Source: http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/06/inventio-v-thyssenkrupp.html
Timestamp: 2013-12-07 20:59:13
Document Index: 757702109

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', 'art, 439']

Inventio v. ThyssenKrupp: Functional Claiming - Patent Law Blog (Patently-O)
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Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Americas Corporation (Fed. Cir. 2011) Download 10-1525Panel: Lourie (author), Prost, Moore
Strong Presumption Against Means Plus Function ConstructionPatentees are permitted to include purely functional language in their claims under ﻿§ 112 ¶ 6. Under that provision, such limitations "shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." Slip Op. at 9. Whether § 112 ¶ 6 applies depends principally on whether the limitation uses the term "means." When that term is not used, "we presume that the limitation does not invoke § 112 ¶ 6." Id. The presumption "is a strong one that is not readily overcome." Id. at 10.
Presumption Not OvercomeGiven the absence of the term "means" in the disputed limitations, the court focused its analysis on whether ThyssenKrupp had overcome the "strong presumption" against application of § 112 ¶ 6, concluding that it had not. In reaching this conclusion, the court agreed with Inventio that it should consider the written description in determining whether the claims recite sufficient structure. "[I]t is proper to consult the intrinsic record, including the written description, when determining if a challenger has rebutted the presumption that a claim lacking the term "means" recites sufficiently definite structure." Slip Op. at 12. Applying this rule, the court found that the terms "modernizing device" and "computing unit" provided, at least in the context of the two patents at issue, sufficient structure:
Is The Court Effectively Applying a Presumption Against Indefiniteness of Functional Claim Elements?Under Supreme Court precedent, a claim may be invalid for indefiniteness if it contains functional claim limitations. See General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corporation, 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938); United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942); c.f. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Section 112 ¶ 6 provides the exception discussed above.
I could see the CAFC's rule as perhaps being justified on the ground that patents are entitled to a presumption of validity, and the indefiniteness issue is, after all, one type of validity analysis. But that does not appear to be how the court has justified its rule thus far. Instead, it has treated it solely as a claim construction question in which deference is given to the patent drafter's choice of language. ThyssenKrupp's Motion to StrikeFollowing the completion of merits briefing, ThyssenKrupp filed a motion to strike portions of Inventio's reply brief on various grounds, including that it contained new and misleading arguments about the disclosure of the '861 and '465 patents. Unimpressed by ThyssenKrupp's motion, the court rejected it. "ThyssenKrupp simply disagrees with Inventio's legal arguments, and its motion seems to us to be an improper attempt to obtain the final word in the appeal, a practice that we strongly discourage." Slip Op. at 3. FIling such a motion, the court commented, "borders on the type of frivolous and wasteful litigation tactics that we have previously frowned upon." Id.
Update: For those interested in reading the offending brief, a copy can be downloaded here: Download SchmitMotionToStrike. Thanks to Hal Wegner for circulating a copy in his email newsletter. Posted on Jun 16, 2011 at 11:33 PM | Permalink
The United Stated Executive Branch is hoping that your functional claim will be approved in 2.5 years instead of the current 4. And they have a high tech graphic to prove it.
http://tinyurl.com/4vortp8
Hope Chaines |
Jun 17, 2011 at 06:13 AM
The court's view of the ThyssenKrupp's motion was a far bit stronger than the write-up here would indicate.
Why the suger-coating of ThyssenKrupp? Perhaps having such a bad actor would "taint" the epistle against "functional claiming"? The choice of language in this article bespeaks a biased and subjective view, rather than an objective one.
Jun 17, 2011 at 07:04 AM
I see (page 3) that Lourie called Thyssen's Motion "nasty". If they want to win, parties should fight like gentlemen. Is that the message the judges are at pains to promulgate?
Jun 17, 2011 at 07:30 AM
I have skimmed through the Decision. Can anybody tell me this. If the claim in suit had recited "computing means" instead of "computing unit" would it have fallen foul of 112-6? If the claim had recited "modernising means" instead of "modernizing device" would it have fallen foul of 112-6? If yes, why exactly? Would that be just because of the choice of one word over another? If so, where pray does form end, and substance begin?
Ah, I think I have found the answer, on page 12. In cited TI v. VDO, "pumping means" turned out NOT to be M+F. So that's all clear now.
Jun 17, 2011 at 07:54 AM
If yes, why exactly? Would that be just because of the choice of one word over another? If so, where pray does form end, and substance begin?
Maybe, but probably not. Yes, probably. Yes. The statute in question is expressly about "form." You invoke the benefits of the statute by choosing a particular form for your claim; those benefits come with some requirements, of course. If you don't choose that form, then that statute doesn't apply. The only difficulty is when you straddle the line by reciting something dumb like "computing means," when you mean "computing device."
This particular case is not about the court exalting form over substance.
Jun 17, 2011 at 07:58 AM
Perhaps, but the message they sent is a little different: If you want to sneak an extra argumentative brief in, against the rules, then you should at least disguise it better.
If the Court is really that concerned, they should come down a little harder. I'm not sure these public embarassments are very effective.
Jun 17, 2011 at 08:03 AM
The name of the game is "form" when talking about Section 112, paragraph 6. Unless you couple "means" with "for [doing some function]," Section 112, paragraph 6 doesn't (or shouldn't) apply. Most of us on this side of the pond now avoid MPF because of the legal baggage MPF unfortunately carries (as the Federal Circuit has interpreted Section 112, paragraph 6) of only covering those "means" which are specifically exemplified in the specification.
I appreciate the replies Cy,EG, and am reassured that it is the statute, not the court here, that is exalting.
I'm a bit worried now though, to read that reciting "computing means" is per se "dumb" (whereas presumably "computing device" isn't). That would be because "computing device" would cover any computing means under the sun whereas "computing means" covers ONLY the specific best mode computing device (and such computing devices as are mechanical equivalents of that single computing device). Got it now. I think.
Jun 17, 2011 at 08:18 AM
It's only per se dumb because of Section 112, par. 6. Please continue using it in Europe - I do.
Jun 17, 2011 at 08:21 AM
I should add that it's not so dumb if "computing means" is not followed immediately by functional language...
Jun 17, 2011 at 08:22 AM
How about examining something DIS-functional. The USPTO is the ONLY US Agency that requires special accreditation to represent clients. An attorney can brief the US Supreme Court, but needs a credential by the USPTO alone, to file a patent application before the USPTO.
You say, " This makes it extremely difficult for a party challenging the definiteness of a functional claim element to prevail, and seems somewhat inconsistent with the broader ideas of General Electric and United Carbon."
As if this is a bad thing. As your described by your write up the claims are perfectly understandable, the spec is perfectly clear and the court came to the right conclusion. It is not necessary to recite a litany about microprocessors, circuit boards, memory and input and output devices for one of ordinary skill to know how to make this invention without undue experimentation. Moreover, such a litany might distract from the modernizing technique. Legal posturing that takes the opposite stance, whether it be by an examiner or infringer is just that...posturing. Posted by:
I read the motion - it's definitely a bit on the strongly-worded side, but I'm not sure it's so "nasty" as to be beyond the pale, or deserving of a smackdown aside from the fact that it's essentially an extra merits brief. Posted by:
Jun 17, 2011 at 09:24 AM
Where can we find a copy of the brief online?
I've uploaded a copy. Posted by:
This piece opens, "Patent claims may be indefinite due to their use of functional language untethered to any structure." Except in the context of § 112 ¶ 6 and design patents, I don't think that's accurate. I thought the news from 1966 had reached everyone (well, except for a few behind-the-times examiners):
“There is nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of [functional language] in drafting patent claims … Indeed we have even recognized in the past the practical necessity for the use of functional language.” In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212, 169 USPQ 226, 228 (CCPA 1971).
“It is true that the italicized portions are ‘functional’ but we do not regard that as good ground to give them ‘no weight.’” In re Land, 368 F.2d 866, 882, 151 USPQ 621, 635 (CCPA 1966).
You will wreck the Shill party we are having.
In this case [] the claims recite a “modernizing device,” delineate the components that the modernizing device is connected to, describe how the modernizing device interacts with those components, and describe the processing that the modernizing device performs. The written descriptions additionally show that the modernizing device conveys structure to skilled artisans.
I haven't read this case but is this "modernizing device" a computer or what? What kind of a doofus would use such a term in a patent claim?
Jun 17, 2011 at 11:41 AM
The problem here is there prior case law requiring that algorithms be disclosed in the specification when claiming computer inventions using MFP. Now the Feds go out of their way to not construe computer claims as MPF just to avoid their prior cases.
So, we now have a drafting trap for he unwary where the differences in result makes no sense whatsoever. The Feds really need to revisit their prior case law on corresponding structure. If that structure is well known, or easily constructed from the description, it is disclosed.
Because nothing is more persuasive than 40 year old CCPA cases with their holdings taken out of context.
And, hey Dennis, the problem is not functional languange in claims. It is functional language at the exact point of novelty which essentially converts the claim into a claim for a result. Cf. O'Reilly v. Morse.
Start your analysis with the stricken brief.
Someone describing new retrofit equipment might. Whats wrong with it? What sort of a doofus couldn't figure out what it is from just the discussion in the write up?
You don't have it quite right Max. Computing means should not invoke 112 six and the specific best mode device you referred to. --Means for computing-- would.