Source: https://m.openjurist.org/421/us/454/johnson-v-railway-express-agency-inc
Timestamp: 2019-10-18 18:32:50
Document Index: 97966253

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1981', '§ 28', '§ 1981', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 28', '§ 198810', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 16', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 28', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 2000', '§ 4', '§ 1981', '§ 151', '§ 1981', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 28', '§ 1988', '§ 1406', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 28']

421 US 454 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc | OpenJurist
421 U.S. 454 - Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc
Willie JOHNSON, Jr., Petitioner,
A. Since there is no specifically stated or otherwise relevant federal statute of limitations for a cause of action under § 1981, the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one provided by state law. See O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701—704, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1110, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966) (Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1947) (National Bank Act); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 27 S.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241 (1906) (Sherman Act); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 15 S.Ct. 217, 39 L.Ed. 280 (1895) (Patent Act). For purposes of this case, the one-year limitation period in Tenn.Code Ann. § 28—304 (Supp.1974) clearly and specifically has application.7 See Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (CA8 1975). The cause of action asserted by petitioner accrued if at all, not later than June 20, 1967, the date of his discharge. Therefore, in the absence of some circumstance that suspended the running of the limitation period, petitioner's cause of action under § 1981 was time barred after June 20, 1968, over 2 1/2 years before petitioner filed his complaint.
B. Respondents argue that the only circumstances that would suspend or toll the running of the limitation period under § 28 304 are those expressly provided under state law. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 28-106 to 28—115 (1955 and Supp.1974) and 28—301 (1955). Petitioner concedes, at least implicitly, that no tolling circumstance described in the State's statutes was present to toll the period for his § 1981 claim. He argues, however, that state law should not be given so broad a reach. He claims that, although the duration of the limitation period is bottomed on state law, it is federal law that governs other limitations aspects, such as tolling, of a § 1981 cause of action. Without launching into an exegesis on the nice distinctions that have been drawn in applying state and federal law in this area,8 we think it suffices to say that petitioner has overstated his case. Indeed, we may assume that he would argue vigorously in favor of applying state law if any of the Tennessee tolling provisions could be said to assist his cause.9
Any period of limitation, including the one-year period specified by § 28—304, is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action. Although any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones. In virtually all statutes of limitations the chronological length of the limitation period is interrelated with provisions regarding tolling, revival, and questions of application. In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim.
There is nothing anomalous or novel about this. State law has been followed in a variety of cases that raised questions concerning the overtones and details of application of the state limitation period to the federal cause of action. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S., at 706, 86 S.Ct., at 1113 (characterization of the cause of action); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S., at 465—467, 67 S.Ct., at 1342 (place where cause of action arose); Barney v. Oelrichs, 138 U.S. 529, 11 S.Ct. 414, 34 L.Ed. 1037 (1891) (absence from State as a tolling circumstance). Nor is there anything peculiar to a federal civil rights action that would justify special reluctance in applying state law. Indeed, the express terms of 42 U.S.C. § 198810 suggest that the contrary is true.
C. Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive guide. As the Court noted in Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S., at 706—707, 86 S.Ct., at 1113, considerations of state law may be displaced where their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action under consideration.
We have noted this possibility above and, indeed, it is conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to toll will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant who values his § 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has completed its administrative proceeding.11 One answer to this, although perhaps not a highly satisfactory one, is that the plaintiff in his § 1981 suit may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner's argument lies in the fact—presumably a happy one for the civil rights claimant—that Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII. Petitioner freely concedes that he could have filed his § 1981 action at any time after his cause of action accrued; in fact, we understand him to claim an unfettered right so to do. Thus, in a very real sense, petitioner has slept on his § 1981 rights. The fact that his slumber may have been induced by faith in the adequacy of his Title VII remedy is of little relevance inasmuch as the two remedies are truly independent. Moreover, since petitioner's Title VII court action now also appears to be time barred because of the peculiar procedural history of this case, petitioner, in effect, would have us extend the § 1981 cause of action well beyond the life of even his Title VII cause of action. We find no policy reason that excuses petitioner's failure to take the minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently.
Petitioner cites American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965), in support of his position. Neither case is helpful. The respective periods of limitation in those cases were derived directly from federal statutes rather than by reference to state law. Moreover, in each case there was a substantial body of relevant federal procedural law to guide the decision to toll the limitation period, and significant underlying federal policy that would have conflicted with a decision not to suspend the running of the statute.12 In the present case there is no relevant body of federal procedural law to guide our decision, and there is no conflicting federal policy to protect.13 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tolling effect given to the timely prior filings in American Pipe and in Burnett depended heavily on the fact that those filings involved exactly the same cause of action subsequently asserted. This factor was more than a mere abstract or theoretical consideration because the prior filing in each case necessarily operated to avoid the evil against which the statute of limitations was designed to protect.14
In recognizing that Congress intended to supply aggrieved employees with independent but related avenues of relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Court emphasizes the importance of a full arsenal of weapons to combat unlawful employment discrimination in the private as well as the public sector. The majority stands on firm ground in recognizing that both remedies are available to victims of discriminatory practices. Accordingly, I concur in Parts I—III of the Court's opinion.
The Court sets out the circumstances that suspend a statute of limitations without close examination of the statute's equitable underpinnings. According to the majority, the federal court is deprived of authority to toll the state statute because it borrows both 'the State's wisdom in setting a limit, (as well as) exceptions thereto,' ante, at 464, and offers no special reason for reluctance to apply the 'overtones' of the period to a federal civil rights action. As a general practice, where Congress has created a federal right without prescribing a period for enforcement, the federal courts uniformly borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations. The applicable period of limitations is derived from that which the State would apply if the action had been brought in a state court. See, e.g., Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914). See also American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 n. 27. 94 S.Ct. 756, 767, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). For the purposes of this case the § 1981 action is governed by the District Court's application of the one-year Tennessee provision for 'actions . . . brought under the federal civil rights statutes.' Tenn.Code Ann. § 28—304 (Supp.1974). See ante, at 462 n. 7.
Congress' failure to include a built-in limitations period in § 1981 does not automatically warrant 'an imprimatur on state law' and sanction the borrowing of both the effect as well as the duration from state law. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., supra, 383 U.S., at 709, 86 S.Ct., at 1115 (White, J., dissenting); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra, 327 U.S., at 394—395, 66 S.Ct., at 583; Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939). It is well settled that when federal courts sit to enforce federal rights, they have an obligation to apply federal equity principles:
* Title VII and now § 1981 both express the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices. Emporium Capwell Co. v. WACO, 420 U.S. 50, 66, 95 S.Ct. 977, 986, 43 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429—430, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). As we have recently observed, 'legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination.' Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, 415 U.S., at 47, 94 S.Ct., at 1019. It is this general legislative intent that must guide us in determining whether congressional purpose with respect to a particular statute is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations.
The legislative history of Title VII and its 1972 amendments demonstrates that Congress intended to provide a coordinated but comprehensive set of remedies against employment discrimination. The short statute of limitations and the procedural prerequisites to Title VII actions emphasized the need to preserve the remedy of a suit under the 1870 legislation, which did not suffer from the same procedural restrictions as the latter enactment. See H.R.Rep.No. 92—238, p. 19 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1972, p. 2137; S.Rep.No. 92—415, p. 24 (1971). See also 118 Cong.Rec. 3370 (1972). Congressional sentiment was that '(b)y strengthening the administrative remedy (it) should not also eliminate preexisting rights which the Constitution (and the Congress had) accorded to aggrieved individuals.' Id., at 3371. While encouragement of private settlement to avoid unnecessary litigation under Title VII and the preservation of an independent § 1981 action may appear somewhat at odds, the two themes are reconciled in the context of their joint remedial purpose: devising a flexible network of remedies to guarantee equal employment opportunities. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 650 (CA5 1974); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CA5 1971); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 84 86, n. 30, 478 F.2d 979, 994—996, n. 30 (1973). See also Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (CA5 1970).
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, supra, we examined the relationship between compulsory arbitration and litigation under Title VII, a relationship analogous to that between the EEOC factfinding and conciliation process and litigation under § 1981, and accommodated both avenues of redress. The reasoning leading to that result is equally compelling here. Forced compliance with a short statute of limitations during the pendency of a charge before the EEOC would discourage and/or frustrate recourse to the congressionally favored policy of conciliation, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S., at 44, 94 S.Ct., at 1017, and '(t)he possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more litigation, not less.' Id., at 59, 94 S.Ct. at 1025. Cf. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S., at 555—556, 94 S.Ct., at 767.
Congressional effort, with the 1972 amendments, to strengthen the administrative remedy by increasing EEOC's ability to conciliate complaints is frustrated by the majority's requirement that an employee file the § 1981 action prior to the conclusion of the Title VII conciliation efforts in order to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations.1 Legislative pains to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation by making the informal investigatory and conciliatory offices of EEOC readily available to victims of unlawful discrimination cannot be squared with the formal mechanistic requirement of early filing for the technical purpose of tolling a limitations statute. In sum, the federal policies weigh strongly in favor of tolling.
Respondents were informed of the petitioner's grievances through the complaint filed with the Commission and conciliation negotiations. The charge filed with the EEOC and the § 1981 claim arise out of the same factual circumstances. The petitioner in this case diligently pursued the informal procedures before the Commission and adhered to the congressional preference for conciliation prior to litigation. Now, when Johnson asserts his right to proceed with litigation under § 1981 after his good-faith, albeit unnecessary, compliance with Title VII procedures, the majority interposes the bar of the Tennessee statute of limitations which clearly was not designed to include such cases.2
Adoption of the tolling principle, however, protects the federal interest in both preserving multiple remedies for employment discrimination and in the proper function of the limitations statute. As a normal consequence tolling works to suspend the operation of a statute of limitations during the pendency of an event or condition. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S., at 560—561, 94 S.Ct., at 769; Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1054, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965). In American Pipe we held that the initiation of a timely class action tolled the running of the limitation period as to individual members of the class, enabling them to institute separate actions after the District Court found class action an inappropriate mechanism for the litigation. In similar manner the Burnett court viewed the initiation of a timely Federal Employers' Liability Act suit in state court as tolling the statute of limitations for the later filing of a federal action following dismissal of the state proceeding for improper venue. The Court's analysis in both cases rested on the conclusion that each plaintiff had by his prior action given the defendant timely notice in a manner that 'fulfilled the policies of repose and certainty inherent in the limitation provisions and tolled the running of the period.' American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, supra, 414 U.S., at 558, 94 S.Ct., at 769.
Although the length of the limitation in these cases was fixed by federal statute, the tolling rationale is equally adaptable to protect subsequent litigation when the duration period is established by state statute. The federal policy in favor of continuing availability of multiple remedies for persons subject to employment discrimination is inconsistent with the majority's decision not to suspend the operation of the statute. As long as the claim arising under § 1981 is essentially limited to the Title VII claim, staleness and unfair surprise disappear as justification for applying the statute.3 Additionally, the difference in statutory origin for the right asserted under the EEOC charge and the subsequent § 1981 suit is of no consequence since the claims are essentially equivalent in substance. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, supra. Since the EEOC charge gives notice that petitioner also has a grievance under § 1981, that filing, like the initial litigation in Burnett and American Pipe, satisfied the equitable policies underlying the limitation provision. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, supra, at 558, 94 S.Ct., at 768.
The applicable statute later was amended to allow a period of 90 days, after issuance of the notice, in which to bring the Title VII action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(f)(1), as amended by Pub.L. 92—261 (1970 ed., Supp. III, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 106.
'28—304. Personal tort actions—Malpractice of attorney Civil rights actions—Statutory penalties.—Actions for libel, for injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, criminal conversation, seduction, breach of marriage promise, actions and suits against attorneys for malpractice whether said actions are grounded or based in contract or tort, civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes, and actions for statutory penalties shall be commenced within one (1) year after cause of action accrued.'
The District Court also based its dismissal of petitioner's § 1981 claim against REA on the alternative ground that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. App. 102a. The Court of Appeals did not address the exhaustion argument. Inasmuch, as we limited our grant of certiorari to the limitation issue, 417 U.S. 929, 95 S.Ct. 2639, 41 L.Ed.2d 232 (1974), we have no occasion here to express a view as to whether a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination is ever subject to a requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.
See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n. 16 (CA5 1971); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 84—86, n. 30, 478 F.2d 979, 994—996, n. 30 (1973).
Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F.Supp. 1338, 1341—1342 (Haw.1974); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F.Supp. 854, 855—856 (N.D.Ga.1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F.Supp. 829, 835 838 (N.D.Cal.1973). Cf. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F.Supp. 832, 842—843 (W.D.Tex.1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (CA5 1974).
In the petition for certiorari it was argued that § 28—304 was inapplicable to petitioner's claim because that statute is limited to claims for damages, whereas petitioner sought injunctive relief as well as backpay. Our limited grant of certiorari foreclosed our considering whether some other Tennessee statute, such as Tenn.Code Ann. § 28—309 (1955) (six years for an action on a contract) or § 28—310 (1955) (10 years on an action not otherwise provided for), might be the appropriate one. We also have no occasion to consider whether Tennessee's express application of the one-year limitation period to federal civil rights actions is an impermissible discrimination against the federal cause of action, see Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543, 546—547 (CA8 1945), aff'd, 327 U.S. 757, 66 S.Ct. 523, 90 L.Ed. 991 (1946), or whether the enactment of the limitation period after the cause of action accrued, Tenn.Pub.Acts 1969, c. 28, did not touch the pre-existing federal claim.
At oral argument petitioner advanced just such a proposition with respect to the applicability of Tennessee's saving statute, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28—106 (1955). Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. See also Pet. for Cert. 21 n. 27.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides:
In Burnett, the Court considered the effect of a prior filing of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state court on the applicable three-year FELA period of limitation. The action had been dismissed because under state law the venue was improper. In view of the express federal policy liberally allowing transfer of improper-venue cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and the desirability of uniformity in the enforcement of FELA claims, the Court concluded that the prior filing tolled the statute. In American Pipe we considered the effect that a timely filed civil anti-trust purported class action should have on the applicable four-year federal period of limitation. The District Court found the suit an inappropriate one for class action status. In the light of the history of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 and the purposes of litigatory efficiency served by class actions, we concluded that the prior filing had a tolling effect.
Petitioner argues that the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC has the effect of placing the charged employer on notice that a claim of discrimination is being asserted. Thus, petitioner argues, the employer has the opportunity to protect itself against the loss of evidence, the disappearance and fading memories of witnesses, and the unfair surprise that could result from a sudden revival of a claim that long has been allowed to slumber. See Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348—349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 429 (1944).
Even if we were to ignore the substantial span of time that could result from tacking the § 1981 limitation period to the frequently protracted period of EEOC consideration, we are not at all certain that a Title VII charge affords the charged aprty the protection that petitioner suggests. See, e.g., Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (CA6 1971). Only where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested by petitioner necessarily exist and will the courts have an opportunity to assess the influence of the policy of repose inherent in a limitation period. See generally Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 1185—1186 (1950).
Under the Court's no-tolling principle petitioner's discharge on June 20, 1967, activated the statute which subsequently ran on June 20, 1968—two years prior to his receipt of the right-to-sue letter! The majority suggests that even if the statute were tolled during the consideration of the EEOC charge and the initial court proceedings, petitioner's Title VII action may be time barred because of the unusual procedural history of the case, requiring the Court to extend his § 1981 claim beyond that arising out of Title VII. But our limited grant of certiorari forecloses consideration of the timeliness of the Title VII claim.
In any event this case reflects no departure from the normal rule of tolling. Consistent with the common understanding that tolling entails a suspension rather than an extension of a period of limitations, petitioner is allowed whatever time remains under the applicable statute, as well as the benefit of any state saving statute. Under Tenn.Code Ann. § 28—106 (1955) an action dismissed without prejudice may be reinstituted within a year of dismissal. The filing here falls well within that time frame.