Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/292/25
Timestamp: 2016-07-29 02:19:05
Document Index: 47233874

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 33', '§ 76', '§ 33', '§ 28', '§ 71', '§ 33', '§ 8', '§ 33', '§ 125', '§ 1', '§ 641', '§ 74', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 56', '§ 74', '§ 51']

GAY v. RUFF. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
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292 U.S. 25 (54 S.Ct. 608, 78 L.Ed. 1099)
Argued: Feb. 12, 13, 1934.
[HTML] Syllabus from 25-26 intentionally omitted
Ruff brought in a state court of Georgia this suit against Gay, as receiver of the Savannah & Atlanta Railway, appointed by the federal court for southern Georgia sitting in equity. The cause of action alleged is the homicide of plaintiff's minor son as a result of the negligent operation of a train by employees of the receiver. Before trial in the state court, the receiver duly filed in the appropriate federal court a petition for removal and certiorari, under the amendment made by Act of August 23, 1916, c. 399, 39 Stat. 532 to Judicial Code § 33 (28 USCA § 76), which inserted therein the clause: 'or against any officer of the courts of the United States for or on account of any act done under color of his office or in the performance of his duties as such officer.'
The federal court denied a motion to remand, (D.C.) 3 F.Supp. 264; and thereafter dismissed the suit, entering a final judgment for want of prosecution. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that judgment, with direction to set aside the dismissal and remand the cause to the state court. 67 F.(2d) 684. Because of conflict of decisions,
certiorari was granted to determine whether the amendment to Judicial Code § 33 authorizes a receiver of a railroad appointed by a federal court sitting in equity to remove from a state court an action brought against him as receiver for damages resulting from the negligent operation of a train by his employees.
First. The respondent raises the preliminary question whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The contention is that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a judgment directing the remand to a state court, because Judicial Code § 28 (28 USCA § 71), declares: 'Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any district court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.'
This provision, enacted in 1887, was broadly construed by this Court as prohibiting review of an order of remand, directly or indirectly, by any proceeding. The prohibition was applied to appeals from, and writs of error to, the federal circuit (and later district) court; to writs of error to a state court after final judgment there; and to mandamus in this Court.
In German National Bank v. Speckert, 181 U.S. 405, 409, 21 S.Ct. 688, 45 L.Ed. 926, where the trial court had refused to remand the case to the state court and the Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed that judgment and ordered a remand, this Court held that it was without jurisdiction to review the latter's action. While adverting in support of its conclusion to the broad construction which had been given to the above-quoted prohibition, the Court ruled there that the fact that an order of remand is not a final judgment precluded its review by writ of error.
But by reason of the extensive power to issue writs of certiorari which the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891
thereafter gave to this Court, it may now review the action to the circuit court of appeals in directing the remand of a cause to the state court. That Act provided that in any case in which the judgment of the circuit court of appeals is made final, 'it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review and determination with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court.' In Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 512, 17 S.Ct. 665, 41 L.Ed. 1095, it was held that the power given was unaffected by the condition of the case as it exists in the circuit court of appeals; that the power may be exercised before, as well as after, any decision by that court and irrespective of any ruling or determination therein; and that the sole essential of this Court's jurisdiction to review is that there be a case pending in the circuit court of appeals. The jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders was exercised in American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, 148 U.S. 372, 13 S.Ct. 758, 37 L.Ed. 486; Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123, 133, 33 S.Ct. 657, 57 L.Ed. 1101; Spiller v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 253 U.S. 117, 121, 40 S.Ct. 466, 64 L.Ed. 810; and Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 37 S.Ct. 575, 61 L.Ed. 1016. And in The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 49, 17 S.Ct. 495, 497, 41 L.Ed. 897, it was held that this Court could review a case pending in, and not yet decided by, the circuit court of appeals, with the same power and authority as if it had been carried here by appeal or writ of error 'that is, as if it had been brought directly from the district or the circuit court.' In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 31 S.Ct. 460, 55 L.Ed. 521, decided under the act of 1891, this Court, without questioning its power, reviewed the judgment of the circuit court of appeals reversing a judgment of dismissal and ordering a remand. Nor has the existence of the power been questioned by the Court since.
Judicial Code § 33 enables a defendant in a state court to remove the case before trial or final hearing there, and thus secure an adjudication by a federal court of first instance of the issues of fact as well as law involved in his justification under the federal statutes. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263, 25 L.Ed. 648. The origin of that section is section 3 of the 'Force Act,' March 2, 1833, c. 57, 4 Stat. 632, 633the nation's reply to South Carolina's threat of 'nullification.' The purpose of the Force Act was to prevent paralysis of operations of the federal government. The special aim of section 3 was to protect those engaged in the enforcement of the federal revenue law from attack by means of prosecutions and suits in a state court for violation of state law. This removal provision was extended by Act of March 3, 1875, c. 130, § 8, 18 Stat. 371, 401, to suits against 'any person for or on account of anything done by him while an officer of either House or Congress in the discharge of his official duty, in executing any order of such House.' These provisions only are embodied in Judicial Code § 33.
The scope of the section was thus limited to cases arising out of the enforcement of the revenue laws or of some order of either House of Congress. And it applied in those cases only when the person defending caused it to appear that his defense was that in doing the acts charged he was doing no more than his duty under those laws or orders.
To appreciate the exceptional character of the removal privilege conferred by section 33, that section should be compared with section 28. Of the two, section 33 alone provides for removal of a criminal case. Removal of civil causes is provided for in both section 33 and section 28 of the Judicial Code. But the civil cases to which section 33 is applicable are few. While section 28 applies to many. Under the latter, any officer of a federal court can remove a suit brought against him on account of any act done under color of his office or in the performance of his duties as such officer, because section 28 applies to 'any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, * * * of which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction.' But in order to avail of the removal privilege conferred by section 28 in respect of a suit arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the facts showing that the suit is of that class must appear by the complaint in the state court;
the amount in controversy must exceed $3,000, except in those cases where jurisdiction is conferred regardless of amount;
the petition for removal must be filed in the state court before the time fixed for answer there; and it must be accompanied by a bond. On the other hand, where section 33 is applicable, the conditions for removal are much more liberal. Removal may be had of the civil suit, at any time before trial or final hearing
in the state court, regardless of the amount involved and without giving any bond, by filing the appropriate papers in the federal court.
I. Congress provided in 1887 that the fact that the defendant was a federal receiver should not preclude the maintenance of an action against him in a state court.
That provision had recently been embodied in section 66 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 125), which declares: 'Every receiver or manager of any property appointed by any court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed.'
In the thirty-nine years since its enactment there had not been, so far as appears, any attempt to repeal that law. It is in harmony with the trend of legislation providing that the federal character of the litigant should not alone confer jurisdiction upon a federal courta policy acted upon in case of national banks as early as 1882
and which had been extended in 1915 to railroads having federal charters.
II. Congress had by the Federal Employers' Liability Act
provided that suits for injuries resulting from negligence in the operation of a railroad, although arising under a federal statute, could be brought in a state court, and if so brought, could not be removed to the federal court.
III. Congress had by recent legislation manifested its adherence to the policy, inaugurated in 1887, of restricting the jurisdiction of the federal trial court. Thus, the prescribed jurisdictional amount, which, after standing for nearly a century at $500 had been raised to $2,000 in 1887,
and was increased to $3,000 in 1911.
Moreover, in 1914 the requirement of this jurisdictional amount was applied to the removal of actions under the Interstate Commerce Act (49 USCA § 1 et seq.) against railroads for injury to or loss of property, although theretofore federal courts had jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy.
Fourth. There is no expression in the Act of 1916, or in the proceedings which led to its enactment, of an intention to repeal any existing law or to depart from the long existing policy of restricting the federal jurisdiction. Whether there was any special occasion for the amendment does not appear. The bill was passed in each House as introduced, without amendment, without debate and without a record vote.
The legislation was not required in order to assure to officers of the federal courts when engaged in enforcing the laws or orders to which section 33 related the same protection which it then afforded to other persons. Marshals executing revenue laws had, for more than fifty-eight years, repeatedly availed themselves of this removal provision.
But an extension of the removal provision might have been desired so as to make it apply to those engaged in executing any judgment or order of a federal court. For any order of the court might arouse opposition to those engaged in enforcing it and result in retaliation by means of proceedings instituted in a state court. The only method of securing in such other cases an adjudication in the federal court before trial in the state court was then by habeas corpus; and that remedy was not always adequate.
The report of the Judiciary Committee of the House which recommended the adoption of the 1916 amendment establishes that such was the sole purpose of Congress. It states:
The contention made that the prohibition in section 28 does not extend to cases under section 33, because of the saving clause in section 5 of the acts of 1887 and 1888 (
24 Stat. 555; 25 Stat. 436), appears to be unfounded. See Cole v. Garland (C.C.A.) 107 F. 759, dismissed on appeal, 183 U.S. 693, 22 S.Ct. 933, 46 L.Ed. 393. Compare Kentucky v. Powers (C.C.) 139 F. 452, 593. Moreover, the saving clause of section 5 of the acts of 1887 and 1888 was in terms applicable to Revised Statutes §§ 641, 642, 643; and those sections were repealed expressly by the Judicial Code. Their substance was carried into sections 31, 32, 33, respectively, of the Judicial Code (28 USCA §§ 7476); but section 5, though not expressly repealed, was nowhere carried into the Judicial Code. See, also, Index of Federal Statutes (1934), p. 1297, footnote 44, which states that by reason of the express repeal of sections 14, 6, 7, of the act of 1887 by the Judicial Code, 'Sec. 5 can have no force independent of the remainder of the act.'
Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 6, 35 Stat. 65, 66, as amended by Act of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 1, 36 Stat. 291 (45 USCA § 56). The policy of abridging the jurisdictions has persisted since. Actions against the Director General of Railroads under section 10 of the Federal Control Act, March 21, 1918, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451, 456, or against the Agent designated by the President pursuant to section 206(a) of Transportation Act 1920, February 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461 (49 USCA § 74(a) for injuries, whether the cause of action is based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 5159), or a state statute or the common law, may not be removed even if there is diversity of citizenship. Davis v. Slocomb, 263 U.S. 158, 160, 44 S.Ct. 59, 68 L.Ed. 226. The lower courts have divided on whether the 1916 amendment repeals this provision by the Employers' Liability Act pro tanto. That it has: Elliott v. Wheelock (D.C.) 34 F.(2d) 213; contra, Knapp v. Byram (D.C.) 21 F.(2d) 226.