Source: https://casetext.com/case/kontakis-v-beyer
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Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110 | Casetext
Kontakis v. Beyer
19 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Third CircuitMar 11, 1994
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Argued February 3, 1994.
Decided March 11, 1994. Sur Petition for Rehearing April 8, 1994.
Before: GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.
Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, and BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, and LEWIS, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.
By an order entered on February 16, 1993, as amended by an order entered on March 8, 1993, the district court granted Nicholas Kontakis' petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that under Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989), the state trial court's jury instructions in his murder trial were unconstitutional. The district court, however, rejected the numerous other contentions Kontakis raised to support his claim for habeas relief. The respondents, the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Prison and the Attorney General of New Jersey, appeal as they contend that the jury instructions error was harmless. Kontakis cross-appeals, maintaining that he is entitled to relief on certain of his other contentions. We will reverse the district court's order granting the writ, and will reject Kontakis' arguments raised in his cross-appeal. Inasmuch as Kontakis could have advanced the issues specified in his cross-appeal as alternative grounds to affirm, we are considering them as being made in support of the result reached in the district court. Accordingly, we treat Kontakis solely as the appellee.
He was not required to cross-appeal, as by raising these issues he is not seeking to enlarge his rights beyond those granted by the district court's order. See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1503 (3d Cir. 1993).
On March 25, 1985, Kontakis killed his estranged wife, Margaret Kontakis. At about noon that day, they had been arguing near a car on Railroad Avenue in Franklin Township, Somerset County, New Jersey. Kontakis then shoved his wife into the car and a struggle ensued. After attempts of bystanders to intervene failed and a police car arrived, Kontakis fired three fatal shots from his handgun into his wife's head from close range while she sat in the car. Several witnesses, including the chief of the Franklin Township Police Department, observed the shooting. A Somerset County grand jury indicted Kontakis for purposeful murder in violation of N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(1) (West 1982), and for knowing murder in violation of N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:11-3(a)(2) (West 1982). Thereafter, Kontakis pled not guilty.
Kontakis called four lay witnesses who testified as to his state of mind immediately prior to the killing. First, his brother Samuel Kontakis testified that in January and February 1985, Kontakis threatened suicide and acted irrationally. Second, Theresa Mary Hartley testified that Kontakis was so "obsessed" with his marital problems that it even affected his ability to drive a car. Hartley further testified that Kontakis telephoned her 10 or 11 times each night about his problems. Third, Mary Retner testified that on the day before the shooting, Kontakis was "in a very bad state of mind, . . . was acting very irrationally, . . . [and] was very suicidal that night." Finally, Kontakis' mother testified that he threatened to kill himself twice daily in March 1985.
The trial judge instructed the jury that when assessing whether the state had proven each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it "need not consider the [mental disease or defect] evidence as to the defendant's state of mind;" if the jury found each element proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it "must then consider the evidence as to the defendant's state of mind;" if Kontakis suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the murder negating the proof of his state of mind "he cannot be said to have acted purposely or knowingly;" and "[i]f there is no preponderance of evidence as to mental disease or defect, negating state of mind, the defense fails." The trial court based these jury instructions on N.J.Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-2 (West 1982).
At the time of Kontakis' trial, N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:4-2 (West 1982) provided that:
The last sentence which this court in Humanik held altered the state's burden of proof has been deleted by an amendment to the statute. See N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:4-2 (West Supp. 1993).
On August 5, 1991, Kontakis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, contending that he was entitled to relief under Humanik as well as on various other grounds. In accordance with its comprehensive memorandum opinion, the district court granted the writ. The court indicated that Humanik compelled it "to conclude, reluctantly, that [Kontakis] was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when the trial judge gave a jury instruction on the law of diminished capacity based upon statutory language which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found to be unconstitutional." The court, however, rejected Kontakis' remaining arguments. An order granting the writ was entered on February 16, 1993, and it was amended by an order entered on March 8, 1993. The state officials then appealed. We must answer three questions on this appeal: (1) whether the jury instructions were constitutionally defective under Humanik; (2) if so, whether the error was harmless; and (3) assuming we find the jury instruction to be constitutionally sound or any error therefrom harmless, whether the district court correctly rejected Kontakis' other arguments.
Kontakis has exhausted his state court remedies.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
II. DISCUSSION A. Scope of Review
Our review of the district court's decision is plenary, as its order was not the product of fact finding following an evidentiary hearing. Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 n. 5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 280, 116 L.Ed.2d 232 (1991). However, our review of the state criminal proceedings is limited, for as the Supreme Court recently has emphasized, in "conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (citations omitted).
B. Whether the jury instructions violated the holding in Humanik
We agree with the district court that the jury instructions were constitutionally erroneous under Humanik. Humanik involved an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus following the petitioner's New Jersey conviction for purposeful and knowing murder. In Humanik, the petitioner argued that the New Jersey statute, N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:4-2 (West 1982), pursuant to which the jury instructions on mental disease and defect were formulated, was unconstitutional. At the trial, the court charged the jury as follows:
Humanik, 871 F.2d at 435 (emphasis by the court in Humanik).
These instructions unconstitutionally altered the state's burden to prove that Kontakis acted purposely when killing his wife, in that they could have caused "a rational juror attempting to attribute some significance to the instruction [to] . . . conclude that the defendant's evidence [on state of mind] should be considered only if the juror finds it to be more likely true than not true." Humanik, 871 F.2d at 442. The instructions suggested that the jury should have ignored Kontakis' defense that he did not possess the requisite state of mind unless "there is . . . [a] preponderance of evidence as to mental disease or defect." Thus, they permitted the jury to ignore Kontakis' mental disease and defect evidence unless the jury found that evidence more probable than not.
The Appellate Division held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because under State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 532 A.2d 199, Perr, Kontakis' psychiatric witness, should "never have been permitted to testify" with respect to Kontakis' mental disease or defect. Indeed, the Appellate Division found that "[t]he only possible consequence of the judge's erroneous admission of [Kontakis'] mental disease or defect evidence and instructing the jury on the point was to improve unjustifiably [his] chances of securing a verdict to a reduced charge of homicide."
In light of the Third Circuit's explicit directive that `a jury may not be told in this context that the mental disease or defect "evidence must be put aside . . . unless it satisfied the preponderance standard,"' . . . the Court cannot adopt the Appellate Division's conclusion that any error was harmless because petitioner was not entitled to the instruction. Whether he was entitled to it or not, the Third Circuit has determined that such an instruction is prejudicial. Moreover, even if the trial judge actually had made explicit to the jury [that] the premise underpinning the State's argument — i.e., if the judge had instructed them, `Ignore the charge on diminished capacity, because defendant is not entitled to it' — the Third Circuit also has indicated that `[a] charge that contradicts a constitutionally impermissible instruction does not cure the problem,. . . when there is a reasonable likelihood that a juror may have understood the charge as conveying an unconstitutional message.' (App. at 21-22) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
Our focus in reviewing the district court's grant of the writ is on whether Kontakis' conviction violated "the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." See Estelle v. McGuire, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 480. Therefore Humanik does not compel or even permit us to grant the writ without considering whether the error was harmful. A contrary holding would violate well-settled Supreme Court precedent that "a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction." Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., delivering opinion of the Court on Part II) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).
The Court in Fulminante recognized that, after Chapman, the Court "has applied harmless error analysis to a wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 111 S.Ct. at 1263 (Rehnquist, C.J.). In discussing the possibility that an error was harmless the Court included a long list of cases involving "`trial error' — error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury." These cases included opinions considering infirm jury instructions. Id. Accordingly, we hold that Fulminante requires us to make a harmless error analysis when determining whether habeas relief should be granted on the basis that there had been unconstitutional jury instructions at a state trial.
The cases are Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (unconstitutionally broad jury instructions); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of the offense); and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (jury instruction containing an infirm presumption).
The Supreme Court now has ruled that in a habeas case, as distinct from a direct appeal, federal courts should apply the test set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), to determine whether constitutional trial errors are harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The Kotteakos test provides that the error is not harmless if it "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. at 1253). Thus, as the Supreme Court has found that errors in jury instructions fall within the category of trial errors, we apply the Kotteakos harmless error standard.
Brecht also acknowledged that "in an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas relief, even if it did not substantially influence the jury's verdict." Brecht, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 n. 9. Kontakis does not argue that his case falls within this exception, so we need not address the issue.
Brecht effectively has overruled the portion of our opinion in Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1249 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 3036, 120 L.Ed.2d 905 (1992), that provided for a "beyond a reasonable doubt" harmless error standard for constitutionally infirm jury instructions. We applied the Chapman standard in Rock for we quite reasonably relied on Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991), which, as the Court acknowledged in Brecht, was a habeas case in which that standard was applied. Brecht, of course, is of great significance because it flatly rejected use of the Chapman test in federal habeas cases involving trial-type error. Under Chapman relief must be granted if there was a federal constitutional error unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This rejection of the Chapman standard and the adoption of the Kotteakos test is certain to change the outcome in some habeas cases. In fairness to the district court, we point out that the Court decided Brecht after the district court granted the writ in this case. Accordingly, the district court understandably believed that it was required to conclude from the instructions themselves that they were prejudicial.
The Supreme Court has provided specific guidance for assessing whether a constitutional error in a jury instruction was harmless. In Estelle v. McGuire the Court found that the "only question for us is `whether the ailing jury instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.'" ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). Moreover, Estelle recognized that "the instruction `may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 147, 94 S.Ct. at 400-01); see also Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1247 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 3036, 120 L.Ed.2d 905 (1992).
But Kontakis argues that Perr's testimony satisfied Breakiron's admissibility standards and therefore the Appellate Division erred as a matter of state law when it found his mental disease and defect evidence inadmissible. Accordingly, he views the Appellate Division opinion as flawed. Kontakis also argues that he satisfied the Breakiron test by introducing other evidence admissible under state law to support his contention that his mental state negated an element of the offense. Accordingly, Kontakis contends that the erroneous instructions allowed the jury to disregard valid evidence supporting his Humanik argument.
But Kontakis does not argue that the exclusion of Perr's testimony by the Appellate Division, as distinguished from the trial court's jury instructions, violated his due process rights.
Kontakis points to this evidence as showing that the Appellate Division wrongly concluded that Kontakis failed to satisfy the Breakiron standards. Kontakis does not contend specifically that, because the jury instruction precluded the jury from properly weighing this lay evidence, the instruction violated his constitutional rights. We, however, believe that to resolve this appeal, we must address this issue.
The difficulty with Kontakis' contention regarding the admissibility of Perr's testimony is that it cannot be accommodated to the principle that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 480 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that "the Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 843, 853 n. 6, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564, 87 S.Ct. 648, 653-54, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967)). Therefore, we will not review the Appellate Division's evidentiary ruling for errors of state law as if we were the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Moreover, we have found that "it is well established that a state court's misapplication of its own law does not generally raise a constitutional claim." Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 888-89 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 472, 121 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992) (citing Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d at 309).
Accordingly, we reiterate Kontakis' state of mind evidence. First, his brother testified that in January and February 1985, Kontakis threatened suicide and acted irrationally. Second, Hartley testified that Kontakis was "obsessed" with his marital problems such that he was unable to drive a car and called her 10 or 11 times each night. Third, Retner testified that on the day before the shooting, Kontakis was "in a very bad state of mind, . . . was acting very irrationally, . . . [and] was very suicidal that night." Finally, his mother testified that Kontakis threatened suicide twice daily in March 1985.
D. Kontakis' other issues 1. Jury Selection
In assessing this argument, we do not review the voir dire for violations of New Jersey law; rather, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution." Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1903, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). We may grant a writ predicated on a finding that a fair and impartial jury was denied only if we find that the state courts committed "manifest error" in rejecting this contention. Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d at 1252 n. 8. Here, we find no "manifest error," and indeed no error at all, in the conclusion reached by the state courts that the voir dire did not result in an unfair or prejudiced jury. The district court accurately summarized the reasons why the voir dire passed constitutional muster when it stated:
Kontakis contends that the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, as provided in N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 1982), violated his constitutional rights under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). That section provides that a homicide which otherwise would be murder is manslaughter if it "is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation." In Beck, the Supreme Court held that in a capital case the trial court committed constitutional error when it would not charge on a lesser-included offense for which the evidence supported a conviction. The Court held that in a capital case in which a conviction for a lesser-included offense could be justified by the evidence, the jury should not be given an all-or-nothing choice. Kontakis, arguing from Beck, contends that the court's refusal to give the passion/provocation charge wrongfully precluded the jury from convicting him on that lesser-included offense. In support of this contention, Kontakis points to evidence that his wife left him, took his child, and committed adultery. He asserts that these circumstances caused him to act in the heat of passion when he shot her. The district court found that this evidence did not support a passion/provocation instruction, and we agree.
The court charged on purposeful murder, knowing murder, aggravated manslaughter, and reckless manslaughter. In accordance with the court's instructions, the jury first considered the charge of purposeful murder and, having convicted Kontakis on that charge, it did not return a verdict on the other three offenses.
The appellants argue that the validity of Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1988), which applied Beck in a non-capital case, is in doubt, citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), and Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d at 884 n. 13. Accordingly, the appellants would limit Beck to capital cases. In view of our disposition of the Beck issue, we do not address this contention.
Kontakis contends that the admission of his wife's statements through McLaughlin's testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront Margaret as a witness. We reject this argument because the Appellate Division held that the statement properly was admitted under state law under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Of course, the Sixth Amendment was not infringed by this evidence, as the amendment does not preclude admission of evidence under firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule. See White v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736, 742 n. 8, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of February 16, 1993, as amended by the order of March 8, 1993, and will remand the matter to the district court for entry of an order denying Kontakis' petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The court notes that the district court appointed John Vincent Saykanic, a member of the New Jersey bar, to represent Kontakis in this case and that he ably has represented Kontakis in both the district court and this court in the finest traditions of the legal profession.