Source: https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-oceguera-4
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:39:38
Document Index: 165744714

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2253', '§ 2255', '§ 2255', '§ 2253', '§ 2253', '§ 2255', '§ 2255']

United States v. Oceguera, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:15-CR-1006 | Casetext
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:15-CR-1006 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2018)
United Statesv.Oceguera
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISIONApr 5, 2018
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:15-CR-1006 CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-30
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ALEJANDRO OCEGUERA
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DISMISSING MOTION TO VACATE , SET-ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABLITY
On January 8, 2016, before the PSR was completed, the United States Sentencing Commission issued a press release regarding potential amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for immigration offenses. On January 14, 2016, the Commission sought comments on several proposed amendments including Amendment 802 that revised the text of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, applicable here. The Commission held hearings on February 17 and March 16, 2016. On April 28, 2016, the proposed Amendments were submitted to Congress with an effective date of November 1, 2016. Oceguera was sentenced before the final hearing on proposed Amendment 802, before the language was final, and nine months before its effective date.
www.ussc.gov.about/news/press-releases/january-8-2016.
81 FR 2295-02 at 2308-12.
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20160428_RF.pdf.
The Court discussed the Strickland standard for complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel in its previous Order. In addition, "[g]enerally, counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate future changes in the law; counsel is not required to be clairvoyant." See United States v. Cooks, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Fields, 565 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2009); Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1078-1079 (5th Cir. 1998).
Frazier was sentenced six days before Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). The FSA decreased the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months to 60 months and increased the quantity of drugs that triggered the minimum sentence, which would have substantially decreased Frazier's guideline range and sentencing exposure. Frazier raised the issue on appeal to the Fifth Circuit which held that he was properly sentenced based upon the statute and the guidelines in effect at the time of his sentence. In addition, the Fifth Circuit held that FSA did not indicate that it applied retroactively. On collateral review, Frazier alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a continuance that would have allowed Frazier to be sentenced under the FSA. The district court rejected that argument. At the time of Frazier's sentencing, no action had been taken in the House of Representatives and none was scheduled, nor was there any indication that the President would sign the legislation that had been passed by the Senate five months earlier. This uncertainty lead the district court to conclude that counsel's failure to request a continuance did not constitute deficient performance.
United States v. Frazier, 428 Fed. App'x 479, 480 (5th Cir. 2011). --------
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding "unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Although Oceguera has not yet filed a notice of appeal, the § 2255 Rules instruct this Court to "issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant." Rule 11, § 2255 RULES.
A certificate of appealability (COA) "may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
To warrant a grant of the certificate as to claims denied on their merits, "[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). This standard requires a § 2255 movant to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the issues presented deserved encouragement to proceed further. United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying upon Slack, 529 U.S. at 483-84). As to claims that the district court rejects solely on procedural grounds, the movant must show both that "jurists of reasons would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
Based on the above standards, the Court concludes that Oceguera is not entitled to a COA on his remaining issue. That is, reasonable jurists could not debate the Court's resolution of his claim, nor does this issue deserve encouragement to proceed. See Jones, 287 F.3d at 329.
For the foregoing reasons, Oceguera's motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D.E. 40) is dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(b) and he is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability.
SIGNED and ORDERED this 5th day of April, 2018.