Source: https://advocatemmmohan.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/indian-penal-code-1860-sections-295-a-499-500-rw-34-defamation-interview-to-a-film-magazine-appellant-making-statements-against-a-particular-community-alleged-to-be-deliberate-malicious-and/
Timestamp: 2015-05-24 17:07:16
Document Index: 323131174

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 136', 'Art.\t32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 32', 'Art. 226']

Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 295-A, 499, 500 r/w. 34-Defamation-Interview to a film magazine- Appellant making statements against a particular community-Alleged to be deliberate, malicious and outraging the religious feelings of that community-Complaint-Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing notice to appellant-Challenge before High Court which held that no offence under S.295A made out but the allegations constitute prima facie offence triable by Magistrate under S.500 =On appeal held the allegations do not contain essential facts constituting offence under S.295A-The complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Pune does not contain allegations to constitute an offence of defamation punishable under S.500-Hence that complaint quashed-Complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Nasik-High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under S.500. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1696 of 1996. =, 1996( 5 )Suppl.SCR 771, 1996( 6 )SCC 263, 1996( 6 )SCALE769 , 1997(10 )JT 469 | advocatemmmohan
Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 295-A, 499, 500 r/w. 34-Defamation-Interview to a film magazine- Appellant making statements against a particular community-Alleged to be deliberate, malicious and outraging the religious feelings of that community-Complaint-Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing notice to appellant-Challenge before High Court which held that no offence under S.295A made out but the allegations constitute prima facie offence triable by Magistrate under S.500 =On appeal held the allegations do not contain essential facts constituting offence under S.295A-The complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Pune does not contain allegations to constitute an offence of defamation punishable under S.500-Hence that complaint quashed-Complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Nasik-High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under S.500. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1696 of 1996. =, 1996( 5 )Suppl.SCR 771, 1996( 6 )SCC 263, 1996( 6 )SCALE769 , 1997(10 )JT 469
Posted by advocatemmmohan ⋅ November 20, 2011	Filed Under Bombay High Court, Criminal Procedure Code, India, indian penal code, JudicialMagistrate, Magistrate, Marwari, Pune	Image via Wikipedia
SHATRUGHNA PRASAD SINHA
RAJBHAU SURAJMAL RATHI & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/1996
Though the respondents were duly served and on an
occasion appeared in person, subsequently they did not
appear. Resultantly, we requested Shri Sushil Kumar Jain,
Advocate of the Bar to assist the Court as amicus curiae. We
place on record our deep appreciation for the valuable
assistance rendered by him.
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment
and order of the High Court of Bombay made on January 21,
1991 in Crl.Writ Petition No. 1545 of 1990. The facts
relevant for the purpose of this case and we proceed on the
basis thereof are that allegations were made in the
complaint filed by the respondents in the Courts of
Magistrate at Pune and Nasik; we deal with those allegations
as they constitute offence for which the Judicial
Magistrate, Ist Class, could take cognizance. In paragraph 2
it is narrated that the complainant-respondent was a social
activist belonging to the Marwari Community, and that the
respondent second accused respectively is the editor and
publisher of Stardust, Film Magazine. An interview she had
with the appellant in June 1989, came to be published at
page 82 of that magazine. During the course of the
interview, the appellant was alleged to have made statements
outraging the religious feeling of the Marwari community and
also defamed the members of Marwari community as a class. In
the complaint filed at Pune, what he has stated is as under:
“The Complainant submits that in
June 89 the Accused No.1 has with
deliberate and malicious intention
of outraging the religious feelings
of Marwari Community made the said
statement. By the statement of the
Accused No,1, the structure of
National Integrity is being
paralysed. The feelings of Marwari
Community also being hurt by the
Statement made by the Accused No.1.
The Statement of Accused No.1 goes
to show that Marwari Community is
not a Class belonging to India and
they have not faith and love
towards India, their mother land.
It is implied from the said
statement that Marwaris are
traitors and enemies of India. So
also accused No.2 has also printed
and published the said statement in
‘Star Dust’ Magazine of 1989 with
of Marwari Community.”
The rest of the paragraphs are only the consequential
narration of the allegations in paragraph 3. According to
the respondents, these allegations constitute offence
punishable under Section 295-A and Section 500 read with
Section 34 of the India Penal Code [IPC, for short]. The
Magistrate had taken cognizance and issued notice to the
appellant for appearance. When it was challenged in the writ
petition, the learned single Judge of the High Court had
held that on a reading of the complaint as a whole, no
offence under Section 295A could be made out; however, the
allegations constitute prima facie offence triable by the
Magistrate under Section 500, IPC. Thus, these appeals by
Section 295A of the IPC envisages the essential
ingredients of the punishment and provides that whoever,
with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by
words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult
the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both. The quoted para does not contain essential facts
constituting the offence.
Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908
[Cr.P.C., for short] in Chapter XV provides as under:
“A Magistrate taking cognizance of
an offence on complaint shall
examine upon path the complainant
and the witnesses present, if any,
and the substance of such
examination shall be reduced to
writing and shall be signed by the
complainant and the witnesses, and
also by the Magistrate provided
that when the complaint is made in
writing, the Magistrate need not
examine the complainant and the
The High Court may take cognizance of any offence under
Section 190(1) (a) upon receiving a complaint containing
facts which constitute such offence. It is a matter of
discretion. Criminal proceedings are initiated by a
Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Taking
cognizance of the offence would include the intention of the
Magistrate of initiating judicial proceedings against the
offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see
whether there is any basis for initiating judicial
proceedings or for other purpose.
It would thus be seen that when a private complaint is
made to the Magistrate, before the Magistrate takes
cognizance of the offence on the complaint so as to take the
other steps, the complaint shall contain all the necessary
facts constituting the offence for which the complaint was
laid, so that the Magistrate can proceed further in taking
further steps after cognizance of the offence is taken by
issuing the process etc. It is seen from reading of para 3
of the complaint, which is the foundation to taking
cognizance of the offence, that the complainant-respondent
has concentrated mainly on the offence punishable under
Section 295A of IPC; the High Court had quashed the said
complaint and no appeal has been filed in this Court.
The next question is: whether the learned Judge was
right in holding that the complaint discloses offence
punishable under Section 500 IPC? Section 499 defines
‘defamation’ thus:
“Whoever by words either spoken or
intended to be read, or by signs or
by visible representations, makes
or publishes any imputation
concerning any persons intending to
harm, or knowing or having reason
to believe that such imputation
will harm, the reputation of such
person, is said, except in the
cases hereinafter excepted, to
defame that person”.
Explanation 2 to the said section envisages that it may
amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a
company or an association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 4 provides that no imputation is said to
harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly
or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral
or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the
character of that person in respect of his caste or of his
calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it
to be believed that the body of that person is in a
loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as
A reading of the complaint does not contain any of the
allegations constituting the offence of defamation
punishable under Section 500, IPC. The contents of the
magazine are alleged to be defamatory against the Marwari
community, lowering them in the estimate of the public or
their reputation is lowered in the society. But we do not
find any allegation made in the complaint. Accordingly, we
hold that the complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate, First Class in Court No.4 at Pune does not
contain any of the allegations so as to constitute the
offence of defamation defined in Section 499 and punishable
under Section 500. Consequently, the Magistrate was not
justified in issuing the process against the appellant. The
complaint is accordingly quashed.
As regards the allegations made against the appellant
in the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate,
Ist Class, at Nasik, on a reading of the complaint we do not
think that we will be justified at this state to quash that
complaint. It is not the province of this Court to
appreciate at this stage the evidence or scope of and
meaning of the statement. Certain allegations came to be
made but whether these allegations do constitute defamation
of the Marwari community as a business class and whether the
appellant had intention to cite as an instance of general
feeling among the community and whether the context in which
the said statement came to be made, as is sought to be
argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, are
all matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate at a
later stage. At this stage, we cannot embark upon weighing
the evidence and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or
not the allegations made in the complaint constitute an
offence punishable under Section 500. It is the settled
legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a
whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute
an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The
Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the
allegations might come within the definition of ‘defamation’
under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But
these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case
set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken
or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever
stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this state
it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed
in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To
that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash
the complaint under Section 500, IPC.
ADVOCATE	View all posts by advocatemmmohan »	« Penal Code, 1860: ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A r/w 120-B-Forgery and misappropriation of bank loans-Bank Manager and Field Officer in conspiracy with each other sanctioned and disbursed loans in names of fictitious persons-Trial Court holding both guilty and sentencing them-Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Prosecution has brought ample material on record which led to only one conclusion that accused committed the offences-Exoneration of one of the accused in departmental inquiry initiated only against him having concluded before police investigation stated in the case, would be of no avail as Inquiry Officer did not have benefit of the evidence that was made available in the criminal proceedings-Besides, the inquiry report was not brought on record and factum of exoneration in departmental proceedings was taken as a defence, it was for the accused to bring on record the relevant material, which was not done-High Court also erred in purporting to hold that specimen finger print and handwritings could not have been taken from accused-ss. 5 and 6 of Identification of Prisoners Act, clearly provides for such a contingency-High Court completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal-Judgment of High Court set aside-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1944-ss. 5(1) and 5(2)-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Appeal against acquittal-Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920-ss. 5 and 6. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: s. 5(1) r/w s.5(2), proviso-Bank Manager and Field Officer forging loans in names of fictitious persons-Both held guilty by trial court-Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Bank Manager completing all formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan including obtaining appraisal report from Field Officer, sanction and disbursement of loan on date of filing of loan application itself-Entire prosecution relating to forgery and misappropriation having been attributed to the Manager, and he having used the appraisal reports prepared by Field Officer, a case is made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-s.(2) of s.5 in the case of Field Officer-Therefore, while upholding conviction and sentence awarded by trial court as against the Manager, sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on Field Officer-Penal Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, 467 and 477-A r/w 120-B IPC. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Appeal against acquittal-Jurisdiction of appellate Court-HELD: an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal against acquittal, would be entitled to consider the evidence brought on record and arrive at its own conclusion-Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken but when only one view is possible to be taken, appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with judgment of acquittal-In the instant case no two views are possible to be taken-Accused were rightly held guilty of the offences charged-High Court misdirected itself in passing judgment of acquittal-Judgment of High Court set aside-Penal Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A r/w s.120-B-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-ss. 5(1), (2). Respondent A-1 and respondent A-2, who were Manager and Field Officer respectively of the appellant Bank, were prosecuted under ss. 409, 420, 467 and 477-A read with s.120-B IPC and s.5 read with s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegations against them were that during the period 7.12.1984 to 14.8.1986, they conspired with each other in matter of sanctioning and disbursing 6 Crop Loans of Rs.5000/- each in the names of fictitious persons by forging signatures and thumb impressions of proposed borrowers in documents resulting in misappropriation of the proceeds of Rs.30,000/-. The trial court held both the accused guilty of the offences charged and sentenced both of them to rigorous imprisonment for six moths. It rejected the plea of respondent A-2 that in view of the departmental proceedings against him resulting in his exoneration he was entitled to be acquitted. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the accused observing, inter alia, that the procedure adopted for obtaining finger prints being contrary to fundamental rights of the accused, the same was not admissible in evidence; that neither the Bank received any complaint from loanees nor did the prosecution bring any corroborative material on record. In the instant appeals filed by the Bank, it was contended for respondent A-2 that he merely prepared the appraisal report and he was not involved in any forgery; that he joined the service only in 1984 and was transferred on or about 14.8.1986, and subsequent renewals of loans having been prepared in 1987, he was entitled to acquittal. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan, appraisal report recommendation prepared by respondent A-2 and sanction and disbursement of loan by respondent A-1 were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of loan was filed. It has furthermore been brought on record that PW-21 and PW-22 on whose behalf loan was applied, were known to respondent A-1. They stated that they were residents of a district different than that shown in their applications. This clearly establishes that the transactions were manipulated by respondent A-1. PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of a day and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch hour, whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement of loan could take place only upon proper verification thereof. The modus operandi of respondent A-1 appeared to be that he had affixed his own thumb impression instead of those of the loanees. Upon sanction of the said loan, the accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused A-1. The said loans were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. [Para s 12, 14, 24 and 25] [581-C; 582-B-C-D; 584-B-C] 1.2. The finger print expert (PW-17), in his evidence, proved that specimen fingerprints tallied with the disputed fingerprints. PW-17 is a qualified and experienced fingerprint expert. There is no reason to discredit his testimony. Apart from the fingerprints, the prosecution also obtained the specimen handwritings of respondent A-1. Handwritings on the said loan documents/applications for grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1. The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have been taken from respondent A-1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly provides for such a contingency. [Paras 15, 17, 18, 34 and 35] [582-E, G; 583-A-B; 586-F-G] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR (1961) SC 1808, relied on. 1.3. It may be true that there was no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually been paid in cash to the respondent A-1. But then no documentary evidence would be available as it was for the respondent A-1, as Manager of the Bank, to hand over the amount in cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3. Besides, PW-5 also stated that debit vouchers (Ext. P-6) contained only one stamp showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature, although it purported to have been shown to be his. Ext. P-6 was, therefore, a forged document. [Paras 20 and 21] [583-E-F, D] 1.4. PWs 3 and 5 who had been working in the same branch of the bank with the respondents have proved the procedure adopted in the matter of grant of loan. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were responsible therefor. [Para 22] [583-G] 1.5. It may be that no act of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-2, but he was the one who had prepared the appraisal report. After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan amounts were sanctioned and the amount of loan purported to have been paid to the loanees and, therefore, he was also guilty of commission of the said offences. [Para 23] [583-H; 584-A] 2. The High Court purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent A-2 in departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry was initiated only against respondent A-2 and was completed even before the police investigation in the case started. The enquiry officer did not have the occasion to consider all the materials brought on record by the prosecution which clearly established the involvement of the respondents. Exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he was charged. Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record. Besides, the factum of exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to bring on record all the relevant documents, including the findings of the Enquiry Officer. [Paras 27, 28, 29 and 33] [574-E-F; 584-G-H; 585-A; 586-D-E] P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1, distinguished. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] 3 SCR 259=[1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 and Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 225, referred to. 3. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The trial judge had assigned cogent reasons in support of its findings. The High Court did not meet the said reasoning. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 26 and 37] [584-D; 859-B] 4. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that presumption of innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by a court, such presumption becomes stronger. It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and the defence and arrive at its own decision. Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. In this case, the Court is firmly of the view that no two views are possible to be taken. [Paras 37 and 38] [589-B, D, E] State of Haryana v. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002] 9 SCC 356; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P., [2004] 10 SCC 699 and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., [2006] 9 SCC 731, referred to. 5. The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-1 alone. Thus, a case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the case of respondent A-2. Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was committed by respondent A-1 even thereafter. The appraisal reports prepared by respondent A-2 were used by respondent A-1 also for the subsequent period, namely, 1987 when respondent A-2 was no longer working in the said branch. Therefore, while upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial judge as against respondent A-1, in view of the special reasons recorded in the judgment, a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on respondent A-2. He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence of three months. [Paras 40, 41 and 42] [589-G; 590-A-C] A. Sharan , ASG., Amit Anand Tiwari and P. Parmeswaran for the Appellants. L.N. Rao, R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar and D. Mahesh Babu for the Respondents. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan, appraisal report recommendation prepared by respondent A-2 and sanction and disbursement of loan by respondent A-1 were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of loan was filed. It has furthermore been brought on record that PW-21 and PW-22 on whose behalf loan was applied, were known to respondent A-1. They stated that they were residents of a district different than that shown in their applications. This clearly establishes that the transactions were manipulated by respondent A-1. PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of a day and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch hour, whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement of loan could take place only upon proper verification thereof. The modus operandi of respondent A-1 appeared to be that he had affixed his own thumb impression instead of those of the loanees. Upon sanction of the said loan, the accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused A-1. The said loans were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. [Para s 12, 14, 24 and 25] [581-C; 582-B-C-D; 584-B-C] 1.2. The finger print expert (PW-17), in his evidence, proved that specimen fingerprints tallied with the disputed fingerprints. PW-17 is a qualified and experienced fingerprint expert. There is no reason to discredit his testimony. Apart from the fingerprints, the prosecution also obtained the specimen handwritings of respondent A-1. Handwritings on the said loan documents/applications for grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1. The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have been taken from respondent A-1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly provides for such a contingency. [Paras 15, 17, 18, 34 and 35] [582-E, G; 583-A-B; 586-F-G] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR (1961) SC 1808, relied on. 1.3. It may be true that there was no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually been paid in cash to the respondent A-1. But then no documentary evidence would be available as it was for the respondent A-1, as Manager of the Bank, to hand over the amount in cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3. Besides, PW-5 also stated that debit vouchers (Ext. P-6) contained only one stamp showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature, although it purported to have been shown to be his. Ext. P-6 was, therefore, a forged document. [Paras 20 and 21] [583-E-F, D] 1.4. PWs 3 and 5 who had been working in the same branch of the bank with the respondents have proved the procedure adopted in the matter of grant of loan. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were responsible therefor. [Para 22] [583-G] 1.5. It may be that no act of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-2, but he was the one who had prepared the appraisal report. After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan amounts were sanctioned and the amount of loan purported to have been paid to the loanees and, therefore, he was also guilty of commission of the said offences. [Para 23] [583-H; 584-A] 2. The High Court purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent A-2 in departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry was initiated only against respondent A-2 and was completed even before the police investigation in the case started. The enquiry officer did not have the occasion to consider all the materials brought on record by the prosecution which clearly established the involvement of the respondents. Exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he was charged. Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record. Besides, the factum of exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to bring on record all the relevant documents, including the findings of the Enquiry Officer. [Paras 27, 28, 29 and 33] [574-E-F; 584-G-H; 585-A; 586-D-E] P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1, distinguished. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] 3 SCR 259=[1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 and Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 225, referred to. 3. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The trial judge had assigned cogent reasons in support of its findings. The High Court did not meet the said reasoning. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 26 and 37] [584-D; 859-B] 4. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that presumption of innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by a court, such presumption becomes stronger. It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and the defence and arrive at its own decision. Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. In this case, the Court is firmly of the view that no two views are possible to be taken. [Paras 37 and 38] [589-B, D, E] State of Haryana v. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002] 9 SCC 356; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P., [2004] 10 SCC 699 and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., [2006] 9 SCC 731, referred to. 5. The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-1 alone. Thus, a case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the case of respondent A-2. Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was committed by respondent A-1 even thereafter. The appraisal reports prepared by respondent A-2 were used by respondent A-1 also for the subsequent period, namely, 1987 when respondent A-2 was no longer working in the said branch. Therefore, while upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial judge as against respondent A-1, in view of the special reasons recorded in the judgment, a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on respondent A-2. He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence of three months. [Paras 40, 41 and 42] [589-G; 590-A-C] A. Sharan , ASG., Amit Anand Tiwari and P. Parmeswaran for the Appellants. L.N. Rao, R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar and D. Mahesh Babu for the Respondents. =2008 AIR 368 , 2007(11 )SCR570 , , 2007(12 )SCALE618 , 2007(12 )JT413
Practice and Procedur-Inherent jurisdiction of High Court- Power to stop publication of proceedings of a trial-Order if violates fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a)-If amenable to proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution. =In a suit for. defamation against the editor of a weekly newspaper, field on the original side of the High Court, one of the	witnesses prayed that the Court may	order	that publicity should not be given to his evidence in the press as his business would be affected. After hearing arguments, the trial Judge passed an oral order prohibiting	the publication of the evidence of the witness. A reporter of the weekly along with other journalists moved	this Court under Art. 32 challenging the validity of the order. . It was	contended that : (i) the High Court did not	have inherent power to pass the order; (ii) the impugned order violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 19(1) (a); and (iii) the order was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32. HELD:(i) (Per Gajendragadkar C. J., Wanchoo, Mudholkar, Sikri, Bachawat and kainaswami, JJ.) : As the impugned order must be held to prevent the publication of the evidence of the witness during the course of the trial and	not thereafter. and the	order	was passed to	help	the administration of justice for the purpose of obtaining	true evidence in the case, the order was within the inherent power of the High Court. [754 A-B; 759 C] The High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera	if the	ends of justice clearly and	necessarily require	the adoption of such a course.	Section 14 of	the Official Secrets Act, 1923 in terms recognises the existence of such inherent powers in its opening clause, and s.	151, Code of Civil Procedure, saves the inherent power of	the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary for	the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of	the Court.	Such a power includes the power to hold a part of the trial in camera or to prohibit exessive publication of a part of the proceedings at such trial. (755 F; 759 C, G; 760 C] Scott v. Scott, [1913] 1 A.C. 417	and Moosbrugger v. Moosbrugger, (1912-13) 29 T.L.R. 658, referred to. Per Sarkar J. : The High Court has inherent power to prevent publication of	the proceedings of a trial. The power to prevent	publication of proceedings is a facet of the power to hold, a trial in camera and cm from it. [776 C] Scott v. Scoot [1913] A.C. 417, explained. Per Shah J. : The Code of Civil Procedure	contains no express provision authorising the to hold its proceedings in camera, but if 745 excessive publicity itself operates as an instrument of injustice, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass an order excluding the public when the nature of the	case necessitates such a course to be adopted An order made by a court	in the	course	of a	proceeding which it	has jurisdiction to entertain-whether the order relates to	the substance of the dispute between the parties	or to	the procedure, or to the rights of other persons, is not without jurisdiction, merely because it is erroneous. [804 B, C. F] Per Hidayatullah J. (dissenting): A Court which was holding a public trial from which the public	was not excluded, cannot	suppress the publication of the deposition of a witness, heard	not in camera but in open Court, on	the request	of the witness that his business will suffer.	[783 H, 789 D] Section 151 C.P.C. cannot be used to confer a discretion on the to turn its proceedings which should be open and public into a private affair.	A trial in camera can only be	used when a	strong	case exists for holding it in	camera	and inherent powers can only be reconised on wellrecognised principles. Where the legislature felt the special need it provided for it. It is not right to assume from s. 14 of the Official Secrets	Act, 1923, that courts possess a general or inherent power of dispensing with open and public trials. [787 E, F, G, H; 789 C] English cases referred to. (ii)(Per Gajendragadkar C.J., Wanchoo, Mudholkar, Sikri and Ramaswami, JJ.) : Just as an order passed by the Court on the merits of	the dispute before it	cannot	be said to contravene the fundamental rights of the litigants before the Court, so the impugned order, which is also a judicial order,	cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of the petitioners. It	was directly connected with	the proceedings before the Court inasmuch as the	Court found that justice could not be done between the parties and	that the matter before it could not be satisfactorily decided unless	publication of the evidence was	prohibited pending the trial. if incidentally, the petitioners were not able to report	what they. heard in Court, that cannot be said to make the impugned order invalid under Art. 19(1) (a).	[761 D-F; 762 F-G] A. K Gopalan v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, 101,	Ram Singh v. State, [1951] 1 S.C.R. 451 and The Parbhani Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. v. The RTA	Aurangabad, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 177, followed. Budhan	Chowdhry v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, explained. Per Sarkar J. : The impugned order does not	violate	the fundamental right of the petitioners to freedom of speech and expression conferred by Art. 19(1) (a-. [777 D] If a judicial	tribunal makes an order which it	has jurisdiction to maim by applying a law which is valid in all respects, the order cannot offend a fundamental right.	An order is within the jurisdiction of the tribunal which	made it, if the tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matters that were litigated before it and if the law which	it, applied	in making the order was a valid law.	A tribunal having	this jurisdiction does not act without	jurisdiction if it	makes an error in the application of the law.	The impugned order is a judicial order within the	jurisdiction of the	Judge	making	it even	though	it restrained	the petitioners who were not. parties to the proceedings.	[774 F-G; 775 B, F-G; 776 B; 779 B, C] Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, followed. Sup Cl/66-2 746 Further, the order is based on a good and valid law.	The power to prohibit publication of proceedings is	essentially the same as the power to hold a trial in camera and the	law empowering a trial in camera is a valid law and does	not violate the fundamental right in regard to liberty of speech because, the person restrained is legally prevented	from entering the Court and hearing the proceedings, and	the liberty	of speech is affected only indirectly. Moreover, the law empowering :a Court to prohibit publication of	its proceedings is	protected by Art. 19(2), because, the	law relates	to contempt of Court and the restriction	is reasonable as it is based on the principle that	publication would interfere with	the course of justice and its	due administration. [777 E-G; 778 C-E, G] The Parbhani Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. v.	RTA Aurangabad, [1960] 3 S.C.R. and A. K.	Gopalan v. State, [1950] 1 S.C.R. 88, followed. Budhan	Chowdhry v. The State, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, explained. Per Shah J. : Jurisdiction to exercise these powers which may affect rights of persons other than those who	are parties to the litigation is either expressly granted to the Court by the	statute	or arises from the necessity to regulate the course of proceedings so as to make them an effective instrument- for the administration of justice. An order made against a stranger in aid of administration of justice between contending parties or for enforcement of its adjudication does not directly infringe any	fundamental right under Art. 19 of the person affected thereby, for it is founded either expressly or by necessary implication upon the nonexistence of the right claimed.	Such a determination of the disputed question would be as much exempt from	the jurisdiction of his	Court	to grant relief against infringement of a fundamental right under Art. 19, as a determination of the disputed question between the parties on merits or on procedure. [803 C-D,; F-H] Per Bachawat J. : The law empowering the High Court to restrain the publication of the report of its	proceedings does not infringe Art. 19(1) (a), because it	affects	the freedom of speech only incidentally and indirectly. [808 G, H] A.K. Gopalan v. Stare of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88 and Ram Singh v. State, [1951] S.C.R. 451, followed. Per Hidayatullah J.(dissenting ) : The order commits a breach	of the fundamental right of freedom of	speech	and expression. [789 E; 792 A) The Chapter on Fundamental Rights indicates	that Judges acting	in their judicial capacity were not intended to be outside	the reach of fundamental rights. The word “State” in Arts. 12 and 13 includes “Courts”	because. otherwise courts	will be enabled to make rules which take away or abridge fundamental rights. and a judicial decision based on such a rule would also offend fundamental rights. A Judge ordinarily decides controversies between the	parties, in which controversies he does not figure, but occasion	may arise collaterally where the matter may be between the Judge and the fundamental rights of any Person by reason of	the Judge’s action. [789 G-H; 790 A-B; 791 C] Prem Chand Garg V. The Excise Commissioner, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 885, referred to. (iii)(Per Gajendmgadkar C.T., Wanchoo, Mudholkar, Sikri and Ramaswami,JJ.) : The High Court is a superior court	of Record and it is for itto consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or 747 not. The order is a judicial order and if it is erroneous a person	aggrieved by it, though a stranger, could move	this Court under Art. 136 and the order can be corrected in appeal;	but the question about the existence of the	said jurisdiction as well as the validity or propriety of	the order cannot be raised in writ proceedings under Art.	32. [770 H; 772 EJ Ujjam Bai v. State, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778, referred to. Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 885, explained. Per Sarkar J.	: This Court has no	power	to issue a certiorari to the High Court. [782 H] When the High	Court has the power to issue the writ of certiorari, it is not, according to the	fundamental principles of	certiorari an inferior court or a court of limited jurisdiction. The Constitution does not contemplate the High Courts to be inferior courts so	that their decisions would be liable to be quashed by	a writ of certiorari issued by the Supreme Court. [782 F-H] Per Shah, J : In the matter of issue of a writ of certiorari against	the order of any Court, in the context of	the infringement of Fundament rights, even orders made by subordinate , such as the District Court or of	subordinate Judge,	are as much exempt from challenge in enforcement of an alleged fundamental right under Art. 19 by	a petition under Art. 32	as orders of the High	Court	which is a superior Court of Record. It is not necessary to decide for the purpose of these petitions whether an order made by a High Court may infringe any of the rights guaranteed by Arts. 20, 21	& 22(1) and may on that account form	the subject-matter of a petition under Art. 32. Art. 19, on the one hand and Arts. 20, 21 & 22(1) are	differently worded. Art. 19 protects personal freedoms of citizens against state action except where the ‘action falls within the exceptions. Arts. 20, 21 & 22 impose direct restrictions upon the power of authorities. [805 E-F; 806 C; 807 A, B; 808 A-B] Per Bachawat J. : The High Court has jurisdiction to decide if it	could restrain the publication of any	document or information relating to the trial of a pending suit or concerning which the suit is brought.	If it	erroneously assumes a jurisdiction not vested in it, its decision may be set aside in appropriate proceedings, but the	decision is not open to attack under Art. 32 on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a). If a stranger is	prejudiced by	an order forbidding	the publication of	the report of any proceeding,	his proper course	is only to apply to the Court to lift the ban.	[808 F; 810 A-B] Per Hidayatullah J. (dissenting) :	Even assuming	the impugned order means a temporary suppression of the evidence of the witness the trial Judge had no jurisdiction to	pass the order. As he passed no recorded order the	appropriate remedy	(in fact the only effective remedy) is to seek to quash The order by a writ under Art. 32. [792 E-F; 801 E] There may be	action	by a Judge which may	offend	the fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 15, 19, 20, 21 and 22 and an appeal to this Court will not only be not practicable but will also be an ineffective remedy and this Court can issue a writ to the High Court to quash its order, under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Since them is no exception in Art. 32 in of the High Courts there is a presumption that the	High Court are not excluded.	Even with the enactment of Art. 226 the power which is conferred on the High Courts is not in every sense a coordinate and the implication	of reading Arts. 32, 136 and 226 together is 748 that there is	no sharing of	the powers to issue	the prerogative writs processed by this Court. Under the total scheme	of the Constitution the subordination of the	High Courts	to the Supreme Court is not only evident but	is, logical. [794F; 797 G-H; 799 D-E] =1967 AIR 1, 1966( 3 )SCR 744, , , »
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