Source: http://openjurist.org/590/f2d/670/jarecki-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 17:43:52
Document Index: 764081829

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1361', '§ 1331', '§ 702', '§ 2', '§ 1361', '§ 1361', '§ 702', '§ 702', '§ 5101', '§ 5101', '§ 5341', '§ 1346']

590 F2d 670 Jarecki v. United States | OpenJurist
590 F. 2d 670 - Jarecki v. United States HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 590 F.2d.
590 F2d 670 Jarecki v. United States 590 F.2d 670
Edward JARECKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.UNITED STATES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Argued Sept. 25, 1978.Decided Jan. 9, 1979.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 23, 1979.
"The (General Services) Administrator . . . may appoint uniformed guards of said administration as special policemen without additional compensation for duty in connection with the policing of public buildings . . . Such special policemen shall have the same powers as sheriffs."Mandamus is a powerful and unusual remedy that issues only in carefully circumscribed situations. It is traditionally available to compel a ministerial duty owed by the agency and then only when the statute defining that duty is "clear and free from doubt". Smith v. Grimm, 9th Cir. 1976, 534 F.2d 1346, 1352; McClendon v. Blount, 7th Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 381, 383; Hammond v. Hull, 1942, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303, 131 F.2d 23, 25, Cert. denied, 1943, 318 U.S. 777, 63 S.Ct. 830, 87 L.Ed. 1145. The language of the Protection of Property Act, however, is not mandatory. The statute does not, on its face, compel the appointment of uniformed guards as special police; it states that the GSA "may" appoint the guards at no additional compensation. Were we to adhere strictly to the traditional view of mandamus, our discussion would end with that observation.
Our reading of the legislative history of Section 318 leads us to the conclusion that the plaintiffs also lack standing to seek an order against the GSA. A primary factor in deciding whether the requirement of standing is met is whether "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question". Data Processing Service v. Camp, 1970, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184. This aspect of the requirements of standing is succinctly incorporated into the mandamus statute. Section 1361 states that mandamus is proper to compel a duty "running directly to the plaintiff". In our view, Section 318 was designed to enable the GSA to discharge its duty to the public and to the government to protect federal property; the reference in the statute to the uniformed guards is merely an incident of this design. Since the statute does not impose a duty on the GSA for the benefit of the guards, we also conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this prerequisite for mandamus relief.
The Supreme Court recently observed that there is "a difference between prospective reclassification, on the one hand, and retroactive reclassification resulting in money damages, on the other." United States v. Testan, 1976, 424 U.S. 392, 403, 96 S.Ct. 948, 955, 47 L.Ed.2d 114, 124. The plaintiffs in that case had alleged that the duties they performed were identical with those performed by other trial attorneys who were classified at a higher GS rating. They sued in the Court of Claims for an order directing reclassification and awarding back pay.10 In reversing the Court of Claims decision, the Supreme Court referred to the traditional rule, relied on by the district court in this case, that a federal employee "is entitled to receive only the salary of the position to which he was appointed, even though he may have performed the duties of another position or claims that he should have been placed in a higher grade". 424 U.S. at 406, 96 S.Ct. at 957, 47 L.Ed.2d at 126. Although the Court held that neither the Back Pay Act nor the Classification Act changed this rule by creating a substantive right to back pay for the period of misclassification, in a significant dictum concerning the scope of the plaintiffs' statutory right to equal pay for equal work under the Classification Act, the Court suggested that a "possible avenue of relief and it, too, seemingly, is only prospective is by way of mandamus, under 28 U.S. § 1361, in a proper federal district court". 424 U.S. at 403, 96 S.Ct. at 956, 47 L.Ed.2d at 124.
The Testan Court, of course, did not expressly decide that the Classification Act requires the Civil Service Commission to compare the duties performed by the plaintiffs with those performed by other employees who are classified differently. That conclusion was implicit, however, in the Court's suggestion that the plaintiffs in Testan, who also complained that their classification did not square with that of other employees performing the same duties, could request prospective relief from the Civil Service Commission or a district court. And other courts have held that without such comparison, the statutory mandate of "equal pay for equal work" is "nothing more than a slogan". Haneke v. Secretary of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 1976, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 535 F.2d 1291, 1298; Testan v. United States, 1974, 499 F.2d 690, 691, 205 Ct.Cl. 330, 332, Rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 392, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114. We agree. The uniformed guards will hardly be consoled by the district court's observation in this case that they were classified properly at one time and continue to receive the pay appropriate to that classification, when they can identify others who receive more money for the same duties. Nor will it console the guards to learn that FPS officers receive more pay because the latter have passed a physical examination, when the guards are called upon to perform identical work despite having failed the physical.12
See, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 308 (1967); 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 23.11 (1958). See also Note, Mandamus in Administrative Actions: Current Approaches, 1973 Duke L.J. 207 (1973)
The reluctance of courts to interpret an ambiguous statute stemmed from the concept that writs of mandamus should not be used by federal courts of limited jurisdiction as substitutes for legislative authority to review administrative action. See Developments in the Law Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 829, 849 (1957). This position is no longer tenable. Congress recently removed the major impediments to judicial review of administrative action in suits for specific relief by eliminating the amount in controversy requirement in suits against federal officers brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and by waiving sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, when non-monetary relief from agency action is requested. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. As a result, § 1361 rarely supplies the only basis for a reviewing court's jurisdiction today.
Suits against federal officers in their official capacity are nonetheless deemed to be suits against the sovereign unless the officials' actions are (1) beyond their statutory powers or (2) even though within the scope of their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are constitutionally void. Dugan v. Rank, 1963, 372 U.S. 609, 621-622, 83 S.Ct. 999, 10 L.Ed.2d 15
The question whether sovereign immunity can deprive a court of mandamus jurisdiction continues to divide the courts. For cases holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not prevent mandamus actions to compel federal officers to perform duties imposed upon them by law, See, e. g., Houston v. Ormes, 1920, 252 U.S. 469, 472-74, 40 S.Ct. 369, 64 L.Ed. 667; Clackamas County v. McKay, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 219 F.2d 479, Vacated as moot, 1955, 394 U.S. 909, 75 S.Ct. 599, 99 L.Ed. 1244; Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 1971, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 129, 448 F.2d 1045, 1052 n.8. Other courts, however, have observed that the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is not a consent to suit by the sovereign and, therefore, sovereign immunity can be a bar to mandamus jurisdiction. Smith v. Grimm, 9th Cir. 1976, 534 F.2d 1346, 1352 n.9; White v. Administrator of General Services Administration, 9th Cir. 1965, 343 F.2d 444; Southport Land & Commercial Co. v. Udall, N.D.Cal.1965, 244 F.Supp. 172
Since sovereign immunity is not a defense for federal officials who have acted beyond statutory powers, it may be unnecessary to consider the doctrine once the similar question at issue in any mandamus case whether the official acted outside the scope of his delegated authority is resolved. See Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 308, 342. In any event, plaintiffs invoking mandamus jurisdiction will usually be able to rely on Congress' waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act is also limited by the principle that extraordinary relief will not be granted when it would impose an intolerable burden on the sovereign defendant or the public. 5 U.S.C. § 702(1).
In the "purpose" section of the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5101(1)(A), Congress stated that it was "to provide a plan for classification of positions . . . (whereby) the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 5101 (1970). See also 5 U.S.C. § 5341(1)-(2) (Supp.IV, 1974)
The plaintiffs rely on a provision of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), to establish jurisdiction over the back pay claim.
We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' efforts to rescue their claim for back pay from the bar of Testan. The plaintiffs allege that the GSA's failure to appoint guards as special police and the arbitrary refusal to waive physical requirements for veterans constituted "unwarranted personnel action" within the meaning of the Back Pay Act. See note 9 Supra. The Supreme Court made crystal clear in Testan, however, that the Back Pay Act provides a monetary remedy solely to employees who are subjected to a "wrongful Reduction in grade" or "in their duly appointed emoluments or position". United States v. Testan, 1976, 424 U.S. at 405-407, 96 S.Ct. at 956-957, 47 L.Ed.2d at 124-126. The uniformed guards have never been subjected to a Reduction in grade or pay. Rather, they alleged that they were denied the benefit of a position to which they should have been but were not appointed. See also Hill v. United States, 9th Cir. 1978, 571 F.2d 1098, 1103
This policy is neither arbitrary nor unfair. Cf. Kavazanjian v. U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, S.D.N.Y.1975, 399 F.Supp. 339, Aff'd mem., 2 Cir., 542 F.2d 1165. It may well be that the instant case is covered by this classification policy. The plaintiffs, however, have alleged that the FPS do not perform any different or more hazardous protective duties.