Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/460/638/580654/
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 08:55:23
Document Index: 183239211

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', 'art. 37', '§ 2']

Rolando Ruiz, Petitioner-appellant, v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-appellee, 460 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 2006 › Rolando Ruiz, Petitioner-appellant, v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal...
Rolando Ruiz, Petitioner-appellant, v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-appellee, 460 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2006)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 460 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 2006)
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Chris K. Gober, Nicholas & Barrera, San Antonio, TX, Adrienne Urrutia Wisenberg, Solomon L. Wisenberg PLLC, Washington, DC, for Petitioner-Appellant.
The exhaustion doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) codifies long-developed principles of comity.8 Before a federal court can find merit in alleged errors by state courts, a petitioner must have first provided the state's highest court with a fair opportunity to apply (1) the controlling federal constitutional principles to (2) the same factual allegations.9 This requirement is designed to give state courts the initial opportunity to pass upon and, if necessary, correct errors of federal law in a state prisoner's conviction or sentence.10 The purpose of exhaustion "is not to create a procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation obviated before resort to federal court."11
A fair opportunity requires that all the grounds of the claim be first and "fairly presented" to the state courts.12 In other words, in order for a claim to be exhausted, the state court system must have been presented with the same facts and legal theory upon which the petitioner bases his current assertions.13 " [I]t is not enough ... that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made."14 An argument based on a legal theory distinct from that relied upon in the state court does not meet the exhaustion requirement.15 "Exhaustion `requires a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts.'"16 AEDPA excuses these requirements only if the petitioner shows "(i) there is an absence of available state remedies in the courts of the State, or (ii) circumstances exist that render such processes ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."17
Ruiz does not contend that he did not know that state habeas offered an avenue for presenting his claims or that the claims were presented. Rather, his present counsel argues, as he did to the district court, that for two reasons there should be no procedural bar here. First, Ruiz contends that his state habeas counsel was ineffective. Ruiz's state habeas counsel filed a petition on behalf of Ruiz asserting seventeen claims, eight of which claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ruiz's present claim is that his lawyer failed to allege two claims. First, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with two specifications: that trial counsel failed to perform a social history and background investigation in preparing for the sentencing phase of the trial and failed to offer the report or the testimony of Dr. Harry Munsinger at the sentencing stage. Second, a claim that Ruiz was denied due process by the state trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard a portion of defense counsel's closing argument regarding the co-defendant who hired Ruiz to murder, as charged in the indictment. The federal district court agreed that trial counsel was ineffective and suggested that state habeas counsel was ineffective, but it properly rejected Ruiz's argument for the reason that incompetence of habeas counsel is not an excuse under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (B) of AEDPA for failure to exhaust or "cause" for an exception to procedural default because Ruiz had no constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings.20 This is true even where a claim cannot be brought, or brought effectively, until state habeas proceedings.21
In a further effort to show "cause" for his failure to raise these claims in state court, Ruiz seeks to show that an "objective external factor"23 impeded his ability to follow state procedural rules. He contends that the state affirmatively interfered with his efforts to acquire new counsel for direct appeal, a replacement for Donald Mach, his trial counsel, which Ruiz thought necessary to prosecute his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But, as the trial court explained, it refused to dismiss Mach because any claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could be raised in a state habeas petition for which, moreover, Ruiz had already filed a request for appointment of counsel. Hence whatever force exists behind Ruiz's argument that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel creates "cause" (or prompts a 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (B) exception to AEDPA), this contention adds nothing.24
Lay persons come to the courthouse with varying levels of education and thought about capital punishment. The opening of a capital trial is an alien environment to citizens called from jobs and homes. Lay persons are confronted by skilled lawyers engaged in an adversarial contest who probe their views on a profound and divisive social issue, usually with a goal of retention or exclusion shaping the questions. We know from experience that the result is often a series of responses that seem to shift and turn and even conflict as questions are framed, reframed and just repeated. A stranger to the trial reading the bare transcript is left with incomplete sentences and elliptic answers with no reconciling theme. Yet one present at trial may well have had a quite different picture. Inflection of voice and body movements of each cast member, absent from the transcript, are present at trial. Until at least twenty-one years ago, such transcripts confounded appellate courts. Wainwright v. Witt responded to the not infrequent frustration of appellate review of the calls of trial judges made in the process of selecting jurors for the trial of capital cases with a pragmatic solution.28 The court acknowledged that a prospective juror's bias "involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record."29 The Court observed: " [T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen [by the trial court] below, but cannot always be spread upon the record."30 "Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law."31 Ms. Castro is the classic wavering prospective juror. This was a call to be made by the trial judge, and there is no record basis for concluding that the court abused its discretion. It follows that we cannot say that the decision of the state court in this case was an unreasonable application of the law as decided by the Supreme Court, and we affirm the denial of federal habeas relief by the district court.
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985). Ruiz made other claims that he does not pursue here.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000)); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 2000).
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595 (emphasis added); Kutzner v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 2001).
Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029).
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-10, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 118 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1992); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 277-78, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971); Dowthitt, 230 F.3d at 745-46.
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 74 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1982); Thomas v. Collins, 919 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1990).
Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-76, 92 S. Ct. 509.
Keeney, 504 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. 1715.
Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S. Ct. 509.
Id. at 275-77, 92 S. Ct. 509.
Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6, 103 S. Ct. 276).
Id. at 259 (citing Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 958 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 261 (citing Picard, 404, U.S. at 276, 92 S. Ct. 509).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (b)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991).
Id. at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546.
See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2001); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 270-72 (5th Cir. 2001); Elizalde v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2004). The district court analyzed the issue only when discussing "cause."
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1986).
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 335, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992).
Id. at 347, 112 S. Ct. 2514. Under Texas law, the jury must find the defendant likely to be a continuing threat to society and find an absence of "sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed." Tex.Code Crim. P. art. 37.071, § 2(e) (1). Ruiz contends that the neglected evidence vitiates both prongs.
469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985)
Id. at 429, 105 S. Ct. 844.
Id. at 429 n. 9, 105 S. Ct. 844
Id. at 425-26, 105 S. Ct. 844.