Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/711/1164/302208/
Timestamp: 2020-01-21 17:08:32
Document Index: 466147308

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3654', '§ 3577', '§ 524', '§ 524', '§ 2', '§ 270', '§ 2680', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 524', '§ 41']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charmer Industries, Inc., et al., Defendants,andpeerless Importers, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charmer Industries, Inc., et al., Defendants,andpee...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Charmer Industries, Inc., et al., Defendants,andpeerless Importers, Inc., Defendant-appellant, 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983) Argued April 29, 1983. Decided June 28, 1983
On March 25, Peerless obtained an order to show cause signed by Judge Sifton, temporarily restraining the Probation Service and the Arizona AG from publishing, discussing, or using the Report, and requiring them to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Following the submission of papers by the interested parties, and oral argument on April 1, 1983, the court denied Peerless's motion. Using the analysis required by Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,2 the court found that Peerless could suffer irreparable injury to its reputation and good will as a result of public disclosure of certain statements in the Peerless Report.3 It concluded, however, that Peerless had not shown that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that there should be no disclosure of the Report by the Arizona AG. The court ruled that neither the early procedural irregularities--i.e., the release of the Report prior to court approval, the failure to disclose the prior release when the request for approval was made, and the misdescription of the Arizona proceeding--nor the ex parte nature of the request to release the Report would warrant an order of nondisclosure. The court ruled that the contents of the Report also did not justify the preservation of confidentiality. It found that the Report contained no grand jury material that had not already been made public through the Government's Plea Memorandum. Further, it observed that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c), presentence reports that are disclosed to a defendant must also be disclosed to the government and that the Rule does not bar the government from disclosing the information. The court viewed the Probation Service as a body with administrative expertise which had--if not initially, at least on reconsideration--exercised its informed judgment in determining that disclosure was appropriate, and the court viewed that determination as entitled to considerable deference. Accordingly, the court concluded that although Peerless had shown substantial questions going to the merits which were fair ground for litigation, it had not shown a likelihood that it would eventually prevail in establishing that disclosure was unwarranted. Finally, the court concluded that Peerless had not demonstrated that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in its favor, because at no time had it denied the accuracy of any statements in the Peerless Report, and thus its interests failed to outweigh those of a state agency seeking information to assist it in determining whether the licenses of Peerless's subsidiary should be revoked.
The presentence report, use of which is governed to some extent by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c),4 is a document prepared by the Probation Service for the district court prior to the court's imposition of sentence upon the defendant. In preparing such a report, the Probation Service acts as an arm of the court, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (1); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3654 (1976) (probation officers appointed by the court), and commences its investigation at the instance of the court.
In order to be of greatest assistance to the court, the report should be as complete as possible, containing " [a]ll objective information which is significant to the decisionmaking process." Id. at 1; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (2). To this end, the report is designed to
describe [ ] the defendant's character and personality, evaluate [ ] his or her problems and needs, help [ ] the reader understand the world in which the defendant lives, reveal [ ] the nature of his or her relationships with people, and disclose [ ] those factors that underlie the defendant's specific offense and conduct in general.
The report normally contains information from a variety of sources. These include the defendant himself, members of his family, cooperating public and private welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, employers, and others who know the defendant. There are no formal limitations on the contents of presentence reports. The restrictions imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to trial evidence are not applicable. See Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d) (3); Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492, 89 S. Ct. 1134, 1136, 22 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1969); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-52, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1084-1086, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949); United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Fatico II "), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S. Ct. 1018, 62 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1980); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711-13 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Fatico I "); United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, the report may well contain hearsay statements that are not subject to cross-examination, Williams v. New York, supra, or information bearing no relationship to the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced, Gregg v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at 492, 89 S. Ct. at 1137. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.").
Frequently information disclosed to probation officers during the presentence investigation is given to the investigators in confidence. For example, a defendant may disclose his income but not wish to have those figures made public. A psychiatrist may provide an evaluation whose availability would best be restricted to the court and those involved in the defendant's rehabilitation. Law enforcement agencies frequently wish to protect the sources of information in their records and will sometimes exact a promise of confidentiality from the probation officer. In order to ensure the availability of as much information as possible to assist in sentencing, the courts have generally determined that presentencing reports should be held confidential. See, e.g., United States v. Martinello, 556 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United States v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 511-13 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973, 88 S. Ct. 1064, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1185 (1968). In affirming a refusal to disclose to a defendant the presentence report on a codefendant, the court in Martinello stated as follows:
Presentence reports are not public records but rather confidential reports to the trial judge for use in his effort to arrive at a fair sentence. United States v. Greathouse, D.C.M.D. Ala., 188 F. Supp. 765 (1960). As other courts have held, requiring disclosure of a presentence report is contrary to the public interest as it may adversely affect the sentencing court's ability to obtain data on a confidential basis from the accused, and from sources independent of the accused, for use in the sentencing process.
Nonetheless, confidentiality of the presentence report is not maintained strictly, for considerations of due process require that the court not impose a sentence on the basis of information that is materially false. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948); United States v. Robin, supra, 545 F.2d at 779. Thus, Rule 32(c) (3), as presently framed, generally requires that prior to imposing sentence, the district court, upon request, permit the defendant or his counsel to read the presentence report.7 The basis for this requirement is the belief that [t]he best way of insuring accuracy is disclosure with an opportunity for the defendant and counsel to point out to the court information thought by the defense to be inaccurate, incomplete, or otherwise misleading.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) advisory committee Note (1974); see 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 524, at 72, 77 (2d ed. 1982). If the report is disclosed to the defendant or his attorney, it must also be disclosed to the attorney for the government. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) (C).
After disclosing the presentence report pursuant to Rules 32(c) (3) (A) and (C), the court must give the defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment on it. If the defendant takes the position that there are factual inaccuracies in the report, the court, in its discretion, may simply disregard the disputed material, see, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359-60, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1205-1206, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion); or, it may allow the defendant to comment without the presentation of testimonial evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1973); or it may request corroboration from the government, id. at 658; or it may hold an evidentiary hearing, see United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978). If persuaded that statements in the presentence report are inaccurate, the sentencing judge is not permitted to rely on those statements in imposing sentence. Whether the decision to disregard disputed statements is made with or without benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the court usually will note its nonreliance but will not cause the inaccurate statements to be deleted from the presentence report. See United States v. Legrano, 659 F.2d 17, 18 (4th Cir. 1981); Note, A Proposal To Ensure Accuracy in Presentence Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L.J. 1225, 1235 & n. 59 (1982).8
Although Rule 32(c) sets the standards for release of presentence reports to defendants, their counsel, and the prosecuting attorneys, it is silent as to whether and under what circumstances such reports may be disclosed to "third persons,"--by which we refer to persons or entities other than the courts, the Parole Commission, the Bureau of Prisons, and probation officers. The implication of Rule 32(c) (3) (D) is that the report should not routinely be made available to third persons, for that subpart provides that, unless the court directs otherwise, any copies of the report that are provided to the defendant, his counsel, or the attorney for the government must be returned to the probation officer immediately after sentence is imposed. The history of Rule 32(c) reflects a longstanding judicial view that confidentiality should be maintained. It was not until 1975 that the rule required a district judge to disclose the report to a defendant who requested it. The 1974 Advisory Committee Report that immediately preceded adoption of this requirement observed that " [m]ost members of the federal judiciary have, in the past, opposed compulsory disclosure." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) advisory committee note (1974) (citing inter alia, a survey of all federal judges); see also 3 C. Wright, supra, at § 524.
In light of the evolution of Rule 32, and the prevailing judicial view that the public availability of presentence reports would likely inhibit the flow of information to the sentencing judge, some courts appear to have interpreted Rule 32(c) as imposing an outright prohibition on disclosure of the reports to third persons. See United States v. Mayse, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("except to the extent that disclosure of a presentence report is permitted under circumstances adverted to in [Rule 32(c) ], it is a confidential document and not to be disclosed to anyone"); United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1976) ("rule does not allow disclosure of the presentence report to the prosecution in a separate trial"). Most courts, however, have concluded, as do we, that Rule 32(c) simply does not reach the question of disclosure to third persons, and have sought to balance the desirability of confidentiality against the need of the moving party for disclosure of the document. In most cases, in a variety of circumstances, these courts have found disclosure unwarranted.9 See, e.g., United States v. Martinello, supra, 556 F.2d at 1216 (no disclosure to a codefendant); United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990, 94 S. Ct. 2399, 40 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1974); United States v. Greathouse, supra, 484 F.2d at 807 (same); United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1976) (no disclosure of report regarding a witness); United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813, 820 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969, 92 S. Ct. 2423, 32 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1972); United States v. Krause, 78 F.R.D. 203, 204 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (no disclosure to defendant's judgment creditor); Hancock Brothers v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (no disclosure to civil antitrust plaintiffs); cf. United States v. Mayse, supra, 467 F. Supp. 1339 (no disclosure to a psychiatrist notwithstanding defendant's consent). No reported case, and only one unreported case, has been called to our attention in which a court has ordered the disclosure of a presentence report to a third party. See United States v. Bernstein, CR 81 160 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1982) (transcript of hearing at which court explained that it had disclosed report to a third person in the interests of justice).10
Few of these courts have discussed the criteria that third-party requests must meet to justify disclosure. Those that have done so have set a standard approaching that for the release of grand jury materials, as set forth in, e.g., Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 1356, 1361 & n. 14, 75 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 & n. 8, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 1672 & n. 8, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683, 78 S. Ct. 983, 986, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1958). These Supreme Court cases establish that for the release of grand jury materials, which are traditionally protected by a "General Rule of Secrecy," Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (2), the movant must make a particularized showing of compelling need; proof of mere relevance, economy, and efficiency will not suffice. The standards applied with respect to presentence reports have been similar, as disclosure has been denied in the absence of "the most compelling reasons," United States v. Krause, supra, 78 F.R.D. at 204, or, when sought by a defendant, absent a showing that the report is "absolutely essential to effective presentation of a defense," United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843, 98 S. Ct. 142, 54 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1977). In the most thorough exposition of the policy considerations warranting a strict standard for third-party disclosure, the court in Hancock Brothers v. Jones, supra, 293 F. Supp. 1229, required a compelling showing that "lifting confidentiality is required to meet ends of justice." Id. at 1233, quoted in United States v. Figurski, supra, 545 F.2d at 391; see United States v. Bernstein, supra. In denying disclosure of the presentence report to civil antitrust plaintiffs, the Hancock Brothers court, recognizing (pre-1975) that disclosure even to a defendant was not mandatory, stated as follows:
293 F. Supp. at 1233. The court then rejected any notion that disclosure of the report to the defendant provided a ground for disclosure to third parties:
Disclosure of probation reports to criminal defendants is based on the strong overriding policy of protecting interests of the criminally-accused. At times, non-disclosure to the defendant dangerously approaches deprivation of the defendant's constitutional rights.... The same principles apply when grand jury secrecy is broken for the benefit of a criminal defendant.... If disclosure to the defendant is used as a basis for disclosure to the third party litigants in a civil proceeding, the criminal defendant's access to information via Rules 32(c) and 6(e) of the Fed. R. Crim. P. is seriously hampered. The defendant is thereby compelled to choose between exercising a recognized privilege or maintaining the confidential nature of such information. This result is undesirable as well as unconstitutional in instances where the Constitution requires giving the defendant access to such information....
We agree with the rationale of Hancock Brothers and with its conclusion that the district court should not authorize disclosure of a presentence report to a third person in the absence of a compelling demonstration that disclosure of the report is required to meet the ends of justice. We regard the presentence report as bearing many of the characteristics--and frailties--of material presented to a grand jury. Grand jury secrecy is designed to accommodate several interests, reflecting the facts, inter alia, that only limited procedural safeguards are available to persons appearing before the grand jury, that hearsay testimony is normally allowed, that there is no right of cross-examination, and that frequently accusations are made for which no indictment is ever returned. See, e.g., Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, supra, 103 S. Ct. at 1360 n. 8, 1361 n. 11; Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, supra, 441 U.S. at 218-19 & n. 8, 99 S. Ct. at 1672-1673 & n. 8. As the cases discussed in Part IIA above reveal, these considerations are also applicable, to a significant degree, to presentence reports. No formal limitations inhibit the collection of information for such reports. The reports frequently contain hearsay and information not relevant to the crime charged. If a defendant challenges the accuracy of a statement in the report, the court may, in its discretion, decline to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the challenges. Even where an evidentiary hearing is convened, the government may be permitted to rest simply on proof that the source of the probation officers' hearsay information is reliable and be excused from producing--or identifying--an informant who provided the disputed information. Hence there may be no opportunity, even at a hearing, for the defendant to confront the maker of the disputed hearsay statement. Finally, even where the defendant's challenge to a presentence report statement has been "successful," in the sense that the district court has determined that it will not rely on the statement in imposing sentence, the statement nevertheless remains in the report. Thus, although the safeguards provided by Rule 32(c) ensure that any material misinformation in the report that is called to the court's attention will not affect the sentencing decision, they do not mean that the presentence report contains no such misinformation.
Further, notwithstanding the goal of accuracy in presentence reports, there is no requirement that the defendant voice his objection to any statement with which he disagrees, and we assume that not all statements with which a defendant might take issue are actually challenged. Indeed, in a significant number of cases, the defendant does not even request disclosure of the presentence report. See Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1615, 1641 n. 141 (1980). In part the failure to challenge statements made in disclosed reports may result from a judgment that the statement is relatively inconsequential in the context of sentencing, or that it may later be challenged in the context of the defendant's review for parole, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) (1982); see also note 5 supra, or that the challenge is not worth the effort. For example, in the present case, we do not know whether Peerless's failure to challenge the Report's hearsay statement from law enforcement authorities about a Peerless officer resulted from its indisputability. We do know that no individuals were defendants in the antitrust action, that the only punishment to be imposed on Peerless was a fine, and that Peerless knew prior to responding to the Report what size fine the government had recommended. It could have been Peerless's view that since the hearsay statement, even if confuted, would remain in the report, the challenge would be a waste of effort. Defendants may be deterred from disputing statements in presentence reports because the resolution of such disputes might tend to delay sentencing. In all the circumstances, therefore, although the failure of a defendant to dispute the truth of a sentence in the report justifies the court's use of that statement in reaching a sentencing decision, see Fatico I, supra, 579 F.2d at 713, we believe the presumption of accuracy is not necessarily warranted in an unrelated context. See McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 270 (Cleary ed. 1972) (propriety of inferring an admission from silence depends in part on incentive to respond).
Ordinarily on an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction, our function is simply to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying relief. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981). Since, however, it was inappropriate for the district court to treat the Peerless request as a commonplace motion for such an injunction, the ordinary standards of review of the denial of such a motion are inapposite. Accordingly, we review the decision below as if the unauthorized release of the Report had not occurred and as if the district court had simply granted a motion to disclose.
A central element in the showing required of a third person seeking disclosure is the degree to which the information in the presentence report cannot be obtained from other sources. While the burden of showing need may be less when the movant is a public body seeking to perform a public duty, cf. United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980) (Bar grievance committee seeking grand jury materials failed to meet even lesser burden because it made no showing of "particularized need" for the materials), than when the movant is a private person, the Arizona AG's showing of need was negligible. This is largely because nearly all of the pertinent information in the Report also appears in the Government's Plea Memorandum. The latter is a public document; the Arizona AG has it. To the extent that the information appears in the public document, the Arizona AG cannot show a compelling need for disclosure of the Report.
The court rejected the suggestion that liquor license revocation might constitute irreparable injury, on the assumption that injury of that type would be compensable in damages. Given the immunity of states under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution from damage suits without their consent, see Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974), and the immunity of federal employees and agencies from tort claims premised on discretionary acts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), the availability of an award, even assuming that damages would be reasonably susceptible to calculation, seems doubtful
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
As a court document, the presentence report is not within the purview of either the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. V 1981), notwithstanding its use or retention by agencies such as the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission. See FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982); Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1968); AO Presentence Monograph at 27-28 & n. 3
Rule 32(c) (3) (A) provides that the probation officer's recommendation, if any, as to sentence, is not to be disclosed, and it allows the court to withhold other information contained in the report in order to protect confidential sources or the safety of the defendant or other persons
As presently formulated, the Rule does not require the court to disclose the presentence report to the defendant if no request is made, United States v. Ruiz, 580 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S. Ct. 732, 58 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1978); 3 C. Wright, supra, § 524, at 73, or to inform the defendant that the report would be disclosed to him or his counsel if a request were made, see Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1615, 1641 (1980). In many cases in which no request is made, the court does not make disclosure. Id. at 1640-43. Recent proposals for the amendment of Rule 32, which have been approved by the Supreme Court and will become effective on August 1, 1983, absent Congressional action, would require the district court, inter alia, to make disclosure to both the defendant and his counsel, whether or not a request had been made. See Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the U.S. District Courts, H.R.Doc. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1983) ("H.R.Doc. No. 55").
In U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court, 345 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1965), on which the Probation Service and the Arizona AG place heavy reliance, the private antitrust plaintiffs sought, and obtained, the disclosure of a government memorandum that had been provided to the probation officer prior to the sentencing of the defendants. The presentence report itself apparently was neither requested nor disclosed
The district court apparently assumed that under the Federal Rules of Evidence this triple hearsay proof would not be admitted in evidence in the DLLC proceeding and that the court was merely being asked to sanction disclosure as a discovery device. This was an erroneous view of the law, see Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 41-1010(A) (1) (West Supp.1982-1983) (administrative hearings to be conducted "without adherence to the rules of evidence required in judicial proceedings"); 102, Galaz v. Moore, 20 Ariz.App. 102, 510 P.2d 413, 415 (Ariz.App.1973) (upholding admission of hearsay in proceeding on application for transfer of liquor license), and the brief submitted by the Arizona AG on this appeal clearly reveals that the Report is sought for use as evidence