Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/390/459/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-12-12 11:45:38
Document Index: 14113040

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 901', '§ 922', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22', '§ 22']

On January 30, 1961, shortly after returning home from work, the petitioner's husband suffered a fall that resulted in his death on February 12. On February 20, 1961, the petitioner, on behalf of herself and her three minor children, filed a claim against her husband's employer, [Footnote 1] the respondent, for compensation death benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. The petitioner alleged that her husband's fall on January 30 had resulted from a work-connected injury suffered on January 26. A hearing was held before a Department of Labor Deputy Commissioner, and on June 8, 1961, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the petitioner's claim for failure to establish that her husband's death had resulted from a work-connected injury. [Footnote 2] The petitioner did not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner's second compensation action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The petitioner contends that that doctrine chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
33 U.S.C. § 922. (Emphasis added.) The petitioner asserts that her second compensation action came under § 22 because it challenged a "determination of fact by the deputy commissioner" in her original compensation action -- namely, the finding that her husband's fall did not result from a work-connected injury. The respondent argues that "a mistake in a determination of fact" in § 22 refers only to clerical errors and matters concerning an employee's disability, not to matters concerning an employer's liability. Conceding that nothing in the statutory language supports this reading, the respondent contends that the legislative history reveals Congress' limited purpose. [Footnote 4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
From 1930 to 1933, the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, which was charged with administering the Act, recommended in its annual reports that § 22 be amended to permit review by the Deputy Commissioner at any time. 14th Ann.Rep. of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission (hereafter USECC) 75 (1930); 15th Ann.Rep.USECC 77 (1931); 16th Ann.Rep.USECC 49 (1932); 17th Ann.Rep.USECC 18 (1933). [Footnote 5] In 1934, Congress, while not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its annual reports for 1934-1936, the Compensation Commission recommended that § 22 be further amended to apply in cases where the original compensation claim is rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. 18th Ann.Rep.USECC 38 (1934); 19th Ann.Rep.USECC 49 (1935); 20th Ann.Rep.USECC 52 (1936). Congress responded in 1938 by amending § 22 to permit review by the Deputy Commissioner "at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim" and to allow the Deputy Commissioner after such review to "award compensation." 52 Stat. 1167. The purpose of this amendment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The respondent raised two other issues in the Court of Appeals, which that court found unnecessary to reach. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary