Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/350/366/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-06-24 00:22:14
Document Index: 508834430

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4244', '§ 4244', '§ 4247', '§ 4248', '§ 4248', '§ 4247', '§ 4248', '§ 4246', '§ 4248', '§ 4244', '§ 4247']

Greenwood v. United States (full text) :: 350 U.S. 366 (1956) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
› Greenwood v. United States
Greenwood v. United States 350 U.S. 366 (1956)
U.S. Supreme CourtGreenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)Greenwood v. United StatesNo. 460Argued January 25, 1956Decided March 5, 1956350 U.S. 366CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
219 F.2d 376 affirmed. Page 350 U. S. 367
Section 4244 provides a procedure for determining mental incompetency during the period "after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of any period of probation." [Footnote 1] Section 4245 sets up a similar procedure for persons in prison believed to have been mentally incompetent at the time of their trial when the issue was not raised or determined before or during trial. Section 4246 states that, whenever the trial court shall determine, under §§ 4244 and 4245, that an accused Page 350 U. S. 368 is or was mentally incompetent, the court may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General until the accused is mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law. Section 4246 further provides that, if the court, after hearing as provided in the preceding §§ 4244 and 4245, finds that the conditions specified in § 4247 exist, the commitment shall be governed by § 4248. [Footnote 2] Section 4247 states that, when a prisoner's sentence is about to expire and the prison board of examiners finds him insane and a probable danger to the officers, property, or other interests of the United States, then the court shall hold a hearing, and, if it determines that those conditions exist, it may commit the prisoner to the custody of the Attorney General. [Footnote 3] Under § 4248, the Page 350 U. S. 369 commitment shall run until sanity is restored, or until the prisoner's condition is so improved that he will not endanger the officers, property, or other interests of the United States, or until suitable arrangements are made for the care of the prisoner by his State of residence -- reserving to the prisoner his right to establish his eligibility to release by writ of habeas corpus. [Footnote 4]
Petitioner, a resident of Cleveland, Ohio, was indicted on November 20, 1952, by a grand jury of the Western District of Missouri on two counts, for robbery from a United States Post Office in Kansas City, Missouri, and for felonious assault there on a postal employee. Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, petitioner signed a waiver of trial in the Western District of Missouri and was transferred to the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio. Acting on the suggestion of appointed counsel, the district judge ordered petitioner examined by a psychiatrist. After a hearing in which the examining psychiatrist testified that it was doubtful that petitioner, because of his mental condition, could have fully understood the significance of the waiver he signed, the District Court, on February 2, 1953, remanded Page 350 U. S. 370 the case to the District Court for the Western District of Missouri for disposition.
"at the present time, there appears to be little likelihood of his recovering to the extent that he might be considered competent in the Page 350 U. S. 371 near future."
The hearing on petitioner's sanity was held on July 15. The two psychiatrists appointed by the court testified Page 350 U. S. 372 that, in their belief, petitioner was sane. The first three reports of the Medical Center were received in evidence, along with a fourth, a report of the Neuropsychiatric Staff of the Medical Center at Springfield, dated July 8, 1954. This latest report concluded
The District Court, in its order of July 30, found that the accused was insane and so mentally incompetent that he could not stand trial; that, if released, he would probably endanger the safety of the officers, property, or other interests of the United States; and that no suitable arrangements for custody and care, other than commitment to the custody of the Attorney General, were available. Petitioner was therefore committed to the custody of the Attorney General until his sanity should be restored or his mental condition so improved that, if released, he would not endanger the safety of the officers, property, or other interests of the United States or until suitable arrangements could be made for the custody and care of defendant by Ohio, the State of his residence. 125 F.Supp. 777, 778. Petitioner appealed from this judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, its seven circuit judges sitting en banc, affirmed, one judge dissenting. Page 350 U. S. 373 219 F.2d 376. Because of the important issue of federal power raised by the case, and because of conflicting views in the Courts of Appeals, compare Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, and Wells v. Attorney General, 201 F.2d 556, with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case, we granted certiorari. 350 U.S. 821.
"If the accused's mental disability appears not to be a transitory condition, but in all likelihood he will, because of his insanity, never be brought to trial, it would seem that as a general rule the federal government should not assume responsibility for his hospitalization merely because he has been accused (but not convicted) of a federal crime. Normally such a person should be turned over to the state of his domicile to be confined in a state mental hospital if hospitalization is called for. "Page 350 U. S. 374
The District Court pursued the appropriate procedure in holding a hearing to determine the existence of the conditions specified in § 4247 once it determined that the accused's mental incompetence seemed more than temporary. Although the language of the statute and the report of the Committee of the Judicial Conference demonstrate that the statute deals generally with the situations both of temporary and more than temporary insanity, one could infer from the reports on the bill by the Committee, by the Judicial Conference itself, and by the committees of both Houses of Congress that the specific commitment under § 4248 was designed only for prisoners whose sentences are about to expire. But this is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute. The second sentence of § 4246 clearly makes commitment under § 4248 applicable to persons found mentally incompetent under § 4244 who meet the conditions specified in § 4247. Page 350 U. S. 375
The fact that, at present, there may be little likelihood of recovery does not defeat federal power to make this initial commitment of the petitioner. We cannot say that federal authority to prosecute has now been irretrievably frustrated. The record shows that two court-appointed psychiatrists found petitioner sane and competent for trial. While the District Court did not accept their conclusion, their testimony illustrates the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment, even about a situation as unpromising as petitioner's, at least as indicated by the report of the United States Medical Center at Springfield. Page 350 U. S. 376 Certainly, denial of constitutional power of commitment to Congress in dealing with a situation like this ought not to rest on dogmatic adherence to one view or another on controversial psychiatric issues.