Source: https://m.openjurist.org/981/f2d/97
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 22:07:40
Document Index: 580870681

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 4203', '§ 4203', '§ 4218', '§ 4203', '§ 2', '§ 4207', '§ 2', '§ 4201', '§ 235', '§ 316']

981 F2d 97 Bridge v. United States Parole Commission Jt Fci Nj | OpenJurist
981 F. 2d 97 - Bridge v. United States Parole Commission Jt Fci Nj
981 F2d 97 Bridge v. United States Parole Commission Jt Fci Nj
981 F.2d 97
William W. BRIDGE
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION and J.T. Holland, Warden of
Federal Correctional Institution at Loretto, Pennsylvania.
United States of America* The United States
Parole Commission and Warden, F.C.I., Fairton,
N.J., Appellants.
No. 92-3110.
Submitted under Third Circuit Rule 12(6), Oct. 6, 1992.
In its memorandum order dated March 13, 1991 (the "first order"), the district court held that the parole hearing record failed to provide a rational basis for linking Bridge to the fire bombing incident. The Parole Commission had relied solely on information contained in Bridge's presentence report in making its finding. The information consisted of an Assistant United States Attorney's summary of a statement by a Customs Service special agent that Bridge had admitted that he personally was responsible for the fire bombing. This embedded hearsay was accompanied by the prosecutor's characterization of the circumstances surrounding the confession as indicative of a high degree of reliability. The district court deemed this evidence insufficient because there was no firsthand description of the admission or the circumstances under which it was made that would demonstrate the confession's reliability. Nor was there other extrinsic evidence that linked Bridge to the fire bombing in any way. The district court therefore remanded the matter to the Parole Commission with instructions to "recompute Petitioner's presumptive parole date based on a Category Five offense behavior severity level, consistent with this memorandum." Bridge v. United States Parole Commission, Civ. No. 90-214J, slip op. at 4 (W.D.Pa. March 13, 1991). The Parole Commission did not appeal this order.
We agree that the district court's first order was a final order4 and that this court may not review that ruling. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), this court has jurisdiction to review "all final decisions of the district courts of the United States...." Remands to administrative agencies are not ordinarily appealable final orders. AJA Associates v. Army Corps of Engineers, 817 F.2d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir.1987). An exception to this generally applicable rule applies when a district court finally resolves an important legal issue in reviewing an administrative agency action and denial of an appeal would foreclose appellate review as a practical matter. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625-29, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664-66, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990); AJA Associates, 817 F.2d at 1073.
The district court's first order meets the criteria for finality articulated in Finkelstein. First, a court's authority to interfere with the Parole Commission's broad discretion to evaluate offense severity qualifies as an important legal issue. Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 941 n. 9 (3d Cir.1988). It is also clear that the district court's first order finally disposed of Bridge's habeas petition. In habeas corpus proceedings, the district court has not finally resolved an issue until it either grants or denies the writ. Id. at 941; accord Allen v. Hadden, 738 F.2d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir.1984). In this case, the court concluded that the evidence in the record did not provide a rational basis for the Commission's finding that Bridge was involved in the bombing. Therefore, the court remanded the matter and ordered that the Commission place Bridge in a Category Five offense severity level. Recognizing that by granting the writ it had completed its task, the district court further ordered that the clerk mark the matter closed. Finally, if on remand the Parole Commission placed Bridge in Category Five, it is doubtful if the Commission could appeal its own order. See Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 625, 110 S.Ct. at 2664.
The district court's order was final. The fact that Bridge subsequently filed a second related habeas petition does not alter our analysis of the finality of the court's first order. Since the Commission failed to appeal the first order within the required time period, see Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) (allowing 60 days to file a notice of appeal in a civil action in which the United States is a party), it waived its right to dispute the court's conclusions contained in that order.
Although we are precluded from reviewing the district court's first order, we nevertheless possess jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Commission's appeal. Bridge argues that the first order conclusively set his offense severity level at Category Five and implicitly precluded any reconsideration hearings. The district court's second order, as Bridge characterizes it, simply enforced its prior ruling. When a court reenters a judgment without altering the substantive rights of the litigants, the entry of the second judgment does not affect the time within which a party must appeal the decisions made in the first order. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 211-12, 73 S.Ct. 245, 248-49, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952); Offshore Prod. Contractors, Inc. v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 224, 229 (5th Cir.1990). If a second judgment revises the litigants' legal rights or plainly resolves an ambiguity that had not been clearly settled, however, then an appeal from the second judgment may challenge any issues resolved or clarified by the second judgment. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator, 344 U.S. at 213, 73 S.Ct. at 249; Offshore Prod. Contractors, 910 F.2d at 229.
To the extent that Bridge relies on the doctrine of law of the case to permanently set his offense severity level at Category Five, his reliance is misplaced. The law of the case doctrine provides that a court should not re-examine an issue already decided in the same case. It is axiomatic that this principle only applies "to issues that were actually discussed by the court in the prior appeal [and] to issues decided by necessary implication." Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir.1984) (quoting Todd & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 637 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.1980)). As we discussed above, the district court's first order did not address or explicitly or by necessary implication decide whether the Parole Commission could reconsider the sufficiency of the evidentiary record if it acquired new evidence implicating Bridge in the bombing. The first order therefore can not be the law of the case as to this question.
Even if we agreed that the district court's first order decided that the Parole Commission could not reconsider the sufficiency of the evidentiary record, the law of the case doctrine still would not control. Commonly recognized exceptions permit reconsideration of an issue previously resolved in the same case if: (1) the right to move for reconsideration would be effectively denied; (2) new evidence is available; (3) a supervening new rule of law is announced; or (4) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Schultz, 737 F.2d at 345; Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 169-70 (3d Cir.1982). When new evidence is available, "the question has not really been decided earlier and is posed for the first time." Hayman Cash Register, 669 F.2d at 169 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873, 79 S.Ct. 111, 3 L.Ed.2d 103 (1958)).
The Parole Commission argues that the district court lacked the power to preclude the Commission from considering new evidence implicating Bridge in the Doubrava bombing. Because this poses a pure question of law, our review is plenary. See United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1036 (3d Cir.1988). We agree with the Commission.
Congress invested the Parole Commission with the statutory authority to grant or deny any application for parole, 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(1) (1988)6, and to modify or revoke an order paroling any eligible prisoner, id. § 4203(b)(3). Indeed, the Parole Commission is the only tribunal that possesses the power to grant or deny a parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 4218(d) (1988) (for purposes of judicial review, Commission's grant or denial of parole is action "committed to agency discretion"); Iuteri v. Nardoza, 732 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1984) ("Congress has vested the sole power to grant or deny parole in the sound discretion of the Commission."); Juelich v. United States Board of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir.1971) ("[T]he determination of a parole eligibility date is wholly within the discretion of the Board.").
The Commission may reopen a parole decision for consideration of new information at any time prior to a prisoner's release, even if the new information was in existence, but was not considered, when the initial parole decision was made. Schiselman v. United States Parole Comm., 858 F.2d 1232, 1238 (7th Cir.1988); Goble v. Matthews, 814 F.2d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir.1987); Iuteri, 732 F.2d at 36; Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 208, 211 (4th Cir.1982); McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir.1980). The rationale underlying these decisions is that the Commission is not an investigative agency, but reviews information furnished by other government agencies. Fardella, 698 F.2d at 211. Consequently, the Commission may not be faulted or penalized for another agency's failure to provide the Commission with all of the evidence in their possession.
National Labor Relations Board v. Food Stores Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 9-10, 94 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 612 (1974) (citations omitted). Thus, legal error in an agency decision does not prevent the agency from expanding its record and rethinking its original order.
A corollary to this tenet of administrative law is that the appropriate judicial remedy when an agency exceeds its discretion is a remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. See Federal Power Comm. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20, 73 S.Ct. 85, 87, 97 L.Ed. 15 (1952). "[T]he function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration." Id. In Idaho Power, the Federal Power Commission granted an applicant a license to build a power plant. The license had certain conditions, which the court of appeals found were illegally imposed. As a remedy for the violation, the court modified the licenses by striking the offensive conditions. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals "usurped an administrative function" by specifying the remedy for the legal error instead of remanding that decision to the agency. Id. On remand, the Federal Power Commission could choose to grant the licenses without the illegal conditions or decline to issue the license at all. A district judge, however, may not perform an administrative function. See Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldridge, 811 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir.1987) (Article III courts may not perform nonjudicial functions, such as exercising Department of Commerce's power to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1580 (2d Cir.1985) (district court may order an agency to promulgate regulations, but requirement of specific language unnecessarily intrudes into administrative sphere).
The Supreme Court's decisions in Food Stores Employees and Idaho Power are equally applicable to all administrative agencies, including the Parole Commission. In Billiteri v. United States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.1976), the district court remanded a prisoner's case to the Parole Commission for development of the record. On appeal from the remand, finding insufficient evidence to support the Commission's factual determinations, the district court conducted its own parole hearing and resolved the relevant factual disputes necessary for parole sentencing. The court of appeals found this action improper because a district court lacks the power to grant parole or judicially determine eligibility for parole. Id. at 943-44. A federal court may review decisions of the Parole Commission for abuse of discretion, but the relief a court may grant is limited: "The only remedy which the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses or wrongful conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of non-compliance, the court can grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the prisoner discharged from custody." Id. at 944; see also Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 692 (3d Cir.1976) (when some rational basis to deny parole exists, district court may remand to Parole Board for fuller explanation of reasons for denial of parole, but may not grant parole to a prisoner).
This court's single decision upholding a district court's conclusive factual finding relating to a parole decision is clearly distinguishable. See Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.1988). In Marshall, the district court remanded a habeas proceeding to the Parole Commission with instructions to clearly explain the reasoning for their offense categorization. Notwithstanding this court order, the Commission reassigned the same offense severity level without pointing to any evidence supporting their decision. In light of the protracted history of the case and the court's impression that the Commission intentionally had evaded the court's mandate, the court ordered the Commission to reassess the prisoner's parole status under a specific offense severity category. We affirmed this portion of the district court's decision. Id. at 944-45. When a district court remands a case to the Parole Board for failure to adequately explain its decision and, on remand, the Commission again declines to articulate a basis for the identical conclusion, a district court may permanently decide this issue on the record before it.
The district court here "usurped an administrative function," Idaho Power, 344 U.S. at 20, 73 S.Ct. at 87, when its second order held that the Commission could not evaluate new evidence implicating Bridge in the Doubrava bombing. Congress vested the authority to grant or deny parole exclusively in the Parole Commission, 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(1), and the Commission may reopen a case based on new adverse evidence, 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(f). The district court's decision divested the Commission of its statutory right to make its own factual determinations in light of new evidence. The court's substitution of its discretion for that of the Commission's is error.
A beneficent concern motivated the district court to permanently set Bridge's offense level. The court speculated that habeas corpus review would be effectively abolished if the Commission could use the habeas proceeding as a trial run for its evidence, and repeatedly conduct rehearings, adding a modicum of additional evidence to justify the same result. This reasoning rests on the implicit assumption that the Parole Commission will act in bad faith by strategically withholding evidence for presentation at a future hearing. We declined to credit the similar argument that dismissal of a pending habeas proceeding when the Commission reopens the case for reconsideration pendente lite would effectively cut off habeas review. United States ex rel. D'Agostino v. Keohane, 877 F.2d 1167, 1174 n. 12 (3d Cir.1989). In Keohane, we refused to assume that the Commission strategically would reopen cases to prevent prisoners access to the federal courts for habeas review. Id.
Just as the presumption that the Commission will reopen cases pendente lite to deny habeas review is unwarranted, so is the district court's presumption that the Commission will repeatedly seek the slightest amount of additional evidence to justify the same result. Government officials are presumed to act in good faith. See Ward v. Rock of Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 811, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2764, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); Hoffman v. United States, 894 F.2d 380, 385 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citations omitted). This presumption of good faith extends to Parole Board members. See Zannino, 531 F.2d at 692 n. 22; Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 263, 62 L.Ed.2d 181 (1979). Bridge has made no showing of bad faith on the part of the Commission.7 Absent an actual demonstration of bad faith, a finding that the Parole Board made a factual determination insufficiently supported by a given record may not preclude the Board from considering new information. The Parole Commission was entitled, indeed was legally required, to fulfill its obligation to consider all relevant and reasonable available evidence, see 18 U.S.C. § 4207, by conducting a rehearing to assess new adverse information and recompute Bridge's parole eligibility date, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(f).
If the conduct (i) involves any place where persons are present or likely to be present; or (ii) involves a residence, building, or other structure; or (iii) results in bodily injury[ ], grade as Category Six.
Bridge v. United States Parole Commission, Civ. No. 90-214J, slip op. at 4 (W.D.Pa. March 13, 1991).
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 have been repealed, but neither party contests that these provisions remain in effect as to Bridge's offense. See Pub.L. No. 98-473 § 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1838, 2032 (1984); Pub.L. No. 101-650 § 316, 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (1990)