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Vandeventer Black LLP - "Who Do You Think is a Longshoreman?"
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THE SEARCH BEGINS: THE IMPACT OF PRIOR LEGISLATION,
LEGAL DECISIONS AND DOL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT
The Impact of Prior Legislation, Legal Decisions and DOL Interpretations of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
Presented by F. Nash Bilisoly of
An individual’s maritime status, both individually and vis-à-vis the defendant, will determine his appropriate remedy, which in turn determines the applicable standard of proof. Maritime workers can generally be classified into four categories: (1) members of the crew of a vessel; (2) longshoremen, ship repairmen or harbor workers; (3) offshore, fixed platform workers; and (4) maritime workers who fit in none of the above categories. Nonmaritime workers injured on the navigable waters of the United States may also be separated into categories such as (1) visitors, (2) passengers, (3) recreational users, and (4) independent contractors. In each instance, the causes of action and the remedies may vary depending on whether the tortfeasor is the injured person’s employer, a third-party stranger, or a vessel. Thus, status is always a function of individual circumstance juxtaposed with relationship to the defendant.
Classification of a worker injured near the water is presently a complicated and often overlapping concept. As will be seen, such a worker may be injured over water and, thus, clearly falls under the LHWCA 17 no matter what his occupation. He may be injured on land, and be covered only if his occupation is "maritime" in nature. In such a case, he will be covered under both the LHWCA and the local state compensation scheme, unless the specific state has legislated that away. Moreover, he may work in "maritime" employment but be injured too far away from the water to qualify for LHWCA coverage. Finally, such a worker may be both a seaman and a longshoreman, entitled to coverage under both the Jones Act and the LHWCA, and perhaps a commensurate state law as well.
The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 as a response to the difficulties that had arisen through the various attempts to find remedies for longshoremen injured over the water’s edge. The Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, had drawn a presumably bright line at the water’s edge, past which a state compensation program could not apply. 18 The opinion rested on the grant of maritime jurisdiction to the federal government in the Constitution,19 which made it virtually impossible for Congress to legislate in state compensation laws.20
As seen previously, a worker injured over navigable waters prior to 1972 was covered no matter what his relationship to traditional maritime activity.32 After a fair amount of litigation over this issue,33 the Supreme Court, with perhaps a small exception, settled the issue in Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates,34 holding that there was no congressional intent to reduce coverage by passage of the Amendments:
Section 2(3) of the LHWCA states: "The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker. . . ."73 Thus, an employee must also be "engaged in maritime employment" to be covered under the LHWCA. Early on, in Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, the Supreme Court held that the status requirement did not necessarily have to be in place at the "moment of injury," but that the focus would be on general occupation.74 Moreover, in P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, the Court drew an expansive definition of "maritime employment," sufficient to encompass almost any worker who assists in the movement of cargo between a ship and ground transportation.75 Land-based claimants must be engaged in activity that was an integral and essential part of loading, unloading, or repairing a vessel.76 In order to meet the "essential or integral" requirement of section 2(3), the First Circuit has required the employee’s duties to be a "necessary link in the chain of work that resulted in ships being built and repaired."77 Furthermore, the claimant must show that maritime work is a regular portion of his duties.78
*524 4. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni
Complicating matters significantly was the Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni87 that a ship repairman working for a shipyard may fulfill the requisites to qualify both as a Jones Act seaman and an "employee" under the LHWCA.88 It had been argued that the LHWCA definition of "employee" was necessarily a filter through which a LHWCA putative seaman had to pass in order to maintain a Jones Act action, the two remedies being mutually exclusive.89 This would mean that any "employee" could not also be a seaman. While that would have perhaps been the simpler solution, the Court did not agree, reasoning that, because a definitional "seaman" might also be performing ship repair work at the time of injury, fortuitous circumstances should not deprive him of his Jones Act remedy.90 The reverse, however, is not true. A putative LHWCA claimant will lose longshore status, even if he meets the statutory definition of "employee," if he is also a definitional seaman. This is because the LHWCA contains an express exclusion for "members of a crew," while the Jones Act has no commensurate exclusion.91
5. Recovery Under the LHWCA
Damages under the LHWCA are limited to loss of earnings only. This Article will not attempt to analyze the many twists and turns that are the subject of extensive litigation in this area, but will only summarize the available damages for comparison purposes with the other statutory or judicially created frameworks. The primary emphasis is on wage recovery; essentially, the injured worker has given up the right to nonpecuniary damages of any sort, including pain and suffering, in return for liability without fault.
6. Damages Against Nonemployers
Maritime workers covered under the LHWCA have always had a general maritime law remedy against tortfeasors who are not their employers. Unlike seamen, maritime workers had an action for negligence against vessel owners at the turn of the century.120 Subsequently, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the seaman’s warranty of seaworthiness was extended to longshoremen, as they were thought to be performing traditional seamen’s work.121 After the Supreme Court allowed indemnification actions by vessel owners against the employers of longshoremen,122 Congress acted in 1972 to restore what was seen as the traditional balance between compensation and liability remedies. Section 905 of the LHWCA was amended to eliminate the Sieracki unseaworthiness action, as well as the vessel’s right to indemnification against the employer.123 What remains is a general maritime law cause of action against either a vessel owner or any other third party for negligence only.124
B. Other Maritime Workers
Because an offshore drilling rig which is fixed to the sea floor is not a vessel in navigation, those on it are not seamen.128 Yet, floating, mobile drilling platforms are vessels in navigation.129 This pointless distinction is rectified to some extent by application of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.130 Those injured while employed in the exploration, development, removal, or transportation by pipeline of natural resources have the LHWCA as their exclusive remedy.131 As in the LHWCA, this does not include employees who are a "master or member of a crew of any vessel."132 In addition, the act only applies to lands beyond the state territorial waters but still on the continental shelf.133
II. Seamen and Damages
A. Definitions and Remedies
The Osceola146 capsulized a seaman’s traditional avenues for recovery at the turn of the century when it recognized maintenance and cure and a limited warranty of seaworthiness as the only available remedies:
(1) [W]hether the structure was being used primarily as a work platform during a reasonable period of time immediately preceding the accident;
(2) whether the structure was moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and
(3) whether, despite being capable of movement, any transportation function performed by the structure was merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a work platform.190 If a structure meets these three criteria, it is not a "vessel in navigation." The First Circuit essentially has held that a vessel’s primary purpose or business must be navigation or commerce or those serving on board are only seamen when it is in actual navigation or transit, noting:
B. Jones Act Damages
Once a court determines that an injured plaintiff has satisfied all of the status requirements of a seaman, and liability is demonstrated, it may turn to the issue of damages. Similar to a general maritime law negligence action,194 a plaintiff may recover past lost wages,195 future loss of earning capacity,196 and past and future medical expenses not covered by cure.197 Damages representing recovery from physical pain and suffering, as well as mental anguish, are also the right of a Jones Act seaman.198
Aside from a Jones Act negligence claim against his employer, a seaman may bring an action for maintenance and cure, as well as unseaworthiness of the vessel, under general maritime law.207 Both the doctrine of unseaworthiness and the right to maintenance and cure are species of liability without fault.208 A seaman’s employer owes a duty to provide maintenance and cure whenever he or she is injured while subject to the call of duty.209 The shipowner must provide a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended purpose.210
1. Warranty of Seaworthiness
A seaman is entitled to damages that are "commensurate with the nature and extent of his injuries."211 As in a Jones Act negligence case, a seaman who proves unseaworthiness can claim pain and suffering, loss of past earnings, impairment of future earning capacity, and past and future medical expenses.212 While a unique action, the damages for unseaworthiness remain the same as a general maritime law negligence action.213
Maintenance and cure may be considered the seaman’s original remedy, and its "origins. . . can be traced to the earliest maritime law digests and sea codes."223 In determining these damages, courts have held that an injured seaman is entitled to medical expenses to the point of maximum medical recovery224 and reasonable expenses for room and board.225 Collective bargaining agreements often attempt to establish a set rate for maintenance,226 although there is disagreement as to the binding nature of such agreements.227 Those unaffected by such agreements may possibly recover their actual expenses upon a proper showing.228
D. Seamen and Nonpecuniary Damages
Aside from pain and suffering, much controversy exists today over the availability of other nonpecuniary damages in light of Miles.241 In Miles, the Supreme Court placed the first significant court-imposed limits on nonpecuniary damages in general maritime law. Claiming unseaworthiness and negligence after a stabbing death at the hands of a crewman, the seaman’s estate sought nonpecuniary damages, such as loss of society and punitive damages.242 In the opinion, Justice O’Connor reasoned that, wherein Congress expressly limited DOHSA to nonpecuniary damages,243 it impliedly did the same when it incorporated FELA into the Jones Act and adopted the judicial interpretation limiting FELA to nonpecuniary damages.244 Advancing the interest of uniformity and legislative deference in maritime law, the majority held that "[i]t would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence."245
The extension of Miles into the topic of punitive damages is another controversial issue. Punitive damages have been generally accepted in general maritime law as a possible element of damages where the defendant’s conduct qualified as a "gross and wanton outrage."259 On the other hand, punitive damages have never been a part of Jones Act damages.260 Vaughan’s approval of the recovery of attorney’s fees in maintenance and cure cases had become the primary authority for seamen to recover punitive damages,261 upon a showing of egregious and wanton conduct, in order to encourage shipowners to promptly pay seamen.262
F. Other Seaman Issues
Aside from seaman remedies available against the employer, a seaman occasionally attempts to recover damages from a nonemployer. In Smith v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., the Fifth Circuit refused to extend the Sieracki doctrine to include a Jones Act seaman’s claim for unseaworthiness against a vessel not owned by his employer.268 Quoting an earlier, controlling decision, it reiterated: "One with seaman status does not become additionally a Sieracki seaman by doing stevedoring work which might be styled traditional seaman’s duties."269 A seaman does not have a Jones Act claim or special cause of action against a party that is not his employer and is simply in the position of any person injured on navigable waters.270 "Congress has not created a statutory remedy for [a] seaman against nonemployers," and, accordingly, they have only a general maritime negligence remedy.271
IV. Nonmaritime Workers
For those not accorded a special status, the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances set forth in Kermerac v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique still reigns.287 This standard allows for a variable standard of care based on the circumstances.288 Successful claims of negligence under the general maritime law entitle a plaintiff to damages of medical expenses, pain and suffering, prejudgment interest, loss of wages, and loss of future earning capacity.289 This general standard applies to an endless array of topics, including cruise ship passengers, recreational passengers’ injuries, recreational collisions, wake damage, and products liability.290
Maritime remedies come in many shapes and sizes, and the damages which emanate therefrom are just as varied. Any attempt to harmonize the distinctions or seek uniformity will result only in frustration. While there are historical reasons that can be found, practical or rational justifications are just not present. Every attempt to bring order has simply fed the children of more lawyers. It is best to know the rules, play by them, and not spend a great deal of time attempting to understand them.
a1 Mr. Bilisoly is a partner at Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Virginia. He is a graduate of Tulane Law School, J.D., 1979 and The College of William & Mary, B.A., 1977. The author gratefully acknowledges the able assistance of his colleague, Spencer J. Guld. He is a graduate the T.C. Williams School of Law, 2015 and the Pamplin School of Business, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 2012.
1 See Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty §6-49, at 419 (2d ed. 1975).
2 While the law of maritime wrongful death is intertwined with that of maritime personal injury, this Article leaves that topic to another contributor in this symposium.
3 See George W. Healy, III, Remedies for Maritime Personal Injury and Wrongful Death in American Law: Sources and Development, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 311, 312 (1994).
4 See Gilmore & Black, supra note 1, §§6-1 to 6-57, at 272-455.
5 See U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
6 See U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
7 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 1970 AMC 967, 987-88 (1970) (interpreting congressional purpose as the uniform application of wrongful death for seaman).
8 See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2008).
9 The terms "direct" and "indirect" are used because the more commonly utilized "pecuniary" and "nonpecuniary" have taken on a life of their own. As will be discussed infra, pain and suffering are surely nonpecuniary bur are not treated as such by the courts.
10 See 33 U.S.C. §§901-964 (2015).
11 See Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 424-25, 1985 AMC 1700, 1707-08 (1985).
12 See 43 U.S.C. §1333(b) (2015).
13 See 46 U.S.C. §188 (1997).
14 See id. §742.
15 See id. §781.
16 See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632, 1959 AMC 597, 602 (1959).
17 See 33 U.S.C. §§901-964 (2015).
18 244 U.S. 205, 216-18, 1996 AMC 2076, 2084-85 (1917).
19 See U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
20 See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 222-23, 1924 AMC 403, 404-05 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 150-51 (1920).
21 See Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927).
22 Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927).
23 See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 341-42, 1953 AMC 237, 244 (1953) (freight brakeman on car float); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244, 247, 1942 AMC 1, 2-3 (1941) (boat salesman on sales trip); Nogueira v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U.S. 128, 130, 134, 1930 AMC 763, 764, 766-67 (1930) (railroad freight handler on float).
24 370 U.S. 114, 124, 1962 AMC 1413, 1421 (1962).
25 See Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927).
26 See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214-15, 1969 AMC 1967-70 (1969).
27 317 U.S. 249, 256-58, 1942 AMC 1653, 1657-59 (1942).
28 See S. Rep. No. 92-1125, at 1, 13 (1972).
29 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (2015).
30 See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264, 1977 AMC 1037, 1048 (1977).
31 33 U.S.C. §902(3) (2015).
32 See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
33 Compare Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 1975 AMC 2411 (9th Cir. 1975) (no LHWCA coverage for work performed over navigable water unless the work had a "realistically significant relationship to navigation or commerce"), with Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1983 AMC 1321 (5th Cir. 1982) (one injured over navigable waters who would have bee covered before 1972 was covered after the Amendments).
34 459 U.S. 297, 1983 AMC 609 (1983).
35 Id. at 324 n.34, 1983 AMC at 631 n.34. (footnote omitted).
36 See id. at 324 n.34, 1983 AMC at 631 n.34.
37 Compare Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 892, 896-98, 1994 AMC 1217, 1219-20, 1228-30 (5th Cir. 1994) (fixed platform oil worker drowned while attempting to evacuate covered, relying on Director, OWCP v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 1983 AMC 609 (1983)), with Brockington v. Certified Elec. Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1528, 1991 AMC 586, 592 (11th Cir. 1990) (electrician injured on a vessel while in transit to a land-based job not covered as there was nothing inherently maritime about his occupation).
38 33 U.S.C. §903(a) (2015).
39 See Perini, 459 U.S. at 324 n.32, 1983 AMC at 631 n.32; Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 425-26, 1970 AMC 1700, 1709 (1985).
The Third Circuit enunciated a third situs test in the case of Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 540 F.2d 629, 638, 1976 AMC 1427, 1440 (3d Cir. 1976), extending coverage to virtually all employees engaged in loading or unloading cargo. This approach was discredited by the Supreme Court in Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 278 n.40, 1977 AMC 1037, 1059 n.40 (1977) ("The Circuit appears to have essentially discarded the situs test....").
568 F.2d 137, 139-40 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 141 (emphasis supplied).
632 F.2d 504, 1981 AMC 2010 (5th Cir. 1980).