Source: https://casetext.com/case/attorney-general-of-us-v-covington-burling-2
Timestamp: 2018-10-18 20:26:35
Document Index: 233963730

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 611', '§ 611', '§ 613', '§ 612', '§ 616', '§ 1905', '§ 615', '§ 615', '§ 615', '§ 615', '§ 615']

Attorney General of U.S. v. Covington Burling, 411 F. Supp. 371 | Casetext
Attorney General of U.S. v. Covington Burling
411 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1976)
United States District Court, D. ColumbiaApr 23, 1976
…In it, the Registration Unit of the Justice Department, which is the authorized delegate of the Attorney…
Earl J. Silbert, Richard L. Thornburgh, Justin O'Shea, Homer H. Kirby, Jr., Brian K. Ahearn, Attys., Dept. of Justice, for plaintiff.
Erwin N. Griswold, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
The Attorney General in this case is seeking an injunction ordering Covington Burling ("CB"), a Washington, D.C. law firm, to allow officials of the Justice Department to inspect certain documents the firm has withheld relating to its representation of the Republic of Guinea. He claims his delegates have a right to see these documents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611 to 621 (1970).
CB initially registered under the Act as an agent of the Republic of Guinea in May of 1967, and has periodically updated its registration statement as required. Until recently, when Guinea terminated its association with the firm, CB advised and represented the country quite actively. Its main efforts seem to have been centered on counseling Guinea on a project the country had undertaken to exploit its bauxite resources. To that end, CB assisted Guinea in its negotiations with those foreign corporations — including American ones — which had agreed to mine the bauxite. The law firm also helped negotiate loans for the project from the World Bank, from the United States Agency for International Development, and from the United States Export-Import Bank. During the course of these negotiations, members of the firm met with the lawyers and staff of the Agency for International Development and of the Export-Import Bank, and also with the Guinea desk officer of the State Department and the U.S. Ambassador to Guinea.
CB also assisted Guinea in other smaller matters. For example, it advised the country on certain contract claims Guinea might have against those corporations that had agreed to mine Guinea's bauxite, and it represented Guinea in a New York state court on a contract dispute arising from Guinea's exhibit at the World's Fair there in 1964.
In January of 1975, officials of the Justice Department sought to inspect the records CB had maintained with respect to its relationship with Guinea. The firm allowed them to see approximately 95 percent of these records; the remaining five percent of the documents, which apparently related to nearly every area in which the firm has assisted Guinea, and amounts to about 1,000 pages, CB refused to let the government inspect. As its reason for withholding these particular documents, the firm stated then that the documents related to confidential communications between Guinea and the firm regarding legal matters. Although it has given other reasons for not allowing officials of the Justice Department to inspect these documents, CB's main contention continues to be that the Foreign Agents Registration Act recognizes an attorney-client privilege that protects these documents. The Attorney General's simple response is that no such privilege exists under the Act.
CB has given two other reasons for withholding these documents: (1) that it only registered under the Act out of an abundance of caution and is not really subject to it at all; (2) and that none of the documents relates to an activity for which registration is required, and the Act therefore does not require disclosure of them. For purposes of argument, however, the firm is willing to have it assumed that both these arguments have failed.
The Attorney General has also suggested that, even if the privilege should exist under the Act, it may have been waived by the client. The Court has found nothing in the record, however, to support this possibility.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act is a disclosure statute. It provides, generally, that every "agent of a foreign principal," as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) and (d), must, unless exempted from doing so by § 613, file a registration statement with the Attorney General which discloses the particulars of the agent's activities on behalf of his foreign principal, and also must file copies of any "political propaganda" the agent publicizes on the principal's behalf. 22 U.S.C. § 612, 614. The Attorney General, in turn, must make information contained in these filings available to the public and to interested parties in government. 22 U.S.C. § 616.
The foreign principal may fear, however, that these persons at the Justice Department might, intentionally or not, directly or indirectly, disclose the confidences to persons who might make use of the embarrassing, unfavorable or secret information against the principal. In fact, there is no express provision in the Act which would deter an official in the Justice Department from doing this. Nor does there appear to be any statute elsewhere which would do so. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970). Nor does it appear that injunctive relief would be helpful, since a decree probably could not be obtained before the damage was done. In the end, the foreign principal would simply have to rely on the good faith of the Attorney General's delegates at the Justice Department.
[a]ny person qualified to practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal before any court of law or any agency of the Government of the United States. . . .
[a]ny person engaging or agreeing to engage only (1) in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of a bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal; or (2) in other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest
Every agent of a foreign principal registered under this subchapter shall keep and preserve while he is an agent of a foreign principal such books of account and other records with respect to all his activities, the disclosure of which is required under the provisions of this subchapter, in accordance with such business and accounting practices, as the Attorney General, having due regard for the national security and the public interest, may by regulation prescribe as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of this subchapter. . . . Until regulations are in effect under this section every agent of a foreign principal shall keep books of account and shall preserve all written records with respect to his activities. Such books and records shall be open at all reasonable times to the inspection of any official charged with the enforcement of this subchapter. . . .
Clearly, § 615 does not expressly dispose of the question of whether a claim of attorney-client privilege can be interposed to prevent disclosure to the government. CB argues that the phrase "books of account and other records" indicates a congressional intent not to subject documents that would tend to disclose confidential client-attorney communications to the recordkeeping requirement of § 615 and thus not to subject them to the disclosure requirement either. But the phrase more fully quoted is "such books of account and other records . . . as the Attorney General . . . may . . . prescribe. . . ." In addition, Congress expressly made the phrase include "all written records with respect to [the agent's] activities" until the Attorney General should issue regulations. Put in this context, the phrase does not appear to be at all probative of an actual congressional intent to exclude confidential client-attorney communications from the requirements of § 615.
Finally, the Court has looked at the legislative history of the Act. On only two occasions does it appear that the problem of the possible disclosure under the Act of confidential client-attorney communications was discussed. Hearings on S. 2136 Before The Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 106-07 (1963). The Court has concluded that on neither occasion did the Committee seriously consider the question.
Therefore, the Court must decide the issue by looking to the purpose of the statute and the function § 615 plays in achieving that purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1952); Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945).
It is important to note at the outset that there are really two questions to be resolved here. The first is whether records relating to confidential communications between a foreign principal and its agent-attorney are included in the "books of account and other records" that must be kept under the Act. If these records must be kept, then a second question arises — whether the phrase "open . . . to . . . inspection" is subject to an implied condition that disclosure of certain records to the Attorney General's delegates need not be made if a valid claim of attorney-client privilege is made. The Court does not think that either interpretation would do "undue violence" to the words of § 615 if the purpose of the Act favors it. See Cabell v. Markham, supra at 739-40.
As to the question of whether the confidential records must per se be disclosed to officials of the Justice Department, the Court finds that this might well, as indicated in Part II above, limit substantially the ability of an agent-attorney to give legal aid to his client. In addition, the Court believes that in all or nearly all instances an impartial judicial officer would be able to disclose portions of a confidential document, or the substance of it, relevant to the Attorney General's needs under the Act without compromising the attorney-client relationship. The Court therefore concludes that an attorney who represents a foreign principal and who has registered as an agent under the Act may validly claim the attorney-client privilege to withhold from disclosure to delegates of the Attorney General documents or portions thereof which are required to be kept under the Act. Whether such documents are properly within the scope of the privilege, however, is for the Court to determine.
The Court can at least hypothecate a situation where these two interests would be locked in unresolvable conflict. See Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Committee, 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080, 93 S.Ct. 679, 34 L.Ed.2d 669 (1972). But that question need not be decided now.
ORDERED that the motion of the Attorney General for an injunction ordering Covington Burling to allow the delegate of the Attorney General to inspect all remaining undisclosed books and records regarding its representation of the Republic of Guinea be, and the same hereby is, denied, since Covington Burling may validly assert the attorney-client privilege with regard to these documents; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of Covington Burling for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted as to those documents which the Court finds to be properly within the scope of the attorney-client privilege; and pursuant to this order it is
FURTHER ORDERED that, within ten (10) days of the date of this order, Covington Burling turn over to the Court for in camera inspection all of the documents which the Attorney General seeks to inspect and which Covington Burling seeks to withhold on the claim of attorney-client privilege, so that the Court may determine whether such documents or portions thereof are properly within the scope of the privilege.