Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/5/1070/626245/
Timestamp: 2019-11-18 09:11:21
Document Index: 258607768

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 846', '§ 2255', '§ 851', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 3742', '§ 851', '§ 841', '§ 851']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Feilberto Flores, Angel L. Fontanez and Amador Rodriguez,defendants-appellants.feilberto Flores, and Amador Rodriguez, Petitioners-appellants, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 5 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1993 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Feilberto Flores, Angel L. Fontanez and Amador Rodr...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Feilberto Flores, Angel L. Fontanez and Amador Rodriguez,defendants-appellants.feilberto Flores, and Amador Rodriguez, Petitioners-appellants, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 5 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 5 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1993) Argued April 28, 1993. Decided Sept. 23, 1993
Feilberto Flores, Angel L. Fontanez, and Amador Rodriguez ("defendants") are three forcibly retired entrepreneurs. Like many successful entrepreneurs, they ran a well-organized commercial enterprise and made a substantial profit.2 There was however, a difference in their business from the American norm. They applied their money-making skills to marketing, distributing, and selling an illegal product: cocaine, lots of cocaine. Eventually, Flores, Fontanez, and Rodriguez were forced into "retirement." All three were indicted, tried, and convicted of crimes. Flores was convicted of one count of conspiring to distribute cocaine, three counts of illegally using a communication facility to facilitate drug trafficking, and two counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 843(b), and 841(a) (1) respectively. Fontanez was convicted of one count of conspiring to distribute drugs and two counts of possession with the intent to distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a). Finally, Rodriguez was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Flores was sentenced to 364 months in prison, Fontanez was sentenced to 264 months, and Rodriguez was sentenced to life without parole. The district court also fined Flores and Rodriguez $25,000 each. In this consolidated appeal, all three challenge their convictions and sentences. Additionally, Flores and Rodriguez petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("section 2255") for alleged constitutional violations surrounding their convictions. We affirm their convictions and sentences, and deny Flores and Rodriguez section 2255 relief.
First of all, there is no requirement that the district court follow some pre-ordained, detailed script when eliciting a criminal defendant's waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.6 United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080, 109 S. Ct. 2099, 104 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989). We do not ask whether a defendant's decision to waive is foolish. Rather, we ask only whether the defendant made an informed decision. A waiver is sufficient if it was made knowingly and intelligently, that is to say, if it was made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 60 (7th Cir. 1992). The district court need not conduct a long-winded dialogue with counsel and defendants when inquiring about a waiver. Roth, 860 F.2d at 1389. It is enough that the district court inform each defendant of the nature and importance of the right to conflict-free counsel and ensure that the defendant understands something of the consequences of a conflict. Id. at 1388.
We note that the district court must recognize a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of choice. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1699, 100 L. Ed. 2d (1988). The district court, with this presumption in mind, chose to respect the decision of the defendants. We do the same. Flores, Fontanez, and Rodriguez, made their decision to waive their right to conflict-free counsel before the district court and cannot now reverse course.
The defendants' other argument--that their waivers are not valid because most of their answers at the Rule 44(c) hearing consisted of only one or two words--is also without merit. In United States v. Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1992), the criminal defendant waived her right to conflict-free counsel by answering the district court with such brief answers as: "Yes, sir.;" "Yes, sir.;" "No, I don't, because I'm not.;" "Yes, sir.;" and "No." Id. at 666-667. We affirmed the district court's decision that such a waiver was valid and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Similarly, we affirm here. The defendants answers at the Rule 44(c) hearing adequately expressed their preferences.7 We respect the defendants' choice of trial counsel and hold that the defendants waived their Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel.
We begin our analysis of this claim by noting that the grounds for relief under section 2255 are very narrow. Basile v. United States, 999 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1993). Flores and Rodriguez can recover if they can show that their Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated.
Their argument on this ground fails for two reasons. First, their contention that their answers were prompted by their attorney is not supported by the record. Affidavits submitted by their attorneys before the district court refute their claim. The district court concluded--and we agree--that these claims are merely post-hoc rationalizations put forth by Flores and Rodriguez to persuade the district court to vacate their convictions. Flores and Rodriguez waived their right to conflict-free counsel in open court, of their own free will. We refuse to say that merely by alleging--with no other support--that their waivers were "prompted" by their attorney entitles them to a hearing on the issue. This is exactly the kind of whipsawing that the Supreme Court has explicitly cautioned against. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Flores and Rodriguez have failed in their attempt to persuade us that their waivers were invalid.
The only other section 2255 issue is whether Flores has sufficiently alleged a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Green because Green allegedly placed greater emphasis on his work in another client's civil case then pending in Hawaii than he did on Flores' criminal case.8 To state a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Flores first had to show that Green's performance was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); United States ex rel. Duncan v. O'Leary, 806 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S. Ct. 1982, 95 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1987). Second, Flores had to show that Green's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. This second prong requires a showing that Green's errors were so serious as to deprive Flores of a fair trial, that is, of a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; O'Leary, 806 F.2d at 1312. To succeed, Flores is required to make both showings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. He has made neither.
To begin with, Flores presents nothing that suggests that Green's performance was deficient. Flores points to nothing Green should have or could have done that Green did not do and therefore fails to rebut our presumption that Green effectively assisted Flores. Biggerstaff v. Clark, 999 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1993). The abundant evidence against Flores also establishes that the result of the trial--Flores' conviction--was reliable.
United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Cabral's testimony in this case satisfies all four parts of this test. First, Rodriguez's membership in the cocaine distribution conspiracy was a matter in issue. Cabral's testimony establishes that Rodriguez was a part of the on-going criminal conspiracy since at least 1988. Cabral's testimony did not relate to Rodriguez's propensity to distribute cocaine as a general matter. Second, Cabral's testimony, which reaches back some two years before the FBI arrested Rodriguez, is easily close enough in time to be relevant to events charged in this case. See Smith, 995 F.2d at 672 (evidence properly admitted where two years separated the prior act and the charged acts); United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1992) (evidence of transaction five years prior to those charged properly admitted). Third, Cabral's testimony supports a jury finding that Rodriguez conspired to distribute cocaine since 1988. Finally, the probative value of Cabral's testimony is not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. The district court properly admitted Cabral's testimony about Rodriguez's pre-indictment involvement in the cocaine distribution conspiracy.
Flores and Rodriguez claim that the district court did not follow the appropriate procedures when it sentenced them. Specifically, they contend that the district court improperly enhanced their sentences without complying with the requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 851(b).10 That statute sets forth the requirements that the government, the criminal defendant, and the district court must follow when the government seeks to enhance the defendant's sentence because of prior convictions. Section 851(a) requires the government to file an information with the court before trial which "states in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon." 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1). If the government complies, as it did in this case, section 851(b) directs the district court, before pronouncement of sentence, to ask the defendant whether the defendant affirms or denies that alleged prior conviction. Rodriguez and Flores argue--quite accurately--that the district court did not comply with this requirement. No matter, Rodriguez and Flores' argument still fails.
Flores' argument fails because he was sentenced under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G"). Section 851 applies to persons convicted of an offense under Title 21 "when the government seeks to enhance the maximum penalty under the recidivist provisions of that statute. The statute does not apply, however, when sentencing is conducted under the Sentencing Guidelines and the defendant receives an increased sentence which is within the statutory range." United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d 416, 417 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The maximum penalty prescribed for a violation of two of the three statutes Flores was convicted of--sections 841(a) (1) and section 846--is life imprisonment.11 Flores received a sentence of 364 months pursuant to the Guidelines. This sentence is within the statutory range. Therefore, the requirements of section 851 do not apply.
Rodriguez's section 851(b) argument fails as well, but for different reasons. The district court sentenced Rodriguez to life imprisonment and fined him $25,000 pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A).12 Section 851's requirements apply, therefore, because Rodriguez was not sentenced pursuant to the Guidelines. The government's information reveals that Rodriguez's two prior convictions, for sentence enhancement purposes, are a 1976 Cook County, Illinois conviction for heroin delivery and a 1982 federal conviction in Puerto Rico for a drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine.
Section 851(e) prohibits a defendant from challenging a conviction that is more than five years old.13 A district court is not required to "adhere to the rituals of Sec. 851(b) where a defendant, as a matter of law, is precluded from attacking the conviction forming the basis of the enhancement information." United States v. Nanez, 694 F.2d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S. Ct. 1884, 76 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1983). See also United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1992) (trial court need not adhere to requirements of section 851(b) where conviction more than five years old), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1664, 123 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1993); United States v. Housley, 907 F.2d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466, 1482 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S. Ct. 972, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1058 (1991). The government filed the information in this case on January 28, 1991. Rodriguez's two prior convictions occurred more than five years before that date. The requirements of section 851(b) do not apply.
Reasonable foreseeability refers to the scope of the agreement that Fontanez entered into when he joined the conspiracy, not merely to the drugs he may have known about. United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 1590, 118 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1992). The district court noted the following evidence against Fontanez: (1) Rodriguez told Cabral the day after Fontanez was arrested that Fontanez was a long-time "trusted worker;" (2) the 120.4 kilogram quantity of cocaine, which the district court used, was a conservative amount, given Cabral's testimony; (3) Fontanez rented the stash apartment in February 1990; and (4) Cabral testified that Fontanez's involvement in the cocaine distribution operation began at least as early as the summer of 1990, well before the first of the eleven transactions which helped comprise the full 120.4 kilogram amount.16 The district court applied the appropriate preponderance of the evidence standard, accepted these facts as established, and concluded that the full quantity of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable to Fontanez. See United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1993) (articulating preponderance of the evidence standard for sentencing). We will reverse the district court's finding only if it is clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Villarreal, 977 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S. Ct. 1350, 122 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1993). It was not clearly erroneous.
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that " [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI
21 U.S.C. § 851(b).
For example, section 841(b) (1) (A) states in relevant part:
(1) (A) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving-- ... (ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of-- ... (II) cocaine such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life....
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A). The "preceding sentence" provides for fines of up to "$8,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $20,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, or both." Id.
21 U.S.C. § 851(e).
Fontanez was sentenced in April 4, 1991. Thus, the Guidelines applicable as of November 1, 1990 apply. Under those Guidelines, a Base Offense Level of 34 applies to defendants found liable for at least fifteen but less than fifty kilograms of cocaine. A Base Offense Level of 36 applies to defendants found liable for at least fifty but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c) (5)
The commentary that interprets or explains a guideline is "authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline." Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1993). There is nothing in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 that violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. We therefore treat it as authoritative