Source: https://casetext.com/case/steve-jackson-games-inc-v-us-secret-serv
Timestamp: 2020-05-31 00:37:00
Document Index: 758880983

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 2510', '§ 2701', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2520', '§ 2707', '§ 2510', '§ 2510', '§ 2515', '§ 2510', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2510', '§ 2703', '§ 2518', '§ 2703', '§ 4', '§ 46', '§ 2702', '§ 2511', '§ 2701', '§ 2703', '§ 2703', '§ 2703', '§ 2701']

Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv, 36 F.3d 457 | Casetext Search + Citator
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv
U.S. v. Steiger
The Circuits which have interpreted this definition as applied to electronic communications have held that it…
Courts, however, have clarified that Congress intended a narrower definition of "intercept" with regard to…
Full title:STEVE JACKSON GAMES, INCORPORATED, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v…
Date published: Oct 31, 1994
holding that Secret Service violated SCA by going beyond warrant and seizing computer server containing unopened email
Summary of this case from Lopez v. Pena
Peter D. Kennedy, R. James George, Jr., George, Donaldson Ford, Austin, TX, for appellants.
The district court's findings of fact are not in dispute. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D.Tex. 1993). Appellant Steve Jackson Games, Incorporated (SJG), publishes books, magazines, role-playing games, and related products. Starting in the mid-1980s, SJG operated an electronic bulletin board system, called "Illuminati" (BBS), from one of its computers. SJG used the BBS to post public information about its business, games, publications, and the role-playing hobby; to facilitate play-testing of games being developed; and to communicate with its customers and free-lance writers by electronic mail (Email).
Central to the issue before us, the BBS also offered customers the ability to send and receive private E-mail. Private E-mail was stored on the BBS computer's hard disk drive temporarily, until the addressees "called" the BBS (using their computers and modems) and read their mail. After reading their E-mail, the recipients could choose to either store it on the BBS computer's hard drive or delete it. In February 1990, there were 365 BBS users. Among other uses, appellants Steve Jackson, Elizabeth McCoy, William Milliken, and Steffan O'Sullivan used the BBS for communication by private Email.
[c]omputer hardware . . . and computer software . . . and . . . documents relating to the use of the computer system . . ., and financial documents and licensing documentation relative to the computer programs and equipment at . . . [SJG] . . . which constitute evidence . . . of federal crimes. . . . This warrant is for the seizure of the above described computer and computer data and for the authorization to read information stored and contained on the above described computer and computer data.
Appellants filed suit in May 1991 against, among others, the Secret Service and the United States, claiming, inter alia, violations of the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, et seq. ; the Federal Wiretap Act, as amended by Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510- 2521 (proscribes, inter alia, the intentional interception of electronic communications); and Title II of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2711 (proscribes, inter alia, intentional access, without authorization, to stored electronic communications).
unlawful for a government officer or employee, in connection with the investigation ... of a criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. . . .
Kluepfel, the Assistant United States Attorney, and Agents Foley and Golden were also sued. In addition to the statutory claims, appellants also claimed violations of the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. And, in September 1992, they added state law claims for conversion and invasion of privacy. Prior to trial, the claims against the individuals were dismissed, and appellants withdrew their constitutional and state law claims.
The district court held that the Secret Service violated the Privacy Protection Act, and awarded actual damages of $51,040 to SJG; and that it violated Title II of the ECPA by seizing stored electronic communications without complying with the statutory provisions, and awarded the statutory damages of $1,000 to each of the individual appellants. And, it awarded appellants $195,000 in attorneys' fees and approximately $57,000 in costs. But, it held that the Secret Service did not "intercept" the E-mail in violation of Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), because its acquisition of the contents of the electronic communications was not contemporaneous with the transmission of those communications.
Appellants raised two other issues regarding damages, but later advised that they have been settled. And, prior to briefing, the Secret Service dismissed its cross-appeal.
Section 2511 was enacted in 1968 as part of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, often referred to as the Federal Wiretap Act. Prior to the 1986 amendment by Title I of the ECPA, it covered only wire and oral communications. Title I of the ECPA extended that coverage to electronic communications. In relevant part, § 2511(1)(a) proscribes "intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication", unless the intercept is authorized by court order or by other exceptions not relevant here. Section 2520 authorizes, inter alia, persons whose electronic communications are intercepted in violation of § 2511 to bring a civil action against the interceptor for actual damages, or for statutory damages of $10,000 per violation or $100 per day of the violation, whichever is greater. 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
An "electronic communication" is defined as: any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include —
(D) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title). . . .
Title I of the ECPA increased the statutory damages for unlawful interception from $1,000 to $10,000. See Bess v. Bess, 929 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1991). On the other hand, as noted, Title II authorizes an award of "the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case . . . less than the sum of $1000". 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c). As discussed, the individual appellants each received Title II statutory damages of $1,000.
The Act defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The district court, relying on our court's interpretation of intercept in United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976), held that the Secret Service did not intercept the communications, because its acquisition of the contents of those communications was not contemporaneous with their transmission. In Turk, the government seized from a suspect's vehicle an audio tape of a prior conversation between the suspect and Turk. (Restated, when the conversation took place, it was not recorded contemporaneously by the government.) Our court held that replaying the previously recorded conversation was not an "intercept", because an intercept "require[s] participation by the one charged with an `interception' in the contemporaneous acquisition of the communication through the use of the device". Id. at 658.
But, obviously, the language of the Act controls. In that regard, appellees counter that "Title II, not Title I, . . . governs the seizure of stored electronic communications such as unread e-mail messages", and note that appellants have recovered damages under Title II. Understanding the Act requires understanding and applying its many technical terms as defined by the Act, as well as engaging in painstaking, methodical analysis. As appellees note, the issue is not whether E-mail can be "intercepted"; it can. Instead, at issue is what constitutes an "intercept".
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) . . . and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.
Critical to the issue before us is the fact that, unlike the definition of "wire communication", the definition of "electronic communication" does not include electronic storage of such communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). See note 4, supra. "Electronic storage" is defined as
Wire and electronic communications are subject to different treatment under the Wiretap Act. The Act's exclusionary rule, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, applies to the interception of wire communications, including such communications in electronic storage, see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), but not to the interception of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990); S.Rep. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577. And, the types of crimes that may be investigated by means of surveillance directed at electronic communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) ("any federal felony"), are not as limited as those that may be investigated by means of surveillance directed at wire or oral communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (specifically listed felonies).
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (emphasis added). The E-mail in issue was in "electronic storage". Congress' use of the word "transfer" in the definition of "electronic communication", and its omission in that definition of the phrase "any electronic storage of such communication" (part of the definition of "wire communication") reflects that Congress did not intend for "intercept" to apply to "electronic communications" when those communications are in "electronic storage".
Stored wire communications are subject to different treatment than stored electronic communications. Generally, a search warrant, rather than a court order, is required to obtain access to the contents of a stored electronic communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). But, compliance with the more stringent requirements of § 2518, including obtaining a court order, is necessary to obtain access to a stored wire communication, because § 2703 expressly applies only to stored electronic communications, not to stored wire communications. See James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 4.10, at 4-126-4-127 (1994) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68 (1986)).
We could stop here, because "[i]ndisputably, the goal of statutory construction is to ascertain legislative intent through the plain language of a statute — without looking to legislative history or other extraneous sources". Stone v. Caplan (Matter of Stone), 10 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1994). But, when interpreting a statute as complex as the Wiretap Act, which is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity, see, e.g., Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1542-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 195, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1994), we consider it appropriate to note the legislative history for confirmation of our understanding of Congress' intent. See id. at 1544.
Our conclusion is reinforced further by consideration of the fact that Title II of the ECPA clearly applies to the conduct of the Secret Service in this case. Needless to say, when construing a statute, we do not confine our interpretation to the one portion at issue but, instead, consider the statute as a whole. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1444 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing N. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.05, at 103 (5th ed. 1992)).
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished . . . .
intentionally accesse[d] without authorization a facility [the computer] through which an electronic communication service [the BBS] is provided . . . and thereby obtain[ed] [and] prevent[ed] authorized access [by appellants] to a[n] . . . electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.
In light of the substantial differences between the statutory procedures and requirements for obtaining authorization to intercept electronic communications, on the one hand, and to gain access to the contents of stored electronic communications, on the other, it is most unlikely that Congress intended to require law enforcement officers to satisfy the more stringent requirements for an intercept in order to gain access to the contents of stored electronic communications.
The ECPA legislative history's explanation of the prohibitions regarding disclosure also persuades us of the soundness of Turk's interpretation of "intercept" and our understanding of the distinctions Congress intended to draw between communications being transmitted and communications in electronic storage. In describing Title II's prohibitions against disclosure of the contents of stored communications, the Senate Report points out that § 2702(a) (part of Title II) "generally prohibits the provider of a wire or electronic communication service to the public from knowingly divulging the contents of any communication while in electronic storage by that service to any person other than the addressee or intended recipient." S.Rep. No. 99-541, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. 37, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3591 (emphasis added). It then goes on to state that § 2511(3) of the Wiretap Act, as amended by Title I of the ECPA, "prohibits such a provider from divulging the contents of a communication while it is in transmission". Id. (emphasis added).
It goes without saying that we generally will not consider issues raised for the first time at oral argument. For this rare exception, the parties, as ordered, filed supplemental briefs on this point.
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (emphasis added).
Section 2703 sets forth the requirements for governmental access to the contents of electronic (but not wire) communications. For electronic communications that have been in electronic storage for 180 days or less, the government can gain access to the contents pursuant to a federal or state warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). For communications that are maintained by a remote computing service and that have been in storage for more than 180 days, the government can gain access by obtaining a warrant, by administrative or grand jury subpoena, or by obtaining a court order pursuant to § 2703(d). 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
holding that email messages stored on a computer, but not yet read, were in electronic storage
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In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit held that the government's acquisition of email messages stored on an electronic bulletin board system, but not yet retrieved by the intended recipients, was not an "interception" under the Wiretap Act.
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