Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19881011_0040275.C02.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-02 22:39:38
Document Index: 40103928

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 914', '§ 924']

| United States v. Feliz-Cordero
United States v. Feliz-Cordero
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE,v.JORGE FELIZ-CORDERO AND ALEXANDER FELIZ-ENCARNACION, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Raymond Dearie, Judge). Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Winter and Miner, Circuit Judges,*fn* Hon. Franklin S. Billings, Jr. District Judge.
Hon. Franklin S. Billings, Jr., District Judge :
Defendant-appellant Jorge Feliz-Cordero ("Cordero") and defendant-appellant Alexander Feliz-Encarnacion ("Encarnacion") each appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. After jury trial before Judge Raymond Dearie, District Judge, defendants were each convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982); two counts of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); one count of distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii); and one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 924(c)(1) and 924(c)(2) (1988).
On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence seized as a result of a search warrant which defendants contend was issued absent probable cause. Defendants also contend on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction on the firearm count. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We affirm the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress physical evidence and reverse defendants' respective convictions on the firearm count.
Defendants Cordero and Encarnacion contend that the search warrant was issued without probable cause because the supporting affidavits were based on unreliable and uncorroborated information provided by Pedro Muniz, a government informant. In determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances standard is employed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). In Gates, the Supreme Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed.
Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted). A magistrate's finding of probable cause is to be given substantial deference by a reviewing court. United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983).
Although conceding that Gates requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances, defendants contend that the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test, requiring an examination of the veracity of an informant and the basis of his knowledge, continues to be relevant to an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969). While "an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report," the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis "permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 234.
Defendants Cordero and Encarnacion claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they carried or used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).*fn1
Neither the legislative history of section 924(c)(1) nor case law in this circuit suggest that the term "carry" should be construed as having any meaning beyond its literal meaning. Therefore, a person cannot be said to "carry" a firearm without at least a showing that the gun is within reach during the commission of the drug offense. See United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1988) (fact that defendant in taxi cab had fully loaded automatic pistol under his seat and heroin and cocaine on his person sufficient to convict under section 924(c)(1)). Since the weapon in the present case was not within reach of either defendant, conviction here can be predicated only on the provision of section 924(c)(1) relating to "uses" a firearm.
In 1984, Congress revised section 924(c). Prior to 1984, the statute had provided that it was a crime to carry a firearm "during the commission of any felony . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1982). The 1984 amendment established as the predicate offense "any crime of violence" instead of "any felony" and substituted the phrase "during and in relation to" for the word "during". In 1986, the statute was again amended to add "drug trafficking crime" as a predicate offense.
The legislative history of the 1984 amendment indicates that the "in relation to" language was intended to make explicit that a person could not be prosecuted under section 924(c) for possessing a firearm during the commission of an entirely unrelated crime. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 314 n.10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3490-92 n.10. Thus, section 924(c) requires more than mere possession of a firearm. Rather, there must be some relation or connection between the firearm and the underlying crime. The necessary relation or connection between possession of a firearm and the underlying crime is established "if from the circumstances or otherwise it could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun if a contingency arose or to make his escape." Id. (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing analysis, in order for possession of a firearm to come within the "uses" provision of section 924(c), one of the following is required: i) Proof of a transaction in which the circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm suggest that the possess or of the firearm intended to have it available for possible use during the transaction; or ii) The circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm in a place where drug transactions take place suggest that it was strategically located so as to be quickly and easily available for use during such a transaction.
In arguing that the firearm convictions should be affirmed, the government relies heavily on United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S. Ct. 1130, 51 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1977). Application of the test set out above to the facts of Grant shows that it is clearly distinguishable from the evidence in the present case. In Grant, it was apparent from the circumstances surrounding the presence of the firearms that the drug dealers intended to use the guns. The evidence established that there were many weapons strategically located, within easy access, in a "veritable fortress" in which security of the drug operation was the prime concern. Id. at 1310-13.
Based on the foregoing, the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendants carried or used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Therefore, defendants Cordero's and Encarnacion's respective convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 914 are REVERSED.
The District Court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress physical evidence is AFFIRMED. Defendants' respective convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) are REVERSED.