Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/327/173/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-09-26 17:25:47
Document Index: 86157728

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 16', '§ 15', '§ 215', '§ 16', '§ 16']

Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co. :: 327 U.S. 173 (1946) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co.
Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co. 327 U.S. 173 (1946)
U.S. Supreme CourtMartino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946)Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co.No. 21Argued October 8, 9, 1945Decided February 4, 1946327 U.S. 173CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner sued to enjoin violation of § 15(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to recover under § 16(b) for unpaid overtime compensation. The district court dismissed the complaint. 51 F.Supp. 505. The circuit court of appeals affirmed. 145 F.2d 163. This Court granted certiorari. 325 U.S. 849. Reversed, p. 327 U. S. 178. Page 327 U. S. 174
The petitioner sued the respondent in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. He sued for himself as a former employee of the respondent and also in a representative capacity for its other employees similarly situated. He sought to enjoin the respondent from violation of § 15(a)(1)(2)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1)(2)(3), of the Fair Labor Page 327 U. S. 175 Standards Act of 1938, and to recover under § 16(b) of the Act [Footnote 1] unpaid overtime compensation together with a like sum as liquidated damages, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
The respondent, a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Detroit, was engaged in washing windows, painting, and similar maintenance work. The employees of the respondent were required in some instances to work longer than 42 hours per week subsequent to October 24, 1939, and longer than 40 hours per week subsequent to October 24, 1940, but were not paid time Page 327 U. S. 176 and a half except for hours worked in excess of 44 hours per week. [Footnote 2]
The work of the respondent and of its employees was done within the Michigan and, for the most part, on the premises of the respondent's customers. It consisted primarily of cleaning the windows for those customers, always under contracts between them and the respondent. The greater part of this work was done on windows on premises used by respondent's customers in the production of goods for interstate commerce. [Footnote 3] Under the circumstances of this case, the cleaning of the windows of industrial plants by the employees of the respondent is an occupation necessary to the production of the goods produced in those plants. [Footnote 4] If the services rendered in Page 327 U. S. 177 this case had been rendered by employees of respondent's customers engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce, those employees would have come under the Act. Respondent's employees are not to be excluded from such coverage merely because their employment to do the same work was under independent contracts. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517, 316 U. S. 524; Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 317 U. S. 90.
Throughout this case, the respondent has urged as a defense that, in good faith and from year to year, since before 1939, it has entered into and renewed written agreements with the labor union of which petitioner and those for whom this suit is brought were members. Some of these agreements, renewed since the Act became effective, applied to the periods here in question and required the respondent to pay overtime for work done in excess of 44 hours a week. This requirement was fully observed. The District Court made a finding that the existence and observance of such agreements constituted no bar to the right of the employees to recover under § 16(b) if the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the case and required overtime pay for work done in excess of a lesser number Page 327 U. S. 178 of hours per week than were stipulated in the agreements. It was not necessary for the Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the effect of this agreement because, in its view, the Act did not apply to the respondent's employees. However, under the view which we take, the respondent is entitled to a decision on this further defense. We agree with the District Court that the agreements cannot supersede the Act, and are not a bar to this action. Cf. Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 324 U. S. 707 et seq.