Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/827/
Timestamp: 2017-02-23 18:37:57
Document Index: 369829987

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1961']

Kaiser Alumium v. Bonjorno :: 494 U.S. 827 (1990) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Kaiser Alumium v. Bonjorno 494 U.S. 827 (1990)
U.S. Supreme CourtKaiser Alumium v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990)Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v. BonjornoNos. 88-1595, 88-1771Argued Dec. 43, 1989Decided April 17, 1990494 U.S. 827Syllabus
Respondents (Bonjorno), the sole stockholders of a now defunct aluminum pipe fabrication company, brought suit against petitioners (Kaiser) in the District Court, alleging that Kaiser had monopolized the market for such pipe in violation of the Sherman Act. Judgment for Bonjorno on a jury verdict and damages award was entered on August 22, 1979. However, the District Court found that this judgment was not supported by the evidence, and held a limited retrial on the issue of damages, which resulted in a jury award of $9,567,939 on December 2, 1981. After judgment was entered on December 4, 1981, the District Court granted a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals, inter alia, vacated the latter judgment and reinstated and affirmed the December 4 judgment, issuing its mandate in 1986. The postjudgment interest statute in effect when Bonjorno's complaint was in filed provided that "interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of judgment, at the rate allowed by State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976 ed.). In 1982, while the appeal was pending, an amended § 1961 went into effect, which specified that "interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate" based on the price for United States Treasury bills settled "immediately prior to the date of judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 ed.). The District Court held that § 1961 required interest to be calculated from December 2, 1981, the date of the damages verdict. However, it rejected Bonjorno's argument that Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696 -- which held that courts are to apply the law in effect at the time of decision except where retrospective application would result in manifest injustice to one of the parties or where there is clear congressional intent to the contrary -- required that the amended version of the statute be applied to determine the applicable interest rate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's determination of the date from which interest should be calculated, but reversed on the issue of which version of § 1961 applied. Page 494 U. S. 828
4. The equities of the case do not require that the rate of interest be set at a rate higher than that afforded by § 1961. Where Congress has not seen fit to provide for a higher interest rate with respect to antitrust Page 494 U. S. 829 suits and has set a definite applicable rate, the courts may not legislate to the contrary. P. 494 U. S. 840.