Source: https://casetext.com/case/medina-v-hornung-2
Timestamp: 2019-03-26 12:49:41
Document Index: 549695090

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2253', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

Medina v. Hornung, 372 F.3d 1120 | Casetext
372 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)
Medina's habeas petition challenges certain allegedly prejudicial ex parte statements made by the trial judge to the jury in violation of his constitutional rights to counsel and to be present during trial. The California Court of Appeal found constitutional error but denied relief on harmless error grounds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Because the state court's denial of Medina's appeal was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, we affirm the district court's denial of Medina's habeas petition. Further, we take this opportunity to explain that, for the purpose of the "unreasonable application" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if a state court disposes of a constitutional error as harmless using an appropriate standard of review, federal courts must examine that disposition for objective unreasonableness without reference to the harmless error test set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Only if the state court's harmless error analysis amounts to an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law do we apply the harmless error standard set forth in Brecht to see whether a habeas petitioner may still be denied relief.
A. Factual Background 1. The Initial Meeting
The judge then provided citations to specific jury instructions.
We review de novo the district court's denial of Medina's habeas petition. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Because Medina filed his habeas petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), his appeal is governed under the rules of that Act. Id. Under AEDPA, we may grant the petition only if the state court's denial of relief:
Finally, even if the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, habeas relief may still be denied absent a showing of prejudice. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10-11, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam). There are two forms of prejudice. Only a small group of "structural errors" are deemed so harmful that they warrant per se relief. Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing to Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). The overwhelming majority of trial errors are non-structural and do not trigger habeas relief unless the error resulted in "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," or unless the judge "is in grave doubt" about the harmlessness of the error. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (citation omitted); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). The relevant inquiry is whether the tainted evidence actually harmed the appellant. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
B. AEDPA Standard of Review Applied to a State Court's Determination of Harmless Error
The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge's ex parte remarks to the jury resulted in constitutional error, but determined that the error was harmless. Because special considerations regarding the application of the Brecht analysis arise when the issue under federal habeas review is a state court's determination of harmless error, we take this opportunity to clarify Brecht's application in this context.
A state court may dispose of most constitutional errors by finding them harmless under the Supreme Court's decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which requires the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or harmless under an equivalent state law standard. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 362. However, as discussed above, federal habeas courts determine harmless error under a different standard — whether the error resulted in substantial or injurious harm. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710.
The existence of these disparate harmless error standards does not affect the application of the "contrary to" clause of § 2254(d)(1). However, their presence fosters confusion regarding how federal courts should apply Brecht in determining the reasonableness of the state court's harmless error analysis under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause. At first glance, it appears that we are layering one reasonableness analysis upon another. However, closer study reveals the following two approaches to reviewing the state's harmless error analysis under the unreasonable application clause:
(1) Federal courts may include the Brecht analysis as part of the "unreasonable application" determination. Under this analytical model, the reasonableness of the state court's Chapman application is determined by conducting a Brecht test. If the prejudice in the case warrants relief under Brecht, the state court's Chapman analysis necessarily violated the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1).
(2) Alternatively, federal courts may apply the Brecht analysis as a separate legal construct. Under this model, federal courts first determine whether the state court's harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1). Only if a predicate finding of unreasonableness is made would the federal court apply Brecht to determine whether the habeas petitioner should nevertheless be denied relief.
Our sister circuits have split on the issue. However, we read the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, ___-___, 124 S.Ct. 7, 11-12, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (per curiam), as endorsing the second approach. In Esparza, the Supreme Court held that "habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless-error review in an `objectively unreasonable' manner." Id. at 12 (citations omitted). In upholding the state court's harmless error analysis, the Supreme Court did not refer to or apply Brecht. The implication is that federal courts should not initially use Brecht in determining whether the state court's harmless error analysis was consistent with the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1).
The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir. 2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that if the state court correctly applied Chapman, federal courts do not apply Brecht unless the state court's Chapman analysis violated AEDPA). Other circuits have reserved judgment. See, e.g., Fuller v. Gorczyk, 273 F.3d 212, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893, 898-99 n. 3. (7th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001), in which the Court applied a Brecht analysis to an AEDPA case, does not compel a different result. The Penry Court was not reviewing the reasonableness of a state court's harmless error analysis; rather, the Court applied a harmless error analysis in the first instance. See id.; cf. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 759-60 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (reflecting no harmless error analysis by the state court). Accordingly, if a federal court applies a harmless error analysis in the first instance, the Brecht standard governs. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Brecht when the state court decided the case under the wrong harmless error standard or failed to apply a harmless error analysis entirely). Because the state court in this case conducted a harmless error analysis, we are guided by the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Esparza, first deciding whether the state court's harmless error analysis is objectively unreasonable and, if so, applying Brecht.
Therefore, pursuant to Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 12, we hold that if a state court disposes of a constitutional error as harmless under an appropriate standard of review, federal courts must, for the purpose of the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), first determine whether the state court's harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable. Only if there is a predicate finding that the state court's harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable, and thus an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, should federal courts engage in a Brecht analysis.
We turn now to the merits of Medina's case.
Improper ex parte remarks made by the judge to the jury are subject to harmless error analysis. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118-20, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983). The California Court of Appeal's harmless error determination in this case was not "contrary to" established federal law. Although the Court of Appeal did not identify Chapman as the guiding point of its harmless error analysis, it applied a state-law "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that comports with federal law. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824; see also Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 362 (noting that a state court need not cite Supreme Court cases, so long as its analysis is not contrary to governing caselaw). Neither did the decision conflict with any materially indistinguishable Supreme Court cases.
State courts may dispose of most constitutional errors by applying the Supreme Court's Chapman test or an equivalent standard. If the state court applied the correct standard of review, and if that disposition does not conflict with any "materially indistinguishable" Supreme Court cases, relief may not be granted under AEDPA § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause.
Federal courts reviewing a state court's harmless error analysis under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause must first determine the objective reasonableness of the state court's harmless error analysis. If the state court's decision does not rise to the level of objective unreasonableness, our inquiry ends. However, if the state court's analysis were objectively unreasonable, thereby reflecting an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we apply the Brecht test to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.