Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/obanion-v-borba-29341
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O'BANION v. BORBA - 32 Cal.2d 145 - Mon, 06/28/1948 | California Supreme Court Resources
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Citation 32 Cal.2d 145
O'BANION v. BORBA , 32 Cal.2d 145
Defendants assert that to acquire a prescriptive easement there must be an open and notorious claim of right, non-permissive user and a use other than that in common with the public. Their attack is basically aimed at the sufficiency of the evidence to establish an open claim of right and adverse user. [1] In this connection it is pertinent to observe that whether the use of the easement is adverse and under a claim of right, or permissive and with the owner's consent, and the nature of the user is sufficient to put the owner on notice, are questions of fact. (1 Cal.Jur. 635.) Also, if there is any substantial evidence to support the judgment, it must be affirmed. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the prevailing [32 Cal.2d 148] party and the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to him.
[3] There has been considerable confusion in the cases involving the acquisition of easements by prescription, concerning [32 Cal.2d 149] the presence or absence of a presumption that the use is under a claim of right adverse to the owner of the servient tenement, and of which he has constructive notice, upon the showing of an open, continuous, notorious and peaceable use for the prescriptive period. Some cases hold that from that showing a presumption arises that the use is under a claim of right adverse to the owner. (Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28 [87 P. 908]; Franz v. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205 [63 P. 361]; Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62 [11 P. 879]; Stevens v. Mostachetti, 73 Cal.App.2d 910 [167 P.2d 809]; Smith v. Skrbek, 71 Cal.App.2d 351 [162 P.2d 674]; Chapman v. Sky L'Onda Mut. Water Co., 69 Cal.App.2d 667 [159 P.2d 988]; Shonafelt v. Busath, 66 Cal.App.2d 5 [151 P.2d 873]; Rose v. Peters, 59 Cal.App.2d 833 [139 P.2d 983]; Wallace v. Whitmore, 47 Cal.App.2d 369 [117 P.2d 926]; Redemeyer v. Carroll, 21 Cal.App.2d 217 [68 P.2d 739]; Lemos v. Farmin, 128 Cal.App. 195 [17 P.2d 148]; Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. Crockett L. & C. Co., 70 Cal.App. 283 [233 P. 370]; Costello v. Sharp, 65 Cal.App. 152 [223 P. 567]; Riciolo v. Lynch, 65 Cal.App. 53 [223 P. 88]; Wells v. Dias, 57 Cal.App. 670 [207 P. 913]; Yuba Cons. Goldfields v. Hilton, 16 Cal.App. 228 [116 P. 715]; Silva v. Hawn, 10 Cal.App. 544 [102 P. 952]; Gurnsey v. Antelope Creek etc. W. Co., 6 Cal.App. 387 [92 P. 326].) It has been intimated that the presumption does not arise when the easement is over unenclosed and unimproved land. (See 28 C.J.S. 736; 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), § 1196A.) Other cases hold that there must be specific direct evidence of an adverse claim of right, and in its absence, a presumption of permissive use is indulged. (Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 667 [66 P. 10]; Los Angeles Brick etc. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.2d 478 [141 P.2d 46]; Rochex & Rochex, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Co., 128 Cal.App. 474 [17 P.2d 794]; Heenan v. Bevans, 51 Cal.App. 277 [196 P. 802].) The preferable view is to treat the case the same as any other, that is, the issue is ordinarily one of fact, giving consideration to all the circumstances and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner. There seems to be no apparent reason for discussing the matter from the standpoint of presumptions. For the trial court the question is whether the circumstances proven do or do not justify an inference showing the required elements. In the appellate [32 Cal.2d 150] court the issue is merely whether there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. This view has been implicitly followed. (See Hutton v. Ormando, 3 Cal.2d 305 [43 P.2d 1100]; Conaway v. Toogood, 172 Cal. 706 [158 P. 200]; Abbott v. Pond, 142 Cal. 393 [76 P. 60]; Humphreys v. Blasingame, 104 Cal. 40 [37 P. 804]; Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456 [12 P. 491]; McMorris v. Pagano, 63 Cal.App.2d 446 [146 P.2d 944]; De la Cuesta v. Bazzi, 47 Cal.App.2d 661 [118 P.2d 909]; Bernstein v. Dodik, 129 Cal.App. 454 [18 P.2d 983]; Grimmesey v. Kirtlan, 93 Cal.App. 658 [270 P. 243]; Brandon v. Umpqua Lumber etc. Co., 26 Cal.App. 96 [146 P. 46]; Burris v. Rodrigues, 22 Cal.App. 645 [135 P. 1105]; Alper v. Tormey, 7 Cal.App. 8 [93 P. 402].) In Conaway v. Toogood, supra, the rule is succinctly stated: "The question as to whether or not the use of a right of way has been adverse and under a claim of legal right so to do, or a mere matter of neighborly accommodation, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, or the court sitting without a jury, from all the facts and circumstances of the case." (P. 709.) While many of the cases mention presumptions, the problem actually discussed therein is the sufficiency of the evidence in the light of all the circumstances disclosed. Furthermore, we see no reason why the same rule should not apply to uncultivated and unenclosed land. It may require more circumstances to establish the right, but the test is ultimately the same.
In the instant case, as before stated, there was ample evidence from which the trial court could conclude that plaintiffs' use was continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, adverse and under a claim of right, with notice of which defendants and their predecessors could be charged. (See Biggs Ditch Co. v. Jongste, 24 Cal.2d 298 [149 P.2d 1]; Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28 [87 P. 908]; Franz v. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205 [63 P. 361]; Wallace v. Whitmore, supra; Redemeyer v. Carroll, supra; Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. Crockett L. & C. Co., supra; Costello v. Sharp, supra; Riciola v. Lynch, supra; Wells v. Dias, supra; Yuba Cons. Goldfields v. Hilton, supra; see 34 Cal.L.Rev. 445.)
Defendants rely upon the following cases: Peck v. Howard, 73 Cal.App.2d 308 [167 P.2d 753]; Jones v. Tierney-Sinclair, 71 Cal.App.2d 366 [162 P.2d 669]; Smith v. Skrbek, supra; Lyons v. Schwartz, 40 Cal.App.2d 60 [104 P.2d 383]; Schudel v. Hertz, 125 Cal.App. 564 [13 P.2d 1008]; and [32 Cal.2d 151] Eddy v. Demichelis, 100 Cal.App. 517 [280 P. 389]. In each of those cases, a judgment based upon findings of the trial court was affirmed, as being supported by sufficient evidence. The evidence simply portrayed the circumstances under which it was claimed the easements were acquired. Likewise, in the instant case it may well be that the trial court could have come to a contrary conclusion, but it was not required to do so as a matter of law under the evidence here presented.
[5] On the claim that the use of the easements was permissive, defendants refer to conversations with plaintiff [32 Cal.2d 152] O'Banion when the defendants erected the fences in 1945 to the effect that he went to defendants to see if the roads could be opened, and discussed the payment of $85 to defendants to obtain an opening, and to alleged admissions by plaintiff O'Banion in his deposition to the effect that he obtained the permission of Miller and Lux, defendants' predecessors, to use the easements.
O'Banion was asked if he had testified in his deposition to the effect that he got permission of Miller and Lux in [32 Cal.2d 153] 1938. He stated that he had. On the other hand we have repeated testimony by O'Banion and others that no permission was obtained from anyone. Assuming the testimony from the deposition was offered as admissions of plaintiff O'Banion and thus independent evidence rather than impeachment (which is doubtful) we have nothing more than a conflict in his testimony which has been resolved by the trier of fact against defendants. "... it is within the province of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in evidence whether the conflict is between witnesses on one side or on opposite sides. Hence, this court will not disturb the finding where there is any substantial evidence supporting it, even though there is a conflict in the evidence produced by the prevailing party." (Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 Cal.2d 296, 301 [163 P.2d 860].)
[7] Defendants raise for the first time by letter sent to this court, after they petitioned for a hearing here, the contention that the injunctive portion of the judgment debarring them from obstructing the easements in anyway whatsoever is too broad and that they should be permitted to erect gates across them. Various rules have been applied in regard to the right of the servient owner to maintain gates (and require the owner of the easement to shut them) across an easement [32 Cal.2d 154] acquired by prescription. It has been stated by some authorities that the right is measured by the user and thus if no gates ever existed during the prescriptive period none may be maintained thereafter. Others hold that in any event the servient owner is entitled to use the easement in any way that does not interfere with the use by the dominant owner and hence he may maintain gates if they do not unreasonably interfere with the easement owner's use of his easement. Some make a distinction between where the easement is in urban areas and over agricultural land. (See cases collected and discussion, 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 98; 73 A.L.R. 778; Thompson on Real Property (Perm. ed.), § 586; Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.), § 812; 17 Ky.L.J. 132; 5 Temp.L.Q. 297; Jones on Easements, § 400; Gale on Easements (9th ed.), p. 495.) It is conceded that during the prescriptive period here involved defendants' land was unenclosed and there are only vague references to it having been used for pasturage. It was at that time apparently unused, uncultivated land. There is no evidence of the use defendants are making or intend to make of their land, nor other circumstances showing the need for gates. Nor did defendants offer evidence to show that the maintenance of gates would not unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs' use of the easements. It is apparent from the record that so far as defendants are concerned, the case was tried upon the theory that plaintiffs had not acquired the easements claimed by them across defendants' property, and no consideration was given to the right of defendants to maintain gates or cattle guards across the easements in the event plaintiffs established their right thereto. As hereinbefore stated, this question was not raised until after defendants' petition for hearing was filed in this court. The question as to the right of defendants to maintain gates or cattle guards across said easements is therefore not before us. In their closing brief filed November 20, 1947, plaintiffs concede that defendants have the right to construct and maintain cattle guards across said easements. Such cattle guards would, of course, constitute some obstruction to the use of said easements by plaintiffs, as one of the uses claimed by plaintiffs was the driving of cattle over said roads. [8] In view of the nature of the easements here involved, it would seem that the maintenance of gates across the roads in question, which gates could be opened and closed by plaintiffs at will, would not constitute obstructions prohibited by the judgment. This question may arise in the event defendants [32 Cal.2d 155] should enclose their land with a fence and construct suitable gates on the roads for the use of those who have the right to traverse them.
It would seem to follow, therefore that the judgment must be interpreted in the light of the use for which the easements were acquired by plaintiffs, and the right of defendants to make a reasonable use of their land subject to the easements thus acquired. (See 17 Am.Jur. § 122, p. 1012; 73 A.L.R. 778, 788; Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. Co. (1941), 17 Cal.2d 576, 579 [110 P.2d 983, 133 A.L.R. 1186]; Merry v. Priest (1931), 276 Mass. 592 [177 N.E. 673, 674]; Chesson v. Jordan (1944), 224 N.C. 289 [29 S.E.2d 906, 909]; Board of Trustees v. Gotten (1919), 119 Mass. 246 [80 So. 522, 523]; Dyer v. Walker (1898), 99 Wis. 404 [75 N.W. 79]; Flener v. Lawrence (1920), 187 Ky. 384 [220 S.W. 1041, 1044].) Whether under such interpretation of the judgment defendants may construct and maintain gates across said easements, which will not interfere with plaintiffs' use thereof, is a matter for the future determination of the court if and when the question is presented.
Mon, 06/28/1948 32 Cal.2d 145 Review - Civil Appeal Opinion issued
1 EMORY O'BANION et al. (Respondent)
2 s, v. A. A. BORBA et al., Appellants. (s, v. A. A. BORBA et al.)
3 EMORY O'BANION et al. (Respondent)
Jun 28 1948 Opinion: Affirmed
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