Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/259/1364/575728/
Timestamp: 2019-11-22 10:32:42
Document Index: 657770625

Matched Legal Cases: ['§112', '§112', '§112', '§112', '§112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112', '§ 112']

S3 Incorporated, (now Known As Sonicblue, Inc.), Plaintiff-appellant, v. Nvidia Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 259 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) :: Justia
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S3 Incorporated, (now Known As Sonicblue, Inc.), Plaintiff-appellant, v. Nvidia Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 259 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - 259 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) DECIDED: August 3, 2001
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the appellate tribunal applies the same criteria as did the district court. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 255 (1986); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1355, 53 USPQ2d 1734, 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The question of whether the claims meet the statutory requirements of §112 ¶2 is a matter of construction of the claims, and receives plenary review on appeal. See Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 53 USPQ2d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Personalized Media Communications v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 705, 48 USPQ2d 1880, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The claims as granted are accompanied by a presumption of validity based on compliance with, inter alia, §112 ¶2. See Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376, 58 USPQ2d 1801, 1806 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
The requirement that the claims "particularly point [] out and distinctly claim []" the invention is met when a person experienced in the field of the invention would understand the scope of the subject matter that is patented when the claim is read in conjunction with the rest of the specification. "If the claims when read in light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention, §112 demands no more." Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon, 997 F.2d 870, 875, 27 USPQ2d 1123, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 692, 57 USPQ2d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001); North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., F.3d 1571, 1579, 28 USPQ2d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 USPQ 81, 94-95 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
For claim clauses containing functional limitations in "means for" terms pursuant to §112 ¶6, the claimed function and its supporting structure in the specification must be presented with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of §112 ¶2. As was explained in In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), "if one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language. If an applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as required by the second paragraph of section 112." See also Atmel Corp., 198 F.3d at 1382, 53 USPQ2d at 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("In order for a claim to meet the particularity requirement of ¶2, the corresponding structure(s) of a means-plus-function limitation must be disclosed in the written description in such a manner that one skilled in the art will know and understand what structure corresponds to the means limitation.")
NVIDIA argues that the claims are ambiguous because two different outputs of the video controller are required, and states that this is inconsistent with the description in the specification. We conclude, however, that a person of skill in this field would understand the claims when viewed in light of the description in the specification. Claim 1 recites a "video controller . . . producing a video information data stream." The next clause of claim 1 states that the RAM receives the "video information data stream" and produces the "video display information data stream"; the specification explains this transformation, and the role of the bit-content of the pixels in generating the display. The final clause of claim 1 states that the DAC is "coupled to both said random-access memory and to said video controller," and serves to "selectively receiv [e] either the video information data stream or the video display information data stream." This clause manifests the specification's teaching that the information from the video controller need not pass through the random-access memory.
Even though patents are written for and by skilled artisans, the court should avoid the temptation to find structure in a patent where none has been identified by the patentee. Claims written in means-plus-function format for which no structure has been identified gives rise to claims which are not technically sufficient to provide appropriate notice to a person of ordinary skill in the art of the identity of the exact structure required, and therefore, the scope of the claim, in the context of a § 112, ¶ 6 claim. The test for definiteness in such instances is whether "structure supporting a means-plus-function claim under § 112, ¶ 6 [appears] in the specification," Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1381, 53 USPQ2d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added), not simply in the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. This requirement is the tradeoff of means-plus-function claiming, enabling patentees to claim a list of structures identified in the patent's written description using general, functional terminology, without the burden of listing those structures within the text of the claim itself. 198 F.3d at 1381-82, 53 USPQ2d at 1230. Where the structure for performing the claimed function is neither stated or properly incorporated by reference within the description, " [f]ullfillment of the § 112, ¶ 6 tradeoff cannot be satisfied." 198 F.3d at 1382, 53 USPQ2d at 1230.
The dissent misperceives the teachings of the specification and our opinion in stating that the data bypassing the RAM and sent directly to the DAC is "unprocessed" video information. See, e.g., dissent at 3 ("'video information' . . . is sent to the display, without color processing"); id. at 1373 ("the majority's conclusion [is] that in bypass mode 8-bit unprocessed video information is transmitted directly to the display"); id. at 1375 ("unprocessed 8-bit data bypasses the RAM and is sent directly to the display"). Despite the dissent's characterization, neither the specification nor our opinion state that video information bypassing the RAM is unprocessed. Supra at 8-9. Nor does our opinion "suggest [] that the 8-bit video information data, input into the RAM in the index mode to generate 18/24-bit color video display data, is itself display data." As our opinion states, "the data output from the video controller is used as an address which is input to a random access memory (RAM) array." Supra at 2. Both parties agree that the video controller can produce information streams which are either routed directly to the DAC, or first to the RAM; that is, both parties agree that a video controller can produce information which is read directly by the DAC and information which is sent to the RAM as an address. For example, nVIDIA explained : "One way to process digital data is to send it directly from the video controller to a [DAC]. . . . This is sometimes referred to as 'direct color mode.' It is possible to expand the number of possible colors available with a given number of bits per pixel by using a [RAM] . . . which functions as a 'look-up table.' The RAM looks up the location (sometimes referred to as an . . . address) corresponding to the pixel data from the video controller. . . . This arrangement is sometimes referred to as 'indexed color mode.'" Brief at 3.
The majority incorrectly states that this dissent mischaracterizes the specification and the majority's opinion, arguing that neither the specification nor the opinion "state that information bypassing the RAM is unprocessed." The majority further states that "our opinion [does not] `suggest [] that the 8-bit video information data, input into the RAM in the index mode to generate 18/24-bit color video display data, is itself display data." Indeed, the specification does not suggest that the 8-bit data sent from the VGA controller is displayable. As noted, the written description provides that the 8-bit video data must be converted into 18/24 bit video display information prior to display. As the majority correctly recognizes, the data converted by the RAM is in fact not displayable until processed. The majority opinion fails to explain how the 8-bit video information data, input into the RAM for color processing in the index mode to generate 18/24-bit color video display data, can also be displayed by the DAC in the bypass mode, given that both streams of data originate from the same stream of data output by the VGA, and are thus identical. The majority's analysis of the claimed invention, as illustrated in Figure 2 of the patent incorporated into the majority opinion, requires that the "video data stream" is 8-bit data input to the RAM for conversion into 18/24-bit display data, and that same stream of 8-bit data is also directly output to the DAC, bypassing the RAM for display without further processing. While the majority attempts to distance its analysis from the fact that the DAC cannot accept unprocessed data and the RAM cannot receive processed data, because the same data must be transmitted to both the RAM and the DAC simultaneously, the majority's analysis requires that both the RAM and the DAC receive unprocessed 8- bit data, or both receive 8-bit display data. The majority argues that the dissent "confuse [s] indefiniteness with nonenablement." That suggests a misunderstanding of the dissent. Whether a claim is invalid for indefiniteness requires a determination of whether one skilled in the art would be able to discern the scope of the claim "when read in light of the specification." Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576, 1 USPQ2d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, where the language of a claim renders it so unclear "that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may be ascertained from the language used," resort to the specification is required. Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999). With regard to definiteness of claims written in means-plus-function format, "the question in the case before us is not whether there has been compliance with some aspect of § 112 ¶ 1, but whether, in utilizing the authority of § 112 ¶ 6 to claim in means-plus-function form, the drafter has adequately described structure, material, or acts which satisfy the claiming requirement of § 112 ¶ 2. In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 946, 42 USPQ2d 1881, 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The dissent maintains that because the claims are technically incorrect, and the written description adds nothing to clarify the ambiguity found in the claims, the claims are indefinite.