Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2014cv00731/854770/22
Timestamp: 2017-03-28 05:11:51
Document Index: 22602963

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 216', 'art, 278', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art,1', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 379']

ORDER granting 20 Defendant's Motion to Remand, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is vacated, and this case is remanded for an award of benefits for Espinoza v. Colvin :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER granting 20 Defendant's Motion to Remand, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is vacated, and this case is remanded for an award of benefits. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. Signed by Judge David G Campbell on 11/25/14.(LSP)
Sherry Renee Espinoza,
No. CV-14-00731-PHX DGC
Plaintiff Sherry Renee Espinoza seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”), which denied her
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under §§ 216(i), 223(d),
and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Defendant’s decision will be vacated and
the matter remanded for an award of benefits.
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income, alleging her disability began on August 9, 2006. Doc. 15 at 1. Since making her
application, Plaintiff has had three hearings before Administrative Law Judges. Id. The
Appeal Council has twice remanded the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. Id. Plaintiff’s
most recent hearing occurred on May 7, 2013. Plaintiff appeared with her attorney and
testified. Id.; A.R. 38-59. A vocational expert also testified. A.R. 59-68. On June 26,
2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act. Id. at 13-32. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.
Id. at 1-6.
Defendants now concede that this third decision also included several legal errors.
The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is
not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495
F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a
to support a conclusion. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence supports a
decision, the court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. As a general rule, “[w]here
the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports
the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
The ALJ’s Five-Step Evaluation Process.
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the
inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe”
medically determinable physical or mental impairment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the
functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable of
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and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step five, where he determines
whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled.
Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.
the Social Security Act through December 31, 2011, and that she has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 9, 2006. A.R. at 18. At step two, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: left tarsal tunnel syndrome/neuritis,
diabetes mellitus, fibromyalgia, and obesity. Id. At step three, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
Id. at 20. At step four, the ALJ found:
[Plaintiff] had the [RFC] to perform sedentary work as
could lift and carry up 20 lbs occasionally, and 10 lbs
frequently; she could sit at least 6-hours, and stand or walk up
to 2-hours in a standard 8 hour workday with normal breaks;
she has no limits on pushing or pulling within the above
weight restrictions; she could occasionally climb ramps or
stairs, but should have avoided climbing ladders, rope, or
scaffolds; she could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, or crawl; and she should have avoided concentrated
exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and
dangerous moving machinery.
Id. at 20. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past
relevant work. Id. at 24. At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the
vocational expert, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. Id. at 25. Given that finding, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not
“under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.” Id. at 26.
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Medical Source Evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of the
following medical sources: Dan Bangart, D.P.M; Jeff Alvarez, M.D.; John Prieve, D.O.;
and Jeanette Jicha, F.N.P. Doc. 15 at 13-18. Defendant concedes the ALJ erred in
considering the opinions of Dr. Bangart,1 Dr. Prieve,2 and Ms. Jicha,3 and asks the Court
to remand for further proceedings to correct these errors. Doc. 20 at 5-6. The Court will
accept Defendant’s concession of error with respect to Dr. Bangart, Dr. Prieve, and Ms.
Jicha, and address the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion of Dr. Alvarez.
examining physicians, and non-examining physicians.
See Lester v. Chater,
81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a
treating physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician
than to one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-
41 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). If it is not contradicted by
another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating or examining physician can be rejected
only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen,
849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)).
The ALJ discounted a portion of Dr. Bangart’s medical opinions because they
were contradicted by a treatment note from February 8, 2011. A.R. at 23. Defendant
concedes the ALJ misconstrued the treatment note as claiming Plaintiff received 100%
relief from a nerve block procedure, when in fact the note merely predicts that the
procedure “should get [Plaintiff] to 100%.” Doc. 20 at 6.
The ALJ gave no weight to the medical opinions of Dr. Prieve because he was
unlicensed at the time of the examination. A.R. at 24. Defendant concedes that the
record does not contain evidence for this finding. Doc. 20 at 5.
The ALJ does not explain the weight given to Ms. Jicha’s medical opinions.
A.R. 960-65. Defendant concedes this is error. Id. at 5-6.
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Dr. Alvarez began treating Plaintiff in 2006. A.R. at 648. In June 2008, Dr.
Alvarez completed a form titled “Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related
Activities (Mental),” and found that while Plaintiff can manage benefits in her own
interest, she has no useful ability to function in 10 of 15 work-related mental function
areas. Id. at 648-50. In a letter dated May 7, 2009, Dr. Alvarez stated that Plaintiff’s
medical problems affect her to the point she needs a caregiver to assist her with
medication and some daily living activities. Id. at 777.
Jeff Alvarez, M.D.
The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Alvarez’s opinions based primarily on three
reasons: (1) Dr. Alvarez’s statements are “wholly unsupported by any objective clinical
finding, cognitive testing, or other psychometric testing”; (2) Plaintiff does not claim to
be as impaired as Dr. Alvarez states; and (3) “Dr. Alvarez is not a specialist in psychiatry,
psychology, or other field of mental or behavioral health.” Id. at 24. The ALJ identified
no contradicting physician testimony or clinical findings. See id.
The ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Alvarez’s opinion on the ground that he is not a
psychologist or psychiatrist. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a treating physician
may properly opine on his patient’s mental condition, particularly when the opinion is
based on observation of the patient over a period of time. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d
1226, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (treating physician qualified to give opinion on how
patient’s mental state impacted on her physical disability even though physician was not
The ALJ also erred in concluding that Dr. Alvarez’s opinion was not support by
clinical findings. Treating sources have identified and diagnosed Plaintiff’s depression
and anxiety. Tr. 518, 542, 648-50, 654-55, 785-86, 800, 842-44, 896-99, 960-65. The
ALJ seemed particularly concerned about Dr. Alvarez’s opinion that Plaintiff needed
caregiver support in daily living. Tr. 24. His opinion, however, was that she needed help
with her medication due to memory issues and some help with daily living. Tr. 777.
This opinion was consistent with the testimony of Plaintiff and her husband that she has
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memory issues and needs help from her daughters and husband in maintaining the house,
preparing meals, etc. Tr. 55-59. Dr. Alvarez did not opine that Plaintiff was so impaired
as to require psychiatric hospitalization as the ALJ suggested. Tr. 24.
With these two reasons rejected, the Court does not find that the ALJ’s third
reason satisfies the clear and convincing reasons standard. The ALJ asserted that even
Plaintiff did not claim to be as mentally impaired as Dr. Alvarez found, but Plaintiff’s
testimony concerned her functioning at home while Dr. Alvarez opined about her ability
to function at work, two significantly different environments. Id. at 648-50. Dr. Alvarez
found that while Plaintiff can manage matters in her own interest, she has no useful
ability to function in 10 of 15 work-related mental function areas. The fact that Plaintiff
can, from a mental health perspective, function better at home than in a work
environment does not constitute a clear and convincing reason to discount Dr. Alvarez’s
opinion regarding her ability to work.
The ALJ did not consider the other factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-
(6), nor did she “[set] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence” or “do more than offer [her] conclusions.” Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1408;
Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. The Court concludes that the ALJ improperly rejected the
opinions of Dr. Alvarez.4
Where an ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of a
physician, a court in this circuit must credit that opinion as true. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834.
An action should be remanded for an immediate award of benefits when the following
three factors are satisfied: (1) the record has been fully developed and further
administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to
provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or
In light of this conclusion and Defendant’s concession of error with respect to
other medical opinions, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ
erred in rejecting her testimony.
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medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the
ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand. Garrison v. Colvin, 759
F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1202
(9th Cir. 2008), Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007), Orn, 495
F.3d at 640, Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004), and Smolen v.
Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)).
The Court agrees with both parties that the ALJ’s decision contains error regarding
the weight given to the medical opinions of Dr. Bangart, Dr. Prieve, and Ms. Jicha.
Doc. 15 at 18; Doc. 20 at 5-6. The Court also finds that the ALJ erred in affording little
weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Alvarez.
When these opinions are credited as true, the following facts are established:
Plaintiff cannot stand or walk for more than five minutes at a time, can stand or walk less
than two hours in an eight-hour workday, must elevate her foot to heart level for 50% of
the workday, and would be compromised in her ability to pay attention and concentrate
for up to 50% of the workday due to pain. Tr. 23, 494-96, 641-46, 772. In addition,
Plaintiff has no useful ability to function in 10 of 15 work-related mental function areas.
Tr. 648-50. She cannot follow work rules, function independently, maintain attention and
concentration, or understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions. Tr. 648-
49. Given these restrictions and the testimony of the vocational experts at Plaintiff’s
three hearings (Tr. 61-65, 100-102, 134-36), Plaintiff does not have the ability to work.
Thus, when the improperly discredited evidence is credited as true, the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled on remand. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020.
The Court notes that the Court of Appeals has adopted the credit-as-true rule in
part to prevent repeated remands and hearings, resulting in lengthy delays in decisions for
disabled applicants. That purpose seems particularly relevant here. Plaintiff has had
three different hearings before ALJs, every one resulting in error and remand.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to remand (Doc. 20) is granted, the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is vacated, and this case is
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remanded for an award of benefits. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and
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