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Timestamp: 2017-05-25 07:12:56
Document Index: 430235738

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 377', '§ 377', '§ 1343', '§ 410', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 2', '§ 425', '§ 425', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512', '§ 512']

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction | Sapient v Geller & Explorologist | Electronic Frontier Foundation - JDSupra
Sapient v Geller & ExplorologistOrder Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
EFF's client, Brian Sapient, belongs to a group called the "Rational Response Squad," which is dedicated to debunking what it calls irrational beliefs. As part of their mission, Sapient and others post videos to YouTube that they say demonstrate this irrationality. One of the videos that Sapient uploaded came from a NOVA program called "Secrets of the Psychics," which challenges the performance techniques of Geller. Despite the fact that only eight seconds of the over thirteen-minute video contain footage allegedly under copyright owned by Geller's corporation Explorogist Ltd. -- a classic fair use of the material for criticism purposes -- Geller filed a takedown demand with YouTube under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). That violates the DMCA requirement that copyright holders only send takedown notices for infringing content. Because of Geller's unlawful DMCA notice, Sapient's YouTube account was suspended, and his videos were not available for over two weeks. On May 8, 2007, EFF filed suit on behalf of Sapient, asking for damages due to Geller's violation of the DMCA, a declaratory judgment that the NOVA video does not infringe Geller's copyrights, and that Geller be restrained from bringing any further legal action against Sapient in connection to the clip. As Sapient was challenging Geller's meritless claims, Explorologist filed a separate lawsuit against Sapient in Pennsylvania. The suit includes more bogus charges, with many of them based on the assertion that Explorologist has the copyright to eight seconds of the introductory footage in the NOVA video. This is the court order granting defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Download PDF 2345678 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JOHN DOE A/K/A BRIAN SAPIENT, Plaintiff, v URI GELLER and EXPLOROLOGIST, LTD, /No C 07-2478 VRW ORDER dispute concerns the copyright infringement takedown provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). See 17 USC § 512(f) (2000). Plaintiff claims that defendants Explorologist, Ltd (“Explorologist”) and Uri Geller (“Geller”) misrepresented to the YouTube file-sharing company that of plaintiff’s video postings infringed defendants’ copyrights. 17 USC § 512(f). Plaintiff seeks damages from the alleged as well as a declaratory judgment of Doc #1. Defendants respond with a motion to dismiss. Doc ##24, 25. Defendants argue that the court lacks CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 11 ooff 2255 1THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 DISTRICT CALIFORNIA K/A BRIAN SAPIENT, C 07-2478 VRW GELLER and EXPLOROLOGIST, Defendants. This dispute concerns the copyright infringement takedown under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 17 512(f) (claims that defendants Ltd ("Explorologist") and Uri Geller ("Geller") knowingly misrepresented to the YouTube file-sharing company that one of plaintiff's video postings infringed defendants' copyrights. 512(f). Plaintiff seeks damages from the alleged misrepresentation, as well as a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. Doc #1. Defendants respond with a motion to Doc ##24, argue that the court lacks Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction because the takedown notice that was sent to YouTube in San Bruno, California, was transmitted from outside the United States. Defendants also move to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint’s allegations surrounding the content of the takedown notice are insufficient FRCP 9(b) and FRCP 8(a). Lastly, defendants move to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a related is proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. I YouTube internet video website is an entirely userdriven medium. Anyone with access to the internet can sign up for YouTube account and upload any video file to YouTube’s servers so that the file may be accessed and viewed anywhere in the world, all for free. For instance, a family might post a video of a child’s game in California so that grandparents may view it in Illinois. Or a pair of young writers might write, film and produce their own television show and broadcast the episodes in serial form online, as in the case of the show “lonelygirl15,” which drew millions of viewers on YouTube. See Virginia Heffernan and Tom Zeller, Well, It Turns Out That Lonelygirl Really Wasn’t, NY Times C1 (social activist organizations and groups use YouTube to spread their messages. See Jose Antonio Vargas, YouTube Creates Issues Debate, Wash Post (Aug 8, at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2007/08/08/youtube_creates_issues_debate.html (visited Dec 4, Naim, The YouTube Effect, Foreign Policy (Feb 2007), at CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 22 ooff 2255 1 subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction because the notice that was sent to YouTube in San Bruno, California, transmitted from outside the United States. Defendants also to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint's allegations the content of the takedown notice are insufficient under FRCP 9(b) and FRCP 8(a). Lastly, defendants move to transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a related action is proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. The YouTube internet video website is an entirely user-driven medium. Anyone with access to the internet can sign up for a YouTube account and upload any video file to YouTube's servers so the file may be accessed and viewed anywhere in the world, all free. For instance, a family might post a video of a child's soccer game in California so that grandparents may view it in Or a pair of young writers might write, film and produce own television show and broadcast the episodes in serial form as in the case of the show "lonelygirll5," which drew of viewers on YouTube. See Virginia Heffernan and Tom Well, It Turns Out That Lonelygirl Really Wasn't, NY Times Cl (Sept 13, 2006). Politicians, social activist organizations and nonprofit groups use YouTube to spread their messages. See Jose Vargas, YouTube Creates Issues Debate, Wash Post (8, 2007), at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/the-trail/2007/08/08/youtube creates issues debate.html (last visited Dec 4, 2007); Moises Naim, The YouTube Effect, Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2007), at Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 www.foreignpolicy. com/story/cms.php?story_id=3676 (Dec 4, Yinka Adegoke, Nonprofits turn YouTube to raise awareness, funds, Reuters UK (Oct 19, 2007), at uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUK119280972697._CH_. 242020071019 (last visited Dec 4, 2007). By nearly eliminating the of mass media distribution, YouTube offers its users unparalleled opportunities for free expression. See Richard Waters and Kevin Allison, How to set a course for a shooting star, Times (Oct at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56fc-11db-9110-0000779e2340.html (last visited Dec 4, because digital content is so easy to generate, the for copyright and trademark violations is enormous. See Waters and Allison, supra. Claiming fair use, a YouTube user might post a homemade video that takes scenes from his favorite movie and sets them to his favorite song, using both without permission. for example, My Body is a Cage, at http://www.youtube.com/v=Pyp34v6Lmcc (the climactic scene from Sergio Leone’s Once Upon a Time in the West with the Arcade Fire’s My Body is a (over 550,000 as of Jan 29, troublingly, a YouTube user might film his favorite musician’s live and post the footage on YouTube, potentially discouraging other fans from purchasing the musician’s live DVD. YouTube does not actively monitor the content of postings on its website. address these and other concerns, Congress passed the DMCA in 1998. 17 USC § 512 (2000). Section 512(c) lays out a process allowing a copyright owner who observes infringing CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 33 ooff 2255 http://www.foreignpolicy. com/story/cms.php?story?_id=3676 (last visited Dec 4, 2007); Yinka Adegoke, Nonprofits turn to YouTube to awareness, funds, Reuters UK (at http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUK119280972697. CH (visited Dec 4, nearly eliminating the cost of mass media distribution, YouTube offers its users opportunities for free expression. See Richard Waters Kevin Allison, How to set a course for a shooting star, Financial Times (8, 2006), at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/7261e5de-56fc-lldb-9110-0000779e2340.html (visited Dec 4, 2007). But because digital content is so easy to generate, the potential for copyright and trademark violations is enormous. See and Allison, supra. Claiming fair use, a YouTube user might a homemade video that takes scenes from his favorite movie and them to his favorite song, using both without permission. See, for example, My Body is a Cage, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pyp34v6Lmcc (mixing the climactic scene from Sergio Leone's Upon a Time in the West with the Arcade Fire's My Body is a Cage) (garnering over 550,000 hits as of Jan 29, 2008). More a YouTube user might film his favorite musician's live performance and post the footage on YouTube, potentially other fans from purchasing the musician's live performance DVD. YouTube does not actively monitor the content of the postings on its website. To address these and other concerns, Congress passed the in 1998. 512 (512(c) lays out a detailed process allowing a copyright owner who observes infringing Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 content on a website like YouTube to have the content taken down. copyright owner must send a notification to YouTube (“takedown notice”) identifying the offending video and asserting under of perjury that the sender is the copyright owner and has a faith belief that the video infringes the sender’s copyrights. 17 USC § 512(c)(3). YouTube then must remove the material from its servers or face infringement liability itself. 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(C). The infringing user might also suffer penalties under YouTube’s terms of use, such as suspension of his account. YouTube Terms of Use ¶7, at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (visited Dec 4, copyright owners who abuse takedown procedure are subject to liability. At issue in this case is the misrepresentation provision of the DMCA, which in relevant part: person who knowingly materially misrepresents [a notice to an internet service provider] that material or activity is infringing * * * shall be for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ incurred by the alleged infringer * who is by such misrepresentation[] as the result of the provider relying upon such misrepresentation in or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing * * *. 17 USC § 512(f). II Explorologist is a private company registered in London, England. Doc #1 ¶5. Defendant Geller is a resident of England and a director and controlling shareholder of Explorologist. Doc #1 ¶¶4, 6. Geller is also a performer who to have psychic powers such as the ability to bend spoons CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 44 ooff 2255 1 on a website like YouTube to have the content taken down. 2 The copyright owner must send a notification to YouTube ("takedown notice") identifying the offending video and asserting under penalty of perjury that the sender is the copyright owner and has a good faith belief that the video infringes the sender's copyrights. 512(c)(3). YouTube then must remove the material from its 7 or face infringement liability itself. 512 (c) (1) (C) infringing user might also suffer penalties 9 YouTube's terms of use, such as suspension of his account. See YouTube Terms of Use 17, at http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Dec 4, 2007). Conversely, copyright owners who abuse the takedown procedure are subject to liability. At issue in this is the misrepresentation provision of the DMCA, which provides, in relevant part: Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents [in a takedown notice to an internet service provider] * * * material or activity is infringing * shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer * * * who is injured by such misrepresentation[] as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity to be infringing * 512(f). Defendant Explorologist is a private company registered London, England. Doc #1 at 15. Defendant Geller is a resident England and a director and controlling shareholder of Doc #1 at 114, is also a performer who claims to have psychic powers such as the ability to bend spoons Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 with his mind. Doc #1 at ¶14. Plaintiff is John Doe AKA Brian Sapient (“Sapient”) who, as part of his “controversial religious beliefs,” is a member of the “Rational Response Squad,” which is to “debunking what it maintains are irrational beliefs and theories.” Doc #1 at ¶¶3, 12. As part of that mission, plaintiff “rel[ies] on YouTube to reach thousands of audience and promote [activist messages and campaigns online.” Doc #1 at ¶12. Plaintiff uses the alias “Brian Sapient” because “he receives a substantial amount of abusive correspondence, including threats of physical harm” due to his beliefs. Doc #1 at ¶3. his attention to “the ongoing debate between evolution and creationism” (see Doc #30 at 2), plaintiff’s choice of “Sapient” as a pseudonym is presumably a reference to evolutionary or relatedly, is a derivative of sapientia, Latin for wisdom. Plaintiff eventually set his sight on Geller. On 15, plaintiff uploaded a video clip (“NOVA video”) to YouTube. The video originally aired on the NOVA program and features an illusionist named James Randi challenging Geller’s powers. Doc #1 at ¶¶13-14. The NOVA video includes “three seconds” of another video clip in which a man named C J Hughes describes Geller’s asserted psychic powers (“Hughes clip”). Doc #1 at ¶14. It is that second clip – the Hughes clip within the NOVA – that prompted the instant dispute. Explorologist owns the copyright to the Hughes clip. Doc #1 at ¶14. Plaintiff alleges on March 23, an agent of defendants sent YouTube a notice identifying plaintiff’s post as infringing and CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 55 ooff 2255 1 his mind. Doc #1 at 114. Plaintiff is John Doe AKA Brian 2 ("Sapient") who, as part of his "controversial religious beliefs," is a member of the "Rational Response Squad," which is committed to "debunking what it maintains are irrational beliefs theories." Doc #1 ¶13, part of that mission, "rel[ies] on YouTube to reach thousands of audience 7 members and promote [his] activist messages and campaigns online." #1 112. Plaintiff uses the alias "Brian Sapient" because 9 "he receives a substantial amount of abusive correspondence, threats of physical harm" due to his beliefs. Doc #1 at 13. Given his attention to "the ongoing debate between evolution creationism" (Doc 2), plaintiff's choice of "Sapient" as a pseudonym is presumably a reference to evolutionary taxonomy, or relatedly, is a derivative of sapientia, Latin for eventually set his sight on Geller. On November 15, 2006, plaintiff uploaded a video clip (the "NOVA video") to YouTube. The video originally aired on the NOVA television program and features an illusionist named James Randi Geller's powers. Doc #1 ¶113-14. The NOVA video "three seconds" of another video clip in which a man named Dr C J Hughes describes Geller's asserted psychic powers ("Hughes clip"). Doc 114. is that second clip -the Hughes clip within the NOVA video -that prompted the instant dispute. Explorologist owns the to the Hughes clip. Doc #1 at 114. Plaintiff alleges that on March 23, 2007, an agent of defendants sent YouTube a takedown notice identifying plaintiff's post as infringing and Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 that the video be removed. Doc #1 at ¶15. Later that YouTube informed plaintiff that the NOVA video had been and removed in response to a copyright infringement takedown notice from Explorologist. Doc #1 at ¶16. YouTube suspended plaintiff’s account for more than two weeks, during which time all his posted videos were unavailable. Doc #1 at ¶17. On May 7, 2007, Explorologist filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where plaintiff resides. See Doc (of Pendency of other Action or Proceeding). That alleges that by posting the NOVA video, Sapient committed infringement under British law, commercial disparagement and appropriation of name or likeness. See Doc #26 Exh 5. On May 8, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant complaint. Count I of the complaint alleges that defendants “knowingly misrepresent[ed]” to YouTube in the takedown notice that plaintiff’s posting infringed defendants’ copyrights. Doc #1 at ¶¶18-23; 17 USC § 512(f). Plaintiff alleges that his posting of NOVA video does not infringe defendants’ copyrights and therefore the takedown notice was a misrepresentation. Doc #1 at 19. Plaintiff then alleges that defendants “knew or should have known” that the video was noninfringing and that defendants “did act with reasonable care or diligence before sending” the takedown notice.” Doc #1 at ¶20. Count II seeks a declaratory judgment that plaintiff’s video is noninfringing under the First and under United States copyright law. Doc #1 at ¶¶24-27. Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs. CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 66 ooff 2255 1 demanding that the video be removed. Doc #1 at 115. Later that day, YouTube informed plaintiff that the NOVA video had been flagged and removed in response to a copyright infringement notice from Explorologist. Doc #1 at 116. YouTube plaintiff's account for more than two weeks, during which all his posted videos were unavailable. Doc #1 at 117. 7 May 7, Explorologist filed a complaint in the District of Pennsylvania, where plaintiff resides. See Doc 9 #29 (Notice of Pendency of other Action or Proceeding). That complaint alleges that by posting the NOVA video, Sapient committed copyright infringement under British law, commercial disparagement appropriation of name or likeness. See Doc #26 Exh 5. May 8, plaintiff filed the instant complaint. I of the complaint alleges that defendants "knowingly materially misrepresent[ed]" to YouTube in the takedown notice that plaintiff's posting infringed defendants' copyrights. Doc #1 9[9[18-23; 512(f). Plaintiff alleges that his posting of the NOVA video does not infringe defendants' copyrights and the takedown notice was a misrepresentation. Doc #1 at then alleges that defendants "knew or should have known" that the video was noninfringing and that defendants "did not act with reasonable care or diligence before sending" the notice." Doc #1 120. Count II seeks a declaratory that plaintiff's video is noninfringing under the First Amendment and under United States copyright law. Doc #1 at ¶124-seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 III addition to defendants’ challenges on the merits, argue that the court lacks both subject matter and jurisdiction. Because the court agrees that this case be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, defendants’ arguments need not be addressed. The Supreme Court has held that if “a district court has before it a straightforward personal issue presenting no complex question of state law, and alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a and novel question, the court does not abuse its by turning directly to personal jurisdiction.” Ruhrgas AG v Marathon Oil Co, 526 US 574, 588 (1999) (footnote omitted); consider Sinochem Intl Co v Malaysia Intl Shipping Corp, 127 SCt ((that a district court may address a forum non plea before considering personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction). federal court has ever addressed subject matter under § 512(f), and the subject matter jurisdiction issue in this case is complex. Defendants argue the court lacks matter jurisdiction because defendants’ act of sending the takedown notice occurred in England, where the fax and email were sent. That fact is significant because United States laws do not apply extraterritorially. See Subafilms, Ltd MGM-Comm’ns Co, F3d 1088, (Cir law is especially unsettled when it comes to cross-border communications. Compare Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd v Gen Inst Corp, 69 F3d 381, 387 (9th Cir 1995) (finding no jurisdiction over a television broadcast from the United States to Canada), with Los CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 77 ooff 2255 1 2 In addition to defendants' challenges on the merits, defendants argue that the court lacks both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Because the court agrees that this case should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, defendants' other arguments need not be addressed. The Supreme Court has held if "a district court has before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction." Ruhrgas Marathon Oil Co, ((omitted); Sinochem Intl Co v Malaysia Intl Shipping Corp, 1184 (2007) (holding that a district court may address a forum non conveniens plea before considering personal jurisdiction or subject jurisdiction). No federal court has ever addressed subject matter jurisdiction under § 512(f), and the subject matter jurisdiction in this case is complex. Defendants argue the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because defendants' act of sending the YouTube takedown notice occurred in England, where the fax and were sent. That fact is significant because United States copyright laws do not apply extraterritorially. See Subafilms, Ltd v MGM-Pathe Comm'ns Co, 24 Fad 1088, 1094 (9th Cir 1994). But copyright law is especially unsettled when it comes to cross-border Compare Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd v Gen Inst Fad 381, (Cir (no jurisdiction over television broadcast from the United States to Canada), with Los Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 News Service v Reuters Television Intl, Ltd, F3d 987 (Cir (jurisdiction over a television broadcast from the United States to Africa); see William Patry, Choice of Law International Copyright, Comp L 384, ((the discrepancy between Allarcom and Reuters); Andreas P Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global J Int’l L 799, ((but noting that the European Community has adopted that approach); see also National Football League v PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F3d 10, 13 (2d Cir 2000) (rejecting Allarcom and that “each step” in the transmission procedure can give rise to jurisdiction). It is unclear how that line of precedent apply to cross-border communications such as defendants’ fax and email. Plaintiff suggests that copyright “authorization” law, which permits jurisdiction over foreign acts that authorize in the United States, is instructive, but that body of case law is inapposite. Authorization law and other species of infringement depend on the particular derivative between direct and indirect copyright infringement. See Subafilms, 24 F3d at 1090-93. Here, however, plaintiff alleges neither direct nor indirect infringement. Overall, copyright law not provide a satisfactory answer whether United States courts have jurisdiction over cross-border communications in § 512(f) In fact, as an alleged violation of § 512(f) is not a copyright claim, copyright law may be of little help. Plaintiff a misrepresentation claim. Accordingly, it may be improper import jurisdiction principles from one specific context – the CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 88 ooff 2255 1 Angeles News Service v Reuters Television Intl, Ltd, 149 Fad 987 (9th Cir 1998) (finding jurisdiction over a television broadcast the United States to Africa); see William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 Am J Comp L 384, 462 n362 (2000) (noting the discrepancy between Allarcom and Reuters); Andreas P Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 Mich J Int'l L 799, 823 n84 (1998) (criticizing Allarcom but noting that the European Community has adopted that see also National Football League v PrimeTime 24 Fad 10, (Cir (Allarcom and holding that "each step" in the transmission procedure can give to jurisdiction). It is unclear how that line of precedent would apply to cross-border communications such as defendants'fax email. Plaintiff suggests that copyright "authorization"law, permits jurisdiction over foreign acts that authorize violations in the United States, is instructive, but that bodyof law is inapposite. Authorization law and other species of vicarious infringement depend on the particular derivative relationship between direct and indirect copyright infringement. Subafilms, Fad at 1090-93. Here, however, plaintiff alleges direct nor indirect infringement. Overall, copyrightlaw does not provide a satisfactory answer whether United States courts jurisdiction over cross-border communications in § 512(f) suits. fact, as an alleged violation of § 512(f) is nota claim, copyright law may be of little help. Plaintiff raises a misrepresentation claim. Accordingly, it may be improper to import jurisdiction principles from one specific context -the Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 and regulation of property rights – to a very different context for which those principles were not designed. See Reindl, at 824. Instead, perhaps misrepresentation law rather than law should control the subject matter jurisdiction so, treating this case as an ordinary tortious misrepresentation case does not much clarify matters. Following common law tort principles, the court might be inclined to rule that the situs of the act is the place where a fax or email was not sent. But the best support for that statement is found not in any recent, binding precedent but rather in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, published in 1934. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) (defining the “place of wrong” as “the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place”); see also cmt a, illus 5, 7. The court might analogize to other federal misrepresentation statutes (see Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, 519 974, 988-89, (Cir (fraud); USC (fraud)), but these too appear to provide scant it to say, subject matter jurisdiction is neither nor definitive. Accordingly, the court is “convinced that challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is not easily resolved and that the alternative ground [of personal is considerably less difficult to decide.” Cantor Fitzgerald, LP v Peaslee, 88 F3d 152, 155 (2d Cir 1996), cited in Ruhrgas, 526 US at 588. CCaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnet n3t8 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 99 ooff 2255 1 creation and regulation of property rights -to a very different for which those principles were not designed. See Reindl, supra, at 824. Instead, perhaps misrepresentation law rather than copyright law should control the subject matter jurisdiction analysis. Even so, treating this case as an ordinary tortious case does not much clarify matters. Following tort principles, the court might be inclined to rule the situs of the act is the place where a fax or email was received, not sent. But the best support for that statement is not in any recent, binding precedent but rather in the First of Conflict of Laws, published in 1934. See of Conflict of Laws § 377 ((the "place wrong" as "the state where the last event necessary to make an liable for an alleged tort takes place"); see also cmt a, court might analogize to other federal statutes (Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc, F2d 974, 89, 991 (2d Cir 1975) (securities fraud); 13 § 1343 (wire fraud)), but these too appear to provide scant guidance. Suffice it to say, subject matter jurisdiction is neither clear nor definitive. Accordingly, the court is "convinced that the challenge to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction is not resolved and that the alternative ground [personal jurisdiction] is considerably less difficult to decide." Cantor LP v Peaslee, Fad 152, (Cir cited in 588. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IV Defendants argue that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over both Explorologist and Geller because each has insufficient minimum contacts with California. Plaintiff responds the court has specific jurisdiction over defendants arising out of the takedown notice sent to YouTube in California. A a motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, Inc v Systems Tech Assocs, Inc, 557 F2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir 1977). When the motion to dismiss constitutes a defendant’s initial response to the complaint, the plaintiff need make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, 557 F2d at 1285. does not raise a general jurisdiction argument asserts only that the court may exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. Under California law, “[a] court of this state exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” Cal Civ Code § 410.10. Given the broad reach of California’s long-arm statute, the court need only satisfy itself that its exercise of does not exceed constitutional due process limitations. See Haisten v Grass Valley Med Reimbursement Fund, 1392, (Cir The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test for when specific jurisdiction may be exercised: Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1100 ooff 2255 1 2 argue that the court lacks personal over both Explorologist and Geller because each has minimum contacts with California. Plaintiff responds that the court has specific jurisdiction over defendants arising of the takedown notice sent to YouTube in California. 79 In a motion challenging personal jurisdiction, the as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction See Data Disc, Inc v Systems Tech Assocs, Inc, (Cir motion to dismiss constitutes defendant's initial response to the complaint, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. Data Disc, at 1285. Sapient does not raise a general jurisdiction argument and asserts only that the court may exercise specific jurisdiction defendants. Under California law, "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the of this state or of the United States." Cal Civ Code the broad reach of California's long-arm statute, court need only satisfy itself that its exercise of jurisdiction does not exceed constitutional due process See Haisten v Grass Valley Med Reimbursement Fund, Ltd, 784 F2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir 1986). Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test for determining when specific jurisdiction may be exercised: 10 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of activities in the forum, thereby invoking the and protections of its laws. 2. The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities. 3. of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Data Disc, 557 F2d at 1287. The Ninth Circuit has since expanded the first prong, also known as the purposeful availment or purposeful direction “apply[ing] different purposeful availment tests to and tort cases.” Ziegler v Indian River County, F3d 470, 473 (9th Cir 1995); see Schwarzenegger v Fred Martin Motor Co, F3d 797, 03 (Cir availment in tort cases is analyzed under the effects test from Calder v Jones, 465 (1984): we have previously recognized, Calder stands for the that purposeful availment is satisfied even by a defendant “whose only ‘contact’ with the forum state is the ‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.” Based on these interpretations of Calder, the “effects” test requires that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. Dole Food Co, Inc v Watts, 303 F3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir 2002) (internal citations omitted). Personal jurisdiction may flow from a single contact with the forum state if the claim “arise[s] out of that particular purposeful contact of the defendant with the forum state.” Lake v Lake, 817 F2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir 1987). Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1111 ooff 2255 11. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate transaction with the forum or perform some act by he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. claim must be one which arises out of or results from defendant's forum-related activities. Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Disc, at 1287. 9 Ninth Circuit has since expanded the first prong, known as the purposeful availment or purposeful direction requirement, "apply[ing] different purposeful availment tests to contract and tort cases." Ziegler v Indian River County, 64 Fad (Cir see Schwarzenegger v Fred Martin Motor Co, 374 Fad 797, 802-03 (9th Cir 2004). Purposeful availment in tort is analyzed under the effects test from Calder v Jones, US 783 (1984) : As we have previously recognized, Calder stands for the proposition that purposeful availment is satisfied even a defendant "whose only `contact' with the forum state the `direction' of a foreign act having in the forum state." Based on these of Calder, the "effects" test requires the defendant allegedly have (committed an act, (expressly aimed at the forum state, (causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be in the forum state. Food Co, Inc v Watts, Fad 1104, (Cir (citations omitted). Personal jurisdiction may flow from single contact with the forum state if the claim "arise[s] out of particular purposeful contact of the defendant with the forum state." Lake v Lake, 1416, (Cir Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 45 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 Plaintiff argues that defendants’ single act of sending the takedown notice to YouTube in California is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in California courts. B The court has its doubts whether plaintiff can demonstrate “purposeful direction” into California under the first of the jurisdiction test. Although defendants allegedly sent the takedown notice to YouTube in California, Sapient resides in Pennsylvania. Sapient is correct that there is no presumption that a plaintiff is harmed in his domiciliary only (see Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc, 465 US 770 (1984) (holding that a New Hampshire could exercise personal jurisdiction in a libel case though resided in New York and defendant resided in Ohio)), but the only activity that occurred in California was YouTube’s act of access to plaintiff’s video. Other than by reciting the language of § 512(f), plaintiff has not explained how the removal of the video is an injury “sufficient” to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants in California. See Yahoo! v La Ligue Le Racisme, F3d 1199, (Cir (the “brunt of the harm” test in favor of the less-restrictive “jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm” test). Instead, plaintiff’s claimed injuries are more likely to be suffered in Pennsylvania. See Bancroft & Masters v Augusta Natl Inc, 223 F3d 1082 (9th Cir 2000) (finding personal jurisdiction in California the Georgia defendant mailed a letter to a domain name registry in Virginia thereby interfering with the domain name rights of plaintiff, who lived in California). Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1122 ooff 2255 1 argues that defendants' single act of sending 2 takedown notice to YouTube in California is sufficient to personal jurisdiction in California courts. court has its doubts whether plaintiff can 7 "purposeful direction" into California under the first prong of the jurisdiction test. Although defendants allegedly sent takedown notice to YouTube in California, Sapient resides in Sapient is correct that there is no presumption that plaintiff is harmed in his domiciliary only (Keeton v Hustler Inc, ((that a New Hampshire court could exercise personal jurisdiction in a libel case though plaintiff resided in New York and defendant resided in Ohio)), but only activity that occurred in California was YouTube's act of disabling access to plaintiff's video. Other than by reciting the of § 512(f), plaintiff has not explained how the removal the video is an injury "sufficient" to establish personal over defendants in California. See Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 Fad 1199, 1207 (9th Cir 2006) (rejecting the "brunt of the harm" test in favor of the less-restrictive "jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm" test). Instead, plaintiff's claimed injuries are more likely to be suffered in See Bancroft & Masters v Augusta Natl Inc, Fad (Cir (personal jurisdiction in California because the Georgia defendant mailed a letter to a domain name in Virginia thereby interfering with the domain name of plaintiff, who lived in California). Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 court does not rest its decision on purposeful grounds, however, because that body of precedent does not apply easily to the facts here. Plaintiffs rarely claim an injury in a state other than their home state, and plaintiffs rarely allege the kind of metaphysical internet free speech injuries or electron-based injuries that Sapient alleges here. See Doc #1 at ¶¶17, 23, 26. The cases cited by both parties are all easily on one or both of those grounds. See Keeton, 465 US 770; Calder, 465 US 783; Menken v Emm, 503 F3d 1050 (Cir Yahoo!, F3d 1199; Harris Rutsky & Co Ins Services, Inc v Bell & Clements Ltd, 328 F3d 1122 (9th Cir 2003); Foods, 303 F3d 1104; Bancroft & Masters, F3d 1082; Wien Air Alaska, Inc v Brandt, 195 F3d 208 (5th Cir 1999); Resnick v Supp 2d 1128 (Hawaii Cody v Ward, Supp (Conn court has no affirmative, binding precedent no clear guidance. Accordingly, the court declines to rule on “purposeful direction” prong of the jurisdiction test, either under the Calder effects test (as plaintiffs urge) or under the theory that defendants’ tortious conduct occurred in California (consider Knipple v Viking Communications, Ltd, 236 Conn 602, 610 ((that “[f]alse representations entering Connecticut wire or mail constitute tortious conduct in Connecticut”)). C Sapient’s case for personal jurisdiction immediately once the court considers the third prong of jurisdiction test, which is that jurisdiction must be reasonable. See FDIC v British-American Ins Co, 828 F2d 1439, 1442 Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1133 ooff 2255 1 The court does not rest its decision on purposeful direction grounds, however, because that body of precedent does not easily to the facts here. Plaintiffs rarely claim an injury a state other than their home state, and plaintiffs rarely the kind of metaphysical internet free speech injuries or based injuries that Sapient alleges here. See Doc #1 at 9[9[17, cases cited by both parties are all distinguishable easily on one or both of those grounds. See Calder, Menken v Emm, Fad 1050 (9th Cir 2007); Yahoo!, 433 Fad 1199; Harris Rutsky & Co Ins Inc v Bell & Clements Ltd, Fad 1122 (Cir Dole Foods, Fad 1104; Bancroft & Masters, 223 Fad 1082; Wien Alaska, Inc v Brandt, Fad 208 (Cir Resnick v Rowe, 283 F Supp 2d 1128 (D Hawaii 2003); Cody v Ward, 954 F Supp 43 (D Conn 1997). The court has no affirmative, binding precedent and no clear guidance. Accordingly, the court declines to rule on the "purposeful direction" prong of the jurisdiction test, either the Calder effects test (plaintiffs urge) or under the that defendants' tortious conduct occurred in California (Knipple v Viking Communications, Ltd, 602, (1996) (holding that "[f]alse representations entering Connecticut by wire or mail constitute tortious conduct in Connecticut")). Instead, Sapient's case for personal jurisdiction flounders immediately once the court considers the third prong of the jurisdiction test, which is that jurisdiction must be See FDIC v British-American Ins Co, 1439, 13 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 (9th Cir 1987) (declining to rule on purposeful availment in light of the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction would be Defendants have the burden of making a “compelling case” exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable; in other that it would not comport with fair play and substantial See Schwarzenegger, F3d at 802. Defendants must show any asserted unfairness could not be alleviated by less restrictive means such as conflict of law rules or an accommodating venue transfer. See Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476-78 (1985). Jurisdiction is reasonable if “under the totality of circumstances the defendant could reasonably anticipate being upon to present a defense in a distant forum.” FDIC, F2d at 1442. The Ninth Circuit has set out seven factors to be weighed in evaluating the reasonableness of exercising personal in a particular case: (1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state; (the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1144 ooff 2255 1 (Cir (to rule on purposeful availment in light 2 the conclusion that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable). have the burden of making a "compelling case" that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable; in other words, that it would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. See Schwarzenegger, 374 Fad at 802. Defendants must show that any asserted unfairness could not be alleviated by less means such as conflict of law rules or an accommodating transfer. See Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, (is reasonable if "under the totality of the circumstances the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called upon to present a defense in a distant forum." FDIC, 828 at 1442. Ninth Circuit has set out seven factors to be weighed evaluating the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction in a particular case: (the extent of the defendants' purposeful interjection the forum state's affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the (the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants' state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's in convenient and effective relief; and (the existence of an alternative forum. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 Harris Rutsky, 328 F3d at 1132; see Insurance Co of North Am v Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir 1981) (“There is no or quantitative test for jurisdiction under the International Shoe reasonableness standard, and we shall not attempt to list all the factors that might, in a different case, be of an assessment of the reasonableness of subjecting a to jurisdiction. For purposes of the present case we conclude that the following seven factors are relevant * * *.”). seven factors must be balanced against one another to determine reasonableness. See Roth v Garcia Marquez, 942 F2d 617, 623, 625 (9th Cir 1991). In this case, each factor suggests that is unreasonable. 1 extent of defendants’ “purposeful interjection” into California was not substantial, comprising only the single takedown notice sent to YouTube. “Even if there is sufficient ‘interjection’ into the state to satisfy the [purposeful availment the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the [reasonableness prong].* * * The smaller the element of purposeful the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the less reasonable is its exercise.” Insurance Co of North Am, 649 F2d at 1271, quoted in Core-Vent Corp v Nobel Industries AB, 11 F3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir 1993). In Core-Vent, the Ninth Circuit found defendant’s libelous article circulated in California to be an “attenuated” contact with California -even though defendants “allegedly intended their actions to cause harm in California” -Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1155 ooff 2255 1 Rutsky, Fad at 1132; see Insurance Co of North Am v 2 Salina Cruz, 1266, (Cir ("There is no mechanical or quantitative test for jurisdiction under the Shoe reasonableness standard, and we shall not to list all the factors that might, in a different case, be part of an assessment of the reasonableness of subjecting a 7 defendant to jurisdiction. For purposes of the present case we that the following seven factors are relevant * *.") 9 The seven factors must be balanced against one another to determine See Roth v Garcia Marquez, 617, (Cir this case, each factor suggests that jurisdiction is unreasonable. The extent of defendants' "purposeful interjection" into was not substantial, comprising only the single takedown sent to YouTube. "Even if there is sufficient `interjection' into the state to satisfy the [availment prong], the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the [prong].* The smaller the element of purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the reasonable is its exercise." Insurance Co of North Am, at 1271, quoted in Core-Vent Corp v Nobel Industries AB, Fad (Cir Core-Vent, the Ninth Circuit found defendant's libelous article circulated in California to be an "attenuated" contact with California -even though defendants "allegedly intended their actions to cause harm in California" Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 and the court ruled that the purposeful interjection factor weighed in defendants’ favor. Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1487, 1488. Here, defendants’ takedown notice is similar to the article in Core-Vent it was a single communication sent from Europe. In fact, defendants’ contacts with California are even more attenuated because, although the takedown notice was sent to California, it was not aimed at any California resident. Thus, whether defendants intended to create an effect in California or even if defendants a tort in California, defendants’ purposeful interjection into California is not extensive. Accordingly, this factor weighs personal jurisdiction. 2 second factor – the burden on the defendants – weighs jurisdiction slightly. “The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.” Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, 480 US 102, 114 (1987). The use of an agent in the United States might alleviate a foreign defendant’s burden (Core-Vent, F3d at 1488), but defendants not have such an agent. And there is no indication that or their representatives “frequently travel to on business.” Harris Rutsky, F3d at 1132-33; see #33-2 (defendants’ travel in the United States and Europe). On the other hand, modern technology has reduced the of litigating in another country (Sinatra v National 1191, (Cir and defendants’ Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1166 ooff 2255 1 the court ruled that the purposeful interjection factor weighed 2 defendants' favor. Core-Vent, Fad at 1487, Here, defendants' takedown notice is similar to the article in Core-Vent because it was a single communication sent from Europe. In fact, defendants' contacts with California are even more attenuated although the takedown notice was sent to California, it 7 not aimed at any California resident. Thus, whether defendants to create an effect in California or even if defendants 9 committed a tort in California, defendants' purposeful interjection California is not extensive. Accordingly, this factor weighs against personal jurisdiction. The second factor -the burden on the defendants -weighs against jurisdiction slightly. "The unique burdens placed upon one must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders." Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, (use of an agent in the United States might alleviate a foreign defendant's burden (see Core-Vent, 11 Fad at 1488), but defendants do not have such an agent. And there is no indication that defendants or their representatives "frequently travel to California on business." Harris Rutsky, 328 Fad at 1132-33; see Doc #33-2 (discussing defendants' travel in the United States and On the other hand, modern technology has reduced the burden of litigating in another country (see Sinatra v National Enquirer, 854 F2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir 1988)), and defendants' 16 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17 personal involvement with the litigation is not likely to be extensive. Explorologist’s claim of undue burden is far less compelling than Geller’s, of course, because Explorologist has sued Sapient in Pennsylvania. Litigation in California would force Explorologist to fight a two-front war in the United States, but much of the burden of litigating in the United States (as selecting and monitoring American counsel) has already done. Because of the Pennsylvania lawsuit, defendants’ burden of litigating in California is not overwhelming, but it is a burden nevertheless, and this factor weighs against jurisdiction slightly. 3 “[L]itigation against an alien defendant creates a higher barrier than litigation against a citizen from a state because important sovereignty concerns exist.” Sinatra, 854 F2d at 1199. The court should not dwell upon this See Harris Rutsky, F3d at 1133, citing Gates Learjet Corp v Jensen, 743 F2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir 1984) (“If [this were] given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit a foreign national in a United States court.”). court may presume that England has a sovereign in adjudicating a claim against a British corporation and British resident. See Harris Rutsky, F3d at 1133. Moreover, the video clip at the heart of the dispute was filmed in England (see Doc #26 5 at ¶7) and features Dr Hughes, whom defendants claim is British (see Doc #26 Exh 2). Defendants’ lack of an agent in the United States is also relevant to sovereignty considerations. See Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1489; Roth, 942 F2d at Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1177 ooff 2255 1 involvement with the litigation is not likely to be 2 Explorologist's claim of undue burden is far less than Geller's, of course, because Explorologist has already sued Sapient in Pennsylvania. Litigation in California force Explorologist to fight a two-front war in the United but much of the burden of litigating in the United States 7 (such as selecting and monitoring American counsel) has already been done. Because of the Pennsylvania lawsuit, defendants' burden litigating in California is not overwhelming, but it is a burden and this factor weighs against jurisdiction slightly. "[L]itigation against an alien defendant creates a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state because important sovereignty concerns exist." at 1199. The court should not dwell upon this consideration. See Harris Rutsky, 328 Fad at 1133, citing Gates Corp v Jensen, 1325, (Cir ("If [factor were] given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States court."). The court may presume that England has a sovereign interest in adjudicating a claim against a British corporation and a British resident. See Harris Rutsky, 328 Fad at 1133. Moreover, video clip at the heart of the dispute was filmed in England (Doc Exh 5 at 17) and features Dr Hughes, whom defendants is British (Doc 2). Defendants' lack of an agent the United States is also relevant to sovereignty See Core-Vent, Fad at 1489; Roth, at Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b234 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24. Accordingly, this factor weighs against jurisdiction slightly. 4 The fourth factor -the forum state’s interest in the dispute -weighs against personal jurisdiction. Sapient resides in Pennsylvania, not California. “Because the plaintiff is not a California resident, California’s legitimate in the dispute have considerably diminished.” Asahi, US at 114. Sapient alleges no violations of California law. See FDIC, 828 F2d at 1444. YouTube is a California company but is not a party to this litigation. California has little interest in the outcome of this case. See Corporate Inv Bus Brokers v Melcher, 824 F2d 786, 791 (9th Cir 1987). Sapient’s only argument to the contrary is that “California has an abiding interest in protecting YouTube videos improper takedown notices” (Doc #30 12 n7), citing the free speech clause in the California constitution and a California statute banning the use of lawsuits to chill free speech. See Cal Const art I, § 2(a); Cal Code Civ Proc § 425.16(a). Those apply to California residents, not Pennsylvania internet users, inanimate computer files or lawsuits filed by British against a Pennsylvania resident in Pennsylvania federal court asserting claims under British law. California is not the regulator of free speech in the digital age. The Supreme Court held in Asahi that courts violate due when they adjudicate lawsuits with no connection to the forum state. See 480 US at 113-16. In Asahi, a Taiwanese auto Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1188 ooff 2255 1 623-24. Accordingly, this factor weighs against jurisdiction 2 fourth factor -the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute -weighs against personal jurisdiction. resides in Pennsylvania, not California. "Because the is not a California resident, California's legitimate 9 interests in the dispute have considerably diminished." Asahi, 480 114. Sapient alleges no violations of California law. See at 1444. YouTube is a California company but is not party to this litigation. California has little interest in the of this case. See Corporate Inv Bus Brokers v Melcher, 786, (Cir Sapient's only argument to the contrary is that "California has an abiding interest in protecting YouTube videos from improper takedown notices" (see Doc at 12 n7), citing the speech clause in the California constitution and a California banning the use of lawsuits to chill free speech. See Cal art I, 2 (Cal Code Civ Proc § 425.16 (a) provisions apply to California residents, not Pennsylvania internet inanimate computer files or lawsuits filed by British residents against a Pennsylvania resident in Pennsylvania federal asserting claims under British law. California is not the worldwide regulator of free speech in the digital age. Supreme Court held in Asahi that courts violate due process when they adjudicate lawsuits with no connection to the state. See 480 US at 113-16. In Asahi, a Taiwanese auto 18 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 manufacturer sued a Japanese auto parts manufacturer in California state court, seeking indemnification arising out of a accident in Solano County. 105-06. The Court held, in a near-unanimous section of a notoriously splintered that jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant was unreasonable even though the key factual event – the motorcycle accident – occurred in California. The Court reasoned that California’s interest in enforcing its automobile safety standards too attenuated and “overly broad” when applied to non-California residents in a claim that did not affect safety directly. 480 US at 114-15. Here, neither party is a California resident, and plaintiffs have not shown that the outcome of this lawsuit will impair the free speech of Californians. Plaintiff’s case for jurisdiction leads to unreasonable (even if unintended) consequences. If plaintiff’s theory of jurisdiction were upheld, then the Northern District of California assert jurisdiction over every single takedown notice ever to YouTube or any other company in Silicon Valley. Citizens the world – from Indonesia to Italy, Suriname to Siberia – could all be haled into court in the San Francisco Bay area, California, USA, for sending off a fax claiming that a video clip is infringing. Federal courts sitting in California could assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants in wholly foreign Consider, for example, Erik Jensen, Boy dupes YouTube to videos, Sydney Morning Herald (14, at www.smh.com.au/news/technology/boy-dupes-youtube-to-delete-v ideos/2007/04/13/1175971361981.html (last visited Jan 3, 2008) (that a 15-year-old boy in Australia pretended to Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 1199 ooff 2255 1 parts manufacturer sued a Japanese auto parts manufacturer in state court, seeking indemnification arising out of a motorcycle accident in Solano County. 480 US at 105-06. The Court in a near-unanimous section of a notoriously splintered opinion, that jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant was even though the key factual event -the motorcycle 7 -occurred in California. The Court reasoned that California's interest in enforcing its automobile safety standards was too attenuated and "overly broad" when applied to non-residents in a claim that did not affect safety 114-15. Here, neither party is a California and plaintiffs have not shown that the outcome of this will impair the free speech of Californians. Plaintiff's case for jurisdiction leads to unreasonable (if unintended) consequences. If plaintiff's theory of were upheld, then the Northern District of California could assert jurisdiction over every single takedown notice ever sent to YouTube or any other company in Silicon Valley. Citizens around the world -from Indonesia to Italy, Suriname to Siberia -all be haled into court in the San Francisco Bay area, USA, for sending off a fax claiming that a video clip infringing. Federal courts sitting in California could assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in wholly foreign disputes. Consider, for example, Erik Jensen, Boy dupes YouTube to delete videos, Sydney Morning Herald (Apr 14, 2007), at http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/boy-dupes-youtube-to-delete-v 2007/04/13/1175971361981.html (visited Jan 3, (reporting that a 15-year-old boy in Australia pretended to 19 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and “succeeded in more than 200 clips removed” from YouTube using bogus notices). Such broad jurisdiction, premised solely on the that many internet companies that are not even parties to § 512(f) litigation have offices in Silicon Valley, is unreasonable. The Northern District of California is not an international court of internet law. California’s interest in Sapient’s case is “slight” (see Asahi, 480 US at 114), and this factor weighs against jurisdiction. 5 The fifth factor -the most efficient judicial resolution the controversy -weighs against jurisdiction. In this case, the most efficient resolution of the controversy is in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Count II of plaintiff’s complaint, which a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, is the mirror of Explorologist’s copyright infringement claim pending in Pennsylvania. Explorologist Ltd v Sapient, No 07-1848 LP (E D Pa). Judge Pollak has already denied a motion to dismiss for lack of matter jurisdiction and has granted in part and denied in a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Doc #31 V. Discovery is underway. See No 07-1848 Doc #42, 44. Judge Pollak requested briefing on various intricacies of British copyright and Sapient responded with a motion for partial summary on the British copyright law claim. See No 07-1848 Doc #45. Many third parties including the American Association of Law the American Library Association and Google have moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of Sapient. See No Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2200 ooff 2255 1 represent the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and "succeeded in having more than 200 clips removed" from YouTube using bogus takedown notices). Such broad jurisdiction, premised solely on the happenstance that many internet companies that are not even parties § 512(f) litigation have offices in Silicon Valley, is The Northern District of California is not an 7 court of internet law. California's interest in Sapient's case is "slight" (9 114), and this factor weighs against jurisdiction. fifth factor -the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy -weighs against jurisdiction. In this case, most efficient resolution of the controversy is in the Eastern of Pennsylvania. Count II of plaintiff's complaint, which seeks a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, is the mirror image of Explorologist's copyright infringement claim pending in Explorologist Ltd v Sapient, No 07-1848 (D Pa). Pollak has already denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and has granted in part and denied in part a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Doc #31 Exh V. Discovery is See No 07-1848 Doc #42, Pollak requested additional briefing on various intricacies of British copyright law, and Sapient responded with a motion for partial summary judgment on the British copyright law claim. See No 07-1848 Doc Many third parties including the American Association of Law Libraries, the American Library Association and Google have moved leave to file an amicus brief in support of Sapient. See No 20 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 1848 #46. Duplication here of those complicated proceedings be a waste of the parties’, the attorneys’ and the court’s resources. And count I of plaintiff’s complaint here becomes moot if Explorologist prevails on its infringement claim in Accordingly, Sapient’s claims can be resolved most efficiently by the court that is already familiar with the underlying facts. This factor also requires the court to evaluate where the witnesses and evidence are likely to be located. See Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1489. Plaintiff claims vaguely that he will need to call employees as witnesses, but he neither identifies any witnesses nor describes the subject matter of their testimony – and its relevance or importance to this lawsuit -with reasonable specificity. See Doc #30 at 17; compare Carolina Co v Data Broadcasting Corp, Supp 2d 1044, (D Cal 2001) (Walker, J). And in any event, the convenience of is “no longer weighed heavily given the modern advances in communication and transportation.” Panavision Intl, LP v F3d 1316, (Cir 6 does not appear to be important to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief. In fact, the opposite: “[N]o doctorate in astrophysics is required to that trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff’s preference.” Roth, 942 F2d at 624. Sapient is already in his home state against Explorologist regarding the NOVA video. Sapient “has not shown that the [claim] cannot be Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2211 ooff 2255 1 07-1848 Doc #46. Duplication here of those complicated proceedings would be a waste of the parties', the attorneys' and the court's And count I of plaintiff's complaint here becomes moot Explorologist prevails on its infringement claim in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, Sapient's claims can be resolved most by the court that is already familiar with the 7 facts. factor also requires the court to evaluate where the 9 and evidence are likely to be located. See Core-Vent, Fad at 1489. Plaintiff claims vaguely that he will need to call YouTube employees as witnesses, but he neither identifies any specific witnesses nor describes the subject matter of their -and its relevance or importance to this lawsuit -with any reasonable specificity. See Doc #30 at 17; compare Carolina Casualty Co v Data Broadcasting Corp, 158 F Supp 2d 1044, 1049 (N D 2001) (J). And in any event, the convenience of witnesses is "no longer weighed heavily given the modern advances communication and transportation." Panavision Intl, LP v Toeppen, 141 Fad 1316, 1323 (9th Cir 1998). California does not appear to be important to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief. In fact, quite the opposite: "[N]o doctorate in astrophysics is required to deduce that trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff's preference." Roth, at 624. Sapient is already litigating in his home state against Explorologist regarding the Sapient "has not shown that the [cannot be Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 22 effectively remedied in [Pennsylvania] or [England].” Sinatra, 854 F2d at 1200. Sapient fails to articulate any concerns that paint California as “important” to his claim. The court acknowledges that internet users in Sapient’s will not always be able to establish jurisdiction in their home states (or in the United States) over defendants in § 512(f) cases. The sender of a takedown notice may not know where the target of the takedown notice lives, and therefore the sender does purposefully direct his actions at any specific individual state. Hence, in some cases, California (the state to which the takedown notice is sent) might be the only plausible state in which to bring a § 512(f) claim over a foreign defendant. The court need not decide the implications of that fact here because Sapient is a party to related litigation in his home state. 7 The last factor – the existence of an alternative forum – weighs against jurisdiction. “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum.” Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1490. Sapient has made no such showing that he would be precluded from suing in Pennsylvania or England. See Harris F3d at 1133-34. “Doubtless [would prefer not to [litigate in England], but that is not the test.” Roth, 942 F2d at 625; see Core-Vent, 11 F3d at 1490; Sinatra, 854 F2d at 1201. The court’s “balance” of the above factors weighs against It is “unreasonable and unfair” for this court to Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2222 ooff 2255 1 remedied in [or [England]." Sinatra, at 1200. Sapient fails to articulate any concerns that paint as "important" to his claim. court acknowledges that internet users in Sapient's position will not always be able to establish jurisdiction in their states (in the United States) over defendants in § 512(f) 7 The sender of a takedown notice may not know where the of the takedown notice lives, and therefore the sender does 9 not purposefully direct his actions at any specific individual Hence, in some cases, California (state to which the notice is sent) might be the only plausible state in which bring a § 512(f) claim over a foreign defendant. The court need decide the implications of that fact here because Sapient is already a party to related litigation in his home state. last factor -the existence of an alternative forum -also weighs against jurisdiction. "The plaintiff bears the burden proving the unavailability of an alternative forum." Core-Vent, Fad at 1490. Sapient has made no such showing that he would be from suing in Pennsylvania or England. See Harris Rutsky, 328 Fad at 1133-34. "Doubtless [Sapient] would prefer not [in England], but that is not the test." Roth, 625; see Core-Vent, Fad at 1490; Sinatra, at 1201. 8 court's "balance" of the above factors weighs against jurisdiction. It is "unreasonable and unfair" for this court to Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 jurisdiction over British residents in a suit brought by a resident over an allegedly tortious fax sent to a party in California. See Asahi, 116 (“Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.”). It is true that jurisdictional difficulties should “be through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional,” such as venue transfer. Burger King, 471 US at 477 & n20. That admonition is relevant if the issue is the defendant’s burden of litigating in the forum state. See Burger King, 471 US at 477 (“[A] defendant claiming substantial may seek a change of venue.”). Here, by contrast, the glaring flaws in plaintiff’s case for jurisdiction are California’s lack of an interest in this dispute and the lack of stopping point to this district’s jurisdiction over foreign defendants in § 512(f) cases. Accordingly the court declines to jurisdiction and transfer venue to Pennsylvania. defendants have made a “compelling case” that personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California unreasonable. V Plaintiff’s attempt to establish personal jurisdiction through physical service of process must fail. Doc #30 at 13-15. Defendants waived service of process, thereby mooting the effect of any subsequent physical service in the state of California. See Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2233 ooff 2255 1 assert jurisdiction over British residents in a suit brought by a 2 Pennsylvania resident over an allegedly tortious fax sent to a third party in California. See Asahi, 480 US at 116 ("Considering international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi ithnii s nsatnce wou ld b e unreasonae abnl unr. d fi"a ) i s t rue th at jur idsitcil diffiltiona cues sou hld "b e 9 accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional," such as venue transfer. Burger King, n20. That admonition is relevant if the issue is the defendant's burden of litigating in the forum state. See Burger 477 ("[A] defendant claiming substantial inconvenience may seek a change of venue."). Here, by contrast, glaring flaws in plaintiff's case for jurisdiction are California's lack of an interest in this dispute and the lack of any stopping point to this district's jurisdiction over foreign in § 512(f) cases. Accordingly the court declines to find jurisdiction and transfer venue to Pennsylvania. Accordingly, defendants have made a "compelling case" personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California is unreasonable. Plaintiff's attempt to establish personal jurisdiction physical service of process must fail. Doc #30 at 13-15. waived service of process, thereby mooting the effectof subsequent physical service in the state of California. See 23 Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b23 4 56 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24 Fed R Civ P 4(d)(4) (2007) (“When the plaintiff files a waiver, * * these rules apply as if a summons and complaint have been at the time of filing the waiver.”) (added). Plaintiff advances no support for his theory of double service. VI The court concludes with three final notes. First, Sapient will suffer no actual prejudice as a result of the court’s ruling. Sapient will be able to raise his § 512(f) claim against Explorologist as a counterclaim in the Pennsylvania action. See Fed R Civ P 13(a), 13(f), 13(b); AJ Indus, Inc v US Dist Court for Central Dist of Cal, 503 F2d 384, 387-89 (1974). And although is not a party to that action, Sapient will be able to bring his claims against Geller using either a regular jurisdiction analysis or the federal long-arm statute. See Fed R Civ P 4(k)(2). the court’s ruling does not require a per se bar personal jurisdiction in California over foreign defendants in § 512(f) cases. In some instances, jurisdiction might be and reasonable based on all the circumstances. If a relies regularly and consistently on YouTube’s takedown then the purposeful direction or purposeful inquiries might be different. Here, had defendants sued Sapient in the United States, or had they sued him in a state other than his residence, then the analysis might be different as well. Vindication of plaintiffs’ rights must be against defendants’ interests in a fair trial and the of the judicial system (Asahi, 113), and on the facts of this case, the balance tips in favor of defendants. Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2244 ooff 2255 1 R Civ P 4(d)(4) (("When the plaintiff files a waiver, 2 * these rules apply as if a summons and complaint have been served at the time of filing the waiver.") (emphasis added). advances no support for his theory of double service. 7 court concludes with three final notes. First, will suffer no actual prejudice as a result of the court's 9 Sapient will be able to raise his § 512(f) claim against as a counterclaim in the Pennsylvania action. See R Civ P 13(a), 13 (f) , 13 (AJ Indus, Inc v US Dist Court for Dist of Cal, 384, 89 (although Geller is not a party to that action, Sapient will be able to bring claims against Geller using either a regular jurisdiction or the federal long-arm statute. See Fed R Civ P 4(k)(2). Second, the court's ruling does not require a per se bar against personal jurisdiction in California over foreign defendants § 512(f) cases. In some instances, jurisdiction might be appropriate and reasonable based on all the circumstances. If a defendant relies regularly and consistently on YouTube's takedown procedures, then the purposeful direction or purposeful interjection inquiries might be different. Here, had defendants never sued Sapient in the United States, or had they sued him in a other than his residence, then the analysis might be as well. Vindication of plaintiffs' rights must be weighed against defendants' interests in a fair trial and the legitimacy of the judicial system (see Asahi, 480 US at 113), and the facts of this case, the balance tips in favor of defendants. Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25 Third, the DMCA provides explicitly that internet users such as Sapient who wish to rebut a takedown notice must consent to the jurisdiction of a federal district court (see 17 USC 512(g)(3)(D)), the statute does not require copyright owners who send takedown notices (such as defendants here) to consent to personal jurisdiction (see 17 USC 512(c)(3)). That difference must be viewed as intentional. See The Adeline, 13 US 244, 253 (1815). If that result seems asymmetrical and unfair, then the problem be resolved by Congress, not this court. VI assuming plaintiffs can demonstrate subject matter and purposeful direction, personal jurisdiction over defendants would violate due process because jurisdiction would be “reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice * * *.” See International Shoe Co v State of Washington, 326 US 310, 320 (1945). Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. VAUGHN R WALKER United States District Chief Judge Ceaassee 33::0077--ccvv--0022447788--VVRRWW D o Dcuomcuemnte 3n8t 38 FFiilleedd 0022//0044//22000088 PPaaggee 2255 ooff 2255 1 the DMCA provides explicitly that internet users as Sapient who wish to rebut a takedown notice must consent to jurisdiction of a federal district court (512 (g) (3) (D)) , but the statute does not require copyright owners send takedown notices (as defendants here) to consent to jurisdiction (c)(3)). That difference must 7 viewed as intentional. See The Adeline, (that result seems asymmetrical and unfair, then the problem 9 should be resolved by Congress, not this court. Even assuming plaintiffs can demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction and purposeful direction, personal jurisdiction over the defendants would violate due process because jurisdiction would not be "reasonable and just according to our traditional conception fair play and substantial justice * *." International Co v State of Washington, (Defendants' to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. IS SO ORDERED. WALKER States District Chief Judge Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7b2f9f3f-166d-4331-adb1-8761e140e67b
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