Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/563/484/31556/
Timestamp: 2019-11-11 20:35:45
Document Index: 745154263

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 798', '§ 403', '§ 5']

Ernest L. Bell, Iii, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. United States of America et al., Defendants, Appellees, 563 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1977) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1977 › Ernest L. Bell, Iii, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. United States of America et al., Defendants, Appellees
Ernest L. Bell, Iii, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. United States of America et al., Defendants, Appellees, 563 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1977)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 563 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1977) Heard June 3, 1977. Decided Sept. 9, 1977
Appellant brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., to compel disclosure of certain documents gathered and collated by the Allied Intelligence Services under the so-called "ULTRA" program during World War II. The National Security Agency resists disclosure of most of the requested material, claiming exemption under § 552(b) (1) for material "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . in fact properly classified."1 The history of appellant's efforts both in and out of court to obtain these documents is more fully set forth in the district court's memorandum opinion of May 7, 1976. Bell v. United States, Dep't of Defense, 71 F.R.D. 349 (D.N.H. 1976). At that time the court declined to order immediate production of the documents for in camera inspection and ordered the defendants to file "detailed affidavits from the agency or agencies controlling these documents, specifying, in particular, the portions of the documents which are exempt and the reasons for their exemption. The affidavits must also specify the substantive and procedural provisions of Executive Order No. 11652 upon which the exemption is based." Id. at 356.
Appellant strenuously argues that the district court abused its discretion in relying on the Boardman affidavit and declining to order in camera review of the documents as authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B). While he concedes that cryptographic methods and information would properly be classified information and therefore exempt from disclosure, he asserts that the documents he seeks do not contain technical information about the ULTRA code system itself, but merely the summaries and byproducts of the ULTRA program, i. e., the historical facts that were learned through ULTRA and disseminated in reports known as "Magic summaries".2 Disclosure of this information, he argues, would reveal nothing about the cryptographic system itself, and therefore classification cannot be justified on the basis asserted by the Boardman affidavit. The district court's refusal to conduct an in camera investigation was, in appellant's view, an abdication of its responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act to determine "de novo", 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B), whether withheld documents properly fall within the exemption claimed by an agency.3 We cannot agree.
In its May 7 memorandum the district court analyzed thoroughly and, we think, correctly, its powers and responsibilities under the Act, and recognized as well that "a delicate balance must be struck between the Executive's implicit constitutional authority to classify documents in the interests of national security and foreign policy and the Judiciary's explicit constitutional power to interpret the laws of the United States." 71 F.R.D. at 355. While it is clear that the FOIA now authorizes in camera review of documents claimed to be exempt on national security grounds, in effect overruling EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S. Ct. 827, 35 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1973), it is also clear that such inspection is not mandated. Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, at 696 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The legislative history indicates that, before in camera inspection is ordered, an agency should be given the opportunity to demonstrate by affidavit or testimony that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure, and that the court is expected to accord "substantial weight" to the agency's affidavit. Id. at 697 & n.10 (as amended) quoting S.Rep. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974). We agree with the District of Columbia Circuit that the test should be whether the affidavit demonstrates by its sufficient description (that) the contested document logically falls into the category of the exemption indicated. In deciding whether to conduct an in camera inspection "it need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith." Id. See also S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (standard of review does not allow court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but neither does it require the court to defer to this discretion of the agency; test is whether the withholding is without a reasonable basis under the applicable executive order or statute).
Defendants also claim exemption under § 552(b) (3) on the ground that the documents are exempted from disclosure by statute, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 798 and 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3). The district court found it unnecessary to reach this claim, as have we
In addition to his claim that the documents are not properly classified as a matter of substance, appellant contends that the proper procedures for exempting material from automatic declassification set forth in EO 11652 § 5(E) were not followed. This claim is without merit. As material classified before the date of the order, the requested documents are governed by subsection (E) (2), not (E) (1)