Source: http://openjurist.org/444/f3d/41/united-states-v-deleon
Timestamp: 2014-08-29 22:33:03
Document Index: 309437499

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326']

444 F3d 41 United States v. Deleon | OpenJurist
444 F. 3d 41 - United States v. Deleon	Home444 f3d 41 united states v. deleon
444 F3d 41 United States v. Deleon 444 F.3d 41
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Dario DELEON, a/k/a Rafael Garcia, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 04-1592.
Roberto M. Braceras, with whom Christine M. Genaitis and Goodwin Procter LLP were on brief, for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
It is a crime for an alien to re-enter the country after he has been deported, unless he has the express permission of the Attorney General of the United States (or unless such permission is unnecessary in his case for other reasons). 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The usual sentence for the crime is a term in prison, followed by deportation.
Somewhat unusually in the criminal law, there is an exception provided by statute, id. § 1326(d), for aliens who can prove that the original deportation order was based on administrative proceedings which were fundamentally unfair. Subsection 1326(d) codifies these due process concerns, which were originally set forth in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987). See United States v. Luna, 436 F.3d 312, 317 (1st Cir.2006). The collateral attack on the deportation order pursuant to § 1326(d) requires that the alien make three showings: that he has exhausted administrative remedies, that he was improperly deprived of the opportunity for judicial review, and that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair.
Rafael Garcia was convicted after a jury trial of the crime of illegal re-entry and was sentenced on April 29, 2004 to 33 months' imprisonment and two years of supervised release; he was released from prison on September 2, 2005, and was in immigration custody awaiting deportation as of the close of briefing in this appeal.
His appeal turns largely on attacking rulings by the district court denying his motion to dismiss the indictment under § 1326(d) because he had not met the three criteria for a successful collateral attack, and denying dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. He challenges jury findings that the criminal proceedings were brought within the five-year statute of limitations and that he re-entered the country without the express consent of the Attorney General. Although he has served his term of imprisonment, will be deported,1 and cannot re-enter the United States legally, he also attacks his sentence of 33 months' imprisonment plus supervised release. Finally, and with some cause, he complains about the delay of more than one year before the district court provided him a transcript for appeal.
The one fact that permeates the analysis in this case, and that affects many of the issues, is that at the time of his original 1995 conviction for sale of crack cocaine and consequent deportation, Garcia gave the false name of Dario DeLeon. He chose to hide from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)2 both his true identity and the fact that he had a green card in his true name (Rafael Garcia). Indeed, he asked for a prompt deportation and took no appeal. The district court found as a matter of fact that this was a deliberate scheme of deception on his part so that he could illegally re-enter the country by using his green card and his real name. This is exactly what he did a mere two months after his deportation; he then lived in the United States for nearly eight years as Rafael Garcia. In March 2003, the government learned for the first time that Rafael Garcia was the same person as the deported DeLeon and started these proceedings.
We affirm Garcia's conviction and sentence in all respects and note these key points in our holdings. First, in performing the collateral attack analysis under § 1326(d), the court ordinarily should address the initial test of exhaustion of administrative remedies before going on to the other two tests. Second, we address the situation where an alien claims that the statute of limitations applicable to § 1326 prosecutions has run but the government's lack of knowledge of the alien's presence is a result of the alien's misrepresentations as to his identity. Third, we clarify and reinforce that a defendant who has been delayed in resolution of his appeal by delay in preparation of the trial transcript cannot establish a violation of due process absent a showing of prejudice.
A. Garcia's Initial Criminal Conviction and Deportation
Garcia, a native of the Dominican Republic, came to Puerto Rico in 1981 or 1982, when he was approximately twelve years old. He obtained temporary permanent resident status in 1987 and lawful permanent resident status in 1990. He later moved to Massachusetts.
In late February 1995, Garcia was arrested in Quincy, Massachusetts and charged with, among other things, selling crack cocaine to undercover officers. Garcia, who was carrying no identification, told the police his name was Dario DeLeon. He also gave a false birth date and lied about his father's name.
Garcia, who said he spoke no English, appeared at least twice in Quincy District Court, accompanied both times by an attorney and at least once by an interpreter. According to a notation in the court records, Garcia was "[a]dvised of right to counsel" and "[a]dvised of alien rights." He never told the judge or anyone else his real name. On March 28, still under the name DeLeon, Garcia entered a plea to the drug charge3 and was sentenced to time served, thirty days' incarceration.
Garcia was then transferred to the custody of the INS. There he again identified himself as DeLeon and consistently denied having legal status. He denied having a visa or a Social Security number and claimed to be unemployed.
The INS Order to Show Cause issued to Garcia (under the name of DeLeon), which was written in both English and Spanish, informed him, among other things, that he could "seek an attorney or representative, if [he] desire[d] to be represented." It also informed him that if he was not satisfied with the eventual decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ), he had the right to appeal. Garcia signed a form (using the name DeLeon) which stated that the Order to Show Cause had been read to him in Spanish. Garcia also signed (as DeLeon) a form that stated, in Spanish, that he was "not a citizen of the United States," that he "d[id] not wish to apply for relief from deportation," and that he "want[ed] to be deported as soon as possible." The form further stated: "This request is completely voluntary. I have not been coerced, threatened, or enticed in any way . . . ."
Prior to his appearance before the IJ, Garcia was provided with a "Notice of Rights" in Spanish. The notice had two relevant sections. The first, entitled "Right to be Represented by an Attorney or Representative," stated:
If you have any questions regarding any of your rights you can speak with an attorney or representative who can explain your rights, including any relief that may be available to you from deportation. The officer who gave you this notice will give you a list of organizations that can provide legal information. Representatives from these organizations will speak to you for free or for a small fee, and some of them might speak your language.... You may contact a lawyer or other legal representative at this time or at any other time prior to your departure from the United States.
The second section, entitled "Right to a Hearing Before an Immigration Judge," stated in relevant part:
If you do not want to return to your country, you have a right to a hearing before an immigration judge, who will determine whether you can remain in the United States. If you request a hearing, you may be represented at the hearing by a lawyer or other legal representative at your own expense. If you cannot afford to pay a lawyer, you may contact an organization on the list of free legal services. For example, if you are married to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, or have lived in the U.S. for seven years or longer, and have not been convicted of a serious crime, you may be eligible for relief from deportation.
(emphasis in the original). Garcia signed the bottom of the form (as DeLeon), indicating he had read it.
Garcia also received, as part of the Order to Show Cause, a page of written information entitled "Notice of Rights and Consequences." It stated, in both English and Spanish: "You will be given a list of organizations, attorneys and other persons who have indicated their availability to represent aliens in these proceedings. Some of these persons may represent you free of charge or for a nominal fee." It noted that hearings before the IJ were typically scheduled no sooner than fourteen days after the issuance of the Order to Show Cause "to allow you to seek an attorney or representative, if you desire to be represented."
On April 26, 1995, Garcia appeared before an IJ in Oakdale, Louisiana. A court interpreter was present. The following colloquy ensued:
IJ: Mr. DeLeon, sir, this is your first appearance in my court, Immigration Court. As such, you're entitled to delaying your case, if you wish, to better prepare your case or to acquire an attorney or we may go forward today, whichever you desire.
Garcia: I cannot afford an attorney. I would like to — I would like to ask for deportation.
IJ: Do you understand the nature of Immigration Court, sir?
At that point Garcia took an oath to testify truthfully. The colloquy then continued:
IJ: Sir, do you understand that you have the right to have an attorney represent you at no expense to the government?
IJ: And you understand, sir, that you have the right to appeal any decision of this court to a higher court in Washington, DC, and you do that through the Federal Court system of this country?
IJ: Sir, do you acknowledge previous receipt of the Form 6618, the legal aid sheet ... as well as your criminal conviction records?
Later, Garcia stated (still under oath) that he was not a U.S. citizen or national and that he entered the United States in 1990 without inspection. The IJ found Garcia deportable. The IJ asked the government attorney if he was "aware of any relief" from deportation, to which the government replied: "No, Your Honor." The IJ ordered Garcia deported to the Dominican Republic. He asked Garcia: "Do you wish to accept that decision or is there an appeal?" Garcia replied: "I accept it."
B. Garcia's Re-entry and Second Conviction
Soon after Garcia's June 1995 deportation, his sister mailed his green card and passport from Massachusetts to him in the Dominican Republic. Less than two months later, in late July 1995, Garcia used these documents to re-enter the United States via Puerto Rico under his real name.4 He did not inform the immigration officials that he had been deported as Dario DeLeon. An immigration official checked Garcia's permanent resident card and then admitted him. Pursuant to standard practice at that time, he did not take Garcia's fingerprints, nor did he check the prints already on file for Garcia against any other database.
Garcia eventually moved back to Massachusetts, where he lived under his real name for several years. In March 2003, Garcia argued with two people at a store in Massachusetts. After he left the store, he noticed that the two were following his car. He decided to go to a police station. The police asked him for identification, which he provided (under his real name). The police then arrested him on an outstanding warrant for operating an unregistered vehicle. Garcia was fingerprinted, and the prints were sent to the FBI for a check of the Bureau's database; at that point, authorities realized that Garcia and "DeLeon" were one and the same.
Garcia was charged with the federal crime of illegal re-entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment under the theories that (1) the 1995 deportation proceeding violated his right to due process and was invalid under § 1326(d), and (2) the indictment was untimely. The district court rejected these contentions in a detailed order, discussed below.
After a four-day jury trial, Garcia was convicted. On April 29, 2004, the district court sentenced him to 33 months' imprisonment (with credit for time served) and 24 months of supervised release. Garcia completed his term of imprisonment on September 2, 2005, during the pendency of this appeal, and was transferred to INS custody to await deportation.
Garcia's primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it found that he failed to meet the collateral attack standard under § 1326(d) and refused to dismiss the indictment.
Subsection 1326(d) bars any collateral challenge to the underlying deportation order unless the alien demonstrates the following:
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). Here, the district court found that Garcia had not met the third ground, in part because he could not show fundamental unfairness, as required under § 1326(d)(3). See Luna, 436 F.3d at 316. We review the subsidiary factual findings for clear error and the ultimate mixed conclusion that there was no fundamental unfairness de novo. See id. at 316-17.
Garcia argued before the district court that he was denied the right to counsel during the 1995 deportation proceeding, and therefore that he met prongs (2) and (3) and that he was excused from meeting prong (1). He argued that he was illiterate in both English and Spanish in 1995, and so the notices informing him of his rights meant little. He also contended that when the IJ told him he could obtain counsel and he replied, "I cannot afford an attorney," the IJ was obligated to pursue the matter. He stated that he never received the legal aid sheet listing pro bono service providers, and that his affirmative answer when the IJ asked him if he had received the sheet was simply a product of his confusion.
Garcia also argued that he met the requirements of § 1326(d) because he did not know he was eligible for relief from deportation. He contended that as a lawful permanent resident, he would have been eligible for discretionary relief unde