Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/136/972/553720/
Timestamp: 2020-05-29 04:52:07
Document Index: 151919532

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 1958', '§ 924', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1959', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 1959', '§ 2', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 1959', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mario Martinez, Defendant-appellant,united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Steven Cox, A/k/a Bobby, Defendant-appellant, 136 F.3d 972 (4th Cir. 1998) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1998 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mario Martinez, Defendant-appellant,united States o...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Mario Martinez, Defendant-appellant,united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Steven Cox, A/k/a Bobby, Defendant-appellant, 136 F.3d 972 (4th Cir. 1998)
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 136 F.3d 972 (4th Cir. 1998) Argued Dec. 6, 1996. Decided Feb. 18, 1998
On June 24, 1993, defendants Mario Martinez and Steven Cox, among others, were charged by indictment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland with conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit a murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count III); travel in interstate commerce to commit a murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (Count IV); use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count V); conspiracy to commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (Count VI); commission of a crime of violence in aid of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (Count VII); and use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence in aid of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count VIII). The district court dismissed Count VII prior to submission of the case to the jury. On November 8, 1993, the jury found Martinez guilty of Counts VI and VIII and found Cox guilty of Counts III, IV, V, VI, and VIII. The defendants now appeal their § 924(c) convictions under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). They also challenge a supplemental jury instruction given by the court and raise various sentencing issues. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
The defendants now appeal. Martinez and Cox both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as charged, respectively, in Count VIII and Counts V and VIII of the indictment. In addition, Martinez contends that a supplemental instruction given by the district court in response to a question from the jury violated the due process clause. Both defendants also argue that the district court erred in sentencing them under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (5), for attempting or conspiring to commit murder, when the indictment generically charged them with conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Martinez further objects to the district court's use of U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(a) in determining his base offense level for sentencing. Finally, Cox asserts that the district court erred in deferring to post-conviction collateral review the issue of whether he was entitled to a downward departure on the basis of incompetency of trial counsel.
The defendants challenge their § 924(c) convictions in view of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). The jury instructions in this case failed to charge the Bailey standard of active employment required to convict a defendant of using a firearm.1 516 U.S. at 142-46, 116 S. Ct. at 505-07. Under Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997), the district court's erroneous instruction on an element of the offense is subject to harmless error analysis. Johnson, 520 U.S. at ---- - ----, 117 S. Ct. at 1548-50. Johnson permits application of the plain error standard set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993).2
Applying the Olano test to this case, it is clear that: (1) there is error; (2) the error is plain; and (3) the error "affect [s] substantial rights." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-35, 113 S. Ct. at 1776-78. It is thus within our discretion to notice and correct the error, if it "seriously affect [s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S. Ct. 391, 392, 80 L. Ed. 555 (1936)). In applying the fourth prong of Olano's harmless error test, we follow the Court in Johnson which considered whether the evidence on the element was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted at trial." Johnson, 520 U.S. at ----, 117 S. Ct. at 1550.
The record evidence regarding the defendants' using and carrying of the firearms shows that Martinez examined the guns in Room 825 of the Days Inn and that Cox was present when Deair and Sinclair gave the guns to Christian for transportation to Baltimore. It is not clear whether Cox ever had physical contact with the guns. In a question to the court, the jury indicated its belief at that time that Martinez was the only defendant who ever "physically handled a weapon." Because any of the defendants' personal physical contact with the guns was limited and most of the evidence thereof attenuated, we cannot say that the evidence on the use or carry element of § 924(c) was "overwhelming" or "essentially uncontroverted." Johnson, 520 U.S. at ----, 117 S. Ct. at 1550. Thus, if we were considering only the application of the evidence to the substantive charge, and did not consider 18 U.S.C. § 2, we are of opinion that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions should be set aside.
Considering the aiding and abetting charge, we are of opinion that the evidence supporting conviction is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted at trial. There can be no doubt that the defendants were heavily involved in the plot to kill Pluck and Prince Ankrah and that the two firearms were an integral part of this plan. Because the court also charged the jury that the substantive offense could have been committed by "another person" as long as the defendants aided or abetted the crime, we are of opinion that the jury should not have found the defendants anything but guilty of the § 924(c) charges had the jury been properly charged. Based on these facts, we are of opinion that there will not be a "miscarriage of justice" if we do not "notice" the district court's error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S. Ct. at 1778-79. Therefore, we affirm the defendants' § 924(c) convictions based on the aiding and abetting theory of liability and hold that the erroneous jury instruction was harmless error.
Martinez next challenges the district court's decision to give a supplemental instruction in response to a jury request regarding Martinez's membership in the conspiracy. In examining a district court's response to a jury's request for clarification on a charge, the inquiry is whether the court addressed the jury's inquiry fairly and accurately without creating prejudice. United States v. Jonathan Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. United Medical and Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1407 (4th Cir. 1993).
Martinez and Cox also challenge the district court's decision to sentence them under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (5) rather than § 1959(a) (4) for their convictions on Count VI. Count VI alleged that the defendants conspired to "commit and threaten to commit a crime of violence against one or more individuals in violation of the laws of the State of Maryland and the United States" in aid of racketeering. It did not specify a particular crime of violence as the object of the conspiracy. The defendants now argue that they should have been sentenced under § 1959(a) (4), prescribing the punishment for threatening to commit a crime of violence, instead of § 1959(a) (5), prescribing the punishment for attempting or conspiring to commit murder or kidnapping. The former sets a maximum imprisonment of five years, the latter a maximum of ten years.
The defendants frame this as a criminal liability issue, claiming that the indictment as worded provided them insufficient notice of the charge against them. In our view, however, the indictment sufficiently set out the activity for which the defendants were tried. Once the jury found the defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit the conduct prohibited by § 1959(a) and specified in the indictment, the district court selected the appropriate sentencing provision from § 1959(a) (1)-(6). The two parts of the statute operate separately: § 1959(a) sets forth the activity for which a person may be punished, while § 1959(a) (1), (6) provides the punishment.4
The defendants appeal to the identity between § 1959(a) (4)'s "threatening to commit a crime of violence" language and similar language in the indictment. Section 1959(a) (4), however, governs threatening to commit a crime of violence rather than conspiring to commit murder as mentioned in § 1959(a) (5). The indictment here charged the defendants with conspiracy, not with merely threatening a crime of violence as mentioned in § 1959(a) (4). Section 1959(a) (4) thus was inapplicable. The district court accordingly was authorized to determine that conspiring to commit murder was the specific crime of violence conspiracy for which the defendants should be sentenced since the indictment did not indicate a particular violent act. The court therefore correctly applied the ten-year maximum of § 1959(a) (5).
In addition, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in applying the sentencing guidelines to his conspiracy conviction under Count VI. At sentencing, the district court found that the crime of violence underlying Martinez's conspiracy conviction was conspiracy to commit murder.5 The court thus determined a base offense level of 32.6 Martinez now claims that the base offense level should be 12 under U.S.S.G. § 2E1.3(a) (1). To give due deference to a district court's application of the sentencing guidelines, we review factual determinations for clear error and legal questions de novo. United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1190 (4th Cir. 1995).
We find no error in the district court's calculations. Martinez argues that conspiracy to commit murder cannot constitute the underlying crime because he was acquitted on the murder counts in this case. An acquittal on particular counts, however, does not prevent the district court from using those offenses in computing the applicable sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 843, 115 S. Ct. 131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1994); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, Martinez's appeal on this issue fails.
The defendants' final assignment of error is also without merit. Cox argues that the district court erred in deferring its determination of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his request for a downward departure to post-conviction collateral review. We review de novo a district court's ruling on whether a factor is a permissible basis for departing from the sentencing guidelines as a question of law. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, ---- - ----, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-48, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1996).
A district court may depart from the guidelines range when "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Departure factors under the guidelines are either "forbidden," "encouraged," "discouraged," or "unmentioned." United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 754, 757 (4th Cir. 1996). The Sentencing Commission expects departures based on "unmentioned" factors to be "highly infrequent." Koon, 518 U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S. Ct. at 2044-46 (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. 4(b)). If a district court is permitted to depart from the guidelines on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, it would constitute one of these highly infrequent "unmentioned" factors.
We are of opinion that a downward departure based on ineffective assistance of counsel is impermissible because it would be inconsistent with the structure and theory of the relevant guidelines. See Koon, 518 U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S. Ct. at 2044-46. The Sentencing Reform Act suggests that which constitutes appropriate sentencing concerns. It refers to the "nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1). Counsel's competency cannot fairly be characterized as relating to either of these concerns. Since such a departure would not be consistent with the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, we conclude that the district court did not err in deferring Cox's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1133, 115 S. Ct. 949, 130 L. Ed. 2d 892 (1995) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claim normally is best left to collateral review). In a case on similar but not the same facts as here, the Ninth Circuit has reached the same conclusion as do we. See United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S. Ct. 438, 121 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1992).
The language of the given instruction is virtually identical to instructions both we and other circuits have held invalid. United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 98, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 1824, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1997); United States v. Robinson, 96 F.3d 246, 249-50 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S. Ct. 411, 136 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1996); United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 122, 124 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 1996). The government has conceded that the district court's definition of use was inconsistent with Bailey.
Defendants did not object in the district court to the jury instruction, thus, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) governs. Rule 52(b) provides that " [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
The district court began with U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a), governing attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. This guideline says that the base offense level shall be determined "from the guideline for the substantive offense." Application Note 2 to this section indicates that the term "substantive offense" "means the offense that the defendant was convicted of soliciting, attempting or conspiring to commit." The court thus turned to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.3, entitled "Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity" and relating to 18 U.S.C. § 1959. This is the substantive offense Martinez was convicted of conspiring to commit. Section 2E1.3 provides that the base offense level for this offense is the greater of either 12 or "the offense level applicable to the underlying crime or racketeering activity." The meaning of "underlying crime" is different from the definition of "substantive offense" found in the commentary to § 2X1.1. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 instructs that a guideline specifying more than one base offense level "shall be determined" on the basis of "all acts and omissions committed ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction." In light of this instruction, the district court found that the underlying crime was conspiracy to commit murder and accordingly determined a base offense level of 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(a) and (b) (1)