Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/94/539/602531/
Timestamp: 2019-08-17 15:17:50
Document Index: 757865941

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 64', '§ 2960', '§ 2945', '§ 1330', '§ 1603', '§ 1605', '§ 1651']

96 Cal. Daily Op. Ser v. 6256, 96 Daily Journald.a.r. 10,256in Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation.maximo Hilao, Class Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Defendant,republic of the Philippines, a Non-party Specificallyidentified As Subject to the Preliminaryinjunction, Appellant.in Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation.maximo Hilao, Class Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Defendant,republic of the Philippines, a Non-party Specificallyidentified As Subject to the Preliminaryinjunction, Appellant, 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1996 › 96 Cal. Daily Op. Ser v. 6256, 96 Daily Journald.a.r. 10,256in Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human R...
96 Cal. Daily Op. Ser v. 6256, 96 Daily Journald.a.r. 10,256in Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation.maximo Hilao, Class Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Defendant,republic of the Philippines, a Non-party Specificallyidentified As Subject to the Preliminaryinjunction, Appellant.in Re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation.maximo Hilao, Class Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Defendant,republic of the Philippines, a Non-party Specificallyidentified As Subject to the Preliminaryinjunction, Appellant, 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 94 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1996)
Argued and Submitted Feb. 13, 1995 in No. 94-16739. Submitted June 18, 1996* in No. 95-15259. Decided Aug. 22, 1996
A number of lawsuits were filed against the Marcos family in American courts. Among them were five suits filed in the Northern District of California and the District of Hawai'i by individuals alleging that they or their relatives had been arrested, tortured, or executed by military intelligence personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos in 1971. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Estate II "), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 934, 130 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1995). The district courts dismissed all five suits on the ground that the Act of State doctrine precluded liability. Id.
Meanwhile, in a separate action filed in the Central District of California, the Republic sued the Estate and Imelda Marcos, asserting RICO and pendent state law claims, and seeking the recovery of $1.55 billion allegedly plundered from the Philippines treasury. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1987), reheard en banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035, 109 S. Ct. 1933, 104 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1989). On 25 June 1986, the district court enjoined the Marcoses and their associates from disposing of any assets anywhere in the world. We affirmed the injunction. 862 F.2d at 1358.
We review a district court's grant of permanent injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion or application of erroneous legal principles. United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1994). The existence of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a question of law reviewed de novo. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017, 113 S. Ct. 1812, 123 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1993).
" [W]here a permanent injunction has been granted that supersedes the original preliminary injunction, the interlocutory injunction becomes merged in the final decree and the appeal from the interlocutory preliminary order is properly dismissed." Continental Training Services, Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks, emendations, and citations omitted). See also Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 588-89, 46 S. Ct. 408, 408-09, 70 L. Ed. 747 (1926) (appeal from interlocutory injunction dismissed where injunction became merged in final decree, appeal of which was also pending before Court); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 979 F.2d 1338, 1340 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Once an order of permanent injunction is entered, the preliminary injunction merges with it and appeal may be had only from the order of permanent injunction."); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Mount Vernon Memorial Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S. Ct. 2037, 72 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1982) (dismissing appeal from denial of preliminary injunction where district court subsequently dismissed relevant count of complaint for failure to state a claim and appeal of that dismissal was before the court); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 637 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Because the [district] court later entered a permanent injunction, which we affirm, the appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction is moot."); Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury, 98 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1938) (same). We therefore dismiss the appeal in No. 94-16739 as moot.
The injunction clearly confronts the Republic with the choice of either conforming its conduct to the dictates of the injunction or ignoring the injunction and risking contempt proceedings. This constitutes sufficient injury-in-fact to give the Republic standing to challenge the injunction even in the absence of an actual finding of contempt against it. See, e.g., Associated Business Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 861 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1988) (preliminary injunction appealable if failure to comply would be enforced by contempt proceeding).
While Rule 65(d) indeed automatically makes the injunction against the Estate binding upon persons "in active concert or participation with" the Estate who have actual notice of the injunction, the district court went further by specifically finding that the Republic is such a person and thus expressly binding it by the injunction. However, in order to enforce this injunction against the Republic, through, for example, contempt proceedings, the district court would have to have personal jurisdiction over the Republic. See Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir.) (contempt order and assessment of $2.6 million in sanctions reversed where district court lacked personal jurisdiction over contemnor), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 276, 133 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1995). See also 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 64 ("It is essential to the power to punish for contempt that the court ... have jurisdiction of the person."); 11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2960 (1995) (" [W]hen it is sought to charge a person with contempt who was not a party to the original action and thus not already within the jurisdiction of the court, that party must be served with process as in any other civil action."). An injunction against the Republic in the absence of personal jurisdiction over it would be futile, as the court would be powerless to enforce its injunction.
A court should not issue an unenforceable injunction: "The rule that a 'court of equity will not issue an unenforceable decree of injunction' comprehends [as a] reason [ ] for denying injunctive relief [ ] that the court ... does not have the means to punish disobedience once discovered." Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting "Developments in the Law--Injunctions", 78 Harv. L. Rev. 994, 1012 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 550, 57 S. Ct. 592, 601, 81 L. Ed. 789 (1937) (" [A] court of equity may refuse to give any relief when it is apparent that that which it can give will not be effective or of benefit to the plaintiff."); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Family Heritage Home-Beaver Dam, Inc., 491 F.2d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Ordinarily a court would not grant an injunction requiring affirmative action in the face of a serious assertion that the decree will be meaningless because it can no longer be carried out, without inquiry into the truth of such assertion."); 11A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2945 (" [T]he court may decide that it lacks the necessary power to enforce a decree so that issuing one might prove to be a futile gesture.").
In order to determine whether the attempt to enjoin the Republic was futile, we must examine whether the district court could have personal jurisdiction over the Republic. The FSIA is the sole basis for jurisdiction over a foreign state.9 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434, 109 S. Ct. 683, 688, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1989). Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state depends on subject-matter jurisdiction over the action against the foreign state under the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). " [P]ersonal jurisdiction, like subject-matter jurisdiction, exists only when one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity in [the FSIA] applies." Id. at 428, 435 n. 3, 109 S. Ct. at 683, 688 n. 3 (1989).
Hilao claims that both the commercial activity and waiver exceptions of the FSIA apply. Once a plaintiff offers evidence that one of the FSIA's exceptions to immunity applies, the party claiming immunity bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception does not apply. Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905, 108 S. Ct. 1077, 99 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1988).
The commercial character of an activity "shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). " [T]he issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.' " Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2166, 119 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1992). " [T]he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives." Id. The central question is "whether the activity is of a kind in which a private party might engage." Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1024.10
A foreign state is not immune from suit if it "has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication...." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1). "The FSIA's waiver exception 'is narrowly construed.' " Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 720 (quoting Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1022). " [C]ourts have found such waivers in cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular country should govern a contract. An implicit waiver would also include a situation where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense of sovereign immunity." H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6617.
Hilao also makes an argument for waiver based upon the Republic's signing of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), Article 14 of which states in part that " [e]ach State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation." Hilao contends that the Republic must have contemplated adjudication of torture claims in the U.S. when it ratified the treaty. Even if the Philippines does have a duty under the Convention to help in the redress of torture and other abuses committed by the Marcoses against citizens of the Republic, the Convention does not mandate that such redress occur in the United States courts. We conclude that the waiver exception does not apply.
Hilao v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989), and Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989)
The Republic presented evidence that the Marcoses transported to Hawai'i stolen cash, negotiable instruments, jewels, and other property worth $8.2 million. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1362. The property included 22 crates of currency that were immediately impounded by the U.S. Customs Service. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d at 1475, reheard en banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988). The Central Bank of the Philippines filed suit in Hawai'i to recover the cash, negotiable instruments, and gold in the crates. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, Civil No. 86-0155 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986)
Hilao suggests that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, authorized the court to take steps to effectuate the court's previous orders. However, the All Writs Act "is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling." Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43, 106 S. Ct. 355, 361, 88 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1985). Here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and the FSIA specifically address the issue at hand and thus are controlling
In addition to the suit in the Central District of California, see also Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986) (suit to recover and enjoin transfer of four buildings and suburban estate in New York), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S. Ct. 2178, 95 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1987); Sotheby's, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpleader action in which Republic explicitly waived sovereign immunity to permit court to decide ownership of paintings); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, Civil No. 86-0155 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986) (suit by Central Bank to recover cash, gold and negotiable instruments impounded from Marcos by U.S. Customs)