Source: https://m.openjurist.org/377/us/252
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 20:50:03
Document Index: 47290307

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 187', '§ 158', '§ 303', '§ 187', '§ 303', '§ 303', '§ 8', '§ 303']

377 U.S. 252 - Local 20 Teamsters Chauffeurs and Helpers Union v. Morton
377 US 252 Local 20 Teamsters Chauffeurs and Helpers Union v. Morton
LOCAL 20, TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS UNION, etc., Petitioner,
Lester MORTON, etc.
And in cases involving union violence, state law has been permitted to prevail by reason of controlling considerations which are entirely absent in the present case. '(W)e have allowed the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order. International Union, United Automobile, etc., Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 78 S.Ct. 932, 2 L.Ed.2d 1030; United Construction Workers, etc., v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025. * * * State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction. * * * In the present case there is no such compelling state interest.' San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247—248, 79 S.Ct. 773, 781, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.
Section 303(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act expressly authorizes state and federal courts to award damages to any person injured by certain secondary boycott activities described in s 303(a).12 The type of conduct to be made the subject of a private damage action was considered by Congress, and § 303(a) comprehensively and with great particularity 'describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives.' Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 357 U.S. 93, 98, 78 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 2 L.Ed.2d 1186.13 In selecting which forms of economic pressure should be prohibited by § 303, Congress struck the 'balance * * * between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests,' id., 357 U.S. at 100, 78 S.Ct. at 1016, by 'preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and (by) shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.' National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692, 71 S.Ct. 943, 953, 95 L.Ed. 1284.
In this case, the petitioner's request to Launder's management to cease doing business with the respondent was not proscribed by the Act. '(A) union is free to approach an employer to persuade him to engage in a boycott, so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited means of coercion through inducement of employees.' Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 357 U.S. at 99, 78 S.Ct. at 1016. This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of the petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations with the respondent.14 Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the community. Local 761, International Union of Electrical, etc., Workers v. National Labor Relations Board, 366 U.S. 667, 672, 81 S.Ct. 1285, 1288, 6 L.Ed.2d 592. If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe when it enacted § 303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to upset the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy. 'For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.' Garner v. Teamsters, etc., Union, 346 U.S. 485, 500, 74 S.Ct. 161, 171, 98 L.Ed. 228. We hold, therefore, that the damages awarded against the petitioner based upon its peaceful persuasion of Lanunder's management not to do business with the respondent during the strike cannot stand.
The same considerations require reversal of the award of punitive damages. Punitive damages for violations of § 303 conflict with the congressional judgment, reflected both in the language of the federal statute15 and in its legislative history,16 that recovery for an employer's business losses caused by a union's peaceful secondary activities proscribed by § 303 should be limited to actual, compensatory damages. And insofar as punitive damages in this case were based on secondary activities which violated only state law, they cannot stand, because, as we have held, substantive state law in this area must yield to federal limitations. In short, this is an area 'of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law.' Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176, 63 S.Ct. 172, 174, 87 L.Ed. 165. Accordingly, we hold that since state law has been displaced by § 303 in private damage actions based on peaceful union secondary activities, the District Court in this case was without authority to award punitive damages.17
There remains for consideration only the question of the damage award for the respondent's loss of the Wilson account. The respondent conceded at trial that there was 'no evidence of unlawful activity in connection with this (the Wilson) job,' and the record makes clear that the respondent lost the Wilson account because his drivers were discouraged from working during the strike by the petitioner's primary strike activity.18 Since § 303(b) authorizes an award of damages only in the event of injury 'by reason of any violation of subsection (a)' and peaceful primary strike activity does not violate § 303(a), Local 761, International Union of Electrical, etc., Workers v. National Labor Relations Board, 366 U.S. 667, 672, 81 S.Ct. 1285, 1288, 6 L.Ed.2d 592, the District Court was without power to award damages proximately caused by lawful, primary activities, even though the petitioner may have contemporaneously engaged in unlawful acts elsewhere. See Chauffeurs, etc., Local Union No. 175 v. National Labor Relations Board, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 294 F.2d 261.
'(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.' 61 Stat. 158, 29 U.S.C. § 187.
200 F.Supp. 653, 658—659.
Section 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187, 'have an identity of language' but specify two 'different remedies.' International Longshoremen's shoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244, 72 § Ct. 235, 239, 96 L.Ed. 275. Section 8(b)(4) provides that certain conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice for which an administrative remedy is afforded. The same conduct under § 303 also gives rise to a claim for damages cognizable in either state or federal courts. As a consequence of the 1959 amendments to the Act, § 303 now incorporates by reference the prohibitions embodied in § 8(b)(4).
In the Senate debate on the bill, Senator Taft said, '* * * I see no reason why suits of this sort should not be permitted to be filed. After all, it is only to restore to people who lose something because of boycotts and jurisdictional strikes the money which they have lost.' 93 Cong.Rec. 4858. Later, in response to Senator Morse's claim that § 303 would impose virtually unlimited liability, Senator Taft said, 'Under the Sherman Act the same question of boycott damage is subject to a suit for damages and attorneys' fees. In this case we simply provide for the amount of the actual damages.' 93 Cong.Rec. 4872—4873.
See United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, 4 Cir., 211 F.2d 742, 747—750, 47 A.L.R.2d 850; Overnite Transportation Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 257 N.C. 18, 125 S.E.2d 277, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862, 83 S.Ct. 120, 9 L.Ed.2d 100.