Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/218/917/61058/
Timestamp: 2020-01-29 19:57:12
Document Index: 271215740

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 151', '§ 101', '§ 158']

National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Knickerbocker Plastic Company, Inc., Respondent, 218 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1955) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1955 › National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Knickerbocker Plastic Company, Inc., Respondent
National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner, v. Knickerbocker Plastic Company, Inc., Respondent, 218 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1955)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 218 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1955) Jan. 15, 1955
The National Labor Relations Board is here petitioning for our order ordering the enforcement of the board's order against respondent, Knickerbocker. The board found that respondent had discharged two of its employees, Mary Ann Goff and Blanche Rounsavell, because of their testimony at a prior board hearing in violation of § 8(a) (3) (4) and (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,1 cited in complaint as the National Labor Relations Act, as emended, Public Law 101, 80th Congress, First Session. The Board also found that respondent had refused to bargain with International Association of Machinists, hereinafter referred to as IAM, which represented a majority of its employees, in violation of § 8(a) (5) and (1);2 discharged a number of employees because they went on strike in protest against the discriminatory discharges and refusal to bargain, in violation of § 8(a) (3) and (1);2 accorded exclusive recognition and bargaining rights to Playthings, Jewelry & Novelty Workers International Union, CIO, and its Local 801, in the face of the IAM's prior claim for recognition, in violation of § 8(a) (2) and (1);2 and made a union-security agreement with the Novelty Workers at a time when the statutory preconditions to such an agreement had not been fulfilled, thereby additionally violating § 8(a) (1) (2) and (3) of the Act.3
It is well established that an employer is under a duty to deal only with the true representatives of his workers. Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, etc., 1937, 300 U.S. 515, 548, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789; N.L.R.B. v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 9 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 153, 159. Accordingly, it is held that an employer acting in good faith may refuse to negotiate with a union until it can be determined whether the union desiring recognition actually represents a majority of the employees. N.L.R.B. v. Chicago Apparatus Co., 7 Cir., 1941, 116 F.2d 753, 158; Texarkana Bus Co. v. N.L.R.B., 8 Cir., 1941, 119 F.2d 480, 484. And where two or more unions claim to represent the employees, the employer has a duty not to recognize any of them until one of them proves a majority. Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 6 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 646. However, while an employer normally has the right to insist upon a board ordered election to determine the claimed majority, he may not, in bad faith, refuse to recognize the union in order to gain time in which to undermine the union or dissipate the claimed majority. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 4 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 365, 373; N.L.R.B. v. Epstein, 3 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 482; N.L.R.B. v. Jackson Press, Inc., 7 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 541, 544; Joy Silk Mills v. N.L.R.B., 1950, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732, 741; North Electric Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 6 Cir., 1941, 123 F.2d 887, 889; N.L.R.B. v. Empire Furniture Corp., 6 Cir., 1939, 107 F.2d 92, 94 N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 2 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 862.
We quote from N.L.R.B. v. Clarksburg Publishing Co., 4 Cir., 1941, 120 F.2d 976, 980: 'The evidence indicates and the Board found that the Guild represented a majority of the editorial employees; and it is obvious that the refusal of the company, acting through Highland, to bargain with the Guild was not due to any doubt as to the number of employees in the union, but was due to a positive rejection by the company of the principle of collective bargaining. Where the real attitude of an employer is that he will not bargain collectively with his employees under any conditions, he cannot excuse himself on the ground that sufficient proof of a majority status was not furnished him. (National) Labor (Relations) Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 2 Cir., 94 F.2d 862, certiorari denied 304 U.S. 576, 58 S. Ct. 1046, 85 L. Ed. 1540; (National) Labor (Relations) Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 18, 22.'
We have viewed the record in context as a whole, under the doctrine of Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 45, and have concluded that we should have to weigh the evidence as a fact finding body to hold that respondent did not violate the Act by declining to recognize IAM as the bargaining agent.
'* * * Prior to the execution of the contract, neither the International Novelty Workers nor Local 801 had obtained the Board certificate of authority to make a unionshop agreement which was then required by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, although the International had filed a petition for the necessary union-shop referendum. On October 22, 1951., Section 8(a) (3) of the Act was amended by eliminating the requirements for such a referendum and substituting a requirement that, to validate a union-security agreement, the labor organization must have received from the Board 'at the time the agreement was made or within the preceding 12 months,' a 'note of compliance' with the filing requirements of Section 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act. Local 801 did not come into compliance with these requirements until April 2, 1952, more than 6 months after the contract was executed.
'In the Board proceedings, respondent contended that its contract with the Novelty Workers was not unlawful because the clause containing the maintenance-of-membership provisions ended with the following language: 'Subject to the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, particularly those set forth in the National Labor Relations Act as amended 1947.' The Board overruled this contention, holding that neither the quoted provision itself nor any other evidence showed that the contracting parties intended to defer the operation of the union-security clause, as distinguished from limiting its application to the comparatively few situations in which Section 8(a) (3) permits discrimination against nonmembers of a labor organization pursuant to a valid union-security contract.'The above quotation is a concise statement as to the point involved and we are in accord with the board's ruling as to the union-security contract. We think the board was supported by the facts and the law when it decided that in its recognition of Local 801 respondent violated § 8(a) (2) and (1) of the Act, and by executing the union security agreement it violated § 8(a) (3).2 It follows that the employee strikers who were discharged on July 10th and 11th, 1951, shall have the privilege of reinstatement as provided in the board's order.
The petition for enforcement was submitted to us on the 8th day of October, 1954. Testimony was given at the hearing that the average tenure of respondent's employees was brief. The circumstances out of which this case arose took place three and one-half years ago in mid-1951. In all probability the circumstances have materially changed including turnover of employees and possible change of viewpoint on the part of both employer and employees. From all appearances, employees have been amicably represented by Local 801 since September 1950. Although it has been held under similar circumstances not to be within the power of this court to order the board to conduct a new election, N.L.R.B. v. P. Lorillard Co., 1941, 314 U.S. 512, 62 S. Ct. 397, 86 L. Ed. 380, when it is considered that the fundamental purpose of the labor Act was and is to prevent disturbance of interstate commerce by labor disputes, through employer-employee agreements arrived at by employer and employees' bargaining agent, it would seem that enforcement of the board's order should be approached with care lest the purposes of the Act be hindered rather than effectuated.
Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., as amended, June 23, 1947, 3:17 P.M., E.D.T., c. 120, Title 1, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 et seq. In pertinent part the Act provides as follows, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 158:
It is stated in the decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board as follows:
'In addition to the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent on several grounds violated Section 8(a) (2) of the Act by entering into a union security agreement with the CIO, we find that such conduct also constitutes independent violations of Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). Ferro-Co-Corporation, 102 NLRB No. 167; John B. Shriver Company, 103 No. 2. As the contract between the Respondent and the CIO was illegal because of the latter's failure to achieve compliance with Section 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act, we do not find it necessary to pass upon or to adopt the Trial Examiner's dictum that the contract, despire its maintenance of membership clause, otherwise 'contained legal union security language."
The board concludes that there are 318 voting employees in the unit. 159 cards would be the equator and 160 cards would constitute a majority. The Board finds 174 employees designated IAM. There are 247 cards included as exhibits. Considering these exhibits in a light most favorable to the petitioner, there appear to be no less than 160 valid cards which is sufficient for a majority. A painstaking check of the cards will not permit us to conclude that the board's finding of 174 valid cards was clearly erroneous
See Note 2 on page 919