Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19830706-919380
Timestamp: 2017-01-22 00:20:44+00:00
Document Index: 35081872

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 401", "l'article 412", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 14", "l'article 36", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 6", "l'article 14", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", 'in fine', "l'article 27"]

M. c. PAYS-BAS
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche M. c. PAYS-BAS
Type d'affaire : DécisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9193/80Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-07-06;9193.80 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS DE CARACTERE CIVILParties : Demandeurs : M.Défendeurs : PAYS-BASTexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 9193/80 M . v/the NETHERLAND S
M . c/PAYS-BAS DECISION of 61uly 1983 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 6 juillet 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªte
Artlcle 6, pnragraph I of the Convention : Lengthv criminal appeal proceediags owing to the excessive case-load of, and lark of personnel at the cotnpetenr court . (Application declared adntissible) .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : Lwtgue durÃ©e d'mte procÃ©dure pÃ©nale en appel, le rÃ´le de la cour compÃ©tente Ã©tant surchargÃ© et son personnel insulfisant (RequÃªte dÃ©clarÃ©e recevable) .
(franÃ§ais : voir p. 92)
The applicant is a Netherlands citizen born in 1955 and residing in E . In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Mr Groen, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam . From the statements and documents submitted it appears that on 30 November 1977 the applicant was convicted in absentia by the Police Magistrate (politierechter) at the Regional Court in Breda for having on two occasions (29 July 1976 and 3 January 1977) driven a ntotor vehicle during a period when his driving licence had been suspended (counts I and IV) and for having driven without a licence (count II) or insurance (count 111), the latter otfences both having been committed on 3 January 1977 . The sentence was as follows : one month's imprisonment on the first and fourih count and one week of detention for each of the second and third counts . On the same day the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Court of Appeal in 's Hertogenbosch .
On 13 April 1978 the Registrar of the Regional Court in Breda forwarded the case-tile to the Court of Appeal . The Procurator-General (Procureur-Generaal) at the Court of Appeal summoned the applicant on 12 November 1979 for the hearing of the appeal on 11 December 1979 . At the hearing the applicant'stated that the period between the decision of the Police Magistrate of 30 November 1977 and the hearing before the Court of Appeal could not be considered to be reasonable within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 of the UN Covenant onCivil and Political Rights . In his opinion, the Registrar of the Regional Court in Breda who forwarded the case-file to the Court of Appeal only on 13 April 1978 had acted contrary to Section 409 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing that this should be done "as soon as possible" . Moreover, according to Section 412 (1) of the Code,"the President (of the Court of Appeal) determines the day of the hearing, if possible within eight days after receipt of the case-file, at the request and recomnrendation of the Procurator-General". Also this time-limit had been largely exceeded . He therefore requested the Court of Appeal to declare the public action inadmissible and to quash the decision of the Police Magistrate . ~On 20 December 1979 the Court of Appeal of 's Hertogenbosch delivered judgment . That decision, insofar as relevant, can be summarised as folloivs : Insofar Ã¢s the applicant had submitted that the public action should be declared inadmissible relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the-Court of Appeal considered that provision 16 be inapplicable since the case had already been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal . Insofar as the applicant had invoked Article 14 of the UN Covenant the Court of Appeal held that even assuming that the delay which elapsed between the filing of the appeal and the summons for the appeal proceedings had caused an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, such finding did not warrant the conclusion that the public action should be declared inadmissible .,ltheld that the UN Covenantmerely imposed obligations on the Contracting Parties and that individuals could -derive therefore merely the right of individual petition to the UN Committee, provided the optional Protocol had been accepted . It added that in any event the Netherlands had complied with its obligations under Article 14 (3) of the Covenant by virtue of Article 36 of the Dutch Code ofLriminalProcedurÃ© .â¢ ' . It rejected on the above grounds the applicant's plea of inadmissibility of the public prosecutor's depÃ¢rtment's action . The Court of Appeal added in an o6iter dictunt thattherÃ© -could be no question of either the reasqnable time limit of Article 6 of the Convention having been transgressed or of . a n â¢ Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedu re provides that where a prosecution is not pursued, the accused can request the court to declare the case terminated . -88-
unreasonable delay in the proceedings within the meaning of Article 14 of the Covenant, if this were to be ascribed to circumstances unrelated to the proceedings themselves, such as the constantly increasing number of criminal cases, both in first instance and on appeal, combined with an almost perntanent lack in staff, these circumstances, as was generally known, having been prevailing since a considerable time . The Court of Appeal declared inadmissible the appeal insofar as it was directed against the conviction on charges 11 and lll and confirmed the decision of the Police Magistrate, while reducing the length of the sentence for reasons unrelated to the facts of the present application . Thereupon the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) . He inter alia argued that the Court of Appeal's iuterpretation of the European Convention and of the UN Covenant was incorrect . Moreover, in his opinion, the undertakings emanating from these treaties imply that the prosecuting authorities themselves should see to the prosecutimt being pursued within a reasonable time and without undue delay . Of course, under Section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused had the possibility to request the court before which his case was pending to terminate the proceedings if his prosecution was not being pursued, but this remedv was not concerned with the moment on which the prosecution was initiated, pursued or further pursued and had to be availed of by the accused hintsell'. The applicant further disagreed with the Court's linal remarks about the increasing number of criminal cases not yet tried and the almost permauent lack of personnel . In this respect . he referred to criteria which the European Court of Human Rights had developed in the cases of WenthofT and Neumeister . In his view it did not even appear from the Court of Appeal's considerations that it had examined the conduct of the prosecuting authorities . By decision of 23 September 1980 the Suprente Court rejected the applicant's appeal on points ot law . Insofar as relevant it stated that Article 6 ot' the Convention and Article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant were designed to prevent that an accused should beyond a reasonable delay live under the threat of (further) prosecution . Unlike the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court was of the view that Article 6 of the Convention was applicable at this stage of the proceedings . It also rejected the Court of Appeal's finding that the individuals could not derive subjective rights from the Covenant . It held theretore that, where the provisions of Article 14 (3) (c) of the Covenant had been disregarded, the prosecution of a person would be so much contrary to the fundamental principles of due process that prosecuting authorities should no longer be entitled to (further) prosecute and that therefore their public action should not be accepted for decision . The Supreme Court further siated ihat unlike the Court of Appeal, it found that the increasing number of cases not yet tried, at first instance and o n
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appeal, and the lack of personnel could not as such justify a delay which is in itself unreasonable . However, in the present case although more time than would normally be desirable had passed between the moment of the filing of the appeal and the hearing by the Court of Appeal, it could neve rt heless not be said that, consequently, the hearing of the case had not taken place "without undue delay" or "within a reasonable time" . In the Supreme Cou rt 's opinion, pa rt icular circumstances which might lead to a different conclusion had not been established by the Cou rt of Appeal or alleged by the applicant . The applicant's appeal on points of law was therefore rejected . A request for pardon lodged on 6 November 1980 was rejected on 15 April 1981 .
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains that the Supreme Court should have quashed the Court of Appeal's judgment for the reason that the period between the date of his appeal (30 November 1977) and of the hearing in appeal (I I December 1979) could not be considered as a"reasonable time" as guaranteed by Article 6(I) of the Convention . In his opinion, the period in question should be considered in the light of, on the one hand, the national legal provisions and, on the other hand, the criteria developed in the cases of Wemhoff and Neumeister .
THE LA W The applicant complains of the duration of the examination by the cou rt ot' Appeal of 's He rtogenbosch of the appeal against his conviction on 30 November 1977 by the Police Magistrate of the Regional Court of Bre da for a series of four traffic offences committed in July 1976 and January 1977 . He considers that the delay which elapsed between the date of the filing of his appeal, 30 November 1977, and the date of the hea ring by the Court of Appeal, 11 December 1979, cannot be considered reasonable within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention . A rt icle 6 (1) of the Convention, which the applicant re lied on, provides inrer alia that in the determination of a criminal charge eve ry one is Ã¨ntitled to a cou rt hea ri ng within a reasonable time . It is not in dispute between the Pa rt ies that proceedings before lhe Cou rt of Appeal up to the verdict lasted more than two years . In the Ktinig judgment of 28 June 1978, the European Cou rt of Human Rights held as follows : "The reasonableness of the duration of proceeding s
covered by Article 6(1) of the Convention must be assessed in each case according to its circumstances . When enquiring into the reasonableness of the duration of criminal proceedings, the Court has had regard, inter alia, to the complexity of the case, to the applicant's conduct and to the manner in which the matter was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities (Eur . Court of H .R ., Ktinig Case, Series A, Vol . 27, para . 99, p . 34) . The Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of the facts before it in the light of the above criteria and submissions made so far by the parties . As regards the complexity of the case, the Commission observes that the Court of Appeal was called upon to examine on appeal a conviction on two counts of a simple traftic olience-namely the driving of a motor vehicle while the accused's driving licence had been suspended, while the conviction on the other two charges-driving without a licence and insurance-were inadmissible on formal legal grounds in view of the sentence imposed . It cannot therefore be said, and the Governntent do not even suggest, that the case was of particular complexity . Secondly, as regard the applicant's own conduct the Commission notes that nothing in the file presently before it indicates that the applicant can be held responsible for the delay in the proceedings . Finally, insofar as the handling of the case by the judicial authorities is concerned, the Commission notes that the Government have explained that the Court of Appeal had a very heavy workload and a permanent lack of staff and that, consequently, those cases where detention on remand had been imposed and other cases in which delay would bring a serious prejudice, were given priority. In the present case, the Court of Appeal had considered that the above elements were lacking . The Commission recalls that in the Buchholz case the European Court of Human Rights held that "the Convention places a duty on the Contracting States to organise their legal system so as to allow the courts to comply with the requirentents of Article 6(1 ) . includint; that of trial within a "reasonable time" and that "nonetheless, a temporary backlog of business does not involve liability on the part ol' the Contracting States provided they have taken reasonable prompt remedial action to deal with an exceptional situation of this kind" (Eur . Court H .R ., Buchholz Case, judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A, Vol . 42, para . SI) . The Comntission notes that it appears from the submissions of the Government that , although the Government have unde rtaken a number of studies into the causes and the eventual solution to the problem of the excessive workload of the judiciary in the Netherlands, no concrete solutions have yet been brought into operation .
The Commission fully realises the considerable expenditure required by measures designed to guarantee the proper administration of justice at a time when activity is greatly expanding (cf . Report of the Commission in Application No . 8737/79, Zimmermann & Steiner against Switzerland, adopted on 9 March 1982, para . 47 iu ffne) . However, in particular in light of the latter consideration, the Commission concludes that the applicant's complaint relating to the length of the criminal proceedings cannot be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Convention and justifies an examination as to its merits . .
For these reasons, the Commission, without prejudging the merits , DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(TRADUCTION) EN FAI T Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant nÃ©erlandais, nÃ© en 1955 et habitant E . Dans la procÃ©dure devant la Commission, il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par MÂ° Groen, avocat Ã Amsterdam . Des dÃ©clarations et piÃ¨ces prÃ©sentÃ©es, il ressort que le requÃ©rant a Ã©t Ã© condamnÃ© par dÃ©faut le 30 novembre 1977 et le juge de paix (Politierechter) du tribunal rÃ©gional de Breda pour avoir Ã deux reprises (29 juillet 1976 et 3 janvier 1977) conduit un vÃ©hicule automobile pendant une pÃ©riode de suspension de son permis de conduire (chefs 1 et IV) et pour avoir conduit sans permis (chef 11) ou sans assurance (chef 1I1), ces deux derniÃ¨res infractions datant du 3 janvier 1977 . La peine a Ã©tÃ© la suivante : un mois de prison pour les premier e t quatriÃ¨me chefs et une semaine pour chacun des deuxiÃ¨me et troisiÃ¨me chefs . Le mÃªme jour, le requÃ©rant intedeta appel de cette dÃ©cision auprÃ¨s de la cour d'appel de 's Hertogensbosch . Le 13 avril 1978, le greffier du tribunal rÃ©gional de Breda transmit le dossier Ã la cour d'appel . Le procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral prÃ¨s la cour d'appel convoqua le requÃ©rant le 12 novembre 1979 pour une audience fixÃ©e au Il dÃ©cembre 1979 .
A l'audience, le requÃ©rant dÃ©clara que le dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© entre la dÃ©cision du juge de paix en date du 30 novembre 1977 et l'audience devant la cour d'appel ne pouvait pas Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme raisonnable, au sens de l'article 6 de la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme et de l'article 14 du Pacte des Nations-Unies relatif aux droits civils et politiques . A son avis, le greffier du tribunal rÃ©gional de Breda, qui n'avait adressÃ© son dossier Ã la cour d'appel que le 13 avril 1978, n'avait pas respectÃ© l'article 401, paragraphe 1, du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, qui stipule que cette transmission doit se faire Â«dans les meilleurs dÃ©lais . . En outre, aux termes de l'article 412 . paragraphe 1, du Code . .le prÃ©sident (de la cour d'appel) fixe, si possible dans les huit jours qui suivent la rÃ©ception du dossier, la date de l'audience sur demande et proposition du procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral . . LÃ encore, ce dÃ©lai a largement Ã©tÃ© dÃ©passÃ© . Le requÃ©rant pria donc la cour d'appel de dÃ©clarer l'action pÃ©nale irrecevable et de casser la dÃ©cision du juge de paix . Le 20 dÃ©cembre 1979, la cour d'appel de 's Hertogenbosch rendit son arrÃªt . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ elle concerne la prÃ©sente affaire, la dÃ©cision peut se rÃ©sumer comme suit : En ce qui concerne le moyen d'irrecevabilitÃ© de l'action pÃ©nale tirÃ© par le requÃ©rant de l'article 6 de la Convention, la cour d'appel estima cette disposition inapplicable en l'espÃ¨ce, puisque l'affaire avait dÃ©jÃ Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©e par un tribunal indÃ©pendant et impartial . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ le requÃ©rant avait invoquÃ© l'article 14 du Pacte des Nations-Unies, la cour d'appel dÃ©clara qu'Ã supposer mÃªme que le dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© entre le dÃ©pÃ´t de l'appel et la convocation Ã l'audience ait causÃ© un retard dÃ©raisonnable de procÃ©dure, cette constatation ne justifiait pas la conclusion d'irrecevabilitÃ© de l'action pÃ©nale . Elle dÃ©clara que le Pacte des Nations Unies n'oblige que les Parties Contractantes, et que les particuliers ne peuvent en tirer qu'un droit de recours individuel Ã la Commission des Nations Unies Ã condition que leur Etat ait ratifiÃ© le Protocole facultatif . Elle ajouta qu'au demeurant les Pays-Bas avaient respectÃ© les obligations que leur assigne l'article 14, paragraphe 3, du Pacte en incorporant ce texte Ã l'article 36 du Code nÃ©erlandais de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . * La cour rejeta, pour les raisons susdites, le moyen invoquÃ© par le requÃ©rant quant Ã l'irrecevabilitÃ© de l'action du parquet . La cour ajouta dans un obiter dictum qu'il ne saurait Ãªtre question ni d'un dÃ©passement du dÃ©lai raisonnable prÃ©vu Ã l'article 6 de la Convention, ni de l'existence dans la procÃ©dure d'un retard excessif au sens de l'article 14 du Pacte, lorsque ceux-ci sont dus Ã des circonstances n'ayant aucun rapport avec l'action elle-mÃªme, par exemple l'augmentation du nombre des affaires pÃ©nales, tant en premiÃ¨r e
â¢ L'article 36 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale prÃ©voit que si l'action pÃ©nale n'est pas diligentÃ©e, l'accusÃ© peut demander au tribunal de classer l'affaire .
instance qu'en appel, associÃ©e Ã une pÃ©nu rie quasi-permanente de personnel, situation dÃ©jÃ ancienne d'ailleurs . La cour d'appel dÃ©clara l'appel irrecevable dans la mesure oÃ¹ il attaquait la condamnation sur les chefs Il et 111 et confirma la dÃ©cision du juge de paix, en rÃ©duisant cependant la durÃ©e de la peine, pour des motifs Ã©trangers aux faits de la prÃ©sente requÃªte . Le requÃ©rant introduisit alors un pourvoi auprÃ¨s de la Cour de cassation (Hoge Raad) . Il fit valoir notamment que l'interprÃ©tation de la Convention europÃ©enne et du Pacte des Nations-Unies donnÃ©e Ã©tait inexacte . Par ailleurs, selon lui, les engagements dÃ©coulant de ces traitÃ©s supposent que le parquet lui-mÃªme s'assure que l'action est poursuivie dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable, sans retard excessif . Certes, aux termes de l'art icle 36 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, l'accusÃ© a la facultÃ© de demander au t ri bunal devant qui son affaire est pendante de la classer si l'action engagÃ©e contre lui n'est pas diligentÃ©e . mais ce recours ne conce rne pas le moment oÃ¹ l'action est engagÃ©e ou poursuivie et c'est Ã l'accusÃ© lui-mÃªme d'en faire usage . Le requÃ©rant conteste les observations finales de la cour sur l'augmen ta tion d'affaires pÃ©nales non encore jugÃ©es et sur la pÃ©nu ri e quasi permanente de pe rsonnel . Il renvoie d'ailleurs Ã cet Ã©gard aux c ri tÃ¨res fixÃ©s par la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme dans les affaires Wemhof et Neumeister . Selon lui, il ne ressort mÃªme pas des considÃ©rants de la cour d'appel qu'elle a ezaminÃ© la conduite de l'affaire par le parquet . Par arrÃªt du 23 septembre 19 80, la Cour de cassation rejeta le pourvoi du requÃ©rant . Elle dÃ©clara notamment que l'article 6 de la Convention et l'article 14, paragraphe 3 c), du Pacte visent Ã empÃªcher un accusÃ© de viv re sous la menace de (nouvelles) pou rs uites au-delÃ d'un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Contrairement Ã la cour d'appel, la Cour de cassation dÃ©clara que l'article 6 de la Convention s'applique Ã ce stade de la procÃ©dure . Elle rejeta Ã©galement l'opinion de la cour d'appel selon laquelle les particuliers ne peuvent pas tirer le droit subjectif du Pacte . Elle dÃ©clara qu'en consÃ©quence, lorsque les dispositions de l'a rt icle 1 4, paragraphe 3 c), du Pacte ont Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connues, poursuivre un individu serait d'autant plus contraire aux p ri ncipes fondamentaux des droits de la dÃ©fense que le parquet n'est plus autorisÃ© Ã continuer les poursuites, et que, dÃ¨s lors, l'action pÃ©nale est frappÃ©e d'irrecevabilitÃ© . La Cour de cassation dÃ©clara en outre que, contrairement Ã la conclusion de la cour d'appel, l'augmentation du nombre des affaires non enco re jugÃ©es, tant en premiÃ¨re ins ta nce qu'en appel, ainsi que la pÃ©nurie de personnel ne peuvent pas justifier un retard qui est par lui-mÃªme excessif . En l'espÃ¨ce, cependant, bien que le dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© entre l'introduction de l'appel et l'audience devant la cour d'appel soit plus long qu'il eÃ»t Ã©tÃ© souhaitable, on ne saurait cependant affirmer que l'affaire n'a pas Ã©tÃ© entendue .sans retard excessif . ou .dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . . De l'avis de la Cour de cassation, la cour d'appel n'a pas Ã©tabli et le requÃ©rant n'a pas allÃ©guÃ© l'existence de circonstances parti-
culiÃ¨res pouvant conduire Ã une conclusion diffÃ©rente . Elle rejeta donc le pourvoi du requÃ©rant . Un recours en grÃ¢ce, introduit le 6 novembre 1980 . fut Ã©galement rejetÃ© le 4 avril 1981 . Griefs Le requÃ©rant soutient que la Cour de cassation aurait dfi casser l'arrÃªt de la cour d'appel au motif que le dÃ©lai sÃ©parant l'introduction de son appel (30 novembre 1977) de l'audience d'appel (11 dÃ©cembre 1979) ne peut pas Ãªtre qualifiÃ© de â¢dÃ©lai raisonnable ., au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Selon ]ui, la pÃ©riode en question devrait Ãªtre examinÃ©e Ã la lumiÃ¨re, d'une part, des dispositions du droit interne et, d'autre part, des critÃ¨res Ã©tablis dans les affaires Wemhof et Neumeister.
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint de la durÃ©e de l'examen par la cour d'appel de 's Hertogenbosch de l'appel qu'il a interjetÃ© le 30 novembre 1977 contre sa condamnation par le juge de paix du tribunal rÃ©gional de Breda pour quatre infractions au code de la route commises en juillet 1976 et janvier 1977 . II estime que le dÃ©lai Ã©coulÃ© entre l'introduction de son appel (30 novembre 1977) et l'audience de la cour d'appel (Il dÃ©cembre 1979) ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme raisonnable, au sens de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . L'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, qu'invoque le requÃ©rant, prÃ©voit notamment que pour faire dÃ©cider du bien-fondÃ© d'une accusation pÃ©nale . toute personne a droit Ã faire entendre sa cause par un tribunal dans un dÃ©lai raisonnable . Il n'est pas contestÃ© entre les parties que la procÃ©dure qui s'est dÃ©roulÃ©e devant la cour d'appel jusqu'Ã l'arrÃªt de celle-ci a durÃ© plus de deux ans . Dans l'arrÃªt Koenig du 28 juin 1978, la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits d e l'Homme a dÃ©clarÃ© que : .Ie caractÃ¨re raisonnable de la durÃ©e d'une procÃ©dure relevant de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention doit s'apprÃ©cier dans chaque espÃ¨ce, suivant les circonstances de la cause . En recherchant si la durÃ©e d'un procÃ¨s pÃ©nal a Ã©tÃ© raisonnable, la Cour a pris en considÃ©ration notamment la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, le comportement du requÃ©rant et la maniÃ¨re dont l'affaire a Ã©tÃ© conduite par les autoritÃ©s administratives et judiciaires . . (Cour eur . D .H . Affaire Kbnig, SÃ©rie A, vol . 27, par . 99, p . 34) . La Commission a procÃ©dÃ©, Ã la lumiÃ¨re des critÃ¨res ci-dessus et de l'argumentation prÃ©sentÃ©e par les parties, Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire des faits qui lui ont Ã©tÃ© soumis .
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Sur la complexitÃ© de l'affaire, la Commission remarque que la cour d'appel Ã©tait invitÃ©e Ã examiner en appel une condamnation sur deux chefs d'infractions simples au code de la route (conduite d'un vÃ©hicule pendant une pÃ©riode de suspension du permis de conduire de l'accusÃ©) alors que l'appel formÃ© contre la condamnation sur les deux autres chefs (condamnation sans permis et sans assurance) Ã©tait irrecevable pour des motifs juridiques de forme, compte tenu de la lÃ©gÃ¨retÃ© de la peine infligÃ©e . On ne saurait donc dire - et le Gouvernement ne le laisse mÃªme pas entendre - que l'affaire ait Ã©tÃ© d'une complexitÃ© particuliÃ¨re . DeuxiÃ¨mement, en ce qui concerne le comportement du requÃ©rant luimÃ©me, la Commission relÃ¨ve que rien dans le dossier dont elle est saisie n'indique que le requÃ©rant puisse Ã©tre tenu pour responsable des retards de procÃ©dure . Enfin s'agissant de la conduite de l'affaire par les autoritÃ©s judiciaires, la Commission a pris note des explications du Gouvemement selon lesquelles la cour d'appel, surchargÃ©e de travail, souffre en permanence d'une pÃ©nurie de personnel et qu'en consÃ©quence elle accorde prioritÃ© aux affaires oÃ¹ l'accusÃ© est en dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive et Ã celles oÃ¹ un retard pourrait entraÃ®ner un prÃ©judice grave . La Commission rappelle que dans l'affaire Buchholz, la Cour europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme a dÃ©clarÃ© que : - La Convention astreint les Etats contractants Ã organiser leurs juridictions de maniÃ¨re Ã leur perrnettre de rÃ©pondre aux exigences de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, notamment quant au â¢dÃ©lai raisonnable . et que .nÃ©anmoins, un engorgement passager du rÃ´le n'engage pas leur responsabilitÃ©, s'ils prennent avec une promptitude adÃ©quate, des mesures propres Ã redresser pareille situation exceptionnelle . (Cour eur . D .H . . Affaire Buchholz . arrÃªt du 6 mai 1981 . SÃ©rie 1, vol . 42, par . 51) . Selon la Commission, il ressort de l'argumentation du Gouvernement que si ce dernier a entrepris un certain nombre d'Ã©tudes sur les causes de cet engorgement excessif de l'appareil judiciaire aux Pays-Bas et sur ses rentÃ¨des Ã©ventuels, aucune solution pratique n'a encore Ã©tÃ© mise en o .uvre . La Commission est pleinement consciente des dÃ©penses considÃ©rables qu'impliquent les mesures propres Ã assurer une bonne administration de la justice dans une conjoncture en pleine Ã©volution (cf . rapport de la Commission pour la RequÃªte NÂ° 8737/79 Zimmermann et Steiner contre la Suisse, adoptÃ© le 9 mars 1982, par . 47 in fine). Vu cette derniÃ¨re considÃ©ration, la Commission estime que le grief du requÃ©rant relatif Ã la durÃ©e de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale le concernant ne saurait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ© comme manifestement mal fondÃ©, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention et qu'un examen de son bien-fondÃ© se justifie . Par ces motifs . la Commission, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ© ,
-96-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 06/07/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page