Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v64/64-071.html
Timestamp: 2016-12-03 04:39:07
Document Index: 140529133

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2422', '§ 7111', '§ 2422', '§ 7112', '§ 7112', '§ 7112', '§ 7112', '§ 7112', '§ 7112', 'art:\n7', '§ 7112', '§ 2422', '§ 2422', '§\n7112']

You are hereHome [Decision Number] United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System, Biloxi, Mississippi (Agency) and American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (Incumbent Labor Organization/Petitioner)
64 FLRA No. 71 FEDERAL LABOR
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO
(Incumbent Labor
Organization/Petitioner)
AT-RP-09-0015
PART AND DENYING IN PART
REVIEW, AND REMANDING TO
on an application for review filed by the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE) under § 2422.31 of the Authority’s Regulations. AFGE filed a petition to clarify
whether: (1) the Veterans Affairs Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System,
Biloxi, Mississippi (VHCS) is a successor employer to the Veterans
Administration Medical Center, Biloxi, Mississippi, Biloxi and Gulfport
Divisions (VA Biloxi-Gulfport); and (2) the descriptions of AFGE’s nationwide
consolidated units of employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
should be amended to state that AFGE is the exclusive representative of “all”
nonprofessional and professional employees of the VHCS, including employees at
the new Eglin Outpatient Clinic (Eglin) at the Eglin Air Force Base in
Florida. The parties agreed that their
stipulations would constitute the entire record in the proceeding. RD Decision
at 1 n.1. Accordingly, the Regional Director (RD) found that the parties
waived their rights to a hearing, and withdrew the previously issued Notice of
Representation Hearing. Id.
The RD determined that
successorship principles did not apply, but amended the existing certifications
to: (1) reflect that the employing Agency’s name has changed to VHCS; and (2)
delete references to the Gulfport Division, which no longer exists. The RD
found that the Eglin employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit under
the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) and that
these employees did not accrete into the AFGE’s existing nonprofessional and
professional units. For the following reasons, we deny
the application in part, grant it in part, and remand to the RD for further
As relevant here, AFGE is the
certified representative of a nationwide consolidated unit of nonprofessional
employees and a nationwide consolidated unit of professional employees of the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). RD Decision at 2. VA Biloxi-Gulfport
originally had divisions in Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, and subsequently
opened outpatient clinics in Mobile, Alabama, and Pensacola and Panama City, Florida. Id. at 2-3. Over the years, the Authority conducted
elections and certified for inclusion in AFGE’s consolidated nonprofessional
unit all nonprofessional employees of these divisions and outpatient clinics. [1] Id. at 2-4. The Authority also conducted elections and certified for
inclusion in AFGE’s consolidated professional unit all professional employees
of the Biloxi and Gulfport Divisions and all professional employees of the
outpatient clinic in Panama City. Id. In addition, pursuant to an AFGE
unit-clarification petition, the Authority amended the certification of the
consolidated professional unit to include, without an election, professional
employees of the outpatient clinics in Mobile and Pensacola. Id. at 3.
In January 1999, VA Biloxi-Gulfport
changed its name to VHCS. Id. However, the relevant unit descriptions
continued to refer to VA Biloxi-Gulfport as the employing Agency. Id. at 9-10. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina
destroyed the Gulfport Division of VHCS. Id. at 4. Subsequently, all
Gulfport Division employees, including all AFGE bargaining-unit employees, were
relocated to the VHCS Biloxi Division, and the Gulfport Division closed. Id. In 2008, VHCS opened Eglin. Id. at 5. In its petition, AFGE requested
that its existing certification be amended to reflect that VHCS is a successor
employer to VA Biloxi-Gulfport, and that unit descriptions of “[a]ll
nonprofessional employees of [VHCS]” and “[a]ll professional employees of
[VHCS]” be added to the current VA-AFGE nationwide consolidated units. Id. at 6-7. AFGE further asserted that, under its proposed unit descriptions, all
professional and nonprofessional employees at Eglin should be automatically
included in its consolidated nonprofessional and professional units because
Eglin is part of VHCS. Id. at 7. VHCS agreed that it is a successor
employer to VA Biloxi-Gulfport based on the name change, and that the
certification should be amended to reflect its current name, but asserted that
an election was necessary for employees at Eglin. Id.
The RD stated that successorship
“involves a determination of the status of a bargaining relationship between an
agency or activity that acquires employees in a previously-existing bargaining
unit pursuant to a reorganization, and a labor organization that exclusively
represented those employees prior to their transfer.” Id. (discussing
the Authority’s successorship test as set forth in Naval Facilities Eng’g
Serv. Ctr., Port Hueneme, Cal., 50 FLRA 363, 368 (1995) (Port Hueneme)).[2] The RD stated that, although VA Biloxi-Gulfport changed its name to VHCS in
January 1999, the name change was not accompanied by any “reorganization” or
“reallocation of jurisdiction or territory serviced[.]” RD Decision at 9. Accordingly, the RD found that the “mere[] . . . name change” relied upon by
the parties did not trigger successorship, and he rejected the parties’
stipulation that VHCS is a successor employer to VA Biloxi-Gulfport. Id.
Although he found no successorship,
the RD found that the Statute provides for the amendment of certifications to
accommodate nominal or technical changes, and he issued amended certifications
in which he designated VHCS as the employing Agency and deleted references to
the closed Gulfport Division. [3] Id. at 9-10 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7111(b)(2); Dep’t of Def.,
Office of Dependents Educ., 15 FLRA 493 (1984) (DOD)).
In amending the certifications, the
RD rejected AFGE’s argument that the new certifications should include “all”
nonprofessional and professional employees of VHCS. RD Decision at 10 n.3. The RD stated that “historically, it is clear that all clinics and divisions of
. . . [VHCS] have been certified separately, primarily through elections, even
though each has been part of the system as a whole at the time of this
certification.” Id. As a result, the RD rejected AFGE’s argument that
employees at Eglin – which was established after the name change from VA
Biloxi-Gulfport to VHCS – should be automatically included in the unit. Id. In this connection, the RD found that, at the time Eglin was established, the
certifications “specifically delineated specific divisions and outpatient
clinics[,]” and did not encompass all of VHCS. Id. As the Eglin
employees do not fall within the express terms of the certifications, the RD
found inapplicable the rule that “new employees are automatically included in
an existing unit where their positions fall within the express terms of a
bargaining unit certificate and where their inclusion does not render the
bargaining unit inappropriate.” Id. (citing Dep’t of the Army,
Headquarters, Fort Dix, Fort Dix, N.J., 53 FLRA 287, 294 (1997) (Fort Dix)). The RD next found that Eglin
employees could not be included in the unit through successorship because the
majority of the Eglin employees were new hires, and therefore did not come from
units in which AFGE was the exclusive representative. RD Decision at 10. The
RD also found that the Eglin employees had not accreted to the AFGE unit. According to the RD, for accretion to occur, it is necessary to find that the
group of employees to be accreted: “(1) do not constitute an appropriate
separate bargaining unit on their own; (2) are not in positions that fall
within the express language of the unit description; and (3) become
functionally and administratively integrated into the pre-existing unit.” Id. at 8-9. Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the RD found that the Eglin
employees occupy positions identical to, and perform substantially identical
duties as, unit employees in Biloxi, Mobile, Panama City, and Pensacola. Id. at 11. The RD reasoned that “[s]ince the units in Biloxi, Mobile, Panama City and Pensacola have been certified and are each appropriate units, I find that the
unit(s) at [Eglin] is also appropriate under the Statute.” Id. Therefore,
the RD concluded, “the first prong of the accretion test fails and accretion
does not apply[.]” Id.
AFGE contends that, under § 2422.31(c)(3)(i) and
(iii) of the Authority’s regulations, review of the RD’s decision is warranted
on the following grounds: (1) the RD failed to apply established law; and (2)
the RD committed a clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual
matter.[4] Application at 1. According to AFGE, the RD failed to
consider reorganizations and transfers of VHCS employees when he found that
successorship principles did not apply. Id. at 4. In this
regard, AFGE argues that “the organizational movement of AFGE-represented
employees” from VA Biloxi-Gulfport to VHCS constitutes a “transfer” for
purposes of the successorship doctrine. Id. at 4-5. AFGE also argues that
the “destruction and permanent closure of the Gulfport facility and the
resultant transfer of Gulfport employees falls squarely within the definition
of a ‘reorganization’” for purposes of successorship. Id. at 5. AFGE
asserts that, at the time of each of these occurrences, it was the certified
representative of all nonprofessional and professional employees at each of the
Agency’s divisions and clinics. Id. at 7. According to AFGE, correctly
updated certifications would reflect that VHCS is the successor employer of all
employees in every VHCS division and clinic, and AFGE requests that the
certifications be modified to include “all” VHCS employees. Id. As the
Eglin employees would fall within the express terms of such certifications,
AFGE contends that, under Fort Dix, Eglin employees should be included
in the VHCS nonprofessional and professional units without an election. Id. at 2-3, 7 n.5, 8 n.6.
AFGE argues that the RD’s refusal
to apply successorship criteria also resulted in “inaccurate and obsolete unit
descriptions.” Id. at 6. Specifically, according to AFGE, the RD
failed to “perform a routine update of the descriptions to . . . reflect
current statutory exclusions[,]” and to correct references to employee
categories and divisions that no longer exist. Id. AFGE further argues that the RD
failed to apply established law when he found that the Eglin employees had not
accreted to the consolidated units. Id. at 8-9. AFGE asserts that the
RD failed to apply any of the three statutory criteria for determining the
appropriateness of a unit under § 7112(a), and “instead relied upon the alleged
appropriateness of other units for finding that an Eglin unit would be
appropriate.” Id. In this connection, AFGE argues that the RD
committed a clear and prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter
when he asserted that units in Biloxi, Mobile, Panama City, and Pensacola are each appropriate units. Id. at 9. According to AFGE, “[t]hese units
are components of AFGE’s professional and nonprofessional consolidated units,
not separate, appropriate, stand-alone units.” Id. In a related
argument, AFGE maintains that the RD’s “assertion that each of the units that
now comprise . . . [VHCS] have been ‘separately certified’ is factually
incorrect and constitutes a prejudicial factual error” because professional
employees of the Mobile and Pensacola clinics were included in the professional
unit through clarification, not through an election. Id. at 9 n.8.
In response to AFGE’s application
for review, the Agency asserts that it “has no position one way or the other,”
but that it would “like to merely point out a few of the stipulated facts.” Opp’n at 1. The Agency then repeats assertions from the parties’ stipulations,
all of which appear in the RD’s Decision. Id. at 1-4; RD Decision at 1-7. The Agency also asserts that AFGE’s application for review “could be misconstrued
to mean that the name change in 1999 took place as the result of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005[,]” and clarifies that these events took place approximately
six years apart. Opp’n at 4.
IV. Analysis and
AFGE argues that the RD failed to
apply established law and committed a clear and prejudicial error concerning a
substantial factual matter with respect to his findings concerning
successorship and accretion. A. Successorship
Doctrine and Unit Descriptions
The successorship doctrine applies
to determine whether, following a reorganization, a
new employing entity is the successor to a previous one such that a secret
ballot election is not necessary to determine representation rights of
employees who were transferred to the successor. Port Hueneme, 50 FLRA
at 368. The RD correctly found that, for successorship to apply, there
must be an “organizational movement of employees within an agency or between
agencies[.]” Def. Logistics Agency, Def. Supply Ctr. Columbus, Columbus, Ohio, 53 FLRA 1114, 1126-27 (1998) (DLA Columbus). Despite AFGE’s
characterization of the January 1999 name change as an “organizational
movement,” there is no record evidence that any employees were transferred or
otherwise organizationally moved when VA Biloxi-Gulfport changed its name to VHCS. In these circumstances, we find that AFGE has not established that the RD
failed to apply established law when he found that the name change was not a
reorganization that required application of the Port Hueneme successorship
AFGE also argues that the closure
of the Gulfport facility and the resulting transfer of Gulfport employees is a
“reorganization” for purposes of successorship. Application at 5. Pursuant to
the parties’ stipulations, the RD found that, following the closure of the Gulfport facility, “all employees whose duty location was the Gulfport Division, including
all AFGE bargaining unit employees, were relocated to the [VHCS] Biloxi
Division.”[5] RD Decision at 4. Even if the RD had found that this was a “transfer” for
purposes of successorship and had proceeded to successfully apply the remaining
successorship criteria under Port Hueneme,[6]
AFGE provides no basis for finding that this transfer required the RD to amend
the certifications to include, broadly, “[a]ll nonprofessional employees of
[VHCS]” and “[a]ll professional employees of [VHCS].” RD Decision at 6. We
note, in this connection, that the Authority has previously declined to replace
a unit description specifically listing each of an agency’s regional
subdivisions with a broader national-level certification where the only
organizational change was the merger of two regional subdivisions. See DOD,
15 FLRA at 494-96. Thus, the transfer of Gulfport employees provides no
basis for granting AFGE’s request to amend the certifications to include “all”
VHCS employees.
For the foregoing reasons, we find
that the RD did not fail to apply established law or commit a clear and
prejudicial error concerning a substantial factual matter by declining to amend
the certificates to include “[a]ll nonprofessional employees of [VHCS]” and
“[a]ll professional employees of [VHCS].” RD Decision at 6, 10 n.3. In light
of this finding, the Eglin employees are not automatically covered by the
express terms of the certifications. Therefore, we further find that the RD
did not fail to apply established law or commit a clear and prejudicial error
concerning a substantial factual matter by concluding that the
automatic-inclusion principle of Fort Dix did not apply to the Eglin
B. Accretion
Accretion involves the addition of
a group of employees to an existing bargaining unit without an election based
on a change in agency operations or organization. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Pac. Nw. Region, Grand
Coulee Power Office, Wash. & Hungry Horse Field Office, Mont., 62 FLRA
522, 524 (2008). Because accretion precludes employee self-determination, the
accretion doctrine is narrowly applied. DLA Columbus, 53 FLRA at 1125. In deciding questions concerning accretion, the Authority is bound by the
criteria for determining an appropriate unit as set forth in § 7112(a) of the
Statute. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Fleet & Indus. Supply Ctr., Norfolk, Va., 52 FLRA 950, 963 (1997) (FISC); U.S. Dep’t of Def. Dependents Schools, 48 FLRA 1076, 1085 (1993) (DOD Schools). Where the
employees being considered for possible accretion into an existing unit
constitute an appropriate separate bargaining unit on their own, the Authority
will not apply accretion principles. See FISC, 52 FLRA at 959 (“If it
is determined that the . . . employees are not included in, and constitute a
majority of employees in, a separate appropriate unit . . . , we will apply the
Authority’s long-established accretion principles.”) (emphasis added and other
emphasis removed); DOD Schools, 48 FLRA at 1085-88 (accretion of
regional unit into worldwide unit not warranted so long as regional unit
remained a separate appropriate unit). To determine whether a unit is
appropriate under § 7112(a) of the Statute, the Authority considers whether the
unit would: (1) ensure a clear and identifiable community of interest among
employees in the unit; (2) promote effective dealings with the agency involved;
and (3) promote efficiency of the operations of the agency involved. See,
e.g., FISC, 52 FLRA at 959. In making unit determinations under § 7112(a),
the Authority examines the factors presented on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 960. The Authority has set forth a wide variety of factors to be
considered with respect to each of the three criteria, but has not specified
the weight of individual factors necessary to establish an appropriate unit. U.S.
Dep’t of the Navy, Commander, Naval Base, Norfolk, Va., 56 FLRA 328, 333 (2000)
(Naval Base, Norfolk) (Chairman Wasserman concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In assessing the first criterion –
that employees share a clear and identifiable community of interest – the
Authority examines such factors as whether the employees in the proposed unit: are
a part of the same organizational component of the agency; support the same
mission; are subject to the same chain of command; have similar or related
duties, job titles and work assignments; are subject to the same general working
conditions; and are governed by the same personnel and labor relations policies
that are administered by the same personnel office. FISC, 52 FLRA at
960-61. In addition, factors such as geographic proximity, unique conditions
of employment, distinct local concerns, degree of interchange between other
organizational components, and functional or operational separation may be
relevant. Id. at 961. In assessing the effective-dealings
requirement, the Authority examines such factors as: the past collective
bargaining experience of the parties; the locus and scope of authority of the
responsible personnel office administering personnel policies covering
employees in the proposed unit; the limitations, if any, on the negotiation of
matters of critical concern to employees in the proposed unit; and the level at
which labor-relations policy is set in the agency. Id. Factors to be
examined in assessing efficiency of agency operations pertain to the effect of
the proposed unit on agency operations in terms of cost, productivity, and use
of resources. Id. at 962.
The RD stated that because “the
units in Biloxi, Mobile, Panama City and Pensacola have been certified and are
each appropriate units, . . . the unit(s) at [Eglin] is also appropriate under
the Statute[,]” given the similarities between the positions and duties of the
employees in those respective units. RD Decision at 11. The RD then concluded
that the Eglin employees could not properly be accreted into the VHCS units. Id. Thus, the RD assessed whether the Eglin employees constituted a separate
appropriate unit based solely on their similarity to employees in other
separately certified units. As an initial matter, the premise
of the RD’s appropriate-unit determination – that the other units are “each
appropriate units” – is not entirely correct. As the RD acknowledged in his
factual findings, the professional employees of the Mobile and Pensacola clinics were included in the consolidated professional unit through
clarification, not through an election, and there is no indication in the
record that they were certified as separate appropriate units. Id. at 3. In this regard, the record indicates that the Mobile and Pensacola professional employees were included in the bargaining unit by accretion. See
Jan. 12, 1996 RD Decision at 9. More importantly, the RD failed to
examine each of the requisite statutory criteria in determining that the Eglin
employees constitute a separate appropriate unit. Further, the record does not
provide a sufficient basis for the Authority to determine whether the Eglin
employees constitute a separate appropriate unit. Because the RD did not
conduct a hearing, the record before us is limited to the stipulations of the
parties. RD Decision at 1 n.1. Although the stipulations include information
about the Eglin employees’ mission and positions, and the organizational level
at which personnel and labor relations are handled for Eglin employees, the
parties’ stipulations do not sufficiently address the variety of additional
factors set forth above that the Authority may consider in appropriate unit
determinations. See RD Decision at 1-6; Stipulation of Facts at 1-6;
Amended Stipulation of Facts at 1. See also, FISC, 52 FLRA at
960-62 (discussing factors examined by the Authority for each of the three
appropriate-unit criteria). In similar circumstances, the Authority has
remanded to the RD for further findings. See, e.g., Naval Base,
Norfolk, 56 FLRA at 334-36.
For the foregoing reasons, we grant
AFGE’s application for review in part on the ground that the RD failed to apply
established law by failing to consider the requisite statutory criteria when
analyzing whether the Eglin employees constitute a separate appropriate unit,
and we remand to the RD to assess whether the Eglin employees constitute a
separate appropriate unit under § 7112(a). If, on remand, the RD determines
that the Eglin employees constitute a separate, appropriate unit, then they may
not be accreted to the existing unit. See FISC, 52 FLRA at 959. IV. Order
We deny the application with regard to the RD’s
application of the successorship doctrine, refusal to adopt AFGE’s proposed
unit descriptions in the amended certifications, and conclusion that the
employees. We grant the application with regard to the question of whether the
Eglin employees constitute a separate appropriate unit under § 7112(a), and
remand that issue to the RD for appropriate action consistent with this Order.[8]
The RD decision provides, in pertinent part:
7. On September 21, 1987, . . . after conducting an election, the . . .
Authority . . . certified for inclusion in the existing [VA-AFGE] consolidated
professional unit the following unit of employees:
professional employees of the Biloxi and Gulfport Divisions of the Veterans Administration Medical Center, Biloxi, Mississippi.
Excluded: All
non-professional employees, supervisors, management officials, and employees described
in 5 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).
8. On February 23, 1995, . . . after conducting an election, the . . .
nonprofessional unit the following unit of employees:
nonprofessional employees, including temporary whose appointments exceed 90
days, who are employed at the VA Pensacola Outpatient Clinic, Pensacola, Florida.
professional employees, supervisors, management officials, and employees as
defined in 5 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6), and (7).
9. On January 12, 1996, . . . the Atlanta Regional Director of the FLRA
certified for inclusion in the existing [VA-AFGE] consolidated professional
unit and clarified the unit . . ., without conducting an election, as follows:
non-supervisory professional employees of Biloxi and Gulfport Divisions of the
Department of Veterans Affairs, Biloxi, Mississippi and the Outpatient Clinics
of Mobile, Alabama and Pensacola, Florida.
non-professional employees, supervisors, management officials, and employees
described in 5 U.S.C. 7112(b)(2), (3), (4), (6) and (7).
12. On June 29, 1999, . . . after conducting an election, the Atlanta
Regional Director included the following group of employees in the existing
[VA-AFGE] consolidated nonprofessional unit . . . :
nonprofessional employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Outpatient
Clinic, Mobile, Alabama.
professional employees, management officials, supervisors, and employees
13. On March 19, 2001, . . . the existing [VA-AFGE] consolidated
nonprofessional unit . . . was clarified and the resulting unit description
includes, as pertinent to this petition, the following:
All non-professional employees at
psychiatry division of Veterans Administration Center, Biloxi, Mississippi,
Gulfport Division, excluding professional employees of the Gulfport Division,
all supervisors, management officials, and personnel engaged in Federal
personnel work in other than a purely clerical capacity.
All GM and S Service non-professional
employees at the Veterans Administration Center, Biloxi, Mississippi, excluding
professional employees, supervisors, management officials, and personnel
engaged in Federal personnel work in other than a purely clerical capacity.
14. On October 17, 2002, . . . after conducting an election, the Atlanta
Regional Director included the following group of employees in the existing [VA-AFGE]
consolidated unit of professional employees . . . :
professional employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Affairs
Outpatient Clinic, Panama City, Florida.
nonprofessional employees, supervisors, management officials, and employees
15. On October 17, 2002, . . . after conducting an election, the Atlanta
[VA-AFGE] consolidated unit of nonprofessional employees . . . :
non-professional employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans
Affairs Outpatient Clinic, Panama City, Florida.
professional employees, supervisors, management officials, and employees
RD Decision at 2-4.
The timeline and wording of the pertinent unit certifications are provided in
the appendix to this decision.
Under the Port Hueneme test, a new entity is a successor, and the union
retains its status as the exclusive representative of employees transferred to
the successor, when: (1) an entire recognized unit, or a portion of a
recognized unit, is transferred, and the transferred employees: (a) are in an
appropriate bargaining unit under § 7112(a) of the Statute after the transfer;
and (b) constitute a majority of the employees in the unit; (2) the new entity
has substantially the same organizational mission with the transferred
employees performing substantially the same duties and functions under
substantially similar working conditions in the new entity; and (3) it has not
been demonstrated that an election is necessary to determine representation. 50 FLRA at 368.
Because the certifications for inclusion of the employees at the Panama City clinic in the AFGE consolidated units do not refer to VA Biloxi-Gulfport as the
employing Agency, the RD did not amend those certifications. RD Decision at 10
5 C.F.R. § 2422.31(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The Authority may grant an
application for review only when the application demonstrates that review is
warranted on one or more of the following grounds: . . . (3) There is a
genuine issue over whether the Regional Director has: (i) Failed to apply
established law; . . . (iii) Committed a clear and prejudicial error concerning
a substantial factual matter.
In its application for review, AFGE asserts that Gulfport employees were
transferred “to other VA and [VHCS] locations” rather than solely to Biloxi, and specifically asserts that some Gulfport laundry employees were transferred to
VA facilities outside of VHCS. Application at 5. However, there is no
evidence in the record that AFGE made these assertions before the RD, and the
Authority’s regulations therefore bar AFGE from raising them in its
application. 5 C.F.R. § 2422.31(b) (“An application may not . . . rely on
any facts not timely presented to the . . . [RD].”) In addition, the RD’s
finding that “all” Gulfport employees were relocated to the Biloxi Division
appears verbatim in the parties’ stipulations. See RD Decision at
4; Stipulations of Fact at 4. Further, even if AFGE were correct, there is no
basis for finding that the transfer of employees outside of VHCS is
relevant to determining whether VHCS is a successor. [6]
Although we assume for purposes of this analysis that the successorship
doctrine could apply to the reassignment of the Gulfport employees to Biloxi,
we note that the Port Hueneme successorship doctrine requires that the
transferred employees: (a) are in an appropriate bargaining unit under §
7112(a) of the Statute after the transfer; and (b) constitute a majority of the
employees in the unit. 50 FLRA at 368. There is no allegation or record
evidence suggesting that the transferred Gulfport employees would constitute a
majority of the employees in the requested unit(s).
AFGE’s claim that the unit descriptions continue to be inaccurate is discussed infra
As discussed previously, in its application, AFGE asserts that even the updated
certifications ordered by the RD do not reflect current statutory exclusions
and retain references to outdated job descriptions and divisions. Application
at 6. We direct that, on remand, the RD consider such arguments and make any
necessary corrections. Federal Labor Relations Authority