Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/298/1208/643017/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 15:00:51
Document Index: 725862357

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3664', '§ 3742', '§ 113', '§ 16', '§ 3663', '§ 3663', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664', '§ 3664']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Curtis James Reano, Defendant-appellant, 298 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 2002 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Curtis James Reano, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Curtis James Reano, Defendant-appellant, 298 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 298 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002) August 14, 2002
Submitted on the briefs:* David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney and J. Miles Hanisee, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Curtis James Reano appeals a district court's imposition of restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) (5). Mr. Reano asserts that the district court erred when it entered a restitution order in the absence of any proof of loss incurred by the victim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1), and we (1) vacate the contested restitution order, and (2) remand for proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
On April 5, 2001, Mr. Reano pleaded guilty, in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, to assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a) (6) and 1153. Mr. Reano's guilty plea acknowledged that he was subject to "restitution as may be ordered by the Court." Rec. doc. 37, at 2 (Plea Agreement). The presentence report, dated June 25, 2001, noted that attempts to contact the victim had been unsuccessful, that a medical billing inquiry had been sent to determine whether restitution was owed for medical services provided to the victim, and that the Court would be notified if restitution was requested. See Rec. vol. III ¶ 21 (Presentence Investigation Report) ("Should a request for restitution be made or if it is determined restitution is owed, this information will be forwarded to the Court.").
The MVRA requires the court to order restitution in any case involving a conviction for an offense that constitutes a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), including assault resulting in serious bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a) (1) (" [W]hen sentencing a defendant convicted of [assault resulting in serious bodily injury, see § 3663A(c) (1) (A) (i),], the court shall order ... that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.").
The MVRA also delineates the procedures for issuing and enforcing a restitution order. Under § 3664(a), the sentencing court must direct the probation officer to report to the court information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order. This information must include, to the extent practicable, an accounting of victim losses, any restitution owed pursuant to a plea agreement, and information concerning the defendant's financial resources. The probation officer must provide this information to the court no later than sixty days before the date of the sentencing hearing. See id. § 3664(d) (1). In addition:
Id. § 3664(d) (5).
The government, however, does not suggest that it complied with the sixty-day notice requirement of § 3664(d) (1) or with the ten-day notice requirement of § 3664(d) (5). Apparently, the government provided the district court with no information or update on the investigation concerning the victim's losses either before or even at sentencing. The government seeks to excuse this failure by arguing that the presentence report put the court and Mr. Reano on notice that the victim's losses were unascertainable at the time of sentencing. Also, the government maintains (1) that it requested more time to develop the record at the sentencing hearing, and (2) that this request served as a request for deferred restitution.
In contrast, Mr. Reano contends that, because the government failed to either (1) follow the statutory procedures necessary to establish proof of loss or (2) seek a deferred restitution order pursuant to § 3664(d) (5), the government may no longer seek restitution and the district court is now without power to order restitution.
The court's authority to order restitution post-sentencing derives solely from the statutory grant of jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) (5). The notice and time requirements imposed by jurisdictional statutes generally are mandatory. Courts lack authority to act in cases where the litigants have not satisfied these requirements.
United States v. Dando, 287 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted).
In this case, neither the government nor the district court followed the procedural requirements of the MVRA. The government, for one, offered a presentence report that explicitly states that " [s]hould a request for restitution be made... this information will be forwarded to the court," Rec. vol. III, at 21 (Presentence Investigation Report), and then, at the sentencing hearing held six weeks later, without presenting any supporting documentation, argued that restitution should be made. The district court, on the other hand, did enter a restitution order with no basis in the record. Given these improprieties, our decision to vacate the district court's restitution order is easily made.
As to the legislative history, the MVRA's primary purpose is to force offenders to "pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes." S.Rep. No. 104-179, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925. "This legislation is needed to ensure that the loss to crime victims is recognized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due. It is also necessary to ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society." Id.
As to our precedent, in Dando, we interpreted the MVRA. In so doing, we noted that " [p]rocedural requirements are liberally construed," Dando, 287 F.3d at 1010. We further determined that, when Congress enacted the MVRA, "Congress intended the 90 day limitation period to protect victims against the dissipation of defendants' assets and not to protect defendants from a drawn-out sentencing process or to establish finality." Id. at 1010 n. 4. "The statute expressly provides procedures pursuant to which victims can request additional compensation for additional losses discovered at any time in the future." Id. We concluded that a "district court's failure to follow statutory procedural requirements [will] not deprive the court of jurisdiction if the actions taken provided the functional equivalent of the statutory procedures." Id. at 1010.
In Dando, the government requested restitution by providing the court with the victim loss information within ninety days of sentencing. This served as the functional equivalent of the statutory procedures. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d) (1) (5). The Dando court ultimately ordered restitution after the ninety day period, noting that the ninety day period had been equitably tolled by notice given to the defendant and through the defendant's request for a deferred hearing.
Additionally, the bill has the further purposes of establishing one set of procedures for the issuance of restitution orders in Federal criminal cases.... Finally, this legislation is needed to replace an existing patchwork of different rules governing orders of restitution under various Federal criminal statutes with one consistent procedure.
S.Rep. No. 104-179, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925 (emphasis added). As stated, we do not condone the government's defiance of congressionally mandated procedural rules. Instead, we strongly urge the government to reexamine the manner in which it endeavors to seek restitution under the MVRA.
Nevertheless, in a holding that we intend to be quite limited, we conclude that, based on the proceedings before us, the imposition of restitution at sentencing put the defendant on notice that restitution would be imposed and thus served as the functional equivalent of the notice required under the MVRA. Furthermore, the subsequent appeal of this order equitably tolled the ninety day period. See Dando, 287 F.3d at 1011 ("The statute's time prescriptions... are subject to equitable tolling."); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 434-35, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 134 L. Ed. 2d 613 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that time prescriptions generally are subject to equitable tolling even in jurisdictional statutes). We remand so that the district court may hold an evidentiary hearing within the 90-day period at which the government must present its proof, the defendant may make appropriate challenges, and the parties will create a record sufficient for any review that we may be asked to make. We note that any restitution order must be ordered within ninety days of the date of the issuance of this mandate. See United States v. Jolivette, 257 F.3d 581, 584-85 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that if "there was no timely judicial determination of the restitution amount, the judgment contain [ed] no enforceable restitution provision"). We encourage the government to promptly provide to the district court any information regarding the victim's losses.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for decision on the briefs without oral argument See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.