Source: https://m.openjurist.org/353/us/553
Timestamp: 2020-01-24 12:29:16
Document Index: 410545678

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 51', '§ 51', '§ 261', '§ 228', '§ 228', '§ 182', '§ 182', '§ 2', '§ 151', '§ 151', '§ 152', '§ 152', '§ 1502', '§ 203', '§ 203', '§ 459', '§ 459', '§ 151', '§ 151', '§ 101', '§ 20', '§ 52']

353 U.S. 553 - State of California v. Taylor a W
Harry TAYLOR, Peter A. Calus, James W. Brewster, et al.
If the Railway Labor Act applies to the Belt Railroad, then the carrier's employees can invoke its machinery established for adjustment of labor controversies, and the National Railway Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over respondents' claims. Moreover, the Act's policy of protecting collective bargaining comes into conflict with the rule of California law that state employees have no right to bargain collectively with the State concerning terms and conditions of employment which are fixed by the State's civil service laws.7 This state civil service relationship is the antithesis of that established by collectively bargained contracts throughout the railroad industry. '(E)ffective collective bargaining has been generally conceded to include the right of the representatives of the unit to be consulted and to bargain about the exceptional as well as the routine rates, rules, and working conditions.' Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, 321 U.S. at page 347, 64 S.Ct. at page 585. If the Federal Act applies to the Belt Railroad, then the policy of the State must give way.8
Under the Railway Labor Act, not only would the employees of the Belt Railroad have a federally protected right to bargain collectively with their employer, but the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement that they have negotiated with the Belt Railroad would take precedence over conflicting provisions of the state civil service laws.9 In Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232, 76 S.Ct. 714, 718, 100 L.Ed. 1112, involving § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, which permits the negotiation of union-shop agreements notwithstanding any law of any State, we stated that 'A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimature of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State.'
We turn now to the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to the Belt Railroad. Section 1, First, of that Act defines generally the carriers to which it applies as 'any carrier by railroad, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(1), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(1), applies to all common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate transportation. The Belt Railroad concededly is a common carrier engaged in interstate transportation. It files its tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Commission has treated it and other state-owned interstate rail carriers as subject to its jurisdiction. See California Canneries Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 I.C.C. 500, 502—503; United States v. Belt Line R. Co., 56 I.C.C. 121; Texas State Railroad, 34 I.C.C.Val.R. 276. Finally, this Court has recognized that practice. United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567. See also, New Orleans V. Texas & P.R. Co., 5 Cir., 195 F.2d 887, 889.
With the exception of the Supreme Court of California's holding in State of California v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857, federal statutes regulating interstate railroads, or their employees, have consistently been held to apply to publicly owned or operated railroads. Yet none of these statutes referred specifically to public railroads as being within their coverage. In United States v. State of California, supra, the United States sought to recover a statutory penalty for the State's operation of this Belt Railroad in violation of the Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531—532, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 2, 6, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 6. That Act applied to 'any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) The State contended there, as it does here, that the Act was inapplicable to the Belt Railroad because a federal statute is presumed not to restrict a constituent sovereign State unless it expressly so provides. This Court said that this presumption 'is an aid to consistent construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when their purpose is in doubt, but it dost not require that the aim of a statute fairly to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly stated.' 297 U.S. at page 186, 56 S.Ct. at page 425. See also State of California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585—586, 64 S.Ct. 352, 356, 88 L.Ed. 322; Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 98—100, 66 S.Ct. 438, 441—442, 90 L.Ed. 552. The Court then held unequivocally that the Safety Appliance Act was applicable to the Belt Railroad. 'We can perceive no reason for extending it (the presumption) so as to exempt a business carried on by a state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Congress, allembracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual action.' 297 U.S. at page 186, 56 S.Ct. at page 425.
Likewise, three courts have ruled that the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, the coverage of which corresponded to that of the Safety Appliance Act, was applicable to public railroads. Mathewes v. Port Utilities Commission, D.C.E.D.S.C., 32 F.2d 913; Higginbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (Sup.Ct.La.); Maurice v. State, 43 Cal.App.2d 270, 110 P.2d 706 (Cal.Dist.Ct. of App.) (involving the Belt Railroad now before us). Similarly, a Federal Court of Appeals has held that the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 435, as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 261 (a companion measure of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 307, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 228a, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228a), the coverage of which was identical with that of the Railway Labor Act, was applicable to this Belt Railroad. State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 129 F.2d 455. At least two federal courts have taken the position that the Railway Labor Act is applicable to railroads owned or operated by the public. National Council of Ry. Patrolmen's Unions, A.F. of L. v. Sealy, 56 F.Supp. 720, 722—723, affirmed 152 F.2d 500, 502; New Orleans Public Belt R. Commission v. Ward, 5 Cir., 195 F.2d 829; and see the opinion of the Attorney General of California, n. 9, supra.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act indicates that it should be treated differently from the above-mentioned railway statutes, insofar as its applicability to a state-owned railroad is concerned. Congress apparently did not discuss the applicability of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. This omission is readily explainable in view of the limited operations of publicly owned railroads. We are told by the parties that there are today 30 publicly owned railroads, all of which are switching or terminal roads, and only 11 of which are operated directly by the public. The fact that Congress chose to phrase the coverage of the Act in all-embracing terms indicates that state railroads were included within it. In fact, the consistent congressional pattern in railway legislation which preceded the Railway Labor Act was to employ all-inclusive language of coverage with no suggestion that state-owned railroads were not included.10
The State contends that doubts are created about congressional intent to make the Railway Labor Act applicable to state-owned railroads by the fact that in certain other federal statutes governing employer-employee relationships, Congress has expressly exempted employees of the United States or of a State.11 We believe, however, that this argument cuts the other way. When Congress wished to exclude state employees, it expressly so provided. Its failure to do likewise in the Railway Labor Act indicates a purpose not to exclude state employees.12
The Railway Labor Act is essentially an instrument of industry-wide government. See Elgin, J. & E.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 749, 751, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1302, 1303, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (dissenting opinion). The railroad world for which the Act was designed has been described as 'a state within a state. Its population of some three million, if we include the families of workers, has its own customs and its own vocabulary, and lives according to rules of its own making. * * * This state within a state has enjoyed a high degree of internal peace for two generations; despite the divergent interests of its component parts, the reign of law has been firmly established.' Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board; A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567, 568—569 (1937). Congress has not only carved this singular industry out of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 182, 29 U.S.C.A. § 182, but it has provided, by the Railway Labor Act, techniques peculiar to that industry. An extended period of congressional experimentation in the field of railway labor legislation resulted in the Railway Labor Act and produced its machinery for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjustments of disputes. A primary purpose of this machinery of railway government is 'To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein * * *.' 48 Stat. 1186 (§ 2), 45 U.S.C. § 151a, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151a. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 242, 70 S.Ct. 577, 578, 94 L.Ed. 795. Like the Safety Appliance Act, the Railway Labor Act is 'all-embracing in scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual action.' United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567. The fact that, under state law, the employees of the Belt Railroad may have no legal right to strike13 reduces, but does not eliminate, the possibility of a work stoppage. It was to meet such a possibility that the Act's 'reign of law' was established. A terminal railroad facility like the Belt Railroad is a vital link in the national transportation system. Its continuous operation is important to the national flow of commerce.
The fact that the Act's application will supersede state civil service laws which conflict with its policy of promoting collective bargaining does not detract from the conclusion that Congress intended it to apply to any common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate transportation, whether or not owned or operated by a State. The principal unions in the railroad industry are national in scope, and their officials are intimately acquainted with the problems, traditions and conditions of the railroad industry. Bargaining collectively with these officials has often taken on a national flavor,14 and agreements are uniformly negotiated for an entire railroad system. '(B) reakdowns in collective bargaining will typically affect a region or the entire nation.' Lecht, Experience under Railway Labor Legislation (1955), 4. It is by no means unreasonable to assume that Congress, aware of these characteristics of labor relations in the interconnected system which comprises our national railroad industry, intended that collective bargaining, as fostered and protected by the Railway Labor Act, should apply to all railroads. Congress no doubt concluded that a uniform method of dealing with the labor problems of the railroad industry would tend to eliminate inequities, and would promote a desirable mobility within the railroad labor force.15
Finally, the State suggests that Congress has no constitutional power to interfere with the 'sovereign right' of a State to control its employment relationships on a state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce. In United States v. State of California, supra, this Court said that the State, although acting in its sovereign capacity in operating this Belt Railroad, necessarily so acted 'in subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national government.' 297 U.S. at page 184, 56 S.Ct. at page 424. 'California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, has subjected itself to the commerce power, and is liable for a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, as are other carriers * * *.' Id., 297 U.S. at page 185, 56 S.Ct. at page 424. That principle is no less applicable here. If California, by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce power so that Congress can make it conform to federal safety requirements, it also has subjected itself to that power so that Congress can regulate its employment relationships. See also, State of California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 586, 64 S.Ct. 352, 356, 88 L.Ed. 322; cf. Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233—238, 76 S.Ct. 714, 718—721, 100 L.Ed. 1112.16
In its briefs before the Court, California suggests that the collective-bargaining agreement is invalid because the Board of the State Harbor Commissioners lacked authority to negotiate the contract, some of the terms of which are in conflict with the state civil service laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that this contention had been waived because it was not briefed there by the State and not mentioned in the State's oral argument. We, accordingly, do not recognize this contention here. The same argument was rejected by the California District Court of Appeal in the earlier state court litigation, State v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 222 P.2d 27, 31—33, and the Supreme Court of California apparently did not reject that position of the appellate court, 37 Cal.2d 412, 421—422, 232 P.2d 857, 863—864. Thus, even if the State's present suggestion were before us, we would feel constrained to accept the ruling of the District Court of Appeal.
Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 501; Erdman Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 424; Newlands Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 103; Adamson Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 721, see Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 S.Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755; General Order No. 8, February 21, 1918, signed by W. G. McAdoo, Director General of Railroads (formulating the Federal Government's labor policy after it took over the railroads in December 1917), Hines, War History of American Railroads (1928), 304—305, see also, p. 155 et seq.; Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 469.
'Sec. 2. * * * (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.' 48 Stat. 1186—1187.
Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; State of California v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 417—418, 232 P.2d 857, 861.
On October 30, 1944, the Attorney General of California rendered an opinion in which he concluded that the State Belt Railroad was subject to the Railway Labor Act, that the Board of Harbor Commissioners must bargain collectively with the Railroad's employees, and that the terms of the existing collective-bargaining agreement supersede conflicting provisions of the state civil service laws. 4 Op.Atty.Gen.Cal. (1944) 300 306; Rhyne, Labor Unions and Municipal Employe Law (1946), 247 251. See also, Long Island R. Co. v. Department of Labor, 256 N.Y. 498, 515—517, 177 N.E. 17, 23—24.
The statutes cited are the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(2); the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 164, 50 U.S.C.App. (1946 ed.) § 1502(d); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d), and the re-employment provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 614—615, 50 U.S.C.App. § 459(b), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 459(b).
'First. * * * Provided, however, That the term 'carrier' shall not include any street, interurban, or suburban electric railway, unless such railway is operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation, but shall not exclude any part of the general steam-railroad system of transportation now or hereafter operated by any other motive power. The Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any party interested to determine after hearing whether any line operated by electric power falls within the terms of this proviso. The term 'carrier' shall not include any company by reason of its being engaged in the mining of coal, the supplying of coal to a carrier where delivery is not beyond the mine tipple, and the operation of equipment or facilities therefor, or in any of sach activities.' 48 Stat. 1185—1186, 54 Stat. 785—786, 45 U.S.C. § 151, First, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151. First.
In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884, this Court ruled that the general term 'employer,' as used in the restrictive provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101, and § 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52, did not include the Federal Government, and that an injunction could issue in a federal court to prevent a union and its officers from precipitating a strike in the bituminous coal mines which, at the time, were being operated by the Government. That case is not a guide here since the statutes there involved differ widely in history and purpose from the Railway Labor Act. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 39—42, 77 S.Ct. 635, 639—641, 1 L.Ed.2d 622.
Lecht, Experience under Railway Labor Legislation (1955), 4, 70—71, 158, 161, 167—168, 177, 192, 209, 225, 233.
Congress clearly had considerations such as these in mind in 1951 when it authorized union-shop agreements, notwithstanding any state law. See n. 6, supra. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that—