Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/90900/butte-superior-co-vs-clark-montana
Timestamp: 2018-02-25 20:08:10
Document Index: 385199480

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2322', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332', '§ 2332']

Butte and Superior Co Vs Clark Montana Co - Citation 90900 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Butte and Superior Co. Vs. Clark-montana Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/90900
Case Number 249 U.S. 12
Appellant Butte and Superior Co.
Respondent Clark-montana Co.
butte & superior co. v. clark-montana co. - 249 u.s. 12 (1910) u.s. supreme court butte & superior co. v. clark-montana co., 249 u.s. 12 (1919) butte & superior copper company v. clark-montana realty company no. 598 argued january lo, 13, 1919 decided march 3, 1910 249 u.s. 12 appeal from the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus in a suit brought in the district court to determine extralateral rights between patented mining claims, the complaint averred that the construction and application of §§ 2322-2332 of the revised statutes were involved, set up the discovery, location, and patent of plaintiffs' claim, and, to meet a defect of the location notice under the state law, averred actual,.....
Butte & Superior Co. v. Clark-Montana Co. - 249 U.S. 12 (1910)
U.S. Supreme Court Butte & Superior Co. v. Clark-Montana Co., 249 U.S. 12 (1919)
years from the date of discovery, the limitation period provided by § 2332. Held that the latter allegations were part of plaintiffs' case, and involved a construction and application of § 2332, and hence the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was reviewable in this Court by appeal. Pp. 249 U. S. 20 -23.
In determining extralateral rights between adjoining patented mining claims, a failure of the earlier location notice to comply with the state law is immaterial if the junior locator, at the time of locating, knew that the earlier locator was in possession of and working his claim. The purpose of a location notice is but to give warning of the prior appropriation. P. 249 U. S. 26 .
As between two patented mining claims, priority of right to the vein of the one where it dips beneath, and unites with the vein of the other is not determined by the dates of entries and patents but by priority of discovery and location. P. 249 U. S. 27 .
An application to patent a lode mining claim invites only such contests as affect the surface, and where no surface conflict involves the apex, a prior locator of an adjacent unpatented claim is not obliged to adverse in order to protect his right to follow his vein extralaterally on the dip. P. 249 U. S. 28 .
Findings of fact made by the district court concerning the apexes, courses, and dips of mineral veins in dispute, and affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, must be accepted by this Court unless clearly wrong. P. 249 U. S. 30 .
A release and quitclaim of an undivided interest in a designated mining claim, though with expressed intent to convey all the grantor's right, title, and interest in the property, together with all earth, rock, ores, etc., found therein, held to pass only rights and interests appertaining to that claim under its location and patent, and not to affect the extralateral rights appertaining to an adjoining claim owned by the grantor. P. 249 U. S. 30 . Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 204 U. S. 204 , distinguished.
territory, uniting there with the main vein again, but the place where the apex crossed the line could not be fixed. Held proper, while decreeing plaintiffs the owner of the strand vein and entitled to its possession throughout its depth a far as it apex extended within their claim, to reserve the question of such extent and the measurement of plaintiffs' rights thereunder for determination in future supplemental proceedings in the light of further mining development. P. 249 U. S. 32 .
be substance in it, not mere verbal assertion or the anticipation of defenses. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74 ; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712 , 234 U. S. 720 .
Has appellees' statement these defects? As we have seen, there is a confident assertion that the construction and application of the designated sections of the Revised Statutes are involved, and, turning to them, we find that they are the foundation of the rights to mining claims and express the conditions of their acquisition and extent, and, it would seem, are often the basis of controversies as to them and the solution of the controversies. And realizing this, we may suppose, appellees were at pains to set out the conditions and steps they observed, and lest there might be omission, and in remedy of it if there should be, they availed themselves by appropriate allegations of § 2332, Rev.Stats. -- that is, they alleged that they were in the actual, open, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the Elm Orlu, working the same for more than five years (the period of limitation under § 2332) continuously from the date of discovery. And counsel admitted, upon a question from the bench at the oral argument, that the allegation had jurisdictional purpose and that resort was had to the federal court that appellees might avail themselves of the provisions of § 2332 and of Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli Mining Co., 194 U. S. 220 , 194 U. S. 226 , the Supreme Court of Montana having decided [ Footnote 1 ] that a notice of location which failed to comply, as appellees' did, with a statute of Montana was defective. The allegation therefore was part of appellees' case -- fortified the other allegations as grounds of suit and recovery -- and made the suit one involving the construction and application of that section. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
1. The court found that the Elm Orlu was located before the Black Rock. Of this finding there can be no doubt if the procedure of the law was observed in the location of the Elm Orlu. The steps in that procedure and their order are well established. The first of them is the discovery of mineral-bearing rock within the claim, and it must precede location. The subsequent steps -- marking the boundaries, posting notice, recording -- are the declaration of title; the patent is the final evidence of it. Such steps being observed, the right is acquired under the Revised Statutes to the vein on its course and dip to the extent that its top or apex is within the surface boundaries of the claim or within vertical planes drawn downward through them. Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1 ; Stewart Mining Co. v. Ontario Mining Co., 237 U. S. 350 .
And it is contended that the Supreme Court of Montana has decided in several cases [ Footnote 2 ] that the requirements of the state statute are imperative, and that one of these cases ( Baker v. Butte City Water Co. ) was affirmed by this Court. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 119 .
grounds: (1) that the Montana cases did not furnish the rule of decision for the federal courts, the better reasoning being (for which cases were cited) that, as the Montana statute did not impose a forfeiture, hence none resulted from defects in the declaratory statement of the Elm Orlu; (2) that the Elm Orlu people were in possession of their claim, working the same -- of which the Black Rock people had knowledge -- and that hence the latter could not avail themselves of the defects in the location of the Elm Orlu. Yosemite Mining Co. v. Emerson, 208 U. S. 25 , was adduced. In the latter ground we concur, and we need not express opinion of the other, although it has impressive strength, and was conceded to have in Yosemite Mining Co. v. Emerson. Indeed, there was a revulsion in the state against the ruling of the cases, and a law was enacted making the issue of a patent for a mining claim conclusive evidence of compliance with the requirements of the laws of the state and making valid all locations under them theretofore made
appellees. It, like the California requirement, had no other purpose than "to warn others of the prior appropriation" of the claim, and such is the principle of constructive notice. It -- constructive notice -- is the law's substitute for actual notice, and to say that it and actual notice are equivalents would seem to carry the self-evidence of an axiom. Besides, in this case, there was unequivocal possession of the Elm Orlu, and it is elementary that such possession is notice to all the world of the possessor's rights thereunder. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417 .
citing therefor Montana Mining Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 204 U. S. 204 , and Bogart v. Amanda Consolidated Gold Mining Co., 32 Colo. 32.
"that the Pyle strand of the Rainbow at some depth in the Elm Orlu diverges from the south side of the said vein and, coursing easterly, unites with the Rainbow at the Black Rock 1,100 level. [ Footnote 3 ]"
It is true the apex of the Pyle strand was found to be within the Elm Orlu, but all else as to the vein was reserved and, in the circumstances, properly reserved. There was simply retention of the case for supplementary proceedings, as the circuit court of appeals observed, to carry out the decree and make it effective under altered circumstances. Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1 , 138 U. S. 47 ; Union Pacific Ry. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 564 .