Source: http://ok.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170808_0000660.C10.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-05-24 23:08:53
Document Index: 92933723

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

TERRY ROYAL, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent - Appellee. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION; SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA; UNITED KEETOOWAH BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA, Amici Curiae.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA D.C. Nos. 6:03-CV-00443-RAW-KEW and 6:12-CV-00191-RAW-KEW
C. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction ................................................................................. 52
1. Additional Legal Background ............................................................................. 54
a. Supreme Court authority ......................................................................... 54
a. Original homeland and forced relocation ................................................. 58
d. Early congressional regulation of modern-day Oklahoma ....................... 61
g. Creation of Oklahoma ............................................................................. 65
5) "Original Allotment Agreement, " ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861 (March 1, 1901) ............................................................................................... 77
6) "Supplemental Allotment Agreement, " ch. 1323, 32 Stat. 500 (June 30, 1902) ......................................................................................... 84
8) "Oklahoma Enabling Act, " ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (June 16, 1906) . 89 ii. Analysis ............................................................................................... 90
(a)all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
"AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). When a state court adjudicates a claim on the merits, AEDPA prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).[20]
Section 2254(d) provides three ways to overcome AEDPA deference. Two appear in § 2254(d)(1), which provides that a state prisoner can qualify for habeas relief by showing a state court decision was (1) "contrary to" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of" federal law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (explaining the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses each carry "independent meaning"). The third way, in § 2254(d)(2), requires a state prisoner to show that a state court decision was based on an unreasonable factual determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, "[e]ach of AEDPA's three prongs-contrary to clearly established federal law, unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and unreasonable determination of the facts-presents an independent inquiry." Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 2017).
Mr. Murphy makes arguments based on all three, but because we need apply only § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" provision to resolve this case, we restrict our discussion to that clause.
When a state court adjudicates a prisoner's federal claim on the merits, review under § 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause proceeds in three steps.
First, we must decide whether there is clearly established federal law that applies to the claim. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Whether the law is clearly established is the threshold question under § 2254(d)(1)."). In discerning what law is "clearly established, " we must look only to the decisions of the Supreme Court, see Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012) (per curiam) (explaining circuit precedent "cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA"), and we must "measure state-court decisions against [the Supreme] Court's precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision, " Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (emphasis and quotations omitted).[21]Within this set of cases, "'clearly established Federal law' for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions." White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (brackets and quotations omitted).
Second, if we can identify clearly established law, we then must assess whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" that law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also House, 527 F.3d at 1018. "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different, ' 'opposite in character or nature, ' or 'mutually opposed.'" Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (controlling opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 495 (1976)). A state court decision violates the "contrary to" clause if it "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases." Id. If the state court identifies and applies "the correct legal rule, " its decision will not be "contrary to" federal law, but the state court's application of the correct rule can still be evaluated under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause. Id. at 406.
Third, if the state court rendered a decision that was "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent by applying the wrong legal test, we do not necessarily grant relief; rather, we review the claim applying the correct law. Put differently, "it is . . . a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of review, " but habeas relief does not "automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard." Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002). By showing the state court decision was "contrary to" clearly established federal law, the prisoner surmounts AEDPA, and the federal habeas court "must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires." Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (explaining that if "the state-court decision falls within" the "contrary to" clause, "a federal court will be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1)"); Milton v. Miller, 744 F.3d 660, 670-71 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding OCCA's decision was "contrary to" clearly established federal standard and reviewing claim de novo).
As previously mentioned, we choose to assume that AEDPA supplies our standard of review and now turn to the substantive law governing Indian country jurisdiction.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;B. Indian ...