Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/211/239/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-09-29 15:21:06
Document Index: 1236885

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4536', '§ 4536', '§ 233', '§ 4536', '§ 4536', '§ 4536', '§ 3082', '§ 4529']

Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. :: 211 U.S. 239 (1908) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. 211 U.S. 239 (1908)
U.S. Supreme CourtWilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., 211 U.S. 239 (1908)Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, LimitedNo. 30Submitted October 22, 1908Decided November 30, 1908211 U.S. 239ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT
The facts are stated in the opinion. Page 211 U. S. 240
This case is one of a number of similar cases arising within Page 211 U. S. 241 the Territory of Hawaii, and is brought here for the purpose of settling the liability of seamen's wages to seizure after judgment by attachment or proceedings in aid of execution. The Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, defendant in error, was directed by order and judgment of the district magistrate of Honolulu to pay into court, on account of a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff in error against one A. Tullet, the sum of $65. Tullet is a seaman, being master of the steamer Keauhou, plying between ports within the territory. The sum of $65 was due to Tullet from the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company for wages for the months of January and February, 1906. The judgment was recovered against Tullet on September 5, 1905, for the sum of $120.38 and costs. An execution was issued thereon and returned unsatisfied. Upon affidavit's being filed, an order was issued attaching the sum of $65, due in manner aforesaid from the navigation company to Tullet. The navigation company filed an answer setting forth that Tullet was an American seaman in the employ of the company, and that the money attached was due to Tullet as wages, and, under § 4536 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the same were not subject to arrestment nor attachment, and that the territorial court had no jurisdiction in the premises. The lower court held that the wages could be attached in this manner. This judgment was reversed in the Supreme Court of Hawaii.
"SEC. 2118. Attachment of debts, order. -- It shall be lawful for a judge of any court upon the ex parte application of such judgment creditor, either before or after such oral examination, and upon affidavit by the judgment creditor or his attorney stating that judgment has been recovered, and that it is still unsatisfied, and to what amount, and that any other person is indebted to the judgment debtor and is within the jurisdiction, to order that all debts owing or accruing from such third person Page 211 U. S. 242 (hereinafter called the 'garnishee') to the judgment debtor shall be attached to answer the judgment debt, and by the same or any subsequent order it may be ordered that the garnishee shall appear before the judge to show cause why he should not pay the judgment creditor the debt due from him to the judgment debtor, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment debt; provided that the judge may, in his discretion, refuse to interfere when, from the smallness of the amount to be recovered, or of the debt sought to be attached, or otherwise, the remedy sought would be worthless or vexatious."
17 Stat. 262, 276, c. 322. It afterwards became, in the revision of 1874, § 4536 of the Revised Statutes. This section appears to have been copied from § 233 of 17 and 18 Victoria, c. 104, which act provides: Page 211 U. S. 243
We have been unable to discover any English case construing this statute, and none has been called to our attention. In Maclachlan on Merchant Shipping, 4th ed., 231, that author states the effect of the statute to be to except seaman's wages from liability to attachment by a judgment creditor, as payment of such wages is valid, notwithstanding any previous sale or assignment thereof, or any attachment, encumbrance, or arrestment thereon. In this country, the cases, state and federal, in which this statute has been under consideration are not in accord. In Telles v. Lynde, 47 F. 912, and The Queen, 93 F. 834, the District Court in the Ninth Circuit reached the conclusion that the statute did not prevent the seizure of seamen's wages after judgment upon proceedings in aid of execution, although the seamen's wages were not liable to attachment in advance of judgment.
The question was very fully considered by Judge Benedict in the case of McCarty v. Steam Propeller City of New Bedford, 4 F. 818. In that case, Judge Benedict held the view that the statute of Victoria 17 and 18, above cited, was but declaratory of the law of England as it theretofore existed, and that, in view of the remedies given in the United States courts in admiralty, and the provisions of the federal statutes enacted in reference to the recovery and protection of the wages of seamen, there was no jurisdiction in the state courts to garnishee the wages of seamen at the instance of a creditor. Page 211 U. S. 244
In the case of The City of New Bedford, 20 F. 57, Judge Brown, sitting in admiralty in the Southern District of New York, adhered to the views expressed by Judge Benedict Page 211 U. S. 245 in McCarty v. The City of New Bedford, supra, notwithstanding the decision in Eddy v. O'Hara, supra, but held that a compulsory payment under garnishee process in Massachusetts, under principles of comity, should be recognized in the admiralty court. In Ross v. Bourne, 14 F. 858, Judge Nelson, sitting in the United States District Court in Massachusetts, held that a suit at law against a seaman, wherein his wages had been attached by a trustee process, but not yet paid, would not bar the seaman's recovery of the whole wages by a suit in admiralty. Upon appeal to the circuit court of the same case (17 F. 703), Judge Lowell said that "he did not dissent" from the learned opinion of Mr. Justice Gray, in Eddy v. O'Hara, supra, but held that such an attachment proceeding should be respected out of comity only, and that comity did not require actions in favor of seamen in admiralty to be hung up to wait the dilatory proceedings of an attachment suit at common law.
From this conflict of views upon the subject, we turn to the consideration of the section (4536) itself. We may premise that no contention was made in the Supreme Court of Hawaii, or in the assignments of error or argument in this Court, that § 4536 was inapplicable because the steamship company was engaged wholly in the coastwise trade. This removes any question on that subject from the case and renders it unnecessary to decide whether the Act of 1874, 18 Stat. 64, c. 260, had the effect to repeal § 4536 so far as vessels thus engaged are concerned. In the first clause of § 4536, it is provided that no wages due or accruing to any seaman shall be subject to attachment or arrestment from any court, and it is the contention of the plaintiff in error that the words "attachment" or "arrestment" only forbid such proceedings before judgment, but do not protect such wages from proceedings in attachment after judgment. Undoubtedly the word "attachment," as ordinarily understood in American law, has reference to a writ the object of which is to hold property to abide the order of the court for payment of a judgment in the event Page 211 U. S. 246 the debt shall be established. And as Mr. Justice Alvey says, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Maryland, Thomson v. Baltimore & Susquehanna Steam Co., 33 Md. 318:
Neither of the words used in the statute, "attachment" or "arrestment," considered literally, has reference to executions or proceedings in aid of execution to subject property to the payment of judgments, but refers, as we have seen, to the process of holding property to abide the judgment. But we are of opinion that this statute is not to be too narrowly construed, but rather to be liberally interpreted with a view to effecting the protection intended to be extended to a class of persons whose improvidence and prodigality have led to legislative provisions in their favor, and which has made them, Page 211 U. S. 247 as Mr. Justice Story declared, "the wards of the admiralty." Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 541.
Furthermore, there are other sections in the title which Page 211 U. S. 248 strongly support the conclusion that it was not intended that seamen's wages should be seized upon execution or attachment to collect judgments rendered at common law. Section 4535 provides that no seaman shall forfeit his lien upon the ship or be deprived of any remedy for the recovery of his wages by an agreement other than is provided for by this Title "Loss of lien." 3 U.S.Comp.Stat. § 3082. Section 4530 provides for the payment of seamen's wages, one-half at every port where such vessel shall load or deliver its cargo, and when the voyage is ended, the remainder of his wages, as provided in § 4529. Section 4546 provides for the summons of the master when wages are unpaid within ten days to show cause why process should not issue against the vessel according to the rules of courts of admiralty. Section 4547 provides for process against a vessel in case a seaman's wages are not paid or the master does not show that the same are otherwise "satisfied or forfeited," and all the seamen having like cause of complaint may be joined as complainants in a single action.
"Ordinarily," says Judge Nelson, in Ross v. Bourne, 14 Page 211 U. S. 249 F. 862, supra,