Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93726/railroad-comm-n-wisconsin-vs-chicago-co
Timestamp: 2019-08-25 09:57:43
Document Index: 707463234

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 416', '§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 15']

Railroad Comm N of Wisconsin Vs Chicago B and Q R Co - Citation 93726 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Railroad Comm'n of WisconsIn Vs. Chicago, B. and Q. R. Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/93726
Case Number 257 U.S. 563
Appellant Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin
Respondent Chicago, B. and Q. R. Co.
railroad comm'n of wisconsin v. chicago, b. & q. r. co. - 257 u.s. 563 (1922) u.s. supreme court railroad comm'n of wisconsin v. chicago, b. & q. r. co., 257 u.s. 563 (1922) railroad commission of wisconsin v. chicago, burlington & quincy railroad company no. 20 argued march 11, 14, 15, 1921 restored to docket for reargument october 24, 1921 reargued december 5, 6, 7, 1921 decided february 27, 1922 257 u.s. 563 appeal from the district court of the united states for the eastern district of wisconsin syllabus 1. an order of the interstate commerce commission requiring a horizontal increase of intrastate passenger fares and excess baggage charges, to correspond with fares and charges fixed for like.....
Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. - 257 U.S. 563 (1922)
U.S. Supreme Court Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922)
1. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring a horizontal increase of intrastate passenger fares and excess baggage charges, to correspond with fares and charges fixed for like interstate service in the same state, cannot be sustained under § 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, as an order to remove undue and unreasonable prejudice to persons traveling in interstate commerce, when it broadly embraces not only the intrastate rates to and from border points, which may work discrimination against interstate passengers and localities, but also those between points more remotely internal from which no such prejudice can arise upon the facts found by the Commission. P. 257 U. S. 579 . The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342 , and Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493 , distinguished.
2. Such an order is not validated by a clause saving the right of the state, or other party in interest, to apply to the Commission for a modification as to particular intrastate fares or charges. P. 257 U. S. 580 .
(a) The effective operation of the Transportation Act reasonably requires that intrastate traffic over the lines of interstate carriers pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an adequate railway system. P. 257 U. S. 585 .
(b) While § 15a, supra, confers no power on the Commission to deal with intrastate rates, § 416 (§ 13, par. 4) of the same act, in authorizing it to remove and in forbidding and declaring unlawful "any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce," clearly contemplates that such discrimination, resulting from intrastate rates unduly low as compared with interstate rates as fixed under § 15a, and tending to thwart the purpose of that section, may be removed by the Commission. P. 257 U. S. 586 .
(c) The act being clear on this point, reports and debates of Congress cannot be resorted to to introduce ambiguity. P. 257 U. S. 588 .
(d) The valuation required by § 15a is not confined to that part of the property of the interstate carrier used in interstate, segregated from that used in intrastate, commerce. P. 257 U. S. 587 .
(e) Raising the level of the intrastate rates in such case is an incident to the effective control of the interstate system, and does not violate the proviso against the Commission's regulating traffic wholly within a state. P. 257 U. S. 588 .
(f) The act as so applied is within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. P. 257 U. S. 589 .
(g) The action of the Commission under it respecting intrastate rates should be directed to substantial disparity which operates as a real discrimination against and obstruction to interstate commerce, leaving state authorities to deal with intrastate rates inter sese on the general level found fair by the Commission. P. 257 U. S. 590 .
First. The report and findings of the Commission undoubtedly show that the intrastate fares work an undue discrimination against travelers in interstate commerce and against localities ( Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 ) in typical instances numerous enough to justify a general finding against a large class of fares. In a general order thus supported, possible injustice can be avoided by a saving clause allowing anyone to except himself from the order by proper showing. This practice is fully sustained by precedent in what was done as a sequence of the Shreveport Case ( Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, supra ). See Meredith v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 34 I.C.C. 472; Railroad Comm'n. of Louisiana v. Arkansas Harbor Terminal Railway Co., 41 I.C.C. 83; Eastern Texas R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 242 F. 300; Looney v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 247 U. S. 214 . In Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 245 U. S. 493 , 245 U. S. 508 , this Court indicated its approval of such practice which was adopted by the Commission. Business Men's League of St. Louis v. Atchison & S.F. R. Co., 49 I.C.C. 713. Any rule which would require specific proof of discrimination as to each fare or rate and its effect would completely block the remedial purpose of the statute.
See also American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617 , 244 U. S. 627 .
of 1920 (which are given in part in the margin, * ) are such reduction and disparity an "undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce" which the Interstate Commerce Commission may remove by raising the intrastate fares? A short reference to the circumstances inducing the legislation and a summary of its relevant provisions will aid the answer to this question.
It is urged that, in previous decisions, notably the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , the Shreveport case, supra, and the Illinois Central case, supra, the expression "unjust discrimination against interstate commerce" was often used when, as the law then was, it could only mean discrimination as between persons and localities, and therefore that it is to be given the same limited meaning here. But here, the general words are used after discrimination against persons and localities have been specifically mentioned. The natural inference is that, even if they include what has gone before, they mean something more. When we find that they aptly include a kind of discrimination against interstate commerce which the operation of the new act for the first time makes important and which would seriously obstruct its chief purpose, we cannot ignore their necessary effect.
It is objected here, as it was in the Shreveport case, that orders of the Commission which raise the intrastate rates to a level of the interstate structure violate the specific proviso of the original Interstate Commerce Act, repeated in the amending acts, that the Commission is not to regulate traffic wholly within a state. To this the same answer must be made as was made in the Shreveport case, 234 U. S. 342 , 234 U. S. 358 , that such orders as to intrastate traffic are merely incidental to the regulation of interstate commerce, and necessary to its efficiency. Effective control of the one must embrace some control over the other in view of the blending of both in actual operation. The same rails and the same cars carry both. The same men conduct them. Commerce is a unit, and does not regard state lines, and while, under the Constitution, interstate and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet when they are so mingled together that the supreme authority, the Nation, cannot exercise complete effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an invasion of state authority of a violation of the proviso.
general disparity between interstate and intrastate rates. Committee reports and explanatory statements of members in charge made in presenting a bill for passage have been held to be a legitimate aid to the interpretation of a statute where its language is doubtful or obscure. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 , 254 U. S. 475 . But, when taking the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the court, extraneous aid like this cannot control the interpretation. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184 , 230 U. S. 198 ; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 , 242 U. S. 490 . Such aids are only admissible to solve doubt and not to create it. For the reasons given, we have no doubt in this case.
Counsel for the appellants have not contested the constitutional validity of the statute construed as we have construed it, although the counsel for the state commissions whom we permitted to file briefs as amici curiae have done so. The principles laid down by this Court in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 432 -433, the Shreveport case, 234 U. S. 342 , 234 U. S. 351 , and the Illinois Central case, 245 U. S. 493 , 245 U. S. 506 , which are rates cases, and in the analogous cases of Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612 , 221 U. S. 618 ; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 , 222 U. S. 26 -27; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 48 , 223 U. S. 51 , we think, leave no room for discussion on this point. Congress, in its control of its interstate commerce system, is seeking in the Transportation Act to make the system adequate to the needs of the country by securing for it a reasonable compensatory return for all the work it does. The states are seeking to use that same system for intrastate traffic. That entails large duties and expenditures on the interstate commerce system which may burden it unless compensation is received for the intrastate business reasonably proportionate to that for the
interstate business. Congress, as the dominant controller of interstate commerce, may therefore restrain undue limitation of the earning power of the interstate commerce system in doing state work. The affirmative power of Congress in developing interstate commerce agencies is clear. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 ; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 ; California v. Pacific Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 1 , 127 U. S. 39 . In such development, it can impose any reasonable condition on a state's use of interstate carriers for intrastate commerce it deems necessary or desirable. This is because of the supremacy of the national power in this field.
In Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 399 , where relevant cases were carefully reviewed, it was said: