Source: https://oshrc.gov/decisions/html_2017/16-1214.html
Timestamp: 2017-05-30 05:23:33
Document Index: 535245581

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 651', '§\n1926', '§ 10', '§ 659', '§ 3', '§ 652', '§2200', '§ 2200', '§ 666', '§\n1926', '§ 666', '§ 666', '§ 17', 'arts 1910', '§\n666', '§2200', '§ 661', '§2200']

Juan Guillen., Docket No. 16-1214
Matthew P. Sallusti,
Dallas, TX, GA, for
Juan Guillen, Pro se,
a citation with a proposed penalty of $2,800.00
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
the United States Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)1
for an alleged serious2
C.F.R. §
1926.454(a), OSHA’s training requirements standard related to scaffolds. After
contested the citation,
Secretary of Labor (Secretary)
filed a formal complaint3
seeking an order affirming the citation and proposed penalty. The Secretary subsequently
a “re-formatted” motion and a second
“re-formatted”
motion seeking an order granting
summary judgment in his favor.4
did not file a response to the motion. The
asserts, and the Court agrees, in light of
Guillen’s failure to answer and or respond to
requests contained therein are deemed admitted.
Since Guillen failed to answer or respond to the complaint, the allegations
that jurisdiction of this action is conferred upon the Commission by § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c),
is an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of § 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5), are deemed admitted.
(Court’s Oct. 7, 2016 Order at 2; Compl.
¶¶ 1, 2). The
of this action pursuant to section 10(c) of the Act.
Pursuant to Commission Rule 90(a), after carefully considering all the evidence and the arguments of
counsel, the Court issues this
constitutes its final disposition of the proceedings.
For the reasons indicated
infra, the
Secretary’s summary judgment motion is
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5
party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought.”
to summary judgment if there is ‘no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
––– U.S. –––,
135 S. Ct. 1338,
1355 (2015) (citing
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a)).
In making that determination, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.”
Tolan v. Cotton,
134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866
(2014) (citing
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Further, the Supreme Court
reminded us of the axiom that
“in ruling on a
judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”
Tolan, 134 S. Ct.
1863 (citing
supra). “Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility”
of informing the
“of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of” the depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, “which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Commission Rule 34(b) mandates that “[w]ithin 20 days after service of the complaint, the party against whom the complaint was issued shall file an answer with the Commission” which “shall contain a short and plain statement denying those allegations in the complaint which the party intends to contest. Any allegation not denied shall be deemed admitted.” 29 C.F.R §2200.
34(b)(1),
(2). Since
failed to file an answer, all
allegations in the complaint,
citation incorporated therein,
admitted. Likewise,
have been served on a party,
matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the requests
. . . the party to whom the requests are directed serves upon the requesting party a written answer specifically admitting or denying the matter involved in whole or in part, or asserting that it cannot be truthfully admitted or denied and setting forth in detail the reasons why this is so, or an objection, stating in detail the reasons therefor.”
29 CFR § 2200.54(b). Again, since
an answer to the Secretary’s
also deemed admitted.
complaint, the citation, and
the Secretary’s requests for admissions
Guillen’s deemed admissions,
Under the law of the
Fifth Circuit, the jurisdiction in which this case arose,
make out a prima facie case for the violation of
“must show by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) that the cited standard applies; (2) noncompliance with the cited standard; (3) access or exposure to the violative conditions; and (4) that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions through the exercise of reasonable due diligence.”
Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Perez, 811 F.3d 730, 735
(5th Cir. 2016)
Jesse Remodeling,
LLC, 22 BNA OSHC 1340 (2006);
Atlantic Battery Co., 16 BNA OSHC 2131 (1994)).
Therefore, as the movant, in order to be entitled to summary judgment, the
must show that,
the evidence in the light most favorable to
no genuine dispute as to
prima facie. For the reasons indicated
infra, the Court concludes the
has carried his burden.
A “serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 666(k). Thus, “[w]hether the employer intended to violate an OSHA standard is irrelevant. The only question relevant to the employer's state of mind is whether he knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the violation.”
Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 318–19 (5th Cir. 1979).
failed to answer or respond to
Secretary’s requests for admissions,
no genuine dispute
died as a result of injuries he sustained after he fell off of the scaffolding
the citation was properly
classified as a serious violation.
(Sec’y’s Statement Undisputed Material Facts
Sec’y’s Req. Admis.
The citation in this case alleges
Guillen violated
29 C.F.R §
1926.454(a), OSHA’s
training requirements related to scaffolds, which mandates “[t]he employer shall have each employee who performs work while on a scaffold trained by a person qualified in the
subject matter to recognize the hazards associated with the type of scaffold being used and to understand the procedures to control or minimize those hazards”
in that “[o]n or about January 19, 2016, at store #1524, an employee was exposed to a fall hazard while
working from a mobile scaffold without being trained on the hazards associated with working
from a mobile scaffold.”
no genuine dispute that
did not have each employee who performed work while on a
scaffold trained by a person qualified in the subject matter to recognize the hazards associated with the
type of scaffold being used and to understand the procedures to control or minimize those hazard.
(Court’s Oct. 7, 2016 Order at 2; Compl. at Ex. A p. 6;
Sec’y’s Statement Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 3, 19-24; Sec’y’s Req. Admis.
¶¶ 4, 8).
that the cited standard was violated.
Guillen failed to answer or respond to the Secretary’s complaint or requests for admissions,
no genuine dispute that Guillen employed Enrique Perez and that on or about January 19, 2016, at store #1524, Perez was exposed to a fall hazard while working from a mobile scaffold and
sustained when he fell off
Sec’y’s Statement Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 19-24;
Sec’y’s Req. Admis. ¶¶ 5-6). Therefore, there is
no genuine dispute that Guillen’s employee was exposed to a fall hazard.
there is no genuine dispute that
“had actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions through the exercise of reasonable due diligence.”
Sanderson Farms, 811 F.3d
at 735. To prove knowledge, “the Secretary must show that the
employer knew of, or with exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the non-complying condition.”
811 F.3d
at 736 (citing Trinity Industries v. OSHRC, 206 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir.
failed to inquire with Perez concerning the amount of training
in relation to scaffolding erection, and further, that Guillen
had not provided
employees, including Perez, with training
on the hazards associated with working from a scaffold.
(Sec’y’s
Statement Undisputed
Material Facts ¶¶ 19-24;
¶¶4, 8, 9). Thus,
constructive knowledge of the
exercise reasonable due diligence.
his prima facie case,
waived his right to present any affirmative defenses after having failed to file an answer to the complaint,
Court concludes the Secretary
135 S. Ct. 1338, 1355 (2015) (citing
proposed a penalty of $2,800.00 for the violation. Under the Act, an employer who commits a “serious” violation may be assessed a civil penalty of up to $7,000 for each such violation.12 29 U.S.C. § 666(b). The Commission is empowered to “assess all civil penalties” provided in this section, “giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations.” 29 U.S.C. § 666(j).
the penalty proposed for the violation “is appropriate within the meaning of § 17(j) of the Act,
due consideration to the size of the business, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of
Guillen, and the history of previous violations.”
(Court’s Oct. 7, 2016 Order at 2;
Compl. ¶ 6;
Compl. at Ex. A p. 6.) Thus, the Court finds the appropriate civil penalty is $2,800.00. Accordingly,
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and therefore his motion
trial in this action is
CANCELLED, the
is assessed and directed to pay to the
a civil penalty of $2,800.00.
Dated: March 6, 2017 /s/ Atlanta, GA JOHN B. GATTO, Judge
1 The Secretary of Labor (Secretary) delegated his authority under the Act to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, who heads OSHA, and assigned responsibility for enforcement of the Act to OSHA.
65 Fed.Reg. 50017 (2000). The Assistant Secretary has promulgated occupational safety and health standards,
see e.g., 29 C.F.R. Parts 1910 and 1926, and has redelegated his authority to OSHA’s Area Directors to issue citations and proposed penalties to enforce the Act.
2 Under section 17 of the Act, violations are characterized as “willful,” “repeated,” “serious,” or “not to be of a serious nature” (referred to by the Commission as “other-than-serious”). 29 U.S.C. §§
666(a), (b), (c).
3 Attached to the complaint and also adopted by reference was the citation at issue. Commission Rule 30(d) provides that “[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion. A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”
29 C.F.R §2200.30(d). Therefore, any reference to the complaint in this memorandum also includes the citation.
4 The Court denied the Secretary’s initial summary judgment motion for failing to comply with the
summary judgment requirements outlined in the Court’s
Since the previously filed summary judgment motions are moot, this memorandum only addresses the second “re-formatted’” motion.
“[u]nless the Commission has adopted a different rule, its proceedings shall be in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 29 U.S.C. § 661(g). Commission Rule 61 provides
“[m]otions for summary judgment are covered by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.”
29 C.F.R §2200.61.