Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/216/1229/570338/
Timestamp: 2019-08-21 11:23:49
Document Index: 14184717

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8116', '§ 8145', '§ 8145', '§ 8116', '§ 8116', '§ 8116']

Ottie R. Noble, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 216 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2000) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 2000 › Ottie R. Noble, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee
Ottie R. Noble, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 216 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2000)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 216 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2000)
Noble then arranged on his own to see Dr. Terry Andrade, a neurosurgeon. On June 15, 1995, Dr. Andrade examined Noble and his medical records. He "strongly recommend [ed]" surgery.
On September 18, 1997, Noble filed a complaint pursuant to the FTCA in which he sought to recover $250,000 for the prolonging of his pain and the loss of his job that he alleged resulted from the OWCP's tortious delay in authorizing his surgery. On December 4, 1997, the United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and (6). On March 19, 1998, the district court found there was a substantial question as to FECA coverage of the alleged injury, ordered the FTCA action held in abeyance, and directed Noble to file a claim with the OWCP seeking additional compensation under FECA for the prolonged pain and job loss that allegedly resulted from the OWCP's delay in authorizing surgery.
Noble contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims and entering judgment for the United States because he had a viable FTCA claim against the United States for the prolonging of his pain and the loss of his job that resulted from the OWCP's delay in authorizing surgery. We review de novo the order dismissing Noble's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the entry of summary judgment for the United States. See Woodruff v. United States Dep't of Labor, Office of Workers Compensation Program, 954 F.2d 634, 636 (11th Cir. 1992).
5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Section 8116(c) was "designed to protect the Government from suits under statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, that had been enacted to waive the Government's sovereign immunity." Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193-94, 103 S. Ct. 1033, 74 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983). "In enacting this provision, Congress adopted the principal compromise-the 'quid pro quo '-commonly found in workers' compensation legislation: employees are guaranteed the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in return they lose the right to sue the Government." Id. at 194, 103 S. Ct. 1033.
The Secretary is authorized to administer and decide all questions arising under FECA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8145, 8149. Under the authority granted in § 8145(2), the Secretary has delegated responsibility for administering FECA to the Director of the OWCP. See Woodruff, 954 F.2d at 637. Once the OWCP determines that a disability or death resulted from a work-related injury as defined by FECA, the claimant is limited to the remedies authorized by FECA, even if a particular type of damage or consequence the claimant suffered is not compensable under FECA. See United States v. Lorenzetti, 467 U.S. 167, 169, 104 S. Ct. 2284, 81 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1984) ("Because the United States' liability for work-related injuries under FECA is exclusive, see § 8116(c), respondent cannot recover from the United States for losses such as pain and suffering that are not compensated under FECA."); see also Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1979) (where a federal employee's injuries occurred in the course of performing his duties, holding that he was not entitled to elect coverage under the FTCA rather than FECA even though proceeding under the FTCA offered the possibility of a more comprehensive remedy).
" [A]n injured employee may not bring an action against the United States under FTCA when there is a 'substantial question as to whether or not the injury occurred in the performance of the employee's duty' " so as to bring it within the coverage of FECA. Avasthi, 608 F.2d at 1060 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 451 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1971)). Where a federal employee brings an action against the United States and there is a substantial question as to whether FECA provides the employee's exclusive remedy for the alleged injury, the district court must do what the district court did in the instant case: hold the action in abeyance pending a coverage determination by the Secretary. See Concordia v. United States Postal Serv., 581 F.2d 439, 442-44 (5th Cir. 1978). A substantial question of coverage exists unless the court determines "as a matter of law that, viewing all of the circumstances, the Secretary could not find FECA coverage of" the alleged injury. Id. at 442.
A long line of cases has held that the exclusive-liability provision of FECA precludes an FTCA action by a federal employee for damages resulting from medical malpractice by a government doctor treating an on-the-job injury. See Sanders v. United States, 387 F.2d 142, 143 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam); see also Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995); McCall v. United States, 901 F.2d 548, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases); Wilder v. United States, 873 F.2d 285, 288 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). The exclusive-liability provision of FECA states that, when it comes to federal employees injured on the job, liability for FECA benefits is the only "liability of the United States ... because of the injury." 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (emphasis added). In Wilder, this court found the following to be a "persuasive" rationale for the rule that liability for medical malpractice of a government doctor in treating an on-the-job injury is liability because of the injury:
873 F.2d at 288 (quoting Balancio v. United States, 267 F.2d 135, 137 (2nd Cir. 1959)) (emphasis added); see also Lance, 70 F.3d at 1095 ("As a matter of textual interpretation, there's a strong argument that liability based on medical malpractice arising out of an injury is liability 'because of the injury.' " (quoting § 8116(c))).