Source: https://casetext.com/case/us-v-davis-465
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 12:33:29
Document Index: 389254389

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3559', '§ 2113', '§ 924', '§ 922', '§ 3559', '§ 2113', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559', '§ 3559']

U.S. v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965 | Casetext Search + Citator
Garrus v. Secretary of the Pa. Dep't of Corr.
See Smith, 474 F.3d at 892. Contrary to Judge Hardiman's argument, there is no circuit split on this issue,…
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A). Prior felonies need not be identified in the indictment, but are to be filed in an…
Full title:UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry DAVIS, Appellant
holding that, like here, the district court did not err by excluding an eyewitness identification expert because this court is "especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion unless the government's case against the defendant rested exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony"
Summary of this case from United States v. Nickelous
No. 00-3624.
Submitted: May 17, 2001.
Filed: August 15, 2001.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, George Howard, Jr., J.
Bruce D. Eddy, argued, Little Rock, AR (Dee Studebaker, on the brief), for appellant.
Linda Lipe, argued, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.
Before BOWMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and KYLE, District Judge.
Appellant, Larry Davis, was convicted in district court of attempted armed bank robbery ( 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d)), use of a firearm in a crime of violence ( 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm ( 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). Under a conviction for these crimes, the statutory maximum sentence is twenty-five years. However, appellant was sentenced to life in prison as a repeat offender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559. Appellant challenges his sentence and conviction on several grounds. We affirm.
Appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 for attempted robbery carries a statutory maximum of twenty-five years. However, appellant received a life sentence according to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3559, which requires a mandatory life sentence if a person is convicted of a serious violent felony-such as robbery-after having previously been convicted of two or more serious violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Under that statute, once the prosecution establishes that a defendant has previously been convicted of two or more violent felonies, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the convictions were nonqualifying felonies, which cannot serve as a basis for imposing the mandatory life sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3). To establish a robbery conviction as nonqualifying, a defendant must prove that no dangerous weapon, or threat of a dangerous weapon, was involved in the offense, and the offense did not result in death or serious injury. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3)(A).
Appellant makes two due process arguments to challenge his sentence: (1) due process demands that the question of whether his past robbery convictions are qualifying or nonqualifying felonies under section 3559 must be submitted to the jury to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) even if the issue need not be submitted to the jury, due process prohibits shifting the burden of proof to a defendant to prove his prior convictions are nonqualifying. We reject both claims.
The Supreme Court has held it is not necessary to submit the fact of a prior conviction to the jury as an element of the crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (refusing to interpret a statute to make the fact of a previous conviction an element, and thus a fact question for the jury, in part because the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice to the defendant); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (stating that any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized by the jury verdict must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). Under this rule, a fact of prior conviction includes not only the fact that a prior conviction exists, but also a determination of whether a conviction is one of the enumerated types qualifying for the sentence enhancement under section 3559. See, e.g., United States v. Gatewood, 230 F.3d 186, 192 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Although in Apprendi the Court noted that it was "arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested," it explicitly refused to overrule that decision because the question of prior convictions was not before the Court. 530 U.S. at 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348. A close examination of Supreme Court cases casts further doubt on the future viability of Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520-21, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the fact of prior conviction is an element of the offense under a recidivism statute, contrary to the rule stated in Almendarez-Torres); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (Scalia, J., with whom Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined dissenting) (stating that the issue of recidivism should be treated as an element of the offense); see also Gatewood, 230 F.3d at 192 (en banc) (questioning the viability of Almendarez-Torres). It is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop. Under Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres, it was proper for the district court to make the finding according to a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had two prior convictions for serious violent felonies.
This still leaves the question of the burden shifting contained in section 3559. The structure of section 3559, which classifies all robberies as serious violent felonies but allows a defendant to prove the prior robbery convictions are nonqualifying by proving certain facts, creates an affirmative defense to the sentence enhancement. See Gatewood, 230 F.3d at 188; United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Although due process places some limits on how the state defines the elements of a crime and distributes the burden of proof, it does not require the state to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Other circuits that have considered the propriety of this burden-shifting provision in section 3559 have all held that under Patterson, Congress has the power to place on a defendant the burden of establishing an affirmative defense that is not an essential element of the crime. Gatewood, 230 F.3d at 189; United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 887 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 208 F.3d 1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000); Kaluna, 192 F.3d at 1195; United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1997). We agree with the reasoning of these circuits and see no reason to repeat it here.
holding that the district court did not err by excluding an eyewitness identification expert because "we are `especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion unless the government's case against the defendant rested exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony'"
approving a burden shifting framework relating to nonqualifying felonies in sentencing that used a preponderance of the evidence standard for the existence of the felonies, but a clear and convincing evidence standard once the burden shifted to the defendant to prove they were nonqualifying
Summary of this case from United States v. C.L.T.
describing § 3559(c) as an affirmative defense available to defendants to prove their prior robbery conviction did not qualify for the sentencing enhancement
discussing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), requiring a mandatory life sentence on the third conviction of a "serious violent felony"
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Kempis-Bonola
reaching same conclusion with respect to enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), which requires a mandatory life sentence on the third conviction for a "serious violent felony"
addressing the continuing viability of Almendárez-Torres, the court applied the prior conviction exemption and determining that "t is our role to apply Supreme Court precedent as it stands, and not as it may develop."
Summary of this case from State v. Avery