Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/649/608/460099/
Timestamp: 2019-11-12 23:42:30
Document Index: 611764639

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Michael Wyane Pearl, Appellant, v. Ronald Dobbs, Assistant Warden A. L. Lockhart, Actingcommissioner; Lieutenant Gooley, Shift Supervisor; Andlieutenant Lay, Assistant to Supervisor, Cummins Unit,arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees, 649 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1981 › Michael Wyane Pearl, Appellant, v. Ronald Dobbs, Assistant Warden A. L. Lockhart, Actingcommissioner...
Michael Wyane Pearl, Appellant, v. Ronald Dobbs, Assistant Warden A. L. Lockhart, Actingcommissioner; Lieutenant Gooley, Shift Supervisor; Andlieutenant Lay, Assistant to Supervisor, Cummins Unit,arkansas Department of Correction, Appellees, 649 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 649 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1981) Submitted May 19, 1981. Decided May 26, 1981
The district court's dismissal was proper. The court correctly relied on United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846, 75 S. Ct. 68, 99 L. Ed. 667 (1954), to dismiss the action against defendants Lockhart and Gooley. The dismissal of the complaint against Lay and Dobbs was also warranted, but we affirm on a more fundamental ground not mentioned in the district court's brief opinion. As the State correctly notes, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e. g., Careaga v. James, 616 F.2d 1062, 1063 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S. Ct. 140-141, 66 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1980); Ronnei v. Butler, 597 F.2d 564, 566 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Because Pearl did not allege that Lay or Dobbs committed acts that caused him injury, no claim was stated against them.
We note that although the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases, a § 1983 plaintiff may maintain a theory of direct liability against a prison or other official if that official fails to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of a subordinate who causes the injury. See Taken Alive v. Litzau, 551 F.2d 196, 199-200 (8th Cir. 1977); Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 527-528 (8th Cir. 1974); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 821-823 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866, 92 S. Ct. 83, 30 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1971). But cf. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 410-418, 421 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S. Ct. 173, 62 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1979).2 Pearl made no allegations of that sort in his complaint.
We express no opinion as to whether Judge Overton correctly held that Pearl alleged no facts in the first suit to indicate that the inmate turnkey acted under color of state law. We note, however, that an inmate may act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes if that inmate is carrying out a specific order of a correction officer or if he has been granted certain authority that enables him to harm the plaintiff. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1974)
Uncertainties that have arisen in prisoner § 1983 suits such as whether simple negligence is actionable under § 1983 and the scope of liability of prison supervisory personnel may be resolved by the Supreme Court in a case from this Circuit. Taylor v. Parratt, No. CV76-L-57 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 1978), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 307 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, -- U.S. --, 101 S. Ct. 315, 66 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1980)