Source: https://casetext.com/case/toure-v-avis-rent-a-car-sys
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 20:52:00
Document Index: 509024442

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5102', '§ 5102', '§ 5102', '§ 5102', '§ 5102', '§ 5102', '§ 5102']

Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345 | Casetext Search + Citator
Rodman v. Deangeles
The jury, however, found against plaintiff on the issue of whether he sustained a medically determined injury…
Brusso v. Imbeault
Dufel v. Green, 84 N.Y.2d 795, 798, 622 N.Y.S.2d 900, 647 N.E.2d 105 (1995). Accord Toure v. Avis Rent A Car…
4,464 Citing Cases
Full title:AHMED DAME TOURE, APPELLANT, v. AVIS RENT A CAR SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL.…
98 N.Y.2d 345 (N.Y. 2002)
holding that MRI tests showing injury and muscle spasms support finding of serious injury under New York law
Summary of this case from Bass v. Hout
APPEAL, in the first above-entitled action, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered June 28, 2001, which, with two Justices dissenting, affirmed an order of the Supreme Court (Bertram Katz, J.), entered in Bronx County, granting a motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
APPEAL, in the second above-entitled action, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered July 3, 2001, which (1) reversed, on the law, a judgment of the Supreme Court (Charles T. Major, J.), entered in Onondaga County upon a verdict in favor of plaintiff Linda W. Manzano on the issue of damages, awarding plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $70,000, (2) granted a motion by defedant to set aside the verdict, and (3) dismissed the complaint.
APPEAL, in the third above-entitled action, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered July 3, 2002, which, with two Justices dissenting, affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court (Anthony F. Shaheen, J.), entered in Oneida County upon a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $45,000.
Beth J. Goldmacher, for respondents.
Joseph S. Cote, III, for appellants.
Michael J. Hutter, for appellants.
These three cases examine the nature and extent of qualitative, objective medical proof necessary for a plaintiff to meet the "serious injury" threshold under the No-Fault Law. We conclude that plaintiffs Toure and Manzano have satisfied their burden under Insurance Law § 5102(d), but plaintiff Nitti has not.
Insurance Law § 5102(d) defines the term "serious injury" as
This Court has long recognized that the "legislative intent underlying the No-Fault Law was to weed out frivolous claims and limit recovery to significant injuries" (Dufel v. Green, 84 N.Y.2d 795, 798; see also Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 234-235). As such, we have required objective proof of a plaintiff's injury in order to satisfy the statutory serious injury threshold (see e.g. Dufel, 84 N.Y.2d at 798;Lopez v. Senatore, 65 N.Y.2d 1017, 1020); subjective complaints alone are not sufficient (see e.g. Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 957-958; Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 679).
In order to prove the extent or degree of physical limitation, an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury (see e.g. Dufel, 84 N.Y.2d at 798; Lopez, 65 N.Y.2d at 1020). An expert'squalitative assessment of a plaintiff's condition also may suffice, provided that the evaluation has an objective basis and compares the plaintiff's limitations to the normal function, purpose and use of the affected body organ, member, function or system (see Dufel, 85 N.Y.2d at 798). When supported by objective evidence, an expert's qualitative assessment of the seriousness of a plaintiff's injuries can be tested during cross-examination, challenged by another expert and weighed by the trier of fact. By contrast, an expert's opinion unsupported by an objective basis may be wholly speculative, thereby frustrating the legislative intent of the No-Fault Law to eliminate statutorily-insignificant injuries or frivolous claims. We now apply these principles to three different cases.
Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for neck and back injuries allegedly suffered when the vehicle he was driving was struck by an automobile operated by defendant Susan Duncan and owned by defendant Avis Rent A Car Systems, Inc. Following joinder of issue, plaintiff served a bill of particulars alleging that he suffered a "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" and a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system," two of the statutory categories defining "serious injury" under Insurance Law § 5102(d). Defendants then moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not sustained a serious injury within the meaning of the No-Fault Law.
Based on Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, Inc. ( 96 N.Y.2d 295 [2001]), plaintiff withdrew his additional claim of a "permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system."
Although plaintiff now objects to the form of some of the exhibits submitted in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, he did not challenge their inclusion before the motion court and therefore failed to preserve this argument for our review (see Hambsch v. New York City Tr. Auth., 63 N.Y.2d 723, 725 [1984]).
Based on his review of medical records from plaintiff's prior health care providers, Dr. Waltz noted that an earlier MRI test of plaintiff's cervical spine — taken one month after the accident — revealed one bulging and two herniated discs. As a consequence, he had plaintiff undergo additional testing — a CT scan of his cervical spine and an MRI of his lumbar spine. According to Dr. Waltz, the CT scan indicated "significantly bulging possibly herniated discs" and the lumbar MRI revealed "significant bulging discs." While conducting a physical examination, Dr. Waltz observed that plaintiff "had paraspinous muscle spasms in the lumbosacral area and a decreased range of motion in his lumbar spine." He opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff's disc pathology was caused by the motor vehicle accident and that plaintiff's injuries are "permanent and result in restriction of use and activity of the injured areas and permanent limitation of his spine and peripheral nervous system." Moreover, Dr. Waltz related this assessment to plaintiff's complaints of difficulty in sitting, standing and walking for extended periods of time and plaintiff's inability to lift heavy objects at work by concluding that these limitations are "a natural and expected medical consequence of his injuries."
Although Dr. Olson's affirmation was sufficient to meet defendants' initial burden to establish a prima facie case that plaintiff's alleged injuries did not meet the serious injury threshold under the No-Fault Law (see e.g. Gaddy, 79 N.Y.2d at 956-957), plaintiff's proffered evidence raises issues of material fact as to whether he sustained a "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" or a "significant limitation of use of a body function or system."
For these two statutory categories, we have held that "[w]hether a limitation of use or function is `significant' or `consequential' (i.e., important * * *) relates to medical significance and involves a comparative determination of the degree or qualitative nature of an injury based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part" (Dufel, 84 N.Y.2d at 798). While Dr. Waltz's affirmation does not ascribe a specific percentage to the loss of range of motion in plaintiff's spine, he sufficiently describes the "qualitative nature" of plaintiff's limitations "based on the normal function, purpose and use of the body part" (id.). Dr. Waltz further attributes the limitations in plaintiff's physical activities to the nature of the injuries sustained by opining that plaintiff's "difficulty in sitting, standing or walking for any extended period of time and his inability to lift heavy boxes at work are a natural and expected medical consequence of his injuries" (see Melino v. Lauster, 195 A.D.2d 653, 655 [3d Dept], affd 82 N.Y.2d 828).
For this reason, the Appellate Divisions have held that a diagnosis of a bulging or herniated disc, by itself, does not constitute a serious injury (see e.g. Manzano v. O'Neil, 285 A.D.2d 966 [4th Dept 2001], revd on other grnds 98 N.Y.2d 345 [2002]; Rose v. Furgerson, 281 A.D.2d 857, 859 [3d Dept], lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 602 [2001]; Pierre v. Nanton, 279 A.D.2d 621 [2d Dept 2001]; Noble v. Ackerman, 252 A.D.2d 392, 394 [1st Dept 1998]).
We cannot say that the alleged limitations of plaintiff's back and neck are so "minor, mild or slight" as to be considered insignificant within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (Licari, 57 N.Y.2d at 236; see also Gaddy, 79 N.Y.2d at 957; Scheer, 70 N.Y.2d at 679). As our case law further requires, Dr. Waltz's opinion is supported by objective medical evidence, including MRI and CT scan tests and reports, paired with his observations of muscle spasms during his physical examination of plaintiff. Considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, this evidence was sufficient to defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment (see Lopez, 65 N.Y.2d at 1020). Given this ruling, we need not pass on plaintiff's remaining claim under section 5102(d).
In this case, plaintiff presented the testimony of her treating physician, Dr. Cambareri, who opined that plaintiff suffered two herniated cervical discs as a result of the automobile accident. His conclusion was supported by objective evidence introduced at trial, namely, the MRI films that he interpreted. Although this medical expert did not assign a quantitative percentage to the loss of range of motion in plaintiff's neck or back, he described the qualitative nature of plaintiff's limitations based on the normal function, purpose and use of her body parts. In particular, Dr. Cambareri correlated plaintiff's herniated discs with her inability to perform certain normal, daily tasks. These limitations are not so insignificant as to bar plaintiff's recovery under the No-Fault Law (see Licari, 57 N.Y.2d at 236). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it cannot be said that there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury (see Parkin v. Cornell Univ., Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523, 526).
This case concerns a different category of serious injury — the "90/180" category. Although this statutory category lacks the "significant" and "consequential" terminology of the two categories at issue in Toure and Manzano, a plaintiff must present objective evidence of "a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature" (Insurance Law § 5102[d]; see also Licari, 57 N.Y.2d at 236-239). Here, the issue is simply whether plaintiff offered sufficient objective medical evidence to establish a qualifying injury or impairment. Because plaintiff failed to do so, we reverse the order of the Appellate Division.
Defendants do not contest the substantiality of plaintiff's limitations. Thus, the latter requirement of the 90/180 category — that the injury prevents a person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment — is not at issue.
Case No. 69: Order reversed, with costs, and defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.
Case No. 94: Order reversed, with costs, and case remitted to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that court.
Case No. 95: Order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed.
holding that a disc bulge, two herniated discs and an unquantified loss of range of motion were sufficient evidence of a serious injury to survive summary judgment
Summary of this case from Komarov v. C.P.S Services, Inc.
holding that the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict should have been granted given the inadequacy of the objective medical proof supporting the opinion of plaintiff's expert
holding that objective proof of a plaintiff's injury is needed in order to satisfy the statutory serious injury threshold
Summary of this case from Scotto v. Moraldo
finding that "[i]n order to prove the extent or degree of physical limitation, an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury"
concluding that a report describing the qualitative nature of the plaintiff's lost range of motion, backed by objective findings and comparison to normal function, raised a material issue of fact as to both the permanent consequential and significant limitation categories of "serious injury"
Summary of this case from Zhang v. Alvarado
In Toure, the New York Court of Appeals noted that “an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used” to prove the extent of a physical limitation and “substantiate a claim of serious injury.” 98 N.Y.2d at 350, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 868, 774 N.E.2d 1197; accord Baytsayeva, 868 F.Supp.2d at 23.
Summary of this case from Satterfield v. Maldonado
noting that "subjective complaints alone" of an injury are insufficient to meet the serious injury threshold
In Toure, the plaintiff defeated a motion for summary judgment by submitting an affirmation from a treating neurosurgeon that related the diagnosis of "permanent limitation of his spine and peripheral nervous system" to (1) the "plaintiff's complaints of difficulty in sitting, standing and walking... [and] plaintiff's inability to lift heavy objects" and (2) objective findings based on two MRIs and a CT scan that the plaintiff suffered from bulging discs.
Summary of this case from Brusso v. Imbeault
In Toure, a plaintiff claimed to have a serious injury under the "90/180 day category," which, she testified, prevented her from exercising and performing household chores.
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In Toure, which involved multiple plaintiffs, one plaintiff stated that after his accident, he could lift moderate-weight objects with significant pain, had pain when bending and using his lower back, could not walk moderate distances, and had pain when turning his head.
In Toure, plaintiff's vehicle was rear-ended by defendant, and plaintiff brought suit pursuant to New York Insurance Law § 5102(d) under "permanent consequential limitation."
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In Toure, as here, the plaintiff's doctor based his opinion regarding the neck and back limitations of the plaintiff on MRI tests and observations of spasm and limitations of range of motion in the plaintiff's back.
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In Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 350 (2002), the Court noted that in order to prove the extent or degree of physical limitation, an expert's designation of a numeric percentage of a plaintiff's loss of range of motion can be used to substantiate a claim of serious injury; but an expert's qualitative assessment of a plaintiff's condition may also suffice, provided that the evaluation has an objective basis and compares the plaintiff's limitations to the normal function, purpose and use of the affected body organ, member, function or system.
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In Toure v Avis Rent A Car Systems Inc, the Court of Appeals made clear that an expert's conclusory findings, without support, does not suffice to establish a serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102(d).
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In Toure v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, 98 NY2d 345 (2002), the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff's proof of injury must be supported by objective medical evidence, in admissible form, such as sworn MRI and CT scan tests.
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In Toure, plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for neck and back injuries which allegedly resulted in a "permanent consequential limitation of a body organ or member" and/or in a "significant limitation of the use of a body function or system."
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bulging disc alone is not a "serious injury"
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In Toure v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems, Inc., 98 NY2d at 350, the Court of Appeals stated that resolving the question of whether plaintiff suffered a "serious injury" involves a comparative analysis of the quantified degree and duration of an alleged injury, or its qualitative impact and duration in the claimant's normal activities.
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In Toure, the Court of Appeals adopted the view of the two dissenting justices in Nitti and dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of sufficient objective medical proof of a serious injury.
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