Source: http://ks.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150716_0000672.DKS.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-04-30 16:39:23
Document Index: 194962971

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 416', '§ 405', '§ 405', 'art, 287', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 466']

| Etzel v. Colvin
Etzel v. Colvin
MARK S. ETZEL, Plaintiff,v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter Commissioner) denying Disability Insurance benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under sections 216(i), 223, 1602, and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381a, and 1382c(a)(3)(A) (hereinafter the Act). Finding at most harmless error in the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) evaluation of the opinions of the medical sources, including the opinion of an "other" medical source, the court ORDERS that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision in this case.
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI benefits, alleging disability beginning August 15, 2008. (R. 28, 253, 255). He exhausted proceedings before the Commissioner, and now seeks judicial review of the final decision denying benefits. Plaintiff alleges substantial evidence does not support the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment because he credited medical source opinions that Plaintiff had certain mental limitations, but did not include those limitations in the RFC assessed.
The court's review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review "[t]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether he applied the correct legal standard. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord, White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but it is less than a preponderance; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also, Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)). "If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary." Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether he has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of his impairment(s) meets or equals the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1). Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner assesses claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id. The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the sequential process- determining at step four whether, in light of the RFC assessed, claimant can perform his past relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience, claimant is able to perform other work in the economy. Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one through four the burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of past relevant work. Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord, Dikeman v. Halter, 245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 n.2. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the economy which are within the RFC assessed. Id.; Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1999).
The court finds at most harmless error in the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of "claimant's counselor, " ARNP Smith. and of the state agency non-examining psychologist, Dr. Cohen. (R. 38) (citing Ex. 35F). Consequently, it affirms the decision below.
II. The ALJ's RFC Assessment Is Supported by His Evaluation of the Opinions of Dr. Cohen and ARNP Smith
Plaintiff points out that in applying the Commissioner's psychiatric review technique at step three of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in the areas of social functioning and of concentration, persistence, or pace. (Pl. Br. 14).[1] He points out that the State agency psychologist, Dr. Cohen, opined that Plaintiff could perform simple work away from the public, and that Ms. Smith opined that Plaintiff had "moderate" limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting and to respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. (Pl. Br. 15). He argues that there is no other opinion contradictory to these opinions, and asserts that the ALJ accorded "significant weight" to both of these opinions. Id. Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE) limited Plaintiff to jobs that require "only occasional cooperation and interaction with the general public, " and hypothesized that Plaintiff retained the ability to "adapt to changes in the workplace on a basic level." Id. at 16 (quoting R. 82).
Plaintiff argues that the ability to adapt to changes in the workplace on a basic level is contradicted by Ms. Smith's opinion that Plaintiff is moderately limited in the ability to respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting and to respond appropriately to normal work pressures. He argues that the ALJ purported to accord "significant weight" to Ms. Smith's opinion, that he did not propose hypothetical questions containing the limitations opined by Ms. Smith, and that this is error requiring remand because the hypothetical question to the VE did not include all of the limitations assessed by the ALJ.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly considered the medical source opinions in assessing Plaintiff's RFC. She argues that the ALJ's decision "can be supported by objective medical evidence" (Comm'r Br. 4), and cites to record evidence supporting a finding that Plaintiff can perform work. Id. at 5. She argues that both Dr. Cohen's opinion and Ms. Smith's opinion that "Plaintiff had only slight limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short, simple instructions and making judgments on simple work-related decisions" support the decision. (Comm'r Br. 7).
With regard to the remainder of Ms. Smith's opinion, the Commissioner points out that Ms. Smith is not an "acceptable medical source, " and that her opinion cannot be considered a "medical opinion" or a "treating source opinion." Id. at 9. She argues that Ms. Smith's opinion (that Plaintiff was moderately limited in the abilities to adapt to work setting pressures and changes) is not better supported by the record evidence or more consistent with the evidence as a whole and is contradicted by Dr. Cohen's failure to find such limitations. Id. Finally, she argues that Ms. Smith's written opinion demonstrates that ...