Source: https://kanterella.com/wiki/Special:Ask/-5B-5BCategory:Finding-5D-5D-20-5B-5BSite.Reactor-20type::GE-2D4-5D-5D-20-5B-5BIdentified-20by::!Licensee-2Didentified-5D-5D/-3FStart-20date/-3FSite/-3FTitle/-3FDescription/mainlabel%3D/order%3Ddescending/sort%3DStart-20date/offset%3D0/format%3Dtable/searchlabel%3D-5BGE-2D4-20events-5D
Timestamp: 2020-07-10 09:06:41
Document Index: 595934236

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art 50', 'art-20', 'art-20']

[[Category:Finding]] [[Site.Reactor type::GE-4]] [[Identified by::!Licensee-identified]]
{{#ask: [[Category:Finding]] [[Site.Reactor type::GE-4]] [[Identified by::!Licensee-identified]]
|searchlabel=[GE-4 events]
"query_string": "[[Category:Finding]] [[Site.Reactor type::GE-4]] [[Identified by::!Licensee-identified]]",
"query_time": "8.2414",
05000341/FIN-2018003-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Fermi Failure to Apply Torque Values Described in Maintenance Procedure for Flexible Couplings on Emergency Diesel Generator 12 A finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was self-revealed when plant operators discovered a pencil-thick lube oil leak coming from a flexible coupling on emergency diesel generator 12 during planned surveillance testing. Specifically, a lube oil leak developed when the flexible coupling located between the engine driven lube oil pump and the lube oil filter failed due to improper torque applied to the coupling On April 20, 2018, the licensee was performing a routine slow start surveillance of emergency diesel generator 12 (EDG12), when plant operators noted a pencil-thick lube oil leak from the flexible coupling fastener located between the engine driven lube oil pump and the lube oil filter with the engine running in idle. Plant operators subsequently shut down the engine, discontinued the surveillance, and EDG12 was declared inoperable. The licensee performed an investigation and found the flexible coupling fastener was torqued to 120 in/lbs. Maintenance procedure 35.307.008, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine General Maintenance, Enclosure X, Revision 44 required a torque value of 240260 in/lbs for the size of piping the fastener was on. The coupling was last disturbed in 2011, and the maintenance procedure at that time did not contain information regarding torque values for flexible couplings. A similar flexible coupling fastener failed in 2016 due to inadequate work instructions for torqueing flexible couplings (NCV 05000341/201600401, ADAMS Accession Number ML17030A328), and corrective actions were developed to use the vendor recommended values that had already been added to the maintenance procedure as Enclosure X in 2014. However, the corrective actions did not require all flexible couplings to be checked to ensure they were appropriately torqued. Opportunities existed for the licensee to ensure these flexible couplings were properly torqued according to vendor recommendations, either through scheduled maintenance online or during refueling and forced outages. Therefore, on April 20, 2018, another flexible coupling that was not checked as an extent of condition failed due to an under torqued condition.
05000296/FIN-2018003-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Browns Ferry Main Steam Relief Valves Lift Settings Outside of Technical Specifications Required Setpoints A self-revealed SL IV NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.3, Safety Relief Valves, was identified when the licensee discovered, through as found test results, that three of the thirteen main steam relief valves (MSRVs) that were removed during the Spring 2018 Unit 3 outage had as found lift settings outside of the +/- 3 percent band required for their operability. The LER was associated with three of the thirteen MSRVs as found setpoints being outside of the +/- 3 percent setpoint band required for their operability. This was discovered on May 17, 2018, following as-found testing results conducted on all thirteen MSRVs that were removed during the refueling outage. The licensee determined that the three MSRV pilot discs had corrosion bonding to their valve seats as a result of their platinum anti-corrosion coatings flaking off. The licensee determined that these three MSRVs were inoperable for an indeterminate period of time from March 26, 2016, when the unit entered Mode 2 (beginning of operating cycle) to February 17, 2018, when the unit entered Mode 4 (beginning of refueling outage). The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report and determined that the report adequately documented the summary of the event including the cause and potential safety consequences. The inspectors also reviewed other documents that indicate that this type of failure is a known industry issue associated with this type of valve.
05000331/FIN-2018003-02 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Duane Arnold Minor Violation During Mode 1 power operations on July 9, 2018, the licensee had both doors of a secondary containment airlock open simultaneously, and a minor violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment was self-revealed. During the time both doors were open, approximately 3 seconds, the allowable penetration opening area was exceeded and rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 requires secondary containment to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3. Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 supports secondary containment operability by verifying that either the outer door(s) or the inner door(s) in each secondary containment access opening are closed. The posted instructions at each secondary containment airlock door stated, ATTENTION Push Button To Be Held In For 2 Seconds Prior To Opening Door, to be of a type appropriate for traversing the containment airlock. Contrary to the above, at approximately 1:34 p.m. on July 9, 2018, while operating in Mode 1 at 97 percent power, two individuals simultaneously traversing through opposite doors of a secondary containment airlock each failed to hold the airlock interlock push button for two seconds prior to opening their respective doors resulting in a momentarily inoperability of secondary containment. Operability was restored upon the immediate closure of one of the two doors. Subsequently, maintenance was unable to recreate the condition and satisfactorily performed Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.6.4.102, Secondary Containment Airlock Verification, and GMPELEC44,Section A5.1,Airlock Door Interlock Checks.The licensee entered this
05000324/FIN-2018411-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Brunswick Security
05000341/FIN-2018003-02 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Fermi Failure to Ensure Electrolytic Capacitors Installed in the Plant Did Not Have Expired Shelf Lives A finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII, Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components was self-revealed when the reactor water cleanup system inlet flow square root converter failed, resulting in a failure of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) differential flow instrument and loss of automatic isolation function of the RWCU isolation valves. Specifically, electrolytic capacitors were installed in the RWCU system logic that had expired shelf lives, resulting in failures of the automatic isolation function of the RWCU system.
05000298/FIN-2018003-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information in a License Amendment Request The inspectors identified that the licensee provided inaccurate information to the NRC in a license amendment request for an emergency action level scheme change. Specifically, the licensee provided information about the measurement ranges of a liquid effluent radiation monitor used in emergency action levels that was not accurate.
05000296/FIN-2018012-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Browns Ferry Failure to correct an inoperable 250V Shutdown Board Battery Charger A self-revealed, Green, NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 3.8.4 was identified when the licensee failed to correct an inoperable 250V Shutdown Board (SDBD) 3EB Battery Charger on Unit 3. Specifically, in 2014 the 250V SDBD 3EB Battery Charger was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ), but no actions were taken to correct the condition, which led to the component being in inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time defined in TS 3.8.4.
05000341/FIN-2018003-03 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Fermi Failure to Identify a Condition Adverse to Quality on Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Outlet Flow Control Valve A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and TS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System, were self-revealed for the licensees failure to identify a condition adverse to quality on the Division 2 RHRSW outlet flow control valve E1150F068B. Specifically, troubleshooting and the associated post maintenance testing failed to identify and correct a failed anti-rotation key which resulted in an inoperable Division 2 RHRSW system for longer than its TS 3.7.1 allowed outage time.
05000298/FIN-2018003-02 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Perform Process Applicability Determination The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow Administrative Procedure 0.9, Tagout, Revision 88, for performing a monthly audit and Process Applicability Determination. Specifically, the inspectors noted that a clearance order on the safety-related residual heat removal service water booster pump room fan coil unit was hanging for greater than 90 days with no Process Applicability Determination performed, which resulted in the power switch for the fan coil unit being unintentionally tagged out of its normal configuration for almost 2 years
05000366/FIN-2018003-01 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Hatch Inoperability of 2A EDG Due to Inadequate Acceptance Criteria for Determining Cleaning Requirements of Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tanks The inspectors documented a Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation of Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for the licensees failure to incorporate preventative maintenance criteria for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) day tanks as recommended by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, 9.a. Specifically, procedure 52SV-R43-001-0, Diesel, Alternator, and Accessories Inspection, Ver. 30.4, did not contain deterministic criteria in the visual inspection of the fuel filters to initiate the cleaning of the EDG day tanks and thus prevent EDG inoperability. The EDG day tanks had never been inspected and cleaned.
05000298/FIN-2018003-03 30 September 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Provide Adequate Lubrication for Drywell Fan Coil Units The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to implement Work Order 5060136 during maintenance on the drywell fan coil units. Specifically, on October 26, 2016, during bearing replacement work on drywell fan coil, unit D, maintenance personnel failed to properly reinstall auto-lubricator injection connectors after removing the interferences per the work order instructions. This error resulted in the failure of drywell fan coil, unit D, due to inadequate bearing lubrication, and ultimately led to a downpower and reactor shutdown.
05000354/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Hope Creek Inadequate Instructions for Station Service Water Pump Maintenance A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV)of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for PSEG providing inadequate written instructions for the performance of maintenance to ensure the station service water (SSW) system remains capable of performing its safety function. Specifically, the PSEG maintenance procedure for SSW pump and motor removal and replacement did not provide adequate instruction to prevent galvanic corrosion when connecting the B SSW pump to its seismic supports, which ultimately resulted in the pump failing its in-service test due to elevated vibration levels on February 18, 2018.
05000259/FIN-2018412-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Browns Ferry Security
05000331/FIN-2018002-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Duane Arnold Minor Violation Minor Violation: On June 19, 2016, while operating at 82 percent power, two secondary containment access airlock doors were opened simultaneously during surveillance testing as part of STP 3.6.4.102, Secondary Containment Airlock Verification. The inspectors determined this event was caused by inadequate procedural guidance which directed the user to attempt to open one airlock door while the other door was already open. During this test, the interlock failed because the permanent magnets had rotated and were misaligned. This failure could have been identified without challenging airlock interlock integrity if the second airlock door wasnt held open. The failure to have adequate procedural guidance for testing the secondary containment airlock doors was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, which requires licensees to have procedures appropriate to the circumstance when performing safety-related activities. In response to this issue, the licensee immediately closed the airlock doors. In addition, the licensee submitted a TS change request to address the concurrent opening of two secondary containment airlock doors. The licensees corrective action program is tracking the TS change as CR 02034076, Secondary Containment Airlock Doors #225 and 228 Both Opened. Screening: The issue screened as minor because all of the questions associated with a minor issue found in IMC 0612, Appendix B were answered No due to the licensee reestablishing secondary containment operability immediately after the second airlock door opened. In addition, the inspectors considered the failure to have an appropriate procedure was less than a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Violation: The failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The disposition of this violation closes LER 05000331/2016001.
05000324/FIN-2018011-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Brunswick Failure to Justify Qualified Life Extension of ASCO Solenoid Operated Valves The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.49(e)(5) for the licensees failure to justify life extensions of ASCO solenoid operated valves (SOVs
05000298/FIN-2018011-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Ensure Adequate Design Control Measures are in Place Associated with RHR Service Water Booster Pump Room Cooling An NRC-identified, Green, Non-cited Violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, occurred for failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate malfunctions of the residual heat removal (RHR) service water booster pump (SWBP) room cooling temperature switch, which could cause environmental changes leading to functional degradation of system performance, into the design basis to verify the necessary protection system action be retained.
05000298/FIN-2018011-04 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Incorrect Classification of Potential Safety-Related Components An NRC-identified, Green, Non-cited Violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, occurred for failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the inspectors identified three examples of the licensees failure to properly classify potential safety-related components in the emergency diesel generator ventilation system and RHR service water booster pump room cooling systems.
05000341/FIN-2018002-03 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Fermi Failure to Adequately Evaluate the Operability of Emergency Diesel Generator11 A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the licensees failure to adequately evaluate the operability of a condition adverse to quality identified on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 11. Specifically, a lube oil leak was evaluated as having no impact to the operation of the emergency diesel generator. However, during the next surveillance run of EDG 11, the engine had to be shut down and declared inoperable due to the lube oil leak degrading during operation.
05000333/FIN-2018411-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 FitzPatrick Security
05000341/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Fermi Failure to Document a Condition Assessment Resolution Document for Reactor Recirculation Motor-Generator Set A Brush Gear Sparking A self-revealed Green finding was identified for failure to document a Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) for 5-inch rooster tail sparking on reactor recirculation motor-generator set A brush gear, which ultimately resulted in a manual recirculation pump A trip and plant transient.
05000387/FIN-2018002-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Susquehanna Inadequate Procedure Adherence to Radiation Protection Requirements A Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7, High Radiation Area, was self-revealed when two plant workers entered a posted high radiation area, and one workers electronic dosimeter alarmed on dose rate. The workers had not been briefed for entry into this area.
05000277/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Peach Bottom Failure to Identify and Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Concerning Battery Charger 2B-003-1 The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations(CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Exelon did not identify and promptly correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) commensurate with its safety significance concerning the 2BD-003-1 safety-related battery charger. Specifically, Exelon did not appropriately prioritize repairs for a CAQ and, as a result, the 2BD-003-1 battery charger failed to operate when placed in service on June 5, 2018
05000259/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Browns Ferry HPCI System Over Pressurization due to Failure to Maintain Procedure A self-revealed, Green, NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings was identified for failure to maintain procedure 2-SR-3.8.4.3(MB-2) Revision 11, Main Bank 2 Battery Service Test. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of an emergent, Unit 2 procedure revision to a step intended to mitigate over pressurizing Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system
05000331/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Duane Arnold Inappropriate Procedural Guidance Resulted in Loss of Scram Function and Failure to Enter Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to have procedures appropriate to the circumstance for testing the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and turbine stop valve (TSV) closure functions. Specifically, STP 3.3.1.117, MSIV Functional Test, and STP 3.3.1.119, Main Turbine Stop and Combined Intermediate Valves Test, directed the use of a reactor protection system test box which disabled the MSIV and the TSV closure automatic reactor scram functions while testing specific combinations of MSIVs and TSVs and failed to require entry into appropriate Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation action statements.
05000325/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Brunswick Automatic Reactor Trip due to Perceived Loss of Stator Cooling Water A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for the failure to properly implement a modification to the turbine control system (TCS). The modification ultimately resulted in an automatic reactor trip on April 7, 2018, due to a turbine trip caused by a perceived loss of stator cooling water. The TCS system improperly generated a loss of stator cooling turbine trip when the TCS measured higher than expected stator cooling water flow rates
05000387/FIN-2018002-03 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Susquehanna Inadequate Justification for Deferral of Corrective Actions for certain Degraded Safety-Related Components The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, when the licensee failed to promptly correct numerous operable but nonconforming or degraded safety-related components.
05000298/FIN-2018002-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Maintain Alarm Procedure for Service Water Booster Pump Ventilation Manual Actions The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, when the licensee failed to maintain Procedure 2.3_R-1 with the bounding time restrictions for required manual ventilation actions identified in Engineering Evaluation NEDC 92-064, Transient Temperature Rise in SWBP Room After Loss of Cooling, Revision 3C2. As a result, the licensee relied on procedure guidance that contained an incorrect, less restrictive allowance of 13 hours for completion of manual actions rather than the bounding 5.8-hour allowance described in NEDC92-064.
05000298/FIN-2018011-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Cooper Failure to Correct Extent of Condition of Surge Suppression Varistor Failures An NRC-identified, Green, Non-cited Violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, occurred when the licensee failed to correct conditions adverse to quality associated with the corrective actions identified in Condition Report RCR 2002-1665 to verify that installed surge suppressor varistors were appropriately sized and that design information was correctly reflected in controlled drawings for the reactor protection system, diesel generator control circuits, and high pressure coolant injection control circuits.
05000277/FIN-2018010-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Peach Bottom Failure to Develop and Maintain Mitigating Strategy The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), Conditions of Licenses, and Peach Bottom Unit 2 and Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.(11), Mitigation Strategy License Condition, because Exelon did not develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions that include operations to mitigate fuel damage. Specifically, Exelon did not adequately develop and maintain procedures to manually depressurize the reactor using the automatic depressurization system safety relief valves in the event of a challenge to the reactor due to a postulated large fire and/or explosion.
05000324/FIN-2018011-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Brunswick Failure to Evaluate Effects of MOV Space Heaters on Qualified Life The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.49(e)(5) for the licensees failure to evaluate the effects of additional heat rise on the qualified life of Limitorque controls.
05000296/FIN-2018002-02 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Browns Ferry Inoperable Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications A self-revealed SL IV NCV of TS 3.5.1 and 3.6.2.3 was identified when the licensee discovered that the 3A RHR pump was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time and follow on action completion time.
05000331/FIN-2018011-01 30 June 2018 23:59:59 Duane Arnold Failure to Translate Environmental Qualification Requirements into Maintenance Procedures/Instructions The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to establish measures to assure that Environmental Qualification (EQ) requirements for qualified components correctly translated into procedures and instructions. Specifically, the inspectors identified two examples of the licensees failure to ensure that the EQ requirements for O-ring installed in EC290 connector/plug-in cable assemblies were translated into the associated maintenance procedures and instructions(i.e.,EQ Files, warehouses storage requirements). The licensee failed to correctly establish an end-of-life replacement schedule for the O-ring used in the cable assemblies installed in the dry well and failed to establish a 2-year shelf-life for the O-ring stored in the warehouse.
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