Source: https://willcountyprose.wordpress.com/tag/title-iv-d/
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 12:11:13
Document Index: 251190270

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 407', '§ 753', '§ 753', '§ 403', '§ 403', '§ 407', '§ 103', '§ 103', '§ 753', '§ 1', '§ 40', '§ 753', '§ 35', '§ 1461', '§ 753', '§ 753', '§ 753', '§ 302', '§ 407', '§ 753', '§ 753', '§ 1054', '§ 20']

Title IV-D | Will County Pro-se
7th Circuit case dealing with Social Security preemption.
Will county Pro sae, Here is a 7th Circuit case dealing with Social Security preemption. I sent along note 7 which explains why the court did not see 42 USC 407 as bearing on this issue, the reason being that it did not involve a court action. Here is note 7:
We believe that plaintiffs’ reliance on section 207 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), is misplaced. It is evident that section 207, on its face, protects social security benefits against direct attachment, garnishment, assignment or levy. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982); Neavear v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1982). Our research has disclosed no case where a court has either upheld or invalidated under section 207 a salary setoff scheme similar to the one at issue here. The Supreme Court’s only decision construing section 207-Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973)-is not to the contrary. In Philpott, a state filed a lawsuit seeking to attach a welfare recipient’s bank account which contained sums paid to the recipient under the federal social security program. The state claimed a legal right to these sums by virtue of a state statute which authorized the state to setoff from the recipient’s state welfare payments a sum equal to any federal social security benefits received by the recipient. The Court held that the action taken by the state to recover monies owed to it under the state statute-the lawsuit seeking an attachment-was specifically barred by section 207. In reaching this conclusion, the Court declined to pass on the question of the general validity of the state statute authorizing the setoff. Instead the Court felt that the unlawful aspect of the state’s action was the lawsuit, which was not specifically authorized by the federal statute. Thus we are unwilling to accept plaintiffs’ argument that section 207, at least as interpreted by the Philpott Court, is another independent ground for invalidating the Wisconsin statute here since the Philpott Court’s decision is limited to a situation involving direct attachment or garnishment by a state, which is not found in the instant case. In addition, the Philpott Court’s failure to reach the question whether a state setoff scheme is valid under section 207 erodes plaintiffs’ reliance on that decision.
Raskin v. MoranMax RASKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert H. Gollmar, Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellant,
J. Dennis MORAN, Ken Timpel, and Charles P. Smith, Defendants-Appellees.
684 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982)
Decided July 9, 1982
*472 472 684 F.2d 472Max RASKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Robert H. Gollmar, Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellant,
J. Dennis MORAN, Ken Timpel, and Charles P. Smith,
Defendants-Appellees.No. 81-1161.United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.Argued Nov. 11, 1981.
*473 473 Mark M. Camp, Pfannerstill & Camp, Wauwatosa, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.
Before PELL and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiffs Max Raskin and Robert H. Gollmar appeal from an order dismissing their complaint and upholding the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute which reduces the salary of certain “reserve” judges by an amount equal to any federal social security benefits received by these judges. On this appeal, plaintiff judges argue that the Wisconsin statute is void under the supremacy clause because it conflicts with federal law, that the state law impermissibly deprives them of property without just compensation in violation of due process and that the statute violates the equal protection clause by treating the judges differently from other state employees. We reverse the judgment below because we find that the Wisconsin statute impermissibly conflicts with federal law governing plaintiffs’ right to social security benefits.
Since his mandatory retirement at age 70 as a circuit judge in 1973, Max Raskin has continued to serve in various capacities as a trial court judge in Wisconsin. In 1977, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the statute in issue here which established the offices of “permanent reserve judge” and “temporary reserve judge.” 1 On August 1, 1978, Raskin was appointed a permanent reserve judge of the Circuit Court of Waukesha County. Raskin had acted as a reserve judge of this court under a predecessor statute since October, 1977, and, after his 1978 appointment, he served as a permanent reserve judge until December 9, 1980. Since that time, Raskin has served as a “temporary reserve judge” of the circuit court on a day-to-day basis. He expects to be reappointed as a permanent reserve judge if another vacancy arises.
During the pendency of this appeal, Robert H. Gollmar petitioned to intervene as a party plaintiff. Gollmar is also a retired Wisconsin judge who is currently acting as a permanent reserve judge in Walworth County. Both Raskin and Gollmar are eligible to receive federal old-age benefits under the Social Security Act (the “SSA” or the “Act”).
Defendants are officials of the Office of the Director of State Courts, who are charged with managing the financial and administrative affairs of the Wisconsin court system, as well as the State Treasurer. Pursuant to the directive of state law, *474474 the defendants have deducted from the compensation payable to plaintiffs as permanent reserve judges an amount equal to the federal social security benefits received by the plaintiffs. The statutory provision authorizing this deduction states:
(b) Permanent reserve judges shall receive compensation equal to the compensation for the 6-month period of a judge of the court to which they are assigned…. This compensation is not subject to s. 41.11(12) or subch. IX of ch. 40 but the combined amount of this compensation and any other judicial compensation together with retirement annuities under the Wisconsin retirement fund, the Milwaukee county retirement fund or other state, county, municipal or other Wisconsin governmental retirement funds or social security received by him or her during any one calendar month shall not exceed one-twelfth of the yearly compensation of a circuit judge, including any county supplements paid as provided in ss. 753.016(2) and 753.071. Permanent reserve judges shall receive health insurance calculated under s. 40.14 of 40.-145 and s. 40.16 and vacation benefits calculated under s. 230.35(1). Except for county supplements, compensation for permanent reserve judges shall be paid from the appropriation under s. 20.625(1)(b).
Wis.Stat. § 753.075(3)(b) (1979) (emphasis supplied). 2 This statutory provision, together with its counterpart in Wis.Stat. § 753.075(3)(a) (1979) applicable to temporary reserve judges, are challenged by plaintiffs here seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
On December 30, 1980, the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the Wisconsin statute neither impaired Raskin’s right to receive social security nor conflicted with the federal statute which allows a recipient, at and after age 72, to receive social security benefits without any deduction for income earned. The district court also rejected plaintiffs’ due process claim, holding that the “right” to social security benefits did not constitute a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Finally, the court found that any difference in treatment of the class of permanent reserve judges and other non-retired, non-permanent judges, including disabled judges, was rationally related to legitimate Wisconsin policy goals.
Plaintiffs’ supremacy clause 3 argument is premised upon section 203(f)(3) of the SSA. That section now provides, inter alia, that in applying what is commonly known as the “retirement test” to reduce a social security recipient’s benefits on account of specified earned income, any income earned after the recipient’s 70th birthday will not be used to reduce benefits. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 403(f)(3) (Supp.1981). 4 The effect of this provision is that social security recipients will not suffer offset of their earnings against their benefits after they reach the age of 70. Recipients under age 70, however, are subject to the “retirement test” provisions of section 203, which reduce benefits *475 475 by one dollar for every two dollars of earned income above a statutorily exempt amount. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 403(f)(1), (8) (Supp.1981). As additional support for their preemption argument, plaintiffs cite section 207 of the SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). Section 207 prohibits the execution, levy, attachment or garnishment of social security benefits.
Plaintiffs’ preemption argument, reduced to its essentials, is that federal policy prohibits any reduction in the social security benefits of persons over age 70 who continue to earn income, and that this prohibition extends to admittedly indirect reductions such as those effectuated here by Wisconsin. According to plaintiffs, it is irrelevant that Wisconsin does not directly take away plaintiffs’ social security benefits because Wisconsin achieves the same result by deducting an equivalent amount from their state salaries. Plaintiffs contend that after age 70, they may work for Wisconsin as judges, receive state salaries for this employment and also receive their full social security benefits under the protection of federal law. Although Wisconsin does not force plaintiffs to give up or assign their federal benefit checks, Wisconsin has reduced their total income by an amount exactly equal to their federal benefit checks through a setoff against their state salaries. Plaintiffs thus urge this court to recognize economic reality rather than to focus on the technical question whether Wisconsin directly impedes their receipt of federal social security benefits.
“The question whether federal law ‘preempts’ state action, largely one of statutory construction, cannot be reduced to general formulas.” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 377 (1978). Nonetheless, the Court has articulated several principles we find instructive for interpreting the supremacy clause. As a starting point, the Court has said that when determining whether state law conflicts with a federal law, “(t)he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Retail Clerks, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 222, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). It is also important to recognize that plaintiffs claim that Wisconsin law is preempted here not because Congress intended to fully occupy the field of welfare-related benefit regulations but rather because Wisconsin law interferes with or contradicts federal policy. Although state law exercising a state’s traditional police powers is not preempted on account of interference with federal law or policy “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947), we are obliged by the supremacy clause to strike down state laws which “stand( ) as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); cf. Ridgway v. Ridgway, — U.S. —-, 102 S.Ct. 49, 70 L.Ed.2d 39 (1981) (even in area of state family law, supremacy clause prevents “frustration and erosion” of federal rights). Moreover, “the relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law ….” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962). Even if “the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration,” we must still strike down the state law if it actually impedes the operation of the federal statute. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1712, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971).
We must therefore begin what “is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining whether they are in conflict.” Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1708, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971). As indicated, section 203(f)(3) eliminates the retirement test for individuals above age 70 so that earned income may not be counted to reduce social security benefits. Congress in 1950 initially legislated an age limitation for application of the retirement test when it established age 75 as the cutoff point for applying the test. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, § 103(e), Pub.L.No. 81-734, 64 Stat. 477, 490. This age threshold *476 476 was lowered to 72 in 1954. 5 Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, § 103(b), 68 Stat. 1052, 1073. When enacting the 1950 age limitation, Congress briefly explained its purpose:
Section 203(f)(3), together with the pertinent statements of legislative history, indicates that Congress eliminated the retirement test recognizing that some persons, who are able to work past normal retirement age, would otherwise receive no return on their social security “investment.” 6 The federal policy evident from this statute is that persons over age 70 should receive the full federal benefit regardless of the source or amount of other income earned by the recipient. Although the SSA does not expressly preclude the application of state law which might incidentally affect some aspect of social security, we have no doubt that a state statute which effectively denies benefits conferred by section 203 would be suspect under the supremacy clause. 7
*477 477 In construing the Wisconsin statute, we note as a preliminary matter that Wis.Stat. § 753.075(3) focuses on regulating the total income to be received as compensation or retirement benefits by reserve judges. The statute then seeks to control total income by regulating salaries. It is undeniable, however, that in the process of regulating plaintiffs’ judicial salaries, Wisconsin has reduced what plaintiffs’ salary would otherwise be (in the absence of the relevant provisions of section 753.075) by an amount precisely equal to their federal social security benefits. See Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Brief, exs. E & F. Defendants advance two purposes for this reduction. First, Wisconsin desires to place both permanent and temporary reserve judges on an equal footing in terms of income (both earned and retirement) with the nonreserve judges whom they replace. Reserve judges thus not only exercise the same powers as the judges they replace but also receive the same total income (earned and retirement) as that normally paid by the state to those active judges. Second, Wisconsin has expressed a strong policy against the practice of “double dipping” by state employees. See 1979 Wis.Laws, ch. 38, § 1 (statement of legislative purposes preceding amendments to Wis.Stat. §§ 40.90-. 96 (1979)). The state apparently believes its best interests are promoted by not paying full salaries to public officials who are simultaneously receiving other public benefits, regardless of the source or purpose of those benefits. 8
Having ascertained the construction of the two statutes, we proceed to the second prong of the Perez v. Campbell test of preemption, i.e., determining whether there is an actual conflict between the state and federal statutes. We are, of course, mindful that a mere inconsistency between the state and federal statutes is not sufficient to invoke the bar of the supremacy clause; the state statute must “stand( ) as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” before we are authorized to invalidate it as repugnant to the Constitution. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404,85 L.Ed. 581.
We are convinced that even under this very demanding standard, the Wisconsin statute at issue here is invalid. Although not directly preventing or impeding plaintiffs’ receipt of social security benefits, Wisconsin effectively deprives the recipient of those federal benefits by reducing plaintiffs’ salaries in an amount precisely equal to the federal benefits. Indeed, we would put form over substance if we held that only direct efforts to reduce, divert or eliminate social security benefits were in conflict with section 203(f)(3). 9 Cf. Toll v. Moreno, *478 478 — u.s. —-, —-, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 2985, 72 L.Ed.2d —- (1982) (held, state could not recoup indirectly from G-4 visaholders taxes which federal government bars state from directly collecting from this class of aliens, by denying in-state resident status for tuition purposes to these aliens). Here, by the indirect method of setoff, which as a matter of elementary arithmetic penalizes in the exact amount of his social security payments the social security recipient who both works and lawfully receives benefits, there is an inescapable conflict with section 203(f)(3) of the SSA. 10 The federal policy of paying persons over age 70 their full social security benefit is effectively thwarted by this state salary deduction scheme. Moreover, the interference with federal policy here is not merely an incidental effect of the state statute. While pleading its concern with “double dipping,” Wisconsin must concede that it is directly regulating judicial salaries based upon, inter alia, the receipt of federal benefits. But where Congress has, by eliminating the retirement test for persons over age 70, made concrete and specific a federal policy against “integration” of social security benefits and salaries, we cannot allow Wisconsin to achieve integration of plaintiffs’ state salaries and federal old age benefits through the device of the salary setoff. 11
The state contends that plaintiffs essentially argue that Congress intended to insure that older social security recipients could “earn as much as possible” and still receive their social security benefits. The district court also ascribed such an argument to the plaintiffs and specifically rejected it. But, whether or not this characterization of congressional intent is accurate, *479 479 we think the present facts do present a clear frustration of the policy incorporated in section 203(f)(3) of the SSA. In any event, plaintiffs do not specifically contend they are entitled to “earn as much as possible” but merely that they should receive a regularly established state salary without setoff for federal social security benefits. This setoff is the financial equivalent of not receiving their social security benefits and, therefore, frustrates the will of Congress. 12
We also note that the federal policy here may not be especially crucial or strongly propounded by Congress. 13 It is arguable that the state policy, on the other hand, may be strongly held and strongly propounded by Wisconsin. But we do not see it as our function to weigh or balance the force of the federal policy against that of the state. Cf. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962) (state statutory purpose not significant in supremacy clause analysis). The supremacy clause itself clearly resolves that conflict in favor of the federal law. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).
In reaching the conclusion that Wis.Stat. § 753.075 is preempted by section 203(f)(3) of the SSA, we find guidance in several Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971), the Court struck down an Arizona statute that conflicted with section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed). Section 17 provided that a discharge in bankruptcy discharges all but certain specified judgments. The conflicting Arizona statute provided that the state would not recognize a discharge in bankruptcy of an automobile accident tort judgment in that, if the debtor-driver did not pay the judgment, the state would withhold driving privileges.
It was undisputed in Perez that Arizona generally possesses plenary authority to regulate the drivers of automobiles on its highways (just as Wisconsin, in the instant case, possesses plenary authority to regulate judges’ salaries) and that insuring the financial responsibility of such drivers was a legitimate state policy undergirding the state statute. But meritorious and important purposes alone were insufficient to save the Arizona statute from federal preemption when the effect of the state statute was to frustrate the federal statute’s protection of debtors discharged in bankruptcy. Similarly in the instant case, the Wisconsin statute frustrates another federal protective provision-section 203(f)(3)’s elimination of the retirement test. This provision guarantees that eligible social security beneficiaries over age 70 will receive their benefits notwithstanding continued gainful employment. Surely the protections of the federal statute are thwarted when the federal government puts money in the plaintiffs’ left pocket while Wisconsin takes a precisely equal amount of money from their right pocket solely because the money was received through the social security *480 480 program. Cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971) (state statute denying AFDC benefits to persons 18 through 20 years old attending college impermissibly conflicts with SSA provision defining eligible recipients as including dependents age 18 to 20 years attending college); Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 88 S.Ct. 362, 19 L.Ed.2d 438 (1967) (state statute denying unemployment benefits to persons who filed charges with NLRB impermissibly conflicts with federal statute designed to protect employees utilizing NLRB processes); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962) (state statute denying rights of survivorship to persons purchasing federal bond with “community” assets impermissibly conflicts with federal regulation designed to allow co-ownership of bonds with rights of survivorship).
Further, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977), the Court struck down a California statute which made no allowance for weight loss resulting from moisture loss occurring in the distribution of consumer goods. The provisions of the state statute conflicted with federal statutes regulating the labeling of meats and like goods. By failing to make allowance for moisture losses, the California statute clearly contradicted the Federal Meat Inspection Act, which both permitted variations resulting from moisture loss from the weight stated on a package of bacon and also provided that “different” labeling standards would not be allowed. 430 U.S. at 528-32, 97 S.Ct. at 1311-1313.
More significant for the instant case was the Court’s conclusion in Jones that the California statute conflicted with the federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), as applied to packages of flour. Although the FPLA expressly preempts, inter alia, “less stringent” state statutes regulating package labeling, 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), the Court found that the California statute was not less stringent and thus was not expressly preempted. 430 U.S. at 538-39, 97 S.Ct. at 1316. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the California statute must fall because the statute, as applied, stood as an “obstacle” to achieving the purposes of the federal law. Packages of flour, each containing the same amount of flour solids, might not satisfy both the federal and California labeling requirements. The Court reasoned that this discrepancy would inhibit value comparisons by consumers because, even though a package of flour marketed in California would state on the label the same gross weight as a package marketed in states following federal guidelines, millers marketing flour in California would need to add more flour to account for moisture losses. 430 U.S. at 540-43, 97 S.Ct. at 1317-1318.
In the instant case, the Wisconsin statute, although not expressly preempted, similarly frustrates the design of section 203(f)(3) of the SSA by setting off against the plaintiffs’ salaries an amount exactly equal to their federal social security benefits. Without such a statutory provision, plaintiffs undeniably would, in accordance with federal policy, receive larger incomes upon attainment of age 70. They would receive full social security benefits regardless of their other earned income. We believe that a state statute which is applied to “cancel out” the receipt of a protected federal benefit, as in the instant case, clearly stands as an obstacle to frustrate the quite apparent underlying goals of the federal statute.
We therefore hold that Wis.Stat. § 753.075 (1979), to the extent it deducts from the salaries of reserve judges amounts equivalent to their federal social security benefits, is void as violative of the supremacy clause. 14 The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of an order directing defendants to *481 481 pay to plaintiffs the sums that have been impermissibly deducted from their salaries on account of their receipt of social security benefits.
* The Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, is sitting by designation.
1 This statute provides:
(a) “Permanent reserve judge” means a judge appointed by the chief justice to serve an assignment for a period of 6 months. Permanent reserve judges shall perform the same duties as other judges and may be reappointed for subsequent periods.
(b) “Temporary reserve judge” means a judge appointed by the chief justice to serve such specified duties on a day-to-day basis as the chief justice may direct.
Wis.Stat. § 753.075(1)(a)-(b) (1979).
2 As noted, Raskin’s appointment to the post of permanent reserve judge expired in December, 1980, and he now serves as a temporary reserve judge. Defendants are authorized under Wis.Stat. § 753.075(3)(a) (1979) to continue to offset against his compensation as a temporary reserve judge sums equal to the amount of social security benefits he receives.
3 The supremacy clause, U.S.Const., art. VI, cl. 2, declares that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme Law of the Land ….”
4 At the time of the litigation before the district court, section 203(f)(3) of the SSA recognized age 72 as the operative age for eliminating the retirement test. Congress amended this provision in 1977 to provide that, in the taxable years after December 31, 1981, the age level for escaping the retirement test would be reduced to 70 years. Social Security Act Amendments of 1977, P.L. No. 95-216, § 302, 91 Stat. 1509, 1531. Throughout this litigation, both plaintiffs were 72 years old or more and, thus, would benefit from the elimination of the retirement test under either the old or the new provisions.
5 In 1977, the House proposed, as part of the SSA amendments then under consideration, to reduce the age for the retirement test exemption from 72 to 65. The bill reported by the Senate, however, reduced that age from 72 to 70. The House acceded to the Senate’s action. See H.R.Rep.No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (Part II), reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4155, 4262-63.
6 Congress’ broad purpose in establishing old-age benefits as part of the social security system was to create a public social insurance program which would protect aged workers and their dependents from loss of income. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976). Although the social insurance aspects of the social security program tend to predominate, certain provisions in the program reveal other factors which have influenced the development of the social security system. For example, the progressive benefit structure in the program reveals, to a certain degree, the influence of a welfare orientation. On the other hand, section 203(f)(3)’s elimination of the retirement test distinctly emphasizes the insurance aspect of the social security system. These different-and often competing-influences create difficulty for the courts in accurately and fairly interpreting the intent of Congress. See generally Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate Income in Old Age: The Erratic Partnership Between Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 Cornell L.Rev. 437 (1979). This difficulty becomes evident in a supremacy clause challenge to a state law purporting to regulate an area wholly within state control-such as the instant case.
7 We believe that plaintiffs’ reliance on section 207 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976), is misplaced. It is evident that section 207, on its face, protects social security benefits against direct attachment, garnishment, assignment or levy. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982); Neavear v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1982). Our research has disclosed no case where a court has either upheld or invalidated under section 207 a salary setoff scheme similar to the one at issue here. The Supreme Court’s only decision construing section 207-Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973)-is not to the contrary. In Philpott, a state filed a lawsuit seeking to attach a welfare recipient’s bank account which contained sums paid to the recipient under the federal social security program. The state claimed a legal right to these sums by virtue of a state statute which authorized the state to setoff from the recipient’s state welfare payments a sum equal to any federal social security benefits received by the recipient. The Court held that the action taken by the state to recover monies owed to it under the state statute-the lawsuit seeking an attachment-was specifically barred by section 207. In reaching this conclusion, the Court declined to pass on the question of the general validity of the state statute authorizing the setoff. Instead the Court felt that the unlawful aspect of the state’s action was the lawsuit, which was not specifically authorized by the federal statute. Thus we are unwilling to accept plaintiffs’ argument that section 207, at least as interpreted by the Philpott Court, is another independent ground for invalidating the Wisconsin statute here since the Philpott Court’s decision is limited to a situation involving direct attachment or garnishment by a state, which is not found in the instant case. In addition, the Philpott Court’s failure to reach the question whether a state setoff scheme is valid under section 207 erodes plaintiffs’ reliance on that decision.
8 Although the purpose underlying the state statute is not controlling in a supremacy clause analysis, see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971), this asserted justification for the Wisconsin statute is a matter of concern to us. Whatever validity may attach to Wisconsin’s desire to prevent “double dipping” by its employees, such as a need to protect the public fisc or prevent the appearance of impropriety, is vitiated when federal benefits are involved. The asserted rationale of restraining “double dipping” actually contributes, in our view, to the conclusion that the Wisconsin statute frustrates federal policy. State law and policy are directed specifically against the recipients of federal social security benefits and an amount exactly equivalent to those benefits is required to be deducted by state law. See also Toll v. Moreno, — U.S. —-, —-, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 2985, 72 L.Ed.2d —- (1982).
9 In apparent recognition of the effect of its social security setoff, Wisconsin notes that “(a)s a trade-off, … permanent reserve judges are exempted from the provisions of sec. 41.11(12), Wis.Stats.” Defendants’-Appellants’ Brief at 6. Section 41.11(12)(a) provides, inter alia, that the annuity paid under the Wisconsin Retirement Fund (WRF) will be terminated for persons over age 60 who resume public employment and earn in excess of one-half of their former annual earnings; under Wis.Stat. § 753.075(3)(b) (1979), permanent reserve judges are exempted from the WRF termination provision. But the defendants have not provided us with any citation to legislative or judicial interpretations of these statutory provisions indicating that the Wisconsin legislature intended the WRF exclusion to counter-balance the effects of the social security setoff. Moreover, even if defendants have accurately characterized the purpose of the WRF exclusion for reserve judges, that interpretation does not address the supremacy clause issue presented here since Wisconsin’s social security setoff still conflicts with section 203(f)(3) of the SSA. Finally, it is possible that Wisconsin has, albeit impliedly, recognized the same interests involved in the federal exemption from the social security retirement test (particularly the interest in permitting individuals who pay into the system to receive at some point some return on their “investment”) by allowing reserve judges to receive the retirement annuities they contributed to as state employees.
10 It may be argued that Wisconsin could, under the supremacy clause, establish a lower rate of pay for reserve judges with the knowledge that additional federal social security benefits would increase the reserve judges’ total income to the level of non-reserve judges and thereby achieve the same general result as Wis.Stat. § 753.075. That may be so, especially since we have no occasion to pass on the general validity of Wisconsin’s judicial salary levels. But Wisconsin has chosen to reduce each reserve judge’s salary by an amount exactly equivalent to his federal social security benefits rather than to pay reserve judges a lower salary in more general recognition of social security and other retirement benefits they might receive. Even though we do not in most cases quarrel with the means chosen by states to regulate matters within their plenary powers, see Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1129, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981), those means are not immune from supremacy clause analysis when they are specifically directed at offsetting the exact equivalent of the social security benefits.
11 In contrast, Congress expressly allowed integration of social security benefits with private pension benefits under section 204 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(b)(1)(B), (C) & (G) (Supp. III 1979). See Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 514-17, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1901-1903, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). For this purpose, pension benefits are inherently different from salaries for full-time employment. Moreover, integration of plaintiffs’ social security benefits and their state salaries is, standing alone, inconsistent with the design and intent of the federal retirement test exclusion for recipients over age 70. Thus, in the absence of specific congressional approval of integration, such as in ERISA, we may not permit a state statutory scheme that operates in quite effective and well-focused contravention of the policy of section 203 of the SSA.
12 We do not believe that plaintiffs here have lost the protection of the federal statute because their state salary (not including county supplements) amounts to the relatively large sum of $49,176 per year. See Wis.Stat. § 20.923(2) (1979); 1981-82 Wis. Blue Book 599. Although Congress did note that most persons who would benefit from a limitation of the retirement test probably earn only small amounts of income, see S.Rep.No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3318, Congress did not enact any salary limitation to apply to individuals like plaintiffs. The elimination of the retirement test at age 70 is effective without regard to the salary level of the recipient. Cf. Chicago Tribune, April 30, 1982, at A-2 (President and some members of Congress over age 70 currently receive their full federal salary plus full social security benefit). In the absence of any exclusions or limitations in section 203(f)(3) based upon the amount of earned income, we cannot conclude that Congress would deny plaintiffs the protections of this statute.
13 Focusing on legislative history … often introduces ambiguities into the process of deciding preemption cases. As Justice Jackson observed, “(i)t is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible support in legislative history.”
14 Because we dispose of this case on grounds that the Wisconsin statute violates the supremacy clause, we need not reach plaintiffs’ other asserted grounds for invalidating that statute.
Raskin v_ Moran, 684 F_2d 472 (7th Cir_ 1982)
-73.226700 -61.875000
Suing the State Under Title II – Is the State Immune?
1. Suing the State Under Title II – Is the State Immune?
The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits Congress to pass laws to address discriminatory actions by states. However, the 11th Amendment has been interpreted to provide states with immunity from private lawsuits for money damages in federal court unless the federal legislation remedies or prevents a problem of unconstitutional state action, and the legislation is deemed proportional and a reasonable response to the problem it is intended to remedy or prevent.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the states’ immunity under the 11th Amendment quite broadly, including holding that states are immune from ADA employment discrimination suits seeking money damages, Garrett v. University of Alabama, 531 U.S 356 (2000).
This analysis was developed by Equip for Equality for Cherry Engineering Support Services, Inc. (CESSI). It is developed for use by the national network of ADA and IT Technical As- sistance Centers and is solely advisory in nature. Equip for Equality and CESSI believe the analysis to be current as of the effective date of the document, but make no representation that the discussion remains good law thereafter. The analysis is not intended to be a legal determination of rights or responsibilities in general or in any specific case. Funding for this information brief is provided in part by NIDRR under contract #ED-02-CO-0008 to CESSI. However, the content and analysis in the document do not necessarily represent the opinion of NIDRR or the U.S. Department of Education and you should not assume endorsement by the Federal government.
Barry C. Taylor, Esq. Legal Advocacy Director
b. Supreme Court Reviews Constitutionality of Title II of the ADA
Three years after the Supreme Court ruled in Garrett that States are immune from employment discrimination suits for money damages in federal court under Title I of the ADA, the Supreme Court agreed to hear State of Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) to decide whether Congress acted properly when it made states subject to suits in federal court under Title II of the ADA.
Facts of Tennessee v. Lane
The plaintiffs in the case, two Ten- nessee residents with paraplegia, were denied access to judicial proceedings because those proceedings were held in courtrooms on the second floors of buildings lacking elevators. One of the plaintiffs, Beverly Jones, sought access to the courtroom to perform her work as a court reporter. The other plaintiff, George Lane, was unable to attend a criminal proceeding being held in an inaccessible second-floor courtroom; the state arrested him for failure to appear when he refused to crawl or be carried up the steps. Lane and Jones filed suit under Title II of the ADA to challenge the state’s failure to hold proceedings in accessible courthouses.
In response to the ADA suit, the State of Tennessee argued that the Supreme Court’s ruling that states cannot be sued for money damages in ADA employment discrimination cases should be extended to suits for money damages against the state under Title II as well. The plaintiffs
argued that there is a stronger history of discrimination by states under Title II and therefore, states should not be im- mune from suits for money damages.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that states are subject to lawsuits filed in federal court for money damages under the ADA in cases involving access to the courts. The question before the Supreme Court was whether Congress acted properly when it enacted the ADA and made states liable for discrimina- tion against people with disabilities in the provision of government services. The Supreme Court has decided that the ADA does apply to the states when people with disabilities seek to enforce their rights to gain access to the courts.
In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled that when the ADA was passed, Con- gress identified an extensive history of discrimination by states in the provision of its programs and services for people with disabilities. The Court went on to hold that the remedies set forth by Congress in the ADA were appropriate to address the objective of enforcing access to the courts for people with disabilities. While the Court limited its holding to cases involving access to courts, its
expansive analysis documents the his- tory of state-sponsored discrimination against people with disabilities in many different areas (such as voting, education, institutionalization, marriage and family rights, prisoners’ rights, access to courts, zoning restrictions, and other areas) and contains broad statements about the careful tailoring of Title II’s requirements generally. These aspects of the decision may prove helpful in defending the constitutionality of other applications of Title II in future cases.
b. Recent Lower Court Interpretations of Tennessee v. Lane
The following cases have been decided applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane.
i. Prisons:
• U.S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 541 (2006), the United States Supreme Court said that an inmate can bring a Title II case against the State for money damages when the conduct by the State violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. While the full Court agreed that damages were available against States for dis- ability discrimination that also violates the Constitution, there is a split among the Justices as to whether damages are available for ADA violations that are not con- stitutional violations. The Court remanded the case to the lower court to identify which conduct by the State would violate the ADA but not the Constitution.
• Hallett v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 2006 WL 903200 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), plaintiff, a former prison inmate, sought dam- ages due to his denial of participation in prison programs, violating Title II of the ADA. The plaintiff used a wheelchair and prison officials told him he could not participate in cer- tain prison programs because “they don’t take wheelchairs.” The defen- dants requested summary judgment, partly because of sovereign immu- nity. However, the district court al- lowed the plaintiff’s claim to proceed. The court found that the actions of the defendants may have involved discriminatory animus, which meant the defendants may have violated the Fourteenth Amendment and there- fore were not entitled to sovereign immunity.
• Degrafinreidv.Ricks,417F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D. N.Y. 2006), prison offi- cials destroyed and failed to replace a prisoner’s hearing aids, the court found that prison officials may have violated his Constitutional rights and allowed him to pursue his ADA claim requesting monetary damages against state officials.
• Association for Disabled Ameri- cans v. Florida International University, 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005), plaintiffs filed suit against University for failing to provide qualified sign language interpret- ers, failing to provide necessary auxiliary aids, such as effective note takers, as well as failing to provide physical access to students with dis- abilities. The 11th Circuit ruled that
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lane should be extended to public education.
• Press v. State Univ. N.Y., 2005 WL 2360050 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), a student with dyslexia and dysgraphia requested use of a calcu- lator in class. Despite the evidence of a pattern of discrimination in education, the court declined to extend Lane to apply to education.
Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason University, 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2005), plaintiff had migraine headaches and the university refused to allow her extra time to complete an exam. The 4th Circuit agreed that Lane should be extended to higher education and rejected the state’s immunity claim.
Costello v. University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2005 WL 1528788 (M.D.N.C. June 29, 2005), plaintiff was a college student with obsessive compulsive disorder who alleged that the university golf coach and others discriminated against him. Court held claim did not involve a fundamental right and upheld defendant’s sovereign immu- nity claim. Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim was allowed to proceed.
Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board, 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005), the court held that the state of Louisiana knowingly waived 11th Amendment immunity to Section 504 by accepting federal funds. The court reasoned that because Con- gress made waiver of 11th Amend- ment immunity a clear condition
of accepting federal funds, a state cannot then argue it did not know- ingly waive its immunity. The test is whether Congress made a clear statement, not the state’s subjective beliefs. The case involved a student with cerebral palsy suing the state for lack of accessible facilities at the school.
Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of the Uni- versity of Illinois, 429 F.Supp.2d 930 (N.D. Ill. 2006), a former M.D./Ph.D student argued that the University of Illinois failed to rea- sonably accommodate his requested accommodations. The district court dismissed his ADA claim, finding that the reasoning in Lane did not extend to education because educa- tion is not a fundamental Consti- tutional right. Although the court found that Illinois waived sovereign immunity for ADA violations, the waiver only applied to employees and Doe’s claims related only to his status as a student. However, the court allowed Doe’s ADA claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities, under the reasoning of Ex Parte Young.
• Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2006), plaintiff, a college student diagnosed with a mental illness, alleged that the University of Puerto Rico failed to reasonably accommodate him and discrimi- nated against him. The defendant’s appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judg- ment to the First Circuit, but the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Extending the reasoning in Lane, the First Circuit found that sovereign immunity is
not a defense to claims regarding access to public education.
iii. Disability Services:
• Buchananv.Maine,417F.Supp.2d 24 (D. Me. 2006), plaintiff was the representative of a mental health services client who was fatally shot by police. The court held that Title II of the ADA does not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity as ap- plied to public mental health servic- es because provision of such services does not implicate a fundamental right.
• Bill M. v. Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 408 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2005), vacated, U.S. v. Nebraska Dept. of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, _ U.S. _ , 126 S. Ct. 1826 (2006), plaintiffs, de- velopmentally disabled adults, sued because they were denied “home and community-based Medicaid- funded services.” The Eighth Circuit limited Lane to the right of access to the courts. However, the Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s opinion and remanded for further consideration in light of the Court’s opinion in U.S. v. Georgia.
• Blumberg v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 122 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2005), plaintiff, a pediatric endocrinologist, was diagnosed with breast cancer, and was terminated when she returned to work. The court held that Title II of the ADA was broad enough to encompass
plaintiff’s claim because “her termi- nation was willful and motivated by disability-discriminatory animus.”
• Cisneros v. Colorado, 2005 WL 1719755 (D. Colo. July 22, 2005), plaintiff, a state employee with a back injury, brought a claim for disability employment discrimination under Title I and Title II of the ADA. The court dismissed plaintiff’s case on the basis that his claims fell within the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett, which held that states were immune from Title I suits for damages in federal court.
• Maizner v. Hawaii Department of Education, 2005 WL 3475692 (D. Hawaii 2005), the court allowed a special education teacher to pursue her claims for prospective relief, holding that the 11th Amendment protects states from retrospective relief but not prospective relief, such as reinstatement. The teacher alleged failure to accommodate her rheumatoid arthritis and termination because of her disability.
• Guttmanv.Khalsa,446F.3d1027 (10th Cir. 2006), a doctor who was diagnosed with depression and post traumatic stress disorder sued New Mexico, alleging the State violated Title II after it revoked his medical license. The district court granted the State summary judgment, but the Tenth Circuit vacated the opinion and remanded for further consider- ation. The Tenth Circuit ordered the district court to reconsider whether the plaintiff stated a claim under Title II against the State and then determine whether or not the Title II claim is barred by sovereign immu-
nity based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in U.S. v. Georgia.
2. Community Integration Litigation
When Congress passed Title II of the ADA it found that isolation and segregation was a pervasive form of discrimination and that discrimination against people with disabilities included people in insti- tutional settings. The U.S. Department of Justice was designated by Congress to enforce Title II of the ADA and to issue regulations for Title II. DOJ Regulations stated that state and local governments must provide their services to people with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified in- dividuals with disabilities and that state and local governments to make reasonable modifications in the services it provides unless those modifications would result in a fundamental alteration.
b. Supreme Court Reviews Community Integration Under Title II of the ADA
In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear its first case addressing community integration under Title II of the ADA. The case was Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) and involved two women with mental retardation and mental illness who were patients at a state-operated hospital in Georgia. Although state treatment profes-
sionals for both women had deemed them appropriate for community-based place- ments, both remained institutionalized. They filed suit under Title II of the ADA alleging that the state had violated the ADA’s integration mandate. The Supreme Court found that the unwarranted institu- tionalization of people with disabilities is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the ADA. The Court ruled that the ADA requires States to serve people with disabilities in community settings, rather than in segregated institutions, when three factors are present:
• Treatment professionals determine community placement is appropriate;
• The person does not oppose com- munity placement; and
• The placement can be reasonably ac- commodated taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others who are receiving State-supported services.
The Court ruled that a State can meet its obligations under Olmstead if it has a comprehensive, effectively working plan for evaluating and placing people with disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace and that is not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.
c. Recent Interpretations:
i. Fundamental Alteration
The Supreme Court held that states must make reasonable modifications in the ser- vices it provides unless those modifications would result in a fundamental alteration.
Many cases have turned on whether the plaintiffs’ requested relief would be a fun- damental alteration.
• FrederickL.v.Dept.ofPub.Wel- fare of Pa., 422 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 2005), is a class action on behalf of residents of a state psychiatric hos- pital. Plaintiffs challenged the State’s compliance with the court mandate to “develop a plan for future de-insti- tutionalization of qualified disabled persons that commits it to action in a manner for which it can be held accountable by the courts.” Plaintiffs argued that the State failed to provide “concrete, measurable benchmarks and a reasonable timeline for them to ascertain when, if ever, they will be discharged to appropriate com- munity services.” In contrast, the State argued that all it had to do was “demonstrate ‘a commitment to take all reasonable steps to continue [its past] progress’” in order to satisfy the fundamental alteration defense. The court interpreted Olmstead “to mean that a comprehensive working plan is a necessary component of a successful ‘fundamental alteration’ defense.” In this case, the State’s ef- forts were insufficient to demonstrate “a reasonably specific and measurable commitment to de-institutionaliza- tion for which DPW may be held ac- countable.” The court then provided specifics, stating that at a bare mini- mum, a comprehensive, effectively working plan should: “specify the time-frame or target date for patient discharge, the approximate number of patients to be discharged each time period, the eligibility for dis- charge, and a general description of the collaboration required between the local authorities and the hous-
ing, transportation,
care, and education agencies
to effectuate integration into the community.”
• Pennsylvania Protection & Advo- cacy, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare, 402 F. 3d 374 (3d Cir. 2005), is a class action brought on behalf of residents in a nursing facility serving people with psychiatric and developmental dis- abilities. The Third Circuit stated that budgetary constraints alone do not satisfy the fundamental altera- tion defense. The court also found that defendants did not meet the fundamental alteration test because they failed to demonstrate a “com- mitment to action” to come into compliance with the ADA. The court held that demonstrating such a commitment is a prerequisite to establishing a fundamental altera- tion defense, and only when this is demonstrated do budgetary issues even become a factor.
• Sanchezv.Johnson,416F.3d1051 (9th Cir. 2005), is a case in which plaintiffs argued that paying lower wages and benefits to community- based service providers than employ- ees in state institutions was resulting in some individuals with develop- mental disabilities being unneces-
sarily institutionalized. The court held that California already had an acceptable de-institutionalization plan in place, and that disrupting it would be a “fundamental alteration of the State’s current policies and practices in contravention of the Supreme Court’s instructions in Ol- mstead.” The court concluded, based on the record, that “California’s commitment to the de-institution- alization of those developmental center residents for whom commu- nity integration is desirable, achiev- able and unopposed, is genuine, comprehensive and reasonable,” and that disrupting this plan would impermissibly restrict the leeway given to states in their operation of developmentally disabled services.
• Arc of Washington v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005) is a case in which the plaintiffs sued Washington state officials for failing to provide sufficient community ser- vices under its Home and Commu- nity Based Services Medicaid waiver program. The 9th Circuit held that Washington demonstrated that it has a “comprehensive effectively working plan” as contemplated by Olmstead, and therefore were not in violation of the ADA. Specifi- cally, the court found: Washington’s HCBS program (1) is sizeable, with a cap that has increased substantially over the past two decades; (2) is full; () is available to all Medicaid-eli- gible disabled persons as slots be- come available, based only on their mental-health needs and position on the waiting list; (4) has already significantly reduced the size of the state’s institutionalized population; and (5) has experienced budget
growth in line with, or exceeding, other state agencies. Under such circumstances, forcing the state to apply for an increase in its Medicaid waiver program cap constitutes a fundamental alteration, and is not required by the ADA.
• LovelyH.v.Eggleston,235F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), involves welfare recipients with disabilities who sought injunctive relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act due to a proposed change in the administration of public benefits by New York City. Instead of providing benefits through its 29 neighbor- hood offices, the City proposed to provide these services only through three central offices. Following the reasoning in Olmstead, the court granted injunctive relief because it found that the City’s proposal clearly violated the mandate that persons with disabilities are given the opportunity to participate in mainstream service delivery mecha- nisms.
ii. Risk of Institutionalization
Although the Olmstead case involved plaintiffs in institutions, courts have held that Olmstead includes people who are at risk of institutionalization.
• In Nelson v. Milwaukee County, 2006 WL 290510 (E.D. Wis. 2006), plaintiffs, who are persons over the age of sixty and with disabilities, brought a class action under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act against the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services and its Secretary. The plaintiffs alleged that the inad- equate funding of service providers
by the defendants in its community based services program would force the plaintiffs into more restrictive settings to receive services. The de- fendants sought to dismiss the claim, but the court allowed the plaintiffs claim to go forward, under the rea- soning of Olmstead. The court found that the inadequate compensation of community services would result in unjustified segregation, violating the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
• In Ligas v. Maram, 2006 WL 64474 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2006), court granted plaintiffs’ class cer- tification motion finding that class included people with developmental disabilities who are currently insti- tutionalized as well as those who are at risk of being institutionalized.
3. Reasonable Modifications in Title II Transportation Cases
Title II of the ADA is divided into two sections. Part A of Title II covers state and local governmental entities and Part B of Title II covers transportation. While Part A specifically states that state and local governments have an obligation to provide reasonable modi- fications, there is no explicit language regarding reasonable modifications in Part B. As a result, an emerging ADA issue is whether people with disabilities are entitled to a reasonable modification when bringing transportation discrimi- nation cases.
In Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. National Passenger R.R., 2005 WL 1459338 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2005), plain- tiffs are members of a group comprised of wheelchair users who travel on Amtrak together, typically to political events. For years, Amtrak, with appropriate notice, would create the necessary accessible space by removing fixed seats from train cars. In 200, however, Amtrak stated that it would no longer remove the seats unless a $200 per ticket fee is paid, in addition to the normal train fare. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of the ADA. The court held that since Part B of Title II states specifically how many spaces for passen- gers using wheelchair must be available on each train, no additional requirement can be imposed. The court found that public transportation entities are exempt to the reasonable modification requirements of Part A of Title II with respect to matters specifically governed by Part B, including the number of accessible seats.
In Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2004), parents of disabled adult passenger brought suit alleging that public paratransit service’s failure to modify its paratransit services to require alley pick-up for passenger violated Americans with Disabilities Act. The 5th Circuit held that the Title II of the ADA does not require a paratransit provider to make reasonable modifications to its services. (Interestingly, the Department of Transportation recently issued Guidance stating that transit agencies must provide paratransit services in a way that goes beyond “curb to curb service” if necessary to actually get the passenger from point of origin to destination. This would seem to indicate that the Department of Trans- portation believes that transit providers are required to provide reasonable modifica- tions of their policies and procedures.)
4. Parking Placard Surcharge
Under the ADA’s regulations, “a public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program ac- cessibility that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscrimi- natory treatment required by the Act.”
b. Court Rules that Parking Placard Surcharge Violates Title II of the ADA
In Klingler v. Missouri Department of Revenue, 433 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 2006), individuals with disabilities sued the State of Missouri alleging that it violated Title II of the ADA by charging a fee for removable disability parking placards. The court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that Missouri was in violation of the ADA. The court rejected that
Missouri met the ADA’s requirements by providing its disability license plates at no cost since the license plate could only be obtained by owners of vehicles that were operated at least 50% of the time by the physically disabled person or used primar- ily to transport physically disabled mem- bers of the owner’s household. Therefore, a removable placard was necessary for an individual who did not own a vehicle or did not ride in a vehicle that met these requirements. Note: Because the 8th Cir- cuit previously held that money damages against the state are only available in court access cases (see Bill M. case above) the plaintiffs were only entitled to injunctive relief in this case, i.e. the removal of the surcharge. However, the court recently revisited its decision to deny plaintiffs monetary damages in light of a recent Supreme Court decision, which held that whether plaintiffs are entitled to recover money damages from the State depends on a claim-by-claim analysis (See Goodman v. Georgia, discussed above). Upon review, the court upheld its decision to deny plaintiffs money damages, finding that the State’s conduct, although in violation of the ADA, was not unconstitutional. Klingler, 455 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2006)
In Keef v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 2006 WL 1651042 (N.W.2d 2006), individuals with disabilities sued the State of Nebraska for both injunc- tive relief and money damages, alleging the State violated Title II of the ADA by charging a $ fee for removable disability parking placards. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not address the plaintiffs’ claim for an injunction because the State had stopped charging the fee for the placards prior to the court’s consideration of the is- sue. As for money damages, the court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery of the placard fee. The court determined
that the fee did not deny individuals of a fundamental right, nor was there evidence that Congress was specifically concerned about fees for placards when it enacted the ADA. Therefore, the court held that the State was immune from suit for recovery of the parking placard fee.
5. Association Discrimination Under Title II
Under the ADA, people who are discrimi- nated because of their association with a person with a disability can state a cause of action. Typically, the association discrimi- nation cases have arisen in the context of employment under Title I. However, two recent cases explore the application of association discrimination in the context of Title II.
b. Is an Association Discrimination Claim Viable Under Title II?
In Barber v. Colorado, 2005 WL 2657885 (D. Colo. 2005), the court dismissed claims against the state by two daughters of an individual with a visual disability, holding that Title II of the ADA does not support associational claims of dis- crimination. The court reasoned that unlike Title I, Title II does not expressly authorize claims based on associational discrimination. However, the court subse- quently clarified its decision after plaintiffs amended their complaint, ruling that a plaintiff may assert a claim for associa-
tional discrimination under Title II as long as the plaintiff is directly injured as a result of discrimination against another person with a disability. See Barber, 2006 WL 213970 (D. Colo. January 4, 2006).
c. Can Third Party Recover Under Association Discrimination Claim for Denial of Access for Person with Disability?
In Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 150 Fed. Appx. 424 (6th Cir. 2005), the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim alleging violations of Title II and Section 504, holding that the individual lacked standing to bring an as- sociational discrimination claim because she was not the individual denied access. The court ruled that it is the claimant who must have suffered the denial of ac- cess because of her relationship with the individual with a disability, and cannot bring a claim based on denial of access of the person with whom she associates.
In Autism Society of Michigan (ASM) v. Fuller, 2006 WL 1519966 (W.D. Mich. 2006), ASM brought suit under Title II, alleging that its organization had suffered an injury because it had to expend resourc- es to address the public school’s discrimi- nation against a student with autism. The court dismissed ASM’s complaint, holding that in order for organizations to have a claim under Title II, they must allege that they were themselves discriminated against or singled out in a discriminatory way due to their association with individuals with disabilities. Because ASM had not suffered an “ADA injury,” its claim of associational discrimination failed.
6. Accommodations for Post-
Many students with learning disabilities need accommodations when taking tests. However, courts have generally been hostile to claims made by students who have succeeded in the past despite hav- ing a learning disability that may or may not have been diagnosed. Because of the general hostility by courts to these kinds of claims, plaintiffs should try to identify a major life activity other than learning in which they are substantially limited.
In Wong v. University of California, 410 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2005), the court ruled that a medical student with a learning im- pairment was not disabled because he had a record of prior academic achievements accomplished without accommodation. The student had failed his clerkship after being denied the accommodation of an additional reading period, but had a his- tory of academic success.
In Brown v. University of Cincinnati, 2005 WL 1324885 (S.D. Ohio 2005), the court ruled that a student is not substan- tially limited in his ability to learn since he successfully completed high school and college without accommodations. Test results indicating below to low average neuropsychological function did not es- tablish substantial limitation in the major
life activity of learning, especially given his past academic success.
In Dixson v. University of Cincinnati, 2005 WL 2709628 (S.D. Ohio 2005), a graduate student with bipolar disorder, dyslexia, and ADD was rightfully denied testing accommodation because she failed to establish her conditions were disabilities as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. The student’s history of success worked against her claim of substantial limitation of her ability to learn.
In Krolik v. Nat’l Bd. Of Medical Ex- aminers, 2006 WL 1794759 (D. Ariz. 2006), the court ruled that a recent medical school graduate was not entitled to a time extension or use of pen and paper for his board exams because he failed to show how his alleged ADHD substantially limited a major life activ- ity. Although the graduate claimed that his learning and reading abilities were substantially limited, the court held that his history of academic success was “directly inconsistent with a claim that a student is substantially limited in learn- ing.” Further, the graduate’s claim that his disability affected his ability to pass the test, which in turn affected his abil- ity to work, failed because he had a long successful history of working.
7. Title II Liability for Failing to Make Sidewalks Accessible
There has been relatively little litigation against municipalities for failing to make its sidewalks accessible, but some recent decisions demonstrate that municipalities
will be held accountable if they do not meet their obligations under the ADA.
In Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002), a group of in- dividuals with disabilities filed an action against the City for violation of Title II and Section 504 due to the city’s failure to provide curb cuts and make its sidewalks accessible. The district court dismissed the portion of plaintiffs’ complaint that dealt with sidewalk obstructions, such as benches, signposts and wires, in the path of access of the city’s sidewalks on the grounds that the ADA or Section 504 did not cover sidewalks. Although the language in the ADA calls for curb cuts in public sidewalks, it does not specifically address the issue of sidewalk accessibil- ity. However, the 9th Circuit reversed and concluded that since the regulations do specifically address curb ramps, they could only do so if sidewalks were covered as well. The court found this interpreta- tion consistent with the purpose of curb cuts and that sidewalks are a “program, service or activity” of the City covered by Title II of the ADA. The City petitioned for the Supreme Court to review the decision, but the Supreme Court denied the petition and let the Ninth Circuit’s decision stand.
In Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F. 3d 901 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court ruling that found that the City of Sandusky violated Title II of the ADA and its related regulations for failing to ensure accessibility when it renovated the City’s sidewalks. However, the Sixth Circuit found in favor of the City with respect to the plaintiff’s claim that the City was required to develop a transition plan for ADA compliance when structural changes are undertaken. The court found
that this provision of the ADA is not en- forceable via a private cause of action.
In Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2006), an individual with paraple- gia sued the City of Boston, alleging that the city violated Title II’s self-evaluation and transition plan regulations by failing to evaluate and improve the condition of its streets and sidewalks to make them more accessible. The court held that the self-evaluation and transition plan regula- tions impose obligations on public entities that go beyond those imposed by Title II of the ADA itself. Consequently, those regulations may not be enforced through the private right of action available under Title II. Moreover, the court noted that even if the plaintiff were entitled to a pri- vate right of action, neither the self-evalu- ation and transition plan regulations nor Title II itself imposes a duty on a public entity to make structural changes to exist- ing facilities.
8. Standing to Sue Under Title III
Article III of the Constitution of the United States restricts the federal courts to the adjudication of “cases” and “con- troversies.” Therefore, to proceed with a federal court case, a plaintiff must have “standing” or a sufficient personal stake in a dispute to ensure the existence of a live case or controversy, which renders judicial resolution appropriate.
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that:
She has suffered an “injury in fact” that is
(b) actual or imminent, not conjec- tural or hypothetical;
It is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by the relief requested.
b. Cases in Which Plaintiff Found to Lack Standing
In Marcovecchio v. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., 2005 WL 159596 (D.N.J. 2005), a court ruled that a bank customer alleg- ing access violations lacked standing to bring claims against any bank location other than his local branch. The court held that an ADA claimant can only sue if there is an actual or imminent threat of future disability discrimination, and thus cannot bring claims against branches he has never been to and has no plans to visit.
In Access 4 All v. Oak Spring, Inc., 2005 WL 1212663 (M.D. Fla. 2005), the court held than an individual who lived five hours away from a Howard Johnson Inn in Ocala lacked standing to bring a Title III claim because he failed to show a likelihood of future harm from the alleged violations. The individual had gone to Ocala to visit an aunt and an amusement park, but his aunt had passed away and he expressed no interest
in returning to the park, so the threat of future injury was speculative at best.
In Access 4 All, Inc. v. Wintergreen Com- mercial Partnership, Ltd., 2005 WL 2989307 (N.D. Tex. 2005), the court dismissed Title III claims of a Florida resi- dent and a Florida organization for lack of standing because they failed to show a threat of future injury from alleged access violations at a Texas Holiday Inn. The court held that although the resident had visited the hotel once, a plaintiff that lives in another state and has no future plans to visit the defendant’s business lacks standing. A reservation made after the complaint was filed could not be considered for standing purposes.
In Chambers v. Melmed, 141 Fed. Appx. 718 (10th Cir. 2005), the court held that an individual who alleged she was denied artificial insemination treatments due to her blindness could not maintain her claim for injunctive relief under Title III because she could not show likelihood of suffering similar harm in the future. The plaintiff had moved away from the clinic and the doctor had ceased all artificial insemination services.
In Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restau- rant, 385 F.Supp.2d 1042 (C.D. Cal. 2005), the court ruled that a restaurant patron with paraplegia lacked standing to sue a California restaurant for failure to comply with accessibility provisions of Title III. The court determined that the patron had not established likelihood of future injury because the restaurant was 116 miles from the patron’s home and he had visited the restaurant only once and had no concrete plans to return. Also, the fact that the patron had previously filed hundreds of lawsuits against small businesses throughout California for
ADA violations caused the court to doubt the sincerity of his intent to return to the restaurant. The patron appealed the court’s decision, and the case is currently pending in the 9th Circuit.
In Access for America, Inc. v. Associated Out-Door Clubs, 2006 WL 1746890 (11th Cir. 2006), the 11th Circuit upheld a district court’s finding that the claim- ants lacked standing to bring a claim against a track facility for having archi- tectural barriers. The court noted that the claimant could not demonstrate that there was any reasonable chance that he would revisit the track, and he failed to prove a threat of future injury
In Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 426 F.Supp.2d 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2006), the court held that a store customer who complained of architectural barriers in Costco’s store lacked standing under Title III because the customer failed to set forth evidence that he intended to return to the store. The court considered such factors as the vast distance between the customer’s residence and the facility, the lack of past patronage at the store, the litigation history of the customer, and the customer’s failure to reply to the store’s letter requesting specific informa- tion about the barriers he encountered at the store.
c. Cases in Which Plaintiff Found to Have Standing
In Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F.Supp.2d 636 (D. Md. 2005), the court allowed former patients with hear- ing impairments to proceed with their Title III claim for failure to provide a live
sign language interpreter upon request, as the patients’ risk of future harm granted them standing to seek injunctive relief. The patients could show likelihood of suffering similar injury if they live in close proximity to the hospital and the hospital engages in an ongoing pattern of behavior in violation of the ADA.
In Kratzer v. Gamma Management Group, Inc., 2005 WL 2644996 (E.D. Pa. 2005), a group of individuals with mobility impairments successfully alleged a Title III claim against Ramada Inn, as they had standing under the ADA’s futility provision despite not attempting to sched- ule conferences at the hotel. The individu- als were able to show actual knowledge of barriers preventing equal access, and that they would use the facility if not for the barriers.
In Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), court found that some bus passengers with disabilities had standing to seek prospective relief in action against city transit system for inaccessible fixed-route bus system when there was specific pleading of the intent to use the bus system in the future and there was sufficient allegations of specific accessibility problems in the past that was traceable to the transit system’s al-
leged failure to comply with the ADA’s transportation provisions.
In Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 413 F.Supp.2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2006), the court held that a customer who encoun- tered architectural barriers at a Pier 1 Imports store had standing to bring suit under the ADA, even as to architectural barriers that the customer had not encoun- tered himself and of which he was not aware until his expert visited the store. The court held that plaintiffs are not required to actually encounter a barrier in order to sue for its removal under the ADA. The future threat of encountering physi- cal barriers at the store, whether or not initially encountered, sufficed to establish the customer’s standing.
In Access 4 All, Inc. v. 539 Absecon Blvd., L.L.C., 2006 WL 1804578 (D. N.J. 2006), the court granted a hotel patron leave to amend his complaint, stating that if the patron included evidence that he intended to return to the New Jersey hotel, he could establish standing to sue the hotel for failure to provide accessibility under Title III. The court disagreed with the hotel that the claimant’s distance from the hotel made it unlikely that he would return if it became accessible. Instead, the
court held that due to the nature of hotels, distance is not a good measure of intent to return. In his affidavit, the patron stated that he returned to New Jersey several times a year and had family in that area. Also, the hotel is located very close to the airport, so it would be an ideal hotel for the claimant to stay when he returned to New Jersey.
9. Evacuation of People with Disabilities
Although most Title III litigation has focused on barriers for people with dis- abilities to enter places of public accom- modation, a recent state court decision indicates that people with disabilities may also have an ADA cause of action if there are barriers to their safe evacuation out of a business.
In Savage v. City Place Ltd. Partnership, 2004 WL 3045404 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 2004), plaintiff, who uses a wheel- chair, was shopping at Marshalls when the store and the mall it was located in were evacuated. Store personnel forced her to exit into an area of the mall that was below ground level and, as a result, she was unable to evacuate because the elevators were shut down and all the exits had stairs. A state court found that Title III of the ADA does apply to the issue of evacuation, and public accommodations must consider the needs of its customers with disabilities when developing emer- gency evacuation plans. The judge rejected the store’s argument that after placing the plaintiff outside the store’s entrance, it was the mall’s legal responsibility to address her evacuation needs.
Following the court’s ruling, the parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement in which Marshalls agreed to redevelop the evacuation procedures at its more than 00 stores located in 42 states and Puerto Rico.
Certificationofemergencyexitsfor people with disabilities;
Certification of store services in the event of an emergency;
Written emergency policies and procedures;
Training on emergency policies and procedures;
ADA consultants hired for develop- ment and implementation of the new policies and procedures; and
Designation of responsible corpo- rate employee to oversee and coor- dinate implementation of the terms of the settlement.
10. ADA’s Application to Websites
The ADA does not explicitly discuss whether it applies to websites, and thus far, there have been few cases. Over the years courts have reached different conclusions as to whether websites are covered under the ADA. (See Martin v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Tran- sit Authority, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2002), holding that transit
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