Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/08/97-3026.htm
Timestamp: 2020-02-26 22:54:04
Document Index: 600111813

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 1956', '§ 1956', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

97-3026 -- U.S. v. Anderson -- 08/24/1999
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (57320 bytes) (55092 bytes)
Defendant-Appellant, No. 97-3026
(D.C. No. 95-CR-20086)
Sylvester Anderson was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(i), and money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). He appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
Mr. Anderson was named in five counts of a sixteen-count indictment that charged numerous defendants with drug trafficking offenses. The charges arose from an alleged conspiracy to use couriers to transport cocaine and cocaine base from Los Angeles to the Kansas City area for sale, and to transport the proceeds from the sale of the drugs back to Los Angeles. Count One charged Mr. Anderson and fourteen other coconspirators including Robert White with conspiring to distribute the drugs, Count Seven charged Mr. Anderson with possessing ten kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, Count Eight charged him and two others with possessing seven kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, Count Ten charged him and Mr. White with possessing one kilogram of cocaine with intent to distribute, and Count Sixteen charged Mr. Anderson with money laundering.
All of those named in the indictment pled guilty except Mr. Anderson and Mr. White, who were tried together. The district court granted Mr. White's motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count, and sent the remaining counts against Mr. Anderson and Mr. White to the jury. Mr. Anderson was convicted of conspiracy under Count One, possession of seven kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute under Count Eight, and money laundering under Count Sixteen. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on either Count Seven, which charged Mr. Anderson with possessing ten kilograms of cocaine, or Count Ten, which charged him and Mr. White with possessing one kilogram.(1) A mistrial was declared as to those counts.
A. Drug Crimes
Mr. Harkness also testified about the incident set out as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that formed the basis for Count Eight, the substantive count upon which Mr. Anderson was convicted, charging him and other coconspirators with possessing seven kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. Mr. Harkness testified that he was told by Mr. Walton to arrange for a courier to fly to Los Angeles. Mr. Harkness went to an apartment, met a woman named Dishire Davey, gave her a plane ticket, and took her to the airport. A few days later he received a page from Mr. Walton telling him to pick up Ms. Davey at the bus station in Topeka, Kansas. He and Mr. Walton arrived at the station but Ms. Davey never appeared. Mr. Harkness did not implicate Mr. Anderson in the incident involving Ms. Davey, however, testifying to the contrary that Mr. Anderson was not at the apartment when he picked up Ms. Davey and took her to the airport, and that Mr. Anderson could not have met her at the Los Angeles airport because he and Mr. Anderson were together at a concert later that night in Kansas.(2)
United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 794 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). As one circuit has pointed out, determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting in a drug distribution case "'is difficult if not impossible.'" United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832, 834 (6th Cir. 1982)). Nonetheless, the evidence showed that Mr. Anderson participated in the conspiracy to distribute drugs, that he went to the airport to pick up a coconspirator drug courier in a car owned by the leader of the conspiracy, and that the courier was provided a hotel room registered in an alias used by that leader. This evidence, although not overwhelming and not undisputed, is sufficient to show that Mr. Anderson willfully associated with Ms. Davey's possession of seven kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute and participated in some manner to assist its commission.(3)
Mr. Anderson was also convicted on Count Sixteen, which charged that his purchase of a 1991 Pontiac Firebird with drug proceeds constituted a violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Mr. Anderson asserts two challenges to this conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the district court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of other financial transactions without a limiting instruction, thus creating the possibility that he was convicted on the basis of events not charged in the indictment.
Id. Accordingly, we stated that "[i]n these cases, our requirement that the jury verdicts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be based on substantial evidence, and not mere suspicion, becomes paramount." Id. at 1475 (citation omitted).
The court fully discussed the situation in camera with Mr. Anderson and then denied the motions. In so doing, the court stated that it did not find a factual showing of a complete breakdown in communication or other irreconcilable conflict, but rather a communication problem that he believed could be mended. The court also stated its belief that it would be virtually impossible for another lawyer to come into the case at that point in time and be prepared to try it.(4)
require that "[t]o warrant a substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." The district court is under a duty to "make formal inquiry into the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with present counsel when substitution of counsel is requested."
Section 3B1.1(c) provides that a defendant's offense level is to be increased two levels "[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity."(5) The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to establish the applicability of this enhancement. See United States v. Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998).
Rec., vol. 5, at 59.(6) As the court observed at trial at the close of the government's case, however:
[T]here really wasn't even any evidence here that described how the drugs were distributed on the street. This is not a case in which we've had a description of the conspiracy which paints various roles . . . .
There was no evidence of how the drugs were distributed beyond being brought back in quantity to Kansas City. . . .[T]here's nothing beyond the fact that bulk drugs were brought back to Kansas City in--in large quantities.
While the record does show Mr. Anderson's involvement with coconspirators who carried money and drugs, there is no evidence showing that he recruited them or controlled their activity.(7) Likewise, although the record establishes Mr. Anderson's possession of large sums of money, the government did not show how the profits of the conspiracy were divided, or that Mr. Anderson claimed or received a larger share of the profits than others. Absent such a showing, the mere fact that Mr. Anderson received profits does not support the enhancement. See United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1489 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, the fact that Mr. Anderson cooked cocaine powder into base does not show that he organized or led the conspiracy or supervised others. See Owens, 70 F.3d at 1129.
Section 3C1.1 requires a two-point upward adjustment to a defendant's offense level "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense."(8) "Obstruction of justice includes the offering of perjured testimony at trial." United States v. Copus, 110 F.3d 1529, 1536 (10th Cir. 1997). "A defendant commits perjury for the purposes of this Guideline if he 'gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.'" United States v. Pretty, 98 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Therefore, "[i]n order to apply the § 3C1.1 enhancement, it is well-settled that a sentencing court must make a specific finding--that is, one which is independent of the jury verdict--that the defendant has perjured herself." United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1573 (10th Cir. 1995). The required finding must encompass "'all of the factual predicates of perjury,'" id. (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993)), so that we are able "'to satisfy our appellate responsibility of review in determining whether the record would support findings of falsity, materiality, and willful intent.'" Owens, 70 F.3d at 1132 (quoting Massey, 48 F.3d at 1574).
On appeal, Mr. Anderson argues that the court's findings are inadequate, pointing out that much of the testimony concerning his involvement with Ms. Davey and Mr. Walton was conflicting, that the court did not explain its reconciliation of the conflicts, and that the court did not make findings on all the elements of perjury. Mr. Anderson also contends the court erroneously attributed to him a statement actually made by Mr. Walton. It was Mr. Walton, not Mr. Anderson, who testified regarding their relationship that "[w]e wasn't real close or nothing, just knew of him, but we never really hung out." Rec., supp. vol. 3, at 46.
1. Mr. White was acquitted on Count Ten.
2. We note that the jury convicted Mr. Anderson on Count Eight notwithstanding Mr. Harkness' testimony exculpating him, while the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count Seven, which was based upon Mr. Harkness' testimony implicating Mr. Anderson in the distribution of ten kilograms of cocaine. The jury apparently did not find Mr. Harkness to be a credible witness.
3. Our affirmance of Mr. Anderson's drug conspiracy conviction distinguishes this case from those aiding and abetting cases in which the defendant was not a member of a conspiracy. In those cases we have held that a defendant's mere presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge that the crime is being committed, is insufficient to support an aiding and abetting conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 295 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1470 (10th Cir. 1991)). When the alleged aider and abetter is a member of a conspiracy and the substantive crime is done in furtherance of the conspiracy, however, criminal liability is governed by different principles. We have held that a criminal conspirator is criminally responsible for substantive crimes committed by other conspirators during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy that are reasonably foreseeable. See United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 1993). The jury was instructed to that effect in the present case. See Rec., vol. 9, at 55. We thus reject Mr. Anderson's claim that plain error occurred because the jury was not instructed that mere presence at the crime scene is not enough to support an aiding and abetting conviction.
4. At that time it appeared that ten defendants would be going to trial on July 24, and the date for filing motions in limine was July 16. By the time of trial on July 30, however, all defendants but Mr. Anderson and Mr. White had entered pleas.
5. The guideline also provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant was a leader or organizer of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and a three-level enhancement if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not a leader or organizer) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, see id. § 3B1.1(b).
6. The district court also stated its agreement with the analysis set out in the presentence report, which stated:
7. Ms. Gaitan did testify that Mr. Anderson told her to lie about her destination when they were stopped on the way to the bus station. We are not persuaded that this single remark, made in response to the exigencies of the moment, is sufficient to establish that Mr. Anderson controlled or supervised Ms. Gaitan in her courier activities. The evidence likewise does not establish that the decision to provide Ms. Gaitan with the box of money and the extra suitcase originated with Mr. Anderson rather than with Mr. Walton, who had arranged for Mr. Anderson to take Ms. Gaitan to the station. See United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1488 (10th Cir. 1996). While we have concluded that the evidence of Mr. Anderson's involvement with Ms. Davey is sufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting, we have found nothing in the record to show that he supervised or controlled her activity.
8. We have set out the guideline in effect on the date of sentencing, January 23, 1997. Section 3C1.1 was amended effective November 1, 1997. See App. C, amendment 566 (Nov. 1, 1997).
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/1999/08/97-3026.htm.