Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/457/456/308025/
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 21:09:22
Document Index: 366289990

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 2201', '§ 5', '§ 138', '§ 291']

Hanover Township Federation of Teachers Local 1954(afl-cio), an Unincorporated Voluntary Association Ofteachers by Larry Kirgan and Irene Joyce, As Representativesof Said Association, and of All Teachers That Belong to Saidfederation, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Hanover Community School Corporation et al., Defendants-appellees, 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) :: Justia
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Hanover Township Federation of Teachers Local 1954(afl-cio), an Unincorporated Voluntary Association Ofteachers by Larry Kirgan and Irene Joyce, As Representativesof Said Association, and of All Teachers That Belong to Saidfederation, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Hanover Community School Corporation et al., Defendants-appellees, 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972)
Jan. 12, 1972. Rehearing Denied March 14, 1972
Appellants, a teachers' union and 22 of its members, contend that a local school board's unfair labor practices are proscribed by the Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4). The district court found merit in some, but not all, of their contentions. They appealed from two orders entered on August 3 and August 14, 1970, 318 F. Supp. 757, which dismissed their claims but ordered reinstatement of nine other teachers (who were plaintiffs in the court below) and enjoined defendants1 from discriminating against members of appellant's union.
The First Amendment protects the right to advocate, either individually or through an association, and also the association's right to engage in advocacy on behalf of its members. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405; Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464. A State may not invade that constitutional protection either by a general advance prohibition against certain forms of advocacy, N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, supra, or by attempting to punish the expression of views that it opposes. E. g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125. See also Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98-103, 68 S. Ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. 562 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). A public employee is protected against discharge in retaliation against the exercise of his constitutional rights, such as his right to speak freely on issues of public importance, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-575, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, his rights of association, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting at 496, 81 S. Ct. at 256, or his right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about matters unrelated to the performance of his official duties, Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284, 88 S. Ct. 1917, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1089.
With this background, and with cases in the non-public employee category upholding free speech and related rights in connection with labor matters,4 the courts, as the court below did in this action with respect to the nine teachers ordered reinstated, have accepted a general proposition that public employees cannot be discharged for engaging in "union activities." Thus, if there is a discharge because of union membership, the general constitutional right of free association, as recognized in N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231,5 and the free speech right recognized in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, are correctly applied to invalidate the discharge, since there is no reason to distinguish a union from any other association.6
Thus, the economic activities of a group of persons (whether representing labor8 or management9 ) who associate together to achieve a common purpose are not protected by the First Amendment. Such activities may be either prohibited or protected as a matter of legislative policy. Thus, some private employers may agree to fix prices10 and others may not11 ; their employees' collective economic acivities are affirmatively protected by statutes which do much more than preserve their right to speak and to advocate.12
Appellants have argued that the tendered contracts do not guarantee that they will receive the same extracurricular assignments as in the past. The absence of such a guarantee does not establish that any of the appellants will, in fact, be denied any opportunities to which they are entitled, or which they may reasonably anticipate, or that they will be treated any differently than non-union teachers. Specific protection against the possibility of future retaliatory action is afforded by the provision in the district court order which prohibits defendants from discriminating against any member of the union. We therefore, agree with Judge Beamer's conclusion that the specific allegations made by the 22 individual appellants in their Third Amended Complaint did not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4).
The major portion of appellants' brief in this court is directed against the district court's holding that the union did not have standing to participate in this litigation. Unquestionably, as the union argues, there are situations in which an association is the proper party to vindicate the constitutional rights of its membership as well as its own rights. N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405. We may assume that this litigation might have taken, or in future proceedings might take, a turn requiring participation by the union as a formal party. In the present posture of the case, however, the issue has no real significance.
Appellants have also argued that the district court should have entered a declaratory judgment establishing a teacher's right to a hearing before the school board prior to termination of employment. The applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, confers jurisdiction to enter such a judgment only "in a case of actual controversy." As we view the rights of the parties in this case, their argument is a request for an advisory opinion rather than a declaratory judgment. There is no teacher or former teacher before the court who was not either reinstated or offered a new contract.15 We find nothing in the record before us to indicate that the board refused to renew the contract of any teacher who is not a party to the case.16 In substance, appellants therefore are merely requesting us to provide them with guidance for the future rather than to resolve a pending or threatened controversy between adverse parties. We have no power to render such advice;17 in any event, more authoritative guidance on that issue is anticipated. See Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted 404 U.S. 909, 92 S. Ct. 227, 30 L. Ed. 2d 181.18
See, e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-103, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423
"Such interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the disclosure [of associational membership] must be made-those who any year can terminate the teacher's employment without bringing charges, without notice, without a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain." 364 U.S. at 486, 81 S. Ct. at 251.
"It is possible of course that at some future time plaintiffs may engage in union-related conduct justifying their dismissal." Id. at 289. The Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 77 S. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347, upheld a state's right to prohibit peaceful picketing the purpose of which was to coerce an employer to put pressure on his employees to join a union, in contravention of a public policy of the state that employees should have a free choice in making their decision. In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834, a union sought to organize peddlers by picketing a wholesaler to induce the wholesaler not to sell to nonunion peddlers. The state courts, finding that such an agreement would constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the state antitrust laws, enjoined the picketing. The Supreme Court affirmed unanimously.
"And it is clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. . . . They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade." 336 U.S. at 503, 69 S. Ct. at 691.
"But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses." 323 U.S. at 543-544, 65 S. Ct. at 329. (Emphasis added.)
See, e. g., such landmark antitrust cases as United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377, 71 L. Ed. 700; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007
See, e. g., 49 U.S.C. § 5b (common carriers may execute agreements on rates and other items, subject to ICC approval); 49 U.S.C. § 138 (airlines may make pooling and other agreements subject to C.A.B. approval); 7 U.S.C. § 291 (agricultural co-operatives)
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L. Ed. 436; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246. See also Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, Inc., 323 U.S. 316, 324, 65 S. Ct. 298, 89 L. Ed. 264