Source: https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/padi-waggin-the-tail-of-one-dogs-journey-from-death-row-to-legislative-inspiration-for-dog-bite-due-process/
Timestamp: 2019-11-21 00:05:47
Document Index: 97424760

Matched Legal Cases: ['§767', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§9', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§767', '§767']

Padi-Waggin: The Tail of One Dog’s Journey from Death Row to Legislative Inspiration for Dog Bite Due Process – The Florida Bar
Vol. 91, No. 1 January 2017 Pg 36 Robert Eschenfelder Animal Law
Pursuant to F.S. §767.13(2) (2015), if a dog caused “severe injury to or death of” a human, the dog “shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time or held for 10 business days after the owner is given written notification [of the right to request an administrative hearing], and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.” In turn, “severe injury” was defined by F.S. §767.11(3) (2015) as “any physical injury that results in broken bones, multiple bites, or disfiguring lacerations requiring sutures or reconstructive surgery.”1
A key point, when the incident occurred, F.S. §767.13(2) did not contain within its body any provision for the owner of a dog found by an animal control authority to have inflicted severe injury or death on a human, to prove that the dog’s actions were due to “mitigating” circumstances, such as whether the severe injury was sustained by a person who, at the time, was unlawfully on the property or, while lawfully on the property, was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog or its owner or a family member, or if the dog was protecting or defending a human being within the immediate vicinity of the dog from an unjustified attack or assault.
In addressing this challenge, the In re Cody judge wrote:
“Had Cody been subjected to the dangerous dog classification, under [s]ection 767.12, [owner] would have had the benefit of certain enumerated defenses, i.e., provocation (see Fl. Stat. §767.12(1)(b)). However, [s]ection 767.13(2) does not authorize any such defenses.”
“To compel execution of all dogs confiscated under Section 767.13(2) is arbitrary and unduly oppressive. The legislature has given animal control authorities unfettered authority to order the killing of any dog, who has not previously been declared dangerous and who causes “severe injury,” regardless of the circumstances. Section 767.13(2), as it is currently written…is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and oppressive.”3
Once it became aware of this authority, the Manatee County Commission became concerned that if the administrative appeal process concluded with a destruction order for Padi, his owner’s due process rights may have been violated. The county was also concerned about similar results in future cases when its staff applied this statute as written, and that the statute may well not be constitutional. Constitutional due process rights cannot be relegated to an administrative process, and when a law or regulation creates an irrebuttable presumption that is alleged to be unconstitutional, a declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy to seek.4 Thus, on August 11, 2015, the Manatee County Commission voted to authorize its lawyers to file a declaratory judgment action against the statute, a move coordinated with Padi’s owner.
Indeed, published appellate decisions (while not squarely presented with a due process argument) seemed to have no problem applying the statute. For instance, in the case of Boesch v. Broward County, 53 So. 3d 1177, 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011),the court expressly noted that: “Section 767.13(2) requires the destruction of a dog not previously declared dangerous only if it attacks and causes severe injury or death to a human.”6 Also, in City of Ocala v. Green, 988 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), the court interpreted F.S. §767.13 and noted that the statute was clearly written and provided that:
The county also relied in its interpretation upon a prior case within its own judicial circuit applying the statute. In the administrative appeal of Erskine v. Manatee County, AD-2013-01,the hearing officer’s February 1, 2013, order ruled, in relevant part:
“However, the [s]tatute in 767.13(2) recognizes that even a dog which has not been previously declared as [d]angerous can commit and attack or bite a human in such a serious manner such that the human suffers severe injury or death, and in such case, although not previously declared [d]angerous, that dog must or using the statutory language, “shall, be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority, placed in quarantine, if necessary, for the proper length of time…and thereafter destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner.” The statute in such case provides for no flexibility in determining the ultimate fate of the dog. The fate of the dog is determined with finality the moment that the dog inflicts a severe injury or death.
To be sure, the Volusia and Sarasota county court opinions had no legally binding effect upon Manatee.9 H owever, those opinions clearly created a valid concern that their existence, and the fact that the county had now become aware of them, could lead to a civil rights suit from the owner (or future owners) if the county continued to apply the statute as written.
“ At its core, this case is about the confiscation and potential destruction of the [d]efendant’s property. Though they are kept as companions, often given people’s names, and commonly referred to as ‘man’s best friend,’ ‘[i]t is undisputed in the law that dogs…are subjects of property or ownership.’ Cnty of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So. 2d 229, 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
“These statements are not meant to diminish the significance of the emotional bonds formed between people and their dogs. After all, ‘the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing.’ La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc. , 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964). Interestingly, the deprivation of the object of such affection may, on occasion, form the basis for recovery beyond the actual value of the dog. Id. The reasons for such affection are obvious, but perhaps most eloquently catalogued in the famous bit of oratory known as ‘Vests Eulogy to the Dog,’ which was delivered during an 1872 closing argument by a Missouri attorney (and, later, senator) named George Graham Vest, who poignantly stated that:
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §9 of the Florida Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. In evaluating whether a statute violates due process, the [c]ourt must determine whether “the statute bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose in safeguarding the public health, safety, or general welfare and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive.” Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So. 2d 1210, 1215 (Fla. 2000); see Young v. Broward Cnty. , 570 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that a reasonableness standard applies to the exercise of regulations enacted to protect public safety).
“Conversely, when faced with a notice of violation of §767.13(2), a dog — like Padi — who has never been classified as dangerous that causes severe injury to a person must be confiscated and thereafter destroyed regardless of the circumstances surrounding the injury to the person. Although provocation is statutorily relevant for purposes of contesting a dangerous dog classification under §767.12(1)(b), and a dog may be considered dangerous under that statute by inflicting severe injury on a person, the legislature has essentially eliminated any consideration as to provocation for dogs cited for causing severe injury to a person under §767.13(2).4 T he [c]ourt finds it illogical and inconsistent that an owner of a dog facing a dangerous dog investigation and classification under §767.12 may assert certain defenses such as provocation, defense of a family member or of a person from an unjustified attack, but an owner of a dog subjected to the provisions of §767.13(2) enjoys no such defenses, notwithstanding the statute’s constitutional validity, to prevent the statutory mandated execution of their dog. In short, if Padi was subjected to a dangerous dog investigation under §767.12, then [d]efendant and Padi would be allowed certain enumerated defenses, such as provocation, in defense to a dangerous dog investigation and classification; however, such defenses are not authorized under §767.13(2).
• Provides that if a dog is classified as “dangerous” as a result of causing severe injury to a human, the animal control authority may destroy the dog only after considering the nature of the injury and future likelihood of harm by the dog;
• Revises the notice of hearing and appeal rights to dog owners;
2 In re Cody, Case No.: 1999-33984 at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
4 Dept. of Revenue v. Young American Builders, 330 So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
8 Erskine v. Manatee County, AD-2013-01 at 8-10 (emphasis added).
9 See State v. Riley, 698 So. 2d 374, n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (decisions of one county court are not binding precedent on another county court because trial courts do not create precedent).
10 Manatee County, 2015 WL 9873843 at *3-*5.
Robert Eschenfelder is an attorney practicing law in Manatee County and is board certified in city, county, and local government law. He represented Manatee County during the Padi case and drafted the initial language that was filed in the legislature, which ultimately became the new law.