Source: https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/nord-stream-2-arbitration-notices-from-moscow/?replytocom=44511
Timestamp: 2020-08-08 12:08:03
Document Index: 695023402

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art 26', 'Art 36', 'Art 49', 'Art 49', 'Art 13', 'Art 10', 'Art 10', 'Art 67', 'Art 2', 'Art 26']

Nord Stream 2: Arbitration Notices from Moscow | Völkerrechtsblog
Fabian Simon Eichberger— 1 October, 2019
Sometimes the unimaginable becomes reality: Donald Trump, his Democrat counterparts, the European Parliament and the European Commission are all united – in their opposition against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The construction of this mega project, a gas pipeline from Russia to Germany that is to supplement the existing Nord Stream twin-pipeline in the Baltic Sea, has caused a stir on both sides of the Atlantic. Observers who thought that Nord Stream 2’s repercussions could not have gotten more dramatic after Richard Grenell, the US ambassador to Germany, sent threatening letters to companies involved in the project, were proven wrong last Thursday when Nord Stream 2 AG initiated investment arbitration proceedings against the European Union (‘EU’) under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (‘ECT’). Nord Stream 2 AG is a Swiss incorporated company, owned entirely by the Russian energy giant Gazprom, which is in turn majority-owned by Russia.
Luckily for legal scholars, Nord Stream 2 offers some unchartered territory in the area of investment dispute settlement and the cocktail of EU and investment law should make the mouth of any international lawyer water.
The Nord Stream 2 Controversy
Nord Stream 2 has put considerable strains on the EU and the transatlantic partnership alike since its construction was first publically envisaged in 2015. While Germany asserts that the pipeline is part of a bigger scheme to stabilize its energy supply, Nord Stream 2 AG emphasizes the potential economic benefits to be reaped by the EU as well as improved energy security. The project is also meant to shield European economies from disputes between Russia and Ukraine concerning the gas transit that have upset European policymakers in the past.
The US, itself a large exporter of gas, has unequivocally opposed the project on numerous occasions. President Trump labelled the pipeline ‘bad for NATO’ and claimed that ‘Germany is totally controlled by Russia’. Recently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a legislation aimed at imposing sanctions on involved companies, should they not pull out.
Eastern European countries have been some of the most vocal critics of the project. The then Polish defence minister Sikorski infamously compared the pipeline’s older sister project Nord Stream to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 back in 2006. Ukraine, whose transit business is likely to suffer from the new competition, voiced concerns to be bypassed. The transit revenues are important to its economy and alternatives to the classic route will make it more vulnerable to Russian pressure.
The European Commission is not a big fan of the new pipeline, either. It has long opposed Nord Stream 2 echoing critiques about the increase in Russia’s influence over the EU’s energy market.
Nonetheless, the project was advanced and is supposed to be completed by the end of 2019.
At the same time the European Commission, scrambling not to be side-lined, has tried to bring the pipeline project under the regulatory umbrella of the EU, notably the EU Gas Directive.
Importantly, among other things such as tariff regulation and third-party access, EU law requires pipeline owners to be separate from the pipeline operators within the ambit of its application. This is to ensure that companies other than the transmission system operators can access their network. In their sum, the requirements might sensibly hurt Nord Stream 2 AG’s interests.
However, in the past these rules were not considered applicable to offshore import pipelines connecting EU member states with third countries, as the directive was intended to regulate the internal market in the first place. This was confirmed by the legal services of the EU Council and the EU Commission. Precisely for this reason the EU directive in question was amended earlier this year following intense negotiations, to fill what the Commission called ‘a legal void’. Under the new legislation, the part of Nord Stream 2 located in German territorial waters generally falls within the scope of EU law.
Nord Stream 2 AG is quite unhappy about these developments and is now trying to challenge the measure via different avenues. In July the company brought a challenge against the amendment before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
At the heart of this action for annulment lies the claim that the recent amendment to the directive is discriminatory, disproportionate and constitutes a ‘lex Nord Stream 2’ mainly aimed at hampering the construction of the pipeline.
Simultaneously, Nord Stream 2 AG targeted the EU measure by means of investment arbitration proceedings under the ECT. Both Switzerland and the EU are members to the ECT, the purpose of which was to integrate the energy sectors of the EU and ex-Soviet and Eastern European States in the aftermath of the Cold War. One element of the complex treaty framework are rules on the settlement of investment disputes.
That Nord Stream 2 AG is a Swiss company appears quite convenient for Russia, which never ratified the ECT. In the Yukos Saga, the Russian Federation emphatically opposed the provisional application of the dispute settlement provisions of the ECT. Now Gazprom’s subsidiary is using just these dispute settlement mechanisms.
Under Art 26(1) and (2) ECT investors have to seek amicable settlement before initiating arbitration proceedings for at least three months. In a letter dated 12 April 2019 Nord Stream 2 AG set a deadline for the EU that lapsed on 12 July 2019 after talks with the Commission could not resolve the dispute. On 26 September 2019, the company filed a notice for arbitration, with the applicable arbitration rules and the seat of arbitration remaining unknown as of now.
While the content of its submissions is not public yet, Nord Stream 2 AG seems to base its claim on violations of the protection from unreasonable and discriminatory measures under Article 10(1) ECT. Following a similar line of argument as before the CJEU, the investor mainly claims, in a document drafted for the negotiations with the Commission, that it is being treated unreasonably and discriminatorily by not being given the opportunity to apply for a derogation under the directive. According to this view, Art 36 of the Gas Directive allows for derogations if the investment risk has not been undertaken yet, whereas Art 49a does the same if the risk has been undertaken, as is the case for Nord Stream 2. However, Art 49a excludes projects from its scope that were not completed before 23 May 2019. Nord Stream 2 AG argues that this purposefully prevents Nord Stream 2 from benefitting from a derogation and therefore constitutes an unlawful discriminatory measure.
Indeed, it may prove a challenge for the EU to convince a tribunal that the amendment to the directive was not meant to single out the Nord Stream 2 project and that the amendments reflect its stated objectives.
Other claims, such as an alleged violation of Art 13 ECT governing expropriations, seem more far-fetched. However, if a tribunal should find a violation of Art 10(1) ECT because of the alleged discrimination it appears likely that Art 10(7) ECT, enshrining the national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligations, would also be considered violated.
Apart from its political importance, this arbitration is of interest because it is the first investment arbitration proceeding under the ECT against the EU itself. This comes at a time when the EU has increasingly tried to position itself as a leading power in both, the reform of the ECT and international investment law in general. Especially those who consider investors’ rights to be too wide-ranging are likely to consider this new milestone as further proof of the need to act.
At this point it is extremely difficult to predict how the next chapter of the Nord Stream 2 drama will unfold. However, one thing appears likely: After Angela Merkel admitted that the Nord Stream 2 project is not only an economic issue but also a political one, we seem to be only at the beginning of a legal saga coming centre stage.
Fabian Simon Eichberger is a Research Fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, and specializes in International Dispute Settlement and International Economic Law. He is a member of the editorial team of Völkerrechtsblog.
Cite as: Fabian Simon Eichberger, “Nord Stream 2: Arbitration Notices from Moscow”, Völkerrechtsblog, 1 October 2019, doi: 10.17176/20191001-112347-0.
Tags:Energy Charter Treaty,EU,Investor-State Arbitration
Duchy du Loi
2 October, 2019 at 14:19	— Reply
Fabian, the directive is a Council and Parliament act. The Commission merely drafts the proposal, but it is those two institutions that decide on the final text. Hence, not sure how you read, from a legal act adopted by the two legislative institutions of the Union after months of discussion, that the executive institution in charge of preparing a first draft is opposed to Nord Stream 2.
Fabian Eichberger
4 October, 2019 at 12:59	— Reply
Dear Duchy Du Loi,
Many thanks for your comment. You’re right that from the fact alone that the Commission proposed the amendment one cannot necessarily draw conclusions as to its stance.
However, in its Q&A on the proposal from 2017 (https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-4422_en.htm) it says that „[t]he Commission position on Nord Stream 2 is well known. […] With the existing well-developed import infrastructures and the expected competitiveness of LNG supplies after 2020, the Commission sees no need for new infrastructure of the magnitude of Nord Stream 2.“
More recently, in an answer to a parliamentary question on the Commission’s position on Nord Stream 2, dated 24 September 2018 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-004084-ASW_EN.html), the Commission „[c]onsiders that Nord Stream 2 does not contribute to the EU’s energy policy objectives such as energy security or diversification of supplies and for that reason does not support its construction. However, the Commission is not in a position to prohibit the construction of individual infrastructure projects.“
Therefore, I think one can confidently say that the Commission opposes Nord Stream 2.
7 October, 2019 at 22:04	— Reply
Thanks, Fabian. We both know that you take the first quote out of context (the “no need for new infrastructure” referring to capacity need rather than economic need), but the second one is pretty unequivocal; I readily grant you that. Good luck with your continued research!
8 October, 2019 at 23:36	— Reply
1. Is it publicly known if ICSID arbitration is intended? Is it possible to
2. ECT‘s applicability within the EU is – since Achmea – still questionable until the ECJ‘s decision in a pending proceeding. As enforceability against the EU would then (potentially) not possible in the EU: How to enforce an arbitral award against the EU outside of the EU? The actual enforceability is what this will come down to.
10 October, 2019 at 11:03	— Reply
it is still unknown what rules were chosen for the arbitration. However, as the EU is no state neither ICSID arbitration (see Art 67 ICSID Convention) nor arbitration under ICSID Additional Facility rules (Art 2 ICSID AF Rules) is possible. Accordingly, the arbitration will take place either under UNCITRAL Rules or under SCC Rules according to Art 26(4) ECT.
As to Achmea, you are right that the exact consequences of the decision for ECT proceedings, even if they involve an investor from a non-EU state such as Switzerland, are not entirely clear. This may be what prompted the Nord Stream 2 AG to select a seat of arbitration outside the EU, albeit the state remains unknown as of now (https://www.iareporter.com/articles/russian-backed-project-investor-nord-stream-2-files-arbitration-against-european-union-under-the-energy-charter-treaty/ (paywall)).
The enforcement of arbitral awards against the EU is quite a complex and interesting topic that I am currently also working on. To begin with, it should be said that the EU will most likely just comply with an award and pay out. However, if an award were rendered against the EU and the EU would prove unwilling to comply, most likely the New York Convention would apply to the enforcement. In a second step the privileges and immunities of the EU in the state where enforcement is sought would become relevant. For example, in countries where an EU Delegation has been established, there are usually special agreements in place between the EU and the host state regulating the Delegation’s immunities.
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