Source: https://casetext.com/case/transcontinental-insurance-co-v-rbmw-inc
Timestamp: 2018-12-15 16:23:17
Document Index: 50079896

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', 'art:\n1', '§ 8', '§ 8']

Transcontinental Insurance v. RBMW, Inc, 262 Va. 502 | Casetext
Transcontinental Insurance v. RBMW, Inc.
262 Va. 502 (Va. 2001)
RBMW, Inc.
262 Va. 502•551 S.E.2d 313•
…Code § 8.01-380. Whether the trial court erred in granting a voluntary motion for nonsuit "presents a…
Lark v. W. Heritage Ins. Co.
…In fact, “[s]ummary judgment is particularly well-suited for the resolution of insurance coverage disputes…
noting that an action can be submitted to the court "&apos;either as the result of oral or written argument, formal notice and motion, or by tendering a jointly endorsed sketch for a decree,&apos;" Moore, 218 Va. at 795-96, 240 S.E.2d at 538, while also recognizing that in setting forth this list in Moore, the Supreme Court "&apos;made no attempt to delineate every possible situation when an action would or would not be &apos;submitted&apos; to the court for decision under the nonsuit statute,&apos;" City of Hopewell v. Cogar, 237 Va. 264, 268, 377 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1989)
Summary of this case from Gerensky-Greene v. Gerensky
An insured Virginia corporation operates a marina. It obtained optional coverage for damage to piers, wharfs and docks from covered causes except those listed in the policy exclusions, which excluded losses from flood, surface water, waves, tides, and overflowing of any body of water, whether driven by wind or not. A hurricane severely damaged the marina. The insured submitted a claim to the underwriter for $139,712.17, but the underwriter paid only $18,143.80 and denied the remainder of the claim. The insured filed a motion for judgment against the underwriter, the insurance agency from which it bought the coverage, and the individual selling agent, alleging that the underwriter breached its contract when it failed to pay the entire claim. The insured alleged in the alternative that the insurance agency and its agent intentionally or negligently misrepresented that storm damage was covered. The trial court ruled that exclusions in the policy did not apply. A nonsuit of claims against the insurance agent and agency was then permitted. The trial court awarded the insured $111,597.55, plus interest. The underwriter appeals this judgment, and the insurance agency appeals the dismissal of claims against it without prejudice under the nonsuit statute.
1. The trial court's determination that the exclusion in the policy did not apply to the damage sustained by the marina presents a mixed question of law and fact. The factual findings of the trial court are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
2. However, interpretation of the provisions of an insurance contract presents a question of law that is considered de novo.
3. "Collapse" means to break down completely.
4. Where provisions of a dock coverage form are ambiguous, the policy is construed in favor of providing coverage. Ambiguity exists where the disputed policy language permits more than one reasonable interpretation of the application of the exclusion provision to the collapse provision.
5. In general, courts interpret insurance policies, like other contracts, in accordance with the intention of the parties gleaned from the words they have used in the document. Each component of an insurance contract should be considered and construed together and seemingly conflicting provisions harmonized when that can be reasonably done, so as to effectuate the intention of the parties as expressed therein. When a policy does not define a given term, the word is given its ordinary and accepted meaning.
6. Exclusionary language in an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer and the burden is upon the insurer to prove that an exclusion applies. Reasonable exclusions not in conflict with statute will be enforced, but it is incumbent upon the insurer to employ exclusionary language that is clear and unambiguous.
7. The policy language in this case excludes from coverage direct or indirect loss caused by flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflowing of any body of water, or their spray, all whether driven by wind or not. The trial court found that the damage was not caused by a flood. However, instead of considering the remaining excluded causes of loss on an individual basis, the trial court read the exclusion as if the phrase "overflowing of any body of water" modified the words "flood," "surface water," "waves," "tides," and "tidal waves." The trial court held that because the waves and tides were "not beyond the limits of the river," they were not "overflowing of the body of water." This grammatical construction of the exclusion is rejected.
8. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the placement of commas in the exclusion indicates that each subject matter must be separately considered, including, "overflowing of any body of water." In this context, that phrase is a verbal noun known as a gerund. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider each of the excluded causes of loss on an individual basis to determine whether coverage was excluded.
9. Having determined that the damage to the marina did not result from a "flood," the trial court should then have considered the remaining excluded causes separately, starting with a "wave." A "wave" is defined in as "a moving ridge or swell on the surface of a liquid." Significantly, unlike a "flood," a "wave" does not require movement of water into an area not typically covered by it.
10. It is clear that the damage to the marina was caused, at least in part, by waves which did most of the damage to the docks and the boathouse. The trial court erred in ruling that the exclusion by its terms did not apply to any of the damage to the marina.
11. The trial court determined that the losses sustained by the marina were covered losses; however, the trial court did not determine whether the losses were covered by the additional coverage for collapse, or other provisions. The significance is readily apparent in light of recent case law construing virtually identical policy language, holding that certain exclusions were inapplicable to the collapse coverage. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a determination of the source of coverage and proper application of exclusions.
12. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the insured to take a nonsuit of its claim against the insurance agency and its agent presents a question of law and, as such, is reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard.
13. Code § 8.01-380 (A) provides in pertinent part that a party may not take a nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim, or any other party to the proceeding, unless he does so before a motion to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires from the bar or before the action has been submitted to the court for decision.
14. For an action to be "submitted to the court," it is necessary that the parties, by counsel, have both yielded the issues to the court for consideration and decision. This could be accomplished either as the result of oral or written argument, formal notice and motion, or by tendering a jointly endorsed sketch for a decree. However, no attempt has been made to delineate every possible situation when an action would or would not be submitted to the court for decision under the nonsuit statute.
15. The granting of a nonsuit even though dispositive motions had been presented to the court and argument had occurred has been approved where the motion for nonsuit was made before the court recessed after oral argument to consider the merits of the motion, or where a post-argument period had been established for filing of additional memoranda.
16. In the present case, the insured's motion for judgment contained alternative causes of action against different parties: breach of contract against the underwriter, and intentional or negligent misrepresentation against the agency and the agent. Prior to hearing argument on the scope of the exclusions, the trial court specifically noted that the claims against the insurance agency and agent were not being considered at that point. Following the trial court's decision, the agency did not present any argument to the trial court, but was excused from the remainder of the proceedings. Therefore, at no time was the issue of the insured's cause of action against the agency and agent yielded by both the agency and the insured to the trial court for consideration and decision.
17. Accordingly, the insured's action against the insurance agency had not been "submitted to the court for decision" within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380 (A).
18. In the case at bar, the insured and the insurance agency and the agent never yielded the issue of the agent's alleged intentional or negligent misrepresentation to the trial court. Thus the trial court did not err in granting a nonsuit of the claim of the insured against the agency.
Appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Prince George County. Hon. James A. Luke, judge presiding.
Record No. 002894 — Reversed and remanded.
Record No. 002532 — Affirmed.
W. Joseph Owen, III ( Cowan Owen, on brief), for appellant. (Record No. 002894)
Bruce M. Marshall ( Durrette, Irvin Bradshaw, on brief), for appellee RBMW, Inc., d/b/a Jordan Point Yacht Haven. (Record No. 002894)
Scott C. Ford ( Douglas M. Palais, McCandlish Kaine, on briefs), for appellants. (Record No. 002532)
Bruce M. Marshall ( Barrett E. Pope, Durrette, Irvin Bradshow, on brief), for appellee RBMW, Inc., d/b/a Jordan Point Yacht Haven. (Record No. 002532)
The PWD policy provides in pertinent part:
1. COVERED PROPERTY, as used in this
Coverage Form means:
4. a. ADDITIONAL COVERAGE COLLAPSE
In early September 1996, Hurricane Fran battered the east coast of the United States. On September 6, 1996, the storm reached Hopewell and severely damaged Jordan Point. RBMW submitted a claim to Transcontinental for $139,712.17. However, Transcontinental only paid $18,143.80 and denied the remainder of RBMW's claim relating to damage to its piers, wharves, and docks along with damage to a boathouse and replacement of a sign.
In its motion for judgment, RBMW stated that its damages totaled $139,712.17. This amount included the $18,143.80 that Transcontinental subsequently paid. Later, Transcontinental and RBMW stipulated that the amount of the damage claim that Transcontinental did not pay was $111,597.55.
On June 22, 1998, RBMW filed a motion for judgment in the trial court against Transcontinental, Robins Insurance, and Mr. Robins. RBMW alleged Transcontinental breached its contract when it failed to pay the entire claim. Additionally, RBMW alleged, in the alternative, that Robins Insurance and Mr. Robins (collectively, "Robins") intentionally or negligently misrepresented to RBMW that storm damage was covered under the PWD policy.
The motion for judgment named 18 defendants, including Robins Insurance, Mr. Robins, Transcontinental, and additional insurance companies. By stipulation, Transcontinental agreed that it underwrote the only insurance policy in question in this case and the trial court, with the exception of Robins Insurance, dismissed with prejudice the remaining 15 insurance companies.
The trial court also viewed a video tape that was a compilation of different video tapes people took the night of the hurricane. Additionally, the trial court received as evidence the insurance policy, including the PWD form.
On May 8, 2000, counsel for Robins received a nonsuit order from RBMW that had not been endorsed by all counsel of record. Robins filed a motion for entry of a dismissal order, asserting that because the trial court determined that there was coverage under the Transcontinental policy, Robins should be dismissed from the case with prejudice. The trial court heard argument and issued a letter opinion on June 30, 2000, stating that it would permit RBMW to nonsuit Robins. Specifically, the trial court noted that RBMW's intentional or negligent misrepresentation count against Robins had not been presented to the trial court for decision and therefore, under Code § 8.01-380, the granting of a nonsuit was appropriate. A July 26, 2000 order memorialized this decision.
II. The PWD Coverage Exclusion a. Standard of Review
[1-2] The trial court's determination that the exclusion in the PWD policy did not apply to the damage sustained by Jordan Point presents a mixed question of law and fact. The factual findings of the trial court are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Cardinal Dev. Co. v. Stanley Constr. Co., 255 Va. 300, 302, 497 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1998). However, interpretation of the provisions of an insurance contract presents a question of law that we consider de novo. See C.F. Garcia Enters., Inc. v. Enterprise Ford Tractor, Inc., 253 Va. 104, 107, 480 S.E.2d 497, 498-99 (1997).
Both RBMW and Transcontinental assert on appeal that our recent decision in Lower Chesapeake Assocs. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 260 Va. 77, 532 S.E.2d 325 (2000), governs the resolution of this case. Transcontinental posits that in Lower Chesapeake we specifically upheld an exclusion, virtually identical to the one present in the case at bar, holding that it was clear and unambiguous. RBMW disagrees and claims that we ruled in Lower Chesapeake that the exclusion was ambiguous when read in conjunction with the portion of the insurance policy regarding "Additional Coverage Collapse." RBMW's interpretation of our decision in Lower Chesapeake is the more accurate of the two positions.
Lower Chesapeake involved a dispute over whether a PWD policy, virtually identical to the policy at issue in the present case, covered damage sustained during Hurricane Fran to four docks at a marina. Initially, we considered the meaning of the word "collapse" as it was used in Section A(4)(a), "Additional Coverage Collapse," of the PWD policy. We applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the word as it was defined in the dictionary and held that "collapse" means "`to break down completely: fall apart in confused disorganization: . . . disintegrate.'" Id. at 86, 532 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 443 (1993)). Under this definition, only part of one dock in Lower Chesapeake suffered a "collapse." Id. at 86-87, 532 S.E.2d at 331.
In Lower Chesapeake, we also considered the application of the exclusions in the PWD policy. We held that the damage incurred by the docks that were battered by the storm, but did not collapse, resulted from excluded causes. Id. at 87, 532 S.E.2d 331. Specifically, we said that the evidence amply supported the trial court's finding that the damage to these docks "resulted, at least in part, from the excluded causes of `[f]lood, . . . waves, tides, tidal waves, . . . all whether driven by wind or not.'" Id. As to the one dock that suffered a "collapse," Valley Forge, the insurance carrier, argued that the same exclusions that nullified coverage to the docks that had not collapsed applied to the dock that did. Id. We disagreed, holding that "[b]ecause these provisions of the dock coverage form are ambiguous, we construe the policy in favor of providing coverage and hold that the exclusions in Section B are inapplicable to the collapse coverage of Section A(4)(a) [Additional Coverage Collapse]." Id. at 88, 532 S.E.2d at 332. We based this decision on the fact that the disputed policy language permitted more than one reasonable interpretation of the application of the exclusion provision in Section B to the collapse provision in Section A(4)(a). Id.
Exclusion B(1)(e)(4) excludes from coverage direct or indirect loss caused by "[f]lood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflowing of any body of water, or their spray, all whether driven by wind or not." Initially, the trial court found that the damage to Jordan Point was not caused by a flood.
The trial court based its finding on the fact that Black's Law Dictionary defined "flood" as "an inundation of water over land not usually covered by it." This definition is found in the sixth edition ofBlack's. The seventh, and most current, edition does not contain a definition for "flood." However, Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines "flood" as "a rising and overflowing of a body of water esp. onto normally dry land."
However, instead of considering the remaining excluded causes of loss on an individual basis, the trial court read the exclusion as if the phrase "overflowing of any body of water" modified the words "flood," "surface water," "waves," "tides," and "tidal waves." As such, the trial court held that because the waves and tides were "not beyond the limits of the river," they were not "overflowing of the body of water."
The trial court stated that Black's defines "overflow" as "to flow or spread beyond the limits." Neither the sixth nor seventh edition ofBlack's contains a definition for "overflow." Because we disagree with the trial court's grammatical reading of the exclusion, we need not consider whether "to flow or spread beyond the limits" is the ordinary or accepted meaning of "overflow."
We disagree with this grammatical construction of the exclusion. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the placement of commas in the exclusion indicates that each subject matter must be separately considered, including, "overflowing of any body of water." In this context, the phrase, "overflowing of any body of water," is a verbal noun known as a gerund. See William Strunk, Jr. E.B. White, The Elements of Style 55 (4th ed. 2000). Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider each of the excluded causes of loss on an individual basis to determine whether coverage was excluded.
[9-10] Having determined that the damage to Jordan Point did not result from a "flood," the trial court should then have considered the remaining excluded causes in Section B(1)(e)(4) separately, starting with a "wave." A "wave" is defined in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary as "a moving ridge or swell on the surface of a liquid (as of the sea)." Significantly, unlike a "flood," a "wave" does not require movement of water into an area not typically covered by it. It is clear that the damage to Jordan Point was caused, at least in part, by waves. Winn admitted that, in his opinion, waves did most of the damage to the docks and the boathouse. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in ruling that exclusion B(1)(e)(4) by its terms did not apply to any of the damage to Jordan Point.
III. RBMW's Nonsuit a. Standard of Review
We have stated, when construing the nonsuit statute, that for an action to be "submitted to the court," it is "necessary for the parties, by counsel, to have both yielded the issues to the court for consideration and decision." Moore v. Moore, 218 Va. 790, 795, 240 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1978). We stated that this could be accomplished "either as the result of oral or written argument, formal notice and motion, or by tendering a jointly endorsed sketch for a decree." Id. at 795-96, 240 S.E.2d at 538. However, in City of Hopewell v. Cogar, 237 Va. 264, 268, 377 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1989), we stated that "[i]nMoore, we made no attempt to delineate every possible situation when an action would or would not be `submitted' to the court for decision under the nonsuit statute."
We have previously approved a trial court's granting of a nonsuit even though motions had been presented to the court and argument had occurred. See Kelly v. Carrico, 256 Va. 282, 286, 504 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1998) (holding that there was no submission because the motion for nonsuit was made before the court recessed after oral argument to consider the merits of the motion for judgment on the pleadings); Cogar, 237 Va. at 267, 377 S.E.2d at 387 (holding that there was no submission because the motion for nonsuit was made within period allowed by court, after oral argument, for litigants to file additional memoranda in support of their positions on a motion for summary judgment).
Robins also claims that RBMW should not have been permitted to suffer a nonsuit because the trial court had already made a ruling that was dispositive as to the cause of action against Robins. For support of this proposition, Robins relies upon our decision in Wells v. Lorcom House Condominiums' Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 381 (1989). In Wells, the plaintiff and defendants had argued before the trial court defendants' demurrer attacking the legal sufficiency of an amended motion for judgment, defendants' plea in bar based on various statutes of limitations, and defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 384. The trial court took the matters "under advisement."Id. at 250, 377 S.E.2d at 382. The plaintiff requested a nonsuit before the trial court issued its ruling, but we held that the request came too late, noting: