Source: https://casetext.com/case/cuyler-v-sullivan
Timestamp: 2018-12-17 09:59:04
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 6', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 | Casetext
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446 U.S. 335•100 S. Ct. 1708•
…A criminal defendant&apos;s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes a right to counsel…
…In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, the Court created an automatic reversal rule where counsel is forced…
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holding that "multiple representation does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest" and "a reviewing court cannot presume that the possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel"
Summary of this case from United States v. Cardona-Vicenty
holding that the lower court had inappropriately granted relief based on the existence of a possible conflict and explaining an actual conflict is required
Summary of this case from Noe v. United States
holding that "a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief
…446 U.S. 335 (1980), the Court suggested that the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.…
Capital Defense Weekly, March 6, 2000
…100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980)."V.An actual conflict may exist and the Constitution is implicated when an attorney is…
Argued February 20, 1980. Decided May 12, 1980.
1. The Court of Appeals did not exceed the proper scope of review when it rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that the two lawyers had not undertaken multiple representation. The Pennsylvania court's conclusion was a mixed determination of law and fact not covered by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), which provides that a state court's determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue shall be presumed to be correct. Pp. 341-342.
Two privately retained lawyers, G. Fred DiBona and A. Charles Peruto, represented all three defendants throughout the state proceedings that followed the indictment. Sullivan had different counsel at the medical examiner's inquest, but he thereafter accepted representation from the two lawyers retained by his codefendants because he could not afford to pay his own lawyer. At no time did Sullivan or his lawyers object to the multiple representation. Sullivan was the first defendant to come to trial. The evidence against him was entirely circumstantial, consisting primarily of McGrath's testimony. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defense rested without presenting any evidence. The jury found Sullivan guilty and fixed his penalty at life imprisonment. Sullivan's post-trial motions failed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction by an equally divided vote. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 446 Pa. 419, 286 A.2d 898 (1971). Sullivan's codefendants, Carchidi and DiPasquale, were acquitted at separate trials.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (1979). It first held that the participation by DiBona and Peruto in the trials of Sullivan and his codefendants established, as a matter of law, that both lawyers had represented all three defendants. The court recognized that multiple representation "`is not tantamount to the denial of effective assistance of counsel. . . .'" But it held that a criminal defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction whenever he makes "`some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote. . . .'" Id., at 519, quoting Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (CA3) ( per curiam), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915 (1970). See also United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (CA3 1973). The court acknowledged that resting at the close of the prosecutor's case "would have been a legitimate tactical decision if made by independent counsel." Nevertheless, the court thought that action alone raised a possibility of conflict sufficient to prove a violation of Sullivan's Sixth Amendment rights. The court found support for its conclusion in Peruto's admission that concern for Sullivan's codefendants had affected his judgment that Sullivan should not present a defense. To give weight to DiBona's contrary testimony, the court held, "would be to . . . require a showing of actual prejudice." 593 F.2d, at 522.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at first divided evenly on whether the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. 593 F.2d, at 521, n. 10.
Judge Garth, with whom Judges Adams and Rosenn joined, filed an opinion dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc. Id., at 524.
At the outset, we must consider whether the Court of Appeals exceeded the proper scope of review when it rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that DiBona and Peruto had not undertaken multiple representation. Petitioners claim that this determination by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was factfinding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
Section 2254(d) provides that "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . [and] evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct" unless the applicant for a federal writ of habeas corpus can establish one of the enumerated causes for exception. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding does not fall within this statute because it is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.
Petitioners must rely solely on the State Supreme Court's holding because the state court that heard evidence on Sullivan's petition for collateral relief did not decide whether defense counsel had represented conflicting interests. See supra, at 339. The State Supreme Court resolved that issue on the second direct appeal without the benefit of a trial court finding. Since we conclude that a determination of whether counsel undertook multiple representation is not a finding of fact, we need not decide whether the statements of an appellate court can be "determination[s] after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). Compare Velleca v. Superintendent, 523 F.2d 1040, 1041-1042 (CA1 1975) ( per curiam), with Hill v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 1346, 1348 (CA9 1972) ( per curiam).
In Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), the Court examined the distinction between law and fact as it applies on collateral review of a state conviction. The Townsend opinion, the precursor of § 2254(d), noted that the phrase "issues of fact" refers "to what are termed basic, primary, or historical facts: facts `in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. . . .'" 372 U.S., at 309, n. 6, quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Findings about the roles DiBona and Peruto played in the defenses of Sullivan and his codefendants are facts in this sense. But the holding that the lawyers who played those roles did not engage in multiple representation is a mixed determination of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the historical facts of this case. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-404 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193, n. 3 (1972). That holding is open to review on collateral attack in a federal court.
We turn next to the claim that the alleged failings of Sullivan's retained counsel cannot provide the basis for a writ of habeas corpus because the conduct of retained counsel does not involve state action. A state prisoner can win a federal writ of habeas corpus only upon a showing that the State participated in the denial of a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is a fundamental right. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29-33 (1972). In this case, Sullivan retained his own lawyers, but he now claims that a conflict of interest hampered their advocacy. He does not allege that state officials knew or should have known that his lawyers had a conflict of interest. Thus, we must decide whether the failure of retained counsel to provide adequate representation can render a trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the petitioners did not present this state action argument to the Court of Appeals, both parties have briefed and argued it in this Court. Since resolution of this question of law is a "predicate to an intelligent resolution" of the question on which we granted certiorari, see Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 258-259, n. 5 (1980), we must address it. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320, n. 6 (1971). See generally R. Stern E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 6.27, pp. 458-461 (5th ed. 1978).
This Court's decisions establish that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236-237 (1941); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923). The Court recognized as much in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), when it held that a defendant who must face felony charges in state court without the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment has been denied due process of law. Unless a defendant charged with a serious offense has counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. Id., at 344; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-468 (1938). When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 29-33.
See generally Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1345-1346 (CA5 1974) (en banc) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975); West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1032-1034 (CA5 1973), vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 363 (1975) (en banc).
See Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Counsel: Why the Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A. J. 254, 255 (1969).
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said in United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (1973):
"A rule which would apply one fourteenth amendment test to assigned counsel and another to retained counsel would produce the anomaly that the nonindigent, who must retain an attorney if he can afford one, would be entitled to less protection. . . . The effect upon the defendant — confinement as a result of an unfair state trial — is the same whether the inadequate attorney was assigned or retained."
In Holloway, a single public defender represented three defendants at the same trial. The trial court refused to consider the appointment of separate counsel despite the defense lawyer's timely and repeated assertions that the interests of his clients conflicted. This Court recognized that a lawyer forced to represent codefendants whose interests conflict cannot provide the adequate legal assistance required by the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 481-482. Given the trial court's failure to respond to timely objections, however, the Court did not consider whether the alleged conflict actually existed. It simply held that the trial court's error unconstitutionally endangered the right to counsel. Id., at 483-487. Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to multiple representation. But nothing in our precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case. Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. Indeed, as the Court noted in Holloway, supra, at 485-486, trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel. "An `attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.'" 435 U.S., at 485, quoting State v. Davis, 110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973). Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.
In certain cases, proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides that the federal district courts "shall promptly inquire with respect to . . . joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation." See also ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Function of the Trial Judge § 3.4(b) (App. Draft 1972).
Several Courts of Appeals already invoke their supervisory power to require similar inquires. See United States v. Waldman, 579 F.2d 649, 651-652 (CA1 1978); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 452-454 (CA2 1973); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (CA8 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (CA8 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); cf. Ford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 348-349, 379 F.2d 123, 125-126 (1967). As our promulgation of Rule 44(c) suggests, we view such an exercise of the supervisory power as a desirable practice. See generally Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel — The Trial Judge's Role, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 653-654 (1980).
Although some Circuits have said explicitly that the Sixth Amendment does not require an inquiry into the possibility of conflicts, United States v. Steel, 576 F.2d 111 (CA6) ( per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978); United States v. Mavrick, 601 F.2d 921, 929 (CA7 1979), a recent opinion in the Second Circuit held otherwise, Colon v. Fogg, 603 F.2d 403, 407 (1979).
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-105, EC 5-15 (1976); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function § 3.5 (b) (App. Draft 1971).
See United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1310 (CA7), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 675-677 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); Geer, supra n. 11, at 145-146.
Nothing in the circumstances of this case indicates that the trial court had a duty to inquire whether there was a conflict of interest. The provision of separate trials for Sullivan and his codefendants significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in their interests. No participant in Sullivan's trial ever objected to the multiple representation. DiBona's opening argument for Sullivan outlined a defense compatible with the view that none of the defendants was connected with the murders. See Brief for Respondent 7. The opening argument also suggested that counsel was not afraid to call witnesses whose testimony might be needed at the trials of Sullivan's codefendants. See id., at 8-9. Finally, as the Court of Appeals noted, counsel's critical decision to rest Sullivan's defense was on its face a reasonable tactical response to the weakness of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecutor. 593 F.2d, at 521, and n. 10. On these facts, we conclude that the Sixth Amendment imposed upon the trial court no affirmative duty to inquire into the propriety of multiple representation.
Holloway reaffirmed that multiple representation does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest. See 435 U.S., at 482. Since a possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation, a defendant who objects to multiple representation must have the opportunity to show that potential conflicts impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial. But unless the trial court fails to afford such an opportunity, a reviewing court cannot presume that the possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. Such a presumption would preclude multiple representation even in cases where "`[a] common defense . . . gives strength against a common attack.'" Id., at 482-483, quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. In Glasser v. United States, for example, the record showed that defense counsel failed to cross-examine a prosecution witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the crime and failed to resist the presentation of arguably inadmissible evidence. Id., at 72-75. The Court found that both omissions resulted from counsel's desire to diminish the jury's perception of a codefendant's guilt. Indeed, the evidence of counsel's "struggle to serve two masters [could not] seriously be doubted." Id., at 75. Since this actual conflict of interest impaired Glasser's defense, the Court reversed his conviction.
A substantial majority of the Courts of Appeals require defendants who contend that multiple representation violated their Sixth Amendment rights to identify an actual conflict of interest. See United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 773 (CA2), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970); United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d 1283, 1284-1285 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Foxworth v. Wainwright, supra, at 1077; Thacker v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 640, 642 (CA6), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); United States v. Mandell, supra, at 677-678; United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d at 321-323; United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); cf. United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1056 (CA2 1976) (burden of proof shifts when trial court fails to inquire into possibility of conflict).
Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972), presented a contrasting situation. Dukes pleaded guilty on the advice of two lawyers, one of whom also represented Dukes' codefendants on an unrelated charge. Dukes later learned that this lawyer had sought leniency for the codefendants by arguing that their cooperation with the police induced Dukes to plead guilty. Dukes argued in this Court that his lawyer's conflict of interest had infected his plea. We found "`nothing in the record . . . which would indicate that the alleged conflict resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel and did in fact render the plea in question involuntary and unintelligent.'" Id., at 256, quoting Dukes v. Warden, 161 Conn. 337, 344, 288 A.2d 58, 62 (1971). Since Dukes did not identify an actual lapse in representation, we affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief.
Glasser established that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error. Once the Court concluded that Glasser's lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it refused "to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice" attributable to the conflict. The conflict itself demonstrated a denial of the "right to have the effective assistance of counsel." 315 U.S., at 76. Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. See Holloway, supra, at 487-491. But until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. See Glasser, supra, at 72-75.
See Comment, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J. Crim. L. C. 226, 231-232 (1977).
I agree with the Court, in Part III, ante, at 342-345, that the alleged failure of retained counsel to render effective assistance involves state action and thus provides the basis for a writ of habeas corpus. I cannot, however, join Part IV of the opinion. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), settled that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants. While Holloway also established that defendants usually have the right to share a lawyer if they so choose, that choice must always be knowing and intelligent. The trial judge, therefore, must play a positive role in ensuring that the choice was made intelligently. The court cannot delay until a defendant or an attorney raises a problem, for the Constitution also protects defendants whose attorneys fail to consider, or choose to ignore, potential conflict problems. "Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. . . . The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942). "While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). This principle is honored only if the accused has the active protection of the trial court in assuring that no potential for divergence in interests threatens the adequacy of counsel's representation.
It is no imposition on a trial court to require it to find out whether attorneys are representing "two or more defendants [who] have been jointly charged . . . or have been joined for trial . . .," to use the language of proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c). It is probable as a practical matter that virtually all instances of joint representation will appear from the face of the charging papers and the appearances filed by attorneys. The American Bar Association's standards under the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Function of the Trial Judge § 3.4(b) (App. Draft 1972), are framed on the premise that judges will be readily able to ascertain instances of joint representation.
Had the trial record in the present case shown that respondent made a knowing and intelligent choice of joint representation, I could accept the Court's standard for a postconviction determination as to whether respondent in fact was denied effective assistance. Where it is clear that a defendant has voluntarily chosen to proceed with joint representation, it is fair, if he later alleges ineffective assistance growing out of a conflict, to require that he demonstrate "that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation." Ante, at 349. Here, however, where there is no evidence that the court advised respondent about the potential for conflict or that respondent made a knowing and intelligent choice to forgo his right to separate counsel, I believe that respondent, who has shown a significant possibility of conflict, is entitled to a presumption that his representation in fact suffered. Therefore, I would remand the case to allow the petitioners an opportunity to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that respondent's representation was not actually affected by the possibility of conflict.
The Court of Appeals held that respondent successfully carried the burden of demonstrating "a possibility of prejudice or conflict of interest and that independent counsel might well have chosen a different trial strategy." United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 521 (1979). The court based its holding, in part, on the testimony of one of respondent's two trial attorneys. He testified that they chose not to present a defense in respondent's case partly because they did not want to expose their defense before the upcoming trials of respondent's codefendants. Also, they did not want to risk having any evidence come out which, while exculpating respondent, might inculpate one of the codefendants. Ibid. The court credited this testimony. Id., at 522.
I believe, however, that the potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is "so grave," see ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-3.5(b) (App. Draft, 2d ed. 1979), that whenever two or more defendants are represented by the same attorney the trial judge must make a preliminary determination that the joint representation is the product of the defendants' informed choice. I therefore agree with MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN that the trial court has a duty to inquire whether there is multiple representation, to warn defendants of the possible risks of such representation, and to ascertain that the representation is the result of the defendants' informed choice.
The determination that the defendant has made an informed choice of counsel would not, of course, establish a waiver that would prevent him from subsequently raising any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest. The dangers of infringing the defendants' privilege against self-incrimination and their right to maintain the confidentiality of the defense strategy foreclose the type of detailed inquiry necessary to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver. Furthermore, the inquiry would take place at such an early stage of the proceedings that not all possible conflicts might be anticipated. See Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 145 (1978).
I dissent from the Court's formulation of the proper standard for determining whether multiple representation has violated the defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court holds that in the absence of an objection at trial, the defendant must show "that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Ante, at 348. If the Court's holding would require a defendant to demonstrate that his attorney's trial performance differed from what it would have been if the defendant had been the attorney's only client, I believe it is inconsistent with our previous cases. Such a test is not only unduly harsh, but incurably speculative as well. The appropriate question under the Sixth Amendment is whether an actual, relevant conflict of interests existed during the proceedings. If it did, the conviction must be reversed. Since such a conflict was present in this case, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Because it is the simultaneous representation of conflicting interests against which the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant, he need go no further than to show the existence of an actual conflict. An actual conflict of interests negates the unimpaired loyalty a defendant is constitutionally entitled to expect and receive from his attorney.
"Conflict of interests" is a term that is often used and seldom defined. The American Bar Associations' usage, which has remained essentially unchanged since the promulgation of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, is a fair statement of what is ordinarily meant by the term, and it is that meaning that I adopt here. The ABA Standards state that a lawyer should not undertake multiple representation "if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to another." ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-3.5(b) (App. Draft, 2d ed. 1979). The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids multiple representation "if it would be likely to involve [the lawyer] in representing differing interests," unless the lawyer can adequately represent each client and obtains the informed consent of each. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A)-(B) (1976). The Code of Professional Responsibility superseded the Canons of Professional Ethics (1937), which spoke of "conflicting interests" rather than "differing interests." The term was defined in Canon 6: "[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." The ABA materials do not, of course, define the constitutional standard. However, they are consistent with Glasser's emphasis on the interests of the defendants, and the corresponding duties owed by the attorney, rather than on the empirical question of the effect of the conflict on the attorney's performance. See Comment, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Representation of Criminal Co-defendants, 68 J. Crim. L. C. 226 (1977).
Moreover, a showing that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance is not only unnecessary, it is often an impossible task. As the Court emphasized in Holloway:
In Glasser, the defendant's objection at trial to joint representation was that, as his lawyer put it, "Mr. Glasser feels that if I would represent Mr. Kretske the jury would get an idea that they are together. . . ." 315 U.S., at 68. Whether the attorney's performance was in fact affected by the joint representation is, of course, irrelevant to the merits of such a claim. While the Court did discuss the possibility that the lawyer's failure to cross-examine prosecution witnesses fully or to object to the admission of certain evidence was the result of the joint representation, the possibility that the jury would assume that "birds of a feather flock to the same lawyer," Greer, supra n. 1, at 136, was the only objection raised at trial and the Court plainly considered it sufficient to require the appointment of separate counsel for Kretske.
"[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing . . . . It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible." 435 U.S., at 490-491 (emphasis in original).