Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/943/94/86235/
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 04:19:00
Document Index: 365681830

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2421', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2421', '§ 2422']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Diane Sabatino, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Joseph Sabatino Defendant, Appellant, 943 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Diane Sabatino, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America...
United States of America, Appellee, v. Diane Sabatino, Defendant, Appellant.united States of America, Appellee, v. Joseph Sabatino Defendant, Appellant, 943 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 943 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1991)
Heard April 5, 1991. Decided Aug. 15, 1991. Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1991
In determining the propriety of trying two or more defendants together, we must initially look to Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) provides that defendants may be tried together "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses." See United States v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d 765, 778 (1st Cir. 1991). Even where joinder is proper under the rule, however, a defendant may still obtain a severance if he or she can show that substantial prejudice, amounting to a miscarriage of justice, would result from a joint trial. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1991). Since the decision to grant or deny severance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, we will interfere with the trial court's determination only upon a showing of manifest abuse. United States v. Martinez-Vidal, 922 F.2d 914, 922 (1st Cir. 1991).
The problem with Diane's argument is this. Although the evidence she cites primarily depicts Joseph's participation in the illegal venture, it was nevertheless also admissible against her under a basic tenet of traditional conspiracy theory, namely, that a conspirator is responsible for acts his or her co-conspirators executed during the existence and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Crocker, 788 F.2d 802, 806 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Cranston, 686 F.2d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 1982). While this evidence might have been susceptible to a Fed.R.Evid. 403 analysis, see United States v. Shenker, 933 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1991), even under such a prism we do not deem its prejudicial value to have outweighed its probativeness. Moreover, in its final instructions the court stressed to the jury, as counsel for both sides had already done in closing, its obligation to consider the evidence against each defendant separately, see United States v. Boylan, 98 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990), thereby adequately safeguarding against any "spillover" effect, see United States v. Silvestri, 790 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir. 1986). Diane's claim of prejudice thus boils down to a complaint that she was tried with a more culpable defendant. But, as we said in Martinez-Vidal, 922 F.2d at 923:
"[P]rejudice means more than just a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial." United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973). Incidental prejudice, such as that which is almost always encountered when multiple defendants playing different roles are tried together, will not suffice. United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554-555 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S. Ct. 2033, 100 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1988).
Finally, we note that the joinder clearly satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b), since both defendants were alleged to have participated in the same series of acts or transactions constituting the offenses.
On appeal, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing all legitimate inferences and resolving all credibility conflicts in its favor. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 1991). Analyzed from that perspective, the verdict will be upheld if any reasonable trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mena, 933 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). Diane was charged with conspiracy to commit two offenses, to wit, aiding and abetting the transportation of individuals across state lines for purposes of prostitution, and using the American Express accounts to facilitate the commission of that crime. To convict, the jury was required to find that she knowingly agreed to violate these federal laws and that at least one overt act was perpetrated in furtherance of that agreement. United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1989).
Against this overwhelming evidence of her active role in the conspiracy, Diane claims she should not have been convicted because she did not assign any of the prostitutes to out-of-state calls. Diane, however, need not have personally assigned any out-of-state calls to be convicted on the conspiracy charge. The essence of the conspiracy crime is the agreement, see United States v. Rivera-Feliciano, 930 F.2d 951, 955 (1st Cir. 1991); Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 785 n. 17, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 1289 n. 10, 1293 n. 17, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975), and an aiding and abetting charge only requires proof that the defendant associated herself with the venture, that she participated in it as something that she wished to bring about, and that she sought by her actions to make it succeed, United States v. Mehtala, 578 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1978). In any event, the record shows that Diane's participation was not as passive as she now characterizes it. Tardiff, for instance, remembered that in January of 1989 Diane and Joseph both sent her to Boston to recruit new prostitutes and service calls channeled through an answering service. Moreover, Ross' first sexual encounter, the one that required Diane's coaching, took her to New Hampshire. The jury could also have reasonably inferred from Diane's continuous presence on the premises and the closeness of the organization that she was privy to most of the out-of-state prostitution assignments.
Thirdly, Diane submits that the erroneous admittance into evidence of testimony directed at establishing that Joseph instructed the company's secretary to place a newspaper advertisement with a telephone number to call for "adult talk," violated Fed.R.Evid. 403 & 404(b) and constituted reversible error. Even assuming that the error was in fact committed, we hardly pause in concluding that, given the overwhelming proof of Diane's participation in the conspiracy, the "error" was harmless. See United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1991) (Rule 404(b) error ruled harmless where independent evidence against appellant was overwhelming). We therefore reject this contention without further discourse.
The Sabatinos join forces to argue that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury when it allowed the word "cause" to appear in its definition of the offense of transporting individuals across state lines for purposes of prostitution, with the result that they were convicted for non-existent crimes. Reading the record, however, we find that before the district court charged the jury on the Mann Act it accommodated the Sabatinos' request that the word "cause" be eliminated from its instructions "to reflect the 1986 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2421." The only remaining concern was that the word "cause" still appeared in the indictment, which the district court refused to strike. Thus, the scope of our review is a limited one: whether such inclusion caused reversible error. The inclusion of a particular wording on the indictment requires reversal only if it is improper and misleads appellants to their prejudice. United States v. Potes, 880 F.2d 1475, 1477 (1st Cir. 1989).
This provision allows a conviction for a substantive crime even when the defendant was not present or did not personally commit all of the requisite acts establishing the offense. One reason for its enactment was to permit the language "causes and procures" to be deleted from a variety of substantive offenses, such as the Mann Act. Jones, 909 F.2d at 539-40. This generic statute "removes all doubt" that one who sets an illegal course in motion but intentionally refrains from "the direct act constituting the completed offense" shall not escape punishment. See H.R.Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A5 (1947); see also Jones, 909 F.2d at 540-41. It is important to emphasize that an aider and abettor charge is implicit in all indictments for substantive offenses, so it need not be specifically pleaded for an aiding and abetting conviction to be returned. United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1519 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pearson, 667 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1982). The fact that in this case both its language and its citation were specifically invoked, however, is the source of no consequences.
The sentencing court added two levels to Joseph Sabatino's BOL for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Guideline § 3C1.1 directs a sentencing court to add two offense levels if "the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution" of the offense. The commentary to § 3C1.1 lists the "threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing [of] a co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so" as an example of conduct to which the enhancement applies. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 3(a)). In the instant case, the sentencing court found that Joseph attempted to obstruct the administration of justice in this manner on two separate occasions. Mindful that the government need only prove the occurrence of these incidents by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Marino, 936 F.2d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 1991), we follow well-established precedent in reviewing the sentencing court's fact-based determinations only for clear error. United States v. Wheelwright, 918 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1990).
The sentencing court additionally increased both of appellants' BOLs by four levels for their leading role in the commission of the offense. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), two requirements must be met for a four-level increase based on a defendant's leading role in the commission of the offense to be forthcoming. First, the sentencing court must conclude that the defendant acted as "an organizer or leader of a criminal activity" and, secondly, that the criminal activity "involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1011 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Preakos, 907 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (1st Cir. 1990) (§ 3B1.1 does not apply to defendant who merely organizes or supervises a criminal activity executed without the aid of others, but must involve an exercise of some degree of control over others or some responsibility for organizing others for the commission of the offense). The non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered by the sentencing court in making this determination include: the exercise of decision-making authority; the nature of the participation in the commission of the offense; the recruitment of accomplices; the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; the degree of participation in planning the offense; the nature and scope of the illegal activity; and the degree of control exercised over others. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (commentary); Preakos, 907 F.2d at 9; Fuller, 897 F.2d at 1220-21. Since role-in-the-offense determinations are fact-specific, we examine them under the clearly-erroneous standard of review. United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1989); Fuller 897 F.2d at 1219-20; McDowell, 918 F.2d at 1011.
The sentencing court also tacked on two levels to both of appellants' BOLs pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 because their criminal activity allegedly targeted vulnerable victims, and four more levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 because their use of these alleged victims presumably involved coercion. Under § 3A1.1, a sentencing court is directed to increase the BOL by two levels if "the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly vulnerable to the criminal conduct." Under § 2G1.1, the sentencing court is directed to raise the BOL by four levels if the offense "involved the use of physical force, or coercion by threats or drugs or in any manner." See United States v. Plaza-Garcia, 914 F.2d 345, 347 (1st Cir. 1990). The district court found that the fact that many of the prostitutes employed by the Sabatinos were single, teenage mothers in need of a job made them unusually vulnerable and represented elements of coercion which warranted a more severe punishment. We vacate both adjustments, albeit for different reasons, which we now proceed to expound.
Starting with the "vulnerable victim" adjustment, we must accept, as caselaw requires, the sentencing court's findings of fact regarding the prostitutes' personal circumstances. See United States v. Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1991). It is the sentencing court's interpretation of the guidelines as applied to the facts of this case which gives us pause. Of course, a sentencing court's legal interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines is subject to plenary review. See United States v. Martinez, 931 F.2d 851, 852 (11th Cir. 1991). And, we find that the sentencing court's interpretation of § 3A1.1 was inaccurate.
The Mann Act was enacted in the early 1900s in response to growing Congressional concern for what many believed to be a widespread practice: commercial procurers taking young girls and women and forcing them into lives of prostitution and vice. Note, The White Slave Traffic Act: The Historical Impact of a Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 Geo. L.J. 1111, 1112 (1984). Although subsequent judicial interpretations of the Act extended its application to other situations, see Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917) (allowing prosecutions in noncommercial cases); United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 35 S. Ct. 271, 59 L. Ed. 504 (1915) (permitting women to be convicted of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act), and the law has been recently amended to reach instances of child sexual abuse, see United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 391-92 (1st Cir. 1991), the statute's original and primary concern with the protection of the victims remained unchanged. In fact, in Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 530, 80 S. Ct. 901, 904, 4 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1959), the Supreme Court stated:
Additionally, Diane complains that she was prejudiced from the incompetent performance of her husband's trial counsel in eliciting particular portions of the government witnesses' plea agreements. Sixth Amendments rights, however, are personal in nature and cannot be asserted vicariously, even by a co-conspirator spouse. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 2905-2906, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979). And, in any event, we have held that informing the jury of the contents of a plea agreement of "normal stripe" is not error. United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1987)
In United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted the provisions of the Mann Act in terms which we find illustrative for our present purposes. While noting that "one need not physically carry or accompany a person interstate in order to 'transport' her; it may be enough effectively to cause her to be transported," that court stated that the more natural reading of § 2421 confines it to cases in which the defendant personally or through an agent performed the proscribed act of transporting. Id. at 540. Reading it any other way would render 18 U.S.C. § 2422, which applies to "those cases in which the defendant provides the motivation, ranging from persuasion to coercion, but the person 'travels' under her own steam, without need of anyone to 'transport' her," redundant. Id