Source: http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/germany/cluster-munition-ban-policy.aspx
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 19:54:41
Document Index: 469871032

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art-155', 'Art-155', 'Art-155', 'Art 155', 'Art 155', 'Art-155', 'Art 155']

Update (November 2015) - Germany declares that it has completed destruction of its cluster munition stockpile.
Five-Year Review: State Party Germany was among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010. It enacted a legislative amendment in 2009 to enforce its implementation of the convention. Germany has participated in all of the convention’s meetings and served as the convention’s first coordinator on stockpile destruction and retention in 2011–2013. Germany regularly promotes universalization of the convention and has condemned new use of cluster munitions, including in Syria. Germany has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to interpretation and implementation of the convention.
In its initial transparency report for the convention, provided in 2011, Germany confirmed it never used cluster munitions, but produced, exported, and imported them in the past. By the end of 2014, Germany had destroyed 99% of a stockpile that once consisted of 573,700 cluster munitions and 58 million submunitions. Germany is retaining 587 cluster munitions and more than 54,800 submunitions for training and research purposes.
Germany submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 27 January 2011 and has provided annual updated reports since, most recently on 20 April 2015.[2]
Germany has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014, where it made a number of statements. Germany has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including in June 2015. German officials also attended an international symposium on mine action in Biograd, Croatia on 27–29 April 2015 that included a session on cluster munitions.[4]
Germany has continued to promote universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, Germany described universalization of the convention as “imperative for the effective stigmatization of cluster munitions.” It encouraged states that had not yet acceded to the convention to join and explicitly called on those states that had signed but not yet ratified to do so.[5] Germany has made similar appeals in previous years and the German Federal Foreign Office informed the Monitor in 2014 that it remained committed to promoting the convention’s standards and continued to raise the matter of accession to the convention in ongoing bilateral consultations with states not party.[6]
Germany has condemned new use of cluster munitions, including in South Sudan and Syria. At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, Germany expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria and South Sudan and called on both governments to stop using them.[7] During a June 2015 meeting of the convention, Germany expressed concern at reported use of cluster munitions in “Africa and eastern Europe.”[8]
Germany has often condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria since October 2012, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle condemned the cluster munition use “in the strongest terms.”[9] Germany has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use.[10] It has voted in favor of four Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently on 2 July 2015.[11]
During the negotiations of the convention, Germany advocated strongly for provisions on “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party). In June 2012, the German Federal Foreign Office reaffirmed to the Monitor that prior to the convention’s entry into force “clear orders” were issued for the German armed forces that “forbade German soldiers from using cluster munitions themselves, and from requesting or ordering the use of cluster munitions.” The instructions also “further prohibited the transport of cluster munitions using Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] vehicles and/or personnel. Ordering or assisting such transport was also banned.”[12]
Germany’s implementation legislation prohibits the transit of cluster munitions.[13]
Germany has yet to express clear views on the prohibition on foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, but United States (US) diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 show that Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions stored by the US in Germany.[14]
Germany’s implementation legislation does not explicitly prohibit investment in cluster munition production and in June 2013, the Federal Foreign Office reaffirmed its position, previously expressed to the Monitor, that “the Federal Government expects the German private sector including financial institutions to implement their voluntary commitments aimed at disinvesting in business segments related to CM [cluster munitions]. It is following the relevant developments closely.”[15]
In 2011 and 2012, motions submitted to and rejected by the German parliament called for Germany’s national implementation legislation, the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) of 2009, to be amended to include a comprehensive ban on direct and indirect investment in cluster munition producers.[16]
Facing Finance and other German NGOs have continued to campaign for a comprehensive ban on financing cluster munition production.[17]
According to the Federal Foreign Office, Germany has never used cluster munitions.[18] It unilaterally renounced the use of all types of cluster munitions on 29 May 2008, one day before it agreed to adopt the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin.[19]
In the past, German industry was very active in the production and export of cluster munitions. According to the Federal Foreign Office, Germany stopped production and transfer of cluster munitions in 2005.[20]
In its initial Article 7 report, Germany declared that “all former production capabilities were dismantled prior to 2008.”[21] The last known export was in 2004–2005 when Germany sent M26 rockets with submunitions to Slovakia.[22]
The company Diehl GmbH and numerous subcontractors were involved in the production of M26 rockets for the 227mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) as part of the MLRS European Producers Group.[23] Lenkflugkörpersysteme GmbH produced the MW-1 dispenser (that deploys submunitions) for aircraft.[24]
The company Rheinmetall produced several types of 155mm artillery projectiles containing dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[25] These were produced for the German armed forces as well as for export customers including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy (co-production), and Norway.[26]
A consortium of Diehl, Gesellschaft für Intelligente Wirksysteme GmbH(GIWS), and Rheinmetall produce the SMArt-155 artillery projectile, a weapon that employs two submunitions but is not considered a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions because it meets the five technical criteria set out by negotiators as necessary to avoid the negative effects of cluster munitions.[27] This has been produced for the German Armed Forces and for export customers Australia, Greece, Switzerland, and the UK.[28] The consortium granted licensed co-production rights to Alliant Techsystems in the US for the SMArt-155, and Alliant has marketed the munitions in the United Arab Emirates. According to the NGO Actiongroup Landmine.de (now Facing Finance), more than 25,000 SMArt-155 projectiles have been produced.[29]
Germany once possessed a total of 573,700 cluster munitions containing 62,923,641 submunitions, including weapons destroyed prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. By the end of 2014, Germany had destroyed 565,978 cluster munitions and 58 million submunitions, representing 98.6% of the original stockpile of cluster munitions and 92% of the submunitions. The remaining stockpile to be destroyed consisted of 7,526 cluster munitions and 4.8 million submunitions.[30]
Cluster munitions stockpiled and destroyed by Germany (as of 31 December 2014)[31]
Cluster munitions (submunitions) originally declared
Cluster munitions (submunitions) to be destroyed
(88 M42/M46)
(3,859,064)
DM602 projectile
(63 DM1348)
(7,345,989)
(7,356,258)
DM612 projectile
(4,404,204)
DM632 projectile
(63 DM1385)
(7,638,813)
(7,642,593)
DM642 projectile
(63 DM1383)
(3,255,525)
(3,249,477)
DM642A1 projectile
(4,449,501)
(4,443,201)
DM652 projectile
(49 DM1383)
(459,914)
DM602 projectile (203mm)
(120 DM1385A1)
(4,777,920)
(4,749,120)
BL755 bomb
(147 Mk1)
(1,963,038)
CBU-2CA bomb
(409 BLU-3/B)
Dispenser MW-1 DM11
(668 MUSA)
Dispenser MW-1 DM12,
(4,536 KB44)
(444,528)
Dispenser MW-1 DM22
(200 STABO)
Dispenser MW-1 DM31
(692 MUSA, MUSPA or MIFF)
Dispenser MW-1 DM32
(2,632 K44 or MIFF)
(644 M77)
(23,404,248)
(18,581,976)
(4,845,456)
Individual submunition
(62,923,641)
(58,073,241)
(4,845,750)
Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Germany is required to destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2018.
Germany has often expressed its intent to complete stockpile destruction by the end of 2015.[32] In September 2014, Germany informed States Parties that it was still on track to complete the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions during 2015.[33]
A total of 7,526 cluster munitions and 4.8 million submunitions remained to be destroyed by the end of 2014:
7,524 M26 rockets containing 4,845,456 M77 submunitions; and
Two BL755 bombs containing 294 Mk1 submunitions.[34]
During 2014, Germany destroyed a total of 41,740 cluster munitions and 5,325,898 submunitions.[35] Germany’s cluster munitions stockpile has been destroyed in Germany at three locations (Nammo Buck in Pinnow, Spreewerk Lübben in Lübben, and Muniberka in Dietersdorf) and in Norway (at Lökken Verk outside of Bergen).[36] The Article 7 reports describe the safety and environmental standards observed.[37]
Germany started destroying the BL755 cluster bombs in 2001, while destruction of DM612 155mm artillery projectiles began in 2007, and destruction of the other types followed in 2009.[38] In April 2013, Germany reported that it spent a total of €11.8 million on stockpile destruction prior to the entry into force of the convention and a further €29.6 million was allocated from 1 August 2010 to 2016, making a total of €41.4 million (US$53.2 million).[39]
In its April 2015 Article 7 report, Germany declared that it is retaining a total of 587 cluster munitions and 54,811 submunitions for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training and research purposes, as listed in the following table.[40]
Cluster munitions retained in accordance with Article 3 (as of 31 December 2014)[41]
Germany initially reported in 2012 that it would retain 782 cluster munitions and 71,872 submunitions so the 2015 total represents a 24% reduction from the original number retained.[42] Germany has been progressively reducing the number of cluster munitions retained by using them during EOD training. In 2011–2014, it consuming a total of 195 cluster munitions and 17,061 submunitions in EOD training as follows: 70 cluster munitions and 4,744 submunitions in 2014, 28 cluster munitions and 3,125 submunitions in 2013, 58 cluster munitions and 6,330 submunitions in 2012, and 39 cluster munitions and 2,862 submunitions in 2011.[43]
Despite this reduction, Germany still retains the largest number of submunitions of any State Party. The CMC has expressed concern at the retention of such high numbers of cluster munitions and submunitions and asked if Germany’s training program is large enough to require the consumption of so many submunitions.
In 2015, Germany reported that it continues to review of the amount of retained submunitions needed for EOD training.[44] In September 2013, it reported that “the calculations and plans for retention of selected items are kept under constant review, thus upholding the spirit of this convention. Thus, we can ensure that we retain only the very minimum quantity of cluster munitions necessary for permitted development and training.”[45]
[1] “Ausführungsgesetz zu Artikel 26 Abs. 2 des Deutschen Grundgesetzes (Gesetz über die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen)” (“Act Implementing Article 26(2) of the Basic Law (War Weapons Control Act)”), 20 April 1961, Sections 18(a) and 21. The Act was amended on 6 June 2009 and entered into force on 11 June 2009 after it was published in the 2009 Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) II-502. See Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form A, 27 January 2011, and 30 April 2012. The act also establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction over German citizens violating its law overseas—Section 21 of the Weapons Control Act. See Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010, p. 38.
[2] The report submitted on 27 January 2011 is for the period from 1 August to 31 December 2010, while calendar years are covered by the subsequent reports provided in April 2012 (for calendar year 2011), April 2013 (calendar year 2012), April 2014 (calendar year 2013), and April 2015 (calendar year 2014).
[3] For more details on Germany’s cluster munition policy and practice up to early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 78–84. It has come to light that the United States (US) engaged with Germany during the Oslo Process to communicate its concerns especially with respect to “interoperability” (joint military operations with states not party). In a US Department of State cable dated 13 February 2008 that was released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011, conventional arms control desk officer Burkhard Ducoffre reportedly informed the US that Germany did not favor doing anything that could limit military cooperation with states not party, whether it be in the context of a UN Chapter VII mission or a NATO operation, and said Germany favored adding an explicit exception to this effect in the draft text of the ban convention. “Germany agrees that Oslo Process text on cluster munitions should not hinder interoperability,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN173 dated 13 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[4] Previously, in 2014, Germany provided financial support for the organization of a workshop on implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions for governments from Southeast Europe held by the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) Centre for Security Cooperation as part of a symposium on mine action in Zadar, Croatia from 22–26 April 2014. RACVIAC, “Symposium on Mine Action,” 22–26 April 2014; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Silke Bellmann, Federal Foreign Office, 1 July 2014.
[5] Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munition Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014.
[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Silke Bellmann, Federal Foreign Office, 1 July 2014. See also, response to Monitor questionnaire by Volker Böhm, Federal Foreign Office, June 2013. At the Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Germany also called on all states that have not yet done so to join the convention without delay. Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.
[9] On 18 October 2012, Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said that any use of cluster munitions in Syria would be “a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law” to be condemned “in the strongest terms.” At the convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2013, Germany strongly condemned Syria’s use of cluster munitions, stating, “the use of these indiscriminate weapons cannot be justified.” See, “Westerwelle besorgt wegen Einsatzes von Streubomben in Syrien” (“Westerwelle concerned about use of cluster bombs in Syria”), Die Welt, 18 October 2012. In September 2013, Germany stated “we are deeply concerned about reports that cluster munitions have been used in the conflict in Syria.” Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.
[10] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/189, 18 December 2014. Germany voted in favor of similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013.
[11] See, “The grave and deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/29/L.4, 2 July 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/28/20, 27 March 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/23, 27 June 2014; and “The continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/25/23, 28 March 2014.
[12] Email from the German Federal Foreign Office, Division 241, 13 June 2012.
[13] Section 18(a) of the War Weapons Control Act states that it is prohibited to “transport [cluster munitions] through or otherwise bring them into or out of a federal territory.” See HRW and Harvard International Human Rights Clinic, “Fulfilling the Ban: Guidelines for Effective National Legislation to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2010, p. 15.
[14] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM [Cluster Munitions] in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” “MFA gives reassurances on stockpiling of US cluster munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[15] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Volker Böhm, Federal Foreign Office, 13 June 2013. In 2012, the Federal Foreign Office informed the Monitor that the “Federal Government expects…German financial institutions to respect the legal obligations under the War Weapons Control Act and to implement their voluntary commitments aimed at disinvesting in the field of [cluster munitions]” and added that it is “following the relevant developments closely.” Email from the German Federal Foreign Office, Division 241, 13 June 2012.
[16] See, Motion presented by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, and the Alliance 90/Greens, “Investitionen in Antipersonenminen und Streumunition gesetzlich verbieten und die steuerliche Förderung beenden” (“A legal prohibition on tax incentives and investments in antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions”), German Parliament (Bundestag) 17/7339, 18 October 2011; and Bundestag, Stenographic Report, 168th Meeting, Plenary Proceedings 17/168, 22 March 2012.
[17] For more information, see: PAX, “Worldwide investment in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, November 2014 update,” Utrecht, November 2014.
[18] Letter from Gregor Köbel, Federal Foreign Office, 5 February 2009.
[19] Email from Jörg-Alexander Albrecht, Desk Officer, Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 30 April 2010.
[21] Germany did not list the production facilities or indicate measures taken to convert or decommission them. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 27 January 2011.
[22] In 2004, Germany transferred 270 M26 rockets and transferred another 132 in 2005. Submission of Germany, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2004, 26 May 2005; and Report for Calendar Year 2005, 1 June 2006.
[23] The MLRS program was known as the Mittleres Artillerieraketenwerfersystem(MARS). Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), p. 716. The 110mm Light Artillery Rocket System was in service with the German Army from 1969 until the mid-1980s, and a submunition warhead was developed for this weapon but was apparently not placed into production. Terry J. Gander, ed., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 1997–1998 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 1997), p. 533.
[24] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 360–361. RTG Euromunition GmbH acted as the exporter for the MW-1. According to the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), after 1996 production of MW-1 was undertaken by Daimler-Benz-Aerospace (DASA). Email from Thomas Küchenmeister, Director, Actiongroup Landmine.de, 24 April 2009.
[25] These DPICM submunitions included non-self-destructing (DM1348) and self-destructing (DM1383) variants designed in Germany, as well as a self-destructing type designed in Israel (M85, also known as DM1385 when contained in German-produced projectiles).
[26] In June 2007, Rheinmetall stated that its involvement in cluster munition production had ended: “Cluster ammunition and/or subammunitions [sic] for such ordnance, bombs and cluster bombs do not belong to those goods which are developed, produced or assembled by Rheinmetall nor any of our subsidiaries.” Letter from Rheinmetall to Norges Bank (acting on behalf of the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund-Global), 5 June 2007, unofficial translation by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, cited in Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Til rådning - Ny vurdering av selskapet Rheinmetall AG” (“Recommendation - New assessment of the company Rheinmetall AG”), 5 September 2007.
[27] Article 2.2(c) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions excludes munitions with submunitions if they have less than 10 submunitions and each submunition weighs more than four kilograms, can detect and engage a single target object, and is equipped with electronic self-destruction and self-deactivation features.
[28] Rheinmetall DeTec AG Press Release, “SMArt 155—Proven Reliability and Accuracy,” June 2005; and letter from Peter Hooton, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 April 2010. In October 2007, it was reported that Australia “has finalised the acquisition of SMArt 155 artillery rounds worth AUD14 million (US$ 12.3 million) for its 36 M198 155mm towed howitzers.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 October 2007.
[29] Actiongroup Landmine.de, “Alternative Streumunition - Problem oder Lösung?” (“Alternative Cluster Munitions - Problem or Solution?”), August 2008. According to Alliant, as of January 2005, over 11,000 SMArt-155 projectiles had been produced by consortium members. Alliant Techsystems press release, “ATK/GIWS SMArt 155 Sensor Fuzed Munition Succeeds in UAE Desert Tests,” 10 January 2005.
[30] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 April 2015.
[32] Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012; statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011; response to HRW letter by Dr. Detlev Wolter, Head of Division, Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 2 May 2011; email from Jörg-Alexander Albrecht, Federal Foreign Office, 30 April 2010; and email from Thomas Frisch, “German National Stockpile Destruction Programme,” Federal Ministry of Defense, 25 June 2009.
[33] Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2013.
[34] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2015. Thirty-six of the M26 rockets and the two BL755 bombs were previously undeclared in past reports.
[35] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2015.
[37] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form B, 20 April 2015, 30 April 2014, April 2013, 30 April 2012, and 27 January 2011.
[40] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 20 April 2015.
[41] Ibid., April 2014, April 2013, and April 2012.
[42] Ibid., 30 April 2012.
[43] Ibid., April 2015, April 2014, April 2013, 30 April 2012; and 27 January 2011.
[47] Email from the German Federal Foreign Office, Division 241, 13 June 2012. See also statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013.