Source: https://fr.scribd.com/document/1903347/Department-of-Labor-01-9535
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 11:02:16
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31105', '§ 1978', '§ 31105', '§ 31105', '§ 701', '§ 31105', '§ 31105', '§ 31105', '§ 701', '§ 706', '§ 1978', '§ 31105', '§ 1978', '§ 1978', '§ 311']

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T E N T H CIR CU IT
CHARLES L. D A L T O N ,
Petitioner, No. 01-9535
UNITED STATES D E P A R TMENT (Petition for Re view)
O F LABOR,
Res pon dent,
COPART, IN C.,
Petitioner Charles Dalton seeks review of an order of the United States
Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (the Board) dismissing his
complaint against Co part, Inc ., his former employer and the Intervenor in this
This order and judgment is not binding prece dent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estop pel. The court
gene rally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
case. Petitioner contends that Cop art violated the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 (ST A A ) by firing him as a truck driver. The STAA
proh ibits terminating an employee for refusing to oper ate a vehic le when that
employee “has a reaso nable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the
pub lic because of the vehicle’s unsafe con ditio n.” 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (a)(1)(B)(ii).
A n administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed with Petitioner and ordered his
reinstatement with back pa y. O n appeal the Board rejected the AL J’s decision
and dismissed Petitioner’s com plaint. An applic able STAA regulation required
the Board to adopt the AL J’s findings if those findings were supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 29 C.F.R. § 1978.10 9(c)(3).
Because substantial evidence supported dispositive findings by the ALJ, we
reverse the Board ’s order.
Petitioner worked as a salvage hauler for Cop art from January 11, 1999,
until March 4, 1999, when Cop art terminated him for refusing to drive his truck.
His job was to drive one of Cop art’s “haulers” (a large truck with the capa city to
hold three wrecked vehicles on its decks wh ile towing a fou rth vehicle), load
wrecked vehicles onto the hauler, return the vehicles to Cop art’s fa cility, and
unload them. Cop art then auctioned the wrecked vehicles on beha lf of insurance
To load a vehic le onto the hauler, the driver operates contro ls at the side of
the truck that raise and tilt the hauler’s deck by means of a hydrau lic ram. With
these contro ls the driver can also oper ate three hydrau lically driven winches.
Each winch is attached to a cable. The driver attaches the cable to the vehic le he
is loading, tilts the deck of the hauler using the ram, and, using the winch
attached to the cable, pulls the vehic le onto the deck.
The condition of the winches, ram, and cables on Petitioner’s truck is
central to this case. O n the morning Petitioner was terminated, his truck was at
the Frontier International repair shop undergoing brake repairs. Petitioner arrived
at Frontier at about 7:45 a.m. to pick up the truck but was told that it wo uld not
be ready until 10 a.m. H e then drove to Cop art and spoke with his supervisor,
Dan Cupp, Cop art’s yard mana ger. Petitioner testified that he informed Cupp that
the brakes had not yet been repaired, and that no work had been done on the
cables or the ram and winches, which had been reported to be leaking.
According to Petitioner, he told Cupp that the truck was unsafe and had been
“pushed to the limit,” Tr. 96, reminded him that the cables had prev iously been
designated for replac eme nt, and expressed concern that the cables could “snap
anytim e.” Tr. 105. Cupp replied that only the brakes wo uld be repaired that da y,
and told Petitioner that he could either clean out cars in the yard or go home and
wa it for the brake repairs to be completed. Petitioner decided to return to
Frontier to wa it for the truck.
O n the way to Frontier, he stopped at a truck stop and called Craig Gille,
Cop art’s General Ma nager. Petitioner testified that he told Gille of his concerns
that the ram, winches, and cables wo uld not be repaired before he was dispatched,
and Gille replied that he wo uld discuss the matter with Cupp and get back to him.
Petitioner arrived at Frontier shortly after 10 a.m. to determine the status of
the repairs. When the work had not been completed by 10:45 a.m ., he went home
and made an appointment to have the win dshie ld on his personal vehic le repaired.
A t 12:30 p.m. Gille called Petitioner at home and told him that the brakes had
been repaired and the truck was ready to drive. Petitioner’s version of the
remainder of the conversation was as follows: He asked Gille whether the leaks
or cables had been repaired. Gille replied that they had not, but were scheduled
to be repaired in a few days. Gille also said that, according to Cupp, the leaks
and cables were not safety concerns. Petitioner countered that the truck was
“extre mely dangerous” without those repairs. Tr. 101. Gille told Petitioner to
return to work and drive the truck or he wo uld be terminated. Petitioner
reiterated his concerns about the safety of the cables and the leaks, and also told
Gille that he had scheduled someone to come to his house that afternoon to repair
his personal vehicle. Gille then terminated Petitioner for refusing to drive the
truck. (Copa rt’s witnesses testified that Petitioner did not raise safety concerns
prior to his term inati on.)
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labo r, alleging that he
was fired in violation of the S T AA because his refusal to drive the truck was
based on a reaso nable apprehension of serious injury as a result of the truck’s
unsafe condition. See 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (a)(1)(B)(ii). After an initial
investigation the Secretary issued findings concluding that Cop art had not
violated the S T A A in discharging Petitioner. Petitioner objected to the findings
and requested a hearing under 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (b)(2)(B).
A one-day de novo hearing was then held before an ALJ on May 10, 2000.
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a Recommended Decision and Order
( R DO ) concluding that Petitioner’s termination violated the STAA. Sp ec ifi ca lly,
the ALJ found that Petitioner had a reaso nable apprehension of serious injury due
to the unsafe condition of (1) the truck’s cables and (2) hydrau lic leaks on the
truck’s winches and ram.
O n appeal the Board issued a Final Decision and Order ( FDO) reversing the
ALJ. The Board concluded that there was not substantial evidence in the record
as a wh ole to support the AL J’s findings that it was reaso nable for Petitioner to
apprehend serious injury with respect to either the cables or the leaks.
Acc ording ly, it rejected the AL J’s RDO and dismissed Petitioner’s com plaint.
Petitioner then sought review in this court under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 and 49
U.S.C. § 31105 (c).
A. The S T A A
Under the S T A A it is unlawful for an employer to “discharge an employee
. . . [who] refuses to oper ate a vehic le because . . . the employee has a reaso nable
apprehension of serious injury to the employee or the pub lic because of the
vehicle’s unsafe con ditio n.” 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (a)(1)(B)(ii). “[A]n employee’s
apprehension of serious injury is reaso nable only if a reaso nable individual in the
circumstances then confronting the employee wo uld conclude that the unsafe
condition establishes a real danger of accid ent, injury, or serious impairment to
health. To qualify for protection, the employee must have sought from the
employer, and been unab le to obtain, correction of the unsafe con ditio n.” Id.
§ 31105 (a)(2).
Thus, to establish a claim under this section, Petitioner must show that (1)
he refused to oper ate his truck because he was apprehensive of an unsafe
condition on the truck; (2) his apprehension was objec tively reasonable; (3) he
sought to have Cop art correct the condition; and (4) Cop art failed to do so. See
Brink’s, Inc. v. Herman , 148 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1998). Elem ents 1 and 2 are
the only matters that the parties address in their briefs on appe al.
W e review the Board ’s final order in accordance with the standards of the
Administrative Proced ure Act (APA ), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. W e must sustain the
Board ’s decision unless it is “a rbitra ry, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law ,” or “unsupported by substantial evid enc e.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A ), (E). See BSP Trans, Inc. v. United States Dep ’t of Labor,
160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998).
In turn, under S T A A regulations the Board must consider the AL J’s factual
findings “conclusive” if those findings are “supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a wh ole.” 29 C.F.R. § 1978.10 9(c)(3). Thus, although
under § 31105(c) of the S T A A we are authorized to review only the Board ’s
decision, in reviewing that decision
w e must also determine whether under the STAA [regulations, the
Board] was bound by the AL J’s findings of fact. If there was
substantial evidence to support the AL J’s findings, then the [Board’s]
refusal to treat them as conclusive was contrary to [29 C.F.R.
§ 1978.10 9(c)(3)] and [its] decision must be set aside.
Ca stle Coal & Oil Co. v. Reich, 55 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995); accord BSP Trans,
Inc., 160 F.3d at 46. In other words, “if we determine that the AL J’s decision
was based on substantial evidence, we must reverse the [Board] and order that the
AL J’s decision be adopted; this is so even if the [Board’s] decision was also
based on substantial evid enc e.” Brink’s, Inc., 148 F.3d at 179. (W e note that the
parties do not challenge the validity of the regulation mandating deference to the
AL J’s findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. At least
one comm entator, how ever, has questioned whether the regulation conf licts with
the A P A . See Ro nald M . Levin, The Year in Judicial Review, 1997-1998, 51
Admin. L. Rev. 389, 398 (1999) (“Normally, when an agency head and ALJ
disagree, the issue is whether the agency head’s position rests on substantial
evidence. And the S T A A provided that judicial review shou ld be in accordance
with the AP A . It is not clear that an agency can alter this review standard by
regulation; indeed, neither the text nor the administrative history of the
Secretary’s regulation had directly stated an intention of doing so.”) (footnotes
om itted .) W e express no view on the ma tter.)
W e must therefore determine whether substantial evidence supp orts the
AL J’s finding that Petitioner had a reaso nable apprehension of serious injury as a
result of the truck’s unsafe condition. “Substantial evidence requires more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by such evidence that a
reaso nable mind might accept to support the con clus ion .” Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d
222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the
determination of whether substantial evidence supp orts the AL J’s decision “is not
simp ly a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed
by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere con clus ion .” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the “sub stantiality of evidence must take into
account whatever in the record fairly detrac ts from its we igh t.” Universal
Cam era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
After examining the entire record, we conclude that substantial evidence
supp orts the AL J’s finding that Petitioner had a reaso nable apprehension of
serious injury with respect to the truck’s cables. Since the Board did not adopt
this finding, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1978.10 9(c)(3), its decision was not in
accordance with law and must be reversed. See BSP Trans, 160 F.3d at 46; Ca stle
Coal, 55 F.3d at 44. W e need not consider whether the AL J’s findings regarding
the leaks are supported by substantial evidence.
The Board ’s focus in its F DO was on whether it wo uld have been
reaso nable for Petitioner to fear danger from the cables. Therefore, we begin
with that issue. Petitioner needed to convince the ALJ that a reaso nable person
could believe that the cables posed a significant dange r. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 311 05(a )(1)(B )(ii) (employee must prove a “reaso nable apprehension of serious
injury”); Yellow Freight Sys ., Inc. v. Reich, 38 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 1994)
(apprehension of danger can be reaso nable even if post-incident inspection sho w s
no safety defect).
Petitioner’s evidence on the condition of the cables included (1) a Cop art
survey of the truck on Februa ry 4, 1999 (one mo nth before his termination); (2)
his o w n tes tim on y; and (3) testimony by the two men who replaced the cables the
day after his termination. During the survey of Petitioner’s truck, Jim Pow ell,
Cop art’s National Fleet and Saf ety Ma nager, inspected the truck, rated its various
com pon ents according to Cop art’s rating scale, and made handwritten com men ts
on Cop art’s “Truck Su rvey” form. Cop art’s rating scale is printed on the form:
“Rating: 3=M eets Standard in ALL Areas; 2=G enera lly Good, Needs Some
Imp rove men t; 1=Not Meeting Standards, Needs Imm ediate Attention; N/A=N ot
Applicable; R=Not Rated During the Insp ectio n.” Resp’t Ex. 5. Pow ell assigned
a “3” rating to 21 com pon ents on Petitioner’s truck, a “2” to 4 componen ts, and a
“1” to 10 componen ts. H e rated the truck’s “Winch and Cables” a “2,” with the
comment “Add T latch to hooks/ #3 winch replace cab le.” Id. Pow ell testified
that his notation “replace cable” meant that the cable shou ld be replaced at the
next scheduled 8,000 mile service. He assumed that replacement wo uld occur in
one or t w o months, depending on the truck’s driving histo ry. The record contains
no mileage figures for the truck, but revea ls that apart from the cables, all
com pon ents that received a “2” rating were repaired on either Februa ry 24 or
Februa ry 26. The cables were replaced on March 5, the day after Petitioner’s
Petitioner testified that the cables needed replacement and could have
“snap[ped] anytim e.” Tr. 105. He explained that under “ideal conditions” a cable
can last three months, but that
when you’re hauling salvage vehicles, you’re messing with mangled
meta l. . . . With a job like this, when you’re hauling wrecked
vehicles, [a cable] could [snap] in three weeks, because . . . there’s
times whe re wh eels are crunched and frames are bent under. . . .
[Y]ou never know what you’re picking up from day to da y. So
they’re just pulling against one another, metal against the rope cable,
and rope as in wire.
H e illustrated that point by describing an incident when a cable snapped
wh ile he was hauling a wrecked vehic le for Co part. Petitioner testified that on
January 20, 1999, tw o cables on his truck needed replac eme nt, but only one was
replaced. That same day the cable that was not replaced snapped:
I was picking up the very first vehicle. I was pulling it to the top,
which [sic] it’s under pretty intense pressure. It snapped . . . . As
soon as it let go, it came whipping straight back towards me. I hit
Petitioner received corroboration from Bill Vincent and Joey Tipton, the
Industrial Splicing Co. repairmen who replaced the cables on Petitioner’s truck on
March 5. They testified that the cables were in “bad sha pe,” Tr. 63, 80, had “bent
wires and broken strands and kinked cab les,” Tr. 63 (Tipton), were “smashed or
broken in some places, [with] kinks, burs, broken wires, et cete ra,” Tr. 78
(Vincen t), and were in danger of breaking. Tr. 63, 79. Vincent stated that the
cables “cou ld break today [or] . . . two da ys from now. . . . It could be any time .”
The ALJ credited this evidence, explic itly finding Petitioner, Tipton, and
Vincent to be believ able witnesses. According to the ALJ, their tes tim on y,
coupled with evidence of Cop art’s Februa ry 4 su rvey, established that the cables
were in disrep air on March 4.
The Board rejected the AL J’s finding regarding the condition of the cables.
It based its rejection on Cop art’s evidence and on its own assessment of
Petitioner’s evidence as incredible. According to the Board, both Petitioner and
the ALJ had “f un da men tal[ly] misund er[stood]” Cop art’s Februa ry 4 survey and
rating system, since “[a] ‘2’ rating, such as Pow ell gave to the winches/cables
item, signified that there was no current defect needing repair, but that the item
shou ld be dealt with at the next routine maintenance—w hich usua lly occurred at
8,000 mile inter vals .” F D O at 14. The Board pointed to Pow ell’s testimony that
wh ile one of the cables had shown signs of wear during the inspection, it was not
The Board did not explain, how ever, why the ALJ was required to credit
Pow ell’s tes tim on y. Nor, more im po rta ntly, did it expla in why Pow ell’s
assessment of the cables’ condition on Februa ry 4 had to hold true on March 4,
particu larly when (1) Cop art failed to produce mileage records for the truck and
(2) the fact that the other com pon ents rated as “2” had been replaced in late
Februa ry sugg ests that the truck had indeed traveled 8,000 miles since Pow ell’s
A s further evidence that the cables were not defective, the Board relied on
the testimony of Ke ith M itchell, the service manager of the Frontier repair shop,
which worked on the truck’s winches the day of Petitioner’s termination.
M itchell stated that (1) in order to repair the winches it was necessary to remove
the cables; (2) it was Frontier’s practice to inspect the cables and to notify the
customer of any safety problems; and (3) nothing was brought to his attention
regarding the cables on Petitioner’s truck. But M itchell did not testify that he
perso nally inspected the cables on the date in question, and he agreed that
Frontier does not specialize in cable repair but leaves that “up to the cable
spe cialis ts.” Tr. 231. And again, the Board did not expla in why the ALJ was
required to believe Mitche ll’s tes tim on y, which the ALJ found to be “clear ly not
credib le in some area s.” R D O at 30.
A s for the testimony of Tipton and Vin cent, who were cable spec ialists and
perso nally inspected the cables shortly after Petitioner’s termination, the Board
com pletely discounted their assertions that the cables were in “bad sha pe,”
believing that the testimony “pro perly cannot be given any weight . . . [because]
neither of them could recall [Petitioner’s] truc k.” FDO at 15. The Board noted
that both had erron eous ly testified that Petitioner’s truck had five cables, when in
fact it had only three. W e disagree, how ever, that this error in recall in itself so
undermined their credib ility that the ALJ could not rely on their testimony that the
cables were defective. Although their memories had dimmed regarding the
number of cables on Petitioner’s truck, evidence at the hearing could reaso nably
be viewed as explaining how they could still recall the cables’ condition.
According to Vin cent, Petitioner returned to the shop to discuss the condition of
the cables shortly after he replaced them, and soon thereafter asked Vincent to
write d o wn his impressions of the cables. The record also contains written
statem ents by Vincent and Tipton dated July 1999, which attest to the cables’
In its brief on appeal the Board notes an additional weakness in Tipton’s
tes tim on y, one not addressed in its decision. Tipton testified that the cables on
Petitioner’s truck had three broken wires per cable strand, but he also testified
that it is five broken wires per cable strand that prese nts a safety concern. This
tes tim on y, how ever, is not nece ssarily inconsistent with Tipton’s conclusion that
the cables were dangerous, since Vincent testified without contradiction that
broken wires or kinks make a cable dangerous, and both repairmen testified that
the cables were kinked on the day that they were replaced. In any even t, Tipton
and Vincent each insisted that the cables were in bad shape.
In short, the Board has failed to persuade us that there was not substantial
evidence to support the AL J’s finding that the cables were defective when
Petitioner was terminated. The Board erred in rejecting that finding.
A s for the dangerousness of defective cables, Petitioner relied in part on his
o w n tes tim on y. Petitioner described the “frightening” incident in January 1999 in
which he claimed that a snapped cable had nearly “taken off a limb ,” and
remarked, “I’ve seen it whe re peop le have lost limbs. I’ve seen it whe re peop le
have been decapitated with a snapped cab le.” Tr. 105.
In addition, Tipton and Vincent testified about the dange rs of defective
cables. Tipton stated that if a cable snapped it could hurt, and poss ibly kill, a
person standing ne arby. Vincent concurred, stating that a cable could break and
“hurt the driver or anyone behind it.” Tr. 79.
This tes tim on y, if believed, is substantial evidence that defective cables are
dangerous. The ALJ credited the tes tim on y. The Board, how ever, did not,
relying on the testimony of Cop art’s engineer Pow ell, and dismissing Petitioner’s
account of the “snapping cable incide nt” as “inhe rently incr edib le.” FDO at 18.
Pow ell testified that the truck’s winches were designed to pull a maximum
of 4,800 pounds, wh ile the cables attached to them could pull 15,000 pounds.
The Board construed this testimony to mean that “absent significant failure of the
cable, the winch wo uld fail under a much lower load than wo uld the cab le.” Id. at
14. The Board ’s interpretation of Pow ell’s testimony is not , how ever,
inconsistent with the AL J’s conclusion that defective cables are dangerous;
indeed, it supp orts the determination that a “sign ifican t” cable failure can pose a
dange r.
The Board ’s rejection of Petitioner’s account of the “snapping cable
incide nt” was based in part on his failure to provide “deta ils that might have lent
credib ility to his claim .” F D O at 18. But Cop art never attempted to impeach
Petitioner on this point by asking questions that could have elicited such details.
Nor did Cop art produce docu men ts that could have confirmed or disproved that a
cable had indeed snapped on one of its trucks in January 1999.
The Board ’s rejection of Petitioner’s story was also based on testimony by
Pow ell. According to the Board, Pow ell stated that the “incident could not have
happened as [Petitioner] described it, because when a cable snaps the end
attached to the winch wo uld fly back in the direction of the winch—w hich wo uld
be in the direction of the cab of the truck and not to the side whe re [Petitioner]
claimed to have been stan din g.” Id. Pow ell’s actual tes tim on y, how ever, was
more equiv ocal:
Q : So if the cable snapped, wo uld the person operating the contro ls
be in any danger of being hit by a snapped cable?
[Pow ell]: I have yet to see a snapped cable like that do that, come
back and wh ip at a person. It wo uld typica lly go straight up and right
toward the winch.
Tr. 280 (emp hasis added ). Mo reover, Pow ell’s experience with towing was
limited. Although he was an engineer and had five-years’ experience designing
trucks and equipment for a utility co mpa ny, he had been employed by Cop art for
only one year and had never driven a tow truck. Also, he admitted that tow truck
drivers do not alw ays lift vehicles in the manner he described, but must also, for
example, use the cables to lift bum pers or sheet metal to make a vehic le
The Board likewise rejected Petitioner’s assertion that he had “seen it
where peop le have been decapitated with a snapped cab le.” FDO at 17, 18
(emp hasis added ). It viewed his statement with “enormous scepticism” since
Petitioner failed to provide details or corroboration. Id. at 18. But again, Cop art
failed to seek such details by questioning Petitioner about his claim. Mo re
im po rta ntly, Petitioner plaus ibly contends on appeal that he was mere ly testifying
that he had heard about such incide nts occurring, not that he had perso nally
witnessed a decapitation.
In addition, the Board implic itly rejected testimony by Tipton and Vincent
that a snapped cable could injure, even kill, a driver or bystander. As prev iously
noted, the Board refused to accord their testimony “any we ight” because they
were confused about the number of cables on Petitioner’s truck. Yet regardless of
how the Board viewed the reliability of Tipton’s and Vince nt’s testimony about
the condition of the cables on Petitioner’s truck, their knowledge of the danger
from broken cables was not challenged.
Thus, w e are unpersuaded that substantial evidence did not support the
AL J’s finding that defective cables posed a significant dange r.
Fina lly, with respect to the subjective requirement for relief under the
STA A— Petitioner’s actual fear that the cables were dangerous—Petitioner
testified to that fear. A former cow orker, Larry Glass, corroborated Petitioner.
Glass testified that he had overhea rd Petitioner tell his supervisors on March 4
that the truck was unsafe due to its “frayed and worn and kinked” cables. Tr. 30.
The ALJ expr essly found Petitioner and Glass to be credib le witnesses.
To be sure, there is strong impeaching evidence in the record. De spite
Petitioner’s assertions that he feared danger from the cables, he surpris ingly
failed to document his concern. Cop art drivers are required to list all vehic le
defe cts on a Driver’s Ve hicle Inspection Repo rt (DVIR) form and subm it the form
at the end of each shift. Yet his repo rts never expressed any concerns about the
cables, desp ite his repo rts of problems with the truck’s brakes, winches, and ram,
including such repo rts on March 1 and 2. He could offer no explanation for this
Q : But what I am trying to get from you, Mr. Dalton, . . . [if] the
brakes were significant enough to put them on this driver inspection
report and mark they were a safety concern, wasn ’t the cable just as
much of a safety concern to you as these brakes were, if you were
afraid it was going to snap and could kill somebody and deca pitate
And if so, why was it not on your driver inspection report on
March 1 or March 2?
[Petitioner]: That’s a good question.
Q : Sho uld it have been?
[Petitioner]: I shou ld have, from the onse t, written down everything
from the go and n ev er— I shou ld have never, ever not written it
down, because I wou ldn’t have been in the position that I was in.
Wh ile this evidence calls into question Petitioner’s alleged fear that the
cables were dangerous, w e do not believe that it is so damning that it
“overwhelms” the other evidence in his favor, rendering that evidence
insub stantial. See Bowen, 865 F.2d at 224 (“evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence ”). Everyone makes foolish omissions from time
to time. Nor do w e find that the remaining evidence in the record undermines the
AL J’s finding that Petitioner feared serious injury from the cables.
In sum, substantial evidence supported the AL J’s findings regarding
Petitioner’s reaso nable fear of danger from the cables. Under its own regulations,
the Board was required to adopt those findings. Its failure to do so was revers ible
W e REVE RSE the decision of the Board and R E M A N D for proceedings
Entered for the Cou rt
Ha rris L Ha rtz
Circu it Judge
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