Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/532/661/index.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 19:23:12
Document Index: 117427056

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12101', '§ 12182', '§ 12182', '§ 12181', '§ 12181', '§ 12182', '§ 12182']

PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN - 532 U.S. 661 - 2001 - US Supreme Court Center - USSC Cases - Nolo
US Supreme Court Center > Volume 532 > PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
PGA TOUR, INC. v. MARTIN - 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
No. 00-24. Argued January 17, 200l-Decided May 29, 2001
Petitioner sponsors professional golf tournaments conducted on three annual tours. A player may gain entry into the tours in various ways, most commonly through successfully competing in a three-stage qualifying tournament known as the "Q-School." Any member of the public may enter the Q-School by submitting two letters of recommendation and paying a $3,000 entry fee to cover greens fees and the cost of golf carts, which are permitted during the first two stages, but have been prohibited during the third stage since 1997. The rules governing competition in tour events include the "Rules of Golf," which apply at all levels of amateur and professional golf and do not prohibit the use of golf carts, and the "hard card," which applies specifically to petitioner's professional tours and requires players to walk the golf course during tournaments, except in "open" qualifying events for each tournament and on petitioner's senior tour. Respondent Martin is a talented golfer afflicted with a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. When Martin turned pro and entered the Q-School, he made a request, supported by detailed medical records, for permission to use a golf cart during the third stage. Petitioner refused, and Martin filed this action under Title III of the ADA, which, among other things, requires an entity operating "public accommodations" to make "reasonable modifications" in its policies "when ... necessary to afford such ... accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such ... accommodations," § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). In denying petitioner summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge rejected its contention, among others, that the play areas of its tour competitions are not places of "public accommodation" within Title Ill's scope. Mter trial, the District Court entered a permanent injunction requiring petitioner to permit Martin to use a cart. Among its rulings, that court found that the walking rule's purpose was to inject fatigue into the skill of shotmaking, but that the fatigue injected by walking a golf course cannot be deemed significant under normal
circumstances; determined that even with the use of a cart, the fatigue Martin suffers from coping with his disability is greater than the fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure from walking the course; and concluded that it would not fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's game to accommodate Martin. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that golf courses, including play areas, are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not "fundamentally alter" the nature of those tournaments.
1. Title III of the ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits petitioner from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his disability. Cf. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 209. That Title provides, as a general rule, that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the ... privileges ... of any place of public accommodation." § 12182(a). The phrase "public accommodation" is defined in terms of 12 extensive categories, § 12181(7), which the legislative history indicates should be construed liberally to afford people with disabilities equal access to the wide variety of establishments available to the nondisabled. Given the general rule and the comprehensive definition of "public accommodation," it is apparent that petitioner's golf tours and their qualifying rounds fit comfortably within Title Ill's coverage, and Martin within its protection. The events occur on "golf course[s]," a type of place specifically identified as a public accommodation. § 12181(7)(L). And, at all relevant times, petitioner "leases" and "operates" golf courses to conduct its Q-School and tours. § 12182(a). As a lessor and operator, petitioner must not discriminate against any "individual" in the "full and equal enjoyment of the ... privileges" of those courses. Ibid. Among those "privileges" are competing in the Q-School and playing in the tours; indeed, the former is a privilege for which thousands of individuals from the general public pay, and the latter is one for which they vie. Martin is one of those individuals. The Court rejects petitioner's argument that competing golfers are not members of the class protected by Title III-i. e., "clients or customers of the covered public accommodation," § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv)-but are providers of the entertainment petitioner sells, so that their "job-related" discrimination claims may only be brought under Title I. Even if Title Ill's protected class were so limited, it would be entirely appropriate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the chance to compete in the Q-School and, if successful, in the subsequent tour events, as petitioner's
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