Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/464/16/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-04-07 17:35:44
Document Index: 331094507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1963', '§ 1341', '§ 1963', '§ 1963', '§ 1961', '§ 1963', '§ 1963', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 1963', '§ 848', '§ 848']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 464 > RUSSELLO V. UNITED STATES, 464 U. S. 16 (1983)
Subscribe to Cases that cite 464 U. S. 16
(c) The fact that the Controlled Substances Act specifically authorizes the forfeiture of "profits" obtained in illegal drug enterprises cannot be read as imposing a limitation upon § 1963(a)(1)'s broader language, particularly chanrobles.com-red
On June 8, 1977, petitioner Joseph C. Russello and others were indicted for racketeering, conspiracy, and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1962(c) and (d), and 2. App. 5. After a jury trial in the United States District Court for chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner took an appeal to the former United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A panel of that court affirmed petitioner's criminal conviction, United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 406 (1981), and this Court denied certiorari, 456 U.S. 943 (1982), as to that aspect of the case. The panel, however, reversed the judgment of forfeiture. App. 64-69. The full court granted rehearing en banc on the forfeiture issue and, by a vote of 16-7, vacated that portion of the panel opinion and then affirmed the forfeiture judgment entered by the District Court. United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (1982). Because of this significant division among the judges of the Court of Appeals, and because the Fifth Circuit majority, id. at 959, stated that its holding "squarely conflict[ed]" with that of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (1980), we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 1101 (1983). [Footnote 1] Since then, the Seventh Circuit has issued an opinion agreeing with the Ninth Circuit. United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283-287 (1983). chanrobles.com-red
681 F.2d 953 (footnote omitted).
Specifically, petitioner was the owner of the Central Professional Building in Tampa. This structure had two parts, an original smaller section in front and a newer addition at the rear. The latter contained apartments, offices, and parking facilities. Petitioner arranged for arsonists to set fire to the front portion. He intended to use the insurance proceeds to rebuild that section. The fire, however, spread to the rear. Joseph Carter, another member of the arson ring, was the adjuster for petitioner's insurance claim, and helped him to obtain the highest payments possible. The resulting payments made up the aggregate sum of $340,043.09 chanrobles.com-red
Here, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) calls for the forfeiture to the United States of "any interest . . . acquired . . . in violation chanrobles.com-red
This Court repeatedly has relied upon the term "interest" in defining the meaning of "property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 408 U. S. 601 (1972) ("property' denotes a broad range of interests"); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 455 U. S. 430 (1982); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U. S. 14, 454 U. S. 17-18 (1981). It undoubtedly was because Congress did not wish the forfeiture provision of § 1963(a) to be limited by rigid and technical definitions drawn from other areas of the law that it selected the broad term "interest" to describe those things that are subject to forfeiture under the statute. Congress selected this general term apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth. Among these are "enterprise" in § 1961(4); "racketeering chanrobles.com-red
We are fortified in this conclusion by our examination of the structure of the RICO statute. We disagree with those chanrobles.com-red
The evolution of these statutory provisions supplies further evidence that Congress intended § 1963(a)(1) to extend beyond an interest in an enterprise. An early proposed version of RICO, S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), had a single forfeiture provision for § 1963(a) that was limited to "all interest in the enterprise." This provision, however, later was divided into the present two subsections and the phrase "in the enterprise" was excluded from the first. Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill chanrobles.com-red
Petitioner stresses that 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2), contained in the Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, specifically authorizes the forfeiture of "profits" obtained in a continuing criminal enterprise engaged in certain drug offenses. Brief for Petitioner 6-7. The Ninth Circuit, in chanrobles.com-red
Marubeni, 611 F.2d 766, n. 7, placed similar reliance upon § 848(a)(2), and observed that the two statutes were passed by the same Congress in the same month. We feel, however, that the specific mention of "profits" in the Controlled Substances Act cannot be accepted as an indication that the broader language of § 1963(a)(1) was not meant to reach profits as well as other types of property interests. Language in one statute usually sheds little light upon the meaning of different language in another statute, even when the two are enacted at or about the same time. The term "profits" is specific; the term "interest" is general. The use of the specific in the one statute cannot fairly be read as imposing a limitation upon the general provision in the other statute. In addition, the RICO statute was aimed at organized crime's economic power in all its forms, and it was natural to use the broad term "interest" to fulfill that aim. In contrast, the narcotics activity proscribed by § 848 usually generates only monetary profits, a fact which would explain the use of the narrower term in § 848(a)(2).
Petitioner also suggests that subsequent proposed legislation demonstrates that the RICO forfeiture provision of 1970 excludes profits. Brief for Petitioner 29-34. The bills to which petitioner refers, however, were introduced in order to chanrobles.com-red
The legislative history clearly demonstrates that the RICO statute was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots. Congress' statement of findings and purpose in chanrobles.com-red
Id. at 79. Senator Scott spoke of "new legal weapons," 116 Cong.Rec. 819 (1970), and Senator McClellan stressed the need for new penal remedies. Id. at 591-592. Representative Poff, floor manager of the bill in the House, made similar observations. Id. at 35193. Representative Rodino observed that "[d]rastic methods . . . are essential, and we must develop law enforcement measures at least as efficient as those of organized crime." Id. at 35199. The RICO statute was viewed as one such "extraordinary" weapon. Id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). And the forfeiture provision was chanrobles.com-red
We are not persuaded otherwise by the presence of a 1969 letter from the then Deputy Attorney General to Senator McClellan. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st chanrobles.com-red