Source: http://openjurist.org/print/529541
Timestamp: 2014-09-24 04:47:34
Document Index: 459936705

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 3583', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 2119', '§ 2119', '§ 2119', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', 'In fine', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841']

269 F3d 1250 United States of America v. Ignasio Maldenaldo Sanchez Published on OpenJurist (http://openjurist.org)
269 F3d 1250 United States of America v. Ignasio Maldenaldo Sanchez 269 F3d 1250 United States of America v. Ignasio Maldenaldo Sanchez 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.IGNASIO MALDENALDO SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.SANTIAGO GILBERTO SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 00-13347, 00-13447
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket Nos. 98-00049-CR-HLM-4-5, 98-00049-CR-06-HLM-4
Defendants-Appellants Ignasio Maldenaldo Sanchez and Santiago Gilberto Sanchez ("the Sanchezes") appeal their convictions and sentences after pleading guilty to a single-count indictment that charged them with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and amphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. They challenge their convictions and sentences primarily based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). A panel of this Court affirmed. See United States v. Sanchez, 242 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2001). Relying on United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000), the panel concluded that "in light of Apprendi, drug quantity is an element of the offense that must be charged in the indictment." Sanchez, 242 F.3d at 1298 (citing Rogers, 228 F.3d at 1324). The panel opinion repeated Rogers's statement that "'drug quantity in sections 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B) cases must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Rogers, 228 F.3d at 1327). Because the indictment did not allege a specific drug quantity, the panel opinion found that both defendants' plea colloquies were "technically inadequate." Id. The panel opinion held, however, that there was "no prejudice" because, inter alia, the Sanchezes' sentences fell below the maximum penalty permitted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Id. at 1300.
We subsequently sua sponte vacated the panel opinion and, by vote of a majority of the judges in active service, ordered that the case be reheard en banc. See United States v. Sanchez, 247 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). We address en banc: whether, in light of Apprendi, drug quantity is now always an element of an offense under § 841 that must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt; whether the district court properly denied the Sanchezes' motion to dismiss the indictment; whether the district court's drug quantity findings under § 841(b)(1)(B) and utilization of that sentencing scheme, which exposed the Sanchezes to enhanced sentences under that section but did not result in an actual term of imprisonment beyond the otherwise applicable maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C), violated Apprendi; whether Apprendi applies to the Sanchezes' § 841 indictment, guilty pleas, convictions, and sentences given that the district court's drug quantity findings did not increase their ultimate sentences beyond the otherwise applicable maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C); in this regard, whether we should adopt the analyses of Apprendi's impact on § 841 cases in United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Camacho, 248 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001), or the analyses in United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2001WL 385096 No. 00-9373 (Oct. 1, 2001), and other circuits' decisions finding that Apprendi does not apply unless a judge-made determination of drug quantity increases a defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise applicable maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C); whether Apprendi rendered the Sanchezes' plea colloquies inadequate under Rule 11 and their guilty pleas unintelligent or involuntary if the court advised them about the higher statutory maximum penalties under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B); whether terms of supervised release for § 841 convictions are controlled by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) or 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) and whether the Sanchezes' four-year terms violated Apprendi; and what is the proper standard of review for each issue.
After such review and for the reasons discussed herein, we see no error, under Apprendi or otherwise, in the Sanchezes' indictment, plea colloquies, convictions, or sentences. We therefore affirm their convictions and their sentences.
This opinion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we review the proceedings in the district court. In Part II, we review the Supreme Court's decisions in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) and Apprendi. We then discuss the federal drug statute, our precedent construing that statute, and Apprendi's effect on both. In Part III, we address the Sanchezes' challenges to their indictment, guilty pleas, and sentences, along with the corresponding standards of review. In Part IV, we summarize our conclusions.
In the district court, the Sanchezes challenged not only their sentences but also their indictment and convictions based on Jones, and on appeal, they rely primarily on Apprendi. Additionally, for the first time on appeal they challenge their plea colloquies under Rule 11 based on Apprendi. The Sanchezes emphasize that from the outset of their cases the government sought enhanced penalties under § 841(b)(1)(B) based on drug quantities. They seek to expand Apprendi's constitutional principle to, and thereby show constitutional error at, all stages of their cases. Thus, we first review in detail the proceedings in the district court.
A. Sanchezes' Indictment
In late 1998, a federal grand jury returned a single-count indictment charging that the Sanchezes "did combine, conspire, confederate, agree, and have a tacit understanding with each other, and with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to violate Title 21, United States Code, § 841, to wit: to knowingly and intentionally possess with the intent to distribute and distribute quantities of methamphetamine and amphetamine, both being Schedule II controlled substances, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846."1 The indictment referenced 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 and the type of drugs involved but not the quantities. Both defendants pled not guilty.
On April 21, 1999, defendant Ignasio Sanchez filed a "Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to Allege Facts that Increase Maximum Penalty," specifically relying on Jones. The motion stated, "Jones clearly holds that the Constitution requires an indictment to allege 'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime.' Furthermore, such a fact must be submitted to a jury for a decision as to proof beyond a reasonable doubt."2 On this basis, Ignasio Sanchez argued that the indictment had to be dismissed because the various statutory maximum penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) were determined by drug quantity, and the indictment against him did not allege a specific drug quantity.
The district court denied the motion, noting that under this circuit's precedent "[t]he statutory scheme set forth in § 841 establishes that drug quantity is a sentencing consideration." The court continued that "the Constitution does not require drug quantity to be considered as an element of the criminal offense defined by § 841." The court noted that Jones "does not stand for the proposition that every fact which exposes a criminal defendant to a higher maximum penalty must be alleged in an indictment." Subsequently, the court granted, without objection, Santiago Sanchez's request to adopt Ignasio Sanchez's motion to dismiss the indictment and denied that motion as well.3
B. Guilty Pleas and Rule 11 Colloquies
In early 2000, the district court conducted separate, but substantially similar, plea colloquies for each defendant pursuant to Rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. The court advised both defendants of their various constitutional rights and asked whether each defendant understood that, by pleading guilty to the single-count indictment, he waived those constitutional rights and there would not be a trial of any kind. Each defendant responded in the affirmative. The court read the entire indictment and advised the Sanchezes that before a jury could find them guilty, the government was required to prove the various elements of the offense, as stated in the indictment, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Regarding sentencing, the district court advised Ignasio Sanchez that depending on the amount of drugs found to be attributable to him, he faced a sentence of either (a) ten years to life imprisonment, five years' supervised release, and a $4,000,000 fine, or (b) five to forty years' imprisonment, four years' supervised release, and a $2,000,000 fine. The court advised Santiago Sanchez only of the first of these two sentences. Although not citing any particular subsections within § 841(b), the court, in effect, described the content of §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B).4 The court also discussed the Sentencing Guidelines and stated that a sentencing range would be developed for each defendant within which the court had discretion to impose a sentence depending on the circumstances of the case.
Both defendants, after acknowledging that they understood the nature of the charge against them, pled guilty to the single-count indictment. Ignasio Sanchez entered a written plea of guilty which, pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2),5 was conditional on his reservation of the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). Santiago Sanchez likewise was allowed to enter a conditional guilty plea.7
C. Pre-Sentence Reports
The initial pre-sentence reports recommended that the Sanchezes be held accountable for specific quantities of methamphetamine and amphetamine which resulted in marijuana equivalencies of 38,106.94 kilograms for Ignasio Sanchez and 50,803.91 kilograms for Santiago Sanchez. Although § 841 specifies grams of methamphetamine and amphetamine, the Sentencing Guidelines convert certain drug quantities into marijuana equivalencies as part of calculating the offense level for the guideline range. See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(c), cmt. n.10 (drug equivalency tables). The statutory penalty for the Sanchezes' drug quantities was ten years' to life imprisonment, as set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).8 Regarding the guideline range within this statutory range, the initial pre-sentence reports recommended a custodial term of 210 to 262 months for both defendants.9
Both defendants and the government timely filed written objections. For example, Ignasio Sanchez objected "to all factual findings of the presentence report as a matter of due process under the Jones rationale." Ultimately, revised pre-sentence reports recommended that Ignasio Sanchez and Santiago Sanchez be held accountable for reduced amounts of methamphetamine and amphetamine, resulting in reduced marijuana equivalencies of 5,447.74 kilograms and 6,713.99 kilograms, respectively. These reduced amounts resulted in a reduced guideline range for both defendants of 135 to 168 months.10 The revised reports stated that the "Statutory Penalty" was "5 to 40 years."11 While this penalty corresponded to § 841(b)(1)(B), the revised reports did not specifically cite to that section of the statute.
The Sanchezes were sentenced in two joint sentencing hearings. At the outset of the first hearing, Ignasio Sanchez orally renewed his motion to dismiss the indictment based on Jones and specifically "based upon the lack of specificity and quantity in the indictment." He continued that this argument "would have an effect at this time . . . in that the findings must be beyond a reasonable doubt under my motion." Both defendants, however, agreed that if validly charged and convicted under this indictment, the court could find that they were accountable for (a) one transaction involving two pounds of methamphetamine, which is equivalent to 1,814.4 kilograms of marijuana, and (b) two other transactions each involving six pounds of amphetamine, the combination of which is equivalent to 1,087.2 kilograms of marijuana. On the basis of the government's evidentiary proffer and the Sanchezes' concessions, the district court found "as a matter of fact by a preponderance of the evidence" that each defendant was responsible for drug amounts resulting in a total marijuana equivalency of 2,903.04 kilograms.12
Regarding the statutory penalty, the district court then stated that its sentencing option was a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years up to forty years. While not expressly referencing § 841(b)(1)(B), the court described the content of that section. In calculating the guideline range within that statutory range, the court determined that the above drug amounts, along with other guideline calculations, produced a custodial guideline range of 87 to 108 months for Ignasio Sanchez and 108 to 135 months for Santiago Sanchez.13 Stating an intention to sentence at the bottom end of those ranges, the court sentenced Ignasio Sanchez to 87 months' imprisonment and Santiago Sanchez to 108 months' imprisonment, followed by four years' supervised release for each defendant.
After imposing the sentences, the court asked for objections. Citing Jones, Ignasio Sanchez's counsel objected to drug quantity not being charged in the indictment and not being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Santiago Sanchez's counsel adopted the Jones objection made by Ignasio Sanchez's counsel. Subsequently, both defendants timely appealed.14
The Sanchezes challenge their single-count indictment, plea colloquies, convictions, and sentences based on Jones and Apprendi. We can discern no error in any of these phases of the Sanchezes' cases. We begin by analyzing Jones and Apprendi. We then review the federal drug statute, this circuit's precedent construing that statutory scheme, and what effect Apprendi has on that landscape.
A. Jones v. United States
Jones was a case of statutory interpretation, in which a grand jury charged the defendant with violating the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119.15 A jury found the defendant guilty. The Supreme Court stated, "This case turns on whether the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, . . . defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict." 526 U.S. at 229, 119 S. Ct. 1215. After analyzing the carjacking statute's text, structure, and legislative history, and after comparing the statute to others in which "serious bodily injury" was "unmistakably identified" as an offense element, the Supreme Court adopted the former interpretation of the statute, concluding that "the fairest reading of § 2119 treats the fact of serious bodily harm as an element, not a mere enhancement." Id. at 239, 119 S. Ct. 1215.
While resolving Jones based on this statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court further justified its construction by invoking the doctrine of constitutional doubt. The Supreme Court observed that under the alternative statutory interpretation, in which serious bodily injury was construed as a sentencing factor, "the statute would be open to constitutional doubt in light of a series of cases over the past quarter century, dealing with due process and the guarantee of trial by jury." Id. at 240, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (citing cases). In the now-famous footnote six, the Supreme Court described the principle "animating" its view that this alternative interpretation "may violate the Constitution," as follows: "[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 243 n.6, 119 S. Ct. 1215. The Supreme Court continued that "[b]ecause our prior cases suggest rather than establish this principle, our concern . . . rises only to the level of doubt, not certainty." Id.
In contrast to its task of statutory interpretation in Jones, the Supreme Court in Apprendi squarely addressed the constitutionality of a statutory sentencing scheme that allowed judge-made findings to increase a defendant's statutory maximum penalty. The defendant, Charles Apprendi, admitted to firing several bullets into the home of an African-American family who had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood in New Jersey. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. A New Jersey grand jury returned a 23-count indictment charging Apprendi with various shootings and with the unlawful possession of various weapons. Id.
Apprendi pled guilty to only three counts in the indictment, including two counts of the second-degree offense of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, in violation of § 2C:39-4(a) of the New Jersey Statutes. Id. at 469-70, 120 S. Ct. 2348. That state firearm statute provided, "Any person who has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995). As a second-degree crime, this firearm offense was punishable by a term of imprisonment "between five years and 10 years." Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) ("Except as otherwise provided, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to imprisonment . . . [i]n the case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between five years and 10 years.").
An entirely separate New Jersey statute, however, provided for higher minimum and maximum sentences than those normally applicable to second-degree crimes if the sentencing court made certain factual findings. That statute provided, "The court shall, upon application of the prosecuting attorney, sentence a person who has been convicted of a crime . . . to an extended term if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the grounds in subsection e," specifically, that "[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
The "extended term" permitted for a second-degree crime, such as possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, was "between 10 and 20 years." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-7a(3) ("In the cases designated in section 2C:44-3, a person who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced . . . to an extended term of imprisonment . . . [i]n the case of a crime of the second degree, for a term which shall be fixed by the court between 10 and 20 years."). This "extended term" of imprisonment was identical to the penalty normally applicable to first-degree crimes. See id. § 2C:43-6(a)(1).
It was this separate state statute - providing for an "extended term" of imprisonment upon a finding that the defendant acted "with a purpose to intimidate . . . because of race" - that was the focus of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi. Only after Apprendi pled guilty to the second-degree crime of firearm possession for an unlawful purpose, which carried a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment, the state requested that the sentencing court impose an enhanced sentence on one of the two firearms counts, pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e). Following an evidentiary hearing on whether Apprendi's "purpose" for the shooting at issue in that count was "to intimidate . . . because of race," the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence "that the crime was motivated by racial bias" and thus that Apprendi acted "with a purpose to intimidate . . . because of race" as stated in the statute. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
Under the terms of the state statute, this judge-made finding triggered an "extended term" of imprisonment of ten to twenty years. Accordingly, the trial judge, over Apprendi's constitutional objection, sentenced Apprendi to twelve years' imprisonment on that count. Id. This sentence was two years above the ten-year maximum ordinarily applicable to the second-degree offense with which Apprendi had been charged and to which he had pled guilty. Id. In addition to this sentence on one of the firearm counts, the court sentenced Apprendi to shorter, concurrent terms on the remaining two counts of the indictment to which Apprendi had pled guilty. Id.
Apprendi appealed his twelve-year sentence on the one firearm count. Id. He argued that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution required that the finding of racial bias upon which his sentence was increased be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a judge based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. The state supreme court affirmed Apprendi's sentence, and he petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 472, 120 S. Ct. 2348.
The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 469, 120 S. Ct. 3248. The Supreme Court noted that the answer to this question was "foreshadowed" by its earlier opinion in Jones. Id. at 476, 120 S. Ct. 2348.
The Supreme Court stated that the rights set forth in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments "indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 477, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). After conducting a historical examination of this entitlement, the Court noted that the "due process and associated jury protections extend, to some degree, to determinations that [go] not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence." Id. at 484, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court continued that its decision did not strip the term "sentencing factor" of all meaning, but rather, the "term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense." Id. at 494 n.19, 120 S. Ct. 2348. The Court recognized, "On the other hand, when the term 'sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an 'element' of the offense." Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court then squarely adopted the following constitutional principle, which was foreshadowed by Jones and has since provided the Sanchezes and so many other criminal defendants ammunition with which to attack their sentences: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348. Applying this principle to the facts of Apprendi's case, the Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing procedure permitted by the New Jersey statutory scheme - which allowed a judge-made finding of racial bias by a preponderance of the evidence to increase a defendant's term of imprisonment for a firearm offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum of ten years and up to twenty years - was invalid. Id. at 491, 120 S. Ct. 2348. The Court therefore reversed Apprendi's 12-year sentence on the firearm offense.16 Id. at 497, 120 S. Ct. 2348.
Thus, Apprendi's holding does not paint with the wide brush suggested by the Sanchezes. Rather, Apprendi was a sentencing case, presented a narrow sentencing issue, and made only a narrow holding about New Jersey's sentencing procedure, specifically: A trial judge cannot find a fact, such as racial bias, and then use that fact to impose a sentence higher than the prescribed statutory maximum penalty for the underlying criminal offense. Indeed, the Court itself characterized the question presented in Apprendi as a "narrow issue." Id. at 474, 120 S. C. 2348.
Moreover, the Apprendi opinion expressly limited the applicability of the constitutional principle it described. Fundamentally, Apprendi did not require that all sentencing factors be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, Apprendi expressly reaffirmed the long-established general principle that a judge-decided fact may affect a defendant's sentence within the applicable statutory range without invoking the constitutional principles articulated in Apprendi. In describing the origins of the requirement that all elements of a crime be proven to a jury, the Court stated, "We should be clear that nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion - taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender - in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual case." Id. at 481, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). The Court continued that its "periodic recognition of judges' broad discretion in sentencing . . . has been regularly accompanied by the qualification that that discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed by the legislature." 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S. Ct. 1248.
In this same vein, the Supreme Court in Apprendi also expressly preserved its earlier opinion in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), in which the Court permitted a fact triggering a mandatory minimum sentence to be decided by a judge based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 86-88, 106 A. Ct. 2411.17 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically stated, "We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict - a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13. Thus, Apprendi actually reaffirmed the longstanding practice of allowing judge-decided facts to affect the length of a defendant's sentence, including leaving the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence within the purview of the trial judge. Apprendi carved out only a limited exception to this general rule for facts that actually cause the sentence imposed on a defendant to exceed the prescribed statutory maximum, requiring that such facts be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt rather than decided by a judge based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Likewise, Apprendi does not apply to judge-made determinations pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to the Apprendi rule."); United States v. Harris, 244 F.3d 828, 829-30 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to the relevant conduct provision of the Sentencing Guidelines); see also United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that "Sentencing Guideline issues are not subject to the Apprendi rule and, thus, there is no requirement that sentencing facts be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt"). As the Supreme Court in Apprendi noted, "The Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has already held." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 n.21. While Apprendi was silent on the issue, its inapplicability to the Sentencing Guidelines follows from its holding. A factual finding under the Guidelines determines the sentence within the statutory range rather than outside it. Because Apprendi only addresses facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, it does not apply to those findings that merely cause the guideline range to shift within the statutory range.18
Apprendi also did not hold that judge-decided facts that expose a defendant to a higher statutory maximum penalty must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The analysis employed in, and the holding of, Apprendi make clear that any consideration of a defendant's sentence in light of Apprendi is to be conducted retrospectively rather than prospectively. The defendant in Apprendi was not merely exposed to a higher sentence than otherwise applicable but was actually sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment under New Jersey's entirely separate "hate crime" statute, which was above the prescribed statutory maximum of ten years' imprisonment for his firearm offense. Our reading of Apprendi anchors its holding to the facts involved. In sum, Apprendi is implicated only when a judge-decided fact actually increases the defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for the crime of conviction.19
C. The Federal Drug Statute
We next examine the impact of Apprendi on the federal drug statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841. To do so, we review initially the plain language and structure of the statutory scheme itself and then our precedent regarding that statute. We then ascertain the effect of Apprendi on both. In reviewing a statutory scheme, "[o]ur task is to construe what Congress has enacted. We begin, as always, with the language of the statute." Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2001).20
The Sanchezes were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).21 Section 841(a), entitled "Unlawful acts," describes the prohibited conduct and the state of mind required for a drug offense. Specifically, § 841(a)(1) renders it "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added).22 The Sanchezes pled guilty to conspiring to violate § 841(a)(1).
According to the plain language of § 841(a)(1), a "controlled substance" is a distinct element of that drug offense. Because § 841(a) makes it unlawful for a person knowingly or intentionally to possess with intent to distribute a "controlled substance," then necessarily there must be an actual "controlled substance" of some quantity involved in that drug offense.23 Thus, to some extent, when a defendant pleads guilty to, or a jury finds the defendant guilty of, an indictment charging possession with intent to distribute a "controlled substance," a drug quantity of some amount is already part of the underlying crime of conviction.
Section 841(b), entitled "Penalties," provides the penalties for violations of § 841(a). It states that "any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (emphasis added). What follows in § 841(b) are myriad sentencing factors (including serious bodily injury, prior felony drug convictions, and drug types and quantities) and associated penalties. Thus, the penalties in § 841(b) become applicable only after a defendant has been duly convicted of a substantive violation of § 841(a).
Section 841(b)'s penalties begin with a statutory maximum of life imprisonment in § 841(b)(1)(A) and decrease in severity based on this host of sentencing factors, including drug types and quantities.24 The first three subsections of § 841(b)(1) govern offenses involving controlled substances listed in schedules I and II, such as the methamphetamine and amphetamine involved in this case. Accordingly, those three subsections will receive the brunt of our attention.
Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides that "[i]n the case of a violation of subsection (a)" of § 841 "involving" certain enumerated quantities of certain enumerated drug types, the defendant "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Section 841(b)(1)(B) largely mirrors § 841(b)(1)(A), providing that "[i]n the case of a violation of subsection (a)" of § 841 "involving" certain lesser amounts of those same drugs set forth in § 841(b)(1)(A), the defendant "shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years." Id. § 841(b)(1)(B).
Section 841(b)(1)(C) applies to all other violations of § 841(a) involving schedule I or II substances and provides, "In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II, . . . except as provided in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D), such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years." 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).25 Section 841(b)(1)(C) sets a term of imprisonment for offenses without regard to drug quantity.26
Thus, § 841 is bifurcated, providing a clear dichotomy of offense elements and sentencing factors. Specifically, the plain language and structure of the statute reflect a congressional intent to create a single offense, defined in § 841(a), and to provide for penalties in § 841(b) dependant upon sentencing factors, such as drug types and quantities.27
D. Circuit Precedent Prior to Apprendi
On multiple occasions prior to both Jones and Apprendi, this Court construed the federal drug statute and concluded that while a "controlled substance" is an element of an offense under § 841(a), neither the nature nor the quantity of that substance is an element of that offense that must be submitted to a jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, this Court held that in order to obtain a conviction, the government need show only that some controlled substance was involved.28 The defendants in these pre-Apprendi cases often argued that drug quantity was an essential element of their offenses.29 We consistently rejected this claim, construing § 841(a) as setting forth a single, complete offense and § 841(b) as setting forth sentencing factors relevant only to determining a defendant's sentence for having violated § 841(a).30
We preserved this interpretation of § 841 even after Jones. See United States v. Hester, 199 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 531 U.S. 941 (2000).31 Hester represented the first serious encounter between our prior statutory interpretation and the constitutional rule of Apprendi, which at that time existed in more embryonic form as footnote six of Jones. In Hester, we noted that our precedent construing § 841 constituted "binding authority" in which we "clearly rejected the characterization of the amount of drugs as an element of the offense under [section] 841." Id. at 1291 (citing cases). We then noted that this precedent foreclosed any argument that drug quantity was an element of an offense under § 841 "unless the Supreme Court decided otherwise in Jones." Id. After quoting and discussing footnote six, we adopted a narrow reading of Jones and concluded that the constitutional principles referenced in Jones did not disrupt our prior approach to § 841 cases.32 Id. at 1291-92. We therefore continued to follow our precedent holding that § 841 is clear and unambiguous and reaffirmed that "[a]s we have announced in our previous cases, Congress decided that the elements of a § 841 offense do not include the weight of the drugs." Id. at 1292.33
E. Apprendi's Impact on § 841 and Our Precedent
Such was the landscape applicable to the federal drug statute before Apprendi squarely adopted the constitutional principle that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Our reading of the tenor of the Supreme Court's decisions is that § 841 is impacted by Apprendi but only to the limited extent that judge-decided facts actually increase a defendant's sentence above the prescribed statutory maximum. We explain the narrow manner in which Apprendi affects § 841.34
Fundamentally, Apprendi did not announce any new principles of statutory construction. Rather, Apprendi addressed only the constitutionality of a state statutory sentencing scheme, and its holding only described constitutional principles affecting such statutory sentencing schemes. Apprendi thus does not change our precedent interpreting § 841 outlined above but instead imposes only an external constitutional restraint under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. While Apprendi does not affect our prior statutory construction of § 841(b) as setting forth purely sentencing factors, it does alter our prior conclusion that such judge-decided facts satisfy a defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial even when those factors increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.35
This external constitutional restraint, however, does not apply to the vast majority of sentencing scenarios. To repeat the oft-repeated, Apprendi explicitly limited its holding to facts "that increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). Therefore, Apprendi has no effect on cases in which a defendant's actual sentence falls within the range prescribed by the statute for the crime of conviction. As stated above, § 841(b)(1)(C) provides a statutory penalty range applicable to all drug offenses involving the controlled substances listed on Schedules I or II without regard to drug quantity. Apprendi thus does not even apply when a defendant's actual sentence for a § 841 drug offense falls within that range. See United States v. Gerrow, 232 F.3d 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[T]here is no error, plain or otherwise, under Apprendi where the term of imprisonment is within the statutory maximum set forth in § 841(b)(1)(C) for a cocaine offense without regard to drug quantity."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 00-9373 (Oct. 1, 2001); United States v. Gallego, 247 F.3d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that because the defendant's sentence of 168 months' imprisonment fell "below the twenty year maximum prescribed by section 841(b)(1)(C)," there is "no error under Apprendi"); United States v. Le, 256 F.3d 1229, 1240 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating in a case under the Hobbs Act that because the defendant's sentence was below the statutory maximum, "Apprendi is inapplicable").36 Accordingly, in a § 841 case, when a defendant's sentence falls at or below the statutory maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C), there is no Apprendi error and there is no need for drug quantity to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.37
Additionally, Apprendi has no application to cases in which statutory sentencing factors trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. As noted above, Apprendi expressly preserved McMillan, in which the Supreme Court approved the use of judge-made factual findings to sentence a defendant to a mandatory minimum penalty. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13. Therefore, in a § 841 case, Apprendi does not prohibit a judge from making drug quantity findings and sentencing a defendant to one of the mandatory minimum sentences in § 841(b), provided that the mandatory minimum term does not exceed the otherwise applicable statutory maximum. This important proposition leaves intact our pre-Apprendi cases involving the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences under § 841(b). See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 905 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) ("As to sentencing, it is now equally well-settled that a defendant need not know the quantity of drug involved in the offense in order to be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence based on quantity under § 841(b)(1)."). Thus, we join six other circuits in concluding that there is no error under Apprendi when the district court sentences a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b).38
Instead, Apprendi applies to § 841 cases only in this limited sense: In light of Apprendi, there is constitutional error in a defendant's sentencing procedures when drug quantity increases a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C), unless it was submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, in a § 841 case in which a defendant's ultimate sentence falls at or below the statutory maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C), there is no Apprendi error and drug quantity need not have been submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, judge-made findings of drug quantity may be used to sentence a defendant anywhere within the applicable statutory range and, as outlined above, may be used in all guidelines calculations. All of these rules on the effect of Apprendi on § 841 have the additional benefit of being consistent with the views adopted in virtually every other circuit to address these matters to date.39
III. THE SANCHEZES' CLAIMS
Having described Apprendi and its effect on § 841 and our precedent, we turn to the Sanchezes' challenges to their indictment, plea colloquies, convictions, and sentences. The Sanchezes seek to stretch Apprendi's constitutional rule and Jones's dicta to apply to the beginning, middle, and end of the criminal procedures in their cases. Specifically, they emphasize that from the outset of their cases, the government sought enhanced penalties under § 841(b)(1)(B) based on the quantity of the methamphetamine and amphetamine involved in their offense. As a result, they contend that their cases were "§ 841(b)(1)(B) cases" and thus that drug quantity was an element of their offense that not only had to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt but that also had to be charged in their indictment. Consistent with these views, the Sanchezes timely moved in the district court to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege the required element of drug quantity, specifically citing Jones. Upon denial of that motion, they entered conditional plea agreements preserving that issue for appeal.
On appeal, the Sanchezes also contend that because their cases are "§ 841(b)(1)(B) cases," the failure to comply with this trio of procedural requirements - indictment, jury submission, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt - was constitutional error under Apprendi or at least under United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000), which the Sanchezes assert expanded Apprendi to all "§ 841(b)(1)(A) and § 841(b)(1)(B) cases." They further argue that the failure to comply with this procedural triumvirate constituted constitutional error that is so fundamental as to be structural error and reversible per se. They also assert that the omission of an essential element from the indictment constituted a jurisdictional error requiring dismissal of the indictment.
Alternatively, the Sanchezes claim that the lack of a specific drug quantity in their indictment meant that their maximum sentence was limited to twenty years under § 841(b)(1)(C) and that their plea colloquies thus did not comply with Rule 11. Although their indictment charged "quantities of methamphetamine and amphetamine," they submit that it had to charge a specific drug quantity in order to support an enhanced sentence under § 841(b)(1)(B). They argue that the district court erred not only by advising them of the increased penalty ranges corresponding to §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B) in Ignasio Sanchez's case and § 841(b)(1)(A) in Santiago Sanchez's case but also by not mentioning § 841(b)(1)(C) and by not advising them that only the lower penalty range under § 841(b)(1)(C) was applicable to the charges in their indictment. In short, the Sanchezes challenge not merely their sentences, as defendant Apprendi did, but also their indictment, plea colloquies, and convictions stemming from that indictment. We are not persuaded by their arguments and address each issue in turn.
Of course, the correct response to an argument that the Sanchezes make about the lack of a specific drug quantity in a § 841 indictment is usually that by entering a guilty plea and ultimately stipulating to or not contesting drug quantity, defendants thereby waive the right to appeal on the basis of Apprendi.40 The Sanchezes' plea agreements, however, were conditional on their right to appeal the sufficiency of the indictment. Because the Sanchezes' conditional plea agreements preserved the indictment issue for appellate review, their guilty pleas do not resolve the matter as would normally be the case. Thus, in light of Jones and Apprendi, we address whether the district court erred in denying the Sanchezes' motion to dismiss their indictment. In other words, we consider whether the Sanchezes correctly claimed in that motion that drug quantity is an essential element that now must always be charged in an indictment for a § 841 offense. We first address the standard of review and then why we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the Sanchezes' motion to dismiss the indictment.
Because the Sanchezes timely raised and thus preserved for appeal the issue of error in their indictment under Apprendi, we review it de novo, but we will reverse only for harmful error. See United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1998). As we have held, Apprendi error is constitutional error, subject to harmless or plain error review depending on the timing of the constitutional objection. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming thirty-year sentence); United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2535 (2001); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829-30 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming thirty-two-year sentence).
Given our precedent, we reject the Sanchezes' claims that Apprendi error is either structural or jurisdictional. In Smith, Candelario, and Nealy, we correctly outlined why an Apprendi error did not create a structural error. In Nealy, we explained, "Structural error occurs only in the rare instance involving a 'structural defect affecting the framework within [which] the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Nealy, 232 F.3d at 829 n.4 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).41 "Failure to submit the issue of drug quantity to the jury is just an element of the trial process and does not rise to the level of structural error. . . ." Id. It "is not structural error because it 'does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or [an] unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.'" Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)). Harmless error review is "appropriate" in the Apprendi context "because it 'block[s] setting aside [sentences] for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.'" Id. at 829-30 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)).
Our precedent follows Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), where the Supreme Court held that "the omission of an element [in a jury instruction] is an error that is subject to harmless-error analysis." Id. at 15. Any Apprendi error arising from the omission of a specific drug quantity in a § 841 indictment is analogous to the jury-instruction error in Neder.42 Indeed, part of the Sanchezes' argument is precisely that a specific drug quantity must be charged in the indictment so that it will then be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant's right to have a petit jury find each element of the offense is no less important than his right to have that same element presented to the grand jury.43
Likewise, we have rejected the claim, which the Sanchezes also make, that an Apprendi error creates a jurisdictional error. See United States v. Cromartie, ___ F.3d ___, No. 00-13957 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2001); McCoy v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, No. 00-16434 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2001).44 A jurisdictional defect occurs only where a federal court lacks power to adjudicate at all. Id.45 The constitutional rights to be charged by a grand jury, be informed of an accusation, and to have a jury trial are the personal rights of the defendant and do not go to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) provides that certain offenses "may be prosecuted by information" if the defendant "waives in open court prosecution by indictment." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Such waiver would not be possible if the indictment-related right were jurisdictional, as parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts by consent. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938).
The notion that any Apprendi-based challenge has a jurisdictional dimension is also implicitly rejected by our precedent's consistent application of plain or harmless error review. See, e.g., United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 943-44 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding plain error under Apprendi in a thirty-year sentence where the indictment did not allege drug quantity but finding no effect on defendant's substantial rights); United States v. Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2000) (assuming arguendo a life sentence was plain error under Apprendi where indictment did not allege drug quantity but finding no effect on defendant's substantial rights), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001).46
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, explicitly endorsed this approach. See United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (concluding that "the failure of an indictment to allege an essential element of a crime does not deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, such failure is subject to harmless error review"). Two other circuits have handled omissions of an element from an indictment in a similar manner.47 See United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating in a § 841 case involving an Apprendi challenge that indictment and jury-instruction errors are "analogous to the instructional error the Court considered in Neder" and did not constitute structural error, and affirming the defendant's 262-month sentence under plain-error review); United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 310-12 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating in a 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) case where the indictment did not charge a type of firearm that the court was "compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in Neder to subject the indictment error in this case to plain error review," and thus finding error was not structural and affirming the defendants' ten-year sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2215 (2001).48 We now turn to the Sanchezes' Apprendi-based challenge to their indictment.
2. The Sanchezes' Indictment
By sparing no expense in the foundational discussion above, the case-specific application of Apprendi that follows will enjoy the luxury of brevity. The correct response to the Sanchezes' argument is that they ultimately were sentenced below the otherwise applicable statutory maximum in § 841(b)(1)(C), and thus, drug quantity never was an element of their offense under § 841 and never became an element under Apprendi. Therefore, there is no Apprendi error in their indictment or in their convictions and sentences stemming from that indictment.
Both before and after Apprendi, in any § 841 case, an indictment charging that a defendant violated § 841 properly charges a complete federal crime without any reference to either drug type or quantity. While under Apprendi the allowable maximum sentence for a § 841 violation may differ depending on how drug quantity was handled at the plea, trial, or sentencing phases, and on the timeliness of an Apprendi-based objection, Apprendi has no effect whatsoever on whether a complete federal crime under § 841 is charged in an indictment that does not specify drug quantity. Therefore, even if an indictment for a § 841 offense does not allege a specific drug quantity, it is legally and constitutionally sufficient both before and after Apprendi, and a district court may still accept the defendant's guilty plea to, or try a defendant on, a § 841 charge and then sentence the defendant for that charge. Thus, the district court did not err in denying the Sanchezes' motion to dismiss their indictment.49
We fully recognize that from the outset of the Sanchezes' cases the government sought enhanced sentences, particularly under § 841(b)(1)(B), and that the district court made drug quantity findings and purported to sentence both Sanchezes under that section. Accordingly, the Sanchezes argue that their cases were "§ 841(b)(1)(B) cases" and thus that there is not only Apprendi error in their cases but also "Rogers error" as coined in United States v. Camacho, 248 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000)).
As explained above, being sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(A) or § 841(b)(1)(B) and being potentially exposed to a higher sentence under either section do not create Apprendi error. Indeed, the condition that the Sanchezes describe - that of facing theoretical or potential exposure to a particular fate under § 841(b)(1)(B) but actually being consigned to one of less severity under § 841(b)(1)(C) - borders on the metaphysical. Contrary to the Sanchezes' suggestion, Apprendi did not hold that judge-made factual findings that merely expose a defendant to a higher statutory maximum penalty, without actually resulting in a sentence beyond the applicable maximum, must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We thus agree with those circuits that have concluded that theoretical exposure to a higher sentence does not constitute error under Apprendi. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 121-22 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]heoretical exposure to a higher sentence, unaccompanied by the imposition of a sentence that in fact exceeds the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum, is of no consequence. . . . In fine, the Apprendi rule applies only in situations in which a judge-made factual determination actually boosts the defendant's sentence beyond the basic statutory maximum. Theoretical exposure to a higher maximum punishment, in and of itself, is not enough.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 00-10411 (Oct. 1, 2001). As stated above, there is no error at all under Apprendi unless a judge-made factual finding actually increases the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum in § 841(b)(1)(C).50
We also recognize that, prior to this en banc decision, our circuit precedent regarding the impact of Apprendi on § 841 cases stemmed largely from United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000) and its progeny. See, e.g., United States v. Camacho, 248 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2535 (2001); United States v. Shepard, 235 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 00-10410 (Oct. 1, 2001). Rogers was correct in some aspects of its analysis but wrong in others. Rogers properly recognized, "Applying Apprendi's constitutional principle to § 841 cases, it is clear that the principle is violated if a defendant is sentenced to a greater sentence than the statutory maximum based upon the quantity of drugs, if such quantity is determined by the sentencing judge rather than the trial jury." Rogers, 228 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis added). Rogers continued that such a sentence - that is, one greater than the statutory maximum - violates Apprendi unless drug quantity was charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.51 To this extent, Rogers correctly analyzed Apprendi's effect on § 841.52
Rogers, however, extended Apprendi substantially beyond its holding, and we are not prepared to go that far. Rogers suggested that the mere fact that a sentence arose in "section 841(b)(1)(A) and section 841(b)(1)(B) cases" meant that drug quantity must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt even if the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum in § 841(b)(1)(C). See id. at 1327. As we have explained, this is not so unless the factual finding of drug quantity boosts the actual sentence imposed under §§ 841(b)(1)(A) or 841(b)(1)(B) beyond the statutory maximum otherwise permissible under § 841(b)(1)(C) absent drug quantity.
Specifically, Rogers also stated: (1) that "sections 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B) may not be utilized for sentencing without a finding of drug quantity by the jury," Rogers, 228 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis added); (2) "that drug quantity in section 841(b)(1)(A) and section 841(b)(1)(B) cases must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi," id. (emphasis added); (3) that when a defendant is sentenced under the wrong subsection of § 841(b), "this alone is reason for us to vacate and remand the sentence," id. at 1321; and (4) that "[a]pplying the rule [of Apprendi] to the facts at hand, it is clear that Rogers must be sentenced under section 841 without reference to drug quantity," id. at 1328; and decided (5) to "overrule Hester to the extent it is inconsistent with this holding," id.
As we have explained, however, a district court's drug quantity findings and utilization of the § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 841(b)(1)(B) sentencing schemes in § 841 cases in no manner violate Apprendi unless the actual sentence ultimately imposed exceeds the catchall maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, for example, mandatory minimum sentences do not violate Apprendi's constitutional rule because they do not exceed the catchall statutory maximum penalty in § 841(b)(1)(C) that is otherwise applicable when no specific drug quantity is charged or found by the jury.53 We therefore expressly disavow these five propositions in Rogers and any repetition of them in Rogers's progeny.
Apprendi does not prohibit all uses of drug quantity in sentencing under § 841, or any use of drug quantity in guideline calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines for that matter. Rather, it prohibits such use only to the extent that a factual finding of drug quantity increases a defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise applicable statutory maximum penalty under § 841(b)(1)(C) absent drug quantity. We limit Rogers's analysis and conclusion about Apprendi to those § 841 cases where the defendant's sentence is both (1) directly affected by a judge-made finding of drug quantity under either § 841(b)(1)(A) or § 841(b)(1)(B), and (2) as a direct result of that drug quantity finding actually exceeds the statutory maximum otherwise permissible under § 841(b)(1)(C).54 As explained above, in all circumstances other than this, there is no Apprendi error.
In sum, a defendant is not entitled to dismissal of a § 841 indictment that does not allege a specific drug quantity, whether that indictment was issued before or after Apprendi. Instead, whether a specific drug quantity is charged affects only the permissible statutory maximum sentence and not the sufficiency of a § 841 indictment. In the context of § 841, Apprendi involves error in sentencing and necessarily looks retrospectively, rather than prospectively, at whether the criminal procedures that culminated in the actual sentence pass constitutional muster.55 Thus, for all of these reasons, the Sanchezes have not shown that the district court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment.
B. Plea Colloquies
The Sanchezes next attempt to make use of Apprendi by arguing - for the first time on appeal - that their convictions must be reversed because their guilty pleas were unintelligent and involuntary under Apprendi. The Sanchezes' challenge to their guilty pleas rests on two branches of the Apprendi tree.
First, the Sanchezes assert that the district court failed to comply with Rule 11 before accepting their guilty pleas because it did not address drug quantity, which they believe Apprendi converted into an element of their offense. The second aspect of their argument is that Apprendi vitiated the voluntariness of their guilty pleas by reducing the legally permissible maximum penalty they faced for their drug offense. More specifically, they aver that their guilty pleas were induced by the threat of a harsher punishment - up to forty years or life imprisonment - than was possible given Apprendi, under which they faced a maximum penalty of only twenty years' imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(C).
The Sanchezes raise the Apprendi issues concerning their guilty pleas for the first time on appeal. This Court has held "that a defendant who has not presented his objection to the district court - for example, through a motion to withdraw the plea - must show plain error on direct appeal." United States v. Quinones, 97 F.3d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1996).56 Thus, the Sanchezes must show that there is (1) "error," (2) "that is 'plain,'" and (3) "that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'" Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). "If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (other internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Rule 11
The Sanchezes claim that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 11 when it accepted their guilty pleas. Rule 11 provides that "[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty . . . the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands," certain matters. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). At issue in this case are the requirements in Rule 11 that the court properly advise the defendant of "the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole or supervised release term." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). Under Rule 11, a "court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d).
Rule 11 serves two purposes: "to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary" and "to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). "Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas." Id.
"No simple or mechanical rule determines whether the district court complied with Rule 11's mandate to satisfy itself that [the defendants] understood the nature of the charges against them." United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 237 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 968 (11th Cir. 1985)). "Rather, the inquiry varies from case to case depending on 'the relative difficulty of comprehension of the charges and of the defendant's sophistication and intelligence.'" Id. (quoting Bell, 776 F.2d at 968). This Court has described "the spectrum of complexity of charges and the concomitant degree of required explication" as follows:
"For simple charges . . . a reading of the indictment, followed by an opportunity given the defendant to ask questions about it, will usually suffice. Charges of a more complex nature, incorporating esoteric terms or concepts unfamiliar to the lay mind, may require more explication. In the cases of extreme complexity, an explanation of the elements of the offense like that given the jury in its instructions may be required."
Id. (quoting United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)). We recently stated that "[p]ossession with intent to distribute crack and conspiracy to do the same are not of course the most complicated of offenses." United States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001).
In assessing whether a district court's failure to comply with Rule 11 constitutes plain error,