Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/368/487/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-09-27 00:18:23
Document Index: 682832908

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

Machibroda v. United States :: 368 U.S. 487 (1962) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Machibroda v. United States
Machibroda v. United States 368 U.S. 487 (1962)
U.S. Supreme CourtMachibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)Machibroda v. United StatesNo. 69Argued December 5, 1961Decided February 19, 1962368 U.S. 487CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
280 F.2d 379, judgment vacated and cause remanded. Page 368 U. S. 488
In 1959, the petitioner instituted the present litigation by filing in the sentencing court a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate and set aside the sentence he was serving. The motion alleged three grounds upon which it was claimed relief should be granted: that the petitioner's pleas of guilty had not been voluntary, but had been induced by promises made by the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution; that, in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Page 368 U. S. 489 court had accepted the guilty pleas without first determining that they had been made voluntarily; and that, in violation of Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court had not inquired if the defendant wished to speak in his own behalf before sentence was imposed. The motion was denied by the District Court without a hearing, 184 F.Supp. 881. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, 280 F.2d 379. We granted certiorari to consider seemingly significant questions as to the scope of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 365 U.S. 842.
In support of his claim that his pleas of guilty had been involuntarily made, the petitioner's motion and supporting affidavit set out detailed factual allegations. Specifically, the motion and affidavit alleged that, on three separate occasions, identified as to time and place, an Assistant United States Attorney had promised the petitioner that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both informations. These promises were said to have been made upon the authority of the United States Attorney, and to be agreeable to the District Judge. It was alleged that the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his own lawyer about the conversations. It was further alleged that when the petitioner threatened to advise his lawyer and the court of what had transpired, the Assistant Page 368 U. S. 490 United States Attorney had told him that if he "insisted in making a scene," certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner's difficulties. Finally, the motion and affidavit alleged that the petitioner had written two letters to the sentencing court and two letters to the Attorney General of the United States "relative to the misrepresentations" by the Assistant United States Attorney, to which he had received no reply. [Footnote 1] Page 368 U. S. 491
The Government filed a memorandum in opposition to the petitioner's motion, attaching an affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney. The affidavit emphatically denied any promises or coercion with respect to the petitioner's pleas of guilty, but did admit that the Assistant United States Attorney had had a conversation with the petitioner in the county jail the day before Breaton's trial, at which time the petitioner was told Page 368 U. S. 492 he was about to be given his last opportunity to tell the truth, and that the court, in sentencing, might well take into consideration the petitioner's refusal to talk.
Without a hearing, the District Judge determined that the petitioner's allegations as to an agreement with the Assistant United States Attorney were false. The court noted that it had never received either of the two letters Page 368 U. S. 493 referred to by the petitioner, but had received a letter purportedly from him six months after sentencing, which did not mention any agreement, but simply requested that the sentences be made concurrent, rather than consecutive. The court further noted that the petitioner had not complained when no request for a reduction of sentence was made by the United States Attorney within sixty days after sentencing, and that, instead, the petitioner had waited almost two and a half years to file the present motion.
The District Court recognized that the "charges of an agreement between a former Assistant United States Attorney and the defendant are serious," and stated that, Page 368 U. S. 494 if "this Court had any doubt as to their falsity, it would require a hearing." The court determined, however, that the combination of factual inferences already mentioned "conclusively indicates the falsity of the defendant's allegations." 184 F.Supp. at 883.
We think the District Court did not proceed in conformity with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, when it made findings on controverted issues of fact without notice to the petitioner and without a hearing. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 342 U. S. 220. The statute requires a District Court to "grant a prompt hearing" when such a motion is filed, and to "determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto" unless "the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." [Footnote 3] This was not a case where the issues raised by the motion were conclusively determined either by the motion itself or by the "files and records" in the trial court. The factual allegations contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit filed with the Government's response, related primarily to purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real Page 368 U. S. 495 light. Nor were the circumstances alleged of a kind that the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or recollection.
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allegations may be. The language of the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion to exercise their common sense. Indeed, the statute itself recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner. [Footnote 4] Whether the petition in the present case can Page 368 U. S. 496 appropriately be disposed of without the presence of the petitioner at the hearing is a question to be resolved in the further proceedings in the District Court.
The Court awards petitioner, a bank robber serving sentences in Alcatraz, a hearing on a § 2255 petition which it admits is "not far from the line" marking those applications the trial judge may ordinarily deny. If this be true, the doubt should be resolved in support of the decision below, not in the destruction of it. The experienced trial judge, who had been with this case from the very beginning, found the files and records conclusively show to be false petitioner's contention that his pleas of guilty were induced by promises of leniency. Accordingly, petitioner's application under § 2255 was dismissed without a hearing in exact compliance with that section. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This Court now rejects the inferences drawn from the files and records by the courts below and substitutes its own finding Page 368 U. S. 497 that these materials do not conclusively belie petitioner's story, and that it is necessary to go outside the files and records to discover the truth of the matter. With this conclusion I cannot agree. [Footnote 2/1] It represents not only a failure to give due deference to the inferences drawn by the two lower courts, but an unwarranted restriction of the summary disposition provision of § 2255. The opinion is an invitation to prisoners, always seeking a sojourn from their keepers, to swear to "Munchausen" tales when self-interest readily leads to self-deception in § 2255 applications . Once the opinion goes the rounds of our prisons, we will likely be plagued with a rash of such spurious applications. [Footnote 2/2]
The record shows that petitioner, who had previously been convicted of armed robbery, participated in four bank robberies in Ohio, which at the point of a sawed-off shotgun netted over $169,000. After the last of these robberies, the Waterville State Savings Bank, he escaped to Canada. He was arrested there and, upon waiver of extradition, was returned to Ohio. An information was filed charging petitioner and one Breaton with the robbery of the Waterville Bank. Both signed in open court waivers of indictment on the charges. A week later, another information was filed against the petitioner alone charging him with the robbery of the First National Bank of Forest. Petitioner, who was accompanied by counsel throughout, again filed a waiver of indictment, and, at this time, he pleaded guilty to both informations. The trial judge called for a presentence report, and petitioner was returned to jail. Page 368 U. S. 498
An examination of the files and records in this case reveals that petitioner clearly outspoke himself. If a deal had been made, it borders on the incredible that petitioner would sit quietly in prison for over two and one-half Page 368 U. S. 499 years after the prosecutor had reneged on his promise. [Footnote 2/3] To my mind, it is preposterous to think that the prosecutor would make the trade alleged when, before any promises were allegedly made, not only had petitioner waived indictment on the Waterville robbery, which was the more serious of the two charges, but his attorney in his presence had mentioned to the judge in open court the "possibility of another information being filed," and had indicated a clear intention to waive indictment on "both informations" and to plead guilty to at least one. Moreover, experienced criminals such as petitioner know that judges, not prosecutors, control sentences. Petitioner says the Assistant had the "implied" consent of the judge. Certainly this would have not been sufficient for one so experienced as petitioner. The pledge he alleges the Assistant exacted as to silence with reference to his attorney did not include the judge. Despite this, and even though he appeared before the judge on three occasions subsequent to the alleged "deal," he never mentioned the same, nor asked for any conference with the judge in camera. Finally, it is inconceivable that credence could be given to a story of an agreement of leniency told by a hardened criminal who, before the alleged agreement was performed, had testified against the Government and favorable to a codefendant. Prosecutors make deals, if at all, for testimony to support their prosecutions, not to destroy them.
In addition to being unbelievable in light of the files and records, petitioner's claim is inconsistent therewith. To explain his tardiness in seeking formal relief, petitioner alleges several previous informal attempts by letter to prod the Government into fulfilling its obligations. Yet Page 368 U. S. 500 the protest letters supposedly sent to the trial judge were not received by him, and were not in the files where, under departmental routine, they would have been deposited had they been received. But petitioner's file is not barren of letters, for it contains one written by petitioner to the trial judge several months after the Assistant United States Attorney had failed to perform the purported bargain. This letter, however, did not even remotely suggest an agreement, but merely sought a reduction of sentence based upon repentance. Then, of course, there is petitioner's own admission at the time his guilty pleas were entered that such action was voluntarily taken.
If such independent proof is available, which Page 368 U. S. 501 I doubt, [Footnote 2/5] then these avenues should be explored before permitting the petitioner to make a trip into town. [Footnote 2/6] Why not ask for a response in this regard, as we often do, before ordering a hearing, with the attendant expense and hazards. The Court implies that a full hearing may not be required in a given case if the allegations are sufficiently "vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible." Although I would not require any hearing under the circumstances of this case, I submit that if, upon remand, it develops that no letters were mailed and that the Assistant United States Attorney did not visit the jail as claimed, then even the rationale of the Court's opinion would not require that petitioner be summoned to tell his story in court. [Footnote 2/7]