Source: http://masslawyersweekly.com/fulltext-opinions/2007/08/27/gossels-v-fleet-national-bank-441968/
Timestamp: 2014-08-21 10:21:38
Document Index: 137819687

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 8', '§ 4', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 222', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 9', '§ 2', '§ 9', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 39', '§ 3', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 4', '§ 3', '§ 3']

- GOSSELS v. FLEET NATIONAL BANK (441968) | Full-text Opinions
Home / Fulltext Opinion / - GOSSELS v. FLEET NATIONAL BANK (441968)	- GOSSELS v. FLEET NATIONAL BANK (441968)
August 27, 2007	69 Mass. App. Ct. 797
05-P-1796	Appeals Court
No. 05-P-1796.
Suffolk. October 10, 2006. – August 22, 2007.
GELINAS, J. The plaintiff C. Peter R. Gossels filed a complaint in the Boston Municipal Court against the defendant Fleet National Bank[1] (Fleet), claiming breach of contract, conversion, and violation of G. L. c. 93A, arising from Fleet’s processing of a check, drawn in a foreign currency, that Gossels presented to Fleet. He later amended the complaint to add a fourth count essentially alleging that Fleet failed to follow the provisions of G. L. c. 106, § 3-107. Following a bench trial, the trial judge found that Fleet was liable for negligent misrepresentation,[2] resulting in damages of $6,861.68. The trial judge explicitly found for Fleet on the G. L. c. 93A claim. The judge ruled that Fleet’s check collection practices were in compliance with G. L. c. 106, § 3-107. The judge made no mention of the breach of contract or conversion counts in her memorandum of decision. Judgment entered for Gossels on the breach of contract count (but only “insofar as it alleges [n]egligent [m]isrepresentation”), and for Fleet on the remaining counts.
The facts as found by the trial judge are uncontested. Gossels received a check from the German government for 85,071.19
euros, drawn on Dresdner Bank of Germany.[3] On October 15, 1999, he took the check to a branch of Fleet at 75 State Street in Boston and presented it to the international teller. Gossels, an account holder at Fleet, did not request that the euros be exchanged for dollars.
At this point, the international teller failed to inform Gossels either that Fleet could pay Gossels only in dollars, or that Fleet paid international checks at a “retail exchange rate” several percentage points lower than the interbank “spot rate” for foreign currency. Had Gossels known this information, he would have taken the check to another bank.[4]
The teller then took the check and gave Gossels a preprinted receipt; in so doing, the teller failed to check either of two boxes on the form, one indicating that “provisional credit” would be given to Gossels, the other that the check was accepted for “collection only.” The judge found that if Fleet had given Gossels provisional credit for the check, then the funds in dollars would have been credited to Gossels on or shortly after October 15, 1999.[5] If the check was accepted for collection only, that would have resulted in a delay of credit pending Fleet’s receipt of payment by the drawee bank of the amount of the check.
Fleet maintains for teller instruction a manual of foreign check collection practices. The manual instructed tellers to inform the customer that receipt of payment by a customer for a foreign check would take four to six weeks, and that an exchange rate would be applied, based on the date of Fleet’s receipt of the funds from the foreign bank. Moreover, the manual instructed tellers to advise the customer of the approximate date on which the exchange rate would be determined. The international teller in this case failed to provide Gossels with any of this information.
Fleet, as collecting bank, sent the check to its global collection department, which sent it with a collection letter dated October 20, 1999, to Fleet’s foreign correspondent bank in Germany, Deutsche Bank. On November 1, 1999, Gossels received a notice from Fleet that the check had been returned unpaid because it lacked an endorsement.[6] Gossels immediately walked to the Fleet branch at 75 State Street in Boston and told the manager that the international teller had instructed him not to endorse the check. The manager asked Gossels to endorse the check, credited his account for $38.25 in lost interest,[7] and waived the $30.00 fee that Fleet had charged Gossels for failing to endorse the check. After Fleet and Deutsche Bank repeated the collection process with the check, which now bore Gossels’s endorsement, Dresdner Bank debited the funds from the appropriate account and sent 85,071.19 euros to Deutsche Bank, which (apparently on December 14 or 15, 1999) credited 84,971.19 euros to Fleet’s account at Deutsche Bank (100 euros having been deducted as a collection fee).
On December 15, 1999, Gossels received notice from Fleet that it had credited his account with check proceeds in the amount of $81,754.77, which was based on the December 15, 1999, retail exchange rate offered by Fleet for 84,971.19 euros. The same number of euros would have been worth $88,616.45 based on the October 15, 1999, retail exchange rate offered by Fleet, or $92,023.80 based on the October 15, 1999, spot rate offered by Dresdner Bank.[8]
Contract claim. We first address Gossels’s argument that the trial judge erred in failing to find that Fleet was in breach of its contract with him with respect to the check.
Under the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code (code)[9] applicable to the transaction, Fleet became Gossels’s agent when he passed the check to Fleet, and Fleet accepted the check, for collection. See G. L. c. 106, § 4-201(a). Nothing in the evidence suggests that either had a contrary intent. “Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and before the time that a settlement given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes final, the bank, with respect to the item, is an agent or subagent of the owner of the item . . . . This provision applies regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of indorsement . . . .” Ibid. Whether Fleet, as the depositary bank, accepted the check for provisional credit to Gossel’s account, or merely took the check for collection, Fleet is a collecting bank. See G. L. c. 106, § 4-105(5). See also Official Comment 4 to Uniform Commercial Code § 4-201, 2B U.L.A. 46-47 (Master ed. 2002). Fleet stated as much by declaring, on the receipt given to Gossels when the bank accepted the check for collection, that it was “an agent for collection on [Gossels's] behalf.” We conclude that the trial judge was correct to treat the action under the theory of a tort claim.
In the first count of his complaint, Gossels alleged that “Fleet breached its Agreement with Gossels by failing to ‘act in good faith’ to collect the euro proceeds from the check that it had accepted from Gossels . . . .” We think this count, and the supporting factual material in the complaint incorporated by reference, was a sufficient pleading that Gossels is entitled to relief against Fleet for breach of its fiduciary duty to Gossels as his agent for the collection of the instrument. In most cases, breach of a fiduciary duty is a tort, and not a breach of contract. See Kirley v. Kirley, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 651, 654 (1988) (noting growing common law trend to declare “that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort”), quoting from Mack v. American Fletcher Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 738-739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). The usual argument, absent here, is whether a contract or a tort period of limitations is applicable to the action, and in those circumstances, we look to the “gist” of the action to make that determination. See, e.g., Barber v. Fox, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 529 (1994) (“gist of the action” was that defendants failed to do as promised; plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty, though sounding in tort, was governed by contract statute of limitations). The fact that, as here, the relationship is established primarily by statute rather than by agreement, further supports the view that the claim is one of tort and not of contract. See Kirley, supra at 653.
Gossels was the principal in the transaction. “In those cases where some period of time elapses between the final payment of the item by the payor bank and the time that the settlement of the collecting bank is or becomes final, . . . the continuance of the agency status of the collecting bank necessarily carries with it the continuance of the owner’s status as principal.” Official Comment 5 to Uniform Commercial Code § 4-201, 2B U.L.A. 47 (Master ed. 2002).
Fleet, as agent under § 4-201, was not a general agent, the agency status being limited to collecting items. See United States for Use & Benefit of Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Sommer Corp., 580 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1978) (Westinghouse). See also Official Comment 1 to Uniform Commercial Code § 4-201, 2B U.L.A. 45 (Master ed. 2002) (section 4-201 was placed in code to govern risk of loss of item while being collected; agency status of § 4-201 is limited to that of “agent for collection”). For example, a collecting bank is not the sort of agent whose knowledge of collateral facts is imputed to the owner of the collection item. See Westinghouse, supra, citing 3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 4-201:1-9 (2d ed. 1971). The bank’s duties as agent include presenting the item, or sending it for presentment, notifying its transferor of nonpayment or dishonor, and settling with the principal when it receives final payment. Westinghouse, supra.
The code specifies that use of ordinary care is required with respect to certain aspects of collection. See G. L. c. 106, § 4-202.[10] The code’s enumeration of areas requiring ordinary care is not exclusive, however, and covers only certain aspects of the bank’s activities. The code also recognizes that there may be additional areas of liability; with respect to other aspects of the transaction, G. L. c. 106, § 4-102(b) states that
“[t]he liability of a bank for action or nonaction with respect to an item handled by it for purposes of presentment, payment, or collection is governed by the law of the place where the bank is located. In the case of action or nonaction by or at a branch or separate office of a bank, its liability is governed by the law of the place where the branch or separate office is located.”
We are of opinion that, in accepting the check for collection, whether or not provisional credit was given, and within the narrow scope of its agency, Fleet became bound to perform the fiduciary duties of an agent to its principal under the laws of the Commonwealth. See Gagnon v. Coombs, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 154 (1995); Kourouvacilis v. American Fedn. of State, County & Municipal Employees, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 533 n.19 (2006), citing Dzuris v. Pierce, 216 Mass. 132, 135-136 (1913). Additionally, we conclude, as did the trial judge when she found that the parties had impliedly assented to try the case on the basis of negligent misrepresentation, that the parties here impliedly assented to try the case on the basis of a breach of Fleet’s fiduciary duty. “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 15(b), 365 Mass. 761 (1974). See Jensen v. Daniels, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 815-816 (2003). Issues tried by express or implied consent of the parties are treated as raised in the pleadings “without regard to whether the pleadings are amended to conform to the evidence.” National Med. Care, Inc. v. Zigelbaum, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 579 (1984). Here, we conclude that the parties impliedly consented to trial of the issue on this basis. Neither party objected to evidence with respect to the representations made by the bank’s personnel, and neither party raised the point in any posttrial proceedings before the trial court. Further, Gossels’s claim under G. L. c. 93A sets out all of the elements of the tort of breach of fiduciary duty, and expressly mentions the misrepresentation of factual information. We consider the appeal on this basis.
As Gossels’s agent and fiduciary, Fleet was obliged to disclose fully all facts material to the transaction. “The principal has a right to be informed of all material facts known to the agent in reference to the transaction in which he is acting for his principal, and good faith requires a disclosure of such facts by the agent.” Spritz v. Brockton Sav. Bank, 305 Mass. 170, 172 (1940). See Farnsworth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen 494, 496 (1861). “Whenever facts known to the agent but not to the principal may affect the desires and conduct of the principal, the agent must communicate that information to the principal . . . particularly if the agent is engaging in ‘any arrangement . . . adverse to the [principal's] interest.’” Gagnon v. Coombs, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 156, quoting from Spritz, supra. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11(1) & comment b (2006) (agent has duty to use reasonable effort to provide principal with facts that principal would wish to have, or facts material to agent’s duty to principal).
Here, Fleet’s teller informed Gossels that his endorsement would not be required for collection of the check, and then sent the check for collection without the endorsement.[11] We conclude that this action on Fleet’s part was a violation of the ordinary care due Gossels under G. L. c. 106, § 4-202(a)(1), the requirement that Fleet use ordinary care in “presenting an item or sending it for presentment.”
Additionally, we think Fleet committed a breach of its duty as an agent when the teller failed to disclose not only that the collection would be in dollars and not in euros, but other elements of the transaction as well, all set out in the instruction manual prepared for teller use with transactions of this nature, which the teller either ignored or of which the teller was ignorant.[12]
While all of the above might be ascribed to the simple negligence of the teller in handling the transaction, thus justifying the trial judge in her finding against Gossels on his claim under G. L. c. 93A, it is of greater concern that Fleet was required, as a fiduciary, to advise Gossels that it would pay his international check at a retail exchange rate that was several percentage points lower than the spot rate it received for foreign currency.[13] With respect to this aspect of the transaction, the trial judge found that Fleet “did [not] explain the terms of the exchange rate.” Nowhere in the transaction did Fleet reveal that it would pay Gossels, its principal, a retail rate of exchange substantially less than the spot rate it obtained for the item, which former rate was set out daily on a “secret” rate sheet that bank employees were advised not to disclose to the public, and that it would profit by effectively keeping the difference. While the bank may argue that it was impossible to advise Gossels of the actual rate of exchange, dependent as that information was on the rate when the check was actually put before the payor bank, Fleet was under a fiduciary obligation to divulge to its principal that it would pay something less than the spot rate, whatever that might be.
The receipt given to Gossels when Fleet took the check contained a statement indicating that the transaction would be subject to “Fleet service charges.” This statement did not fulfil Fleet’s fiduciary duty to disclose to Gossels that its arbitrage of the exchange rate would cost Gossels thousands of dollars. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that failure to disclose large commission charges are a breach of fiduciary duty.
See United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 212 (2d Cir. 2002) (forty-five or fifty percent commissions with “no relationship to the commissions that would be charged in a competitive market”); Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 43, 52 (1994) (undisclosed fee charged by agent). We think the differential here to be of this character, and not a transactional charge, see and contrast Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 532-536 (2d Cir. 1999) (broker need not disclose $158.86 markup on six-month Treasury bill sold for $99,488.42 with maturity value of $102,000). Moreover, the failure to disclose this rate differential was not mere negligence or oversight; the rate sheet was published internally with instructions that it was not to be revealed to the public, which included Gossels, the principal.
Nor do we think it a defense to Fleet’s failure to act that Gossels did not pursue, with vigilance and attention, either the matter of the currency in which the check would be paid or the rate differential that might apply, especially as the rate sheet was to be kept secret from customers. As noted in the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11 comment d (2006), “[i]t is not a defense to an agent’s breach of duty to transmit material information that the principal could, through investigation, have ascertained the truth independently.” Gossels, as the principal, was under no obligation to question his agent or to demand a specific enumeration of service charges. The duty of disclosure was on Fleet.
Further, after payment of the item, when Gossels did question the rate and the transaction, Fleet failed to provide such detail of the transaction that would be expected of a fiduciary. Instead, Fleet informed Gossels by letter that he was not being “shortchanged” and that the spot rates Gossels had cited were for “Interbank use, not for consumer exchange. [We] can assure you that the rate of exchange used in this matter is fair.” By failing to disclose the rate, and by withholding the amount without giving Gossels an adequate explanation, Fleet further committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to give a complete accounting of the disposition of the funds, including the amounts gained by Fleet as the result of its application of a rate differential. “An agent or fiduciary is under a duty to keep and render accounts and, when called upon for an accounting, has the burden of proving that he properly disposed of funds which he is shown to have received for his principal or trust.” Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 339 Mass. 101, 126 (1959). See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.12 (2006) (“agent has a duty . . . to keep and render accounts to the principal of money or other property received or paid out on the principal’s account”).
This duty applies regardless of the agent’s intent, and if there is no prior agreement with regard to the profit, the agent must not only render an account of it, but must pay the funds over to the principal. See Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 1991) (even in the absence of corrupt intent on the part of the agent, where the agent secures a profit unbeknownst to the principal in connection with a transaction undertaken on the principal’s behalf, the agent has an affirmative duty to account and pay over that profit to the principal, absent an agreement between the agent and the principal to the contrary). Fleet was bound to account for the amounts it kept in the rate arbitrage, and to pay it over to Gossels. Fleet compounded its breach of fiduciary duty to Gossels in April, 2000, when it refused to explain the bank’s conduct or to account to Gossels for the precise disposition of the funds, and when it refused to pay Gossels the amount represented by the spot rate of exchange.
Conversion claim. Gossels also claims on appeal that the trial court committed error in not finding for him on count II of his complaint, alleging that Fleet had converted his funds to its use.
“The elements of conversion require that a defendant be proved to have ‘intentionally or wrongfully exercise[d] acts of ownership, control or dominion over personal property to which he has no right of possession at the time . . . .’” Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 407, 412 (2003), quoting from Abington Natl. Bank v. Ashwood Homes, Inc., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 507 (1985). Here, on undisputed evidence that Fleet, as a fiduciary, retained a portion of the check proceeds based on its retail rate sheet differential, and, upon inquiry by Gossels, failed to either account for the funds or to restore them to his account, Fleet knowingly and purposefully deprived Gossels of his funds, and thereby committed the tort of conversion in addition to a breach of its fiduciary duties. See Third Natl. Bank of Hampden County v. Continental Ins. Co., 388 Mass. 240, 244 (1983) (conversion requires exercise of dominion or control over personal property of another); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965). See also Gagnon v. Coombs, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 154-159.
Negligent misrepresentation. As noted, the trial judge found and ruled for Gossels on a tort theory of negligent misrepresentation. Fleet does not question the judge’s decision to treat the case as one involving negligent misrepresentation; it argues here, as it did before the Appellate Division, only that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding of negligent misrepresentation, especially with respect to the judge’s finding that Gossels requested that Fleet pay the check proceeds to him in euros. While it is true that the evidence does not support the judge’s finding that Gossels requested the payment of the check in euros, this was not the only basis of the negligent misrepresentations. The judge found, correctly in our view, that Fleet “had an obligation to inform Gossels whether Fleet was accepting the check for ‘provisional credit’ or for ‘collection only.’ Fleet also had an obligation to inform Gossels that Fleet gave only dollars and not euros,” and did not so inform him. The bank’s silence here, in light of its duty to speak, constitutes a negligent misrepresentation. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 362 (1933); Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester, 339 Mass. at 113; Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 48 (1969). Fleet has not raised the issue whether the judge could properly enter a finding of negligent misrepresentation despite its not being expressly pleaded. We will not disturb the trial judge’s finding and ruling that Fleet was liable on a theory of negligent misrepresentation.
Chapter 93A claim. On appeal, Gossels further claims that the trial judge erred denying his claim under G. L. c. 93A. Fleet responds that its actions could not amount to a violation of the statute. The trial judge found against Gossels on the c. 93A claim because “the teller’s failure . . . was simply negligent, and therefore, neither deceptive nor unfair within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A.” The Appellate Division affirmed, ruling that “Fleet’s conduct was ‘neither deceptive nor unfair within the meaning of G. L. c. 93A.’ The conduct did not rise to the level of ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous’ conduct that is necessary for a G. L. c. 93A violation.” Having found that there was no violation of c. 93A, the trial judge never reached the issue whether Fleet had responded to Gossels’s demand letter.
Given our conclusion that Fleet was in serious breach of its fiduciary obligations to Gossels, especially as regards the disclosure of the rate of exchange differential, we conclude that it was error to find no unfair or deceptive act occurred under c. 93A.
“Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact, . . . the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a c. 93A violation is a question of law.” Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 414 (1991). General Laws c. 93A, § 2(a), inserted by St. 1967, c. 813, § 1, declares unlawful any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Liability under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, requires two elements: the conduct must be an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and the act or practice must be a foreseeable cause of injury to the plaintiff. See Lord v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 309, 317 (2004). See also Aquino v. Pacesetter Adjustment Co., 416 F. Supp. 2d 181, 192 (D. Mass. 2005).
Here, Fleet made negligent misrepresentations and breached its fiduciary duty to Gossels through its teller in the initial instance by neglecting the requirement of an endorsement on the check and in failing to disclose that the money would be collected in dollars and not in euros. As well, the teller and then Fleet’s other officers failed to disclose the rate differential the bank would pay based on its internal rate sheet and, after Gossels began to press for information, Fleet continually attempted to assure Gossels that he had been treated fairly, but without revealing the details of the rate sheet differential or of other aspects of the transaction. Again, in the initial instance, the teller failed to follow the instruction sheet specially prepared and made available to Fleet tellers with respect to international checks.
“[A] negligent misrepresentation of fact the truth of which is reasonably capable of ascertainment is an unfair and deceptive act or practice within the meaning of c. 93A, § 2(a).” Glickman v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 235 (1985). As in the Glickman case, Fleet was obviously in a better position to know the conditions of the transaction, and “should not be allowed to misrepresent the truth simply because they have not made reasonable efforts to ascertain it.” Ibid. See Berenson v. National Fin. Servs., LLC, 403 F. Supp. 2d 133, 148-152 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding financial institution potentially liable under G. L. c. 93A for depriving customers of “lost opportunity to earn interest”); Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc., 407 Mass. 391, 396-397 (1990) (holding car salesman liable under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, where misrepresentation of fact was reckless, though in nature of opinion); Golber v. BayBank Valley Trust Co., 46 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 261 (1999) (negligent misrepresentation of fact, the truth of which is reasonably capable of ascertainment, is an unfair and deceptive act or practice within the meaning of c. 93A, § 2(a). This is especially true where Fleet purposely withheld information from its principal by not revealing the rate differential, arising from its use of the internal rate sheet, that it would apply in crediting the check proceeds to his account. See Grossman v. Waltham Chem. Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 932, 933 (1982) (failure to disclose fact, the disclosure of which may have influenced a person not to enter into a transaction, is a violation of c. 93A).
Damages. Based on her finding of negligent misrepresentation, the trial judge found that Gossels had been damaged in the amount of $6,861.68, the difference between what the bank paid Gossels on December 15, 1999, and the amount he would have received on October 15, 1999, using Fleet’s internal retail rate sheet for that day, if he had been given provisional credit and had the check been properly processed.[14] Gossels argues, and we agree, that the rate used should have been the spot rate for the latter date, and not the undisclosed, unagreed-to rate Fleet withheld from the public and its customers. Absent an agreement to the contrary, see G. L. c. 106, § 4-103(a), the agent is responsible for paying to the principal the full amount of the proceeds obtained in the transaction. See Mackey v. Rootes Motors Inc., 348 Mass. 464, 467-468 (1965); Newton v. Moffie, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 462, 469 n.9 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 39, 387, 388 (1958). Here, in accordance with G. L. c. 106, § 3-107,[15] the check was payable at the Dresdner Bank either in euros or in dollars at “the current bank-offered spot rate at the place of payment for the purchase of dollars on the day on which the instrument is paid.” Because there was no agreement with respect to a different rate that would be paid to Gossels, its principal, as Fleet had not disclosed the rate at which it would pay him, had the check been properly processed by Fleet, Fleet would have been obligated to pay Gossels in accordance with the spot rate at Dresdner Bank on October 15, less the service charge made by the correspondent bank and Fleet’s collection fee. So calculated, the difference between what Fleet should have paid Gossels and what it did pay him was $10,269.03.
Fleet argues that when the check was presented for provisional credit or for collection Fleet would have no way of knowing what the spot rate would be on the date, some days hence, of presentment to Dresdner Bank, and was thus in no position to quote a precise rate to Gossels. We think this argument without merit; the internal rate sheet published for bank use only established the rate at approximately four percent less than current spot rates, and Fleet was in a position to advise Gossels of this fact, and to attempt to secure his agreement to a reduced amount.
Conclusion. The judge’s finding under count I of the complaint that Fleet is liable to Gossels for negligent misrepresentation has not been shown to be erroneous. Fleet is also liable to Gossels under count I for breach of fiduciary duty. Gossels is entitled to judgment as well on counts II (conversion) and III (G. L. c. 93A) of his complaint.[16] Duplicative damages under the multiple counts is not allowed, however. See Calimlim v. Foreign Car Center, Inc., 392 Mass. 228, 235 (1984); Mailman’s Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. v. Lizotte, 415 Mass. 865, 870 (1993). The judgment is vacated and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a single judgment in favor of Gossels on the aforementioned claims, reflecting actual damages in the amount of $10,269.03.[17] As she denied Gossels’s claim under G. L. c. 93A, the trial judge never reached the issue whether the bank had responded to Gossels’ c. 93A demand letter. Nothing in the record suggests that they did so. As we have concluded that Gossels was entitled to judgment on his claim pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, the trial court shall also, consistent with this opinion, determine whether Fleet’s violation was such as to make appropriate an award of multiple damages in accordance with c. 93A, § 9(3). See Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Brauer, 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 422. Gossels shall also be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the trial court. See G. L. c. 93A, § 9(4). The trial judge may take further evidence on each of these items on remand.
[1] We employ the name Fleet National Bank although through acquisition and merger the name no longer is used. No substitution of party appears in the record.
[2] The trial judge specifically found that “Fleet negligently misrepresented the terms by which the check would be collected and the denomination of the funds that would be credited to Gossels’[s] account” (footnote omitted). Gossels did not specifically allege a negligent misrepresentation count in his complaint.
[3] This check was a payment in reparation for the seizure by the Third Reich of property belonging to Gossels’s family.
[4] The trial judge “credit[ed] the testimony of Gossels that if he had known that Fleet intended to give him dollars instead of euros, he would have declined to give the check to Fleet and would have taken it to another bank.” The trial judge also “credited the testimony of Gossels that . . . he asked [the teller] to collect the total amount of the check in euros.” The record contains no testimony regarding this latter point.
[5] A Fleet policy sheet admitted in evidence states that “Provisional Credit payments are subject to final collection.
Foreign bank fees and Fleet service charges are deducted from proceeds.”
[6] Deutsche Bank had attempted to collect the funds by logging the check into its system and mailing the check to Dresdner Bank. After failing to receive a guaranty from Fleet in lieu of Gossels’s endorsement, Dresdner Bank returned the check unpaid.
[7] Although not clear from the record, it appears that this was the amount of interest that would have been earned to that date had Fleet accepted the check on a “provisional credit” basis.
[8] The October 15, 1999, Fleet retail exchange rate for checks under $100,000 was $1.0429 per euro. The October 15, 1999, Dresdner Bank spot rate was $1.0830. In line 16 of its answer, Fleet “Admitted that Fleet collected $84,971.19 in Euros [sic] and did not credit the Euros to Gossels['s] account but instead converted the Euros to Dollars at the then exchange rate for non-interbank transfers of more [sic] than $1 million. Further answering, Fleet says that the spot rate is only generally available for interbank transfers of more than $1
million.” (Emphasis added.) The first use of the phrase “more than $1 million” in an apparent typographical error notwithstanding, the rate used by Fleet was for interbank transfers of less than $1 million.
[9] All citations in this opinion to provisions of article 3 and 4 of the code are to those appearing in St. 1998, c. 24, § 8.
[10] The section provides in relevant part, “(a) A collecting bank must exercise ordinary care in: (1) presenting an item or sending it for presentment; (2) sending notice of dishonor or nonpayment or returning an item other than a documentary draft to the bank’s transferor after learning that the item has not been paid or accepted, as the case may be; (3) settling for an item when the bank receives final settlement; and (4) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay in transit within a reasonable time after discovery thereof.” G. L. c. 106, § 4-202.
[11] Nothing in the record suggests why the teller would give Gossels such advice, or whether the teller sought information
from superiors concerning what is common and elementary procedure in the cashing and collection of checks.
[12] As noted, there is no evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that Gossels requested payment in euros. According to the bank’s manual, the teller was under obligation to advise Gossels in this regard, and failed to so do; there was no need for Gossels to have made his wishes known. As well, the failure to advise Gossels was a breach of the bank’s fiduciary duty.
[13] We hasten to add that nothing prevents the bank from using a retail exchange rate lower than the spot rate available on the day of collection or the interbank rate used between banks; the issue here is strictly one of the disclosure an agent owes its principal with respect to the terms of the transaction (and the principal’s agreement to those terms).
[14] Neither party has challenged the trial judge’s use of the October 15, 1999, provisional credit date rather than October 21, 1999, when final collection would apparently have occurred if Gossels had endorsed the check on October 15.
[15] The trial judge found, and we agree, that insofar as the presentment to Dresdner Bank is concerned, Fleet appropriately followed the provisions of § 3-107. There is no claim that Fleet failed to obtain the appropriate amount of money at this point.
[16] As to count IV, we conclude that there was no violation of G. L. c. 106, § 3-107. The option whether to make payment in the foreign currency or in dollars lies in the payor bank, a choice over which the collecting bank has no control.
[17] As we conclude that count I of Gossels’s complaint sounds in tort and not in contract, there was no error, as claimed by Gossels, in the failure to award prejudgment interest.