Source: http://openjurist.org/96/f3d/1020
Timestamp: 2015-04-18 23:51:48
Document Index: 77564998

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1097', '§ 1097', '§ 1097', '§ 636', '§ 636', '§ 1097', '§ 1097']

96 F3d 1020 United States v. Ranum | OpenJurist
96 F. 3d 1020 - United States v. Ranum	Home96 f3d 1020 united states v. ranum
96 F3d 1020 United States v. Ranum 96 F.3d 1020
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Gary RANUM, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 95-2512.
Argued Dec. 13, 1995.Decided Sept. 25, 1996.
Larry Wszalek, argued, Office of the United States Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
T. Christopher Kelly, argued, Reynolds, Thomas, Kelly & Habermehl, Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gary Ranum was charged in a one-count information with "knowingly and willfully obtain[ing] by ... false statements" federally-insured student loan funds in an amount not exceeding $200, a misdemeanor violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a) punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed one year and/or a maximum fine of $1,000. Ranum used a false Social Security number on some eight separate occasions in order to obtain federally-insured loans totalling $7,586 and thus could have been charged with a felony in violation of § 1097(a), which carries a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment and/or a maximum fine of $10,000. 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a). After negotiation, the Government agreed to charge Ranum with a misdemeanor offense in exchange for the defendant's agreement to plead guilty and pay restitution. With the advice of counsel, and pursuant to a signed, written plea agreement, Ranum entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor violation and agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $7,586. At the time of his plea hearing, the defendant consented to proceedings before a magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4). The magistrate judge accepted Ranum's plea after conducting a hearing to satisfy himself that the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. During the proceedings and before sentencing, Ranum requested of the court permission to withdraw his plea of guilty, alleging that it was invalid because he had not been made aware of all possible defenses available to him. The magistrate judge denied the motion and sentenced Ranum to three years probation and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $7,586, together with a criminal assessment penalty of $25.1 Ranum appealed to the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4), contesting the magistrate judge's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court reviewed the proceedings and affirmed the order of the magistrate judge. Ranum appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and requests that he be permitted to proceed to trial. We affirm.
A. Ranum's Loan Application(s)
Gary Ranum is fifty-three years of age and is a college graduate (University of Wisconsin 1973). He entertained the idea of becoming a physician for many years. Ranum attended the University of Iowa Physician Assistant Program in 1987-88, obtaining student loans for this purpose. In 1989, he registered for coursework at the University of Wisconsin ("UW") Medical School. He withdrew from the program after four months when it became clear that he could not qualify for financial assistance. Although the record is not as detailed as it might be, it appears that Ranum may very well have been denied financial aid on the basis that he was in default on a previous student loan (or loans) from earlier in his educational career. The record does not reflect but we assume that these loans were obtained using Ranum's valid Social Security number.
In January of 1991, Ranum registered for classes at the Madison Area Technical College ("MATC"), with the goal of obtaining certification as a real estate agent. In completing the registration paperwork, Ranum used a Social Security number that was not his own, but rather a number that differed from his own validly-issued Social Security number by one digit. Ranum admitted at his plea hearing that he was aware of this discrepancy, but alleges that this number was assigned to him mistakenly by MATC itself and that he used it to avoid the inconvenience of clearing up an administrative mistake (the record is devoid of any evidentiary support for this claim). In order to receive a federally-insured educational loan from a private lender, one must first provide certain information to the U.S. Department of Education to establish eligibility for such a loan. Accordingly, in mid-February 1991, several weeks after registering at MATC, Ranum completed and signed a Financial Aid Form ("FAF")2 for the academic year 1990-91, again entering the same false Social Security number, and submitted the document to the Department of Education for processing. In early April 1991, Ranum received, signed, and returned to the Department of Education a verification form known as a "Student Aid Report" ("SAR"), which set forth the false Social Security number that Ranum had previously provided on the FAF. The SAR form signed by Ranum stated, inaccurately, that the defendant was not currently in default on any previous student loans.3 The defendant continued to use the bogus Social Security number on two promissory note applications that he executed and submitted to the lender, Great Lakes Higher Education Corporation ("GLHEC"), in April and May of 1991. The promissory note application forms stated that the applicant had not been in default with respect to any previous student loans, and further stated that the applicant had not received student loan assistance of any kind before July 1, 1988. However, the record reflects that Ranum was in default on earlier educational loans as late as 1989 (when he was denied financial aid at UW), and that he remained in default at the time he started using the false Social Security number to obtain financial aid at MATC in 1991.4 Thus, the defendant was not only knowingly using a false Social Security number, but he was also giving the lender false information concerning his past and current loan default status.5 Ranum also deceived the lender when stating that he had not obtained any student loans prior to July 1, 1988, for the record clearly reflects that he obtained student loans in college during the early 1970's and again when he attended the Iowa Physician Assistant Program in 1987-88.
When applying for student loans for the 1991-92 academic year at MATC, Ranum repeated the pattern of fraud and deceit described above: entering the bogus Social Security number on a FAF, a SAR, and two promissory note application forms. The defendant continued to use the false Social Security number, with full knowledge that it was not his own, and ultimately obtained a total of $7,586 in financial aid while attending MATC.6 Ranum's use of the false Social Security number to accomplish this fraudulent scheme was uncovered in an investigation by the U.S. Department of Education's Inspector General's Office.
Ranum concedes that he knowingly and willfully used a false Social Security number in filling out the student loan application forms. At the same time, he somehow claims that it was not his intention to deceive anyone with his use of the false number.7
B. Ranum's Plea Agreement & Hearing
Ranum's written, signed plea agreement stated that he would enter a plea of guilty to making a false statement in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a), as set forth in the information,8 in exchange for the Government's recommendation that he receive a two-level reduction in his Sentencing Guidelines offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
At the plea hearing, the magistrate judge conducted a colloquy with Ranum in order that he might ascertain whether his plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. Initially, the magistrate judge determined that Ranum had been afforded an adequate opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with his lawyer. Thereafter, the Government, at the request of the magistrate judge, summarized the plea agreement, including the nature of the charge and maximum penalties, in the presence of the defendant and for the court record. Ranum acknowledged that the prosecutor's summary of the crime as well as his participation in the scheme was accurate and thereafter entered a plea of guilty. When queried by the magistrate judge, he stated that no one had improperly influenced his decision to enter a plea of guilty, that he understood the crime with which he was charged, and that he was aware of the legal consequences of entering the guilty plea (including the waiver of constitutional rights such as the right to trial, etc., which the court reviewed in detail in addition to explaining the sentencing procedure that would be used following a plea). After reviewing these matters with the defendant in some detail, the court again sought to determine whether or not the defendant was entering his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily:
THE COURT: Let me ask this in a slightly different way. It sort of covers where we have already been. But under the United States Constitution, nobody can make you plead guilty to a crime. And by pleading guilty today, you are giving up that right and admitting that you did what the government says that you did. Do you understand that that is what is happening, and do you give up that right?
RANUM: Yes, I do, Sir.
The Government then proffered the set of facts surrounding the crime that it was prepared to establish at trial, including the defendant's admission to the Department of Education investigator that he had obtained student loans by using a Social Security number well knowing that it was not his own. Ranum himself, when queried by the magistrate judge concerning the factual basis for the charge, admitted that he knowingly used a false Social Security number on the loan application. The court asked Ranum if he knew that the number he had used was not his own and Ranum replied: "That is correct. I am guilty of not changing that number in the records. I used that number that [MATC] had given me." Finally, Ranum again stated for the record that he was pleading guilty to the crime as charged.
The defendant Ranum was represented by counsel and was given ample opportunity to consult with his lawyer before entering his plea of guilty.
The sole issue in this case is whether intent to deceive the Government is an essential element of the crime of making a false statement under 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a). Ranum contends that it is, and that consequently he had available to him a defense of which he was unaware at the time he entered his plea: namely, the defense that he lacked the intent to deceive the Government. Because he was not apprised of this defense, Ranum argues that (despite the assistance of counsel) his plea of guilty was not knowingly and voluntarily made and that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea.
A. Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas
Due process and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 require that a defendant's guilty plea be voluntarily (i.e., not induced by threats or promises of any kind), and knowingly made. See United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir.1991); Haase v. United States, 800 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir.1986). Thus, the defendant must understand the elements of the crime to which he is pleading, as a guilty plea is an admission of all of the elements of the crime charged. Musa, 946 F.2d at 1303 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)); see also United States v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582, 586 (7th Cir.1992) (defendant must be informed of and understand "the nature of the charge" to which he is pleading). The defendant must also understand "that his or her conduct actually falls within the charge[,] ... and should be made aware of possible defenses, at least where the defendant makes known facts that might form the basis of such defenses." United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1984).
While this court has emphasized the importance and the solemnity of Rule 11 hearings, such events need not provide the defendant with a detailed course on criminal procedure:
We have never required strict adherence to the strictures [of Rule 11]; rather, the focus is on whether, looking at the total circumstances surrounding the plea, the defendant was informed of his or her rights. We have not and do not intend to mandate a specific format or dialogue to be followed in a Rule 11 hearing. If the defendant is fully apprised of his rights and the consequences of his actions, and he knowingly and voluntarily enters into the entire contents of the plea agreement, the hearing is proper.
United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir.1995) (citations and quotations omitted) (plea was knowing and voluntary despite the fact that defendant was asked only questions requiring yes or no answers). Our decisions have adopted a flexible, common-sense "totality of the circumstances" approach in determining whether or not a defendant fully understood the charges to which he pled. United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1423 (7th Cir.1994). Under this approach, "we consider the complexity of the charge, the defendant's level of intelligence, age and education, whether the defendant was represented by counsel, the judge's inquiry during the plea hearing and the defendant's statements, as well as the evidence proffered by the government." Id.
Rule 32(e) provides that "[i]f a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty ... is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason." Fed. R.Crim. P.32(e) (emphasis added). One "fair and just reason" for withdrawal is a showing that the plea was not entered knowingly. United States v. Saenz, 969 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir.1992). A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea; rather, the decision to permit such a withdrawal is committed to the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 757-58 (7th Cir.1993). Our decisions have underscored the broad discretion available to trial judges in ruling on withdrawal motions of this nature:
When a defendant wishes to withdraw his plea after he states at a Rule 11 hearing that it was freely and knowingly given, he faces an uphill battle in persuading the judge that his purported reason for withdrawing his plea is "fair and just." The presumption of verity is overcome only if the defendant satisfies a heavy burden of persuasion. The district court is generally justified in discrediting the proffered reasons for the motion to withdraw and holding the defendant to his admissions at the Rule 11 hearing.
Messino, 55 F.3d at 1248 (quotations omitted).
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the test for whether a plea is knowing and voluntary is a flexible one, and the decision to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea is committed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Ordinarily, we would analyze in some detail the factors