Source: https://casetext.com/case/gay-student-services-v-texas-a-m-university
Timestamp: 2019-02-21 10:21:48
Document Index: 389581947

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1331', '§ 2201', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331']

Gay Student Services v. Texas a M University, 612 F.2d 160 | Casetext
Gay Student Services v. Texas a M University
612 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1980)
Gay Student Servicesv.Texas a M University
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth CircuitFeb 20, 1980
Gay Activists Alliance v. Bd. of Regents
…It is important to note at this point that for the purpose of the injunction, the Board of Regents, as a body…
Moreno v. Texas Southern University
…Because plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, this court must determine whether Texas Southern University,…
finding that a university may be a "person" for purposes of § 1983, but may still be immune under the eleventh amendment.
Summary of this case from Irwin v. Calhoun
Nelson Mallett, J. Patrick Wiseman, Hormachea Sauer, Larry Sauer, Sarah Scott, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.
The plaintiffs-appellants are student members of Gay Student Services, a voluntary association which has sought and been denied official registration as a student organization by Texas A M University at College Station.
Listed as defendants are Texas A M University, Jack K. Williams, President of Texas A M at College Station, John J. Koldus, Vice-President for Student Services at Texas A M at College Station, and W. C. Freeman, Executive Vice-President for Administration at Texas A M at College Station. Also named as defendants are the members of the Board of Regents for Texas A M. All defendants are sued in their official capacities and not individually.
On November 29, 1976, Dr. Koldus wrote a letter denying official recognition to the group. In this letter he noted that homosexual conduct was illegal in Texas [as it undoubtedly is under Chapter 21 of the Texas Criminal Code] and that Gay Student Services was likely to promote and incite acts contrary to and in violation of the Texas Penal Code. He concluded that Gay Student Services was not "consistent with the philosophy and goals that have been developed for the creation and existence of Texas A M University."
The complaint further alleges that due to the denial of official recognition the group has been forced to secure off-campus meeting places, involving rent and maintenance costs; meetings have often been in private homes, limiting the number who can attend; hostility of other students toward the organization has increased; members of the organization have been restricted in their ability to speak to classes and seminars; advertising and distribution of literature informing students of meetings, services, and educational goals of the organization has been severely limited; and "traditional myths" about sexual stereotypes have been reinforced. The plaintiffs further state that Texas A M University has at no time prohibited the enrollment of men and women who openly identify themselves as homosexuals. Nevertheless, it refuses these students the same rights as other students to organize and meet for the purpose of discussing common interests and problems.
On June 28, 1977, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. It was alleged that (1) Texas A M University and the other named individual defendants, sued in their official capacity, were not "persons" for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; therefore, jurisdiction was lacking under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, (2) plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action giving rise to general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (3) plaintiffs had not overcome the jurisdictional bar of the 11th Amendment, (4) plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the cause they sought to bring, and that (5) dismissal of the cause as pleaded under §§ 2201 and 2202 was proper.
Since the dismissal order does not tell us the legal theory upon which the dismissal was based, we proceed to a consideration of all the grounds asserted in the motion to determine whether at this juncture dismissal could have properly been predicated on any one of them.
The motion to dismiss did not state that it was premised upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We note that such a claim would fail, nevertheless, under the standard set out in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that such a motion should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any statement of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. See Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1976); Cook Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1971).
I [12] Asserted Ground No. 1: § 1983 "person" status
Consequently, an institution of higher learning, such as the university here involved, no longer enjoys absolute § 1983 immunity. Monell did not specifically mention universities as "persons" but there would appear to be no analytical difference in the operation of universities and other governing bodies such as cities. See Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979), holding San Jacinto Junior College to be a "person" for purposes of § 1983.
The Monell majority opinion also stated in a footnote: "Our holding today is, of course, limited to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 436 U.S. at 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36 n. 54. An entity may be a "person" under § 1983 yet still not be sued for monetary relief due to Eleventh Amendment immunity based upon the entity's close connection with the State and its treasury. This does not, however, prevent declaratory or injunctive relief. The word "person" as used in § 1983 is not intended to have a bifurcated application dependent on the nature of the relief sought. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973).
On the other hand, the language of § 1983, read against the background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.
Since official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent — at least where Eleventh Amendment considerations do not control analysis — our holding today that local governments can be sued under § 1983 necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 in those cases in which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own name.
436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2036-55. See Rainey v. Jackson State College, 591 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1979); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District of Sweeny, Texas, 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966, 98 S.Ct. 507, 54 L.Ed.2d 452 (1977).
After Monell was handed down, a number of district court cases holding cities and other various local governing bodies as not "persons" were vacated and remanded for application of Monell. See, e. g., McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 583 F.2d 1229 (3rd Cir. 1978) (vacating a district court decision relying on pre- Monell law in holding the state governmental entity SEPTA not a "person" under § 1983); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Peoria, Illinois, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978) (remanding civil rights action against Park District in light of Monell establishing governmental units as "persons").
II [21] Asserted Ground No. 2: 11th Amendment Immunity
If the plaintiffs were seeking only monetary recovery from the defendants, we would first examine the nature of the entity sued to determine whether it is an arm of the state or an independent "political subdivision". Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). See Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, supra at 98. If Texas A M University is an arm of the state such that any recovery of damages would, in effect, be against the state, to come from the state treasury, then the Eleventh Amendment would bar the action and recovery. If the University is an independent political body or has in some manner waived its immunity, however, monetary recovery would not impinge on the Eleventh Amendment.
Numerous circuit decisions have found universities to be so closely connected with the state that a suit against the university or its officials is the same as a suit against the state. E. g., Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976) (officials and members of Board of Trustees of Mississippi State University held immune from suit to recover excess payments of tuition by resident alien students); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976) (suit against members of Board of Trustees of the University of Wyoming barred); Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1975) (Memphis State University officials immune); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975) (East Carolina University officials immune); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971) (University of Kansas and University Press of Kansas immune as alter egos of the state); Walstad v. University of Minnesota Hosps., 442 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1971).
While we make no determination here concerning the relationship of Texas A M University to the state of Texas for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes, we do note that at least one other Texas University with its governing board and officials has been held immune from monetary damages or relief based on the Eleventh Amendment. Ramos v. Texas Tech University, 441 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affirmed on basis of opinion below, 566 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). See Henry v. Texas Tech University, 466 F. Supp. 141 (N.D.Tex. 1979) (explaining in more detail the status of Texas Tech University as an arm of the state and thus immune under the Eleventh Amendment).
Institutions of higher learning that are not so closely connected with the state as to be an instrumentality of the state but rather display the characteristics of an independent body are not immune from suit for monetary relief. See, e. g., Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979), citing Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 522 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1975) (under Texas code suit against the junior college was not in reality a suit against the state); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3rd Cir. 1976) (University of Pittsburgh, Temple University and Penn State University held liable for equitable restitution of tuition fees because of not being state instrumentalities).
III [24] Asserted Ground No. 3: Standing
The assertion that plaintiffs lack standing to bring the suit is frivolous.
IV [26] Asserted Ground No. 4: § 1331 jurisdiction and cause of action
The standards applicable to the disposition of a case of the kind presently before us have never been specifically illuminated by the Supreme Court. See Ratchford v. Gay Lib (dissent to the denial of certiorari), 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S.Ct. 1276, 55 L.Ed.2d 789 (1978). Some of the cases dealing with First Amendment rights of college student associations are footnoted below.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973). In Healy it was held that the student organization in question was entitled to recognition under the First Amendment unless there was a showing that the group directly advocated inciting or producing imminent lawless action likely to cause such a result. Healy also cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, for the principle that the power to prohibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal nature but may reach actions which "materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school", etc., 408 U.S. at 189, 92 S.Ct. at 2350.