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Timestamp: 2020-02-17 10:25:46
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Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\t32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\n32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art.\t32', 'Art. 265', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 13', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32']

PIONEER TRADERS & ORS versus CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS PONDICHERRY
1963 AIR 734	1963 SCR Supl. (1) 349
PIONEER TRADERS & ORS V. CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS PONDICHERRY [1962] RD-SC 272 (27 September 1962)
27/09/1962 WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION: 1963 AIR 734	1963 SCR Supl. (1) 349
French	Establishments--Administrative	integration	with India-Confiscation of	goods imported	and imposition of penalty	in the alternative--Petition	in enforcement of fundamental rights-Maintainability--Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (f), 32-French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order , 1954, S.	R. O. 3315, para 6-Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878), s.	67 (8)-Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 (18 of 1947), s. 3 (2).
The petitioners, on patentes issued to them by	the French Administration,	imported goods to Pondicherry after	its administration had been taken over by the Union of India on November 1, 1954. They had placed orders for the imports in England	before	August 15, 1954, after acquiring foreign exchange by modes approved by the French Administration.
Before	the goods arrived in Pondicherry, the Government of India had issued S. R. O. 3315 under s. 4 of	the Foreign jurisdiction Act, 1947. By	this notification the	Sea Customs	Act, 1878, the Imports and Exports (Control)	Act, 1947, and various other Acts mentioned in the schedule	were extended to French Establishments. By a press communique issued	by the Government of India, French license-holders were asked to apply to the Controller of Imports and Exports for validation	of their licences before the	shipping of goods.	As it	was too late for the petitioners to	stop shipment, they applied to the Controller for the validation of their authorisation but this was refused and the goods arrived after November 1, 1954. The Collector	confiscated them under s. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with s. 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947,	and imposed penalties in the alternative for clearing them.	The petitioners preferred	appeals	to the Central Board of Revenue	on the basis of para 6 of S. R. O. 3315 but	the Board	dismissed the	appeals	reducing the	penalties.
Revision petitions made to the Government of India were also rejected. Relying on the decision of this Court in Messrs Universal Imports Agency v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports that para 6 of S. R. O. 3315 had the effect of protecting the imports 350 made in similar circumstances such as in the present cases, the petitioners came up to this Court under Art. 32 of	the Constitution for enforcement of their	fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f). A preliminary objection to	the maintainability of the writ petitions was taken on behalf of the Union of India on basis of the decision of this Court in Smt. Ujjambai v. The State of Uttar Pradesh.
Held (per Sinha, C. J., Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ.), that the decision of this Court in Ujjambai's	case applied and the petitions under Art. 32 must	fail.	The questions that	were raised in Ujjambai's case	not having been raised in the case of Messrs Universal Imports Agency this Court had no occasion to consider in the	latter	case whether	the quasi-judicial authority	in that case	had jurisdiction to decide the matter. The petitioners could not, therefore, get out of the decision in Ujjambai's	case on the ground that the tax authorities in the present cases had no inherent jurisdiction to do so.
The observations of Das, J., and Kapurj., in Ujjambai's case with regard to Messrs Universal Agency's case must be	held to be per incuriam.
Smt. Ujjambai	v. The State of Uttar	Pradesh, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, explained and applied.
Kailash	Nath v. State of U. P., A. 1. R. (1957) S. C.	790, referred to.
Paragraph 6 of S. R. O. 3315, properly construed, must be deemed	to have been inserted in each one of the Acts	men- tioned	in the Schedule and in the Sea Customs Act to	have taken the place of original s. 2 of that Act.	There	was therefore no scope for the contention that Ujjambai's	case had no	application inasmuch as no misconstruction of	any provisions of the Sea Customs Act was involved.
Held, further,	that the order of a Customs authority imposing confiscation and penalty under s. 167 (8) of	the Sea Customs Act, 1878, was a quasi-judicial order and	the Customs	authorities had the duty to	act judicially in deciding questions of confiscation and penalty.
Per Das Gupta, J.--If the importations in the present cases were made on the basis of contracts concluded before 351 November 1. 1954, the Sea Customs	Act would have no application because of para	6 of	S. R.	O. 3315 as construed by this Court in M/s Universal Agency's me and the customs authorities who derived their jurisdiction	from that Act would have no jurisdiction to make the orders	they did, and so the present petitions under Art.	32 of	the Constitution would be maintainable.
Where a judicial or quasi-judicial authority had in law no jurisdiction, the omission of the party to canvass that question before the authority could	not also give it jurisdiction.
N. C.	Chatterjee,	R. Ganapathy	Iyer,	and	G.
Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioners.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, B. R.	L.
Iyengar and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
1962.	September 27.	The judgment	of Sinha, C.	J., Gajendragadkar,	Wanchoo and Shah, JJ., was delivered by Wanchoo, J., Das Gupta, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
WANCHOO, J.-These twenty-nine petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution raise common questions and will be dealt	with together. They have been filed by two firms who obtained patentes to carry on business in Pondicherry in September, 1954, for the first time. As the facts in all the petitions are similar, we shall only give the	facts generally to understand the questions raised before us. The two firms, 352 it may	be mentioned, did not carry on any	business in Pondicherry before September, 1954, when they got a patente each and the proprietor of one of them is a resident of	New Delhi while the proprietor of the other is a	resident of Bombay.
The administration of Pondicherry was taken over by	the Union	of India from	November 1, 1954. Before	that Pondicherry was under the administration of the Government of France and was a free port.	Import into Pondicherry	was thus not subject to any restriction, except with regard to certain	goods	with which we are not	concerned. in	the present	petitions. Any merchant desiring to carry on business in the territory of Pondicherry had	however to obtain a patente before he could do so.	These patentes were of five kinds one of which was a patente authorising	the trader	to carry on the business of import of	goods other than those which were under	restriction.	Though	the importers were entitled by virtue of the patente to import goods subject to certain restrictions, this right could only be exercised by securing foreign exchange which was subject to certain limitations and was controlled by the Department of Economic Affairs at Pondicherry. There were two ways in which foreign exchange could be acquired, namely, (i) at the official rate through the Department of Economic Affairs, or (ii) in the open market at such rate as might be available;
and both these ways were considered valid before November 1, 1954.	Further	there	used to be authorisations for	the purpose of import and the authorisations indicated the limit within	which foreign exchange could be acquired either at the official rate or through the open market.
The petitioners' case	is that though	the patentes	were secured	in September, 1954, orders for import	were placed before August 15, 1954.	Thereafter after authorisations had been obtained from the French authorities, foreign exchange was acquired in the open market for the purpose of financing the 353 import.	There were in all twenty-nine transactions by	the two firms, which are the subject-matter of these petitions;
and in certain cases advances were paid, the balance being payable	by means of bills of exchange drawn on 'documents against payment" basis. But though the orders were placed before	August 15, 1954, and necessary foreign exchange	had also been secured in the open market later, shipments could not be made because of an unexpected dock strike in England and on the Continent and also for want of shipping space, and therefore most of the consignments on the basis of	the twenty-nine orders were shipped after November 1, 1954,	and only three consignments out of twenty-nine could be shipped in October, 1954, that is, before the administration of Pondicherry was taken over by the Government of India.	The goods in all	these cases arrived at Pondicherry after November 1, 1954. In the meantime, the administration of Pondicherry was taken over by the Government of India	from November 1, 1954, in pursuance of an agreement between	the Government of India and the Government of France, and	two notifications were issued by	the Government of India, namely,	S. R. O.s. Nos. 3314 and 3315.	By S. R. O. 3315, which was made under s,4 of the Foreign jurisdiction Act, No XLVII of 1947, the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Reserve	Bank of India Act, 1934, the Imports and Exports (Control)	Act, 1947, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and	the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, were extended to Pondicherry.	This S.R.O. contained a saving clause which laid down that-- "'Unless	otherwise specially provided in	the schedule,	all laws in force in	the French Establishments	immediately before	the commencement of this Order., which correspond to the enactments specified in the Schedule, shall cease to have effect, save as respects things done or omitted to be done before	such commencement." 354 As a consequence of these two S. R. O.s. a press communique was issued by the Government of India on November 1, 1954, explaining the effect of these notifications, in which it was stated that imports into and exports from	the French Establishments	would be regulated in accordance with	the provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947.
It was further stated that as regards orders placed outside the Establishments and finalized through grant of a licence by competent French authorities in accordance with the	laws and regulations in force prior to November 1, 1954, licence- holders	were advised to apply to the Controller of Imports and Exports for validation of licences held by them.
Licence-holders	were further advised not to	arrange	for shipment of goods until the licences held by them had	been validated by the Controller of Imports and Exports. In view of this press communique, the petitioners tried to	stop shipment until the authorisations held by	them	were validated by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Pondicherry. But their suppliers told them that this could not be done,, as the goods were in the course	of shipment and it was too late to stop the shipment. The	petitioners then applied for validation of the authorisations, but	the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Pondicherry refused to validate them. The petitioners'	case is that	this refusal	was arbitrary.	Eventually, when the goods arrived at Pondicherry	after	November 1, 1954, the	petitioners approached the Collector of Customs at Pondicherry to permit clearance of the goods.	They were not, however, allowed to clear them, and notices were issued to them to	show cause why the goods should not be forfeited on the ground that the import	had been made in contravention of the	Imports	and Exports	(Control) Act, 1947 and the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
The petitioners thereupon showed cause and their case	was that orders had been placed before August 15, 1954, and	the imports had been made strictly in accordance with the law in force in, 355 Pondicherry before November 1, 1954, and therefore could not be said to be unauthorised.	The Collector	of Customs however	refused to accept this explanation	and ordered confiscation of the goods, and in the	alternative imposed penalties for clearing them. These penalties	amounted to over Rs. 64,000/- in the case of one of the firms and	over Rs. 96,000/- in the case of the other firm, There were	then appeals	by the petitioners before the Central Board of Revenue	against the orders imposing	penalties. These appeals	were dismissed, though the penalty was	reduced to over Rs.35,000/- in the case of one firm and Rs. 60,000/- in the case of other firm. The	petitioners then went in revision to the Government of India but their revisions were rejected on January	23, 1957. It	appears that	the petitioners paid the penalty though the date is not clear from the petitions and cleared the goods. The	petitioners were apparently satisfied with the orders passed against them for they	took no steps to go to Court after	the revisions had been dismissed by the Government of India in January, 1957, though they say that they have	been making representations	to the Government of India in	that behalf without any effect and that the last communication from	the Government of India was received by them in this connection in August, 1961.
In the	meantime, certain impotrers of Pondicherry filed petitions in this Court in 1959 challenging the order of confiscation and the alternative order imposing penalties on them by the Collector of Customs, Pondicherry, in somewhat similar	circumstances : (see	Messrs.	Universal Imports Agency v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1)).
Those petitions were decided on August 23, 1960 and	this Court held that in view of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315, already referred to, which saved the effect of all laws in force in the French	Establishments	immediately before	the commencement of the order even though those laws	were repealed by the order, with respect	to things done or omitted to be (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 305.
356 done before such commencement, the authorisations granted by the French authorities before November 1, 1954, for import were sufficient to protect the goods imported on the basis of those authorisations whether the exchange	was secured officially or from the open market, from the operation of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and other provisions to the same effect.	This view was taken on	the ground	that para. 6 saved "things done" before November 1, 1954 and as firm contracts had been entered into	and authorisations	granted before November 1,	1954,	the subsequent arrival of goods in Pondicherry after November 1, 1954,	as the	consequence of the contracts and	the authorisations	was a "thing done" under para. 6 of S.R.O.
3315.	It was held that the words "'things done" must be reasonably interpreted and if so interpreted they not	only meant things done but also the legal	consequence flowing therefrom. Consequently, it was held	that the imported goods in those cases were not liable to confiscation under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and similar provisions of any	other law, as firm contracts had been	made before November 1, 1954 and exchange had been arranged either officially or through the open marketin	full or in part under authorisations granted by the French Government and the subsequent import after	November 1, 1954 was a consequence of these things which had	been done before November 1, 1954 an was therefore protected by para. 6. In the result the penalty collected was ordered to be refunded.
This decision was given in August 1960, and it	seems	that after this decision, the petitioners wrote to the Government of India in September, 1960, for refund of penalties in their cases also; they were informed in February, 1961, that no refund could be made. The petitioners seem to	have written again to the Government of India in June, 1961,	and to this the Government of India gave a final reply in 357 August,	1961.	Thereafter the present writ petitions	were filed in October, 1961. The petitioners rely on	the decision of this Court in Messrs. Universal Imports Agency (1) and contend that they are entitled to refund of penalty as their cases are exactly similar to the case	of Messrs.
Universal Imports Agency. (1) They pray for a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing	the orders resulting in the imposition of penalty beginning with	the orders of the Collector of Customs. Pondicherry, and ending with those of the Government of India in revision and	also for a direction requiring the respondents to refund to	the petitioners the sum realised as penalty.
The petitions have been opposed on behalf of the Union of India on a number of grounds. It is however unnecessary for us to detail all the grounds raised on behalf of the Union of India in view of an objection that has been taken to	the maintainability of these petitions based on the decision of this Court in	Smt.	Ujjambai v. The State of Uttar Pradesh.(2) We shall therefore refer only to such parts of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India as will suffice to explain the preliminary objection raised on its behalf.
The Union's case is that the talks for the de facto transfer of the	French-Indian Establishments to the Government of India were resumed in August 1954, and that as a result of these talks, an agreement dated October 20, 1954, between the Government of India and the Government of France for the settlement of	the question of the future of	the French Establishments	in India was arrived at. Pursuant to	this agreement, the administration of the French Establishments (including Pondicherry) was transferred to the Government of India from November 1, 1954. In consequence, the Government of India promulgated two orders, namely, S. R. O's 3314	and 3315 on October 30, 1954, to come into force from November 1, 1954. The first of these orders was known as the (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 305.
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 770, 358 French	Establishments	(Administration) Order	while	the second	order	was known as	the French Establishments (Applications of laws) Order, 1954, by which the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and certain other Acts were made applicable to the	said settlements. Some persons, including the petitioners,	who had no business in Pondicherry from before mala fide	with intent to defeat the laws in force in the Indian Union which were legally to be extended to the French Establishments when their administration was taken over by the Government of India, managed to procure some colourable documents on the strength of which they claimed that they had placed firm orders	with foreign firms for import of goods	which	were restricted under the Indian Import Control	Regulations.
After the Government of India had applied S. R. O's 3314 and 3315 to the French Establishments and taken	over their administration from November 1, 1954, a press communique was issued	on November 1, 1954, that orders placed outside	the French	Establishments	and finalised through	a grant of licence	by the competent French authorities in accordance with the laws and regulations in force prior to November 1, 1954 should be got validated by the Controller	of Imports and Exports appointed for Pondicherry. Further,	the licence-holders were advised not to arrange for shipments of goods until the licences held by them were validated. Later on January 5, 1955, the Union of India issued another press communique in view of certain representations	received on the basis of Art. 17 of the Indo-French Agreement and	the public was informed that import of goods against open market transactions after November 1, 1954, would be	treated as unauthorised.	But having regard to the hardship likely to be caused to genuine importers who had placed orders in pursuance of their normal trading operations against which goods were in the normal course shipped by the suppliers prior-to the date of merger, the Collector of Customs, 359 Pondicherry was being authorised to accord certain concessions to genuine importers. One of these concession was that goods shipped before November 1, 1954, but ordered before	August	15, 1954, would be cleared without penalty irrespective of origin and value. The petitioners tried to take advantage	of this concession and therefore tried to show before the Collector of Customs, Pondicherry that	they had placed firm orders before August 15, 1954, though shipments could only be made in three cases before November 1, 1954, and were delayed in others because of dock strike in England and in Continental countries. This case	was scrutinised by the Collector of Customs and he pointed	out in his order that though the orders for these goods are said to have been placed before August 15, 1954, the two firms could only start functioning in Pondicherry from the month of September in which month they had obtained patent	for conducting business there legally.	The Collector	also pointed	out that in	the ordinary course of business, commitments were not made	without entering	into correspondence	with the suppliers regarding	the prices, terms of payment etc., but in these cases, the	petitioners produced no such correspondence. It was also found that the petitioners had not done any business of this kind even in the Indian Union before this. The Collector therefore	held that it had not been proved that the goods had in fact	been ordered before August 15, 1954, and therefore ordered their confiscation and imposed penalty in lieu thereof The appeals of the Petitioners to the Central Board of Revenue failed except	to the extent that the penalty	was reduced.	The Board's order was silent on the point whether the goods	had in fact been ordered before August 15, 1954. But the Board held that as the goods were imported without licence at a time when a licence was required for	their	import,	the appeal must fail. The petitioners then went in revision to the Government of India but failed there also.
360 The preliminary objection is	that the orders imposing penalty	are quasi-judicial orders passed by	a competent authority having jurisdiction under a taxing statute. It is not the case of the petitioners that the statute under which the orders had been made read with S.R.O. 3315 of 1954 is in any way ultra vires. The sole basis of these petitions is that para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 has been misconstrued by	the authorities concerned	and thus a penalty has	been levied which could not be levied if para. 6 had not	been misconstrued.	The petitioners therefore question	the validity of the order imposing penalty based	on a	mis- construction of para. 6 of S.R.O. 3315 of 1954 and this they cannot do by petition under Art. 32, whatever other remedies they might have against such an order, in view of	the decision of this Court in Ujjambai's case.(1) It	is therefore contended on behalf of the Union of	India	that these petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution are	not maintainable and should be dismissed on this ground alone.
In reply, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners	that Ujjambai's case.(1) does not apply in the circumstances of these petitions. It is not seriously	disputed that	the orders	imposing penalty were quasi-judicial orders; but it is urged that these orders were passed without	jurisdiction and infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 19 (1) (g), and would be liable to challenge by petition under Art. 32 and the actual decision in Ujjambai's case(1) will not be applicable.
It is	therefore necessary to consider the effect of	the decision in Ujjambai's case.(1) That case was heard by a Bench of seven learned judges of this Court, and the final decision was by a majority of five to two. The following two questions came up for decision in that case "1. Is	an order of assessment	made by an authority under a taxing statute which is (1) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.
361 intra vires, open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (g), on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act	or of a notification issued thereunder?
2. Can	the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of	the Constitution?" As was	pointed out by Das, J., in that case, the two questions were inter-connected and substantially related to one matter, namely, "is the validity of an order made	with jurisdiction under an Act which is intra vires and good	law in all respects, or	a notification properly issued thereunder, liable to be questioned in a petition under Art.
32 of	the Constitution on the sole ground that	the provisions of	the Act, or the terms of the	notification issued	thereunder, have been misconstrued?"	It was	not disputed in that case that where the statute or a provision thereof	is ultra vires, any action taken under	such ultra vires provision by a quasi-judicial authority which violates or threatens to violate a fundamental right does give	rise to a question of enforcement of that right and	a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution will lie. Further, it was not disputed that when the assessing authority sought to tax a transaction	the taxation of which came	within	the constitutional prohibition, the violation of	fundamental right must be taken to have been established and such cases were treated as on a par with those cases where	the provision itself was ultra vires. It was also not disputed that where the statute was intra vires but the action taken under it was without inherent jurisdiction, a petition under Art. 32 would lie. Finally, it was also not	disputed in that case that where the action taken is procedurally ultra vires, the case is assimilated to a case of an action taken without inherent jurisdiction and would be open to challenge by a petition under Art. 32, 362 The controversy was ""what is the position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law which is	admittedly intra vires ?" It was in	that connection where the authority has inherent jurisdiction to decide	the matter and the law under which it	proceeds is intra vires that the question arose whether the decision of such an authority could be challenged by a petition under Art. 32 on the sole	ground	that it was	based on a misconstruction of the provision of law or of	the notification properly	issued	thereunder. Five of	the learned	judges	composing the	Bench	answered both	the questions raised in that case in the negative. Das,	J., held as follows :- "'An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is	intra vires and in	the undoubted	exercise of	its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the	sole ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. Nor can the validity	'of such an	order be questioned in	a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution." Kapur, J., held as follows "'If the statute and its constitutionality is not challenged then every part of it is constitutionally	valid	including	the provisions authorising the levying of a	tax and the mode and procedure for assessment	and appeals etc. A determination of a question by a	Sales-Tax Officer acting	within	his jurisdiction must be equally valid and legal.
In such	a case, an erroneous construction, assuming	it is erroneous, is in respect of a matter which the statute has	given	the authority	complete jurisdiction	to decide.
The decision is therefore a	valid	act irrespective of its being erroneous, 363 An order	of assessment passed by a quasi- judicial	tribunal under a statute which is ultra vires cannot be	equated with	an assessment order passed by that tribunal under an intra vires statute even though erroneous.
The former being without authority of law is wholly unauthorised and has no existence in law and therefore the order is an infringement of fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1)	(f) and (g) and can be challenged under Art. 32.
Hidayatullah, J., held as follows:- "But where the law is made validly and in conformity with the fundamental rights and the officer enforcing it acts with jurisdiction, other considerations arise. If, in the course of his duties, he has to construe provisions of law and miscarries, it gives a right of appeal and revision, where such lie and	in other appropriate cases, resort can be had to the provisions of Arts. 226 and 227 of	the Constitution, and the matter brought before this Court by further	appeals. This	is because every erroneous decision "does	not give rise to a breach of fundamental rights.	Every right of appeal	or revision cannot be said to merge in the enforcement of fundamental rights. Such errors can only be corrected	by the processes of	appeals	and revisions. Art.	32 does not,	as already stated, confer an appellate or revisional jurisdiction on this Court, and if the law is valid and the decision with jurisdiction,	the protection of Art. 265 is 364 not destroyed. There is only one exception to this, and it lies within extremely narrow limits.	That exception also	bears	upon jurisdiction, where by a misconstruction	the State Officer or a quasi-judicial tribunal embarks upon an action wholly outside the pale of the law he is enforcing. if, in those circumstances.,	his action constitutes a breach of fundamental rights, then a petition under Art. 32 may lie." Mudholkar, J., summarised his conclusions as below:- The question of enforcement of a	fundamental right will arise if a tax is assessed under a law which is (a) void under Art. 13 or (b) is ultra vires the Constitution, or (c) where it is subordinate legislation, it is ultra vires the law under which it is made or inconsistent with any other law in force.
2. A similar question will also arise if the tax	is assessed and/or levied by an authority (a) other than the one empowered to do so under the taxing law or (b) in violation of the procedure prescribed by the law or (c)in colourable exercise of the powers conferred by the law.
3. No	fundamental right is breached	and consequently no question of enforcing a funda- mental right arises where a tax	is assessed and levied bona fled by a competent authority under a valid law by following the procedure laid down by that law, even though it be based upon an	erroneous construction	of the	law except when by reason of the	construction placed upon the law a tax is assessed	and levied which is beyond the competence of	the legislature or is violative of the provisions of Part III 365 or of any other provisions of the Constitu- tion.
4. A mere misconstruction of a provision of law does not render the decision of a quasi- judicial	tribunal void (as being	beyond	its jurisdiction). It is a good and valid deci- sion in law until and unless it is corrected in the appropriate manner. So long as	that decision stands, despite its being erroneous, it must be regarded as one authorised by	law and where, under such a decision a person is held liable top pay a tax that person cannot treat the decision as a nullity	and contend that "what is demanded of him is something which is not authorised by law. The position would be the same even though upon a proper construction, the law under which the decision was given did not authorise such a levy." Mudholkar, J., therefore, agreed with Das, J., and was of the view that the two questions must be answered in	the negative.
The other two learned judges, Subha Rao and Ayyangar,	JJ., took the contrary view. They were of the view	that there could be no valid distinction between an order passed by an authority without jurisdiction, in the sense that	the authority is not duly constituted under the Act or that it has inherent want of jurisdiction, and a wrong order passed by the authority on a misconstruction of the relevant provi- sions of the Act; in either case if the order affects a fundamental right it will be open to challenge by petition under Art. 32 on the ground that by a wrong construction, a fundamental right either under Art. 19 (1) (f) or under Art.
It will be seen from the above summary of the views of	the learned Judges who constituted the majority that, though the reasons given for coming to 366 their conclusion were	slightly different they were	all agreed	that where an order of assessment is made by an authority with jurisdiction under a taxing statute which is intra vires, it is not open to challenge as repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (g) on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction	of a	provision of	the Act or of a notification issued thereunder and the validity of such ail order cannot be questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, though it may be open to question such an order on appeal or in revision in case' the statute provides for that remedy or by a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 in appropriate cases.
The contention on behalf of the Union is that the orders in the present	case are orders of an authority	with jurisdiction acting quasi-judicially and even if they	are based on a misconstruction of para. 6 of S.R.O. 3315	they will not be open to challenge by petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, whatever other remedies the	petitioners might have against them. It is urged	that in principle there is no difference between an order of assessment under a taxing statute and an order of confiscation, with an alternative penalty, for both are orders of a quasi-judicial authority under a taxing statute which is intra vires;	and if orders are passed with jurisdiction in either case	they will not be open to challenge under Art. 32 on the	sole ground	that they are passed on a misconstruction of a provision of an Act or a notification issued thereunder.
It has	not been disputed that the order of a customs authority imposing confiscation and penalties under s.	167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act (No. 8 of 1878) is quasi-judicial and the customs authority has the duty to act judicially in deciding the question of confiscation and penalty: (see	Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent District Jail,	Amritsar(1).
367 would thus be	open to challenge and	in this connection reliance was placed on the observations of Kapur, J., in Ujjambai's case() in connection with the decision in	the case of Messrs. Universal Imports Agency.(2)	Kapur,	J., observed with	respect to this decision that "in any	case this is an instance	of want of jurisdiction to	tax transactions which the law excludes from the taxing powers of the	authority levying the tax", though he	pointed	out further that the question of the applicability of Art. 32 to quasi-judicial	determinations was not raised in that case.
With respect, it may be pointed out that as the question of the applicability of Art. 32	to quasi-judicial determi- nations was not raised at all in the case	of Messrs.
Universal Imports Agency(), the Court had no	occasion to consider the question whether the authority in that case had inherent jurisdiction to decide the matter. The majority judgment on which the petitioners	rely has nowhere considered the question whether the authority in that	case suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction when it decided to confiscate the goods imported and levy penalties in	the alternative.	All that the	learned	counsel for	the petitioners could draw our attention to was a sentence in the majority judgment to the following effect :
"We would, therefore, hold that paragraph 6 of the Order saves the transactions entered	into by the petitioners and that the	respondents had no right to confiscate their goods on	the ground that they were	imported without licence." It is urged that when the majority said that the authorities had no right to confiscate the goods, it was meant that they had no	inherent jurisdiction to do so. As we read	the majority judgment, however, we do not find any warrant	for coming	to the conclusion that it was decided in that	case that the authorities	in that case	had no inherent jurisdiction to confiscate the goods or impose penalties in lieu thereof.	It is true that it was said in the majority judgment that (1) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.
368 the respondents had no right to confiscate the goods	but that was because just before in that very sentence it	was held that para. 6 of the Order saved the transactions.
Therefore, when the majority in that case said that	the authorities had no right to confiscate the goods, all	that was meant was that the authorities had misconstrued para. 6 and so	confiscated the goods, but	that on a correct construction of para. 6 they could not do so.	It cannot therefore he said that the majority decision in that	case was based on lack of inherent jurisdiction. The petitioners therefore cannot get	out of the decision in Ujjambai's case(1)	on the ground that the authorities who	confiscated the goods and levied penalties in the alternative in	the present cases had no inherent jurisdiction to do so.
As we have just indicated, the decision of this Court in the case of Messrs. Universal Imports Agency(2) was not based on the ground that the appropriate authority who confiscated the goods lacked inherent jurisdiction to do so.	The decision, in substance, proceeded on the ground that in exercising the said	jurisdiction, the authority	had misconstrued S.R.O. 3315. The question as to whether a writ petition under Art. 32 can lie on that ground was not raised before the Court and has not been considered. Therefore, it seems to us, with respect, that the observation made by Kapur J. in the case of Ujjambai(1) that the decision in the case of Messrs. (universal Imports Agency(2)	affords an instance of want of jurisdiction to tax transactions which the law excludes from the taxing powers of the authority levying the tax, is not very accurate.	Similarly, it may be added that the inclusion of the said decision '~m the Est of judgments cited by ~Das, J., which, in his opinion, illustrated categories of cases where executive	authorities have acted without jurisdiction, is also not justified.
Since the point about the competence of the writ petition was not raised or considered in the case	of Messrs.
It is well known that after the decision of the Court in the case of Kailash Nath	v. State of U. P.,(1) some	writ petitions were entertained	on the	ground	that	the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 32 could	be invoked even if a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial authority	had misconstrued the law	under which it	purported to	act.
Having	regard to the decision of the Special Bench in	the case of Ujjambai(2), these precedents have now	lost their validity.
Then we come	to the question whether this is	a case of misconstruction	of a provision of the law which is intra vires by an authority acting under a taxing statute. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that	the taxing statute	in this case was the Sea a Customs Act and	the misconstruction, if any, would be of para. 6 of S. R. O.
3315. This in our opinion is not correct. The Sea Customs Act was applied to Pondicherry by S. R. O. 3315. This	S.R.
O. has six paragraphs.	The first paragraph gives the	name of the S. R. O. and the date from which it will come	into force.	The second paragraph	defines what	are "French Establishments"	to which the S. R. O. was applicable.	The third paragraph lays down that certain Acts mentioned in the Schedule which are twenty-two in number would apply to	the French	Establishments subject to certain conditions which are not material. Sub-paragraph (2) of para. 3 applies	all rules under the various enactments in the Sehedule to	the French Establishments.	Paragraph 4 lays down how references in any enactment, notification, rule, order or regulation applied	to the French Establishments have to be construed.
Paragraph 5 gives power to any Court, tribunal or authority required or	empowered to	enforce in	the French Establishments any enactment specified in the	schedule to construe enactment with such alterations, not affecting the (1) A. 1. R. (1957) S. C. 790.	(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.
6 which we have already set out. It will be seen therefore that S. R. O. 3315 applied the Sea Customs Act and certain other	Acts to the	French	Establishments, including Pondicherry, and para. 6 in particular is similar to a repealing and saving provision to be found in an Act which repeals	and reenacts	an earlier enactment.	It would therefore be not improper to read para. 6 as	if it	was incorporated in each one of the twenty-two Acts which	were extended to the French Establishments by S. R. O. 3315.	The construction therefore of para. 6 of the S. R. O. which must be deemed to have been inserted in each one of the	Acts mentioned in the Schedule would be a construction of the Sea Customs	Act itself. Original s. 2 in the Sea	Customs	Act provided for repeal of earlier enactments and	for saving, (though it no longer exists in the Act as it was repealed by the Repealing Act No. 1 of 1938). In	effect, therefore, para. 6 of the S. R. O. would take the place of original s.
2 of the Sea Customs Act. Therefore, an interpretation of para. 6 of the S. R. O. which must be deemed to have	been inserted in the Sea Customs Act in place of original s. 2 would be an interpretation of the Sea Customs Act. So	the contention that Ujjambai's case(1) does not apply, for there has been no misconstruction of any of the provisions of	the Sea Customs Act, has no force.	It may be added that it is not disputed in this case that the Collector of Customs	had inherent jurisdiction to deal with this matter and the	only attack	on his order aid on the subsequent orders passed in appeal	and revision is that they misconstrue the provision of para. 6 of the S. R. O.
Finally, it	is urged that	there	was in fact	no misconstruction of the provisions of para. 6 of S.R.O.	3315 in these cases and Ujjambai's case(1) will not apply to these petitions. Literally speaking, it masbe	correct to say that there was no actual miscoyn (1) [1963] 1 S. O. R. 778.
371 truction of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 in these cases by	the Collector of Customs.	What had happened was, as we	have already indicated, that the petitioners tried to bring their case before him within the terms of the press communique of January 5, 1955, by which certain concessions were extended to genuine importers.	They therefore tried to	prove	that they had placed firm orders before August 15, 1954, and	had also provided for foreign exchange to the extent necessary after receiving authorisations and that three of	the consignments had been shipped before the 1st	of November while the other twenty-six could not be shipped before	that date for reasons beyond their control.	The petitioners thus wanted	to take advantage of the concessions in the press communique. They do not seem to have	raised	before	the Collector of Customs the question that even if they had	not placed the orders before August 15, they would still be entitled to the benefit of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 if	they had placed the orders before November 1, 1954 and	had received authorisations from the French authorities before November 1, 1954, and had made arrangements to	the extent necessary for	foreign	exchange either through official channels or through open market. The Collector considered the case put forward by the petitioners namely, that	they had placed firm orders before August 15, 1954, and held, for reasons which we have already indicated, that that could not be true. The	Collector therefore refused to give the petitioners the benefit of the press communique. In	the circumstances the Collector could not proceed	further to consider that even if the orders were placed after August 15, the petitioners would be protected by para. 6 of S. R.
The Board in appeal however did not rest its	decision on this.	It held that as-the goods were actually imported after November 1, 1954, when	licence' restrictions	were actually in force, the goods would be liable to confiscation as imported,without licence.
372 This decision,	in effect, refused to give the	benefit of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 to the petitioners. and to	that extent the paragraph can by implication be said to have been misconstrued by the Board.
This matter can therefore be looked at in two ways. If it is held that the petitioners rested their case on only	the ground that they had placed the orders for import before August	15, 1954, and were thus entitled to the	benefit of the press communique, the finding of the Collector to	the effect	that he was not prepared to believe that case	for three reasons	given by him cannot be said to justify a prayer	for a writ because it is a finding of fact; and a writ cannot issue even if the said finding is erroneous.
If, there. fore, that was all that	was raised by	the petitioners before the authorities concerned, and	the authorities concerned have found against the petitioners on the main question of fact involved in their	contentions before	them, it cannot be said that the authorities	were wrong in the view they took for the reasons given by	them and there would therefore be no question of any interference under Art. 32.	Further, if a petition under Art. 32 is	not maintainable when a provision of law is misconstrued, it would be much less maintainable when there is a mistake of fact though as we have indicated already, it cannot be	said in this case that the Collector was wrong in his conclusion on the facts.
The petitioners' case, as put forward in, this Court, is that even if firm orders were not placed be. fore August 15, 1954, they were entitled to take advantage of the judgment of this Court in Messrs. Universal Imports Agency's(1)	case if they had placed orders after obtaining the	patentes in September and had received authorisations and had arranged for foreign exchange to the extent necessary before November 1, 1954. If this is the case of the petitioners now,	and they want to succeed on it, it must (1)[1961] 1 S. C. R. 305.
373 be held that	the Board by implication negatived it in appeal.	This	could only be done by a	misconstruction of para. 6 of S. R. O . 3315, for if that paragraph had	been rightly	construed, as	held by this	Court	in Messrs.
Universal Imports Agency's case, (1) the goods would	not have been confiscated.
Therefore the	position is this. If the petitioners	only raise the claim based on the press communique that they	had placed	firm orders before August 15, 1954, their claim	has been negatived on facts and we see no reason to differ	from the conclusion of the Collector on the facts. On the other hand, if the petitioners seem to have raised the case which they are now	raising before us on the basis	of Messrs.
Universal Imports Agency's case (1) before the	Board,	the Board must be deemed to have turned down that claim and that could only be on the basis of the misconstruction of para 6 of S.	R. O. 3315. The case, therefore, that	is now	put forward	on behalf of the petitioners before us would be absolutely analogous to the position in Ujjambai's case(2) In that case the assessing authority acting	with jurisdiction upon a. misconstruction of a statute which	was intra vires or a notification properly issued thereunder assessed the tax and it was held that such an assessment cannot	be impugned as repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (f) and	(g) on the sole ground that it was based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act and the validity of such an order cannot	be questioned in a petition under Art. 32. In	the present case, a similar quasi-judicial authority i. e.,	the Board acting judicially within its jurisdiction must be deemed	to have turned down by implication the contention raised	on the	basis of para 6 of S.R.O. 3315 by	the petitioners before it and this could only be done on	the misconstruction of that paragraph in view of the decision in Messrs.	Universal Imports	Aqency's case	(1).	The petitioners however cannot question the validity of those orders	by petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution,	for the Act under (1) [ 1661] 1 S, C. R. 305.
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R, 778 374 which the orders were passed read with S.R.O. 3315 is	not assailed as ultra, vires and the only ground on which it is said that a fundamental right has been violated	is that there has been by implication a	misconstruction of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 by the Board. In that view	the decision in Ujjambai's case (1) will apply with full force to the	present petitions. We therefore hold that	the validity. of the orders impugned cannot be questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petitions are hereby dismissed with costs-one set of hearing costs.
DASs GUPTA, J.--In sixteen petitions under Art. 32 of	the Constitution the petitioner, a merchant carrying on business under	the name and	style,	Messrs.	Eastern Overseas (Pondicherry), seeks relief against the orders by which	the Collector of Customs purporting to act under s. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act read with s. 3 (2) of the	Import	and Export	Control	Act, 1947 directed confiscation of goods which he had imported into Pondicherry, at the same	time giving	him option to pay in lieu of	confiscation, fines aggregating in all 16 cases to Rs. 96,400/-.	The appeals against	these- orders to the Central Board of Revenue	were unsuccessful except that the penalty of fine	payable	was reduced to a total sum of Rs. 60,235/-.	The petitioner then moved the Government of India for revision of these orders but the revision applications were rejected.
Shortly	stated, the petitioner's case is that in all	the sixteen cases he had concluded before November 1, 1954, firm contracts with foreign suppliers for supply of these goods by shipment to Pondicherry and it was on these contracts that the goods in question were imported by him. By	the date the goods reached Pondicherry, the Sea Customs Act	had become	applicable to Pondicherry as a result of an order made by the Government of India on October 30, 1954, the S..
R. O.	No. 3315. This order was made under s. 4 of	the Foreign Jurisdiction (1) [1963] 1.S. C. R. 778, 375 Act, 1947,in pursuance of the Indo-French Agreement under which the administration of Pondicherry was vested with	the Government of India from November 1, 1954. Paragraph 6 of that order however contained a saving clause. By reason of that the Sea Customs Act did not apply to the imports	made by him.	That paragraph is in these words :- "Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Schedule, all laws in force	in the	French	Establishments	immediately before	the commencement of the order, which correspond to enactments specified in the Schedule, shall cease to	have effect,	save as respect things done, or omitted to be	done before such commencement." It was held by this Court in Universal Imports Agency v. The Chief Controller of Imports & Exports (1) that	importations of goods into Pondicherry after November 1, 1954, would have the benefit of this saving clause, if the importation is in pursuance of a contract concluded prior to November 1, 1954.
The Court petitioner bases his case on the law as settled by this Court in the case mentioned above and contends that as the Sea Customs Act was not applicable to the	importations of the goods, in these sixteen cases, the importations being in pursuance of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954, the orders of confiscation of his property and the orders of penalty made upon him were illegal. There has thus been by these orders an invasion of the petitioner's	fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and for the protection of that right these petitions have been made.
The respondent contends that the basis of the	petitioner's case that the importations were in pursuance of a contract concluded before November 1, 1954, has not been established.
Apart from this defence on merits, a preliminary objection is raised at the hearing on the authority of the decision of this (1)..[1961] 1 S. C. R. 305, 376 Court in Smt.	Ujjam Bai v. The State of U.P.	() that a petition under Art. 32 does not lie. The argument is	that the order of confiscation and penalty has been made by an authority under a statute which is intra vires and in	the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction. The	validity of such an order cannot therefore be called in question in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution even though	the authority may have misconstrued the provisions of Para. 6 of S.R.O. 3315.
In resisting the preliminary objection, Mr. N.C. Chatterjee has argued on behalf of the petitioner that all these 16 cases are cases of a quasi-judicial authority acting without Jurisdiction and so, the decision in Ujjam Bai's Case	(1), far from creating any difficulty in the way of the issue of a writ, definitely helps the petitioner. It is not disputed that in deciding the preliminary objection the Court has to proceed on the basis that the petitioner's allegations about the importations having been made on the basis of contracts concluded before November 1,	1954,	are correct.	The necessary consequence of this fact it is argued, is that the Sea Customs Act would not	apply to these cases	of importations and consequently the Collector of Customs, an officer, who derives his jurisdiction from the Sea Customs Act, would have no jurisdiction to make any, order in respect of them. In my opinion, there is considerable force in the	argument and the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent should fail.
The majority decision	in Ujjam Bai's case (1) is clear authority for the proposition, that an order of confiscation or penalty made by an authority under a statutory provision which is intra vires cannot be questioned in	a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the ground that it	has been passed under a misconstruction of the provision of law, provided the order is made "'in the undoubted	exercise of its (1) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778, 377 jurisdiction."	Ujjam Bai's case also appears however to be equally	clear	authority for the proposition that "'if a quasi-judicial	authority acts without jurisdiction	or wrongly assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to a collateral fact and the resultant action threatens or violates a fundamental right the question of enforcement of that right arises and a petition under Art. 32	will lie." This proposition has been recently reiterated by a Bench of five judges of this Court in The State Trading	Corporation of India v. The State of Mysore (Writ Petitions Nos. 65	and 66 of 1960.) In that case also an objection was raised on the authority of Ujjam Bai's Case to the maintainability of writ petitions under	Art. 32 of	the Constitution'.
"It was however said that the petitions were incompetent in view of our decision in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1) in as much as the Taxing Officer under the Mysore	Acts had jurisdiction to decide whether particular sale was an inter-State sale or not and any error committed by them as a quasi-judicial	tribunals in exercise of such	jurisdiction did not offend any fundamental right.	But we	think	that case is clearly distinguishable. Das, J., there stated that "'if a quasi-judicial authority acts without jurisdiction or wrongly assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to a collateral fact and the resultant action threatens or violates a fundamental right, the question of enforcement of that right arises and a petition under Art. 32 will lie." He also said that where a statute is intra vires but the action taken is without jurisdiction, then a petition under Art. 32 would be competent. That is the case here. There is no dispute	that the taxing officer had no jurisdiction to	tax inter-State sales, there being a constitutional	prohibition against	a State taxing them.	He could not give himself jurisdiction to do so by deciding a collateral fact wrongly.
378 have done here., Therefore,	we think the	decision in Ujjambai's case is not applicable to the present case	and the petitions are fully competent." It is hardly necessary to cite any further authority for the proposition that an inferior tribunal cannot give to itself jurisdiction by deciding a collateral	fact wrongly.	I;
shall only refer to the decision in	Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee (1) where the matter was discussed in picturesque language thus :	"No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on	the question of the existence or extent of such	jurisdiction ;............... ..................	a Court	with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by	finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe." What has happened in the cases now before us is that	the Collector who has jurisdiction only in cases coming under the Sea Customs Act has assumed jurisdiction, on a wrong finding	that the Sea Customs Act applies to these cases, even though in law it does not.
There is no escape from the conclusion that on the authority of this Court's decision in	Messrs.	Universal Imports Agency	v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports	(2), the Sea Customs Act will not apply and the law formerly in force in the	French	Establishments,	immediately before November 1,	1954, would apply, in respect of	all importations into Pondicherry made on the basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954. On the assumption which, as already stated, must be	made in considering	the preliminary objection, that the importations in these cases were made on	the basis of	contracts concluded before November 1, 1954, the irresistible conclusion is that	the Sea Customs Act had no application to these	cases.	It necessarily follows that the Collector of Customs had,, on the (1) [1910] 2 K. B. 859.
It appears that before the Collector the petitioner did	not seek to make the case which he now wants to make, viz., that the contract for supply of the goods was made in all these cases before November 1, 1954. Before the Collector	the petitioner's case was that the contracts in all the cases had been concluded before August 15, 1954. The collector came to the conclusion that this case, viz., that	the contracts had been concluded before August 15, 1954, had not been established. It was in that view that he made	the orders	of confiscation with	an option to	pay penalty instead. It seems probable that in the appeals before the Central	Board	of Revenue and the revisional	applications before	the Government of India also the petitioner's	case was that the contracts had been concluded before August	15, 1954, and the case that the contracts were concluded before November 1, 1954, was not pleaded. The Member, Central Board of Revenue, in disposing of the appeals recorded	his view that it was not in doubt that the goods	in question were imported into Pondicherry at a time when a licence	was required for their import and that the appellant did	not have such a licence.	In that view he affirmed	the Collector's orders with a modification that the fine in lieu of confiscation be reduced. The Government of	India	also found no reason to interfere with the orders passed by	the Central Board of Revenue.
These facts can however make no difference to the position in law	that if in fact the importations were made on	the basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954,	the Sea Customs Act would not 380 apply and the Collector or the Central Board	of Revenue would have no jurisdiction to make any order of confiscation or penalty. Where an authority whether judicial or quasi- judicial has in law no jurisdiction to make an order	the omission by a	party to raise	before	the authority	the relevant facts for deciding that question cannot clothe it with jurisdiction.
The substance of the matter is that the Collector assumed jurisdiction on the view that the Sea Customs Act applied to these cases, if the importations were on the basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954-as we	have assumed,-the Sea Customs Act does not however apply to these cases.	Therefore, the Collector acted without	jurisdiction and the fact that the assumption of jurisdiction was based on the	Collector's wrong decision, does not	change	that position. The writ	petitions would therefore	be maintainable, if the petitioner can satisfy the Court	that the importations were	made on the	basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954. I would therefore reject the preliminary objection.
When the Universal Imports Agency Case was decided by	this Court,	no objection to the maintainability of the	writ petition was raised; and consequently, the Court had not to consider the question	whether the action taken by	the Collector of Customs was with or without jurisdiction.	So long as however the	law as laid down by the majority judgment in that case remains good law, we must hold	that the Sea Customs Act would not apply to imports in these cases also if	they were made on the	basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954; and as explained above, that in my opinion compels the conclusion that the Collector of Customs acted without jurisdiction, if the imports	were on the basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954.
It may be mentioned here in this connection that S. K.
Das, J., in his judgment in Ujjam Bai's Case (2) (1) [1962] 1 S. C. R. 305.
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778 381 referred to the decision of this Court in Universal Imports Agency	v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1) as a case where a quasi-judicial authority	has acted without jurisdiction. Kapur, J., has also referred to this case and said in any	case, this is	an instance of want	of jurisdiction to tax transactions which the law excludes from the taxing powers of the authority levying the tax." Coming now to the merits of the petitions, I need only state that the materials that have been produced by the petitioner are by no means sufficient to establish the case that	the contracts in these several cases were concluded before November 1, 1954. Mr. Chatterjee prayed to the Court for an opportunity to	adduce	further documentary evidence	to convince us of the truth of the petitioner's case on	this point.	I might perhaps have been inclined to	grant this prayer.	No useful purpose will however be served by my discussing Chat question, or the materials already on	the record, as my learned brethren,. having come to a conclusion that the preliminary objection should	succeed, have	not considered the merits of the petition.
The position is exactly similar in	the other thirteen petitions filed by M/s. Pioneer Traders which	were heard along with the petitions already discussed and my conclusion in regard to those petitions is also the same.