Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102553/boys-markets-inc-vs-retail-clerks-union
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 4', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 108', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 1441', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 4', '§ 301', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 301']

Boys Markets Inc Vs Retail Clerks Union - Citation 102553 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Boys Markets, Inc. Vs. Retail Clerks Union - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102553
Case Number 398 U.S. 235
Appellant Boys Markets, Inc.
Respondent Retail Clerks Union
boys markets, inc. v. retail clerks union - 398 u.s. 235 (1970) u.s. supreme court boys markets, inc. v. retail clerks union, 398 u.s. 235 (1970) boys markets, inc. v. retail clerks union, local 770 no. 768 argued april 21-22, 1970 decided june 1, 1970 398 u.s. 235 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus petitioner company and respondent union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement containing a provision that all controversies concerning its interpretation or application should be resolved by arbitration and that there should be no work stoppage, lockout, picketing, or boycotts during the life of the contract. a dispute arose and, when petitioner did not accede to.....
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union - 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
U.S. Supreme Court Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
Held: In the circumstances of this case -- where the grievance was subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, petitioner was ready for arbitration when the strike was enjoined, and the District Court concluded that respondent's violations of the no-strike clause were causing petitioner irreparable injury -- the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, supra, overruled. Pp. 398 U. S. 240 -255.
(a) The doctrine of stare decisis, "a principle of policy, and not a mechanical formula," does not bar reexamination of Sinclair. Pp. 398 U. S. 240 -241.
(b) The mere silence of Congress after Sinclair was decided does not foreclose reconsideration of that decision. Pp. 398 U. S. 241 -242.
abuse against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957). Pp. 398 U. S. 242 -243.
(d) This Court's holding in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 75, 390 U. S. 557 (1968), that § 301(a) suits initially brought in state courts are removable to federal courts (a decision which, in conjunction with Sinclair, had the effect of ousting state courts of jurisdiction in such cases where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obligation), contravenes the congressional purpose embodied in § 301(a) to supplement, and not encroach upon, the preexisting jurisdiction of state courts. Avco has created an anomalous situation urgently necessitating reconsideration of Sinclair. Pp. 398 U. S. 244 -245.
(e) Congress did not intend that the removal procedure be used to foreclose completely injunctive and other remedies otherwise available in the state courts. P. 398 U. S. 246 .
(f) Extending Sinclair to the States would be an unacceptable resolution of the dilemma created by Sinclair and Avco because it would substantially lessen the employers' incentive to agree to submit grievances to arbitration in exchange for the unions' undertakings to refrain from striking and would totally eliminate, contrary to congressional intent, the injunction as the most effective device to enforce no-strike obligations. Pp. 398 U. S. 247 -249.
(g) The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must he accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration, equitable remedies to enforce which are essential to further congressional policy for peacefully resolving labor disputes. Pp. 398 U. S. 249 -253.
(h) The narrow holding in this case comports with the principles of the dissent in Sinclair, supra at 370 U. S. 228 , which the Court adopts as guidelines for the district courts in determining whether to grant injunctive relief. Pp. 398 U. S. 253 -254.
In this case, we reexamine the holding of Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [ Footnote 1 ] preclude a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective
bargaining agreement, even though that agreement contains provisions, enforceable under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, [ Footnote 2 ] for binding arbitration of the grievance dispute concerning which the strike was called. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, considering itself bound by Sinclair, reversed the grant by the District Court for the Central District of California of petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. 416 F.2d 368 (1969). We granted certiorari. 396 U.S. 1000 (1970). Having concluded that Sinclair was erroneously decided and that subsequent events have undermined its continuing validity, we overrule that decision and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In February, 1969, at the time of the incidents that produced this litigation, petitioner and respondent were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which provided, inter alia, that all controversies concerning its interpretation or application should be resolved by adjustment and arbitration procedures set forth therein [ Footnote 3 ] and that, during the life of the contract, there should
be "no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts. . . ." [ Footnote 4 ] The dispute arose when petitioner's frozen foods supervisor and certain members of his crew who were not members of the bargaining unit began to rearrange merchandise in the frozen food cases of one of petitioner's supermarkets. A union representative insisted that the food cases be stripped of all merchandise and be restocked by union personnel. When petitioner did not accede to the union's demand, a strike was called and the union began to picket petitioner's establishment. Thereupon petitioner demanded that the union cease the work stoppage and picketing and sought to invoke the grievance and arbitration procedures specified in the contract.
At the outset, we are met with respondent's contention that Sinclair ought not to be disturbed, because the decision turned on a question of statutory construction which Congress can alter at any time. Since Congress has not modified our conclusions in Sinclair, even though it has been urged to do so, [ Footnote 5 ] respondent argues that principles of stare decisis should govern the present case.
" [S]tare decisis is a principle of policy, and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience."
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 , 309 U. S. 119 (1940). See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 , 382 U. S. 116 (1965). It is precisely because Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our otherwise consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration [ Footnote 6 ] and our efforts to accommodate and harmonize this policy with those underlying the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [ Footnote 7 ] that we believe Sinclair should be reconsidered. Furthermore, in light of developments subsequent to Sinclair, in particular, our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557 (1968), it has become clear that the Sinclair decision does not further, but rather frustrates, realization of an important goal of our national labor policy.
Nor can we agree that conclusive weight should be accorded to the failure of Congress to respond to Sinclair on the theory that congressional silence should be interpreted as acceptance of the decision. The Court has cautioned that "[i]t is, at best, treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 , 328 U. S. 69
(1946). Therefore, in the absence of any persuasive circumstances evidencing a clear design that congressional inaction be taken as acceptance of Sinclair, the mere silence of Congress is not a sufficient reason for refusing to reconsider the decision. Helvering v. Hallock, supra, at 309 U. S. 119 -120.
353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 456 , and, more specifically, that a union can obtain specific performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate grievances. We rejected the contention that the anti-injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited this type of relief, noting that a refusal to arbitrate was not "part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed," id. at 353 U. S. 458 , and that the Act itself manifests a policy determination that arbitration should be encouraged. See 29 U.S.C. § 108. [ Footnote 8 ] Subsequently, in the Steelworkers
Trilogy, [ Footnote 9 ] we emphasized the importance of arbitration as an instrument of federal policy for resolving disputes between labor and management, and cautioned the lower courts against usurping the functions of the arbitrator.
Id. at 368 U. S. 511 .
Shortly after the decision in Dowd Box, we sustained, in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), an award of damages by a state court to an employer for a breach by the union of a no-strike provision in its contract. While emphasizing that, "in enacting § 301, Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules," id. at 369 U. S. 104 , we did not consider the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to state court proceedings because the employer's prayer for relief sought only
Subsequent to the decision in Sinclair, we held in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 7, supra, that § 301(a) suits initially brought in state courts may be removed to the designated federal forum under the federal question removal jurisdiction delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In so holding, however, the Court expressly left open the questions whether state courts are bound by the anti-injunction proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and whether federal courts, after removal of a § 301(a) action, are required to dissolve any injunctive relief previously granted by the state courts. See generally General Electric Co. v. Local Union 191, 413 F.2d 964 (C.A. 5th Cir.1969) (dissolution of state injunction required). Three Justices who concurred expressed the view that Sinclair should be reconsidered "upon an appropriate future occasion." 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 562 (STEWART, J., concurring). [ Footnote 10 ]
relief is sought for breach of a no-strike obligation. Union defendants can, as a matter of course, obtain removal to a federal court, [ Footnote 11 ] and there is obviously a compelling incentive for them to do so in order to gain the advantage of the strictures upon injunctive relief which Sinclair imposes on federal courts. The sanctioning of this practice, however, is wholly inconsistent with our conclusion in Dowd Box that the congressional purpose embodied in § 301(a) was to supplement, and not to encroach upon, the preexisting jurisdiction of the state courts. [ Footnote 12 ] It is ironic indeed that the very provision that Congress clearly intended to provide additional remedies for breach of collective bargaining agreements has been employed to displace previously existing state remedies. We are not at liberty thus to depart from the clearly expressed congressional policy to the contrary.
uniformity elaborated in Lucas Flour Co., is seriously offended. This policy, of course, could hardly require, as a practical matter, that labor law be administered identically in all courts, for undoubtedly a certain diversity exists among the state and federal systems in matters of procedural and remedial detail, a fact that Congress evidently took into account in deciding not to disturb the traditional jurisdiction of the States. The injunction, however, is so important a remedial device, particularly in the arbitration context, that its availability or nonavailability in various courts will not only produce rampant forum shopping and maneuvering from one court to another, but will also greatly frustrate any relative uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the existing scheme, with the injunction remedy technically available in the state courts but rendered inefficacious by the removal device, assigns to removal proceedings a totally unintended function. While the underlying purposes of Congress in providing for federal question removal jurisdiction remain somewhat obscure, [ Footnote 13 ] there has never been a serious contention that Congress intended that the removal mechanism be utilized to foreclose completely remedies otherwise available in the state courts. Although federal question removal jurisdiction may well have been intended to provide a forum for the protection of federal rights where such protection was deemed necessary or to encourage the development of expertise by the federal courts in the
It is undoubtedly true that each of the foregoing objections to Sinclair-Avco could be remedied either by overruling Sinclair or by extending that decision to the States. While some commentators have suggested that the solution to the present unsatisfactory situation does lie in the extension of the Sinclair prohibition to state court proceedings, [ Footnote 14 ] we agree with Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court that
An additional reason for not resolving the existing dilemma by extending Sinclair to the States is the devastating implications for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not available. [ Footnote 15 ] As we have
previously indicated, a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra, at 353 U. S. 455 . [ Footnote 16 ] Any incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is, of course, true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union. [ Footnote 17 ]
We have also determined that the dissenting opinion in Sinclair states the correct principles concerning the accommodation necessary between the seemingly absolute terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policy considerations underlying § 301(a). [ Footnote 18 ] 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 215 .
The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act and the purposes of arbitration. Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions. See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1 , 369 U. S. 11 (1962); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 , 350 U. S. 285 (1956); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 , 312 U. S. 235 (1941).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to a situation totally different from that which exists today. In the early part of this century, the federal courts generally were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent the organization and strengthening of labor unions, and, in this industrial struggle, the injunction became a potent weapon that was wielded against the activities of labor groups. [ Footnote 19 ] The result was a large number of sweeping decrees, often issued ex parte, drawn on an ad hoc basis without regard to any systematic elaboration of national labor policy. See Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Co., 311 U. S. 91 , 311 U. S. 102 (1940).
In 1932, Congress attempted to bring some order out of the industrial chaos that had developed and to correct the abuses that had resulted from the interjection of the federal judiciary into union-management disputes on the behalf of management. See declaration of public policy, Norris-LaGuardia Act, 2, 47 Stat. 70. Congress, therefore, determined initially to limit severely the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . . ." § 4, 47 Stat. 70. Even as initially enacted, however, the prohibition against federal injunctions was by no means absolute. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 7, 8, 9, 47 Stat. 71, 72. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Wagner Act, [ Footnote 20 ] designed to curb various management activities that tended to discourage employee participation in collective action.
The principles elaborated in Chicago River are equally applicable to the present case. To be sure, Chicago River involved arbitration procedures established by statute. However, we have frequently noted, in such cases as Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers Trilogy, and Lucas Flour, the importance that Congress has attached generally to the voluntary settlement of labor disputes without resort to self-help, and more particularly to arbitration as a means to this end. Indeed, it has been stated that Lincoln Mills, in its exposition of § 301(a), "went a long way towards making arbitration the central institution in the administration of collective bargaining contracts." [ Footnote 21 ]
a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. [ Footnote 22 ] We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes, that the core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by the limited use of equitable remedies to further this important policy, and consequently that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant case.
370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 228 . (Emphasis in original.)
" ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION"
We held in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., supra, that, even in the absence of an express no-strike clause in the collective bargaining contract, an agreement that certain disputes "will be exclusively covered by compulsory terminal arbitration" (369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 106 ) gives rise to an implied promise by the union not to strike during the term of the contract in response to these arbitrable disputes. Id. at 104-106. In the present case, there was an express no-strike clause in the union-management contract. See n 4, supra.
When Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 , was decided in 1962, I subscribed to the opinion of the Court. Before six years had passed, I had reached the conclusion that the Sinclair holding should be reconsidered, and said so in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557 , 390 U. S. 562 (concurring opinion). Today I join the Court in concluding "that Sinclair was erroneously decided, and that subsequent events have undermined its continuing validity. . . ."
In these circumstances, the temptation is strong to embark upon a lengthy personal apologia. But since MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN has so clearly stated my present views in his opinion for the Court today, I simply join in that opinion and in the Court's judgment. An aphorism of Mr. Justice Frankfurter provides me refuge: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U. S. 595 , 335 U. S. 600 (dissenting opinion).
When the Court implies that the doctrine called stare decisis rests solely on "important policy considerations . . . in favor of continuity and predictability in the law," it does not tell the whole story. Such considerations are present and, in a field as delicate as labor relations, extremely important. Justice Brandeis said, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 , 285 U. S. 406 (1932):
" Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because, in most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."
When this Court is interpreting a statute, however, an additional factor must be weighed in the balance. It is the deference that this Court owes to the primary responsibility of the legislature in the making of laws. Of course, when this Court first interprets a statute, then the statute becomes what this Court has said it is. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moser, 275 U. S. 133 , 275 U. S. 136 (1927). Such an initial interpretation is proper, and unavoidable, in any system in which courts have the task of applying general statutes in a multitude of situations. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 112-115 (1921). The Court undertakes the task of interpretation, however, not because the Court has any special ability to fathom the intent of Congress, but rather because interpretation is unavoidable in the decision of the case before it. When the law has been settled by an earlier case, then any subsequent "reinterpretation" of the statute is gratuitous, and neither more nor less than
The legislative effect of the Court's reversal is especially clear here. In Sinclair, the Court invited Congress to act if it should be displeased with the judicial interpretation of the statute. We said, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 214 -215:
Commentators on our holding found this invitation to legislative action clear, and judicial self-restraint proper. See Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 Va.L.Rev. 427, 464-465 (1969); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547, 1565-1566 (1963). Bills were introduced in Congress seeking to effect a legislative change. S. 2132, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Congress, however, did not act, thus indicating at least a willingness to leave the law as Sinclair had construed it. It seems to me highly inappropriate for this Court now, eight years later, in effect to enact the amendment that Congress has refused to adopt. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U. S. 356 (1953); see also United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U. S. 236 , 348 U. S. 242 -244 (1955).
I do not believe that the principle of stare decisis forecloses all reconsiderations of earlier decisions. In the area of constitutional law, for example, where the only alternative to action by this Court is the laborious process of constitutional amendment and where the ultimate responsibility rests with this Court, I believe reconsideration is always proper. See James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213 , 366 U. S. 233 -234 (1961) (separate opinion
of BLACK, J.). * Even on statutory questions, the appearance of new facts or changes in circumstances might warrant reexamination of past decisions in exceptional cases under exceptional circumstances. In the present situation, there are no such circumstances. Congress has taken no action inconsistent with our decision in Sinclair. Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 , 328 U. S. 70 (1946). And, although bills have been introduced, cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 , 309 U. S. 119 -120 (1940), Congress has declined the invitation to act.
The only "subsequent event" to which the Court can point is our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U. S. 557 (1968). The Court must recognize that the holding of Avco is in no way inconsistent with Sinclair. As we said in Avco, supra, at 390 U. S. 561 :
* Other members of the Court have drawn the distinction between constitutional and statutory matters, and indicated that the correction of this Court's errors in statutory interpretation is best left to Congress. For example, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS noted in dissent in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 , 382 U. S. 133 -134 (1965):
See also United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U. S. 392 , 381 U. S. 406 (1965) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). Apparently, however, some members of the Court are willing to give greater weight to stare decisis in constitutional than in statutory matters. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 , 394 U. S. 327 -328 (1969) (HARLAN, J., concurring).