Source: http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/546094/
Timestamp: 2013-05-18 20:38:17
Document Index: 615777582

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art.102', 'Art.102', 'Art.84', 'Art.102', 'Art.102', 'Art. 20']

T.T.V.Dhinakaran vs P.Selvendran on 4 March, 2002
Article 102(1)(d) in The Constitution Of India 1949
R.Muniasamy, S/O.P.Rajadurai vs The District Collector on 23 March, 2007
representation of people act, 1951 article 102
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 04-3-2002 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.CHOCKALINGAM O.A.No.18 of 2002 in
ELECTION PETITION NO.1 of 2000 T.T.V.Dhinakaran .. Petitioner
1. P.Selvendran
2. Selvam P.
3. Mansoor Alikhan 4. P.R.Jegannathan 5. K.Elamurugan 6. Kandasamy K. 7. Kasimayan V. 8. Kalichamy V. 9. Sadayandi A. 10.Saravanapandian 11.Segar S.R. 12.Palanisamy 13.Pandiammal 14.Poovaiah S. 15.Rajagopal C.
16.Returning Officer,
No.25 Periyakulam Parliamentary
Constituency, Periyakulam. .. Respondents This application is filed to reject the Election Petition
1/2000 as it does not furnish any cause of action and is also
totally lacking material facts within the meaning of Sec.83(1)(a)
of the Representation of People's Act.
For Petitioner : Mr.B.Kumar, Sr.Advocate,
for Mr.A.Jenasenan For Respondents: Mr. T.R.Rajagopalan,Sr.Advocate for Mr.P.Wilson
: ORDER An Election Petition is filed by the first respondent
herein in Election Petition No.1 of 2000, challenging the
election of the petitioner herein and seeking a declaration that
the election of the petitioner herein from No.25 Periyakulam
Parliamentary Constituency is null and void and to set aside the
same on the grounds that (i) under S.100(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 the returned candidate was not
qualified to be chosen to fill the seat; (ii) under S.100(1
)(d)(i) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, the result of
the election of the petitioner herein has been materially
affected by the improper acceptance of his nomination; (iii)
under S.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of People Act, 1951,
there is non compliance of provisions of Constitution or any
rules or orders made under the Act; and (iv) the petitioner
herein should have been disqualified under S.8(1)(e) read with
S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1 951, and to
declare that the first respondent herein has been duly elected
from No.25 Periyakulam Parliamentary Constituency. 2. During the pendency of the main election petition,
the first respondent therein and the petitioner herein has filed
the instant application in O.A.No.18 of 2002 seeking rejection of
the main election petition, as it does not furnish any cause of
action and is totally lacking material facts within the meaning
of S.83(1)(a) of the Representation of People's Act.
3. The averments in the affidavit filed in support of
the application can briefly be stated as follows:
It is averred in the main election petition in para 5
that the petitioner herein has acquired allegiance or adherence to foreign State viz. Republic of Singapore. The thrust of the
said allegation is that by a process of acquisition, he has
acquired allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. In support
of this serious allegation, there is no material facts mentioned in the main elect ion petition. What is stated in the main
petition is a copy of the memo of appeal preferred by the
petitioner herein before the Appellate Board constituted under
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. This does not and cannot mean acquisition of allegiance or adherence. The allegations made in
paragraph 9 of the main petition that the petitioner herein had
applied for and granted by the Singapore authorities in January
1995, the status of Permanent Resident of Singapore; that this
was subject to local laws of Singapore State; that the status of
Permanent Resident is subject to the rights and liabilities,
arising out of Singapore laws viz. Immigration Act and Companies
Act; and that by such a permanent resident status in Singapore,
the petitioner herein is clearly under an acknowledgment of
allegiance or adherence to the Foreign State, thus incurring the
disqualification for Membership of either of House of Parliament
are totally lacking material facts. Firstly, it lacks in
material facts viz. What are the rights and liabilities of a
Permanent Resident Status holder in Singapore?. The first
respondent herein seeks to equate the permanent Resident status as &quot;Acquisition&quot; of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State.
The basic material facts required are what are the rights and
liabilities following from or referable to a person having
permanent resident rights in Singapore; and how those rights and
liabilities that attach to a permanent resident of Singapore
could be equated to or is allegiance or adherence to a foreign
State. Without these material facts, it is impossible for the
first respondent herein to meaningfully reply to the allegations
in paragraph 9. Nor is it possible to conclude the basic premise
that getting permanent resident status ipso facto means
allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. Secondly, the
allegations regarding the rights and liabilities arising out of
the said local laws of Singapore lack totally material facts.
What are the laws of Singapore, is not mentioned in the main
petition. So also, how those laws are made applicable to a
Permanent Resident and under what circumstances and conditions are not mentioned. It is also not mentioned how those laws or
the provisions in those laws amount to acknowledgement of
allegiance or adherence to a Foreign State so as to amount to
disqualification within the meaning of Article 102 of the
Constitution of India. It appears to be the requirement of law
that if reliance is placed on any foreign law, it must
specifically be pleaded and quoted as the foreign law itself
amounts to a material fact. This Hon'ble Court cannot take
judicial notice of any foreign law. Therefore, the main election
petition lacks cause of action. The first premise that the
disqualification by means of allegiance or adherence to a foreign
State is by acquisition is an impossible concept, and one that is
unknown to law, and the same cannot possibly exist. No process
by which there could be an acquisition of allegiance or adherence
to a foreign State is either mentioned or pleaded in the main
petition. The second premise is acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence. The word &quot;OR&quot; used denoting the disjunctive itself
renders the main petition vague and is a failure to furnish the
exact fact and material fact. It appears to be that allegiance
is one concept, and the adherence is entirely another. The
ingredients of both are not the same. Hence, it cannot be
averred that by acquisition, the petitioner herein has
acknowledged allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. This vagueness flows from the lack of material fact. It is averred in
paragraph 11 that this petitioner &quot;in being a Director of Dipper
Investments Ltd. Godfrey Resources and Benjan Tree is governed
by UK Company Laws.... Being the Director of the above said Company he is under an acknowledgement of an allegiance or adherence to a foreign State under Art.102(1)(d) of the
Constitution&quot;. The vagueness and lack of particulars are also too clear in the said paragraph. How being a Director of a
Company in UK would, in law, amount to acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State so as to amount to a
disqualification. Firstly, what are the rights and liabilities
of a Director by laws of UK governing such Directorship of the
Company is not averred in the main petition. Secondly, the laws
of UK would constitute a material fact, that requires to be
pleaded. Thirdly, it is not stated how there had been any
instance of adherence to any such law in the first place by the
petitioner. These material facts are required to be pleaded.
Likewise, the allegation in para 13 of the main petition that he
had suffered an imposition of penalty by the proceedings of the
Special Director, Enforcement Directorate as an adjudicating
authority also lacks material facts. The disqualification under
S.8(1)(e) of the Representation of People Act 1951 clearly
mentions that a person must be convicted by court of competent
jurisdiction i.e. a person must have been convicted after lawful
charge and a lawful trial. Adjudication proceedings or the
orders passed thereunder are not convictions in a criminal case.
It has been held by this Hon'ble Court that adjudication
proceedings are merely civil actions and no such thing viz. mens
rea or guilty intention is either required to be pleaded or
proved. The averments in para 14 of the main petition also lack
material facts. The registration of the petitioner as a voter in
the voters list of Mylapore Constituency has become final. There
is no averment of illegality or irregularity attendant upon such
registration. There could not be an adjudication of the aspects
raised in paragraph 14 of the main petition without all necessary
parties being impleaded in the petition. Thus, the main election
petition which lacks material facts and which does not furnish
any cause of action is liable to be rejected.
4. The first respondent herein, who is the petitioner in
the election petition has contested the application with the
following averments in his counter:
The petitioner had failed to notice the vital distinction
between material facts and material particulars. As held in
several decisions of the Supreme Court, material facts and
material particulars certainly come out to two different things.
Material facts are those facts which constitute cause of action.
While the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the
election petition, the absence of material particulars can be
cured at a later stage by way of an appropriate amendment. For
the purpose of considering a preliminary objection, the averments
in the petition should be assumed to be true and the Court has to
find out whether those averments disclose a cause of action or a
triable issue as such. If the Election Petition as such
discloses a cause of action which if unrebutted could void the
election, the provisions of Order VII Rule II C.P.C. cannot be invoked in such a case. The case of the first respondent herein
is that the petitioner, the returned candidate, had suffered
disqualification of membership under Article 102(1)(d) of the
Constitution, as he is under an acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State. This is the material fact pleaded
by the first respondent constituting a cause of action and as
such, a triable issue in the election petition, which pervades
the main petition. If this material fact is not rebutted, then
the election of the petitioner herein shall stand void. Whatever that would become necessary to establish the said material fact
can only constitute material particulars. Most of the material
particulars have already been pleaded in the main petition, and
documents relied upon by the first respondent have also been filed along with it. If some more documents are necessary to
complete the material particulars, it can always be done at any
stage of the proceedings. The copy of the memorandum of appeal
preferred by the petitioner herein before the Appellate Board
under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is mentioned as a
material particular to prove the admitted material fact that the
petitioner herein, by virtue of his acquiring a permanent resident status and being a director of certain companies in
Singapore, owes an allegiance or adherence to a foreign state.
In the said memorandum of grounds, the petitioner had
categorically stated that he is a non resident Indian having also
acquired a permanent resident status which certainly entails
certain consequence of being bound by the laws of Singapore. Up
to the sentence ending with &quot;incurring the disqualification of
Membership of either House of Parliament&quot; in para 4 of the
affidavit, the same extracts material facts pleaded by the first
respondent in the main petition. The rest of the averments in
para 4 of the affidavit can only be material particulars. The
said material fact constituting the cause of action for
disqualifying the petitioner has to be proved by material
particulars, most of which have been referred to and filed along
with the main petition. The application form for Permanent Resident Status and the conditions prescribed therein, the
extract of the Registrar of Companies, Singapore, all go to prove
the material fact pleaded by the first respondent with regard to
the allegiance or adherence to a foreign state. As regards the
provision of law applicable to the petitioner herein consequent
upon his acquisition of permanent resident status, the same can
only be material particulars which can always be relied upon by
the first respondent herein by referring to the provisions of the
Singapore Companies Act. The relevant provisions of the
Singapore Companies Act cannot constitute material facts. For
the purpose of finding out material fact and triable issue, this
Hon'ble Court is entitled to find out the nature of the
provisions of the Singapore laws that will become applicable to
any person holding a permanent resident status in Singapore as
well as any person who is a director of a company established in
Singapore under the provisions of the Companies Act. Such
examination will certainly not amount to administering the
foreign laws by an Indian Court. The reliance of any foreign law
would amount to a material particular, but not a material fact,
since mere reference of a provision of foreign law by itself will
not constitute material facts. It can only be in support of a
material fact. The truth or otherwise of the pleadings taken in
the Election Petition constituting a material fact cannot be gone
into, and that has to be established only at the time of trial.
The petitioner herein has failed to appreciate the difference
between the material facts and material particulars. As regards
the petitioner being a director of certain companies in U.K., it
has been specifically stated that the petitioner comes under the
purview of U.K. Company Laws and whatever reasons that have been stated in this counter affidavit as regards the petitioner being
a permanent resident of Singapore and being a director of certain
companies in Singapore will mutates mutandis apply to the petitioner being a director of U.K. Companies. By being a
director of a foreign company and bound by the company laws of that country which imposes rights and liabilities and also
penalties, the petitioner becomes clearly bound to abide by those
provisions of foreign laws. To what extent the petitioner is
bound is irrelevant so long as the petitioner is bound by certain
provisions of foreign laws on account of the material facts that
he owes allegiance or adherence to the laws of a foreign State.
Thus, no election petition can be dismissed on the ground that it
lacks all the material particulars supporting the material facts
pleaded. Many of the documents establishing the allegiance or adherence to foreign laws have already been referred to and filed
along with the main petition. The instant application has been filed only to delay the trial and disposal of the main petition.
Therefore, this application may be dismissed with exemplary costs.
5. Both sides did not adduce any evidence both oral and
documentary. 6. The point that would arise for determination in this
original application is,
&quot;whether the election petition filed by the first respondent
herein is liable to be rejected on the ground that it does not
furnish any cause of action and is totally lacking in material
facts within the meaning of S.83(1)(a) of the Representation of
People's Act?&quot;
7. As seen above, the first respondent herein has
challenged the election of the petitioner herein and sought a
declaration that the election of the petitioner herein from No.25
Periyakulam Parliamentary Constituency is null and void and to
set aside the same on the grounds that (i) under S.100(1)(a) of
the Representation of People Act, 1951 the returned candidate was
not qualified to be chosen to fill the seat; (ii) under
S.100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of People Act, 195 1, the
result of the election of the petitioner herein has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of his nomination;
(iii) under S.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of People Act,
1951, there is non compliance of provisions of Constitution or
any rules or orders made under the Act; and (iv) the petitioner
S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, and to
declare that the first respondent herein is a duly elected
candidate from the said constituency.
8. Pending proceedings in the main election petition,
the first respondent therein has moved the instant application
seeking rejection of the main election petition No.1/2000 on the
grounds that it did not furnish any cause of action and also it lacks in material facts with the meaning of S.83(1)(a) of the
9. At the outset, it has to be pointed out that what are
to be decided at this stage is as to whether the main election petition warrants an order of rejection by this court on the
ground of non furnishing of cause of action and lack of material
particulars within the meaning of S.83(1)(a) of Representation of
People's Act, as put forth by the petitioner herein.
10. Arguing for the petitioner/first respondent, the
learned Senior Counsel Mr.B.Kumar would submit that the
petitioner was elected as a Member of Parliament in Periyakulam
constituency in the general election for Lokh Sabha held in
August 1999 with a very large margin; that the first respondent
has filed the election petition seeking a declaration that the
election of the petitioner/first respondent was null and void and
to set aside the same alleging that he was not qualified under
S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act 1951 to be chosen
to fill the seat as the returned candidate, and his election has
been materially affected by the improper acceptance of his
nomination and for the non compliance of provisions of the Constitution and the provisions under S.100(1)(d)(iv) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, and he has been disqualified
under S.8(1)(e) read with S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of
People Act, 1951; that the said election petition has got to be
rejected, since it does not furnish the cause of action and
totally lacks in material facts within the meaning of S.83(1)(a)
of the Representation of People Act; that according to S.83(1)(a)
of the Act, the election petition should contain concise
statement of material facts, on which the election petitioner
relied; that said provision is mandatory; that when the election
petition does not contain material facts, disclosing the cause of
action, the said election petition has got to be rejected
outright; that no evidence could be permitted to be let in where
the material facts have not been averred in the election
petition; that material facts and material particulars are
different; that the material facts are those facts constituting
the ingredients necessarily to be averred and proved to complete the cause of action, while the material particulars are those
which give finishing touch to the basic contours of a picture
already drawn to make it full of details; that the failure to
give even a single material fact is fatal to the election
petition, whereas the deficiency in pleading material particulars
could be permitted to be supplied later by way of an amendment of
the election petition; that the election of the petitioner is
being challenged in the election petition stating that the
petitioner is a permanent resident status holder in Singapore;
that he is a Director of a Company by name Adventure Holding in
Singapore and three companies in United Kingdom; that the
election petitioner has filed certain documents and xerox copies
along with the election petition; that it is averred in the
election petition that the permanent residential status of the
petitioner herein is subject to the local laws of Singapore viz.
Immigration Act and Companies Act of Singapore, and by holding permanent status of Singapore, the petitioner/first respondent
was clearly under acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a
foreign State and this is a disqualification for membership of
Parliament; that it is also averred that the petitioner/first
respondent being the Director of three Companies in U.K., he was
under the acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign
State, and hence it has be come necessary to consider what is meant by allegiance to a foreign State and adherence to a Foreign
State; that the allegiance to a foreign State is different from
adherence to a foreign State; that &quot;adherence&quot; under Article 102
means that a person must follow or hold or maintain loyalty
steadily and consistently to a State; that the decision of this
court in HAJA SHERIFF VS. STATE reported in AIR 1985 MADRAS 55 is not applicable to the present facts of the case, since in that
case the court on all proved facts came to the conclusion that he
was paid a remuneration out of the Turkish National Fund, and he
was holding loyalty to the Republic of Turkey which amounted to
the adherence to the State of Turkey, and thus found him
disqualified from being a member of the Legislature of the State;
that from the said decision, it would be clear that adherence would require a close association with a foreign State; that
insofar as the allegiance was concerned, it is such natural or
legal obedience which every subject owes to his country; that the
obligation of fidelity which the individual owes to the
government or to the sovereign under whom he lives in return for
the protection he receives, and thus the allegiance appears to
require a status equivalent to that of a citizen of a country, so
that by virtue of it, he must give allegiance to the State and
receive protection from it therefor; and that in the light of the
above decision of what is relevant by allegiance or adherence,
the averment contained in the election petition cannot be said to
have contained necessary material facts.
11. Added further, the learned Senior Counsel that the
election petitioner has relied on document No.6, a declaration
given in the memorandum of appeal against the decision of the
Adjudicating Authority under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act filed before the Foreign Exchange Appellate Board to show that
the petitioner/first respondent has described himself as a
Non-resident Indian within the meaning of the provisions of FERA,
and he is a Director of the Company Adventure Holding and other
Companies in U.K., and thereby under acknowledgement of
allegiance or adherence to the foreign State; that the
allegations in the election petition on the face of it totally
lack material facts; that it is not mentioned what are the rights
and liabilities of a permanent resident holder of Singapore; that
it was only if those rights and liabilities that attaches itself
to a permanent resident of Singapore are mentioned, it could then
be seen if such rights and liabilities or privileges would amount
to allegiance or adherence within the meaning of Art.102 of the
Constitution; that without these material facts and ingredients,
the inference that the permanent resident status would mean allegiance or adherence to a foreign State could never be drawn;
that in the light of the decisions in Haja Sheriff's case, the
rights and obligations of a permanent resident or a Director must
be of such a nature to show the connection with the State of
Singapore or U.K.; that without those, there could not be
adherence to the foreign State; that it would be impossible to
contend that a commercial venture by being a Director of a Company could ever amount to a relationship with the State or to
perform the duties on behalf of a State; that the whole of the election petition was about the application of laws of Singapore,
which the election petitioner says Immigration Act of Singapore and its Companies Act; that it would undoubtedly be a material
fact in the context of the election petition to say what is
Immigration Act or Companies Act of Singapore; that it must be
specifically pleaded as a material fact what this so called
Immigration Act and Companies Act say about a permanent resident rights holder of Singapore; that if these two acts confer some
privilege or impose obligations or duties, it must be specifically pleaded, and it must also be pleaded how those
privileges of a permanent resident holder gets or duties or
obligations imposed on him was inconsistent with his being a
citizen of India or amount to allegiance or it amounts to adherence to a foreign State; that even if any one of the above
aspects is not pleaded, it would amount to lack of material fact;
that it is pertinent to note that the election petition does not
contain any pleading on any one of the above aspects, and thus it
totally lacks material facts; that this is more so as foreign law
itself required to be pleaded as a material fact; that the Apex
Court in Sonia Gandhi's case reported in JT 2001 (7) SC 629 has
settled the proposition that the Indian courts cannot take
judicial notice of any foreign law, and the foreign law itself
therefore amounts to material fact, which has got to be pleaded,
and thus, the present election petitioner has not pleaded any
foreign law, and hence the petition incurably lacks material
facts, and therefore is liable to be rejected; that while the
election petitioner has alleged that the elected candidate was
disqualified on account of acknowledgement of allegiance or
adherence to a foreign State, such an inference cannot be drawn
unless the material facts from which such an inference can be
drawn, are stated in the petition; that the Apex Court in Sonia
Gandhi's case has held that the reproduction of the material part
of the averment of the expression from Article 102 of the
Constitution would not be sufficient, but the material facts
wherefrom such inference might follow have to be necessarily stated; that the said decision of the Apex Court applies to the
facts of the case on hand; that as regards the allegations of
disqualification pleaded under S.8(1)(e) of the Act, it lacks
material particulars, and apart from that, it cannot constitute a
cause of action; that S.8(1) of the Representation of People Act
clearly states that &quot;where a person convicted of an offence
punishable under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973&quot;, and thus there must have been a conviction which would mean that it must
be after a lawful charge followed by a lawful trial and
punishment being given for the offence; that the election
petition does not mention that the elected person was prosecuted
for any offence under the FERA nor does it say that he was
convicted thereunder, and thus without those material averments S.8(1)(e) of the Act could not be applied, and hence the election
petition is liable to be rejected on that ground.
12. It is further argued by the learned Senior Counsel
that the penalty imposed by the Special Director in an
adjudication proceedings was not in a criminal trial; that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act itself in the decision reported in AIR 1996 SC
1100 (Director of Enforcement Vs. MCTM Corporation) has held
that the adjudication proceedings did not amount to conviction
for an offence; that they are only civil contravention; that no
mens rea was required to be proved, and thus the averments that
imposition of penalty must be deemed to be a disqualification
under S.8(1)(e) of the Act could never be countenanced; that the
next allegation that the petitioner's name has been wrongly entered in the electoral roll and the certified copy of the voters list was illegal and void; that these allegations cannot
be examined by this court sitting as an Election Court; that this
proposition was laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex
Court reported in AIR 1974 (3) SCC 415 ( Hariprasad Mulshahar Trivedi Vs. B.V.Raju); that the said decision was followed by
the Supreme Court in a case reported in JT 2001 (7) SC 629; that
in the aforesaid decision, the Constitution Bench has decided the
issue directly and clearly, and hence no other Supreme Court judgment of the lesser number of Judges could reach a contrary or
a different view that which is laid down by the Constitution
Bench; that S.36(7) of the Representation of People Act provides
that for the purposes of this Section, a certified copy of an
entry in the electoral roll for the time being in force of a
constituency shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that the
person referred to in that entry is an elector for that
disqualification mentioned in Sec.16 of the Representation of People Act 1950; that the certified copy of the voters list is
statutorily recognized as a conclusive evidence, and hence it
would be futile to challenge the same in the election petition;
that S.36(7) itself points out that only under one circumstance,
the entry in the electoral roll could be challenged; that the
condition is where there is disqualification within the meaning
of Sec.16 of the Representation of People Act 1950; that Sec.16
of that Act reads that a person shall be disqualified for
registration in an electoral roll if he is not a citizen of India
or is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court
or is for the time being disqualified from voting under the
provisions of any law relating to corrupt practices and other
offences in connection with elections; that it is not disputed
that the copy of electoral roll shows the petitioner/first
respondent as the voter in Mylapore Constituency, which cannot
also be challenged on any one of the grounds specified under S.16
of the Representation of People Act, 1950, and hence the allegations seeking to challenge the voters list was totally
without jurisdiction; that it was something on which this court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate and enquire into, and those
averments in the election petition could never furnish a cause of
action; that the election petition was also liable to be
rejected, as there was no prayer to bring the case within the
meaning of disqualification under Article 102(1)(d) of the
Constitution, and therefore, under S.100(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, the Constitution of india
throughout maintains a well defined distinction between a person
being &quot;not qualified&quot; and a person being &quot;disqualified&quot;; and that
this distinction has also been accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
13. Added further the learned Senior Counsel that
paragraph 11 in the election petition contains a prayer stating
that the election of the first respondent was liable to be set
aside under S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act 1951,
as returned candidate was not qualified to be chosen to fill the
seat; that the term &quot;not qualified&quot; could only refer to the
Article 84 of the Constitution which provided the contingency
under which a candidate could be said to be not qualified for
election, and thus when the prayer mentions only about the person
being not qualified it cannot refer to any disqualification under
Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution; that the averments of
invalidity of the petitioner herein in having been elected as
member of Parliament was not challenged on any ground peculiar to
Article 84, and thus the prayer cannot said to be supported by
pleadings, and therefore the whole of the election petition is
liable to be rejected; that it is averred in the petition that in
document No.6 filed by the election petitioner, there is a column
nationality against which there was an entry Singapore P.R., and
on this it was sought to be contended by the election
petitioner's side that this petitioner had stated that he is the
Singapore National, and therefore it amounted to
disqualification; that this was wholly erroneous and
unreasonable; that even assuming that the said document is true and valid, it is stated as Singapore Permanent Resident; that it
means the permanent residential status in Singapore; that it does
not state that the petitioner is a Singapore national; that such
a stand and pleading has not even been made by the election
petitioner either in the election petition or in the counter
filed to this application to reject the election petition, and
hence the said contention put forth by the first respondent
herein could also be of no avail for the reason that if the
petitioner herein is a Singapore national, then he would not be a
Citizen of India; that if he is not a citizen of India, then that
is a separate disqualification under Article 102 of the
Constitution, but the same has not been pleaded either in the
election petition or anywhere else including the counter to this
application, and thus the election petition does not furnish the
cause of action and totally lacks in material facts, and hence
the same has got to be rejected.
14. In support of his contention, the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner/first respondent relied on the following decisions. 1) AIR 1976 SC 744; 2) AIR 1969 SC 1201; 3)
AIR 1999 SC 252; 4) JT 1992 (2) SC 484; 5) AIR 1996 AP 231; 6)
AIR 1985 MADRAS 55; 7) 1986 (4) SCC 78; 8) 2001(8) SCC 233; 9) JT 2001 (7) SC 629; 10) 1989(4) SCC 482; 11) AIR 1996 SC 1100; 12) AIR 2001 SC 2565; 13) AIR 2001 SC 2992; 14 ) AIR 1953 SC 325; and 15) 1974(3) SCC 415. 15. Countering to the above contentions of the
petitioner's side, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan,
appearing for the first respondent with vigour and vehemence would submit that the election petition was filed for setting
aside the election of the petitionerfirst respondent on four
grounds set out in the election petition; that during the pendency of the same and after the necessary issues for enquiry
were framed, the petitioner-first respondent has filed the
instant application for rejection of the election petition on the
grounds that the election petition does not furnish any cause of
action and also is totally lacking in material facts; that the
relevant provisions which require consideration for deciding the
matter are S.83(1) of the Representation of Peoples Act and
Sec.100, Article 102 of the Constitution of India, Sec.2(e),
Sec.4(d) and Sec.36 of the RP Act 19 51 and Ss. 16, 19 and 20 of the RP Act 1950; that in paragraphs 5 and 7 to 11 of the election
petition, the election petitioner has specifically averred that
the petitioner herein was clearly under an acknowledgement of
allegiance or adherence to the foreign State, and thus incurring
the disqualification for Membership of either House of Parliament
even before the commencement of the election process; that the
material facts which were highlighted in the petition were &quot;that
the first respondent had given his address as 37, Jalan Telite,
Singapore; that he is a Director in Adventure Holdings Pvt.
Ltd., incorporated on 2.4.1984, that he is also a director in
other companies viz. Dipper Investments ltd., Godfrey Resources and Benjon Tree incorporated under U.K.Laws&quot;; that the election
petitioner has further referred to an extract from the Registry
of Companies and Business, Singapore, regarding the brief details
of Adventure Holdings Pvt. Ltd., in which the first respondent
therein had stated as against the column &quot; Nationality&quot;
Singapore PR; that this declaration was given on 11.11.1999, as
seen from the document Nos. 4 and 5 filed along with the election petition; that it is also specifically stated that the
first respondent therein holds a passport under a permanent identity card of Singapore; that the same was stated as a fact in
the election petition that the first respondent therein was
clearly under an acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a
foreign State and thus incurring a disqualification of Membership
of either House of Parliament even before the commencement of the
election process; that Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution of
India disqualifies a person from being chosen as and for being a
Member of either House of Parliament if he is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State; that in the instant case, the petitioner herein having declared
his nationality as Singapore PR has shown that he is under an
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State
viz. Singapore; that by declaring his nationality as Singapore
PR, the petitioner herein was disqualified to contest an election
in India; and that the contention of the petitioner that he has
declared only his status as a Permanent Resident cannot be accepted, since nationality is different from the status of a
16. Added further the learned Senior Counsel that the
question before this Court is whether the election petition is
liable to be rejected on the ground that it had not disclosed the
material facts; that a perusal of the election petition would
clearly reveal that the same contains the necessary material facts to support the contentions raised relating to Article
102(1)(d) of the Constitution of india, and therefore the
application filed by the petitioner/first respondent seeking
rejection of the election petition is not maintainable; that in
Law Lexicon of British India by Mr.P.Ramanatha Aiyar, the
nationality is defined as distinctive national qualities;
membership of a nation; race forming part of one or more
political nations; that the nationality is the condition or
status of belonging to a nation or a State either by birth or by
naturalisation; that in American Encyclopedia Nationality in the
legal sense is a status of belonging to a State for the purposes
of International Law; that the Supreme Court in a case reported
in AIR 1963 SC 1811 while considering whether the State Trading
Corporation of India Ltd., is a citizen, has dealt with the
subject nationality, where the Constitution Bench has pointed out
that the nationality appurtains to the Domain of International
Law, and represents the political status of a person, by virtue
of which he owes allegiance to a particular sovereign authority;
that by reason of his nationality, the petitioner/first
respondent has to adhere to the laws of that land; that in view of the above legal position, the election petition discloses the
material facts and therefore is not liable to be rejected; that
the Apex Court in a case reported in 1999 (3) SCC 73 7 has dealt
with the issue relating to the pleading of material facts as
required under S.83 of the Representation of People Act; that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between the
pleading of material facts and the pleading of material
particulars; that according to the Supreme Court, the failure to
plead the material particulars can be cured at a later stage by
an appropriate amendment; that according to the Honourable
Judges, an election petition was not liable to be dismissed in
limine merely because full particulars of corrupt practice were
not set out; that material facts are such primary facts, which
must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence
of a cause of action; that in the case reported in 199 9(1) SCC
666, the Supreme Court has held that all those facts which are
essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of
action, or material facts which must be pleaded and failure to
aver even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of
mandate under S.83(1)(a) of the Act; that the Apex Court has
extracted the relevant portion of the Election Petition on its
hand and has pointed out that the election petitioner had pleaded
the material facts; that in the said decision, the Apex Court has
referred to an earlier decision of that Court reported in 1994
(2) SCC 392, and has held that a reasonable cause of action is
said to mean a cause of action is some chances of success, and so long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some
questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the
case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking
it out; that the Supreme Court in a case reported in 2002(1) SCC
499 after referring to all its earlier judgments, has held that
material facts and material particulars certainly connotes two
different things, and material facts are those facts which
constitute the cause of action; and that the Supreme Court in a
decision in 2000(2) SCC 294 has also held that the court cannot
dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether
each one of them discloses cause of action, and the petition has
to be considered as a whole, and there cannot be a partial
17. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court reported in
1999 (2) SCC 217, the learned Senior Counsel for the first
respondent would urge that the election petition cannot be
dismissed in limine for want of particulars, and if the court
finds that particulars are necessary, an opportunity should be
given to the petitioner to amend the petition and include the
particulars; that the Apex Court has also held in 19 98(1) SC 416
that the election petition cannot be rejected at a preliminary
stage on the ground that it does not contain a concise statement
of facts, and thus in view of the pronouncements of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, the present election petition cannot be rejected on the ground that it does not disclose the material facts or the
cause of action; that the election petitioner has specifically
pleaded that the petitioner/first respondent has declared his nationality as Singapore PR; that he was under an acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign state; that the
requirement of Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution was
satisfied; that the averment of the petitioner herein in this
application to ignore the statement of facts pleaded and then
making a submission that even on the basis of the fact pleaded,
the election petition cannot be maintained, is unsustainable; that once the material facts are disclosed in the election
petition and cause of action is established, the election
petition cannot be rejected on the ground that the election
petitioner's case was a weak one; that in fact the
petitioner/first respondent's contention before the Enforcement
authorities that the FERA is not applicable to him also would
prove that the fact pleaded by the election petitioner was
correct; and the petitioner/first respondent suffered a
18. It is also argued by the learned Senior Counsel that
the other ground on which the election petition filed was that
the petitioner/ first respondent was not an ordinarily resident
as defined under the Representation of People Act, 1950; that
S.2(e) of the Act defines &quot; Elector&quot;; that the elector in
relation to a constituency means a person whose name is entered
in the electoral roll of that constituency for the time being in
force and who is not subject to any of the disqualifications
mentioned in S.16 of the Representation of People Act, 1950 ;
that S.4 of the said Act refers to the qualification for
Membership of the House of the People, and as per S.4(d) of the
Act, a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat
in the House of the People unless he is an elector for any parliamentary constituency; that S.19 of the Representation of
People Act 1950 prescribes conditions of registration of the
voters; that S.19(b) requires every person, who is &quot;ordinarily
resident&quot; in the constituency shall be entitled to be registered
in the electoral roll of the constituency; that the ordinarily
resident is defined under S.20 of the Act; that on the facts
pleaded in the present election petition, the petitioner/first
respondent cannot be considered to be an ordinarily resident as
the facts pleaded in the election petition would show that he had
his permanent residence in Singapore and he had declared himself
to be a Singapore National; that the submission of the
petitioner/first respondent in this application seeking for
rejection of the election petition was that once the
petitioner/first respondent is registered as an elector, he is
qualified to stand for election as the disqualification under
S.16 of the Act is not applicable to him, is untenable; that it
is not correct to state that the question of eligibility of a
voter enrolled in an electoral roll cannot be decided in the
election petition, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court
reported in 2001(8) SCC 233 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has pointed out that sub Sec.7 of Sec.36 of R.P.A 1951, dealing with
scru tiny of nomination paper by the Returning officer itself
provides that for the purpose of this Section, a certified copy
of an entry in the electoral roll shall be conclusive evidence of
the person being an elector for the constituency, unless it is
proved that he is subject to a disqualification mentioned in
Sec.16 of the RPA 1950; and that the Supreme Court has also held
that if a person is alleged to be not a citizen of India,
therefore, suffering from absence of qualification under Art.84
is also a positive disqualification of Art.102 of the
Constitution, than the case which one attracts applicability of
Sec.100(d)(iv) of RPA 151 and such an issue can be tried by the
High Court in an election petition in spite of the returned
candidate being enrolled in the voters list, for it will be a
case of alleged non-compliance of the provisions of the
19. Added further the learned Senior Counsel that an invalid registration of a foreign national as an elector is
opposed to the provisions of the RP Act as well as the Constitution; that in the present election petition, the election
petitioner has categorically stated that the petitioner/first
respondent has shown allegiance or adherence to another State and that he is not a resident of India; that in the circumstances,
the first respondent being registered as an elector in the
electoral roll was per se void and was opposed to the
Constitution as well as the provisions of the Representation of
People Act; that in the circumstances, the question whether the
registration of the petitioner/first respondent in the electoral
roll was legal or not can be gone into in the instant election
petition; that the election petitioner had pleaded material
facts; that he was entitled to prosecute the election petition,
and the application for rejection of the same is therefore not
maintainable; that in the election petition, the election
petitioner has pleaded all the material facts in support of his
contention relating to Ss 100(1)(a), 100(1)(d)(i) and
100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of People Act; that the
disqualification under S.8(1)(e) of the said Act is not
satisfied, and thus the election petitioner has given all the
material facts necessary and has furnished the causes of action,
and hence it cannot be stated that the election petition does not
furnish the cause of action either, or is totally lacking in
material particulars within the meaning of S.83(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, and therefore, the application
filed by the petitioner/first respondent for rejection of the
election petition has got to be dismissed. In support of his
contentions, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the following
decision: 1) 1999(3) SCC 737; 2) 2000 (2) SCC 294; 3) 1998 (1)
SCC 416; 4) 2002 (1) SCC 499; 5 ) AIR 2001 SC 2565; 6) AIR 1963 SC 1811 and 7) 1999 (2) SCC 217. 20. As seen above, the election petitioner, who is the
first respondent herein has filed the election petition seeking a
declaration that the election of the first respondent, who is the
petitioner herein from No.25 Periyakulam Parliamentary
Constituency as null and void and to set aside the same on the
specific grounds, stated supra. Pending the election petition,
the first respondent therein has filed the instant application
seeking an order of rejection of the election petition on the ground that it does not furnish the cause of action, and also
totally lacks in material facts within the meaning of S.83(1)( a)
of the Representation of People Act. Thus the only question that
would arise for consideration would be whether the election
petition instituted by the first respondent herein has to be
rejected on the ground that it does not furnish the cause of
action and totally lacks in material facts as understood by
S.83(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act.
21. Before adverting to the said question, it would be
appropriate to highlight the necessary and relevant provisions of
the Representation of People Act, 1950 and 1951 and the Articles of the Constitution of India. The election petition filed by the
first respondent herein relies on Ss. 100(1)(a), 100(1)(d)(i),
100(1)(d)(iv) and S.8(1)(e) read with S.100(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, and the provisions of the
Constitution of India in Article 102(1)(d). S.100 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 enumerates the grounds for
declaring the election to be void.
S.100(1)(a) of the Act reads:
&quot;(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion-
(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not
qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat
under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union
Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963)&quot;.
S.100(1)(d)(i) of the Act reads as follows:
&quot;(1)....
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected-
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination&quot;.
S.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act reads thus;
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under
this Act&quot;.
Speaking of the disqualification on conviction for certain
offences, S.8(1)(e) of the Act reads:
&quot;(1) A person convicted for an offence punishable under-
(e) the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1973 (46 of 1973);
shall be disqualified for a period of six years from the date of
such conviction&quot;.
Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution of India reads thus;
&quot;102. Disqualification for membership:- (1) A person shall be
disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of
either House of Parliament-
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State&quot;.
22. Now the court has to examine whether the election
petition filed by the first respondent herein is lacking in
material facts within the meaning of S.83(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, and does not disclose any
cause of action and raise a triable issue, which could be put to
trial. S.83 of the Representation of People Act reads:
&quot;83. Contents of petition:- (1) An election petition-
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice....&quot;
A reading of the above Section would clearly reveal that it
contemplates that an election petition shall contain a concise
relies. The Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to consider the
mandate under the said provision in a case reported in JT 2001 (7) SC 629 (HARI SHANKER JAIN V. SONIA GANDHI), and has held as follows:
&quot;23. Section 83(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an election
petition shall-contain a concise statement of the material facts
on which the petitioner relies. By a series of decisions of this
Court, it is well settled that the material facts required to be
stated are those facts which can be considered as materials
supporting the allegations made. In other words, they must be
such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in
the petition and would constitute the cause of action as
understood in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The expression
'cause of action' has been compendiously defined to mean every
fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the
court. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete
cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The
function of the party is to present as full a picture of the
cause of action with such further information in detail as to
make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet.
(See Samant N. Balakrishna etc. V.George Fernandes and Ors. Etc. (((1969) 3 SCR 603), Jitender Bahadur Singh V. Krishna
Behari ((1969) 2 SCC 433). Merely quoting the words of the section like chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating
material facts. Material facts would include positive statement
of facts as also positive averment of a negative fact, if
necessary. In V.S.Achuthanandan v. P.J.Francis &amp; Anr. (JT 1999
(2) SC 347 = (1999 ) 3 SCC 737), this Court has held, on a
conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that material
facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at the
trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action.
Failure to plead &quot;material facts&quot; is fatal to the election
petition and no amendment of the pleading is permissible to
introduce such material facts after the time-limit prescribed for
filing the election petition.
24. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition
irrespective of any written statement or denial and reject the
petition if it does not disclose a cause of action. To enable a
court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not disclose
a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and nothing else.
Courts have always frowned upon vague pleadings which leave a
wide scope to adduce any evidence. No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings.&quot;
23. At this juncture, it has become very necessary to
point out the distinction between the material facts and material
particulars, because different consequences might flow from a
deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading. The
Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in
AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 744 (UDHAV SINGH V. MADHAV RAO SCINDIA) has dealt with the distinction between the material facts and
material particulars and has observed thus:
&quot;37. Like the Code of Civil procedure, this section also
envisages a distinction between &quot;material facts&quot; and &quot;material
particulars&quot; Cl.( a) of sub-section (1) corresponds to Order 6,
Rule 2, while Clause (b) is analogous to Order 6, Rules 4 and 6
of the Code. The distinction between &quot;material facts&quot; and
&quot;material particulars&quot; is important because different
consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars or particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead
even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of
action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to
be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure.
If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer
from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be
summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of
a petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars,
the court has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the
required particulars even after the expiry of limitation.
38. All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a
party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his
defence, are &quot;material facts&quot;. In the context of a charge of
corrupt practice &quot; material facts&quot; would mean all the basic facts
constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice
alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate before he
can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election petition, a
particular fact is material or not, and as such required to be
pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge
levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of
the case. In short, all those facts which are essential to
clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action, are &quot;material facts&quot; which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even
a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of
Sec.83(1 )(a).
39. &quot;Particulars&quot;, on the other hand, are &quot;the details of the
case set up by the party&quot;. &quot;Material particulars&quot; within the
contemplation of Clause (b) of Section 83 (1) would therefore
mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and
embellish the material facts already pleaded in the petition in
compliance with the requirements of Clause (a). 'Particulars' serve the purpose of finishing touches to the basic contours of a
picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative.
40. The distinction between 'material facts' and 'material particulars' was pointed out by this Court in several cases,
three of which have been cited at the bar. It is not necessary
to refer to all of them. It will be sufficient to close the
discussion by extracting what A.N.Ray J. (as he then was) said
on this point in Hardwari Lal's case (AIR 1964 SC 1366) (supra):
&quot;It is therefore vital that the corrupt practice charged against
the respondent should be a full and complete statement of
material facts to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of
action and to give an equal and full opportunity to the
respondent to meet the case and to defend the charges. Merely,
alleging that the respondent obtained or procured or attempted to
obtain or procure assistance are extracting words from the
statute which will have no meaning unless and until facts are
stated to show what that assistance is and how the prospect of
election is furthered by such assistance. In the present case,
it was not even alleged that the assistance obtained or procured
was other than the giving of vote. It was said by counsel for
the respondent that because the statute did not render the giving
of vote a corrupt practice the words &quot;any assistance&quot; were full
statement of material fact. The submission is fallacious for the
simple reason that the manner of assistance, the measure of assistance are all various aspects of fact to clothe the petition
with a cause of action which will call for an answer. Material
facts are facts which if established would give the petitioner
the relief asked for. If the respondent had not appeared, could
the court have given a verdict in favour of the election
petitioner? The answer is in the negative because the
allegations in the petition did not disclose any cause of
action.&quot;&quot;
24. It has also been held by the Apex Court in a
decision reported in (1999) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 737 (V.S.ACHUTHANANDAN V. P.J.FRANCIS AND ANOTHER) thus; &quot;In the instant case, as noted earlier, the election petition has
been rejected by invoking the powers of Section 83 of the Act
read with Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
After referring to some judgments, the learned trial Judge of the
High Court has concluded: &quot;Read as a whole, the averments contained in the election
petition do not satisfy the requirements of Section 83 of the
Act. No prima facie case is made out to hold that the first
respondent has committed corrupt practices or that it is a fit
case where re-counting is to be ordered. On a perusal of the
election petition, it is seen that the petitioner has not pleaded
the material facts with necessary particulars which would enable
the Court to grant the prayer made in the petition. Pleadings in
the election petition do not make out a cause of action for
ordering re-count, as prayed for in the petition. So, the
election petition is liable to be rejected under Section 83 of
the Act read with Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC.&quot;
15. It would thus appear that the election petition was rejected
mainly on the ground that it did not disclose the cause of action
as according to the learned trial Judge the allegations regarding
corrupt practice were vague and did not disclose &quot;material facts
and full particulars&quot; of the corrupt practice alleged. It is
evident that the learned trial Judge did not distinguish between
the &quot;material facts&quot; and the &quot;material particulars&quot; of
allegations regarding corrupt practices as defined under Section
123 of the Act. The law on the point is well settled which
appears to have not been taken note of or appreciated by the
learned trial Judge. After referring to various pronouncements
of this Court including cases in Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain,
Samant N.Balkrishna v. George Fernandez, Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan, Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, F.A.Sapa v.
Singora and Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe
and a host of other authorities, this Court in L.R.Shivaramagowda
v. T.M.Chandrshekar held that while failure to plead &quot;material
facts&quot; is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the
pleading is permissible to introduce such material facts after
the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition, the
absence of &quot;material particulars&quot; can be cured at a later stage
by an appropriate amendment. An election petition was not liable
to be dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of
corrupt practice alleged were not set out. It is, therefore,
evident that material facts are such primary facts which must be
proved at the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause
of action. Whether in an election petition a particular fact is
a material fact or not, and as such, required to be pleaded is a
question which depends on the nature of the charge levelled, the
ground relied upon, and in the light of
the special circumstances of the case. In Udhav Singh case the
Court held:(SCC p.523, paras 42-43)
&quot;In short, all those facts which are essential to clothe the
petitioner with a complete cause of action, are 'material facts'
which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section
83(1)(a).
'particulars', on the other hand, are 'the details of the case
set up by the party'. 'Material particulars' within the
contemplation of clause (b) of Section 83(1) would therefore mean
all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and
picture already drawn, to make it full, more detailed and more informative.&quot;&quot;
25. Whether in an election petition a particular fact is
material or not, and as such required to be pleaded is a question
depending upon the nature of the charges levelled, the ground relied upon by the election petitioner and the special
circumstances of the case. The facts which are essential to
clothe the petitioner/first respondent with a complete cause of
action, are material facts, which must be necessarily pleaded,
and failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to
disobedience of the mandate of S.83(1)(a) of the Representation
26. Bearing in mind the mandatory provision that the
election petition should contain a concise statement of material
facts, on which the election petitioner relies, and the
distinction between the material facts and material particulars,
this court has to examine the election petition and find out
whether the election petition has to be rejected on the ground that it lacks material particulars, and it does not disclose a
cause of action, as contended by the petitioner/first respondent.
27. The specific case of the election petitioner is that
the petitioner/first respondent has already incurred the
disqualification for Membership of either House of the Parliament
by acknowledgement of his allegiance or adherence to the foreign
State. It would be more appropriate to reproduce the pleadings
in the election petition in that regard (Paragraphs
5,7,8,9,10,and 11).
&quot;5......the 1st respondent herein has acquired allegiance or
adherence to Foreign State viz. Republic of Singapore and in
support of the same, filed a copy of memo of appeal (Document III) preferred by the 1 st respondent before the appellate Board
and in view of such penalty suffered, the 1st respondent should
7. The petitioner submits that by his own admission before the
Enforcement Officer, Chennai, entrusted with the administration
of the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, made on various dates between 2-11-95 and 30-1-96, the 1st respondent herein had stated and given his address as 37, Jalan Teliti,
Singapore, that he should be regarded as a non resident Indian
and he had made his claim as holding a permanent resident status
of Singapore. He had also stated that he is a Director in
ADVENTURE HOLDINGS PTE LTD., incorporated on 2-4-1994 and that he was also a Director in certain other companies viz. Dipper
Investments Ltd., Godfrey Resources and Benjan Tree incorporated
under UK Laws. The aforesaid statements of the 1st respondent herein had been filed by the Enforcement Directorate in the typed
set of papers after duly serving copies on the 1st respondent herein, in HCP No.240/96 on the file of this Hon'ble Court.
Excerpts from his statements have also been quoted in the
judgment of this Hon'ble Court in the said HCP No.240/96, dated
8. The petitioner herein is filing herewith an extract from the
REGISTRY OF COMPANIES AND BUSINESS (RCB) Singapore regarding the brief details of ADVENTURE HOLDINGS PTE LTD., incorporated on 2-4-94 in which as regards the 1st respondent, it is stated as
against the column ' Nationality&quot;: 'SINGAPORE P.R.', and his position as Director. It is also stated at the end of the
extract that the above information is updated to fourteen days
from 11-11-1999 (Document VI). The petitioner is also filing true xerox copies of the following
documents: i) The Deposit Scheme for Permanent Residence; ii) Application for Permanent resident under the
Entrepreneur Scheme; iii) Deposit Scheme for permanent residence Form 'A';
iv) Application for Permanent Residence in Singapore for
Entrepreneurs Form 'B'; and
v) Form 4 Immigration Act Application for an Entry permit for
permanent residence (Documents VII (i) to (V))
9. The petitioner submits that from the schedule of dates
relating to the election for Periyakulam Constituency as stated
above, the 1st respondent on all the relevant dates was holding a
Permanent Resident status of Singapore. The status of permanent
residence was applied for by the 1st respondent and granted by
the Singapore Authorities in January 1995 subject to local laws
of Singapore State in this behalf and as such, the said status is
subject to the rights and liabilities arising out of Singapore
laws (Immigration Act and Companies Act). By holding such a permanent status of Singapore, the 1st respondent herein is
clearly under an acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to
the Foreign State thus incurring the disqualification for
Membership of either of House of Parliament, even before the
commencement of Election process. 10. The petitioner submits that the 1st respondent in his
statements before the Enforcement Directorate referred to above,
stated that he has been issued with a permanent Identity Card and
Passport No.NRIC/ Passport No.S2645368B at Singapore. 11. The 1st respondent herein by his statements mentioned above,
in being a Director in Dipper Investments Ltd., Godfrey Resources
and Benjan Tree is governed by UK Company Laws as the said companies have been incorporated under U.K. Laws. Being the
Director of the above said companies, he is under an acknowledgement of an allegiance or adherence to the Foreign State under Art.102(1)(d) of the Constitution of India.&quot;
28. Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution of India
disqualifies a person for being chosen as and for being a Member
of either House of Parliament, if he is under any acknowledgement
of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. Hence, it has
become necessary to examine what is acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. Needless to say that allegiance
is different from adherence. &quot; Allegiance&quot; is defined in the Law
Lexicon by Ramanatha Iyer as follows:
&quot;&quot;Allegiance&quot; is such natural or legal obedience which every
subject owes to his Prince. The obligation of fidelity which the
individual owes to the government or to be sovereign under which
he lives in return for the protection he receives.....
the tie or ligament which binds the subject (or citizen) to the
King (or Government) in return for that protection which the King
(or Government) affords the subject (or citizen). It consists in
&quot;a true and faithful obedience of the subject due to his
sovereign.&quot;
The word 'adherence' employed in Article 191(1)(d) of the
Constitution came up for interpretation by a Full Bench of this
Court in a case reported in AIR 1985 MADRAS 55 (K.S.HAJA SHAREFF V. HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU, MADRAS AND OTHERS), wherein it was held, &quot;&quot;Adherence&quot; means that a person must follow or hold or maintain
loyalty, steadily or consistently to a person, or group or
29. Relying on a document being an extract from the
Registry of Companies and Business (RCB), Singapore, as to the
details of Adventure Holdings Pte Limited and pointing to the
statement given by the petitioner/first respondent as against the
column 'Nationality' as Singapore P.R., it is contended by the
election petitioner's side that the status of permanent resident
was applied for by the petitioner-first respondent and granted by
the Singapore authorities subject to the local laws of Singapore State in that behalf, and as such the said status was subject to
the rights and liabilities arising out of Singapore laws viz.
Immigration Act and Companies Act, and by holding such a permanent status of Singapore, the petitioner/first respondent
was clearly under an acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence
to a foreign State, and thus has incurred the disqualification
for membership of either house of Parliament even before the commencement of the election process. It is pertinent to note
that the election petition has not proceeded on the footing that
the petitioner/first respondent was neither a citizen of India
nor his citizenship was terminated at any point of time. It is
not disputed that he was born in India, and by virtue of the
same, he is of Indian origin and citizenship under Article 5 of
the Indian Constitution. Under such circumstances, the statement
given by the petitioner/first respondent against the column '
Nationality' as Singapore Permanent Resident as stated above by
itself, will not take away or put an end to his Indian
citizenship. While nationality is a condition or status of
belonging to a nation or State either by birth or by a
naturalisation, it would be very hard to infer or accept that the
petitioner/first respondent by making a mere statement before the
Registrar of Companies and Business, Singapore, has acquired the
nationality of that country. It is pertinent to note that
nowhere the election petitioner has pleaded that the petitioner herein had acquired the nationality of Singapore, nor can the
Singapore Permanent Resident be equated to the nationality of Singapore. At this juncture, it would be appropriate and more advantageous also to reproduce the law laid down by the Full
Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case reported in JT 2001 (7)
SC 629 (HARI SHANKER JAIN V. SONIA GANDHI), as follows: &quot;In election petition no.4 of 1999 filed by Hari Krishna Lal it
is alleged that the respondent is a citizen of Italy and has not
renounced the same without stating on what facts or material the
petitioner has drawn that inference. It is alleged that the
respondent was at the material time 'under acknowledgement of
allegiance and adherence' to Italy, a foreign State, which is a
Constitution. The material part of the averment is an expression
picked up and reproduced as a ritual from Article 102 of the Constitution but the material facts wherefrom such inference may
follow have not been stated. The petition then alleges that the
respondent did not reside in India for a period of 12 months
immediately before her having applied for citizenship by
registration on 7th April, 1983 which was granted to her on 30th
April, 1983. However, the petition itself alleges that the
respondent came to India from Italy some time after the year 1971
and was in India in the year 1977, 1980 and 1983. When did the
respondent then go away from India and the exact period of time
when the respondent was or must have been away from India so as to infer her having not resided in India for the requisite period
of 12 months before 30th April, 1983, as averred, are not stated.
Factual matrix for the bald assertion is completely missing from the election petition. There is no overt act relating to
adherence and allegiance after the grant of citizenship to the
respondent, even alleged, let alone supported by through any
material facts.&quot;
The said declaration would mean the permanent residency status of
the individual in Singapore. It is not the stand or the pleading
of the election petitioner that the petitioner/first respondent
was a Singapore national. Hence, the election petitioner cannot
now be permitted to say that the petitioner/first respondent is a
Singapore national, and thereby, he suffers the disqualification.
If the petitioner/ first respondent is a national of Singapore
State, he cannot be a citizen of India, and if he is not a
citizen of this country, then, that would constitute a separate
disqualification under Article 102 of the Constitution, but that
is not the case of the election petitioner.
30. What are all averred in the election petition is
that by holding a permanent resident of Singapore, the
petitioner/first respondent is under an acknowledgement of
allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. A mere statement that the petitioner/first respondent was subject to the local
laws of Singapore State and his status as a permanent resident
was subject to the rights and liabilities arising out of the
Singapore laws viz. Immigration Act and Companies Act would not
by itself be sufficient to hold that he is under an
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to that State. Equally so is the averment that the petitioner/first respondent being a Director in Dipper Investments Ltd., Godfrey Resources and Benjan Tree was governed by U.K. Company laws and hence as a Director of the said Companies he was under an acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State under Article
102(1)(d) of the Constitution. It remains to be stated that
though the election petitioner has averred that the petitioner/
first respondent was disqualified to contest the election because
of his declaration as Singapore Permanent Resident, the election
petitioner has not chosen to aver anything about the rights and
liabilities attached to a permanent resident of Singapore, in
order to find out whether those rights and liabilities would
amount to allegiance or adherence within the meaning of Article
102 of the Constitution of India. The contention of the election
petitioner that the petitioner/first respondent was a Director of
some companies governed by the laws of that State, and hence it has to be construed that he owes allegiance to that State or
adherence to those laws, cannot be countenanced. The averments in the election petition does not contain anything about the
rights and liabilities arising out of Singapore laws, viz.
Immigration Act and Companies Act. Merely making mention of
these two enactments of Singapore State would not be sufficient
nor can it constitute the statement of material facts. This view
of the court is fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in
Sonia Gandhi's case (JT 2001 (7 ) SC 629), stated supra, wherein
&quot;27. Italian law is a foreign law so far as the courts in India
are concerned. Under Section 57(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1871,
the Court shall take judicial notice of, inter alia, all laws in
force in the territory of India. Foreign laws are not included
therein. Sections 45 and 84 of Evidence Act permit proof being
tendered and opinion of experts being adduced in evidence in proof of a point of foreign law. Under order VI Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, every pleading shall contain a
statement in concise form of the material facts relied on by a
party but not the evidence nor the law of which a court may take
judicial notice. But the rule against pleading law is restricted
to that law only of which a c ourt is bound to take judicial
notice. As the court does not take judicial notice of foreign
law, it should be pleaded like any other fact, if a party wants
to rely on the same (See Mogha's Law of Pleadings, 13th Edition,
Page 22). In Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Hannay &amp; Co. (1918(2) KB 62 3), it was held that, &quot;Foreign law is a question
of fact to an English court ..... the opinion of an expert on
the fact, to be treated with respect, but not necessarily
conclusive&quot;. In Beatty v. Beatty (192 4 (1) KB 807), it was
held that the American law in English courts must be proved by
the evidence of experts in that law. In Lazard Brothers and
Company v. Midland Bank Limited (1933 AC 289), their Lordships
of Privy Council observed that what the Russian Soviet law is, is
a question of fact, of which the English court cannot take
judicial cognizance, even though the foreign law has already been
proved before it in another case. The court must act upon the
evidence before it in that actual case. The statement of law by
Halsbury in Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol.15, Para 610, at
page 335) is that English courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign law and foreign laws are usually matters of evidence
requiring proof as questions of fact.
28. There is, thus, no manner of doubt that in the courts in
india, a point of foreign law is a matter of fact and, therefore,
a plea based on a point of foreign law must satisfy the
requirement of pleading a material fact in an election petition
filed before the High Court. .....&quot;
In view of the above decision, the submission made by the learned
counsel for the first respondent that the election petitioner has
averred the names of the enactments and the remaining things were
matters of evidence cannot be countenanced, in the absence of a specific pleading as to the provisions in the enactments speaking
of the rights and the liabilities attached to the individual. So
long as this court cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law,
which is the question of fact, the election petitioner should
have pleaded the necessary provisions of the enactments, which
would speak of the acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to
that State. Nowhere it is averred in the election petition what
these two enactments state about the rights of a permanent
resident holder or the privileges conferred or obligations and
duties imposed on him. That apart, it would also be necessary to
specifically plead how those privileges or duties or obligations
would amount to acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to that State. Thus what are all stated in the election petition is
the names of the two enactments of Singapore, a foreign State.
The court is of the opinion that it cannot amount to stating of
material facts; and that the election petition neither contains
the positive statement of facts nor the positive averments of
negative facts. In the absence of those material facts, an
inference that the permanent resident status of the
petitioner/first respondent would mean allegiance or adherence to
the State of Singapore cannot be drawn. In view of the absence
of such a pleading, it cannot be stated that the election
petition contained a statement in the concise form of material
facts relied on by the election petitioner, as required by
S.83(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
31. Much relying on a Full Bench decision of this court
reported in AIR 1985 MADRAS 55 (K.S.HAJA SHAREFF V. HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU, MADRAS, AND OTHERS), the learned Senior Counsel for the election petitioner would submit
that the said decision is applicable as the facts in that case
are analogous to the present case, and thus, it has got to be
held that the petitioner/first respondent has acknowledged adherence to the foreign State, and thereby, he was disqualified
from continuing as Member of the Parliament. On a perusal of the
Full Bench judgment of this court, stated supra, it could be seen
that this court has found that K.S.Haja Shareff, the petitioner
therein had acknowledged adherence to foreign State on proved
facts that he was appointed as Honorary Counsel of Republic of
Turkey, and in that capacity he bound himself to the State of
Turkey; that he represented the interest of Turkey Nationals in India; that he would do all other assignments which might be
entrusted to him in the interest of the State of Turkey; that he
would hoist the national flag of Turkey and play National anthem
of Turkey while celebrating the Turkish National Holidays; that
on the Republic Day or Independence Day of India, he would hoist
the Turkish flag and participate in the function as a
representative of the State of Turkey; that he was entitled to
fly the flag of Turkey and display coat of Arms of Turkey; that
he would correspond directly with the Diplomatic Mission of
Turkey; and that he received remuneration out of Turkish National
Fund. In view of the above, their Lordships in the said decision
have held that the petitioner therein was disqualified from
continuing as the Member of the Assembly. This Court is afraid
whether the above decision of this court rendered on those proved
and established facts can be applied to the present facts of the
32. One of the grounds, on which the election of the
petitioner/ first respondent is challenged, is that the election
has been materially affected by improper acceptance of his
nomination, and hence it has to be declared as void under S.100(1)(d) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the name of
the petitioner/first respondent has been registered as an elector
at No.2, 4th Street, Venkateswara Nagar, Mylapore, Chennai in the
voters list of Mylapore Constituency. It is contended by the
election petitioner's side that the registration of the name of
the petitioner herein in the voters list itself was illegal and
void, since he was not an ordinarily resident in the said
constituency, and hence he was not entitled to be registered in
the electoral roll in that constituency; that once the
petitioner/first respondent was not entitled to register as a
voter and has not satisfied the conditions of ordinarily resident
for being registered in the voters list, then he could not be
said to have satisfied the conditions for Membership of the
Houses, as stated in S.4(d) of the Act, and that when under law
the petitioner/first respondent cannot be registered as a voter
in any constituency, he was not entitled to file the nomination,
and the acceptance of the said nomination amounted to an improper acceptance of nomination, by which the result of the election has
been materially affected. The court is of the view that the
legality or otherwise of the registration of the petitioner-first
respondent as a voter in the voters list cannot either be examined and investigated into, or be found as an improper
acceptance of nomination, in view of the law laid down by the
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of five
Honourable Judges reported in (1974) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 415 (HARI PRASAD MULSHANKER TRIVEDI V. V.B.RAJU AND OTHERS). In the said case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as
&quot;We think that the intention of the Parliament to oust the
jurisdiction of the Court trying an election petition to go into
the question whether a person is ordinarily resident in the
constituency in the electoral roll of which his name is entered
is manifest from the scheme of 1950 and the 1951 Acts. It would
defeat the object of the 1950 Act if the question whether a
person was ordinarily resident in a constituency were to be tried
afresh in a court or tribunal, trying an election petition.&quot;
From the above decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it would be
abundantly clear that this court trying the election petition
should not go into the question whether the petitioner/first
respondent was an ordinarily resident in the said constituency or
as to the legality or otherwise of the registration of the
petitioner-first respondent as a voter in the electoral roll.
According to S.36(7) of the Representation of People Act, a certified copy of an entry in the electoral roll for the time
being in force of a constituency shall be conclusive evidence of
the fact that the person referred to in that entry is an elector
for that constituency, unless it was proved that he was subjected
to a disqualification mentioned in S.16 of the Representation of
People Act, 1950. According to S.16 of the Representation of
People Act, 1951, a person shall be disqualified for registration
in an electoral roll, if he is not a citizen of India or is of
unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court or for
the time being is disqualified for voting under any law, relating
to corrupt practice and other offences in connection with the
election. It is pertinent to note that the registration of the
petitioner/first respondent in the electoral roll in Mylapore
Constituency is not attacked by the election petitioner on any
one of the grounds specified under the above provision. The
averments in the election petition, thus, cannot make out a cause
of action to challenge the election in this Court.
33. The other ground challenging the election, is that
the petitioner/first respondent was disqualified under S.8(1)(e)
read with S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951.
Paragraph 13 of the election petition reads:
&quot;Even otherwise, the 1st respondent has been ordered to pay a
penalty of Rs.31 Crores for offences under FERA by proceedings of
the Special Director, Enforcement Directorate, New Delhi in order
No.SDE (APK) III/03/98 F.No.T-3/22-D/95 dated 6-2-98. Courts have held that for payment of penalty, mens rea or culpability is
necessary. Unless the conduct of the person is contumacious or
intentionally dishonest in violating the provisions of the Act,
penalty could not be levied. Though the 1st respondent has
preferred an appeal against the said order before the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, New Delhi, a mere filing of
an appeal would not have the effect of wiping out the said order
levying penalty. May be, its enforcement by way of collection
might be stayed. In the circumstances, it should be deemed that
the 1st respondent has suffered disqualification as per
Sec.8(i)(e) of the Representation of People Act 1951. Even
though this objection was raised before the Returning Officer,
the said objection has been rejected, without any consideration
in proper perspective. The object of prescribing such a
disqualification is to ensure purity in public life and such
offenders of FERA cannot be said to fall outside the ambit of
Sec.8 and not to countenance such an interpretation would only
result in defeating the very object of such a provision
prescribing the disqualification for violation of statutory
provisions. In this view of the matter the 1st respondent should
have been disqualified and is liable to be disqualified under
Sec.8(1)(e) read with Sec.1 00(1)(a) of the Representation of the
People Act 1951.&quot; A reading of S.8(1)(e) of the Representation of People Act would
make it explicit that in order to attract the disqualification,
the concerned person should have been convicted of an offence
punishable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. Thus there should have been a conviction followed by a trial on a
lawful charge framed against the person. Nowhere the election
petition mentions that the elected candidate was prosecuted for
any offence under the FERA nor was he punished thereunder. The
Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to consider the circumstance
and hold that the adjudication proceedings under the FERA did not
amount to conviction for an offence, and they are only civil
contravention, in a case reported in AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 1100 (DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT V. M/S.MCTM CORPORATION PVT. LTD AND OTHERS), as follows: &quot;The proceedings under S.23(1)(a) are &quot;adjudicatory&quot; in nature
and character and are not 'criminal proceedings'. The officers
of the Enforcement Directorate and other administrative
authorities are expressly empowered by the Act to 'adjudicate'
only. Indeed they have to act &quot;judicially&quot; and follow the rules
of natural justice to the extent applicable but, they are not
'Judges' of the &quot;Criminal Courts&quot; trying an 'accused' for
commission of an offence, as understood in the general context.
They perform quasi-judicial functions and do not act as &quot;Courts&quot;
but only as 'administrators' and 'adjudicators'. In the
proceedings before them, they do not try &quot;an accused&quot; for
commission of &quot;any crime&quot; (not merely an offence) but determine the liability of the contravenor for the breach of his
&quot;obligations&quot; imposed under the Act. They impose 'penalty' for
the breach of the 'civil obligations' laid down under the Act and
do not impose any &quot;sentence&quot; for the commission of an offence. The expression 'penalty' is a word of wide significance. Sometime, it means recovery of an amount as a penal measure even in civil proceedings. An exaction which is not compensatory in
character is also termed as a 'penalty'. When penalty is imposed
by an adjudicating officer, it is done so in 'adjudicatory
proceedings' and not by way of fine as a result of &quot;prosecution&quot;
of an ' accused' for commission of an &quot;offence&quot; in a criminal
Court. Therefore, merely because 'penalty' clause exists in
Section 23(1)(a), the nature of the proceedings under that Section is not changed from ' adjudicatory' to 'criminal' prosecution. An order made by an adjudicating authority under
the Act is not that of conviction but of determination of the
breach of the civil obligation by the offender.
Constitution of India, Art. 20(2).
Mens rea (as is understood in criminal law) is not an essential
ingredients for holding a delinquent liable to pay penalty under
Section 2 3(1)(a) of FERA 1947 for contravention of the provisions of Section 1 0 of FERA, 1947 and penalty is attracted
under Section 23(1)(a) as soon as contravention of the statutory
obligation contemplated by Section 10(1)(a) is established.
The breach of a &quot;civil obligation&quot; which attracts &quot;penalty&quot; under
Section 23(1)(a) and a finding that the delinquent has contravened the provisions of Section 10 would immediately
attract the levy of ' penalty' under Section 23 irrespective of
the fact whether the contravention was made by the defaulter with
any &quot;guilty intention&quot; or not. Therefore, unlike in a criminal
case, where it is essential for the &quot; prosecution&quot; to establish
that the &quot;accused&quot; had the necessary guilty intention or in other
words the requisite 'mens rea' to commit the alleged offence with
which he is charged before recording his conviction, the obligation on the part of the Directorate of Enforcement in cases
of contravention of the provisions of Section 10 of FERA, would
be discharged where it is shown that the &quot;blameworthy&quot; conduct of
the delinquent had been established by wilful contravention by
him of the provisions of Section 10. It is the delinquency of
the defaulter itself which established his &quot;blameworthy&quot; conduct
attracting the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) without any further
proof of the existence of &quot;mens rea&quot;. Even after an adjudication
by the authorities and levy of penalty under Section 23(1)(a),
the defaulter can still be tried and punished for the commission
of an offence under the penal law, where the act of defaulter
also amounts to an offence under the penal law and the bar under
article 20(2) of the Constitution of India in such a case would
not be attracted. The failure to pay the penalty by itself
attracts 'prosecution' under Section 23-F and on conviction by
the 'court' for the said offence imprisonment may follow.&quot;
In view of the above decision, the adjudication proceedings under
the FERA is not a prosecution of an accused for commission of an
offence in a criminal court, and the penalty imposed cannot be
termed as fine. Hence, the
imposition of penalty cannot be deemed to be a
disqualification, and thus it would not constitute a cause of
34. Apart from all the above, paragraph 21 of the
election petition reads:
&quot;For the above reasons, the election of the 1st respondent is
(i) Under Sec.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, as the returned candidate was not qualified to be chosen to
fill the seat....&quot;
The said averment would indicate that the election of the
petitioner/first respondent was sought to be set aside under
S.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 as the
returned candidate was not qualified. Hence &quot;not qualified&quot; should only r efer to Article 84 of the Constitution of India,
&quot;84. Qualification for membership of Parliament:- A person shall
not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless
(a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some
person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an
oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose
in the Third Schedule.&quot;
It is pertinent to note that Article 102 of the Constitution
acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State.&quot;
But, Sec.100(1)(a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951
&quot;100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:- (1) Subject to
the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of
Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963).&quot;
Thus, the ground urged by the election petitioner and stated
supra, speaking only about the petitioner/first respondent being
not qualified, does not refer to any disqualification under
Article 102(1)(d) of the Constitution of India. Nowhere the
election petitioner has challenged the election alleging any
invalidity of the petitioner/first respondent in having been
elected as the Member of Parliament on any one of the grounds
stated in Article 84 of the Constitution. Therefore, the relief
sought for as stated above, is not supported by the requisite and
necessary pleadings. 35. Relying on a decision of the Apex Court reported in
2000(2) SCC 294, the learned Senior Counsel for the election
petitioner would submit that the court cannot dissect the
pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of
them discloses a cause of action; that the election petition has
to be considered as a whole; and that there cannot be a partial
rejection of the election petition. More explicit it is, on a
reading of the whole election petition, that it lacks necessary material facts, which would constitute the cause of action; and
that the facts contained in the election petition would not
constitute any cause of action.
36. The contention of the election petitioner's side
that a reasonable cause of action would mean a cause of action
with some chances of success, and so long as the claim discloses
some causes of action or raises some questions fit to be decided
by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to
succeed, is not a ground for striking it out, cannot be
countenanced. Attractive though the submissions of the learned
Senior Counsel for the election petitioner may be, they cannot be
an answer to the non-compliance of the mandatory requirements contemplated under the said provision of law, nor can they cure
the defect. As seen above, the election petition lacks material
facts, and thus it does not disclose any cause of action fit to
be decided by the court. The election petition suffers from the
vice of not satisfying the mandatory requirement of pleading
material facts, as required by Sec.83(1)(a) of the Representation
37. It is quite apparent from the discussions made above
and it would be suffice to say also, after a careful reading of
the election petition and hearing of the respective learned
Senior Counsel, that the election petition suffers from the
incurable defect by not satisfying the mandatory requirements of
pleading material facts as required by Sec.83(1)(a) of the
Representation of People Act, 1951, and the court is also
satisfied that the election petition does not satisfy the
requirement which is mandatory and also the judicial decisions stated supra. It could be well stated that the election petition
lacks the material facts, but is vague and bald in the
allegations made, and thus, the pleadings in the election
petition do not disclose any cause of action, necessitating the
court to try the same. Mandatory provisions of the Act speaking
of the pleadings and procedures for challenging an election must
be strictly followed, and if there be any deviation from or non
compliance with the same, the court has no other alternative than
to reject the election petition. Therefore, in view of the
reasons stated and discussions made above and the judicial
pronouncements, stated supra, it has to be necessarily held that the election petitioner, the first respondent herein has not made
out any ground to try the election petition, which lacks material
particulars; and that the grounds urged by him are devoid of
cause of action. The instant application has got to be allowed,
and thereby the election petition, not satisfying the requisite
and relevant provisions of law, is liable to be rejected at the
pre-trial stage itself.
38. In the result, this original application is allowed.
Consequently, Election Petition No.1 of 2000 is rejected. In the
circumstances, there shall be no order as to the costs. In view
of the rejection of the election petition, connected O.A.Nos.
37, 38 and 39 of 2002 are dismissed.
Index: yes/no -3-2002
M.CHOCKALINGAM, J. Pre-delivery order in
O.A.No.18 of 2002 in
ELEC.P.No.1 of 2000 Dt: 04-3-2002