Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850711-1081284
Timestamp: 2017-07-21 15:17:16+00:00
Document Index: 147137685

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 1666", "l'article 1634", "l'article 1634", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 6", "l'article 25", "l'article 1666", "l'article 1666", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 1666", "l'article 8", "l'article 27", "l'article 8", "l'article 26", "l'article 1666", "l'article 26", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 26", "l'article 26", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 6", "l'article 19"]

D. c. REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche D. c. REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 10812/84Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-07-11;10812.84 Analyses : (Art. 5-3) DUREE DE LA DETENTION PROVISOIRE, (Art. 6) PROCEDURE PENALEParties : Demandeurs : D.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 10812/84 D . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN Y D . c/RÃPUBLIQUE FÃDÃRALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 11 July 1985 on Ihe admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 11 juillet 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ¨t e
Article 8, paragraph 2 or the Convention : a) Withdrawnl of a ntrnher's right to custody of her natural son and his p(acentent in gtaardi(inship . Circumstances justifi,ing these measures regarded as necessa . nforthepci ld'sheat,mornigsdfeom b) Pursuatu to an order withdrawing custody, rentoval br the amhorities of a child from hi.s school without the ntother's knowledge and his placement in a disraru educational establishment, preventing ihe mother from conmcting him . Refusal to rereal dte child's address (Comp[aint declared admissible) . A rticle 19 of the Convention : 7h e Commission is not competenr to examine tilleged errors offact or law conunitted by national courts, except where it considers tha t such errors miglu hate irnohed a possible violation of rhe riglus and freednms set uut in dte Cunvemion . A rticle 25 of the Convention : Mother of a child under qualified stawton guardiartsidp accepted as the child's represernmive where their complaints are identical and relate to rhe guardianship order .
Arficle 8. paragraphe 2, de la Convention : a) Retrait Ã une mÃ¨re du droit de garde sur son enfant namrel et placetnent de celuici sous tutelle lÃ©gale . Circonstances justifiant ces mesures considÃ©rÃ©es comme nÃ©cessaires Ã la protection de la santÃ© . de la morale et des droits et libertÃ©s de l'enfant . 211
b) Circonstances dans lesquelles les nutoritÃ©s . en exÃ©cution d'une mesure de retrait de garde, ont enlevÃ© un enfant Ã la sortie de l'Ã©cole et Ã l'insu de la mÃ¨re et l'ont placÃ© dans une nraison d'Ã©ducation Ã©loignÃ©e . empÃªchant la mÃ¨re de maintenir un contan arec lui, notamntem en ne rÃ©rÃ©laru pas l'adresse de l'enfant (CriefdÃ©clarÃ© recerable) . Article 19 de la Convention : [,a Commission ne peut examiner de prÃ©tendues erreurs de fitit ou de droit commises par le juge national que dans la mesure oÃ¹ ces crreurs pourraient impliquer tate violation des droits et libertÃ©s garamis par la Convention .
Article 25 de la Convention : MÃ¨re d'un enfant placÃ© sous tutelle lÃ©gale limitÃ©e, admise cntntne reprÃ©sentatue de sott ettfant dans la mesure oÃ¹ leurs griefs sont idenÂ«ques et risetu la mise sous nuelle limitÃ©e .
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 225 )
The applicant, a German citizen born in 1944, is a housewife resident in Berlin . Before the Commission she is represented by Dr . Rust, a lawyer practising in Berlin . The applicant is filing her application also in the name of her son, a schoolboy, who was bom out of wedlock on 18 March 1976 . Patemity of the son, a schoolboy, has been acknowledged by an American soldier . The son's residence is currently unknown . In 1981 and 1982 two medical opinions prepared by medical specialists, inter nlia Prof. G . . stated that severe educational errors on the applicant's part were jeopardising her son's developmeni . Prof. G . suggested that the applicant should be assisted in order to ensure that her son could remain with her . A further opinion of Dr . S ., the applicant's GP . of 8 Febmary 1982, mentioned the applicant's reduced intellectual abilities . While Dr . S . did not recommend a separation, he suggested that a further person should assist in the son's education . On 9 February 1982 the Berlin-Spandau District Court (Amtsgericht) acting as Guardianship Court temporarily transferred the mother's right to decide her son's residence to the Youth Office . It also ordered the Spandau Mental Hospilal to prepare a medical opinion on the applicant and her son which was given on 27 April 1982 . The psychological opinion which was signed by Dr . K . and independently verified by Iwo other specialists expressed the fear that the mother was not able to educate her son properly who disclosed clear symptoms of disturbed development in the psycho-affective area . It recommended that other people should assist in his education and that he should undergo psychotherapeutic treatment . Without aheration of the situation of mother and son, it was very likely that further damages would occur . Dr . K . recommended that other people should assist in his education : 212
if the son's development had not improved within one year, he should be taken out of the applicant's household . The District Court then restored the applicant's custody over her son . In view of the son's irregular visits to a day-nursery, the District Coun ordered the applicant on 21 June 1982 to send her son to a school and to ensure that he underwent psychotherapeutic treatment . The mother underwent the treatment in June 1982 and in January 1983 . but her son apparently did not . On 17 August 1982 the applicant's son commenced printary school . Accordin g to school reports issued between 17 August 1982 and 24 November 1982 he visited the school altogether on nine days . On the other days the applicant provided doctors' cenificates that her son was absent for medical reasons . The applicant and a teacher were once involved in a fight in the classroom . Thereupon a poster at the school entrance stated that the applicant was prohibited from entering the school . The applicant then no longer sent her son to the school . After searching for another institution, she sent him to elementary school in June 1983 .
On 12 April 1983 and upon request of the Family Welfare Office, the District Coun acting as Guardianship Court transferred the custody over the applicant's son (Personensorgerecht) to the Kreuzberg Youth Office (Jugendamt) and a stamtory guardian . The court ordered the Youth Office to keep the son's residence secret and to take the son away from the apanntent of the applicant or of the son's grandparents . The court relied on S . 1666 of the Gerntan Civil Code . The applicant appealed against this decision to the Berlin Regional Court (Landgericht) which on 10 May 1983 suspended the execution of the previous decision . The applicant submitted in the appeal proceedings a medical opinion by Dr . A . who, while not recommending a separation, pointed out that it would be difficult for him to conduct a satisfactory therapy under the social security systeni and that the applicant had difficulties in gaining confidence in hint . According to a subsequent letter of Dr . A ., a Regional Judge had telephoned Dr . A . during these proceedings . The call or its content were then not disclosed to the applicant . On 18 August 19 9 3 the court dismissed the appeal insofar as it concerned the issue of custody and the fact that the son was to be taken out of the apartment of the applicant, or the son's grandparents . On the other hand, the court found that the District Court has wrongly permitted the Youth Office to keep secret from the mother the residence of her son, and it quashed without replacement the previous instance's decision insofar as it had permitted the Youth Office to keep the son's residence secret . The coun's decision counted 34 pages . 213
In respect of the issue of custody the coun reached its decision on the basis of the niedical opinion of Dr . K . as well as of Dr . S . and Prof . G . The decision which refers to three hearings before the District Court in which the applicant participated also summarised Dr . A .'s opinion . The coun did not regard as necessary a funher examination of the applicant during a period of recovery at a hospital, as such a relaxing framework did not correspond with daily life . While the court agreed that the applicant wanted the best for her son, her neurotic disposition and reduced intellectual abilities prevented her from disceming what was necessary for his education . She had not ensured his regular visits to a nursery and, upon the measures ordered by the District Coun on 21 June 1982, subsequently to ensure his education by sending him regularly to school . It could be assumed that the applicant's psychological state had contributed to the fight with the teacher in the classroom . Her son had now a pronounced disturbance (Fehlentwicklung) in the psycho-affective area and a reduced group ability, and her behaviour warranted the conclusion that she would continue to act in the same way as before . Dr . A .'s statement also disclosed that he regarded a therapeutic treatment of the applicant as not useful . As to the son's residence, the Regional Court found that the District Court had incorrectly permitted the Youth Office to keep the son's residence secret . The measure itself in fact entailed a complete exclusion of relations between mother and child within the meaning of S .1634 . The Regional Court found it unjustifiable at that stage to exclude the applicant' s complete access to her son in view of the fact that the separation between molher and son would in any event bring grave psychological problems for both . The court continued : "To alleviate these difficulties it can become altogether necessary (durchaus erforderlich) that the mother is pennitted contact (Umgang) with her child in order to calm down the situation . On the other hand, it is not to be excluded that such contact with the child may also aggravate the disturbance . . . For the purpose of psychological adaptation to the separation, mother and child must have the opportunity to see each other, to speak with and to comfort each other . Whether this will succeed in view of the mother's neurotic disturbance cenainly appears doubtful . Only the future development can bring cenainty here . The mother should by means of a reasonable conduct try not to give cause for a substantial restriction of her right to contact . According to the present state of the proceedings the impugned decision must therefore be quashed insofar as it entitled the Youth Office to keep secret from the mother the child's residence ." (p . 33/34) . The Regional Coun concluded its judgment by requesting the mother to cooperate with the Youth Office . The decision was served on the Youth Office and the applicant's lawyer on 2 September 1983 . 214
On 2 September 1983 the municipal guardian took the applicant's son from his classroom directly to the airport . The son was flown to Hamburg and brought to an institution without having seen, or spoken with, the applicant . The applicant has not been told her son's address . The applicant appealed against the decision of the Regional Court of 18 August 1983 to the Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht), complaining . inter alia, that her son's residence was still being kept secret . The District Office also lodged an appeal on 20 September 1983 in which it objected to the Regional Court's decision to reveal the son's residence . The office stated that the applicant's son was happily settling in in a children's home . The appeal continues : "In the case of a disclosure of his place of residence it must be feared that the ntother will immediately visit the child which would result in a considerable disturbance of our ward . . ." . On 29 November 1983 the Court of Appeal dismissed both the applicant's and the District Office's appeals . In the court's view, it was not unjustified that that previous instance had upheld the applicant's request to have personal contact with her son and to know his residence . The Regional Coun had been competent to deal with this question which concerned the regulation of contact (Umgangsregelung) within the meaning of S .1634 . Complete exclusion of contact would according to S .1634(2) only be necessary if no other means of protecting the child were available . On the other hand, the withdrawal of custody from the applicant contplied with S .1666(I) . The previous instance had assessed the medical opinions correctly and had not comntitted any procedural errors, in particular not in respect of the judge's telephone conversation with Dr . A .
1 . On 2 Febmary 1984 the applicant requested the Spandau District Court to withdraw custody over the applicant's son from the municipal guardian in view of the nianner in which the son had been taken away from Berlin and the fact that his residence was being kept secret . The legal adminis trator ( Rechlsp0eger) of the District Coun decided on 21 February 1984 not to withdraw custody over the applicant's son from the municipal guardian, though the lauer was ordered to disclose the son's residence . On 24 February 1984 the District Court also decided that the son should not be brought back to Berlin . The applicant then filed a complaint to the latter coun (Erinnerung) in which she submitted that the son's residence was still kept secret . Regular visits were not possible . already in view of the fact that her son had been taken away from school and transferred to West Germany . The municipal guardian also filed a complaint o n 215
15 March 1984 stating that, while the son's residence should continue to be kept secret in his own interesi . it had no objections to the applicant meeting her son somewhere else free of costs . However, the applicant had refused to accept this offer . Ill . On 16 April 1984 the District Court acting as Guardianship Court quashed its decision of 21 February and now stated that the applicant should be able to meet her son regularly, but that the guardian could decide where the meetings should occur . It was not an abuse of the guardian's office if such meetings did not take place at the son's residence . The applicant appealed against this decision . She requested that the youth authorities be ordered, under the threat of forcible execution, to disclose her son's residence . On 9 November 1984 the Regional Court rejected the appeal . It found that the Youth Oflice had a cenain competence to decide on the necessary measures concerning the child . The decision continues : "If the Regional Court - confirmed by the Court of Appeal - has quashed the decision of the District Court which was not to reveal the son's residencethis does not automatically entail the general obligation of the Youth Office to communicate to the ntother the residence immediately in all circumstances . Rather, the Youth Office should within its duty bound discretion (pflichigem8sses Ermessen) endeavour in the interest of the child to communicate the child's residence to the mother" (p . 7) . According to the judgment, the transfer of the applicant's son from Berlin to the institution had been handled inadequately and would have worried the son . However, the Youth Office had within its duty bound obligation so far unsuccessfully endeavoured to arrive at the first condition for communicating the residence, i .e . a talk with the mother about the situation of her son . As convulsive scenes could be anticipated if mother and son came together, it was important to find out whether the ntoiher was ready for such a meeting . It was particularly worrying that the mother refused to talk with the Youth Office . The latter had justifiably refused to panicipate at a meeting at the office of the applicant's lawyer together with the applicanl . her lawyer and an educator from the institution, in view of the fact that the atmosphere of a lawyer's office would have inhibited the educator in the free exposition of her views . If the applicant wanted personal contact with her child at his place of residence, this concerned the regulation of contact within the meaning of S . 1634, a matter on which the District Court had not yet decided and which could not therefore b e
entered into upon appeal . The Regional Coun also saw no reason to withdraw custody from the municipal guardian or to terminate the son's stay in the institution where his progress was positive . Even if the son could have been placed in a Berlin home, it was at present not apparent that his continuing stay in a West German home would be detrimental to him . On 4 June 1985 the Coun of Appeal, in rejecting the applicant's appeal, found that the decisions of the previous courts disclosed no legal errors and rejected the appeal . The court stated in particular that, if the District Coun had on 16 April 1984 quashed the previous decision of the legal administrator to communicate the son's address . this meant that the Youth Office was entitled, until funher notice, not to disclose the address . The legal administrator had not been competent to decide on ihe issue of access . On 16 April 1984 the District Court had stated that the municipal guardian could decide whether the applicant could contact her son . Its decision thus also affected the manner in which the applicant exercised her right of access . However- the court had ensured that the son would not be disturbed by the applicant's unprepared and uncontrolled visits . Nevenheless, this only constituted a temporary ntea .sure . If, after the decision of 16 April 1984, no agreement as to the access could be reached, the Guardianship Court would then have to regulate the issue . u had not been foreseeable that the mother would refuse all cooperation . The Guardianship Court should now urgently regulate the applicant's access to her son and, for this purpose, undertake the necessary investigations, and properly hear the parties . The Coun of Appeal also rejected the applicant's request that her son should be brought back to Berlin . His placement in West Germany far away from the applicant had been correct inasmuch as this prevented the applicant's uncontrolled contacts with her son .
COMPLAINTS I . The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention of the loss of custody over her son who has been placed under guardianship and taken out of her household . She invokes her right to educate her son, and his right to be educated by his parent . She submits, inrer alia, that the mere possibility of a danger for the son's well-being does not justify such a measure . His well-being would not have been endangered if he had remained in her household, as had been advocated by all ntedical experts . The applicant's educational assistance would have been sufficent . 2 . Under Anicle 8 the applicant complains of the forcible execution on 2 Septentber 1983 by the Youth Office of the separation of her son . She submits that he was taken away from his school under distressing circumstances and without the applicant's knowledge, as well as against her will . 217
3 . The applicant complains under Article B of the fact that her son was taken away from Berlin and brought to an institution in West Germany . As she is impecunious . this measure effectively prevents her from maintaining constant contact with her son . Funhermore, such an education can never be an adequate substitute for parental education, and her son is indeed now suffering from a lack of parental affection . 4 . The applicant submits that the decisions of the Regional Court of 18 August 1983 . and of the Court of Appeal of 29 November 1983, quashed the decision of the District Court of 12 April 1983 . insofar as the latter had ordered the Youth Office to keep the son's residence secret . She complains under Article 8 that, contrary to these decisions, her son's residence has not been disclosed, thus depriving her of all written or personal contact with her son . 5 . The applicant also complains of the manner in which the above courts conducted the proceedings and assessed the facts, as well as of the resulting decisions . She alleges, inter a(ia, the incorrect application of German law, the one-sided interpretation of the medical opinions which had all advocated against a separation, and the insufficient substantiation of the court decisions . The Regional Court had conducted the proceedings improperly insofar as a judge had made a telephone call with Dr . A ., the contents of which had been misunderstood by the court and had not been communicated to the applicant's lawyer . Dr . A .'s medical opinion had not been considered by the Regional Court . The applicant relies on Article 6 para . I of the Convention, and her right to a fair hearing .
THE LA W The applicant submitted in the application of 23 January 1984 that she was 1. filing the application in her own name as well as in the name of her son who was then aged seven years and ten months and had been placed under statutory guardianship . Under Article 25 para . I of the Convention, the Commission "may receive petitions . . . from any person . . . claiming lo be the victim of the rights set forth in (the) Convention" . In principle, a parent who has the custody over his or her child is able to introduce an application before the Commission on behalf of the child . This opportunity ntay be qualified by Ihe status of the parent's legal relationship with the child under domestic law . It is true that in the present case the applicant's son was placed under statutory guardianship . 218
However, the Commission notes that the applicant's position in respect of her son has, according to S . 1666(1) of the German Civil Code, only been qualified lo the extent that the Youth Office acting as the son's statutory guardian may decide in particular the son's residence and education . Moreover, the applicant's complaints are directed against the proceedings before the Gernian couns leading to the decision under S .1666(I) of the Civil Code to appoint a statutory guardian as well as against the manner in which this decision was executed . On the other hand, the complaints of the applicant's son are in this respect identical to those put forward by the applicant . In these circumstances the Commission considers that the applicant is able to introduce the application also on behalf of her son without it being necessary for the recipnxal parties to the "family life" in question to be made joint applicants . 2 . The applicant complains of the withdrawal of custody (Personensorgerecht) over her son, who has been placed under statutory guardianship (AmtspFlegschaft) and taken out of her household . She submits, inter al/a, that these measures did not correspond with the conclusions expressed in various medical expert opinions, and that thc measures were ordered without considering the suitability of less rigid means . The nteasures at issue could not be justified by the mere possibility that the son's well-being would be endangered if he remained with the applicant . She relies on Article 8 of the Convention which states : "I . Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his hotne and his correspondence . 2 . There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or ntorals, or for the protection of the rights and freedonts of others . " The respondent Government have contended that the German courts' decision to withdraw the applicant's custody over her son, while constituting a panicularly serious interference with the applicant's parental rights, was justified under Article 8 para . 2 . as being the most lenient means after other attempts to prevent damage to the son had failed . As had been found by medical experts, damage had already occurred to the son . and further damage was to be feared if he continued to remain with the applicant . The decision by the German courts to withdraw the applicant's custody over her son, to put him under statutory guardianship, and to take him away from the applicant's household constituted an interference with family life . protected by Anicle 8 of the Convention . The Contmission's next task is to examine whether such interference was justified under Anicle 8 para . 2 . 219
The Commission obse rves that the German courts' decision concerning the withdrawal of the applicant's custody over her son was taken in accordance with the domestic law, as laid down in Section 1666 of the German Civil Code . Moreover, the German courts carefully examined the necessity of the measures taken . Thus, the Regional Coun, in its decision of 18 August 1983, considered that all medical opinions had confirmed the mother's reduced intellectual and educational abilities . The court appointed expert, Dr . K ., had stated on 27 April 1982 in an opinion independently verified by two further experts that the applicant's son disclosed clear symptoms of disturbed development in the psycho-affective area ; if the situation of the applicant and the son remained unchanged- it was unlikely that his condition would improve . The expert opinion recommended in particular that one more opportunity should be given to the applicant and that the son should be taken out of her household if there was no improvement within one year . In this respect the Commission notes that the decisibn was thereupon taken by the Regional Court only after considering that the developments subsequent to Dr . K .'s opinion, rather than indicating an improvement in the son's development, disclosed the applicant's continuing difficulties in ensuring her son's education . The court also considered that less rigid measures, such as had been ordered by the District Court on 21 June 1982, had proved unsuccessful . In the court's view the applicant's conduct warranted the conclusion that she would continue to act in the same way as before and that the son's well-being would thus be seriously jeopardized if he continued to remain with her . The Commission considers that the decisions taken by the German courts were reasonable in the circumstances, and that the interference with the applicant's right to respect for family life was justified under Article 8 para . 2 of the Convention, as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the health and morals and the rights and freedoms of others, namely the child concerned . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . 3 . The applicant also complains under Article 8 of the Convention about the forcible separation from her son on 2 September 1983 . She submits that he was taken away from his school under distressing circumstances, without her knowledge and against her will . a . The Government sta ( e that this complaint was not raised by the applicant in her application to the Commission, possibly because the right to decide the son's residence no longer fell to the applicant . However, the Commission has satisfied itself that at the outset, in her application of 23 Janua ry 1984, the applicant directed one complaint " against . . . 2) the forcibly executed separation from her son by the Youth Office Berlin-Kreuzberg on 2 September 1983 . . ." (p . 1) . 220
b. The Government submit furthermore that the applicant failed to exhaust domestic rentedies within the nteaning of Article 26 of the Convention . The Court of Appeal stated on 29 November 1983 that the complaint at issue was not part of its decision . The applicant could have raised this point together with the coniplaints directed against the Youth Office . It was doubtful, however, whether a complaint by the applicant of a breach of duty on the part of the Youth Office would have ntet the conditions of Anicle 26 . However, the Contmission observes that, once the applicant's son had been placed under statutory guardianship, the applicant could no longer decide the son's residence or, therefore, introduce a complaint in this respect . in view of the fact that the exercise of this right appertained, according to S . 1666(() of the German Civil Code, to the Youth Office as statutory guardian . Therefore, the applicant had no possibility to complain about the manner in which her son was taken away from school . Notwithstanding these circumstances, the Commission notes that the complaint at issue was mentioned, inrera[ia, in the applicant's appeal statement to the Regional Coun . On 9 November 1984, this court found that the transfer of the applicant's son on 2 September 1983 from Berlin to West Germany had been handled inadequately . However, the court did not arrive at the conclusion that the applicant's rights had been violated . In her further appeal . the applicant again referred, in her contplaint about the Youth Office's conduct concerning custody . to this passage of the Regional Court's decision . The Commission concludes, therefore, that in this respect the applicant has complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . c . In addition, the Government submit that the measure at issue, as the most lenient one, met the criteria of Article 8 para . 2 of the Convention . Had the son been taken away from the applicant's apartment, draniatic scenes would have been conceivable which would have caused a psychological shock to the applicant's son . Another possibility was that the applicant might have gone imo hiding with her son . The Commission considers that the complaint raises difficult questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits . This part of the application is therefore not manifestly illfounded and ntust be declared adntissible, no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible having been established . 4 . The applicant complains under Anicle 8 that her son was taken away from Berlin and brought to a West German institution for education . As she is impecunious this measure effectively prevents her from maintaining constant contact with her son . Such an education can be no substitute for parental education .
The respondent Government submit that the West German institution which was chosen as no free place was available in a Berlin home, is a qualified establishnient for pedagogical treatment where the applicant's son is developing well . This measure was therefore justified by Article 8 para . 2 . The Contmission finds that this is also a complex question of fact and law which can only be resolved by an examination of the merits . It follows that this aspect of the application cannot be declared manifestly ill-founded and must be declared admissible, no other grounds of inadmissibility having been established .
5 . The applicant next submits that the decisions of the Regional Coun of 18 August 1983 and of the Court of Appeal of 29 November 1983 quashed the decision of the District Court of 12 April 1983 insofar as the latter had ordered the Youth Office to keep the son's residence secret . She complains under Article 8 that, contrary to these decisions, her son's residence has not been disclosed, thus depriving her of all written or personal contact with her son . a. The respondent Government contend that the applicant has in this respect not exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . The decisionof the Regional Court of 18 August 1983 and of the Court of Appeal of 29 November 1983 which set aside the previous decision of the District Coun without replacentent- did not settle the question whether the son's residence should be disclosed to the applicant . The Regional Court and the Court of Appeal would not have been competent to do so . As a matter of principle and in accordance with S . 1634 (2) of the Civil Code, the Youth Office will decide on the manner in which a parent not entitled to custody will exercise his right of access which has been granted in principle to the applicant by the court . If no agreement can be reached, the Guardianship Court will decide on the details of access . This interpretation has now been confirmed by the Coun of Appeal on 4 June 1985 . The Commission considers thal the issue of the disclosure of the son's address may be connected with the issue of regulating the applicant's right of access to her son . However, the applicant has directed her present complaint specifically against the non-disclosure of the address . The applicant raised this complaint in the first proceedings before all the respective courts . Upon appeal, in its decision of 18 August 1983, the Regional Court quashed the District Court's previous decision without replacement insofar as the Youth Office had been entitled to keep the address secret . The Youth Office, in its subsequent appeal, stated that the address should nevertheless not be disclosed as the applicant would otherwise immediately visit her son . Hence, the Youth Office itself regarded the Regional Court's decision of 18 August 1983 as in fact indicating that the applicant should be told her son's address . On 29 November 1983 the Court of Appeal confirmed the Regional Court's decision- ituer alia, insofar as the latter had quashed the District Court's decisio n 222
not to disclose the address . The Youth Office nevertheless did not disclose the address . The applicant then again raised this complaint in the second proceedings before all the respective courts . The Commission is, therefore . satisfied that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in respect of the complaint at issue, within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention . b. The Government submit that, insofar as the German courts granted the applicant a right of access in general, there has been no violation of the applicant's rights under Article 8 para . I . The Youth Office wasjustified in trying to come to an agreement with the applicant on details of the right of access, as there existed the danger that the applicant would visit her son, take hint away and go into hiding . To this extent the nteasure not to disclose the address wasjustified by the criteria of Article 8 para . 2 . The issue must now be decided by the Guardianship Court . The Commission considers that the complaint raises difficult questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits . This part of the application is therefore not manifestly illfounded and niust also be declared admissible, no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible having been established . 6 . The applicant further complains, in respect of the first proceedings before the German couns, of the manner in which these courts conducted the proceedings and assessed the facts, as well as of the resulting decisions . She alleges, inter alia, an incorrect application of Gerntan law, a one-sided interpretation of the medical opinions which had all advocated against a separation, and an insufficient substantiation of the coun decisions . She alleges that the Regional Court had conducted the proceedings improperly, insofar as thejudge had made a telephone call with Dr . A ., the contents of which had been misunderstood by the court and had not been comntunicated to the applicant's lawyer . Dr . A .'s medical opinion had not been considered by the Regional Court . The applicant relies on Article 6 para . I which stales : "I . In the detennination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law . Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals,public order or national security in a deniocratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circuntstances where pubficity would prejudice the interests of justice . " The Contmission recalls that in accordance with Article 19 . its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention . In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors o f
law or fact have been committed by domestic courts except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see No . 8417/78 . Dec . 4 .5 .79, D . R . 16 p . 200) . The Commission has examined the applicant's various complaints under Article 6 para'1 . However, it finds no evidence to indicate that the applicant, who was represented by a lawyer . could not present her case properly, or that the proceedings were iniproperly conducted by the German Ã§ourts .
In particular the applicant could present her complaints in proceedings before three different courts and she was present at three hearings before the District Court . The Regional Court's decision of 18 August 1983 contained on 34 pages a review of all the relevant medical opinions and an extensive substantiation as well as a full reasoning for the nteasures taken which were generally based on the conclusions expounded in Dr . K .'s expert opinion . It is true that the applicant also complains that a Regiontil Court judge ha d telephoned Dr . A . the contents of which conversation had been misunderstood and had not been communicated to the applicant's lawyer . Moreover, Dr . A .'s medical opinion had not been considered . However, it does not transpire from the Regional Court's decision that this telephone conversation bore any special influence on the outcome of the proceedings . The respective decision, while containing no reference thereto, did indeed summarise Dr . A .'s opinion as it had been submitted by'the applicant . In any event, the Commission notes that the applicant could raise this point again in the appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal which, after considering the issue, found that it did not disclose any procedural error .Acordingly . these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation o f the rights set out in Article 6 para . I . The Commission concludes that this part of ihe application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para . 2 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits, the applicant's complaints concernin g (a) the manner in which the applicant's son was taken away from his school in Berlin (para . 3 of (he law) ; (b) the placement of her son in a West German home (para . 4 of the law) ; (c) the refusal of the German authorities to disclose to her the son's residence (para . 5 of the law) ; and DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the reniainder of the application . 224
EN FAI T La requÃ©rante, ressortissante allemande nÃ©e en 1944, est une femme au foyer domiciliÃ©e Ã Berlin . Devant la Commission, elle est reprÃ©sentÃ©e par Me Rust, avocat Ã Berlin . La requÃªte est prÃ©semÃ©e aussi au nom de son fils, nÃ© hors mariage le 18 mars 1976 . Son fds- Ã©colier a Ã©tÃ© reconnu par son pÃ¨re . soldat amÃ©ricain . Le doniicile du fils n'est pas connu . En 1981 et 1982, deux avis Ã©tablis par des mÃ©decins spÃ©cialistes, notamment par le Professeur G ., indiquaient que de graves erreurs d'Ã©ducation de la pan de la requÃ©rante compromettaient le dÃ©veloppement de l'enfant . Le Professeur G . suggÃ©rait d'aider la requÃ©rante afin de permettre au fils de rester prÃ¨s de sa mÃ¨re . Un autre avis donnÃ© le 8 fÃ©vrier 1982 par le Dr . S ., mÃ©decin gÃ©nÃ©raliste de la requÃ©rante, Ã©voquait les aptitudes intellectuelles rÃ©duites de sa cliente . Le Dr . S . ne recommandait pas de la sÃ©parer de l'enfant mais suggÃ©rait qu'une autre personne assiste la mÃ¨re dans l'Ã©ducation de son fils . Le 9 fÃ©vrier 1982, le iribunal de district (Amtsgericht) de Berlin-Spandau, agissant en qualitÃ© de juge des tutelles, transfÃ©ra provisoirement Ã l'office de la jeunesse le droit de la mÃ¨re de dÃ©cider du domicile de son fils . Le tribunal ordonna Ã©galement Ã l'hÃ´pital psychiatrique de Spandau de donner son avis mÃ©dical sur la requÃ©rante et son fils, avis qui fut rendu le 27 avril 1982 . L'avis du psychiatre, signÃ© du Dr . K . et confirmÃ© par deux autres spÃ©cialistes indÃ©pendants, exprimait la crainte que la mÃ¨re ne soit pas en mesure d'Ã©duquer convenablement son fils, chez qui on notait des syntpi6ntes trÃ¨s nets de troubles du dÃ©veloppement psycho-affectif . Le docunient reconnnandait que d'autres personnes aident Ã l'Ã©ducation de l'enfant et que ce dernier soit soumis Ã une psychothÃ©rapie . En ne changeant rien Ã la situation mÃ¨re-fils, on verrait trÃ¨s probablement s'aggraver les dÃ©gÃ¢ts . Le Dr . K . recommandait que d'autres personnes aident Ã l'Ã©ducation de l'enfant ; si le dÃ©veloppement du fils ne s'amÃ©liorait dans le dÃ©lai d'un an . il faudrait enlever l'enfant Ã la requÃ©rante . Le tribunal de district dÃ©cida de restituer Ã la requÃ©rante le droit de garde sur son fds . L'enfant ne venant que trÃ¨s irrÃ©guliÃ¨rement Ã la consultation de l'hÃ´pital, le tribunal de district ordonna le 21 juin 1982 Ã la requÃ©rante d'envoyer son fils dans un Ã©tablissement scolaire et de veiller Ã ce qu'il suive une psychothÃ©rapie . La mÃ¨re se soumit au traitement en juin 1982 et en janvier 1983 mais son flls ne le fit pas . semble-t-il . Le 17 aoÃ»t 1982, le fils de la requÃ©rante entama sa scolaritÃ© Ã l'Ã©cole primaire . Les rapports scolaires indiquent qu'entre le 17 ao0t et le 24 novembre 1982, il frÃ©quenta l'Ã©cole neuf jours au total . Pour le reste du temps, la requÃ©rante fournit des certificats mÃ©dicaux justifiant l'absence de l'enfant par des raisons mÃ©dicales . La requÃ©rante et un instituteur eurent un jour une rixe dans la salle de classe, aprÃ¨s quo i
une affiche fut placardÃ©e Ã l'entrÃ©e de l'Ã©cole interdisant Ã la requÃ©rante de pÃ©nÃ©trer dans 1-Ã©tablissement . La mÃ¨re cessa d'envoyer son fils dans cette Ã©cole, chercha un autre Ã©tablissement et inscrivit l'enfant dans une Ã©cole Ã©lÃ©mentaire en juin 1983 .
Le 12 avril 1983 et sur demande de l'office de protection de la famille, le tribunal de district agissant en qualitÃ© de juge des tutelles transfÃ©ra le droit de garde (Personensorgerechi) sur le fils de la requÃ©rante Ã l'office de la jeunesse de Kreuzberg (Jugendamt) et Ã un tuteur lÃ©gal . Le tribunal ordonna Ã l'office de la jeunesse de tenir secret le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant et d'Ã©loigner l'enfant de sa mÃ¨re ou de ses grands-parents . Le tribunal invoqua l'article 1666 du Code civil allemand . La requÃ©rante se pourvut contre cette dÃ©cision devant le tribunal rÃ©gional (Landgericht) de Berlin, qui suspendit le 10 mai 1983 l'exÃ©cution de la dÃ©cision prÃ©cÃ©dente . La requÃ©rante produisit en appel un certificat mÃ©dical du Dr . A . qui, tout en ne recontmandant pas une sÃ©paration d'avec l'enfant, soulignait qu'il lui serait difficile de conduire une thÃ©rapie satisfaisante dans le cadre du rÃ©gime de sÃ©curitÃ© sociale et que la requÃ©rante avait des difficultÃ©s Ã lui faire confiance . Selon une lettre ultÃ©rieure du Dr . A ., un juge du tribunal avait tÃ©lÃ©phonÃ© au docteur pendant la procÃ©dure . Ni l'appel ni sa teneur n'ont Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©s Ã la requÃ©rante . Le 18 ao6t 1983, le tribunal rejeta l'appel dans la mesure oÃ¹ il concernait la question de la garde et le fait que l'enfant devait Ã©tre Ã©loignÃ© la requÃ©rante ou des grands-parents . D'autre part, le tribunal estima que le tribunal de district avait Ã tort autorisÃ© l'Office de la jeunesse Ã¹ ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler Ã la mÃ¨re le lieu de rÃ©sidence de son fils el il annula sans la rentplacer la dÃ©cision de la juridiction infÃ©rieure dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle avait autorisÃ© l'Office de lajeunesse Ã garder le secret sur la rÃ©sidence de l'enfant . La dÃ©cision du tribunal couvrait 34 pages . Sur la question de la garde, le tribunal trancha en se fondant sur les avis des docteurs K . et S . et du Professeur G . Sa dÃ©cision, qui se rÃ©fÃ¨re Ã trois audiences devant le tribunal de district auquel la requÃ©rante avait Ã©galement participÃ©, rÃ©sume l'avis du Dr . A . Le tribunal n'estima pas nÃ©cessaire de procÃ©der Ã un exanten complÃ©mentaire de la requÃ©rante pendant qu'elle Ã©tait en voie de guÃ©rison dans un hÃ´pital car ce cadre de repos n'a rien Ã voir avec la vie de tous les jours . Le tribunal reconnut que la requÃ©rante dÃ©sirait certes le bien de son enfant, mais que ses tendances Ã la nÃ©vrose et ses faibles capacitÃ©s intellectuelles l'empÃ©chaient de discerner ce qui Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire Ã l'Ã©ducation de l'enfant . Elle n'avait pas veillÃ© Ã ce qu'il aille rÃ©guliÃ¨rement Ã l'Ã©cole matemelle et, aprÃ¨s les mesures ordonnÃ©es par le tribunal de district le 21 juin 1982, n'avait pas assurÃ© son Ã©ducation en l'envoyant rÃ©guliÃ¨rement Ã l'Ã©cole . On pouvait supposer que son Ã©tat psychologique expliquait sa rixe avec l'instituteur dans la classe . Son fils manifestait Ã prÃ©sent de graves penurbations (Fehlentwicklung) du domaine psycho-affectif et des aptitude s 226
relationnelles limitÃ©es . Le comportement de la mÃ¨re permettait de conclure qu'elle persisterait Ã agir comme avant . La dÃ©claration du Dr . A . rÃ©vÃ©lait Ã©galement qu'il estimait inutile d'entreprendre une IhÃ©rapie chez la requÃ©rante . Quant au lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant, le tribunal rÃ©gional estima que le tribunal de district avait Ã tort autorisÃ© l'office de la jeunesse Ã le tenir secret . En soi, cetlc ntesure entraÃ®nait pratiquement une exclusion totale des rappons mÃ¨re-enfant au sens de l'anicle 1634 . Le tribunal rÃ©gional estima injustifiable Ã ce stade de supprimer complÃ¨tement le droit de visite de la requÃ©rante Ã son fils, Ã©tant donnÃ© que la sÃ©paration mÃ¨re-fils aurait de toutes maniÃ¨res des graves rÃ©percussions psychologiques pour l'un comme pour l'autre . Le tribunal poursuivait en ces termes : â¢ Pour attÃ©nuer ces difOcultÃ©s, il peut s'avÃ©rer absolument nÃ©cessaire (durchaus erforderlich), dans un souci d'apaisement, de permettre un contact (Umgang) de la nt8re avec son enfant . D'un autre cÃ´tÃ©, Il ne faut pas exclure l'Ã©ventualitÃ© que ce contact avec l'enfant aggrave le trouble . . . Pour s'adapter psychologiquement Ã la sÃ©paration, ntÃ¨re et fils auront la possibilitÃ© de se voir, de parler et de se rÃ©confoner ntutuellement . Certes, le succÃ©s de l'entreprise parait douteux . vu des troubles nÃ©vrotiques de la ntÃ¨re . Seul l'avenir apportera une certitude sur ce point . La mÃ¨re doit essayer, en se comportant raisonnablemem, de ne pas obliger Ã restreindre fortemem son droit de visite Ã l'enfam . En l'Ã©tat actuel des choses, la dÃ©cision attaquÃ©e doit dÃ¨s lors dtre annulÃ©e dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle autorise l'office de la jeunesse Ã cacher Ã la mÃ¨re le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant . â¢ (p . 33/34) . Le tribunal rÃ©gional terminait en demandant Ã la mÃ¨re de coopÃ©rer avec l'Offic e de la jeunesse . La dÃ©cision fut signifiÃ©e Ã l'office et Ã l'avocat de la requÃ©rante le 2 septembre 1983 . Le 2 septembre 1983, le tuteur municipal alla chercher le fils de la requÃ©rante en classe et l'aniena directenient Ã l'aÃ©ropon . L'enfant s'envola pour Hambourg et fut antenÃ© dans un Ã©tablissement sans avoir vu la requÃ©rante ni lui avoir parlÃ© . La mÃ¨re ne fut pas informÃ©e de l'adresse de l'enfant . La requÃ©rante recourut devant la cour d'appel de Berlin (Kammergericht) contre la dÃ©cision rendue par le tribunal rÃ©gional le 18 aoÃ¹t 1983, se plaignant notantntent qu'on persistait Ã lui cacher le lieu de rÃ©sidence de son fils . L'office du district interjeta aussi le 20 septembre 1983 un appel par lequel il s'opposait Ã la dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional de rÃ©vÃ©ler le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant . L'office dÃ©clarait que l'enfant s'installait avec plaisir dans un foyer pour enfants et continuait en ces termes : â¢ Si on rÃ©vÃ¨le Ã la mÃ¨re le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant, il est Ã craindre qu'elle ne vienne imniÃ©diatement lui rendre visite, ce qui perturbera grandement notre mission de garde . . . - .
Le 29 novembre 1983, la cour d'appel dÃ©bouta et la requÃ©rante et l'office du district . Selon la cour, les juridictions infÃ© ri eures Ã©taient fondÃ©es Ã faire droit Ã la demande de la requÃ©rante d'avoir des contacts personnels avec son fils et de connaitre son lieu de rÃ©sidence . Le tribunal rÃ©gional avait compÃ©tence pour connaÃ®tre de cette question de rÃ©glementation des contacts ( Umgangsregelung) au sens de l'article 1634 . Exclure complÃ¨tement ces contacts ne serait nÃ©cessaire, selon l'a rt icle 1634 ( 2) . que faute d'autre moyen de protÃ©ger l'enfant . D'un autre cÃ´tÃ©, retirer la garde Ã la requÃ©rante Ã©tait conforme Ã l'anicle 1666 par . I . La premiÃ¨re juridiction avait apprÃ©ciÃ© correctement les avis des mÃ©decins et n'avait pas commis d'erreur de procÃ©dure, notamment quant Ã l'entretien tÃ©lÃ©phonique du juge avec le Dr . A .
Le 2 fÃ©vrier 1984, la requÃ©rante demanda au tribunal de district de Spandau de retirer la garde de son fils au tuteur municipal, compte tenu de la maniÃ re dont l'enfant avait Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de Berlin et du fait que sa rÃ©sidence Ã©tait toujours tenue secrÃ¨te . L'administrateur lÃ©gal (Rechtspfleger) du tribunal de district dÃ©cida l e 21 fÃ©vrier 1984 de ne pas retirer la garde de l'enfant au tuteur municipal, mais ordonna Ã ce dernier de rÃ©vÃ©ler oÃ¹ se trouvait l'enfant . Le 24 fÃ©vrier 1984, le tribunal de district dÃ©cidait Ã©galement de ne pas ramener l'enfant Ã Berlin . La requÃ©rante dÃ©posa auprÃ¨s de cette derniÃ¨re juridiction une plainte (Erinnerung) concernant la persistance du secret sur le lieu de rÃ©sidence de son fils . La mÃ¨re ne pouvait pas lui rendre rÃ©guliÃ¨rement visite puisqu'il avait Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de l'Ã©cole et transfÃ©rÃ© en Allemagne de l'Ouest . Le tuteur municipal dÃ©posa lui aussi une plainte le 15 mars 1984, dÃ©clarant que si la rÃ©sidence du fils devait continuer Ã Ãªtre gardÃ©e secrÃ¨te dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de l'enfant, il n'avait pas d'objection Ã ce que la requÃ©rante rencontre son fils quelque part ailleurs aux frais de l'administration . Cependant . la requÃ©rante dÃ©clina l'offre .
Ill . Le 16 avril 1984, le tribunal de district agissant en qualitÃ© de juge des tutelles, annula sa dÃ©cision du 21 fÃ©vrier, dÃ©clarant Ã prÃ©sent que la requÃ©rante pouvait rencontrer son fils rÃ©guliÃ¨rement mais que le tuteur dÃ©ciderait du lieu des rencontres . Ce n'Ã©tait pas pour lÃ© tuteur abuser de ses fonctions que de dÃ©cider que les rencontres n'auraient pas lieu au domicile de l'enfant .LarequÃ©rantefi ap eld cet dÃ©cison . Elle demanda d'ordonner Ã l'offic e de la jeunesse, Ã peine d'exÃ©cution forcÃ©e, de lui rÃ©vÃ©ler le lieu de rÃ©sidence de son fils .
Le 9 novembre 1984, le tribunal rÃ©gional rejeta l'appel . Il estima l'office de la jeunesse compÃ©tent pour dÃ©cider des mesures nÃ©cessaires Ã l'enfant . La dÃ©cision sc poursuivait ainsi : -Si le tribunal rÃ©gional d'abord, puis la cour d'appel, ont cassÃ© la dÃ©cision du tribunal de district de ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant, cela n'entraine pas automatiquement pour l'office de la jeunesse l'obligation gÃ©nÃ©rale de communiquer immÃ©diatement et sans discemement le lieu de rÃ©sidence Ã la mÃ¨re . Mieux vaut dire que, dans les limites de son pouvoir discrÃ©tionnaire (pllichtgemÃ sses Ermessen) . l'office s'efforcera, dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de l'enfant, de contmuniquer Ã la tn8re le lieu de rÃ©sidence de son filsÂ» (p . 7) . Selon ce jugement, le transfen du fils de la requÃ©rante de Berlin Ã l'Ã©tablissement oÃ¹ il Ã©tait Ã prÃ©sent n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© menÃ© convenablement et avait dÃ¹ inquiÃ©ter l'enfant . Cependant, l'office de la jeunesse s'Ã©tait vainement efforcÃ©, dans le cadre de son obligation de fonction, d'arriver Ã la premiÃ¨re condition pour communiquer le lieu de rÃ©sidence, Ã savoir un entretien avec la mÃ¨re sur la situation de l'enfant . Comme on pouvait prÃ©voir des scÃ¨nes agitÃ©es si mÃ¨re et fils Ã©taient mis en prÃ©sence, il Ã©tait important de s'assurer que la mÃ¨re Ã©tait prÃ©te Ã ce genre de rencontre . 11 Ã©tait particuliÃ¨rement inquiÃ©tant que la ntÃ¨re refuse de traiter avec l'office de la jeunesse . Ce dernier avait Ã juste titre refusÃ© de participer Ã une rÃ©union dans le bureau de l'avocat de la requÃ©rante Ã laquelle devaient assister la requÃ©rante, son avocat et une Ã©ducatrice de l'Ã©tablissentent, car l'atmosphÃ©re dans l'Ã©tude de l'avocat aurait empÃªchÃ© l'Ã©ducatrice d'exposer librement son point de vue . Si la requÃ©rante dÃ©sirait un contact personnel avec son enfant au lieu oÃ¹ il Ã©tait domiciliÃ©, ccci concernait la rÃ©glementation des contacts mÃ¨re-fils au sens de l'article 1634, question sur laquelle le tribunal de district ne s'Ã©tait pas encore prononcÃ© et qui ne pouvait dÃ¨s lors pas faire l'objet d'un appel . Le tribunal rÃ©gional ne voyait pas non plus de raison de retirer la garde au tuteur municipal ou de mettre fin au sÃ©jour de l'enfant dans l'Ã©tablissement alors que ses progrÃ¨s Ã©taient encourageants . MÃ©me si l'enfant avait pu Ã©tre placÃ© dans un foyer Ã Berlin, il ne semblait pas pour le ntoment que denteurer dans un foyer en Allemagne de l'Ouest lui soit nÃ©faste . Le 4 juin 1985, en rejetant l'appel de la requÃ©rante, la cour d'appel estima que les dÃ©cisions judiciaires intÃ©rieures ne rÃ©vÃ©laient aucune erreur de droit et elle dÃ©bouta l'appelante . La cour dÃ©clara notamment que . si le 16 avril 1984 le tribunal de district avait annulÃ© la dÃ©cision de l'administrateur lÃ©gal de contmuniquer l'adresse de l'enfant, cela signifiait que l'office de lajeunesse Ã©tait habilitÃ©, jusqu'Ã nouvel ordre, Ã ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler cette adresse . L'administrateur lÃ©gal n'Ã©tait pas compÃ©tent pour dÃ©cider de la question du droit de visite . Le 16 avril 1984, le tribunal de district avait dÃ©clarÃ© que le tuteur municipal pouvait se prononcer la possibilitÃ© pour la requÃ©rante de rencontrer son fils . Sa dÃ©cision affectait dÃ¨s lors la maniÃ¨re dont la requÃ©rante allait exercer son droit de visite . Cependant, le tribunal avait veillÃ© Ã ce que l'enfant n e 229
soit pas perturbÃ© par les visites anarchiques et non prÃ©parÃ©es de la requÃ©rante . NÃ©anmoins . ceci ne constituait qu'une mesure transitoire . Si, aprÃ¨s la dÃ©cision du 16 avril 1984 . aucun accord ne pouvait Ã¨tre obtenu sur le droit de visite, le juge des tutelles devrait alors rÃ©gler la question . On ne pouvait pas prÃ©voir que la mÃ¨re refuserait toute coopÃ©ration . Le juge des tutelles devait maintenant, de toute urgence, rÃ©glementer le droit de visite de la requÃ©rante, entreprendre les investigations nÃ©cessaires Ã cet effet et entendre contnte il se doit les parties . La cour d'appel rejeta Ã©galement la demande de la requÃ©rante tendant Ã ramener son fils Ã Berlin . Le placement de l'enfant en Allemagne de l'Ouest, loin de la requÃ©rante . avait Ã©tÃ© une bonne chose dans la mesure oÃ¹ cela empÃªchait la mÃ¨re d'avoir des contacts anarchiques avec son fils . GRIEFS I . La requÃ©rante se plaint- en invoquant l'article 8 de la Convention, d'avoir perdu la garde de son fils, placÃ© sous tutelle et enlevÃ© du foyer familial . Elle invoque le droit d'Ã©duquer elle-mÃ¨me son fils et le droit de l'enfant d'Ã¨tre Ã©duquÃ© par son parent . EllÃ© soutient notamment que la simple Ã©ventualitÃ© d'un risque pour la santÃ© de l'enfant nc justifiait pas une telle mesure . La santÃ© de l'enfant n'aurait pas Ã©tÃ© comprontise s'il Ã©tait restÃ© au foyer, comme le prÃ©conisaient tous les mÃ©decins . Il aurait Ã©tÃ© suffisant d'aider la requÃ©rante Ã Ã©duquer l'enfant . 2 . Au regard de l'article 8 . la requÃ©rante se plaint de ce que le 2 septembre 1983 . l'office de la jeunesse l'a sÃ©parÃ©e de force de son fils . Elle soutient que l'enfant a Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de son Ã©cole dans des circonstances angoissantes, Ã l'insu de sa mÃ¨re et aussi contre sa volontÃ© . 3 . La requÃ©rante se plaint- toujours au regard de l'article 8, de ce que l'enfant a Ã©tÃ© Ã©loignÃ© de Berlin et amenÃ© dans un Ã©tablissement en Allemagne FÃ©dÃ©rale . Etant impÃ©cunieuse, elle se trouve dÃ¨s lors dans l'impossibilitÃ© effective de maintenir le contact avec son fds . En outre, pareille Ã©ducation ne peut pas Ã©tre un substitut convenable Ã une Ã©ducation par la famille et le fils souffre de fait maintenant d'un manque d'affection parentale . 4 . La requÃ©rante soutient que la dÃ©cision rendue par le tribunal rÃ©gional le 18 aoÃ¹t 1983 et celle de la cour d'appel en date du 29 novembre 1983 ont annulÃ© la dÃ©cision du 12 avril 1983 prise par le tribunal de district dans la mesure oÃ¹ ce dernier avait ordonnÃ© Ã l'office de la jeunesse de tenir secret le lieu de rÃ©sidence de l'enfant . Elle se plaint en invoquant l'article 8 que, contrairement Ã ces dÃ©cisions, la rÃ©sidence de son fils ne lui a pas Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e, ce qui l'a privÃ©e de tout contact Ã©crit ou personnel avec l'enfant . 5 . La requÃ©rante se plaint Ã©galement de la maniÃ¨re dont les tribunaux prÃ©citÃ©s ont ntenÃ© la procÃ©dure et apprÃ©ciÃ© les faits, et aussi des dÃ©cisions qui en sont rÃ©sultÃ©es .
Elle allÃ¨gue notamment que la lÃ©gislation allemande a Ã©tÃ© mal appliquÃ©e, que les avis ntÃ©dicau .a ont Ã©tÃ© interprÃ©tÃ©s de maniÃ¨re partiale puisque tous les mÃ©decins s'Ã©taient prononcÃ©s contre une sÃ©paration et que les dÃ©cisions judiciaires n'Ã©taient pas suffisamntent fondÃ©es . Le tribunal rÃ©gional n'avait pas conduit convenablement la procÃ©dure dans la mesure oÃ¹ un juge avait eu avec le Dr . A . un entretien tÃ©lÃ©phonique dont la teneur a Ã©tÃ© mal comprise par le tribunal et n'a pas Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©e Ã l'avocat de la requÃ©rante . L'avis du Dr . A . n'a pas Ã©tÃ© examinÃ© par le tribunal rÃ©gional . La requÃ©rante invoque l'article 6 par . I de lu Convention et son droit de bÃ©nÃ©ficier d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable .
EN DROI T 1 . Dans sa requÃ©te du 23 janvier 1984, la requÃ©rante a fait valoir qu'elle dÃ©posait la requÃ©te en son nom propre et au nom de son fils, alors Ã gÃ© de 7 ans et 10 mois et placÃ© sous tutelle lÃ©gale . Selon l'article 25 par . I de la Convention, la Commission -peut Ã©tre saisie d'une requÃ©te adressÃ©e . . . par toute personne physique . . . qui se prÃ©tend victime d'une violation . . . des droits reconnus dans la (prÃ©sente) Conventionâ¢ . En principe, le parent qui a la garde de son enfant peut introduire une requÃ¨te auprÃ¨s de la Commission au nom de l'enfant . Cette possibilitÃ© peut Ã©tre nuancÃ©e par la situation des rapports juridiques du parent avec l'enfant au regard du droit interne . 11 est exact qu'en l'espÃ¨ce le fds de la requÃ©rante Ã©tait placÃ© sous tutelle lÃ©gale . Cependant, la Commission relÃ¨ve que . selon l'article 1666 par . 1 du Code civil allemand . la situation de la requÃ©rante vis-Ã -vis de son fils n'a Ã©tÃ© limitÃ©e que dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'office de la jeunesse, tuteur lÃ©gal de l'enfant . pouvait dÃ©cider notamment de son lieu de rÃ©sidence et d'Ã©ducation . En outre, les griefs de la requÃ©rante concernent d'une part la procÃ©dure devant les tribunaux allemands, qui a conduit, conformÃ©nient Ã l'article 1666 par . I du Code civil, Ã dÃ©signer un tuteur lÃ©gal et, d'autre part, la maniÃ¨re dont cetue dÃ©cision a Ã©tÃ© niise en rcuvre . Les griefs du fds de la requÃ©rante sont Ã cet Ã©gard identiques Ã ceux dc sa mÃ¨re . Dans ces conditions . la Commission estime que la requÃ©rante est en mesure d'introduire la requÃªte tant en son nom qu'au nom de son fils sans qu'il soit nÃ©cessaire que les panenaires de la â¢ vie familiale â¢ en question soient considÃ©rÃ©s comme des co-rcquÃ©rants . 2 . La requÃ©rante se plaint que la garde (Personensorgerecht) de son fils lui a Ã©tÃ© retirÃ©e, car il a Ã©tÃ© placÃ© sous tutelle lÃ©gale (AmtspOegschaft) et enlevÃ© du foye r
familial . Elle soutient notamment que ces mesures ne correspondent pas aux conclusions formulÃ©es dans diverses expertises mÃ©dicales et que les mesures ont Ã©tÃ© dÃ©cidÃ©es sans examiner l'opportunitÃ© de moyens moins rigides . Les mesures litigieuses ne sauraient sejustifier par la simple Ã©ventualitÃ© d'un risque pour la santÃ© de l'enfant si celui-ci restait avec la requÃ©rante . La milre invoque l'article 8 de la Convention . aux termes duquel : Â« I . Toute personne a droit au respect de sa vie privÃ©e et familiale, de son domicile et de sa correspondance .
2 . II ne peut y avoir ingÃ©rence d'une autoritÃ© publique dans l'exercice de ce droit que pour autant que cette ingÃ©rence est prÃ©vue par la loi et qu'elle constitue une mesure qui, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, est nÃ©cessaire Ã la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale, Ã la sÃ»retÃ© publique, au bien-Ãªtre Ã©conomique du pays, Ã la dÃ©fense de l'ordre et Ã la prÃ©vention des infraction pÃ©nales, Ã la protection de la santÃ© ou de la morale, ou Ã la protection des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui . . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur a soutenu que si la dÃ©cision des tribunaux allemands de retirer Ã la requÃ©rante la garde de son fils constituait une ingÃ©rence particuliÃ¨rement grave dans les droits parentaux de la requÃ©rante, elle se justifiait nÃ©anntoins au regard de l'article 8 par . 2 comme constituant le moyen le plus clÃ©ment aprÃ¨s l'Ã©chec d'autres tentatives de prÃ©venir les dommages chez l'enfant . Comme l'ont constatÃ© les mÃ©decins, le fils a dÃ©jÃ subi des dommages et il est Ã craindre que la situation empirera s'il reste avec sa mÃ¨re . La dÃ©cision des tribunaux allemands de retirer Ã la requÃ©rante la garde de son fds- de le placer sous tutelle lÃ©gale et de l'enlever du foyer ntaternel, constituait une ingÃ©rence dans la vie familiale protÃ©gÃ©e par l'anicle 8 de la Convention . La Commission a maintenant pour tÃ¢che d'examiner si cette ingÃ©rence se justifiait en regard de l'anicle 8 par . 2 : La Commission observe que la dÃ©cision des tribunaux allemands de retirer Ã la requÃ©rante la garde de son fds a Ã©tÃ© prise conformÃ©ment Ã la lÃ©gislation interne . singuliÃ¨rement l'article 1666 du Code civil allemand . En outre, les tribunaux allemands ont soigneusement examinÃ© la nÃ©cessitÃ© des mesures dÃ©cidÃ©es . C'est ainsi que, dans sa dÃ©cision du 18 aoÃ»t 1983- le tribunal rÃ©gional a considÃ©rÃ© que les ntÃ©decins avaient tous confirmÃ© les faibles aptitudes intellectuelles et Ã©ducatives de la mÃ¨re . Le tribunal a dÃ©signÃ© le Dr . K . comme expert qui . le 27 avril 1982, a donnÃ© un avis, confirmÃ© en toute indÃ©pendance par deux contre-experts, et selon lequel le fils de la requÃ©rante montrait nettement des troubles du dÃ©veloppement dans le domaine psycho-affectif ; si la situation mÃ¨re-fils restait inchangÃ©e, il Ã©tait peu probable que l'Ã©tat de l'enfant s'amÃ©liore . L'expen recommandait cependant de donner encore une chance Ã la requÃ©rante et de ne lui enlever le fils que s'iI n'y avait pas amÃ©lioration dans le dÃ©lai d'un an .
La Commission rel@ve Ã cet Ã©gard que la dÃ©cision n'a Ã©tÃ© prise par le tribunal rÃ©gional qu'une fois constatÃ© que l'Ã©volution de la sitnation aprÃ¨s l'expertise du Dr . K ., loin de montrer une aniÃ©lioration dans le dÃ©veloppement de l'enfant, rÃ©vÃ©lait que la requÃ©rante avait des difficultÃ©s persistantes Ã assurer l'Ã©ducation de son fils . Le tribunal a estimÃ© Ã©galentent que des mesures ntoins rigoureuses, par exemple celles qu'avait ordonnÃ©es le tribunal de district le 21 juin 1982, s'Ã©taient rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©es infructneuses . Selon le tribunal, le coniportement de la requÃ©rantejustifiait la conclusion qu'elle persisterait Ã agir de la mÃªme maniÃ¨re qu'avant et que la santÃ© de l'enfant serait dÃ¨s lors gravement comprontise s'iI restait avec sa mÃ¨re . La Contniission considÃ¨re que les dÃ©cisions prises par les tribunaux allemands Ã©taient raisonnables vu la situation et que l'ingÃ©rence dans le droit de la requÃ©rante au respect de sa vie fantiliale Ã©tait justifiÃ©e au regard de l'article 8 par . 2 de la Convention parce que nÃ©cessaire, dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique, Ã la protection de la santÃ© et de la morale et des droits et libertÃ©s d'autrui, Ã savoir ceux de l'enfant en question . Il s'ensuit que, sur ce point, la requÃªte est manifestement ntal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . 3 . La requÃ©rante se plaint Ã©galement, en invoquant l'article 8 de la Convention, d'avoir Ã©tÃ© sÃ©parÃ©e de force de son fils le 2 septembre 1983 . Elle soutient qu'il a Ã©(Ã© enlevÃ© de son Ã©cole dans des conditions angoissantes, Ã l'insu et contre la volontÃ© de sa mÃ¨re .
a. Le Gouvernemem dÃ©clare que ce grief n'a pas Ã©tÃ© formulÃ© par la requÃ©rante dans sa requcte Ã la Contniission, sans doute parce que le droit de dÃ©cider du domicile de son fils ne lui appanenait plus . Cependant, la Commission est convaincue que, dÃ¨s le dÃ©part, dans sa requÃ¨te du 23 janvier 1984 . la requÃ©rante a formulÃ© un grief . contre . . . 2) la sÃ©paration de forcc de sun fils par l'office de la jeunesse de Berlin-Kreuzberg le 2 septembre 1983 . . .- (p . I) . b . Le Gouvernement soutient en outre que la requÃ©rante n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes au sens de l'anicle 26 de la Convention . La cour d'appel a dÃ©clarÃ© le 29 novembre 1983 que le grief en question ne faisait pas partie de sa dÃ©cision . La requÃ©rante aurait pu soulever cette question en mÃªme temps que les griefs qu'elle a forinulÃ©s contre l'office de la jeunesse . On peut se demander cependant si une plainte de la requÃ©rante concernant une mÃ©connaissance des obligations de l'office de la jeunesse aurait rempli les conditions prÃ©vues Ã l'article 26 . La Commission fait cependant observer qu'une fois le fils de la requÃ©rante placÃ© sous tutelle lÃ©gale . la mÃ¨re ne pouvait plus dÃ©cider du lieu de rÃ©sidence d e
l'enfant ni dÃ¨s lors introduire une plainte de ce chef, compte tenu de ce que, selon l'article 1666 par . I du Code civil allemand, l'exercice de ce droit incombait Ã l'office de la jeunesse, dÃ©sormais tuteur lÃ©gal . La requÃ©rante n'avait dÃ¨s lors plus la possibilitÃ© de se plaindre de la maniÃ¨re dont son fils avait Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de l'Ã©cole . MalgrÃ© cela, la Commission relÃ¨ve que le grief en question figurait notamment dans les moyens de l'appel de la requÃ©rante au tribunal rÃ©gional . Le 9 novembre 1984, cettejuridiction a estimÃ© que le transfert du fils de la requÃ©rante le 2 septembre 1983 de Berlin en Allemagne fÃ©dÃ©rale avait Ã©tÃ© menÃ© de maniÃ¨re impropre . Le tribunal n'est cependant pas parvenu Ã la conclusion qu'il y avait eu violation des droits de la requÃ©rante . Dans son nouvel appel . particuliÃ¨rement dans ses griefs contre le componentent de l'office de la jeunesse concernant la garde, la requÃ©rante Ã©voqua Ã nouveau ce passage de la dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional . La Comntission conclut dÃ¨s lors qu'Ã cet Ã©gard la requÃ©rante a satisfait Ã la condition d'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention . Le Gouvemement soutient en outre que la mesure litigieuse, qui Ã©tait la plus C. clÃ©mente, rÃ©pondait aux conditiuns de l'article 8 par . 2 de la Convention . Si le fils avait Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de l'appartement de la requÃ©rante, il y aurait eu des scÃ nes dramatiques qui auraient provoquÃ© chez l'enfant un choc psychologique . Une autre Ã©ventualitÃ© est que la requÃ©rante aurait pu prendre la fuite et se cacher avec son fils . La Commission estime que le grief pose des questions de fait et de droit dont la complexitÃ© appelle, pour en dÃ©cider, un examen au fond . La requÃªte n'est donc pas, surce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e et elle doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . 4 . La requÃ©rante se plaint que son fils a Ã©tÃ© enlevÃ© de Berlin et amenÃ© dans un Ã©tablissentent d'Ã©ducation en Allemagne fÃ©dÃ©rale, ce qui est contraire Ã l'article 8 . Vu son impÃ©cuniositÃ©,la mÃ¨re se trouve dÃ¨s lors dans l'impossibilitÃ© effective de maintenir le contact avec son fds . En outre, ce type d'Ã©ducation ne saurait remplacer l'Ã©ducation parentale . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient, quant Ã lui, que si cet Ã©tablissement en Allemagne fÃ©dÃ©rale a Ã©tÃ© choisi, c'est parce qu'il n'y avait pas de place dans un foyer berlinois, qu'il s'agit d'un Ã©tablissement qualifiÃ© pour le traitement et la pÃ©dagogie et que le fils de la requÃ©rante s'y dÃ©veloppe bien . Cette mesure Ã©tait dÃ¨s lorsjustifiÃ©e au regard de l'article 8 par . 2 . La Commission estime que c'est lÃ Ã©galement une question complexe de fai t et de droit qui ne pem Ãªtre rÃ©solue que par un examen du bien-fondÃ© de la requÃªte . Il s'ensuit que, sur ce point, la requ@te ne saurait Ã©tre dÃ©clarÃ©e manifestement mal fondÃ©e, et qu'elle est donc recevable, aucun motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli .
5 . La requÃ©rante fait valoir ensuite que les dÃ©cisions rendues le 18 aoÃ»t 1983 par le tribunal rÃ©gional et le 29 novembre 1983 par la cour d'appel ont annulÃ© le jugement du tribunal de district en date du 12 avril 1983 en ce que ce demier avait ordonnÃ© Ã l'office de la jeunesse de tenir secret le domicile de l'enfant . Elle se plaint en invoquant l'article 8 que, contrairetnem Ã ces dÃ©cisions, le domicile de l'enfant ne lui a pas Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©, ce qui l'a privÃ©e de tout contact Ã©crit ou personnel avec son fils . a . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur rÃ©plique que la requÃ©rante n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© Ã cet Ã©gard les voies de recours internes au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention . En effet, la dÃ©cision rendue le 18 aoGt 1983 par le tribunal rÃ©gional et celle de la cour d'appel en date du 29 novembre 1983 . qui ont annulÃ© la dÃ©cision du tribunal de district sans la rentplacer, n'ont pas rÃ©glÃ© la question de savoir s'iI fallait rÃ©vÃ©ler Ã la requÃ©rante le doniicile dc son fds . Tribunal rÃ©gional et cour d'appel n'avaient pas compÃ©tence pour en dÃ©cider . En principe, et selon l'anicle 1634 par . 2 du Code civil, c'est l'office de la jeunesse qui doit dÃ©cider de la maniÃ¨re dont un parent qui n'a pas le droit de garde exercera le droit de visite qui en principe, a Ã©tÃ© accordÃ© Ã la requÃ©rante par le tribunal . S'il n'y a pas accord sur ce point, le tribunal des tutelles dÃ©cidera des modalitÃ©s du droit de visite . Cette interprÃ©tation a Ã©tÃ© confirmÃ©e par la cour d'appel le 4 juin 1985 . La Commission estime que la question de la divulgation de l'adresse de l'enfant peut Ã©tre liÃ©e Ã celle de la rÃ©glementation du droit de visite de la requÃ©rante Ã son fils . Toutefois, la requÃ©rante a formulÃ© expressÃ©ment son grief contre la nonrÃ©vÃ©lation de l'adresse . La requÃ©rante a formulÃ© ce grief dans la premiÃ¨re prncÃ©dure devant toutes les juridictions internes . En appel dans sa dÃ©cision du 18 aoÃ¹t 1983, le tribunal rÃ©gional a annulÃ© le jugement du tribunal de district sans le remplacer en ce qui concerne le droit de l'office de lajeunesse de garder secrÃ¨te l'adresse de l'enfant . Dans son appel subsÃ©quent, l'office de la jeunesse a dÃ©clarÃ© que l'adresse ne serait de toute faÃ§on pas rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e car autrement la requÃ©rante rendrait imntÃ©diatement visite Ã son fils . Il est clair dÃ¨s lors, que l'office lui-nt@me a considÃ©rÃ© que la dÃ©cision rendue le 18 ao0t 1983 par le tribunal rÃ©gional indiquait en rÃ©alitÃ© que la requÃ©rante devrait connaitre l'adresse de son fils . Le 29 novembre 1983, la cour d'appel a confirmÃ© la dÃ©cision du tribunal rÃ©gional dans la mesure notamment oÃ¹ cette derniÃ¨re annulait la dÃ©cision du tribunal de disirict de ne pas indiquer l'adresse . Pourtant, l'office de la jeunesse n'a pas rÃ©vÃ©lÃ© les coordonnÃ©es de l'enfant . La requÃ©rante a alors Ã nouveau formulÃ© ce grief dans la seconde procÃ©dure devant toutes les juridictions intemes . La Conimission a dÃ¨s lors la conviction que, s'agissant de ce grief, la requÃ©rante a Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes au sens de l'article 26 de la Convention .
h . Le Gouvernentem soutient que . dans la mesure oÃ¹ les tribunaux allemands ont accordÃ© Ã la requÃ©rante un droit de visite en gÃ©nÃ©ral, il n'y a pas eu violation des droits garantis Ã l'intÃ©ressÃ©e par l'article 8 par . I . L'office de la jeunesse Ã©tait fondÃ© Ã tenter de parvenir avec la requÃ©rante Ã un accord sur les modalitÃ©s du droit de visite car il y avait un risque de voir la requÃ©rante rendre visite Ã son fils et l'enlever pour se cacher avec lui . Sous ce rapport, la mesure visant Ã ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler l'adresse de l'enfant se justifiait selon les critÃ¨res de l'article 8 par . 2 . La question doit Ã prÃ©sent Ãªtre tranchÃ©e par le tribunal des tutelles .
La Commission estime que ce grief pose des questions de fait et de droit dont la complexitÃ© appelle, pour en dÃ©cider, un examen au fond . La rÃ©qu@te n'est donc pas, sur ce point, manifestement mal fondÃ©e et doit Ãªtre dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable, aucun ntotif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'ayant Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . La requÃ©rante se plaint, en outre, Ã propos de la premiÃ¨re procÃ©dure devant le s .6 tribunaux allemands, de la maniÃ¨re dont ces juridictions ont conduit la procÃ©dure et apprÃ©ciÃ© les faits, ainsi que des dÃ©cisions qui en sont rÃ©sultÃ©es . Elle allÃ¨gue notamment une mauvaise application de la lÃ©gislation allemande, une interprÃ©tation partiale des avis ntÃ©dicaux qui prÃ©conisaient tous de ne pas sÃ©parer la mÃ¨re et l'enfant et une insuffisance de ntotivation des dÃ©cisionsjudiciaires . Elle allÃ¨gue aussi que le tribunal rÃ©gional amal conduit la procÃ©dure, dans la mesure oÃ¹ le juge a eu avec le Dr . A . une conversation tÃ©lÃ©phonique dont la teneur a Ã©tÃ© mal comprise du tribunal et n'a pas Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ©e Ã l'avocat de la requÃ©rante . L'avis du Dr . A . n'a pas Ã©tÃ© pris en compte par le tribunal rÃ©gional . La requÃ©rante invoque l'article 6 par . I aux ternies duque l Â« I . Toute personne a droit Ã ce que sa cause soit entendue Ã©quitablement , publiquentent et dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, par un tribunal indÃ©pendante et impartial, Ã©tabli par la loi, qui dÃ©cidera, soit des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caractÃ¨re civil, soit du bien-fondÃ© de toute accusation en matiÃ¨re pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre elle . Le jugement doit Ãªtre rendu publiquement, mais l'accÃ¨s de la salle d'audience peut Ãªtre interdit Ã la presse et au public pendant la totalitÃ© ou une partie du procÃ¨s dans l'intÃ©rÃªt de la moralitÃ©, de l'ordre public ou de la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique . lorsque les intÃ©r@ts des mineurs ou la protection de la vie privÃ©e des parties au procÃ¨s l'exigent ou dans la ntesure jugÃ©e strictement nÃ©cessaire par le tribunal . lorsque dans des circonstances spÃ©ciales la publicitÃ© serait de nature Ã porter atteinte aux intÃ©rÃ¨ts de la justice . Â» La Commission rappelle que . selon l'article 19, son unique tÃ che est d'assure r le respect des engagements rÃ©sultant de la Convention pour les Panies contractantes . Elle n'est, en paniculier, pas compÃ©tente pour examiner une requ@te relative Ã des erreurs de fait ou de droit prÃ©tendument contmises par une juridiction interne, sauf si et dans la mesure oÃ¹ ces erreurs lui semblent susceptibles d'avoir entrainÃ© une atteinte aux droits ou libertÃ©s garantis par la Convention (voir No 8417/78, dÃ©c . 4 .5 .79 . D . R . 16 p . 200) .
236Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 11/07/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page