Source: http://md.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20130430_0000777.DMD.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-02-28 12:23:52
Document Index: 607063880

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2253', '§ 2253']

| Issa v. United States
Issa v. United States
AKEEMLUTAL ISSA, Petitioner,v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. No. DKC-10-335
Petitioner contends that his petition is not untimely because he filed it within a year after the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the one-year limitations period runs from "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." This argument falters, however, because Simmons was decided by the Fourth Circuit, not the Supreme Court, and the decision upon which Simmons rests, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010), was decided prior to Petitioner's sentencing.
We note that [a Section 2255 petitioner's] claim for retroactive application of the Supreme Court's opinion in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010), and our opinion in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241-45 (4th Cir. 2011) ( en banc ), fails in light of our recent opinion in United States v. Powell, 691 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2012).
Clearly, then, the holding in Simmons is not a new right recognized by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Moreover, Simmons concerned whether a prior conviction for a violation of a particular North Carolina statute qualified as a felony. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the defendant's conviction for a Class I felony under North Carolina law was an offense "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" and thus qualified as a predicate felony conviction for purposes of the sentencing enhancement provision of the Controlled Substances Act ("the CSA").[1] Simmons, 649 F.3d at 243. Under North Carolina law, the defendant, as a first-time offender, could not receive a sentence exceeding eight months' community punishment. Id. "Because the state sentencing court never made the recidivist finding necessary to expose [the defendant] to a higher sentence, Carachuri teaches that the Government cannot now rely on such a finding to set the maximum term of imprisonment.'" Id. (quoting Carachuri, 130 S.Ct. at 2587 n. 12). Thus, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the North Carolina law, under the circumstances presented by the defendant's case, did not qualify as a predicate felony conviction for purposes of sentencing enhancement under the CSA. Simmons, 649 F.3d at 245.
Alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4), a petition may be filed within one year of "the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Some courts have held that, to the extent that interpretation of North Carolina law may impact sentencing enhancement in a federal conviction, the holding in Simmons may be relied upon as a fact supporting the claim under the exception for the one-year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). See, e.g., Yarborough v. United States, Nos. 5:07-CR-00270-1-F, 5:11-CV-00568-F, 2012 WL 1605579, at *2 (E.D. N.C. May 8, 2012) (holding that a change in precedent announced by the Fourth Circuit constitutes a fact for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4)). Issa, however, does not assert that a prior North Carolina conviction was relied upon for sentencing enhancement in his case. Thus, the Simmons decision does not apply to excuse the untimeliness of Issa's Motion to Vacate.
Issa was granted additional time to explain why his motion should not be dismissed as time-barred and whether equitable tolling applied to his filings. (ECF No. 29). In addition to reasserting his reliance on Simmons, Issa further indicates that his research on filing his motion to vacate was slow and difficult work given that he did not have the assistance of an attorney. (ECF No. 30). To be entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner must establish either that some wrongful conduct by the Government contributed to his delay in filing his Motion to Vacate, or that circumstances beyond his control caused the delay. See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). "[A]ny resort to equity must be reserved for those rare instances where... it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result." Id. Petitioner fails to establish factors warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. To the extent Petitioner relies on his pro se status to excuse his late filing, such a contiention is insufficient to invoke equitable tolling. See United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (ignorance of the law, even for a pro se litigant, is insufficient).
Unless a certificate of appealabilty ("COA") is issued, a petitioner may not appeal the court's decision in a Section 2255 proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed.R.App.P. 22(b). A COA may issue only if the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong[, ]" Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or that "the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further, " Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). The denial of a COA does not preclude a petitioner from seeking permission to file a ...