Source: http://www.dol.gov/brb/References/Reference_works/lhca/lsdesk/dbsec8f.htm
Timestamp: 2014-10-31 21:29:24
Document Index: 133595101

Matched Legal Cases: ['§944', '§8', '§8', '§702', '§908', '§944', 'art 15', '§702', '§908', '§702', '§702', '§702', '§702', '§902', '§8', '§8', '§621']

DBSEC8F
SECTION 8(f)
Section 8(f) shifts part of the liability for permanent partial and permanent total disability, and death benefits, from employer to the Special Fund created in Section 44 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §944, when the disability or death is not due solely to the injury which is the subject of the claim. In construing this provision, the courts have acknowledged that Section 8(f) was enacted to avoid discrimination against handicapped workers, stating
the purpose of new 8(f) is to prevent discrimination against handicapped workers in hiring and firing, a discrimination encouraged by the remainder of the Act were it not for §8(f). The Act makes the employer liable for compensation. Hence, the employer risks increased liability when he hires or retains a partially disabled worker. By virtue of the contribution of the previous partial disability, such a worker injured on the job may suffer a resulting disability greater than a healthy worker would have suffered. Were it not for the shifting of this increased compensation liability from the employer to the Special Fund under §8(f), the Act would discourage employers from hiring and retaining disabled workers.
Director, OWCP v. Campbell Industries, Inc., 678 F.2d 836, 839, 14 BRBS 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983), quoting C & P Telephone Co. v. Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503, 512, 6 BRBS 399, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev�g Glover v. C & P Telephone, 4 BRBS 23 (1976). See also H. Rep. No. 92-1441 reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4705-06.
Section 8(f)(1) states the general rule that where an employee with an existing permanent partial disability suffers injury, the employer shall pay compensation for the disability due to that injury at the average weekly wage at that time. It then specifies requirements for obtaining Section 8(f) relief based on whether the pre-existing permanent partial disability is covered under the schedule or Section 8(c)(21) and whether claimant sustains permanent total disability or death, or permanent partial disability following the work-related injury which is the subject of the claim. Once the requirements for Section 8(f) relief are met, then employer�s liability is generally limited to 104 weeks, although this period may vary in scheduled injury cases. See General Rules, infra. Even in cases where Section 8(f) is applicable, the Special Fund is not liable for medical benefits. Stone v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 20 BRBS 1 (1987); Barclift v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 15 BRBS 418 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 737 F.2d 1295, 16 BRBS 107(CRT) (4th Cir. 1984); Scott v. Rowe Machine Works, 9 BRBS 198 (1978); Spencer v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 BRBS 675 (1978). Similarly, the Fund is not liable for funeral expenses. Fineman v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 27 BRBS 104 (1993). The Special Fund also cannot be held liable for claimant's attorney�s fees under Section 28, Section 26 or any other provision. Rihner v. Boland Marine & Manufacturing Co., 24 BRBS 84 (1990), aff'd, 41 F.3d 997, 29 BRBS 43 (CRT) (5th Cir. 1995). Additional cases on this topic are digested in Section 28, Liability of the Special Fund. The Board has held that an employer is entitled to interest, payable by the Special Fund, on monies paid in excess of its liability under Section 8(f). Lewis v. American Marine Corp., 13 BRBS 637 (1981); Campbell v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 15 BRBS 380 (1983) (Ramsey, concurring and dissenting)
Section 8(f)(2)(A) provides that after the end of the period of payments for which employer is liable under subsection (1), the Special Fund is liable for the remainder of the compensation due claimant, except that the Fund shall not be liable where the employer has failed to secure the payment of compensation as required by Section 32 of the Act. Thus, where employer fails to obtain insurance coverage as required by the Act, employer forfeits its right to Section 8(f) relief. Lewis v. Sunnen Crane Service, Inc., 34 BRBS 57 (2000). Compare Weber v. S.C. Loveland Co., 35 BRBS 190 (2002), aff�g and modifying on recon. 35 BRBS 75 (2001). Section 8(f)(2)(B) provides that after the Special Fund assumes liability the liable employer or carrier remains a party to the claim and retains all rights under the Act. See Standing, infra.
Section 8(f)(3) provides that the request for Section 8(f) relief must be raised in the first instance before the district director and failure to do so bars Special Fund liability unless employer shows it could not have reasonably anticipated the Fund�s liability. See 20 C.F.R. §702.321. Cases involving this provision are addressed infra, under Timeliness of Employer�s Request.
The Board agreed with the Director that the administrative law judge erred in assessing funeral expenses against the Special Fund pursuant to Section 8(f) on the rationale that such expenses are included within definition of compensation found in Section 2(12). Relying on Kahny, 15 BRBS 212 (1982), the Board noted that the word "compensation" may have different meanings under different sections of the Act depending on the purpose of the section in which it is being used. The Board indicated that Section 8(f) was only intended to limit employer's liability for periodic payments of compensation and thus that funeral expenses are not included within the class of compensation for which the Special Fund could be liable under Section 8(f). Bingham v. General Dynamics Corp., 20 BRBS 198 (1988).
Funeral expenses cannot be assessed against the Special Fund, as they are not "compensation." Fineman v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 27 BRBS 104 (1993).
Section 8(f)(2)(A) provides that the Special Fund �shall not� be responsible for benefits pursuant to Section 8(f) if the employer fails to comply with Section 32(a), which requires the employer to have insurance. Due to the mandatory nature of the statutory language, the difference in the regulations implementing 8(f)(2)(A) and 8(f)(3), and based on an analogy with raising Section 14(e) issues, the Board held that Section 8(f)(2)(A) is an issue which may be raised at any time. The Board further held that the relevant time for determining if employer is insured is the time the injury occurred, as this interpretation is supported by the Section 44 assessment formula. As it was not contested that employer did not have insurance at the time of claimant�s injury, the Board reversed the administrative law judge�s finding that Section 8(f) relief was not barred in this case. Lewis v. Sunnen Crane Service, Inc., 34 BRBS 57 (2000).
The Board rejected the Director�s motion to reconsider the award of Section 8(f) relief on the ground that employer failed to secure payment of compensation under Section 32. The Board distinguished Lewis, 34 BRBS 57 (2000), stating that employer�s effort herein to obtain the necessary coverage was a far cry from the Lewis employer�s attempt to circumvent the Act. Thus, although, due to pronouncements in the law, employer�s insurance ultimately contained a gap in policies which omitted coverage for claimant�s injury at the Port of Kingston, such error does not mandate the conclusion that employer failed to secure payment of compensation under Section 32, and it does not bar employer from Section 8(f) relief pursuant to Section 8(f)(2). Consequently, the Board reaffirmed that the Special Fund shall assume payment for claimant�s benefits after May 2, 1994. Weber v. S.C. Loveland Co., 35 BRBS 190 (2002), aff�g and modifying on recon. 35 BRBS 75 (2001).
To be entitled to Section 8(f) relief where the work injury results in permanent total disability or death, the employer must establish (1) that the employee had a pre-existing permanent partial disability; (2) that this disability was �manifest� to the employer; and (3) that the employee�s permanent total disability is not due solely to the employment injury but is the result of the combination of the pre-existing permanent partial disability and the subsequent work-related injury. Two �R� Drilling Co. v. Director, OWCP, 894 F.2d 748, 23 BRBS 34(CRT) (5th Cir. 1990); Jacksonville Shipyards Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Stokes], 851 F.2d 1314, 21 BRBS 150(CRT) (11th Cir. 1988); Bechtel Associates, P.C. v. Sweeney, 834 F.2d 1029, 20 BRBS 49(CRT) (D.C. Cir. 1987); Director, OWCP v. Campbell Industries Inc., 678 F.2d 836, 14 BRBS 974�(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); C & P Telephone Co. v. Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503, 6 BRBS 399 (D.C. Cir. 1977). When an employee is permanently partially disabled due to the work injury, in addition to these three elements the employer must show that the permanent partial disability being compensated �is materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.� 33 U.S.C. §908(f)(1). The subsequent employment-related injury to which Section 8(f) applies is also known as the �second injury.� Employer bears the burden of proving each element of Section 8(f) relief. See, e.g., Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp. [Johnson], 129 F.3d 45, 31 BRBS 155(CRT) (1st Cir. 1997); Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. [Harcum I], 8 F.3d 175, 27 BRBS 116(CRT) (4th Cir. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 122, 29 BRBS 87(CRT) (1995). Accord CNA Ins. Co. v. Legrow, 935 F.2d 430, 24 BRBS 202(CRT) (1st Cir. 1991); Two �R� Drilling, 894 F.2d 748, 23 BRBS 34(CRT); Stokes, 851 F.2d 1314, 21 BRBS 150(CRT).
Section 8(f) does not apply where the disability is temporary. Jenkins v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 17 BRBS 183 (1985); see Nathenas v. Shrimpboat, Inc., 13 BRBS 34 (1981) (where disability is temporary, it is error for administrative law judge to make Section 8(f) findings).
Section 8(f)(1) begins with the general proposition that where an employee with an existing permanent partial disability is injured, employer is liable for compensation for the disability due to that injury based upon his average weekly wage at that time. This statement is followed by four sentences stating limitations on employer�s liability based on the whether claimant�s injury is to a body part covered by the schedule or not and whether the injury resulted in permanent total or partial disability or death. Where an employee having a pre-existing permanent partial disability sustains a second injury to a member which is not covered by the schedule of Section 8(c)(1)-(20), and that injury results in permanent total disability or death which is not due solely to the latter injury, employer�s compensation liability is limited to 104 weeks, with the remainder to be paid from the Special Fund created under Section 44 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §944. Where such a second injury results in permanent partial disability and the employee had a pre-existing permanent partial disability, the statute states not only that the resulting permanent partial disability must �not be due solely to� the subsequent injury, but also that it must be �materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.�
Where the second injury is to a member covered by the schedule and it results in permanent partial or total disability, the same standards apply in that the resulting disability cannot be solely due to the second injury and, in the case of partial disability, it must be materially and substantially greater than that which would result from the subsequent injury alone. However, in such cases, employer is liable for the greater of 104 weeks or the number of weeks due under the schedule for the subsequent injury, except in cases of hearing loss awards under Section 8(c)(13), where employer is liable for compensation for the lesser of such periods.
In many cases where the second injury results in scheduled permanent partial disability, Section 8(f) does not apply at all as the full award to claimant is less than 104 weeks. See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Nash, 757 F.2d 1461, 17 BRBS 29(CRT) (5th Cir. 1985), on reconsideration en banc, 782 F.2d 573, 18 BRBS 45(CRT) (5th Cir. 1986), aff�g in relevant part 15 BRBS 386 (1983); Byrd v. Toledo Overseas Terminal, 18 BRBS 144 (1986).
The 1984 Amendments altered this result for Section 8(c)(13) hearing loss awards, as Congress sought to correct what the Board had recognized as a gap in the statutory scheme in Primc v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 12 BRBS 190 (1980), which held that Section 8(f) could not apply to a hearing loss award of less than 104 weeks. See also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Fishel, 757 F.2d 1461, 17 BRBS 29(CRT) (4th Cir. 1982), aff�g 14 BRBS 520 (1981). The Amendments exchanged the word �greater� for �lesser� in cases of hearing loss under Section 8(c)(13). Since employer is liable for the lesser of the number of weeks provided for the subsequent loss or 104 weeks, where employer can establish a manifest pre-existing hearing loss which combined with further exposure to noise to result in an increased loss, the Special Fund will be liable for some benefits. See Reggiannini v. General Dynamics Corp., 17 BRBS 254 (1985).
In scheduled cases other than hearing loss cases, where the award to claimant equals or exceeds 104 weeks and the subsequent injury�s contribution is less than 104 weeks, employer is liable for 104 weeks. If the award to claimant equals or exceeds 104 weeks, and the subsequent injury�s contribution exceeds 104 weeks, employer is liable for the full contribution of the subsequent injury. See Davenport v. Apex Decorating Co., 18 BRBS 194 (1986). In all cases where the requirements of Section 8(f) are met, the Special Fund pays the remainder of the award.
Claimants have argued that Section 8(f) requires an award of at least 104 weeks when a scheduled disability amounts to less than 104 weeks. This contention has been rejected. Fishel, 757 F.2d 1461, 17 BRBS 29(CRT); Strachan, 757 F.2d 1461, 17 BRBS 29(CRT).
Under the aggravation rule, unless Section 8(f) applies, employer must pay the full award regardless of the amount of employer�s contribution to the disability. Fishel, 757 F.2d 1461, 17 BRBS 29(CRT); Ashley v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 10 BRBS 42 (1978), aff�d sub nom. Director, OWCP v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 625 F.2d 317, 12 BRBS 518 (9th Cir. 1980). The statute specifically states that awards under Section 8(f) must be paid in addition to payments for temporary total and temporary partial disability. Romanowski v. I.T.O. Corp., 4 BRBS 59 (1976).
Where claimant injured his toe, which resulted in the amputation of his foot as a result of the combination of claimant�s work injury and his pre-existing diabetes, the Board held that employer was liable for the 205 weeks provided in the schedule for loss of a foot. The Board rejected employer�s argument that its liability should be limited to 104 weeks as no scheduled award was entered, finding this argument contrary to the plain language of the statute which states that where a scheduled injury results in permanent total disability, and the permanent total disability is not due solely to this subsequent injury, employer is liable for the greater of 104 weeks or the applicable scheduled period of weeks for the injury. Higgins v. Hampshire Gardens Apartments, 19 BRBS 77 (1986) (Brown, J., dissenting), aff'd on recon. en banc, 19 BRBS 192 (1987).
Where claimant first injured his back in March and a second incident occurred in May following his return to work, the Board vacated the denial of Section 8(f) relief. The Board rejected the administrative law judge�s finding that the short span of time between the two injuries precluded Section 8(f) relief, holding that Section 8(f) does not require that a certain amount of time pass between claimant's first injury and his subsequent injury before an employer is entitled to relief. To conclude, as the administrative law judge did, that a short span of time between a claimant's two injuries precludes the possibility of a Section 8(f) award, would eliminate recovery under the statute for recurrences or significant increases in an existing impairment, which would undermine the purpose of Section 8(f). Lockhart v. General Dynamics Corp., 20 BRBS 219 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp., 980 F.2d 74, 26 BRBS 116(CRT) (1st Cir. 1992).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that claimant's intracranial bleeding preceding a stroke constituted a pre-existing disability for purposes of Section 8(f) and that 12 days was a sufficiently long time for a pre-existing permanent partial disability to emerge. No specific amount of time must pass between the pre-existing condition and the work injury. The Board therefore rejected Director's argument that claimant's bleeding and stroke constituted one condition to which Section 8(f) relief would not apply. Ortiz v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 25 BRBS 228 (1991).
Where the Board vacated the administrative law judge�s concurrent awards for injuries in 1980 and 1983, it also vacated the findings that employer was not entitled to Section 8(f) relief for the compensation due on 1980 injury, but that Section 8(f) relief was available for the compensation owed claimant for his 1983 injury. The Board held that as claimant�s first injury resulted in no loss in wage-earning capacity, the administrative law judge erred in fashioning an ongoing award for this injury, shifting this award to the carrier at the time of the second injury and then using claimant�s remaining earning capacity as the basis for his 1983 award. Since claimant's disability was due to the aggravation of his 1980 injury by his 1983 injury, the Board remanded for one award for claimant�s entire disability based on his earnings at that time. Since the administrative law judge's findings established that the requirements of Section 8(f) were met with regard to the last injury, the Board modified the award to hold that Section 8(f) was available on claimant�s full disability award. Kooley v. Marine Industries Northwest, 22 BRBS 142 (1989).
The Board held that Section 8(f)(1) specifically and unequivocally states that employer is liable for 104 weeks of permanent disability, in addition to compensation payments for temporary disability. Thus, employer is not entitled to credit payments for temporary disability against its Section 8(f) liability where the period of temporary disability falls between two periods of permanent disability. Shaw v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 23 BRBS 96 (1989).
The Board held that 20 C.F.R. §702.145(b) does not exempt employer from paying temporary total disability benefits following the completion of the 104 weeks period of permanent partial disability for the same injury. The Board held that the proper interpretation is that an employer who qualifies for Section 8(f) relief is to provide permanent disability compensation of "only" 104 weeks and for "none other" periods of permanent disability. "In addition" employer must pay all compensation due for temporary disability whenever it occurs. Sizemore v. Seal and Co., 23 BRBS 101 (1989).
The Ninth Circuit addressed an issue of first impression for the courts: whether a permanent partial disability may be recharacterized as temporary total during a period of recovery from surgery, in this case, five years later. The court holds that it may be, as �permanency� is not immutable. If claimant�s condition deteriorates and medical intervention leads to a new healing period, the prior point of maximum medical improvement no longer holds. Any award for temporary total disability subsumes the underlying permanent partial disability such that only the former award is payable. Thus, the court affirmed the award of temporary total disability following surgery, and held that employer must make these payments notwithstanding the award of Section 8(f) relief, as the Special Fund cannot be held liable for temporary disability benefits. Pacific Ship Repair & Fabrication Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Benge], 687 F.3d 1182, 46 BRBS 35(CRT) (9th Cir. 2012).
Claimant initially injured his back at work in 1985 and subsequently returned to work until a 1987 lay-off. Following an incident at home during this time, claimant did not return to work. The Board affirmed a finding that the incident at home was not a new injury but was a continuation of claimant�s recurring back pain. In remanding the case for the administrative law judge to consider whether claimant�s work for employer after he returned following the 1985 injury resulted in an aggravation, and thus a second injury, the Board stated the incident at home was not relevant to the Section 8(f) inquiry and rejected the Director�s argument that there was no �second injury.� The Board stated that Section 8(f) relief was available if claimant's initial work-related injury resulted in a serious lasting problem, thus meeting the pre-existing permanent partial disability element, which was aggravated by his continuing work for the same employer, which could meet the contribution element, and remanded for consideration of these issues. Merrill v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 25 BRBS 140 (1991).
The Board rejected employer's argument that since the administrative law judge found in his initial decision that claimant was entitled to an award under Section 8(c)(21), he should have directed the Special Fund to reimburse employer for all sums it paid in excess of 104 weeks pursuant to a 1981 settlement. While the administrative law judge found that employer was entitled to Section 8(f) relief for claimant's back injury, the payments made under the 1981 settlement were for claimant's knee injuries alone, and there was no evidence of any pre-existing permanent partial disability which contributed to this disability to claimant's knees. Thus, the payments had no relevance to employer's entitlement to Section 8(f) relief for claimant's back condition, and the denial of reimbursement was affirmed. Bass v. Broadway Maintenance, 28 BRBS 11 (1994).
The Board remanded the case for the administrative law judge to fully discuss the basis for his finding that employer was not entitled to Section 8(f) relief. The Board restated the elements of Section 8(f) and noted that the administrative law judge's decision failed to comport with the APA. Goody v. Thames Valley Steel Corp., 28 BRBS 167 (1994)(McGranery, J., dissenting).
Where claimant was disabled due to both orthopedic and lung conditions, with the result that while claimant was permanently totally disabled by the lung condition in 1987 but employer did not have to commence such payments until 1989, the Board reversed the administrative law judge�s determination that employer was entitled to Section 8(f) relief for the lung condition after 104 weeks from the 1987 date when claimant was adjudged permanently disabled. Section 8(f) states that �employer shall provide� compensation for a determined period of time and thereafter is entitled to Section 8(f) relief. The decision was thus modified to provide for the Special Fund�s assumption of liability after employer actually paid permanent disability benefits for 104 weeks. Hansen v. Container Stevedoring Co., 31 BRBS 155 (1997).
In the case of a scheduled injury, employer is liable for compensation for the greater of 104 weeks or the number of weeks in the schedule attributable to the subsequent injury. The administrative law judge here reasonably determined, based on Dr. London�s report, that since as a result of a prior 1990 accident claimant had a 16 percent impairment to each leg, and the parties stipulated to a total 50 percent impairment to each leg as of June 1996, claimant sustained a 34 percent impairment to each knee as a result of claimant�s employment. Employer was held liable for 104 weeks� compensation for each knee as this is greater than 34 percent of 288, 33 U.S.C. §908(c)(2). Berg v. Matson Terminals, Inc., 34 BRBS 140 (2000), aff'd, 279 F.3d 694, 35 BRBS 152(CRT) (9th Cir. 2002).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that claimant�s pre-existing disability was 16 percent based on the opinion of employer�s physician and thus a 34 percent impairment to both knees was attributable to claimant�s work injury where the parties stipulated that the result of claimant�s work injury was a 50 percent impairment to each knee. Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Berg, 279 F.3d 694, 35 BRBS 152(CRT) (9th Cir. 2002), aff�g 34 BRBS 140 (2000).
Hearing Loss The Board held that in apportioning Section 8(f) liability under the 1984 Amendments, the relevant hearing loss figures must be calculated in accordance with the AMA Guides. The Board rejected employer's proposal to compare claimant's pre-employment decibel-loss figure with a later decibel-loss figure. The Board also rejected employer's contention that the administrative law judge erred in calculating Section 8(f) liability by converting claimant's pre-existing monaural hearing loss into binaural hearing impairment. McShane v. General Dynamics Corp., 22 BRBS 427 (1989).
Under the Act as amended in 1984, in hearing loss cases, employer's liability is limited to the lesser of 104 weeks or the extent of hearing loss attributable to the employment. Therefore, employer is only liable for its contribution to the hearing loss, and the Special Fund is liable for the remainder, even if the total award is less than 104 weeks. Epps v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 19 BRBS 1 (1986).
Section 8(f) as amended in 1984 limits employer's liability in hearing loss claims to the lesser of 104 weeks or the extent of hearing loss attributable to the subsequent injury. Machado v. General Dynamics Corp., 22 BRBS 176 (1989). (Note: in Reggiannini, 17 BRBS at 257, the standard was referred to as "extent of hearing loss attributable to the employment")
Where claimant, who began working for employer in 1933, received his first audiogram in 1959 which indicated a 15.7 percent binaural hearing loss, and retired from his position with employer in 1975 with a 33.7 percent binaural hearing loss, the Special Fund was liable for the 15.7 percent hearing loss which occurred before the 1959 hearing test, and employer was liable for the remainder, based on the precept that Section 8(f) was enacted in part to encourage the retention of disabled workers. A pre-employment audiogram is not a prerequisite to Section 8(f) relief under the amended Act. Risch v. General Dynamics Corp., 22 BRBS 251 (1989).
Claimant was employed as a supervisor for employer from 1964 to 1983, at which time he had a 23.4 percent binaural hearing loss. Claimant was given a pre-employment audiogram in 1964 which indicated a high frequency hearing loss, but the hearing loss was too minimal to be quantifiable under the AMA Guides. Because the 1964 audiogram interpreted under the Guides indicated no binaural hearing loss, the Board held that the 1964 audiogram can not establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability cognizable under Sections 8(c)(13) and 8(f) of the Act as amended in 1984. The Board, however, remanded for the administrative law judge to determine whether other audiograms in the record could establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability based on the holding in Risch that audiograms taken during employment may suffice if employer continued to expose claimant to injurious noise which aggravated his condition. In so doing, the Board rejected the contention that claimant must have been informed of the results of the audiograms in order for employer to qualify for Section 8(f) relief based on them, stating that employer�s knowledge, actual or constructive, is necessary only for a manifest pre-existing permanent partial disability. Fucci v. General Dynamics Corp., 23 BRBS 161 (1990) (Brown, J, dissenting).
Where there was no creditable evidence of the extent of claimant's hearing loss prior to 1984, and claimant left covered employment in 1971, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge's findings that employer did not meet its burden of establishing that claimant had a pre-existing disability which was manifest to employer prior to his leaving covered employment. Dubar v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 25 BRBS 5 (1991).
The Board held initially that the administrative law judge erred in relying on a November 1984 audiogram to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability where he also found claimant was not exposed to noise after October 1984. However, the Board modified the award of Section 8(f) relief based on the results of an earlier audiogram. The Board rejected the Director's contention that Section 8(f) should not apply in cases where the employer administered audiograms to claimant and allegedly did not inform him of the results or file an injury report with the district director. In this case there was no evidence that the results were concealed, and under Section 30(a) as amended in 1984, employer has no duty to report "no time lost" injuries. The Board also rejected Director�s argument that the claim should be �amended� to include a claim based on the earlier hearing loss for which employer would be liable, as claimant did not file a claim after the earlier audiograms and there is no basis under the Act for a claim to be �amended� by the Director to include claims for prior hearing losses for the purpose of creating a credit for the Special Fund against its liability. Skelton v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 27 BRBS 28 (1993).
The Board rejected the Director�s argument that 20 C.F.R. §702.321, which states that the pre-existing hearing loss �must be documented by an audiogram which complies with the requirements of Section 702.441,� requires that employer produce a �presumptive� audiogram pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §702.441(b) in order for it to establish the pre-existing hearing loss requisite for its entitlement to Section 8(f) relief. The Board explained that the key question relating to hearing loss for purposes of Section 8(f) relief, as well as for establishing the extent of hearing loss in adjudicating any other aspect of the claim, is whether there is sufficient probative evidence, applying the AMA Guides and procedures of Section 702.441(d), to establish the extent of a claimant�s permanent loss of hearing at a particular point in time. The Board rejected the Director�s contention that the audiogram documenting claimant�s pre-existing hearing impairment is deficient under 20 C.F.R. §702.441(d). The administrative law judge found that the examiner, type of equipment, and calibration date were on the audiogram results. The administrative law judge also found that claimant�s current physical condition was noted in materials accompanying the audiogram. The administrative law judge relied on a doctor�s testimony concerning the reliability of the audiogram, and the hearing loss was calculated under the AMA Guides. Thus, the Board affirmed the finding that the pre-existing permanent partial disability element for Section 8(f) relief was met, as well as the award of Section 8(f) relief. R.H. [Harris] v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 42 BRBS 6 (2008). The administrative law judge erroneously addressed whether claimant�s 2003 audiogram demonstrated a materially and substantially greater disability than that demonstrated on the 2002 audiogram before determining whether the 2003 audiogram showed a greater loss and was thus a second injury. However, the administrative law judge rationally credited uncontradicted medical evidence that audiogram test results at any particular frequency that fall within a 5 decibel range of each other are within the range of test/retest variability and thus are a measure of the same hearing loss. In this case, the 2002 and 2003 audiogram results are within the range of test/retest variability such that the 2003 audiogram does not represent an increase in claimant�s hearing loss since the 2002 audiogram. The Board, therefore, affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that employer did not establish a second injury for purposes of Section 8(f) by virtue of these audiograms. With regard to earlier audiograms, the Board held that the administrative law judge erred in rejecting employer�s claim for Section 8(f) relief by finding that 20 C.F.R §§702.321, 702.441 requires that employer provide claimant with a copy of the audiogram and interpreting report in order for the test to be valid for purposes of Section 8(f). Claimant need not be informed of the prior test results for employer to be entitled to Section 8(f) relief. Moreover, employer�s entitlement to Section 8(f) relief need not be predicated on an audiogram that meets all of the criteria of Section 702.441(b)-(d), citing R.H., 42 BRBS 6. The Board remanded the case for the administrative law judge to address employer�s entitlement to Section 8(f) relief based on any of the audiograms pre-dating the audiogram that established claimant�s compensable second injury. G.K. [Kunihiro] v. Matson Terminals, Inc., 42 BRBS 15 (2008), aff�d mem. sub nom. Director, OWCP v. Matson Terminals, Inc., 442 F. App�x 304 (9th Cir. 2011).
Elements of Section 8(f) Relief
Pre-Existing Permanent Partial Disability
The Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word �disability� as used in requiring a previous disability in Section 8(f), and concluded that Congress did not intend to use �disability� as a term of art in Section 8(f). Thus, the Court concluded that in the context of Section 8(f), a prior disability need not fall within the definition of that term in Section 2(10) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §902(10). Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit and Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198 (1949). Although Lawson interpreted Section 8(f) as it existed prior to the 1972 Amendments, the courts have concluded that no relevant change was intended by the rephrasing of �previous disability� in the original Section 8(f) to �existing permanent partial disability� in the amended version. See, e.g., C & P Telephone Co. v. Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503, 6 BRBS 399 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Director, OWCP, 542 F.2d 602, 4 BRBS 79 (3d Cir. 1976).
The most often-cited definition of �existing permanent partial disability� under Section 8(f) was set forth in C & P Telephone. In C & P Telephone, the court rejected the theory that an existing permanent partial disability under Section 8(f) was required to be an economic disability:
To summarize, the term �disability� in new Section 8(f) can be economic disability under §8(c)(21) or one of the scheduled losses specified in §8(c)(1)-(20), but it is not limited to those cases alone. �Disability� under new Section 8(f) is necessarily of sufficient breadth to encompass those cases, like that before us, wherein the employee had such a serious physical disability in fact that a cautious employer would have been motivated to discharge the handicapped employee because of a greatly increased risk of employment-related accident and compensation liability.
564 F.2d at 513, 6 BRBS at 415. The �economic� disability theory has been rejected in several other circuits as well. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Mayes], 913 F.2d 1426, 24 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 1990); Director, OWCP v. Campbell Industries, Inc., 678 F.2d 836, 14 BRBS 974 (9th Cir. 1982), rev�g Lostaunau v. Campbell Industries, Inc., 13 BRBS 227 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); Equitable Equipment Co., Inc. v. Hardy, 558 F.2d 1192, 6 BRBS 666 (5th Cir. 1977), rev�g 3 BRBS 426 (1976); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, 542 F.2d 602, 4 BRBS 79, rev�g 1 BRBS 541 (1975). But see Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. v. U. S. Dep�t of Labor, 553 F. 2d 1144, 5 BRBS 756 (8th Cir. 1977) (court does not decide issue). The �cautious employer� test has now been widely adopted. E.g., Morehead Marine Services, Inc. v. Washnock, 135 F.3d 366, 32 BRBS 8(CRT) (6th Cir. 1998); Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp. [Johnson], 129 F.3d 45, 31 BRBS 155(CRT) (1st Cir. 1997); Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp. [Bergeron], 982 F.2d 790, 26 BRBS 139(CRT) (2d Cir. 1992); Lockheed Shipbuilding v. Director, OWCP, 951 F.2d 1143, 25 BRBS 85(CRT) (9th Cir. 1991).
Although in the past the Board had required that claimant's pre-existing disability be economically disabling, the Board reversed its position and followed the lead of the appellate courts in not requiring economic disability. See, e.g., Bickham v. New Orleans Stevedoring Co., 18 BRBS 41 (1986); Burch v. Superior Oil Co., 15 BRBS 423 (1983); Shoemaker v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 12 BRBS 141 (1980); Johnson v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 11 BRBS 427 (1979); Lawson v. Atlantic & Gulf Grain Stevedores Co., 6 BRBS 770 (1977); Benoit v. General Dynamics Corp., 6 BRBS 762 (1977). In addition, the Board has specifically applied the test established in C & P Telephone that a condition is a disability for purposes of Section 8(f) when it is such that a cautious employer would be motivated to discharge the employee because of a greatly increased risk of compensation liability. See, e.g., Devor v. Dep�t of the Army, 41 BRBS 77 (2007); Smith v. Gulf Stevedoring Co., 22 BRBS 1 (1988); Johnson, 11 BRBS 427; Cononetz v. Pacific Fisherman, Inc., 11 BRBS 154 (1979).
The D.C. Circuit has also held that the mere fact of past injury does not itself establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Rather, �there must exist, as a result of that injury, some serious, lasting physical problem.� Director, OWCP v. Belcher Erectors, 770 F.2d 1220, 1222, 17 BRBS 146, 149(CRT) (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in Campbell Industries, 678 F.2d 836, 14 BRBS 974, holding employer did not meet the C & P Telephone criteria as it did not establish that claimant�s prior back injuries resulted in a serious physically disabling condition and his psychological condition was not diagnosed until after the work injury. The court therefore reversed the Board�s decision in Lostaunau, 13 BRBS 227, which had held that the prior conditions were sufficient. See Dove v. Southwest Marine of San Francisco, 18 BRBS 139 (1986) (old ankle fracture did not produce serious lasting physical problem; award of Section 8(f) relief reversed); Bickham, 18 BRBS 41 (mere diagnosis of a pre-existing condition is not necessarily sufficient).
A work-related condition may establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability for purposes of Section 8(f). See Electric Boat Corp. v. DeMartino, 495 F.3d 14, 41 BRBS 45(CRT) (2d Cir. 2007), and cases discussed under the contribution element regarding aggravation.
The Board has stated that an existing permanent partial disability must be based on a physical foundation. Elements such as a claimant's background, age, limited education, language difficulties and limited prior work experience may not be used. Cononetz, 11 BRBS 154. See Watts v. Marcel S. Garrigues Co., 19 BRBS 40 (1986), aff'd sub nom. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Director, OWCP, 818 F.2d 1424, 20 BRBS 11(CRT) (9th Cir. 1987). Compare Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Mayes], 913 F.2d 1426, 24 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 1990). Neither do family dependents nor social discrimination constitute a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Collins v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979).
Obesity by itself does not constitute a pre-existing disability. A pre-existing disability must be a medically cognizable ailment rather than an unhealthy habit or lifestyle. Wilson v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 23 BRBS 24 (1989); Vogle v. Sealand Terminal, Inc., 17 BRBS 126 (1985); Brogden v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 259 (1984). However, physically disabling symptoms of obesity may suffice. Wilson, 23 BRBS 24.
An x-ray showing pleural thickening establishes a pre-existing permanent partial disability, as it evidences a serious lung condition. Topping v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 40 (1983); Musgrove v. William E. Campbell Co., 14 BRBS 762 (1982).
Alcoholism may constitute a pre-existing disability pursuant to Section 8(f). Parent v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 7 BRBS 41�(1977). In Parent, employer submitted evidence that claimant�s alcoholism resulted in a psychological disability which combined with his work injury. Thus, while alcoholism may meet this requirement, where there is no evidence that it caused a serious lasting physical condition, that requirement is not met. See Settles v. Lane Constr. Corp., 15 BRBS 148 (1982) (records indicated only that claimant was a heavy drinker).
Smoking does not qualify as a pre-existing disability until it results in medically cognizable symptoms that physically impair the employee. General Dynamics Corp. v. Sacchetti, 681 F.2d 37, 14 BRBS 862 (1st Cir. 1982), aff�g 14 BRBS 29 (1981). In Sacchetti, the court reasoned that applying Section 8(f) to �socially pervasive risks� would redefine �disability,� broadening the rule beyond its intended scope. Digests
Illiteracy is not a pre-existing permanent disability for purposes of Section 8(f); unless there is a medically cognizable physical or mental ailment underlying a disability such as this, it is a mere social or economic factor insufficient to trigger relief. Watts v. Marcel S. Garrigues Co., 19 BRBS 40 (1986), aff'd sub nom. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Director, OWCP, 818 F.2d 1424, 20 BRBS 11(CRT) (9th Cir. 1987).
Affirming this decision, the Ninth Circuit held that mental impairment qualifies as a permanent partial disability under Section 8(f) if it is shown that the impairment was not simply due to lack of education. An employee's illiteracy which is not the result of mental retardation or a learning disability does not constitute a pre-existing permanent partial disability for purposes of Section 8(f). State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Director, OWCP, 818 F.2d 1424, 20 BRBS 11(CRT) (9th Cir. 1987). Where the evidence credited by the administrative law judge established that psychological testing showed that claimant suffered from �borderline retardation,� the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board and held that this mental limitation was sufficient to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability. The court held that the definition of disability as an economic concept set forth in Section 2(10) does not apply to Section 8(f). Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Mayes], 913 F.2d 1426, 24 BRBS 25(CRT) (9th Cir. 1990).
The Board vacated the administrative law judge's denial of Section 8(f) relief and remanded for reconsideration of whether claimant's low intellectual level constituted a pre-existing permanent partial disability where he did not discuss relevant medical opinions regarding claimant�s psychological problems which suggested these problems were more serious than he found and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mayes, 913 F.2d 1426, 24 BRBS 25(CRT), was issued subsequent to his decision. White v. Peterson Boatbuilding Co., 29 BRBS 1 (1995).
Obesity, by itself, cannot constitute a pre-existing disability. A pre-existing disability must be a medically cognizable physical ailment rather than an unhealthy habit or lifestyle. Physically disabling symptoms attributable to obesity may thus be sufficient to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability. The Board remanded for the administrative law judge to consider the evidence in light of these propositions. Wilson v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 23 BRBS 24 (1989).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that substantial evidence supported a determination that claimant's first injury was not permanent where he resumed his old job including overtime without restrictions or a decrease in pay and there was no objective medical evidence of permanent disability. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Cortez], 793 F.2d 1012, 19 BRBS 1 (CRT) (9th Cir. 1986).
The First Circuit affirmed a finding that claimant's hypertension was a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Claimant had the condition "for years," had a job offer postponed because of elevated blood pressure, and had significantly elevated blood pressure at the time of hire with employer. Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp. [Fantucchio], 787 F.2d 723, 18 BRBS 88(CRT) (1st Cir. 1986).
Where claimant had a history of three injuries to his left arm yet suffered no significant medical problems or work restrictions, the mere existence of these prior injuries did not establish a pre-existing disability for Section 8(f) purposes because the pre-existing condition must produce some serious, lasting physical problem. Mijangos v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 19 BRBS 15 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 941, 25 BRBS 78(CRT) (5th Cir. 1991).
The Board reversed an administrative law judge's denial of Section 8(f) relief, reasoning that claimant's long-standing lung condition consisting of chronic obstructive lung disease, bronchitis and pneumonia constituted a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Armand v. American Marine Corp., 21 BRBS 305 (1988).
The Board held, contrary to the administrative law judge's conclusion, that Section 8(f) does not require a finding of maximum medical improvement before a pre-existing permanent partial disability can be found. The pre-existing condition must produce some serious lasting physical problem, but it need not have reached maximum medical improvement. Lockhart v. General Dynamics Corp., 20 BRBS 219 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp., 980 F.2d 74, 26 BRBS 116(CRT) (1st Cir. 1992).
The Board reversed the administrative law judge's holding that age-related disabilities are not within the scope of Section 8(f). There is no indication that Congress intended to preclude an existing disability due to age or other causes from forming a basis for Section 8(f) relief, based solely on the cause of the disability. The disability need only be a serious, lasting physical condition. The Board also rejected the administrative law judge's reasoning that employees with age-related disabilities are already protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. The case was remanded for the administrative law judge to determine if degenerative disc disease is a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Greene v. J.O. Hartman Meats, 21 BRBS 214 (1988).
In remanding for reconsideration of the issue of employer's entitlement to Section 8(f) relief, the Board noted that an asymptomatic condition which is aggravated by treatment for the work injury might be a pre-existing permanent partial disability. The pre-existing condition need not result in an economic disability to be a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Dugas v. Durwood Dunn, Inc., 21 BRBS 277 (1988).
The Board noted that symptoms of fatigue alone do not constitute the type of pre-existing condition which would likely motivate a cautious employer to discharge an employee so as to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability for Section 8(f) purposes and thus the administrative law judge's failure to discuss evidence on this issue is harmless error. The Board stated that the administrative law judge erred in relying on the fact that claimant had not lost time from work to conclude that claimant's skin rash was not a pre-existing permanent partial disability, inasmuch as a condition need not be economically disabling to constitute a permanent partial disability under Section 8(f). Concluding this finding was harmless error, the Board affirmed the administrative law judge's denial of Section 8(f) relief based on a determination that administrative law judge correctly concluded that claimant's rash had not resulted in any serious lasting physical problem. Peterson v. Columbia Marine Lines, 21 BRBS 299 (1988). The Board held that an administrative law judge erroneously concluded that a physician's diagnosis of a protruding disc was insufficient to establish a permanent partial disability simply because he had not given claimant a physical impairment rating. The Act does not require that claimant receive a physical impairment rating to establish a permanent partial disability for Section 8(f) purposes so long as claimant's pre-existing condition has resulted in a serious lasting physical problem. The administrative law judge also erred in relying on the fact that claimant had been released to return to work following his prior injury to conclude that this injury had not resulted in "permanent partial disability" within the meaning of Section 8(f) as a condition need not be economically disabling to establish a permanent partial disability under Section 8(f). Moreover, a doctor stated protruded disc made claimant susceptible to further injury. Smith v. Gulf Stevedoring Co., 22 BRBS 1 (1988).
The Board reversed the administrative law judge's finding that claimant's diabetes and hypertension did not constitute pre-existing permanent partial disabilities because they were "merely" risk factors for developing heart disease and did not constitute serious, lasting problems, and because claimant was unaware of the conditions. The Board held that the mere fact claimant did not lose any time at work due to these conditions does not preclude a finding of pre-existing permanent partial disability, since these conditions need not be economically disabling. The Board further noted that the record contained medical evidence that claimant's hypertension and diabetes put him at risk for heart disease, and the evidence demonstrated that these conditions were longstanding and well documented. Since claimant�s knowledge of the conditions is not relevant, and they met the �cautious employer� test, the Board reversed the administrative law judge�s decision. Dugan v. Todd Shipyards, Inc., 22 BRBS 42 (1989).
The Board majority rejected a dissenting view that laws protecting handicapped workers have rendered the C&P Telephone test meaningless. Section 8(f) may encompass persons who are "disabled" but who do not meet the standards of "disability" set forth in other statutory schemes. The Board's function is to interpret the specific statutory scheme of the Act, not to gauge the necessity of the scheme in light of other laws addressing employment discrimination, as Congress has not given any indication that federal laws protecting the handicapped in any way override or modify Section 8(f). Accordingly, the Board stated it would continue to apply the C & P Telephone standard in determining whether the pre-existing permanent partial disability element is met in a given case. The Board remanded the case for reconsideration as the administrative law judge�s findings were inadequate and did not address relevant evidence. Preziosi v. Controlled Industries, Inc., 22 BRBS 468 (1989) (Brown, J., dissenting).
A condition alleged to be a pre-existing disability for Section 8(f) purposes must precede the injury on which the compensation claim is based. Where the insurer did not argue that the employee had such a condition, the Board held that the administrative law judge properly denied Section 8(f) relief. Mikell v. Savannah Shipyard Co., 24 BRBS 100, (1990), aff'd on recon. 26 BRBS 32 (1992), aff'd mem. sub nom. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 14 F.3d 58 (11th Cir. 1994). Where a pre-employment audiogram revealed a hearing loss too minimal to be quantified under the AMA Guides, the Board held it insufficient to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability under Section 8(f). The Board, however, remanded for the administrative law judge to determine whether other audiograms in the record could establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Fucci v. General Dynamics Corp., 23 BRBS 161 (1990)(Brown J., dissenting).
The Board affirmed an administrative law judge's finding that claimant's history of gastrointestinal problems was insufficient to constitute a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Although claimant had several GI series tests and complained of pain over the course of 16 years, there was no evidence of any impairment; after each occasion of abdominal pain, claimant returned to work with no significant problems, and there was no pre-injury diagnosis indicating that claimant suffered from a permanent condition. Devine v. Atlantic Container Lines, G.I.E., 23 BRBS 279 (1990).
The Board held that an asymptomatic pre-existing condition which pre-disposed a claimant to injury and which would cause a doctor to impose restrictions was a pre-existing permanent partial disability under Section 8(f) because it was a serious lasting condition that would have caused a cautious employer to consider terminating him. Currie v. Cooper Stevedoring Co. Inc., 23 BRBS 420 (1990).
In a hearing loss case, the Board noted that a prior work-related injury may constitute a pre-existing permanent partial disability for purposes of Section 8(f) relief. Emery v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 24 BRBS 238 (1991), vacated mem. sub nom. Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 953 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1991).
The First Circuit agreed with the Board's reversal of Section 8(f) relief. The fact that claimant previously sustained back injuries does not, standing alone, establish that he had a pre-existing permanent partial disability. In this case, claimant resumed regular physical labor after recovering from each of his previous back injuries. Furthermore, employer must show that, but for the pre-existing injury, claimant would not have been rendered totally disabled by the work-related injury. Employer not only failed to show that claimant had a pre-existing injury, it did not show that the pre-existing injury, combined with the final work-related injury, would, or did, create a greater degree of disability. CNA Ins. Co. v. Legrow, 935 F.2d 430, 24 BRBS 202(CRT) (1st Cir. 1991). Citing the "cautious employer" test, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's denial of Section 8(f) relief and agreed with the administrative law judge that claimant had a preexisting permanent partial disability where there was substantial evidence that claimant failed to completely recover from his back injuries and continued to have back problems for seven years after returning to work. The decision distinguished Legrow, 935 F.2d 430, 24 BRBS 202(CRT). Lockheed Shipbuilding v. Director, OWCP, 951 F.2d 1143, 25 BRBS 85(CRT) (9th Cir. 1991).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that 12 days was a sufficiently long time for a pre-existing permanent partial disability to emerge, and that claimant's intracranial bleeding preceding the stroke constituted a pre-existing disability for purposes of Section 8(f). No specific amount of time must pass between the pre-existing condition and the work injury. The Board therefore rejected Director's argument that claimant's bleeding and stroke constituted all one condition to which Section 8(f) relief would not be applicable. Ortiz v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 25 BRBS 228 (1991).
The Board affirmed the finding that employer established a pre-existing permanent partial disability. One of claimant's treating physicians opined that claimant was susceptible to prolonged disability due to his back condition. This opinion constituted substantial evidence from which the administrative law judge could rationally find that claimant had a serious and lasting permanent partial disability. Thompson v. Northwest Enviro Services, Inc., 26 BRBS 53 (1992).
The Second Circuit deferred to the Director's reliance on C & P Telephone Co., 564 F.2d 503, 6 BRBS 399(CRT), which defined the term "disability" as used in Section 8(f) as meaning either economic disability, or a condition described in the schedule in Section 8(c), or a physical disability that would motivate a cautious employer to discriminate against a handicapped employee for fear of increased compensation liability. The court, however, declined to defer to the Director's specific application of this standard and remanded the case for the administrative law judge to determine whether claimant's pre-existing asymptomatic back condition constituted a serious physical condition such that a cautious employer would have been motivated to discharge or decline to hire the claimant because of an increased risk compensation liability. The court noted that the administrative law judge is not bound by the Director's view that an asymptomatic condition cannot satisfy this test. Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp. [Bergeron], 982 F.2d 790, 26 BRBS 139(CRT) (2d Cir. 1992).
A doctor's opinion that claimant had a serious asbestos-related lung disease which was evidenced on x-rays for years prior to his retirement constituted substantial evidence that claimant had a pre-existing permanent condition which would have motivated a "cautious employer" to discriminate against him because of a greatly increased risk of compensation liability. Medical records need not indicate the precise nature or severity of a pre-existing condition in order to satisfy this requirement of Section 8(f), so long as there is sufficient information to establish the existence of a serious lasting physical problem prior to the subsequent injury. Shrout v. General Dynamics Corp., 27 BRBS 160 (1993) (Brown, J., dissenting).
Because the existing medical records failed to establish that the injuries cited by employer resulted in a "serious lasting physical condition" etc., the administrative law judge rationally determined that employer failed to establish the pre-existing permanent partial disability element of Section 8(f) entitlement. The records revealed only minor injuries with no lingering effects. Kubin v. Pro-Football, Inc., 29 BRBS 117 (1995).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s conclusion that employer failed to establish that claimant suffered from a manifest pre-existing permanent partial disability. The evidence showed that claimant�s pleural thickening prior to his December 1986 work-related injury was minimal, caused by fat, and, after claimant lost 30 to 40 pounds, disappeared. With regard to claimant�s chronic bronchitis, the administrative law judge found that claimant never missed work because of it, and determined that there was no evidence prior to December 1986 which included either a diagnosis of a chronic condition or a permanent, serious lasting pulmonary condition. Goody v. Thames Valley Steel Corp., 31 BRBS 29 (1997), aff�d mem. sub nom. Thames Valley Steel Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s determination that claimant had a pre-existing permanent partial disability as the additional medical evidence employer submitted on reconsideration cured the deficiencies the administrative law judge found in the original medical report. Thus, substantial evidence supported the finding that claimant�s pre-existing back problems were �serious and lasting.� Wiggins v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 31 BRBS 142 (1997).
In dicta, the First Circuit stated that claimant�s existing obstructive pulmonary disease due to smoking and obesity constituted a pre-existing permanent partial disability within the meaning of Section 8(f) under the �cautious employer� test. Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp. [Johnson], 129 F.3d 45, 31 BRBS 155(CRT) (1st Cir. 1997).
In determining whether claimant had a pre-existing permanent partial disability for purposes of Section 8(f), the Sixth Circuit adopted the cautious employer test, over the Director�s objection, under which a claimant has a permanent partial disability when the claimant had �such a serious physical disability in fact that a cautious employer . . . would [be] motivated to discharge the handicapped employee because of a greatly increased risk of employment-related accident and compensation liability.� The case was remanded for the administrative law judge to apply this test. Morehead Marine Services, Inc. v. Washnock, 135 F.3d 366, 32 BRBS 8(CRT) (6th Cir. 1998). The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s denial of Section 8(f) relief as he rationally determined that employer did not establish a manifest pre-existing disability. Specifically, although the records submitted by employer in support of its application for Section 8(f) relief indicated that claimant had some pre-existing emotional problems, the administrative law judge rationally found that they do not establish the existence of a serious, lasting emotional problem pre-dating the work injury. Callnan v. Morale, Welfare & Recreation, Dep�t of the Navy, 32 BRBS 246 (1998).
The Board affirmed the administrative law judge�s denial of Section 8(f) relief as employer failed to establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability due to either claimant�s obesity or his back condition. Obesity alone is insufficient to establish a pre-existing disability, and the administrative law judge rationally credited evidence that claimant�s prior back injuries were only temporarily disabling. Hundley v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 32 BRBS 254 (1998).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the administrative law judge�s finding that employer did not establish a pre-existing permanent partial disability. The administrative law judge rationally rejected the medical opinions of Drs. Reid as lacking supporting data or medical analysis, and claimant returned to work for several years with no permanent work restrictions after the prior injuries. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Cherry, 326 F.3d 449, 37 BRBS 6(CRT)(4th Cir. 2003). As the administrative law judge did not address whether claimant�s pre-existing osteoarthritis of the knees resulted in a serious and lasting condition, the Board remanded the case for the administrative law judge to address whether claimant�s pre-existing knee conditions constituted a pre-existing permanent partial disability. Beumer v. Navy Personnel Command/MWR, 39 BRBS 98 (2005).
Claimant injured his right shoulder at work and had previously injured the same shoulder, undergone two surgeries and had permanent work restrictions. The Board reversed the administrative law judge�s finding that claimant did not have a pre-existing permanent partial disability. The Board held that, as �disability� under Section 8(f) is not limited to an economic disability, it was improper for the administrative law judge to conclude that claimant had no disability merely because he was able to perform his usual work as a bartender. Rather, the fact that claimant had two prior shoulder surgeries, his condition had been deemed �chronic� as early as 1998, and he had been given permanent lifting restrictions in 1999, established that claimant had a lasting condition prior to his work injury in 2000. Therefore, the Board vacated the denial of Section 8(f) relief, and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining Section 8(f) elements. Devor v. Dep�t of the Army, 41 BRBS 77 (2007).
The Second Circuit held that an employer is eligible for Section 8(f) relief where the employee�s pre-existing disability and second injury both arise from the same course of employment with the same employer. Electric Boat Corp. v. DeMartino, 495 F.3d 14, 41 BRBS 45(CRT) (2d Cir. 2007).
Manifest The requirement that a claimant's pre-existing disability be manifest to the employer is not a statutory requirement of Section 8(f), but was added by the courts in early cases. See Lambert�s Point Docks, Inc. v. Harris, 718 F.2d 644, 16 BRBS 1(CRT) (4th Cir. 1983); Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. [Langley], 676 F.2d 110, 14 BRBS 716 (4th Cir. 1982); Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. v. U. S. Dep�t of Labor, 553 F.2d 1144, 5 BRBS 756 (8th Cir. 1977); Equitable Equip. Co. v. Hardy, 558 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.1977); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Director, OWCP, 542 F.2d 602, 4 BRBS 79 (3d Cir. 1976); Dillingham Corp. v. Massey, 505 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1974); American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 426 F.2d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Accord Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, OWCP [Reno], 136 F.3d 34, 32 BRBS 19(CRT) (1st Cir. 1998); C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 31 F.3d 1112, 28 BRBS 84(CRT) (11th Cir. 1994); Two "R" Drilling Co., Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 894 F.2d 748, 23 BRBS 34(CRT) (5th Cir. 1990); Eymard & Sons Sh