Source: https://casetext.com/case/lovelace-v-bowen
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 404', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404']

Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55 | Casetext Search + Citator
Lovelace v. Bowen
Sullivan v. Day
B. Comparison to Federal SSI Program Plaintiffs cite numerous federal decisions for the proposition that it…
A finding that a claimant is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates…
Full title:L.B. LOVELACE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. OTIS R. BOWEN, M.D., SECRETARY OF…
813 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1987)
holding that if "the claimant cannot afford the prescribed treatment or medicine, and can find no way to obtain it, the condition that is disabling in fact continues to be disabling in law."
Summary of this case from Warre ex rel. E.T. v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
No. 86-4820. Summary Calendar.
The Secretary, through his delegates, concluded that the medical evidence and the testimony showed that Lovelace had the ability to do the work he had done in the past. A person who can do the work he has done in the past cannot, of course, be considered disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1986); Jason v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 82, 84-85 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
We review administrative findings under the Social Security Act only to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards in reaching his decision. An individual who claims disability insurance benefits has the burden of proving his "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted . . . for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." If the claimant shows that he is no longer capable of performing his past work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that he can engage in some other type of substantial gainful employment. Disability for Supplemental Security Income is defined in the same terms as disability for social security disability insurance: inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. The standard for judicial review is likewise the same for both programs. Therefore, we rely on social-security-disability-insurance cases as well as Supplemental Security Income cases without distinction.
Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1980); White v. Harris, 605 F.2d 867, 869 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1982); Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 428, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).
White, 605 F.2d at 869.
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) (1982).
Strickland, 615 F.2d at 1105-06.
The Secretary has promulgated regulations that establish a five-step procedure for sequentially evaluating a claim and determining whether a claimant is disabled. First, a claimant who at the time of his disability claim is engaged in substantial, gainful employment is not disabled. Second, the claimant is automatically denied benefits if the asserted impairment is not severe, without consideration of his age, education, or work experience. Third, if the asserted impairment is severe, the claimant is perforce disabled if his impairment meets or equals an impairment described in the Listings. Fourth, a claimant with a severe impairment that is not per se disabling is denied benefits if he is capable of doing past relevant work. Fifth, a claimant who cannot return to past relevant work is denied benefits if he can engage in work available in the national economy. In this step, the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience are considered. A claimant who cannot return to work and who cannot engage in other work is disabled. A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1986).
Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
Luevenia Davis v. Heckler, 759 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1985).
Barajas v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
In recent decisions, we have reviewed a number of cases in which the disability claim was denied at the second step of the process when the ALJ found that the claimant did not suffer from a "severe impairment." The current regulations state that an impairment "is not severe if it does not significantly limit [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Basic work activities are defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." We have held that the "significantly-limit" language of the "severity" regulation must be read in context with a predecessor regulation defining a "non-severe impairment" as a "slight neurosis, slight impairment of sight or hearing, or other slight abnormality or combination of abnormalities." The standard expressly established by the earlier regulation continues to be the proper legal standard to be applied in determining whether an ailment constitutes a severe impairment. As the Eleventh Circuit held in Brady v. Heckler, "[a]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience." Our reading of the "severity" regulation comports with the Secretary's understanding of his own regulation.
Luevenia Davis, 759 F.2d at 435; Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1984); Barbara Davis v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a).
Id. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b).
Estran, 745 F.2d at 340-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1968).
Estran, 745 F.2d at 342.
724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984), cited in Estran, 745 F.2d at 341. See also Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 948-52, 954 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 1240, 1243 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1984); Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1014 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1984); Hundrieser v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1231, 1234-39 (N.D.Ill. 1984); Trafton v. Heckler, 575 F. Supp. 742, 745-46 (D.Me. 1983).
Brady, 724 F.2d at 919-20. See also Martin, 748 F.2d at 1032; Estran, 745 F.2d at 340-42.
A medical condition that can reasonably be remedied either by surgery, treatment, or medication is not disabling. If, however, the claimant cannot afford the prescribed treatment or medicine, and can find no way to obtain it, "the condition that is disabling in fact continues to be disabling in law." As this circuit did, in Taylor v. Bowen, every other circuit that has considered the question, so far as we can find, has concluded that the medicine or treatment an indigent person cannot afford is no more a cure for his condition than if it had never been discovered. Decisions to this effect have been rendered in the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. To a poor person, a medicine that he cannot afford to buy does not exist.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(a), (b) and 416.930(a), (b) (1986). Knox v. Finch, 427 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1970); McCarty v. Richardson, 459 F.2d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Stillwell v. Cohen, 411 F.2d 574, 575-76 (5th Cir. 1969); Whaley v. Gardner, 255 F. Supp. 862, 867 (E.D.Mo. 1966), aff'd, 374 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1967); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(b), 416.930(b) (1985).
Taylor v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1986).
Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986); Millner v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 243, 245 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1984); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1984).
Dover v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1986); Benson v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir. 1985); Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 1984).
Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985).
In like disregard of reality, the Secretary continues to hold that a person who is disabled because of obesity has a condition that is per se remediable, without examining the medical condition and personal factors that might make it possible or impossible for a particular disabled person to remedy his obesity. As we held in Scott v. Heckler,
770 F.2d 482, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1985).
The rejection of Lovelace's claim suffers from a third defect. In reaching his decision, the ALJ expressed a good deal of skepticism regarding Lovelace's complaints of pain, particularly because Lovelace did not appear to be experiencing severe pain at the hearing. While it is the task of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make credibility determinations, his decisions must be supported by substantial evidence. Even if a person's demeanor can be taken to reflect his degree of pain when that pain is chronic, the issue is not how much pain Lovelace suffers when he is at rest. The relevant question is how much pain he experiences when trying to work. Lovelace's demeanor at the hearing sheds little, if any, light on that question.
Allen v. Schweiker, 642 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Gaultney v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1974).
Strickland, 615 F.2d at 1108.
Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Reinhart v. Secretary, HHS, 733 F.2d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1984); Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1981).
holding that an inability to afford treatment by itself is insufficient; a claimant must also show that she could not obtain medical treatment from other sources, such as free or low-cost health clinics
Summary of this case from Southern v. Berryhill
Summary of this case from Stephanie Z. v. Berryhill
holding that an impairment which can be reasonably controlled or remedied with medication is not disabling under the Act
holding that a medical condition reasonably remedied by medication is not disabling
Summary of this case from Soto v. Colvin
In Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1987), the court reversed the Secretary's decision that the claimant's condition was not severe because remediable by medication, on grounds that the claimant was unable to afford the medication.
Summary of this case from McKnight v. Sullivan
In Lovelace we held that a condition disabling in fact becomes disabling in law if the claimant is unable to obtain treatment.
Summary of this case from Harper v. Sullivan
In Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987), the court concluded that the claimant was disabled due to back problems, gout, hypertension, severe pain, and obesity, a combination of impairments much like those shown by Hammock.
Summary of this case from Hammock v. Bowen
In Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1987), also cited by the claimant, the court held the ALJ made three errors, one of which was being skeptical of the claimant's complaints of pain solely on the basis of the claimant's not appearing to experience pain at the hearing.
Summary of this case from Johnson v. U.S. Comm'r
In Lovelace, the Fifth Circuit held that although a medical condition that can reasonably be remedied by surgery, treatment or medication is not disabling, a condition disabling in fact becomes disabling in law if the claimant is unable to obtain the prescribed treatment or medication. 813 F.2d at 59.
Summary of this case from Sonnier v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
explaining that, if "the claimant cannot afford the prescribed treatment or medicine, and can find no way to obtain it, the condition that is disabling in fact continues to be disabling in law"
noting that a medical impairment that can reasonably be controlled by medication, surgery, or treatment is not disabling
Summary of this case from Johns v. Colvin
In Lovelace, the Fifth Circuit held that if "the claimant cannot afford the prescribed treatment or medicine, and can find no way to obtain it, 'the condition that is disabling in fact continues to be disabling in law.
Summary of this case from Miles v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.