Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201601/?pg=47
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 07:15:05
Document Index: 475344061

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§\n13', '§ 13', '§ 13', '§ 5', '§ 5']

While A.R.S. § 13-1407(E) provides a defense that may be raised by a defendant in a child sexual molestation/abuse case as to a lack of sexual motivation, it is not an affirmative defense, whereby, if during such a prosecution a defendant satisfies the burden of production to raise the defense, then the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was motivated by a sexual interest. State v. Holle, 2 CA-CR 2014-0268, 9/16/2015.
A trial court does not err by denying a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence under Miranda in a case in which no actual custodial interrogation occurred prior to incriminating admissions being made where the defendant, who was homeless and found at the scene of a possible burglary being investigated, was merely asked to wait for police to allow them to conclude his interview by sitting on the curb next to the subject building while police spoke to the owner of the building who had just arrived about a broken window, prompting the defendant, who was sitting next to the window when police arrived, to subsequently confess to his involvement in the burglary. While the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Seibert and Elstad preclude admissions made during a two-step interrogation process (i.e., deliberate improper interrogation by police of suspect without Miranda leading to admissions later confirmed after Miranda warnings given prior to second part of questioning), where there is no initial coerced (custodial) interrogation, there is no violation of Seibert/ Elstad principles. In dissent, Judge Swann noted that although the United States Supreme Court in Morse has “explicitly excluded general on-the-scene questioning for the purpose of investigating a crime from its definition of ‘custodial interrogation’”, the defendant in this case was asked to sit on the curb and wait while supervised by another officer after previously being asked to sit in the back of the police car during initial questioning which facts are inherently inconsistent with a reasonable freedom of movement. State v. Maciel, 1 CA-CR14-0243, 9/10/15.*
In a case that largely focused on the disputed question of who was the actual “road rage” aggressor in which there was reasonable evidence presented at trial of “road rage” conduct by the victim against the defendant and his family that included tailgating their vehicle followed by brandishing a firearm while at a traffic light and continuing with the victim chasing the defendant’s vehicle through at least two red lights, a trial court commits reversible error by denying a defendant’s requested jury instruction on the crime-preven-tion justification defense afforded by A.R.S. § 13-411. Section 13-411(A) provides that a person is justified in threatening deadly physical force if the person reasonably believes such force “ is immediately necessary” to prevent the other person from committing any one of several enumerated crimes, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 13-1204(A) ( 2). The effect of the crime prevention privilege is to allow a person to use force in preventing a crime, rather than compel him to await the commission of the unlawful act. In deciding the issue the appellate court noted that under the slightest evidence standard a trial court does not weigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in it; rather, the court merely decides whether the record provides evidence “upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense.” State v. Almeida, 2
CA-CR 2014-0267, 8/19/15.
A trial court does not err by
refusing to give an entrapment
jury instruction in a case where
the defendant would not admit
the substantive elements of the
narcotics sale offense, yet merely
relied on recorded statements he
made to undercover police officers
in which defendant basically told
the officer that he did not usually do
this. The elements of an entrapment
defense are codified in A.R.S. §
13-206, which provides in relevant
part that a defendant must “admit by
his testimony or other evidence the
substantial elements of the offense
charged.” A defendant’s “silence”
at trial against the State’s evidence
is not an admission to all elements
of the offense required by A.R.S.
§ 13-206 because the Arizona
Supreme Court has held that an
admission for entrapment defense
and jury instruction purposes “must
be made in some affirmative man-
ner and cannot be assumed from a
defendant’s silence.” State v. Gray, 2
CA-CR2014-0436, 8/13/15.
The use of a police dog to
sniff for drugs in a hotel hallway
at night following police having
recently pulled over the vehicle of
one of the hotel guests with a strong
odor of fresh marijuana emanating
from its back seat/trunk area to
which the police dog had alerted
yet without any additional evidence
or marijuana being present does
not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment when police had permission
from hotel management to con-
duct the sniff and it could not be
argued that the hallway consti-
tuted constitutionally protected
“curtilage” (as protected by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Jardines). Moreover, while under
A.R.S. § 13-3917 a search warrant
The Arizona Supreme Court accepted
review or jurisdiction of the follow-
ing issues on Oct. 27, 2015*:
State of Arizona v. Francisco L. Encinas Valenzuela, 2 CA-CR 14-0169; 237
Ariz. 307, 350 P.3d 811 (App. 2015);
Ariz. Supreme Court No. CR-15-
0222-PR
The Fourth Amendment prohibits
demanding that those placed under
arrest submit to a search for evidence
to be used against them in a criminal
trial. Here, the officer demanded Valenzuela submit to a search in-
voking “Arizona law” as authority. Valenzuela submitted to the law,
and the State used the fruits of the search against him in a criminal
trial. Did the officer violate Valenzuela’s Fourth amendment right?
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F./D.L., 1 CA-JV 15-0034; 2015 WL
4575956; Ariz. Supreme Court No. CV-15-0274-PR
• Granted on the following issues only:
Whether the record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, and whether the reasoning of the Jose M. case is persuasive and should apply in this case.
Jason S. Brown v. Hon. McClennen/State, 1 CA-SA 14-0257;
Order (no citation); Ariz. Supreme Court No. CV-15-0042-PR • Issues:
1. The Fourth Amendment requires the State to seize evidence voluntarily, free of coercion or duress, no matter how slight.
Arizona’s statute compels those arrested for boating under the influence to submit to a search using the phrase “Arizona law requires you to submit….” Does demanding a defendant submit to a search comport with the Fourth Amendment’s edict that all evidence be seized voluntarily?
2. The Fourth Amendment ensures every citizen the right to be secure in his “person”; thus, no State may compel anyone to submit to a search, especially when refusing to submit begets additional criminal sanctions. A.R.S. § 5-395(L) appears to criminalize refusing to submit to an officer’s request to search.
Does A.R.S. § 5-395(l) comport with the Fourth Amendment’s protections against coerced searches?
*Unless otherwise noted, the issues are taken verbatim from either the petition for review or the certified question.