Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20070430_0000324.WNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-25 19:20:21
Document Index: 207912544

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 1343', '§ 1341', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 2255']

| United States v. Bifulco
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,v.FRANK J. "BUTCHIE" BIFULCO, DEFENDANT.
Petitioner was convicted after jury trial on April 10, 2003, of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 371), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), and use of fire in commission of a federal felony (18 U.S.C. § 844(h)) for his role in the destruction of a vehicle in order to aid a third party in avoiding milage overage charges on her lease. On July 24, 2003, this Court sentenced the petitioner to the statutorily-mandated sentence of 120 months' incarceration on the § 844 count, and to ten months each on the remaining three counts to be served concurrently with one another, but (as required by § 844(h)) consecutively to the 120-month sentence imposed for the § 844 count.
Thus, petitioner's total sentence was 130 months.
In contrast to Mr. Albert's corroborated testimony, the petitioner offers only his uncorroborated testimony that he drove straight from the convenience store to the parking lot, saw the car on fire, asked Mr. Albert, "Are you crazy?", and instructed him to put out the fire. Thus, even if petitioner had testified, his testimony would have done little in overcoming the overwhelming evidence offered by the government at trial.
In sum, petitioner has failed to establish that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel.
B. Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
Petitioner also claims that he was not provided with effective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a supplemental brief or letter pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure notifying the Second Circuit of the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which was rendered by the Supreme Court while petitioner's appeal was pending. Petitioner objects to the admission of the testimony of Chalres Hargrove, a Home Depot employee, regarding a statement made by James Brooks, another Home Depot employee. The Court finds this argument without merit.
In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55, 68, the Supreme Court held that testimonial hearsay is barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant regarding the statement. Crawford is inapplicable to this case for two reasons. First, Crawford prohibits only testimonial hearsay, not all hearsay. Statements offered under the excited utterance or present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(2), which was the case here, are not considered testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006) (statements given to 911 operators which constitute excited utterances are not "testimonial hearsay"); United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682 (2006) (present-sense impression does not constitute hearsay). Second, Crawford only prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay when the defendant does not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Because the declarant (James Brooks) testified at trial, the petitioner had an opportunity to cross-examine him regarding the statement.
Petitioner further claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a supplemental brief or otherwise request that the Second Circuit remand his case for re-sentencing pursuant to United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d. Cir. 2005). He points to the Circuit Court's sua sponte statement that, "[w]hile Bifulco would be entitled to a Crosby remand had he asserted a Sixth Amendment Claim, he failed to do so in his briefs, nor has he provided this Court with a 28(j) letter." United States v. Bifulco, 127 Fed.Appx. at 551. This argument is unavailing.
Even had appellate counsel requested a Crosby remand and such a remand had been directed, it would not have changed the sentence imposed in this case. Petitioner's conviction for use of fire in commission of a federal crime (18 U.S.C. § 844(h)) was subject to a statutorily-mandated sentence of 120 months, and therefore could not have been the subject of a Crosby remand. In addition, because § 844(h) requires that the sentence on the § 844(h) violation run consecutive to the sentences imposed on the predicate felonies, that aspect of the sentence would also not have been subject to a Crosby remand. With regard to the concurrent 10-month sentences imposed on the other counts of conviction, the Court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether the United States Sentencing Guidelines had been advisory rather than mandatory.
For the reasons stated, the Court denies petitioner's § 2255 motion. The Clerk of Court shall take all steps necessary to close the case.