Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/742/816/212651/
Timestamp: 2020-02-27 12:18:33
Document Index: 455797198

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1983', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437', '§ 1437']

Rosa Lee Phelps; Lewis A. Mcabee; Branda Switzer; Carolynpoole; Mary Ann Gory; Joyce Wooford; Emma Youngand Sandra New, Individually and Onbehalf of All Others Similarlysituated, Appellants, v. Housing Authority of Woodruff and L.g. Casey, Individuallyand in His Official Capacity As Director of Thehousing Authority of Woodruff, and Theirofficers, Subordinates Andsuccessors, Appellees, 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fourth Circuit › 1984 › Rosa Lee Phelps; Lewis A. Mcabee; Branda Switzer; Carolynpoole; Mary Ann Gory; Joyce Wooford; Emma Y...
Rosa Lee Phelps; Lewis A. Mcabee; Branda Switzer; Carolynpoole; Mary Ann Gory; Joyce Wooford; Emma Youngand Sandra New, Individually and Onbehalf of All Others Similarlysituated, Appellants, v. Housing Authority of Woodruff and L.g. Casey, Individuallyand in His Official Capacity As Director of Thehousing Authority of Woodruff, and Theirofficers, Subordinates Andsuccessors, Appellees, 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - 742 F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1984) Argued Feb. 8, 1984. Decided Aug. 24, 1984
In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs appeal from judgment entered for the defendants after a trial to the court. We affirm.
Plaintiffs brought suit in November 1982 alleging that defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in several respects. First, plaintiffs in subclass B asserted that they were, in accordance with the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A), entitled to preferential treatment in admissions to Kelly Acres because at the time of their applications they were living in substandard housing or were involuntarily displaced. Defendants, they alleged, had not afforded them this treatment, thereby denying them "rights secured by the ... laws" of the United States. Second, subclass A plaintiffs argued that defendants' failure to notify them of expected dates of occupancy deprived them of rights secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (3) (ii). Third, subclass B plaintiffs alleged that defendants had deprived them of a "property interest" in this preference without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, subclass C tenants alleged that they had been denied equal protection of law by the defendants' practice of holding units vacant awaiting applications from tenants able to pay a higher rental rather than renting to currently available lower income applicants. Plaintiffs sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
Trial was had to the court in July 1983, after which judgment was entered for defendants. On authority of Perry v. Housing Authority of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981), the court held that plaintiffs had proved no cognizable cause of action under Sec. 1983. Alternatively, the court held that plaintiffs had not proved that any particular plaintiff had been denied a preference and as a result had been denied admission to Kelly Acres; and that, as a finding of fact, the Authority had not held apartments open to await higher income tenants. Finally, the court refused to award damages, holding that even if liability had been proven, the records did not furnish evidence sufficient to calculate a non-speculative award. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs first contend that the district court erred in holding that the defendants had not deprived them of "rights secured" by the Housing Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1437. The plaintiffs dispute both the court's legal conclusion that the Housing Act's preference provisions did not give rise to rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its finding that, in any event, plaintiffs had not been denied such rights. Because we agree with the district court's legal conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address the plaintiffs' factual contentions.
It is of course now established that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be invoked to redress certain violations of federal statutory law by state actors. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980); Middlesex City Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981). It is equally clear, however, that not all violations of federal law are so actionable. Determining whether violation of a particular federal statute gives rise to Sec. 1983 liability involves two inquiries. First, whether Congress, in enacting the statute, manifested in the statute itself an intent to foreclose its private enforcement? Second, whether the statute is of a kind aimed at creating enforceable "rights" under Sec. 1983? Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981); Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 17-20, 101 S. Ct. at 1539-41.
Plaintiffs argue that two such rights are implicit in the Housing Act and HUD regulations implementing it. First they contend that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A), and accompanying regulations, confers upon them a right to preferential admission to public housing projects, a preference which, they further argue, is enforceable under Sec. 1983:
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A).7 Second, they argue that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (3) (ii) gives them a Sec. 1983-enforceable right to receive notice of their expected date of occupancy:
At the outside, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A) could only be read to grant the plaintiffs entitlement: (1) to have included in the ACC a requirement (2) that the defendants adopt selection criteria that (3) accommodates their preference (4) while also accommodating the equally important goals of achieving a tenant mix representative of a broad range of incomes and of achieving financial solvency. To find in this a judicially enforceable, federally secured individual "right" would require ascribing to Congress an assumption that courts of law could, and an intention that they should, make the necessary balancing of inevitably conflicting interests as between different applicants and possibly opposing statutory purposes that would be required to adjudicate individual claims of right. Given the difficulties--indeed the essential impossibility--of such a judicial task, we cannot ascribe such an assumption or intention to Congress.
Finally, this court has earlier considered, and rejected, an argument much like plaintiffs' in an action seeking relief for alleged violations of another section of the Housing Act. In Perry v. Housing Authority, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981), public housing tenants sought damages for the Authority's breach of its lease agreement, namely of covenants to repair. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) mandated that every ACC require the landlord to comply with HUD procedures designed to protect tenant security. This court held that this requirement did not give plaintiffs individual rights enforceable under Sec. 1983. Although it might be argued that Perry is distinguishable, since the preference and notice rights are more specific than Sec. 1437d(c)'s general requirement of maintaining tenant security, we are not persuaded that this distinction is of sufficient moment to alter our conclusion that the defendants' actions did not deprive the plaintiffs of any "rights secured by the ... laws of the United States."10
The initial inquiry is whether plaintiffs have been deprived of a "property" interest, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979), to which they have a "legitimate claim of entitlement." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). Such a property interest must arise from "an independent source, such as state law." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S. Ct. at 2709.
Plaintiffs assert such an "independent source" in the preference language of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A). Although the argument that public housing applicants have limited due process rights in the determination of their applications has some support in the case law, the parties cite no case directly holding that the preference requirement arises to the level of a constitutionally-protected property interest, and our research does not disclose any.11 We are of the opinion that no such property interest exists. Given the almost infinite amalgam of factors that must guide the Authority's discretionary tenant selections, we believe that the "preference" to which any particular applicant might lay claim is so contingent upon the relative merits of all other applications and so subject to the exercise of legitimate management discretion that any particular plaintiff's prospect of being admitted must be considered merely an expectation, rather than an entitlement rising to the level of constitutionally protected property interests.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendants' alleged practice of holding apartments vacant awaiting higher-income applicants despite the availability of substantial numbers of lower-income applicants constitutes a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree.
Assuming, arguendo, that the district court's factual findings on this issue, i.e., that the Authority had not maintained vacancies in an effort to secure higher-rent tenants, are clearly erroneous, a holding we would hesitate to make on the record before us, we believe that such a practice is, in the particular circumstances of this case, rationally related to two legitimate governmental objectives. First, collection of a higher monthly rental would obviously help maintain the project's solvency, which appears to have been in constant jeopardy. Second, renting vacant apartments to higher income tenants would contribute to the realization of a goal mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A) itself, that of achieving a mix of tenants across a broad range of incomes. For this reason, we reject the appellants' equal protection argument as well.12
June 1979 --------------------------- Rent Range Units Allocated $ 0-27 21 28-67 22 68-106 23 107-146 21 147 k 13 March 1976 --------------------------- Rent Range Units Allocated ---------- --------------- $ 0-30 10 31-40 10 41-50 14 51-60 22 61-70 22 71 k 22
Plaintiff Dates Eligible Probable Rent Range --------- ----------------------------------- ------------------- Gory Winter 1977 to July 1983 $ 0-27 Poole August 17, 1978 until admitted on November 22, 1982 0-27 Switzer Summer 1979 to July 1983 0-27 Phelps Fall, 1979 to August 17, 1981 October 1981 to July 1983 0-27 Young April 1978 to July 1983 28-67 Wofford March 2, 1982 to November 18, 1982 68-106 New January 1979 to March 1980 January 13, 1981 to March 27, 1981 107-146 February 23, 1982 until admitted in July 1983 McAbee August 19, 1981 to July 1983 107-146
Although the plaintiffs do not assert a right of action as third-party beneficiaries of the ACC, we regard this argument foreclosed by Perry v. Housing Authority, 664 F.2d 1210, 1218 (4th Cir. 1981)
Appellants argue that the district court erred in holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (4) (A) and 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c) (3) (ii) do not give rise to implied private causes of action. It is somewhat unclear whether they make this argument only in response to the district court's holding that in order for a violation of a federal statute to be actionable under Sec. 1983, that statute must be of such a quality that in essence it gives rise to such an implied action, or whether they suggest that they had asserted such a separate private right of action that was erroneously denied
As both the complaint and the court's opinion are cast in Sec. 1983 terms, we consider the former interpretation more plausible. The inquiry under either interpretation of the appellant's position is similar, though not perfectly congruent. Nevertheless, lest our disposition of the case seem incomplete, we reject plaintiffs' implied private cause of action argument on the reasoning of Perry v. Housing Authority, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs buttress their argument, however, with two analogous cases. In Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982), for example, the court held that a public housing tenant who, by virtue of her status as a tenant, might be eligible for federal rent subsidies under section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, had a property interest in such benefits sufficient to mandate orderly processing of her benefits application. Likewise, in Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968), the court held that due process required orderly procedures and ascertainable standards for selecting among applicants for public housing