Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/624/885/312730/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 04:49:34
Document Index: 500255579

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7401', '§ 1857', '§ 7409', '§ 7410', '§ 7418', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233', '§ 233']

People of the State of California, Etc., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Department of the Navy et al., Defendants-appellants, 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980) :: Justia
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People of the State of California, Etc., Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Department of the Navy et al., Defendants-appellants, 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980)
June 2, 1980. Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 1980
The State of California brought this action against the U. S. Navy, claiming that the level of air pollution from certain of the Navy's jet engine test cells violates California air quality standards promulgated under the Federal Clean Air Act. The district court, in its judgment filed February 10, 1979, based on its orders of February 10, 1979 and April 12, 1977 (the latter reported at 431 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1977)), granted California's claim for equitable relief and ordered the Navy to meet California's emission standards. The Navy appeals and argues that federal preemption of state regulation of aircraft or engine emissions includes and exempts emissions from engine test cells also. We affirm the district court's judgment.
Under the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq.), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has the responsibility for promulgating standards for ambient air quality. Section 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409. But the states have primary responsibility for implementing those standards; the states must develop and adopt "implementation plans" which, after EPA approval, are published as regulations in the Federal Register. Section 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Federal installations are required to comply with state implementation standards. Section 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418; Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 182-83, 96 S. Ct. 2006, 2014, 48 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1976).2 The state implementation plans may contain pollution requirements which are more, but not less, strict than the EPA standards. California has gone through all the required steps, including EPA approval, in adopting and enforcing its implementation plan with its pollution requirements.3
The parties agree that under § 233, Congress preempted to, or retained under, federal control the regulation of pollution from aircraft and aircraft engines. This appeal resolves into a single question of statutory construction: Are the immobile test cells involved here within the intended scope of § 233 preemption?The district court below discussed the preemption doctrine extensively and excellently, with emphasis on applying it in this context. See 431 F. Supp. at 1281-90. We shall not repeat that discussion here. In applying the preemption doctrine to § 233, the district court developed a test for § 233 preemption with which we are in general agreement.
This is especially so for two additional reasons. First, prior to the April 12, 1977 ruling, the Navy declined, despite requests from the district judge, to present arguments and evidence as to potential federal interests which might be impaired by test cell modification. See 431 F. Supp. at 1289. Second, between the 1977 opinion which set forth the district court's preemption test and the summary judgment in 1979, the Navy, knowing what facts were important under the district court's test, had nearly two years to present evidence raising material factual dispute but did not.
See 431 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (top of second column), 1283 (second column, text accompanying footnote 11), 1285 (second column at headnote 20), 1287 (first column at first full paragraph), & 1287 (second column at end of carryover paragraph)
This finding pervades the district court's discussion in 431 F. Supp. 1271, 1281-90. The two most specific instances follow
F. Supp. at 1281 n.7