Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20051102_0001406.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 00:29:05
Document Index: 26831387

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2301', '§ 2302', '§ 2329', '§ 2330', '§ 2331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Reichley v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Agriculture
GALEN REICHLEY, T/D/B/A REICHLEY BROTHERS FARM; ALLEN REICHLEY, T/D/B/A REICHLEY BROTHERS FARM; CURTIS STROUPv.PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; PENN AG INDUSTRIES; LONGENECKER'S HATCHERY, INC.; KREAMER FEED, INC.; DENNIS C. WOLFF; SAMUEL E. HAYES, AS SECRETARY OF THE PA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE GALEN REICHLEY, ALLEN REICHLEY T/D/B/A/ REICHLEY BROTHERS FARM AND CURTIS STROUP, APPELLANTS
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania District No. 03-cv-00009 District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir.
Before: Sloviter, McKee, Circuit Judges, and Fullam, District Judge*fn1
A. Statutory and Regulatory Underpinnings
In enacting Pennsylvania's Domestic Animal Law (Act of July 11, 1996, P.L. 561. No. 100, as amended), 3 Pa. CS. §§ 2301-2389, Pennsylvania's General Assembly declared animal health to be of major economic interest in Pennsylvania, and it proclaimed that "it is the . . . policy of the Commonwealth to assure the health and welfare of animals kept in captivity, to prevent and control diseases and dangerous substances that may threaten the safety of animals and humans, and to provide for desirable management practices for the production . . . of domestic animals." 3 Pa.C.S. § 2302.*fn2 The Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (the "PDA"), and more specifically, the Secretary of Agriculture, has authority to implement that policy.
Accordingly, the PDA has the power under the Domestic Animal Law to quarantine animals it reasonably suspects have been exposed to a dangerous, transmittable disease. 3 Pa.C.S. § 2329 (a). The PDA also has the authority to, "condemn and seize or cause to be destroyed, any quarantined domestic animal . . . that has been determined by the Department as having been exposed to a dangerous transmittable disease or hazardous substance such that destruction of the domestic animal. . . is necessary to prevent the spread of such disease or contamination." 3 Pa.C.S. § 2330.
As the District Court explained, "Avian influenza is caused by a type A virus with symptoms that . . . vary from a mild disease with little or no mortality to a highly fatal disease depending on various factors." App. at 9. The viruses are classified into "low pathogenic and highly pathogenic forms based on the severity of the illnesses they cause. Although both demonstrate differing clinical signs in affected birds, both forms . . . are highly contagious and have a potentially devastating effect on the poultry industry[,]" id., due to the viruses' ability to rapidly spread from flock to flock. App. at 1331
[T]here were about seven and a half million birds lost. The infection went to high path avian influenza and indemnities paid during that period . . . were close to $63 million, and I guess the total cost to the industry was like $84 million. . . . [I]n other words, it was a very big outbreak.
App. at 1273. He characterized the 1983 outbreak as "catastrophic." Id. Although he did not know for a fact that the outbreak began as a "low path" outbreak that mutated to a "high path" one, he stated, "that has happened in many of the outbreaks around the world. . . and it is always the biggest fear. . . ". Id.
According to a report of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, avian influenza occurs naturally in the intestines of wild birds, and it can be highly contagious and potentially fatal in domesticated animals such as chickens, ducks, and turkeys. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Information about Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/pdf/avianflufacts.pdf.*fn3 Although the virus does not usually infect humans, it has that potential and does infect humans occasionally.
In order to control the spread of diseases such as avian influenza, the PDA sometimes finds it necessary to "depopulate" diseased poultry.*fn4 Owners of flocks that the PDA orders depopulated under the Domestic Animal Law are entitled to compensation pursuant to that statute. 3 Pa.C.S. § 2331. Owners of flocks can also be compensated for agreeing to depopulate suspicious flocks in the absence of a formal order from the PDA if there is evidence that the virus is present. This is known as "friendly condemnation." App. at 1273.
[tested] [p]ositive for any test on surveillance, or
[was] sero-positive . . . or
The quarantine would be removed if further testing confirmed that the virus had run its natural course, or if additional testing established that the flock was not actually infected despite preliminary indications to the contrary. Id.Additional testing of the contaminated flock to confirm a preliminary indication of avian influenza began only after a four week period, and in large flocks of over 300 birds testing could last several weeks. In the meantime, of course, the owners could not sell the suspicious flock or ship any birds from that flock.
In combating communicable diseases such as avian influenza, the PDA works closely with "stakeholders" in the affected industry "to ensure that the industry will cooperate with the Department to stop the spread of the disease." App. at 1332.*fn5 This communication and coordination with affected individuals "serves to alert the poultry industry that a threatening virus is prevalent in the Commonwealth; and it encourages biosecurity." Id. Dr. Enck testified without contradiction at his deposition that "without industry support, there's no way you can control an infection." App. at 1274. Accordingly, the PDA seeks and requests "logistical support" in imposing quarantines and ordering depopulation. Id. The PDA thus solicits the opinion of stakeholders when combating an outbreak such as avian influenza, however, Dr. Enck, as the Commonwealth's veterinarian makes the "final decision."*fn6
C. The Reichley Brothers Farm, and the 2001 Outbreak
Appellants Galen and Allen Reichley, doing business as "Reichley Brothers Farm," produce poultry (particularly chicken broilers) for human consumption. Reichley Brothers Farm acquires much of the poultry it sells by contracting with various poultry farmers who are in the business of raising poultry for sale. Reichley Brothers also sells poultry for distribution via the New York Live Bird Market ("NYLBM") through distributors such as Anthony Campanelli.*fn7
Penn Ag Industries is a trade association that includes farmers and growers involved in the poultry business.*fn8
1. The Rakered Flock
Deanna Rackered was a poultry grower who raised poultry under contract with Reichley Farms. On December 19, 2001, the day after Galen Reichley attended the Penn Ag Industries meeting and learned that the owner of a quarantined duck flock in Ephrata was refusing to voluntarily depopulate his flock, a report from one of the samples taken from the Reichley flock showed that flock was "suspicious for Avian Influenza virus . . . ."*fn9 App. at 1350.
Nevertheless, the members of Penn Ag Industries who attended were quite concerned about the potential for an outbreak in that flock because it shared a common caretaker with Stroup 1. Thus, the members at the meeting thought that there was a significant risk that the supposed infection from Stroup 1 would eventually spread to Stroup 2. App. at 1516. Accordingly, a roll call vote was taken, and those in attendance decided to purchase Stroup 2 and then destroy it.*fn10 Galen Reichley and Dr. Enck were both present at this meeting. Reichley once again did not object because he felt "backed into a corner." Accordingly, Reichley Farm sold the flock to Penn Ag Industries for the statutorily defined level of compensation. The flock was thereafter destroyed on January 11, 2001.
Thereafter, Reichley Brothers and Curtis Stroup initiated the instant litigation in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In their amended complaint they alleged that the PDA improperly delegated its authority under the Domestic Animal Law to Penn Ag Industries and that Penn Ag Industries therefore acted under color of state law to unconstitutionally deprive them of their property. Amended Compl. ¶153-56. The plaintiffs also charged Dennis C. Wolfe, the Secretary of Agriculture of Pennsylvania, in his official capacity. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of procedural and substantive due process and sought prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiffs had initially named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Samuel Hayes, former Secretary of Agriculture, as defendants. However, the District Court dismissed the Commonwealth pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. The court also dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Hayes, concluding that they were either barred by the Eleventh Amendment or that he enjoyed qualified immunity.*fn11
Thereafter, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dennis C. Wolff and Penn Ag Industries, and this appeal followed.
Our review of a District Court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002). In reviewing the grant of summary judgement we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants and affirm only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact so that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 247.
Accordingly, there can be no cause of action under § 1983 absent violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The defendant must also act under color of official authority. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Penn Ag Industries Did Not Act Under Color of Law
Here, even assuming that appellants could somehow establish an unconstitutional taking, the record would still not establish that Penn Ag Industries acted under color of state law. It is undisputed that Reichley Brothers received no written order from the Department of Agriculture directing condemnation of its flocks, nor is there any evidence that the PDA somehow instructed Penn Ag Industries to purchase Stroup 2, or that it instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to impose a quarantine. Rather, the heart of appellants' attempt to find state action lies in their allegation that the challenged actions "were done with the full knowledge and complicity of representatives of the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture . . .". Appellants' Br. at 7. Appellants also claim that the PDA delegated authority to Penn Ag Industries in lieu of establishing adequate protocols to address an outbreak of avian influenza. As we noted earlier, the Commonwealth does have certain protocols in place for when a potential outbreak of avian influenza arises; however, those protocols did not include procedures for determining when to lift a quarantine, or how to expeditiously respond when preliminary test results are subsequently shown to be incorrect or "false positives."*fn12
Appellants' 1983 claim therefore rests upon their contention that the state delegated those governmental decisions to Penn Ag Industries and thereby transformed the actions of that private trade association into the actions of the state for purposes of § 1983. See Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals only against government action, unless the state has delegated authority to a private party, thereby making the actor a state actor and implicating the Due Process Clause). However, the District Court correctly determined that the record belies appellants' attempts to weave state action from the thread of industry involvement and cooperation with the Commonwealth's efforts to contain and combat this highly infectious disease.
Dr. Enck stated during his deposition, "[w]hatever [Penn Ag Industries] decides, it still winds up that PDA is the end voice that says 'yes, this is what we are going to do.'" App. at 1270. That statement is consistent with the other evidence on this record despite appellants' contentions.
Appellants' claim of a constitutional deprivation is further undermined by the fact that Galen Reichley consented to the challenged actions here. Notwithstanding hyperbolic pronouncements that the consent was the product of a "mob atmosphere" and coercion,*fn13 Galen Reichley clearly knew about the situation involving the Ephrata duck flock. That situation demonstrated that, absent official action by the PDA, Penn Ag Industries could do nothing without the owner's consent. This only confirms that it is the Secretary of Agriculture acting on behalf of the Commonwealth that has the authority to depopulate a flock unless the owner agrees; just as Dr. Enck testified.
Reichley admitted that he never asked "what will happen if I don't put my birds down," app. at 1660, and a reasonable fact finder could only conclude that he, in fact, knew the answer to that question, despite his assertions to the contrary. It is clear that appellants had a viable option and that they knew as much. Moreover, even assuming that the pressure at the meetings of Penn Ag Industries was so great that it somehow negated Reichley's consent, there would still be precious little on this record, other than appellants' allegations, to establish that Penn Ag Industries was a state actor. That is clearly not enough to withstand summary judgment.*fn14 See Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1998) ("something more than . . . naked allegations [are] required at the summary judgment stage.").
Appellants devote a substantial part of their brief to arguing that the District Court erred in relying upon the Declaration of Samuel Hayes, the former Secretary of Agriculture. Appellants' Br. at 42 to 46. Appellants did not originally depose Hayes because he was not a defendant during the initial discovery. It was not until the amended complaint was filed that Hayes and Wolff were included in this action. Appellants' Br. at 42. In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the District Court stated that it, "expressly eschew[ed] reliance upon the Declaration of Samuel Hayes, Jr.
This does not prejudice appellants' claim in any way." Nevertheless, the District Court at times quoted verbatim from portions of Hayes' Declaration. However, any error in doing so was harmless because, even absent Hayes' declaration, it is clear that the PDA did not delegate its authority to Penn Ag Industries, the private trade association was not a state actor, and that appellants agreed to the actions they now challenge.
D. The Due Process Claim
Appellants' due process claim fares no better. A procedural due process claim requires us to consider three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk that the plaintiff will suffer an erroneous deprivation through the procedure used and the probable value if any of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest. Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Id. at 334. It is not disputed that avian influenza endangers the health of poultry sold for human consumption, or that it threatens public health. Nor can it be seriously contended that an outbreak does not require prompt action that includes quarantining suspected flocks to prevent further contamination. To the extent that appellants are insisting upon notice and an opportunity for a hearing before depopulation, the District Court readily and correctly rejected that claim. Due process does not require pre-deprivation notice and hearing where there is an adequate scheme to compensate the property owner for the deprivation.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)); see also Zinermon v. Birch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990).*fn15
We noted at the outset that appellants also mention a substantive due process claim in their brief. It is not at all apparent that this brief mention is sufficient to raise the issue, nor is it apparent that appellants seriously intended to press that claim. Nevertheless, assuming that appellants are adequately raising a substantive due process claim, it can quickly be disposed of. In United Artists Theater v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2002) we explained:
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court explained the standard that applies when a plaintiff alleges that an action taken by an executive branch official violated substantive due process. The Court observed that the core of the concept of due process is protection against arbitrary action and that only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.