Source: http://www.cfinst.org/legacy/eguide/mcconnellvfec/files/web/SoftMoney_web.html
Timestamp: 2019-12-13 22:22:38
Document Index: 542211659

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Cite as: 540 U
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 23 Opinion of the Court
Accordingly, we first turn our attention to Title I of BCRA.
Title I is Congress’ effort to plug the soft-money loop­hole. The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003).38 In short, §323(a) takes national parties out of the soft-money business.
The remaining provisions of new FECA §323 largely reinforce the restrictions in §323(a). New FECA §323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local party committees from using such funds for activities that affect federal elections. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b). These “Federal election activit[ies],” defined in new FECA §301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed­purpose activities that have long been regulated under the FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 U. S. C. A. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these soft­money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage in electioneering activities. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d). New FECA §323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e). Finally, new FECA
38The national party committees of the two major political parties are: the Republican National Committee (RNC); the Democratic Na­tional Committee (DNC); the National Republican Senatorial Commit­tee (NRSC); the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
24 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
§323(f) prevents circumvention of the restrictions on na­tional, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communi­cations that promote or attack federal candidates. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(f).
Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323, as well as challenges based on the Elec­tions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, principles of federal­ism, and the equal protection component of the Due Proc­ess Clause. We address these challenges in turn.
In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign contributions. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. , ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 387–388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 19. In these cases we have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, “entai[l] only a mar­ginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id., at 20; see also, e.g., Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); Shrink Missouri, supra, at 386–388. In Buckley we said that:
“A contribution serves as a general expression of sup­port for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the con­tribution, since the expression rests solely on the un­differentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough in­dex of the intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organiza-
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 25 Opinion of the Court
tion thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may re­sult in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu­tor.” 424 U. S., at 21 (footnote omitted).
Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to “preven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advo­cacy.” Ibid.
We have recognized that contribution limits may bear “more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak,” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 388, since contribu­tions serve “to affiliate a person with a candidate” and “enabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their resources,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits, however, which “preclud[e] most associations from effec­tively amplifying the voice of their adherents,” contribu­tion limits both “leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist person­ally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates,” and allow associations “to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy.” Ibid. The “overall effect” of dollar limits on contributions is “merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons.” Id., at 21–22. Thus, a contri­bution limit involving even “‘significant interference’” with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies
26 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
the “lesser demand” of being “‘closely drawn’” to match a “‘sufficiently important interest.’” Beaumont, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 15) (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387–
388).39
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amend­ment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confi­dence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208; see also Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440–441 (2001) (Colorado II). We have said that these interests directly implicate “‘the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.’” National Right to Work, supra, at 208 (quoting Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 570). Because the electoral process is the very “means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action,” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 401 (BREYER, J., concurring), contribution limits, like other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that
39 JUSTICE KENNEDY accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating “unseemly corporate speech” with the speech of political parties and candidates, and then adverting to the “corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the litigation.” Post, at 7 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech— including “unseemly corporate speech.”
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 27 Opinion of the Court
reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contri­bution limits, “there is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’” Id., at 400 (BREYER, J., concurring). The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper deference to Con­gress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process.
Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dissenting colleagues. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 405–410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); id., at 410– 420 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 635–644 (1996) (Colorado I) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). We have rejected such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identified above. We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considera­tions of stare decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consis­tently followed since Buckley was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202
(1991).40
40Since our decision in Buckley, we have consistently applied less rigorous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., 424 U. S., at 23– 36 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $1,000 limit on individual
28 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, §323’s restrictions have only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and parties to engage in effective political speech. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complex as its provi­sions may be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal office­holders.
Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict scrutiny to §323 because many of its provisions restrict not only con­tributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds raised outside of FECA’s contribution limits. But for purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrele­vant that Congress chose in §323 to regulate contributions on the demand rather than the supply side. See, e.g., National Right to Work, supra, at 206–211 (upholding a provision restricting PACs’ ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to prevent circumven­tion of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct
contributions to a candidate and FECA’s $5,000 limit on PAC contribu­tions to a candidate); id., at 38 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $25,000 aggregate yearly limit on contributions to candidates, political party committees, and political committees); California Medi­cal Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 195–196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees); Na­tional Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208–211 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to antisolicitation provision buttressing an otherwise valid contribution limit); Colorado II, 533 U. S. 431, 456 (2001) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordinated with a candidate); Fed­eral Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S.___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14–15) (applying less rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended to pre­vent circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits).
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 29 Opinion of the Court
restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here.
For example, while §323(a) prohibits national parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money, and §323(b) prohibits state party committees from spending nonfed­eral money on federal election activities, neither provi­sion in any way limits the total amount of money parties can spend. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(a), (b) (Supp. 2003). Rather, they simply limit the source and individual amount of donations. That they do so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render them expenditure
limitations.41
Similarly, the solicitation provisions of §323(a) and §323(e), which restrict the ability of national party com­mittees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders to solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample opportunities for soliciting federal funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA’s source and amount restrictions. Even §323(d), which on its face enacts a blanket ban on party solicita­tions of funds to certain tax-exempt organizations, never­theless allows parties to solicit funds to the organizations’ federal PACs. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d). As for those organi­zations that cannot or do not administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds directly to such or­ganizations, and may solicit funds expressly for that pur­pose. See infra, at 72–73 (construing §323(d)’s restriction on donations by parties to apply only to donations from a party committee’s nonfederal or soft-money account). And as with §323(a), §323(d) places no limits on other means of endorsing tax-exempt organizations or any restrictions on solicitations by party officers acting in their individual
41Indeed, Congress structured §323(b) in such a way as to free indi­vidual, corporate, and union donations to state committees for nonfed­eral elections from federal source and amount restrictions.
30 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
capacities. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(a), (d).
Section 323 thus shows “due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informa­tive and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views.” Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980). The fact that party committees and federal candidates and officeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts or request that a corporation or union contribute money through its PAC in no way alters or impairs the political message “intertwined” with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required fundraisers to disclose particular information as a content­based regulation subject to strict scrutiny because it “neces­sarily alter[ed] the content of the speech”). And rather than chill such solicitations, as was the case in Schaumburg, the restriction here tends to increase the dissemination of in­formation by forcing parties, candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of potential donors. As with direct limits on contributions, therefore, §323’s spending and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on
political speech.42
42 JUSTICE KENNEDY’s contention that less rigorous scrutiny applies only to regulations burdening political association, rather than political speech, misreads Buckley. In Buckley, we recognized that contribution limits burden both protected speech and association, though they generally have more significant impacts on the latter. 424 U. S., at 20– 22. We nevertheless applied less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s contribu­tion limits because neither burden was sufficiently weighty to overcome Congress’ countervailing interest in protecting the integrity of the political process. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388 (2000) (“While we did not [in Buckley] attempt to parse [the] distinctions between the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restric­tions bore more heavily on the associational right than on [the] freedom
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 31 Opinion of the Court
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different from the burdens that accompanied Buckley’s contribution limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have ap­plied to attempts to regulate the internal processes of
political parties. E.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 573–574 (2000). In making this
argument, plaintiffs greatly exaggerate the effect of §323, contending that it precludes any collaboration among
national, state, and local committees of the same party in fundraising and electioneering activities. We do not read
the provisions in that way. See infra, at 51–52. Section 323 merely subjects a greater percentage of contributions to parties and candidates to FECA’s source and amount limitations. Buckley has already acknowledged that such limitations “leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates.” 424 U. S., at 22. The modest impact that §323 has on the ability of committees within a party to associate with each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny. None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment analysis; it is only that we account for them
in the application, rather than the choice, of the appropri­
ate level of scrutiny.43
to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review.” (citation omitted)). It is thus simply untrue in the campaign finance context that all “burdens on speech necessitate strict scrutiny review.” Post, at 29.
43 JUSTICE KENNEDY is no doubt correct that the associational burdens imposed by a particular piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times be so severe as to warrant strict scrutiny. Ibid. In light of our interpretation of §323(a), however, see infra, at 46–47, §323 does not
32 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
With these principles in mind, we apply the less rigor­ous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to evaluate the constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because the five challenged provisions of §323 implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, however, that Congress enacted §323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government’s important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.
The core of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which provides that “national committee[s] of a political party . . . may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition ex­tends to “any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, or maintained, or con­trolled by such a national committee.” §441(a)(2).
The main goal of §323(a) is modest. In large part, it simply effects a return to the scheme that was approved in Buckley and that was subverted by the creation of the FEC’s allocation regime, which permitted the political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a combi­nation of hard and soft money. See supra, at 11–13, and
present such a case. As JUSTICE KENNEDY himself acknowledges, even “significant interference” with “protected rights of association” are subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at____________________________ (slip op., at 15); see post, at 28. There is thus nothing inconsistent in our decision to account for the particular associational burdens imposed by §323(a) when applying the appropriate level of scrutiny.
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 33 Opinion of the Court
n. 7. Under that allocation regime, national parties were able to use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect federal candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the money to the political parties, donors could contribute large amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influence federal elections.44 New §323(a) is designed to put a stop to that practice.
The Government defends §323(a)’s ban on national parties’ involvement with soft money as necessary to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its appearance consti­tutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits. We have not limited that interest to the elimination of cash-for-votes exchanges. In Buckley, we expressly rejected the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to FECA’s contribu­tion limits, noting that such laws “deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influ­
44The fact that the post-1990 explosion in soft-money spending on federal electioneering was accompanied by a series of efforts in Con­gress to clamp down on such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA) underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking to limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102nd Congress (1991) (10 such bills introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Cam­paign Finance Legislation in the 103rd Congress (1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 201–206 (per curiam) (discussing legislative efforts to curb soft money in 105th and subsequent Congresses).
34 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
ence government action.” 424 U. S., at 28. Thus, “[i]n speaking of ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo arrangements,’ we [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public offi­cials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389; see also Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes agreements to “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment”).
Of “almost equal” importance has been the Govern­ment’s interest in combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large campaign contributions. Buckley, supra, at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 390; Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 496–497 (1985). Take away Congress’ authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and “the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390; see also id., at 401 (BREYER, J., concurring). And because the First Amendment does not require Congress to ignore the fact that “candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law,” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457, these interests have been sufficient to justify not only contribution limits them­selves, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits, id., at 456 (“[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption”).
“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty or the plausibility of the justification raised.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The idea that large contributions to a national party can cor­rupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corrup­tion of federal candidates and officeholders is neither
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 35 Opinion of the Court
novel nor implausible. For nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dollar limits and source restrictions on con­tributions that individuals and other entities can give to national, state, and local party committees for the purpose of influencing a federal election. The premise behind these restrictions has been, and continues to be, that contributions to a federal candidate’s party in aid of that candidate’s campaign threaten to create—no less than would a direct contribution to the candidate—a sense of obligation. See Buckley, supra, at 38 (upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to a can­didate, political committee, and political party committee as a “quite modest restraint . . . to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation” by, among other things, “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party”). This is particularly true of contributions to national par­ties, with which federal candidates and officeholders enjoy a special relationship and unity of interest. This close affiliation has placed national parties in a unique position, “whether they like it or not,” to serve as “agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” Colorado II, supra, at 452; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 406 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (“[Re­spondent] asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context of a system which favors candidates and office­holders whose campaigns are supported by soft money, usually funneled through political parties” (emphasis added)). As discussed below, rather than resist that role, the national parties have actively embraced it.
The question for present purposes is whether large soft­money contributions to national party committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the appearance of corruption. Both common sense and the ample record in these cases confirm Congress’ belief that they do. As set forth above, supra, at 11–13, and n. 7, the FEC’s allocation regime has invited widespread circumvention of FECA’s
36 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
limits on contributions to parties for the purpose of influ­encing federal elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific pur­pose of influencing a particular candidate’s federal elec­tion. It is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.45
The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loop­hole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite FECA’s hard-money limits on direct contri­butions to candidates, federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national and state committees “solely in order to assist federal campaigns,” including the officeholder’s own. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology ¶¶6–9 (hereinafter Randlett Decl.), App. 713–714); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471–473, 478–479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 842–843 (Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amounts of soft money raised by each officeholder, and “the amount of
45 JUSTICE KENNEDY contends that the plurality’s observation in Colo­rado I that large soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat of corruption “establish[es] that” such contributions are not corrupting. Post, at 17–18 (citing Colorado I, 518 U. S. 604, 616, 617– 618 (1996)). The cited dictum has no bearing on the present case. Colorado I addressed an entirely different question—namely, whether Congress could permissibly limit a party’s independent expenditures— and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It also had before it an evidentiary record frozen in 1990—well before the soft-money explosion of the 1990’s. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993).
Cite as: 540 U. S. ____ (2003) 37 Opinion of the Court
money a Member of Congress raise[d] for the national political committees often affect[ed] the amount the com­mittees g[a]ve to assist the Member’s campaign.” Id., at 474–475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors often asked that their contributions be credited to particular candidates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the funds were hard or soft. Id., at 477–478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party committees often teamed with individual candidates’ campaign committees to create joint fundraising committees, which enabled the candidates to take advantage of the party’s higher contri­bution limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred candidate. Id., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 847–848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report (characterizing the joint fundraising com­mittee as one “in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for use in their own races”)). Even when not participating directly in the fundraising, federal office­holders were well aware of the identities of the donors: National party committees would distribute lists of poten­tial or actual donors, or donors themselves would report their generosity to officeholders. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 487– 488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“[F]or a Member not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge, as it is provided by the national political parties and the donors themselves”); id., at 853–855 (Leon, J.).
For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on ideologi­cal grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influ­ence over federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and partner at a lobbying firm in Washington, D. C., stated in his declaration:
“‘You are doing a favor for somebody by making a
38 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
large [soft-money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone—that is, write a larger check—and they feel even more compelled to recipro­cate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged about contributions, but people do have understandings.’” Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young ¶14; see 8–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).46
Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and 2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave sub­stantial sums to both major national parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 508– 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Tbls.
46Other business leaders agreed. For example, the chairman of the board and CEO of a major toy company explained:
“ ‘Many in the corporate world view large soft money donations as a cost of doing business. . . . I remain convinced that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders actually appear to have sold themselves and the party cheaply. They could have gotten even more money, because of the potential importance of their decisions to the affected business.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., ¶16; see 6–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 17).
Similarly the chairman emeritus of a major airline opined:
“ ‘Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those checks open the doors of the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the Administration. . . . Labor and business leaders believe—based on experience and with good reason—that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶12, App. 283–284, ¶10); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858–859 (Leon, J.) (same).
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5–6); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (“‘Giving soft money to both parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access.’” (quoting declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers
¶15, App. 175)).47
“‘Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fund­raising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about—and quite possibly votes on—an issue? . . . When you don’t pay the piper that finances your cam­paigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother’s milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶10 (hereinafter Simpson
47Even more troubling is evidence in the record showing that na­tional parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions purchase influence or protection to pressure donors into making contri­butions. As one CEO explained:
“ ‘[I]f you’re giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They’ll get a message that basically asks: ‘Are you sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don’t you want to have friends on both sides of the aisle?’ If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don’t give. . . . [D]uring the 1990’s, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the person’s opponent.’ ” Id., at 510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Randlett Decl. ¶12, App. 715); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon, J.) (same).
40 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
Decl.), App. 811); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same).
See also id., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“‘The majority of those who contribute to political parties do so for business reasons, to gain access to influential Members of Congress and to get to know new Members.” (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A, ¶46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal candidates and officeholders together, “[p]arties are thus necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the party’s message or to elect party candidates across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 451–452.
Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public believes a vote was switched), Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But the record is to the contrary. The evi­dence connects soft money to manipulations of the legisla­tive calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 852 (Leon, J.); App. 390–394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶¶5, 8–11 (hereinafter McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson Decl. ¶10) (“Donations from the tobacco industry to Republicans scuttled tobacco legislation, just as contributions from the trial lawyers to Democrats stopped tort reform”); App. 805 (declaration of former Sen. Paul Simon ¶¶13–14). To claim that such actions do not change legislative outcomes surely misun­derstands the legislative process.
More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Con-
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gress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing sim­ple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.” Colorado II, supra, at 441. Many of the “deeply disturbing examples” of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27, to justify FECA’s con­tribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given sub­stantial donations to gain access to high-level government officials. See Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 821, 839–840, n. 36; nn. 5–6, supra. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly gave the “appearance of such influ­ence.” Colorado II, supra, at 441; see also 519 F. 2d, at 838.
“‘Special interests who give large amounts of soft money to political parties do in fact achieve their ob­jectives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators and House Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time available in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and unions and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their par­ties. These are not idle chit-chats about the philoso­phy of democracy. . . . Senators are pressed by their benefactors to introduce legislation, to amend legisla­tion, to block legislation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way.’” Id., at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Warren Rudman ¶7 (here­inafter Rudman Decl.), App. 742); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same).
So pervasive is this practice that the six national party
42 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
committees actually furnish their own menus of opportu­nities for access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the DCCC offers a range of donor options, starting with the $10,000-per-year Business Forum pro­gram, and going up to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the donor to bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and chair of the DCCC, complimentary invita­tions to all DCCC fundraising events, two private dinners with the Democratic House leadership and ranking mem­bers, and two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Colorado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id., at 504–505 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id., at 506 (describing records indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in return for large dona­tions); id., at 502–503 (describing RNC’s various donor programs); id., at 503–504 (same for NRSC); id., at 500– 503 (same for DSCC); id., at 504 (same for NRCC). Simi­larly, “the RNC’s donor programs offer greater access to federal office holders as the donations grow larger, with the highest level and most personal access offered to the largest soft money donors.” Id., at 500–503 (finding, further, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to officeholders to attract soft-money donations and encour­ages officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord, id., at 860–861 (Leon, J.).
Despite this evidence and the close ties that candidates and officeholders have with their parties, JUSTICE KENNEDY would limit Congress’ regulatory interest only to the prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption “inherent in” contributions made directly to, contributions made at the express behest of, and expendi­tures made in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post, at 8–10, 15. Regulation of any other donation or expenditure—regardless of its size, the recipi-
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ent’s relationship to the candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a candidate’s election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed and explicit intent to purchase influence—would, according to JUSTICE KENNEDY, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view of corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption, ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.48
JUSTICE KENNEDY’S interpretation of the First Amend­ment would render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide
48In addition to finding no support in our recent cases, see, e.g., Colo­rado II, 533 U. S., at 441 (defining corruption more broadly than quid pro quo arrangements); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 389 (same), JUSTICE KENNEDY’s contention that Buckley limits Congress to regu­lating contributions to a candidate ignores Buckley itself. There, we upheld FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate yearly contributions to candidates, political committees, and party committees out of recogni­tion that FECA’s $1,000 limit on candidate contributions would be meaningless if individuals could instead make “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” 424 U. S., at 38. Likewise, in Califor­nia Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA’s $5,000 limit on contributions to multicandidate political committees. It is no answer to say that such limits were justified as a means of preventing individuals from using parties and political committees as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA’s $1,000 limit on individual contributions to candidates. Given FECA’s definition of “contribution,” the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not only the source and amount of funds available to parties and political commit­tees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and amount of funds available to engage in express advocacy and numerous other noncoordinated expenditures. If indeed the First Amendment prohib­ited Congress from regulating contributions to fund the latter, the otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e.g., a strict limit on donations that could be used to fund candidate contri­butions) would have provided insufficient justification for such over­broad legislation.
44 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituen­cies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash­for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just such temptation.
JUSTICE KENNEDY likewise takes too narrow a view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those transactions with “inherent corruption potential,” which he again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the inference “that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption.” Post, at 14.49 In our view, however, Congress is not required to ignore histori­cal evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation. Post, at 12–14. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance of undue influence. Implicit (and, as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is the suggestion that money buys influ­
49At another point, describing our “flawed reasoning,” JUSTICE KENNEDY seems to suggest that Congress’ interest in regulating the appearance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually “create . . . corrupt donor favoritism among . . . officeholders.” Post, at 16. This latter formulation would render Congress’ interest in stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing actual corruption.
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ence. It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the appear­ance of corruption.
In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Con­gress’ determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.
Plaintiffs and THE CHIEF JUSTICE contend that §323(a) is impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA’s hard­money source and amount limits, including, for example, funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake.50 Post, 2–5 (REHNQUIST, C. J., dissenting). Such activities, THE CHIEF JUSTICE asserts, pose “little or no potential to corrupt . . . federal candi­dates or officeholders.” Post, at 5 (dissenting opinion). This observation is beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of §323, regulates contributions, not activi­ties. As the record demonstrates, it is the close relation­ship between federal officeholders and the national par­ties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect.
50In support of this claim, the political party plaintiffs assert that, in 2001, the RNC spent $15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfederal amount raised that year) on purely state and local election activity, including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–103 (statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 336–337 (Henderson, J.); id., at 464–465 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 830 (Leon, J.).
46 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
As one expert noted, “‘[t]here is no meaningful distinc­tion between the national party committees and the public officials who control them.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468–469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann Expert Report 29). The national committees of the two major parties are both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates. Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major parties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders. Ibid. The nexus between national parties and federal officeholders prompted one of Title I’s framers to conclude:
“Because the national parties operate at the national level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal of­ficeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the national party committees, there is a close connec­tion between the funding of the national parties and the corrupting dangers of soft money on the federal political process. The only effective way to address this [soft-money] problem of corruption is to ban en­tirely all raising and spending of soft money by the national parties.” 148 Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays).
This close affiliation has also placed national parties in a position to sell access to federal officeholders in ex­change for soft-money contributions that the party can then use for its own purposes. Access to federal office­holders is the most valuable favor the national party committees are able to give in exchange for large dona­tions. The fact that officeholders comply by donating their valuable time indicates either that officeholders place
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substantial value on the soft-money contribution them­selves, without regard to their end use, or that national committees are able to exert considerable control over federal officeholders. See, e.g., App. 1196–1198 (Expert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University) (“Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an environment in which political parties-in-government control the re­sources crucial to subsequent electoral success and legisla­tive power. Political parties organize the legislative cau­cuses that make committee assignments”); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report) (indicating that office­holders’ re-election prospects are significantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership). Either way, large soft­money donations to national party committees are likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the ends to which their contributions are even­tually put. As discussed above, Congress had sufficient grounds to regulate the appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The Government’s strong interests in preventing corruption, and in particular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source, amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.51
51The close relationship of federal officeholders and candidates to their parties answers not only THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s concerns about §323(a), but also his fear that our analysis of §323’s remaining provi­sions bespeaks no limiting principle. Post, at 6–7 (dissenting opinion). As set forth in our discussion of those provisions, the record demon­strates close ties between federal officeholders and the state and local committees of their parties. That close relationship makes state and local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders. Thus, in upholding §§323(b), (d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact that they regulate contributions used to fund activities influencing federal elections, but also that they regulate contributions to or at the behest of entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for corruption. We agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that
48 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
Plaintiffs also contend that §323(a)’s prohibition on national parties’ soliciting or directing soft-money contri­butions is substantially overbroad. The reach of the solici­tation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars only solici­tations of soft money by national party committees and by party officers in their official capacities. The committees remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well as to solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and state and local candidates.52 They also can contribute hard money to state committees and to candidates. In accordance with FEC regulations, furthermore, officers of national parties are free to solicit soft money in their individual capacities, or, if they are also officials of state parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083 (2002).
This limited restriction on solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on national committees’ receiving soft money. The same observations that led us to approve the latter compel us to reach the same conclusion regarding
Congress could not regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or newspaper editors on the sole basis that their activities conferred a benefit on the candidate. Post, at 7 (dissenting opinion).
52Plaintiffs claim that the option of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is an illusory one, since several States prohibit state and local candidates from establishing multiple campaign ac­counts, which would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm’n Advisory Op. A– 91–448 (Dec. 16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §2(3); Iowa Code §56.5A (Supp. 2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(J) (Anderson Supp. 2002). Plaintiffs maintain that §323(a) combines with these state laws to make it impossible for state and local candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the challenge we are considering is a facial one, and on its face §323(a) permits solicitations. The fact that a handful of States might interfere with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicitations is an argument that may be addressed in an as-applied challenge.
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the former. A national committee is likely to respond favorably to a donation made at its request regardless of whether the recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in federal laws. E.g., 18 U. S. C. §201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials “demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] . . . anything of value personally or for any other person or entity . . .” (emphasis added)); 5 CFR §2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to federal em­ployees encompasses gifts “[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee”).
Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the overbreadth of §323(a)’s solicitation ban. They point in particular to §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2 U. S. C. A §441i(a) with §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). The differences between §§323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitutional significance. We have recognized that “the ‘differing structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process,’” National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210, and we respect Congress’ decision to proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance regulation, see Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 258, n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 105. The differences between the two provisions reflect Congress’ reasonable judgments about the function played by na­tional committees and the interactions between commit­tees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge.
50 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that §323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and associational rights of minor parties such as the Libertarian National Committee, which, owing to their slim prospects for electoral success and the fact that they receive few large soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC and DNC. In Buckley, we rejected a similar argument concerning limits on contributions to minor-party candidates, noting that “any attempt to ex­clude minor parties and independents en masse from the Act’s contribution limitations overlooks the fact that mi­nor-party candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on the outcome of an election.” 424 U. S., at 34–35. We have thus recognized that the rele­vance of the interest in avoiding actual or apparent cor­ruption is not a function of the number of legislators a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party that manages to elect only one of its members to federal office as it does to a major party whose members make up a majority of Congress. It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties and all candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process.
We add that nothing in §323(a) prevents individuals from pooling resources to start a new national party. Post, at 5 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Only when an organiza­tion has gained official status, which carries with it sig­nificant benefits for its members, will the proscriptions of §323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from “amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Buckley, supra, at 21.
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Finally, plaintiffs assert that §323(a) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees. By way of example, plaintiffs point to the Republican Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in con­cert with the state and local committees of a given State to plan and implement joint, full-ticket fundraising and electioneering programs. See App. 693, 694–697 (declara­tion of John Peschong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that §323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engaging in collective decisionmaking about how soft money will be solicited, received, and spent. Such associational burdens, they argue, are too great for the First Amendment to bear.
We are not persuaded by this argument because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the terms “spend,” “receive,” “direct,” and “solicit.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003). Nothing on the face of §323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money. As long as the national party officer does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money, §323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and electioneering activity. Intervenor­defendants, the principal drafters and proponents of the legislation, concede as much. Brief for Intervenor­Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02– 1674 et al., p. 22 (“BCRA leaves parties and candidates free to coordinate campaign plans and activities, political messages, and fundraising goals with one another”). The FEC’s current definitions of §323(a)’s terms are consistent with that view. See, e.g., 11 CFR §300.2(m) (2002) (defin-
52 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
ing “solicit” as “to ask . . . another person” (emphasis added)); §300.2(n) (defining “direct” as “to ask a person who has expressed an intent to make a contribution . . . to make that contribution . . . including through a conduit or intermediary” (emphasis added)); §300.2(c) (laying out the factors that determine whether an entity will be consid­ered to be controlled by a national committee).
Given the straightforward meaning of this provision, JUSTICE KENNEDY is incorrect that “[a] national party’s mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative” or its assistance in developing a state party’s Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that the officers are in “‘indirect control’” of the state party and subject to criminal penalties. Post, at 5–6. Moreover, §323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free to participate, in their official capacities, with state and local parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard money; party officials may also solicit soft money in their unofficial capacities.
In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties between federal candidates and state party committees, BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit for soft-money dona­tions.53 Section 323(b) is designed to foreclose wholesale
53Even opponents of campaign finance reform acknowledged that “a prohibition of soft money donations to national party committees alone would be wholly ineffective.” The Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings on S. 522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Admini-
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evasion of §323(a)’s anticorruption measures by sharply curbing state committees’ ability to use large soft-money contributions to influence federal elections. The core of §323(b) is a straightforward contribution regulation: It prevents donors from contributing nonfederal funds to state and local party committees to help finance “Federal election activity.” 2 U. S. C A. §441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). The term “Federal election activity” encompasses four distinct categories of electioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly sched­uled federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the­vote (GOTV), and generic campaign activity54 that is “conducted in connection with an election in which a can­didate for Federal office appears on the ballot”; (3) any “public communication”55 that “refers to a clearly identi­fied candidate for Federal office” and “promotes,” “sup­ports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” a candidate for that office; and (4) the services provided by a state committee em­ployee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her time to “activities in connection with a Federal election.” §§431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several categories of activity from this definition: public communi­cations that refer solely to nonfederal candidates;56 contri­
stration, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, Covington & Burling).
54Generic campaign activity promotes a political party rather than a specific candidate. 2 U. S. C. A. §431(21).
55A public communication is “a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertis­ing.” §431(22).
56So long as the communication does not constitute voter registra­tion, voter identification, GOTV, or generic campaign activity. §431(20)(B)(i).
54 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
butions to nonfederal candidates;57 state and local political conventions; and the cost of grassroots campaign materi­als like bumper stickers that refer only to state candi­dates. §431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the statutory definition must be funded with hard money. §441i(b)(1).
Section 323(b)(2), the so-called Levin Amendment, carves out an exception to this general rule. A refinement on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to pay for certain activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal funds, the Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an allocated ratio of hard money and “Levin funds”—that is, funds raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and certain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that limit, §323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to the States.58
The scope of the Levin Amendment is limited in two ways. First, state and local parties can use Levin money to fund only activities that fall within categories (1) and (2) of the statute’s definition of federal election activity— namely, voter registration activity, voter identification drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for any activi­ties that refer to “a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”; they likewise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless they refer “solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or local office.”
57Unless the contribution is earmarked for federal election activity. §431(20)(B)(ii).
58The statute gives the FEC responsibility for setting the allocation ratio. §441i(b)(2)(A); see also 11 CFR §300.33(b) (2003) (defining allocation ratios).
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§§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
Second, both the Levin funds and the allocated portion of hard money used to pay for such activities must be raised entirely by the state or local committee that spends them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party committees to cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. It also means that a state party committee cannot use hard money transferred from other party committees to cover the hard-money portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermore, national committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders generally may not solicit Levin funds on behalf of state committees, and state committees may not team up to raise Levin funds. §441i(b)(2)(C). They can, how­ever, jointly raise the hard money used to make Levin expenditures.
We begin by noting that, in addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction. Its conclu­sion, based on the evidence before it, was that the cor­rupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into the political process solely through national party committees. Rather, state committees function as an alternate avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces.59 Indeed, both candidates and parties already ask
59One former Senator noted:
“ ‘The fact is that much of what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates. The national parties know it; the candidates know it; the state and local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft money for activities that affect federal elections, then the problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to raise the money will exist; the same large contributions by corporations,
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donors who have reached the limit on their direct contri­butions to donate to state committees.60 There is at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that such dona­tions have been made with the intent—and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus promotes an important
unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the federal candidates who benefit from state party use of these funds will know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distortions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism will erode the foundations of our democracy— except it will all be worse in the public’s mind because a perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money into the system.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶19, App. 746).
60 E.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘It is . . . not un­common for the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional contri­butions to the state party’ ” (quoting declaration of Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief Counsel ¶68, App 308)); see also Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting Congressman Wayne Allard’s Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing the recipient that “ ‘you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,’ ” but “ ‘you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party’ ”); 251 F. Supp 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply ‘pass throughs’ to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mail’ ” (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510–1511.)).
61The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial donation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43–44; 2 id., at 2907–2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to state Demo­cratic committees in apparent exchange for access and influence. 1 id., at 44–46; 2 id., at 3167–3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40)).
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governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influ­ence that soft-money donations to political parties already have.
Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft­money donors would react to §323(a) by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence. It was “neither novel nor implausible,” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391, for Congress to conclude that political parties would react to §323(a) by directing soft-money contributors to the state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. We “must accord substantial deference to the predictive judg­ments of Congress,” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 665 (1994), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby evis­cerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important govern­mental interest.
Plaintiffs argue that even if some legitimate interest might be served by §323(b), the provision’s restrictions are unjustifiably burdensome and therefore cannot be consid­ered “closely drawn” to match the Government’s objec­tives. They advance three main contentions in support of this proposition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no conceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amendment imposes an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of political parties. Finally, they argue that the provision prevents them from amassing the
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resources they need to engage in effective advocacy. We address these points in turn.
It is true that §323(b) captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal offices. But these are the same sorts of activities that already were covered by the FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had to be funded in part by hard money, because they affect federal as well as state elections. See 11 CFR §106.5 (2002). As a practical matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC’s allocation regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting the formulas applicable to these activities in order to restore the efficacy of FECA’s long­time statutory restriction—approved by the Court and eroded by the FEC’s allocation regime—on contributions to state and local party committees for the purpose of influencing federal elections. See 2 U. S. C. §§431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 (upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate contributions to candi­dates and political committees); cf. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA’s $5,000 limit on contributions to multi­candidate political committees).
Like the rest of Title I, §323(b) is premised on Congress’ judgment that if a large donation is capable of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we explain below, §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulat­ing contributions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of
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corruption: those contributions to state and local parties that can be used to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these regulations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and substantive limitations de­signed to focus the regulations on the important anti­corruption interests to be served. We conclude that §323(b) is a closely-drawn means of countering both cor­ruption and the appearance of corruption.
The first two categories of “Federal election activity,” voter registration efforts, §301(20)(A)(i), and voter identi­fication, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in connection with a federal election, §301(20)(A)(ii), clearly capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common sense dictates, and it was “undisputed” below, that a party’s efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly assist the party’s candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number of like­minded registered voters who actually go to the polls.62 See, e.g., id., at 459 (“‘[The evidence] shows quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Re­publican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Re­publican candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate. . . . [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal elections’” (quoting Green Expert Report 14)). Representatives of the four major congressional campaign committees confirmed that they “‘transfe[r] federal and nonfederal money to state and/or local party committees for’” both voter regis­
62Since voter identification is a necessary precondition of any GOTV program, the findings regarding GOTV funding obviously apply with equal force to the funding of voter identification efforts.
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tration and get-out-the-vote activities, and that “‘[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election of federal candidates.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 459, 461 (citations omitted).
The record also makes quite clear that federal office­holders are grateful for contributions to state and local parties that can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id., at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a California Demo­cratic Party donor and noting that CDP’s voter registra­tion and GOTV efforts would help “‘increase the number of Californian Democrats in the United States Congress’” and “‘deliver California’s 54 electoral votes’” to the Demo­cratic presidential candidate).
Because voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer substantial bene­fits on federal candidates, the funding of such activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent corrup­tion. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk. Its contribution limitations are focused on the subset of voter registration activity that is most likely to affect the election prospects of federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120 days before a federal election. And if the voter registration drive does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment’s higher contribution limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (Supp. 2003). Similarly, the contri­bution limits applicable to §301(20)(A)(ii) activities target only those voter identification, GOTV, and generic cam­paign efforts that occur “in connection with an election in which a candidate for a Federal office appears on the ballot.” 2 U. S. C. A. §431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing this subsection, the FEC has categorically excluded all activity that takes place during the run-up to
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elections when no federal office is at stake.63 Further­more, state committees can take advantage of the Levin Amendment’s higher contribution limits to fund any §301(A)(20)(i) and §301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a federal candidate. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). The prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently important gov­ernmental interests of avoiding corruption and its appearance.
“Public communications” that promote or attack a can­didate for federal office—the third category of “Federal election activity,” §301(20)(A)(iii)—also undoubtedly have a dramatic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime motivating force behind BCRA’s passage. See 3 1998 Senate Report 4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) (“[T]he hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble”). As explained below, any public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal candidate directly affects the election in which he is participating. The record on this score could scarcely be more abundant.
63With respect to GOTV, voter identification, and other generic cam­paign activity, the FEC has interpreted §323(b) to apply only to those activities conducted after the earliest filing deadline for access to the federal election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after January 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR §100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any activities conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt from regulation under §323(b). Of course, this facial challenge does not present the question of the FEC regulations’ constitutionality. But the fact that the statute provides this basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow §301(20)(A)(ii) further calls into question plaintiffs’ claims of facial overbreadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973).
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Given the overwhelming tendency of public communica­tions, as carefully defined in §301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we hold that application of §323(b)’s contribution caps to such communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended
to address.64
As for the final category of “Federal election activity,” §301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress’ interest in pre­venting circumvention of §323(b)’s other restrictions justi­fies the requirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activi­ties in connection with a federal election. In the absence of this provision, a party might use soft money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in federal electioneering, by the simple expedient of dividing the federal workload among multiple employees. Plaintiffs have suggested no reason for us to strike down this provi­
64We likewise reject the argument that §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitu­tionally vague. The words “promote,” “oppose,” “attack,” and “support” clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision. These words “provide explicit standards for those who apply them” and “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108–109 (1972). This is particularly the case here, since actions taken by politi­cal parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 79 (noting that a general requirement that political committees disclose their expenditures raised no vagueness problems because the term “political committee” “need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate” and thus a political committee’s expenditures “are, by definition, campaign related”). Furthermore, should plaintiffs feel that they need further guidance, they are able to seek advisory opinions for clarification, see 2 U. S. C. §437f(a)(1), and thereby “remove any doubt there may be as to the meaning of the law,” Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580 (1973).
65Any doubts that donors would engage in such a seemingly complex scheme are put to rest by the record evidence in Buckley itself. See
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sion. Accordingly, we give “deference to [the] congres­sional determination of the need for [this] prophylactic rule.” National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 500.
Plaintiffs also contend that §323(b) is unconstitutional because the Levin Amendment unjustifiably burdens association among party committees by forbidding trans­fers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin ex­penditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. We recognize, as we have in the past, the impor­tance of preserving the associational freedom of parties. See, e.g., California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cen­tral Comm., 489 U. S. 214 (1989). But not every minor restriction on parties’ otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11.
As an initial matter, we note that state and local parties can avoid these associational burdens altogether by for­going the Levin Amendment option and electing to pay for federal election activities entirely with hard money. But in any event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures. Without the ban on transfers of Levin funds among state committees, donors could readily circumvent the $10,000 limit on contributions to a committee’s Levin account by making multiple $10,000 donations to various committees that could then transfer the donations to the committee of choice.65 The same anticircumvention goal
64 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
undergirds the ban on joint solicitation of Levin funds. Without this restriction, state and local committees could organize “all hands” fundraisers at which individual, corporate, or union donors could make large soft-money donations to be divided between the committees. In that case, the purpose, if not the letter, of §323(b)(2)’s $10,000 limit would be thwarted: Donors could make large, visible contributions at fundraisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting federal officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme.
Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s apparent prohibition on the transfer of hard money by a national, state, or local com­mittee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a separate state or local committee’s Levin expenditures presents a closer question. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2003). The Government defends the restriction as necessary to prevent the donor committee, particularly a national committee, from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest control over the spending of the recipient committee’s Levin funds. This purported interest is weak, particularly given the fact that §323(a) already polices attempts by national parties to engage in such behavior. See 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(2) (extending §323(a)’s restric­tions to entities controlled by national party committees). However, the associational burdens posed by the hard­money transfer restriction are so insubstantial as to be de minimis. Party committees, including national party committees, remain free to transfer unlimited hard money
n. 6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals’ findings regarding the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with White House officials).
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so long as it is not used to fund Levin expenditures. State and local party committees can thus dedicate all “home­grown” hard money to their Levin activities while relying on outside transfers to defray the costs of other hard­money expenditures. Given the strong anticircumvention interest vindicated by §323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s restriction on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of associa­tional infringement.
Finally, plaintiffs contend that §323(b) is unconstitu­tional because its restrictions on soft-money contributions to state and local party committees will prevent them from engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly noted, the political parties’ evidence regarding the impact of BCRA on their revenues is “speculative and not based on any analysis.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 524. If the history of campaign finance regulation discussed above proves any­thing, it is that political parties are extraordinarily flexi­ble in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that §323(b) may reduce the relative amount of money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely incon­sequential. The question is not whether §323(b) reduces the amount of funds available over previous election cy­cles, but whether it is “so radical in effect as to . . . drive the sound of [the recipient’s] voice below the level of no­tice.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If indeed state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available.
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New FECA §323(d)’s Restrictions on Parties’ Solicitations for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt Organizations
Section 323(d) prohibits national, state, and local party committees, and their agents or subsidiaries, from “so­licit[ing] any funds for, or mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations” to, any organization established under §501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code66 that makes expenditures in connection with an election for federal office, and any political organizations established under §527 “other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office.”67 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The District Court struck down the provision on its face. We reverse and uphold §323(d), narrowly construing the section’s ban on donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised in compli­ance with FECA.
The Government defends §323(d)’s ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations engaged in political activity as preventing circumvention of Title I’s limits on contribu­tions of soft money to national, state, and local party
66Section 501(c) organizations are groups generally exempted from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. §501(a). These include §501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations, as well as §501(c)(4) social welfare groups.
67Section 527 “political organizations” are, unlike §501(c) groups, organized for the express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity. They include any “party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and oper­ated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contri­butions or making expenditures” for the purpose of “influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, or appointment of any individual for Federal, State, or local public office.” 26 U. S. C. §527(e).
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committees. That justification is entirely reasonable. The history of Congress’ efforts at campaign finance reform well demonstrates that “candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457. Absent the solicitation provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incen­tives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates.68 All of the corruption and appearance of corruption attendant on the operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Donations made at the behest of party committees would almost certainly be regarded by party officials, donors, and federal officeholders alike as benefiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by soliciting the
68The record shows that many of the targeted tax-exempt organiza­tions engage in sophisticated and effective electioneering activities for the purpose of influencing federal elections, including waging broadcast campaigns promoting or attacking particular candidates and conduct­ing large-scale voter registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the final weeks of the 2000 presidential campaign, the NAACP’s National Voter Fund registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hotline, ran three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348–349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports that the program turned out one million additional African­American voters and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22% in New York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. Ibid. The effort, which cost $10 million, was funded primarily by a $7 million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., at 349 (citing cross-examination of Donald P. Green, Yale University 15–20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub. Record); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kol­lar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id., at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson, J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Abortion and Repro­ductive Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 million and mobi­lized 2.1 million pro-choice voters (citing declaration of Mary Jane Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL, 8, App. 271–272, ¶24)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same).
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donations to third-party organizations, the parties would avoid FECA’s source-and-amount limitations, as well as its disclosure restrictions. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348 (Henderson, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that, prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same).
Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress’ concerns about circumvention are not merely hypothetical. Even without the added incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organiza­tions for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 (“In addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition’s nonprofit organizations”); id., at 5983 (minority views) (“Tax-exempt ‘issue advocacy’ groups and other conduits were systematically used to circumvent federal campaign finance laws”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Par­ties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called “politician 527s,” which are little more than soft­money fronts for the promotion of particular federal of­ficeholders and their interests. See id., at 519 (Kollar­Kotelly, J.) (“‘Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group. . . . In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who have their own 527s’” (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders’ Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance Re­form Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 849– 850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from the national parties themselves. See id., at 519–520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27
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industries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, at 10–11)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA’s tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organiza­tions will only increase.
Section 323(d)’s solicitation restriction is closely drawn to prevent political parties from using tax-exempt organi­zations as soft-money surrogates. Though phrased as an absolute prohibition, the restriction does nothing more than subject contributions solicited by parties to FECA’s regulatory regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for solicitation and other expressive activity in support of these organizations. First, and most obviously, §323(d) restricts solicitations only to those §501(c) groups “mak[ing] expenditures or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal office,” 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d)(1) (Supp. 2003), and to §527 organizations, which by definition engage in partisan political activity, §441i(d)(2); 26 U. S. C. §527(e). Second, parties remain free to solicit hard-money contributions to a §501(c)’s federal PAC, as well as to §527 organizations that already qualify as federal PACs.69 Third, §323(d) allows parties to endorse qualifying organizations in ways other than direct
69Notably, the FEC has interpreted §323(d)(2) to permit state, dis­trict, and local party committees to solicit donations to §527 organiza­tions that are state-registered PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and that do not make expenditures or disbursements in connection with federal elections. 11 CFR §300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined that this interpretation of “political committee”—at least with respect to state, district, and local committees—was consis­tent with BCRA’s fundamental purpose of prohibiting soft money from being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106 (2002).
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solicitations of unregulated donations. For example, with respect to §501(c) organizations that are prohibited from administering PACs, parties can solicit hard-money dona­tions to themselves for the express purpose of donating to these organizations. See supra, at 72–73. Finally, as with §323(a), §323(d) in no way restricts solicitations by party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (extending restrictions to solicitations and dona­tions made by “an officer or agent acting on behalf of any such party committee” (emphasis added)).
In challenging §323(d)’s ban on solicitations, plaintiffs renew the argument they made with respect to §323(a)’s solicitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organizations that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) with §441i(e)(4). But if §323(d)’s restrictions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not to regulate the activities of an­other group as stringently as it might have. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210; see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 656–657 (1966). In any event, the difference between the two provisions is fully explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike federal candi­dates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual ca­pacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to accommo­date the individual associational and speech interests of candidates and officeholders in lending personal support to nonprofit organizations, also places tight content, source, and amount restrictions on solicitations of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. Given those limits, as well as the less rigorous standard of re­view, the greater allowances of §323(e) do not render §323(d)’s solicitation restriction facially invalid.
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Section 323(d) also prohibits national, state, and local party committees from making or directing “any dona­tio[n]” to qualifying §501(c) or §527 organizations. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The Government again defends the restriction as an anticircumvention measure. We agree insofar as it prohibits the donation of soft money. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees could accomplish directly what the antisolici­tation restrictions prevent them from doing indirectly— namely, raising large sums of soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in federal election activities. Because the party itself would be raising and collecting the funds, the potential for corrup­tion would be that much greater. We will not disturb Congress’ reasonable decision to close that loophole, par­ticularly given a record demonstrating an already robust practice of parties’ making such donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517–518 (Kollar-Kotelly); id., at 848–849 (Leon, J.).
The prohibition does raise overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a party’s federal account—i.e., funds that have already been raised in compliance with FECA’s source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Par­ties have many valid reasons for giving to tax-exempt organizations, not the least of which is to associate them­selves with certain causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the values espoused by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents parties from making even the “general expression of support” that a contribution represents. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. At the same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress’ goal of pre­venting corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders.
The Government asserts that the restriction is neces-
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sary to prevent parties from leveraging their hard money to gain control over a tax-exempt group’s soft money. Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns over capture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set forth in §§323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but to entities under their control. See 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(2) (extending prohibitions on na­tional party committees to “any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national committee” (emphasis added)); §441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party committees).
These observations do not, however, require us to sus­tain plaintiffs’ facial challenge to §323(d)’s donation re­striction. “When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitution­ality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 331 (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional problems, we narrowly construe §323(d)’s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised in com­pliance with FECA. This construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole. Though there is little legislative history regarding BCRA generally, and almost nothing on §323(d) specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998 Senate report regarding campaign finance practices in­volve the use of nonprofit organizations as conduits for large soft-money donations. See, e.g., 3 1998 Senate Re­port 4565 (“The evidence indicates that the soft-money loophole is fueling many of the campaign abuses investi­gated by the Committee. . . . Soft money also supplied the funds parties used to make contributions to tax-exempt
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groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for election­related activities”); id., at 4568–4569 (describing as an “egregious exampl[e]” of misuse a $4.6 million donation of nonfederal funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax Re­form, which the organization spent on “direct mail and phone bank operations to counter anti-Republican adver­tising”). We have found no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much less that it intended to prohibit, donations of money already fully regulated by FECA. Given Title I’s exclusive focus on abuses related to soft money, we would expect that if Congress meant §323(d)’s restriction to have this dramatic and constitutionally questionable effect, it would say so explicitly. Because there is nothing that compels us to conclude that Congress intended “donations” to include transfers of federal money, and because of the constitutional infirmities such an interpretation would raise, we decline to read §323(d) in that way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA.
New FECA §323(e) regulates the raising and soliciting of soft money by federal candidates and officeholders. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). It prohibits federal candidates and officeholders from “solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or spend[ing]” any soft money in connection with federal elections. §441i(e)(1)(A). It also limits the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with state and local elections. §441i(e)(1)(B).70
70Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly constrains the ability of federal candi­dates and officeholders to solicit or spend nonfederal money in connec­tion with state or local elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA’s
74 MCCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Opinion of the Court
Section 323(e)’s general prohibition on solicitations admits of a number of exceptions. For instance, federal candidates and officeholders are permitted to “attend, speak, or be a featured guest” at a state or local party fundraising event. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(3). Section 323(e) specifically provides that federal candidates and office­holders may make solicitations of soft money to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is not to engage in “Federal election activit[ies]” as long as the solicitation does not specify how the funds will be spent, 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(4)(A); to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose is to engage in “Federal election activit[ies]” as long as the solicitations are limited to individuals and the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(4)(B); and to §501(c) organizations for the express purpose of carrying out such activities, again so long as the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U. S. C. A. §441(e)(4)(B).
No party seriously questions the constitutionality of §323(e)’s general ban on donations of soft money made directly to federal candidates and officeholders, their agents, or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the narrowest reading of Buckley, a regulation re­stricting donations to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which those funds are ultimately put, qualifies
analogous hard-money contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. In effect, §323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute to or at the behest of federal candidates and officehold­ers, while restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not related to federal elections. If the federal candidate or officeholder is also a candidate for state or local office, he or she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to state regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or expenditures refer only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(2).
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as a contribution limit subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have only marginal speech and associa­tional value, but at the same time pose a substantial threat of corruption. By severing the most direct link between the soft-money donor and the federal candidate, §323(e)’s ban on donations of soft money is closely drawn to prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders.
Section 323(e)’s restrictions on solicitations are justified as valid anticircumvention measures. Large soft-money donations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contribu­tions made directly to the candidate or officeholder. Though the candidate may not ultimately control how the funds are spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder is evident from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and officeholders could easily avoid FECA’s contribution limits by soliciting funds from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded organizations en­gaging in federal election activities. As the record demon­strates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal candi­dates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in order to help their own, as well as their party’s, electoral cause. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting fundraising letter from a Congressman explain­ing to contributor that “‘you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my campaign,’ but ‘you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Re­publican Party’”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 479–480 (Kollar­Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders’ soliciting funds to state and local parties); id., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id., at 518 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders’ soliciting funds for non­profits for electioneering purposes); id., at 849 (Leon, J.)
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(same). The incentives to do so, at least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, will only increase with Title I’s restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money by national, state, and local parties.
Section 323(e) addresses these concerns while accommo­dating the individual speech and associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders. Rather than place an outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations, §323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft money. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(4). This allowance accommodates individuals who have long served as active members of nonprofit organizations in both their official and individ­ual capacities. Similarly, §§323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the traditional fundraising role of federal office­holders by providing limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders to associate with their state and local colleagues through joint fundraising activities. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(e)(1)(B), 441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the substantial threat of corruption or its appearance posed by donations to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, §323(e) is clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold §323(e) against plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.
The final provision of Title I is new FECA §323(f). 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(f) (Supp. 2003). Section 323(f) generally prohibits candidates for state or local office, or state or local officeholders, from spending soft money to fund “public communications” as defined in §301(20)(A)(iii)— i.e., a communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(f)(1);
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§431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from this restriction are com­munications made in connection with an election for state or local office which refer only to the state or local candi­date or officeholder making the expenditure or to any other candidate for the same state or local office. §441i(f)(2).
Section 323(f) places no cap on the amount of money that state or local candidates can spend on any activity. Rather, like §§323(a) and 323(b), it limits only the source and amount of contributions that state and local candi­dates can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact federal elections. And, by regulating only contri­butions used to fund “public communications,” §323(f) focuses narrowly on those soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders.
Plaintiffs advance two principal arguments against §323(f). We have already rejected the first argument, that the definition of “public communications” in new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See supra, 62, n. 64. We add only that, plaintiffs’ and JUSTICE KENNEDY’s contrary reading notwithstanding, post, at 34, this provision does not prohibit a state or local candidate from advertising that he has received a federal officeholder’s endorsement.71
The second argument, that soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for “public communications” do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal candidates, ig­nores both the record in this litigation and Congress’
71See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Fein­gold) (Section 323(f) does not prohibit “spending non-federal money to run advertisements that mention that [state or local candidates] have been endorsed by a Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of a named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not support, attack, promote or oppose the Federal candidate”).
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strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise valid contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has driven the soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every possible way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They have labored to bring them under the FEC’s allocation regime; they have raised and transferred soft money from national to state party com­mittees to take advantage of favorable allocation ratios; and they have transferred and solicited funds to tax­exempt organizations for production of such ads. We will not upset Congress’ eminently reasonable prediction that, with these other avenues no longer available, state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue adver­tising. We therefore uphold §323(f) against plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.72
72 JUSTICE KENNEDY faults our “unwillingness” to confront that “Title I’s entirety . . . look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan,” citing §323(e), which provides officeholders and candidates with greater opportunities to solicit soft money than §§323(a) and (d) permit party officers. Post, at 23–24. But, §323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates and allows only minimally greater opportunities for solicita­tion out of regard for the fact that candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step out of their official roles. Supra, at 70–71; 42 U. S. C. A. §441i(e). Any concern that Congress might opportunisti­cally pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent corruption. It has done so here. At bottom, JUSTICE KENNEDY has long disagreed with the basic holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous scrutiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area where it enjoys particular expertise—applies to assess limits on campaign contributions. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 465 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (joining JUSTICE THOMAS for the proposition that “Buckley should be overrruled” (citation omitted)); Shrink Mis­souri, 528 U. S., at 405–410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting).
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Several plaintiffs contend that Title I exceeds Congress’ Election Clause authority to “make or alter” rules gov­erning federal elections, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of private parties. It imposes no requirements whatsoever upon States or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fund­raising tactics that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States, and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing of state electoral cam­paigns. But these indirect effects do not render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for federal law to prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coopera­tive, 532 U. S. 483 (2001). Indeed, such conflict is inevitable in areas of law that involve both state and federal con­cerns. It is not in and of itself a marker of constitutional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 392 (1879).
Of course, in maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this Court has done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering the States. We have also policed the absolute boundaries of congressional power under Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995). But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Con-
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gress has overstepped its Elections Clause power in enact­ing BCRA. Congress has a fully legitimate interest in main­taining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal electoral processes through the means it has chosen. Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that those interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding, we cannot con­clude that those interests are insufficient to ground Con­gress’ exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison, supra, at 607 (respect owed to coordinate branches “de­mands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its consti­tutional bounds”).
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Title I violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates against politi­cal parties in favor of special interest groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes numerous restrictions on the fundraising abilities of political parties, of which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent. Interest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast advertising (other than electioneering communications). We con­clude that this disparate treatment does not offend the Constitution.
As an initial matter, we note that BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways. Most obviously, party committees are entitled to receive individual contributions that substantially exceed FECA’s limits on contributions to nonparty political committees; individuals can give $25,000 to political party committees whereas they can give a maximum of $5,000 to nonparty political commit-
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tees. In addition, party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candidates by making coordinated expendi­tures, and those expenditures may greatly exceed the contribution limits that apply to other donors. See 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d) (Supp. 2003).
More importantly, however, Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences between political par­ties and interest groups when crafting a system of cam­paign finance regulation. See National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210. Interest groups do not select slates of candi­dates for elections. Interest groups do not determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties have influence and power in the legislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify candidates, or that parties in turn have special access to and relationships with federal of­ficeholders. Congress’ efforts at campaign finance regula­tion may account for these salient differences. Taken seriously, appellants’ equal protection arguments would call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but much of the pre-existing structure of FECA as well. We therefore reject those arguments.