃ© indÃ»ment retardÃ©e, ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme un recours â¢ effectif et suffisant â¢ que l'article 26 de la Convention oblige Ã Ã©puiser . En consÃ©quence, la procÃ©dure indiquÃ©e par le Gouvernement n'est pas de celles que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait tenu d'utiliser aux termes de l'article 26 de la Convention . Le Gouvernement soutient Ã©galement que cette partie de la requÃªte est manifestement mal fondÃ©e . Cependant, la Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© accusÃ© des infractions en question en dÃ©cembre 1972 et que,l'accusation Ã©tait toujours pendante en mars 1978, date oÃ¹ le parquet a dÃ©cidÃ© l'abandon des poursuites . Selon le Gouvernement, le dÃ©lai Ã© coulÃ© Ã partir de fÃ©vrier 1975 serait le fruit d'un oubli . Dans ces conditions, la Commission estime qu'il se pose au regard de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention un problÃ¨me de fond sur le point de savoir s'il a Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© â¢ dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable - sur le s accusations en question . Cette partie de la requÃªte ne saurait donc Ãªtr e qualifiÃ©e de manifestement mal fondÃ©e et doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable .
-2J-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 06/03/1982Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page