Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/281/66/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-08-28 02:25:14
Document Index: 459899197

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 266', '§ 77', '§ 77', '§ 51', '§ 81', '§ 77', '§ 21', '§ 47']

Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook :: 281 U.S. 66 (1930) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook
Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook 281 U.S. 66 (1930)
U.S. Supreme CourtCarley & Hamilton, Inc. v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930)Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v. SnookNos. 86 and 267Submitted January 9, 1930Decided February 24, 1930281 U.S. 66APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
3. The proposition that, although the fees are not per se disproportionate to the privilege of operating over all the highways of the state, owners are entitled to licenses limiting the operation of their motor vehicles to a few highways which they wish to use (e.g., to streets in particular cities) upon payment of correspondingly reduced fees, is not supported by any constitutional principle. P. 281 U. S. 72. Page 519 U. S. 67
Appeals from decrees of the district court of three judges dissolving temporary injunctions and dismissing the bills in two suits against California officials, to enjoin them from enforcing provisions cf the state Motor Vehicle Act with respect to the imposition and collection of certain registration fees for motor vehicles. Page 519 U. S. 68
These are appeals under § 266 of the Judicial Code from final decrees of district courts of three judges for the Northern District of California. Each, on motion to dismiss the complaint, dissolved a temporary injunction, dismissed the complaint, and upheld the constitutionality of § 77(b) and (c) of the Motor Vehicle Act of California, 1923 California Statutes, c. 266, as amended, 1927 California Statutes, c. 844. Section 36(a) requires every motor vehicle operated upon the public highways of the state to be registered. Under § 77(a), an annual fee of $3 is exacted for the registration of all motor vehicles. By subsections (b) and (c), printed in the margin so far as relevant, [Footnote 1] a graduated license or registration fee, payable Page 281 U. S. 69 in advance, is exacted for registration of motor vehicles used for transportation "of passengers for hire or for transportation of property." The duty of enforcing the act is committed to the respondent, the chief of the division of motor vehicles, who is required to deposit the fees collected in the state treasury to the credit of the "motor vehicle fund." After deductions for the support of the division of motor vehicles, the fund is required to be expended, one half by paying it over to the counties, to be used by them in the construction and maintenance of public roads, the other half for the maintenance of state roads.
Under §§ 51 and 153(c), operation of a motor vehicle for which the registration fees have not been paid is a Page 281 U. S. 70 misdemeanor, punishable by fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. By § 81, fees not paid for 30 days after they become due are doubled. Their payment is secured by a lien upon the vehicles required to be registered, enforceable by seizure and sale.
Petitioners insist that the registration fees imposed by § 77(b) and (c) are, in effect, tolls for the use of the highways Page 281 U. S. 71 maintained by the state, see Matter of Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 290; Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21, 29, 248 P. 235, and, as they pay the license tax imposed by the cities for the use of city streets, the exaction of the additional "tolls" with respect to highways outside of cities, which petitioners in No. 86 do not use and which the petitioners in No. 267 use less than the city streets, is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But we are now concerned only with the use of motor cars in intrastate commerce, and, in any case, not the precise name which may be given to the money payment demanded, but its effect upon the persons paying it, is of importance in determining whether the Constitution is infringed. Whatever other descriptive term may be applied to the present registration fees, they are exactions, made in the exercise of the state taxing power, for the privilege of operating specified classes of motor vehicles over public highways, and expended for state purposes. Such fees, if covered into the state treasury and used for public purposes, as are general taxes, obviously would not offend against the due process clause. Nor can we see that they do so the more because the state has designated the particular public purposes for Page 281 U. S. 72 which they may be used. There is nothing in the federal Constitution which requires a state to apply such fees for the benefit of those who pay them. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 169 U. S. 280.
Only a word need be said of petitioner's contention that the exemption of all vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, although their loaded weight may be much more than vehicles not exempt, infringes the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similar § 21 of article 1 of the state constitution. [Footnote 2] That the legislature Page 281 U. S. 73 may graduate the fees according to the propensities of the vehicles to injure or to destroy the public highways, and may exempt those with respect to which this tendency is slight or nonexistent, cannot be doubted. We may not assume that vehicles weighing less than 3,000 pounds, with loads which they usually carry, are not of this class, or that vehicles weighing more than 3,000 pounds with their accustomed burden added do not have this tendency. It is for the legislature to draw the line between the two classes. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 170 U. S. 300-301; Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 184 U. S. 331; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 223 U. S. 62; Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322; Watson v. State Comptroller, 254 U. S. 122, 254 U. S. 125; Franchise Motor Freight Assn. v. Seavey, 196 Cal. 77, 81; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42, 48, 248 P. 244. Cf. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 221 U. S. 484; Packard v. Banton, supra; Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 280 U. S. 123.
The present registration fees cannot be said to be tolls in the commonly accepted sense of a proprietor's charge for the passage over a highway or bridge, exacted when and as the privilege of passage is exercised. See Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 119 U. S. 548; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288, 123 U. S. 293; St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 148 U. S. 97. The fact that registration fees are imposed generally upon all residents who use motor vehicles within the state, without reference to any Page 281 U. S. 74 particular highways or to the extent or frequency of the use, and that, as in California, they are not exacted of nonresident automobilists passing through the state (1923 California Statutes, c. 266, § 47), marks them as demands of sovereignty, not of proprietorship, and likens them to taxes, rather than tolls. The fact that they may have been held justified, in other connections, because of their similarity to "tolls for the use of highways" affords no basis for saying that the present fees are prohibited tolls within the meaning of the federal Highway Act.