Source: http://federal-circuits.vlex.com/vid/souders-south-carolina-public-authority-29453838
Timestamp: 2016-02-06 11:27:14
Document Index: 360346368

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 1631', '§ 1491', '§ 1491', '§ 1491', '§ 1491', '§ 803', '§ 49']

Souders v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, (Fed. Cir. 2007) - Case Law - VLEX 29453838
Souders v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Parts:DCT
Docket Number:06-1426
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 20 -1428
WILLIAM J. SOUDERS, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, TERESA MARSH FOXWORTH, LEWIS DREW MARSH, SARAH OVER, ALLEN D. FORE, BETTYE S. MARSH, JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), MCLEOD LUMBER COMPANY, INC., DOROTHY MCLEOD RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, INC., BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, JAMES M. SIMONS, MICHAEL TAPPERT, ELIZABETH SINGLETON GRAYSON, EUGENE COLLINS, BARBARA COLLINS, RALPH HOFFMAN, JOHN D. HOLLINGSWORTH, JESSE D. RUSSELL, and CAROLE R. RUSSELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and UNITED STATES, Movant-Appellee.
WILLIAM J. SOUDERS, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, TERESA MARSH FOXWORTH, LEWIS DREW MARSH, ALLEN D. FORE, BETTYE S. MARSH, JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), DOROTHY MCLEOD RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, INC., BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, JAMES M. SIMONS, MICHAEL TAPPERT, ELIZABETH SINGLETON GRAYSON, EUGENE COLLINS, BARBARA COLLINS, RALPH HOFFMAN, ELBERT SMALLS, JOHN D. HOLLINGSWORTH, JESSE D. RUSSELL, and CAROLE R. RUSSELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and UNITED STATES, Movant-Appellee.
HERBERT BUTLER, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, MARY O. SWATEK, FRANK SWATEK, LINDA H. FORE (Personal Representative of the Estate of Allen D. Fore), BETTYE S. MARSH ROBERTS, DOROTHY M. RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, HOLLINGSWORTH FUNDS, INC., ELIZABETH S. GRAYSON, RALPH HOFFMAN, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, BARBARA COLLINS (Personal Representative of the Estate of Eugene Collins), JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), ELBERT SMALLS, BUCKY WATKINS, and JAMES L. LAMBERT, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and UNITED STATES, Movant-Appellee.
Ryan D. Nelson, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for movant-appellee. On the brief were Sue Ellen Wooldridge, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew J. Sanders, Attorney, Appellate Section, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.Of counsel were Fred R. Disheroon and Malcolm L. Stewart, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge Patrick Michael Duffy United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 20 -1428
WILLIAM J. SOUDERS, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, TERESA MARSH FOXWORTH, LEWIS DREW MARSH, SARAH OVER, ALLEN D. FORE, BETTYE S. MARSH, JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), MCLEOD LUMBER COMPANY, INC., DOROTHY MCLEOD RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, INC., BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, JAMES M. SIMONS, MICHAEL TAPPERT, ELIZABETH SINGLETON GRAYSON, EUGENE COLLINS, BARBARA COLLINS, RALPH HOFFMAN, JOHN D. HOLLINGSWORTH, JESSE D. RUSSELL, and CAROLE R. RUSSELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and UNITED STATES, Movant-Appellee.
WILLIAM J. SOUDERS, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, TERESA MARSH FOXWORTH, LEWIS DREW MARSH, ALLEN D. FORE, BETTYE S. MARSH, JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), DOROTHY MCLEOD RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, INC., BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, JAMES M. SIMONS, MICHAEL TAPPERT, ELIZABETH SINGLETON GRAYSON, EUGENE COLLINS, BARBARA COLLINS, RALPH HOFFMAN, ELBERT SMALLS, JOHN D. HOLLINGSWORTH, JESSE D. RUSSELL, and CAROLE R. RUSSELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
HERBERT BUTLER, PHYLLIS W. SOUDERS, C. BARRY MARSH, JUSTIN MARSH, MARY O. SWATEK, FRANK SWATEK, LINDA H. FORE (Personal Representative of the Estate of Allen D. Fore), BETTYE S. MARSH ROBERTS, DOROTHY M. RHODES, HELEN M. BRADHAM, DARLINGTON VENEER COMPANY, INC., BUBENDORF BROTHERS, INC., SUSAN SHEPPARD, HOLLINGSWORTH FUNDS, INC., ELIZABETH S. GRAYSON, RALPH HOFFMAN, FRANK M. O'BRIEN, III, BARBARA COLLINS (Personal Representative of the Estate of Eugene Collins), JOE EASLEY (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), ELBERT SMALLS, BUCKY WATKINS, and JAMES L. LAMBERT, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, MAYER and DYK, Circuit Judges.MICHEL, Chief Judge.
I. BACKGROUND SCPSA is a public utility company in South Carolina. Since 1942, SCPSA has operated a series of hydroelectric plants on the Santee and Cooper Rivers under license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), collectively known as the Santee Cooper Diversion Project ("Santee Project"). These waterworks disrupted Charleston Harbor, thus Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct new waterworks, collectively known as the Cooper River Rediversion Project ("Rediversion Project"), to rectify the problem. The centerpiece of the Rediversion Project is the St. Stephen hydroplant.
The Corps contracted with SCPSA in 1977 to operate the Rediversion Project, which entered service in 1985. The 1977 contract provides that after fifty years, SCPSA 20 -1428 3
would acquire title to the Rediversion Project from the federal government. Until then, the contract provides that the federal government would "assume the risk of all claims arising from the construction and operation" of the facilities, "except those arising from the fault or negligence of [SCPSA]." Further, the contract requires that SCPSA gives timely notice to the government of any such claims.
In 2003, SCPSA filed a claim against the Corps under the 1977 contract seeking reimbursement for any damages awarded, as well as attorney's fees and costs, for the various ongoing cases relating to the Rediversion Project. The claim resulted in a decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals holding that the 1977contract obligated the federal government to indemnify SCPSA subject to potential defenses. The federal government then filed a motion to intervene in the 1993, 1997, and 2003 actions against SCPSA and transfer to the Court of Federal Claims due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. SCPSA filed a brief in support of the government's motion.
II. DISCUSSION The scope of our review here is limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A), our jurisdiction is restricted to a review of the district court's denial of the United States' motion to transfer these cases to the Court of Federal Claims. 3 We conduct this review de novo. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 578 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
It is well settled that transfer of a case to another court is only permissible if the destination court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 4 28 U.S.C. § 1631; James, 159 F.3d at 582-83. Thus here, a crucial inquiry is whether the Court of Federal Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the three civil actions at issue.The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), which states:
The claims of the three lawsuits at issue can be summarized as generally consisting of (1) tort claims, 5 (2) other state law claims, 6 (3) a claim that SCPSA was in violation of its FERC license, and (4) takings claims under the United States Constitution. It is immediately clear that the tort claims are clearly outside the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and thus cannot be transferred there. See 28U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (excluding jurisdiction over cases "sounding in tort"). Claims founded on state law are also outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See id.; United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215-18 (1983) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1491 as limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to monetary claims founded upon the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes or regulations, or federal contracts). And the Court of Federal Claims similarly lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims by third parties that a FERC licensee is in violation of its license. 7
The Court of Federal Claims is empowered to hear cases in which a plaintiff seeks just compensation for a taking under the Fifth Amendment as such a claim is "against the United States founded . . . upon the Constitution." See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). By definition, a claim for just compensation under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment must be against the United States since it applies only to the federal government. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.226, 238-39 (1897) (citing Scott v. City of Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1888)).
Takings by state governments, such as by a state agency, are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which incorporates the Fifth Amendment's takings clause under its due process clause. Id.; see also Tuthill Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 381F.3d 1132, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that a state law was held to have facilitated a taking "under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Fifth" in Loretto v.Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). But because such Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are against a state governmental entity and are not "against the United States," the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over them. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims only has jurisdiction over monetary claims against the federal government and that this does not include Fourteenth Amendment due process claims).
SCPSA argues that despite the way plaintiffs chose to tailor their claims, this court should instead construe the takings claims--and indeed all of the claims--as claims "against the United States." SCPSA argues this is so because it operated the St. Stephen hydroplant and the Rediversion Project pursuant to a contract with the Corps, which is the true owner of the Rediversion Project. SCPSA further argues that the 1977
20 -1428 8
contract was drafted with the intent that SCPSA be immunized from any and all liability arising from its operation of the Rediversion Project, liability instead being wholly borne by the federal government.
These arguments, however, are irrelevant. While the facts may or may not support a Fifth Amendment takings claim by plaintiffs against the United States, no such claim was pursued by the plaintiffs in the cases now before us. 8 Further, whether plaintiffs' takings claims against SCPSA will succeed considering the relationship between SCPSA and the Corps does not bear on whether the Court of Federal Claims would have jurisdiction should these cases be transferred. And an agreement by the United States to indemnify and assume liability for SCPSA's activities, if such an agreement is ultimately found to exist and apply here, does not transform plaintiffs'Fourteenth Amendment takings claims into Fifth Amendment claims against the United States. Therefore, the district court properly denied the motion to transfer these cases to the Court of Federal Claims.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the order of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina is AFFIRMED.
[1]-. The district court bifurcated the liability and damages portions of the case.The damages trial has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
2006-1426, -1427, -1428 4
[2]-. Under 16 U.S.C. § 803(c), a FERC licensee is "liable for all damages occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance, or operation of the project works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto, constructed under the license."
2006-1426, -1427, -1428 5
[3]-. While the order also ruled on the United States' motion to intervene, that portion of the order is not before us in this appeal.
[4]-. Under 28 U.S.C. 1631, transfer in "a civil action" is warranted only when there is a "want of jurisdiction," transfer is "in the interest of justice," and the action "could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed" in the transferee court.Here, since the question of whether the Court of Federal Claims would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the actions at issue--such that they "could have been brought"in that court--is dispositive, we need not address whether the other prerequisites to transfer are met.
2006-1426, -1427, -1428 6
[5]-. More specifically, these claims consist of negligence and trespass claims.
[6]-. These claims are takings claims under the South Carolina state constitution and a claim under S.C. Code § 49-11-10 (1976), which prohibits the construction or maintenance of a dam that causes water to overflow onto another's property without consent.
[7]-. Plaintiffs also filed an action with FERC essentially on this claim. That action was dismissed by the agency.
2006-1426, -1427, -1428 7
[8]-. We express no view as to whether the facts of these cases would actually support a Fifth Amendment takings claim, nor any view as to the merits of such a claim were it to be asserted. Here, the complaints do not assert a Fifth Amendment takings claim, and plaintiffs' counsel confirmed at oral argument that no such claim was being asserted. We thus have no occasion to determine whether the assertion of such a Fifth Amendment takings claim against a nominal defendant (such as an officer or agent of the United States), where the United States is the real party in interest, could be transferred to the Court of Federal Claims (with the United States ultimately substituted as the defendant).
Davenport v. Lamb, 80 U.S. 418, 13 Wall. 418 (1871)
Madden v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., (Ohio 2003)
Notice: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(C) States that Citation of Unpublished Dispositions is Disfavored Except for Establishing Res Judicata, Estoppel, or the Law of the Case and Requires Service of Copies of Cited Unpublished Dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Robert L. Mason, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Will Tom Wathen, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees., 956 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1992)