Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/American_Federation_of_Labor_v._National_Labor_Relations_Board/Opinion_of_the_Court
Timestamp: 2020-07-02 23:14:07
Document Index: 181231514

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 151', '§ 151', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 10', '§ 9']

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American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board/Opinion of the Court
< American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board
American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board
892643American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board — Opinion of the Court
Argued: Dec. 7, 8, 1939. --- Decided: Jan 2, 1940
The question decisive of this case is whether a certification by the National Labor Relations Board under s 9(c) of the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, 453, 29 U.S.C., Supp. IV, §§ 151-166, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166, that a particular labor organization of longshore workers is the collective bargaining representative of the employees in a designated unit, composed of numerous employers of longshore workers at Pacific Coast ports, is reviewable by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the procedure set up in § 10(f) of the Act.
This brings us to the provisions for review of action taken by the Board in § 10(f) which is controlling in the present proceeding. That subdivision [1] appears as an integral part of § 10. All the other subdivisions relate exclusively to proceedings for the prevention of unfair labor practices. Both they and subdivision (f) are silent as to the proceedings or certifications authorized by § 9. Section 10(f), providing for review, speaks only of a 'final order of the Board'. It gives a right to review to persons aggrieved by a final order upon petition to a court of appeals in the circuit 'wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia'. It directs that the order shall be reviewed on the entire record before the Board 'including the pleading and testimony' upon which the order complained of was entered, although no complaint or other pleading is mentioned by § 9 relating to representation proceedings and certificates. Subdivision (f) provides that upon petition for review by an aggrieved person 'the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subdivision (subsection) (e)', and it is given the same jurisdiction 'to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board.' See, Ford Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 364, 369, 59 S.Ct. 301, 305, 83 L.Ed. 221.
Upon the introduction of the bill which was enacted as the Wagner Act, Congress had pointedly brought to its attention the experience under Public Resolution 44 of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1183. That resolution authorized the National Labor Relations Board, predecessor of respondent, 'to order and conduct an election' by employees of any employer to determine who were their representatives for bargaining purposes. Section 2 provided that any order of the Board should be reviewed in the same manner as orders of the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The reports of the Congressional committees upon the bill which became the Wagner Act refer to the long delays in the procedure prescribed by Resolution 44, resulting from applications to the federal appellate courts for review of orders for elections. [2] And in considering the provisions of § 9(d) the committee reports were emphatic in their declaration that the provisions of the bill for court review did not extend to proceedings under § 9 except as incidental to review of an order restraining an unfair labor practice under § 10. [3] The bill was similarly explained on the Senate floor by the committee chairman who declared: 'It provides for review in the courts only after the election has been held and the Board has ordered the employer to do something predicated upon the results of an election.' 79 Cong.Rec., 7658. The conclusion is unavoidable that Congress, as the result of a deliberate choice of conflicting policies, has excluded representation certifications of the Board from the review by federal appellate courts authorized by the Wagner Act except in the circumstances specified in § 9(d).
An argument, much pressed upon us, is, in effect, that Congress was mistaken in its judgment that the hearing before the Board in proceedings under § 9(c), with review only when an order is made under § 10(c) directing the employer to do something 'provides an appropriate safeguard and opportunity to be heard', House Rep., p. 23, and that 'this provides a complete guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board,' Sen.Rep., p. 14. It seems to be thought that this failure to provide for a court review is productive of peculiar hardships, which were perhaps not foreseen in cases where the interests of rival unions are affected. [4] But these are arguments to be addressed to Congress and not the courts. The argument too that Congress has infringed due process by withholding from federal appellate courts a jurisdiction which they never possessed is similarly without force. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596, 58 S.Ct. 732, 82 L.Ed. 1039; see In re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U.S. 486, 495, 58 S.Ct. 1001, 1005, 82 L.Ed. 1482.
^1 '(f) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit court of appeals of the United States in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, including the pleading and testimony upon which the order complained of was entered and the findings and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e), and shall have the same exclusive jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board; and the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall, in like manner be conclusive.'
^2 'Weaknesses in Existing Law. * * * (6) Obstacles to elections.-Under Public Resolution 44, any attempt by the Government to conduct an election of representatives may be contested ab initio in the courts, although such election is in reality merely a preliminary determination of fact. This means that the Government can be delayed indefinitely before it takes the first step toward industrial peace. After almost a year not a single case, in which a company has chosen to contest an election order of the Board, has reached decision in any circuit court of appeals.' Sen.Rep. No. 573, Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5, 6.
^3 'There is no more reason for court review prior to an election than for court review prior to a hearing. But if subsequently the Board makes an order predicated upon the election, such as an order to bargain collectively with elected representatives, then the entire election procedure becomes part of the record upon which the order of the Board is based, and is fully reviewable by an aggrieved party in the Federal courts in the manner provided in section 10. And this review would include within its scope the action of the Board in determining the appropriate unit for purposes of the election. This provides a complete guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board.' Sen.Rep. 573, Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14.
^4 Congress apparently recognized that representation proceedings under § 9(c) might involve rival unions. The House Committee said: 'Section 9(c) makes provisions for elections to be conducted by the Board or its agents or agencies to ascertain the representatives of employees. The question will ordinarily arise as between two or more bona fide organizations competing to represent the employees, but the authority granted here is broad enough to take in the not infrequent case where only one such organized group is pressing for recognition, and its claim of representation is challenged.' H.Rep. No. 1147, Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 22.
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United States Supreme Court decisions in Volume 308
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