Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/608/129/249355/
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 04:44:50
Document Index: 236155866

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1701', '§ 1709', '§ 1709', '§ 1709', '§ 2719', '§ 1709', '§ 1709']

Jack R. Hanson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Polk County Land, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees, 608 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1979 › Jack R. Hanson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Polk County Land, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellee...
Jack R. Hanson et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Polk County Land, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees, 608 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 608 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979) Dec. 10, 1979
Appellants Jack and Jannette Hanson seek reversal of a summary judgment entered against them in their suit for damages against defendants Polk County Land, Inc. and B. C. Lively, brought under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 Et seq. Because of procedural irregularity in the granting of the summary judgment motion, Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. we reverse and remand.
Appellants contend on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment prior to the lapse of ten days from the time the motion was made. Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. Additionally, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper in that the pleadings and depositions on file with the court establish continuing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1) which are not time barred, and raise a question of fact concerning the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Defendants contend that the pleadings and depositions before the court do not raise issues of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations or continuing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1). Defendants finally assert that the lack of ten days' notice under Rule 56(c) is harmless error as appellants did not object to the premature nature of the ruling and were given the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the motion prior to the ruling.
We do not decide whether the record before us reflects disputed questions of fact concerning continuing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1) and equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Two procedural difficulties with the grant of summary judgment in this case require reversal. First, summary judgment was granted on an oral motion, and second, the ten-day notice requirement of Rule 56(c) was not satisfied.
Professors Wright and Miller state that, "(a)s is true of motions generally, a Rule 56 motion should be in writing and specify the grounds on which judgment is sought." 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2719 at 455 (1973). The Ninth Circuit, in Sequoia Union High School District, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 227, 228, reversed a summary judgment that was based on an oral motion, stating "(o)ral motions for summary judgments in Federal courts are not authorized or provided for in Rule 56 or elsewhere." But see Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, S.D.N.Y., 1968,293 F. Supp. 130, 133. The above rule is sound. Allowing oral motions for summary judgment leads to exactly the confusion that has occurred in this case with each side having different recollections of what was contended. Requiring a written motion also insures adequate notice to both sides. Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. Granting defendants' oral motion for summary judgment therefore constituted reversible error.
In the instant case, appellants had no advance notice that they were to face a motion for summary judgment at the pretrial conference on September 12. They had no opportunity, other than a few hours granted by the court, to prepare themselves to meet defendants' arguments on the statute of limitations issue. While we do not decide whether disputed questions of fact appear in the record before us, it is clear that if plaintiffs had been given ten days to answer defendants' contentions, they might have avoided the result reached below. A factual dispute about equitable tolling of the statute of limitations or continuing violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1) would cause summary judgment to be inappropriate. See, e. g., Holifield v. Cities Service Tanker Corp., E.D. La., 1976, 421 F. Supp. 131, Aff'd, 5 Cir., 1977, 552 F.2d 367 (equitable tolling of the statutory period); Husted v. Amrep Corp., S.D.N.Y., 1977, 429 F. Supp. 298 (continuing violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1)) . The ambiguous statements from plaintiffs' depositions on which defendants rely do not preclude plaintiffs' proffering further evidence on the controlling questions.