Source: https://www.lowelaw.com/death-of-copyright
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 19:52:04
Document Index: 652469903

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 2', '§ 13', '§ 101', '§ 106', '§ 504', '§ 345', '§ 106']

Death Of Copyright | Lowe & Associates
Death_Of_Copyright.pdf
Were all these cases without merit, or did the studios and networks simply have far superior counsel in each case? These suppositions are very unlikely. The case law governing these actions simply has become so amorphous that, for almost every principle of law favorable to creators, the courts have endorsed and applied an opposite principle. As a result, the determination of each case now rests almost entirely in the unfettered discretion of trial judges, who have consistently dismissed plaintiffs' claims. Unless the current trend changes, longstanding principles once favorable to creators may be eclipsed by an evolving body of law so unfavorable to them that the studios and networks are essentially immunized from liability except in cases of identical copying and conceded access to the plaintiff ‘s work.
Since direct evidence of copying rarely is available in a copyright infringement suit, 4 plaintiffs typically must establish that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work and that the two works are substantially similar. 5 Proof of access requires only a “reasonable possibility” to view or copy the plaintiff's work. 6 Courts commonly cite to the countervailing principle, however, that “mere speculation or conjecture” is insufficient. Because the analysis of a reasonable possibility necessarily includes some conjecture and speculation, the “line between a ‘bare' possibility and a ‘reasonable' possibility of access is difficult to draw.” 7 If the work has not been widely disseminated, which is usually the case for unpublished screenplays, “a particular chain of events” must be established between the plaintiff's work and the defendant's access to that work. 8
Early cases outside of the Ninth Circuit found access even when the plaintiff could not actually place the work in the hands of the defendant. For example, in the First Circuit case of Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, the plaintiff offered evidence that he had mailed his copyrighted work to the defendant's principal office. The court held that this mailing created “an inference that the letter reached its proper destination” and that to require the plaintiff to show that the “particularly responsible employees had received his communication” would have been unfair. 9 Similarly, in 1971, a New York district court held in Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc ., that corporate receipt could be “sufficient to raise a triable issue, despite plaintiff's inability to show receipt by the responsible employee,” 10 because it would be unfair to “saddle a plaintiff with disproving non-access within a corporate structure foreign to him and with witnesses not his own.” 11
Unfortunately for creators, the Bevan holding was rejected by some courts. 12 For example, in Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MC A, Inc ., a 1984 case, the Central District of California identified only three circumstances that would meet the type of close relationship between coworkers necessary to give rise to a reasonable opportunity of access. The person who received the plaintiff's work must (1) be “a supervisor with responsibility for the defendant's project,” or (2) “part of the same work unit as the copier,” or (3) have “contributed creative ideas or material to the defendant's work.” 13 By limiting, as a matter of law, the instances in which a plaintiff can prove access within a corporate structure, the Meta-Film court effectively precluded plaintiffs from establishing access in numerous scenarios in which there is actual access but the facts do not fall into one of the court's enumerated categories. 14
The Meta-Film court also recognized situations in which a third-party intermediary not of the same business enterprise as the alleged infringer may be found to have passed along the plaintiff's work. 15 The court limited such situations, however, to instances in which the third-party intermediary “provided creative suggestions and ideas” concerning the allegedly infringing work and “the dealings between the three entities (plaintiff, defendants, and [intermediary]) . . . related to the identical subject matter.” 16 Although Meta-Film‘s effect in the Ninth Circuit has been limited to several district court cases 17 — and the Ninth Circuit has not adopted its holding 18 — Meta-Film has been influential in the Second Circuit, which expressly relied on the case when it overruled Bevan. 19 Thus, Meta-Film remains a prominent example of why commentators note that “many courts set an unrealistically high bar as to what constitutes a close relationship” for establishing access. 20
To determine whether substantial similarity exists between works at the summary judgment phase, the Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to perform an “extrinsic” analysis of the works' objective elements, focusing on “articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events.” 24 In application, however, this analysis has been unpredictable and has resulted in wildly conflicting case law and results. In addition, in recent years, the Ninth Circuit has ignored established case law that requires the court to not only include “unprotectable elements” in its analysis 25 but also exclude dissimilarities between the two works. 26
A long line of copyright infringement cases holds that a plaintiff's and defendant's works should be compared in their entirety, including both protectable and unprotectable elements, 27 to determine whether a qualitatively (or quantitatively) significant portion of a plaintiff's work was appropriated. 28 This comports with basic principles of copyright law and is known as the selection-and-arrangement test. 29
In the seminal 1991 case Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Company, the US Supreme Court held that, when dealing with works largely (or even entirely) composed of unprotectable elements, “choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original.” 30Transposed to the literary arts, the test provides that, although copyright law does not generally protect basic plot premises in literary works or commonly used expressions that flow naturally from those premises (scenes a faire), the original selection and arrangement of these elements can constitute a protectable work in and of itself. 31 Therefore, the wholesale exclusion of all unprotectable elements improperly limits the scope of copyright protection. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this principle on numerous occasions but has spent the better part of the past decade aggressively denying its use to plaintiffs in copyright infringement cases against studios and networks.
Metcalf v. Bochco, decided in 2002, is one of only two copyright infringement cases against a studio or network in the last 20 years that proceeded to trial. (The other is Shaw v. Lindheim.). 32 In Metcalf, the plaintiff offered evidence that the defendant had misappropriated many elements of the plaintiff's screenplay to create a television series for NBC. The court recognized that “the similarities proffered by [the plaintiff] are not protectable when considered individually; they are either too generic or constitute ‘scenes a faire.'” 33 “The presence of so many generic similarities and the common patterns in which they arise help satisfy the extrinsic test,” however. 34 The court memorably compared the elements of literary works to those of musical compositions:
The 2003 case of Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Company may have played the heaviest hand against the use of the selection-and-arrangement test. 37 The Rice court stated that “similarities derived from the use of common ideas cannot be protected.” This assertion ignored the holdings and rationales of the cases that the court cited, including Metcalf, but the Rice court attempted to distinguish Metcalf by stating that it was “based on a form of inverse ratio rule analysis” (i.e. , the rule whereby more access requires less substantial similarity and vice versa) and seemed to imply that the selection-and- arrangement test is applicable only when access is conceded. 38 This implication, which limits Metcalf to its facts, overlooks that nowhere in Metcalf (or any case prior to it) is the inverse ratio rule required for the application of the selection-and-arrangement test. 39 Nevertheless, Rice‘s misinterpretation of Metcalf has been repeatedly followed by the Ninth Circuit in subsequent opinions.
Moreover, in one flourish of its pen, the Funky Films court created a whole new defense for alleged infringers where none previously existed and that has been heavily relied on in subsequent court opinions. The court stated that a “reading of the two works reveal [ed] greater, more significant differences” than similarities. 41 In essence, the court constructed a new test of “substantial dissimilarity” in the context of copyright infringement, one that completely contravenes the well-established principle that dissimilarity is irrelevant as long as the plaintiff makes a showing of the defendant work's similarity to a substantial element of the plaintiff's work. 42
In Benay, decided in June 2010, the plaintiffs' agent pitched and provided a copy of their screenplay The Last Samurai to the president of production at Warner Bros. 46 The studio declined to proceed further with the screenplay but later produced and released a film with the exact same title and premise as the plaintiffs' work. 47 Despite compelling evidence that actual copying of the plaintiff's screenplay occurred, 48 the court deemed it insufficient to overcome the overall lack of similarities between protected elements of the works.” 49 The Ninth Circuit's extrinsic analysis once again ignored the selection-and-arrangement test, comfortably stripping all unprotected elements from the works and ultimately using the new Funky Films dissimilarity analysis as a basis to rule against the plaintiffs on their copyright claim. 50
Many troubling questions arise from this trend. Why do judges believe that they can perform the extrinsic analysis of literary works better than plaintiffs' experts? 61 An extrinsic analysis is no easy feat. A judge who dismisses an expert witness, believing the subject matter within his or her grasp, effectively acts as a self-appointed expert. This is a disservice to the creators of literary works. It implies that writing a screenplay is a less complex and involved undertaking than writing a song or a software program. Moreover, the judge essentially deprives plaintiffs of their constitutional right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, this is the current state of copyright law for literary works, with no signs of rebalancing anytime soon.
In copyright infringement cases, judges are supposed to play the role of gatekeeper to the jury. Their task in analyzing substantial similarity is supposed to be extrinsic, that is, objective. 62 If a plaintiff can show objective similarity, a jury is brought in to determine whether the total concept and feel—the intrinsic test—of the plaintiff's and defendant's works are substantially similar. In practice, however, the extrinsic test has been devoured by an intrinsic test performed by the judge. Simply put, with judges able to substitute their opinions for those of experts and juries on issues of material fact, all other witnesses to the case become effectively redundant.
One case arguably did not result in a clear-cut victory for the defendant studio. See Miller v. Miramax Film Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25967, at *28 (2001). The case achieved no final judgment on the merits, however. The court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff's copyright infringement claim (much like two other cases discussed infra) before the case disappeared from the docket entirely.
Cabell v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54667 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (summary judgment for defendant) (You Don't Mess with the Zohan).
Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (jury verdict in favor of defendant studio), aff'd, Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed. Appx. 635 (9th Cir. 2006) (City of Angels).
Thomas v. Walt Disney Company, 337 Fed. Appx. 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (defendant's motion to dismiss affirmed) (Finding Nemo).
Zella v. E. W. Scripps Company, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (defendant's motion to dismiss granted) (Rachael Ray).
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (upon remand, judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant studio); Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F. 3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (jury verdict in favor of defendant studio), aff'dMetcalf v.Bochco, 200 Fed. Appx. 635 (9th Cir. 2006).
See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.02 [A] (2007).
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,562 F. 2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Berkic v. Crichton, 761F. 2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1985); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F. 3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157.
Three Boys Music, 212 F. 3d at 482.
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F. 2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.1967).
Bevan v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 329 F. Supp. 601, 609 (D.C.N.Y. 1971).
Bevan, 329 F. Supp. at 610.
See Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F. 3d 46 (2d Cir.2003); Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1355-1356.
See Mestre v. Vivendi Universal U.S. Holding Co., 2005 WL1959295 (D. Or. 2005), aff'd , 273 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2008); Merrill v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 2005 WL 3955653(C.D. Cal. 2005).
Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1358.
Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1359 (analyzing and distinguishing Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F. 2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981)).
See Merrill, 2005 WL 3955653, at *8 (citing only Meta-Film‘s three categories as a requirement for access); Mestre, 2005 WL1959295, at *5 (applying the three categories as limiting but adding the requirement that “at a minimum, the dealings between the plaintiff and the intermediary and between the intermediary and the alleged copier must involve some overlap in subject matter”); Weygand v. CBS Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1120, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (ignoring the three categories altogether, and instead citing general Meta-Film language as a catch-all provision: “courts have found access when . . . an individual in a position to provide suggestions or comments with respect to the defendant's work . . . had the opportunity to view the plaintiff ‘s work”).
The Ninth Circuit has cited Meta-Film but never for this proposition. See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F. 3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1994); E. W. French & Sons v. General Portland, 885 F. 2d1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1989); Lloyd v. Schlag, 884 F. 2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1989); Little Oil Co. v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co., 852 F. 2d 441, 445 (9th Cir. 1988).
Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F. 3d 46 (2d Cir. 2003)
Nick Gladden, “When California Dreamin' Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an Improved Framework,” 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 359, 359-384 (2003).
One unreported case may offer some hope for creators. See Miller v. Miramax Film Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25967, at *28 (2001) (holding that evidence of a screenplay submitted to Universal Pictures, along with evidence that agents were common to the writers of both works, was sufficient to preclude summary judgment on access).
See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 607 F. 3d 620 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P.,462 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2006); Mestre , 2005 WL 1959295, at*5; Zella v. E. W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (C.D. Cal.2007).
4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[D] (2007).
Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F. 3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F. 3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, Metcalf v. Bochco, 200 Fed. Appx. 635 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The particular sequence in which an author strings a significant number of unprotectable elements can itself be a protectable element.”).
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F. 2d 1353, 1362 (1990) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F. 2d 49,56 (2d Cir. 1936)); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F. 2d 898,901 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Dissection of dissimilarities is inappropriate because it distracts a reasonable observer from a comparison of the total concept and feel of the works.”); 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright§ 13.03[B][1][a] (2007).
See Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P. 2d 947 (Cal. 1953) (en banc); Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. N.Y. 1954); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F. 2d 1106 (9th Cir.1970); United States v. Hamilton, 583 F. 2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348(1991); Shaw, 809 F. Supp. 1393; Three Boys Music, 212 F. 3d 477,481 (9th Cir. 2000); Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203F. Supp. 2d 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Metcalf, 294 F. 3d 1069; Satava v. Lowry, 323 F. 3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F. 3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).
Baxter v. MCA, 812 F. 2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987); 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright§ 13.03[B][1][a] (2007).
1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.11 (2007).
Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. 340.
Metcalf, 294 F. 3d at 1074.
Shaw v. Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
Metcalf, 294 F. 3d at 1073.
See Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[C]opyright also protects the expressiveact of arranging completely unprotected works. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F. 3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994).”).
Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F. 3d 1170, 1174-1175 (2003) (“In analyzing the scope of copyright protection afforded to The Mystery Magician, we note at the outset that ideas generally do not receive protection, only the expression of such ideas do.”); Metcalf, 294 F. 3d at 1074 (“It is true that this dichotomy between an idea and its expression is less clear when the idea and expression are ‘merged' or practically indistinguishable. However, we have held that ‘similarities derived from the use of common ideas cannot be protected; otherwise, the first to come up with an idea will corner the market.' Apple , 35 F. 3d at 1443.”).
Rice, 330 F. 3d at 1179. See Mestre v. Vivendi Universal U.S. Holding Co., 273 Fed. Appx. 631, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Moreover, even if ‘[t]he particular sequence in which an author strings a significant number of unprotectable elements can itself be a protectable element' in certain contexts, Mestre has not demonstrated sufficient similarities in sequence to qualify for such protection.”) (citations omitted)).
While the plaintiff's case in Metcalf was “strengthened considerably” by the defendant's concession of access, the Metcalf court never actually invoked the inverse ratio rule, nor did it hold that finding substantial similarity through selection and arrangement was contingent on access being admitted.
Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 462 F. 3d1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Funky Films, 462 F. 3d at 1078.
4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[B] [1][a] (2007).
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F. 2d 1353, 1362 (1990) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F. 2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)).
A “derivative work,” as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101, is “a work based upon one or more pre-existing works . . . including any form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”17 U.S.C. § 106 provides that, subject to other sections of the Copyright Act, a copyright owner “has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 607 F. 3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010).
Benay, 607 F. 3d at 622.
Benay, 607 F. 3d at 622-23.
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't, 2008 U.S. 9th Cir. Briefs 55719 (9th Cir. June 9, 2009) (“Defendants copied plaintiffs' work right down to the historical inaccuracy of cannons being new when in fact cannons date back to the fourteenth century.”).
Benay, 607 F. 3d at 629.
Benay, 607 F. 3d at 625 (“We agree with the district court that‘[w]hile on cursory review, these similarities may appear substantial, a closer examination of the protectable elements including plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events, exposes many more differences than similarities between Plaintiffs' Screenplay and Defendants' film.”‘).
Benay, 607 F. 3d at 629, 633.
See Rokos v. Peck, 182 Cal. App. 3d 604, 617-18 (1986) (holding that an implied-in-fact contract between the plaintiff and the writer was effective only between them).
While copyright law allows for recovery of actual damages and profits resulting from the infringement, a breach of contract allows recovery of damages only for the amount the plaintiff would have received under the contract. See17 U.S.C.A. § 504; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 345; Benay , 607 F. 3d 620.
In Montz v. Pilgrim Films & TV, Inc ., decided less than a week before Benay, the court affirmed the defendants' motion to dismisson the grounds that the plaintiff ‘s implied-in-fact contract claim was “merely derivative” of the plaintiff's rights under 17U.S.C. § 106 and was thus preempted by federal copyright law. Montz v. Pilgrim Films & TV, Inc., 606 F. 3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010). Montz thus stands as another major blow for creators, who saw a chance to protect their works through implied contract claims based on earlier Ninth Circuit cases. See Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 28043 (holding that the implied promise to pay constituted an extra element for preemption purposes that transformed the action from one arising under the ambit of federal copyright law to one sounding in contract).
See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 462 F. 3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F. 2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F. 2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984); Shaw v Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F. 2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F. 2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1980) (“As a general rule, summary judgment is inappropriate where an expert's testimony supports the nonmoving party's case.”).
Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 235 F. 3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Weighing the credibility of conflicting expert witness testimony is the province of the jury.”).
See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F. 3d 1170 (2003) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding the testimony of plaintiff ‘s expert); Bethea v. Burnett, 2005 WL1720631, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (ignoring plaintiff ‘s expert's testimony, finding it unhelpful to the court's own analytic dissection); Shaw v. Lindheim, 809 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (disregarding plaintiff ‘s expert's testimony in overturning jury verdict in favor of plaintiff); Funky Films, 462 F. 3d at 1076 (“[T]he district court conducted an independent analysis of[the works].”); Gable v. NBC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77772, at *59 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Expert testimony is far less critical in a case like this than it is in a case where specialized knowledge is required to dissect the objective components of the copyrighted work.”).
Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying defendants' requests for reconsideration and summary adjudication based on substantial similarities between the two works).
But see Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F. 3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2004)(The district court's dismissal of expert testimony and use of its own substantial similarity analysis to discount similarities between the two works as scenes a faire was erroneous.) (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F. 2d 1465,1472 (9th Cir. 1992)).
See Brown Bag Software , 960 F. 2d at 1473-1474 (relying on expert testimony in order to identify the objective points of comparison among different computer software programs); Swirsky, 376 F. 3d at 847-848 (relying on expert testimony comparing the objective elements—pitch, melodies, baselines, tempo, chords, structure, and harmonic rhythm—of musical works).
In re Apple Sec. Litig., 886 F. 2d 1109, 1442 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Brown Bag Software , 960 F. 2d at 1475; Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F. 2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“[T]he extrinsic test now objectively considers whether there are substantial similarities in both ideas and expression, whereas the intrinsic test continues to measure expression subjectively.”).