Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/465/236/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 20:52:45
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1973', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 51', '§ 5', '§ 5']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 465 > MCCAIN V. LYBRAND, 465 U. S. 236 (1984)
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Held: The Attorney General's lack of objection to the 1971 submission cannot be deemed to have the effect of ratifying the changes embodied in the 1966 Act. Pp. 465 U. S. 243-258. chanrobles.com-red
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., concurred in the judgment.
In 1966, South Carolina enacted a statute that altered Edgefield County's election practices, but the statute was not submitted to federal officials for their approval as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. [Footnote 1] In 1971, the statute was amended, modifying the 1966 election practices, and state officials submitted the amendment to the Attorney General for his approval. In response to a request from the Attorney General, state officials provided him with additional documentation in support of their submission, including the 1966 statute. The Attorney General approved the submission, stating that he did not object to the change in question. The chanrobles.com-red
On June 1, 1966, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted Act No. 1104, which was effective as a matter of state law when it was signed by the Governor on June 7, 1966. The Act created a new form of government for Edgefield County, altering the county's election practices. The office of County Supervisor and the Board of County Commissioners were abolished upon expiration of the incumbents' terms. A three-member County Council with broad legislative and administrative powers was created, [Footnote 4] and the county was chanrobles.com-red
In 1971, state officials sent a letter to the Attorney General of the United States stating: "In accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, there are submitted herewith copies" of 18 listed recent state enactments, which included the 1971 amendment regarding Edgefield chanrobles.com-red
The appellants, black voters residing in Edgefield County, South Carolina, commenced a class action in 1974 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina challenging the county's election practices on constitutional grounds. Specifically, they alleged in their complaint chanrobles.com-red
App. to Juris.Statement 12a. The District Court did not find, however, that the Justice Department had been provided with any information concerning chanrobles.com-red
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), [Footnote 11] was enacted by Congress as a response to the "unremitting and ingenious defiance" of the command of the Fifteenth Amendment for nearly a century by state officials in certain parts of the Nation. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 383 U. S. 309 (1966). Congress concluded that case-by-case litigation under previous legislation was an unsatisfactory method to uncover and remedy the systematic discriminatory election practices in certain areas: such lawsuits were too onerous and time-consuming to prepare, obstructionist tactics by those determined to perpetuate discrimination yielded unacceptable delay, and even successful lawsuits too often merely resulted in a change in chanrobles.com-red
The "preclearance" requirement mandated by § 5 of the Act is perhaps the most stringent of these remedies, and certainly the most extraordinary. [Footnote 12] It prohibits jurisdictions chanrobles.com-red
would be likely to engage in "similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself." South Carolina chanrobles.com-red
The original voting rights bill did not contain this alternative preclearance method, but after concerns arose that the declaratory judgment route would unduly delay implementation of nondiscriminatory legislation, it appears that the proviso was added "to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to covered States." Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491, 432 U. S. 503 (1977). While the legislative history of the proviso is sparse, ibid., the history which does exist and the lack of controversy surrounding the proviso indicate that Congress in no way intended that the substantive protections of § 5 be sacrificed in the name of expediency, though it did logically anticipate that most jurisdictions would opt for the alternative preclearance method, and that declaratory judgment actions would likely be limited to those occasions on which the Attorney General interposed an objection, see H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1965); Hearings chanrobles.com-red
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 400 U. S. 392, n. 10 (1971). Moreover, it is apparent that ambiguity concerning the scope of a preclearance is more likely if the State opts for the more expeditious method: silence constitutes consent under that method, and even when the Attorney General affirmatively states he has no objection, ambiguity may be present if the State's submission itself is ambiguous. The potential for such ambiguity was particularly pronounced prior to the adoption of detailed regulations by the Justice Department governing preclearance chanrobles.com-red
Congress has amended the Voting Rights Act several times, each time continuing the basic structure of the original preclearance provision. [Footnote 14] In the legislative history of the extensions of the Act, § 5 has been deemed to be a "vital element" of the Act to ensure that "new subterfuges will be promptly discovered and enjoined." H.R.Rep. No. 91-397, p. 8 (1969). But Congress recognized that it was only as vital as state compliance allowed it to be. Unfortunately, it appeared that "States rarely obeyed the mandate of that section, and the Federal Government was too timid in its enforcement." Hearings on H.R. 4249 before the Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1969) (statement of Rep. McCulloch). Few changes were submitted, and only a handful of objections were interposed: "Where local officials have passed discriminatory laws, generally they have not been submitted to the Department of Justice." Hearings on H.R. 4249 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 220 (1969) (statement of Attorney General Mitchell). While compliance with § 5 increased after the 1970 extension of the Voting Rights Act, and the provision was believed to have been largely responsible for gains achieved in minority political participation, H.R.Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 10-11 (1975), the continuing "widespread failure to submit proposed changes in election law for Section 5 review before attempting to implement the change" was recently viewed as "significant evidence of the continuing need for the preclearance requirement." S.Rep. No. 97417, p. 12 (1982). The Attorney General has attempted to chanrobles.com-red
United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm'rs, supra, at 435 U. S. 136. This interpretation of the provision is faithful to its history and purpose, while at chanrobles.com-red
Edgefield County is admittedly a political subdivision of South Carolina subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, [Footnote 16] and it is conceded that the 1966 Act was subject to the preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Act. [Footnote 17] It is also undisputed that the 1966 Act was never submitted to the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for § 5 review. [Footnote 18] Accordingly, unless the preclearance chanrobles.com-red
As we previously observed, the preclearance procedures mandated by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act focus entirely on changes in election practices. Supra at 465 U. S. 245. The title of the 1971 amendment unambiguously identified the changes in election practices which it effected -- an increase in the number of Council members and residency districts -- and served to define the scope of the preclearance request. An examination of the correspondence concerning the 1971 submission, supra at 465 U. S. 240-241, plainly shows that only the 1971 amendment was being considered for preclearance, [Footnote 19] and further indicates that the request for preclearance was viewed as limited to the change [Footnote 20] in elections practices effected by it. [Footnote 21] chanrobles.com-red
The significance the District Court attached to the Attorney General's request for additional information was wholly unwarranted. It is plain that the information which the Attorney General requested and received was merely relevant chanrobles.com-red
Moreover, the information obtained in response to the Attorney General's request did not enable him to ascertain whether a covered change was made by the 1966 Act, [Footnote 22] much less evaluate whether the changes made by the 1966 scheme -- and unaffected by the 1971 amendment -- were discriminatory in purpose or effect when compared to the 1964 practices. In order to pass on the 1966 Act, he would have needed information concerning the pre-1966 election law and its practical effects. He neither requested nor received such information. [Footnote 23] Just as "no one would argue" that the Attorney chanrobles.com-red
In concluding that there is insufficient evidence for a finding that the Attorney General actually considered the changes made by the 1966 Act in preclearing the 1971 amendment, we note that, at the time of the 1971 submission, the Attorney General was completing promulgation of regulations governing § 5 submissions. [Footnote 25] The regulations shed light chanrobles.com-red
on the correct interpretation of the scope of the changes encompassed by the Attorney General's preclearance letter, since they make clear the nature of the information necessary to constitute a valid "submission." See 28 CFR § 51.2(c) (1972). [Footnote 26] The regulations indicate that the focus of the Attorney General's scrutiny of a statute was, understandably, limited to the specific changes submitted for consideration. [Footnote 27] Finally, the Justice Department has recently indicated that the changes made in the 1966 Act and retained in the 1971 amendment have not been precleared, see App. to Juris.Statement 40a-42a, and such after-the-fact Justice Department statements have been previously relied upon in determining chanrobles.com-red
The District Court also erred in viewing the submission's scope as encompassing all features of the 1971 amendment, rather than the changes effected by that particular enactment. When a jurisdiction adopts legislation that makes clearly defined changes in its election practices, sending that legislation to the Attorney General merely with a general request for preclearance pursuant to § 5 constitutes a submission of the changes made by the enactment and cannot be deemed a submission of changes made by previous legislation which themselves were independently subject to § 5 preclearance. [Footnote 28] The fact that a covered jurisdiction adopted a new election practice after the effective date of the Voting Rights Act raises, in effect, a statutory inference that the practice may have been adopted for a discriminatory purpose, or may have a discriminatory effect and places the burden on the jurisdiction to establish that the practice is not discriminatory. A request for preclearance of certain identified chanrobles.com-red
In summary, to the extent the judgment below may be interpreted as resting upon a factual finding that the Attorney General actually considered and approved the changes made chanrobles.com-red