Source: http://masslawyersweekly.com/reprints/its-time-to-restore-the-promise-of-the-permit-session/
Timestamp: 2017-07-22 16:54:28
Document Index: 338229953

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 17', '§ 9']

» It’s time to restore the promise of the permit session
It’s time to restore the promise of the permit session
Recognizing that development projects were bogged down in courts across the Commonwealth, in 2006 the Legislature created the Land Court Permit Session to resolve disputes involving large-scale development projects. The Permit Session Statute, G.L. c. 185, § 3A expressly confers original jurisdiction on the Land Court. But three recent cases, Buccaneer Development, PRE and Skawski, demonstrate how the court system itself has thwarted the statute’s legislative intent. The Supreme Judicial Court now has an opportunity to stop the judicial shenanigans trying to circumvent the statute and restore the Land Court Permit Session to its rightful role.
Buccaneer Development
In a procedural maze that would have confounded M.C. Escher, just three years after it ruled that the Housing Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case that met the threshold criteria of the Permit Session Statute (Buccaneer Dev., Inc. v. ZBA of Lenox, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 40 (2012) (Buccaneer I)), the Appeals Court upheld a virtually identical decision by the same Housing Court judge in Buccaneer Development, Inc. v. ZBA of Lenox, Appeals Court No. 14-0-855 (Aug. 11, 2015)(Buccaneer II).
The Buccaneer cases involve a proposed retirement community near the Cranwell resort in Lenox. The developer appealed the Lenox ZBA’s denial of a special permit to the Permit Session of the Land Court. Town counsel requested a transfer to the Housing Court. After a trial, the Housing Court upheld the ZBA. In Buccaneer I, the Appeals Court vacated the decision ruling that the Housing Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under the Permit Session Statute, G.L. c. 185, § 3A.
When the matter was remanded to the Permit Session of the Land Court, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court cross-designated the original Housing Court judge to sit as a judge of the Permit Session of the Land Court. Back before the same Housing Court judge, the developer consented to proceed on a “case stated” basis, but expressly reserved its objection to the court’s jurisdiction. Based on the same record, the Housing Court judge essentially issued a carbon copy of her original decision upholding the ZBA. Again, the developer appealed.
In this second appeal the majority in Buccaneer II treated the “Special Designation” of the Housing Court judge to sit in the Permit Session as though it was a standard operating procedure and upheld essentially the same decision that it had previously vacated for lack of jurisdiction, implicitly endorsing this end run around the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Court Permit Session. In a sharp dissent, Associate Justice Janis Berry derided the gamesmanship employed to avoid the Permit Session and advocated that the decision be vacated on both procedural and substantive grounds.
PRE and Skawski
During this same period, the same Housing Court judge sought to retain two other cases that were within the original jurisdiction of the Permit Session: Palmer Renewable Energy, LLC v. City of Springfield, (12 PS 461494 and 23 PS 467569) (PRE) and Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Property Development, LLC, Appeals Court No. 13-P-1947 (Skawski).
When the Appeals Court issued Buccaneer I, Palmer Renewable Energy, LLC (“PRE”) was fighting to reverse the transfer to the Housing Court of a zoning appeal that it filed in the Permit Session of the Land Court regarding the revocation of building permits for the construction of its biomass energy facility in Springfield. In response to PRE’s Motion to Remand to the Permit Session, the Housing Court judge issued an order that PRE show cause why she shouldn’t be cross-designated as a Superior Court judge to continue hearing the matter.
PRE opposed the cross-designation on the grounds that the initial transfer from the Permit Session of the Land Court to the Housing Court was improper and void ab initio. PRE’s position was bolstered by the fact that a related G.L. 40A, § 17 appeal for the same project was already before Judge Sands in Permit Session of the Land Court. Even without the related litigation, the cases met the threshold criteria and belonged in the Permit Session. Ultimately, PRE prevailed and got the two building permit cases transferred back to Judge Sands in the Land Court who overturned the ZBA’s decision to revoke PRE’s building permits for the energy plant.
During this same period, Skawski was also in front of the same Housing Court judge. Skawski was brought by abutters opposing a special permit issued by the Greenfield Planning Board for a 135,000 square foot retail facility. Unlike Buccaneer and PRE, which were originally filed in the Permit Session of the Land Court and transferred to the Housing Court, the abutters in Skawski filed their G.L. c. 40 A, § 17 complaint in the Housing Court. Shortly after the issuance of Buccaneer I, the developer moved to dismiss the case on grounds that under the Permit Session Statute, the Housing Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the project. As she suggested in PRE, the Housing Court Judge sought to transfer the case to Superior Court and to be cross-designated as a Superior Court judge. The developer objected to the transfer and after several months without any response to the transfer request, the Housing Court judge denied the developer’s motion to dismiss based on the Housing Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Drawing from Buccaneer I, the Appeals Court in Skawski agreed with the developer that the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the abutters’ appeal under G.L. 40A, § 17 because the project met the threshold criteria of the Permit Session Statute. Recently, the SJC granted the abutters’ request for further appellate review and has sought amicus briefs on whether the Housing Court has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17 over matters that are within the original jurisdiction of the Permit Session. Skawski v. Greenfield Investors Property Development, LLC, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 903, further appellate reviewed granted, 472 Mass. 1103 (2015). Hopefully, the high court will confirm that in granting original jurisdiction to the Land Court, the legislature intended that court to adjudicate permit disputes that fit the criteria of the Permit Session Statute.
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the Chief Judge of the Trial Court has the capacity to stop this blatant forum shopping by denying requests to transfer cases from the Permit Session to the Housing Court and for cross-designation of judges under G.L. c. 211B, § 9.
Thomas A. Mackie and Peter F. Durning counsel clients on environmental and land use permitting issue at Mackie Shea. They are counsel to Palmer Renewable Energy, LLC with respect to environmental permitting and zoning issues.