Source: https://openjurist.org/328/us/152/first-iowa-hydro-electric-cooperative-v-federal-power-commission
Timestamp: 2018-12-11 00:35:21
Document Index: 492096620

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 7767', '§ 14', '§ 9', '§ 821', '§ 821', '§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 27', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 791', '§ 791', '§ 9', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 9', '§ 4', '§ 767', '§ 797', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 791', '§ 791', '§ 817', '§ 817', '§ 7771', '§ 803', '§ 803', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 797', '§ 797', '§ 23', '§ 7767', '§ 10', '§ 23', '§ 4', '§ 10', '§ 803', '§ 803', '§ 7792', '§ 13', '§ 7793', '§ 6', '§ 802', '§ 802', '§ 303', '§ 825', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 9', '§ 791', '§ 797', '§ 792', '§ 23', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 10', '§ 14', '§ 19', '§ 27', '§ 8', '§ 383', '§ 383', '§ 27']

328 U.S. 152 - First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission
328 US 152 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (STATE OF IOWA, Intervener).
In the Federal Power Act there is a separation of those subjects which remain under the jurisdiction of the states from those subjects which the Constitution delegates to the United States and over which Congress vests the Federal Power Commission with authority to act. To the extent of this separation, the Act establishes a dual system of control. The duality of control consists merely of the division of the common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of Government, each with final authority in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two agencies to share in the final decision of the same issue. Where the Federal Government supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final authority. In fact a contrary policy is indicated in §§ 4(e), 10(a)(b) and (c), and 23(b).12 In those sections the Act places the responsibility squarely upon federal officials and usually upon the Federal Power Commission. A dual final authority, with a duplicate system of state permits and federal licenses required for each project, would be unworkable. 'Compliance with the requirements' of such a duplicated system of licensing would be nearly as bad. Conformity to both standards would be impossible in some cases and probably difficult in most of them.13 The solution adopted by Congress, as to what evidence an applicant for a federal license should submit to the Federal Power Commission, appears in § 9 of its Act. It contains not only subsection (b)14 but also subsections (a) and (c).15 Section 9(c) permits the Commission to secure from the applicant 'Such additional information as the commission may require.' This enables it to secure, in so far as it deems it material, such parts or all of the information that the respective states may have prescribed in state statutes as a basis for state action. The entire administrative procedure required as to the present application for a license is described in § 9 and in the Rules of Practice and Regulations of the Commission.16
The State of Iowa, in its petition to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission stated in relation to the proposed diversion of water from the Cedar River to the Mississippi: 'said diversion would be in direct violation of the provisions of section 7771, Code of Iowa 1939.' Also, in the State's motion to intervene in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, it alleged that 'By reason of said provisions of law (§§ 7767 and 7771, Code of Iowa, 1939) and the diversion of water involved in the proposed project of petitioner, the executive council of the state of Iowa could not lawfully grant a permit for the erection of the dam proposed.' Furthermore, the Executive Council, which includes the Governor of the State, on July 5, 1944, adopted a resolution directing the Attorney General of Iowa to intervene in this case before that court and 'thereby take steps to sustain the said order of the Federal Power Commission (dismissing the petitioner's application for a federal license)' because 'it is vital to the interests of the State of Iowa that the said order of the Commission be sustained.' This demonstrates that the State of Iowa not only is opposed to the granting of a State permit but is opposed also to the granting of a federal license for the project. This opposition is based at least in part on the ground that the State statute, as interpreted by the State officials, expresses a policy opposed to the diversion of water from one stream to another in Iowa under such circumstances as the present.
The Act leaves to the states their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, administer the public lands and reservations of the United States and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the treaties of the United States. These sources of constitutional authority are all applied in the Federal Power Act to the development of the navigable waters of the United States.17
The closeness of the relationship of the Federal Government to these projects and its obvious concern in maintaining control over their engineering, economic and financial soundness is emphasized by such provisions as those of § 14 authorizing the Federal Government, at the expiration of a license, to take over the licensed project by payment of 'the net investment of the licensee in the project or projects taken, not to exceed the fair value of the property taken,' plus an allowance for severance damages. The scope of the whole program has been further aided, in 1940, by the definition given to navigable waters of the United States in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243. 'Students of our legal evolution know how this Court interpreted the commerce clause of the Constitution to lift navigable waters of the United States out of local controls and into the domain of federal control. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23, to United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243.' Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303, 64 S.Ct. 950, 956, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 153 A.L.R. 245.
Further light is thrown upon the meaning of the Federal Power Act by the statement, made by Representative William L. LaFollette of Washington, a member of the Special Committee on Water Power, which reported the bill which later became the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. In the debate which led to the insertion in § 9(b) of the reference to state laws as to the bed and banks of streams, he said:
'The property rights are within the State. It can dispose of the beds, or parts of them, regardless of the riparian ownership of the banks, if it desires to, and that has been done in some States. If we put in this language, which is practically taken from that Supreme Court decision (United States v. Cress, 243 U. . 316, 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746), as to the property rights of the States as to the bed and the banks and to the diversion of the water, then it is sure that we have not infringed any of the rights of the States in that respect, or any of their rules of property, and we are trying in this bill above everything else to overcome a divided authority and pass a bill that will make it possible to get development. We are earnestly trying not to infringe the rights of the States. If possible we want a bill that can not be defeated in the Supreme Court because of omissions, because of the lack of some provision that we should have put in the bill to safeguard the States.' 56 Cong.Rec. 9810. (Italics supplied.)
As indicated by Representative LaFollette, Congress was concerned with overcoming the danger of divided authority so as to bring about the needed development of water power and also with the recognition of the constitutional rights of the states so as to sustain the validity of the Act. The resulting integration of the respective jurisdictions of the state and Federal Governments, is illustrated by the careful preservation of the separate interests of the states throughout the Act, without setting up a divided authority over any one subject.19
'Sec. 27. That nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.' 41 Stat. 1077, 16 U.S.C. § 821, 16 U.S.C.A. § 821.
Section 27 thus evidences the recognition by Congress of the need for an express 'saving' clause in the Federal Power Act if the usual rules of supersedure are to be overcome. Sections 27 and 9(b) were both included in the original Federal Water Power Act of 1920 in their present form. The directness and clarity of § 27 as a 'saving' clause and its location near the end of the Act emphasizes the distinction between its purpose and that of § 9(b) which is included in § 9, in the early part of the Act, which deals with the marshalling of information for the consideration of a new federal license. In view of the use by Congress of such an adequate 'saving' clause in § 27, its failure to use similar language in § 9(b) is persuasive that § 9(b) should not be given the same effect as is given to § 27.
The effect of § 27, in protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to laws as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. It therefore has primary, if not exclusive reference to such proprietary rights. The phrase 'any vested right acquired therein' further emphasizes the application of the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words 'other uses.' Those words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes. This was so held in an early decision by a District Court, relating to § 27 and upholding the constitutionality of the Act, where it was stated that 'a proper construction of the act requires that the words 'other uses' shall be construed ejusdem generis with the words 'irrigation' and 'municipal." Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., D.C., 283 F. 606, 619.
This section therefore is thoroughly consistent with the integration rather than the duplication of federal and state jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus 'saved' to the states, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural course.20
Section 9(b)21 does not resemble § 27. It must be read with § 9(a) and (c).22 The entire section is devoted to securing adequate information for the Commission as to pending applications for licenses. Where § 9(a) calls for engineering and financial information, § 9(b) calls for legal information. This makes § 9(b) a natural place in which to describe the evidence which the Commission shall require in order to pass upon applications for federal licenses. This makes it a correspondingly unnatural place to establish by implication such a substantive policy as that contained in § 27 and which, in accordance with the contentions of the State of Iowa, would enable Chapter 363 of the Code of Iowa, 1939, to remain in effect although in conflict with the requirements of the Federal Power Act. There is nothing in the express language of § 9(b) that requires such a conclusion.
It does not itself require compliance with any state laws. Its reference to state laws is by way of suggestion to the ederal Power Commission of subjects as to which the Commission may wish some proof submitted to it of the applicant's progress. The evidence required is described merely as that which shall be 'satisfactory' to the Commission. The need for compliance with applicable state laws, if any, arises not from this federal statute but from the effectiveness of the state statutes themselves.
When this application has been remanded to the Commission, that Commission will not act as a substitute for the local authorities having jurisdiction over such questions as the sufficiency of the legal title of the applicant to its riparian rights, or as to the validity of its local franchises, if any, relating to proposed intrastate public utility service. Section 9(b) says that the Commission may wish to have 'satisfactory evidence' of the progress made by the applicant toward meeting local requirements but it does not say that the Commission is to assume responsibility for the legal sufficiency of the steps taken. The references made in § 9(b) to beds and banks of streams, to proprietary rights to divert or use water, or to legal rights to engage locally in the business of developing, transmitting and distributing power neither add anything to nor detract anything from the force of the local laws, if any, on those subjects. In so far as those laws have not been superseded by the Federal Power Act, they remain as applicable and effective as they were before its passage. The State of Iowa, however, has sought to sustain the applicability and validity of Chapter 363 of the Code of Iowa in this connection, on the ground that the Federal Power Act, by the implications of § 9(b), has recognized this chapter of Iowa law as part of a system of dual control of power project permits, cumbersome and complicated though it be. If it had been the wish of Congress to make the applicant obtain consent of state, as well as federal authorities, to each project, the simple thing would have been to so provide. In the course of the long debate on the legislation it was proposed at one time to provide for some such a consent in § 9(b).
This proviso was not enacted into law but it illustrates the concreteness with which the proposal was before Congress. In 1918, when Representative Mondell, of Wyoming, successfully defended the present language against amendment, he stated the purposes of § 9(b) as follows:
'There are two controlling reasons for the insertion of this paragraph. The first, from the standpoint of water-power legislation, is that the water power commission shall have the benefit of all of the information which the States possess relative to the condition of water supply at the point of proposed diversion. That is a very important reason for a provision of this kind. * * * The second reason is so that the bill shall carry with it notice to the commission that they must proceed in accordance with the State laws, which they must do in any event, whether the provision were in the bill or not.' 56 Cong.Rec. 9813-9814. (Italics supplied.)
The purpose of this section as thus explained is consistent with the contention of the Commission in this case. It provides for presentation of information to the federal commission and protects the constitutional rights of the States. This explanation does not support the contention of the State of Iowa that § 9(b) amounts to the subjection of the federal license to requirements of the state law on the same subject. The inappropriateness of such an interpretation is apparent in the light of the circumstances which culminate in the passage of the Federal Water Power Act in 1920. The purposes of the Act were then so generally known as to have made such a restrictive interpretation impossible and a denial of it unnecessary. It was the outgrowth of a widely supported effort of the conservationists to secure enactment of a complete scheme of national regulation which would promote the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Nation, in so far as it was within the reach of the federal power to do so, instead of the piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach of the River and Harbor Acts and other federal laws previously enacted.
It was a major undertaking involving a major change of national policy.23 That it was the intention of Congress to secure a comprehensive development of national resources and not merely to prevent obstructions to navigation is apparent from the provisions of the Act, the statutory scheme of which has been several times reviewed and approved by the courts.24
The detailed provisions of the Act providing for the federal plan of regulation leave no room or need for conflicting state controls.25 The contention of the State of Iowa is compara le to that which was presented on behalf of 41 States and rejected by this Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404, 405, 426, 427, 61 S.Ct. 291, 298, 308, 85 L.Ed. 243, where this Court said:
It is the Federal Power Commission rather than the Iowa Executive Council that under our constitutional Government must pass upon these issues on behalf of the people of Iowa as well as on behalf of all others.
We are all agreed that Congress has the constitutional power to promote a comprehensive development of the nation's water resources and that it has exercised its authority by the Federal Power Act. 41 Stat. 1063, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., 16 U.S.C.A. § 791a et seq. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063; State of New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 46 S.Ct. 122, 70 L.Ed. 289; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243. And in view of Congress' power, of course this enactment overrides all State legislation in conflict with it. But the national policy for water power development formulate by the Federal Power Act explicitly recognizes regard for certain interests of the States as part of that national policy. This does not imply that general, uncritical notions about so-called 'States' rights' are to be read into what Congress has written. It does mean that we must adhere to the express Congressional mandate that the public interest which underlies the Federal Power Act involves the protection of particular matters of intimate concern to the people of the States in which proposed projects requiring the sanction of the Federal Power Commission are to be located. By § 9(b) of the Act, 41 Stat. 1063, 1068, 16 U.S.C. § 802(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 802(b)1 Congress explicitly required that before the Commission can issue a license for the construction of a hydroelectric development, such as the proposed project of the petitioner, the Commission must have 'satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State' in reference to the matters enumerated.
To safeguard the interests of the States thus protected by § 9(b), Congress has directed that notice be given to the State when an application has been filed for a license, the granting of which may especially affect a State. § 4(f), 49 Stat. 838, 841, 16 U.S.C. § 767(f), 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(f). If a State does not challenge the claim of an applicant, the evidence submitted by the applicant, if found to be satisfactory by the Commission, has met the demands of § 9(b), and a State cannot thereafter challenge the Commission's determination. But a real problem in administration is presented to the Power Commission when a State does intervene and claims that the applicant has not complied with its lawful requirements. For, before the Commission can meet the duty placed on it by § 9(b), it must ascertain the scope and meaning of the State law. Suppose the State law is not clear or is susceptible of different constructions and has received no construction by the only authoritative source for the interpretation of State laws, namely, the highest court of the State. Must the Federal Power Commission give an independent interpretation of the laws of the State? This is not to suggest an unreal or hypothetical situation. The Federal Power Commission submitted here a compilation of laws relating to State requirements relevant under § 9(b) for not less than thirty States. Are the lawyers of the Commission to make themselves the originating interpreters of the laws of these States? Are they to construe, for instance, the laws of New Jersey and Oklahoma and Arizona and Illinois when the courts of those States have not spoken? And if they do and the State appeals from the decision, must the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia become the interpreter of these various laws? Finally, in the event of a further appellate review is this Court to construe State legislation without guidance by the Stat courts? Time out of mind, and in a variety of situations, this Court has admonished against the avoidable assumption by this Court of the independent construction of State legislation. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 207-209, 49 S.Ct. 282, 288, 289, 73 L.Ed. 652; Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Railroad Comm. v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U.S. 145, 158, 164—166, 50 S.Ct. 71, 74, 76, 77, 74 L.Ed. 234. It is pertinent to recall the classic statement of the reason for leaving to the controlling interpretation of local courts the meaning of local law' 'to one brought up within it, varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar never could have gotten from the books.' Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106, 43 S.Ct. 286, 288, 67 L.Ed. 550. If it has been deemed unwise to throw upon this Court the burden of construing local legislation when the construction could by appropriate procedure be had from the States, it seems odd that we should reject this as a rule of administration adopted by the Power Commission.
That is all that the Commission has done in this case. It has said, in effect: 'We do not know what the Iowa law demands of the applicant. Iowa has a right to make certain demands under § 9(b) and until they are met we are not empowered to grant a license to the applicant. But we cannot tell whether they have been met, because the meaning of the Iowa statutes has not been determined as it easily can be determined, by an appropriate action in the Iowa courts. Only after such an authoritative pronouncement can we know what our obligation under the statute may be.' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia thought that such procedure made sense. It seems to have said: 'The Commission doesn't know what the Iowa law requires, and neither do we. For we cannot tell what it requires until the Iowa Supreme Court tells us what it requires. And an adjudication of thatissue can be readily secured if the applicant will proceed along the easy path provided by Iowa for obtaining such an adjudication.' 151 F.2d 20. Even we cannot construe the requirements of Iowa law in the absence of a determination by the Iowa Supreme Court. And in much more conventional types of litigation we have evolved the procedure whereby federal litigation is stayed until the State law is authoritatively determined by a State court. E.g., Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152; A.F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761.
What reason of policy is there for not approving this mode of adjusting interests that involve a regard for both federal and State enactments? The Federal Power Commission which devised this procedure has not been an unzealous guardian of the national interests. E.g., F.P.C. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 62 S.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037; F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333.
It is no answer to suggest that the Attorney-General of Iowa at the bar of this Court expressed a view of the Iowa statute which would make obedience to it needless because of conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act. The Attorney-General is not the judicial organ of the State of Iowa. This Court does not always take the interpretation by the Attorney-General of the United States of a federal statute. It should not take the view of the Attorney-General of Iowa as authoritative on a statute not construed by the Supreme Court of Iowa when we are called upon to make the adjustment in federal-State relations which Congress has enjoined in § 9(b). After all, advocates, including advocates for States, are like managers of pugilistic and election contestants, in that they have a propensity for claiming everything. Before conflict can be found between federal and Sta e legislation, construction must be given the State legislation. Avoidance of conflict is itself an important factor relevant to construction. And so, construction of State legislation relating to the matters dealt with in the Federal Power Act is subtle business and a subtlety peculiarly within the duty, skill, and understanding of State judges.
If it be said that the procedure for which the Federal Power Commission contends may take time, there is no assurance that a contested case like this will not take just as much time hereafter. The Commission must pass independently on an unconstrued State statute; its construction may then come before the Court of Appeals for the District and eventually before this Court. Even then the possibility remains that this Court's decision will be followed by one in the State court ruling, as has not been unknown, that this Court's interpretation was in error. In any event, mere speed is not test of justice. Deliberate speed is. Deliberate speed takes time. But it is time well spent.
'Unless Section 9(b) is to be given no effect whatever, some evidence of compliance with at least some state laws is a prerequisite to the issuance of a federal license, and the view of the court below, that there is no occasion, in this case, to anticipate conflicts between state and federal authority and the consequent invalidity of the state law, is not an unreasonable one. 'To predetermine, even in the limited field of water power, the rights of different sovereignties, pregnant with future controversies, is beyond the judicial function,' United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 (61 S.Ct. 291, 306, 85 L.Ed. 243). Here petitioner, since the modification of its plans, has given the State Executive Council and the Iowa courts no opportunity to express their views on its proposed project with reference to matters which may be peculiarly of local concern; without such an expression, it is difficult to assess the propriety of what is only an anticipated exercise of the State's power.'
Accordingly, I think that the judgment should be affirmed.
41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a 825r, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a—825r.
'Sec. 23. * * * (b) It shall be unlawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose of developing electric power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the navigable waters of the United States, or upon any part of the public lands * * * of the United States * * * except under and in accordance with the terms of * * * a license granted pursuant to this Act. Any person, association, corporation, State, or municipality intending to construct a dam or other project works across, along, over, or in any stream or part thereof, other than those defined herein as navigable waters, and over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States shall before such construction file declaration of such intention with the Commission, whereupon the Commission shall cause immediate investigation of such proposed construction to be made, and if upon investigation it shall find that the interests of interstate or foreign commerce would be affected by such proposed construction, such person, association, corporation, State, or municipality shall not construct, maintain, or operate such dam or other project works until it shall have applied for and shall have received a license under the provisions of this Act. If the Commission shall not so find, and if no public lands * * * are affected, permission is hereby granted to construct such dam or other project works in such stream upon compliance with State laws.' 49 Stat. 846, 16 U.S.C. § 817, 16 U.S.C.A. § 817.
On February 7, 1940, the Commission had sent notice to the Governor of Iowa of the filing of the original declaration of intention and invited him to present information and comments relative thereto. The State, however, took no part in the proceedings. The record also indicates that twice in the three years be ore the present proceeding, the Executive Council of the State of Iowa rejected applications of the petitioner requesting state permits to construct a dam near Moscow comparable to that proposed in all of these proceedings, but not including a diversion of water from the Cedar to the Mississippi River. The last application of the petitioner to the Council for such a permit was filed August 12, 1940, and rejected June 25, 1941. No application has been made by the petitioner to the Executive Council for a state permit for construction of the project including the canal diverting most of the flow of the Cedar River to the Mississippi and providing for a plant and tailrace on the bank of the Mississippi. In its petition to intervene in the present proceeding for a federal license, the State alleged that such a diversion would violate § 7771 (in Chapter 363) of the Code of Iowa, 1939. That allegation touches the principal question in this case.
'(a) That the project adopted, including the maps, plans, and specifications, shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes; and if necessary in order to secure such plan the Commission shall have authority to require the modification of any project and of the plans and specifications of the project works before approval.' 49 Stat. 842, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 803(a).
'Sec. 9. That each applicant for a license hereunder shall submit to the commission—
'(b) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a license under this Act.' 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U.S.C. § 802(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 802(b).
'Sec. 4. The commission is hereby authorized and empowered—
'(e) To issue licenses * * * to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any State thereof, * * * for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or upon any part of the public lands * * * of the United States * * *: Provided, further, That no license affecting navigable capacity of any navigable waters of the United States shall be issued until the plans of the dam or other structures affecting navigation have been approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War. Whenever the contemplated improvement is, in the judgment of the commission, desirable and justified in the public interest for the purpose of improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, a finding to that effect shall be made by the commission and shall become a part of the records of the Commission: * * *.' 49 Stat. 840, 16 U.S.C. § 797(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e). See also, § 23(b), note 2, supra.
Sections 7771, 7776, 7792 and 7796 of Chapter 363 have a less direct relation to the issue but would be superseded by the Federal Power Act if § 7767 is superseded by it.
See § 10(a), note 5, supra; § 23(b), note 2, supra; and § 4(e), note 7, supra.
See § 10(a), note 5, supra; and also:
'Sec. 10. All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the following conditions: * * *
'(b) That except when emergency shall require for the protection of navigation, life, health, or property, no substantial alteration or addition not in conformity with the approved plans shall be made to any dam or other project works constructed hereunder * * * without the prior approval of the Commission; and any emergency alteration or addition so made shall thereafter be subject to such modification and change as the Commission may direct.
'(c) That the licensee shall maintain the project works in a condition of repair adequate for the purpose of navigation and for the efficient operation of said works in the development and transmission of power, shall make all necessary renewals and replacements, shall establish and maintain adequate depreciation reserves for such purposes, shall so maintain and operate said works as not to impair navigation, and shall conform to such rules and regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe for the protection of life, health, and property. * * *' 49 Stat. 842, 16 U.S.C. § 803(b) and (c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 803(b, c). (Italics supplied.)
Report from the Chief of Engineers on the Iowa River and its tributaries made in 1929 covering navigation, flood control, power development and irrigation. H.R. Doc. No. 134, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 86, 87, 90.
See notes 7, 5, 10 and 2, supra.
In addition to those given in the text, another example of conflict between the project requirements of the Iowa statutes and those of the Federal Power Act appears in § 7792 of the Iowa Code. That section requires the beginning of construction of the project dam or raceway within one year and the completion of the plant within three years after the granting of the permit. This conflicts with § 13 of the Federal P wer Act which makes this largely discretionary with the Federal Power Commission but generally contemplates that the construction be commenced within two years from the date of the license. So in § 7793 of the Iowa Code, the life of a permit conflicts with the term of a license under § 6 of the Federal Power Act.
'(c) Such additional information as the commission may require.' 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U.S.C. § 802(a) and (c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 802(a, c).
These rules and regulations are issued pursuant to §§ 303, 308 and 309, 49 Stat. 855, 859, 16 U.S.C. §§ 825b, 825g and 825h, interpreting §§ 4 and 9 of the Federal Power Act. Federal Power Commission Rules of Practices and Regulations, 1938, §§ 4.40—4.51, 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.40—4.51. They cover the field so fully as to leave no purpose to be served by filing comparable information required in some alternative form under state laws as a basis for a state permit. Exhibits D and E, required by § 4.41 of the regulations, are to satisfy § 9(b) of the Federal Power Act and have to do especially with property rights in the use of water under the state laws and do not alter the legal situation presented by the Act itself. These exhibits are described as follows:
'Exhibit D.—Evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and in any other business, necessary to effect the purposes of the license applied for, including a certificate of convenience and necessity, if required. This evidence shall be accompanied by a statement of the steps that have been taken and the steps that remain to be taken to acquire franchise or other rights from States, counties, and municipalities before the project can be completed and put into operation.
'Exhibit E.—The nature, extent, and ownership of water rights which the applicant proposes to use in the development of the project covered by application, together with satisfactory evidence that the applicant has proceeded as far as practicable in perfecting its rights to use sufficient water for proper operation of the project works. A certificate from the proper State agency setting forth the extent and validity of the applicant's water rights shall be appended if practicable. In case the approval or permission of one or more State agencies is required by State law as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to take or use water for the operation of the project works, duly certified evidence of such approval or permission, or a showing of cause why such evidence cannot be reasonably submitted shall also be filed. When a State certificate is involved, one certified copy and three uncertified copies shall be submitted.' Federal Power Commission Rules of Practice and Regulations, effective June 1, 1938, pp. 21, 22.
The Federal Government took its greatest step toward exercising its jurisdiction in this field by authorizing federal licenses, under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 1063, 16 U.S.C.A. § 791 et seq.), for terms of 50 years for the development of water power in the navigable waters of the United States. That Act was limited in 1921 by the exclusion from it of water power projects in national parks or national monuments. 41 Stat. 1353, 16 U.S.C.A. § 797. The Commission was reorganized so as to improve its administrative capacity in 1930. 46 Stat. 797, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 792, 793, 797. The Act was generally revised and perfected on August 26, 1935, 49 Stat. 803, when it received the name of the Federal Power Act. It was then made Part I of Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935.
This last step was shortly after the decision of this Court in United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 55 S.Ct. 789, 79 L.Ed. 1546, and it has served to clarify the law as it existed prior to that decision. Among other things this last step amende § 23 so as expressly to require a federal license for every water power project in the navigable waters of the United States. It also made mandatory, instead of discretionary, the filing with the Federal Power Commission of a declaration of intention by anyone intending to construct a project in non-navigable waters over which Congress had jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce. It continued its recital of permission to construct such projects upon compliance with the state laws, rather than with the Federal Power Act, provided the projects were not in navigable waters of the United States, did not affect the interests of interstate or foreign commerce and did not affect the public lands or reservations of the United States. These amendments sharpened the line between the state and federal jurisdictions and helped to make it clear that the Federal Government was assuming responsibility through the Federal Power Commission for the granting of appropriate licenses for the development of water power resources in the navigable waters of the United States. See also the rapid development of federal projects shown in the Annual Reports of the Federal Power Commission 1921—1945.
H.R. Doc. No. 134, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., reflecting the recommendations of the District Engineer, pp. 8-90; Division Engineer, p. 90; Mississippi River Commission, pp. 90-93; Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, pp. 3-8; and the Chief of Engineers, pp. 1-3. See especially pp. 86, 87, 90.
Instances of such provisions are the following: § 4(a) and (c), cooperation of the Commission with the executive departments and other agencies of the State and National Governments is required in the investigation of such subjects as the utilization of water resources, water-power industry, location, capacity, development costs and the relation to markets of power sites, and the fair value of power. § 4(f), notice of application for a preliminary permit is to go to any State or municipality likely to be interested. § 7(a), in issuing permits and licenses preference is to be given to States and municipalities. § 10(e), licenses to States and municipalities under certain circumstances shall be issued and enjoyed without charge. § 14, a right is reserved not only to the United States but to any State or municipality to take over any licensed project at any time by condemnation and payment of just compensation. §§ 19 and 20, regulation of service and rates is preserved to the states.
The legislative history of § 27 confirms these conclusions. The language is similar to that of § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C. § 383, 43 U.S.C.A. § 383, which provides, 'nothing (in several listed sections) in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, * * *.'
The clause reappeared in the Bill which became the Federal Water Power Act and was there enacted into the law in its present form. The use, in § 27 of the Federal Power Act, of language having a limited meaning in relation to proprietary rights under the reclamation law and in public land bills, carries that established meaning of the language into the Federal Power Act in the absence of anything in the Act calling for a different interpretation of the language.
The nation-wide drive for the passage of this legislation dates back at least to the administration of Theodore Roosevelt and to the enthusiastic support of 'the conservationists' led by Gifford Pinchot, as Chief of the Division of Forestry.
'For the first time, the Act of 1920 established a national policy in the use and development of water power on public lands and navigable streams. * * *.' Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation (1945), 14 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 9, 19. See also, Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation, c. VI.
The present Act was distinctly an effort to provide federal control over and give federal encouragement to water power development. It grew out of a bill prepared by the Secretaries of War, Interior and Agriculture. It was recommended by a Special Committee on Water Power created in the House of Representatives at the suggestion of President Wilson. See Statement by Representative Sims, Chairman of the Committee on Water Power, 56 Cong.Rec. 9797-9798. The bill was to provide 'a method by which the water powers of the country, wherever located, can be developed by public or private agencies under conditions which will give the necessary security to the capital invested and at the same time protect and preserve every legitimate public interest. * * * The problems are national, rather than local; they transcend state lines and cannot be handled adequately except by or in conjunction with national agencies.' Statement by David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5.
State of New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 46 S.Ct. 122, 70 L.Ed. 289; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243; Clarion River Power Co. v. Smith, 61 App.D.C. 186, 59 F.2d 861, certiorari denied 287 U.S. 639, 53 S.Ct. 88, 77 L.D. 553; Alabama Power Co. v. McNinch, 68 App.D.C. 132, 94 F.2d 601; Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 74 App.D.C. 351, 123 F.2d 155, certiorari denied 315 U.S. 806, 62 S.Ct. 640, 86 L.Ed. 1205; Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 128 F.2d 280, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 652, 63 S.Ct. 48, 87 L.Ed. 525; Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 137 F.2d 701; Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 7 Cir., 147 F.2d 743, certiorari denied 325 U.S. 880, 65 S.Ct. 1574; Georgia Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 908.
'Sec. 9. That each applicant for a license hereunder shall submit to the commission * * *
'(b) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting, and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a license under this Act.'