Source: https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-assessments/management-of-personal-information-department-of-human-services-as-the-contact-services-provider-for-the-my-health-record-system/
Timestamp: 2019-08-23 21:50:58
Document Index: 54996870

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 4', 'art 1', 'art 2', 'art 3', 'art 4', 'art 4', 'art 4', 'art 5']

Management of personal information – Department of Human Services as the contact services provider for the My Health Record system — OAIC
Assessment undertaken: March 2017
Draft report issued: August 2017
Final report issued: November 2017
This report outlines the findings of an assessment by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) of the Department of Human Services (DHS) in its capacity as a contractor of the My Health Record System Operator. The My Health Record System Operator is the Australian Digital Health Agency (the Agency).
The OAIC has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Agency to provide dedicated privacy-related services under the Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act), the My Health Records Act 2012 (My Health Records Act) and the Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Healthcare Identifiers Act). Under the terms of the MOU, the OAIC undertakes up to two privacy assessments each year relating to the My Health Record system. This assessment forms part of the MOU work programme.
The purpose of the assessment was to determine whether DHS, in its role as contractor to the Agency, is taking such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to implement practices, procedures and systems relating to DHS’s functions or activities that will ensure its compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) and that will enable DHS to deal with inquiries or complaints from individuals about its compliance with the APPs. Taking such steps is a requirement of APP 1.2.
DHS has multiple roles in relation to the My Health Record system. The scope of this assessment, however, was confined to the contact services provided by DHS to individuals on behalf of the Agency.
The findings of the OAIC’s assessment show that the Digital Health Branch – which provides the My Health Record contact services – and related DHS teams have a good privacy awareness culture and good training and management structures in place that help DHS comply with the APPs when providing My Health Record contact services.
Our findings raise some areas for improvement set out in Part 4 of this report. In summary, the OAIC found that, in some areas, DHS would benefit from greater clarity in its policies and procedures to ensure consistency in its personal information handling practices. We have made one recommendation.
Part 1: Description of assessment
1.1 This assessment was conducted under s33C(1)(a) of the Privacy Act, which allows the OAIC to assess whether personal information held by an entity is being maintained and handled in accordance with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs).
1.2 The objective of the assessment was to determine whether DHS is handling personal information, in its capacity as a contractor to the Agency, in accordance with the APPs found in the Privacy Act.
1.3 This assessment specifically examined DHS’s compliance with APP 1.2. This APP requires APP entities to take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to implement practices, procedures and systems that will ensure compliance with the APPs and that will enable the entity to deal with inquiries or complaints from individuals about its compliance with the APPs.
1.4 DHS has multiple roles in relation to the My Health Record system. The scope of this assessment was limited to the consideration of DHS’s handling and management of personal information for individuals when providing My Health Record system contact services, as outlined in an interim agreement that DHS has with the Agency, in so far as it related to DHS’s functions or activities.
1.5 The assessment of DHS was risk based. The focus was on identifying privacy risks to the effective handling of personal information in accordance with privacy legislation.
1.6 Where the OAIC identifies privacy risks during its assessments and considers those risks to be high or medium risks, according to OAIC guidance, the OAIC makes recommendations to the assessed entity about how to address those risks. If the recommendations are put in place by the assessed entity it will, in the opinion of the OAIC, minimise the risks identified around the management of personal information.
1.7 For more information about privacy risk ratings, refer to the OAIC’s ‘Risk based assessments – privacy risk guidance’ in Appendix A. Further detail on this approach is provided in Chapter 7 of the OAIC’s Guide to privacy regulatory action.[1]
1.8 The OAIC asked DHS to provide copies of relevant policies and procedures for review. The assessors then conducted the fieldwork component of the assessment. This included interviewing key members of DHS staff from the Digital Health Branch, the Cyber Security Branch and the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch, and reviewing further documents, at DHS’s offices in Canberra from 21 to 23 March 2017. A further telephone interview was conducted with a DHS staff member from the Internal Fraud Detection and Data Team on 24 March 2017.
Part 2: Overview of My Health Record services provided by DHS
2.1 DHS delivers two functions for the My Health Record system:
It is a registered repository operator under the My Health Records Act. The DHS-operated repository makes Medicare, Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and repatriation PBS claims data and organ donor and immunisation data available to the My Health Record system.
It provides contact services with individuals and healthcare providers on behalf of the My Health Record System Operator under an interim agreement with the Agency.
2.2 DHS is also the service operator of the Healthcare Identifiers Service (the HI Service) under the Healthcare Identifiers Service Act 2010. The HI Service is a foundation service for the My Health Record system.
2.3 This assessment focuses on the contact services provided by DHS to individuals on behalf of the My Health Record System Operator. As the contact services provider, DHS provides the infrastructure for registration and identity authentication, handles My Health Record-related enquiries, complaints and advice via phone, face-to-face, mail and online channels.
2.4 The Digital Health Branch of DHS is responsible for the management of these services. The OAIC’s assessment focused on practices, procedures and systems implemented by the Digital Health Branch to provide these services.
Roles of the Department of Human Services
Registered Repository Operator: provides MBS, PBS, organ donor and immunisation data to My Health Records. Role defined under the My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth)
Healthcare Identifiers Service Operator: manages healthcare identifier data for use in the My Health Record system. Role defined under the Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth)
Contact service provider: provides contact and incident management functions on behalf of the My Health Record System Operator. Role defined under the interim agreement with the System Operator.
Operated by the Australian Digital Health Agency
(My Health Record System Operator)
Shows scope of assessment
Overview of systems used by DHS to provide My Health Record contact services
2.5 The Digital Health Branch uses a number of different systems to provide the My Health Record contact services on behalf of the Agency.
2.6 These include the Customer Directory Maintenance System (CDMS) which is a system owned and operated by DHS, and which stores the Medicare and Individual Healthcare Identifier data.
2.7 The CDMS is used and accessed by DHS service officers that deal with a broad range of issues across DHS, such as general Medicare enquiries, as well as My Health Record issues that are dealt with by service officers with specialist My Health Record training (My Health Record service officers).[2] These My Health Record service officers can use the CDMS to access the My Health Record system for one purpose only – to create a new My Health Record for an individual.
2.8 The CDMS does not link directly to the My Health Record system. Additionally, Medicare data is stored in a separate Repository Administration System administered by DHS.
2.9 My Health Record service officers also use two other systems, which are owned and managed by the Agency, to undertake their contact services. These are the Customer Relationship Management (CRM) tool which is used to record details of individuals’ feedback, enquiries or complaints in relation to the My Health Record system, and the Admin Portal which is used to document and respond to post-registration inquiries, such as cancelling an individual’s My Health Record. The Admin Portal provides direct access to an individual’s My Health Record, however service officers cannot access any clinical information in an individual’s My Health Record.
2.10 DHS is required to submit a request to the Agency to authorise DHS service officers to access the CRM and Admin portal.
2.11 In addition to the CDMS, CRM and Admin Portal, DHS also uses an incident management system (IMS) that allows the Digital Health Branch, the Agency and the National Infrastructure Operator[3] to collaborate on the management of incidents relating to the My Health Record system. In order for service officers to access the IMS, the Digital Health Branch must submit a request to the Agency to authorise relevant DHS staff to use and access the system. The Agency manages this access.
2.12 DHS staff also use DHS’s document management system (DMS) local shared drives, email and DHS’s intranet to store information, communicate with colleagues and access internal policies and procedures.
2.13 The diagram below depicts the various systems that DHS uses to provide contact services under the interim agreement, as well as the related systems used to store relevant information.
Repository Administration System
DHS Document Management System
Customer Directory Maintenance System
Portal to the My Health Record System
DHS controlled systems
Access controls on DHS staff considered in this assessment
Part 3: Privacy analysis
3.1 The OAIC’s Privacy management framework: enabling compliance and encouraging good practice[4] provides guidance and steps the OAIC expects agencies and organisations to take to meet their ongoing compliance obligations under APP 1.2. The privacy analysis in this section of the report considers the way in which DHS implements these steps when handling personal information in the course of providing My Health Record contact services.
3.2 In addition, the analysis in this section has regard to the OAIC’s APP Guidelines[5] which outline the mandatory requirements of the APPs, how the OAIC will interpret the APPs and matters the OAIC may take in to account when exercising functions and powers under the Privacy Act. Our approach also considered the broader legislative environment created by the My Health Records Act, where appropriate.
Privacy protective practices
3.3 DHS appears to have a good privacy culture. Based on the OAIC’s review of documents and interviews with DHS staff, there is a general awareness of privacy and security issues and a good general understanding of the importance of appropriate information handling practices.
3.4 The OAIC observed a positive culture of privacy awareness within the Digital Health Branch. The team members interviewed during the assessment demonstrated a sound understanding of the Branch’s processes and the privacy implications of their work.
3.5 The OAIC noted that there was frequent interaction and collaboration between teams within the Digital Health Branch, as well as between the Digital Health Branch and the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch.
3.6 The OAIC observed a good level of collaboration between teams responsible for the operational aspects of delivering My Health Record contact services, and teams responsible for policy and legislative work. Service officers in the Digital Health Operations team frequently meet and discuss issues with the Legislation and Project Support team.
3.7 In addition, all new service officers from the Digital Health Operations team spend a day with the Legislation and Project Support team to gain an understanding of the legislative and policy requirements of the My Health Record system.
3.8 While teams and branches at DHS collaborate well internally, there also appeared to be good governance arrangements in place between DHS and the Agency. DHS staff frequently meet with and discuss issues over the phone with staff at the Agency. In addition, DHS’s National Manager (who oversees the work of the Digital Health Branch) holds weekly meetings with their counterpart at the Agency.
3.9 The data integrity team within the Digital Health Branch is responsible for taking corrective action on affected My Health Records where intertwined[6] Medicare records exist. They also respond to any My Health Record-related data breaches. The creation of this specialist team highlights the priority given to data integrity. The OAIC considers the development of this dedicated team to be a good step in ensuring that data integrity is a high priority for DHS and that data integrity issues are efficiently and effectively responded to by staff that have particularly expertise in that area.
3.10 All staff at DHS are required to undertake mandatory privacy and fraud awareness training upon commencement of employment. Each year all DHS staff are also required to complete refresher training on privacy and fraud.
3.11 DHS staff who act as My Health Record service officers are also required to complete training modules specifically on the My Health Record system. These modules detail the steps service officers must take to perform certain functions, and also explain the legislative provisions that protect personal information in the My Health Record system.
3.12 During the fieldwork component of the assessment, the OAIC observed a number of DHS’ training modules, including the privacy training undertaken by all DHS staff and the My Health Record-specific training.
3.13 The training modules clearly and comprehensively explain the privacy implications related to the core work that DHS staff carry out. The modules were engaging and interactive, and had the same ‘look and feel’ as other DHS training modules.
3.14 The OAIC considers the training modules – including the mandatory privacy and fraud yearly refresher training – to be comprehensive and a good step in ensuring that staff are aware of their privacy obligations.
Privacy Threshold Assessment process
3.15 DHS’s Operational Privacy Policy requires DHS staff to undertake a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) for all new projects and for any other activities, which involve changes to the way DHS manages (i.e. collects, discloses, stores or uses) any personal information.
3.16 If the outcome of the PTA is that the project or activity involves a significant change to DHS’ management of personal information, or might have a significant impact on the privacy of individuals, then a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is required unless otherwise authorised by the Secretary or a Deputy Secretary of DHS. Significant matters that do not require a PIA may require a privacy assurance provided by the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch.
3.17 PTAs are generally undertaken to determine, early in a project, whether it is necessary to conduct a PIA or for further assurance to be provided by the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch in relation to new or changed procedures.
3.18 The Programme Advice and Privacy Branch has implemented a process for DHS staff to undertake PTAs, with information and guidance on how to complete a PTA available on DHS’s intranet. The Programme Advice and Privacy Branch also provides support or assistance where required to complete the assessment.
3.19 The OAIC understands that PTAs (including those related to the My Health Record system) are conducted by individual branches and then reviewed by a central project team that is part of the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch.
3.20 The OAIC considers the elevation of PTAs to the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch a good practice as it creates a cross-branch oversight mechanism. Additionally, it helps ensure that the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch can proactively provide guidance on the potential privacy impacts of new projects.
3.21 The level of detail included in DHS’s Operational Privacy Policy provides clarity and certainty about the PTA process required to be undertaken by staff. Additionally, the elevation of approvals for not conducting a PIA to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary level suggests that PIAs are considered an intrinsic part of projects and activities that handle personal information.
3.22 Where the change relates to the My Health Record system as a whole (and not a specific DHS component), the Agency is responsible for commissioning a PIA, as relevant.
3.23 The OAIC reviewed a number of detailed policies and procedures developed by the Digital Health Branch to assist staff to provide the contact services and to respond to unplanned incidents. These included privacy incident process documents and a risk management plan, identity verification processes and dealing with enquiries to access and correct personal information and complaints made by individuals.
3.24 In developing policies and procedures – such as those related to incident and risk management – the Digital Health Branch noted that it considers how the policies and procedures fit within the broader DHS Privacy Management Framework. This helps to ensure that the management of personal information remains a central consideration when developing relevant policies and procedures. It also facilitates an integrated approach to privacy management across DHS.
3.25 Policy and procedure documents are reviewed regularly, at least once a year, usually as part of a continual improvement process. More significant re-writes are conducted if there has been a significant change to the process or if the Agency requests a change.
3.26 Service officers can provide feedback on policies and procedures through an online feedback process.
3.27 The Digital Health Branch’s risk management plan is reviewed and updated on a quarterly basis, or on a more ad hoc basis if issues arise in between the quarterly reviews. In reviewing the risk management plan, input from internal stakeholders, such as the CIO Group and the Programme Advice and Privacy Branch, is often sought. The Directors of each section within the Digital Health Branch are then responsible for disseminating the plan to staff within their sections.
3.28 The Digital Health Branch’s privacy incident management processes demonstrate a holistic approach to responding to and addressing privacy incidents as relevant branches and teams within DHS are consulted when responding to incidents. The circumstances in which they are consulted are clearly set out in the document, ‘My Health Record – Privacy Incident Process’ and in the related process map.
3.29 DHS provided the OAIC with a Security Risk Management Plan, Part A (dated November 2016) and a Security Risk Management Plan, Part B (dated March 2017) (together, the risk management documents) during the fieldwork. The risk management documents set out the results of a threat and risk assessment and a consequential risk treatment plan relating to the My Health Record system. The risk management documents set out four risks and proposed treatments that on their face seem appropriate. These documents also noted that the generally accepted level of IT risk is considered to be low. All treatments identified were designed to maintain or reach that level.
3.30 The OAIC sought access to DHS’ overarching information security management plan (or equivalent) during the assessment. The OAIC was informed in September 2017 that while DHS does not have a departmental wide information security management plan or equivalent documentation, it has an Information Security Management Framework (ISMF) with a range of linked information security policies, standards and directives (together, the information security policy documents).
3.31 At the same time, DHS informed the OAIC that information security management is analysed and documented at the system level, consistent with the information security policy documents and that the documents relevant to the assessment were the risk management documents.
3.32 The information security policy documents were not provided to the OAIC during the assessment. As a result the OAIC cannot comment on the appropriateness of the information security policy documents from a privacy perspective, in particular from the perspective of APP 1.2.
3.33 As outlined above, the Digital Health Branch uses a number of different IT systems to provide My Health Record contact services on behalf of the My Health Record System Operator.
DHS operated systems
3.34 Access to DHS operated systems are set by DHS. Passwords to access these systems must be changed by the users every three months.
3.35 Access controls on the CDMS limit access to information only to service officers with a need to know that information. Managers are responsible for approving access to the CDMS and other DHS controlled systems to each of their staff individually; the level of access is determined by the service officer’s duties.
3.36 The OAIC understands that DHS conducts regular audits and monitors its own systems, such as the Customer Directory Maintenance System (CDMS) for unauthorised or anomalous access.
3.37 The access control policy governing these processes was not made available to the assessors during their fieldwork. Whilst the access controls observed by the assessors in the fieldwork appeared appropriate, OAIC was not able to review the overarching policy against the processes described by DHS staff.
3.38 DHS staff used shared drives and an internal document management system (DMS) to store information. Access to these drives and to the DMS is limited to those staff who need to know to perform their duties. For example, access to the shared drive used by the policy team is limited to members of that team. There are some potential improvements to these processes which are discussed in Part 4.
Non DHS operated systems
3.39 As noted in paragraphs 2.7 and following above, access to the Admin Portal, CRM and IMS is managed through the Agency following a request by DHS. DHS notifies the Agency of the identity of its staff that require access to those systems and the Agency manages that access. DHS cannot audit its staff’s use of those systems.
3.40 The OAIC was informed that there is no segregation of access by its staff to the CRM and Admin Portal based on role or authority. There is segregation within the IMS – staff access is limited to those areas that DHS has nominated its staff have access to. Access to these systems is reviewed every six months. There are some potential improvements to these processes which are discussed in Part 4.
3.41 The auditing arrangements used in those systems are not managed by DHS and therefore could not be further assessed by the OAIC under this assessment.
3.42 While DHS is not able to apply access controls to the systems that are operated by the Agency, the Digital Health Branch has taken proactive steps to implement some level of mitigation in the Admin Portal.
3.43 Authorised service officers use the Admin Portal to process complex registrations. The service officers that respond to My Health Record registrations, enquiries and complaints are separated into different tiers of authority: Tiers 1, 2 and 3. The interim agreement specifies the tasks that each tier is responsible for carrying out, with the more complex cases being escalated to Tier 3.
3.44 In order to mitigate the risk that a Tier 1 or Tier 2 service officer will attempt to perform a task which they are not trained to, or do not have authority to, perform, the Digital Health Branch does not publish documents on its intranet relating to the processes only undertaken by Tier 3 service officers on the Admin Portal.
3.45 In addition, when a Tier 3 function is about to be performed, a warning sign will appear on the screen informing the service officer that they are about to perform a Tier 3 function and to not proceed unless they are a Tier 3 service officer.
3.46 The Digital Health Branch’s Data Breach Response Plan sets out procedures and lines of authority for DHS staff in the event that DHS becomes aware of a data breach.
3.47 The Data Breach Response Plan explains the requirements of section 75 of the My Health Records Act, which sets out how participants in the My Health Record system are to address and respond to a My Health Record data breach. The OAIC suggests that the section 75 requirements be mentioned earlier in the document to help ensure that readers of the document immediately understand the legislative underpinnings of the Data Breach Response Plan.
3.48 In addition, the OAIC considers that the clarity of the Data Breach Response Plan could be improved by:
explaining in the document how it interacts with the incident response processes that have been developed by the Digital Health Branch
incorporating or referencing the process diagrams that accurately reflect current work flows for handing specific types of section 75 data breaches, including interaction with the Agency, which were discussed separately with the OAIC in November 2016.
3.49 This will help ensure that staff have a good understanding of how the broader incident response processes interact with the specific data breach response process.
Part 4: Areas for improvement
4.1 Overall, the OAIC considers that the Digital Health branch would benefit from reviewing and updating its processes in four areas and has made one recommendation in relation to this below.
Information security management framework and access control policy
4.2 As noted above, the OAIC was not provided with copies of DHS’ access control policy or its information security policy documentation. As a result, the OAIC cannot comment on the appropriateness of the access control policy or the information security policy documents from a privacy perspective, in particular from the perspective of APP 1.2 or compare them against observations from its fieldwork.
4.3 The OAIC is considering how to bridge this gap, possibly by way of a follow-up or subsequent assessment of access control, and logging and monitoring policies.
Control of customer information plan
4.4 The OAIC was provided with a document that the Digital Health Branch developed to provide staff with guidance on storing customer information outside of core systems. This was referred to as the ‘control of customer information plan’.
4.5 During discussions with the staff from the Digital Health Branch, it became apparent that different sections within the Branch have different processes for the storage of information outside of core systems. While it appeared that each section was aware of where their section stored information outside of core systems and how the information was protected, there was no branch-wide register of where information was stored outside of non-core systems. There is a risk that non‑conformance with the plan may arise by human error.
4.6 The OAIC recommends including a register in the control of customer information plan document that outlines where each team within the Digital Health Branch stores personal information outside of core systems to ensure oversight of the storage of information.
4.7 In addition, the OAIC considers that a number of other amendments could be made to the control of customer information plan to improve the clarity and usefulness of the document. These include:
simplifying the language to make the document more user-friendly
providing further examples of data breaches under section 75 of the My Health Records Act (currently the plan only refers to intertwined Medicare records as an example of a My Health record data breach)
updating the reference to Information Privacy Principle 11.1(d) to refer to the relevant Australian Privacy Principle
referring to the Privacy Act 1988 where relevant to ensure staff are aware that the control of customer information plan is underpinned by legislative obligations to protect personal information from unauthorised collection, use and disclosure.
Informing the Agency of staff access to CRM, Admin Portal and the IMS
4.8 As noted in paragraphs 2.7 and following above, in order to register individuals and respond to their enquiries about the My Health Record system, service officers need to access the Admin Portal and the CRM and certain staff require access to the IMS.
4.9 The interim agreement between DHS and the Agency includes a requirement to conduct a biannual review of licences to CRM and the Admin Portal to ensure service officers who have previously been allocated licences to perform My Health Record work still require one.
4.10 The OAIC considers the inclusion of this requirement in the interim agreement to be a good step in ensuring that only individuals with a need can access personal information in the Admin Portal and the CRM.
4.11 As the review of licences is only conducted biannually, the OAIC was informed that, as soon as a staff member leaves the team and no longer requires access to CRM, the Admin Portal and the IMS, managers proactively inform the Agency that the licences of those staff members need to be revoked and their access to the IMS be removed. This process ensures that access is revoked as soon as staff members no longer require access, rather than after a review is conducted every six months.
4.12 The OAIC recommends that this informal process of informing the Agency as soon as staff members no longer require access to CRM, the Admin Portal and IMS is formalised in a Digital Health Branch document. This will help further ensure that there is a clearer process for the Agency to be informed that DHS staff members no longer require access to the incident management system.
4.13 DHS’ My Health Record fraud control plan formalises the fraud control arrangements for the aspects of the My Health Record programme that DHS is operationally and technically responsible for. The plan provides a summary of My Health Record fraud risks and identifies key controls in place to manage My Health Record fraud risks.
4.14 While fraud will often involve the unauthorised collection, use or disclosure of personal information, other instances of mishandling personal information will not necessarily be cases of fraud.
4.15 For example, the deliberate creation, manipulation or disclosure of personal information by an individual for the purposes of personal financial gain is likely to be a case of fraud as well as a case of mishandling an individual’s personal information. However, disclosing sensitive information to another person, for example, in and of itself may not be a case of fraud but is likely to be a case of mishandling personal information.
4.16 The DHS My Health Record fraud control plan, however, does not draw this distinction and it is unclear whether a number of risks identified are directly fraud-related or whether they are in fact mishandling of personal information and unrelated to fraud. The plan’s focus on privacy management is therefore not as prominent or as clearly defined as it should be, giving rise to a risk that privacy issues may be overlooked.
4.17 The OAIC recommends clarifying in the fraud control plan what activities and subsequent mitigation strategies relate to fraud and which relate to other instances of mishandling personal information.
The Digital Health Branch:
reviews and updates its control of customer information plan, in particular to include a register of where information is stored outside of core systems
documents its informal process of notifying the Agency of staff movements relevant to access to the Admin Portal, CRM and IMS
reviews and updates its My Health Record fraud control plan, including reference to the mishandling of personal information as a separate and distinct activity to fraud.
Part 5: Recommendation and DHS’ response
5.1 The Digital Health Branch:
5.2 The Department of Human Services is committed to proactively protecting all personal information held and has strict controls and policies in place for accessing and disclosing personal information.
The assessment was conducted professionally and it provided the opportunity for the Digital Health Branch to have its My Health Record procedures, training materials and policy documents reviewed by the OAIC.
Due to misinterpretation of the information requested by the OAIC, DHS did not provide its access control policy and information security policy documentation to the OAIC during this assessment. DHS will ensure that these policy documents be available to the OAIC at its follow-up assessment.
DHS supports the findings and agrees to implement the recommendations made under section 5.1 of this report.
Appendix A – Privacy Risk Guidance
[1] https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/our-regulatory-approach/guide-to-privacy-regulatory-action/
[2] The service officers used in Digital Health operations are responsible for responding to enquiries, complaints and registration requests from individuals and healthcare providers. They are separated into tiers 1, 2 and 3. Each tier performs different types of work and responds to different types of requests from individuals and healthcare providers. The specific types of work that each tier is allocated to is set out in the delegation instrument between DHS and the Agency. Tiers 1 and 2 service officers also perform Medicare-related work, whilst the tier 3 service officers perform only My Health Record system work.
[3] The Agency has contracted a private company, Accenture Australia Holdings Pty Ltd, to act as the National Infrastructure Operator of the My Health Record system. The National Infrastructure Operator is responsible for providing and managing the My Health Record system on behalf of the Agency.
[4] https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/privacy-management-framework
[5] https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/
[6] An intertwined record is defined as a single Medicare enrolment record that has been used interchangeably between two or more individuals. If an individual’s Medicare record has been used interchangeably and that individual also has a My Health Record registration and has given consent to display Medicare data in their My Health Record, claiming data from the second individual’s Medicare record could be included in the first individual’s My Health Record.