Source: http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20BCO%2020170615783/IN%20RE%20GREGORY
Timestamp: 2017-06-23 03:19:45
Document Index: 323056696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 362', '§ 521', '§ 362', '§ 521', '§ 521', '§ 521']

IN RE GREGORY | Case No. 10-50237. | By CYNTHIA A. NORTON | Leagle.com
Citing Case IN RE: RUBY AUDEEN GREGORY, Debtor.
Description of the Real Estate Involved At the time Ruby Gregory filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2010, she owned a home in Stanberry, Missouri, known as 317 N. Willow Street, with her daughter, Rita.3 The property at 317 N. Willow is legally described in part as "Tract B."4 Ruby and Rita also owned the adjoining property, 313 N. Willow Street, legally described in part as "Tract A."5 The property at 313 N. Willow is a lot with an abandoned structure.
• expanded the individual debtor's duty to file a statement of intention to all secured debts, not just consumer ones42
• shortened the time for the debtor to perform the intention43
• added a new debtor duty to "not retain possession" of certain personal property unless the debtor timely reaffirmed the debt or redeemed the property44
• added a "penalty" for violations of the duty not to retain possession by providing for an automatic lift of stay before the discharge45
• added a separate provision in § 362(h) lifting the stay when the debtor either failed to timely file the statement of intention with respect to certain personal property or failed to "take timely the action"46
• modified the savings clause in § 521(a)(2) to make it subject to § 362(h)47
• validated the enforcement of ipso facto clauses in certain circumstances related to certain personal property48
• authorized secured creditors with an interest in the debtor's principal residence to seek or obtain periodic payments "associated with a valid security interest in lieu of pursuit of in rem relief to enforce the lien."49
FootNotes 1. All statutory references are to the United States Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, unless otherwise noted. All references to "Rules" are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, unless otherwise noted.
35. The Third Circuit in In re Price, the last circuit court to address the issue before the BAPCPA amendments of 2005, explains the statutory construction problem with § 521(2) this way:
We begin with the pertinent text of section 521(2)(A). Congress has mandated that a debtor must file a statement of intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). The trouble lies with the phrase `if applicable.' Do those words merely indicate that the three options — exemption, redemption, and reaffirmation — are relevant when a debtor intends to retain and not applicable when a debtor chooses to surrender the collateral? If so, section 521(2)(A) sets out an exhaustive set of retention options. Or, does `if applicable' mean `if' the debtor wishes to choose any of the three options that follow on its heels, i.e., when redemption, reaffirmation, and exemption `apply,' that intention must be specifically stated? If the latter construction is correct, then section 521(2)(A) leaves available other methods of retention, such as by keeping the loan current.
37. As explained in In re Parker, the analysis is actually more nuanced:
The Second, Fourth, and Tenth circuits have held that debtors who are current on their loan payments on secured property may elect to retain the property and make the payments specified in the contracts with the creditor. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 53; Home Owners Funding Corp. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989). After a thorough review of the extant case law, the Second Circuit held that the statute "appears to serve primarily a notice function, not necessarily to restrict the substantive options available to a debtor who wishes to retain collateral security a debt." In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the words `if applicable' meant that there are other options available to the debtor. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348. The Tenth Circuit decided that the plain language of the statute was mandatory, but as the statute gives no power of enforcement, the bankruptcy court, in its discretion may allow the debtor to keep possession of the property and continue to make payments: "[A]lthough we regard as mandatory the provisions of [§ 521], we do not believe these provisions make redemption or reaffirmation the exclusive means by which a bankruptcy court can allow a debtor to retain secured property." In re Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1547.
44. In a case under chapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an individual, [the debtor shall] not retain possession of personal property as to which a creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price secured in whole or in part by an interest in such personal property unless the debtor, not later than 45 days after the first meeting of creditors under section 341(a), either —