Source: http://openjurist.org/257/f3d/1013
Timestamp: 2015-08-30 22:48:09
Document Index: 397191391

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5', '§ 1291', '§ 1341', '§ 501', '§ 1957', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291']

257 F3d 1013 United States of America v. Norman Anthony King | OpenJurist
257 F. 3d 1013 - United States of America v. Norman Anthony King Home
257 F3d 1013 United States of America v. Norman Anthony King 257 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.NORMAN ANTHONY KING, AKA NORM KING, AKA NORMAN AUGUST KLAUSE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
No. 99-10478
Argued and Submitted September 13, 2000Filed April 13, 2001As amended July 20, 2001.Second Amendment August 3, 2001.
Suzanne A. Luban, Berkeley, California, for the defendant-appellant.
Robert T. Swanson, Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Section, San Francisco, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-95-00197-VRW.
The opinion filed April 13, 2001 is amended as follows:
At slip op. 4634, delete the paragraph beginning"Application of the 1995 Guidelines . . . ." Insert the following paragraph in its place:
The 1994 Guideline version of § 5G1.3(c) is more favorable to King than the 1995 Guideline version. United States v. Chea, 231 F.3d 531, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court must apply the 1994 Guidelines on remand in determining whether and to what extent to run the new sentence concurrently to King's prior undischarged term of imprisonment. In doing so, it must either apply the methodology described in the Guideline commentary or provide a good reason for not doing so. Id. at 536; United States v. Redman, 35 F.3d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1994). If the court chooses the latter course, it must explain its decision on the record in a way that indicates it has considered the commentary methodology. Id.
At slip op. 4631, delete the sentence reading "These claims are of dubious weight, especially given King's prior perjury conviction."
With these alterations, Appellant's Petition for Panel Rehearing, filed April 26, 2001, is DENIED.
Defendant-Appellant Norman King appeals his conviction and sentence on 19 counts of a 50-count indictment. The indictment charged him with engaging in three mail fraud schemes, using counterfeit postage meter stamps and money laundering. Though he pled guilty to the 19 counts, he now challenges the validity of the plea, as well as the district court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") and the amount of restitution imposed. The government, in addition to disputing King's contentions, argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that jurisdiction is proper. We affirm the conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
On May 10, 1995, a grand jury in the Northern District of California returned an indictment charging King with 40 counts of mail fraud (in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1341), one count of using a counterfeit postage meter stamp (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 501) and nine counts of money laundering (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957). The indictment alleged that King had engaged in three fraudulent schemes.
Under the first such scheme (summarized in counts 1 through 5 of the indictment), he allegedly mailed postcards to recipients located throughout the United States informing them that they had been selected as winners in the"$25,000 Win-A-Fortune Contest," and were required to return the postcard along with $10 for processing fees within seven days to claim their prize. Recipients who wished to check on the status of their prizes were instructed to call one of three numbers on the postcard, two of which were "900" numbers imposing a $9.95 per minute charge on the caller. The recording available through these numbers restated the information on the postcard.
Under the second allegedly fraudulent promotion, King sent out mailers with information about missing children on the front and an offer for a free camera and 100 rolls of film on the back. Recipients were instructed to send $10 in shipping, handling and insurance costs in order to take advantage of the offer. Counts 6 through 22 concern this promotion.
The third scheme in the indictment -- and the one to which King initially pled guilty -- involved mailing postcards marked "FINAL NOTICE" informing recipients that they had been selected as winners in a $10,000 sweepstakes. To collect, recipients were instructed to send a $10 "processing fee," as well as an additional $5 for "Rush Handling, " within 14 days. The parties dispute how many such postcards were sent out. The government estimates that King mailed 1.7 million postcards, while King claims that the number is much lower. He admitted sending more than 10,000 such postcards, but could not recall whether the number exceeded 50,000. Counts 24 through 41 are related to the "Final Notice " scheme.1
Count 42 of the indictment, to which King also pled guilty initially, alleged that he had used a counterfeit postage meter stamp to avoid paying the postage on approximately 1.7 million postcards in connection with the "Final Notice" scheme. The government alleged that King owed at least $302,940 in postage costs.
The final nine counts, alleging violations of the federal money-laundering statute, are not at issue in this appeal.
B. King's Plea
At a July 20, 1999 status hearing, King informed the court that he wished to plead guilty to counts 24 through 42 of the indictment. In response to questioning from the court, King stated he had discussed with his attorney the nature of the charges against him, the necessary elements of proof and possible defenses. He also said he was satisfied with the representation he had received. When asked specifically about the "Final Notice" scheme charges to which he was pleading guilty, King stated that he had intended to pay out shares of a $10,000 fund to all recipients who responded to his mailing, but failed to send payments to 18 of them. The government contended King's statement failed to make out a factual basis for mail fraud because he had not admitted making false statements in the postcards. King responded, "I'm not pleading guilty to any false statements because as far as I'm concerned there were no false statements. I'm pleading guilty to mail fraud for non-fulfillment of prizes." Despite the government's concerns, the court accepted King's plea after determining that it was made intelligently and voluntarily. Still fearing the factual basis for the plea might be lacking, the government filed a "Further Submission by Government in Support of Factual Basis for Guilty Pleas," in which it argued that additional evidence in the record supported a finding that the postcards contained false statements and that King intended to defraud the recipients.
At a hearing on August 31, 1999, King's attorney objected to the government's proposed submission and argued that the factual basis from the earlier hearing was adequate to allow for sentencing. The court found the prior record was sufficient to demonstrate King's admission of guilt was knowing, intelligent and uncoerced. It sentenced King to 71 months in prison and ordered him to pay $302,000 in restitution to the United States Postal Service.
At a hearing on September 14, 1999, King moved to withdraw his earlier plea, contending his actions did not meet the legal definition of mail fraud and that he would not have pled guilty if he had known the potential extent of his sentence. The court proposed holding another hearing October 5 to give King an opportunity to consult with his lawyer about the wisdom of withdrawing his plea in the interim. King did not agree to this delay, as it would have entailed waiver of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. At the close of the hearing, the court again proposed conducting another status hearing on October 5. The record does not reflect whether this proposed status conference ever took place.
Judgment was entered December 17, 1999, relating back nunc pro tunc to the sentencing dates, August 31, 1999 and September 14, 1999. King filed a timely notice of appeal.
The government argues this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the judgment in the district court is not "final," given the 31 counts of the indictment yet to be adjudicated. Under § 1291, "the courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. "Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment." Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). The government notes that, while King pled guilty to and was sentenced on counts 24 through 42 of the indictment, the remaining counts are still pending in the district court. Therefore, it contends, we do not have jurisdiction to hear King's appeal, because the district court's judgment was not "final" as to the entirety of the indictment.
This court addressed this general issue in United States v. Powell, 24 F.3d 28 (9th Cir. 1994). There, the defendant had been indicted on four counts, including a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Powell successfully moved to sever the firearm charge, was convicted on the other three and immediately appealed the conviction. In a separate trial, he was convicted of the felon-in-possession charge, and he appealed that conviction as well. On appeal, we addressed whether the district court's jurisdiction over the second conviction was proper, given that the appeal on the first conviction was pending. Concluding that "[s]everance is analogous to charging the defendant in two separate indictments," we held that the final judgment rule had not been violated, despite the possibility that district court jurisdiction over one of the severed cases, concurrent with appeals court jurisdiction over the other, could lead to a waste of resources in the event the cases involved a commonality of issues. Powell, 24 F.3d at 30-31; see also United States v. Abrams , 137 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Powell rationale applies here. King's pleading guilty to a subset of charges in effect severed the indictment into two parts and made him ready for sentencing on the charges related to the Final Notice scheme. The government has acknowledged as much in its brief. See Appellee's Br. at 22 ("Although Powell turned in part on the fact that the count before this Court had been severed from the remaining counts, that difference provides no basis for distinguishing this case. Indeed, if the Court dismissed the current appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the district court could create jurisdiction in this Court simply by formally severing the counts on which appellant had pleaded guilty from the remaining counts."). Because the court imposed sentence on counts 24 through 42, King was entitled to appeal the sentence despite the pending charges. See Powell, 24 F.3d at 31 ("When sentence was imposed on the severed counts, [defendant] was entitled to appeal because there was nothing left to be done but to enforce the sentence."). A contrary holding, under which King would begin serving his sentence before obtaining the right to appeal it, would violate fundamental notions of due process. See Abrams, 137 F.3d at 707. The government responds that the district court could stay execution of the judgment if warranted under the circumstances. As execution of the sentence was not stayed here, however, that theoretical possibility is not relevant to our decision.
Two other circuits have held they lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal on one charge of a multiple-count indictment while other charges were pending. See United States v. Leichter, 160 F.3d 33, 34 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Kaufmann, 951 F.2d 793, 794 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases, however, presented distinguishable facts. In Leichter, the district court decided sua sponte to sever for trial one count of a more than 390-count indictment. The jury convicted on that count after a two-month trial, and the court sentenced the defendants accordingly. The government then dismissed all but 38 of the remaining counts of the indictment. The defendants appealed, and execution of the sentences was stayed pending the appellate court's judgment. Concluding that no severance creating two distinct cases had occurred, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Leichter, 160 F.3d at 36-37. Here, in contrast, indictment charges 24 through 42 were distinct from the remaining counts, and the counts were effectively severed by King's guilty plea. Thus, the two objectives emphasized by the Leichter court -- preserving a trial judge's authority to sever a case in the interests of litigation management and providing notice to litigants when severance occurs, see id. at 36 -- were not implicated. King created a de facto severance of the case by pleading guilty to a subset of the charges, and accordingly had notice of the severance.
Kaufmann, similarly, has no bearing here. The jury in that case acquitted on two counts of a five-count indictment, convicted on one and hung on the remaining two. All counts related to money laundering or attempted money laundering. The appeals cour