Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19801030_0000267.CDC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-05 08:34:16
Document Index: 312320029

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2605', '§ 2605', '§ 2605', '§ 2605', '§ 2605', '§ 761', '§ 2618', '§ 2618', '§ 2605', '§ 292']

| 10/30/80 Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
10/30/80 Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., PETITIONERv.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT AD HOC COMMITTEE ON LIQUID DIELECTRICS OF THE ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, ET AL., JOY
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, et al., AND ALUMINUM
COMPANY OF AMERICA, INTERVENORS 1980.CDC.267
In this case the Environmental Defense Fund petitions for review of regulations, issued by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency , that implement section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act . *fn1 That section of the Act provides broad rules governing the disposal, marking, manufacture, processing, distribution, and use of a class of chemicals called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). *fn2
EDF seeks review of three aspects of the regulations. *fn3 First, it challenges the determination by EPA that certain commercial uses of PCBs are "totally enclosed," a designation that exempts those uses from regulation under the Act. Second, it claims that the EPA acted contrary to law when it limited the applicability of the regulations to materials containing concentrations of PCBs greater than fifty parts per million (ppm). Third, EDF challenges the decision by EPA to authorize the continued use of eleven non-totally enclosed uses of PCBs.
We find, however, that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the EPA determination to allow continued use of the eleven non-totally enclosed uses. Accordingly, on this third point, we uphold the EPA regulations. I. BACKGROUND
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) have been manufactured and used commercially for fifty years for their chemical stability, fire resistance, and electrical resistance properties. They are frequently used in electrical transformers and capacitors. However, PCBs are extremely toxic to humans and wildlife. The extent of their toxicity is made clear in the EPA Support Document *fn4 accompanying the final regulations, in which the EPA Office of Toxic Substances identified several adverse effects resulting from human and wildlife exposure to PCBs.
EPA has found that PCBs will adversely affect wildlife as well as humans. Concentrations below one ppb (part per billion) are believed to impair reproductivity of aquatic invertebrates and fish. Some birds suffered "severe reproductive failure" when fed diets containing concentrations of only ten ppm of PCBs. Id. at 19. Because PCBs collect in waterways and bioaccumulate in fish, *fn5 fish-eating mammals run a special risk of adverse effects. Such mammals may have "significantly higher concentrations of PCBs in their tissues than the aquatic forms they feed on." Id. at 36.
EPA estimates that by 1975 up to 400 million pounds of PCBs had entered the environment. Approximately twenty-five to thirty percent of this amount is considered "free," meaning that it is a direct source of contamination for wildlife and humans. The rest, "mostly in the form of industrial waste and discarded end use products, is believed to be in landfill sites and thus constitutes a potential source of new free PCBs." Id. at 33-34. *fn6 Other significant sources of PCBs include atmospheric fallout and spills associated with the use or transportation of PCBs. Id. at 29.
Id. at 38. Because "PCBs released anywhere into the environment will eventually enter the biosphere ... EPA has determined that any such release of PCBs must be considered "significant.' " Id.
Responding to the dangers associated with the use of PCBs and other toxic chemicals, Congress in 1976 enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act , Pub.L.No.94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). Although the Act is generally designed to cover the regulation of all chemical substances, section 6(e) refers solely to the disposal, manufacture, processing, distribution, and use of PCBs. No other section of the Act addresses the regulation of a single class of chemicals.
The special attention accorded to PCBs in the Toxic Substances Control Act resulted from the recognized seriousness of the threat that PCBs pose to the environment and human health. During the debate over the Senate version of the Act, Senator Nelson, the author of the amendment adding the PCB subsection to the Senate bill, noted that PCBs were widespread in the environment and that they posed significant potential dangers to human health and to wildlife. *fn7 In the House of Representatives, Congressman Dingell introduced a similar amendment to the House version of the Toxic Substances Control Act, *fn8 not only because PCBs posed great dangers to the natural and human environments, but also because "the history of EPA is not one of vigorous and quick action." *fn9
As enacted, section 6(e) of the Act *fn10 sets forth a detailed scheme to dispose of PCBs, to phase out the manufacture, processing, and distribution of PCBs, and to limit the use of PCBs. Specifically, section 6(e) provides that, within six months of the effective date of the Act (January 1, 1977), EPA must prescribe methods to dispose of PCBs and to require that PCB containers be marked with appropriate warnings. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1). One year after the effective date of the Act, PCBs can be manufactured, processed, distributed, and used only in a "totally enclosed manner." Id. § 2605(e)(2). One year later, all manufacture of PCBs is prohibited. Id. § 2605(e)(3)(i). Six months after that (i. e. two and one-half years after the effective date of the Act), all processing and distribution of PCBs in commerce is prohibited. Id. § 2605(e)(3)(ii). Thus, today, except for the specified authorizations and exemptions described below, the Act permits PCBs to be used only in a totally enclosed manner, and it completely prohibits the manufacture, processing, and distribution of PCBs.
The statute sets forth only limited exceptions to these broad prohibitions. Subsection 6(e)(2)allows the Administrator of EPA to authorize by rule the continued use of PCBs in a non-totally enclosed manner if he finds that the proposed activity "will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Id. 2605(e)(2). *fn11 Under subsection 6(e)(3), the Administrator may grant a case-by-case exemption to the prohibitions on manufacture, processing, and distribution of PCBs in subsection 6(e)(3). An exemption, which may be granted for one year subject to conditions set by the Administrator, id. § 2605(e)(3), must be based on the Administrator's findings that "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment would not result, and ... good faith efforts have been made to develop a chemical (substitute) which does not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Id. (emphasis added).
In June 1978 EPA issued proposed Ban Regulations that would implement the prohibitions mandated in subsections 6(e)(2) and (3), define "totally enclosed manner," authorize several non-totally enclosed uses, and set forth the procedures for obtaining exemptions from the prohibitions. See Proposed Ban Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 24,801 (1978). As foreshadowed in the final Disposal Regulations, the proposed and final Ban Regulations (issued May 31, 1979) set fifty ppm as the cutoff. See 43 Fed.Reg. 24,813 (1978), 44 Fed.Reg. 31,543 (1979) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 761.1(b)). The final regulations defined all electrical capacitors, electromagnets, and non-railroad transformers as totally enclosed, *fn12 thus automatically exempting them from regulation under the Act. In the final regulations the Administrator authorized eleven non-totally enclosed uses to continue, including the servicing of totally enclosed uses, *fn13 based on his consideration of the health and environmental effects of PCBs, the exposure to PCBs resulting from these activities, the availability of substitutes for the PCBs, and the economic impact of restricting those uses. See Support Document, supra note 4, at v. Most authorizations continue until July 1, 1984, with some authorizations expiring sooner. Only the authorization for carbonless copy paper continues indefinitely. II. JURISDICTION
At the outset one of the intervenors, Ad Hoc Committee on Liquid Dielectrics of the Electronic Industries Association , challenges the jurisdiction of this court to consider EDF's petition. EIA contends that under the authority of Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 194 U.S. App. D.C. 143, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir.1978), and subsection 20(a)(2) of TSCA, *fn14 a federal district court is the proper forum in the first instance to hear EDF's claims. Upon considered review of this jurisdictional question, we find EIA's position to be without merit, and we hold that the matters at issue in this case are properly before this court for review.
In the aforecited EDF case, decided in 1978, EDF had challenged EPA regulations governing the discharge of PCBs into waterways. *fn15 Among its several claims, EDF petitioned for review of EPA's failure to regulate past manufacturers and users of PCB-contaminated equipment.
A review of the jurisdictional provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act demonstrates that this court, and not the district court, has jurisdiction to consider EDF's petition. Section 20(a) permits suits against persons alleged to be in violation of the Act or against the Administrator for failure to perform a mandatory duty. 15 U.S.C. 2619(a). In either of these situations, a plaintiff could not prevail unless he presented evidence or proceeded on a set of stipulated facts, both of which make the district court the appropriate forum. Section 19(a), by contrast, provides that:
15 U.S.C. § 2618(a). Precisely because EDF is seeking review of the PCB regulations and is not prosecuting an action that would require the taking of evidence, jurisdiction lies in the court of appeals. *fn16 III. USE AUTHORIZATIONS
The Act permits the Administrator to authorize "by rule" non-totally enclosed uses of PCBs if he finds that such uses "will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 15 U.S.C. 2605(e)(2). *fn17 Using the criteria set forth in subsection 6(c)(1),18 the Administrator found that eleven non-totally enclosed uses did not present an unreasonable risk. On the basis of these findings, EPA authorized the continued use of the eleven non-totally enclosed uses here in dispute.19
The basis for EDF's argument is found in subsection 6(e)(4), which requires the Administrator to promulgate rules in accordance with the procedural provisions in subsections 6(c)(2), (3), and (4); no reference to subsection 6(c)(1) is found in subsection 6(e)(4).21 EDF claims that this omission evidences a congressional intent to preclude EPA from using the 6(c)(1) criteria in making "unreasonable risk" determinations pursuant to subsection 6(e)(2). Because the Administrator used those criteria,22 EDF argues that the unreasonable risk determinations were "fatally flawed ... (placing) disproportionate weight ... on the adverse economic impact of a ban, (and seriously undermining) the Congressional objective of bringing about the development and use of substitutes in existing PCB activities ...." Petitioner's brief, p. 57.
Without more, however, we find that the omission of a reference to subsection 6(c)(1) in 6(e)(4) does not imply that Congress meant to prevent EPA from considering the challenged criteria in making unreasonable risk determinations under 6(e)(2). There is nothing in the wording of the statute or the legislative history that affirmatively supports the position of EDF.
The structure of section 6(e) also indicates that EDF's position is incorrect. Because section 6(e) uniquely applies to a single class of chemicals, some provision was needed to establish procedural guidelines for the issuance of rules regulating the use of PCBs. Reference to subsections 6(c) (2), (3), and (4) fulfilled that need, whereas reference to subsection 6(c)(1), a substantive provision, was simply unnecessary. Because there is no compelling evidence to support the position advanced by EDF, and because of the deference that we must accord an agency's reasonable interpretation of its statute, see Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S. Ct. 1529, 1535, 6 L. Ed. 2d 924 (1961), we conclude that the statute does not preclude the EPA from using the subsection 6(c)(1) criteria in making the unreasonable risk determinations under 6(e)(2) .
Moreover, because the expression "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" is left undefined in section 6(e), the Administrator was required to give some meaning to it. Since the 6(c)(1) criteria obviously pertain to factors of "unreasonable risk," it was entirely appropriate for EPA to consider such criteria in ascribing a meaning to the use authorization provision in 6(e)(2). EDF has shown nothing to indicate otherwise. In fact, EDF does not really contest use of the first three criteria in 6(c)(1) i. e. the effects on health and on the environment, and the availability of substitutes. Rather, EDF's primary focus is on the fourth criterion in 6(c) (1), relating to the economic consequences of the authorization. Yet, EDF's objections to the "economic consequences" criterion cannot stand in the face of section 2(c) of the Act, which expressly requires the Administrator to consider such factors.23
Furthermore, the particular economic factors that EPA took into account were plainly reasonable.24 The Administrator did not simply propose to consider the effect of the ban on industry, but also the effects on "the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health." See note 18 (supra). This formulation, which considers a broad range of benefits and costs of the ban and use authorization, is entirely consistent with the section 2(c) requirement that the Administrator consider the economic and social impact on his actions.
Because the 6(c)(1) criteria fulfill an express mandate of the statute and reflect a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous phrase, we conclude that the Administrator did not err in choosing those criteria to make the unreasonable risk determinations under 6(e)(2).25
The standard of judicial review for rules promulgated under section 6(e) is expressly set forth in subsection 19(c)(1)(i): "the court shall hold unlawful and set aside such rule if the court finds that the rule is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record." 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(i). Evidence includes "any matter in the rulemaking record." Id.
The substantial evidence standard27 mandated by the Act is generally considered to be more rigorous than the arbitrary and capricious standard normally applied to informal rulemaking.28 Under the substantial evidence standard, a reviewing court must give careful scrutiny to agency findings and, at the same time, accord appropriate deference to administrative decisions that are based on agency experience and expertise. Because administrative decisions often involve judgments based on incomplete or even conflicting scientific data, the agency "may have to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considerations." AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C.Cir.1979). Consequently, reviewing courts "must examine both factual evidence and the agency's policy considerations set forth in the record." Id. The court's role in reviewing regulations is to ensure public accountability "by requiring the agency to identify relevant factual evidence, to explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state candidly any assumptions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and argument." United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, -- - F.2d -- , -- , No. 79-1048 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 15, 1980). With these general guidelines in mind, we review EPA's PCB use authorizations.
It is clear that the Administrator has properly applied the 6(c)(1) criteria in making the unreasonable risk determinations. Where scientific knowledge is incomplete, EPA has set forth specific policy considerations explaining the final regulations. Finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Administrator's findings, we uphold the authorizations for railroad transformers.32 IV. THE FIFTY PPM REGULATORY CUTOFF
As a part of the regulatory scheme for PCBs under section 6(e), EPA limited application of the Disposal and Ban Regulations to materials containing concentrations of at least fifty ppm of PCBs. With one exception,33 materials with lower concentrations remain unregulated under the TSCA regulations.34 EDF contends that this limitation contravenes the statutory command in subsections 6(e)(2)and 6(e)(3)to regulate "any polychlorinated biphenyl." While we do not adopt all of EDF's reasoning, we find that, under the applicable standard for judicial review,35 there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the Administrator's decision to establish a regulatory cutoff at fifty ppm.
Throughout the rulemaking proceedings for both the Disposal and Ban Regulations, EPA assumed that it would adopt some sort of regulatory cutoff. In the Disposal Regulations, EPA set the cutoff at 500 ppm, not because of health and environmental considerations, but in order to choose "a level at which regulated disposal of most PCB's can be implemented as soon as possible." Preamble to Final Disposal Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 7,151 (1978). EPA was reluctant to impose a lower cutoff since, from available information, the agency could not determine the "regulatory impact on commercial products" for lower levels. Subsequent to those proceedings, however, the agency acquired evidence that led it to believe that the "impact on commercial products of defining lower levels of contamination as "PCB Mixtures' appears less than first believed .... (As a result), the Agency plans to propose a lower concentration of PCB's, possibly in the range of 50 ppm or below, to define PCB mixture in the forthcoming" Ban Regulations. Id.
Both EPA and EDF claim that the statutory language and legislative history support their positions on the regulatory cutoff. The statutory language is simple: "no person may ... use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner other than in a totally enclosed manner." 15 U.S.C. 2605(e)(2). Similarly, the prohibitions on manufacture, processing, and distribution refer to "any polychlorinated biphenyl." See id. 2605(e)(3). Taken literally, this language might require EPA to regulate every molecule of PCB. We are reluctant, however, to impose such an extreme interpretation absent support in the legislative history.
EPA also seeks to justify the regulatory cutoff on the basis of the serious impact a lower cutoff would have on industries that inadvertently produce PCBs during the manufacturing process. See Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,516 (1979). As EPA readily concedes, however, the inadvertent commercial production of PCBs is to be regulated under the Act. See note 37 (supra). By providing a blanket exemption for concentrations below fifty ppm, the Administrator has circumvented the authorizations and exemptions requirements provided in the statute. EPA made no finding that the cutoff would involve no unreasonable risk to health or the environment.42 As the EPA noted in its Support Document for the final Ban Regulations, justifying a fifty rather than a 500 ppm cutoff, "the authorization and exemption processes are the most effective way to deal with any difficulties. The authorization and exemption processes allow the Agency to tailor the compliance requirements and to be informed as to which companies are having problems and how they are disposing of their waste streams." Support Document, supra note 4, at 93-94. We agree with EPA. Consequently, the burdens faced by industries cannot be the basis for the fifty ppm cutoff.43
One of the intervenors, Edison Electric Institute , and EPA have attempted to justify the fifty ppm cutoff as an administratively created exemption to the Act.44 See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 51, 636 F.2d 323, No. 78-1006 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Under the heading of "administrative necessity," this court has recognized that an agency may depart from the requirements of a regulatory statute. See id. at 357-360 (opinion for the court by Leventhal, J.). While the court in Alabama Power emphasized that "categorical exemptions from the clear commands of a regulatory statute, though sometimes permitted, are not favored," id. at 358-360, it also noted that there is "substantive authority (for an agency) to take appropriate action to cope with the administrative impossibility of applying the commands of the substantive statute." Id. at 358-359. However, "(t)he agency's burden of justification in such a case is especially heavy." Id. at 359.
We reemphasize that the Administrator has other, more appropriate means providing him with flexibility to avoid disproportionate impacts on industries or on health and the environment. Those tools are the authorization and exemption provisions in subsections 6(e)(2)and 6(e)(3). The standards enunciated therein, requiring findings of no "unreasonable risk of injury to health and the environment" and, in the case of exemptions, good faith efforts to find substitutes, reflect a plain congressional intention that cannot be ignored. For if there is an unreasonable risk of injury, as there may be given EPA's findings, surely Congress did not intend to permit the continued use, manufacture, processing or distribution of PCBs in concentrations below fifty ppm. EPA's ad hoc consideration of economic impact and disposal requirements, leading to a conclusion that the fifty ppm cutoff "provides adequate protection for human health and the environment," Preamble to Final Ban Regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 31,516 (1979), is neither as rigorous nor as strict as the statutorily required unreasonable risk determination based on the subsection 6(c)(1) criteria.47 Thus, we remand this part of the record to EPA for further proceedings. V. TOTALLY ENCLOSED USES
There can be no serious doubt that Congress intended to permit the continued use of PCBs in a "totally enclosed manner."49 The statute defines that expression to mean "any manner which will ensure that any exposure of human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated biphenyl will be insignificant as determined by the Administrator by rule." 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2).
In both the proposed and final Ban Regulations, EPA defines " "insignificant exposure' as no exposure." See Preamble to Proposed Ban Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 24,805 (1978).50 Because "any release of PCBs into the environment will eventually result in widespread exposure of wildlife, including some of man's major food sources, and humans and that any such exposure may have adverse effects," Support Document, supra note 4, at 8, EPA concluded that there was "no rational basis for selecting any particular exposure level above zero for the purposes of this regulation." Preamble to Proposed Ban Regulations, 43 Fed.Reg. 24,805 (1978).
In light of the record in this case, we find that there is no substantial evidence that the regulations concerning totally enclosed uses "will ensure that any exposure of human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated biphenyl will be insignificant." 15 U.S.C. 2605(e)(2)(emphasis added). This lack of substantial evidence calls into question EPA's implicit finding that it can designate entire classes of uses, rather than individual containers, as totally enclosed. Of course, we are not directing EPA to apply the "totally enclosed" proviso on a more individualized basis. On the present record, however, EPA's findings as to which PCB uses may be classified as totally enclosed cannot stand. Accordingly, we remand the record to the EPA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VI. HOLDING
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1976).