Source: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/13611.88-en-19920925/view/
Timestamp: 2018-02-24 21:34:03
Document Index: 439998956

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 32', 'art. 47', 'art. 25', 'art. 44', 'art. 48', 'art. 46', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 43', 'in fine', 'art. 43', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 31', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 6', 'art. 51']

CROISSANT v. GERMANY About Project
In the case of Croissant v. Germany*,
Having deliberated in private on 27 March and 28 August 1992,
1. The case was referred to the Court on 19 April 1991 by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission"), within the three-month period laid down in Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in an application (no. 13611/88) against Germany lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Klaus Croissant, a German national, on 3 December 1987.
The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Germany recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether or not the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-c).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30). The President gave the lawyer leave to use the German language (Rule 27 para. 3).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 23 April 1991 the President drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the seven other members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr J. Pinheiro Farinha, Mr B. Walsh, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr S.K. Martens and Mr F. Bigi (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr F. Matscher and Mr J.M. Morenilla, substitute judges, replaced respectively Mr Pinheiro Farinha, who had resigned and whose successor had taken up his duties before the hearing (Rules 2 para. 3 and 22 para. 1), and Mr Macdonald, who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
4. Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the German Government ("the Government"), the Delegate of the Commission and the representative of the applicant on the organisation of the procedure (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the registry received, on 13 September 1991, the applicant’s memorial and, on 16 September, the Government’s. On 11 October 1991 the Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit her observations at the hearing. On 16 March 1992 he filed several documents.
On 28 February 1992 the Chamber had decided, after considering the observations of the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission thereon, to reject a request by the applicant for the hearing of witnesses.
5. In accordance with the decision of the President - who had also given the representatives of the Government leave to plead in German (Rule 27 para. 2) - the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 March 1992. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
Mr U. Heissler, President
of the Stuttgart Regional Court,
Mr G. Uhink, Principal Administrator, Counsel;
Mr K. Eschen, Rechtsanwalt, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Meyer-Ladewig for the Government, by Mrs Thune for the Commission and by Mr Eschen for the applicant, as well as their replies to questions put by the Court. The Government and the applicant filed several documents.
6. Mr Klaus Croissant, a German national, is a lawyer who practises in Berlin. At the material time, he was facing criminal proceedings in the Stuttgart Regional Court (Landgericht) in connection with his activities as the lawyer of various members of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF).
10. On 6 March 1978 the Stuttgart Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) upheld this decision. It recalled that, according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), an appointment to act as defence counsel could and should only be revoked when its purpose - that is, to ensure that the accused will be adequately defended and the proceedings properly conducted - is seriously endangered. On similar grounds as the first-instance court, it held that Mr Croissant had not established that this requirement was met in respect of Mr Hauser’s appointment.
On 30 April 1987 the appeal was allowed in respect of two minor items (DM 113,70 in total), but was dismissed as to the main issue. The Court of Appeal held that the designation of a third court-appointed defence counsel had corresponded to a pressing need - ensuring an adequate defence -, on account of the scope and complexity of the case and in view of the probable duration of the trial. If the court, when making the appointment, had also purported to secure that the trial would take its legal course, it had rightly done so since that was a legitimate interest to be taken into account as well. As to the applicant’s arguments based on Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention, the court endorsed the reasons given by the Regional Court. It added that the financial means of the defendant are immaterial for deciding whether or not the court should appoint a defence counsel. The question whether a convicted person is able to pay only arises after the criminal proceedings have ended.
16. On 23 June 1987 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain Mr Croissant’s constitutional appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde), taking the view that it had no prospect of success. In the light of the Commission’s case-law, the court considered that it did not follow from Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) of the Convention that legal assistance was definitively provided free. It held that a convicted person’s obligation to pay costs and expenses derived from the fact that proceedings had been brought as a result of his own conduct. The principle of the "social state" (Sozialstaatsprinzip) and the right to a fair trial no doubt guaranteed that, where necessary, legal assistance be accorded to an indigent accused, but they did not require him to be definitively dispensed from paying the fees incurred. The law on legal costs and expenses made available other possibilities (arrangements for payment or stay of execution) to take effective account of the financial difficulties of the convicted person. Finally, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion regarding the necessity of appointing Mr Hauser as the third lawyer (see paragraph 15 above) was coherent and in any event had not been arbitrary.
"(1) The accused (Beschuldigter) may be assisted by a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings. He may not be represented by more than three lawyers of his own choice.
"(1) The assistance of a defence counsel is necessary where:
"(1) In the cases provided for in Article 140 (1) and (2), a defence counsel shall be appointed for an accused who has been officially charged before the court (Angeschuldigter) and is not yet represented by counsel, as soon as the accused is invited ... to make a statement on the indictment.
"(1) In so far as possible, the President of the court shall designate the lawyer to be appointed from among the lawyers admitted to plead in a court within the same jurisdiction. The accused shall be offered the opportunity of indicating a lawyer of his choice within a prescribed time-limit. Unless there are important reasons for not doing so, the President shall appoint the lawyer indicated by the accused.
"1. The defendant shall bear the costs in so far as they ensue from proceedings brought on account of an offence for which he has been convicted ..."
"(1) The payment of legal costs and other debts provided for in Article 1 (1), nos. 5 to 9, of the Regulation on the recovery of costs ... of 11 March 1937 ... may be deferred where their immediate payment would cause exceptional hardship to the person liable to pay and if such a deferment does not jeopardise the debt ...
(3) The competent Minister shall take the decision provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2. In certain categories of cases he may delegate this power, in whole or in part, to subordinate authorities."
23. The Commission declared the application (no. 13611/88) admissible on 8 December 1989. In its report of 7 March 1991 (Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion that there had been no violation either in respect of the fees and expenses of Mr Baier and Mr Kempf (unanimously) or in respect of those of Mr Hauser (seven votes to four). The full text of its opinion and of the two separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment*.
For their part, the Government invited the Court to find: "... that, in this case, the Federal Republic of Germany has not violated Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention."
25. Mr Croissant alleged a violation of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention. The paragraphs of that Article on which he relied - 3 (c) in conjunction with 1 (art. 6-3-c, art. 6-1) - provide as follows:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ..."
His complaint was directed against the order requiring him to reimburse to the State the fees and disbursements of the three counsel officially appointed by the Stuttgart Regional Court to defend him, namely Mr Baier and Mr Kempf, at his request, and Mr Hauser, against his wishes ("the reimbursement order"). He submitted that this order:
His general complaint regarding the reimbursement order raises the question whether it is compatible with Article 6 (art. 6) for the State to seek to recover from an accused, after he has been convicted, the fees and disbursements of one or more defence counsel who were appointed by the competent court on the ground that the interests of justice so required and who, in accordance with its order, provided him during his trial with assistance for which they did not charge him at the time. An analysis of this complaint reveals that attention must be given to both the initial appointment itself and the subsequent reimbursement order. The former raises - irrespective of the accused’s means - issues under Article 6 (art. 6), especially as regards the meaning of the phrase "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing"; it will therefore be examined first, for if the appointment was incompatible with Article 6 (art. 6), the same would apply to a decision to recover the costs occasioned thereby.
The requirement that a defendant be assisted by counsel at all stages of the Regional Court’s proceedings (Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph 20 above) - which finds parallels in the legislation of other Contracting States - cannot, in the Court’s opinion, be deemed incompatible with the Convention.
It is true that Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) entitles "everyone charged with a criminal offence" to be defended by counsel of his own choosing (see the Pakelli v. Germany judgment of 25 April 1983, Series A no. 64, p. 15, para. 31). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, this right cannot be considered to be absolute. It is necessarily subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is concerned and also where, as in the present case, it is for the courts to decide whether the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by them. When appointing defence counsel the national courts must certainly have regard to the defendant’s wishes; indeed, German law contemplates such a course (Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraph 20 above). However, they can override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.
Finally, in the opinion of the Regional Court there were valid reasons - namely a possible conflict of interests between Mr Croissant and one of his former employees - for refusing to designate Mr Künzel (see paragraph 9 above).
31. Furthermore, the Government maintained - and this was confirmed by Mr Croissant’s counsel at the Court’s hearing - that Mr Hauser took an active part in the defence and was closely involved with the other two counsel in planning the strategy to be adopted. Accordingly, his designation cannot be said to have adversely affected the applicant’s defence.
33. Unlike the rights embodied in other provisions of Article 6 para. 3 (art. 6-3) (for example, sub-paragraph (e) (art. 6-3-e) - see the Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç v. Germany judgment of 28 November 1978, Series A no. 29, pp. 16-17, para. 40), the right to free legal assistance conferred by sub-paragraph (c) (art. 6-3-c) is not absolute; such assistance is to be provided only if the accused "has not sufficient means to pay".
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 September 1992.
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Mr De Meyer is annexed to this judgment.
I have no difficulty in finding, in common with my fellow judges, that the Stuttgart Regional Court did not violate any of the applicant’s fundamental rights in deciding that a third defence counsel should be appointed for him.
With reference to the choice of defence counsel, however, I consider that Mr Croissant was entitled to refuse the assistance of a lawyer in whom he had no confidence, just as the court was entitled to refuse, for valid reasons, to appoint the lawyer suggested by the applicant.
It appears that no efforts were made to secure the appointment as third defence counsel of a lawyer in whom Mr Croissant had confidence and in respect of whom there were no valid grounds to prevent the court appointing him. Moreover, it has not been shown that it was not possible to find a lawyer who complied with both these requirements.
In such circumstances it is not permissible that Mr Croissant should be obliged to reimburse the State for Mr Hauser’s fees.
* The case is numbered 62/1991/314/385. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creations and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
* Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 237-B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's report is available from the registry.
CROISSANT v. GERMANY JUDGMENT