Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102568/brady-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-09-21 14:34:55
Document Index: 5630205

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 1201', '§ 2255', '§ 1201', '§ 1201']

Brady Vs United States - Citation 102568 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Brady Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/102568
Decided On May-04-1970
Case Number 397 U.S. 742
Appellant Brady
brady v. united states - 397 u.s. 742 (1970) u.s. supreme court brady v. united states, 397 u.s. 742 (1970) brady v. united states no. 270 argued november 18, 1969 decided may 4, 1970 397 u.s. 742 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit syllabus petitioner was indicted in 1959 for kidnaping and not liberating the victim unharmed in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1201(a), which imposed a maximum penalty of death if the jury's verdict so recommended. upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed, would plead guilty and testify against him, petitioner changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. the trial judge accepted the plea after twice questioning petitioner (who was represented.....
Brady v. United States - 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
U.S. Supreme Court Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
Held: On the record in this case, there is no basis for disturbing the judgment of the courts below that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary. Pp. 397 U. S. 745 -758.
(a) Though United States v. Jackson, supra, prohibits imposition of the death penalty under § 1201(a), it does not hold that all guilty pleas encouraged by the fear of possible death are involuntary, nor does it invalidate such pleas, whether involuntary or not. Pp. 397 U. S. 745 -748.
(b) A plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of the death penalty, and here, petitioner's plea of guilty met the standard of voluntariness, as it was made "by one fully aware of the direct consequences" of that plea. Pp. 397 U. S. 749 -755.
(c) Petitioner's plea, made after advice by competent counsel, was intelligently made, and the fact that petitioner did not anticipate United States v. Jackson, supra, does not impugn the truth or reliability of that plea. Pp. 397 U. S. 756 -758.
In 1959, petitioner was charged with kidnaping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). [ Footnote 1 ] Since the indictment charged that the victim of the kidnaping was not liberated unharmed, petitioner faced a maximum penalty of death if the verdict of the jury should so recommend. Petitioner, represented by competent counsel throughout, first elected to plead not guilty. Apparently because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury, petitioner made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial. Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, petitioner changed his plea to guilty. His plea was accepted after the trial judge twice questioned him as to the voluntariness of his plea. [ Footnote 2 ]
In 1967, petitioner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because § 1201(a) operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. It was also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. [ Footnote 3 ]
the statute unconstitutional because it permitted imposition of the death sentence only upon a jury's recommendation, and thereby made the risk of death the price of a jury trial. This Court held the statute valid, except for the death penalty provision; with respect to the latter, the Court agreed with the trial court "that the death penalty provision . . . imposes an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right. . . ." 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 572 . The problem was to determine
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 581 . The inevitable effect of the provision was said to be to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. Because the legitimate goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it could be achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and elect a jury trial, the death penalty provision "needlessly penalize[d] the assertion of a constitutional right," 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 583 , and was therefore unconstitutional.
390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 583 . Cited in support of this statement, 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 583 n. 25, was Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F.Supp. 581 (D.C. N.J.1967), where a plea of guilty ( non vult ) under a similar statute was sustained as voluntary in spite of the fact, as found by the District Court, that the defendant was greatly upset by the possibility of receiving the death penalty.
"[T]hat jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected" was no ground for automatically rejecting all guilty pleas under the statute, for such a rule "would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility." 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 584 .
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not. Jackson prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under § 1201(a), but that decision neither fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if both "voluntary" and "intelligent." See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 , 395 U. S. 242 (1969). [ Footnote 4 ]
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment has long been recognized. Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the act charged in the indictment. He thus stands as a witness against himself, and he is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so -- hence the minimum requirement that his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice. [ Footnote 5 ] But the plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial -- a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [ Footnote 6 ] On neither score was Brady's plea of guilty invalid.
The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 , 373 U. S. 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 , 347 U. S. 558 (1954). One of these circumstances was the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict after a trial. It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty, and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment, rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty. [ Footnote 7 ] But
Insofar as the voluntariness of his plea is concerned, there is little to differentiate Brady from (1) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and jury have the same range of sentencing power, who pleads guilty because his lawyer advises him that the judge will very probably be more lenient than the jury; (2) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge alone has sentencing power, who is advised by counsel that the judge is normally more lenient with defendants who plead guilty than with those who go to trial; (3) the defendant who is permitted by prosecutor and judge to plead guilty to a lesser offense included in the offense charged, and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty to certain counts with the understanding that other charges will be dropped. In each of these situations, [ Footnote 8 ] as in Brady's case, the defendant might never plead guilty absent the possibility or certainty that the plea will result in a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty. We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal law characteristically extends to judge or jury a range of choice in setting the sentence in individual cases, and because both the State and the defendant often find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of the maximum penalty authorized by law. For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious -- his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State, there are also advantages -- the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment, and, with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. [ Footnote 9 ] It is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that, at present, well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, [ Footnote 10 ] a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury.
168 U.S. at 168 U. S. 542 -543. More recently, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), carried forward the Bram definition of compulsion in the course of holding applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. [ Footnote 11 ]
Bram is not inconsistent with our holding that Brady's plea was not compelled even though the law promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did not go to trial. Bram dealt with a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances, even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to inducement, and the possible impact on them too great, to ignore and too difficult to assess. But Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel, any more than Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), held that the possibly coercive atmosphere of the police station could not be counteracted by the presence of counsel or other safeguards. [ Footnote 12 ]
"'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are, by their nature, improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business ( e.g., bribes).' 242 F.2d at page 115. [ Footnote 13 ]"
Under this standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty. [ Footnote 14 ]
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, while adhering to his belief that United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 , was wrongly decided, concurs in the judgment and in substantially all of the opinion in this case.
[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result, see post, p. 397 U. S. 799 .]
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487 , 368 U. S. 493 (1962); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 , 316 U. S. 104 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 , 312 U. S. 286 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220 , 274 U. S. 223 (1927).
See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 , 317 U. S. 275 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 304 U. S. 464 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 , 281 U. S. 312 (1930).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 , 378 U. S. 7 (1964). See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 , 373 U. S. 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528 (1963); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 , 162 U. S. 622 -623 (1896).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 384 U. S. 466 (1966).