Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=1667
Timestamp: 2019-11-13 13:02:52
Document Index: 709194879

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 14', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 14', 'Art.\n31', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\t19', 'Art. 19', 'Art.\n19', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\t14', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 31', 'Art.31', 'Art.\t31', 'Art 14']

MAHARANA SHRI JAYVANTSINGHJI RANMALSINGHJI versus THE STATE OF GUJRAT
1962 AIR 821	1962 SCR Supl. (2) 411
MAHARANA SHRI JAYVANTSINGHJI RANMALSINGHJI V. THE STATE OF GUJRAT [1961] RD-SC 365 (22 December 1961)
22/12/1961 DAS, S.K.
CITATION: 1962 AIR 821	1962 SCR Supl. (2) 411
RF	1963 SC 864	(30) RF	1970 SC 564	(43) F	1971 SC1992	(14) RF	1977 SC2121	(1) R	1979 SC1550	(14)
Land Tenure, Abolition	of-Amendment	of enactment-If creates a	new class of	permanent tenants-Constitutional	validity-If infringes fundamental rights of	erstwhile tenure-holders- Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bom. LVII of 1958), ss. 3, 4, 6-Constitution of India, Art. 14, 19 (1)(f), 31, 31-A.
The petitioners,	who were tenure-holders, challenged the	constitutional	validity of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 and in particular ss. 3 and 4 read with s. 6 of that Act,	as infringing	their fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Their case in brief was that those provisions by making certain non-permanent tenants permanent as from the	commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, enabled them to acquire occupancy right by payment of six times the assessment or the rent under s. 5A of that Act instead of 20 times to 200 times the assessment under s. 32H	of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, 412 as amended in	1956, and thereby substantially deprived the petitioners of the rights acquired by them on	the 'tillers'	day, April 1, 1957, when they ceased to be tenure-holders. It	was urged that the impugned Act	was a piece of colourable legislation in	that it had confiscated, under the guise of defining a permanent tenant or changing a rule of	evidence, a large part of the purchase price the petitioners were entitled to from their tenants, and that the	State Legislature had not the competence	to enact it as it was not saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution.
^ Held, (Sarkar	and	Mudholkar, JJ., dissenting), that ss.3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958, in so far as	they deemed some tenants as	permanent tenants in possession of Taluqudari land, were unconstitutional and void. Under the	guise	of changing the definition of a permanent tenant and changing a rule of evidence, they really reduced the purchase price that the	petitioners were entitled to receive under s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy	and Agricultural Lands Act,	1948,	as amended in 1956, from some of their tenants on the "tillers' day." Per Sinha,	C.J., and Das, J.-There can be no doubt that s. 4 of the impugned Act, properly construed, created a	new class of	permanent tenants not contemplated by s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and not in existence on the 'tillers' day", and the combined effect of ss.
3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act was that if the tenure holder did not make an application under s.
6 within six months from the commencement of the impugned Act for a declaration that a tenant under him was	not a	permanent tenant, the name of the tenant would be recorded as a permanent tenant if he fulfilled the conditions laid down by s. 4 and thereafter he would be	deemed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant and under s. 4 all the provisions of the	Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949, would apply to him.	The result of this combined effect would be to	deprive	the tenure-holder of	any real opportunity of contesting the claims of the tenant and deprive him of the purchase price prescribed by s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
The right	of the	petitioners to	the said purchase price	from those of their tenants who were non-permanent on April 1, 1957, was a right of property guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) and the impugned sections adversely affected that right with retrospective effect Section 6, tested in the light of Art. 19(5), could not be said to impose a reasonable restriction	in the	interest of the general public.
413 Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, applied.
Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The	State	of Bombay. [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, referred to.
Article 31A of	the Constitution had	no application. The relation between the tenure- holders and the tenants had changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor on April 1, 1957, and	the impugned	Act which affected such rights, did not	come within the protection of that Article.
In view of the true scope and effect of ss.
3, 4 and 6, the impugned Act could not fall within any entry of List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was	a piece of colourable legislation.
Per Sarkar	and Mudholkar,	JJ.-Section 4	of the impugned Act did not expand the definition of a permanent tenant and	did not take	away any property that was vested in the landlord on the "tillers day".	Nor did it confer any new property on the tenant. It only applied to and rescued a permanent tenant faced with the task	of proving the nature of his	tenancy, by raising	a presumption of	permanency in his favour. If	in fact his tenancy was not permanent and had been extinguished by law	but he was tentatively recorded as permanent, the landlord could rebut the presumption	in a proceeding under s. 6 (1) by producing the	documents in his possession	or otherwise by showing that the tenancy was not in fact permanent and, therefore,	had been extinguished by s. 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands	Act, 1948, and claim compensation or the	purchase money	under	s.
32H(1)(II) of the Act,	that right of his not having been affected in any way by the impugned Act. If he failed, he would get the purchase price according to s. 5A of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act,	1949, which would not	be and was not challenged.
Dhirubha Devisingh	Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691, referred to.
The impugned Act dealt with matters arising out of	the relationship between landlord and tenant. Its provisions were not intended to apply where such relationship did not subsist. The Act was, therefore, within the competence of the Legislature under entry 18 of	List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was thus not a piece of colourable legislation.
31(1) and the Act was within	the protection	of Art. 31A of the	Constitution	and its Constitutional Validity	could not be	challenged under Art. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
Held, further, that the	distinction made between tenure	villages and non-tenure ones was a classification based on the extent of availability of the	material for raising the inference or the presumption and such	classification had	a reasonable nexus with the object sought to	be achieved by the Act.
Per Ayyangar, J.-There was no basis for the argument that s. 4 of the impugned Act merely intended to provide	a rule of evidence for determining who was a permanent tenant under s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and did not extend the category of	such tenants. It enacts a positive rule	of law by which a	person	in possession of holding of a tenure-land must	be "deemed" to be a permanent tenant on fulfilment of the three specified conditions. This is evident from the provisions of	s. 6(1) under which every person who satisfied the definition of a permanent tenant under s. 4 was entitled automatically and without applying for to be entered as a permanent tenant in the record of rights by the Mamlatdar unless the tenure-holder filed an objection	in writing. Obviously such objection could only be on grounds open to him under s. 4. Section 4(b) and s.6(1) of the impugned Act had to be read together as forming an integrated whole. The entire object and purpose of the impugned enactment was not, therefore, to	enact	a rule	of evidence for determining who	were permanent	tenants under the pre-existing law but	to define and create a new class of permanent tenants who satisfied s. 4 of the Act.
415 C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General	of India, N.P. Nathwani, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
N.P. Nathwani and I.	N. Shroff for respondents Nos. 5 and 6 (in Petns. Nos. 120, 148 and 156 of 1958).
1961. December 22.-The Judgment of Sinha, C.
J., and	Das, J., was delivered by Das, J., the judgment of Sarkar and Mudholkar	JJ., was delivered by Mudholkar, J., and Ayyangar, J., delivered a separate judgment.
S. K. Das, J.-In	these 13 writ	petitions arises a common question of	law, namely, the constitutional validity	of some of the provisions of the	Bombay Land	Tenure	Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bombay	Act LVII of 1958) and in	particular, of the provisions contained in ss. 3 and 4 read with	s. 6 thereof.	We shall hereinafter refer to this Act as the impugned Act, 1958.
Put very briefly, the case of the petitioners is that	as a result of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958, certain non-permanent tenants were deemed to be permanent tenants as from the commencement of the	Bombay	Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act,	1949 (Bombay Act LXII	of 1949), hereinafter referred to as the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 and thereby	became entitled to acquire on payment of six times the assessment or six times the rent instead of at least the minimum of twenty times the assessment, the rights of	an "occupant" within the meaning	of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. This result, it is contended, has substantially deprived the petitioners of	the rights which they acquired on tillers' day (April 1,	1957) by reason of the provisions contained in s. 32 and other relevant sections of the Bombay	Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of	1948)	as amended from time to time. It is 416 stated that this deprivation has resulted in the violation of certain fundamental rights of the petitioners, such as those guaranteed under Arts.
14, 19	and 31	of the	Constitution. On behalf of the petitioners	it has	also been contended that apart from the question of violation	of their fundamental rights, the impugned Act, 1958 is a piece of colourable legislation in the sense that under the guise of changing a rule of evidence, it has in effect taken away the petitioners' property without payment	of compensation and given it to another; it is, therefore, a piece of legislation which does not come within any entry of the two legislative lists under which the State Legislature was competent to make laws.
To appreciate the points urged in support of the petitions which have all been heard together, it will	be necessary to consider the effect and inter-; action	of some	of the provisions of four principal Acts, namely, (1)	the Bombay Land Revenue	code 1879 (Bombay	Act V	of 1879), hereinafter referred to as the Revenue Code; (2) the Bombay Tenancy and	Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended from	time to	time, hereinafter called the Tenancy Act, 1948; (3) the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1979; and (4) the impugned Act, 1958. We shall presently read the relevant provisions of these Acts. But before we do so, it is necessary to state	some facts. The facts are similar, though not	the same, in	all the petitions. It will be	sufficient to	state the facts of one of the petitions (Petition no. 120 of 1958) in detail in order to focus attention on the main question of law which is	the same in all these petitions and	which we have	indicated briefly in the preceding paragraph.
The petitioners are all	ex-Taluqdars.	In Petition No. 120 of 1958 the	petitioner was	a Taluqdar of two estates known as Sanand and Koth in the Ahmedabad district of the then State of 417 Bombay and now of the State of Gujarat. These two estates comprised 24	Taluqdari villages. The petitioner was	the absolute proprietor of all the lands comprised	in the	two estates, subject	to payment of land revenue to the State (Government under the petitioner there were tenants-it	is stated, some permanent and some non-permanent. In the year 1949, the Bombay Provincial Legislature enacted the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 which came into force on August 15, 1950. As a result of the provisions	of that	Act, the Taluqdari tenure as such was abolished and certain properties, such as, wells, tanks, waste lands, uncultivated lands, etc., were acquired by the State; and the Taluqdar was converted into mere "occupant" as defined in the Revenue Code and was to pay land revenue in accordance with the provisions of that Code.
Section 3 (16) of the Revenue	code defined	an "occupant" as	meaning "a holder in actual possession of	unalienated land, other than	a tenant; provided that where the holder in actual possession is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as the case	may be, shall be deemed to be the	occupant." In 1955 the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was amended and s. 5A was inserted. This section, in effect, gave a permanent	tenant	in possession of Taluqdari land the right to become an occupant if he paid six times the assessment for acquiring the right of occupancy.	In other words, if a permanent	tenant of an ex-Taluqdar paid the required amount as stated in s. 5A, he became an occupant. himself in place	of the ex- Taluqdar and came into	direct relation with the State in the matter of payment of land revenue, and acquired all the rights of an occupant under the Revenue Code. The right which was conferred by s. 5A was available at first for a limited period only, but it was extended till 1962 as stated at the Bar. It is	necessary to state now what	is meant by "permanent tenant". Section 16 of the Taluqdari Abolition 418 Act, 1949 made the provisions of the Revenue Code applicable thereto and an attempt was made	to harmonize the	provisions of the	Taluqdari Abolition Act,	1949 with the provisions of the Revenue Code; therefore, for understanding what is a "permanent tenant" we have to go to the Revenue Code, s. 83 whereof, so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:
"83 x x x	x x And where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy,	no satisfactory evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and there is not any such	evidence of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and	tenant,	or those under whom	they respectively claim title, or any usage of the	locality as to duration of such tenants, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of	such landlord and of	those who derive title under him.
And where there is no satisfactory evidence of the capacity in which a person in possession of land in respect of	which	he renders service or pays rent to the landlord received, holds or retains possession of the same it shall be	presumed that	he is	in possession as tenant.
x	x	x	x It will	be noticed that the expression "permanent tenant" does not occur	in the	section. What	is stated therein	is that	in certain circumstances the duration of the tenancy of a tenant as against his immediate landlord shall be presumed to be co- extensive with	the duration of the tenure of such landlord. The two circumstances mentioned are, (1) where by reason of the antiquity of the tenancy no satisfactory evidence	of its commencement	is forthcoming, and (2)	where there is no such evidence 419 of the	period of its intended	duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and	tenant, or any usage of the locality as	to duration of the tenancy. Some time later, by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956, the definition of a "permanent tenant" was inserted in s. 2(10A)	of the	Tenancy Act, 1948.
"`permanent tenant' means a person- (a) who immediately before the commencement of	the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment)	Act, 1955 (hereinafter called `the Amending Act, 1955')- (i) holds land	as mulgenidar	or mirasdar; or (ii) by custom,	agreement, or the decree or order of a Court	holds the land on lease permanently; or (b) the commencement or duration	of whose tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved by reason of antiquity;
and includes	a tenant whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in	the record of rights or in any public record or in any other revenue record as a permanent tenant immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955." Section 87A of the Tenancy Act, shall, which was also inserted by Bombay Act XII of 1956 by s. 47 thereof, said:
"Nothing in this Act, shall affect the provisions	of any of	the Land Tenures Abolition Acts, specified in Schedule III to this Act, in so far as such provisions relate to the conferment of right of An occupant in favour of	any inferior holder or	tenant in respect of any land held by him." 420 In Schedule III to the Tenancy Act,	1948, was given a list of Land Tenures Abolition Act, including the	Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949.
Therefore, the effect of s. 87A aforesaid was that nothing in the Tenancy	Act, 1948, affected the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, in so far as the provisions in s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949, conferred the right of an occupant in favour of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land on payment of the sums mentioned	therein. The arguments before	us have proceeded	on the	footing	that before the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958, the status of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land	was to be determined by the provisions in s. 83 of the Revenue Code; in other words by the two circumstances mentioned in that section.
What was the position with regard to tenants who were not permanent ? No right was conferred on them by	s. 5A	of the	Taluqrlari Abolition Act, 1949, which section was inserted in that Act in 1955 by	Bombay Act I of 1955. The rights of these non-permanent tenants were governed by the Tenancy Act, 1948, which underwent	some fundamental changes in 1956 (see Bombay Act XIII of 1956). The changes relevant for our purpose were contained in s. 32 and some	of the	succeeding sections. The effect of these sections was considered by this court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay	(1). After summarising the	provisions contained in ss. 32 to 32R, this Court said:
"The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers' day and there	is a	completed purchase or sale	thereof as between the landlord and the tenant.	The tenant is	no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether 421 he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare	that	such tenant is not willing	to purchase the	land and that	the purchase	is ineffective. It	is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal	that	the	purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tillers' day and will continue to be operative, the only	obligation on	the tenant then being the	payment of price in	the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment	of such price either	in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, s. 32M declares the purchase to	be ineffective but	in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective	as from the tillers' day until	such default	is committed and,	there is no question of	a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the	tenant on the tillers' day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing	to appear or making a	statement that he is not	willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest	in the	land defeasible only	in either of those cases	and it cannot therefore be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite." 422 The tillers' day referred to above was the first day of	April, 1957. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is	that according	to the decision of this Court, the title of the petitioners to lands held by	tenants who were entitled to the benefit of ss. 32 to 32R passed immediately to the tenants on the	tillers' day and there	was a	completed purchase or sale thereof	as between the petitioners and	the tenants. So far as permanent tenants in possession	of taluqdari lands were concerned, they	were governed	by s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and nothing in the Tenancy Act, 1948, affected their right under that section. But non-permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands became purchasers	of their lands on the tillers'	day with an obligation to pay the	purchase price mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948. Section 32H, in so far as it bears upon non-permanent tenants, says:
"32H. (1) Subject to	the additions and deductions as provided in	sub-sections (1A) and (1B),	the purchase	price	shall	be reckoned as follows, namely:- (i) in the case of a	permanent tenant X	X	X (ii) in	the case of other tenants, the purchase	price	shall	be the aggregate of the following amounts, that is to say,- (a) such amounts as	the Tribunal may determine not being less	than 20	times the assessment and not more than 200	times the assessment;
(b) the value of any structures, wells, and embankment	constructed and other permanent fixtures	made and trees planted by the landlord on the land;
423 (d) the amounts, if	any, paid by	or recovered from the landlord as land revenue and other	cesses referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c)	and (d) of sub-section (1)	of section 10A, in the event of the failure on the part of the tenant to pay the same.
Explanation 1.- *	* * Explanation 2.- *	* * (1A) Where a tenant to whom subsections (1) and (2) of section 10A do not apply, has, after the	commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955, paid in respect of the land held by him as tenant land revenue and other cesses referred to in sub-section (1) of that section,	on account of the failure of the landlord to pay the same,	a sum equal to the total amount so paid by the tenant until the date of the determination of the purchase price shall be deducted from the aggregate of the amounts determined under sub-section (1).
(1B) (a) On the amount arrived at	in accordance	with	the provisions	of sub- sections (1) and (lA)	there shall	be calculated interest at 4-1/2, per cent, per annum for	the period between the date	on which the	tenant is deemed to have purchased the land under section 32 and the date of the determination of the purchase price.
(b) (i) The amount of interest	so calculated shall be added to, and (ii) the amount of rent, if any, paid by the tenant	to the	landlord and the value of any products of trees planted by the landlord if such products are removed by the landlord during the	said period shall be deducted from, the amount so arrived at.
424 (2) The State Government may by general or special	order, fix different minima and maxima for	the purpose of sub-clause (a) of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) in respect of any kind of land	held by tenants in any backward area. In	fixing	such minima and maxima, the State Government shall have regard to	the rent payable for the land and the factors specified in	sub-section (3) of section 63A." The difference	in the purchase price mentioned in s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and the purchase price mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, is	noticeable. Under s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, the purchase price for the right of occupancy is approximately six times the assessment fixed for the land. Under s. 32H,	however, the minimum	is 20	times the assessment and	the maximum	200 times the assessment. These minima and maxima are liable to reduction in the case	of land held by tenants in any backward area.
Now, the main grievance of the petitioners is this. So far	as non-permanent tenants were concerned, the	title of the petitioners to their lands passed on April 1, 1957, to the tenants and the petitioners	ceased to be landlords. All that they became entitled to on that day was the purchase price	mentioned in s. 32H. By one stroke of the	pen as	it were, the impugned	Act, 1958, made almost all non-permanent tenants into permanent tenants and thereby deprived the petitioners of	the higher purchase price which they were entitled to	get under s. 32H and the succeeding sections of the Tenancy Act, 1948. In petition No. 120 of 1958 the petitioners has stated that he would lose about Rs. 14 lacs as a result of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958.
We may now read some of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958. The Act is entitled "an Act 425 further	to define permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other matters."	In view of the argument advanced before us on behalf of the respondents that the impugned	Act, 1958 merely changes a rule of evidence, it is worthly of note that the long title itself states that the Act is an Act	further to define permanent tenants.
Section 2 of the Act is the interpretation section and the	expression 'Land Tenure Abolition law' means in relation to a permanent tenant, Acts specified in Part I of the Schedule. The Taluqdari Abolition Act,	1949 is	one of the Acts mentioned in Part I of the Schedule. The expression 'tenure- holder' means inter alia a taluqdar and 'tenure- land' means inter alia taluqdari land. Sections 3, 4 are 6 and important for our purpose and should be read in full.
"3. A	person shall,	within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to	be an inferior holder, a permanent holder or,	as the	case may be, a permanent tenant, on	the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if	his name has been recorded in the record of rights	or other public or	revenue record as an inferior holder, permanent	holder or permanent tenant in respect of any tenure-land- (a) on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceedings	under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the	Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879- (i) before the commencement of this Act, or 426 (ii) after the commence of this Act in cases in which inquiries were pending at the commencement of this Act, or (c) in pursuance of	an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect	of an entry under section 6 of this Act.
4. For the purposes of the relevant Act specified	in Part I of	the Schedule,	a person- (a) who on the date of the commencement of that Act was holding any tenure-land and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if any, were, immediately	before that date for such continuous period of twelve years or more, holding the same tenure-land, or any other tenure-land,	as a tenant or inferior holder under the tenure-holder for the time being on payment of an amount exceeding the assessment of the land, shall unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been	a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b), be deemed to	be a permanent tenant of the land	under	clause	(a) and all the provisions of that Act shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant.
Explanation.-The assessment	for the purpose of	this section shall be reckoned as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5.
6. (1) The rights of an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant under sections 4	and 5	shall be entered in the record of	rights unless the tenure holder applies in	writing to the Mamlatdar within six months	from the date of the commencement of	this Act for	a declaration	that any holder, or tenant under him is not	an inferior holder, a 427 permanent holder or, as the case	may be, a permanent tenant.
(2) Any such application	shall	be disposed of as if	it were an application in respect of a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." The constitutional	validity of the aforesaid provisions has been challenged before us on behalf of the petitioners on the following grounds.
(1) The Bombay State legislature was not competent to enact the	impugned Act,	which is a piece of colourable legislation inasmuch as under the guise of defining	a permanent tenant,	or changing a rule of	evidence, it has really confiscated a large part of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to under s.
32H of	the Tenancy Act, 1948	from some of their tenants;
(2) The impugned Act contravenes the rights of the	petitioners guaranteed by the Constitution under Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 there of; and (3) Article 31A does not save it.
On behalf of the respondents the main argument is that the impugned Act, 1958, merely changes a rule of evidence for determining who are	permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands; it does nothing more than that and is not, therefore, bad on any of the	grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners. It	is clear that if the impugned Act merely changes	a rule of evidence for determining who are permanent tenants	in possession	of taluqdari lands, then the points urged as to the violation of the petitioners'	fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 (l) (f) and 31 would not at all arise. If, on the contrary, it is found that the impugned Act is not a piece of legislation which changes a rule of evidence but is a	device	by which the petitioners have been deprived of their property 428 without payment	of compensation, then it would be a piece	of colourable	legislation not within the competence of	the	State	Legislature. The legislation would then fall on the main ground that it	is a piece of colourable legislation, the subject matter	of which is not covered by any entry in List II or List III.
Therefore, the crux of the matter is what is the true scope and effect of the provisions of the impugned Act,	1958. To this question we now address ourselves.
It may be stated at the very outset that the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the	Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 and the Tenancy Act, 1948 as amended by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956	has not been challenged before us.	In Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The state	of Bombay and Sri	Ram Ram Narain Medhi	v. The	State	of Bombay,	it was held	by this Court that the relevant provisions of those two	Acts were Constitutionally valid.	What has been challenged before us is the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of	the impugned	Act 1958, particularly the provisions in ss. 3,4 and 6 which we have	quoted earlier. What is the	scope and effect of those provisions? Section 3	in effect states that a person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to be a permanent tenant on	the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his name has been recorded in the record of rights or other public or revenue record as a permanent tenant in respect of any tenure	land in	any of	the three following circumstances- (a) on the date of the	abolition of the relevant land-tenure; or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceeding under the relevant land tenure abolition law or the Revenue Code 429 either before or after	the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958; or (c) in pursuance of an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. It is worthy of note that s. 3 does not create a mere presumption, as is referred to in s. 135J of the Revenue Code. Section 135J of the Revenue Code states inter alia that an entry in the	record of rights shall	be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Section 3 of the impugned Act, 1958	states, however, that	a person shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the date of the abolition of	the relevant land tenure if his name has been recorded in the record of rights in respect of any tenure land in any of the three circumstances mentioned as (a), (b) and (c) therein. In other	words, if any one of the three circumstances mentioned in the section exists, then by a fiction of	law a person who fulfils that circumstance must	be deemed to be a permanent tenant. Section 4 says in effect that a tenant(a) who on the date of the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was holding any tenure land, and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if any, were immediately before that date for such continuous periods as aggregate to	a total continuous period of 12 years	or more, holding the same tenure land, or any other tenure land shall unless it is proved by the tenure- holder that he would not have	been a	permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under (b) above, be deemed to be a permanent tenant	of the land	under (a), and all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant. There is a third condition mentioned in s.
4, namely, the amount	which the tenant pays must exceed the assessment of the land. This condition does not, however have any importance in the discussion which follows and no further reference to it is necessary.
430 There is no difficulty in understanding cl.
(a) of	s. 4 but cl. (b) is not so clear. The expression "continuous	periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve years or more" is neither very elegant nor very clear. Perhaps, the expression means that	one	particular continuous period may be of less than twelve years but there may be more than one such	continuous period and in such a case the totality of such continuous periods must aggregate twelve years or more; if however, one	continuous period extends over twelve years or more, there is no difficulty, and the question of the aggregate totalling twelve years does not arise. The	question of the aggregate totalling twelve years will arise when there are more continuous periods than one,	of less than twelve years duration each. The possessions for	such continuous periods may be of the same tenure-land or of different tenure-lands.
If however, the aggregate of continuous periods of possession of the same tenure-land or of any other tenure-land comes to twelve years or	more, then cl. (b)	of s.	4 is fulfilled. It further appears that conditions	mentioned in	(a) and (b) are cumulative. In other words, for the application of s.4, a tenant must be in possession of tenure-land on the	date of	the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act,	1949 (August 15, 1950) and further more must have been in possession of	the same tenure-land or	of any other tenure-land for continuous periods aggregating more than twelve years immediately before the said date. A person who fulfils the aforesaid two conditions shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant of the land unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenants of the basis of possession referred to in cl.(b). The expression "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession	of the	land under clause	(b)" has again given rise	to some difficulty. Two views have been can- 431 vassed before us. One view is that the expression means that the tenure-holder can only contest the correctness of	the claim of twelve years' possession and show that the tenant was not	in possession of the land or lands concerned or that the continuous period or periods of possession did not aggregate twelve years. The other view is that the tenure-holder can show	that the tenancy commenced on a particular date or that there is satisfactory evidence	of the	duration of the tenancy, and therefore, under s. 83 of the Revenue Code the tenant would	not be	a permanent tenant merely by reason of twelve years' possession.
Section 4 as worded is somewhat obscure and if one were to	go merely by the words used, one would be inclined to accept the	first view. On that view, the Section undoubtedly would go much further than merely introducing a rule of evidence; it would create a new	class of permanent tenants not contemplated by	s. 83	of the	Revenue Code. The latter section	talks of two circumstances which determine the status of a tenant: one relates to commencement of	the tenancy and the other to its intended duration. Under s. 83 the onus will be on the person who claim a permanent status as	a tenant to prove that either the commencement of the tenancy is not known or that its intended duration was not agreed upon between the landlord and tenant or was not governed by any usage of the locality. Section 4 of	the impugned	Act, 1958 gives a go-by to these circumstances. It brings in different considerations altogether. In effect it says that if a	person was in possession of any tenure-land on	August	15, 1950 (the date	of commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949) and was	further more in possession of the same tenure-land or	any other tenure-land for	a continuous aggregate period of	twelve years,	he would be deemed to be a permanent tenant, unless the tenure-holder proved that he was not	in possession for	a continuous aggregate period	of twelve years 432 as laid down in cl. (b) of the section. This means that instead of the two circumstances relating to commencement and duration a new consideration is brought in, namely, whether the tenant has been in possession for	a continuous, aggregate period of twelve years. If he has been, then	he is	a permanent tenant. If he has not been in such possession, then he is not a permanent tenants. In other words, s. 4 of	the impugned Act, 1958, completely changes the definition of a permanent tenant	and creates a	new class of	permanent tenants who were not permanent tenants on April 1, 1957. If this view is correct, and we think that there is a good deal to be said in favour of this view, then s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958 in spite of giving the	tenure-holder an opportunity of proving that the tenant was not in possession for an aggregate continuous period	of twelve years under s. 4 read with s. 6, undoubtedly changes the very definition	of permanent tenant and by that change wipes out a large part	of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to get on April 1, 1957 from some of their tenants. It is not disputed that on this view of s. 4, the impugned legislation would be unconstitutional inasmuch as it would bring within the category of permanent tenants persons who	were non-permanent tenants	under	the previous law and	there	by deprive the tenure-holders of part of the purchase money which they were to get from them.
It has been contended that the second view with regard to the expression "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on	the basis of	continued possession of	the land under clause (b)"	is preferable on the ground that cl. (b) is one of the conditions which the tenant must fulfil before he can get the benefit of s. 4 and there would not be much	sense in allowing the	tenure-holder	to disprove a condition which the tenant must fulfil before he can get 433 the benefit of s. 4. We find	it difficult	to accept	this view. On a pure question	of construction of	the words used in s. 4, we see nothing wrong in allowing the	tenure-holder	to prove that the tenant	was not	in possession for continuous periods aggregating twelve	years. Let us, however, assume that the second view as to the interpretation of s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958, is preferable to the first view. What then is the position? The position then is that a tenant who fulfils the two conditions mentioned in cls. (a) and (b)	must be deemed to be a permanent tenant unless the tenure-holder proves the commencement and/or duration of the tenancy. From this point of view it	may be	argued that s. 4 merely changes a rule of	evidence and	throws the onus on the tenure-holder to prove that in spite	of twelve years' continuous possession mentioned in cl. (b), the tenant is not a permanent tenant by reason of the circumstance that	the commencement of the tenancy or its intended duration is known. Under s. 6 the rights of a permanent tenant under s. 4 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure-holder applies in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of the commencement of	the impugned Act, 1958, for the declaration that the tenant under him	is not	a permanent tenant. If any such application is filed by the	tenure-holder, it shall be disposed of as if it were an application in respect of a disputed case under s. 135D of the Revenue Code. What is the effect of s. 6 ?	It was	conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State and also the respondent tenants that the tenure- holder has only one opportunity of saying that a tenant under him is not a permanent tenant and the tenure-holder	must avail himself	of that opportunity within six months from June 10, 1958, the date on which the impugned Act, 1858, came into force. The combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 appears to us to be this. If the tenure-holder has made no application 434 within six months from June	10, 1958, for	a declaration that a tenant under him	is not	a permanent tenant, every tenant under him who fulfils the conditions mentioned in cls. (a) and (b) of s. 4 at once gets recorded in the record of rights as a permanent tenant. As soon as he is so recorded, he must be deemed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant by a fiction of law and under s.
4 all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, will apply	to him	as they apply to a permanent tenant. This combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned	Act, 1958 does in our opinion deprive	the tenure-holder of	any real opportunity of	contesting the claims of his tenants and makes them permanent tenants once they are recorded in the record of rights, thereby depriving the tenure-holder of the purchase price which he was entitled	to get	from them under s.
32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948.
On behalf of the respondents it was stated at the Bar that the petitioners had made applications for a declaration under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, and that those applications	are still pending. We have no materials in support of this statement. No affidavit has been made on behalf of the respondents	to this effect; nor do we know if those applications related to all the non- permanent tenants of the petitioners. What we know is that in a stay	application made by the petitioner in petition No. 120 of 1958 it was averred that the petitioner had filed several declaratory suits before the Mamlatdar under	s.
70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1948, for a declaration that the tenants concerned were not	permanent tenants. Those	suits were however, filed prior to the coming into force	of the impugned Act, 1958.
The petitioner	asked for a stay of those suits on two grounds: firstly, that after the coming into force of the impugned	Act, 1958, the suits would become	infructuous, and secondly,	that the Mamlatdar concerned would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the constitutional 435 validity of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958, and in view of those provisions would	be bound to hold that	the tenants had become permanent tenants. This Court	passed no order on the application	for stay. But the petitioner, it appears, moved	the Mamlatdar to stay the hearing of the	suits pending the disposal of	the writ petition in this Court and the suits were stayed.
In a second petition	filed on behalf of the petitioner it was stated that after the coming into force of the	impugned Act,	1958, the petitioner received a notice to show cause why the non-permanent tenants under him should not	be declared to be permanent tenants and the record of rights amended accordingly. The petitioner applied to the	Revenue	Officer concerned to stay the proceedings in	view of	the writ petition pending in this	Court. This request was, however, turned down. The petitioner then came to this Court and it appears that an order was	made to the effect that any investigation which might be	necessary for the	proceedings pending before the Revenue Officer might be continued, but no final order or entry should be made till the disposal of the writ petition. Such	an order appears to have been made in respect of	a number of	villages and the petitioner stated that he had thousands of tenants in 24 villages, some of whom were permanent, some protected, and	some ordinary.	Nothing was stated in those petitions or in the replies thereto as to whether the tenure-holder had made an application for a declaration within the meaning	of s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. All that has been stated in the application is that in response to a notice received from the Revenue Officer, the petitioner, as a tenure-holder, had moved this Court for	a stay of	the proceedings. If the petitioner had filed no application for a declaration within the meaning of s. 6 of the impugned Act,	1958, and within the time allowed by that section, then it is obvious 436 that the Revenue Officer dealing with	the suits under s. 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1948, pending before him, or the Revenue Officer dealing with other proceedings before him, must give effect to the provisions	of ss.	3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. It is, therefore difficult to see how the pendency of the suits or	other proceedings before the Revenue Officers concerned can be of any assistance	to the	petitioners. The question, therefore, boils down to this. Section 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 does give one opportunity to the petitioners	to make an application for	a declaration that any tenant under him	is not	a permanent tenant, but that opportunity was to be availed of within six	months from June 10, 1958.
Once that opportunity is lost, the tenure-holder cannot claim that a tenant who fulfils cls. (a) and (b)	of s.	4 is not a permanent tenant. Our attention was drawn to sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. Those sub-sections say in effect that if any question arises whether	any person is a permanent tenant, the State Government or an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf shall decide the question; where such officer decides such question any person aggrieved by the decision may file an	appeal to the State Government within 60 days from the	date of the decision; and the decision of the State	Government shall be final.
It was	not suggested before us that the aforesaid sub-sections would give the tenure-holder a second opportunity of contesting the claim of the tenant, and it	seems to us quite clear that the tenure- holder who had	failed	to make an application within the time mentioned in s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, would not be in a position to take advantage of sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. If ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, are good and valid in law, then whichever be	the authority that has to decide the claim of the tenant, it must decide it in accordance with those provisions.
437 In these circumstances, can it be said that the opportunity given by s. 6 is	a real opportunity and does it amount to merely	changing a rule of evidence ? We think that this	question must	be answered in the negative.
It is to be noted that on April 1, 1957 the petitioners ceased to be tenure-holders of the lands held by non-permanent tenants and as held by this Court, ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948, clearly contemplated the vesting of the title in the	tenants on the tillers' day, defeasible only on certain	specified contingencies. This Court held that those sections were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any	event a	modification of the	landlord's rights in the estate within the meaning of Art.
31A (1)	(a) of	the Constitution. If that was the true effect of ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948, then on April 1, 1957 the petitioners were left only with the right to get the purchase price under s. 32H. That right of the petitioners was undoubtedly a right to	property. In Bombay Dying and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (1) this Court observed, with regard to unpaid wages of an employee,	that when an employee had done his work, the amount of wages earned by him become a debt due to him from the employer and this was property which could be assigned under the law. The provisions of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act (Bombay Act XL of 1953) were under consideration in that case. Section 3 of the Act transferred inter alia all unpaid accumulation of wages to a	fund known as the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund. This Court held that s. 3 (1) of the Act in so far as it related to unpaid accumulation in s. 3(2) (b)	was unconstitutional and void by reason of the right guaranteed under	Art. 19(1) (f) of	the Constitution and was not	saved	by cl.(5) thereof.	We think that the same principle must apply in the 438 present case. The right of the petitioners to the purchase price	under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, from those of their tenants who were non- permanent on April 1, 1957,	was a	right	of property in respect of which the petitioners have a guarantee under Art.	19 (1)(f). The provisions in ss.	3,4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, in so far as	they	laid	down that in certain circumstances a	tenant shall be deemed to be	a permanent tenant from the date of the Taluqdari abolition Act,	1949, adversely affected the right of the	petitioners with retrospective effect; it practically wiped off a large part of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to get.
If s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is to be tested on the	touchstone of reasonable restrictions	in the interests of the general public as laid down in cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, it must be held	that it does	not impose a	reasonable restriction. We	have found it very difficult to understand why	and how	it is reasonable that the tenure-holder must make an application within six months from the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, for a declaration that his tenants are not permanent tenants. The petitioners have three kinds of tenants-permanent tenants,	protected tenants, and ordinary tenants.	On April 1, 1957 the petitioners	ceased to be tenure holders	in respect	of all tenants other than	permanent tenants and became entitled only to the purchase price under s. 32H. If any tenant claimed on that date that he was a permanent	tenant, he had to establish his claim in	accordance with s. 83 of the Revenue Code. Such a claim could be contested by the	tenure-holder whenever made by the tenant.
But by	the impugned Act, 1958, all	this was changed, and unless the tenure holder made	an application within six months of the commencement of the	impugned Act,	1958, he was	not in	a position to say that a particular tenant who was in possession of tenure-land for continuous period aggregating twelve years on and before August 15, 439 1950, was not a permanent tenant. We are unable to hold that the six months' limit imposed by s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances, a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art.
19(5) of the	Constitution.	It is	a little difficult to understand how	the tenure-holder could know which of his non-permanent tenants would claim to be permanent on the coming into force of the impugned	Act, 1958. Obviously, the tenure-holder had to anticipate that all his non- permanent tenants might claim to be permanent, and therefore it was incumbent on	him to make an application for	a determination that none of his non-permanent tenants were permanent,	and unless he did	so he would lose his right to get the purchase price	under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948. We are clearly of the view that the time limit imposed by s. 16 of the impugned Act, 1958, is, in	these	circumstances,	and unreasonable restriction and	cannot be justified under Art.
In view of this finding it is unnecessary to consider the	effect	of Art. 31	of the Constitution. On behalf of the respondent State reliance was sought to	be placed on Art. 31A of the Constitution. That Article, in our opinion, has no	application to the present cases, inasmuch as there was no acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification	of any	such rights. On April 1, 1957, the tenure-holders had ceased to be tenure- holders in respect of lands held by non-permanent tenants. The relation between	the tenure-holders and the	tenants had changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor. When, therefore, the	impugned Act, 1958, affected the right of the petitioners as creditors to get	a certain sum of money from the debtors, it did not provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein; nor did	it provide for the extinguishment or modification of any such 440 rights. Therefore, Art. 31A has no application and cannot save the impugned Act, 1958.
It has been contended before us	that while implementing the provisions of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, it was found that because of the failure	or inability of the ex- Taluqdar to produce old records concerning the tenants it was difficult for the tenants to take the benefit of that	provision; therefore,	it became necessary for the Legislature to define permanent tenant in such a way that the tenure- holder might not defeat the provisions of s. 5A.
That it	was stated, was the reason for enacting ss. 3,	4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. If the reason was as stated above, then the tenure-holder should have been given	a chance to contest the claim of the tenant whenever he made a claim of being a	permanent tenant. It appears	to us that the true scope and effect of the provisions in ss.
3, 4 and 6 of	the impugned	Act, 1958 is	to considerably reduce the purchase price payable to the petitioners	and this has been secured by the device of defining permanent tenant in such a way that the tenure-holder has no real opportunity of contesting the	claim of the tenants. In that view of the	matter, the impugned Act, 1958, does not fall within any entry	of List	II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and is a piece	of colourable	legislation.	What	is colourable legislation was explained by this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo	v. The	State	of Orissa (1). This Court said that the idea conveyed by the expression "colourable legislation" is that although apparently a legislature in	passing	a statute purported to within the limits of its powers,	yet in substance and in reality	it transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. We are of the view that, that is what has happened in the present case. Under the guise of defining a 441 permanent tenant or changing a rule of evidence what has been done is to reduce the purchase price which became payable to the	tenure-holders	on April 1, 1957.
For these	reasons we must hold that ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 in so far as they deem some tenants as permanent tenants	in possession of taluqdari land are unconstitutional and void. Under the	guise	of changing the definition of a permanent tenant, they really take away a	large part of the right of the petitioners to get	the purchase price under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, from some of their tenants. The petitions must	accordingly be allowed with costs.
As the	petitions have	been heard together there will be only one hearing fee.
MUDHOLKAR, J,-Writ	petition No. 120 of 1958 was heard along with writ petitions Nos. 147 to 158 of	1958. But a common argument was advanced before us on behalf of the petitioner in each case by Mr. G.S. Pathak and by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Gujarat and by Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the tenants.
The petitioners in these cases were Talukdars of certain villages in	that part of the former state of Bombay which is now the State of Gujarat.
The rights of Talukdars in different	parts	of Gujrat to Taluqdari villages were regulated by the Ahmedabad Taluqdars Act, 1862 (Bom. 6 of 1862) and the Broach and Kaira Incumbered Estates Act, 1881 (XXI of 1881) and the Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888.
The Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (herein referred to as the Abolition Act) repealed the aforementioned Taluqdari Acts and s. 3 thereof abolished the	Taluqdari tenure wherever	it prevailed. That section further abolished all incidents of the said tenure attaching to any land comprised in a Taluqdari Estate. Section 5 of that Act made all the taluqdars "occupants" of the lands in their 442 possession, within the meaning	of the expression "occupant" occurring in the Bombay Land Revenue Code (hereafter	referred to as the Code). Like "Occupants" in	other areas of the Bombay State these persons became liable to pay land revenue to the Government subject to the provisions of cl.(b) of sub-s.2 of s.5. Nothing, however,	turns	on these provisions. Section 16 of the aforesaid Act makes the provisions of the Code applicable	to taluqdari villages	subject to	certain modifications with which we are not concerned. The validity of the Abolition Act was	challenged before this Court but	that challenge failed vide Dhisubha Devisingh Gohil v.	The	State	of Bombay(1).
Vast areas of lands in these villages were in the occupation	of inferior holders,	permanent tenants, protected tenants, ordinary tenants etc.
It is not disputed that the provisions of Ch. VII of the Code which deals with "superior holders and inferior holders" govern the relationship between the tenure holders and permanent tenants.	In addition to these provisions there are those in the Bombay Tenancy and	Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereafter	referred to as the 'Tenancy Act') which deal with the relationship between landlord and tenant and till April 1,	1957, it is these provisions which exclusively governed the relationship between the tenure-holder and tenants other than permanent tenants and inferior holders.
It would be necessary	to refer to some of the provisions of this Act	while	dealing	with the arguments advanced before us.
"(1) Notwithstanding anything	contained in section 5 a permanent tenant in possession 443 of any taluqdari land, and also an inferior holder holding such land on payment of annual assessment	only,	shall	be deemed to	be occupants within the meaning of	Code,	in respect of	such land in their possession and shall be	primarily liable to	the State Government for the payment of land revenue due in respect of	such land, and shall	be entitled to all the rights and	shall	be liable to	all the	obligations in respect of such land	as occupants under the Code or any other law for time being in force:
Provided that- (a) such permanent	tenant	shall	be entitled to the rights of an occupant	in respect of such land on payment to the taluqdar or the cadet as the case may be :- (i) of	the	occupancy price equivalent to four	multiples of the assessment fixed for such land, and (ii) for	the extinguishment	or modification	of any rights of the taluqdar or cadet, as the case may be, including the	right of reversion in the lands, of a further sum equivalent	to two multiples of such assessment;
x	x	x (2) The right conferred under sub- section (1) shall not be exercisable after a period of (five) years from the date on which the Bombay Taluqdari Tenures	Abolition (Amendment), Act 1954 comes into force.
x	x	x This section for the first time conferred upon a permanent tenant the right to acquire the status of an occupant in respect of the land held by him as a permanent tenant	of the	tenure-holder upon payment of a certain sum of money as the price of occupancy to the tenure-holder	within five years of the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955.
Section 5A of the Act has never been challenged, and the	argument before us proceeded	upon the footing that it is a perfectly valid piece of law.
Though the Abolition Act by s. 5A thus conferred upon	the permanent tenants in the taluqdari villages the right become occupants, it did not	define what a permanent tenant was. By an amendment made by Bombay Act XVIII of 1958, it was provided that certain persons	would be permanent tenants but that does	not really define what	a permanent tenant is. This absence of definition of a permanent tenant did	not, however,	create any difficulty because in Bombay that term has been understood to	mean the tenant described	in paragraph 2 of s. 83 of the Code. Indeed, in the petitions themselves it is stated that s.83 of the Code defines	a permanent tenant. The second paragraph of that section is in these terms:
"And where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy	no satisfactory	evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and there is not any such	evidence of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and	tenant,	or those under whom	they respectively' claim title or any usage	of the	locality as to duration of such tenancy, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of	such landlord and of	those who derive title under him." Under this section, therefore, a permanent tenant is one	whose tenure is co-extensive with that of his landlord and a tenant is to be presumed to be such a	tenant when by reason	of antiquity, the commencement of	the tenancy cannot be proved and there is no satisfactory evidence of	the agreed duration of the tenancy or of	any usage of the locality as 445 to such duration. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1956 (13 of 1956) which among other provisions, has amended s. 2 of the Tenancy	Act has given a definition of the expression in the new sub-s.10A thereof but it is not necessary to reproduce it as no argument based on it is advanced before us as indeed none could be advanced.
That Act	made extensive	and far-reaching amendments in the Bombay Tenancy Act. Several sections thereof were recast including s.32.
Amongst the Provisions added are ss. 32A to 32-R which appear in the second part of Chapter 3 of that Act, dealing with "Purchase of land	by tenants" to which we will refer hereafter.	By virtue of s.32, sub. s. 1, on April	1, 1957, called the "tillers' day" every tenant, including permanent tenant was, subject to	the other provisions of that section and of the succeeding sections deemed to have purchased the tenancy land in his	possession from	the landlord free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon. Section 87A, which also was added to the Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1956, provided that nothing in the Tenancy Act was to affect the provisions of any of the Land Tenure Abolition Acts specified	in Schedule II (which includes the Abolition Act in question) in so far as such provisions relate to the confinement of the right of an occupant upon a permanent tenant in respect of land held by him.
In consequence	of this	the provisions of s. 32-H of the	Tenancy Act which deal	with the purchase price payable by permanent tenants will not apply to such	permanent tenant. He	would,	therefore, have only that right which is	conferred upon	a permanent tenant by s.	5-A of the Abolition Act.
The result of this is that he would not be bound to pay the purchase price at once under s. 32-H of the Tenancy Act and can make	his election	to acquire or not to acquire the right of an occupant within the period allowed by s. 5-A (as extended from time to time).
446 The records relating to tenancies	in taluqdari villages used to be maintained by the tenure-holders. It is	from these records that information could be obtained as to the nature of the tenancies of the tenants in those villages.
While implementing the provisions of s. 5-A of the Abolition Act it was found that because of the refusal, failure or inability of the taluqdar to produce old records concerning the tenants it was difficult for the tenants to take the benefit of that provision. Therefore, the legislature passed Bombay Act No. 57 of 1958 called the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958. The long title of the Act runs thus: "An Act further to define permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other matters."	Section 4 of this Act states who are to	be deemed to be permanent tenants for the purpose	of the Land	Tenure Abolition laws specified in Part II of the Schedule to the Act.
The validity of this Act (hereafter referred to as the impugned	Act) and in particular of the provisions of s. 4 is challenged before us.
According to Mr. Pathak s. 4 of the Act in effect expands	the category of permanent tenants by bringing within its fold persons	who were merely ordinary	tenants prior to the enactment of this provision.	So far	as an	ordinary tenant is concerned it is Mr. Pathak's contention that on the tillers' day he became an occupant of the land or at any rate	the landlord (or tenure-holder) lost his interest therein and that thereafter the latter became entitled to receive from the tenant the purchase price by the combined operation of s.
32(1) and s. 32-H(1) (i) of	the Tenancy Act.
447 "On the Ist day	of April, 1957, (hereinafter referred to	as 'the tillers' day') every tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be	deemed	to have purchased	from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates	the land leased personally;
(b) such tenant is	not a	permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of this tenancy under section 31: or (ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March, 1957 under section 29 for	obtaining possession of the land; (or) (iii) the landlord has not	terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section	15, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the	31st day of March, 1957 under section 29, for obtaining possession of the lands;
"(1)	Subject	to the additions and deductions as provided in sub-sections 1A and 1B, the purchase price shall be reckoned as follows, namely:- (i) In the case of a	permanent tenant who	is cultivating	the land personally 448 the purchase	price	shall	be the aggregate of the following amounts, that is to say,- ...	...	... ...
..." (ii) In the case of other tenants the purchase	price	shall	be the aggregate of the following amounts, that is to say,- (a)	such	amount	as the Tribunal may determine	not being less than 20 times the assessment and not	more than 200	times the assessment;
..." According to the petitioner in W. P. 120 of 1958 the total area of land held by him in his villages is 62,588 acres out of which only 703 acres are in his personal cultivation and the rest is held by tenants who are non-permanent tenants. He contends that by	the operation of s. 4 of the impugned Act most of	these persons	are likely to be placed in the category of permanent tenants with the result that the petitioners would be compelled to accept purchase price at a much lower rate, that is, they would get only six times the assessment instead of between 20 and 200 times the assessment, as may be determined by the tribunal. According to him his estimated loss	would be over Rs. 14,00,000.	On behalf	of the State	it is	denied	that the petitioner would be put to any such loss.
The substance of the argument of Mr. Pathak is that	the right to	claim compensation under s.32H(1)(ii) from the	ordinary tenants having vested in the petitioner it cannot be taken away by the	Bombay legislature	by extending the definition of "permanent tenant" so as to include within it those who were merely ordinary tenants on the	"Tillers' Day".	He formulated his grounds of attack on the legislation as follows:
(2) The impugned Act is	colourable legislation as it amounts to a device adopted for the purpose of confiscating money, the right to	claim which had vested in the landlord as purchaser on	April 1, 1957, and that the State legislature had no power to make a law with respect to this matter.
(3) The impugned Act being outside the legislative competence	of the Bombay legislature, taking away of the petitioner's money was	a contravention	of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution.
(7) The Act	infringes Art.	14 of the Constitution as there are	other classes	of tenure-holders similarly situate to whom the impugned Act does not apply.
4 of the impugned Act extends	the definition of permanent tenants and	brings	within	its fold persons who were till April 1, 1957, that is, the "tillers' day", ordinary tenants.	If this assumption is invalid then the whole edifice which Mr. Pathak has built upon it must tumble down. Let us 450 consider what exactly s. 4 of	the impugned Act does. In order to appreciate Mr. Pathak's argument properly it would be desirable to reproduce that section as well as ss. 3 and 6. These sections run thus:
Section 3 : "A person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to	be an	inferior holder, a permanent holder or, as the case	may be, a permanent	tenant,	on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his name has been recorded in the	record	of rights or	other public or revenue records as an	inferior holder, permanent	holder	or permanent tenant in respect of any tenure- land- (a) on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceedings under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879- (i) before the commencement of this Act, or (ii) after the commencement of this Act in	cases	in which inquiries were	pending at the commencement of this Act, or (c) in pursuance of an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under section 6 of this Act." The relevant Land Tenure Abolition law for our purposes is the Bombay	Tenancy Abolition Act and tenure land means taluqdari land.
"For the purposes of	the relevant Act specified	in part I of	the Schedule,	a person- 451 (a) who on the date of the commencement of that Act was holding any tenure land, and (b) who and	whose	predecessors	in title, if	any were, immediately before that date for such continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve years or more, holding the same tenure-land or any other tenure-land, as a tenant or inferior holder under the tenure-holder for	the time being on payment of an amount exceeding the assessment of the land, shall unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that	he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of	continued possession of the land under clause (b), be deemed to	be a permanent tenant of the land under clause (a) and all the provisions of that Act shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant." Section 6 runs thus:
"(1) The rights of an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant under sections 4	and 5	shall be entered in the record of	rights	unless	the tenure-holder applies in	writing to the Mamlatdar within six months	from the date of the commencement of this Act for a declaration that any holder or	tenant	under	him is	not an inferior holder, a	permanent holder or, as the case may be, a permanent tenant.
(2) Any such application	shall	be disposed of as if	it were an application in respect of a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." Thus according	to s. 3 a person whose name	is recorded in the record of rights or other public revenue records	as a permanent tenant in respect of tenure land he will be deemed to be a permanent 452 tenant	within	the meaning of the	expression occurring in the Abolition Act.
As	already stated, for	ascertaining the meaning of the expression one has to go to para. 2 of s. 83 of the Code. No doubt, it merely raises a presumption as	to permanent tenancy but from that para. we can deduce the essential feature of	a permanent tenancy.
The argument is that s. 3 being a deeming provision in so far as the	Abolition Act	is concerned, gives new definition of a	permanent tenant. What the section says	is that certain persons will be deemed to be permanent tenants for the purpose of the Abolition Act. Who are these persons ? Are they chosen arbitrarily and put in that class though they	could not possibly have been so	put under the	previous law	? A bare perusal of clauses (a)	to (c) of s. 3 shows that only tenants who have been found on enquiry to be permanent tenants, at least presumptively, are to be regarded as permanent tenant, for the purpose of the	Abolition Acts and	their	status	as permanent tenants can no longer be questioned. In regard to persons whose cases fall under clauses (a) and	(b) all that the section has done is to take away the	right	of the	tenure-holder	to challenge in a collateral proceeding their status as permanent tenants. As regards tenants falling under cl. (c) what the provision has done is to require	the tenure holder to object to the recording of such person as	permanent tenant within a certain time before the mamlatdar. If he fails to avail himself of the opportunity the door is shut	to his	saying thereafter that the person is not	a permanent tenant. It is to be noted that tenants	who are to be regarded as	permanent tenants for the purposes of the Abolition Act have been so	found in enquiries held by revenue courts and not	persons arbitrarily selected or persons who could not reasonably be regarded as permanent tenants.
453 The inclusion of persons as permanent tenants in the	register of rights may	be prior to the commencement of	the Abolition Act or	after its commencement. The proceedings for the	inclusion may have been instituted prior to the commencement of the	Abolition Act or may be instituted under the impugned Act. If they hold in favour of the tenant he will be deemed to be a permanent tenant.
The landlord cannot then be permitted to say that he is not a permanent tenant. It is difficult to see how this disability imposed upon a landlord to dispute the fact that	a person is a	permanent tenant be regarded as enlarging the definition of a permanent tenant. It	is true that s. 135.J of the Code granted the landlord a right to challenge the correctness	of an	entry in the	record of rights in collateral proceedings without reference to time and that right is	abrogated by the impugned Act but even	so doing that	cannot	be regarded as taking away a vested right. Within what time, in what circumstances and	in which manner a particular fact is open to challenge is only a	matter	of procedure and it	cannot	be disputed that	there	is no	vested right	in procedure.
The effect	of the	provision thus is that in proceedings under the Abolition Act for conferral of a right of an occupant the claimant's status as a permanent tenant cannot, if he satisfies the requirement of any of the three clauses of s. 3 of the impugned Act be open to	question by the tenure-holder. Would the position have been any different if the impugned Act had not been passed ? Let us consider s. 5A of the Abolition Act by itself. Suppose	a person recorded as a permanent tenant in the record of rights claimed to enforce the right conferred by this section to obtain the right of an occupant in proceedings thereunder.
These proceedings would be taken before a revenue officer and he would be bound to act on the entry in the record 454 of rights until and	unless	it was lawfully substituted by	another. No	suit	lies for correcting an entry in the record of rights. Only in a collateral proceeding could it	have been challenged and	the jurisdiction of a civil court be invoked. Where no such suit or proceeding is pending when the proceedings under s. 5A are going on the	tenure-holder cannot be permitted to	go behind the entry. However,	as an	additional safeguard the Abolition Act has provided in s. 5A itself a remedy and that is to approach the State Government or an authority empowered by it in this behalf for deciding to question.
Clause (b)	of s.	3 of the impugned Act, as also cl. (c), expressly contemplate cases where there is a dispute as to the status of a person and if it has been decided in favour of the person claiming to be a permanent tenant he is to	be deemed to be a	permanent tenant for the purposes of the	Abolition Act.	True that thereafter the tenure-holder cannot challenge the fact even in a collateral proceeding but that would be by reason of the	provisions of s. 5A itself which have not been challenged. No doubt after the commencement of the impugned Act no new proceedings under s. 5A of the	Abolition Act are permissible but that is because an alternative remedy	is available under s. 6 of the impugned Act.
We must now examine s.	4 in detail.	It provides that a person	who, on the date of the commencement of	the Abolition Act was holding any tenure land and who, and whose predecessors	in title, if any, were immediately before that date "for such continuous periods as aggregate to	a total continuous period of 12 years	or more" holding the same tenure land or any other land as a tenant be deemed to be a	permanent tenant "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession	of the	land under clause (b)". It is difficult to appreciate how it expands the definition of permanent tenant. True, it says that such a 455 tenant will be deemed to be a permanent tenant but it does	not stop there. It goes on to say that he will be	so deemed unless the	tenure-holder can show that he cannot be so deemed ! What does s.4 mean when it says that a tenant shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant	? Clearly, the legislature had in mind the provisions of	s. 83 of the Code which by virtue of s. 16 of the Abolition Act apply to all ex-taluqdari villages. To repeat, the impugned Act does not	define "permanent tenant" anywhere and that it is from	para 2 of s. 83 of the Code that we must infer that a person whose tenancy is co-extensive with that of the landlord is a permanent tenant. A tenure-holder can get rid of the	presumption raised by this provision if he can show the precise date of the commencement of the tenancy or if he can show that the tenancy is terminable in particular circumstances	or on	a particular date. We find nothing in s. 4 which directly or indirectly modifies the requirements of the definition of "permanent tenant". No doubt, para 2	of s. 83 of the Code sets out certain conditions for	raising a presumption of permanent tenancy and s. 4 of the impugned Act modifies them. But by doing so, it is difficult to see how it alters the basic requirements of a permanent tenancy as deducible from para 2 of s. 83 of the Code. All that s. 4 does	is to	alter the conditions for	raising the presumption but that cannot	amount	to altering the definition	of "permanent tenant." According to Mr. Pathak, however, the section permits the landlord to prove only that the tenant and his predecessors	in title were not	in possession for a continuous period of twelve years or more, on the date of the commencement of the Abolition Act and that if they fail to prove this, the presumption	raised by the section would	be irrebuttable. Thus according to him s. 4 makes a person who is in possession as a tenant for over twelve years, a permanent tenant even if the date of the commence- 456 ment of	his tenancy was known	or the duration thereof was for a definite period. In our opinion, reading the section that way would lead to	an absurdity. It is admitted on both hands that s. 4 is intended to be availed of only in proceedings under s.6 to which a landlord	would be a party.
Clause (b) of that section which enacts the second condition which	has to	be fulfilled by a person before he can avail himself of the presumption under that section	prescribes the minimum "duration" of a tenancy and does not deal with the question of its commencement or terms. Either the tenant fulfils	that condition	or he does not. If he does	not fulfil it no further question arises and he must be deemed to be an ordinary tenant and nothing more. Therefore, if the tenant satisfies the condition,	it would be meaningless to give to the tenure-holder an opportunity of disproving the very thing which had been proved in his presence and upon proof of which the tenant has been able to enlist the presumption created by the section in his	aid. Such a construction would render the provision absurd or at best useless.
If the section was capable of being read in the way	Mr. Pathak wants, it would read thus: "A person who has been in possession of tenure land at the	commencement of	the Abolition Act and was holding the same or any other land under the same tenure holder for a continuous period of 12 years he shall unless the tenure holder proves that he was not holding the	land or lands for the continuous period of 12 years, be deemed to be a permanent tenant". Surely this	would	be making nonsense of the section. We are wholly unable	to accept such a reading.	We think, therefore, that the tenure-holder can prove under the section that on the	basis of twelve years continued possession the tenant would not have been a permanent tenant for other reasons. These other reasons must be the reasons which in spite of the 457 length of possession would show that he is not a permanent tenant because the tenancy commenced at a certain time or because a term had been agreed upon for the tenancy or fixed by usage.
It may be, as the learned Solicitor General says, that the language used by the legislature is not felicitous.	Even so, we think that it would not at	all be	far-fetched to construe it	as meaning that the tenure-holder	has the right to establish for getting over the presumption, that the tenancy originated at a definite point of time or was	of a finite duration. The language used by the legislature	is in	our view capable of only such construction.
Then it is said	that even if	s. 4	is construed as giving an opportunity to the tenure- holder to prove otherwise than by disproving that the tenant had been in continuous possession of land under him for twelve years that he is not a permanent tenant, that opportunity is illusory and really nonexistent and, therefore, s. 4 in effect extends the definition of a permanent tenant. This contention is based on	s. 6 of the Act which, it may be	stated gives the tenure holder a period of six months from the commencement of the impugned Act to	move the Mamlatdar in writing for	a declaration that the tenant is not a	permanent tenant within s. 4. It may be stated	that the respondents concede that s. 6 has that effect.
We are, however, unable to agree	that s. 6 makes the opportunity to rebut the presumption raised under s. 4 by continuous possession for twelve years illusory or non-existent. We have first to point out that we do not find this point taken in the petitions. Secondly, we fail	to appreciate why	the six	months' time	prescribed should be considered as if no time had really been given to the tenure-holder which would be the effect of accepting the petitioners' contention.
Even so, we do not see why it should not have been reasonably possible to lodge these applications within the period allowed. All that the tenure- holder has to do is to name the tenant concerned and state that he wants a declaration that the tenant is not a permanent tenant. It is also said that the tenure-holder has to make the application in anticipation of the tenant making a claim to be a permanent tenant.	But we are	unable	to appreciate how	this	by itself can	make the opportunity to	rebut non-existent. We find	no practical difficulty in the tenure-holder making the application in anticipation.
Furthermore, the	question has to	be considered according to the realities of the case.
It is admitted in the petitioners' affidavit in opposition that	the preparation of the record of rights in respect of the tenants in the taluqdari villages commenced soon after	the Abolition Act came into force, that	is, soon after August 15, 1950. Many of	the tenants have already been recorded as permanent tenants and since this could only have been done	with	reference to the provision of s. 83 of the Code the petitioners can have no	grievance against such entries. Further, s. 3(b)(ii) of the impugned Act takes into account the fact that the proceedings in respect of the preparation of	the record of rights were pending at the	commencement	of this Act.	In these proceedings the	tenure holder	must already have objected-of course where he thought fit-to the tenant being recorded as a permanent tenant. These again would cover quite a number of cases. It is only in regard to the remaining cases that 459 applications under s. 6 would	be required.	We think it right also to point out that the rights under s. 4 of the impugned Act can be claimed by a tenant	who pays for	his holding	an amount exceeding the assessment of the land. This	we suppose would further reduce the number of tenants to whom	s. 6 would apply. We have no materials on which to show that these would form a very large number. As we have already stated the petitioners not having raised the	present point out of s. 6, they have not given any materials to	show the cases of how	many	tenants	are outstanding.
Therefore, on	the facts on this	case, the petitioners cannot legitimately urge any practical difficulty in making applications under s. 6. We may also state here that many claims by tenants to be permanent tenants must have long	ago been raised because under s. 5A of the Abolition Act, as originally framed, a tenant had five years from its commencement, that is, from August 15, 1950, within which to exercise his right. At the date of the impugned Act this	period had been extended upto February 28, 1960. The impugned Act came into force on June 10, 1958. Therefore, at the date of the impugned Act the tenant had about one year and nine months within which to exercise	the right given to him by s. 5-A of the Abolition Act. It is apparently for	this reason that s.	6 of the impugned Act fixed the period of six months. It is true that later the	period	under	s.5-A was extended but that was	by Act XVIII of 1960 which came into force on	April 8, 1960	and had, therefore, no bearing on the legislature fixing the time under s. 6 of the impugned Act.
According	to one of our brethren the definition of	"permanent tenant" is enlarged because even though the point of time when the tenancies of persons over certain lands commenced were known these persons are also included in the definition of	"permanent tenant" under the impugned Act and cl. (b) of s. 4 is said to do this. We may point out 460 that this was not one of the arguments advanced at the Bar	and the respondents had no opportunity of meeting it. That apart, it is	clear	that this clause has to be read with Expl. II to s. 5-A of the Abolition Act. As	already stated	s. 5-A was not attacked as unconstitutional. Explanation II thereto provides as follows:
"For the purpose of	this section,	a permanent tenant includes a tenant who holds a	taluqdari land	in exchange of another taluqdari land of which he was, and but for the exchange would have	been a	permanent tenant and who	has been in	continuous possession	thereof since the	date	of exchange." We may	assume that the Explanation extends the definition of "permanent tenant" but its validity has not	been challenged by the plaintiffs. Clause (b) of	s. 4 of the impugned Act merely takes note of the practice in tenure villages of changing the holdings of tenants from time to time and it is apparently for	this reason that there was	no challenge to s. 4 of the impugned Act on this ground. It is	only the persons who	or whose predecessors in title	were tenants	in tenure villages from time immemorial	who will get the benefit of the impugned Act and no others. No new persons will thus be brought in by s. 4(b) and so it is idle to say that it enlarges the definition of permanent tenant.
It is said that s. 4 widens the definition of permanent tenant by	including tenants the commencement of whose	tenancies is	definitely known. But does it do that ? The tenant in	a tenure village is a person holding tenure land. It is not	necessary that	he and his predecessors in title should have been holding the same parcel of land since the commencement of their tenancy. The practice of exchanging parcels of lands prevailed in tenure villages and Expl. II to s. 5-A has been founded upon it. Section 83 of the Code refers to the per- 461 manency of the relationship of landlord and tenant and not to the existence of permanent tenancy with respect	to a	specific parcel of land. These provisions have	to be read along with s. 4 of the impugned Act because this Act cannot stand or was not intended to stand	by itself. It adds certain provisions to the Abolition Act and the Code and these provisions must necessarily be assimilated to those of the main Act. Looked at this way it is clear that what s. 4 contemplates is a person the commencement of	the tenancy of whose predecessors in title is unknown but who has been in possession of the	same or	different parcels of tenure land for a period of not less than twelve years prior to the	commencement of	the Abolition Act. It may be possible to say when he came into possession of a parcel of land `X' where it was taken by him within	or more than twelve years	of the commencement of	the Abolition Act but that is not the same thing as saying that the relation between him and	tenure-holder came into existence on that date for the first time. If in fact it came into existence more	than	twelve years before the Abolition Act came into force, may be with respect to different parcels of land from time to time, he is entitled to be regarded as a permanent tenant, unless of course it can be shown by the landlord that he	or his	predecessor in	title was first inducted as a tenant in the tenure village at a definite period of time or that the tenancy was of a finite duration.
Thus, in our judgment, s. 4 of the impugned Act does not expand the definition of a permanent tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that it has the effect of taking away from the landlord any property which	had vested in him on the tillers' day. It may be	that a	tenant who, prior to the enactment of s. 4, was merely recorded as	an ordinary tenant because he could not show that the origin of his tenancy	was lost in the mists of anti- 462 quity and that now availing	himself of this provision, he	can get himself recorded as	a permanent tenant by	showing	his	continuous possession for twelve years. But s. 4 does not, as we read it, say that he becomes a permanent tenant in these circumstances in every case. He would not become one if the landlord shows that his tenancy commenced on a particular date beyond those twelve years or is of a finite duration.
Section 32H(1) does not	confer	upon the landlord the right to claim the price of occupancy at the	rates prescribed in sub-s. (1)(ii) from a person because	he is	recorded as an ordinary tenant but only from one who is in fact other than a permanent tenant.	If, in	fact,	he was	a permanent tenant, or can be presumed	to be	a permanent tenant though till the coming into force of the impugned Act he was not recorded as such no right to claim the price of	occupancy on the footing that he is not a permanent	tenant	of tenure land vested in the tenure-holder by virtue of that provision. Section 87-A of the Tenancy Act renders s. 32H(1)(i)	inappropriate to such	a tenant. No question of	infringement of the right under Art. 19(1) (f) therefore arises in such cases.
It was also said	that s.	6 of the impugned Act is	void because	it puts an unreasonable restriction upon the tenure-holder's right to hold property and, therefore, offends Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. This point does not	appear to have been taken in the petitions. In any case, if our construction of s. 4 is	right,	then the impugned Act would be	saved by Art. 31-A of the Constitution and its validity would not be open to attack	on the ground that	it violated Art.
Furthermore, it is difficult to	appreciate how the	tenure-holder's right to hold property is affected by s. 6. His right of property with which we are 463 concerned, is as occupant of certain land having some permanent or other tenants under him. Section 5-A of	the Abolition	Act gives the	permanent tenants	the right to	convert themselves into occupants and thereby cease to be tenants of the tenure-holder. The validity of	this provision is not at	all challenged.	A tenant may	claim the benefit under this section only if he establishes that he	is a permanent tenant. It is plainly conceivable that in many cases the tenure-holder may dispute that the tenant is a permanent tenant.
On such	dispute being	raised, the tenant has to prove that he is a permanent tenant. All that s. 6 does is	to fix	a time	limit within	which the tenure-holder shall have the right to dispute that certain	permanent tenants are not	permanent tenants. That	does make those who	were not permanent tenants, such tenants. Therefore, s. 6 can in	no way	be said to affect the tenure- holder's right to property.
Further, it would appear	that in most cases the tenure-holders themselves including the petitioners, have actually applied	to the mamlatdars for a declaration in their favour under this provision and those applications are pending.
The learned Solicitor-General informed us that as a matter of fact upon the basis of the records made available	by the	tenure-holders tentative entries	were	made in the	record	of rights immediately after the coming into force of the impugned Act and that thereupon the tenure-holders have applied to the mamlatdar	well within six months for a declaration under that	provision.
To summarise, the position is that s. 4 of the impugned	Act by merely enacting the presumption does not take away any property of the tenure-holder. His property such as it is, is left in tact. That section 464 does not confer any new property upon a tenant. It only comes to the rescue of a permanent tenant who is faced with the task of proving the nature of his tenancy, by raising a	presumption	of permanency in his favour. If in fact his tenancy is not	permanent and has been extinguished by law but he	is tentatively recorded or is sought to be recorded as permanent, the landlord can, in	a proceeding under s.6(1) rebut	the presumption by producing the	documents in his possession	or otherwise that	the tenancy	is not in fact permanent and, therefore, has been extinguished by the operation of s.32(1) of the Tenancy Act. If he proves	this he will	be entitled to claim compensation or purchase money at	the rates permissible under s. 32H(1)(ii) of that Act. That right of his is not affected	in any	way by the impugned Act.	If he	does	not succeed	in establishing that, then he will be only entitled to get purchase price at the rate provided in s.5A of the	Abolition Act.	That, however, would be by virtue of the operation of s.5A of the Abolition Act-a provision which, as we have already said has not been challenged-and not because any provision of the impugned Act deprives him of a right to claim a higher purchase price.
The impugned Act is plainly applicable only to matters arising out	of a relationship between landlord and	tenant.	Its provisions are not intended to apply where such relationship does not subsist. Therefore, the law must be held to	be within the competence of the legislature by virtue of entry 18 of	List II of the Constitution which is to the following effect :
"Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land	tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and	the collection	of rents; transfer	and	alienation	of agricultural land; land	improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." 465 There can be no question of regarding the impugned Act as	colourable because it directly falls under Entry 18 and deals with matters which have	a bearing upon the relationship	of landlord and tenant. The law being	thus within the competence of the	Bombay legislature,	Art.31(1) of the Constitution cannot be said	to have been infringed. The first three points urged by Mr.
Pathak accordingly fall to the ground. The fourth, fifth and sixth points	are also based on the assumption that	the impugned Act confers upon the persons whose tenancy rights were extinguished on April 1, 1957, rights	of permanent tenancy. Upon the construction which alone	can properly	be placed on s. 4 it cannot be said to confer any new rights on such persons. To repeat, the section applies to permanent tenants and permanent tenants alone. Therefore, the three contentions raised by Mr. Pathak do not fall for consideration.
The seventh point urged by Mr. Pathak is that ss. 4 and 5 of the impugned Act do not apply to other occupants	under	the Bombay Land Revenue Code, who are	similarly situate and	that the result of this would be that they will be entitled to higher purchase price than	that permissible under s. 5A of the Abolition Act. This, according to him, is a classification without any reasonable connection with	the objects sought to be achieved by the	statute. If our construction of s. 4 is correct, Art.	31-A of the Constitution would protect the law and the petitioners	would	be precluded from	challenging it	on the ground that it infringes Art 14. Apart from that we may point out that though the impugned Act applies only to tenure villages	and not to non-tenure	villages, there is, in fact a ground of distinction between villages of the two types. That ground is the availability or	otherwise of the records. In the former all the relevant records were	with the tenure-holders themselves, but as stated in the statement of 466 "objects and reasons" were not produced by them and this created difficulties	in completing the record of rights. In the latter the records having been maintained	by the	Government were available and therefore,	no difficulty was experienced	in completing the record of rights. The classification is thus based on the extent of the availability of the	material for raising	an inference or a presumption and, therefore, has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to	be achieved by the impugned Act.
Upon this	view	it is	not necessary	to consider the other points urged by Mr. Pathak on the authority of various decisions because the very basis of those arguments is, in our opinion, unsound. The petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. As there was only one common argument we direct that there will be	only one set	of costs.
AYYANGAR, J.-I entirely agree with the order proposed to be passed by my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned Brother S.K. Das J. The only reason for my separate judgment is because of the views I entertain regarding the import of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment),	Act 1958 (Bombay Act LVII of 1958) hereinafter referred to as the	impugned Act, and in particular of s. 4 thereof.
The facts	of the case	and the relevant statutory provisions bearing upon it are set out in extenso in the judgments of my learned brethren and they do not need to be repeated Before entering on a consideration of the proper construction of the impugned Act it	is necessary to state that I did not understand the learned Solicitor-General to contest the position that if	the impugned Act extended the definition of the	term permanent	tenant beyond that which obtained under	s.83 of the Land Revenue Code, and brought into that category tenants who before then were comprehended within the	class	of "other tenants".
467 under s.32H(1)(ii) of Bombay Act 13 of 1956, its constitutional validity could be sustained, having regard to the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of	Bombay(1) holding that the effect of the 1956 legislation was	to replace the relationship of landlord and tenant by that of vendor and purchaser as between the tenure-holder and his tenants. His submission was accordingly directed to establishing	that the impugned Act while not modifying in any manner the basic requirements needed to constitute a person a "permanent tenant" under s. 83 of the Code, merely shifted the onus of proof on to the tenure-holder on certain stated facts being found.
It is this view which has found favour with my learned brother	Mudholkar J.	On the Construction of	the relevant provisions of the impugned Act, he has held that the	status	or character of a permanent tenant or the definition of that term has not been altered in any manner, and that whereas before the impugned enactment the onus was upon the tenant to prove all the necessary elements to establish his claim to be a permanent tenant, the change effected by the Act of 1958 was to throw on the landlord the burden of proving	the origin of the	tenancy and its terminable character in the event of its being proved that the tenant	had been in possession of his holding for twelve	Dears before August 15, 1950. If this construction of the effect of the impugned Act were accepted I agree it would go a considerable way towards	establishing the constitutional validity of the impugned provision.
I feel myself however unable to	accept the construction of	s.4 of the impugned Act which was put forward before us	by the learned Solicitor- General for the State	and Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the contesting tenants. To start with, the long 468 title of the Act itself states that the Act is one for further to	"define" permanent tenants.	No doubt, where the operative words of the provision are clear that only a shifting of the onus	of proof is effected, the	long title of the Act cannot be called in aid to vary their proper interpretation, but that is not the position here.
On the	other hand as I shall show presently, the operative provisions of the enactment appears to me designed to clearly	carryout the purpose set out in	the long title, viz.,	to "define" or to redefine the	class of persons who	shall	be considered to be "permanent	tenants" for the purposes of obtaining the benefits conferred upon "permanent tenants" under the	law that existed before that date.
"3. A	person shall,	within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition Law (in the context the	Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949), be	deemed to be ....... a permanent tenant on	the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if	his name has been recorded in the record of rights	or other public or	revenue record	as.....	permanent tenant in respect of any tenure-land (a) on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceedings	under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the Land Revenue Code, 1879- (i) before the commencement of this Act, (ii) after the commencement of this Act in cases in which inquiries were pending at the commencement of this Act, or 469 (iii) in pursuance of an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under section 6 of this Act." "4. For the purposes of the relevant Act specified	in Part I of	the Schedule,	a person- (a) who on the date of the commencement of that Act was holding any tenure-land, and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if any were, immediately before that date for such continuous periods as aggregate to	a total continuous period of twelve years	or more, holding the same tenure-land or any other tenure-land, as a	tenant...... under the tenure- holder for	the time being on payment of an amount exceeding the assessment of the land shall unless it is proved by the tenure- holder that he	would not have been	a permanent tenant on the basis of	continued possession of the land under clause (b), be deemed to	be a permanent tenant of the land under clause (a) and all the provisions of that Act shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant.
Explanation.-The assessment	for the purpose of	this section shall be reckoned as provided in clauses (a) and (b)	of section 5." "6. (1) The	rights	of ...........(a) permanent tenant under sections 4 and 5 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure-holder applies in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of the commencement	of this Act for	a declaration that any holder or tenant under his is not....... a permanent tenant.
(2) Any such application	shall	be disposed of as if	it were an application in respect of a 470 disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." to extract only the portion	pertinent to the controversy before us.
It will be seen that by force of s. 3 persons are deemed to	be permanent tenants	under the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, if the name of such tenant is recorded in	the record of	rights	or other public records as "a permanent	tenant" in any one of the three events specified in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of the section. In so far as reference is made	to persons already recorded in the record of rights before the passing	of the	Act, the characteristics for determining who a	permanent tenant was would obviously have been based on the pre-existing law and	they	would have been permanent tenants under the law apart	from the "deeming" provision.	The position	of those recorded under cl. (b) might be similar, and it is unnecessary to	enter into a	discussion as	to whether in cases where an enquiry commenced before the commencement of the Act	but is	completed thereafter, the	tests brought	in by s. 4 of the Act could be availed of to determine the status of the tenant. If one proceeded on the	assumption that the provisions of the impugned Act are not to be brought in into an	enquiry already started there would be no difference between cls. (a) and (b) of s. 3-and in both cases they would be actual and not	statutorily deemed "permanent	tenants".
It brings in, if my construction of s. 4(b) is correct, a new class of "permanent tenants"	- persons who were before the date of the impugned enactment non-permanent	tenants in whom by virtue of the	provisions of Bombay Act 13 of 1956 the interest of the landlord stood transferred and by whom the purchase-price specified in s.32H(1)(ii) was payable, into the category of	"permanent tenants." 471 Section 3(c) refers to an entry	made by	a Mamlatdar under	s. 6,	but when one looks at s. 6 he is referred to s. 4 as containing or defining the class of	tenants whom	the Mamlatdar	is enjoined to enter in the revenue records as	a "permanent tenant." Turning now to s. 4, it would be seen	that persons are deemed to be "permanent tenants" if they satisfied	three	cumulative conditions : (a) they must be holding tenure-land on the date of the commencement of that Act, viz., The Taluqdari Abolition Act, i.e., on August 15, 1950, (b) they or those from	whom they claim should immediately before August 15, 1950, have been continuously in possession of that or any other tenure-land for twelve years, (c) the amount of rent payable by	them should exceed the assessment leviable on the	land	calculated according to s. 5. The effect	of condition (a) would be to exclude from the category of permanent tenants those who came	into occupation or were inducted on the land of which they could claim to be permanent tenants, after August 15, 1950. But every tenant who was in possession of tenure-land on that date	could	apparently qualify for obtaining the status of a permanent tenant, being deemed to be such, if he satisfied the other two conditions. As	regards condition (b),	there	is obscurity and	contradiction attending the expression "continuous	periods aggregating to	a total continuous period of	twelve years".
Aggregation would obviously mean an addition	of integers, and when units of time are the integers as is apparent from the context, in plain words it would mean the addition of broken periods.	To posit continuity in such a case, might possibly suggest that it refers to cases where a tenant is in possession of different parcels of tenure-land throughout the	twelve-year period, though he	is not in	possession of any	particular parcel continuously for a period of 12 years, and that the terms of the section would be satisfied and he would be deemed to have been in "continuous 472 possession" of	the land of	which he was	in possession at the commencement	of the	Taluqdari Abolition Act for the	purpose of qualifying for permanent tenancy of that parcel. An analysis of the circumstances attendant on this	condition would reveal the following : (1) Let us take it that during the period twelve years before August 15, 1950 a tenant had been in possession of three distinct parcels of tenure land `A', `B' and `C' at different periods but continuous, i.e., there being no point of time at which he was not	in possession of one or the other of these three parcels and that on the date of the commencement of the	Act he	is in possession of parcel `C'. It is possible that such a situation might arise from exchange of holdings with the consent of the tenure-holder by a person who	was a permanent tenant under the existing law. But the provision on its	terms is not confined to exchanges by such tenants, but is of wider application. If the proper construction of this unclear provision of s. 4 be as above, any	tenant who satisfied the other conditions of the section, would be deemed to be a permanent tenant in respect of parcel `C'.
It will	at once be seen that the origin of his tenancy of holding `C'	is ex	concessis known.
Surely, such a tenant	would not be a	permanent tenant within s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. It has only to be added that he would not fall within the definition of a permanent tenant even under s. 2(10A) of the Tenancy Act inserted by Bombay Act 13 of 1956. The argument, therefore that s.	4 was	merely intended	to and provided a rule of	evidence for determining who a permanent tenant was under s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and did not extend	such category	of persons by an artificial definition, would appear to be negatived even by the first paragraph of s.
This conclusion	is strengthened by the provision made	at the	end of	s. 4(b) of the impugned Act as regards the grounds upon which the landlord or 473 the tenure-holder could disprove the right of a tenant to the status of a permanent tenant. That provision reads:
"Unless it is proved by the tenure- holder that he	would	not have been	a permanent tenant on the basis of	continued possession of land under clause (b)......" The learned Solicitor-General submitted that	to read this portion of s. 4 (b) as meaning that the landlord has to disprove what the tenant has already proved	would be to give it no meaning at all and	that consequently it should be held that in order to give some rational meaning to the words quoted they refer to tenure-holder having to prove that the tenant	was not a permanent tenant under s. 83 of	the Bombay Land Revenue Code. To put it differently, the construction suggested was that on	the conditions laid down in s. 4(b) being fulfilled, viz., continuous possession of tenure- land by	a tenant for twelve years computed	as described, the	onus was shifted to the tenure- holder to prove that the tenant did	not fall within the category of persons described in s. 83 of the	Code. I	find myself unable to accept this interpretation of the section. Even if one started with the presumption that what the impugned Act sought to achieve was not to "define" a permanent tenant but merely to shift the onus of proving the status-the conditions of s. 83 of the Code being assumed to be still the determinant, I do not find words in s. 4 to support the interpretation which the learned Solicitor-General desires the Court to accept. There is no reference to s. 83 in the impugned Act and the class of	persons who are termed "permanent tenants" are expressly stated to be those who are deemed to be such. That itself would be some indication that the class is an artificial creation brought into existence by the Act. That apart, I have already pointed out that the opening words of the 474 first paragraph of s. 4(b) contemplate cases where the origin of the tenancy of the parcel in respect of which permanent tenancy is claimed	is known.
Lastly, the words in which the content of the right of the tenure-holder to dispute the "deemed" permanent tenancy are couched are wholly incompatible with his having a right to establish that the tenant does not satisfy the requirements of s. 83 of the Code. The words used are "that the tenant would not have	been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued	possession of	land under clause (b)". The conditions on the fulfilment of which a	person is deemed to be a permanent tenant are, as	already pointed out, three and of these two are set	out in	sub-cl. (b),	viz., the "continuous" possession	of tenure-land and the rent of	the land being higher	than the revenue assessment. In	my opinion the argument about the irrationality of the literal construction of the quoted words or s. 4(b) stems from the assumption that s.	4 contemplates	an enquiry or proceeding initiated by the tenants who by evidence establish the matters set out in s. 4 and it is on that basis that the submission is made that the legislature could not have made a provision for the same matters being	disproved by the tenure- holder.	Even if the	basis be assumed to	be correct, I do	not see any	absurdity in the provision. But	that apart, in my judgment s. 4(b) does not contemplate	or provide	for any application by	the tenant and therefore there is no question of the tenant having established that the conditions	of s. 4(b) have been	satisfied.
Section 4(b) enacts a	positive rule of law	by which a	person in possession	of a holding	of tenure-land on August 15, 1950 is "deemed" to be a permanent tenant on	the fulfilment	of three conditions, the	tenure-holder being entitled	to establish that the conditions of that section have not been satisfied when proceedings	for that purpose are initiated by him. The 475 provision for proceedings being initiated by the tenure-holder to take	advantage of	the right granted to him by s. 4(b) is to be found in s. 6.
What has just been stated is amply borne out by the	terms of s. 6,	for it	enacts	that the rights of a permanent tenant under s. 4 "shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure- holder applies	in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the commencement of the Act of a declaration that the tenant under him	is not	a permanent tenant" (to	quote only the material words). It will therefore be seen that the concept of permanent tenant as	envisaged under s. 4	is incorporated into the	texture	of s.	6. Every person who satisfies the definition of a permanent tenant	under s. 4 is therefore automatically entitled without application by him, to be entered in the	revenue records	as a permanent tenant by the Mamlatdar unless the tenure-holder applies in writing objecting to the entry. Obviously the objections which he could raise and which would be the subject of adjudication under s. 6 are those set out	as being open to him under s. 4. In this connection it has to be noticed that s. 6 does not specify the grounds upon which the tenure-holder might object to a tenant being treated as	a permanent tenant and it is on the absence of those provisions that the	learned	Solicitor-General bases his argument suggesting that the objections of the	tenure-holder would extend to	disproving that the tenant was a permanent tenant under s. 83 of the	Code. It is not possible to accede to this submission. It is common ground that no enquiry is contemplated under s. 4(b) and that the right of the tenure-holder to object to the entry of the tenant	as a	permanent tenant is	by taking advantage of the provision in	s. 6.	It would therefore follow that	s. 4(b) and	s. 6 are integrated provisions,	the one	laying	down the grounds of objection open to the tenure-holder, and s.	6 making provision for the forum in which and 476 the procedure by which	such objections could be urged. To put the matter slightly differently s.
4(b) specifies	the grounds of objection open to a tenure-holder but does not indicate where and in which proceeding the objections could be raised- while s. 6 indicates that the authority to decide is the	Mamlatdar and that the proceeding would be initiated by an objection petition filed by the tenure-holder. Both s. 4(b) and s. 6	would	be truncated unless they were read as forming	an integrated whole. It is in this manner that	a reconciliation is possible between the terms	of ss. 4 and 6 which so	to speak form together provision for determining, after investigation.
the class of persons who shall be entitled	to claim rights as permanent tenants.	Section	4 having defined	a permanent tenant in positive terms, s. 6 steps in and sets up a procedure and creates a forum in which that positive provision might be tested and if not displaced	would	be given effect to. In the view I have expressed the reference to the enquiry being under s. 135D of the Code would not make any difference, because the officials and Tribunals or Courts vested with authority under s. 135D of the Code and the related provisions would have	still to consider whether the tenant had or had not qualified to be a permanent tenant by	the application of the criteria enacted by s.	6. I am therefore clearly of the	opinion that the entire object and purpose of the impugned enactment which is given effect to by its	operative provisions enacts not a rule of evidence for determining who permanent tenants are under the pre-existing law, but to define, create and as	it were, add a	new class of "permanent tenants", i.e., those who satisfy the requirements of s. 4.
If this were the	proper construction of the impugned enactment it was not seriously contested that the enactment	would be	void and unconstitutional and liable to	be struck down. I agree therefore	that these petitions	should	be allowed.
477 BY COURT : In accordance with the opinion of the majority, these petitions	are allowed with costs. As the petitions have been heard together there will be only one hearing fee.