Source: http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/Opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=25148
Timestamp: 2013-05-25 21:25:35
Document Index: 792010796

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 6']

AGO 2010 No. 4 - February 05, 2010
The state constitution vests authority in the legislature to direct the number of judges of the superior court. A county legislative authority wishing to reduce the number of existing judgeships may work with the legislature to accomplish that result.*****************************
February 5, 2010 Jeff Hall
Olympia, WA 98504-1170 Cite As:
AGO 2010 No. 4 Dear Mr. Hall:By letter previously acknowledged, you have requested our opinion on the following question:When an existing, authorized superior court judge position becomes vacant, does the county have authority to eliminate the position?BRIEF ANSWER No. The state constitution authorizes the legislature to direct the number of judges for each superior court. A county legislative authority desiring to reduce the number may work with the legislature to accomplish this result through a statutory change.ANALYSIS Your question presents a purely legal issue, and only a limited factual background is necessary in order to place that issue into context. A judge of the Pierce County Superior Court resigned effective November 16, 2009. Citing difficult budgetary circumstances, the Pierce County Council adopted an ordinance stating that the vacant position was eliminated. Pierce County Ordinance 2009-105. You ask whether a county has the authority to eliminate a position on the superior court when that position becomes vacant. [1] We conclude that the state
More recently, the legislature has granted a limited role to the county legislative authority regarding the initial decision to create new positions, but has not suggested that counties have any authority to eliminate positions after they are created. The usual formulation of such statutory language has been to make the effectiveness of the new position contingent upon the county’s approval of the new positions and agreement to accept the associated costs. The legislature did this for the first time in 1980, when it authorized additional positions on the King County Superior Court. Laws of 1980, ch. 183, § 1 (amending RCW 2.08.061 by conditioning approval of new positions upon county approval and agreement to accept the associated costs). As an additional example, when the legislature authorized the creation of Pierce County’s fourteenth and fifteenth superior court positions, it made their effectiveness contingent upon the approval of the county’s legislative authority:The additional judicial positions created by sections 1 and 2 of this act in Pierce and Clark counties shall be effective only if, prior to January 1, 1987, each county through its duly constituted legislative authority documents its approval of the additional positions and its agreement that it will pay out of county funds, without reimbursement from the state, the expenses of such additional judicial positions as provided by statute. The additional expenses include, but are not limited to, expenses incurred for court facilities.Laws of 1985, ch. 357, § 4 (uncodified); see also Laws of 1989, ch. 328, § 5 (uncodified) (same for Pierce County’s sixteenth through nineteenth superior court positions). The legislature continues to use this approach. See, e.g., Laws of 2007, ch. 95 (dividing the joint superior court for San Juan and Island Counties into two, one for each county, and adding one judge, contingent upon the agreement of both counties to assume the associated costs).
The legislature has varied that language on some occasions. For example, when it authorized the creation of Pierce County’s most recently-added superior court positions, the legislature provided: The additional positions created by section 3 of this act for the county of Pierce, take effect as follows: One additional judicial position is effective January 1, 1998; two positions are effective January 1, 1999; and two positions are effective January 1, 2000. The actual starting dates for these positions may be established by the Pierce county council upon request of the superior court and by recommendation of the Pierce county executive.Laws of 1997, ch. 347, § 4 (uncodified). The legislature’s historical pattern of increasing the number of superior court judges by statutory amendment results in a series of five current statutes, authorizing various numbers of judges for each county. RCW 2.08.061 (number of judges for King, Spokane, and Pierce Counties); RCW 2.08.062 (same for Chelan, Douglas, Clark, Grays Harbor, Kitsap, Kittitas, and Lewis Counties); RCW 2.08.063 (same for Lincoln, Skagit, Walla Walla, Whitman, Yakima,
Adams, and Whatcom Counties); RCW 2.08.064 (same for Benton, Franklin, Clallam, Jefferson, Snohomish, Asotin, Columbia, Garfield, Cowlitz, Klickitat, and Skamania Counties); RCW 2.08.065 (same for Grant, Ferry, Okanogan, Mason, Thurston, Pacific, Wahkiakum, Pend Orielle, Stevens, San Juan, and Island Counties). The statute applicable to Pierce County, among others, provides: There shall be in the county of King no more than fifty-eight judges of the superior court; in the county of Spokane thirteen judges of the superior court; and in the county of Pierce twenty-four judges of the superior court.RCW 2.08.061. The number of judicial positions on each superior court is, accordingly, a matter of statute. The legislature’s recent practice of conditioning effectiveness of new positions upon county approval and agreement to accept the associated costs does not alter the constitutional assignment to the legislature of authority to “direct” the number of judges on each superior court. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 5. The role of the county under these statutory formulations is limited to the initial approval of the positions. Until the legislature began conditioning the effectiveness of new positions upon county approval, new judicial positions were simply created directly by statutory amendment. Under most of the recent legislative enactments, new positions were not created unless the county’s legislative authority approved, and agreed to pay the resulting costs. See, e.g., Laws of 1985, ch. 357, § 4. Under the 1997 legislation quoted above, the legislature did not explicitly condition the new positions upon county approval, but allowed the county legislative authority to establish the starting dates for new positions. See, e.g., Laws of 1997, ch. 347, § 4. In both approaches, the legislature included this language only in uncodified sections, and not in permanent statute. See RCW 1.04.010 (describing the RCW as including “all the laws of the state of a general and permanent nature”). The statutes, thus, only afford the county legislative authority a role in the approval of new positions; they do not suggest or imply any authority for a county to eliminate positions after they have been created. The statutory language speaks only to initial creation of new positions, and says nothing more. There is nothing about making the creation of a new position contingent upon a county’s consent to fund it, or to set a starting date for it, that implies any authority to eliminate it later. This is particularly clear with regard to the 1997 act, which discusses only starting dates for new positions.
[original page 5] boundaries, as well. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 6 (superior court process “shall extend to all parts of the state”); RCW 2.08.210 (same); see also RCW 2.08.160 (decisions of judges sitting as visiting judges in other counties have the same effect as if rendered by a judge of that county). The number of judges sitting in each county is not, accordingly, an exclusively local concern. Moreover, it is not clear how an implied power of a county to eliminate a superior court position would apply to a multi-county superior court. There is no statute explaining whether a single county could eliminate such a position, or whether joint action by all affected counties would be required. The best explanation for the absence of such a statute is that there is no implied power for a county to eliminate a superior court position.
Deputy Solicitor Generalwros[1] Your question is not limited to any single county, but because of the recent events in Pierce County, we use that county as an example when reference to a specific county helps to illustrate points relevant to our analysis. We received a thoughtful analysis of the question presented from the chair of the Pierce County Council, which we found helpful in developing our own analysis of the question presented.[2] Most superior courts serve a single county, but there are also a number of multi-county superior courts. In this opinion, we refer to superior court judges serving in a “county,” in order to avoid the repeated use of the phrase, “county or counties” when describing judicial positions.