Source: http://escnewsletter.org/newsletter/2017-2/bespoke-uk-eu-police-and-judicial-cooperation-post-brexit
Timestamp: 2018-05-21 17:02:54
Document Index: 247527122

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 25', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 25', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 36', 'Art. 35', 'art, 2009', 'Art. 26', 'art. 26', 'art. 45', 'Art. 4', 'Art. 325']

“Bespoke” UK-EU Police and Judicial Cooperation Post-Brexit | Criminology in Europe
Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson
Since the Treaty of Lisbon removed the British veto in European police and judicial cooperation, UK involvement in this policy field has amounted to a block opt-out of all pre-Lisbon measures, a host of simultaneous opt-back-ins, several subsequent opt-ins to post-Lisbon measures and partial involvement in the Schengen acquis.1 This à la carte approach paints an indistinct portrait: a tree with many branches, carefully pruned in the national interest – and now shaken to the roots by the complexities of implementing the vote to leave the EU.
In a flurry of ongoing Brexit-related inquiries,2 domestic criminal justice actors have consistently raised concerns around the UK’s future relationship with EU measures based on mutual recognition, chiefly the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) but also the new European Investigation Order (EIO), with the EU agencies Europol and Eurojust, and with information-sharing mechanisms such as the Schengen Information System (SIS II).3 The size and nature of the UK’s contribution to European police and judicial cooperation undoubtedly places it in a uniquely strong position to negotiate a “bespoke” settlement upon exiting the EU.4 Here, I focus on the UK’s future relationships with Europol and Eurojust, where perceptible changes to criminal justice cooperation on the ground, in court (and, increasingly, online) may also herald more structural changes to the balance between common law systems and civil law traditions across the remaining Member States.
Europol: full membership light?
Presently, the UK has the largest Liaison Bureau within Europol HQ in The Hague where, besides the 17 British liaison officers currently seconded, there are another 49 British officers employed directly by Europol, including its Director and the head of its European Cybercrime Centre. Informationally, operationally and politically, the UK is one of the agency’s biggest players:5 it is a top-three contributor of intelligence;6 of Europol’s 13 top priorities and operational projects, it is leading or co-leading around half.7 The UK’s membership in the EU automatically entitles it to search directly in the Europol Information System (EIS), and to national representation on the agency’s Management Board.
Europol, of course, already has external arrangements: operational (second-tier) and strategic (third-tier) agreements are in place between Europol and 19 non-EU Member States, including EEA States Norway and Iceland, along with the USA. Second-tier operational partners may use the agency’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) but do not have direct access to EIS: all inquiries have to be made on a law enforcement to law enforcement basis – a recipe for request build-up. If authorised, they may have a standing office in The Hague and engage in joint work when invited to the table, but they cannot lead EMPACT priority areas8 and have no seat on the Management Board. High-profile appointments are thus out of the question. Third-tier “strategic” partnership (as exists with Russia), meanwhile, provides no access to personal data and pales in comparison even to tier two.
In October of last year, the Minster of State for Policing, Fire and Criminal Justice confirmed that it would be following events in Denmark closely9 after the Danes voted in December 2015 to reject the conversion of their Justice and Home Affairs opt-out into an opt-in system, similar to that employed by the UK and Ireland,10 meaning their departure from the top tier of Europol was assured. Nonetheless, a last-minute deal was eventually cut in May of this year, two days before the entry into force of the new Europol Regulation (more on this below), granting Denmark continued access to the EIS and participation in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), along with a special “observer” seat on the Management Board, without voting rights.11 A model for the UK? Perhaps – but then again, Denmark is in the border-free Schengen Zone, and it is staying in the EU.
Any UK-EU agreement on Europol will moreover be the first struck under its new Regulation,12 which the UK (a tad ironically) recently opted into in order to ensure full membership until Brexit takes effect. The ironies do not stop there. Under the new framework, bilateral partnerships will no longer be agreed with Europol independently but either on the basis of a data protection “adequacy decision” by the Commission or by agreement with the EU as a whole under article 218 TFEU.13 In the criminal justice field, the data protection adequacy of “the third country, a territory or one or more specified sectors within that third country” is assessed on the basis of Article 36 of the new “Policing Directive”14 (implementation due by 6th May 2018 – in all likelihood, before Brexit materialises).15 This evaluation is potentially very wide-ranging, with the Commission obliged to assess all relevant national rules in place16 and the effective, independent supervision of compliance with such rules.17 As for the second route to an international partnership, the Europol Regulation also expressly provides that any agreement reached under Article 218 TFEU must “adduc[e] adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals”.18 Furthermore, under Article 218(11) TFEU a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is amended or the Treaties are revised.
In the post-Lisbon EU, data protection is of constitutional value.19 This has notably found expression in the strong stance on data protection and privacy taken by the Court in its Digital Rights Ireland, Tele2 Sverige and Schrems judgments. Meanwhile, so far a “legal and political blind eye has been turned to the elephant in the room following the Snowden revelations, namely that GCHQ […] was allegedly engaged in mass personal data interception and retention without putting in place the requisite safeguards for individual rights”.20 A post-Brexit UK would, as a third state, no longer benefit from the presumption of adequacy afforded to EU Member States, whilst in assessing adequacy the Commission is bound to take into account international commitments or obligations and “participation in multilateral or regional systems, in particular in relation to the protection of personal data”.21 Nor does it appear feasible to sidestep the new EU data protection standards by taking a bilateral, country-to-country route.22 As such, a collision course looks set, with the Commission and the Court in prime positions to exert influence on future data protection law in the UK, highlighting “a tension between two of [the Government’s] four overarching objectives in the negotiation – bringing back control of laws to Westminster and maintaining strong security cooperation with the EU”.23
Eurojust: Keeping it civil
Eurojust is the EU agency charged with promoting cooperation and coordination between judicial authorities (prosecutors, judges or police officers depending on the Member State) in EU countries involved in investigations and prosecutions of serious cross-border criminal cases, whether through the facilitation of mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests and execution of EAWs, the bringing together of national authorities in co-ordination meetings to agree an approach to specific cases, or providing legal, technical and financial support to JITs. Two of the four Presidents of the Eurojust College to date, including its first, have been British. This is no coincidence: an emphasis on the cooperation between national (judicial) authorities which is facilitated and developed by Eurojust complements the UK’s long-standing perception of supranational European integration in the criminal justice area as a peril to national sovereignty. The same logic (of driving forward judicial cooperation whilst eschewing changes to domestic laws) underpins the principle of mutual recognition – of which the UK was the main proponent24 – and its flagship measure, the EAW – of which the UK makes extensive use.25
Those in the UK who regularly use Eurojust are unequivocal in their wish to see continuity post-Brexit: the DPP, for example, recently emphasised the immense benefits of multilateral real-time cooperation between judicial authorities, in a neutral space, with full translation support.26 Whilst there is precedent behind continuing to participate in JITs – as may Norway, Switzerland and Iceland – by the same token, the UK’s National Member in the College would likely be replaced by a Liaison Prosecutor akin to those representing Norway, Switzerland and the USA. It has been suggested that it may also be possible to secure access to the Case Management System (CMS),27 which allows for the cross-checking of UK cases or leads against the agency’s database, but the odds are against representation on the (proposed) new Executive Board – in stark contrast to the UK’s track record. EU data protection standards will also be central to how the UK interacts in future with Eurojust. Currently, Eurojust may “establish and maintain cooperative relations” through its own agreements with third states subject to approval by the Council of the data protection provisions therein.28 Again, under the proposed Eurojust Regulation29 agreements providing for the transfer of personal data to third states would require either a Commission adequacy decision or an international agreement under Article 218 TFEU.30
Losing a strategically-important role within Eurojust would be but one instance of a broader absence, or at least waning, of UK influence over the future development of European integration in criminal justice and policing. Ostensibly, the centre of gravity has already shifted: in June of this year, 20 Member States agreed to push forward with the creation of an independent European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO, to be based in Luxembourg) for the investigation and prosecution of fraud and other crimes affecting the EU budget (“PIF crimes”).31 Mitsilegas has noted that the choice now to use the “enhanced cooperation” mechanism to push through a legislative project held up since 2013 echoes, paradoxically, the UK’s long-standing “pick and choose” approach to politically-sensitive matters, raising the prospect of an increasingly “multi-speed Europe”.32
The UK’s consistent opposition as a Member State to the Commission’s EPPO proposal already provoked debate as to whether, to what extent and how in practice non-participating Member States would be obliged (by primary EU law)33 to accept the EPPO’s competence regarding the investigation and prosecution of PIF crimes. In 2014, for instance, the then Home Secretary voiced doubts as to whether the UK authorities would even be required under current national law to respond to evidence and extradition requests from the EPPO, and declined to speculate as to potential accommodation through legislation as the exact form the EPPO would take was not yet known.34 Clarity in that regard is now drawing closer, and given the financial nature of PIF crimes and the market shares of British-based banks, one suspects that even a Brexited UK will have a major role to play in protecting the EU budget in some shape or form. “Full membership light” at both Europol and Eurojust in exchange for “adequate” data protection and “bespoke” cooperation with the EPPO? Only time – and those parts of the negotiations made public – will tell.
Katalin Ligeti is Professor of European and International Criminal Law and Dean-elect of the Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Université du Luxembourg
Gavin Robinson is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Criminal Law & IT Law at Université du Luxembourg and Assistant Editor of the New Journal of European Criminal Law (njecl.eu)
1 See J. Dawson, Brexit: implications for policing and criminal justice cooperation, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper Number 7650, 24 February 2017, at 2.
2 Inter alia, House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation (Report 16 December 2016); House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, EU policing and security issues inquiry (oral evidence concluded 7 March 2017); House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, Criminal Justice Cooperation with the EU after Brexit: the European Arrest Warrant inquiry (inquiry launched 24 March 2017).
3 The Prüm framework, EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) are also high on most lists.
4 White Paper, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, HM Government, Cm 9417 (February 2017) at 11.2.
5 “The UK uses Europol more than almost any other country”; HM Government (9th May 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-cooperation-with-the-eu-on-justice-home-affairs-foreign-policy-and-security-issues-background-note
6 Q181, Rob Wainwright, HC 806.
7 Moreover, in areas which are important to the UK such as cybercrime and migrant smuggling: Q146, Rob Wainwright, ibid.
8 See https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/eu-policy-cycle-empact
9 Q28, Brandon Lewis MP, oral evidence to EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, HL Paper 77.
10http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35002158
11https://euobserver.com/institutional/137730
12 OJ L 135, 24.5.2016, p. 53–114.
13 Art. 25 (1)(a), (b), new Europol Regulation, ibid.
14 OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131.
15 The UK, in any case, opted out of the Directive.
16 Art. 36.2(a): [When assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, the Commission shall, in particular, take account of the following elements]: “the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well as the implementation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security measures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country or international organisation, case-law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are transferred”.
17 Art. 36.2(b).
18 Art. 25.1(b).
19 Article 16 TFEU provides that “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them”, whilst Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, now elevated to the level of primary law (Art. 6(1) TEU), enshrines the right to protection of personal data.
20 See C. Kuner, D. J. B. Svantesson, F. H. Cate, O. Lynskey and C. Millard (2016), ‘The global data protection implications of ‘Brexit’’, International Data Privacy Law 6(3): 167–169 at 167.
21 “Policing Directive”, Art. 36.2(c). Adequacy decisions must be reviewed at least every four years, and provision is made for ongoing monitoring by the Commission of developments in third countries that could affect the functioning of such decisions: Arts. 36(3)–(4).
22 Although the “Policing Directive” will naturally not apply to the UK – which had in any case opted out – to name but one sticking point, remaining Member States will be required to apply a series of stringent steps in order to share data with third states: see Arts. 35–37, Policing Directive. Art. 35(3) is decisive: “All provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure that the level of protection of natural persons ensured by this Directive is not undermined”.
23 HL EU Committee, supra n. 2, para 39.
24 See V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart, 2009), Ch. 3.
25 See HM Government, supra n. 6., at 1.11.
26 Q51, Alison Saunders, oral evidence to EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, HL Paper 77.
27 HL EU Committee, supra n.2, para 83.
28 Eurojust Decision (consolidated, see http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary), Art. 26a(2). Lest such terms fail (or be likely to fail) to be respected, the Joint Supervisory Board can suspend operation of the agreement until this is remedied; art. 26a(8). Eurojust currently has cooperation agreements with Iceland, Liechtenstein, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and the USA.
29 COM/2013/0535 final – 2013/0256 (COD).
30 Draft Eurojust Regulation, ibid, art. 45.1(a)-(c).
31http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/08-eppo/
32 V. Mitsilegas (2017), ‘European Criminal Law after Brexit’, Criminal Law Forum 28(2): 219–250 at 250.
33 In accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, and pursuant to Art. 325 TFEU; see Q7, Katalin Ligeti, oral evidence to HL EU Sub-Committee on Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection, The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): The Impact on Non-Participating Member States (1 December 2014).
34 Q57, Theresa May MP, ibid.