Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I95_0066.htm
Timestamp: 2013-12-08 19:59:17
Document Index: 402092898

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 209', '§ 207', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§\n200', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 209', '§ 209', '§ 207', '§ 207', '§ 94', '§ 207']

IN THE MATTER OF SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, v. NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT, AND CITY OF SCHENECTADY, APPELLANT-RESPONDENT. (PROCEEDING NO. 1) / IN THE MATTER OF CITY OF SCHENECTADY, APPELLANT-RESPONDENT, v. NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, RESPONDENT, AND SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. (PROCEEDING NO. 2)85 N.Y.2d 480, 650 N.E.2d 373, 626 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1995).
3 No. 44 [1995 NY Int. 066]
James W. Roemer, Jr., for Appellant-respondent.
Jane K. Finin, for Respondent-appellant.
David P. Quinn, for Respondent.
The issue here is whether General Municipal Law §
207-c requires mandatory bargaining before a police officer who is
injured in the line of duty or becomes ill during the performance
of duty can be forced to (1) perform light duty, (2) undergo
surgery at the direction of the City or (3) waive the
confidentiality of medical records. Because the Appellate Division
properly concluded that none of these matters is subject to
mandatory bargaining, we affirm.
General Municipal Law § 207-c was enacted in 1961 and
provided that a police officer "who is injured in the performance
of his duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance
of his duties" could receive salary or wages, as well as medical
benefits from the municipality. During February and March 1990,
the City of Schenectady sought to adopt six new rules governing the
receipt of benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c. The three
rules pertinent to this appeal require that a police officer (1)
assume a light duty position, as ordered by the City, (2) submit to
surgery as ordered by the City and (3) execute a medical
confidentiality waiver form for the City's examining physician when
the officer appears for examination of a GML § 207-c injury or
In April 1990, the Schenectady Police Benevolent
Association (PBA) filed an improper practice charge with the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the City of
Schenectady violated Civil Service Law § 209-a.1(a), (c), and (d)
by unilaterally and improperly instituting new rules and procedures
relating to qualification for benefits under General Municipal Law
§ 207-c. Underlying this charge was the City's requirement that
several police officers recovering from injuries suffered on the
job return to work to perform light duty in the Schenectady Police
Department. Additionally, the City required one officer to submit
After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
rejected any contention that Civil Service Law § 209-a.1(a) and (c)
had been violated since "no evidence of improper motivation was
presented by the PBA."[n 1] The ALJ found that the order to perform
light duty or to undergo surgery was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining. The ALJ also found that the City had no right to
require a medical confidentiality waiver since this matter was
subject to mandatory bargaining. She thus found a violation of
Civil Service Law § 209-a.1 (d).[n 2] Both the PBA and the City filed
exceptions to the ALJ's findings and PERB affirmed the ALJ's
The PBA commenced the first CPLR article 78 proceeding
seeking to annul PERB's determination with regard to the
performance of light duty and submission to surgery. The City
instituted a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul PERB's affirmation
of the ALJ's decision, in part, because it required mandatory
bargaining for a medical confidentiality waiver. The two
proceedings were consolidated.
Supreme Court confirmed PERB's determination, except with
respect to the medical confidentiality waiver which it found not to
be subject to mandatory bargaining. The Appellate Division
modified Supreme Court's judgment by concluding that the medical
confidentiality waiver is subject to mandatory collective
bargaining only insofar as it relates to the release of information
other than that relating to whether the officer remains disabled or
is capable of light duty. This Court granted both the City's
motion and the PBA's cross-motion for leave to appeal.
The PBA contends that there is no legislative intent or
scheme discernible in GML § 207-c to remove light duty and
compulsory elective surgery from mandatory collective negotiations. The City argues that the Appellate Division's modification of
Supreme Court's ruling with respect to medical confidentiality
waivers adversely impacts upon the rights of a municipality as
articulated in General Municipal Law § 207. PERB maintains that
GML § 207-c indicates a legislative intent that light duty and
surgery not be the subject of mandatory collective bargaining. PERB also contends that no statutory or other authority eliminates
the requirement of mandatory collective bargaining with respect to
a waiver of medical confidentiality.
First, concerning the standard of review, we recognize
that an administrative agency's determination requires deference in the area of its expertise (see, Rosen v Public Employment
Relations Bd., 72 NY2d 47-48). Where, however, the matters at
issue involve statutory interpretation, such deference is
inapplicable (id.; Matter of Webster Cent. School Dist. v Public
Employment Relations Bd. of State of N.Y., 75 NY2d 619, 626). This
case involves only statutory interpretation.
It is settled that the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law §
200) generally requires bargaining between public employers and
employees regarding terms and conditions of employment (see, Matter
of Board of Educ. v New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd.,
75 NY2d 660, 667, quoting Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v
Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774, 778). The policy of such
bargaining in this state is "strong" and "sweeping" (id.). Even
that policy, however, is negated under special circumstances. It
is unquestioned that the bargaining mandate may be circumscribed by
"plain" and "clear" legislative intent or by statutory provisions
indicating the Legislature's "inescapably implicit" design to do so
(Matter of Webster Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd.,
75 NY2d 619, 627, supra; see also, Matter of Board of Educ., 75
NY2d 660, 667, 668 supra).
Turning to the specific issues before us, we hold that
GML § 207-c authorizes the City to require both light duty and,
under the appropriate circumstances, even surgery, where
reasonable. As for light duty, GML § 207-c(3) provides that where,
in the opinion of a physician or health authority, a police officer
is "unable to perform his regular duties as a result of * * *
injury or sickness but is able, in their opinion to perform
specified types of light police duty," the officer is entitled to
receive salary and other benefits only if that light duty is
performed. That the City ordered the officers to submit to light
duty is consistent with the authority given in this provision.
The PBA claims that GML § 207-c does not authorize surgery absent bargaining. However, GML § 207-c(1) clearly provides
otherwise. After stating that an officer who is injured in the
performance of his duties or becomes ill in the performance of his
duties is entitled to salary, wages and medical benefits, the
statute provides that these benefits may be withheld if the officer
refuses to undergo surgery. Regarding this claim, the statute
provides, in part,
Provided, however, and notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the municipal health authorities or any physician appointed for the purpose by the municipality, after a determination has first been made that such injury or sickness was incurred during, or resulted from, such performance of duty, may attend any such injured or sick policeman, from time to time, for the purpose of providing medical, surgical or other treatment * * *
(emphasis supplied). The section goes on to provide that anyone
who refuses to accept "medical treatment or hospital care" waives
the right to benefits under the section. Unquestionably the
Legislature contemplated that municipalities would, where
appropriate and reasonable, require police officers to submit to
corrective surgery, or forfeit benefits under the statute. In this
regard, the police officers here do not differ from firefighters
(see, Matter of Mondello v Beekman, 56 NY2d 513, affg on opinion
below at 78 AD2d 824). In Mondello v Beekman, the petitioner's
application for line of duty disability retirement was dismissed
because the petitioner had failed to accept proper medical
treatment. In affirming on the opinion of the Appellate Division,
this Court tacitly acknowledged that the Medical Board could
require corrective medical treatment, including surgery. Additionally, any officer would have general recourse to article 78
proceedings to challenge an allegedly arbitrary or unreasonable
Although the waiver issue is not as clear, we determine
that the Appellate Division reached the correct result by narrowing
the City's waiver requirement to only those items necessary for the
City's determination of the nature of the officer's medical problem
and its relationship to his or her duties. The waiver sought by
the City in this action is far too broad, requiring all medical
records of the officer. Nothing in GML § 207-c authorizes the City
to require disclosure of such broad-based information. Any
requirement of waiver, apart from that required with respect to the
applicable injury or sickness, should be the subject of collective
bargaining. In a similar vein, Matter of Board of Educ. v New York
State Pub. Employment Relations Bd. (75 NY2d 660, supra) held that
the New York City Board of Education's financial disclosure
requirements, which were similarly intrusive regarding employees'
personal financial matters, were subject to bargaining.
Finally, it should be clear that the procedures for
implementation of the requirements of GML § 207-c are not before
us. Those procedures may or may not be subject to bargaining. For
example, no reason has been shown here why officers should not be
permitted the opportunity to obtain and have considered the views
of their personal physicians as to surgery.
be affirmed, without costs.
1. Civil Service Law § 209-a.(1)(a) and (c) read as
follows: "It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or
its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce
public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
section two hundred two (right of organization) for the purpose of
depriving them of such rights; * * *(c) to discriminate against any
employee for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership
in, or participation in the activities of, any employee
organization."[return to text]
2. Civil Service Law § 209-a.(1)(d) makes it an improper
employer practice "to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the
duly recognized or certified representatives of its public
employees."[return to text]
BELLACOSA, J. (dissenting in part):
We agree with the Court to affirm the Appellate Division order
insofar as it resolves the issues of the waiver of confidentiality of
medical records and the performance of light duty. With respect to this
Court's affirmance of the portion of the Appellate Division order that
upholds the authority of the municipal-employer to impose surgical and
medical treatments on police officers injured in the line of duty, we
respectfully dissent and vote to modify.
General Municipal Law § 207-c should not be construed to effect
forfeiture of police officer employee benefits for refusal to submit to
surgical and medical treatments unilaterally mandated by physicians
employed by the municipality, without at least the counterbalance of
collective bargaining protections.
The Court has long recognized the "strong and sweeping policy
of the State" to support employer-employee negotiations under the Civil
Service Law (Mtr. of Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn.,
40 NY2d 774, 778). Absent a clear and explicit withdrawal of this
employer-employee matter from collective bargaining, sound statutory
interpretation, legislative intent and public policy concerns militate
against the imposition of such a profound, governmental, management,
encroachment of employee, personal autonomy. PERB ruled that the
forfeiture of employee benefits for the refusal to submit to mandated
surgical and medical directives is a matter outside the scope of
collective bargaining. We agree with the Court that PERB's determination is not
entitled to special deference (see, Mtr. of Newark Valley Cent. School
Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 83 NY2d 315, 320; Mtr. of Webster
Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 619, 626). On
the pure statutory construction ground, however, we conclude that the
PERB determination in this respect should be annulled.
In pertinent part, General Municipal Law 207-c provides:
"Any sheriff, undersheriff, deputy sheriff or corrections officer of the sheriff's department of any county or any member of a police force of any county * * * who is injured in the performance of his duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his duties so as to necessitate medical or other lawful remedial treatment shall be paid by the municipality by which he is employed the full amount of his regular salary. * * * Provided, however, * * * the municipal health authorities or any physician appointed for the purpose by the municipality, * * * may attend any such injured or sick policeman, from time to time, for the purpose of providing medical, surgical or other treatment, or for making inspections. * * * Any injured or sick policeman who shall refuse to accept medical treatment or hospital care or shall refuse to permit medical inspections as herein authorized * * * shall be deemed to have waived his rights under this section in respect to expenses for medical treatment or hospital care rendered and for salary or wages payable after such refusal" (emphasis added).
The fact that General Municipal Law § 207-c declares that
an officer's refusal to accept medical treatment shall be deemed a
waiver of rights to benefits and salary does not solve or answer
the essential and threshold issue in this case. This waiver
provision introduces no final entity, procedural protections or
process or mechanism for determining the necessity or propriety of
municipal employer-mandated medical directives. The statute
prescribes no regimen for rendering such determinations.
It is no answer, therefore, and plainly insufficient
protection for employees, when the Court suggests that attendant
procedures affecting the core power may be subject to collective
bargaining or, ultimately, to judicial CPLR article 78 review or
even to a generalized reasonableness standard. The merits or the
review of the assigned treatment are not germane to the resolution
of the issue of the power to compel in the first instance under
statutory interpretation. Moreover, since no explicit or
inescapably implied legislative expression takes the core power or
the attendant procedural protections out of the traditional and
ordinary collective bargaining sphere, the whole, intertwined power
should be subject to that essential employer-employee protection
and policy preference (see, Mtr. of Webster Cent. School Dist. v
Public Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 619, 626-628, supra).
Our analysis flows from the obligation of courts to look
to the statutory language and give it "its most obvious and natural
meaning" (Ball v Allstate Ins. Co., 81 NY2d 22, 25; Matter of
Greenberg [Ryder Truck Rental], 70 NY2d 573, 577; McKinney's Cons
Law of New York, Book 1, Statutes § 94, at 188). Complementing that
principle is the axiom that "[w]here the statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face, the legislation must be interpreted as it
exists * * * [and] the courts may not resort to rules of
construction to broaden the scope and application of a statute"
(Doctors Council v New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 71 NY2d 669,
674, quoting Bender v Jamaica Hosp., 40 NY2d 560, 561-562).
Transcending these general nostrums in this case is the
explicitly apt State policy favoring the collective bargaining of
terms and conditions of employment (see, Mtr. of Webster Cent.
School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 619, supra). In
Webster, the Court held unanimously that "any implied intention
that there not be mandatory negotiation must be 'plain and clear'
[Syracuse Teachers Assn. v Board of Educ., 35 NY2d 743, 744] or
'inescapably implicit' in the statute [Matter of Cohoes City School
Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774, 778; {other citation
omitted}]" (Webster Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations
Bd., supra, at 627).
The instant case fails these general and specific
statutory interpretation tests with respect to the subject of
unilateral power of a municipal-employer to impose surgical and
medical protocols under penalty of forfeiture of statutory employee
benefits. The plain language of the statute evinces no express or
implied legislative intent that a municipal employer, through its
physicians, is unilaterally empowered to command its employees to
submit themselves to invasive physical and medical procedures and
treatments (compare, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 492; see also,
Schloendorff v Society of NY Hosp., 211 NY 125, 129). Indeed, the
active phrase of art is "attend * * * for the purpose of
providing," a phrase very different from the more easily
articulated "may direct" -- if that is what the Legislature
General Municipal Law § 207-c is a remedial statute
enacted for the benefit of police officers injured in line of duty. As such, it must be liberally construed in their favor (see, Mtr.
of Mashnouk v Miles, 55 NY2d 80, 88). As noted, the Legislature
invested the physicians of municipal employers with the limited
authority to "attend" the injured police officer "for the purpose
of providing medical, surgical or other treatment." Augmentation
of this limited role and authorization, however, with the
extraordinary unilateral power to order surgical and medical
protocols, is not expressly, reasonably, or inescapably implied in
the statute. For courts to infer such a profound transformation
and vast intrusive power from legislative silence would be unusual
in any case, but in matters such as are in dispute here --
mandatory medical protocols under penalty of forfeiture of employee
salary and medical benefits -- would be astounding, especially in
the face of the more restrictive legislative language actually
used. The Court's gloss thus lacks statutory roots or
interpretative sustenance and transgresses the limitation on
legislating under the guise of statutory construction (see, People
v Heine, 9 NY2d 925, 929). At the very least, New York's well-
established preference for allowing such subjects to be resolved by
collective bargaining ought to play a part (see Mtr. of Cohoes City
School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774, 778, supra).
Our analysis and application of these principles is
cogently reinforced by legislative history. Relevant memoranda
submitted by the Department of Law to the Governor indicate that
the primary purpose of this law is to provide "for payment of
salary, medical and hospital expenses" for injured or sick police
officers (Mem of Dept of Law in support of Bill No. 4914, Bill
Jacket; see, Governor's Memorandum on approving L 1961, ch 920,
1961 NY Legis Ann, at 486-487). The bill jacket contains no
reference to granting municipal physicians unilateral authority to
order medical protocols without at least collective bargaining
protections. Because the determination that a police officer must
submit to employer-directed medical procedures violates personal
autonomy, ordinary collective bargaining protections seem sensible
and necessary, absent an explicit legislative withdrawal of that
employee safeguard, which could have been so plainly set forth if
intended (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 492, supra; Schloendorff
v Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 NY 125, 129, supra; see also, Winston
v Lee, 470 US 753, 759; Mills v Rogers, 457 US 291, 299).
The Legislature might arguably have explicitly prohibited
collective bargaining with respect to this significant subject
matter for some compelling, demonstrable state purpose. It did not
do so. That ought to be the end of this case on that issue.
In this setting, on this record and on this statute's
reading, this essential safeguard should be accorded priority, at
least for collective bargaining protections purposes, over a
statutory interpretation which, only by substantial judicial gloss,
would justify unilateral and mandatory medical directives from
municipal employers against the interests of particular public
safety employees. Frankly, we find it hard to conjure up any term
of employment that would impinge more significantly upon an
individual employee's personal prerogatives than does the subject
that divides our ruling on this part of this case.
Thus, we would modify the order of the Appellate Division
and annul that part of the PERB determination that removes
employer-mandated surgery from collective bargaining give and take.
Order affirmed, without costs. Opinion by Judge Smith. Chief
Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone and Levine concur. Judge
Bellacosa dissents in part in an opinion in which Judge Ciparick