Source: http://openjurist.org/416/us/505
Timestamp: 2017-04-24 04:53:50
Document Index: 666952136

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 510', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2510', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 3731', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2516', '§ 509', '§ 510', '§ 2516', '§ 510', '§ 245', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2510', '§ 2516', '§ 2516', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2516', '§ 2510', '§ 2518', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 509', '§ 2511', '§ 2520', '§ 503', '§ 506', '§ 0', '§ 3803', '§ 8', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2511', '§ 2515', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

416 US 505 United States v. Giordano | OpenJurist
416 U.S. 505 - United States v. Giordano Homethe United States Reports416 U.S.
416 US 505 United States v. Giordano 416 U.S. 505
94 S.Ct. 1820
40 L.Ed.2d 341
UNITED STATES, Petitioner,v.Dominic Nicholas GIORDANO et al.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) that 'the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge . . . for . . . an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications' by federal investigative agencies seeking evidence of certain designated offenses; and further provides that the contents of intercepted communications, or evidence derived therefrom, may not be received in evidence at a trial if the disclosure of the information would violate Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and may be suppressed on the ground, inter alia, that the communication was 'unlawfully intercepted,' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i). In this case an application purportedly authorized by a specially designated Assistant Attorney General for an order permitting the wiretap of the telephone of respondent Giordano, a narcotics offense suspect, was submitted to the Chief Judge of the District Court, who then issued an interception order, and later an extension order based on a similar application but also including information obtained from the previously authorized interception and extending the authority to conversations of additional named individuals calling to or from Giordano's telephone. The interception was terminated when Giordano and the other respondents were arrested and charged with narcotics violations. During suppression hearings, it developed that the wiretap applications had not in fact been authorized by a specially designated Assistant Attorney General, but that the initial application was authorized by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant and the extension application had been approved by the Attorney General himself. The District Court sustained the motions to suppress on the ground that the Justice Department officer approving each application had been misidentified in the applications and intercept orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the initial authorization violated § 2516(1), thereby requiring suppression of the wiretap and derivative evidence under §§ 2515 and 2518(10) (a)(i), inter alia. Held:
1. Congress did not intend the power to authorize wiretap applications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him. Pp. 512—523.
(a) Notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 510, which authorizes the Attorney General to delegate any of his functions to any other officer, employee, or agency of the Justice Department, § 2516(1), fairly read, was intended to limit the power to authorize wiretap applications to the Attorney General himself and to any Assistant Attorney General he might designate. Pp. 512—514.
(b) This interpretation of § 2516(1) is strongly supported by the purpose of the Act effectively to prohibit all interceptions of oral and wire communications, except those specifically provided for, and by its legislative history. Pp. 514—523.
2. Primary or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant to a court order issued in response to an application which was, in fact, not authorized by the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General must be suppressed under § 2515 upon a motion properly made under § 2518(10)(a), and hence the evidence obtained from the interceptions pursuant to the initial court order was properly suppressed. Pp. 524—529.
(a) Under § 2518(10)(a)(i) the words 'unlawfully intercepted' are not limited to constitutional violations, but the statute was intended to require suppression where there is a failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. Pp. 524—528.
(b) Since Congress intended to condition the use of intercept procedures upon the judgment of a senior Justice Department official that the situation is one of those warranting their use, thus precluding resort to wiretapping in various situations where investigative personnel would otherwise seek intercept authority from the court and the court would very likely authorize its use, it is evident that the provision for pre-application approval was intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when it is shown that this statutory requirement has been ignored. Pp. 528—529.
3. Communications intercepted pursuant to the extension order were inadmissible, since they were evidence derived from the communications invalidly intercepted pursuant to the initial order. Pp. 529—533.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211—225, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510—2520, prescribes the procedure for securing judicial authority to intercept wire communications in the investigation of specified serious offenses. The Court must here determine whether the Government sufficiently complied with the required application procedures in this case and whether, if not, evidence obtained as a result of such surveillance, under a court order based on the applications, is admissible at the criminal trial of those whose conversations were overheard. In particular, we must decide whether the provision of 18 U.S.C. s 2516(1)1 conferring power on the 'Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General' to 'authorize an application to a Federal judge . . . for . . . an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications' by federal investigative agencies seeking evidence of certain designated offenses permits the Attorney General's Executive Assistant to validly authorize a wiretap application to be made. We conclude that Congress did not intend the power to authorize wiretap applications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by him and that primary or derivative evidence secured by wire interceptions pursuant to a court order issued in response to an application which was, in fact, not authorized by one of the statutorily designated officials must be suppressed under 18 U.S.C. § 2515 upon a motion properly made under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
* In the course of an initial investigation of suspected narcotics dealings on the part of respondent Giordano, it developed that Giordano himself sold narcotics to an undercover agent on October 5, 1970, and also told an informant to call a specified number when interested in transacting narcotics business. Based on this and other information, Francis Brocato, an Assistant United States Attorney, on October 16, 1970, submitted an application to the Chief Judge of the District of Maryland for an order permitting interception of the communications of Giordano, and of others as yet unknown, to or from Giordano's telephone. The application recited that Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson had been specially designated by the Attorney General to authorize the application. Attached to the application was a letter from Will Wilson to Brocato which stated that Wilson had reviewed Brocato's request for authorization and had made the necessary probable-cause determinations and which then purported to authorize Brocato to proceed with the application to the court. Also attached were various affidavits of law enforcement officers stating the reasons and justification for the proposed interception. Upon reviewing the application, the Chief Judge issued an order on the same day authorizing the interception 'pursuant to application authorized by the Assistant Attorney General . . . Will Wilson, who has been specially designated in this proceeding by the Attorney General . . . to exercise the powers conferred on him by (18 U.S.C. § 2516).' On November 6, the same judge extended the intercept authority based on an application similar in form to the original, but also including information obtained from the interception already authorized and carried out and extending the authority to conversations of additional named individuals calling from or to Giordano's telephone. The interception was terminated on November 18 when Giordano and the other respondents were arrested and charged with violations of the narcotics laws.
The District Court sustained the motions to suppress on the ground that the officer in the Justice Department approving each application had been misidentified in the applications and intercept orders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) and (a)(d), United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1060 (D.C.Md.1972). On the Government's pretrial appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the Court of Appeals affirmed on the different ground that the authorization of the October 16 wiretap application by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant violated § 2516(1) of the statute and struck at 'the very heart' of Title III, thereby requiring suppression of the wiretap and derivative evidence under §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a)(1) and (ii).2 469 F.2d 522, 531 (CA4 1972). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit3 with respect to the administration of the circumscribed authority Congress has granted in Title III for the use of wiretapping and wiretap evidence by law enforcement officers. 411 U.S., 905, 93 S.Ct., 1530, 36 L.Ed.2d 194.
The United States contends that the authorization of intercept applications by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the statute and that even if it were, there being no constitutional violation, the wiretap and derivative evidence should not have been ordered suppressed. We disagree with both contentions.4
Turning first to whether the statute permits the authorization of wiretap applications by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant, we begin with the language of § 2516(1), which provides that '(t)he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize' an application for intercept authority. Plainly enough, the Executive Assistant is neither the Attorney General nor a specially designated Assistant Attorney General; but the United States argues that 28 U.S.C. § 509,5 deriving from the Reorganization Acts of 1949 and 1950, vests all functions of the Department of Justice, with some exceptions, in the Attorney General, and that Congress characteristically assigns newly created duties to the Attorney General rather than to the Department of Justice, thus making essential the provision for delegation appearing in 28 U.S.C. § 510:
As a general proposition, the argument is unexceptionable. But here the matter of delegation is expressly addressed by § 2516, and the power of the Attorney General in this respect is specifically limited to delegating his authority to 'any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General.' Despite § 510, Congress does not always contemplate that the duties assigned to the Attorney General may be freely delegated. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, for instance, certain prosecutions are authorized only on the certification of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, 'which function of certification may not be delegated.' 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1). Equally precise language forbidding delegation was not employed in the legislation before us; but we think § 2516(1), fairly read, was intended to limit the power to authorize wiretap applications to the Attorney General himself and to any Assistant Attorney General he might designate. This interpretation of the statute is also strongly supported by its purpose and legislative history.
The purpose of the legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties,6 all interceptions of oral and wire communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act, most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers when authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of the serious crimes listed in § 2516. Judicial wiretap orders must be preceded by applications containing prescribed information, § 2518(1). The judge must make certain findings before authorizing interceptions, including the existence of probable cause, § 2518(3). The orders themselves must particularize the extent and nature of the interceptions that they authorize, § 2518(4), and they expire within a specified time unless expressly extended by a judge based on further application by enforcement officials, § 2518(5). Judicial supervision of the progress of the interception is provided for, § 2518(6), as is official control of the custody of any recordings or tapes produced by the interceptions carried out pursuant to the order, § 2518(8). The Act also contains provisions specifying the circumstances and procedures under and by which aggrieved persons may seek and obtain orders for the suppression of intercepted wire or oral communications sought to be used in evidence by the Government. § 2518(10) (a).
S. 1495 was not enacted, but its provision limiting those who could approve applications for court orders survived and was included in almost identical form in later legislative proposals, including the bill that became Title III of the Act now before us.7 In the course of testimony before a House Committee in 1967, the draftsman of the bill containing the basic outline of Title III engaged in the following colloquy:
'Professor Blakey. If I am not mistaken, the present procedure is before any wiretapping or electronic equipment is used now it is generally approved at that level anyway, Mr. Chairman, and I would not want this equipment used without high level responsible officials passing on it. It may very well be that in some number of cases there will not be time to get the Attorney General to approve it. I think we are going to have just (sic) to let those cases go, and that if this equipment is to be used it ought to be approved by the highest level in the Department of Justice. If we cannot make certain cases, that is going to have to be the price we will have to pay.' Hearings on Anti-Crime Program before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1379 (1967).8
'Paragraph (1) . . . centralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices might develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision in itself should go a long way toward guaranteeing that no abuses will happen.' S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96—97 (1968).
This report is particularly significant in that it not only recognizes that the authority to apply for court orders is to be narrowly confined but also declares that it is to be limited to those responsive to the political process, a category to which the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General obviously does not belong.9
The Senate passed H.R. 5037, with the amendments tracking the provisions of S. 917, on May 23, 1968, as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 114 Cong.Rec. 14798 and 14889. During the proceedings leading to the passage of the bill, emphasis was again placed on § 2516. That the Attorney General had the exclusive authority to approve or provide for the approval of wiretap applications was reiterated, and it was made clear that as the bill was drafted no United States Attorney would have or could be given the authority to apply for an intercept order without the advance approval of a senior officer in the Department.10 There was no congressional attempt, however, to extend that authority beyond the Attorney General or his Assistant Attorney General designate.
The Government insists that because § 2516(2) provides for a wider dispersal of authority among state officers to approve wiretap applications and leaves the matter of delegation up to state law,11 it is inappropriate to confine the authority so narrowly on the federal level. But it is apparent that Congress desired to centralize and limit this authority where it was feasible to do so, a desire easily implemented in the federal establishment by confining the authority to approve wiretap applications to the Attorney General or a designated Assistant Attorney General. To us, it appears wholly at odds with the scheme and history of the Act to construe § 2516(1) to permit the Attorney General to delegate his authority at will, whether it be to his Executive Assistant or to any officer in the Department other than an Assistant Attorney General.12
'(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.'13
The Court of Appeals held that the communications the Government desired to offer in evidence had been 'unlawfully intercepted' within the meaning of paragraph (i), because the October application had been approved by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General rather than by the Attorney General himself or a designated Assistant Attorney General.14 We have already determined that delegation to the Executive Assistant was indeed contrary to the statute; but the Government contends that approval by the wrong official is a statutory violation only and that paragraph (i) must be construed to reach constitutional, but not statutory, violations.15 The argument is a straightforward one based on the structure of § 2518(10)(a). On the one hand, the unlawful interceptions referred to in paragraph (i) must include some constitutional violations. Suppression for lack of probable cause, for example, is not provided for in so many words and must fall within paragraph (i) unless, as is most unlikely, the statutory suppression procedures were not intended to reach constitutional violations at all. On the other hand paragraphs (ii) and (iii) plainly reach some purely statutory defaults without constitutional overtones, and these omissions cannot be deemed unlawful interceptions under paragraph (i), else there would have been no necessity for paragraphs (ii) and (iii) or to put the matter another way, if unlawful interceptions under paragraph (i) include purely statutory issues, paragraphs (ii) and (iii) are drained of all meaning and are surplusage. The conclusion of the argument is that if non-constitutional omissions reached by paragraphs (ii) and (iii) are not unlawful interceptions under paragraph (i), then there is no basis for holding that 'unlawful interceptions' include any such statutory matters; the only purely statutory transgressions warranting suppression are those falling within paragraphs (ii) and (iii).
The position gains some support from the fact that predecessor bills specified a fourth ground for suppression—the lack of probable cause—which was omitted in subsequent bills, apparently on the ground that it was not needed because official interceptions without probable cause would be unlawful within the meaning of paragraph (i).16 Arguably, the inference is that since paragraphs (ii) and (iii) were retained, they must have been considered 'necessary,' that is, not covered by paragraph (i).
The principal piece of legislative history relative to this question is S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Government emphasizes that the report expressly states that § 2518(10)(a) 'largely reflects existing law' and that there was no intention to 'press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law.' Id. at 96. But the report also states that the section provides for suppression of evidence directly or indirectly obtained 'in violation of the chapter' and that the provision 'should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.'17 Moreover, it would not extend existing search-and-seizure law for Congress to provide for the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of explicit statutory prohibitions. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).18
In the affidavit supporting the application, the United States set out the previous applications and orders, incorporated by reference and reasserted the 'facts, details and conclusions contained in (the) affidavits' supporting the prior wiretap application, and set down in detail the relevant communications overheard under the existing order, as well as the physical movements of Giordano observed as the result of an around-the-clock surveillance that had been conducted by the authorities. App. 65—81. The Government concluded '(a) fter analyzing the intercepted conversations to and from (Giordano's telephone) and the results of BNDD surveillance' that nine listed individuals, some identified only by aliases, were associated with Giordano as suppliers or buyers in illegal narcotics trafficking and that certain other persons were perhaps connected with the operation in an as yet undisclosed fashion. Id., at 79—80. It was also said that the full scope of Giordano's organization was not yet known. Id., at 80. Assertedly, Giordano was extremely guarded in his telephone conversations, 'any specific narcotics conversations he makes are from pay phones' and '(c)onventional surveillance would be completely ineffective except as an adjunct to electronic interception.' Id., at 81. The United States accordingly requested an extension of the interception order for no longer than a 15-day period.
It is urged in dissent that the information obtained from the illegal October 16 interception order may be ignored and that the remaining evidence submitted in the extension application was sufficient to support the extension order. But whether or not the application, without the facts obtained from monitoring Giordano's telephone, would independently support original wiretap authority, the Act itself forbids extensions of prior authorizations without consideration of the results meanwhile obtained. Obviously, those results were presented, considered, and relied on in this case. Moreover, as previously noted, the Government itself had stated that the wire interception was an indispensable factor in its investigation and that ordinary surveillance alone would have been insufficient. In our view, the results of the conversations overheard under the initial order were essential, both in fact and in law, to any extension of the intercept authority. Accordingly, communications intercepted under the extension order are derivative evidence and must be suppressed.19 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
III, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510—2520
(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when—
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.
(1) The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, when such interception may provide or has provided evidence of—
(b) a violation of section 186 or section 501(c) of title 29, United States Code (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations), or any offense which involves murder, kidnapping, robbery, or extortion, and which is punishable under this title;
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire or oral communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that—
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or oral communication shall specify—
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines that—
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom on the grounds that—
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil case of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be ntitled to recover from any such person—
I agree with the majority that the authorization by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of the application for the October 16 interception order contravened 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) and that the statutory remedy is suppression of all evidence derived from interceptions made under that order. I therefore join Parts I, II, and III of the opinion of the Court. For the reasons stated below, however, I dissent from the Court's conclusion, stated in Part IV of its opinion, that evidence obtained under the two 'pen register'1 extension orders and under the November 6 extension of the interception order must also be suppressed.
These are the pertinent facts. On October 8, 1970, the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland authorized the use of a pen register device to monitor and record for a 14-day period all numbers dialed from a telephone listed to respondent Giordano. There is no dispute that the pen register order was based on probable cause and was therefore lawful under the Fourth Amendment. On October 16, 1970, the District Court issued an order authorizing the interception of wire communications to and from Giordano's telephone for a period not to exceed 21 years. There is likewise no dispute that the wiretap order was based on probable cause. The defect in the application for this order was not the strength of the Government's showing on the merits of its request but the authorization of the application by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General rather than by one of the officials specifically designated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). As a result of this procedural irregularity both the contents of communications intercepted under the October 16 wiretap order and any 'evidence derived therefrom' must be suppressed. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a).
The Government contends that, putting aside all evidence derived from the invalid original wiretap order, the independent and untainted evidence submitted to the District Court constituted probable cause for issuance of both pen register extension orders and the wiretap extension order, and in the latter case also satisfied the additional requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).2 Preoccupied with the larger issues in this case, the District Court summarily dismissed this contention insofar as it related to the pen register extension orders:
'The subsequent extension orders are not supported by sufficient showings of probable cause, however, for the reason that information was used to obtain those extension orders from a Title III wiretap which, for reasons appearing later in this opinion, was defective. The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine requires the suppression of all pen register information obtained under the subsequent orders. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).' 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1041 (D.C.Md.1972).
With respect to the wiretap extension, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the Government's contention that communications intercepted under the extension were not derivatively tainted by the improper authorization defect in the original wiretap order, and neither court made any finding on this contention. The District Court simply found the wiretap extension order invalid on a different ground applicable both to the extension and to the original order. Specifically, the court concluded that the original wiretap order was unlawful because the application for it misidentified the approving officer and therefore failed to comply strictly with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a) and (4)(d). The misidentification problem occurred in the application for the original wiretap order and in the application for the wiretap extension. The District Court held the extension order invalid on that basis alone and ordered the evidence obtained pursuant thereto suppressed for that reason.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed on a different ground entirely. It held the original order invalid because the application for it had been approved by the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General rather than by one of the officials designated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). The defect of improper authorization, unlike the misidentification problem, arose only in connection with the original wiretap order. Perhaps through simple oversight, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the fate of the evidence obtained under the extension. Thus neither of the lower courts ruled on the derivative evidence question.
Today we affirm the suppression of evidence obtained under the original wiretap order for the same reason adopted by the Court of Appeals—the defect of improper authorization. As noted above, this defect did not occur in the application for the wiretap extension order. Today we also hold that misidentification of the approving authority does not render inadmissible evidence obtained pursuant to a resulting interception order. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380. This decision removes the sole basis advanced by the District Court for suppressing the telephone conversations intercepted under the wiretap extension order and requires us to consider whether that evidence should be suppressed by reason of the improper authorization of the application for the original order. In doing so it is important to note that we are the first court to consider this aspect of the case.
* The installation of a pen register device to monitor and record the numbers dialed from a particular telephone line is not governed by Title III. This was the conclusion of the District Court in the instant case and of the courts in United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523, 548—549 (SD Cal. 1971), and in United States v. Vega, 52 F.R.D. 503, 507 (EDNY 1971). This conclusion rests on the fact that the device does not hear sound and therefore does not accomplish any 'interception' of wire communications as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)—'the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device' (emphasis added). Any doubt of the correctness of this interpretation is allayed by reference to the legislative history of Title III. The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in discussing the scope of the statute explicitly states '(t)he use of a 'pen register,' for example, would be permissible.' S.Rep.No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 (1968).
Because a pen register device is not subject to the provisions of Title III, the permissibility of its use by law enforcement authorities depends entirely on compliance with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment.4 In this case the Government secured a court order, the equivalent for this purpose of a search warrant, for each of the two extensions of its authorization to use a pen register. The District Court seemed to assume that because these extension orders were based in part on tainted evidence, information obtained pursuant thereto must necessarily be suppressed under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. 340 F.Supp., at 1041. That is not the law.
The independent-source rule has as much vitality in the context of a search warrant as in any other. Thus, for example, unlawfully discovered facts may serve as the basis for a valid search warrant if knowledge of them is obtained from an independent and lawful source. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 344 F.2d 792 (CA10 1965). The obvious and well-established corollary is that the inclusion in an affidavit of indisputably tainted allegations does not necessarily render the resulting warrant invalid. The ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally obtained evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show probable cause. James v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 315, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 (1969); United States v. Sterling, 369 F.2d 799, 802 (CA3 1966); United States v. Tarrant, 460 F.2d 701, 703—704 (CA5 1972); United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 379 (CA8 1973); Howell v. Cupp, 427 F.2d 36, 38 (CA9 1970); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 321 (CA9 1962).5 Judge Weinfeld aptly stated the point in United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80 (SDNY 1965):
'There is authority, and none to the contrary, that when a warrant issues upon an affidavit containing both proper and improper grounds, and the proper grounds—considered alone—are more than sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, inclusion of the improper grounds does not vitiate the entire affidavit and invalidate the warrant.' Id., at 82.
I know of no precedent holding to the contrary.6
The basis for the majority's conclusion to the contrary is far from apparent. In the final footnote to its opinion, the Court states that the evidence obtained under the defective original wiretap order 'should be considered a critical element in extending the pen register authority.' The majority does not suggest, however, that the original pen reggister order was based on anything less than probable cause. Nor does it deny that the affidavit supporting the extension of the pen register authority fully incorporated the earlier untainted allegations. And, finally, the majority does not contradict the established principle that a warrant based on an affidavit containing tainted allegations may nevertheless be valid if the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit shows probable cause. In light of these significant silences, the majority's bare assertion that the tainted evidence obtained under the original wiretap order was a 'critical element' in the extension of the pen register authority is, to me, an unexplained conclusion—not a rationale.
Unlike the pen register extensions, the wiretap extension order of November 6 is governed by Title III. The provisions of that statute prescribe an elaborate procedure for the lawful interception of wire communications. To the extent that the statutory requirements for issuance of an intercept order are unconstitutional in nature, the exclusionary rule adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment does not pertain to their violation. The statute, however, contains its own exclusionary rule, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), and the scope of the suppression remedy is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2515 to include derivative evidence:
Thus, although the validity of a wiretap order depends on the satisfaction of certain statutory conditions in addition to the constitutional requirement of probable cause, the principle developed in Part I of this opinion is fully applicable to the November 6 wiretap extension order. The question is not whether the application for that order relied in part on communications intercepted under the invalid original order but whether, putting aside that tainted evidence, the independent and lawful information stated in the supporting affidavit suffices to show both probable cause and satisfaction of the various additional requirements of Title III.7 United States v. Iannelli, 339 F.Supp. 171 (WD Pa. 1972); United States v. Ceraso, 355 F.Supp. 126 (MD Pa. 1973).
The application for the wiretap extension order was supported by the affidavit of a group supervisor from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The same officer had sworn to one of two affidavits submitted in support of the application for the original wiretap order. The other had been filed by a narcotics agent acting under his supervision and stated facts within their joint knowledge. In the affidavit for the extension order, the supervisor swore that he had reviewed both of the earlier affidavits, and he 'reassert(ed) the facts, details and conclusions contained in those affidavits.' App. 66. Those allegations not only established probable cause to believe that Giordano was engaged in the illegal sale any distribution of narcotics on a fairly substantial scale, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), they also satisfied the additional statutory criteria for issuance of an intercept order. They showed, for example, that Giordano had made numerous telephone calls to numbers listd to well-known narcotics violators and hence that there was probable cause to believe that communications concerning the illegal drug traffic were taking place on Giordano's telephone line. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(3)(b) and (d). The affidavits also established the inadequacy of alternative investigative means and demonstrated that without a wiretap of Giordano's telephone the narcotics agents would be unable to discover his source of supply or method of distribution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). All this was shown on the basis of wholly untainted evidence incorporated and reaffirmed in the affidavit supporting the Government's request for the wiretap extension order.
The affidavit also provided additional untainted information to support the application for the extension order. It set forth, for example, the circumstances of Giordano's sale of $3,800 worth of heroin to an undercover agent on the day following issuance of the original wiretap order. Moreover, it recounted in great detail highly suspicious conduct observed by federal agents keeping Giordano under physical surveillance.8 Like the allegations incorporated by reference from the earlier affidavits, this additional untainted information was relevant both to the constitutional requirement of probable cause and to the various statutory criteria for issuance of an intercept order. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
In full, 28 U.S.C. § 509 provides:
'All functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the Department of Justice and vested in the Attorney General except the functions—
Criminal sanctions were provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2511, and a civil damages remedy was created in § 2520. See Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 534.
In the hearings on the McClellan bill, S. 675, see n. 7, supra, the limitation on the application authorization power was frequently brought to the fore. Thus, Chief Judge Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who had earlier been United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, noted in testimony on March 8, 1967, that the 'application would require approval of the Attorney General or a designated assistant . . .,' and he urged, in support of his recommendation that it was unnecessary to limit the use of wiretapping to the investigation of a narrow group of serious crimes, the fact that there were other factors which would greatly limit the use of wiretapping, beginning with the observation that 'the proposed statute, section 5a, provides that only the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by him, may authorize the necessary application to a Federal judge for approval to wiretap. Thus the application will be carefully screened.' Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, supra, n. 7, at 171—172. A letter urging adoption of legislation to govern the area of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping was sent to the subcommittee on March 7 by all living former United States Attorneys of the Southern District of New York, who recommended that interception be prohibited 'unless authorized by a Federal judge on application of the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice specially designated by the Attorney General, when such authorized interception or recording may provide evidence of an offense against the laws of the United States.' Id., at 511—512. And Senator McClellan himself commented to a judge testifying before the subcommittee:
'This legislation, as you know, requires rather thorough court supervision through the application for a court order made by the Attorney General or officials designated in the bill. A court of course, would have to weigh the probable cause or the reasonable cause in support of such an application. I do not know how to tighten it up any more than we have in the bill. . . . Can you tell us how to tighten it up any more?' Id., at 894—895.
The Attorney General is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 28 U.S.C. § 503, as are the nine Assistant Attorneys General provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 506. The position of Executive Assistant, on the other hand, is established by regulation, to assist the Attorney General, inter alia, in the review of 'matters submitted for the Attorney General's action' and to '(p)erform such other duties and functions as may be specially assigned from time to time by the Attorney General.' 28 CFR § 0.6. It would appear from the Government's brief that the Executive Assistant involved in this case served as Executive Assistant to at least four Attorneys General.
'We also would seek to reduce the anomaly referred to above by providing that the Attorney General may delegate to United States Attorneys the power to initiate applications.' 114 Cong.Rec. 14473—14474.
The draft statute prepared by Professor Blakey provided this fourth ground warranting suppression in cases where there was no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the interception order was issued. Task Force Report: Organized Crime, supra, n. 7, at 111, § 3803(k)(1) (C). So did the McClellan bill, S. 675, which was introduced prior to Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). Hearings on Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, supra, n. 7, at 78, § 8(g)(3). But the bill proposed by Senator Hruska after Berger (S. 2050) omitted this ground in a provision the language of which is substantially identical to § 2518(10)(a) as finally enacted. Id., at 1008, § 2518(k)(1). An explanation for the omission is provided in an appendix comparing S. 675 with S. 2050, which was published by Senator Scott, a cosponsor of the latter bill, in an article in the Howard Law Journal, Wiretapping and Organized Crime, 14 HowL.J. 1 (1968), and which was reprinted in Senator Scott's remarks on the Senate floor concerning the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 114 Cong.Rec. 13205—13211. It is there simply stated that 'Senator Hruska's man says that the probable cause test is implied in (1).' Id., at 13211.
We find without substance the Government's suggestion that since 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) makes criminal the 'willful' disclosure of the contents of an intercepted communication, 'knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection,' and § 2515 ties the propriety of suppression of evidence to the impropriety of its 'disclosure,' to hold that statutory violations committee in the Justice Department's internal approval and submission procedures with respect to wiretap applications preclude disclosure in court would be to attribute to Congress an intent to impose substantial criminal penalties for 'every defect in processing applications.' Brief for United States 38. Apart from the fact that a majority of the Court in United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380, has concluded that not every defect will warrant suppression, it is evident that § 2511 does not impose criminal liability unless disclosure is 'willful' and unless the information was known to have been obtained in violation of § 2511(1). Clearly, the circumstances under which suppression of evidence would be required are not necessarily the same as those under which a criminal violation of Title III would be found.
A pen register is a mechanical device attached to a given telephone line and usually installed at a central telephone facility. It records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from that line. It does not identify the telephone numbers from which incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed. Its use does not involve any monitoring of telephone conversations. The mechanical complexities of a pen register are explicated in the opinion of the District Court. 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1-38—1041 (Md.1972).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), the court is required to make the following determinations:
The majority seems to believe that this principle, while fully applicable to original wiretap orders, is wholly inapplicable to extension orders. This, at least, is the most reasonable construction of the majority's discussion of §§ 2518(1)(e) and (f). Ante, at 532—533. Those provisions require that an application for an extension order include 'a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications' and 'a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception . . ..' According to the majority, the fact that law enforcement authorities complied with §§ 2518(1)(e) and (f) by including in the application for the extension order information regardig the earlier wiretap necessarily and automatically rendered the extension order invalid, regardless of whether the independent and untainted information in the application for the extension satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and § 2518(3).
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