Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/345/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-05-28 06:45:33
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 204', '§ 1971', '§ 1971', '§ 4', '§ 1971', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 1', '§ 150', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 1973', '§ 4', '§ 1973']

NAACP v. New York (full text) :: 413 U.S. 345 (1973) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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NAACP v. New York 413 U.S. 345 (1973)
U.S. Supreme CourtNAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973)National Association for the Advancementof Colored People v. New YorkNo. 72-129Argued February 27-28, 1973Decided June 21, 1973413 U.S. 345APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, are designed to prohibit the use of tests or devices, or the alteration of voting qualifications or procedures, when the purpose or effect is to deprive a citizen of his right to vote. Sections 4 and 5 apply in any State or political subdivision thereof which the Attorney General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, or November 1, 1968, any "test or device," and with respect to which the Director of the Census Bureau determines that less than half the voting-age residents were registered, or that less than half voted in the presidential election of that November. These determinations are effective on publication and are not judicially reviewable. Publication suspends the effectiveness of the test or device, which may not then be utilized unless a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia determines that no such test or device has been used during the 10 preceding years "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Section 4(a) provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The State or political subdivision may also institute an action pursuant to § 5 in the District Court for the District of Columbia, for a declaratory judgment that a proposed alteration in voting qualifications or procedures "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." The statute also permits the change to be enforced without the court proceeding if it has been submitted to the Attorney General and he has not interposed an objection within 60 days. Neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a § 5 declaratory judgment bars a subsequent private action to enjoin enforcement of the change. Such an action shall also be determined by a three-judge court and is appealable to the Supreme Page 413 U. S. 346 Court. The Attorney General, on July 31, 1970, filed with the Federal Register his determination that New York on November 1, 1968, maintained a test or device as defined in the Act, and this was published the next day. On March 27, 1971, the Federal Register published the Census Director's determination that in the counties of Bronx, Kings, and New York, "less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein voted in the presidential election of November 1968." New York State filed an action on December 3, 1971, seeking a judgment declaring that, during the preceding 10 years, the three counties had not used the State's voting qualifications "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," and that §§ 4 and 5 were thus inapplicable to the counties. Pursuant to stipulation, the United States filed its answer on March 10, 1972, alleging, inter alia, that it was without knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of New York's allegation that the literacy tests were not administered discriminatorily. On March 17, New York filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits, and, on April 3, the United States formally consented to the entry of the declaratory judgment sought by the State. Appellants filed their motion to intervene on April 7. New York opposed the motion claiming that: it was untimely, as the suit had been pending for more than four months; it had been publicized in early February, and appellants did not deny that they knew the action was pending; appellants failed to allege appropriate supporting facts; no appellant claimed to be a victim of voting discrimination; appellants' interests were adequately represented by the United States; delay would prejudice impending elections; and appellants still could raise discrimination issues in the state and federal courts of New York. On April 13, the three-judge court denied the motion to intervene and granted summary judgment for New York. While the appeal was pending, it was disclosed that the attorney who executed affidavits for appellants had not begun employment with appellant NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., until March 9, 1972, and that Justice Department attorneys met with two individual appellants in January, 1972, during the course of their investigation.
2. The motion to intervene was untimely, and, in the light of that fact and all the other circumstances of this case, the District Page 413 U. S. 347 Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Pp. 364 369.
This appeal from a three-judge district court for the District of Columbia comes to us pursuant to the direct review provisions of § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a). [Footnote 1] The appellants [Footnote 2] seek review of Page 413 U. S. 348 an order dated April 13, 1972, unaccompanied by any opinion, denying their motion to intervene [Footnote 3] in a suit that had been instituted against the United States by Page 413 U. S. 349 the State of New York, on behalf of its counties of New York, Bronx, and Kings. New York's action was one for a judgment declaring that, during the 10 years preceding the filing of the suit, voter qualifications prescribed by the State had not been used by the three named counties "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," within the language and meaning of § 4(a), and that the provisions of §§ 4 and 5 of the Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b and 1973c, are, therefore, inapplicable to the three counties.
Appellants contend here that their motion to intervene should have been granted because (1) the United States unjustifiably declined to oppose New York's motion Page 413 U. S. 350 for summary judgment; (2) the appellants had initiated other litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to compel compliance with §§ 4 and 5 of the Act; and (3) the appellants possessed "substantial documentary evidence," Jurisdictional Statement 7, to offer in opposition to the entry of the declaratory judgment.
"any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational Page 413 U. S. 351 achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class."
"shall enact Page 413 U. S. 352 or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that In force or effect"
On July 31, 1970, the Attorney General filed with the Federal Register his determination that New York on November 1, 1968, maintained a test or device as defined in § 4(c) of the Act. This was published the following day. 35 Fed.Reg. 12354. On March 27, 1971, there was published in the Federal Register the determination Page 413 U. S. 353 by the Director of the Bureau of the Census that in the counties of Bronx, Kings, and New York, in the State of New York, "less than 50 per centum of the persons of voting age residing therein voted in the presidential election of November 1968." 36 Fed.Reg. 5809.
The jurisdictional issue is simply phrased: whether "any appeal," within the language of the second paragraph of § 4(a), includes an appeal by a would-be, but unsuccessful, intervenor. Certainly, the words "any appeal" are subject to broad construction; they could be said to include review of any meaningful judicial determination Page 413 U. S. 354 made in the progress of the § 4 lawsuit. That Congress intended a broad meaning is apparent from its expressed concern that voting restraints on account of race or color should be removed as quickly as possible in order to "open the door to the exercise of constitutional rights conferred almost a century ago." H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1965). See S.Rep. No. 162, pt.. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7 (1965). Indeed, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an addition to, and buttressed, § 204 of the Revised Statutes, as that section had been amended by the respective Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, 71 Stat. 637, 74 Stat. 90, and 78 Stat. 241, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971. When the 1965 Act was under consideration by the Congress, § 1971(c) already empowered the Attorney General to institute a civil action to protect the right to vote from deprivation because of race or color or from interference by threat, coercion, or intimidation. Section 1971(g) further provided that, in such a suit, the Attorney General could request a three-judge court, and
Despite this existing statutory provision designed to hasten the removal of barriers to the right to vote, the Congress determined, in 1965, that the enforcement of the voting rights statutes "has encountered serious obstacles in various regions of the country," and progress "has been painfully slow, in part because of the intransigence of State and local officials and repeated delays in the judicial process." H.R.Rep. No. 439, supra, at 9. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 309-315, and Allen v. State Board of Election, 393 U. S. 544, 393 U. S. 556 n. 21 (1969). Congress thus produced Page 413 U. S. 355 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in response to this recognized problem, and provided in that Act that "any appeal" in a § 4(a) three-judge proceeding shall lie to this Court. This contrasts with the language in the earlier theretofore existing statute providing for an appeal here only "from the final judgment" of the three-judge court. § 1971(g). The broader language of § 4(a), when viewed in the light of Congress' concern about hastening the resolution of suits involving voting rights, see Apache County v. United States, 256 F.Supp. at 907, prompts us to conclude that the unsuccessful intervenor's § 4(a) appeal is directly here, and not to the Court of Appeals.
Earlier this Term, in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151 (1972), we held that § 2 of the Expediting Act lodged in this Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory, as well as final, orders in Government civil antitrust cases. In so holding, we emphasized Congress' determination "to speed appellate review." Id. at 409 U. S. 155. As we have noted above, Congress has expressed a similar need for speed in adjudicating voting rights cases. We could not justify dissimilar treatment to an unsuccessful intervenor under the parallel § 4(a) of the Civil Rights Act. Page 413 U. S. 356
As originally enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 related only to a period of five preceding years, to a test or device in effect on November 1, 1964, to a paucity of persons registered on that date, and to a paucity of voters in the presidential election of 1964. 79 Stat. 438, 439. In 1970, however, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. Pub.L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. This new legislation, among other things, related §§ 4 and 5 to ten, rather than five, preceding years and, in addition to the November 1, 1964, date and the presidential election of that year, to November Page 413 U. S. 357 1, 1968, and the 1968 election. Also, the 1970 Act suspended the use of any test or device "in any Federal, State, or local election" prior to August 6, 1975, without regard to whether a determination has been made that § 4 covered a particular State or political subdivision. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 400 U. S. 131-132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.).
It was in December, 1971, during the pendency of state legislative proceedings for the redrafting of congressional and state senate and assembly district lines, [Footnote 9] that the State of New York filed its complaint in the present Page 413 U. S. 358 action. [Footnote 10] The amended complaint, filed 13 days later, alleged that certain of the State's qualifications for registration and voting, prescribed by New York's Constitution, Art. II, § 1, and by its Election Law, §§ 150 and 168, as amended (the ability to read and write English, the administration of a literacy test, and the presentation of evidence of literacy in lieu of the test), had not been used during the preceding 10 years "for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," App. 6a; that the State's literacy requirements were suspended in 1970 and remained suspended; that, after enactment of the 1965 Act, the New York City Board of Elections provided English-Spanish affidavits to be executed in lieu of a diploma or certificate in conformity with the requirements of the Act; and that, beginning in 1964 and continuing through 1971, with the exception of 1967, there were voter registration drives every summer designed to increase the number of registered voters in the three named counties. New York and the United States stipulated that the Government could file its answer or other pleading by March 10, 1972. The answer was filed on that day. The Government therein admitted that English-Spanish affidavits were provided by the City Board of Elections but averred, on information and belief, that such affidavits Page 413 U. S. 359 were not so provided prior to 1967. The answer also alleged that the United States was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the literacy tests were administered with no intention or effect to abridge or deny the right to vote on the basis of race or color.
"[s]ince it was never the practice of administering the tests to discriminate against any person on account Page 413 U. S. 360 of race or color, and since the filing requirements of the Voting Rights Act are leading to delays which may well disrupt the political process in New York, this action for declaratory judgment has been brought."
Appellants' motion to intervene was filed April 7. Appellants asserted that, if New York were successful in the present action, the appellants would be deprived of the protections afforded by §§ 4 and 5; that they "would be legally bound" thereby in their simultaneously filed § 5 action in the Southern District of New York; and that the latter action "would necessarily fail." App. 45a. [Footnote 12] Page 413 U. S. 361 The appellants also alleged that the § 5 suit asserted that New York
There was also filed an affidavit of Eric Schnapper, one of the attorneys for the appellants. This repeated the allegations contained in the motion to intervene and also asserted that, on March 21, the affiant advised a Department of Justice attorney that, when the New York redistricting laws were submitted to the Department, he wished to submit material and arguments in opposition to their approval; that, on March 23, he was advised by another Department attorney that papers were being Page 413 U. S. 362 prepared in opposition to New York's motion for summary judgment; that he informed the attorney that the appellants were considering the institution of an action in the Southern District of New York; that, on April 3, he was advised by the Department of Justice that it would have no objection to the institution of the New York suit; and that, in the afternoon of April 5, he was informed by telephone for the first time that, two days earlier, the United States had consented to New York's motion for summary judgment. App. 48a-51a.
The United States took no position with respect to the appellants' motion to intervene. New York opposed the motion on six grounds. The first was untimeliness, in that the suit had been pending for more than four months, an article about it had appeared in early February in the New York Times, and the appellants did not deny that they had knowledge of the pendency of the action. The second was failure to allege appropriate supporting facts. The third was the lack of a requisite interest, in that none of the appellants asserted he was a victim of discriminatory application of the literacy test; rather, the motion to intervene was subordinate to the appellants' real interest in invalidating New York's reapportionment of its assembly, senate, and congressional districts, as evidenced by the institution of their action in the Southern District of New York. The fourth Page 413 U. S. 363 was adequate representation of the appellants' interest by the United States. The fifth was that delay in the granting of the motion for summary judgment would prejudice New York and jeopardize the impending primary elections for offices of Assembly, Senate, and Congress, as well as for delegates to the upcoming Democratic National Convention. The sixth was that the appellants and others who claimed discrimination still could raise those issues in the state and federal courts of New York. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion to Intervene 1. Like reasons were asserted in a supporting affidavit of an Assistant New York Attorney General. App. 67a-70a.
On April 24, the appellants filed a motion to alter judgment on the ground, among others, that their motion to intervene was timely, since neither the appellants nor their counsel knew of the § 4(a) action until March 21. [Footnote 14] The appellants now asserted that evidence was available to demonstrate that, in the three counties, education afforded Page 413 U. S. 364 nonwhite children by New York was substantially inferior to that afforded white children, and that
The foregoing detailed recital of the facts and of the history of the case is necessary because of the discretionary nature of the District Court's order we are called upon to review. Our task is to determine whether, upon Page 413 U. S. 365 the facts available to it at that time, the court erred in denying the appellants' motion to intervene.
Intervention in a federal court suit is governed by Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 24. [Footnote 15] Whether intervention be claimed of right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial words of both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the application must be "timely." If it is untimely, intervention must be denied. Thus, the court where the action is pending must first be satisfied as to timeliness. [Footnote 16] Although the point to which Page 413 U. S. 366 the suit has progressed is one factor in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispositive. Timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. [Footnote 17] And it is to be determined by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on review. [Footnote 18]
1. The court could reasonably have concluded that appellants knew or should have known of the pendency of the § 4(a) action because of an informative February article in the New York Times discussing the controversial aspect of the suit; [Footnote 19] public comment by community leaders; the size and astuteness of the membership and staff of the organizational appellant; and the questioning Page 413 U. S. 367 of two of the individual appellants themselves by Department of Justice attorneys investigating the use of literacy tests in New York.
2. We, however, need not confine our evaluation of abuse of discretion to the facts just mentioned, for the record amply demonstrates that appellants failed to protect their interest in a timely fashion after March 21, 1972, the date they allegedly were first informed of the pendency of the action. At that point, the suit was over three months old, and had reached a critical stage. The United States had answered New York's complaint on March 10, and in that answer, had clearly indicated that it was without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of New York's allegation that the State's literacy tests were administered without regard to race or color. App. 13a. New York, in reliance upon this answer, then filed its motion for summary judgment. The only step remaining was for the United States either to oppose or to consent to the entry of summary judgment. This was the status of the suit at the time the appellants concede they were aware of its existence. It was obvious that there was a strong likelihood that the United States would consent to the entry of judgment, since its answer revealed that it was without information with which it could oppose the motion for summary judgment. Thus, it was incumbent upon the appellants, at that stage of the proceedings, to take immediate affirmative steps to protect their interests either by supplying the Department of Justice with any information they possessed concerning the employment of literacy tests in a way designed to deny New York citizens of the right to vote on account of race or color, or by presenting that information to the District Court itself by way of an immediate motion to intervene. [Footnote 20] Appellants Page 413 U. S. 368 failed to take either of these affirmative steps. They chose, rather, to rely on representations said to have been made by Department of Justice attorneys during the course of telephone conversations. The content of the representations allegedly made by the attorneys is a matter of dispute. Brief for United States 46-47. Indeed, it appears from the affidavit filed by appellants' counsel in support of the motion to alter judgment that appellants were not preparing, prior to the "night of April 6-7," to file a motion to intervene or even to file their New York federal action seeking to enjoin the 1972 elections. See n 14, supra.
3. It is also apparent that there were no unusual circumstances warranting intervention, since (a) no appellant alleged an injury, personal to him, resulting from the discriminatory use of a literacy test, (b) appellants' claim of inadequate representation by the United States was unsubstantiated, (c) appellants would not be foreclosed from challenging congressional and state legislative redistricting plans on the grounds that they were the product of improper racial gerrymandering, cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), (d) appellants were free to renew their motion to intervene following the entry of summary judgment, since the District Court was required, under § 4(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a), to retain jurisdiction for five years after judgment, and, (e) in any event, no citizen of New York could be denied the right to vote in the near future since all literacy tests Page 413 U. S. 369 have been suspended until August 6, 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa.
"Rule 24. -- INTERVENTION" "(a) Intervention of right."
Iowa State University Research Foundation v. Honeywell, Inc., 459 F.2d at 449; Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 420 F.2d at 1115; Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d at 109.
McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (CA5 1970); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rhodes, 403 F.2d at 5; 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 24.13, p. 24-524.
When two mighty political agencies such as the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. and the Attorney General of New York in Albany agree that there is no racial discrimination in voting in three New York counties although the historic record [Footnote 2/1] suggests it, it Page 413 U. S. 370 is time to take a careful look and not let this litigation be ended by an agreement between friendly political allies.
In the face of this history, the United States did not call one witness or submit a single document or make even a feeble protest to New York's claim that it was lily white. The United States has no defense to offer. The desultory way in which the United States acted is illustrated by the fact that, although the Act requires Page 413 U. S. 371 the District Court to retain jurisdiction of the cause for five years, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a), the United States did not even make the request. It capitulated completely. And yet the blacks, the Americans of Puerto Rican ancestry, and other minorities victimized by illiteracy tests clamor in their way for representation. Only NAACP offers it in this case. The investigation made by the Department of Justice has all the earmarks of a whitewash.
This suit by the State of New York to get an exemption for the three counties started on December 3, 1971. On March 10, 1972, the United States filed its answer and on March 17, 1972, New York moved for summary judgment. On March 21, 1972, NAACP was advised by the Department of Justice that the latter would oppose New York's motion for summary judgment. Out of the blue, the Department of Justice, on April 4, 1972, consented to the entry of a decree exempting the three New Page 413 U. S. 372 York counties from the Act. The motion to intervene was promptly filed April 7, 1972.
In my view, the District Court erred in denying appellants' motion for leave to intervene in this suit under § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 Page 413 U. S. 373 U.S.C. § 1973b(a). The case plainly turns on its facts, and its impact on the development of principles governing intervention will doubtless be small. But what is ultimately at stake in this suit by New York to obtain an exemption under the Voting Rights Act is the applicability of the protections of the Act to 2.2 million minority group members residing in three New York counties. According to appellants, the total number of minority group members affected by all previous exemptions combined was less than 100,000.
"obvious that there was a strong likelihood that the United States would consent to the entry of judgment, since its answer revealed that it was without information with which it could oppose the motion for summary judgment. Thus, it was incumbent Page 413 U. S. 374 upon the appellants, at that stage of the proceedings, to take immediate affirmative steps to protect their interests either by supplying the Department of Justice with any information they possessed concerning the employment of literacy tests in a way designed to deny New York citizens of the right to vote on account of race or color, or by presenting that information to the District Court itself by way of an immediate motion to intervene."
The timeliness of a motion to intervene is determined not by reference to the date on which the suit began or the date on which the would-be intervenors learned that it was pending, but rather by reference to the date when the movants learned that intervention was needed to protect their interests. See Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125 (CA5 1970); cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U. S. 129 (1967). Prior to the announcement that the United States would not contest the motion for summary judgment, appellants could not have known that intervention was needed to protect their interests and the interests of the class they represent. In an affidavit filed in connection with the motion to intervene, appellants' attorney stated that he had been advised by three different Justice Department attorneys that the United States would oppose New York's motion for summary judgment. App. 48a-51a. The Court suggests that the contents of the representations made by these attorneys is "a matter of dispute." Ante at 413 U. S. 368. The matter was not in dispute, however, at the time the affidavit was filed, nor did it become the subject of dispute until five months later, Page 413 U. S. 375 when the Government filed in this Court its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm. Even then, the United States did not deny that appellants had been offered certain assurances by Government attorneys, but stated only that the affidavit was not "an accurate representation of the substance of the conversations between counsel for appellants and attorneys for the government." Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, filed Sept. 13, 1972, p. 4 n. 3.