Source: http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/2525?quicktabs_8=3
Timestamp: 2013-12-10 11:25:18
Document Index: 144444327

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2525', '§ 2525', '§ 2525', '§ 4205', '§ 3141', '§ 4205', '§ 3141', '§ 3114', '§ 25252012112']

50 USC § 2525 - Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile | Title 50 - War and National Defense | U.S. Code | LII / Legal Information Institute
USC › Title 50 › Chapter 42 › Subchapter II › Part A › § 2525	prevnext
50 USC § 2525 - Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile
The head of each national security laboratory.
The commander [1]
of the United States Strategic Command.
Dual validation teams in support of assessments In support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator for Nuclear Security may establish teams, known as “dual validation teams”, to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—
be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated;
have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations;
use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and
pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations.
review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c);
subject such matters to challenge; and
submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.
The results of each such assessment.
Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—
an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and
a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.
An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.
Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.
In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—
a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;
a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 2532 of this title to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments;
a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations; and
a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c).
In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types.
An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.
Submittals to the President and Congress (1)
Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—
each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year;
any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;
the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and
any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.
Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.
The term “national security laboratory” has the meaning given such term in section 2471 of this title.
the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and
the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4205, formerly div. C, title XXXI, § 3141,Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2730; renumbered div. D, title XLII, § 4205, and amended Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3141(e)(6),Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1759; Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3114(a)(2)–(d), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2706, 2707.)
50 USCDescription of ChangeSession YearPublic LawStatutes at Large § 25252012112-239 [Sec.] 3131(c)126 Stat. 2180 LII has no control over and does not endorse any external Internet site that contains links to or references LII. U.S. Code Toolbox