Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/450-f-2d-199-595748426
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 12:56:23
Document Index: 287241029

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6003', '§ 2514', '§ 2514', '§ 2514', '§ 2514', '§ 2518', '§ 2511', '§ 2516', '§ 2518', '§ 2515', '§ 801', '§ 2511', '§ 2515', '§ 2518', '§ 2518']

450 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1971), 71-1088, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, In re Harrisburg, Pennsylvania - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 595748426
Docket Nº: 71-1088.
Party Name: In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. In the Matter of Joques EGAN, Appellant.
Case Date: May 28, 1971
450 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1971)
Before HASTIE, Chief Judge, and FORMAN, [*] SEITZ, VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT, ADAMS, GIBBONS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether a citizen who is summoned before a grand jury may object to questions based on information obtained through allegedly illegal and indeed unconstitutional wiretapping directed against the witness. Because of the great importance of what is at stake
here-not only the interpretation of provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act dealing with unauthorized electronic surveillance, but also the Fourth Amendment-we are constrained to set forth our views in some detail.
We begin with the reminder that the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, recognized by countless decisions of the Supreme Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of citizens against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. It thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people basic to a free society. 1
Sister Joques Egan, a member of the Order of Sacred Heart, was called before a federal grand jury in the early afternoon of January 14th in connection with an investigation into an alleged plot to kidnap a high public official and other offenses. An indictment naming six defendants had been handed down several days before, and it had named Sister Egan as an alleged co-conspirator, but not as a co-defendant. 2 Immediately following her refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, her counsel was served by the Government with an application for immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 6003 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
Contrary to the Court's instruction, and in direct reversal of the Government's announced intention, appellant was not called before the grand jury on January 26th. Instead, the Government served counsel with an application for a grant of "transactional immunity" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2514, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, stating that the Court would hear this new application "immediately." 3
Appellant's counsel, having had the new application for only fifteen minutes, asked for adequate time to prepare to argue the applicability and the constitutionality of § 2514 of the 1968 Act. Indeed the undated authorization letter from the Assistant Attorney General was not shown to Sister Egan's counsel until all parties were in the courtroom for the hearing. The Court refused to give defense counsel the opportunity to argue the applicability of § 2514, and instead immediately signed the order granting immunity and requiring Sister Egan to appear before the grand jury forthwith. Sister Egan's counsel, together with the Government attorney, went to the Court's chambers and made additional
objections both to the applicability of § 2514 and the lack of adequate notice and time to prepare argument. 4 The Court overruled all the objections made by Sister Egan's counsel, but did acknowledge the shortness of time permitted counsel to prepare for the hearing.
Before the grand jury once again, Sister Egan refused to testify on several grounds, [5] one of which is her primary contention on appeal-that the information which caused the Government to subpoena her and which prompted the questions propounded to her flowed from illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
Thereafter, on Sister Egan's application, this Court granted bail until it could decide the appeal on the merits. Without hearing further oral argument, the Court proceded on March 2, 1971 to affirm the judgment of contempt. Sister Egan then filed a petition for rehearing, and the Court en banc heard argument on April 5, 1971. 6
The Government did not suggest during reargument before the Court en banc, or at any time in this proceeding, that it did not employ wiretaps nor that any electronic surveillance that may have been utilized was authorized by court order. Since Sister Egan has not yet been afforded a hearing regarding her allegations
of illegal electronic surveillance by the Government, for the purpose of this appeal we assume her allegations to be true.
Three primary issues are raised by this case: first, whether the procedure provided by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(10) (a) for the suppression of evidence derived from illegally intercepted communications is available to Sister Egan under the present circumstances; second, whether a district court may order Sister Egan to testify before a grand jury, if such testimony would violate an express congressional prohibition; third, whether Sister Egan has a constitutional right to refuse to answer questions propounded to her before a grand jury when the basis for the questions is electronic surveillance of her conducted by the Governmment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Section 2515 is an unequivocal bar to questioning one before a grand jury if the questions are derived from electronic surveillance conducted in the absence of a properly issued warrant and aimed at the witness, if the witness himself objects to the interrogation. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511, § 2516, § 2518. The prohibition of § 2515 is in accord with Congressional findings set forth in § 801 of the Act of 1968, which explain that the purpose of Title III of the Act is, inter alia, "to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications" and "the integrity of court and administrative proceedings." 7
In his dissent, Judge Gibbons interprets this view as meaning that if illegal wiretaps are used against A, then A himself is precluded from voluntarily revealing the contents of the overheard communication. We do not so read § 2511 (1) (c). Instead, we suggest that it unqualifiedly bars the party making the illegal tap; not the party who has been victimized-the "aggrieved party."
The Government contends, however, that although Congress in § 2515 specifically prohibited the disclosure to a grand jury of evidence derived from illegal wiretaps, nevertheless Congress excluded grand jury witneses from availing themselves
of the remedy provided by § 2518 (10) (a). Section 2518(10) (a) states:
The initial requirement for the invocation of § 2518(10) (a) procedure is that the moving party be an "aggrieved person."
Section 2510(11) defines "aggrieved person" for the purpose of the Act of 1968 to mean "a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the...
Davis v. State, 042016 NVCA, 68935