Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19800305-828978
Timestamp: 2016-10-24 00:18:31+00:00
Document Index: 136243310

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 321", "l'article 143", "l'article 36", "l'article 345", "l'article 36", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 27"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Radiation partielle du rôle ; Frais et dépens - demande rejetée (deuxième requérant)Numérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8289/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1980-03-05;8289.78 Parties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION/REl1UETE NÂ°8289/7 8 X .v/AUSTRI A X . c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 5 March 1980 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 5 mars 1980 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6 of the Convention : In the area of criminal law, the safeguards of Artic% 6apply in principle to appeal proceedings which only concern sentence . Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention : Equality of arms. In the course of criminal appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court, written communications between the Judge Rapporteur and the Attorney-General allegedly kept secret from the defence. Complaint declared admissible . Article 6, paragraph I and 3 ( c) of the Convention : Convicted prisoner not authorised to attend in person the trial before the appeal jurisdicttbn . Question as to whether his presence was necessary for the Court to arrive at its opinion. Complaint declared admissible . Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Convention : The principle of presumption of innocence does not apply to appeal proceedings that only concern sentence and not guilt. Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction wfth Article 6, paragraph 1 and 3 Icl of the Convention : Rules of Procedure according to which convicted persons at liberty are entit/ed to appear in person before the appeal court, while convicted persons in detention can only appear by permission of the Court . Complaint declared admissible 6 de la Convention : En matiÃ©re .Article pÃ©nale, les garanties de l'article 6 s'appliquent en principe Ã une procÃ©dure d'appel ne portant que sur la mesure de la peine . Article 6, paregraph 1, de la Convention : EgalitÃ© des armes. Lors d'une procÃ©dure de recours en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale devant la Cour SuprÃªme, communications Ã©crites entre le juge rapporteur et le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ©tendOment dissimulÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense. Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . - 160 -
Artic% 6, paragraphes 1 et 3, titt . c, de la Convention : CondamnÃ© dÃ©tenu non autorisÃ© Ã© comparaitre en personne 8/'audience de la juridiction d'appel. Question de savoir si sa prÃ©sence Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire pour contribuer 2/a formation de l'opinion de la cour. Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable . Artic% 6, peragraphe 2, de la Convention : Le principe de la prÃ©somption d'innocence ne s'applique pas dans une procÃ©dure d'appel porrant non sur la culpabilitÃ© mais seulement sur la mesure de la peine. Article 14 de la Convention, combinÃ© avec l'article 6, paragrephes 1 et 3, litt. c, de la Convention : RÃ©gle de procÃ©dure selon laquelle les condamnÃ©s dÃ©tenus ne peuvent comparaÃ®tre que sur dÃ©cision de la cour . Grief recevable .
I/ran(;ais : voir p . 1641
The facts of the case as they appear from the submissions of the applicant's lawyer, Dr Michael Graff, a barrister practising in Vienna, may be summarised as follows 1 . The applicant is an Austrian citizen born on . . . January 1957 who is at present serving a long-term prison sentence at the penitentiary of Garsten . On . . . August 1977, he was convicted by the Regional Court of Vienn a sitting as a jury court, of the crime of aggravated robbery Is . 142 (1), 143 of Ihe Penal Code) . He was found guilty of having committed this crime, together with another person, on . . . January 1977, by assaulting two men one of whom was killed and the other seriously injured, and depriving them of their money . The court pronounced a sentence of ten years imprisonment, i .e . the minimum penalty provided for by the law in the case of aggravated robbery resulting in the death of a person Is . 143 of the Penal Code, last phrase) . 2 The applicant filed a plea of nullity and appealed from the sentence, this later appeal being based on grounds of extraordinary mitigation Is 41 . para . 2 of the Penal Code) which allow to reduce a sentence below the minimum penalty . The Public Prosecutor likewise appealed from the sentence which in his opinion did not adequately reflect the guilt of the applicant . 3 . On . . . December 1977, the Supreme Court fixed a public hearing for . . . January 1978 . At the same time it summoned the applicant's lawyer and informed the applicant that he could only appear through his lawyer insofar as his plea of nullity was concerned . As regards the appeal from the sentence, the applicant was informed that it was not envisaged to bring him before the court to attend the hearing Is . 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) .
4 . The file had in the meantime been examined by the member of the Supreme Court who had been appointed Rapporteur . On . . . November 1977, the Judge Rapporteur transmitted the file to the Attorney-General with a request for his comments . This request was accompanied by the following confidential statement :
"p .d . 1= pro domo) : The supplementary questions have not been included in the judgment . This violation of s . 342 CCP-which has not been complained of-does not, however, give rise to nullity (EvBl . 1966/466 , 1973/100, most recently 10 Os 67/76 etc .) . The receipt of a payment by X . of AS 2000 .-- to the SOS-Kinderdorf is attached to the transcript of deliberations" . 5 . In reply to this request, the Attorney-General submitted a so-called Croquis, an unsigned copy of which could be obtained by the applicant's lawyer from the Registry of the Suprme Court, under a practice established pursuant to earlier applications brought against Austria with the European Commission of Human Rights The copy of the croquis which was made available to the applicant's lawyer contained the Attorney-General's consent to the holding of a public hearing, and legal submissions concerning the plea of nullity . The original of the croquis, however, which was not made available to the applicant's lawyer, contained additional comments in reply to the above pro domo statement of the Judge Rapporteur (which itself was not disclosed either to the applicant or his lawyer) . The confidential comments were worded as follows : "pro domo :
1 . The information on the law IRechtsbelehrungl was in accordance with the rule contained in the last phrase of s . 321 121 CCP as it contained a reference to the limitation of the maximum penalty of s . 143 PC brought about by virtue of s . 36 PC'1 . There is, however, an error concerning the facts in that it was wrongly stated that both applicants had not completed their 20th year of age at the time of the commission of the crime 1 . . . .1 .19771 . (arg . "as both . . ."1 . In the case of Y (the co-accused of the present applicant) who is born on .2 .1956 this condition was already met on . . . .2 .1976 . In the opinion of the Attorney-General, this information on the law is not, however, in itself sufficient to deny the nullity of the judgment under s . 345 para . 1 No 13 CCP, and to assume that the jury cour t
' This section of the Penal Code provides Ihat a life sentence may not be imposed in the case of a person who has not vet attained the age of 20 at the date of committing the Crime .
-although omitting an express reference to s . 36 PC in the judgmenthas in fact taken into account the penalty provided for by the law as modified by this provision . This is contradicted i .a . by the fact that this part of the information on the law has been struck out in the same way as the information concerning the supplementary questions . 2 . The supplementary questions originally included in the questions put to the jury and the related part of the information on the law may have been struck out before the list of questions was handed to the jury, on the basis of the confessions made by both accused on the second day of the trial (p . 485, Vol I of the file) . Their omission from the judgment would then have been justified . " The applicant submits that it was not possible for his lawyer to obtain a photocopy of the original of the croquis, containg the above confidential statement . He therefore requests the Commission to invite the respondent Government to submit this document . 6. Al the public hearing before the Supreme Court, on . . . January 1979, the applicant's lawyer, referring to the Convention of Human Rights, objected to the exclusion of the applicant from the hearing . Nevertheless the hearing was continued in the absence of the applicant, and the Supreme Court dealt both with the plea of nullity and with the appeal from the sentence . It was only after the deliberations of the Court that the President of the Chamber informed the applicant's lawyer of the court's decision to reject the above objection which had to be construed as an application to bring the applicant before the court . The reason given was that no grounds had been produced which would have necessitated the applicant's appearance . In its judgment of the same day which was served upon the applicant on . . . March 1978 the Supreme Court rejected both the applicant's plea of nullity and his appeal from the sentence, while upholding the Public Prosecutor's appeal . As a consequence, the original 10 years sentence was increased to 12'h year s Complaints 1 . The applicant complains, first, that he was not allowed to be present and plead at the hearing of the Supreme Court on his appeal from the sentence .
a . Section 296, paragraph 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' provides that a person who is not in prison has a legal right to be sommoned ' The lezt of thi s provision reads as follows :"In all other cases, the Supreme coun shall take a decision on the appeal either at the public court sitting called upon to deal with the plea of nullity or, where the plea of nullity has already been decided upon at the non-public sitting, at a public court sitling devoted to Ihe appeal The fixing of the date end organisation of the sitting shall b e
subiect to the provisions ol paragraphs 286 and 2 87, it bei ng underslood that an accused who is not under ar/est must ahveys be summoned !o aDpeat and that an accused under a/TSt may a/sO be /eouire0 (o appear -163 -
to a public hearing of the Supreme Court on his appeal from sentence . If he is present, he has a right to state the reasons of his appeal, and to make a concluding remark Is . 296 para . 3, 287 para . 3 CCP) . In the case of a person under arrest, however, it is wholly in the discretion of the court whether or not it decided that the person concerned shall appear before it . The applicant considers that it is especially important for an accused to be present at the hearing on an appeal from sentence which does not concern legal questions, but the determination of the penalty having regard to the personality of the accused . He does not understand why a complicated procedure has to take place before a jury court which is called upon to decide on the conviction and sentence under the immediate impression of the personality of the accused and the evidence againt him, if the appellate jurisdiction can revise this sentence to his detriment without ever having seen him and without forming an opinion on his personality . The applicant considers that in such a procedure he is not treated as a subject, but as an object of the proceedings and thereby violated in his human dignity . He is of the opinion that the procedure followed is in itself contrary to the requirement of a fair hearing which is laid down in Article 6 .1 of the Convention, and to the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 6 .2 . Moreover, he considers that there is discrimination between an accused who is at liberty and an accused who is under arrest, because the law provides that the former has an absolute and unqualified right to be present at the appeal hearing whereas the latter has no right at all and his possibility to be present at the hearing depends entirely on the discretion of the court . He believes that the circumstance that in one case there are legal grounds for detention whereas they are lacking in another case does not justify this difference of the procedural position . b . Apart from the above general complaint, the applicant also complains of the position taken by the court in the particular case He alleges that it was unfair of the Supreme Court, and contrary to Article 6 .1 of the Convention, to construe as an application to bring the applicant before the court, the objection filed by his lawyer at the public hearing on . . . January 1978, and to reject the said application for failure to submit reasons . In the applicant's submissions the Supreme Court had already decided on . . . December 1977 that he would not be brought before the court . The law does not provide for an application in this respect, and in any event it would have been useless to make such application after the Supreme Court had already decided . But even if his lawyer's above objection could be construed as an application, it was unfair to dismiss it for lack of reasons without drawing the lawyer's attention to the fact that further reasons would be required . Moreover, the lawyer had in fact given a reason by referring to the applicant's rights under th e
Convention . Finally, it is alleged that it was unfair of the Supreme Court to pronounce its decision concerning the question of the applicant's appearance only after rendering its judgment on the substance of the case . 2 . The applicant's second complaint is related to the confidential exchange of communications between the Supreme Court's Rapporteur and the Attorney-General in relation to factural and legal circumstances concerning his plea of nullity . a . He considers that the procedure followed in his case violated the principle of equality of arms which is inherent in the notion of a fair trial, and that it gives rise to serious doubts as to the impartiality of the court, because the prosecution authorities were given a privileged position by obtaining an opportunity to know, and comment on, legal considerations of the Judge Rapporteur without any knowledge of the accused or his lawyer . In the applicant's opinion, an argument to the effect that the Attorney General is not a prosecution authority can no longer be maintained . The President of the Supreme Court, Mr Pallin, has himself written the following : "As regards the existing constitutional and legal situation, there should be no doubt as to the position of the Attorney-General being a party to the proceedings before the Supreme Court and also a prosecution authority . . . The Attorney-General therefore is the representative of the State in the proceedings before the Supreme Court and the officer responsible for the prosecution ITriger der Anklage) at this stage of the proceedings" fOberster Gerichtshof und Generalprokuratur, Festschrift fÃ¼r Christian Broda, Vienna 1976, at p . 221) . b . In addition, the applicant complains that the croquis of the AttorneyGeneral is not communicated, as of right, to the accused or to the defence, and that the defence is not given the opportunity to submit written comments in reply . Even apart from the special circumstances of the present case which have involved a confidential exchange of communications between the Judge Rapporteur and the Attorney-General, the applicant considers that also the normal practice introduced as a result of earlier applications filed with the Commission is still unsatisfactory . In his view it is not justified, and in fact humiliating for the defence counsel that he must ask at the court's registry for an unsigned copy of the croquis, and that there is no legal right of the defence to be informed of, and to reply to any written communications made by the other party in the proceedings . He considers that also this practice is contrary to the principle of equality of arms and in violation of Article 6 .1 of the Convention .
THE LAW 1 . The applicant has first complained of his exclusion from the hearing of the appeals against the sentence which led to an increase of the sentence by two and a half years . He considers that his right to a fair hearing under Article 6 .1 of the Convention and his right to be presumed innocent under Article 6 .2 of the Convention have thereby been violated . The Commission first observes that Article 6 is in principle applicable to appeal proceedings concerning the sentence . As it has already stated in its decision on the admissibility of Application No . 4623/70 ICollection of Decisions 39, pp . 66, 74), "the determination of a criminal charge, within the meaning of Article 6 .1 of the Convention, includes not only the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, but also in principle the determination of his sentence" . The applicant's above complaint cannot therefore be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention . However, the Commission is of the opinion that the presumption of innocence in Article 6 .2 only relates to the guilt of the accused, and cannot be invoked in relation to an increase of the sentence by the appeal court . The Commission therefore limits its examination of the complaint to the issue arising under Article 6 .1 of the Convention . Article 6 .3 .c according to which everyone charged with a criminal offence has inter alia the minimum right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance . . ." may also be pertinent . The Commission has stated in its earlier case law that the Convention does not as such guarantee an accused person's right to be present at the hearing of his appeal . It is necessary to take into account the whole situation of the defence and not only the person of the accused when judging whether his rights and in particular his rights under Article 6 .1 and 6 .3 .c of the Convention have been violated by his exclusion from an appeal hearing (cf . Applications Nos 1169/61, Yearbook 6, p . 520 ; 2635/65, Collection of Decisions 28, pp . 43, 49 ; and 7138/75, Decisions and Reports 9, p . 50) . The Commission observes that the situation in the present case involved an appreciation by the Supreme Court of the relative weight of grounds of mitigation and grounds of aggravation following an appeal not only by the applicant himself, but also by the prosecution against the sentence imposed by a jury court . The supreme Court's decision in fact resulted in a considerable increase of the sentence and it was not necessarily limited to an examination of points of law . As regards the relevant facts, including the cirÃ©umstances of the commission of the crime and the applicant's personality structure, the statements contained in the jury court's judgment were moreover limited to an absolute minimum . It is true that th e
applicant's lawyer pleaded the applicant's case at the appeal hearing before the Supreme Court . However, the Commission considers that the question of whether or not, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant's personal appearance at the appeal hearing was required in order to secure to him a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 .1 and the right under Article 6 .3 .c of the Convention to defend himself in person or through legal assistance is of such complexity that its determination should depend on an examination of the merits . 2 . The applicant has further complained of the difference of treatment to which he was subjected as a person under arrest in relation to persons at liberty with regard to his procedural rights in the above appeal proceedings . Section 296 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in fact gives a legal right to be summoned besides his lawyer to any accused who is at liberty, whereas in the case of a detained person the decision whether or not he will be allowed to appear at the appeal hearing depends entirely on the discretion of the court . Although the applicant has not invoked any particular provision of the Convention in this respect, the Commission has examined this complaint under Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 6 .1 and 6 .3 .c . Article 14 secures to everyone the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention without discrimination on any ground such as, for instance, status . The question which arises in the present case is whether the status of the applicant as a detained person justified a different treatment in comparison with a person at liberty regarding his procedural rights under Article 6 .1 and 6 .3 .c of the Convention in criminal appeal proceedings . The Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of the parties' submissions on this point . However, it again considers that the complaint raises complex issues under the above Articles of the Convention whose determination should depend on an examination of the merits . 3 . The applicant has finally complained of a confidential exchange of communications between the Judge Rapporteur and the Attorney-General in the Supreme Court proceedings dealing with his plea of nullity . He considers that the principle of equality of arms was thereby violated in his case and that accordingly there has been a breach of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 6 .1 of the Convention . Insofar as he submits that this violation of the Convention consisted already in the fact that the Attorney-Genral's croquis was not served upon his defence lawyer in the ordinary way and that the lawyer could get hold of this document only by requesting it at the Attorney-General's office, the Commission fails to see any appearance of a violation of Article 6 .1 . The principle of equality of arms enshrined in the notion of fair trial does not call for a particular form of communication of the contents of the file, or of an y
part of it, to the defence . As long as the available procedure is not particularly onerous and does not in essence deprive the defence of the practical possibility of making use of his rights it cannot be said that the right to a fair trial has been impaired . The Commission therefore limits its consideration of this complaint to those jransactions between the Judge Rapporteur and the Attorney-General which were in fact kept secret from the defence . In this respect, the Commission notes the various arguments put forward by the parties as to the position of the Attorney-General as a prosecuting authority or otherwise, and as to the possible effect of the confidential exchange of communications on the effective exercise of the rights of the defence . It considers that complex and difficult issues relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 6 .1 of the Convention are raised which should depend on an examination of the merits . 4 . In conclusion, it follows that the application cannot be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention and must therefore be admitted, no other ground for declaring it inadmissible having been established .
For these reasons, the Commission, without prejudging the merits , DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE :
(TRADUCTION ) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause tels qu'ils ressortent des exposÃ©s prÃ©sentÃ©s par le conseil du requÃ©rant, Me . Michael Graff, avocat au barreau de Vienne, peuvent se rÃ©sumercomme suit :
1 . Le requÃ©rant, ressortissant autrichien nÃ© le . . . 1957, purge prÃ©sentement une peine de longue durÃ©e au pÃ©nitencier de Garsten . Le . . . aoÃ»t 1977, il a Ã©tÃ© condamnÃ© pour brigandage qualifiÃ© (articles 142, paragraphe 1, et 143 du Code pÃ©nall par le tribunal rÃ©gional de Vienne siÃ©geant comme cour d'assises . II a Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable d'avoir perpÃ©trÃ© ce crime de concert avec une autre personne, le . . . janvier 1977, en attaquant deux hommes, dont l'un a Ã©tÃ© tuÃ© et l'autre griÃ©vement blessÃ©, et
en les dÃ©pouillant de leur argent . Le tribunal l'a condamnÃ© Ã© dix ans de prison, soit la sanction minimale prÃ©vue par la loi pour l'auteur d'un brigandage qualifiÃ© ayant entrainÃ© mo rt d'homme (article 143 du Code pÃ©nal, derniÃ©re phrase) . 2 . Le requÃ©rant a introduit un pou rvoi en cassation et a interjetÃ© appel quant Ã la peine prononcÃ©e en invoquant pour cet appel les motifs d'attÃ©nuation extraordinaires ( anicle 41, paragraphe 2, du Code pÃ©nal ) , qui permettent de rÃ©duire une condamnation au-dessous de la peine minimale . Le ministÃ©re public a aussi fait appel, la peine ne correspondant pas bien, selon lui, Ã la culpabilitÃ© du requÃ©rant . 3 . Le . . . dÃ©cembre 1977, la Cour SuprÃªme a fixÃ© une audience publique au . . . janvier 1978 . SimultanÃ©ment, elle a convoquÃ© l'avocat du requÃ©rant et informÃ© ce dernier qu'il ne pourrait comparaÃ®tre que par l'entremise de son avocat, s'agissant de son pou rvoi en cassation . Pour ce qui Ã© tait de l'appel, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© informÃ© qu'il n'Ã©tait pas envisagÃ© de l'amener devant la Cour pour assister Ã© l'audience (article 344 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nalel . 4 . Dans l'intervalle, le dossier avait Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par le membre de la Cour SuprÃªme dÃ©signÃ© comme Rapporteur . Le . . . novembre 1977, le Juge rapporteur a communiquÃ© le dossier au Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral en lui demandant de lui faire part de ses observations . Celte demande Ã©tait accompagnÃ©e de la remarque confidentielle suivant e Â«Les questions supplÃ©mentaires n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© incluses dans l'arrÃªt . Cette violation de l'a rt icle 342 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale - qui n'a pas Ã©tÃ© soulevÃ©e - n'est toutefois pas un motif de cassation . IEvBI . 1966/468 ; 1973/100, tout rÃ©cemment 10 Os 67/76, etc .) .
L'accusÃ© de rÃ©ception d'un versement de 2 000 schillings autrichiens effectuÃ© au SOS-Kinderhof est annexÃ© Ã la transcription des dÃ©libÃ©rations Â» . 5 . En rÃ©ponse Ã© cette demande, le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral a soumis un Â«Ã§roquisÂ», dont l'avocat du requÃ©rant a pu se procurer un exemplaire non signÃ© au greffe de la Cour SuprÃªme, conformÃ©ment Ã une pratique qui s'est instaurÃ©e Ã© la suite de requÃ©tes introduites contre l'Autriche auprÃ©s de la Commission europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . La copie du Â«croquisÂ» communiquÃ©e A l'avocat du requÃ©rant contenait l'accord du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral pour la tenue d'une audience publique, ainsi que des arguments juridiques concernant le pourvoi en cassation . L'original du Â«croquisÂ», qui n'a pas Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ© Ã l'avocat du requÃ©rant, contenait des observations supplÃ©mentaires en rÃ©ponse Ã la remarque Â«Ã usage internen susmentionnÃ©e du Juge rapporteur Iremarque qui n'a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e ni au requÃ©rant, ni Ã son avocat) .
Ces remarques confidentielles Ã©taient les suivantes a A usage interne : 1 . Les informations juridiques fournies aux jurÃ©s (Rechtsbelehrung) ont Ã©tÃ© conformes Ã la rÃ©gle figurant dans la derniÃ©re phrase de l'article 321, paragraphe 2 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale car elles contenaient une rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã la limitation de la peine minimale visÃ©e Ã l'article 143 du Code pÃ©nal, instituÃ©e par l'article 36 du Code pÃ©nal' . Toutefois, il existe une erreur de fait en ce qu'il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© Ã tort que les deux requÃ©rants n'avaient pas 20 ans rÃ©volus au moment de la commission du crime 110 .1 .19771 . IconsidÃ©rant a attendu que les deux . . . nl . Dans le cas de Y . Ico-accusÃ© du prÃ©sent requÃ©rantl, nÃ© le . . . 1956, cette condition a Ã©tÃ© remplie dÃ©s le . . . 1976 . Selon le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral, les informations juridiques ne sont toutefois pas suffisantes en elles-mÃªmes pour exclure la cassation conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 345, paragraphe 1, NÂ° 13, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale et pour justifier la prÃ©somption que le tribunal siÃ©geant comme cour d'assises - bien qu'ayant omis de faire expressÃ©ment rÃ©fÃ©rence Ã l'article 36 du Code pÃ©nal dans l'arrÃªt - a bien pris en considÃ©ration la sanction prÃ©vue par la loi, telle que modifiÃ©e par cette disposition . Ceci est contredit, notamment, par le fait que cette partie des informations juridiques a Ã©tÃ© rayÃ©e de la mÃªme maniÃ©re que les informations concernant les questions supplÃ©mentaires . Les questions supplÃ©mentaires initialement incluses dans les ques.2 tions posÃ©es au jury, ainsi que la partie y relative des informations juridiques ont peut-Ã©tre Ã©tÃ© rayÃ©es avant que la liste de questions ne soit soumise au jury, en raison des aveux faits par les deux accusÃ©s le deuxiÃ¨me jour du procÃ©s (p . 485, Vol . I du dossier) . Leur noninclusion dans l'arrÃªt aurait alors Ã©tÃ© justifiÃ©e Â» . Le requÃ©rant prÃ©tend que son avocat a Ã©tÃ© dans l'impossibilitÃ© de se procurer une photocopie de l'original du acroquisÂ», contenant la dÃ©claration confidentielle ci-dessus . II a demandÃ©, en consÃ©quence, Ã la Commission d'inviter le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur Ã produire ce document . 6 . A l'audience publique de la Cour SuprÃªme, le . . . janvier 1979, l'avocat du requÃ©rant, invoquant la Convention des Droits de 'Homme, a protestÃ© contre la non-admission du requÃ©rant Ã I'audience . Celle-ci s'est nÃ©anmoins poursuivie en l'absence du requÃ©rant, et la Cour SuprÃªme a examinÃ© Ã la fois le pourvoi et l'appel . Ce n'est qu'aprÃ©s les dÃ©libÃ©rations de la Cour que le PrÃ©sident de Chambre a avisÃ© l'avocat du requÃ©rant de la dÃ©cision de la Cour de rejeter l'objection susmentionnÃ©e, qui devait Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©e comme un e - Cet article du Code pÃ©nal prÃ©voit qÃ» une condamnation Ã vie ne pem pas Ãªtre inIllgAe Ã une oe rs onne oui n'avait oas 20 ans rBvolus lorsqÃ»elie a commis le crime .
requÃªte tendant Ã obtenir la comparution du requÃ©rant devant la Cour . La raison invoquÃ©e Ã©tait qu'aucun motif n'avait Ã©tÃ© avancÃ© qui aurait rendu nÃ©cessaire la prÃ©sence du requÃ©rant . Dans sa dÃ©cision du mÃ©me jour, signifiÃ©e au requÃ©rant le . . . mars 1978, la Cour Supr@me a rejetÃ© tout Ã la fois le pourvoi en cassation du requÃ©rant et son appel, mais a donnÃ© suite Ã l'appel du ministÃ©re public . La peine initiale de dix ans a ainsi Ã©tÃ© portÃ©e Ã douze ans et demi . GRIEFS 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'abord de ne pas avoir Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã assister et plaider sa cause Ã l'audience de la Cour SurpÃ©me portant sur son appel . a . L'article 296, paragraphe 1, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale' stipule qu'une personne qui n'est pas dÃ©tenue a le droit d'Ãªtre convoquÃ©e Ã une audience publique de la Cour SuprÃ©me portant sur son appel . Si elle est prÃ©sente, elle a le droit d'exposer les motifs de son appel et a la parole la derniÃ©re (articles 296, paragraphe 3, 287, paragraphe 3, Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nalel . Dans le cas d'une personne dÃ©tenue toutefois, le tribunal est souverain pour dÃ©cider ou non de sa comparution devant lui . Le requÃ©rant juge particuliÃ©rement important pour un accusÃ© d'assister Ã l'audience portant sur un appel concernant la peine, qui ne concerne pas des points de droits, mais de dÃ©termination de la sanction compte tenu de la personnalitÃ© de l'accusÃ© . Il ne comprend pas pourquoi une procÃ©dure complexe doit se dÃ©rouler devant une cour d'assises qui est appelÃ©e Ã se prononcer sur la culpabilitÃ© et la peine sous l'impression directe de la personnalitÃ© de l'accusÃ© et des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve Ã charge, si la juridiction d'appel peut modifier cette peine Ã son dÃ©triment, Ã lui accusÃ©, et ce sans l'avoir jamais vu et sans s'Ãªtre forgÃ© une opinion sur sa personnalitÃ© . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'avec cette procÃ©dure, il n'est pas traitÃ© comme un sujet mais comme un objet de l'instance et que sa dignitÃ© d'homme est par lÃ©-mÃ©me violÃ©e . Il estime que la procÃ©dure suivie est en elle-mÃ©me contraire Ã l'exigence d'un procÃ©s Ã©quitable figurant Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, ainsi qu'Ã© la prÃ©somption d'innocence posÃ©e Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2 . De surcroit, il estime qu'il y a discrimination entre un accusÃ© en libertÃ© et un accusÃ© dÃ©tenu, puisque la loi prÃ©voit que le premier a un droit absolu et inconditionnel d'assister Ã l'audience d'appel, tandis que le second n' a ' Le teKte de cette disoosition est le suivant : Â« Dans tous les autres cas, la COur SuerEme statue sur l'appel eoit IOre de la sAance publiqu e
qonant sur le oowvoi en cassmion, soit, lorsaue le oourvol en cassation a dAia lait l'obiet d'une dAcision en sAance nonpublique, lors d'une sÃ©ance publique ponant sur l'appel . La fixation de le date et l'organisation de la sEance sont rAgies par les articles 286 et 287 . Ã©tant entendu au'un accusÃ© aui n'esr pas en Atat d'9neslarion doit rouiours ErrB convoauA nour comq9rdrrre et qu'un accus@ en Ã©tat d'anestation peur aussi @f/e apaelA B cornp3raitr9 . . . I.
aucun droit et que sa prÃ©sence Ã l'audience dÃ©pend~ entiÃ©rement du bon vouloir de la cour . Il pense que la circonstance qu'il existe,des motifs de dÃ©tention dans un cas alors qu'il n'en existe pas dansl'autre ne justifie pas cette diffÃ©rence de traitement au niveau de la procÃ©dure . b . Abstraction faite du grief gÃ©nÃ©ral ci-dessus,'ie : requÃ©rant se plaint aussi de l'attitude de la Cour Ã son endroit . Il prÃ©tendqu'il a'Ã©tÃ© inÃ©quitable de la part de la Cour SuprÃªme, et contraire Ã l'article-6,paragraphe 1, de la Convention, d'interprÃ©ter l'objection soulevÃ©e pars .son -avocat Ã l'audience publique du . . . janvier 1978 comme une requÃ©te tendant :Ã le faire comparaitre devant elle, et de rejeter ladite requÃªte pour insuffisance de motifs . Le requÃ©rant estime que dÃ©s le . . . dÃ©cembre 1977, :1a Cour SuprÃ©me avait dÃ©cidÃ© de ne pas le faire comparaÃ®tre devant elle . La loi ne prÃ©voit pas la possibilitÃ© d'une requÃªte Ã cet Ã©gard et, quoi qu'il en doit, il .-aurait Ã©tÃ© inutile d'en introduire une aprÃ©s que la Cour eut dÃ©jÃ© pris sa, dÃ©cision . Mais mÃ©me si l'objection de son avocat pouvait Ã tre interprÃ©tÃ©e commeune requÃªte, il Ã©tait inÃ©quitable de la rejeter pour absence de motifs sansr :attirer l'attention de l'avocat sur le fait que des motifs supplÃ©mentaires,seraient nÃ©cessaires . En outre, l'avocat avait bien fait Ã©tat d'un motif en invoquantles droits garantis au requÃ©rant par la Convention . Enfin, le requÃ©rant estime qu'il Ã©tait inÃ©quitable de la part de la Cour SuprÃªme de ne se prononcerâ¢sun .la question de la comparution du requÃ©rant qu'Ã prÃªs avoir rendu sa dÃ©cision au fond . 2 . Le second grief du requÃ©rant vise l'Ã©change decommunications confidentielles entre le Juge rapporteur de la Cour SuprÃ©meet le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral au sujet des circonstances de faitet de droit :entourant son pourvoi . a . Il considÃ©re que la procÃ©dure suivie dans son cas a violÃ© le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes inhÃ©rent Ã la notion de procÃ©s Ã©quitable,-et qu'elle fait sÃ©rieusement douter de l'impartialitÃ© de la cour, Ã©tant donnÃ© que le ministÃ¨re public s'est vu confÃ©rer une position privilÃ©giÃ©e, ayant eu'lapossibilitÃ© de prendre connaissance des considÃ©rations juridiques du Juge rapporteur et de les commenter sans que celles-ci aient Ã©tÃ© portÃ©es'A laconnaissance de l'accusÃ© ou de son avocat . Le requÃ©rant estime qu'on ne peut continuer de prÃ©tendre . que le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral n'est pas une autoritÃ© depoursuite . Le PrÃ©sident .de la Cour Supr@me, M . Pallin, a d'ailleurs lui-mÃªme Ã©crit : Â« Dans l'actuelle situation constitutionnelle et lÃ©gale, il ne devrait pas y avoir de doute quant au fait que le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral est tout Ã la fois panie Ã l'instance devant la Cour SurpÃªme et autoritÃ© depoursuite . . . Le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral est donc Ã la fois le reprÃ©sentant'de l'Etat dans la procÃ©dure qui se dÃ©roule devant la Cour SuprÃªme et .le titulaire de l'action publique (TrÃ ger der,Anklagel Ã ce stadede' la procÃ©dure . x (Oberster Gerichtshot und Generalprokuratur, Festschrift fÃ¼r Christian Broda, Vienna 1976, p . 221) .
-' 172 -
b . De surcroit, le requÃ©rant se plaint que le a croquis Â» du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral ne soit pas communiquÃ© de plein droit Ã l'accusÃ© ou Ã la dÃ©fense, et qu'on ne donne pas Ã cette derniÃ¨re la possibilitÃ© de soumettre par Ã©crit des observations en rÃ©ponse . MÃªme si l'on fait abstraction des circonstances particuGÃ©res de la prÃ©sente affaire, qui ont donnÃ© lieu Ã un Ã©change de communications confidentielles entre le Juge rapporteur et le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral, le requÃ©rant estime que la pratique normale instituÃ©e Ã la suite des requÃ©tes prÃ©cÃ©demment soumises Ã la Commission est encore peu satisfaisante . Il juge injustifiÃ©, et mÃªme humiliant pour l'avocat de la dÃ©fense que celui-ci doive demander au greffe de la Cour une copie non signÃ©e du Â«croquisn, et que la loi ne donne pas Ã la dÃ©fense le droit d'Ã©tre informÃ©e des communications faites par Ã©crit par l'autre partie Ã la procÃ©dure et de rÃ©pondre Ã ces communications . Il considÃ¨re que cette pratique Ã©galement est contraire au principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes et Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 1, . de la Convention .
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu de ne pas avoir Ã©tÃ© admis Ã l'audience portant sur son appel, qui a abouti Ã un allongement de 2 ans et demi de sa peine . Il allÃ©gue de ce fait une violation de son droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable, protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, ainsi que de son droit Ã Ã©tre prÃ©sumÃ© innocent, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . La Commission observe d'abord que l'article 6 est en principe applicable aux appels portant sur la peine infligÃ©e . Comme elle l'a dÃ©jÃ© dÃ©clarÃ© dans sa dÃ©cision sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te NÂ° 4623/70 (Recueil 39, pp . 66, 74), Â« la dÃ©termination du bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation en matiÃ©re pÃ©nale, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, comprend non seulement une dÃ©cision sur la culpabilitÃ© ou l'innocence de l'accusÃ©, mais Ã©galement en principe une dÃ©cision sur la peine Â» . Le prÃ©sent grief ne peut donc pas Ãªtre rejetÃ© comme Ã©tant incompatible ratione materiae avec les dispositions de la Convention . Toutefois, la Commission estime que la prÃ©somption d'innocence figurant Ã l'article 6, paragraphe 2 ne vise que la culpabilitÃ© de l'accusÃ© et ne peut pas Ãªtre invoquÃ©e au sujet d'une aggravations de la peine prononcÃ©e par la juridiction d'appel . La Commission limite en consÃ©quence son examen des griefs Ã la question se posant sous l'angle de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . L'article 6, paragraphe 3 Icl, aux termes duquel toute personne accusÃ©e d'une infraction a droit notamment Ã Â« se dÃ©fendre lui-mÃªme ou avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur . . . Â» peut aussi Ã©tre pertinent . - 173-
La Commission a dÃ©clarÃ© dans sa jurisprudence antÃ©rieure que la Convention ne garantit pas comme tel Ã l'accusÃ© le droit d'Ãªtre prÃ©sent Ã l'audience portant sur son appel . Il convient de tenir compte de l'ensemble de la situation de la dÃ©fense et non seulement de la personne de l'accusÃ© pour apprÃ©cier si ses droits, et en particulier les droits que lui reconnaissent l'article 6, paragraphe 1 et l'article 6, paragraphe 3 Icl de la Convention, ont Ã©tÃ© violÃ©s du fait de sa non-admission Ã l'audience d'appel (cf . NÂ° 1169/61, Annuaire 6, p . 520 ; NÂ° 2635/65, Recueil 28, pp . 43, 49 ; et 7138/75, DÃ©cisions et rapports 9, p . 50) . La Commission observe que la situation, en l'espÃ©ce, impliquait une apprÃ©ciation par la Cour SuprÃªme du poids relatif des motifs d'attÃ©nuation et des motifs d'aggravations Ã la suite d'un appel interjetÃ© non seulement par le requÃ©rant lui-mÃªme mais encore par le ministÃ©re public contre la peine prononcÃ©e par une cour d'assises . La dÃ©cision de la Cour SuprÃ©me a entrainÃ© une forte aggravation de la peine et elle n'a pas Ã©tÃ© nÃ©cessairement limitÃ©e Ã l'examen de points de droit . S'agissant des faits pertinents, et notamment des circonstances de la commission de l'infraction et de la structure de la personnalitÃ© du requÃ©rant, les dÃ©clarations contenues dans l'arrÃ©t de la Cour d'assises Ã©taient limitÃ©es au minimum . Il est exact que l'avocat du requÃ©rant a plaidÃ© le dossier de celui-ci Ã l'audience d'appel devant la Cour SuprÃ©me . Toutefois, la Commission considÃ©re que la question de savoir si, vu l'ensemble des circonstances de l'affaire, la comparution personnelle du requÃ©rant Ã l'audience d'appel Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire pour lui assurer un procÃ©s Ã©quitable au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, ainsi que la question du droit protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 3(c) de la Convention de se dÃ©fendre en personne ou d'avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur, sont d'une complexitÃ© telle que leur solution relÃ©ve d'un examen du fond de l'affaire . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre du traitement diffÃ©rent qui lui a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©servÃ© du fait qu'il Ã©tait dÃ©tenu, par rapport Ã celui accordÃ© aux personnes en libertÃ©, quant aux droits procÃ©duraux dans la procÃ©dure d'appel susmentionnÃ©e . L'article 296, paragraphe 3 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale confÃ©re effectivement Ã tout accusÃ© en libertÃ© le droit d'Ãªtre appelÃ© Ã comparaitre aux cbtÃ©s de son avocat, alors que, dans le cas d'une personne dÃ©tenue, la cour est souveraine pour autoriser ou non cette personne Ã comparaitre Ã l'audience d'appel . Bien que le requÃ©rant n'ait invoquÃ© aucune disposition particuliÃ©re de la Convention Ã cet Ã©gard, la Commission a examinÃ© ce grief sous l'angle de l'article 14 de la Convention, en combinaison avec l'article 6, paragraphe 1 et paragraphe 3(c) . L'article 14 garantit Ã chacun la jouissance des droits et libertÃ©s reconnus dans la Convention sans distinction aucune fondÃ©e notamment sur une situation . La question qui se pose en l'espÃ©ce est celle de savoir si la situation du requÃ©rant en tant que personne dÃ©tenue justifiait un traitement diffÃ©rent par rapport Ã une personne en libertÃ©, en ce qui concern e
ses droits procÃ©duraux garantis par les articles 6, paragraphe 1 et 6, paragraphe 3 Icl de la Convention dans une procÃ©dure d'appel criminelle . La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire des exposÃ©s des parties sur ce point . Ici Ã©galement, elle considÃ©re que le grief soulÃ©ve des questions complexes sur le terrain des articles susmentionnÃ©s de la Convention, dont la solution relÃ©ve d'un examen du fond de l'affaire .3 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint enfin d'un Ã©change de communications confidentielle entre le Juge rapporteur et le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral au cours de la procÃ©dure de la Cour SuprÃ©me portant sur son pourvoi en cassation . Il considÃ©re que le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes a Ã©tÃ© violÃ© de ce fait dans son cas et qu'il y a donc eu violation de son droit Ã un proÃ©Ã¨s Ã©quitable, protÃ©gÃ© par l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ il fait valoir qu'une telle violation de la Convention rÃ©side dÃ©jÃ dans le fait que le Â« croquis Â» du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral n'a pas Ã©tÃ© signifiÃ© Ã son avocat suivant la procÃ©dure ordrnaire et que l'avocat n'a pu se procurer ce document qu'en en faisant la demande au bureau du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral, la Commission ne voit pas l'apparence d'une violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 . Le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes contenu dans la notion de procÃ©s Ã©quitable ne requiert pas une forme particuliÃ©re de communiration Ã© la dÃ©fense du contenu du dossier, ou d'une partie de celui-ci . Tant que la procÃ©dure disponible n'est pas particuliÃ©rement onÃ©reuse et n'aboutit pas Ã priver la dÃ©fense de la possibilitÃ© pratique d'exercer ses droits, on ne peut pas direqu'il y ait atteinte au droit Ã un procÃ©s Ã©quitable . La Commission limite donc l'examen de ce grief aux communications entre le Juge rapporteur et le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral qui ont Ã©tÃ© effectivement dissimulÃ©es Ã la dÃ©fense . - A cet Ã©gard la Commission a pris note des divers arguments prÃ©sentÃ© s par les parties au sujet de la position du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral en tant que membre de l'autoritÃ© de poursuite ou dans une autre qualitÃ©, ainsi qu'Ã© l'effet possible de l'Ã©change de communications confidentielles sur l'exercice effectif des droits de la dÃ©fense . Elle considÃ©re qu'il se posÃ© des questions complexe . paragraphe 1 de l sanetdÃ©lica'nrpoetdalic 're6 Convention, questions dont la solution relÃ©ve d'un examen du fond de l'affaire .4 . En conclusion, la requÃªte ne peut pas Ãªtre rejetÃ©e commÃ© manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention et elle doit donc Ã©tre retenue, aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© constatÃ© .
Par ces motifs, la Commission, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© , DECLARE LA REQUETE RECEVABLE .
- 175 -Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Cour (chambre)Date de la décision : 05/03/1980Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page