Source: http://animallaw.info/cases/causfd26cl_ct1405.htm
Timestamp: 2013-06-19 01:46:30
Document Index: 295485062

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 4740', '§ 3727', '§ 203', '§ 1331', '§ 1333', '§ 1333', '§ 1331']

MARIAN BLANK HORN delivered the opinion of the court.
Opinion of the Court: This case was brought by plaintiffs to redress an alleged breach by defendant, United States, of a contract between plaintiffs and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the United States Department of the Interior (DOI). This case is before the court on the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(4) of the Rules of the United States Claims Court (RUSCC). Plaintiffs oppose this motion on the basis that a valid and binding contract, express or implied in fact, exists between the parties. Both parties waived oral argument on the motion. After carefully reviewing the submissions of the parties, as is more fully discussed below, the court, hereby, DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss.
The Act provides that BLM shall manage the population of wild horses and burros on federal lands �in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). The Act empowers the Secretary of DOI to make a determination that �an overpopulation� exists on a given area of public lands and that action is necessary to remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve proper management levels. Upon such determination, the Secretary may authorize the humane capture of excess wild free-roaming horses and burros and place them, through an adoption process, with qualified individuals. 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). The Act further provides that, following transfer of the animals, qualified individuals may obtain title to the wild horses, after demonstrating to the Secretary that the adopter has provided �humane conditions, treatment and care for such animals for a period of one year, the Secretary is authorized upon application of the transferee to grant title to not more than four animals to the transferee at the end of the one year period.� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c).
In Yankton, BLM officials Bruce Stevens, Jean Bowdle and Jack Steinbreck conducted a field inspection of the horses. The BLM officials determined that the horses had received proper care and humane treatment for the preceding one-year period. According to the complaint, BLM �also determined that A & B Horse Farms and the individual adopters had complied with all the terms, requirements, and obligations set forth in the Private Maintenance and Care Agreement, and with all other laws and regulations governing the adoption of wild horses.�
At the time of the inspection, BLM official, Jack Steinbreck, questioned A & B Horse Farms regarding where the horses would be shipped after the conclusion of the inspection. A & B Horse Farms told Steinbreck, in the presence of Bruce Stevens and Jean Bowdle, that the horses were being shipped to Montana. During the inspection, BLM official Jack Steinbreck allegedly made statements to officials of A & B Horse Farms that the horses were now the property of A & B Horse Farms �to do with as it pleased.�
On October 28, 1987, BLM received a telegram from the Fund for Animals Inc. alerting BLM that it had come to the Fund's attention that A & B Horse Farms intended �commercial exploitation of the horses,� upon passage of title. As a result, on November 10, 1987, BLM confiscated the bulk of the horses in Great Falls, Montana. On November 22, 1987, BLM confiscated the remaining ten horses from *1409 the holding pen west of Yankton. According to plaintiffs, they received neither notice of, nor an explanation for, these actions by BLM.FN2
BLM subsequently received information that A & B Horse Farms was adopting the horses with the intent to sell them for slaughter once title passed, conduct in direct contravention of the Act's requirements that adopter's be �qualified individuals' who �can assure humane treatment and care.� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(B). Accordingly, BLM officials confiscated the horses in Great Falls, Montana on November 10, 1987 and confiscated the remaining ten horses in Yankton, South Dakota on November 22, 1987.
A motion to dismiss, pursuant to RUSCC 12(b)(1) and RUSCC 12(b)(4), based on a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, requires that the court reach its decision based on the evidence presented by the parties. The Supreme Court has clearly articulated, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explicitly adopted, the general standards for weighing evidence presented in a complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss, as follows: �in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.� Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); accord Hamlet v. United States, 873 F.2d 1414, 1416 (Fed.Cir.1989). If a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint, the trial court may also consider relevant evidence in order to resolve disputed facts. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed.Cir.1988). The court must accept as true any undisputed allegations of fact made by plaintiff. In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must presume all factual allegations in the complaint are true. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 2492 n. 2, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977). See also Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 1686. When facts relevant to the issue of jurisdiction are disputed, the court is required to decide those facts. Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 747. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Pasco Enterprises v. United States, 13 Cl.Ct. 302, 305 (1987); Metzger, Shadyac & Schwartz v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 107, 109 (1986). A motion to dismiss should not be dismissed by the court �unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.� Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In a determination of the validity of the motion to dismiss �conclusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not withstand a *1411 motion to dismiss.� Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir.1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Moreover, �legal conclusions, deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness.� 2A Jeremy C. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.07 [2.-5] (2d ed. 1992).
FN3. �As a general rule, there can be no implied contract where there is an express contract between parties covering the same subject.� Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 649, 673, 428 F.2d 1241, 1255 (1970).
The required elements of an express contract are as follows: �For there to be an express contract, the parties must have intended to be bound and must have expressed their intention in a manner capable of being understood. A definite offer and an unconditional acceptance must be established.� Russell Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.Cl. 596, 608, 537 F.2d 474, 481 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073, 97 S.Ct. 811, 50 L.Ed.2d 791 (1977). An implied-in-fact contract likewise requires a meeting of the minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is clear from the conduct of the parties. Id. at 609, 537 F.2d at 482. See also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597, 43 S.Ct. 425, 426, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1923); Fincke v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 233, 243-244, 675 F.2d 289, 295 (1982).
The requirements for establishing an express or implied in fact contract are similar.FN4 *1412 Marshall v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 497, 499 (1990); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 3 Cl.Ct. 329, 338-39 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 452 (Fed.Cir.1984). Plaintiffs must show �mutuality of intent to contract, offer and acceptance, and that the officer whose conduct is relied upon had actual authority to bind the government in contract.� See H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818, 106 S.Ct. 64, 88 L.Ed.2d 52 (1985); Howard v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 475, 478 (1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1267 (Fed.Cir.1991), reh., en banc, denied, (Fed.Cir. Feb. 20, 1992).
The facts show BLM's Adopt-A-Horse Screening Guide does not constitute an express contract between plaintiffs and the government. This form does not unambiguously manifest the government's �acceptance� of plaintiffs' �offer� to adopt wild horses. Rather, it clearly informs the adopter that he or she must make further application and undergo further screening in order to qualify for the program, and move towards obtaining title. The Adopt-A-Horse Screening Guide makes specific reference to the need for the parties subsequently to sign a Private Maintenance and Care Agreement, and that title will pass in the future, dependent on the fulfillment of certain conditions.
�NOTE: THIS IS A CONTRACT: RETAIN WITH OTHER LEGAL RECORDS.�
The general rule regarding the authority of government agents to bind the government is discussed in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947). Anyone entering into an agreement with the government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that the agent who purports to act for the government stays within his/her authority. Federal Crop Ins., 332 U.S. at 384, 68 S.Ct. at 3. Section 1333(b)(2)(B) of Title 16, United States Code, expressly grants the Secretary authority to transfer title to the horses to private individuals who have complied with certain specified terms, including the ability to provide humane treatment and care. The Act also grants the Secretary full discretion to determine whether the necessary conditions for the issuance of title have been met, including that the individual �has provided humane conditions, treatment & care for such animal or animals for a period of one year.� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). The authority to issue title is delegated by the Secretary of DOI to an authorized DOI *1413 officer pursuant to regulations found in 43 C.F.R. § 4740.5 (1985) as follows:
Defendant has also argued that based on plaintiffs' earlier filed complaint, Case No. 664-88C, the action now before this court, Case No. 90-3891C, which alleges breach of contract, should be deemed res judicata. If a case has been disposed of on the merits by a previous Order or Opinion in this court, a subsequent action on the same grounds should not be entertained. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). But, such is not the instant case. Nor is the doctrine of �issue preclusion� one behind which the defendant ought to be allowed to hide in the instant case. See Mother's Restaurant, Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1983).
The complaint is not clear about the precise contractual arrangements between BLM and A & B Farms (the partnership) and between BLM and each of the individual adopters. See Complaint, ¶¶ VII, X and XXXI, Exhibit A (¶ 3 & ¶ �OBTAINING TITLE�) and Exhibit B (2d par.). Presumably each of the 150 adopters made application to BLM to adopt four wild horses, executed an Adopt-A-Horse Screening Guide in the form of Exhibit A to the complaint and, prior to obtaining possession of the horses, entered a separate written agreement with BLM entitled Private Maintenance and Care Agreement. Id. No copy of a Private Maintenance and Care Agreement was submitted with the complaint or attached to any of the motion papers. Further, presumably, there was no direct express contractual relationship between A & B Horse Farms and BLM. Id. (emphasis added).
Under the Rules of the United States Claims Court (RUSCC), every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. RUSCC 17(a). The rule also states that a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought. RUSCC 17(a).FN5 See also *1415 H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d at 1576. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a).FN6 In the federal courts, it has been held that the �real party in interest� is one possessing the legal right to enforce the claim under applicable substantive law. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Perry, 322 F.2d 589, 591 (10th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984, 84 S.Ct. 516, 11 L.Ed.2d 472 (1964).
FN9. Defendant also cites to the Federal Anti-Assignment Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988), which applies to assignments of claims against the government, to argue that plaintiffs' claims are barred. The federal statute refers to �[a]ll powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim� and then proceeds to declare them null and void unless executed in the presence of two witnesses after the allowance of a claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 203. Section 203 is not applicable to the power of attorney in the present instance. The power of attorney granted by the individual adopters to plaintiffs was not an assignment of a claim. Rather, it was an assignment of their rights to enter into an agreement with the government to care for and maintain wild horses. Thus, plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the Federal Anti-Assignment Statute.
Although the Rock Springs District BLM office provided adopters with a draft document entitled �Power of Attorney,� this document was not a BLM form.
The power of attorney form also specifically names A & B Horse Farms as the attorney in fact, and grants the power to sign its name, and, if necessary, the names of the private adopters to the Private Maintenance and Care Agreement. Thus, in the instant case, there was no danger of exposing the government to suits by �undisclosed principals� as was feared in American National Bank & Trust, 22 Cl.Ct. at 14. Indeed, most, if not all, of the contacts that BLM had with the adopters included a signature by plaintiffs, A & B Horse Farms.
Sections 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 are found in Chapter 30 of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses & Burros Act, and are titled �Wild Horses & Burros: Protection, Management & Control.� The statute is very clear that the transfer of any wild horses or burros can only be made if the Secretary of DOI can �assure humane treatment and care ...� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(B). Final title to the adopted animals can only be transferred by the Secretary of DOI upon application by the transferee, and after a determination by the Secretary that such adopter has provided �humane conditions, treatment and care for such animal or animals for a period of one year.� 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c).
The Adopt-A-Horse Screening Guide, the Application for Adoption of Wild Horses or Burros, the Power of Attorney and the Private Maintenance and Care Agreement, signed by the plaintiffs, all refer to the commitments made by the adopters of the wild animal to provide humane and caring treatment to the animals. The Adopt-A-Horse Screening Guide refers to the requirements regarding care of the animals prior to adoption, and the application sets forth very specific �Terms of Adoption.� Paragraph 7 of the Power of Attorney references the signator's primary responsibility to care for the adopted animals in accordance with the terms of the Private Maintenance and Care Agreement and with all applicable laws and regulations. Although the copy of the sample Private Maintenance and Care Agreement included in the record is in part difficult to read, the agreement clearly does specify conditions for possession of the animals, as well as �prohibited acts,� in order to ensure humane and proper treatment of the animals. There is, therefore, no question in the mind of the court that the requirement of humane treatment was included as a part of the contractual agreements, signed by the *1418 parties, including the individual applicants and A & B Horse Farms. In the subsequent proceedings in this case, in order to recover, plaintiffs must be prepared to demonstrate that they have not breached the contracts.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the critical issue of statutory interpretation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 raised by the instant case. In that case, the DOI argued that after the year �probationary� period had passed, the Secretary was entitled to transfer title, even if he knew beforehand that once the adopters received title, they were intending to put the animals to commercial use. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically rejected that result. The Ninth Circuit Court reviewed the legislative history, and wrote that such a result would contradict the congressional intent.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Top of Page	Share