Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/313/270
Timestamp: 2013-12-20 16:11:00
Document Index: 132049594

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 75', '§ 75', '§ 74', '§ 202', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 22', '§ 75', '§ 203', '§ 75', '§ 1', '§ 75', '§ 1', '§ 75']

BENITEZ SAMPAYO v. BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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313 U.S. 270 (61 S.Ct. 953, 85 L.Ed. 1324)
BENITEZ SAMPAYO v. BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA.
[HTML] Messrs. F. B. Fornaris, of Ponce, P.R., and Elmer McClain, of Lima, Ohio, for petitioner.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the formula for determining whether petitioner was a farmer was to be found in § 1(17) of the Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 840, 841, and that petitioner could not be regarded as a farmer within its terms. 1 Cir., 109 F.2d 743, on rehearing, 109 F.2d 750. Because the decision was substantially inconsistent with Order 50(9) of the General Orders in Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53, 305 U.S. 677, 710, 59 S.Ct. clxxvii, we granted certiorari.
311 U.S. 623, 61 S.Ct. 10, 85 L.Ed. -.
Starting with the premise that only one of the definitions can stand, respondent contends that § 1(17) is an implicit repeal of § 75, sub. r. To support the contention, respondent points to the obsolete reference in § 75, sub. r to § 74, 11 U.S.C.A. § 202, and to a statement in a committee report which is said to indicate that Congress intended the definition in § 1(17) to measure the applicability of § 4, sub. b, 11 U.S.C.A. § 22, sub. b, to persons who claim to be farmers.
Section 75, with immaterial differences, first appeared in the distressed-debtor legislation of 1933. 47 Stat. 1467, 14701473. Designed for a particular purpose, the relief of hard-pressed farmers, it was regarded as a special and temporary enactment. See § 75, sub. c; compare S.Rep. No. 1215, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; H.Rep. No. 1898, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. In 1938 its time limit was extended to 1940. 52 Stat. 84, 85, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203, sub. (c). At that time a special committee held extensive hearings on a proposal to make § 75 a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Act, and finally concluded that the section should be continued only as temporary legislation. Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Congress, 2d and 3d Sessions; see also H.Rep. No. 1833, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2; S.Rep. No. 899, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No. 1658, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2. Naturally enough, legislation drafted for such a purpose carried its own test for determining the persons to whom it should apply.
The Chandler Act, a careful and comprehensive revision of bankruptcy legislation, was the product of several years of thoughtful study. See 81 Cong.Rec. 8646-8649. One of its avowed purposes was to clarify or remove inconsistent and overlapping provisions. See H.Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 13. As a part of this comprehensive revision, numerous definitions were overhauled or inserted for the first time. Among the latter was § 1(17). See H.Rep. No. 1409, supra, p. 6. But § 75, sub. r also was left in the Act, and, as already indicated, its existence was not unknown to the revisors. Its very presence in the statute after the revision is persuasive evidence that § 1(17) was not intended to govern proceedings under § 75.