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Matched Legal Cases: ['§1988', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§1983', '§ 602', '§1983', '§1988', '§ 602', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1979', '§ 563', '§ 629', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 563', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 1979', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 563', '§ 629', '§ 1979', '§ 563', '§ 629', '§ 629', '§ 1343', '§ 24', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 193', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1', '§ 1983', '§ 24', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1336', '§ 1241', '§ 1246', '§ 3701', '§ 3742']

MAINE V. THIBOUTOT, 448 U. S. 1 (1980) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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MAINE V. THIBOUTOT, 448 U. S. 1 (1980)
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No. 79-838
2. In view of its plain language and legislative history, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988 -- which provides that attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party (other than the United States) in "any action . . . to enforce" a provision of §1983, inter alia, and which makes no exception for statutory §1983 actions -- authorizes the award of attorney's fees in such actions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 2
Moreover, it follows from the legislative history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the §1983 remedy whether the action is brought in a federal court or, as was the instant action, in a state court. Pp. 448 U. S. 11.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 448 U. S. 11.
The case presents two related questions arising under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1988. Respondents brought this suit in the Maine Superior Court alleging that petitioners, the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services, violated §1983 by depriving respondents of welfare benefits chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 3
to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7). The petitioners present two issues: (1) whether §1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, and (2) if so, whether attorney's fees under §1988 may be awarded to the prevailing party in such an action. [Footnote 1]
Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel's by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), exhausted their state administrative remedies, and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court's judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. [Footnote 2] The court, however, denied respondents' motion for attorney's fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 4
had no entitlement to attorney's fees under state law, but were eligible for attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. [Footnote 3] We granted certiorari. 444 U.S. 1042 (1980). We affirm.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 415 U. S. 675 (1974). @ 430 U. S. 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that municipalities are "persons" under § 1983, reasoned that
While some might dismiss as dictum the foregoing statements, numerous and specific as they are, our analysis in several § 1983 cases involving Social Security Act (SSA) claims has relied on the availability of a § 1983 cause of action for statutory claims. Constitutional claims were also raised chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 6
in these cases, providing a jurisdictional base, but the statutory claims were allowed to go forward, and were decided on the merits, under the court's pendent jurisdiction. In each of the following cases, § 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of action because, as the Court held in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 673-674; id. at 415 U. S. 690 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), the SSA affords no private right of action against a State. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 440 U. S. 132, and n. 13 (1979) (state foster care program inconsistent with SSA); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 436 U. S. 729, and n. 3 (1978) (state emergency assistance program consistent with SSA); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975) (state shelter allowance provisions inconsistent with SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (state prohibition against AFDC aid for college students inconsistent with SSA); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 392 U. S. 311 (1968) (state cohabitation prohibition inconsistent with SSA). Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 415 U. S. 532-533, 415 U. S. 543 (1974) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state recoupment provisions consistent with SSA); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 405 U. S. 670 (1972) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state absent-spouse rule consistent with SSA).
In the face of the plain language of § 1983 and our consistent treatment of that provision, petitioners nevertheless persist in suggesting that the phrase "and laws" should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws. [Footnote 4] Petitioners suggest that, when § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which accorded jurisdiction and a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States," was divided by the 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev.Stat. § 1979, and jurisdictional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 7
sections, Rev.Stat. §§ 563(12) and 629(16), Congress intended that the same change made in § 629(16) be made as to each of the new sections as well. Section 629(16), the jurisdictional provision for the circuit courts and the model for the current jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), applied to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights." On the other hand, the remedial provision, the predecessor of § 1983, was expanded to apply to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution and laws," and § 563(12), the provision granting jurisdiction to the district courts, to deprivations of rights secured by "the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States."
Id. at 448 U. S. 637 (POWELL, J., concurring). On the other hand, there are no indications that that was the only purpose, and Congress' attention was specifically directed to this new language. Representative Lawrence, in a speech to the House of Representatives that began by observing that the revisers had very often changed the meaning of existing statutes, 2 Cong.Rec. 825 (1874), referred to the civil rights statutes as "possibly [showing] verbal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 8
modifications bordering on legislation," id. at 827. He went on to read to Congress the original and revised versions. In short, Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not intended. [Footnote 5] Petitioners' arguments amount to the claim that, had Congress been more careful, and had it fully thought out the relationship among the various sections, [Footnote 6] it might have acted differently. That argument, however, can best be addressed to Congress, which, it is important to note, has remained quiet in the face of our many pronouncements on the scope of § 1983. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978).
Petitioners next argue that, even if this claim is within § 1983, Congress did not intend statutory claims to be covered by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 9
which added the following sentence to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (emphasis added):
The legislative history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights. Principal sponsors of the measure in both the House and the Senate, however, explicitly stated during the floor debates that the statute would make fees available more broadly. Representative chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 10
Drinan explained that the Act would apply to § 1983, and that § 1983
Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that, even if § 1988 applies to § 1983 claims alleging deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument. [Footnote 11] As we have said above, Martinez chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 11
v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), held that § 1983 actions may be brought in state courts. Representative Drinan described the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act as "authoriz[ing] the award of a reasonable attorney's fee in actions brought in State or Federal courts." 122 Cong.Rec. 35122 (1976). And Congress viewed the fees authorized by § 1988 as "an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain" compliance with § 1983. S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). It follows from this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court. [Footnote 12]
The Court holds today, almost casually, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations under color of state law of any federal statutory right. Having transformed purely statutory claims into "civil rights" actions under § 1983, the Court concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 permits chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 12
the "prevailing party" to recover his attorney's fees. These two holdings dramatically expand the liability of state and local officials, and may virtually eliminate the "American Rule" in suits against those officials
The Court asserts that "the phrase and laws' . . . means what it says," because "Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase. . . ." Ante at 448 U. S. 4. Finding no "definitive" contrary indications in the legislative history of § 1983, the Court concludes that that statute provides a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 13
remedy for violations of the Social Security Act. The Court suggests that those who would read the phrase "and laws" more narrowly should address their arguments to Congress. Ante at 448 U. S. 8.
"'not only by a consideration
Page 448 U. S. 14
of the words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law and the circumstances under which the words were employed.'"
The origins of the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 were discussed in detail in two concurring opinions last Term. Compare chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 15
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 441 U. S. 623 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring), with id. at 441 U. S. 646 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). I shall not recount the full historical evidence presented in my Chapman opinion. Nevertheless, the Court's abrupt dismissal of the proposition that "Congress did not intend to change the meaning of existing laws when it revised the statutes in 1874," ante at 448 U. S. 8, n. 5, reflects a misconception so fundamental as to require a summary of the historical record.
In addition to creating a cause of action, § 1 of the 1871 Act conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon "the district or circuit courts of the United States. . . ." 17 Stat. 13. In the 1874 revision, the remedial portion of § 1 was codified as § 1979 of the Revised Statutes, which provided for a cause of action in terms identical to the present § 1983. The jurisdictional portion of § 1 was divided into § 563(12), conferring district court jurisdiction, and § 629(16), conferring circuit court jurisdiction. Although §§ 1979, 563(12), and 629(16) came from the same source, each was worded differently. Section 1979 referred to deprivations of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws"; § 563(12) described rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States, or . . . by any law of the United States"; and § 629(16) encompassed rights secured "by the Constitution of the United States, or . . . by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 16
States." [Footnote 2/2] When Congress merged the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts in 1911, the narrower language of § 629(16) was adopted, and ultimately became the present 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 24(14), 36 Stat. 1092. [Footnote 2/3]
441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 637. Careful study of the available materials leaves no serious doubt that the Court's contrary conclusion is completely at odds with the intent of Congress in 1874. Id. at 441 U. S. 640. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 17
Ibid. [Footnote 2/5] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 18
Id. at 828. Observing that "[t]his mode of classifying . . . to some extent duplicates in the revision portions of statutes" that previously were one, Lawrence praised "the general accuracy" of the revision. Ibid. Nothing in this sequence of remarks supports the decision of the Court today. There was no mention of the addition of "and laws," nor any hint that the reach of § 1983 was to be extended. If Lawrence had any such intention, his statement to the House was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 19
a singularly disingenuous way of proposing a major piece of legislation.
The legislative history alone refutes the Court's assertion that the 43d Congress intended to alter the meaning of § 1983. But there are other compelling reasons to reject the Court's interpretation of the phrase "and laws." First, by reading those words to encompass every federal enactment, the Court extends § 1983 beyond the reach of its jurisdictional counterpart. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 20
Second, that reading creates a broad program for enforcing federal legislation that departs significantly from the purposes of § 1983. Such unexpected and plainly unintended consequences should be avoided whenever a statute reasonably may be given an interpretation that is consistent with the legislative purpose. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 287 U. S. 446-448 (1932); United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 284 U. S. 175 (1931); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 143 U. S. 459 (1892).
We have stated, for example, that a major purpose of the Civil Rights Acts was to "involve the federal judiciary" in the effort to exert federal control over state officials who refused to enforce the law. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. at 409 U. S. 427. Congress did so, in part, because it thought the state courts at the time would not provide an impartial forum. See id. at 409 U. S. 426-429. See generally 365 U. S. 174-183 (1961); Developments in the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1133, 1150-1153 (1977). Thus, Congress elected to afford a "uniquely federal remedy," Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 407 U. S. 239 (1972), that is, a "federal right in federal courts,'" District of Columbia v. Carter, supra at 409 U. S. 428, quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra at 365 U. S. 180 (emphasis added). Four Terms ago, we considered the origins of § 1343(3) and § 1983 and concluded that "the two provisions were meant to be, and are, complementary." Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 583; see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,@ 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 543, n. 7.
The Court ignores these perceptions and dismisses without explanation the proposition, explicitly accepted in Flores, that § 193 and § 1343(3) are coextensive. The Court cites no evidence that Congress ever intended to alter so fundamentally its original remedial plan, and I am aware of none. [Footnote 2/8] Nearly every commentator who has considered the question has concluded that § 1343(3) was intended to supply federal jurisdiction in all § 1983 actions. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra at 441 U. S. 637, n.19 (POWELL, J., concurring) (collecting citations). [Footnote 2/9] Since § 1343(3) covers statutory chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 22
claims only when they arise under laws providing for the equal rights of citizens, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 441 U. S. 615-618, the same limitation necessarily is implicit in § 1983. The Court's decision to apply that statute without regard to the scope of its jurisdictional counterpart is at war with the plainly expressed intent of Congress.
Even a cursory survey of the United States Code reveals that literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and social welfare enactments may be affected. [Footnote 2/12] The States now participate chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 23
in the enforcement of federal laws governing migrant labor, noxious weeds, historic preservation, wildlife conservation, anadromous fisheries, scenic trails, and strip mining. Various statutes authorize federal-state cooperative agreements in most aspects of federal land management. In addition, federal grants administered by state and local governments now are available in virtually every area of public administration. Unemployment, Medicaid, school lunch subsidies, food stamps, and other welfare benefits may provide particularly inviting subjects of litigation. Federal assistance also includes a variety of subsidies for education, housing, health care, transportation, public works, and law enforcement. Those who might benefit from these grants now will be potential § 1983 plaintiffs.
Moreover, state and local governments will bear the entire burden of liability for violations of statutory "civil rights" even when federal officials are involved equally in the administration chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 24
of the affected program. Section 1983 grants no right of action against the United States, and few of the foregoing cooperative programs provide expressly for private actions to enforce their terms. Thus, private litigants may sue responsible federal officials only in the relatively rare case in which a cause of action may be implied from the governing substantive statute. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979). It defies reason to believe that Congress intended -- without discussion -- to impose such a burden only upon state defendants.
Even when a cause of action against federal officials is available, litigants are likely to focus efforts upon state defendants in order to obtain attorney's fees under the liberal standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where "civil rights" of any kind are, at best, an afterthought. In this case, for example, the respondents added a § 1983 count to their complaint some years after the action was initiated, apparently in response to the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. See also United States v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 595 F.2d 525, 529 (CA9 1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U. S. 352 (1980). The uses of this technique have not been explored fully. But the rules of pendent jurisdiction are quite liberal, and plaintiffs who prevail on pendent claims may win awards under § 1988. Maher v. Gagne, post, p. 448 U. S. 122. Consequently, ingenious pleaders may find ways to recover attorney's fees in almost any suit against a state defendant. [Footnote 2/13] Nothing in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 suggests that Congress intended chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 25
to remove so completely the protection of the "American Rule" in suits against state defendants. [Footnote 2/14]
Today's decision confers upon the courts unprecedented authority to oversee state actions that have little or nothing to do with the individual rights defined and enforced by the civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era. [Footnote 2/15] This result cannot be reconciled with the purposes for which § 1983 was enacted. It also imposes unequal burdens on state and federal officials in the joint administration of federal programs, and may expose state defendants to liability for attorney's fees in virtually every case. If any Member of the 43d Congress had suggested legislation embodying these results, the proposal certainly would have been hotly debated. It is simply chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 26
inconceivable that Congress, while professing a firm intention not to make substantive changes in the law, nevertheless intended to enact a major new remedial program by approving -- without discussion -- the addition of two words to a statute adopted only three years earlier
Commentators have chronicled the tortuous path of judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts enacted after the Civil War. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 1323 (1952); Note, Developments in the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 27
Harv.L.Rev. 1133 (1977); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1285 (1953). One writer found only 21 cases decided under § 1983 in the first 50 years of its history. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 Ind. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). Another lamented, as late as 1952, that the statute could not be given its intended broad effect without a "judicial and constitutional upheaval of the first magnitude." Gressman, supra at 1357. That upheaval ultimately did take place, and § 1983 actions now constitute a substantial share of the federal caseload. [Footnote 2/16] Nevertheless, cases dealing with purely statutory civil rights claims remain nearly as rare as in the early years.
Although constitutional claims under § 1983 generally were limited to "personal" rights in the wake of Holt and Mr. Justice Stone's influential opinion in 307 U. S. 531 (1939), [Footnote 2/17] purely statutory claims remained virtually unrecognized. When the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a statutory claim nearly half a century after Holt, it found no case whatever "in which the right or privilege at stake was secured by a law' of the United States." Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 139, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947). The plaintiff in [email protected] was a public school teacher who alleged that the school board had discharged her because of absences incurred while exercising her statutory right to serve on a federal jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint stated a claim under § 1983. 162 F.2d 139.
The opinion in Bomar, which cited no authority and reviewed no legislative history, provoked widespread commentary. See generally Note, The Propriety of Granting a Federal Hearing for Statutorily Based Actions under the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights Acts: Blue v. Craig, 43 Geo. Wash.L.Rev. 143, 1363-1364, and n. 169 (1975). But it appears to have had little practical effect. [Footnote 2/18] The issue did not arise with any frequency until the late 1960's, when challenges to state administration of federal social welfare legislation became commonplace. The lower courts responded to these chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 29
suits with conflicting conclusions. Some found 1983 applicable to all federal statutory claims. [Footnote 2/19] Others refused to apply it to purely statutory rights. [Footnote 2/20] Yet others believed that § 1983 covered some, but not all, rights derived from nonconstitutional sources. [Footnote 2/21] Numerous scholarly comments discussed the possible solutions, without reaching a consensus. [Footnote 2/22]
The courts and commentators who debated the issue during this period were singularly obtuse if, as the Court now asserts, all doubt as to the meaning of "and laws" had been resolved by a long line of consistent authority going back to 1939. Ante at 448 U. S. 5. I know of no court or commentator who has chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 30
thought that all such doubt had been extinguished before today. [Footnote 2/23]
Rosado is not the only case to have assumed sub silentio that welfare claimants have a cause of action to challenge the adequacy of state programs under the Social Security Act. As the Court observes, many of our recent decisions construing the Act made the same unspoken assumption. Ante at 448 U. S. 6. It does not necessarily follow that the Court in those cases assumed that the cause of action was provided by § 1983, rather than the Social Security Act itself. [Footnote 2/24] But even if it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 31
did, these cases provide no support for the Court's ruling today.
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 415 U. S. 535, n. 5 (1974); see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 663; 7 U. S. 172 (1805). This rule applies with even greater force to questions involving the availability of a cause of action, because the question whether a cause of action exists -- unlike the existence of federal jurisdiction -- may be assumed without being decided. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 441 U. S. 476, and n. 5 (1979). Thus, the Court's ruling finds no support in past cases in which the issue was not squarely raised. Here, as in Hagans v. Lavine, [email protected] at 415 U. S. 535, n. 5, we must approach the question "as an open one calling for a canvass of the relevant . . . considerations." [Footnote 2/25]
The Court also relies upon "numerous and specific" dicta in prior decisions. Ante at 448 U. S. 5. But none of the cited cases contains anything more than a bare assertion of the proposition that is to be proved. Most say much less than that. For example, the Court occasionally has referred to § 1983 as a remedy for violations of "federally protected rights" or of "the Federal Constitution and statutes." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra at 436 U. S. 700-701; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 445 U. S. 649, 445 U. S. 650 (1980). These generalized references merely restate the language of the statute. They shed no light on the question whether all or chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 32
only some statutory rights are protected. To the extent they have any relevance to the issue at hand, they could be countered by the frequent occasions on which the Court has referred to § 1983 as a remedy for constitutional violations without mentioning statutes. [Footnote 2/26] But the debate would be meaningless, for none of these off-hand remarks provides the remotest support for the positions taken in this case. [Footnote 2/27]
The only remaining decisions in the Court's "consistent" line of precedents are Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 384 U. S. 829-830 (1966), and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 675. In each case, the Court asserted -- without discussion and in the course of disposing of other issues -- that § 1983's coverage of statutory rights extended beyond federal equal rights laws. Neither contains any discussion of the question; neither cites relevant authority. [Footnote 2/28] Nor has this Court always uncritically assumed the proposition for which Greenwood and Edelman chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 33
now are said to stand. On the same day the Court decided Edelman, it refused to express a view on the question whether § 1983 creates a cause of action for purely statutory claims. Hagans v. Lavine, supra at 415 U. S. 534, n, 5. The point was reserved again in Southeastern Community College v Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 442 U. S. 404-405, n, 5 (1979)
In my view, the Court's decision today significantly expands the concept of "civil rights" and creates a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal system. There is no probative evidence that Congress intended to authorize the pervasive judicial oversight of state officials that will flow from the Court's construction of § 1983. Although today's decision makes new law with far-reaching consequences, the Court brushes aside the critical issues of congressional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 34
intent, national policy, and the force of past decisions as precedent. I would reverse the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
The addition of "and laws" did not change the meaning of § 1, because Congress assumed that that phrase referred only to federal equal rights legislation. In 1874, the only such legislation was contained in the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Acts, which conferred rights also secured by the recently adopted Fourteenth Amendment. See 448 U. S. 1, supra.
In the Court's view today, § 1983 actions based on statutes unrelated to equal rights could have been brought in district, but not circuit, courts after 1874. See 448 U. S. 2, supra. When Congress merged the two jurisdictional provisions in 1911, the narrower language of the circuit court provision was adopted. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 24(14), 36 Stat. 1092. Yet there is no indication in the legislative history of the 1911 Act that Congress intended to change the scope of federal jurisdiction. The Senate Report states that the new section "merges the jurisdiction now vested in the district court . . . and in the circuit courts . . . and vests it in the district courts." S.Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, pp. 15, 50-51 (1910).
An incomplete sample of statutes requiring federal-state cooperation is collected in the 448 U. S. Plaintiffs also may contend that state activities unrelated to cooperative programs have burdened rights secured by federal statutes. E.g, Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1011, 1017-1019 (CA8) (authority of Secretary of the Interior to hold Indian lands), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 965 (1978); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319 (CA4 1977) (extradition of prisoners), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 139 (CA2) (right to sit on federal juries), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Gage v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 356 F.Supp. 80, 88 (ND Ill.1972) (right to an environmental impact statement prior to action in which federal agency participates); McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F.Supp. 414, 417, 419-420 (Md.1951) (federal ban on the tapping of telephones).
The prevailing view limiting § 1983 actions to "personal" rights may have discouraged statutory claims. See 448 U. S. 17, supra. And there was little occasion to consider whether § 1983 was limited to "equal rights" statutes, because the personal/property rights distinction served much the same purpose. Note, 43 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1361, n. 157.
E.g., Chase v. McMasters, 573 F.2d 1017, and n. 5 (relationship between Federal Government and Indians embodied in the Indian Organization Act of 1934 has "constitutional dimensions"); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 249-250 (CA2 1969) (Social Security Act not a statute providing for equal or civil rights); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat. Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 521-522 (Minn.1979) (National Bank Act restriction on interest rates not a statute providing for equal or civil rights); cf. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 166-167 (CA9 1950) (Social Security Act and National Labor Relations Act enforceable only by remedies prescribed therein).
See Cover, supra, 448 U. S. 9, at 24-25; Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 Harv.Civ.Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 1, 6-8, 19 (1970); Note, 43 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. supra, 448 U. S. 17, at 1361-1362; Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 1404, 1426 (1972); Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1285, 1299-1300 (1953); Note, 16 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 253, 263 (1948).
6. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 35
649, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976 ed. and Supp. III); see § 1336.
4. National Trails System Act, 82 Stat. 919, as amended, 16 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 36
U.S.C. § § 1241-1249 (1976 ed. and Supp. III); see § 1246 (h) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
9. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1167, 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III); see, e.g., §§ 3742, 3744(c). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 448 U. S. 37