Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/417/12/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-12-18 01:36:46
Document Index: 678573344

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301']

William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters, (full text) :: 417 U.S. 12 (1974) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 417 › William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters › Case
417 U.S. 12 (1974)
The Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida District Court of Appeal erred in refusing to issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the Circuit Court for Duval County from exercising its jurisdiction over a suit within the purview of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). [Footnote 1] The suit sought to enjoin respondent unions' breach of a no-strike clause contained in a
Art. VI and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting the strike. The Carpenters then sought a writ of prohibition from a Florida District Court of Appeal, contending that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to order injunctive relief because the alleged breach of the no-strike clause was also arguably an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4)(i)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(D), [Footnote 2] and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The District Court of Appeal denied the writ of prohibition and, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed.
Id. at 359 U. S. 245. When, however, the activity in question also constitutes a breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Board's authority "is not exclusive, and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 197. This exception was explicitly reaffirmed in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 403 U. S. 297-298 (1971). It was fashioned because the history of § 301 reveals that "Congress deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements 'to the usual processes of the law,'" Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 368 U. S. 513 (1962). Thus, we have said that the Garmon doctrine is "not relevant" to actions within the purview of § 301, Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 101 n. 9, which may be brought in either state or federal courts, Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra, at 368 U. S. 506.
Thus, § 10(k) "not only tolerates but actively encourages, voluntary settlements of work assignment controversies between unions. . . ." Carey v.Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261, 375 U. S. 266 (1964). Recognizing Congress' preference for voluntary settlement of jurisdictional disputes, the Board has declined jurisdiction in § 10(k) cases, commenting that,
The Board's practice and policy of declining to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over arguably unfair labor practices which also violate provisions of collective bargaining agreements for voluntary adjustment of disputes highlight the congressional purpose that § 301 suits in state and federal courts should be the primary means for "promoting collective bargaining that [ends] with agreements not to strike." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 353 U. S. 453 (1957). The assurance of swift and effective judicial relief provides incentive to eschew economic weapons in favor of binding grievance procedures and no-strike clauses.
Indeed, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557, 390 U. S. 561 (1968), disposes of the argument. We there said:
"The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. . . . Any error in granting or designing relief 'does not go to the jurisdiction of the court.' Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 276 U. S. 331."
Moreover, the policy reasons against extension of the Garmon doctrine to suits within the scope of § 301 are particularly compelling when the relief sought is specific performance of a no-strike obligation, rather than damages. What we said in Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 398 U. S. 248 (1970), is pertinent here:
"[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 353 U. S. 455. Any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is, of course, true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union."
(Footnotes omitted.) See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U. S. 368, 414 U. S. 382 (1973).
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957). See Boys Markets v. Clerks Union, supra, at 398 U. S. 247. Rather, the jurisdiction given federal courts under § 301 was "not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the courts of the various States over contracts made by labor organizations," Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. at 368 U. S. 511