Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20131104_0001805.DAZ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 10:36:31
Document Index: 35257797

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915']

| Morales v. Arpaio
Morales v. Arpaio
Sergio M. Morales, Plaintiff,v.Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., Defendants.
On September 10, 2013, Plaintiff Sergio M. Morales, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). On October 3, 2013, prior to the Court's screening of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Allow First Amended Complaint One Day Late" (Doc. 5), to which he attached a copy of the proposed First Amended Complaint (Doc. 5, Attach. 1). Plaintiff's Motion will be granted insofar as the First Amended Complaint supersedes the original Complaint in its entirety. The Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend.
Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $10.49. The remainder of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month's income each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
III. First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff asserts two counts of excessive force and denial of constitutionally adequate medical care. He names as Defendants Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio and Fourth Avenue Jail Detention Officer Graffious.
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts that he has been diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia and was being held in the Fourth Avenue Jail in Phoenix, Arizona on July 26, 2013. Around 5:49 p.m. that day, Plaintiff was "absent his prescribed medication, " Risperdal and Valproic Acid, and heard voices. Plaintiff "lost contact with the environment around him causing him fear under dementia." Plaintiff exited the jail cell to get away from the voices, and he alleges that he was "thrown spread eagle to the floor by 4 to 5 [Detention Officers] and was then repeatedly punched in the face by Defendant Graffious until [his] nose fractured." Plaintiff states that he suffers permanent, noticeable damage to his nose, that he cannot breathe through his nose without difficulty, that his senses of smell and taste have been negatively altered, and he suffers headaches because of the incident.
In Count II, Plaintiff states that "immediately after this beating, [he] was taken for x-rays and his nose fracture was confirmed." Plaintiff alleges that his nose "was never fixed by the 4th Avenue Jail[]s medical staff, " resulting in permanent noticeable damage.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and court costs.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
A. Sheriff Arpaio
Plaintiff sues Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio. While Arpaio may be sued for constitutional violations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him. "A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official acted as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant's position as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his individual capacity "is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts against Arpaio except to state in Count I that Defendant Graffious "under the direction of Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio along with 4 to 5 other Detention Officers whom Plaintiff is unable to identify at this time were responsible for breaking Plaintiff's nose." In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that "several detention officers, under the command of Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, the Defendant, held Plaintiff down and repeatedly punch Plaintiff's nose until it fractured." Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. First, it is not clear whether Arpaio was actually present at the Fourth Avenue Jail and directing Defendant Graffious and others to take Plaintiff down and punch him or whether Plaintiff is predicating liability on a theory of respondeat superior. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support that Arpaio directly violated his constitutional rights or that Arpaio was aware that Plaintiff's rights were being violated but failed to act. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support that Arpaio enacted or enforced a policy, custom, or practice that resulted in the denial of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Arpaio and he will be dismissed.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, not the Eighth Amendment, protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations' for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention." Id. (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force was excessive depends on "whether the officers' actions [were] objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. Moreover, [t]he "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, " violates the Fourth Amendment.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support that the amount of force allegedly used by Defendant Graffious was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. For instance, Plaintiff does not state whether he was complying with any orders given by the officers, threatening any of them, or generally resisting them. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive force under the circumstances, and Count I and Defendant Graffious will be dismissed.
Plaintiff designates Count II as a claim for denial of medical care. However, Plaintiff fails to identify any named Defendant as responsible for the alleged deprivation. Accordingly, Count II will be dismissed.
Plaintiff is advised that not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a "serious medical need" by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant's response was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).
Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. "Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference." Clement v. California Dep't of Corrections, 220 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of "indifference, " "negligence, " or "medical malpractice" do not support a claim under § 1983). "A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] serious medical needs." Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a second amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant's conduct. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377.
A second amended complaint supersedes the original and first amended complaints. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat an original and first amended complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original or first amended complaint is waived if it is not raised in a second amended complaint. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
D. Possible Strike
Because the First Amended Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the dismissal may count as a "strike" under the "3-strikes" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 "if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik , 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).
(1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $10.49.
(3) Plaintiff's "Motion to Allow First Amended Complaint One Day Late" (Doc. 5) is granted insofar as the First Amended Complaint supersedes the original Complaint in its entirety.
(4) The Clerk of Court must separately file the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 5, Attach. 1).
(5) The First Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this Order.
(6) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
(7) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner.