Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/547/05-5992/index.php
Timestamp: 2019-09-22 22:54:21
Document Index: 45391860

Matched Legal Cases: ['§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161', '§3161']

Zedner v. United States - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
US Supreme Court Decisions - On-Line> Volume 547 > Zedner v. United States
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within 70 days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance. 18 U. S. C. §3161(c)(1). Recognizing that criminal cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular cases, the Act includes a long and detailed list of periods of delay that are excluded in computing the time within which trial must start. Section 3161(h)(8) permits a district court to grant a continuance and exclude the resulting delay if it makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial. To promote compliance without needlessly subverting important criminal prosecutions, the Act provides that, if the trial does not begin on time and the defendant moves, before the trial’s start or entry of a guilty plea, to dismiss, the district court must dismiss the charges, though it may choose whether to do so with or without prejudice..
1. Because a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the Act, petitioner’s waiver “for all time” was ineffective. Pp. 9–12..
(a) The Act comprehensively regulates the time within which a trial must begin. Section 3161(h), which details numerous categories of delay that are not counted in applying the Act’s deadlines, conspicuously has no provision excluding periods of delay during which a defendant waives the Act’s application. It is apparent from the Act’s terms that this was a considered omission. Instead of allowing defendants to opt out, the Act demands that continuances fit within one of §3161(h)’s specific exclusions. In deciding whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance, a court must consider a defendant’s need for “reasonable time to obtain counsel,” “continuity of counsel,” and “effective preparation” of counsel. §3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). If a defendant could simply waive the Act’s application in order to secure more time, no defendant would ever need to put such considerations before the court under the rubric of an ends-of-justice exclusion. The Act’s purposes also cut against exclusion on the grounds of mere consent or waiver. Were the Act solely designed to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, such an application might make sense, but the Act was also designed with the public interest firmly in mind. This interpretation is entirely in accord with the Act’s legislative history. Pp. 9–11..
3. When a district court makes no findings on the record to support a §3161(h)(8) continuance, harmless-error review is not appropriate. The Government argues that an express finding need not be entered contemporaneously and could be supplied on remand. But the Act requires express findings, see §3161(h)(8)(A), and at the very least implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time the district court rules on the see §3161(h)(8)(A), and at the very least implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time the district court rules on the see §3161(h)(8)(A), and at the very least implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time the district court rules on the motion to dismiss. Because the District Court made no such express findings, the 1997 continuance is not excluded from the speedy trial clock. This error is not subject to harmless-error review. Harmless-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) presumptively applies to “all errors where a proper objection is made,” Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 7, but strong support for an implied repeal of Rule 52(a) in this context is provided by the Act’s unequivocal provisions, which specify that a trial “shall commence” within 70 days, §3161(c)(1) (emphasis added), and that “[n]o … period of delay” from an ends-of-justice continuance “shall be excludable” from the time period unless the court sets forth its reasoning, §3161(h)(8)(A) (emphasis added). Applying harmless-error review would also tend to undermine the detailed requirements of the provisions regulating ends-of-justice continuances. Pp. 15–18.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined as to all but Part III–A–2. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.