Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19850710-1121984
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KURUP c. DANEMARK
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Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 11219/84Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1985-07-10;11219.84 Analyses : (Art. 5-3) DUREE DE LA DETENTION PROVISOIRE, (Art. 6) PROCEDURE PENALEParties : Demandeurs : KURUPDéfendeurs : DANEMARKTexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ° 1 1219/8 4 John Ib Nielsen KURUP v/DENMARK John lb Nielsen KURUP c/DANEMAR K
DECISION of 10 July 1985 on Ihe admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 10 juillet 1985 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6, peragraph 3 of the Convention : In determining whether the rights guaranteed by this provision have been respected, the overall position of the defense must be considered. Article 6, paragraph 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention : 7he abilipâ¢ for an accused to confer with his representative is a fundamental element in the preparation of the defense, but may be subjected to restrictions (here, a prohibition on the representative from discussing with the accused the statements of witnesses who, in order to preserve their anonymity, were esamined in the accused's absence) . Article 6, paragraph 3(d) of the Convention : 77i is provision is not violated where, esceptionally and to prevent possible intimidation, a witness is heard in the accused's absence but in the presence of his representative .
Articie 6, paragraphe 3, de la Convention : Pour dÃ©terminer si les droits garantis par ce paragraphe ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©s, il faut prendre en considÃ©ration la situation gÃ©nÃ©rale faite Ã la dÃ©fense . A rt icle 6, paragraphe 3, litt. b) et c), de la Convention : La possibilitÃ© pour un accusÃ© de s'eniretenir avec son dÃ©fenseur est un Ã©lÃ©ment fondamental de la prÃ©pararion de la dÃ©fense, mais elle peut subir des restrictions (En l'espÃ¨ce, interdiction faite au dÃ©fenseur de s'entretenir avec l'accusÃ© des dÃ©clarations de tÃ©moins interrogÃ©s en l'absence de l'accusÃ©, pour prÃ©server l'anonymat de ceu.r-ci) .
Article 6, paragraphe 3, litt . d), de la Convention : Aucune violation de cene disposirion dans le cas oÃ¹, Ã titre exceptionnel e[ pour Ã©viter une tentative d'intimidarion, un tÃ©ntoin est entendu au procÃ¨s hors la prÃ©sence de l'accusÃ© lui-mÃ©nte mais en prÃ©sence de son dÃ©fettseur.
((ranÃ§ais : roir p . 293)
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows . The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1948 . At the time of introducing his application the applicant was serving a 5 year and 6 month prison sentence at Nyborg State Prison . Before the Commission he is represented by his lawyer . Mr . Manfred Petersen, Copenhagen, Denmark . On I July 1981 a person, A, was questioned in court about the applicant's business in the presence of a judge and a prosecutor . Due, inter alia, to the information obtained the applicant was arrested on 3 July 1981 suspected of having violated antong other things the Narcotics Act . After a further investigation of the case the prosecutor submitted on I I Febmary 1982 an indictment by which the applicant was charged with 13 counts concerning narcotics offences, living off immoral eamings, theft, possession of firearms as well as violations of the Traffic Act . During the trial before the Copenhagen City Court in June 1982 . a number of witnesses was heard . One witness, D, requested permission to give evidence in camera without the presence of the applicam, due to fear of reprisals from the applicant or his friends . Despite protests from the defence, the Court decided to close the doors and furthermore decided not to reveal the identity of the witness to the applicant . After the witness had been examined by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defence, the applicant was brought back to the courtroom and informed of the statement subniitted by D . With regard to the witness A mentioned above, the prosecutor informed the Court that this witness could not be found but that the witness had informed the police that he/she refused to give evidence due to fear of the applicant and his friends . The prosecutor therefÃ´re requested permission to use A's statements obtained in court on I July 1981 as evidence . The Court granted the permission and futhermore decided not to reveal A's identity to the applicant . On 4 June 1982 the applicant was sentenced to 5 years' and 6 months' imprisonment by the City Court, which inter alia found the applicant guilty of the charge to which the statements of D and A related .
The applicant appealed against this judgment as well as the procedural decisions concerning the witnesses D and A to the Court of Appeal . Both D and A appeared as witnesses before the Court of Appeal . The Court decided to exempt them from giving evidence. Since, however, they agreed to speak, the Court decided to hear them in camera without the applicant being present and without revealing their identity to him . The prosecution as well as the applicant's defence counsel, however, were present and the defence counsel was allowed to cross-examine thewitnesses . The applicant was afterwards infortned of the contents of their statements but only to such an extent that the identity of the witnesses remained secret . At the end of the trial the Court furthermore decided to close the doors during the part of the prosecution's summing-up which dealt with D's and A's statements and to exclude the applicant from that part of the summing-up as well . After the latter decision the applicant refused to attend the remaining part of the trial . By judgment of 14 January 1983 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the City Court . After having obtained leave to appeal on 7 June 1983 from the Ministry of Justice the applicant appealed against the Court of Appeal judgment to the Supreme Court in order to have the case referred back to the lower courts for a new trial . The applicant complained of serious procedural errors during the trials before the lower courts since the identity of the witnesses D and A had not been revealed to him and since the Coun of Appeal had excluded him from the part of the prosecution's summing-up which concerned the statement of these witnesses . Furthermore the applicant invoked Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights . The prosecution maintained before the Supreme Court that the secrecy of D's and A's identity was necessary to protect them and necessary in order to obtain their statements, which were of great importance for the outcome of the case which concerned serious crimes . The strength of the evidence given by anonymous witnesses was a matter for the courts to evaluate . In its decision of 2 December 1983 upholding the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court's majority of five out of seven judges stated : "According to Article 173 para . 2 of the Administration of Justice Act the Court must show special consideration for a witness who makes statements in accordance with Articles 169-172 . If the circumstances give reason to believe that the making of statements in such cases involve an obvious risk that the witness or persons closely related to him would suffer any harm, regard to the witness may allow that the identity is kept secret from the accused, if respect for the public interest in view of the seriousness of the case and the importance of the statement quite exceptionally would require that the statement is made . If it is thus decided to keep the identity of the witness secret from the accused it follows that the rules in Articles 834 and 835 of the Administration of Justice Act conceming the list of evidence and the other documents of the case as wel l
as the rUles in Article 846 concerning the accused's presence during the trial and Article 848 para . 2 conceming the duty to inform the accused of the statements made in his absence, must be interpreted with such limits which are a natural consequence of the right of the witness to secrecy . With reference hereto these judges are of the opinion that the circumstances of the present case gave reason to keep the identity of A and D secret from the accused and thus also justifled the decisions taken, i .e ., to exclude the accused from the courtroom during the prosecution's detailed summing-up of the statements of these witnesses . " The minority of two judges stated : "The Administration of Justice Act must be considered to imply that the accused has the right personally to be informed not only of the contents of the statements made cf. Article 848 para . 2, but also of the identity of the witnesses in order to evaluate their statements . Since these judges do not find that Anicle 173 para . 2 or other Articles in the Administration of Justice Act warrant a deviation from this fundamental rvle, they accept the accused's claim and would refer the case back to the City Court . "
COMPLAINTS With reference to Article 6 para . I and para . 3 (b), (c) and (d), the applicant submits the following : It is a fundamental right for an accused to know all the evidence used against him . According to the Convention an accused has the right to defend himself . If an accused and his defence counsel do not have the possibility of preparing the defence freely- as in the present case- the rights secured by the Convention become illusory . In this respect it is pointed out in particular that the defence counsel was not allowed to reveal the identity of the witnesses to the applicant and he was not allowed to discuss important parts of the statements of these witnesses with the applicant in order not to reveal their names . The anonymity of a witness may influence the statement to the detriment of the accused since the control of the credibility of the statement is reduced . There may be a risk that the witness will be influenced if he may rest assured that his identity will not be disclosed . The anonymity of a witness may not only destroy the confidentiality between the defence counsel and the accused, but may also make it next to impossible for counsel to carry out a proper defence . It is maintained that the lack of communication between the accused and his counsel, which follows from the secrecy imposed . is such an obstruction of the accused's right to prepare his defence that Article 6 para . 3 (b) has been violated . With regard to the courts' acceptance of the applicant's being led out of the courtroom during the prosecution's summing-up, it is pointed out that this in fac t 290
implies that the defence cannot convnent on this summing-up unless the applicant remains outside also during the defence's summing-up . The necessity of the anonymity of a witness is in particular based on security and it is of course necessary to show consideration for a witness if he is in any danger . On the other hand this security would be fully considered in giving the witness the opponunity to refuse to give evidence in accordance with Article 171 of the Administration of Justice Act . In the present case the witnesses were granted this opportunity . It is alleged that there was nothing in the present case to indicate that there was any danger to the witnesses but that the courts merely accepted the proscution's requests for excluding the accused without any substantiated reasons for such a measure . It is admitted that without anonymous witness statements it may be impossible to conduct certain criminal proceedings . However, since such statements involve an obvious risk of wrong convictions the legal safeguards of an accused can only be upheld by not accepting such statements .
THE LA W I . The applicant's complaints relate to the fact that the identity of the witnesses in question was not revealed to him, that he had to leave the courtroom while these witnesses were examined and furthermore that he was excluded from the part of the prosecutor's summing-up of the case which dealt with the statements of these witnesses . The applicant maintains that these circumstances violated his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence as secured to him under Article 6 para . 3 (b) of the Convention . He also maintains that his right to defend himself in person was impeded thereby contrary to Article 6 para . 3 (c) . Furthermore the applicant is of the opinion that his right to examine witnesses as set out in Article 6 para . 3 (d) has been set aside and finally that he did not get a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 para . I of the Convention . The Commission recalls that the rights secured by Article 6 para . 3 are those of the accused and the defence in general . In order to determine whether these rights were respected, it is not sufficient to consider the situation in which the accused himself is placed . Consideration must also be given to the situation in which the defence as a whole is placed (cf . Nos . 7572 176 . 7586/76 and 7587/76, Dec . 8.7 .78, D .R . 14 pp . 64, 115 with further references) . It is true that the accused's ability to meet with his counsel is a fundamental part of the preparation of his defence . However, it cannot be maintained that the right 291
to meet with counsel and consult him may not be subject to any restriction (cf . No . 8339/78 . Dec . 12 .7 .79 . D .R . 17 pp . 180, 226) . In the present case the applicant's defence counsel was obliged to refrain from discussing such parts of the statements made by the witnesses A and D which could lead to their identity being disclosed to the applicant by virtue of the secrecy decisions taken by the competent court . However, otherwise there appears to have been no restrictions as to visits, facilities, correspondence or exchange of information between the applicant and counsel in order to prepare a proper defence . In these circumstances the Commission cannot find that the restriction in question did affect the applicant's right to prepare his defence to such an extent that it could amount to a violation of Article 6 para . 3 (b) or (d) of the Convention as invoked by the applicant . 2 . With regard to the applicant's complaint that he had to leave the counroom of the Court of Appeal when the witnesses A and D were heard the Commission recalls that it is in principle essential that an accused is present when witnesses are being heard in a case against him . The Commission has nevertheless accepted that in exceptional circumstances there may be reasons for hearing a witness in the absence of the person against whom the statement is to be made on condition that his lawyer is present (cf. No . 8395/78, Dec . 16 .12 .81 . D .R . 27 pp . 50, 54) . In the present case the applicant was ordered to leave the courtroom when the witnesses A and D gave evidence against him . This order was given in accordance with Article 848 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act which provides that the President of the court may decide that the accused shall leave the courtroom while a witness or co-accused is heard when there are particular reasons indicating that an unreserved statement cannot otherwise be obtained . It would thus appear that in this case, which concerned inter alia serious drug crimes, the Court of Appeal had good reasons for ordering the applicant to leave the courtroom . However, when the applicant was ordered to leave the courtroom, his defence counsel remained in the room and had every opportunity, in accordance with Article 6 para . 3 (d) to examine the two witnesses in question . The Cornmission further finds that the interests of the defence could be safeguarded just as well by the lawyer as by the applicant himself . The Commission concludes therefore that the requirements of Article 6 para . 3 (d) were met at the applicant's trial and that consequently there is no appearance of a violation of this provision . 3 . Although the Commission has not discovered a prima facie infringement of the minimum rights laid down in Article 6 para . 3 of the Convention, it has also considered whether the circumstances referred to by the applicant during his trial may nevertheless lead to the conclusion that he did not get a fair hearing as guaranteed to hint by Article 6 para . I of the Convention .
It is recalled that it has been constantly held both by the Commission and by the European Court of Human Rights that the principle of equality of arms, that is the procedural equality of the accused and the prosecutors, is an inherent element of a fair trial (cf. e .g . Eur . Court H .R . Neumeisterjudgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no . 8 para . 22 of the law) . However, as pointed out above this does not secure to the accused the right to be present in person in all circumstances . Therefore, having considered the applicant's complaint as submitted, including the fact that the applicant had to leave the courtroom during the prosecutor's summing-up of the witnesses statements, the Commission ftnds no indication of any violation of the principle of equality of arms in this case to the effect that the applicant would not have had a fair hearing in the Coun of Appeal within the meaning of Article 6 para . I of the Convention .Itfol wstha theap licatonmustber ject dasbeingmanifestlyi-founde d within the meaning of Anicle 27 para . 2 of the Convention . For this reason, the Commissio n DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Les faits de la cause, tels que le requÃ©rant les a exposÃ©s, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant danois nÃ© en 1948 . Au moment de l'introduction de sa requÃªte, il purgeait une peine de cinq ans et demi Ã la prison d'Etat de Nyborg . Devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par Me Manfred Petersen, avocat Ã Copenhague, Danemark . Le 1â¢ juil et 1981, une person e, A ., fut interrogÃ©e en justice en prÃ©sence d'u n juge et d'un procureur, sur les activitÃ©s du requÃ©rant . En partie des informations ainsi recueillies, le requÃ©rant fut arr@tÃ© le 3 juillet 1981 parce qu'il Ã©tait soupconnÃ© notamment d'infractions Ã la lÃ©gislation sur les stupÃ©fiants . AprÃ¨s un complÃ©ment d'instruction, le procureur dressa contre le requÃ©rant le 11 fÃ©vrier 1982 un act e
d'accusation comportant treize chefs d'accusation : infractions Ã la lÃ©gislation sur les stupÃ©fiants . revenus de provenance immorale, vol . dÃ©tention d'armes Ã feu ainsi qu'infractions au code de la route . Lors du procÃ©s devant le tribunal municipal de Copenhague en juin 1982, un certain nombre de tÃ©moins furent entendus . L'un d'eux, D . . demanda l'autorisation de tÃ©moigner Ã huis clos hors la prÃ©sence du requÃ©rant, parce qu'il craignait des reprÃ©sailles de la part du requÃ©rant ou de ses amis . MalgrÃ© les protestations de la dÃ©fense, le tribunal dÃ©cida d'une part de fermer les portes et, d'autre part . de ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler l'identitÃ© du tÃ©moin au requÃ©rant . AprÃ¨s l'interrogatoire du tÃ©moin par l'accusation et son contre interrogatoire par la dÃ©fense, le requÃ©rant fut ramenÃ© en salle d'audience et informÃ© des dÃ©clarations faites par D .
S'agissant du tÃ©moin A . prÃ©citÃ©, le procureur porta Ã la connaissance du tribunal que le tÃ©moin Ã©tait introuvable, mais qu'il avait informÃ© la police qu'il/elle refusait de tÃ©moigner par peur du requÃ©rant et de ses amis . Le procureur sollicita donc l'autorisation d'utiliser comme Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve les dÃ©clarations faites par A . devant le tribunal le 1 - juillet 1981 . Le tribunal accorda l'autorisation et dÃ©cida en outre de ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler l'identitÃ© de A . au requÃ©rant . Le 4 juin 1982, le requÃ©rant fut condamnÃ© Ã cinq ans et six mois de prison par le tribunal municipal qui le dÃ©clara notamment coupable de l'accusation sur laquelle portaient les dÃ©clarations de D . et de A . Le requÃ©rant fit appel devant la cour d'appel de ce jugement ainsi que des dÃ©cisions de procÃ©dures concernant les tÃ©moins D . et A . L'un et l'autre coniparurent devant la cour d'appel qui dÃ©cida de les dispenser de tÃ©moigner . Comme ils acceptÃ¨rent cependant de parler, la cour dÃ©cida de les entendre Ã huis clos hors la prÃ©sence du requÃ©rant et ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler leur identitÃ© Ã l'accusÃ© . L'accusation ainsi que l'avocat dÃ©fenseur du requÃ©rant Ã©taient cependant prÃ©sents et ce dernier fut autorisÃ© Ã contreinterroger les tÃ©moins . Par la suite, le requÃ©rant fut informÃ© de la teneur de ces tÃ©moignages mais seulement dans la mesure oÃ¹ l'identitÃ© de leurs auteurs pouvait rester secrÃ¨te . A l'issue du procÃ¨s . la cour dÃ©cida en outre de fermer les portes pendant la partie du rÃ©sumÃ© que fit le procureur des dÃ©clarations de D . et de A . et de faire sortir le requÃ©rant pendant cette partie du rÃ©sumÃ© aussi . Suite Ã cette dÃ©cision, le requÃ©rant refusa d'assister au reste du procÃ¨s . Par arrÃ©t du I-janvier 1983, la cour d'appel confirma lejugement du tribunal municipal . AprÃ¨s avoir obtenu du ministÃ¨re de la Justice l'autorisation de faire appel le 7juin 1983, le requÃ©ram se pourvut devant la Cour suprÃ©me contre l'arrÃ©t de la cour d'appel et demanda le renvoi de l'affaire devant les juridictions infÃ©rieures pour y Ã¨tre rejugÃ© . Il se plaignait de graves vices de procÃ©dure pendant les procÃ¨s devant les juridictions infÃ©rieures puisque, d'une part . l'identitÃ© des tÃ©moins D . et A . ne lui avait pas Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e et . d'autre pan, la cour d'appel l'avait exclu d'une partie d e 294
l'audience oÃ¹ l'accusation rÃ©sumait les dÃ©clarations de ces tÃ©moins . En outre, le requÃ©rant invoqua l'article 6 de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme . L'accusation plaida devant la Cour suprÃªme que le secret de l'identitÃ© de D . et de A . Ã©tait nÃ©cessaire tant pour assurer la protection des intÃ©ressÃ©s que pour obtenir leurs dÃ©clarations, qui Ã©taient de grande importance pour l'issue d'une affaire mettant en jeu des dÃ©lits graves . L'importance des tÃ©moignages donnÃ©s par des tÃ©moins anonymes Ã©tait une question relevant de l'apprÃ©ciation des tribunaux . Dans sa dÃ©cision du 2 dÃ©cembre 1983 qui confirmait les jugements des juridictions infÃ©rieures, la Cour suprÃªme dÃ©clara, Ã la majoritÃ© de cinq juges sur sept, que : .Selon l'anicle 173 par . 2 de la loi sur l'administration de la justice, le tribunal peut rÃ©server un traitement spÃ©cial Ã un tÃ©moin qui fait des dÃ©clarations conformÃ©ment aux anicles 169 Ã 172 . Si la situation permet de penser qu'en pareil cas le tÃ©moignage implique un risque Ã©vident de prÃ©judice ponÃ© au tÃ©moin ou Ã des personnes qui lui sont Ã©troitement liÃ©es, le tribunal peut autoriser Ã ne pas divulguer l'identitÃ© du tÃ©moin Ã l'accusÃ© si, compte tenu de la gravitÃ© de l'affaire et de l'importance de la dÃ©claration, l'intÃ©rÃ©t gÃ©nÃ©ral exige Ã titre tout Ã fait exceptionnel de recueillir ce tÃ©moignage . Si le tribunal dÃ©cide de ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler Ã l'accusÃ© l'identitÃ© des tÃ©moins, il s'ensuit que les rÃ¨gles figurant aux articles 834 et 835 de la loi sur l'administration de la justice (liste des preuves et autres documents de l'affaire), ainsi que les rÃ©gles Ã©noncÃ©es Ã l'anicle 846 (prÃ©sence de l'accusÃ© au procÃ¨s) et Ã l'article 848 par . 2 (devoir d'informer l'accusÃ© des dÃ©clarations faites en son absence) doivent Ãªtre interprÃ©tÃ©es en les assortissant des limites dÃ©coulant naturellement du droit du tÃ©moin au secret de son identitÃ© . Sur la foi de ces textes, les prÃ©sents juges estiment que les circonstances de la prÃ©sente affaire autorisaient Ã ne pas rÃ©vÃ©ler Ã l'accusÃ© l'identitÃ© de A . et de D ., ce qui justifie Ã©galement les dÃ©cisions prises, Ã savoir exclure l'accusÃ© de la salle d'audience pendant que l'accusation rÃ©sumait les dÃ©clarations de ses tÃ©moins . Â» La minoritÃ©, composÃ©e des deux autres juges, dÃ©clara au contraire que : . La loi sur l'administration de la justice doit Ã¨tre considÃ©rÃ©e comme impliquant que l'accusÃ© a le droit d'Ãªtre personnellement informÃ© non seulement de la teneur des dÃ©clarations faites en application de l'article 848 par . 2, mais aussi de l'identitÃ© des tÃ©moins afin d'apprÃ©cier leurs tÃ©moignages . N'estimant pas que l'anicle 173 par . 2 ou d'autres dispositions de la loi prÃ©citÃ©e justifient que l'on s'Ã©carte de cette rÃ¨gle fondamentale, les prÃ©sents juges font droit au grief de l'accusÃ© et souhaitent renvoyer l'affaire devant le tribunal municipal .295
GRIEFS Invoquant l'article 6 par . I et par . 3 b), c), et d), le requÃ©rant expose en ces termes son argunientation . C'est un droit fondamental pour l'accusÃ© que de connaÃ®tre tous les tÃ©moignages utilisÃ©s contre lui . Or, selon la Convention, un accusÃ© a le droit de se dÃ©fendre luimÃªme . Si l'accusÃ© et son avocat dÃ©fenseur n'ont pas la possibilitÃ© de prÃ©parer librement la dÃ©fense comme ce fut le cas en l'espÃ¨ce, les droits garantis par la Convention en deviennent illusoires . A cet Ã©gard, le requÃ©rant souligne notamment que son dÃ©fenseur n'a pas Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã lui indiquer l'identitÃ© des tÃ©moins ni Ã examiner avec lui des parties imponantes des dÃ©clarations de ces tÃ©moins parce que cela aurait rÃ©vÃ©lÃ© leur nom . Or, l'anonymat d'un tÃ©moin peut influer sur le tÃ©moignage au dÃ©triment de l'accusÃ© puisque le contrÃ´le de la crÃ©dibilitÃ© des dÃ©clarations s'en trouve diminuÃ© . ll peut y avoir risque de voir le tÃ©moin influencÃ© s'il a l'assurance que son identitÃ© ne sera pas rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e . L'anonymat d'un tÃ©moin peut non seulement dÃ©truire la confiance entre l'accusÃ© et son dÃ©fenseur, mais aussi rendre pratiquement impossible Ã l'avocat de ntener convenablement la dÃ©fense . Le requÃ©rant soutient que l'absence de communication entre l'accusÃ© et son dÃ©fenseur, dÃ©coulant du secret ainsi intposÃ©, est une telle obstmction au droit de l'accusÃ© de prÃ©parer sa dÃ©fense que cela entraine violation de l'article 6 par . 3 b) . S'agissant de ce que les tribunaux ont acceptÃ© qu'il soit Ã©vincÃ© de la salle d'audience pendant le rÃ©sumÃ© fait par le procureur . le requÃ©rant souligne qu'en fait cela implique que la dÃ©fense ne peut pas prÃ©senter d'observations sur ce rÃ©sumÃ© Ã moins qu'il ne reste en dehors du prÃ©toire pendant le rÃ©sumÃ© de la dÃ©fense Ã©galement . La nÃ©cessitÃ© de garder l'anonymat d'un tÃ©nioin s'explique notaniment par sa sÃ©curitÃ© et il faut, bien sÃ¹r, mÃ©nager le tÃ©moin qui court un danger quelconque . Mais d'un autre cÃ´tÃ©, cette sÃ©curitÃ© serait parfaitement respectÃ©e si l'on donnait au tÃ©moin la possibilitÃ© de refuser de tÃ©moigner conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 171 de la loi sur l'administration de la justice . En l'espÃ¨ce, les tÃ©tnoins se sont vu accorder cette facultÃ© . Selon le requÃ©rant, rien dans la prÃ©sente affaire n'indique que les tÃ©moins aient courU un danger quelconque et les tribunaux ont tout sintplemenl acceptÃ© la demande de l'accusation d'exclure l'accusÃ© sans rÃ©clamer aucune justification d'une telle mesure .
Le requÃ©rant admet que, sans les dÃ©clarations faites anonymement par des tÃ©moins, il pourrait Ãªtre impossible de conduire certaines procÃ©dures pÃ©nales . Cependant, de telles dÃ©clarations impliquant un risque Ã©vident de condamnation erronÃ©e . la protection juridique de l'accusÃ© ne peut qu'Ãªtre renforcÃ©e par leur rejet . 296
EN DROI T I . Les griefs du requÃ©rant concement le fait que l'identitÃ© des tÃ©moins en question ne lui a pas Ã©tÃ© rÃ©vÃ©lÃ©e, qu'il a dÃ» quitter la salle d'audience pendant l'interrogatoire de ces tÃ©moins et aussi au moment oÃ¹ le procureur rÃ©sumait les dÃ©claralions desdits tÃ©moins . Le requÃ©rant soutient que cette situation a mÃ©connu le droit que lui garantit l'article 6 par . 3 b) de la Convention de disposer du temps et des facilitÃ©s nÃ©cessaires Ã la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . Il soutient Ã©galement que le droit de se dÃ©fendre luimÃªme s'en est trouvÃ© entravÃ©, contrairement Ã l'article 6 par . 3 c) . En outre, le requÃ©rant estime que le droit d'in(erroger les tÃ©moins, que lui garantit l'article 6 par . 3 d), a Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connu en l'espÃ©ce et enfin qu'il n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable au sens de l'article 6 par . 1 de la Convention . La Commission rappelle que les droits garantis par l'article 6 par . 3 sont ceux de l'accusÃ© et de la dÃ©fense en gÃ©nÃ©ral . Pour dÃ©terminer si ces droits ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©s, il ne suffil pas d'envisager la situation faite Ã l'accusÃ© lui-m@me, il faut aussi prendre en considÃ©ration l'ensemble de la silualion faite Ã la dÃ©fense (cf. No 7572/76, 7586/76 et 7587/76, dÃ©c . 8 .7 .78, D .R . 14 pp . 64, 90 et rÃ©fÃ©rences complÃ©mentaires) . Il est exact que la possibilitÃ© pour l'accusÃ© de s'entretenir avec son dÃ©fenseur est un Ã©lÃ©ment fondamental de la prÃ©paration de sa dÃ©fense . On ne saurait soutenir toutefois que le droit de s'entretenir avec son conseil et d'Ã©changer avec lui des instmctions n'est susceptible d'aucune restriction (cf . No 8339/78, dÃ©c . 12 .7 .79, D .R . 17 pp . 180, 204) . En l'espÃ¨ce, suite aux dÃ©cisions sur le secret prises par le tribunal compÃ©tent, le dÃ©fenseur du requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© obligÃ© de s'abstenir d'examiner avec son client les parties des dÃ©clarations des tÃ©moins A . et D . qui auraient pu conduire Ã rÃ©vÃ©ler leur identitÃ© au requÃ©rant . Cependant, il ne semble pas y avoir eu autrement restrictions quant aux visites et aux possibilitÃ©s pour le requÃ©rant et son dÃ©fenseur de correspondre ou d'Ã©changer des informations afin de prÃ©parer convenablement la dÃ©fense . Dans ces conditions, la Commission ne saurait estimer que la restriction en question ait affectÃ© le droit du requÃ©rant de prÃ©parer sa dÃ©fense au point de constituer, comme il le prÃ©tend, une violation de l'article 6 par . 3 b) ou d) de la Convention . 2 . S'agissant du grief selon lequel le requÃ©rant a dÃ» quitter la salle d'audience de la cour d'appel lorsque les tÃ©moins A . et D . ont Ã©tÃ© entendus, la Commission rappelle qu'il est en principe essentiel que l'accusÃ© assiste lors de son procÃ¨s Ã l'audition des tÃ©moins . Elle a nÃ©anmoins admis que, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, il peut y avoir des raisons d'entendre un tÃ©moin en l'absence de la personne contre qui est dirigÃ© la dÃ©position, Ã condition que son avocat soit prÃ©sent (cf . No 8395/78 . dÃ©c . 16 .12 .81, D .R . 27 pp . 50, 59) .
En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant a reÃ§u l'ordre de quitter la salle lorsque les tÃ©moins A . et D . ont dÃ©posÃ© contre lui . Cet ordre Ã©tait conforme Ã l'article 848 de la loi danoise sur l'administration de la justice qui prÃ©voit que le prÃ©sident du tribunal peut dÃ©cider que l'accusÃ© quittera le prÃ©toire pendant l'audition d'un tÃ©moin ou d'un coaccusÃ© lorsqu'il y a lieu de penser que le tribunal n'obtiendra pas autrement une dÃ©claration franche . Il semblerait dÃ¨s lors que, dans cette affaire qui concernait notamment des infractions graves en matiÃ¨re de stupÃ©fiants, la cour d'appel avait de bonnes raisons d'ordonner au requÃ©rant de quitter la salle .
Cependant, lorsque le requÃ©rant fm sommÃ© de quitter le prÃ©toire, son dÃ©fenseur est restÃ© dans la salle et a eu, conformÃ©ment Ã l'anicle 6 par . 3 d), la possibilitÃ© d'interroger les deux tÃ©ntoins . La Commission estime en outre que les intÃ©rÃ©ts de la dÃ©fense pouvaient tout aussi bien Ã¨tre sauvegardÃ©s par l'avocat que par le requÃ©rant lui-ntÃ©nte . La Commission en conclut dÃ¨s lors que les exigences de l'article 6 par . 3 d) ont Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©es lors du procÃ¨s du requÃ©rant et qu'il n'y a pas en consÃ©quence apparence de violation de cette disposition . 3 . Bien que la Contmission n'ait pas constatÃ© une apparence de violation des droits minimunts Ã©noncÃ©s Ã l'article 6 par . 3 de la Convention, elle a cependant examinÃ© aussi si les circonstances du procÃ¨s Ã©voquÃ©es par le requÃ©rant permettent nÃ©anmoins de conclure qu'il n'a pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable, comme le lui garantit l'article 6 par . 1 de la Convention . La Commission rappelle que, selon sa jurisprudence et celle de la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, le principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes, c'est-Ã -dire l'Ã©galitÃ© en cours de procÃ©dure entre l'accusÃ© et l'accusation, est un Ã©lÃ©ment inhÃ©rent au procÃ¨s Ã©quitable (cf. par exemple Cour Eur . D .H . arrÃ©t Neumeister du 27 juin 1968 . sÃ©rie A nÂ° 8, par . 22 de la partie EN DROIT) . Cependant, la Commission l'a soulignÃ© plus haut, cela ne garantit pas Ã l'accusÃ© le droit d'Ãªtre dans tous les cas personnellentent prÃ©sent Ã l'audience . DÃ¨s lors, aprÃ¨s avoir examinÃ© le grief du requÃ©rant tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©, et notamment le fait que l'intÃ©ressÃ© ait dÃ» quitter la salle d'audience pendant le rÃ©sumÃ© des dÃ©clarations des tÃ©moins fait par le procureur, la Commission n'y trouve en l'espÃ¨ce aucun indice de violation du principe d'Ã©galitÃ© des armes au point que le requÃ©rant n'aurait pas bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© devant la cour d'appel d'un procÃ¨s Ã©quitable au sens de l'article 6 par . I de la Convention . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e au sens de l'article 27 par . 2 de la Convention . Par ce motif. la Commissio n
DECLARE LA REQUETE IRRECEVABLE . 298Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 10/07/1985Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page