Source: https://www.ptab.us/2009/12/
Timestamp: 2020-04-09 18:55:54
Document Index: 93935301

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 251', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§\n101']

PTAB.US: December 2009
Ex Parte Johnson et al LEBOVITZ 112(1) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Ex Parte Mizushima et al SMITH 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
To anticipated Appellants’ claimed invention, a reference must lead one of ordinary skill in the art to a product which falls within the scope of the claim "without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference." In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972).
Ex Parte Ramsden et al COLAIANNI 103(a) Carestream Health, Inc.
As stated in In re Rinehart,
When prima facie obviousness is established and evidence is submitted in
rebuttal, the decision-maker must start over. Though the burden of going forward
to rebut the prima facie case remains with the applicant, the question of
whether that burden has been successfully carried requires that the entire path
to decision be retraced. An earlier decision should not, as it was here, be
considered as set in concrete, and applicant's rebuttal evidence then be
evaluated only on its knockdown ability. Analytical fixation on an earlier
decision can tend to provide that decision with an undeservedly broadened
umbrella effect. Prima facie obviousness is a legal conclusion, not a fact.
Facts established [sic] by rebuttal evidence must be evaluated along with the
facts on which the earlier conclusion was reached, not against the conclusion
531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (CCPA 1976).
Ex Parte Tsuzaki et al SMITH 103(a) OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Hannington DELMENDO 101/112(1) HEIDI A. BOEHLEFELD RENNER, OTTO, BOISELLE & SKLAR, LLP
“[T]he PTO has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure.” In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, it is “[o]nly after the PTO provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's asserted utility.” Id.
Brana, In re, 51 F.3d 1560, 34 USPQ2d1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . .2106, 2107.01, 2107.03, 2164.01(c) , 2107.02, 2164.02, 2164.04, 2164.07
Ex Parte Friauf et al COURTENAY 103(a) DALE F. REGELMAN QUARLES & BRADY, LLP
Invention or discovery is the requirement which constitutes the foundation of
the right to obtain a patent . . . unless more ingenuity and skill were required
in making or applying the said improvement than are possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there is an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute the essential elements of every invention.
Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 197 (1876) (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850))
Ex Parte Sakata HOFF 102(e)/103(a) MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, PLLC
Ex Parte Kasiviswanathan et al MOHANTY 102(e) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Posted by James Long at 8:38 AM No comments :
Ex Parte Ross et al MILLS Concurring McCOLLUM 103(a) INSKEEP INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP, INC
If when combined, the references "would produce a seemingly inoperative device," then they teach away from their combination. In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 587 (CCPA 1969); see also, In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding no suggestion to modify a prior art device where the modification would render the device inoperable for its intended purpose).
Sponnoble, In re, 405 F.2d 578, 160 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . 2141.02
A proposed modification or combination of the prior art that would change the basic principles under which the prior art invention was designed to operate weighs against a conclusion of prima facie obviousness. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959).
Ex Parte Ribarich MARTIN 103(a) FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
Ex Parte Daoud et al BARRETT 102(e)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Ex Parte Brod ADAMS 112(2)/112(1)/103(a) FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P
Ex Parte Hsu et al SAADAT 112(1)/103(a) THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C. - IBM
Ex Parte Conaway et al HORNER 102(b)/103(a) ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT
In other words, “[t]he patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production.” SmithKline, 439 F.3d at 1317.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 74 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2112
However, if the words of limitation can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process used to obtain it, then the limitation is commonly interpreted in its structural sense. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp. , 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“[E]ven words of limitation that can connote with equal force a structural characteristic of the product or a process of manufacture are commonly and by default interpreted in their structural sense….”); Hazani v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Com’n. , 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that claims to a plate having a “chemically engraved” surface are best characterized as pure product claims, since the “chemically engraved” limitation, read in context, describes the product more by its structure than by the process used to obtain it); see also In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 278-79 (CCPA 1969)(noting that past-tense verbs such as “ ‘intermixed,’ ‘ground in place,’ ‘press fitted,’ ‘etched,’ and ‘welded,’ all … at one time or another have been separately held capable of construction as structural, rather than process, limitations.”).
Ex Parte Sherwood GARRIS 112(1)/103(a) FREILICH, HORNBAKER & ROSEN
Posted by James Long at 8:29 AM No comments :
Ex Parte Logtenberg SCHEINER 112(1) TRASKBRITT, P.C.
“The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an applicant from later asserting that he invented that which he did not.” Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. , 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 57 USPQ2d 1449 (D. Mass. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706.04
Ex Parte Moreland et al ADAMS 102(b)/103(a) BUTZEL LONG
Ex Parte Phillips COLAIANNI 102(b)/103(a) MCNEES WALLACE & NURICK LLC
Ex Parte Boronkay et al FRANKLIN 102(b)/103(a) TOWNSEND AND TOWNSEND AND CREW, LLP
Ex Parte Work BARRETT 102(b)/103(a) SONNENSCHEIN NATH & ROSENTHAL LLP
Ex Parte Rhoads FETTING 112(2)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) DIGIMARC CORPORATION
Ex Parte Yang et al MILLS 102(e)/103(a) VIDAS, ARRETT & STEINKRAUS, P.A.
The claims are not to be confined to the embodiments found in the Specification, and it is improper to import limitations from the Specification into the claims. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp. , 498 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Trans Texas Holdings Corp., In re, 498 F.3d 1290, 83 USPQ2d 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2286, 2686.04
As set forth in In re Hiniker Co. , 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), "[t]he name of the game is the claim."
Hiniker Co., In re, 150 F.3d 1362, 47 USPQ2d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1998) . . . . 2106, 2242, 2258, 2258.01, 2642
Ex Parte Nadooshan et al HAIRSTON 101/102(b)/103(a) AVAYA DEMONT & BREYER, LLC
Posted by James Long at 9:17 AM No comments :
Ex Parte Bretler GRIMES 103(a) WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
Ex Parte HSU et al CRAWFORD 103(a) FISH & RICHARDSON P.C.
Ex Parte Jones WARREN 103(a) DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
The Examiner has not addressed the evidence in Specification Example 1 in considering Appellant’s position. See generally Ans. Thus, the Examiner has not based the conclusion of unpatentability set forth in the Answer on the totality of the record. See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due consideration to persuasiveness of argument.”) (citing, inter alia, In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3 [sic - n.4] (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also, e.g., In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and cases cited therein (applicant’s rebuttal evidence must be considered). Indeed, the Examiner’s failure to consider the evidence in Specification Example 1, properly relied on by Appellant, is clear error. See, e.g., Sullivan, 498 F.3d at 1355.
Oetiker, In re, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .707.07(f) , 716.01(d) , 1504.01(a) , 2106, 2107.02, 2142, 2145, 2164.07
Spada, In re, 911 F.2d 705, 15 USPQ2d 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2112.01
Ex Parte Karaoguz et al DIXON 102(b)/102(e)/103(a) MCANDREWS HELD & MALLOY, LTD
Ex Parte Roh HORNER 102(b)/103(a) LAW OFFICE OF DALE B. HALLING
Ex Parte Gooding et al CRAWFORD 102(e) KING & SPALDING
Ex Parte Scheifele McCARTHY 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C.
Ex Parte Komatsu et al WARREN 103(a) PAULY, DEVRIES, SMITH & DEFFNER, L.L.C.
Ex Parte Deeds DIXON 103(a) BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.
Ex Parte Hand SONG 103(a) Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone P.L.C.
Ex Parte Stinson BOALICK 102(b)/103(a) HOFFMANN & BARON, LLP
“By using the term ‘consisting essentially of,’ the drafter signals that the invention necessarily includes the listed ingredients and is open to unlisted ingredients that do not materially affect the basic and novel properties of the invention.” PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp. , 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998). To construe the phrase “consisting essentially of,” it is “necessary and proper to determine” the interpretation that the Specification reasonably supports. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551 (CCPA 1976). Furthermore, Appellant has the burden of showing that unclaimed limitations in a prior art reference would materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 874 (CCPA 1964).
Herz, In re, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461(CCPA 1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.03
Ex Parte Walzak et al BAHR 103(a) SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
Evidence related solely to the number of units sold, without any indication as to whether this represents a substantial quantity in the market, provides a very weak showing of commercial success, if any. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Even assuming an applicant has sufficiently demonstrated commercial success, that success is relevant in the obviousness context only if it is established that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention (i.e., a nexus between the sales and the merits of the claimed invention), as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the claimed subject matter. Id. See also Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. , 776 F.2d 309, 315-16 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (commercial success may have been attributable to extensive advertising and position as a market leader before the introduction of the patented product).
Huang, In re, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . 716.03, 716.03(b) , 2145
Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp. , 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985) . . . . .716.03(b) , 716.06, 2141.01(a)
Posted by James Long at 9:08 AM No comments :
Ex Parte Hwang et al GREEN 103(a) THOMAS, KAYDEN, HORSTEMEYER & RISLEY, LLP
Ex Parte Masuda et al GREEN 103(a) KLARQUIST SPARKMAN, LLP
Ex Parte Patel et al SAADAT 103(a) NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
Ex Parte Kapur HAHN 103(a) Ryan, Mason & Lewis, L.L.P.
Ex Parte Bray et al SAADAT 102(b)/103(a) GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (PCPI) C/O FLETCHER YODER
Ex Parte Balogh CRAWFORD 112(2)/103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Alexander J. Burke
The context of the surrounding words of the claim must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms. ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
ACTV, Inc. v. The Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 68 USPQ2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2111.01
Ex Parte Oddsen STAICOVICI 103(a) DESIGN IP, P.C.
An overly broad interpretation, as the Examiner suggests, would eviscerate the meaning of the phrase integrally formed because it would mean that all components of APA’s channel 14 as modified by the boss of Matsubara or Schwartztrauber are integrally formed merely because they are interconnected to each other in some manner. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions which render phrases in claims superfluous).
Ex Parte Wang et al LORIN 102(b)/103(a) NIXON PEABODY, LLP
Ex Parte Webster et al BAHR 102(b)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) K&L Gates LLP
The description requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement of that provision. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. Id.
Ex Parte Kaylor et al McCARTHY 102(b)/103(a) KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
Ex Parte Kroese et al STAICOVICI 102(b)/103(a) THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Ex Parte Ashcraft et al HOMERE 103(a)/101 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) DUKE W. YEE YEE AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Ex Parte Serlet et al DIXON 103(a)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY, PC
Ex Parte Shu et al MARTIN 102(e)/103(a) GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
Ex Parte Dennis et al KERINS 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) GARDERE WYNNE SEWELL LLP
Ex Parte Fisher et al CRAWFORD 103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) O'BANION & RITCHEY LLP/ SONY ELECTRONICS, INC.
Ex Parte Fabian et al LEBOVITZ 103(a) ERNEST D. BUFF
Ex Parte Rittner et al GREEN 102(b)/103(a) MCGLEW & TUTTLE, PC
Ex Parte Schramm ROBERTSON 112(1)/112(2)/102(b)/102(e)/103(a) Michael R. Schramm
Ex Parte Stamler et al ADAMS 112(1)/103(a) BACON & THOMAS, PLLC
Ex Parte Hicks et al MOHANTY 103(a) AT&T Legal Department - CC
Ex Parte Marsh BAHR 102(e)/103(a) KINNEY & LANGE, P.A.
Ex Parte Racenet et al O’NEILL 103(a) TYCO HEALTHCARE GROUP LP
Ex Parte VanderVelde et al STEPHENS 103(a) PANDUIT CORP.
Ex Parte Bello et al THOMAS 112(1)/103(a) KUNZLER & McKENZIE
In other words, Claim 1’s “if” statement sets forth a necessary prelude to reordering the requests. Thus, the “if” statement must be given weight. “[E]very limitation positively recited in a claim must be given effect in order to determine what subject matter that claim defines.” In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 1970). See also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.”); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the court can not ignore a plethora of meaningful limitations).
Wilson, In re, 424 F.2d 1382, 165 USPQ 494, (CCPA 1970).. . . . . . . . . . . .2143.03, 2173.06
Ex Parte Fang et al TURNER 103(a) DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
Ex Parte Grundfest MOHANTY 103(a) SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER, P.A.
Posted by James Long at 9:53 AM No comments :
Ex Parte Mostafazadeh et al JEFFERY 35 U.S.C. § 251 improper recapture Beyer Law Group LLP
Lastly, Appellants challenge the basis for our declining to follow the precedential Board decision Ex parte Eggert, 67 USPQ2d 1716 (BPAI 2003). Request, at 13-14. Although Appellants contend otherwise, we maintain that Eggert is inconsistent with the rationale expressed in the subsequent Federal Circuit decision, North Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Pkg., Inc. , 415 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Decision, at 14 n.5. We therefore decline to follow this conflicting older Board precedent. See Standard Operating Procedure 2, Publication of Opinions and Binding Precedent (“SOP 2”), § VI(D) (BPAI Mar. 23, 2008), at 6 (“All judges, including the Chief Judge, are bound by a published or otherwise disseminated Precedential opinion of the Board unless the decision supported by the opinion is . . . inconsistent with a decision of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”) (emphases added).
Eggert, Ex parte, 67 USPQ2d 1716 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 1412.02
North American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc. , 415 F.3d 1335, 75 USPQ2d 1545(Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . 1412.02
Ex Parte Luczak HASTINGS 103(a) BACHMAN & LAPOINTE, P.C. (P&W)
Ex Parte Salmi et al BARRY 102(e)/112(2) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Perman & Green, LLP
Ex Parte Bao KIMLIN 102(e)/103(a) HITT GAINES, PC ALCATEL-LUCENT
Ex Parte Koelzer O’NEILL 103(a) ST. ONGE STEWARD JOHNSTON & REENS, LLC
Ex Parte Hanson et al HORNER 102(b) GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN
Ex Parte Heiman HORNER 103(a) WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP
Ex Parte Nicklas TIERNEY 103(a) Houston Eliseeva
Ex Parte Jha et al GAUDETTE 102(e)/102(b)/103(a) LANDO & ANASTASI, LLP
Ex Parte Gehring et al JEFFERY 112(2)/102(e)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Ex Parte Nishimura NAGUMO 102(b) Kathy Manke Avago Technologies Limited
Ex Parte Peterson HORNER 102(e)/103(a) 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Ex Parte Blonder et al ADAMS 103(a) MARSH, FISCHMANN & BREYFOGLE LLP
Ex Parte Hunt GRIMES 103(a) STEPHEN DONOVAN ALLERGAN, INC.
“Mere improvement in properties does not always suffice to show unexpected results. In our view, however, when an applicant demonstrates substantially improved results . . . and states that the results were unexpected, this should suffice to establish unexpected results in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Soni, In re, 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . 707.07(f) , 2145
Ex Parte Kawakami et al WARREN 102(b)/103(a) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED
Ex Parte Rose et al KIMLIN 103(c) KNOBBE MARTENS OLSON & BEAR LLP
Ex Parte Barsness et al SIU 103(a) IBM CORPORATION
Ex Parte Jones et al HUGHES 103(a) Mueller and Smith, LPA
Ex Parte Sato BAUMEISTER 102(b) RADER FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC
Ex Parte Rogers et al McCOLLUM 103(a) GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
Ex Parte Toback O’NEILL 103(a) ALIX YALE & RISTAS LLP
Ex Parte Kolovson THOMAS 102(b)/103(a) HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
Ex Parte Fine et al CRAWFORD 101/102(e)/103(a) AT&T LEGAL DEPARTMENT - Toler
As a matter of Patent Office practice, a specification which contains a
disclosure of utility which corresponds in scope to the subject matter sought to
be patented must be taken as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of §
101 for the entire claimed subject matter unless there is reason for one skilled
in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its
Langer, In re, 503 F.2d 1380, 183 USPQ 288 (CCPA 1974) . . . . . . . .2107.02, 2107.03, 2124
Posted by James Long at 8:43 AM No comments :