Source: https://openjurist.org/195/f3d/42/cyprus-emerald-resources-corporation-v-federal-mine-safety-and-health-review-commission-and-secretar
Timestamp: 2019-01-16 09:02:43
Document Index: 87379326

Matched Legal Cases: ['art:\n30', '§ 814', '§ 814', '§ 50', '§ 817', '§ 77', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 814', '§ 814', '§ 814', '§ 814', '§ 814', '§ 104', '§ 814', '§ 104']

195 F3d 42 Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Secretary of Labor | OpenJurist
195 F. 3d 42 - Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Secretary of Labor
195 F3d 42 Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and Secretary of Labor
195 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
Cyprus Emerald Resources Corporation, Petitioner
Nos. 98-1442 and 98-1548
Decided November 5, 1999
Section 104(d)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Act) provides in part:
30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Designation of a violation as "significant and substantial" under section 104(d)(1) can have significant consequences to a mine operator. See 30 U.S.C. § 814(d), (e).1 RAG Emerald Resources Corp. (Emerald), formerly known as Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., petitions for review of a Federal Mine Safety Health Review Commission (FMSHRC, Commission) decision upholding a finding that Emerald's violation of 30 C.F.R. § 50.11(b) (50.11(b)) was "significant and substantial." Secretary of Labor v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. 790 (1998). Emerald had challenged the finding on the ground that the plain language of section 104(d)(1) precludes designation of the 50.11(b) violation as "significant and substantial" because 50.11(b) is not "a mandatory health or safety standard" as section 104(d)(1) requires.2 The Commission determined that the statute is ambiguous on the subject and that the Commission could therefore reasonably construe the statutory language to permit such a finding. The Commission was wrong. Section 104(d) unambiguously authorizes a "significant and substantial" finding for violation only of a mandatory health or safety standard. We therefore hold that a "significant and substantial" finding is permissible in a citation charging violation of a mandatory safety or health standard only3 and, accordingly, grant Emerald's petition for review.
Emerald operates a coal mine and processing plant in Greene County, Pennsylvania. Refuse from the plant is ordinarily used to build up a nearby impoundment embankment pursuant to a disposal plan approved by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (FMSHA) in 1983. When road or weather conditions prevent hauling refuse to the impoundment, Emerald takes it to a "short-haul" area closer to the processing plant. On April 2, 1993 FMSHA received a complaint that part of a short-haul refuse pile had collapsed and slipped into a "slurry pond."4 An FMSHA inspector issued an "imminent danger" withdrawal order pursuant to section 107(a) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 817(a),5 and upon a subsequent inspection issued three citations charging "significant and substantial" and "unwarrantable" violations of mandatory safety standards (30 C.F.R. §§ 77.215(f), 77.215(h) and 77.1608(b)) under section 104(d)(1) for improperly construct-ing and using vehicles in the refuse pile. During his investigation, the inspector learned of a previous refuse pile collapse on December 27, 1992, for which the inspector also issued citations alleging "significant and substantial" and "unwarrantable" violations of the same standards. In addition, he issued citations for violating two additional regulations that are not mandatory standards: 30 C.F.R. § 50.10, for failing to notify FMSHA of the earlier collapse, and 30 U.S.C. § 50.11(b), for failing to investigate the collapse. The inspector designated the 50.11(b) violation as "significant and substantial."
30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1) (emphasis added). If in drafting this provision " 'Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' " we "must give effect to Congress's 'unambiguously expressed intent.' " Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC, 111 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). "If 'the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' we ask whether the agency's position rests on a 'permissible construction of the statute.' "Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). We conclude, as Emerald has maintained from the start, that the highlighted portion of the quoted sentence plainly and unequivocally conditions a "significant and substantial" finding (as well as an "unwarrantable" one) upon an initial finding "that there has been a violation of [a] mandatory health or safety standard." As the two dissenting Commissioners observed, "The language of the Act is inescapable on this point." 20 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 826-27 n.1. We therefore hold that the statute does not authorize the FMSHA to designate as "significant and substantial" a violation of a regulation such as 50.11(b) that is not a mandatory health or safety standard.
Despite the clarity of the relevant language, the Commission suggests a Chevron detour around the statute's plain meaning. We find it impassable. The Commission asserts that the quoted statutory language is somehow rendered ambiguous by its reference to "any citation given to the operator under [chapter 22 of Title 30]," that is to any citation authorized by section 104(a). The Commission's reasoning, as far as we can discern it, runs thus: (1) section 104(d)(1) refers to a citation issued under section 104(a), which is the source of the Commission's authority to issue all citations, including those containing "significant and substantial" findings; (2) section 104(a) treats all violations identically, whether of a statutory provision, of a mandatory standard or of a regulation that is not a standard; (3) therefore, it is ambiguous whether the "significant and substantial" authority in section 104(d)(1) also applies equally to all violations. The Commission's third point simply does not follow from the other two; and, besides, it ignores the unambiguous language that the Congress used.
If the violation is found to be both "significant and substantial" and "caused by an unwarrantable failure of [the] operator to comply with [the] mandatory health or safety standards," section 104(d)(1) requires a withdrawal order for a second mandatory standard violation caused by an "unwarrantable failure to comply" within 90 days of the first. 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Section 104(d)(2) requires a second withdrawal order for "violations similar to those that resulted in the issuance of the [first] withdrawal order." Id. § 814(d)(2). Section 104(e)(1) requires withdrawal for "any violation of a mandatory health or safety standard which could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard" within 90 days after the operator has been notified of "a pattern of violations of mandatory health or safety standards in the coal or other mine which are of such nature as could have significantly and substantially contributed to the cause and effect of coal or other mine health or safety hazards." Id. § 814(e)(1). Once a section 104(e)(1) withdrawal order issues, section 104(e)(2) requires another such order for "any violation of a mandatory health or safety standard which could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine health or safety hazard." Id. § 814(e)(2).
This holding was foreshadowed by language in Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC, 111 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See, e.g., 111 F.3d at 917 ("Congress has plainly excluded consideration of surrounding conditions that do not violate health and safety standards."). In that case, however, we did not address the precise question raised here. We held there that the plain language of section 104(d)(1) precludes the Commission from basing a "significant and substantial" finding on conditions that did not violate the regulation under which the mine operator was cited. Because that regulation was a mandatory standard, we did not consider whether the statute permits a "significant and substantial" finding when the violated regulation is not a mandatory standard.
Today's majority opinion holds that under § 104(d)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1), there may be "a 'significant and substantial' finding for violation only of a mandatory health or safety standard." Maj. op. at 3. Secretary of Labor v. FMSHRC, 111 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997), held the same:
As we read [§ 104(d)(1)], the critical words are "suchviolation is of such nature." A "significantly and sub-stantially" finding may be made only after an authorizedrepresentative has found a "violation" of mine safety andhealth regulations.... By focusing the decisionmaker'sattention on "such violation" and its "nature," Congresshas plainly excluded consideration of surrounding condi-tions that do not violate health and safety standards.