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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 301', '§ 1001', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 17', '§ 201', '§ 301', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 334', '§ 332', '§ 333', '§ 332', '§ 1331']

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson (full text) :: 478 U.S. 804 (1986) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson 478 U.S. 804 (1986)
U.S. Supreme CourtMerrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. ThompsonNo. 85-619Argued April 28, 1986Decided July 7, 1986478 U.S. 804CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
Held: A violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, here, determining the question of removal jurisdiction by reference to the "well-pleaded complaint," and assuming that there is no federal cause of action for FDCA violations, the cases were improperly removed to the Federal District Court. The assumed congressional determination to preclude federal private remedies for violations of the FDCA is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal question jurisdiction. The asserted federal interest in federal review and the novelty of the question whether the FDCA applies to sales in Canada Page 478 U. S. 805 and Scotland are not sufficient to give a state-based FDCA claim status as a jurisdiction-triggering federal question. 766 F.2d 1005, affirmed. Pp. 478 U. S. 807-817.
The Thompson respondents are residents of Canada, and the MacTavishes reside in Scotland. They filed virtually identical complaints against petitioner, a corporation, that manufactures and distributes the drug Bendectin. The complaints were filed in the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton County, Ohio. Each complaint alleged that a child was born with multiple deformities as a result of the mother's ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. In five of the six counts, the recovery of substantial damages was requested on common law theories of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and gross negligence. In Count IV, respondents alleged that the drug Bendectin was "misbranded" in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), because its labeling did not provide adequate Page 478 U. S. 806 warning that its use was potentially dangerous. Paragraph 26 alleged that the violation of the FDCA "in the promotion" of Bendectin "constitutes a rebuttable presumption of negligence." Paragraph 27 alleged that the "violation of said federal statutes directly and proximately caused the injuries suffered" by the two infants. App. 22, 32.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 766 F.2d 1005 (1985). After quoting one sentence from the concluding paragraph in our recent opinion in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1 (1983), [Footnote 2] and noting "that the FDCA does not create or imply Page 478 U. S. 807 a private right of action for individuals injured as a result of violations of the Act," it explained:
Article III of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear cases "arising under" federal statutes. [Footnote 3] That grant of power, however, is not self-executing, and it was not until the Judiciary Act of 1875 that Congress gave the federal courts general federal question jurisdiction. [Footnote 4] Although the constitutional meaning of "arising under" may extend to all cases in which a federal question is "an ingredient" of the action, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 823 (1824), we have long construed the statutory grant of federal question Jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power. Page 478 U. S. 808 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 461 U. S. 494-495 (1983); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 358 U. S. 379 (1959).
We have, however, also noted that a case may arise under federal law "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law." Page 478 U. S. 809 Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 9. [Footnote 5] Our actual holding in Franchise Tax Board demonstrates that this statement must be read with caution; the central issue presented in that case turned on the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), but we nevertheless concluded that federal jurisdiction was lacking.
This case does not pose a federal question of the first kind; respondents do not allege that federal law creates any of the causes of action that they have asserted. [Footnote 6] This case thus poses what Justice Frankfurter called the "litigation-provoking problem," Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 Page 478 U. S. 810 U.S. 448, 353 U. S. 470 (1957) (dissenting opinion) -- the presence of a federal issue in a state-created cause of action.
In this case, both parties agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is no federal cause of action for FDCA violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume that this is a correct interpretation of the FDCA. Thus, as the case comes to us, it is appropriate to assume that, under the settled framework for evaluating whether a federal cause of action lies, some combination of the following factors is present: (1) the plaintiffs are not part of the class for whose special benefit the statute was passed; (2) the indicia of legislative Page 478 U. S. 811 intent reveal no congressional purpose to provide a private cause of action; (3) a federal cause of action would not further the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) the respondents' cause of action is a subject traditionally relegated to state law. [Footnote 7] In short, Congress did not intend a private federal remedy for violations of the statute that it enacted.
The recent character of that development does not, however, diminish its importance. Indeed, the very reasons for the development of the modern implied remedy doctrine -- the "increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation," as well as "the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent," Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 456 U. S. 377 (1982) (footnote omitted) -- are precisely the kind of considerations that should inform the concern for "practicality and necessity" that Franchise Tax Board advised for the construction of § 1331 when jurisdiction is asserted Page 478 U. S. 812 because of the presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action.
The significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For the ultimate import of such a conclusion, as we have repeatedly emphasized, is that it would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute. [Footnote 9] We think it would similarly flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a "rebuttable presumption" or a "proximate cause" under state law, rather than a federal action under federal law. [Footnote 10] Page 478 U. S. 813
"'What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of causation . . . , a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web Page 478 U. S. 814 and lays the other ones aside.'"
Far from creating some kind of automatic test, Franchise Tax Board thus candidly recognized the need for careful judgments about the exercise of federal judicial power in an area of uncertain jurisdiction. Given the significance of the assumed congressional determination to preclude federal private remedies, the presence of the federal issue as an element of the state tort is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional purposes and the federal system. This conclusion is fully consistent with the very sentence relied on so heavily by petitioner. We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal question jurisdiction. [Footnote 12] Page 478 U. S. 815
Second, petitioner contends that there is a powerful federal interest in seeing that the federal statute is given uniform interpretations, and that federal review is the best way of insuring such uniformity. In addition to the significance of the congressional decision to preclude a federal remedy, we do Page 478 U. S. 816 not agree with petitioner's characterization of the federal interest and its implications for federal question jurisdiction. To the extent that petitioner is arguing that state use and interpretation of the FDCA pose a threat to the order and stability of the FDCA regime, petitioner should be arguing not that federal courts should be able to review and enforce state FDCA-based causes of action as an aspect of federal question jurisdiction, but that the FDCA preempts state court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute. [Footnote 13] Petitioner's concern about the uniformity of interpretation, moreover, is considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district court jurisdiction for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action. [Footnote 14]
Finally, petitioner argues that, whatever the general rule, there are special circumstances that justify federal question jurisdiction in this case. Petitioner emphasizes that it is unclear whether the FDCA applies to sales in Canada and Scotland; there is, therefore, a special reason for having a federal Page 478 U. S. 817 court answer the novel federal question relating to the extraterritorial meaning of the Act. We reject this argument. We do not believe the question whether a particular claim arises under federal law depends on the novelty of the federal issue. Although it is true that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on a frivolous or insubstantial federal question, "the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system," Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 8, would be ill-served by a rule that made the existence of federal question jurisdiction depend on the district court's case-by-case appraisal of the novelty of the federal question asserted as an element of the state tort. The novelty of an FDCA issue is not sufficient to give it status as a federal cause of action; nor should it be sufficient to give a state-based FDCA claim status as a jurisdiction-triggering federal question. [Footnote 15]
It is so ordered. Page 478 U. S. 818
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides, in language that parrots the language of Article III, that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction "of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Although this language suggests that Congress intended in § 1331 to confer upon federal courts the full breadth of permissible "federal question" jurisdiction (an inference that is supported by the contemporary evidence, see Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1, 463 U. S. 8, n. 8 (1983); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 Tulane L.Rev. 362, 374 376 (1942); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 543, 568 (1985)), § 1331 has been construed more narrowly than its constitutional counterpart. See Verlinden B.V., supra, at 461 U. S. 494-495; Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 358 U. S. 379 (1959). Nonetheless, given the language of the statute and its close relation to the constitutional grant of federal question jurisdiction, limitations on federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 must be justified by careful consideration of the reasons Page 478 U. S. 819 underlying the grant of jurisdiction and the need for federal review. Ibid. I believe that the limitation on federal jurisdiction recognized by the Court today is inconsistent with the purposes of § 1331. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
"The general rule is that, where it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court has jurisdiction Page 478 U. S. 820 under [the statute granting federal question jurisdiction]."
The continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge. We have cited it approvingly on numerous occasions, and reaffirmed its holding several times -- most recently just three Terms ago by a unanimous Court in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, supra, at 463 U. S. 9. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U. S. 350, 256 U. S. 357 (1921); Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 327 U. S. 685 (1946); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U. S. 437, 348 U. S. 450, and n. 18 (1955) (plurality opinion); Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682, 372 U. S. 696 (1963); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 438 U. S. 70 (1978). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 356 (1936) (separate opinion of McReynolds, J.); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 353 U. S. 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 373 U. S. 659 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Cf. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 299 U. S. 112 (1936) ("To bring a case within [§ 1331], a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action"). Moreover, in addition to Judge Friendly's authoritative opinion in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, supra, at 827, Smith has been widely cited and followed in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 263, n. 8, 531 F.2d 585, 595 n. 8 (1976); Mungin v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 416 F.2d 1169, 1176-1177 (CA5 1969); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (CA2 1968); Warrington Sewer Co. v. Tracy, 463 F.2d 771, 772 (CA3 1972) (per curiam); New York by Abrams v. Citibank, N.A. 537 F.Supp. 1192, 1196 (SDNY 1982); Kravitz v. Homeowners Warranty Corp., 542 F.Supp. 317, 319 (ED Pa.1982). See also Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 (CA2 1982); Christopher v. Cavallo, 662 F.2d 1082 (CA4 1981); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson oil Co., 586 F.2d 1375 (CA10 1978), Page 478 U. S. 821 cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Garrett v. Time-D.C., Inc., 502 F.2d 627 (CA9 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Sweeney v. Abramovitz, 449 F.Supp. 213 (Conn.1978). Furthermore, the principle of the Smith case has been recognized and endorsed by most commentators, as well. Redish 67, 69; American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 178 (1969) (hereinafter ALI); Wright § 17, at 96; P. Bator, P. Mistakin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d ed., 1973); Mistakin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum.L.Rev. 157, 166 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp.Prob. 216, 225 (1948). [Footnote 2/1] Page 478 U. S. 822
There is, to my mind, no question that there is federal jurisdiction over the respondents' fourth cause of action under the rule set forth in Smith and reaffirmed in Franchise Tax Page 478 U. S. 823 Board. Respondents pleaded that petitioner's labeling of the drug Bendectin constituted "misbranding" in violation of §§ 201 and 502(f)(2) and (j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), and that this violation "directly and proximately caused" their injuries. App. 21-22 (Thompson complaint), 31-32 (MacTavish complaint). Respondents asserted in the complaint that this violation established petitioner's negligence per se, and entitled them to recover damages without more. Ibid. No other basis for finding petitioner negligent was asserted in connection with this claim. As pleaded, then, respondents' "right to relief depend[ed] upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Smith, 255 U.S. at 255 U. S. 199; see also Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 28 (there is federal jurisdiction under § 1331 where the plaintiff's right to relief "necessarily depends" upon resolution of a federal question). [Footnote 2/2] Furthermore, although petitioner disputes its liability under the FDCA, it concedes that respondents' claim that petitioner violated the FDCA is "colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation." Smith, supra, at 255 U. S. 199. [Footnote 2/3] Page 478 U. S. 824 Of course, since petitioner must make this concession to prevail in this Court, it need not be accepted at face value. However, independent examination of respondents' claim substantiates the conclusion that it is neither frivolous nor meritless. As stated in the complaint, a drug is "misbranded" under the FDCA if
The Court apparently does not disagree with any of this -- except, of course, for the conclusion. According to the Court, if we assume that Congress did not intend that there be a private federal cause of action under a particular federal law (and, presumably, a fortiori, if Congress' decision not to create a private remedy is express), we must also assume that Congress did not intend that there be federal jurisdiction over a state cause of action that is determined by that federal law. Therefore, assuming---only because the parties Page 478 U. S. 825 have made a similar assumption -- that there is no private cause of action under the FDCA, [Footnote 2/4] the Court holds that there is no federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim:
The Court nowhere explains the basis for this conclusion. Yet it is hardly self-evident. Why should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private federal remedy mean that Congress would not want there to be federal jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating the federal law? Clearly, the decision not to provide a private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the reasons Congress withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for withholding federal jurisdiction. Thus, it is necessary Page 478 U. S. 826 to examine the reasons for Congress' decisions to grant or withhold both federal jurisdiction and private remedies, something the Court has not done.
In addition, § 1331 has provided for adjudication in a forum that specializes in federal law, and that is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly. Because federal question Page 478 U. S. 827 cases constitute the basic grist for federal tribunals, "[t]he federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law." Id.. at 164-165. By contrast, "it is apparent that federal question cases must form a very small part of the business of [state] courts." Id. at 165. As a result, the federal courts are comparatively more skilled at interpreting and applying federal law, and are much more likely correctly to divine Congress' intent in enacting legislation. [Footnote 2/6] See ibid.; Redish 71; Currie 160; Comment 636; Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 Ind.L.J. 563, 564-565 (1981).
These reasons for having original federal question jurisdiction explain why cases like this one and Smith, cases where the cause of action is a creature of state law, but an Page 478 U. S. 828 essential element of the claim is federal -- "arise under" federal law within the meaning of § 1331. Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law expresses Congress' determination that there is a federal interest in having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a particular norm established by that law. Because all laws are imprecise to some degree, disputes inevitably arise over what specifically Congress intended to require or permit. It is the duty of courts to interpret these laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose is realized. As noted above, Congress granted the district courts power to hear cases "arising under" federal law in order to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be interpreted more correctly and applied more uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that the availability of a federal forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way that Congress intended.
By making federal law an essential element of a state law claim, the State places the federal law into a context where it will operate to shape behavior: the threat of liability will force individuals to conform their conduct to interpretations of the federal law made by courts adjudicating the state law claim. It will not matter to an individual found liable whether the officer who arrives at his door to execute judgment is wearing a state or a federal uniform; all he cares about is the fact that a sanction is being imposed, and may be imposed again in the future -- because he failed to comply with the federal law. Consequently, the possibility that the federal law will be incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the state law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions in precisely the same way as if it was federal law that "created" the cause of action. It therefore follows that there is federal jurisdiction under § 1331. Page 478 U. S. 829
These reasons simply do not justify the Court's holding. Given the relative expertise of the federal courts in interpreting federal law, supra, at 478 U. S. 826-827, the increased complexity of federal legislation argues rather strongly in favor of recognizing federal jurisdiction. And, while the increased volume of litigation may appropriately be considered in connection with reasoned arguments that justify limiting the reach of § 1331, I do not believe that the day has yet arrived when this Court may trim a statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it too broad. [Footnote 2/7] Page 478 U. S. 830
The enforcement scheme established by the FDCA is typical of other, similarly broad regulatory schemes. Primary responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Act has been conferred upon a specialized administrative agency, here, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Footnote 2/8] Congress has provided the FDA with a wide-ranging arsenal of weapons to combat violations of the FDCA, including authority to obtain an ex parte court order for the seizure of goods subject to the Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 334, authority to initiate proceedings in a federal district court to enjoin continuing violations of the FDCA, see § 332, and authority to request a United States Attorney to bring criminal proceedings against violators, see § 333. See generally 1 J. O'Reilly, Food and Drug Administration, chs. 6-10 (1979 and Supp.1985). Significantly, the FDA has no independent enforcement authority; final enforcement must come from the federal courts, Page 478 U. S. 831 which have exclusive jurisdiction over actions under the FDCA. See §§ 332(a), 333, 334(a)(1). Thus, while the initial interpretive function has been delegated to an expert administrative body whose interpretations are entitled to considerable deference, final responsibility for interpreting the statute in order to carry out the legislative mandate belongs to the federal courts. Cf. 467 U. S. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 8 467 U. S. 43, n. 9 (1984) ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction, and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent").
It may be that a decision by Congress not to create a private remedy is intended to preclude all private enforcement. If that is so, then a state cause of action that makes relief available to private individuals for violations of the FDCA is preempted. But if Congress' decision not to provide a private federal remedy does not preempt such a state remedy, then, in light of the FDCA's clear policy of relying on the federal courts for enforcement, it also should not foreclose federal jurisdiction over that state remedy. Both § 1331 and the enforcement provisions of the FDCA reflect Congress' strong Page 478 U. S. 832 desire to utilize the federal courts to interpret and enforce the FDCA, and it is therefore at odds with both these statutes to recognize a private state law remedy for violating the FDCA, but to hold that this remedy cannot be adjudicated in the federal courts.
There is no subject matter jurisdiction when a state cause of action alleges a violation of a federa...	Facts	A child of the Thompsons and a child of the MacTavishes were born with birth defects because of thei...