Source: http://www.virginiainjuryattorneyblog.com/2009/01/
Timestamp: 2013-12-05 03:03:26
Document Index: 382496082

Matched Legal Cases: ['§8', '§8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§8', '§8', '§8', '§1983', '§1983', '§636', '§1983']

Toward frustrating medical malpractice claims, hospitals, nursing homes and other healthcare institutions routinely keep “double books” about personal injury incidents – a laundered “patient chart” and other trenchant facility records about the patient. Healthcare institutions routinely withhold the latter from patients, claiming statutory quality-care/peer-review privilege under Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.17. But Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. champions victim patient rights and debunks ostensible privilege in succeeding posts.
The “statutory language [of §8.01-581.17] is clear, unambiguous, and unqualified.” HCA Health Servs. of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 220 (2000). “When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning of the enactment will be given it. Courts must give effect to legislative intent, which must be gathered from the words used, unless a literal construction would involve a manifest absurdity.” Id. 8.01-581.17 “provides a privilege in plain language which is limited narrowly to medical staff committees, utilization rule committees, and other committees specified in § 8.01-581.16.” Klarfeld v. Salsbury, 233 Va. 277, 284 (1987)(italics in original)(underlining added). “[T]he scope of § 8.01-581.17 is more limited [than § 8.01-581.16]. Stated differently, § 8.01-581.17 does not include an ‘other entity’ referred to in § 8.01-581.16 which is not a ‘committee’.” Id. “Ambiguities in the [medmal] statutes should not be extended to enlarge the privilege.” Johnson v. Roanoke Mem’l Hosps., Inc., 9 Va. Cir. 196, 199 (Roanoke 1987). “Any ambiguities in [§ 8.01-581.17] must be strictly construed for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, ‘exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth’. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974).” Curtis v. Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc., 21 Va. Cir. 275, 277 (Fairfax 1990). Recently writing for the Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Lemons reiterated that a statute (such as §8.01-581.17) “in derogation of the common law… must be ‘strictly construed and not…enlarged in [its] operation by construction beyond [its] express terms’.” Univ. of Va. Health Servs. Found. v. Morris, 275 Va. 319 (2008)(Lemons, J.)(denying immunity to a hospital healthcare provider in the context of medical malpractice).
Riverside Hosp., Inc. v. Johnson, 272 Va. 518 (2006), a landmark medical malpractice case of Mr. Waterman, held “communications … provided to” covered committees were “not privileged”; “factual information of patient care” is not confidential or privileged; and use of factual patient care information in the peer review or quality care committee process does not render it privileged. “These limitations on the application of the privilege are consistent with preserving the confidentiality of the quality review process while allowing disclosure of relevant information regarding specific patient care and treatment. *** It is the deliberative process and the conclusions reached through that process that the General Assembly sought to protect. *** The deliberative process involving evaluation of patient safety conditions and the design of initiatives to improve the health care system both necessarily begin with factual information of patient care incidents occurring within the health care facility. The use of this factual information in some way in the peer review or quality care committee process alone is insufficient to automatically cloak such information with the protection of no-disclosure. Factual patient care information that does not contain or reflect any committee discussion or action by the committee reviewing the information is not the type of information that must ‘necessarily be confidential’ in order to allow participation in the peer or quality assurance review process. Rather such information is the type, contemplated by Subsection (C) of Code §8.01-581.17, which the General Assembly has specifically instructed should not be brought within the scope of those items entitled to the privilege under any other part of the section. Applying these principles, we conclude that the documents at issue here are of the nature of those described in Code §8.01-581.17(C) and are not privileged.” 272 Va. at 532-533 (emphasis added). Cf., Stevens v. Lemmie, 40 Va. Cir. 499, 508 (Petersburg 1996)(Lemons, J.).
In a §1983 civil rights wrongful death suit, Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. recently survived a federal court challenge to 755 days elapsing from filing to service of the pro se complaint. One unsuccessful defense line of attack was that the clerk’s multiple extensions were not granted within the original time periods for service. Webb v. Stevens, No. 5:05-CV-33-BO(1) Decision and Order (Mar. 17, 2008) aff’d Order (May 22, 2008),2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61480 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008).
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(m) is not subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Specifically, Rule 6(b) does not superimpose onto Rule 4(m) the ostensible requirement of moving for an extension prior to expiration of the 120-day time period. That would be contrary the plain clear language of Rule 4(m) and Rule 6(b)(2). It also ignores that the Court can act “on its own initiative” under Rule 4(m).
Rule 4(m), which pertains solely to service, provides in pertinent part: “If service is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative [shall ‘dismiss’ or ‘extend’].” Thus, Rule 4(m) explicitly: (1) is wholly self-enabling, does not reference Rule 6(b) and is not dependent upon it; (2) is triggered if and when the time already has expired without service, i.e., must not be invoked prior to expiration of the time; and (3) always is subject to the Court acting sua sponte. Per 1993 Amendment, a Rule 4(m) extension may be for “good cause” or no good cause.
Conversely, Rule 6(b) provides for general enlargement of time since, unlike Rule 4(m), most Rules with time periods do not contain their own provisions for enlargement. Rule 6(b) allows enlargement: (1) within court discretion prior to expiration of the time period; and, significantly, (2) for “excusable neglect” even after expiration of the time period.
Hence specific Rule 4(m) and general Rule 6(b) both provide for enlargement, yet have difference structure, timing and standards. Although Rule 6(b) may apply generally to service under Rule 4 – just as it does to other Rules – it does not rewrite (eviscerate) Rule 4(m), which since its 1993 Amendment is a much more liberal standard for enlargement of time for service.
In a §1983 civil rights suit for wrongful death, Avery T. “Sandy” Waterman, Jr., Esq. recently withstood challenge in federal court to the pro se complaint not having been served for 755 days after filing. In Webb v. Stevens, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61480 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008), the clerk had granted multiple extensions of time under Fed R. Civ. P. 4(m) to effect service, including without any finding of good cause.
It is not necessary for a court to find “good cause” for a discretionary extension of time to be valid under Rule 4(m). In 1996 the United State Supreme Court pronounced: “Most recently, in 1993 amendments to the Rules, courts have been accorded discretion to enlarge the 120-day period ‘even if there is no good cause shown.’ See, Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4, 28 U.S.C. App.” Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996)(dicta)(emphasis added). Contrarily, in 1995, a Fourth Circuit panel erroneously had upheld the old “good cause” requirement, reciting incorrectly that “Rule 4(j) was edited without a change in substance and renumbered as Rule(m),” Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1995); falling out of step with every other circuit in the country. See, e.g., Horenkamp v. Van Winkle and Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132-1133 (11th Cir. 2005)(and cases cited therein).
Early on, most Fourth Circuit district courts blindly followed Mendez, either ignorant of Henderson or deferential to Mendez. But the current has shifted, swamping Mendez increasingly. Some courts expressly have rejected Mendez. See, e.g., Scruggs v. Spartanburg Reg. Med. Ctr., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26227, *5-7 (4th Cir. 1999); Yongo v. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14684, *25(E.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2008); Cane Creek Cycling Components, Inc. v. Tien Hsin Indus. Co., Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79957, *19 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2007); Bethae v. S.P. Richards Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71170, *1-4 (D.S.C. Sep. 24, 2007) (plaintiff did not serve within 120 days, Magistrate recommended additional 90 days, and Judge granted additional 270 days as “reasonable”); Cochran v. Waldrop, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13213, *3 (D.S.C. 2007); Bonds v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88392, *10-12 (D.S.C. 2006); Bey v. Stamp, 2006 U.S Dist. LEXIS 70298, *4 (W.D.N.C. 2006), aff’d 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15186 (4th Cir. 2007); Lane v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 388 F.Supp.2d 590, 596-597 (M.D.N.C.2005); Melton v. Tyco Valves & Controls, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 288, 289-290 (D. Md. 2002); Tracy v. Angelone, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16682 (W.D. Va. 2002); and Hammad v. Tate Access Floors, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527-528 (D. Md. 1999). Others less confrontationally have rejected Mendez impliedly, expressly following Henderson and/or other courts without referring to Mendez. See, e.g., Giacomo-Tano v. Levine, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26997, *4 (4th Cir. 1999); Shekhem v. Norfolk So. Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15819 *3-4 (W.D.Va. Feb. 28, 2008); Fabriko Acquisition Corp. v. Advisco Capital Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11882, *2 (W.D. Va. 2007); Atkins v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5791 (D. Md. 2007); Huber v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8315, *1 (D. Md. 2006); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Batson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4305 *5 (D. Md. 2004); Coates v. Shalala, 914 F. Supp. 110, 112-113 (D. Md. 1996); and Fultz v. Rittlemeyer, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5379, *4-6 (W.D. Va. 1995). Given the “stealth” rejection, it is difficult to know just how many other Fourth Circuit district courts are not following Mendez.
The Eastern District of Virginia has eroded its support for Mendez. Compare Reliable Tax & Fin. Servs., Inc. v. H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc., 212 F.Supp.2d 592, 595 (E.D. Va. 2002)(Smith, J.)(following Mendez) with United States v. Gulf Ins. Co., 225 F.R.D. 526, 528 (E.D. Va. 2005)(Smith, J.)(“some question”) and United States v. Sea Bay Dev. Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33734, *19 (E.D. Va. 2007)(Jackson, J.)(“questionable nature of Mendez”). The District of Maryland repeatedly has rejected Mendez over time. Compare Braithwaite v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 160 F.R.D. 75 (D. Md. 1995) with Atkins, Huber, Batson, Melton, Hammad and Coates.
“Circumstances in which the advisory committee suggests that the Court should exercise its discretion include pro se claims and cases in which ‘the application of statute of limitation would bar the refiled actions.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) advisory committee’s note (1993).” Coates, 914 F.Supp. at 113 (emphasis added). Hence a number of courts have applied Rule 4(m) in those circumstances extending the time for service without requiring “good cause”. “In certain cases, extension of time for service is warranted because the Plaintiff’s claims would otherwise automatically be barred by application of the statute of limitations.*** The absence of a limitations issue does not, of course, preclude the extension given the other considerations discussed.” Yongo,* 29 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., id., Lane, Tracy and Fultz. Indeed, in Tracy, the Western District of Virginia vacated a prior dismissal order, reinstated the case on the docket and then extended the time for service with no “due diligence” or other “good cause”. Continue reading "
Recently, wrongful deaths were reduced by almost 50% and untoward personal injuries were reduced by over 35% by a 19-item non-cardiac surgical safety checklist. The New England Journal of Medicine reported this on January 29, 2009, by article, “A Surgical Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbility and Mortality in a Global Population.”
During October 2007-September 2008, roughly 4,000 patients in 8 urban hospitals worldwide participated in the World Health Organization’s Safe Surgery Saves Lives program. The study findings proved its premised, thereby indicating prevalent medical malpractice: “Surgical complications are common and often preventable.”
The checklist principally consists of verifying patient identity, allergies and blood type; surgical site, procedure, and critical events; and access to blood, imaging, and certain instrumentalities. Verification occurs before anesthesia induction, before skin incision, and before leaving the operating room.
The implication is that many wrongful deaths and personal injuries are caused by medical malpractice in non-cardiac surgery due to healthcare providers neglecting simple routine verification procedures. Fortunately, these serious untoward consequences are readily avoidable. Posted by Avery T. "Sandy" Waterman, Jr., Esq. | Permalink | Email This Post
The standard of review by a District Judge for a nondispositive motion decided by a Magistrate is whether the decision is “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law”. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A). In Webb v. Stevens, No. 5:05-CV-33-BO(1) Order (E.D.N.C. May 22, 2008), a §1983 civil rights wrongful death suit, the Judge summarily affirmed under that standard an appeal from a grant of leave to amend by the Magistrate.
“A motion to amend is generally considered a nondispositive pretrial motion, subject to Rule 72(a) standard of review.” Young v. James, 168 F.R.D. 24, 26 (E.D. Va. 1996). In Young, the amendment sought to rename one of the plaintiffs, destroying the court’s jurisdiction over the cause; and defendants opposed, claiming bad faith, prejudice and futility. The District Judge followed the liberal amendment mandate of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a) and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), and affirmed the analysis and holding of the Magistrate in Young as not “clearly erroneous or contrary to the law”. Id. at 27-28.
The Magistrate is “clearly erroneous” only if “the reviewing court…is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). This “clearly erroneous and contrary to law” standard has been followed by North Carolina and other sister Fourth Circuit courts in affirming Magistrates. E.g., Neuberger Berman Real Estate Income Fund, Inc. v. Lola Brown Trust Co., 1B, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11358, *5 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2006). Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd., 230 F.R.D. 438, 447-448 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
Under the applicable standard of review, a District Judge substituting his personal decision-making or that of a “reasonable person” on de novo review is reversible error. “Since it does not appear that Judge Spiegel applied the clearly erroneous standard, the case is remanded for consideration under that standard. It seems that Judge Spiegel weighed the evidence de novo and decided that a reasonable person could conclude that there was a coverup. Whether a reasonable person could find evidence of a coverup that may support a finding of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is irrelevant for the purposes of Judge Spiegel’s decision. What is relevant for Judge Spiegel to consider is whether the Magistrate Judge was clearly erroneous when he found that no crime-fraud exception could be found. Therefore, we remand this case to the district court for determination of whether the Magistrate Judge clearly erred in his rejection of crime-fraud exception.” Chesher v. Allen, 122 Fed. Appx. 184, 187-188 (6th Cir. 2005).
It is hornbook law that the Court cannot consider Exhib