Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/ca5/c397396/gifton-jones-jr-and-gracie-jones-v-w-o-fitch-trustee
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 06:43:37
Document Index: 507299057

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1635', '§ 1635', '§ 226', '§ 1604', '§ 226', '§ 226', '§ 1635', '§ 226', '§ 1635']

Gifton Jones, Jr., and Gracie Jones v. W. O. Fitch, Trustee, Fifth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
Gifton Jones, Jr., and Gracie Jones v. W. O. Fitch, Trustee , 665 F.2d 586 ( 1982 )
665 F.2d 586
Gifton JONES, Jr., and Gracie Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
W. O. FITCH, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
"(I)n order for a nondisclosure to be material for rescission purposes under § 1635," this court has acknowledged, "the plaintiff must show at the least that the nondisclosure of which he complains was that 'which a reasonable consumer would view as significantly altering the "total mix" of information made available. That is, the omission need not be so important that a reasonable consumer would probably change creditors. However, the information must be of some significance to a reasonable consumer under the circumstances in his " comparison shopping" for credit.' " Davis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 620 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Ivey v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 428 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D.Ga.1977)). We agree with petitioners that the test for "materiality" is an objective, rather than subjective, test, "based on what a reasonable consumer would find significant in deciding whether to use credit." Bustamente, 619 F.2d at 364. Nonetheless, we do not believe that under the circumstances of this case, the failure to identify in the disclosure statement the real property securing the loan constitutes a failure to make a "material disclosure" for purposes of § 1635(a). Here, the disclosure statement disclosed that the loan was secured by a deed of trust on real property, the deed of trust was executed as a part of the single transaction and there is no suggestion that petitioners did not know of the security interest being taken in their home. In such circumstances, we do not believe that the omission of a legal description of the property from the disclosure statement would be viewed by a reasonable consumer as significantly altering the total mix of information made available.
Accord, Mason v. General Finance Corp. of Virginia, 401 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D.Va.1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542 F.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976). Contra, Clemmer v. Liberty Financial Planning, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 272 (W.D.N.C.1979); Ray v. Acme Finance Corp., 367 So. 2d 186 (Miss.1979) (dealing with joint insurance). See also, Doggett v. Ritter Finance Co., Inc. of Louisa, 528 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding such disclosure although not specifically addressing the issue of co-borrower signatures).
Petitioners assert, relying on United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966), that because the federal and the state claims arose from the same transaction the district court erred in not taking pendent jurisdiction over the state claim. Under Gibbs, a federal court has the power to hear a pendent state law claim where the court has jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims derive from a "common nucleus of operative facts." Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. In this case, the district court stated that the Gibbs "common nucleus" test was clearly satisfied. The issue in this case, however, is not whether the district court had the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction but whether the district court abused its discretion by not exercising that power. See Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to them, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188). Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.
Regulation Z § 226.8(b)(5), promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604, permits identification of the property to which a security interest relates in a separate document where clear identification cannot properly be made on the disclosure statement. Except in this limited circumstance, Regulation Z § 226.8(a) requires the identification to be included in the disclosure document. Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437 (3rd Cir. 1977); cf. Harris v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc., 609 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure to make required disclosure on same side of one page insufficient to meet requirements of Regulation Z and resultant understatement of finance charge was material non-disclosure entitling borrower to rescission). In its recent decision in Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, --- U.S. ----, ---- n.5, 101 S. Ct. 2266, 2268 n.5, 68 L. Ed. 2d 783, 788 n.5 (1981), the Supreme Court observed that "(t)he TILA does not state that the disclosure required by the statute must be made on the face of the contract," although Regulation Z does in some instances, noting also § 226.8(b)(5). Whether or not the identification was so long that it could not be included in the disclosure statement, we do not consider the form of disclosure used here to constitute a material nondisclosure for purposes of § 1635(a) under the circumstances of this case. The fact that Regulation Z § 226.8(b)(5) contemplates use of the form of disclosure employed here in some circumstances implies that its use does not threaten material nondisclosure within the meaning of § 1635(a)
DocketNumber： 80-3448
Citation Numbers： 665 F.2d 586
cary-stout-doggett-jr-and-helen-doggett-v-ritter-finance-company-inc , 528 F.2d 860 ( 1975 )
gloria-mason-and-leroy-mason-v-general-finance-corporation-of-virginia-a , 542 F.2d 1226 ( 1976 )
international-harvester-credit-corporation-and-international-harvester , 547 F.2d 888 ( 1977 )
David Gantt and Phyllis Gantt v. Commonwealth Loan Company, ... , 573 F.2d 520 ( 1978 )
James B. Jackson v. Harold Stinchcomb, Etc. , 635 F.2d 462 ( 1981 )
Clemmer v. Liberty Fin. Planning, Inc. , 467 F. Supp. 272 ( 1979 )
Mason v. General Finance Corporation of Virginia , 401 F. Supp. 782 ( 1975 )
Ray v. Acme Finance Corp. , 367 So. 2d 186 ( 1979 )
Kathy L. Joiner, Etc. v. Diamond M Drilling Co. And ... , 677 F.2d 1035 ( 1982 )
luella-wright-and-charlie-wright-plaintiffs-appellees-cross-willie-shavers , 679 F.2d 436 ( 1982 )
Enoch Stewart and Darrel Ann Stewart v. Abraham Lincoln ... , 698 F.2d 1289 ( 1983 )
Gingerich v. White Pigeon Community Schools , 736 F. Supp. 147 ( 1990 )
Matter of Estate of Laible , 343 N.W.2d 388 ( 1984 )
Cole v. Lovett , 672 F. Supp. 947 ( 1987 )
Smith v. Capital Roofing Co. of Jackson, Inc. , 622 F. Supp. 191 ( 1985 )
London v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, NA , 150 F. Supp. 2d 1314 ( 2001 )