Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/353/325
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 20:14:52
Document Index: 285635300

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 51', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 8', '§ 11', '§ 1', '§ 6', 'art:\n36', '§ 11', '§ 8', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 4', '§ 13', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 5', '§ 14', '§ 6', '§ 6']

The BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Daniel T. JACKSON. | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
Supreme Court aboutsearch liibulletin subscribe previews The BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Daniel T. JACKSON.
353 U.S. 325 (77 S.Ct. 842, 1 L.Ed.2d 862)
Argued: March 28 and April 1, 1957.
[HTML] dissent, BURTON, FRANKFURTER, HARLAN, WHITTAKER
[HTML] See 354 U.S. 943, 77 S.Ct. 1391.
This is a suit for damages arising from an injury suffered by a section foreman of the petitioner while operating a motor track car that was towing a push truck on petitioner's tracks. It was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. The sole question is whether such vehicles when used in the manner here are within the coverage of the Safety Appliance Acts.
The petitioner contends that neither vehicle comes within the general coverage of the Acts; and, in the alternative if the vehicles are included, that they are exempted as 'four-wheel cars' under § 6 of the Acts.
The power or train brake provisions of the Safety Appliance Acts apply to the motor track car and the coupling and brake requirements to the hand car when they are employed in the manner here involved. If used separately, though we do not pass on the question, it may well be that entirely different sections of the Acts might apply to each of the vehicles. But here the hand car was not operated by hand as was originally intended. On the contrary, it was fastened by a pinnot a couplerto a motor track car, a self-propelled piece of equipment, and was hauled with its cargo to its destination on the tracks of petitioner. The hand car had no brakes, although the Acts specifically require 'any car' to be equipped with a hand brake.
It was being used for hauling purposes. Furthermore, the motor track car, instead of being used solely to carry men and tools to their place of work, was used to pull or tow another caralbeit a hand car. It had no power or train brakes but was equipped with a simple hand brake designed for its individual operation. The brake was wholly insufficient for the use to which the railroad put the vehicles.
We believe that the controlling factor is the nature of the employment of the vehicles in the railroad's service, that is the type of operation for which they are being used. Here at the time of the injury it is admitted that petitioner was putting the motor track car to locomotive uses in pulling a hand car used to haul material, tools, and equipment. In the light of the prime purpose of the Safety Appliance Acts, i.e., 'the protection of employees and others by requiring the use of safe equipment,' Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 1943, 317 U.S. 481, 486, 63 S.Ct. 347, 351, 87 L.Ed. 411, when the railroad uses this type of equipment in this mannerregardless of the label it places on the vehiclesthe commands of the Acts must be obeyed. The operation as conducted when the respondent was injured, with a motor track car equipped with neither power nor train brakes pulling an attached hand car with neither an automatic coupler nor hand brake, was in defiance of the requirements of the Acts. See 45 U.S.C. 18, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 18. This is not to say that these vehicles, even when used as herein described, must be equipped with devices not adaptable to their safe operation. As was said in Southern R. Co. v. Crockett, 1914, 234 U.S. 725, 34 S.Ct. 897, 58 L.Ed. 1564:
'We deem the true intent and meaning to be that the provisions and requirements respecting train brakes, automatic couplers, grab irons, and the height of draw-bars shall be extended to all railroad vehicles * * * so far as the respective safety devices and standards are capable of being installed upon the respective vehicles.' Id., 234 U.S. at pages 737738, 34 S.Ct. at page 902.
It is contended that, since the Commission has for over 60 years considered maintenance-of-way vehicles not subject to the Acts, this consistent administrative interpretation is persuasive evidence that the Congress never intended to include them within its coverage. It is true that long administrative practice is entitled to weight, Davis v. Manry, 1925, 266 U.S. 401, 405, 45 S.Ct. 163, 164, 69 L.Ed. 350, but here there has been no expressed administrative determination of the problem.
We believe petitioner overspeaks in elevating negative action to positive administrative decision. In our view the failure of the Commission to act is not a binding administrative interpretation that Congress did not intend these cars to come within the purview of the Acts. See Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1956, 350 U.S. 318, 321322, 76 S.Ct. 386, 389, 390, 100 L.Ed. 364.
The fact that the Commission has not sponsored legislation rather indicates that it thought the problem too insignificant for consideration. We think the Commission expresses this view in its amicus curiae brief when it says 'the needs are for strict enforcement of sound operating rules and regulations rather than for air brakes, automatic couplers and the other devices specified in the Safety Appliance Acts.' But this is a matter of policy for the Congress to decide and it wrote into the Safety Appliance Acts that their coverage embraced 'all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles.'
This plain language could not have been more all-inclusive. This Court has construed the language of the Act in its generic sense. In Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 1904, 196 U.S. 1, 25 S.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363, with reference to the meaning of the word 'car,' the Court said: 'There is nothing to indicate that any particular kind of car was meant. Tested by context, subject matter and object, 'any car' meant all kinds of cars running on the rails, including locomotives.' Id., 196 U.S. at pages 1516, 25 S.Ct. at page 161. See also Spokane & Inland E.R. Co. v. Campbell, 1916, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S.Ct. 683, 60 L.Ed. 1125.
In view of the history and purposes of the Safety Appliance Acts, and the literal language used by the Congress that they embraced 'any car'
and 'any locomotive engine * * * hauling * * * any car,'
together with the practical necessity of affording safety appliances to thousands of railroad maintenance employees, as well as the public, we conclude that the motor track car and hand car when used by the petitioner in the manner employed here must be equipped in accordance with the requirements of the Safety Appliance Acts.
required the railroad to equip a gasoline-driven motor track car with a train brake and a push truck with a hand brake, and that the railroad was liable if its failure to furnish this equipment contributed to the accident. The correctness of this instruction presents the issue whether the Safety Appliance Acts apply to these small maintenance-of-way vehiclesthe successors to the familiar handcars of years ago. The Court approves the instruction, and, in doing so, it holds that a motor car is a 'locomotive,' that a push truck is a 'car,' and that the two combined are a 'train' as those terms are used in the Safety Appliance Acts. I do not find in the language of the Acts, their background and legislative history, or in the longstanding administrative practice of the Interstate Commerce Commission justification for so holding.
Civil liability in damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act follows as a matter of course if the violation is a proximate cause of an employee's injury.
The Safety Appliance Acts apply expressly to 'all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce * * * and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in connection therewith * * *.' 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. 8, 45 U.S.C.A. § 8. The term 'similar vehicles' shows that all vehicles are not included. Motor cars and push trucks must come within the terms 'locomotives,' 'cars,' or 'similar vehicles.'
The statutory context demonstrates that the crucial terms 'locomotives' and 'cars'were used in their ordinary sense as referring to standard operating equipment rather than to small maintenance-of-way vehicles like those involved in this case. For example, § 1, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 1, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1, which requires 'power driving-wheel brake(s)' and a 'train-brake system,' speaks in terms of a 'locomotive engine,' 'engineer,' 'brakesmen' and 'train.'
A small motor car used to haul section hands and their tools to and from work would not ordinarily be called a 'locomotive engine' except in jest, nor would a motor car with a push truck attached be referred to as a 'train.' Much less would the section hand operating the motor car, who would ordinarily belong to a separate unionthe Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employeesbe referred to as an 'engineer' or his crew as 'brakemen.' This is language appropriate to vehicles and employees used in standard freight and passenger operations but not to a motor car towing a push truck.
Other sections indicate that the word 'car' refers to standard railroad cars. Section 2 makes it unlawful for any railroad 'to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car * * * not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.' 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 2, 45 U.S.C.A. § 2. This section, as well as the detailed provisions of § 5 dealing with the prescribed height of drawbars on couplers, could not be applicable to cars of little more than a yard's height easily coupled by hand without danger to anyone.
The recognized purpose of each of the Safety Appliance Acts was the protection of operating employees of railroads from the hazards involved in the movement of standard trains and cars. The first Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 17, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 17, enacted in 1893, was preceded by a decade of concern, not with light maintenance equipment, but with the death toll caused by the two major hazards facing railroad trainmen: (1) the necessity for operating employees to work between freight cars in coupling them, and (2) the necessity for brakemen to operate hand brakes while standing on the tops of freight cars.
Nevertheless, the Interstate Commerce Commission, disturbed because some locomotives and standard cars were not required to be equipped with automatic couplers, recommended broadening amendments. These recommendations called for automatic couplers for all locomotives and for 'all vehicles * * * which are ordinarily hauled or propelled by standard locomotives.'
The second Safety Appliance Act, enacted in 1903, 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. 810, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 810, incorporated these recommendations. It extended the first Act to 'all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce * * * and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in connection therewith * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) Initially, the word 'vehicles' in the bill was unqualified by the word 'similar.' S.Rep.No. 1930, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 16. However, a railroad representative objected to it on the ground that it was too broad and suggested the term 'traffic cars.' Id., at 1617. The legislative representative of the Brotherhoods opposed the suggested substitute because it might be thought inapplicable to 'cabooses, steam shovels, snowplows, scale cars, and similar conveyances,' which are used in connection with standard equipment. Id., at 46. The result was that the word 'vehicles' was qualified by the addition of 'similar.' This indicates that the term 'similar vehicles' was used to cover special equipment, such as snowplows, used in connection with standard equipment. Maintenance-of-way vehicles have never been capable of such use.
The third Safety Appliance Act, 36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. 11 16, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1116, enacted in 1910, supplemented the existing Acts so as to require additional safety appliances, but did not extend the coverage. 'Cars' were to be equipped with secure still steps and efficient hand brakes; 'cars' requiring secure ladders and running boards were to be so equipped; secure handholds or grab irons were to be installed on the roofs at the tops of such ladders; and the Commission was to designate the standards for these and certain other appliances, as well as to modify or change the standard height for drawbars. These additions grew out of recommendations made by the Commission and their history reveals an intent to secure uniform equipment on operating cars.
Uniformity was considered to be imperative because trainmen working on trains by day and by night would operate more safely if the appliances they neededsill steps, ladders, running boards, grab irons and the likewere uniform in character and location on all freight cars. Most of these appliances are not at all adapted to motor cars and push trucks. On these small vehicles there not only is little or no need for this equipment, but there is no suitable place to attach it.
The inapplicability of the Safety Appliance Acts to maintenance-of-way vehicles is confirmed by the long-standing administrative interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and by numerous practical considerations. The Interstate Commerce Commission has administered these Acts for over half a century. During that time, it has, by its own statement, 'never considered the small maintenance of way vehicles subject to those acts * * *.'
Motor cars are not subjected to the inspection required of 'locomotives.' Maintenance-of-way vehicles are not considered as trains, locomotives or cars for accident reporting purposes.
Despite the Commission's consistent construction of the Acts since their inceptions, the Court today states that 'there has been no expressed administrative determination * * *.' 353 U.S. 330, 77 S.Ct. 846. Not only was there no reason for the Commission to disclaim application, but its 'negative' action in declining to subject these vehicles to the Acts is impressive because the Acts impose an affirmative duty on the Commission to enforce their provisions.
The Commission and the Department of Justice have been aware that motor cars and push trucks used by American railroads were not equipped with automatic couplers, power brakes and so on. Their failure to prosecute evidences their interpretation of the Acts. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351352, 61 S.Ct. 580, 581, 582, 35 L.Ed. 881.
Here there are considerations entitling the Interstate Commerce Commission's views to special respect. See Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401, 404405, 45 S.Ct. 163, 164, 69 L.Ed. 350. The Commission has played a predominant role in developing and perfecting the Acts, the Congress has given it broad discretionary powers in administering them. Its consistent interpretation of the Acts, known to Congress, the railroad industry and the railroad labor organizations, is persuasive evidence that the Acts never were intended to apply to motor cars and push trucks.
It is also significant that the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, whose members operate and maintain motor cars in their work, never has contended that the Safety Appliance Acts apply to these vehicles. However, the Brotherhood has been active in soliciting other legislative which it feels will add to the safety of its members.
This state legislation dealing expressly with the safety requirements of motor track cars indicates that the Federal Acts have not been thought to apply to them. As to the question of preemption, see Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 209, 71 L.Ed. 432.
The Court's decision is directly opposed to the Commission's practice and opinion. It imposes onerous requirements, unrelated to safety, on a large class of vehicles never before considered subject to the Acts.
27 Stat. 531, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 116, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 116.
27 Stat. 532, as amended, 29 Stat. 85, 62 Stat. 909, 45 U.S.C. 6, 45 U.S.C.A. § 6, provides in part:
36 Stat. 298, 45 U.S.C. 11, 45 U.S.C.A. § 11, provides in part:
We note that in 1953 the Interstate Commerce Commission, in a proceeding to prescribe rules governing inspection of electrically operated units and multiple-unit equipment, has itself declared a 'self-propelled unit of equipment capable of moving other equipment' to be a locomotive under the Act. Ex parte No. 179, 297 I.C.C. 177, 192. While the proceeding did not involve motor track cars, the language of the Commission casts some light on that problem. The Commission pointed out that 'The language in the act is all-inclusive, and considering its purpose * * * the words 'any locomotive' as used in section 2 must be construed as intended to encompass all of the motive equipment of any carrier subject to the act. * * * Appearance clearly cannot determine the classification into which this type of equipment should be placed.' (Emphasis added.) Id., at 191192.
32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. 8, 45 U.S.C.A. § 8.
27 Stat. 532, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 6, 45 U.S.C.A. § 6.
27 Stat. 531, as amended, 29 Stat. 85, 32 Stat. 943, 36 Stat. 298, 62 Stat. 909, 45 U.S.C. 116, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 116.
Section 6, 27 Stat. 532, 45 U.S.C. 6, 45 U.S.C.A. § 6; § 4, 36 Stat. 299, 45 U.S.C. 13, 45 U.S.C.A. § 13.
'* * * it shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to use on its line any locomotive engine in moving interstate traffic not equipped with a power driving-wheel brake and appliances for operating the train-brake system, or to run any train in such traffic * * * that has not a sufficient number of cars in it so equipped with power or train brakes that the engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that purpose.' 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 1, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1.
The language of § 3 reinforces this conclusion. It provides that a railroad that has complied with § 1 'may lawfully refuse to receive from connecting lines of road or shippers any car not equipped sufficiently * * * with such power or train brakes as will work and readily interchange with the brakes in use on its own cars * * *.' 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 3, 45 U.S.C.A. § 3. It is concerned with the transfer of standard freight or passenger cars from one railroad to another and is not applicable to maintenance-of-way vehicles.
See S. Rep. No. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 5; H.R. Rep. No. 1678, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3; 1 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (1931), 246, n. 4. Since passenger cars, by 1893, had generally been equipped with the required appliancestrain brakes and automatic couplersthey did not present the same hazards to trainmen.
The Commission recommended enactment of legislation in 1889 after completing a general investigation of railroad safety conditions. It continued to press for legislation until the enactment of the first Safety Appliance Act in 1893. See Interstate Commerce Commission Activities, 18871937 (1937), 118 120; Third Ann.Rep., I.C.C., for 1889, 4445, 84101; Fifth Ann.Rep., I.C.C., for 1891, 337340; Sixth Ann.Rep., I.C.C., for 1892, 6970.
The 1893 Act was entitled 'An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers and continuous brakes and their locomotives with driving-wheel brakes, and for other purposes.' The only provision which might be thought to be unrelated to power brakes or automatic couplers was the requirement in § 4 of 'secure grab irons or handholds in the ends and sides of each car' and this requirement was expressly stated to be 'for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars.' 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. 4, 45 U.S.C.A. § 4.
Twenty-third Ann.Rep., I.C.C., for 1909, 4041; S.Rep.No.250, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2; H.R. Rep. No. 37, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
'For over half a century, the Commission has administered the Safety Appliance Acts, as well as the other acts relating to railroad safety. During this period, the Commission has never considered the small maintenance of way vehicles subject to those acts, and we submit that the foregoing contemporary and legislative histories furnish a sound foundation for its view. That legislation is concerned with locomotives, cars and similar vehicles which employees were formerly required to go between to couple, or to ascend to use the hand brake. The acts are designed primarily to reduce or eliminate those hazards. They should not be construed to apply to entirely different types of equipment whose operation does not involve such risks.' Brief of Interstate Commerce Commission, as amicus curiae, 1820.
Under § 6 of the original Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 532, 45 U.S.C. 6, 45 U.S.C.A. § 6, and §§ 5 and 6 of the third Safety Appliance Act, 36 Stat. 299, 45 U.S.C. 14 and 15, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 14, 15, the Interstate Commerce Commission has the mandatory duty of informing United States District Attorneys of violations of the Acts; these attorneys have the mandatory duty to prosecute violators; and railroads are liable for a penalty of $100 for each violation.
See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 311315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 356, 358, 77 L.Ed. 796; State of Wisconsin v. State of Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413, 49 S.Ct. 163, 170, 73 L.Ed. 426.
Hertel, History of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (1955), 212213.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 34; Hearings before House Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 378 and H.R. 530, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1754.
The Court also rejects the railroad's alternative contention that motor track cars and push trucks, if within the purview of the Acts, are excepted from the Acts by virtue of the proviso in § 6 exempting 'trains composed of four-wheel cars or * * * locomotives used in hauling such trains.' 27 Stat. 532, 29 Stat. 85, 45 U.S.C. 6, 45 U.S.C.A. § 6. This proviso confirms the view expressed in this dissent that power brakes, automatic couplers, and the other specified appliances are not required of motor track cars and push trucks. The exception, on its face, applies to them as four-wheel vehicles. And, although the legislative history indicates that Congress had four-wheel coal cars primarily in mind, the proviso is not expressly limited to coal cars and is thoroughly consistent with a purpose to exempt from the Acts maintenance vehicles that are not suited to the prescribed safety appliances.