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Document Index: 188595586

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 122', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 122', '§ 101', '§ 4', '§ 1283', '§ 124', '§ 122', '§ 1462', '§ 1305']

JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. V. WILSON, 343 U. S. 495 - Volume 343 - 1952 - Full Text - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 343 > JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. V. WILSON, 343 U. S. 495 (1952) > Full Text
The New York Appellate Division sustained revocation of a license for the showing of a motion picture under § 122 of the New York Education Law on the ground that it was "sacrilegious." 278 App.Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed. 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665. On appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), reversed, p. 343 U. S. 506.
"to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel [with specified exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department. . . . [Footnote 1]"
"The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto. [Footnote 2]"
acting under the statute quoted above, issued to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The Miracle," with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy called "Ways of Love." [Footnote 3] Thereafter, for a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways of Love" was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price.
During this period, the New York State Board of Regents, which by statute is made the head of the education department, [Footnote 4] received "hundreds of letters, telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other communications" both protesting against and defending the public exhibition of "The Miracle." [Footnote 5] The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested three members of the Board to view the picture and to make a report to the entire Board. After viewing the film, this committee reported to the Board that, in its opinion, there was basis for the claim that the picture was "sacrilegious." Thereafter, on January 19, 1951, the Regents directed appellant to show cause, at a hearing to be held on January 30, why its license to show "The Miracle" should not be rescinded on that ground. Appellant appeared at this hearing, which was conducted by the same three-member committee of the Regents which had previously viewed the picture, and challenged the jurisdiction of the committee and of the Regents to proceed with the case. With the consent of the committee, various interested persons and
Appellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the Regents. [Footnote 6] Among the claims advanced by appellant were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the guaranty of separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion; and, (3) that the term "sacrilegious" is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant's contentions and upheld the Regents' determination. 278 App.Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740. On appeal the New York Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665. The case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
As we view the case, we need consider only appellant's contention that the New York statute is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech and a free press. In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U. S. 230 (1915), a distributor of motion pictures sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Ohio statute which required the prior approval of a board of censors before any motion
"It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion. [Footnote 7]"
In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. [Footnote 8] That principle has been
followed and reaffirmed to the present day. Since this series of decisions came after the Mutual decision, the present case is the first to present squarely to us the question whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of "speech" or "the press." [Footnote 9]
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. [Footnote 10] The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. As was said in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 333 U. S. 510 (1948):
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. [Footnote 11]
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra, is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it. [Footnote 12]
media of communication of ideas. [Footnote 13] Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule.
The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Court there recounted the history which indicates that a major purpose of the First Amendment guaranty of a free press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication, although it was carefully pointed out that the liberty of the press is not limited to that protection. [Footnote 14] It was further stated that "the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only
in exceptional cases." Id. at 283 U. S. 716. In the light of the First Amendment's history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an exceptional case.
"It is simply this: that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule. . . . [Footnote 15]"
This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. [Footnote 16] In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no
charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). [Footnote 17] Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. [Footnote 18] However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures. [Footnote 19]
whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different question from the one now before us. [Footnote 20] We hold only that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious."
Id., § 122
McKinney's N.Y.Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 101; see also N.Y.Const., Art. V, § 4.
The action was brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, Gilbert-Bliss N.Y.Civ.Prac., Vol. 6B, 1944, 1949 Supp., § 1283 et seq. See also McKinney's N.Y.Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 124.
236 U.S. at 236 U. S. 244.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 268 U. S. 666 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 283 U. S. 368 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 244 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 299 U. S. 364 (1937); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 303 U. S. 450 (1938); Schneider v . State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 160 (1939).
See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 303 U. S. 452 (1938).
See Inglis, Freedom of the Movies (1947), 20-24; Klapper, The Effects of Mass Media (1950), passim; Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 Yale L.J. 696, 70708 (1951), and sources cited therein.
See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 323 U. S. 531 (1945).
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 334 U. S. 166 (1948):
E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 713-719 (1931); see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 303 U. S. 451-452 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 245-250 (1936); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 205 U. S. 462 (1907).
303 N.Y. 242, 258, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672. At another point, the Court of Appeals gave "sacrilegious" the following definition: "the act of violating or profaning anything sacred." Id. at 255, 101 N.E.2d at 670. The Court of Appeals also approved the Appellate Division's interpretation:
Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 310 U. S. 97 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 283 U. S. 369-370 (1931).
Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
See the following statement by Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310 (1940):
In the Near case, this Court stated that "the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications." 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 716. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 315 U. S. 571-572 (1942), Mr. Justice Murphy stated for a unanimous Court:
But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 336 U. S. 82 (1949):
A practised hand has thus summarized the story of "The Miracle": [Footnote 2/1]
"Opinions may vary, and questions may arise -- even serious ones -- of a religious nature (not to be diminished by the fact that the woman portrayed is mad [because] the author who attributed madness to her is not mad). . . . [Footnote 2/2]"
While acknowledging that there were "passages of undoubted cinematic distinction," Regnoli criticized the film as being "on such a pretentiously cerebral plane that it reminds one of the early d'Annunzio." The Vatican newspaper's critic concluded: "we continue to believe in Rossellini's art, and we look forward to his next achievement." [Footnote 2/3] In October, 1948, a month after the Rome premiere of "The Miracle," the Vatican's censorship agency, the Catholic Cinematographic Centre, declared that the picture "constitutes in effect an abominable profanation from religious and moral viewpoints." [Footnote 2/4] By the Lateran agreements and the Italian Constitution, the Italian Government is bound to bar whatever may offend the Catholic religion. However, the Catholic Cinematographic Centre did not invoke any governmental sanction thereby afforded. The Italian Government's censorship agency gave "The Miracle" the regular nulla osta clearance. The film was freely shown throughout Italy, but was not a great success. [Footnote 2/5] Italian movie critics divided in opinion. The critic for II Popolo, speaking for the Christian Democratic Party, the Catholic
party, profusely praised the picture as a "beautiful thing, humanly felt, alive, true and without religious profanation as someone has said, because, in our opinion, the meaning of the characters is clear, and there is no possibility of misunderstanding." [Footnote 2/6] Regnoli again reviewed "The Miracle" for L'Osservatore Romano. [Footnote 2/7] After criticising the film for technical faults, he found "the most courageous and interesting passage of Rossellini's work" in contrasting portrayals in the film; he added: "Unfortunately, concerning morals, it is necessary to note some slight defects." He objected to its "carnality" and to the representation of illegitimate motherhood. But he did not suggest that the picture was "sacrilegious." The tone of Regnoli's critique was one of respect for Rossellini, "the illustrious Italian producer." [Footnote 2/8]
On March 2, 1949, "The Miracle" was licensed in New York State for showing without English subtitles. [Footnote 2/9] However, it was never exhibited until after a second license was issued on November 30, 1950, for the trilogy, "Ways of Love," combining "The Miracle" with two French films, Jean Renoir's "A Day in the Country" and Marcel Pagnol's "Jofroi." [Footnote 2/10] All had English subtitles. Both licenses
N.Y. Education Law, § 122. The trilogy opened on December 12, 1950, at the Paris Theatre on 58th Street in Manhattan. It was promptly attacked as "a sacrilegious and blasphemous mockery of Christian religious truth" [Footnote 2/11] by the National Legion of Decency, a private Catholic organization for film censorship, whose objectives have intermittently been approved by various non-Catholic church and social groups since its formation in 1933. [Footnote 2/12] However, the National Board of Review (a non-industry lay organization devoted to raising the level of motion pictures by mobilizing public opinion, under the slogan "Selection Not Censorship") [Footnote 2/13] recommended the picture as "especially worth seeing." New York critics on the whole praised "The Miracle"; those who dispraised did not suggest sacrilege. [Footnote 2/14] On December 27, the critics selected the "Ways of Love" as the best foreign language
film in 1950. [Footnote 2/15] Meanwhile, on December 23, Edward T. McCaffrey, Commissioner of Licenses for New York City, declared the film "officially and personally blasphemous" and ordered it withdrawn at the risk of suspension of the license to operate the Paris Theatre. [Footnote 2/16] A week later, the program was restored at the theatre upon the decision by the New York Supreme Court that the City
License Commissioner had exceeded his authority in that he was without powers of movie censorship. [Footnote 2/17]
Upon the failure of the License Commissioner's effort to cut off showings of "The Miracle," the controversy took a new turn. On Sunday, January 7, 1951, a statement of His Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman, condemning the picture and calling on "all right-thinking citizens" to unite to tighten censorship laws, was read at all masses in St. Patrick's Cathedral. [Footnote 2/18]
various denominations, after seeing the picture, found in it nothing "sacrilegious or immoral to the views held by Christian men and women," and, with a few exceptions, agreed that the film was "unquestionably one of unusual artistic merit." [Footnote 2/19]
In this estimate, some Catholic laymen concurred. [Footnote 2/20] Their opinion is represented by the comment by Otto L. Spaeth, Director of the American Federation of Arts and prominent in Catholic lay activities:
hymn to the Virgin, in their brutal badgering of the tragic woman. The scathing indictment of their evil behavior, implicit in the film, was seemingly overlooked by its critics. [Footnote 2/21]"
William P. Clancy, a teacher at the University of Notre Dame, wrote in The Commonweal, the well known Catholic weekly, that "the film is not obviously blasphemous or obscene, either in its intention or execution." [Footnote 2/22] The Commonweal itself questioned the wisdom of transforming Church dogma which Catholics may obey as "a free act" into state-enforced censorship for all. [Footnote 2/23] Allen Tate, the well known Catholic poet and critic, wrote:
"The picture seems to me to be superior in acting and photography but inferior dramatically. . . . In the long run, what Cardinal Spellman will have succeeded in doing is insulting the intelligence and faith of American Catholics with the assumption that a second-rate motion picture could in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith. [Footnote 2/24]"
"In The Miracle men, are still without pity because they still have not come back to God, but God is already present in the faith, however confused, of that poor, persecuted woman, and since God is wherever a human being suffers and is misunderstood, The Miracle occurs when at the birth of the child the poor, demented woman regains sanity in her maternal love. [Footnote 2/25]"
affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665. After concluding that the Board of Regents acted within its authority and that is determination was not "one that no reasonable mind could reach," id. at 250-255, 256-257, 101 N.E.2d 665, 667-671, the majority held, first, that "sacrilegious" was an adequately definite standard, quoting a definition from Funk & Wagnalls' Dictionary and referring to opinions in this Court that, in passing used the term "profane," which the New York court said was a synonym of "sacrilegious"; second, that the State's assurance
does not violate the religious guarantee of the First Amendment, and third, that motion pictures are not entitled to the immunities from regulation enjoyed by the press, in view of the decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U. S. 230. Id. at 255-256 [argument of counsel -- omitted], 236 U. S. 258-260, 260 U. S. 260-262, 101 N.E.2d 670-674. The two dissenting judges, after dealing with a matter of local law not reviewable here, found that the standard "sacrilegious" is unconstitutionally vague, and, finally, that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech applied equally to motion pictures, and prevented this censorship. 303 N.Y. 242, 264, 101 N.E.2d 665, 675. Both State courts, as did this Court, viewed "The Miracle."
Arguments by the parties and in briefs amici invite us to pursue to their farthest reach the problems in which this case is involved. Positions are advanced so absolute and abstract that, in any event, they could not properly determine this controversy. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 341, 297 U. S. 346-348. We are asked to decide this case by choosing between two mutually exclusive alternatives: that motion pictures may be subjected to unrestricted censorship, or that they
must be allowed to be shown under any circumstances. But only the tyranny of absolutes would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems generated by the need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion pictures in compact modern communities. It would startle Madison and Jefferson and George Mason, could they adjust themselves to our day, to be told that the freedom of speech which they espoused in the Bill of Rights authorizes a showing of "The Miracle" from windows facing St. Patrick's Cathedral in the forenoon of Easter Sunday, [Footnote 2/26] just as it would startle them to be told that any picture, whatever its theme and its expression, could be barred from being commercially exhibited. The general principle of free speech, expressed in the First Amendment as to encroachments by Congress, and included as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, binding on the States, must be placed in its historical and legal contexts. The Constitution, we cannot recall too often, is an organism, not merely a literary composition.
Even in Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U. S. 230, it was deemed necessary to find that the terms "educational, moral, amusing or harmless" do not leave "decision to arbitrary judgment." Such general words were found to "get precision from the sense and experience of men." Id. at 236 U. S. 245, 236 U. S. 246. This cannot be said of "sacrilegious." If there is one thing that the history of religious conflicts shows, it is that the term "sacrilegious" -- if by that is implied offense to the deep convictions of members of different sects, which is what the Court of Appeals seems to mean so far as it means anything precisely -- does not gain "precision from the sense and experience of men."
statements its action on any specific motion picture, which we are advised is itself not made public. Of the fifty-odd reported appeals to the Board of Regents from denials of licenses by the Division, only three concern the category "sacrilegious." [Footnote 2/27] In these cases, as in others under the Act, the Board's reported opinion confines itself to a bare finding that the film was or was not "sacrilegious," without so much as a description of the allegedly offensive matter, or even of the film as a whole to enlighten the inquirer. Well equipped law libraries are not niggardly in their reflection of "the sense and experience of men," but we must search elsewhere for any which gives to "sacrilege" its meaning.
Sacrilege, [Footnote 2/28] as a restricted ecclesiastical concept, has a long history. Naturally enough, religions have sought to protect their priests and anointed symbols from physical injury. [Footnote 2/29] But history demonstrates that the term is hopelessly vague when it goes beyond such ecclesiastical definiteness and is used at large as the basis for punishing deviation from doctrine.
Etymologically, "sacrilege" is limited to church-robbing: sacer, sacred, and legere, to steal or pick out. But we are
told that "already in Cicero's time it had grown to include in popular speech any insult or injury to [sacred things]." [Footnote 2/30] "In primitive religions [sacrilege is] inclusive of almost every serious offence even in fields now regarded as merely social or political. . . ." [Footnote 2/31] The concept of "tabu" in primitive society is thus close to that of "sacrilege." [Footnote 2/32] And in
"the Theodosian Code the various crimes which are accounted sacrilege include -- apostasy, heresy, schism, Judaism, paganism, attempts against the immunity of churches and clergy or privileges of church courts, the desecration of sacraments, etc., and even Sunday. Along with these crimes against religion went treason to the emperor, offences against the laws, especially counterfeiting, defraudation in taxes, seizure of confiscated property, evil conduct of imperial officers, etc. [Footnote 2/33]"
During the Middle Ages the Church considerably delimited the application of the term. St. Thomas Aquinas classified the objects of "sacrilege" as persons places, and thing. [Footnote 2/34] The injuries which would constitute
"sacrilege" received specific and detailed illustration. [Footnote 2/35] This teaching of Aquinas is, I believe, still substantially the basis of the official Catholic doctrine of sacrilege. Thus, for the Roman Catholic Church, the term came to have a fairly definite meaning, but one, in general, limited to protecting things physical against injurious acts. [Footnote 2/36] Apostasy, heresy, and blasphemy coexisted as religious crimes alongside sacrilege; they were peculiarly in the realm of religious dogma and doctrine, as "sacrilege" was not. It is true that Spelman, writing "The History and Fate of Sacrilege" in 1632, included in "sacrilege" acts whereby
sorcerers, witches, and enchanters. [Footnote 2/37]"
To the extent that English law took jurisdiction to punish "sacrilege," the term meant the stealing from a church, or otherwise doing damage to church property. [Footnote 2/38] This special protection against "sacrilege," that is, property damage, was granted only to the Established Church. [Footnote 2/39] Since the repeal less than a century ago of the English law punishing "sacrilege" against the property of the Established Church, religious property has received little special protection. The property of all sects has had substantially the same protection as is accorded non-religious property. [Footnote 2/40] At no time up to the present has English law known "sacrilege" to be used in any wider sense than the physical injury to church property. It is true that, at times in the past, English law has
taken jurisdiction to punish departures from accepted dogma or religious practice or the expression of particular religious opinions, but never have these "offenses" been denominated "sacrilege." Apostasy, heresy, offenses against the Established Church, blasphemy, profanation of the Lord's Day, etc., were distinct criminal offenses, characterized by Blackstone as "offences against God and religion." [Footnote 2/41] These invidious reflections upon religious susceptibilities were not covered under sacrilege as they might be under the Court of Appeals' opinion. Anyone doubting the dangerous uncertainty of the New York definition, which makes "sacrilege" overlap these other "offenses against religion," need only read Blackstone's account of the broad and varying content given each of these offenses.
A student of English lexicography would despair of finding the meaning attributed to "sacrilege" by the New York court. [Footnote 2/42] Most dictionaries define the concept in the limited sense of the physical abuse of physical objects. The definitions given for "sacrilege" by two dictionaries published in 1742 and 1782 are typical. Bailey's defined it as
"the stealing of Sacred Things, Church Robbing; an Alienation to Laymen, and to profane and common Purposes, of what was given to religious Persons, and to pious Uses. [Footnote 2/43]"
Barclay's said it is "the crime of taking any thing dedicated to divine worship, or profaning any thing sacred," where "to profane" is defined "to apply any thing sacred to common uses. To be irreverent to sacred persons or things." [Footnote 2/44] The
same dictionaries defined "blasphemy," a peculiarly verbal offense, in much broader terms than "sacrilege," indeed in terms which the New York court finds encompassed by "sacrilegious." For example, Barclay said "blasphemy" is "an offering some indignity to God, any person of the Trinity, any messengers from God, his holy writ, or the doctrines of revelation." [Footnote 2/45] It is hardly necessary to comment that the limits of this definition remain too uncertain to justify constraining the creative efforts of the imagination by fear of pains and penalties imposed by a necessarily subjective censorship. It is true that some earlier dictionaries assigned to "sacrilege" the broader meaning of "abusing Sacraments or holy Mysteries," [Footnote 2/46] but the broader meaning is more indefinite, not less. Noah Webster first published his American Dictionary in 1828. Both it and the later dictionaries published by the Merriam Company, Webster's International Dictionary and Webster's New International Dictionary, have gone through dozens of editions and printings, revisions and expansions. In all editions throughout 125 years, these American dictionaries have defined "sacrilege" and "sacrilegious" to echo substantially the narrow, technical definitions from the earlier British dictionaries collected in the Appendix, post, p. 343 U. S. 533. [Footnote 2/47]
The New York Court of Appeals' statement that the dictionary "furnishes a clear definition," justifying the vague scope it gave to "sacrilegious," surely was made without regard to the lexicographic history of the term. As a matter of fact, the definition from Funk & Wagnalls' used by the Court of Appeals is taken straight from 18th Century dictionaries, particularly Doctor Johnson's. [Footnote 2/48] In light of that history, it would seem that the Funk &
Examination of successive editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica over nearly two centuries up to the present day gives no more help than the dictionaries. From 1768 to the eleventh edition in 1911, merely a brief dictionary-type definition was given for "sacrilege." [Footnote 2/49] The eleventh edition, which first published a longer article, was introduced as follows:
which cultural objects play so great a part, than in more highly spiritualized religions where they tend to disappear. But wherever the idea of sacred exists, sacrilege is possible. [Footnote 2/50]"
requirements for the separation of Church and State. The crime of blasphemy in Seventeenth Century England was the crime of dissenting from whatever was the current religious dogma. [Footnote 2/51] King James I's "Book of Sports" was first required reading in the churches; later all copies were consigned to the flames. To attack the mass was once blasphemous; to perform it became so. At different times during that century, with the shifts in the attitude of government towards particular religious views, persons who doubted the doctrine of the Trinity (e.g., Unitarians, Universalists, etc.) or the divinity of Christ, observed the Sabbath on Saturday, denied the possibility of witchcraft, repudiated child baptism or urged methods of baptism other than sprinkling, were charged as blasphemers, or their books were burned or banned as blasphemous. Blasphemy was the chameleon phrase which meant the criticism of whatever the ruling authority of the moment established as orthodox religious doctrine. [Footnote 2/52] While it is true that blasphemy prosecutions
have continued in England -- although in lessening numbers -- into the present century, [Footnote 2/53] the existence there of an established church gives more definite contours to the crime in England than the term "sacrilegious" can possibly have in this country. Moreover, the scope of the English common law crime of blasphemy has been considerably limited by the declaration that "if the decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked," [Footnote 2/54] a limitation which the New York court has not put upon the Board of Regents' power to declare a motion picture "sacrilegious."
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 310, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the whole Court, said:
Catholics, are offensive to a great many Protestants, and therefore, for them, sacrilegious in the view of the New York court. Is a picture treating either subject, whether sympathetically, unsympathetically, or neutrally, "sacrilegious"? It is not a sufficient answer to say that "sacrilegious" is definite, because all subjects that in any way might be interpreted as offending the religious beliefs of any one of the 300 sects of the United States [Footnote 2/55] are banned in New York. To allow such vague, undefinable powers of censorship to be exercised is bound to have stultifying consequences on the creative process of literature and art -- for the films are derived largely from literature. History does not encourage reliance on the wisdom and moderation of the censor as a safeguard in the exercise of such drastic power over the minds of men. We not only do not know, but cannot know, what is condemnable by "sacrilegious." And if we cannot tell, how are those to be governed by the statute to tell?
It is this impossibility of knowing how far the form of words by which the New York Court of Appeals explained "sacrilegious" carries the proscription of religious subjects that makes the term unconstitutionally vague. [Footnote 2/56] To stop short of proscribing all subjects that might conceivably be interpreted to be religious, inevitably creates a situation whereby the censor bans only that against which
From all that has been said, one is compelled to conclude that the term "sacrilegious" has come down the stream of time encrusted with a specialized, strictly confined meaning, pertaining to things in space, not things in the mind. The New York Court of Appeals did not give the term this calculable content. It applied it to things in the mind, and things in the mind so undefined, so at large, as to be more patently in disregard of the requirement for definiteness, as the basis of proscriptions and legal sanctions for their disobedience, than the measures that were condemned as violative of Due Process in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81; A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385; Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507; Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290. This principle is especially to be observed when what is so vague seeks to fetter the mind and put within unascertainable bounds the varieties of religious experience.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER*
Crowther, "The Strange Case of The Miracle,'" Atlantic Monthly, April, 1951, pp. 35, 36-37.
"The Miracle" was passed by customs. To import "Any obscene lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . motion-picture film" is a criminal offense, 35 Stat. 1088, 1138, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 1462, and importation of any obscene "print" or "picture" is barred. 46 Stat. 590, 688, 19 U.S.C. § 1305. Compare the provision, "all photographic-films imported . . . shall be subject to such censorship as may be imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury." 38 Stat. 114 151 (1913), 42 Stat. 858, 920 (1922), repealed 46 Stat. 590, 762 (1930). See Inglis, Freedom of the Movies, 68.
Id. at 74-82.
Howard Barnes, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 1950, p. 30, cols. 1-3: "it would be wise to time a visit to the Paris in order to skip [The Miracle']. . . . Altogether it leaves a very bad taste in one's mouth."
Seymour Peck, N.Y. Daily Compass, Dec. 13, 1950, 3, cols. 3-5: "The Miracle' is really all Magnani. . . . one of the most exciting solo performances the screen has known."
Time, Jan. 8, 1951, p. 72, cols. 2-3: "[The Miracle'] is second-rate Rossellini despite a virtuoso performance by Anna Magnani."
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. McCaffrey, 198 Misc. 884, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 892.
Catholic opinion generally, as expressed in the press, supported the view of the Legion of Decency and of Cardinal Spellman. See, for example, The [New York] Catholic News, Dec. 30, 1950, p. 10; Jan. 6, 1951, p. 10; Jan. 20, 1951, p. 10; Feb. 3, 1951, p. 10; Feb. 10, 1951, p. 12, and May 19, 1951, p. 12; Commonweal, Jan. 12, 1951, p. 351, col. 1; The [Brooklyn] Tablet, Jan. 20, 1951, p- 8, col. 4; id. Jan. 27, 1951, p. 10, col. 3; id. Feb. 3, 1951, p. 8, cols. 3-4; Martin Quigley, Jr., "The Miracle' -- An Outrage"; The [San Francisco] Monitor, Jan. 12, 1951, p. 7, cols. 3-4 (reprinted from Motion Picture Herald, Jan. 6, 1951); The [Boston] Pilot, Jan. 6, 1951, p. 4. There doubtless were comments on "The Miracle" in other diocesan papers which circulate in various parts of the country, but which are not on file in the Library of Congress or the library of the Catholic University of America.
The Commonweal, Mar. 2, 1951, pp. 507-508. Much the same view was taken by Frank Getlein writing in The Catholic Messenger, Mar. 22, 1951, p. 4, cols. 1-8, in an article bearing the headline: "Film Critic Gives Some Aspects of The Miracle' Story: Raises Questions Concerning Tactics of Organized Catholic Resistance Groups in view York." See also "Miracles Do Happen," The New Leader, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 30, col. 2.
In the Matter of "The Puritan," 60 N.Y.St.Dept. 163 (1939); In the Matter of "Polygamy," 60 N.Y.St.Dept. 217 (1939); In the Matter of "Monja y Casada -- Virgen y Martir" ("Nun and Married -- Virgin and Martyr"), 52 N.Y.St.Dept. 488 (1935).
Since almost without exception "sacrilegious" is defined in terms of "sacrilege," our discussion will be directed to the latter term. See Bailey, Universal Etymological English Dictionary (London, 1730), "Sacrilegious" -- "of, pertaining to, or guilty of Sacrilege"; Funk & Wagnalls' New Standard Dictionary (1937), "Sacrilegious" -- "Having committed or being ready to commit sacrilege. Of the nature of sacrilege; as, sacrilegious deeds."
For general discussions of "sacrilege," see Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Hastings ed., 1921), "Sacrilege" and "Tabu"; Rev. Thomas Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology (1908), 226-230; The Catholic Encyclopedia (1912), "Sacrilege", and Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Sacrilege."
See Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Hastings ed., 191), "Tabu."
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part II-II, question 99. The modern Codex Juris Canonici does not give any definition of "sacrilege," but merely says it "shall be punished by the Ordinary in proportion to the gravity of the fault, without prejudice to the penalties established by law. . . ." See Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law (1946), 857. 2 Woywod, A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law (1929), par. 2178, 477 478, thus defines sacrilege:
"Sacrilege consists in the unworthy use or treatment of sacred things and sacred persons. Certain things are of their nature sacred (e.g., the Sacraments); others become so by blessing or consecration legitimately bestowed on things or places by authority of the Church. Persons are rendered sacred by ordination or consecration or by other forms of dedication to the divine service by authority of the Church (e.g., by first tonsure, by religious profession)."
Sir Henry Spelman, The History and Fate of Sacrilege (2d ed., 1853), 121-122. Two priests of the Anglican Church prepared a long prefatory essay to bring Spelman's data up to the date of publication of the 1853 edition. Their essay shows their understanding also of "sacrilege" in the limited sense. Id. at 1-120.
2 Russell, Crime (10th ed., 1950), 975-976; Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (9th ed., 1950), 348-349. See 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1, § III; 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, § X; 1 Mary, c. 3, §§ IV-VI.
7 & 8 Geo. IV, e. 29, § X, which the marginal note summarized as "Sacrilege, when capital," read: "if any Person shall break and enter any Church or Chapel, and steal therein any Chattel . . . [he] shall suffer Death as a Felon." This statute was interpreted to apply only to buildings of the established church. Rex v. Nixon, 7 Car. & P. 442 (1836).
Compare the definitions Of "sacrilege" and "blasphemy" in the dictionaries, starting with Cockeram's 1651 edition, which are collected in the Appendix, post, p. 343 U. S. 533.
1 Funk & Wagnalls' Standard Dictionary of the English Language, which was first copyrighted in 1890, defined sacrilege as follows in the 1895 printing: "1. The act of violating or profaning anything sacred. 2. Eng.Law (1) The larceny of consecrated things from a church; the breaking into a church with intent to commit a felony, or breaking out after a felony. (2) Formerly, the selling to a layman of property given to pious uses." This definition remained unchanged through many printings of that dictionary. The current printing of Funk & Wagnalls' New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, first copyrighted in 1913, carries exactly the same definition of "sacrilege" except that the first definition has been expanded to read: "The act of violating or profaning anything sacred, including sacramental vows ."
"The offence, in the first place, consisted in the publication in 1725 of a tract entitled A Moderator between an Infidel and an Apostate, in which the author questioned the historical accuracy of the Resurrection and the Virgin Birth. Such speculations, however much they might offend the religious feeling of the nation, would not now arouse apprehensions in the civil government, or incur legal penalties; but at the time of which we are writing, when the authority of government was far less stable and secure and rested on far narrower foundations than at present, such audacious opinions were considered, not without some reason, as a menace, not only to religion but to the state."
See, e.g., Rex v. Boulter, 72 J.P. 188 (1908); Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd., [1917] A.C. 406.
Reg. v. Ramsay, 15 Cox's C.C. 231, 238 (1883) (Lord Coleridge's charge to the jury); Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd., [1917] A.C. 406.
"Pressure forced deletion of the clerical background of Cardinal Richelieu from The Three Musketeers. The [Motion Picture Production] code provision appealed to was the section providing that ministers should not be portrayed as villains."
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