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People v. Ramos :: :: Supreme Court of California Decisions :: California Case Law :: California Law :: US Law :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › California Case Law › Cal. 3d › Volume 30 › People v. Ramos
[Crim. No. 21352. Supreme Court of California. January 25, 1982.]
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer, Assistant Attorney General, [30 Cal. 3d 562] Richard D. Garske, Patricia D. Benke, Michael D. Wellington, Jay M. Bloom and Harley D. Mayfield, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The instant case is our first opportunity to consider a judgment of death imposed pursuant to the 1978 death penalty initiative approved by voters on November 7 of that year. Popularly known as the Briggs Initiative, the 1978 law contains several significant changes from the 1977 law, the constitutionality of which was approved by four members of this court in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 264 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]. Without offering any opinion as to other possible challenges, we have concluded that several recent United States Supreme Court cases mandate our holding unconstitutional on due process grounds the portion of the 1978 statute which requires the penalty phase jury to be instructed regarding the Governor's power to commute a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Accordingly, [30 Cal. 3d 563] the judgment of death must be reversed due to the use of this unconstitutional "Briggs Instruction." The judgment of guilt as to the murder, attempted murder, and robbery counts is affirmed.
Pickrell testified that the next thing he remembered was feeling Kathryn Parrott fall toward him. Almost simultaneously, he felt a sharp blow to the back of his head and also fell over. Sometime subsequent to that, he felt another blow to his head followed by a ringing in his ears. He testified that he never heard a gunshot or smelled smoke. He lay on the floor until he could hear no movement in the building. He then got [30 Cal. 3d 564] up, discovered Parrott's body next to him, and reported the incident to police. When police arrived, they found that Parrott was dead.
The presentation of defense evidence consumed the largest portion of time during the penalty phase, providing considerable background information [30 Cal. 3d 565] concerning appellant's childhood and adolescence in San Antonio, Texas. He and his brother were adopted as infants. His adoptive father died when he was 8; his mother died when he was 13 or 14. From that point on, appellant and his brother (who was two years older) lived by themselves, although some supervision was provided by a maternal aunt.
Appellant also testified on his own behalf at the penalty phase. He admitted the robbery and shooting the victims, but he denied intending to kill them. He explained that he had hit each one on the head with a metal pipe, but that Gaitan instructed him that each must be killed to prevent their identifying appellant and himself. Appellant then re-entered the refrigerator, intending to make it look as though he had killed both Parrott and Pickrell. He testified: "My intentions were not to kill them; my intentions were to just graze them, kind of knock them out because I wasn't too sure, and since I hadn't checked them before, if they were knocked out or not, and when I walked back in, I didn't check if they were knocked out or not. ... I pointed the weapon at an angled position, like upwards, to sort of graze them, and I fired the shot. ... After I shot, I turned around and I looked at Mr. Pickrell, Kevin, and went in back of him about a foot away, and I fired at an angle position at him, too." [30 Cal. 3d 566]
After some preliminary investigation, Officer Buckels telephoned the Santa Ana Hotel and was informed by a hotel employee that appellant had checked out on May 31. Buckels then proceeded to 1313 West Tolliver at approximately 5 a.m. and questioned Joe Calderon and a Mr. Escamilla. Escamilla told Buckels that both appellant and Ruben Gaitan had lived at his residence for approximately one month after arriving in California from San Antonio, but that both had moved out [30 Cal. 3d 567] two months earlier. Calderon stated that he had gone to school with appellant and Gaitan in San Antonio. He told Buckels that the two were close friends and would probably be found together. Gaitan, he explained, worked at the South Coast Plaza Hotel on Bristol, and both appellant and Gaitan were living in an apartment complex in the 3100 block of South Bristol on the east side of the street. Calderon could provide no specific address or apartment number.
While Buckels was speaking with the manager, Hindman informed him that an individual matching the description of Ruben Gaitan had just emerged from apartment number 231 and was proceeding down the street. Hindman and Buckels caught up with the individual, advised him that they were police officers, and asked for identification. As the individual reached for his wallet, the officers observed a small tattoo between the thumb and forefinger. From the wallet he produced an identification card from the South Coast Plaza Hotel bearing the name Ruben Gaitan. In response to questioning, he informed Buckels that he lived in apartment number 231 and that appellant and Jose Zavala [30 Cal. 3d 568] were currently in the apartment. Gaitan was then handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car.
Appellant contends that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed on numerous grounds. He argues that the search was tainted by: (1) the illegal detention and arrest of Ruben Gaitan; (2) police violation of Penal Code section 844's knock-notice requirements; [30 Cal. 3d 569] and (3) the illegal arrest of appellant in violation of People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 263 [127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333]. Appellant also urges (4) that the search categories authorized by the warrant were broader than justified by the facts contained in the affidavit; (5) that items seized during the search exceeded the terms of the warrant and lacked any "nexus" to the crime under investigation; and (6) that the warrant was invalid because it was not signed by the magistrate prior to its execution. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that while some of appellant's arguments may have technical merit, he was not prejudiced by any of the claimed errors.
In In re Tony C. (1979) 21 Cal. 3d 888, 892-893 [148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957], we explained, "It is settled that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stopping and briefly detaining a person for questioning or other limited investigation. ... [I]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity." We noted the converse of this standard in People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682-683 [72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800] when we stated that "a police officer may not detain and question a person when there are no circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course was necessary to the proper discharge of the officer's duties." (See also People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 638, 644 [156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115].)
In the instant case, the detention of Gaitan was clearly "necessary to the proper discharge of the officer's duties." (Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d [30 Cal. 3d 570] 674.) Officer Buckels had been told by Joe Calderon that appellant and Gaitan would likely be found together. Appellant's accomplice in the robbery was as yet unidentified and police reasonably suspected that Gaitan might be involved. Calderon had given Buckels a fairly detailed description of Gaitan, and information from several sources indicated that Gaitan was currently living in apartment number 231. When an individual matching Gaitan's description left the apartment, the officers would have been remiss in their duties had they not detained the individual for questioning in hopes of locating appellant and identifying the second suspect. We therefore conclude that the detention of Ruben Gaitan was proper.
Appellant's argument is technically correct; the police officers did not literally comply with section 844's requirement that they announce their purpose. Since it is established for the purposes of section 844 that a "breaking" includes "uninvited entries through open doors [citations], even where the door is opened in response to a police officer's knock [citation]" (People v. Baldwin (1976) 62 Cal. App. 3d 727, 739 [133 Cal.Rptr. 427]), the police entry here violated the literal terms of section 844.
The information used by the police in support of the contested warrant, however, was all obtained prior to the actual entry of the house which appellant claims was illegal. As soon as the door to the apartment was opened by Jose Zavala, police observed appellant inside. That information in itself was sufficient to support issuance of the search warrant. Accordingly, we conclude that even if failure by the police to [30 Cal. 3d 571] comply with the literal requirements of section 844 cannot be excused, such noncompliance did not taint the search warrant and would not necessitate the suppression of any subsequently seized evidence. (See generally Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 488 [9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407].)
4. Even if police failure to secure an arrest warrant for appellant violated People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 263, the illegal arrest did not taint the subsequently obtained search warrant.
[3] Appellant argues that his warrantless arrest inside apartment number 231 violated People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal. 3d 263, where we concluded that "warrantless arrests within the home are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances." (Id., at p. 276.) He contends that since the warrantless arrest preceded the obtaining of a search warrant for the apartment, any subsequently seized evidence must be ordered suppressed.
Assuming arguendo the merit of appellant's argument, fn. 4 we note that he is still unable to demonstrate how the illegal arrest in any way facilitated the obtaining of the warrant and the subsequent seizure of evidence. The analysis is analogous to that already described with respect to the alleged violation of Penal Code section 844. (See p. 570, ante.) Appellant concedes that it is the entry of the apartment by police which gave rise to any possible illegality; Ramey is not violated if police merely knock on the door without an arrest warrant. When Jose Zavala opened the door to the apartment, before the police entered, the police observed an individual in plain view standing behind Zavala. It is this information connecting appellant with the apartment, obtained prior to any allegedly illegal police conduct, which formed the basis for the search warrant. fn. 5 In fact, the telephonic affidavit in support of the search warrant did not even mention that appellant had been arrested. The affidavit merely recited, "Contact was made at the front door of [30 Cal. 3d 572] the apartment by officers and, upon contact, the individuals coming to the front door were identified as Marcelino Ramos and another person, by the name of Jose Zavala."
We therefore conclude that even if the warrantless arrest of appellant violated People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal. 3d 263, it would not require the invalidation of the search warrant and the suppression of any evidence.
[4] As noted previously, the search warrant issued by Judge Knox listed eight categories of items to be searched and seized. (See p. 570, ante.) Appellant particularly complains that categories (2) "clothing," (6) "personal papers" of appellant or any other individual, and (8) "any papers, bills, letters addressed to occupants or visitors of [the] apartment," were unnecessarily broad and in effect authorized a general exploratory search. (See Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal. 3d 238, 249-250 [118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590]; Thompson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal. App. 3d 101, 112 [138 Cal. Rptr. 603].)
Even if we assume that the challenged categories were overly broad, appellant has not shown that any item of incriminating evidence introduced at trial was seized pursuant to the questioned portions of the warrant. He has thus failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting the judgment of guilt. (See Aday v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 789, 797 [13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 362 P.2d 47].)
[5a] Appellant identifies 13 specific items seized during the search and argues that the seizures were not authorized by the warrant. He recognizes the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement which we explained in Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 144, 157 [81 Cal. Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485]: "When officers, in the course of a bona fide effort to execute a valid search warrant, discover articles which, although not included in the warrant, are reasonably identifiable as contraband, they may seize them whether they are initially in plain sight or come into plain sight subsequently, as a result of the officers' [30 Cal. 3d 573] efforts." (See also People v. Superior Court (Meyers) (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 67, 73-74 [157 Cal. Rptr. 716, 598 P.2d 877].) Appellant contends, however, that the Skelton exception is inapplicable because the items seized were not reasonably identifiable as contraband or other seizable evidence.
The Attorney General responds by noting that many of the challenged items arguably fall within properly drawn categories of the search warrant. Items (3), (6) and (7) clearly constitute firearms and ammunition (search warrant categories one and three). Respondent also asserts that items (2) and (8) fall within a reasonable interpretation of those categories. Items (5), (9), (10) and (11) seem to be personal papers within the sixth category of the warrant. This leaves items (1), (4), (12) and (13). [6] The record does not reflect that items (1) and (4) were ever introduced into evidence during either the guilt or penalty phases and appellant does not suggest otherwise. fn. 6 He is thus unable to meet his burden of establishing prejudice even if they were improperly seized. fn. 7 [5b] The necessary nexus for the other two items is patently obvious. A Mexican food order form (item (13)) was clearly relevant to establish a connection to a Taco Bell robbery. And although the exact nature of the Taco Bell diagram (item (12)) may not have been ascertainable to the searching officers, it was definitely suspicious and its seizure was reasonably necessary in order to establish its evidentiary value. [30 Cal. 3d 574]
The procedure utilized here is specifically authorized by Penal Code sections 1526, subdivision (b) and 1528, subdivision (b). Appellant's reliance on Bowyer v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal. App. 3d 151 [111 Cal. Rptr. 628, 112 Cal. Rptr. 266] is misplaced. Bowyer merely held that the officer/affiant must prepare a duplicate original warrant and that such warrant must be in existence at the time the magistrate authorizes the officer to affix his signature. (Id., at pp. 163-164 and fn. 11.) That requirement was clearly complied with in the present case. Accordingly, trial counsel was not incompetent for failing to object to the procedure.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury, "The evidence in this case will show that Mr. Ramos and Mr. Gaitan premeditated and planned the execution of those two young people in the Taco Bell, with no doubt at all." Counsel for both defendants objected, contending [30 Cal. 3d 575] that the prosecutor was arguing ultimate facts under the guise of an opening statement. The objection was overruled by the trial judge, who concluded that the prosecutor was "entitled to state his theory and how the evidence will fit the theory."
[8] The purpose of an opening statement "is to prepare the minds of the jury to follow the evidence and to more readily discern its materiality, force and effect." (People v. Arnold (1926) 199 Cal. 471, 486 [250 P. 168]; see also People v. Green (1956) 47 Cal. 2d 209, 215 [302 P.2d 307].) It is difficult to conceive of how the prosecutor can accomplish this function if he is not entitled to state his theory of the case in terms of the requisite elements of the crime. But even were we to accept appellant's contention that there was a technical error here, it is inconceivable that such error resulted in prejudice to him. (See People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 946, 955 [114 Cal. Rptr. 632, 523 P.2d 672].)
Appellant claims that some of the trial court's comments during voir dire regarding possible jury verdicts were prejudicial and require a reversal of his conviction. On several occasions, the judge discussed the jury's obligation to decide between first and second degree murder in the event of a conviction, but did not mention the possibility of a manslaughter verdict or of a hung jury. [30 Cal. 3d 576]
[10] Appellant failed to object to the court's comments when made, however, and a challenge to allegedly improper remarks generally may not be raised for the first time on appeal, particularly when, as in this case, a timely objection may have obviated any problem by permitting the court to clear up any misunderstanding that his comments may have elicited. (See, e.g., People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 425, 434 [341 P.2d 303]; People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 814, 836-837 [163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 P.2d 689].) In any event, in view of the state of the evidence, we do not believe that there is any reasonable probability that the comments prejudiced the appellant.
The photographs at issue, disclosing and corroborating the manner in which the crime was committed, were clearly relevant to the issue of malice. (See People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 264, 302 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 142, 171 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) Under Evidence Code section 352, however, a trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the danger of prejudice created by the evidence outweighs the evidence's probative value. Appellant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion under section 352 in admitting the photos.
Our past cases make clear that a trial court's refusal to exclude otherwise admissible photographs under section 352 will not be disturbed on appeal unless the prejudicial effect clearly outweighs the photos' probative value. (See People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 199, 211 [155 [30 Cal. 3d 577] Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]; People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 349, 363 [105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594].) In the present case, the photos in question are not unduly gory or gruesome and the trial court could properly find that each of the photographs provided sufficiently significant corroboration of Pickrell's testimony to outweigh any potential prejudice. We note that the trial court excluded an additional photograph of Parrott's body taken at the scene of the killing after a police officer had turned her body over. We find no abuse of discretion in the challenged rulings.
In our recent decision in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 143, 152 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826], we noted that ordinarily "if a defendant offers to admit the existence of an element of a charged offense, the prosecutor must accept that offer and refrain from introducing evidence ... to prove that element to the jury." In light of the defendant's stipulation in this case, the prosecutor cannot plausibly maintain that the introduction of the photograph was needed to demonstrate either that Parrott was a human being within the meaning of Penal Code section 187 or that she was alive prior to the events of the night in question.
Although neither party has directed our attention to any prior criminal case in which the admissibility of a similar photograph of the decedent was in question, in O'Meara v. Haiden (1928) 204 Cal. 354, [30 Cal. 3d 578] 366 [268 P. 334, 60 A.L.R. 1381], our court addressed a comparable issue in the context of a wrongful death action. In O'Meara, as in this case, the photograph of a young decedent was identified by the decedent's parent before the jury and was introduced into evidence. In concluding that the admission of such evidence was erroneous, our court stated in O'Meara: "There was no dispute as to the identity of the boy injured. Just what was the purpose of offering in evidence his photograph is not apparent from the record, unless it was to unduly prejudice the jury in favor of the plaintiff. The reporter's transcript shows that the mother wept as she identified her son's picture. The effect of such procedure cannot aid in the rendition of a just and fair verdict by the jury, which should be the purpose of all trials by jury. To permit the introduction of the dead boy's photograph under the circumstances shown in this action was undoubtedly error. ..." (See also Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal. 2d 448, 459 [267 P.2d 303]; cf. Westberg v. Willde (1939) 14 Cal. 2d 360, 371 [94 P.2d 590].) Courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions when the proffered photograph has had no bearing on any contested issue in the case. (See generally Annot. (1960) 74 A.L.R.2d 928.)
As the People suggest, the trial court could properly have found that the proffered testimony was relevant to the prosecution's claim that the [30 Cal. 3d 579] murder in this case was a deliberate, premeditated murder and was not spontaneously precipitated by any resistance or aggressive conduct on the part of the victim. Evidence that Parrott had intended to offer no resistance to any robbery attempt would tend to show that she acted consistently with such preexisting intent and would tend to corroborate Pickrell's testimony to that effect. Accordingly, appellant's relevancy objection was properly overruled.
Appellant also argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury that the testimony was not to be used to show the truth of the matter asserted, allegedly leaving the impression that the confined employees had some basis in past experience with the appellant to believe he was capable of murder. The suggested inference, however, does not naturally follow from the statement in question. In any event, appellant fails to show that any possible error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1, 26 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) [30 Cal. 3d 580]
[16] As appellant suggests, evidence of possession of a weapon not used in the crime is ordinarily not admissible (see People v. Lo Cigno (1961) 193 Cal. App. 2d 360, 379 [14 Cal.Rptr. 354]), and in this case the prosecution did not present evidence demonstrating that the disassembled gun might have been the weapon used in the robbery. The testimony concerning the disassembled gun was very brief, however, and in view of the strong uncontradicted evidence that the defendant had used a gun during the commission of the robbery, this evidence, even if improperly solicited, was not prejudicial.
Evidence Code section 1418 provides that "[t]he genuineness of writing ... may be proved by a comparison made by an expert witness with writing (a) which the court finds was admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or (b) otherwise proved [30 Cal. 3d 581] to be genuine to the satisfaction of the court." fn. 11 In this case, the personnel director's testimony established that Gaitan was personally present when the application on his behalf was filled out, and in the absence of any contrary indication we believe that the trial court could properly admit the document for use as a comparison handwriting exemplar. Moreover, it is clear in any event that the evidence was not prejudicial, because the handwriting on the Taco Bell order was additionally linked to Gaitan through the use of exemplars taken directly from Gaitan by one of the numerous handwriting experts who testified at trial.
[18] Finally, appellant asserts that even if none of the alleged errors was individually important enough to affect the outcome of the case, their cumulative effect was prejudicial requiring reversal of his conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Vindiola (1979) 96 Cal. App. 3d 370, 388 [158 Cal. Rptr. 6]; People v. Williams (1971) 22 Cal. App. 3d 34, 45 [99 Cal. Rptr. 103].) In this case, however, the evidence against appellant at the guilt phase was more than substantial, including most significantly the positive identification by the surviving victim. Even if all of the challenged evidence had been excluded, we do not think that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been affected. Therefore, any possible error did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
Although in a proper case a trial court may be required to give sua sponte instructions to guide the jury in evaluating an accomplice's testimony [30 Cal. 3d 582] (see, e.g., People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal. 3d 460, 466-469 [110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298]), in People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 362, 398-399 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961], we explained that when, as here, a codefendant testifies that he was not involved in the crime -- and thus that he was not an accomplice -- the trial court may properly conclude that the giving of accomplice instructions might improperly prejudice the codefendant's case. Terry indicates that in such a situation the giving or withholding of such instructions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. In view of the fact that Pickrell's testimony obviously provided adequate corroboration of Gaitan's testimony against the appellant, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the accomplice instructions sua sponte in this case.
[20] Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. Whether or not assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense when a defendant is charged both with robbery and a "use" allegation, a trial court, as we explained in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 668, 683-686 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1], is required to give such an instruction only if there is substantial evidence to support a jury's determination that the defendant was in fact only guilty of the lesser offense.
In this case, contrary to appellant's contention, there is no evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was only guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and not robbery. The evidence pointed unmistakably to the fact that appellant had taken money from the Taco Bell; appellant had presented no evidence to suggest that he did not have the specific intent to steal. (Cf. People v. McGreen (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d 504, 512 [166 Cal. Rptr. 360].) Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on assault with a deadly weapon.
In addition to being convicted of the charged substantive crimes, defendant was found to have intentionally inflicted great bodily injury upon Pickrell, a finding which subjected appellant to a three-year enhancement of his punishment under Penal Code section 12022.7. [30 Cal. 3d 583] [21] Appellant contends that this enhancement finding should be reversed because the trial court did not specifically inform the jury that CALJIC No. 2.02 (1979 rev.), delineating the conditions under which specific intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, was applicable to the jury's determination of specific intent with respect to the enhancement. (See People v. Salas (1976) 58 Cal. App. 3d 460 [129 Cal. Rptr. 871].)
We think it clear that appellant suffered no prejudice from the trial court's omission. The jury in this case was generally instructed on the principles embodied in CALJIC No. 2.02 with respect to the substantive crimes, and the jury was also informed to consider all the instructions as a whole and to regard each in light of all the others. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that the jury was confused as to the proper use of circumstantial evidence in connection with the enhancement finding. (See People v. Radil (1977) 76 Cal. App. 3d 702, 707-709 [142 Cal. Rptr. 233].)
[22] Appellant was not only convicted of the murder of Kathryn Parrott, but also of the attempted murder of Kevin Pickrell. Instructing the jury on the latter offense, the court stated that "an attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the crime and a direct but ineffectual act towards its commission." It then instructed the jury that it could find defendant guilty of murder on any of three theories: express malice, implied malice, or felony murder. The court neglected, however, to inform the jury that the crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill, a mental state coincident with express malice but not necessarily with implied malice or felony murder. The jury instructions thus implied that the jury should find appellant guilty of attempted murder if it determined that appellant intentionally committed an act which, were the victim to die, would consitute murder on an implied malice or felony-murder theory. As we explained recently in People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 733 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446], such instructions are inadequate. fn. 12 [30 Cal. 3d 584]
In People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 142, 164 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587], this court stated that "in a capital case, where diminished capacity appears to be the sole potentially meritorious defense, and counsel has in fact elected to present such a defense at trial, counsel must be expected to take those reasonable measures to investigate the factual framework underlying the defense preliminary to the exercise of an informed choice among the available tactical options, if any." (Italics in original.) Although appellant purports to rely on Frierson, the case is readily distinguishable on its facts. As noted, defense counsel in Frierson elected to present a diminished capacity defense but decided to do so without the benefit of expert psychiatric witnesses. Appellant's counsel decided that a diminished capacity defense was inappropriate to [30 Cal. 3d 585] the facts of this case. Therefore, it is the propriety of counsel's decision not to present the defense which must be evaluated.
Moreover, trial counsel's decision not to present a diminished capacity defense cannot be said to have deprived appellant of effective assistance. None of the psychiatric evidence accumulated by counsel either before or after the guilt phase suggested that appellant was incapable of forming the intent to steal. (See, e.g., People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 155; People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 379, 391-393 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659].) Since the prosecution's first degree murder case was presented to the jury on a felony-murder theory as well as a premeditation theory, additional evidence of diminished capacity would have been largely irrelevant. Counsel could have properly concluded that such psychiatric evidence as was available should be saved for the penalty phase in an effort to persuade the jury that appellant was an inappropriate candidate for the death penalty. Under these circumstances, we will not proceed to second-guess trial counsel's choice of tactics. (See People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 814, 828 [163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 P.2d 689].)
A review of the record indicates that appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims are spurious. (See generally People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 557 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738].) [30 Cal. 3d 586]
Relying on People v. Walls (1978) 85 Cal. App. 3d 447 [149 Cal. Rptr. 460], appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury in "reasonably rejecting" the possibility that the rifle changed hands and that codefendant Gaitan in fact used the weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5. (See People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 122, 139 [70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777].) Appellant contends that since no one actually saw him shoot the victims, the jury could not properly find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant's second claim is equally meritless. He begins by citing People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] for the proposition that "it [is] not enough for the jury to find the defendant guilty of a murder and one of the listed crimes; the statute also require[s] that the jury find the defendant committed the murder 'during the commission of or attempted commission of' that crime." (Id., at p. 59, italics in original.) From this assumption he asserts that the robbery in this case was completed before the killing took place, and therefore that the murder was not perpetrated "in the commission of" a robbery within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
It is well established that the crime of robbery continues beyond the point in time when the property is taken from the victim. (See People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 192, 199-200 [104 Cal. Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d [30 Cal. 3d 587] 1145] and cases there cited.) In the instant case, the killing occurred at the same location as the robbery and within a short time after the money was taken from the safe. Moreover, the jury could well have concluded that the purpose of the killing was to eliminate a witness to the robbery. Under the circumstances, there is overwhelming evidence from which a jury could find that the killing was perpetrated "in the commission of" a robbery.
[27] As a general rule, even though a defendant entertains but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may be convicted and punished for each crime of violence committed against a different victim. (See People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal. 3d 873, 885 [135 Cal. Rptr. 654, 558 P.2d 552] and cases there cited.) [28] Robbery is recognized as a crime of violence against the person. (See People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal. 3d 873, 880; People v. Guerin (1972) 22 Cal. App. 3d 775, 781-782 [99 Cal. Rptr. 573].) Thus when the defendants in People v. Childs (1980) 112 Cal. App. 3d 374 [169 Cal. Rptr. 183] took money at gunpoint from five bank tellers, they were convicted of five separate robberies. (Id., at pp. 382, 383.) [26b] The foregoing principles would indicate that appellant was properly convicted of the robberies of both Parrott and Pickrell.
In the first such case, People v. Guerin, supra, 22 Cal. App. 3d 775, defendant was convicted of the robbery of two liquor store clerks and Simon, the store manager. Quickly affirming the conviction as to each [30 Cal. 3d 588] clerk on the ground that each had separate dominion over his own cash register, the court balked as to Simon. "As manager," it observed, "he was in at least constructive possession of all the money in both registers. ... But when the prosecution elected to charge Reifel and Miss Ward [the clerks] as additional victims of the takings, it found itself in the position of charging two robberies for each taking. ... [H]ad defendant been guilty only of theft, such a result could not have been permitted. We do not think that it can be permitted here." (Id., at p. 782.) The court then reduced the conviction as to Simon to assault with a deadly weapon, "an offense included within the crime of robbery in the first degree." (Id., at pp. 782-783.)
In the next case, People v. Higgins (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 771 [104 Cal. Rptr. 925], defendants at gunpoint compelled two clerks to remove money from the same cash register. The same panel of the Court of Appeal as had decided Guerin relied on that case in holding that defendants could have been convicted of robbing either clerk, but not both; it then reduced the offense as to one clerk to assault with a deadly weapon.
In both Guerin and Higgins, the defendants were convicted of first degree robbery. The use of a deadly weapon was an essential element of first degree robbery, a fact upon which the court relied in finding assault with a deadly weapon was a lesser included offense. The 1976 Legislature, however, amended section 211a to eliminate the degrees of robbery, which raised anew the question of lesser included offenses. In People v. McGreen, supra, 107 Cal. App. 3d 504, the Court of Appeal addressed that issue, and held that a charge of robbery plus an allegation that defendant used a firearm in the commission of the robbery encompassed the lesser offense of assault with a deadly weapon.
Finally, People v. Childs, supra, 112 Cal. App. 3d 374, applied the McGreen analysis to a case of multiple robbery convictions. In Childs, as we noted earlier, defendants committed separate robberies of each of the bank tellers. On leaving the bank, defendants accosted a pickup truck, ordered the driver (Negoli) and the passenger (Lazar) out of the vehicle, and fled in the truck. The court stated that "both victims were in possession of the same vehicle and were victims of a single taking. Therefore, the additional count charging [defendant] for robbery of Negoli must be modified in light of the robbery conviction sustained against Lazar. Since both Negoli and Lazar were victims of an assault, [30 Cal. 3d 589] the conviction on Count III (robbery of Negoli) must be modified to assault with a deadly weapon pursuant to Guerin." (Id., at p. 383.)
Relying on the recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Aaron (1980) 409 Mich. 672 [299 N.W.2d 304], appellant invites [30 Cal. 3d 590] us to reexamine the underpinnings of the felony-murder rule in California. For the time being, however, we choose to decline the invitation since the facts of the instant case make it an inappropriate vehicle for such a re-examination. The record in the guilt and penalty phases strongly suggests that the jury viewed the killing in this case as intentional and malicious. It is thus unlikely that the giving of the felony-murder instruction worked to appellant's detriment.
We therefore rely on extensive and well-settled precedent in affirming appellant's first-degree murder conviction under circumstances where a felony murder theory was presented to the jury. (See, e.g., People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal. 3d 375, 388 [99 Cal. Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793]; People v. Lindley (1945) 26 Cal. 2d 780, 791 [161 P.2d 227]; People v. Doyell (1874) 48 Cal. 85, 94-95.) We do not suggest that a reexamination of such precedent may not be appropriate under other circumstances. fn. 17
In the instant case the court instructed the jury in the language of the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which implements the statute: "You are instructed that under the State Constitution, a Governor is empowered to grant a reprieve, pardon, or commutation of a sentence following conviction of a crime. Under this power, a Governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence of life without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would include the possibility of parole." [30 Cal. 3d 591]
We shall point out, after examining the background of the Briggs Instruction and the history of similar instructions, that the Briggs Instruction cannot withstand constitutional analysis. In the first place, it invites considerations that are foreign to the jury's task of determining whether the defendant should live or die. Instead of assuring that the jury's life-or-death decision rests on "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense" (Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304 [49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 603-608 [57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 988-992, 98 S.Ct. 2954]), the instruction focuses the attention of the jury on the fact that the Governor has the power to render the defendant eligible for parole if the jury does not vote to execute him. The jury's induced consideration of this possibility leads it into an area where it has no guidelines and in which its conclusion must be entirely speculative. In this realm, the jury's life-or-death sentencing decision may be based at least in part on the jurors' perception of the present or some future governor's philosophy or possible action, rather than on the defendant's crime, his character and his record. The challenged instruction thus improperly leads the jury far beyond the constitutional safeguards of due process of law.
The Briggs Instruction appears to be unique among the 38 states which have capital punishment statutes currently in effect. fn. 18 The impropriety [30 Cal. 3d 592] of the statute, however, becomes clear from a review of the numerous decisions which have condemned comparable instructions or prosecutorial comment advising or permitting the jury to consider the possibility of pardon or parole in deciding what sentence is to be imposed upon the convicted defendant.
Almost 20 years ago, in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 631 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], this court held prejudicially erroneous an instruction that told the jury that in deciding whether or not to impose the death sentence upon a convicted defendant it should consider the possibility that the Governor might commute the sentence or that the prison authorities might eventually grant defendant parole.
We addressed two separate issues in Morse. As to instructions regarding the possibility of parole, we noted that "[t]he objective situation is difficult enough without blurring the functions. The function of the jury is to consider the facts surrounding the crime and the defendant's background, and upon that basis, reach its decision. The jury should not be invited to decide if the defendant will be fit for release in the future; it should not at all be involved in the issue of the time, if any, when the defendant should be released; ... placing such issues before the jury ... in substance, transposes the task of the Adult Authority to the jury." (Id., at p. 643.) The opinion recognized the state interest in assuring that jurors do not engage in erroneous speculation based on [30 Cal. 3d 593] incorrect preconceptions; it held that the jury could be informed as to the general operation of the parole procedure, but then should be specifically instructed not to speculate as to what the Adult Authority might do. (Id., at p. 648.)
Although some early cases found such error to be nonprejudicial (e.g., Grandsinger v. State (1955) 161 Neb. 419 [73 N.W.2d 632, 651]; McMann v. State (Fla. 1951) 55 So. 2d 538, 539-540), the general current rule holds that jury consideration of such possibilities works automatic prejudice. (E.g., State v. Lindsey (La. 1981) 404 So. 2d 466, 484-488; Bush v. State (1977) 261 Ark. 577 [550 S.W.2d 175, 177]; Sukle v. People (1941) 107 Colo. 269 [111 P.2d 233, 235]; see also Lovely v. United States (4th Cir. 1948) 169 F.2d 386, 391.) In some jurisdictions, [30 Cal. 3d 594] mere mention of the possibility of pardon or parole constitutes grounds for reversal. (E.g., Hinton v. Com. (1978) 219 Va. 492 [247 S.E.2d 704, 706].) In others, jurors may be generally informed of the possibility of pardon, but then must be specifically instructed not to consider it in reaching their verdict. (E.g., State v. White (1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65, 76-77]; Commonwealth v. Aljoe (1966) 420 Pa. 198 [216 A.2d 50, 55, 16 A.L.R.3d 1126].)
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State v. Lindsey, supra, 233 S.E.2d 734 reached a similar result. There, the jury was instructed that if it recommended mercy, defendant would be "'entitled to parole under the applicable statute of the State of West Virginia.'" (Id., at p. 738; italics in original.) The court noted that a convicted defendant "is never entitled to parole. [Citation]. He is eligible to be considered for parole." (Id., at p. 739.) The opinion continues: "The jury is the trier of facts and 'there is no presumption that they are familiar with the law.' [Citation.] ... We cannot presume that the jury knows the law and the instruction given to it, being extremely misleading, doubtless induced that jury to convict without a mercy recommendation. ... We must conclude that such instruction, being inaccurate, [30 Cal. 3d 595] misleading and incomplete, operated to the detriment of the defendant and constituted reversible error." (Id.; see also State v. Tudor (1950) 154 Ohio St. 249, 43 Ohio Ops. 130 [95 N.E.2d 385, 391] (dis. opn. of Hart, J.); State v. Brooks (1978) 271 S.C. 355 [247 S.E.2d 436, 438-439].)
[29a] The United States Supreme Court has now established that in capital cases the Eighth Amendment requires that the decision whether a defendant is to live or die must be based upon "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances [30 Cal. 3d 596] of the particular offense." (Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 304 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 961]; Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 603-608 [57 L.Ed.2d at pp. 988-992].)
The Briggs Instruction, by injecting an irrelevant and speculative consideration into the penalty determination, diverts the jury's attention from the central issue and thereby "creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." (Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 605 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990]. See also Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 638, 642 [65 L. Ed. 2d 392, 403, 405-406, 100 S. Ct. 2382].) [30 Cal. 3d 597]
The instruction also encouraged the prosecutor to elicit some particularly prejudicial testimony on cross-examination from Dr. Sheffner, the defense psychiatrist. The prosecutor first asked the doctor whether the appellant was aware of the possibility of parole by way of a gubernatorial commutation, were he to receive a sentence of life imprisonment. The doctor replied that appellant was aware of the possibility, although [30 Cal. 3d 598] he viewed the chances as rather remote. The prosecutor then inquired as to the defendant's state of mind were he to be released on parole after 10 or 20 years in prison. [30] The doctor testified that defendant answered that he would probably have built up within himself such feelings of anger and frustration that he would attempt to take revenge on anyone involved in the trial, including the district attorney who prosecuted the case, the judge who presided over it, and the jurors who voted to convict him. fn. 22 Thus, the jurors in this case were not only misled in the abstract; they were given a very personal motive to insure that defendant was never released. And the Briggs Instruction through its misleading implication suggested that the only way to attain this "permanent" result was a sentence of death. fn. 23
[29b] Decisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that procedures biased in favor of the death penalty cannot withstand constitutional challenge; the Briggs Instruction results in the scales of justice being "tipped toward death." In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770], the court stated that "[o]ne of [the basic requirements of procedural fairness] is that the decision whether a man deserves to die must be made on scales that are not deliberately tipped toward death." (Id., at pp. 521-522, fn. 20 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) The court concluded: "The State of Illinois has stacked the [30 Cal. 3d 599] deck against the petitioner. To execute this death sentence would deprive him of his life without due process of law." (Id., at p. 523 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 785-786].)
In an attempted answer to these solid objections to the Briggs Instruction the People urge that the instruction neither leads to misunderstanding nor works any effect at all. The People point out that the jury does not enjoy an unlimited discretion in determining whether to impose death or life without possibility of parole, but are instructed to "consider [30 Cal. 3d 600] ... the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, to weigh them and to reach a decision based on such findings." The People therefore would dismiss as in "no way a factor" the specific instruction that the "governor is empowered to grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation" and that "under this power, a Governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence." The People go so far as to assert that the jury "was impliedly told not to consider" this instruction as to the Governor's power, and that the instruction as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances somehow obliterates the instructions as to the Governor's powers.
We therefore hold that the Briggs Instruction constitutes a dual violation of defendant's due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. fn. 24 By encouraging the jury to consider an irrelevant and confusing [30 Cal. 3d 601] factor in their deliberations, the instruction reduces the reliability of any resulting sentencing determination. This vice is compounded by the practical effect of the instruction in biasing the jury in favor of the death penalty by suggesting -- totally incorrectly -- that the only way that the jury can ensure that the convicted defendant will not be released from custody through the Governor's commutation power is by imposing a sentence of death.
Surely, if the State of California exacts the death penalty, it has no license to take a human life based upon an improper and unconstitutional verdict of death. A human life cannot be balanced against the costs to the state of conducting a fair trial. If the state is to execute an individual, it must not do so on the basis of a verdict of death tainted by [30 Cal. 3d 602] a misleading, deceptive, unconstitutional instruction, but upon a proceeding that clearly complies with due process of law.
As we recently observed, the death penalty laws, as with all legislation, are presumed constitutional and will be upheld unless their invalidity "clearly, positively and unmistakably" appears. (People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 264, 317 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]; see In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 444, 453 [75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296].) In similar fashion, in appraising the constitutionality of initiative measures such as the 1978 death penalty law, we should resolve all doubts in favor of the use of the initiative process if we can reasonably do so. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) Significantly, the majority cites no cases whatever which suggest that it would be unconstitutional to instruct the jurors in a capital [30 Cal. 3d 603] case regarding the Governor's commutation power. Indeed, as discussed below, most cases acknowledge the self-evident fact that the Governor's authority to commute or reduce a criminal sentence is a matter of common knowledge. That being so, the giving of the challenged instruction must be considered harmless and nonprejudicial.
Moreover, even if the instruction did advise the jury to consider the commutation power in making its determination, on what proper basis could such an instruction be deemed unconstitutional? It is true that some prior cases have suggested that the consideration of the possibility of subsequent administrative grants of parole raises an extrinsic factor which might confuse the jury or diminish its sense of responsibility. (E.g., People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 631, 643, 652-653 [76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607].) Yet unlike the situation in those cases, here the issue of parole is necessarily presented to the jurors by the very language of the alternative punishment being considered by them, namely, "life without possibility of parole." (Pen. Code, § 190.) Moreover, Morse involved no statute which mandated the giving of such instruction, and its holding appears to rest not on constitutional grounds but upon this court's inherent power to supervise the lower courts in the absence of contrary legislation. Surely, the people of this state, who are the ultimate sovereign, in adopting legislation of this kind by initiative, are entitled to disagree with and override our view of the relevance of information which might be of concern to the jurors in a capital case.
The majority suggests, however, that the instruction mandated by the 1978 law is incomplete in its failure to advise the jury that the Governor may commute a sentence of death as well as a sentence of life [30 Cal. 3d 604] without possibility of parole. It is difficult to understand how or why a defendant would ever desire such an instruction, which could only lead the jurors to minimize the seriousness and severity of the death penalty as a choice of punishment. Indeed, in Morse, supra, we expressly disapproved a similar instruction, on the basis that it "may very well induce the jury to assume that its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment. [¶] ... The impact of the instruction must necessarily weaken the jury's own sense of responsibility." (60 Cal.2d at p. 649, italics added.)
Finally, as many of the cases make clear, it is likely that most jurors already know of the Governor's commutation power. Several courts have recognized that the availability of parole and commutation in capital cases is readily understood among lay persons. (See State v. Carroll (1937) 52 Wyo. 29 [69 P.2d 542, 560]; State v. Cherry (1979) 298 N.C. 86 [257 S.E.2d 551, 561]; Grandsinger v. State (1955) 161 Neb. 419 [73 N.W.2d 632, 651], cert. den. 352 U.S. 880 [1 L. Ed. 2d 81, 77 S. Ct. 104]; Paramore v. State (Fla. 1969) 229 So. 2d 855, 860; Sullivan v. State (1936) 47 Ariz. 224 [55 P.2d 312, 318-319].) Cherry involved juror discussion and consideration of the possibility of subsequent parole by administrative bodies. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted: "We see little prejudice to defendant since the possibility of parole or executive clemency is a matter of common knowledge among most adult persons." (P. 561, italics added.) The same conclusion was expressed more forcibly by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Grandsinger, another capital case, wherein the court observed that the [30 Cal. 3d 605] prosecutor's comments regarding the availability of pardon or parole "was simply a statement of existing ... law which all men, including the jurors, were presumed to know and doubtless did already know about before the statement was made." (P. 651.) The Grandsinger court concluded that "It would be a perversion of truth and justice" to hold that the prosecutor's comments required reversal of the death penalty rendered in that case. (Ibid.)
FN 1. Codefendant Gaitan testified at the guilt phase and denied any participation in either the robbery or the shootings.
FN 2. Appellant also appears to argue that the subsequent arrest of Gaitan was illegal. But since all the information provided by Gaitan was given to police prior to arrest, the legality of the arrest would not affect the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.
FN 3. Section 844 provides: "To make an arrest, a ... peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired."
FN 4. The Attorney General argues that exigent circumstances excused police failure to obtain an arrest warrant in this case. He focuses on the time period following Gaitan's statement that appellant was presently inside the apartment and contends that the police officers should not have been expected to wait for an arrest warrant to arrive. In addition, of course, the police had previously received information indicating that if defendant were in trouble, he would probably be attempting to leave the state for San Antonio.
FN 5. It should be noted that police observations merely corroborated what Ruben Gaitan had told them earlier, i.e., that appellant and Jose Zavala were present in the apartment.
FN 6. It also appears that items (2), (4) and (9) were not introduced into evidence.
FN 7. The Attorney General argues that item (1) was clothing (category two of the warrant) and that the searching officers might reasonably suspect that a mask was used in the robbery, although there was no evidence to that effect. He contends that item (4) (the two books) consisted of materials dealing with terrorism and terrorist activities which were seized to establish a possible motive for the robbery.
FN 8. The prosecutor argued as follows: "Now, the defense in this case has failed to raise a reasonable doubt, and I say that because after Mr. Pickrell has testified, and all of the other witnesses have testified, there is no question in this case but that the people in this case on trial are guilty of the crime.
FN 9. Defendant failed to make any hearsay objection at trial, and consequently may not object to the evidence's admission on that ground on appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353.)
FN 10. The key portion of the testimony in question is Pickrell's statement that: "Well, I told her that he was probably going to kill us because we knew him, and then she just said 'Well, pray to God.'"
FN 11. Contrary to defendant's contention, the provisions of section 1271, governing the introduction of a document as an exception to the hearsay rule, are not applicable here because the document was not introduced to prove the truth of its contents, but simply as evidence of Gaitan's handwriting.
FN 12. Murtishaw involves a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, a crime virtually indistinguishable from attempted murder. Indeed, under legislation effective January 1 of last year (Stats. 1980, ch. 300, §§ 1-2) the separate crime of assault with intent to commit murder has been eliminated, so that all acts which formerly could have been prosecuted under that rubric are now prosecuted as attempted murders. Thus, Murtishaw's analysis of the jury instructions appropriate to the crime of assault with intent to commit murder applies with undiminished force to the present case.
FN 13. The prosecution case at the guilt phase strongly indicated that appellant attempted to kill the two witnesses to the robbery. Intent was inferable from the circumstances of the crime. Since appellant presented no evidence at the guilt phase, there was no substantial basis from which the jury could conclude otherwise. All of the evidence suggesting that appellant may not have entertained an intent to kill was presented during the penalty phase.
FN 14. The Halsted-Reitan test was administered to appellant by Dr. John Haberland of the University of California at Irvine Medical Center on December 17, 1979.
FN 15. Section 211 provides as follows: "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear."
FN 16. To the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion, Guerin, Higgins and Childs are hereby disapproved.
FN 17. Appellant also contends that the 1978 death penalty law is unconstitutional because it allows for the imposition of capital punishment without a determination that the defendant intended the death of the victim where the first degree murder conviction is based on a felony-murder theory. In view of our conclusion that the penalty determination must be reversed due to the unconstitutionality of the Briggs Instruction, we need not express an opinion on this additional contention.
FN 18. The Massachusetts death penalty law, recently declared unconstitutional on independent state grounds in District Atty. for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson (1980) ___ Mass. ___ [411 N.E.2d 1274], also did not contain any mandated instruction similar to the Briggs Instruction.
FN 19. In Broyles v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1954) 267 S.W.2d 73, 76-77, the court stated: "Under our theory of separation of governmental powers, it is the duty of the judiciary to obtain a conviction of those guilty of crime. But once that conviction has been obtained and the sentence imposed, it is the duty of other departments of government to enforce the sentence and to determine when and under what circumstances the prisoner will be eligible for release. ... [Thus,] the parole of prisoners falls within another department of government, and a discussion of the subject has no place in an argument to a jury." In State v. Lindsey, supra, (La.) 404 So.2d at page 487, the court said, "The jury could conclude that the governor will improperly pardon dangerous offenders or commute their sentences, thereby encouraging it to pre-empt the governor's power and defeat the constitutional design by opting for the death penalty."
FN 20. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Farris v. State (Tenn. 1976) 535 S.W.2d 608, 614 suggested that "[j]urors should not be permitted to speculate on the length of sentences, discretionary parole, ... and a whole conglomeration of events which, if they come to pass at all, will come to pass in the future. Very heavily involved is the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial."
FN 21. Not only is the instruction a half-truth in the practical sense, but were it part of a contractual negotiation, it would arguably constitute a tortious deceit and a fraudulent misrepresentation. Civil Code section 1710, subdivision 3 defines a deceit as "[t]he suppression of a fact, by one ... who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact. ... " (See also Civ. Code, § 1572, subd. 3; Rest.2d Torts, § 529.) While the considerations which govern private conduct as opposed to governmental conduct are admittedly different in many cases, we would condone an anomaly if we were to uphold this instruction and in essence authorize state-sanctioned fraud and deceit in the most serious of all state actions: the taking of a human life. (See Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 U.S. 349 at p. 358 [51 L. Ed. 2d 393 at p. 402, 97 S. Ct. 1197].)
FN 22. This testimony was marginally relevant to explain the basis of Dr. Sheffner's conclusion that appellant had congenital brain damage evidenced by primitive and illogical thinking. The Attorney General also asserts that the testimony was independently relevant as bearing on appellant's state of mind at the time of the crime and on his character in general. Even relevant evidence, however, may be excluded by the trial court "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice. ..." (Evid. Code, § 352.)
A trial court ruling admitting evidence under section 352 may be reviewed only to determine whether the court abused its discretion. (See People v. Kelley (1977) 75 Cal. App. 3d 672, 678 [142 Cal. Rptr. 457].) Although courts have rarely found an abuse of discretion, our opinion is that the present case constitutes one of those rare exceptions. The probative value of the testimony was insignificant; Dr. Sheffner had other grounds for his diagnosis, and could cite other examples of defendant's "primitive thinking." And even if marginally relevant on independent grounds, its prejudicial effect was substantial, particularly when considered in connection with the jury instruction on the Governor's commutation power. Weighing the danger of prejudice against the probative value, we conclude that the testimony should not be admitted if the penalty phase is retried.
FN 23. In Morse, we quoted one commentator whose observation is equally pertinent to the instant case: "'[T]he fact that a person sentenced to life might be released before he may safely be returned to society indicates a weakness in the parole system -- not that he ought to have been executed.' (Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases (1953) 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1119.)" (60 Cal.2d at p. 644, fn. 10.)
FN 24. Whether or not the Briggs Instruction also independently violates one or more provisions of the California Constitution is an issue we need not decide.