Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/444/83/341080/
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 17:32:07
Document Index: 3490816

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 460', '§ 1622', '§ 1625', '§ 1622', '§ 1622', '§ 1622']

Robert Austin Wright, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Selective Service System, Local Board No. 105, St. Louis County, Minnesota, et al., Defendants-appellants, 444 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1971) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1971 › Robert Austin Wright, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Selective Service System, Local Board No. 105, St. Loui...
Robert Austin Wright, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Selective Service System, Local Board No. 105, St. Louis County, Minnesota, et al., Defendants-appellants, 444 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1971)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 444 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1971)
Morton Hollander, Chief, Appellate Section, L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert G. Renner, U. S. Atty., J. F. Bishop, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
The facts of this case are fully set out in the lower court's opinion, published at 319 F. Supp. 509. For the purposes of this appeal, the facts can be briefly stated:
On appeal, the government raises two issues: (1) the scope of pre-induction review under 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3), and (2) the scope of the fatherhood deferment.2
We dispose of this case by holding that the lower court erred in granting relief since the applicable regulations did not entitle the registrant to a III-A fatherhood deferment.3 In Ryan v. Hershey, supra, we held that 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(c) (3) is a valid exercise of Presidential discretion and that it precludes the granting of the III-A fatherhood deferment on account of unborn children unless the registrant notifies his Local Board of the pregnancy prior to the issuance of his induction order. In our view, this regulation establishes a valid criterion for the issuance of the deferment and is not superseded or modified by 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2, the regulation governing the reopening of classifications subsequent to the issuance of an order to report for induction.
Nor do we think that the actual birth of the registrant's child entitles him to the fatherhood deferment. While § 1622.30(c) (3) speaks specifically only to the situation of a deferment because of unborn children, we believe it evidences a general regulatory scheme to grant fatherhood deferments to only those individuals who, at the time of the issuance of their order to report for induction, have children or have notified their local board of their wife's pregnancy. Since the regulations permit the fatherhood deferment to be granted upon notification of conception, we think it understandable that the regulations do not specifically prohibit the granting of the deferment upon the birth of a child after the issuance of an induction order. The regulations obviously recognize the close relationship between pregnancy and birth and do not intend that these events should be considered separate justifications for the fatherhood deferment.
This case does not involve the III-A hardship deferment. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(b) [now 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(a)]