Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/585/336/424547/
Timestamp: 2017-11-21 00:44:40
Document Index: 763707221

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2661', '§ 2654', '§ 601', '§ 602', '§ 1302', '§ 205', '§ 770', '§ 770', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 1343', '§ 1343', 'art:\n45', '§ 205', '§ 205']

Janice Ann Page, Individually and on Behalf of All Otherpersons Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. Victor Preisser, Commissioner of the Iowa Department Ofsocial Services, Marjorie Lidgett, Income Maintenanceadministrator of the Pottawattamie County Office of the Iowadepartment of Social Services, Jean Potter, Assistant Incomemaintenance Administrator and Adc Supervisor for Thepottawattamie County Office of the Iowa Department of Socialservices, Individually and in Their Official Capacities, Appellees, 585 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1978) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eighth Circuit › 1978 › Janice Ann Page, Individually and on Behalf of All Otherpersons Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. Vi...
Janice Ann Page, Individually and on Behalf of All Otherpersons Similarly Situated, Appellant, v. Victor Preisser, Commissioner of the Iowa Department Ofsocial Services, Marjorie Lidgett, Income Maintenanceadministrator of the Pottawattamie County Office of the Iowadepartment of Social Services, Jean Potter, Assistant Incomemaintenance Administrator and Adc Supervisor for Thepottawattamie County Office of the Iowa Department of Socialservices, Individually and in Their Official Capacities, Appellees, 585 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1978)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit - 585 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1978)
Submitted May 18, 1978. Decided Oct. 2, 1978
The District Court confronted the supremacy clause question first3 and held that the Iowa regulations were not inconsistent with the federal regulations. It granted the Department's motion for summary judgment. Then, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b),4 the court, finding no just reason for delay, ordered final judgment to be entered upon the supremacy clause issue. No appeal was taken from that order. Approximately a year later, the court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment on the due process clause issue. Page appeals from that order of the court. In this appeal, she raises both the supremacy clause and due process issues.
A. Initially, we decide whether Janice Page can raise the supremacy clause issue in this appeal. Ordinarily, the period of time for taking an appeal begins to run from the time the district court certifies a claim as appropriate for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2661 at 90 (1973). Page did not appeal from the District Court's denial of her supremacy clause argument. She contends, however, that because her lawsuit involves only a single claim rather than multiple claims, the court improperly certified the supremacy clause issue as a separate claim under Rule 54(b). If the court erred in certifying the supremacy clause issue, she argues, she is not precluded from raising it, together with her due process argument, in this appeal.
B. Rule 54(b) was originally enacted to avoid the possible injustice that might result if judgment of a distinctly separate claim were delayed until adjudication of the entire case. See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (1946), Reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 472 (1946). The rule did not, however, purport to amend or dilute the fundamental rule against splitting a cause of action and deciding appellate cases piecemeal. See In re Bromley-Heath Modernization Committee, 448 F.2d 1271 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435, 76 S. Ct. 895, 100 L. Ed. 1297 (1956). Thus, Rule 54(b) allows an appeal only from a judgment on a separate claim and both courts and commentators have expressed the exceptional nature of a Rule 54(b) certification. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2654 at 33 (1973). Rule 54(b) certifications should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel. See Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932, 80 S. Ct. 370, 4 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1960).
Courts have struggled in attempting to delineate a precise definition of "claim" for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n.4, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 47 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1976); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice PP 54.24, 54.33 (2d ed. 1976). It is clear that a claimant who presents a number of alternative legal theories, but whose recovery is limited to only one of them, has only a single claim of relief for purposes of Rule 54(b). See Edney v. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company, 348 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1965). One commentator has aptly summarized the policies underlying this view.
Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 360-361 (1961).
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, supra, 424 U.S. at 743, 96 S. Ct. at 1206, Citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, supra, 351 U.S. at 435, 76 S. Ct. 895.
Iowa participates in the cooperative federal-state AFDC program. The program, which emerged from the Social Security Act of 1935, As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 Et seq., is financed primarily by the federal government on a matching fund basis and is administered by the individual states. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-317, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1118 (1968). States are not compelled to participate in the program. Those states that choose to receive federal funds under the program must submit to the Secretary of HEW a plan that conforms to the Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated by HEW. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253, 94 S. Ct. 1746, 40 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1974).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (4), a state AFDC plan must provide a recipient, before he is denied benefits, "an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency." Pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1302, the Secretary of HEW has promulgated regulations to administer the Social Security Act and further its objectives. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (13) (i) (1977), which has been promulgated by the Secretary, provides:
Iowa Administrative Code § 770-9.1(2) (a) & (b).
The recipient may, if he believes the name of a third party or the information provided is necessary for presentation of his appeal, request the hearing examiner to inspect the file In camera to determine whether release of the information is necessary. If the examiner decides that the information should not be released, he may not consider it in disposing of the appeal. Iowa Administrative Code § 770-9.1(2) (b) (1) & (2).
The District Court stated that 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (13) (i) (1977), which requires a recipient to have an Adequate opportunity to examine the contents of his case file, does not require "unconditional or totally unrestricted" access to the file. The court held that so long as a state plan provides a claimant with a sufficient opportunity to examine the materials that might aid in preparation for or presentation of his defense at the administrative hearing, the requirements of the HEW regulations are met. The court found that the Iowa regulations provide the claimant with sufficient access. In particular, the court found that the following three factors minimize the impact of the Iowa restrictions on access to identification of third parties:
Reasonably construed, 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (13) (i) (1977) "plainly entitles the (recipients) to examine the Entire contents of their files prior to and during an appeals hearing."5 Areizaga v. Quern, 442 F. Supp. 168, 173 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (emphasis added). The HEW regulations do not contain the limitations upon complete access that are included in the state scheme. Whatever the merits of those limitations, HEW chose not to include them in the federal regulations. See Feld v. Berger, 424 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Iowa chose, voluntarily, to participate in the AFDC program. In doing so, it was obliged, in promulgating regulations, to conform to HEW's regulations. See Shea v. Vialpando, supra, 416 U.S. at 253, 94 S. Ct. 1746. We, thus, hold that because the Iowa regulations do not provide the AFDC recipient with complete access to his file, they contravene the federal regulations and are void under the supremacy clause.6
Jurisdiction of the due process claim is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.4, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 39 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1974), the Supreme Court left open the question whether a claim of a conflict between federal and state law (supremacy clause) is itself a constitutional question under § 1343(3). The Court held, however, that when the due process (constitutional) claim is "not insubstantial," a federal court has pendent jurisdiction of the supremacy clause issue. See Hagans v. Lavine, supra, 415 U.S. at 542-543, 94 S. Ct. 1372. Because Page's due process claim is not "insubstantial" as the Supreme Court has defined it, See id., the District Court had jurisdiction to decide the supremacy clause issue
Because resolution of the due process argument would have required the empaneling of a three-judge court, the District Court properly decided the supremacy clause issue first. See Hagans v. Lavine, supra, 415 U.S. at 543, 94 S. Ct. 1372
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides in part:
45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (13) (i) (1977), which is currently in force, superseded 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (10) (i), which limited the recipient's access to those documents to be used by the state at the administrative hearing. This change evidences a clear agency intent to provide a recipient not only with the documents that the state plans to use at the hearing, but with all documents and materials contained in his file