Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/511-u-s-298-605224106
Timestamp: 2020-06-04 15:43:46
Document Index: 168823812

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1977', '§ 1981', '§ 101', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 101', '§ 102', '§ 101']

511 U.S. 298 (1994), 92-938, Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc. - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 605224106
511 U.S. 298 (1994), 92-938, Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.
Docket Nº: No. 92-938
Citation: 511 U.S. 298, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, 62 U.S.L.W. 4271
Party Name: RIVERS et al. v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, 62 U.S.L.W. 4271
Section 101 does not apply to a case that arose before it was enacted. Pp. 303-314.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, ante, p. 286. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 314.
Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102- 166, 105 Stat. 1071, defines the term "make and enforce contracts" as used in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." We granted certiorari to decide whether § 101 applies to a case that arose before it was enacted. We hold that it does not.
On December 22, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondent had discharged them because of their race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.[1] They claimed, inter alia, that they had been fired on baseless charges because of their race and because they had insisted on the same procedural protections afforded white employees.
On appeal, petitioners contended that the District Court had misconstrued their complaint: They had not merely claimed discriminatory discharge, but more specifically had alleged that respondent had retaliated against them, because of their race, for attempting to enforce their procedural rights under the collective-bargaining agreement. Because that allegation related to "enforcement" of the labor contract, petitioners maintained, it stated a § 1981 claim even under Patterson's construction of the statute. While petitioners' appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) became law. Section 101 of that Act provides that § 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts applies to all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship, including discriminatory contract terminations.[2] Petitioners accordingly filed
a supplemental brief advancing the argument that the new statute applied in their case. The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioners' first contention but not the second. Accordingly, it ruled that § 1981 as interpreted in Patterson, not as amended by § 101, governed the case and remanded for a jury trial limited to petitioners' discrimination-in-contract-enforcement claim. See Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (CA6 1992).
In Landgraf, we concluded that § 102 of the 1991 Act does not apply to cases that arose before its enactment. The reasons supporting that conclusion also apply to § 101, and require rejection of two of petitioners' submissions in this case. First, these petitioners, like the petitioner in Landg...
1 Minn. 24 (Minn. 1851), Chouteau v. Rice