Source: https://www.ejiltalk.org/is-libya-under-an-obligation-to-surrender-saif-gaddafi-to-the-icc-part-i-what-does-the-rome-statute-say/comment-page-1/
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 01:49:42
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Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 95', 'Art. 89', 'Art. 89', 'Art. 95', 'Art. 89', 'Art. 89', 'Art. 89', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 95', 'Art. 19', 'Art. 95', 'art 17', 'art 17', 'arts 86', 'art 95', 'art 95', 'Art 89', 'Art 17', 'Art 89']

EJIL: Talk! – Is Libya Under an Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC? Part I (What Does the Rome Statute Say?)
Home EJIL Analysis Is Libya Under an Obligation to Surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC? Part I (What Does the Rome Statute Say?)
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Excellent post. I do, however, have a question and a comment for you. First, the question: what, in your view, is a ne bis in idem challenge in national court? I find much of your argument convincing, but I’m still troubled by how you distinguish Article 89(2). You avoid the redundancy argument by saying that “[t]he answer is that the general suspension under Art. 95 only applies where there is a challenge to admissibility made to the ICC under Articles 18 and 19. However, the situtaion contemplated in Art. 89(2) is slightly different as it relates to a challenge made in a national court but related to ne bis in idem as provided for in Article 20.” That implies that there is a difference between a ne bis in idem challenge that a suspect would bring at the ICC (which falls under Article 19) and a ne bis in idem challenge that a suspect would bring at the national level (which falls under Article 19). Yet I see nothing in the Rome Statute that allows a suspect to challenge admissibility in a national court on the basis of ne bis in idem (except when he has been previously tried by the ICC, which is not the case for Article 89(2), where the duty to surrender a suspect to the Court is at issue). I don’t even understand what such a challenge would look like, except in the sense that a suspect is asking the state to challenge admissibility on his behalf in order to avoid surrendering him, because he has already been tried by that state — in which case I don’t see any functional difference between the suspect challenging admissibility and the state doing so.
In other words, I don’t see how the ICC will ever deal with an admissibility challenge that is brought under something other than Article 19. So if Article 95 is not limited to requests for evidence, as the second clause implies, and requires suspension whenever “there is an admissibility challenge under consideration by the Court pursuant to article 18 or 19,” then Article 89(2) remains redundant.
Finally, the comment: I think there is a strong policy reason not to read Article 95 as you and Jens do, because it makes it easier for states to shield their nationals from the ICC for impermissible reasons. A state that is completely committed to the ICC will bring a good-faith admissibility challenge and then turn the suspect over if it loses. A state that wants to shield a suspect from justice, however, will simply hold on to the suspect — as you believe Article 95 permits — and then not turn him over if it loses its admissibility challenge. It thus makes more sense to require states to turn the suspect over as a condition of bringing an admissibility challenge. Why should the Court go to the time and effort of addressing admissibility when there is little if any hope (see, e.g., Sudan) that the state will comply with a finding that goes against the state
Damn it. The second “Article 19” in the first paragraph should be “Article 89(2).”
November 27, 2011 at 3:00
Good stuff. My remark to Kevins OJ posting runs along the same line, i think.
Thanks for the question and comment. With regard to your question, it is worth noting that my point about Art. 89(2) dealing with ne bis in idem challenges in national courts (while Art. 95 deals with admissiblity challenges before the ICC) is taken directly from the text of that provision. That is what the provison says. You’re right that there is no where else in the Statute that speaks about such a challenge being made in a national court. However, that is not to say that the accused, where he has been previously tried, will not make this point in a national court. So, I imagine that Art. 89(2) should be regarded as the provision that explicitly contemplates this possibility and makes provision for it. You ask what the challenge would look like. I suppose that would depend on national law. However, whatever it looks like Art. 89(2) states that the State is to consult with the Court. I’m not sure this can be regarded as a challenge to admissibility by the State. At best I would regard it as an invitation by the State for the ICC to consider admissibility on its own motion where it has not previously been challenged. Incidentally, this is similar to what has happened in the ICJ on one or two occasions where States have invited the ICJ to order provisional measures propio motu. I think either the LaGrand case or the similar Paraguay v US case on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was such a case. It is actually important that the consultation under Art. 89(2) not be regarded as a challenge to admissibility by the State. This is because, if it is, then the Prosecutor is required to suspend the investigation (under Art. 19(7)) while this does not seem to be required where the Court considers admissibility propio motu.
I agree with your comment when you say that the reading the Statute in the way in which I read it would give room to a State that wishes to shield a suspect to delay surrender simply by bringing an admissibility challenge. While it might have been better to require the State to first turn over the suspect, I think the drafters took the principle of complementarity seriously and I would not assume that the overriding goal was to simply ensure trial by the ICC. The context of the provisions regarding admssibility challenges suggests to me that there isn’t this assumption that the Court just continues with its processes while an admissibility challenge is ongoing. This is why I started my analysis above of Art. 95 by referring to Art. 19(7). That provision states that:
“If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) or (c), the Prosecutor shall suspend the investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in accordance with article 17.”
This means that an admissibility challenge by a State (at least one before prosecution commennces, whatever that may mean) effectively brings the case to a halt until that admissibility challenge is determined. Also we agree that Art. 95 would also suspend the State’s other obligations to comply with requests. Given this context, it is not at all obvious that the singular obligation to surrender should continue while everything else is frozen. In any event, though a State acting in bad faith can use the provision to suspend it’s obligations those obligations are only suspended. The obligation will resume if the admissiblity challenge fails. I suppose if the provisions are construed the way in which I read them, this will provide an incentive for the Court to move swiftly.
November 29, 2011 at 5:44
Dapo, great post. I have added another level of complication here: http://www.liebercode.org/2011/11/libya-death-penalty-can-icc-complain.html
Specifically, if the defendants are sent to The Hague immediately, and Libyan subsequently wins an admissibility challenge, would the ICC really send them back to face the death penalty?
November 29, 2011 at 13:25
I’ve been following the discussions over at Opinio Juris and here with some interest. To me, though, it seems to key issue is whether the ICC can exercise jurisdiction, not whether Libya is under an obligation to surrender Saif. Perhaps my general principles of international law are a bit rusty, but isn’t the effect of art 17(1)(a) that if Libya is in a position to prosecute, the Court has no jurisdiction? I’m curious about the relationship between Res 1970 and this provision. Can Res 1970 override the Statute? I can see how art 17(1)(a) will pose no problem if the State is a lawless, but in a situation where it appears Libya is considering trying Saif itself, can Res 1970 really make inactive provisions of the Statute? I can see how – if this is the case – that the ICC could effectively be made a malleable puppet by the UNSC. If the UNSC declared a provision in the Statute inactive, for instance, isn’t this a similar situation in that the Statute has been overridden? I’m curious to hear your thoughts.
February 24, 2012 at 5:14
Dapo, Kevin, Jens – These are all wonderful arguments. It is a treat to see three great minds weaving these intricate provisions into slightly different patterns. I sympathized with the laments about drafting by committees, but alas there is no other known way to produce a treaty!
May I venture to lay out what I believe is the scheme? I think it supposed to be simple and beautiful. I may match up here with Dapo and possibly Jens:
1) there is a general ongoing obligation to cooperate & execute requests (arts 86-89)
2) exception: can postpone during admissiblity challenge (art 95)
3) however you still have to cooperate where investigative steps for collecting/preserving evidence pending the admissiblity determination are authorized (art 95, 19) (great point by Dapo re accidental gap re orders re ‘absconding’).
And the following provisions are not part of the picture here:
4) Art 89(4), 94 aren’t part of the picture because those concern pursuit of a different ‘case’; admissibility (Art 17) is about the (same) ‘case’.
5) Art 89(2) is where a ne bis in idem challenge is brought in national courts. Such a challenge is commonly available in in extradition legislation, and thus would be available if states use an extradition template, or have something similar in their surrender legislation, or if it is available as a constitutional right. In Canada, for example, a person could always challenge extradition or surrender by claiming “autrefois acquit/autrefois convict” (it’s a Charter right). 89(2) says if such a challenge is made, check if admissibility has been raised at the ICC, and if it has, then let the ICC determination govern.
You can’t challenge ‘admissibility’ in a Canadian (or other) extradition hearing because there is no such concept in domestic criminal law. You can however bring a ne bis in idem challenge in the extradition laws of many countries, because it is a human right.
February 27, 2012 at 1:42
Hi John Smith, I noticed you’ve posted your question in a couple of places, so maybe I can help you a bit.
First, Article 17 doesn’t affect ‘jurisdiction’ per se. The ICC has concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of its Statute, the UNSC resolution, and Libya’s acceptance of UNSC powers under the UN Charter. Article 17 can however operate to render a particular case “inadmissible”, meaning that the ICC won’t exercise the jurisdiction that it clearly has.
Second, you are mostly correct about the significance of Article 17. Your references to Libya “being in a position” or “considering” prosecuting suggests that you might have fallen prey to a popular and persistent misquoting of Article 17. What Article 17(1)(a) expressly requires is a showing that “the case is being investigated or prosecuted”, for example by Libya. *If* that is done, then the case will be inadmissible, *unless* it is shown that Libya is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the proceeding. But you are right about the outcome: if Libya investigates and prosecutes the case, then the case is inadmissible at the ICC (unless Libya is unwilling or unable to carry it out genuinely).
However, procedurally, this consequence of inadmissibility requires an inadmissibility determination. There are several ways this can happen, including inter alia if Libya brings a challenge. What Dapo, Kevin and Jens David are discussing is what happens to the obligation to surrender pending that determination.