Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/11-1351
Timestamp: 2013-05-22 10:51:28
Document Index: 249460507

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1089', '§1089', '§1089', '§2680', '§2680', '§2680', '§1089', '§2680', '§1089', '§1089', '§1089', '§2680', '§2679', '§1089', '§2679', '§1089', '§1089', '§1089', '§233', '§2680', '§1089', '§2702', '§2680', '§7316', '§2680', '§20137', '§2680', '§7316', '§1089', '§2680', '§1089', '§2680', '§2679', '§1089']

LEVIN v. UNITED STATES | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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(a) To determine whether the Government’s immunity is waived for batteries, the Court looks to §1089(e)’s language, “giving the ‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’ ” Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103. Levin claims that the operative clause of §1089(e), which provides that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception “shall not apply” to medical malpractice claims, is qualified by the provision’s introductory clause “[f]or purposes of this section,” which confines the operative clause to claims alleging malpractice by personnel in the armed forces and the other agencies specified in the Gonzalez Act. The Government, in contrast, argues that §1089(e)’s introductory clause instructs courts to pretend, “[f]or purposes of” the Gonzalez Act, that §2680(h) does not secure the Government against liability for intentional torts, including battery, even though §2680(h) does provide that shelter. The choice between the parties’ dueling constructions is not a difficult one. Section 1089(e)’s operative clause states, in no uncertain terms, that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, §2680(h), “shall not apply,” and §1089(e)’s introductory clause confines the abrogation of §2680(h) to medical personnel employed by the agencies listed in the Gonzalez Act. Had Congress wanted to adopt the Government’s counterfactual interpretation, it could have used more precise language, as it did in §1089(c), a subsection adjacent to §1089(e). Pp. 8–11.
(b) Under the Government’s interpretation of §1089(e), the Liability Reform Act would displace much of the Gonzalez Act. That reading conflicts with the view the Government stated in United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160. There, the question was whether a person injured abroad due to a military doctor’s negligence may seek compensation from the doctor in a U. S. court, for the FTCA gave them no recourse against the Government on a “claim arising in a foreign country,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(k). In arguing that such persons also lacked recourse to a suit against the doctor, the Government contended that the Liability Reform Act made “[t]he remedy against the United States” under the FTCA “exclusive.” §2679(b)(1). This interpretation, the Government argued, would not override the Gonzalez Act, which would continue to serve two important functions: Title 10 U. S. C. §1089(f)(1) would authorize indemnification of individual military doctors sued abroad where foreign law might govern; and the Gonzalez Act would allow an FTCA suit against the United States if the doctor performed a procedure to which the plaintiff did not consent. Adopting the Government’s construction, the Court held that §2679(b)(1) grants all federal employees, including medical personnel, immunity for acts within the scope of their employment, even when the FTCA provides no remedy against the United States. 499 U. S., at 166. Under the Government’s current reading of §1089(e), the Liability Reform Act overrides the Gonzalez Act except in the atypical circumstances in which indemnification of the doctor under §1089(f)(1) remains possible, while under Levin’s reading, the Gonzalez Act does just what the Government said it did in Smith. Pp. 11–13.
1985, 10 U. S. C. §1089, passed in 1976 and com- monly known as the Gonzalez Act.
1870, 42 U. S. C. §233(e) (1976 ed.) (“For purposes of this section, the provisions of [§2680(h)] shall not apply to assault or battery arising out of negligence in the performance of medical . . . functions.”). Targeted immunity statutes enacted around the same time as the Gonzalez Act similarly shielded medical personnel employed by specific agencies. See supra, at 3, n. 2. Each such measure contained a provision resembling §1089(e). See 22 U. S. C. §2702(e) (“For purposes of this section, the provisions of [§2680(h)], shall not apply to any tort enumerated therein arising out of negligence in the furnishing of medical care or related services.”); 38 U. S. C. §7316(f) (“The exception provided in [§2680(h)] shall not apply to any claim arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission of any person described in subsection (a) in furnishing medical care or treatment . . . while in the exercise of such person’s duties in or for the Administration.”); 51 U. S. C. §20137(e) (“For purposes of this section, the provisions of [§2680(h)] shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrong- ful act or omission in the performance of medical . . . functions.”).
38 U. S. C. §7316(f), concerning Department of Veterans Affairs’ medical personnel, includes an “es- sentially identical counterpart” to §1089(e), which sim- ilarly “nullif[ies] §2680(h) and thereby expand[s] the injured party’s remedy against the government under the FTCA”).
Were we to accept the Government’s interpretation of §1089(e), the Liability Reform Act would displace much of the Gonzalez Act. To explain why this is so, we describe the situation before the Court in United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160. Smith presented the question whether persons injured abroad due to a military doctor’s negligence may seek compensation in a U. S. court from the doctor who caused the injury. Because the FTCA excludes from the Government’s waiver of immunity “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(k), the plaintiffs in Smith had no remedy against the United States. They also lacked recourse to a suit in this country against the doctor, the Government urged, for the Liability Reform Act made “[t]he remedy against the United States” under the FTCA “exclusive of any other civil action.” §2679(b)(1). Were that the case, the plaintiffs responded, the Liability Reform Act would effectively repeal the Gonzalez Act. See Brief for Respondents in Smith, O. T. 1990, No. 89–1646, pp. 33–46. In particular, they observed, 10 U. S. C. §1089(f)(1) authorizes the head of an agency to indemnify military doctors “assigned to a foreign country” whose negligent conduct injures a patient. But the indemnification provision would have no work to do, the plaintiffs argued, if the Liability Reform Act foreclosed suit against the doctor.
We see nothing dispositively different about the word- ing of the two provisions.