Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/c422299/33-fair-emplpraccas-bna-303-32-empl-prac-dec-p-33807-diane-fouche/
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 03:37:08
Document Index: 347082739

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 12', '§ 2000', '§ 1601', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000']

33 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 303, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,807 Diane Fouche v. The Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
33 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 303, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,807 Diane Fouche v. The Jekyll Island-State Park Authority , 713 F.2d 1518 ( 1983 )
33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 303,
Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court applies to states and state officials but not to municipal corporations, counties, or other political subdivisions of the state. Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S. Ct. 568, 572, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). Whether the Park Authority is an arm of the state protected by the Eleventh Amendment "turns on its function and character as determined by state law." Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir.1981). Factors that bear on this determination include the definition of "state" and "political subdivision," the state's degree of control over the entity, and the fiscal autonomy of the entity. See Mt. Healthy, supra, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. at 572; United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.1982).
The Eleventh Amendment protects the sovereignty of the state by prohibiting suits when recovery would be paid from state funds. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974). Fouche points to two factors that allegedly show that any recovery here would not come from state funds. First, during the period relevant to this lawsuit, March 19, 1979, through March 19, 1981, the Park Authority was self-supporting and received no state funds appropriated by the Georgia Assembly. We do not consider this factor to be dispositive because a judgment would be paid out of current funds. The record is silent as to the extent of the appropriations the Authority has received during its lifetime. However, because the Park Authority's budget is submitted to the General Assembly, presumably the state would be responsible for any debts incurred by it that could not be paid out of its revenues.
179 Ga. at 222; 175 S.E. at 574. However, in 1935 the Georgia Assembly enacted a law in response to Regents which provided that the " 'Regents of the University System of Georgia,' is hereby declared to be a governmental agency of the State of Georgia.... The members of the Board of Regents ... are hereby declared to be public officers of the State of Georgia...." Ga.L.1935 p. 171 at 172. See Busbee v. Georgia Conference, American Association of University Professors, 235 Ga. 752, 756, 221 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1975). In addition, two decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court demonstrate that the Board of Regents is a part of the state of Georgia for sovereign immunity purposes. In Busbee, supra, and McCafferty v. Medical College of Georgia, 249 Ga. 62, 287 S.E.2d 171 (1982), the court assumed that a suit against "the Board of Regents ... is a suit against the state." McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.Ga.1982) (discussing McCafferty ). In both cases the determination of whether the Board of Regents is protected by sovereign immunity hinged on whether its immunity was waived by its authorization to sue and be sued. The 1935 legislation, Busbee, and McCafferty effectively refute the broad language of Regents. Because Fouche asserts that the Board of Regents has the same legal status as Georgia authorities, Busbee and McCafferty also reinforce our conclusion that the Park Authority is an arm of the state.
There are no Georgia or federal cases discussing the status of this Authority. However, both state and federal courts have examined whether other Georgia authorities are protected by sovereign immunity. In McDevitt & Street Co. v. Georgia Building Authority, 343 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.Ga.1972), the court held that the Georgia Building Authority could not be sued because it was "an arm or alter ego of the state." Id. at 1240. Similarly, in Medical Center Hospital Authority v. Andrews, 250 Ga. 424, 297 S.E.2d 28 (Ga.1982), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the Hospital Authority had waived its sovereign immunity, necessarily implying that, as an arm of the state, it enjoyed sovereign immunity. See generally Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479, 481-82 n. 5, 254 S.E.2d 857, 859 n. 5 (1979).
Waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found "only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction'." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1361, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S. Ct. 458, 464, 53 L. Ed. 742 (1909)). Furthermore, consent to suit in state court does not necessarily waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1177 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910, 97 S. Ct. 2959, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1977).
Fouche asserts that the broad language of O.C.G.A. § 12-3-232(a) providing for suits in "all courts" should control. One commentator has recently noted that the pertinent inquiry is "the comprehensiveness of the statutory language used."5 For example, a state statute granting only the power to "sue and be sued" may not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 277, 79 S. Ct. 785, 787, 3 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1959), while a statute authorizing an entity "to sue and be sued in any court of law or equity," McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (S.D.Ga.1982) (construing McCafferty v. Medical College of Georgia, 249 Ga. 62, 287 S.E.2d 171 (1982)), constitutes a complete waiver of immunity from suit in state and federal courts. Although the waiver language of § 12-3-232 is as comprehensive as the provision in McCroan, it must be read in conjunction with the venue provision. There was no comparable venue provision in McCroan.
Because Fouche has sued an agency of the state rather than state officials, the Eleventh Amendment also bars injunctive or prospective relief. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam).II. Title VII
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Fouche's Title VII claim against the Park Authority because Congress may provide for private suits against states or state officials, pursuant to its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976). However, the district court dismissed Fouche's Title VII claims because she had not received the appropriate right-to-sue letter. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1),6 a right-to-sue letter must be issued by the United States Attorney General because this case involves "a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision." Fouche initially received notices of right-to-sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ["EEOC"] and filed those notices with the district court. After the Park Authority moved to dismiss the Title VII claim, Fouche's attorney wrote to the Attorney General and requested a right-to-sue letter. A representative of the Attorney General informed Fouche's counsel that the Justice Department did not intend to issue a right-to-sue notice in this case. The Justice Department's position is based on the directive of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(d),7 which states that the right-to-sue letter in this type of case must be issued by the EEOC, directly contradicting the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, in determining whether Fouche can maintain her Title VII claim, we must first address whether the requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is jurisdictional or is subject to equitable waiver, modification, or estoppel. If the requirement is not jurisdictional, we must then decide whether the facts of this case warrant a modification of the requirement.
In Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 729, 74 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1983),8 the Court held "that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite." Id. at 1215. In Pinkard the plaintiffs had filed their suit before they received their right-to-sue letters from the EEOC. The district court dismissed the Title VII claim, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that the right-to-sue notice must be received before suit is commenced. See footnote 6, supra. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that "the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent, which on proper occasion may be equitably modified." Id. at 1218-19. Accord Rice v. New England College, 676 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir.1982) (requirements of § 2000e-5(f)(1) are not jurisdictional). A brief examination of Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir.1982), confirms the applicability of the Pinkard holding to this case.
Id. at 1009 (footnote omitted). Therefore, Jackson mandates that all Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as conditions precedent to suit rather than as jurisdictional requirements. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982) (requirement that EEOC charge be timely filed is not jurisdictional prerequisite).
The Park Authority argues that the holdings of Pinkard and Jackson cannot apply to this case because those suits were against private parties and this one is against an arm of the state. According to the Authority's argument, Title VII preconditions, even if not jurisdictional prerequisites in suits between private parties, are jurisdictional prerequisites to the Title VII waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity when the defendant is an arm of the state. The Park Authority has not offered any precedent to support this distinction, and we have been unable to find any. The rationale and broad holding of Jackson militate against such a distinction. Citing Jackson, a district court in this Circuit recently rejected the same contention in a case that presented closely analogous facts to the one at hand. English v. Ware County Dept. of Family & Children Services, 546 F. Supp. 689, 692 n. 4 (S.D.Ga.1982). In English the plaintiff received an EEOC determination that it lacked reasonable cause to believe her charges were true, with an attached right-to-sue notice. The determination instructed the plaintiff that if she wished to pursue her claim she must file suit in federal district court; it said nothing about the necessity of a right-to-sue notice from the Attorney General. The court found that under these circumstances the statutory requirement of notice from the Attorney General should be suspended. Id. at 693.
Our decision is consistent with earlier decisions which have declined to dismiss suits when the EEOC or the Attorney General refused to issue a right-to-sue letter. Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, 526 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.New York 1981); Stapper v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 470 F. Supp. 242 (W.D.Tex.1979); Johnson v. Duval County Teachers Credit Union, 507 F. Supp. 307 (M.D.Fla.1980). See Miller v. International Paper Company, 408 F.2d 283, 287-88 n. 18 (5th Cir.1969); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 940 (M.D.Ala.1974). These cases did not address whether the requirements of § 2000e-5(f)(1) are jurisdictional. Instead, the premise of their holdings was that a plaintiff cannot be responsible for the acts or omissions of the EEOC or Attorney General and should therefore not be penalized for them
DocketNumber： 82-8528
Citation Numbers： 713 F.2d 1518
United Carolina Bank, Administrator Cta of the Estate of ... , 665 F.2d 553 ( 1982 )
28 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1191, 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,604 ... , 676 F.2d 9 ( 1982 )
McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority , 210 Ga. 1 ( 1953 )
McCafferty v. Medical College of Ga. , 249 Ga. 62 ( 1982 )
Hicks v. Shea , 149 Ga. App. 396 ( 1979 )
Busbee v. University Professors , 235 Ga. 752 ( 1975 )
Glover v. Donaldson , 243 Ga. 479 ( 1979 )
Roy Lee Taylor v. Dept. of Public Safety ( 2005 )
Hiller v. State of Oklahoma , 327 F.3d 1247 ( 2003 )
36 Fair empl.prac.cas. 261, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,760 ... , 746 F.2d 699 ( 1985 )
Harry M. Williams v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit ... , 721 F.2d 1412 ( 1983 )
Jan M. Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian ... , 734 F.2d 730 ( 1984 )
Dorothy L. Hendrix v. Memorial Hospital of Galveston County , 776 F.2d 1255 ( 1985 )
T. Dewey Harden, Jr. v. Ralph Adams, Individually and as ... , 760 F.2d 1158 ( 1985 )
unempl.ins.rep. Cch 21,803 Richard L. Fincher v. State of ... , 798 F.2d 1371 ( 1986 )
W. Creekmore Wallace, II v. State of Oklahoma , 721 F.2d 301 ( 1983 )
edward-f-dougherty-v-marion-s-barry-jr-as-mayor-of-the-district-of , 869 F.2d 605 ( 1989 )
foremost-guaranty-corporation-v-community-savings-loan-inc-a-maryland , 826 F.2d 1383 ( 1987 )
Hattie E. Robinson, Lamar Glover v. Georgia Department of ... , 966 F.2d 637 ( 1992 )
Lisa M. Jones, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, ... , 857 F.2d 494 ( 1988 )