Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/20130708/?pg=53
Timestamp: 2020-04-06 17:48:01
Document Index: 554888884

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 41', '§ 13']

shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.” Under this provision, the government may not completely remove or substantially impair a property’s existing access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the owner. The mere fact that the impairment may have been a valid exercise of a city’s police power does not mean the city had an unqualified right to destroy or substantially impair access without paying just compensation. When a city takes property that results in a property owner losing access to one street while retaining access via another, evidence that the loss has a significant adverse impact on the market value of the property is sufficient to create a genuine factual issue as to whether access to the property was materially impaired. Phoenix v. Garretson, 1 CA-CV 10- 0620, 5/7/13.
Arizona May Exert Personal Jurisdiction Over an Out-of-State Law Firm That Issues an Opinion Letter to an Arizona Resident Regarding Federal Law. Arizona’s “long-arm” statute to reverse allows Arizona to exert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant ( 1) demonstrates personal conduct targeting Arizona, ( 2) there is a nexus between that conduct and the asserted claim, and ( 3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. An out-of-state law firm that knows a client is an Arizona resident, sends an opinion letter to Arizona, and knows that the client intends to rely on the letter when filing his taxes in Arizona is subject to Arizona’s personal jurisdiction. Beverage v. Pullman & Comley LLC, 1 CA-CV 12-0173, 4/25/13.
A Business’s Customer List Is
Not a Trade Secret Where the
Business Has Not Shown that
the List Contains Unique and
Original Information, That the
Business Invested Substantial
Time and Effort to Acquire the
Information, or That the
Business Treated the List as
Secret. There is a two-part inquiry
to determine whether something is
a trade secret: first, whether ( 1) the
subject matter of the information
is secret, and ( 2) reasonable efforts
have been taken to keep the
information secret. To determine
whether a customer list is a trade
secret, courts consider four factors:
( 1) does the list represent a selec-
tive accumulation of detailed,
valuable information about cus-
tomers; ( 2) were substantial efforts
expended to identify and cultivate
the customer base such that it
would be difficult for a competitor
to acquire or duplicate the same
information; ( 3) does the informa-
tion in the customer list derive
independent economic value from
its secrecy and give the holder of
the list a demonstrable competitive
advantage over others in the indus-
try; and ( 4) did the claimant
divulge its customer list externally
and internally, i.e., to people out-
side of its business as well as to its
own employees. If there is a failure
to provide evidence supporting
these factors, a customer list is not
a trade secret. Calisi v. Unified
Financial Services LLC, 1 CA-CV
11-0812, 4/11/13.
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 67(d), Which Requires a Trial Court to Order a Plaintiff to Provide Security for Costs on a Showing That He Does Not Own Property Within the State That Could Satisfy the Defendant’s Claim for Costs in the Litigation, Is Facially Constitutional Because the Requirement May Be Waived Based on the Plaintiff’s Inability to Post Bond. Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 67(d) requires the court to order a plaintiff to provide security to cover the defendant’s costs if the plaintiff does not have property in the state that would be sufficient to cover the costs. Arizona’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause requires that citizens of the state have equal access to the courts, regardless of financial status. Rule 67(d) is facially constitutional because it requires a court to vacate the ordered bond if the plaintiff shows a financial inability to provide security. Thiele v. City of Phoenix, 1 CA-CV 11-0769, 4/2/13.
Although a superior court errs when it denies a defendant’s request for a jury instruction explaining that the State has the burden to disprove a justification defense supported by the evidence as lawfully applying to not only a second-degree murder charge, yet to the less-er-included offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide,
such error may be harmless if the failure to instruct did not affect the verdict. While a trial court errs under both the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and applicable Arizona case law by precluding evidence showing the motive or bias of a complaining State’s witness related to a civil action brought by the witness against the defendant as it has a direct bearing on the credibility of the witness, such error may be harmless where there is strong, if not overwhelming, evidence of guilt, and the complaining witness who brought the civil action is not the State’s only witness. State v. Almaguer, 2 CA-CR2011-0249, 5/31/13.
13-1204(B) is not duplicative because unlike § 13-1203(A), which may be violated by distinctly different conduct or different types of assault causing different kinds of harm, § 13-1204(B) not only creates a single offense by requiring proof of a particular harm, yet the Legislature obviously intended to create a unique offense because it actually created a separate subsection to prohibit such conduct. State v. Delgado, 2
CA-CR-2012-0287, 5/30/13.
A.R.S. § 13-1204(B)( 1),
providing that a person com-
mits aggravated assault by
“imped[ing] the normal breath-
ing or circulation of blood of
another person” is not unconsti-
tionally vague because a person
of reasonable intelligence would
understand what conduct is pro-
hibited by the statute, even
though the statute may have been
written with greater precision as to
the meaning of the term “normal”.
A plain reading of § 13-
1204(B)( 1) provides adequate
notice that a person may not
impede another’s normal or typical
breathing or circulation of blood.
The fact that “normal” breathing
may not be the same for all persons
does not render the statute uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, A.R.S. §
A.R.S. § 41-1604, which
gives the Director of the
authority to impose a $25
charge for conducting a back-
ground check on any person
seeking to visit a prison inmate,
is not an unconstitutional spe-
cial law because it is rationally
related to a legitimate governmen-
tal interest in recovering some of
the costs that inmate visitors
impose on the prison system and
encompasses the relevant class of
individuals who impose special
costs on the prisons that use by
other groups do not. Hamm v.
Ryan, 1 CA-CV 12-0130,
In a forfeiture case related to racketeering defendants engaged in the prohibited sale of drugs and money laundering, A.R.S. § 13- 4311(G) does not provide a 10-day grace period for either