Source: http://openjurist.org/482/f3d/641/andreoli-v-m-gates-sc-usn-dla-d
Timestamp: 2016-05-01 23:18:37
Document Index: 752880426

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 705', '§ 705', '§ 8102', '§ 10', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1291']

482 F3d 641 Andreoli v. M Gates Sc Usn Dla-D ) | OpenJurist
482 F. 3d 641 - Andreoli v. M Gates Sc Usn Dla-D ) HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series482 F.3d
482 F3d 641 Andreoli v. M Gates Sc Usn Dla-D ) 482 F.3d 641
Janice ANDREOLI, Appellantv.*Robert M. GATES, Secretary of Defense; Keith Lippert, Vice Admiral, SC, USN, Director of the Defense Logistics Agency Office of the Director DLA-D Headquarters, Defense Logistics Agency*(Amended pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c)).
Before SLOVITER and RENDELL, Circuit Judges, and IRENAS**, District Judge.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants1 on Andreoli's hostile work environment claim based on the conclusion that, under the applicable law, Andreoli's employer could not be held liable for DeLutiis' conduct. Although this ruling was essentially fact-based, we think it helpful to discuss the elements of a hostile work environment claim before delving into the lengthy factual underpinnings of this case.
An employer will be liable for the harassing conduct of the alleged victim's coworker if the employer was "negligent or reckless in failing to train, discipline, fire or take remedial action upon notice of harassment." Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 26 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir.1994)). An employer is negligent if it "knew or should have known about the harassment, but failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action." Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotations omitted). Even if the remedial action does not stop the alleged harassment,2 it is "adequate" if it is "reasonably calculated" to end the harassment. Id. (quoting Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 412-13 (3d Cir.1997)).
In most cases, the focus will be on the timing and nature of the employer's response. We have found an employer's actions to be adequate, as a matter of law, where management undertook an investigation of the employee's complaint within a day after being notified of the harassment, spoke to the alleged harasser about the allegations and the company's sexual harassment policy, and warned the harasser that the company does not tolerate any sexual comments or actions. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407 (3d Cir.1997). On the other hand, we have denied summary judgment in favor of an employer when there was a nineteen-month delay between when the employer was notified of the complaint and when the employer took remedial action. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453. We have also denied summary judgment in favor of an employer when there was evidence that the employee's supervisor knew about the harassment and did nothing for three months, despite other evidence that the alleged harasser's supervisor later took immediate action upon learning of the harassment. Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 26. We reasoned that a jury should decide whether the employer's remedial action was prompt and adequate.
Most of the underlying facts are undisputed. Where there is a dispute, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Andreoli. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2001).
Andreoli worked as a federal employee at the DSCP from 1988 until 2000, when she stopped coming to work because she was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression in reaction to the behavior of her coworker, Larry DeLutiis. It all started in 1989, when DeLutiis began making offensive, off-color comments to Andreoli about women from work or women that he had seen outside of work. His comments and actions were, at best, objectionable and, at worst, lewd and harassing.3
Andreoli spoke to her immediate supervisor, Robert Crawford, about what she had been through with DeLutiis. Crawford replied, "Well, Janice, that was a long time ago. You need to get over that." App. at 607. She then spoke to Provision Chief Rosemarie Badame. Andreoli, visibly shaken up and crying, told Badame that DeLutiis was trying to get on her shift, that he stalked her and sexually harassed her, and that the harassment was ongoing. App. at 607. Badame replied that Andreoli was not the first person to complain about DeLutiis' behavior, but that if Andreoli were to tell anyone about the harassment, DeLutiis would find out. Then, there would be nothing Badame could do to "save" Andreoli because DeLutiis has a pattern of harassing people. App. at 607. In 1997, Andreoli applied for a position as an IT Specialist and was transferred to DeLutiis' shift.4
DeLutiis' bad behavior continued. It escalated in April 2000, when he began to physically threaten Andreoli while driving his government vehicle in the DSCP parking area. On the first occasion, Andreoli was sitting on a cement post outside one of the DSCP buildings and DeLutiis drove a government van very close to Andreoli and parked in a no-parking area next to where she was seated. Twice later that month, DeLutiis was again driving a government van and swerved towards Andreoli as though to run her over as she was crossing the parking lot. Andreoli did not originally report these incidents to DSCP management, out of concern that her supervisors had begun to view her as a constant complainer, until DeLutiis drove head-on toward her on May 22, 2000.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Andreoli's employer, and we apply the same standard that the District Court should have applied. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir.2001).5 Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir.2000).
First, the District Court placed the burden on Andreoli's employer to establish that it was not vicariously liable for DeLutiis' conduct by proving that it took prompt and adequate remedial action and that Andreoli failed to take advantage of the preventive opportunities offered to her. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (holding that employer has affirmative defense to vicarious liability for supervisor's conduct if (1) employer acted promptly and reasonably to prevent and correct the alleged harassment and (2) employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities offered to her). In this case, however, because DeLutiis was not Andreoli's supervisor, there is no presumption of employer liability or accompanying burden on the employer to establish an affirmative defense to liability. As we have previously recognized, "[u]nder Title VII, much turns on whether the harassers are supervisors or coworkers. If supervisors create the hostile environment, the employer is strictly liable, though an affirmative defense may be available where there is no tangible employment action. When coworkers are the perpetrators, the plaintiff must prove employer liability using traditional agency principles." Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 452-53 (3d Cir.2006)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the burden is on Andreoli to prove that her employer is liable for her coworker's conduct by showing that "management knew or should have known about the harassment, but failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action." Id. at 453 (internal quotations omitted). The fact that Andreoli accepted a job on the same shift as DeLutiis is more significant if Ellerth is implicated, because a plaintiff's having availed herself of "preventive opportunities" is specifically at issue under Ellerth. However, it is not a necessary consideration when the issue is the employer's conduct and liability for a coworker's conduct, where Ellerth is not implicated. Andreoli's taking a position on the same shift as DeLutiis could, however, be considered by the jury as relevant to whether DeLutiis' behavior was truly objectionable, or in evaluating Andreoli's credibility.
Since a reasonable juror could find that management at the DSCP failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action after learning of the alleged harassment against Andreoli, we will reverse the District Court's order granting summary judgment to Andreoli's employer on her Title VII hostile work environment claim. A jury should decide whether Andreoli can prove the five elements of a claim for hostile work environment.6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). "Opposition" to discrimination "can take the form of `informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management.'" Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 343 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir.2006)).
Andreoli argues that she is "disabled" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and that her employer violated the Act by failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must first demonstrate that she has a disability. Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir.2000). Andreoli argues that she is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act because her impairments—depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD")—substantially limit her in the major life activities of working, thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(defining "individual with a disability" under the relevant portion of the Act as "any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities" or has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment).
Andreoli urges that the approval of her occupational disease claim for PTSD and severe depression by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office on Workers Compensation in August 2001 and her receipt of workers' compensation benefits is evidence that she is disabled. However, the standard for receipt of workers' compensation benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA") is different than the standard for whether a person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (requiring that an individual have "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities" in order to be "disabled" under Rehabilitation Act), with 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (FECA provision requiring that the "United States shall pay compensation ... for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty"), and 20 C.F.R. § 10.5 (defining "disability" under the FECA as an "incapacity, because of an employment injury, to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of injury").
Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, Senior District Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
Andreoli sued Keith Lippert and Donald Rumsfeld in their official capacities, as the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency and the Secretary of the Department of Defense. App. at 37
A remedial action that stops the harassment is adequate as a matter of lawKnabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 411 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Jensen, 435 F.3d at 453 (employer action was "adequate" because it stopped the harassment); Weston, 251 F.3d at 427 (no liability where employer action stopped the harassment).
DeLutiis described a woman that Andreoli knew from high school as having "big jugs" and described what he would like to do with the woman's breasts. He also made reference to fondling female coworkers and commented on Andreoli's clothes and appearance, including her buttocks and her chest. He made comments about what he would do to Andreoli if he ever had the opportunity and repeatedly mentioned that his nickname was "the lapper." App. at 595-96. He leaned very close to Andreoli and brushed against her and tried to kiss her. At one point, DeLutiis put his hand between Andreoli's legs and refused to remove it until Andreoli began screaming and dug her fingernails into DeLutiis' arm
There is nothing in the record as to why Andreoli applied for and accepted a job that required her to work on the same shift as DeLutiis. However, she submits in her reply brief that she applied for this position because, as a result of restructuring at the Department of Defense, "all the employees in her section were told that they must apply for jobs remaining at the facility" or risk being out of a job. Appellant's Reply Br. at 6
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. We have jurisdiction over Andreoli's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the District Court addressed only the second and fifth elements of Andreoli's claim because the parties did not dispute the remaining elements. App. at 16. The Court concluded that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the discrimination Andreoli suffered was pervasive and regular, but that summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants because Andreoli had not establishedrespondeat superior liability. App. at 18a. Since we conclude that a reasonable juror could find Andreoli's employer liable on this claim, on remand, the entirety of Andreoli's hostile work environment claim should be decided by a jury.
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