Source: http://openjurist.org/653/f2d/26
Timestamp: 2014-10-24 09:02:08
Document Index: 284471531

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848', '§ 848']

653 F2d 26 United States v. Chagra | OpenJurist
653 F. 2d 26 - United States v. Chagra	Home653 f2d 26 united states v. chagra
653 F2d 26 United States v. Chagra 653 F.2d 26
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,v.Jamiel CHAGRA, Defendant, Appellee.
Argued May 8, 1981.Decided June 30, 1981.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 21, 1981.
Section 848 states that a person "who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment" of 10 years to life, a fine of up to $100,000 and forfeiture of all profits from the enterprise. It then defines the violation more specifically: A person engages in a continuing criminal enterprise if (1) he violates any felony provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act or the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, and (2) the violation is part of a continuing series of violations undertaken in concert with five or more other persons, he organizes, manages or supervises those others, and he derives substantial income from the activity.1 The courts have defined "continuing series" to mean three or more violations. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the statute is aimed at drug ring managers or "kingpins", and it defines their role in terms of supervising others while engaged in three or more drug felonies.
The government indicted Chagra, the defendant, in the Western District of Texas on July 31, 1979.2 The first three counts of the indictment charged conspiracies to import marijuana and cocaine and possession of cocaine, all in 1977. The fourth count charged a violation of § 848. It alleged that Chagra committed fourteen relevant underlying drug felonies between April 1974 and April 1978, in concert with at least five other persons whom he organized, managed or supervised. These fourteen consisted of those charged in the first three counts and eleven others, seven of which took place in 1977 or 1978, one of which took place on December 30, 1976, and three of which took place in 1974. After trial, Chagra was convicted on counts three and four. He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment on count four (the § 848 count).3 His appeal from that conviction is currently pending.
In July 1980, the district court considered defendant's motion to dismiss the Massachusetts indictment on grounds of double jeopardy. The court agreed with the government that these charges and the Texas charges were different: the facts alleged were different, the times of the specific actions charged were different, the evidence was different. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the events charged in Massachusetts "fall squarely within the period of continuous violations charged in the Texas indictment." Moreover, the Texas indictment referred to violations committed in "divers other places to the grand jurors unknown." And, evidence of the Massachusetts violations might have been admitted in Texas to show additional felonies underlying the § 848 charge. Therefore, the court severed and continued counts one and three (the conspiracy counts). The court proceeded with counts two and four, reasoning that they could not have been charged in Texas because venue would not have been proper there; but subsequently, the district judge changed his mind about the importance of lack of venue. Then, to simplify the case, while expediting appeal, the parties agreed to conduct a bench trial. The court found Chagra guilty on counts two and four and sentenced him; it then vacated that determination; it also vacated the order severing counts one and three; and it dismissed all four counts on grounds of double jeopardy. The government appeals from this latter determination.
Given these differences, a claim of double jeopardy ordinarily could not be sustained even if the offenses charged in the two indictments had been the same. If, for example, conspiracies to possess, or to distribute, or to import, controlled substances had been charged in both indictments, the factors set out above indicate they would have been considered separate, free-standing conspiracies, for which separate indictments, trials and punishments are proper. United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Papa, supra. The fact that the offenses charged here arise under different statutory provisions would ordinarily weaken the case for "double jeopardy" still further, see United States v. Marable, supra.
Defendant here, however, argues that the special relation between § 848 and the drug felonies that potentially underlie a § 848 charge creates double jeopardy where otherwise none would exist. He argues that these latter violations are all "lesser included offenses" in the § 848 "continuing criminal enterprise". The government, he argues, cannot indict him for both the "enterprise" and any contemporaneous offenses that might have constituted a part of that enterprise, whether or not those lesser offenses were "free standing" in relation to each other. See United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980).