Source: http://openjurist.org/242/f3d/348
Timestamp: 2017-06-25 17:05:55
Document Index: 464152216

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§841', '§ 841', '§841', '§841', '§841', '§841', '§841', '§841', '§841', '§841']

242 F3d 348 United States of America v. Jose Ramirez, Sr. | OpenJurist
242 F. 3d 348 - United States of America v. Jose Ramirez, Sr. HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series242 F.3d
242 F3d 348 United States of America v. Jose Ramirez, Sr. 242 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2001)
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Jose Ramirez, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 98-6130
This published opinion sets forth the court's ruling as to defendant Jose Ramirez Sr.'s final claim, that his sentence is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse his sentence and remand it to the district court for re-sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. Our decision concerning Ramirez Sr. and co-defendant Angel Anguiano's other appeals can be found in the unpublished opinion for case no. 98-5605.
Under current criminal law, a defendant's rights to notice by indictment of the crime charged, trial by jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and confrontation of witnesses turn on whether particular conduct is categorized as an "element of the offense" or as merely "a sentencing factor." See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 530 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 2090 (2000) (holding that the use of a "machinegun" in the commission of a violent crime is an element of a separate, aggravated crime, not a sentencing factor"), United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (a criminal defendant is entitled to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt"),McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (affirming Pennsylvania statute requiring that sentencing factors need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence). Following Congress's creation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647 (1989) (affirming the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) and McMillan, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), there has been a significant amount of judicial confusion concerning when certain facts should be considered an "element of the offense" and when they should be considered mere "sentencing factors." See, e.g., Castillo, 120 S.Ct. at 2092 (noting the disagreement among the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the question of whether possession of a machinegun should be considered a sentencing factor or an element of a separate, aggravated offense). In the recent case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (June 26, 2000), the Supreme Court took an initial step to clarify the boundary between what is an "element of the offense" and what is a "sentencing factor." The basic holding of Apprendi is twofold: first, that courts must count any "fact" that increases the "penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" as an element of the offense "except for one important exception," i.e., "the fact of a prior conviction;" and second, that it "is unconstitutional for a legislature" to treat "facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed" as mere sentencing factors, rather than facts to be established as elements of the offense. The question before us in this direct criminal appeal is how Apprendi applies to the various increases in penalties, particularly mandatory minimum penalties, imposed by the multi-layered sections and subsections of the federal drug statute set out in 21 U.S.C. § 841.
The indictment against the defendant charged him in general language in the first count with a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and in the second count with an attempt to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. Neither count specified the amount of cocaine involved or any other facts regarding the drug crime. After a jury trial, District Judge Echols, in a well-reasoned statement based on the sentencing rules then applicable, sentenced the defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years because he found the quantity of cocaine involved was greater than 5 kilograms -- in this case, 10 kilograms -- and that the defendant had a prior drug conviction.1 The applicable drug statute (21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A)) provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years if the offense involves 5 kilograms or more of cocaine and the defendant has a prior drug conviction. The statute in the next subsection (§ 841(b)(1)(B)) provides for a lower mandatory minimum of ten years if the offense involves less than 5 kilos but more than 500 grams and the defendant has a prior drug conviction. The next subsection (§841(b)(1)(C)) does not provide any mandatory minimum sentence under the same circumstances if the amount proved is less than the drug quantities listed in the two preceding subsections.
The reasoning of Apprendi as explained by Judge Wiseman is applicable to the instant case. Here Judge Echols believed that under the law existing prior to Apprendi and Flowal drug weight was merely a sentencing factor and that a finding of 10 kilos required a 20-year minimum sentence, but under Apprendi, this view is no longer possible. Aggravating factors, other than a prior conviction, that increase the penalty from a nonmandatory minimum sentence to a mandatory minimum sentence, or from a lesser to a greater minimum sentence, are now elements of the crime to be charged and proved. From a practical perspective, this means that when a defendant is found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), he must be sentenced under 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(C) unless the jury has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the minimum amounts required by §841(b)(1)(A) and §841(b)(1)(B).2 Because in this case the government did not charge or attempt to prove to the jury a quantity of drugs that would permit a mandatory sentence, we remand this case to the District Court with instructions to sentence the defendant under 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(C) and in accordance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
This instruction specifically does not cover drug conspiracies exclusively involving Marihuana, which are governed by 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(D).
Two other circuits have held that the Apprendi rule does not apply to the determination of quantity of drugs in order to trigger the statutory minimum sentences. See United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("we hold that a fact used in sentencing that does not increase a penalty beyond the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt"); and United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 934 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Those [statutory] minimums, because they are within the statutory range authorized by §841(b)(1)(C) without reference to drug quantity, are permissible under Apprendi and McMillan even where the drug quantity was not charged in the indictment or found by the jury. . . .").