Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/282/1184/581947/
Timestamp: 2020-02-19 00:46:40
Document Index: 191294729

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 138', '§ 2254', '§ 138', '§ 2254']

Michael Reese, Petitioner-appellant, v. George H. Baldwin, Respondent-appellee, 282 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 2002 › Michael Reese, Petitioner-appellant, v. George H. Baldwin, Respondent-appellee
Michael Reese, Petitioner-appellant, v. George H. Baldwin, Respondent-appellee, 282 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2002)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 282 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) Argued and Submitted November 9, 2001
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Dennis N. Balske, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for the petitioner-appellant.
Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, OR, for the respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, James A. Redden, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-00851-ST.
Petitioner Michael Reese ("Reese") appeals the district court ruling that his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his § 2254 habeas petition is procedurally defaulted because of lack of exhaustion. The issue is whether Reese adequately alerted the state courts to the federal nature of his claims. We reverse the district court, concluding that Reese fairly presented his federal claims to the state courts, and we remand for further proceedings on his habeas petition.
Reese appealed his sentence again for the third time and was appointed still another counsel. But Reese's appeal proceeded under an ill star. Reese's appellate counsel declined to champion Reese's position and filed a Balfour brief with the Oregon Court of Appeals suggesting that the appellate issues had no merit. The Balfour system is Oregon's version of the Anders briefing system announced in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), through which appointed counsel present claims they conclude are frivolous.1
As is typical in Oregon, however, that was not the end of the matter. Reese filed a pro se petition for state post conviction relief ("PCR"). As it turns out, the tale of Reese's PCR process is the part of the state court proceedings that is most pertinent for our purposes in this appeal. The PCR court appointed still another new counsel for Reese. Counsel filed an amended petition raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, citing explicitly to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution as well as to the Oregon constitution.2
The PCR court denied the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim with a terse ruling, citing federal law authority. In its Memorandum of Opinion, beneath a heading "Adequate Appellate Counsel," the court simply wrote, "Appellate counsel need not present every colorable issue. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983)."3 Reese again appealed, now in the PCR process.
Reese next filed a petition for review in the Oregon Supreme Court. This petition cited to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution, but the citations appeared to support claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel only. The sentence containing these citations stated, "Moreover, since Petitioner asserts he was coerced and threatened by counsel to waive his right to trial by jury, Petitioner believes his 5th, 6th and 14th amendment rights have been violated." Reese's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal was made summarily, along with many other claims. The petition contained no express citation to federal authority for the claim.5 The Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
The district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas claim on the ground of procedural default presents issues of law that we review de novo. See La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001).
A state prisoner must exhaust available state court remedies on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court may consider granting habeas corpus relief. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1992). Exhaustion is required by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (A). "To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of § 2254, habeas petitioners must `fairly presen [t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and to correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (2000), as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995)).
The exhaustion requirement has long been rooted in our commitment to federalism, see Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-52, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868 (1886), and it goes hand in hand with our respect for state court processes. State courts, like federal courts, may enforce rights under the federal constitution. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-59, 110 S. Ct. 792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1990).
If a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust a claim, it may be procedurally defaulted. A claim is procedurally defaulted "if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848-49, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999); Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990). If Reese did not fairly present his claims to the Oregon courts, he procedurally defaulted them, because he is now barred by Oregon's time limits from going back and trying again to exhaust them. See Or.Rev. Stat. § 138.071 (2001).
Lyons carefully addressed and established helpful guidelines for assessing whether a federal claim was fairly presented in the state court. As we explained, " [A] petitioner for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 exhausts available state remedies only if he characterized the claims he raised in state proceedings specifically as federal claims." Lyons, 232 F.3d at 670 (emphasis original). "In short, the petitioner must have either referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or statutes or cited to federal case law." Id. Lyons also makes clear that the specific allegation cannot be an implied one; there must be explicit reference to federal law. As we held in Lyons, " [A] federal claim has not been exhausted in state court unless the petitioner both raised the claim in state court and explicitly indicated then that the claim was a federal one ..." Id. at 669 (emphasis original).
The parties agree that Reese complied with Lyons at the PCR court, but the state argues that Reese did not satisfy Lyons at the Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court. So we must decide whether a habeas petitioner must comply with Lyons at every level of a state court system or if complying at one level — the PCR court — is enough.
To exhaust a claim in the state courts, a habeas petitioner must, in addition to complying with Lyons, present that claim to the state's highest court, even if that court has discretionary control over its docket. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728. If 4002 Lyons was intended only to ensure that the state has some chance to address a federal issue before the federal courts do so, then it might be satisfied by explicitly citing federal law once, to a lower-level court such as the PCR court. However, we reject that view. Lyons is properly read as part and parcel of exhaustion law. It is thus apparent that Lyons's requirement of explicitly presenting a federal claim must be satisfied at the highest levels of the state court system to ensure that possibilities of the state courts resolving federal issues relating to state prisoners have been truly exhausted.9 A request to a lower court alone is not sufficient to exhaust prospects of state court relief on a federal claim. To exhaust requires that the highest state court must be alerted to the specifically federal nature of the claim presented.
The United States Supreme Court has said that a habeas petitioner must give the state courts "one full opportunity" to decide a federal claim by carrying out "one complete round" of the state's appellate process in order to properly exhaust a claim. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728. Lyons held that a petitioner can exhaust a claim only by both raising the claim and explicitly indicating the claim is a federal one. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. The federalism policies underlying exhaustion and the concerns that underlie Lyons argue persuasively that explicitness is necessary not merely at any one state court level, but instead at the highest state court that hears such claims. Following and clarifying Lyons, we hold that a habeas petitioner must indicate to the state's highest court the specifically federal nature of a claim in order to exhaust it. Accordingly, presenting a federal claim explicitly at the PCR court in itself is not sufficient for exhaustion.
The PCR decision Reese was appealing, which the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without further reasoning, did explicitly cite federal law — Strickland and Jones v. Barnes — to support the denial of Reese's ineffective assistance claims. Oregon law requires the PCR court to "state clearly the grounds upon which the cause was determined, and whether a state or federal question, or both, was presented and decided." Or.Rev.Stat. § 138.640 (1999). Given that there is no other statement from the PCR court on the federal versus state nature of Reese's claim, the citations to Strickland and to Jones v. Barnes in the PCR court's decision "state clearly" to any who read the decision that Reese presented a federal question and that the PCR court decided it on federal grounds.
To summarize our views: Reese raised the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim and cited federal authority in his petition to the PCR court. The PCR court cited only federal law in deciding the issue, and under Oregon law this means the claim was decided on federal grounds. Reese included the claim in his brief to the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the PCR court's decision, which had been made on the basis of federal law. Based on these factors, we hold that the Oregon Court of Appeals "surely [was] alerted to the fact that [Reese was] asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S. Ct. 887.
Reese cited the federal constitution in the argument section of his Oregon Supreme Court petition, but did so explicitly to support only claims other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Here is the part of Reese's petition offering federal authority: "Moreover, since Petitioner asserts he was coerced and threatened by counsel to waive his right to trial by jury, Petitioner believes his 5th, 6th and 14th amendment rights have been violated."
The question then is whether we should presume that the Oregon Supreme Court read the PCR court decision, which explicitly cited federal law. If the Oregon Court of Appeals had rendered a reasoned, substantive decision, it might be argued that we should presume only that a state supreme court would read the decision that it is asked to review — in this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals decision. But here, the Oregon Court of Appeals had granted a summary affirmance and did not speak to the merits except by affirming what the PCR court had said. We conclude that it is appropriate to presume that, when faced with a summary affirmance from the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court would have read the PCR court's substantive decision. Any other conclusion would not do credit to the appellate review process. For whatever variations may be appropriate under discretionary state procedures, an appellate court cannot fairly review a decision without knowing its content.
But we need not go so far as to hold that a rational discretionary review process must always include some review of the underlying decision. For even if a state supreme court could rationally and fairly decide whether to grant review without reading the underlying opinion, it does not follow that a claim must be visible from the face of the underlying petition alone to be "fairly presented" for our purposes in assessing exhaustion. The United States Supreme Court has explicitly explained that proper exhaustion requires a habeas petitioner to give the State "a fair opportunity to pass upon [his claims]." Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 146 L. Ed. 2d 518 (2000) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). See also Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668 ("To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of § 2254, habeas petitioners must `fairly presen [t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and to correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" (quoting Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365, 115 S. Ct. 887)). Comity requires only that we not rule if the state court has not had the opportunity first to hear federal habeas claims. Where opportunity existed, comity is not offended by an opportunity that the state foregoes.
T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs."1 At least federal appellate judges are not, according to our precedent.2 Yet the majority would hold state supreme court justices to a different standard — requiring them to root through the record for rare truffles of legal support that may complete an incompletely raised claim in one of the thousands of petitions they must decide whether to grant every year. And if they choose not to engage in this porcine behavior, they have, according the majority, chosen not to "take the opportunity" presented to them by a petitioner to review that petitioner's claim. The majority so holds despite clear and binding precedent regarding what constitutes fair presentation and despite clear Oregon procedural rules.
In order fairly to present a federal claim to state courts, a petitioner must "include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief."3 Thus, fair presentation requires the assertion of the facts and the law supporting each claim.
There are good reasons for requiring the citation of facts and law supporting a claim in order to deem it fairly presented and exhausted.4 For one thing, too many petitions for review are presented to state courts5 to expect judges and law clerks to search through the record to find support for a claim that is not presented. Departing from the requirements of fair presentation thus renders hollow our professed interest in providing state supreme courts with an opportunity to review federal claims. Practically, they will have no such opportunity if they are required to search the record each time an incompletely supported claim appears before them.
(g) A copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, including the court's opinion and any concurring and dissenting opinions.6
Worthy of note is the fact that the rules also require that the court of appeals' decision accompany a petition but do not require the lower court's decision to accompany the petition. This makes sense — after all, the Oregon Supreme Court will be reviewing the decision of the court immediately below if it decides to grant the petition for review. This rule undermines the assumption of the majority in this case, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court will naturally look to the trial court's decision when deciding whether to grant a petition for review. The rule does not even require that the trial court opinion accompany the petition.
By dissenting, I do not mean to diminish the disturbing history of this case. The parade of lawyers assigned to Reese and the mistakes made in his representation are an embarrassment. However, the unfortunate history of this case does not merit the creation of an odd and unreasonable exception to the rules of fair presentation. There are good reasons for those rules. The old adage "hard cases make bad law" seems to apply here. I dissent.
Under the Balfour system, counsel files a brief notifying the court that counsel feels the appeal lacks merit. Counsel writes and signs Part A of the brief, which gives a statement of facts and procedural history. Counsel includes any issues that the appellant wishes to raise in Part B of the brief, which is signed by the appellant. Contrary to the system announced in Anders, Oregon's system does not require counsel to withdraw. Instead, counsel remains on hand to help the appellant with any issues appellant might want to raise. Additionally, unlike in Anders, an Oregon court presented with a Balfour brief does not engage in its own independent review of the entire record. See State v. Balfour, 311 Or. 434, 814 P.2d 1069 (1991).
The amended petition stated:
Petitioner was denied adequate assistance of appellate counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under Article I, Section 11, of the Constitution of Oregon, in that counsel on appeal failed to:
a. Withdraw as attorney for Petitioner due to conflict of interest in that her husband ... had been the attorney for prosecution three times on Petitioner's cases;
b. Notify Petitioner in advance when she removed Petitioner's attorney David Allen, from Petitioner's case and became the attorney of record for Petitioner without Petitioner's consent;
c. Raise issues that had been preserved for appeal;
d. File a timely Notice of Appeal;
e. Obtain trial transcripts in a timely manner and in order to provide a thorough and proper appeal.
Just above the court's decision on the appellate counsel claim was a separate heading entitled "Adequate Assistance of Counsel". Under that heading, another terse ruling stated, "Petitioner received adequate assistance of trial counsel," and cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the leading federal precedent establishing the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, as well as citing "Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or. 867, 627 P.2d 458 (1981)," an Oregon case analyzing ineffective assistance claims under both the federal and Oregon constitutions. See Krummacher, 290 Or. 867, 627 P.2d 458, 461.
The Court of Appeals issued an order granting the motion for summary affirmance and affirming the PCR court's decision:
"Respondent has moved for summary affirmance pursuant to ORS 138.660 on the ground that this appeal presents no substantial question of law. Appellant has not opposed the motion. The motion is granted.
For convenience, we set forth relevant parts of the petition, including the full argument section of the petition:
Statement of reasons for reversal of Court of Appeals
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed for the following reason: Petitioner was subject to several errors with respect to this case, including improper sentencing, ineffective assistance of both trial court and appellate court counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper waiver of jury and improper investigation.
... Petitioner alleges trial court errors related to sentencing, in that the Petitioner received an unlawful dangerous offender sentence. Moreover, Petitioner alleges claims of error with respect to improper waiver of a jury trial, failure to provide a fair and impartial trial, improper resentencing, inadequate assistance of counsel, inadequate investigation and inadequate appellate counsel.
The sentence levied upon the petitioner is improper in that Petitioner was subject to several errors with respect to this case, including improper sentencing, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, improper waiver of jury and improper investigation.
Petitioner asserts that his imprisonment is in violation of ORS 138.530. Petitioner alleges that the sentence violates his eighth amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, since Petitioner asserts he was coerced and threatened by counsel to waive his right to trial by jury, Petitioner believes his 5th, 6th and 14th amendment rights have been violated.
The magistrate judge would have granted relief because she would have held Oregon's Balfour system unconstitutional. Because we find only that Reese exhausted his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we do not have occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the Balfour system.
The district court based its decision on our recent opinion in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2000). In Lyons we held that strict rules for fair presentation to state courts applied to pro se petitioners. See Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669.
Accordingly, we do not now have occasion to review the merits of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim or any other claims contained in Reese's habeas petition. If there was procedural default, a defaulted claim could be considered only with a showing of cause and prejudice, or a showing that refusing to hear the claim would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). No serious contention of cause can be made here, since Reese had no right to counsel on his PCR appeals. See Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 2000). Reese does not argue that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a procedural default.
To exhaust is defined as "To use up completely (either a material or immaterial thing); to expend the whole of; to consume entirely." Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, 1989
We express no opinion on the merits of Reese's claim
Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1996).
See, e.g., Gray, 518 U.S. at 162, 116 S. Ct. 2074; Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987.
In 1998, 8,627 petitions for review were filed for state supreme court review in California; 1,366 in Arizona; 1,146 in Washington; and 962 in Oregon See State Court Caseload Statistics, 1998, National Center for State Courts (1999).
Or. R. App. P. 9.05(3)