Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-jus-ad-bellum-and-the-airstrikes-in-yemen-double-standards-for-decamping-presidents/
Timestamp: 2019-07-21 01:05:11
Document Index: 426271064

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 103', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 2', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51', 'Art. 51']

EJIL: Talk! – The Jus ad Bellum and the Airstrikes in Yemen: Double Standards for Decamping Presidents?
Home States and Statehood Government The Jus ad Bellum and the Airstrikes in Yemen: Double Standards for Decamping Presidents?
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One should not attempt to approach these issues in a legalistic manner that ignores legal policies at stake, such as “self-determination” of a people (not a govt.). Merely because a president was democratically elected does not mean that such an elite will necessarily continue to represent authority or self-determination in a given country. Further, merely because a govt. is fighting in a civil war, one must not assume that, therefore, any intervention in support of the government is necessarily contrary to self-determination. It could be that the “belligerent” is an entity like ISIS and that the government still represents authority and self-determination of the majority of the people. States have a duty under the Charter to take joint and separate action to achieve universal respect for and observance of human rights as well as self-determination. see UN Charter, arts. 55 and 56, plus art. 103 (override of other ordinary agreements).
May 1, 2015 at 0:44
I agree that the former president of the Yemen is not better than the former president of the Ukraine. IMHO he even gave his “power” to the Houthis at one moment and they did set him free or something.
But I also agree with Jordan, that there is no restriction of foreign intervention in the case of a civil war. This is what the US did yall the time in South America and I would doubt that there is any new PIL on that, Assad would be a case. It wouldnt matter who it is. ISIS or not is just a political question and who is “ISIS” anyway? If we would support Assad and reconstruct Saddams army… Well, if we could reconstruct all that was destroyed by Bremer…
Jordan, as far as I remember from having read Gray’s Use of Force, the US relied on Endara’s request as a policy argument but refrained from framing its Panama operation as an intervention by invitation? Or would you say that one should not be so strict in drawing the line?
well, going back to the classic debate, huh? Nicaragua (intervention on behalf of the government is ok) vs. the IDI (no intervention accept against terrorist enemies – but then again, the old question as to who is a terrorist comes up).
President Bush’s Report to Congress stated that “[I]n the early morning of December 20, 1989, the democratically elected Panamanian leadership announced formation of a government, assumed power in a formal swearing-in ceremony, and welcomed the assistance of U.S. Armed Forces in removing the illegitimate Noriega regime. The deployment of U.S. Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defense…. It was welcomed by the democratically elected government of Panama.”
We had two panels at the annual meeting of the ASIL on use of force and on presidential powers (84 Proc., Am. Soc. Int’l L. 182, 236 (1990). There was also an Agora in the AJIL, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 494 (1990).
He ‘confirmed’ that the UN had taken the legal position that collective self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter applied to the situation in which Iraq had been under attack by ISIL, and as a basis for the military intervention in Yemen at the request of the incumbent Govt. in Yemen.
Arguably, self -defence is only relevant when there the state using force (US and others in Iraq; Saudi Arabia and others in Yemen) is acting potentially in breach of Art. 2(4) of the UN charter. However, where the state on whose territory force is used (Iraq & Yemen) consents, there is no breach of Art. 2(4) of the Charter and thus one doesn’t even get to self-defence.
I have checked my note: collective self-defence under Art. 51/UN Charter to protect Iraq against ISIL; and collective self-defence under Art. 51/UN Charter against the ‘insurgents’ in Yemen at the request of the incumbent Govt. in Yemen.
We wondered why Art. 51 could be applied: (a) in the case of Iraq, to non-State actors (ISIL), contrary to the ICJ jurisprudence (according to Prof. Nolte, in the Wall advisory opinion and in another case (DRC Congo v. Uganda?)); and (b) in the case of Yemen, to the ‘insurgents’ who were one of the parties to the NIAC in Yemen. Could it be assumed that there was foreign military intervention in the armed conflict in Yemen which had thereby ‘internationalized’ the conflict, and that the collective self-defence was directed against the foreign military forces and the ‘insurgents’ who were in fact their proxies/agents? No clarification was given, however.
Thank you for your post. While many legal questions remain unanswered, we cannot do service to the situation without a careful appreciation of the context. The usual legal approach is: yes but what is the law. However, in this case, there is almost no law. Moreover, the main question of the article appears to be “legitimacy” of invitation. Houthis have their own claims regarding legitimacy, cannot be easily disregarded. In this sense, the “non-state actor” legitimacy is perhaps the greatest challenge, which we also found in Syria etc.