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Timestamp: 2020-08-09 11:54:41
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3500', '§ 1341', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500', '§ 3500']

US Supreme Court Decisions On-Line> Volume 425 > GOLDBERG V. UNITED STATES, 425 U. S. 94 (1976)
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(b) Nor is the Act limited to statements made to an investigative agency, as distinguished from prosecutors preparing for trial. Though the Government's argument to the contrary is based on the asserted unfairness of allowing defense counsel to impeach a witness by a statement that is the product of the attorney's selections, rather than his own, the writings are producible only if they meet the terms of the statutory definition; chanrobles.com-red
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEWART, J., joined, post, p. 425 U. S. 112. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C.J.,joined, post, p. 425 U. S. 116. chanrobles.com-red
This case presents important questions of construction and administration of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. [Footnote 1] chanrobles.com-red
At petitioner's trial in the District Court for the District of Arizona on charges of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the trial judge sustained the Government's contention that certain writings of Government lawyers of conversations with the Government's key witness chanrobles.com-red
We hold that a writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the testimony of a Government witness that has been "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by the Government witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and is not rendered nonproducible because a Government lawyer interviews the witness and writes the "statement." We hold further that, in the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals erred in determining in the first instance that the writings in question were not "statements." We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand chanrobles.com-red
Of the five defendants, only petitioner and Newman worked for the company. Newman agreed to plead guilty to a single count of the indictment and to testify as a Government witness. Thereupon his case was severed prior to petitioner's trial. [Footnote 4] He was the key prosecution witness, revealing in great detail the operation of the fraudulent scheme and the transactions alleged chanrobles.com-red
We see nothing in the Jencks Act or its legislative history that excepts from production otherwise producible statements on the ground that they constitute "work chanrobles.com-red
The Government maintains that the Act can be read to include only statements given to a Government investigative or law enforcement agent during an investigation, and not those given to a Government trial attorney in preparation for trial. This contention rests in part on the original language of § 3500(a), which postponed discovery, until after a witness' direct examination, of statements of the witness made "to an agent of the Government." [Footnote 6] But nothing in the Act even remotely suggests chanrobles.com-red
The Government also suggests that Congress enacted the Jencks Act to limit the scope of this Court's decision chanrobles.com-red
S.Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1957). See H.R.Rep. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1957); Campbell I, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 92. Moreover, Congress was concerned not with the Jencks decision itself, but with "misinterpretations and misunderstandings" in application of Jencks in district courts and courts of appeals. S.Rep. No. 981, supra at 3-5, 7-12; H.R.Rep. No. 700, supra at 2-3, 6. The concern was that misapplication of Jencks would permit defendants "to rove at will through Government files." S.Rep. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1957). See Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 360 U. S. 350 (1959). The House committee expressed its goal as that of preventing defendants from "rummag[ing] through confidential information containing matters of public interest, safety, welfare, and national security." H.R.Rep. No. 700, supra, at 4. [Footnote 8] chanrobles.com-red
For the same reasons, we see no merit in the Government's argument that, without an exception, disclosure of statements taken by Government lawyers may undermine the policies that gave rise to the work product doctrine. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 422 U. S. 236-239 chanrobles.com-red
The Government contends that production of statements written by Government lawyers "forces the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding witness' remarks." Hickman v. Taylor, supra at 329 U. S. 513. Although the risk of such testimony supported approbation of the work product doctrine in Hickman, the nature of the disclosure provided by the Jencks Act differs significantly. In Hickman, the Court concluded that there was no showing of necessity strong enough to justify the requested disclosure: there was a danger of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, there chanrobles.com-red
was "[n]o legitimate purpose," and use of the attorney's words for impeachment would have made the attorney a witness, rather than an officer of the court. 329 U.S. at 329 U. S. 512-513. First, although there is some risk that a witness' words will be distorted in notes taken by a Government lawyer, see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 352, there is no such danger where a witness has adopted or approved the lawyer's notes. Second, there is a clearly legitimate -- and congressionally recognized -- purpose for disclosure under the Jencks Act. The Act requires disclosure of all statements for use in impeaching witnesses and "is thus designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice." Campbell I, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 92. Third, the lawyer is not called upon to be a witness, since statements are produced only where they can "fairly be said to be the witness' own." Finally, we cannot accept the Government's claims that defense counsel will have a right to call Government lawyers as witnesses to "authenticate" their notes, [Footnote 11] nor do we find realistic the Government's fear that a lawyer will "feel impelled" to take the stand. [Footnote 12] chanrobles.com-red
We have recognized that a Government objection to production may require that the trial court inspect documents or hold a hearing to gather extrinsic evidence bearing on the extent to which the documents are statements producible under § 3500. [Footnote 14] Campbell I, supra at chanrobles.com-red
The necessity for a hearing in the District Court is highlighted by developments since our grant of the petition for certiorari. The Solicitor General has discovered that 40 of the 237 pages of material are not notes of Government lawyers, but handwritten statements of Newman himself. [Footnote 16] Petitioner contends that the failure of the Government to turn over those 40 pages constitutes error requiring reversal of his conviction without more. [Footnote 17] chanrobles.com-red
As to the remainder of the 237 pages, there are other issues to be resolved on remand. For example, it will be necessary to determine whether the prosecutors' notes were actually read back to Newman and whether he adopted or approved them. [Footnote 19] In addition, the court may chanrobles.com-red
We of course intimate no view whether production of any of the 237 pages of material was required in this case. That determination is to be made by the District Court. We therefore conclude that the proper disposition of this case is that of Campbell I, supra at 365 U. S. 98-99. Petitioner is entitled to a redetermination of his motion for the production of the 237 pages of material. But we do not think that this Court should vacate his conviction and order a new trial, since petitioner's rights can be fully protected by a remand to the trial court with direction to hold an inquiry consistent with this opinion. The District Court will supplement the record with findings and enter a new final judgment of conviction if the court concludes after the inquiry to reaffirm its denial of petitioner's motion. This procedure will preserve petitioner's opportunity to seek further appellate review on the augmented record. On the other hand, if the court concludes that the Government should have been required to deliver the material, or part of it, to petitioner, and that the error was not harmless, [Footnote 21] the District Court will chanrobles.com-red
Some courts have suggested that the trial court has an "affirmative duty" to secure the necessary evidence. E.g., Saunders v. United States, supra at 348, 316 F.2d 349; United States v. Chitwood, 457 F.2d 676, 678 (CA6 1972); United States v. Keig, 320 F.2d 634, 637 (CA7 1963); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 734 (CA9 1962).
The statutory definition is in two parts, encompassing originals of statements made by the witness (18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)) and verbatim or substantially verbatim copies (§ 3500(e)(2)). Whether a particular writing is an original or a copy, it is not a statutory "statement" unless it reflects the witness' own words fully and without distortion. [Footnote 2/2] If it is truly an impeaching statement, chanrobles.com-red
Frequently such statements are in the form of narratives or summaries actually drafted by the interviewer chanrobles.com-red
If one of the prosecutor's notes is that kind of factual comment, it is still not a statutory statement unless that specific note has been adopted or approved by the witness. For if a witness could testify, without fear of chanrobles.com-red
Whether this requirement can be satisfied without the testimony of the prosecutor is a question that is not ripe for decision. [Footnote 2/5] The possibility of the need for such testimony is a matter which the trial court may appropriately consider in determining whether any specific note is producible. For nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to authorize cross-examination of the prosecutor by defense counsel. In order to avoid the risk of unseemly testimony by trial counsel and, more importantly, in order to avoid unfairness to the witness, any determination that a portion of the prosecutor's notes is producible must be supported chanrobles.com-red
Goldberg's motion rested solely on information elicited from Newman during cross-examination. The entire pertinent cross-examination is set out in the margin. [Footnote 3/1] chanrobles.com-red
The opinion of the Court concludes that the interchange in this limited cross-examination "raised a sufficient question under the Act to require the trial judge to conduct" chanrobles.com-red
Ante at 425 U. S. 110-111, n.19. Compare Campbell v. United States, 365 U. S. 85 (1961) (Campbell I), and Campbell v. United States, 373 U. S. 487 (1963) (Campbell II), with Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343 (1959). In my view, the fact that interview notes frequently will not be producible chanrobles.com-red
The questions asked simply failed to focus on the critical inquiry: whether a "statement" of the witness, embodied in the prosecutors' notes, had been "adopted or approved." [Footnote 3/3] The conferences with Newman occurred from time to time over several weeks, with the prosecutors presumably taking notes at each conference. Goldberg's counsel, however, did not even ask whether notes were taken at the June 17 conference or at subsequent ones. [Footnote 3/4] As to the June 11 meeting with Newman, counsel only asked whether notes had been taken. [Footnote 3/5] The questions chanrobles.com-red
about the May 12 session were whether notes had been taken and, in essence, whether "discussions of the general substance" of the notes had occurred. [Footnote 3/6] The questions about the June 9 and 10 conferences and the June 16 session were more illuminating, but only slightly. Counsel did ask whether the notes had been read back "occasionally" for commentary by Newman, but he never asked whether Newman had adopted or approved any portion of the final version of the prosecutors' notes or whether the reading back of the notes had merely elicited further discussion because Newman disputed the prosecutors' understanding. [Footnote 3/7] The problem created by such aimless and unilluminating questions was compounded by counsel's satisfaction with vague and ambiguous answers that hardly evidenced the critical chanrobles.com-red
In Palermo v. United States, supra at 360 U. S. 354, the Court recognized that the Act provides no procedure for resolving questions about whether a particular document is a "statement." Delineation of appropriate procedures therefore falls to the courts. To date, the cases of this Court's addressing procedures have been concerned with the nature of the collateral inquiry to be conducted by the trial judge when such inquiry is necessary. See, chanrobles.com-red
The proper administration of the Act requires that the defendant meet an initial burden of showing that collateral inquiry is necessary to protect his rights under the Act. The placing of such a burden on the defendant is consistent with the basically adversary posture of the Act, which requires production of "statements" only upon the defendant's motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). [Footnote 3/11] This requirement also is appropriate because the trial should not be interrupted for collateral proceedings absent a genuine need for them. Cf. Palermo v. United States, supra at 360 U. S. 355. [Footnote 3/12] chanrobles.com-red
If a moving defendant meets the threshold burden of showing that a statutory "statement" may exist, the judge then must conduct a nonadversary inquiry suited to resolve the particular issue presented. Campbell I, supra at 365 U. S. 95-96; Palermo v. United States, supra at 360 U. S. 354-355. If the trial judge's inquiry is inadequate when inquiry is needed, it is appropriate for an appellate court to remand for further proceedings. In this case, however, the need for collateral proceedings was not chanrobles.com-red
In applying the Act to typical interview notes alleged to have been "adopted or approved" by a witness, we must remember that such notes do not fit within the core of the Act. Subsection (e)(1) includes "written statement[s] made by [the] witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him." [Footnote 3/14] Subsection(e)(2), chanrobles.com-red
not relied upon in this case, requires a "substantially verbatim" reproduction of an "oral statement made by [the] witness and recorded contemporaneously." Typical interview notes are selective -- even episodic -- and therefore fall outside of subsection (e)(2). Even if "adopted or approved" by the witness, such notes were not written by the witness himself, and therefore fall without the core of subsection (e)(1). Typical interview notes that allegedly have been "adopted or approved" thus lack important guarantees of dependability that Congress relied upon in the central concept of subjections (e)(1) and (e)(2). [Footnote 3/15] These guarantees, it should be noted, arise partly from the sense that a witness normally would have of "going on the record" [Footnote 3/16] when he makes a statement within the core of subsection (e)(1) or subsection (e)(2). [Footnote 3/17] It is to supply a comparable chanrobles.com-red
This exacting standard is required by the Act's attempt to assure fairness to witnesses and the Government, as well as to defendants. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 350; Campbell I, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S. 95. As every trial lawyer knows, the testimony given in court rarely conforms precisely to what the witness chanrobles.com-red
has said prior to trial in interviews with counsel. This is true in part because lengthy exploratory interviews often are required to refresh the witness' memory sufficiently to allow him to reconstruct events that may have transpired long before. [Footnote 3/19] Such interviews and the related note taking serve to distill the essence of what the witness knows and to identify the relevant. The Act was not designed to allow a witness to be impeached by every arguable variation between his trial testimony and notes written by the prosecutor and casually approved by the witness during this process. The witness may have expressed only general assent to the prosecutor's understanding without any consciousness that he had to be ready to stand by every word in or nuance conveyed by the prosecutor's notes. If notes are producible on a showing of less than knowing adoption as a formal statement, honest and reliable witnesses will be postured wrongly before the jury as having made inconsistent statements. This is unfair to the witness, and it unduly handicaps the Government's efforts to convict guilty defendants. [Footnote 3/20] chanrobles.com-red
See, e.g., 425 U. S. 5, supra.
Indeed, only the foolish or exceptionally talented counsel will depend solely on his memory when preparing for the examination of a key witness. But the fact that counsel usually will take notes does not mean that the notes often will be "statements." Counsel rarely take down verbatim what witnesses say in these preparatory conferences. Consequently, prosecutors' notes may be expected to meet the requirements of subsection (e)(2) very infrequently. Cf. 425 U. S. 3, supra. The notes taken will vary from cryptic "memory jogs" to full summaries of the anticipated testimony.
A witness would have an especially strong sense of "going on the record" in the context of subsection (e)(3), which governs a "statement . . . made by [the] witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3). Interestingly, Congress has required somewhat less in the way of recording safeguards under subsection (e)(3) than under subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2). See 425 U. S. 18, infra. Presumably this is because procedural safeguards seem less necessary as the formality of the "statement" increases. This, of course, further supports the requirement elaborated in the text.