Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/12/214/528718/
Timestamp: 2019-07-18 11:26:33
Document Index: 549521029

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 621', '§ 623', '§ 2000', '§ 255', 'art, 744', '§ 626', '§ 255']

Juraj Pavicic, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Micro Lapping and Grinding Co., Inc., and Raymond Robaugh,defendants-appellants, 12 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1993 › Juraj Pavicic, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Micro Lapping and Grinding Co., Inc., and Raymond Robaugh,defe...
Juraj Pavicic, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Micro Lapping and Grinding Co., Inc., and Raymond Robaugh,defendants-appellants, 12 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 12 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1993)
Defendants, Micro Lapping and Grinding Co. and Raymond Robaugh, appeal the district judge's denial of their motions for judgment as a matter of law and of their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Defendants argue that plaintiff, Juraj Pavicic, failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of age discrimination by defendants in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Defendants also appeal denial of their motion to dismiss, arguing that they properly raised a statute of limitations defense in their post-verdict motion. We affirm.
Defendants argue that Pavicic failed to establish his prima facie case because he did not prove that he was physically able to return to work at Micro Lapping. We do not consider the merits of this argument, because "it is now firmly established in this circuit that when a case has been tried on the merits, a reviewing appellate court need not address the sufficiency of plaintiff's prima facie case, and may instead proceed directly to the ultimate question [of] whether plaintiff has established discrimination." Brownlow v. Edgecomb Metals, Co., 867 F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir. 1989).
Defendants argue that Pavicic presented insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of age discrimination. The Brownlow court observed that the question of "whether age was a determining factor in the employer's decision to fire the plaintiff" is "quintessentially a question of fact." Id. In McNaughton v. United States, 888 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1989), we stated:
(Citations omitted). This standard governs our review of both the district judge's denial of the Rule 50(a) motions for judgment as a matter of law and of the Rule 50(b) renewal motion. Agristor Leasing v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 869 F.2d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1989).
In an attempt to shift the focus of our review forward to June 1988, defendants emphasize that, even if Robaugh's decision was made in March of 1988, Micro Lapping did not take any adverse employment action against Pavicic until June 14 of that year. This point is irrelevant under the applicable law. The Supreme Court has instructed that the "present, active tense" of the words of the employment discrimination statutes ("to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of his age [,]" 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)), commands an inquiry into whether an adverse employment decision was based upon forbidden factors "at the moment it was made [,]" and not at the moment it was effectuated. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis in original); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981).
Defendants argue, however, that binding precedent precludes our finding that a single remark can itself be sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in an ADEA claimant's favor. Defendants rely in particular upon Gagne v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989), where the ADEA plaintiff's former supervisor had once stated that he "needed younger blood." There, we concluded that this remark, standing alone, was not sufficient evidence to create a material factual issue as to whether Gagne's dismissal was motivated by her age. Gagne herself had characterized this remark as "isolated" and "indicated that the statement was made facetiously and was not directed at any particular individual." Id. at 314. These facts vitiated the remark's evidentiary force, and we therefore held that it was too "ambiguous" and "abstract" to support a finding of age discrimination. Id.
Defendants appeal the denial of their post-verdict motion to dismiss, which raised a statute of limitations defense. Section 626(e) (1) of the ADEA incorporates by reference the limitations period of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 255(a),1 which mandates that actions
The first of defendants' two arguments here is that they properly raised a statute of limitations defense in their answer. The answer denied that Pavicic had complied with all of the "procedural prerequisites" to the assertion of his claim, and further stated that " [p]laintiff failed to comply with the statutorily mandated prerequisites to filing an [ADEA] action [.]" When, however, Pavicic in an interrogatory asked defendants to explain in detail the factual bases for their "prerequisites" defense, defendants merely responded that " [p]laintiff has failed to file with appropriate state agencies as required by law." Pavicic consequently was in no way "properly apprised of [defendants'] concerns for the jurisdictional basis of this suit." Herman v. National Broadcasting Co., 569 F. Supp. 282, 287 (N.D. Ill. 1983), modified in part, 744 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1989). We therefore hold that defendants did not raise a statute of limitations defense in their answer.
It is well settled that " [p]ursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defense based upon a statute of limitations is waived if not raised in the first responsive pleading." Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988). Defendants, however, seek to avoid this rule's application by relying upon an exception to it. We have held that a tardy statute of limitations defense is not waived "when it clearly appears on the face of the pleadings and is raised in a motion to dismiss," so long as plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the defendant's delay in asserting the defense. Pierce v. County of Oakland, 652 F.2d 671, 672 (6th Cir. 1981). Common examples of prejudice include plaintiff's incurring of substantial litigation expenses before the defense is raised, id. at 673, and plaintiff's action or forbearance in reliance upon defendant's failure to raise the defense. Estes v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 636 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1980).
Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 1292, 1295 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting Faith v. Texaco, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 118, 121 (W.D. Mich. 1969)).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, amended 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1) to omit the incorporation of the limitations period of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). For two reasons, we nonetheless apply to Pavicic's case the limitations scheme in effect before this amendment. First, the amended Sec. 626(e) (1) sets forth a limitations scheme that is different in kind from its predecessor, and with which Pavicic could not have possibly complied. Second, we have held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not to be given retroactive effect, although the Supreme Court has decided to review this holding. See Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490, 495-97 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-938)