Source: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=8211&Language=en
Timestamp: 2014-10-23 21:17:28
Document Index: 618919122

Matched Legal Cases: ['arty\n4', 'arty\n5', 'arty\n8', 'arty\n10', 'art\n8', 'arty\n9', 'arty 1', 'arty17', 'arty15', 'arty13', 'arty 5']

REPORT on the situation in Cyprus (recent political developments)
Doc. 7206
REPORT on the situation in Cyprus (recent
political developments)
(Rapporteur: Lord FINSBERG, United Kingdom, European
Democratic Group)
The situation in Cyprus is among the potentially destabilising factors in the Mediterranean region. The Council of Europe should continue to back the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General. These aim at a comprehensive settlement which preserves the unity of the island and accommodates the two communities — Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — within a federal bi-zonal state. In this respect, demilitarisation of the island is essential. The Council of Europe should contribute to a climate of trust between the two communities, notably by promoting direct contacts and sponsoring joint practical initiatives. For its part, the Assembly is ready to invite representatives of political parties of the two communities to attend certain committee meetings on an ad hoc basis, when they deal with issues directly concerning Cyprus.
1. The Assembly believes that the situation in Cyprus is one of the potentially destabilising problems in the Mediterranean region. It directly concerns four member states of the Council of Europe, namely the Republic of Cyprus and the three guarantor powers of its 1960 Constitution, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
2. In all its texts adopted on Cyprus, the Assembly has expressed its unwavering support for the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to reach a comprehensive settlement of the problem.
3. In August 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations submitted a "set of ideas" to the two communities — Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — to serve as a basis for an overall framework agreement. However, the talks on this proposal showed that there was deep-seated mistrust separating the two parties. In order to overcome this, the Secretary General of the United Nations proposed, in November 1992, a series of "confidence-building measures" designed to create a new climate, more favourable to the negotiation process. 4. After more than one year of intercommunal talks and faced with the absence of agreement between the two sides, in July 1994 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 939 in which it reiterated that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable and requested the Secretary General to begin consultations with the two parties, the guarantor powers and members of the Security Council.
5. The Assembly welcomes the proposal for the demilitarisation of the island set out by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and urges the Turkish Cypriot administration to give it proper consideration. Such demilitarisation would mean that Turkish troops now illegally present in the country, as resolved by the United Nations, would withdraw according to an agreed time-table.
6. The Assembly considers that the Council of Europe should continue to back the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to progress towards a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem while preserving the unity of the island and accommodating the two communities within a federal bi-zonal state. The Council of Europe should also help to build a climate of trust between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Direct contacts between them are the best way of creating confidence.
7. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. urge the political leaders of both communities to accept the proposals of the Secretary General of the United Nations forthwith and thus demonstrate that the political will for a settlement really exists by accepting at the same time all the Secretary General's proposals for implementation of the "confidence-building measures";
ii. ask the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot administration to allow at the earliest possible moment the exercise of the right to free movement of persons between the two parts of the island together with all other rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights;
iii. invite the Government of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot administration and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to co-operate to allow normal international telephone and postal access to the northern part of the island;
iv. launch an appeal to both communities to refrain from using propaganda against the other community;
v. invite both communities to revise, with the Council of Europe's assistance, the textbooks used in schools on both sides in order to put more emphasis on what unites the two communities than on what separates them;
vi. promote the establishment of a climate of trust between the two communities by sponsoring practical initiatives for this purpose, in particular in the fields of culture, education, youth, sport and commerce;
vii. play a more active role as regards the settlement of the Cyprus problem, in accordance with its Declaration of 10 November 1994 on compliance with commitments accepted by member states of the Council of Europe and ask the Government of Turkey to co-operate in the implementation of United Nations resolutions and the rule of law.
1. The Assembly, referring to its Recommendation ... (1995) on the situation in Cyprus, declares its continued readiness to contribute to a climate of trust between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Demilitarisation of the island is essential to this purpose.
2. Promoting dialogue between the representatives of both communities should be a permanent endeavour of all members of the Assembly.
3. The Assembly gives its full backing to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to progress towards a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem and considers that the "confidence-building measures" he proposed constitute the best prospect for a settlement, on which foundation further progress can be made.
4. It invites the leaders of both communities to look forward, whilst drawing lessons from the past, when considering the proposals of the Secretary General of the United Nations.
5. The Assembly reiterates that the only state recognised by the United Nations and the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus, but notes that at present the voice of the Turkish Cypriot community is not heard in the Organisation.
6. The Assembly therefore decides:
i. to continue to monitor very closely the confidence-building effort by the Secretary General of the United Nations;
ii. to invite representatives of political parties of the two communities, when considered appropriate, to attend committee meetings, on an ad hoc basis, when they deal with issues directly concerning Cyprus; iii. to encourage its members, when visiting Cyprus, particularly to meet political leaders and representatives of youth organisations of both communities;
iv. to call upon all its members to refrain from any actions that could be interpreted as extending recognition to the entity in the occupied part of Cyprus, in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
by Lord FINSBERG
I. Introduction a. Assembly action 1 - 12
b. Recent political developments 13 - 19
II. United Nations action in Cyprus since 1992 a. United Nations involvement 20 - 31
b. The "confidence-building measures" 32 - 36
III. Intercommunal talks since 1992 37 - 54
IV. Position of the parties 55
a. Republic of Cyprus 56 - 66
b. Turkish Cypriot administration and
Turkish Cypriot political parties 67 - 74
c. Guarantor powers 75 - 77
V. Conclusions 78 - 98
Appendix I: Programme of the visit Appendix II: Representation of the Cypriot political parties
Appendix III: Historical background (1960-92)
Appendix IV: List of reports by the Secretary General of the United Nations on his mission of good offices since 1992
Appendix V: The "set of ideas"
Appendix VI: Resolution 939 (1994) adopted by the Security Council on 29 July 1994)
1. In Resolution 963 (1991) on Europe's role in the future "new world order" after the Gulf war, adopted on 25 April 1991, the Assembly pointed to the Cyprus problem as one of the potentially destabilising situations in the Mediterranean region. It also expressed its wish for an early report on the issue.
2. This report has therefore been drawn up to meet the Assembly's request, but the situation has been so fluid that it is only now possible to present a meaningful report. I would remind you that the last report by the Political Affairs Committee on the situation in Cyprus goes back ten years (Doc. 5165, Rapporteur: Mr Baumel). It inspired Resolution 916 (1984) adopted in March 1984. The long period of time that has since elapsed is a perfect illustration of the complexity of the Cyprus problem. Yet it directly concerns four member states of the Council of Europe, namely the Republic of Cyprus and the three guarantor powers of the 1960 Cypriot constitution, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
3. Nevertheless, over this ten-year period, the Assembly has continued to keep a very close watch on the situation in Cyprus. In May 1987, it adopted Recommendation 1056 (1987) on national refugees and missing persons in Cyprus and in May 1992, Recommendation 1197 (1992) on the demographic structure of the Cypriot community. In these two texts, it suggested that solving certain humanitarian and demographic problems would help create a climate of confidence between the parties and would make it possible to move towards a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Cypriot conflict. I do not intend to deal with these issues in this report. Those interested can find relevant information on these questions in the reports of Mr Riesen and Mr Andreas M�ller (Doc. 5716) and of Mr Cuc� (Doc. 6589) which were debated before the adoption of the above-mentioned recommendations.
4. In all its texts on Cyprus, the Assembly has expressed its unwavering support for the efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations to reach a settlement of the Cyprus problem. These efforts began in 1964 when the United Nations Security Council asked the Secretary General to appoint a mediator to deal with the Cyprus problem. At the same time, our Assembly has been conscious that some one-fourth of the population of Cyprus is without a legal means to make its voice heard in Strasbourg.
5. Since then, successive Secretaries General of the United Nations have tried to contribute to solving the Cyprus problem. Shortly after taking office in January 1992, the current Secretary General, Mr Boutros Ghali, proposed a "set of ideas" to the two communities — Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot — designed to serve as the basis for an overall framework agreement. However, the meetings held between the leaders of the two communities in late October and early November 1992 highlighted the mistrust between the two parties. In order to overcome this, in May 1993 Mr Boutros Ghali proposed a series of "confidence-building measures" designed to create a new climate, more favourable to the negotiation process.
6. With discussion of these "confidence-building measures" in full swing, I visited Cyprus between 31 January and 5 February 1994 and met representatives of the two communities. The detailed programme of my visit appears in Appendix I.
7. In April 1994, the Political Affairs Committee agreed my proposal to organise a hearing on the situation in Cyprus with representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties. Such a hearing was held on 29 June 1994. It allowed members of the committee to understand the parties' views on the "confidence-building measures" and on other issues related to the Cyprus question. The representation of these political parties in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus and in the "Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)"1 appears in Appendix II.
8. I would like to thank the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot administration, the leaders of political parties and the representatives of local authorities, academic circles and business groups in the two communities for their welcome during my visit, and for their valuable co-operation, without which it would not have been possible to draw up this report.
9. In a review of the Cypriot problem one has to decide when to start. So much conflict is intertwined with history and myth — conflict which has been expressed in bloodshed, hatred or suspicion — that the logical starting point seems to be the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 following the London and Zurich agreements which produced a constitution which was designed to provide a federal bi-communal state with built-in safeguards for the rights of the minority.
10. Less than four years later this constitution was in shreds following the actions of Archbishop Makarios and his government which resulted in the ignoring of the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President's right of veto; refusal to permit the Turkish Cypriot MPs to attend parliament to debate bills. Bills which they were not permitted to see in advance unless they gave certain undertakings and the refusal to allow the Turkish Cypriot MPs to be escorted to parliament by United Nations troops. All this is detailed in the United Nations' Secretary General document of July 1965 (S/6569) and cannot be ignored as one of the major causes of what has happened since nor can the continued presence of Turkish troops in defiance of United Nations resolutions.
11. It is with this background which clearly demonstrated that both sides bear a heavy responsibility for the past and thus a need to make a fresh start which, from my conversations with ordinary Cypriot citizens, is fervently desired and which could begin with the United Nations confidence-building measures if both sides are willing to accept them in full and permit the United Nations Secretary General to work out the implementation. That, as Winston Churchill said, could be the "end of the beginning" nor most certainly the end but with such a foundation one could start to build a federal bi-communal state once more.
12. Appendix III contains a brief summary of the recent history of the Republic of Cyprus since its independence in 1960 to Mr Boutros Ghali's arrival at the helm of United Nations in January 1992. It goes without saying that both sides have diverging views on the events described
b. Recent political developments
13. In view of their influence on negotiations between the two parties, I must stress the importance of the two elections held in Cyprus in 1993.
14. On 14 February 1993, Mr Clerides, the leader of Democratic Rally (DISY), the main Greek Cypriot party, was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus with 50,28% of the vote compared with 49,72% for Mr Vassiliou, the outgoing President, essentially backed by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL). In the course of the election campaign, the stand taken by the candidates on the "set of ideas" proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations clearly influenced the electorate. When elected, Mr Clerides was much more reserved on this issue than Mr Vassiliou. This not only reflected the position of his party, but also that of the Democratic Party (DIKO) who had called on the electorate to vote for him in the second round, and the Socialist Party (EDEK) who called on its supporters to vote according to their conscience.
15. Elections were held in the northern part of Cyprus on 12 December 1993. They brought important changes to the political representation of the Turkish Cypriot community. Although the National Unity Party gained the highest share of the vote (29,95%), it was forced to hand over power to a coalition made up of the centrist Democrat Party (29,24%) and the socialist Republican Turkish Party (24,04%). This coalition had presented itself to the electorate with a much more favourable attitude to negotiations with the Greek Cypriot community than the National Unity Party. 16. Reference should also be made here to the positive opinion issued in June 1993 by the Commission of the European Communities on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership of the European Union. However, in its conclusions, the Commission refers to the possibility of the failure of the intercommunal talks and underlines that, if this eventuality arises, the question of Cyprus' accession to the European Union should be reconsidered in January 1995.
17. In its judgment of 5 July 1994, the Court of Justice of the European Communities ruled on the interpretation of the Association Agreement of 1972 between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Cyprus and Council Directive 77/99/EEC of 1976. These texts were held to preclude acceptance — by the national authorities of a member state, upon importation of certain products from the northern part of Cyprus — of movement and phytosanitary certificates issued by authorities other than the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. It was held that problems arising from the de facto partition of the island should be resolved exclusively by the Republic of Cyprus, which alone is internationally recognised.
18. On 29 August 1994, as a reaction to this judgement, as well as to progress on application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership of the European Union, the "Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC)2 annulled earlier resolutions envisaging a federal solution as the only one for the island. It was voted to move towards economic integration with Turkey and to conclude foreign policy, defence and security agreements with Turkey comparable to those between Greece and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. In reply to the debate, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Soysal, said that "if the European Union counts the south as Cyprus, and approves such an economic integration, then the republic in the north will have no choice but to join with — that is, to integrate economically with — Turkey".
19. On 7 September 1994, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Clerides, addressed a letter to Mr Boutros Ghali, referring to these new developments and reiterating his desire to achieve, during his presidency, a solution of the Cyprus problem or at least to make such progress towards it that the peace-making process will be irreversible. Mr Clerides reaffirmed that the solution must be based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and, in particular, on Resolution 939 of 29 July 1994 (see paragraph 3 and Appendix VI). The acceptance of this resolution by the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey was seen by Mr Clerides as a condition to enter into intensive negotiation in the context of the Secretary General's good offices. In his letter, Mr Clerides also reiterated his proposal for the demilitarisation of the island (see paragraph 57). I cannot but welcome Mr Clerides' initiative which could contribute to overcome the present stalemate.
II. United Nations action in Cyprus since 1992
a. United Nations involvement
20. As was stressed in paragraph 4 above, United Nations involvement in Cyprus dates back to March 1964, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 creating the peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) and asking the Secretary General to appoint a mediator to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Many mediators and special representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations have since come and gone, all entrusted with the task of reconciling the two communities' positions. Reports by the Secretary General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus have periodically been referred to the United Nations Security Council. A list of these reports since 1992 appears in Appendix IV.
21. When Mr Boutros Ghali took office as Secretary General of the United Nations in January 1992, he was keen to give fresh impetus to the mission of good offices with which he had been entrusted by the United Nations Security Council. Building on the efforts of his predecessor, Mr Perez de Cuellar, he began putting the finishing touches to a set of ideas designed to provide a basis to make it possible to resolve a large number of problems in order to reach an overall agreement. These ideas had emerged in the course of the various contacts that the Secretary General's representative had maintained throughout 1991 with the leaders of the two communities as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey.
22. The Secretary General's report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) contains an initial draft of this set of ideas which, a few days later, the Security Council was to endorse with the adoption of Resolution 750 (1992). In this resolution, the Security Council also asked the Secretary General to continue his efforts to complete the "set of ideas" during the months of May and June 1992 and to submit specific recommendations to it on the means to overcome any outstanding obstacles.
23. On 21 August 1992, the Secretary General submitted his report to the Security Council (S/24472) describing the efforts made. This report contained a "set of ideas" on an overall framework agreement on Cyprus, whose contents are described in Appendix V. In Resolution 774 of 26 August 1992, the Security Council approved the set of ideas and encouraged the parties to resume their direct talks and to continue uninterrupted negotiation until they reached an agreement based on the set of ideas. In this resolution, the Security Council also indicated that the current efforts could not continue indefinitely and that the maintenance of the status quo was unacceptable.
24. Unfortunately, the talks held in New York between 26 October and 11 November 1992 on the "set of ideas" showed that there was deep-seated mistrust separating the two parties. The Secretary General of the United Nations came to the conclusion that as long as this situation prevailed it was difficult to envisage a favourable outcome. In his report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830) he therefore informed the United Nations Security Council of his intention to propose a number of confidence-building measures to the parties. According to the Secretary General of the United Nations, these measures, which would be taken in good faith by each of the parties, would be designed to help achieve the objective of the forthcoming joint meetings, namely an overall agreement based on the whole of the "set of ideas" approved by the Security Council. Security Council Resolution 789 (1992) sets out these confidence-building measures and urges all concerned to undertake to respect them.
25. In the months that followed, preparatory discussions between the Secretary General's representatives and the leaders of the two communities and the joint meetings that followed, mainly focused on confidence-building measures. It gradually emerged that both parties attached particular importance to the rehabilitation of the fenced area of Varosha, situated on the coast south of Famagusta, as an area for trade and inter-community contacts, as well as to the reopening of Nicosia International Airport to civilian passenger and cargo traffic. However, the Secretary General's reports to the Security Council of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) and 14 September 1993 (S/26438) revealed major difficulties.
26. In the course of October and November 1993, at the request of the United Nations Secretary General, two delegations of independent experts travelled to Cyprus to assess the economic benefits that might be generated by the package of "Varosha-Nicosia International Airport" measures, along with the work needed for the airport to become operational. The expert mission reports were published in December 1993 and Mr Boutros Ghali transmitted them to the leaders of the two communities, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to the President of the Security Council.
27. In the first of these reports, the experts indicated their conviction that the implementation of confidence-building measures would be of great benefit to the two communities. The benefits might be relatively greater for the Turkish-Cypriot community, given the relative size of its economy. The rehabilitation programme for Nicosia International Airport could be completed within eighteen months of approval of the final project.
28. On 4 March 1994, the Secretary General of the United Nations reported to the Security Council on the progress of negotiations (S/1994/262). In his report he expressed the hope that an agreement on the Varosha-Nicosia International Airport package could be reached before the end of March 1994. Not for the first time his hopes remained unfulfilled.
29. On 30 May 1994, Mr Boutros Ghali submitted a new report (S/1994/629) to the Security Council stressing that the absence of agreement stemmed mainly from the lack of political will on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. Faced with this deadlock, the Secretary General suggested five possible options to the Security Council. The first would be to conclude that, after thirty years of endeavour, the political will for a settlement did not exist and that it would be preferable to redirect the United Nations' resources elsewhere. The second would be to terminate the good offices mission and adopt coercive measures against the side that posed an obstacle to settlement. The third would be to put the confidence-building measures to one side and resume discussion of the "set of ideas". The fourth would be to invite all concerned to undertake a fundamental review of the Cyprus problem. The fifth option would be to build on the fact that both sides had accepted the package of confidence-building measures in principle, in order to renew efforts to obtain agreement on their implementation.
30. On 28 June 1994, the Secretary General addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council making clear that progress was made with the Turkish Cypriots during June and that by the end of the month a substantial measure of agreement had been achieved on the plan for implementation of the confidence-building measures. However, Mr Boutros Ghali concluded that neither side was prepared to go forward as he had proposed. 31. On 29 July 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 939 (1994) (see Appendix VI) in which it reiterated that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable and requested the Secretary General to begin consultations, not only with the two leaders in Cyprus and the guarantor powers, but also — and this for the first time — with members of the Security Council. These consultations should be conducted with a view to undertaking "a fundamental and far-reaching reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem in a manner that that will yield results".
b. The "confidence-building measures"
32. As mentioned above, disagreement between the two parties on the "set of ideas" prompted the Secretary General to propose, as early as November 1992, a package of confidence-building measures which were the subject of preparatory discussions in Nicosia in the spring of 1993 and the joint meeting in New York at the end of May 1993. Following these meetings, it became clear that two steps were considered priorities: rehabilitating the Varosha area and reopening Nicosia International Airport.
33. The Varosha area, which has become a "ghost town" since it was encircled by Turkish forces in August 1974, is surrounded by territory controlled by the Turkish Cypriot administration and is located a few kilometres north of the buffer zone administered by the United Nations. The proposal of the United Nations Secretary General is to place Varosha under the administration of the United Nations, which would also be responsible for security. Trade between the two communities might develop in the area and the chambers of commerce and industry of both sides could together decide on, develop and promote joint projects. Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be able to enter the area freely and foreigners would have freedom of movement, including passage between the two parts of the island. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 550 (1984), only former residents would be entitled to resettle in Varosha.
34. The reopening of Nicosia Airport to civilian passengers and cargo traffic would take place under the auspices of the United Nations in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organisation. Access to the airport would be limited to foreign airlines that have traffic rights in Cyprus as well as airlines registered in Turkey. Both sides would have free access to the airport. Foreign visitors who entered Cyprus through Nicosia International Airport could, during their stay on the island, travel unhindered between the two sides. The costs incurred by the reopening of the airport and its operation would be borne by both sides in a manner that still has to be agreed.
35. While the majority of discussions over recent months have focused on the two confidence-building measures outlined above, the Secretary General of the United Nations had proposed a whole package which covered a variety of areas. Proposals concerned:
—ex pert co-operation to solve the water problem;—
—co -operation over education;—
—th e organisation of joint cultural and sports events;—
—me etings of political party leaders of both sides;—
—fr ee movement of journalists of both sides;—
—me etings of the chambers of commerce and industry of both sides;—
—eq uitable access to international assistance for both communities;—
—co -operation between the two communities in order to devise and implement joint projects in Nicosia;—
—co -operative arrangements on electricity;—
—in ter-communal co-operation in Pyla;—
—co -operation with the United Nations peace-keeping forces.36
36. It was also suggested that representatives of the two communities meet periodically to propose additional confidence-building measures for implementation by both sides. III. Intercommunal talks since April 1992
37. In May 1992 the United Nations Secretary General's representatives went to the area, where they met representatives of the two communities and of Greece and Turkey. All parties endorsed the Secretary General's efforts. He invited the leaders of the two communities to meet at the United Nations headquarters in New York starting 18 June 1992 and for as long as was reasonable to reach agreement on the "set of ideas" that he had set out in his report of April 1992 (see paragraph 19). Indirect talks with the leaders of the two communities began on the agreed date, were broken off on 23 June 1992 and resumed on 15 July, continuing until 11 August 1992. In the course of these indirect talks it was agreed to hold joint meetings to allow the leaders of the two communities to exchange views on the "set of ideas", beginning with the issue of displaced persons.
38. Four joint meetings were held in New York from 12 to 14 August 1992. The Secretary General of the United Nations proposed that they be temporarily suspended to give the parties time to reflect. It was agreed that joint meetings would resume in October 1992. Mr Boutros Ghali reported on the substance of these talks to the Security Council on 21 August 1992 (Report S/24472); it adopted Resolution 774, mentioned in paragraph 20, on 26 August. 39. Following up this resolution, Mr Boutros Ghali's representatives continued their contacts with all the parties concerned and prepared for the resumption of joint talks in New York. Talks began on 28 October 1992, chaired by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and lasted until 11 November 1992. The leaders of the two communities agreed to consider the headings in the "set of ideas", beginning with those concerning displaced persons, and moving on to the constitutional aspects of the federation and territorial adjustments. It emerged in the course of discussions that the Turkish Cypriot side was basically in agreement with 91 of the 100 paragraphs of the "set of ideas" but, with regard to territorial adjustments, refused to accept the map approved by the Security Council as the basis for an agreement. The Greek Cypriot side accepted the "set of ideas" and the map, subject to improvements which might be made in the interests of the two communities. However, despite the Secretary General's efforts, it was not possible to reach an overall agreement. The lack of political will and the continuing mistrust between the two parties meant it was difficult for the talks to end on a positive note.
40. This situation, described by the Secretary General of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council on 19 November 1992 (S/24830), prompted Mr Boutros Ghali to propose a package of confidence-building measures which the Security Council enshrined in Resolution 789 of 25 November 1992 (see paragraph 21). They concerned in particular:
—th e reduction of the number of non-Cypriot troops and defence spending in Cyprus;—
—co -operation by the military authorities on each side with the UN FICYP;—
—ex tension of the area under the control of UNFICYP to include Varosha;pr
promotion of people-to-people contact between the two communities and reducing restrictions on the movement of persons, including foreigners across the buffer zone;
—pr oposal by each side of bi-communal projects;—
—co mmitment of both sides to hold a Cyprus-wide census;—
—co -operation between both sides to enable the United Nations to undertake feasibility studies on the resettlement and rehabilitation of persons affected by territorial adjustments and on an economic development programme to benefit those persons who would resettle in the area under Turkish Cypriot administration.41
41. The outstanding disagreements and, probably, the fact that presidential elections were to be held in the Republic of Cyprus in February 1993 led the leaders of the two communities to postpone joint meetings until March 1993. In the report quoted in the preceding paragraph, the Secretary General expressed his hope that the Turkish Cypriot side's positions would evolve to come more closely into line with the "set of ideas". 42. Following presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, the Secretary General of the United Nations resumed contact with the two parties and proposed that they come to New York for a joint meeting on 30 March 1993 in order to discuss the timetable and arrangements for preparing the resumption of negotiations. The leaders said they were prepared to resume joint meetings on 24 May 1993. These meetings were preceded by a preparatory process in which the Secretary General's representatives met separately in Nicosia with representatives of the two communities to clarify issues relating to the "set of ideas" and to consider the implementation of the confidence-building measures. At this time, in March 1993, Mr Camilion, the Secretary General's special representative, was recalled by the government of his country, Argentina, and had to leave his post. The Secretary General appointed Mr Clark, former Canadian Prime Minister, as his replacement.
43. As planned, joint meetings resumed in New York with Mr Boutros Ghali in the Chair on 24 May 1993 and continued until 1 June. In the course of discussions the Greek Cypriot side signalled that it would agree to the confidence-building measures suggested for Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, provided they did not include additional clauses which would imply, directly or indirectly, recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The Turkish Cypriot side contended that leaving Varosha under United Nations administration was a major concession that was not sufficiently compensated for by the opening of Nicosia International Airport. The Turkish Cypriot side demanded the lifting of restrictions imposed on traffic to airports and ports in the northern part of Cyprus.
44. In spite of the various amendments to the measures proposed by the Secretary General, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots said that he had to consult representatives of the community and the Turkish Government before giving his reply. In order to do so, he suggested postponing joint meetings until 15 June 1993. 45. On 3 June 1993, Mr Denktash returned to Nicosia and visited Ankara from 8 to 11 June. During his visit, he was extremely critical of the confidence-building measures proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and wondered whether it was worth returning to New York on the agreed date. In the meantime, the Turkish authorities said that they backed the Secretary General's proposals on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport and that they urged that they be accepted. On 11 June the Turkish Cypriot side indicated that Mr Denktash did not intend to return to New York to resume discussions as scheduled. However he did send a message to Mr Boutros Ghali
indicating that if the confidence-building measures were to be accepted the northern part of Varosha, north of Dhimokratias Street, would have to remain on the Turkish Cypriot side. He again stressed the need to lift the air and maritime embargo on the northern part of the island.
46. In his report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) to the Security Council, the Secretary General indicated his disappointment with Mr Denktash's attitude and regretted that he had not respected his undertaking to resume joint meetings in New York on 14 June. Nevertheless, he said that he was prepared to continue his efforts and announced the dispatch of his special representative to the region to attempt to reconcile the positions.
47. The Secretary General's special representative, Mr Clark, visited Greece, Turkey and Cyprus from 13 to 23 July 1993. In Athens he met Prime Minister Mitsotakis and in Ankara the Prime Minister, Mrs Ciller, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr In�n�, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Cetin. In Cyprus, discussions with the leaders of the two communities revealed that their respective positions had not changed. Mr Clerides reaffirmed the Greek Cypriot side's acceptance of the confidence-building measures relating to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. Mr Denktash reiterated his criticism of the confidence-building measures and described the deep divisions within the Turkish Cypriot community on this subject. According to Mr Denktash, these internal problems could only be resolved by calling elections towards the end of 1993. At meetings with the leaders of political parties and the Turkish Cypriot business community, Mr Clark noted that notwithstanding the interest generated by the confidence-building measures concerning Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, the information available to them was fairly limited. In addition, there seemed to be insufficient awareness of the Turkish authorities' backing for the confidence-building measures. In Athens, the Greek Government told Mr Clark that the Secretary General's proposals had its total support and described the position of the Greek Cypriot side. Mr Boutros Ghali submitted a new report (S/26438) to the Security Council on 14 September 1993 on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, in which he highlighted the need for more active backing from the Turkish Cypriot side to make headway with negotiations.
48. Following the elections of December 1993 in the northern part of Cyprus, Mr Denktash informed the Secretary General of the United Nations on 20 January 1994, of his willingness to co-operate to reach an agreement on the confidence-building measures. From 22 to 28 January 1994 the Secretary General's special representative, Mr Clark, visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, where he met all the parties and stressed the importance of resuming talks. On 27 January Mr Clerides contacted the Secretary General of the United Nations to confirm his acceptance of the package of confidence-building measures. On 28 January, Mr Denktash also confirmed that the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the confidence-building measures and that it was prepared to discuss the arrangements for implementation.
49. On 3 February 1994, Mr Boutros Ghali contacted the leaders of the two communities to ask them to resume negotiations in mid-February with a view to reaching agreement on a limited number of matters concerning Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. The two parties agreed to Mr Boutros Ghali's proposal and on 17 February Mr Clark returned to Cyprus to resume negotiations which lasted until 25 February. The aim was to arrive at a common interpretation of the following questions:
—Un ited Nations administration of Nicosia International Airport and the Varosha area;—
—th e timetable for transferring the Varosha area to United Nations administration as well as for its reopening, and the timetable for reopening Nicosia Airport;—
—ar rangements to make Varosha an area of bi-communal contact and trade;tr
traffic rights for airlines flying to Nicosia International Airport;
—se curity arrangements for the operation of Nicosia International Airport;—
—fr ee movement of people and goods at Nicosia Airport;—
—ar rangements for implementing the package of confidence-building measures proposed by the Secretary General on 1 July 1993.50
50. On 23 March 1994, following three days of negotiations with the leaders of both communities, Mr Clark announced that the Turkish Cypriot side had not yet given the approval he was expecting to a "draft of ideas" for implementing the confidence-building measures that he had submitted on 21 March. 51. This "draft of ideas" included the following principles:
—ne ither side should seek to take political advantage of the other party;—
—th e benefits of the confidence-building measures for the Turkish Cypriot side would mean the lifting for all practical purposes of the economic obstacles that had been weighing on this community;—
—th e reopening of Nicosia International Airport would provide the Turkish Cypriot community with a direct link with the economies of other countries;—
—ar rangements would be worked out to ensure unhindered and secure access to Varosha from the southern part of the island;—
—tu rning the fenced area of Varosha into a special area for bi-communal contact and commerce, a key element in the package, would involve making economic opportunities in the area available to Turkish Cypriots.52
52. In April 1994, the Secretary General's representative met with the two sides. On 28 April 1994, Mr Denktash announced at a press conference that talks had broken down. Mr Clark then announced that, in the circumstances, there was no point continuing talks. 53. On 11 and 12 May 1994, senior Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and American officials met in Vienna to attempt to reach an agreement on the ideas put forward on 21 March 1994. These talks were, unfortunately, unsuccessful and the situation has remained deadlocked.
54. As already indicated in paragraphs 26 and 27, on 30 May 1994 the Secretary General of the United Nations informed the Security Council that negotiations between the two communities had reached a dead end. On 28 June 1994, the Secretary General reiterated that neither party was ready to accept his proposals.
55. In the following paragraphs I will attempt to sum up the positions of the parties as presented to me by those concerned during my visit to Cyprus in February 1994, at the hearing organised by the committee at the end of June 1994 and in the course of my meetings with representatives of the three guarantor powers in April and May 1994.
a. Republic of Cyprus
56. The attitude of the President of the Republic, Mr Clerides, and of the members of his government I met, towards the "confidence-building measures" proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations was favourable on the whole. Yet, understandably, both the rehabilitation of Varosha and the reopening of Nicosia International Airport were viewed simply as measures to make it possible to create the climate of trust necessary to come to an overall framework agreement. The impression was, and this was subsequently borne out by the turn of events, that joint meetings in New York could not resume as long as there was no agreement on the "confidence-building measures" as, if they were to fail again, the credibility of the negotiating process would be undermined.
57. President Clerides also informed me of his imaginative proposal for the demilitarisation of the island which he had set out in his letter of 17 December 1993 to the Secretary General of the United Nations and described at length on 12 April 1994 when he had addressed the Assembly. In order to counter the climate of fear and mistrust that prevailed between the two communities, the Cypriot Government had offered, among other measures, to disband the national guard and to hand over its weapons and installations to the United Nations peace-keeping force and to bear the full costs of United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus. In addition, defence savings would not only go to financing the United Nations force but would also be spent on projects which might be of benefit to both communities. President Clerides' only condition was that Turkey commit itself to withdrawing its forces from Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriot armed forces also be disbanded and their weapons handed over to the United Nations peace-keeping force. President Clerides' proposal has unfortunately not been given any proper consideration by the Turkish Cypriot side.
58. The Cypriot Government was keen to stress that the Greek Cypriot community wanted to preserve its identity, as it was in a geographical environment that was overwhelmingly Turkish, even though it formed the majority of the island's population. In its view, Cyprus' future hinged on an agreement between the two communities, which would then allow it to join the European Union. Accordingly, the government was in favour of greater European Union participation in the negotiations between the two communities. The appointment of a European Union representative responsible for the Cyprus question has been very favourably received. His terms of reference are to monitor the political developments in Cyprus, including the intercommunal talks with regard to their impact on Cyprus' application for membership of the European Union.
59. The Cypriot Government was aware of the economic cost of the confidence-building measures proposed by the Secretary General but was prepared to bear the expense for reasons which are of course political, and because once they enter into force both communities will reap their rewards.
60. The Democratic Rally Party (DISY) proved to be very wary of the "confidence-building measures" as there was a risk that they would amount to indirect recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The DISY was convinced that Turkey did not wish to settle the Cyprus question. It might be easier to reach an agreement if the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community could negotiate without any outside influence.
61. The Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) indicated that it was difficult for it to reject the "confidence-building measures" if they were balanced and were likely to dispel mistrust between the two communities. However, the measures proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations risked being dangerous for the Republic of Cyprus and undermining the future settlement of the Cyprus problem. Their implementation might create the conditions for a de facto recognition of the entity in the northern part of Cyprus. President Clerides' acceptance of the "confidence-building measures" had presented AKEL with a fait accompli. Yet the issue had never been discussed in the national council, the President of the Republic's advisory body that had been set up by President Makarios, comprising representatives of Greek Cypriot parties.
62. The Democratic Party (DIKO), which rejected the invitation to participate in the committee's hearing, has always been opposed to the "confidence-building measures". As far as this party is concerned, the heart of the matter is not the "confidence-building measures", but Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus, Turkey's complete refusal to respect United Nations' resolutions and the continuous and flagrant violations of Cypriots' human rights by Turkey. The DIKO felt that the Turkish Cypriot side did not have the political will to accept the "confidence-building measures" or to seek a solution to the problem. In the opinion of the DIKO, Turkey alone, as an invader and occupying power, determined the policy and attitude of the Turkish Cypriot leaders in practice as well as in theory. The DIKO would like negotiations on an overall settlement of the Cyprus question to be held in tandem with those on the "confidence-building measures".
63. The Socialist Party (EDEK) emphasised that the Cyprus problem is not simply an inter-communal quarrel but the result of an invasion, an occupation, the forced separation of two communities and the violation of international law. The EDEK declared that the "confidence-building measures" could not achieve results in the absence of any desire on the part of Turkish Cypriot leaders to come to an agreement.
64. The Liberal Party said that it endorsed both the spirit and the contents of the "confidence-building measures" as in its view they were the starting point for any overall settlement of the Cyprus question. The contact, dialogue and trade between the two parts of the island, which the "confidence-building measures" were designed to foster, would give both Cypriot communities an opportunity to come together and to dispel the climate of mutual mistrust that currently prevailed. This process could pave the way for reunification of the island.
65. During my visit to Cyprus, the attitude of representatives of the business community towards the "confidence-building measures" tended to be reserved, perhaps through lack of detailed knowledge, but was broadly favourable. Although the reopening of Nicosia International Airport and the rehabilitation of the Verosha area did not appear, in the short term, necessary for the Cypriot economy to function well, in the medium and long term implementing the "confidence-building measure" should have positive repercussions, particularly in the light of Cyprus' potential membership of the European Union.
66. Representatives from academic circles and youth organisations were, on the other hand, more reluctant to concede that "confidence-building measures" might facilitate settlement of the Cyprus problem. I distinctly sensed that there was enormous mistrust of the Turkish Cypriot leaders and that this attitude could not change overnight. b. Turkish Cypriot administration and Turkish Cypriot political parties
67. During my visit to Cyprus I crossed the demarcation line between the two sectors to hold talks with leaders of the Turkish Cypriot administration as well as with representatives of the various Turkish Cypriot political parties. As already indicated, political representatives also took part in the hearing organised by the committee in Strasbourg at the end of June 1994.
68. Mr Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, indicated that the differences between the two parties centred more on the implementation of the "confidence-building measures" than on their substance. The Turkish Cypriot community set great store by its security and that could only be guaranteed by the presence of the Turkish army. Recent defence agreements between the Greek Government and the Cypriot Government had fuelled the mistrust of Turkish Cypriots. For this reason President Clerides' demilitarisation proposal could not be taken seriously. The greatest obstacle to the negotiations was, to his mind, the mentality of Greek Cypriots who view Turkish Cypriots as a minority rather than as partners who should be treated on an equal footing.
69. On a number of occasions the Turkish Cypriot authorities brought up the attacks to which their community had been subjected in the years preceding Turkish intervention in July 1974. The Turkish Cypriot community now feels discriminated against as only the Greek Cypriot community enjoys international recognition as the Republic of Cyprus. What is more, the Turkish Cypriot authorities consider that the Greek Orthodox Church has a negative influence on the Greek Cypriot community.
70. The Democrat Party, which had appeared to have a relatively positive attitude towards the "confidence-building measures" during my visit to Cyprus in February 1994, appeared far more reticent at the hearing organised by the committee in June 1994. They claimed the "draft ideas" for the implementation of the "confidence-building measures", which had been presented by the Secretary General's representative on 21 March 1994 (see paragraph 48), diverged from the initial package of proposed measures on a number of fundamental points. Consequently, negotiations needed to focus on differences in comparison with the initial package in order to eliminate them. It would only be possible to resume discussion of the "confidence-building measures" once these divergences had been removed.
71. The Communal Liberation Party (CLP) has come out in favour of a bi-communal and bi-zonal Cypriot federation, whereby the two communities could share equally in the wealth of the country and live in security and equality. Starting from this principle, the CLP felt that the "confidence-building measures" constituted a major step towards an overall solution and backed the process. The CLP thought that the great majority of Greek Cypriot political forces were opposed to the "confidence-building measures" and that their main aim was to create the conditions that would favour unilateral negotiation of Cypriot membership of the European Union, making the Turkish Cypriot side shoulder responsibility for the breakdown in negotiations between the two communities.
72. The Republican Turkish Party (RTP) endorsed the "confidence-building measures". It attempted to play a constructive role in negotiations on the implementation of "confidence-building measures". The RTP thought that these measures were the only way to overcome the fear, the mistrust and the tension between the two communities. The RTP stressed the role that political leaders and the media could play in bringing the two communities closer together.
73. The National Unity Party (NUP) was hostile to the idea of a step-by-step approach to solving the Cyprus conflict as embodied by the "confidence-building measures". In the NUP's view, a viable solution was only possible if the parties were on an equal footing. The international community should acknowledge this equality and discard policies designed to impose an unacceptable solution on the Turkish Cypriot community, which had long been the victim of unjustified isolation. The NUP was opposed to the "confidence-building measures" as they might well undermine the real post-1974 situation in Cyprus. The NUP was also opposed to Cyprus joining the European Union as it felt that Cyprus could only join an organisation of which Greece and Turkey were both members.
74. My talks with representatives of the Turkish Cypriot business community revealed an attitude that was relatively favourable to the "confidence-building measures", which, in their opinion, were likely to have a positive effect on the economy of the northern part of the island. The academic community, on the other hand, was somewhat more reserved. This can perhaps be attributed to the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the university, which enables it to maintain high-level relations with academic circles in Turkey and other European countries.
c. Guarantor powers
75. Since the beginning of negotiations between the two communities on the "confidence-building measures", Greece has given its full backing to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations and endorsed the position of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. As far as the Greek authorities are concerned, Turkey's responsibility with regard to the situation in Cyprus is on a different level from that of the other guarantor powers and human rights violations and settlements by mainland Turks in the northern part of Cyprus need to be borne in mind, if the complexity of the Cyprus problem is to be grasped. The fact that it was impossible to reach an agreement on the implementation of the "confidence-building measures" was attributable to the lack of political will on the part of Turkish Cypriot leaders. Greece was openly in favour of Cyprus becoming a member of the European Union.
76. Similarly, Turkey has given its full backing to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations as well as to the "confidence-building measures" that he proposed and which might form the starting point for an overall agreement. However, the Turkish authorities thought that it was up to the Turkish Cypriot community to take the final decision. With regard to the implementation of the "confidence-building measures", the Turkish authorities shared the view of the Turkish Cypriot administration, in other words that it should involve, for all practical purposes, the lifting of economic obstacles to the development of the northern part of Cyprus. The Turkish authorities said that the presence of the Turkish army on Cyprus would be necessary for as long as the conflict persisted.
77. The United Kingdom has consistently backed the Secretary General's efforts to achieve a settlement of the Cypriot conflict. The British Government hoped that negotiations on the implementation of the "confidence-building measures" might still be successful as this would constitute a modest but significant step towards an overall agreement. The British authorities have attempted to use their influence on the parties concerned, as well as the Turkish authorities, to reach an agreement. The United Kingdom viewed the United Nations proposal as balanced and fair. With regard to Cyprus' application for membership of the European Union, the British Government was forced to acknowledge the existing practical difficulties. Reunification would certainly facilitate Cypriot membership of the European Union.
78. I doubt if either side in this tragic affair will be satisfied by my report but this cannot be helped if a sincere effort is to be made to offer some constructive suggestions. A constructive criticism, based upon fact and conversation, will only be rejected by those who do not wish to make progress and who want to retain the unsatisfactory status quo.
79. My visit to the Republic of Cyprus and then to the part controlled by the Turkish Cypriot administration, brought home to me, as never before, the yawning gap between the two with the elements of fear and mistrust predominating. It is also sad that, almost without exception, each person I spoke with did not miss the opportunity of reciting what happened over the past few hundred or past thirty years or so, as reasons for impugning the other side's motives or doubting their sincerity.
80. It is through this miasma that a way forward must be found. Some say that if the older generation — who know each other — cannot solve it, nobody can because the younger generation do not know each other. Some of the younger generation say they stand a better chance because they do not bear the scars or memories of what happened before they were born.
81. Two of the saddest discussions I had on my visit were with representative organisations of relatives of the "missing persons". Few can really believe that many of them are alive — if any — but each side uses this issue against the other. The Committee on Missing Persons, set up in 1981 by the United Nations, or the International Committee of the Red Cross should be enabled to carry out any investigations they consider essential in order to reach a conclusive view on what happened to those unfortunates and the authorities in Greece, Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus and in the part controlled by the Turkish Cypriot administration should co-operate unreservedly.
82. Perhaps the most noticeable features of my visit were fear and mistrust. Almost without exception everyone to whom I spoke was in fear of "the other side". At one house the owner, when I praised the architecture, said "I don't want the Turks to get it !". For their part many Turkish Cypriots said that they feared without the presence of Turkish troops they would be massacred again by the Greek Cypriots.
83. I met very few people, politician, professor or businessman — on either side — who believed in the sincerity of the other side. This hardly offers fertile soil in which the United Nations proposals can grow to fruition although for my part I do not doubt the sincerity of the main participants, Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash.
84. If Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, could stop looking to the past and draw a line across the page, progress might be made but when the media is constantly reminding people of the horrors of the past and even schoolchildren are taught to hate and fear "the other side" what hope can there be?
85. The United Nations confidence-building measures can, if goodwill exists on all sides, lead to an overall settlement in the years ahead. No doubt other measures will emerge from the discussions but much needs to be done on the human basis. People must be enabled to travel freely and safely and to sleep on whichever side of the island they wish.
86. The petty restrictions and obstructions can only continue the separation of the two communities. The Greek Cypriot side must permit people to cross into the part controlled by the Turkish Cypriot administration and to stay overnight if that is their wish. The pretence that Turkey itself does not exist, as exemplified by the absence of Turkey in the Greek Cypriot directory of international telephone dialling codes, reminds one of the more foolish attitudes of the cold war period.
87. Equally the Turkish Cypriot side must allow people to cross freely and not, at a whim, refuse to let people pass even when prior permission has been obtained. The Turkish Cypriots say that when their citizens cross into the Greek Cypriot section, they may be shown on television as "coming from the occupied sector". This is because such people are, broadly speaking, rarities and if large numbers regularly crossed, they would rapidly cease to be newsworthy.
88. I must say that when I left Cyprus in February 1994 I was much more optimistic than I am today at the time of drafting this report. Then, I had the clear impression that a great majority of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides were in favour of the "confidence-building measures" proposed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. Today this impression is somewhat blurred. As far as the Greek Cypriot side is concerned, the political parties represented in the parliament are less inclined than President Clerides to accept the "confidence-building measures" as well as the "draft ideas" for their implementation. On the Turkish Cypriot side, it would appear that it is Mr Denktash who is much more reluctant to come to an agreement than the political parties that make up the Turkish Cypriot administration.
89. Under these extremely difficult circumstances, the question arises as to what the Council of Europe can do to help resolve the Cyprus conflict. First of all, I think that our Organisation should continue to give its full backing to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to reach, as soon as possible, to an agreement on the "confidence-building measures" which are currently under consideration. But in doing so, the Council of Europe can also help build a climate of trust between the two communities, which would begin to make it possible to dispel fear and mistrust, and to progress towards a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. During my visit to Cyprus I was assured that both parties would agree to the Council of Europe sponsoring practical initiatives for this purpose. I raised the possibility of holding summer seminars for students from both communities and the academic communities of the two parties appeared to react favourably to this proposal. The Council of Europe might also pay close attention to history textbooks used in schools on both sides with a view to proposing texts that put more emphasis on what unites the two communities than on what separates them.
90. For its part, the Assembly must promote dialogue between the representatives of political parties of the two communities. The example of the hearing organised by the committee must be built on. I am in favour of inviting representatives from political parties of the two communities to attend Assembly committee meetings, on an ad hoc basis, when they deal with issues directly concerning Cyprus.
91. Other initiatives that the Assembly should endeavour to promote are, for example, the gradual exercise of the right to free movement of persons between the two parts of the island. It is hard to imagine that Cyprus could become a member of the European Union and that as a result its citizens could move freely within the European Union but at the same time be unable to move freely within the island. Another problem that might easily be resolved is that of telephone and postal access to the part under Turkish Cypriot administration. It is worth bearing in mind that direct personal contacts are the best way of restoring confidence.
92. Lastly, I would like to appeal to both parties to refrain from using the media, be it the press, radio or television, for political propaganda purposes against the other party. Political leaders should refrain from using attacks on the other party for domestic political purposes. As long as this biased use of the media continues, it will be extremely difficult to build a climate of trust between the two communities.
93. When the United Kingdom relinquished control of Cyprus following the decision of the United Kingdom to grant independence to those territories wishing to have that status and capable of implementing it, it handed over to the Republic of Cyprus a constitution based upon a solemn treaty which was acceptable to both the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and the three guarantor powers, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
94. Without going into reasons I merely record the historical fact that both sides failed to honour the settlement agreed in London and Z�rich. The continued recitation of what happened and why, which is an all too frequent occurrence whenever Cyprus is discussed in the Council of Europe, not merely tries the patience and antagonises the majority of members of the Assembly but is wholly unconstructive because the various versions do not always match the actual facts. What this report is attempting to do is to look forward whilst drawing lessons from the past and in so doing to record without bias or recrimination that both communities bear a heavy responsibility for bringing their delightful island to the brink of destruction. Shakespeare summed it up very well for us in Julius Ceasar when he wrote: "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, when taken at the flood, leads on to fortunes. Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures." 95. For more than three decades, Cyprus has been in a state of turmoil for which both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders bear a very heavy responsibility. A variety of solutions have been offered by the United Nations which would have preserved the unity of the island whilst accommodating the two communities within a federal bi-zonal republic.
96. This last confidence building effort by the United Nations Secretary General has been — and is still — the best prospect for a settlement as it provides the foundation on which to build further efforts. Sadly it has to be said that the Turkish Cypriot authorities have failed to grasp this chance and must be held largely responsible for this failure.
97. Now may be the last time to avert a fresh catastrophe and whoever obstructs the United Nations efforts will bear an immense responsibility.
98. Even now at this eleventh hour I would appeal to the Turkish Cypriot authorities to accept the United Nations proposals without further prevarication or quibble.
of the visit to Cyprus
(30 January-6 February 1994)
Talks in the part controlled by the Republic of Cyprus
9 a.m. Meeting with ambassadors of member countries of the Council of Europe accredited to Cyprus
10.30 a.m. Mr Dain, British High Commissioner
12 noon Mr Clerides, President of the Republic of Cyprus
1 p.m. Lunch hosted by Mr Clerides
3.30 p.m. Mr Feissel, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations
8.30 p.m. Dinner hosted by Mr Galanos, President of the House of Representatives
9 a.m. Mr Galanos, President of the House of Representatives
10 a.m. University of Cyprus
11 a.m. Mr Economides, Minister of Finance, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
12 noon Mr Matsis, MP, Chairman of the Democratic Rally Party (DISY)
1 p.m. Lunch with businessmen
4 p.m. Mr Papadopoulos, MP, Parliamentary leader of the Democratic Party (DIKO)
5.30 p.m. Meeting with journalists
6 p.m. Mr Poyiatzis, Representative of the Maronite Community in the House of Representatives
6.30 p.m. Pancyprian Committee of Parents and Relatives of Missing Persons
8.30 p.m. Dinner hosted by Mr Papadopoulos
9.30 a.m. Mr Christofias, MP, Secretary General of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)
11.30 a.m. Dr Lyssarides, MP, Chairman of the Socialist Party (EDEK)
12.30 p.m. Members of the Nicosia Municipal Council
1 p.m. Lunch with members of the of the Nicosia Municipal Council
5 p.m. Representatives of youth organisations
8.30 p.m. Dinner hosted by Dr Lyssarides
8.45 a.m. Crossing to the northern part
Talks in the part controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration
9 a.m. Mr Denktash, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)3
10 a.m. Mr Rasit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the TRNC1
11 a.m. Mr Acarkan, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the TRNC,1 and members of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee
1.15 p.m. Lunch hosted by Mr Denktash
3.30 p.m. Mr Atun, Prime Minister of the TRNC,1 Chairman of the Democrat Party
4.30 p.m. Mr �zg�r, Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman of the Turkish Republican Party
5.30 p.m. Dr Eroglu, Chairman of the National Unity Party
8 p.m. Dinner hosted by Mr Acarkan
Friday 4 February 1994
9 a.m. Mr Akinci, Chairman of the Communal Liberation Party
10 a.m. Committee of Families of Missing Turkish Cypriots
10.45 a.m. Departure for Famagusta
12.30 p.m. East Mediterranean University
1.30 p.m. Lunch hosted by Prof. Oral
3.30 p.m. Departure for Kyrenia
4.45 p.m. Mr Liatsos, Representative of the Maronite Community
5.15 p.m. Departure for Nicosia
5.45 p.m. Mr Nami, businessman
7 p.m. Return to the southern part
8.30 p.m. Dinner hosted by Mr Galanos
Saturday 5 February 1994
8.15 a.m. Mr Rolandis, MP, Chairman of the Liberal Party
9 a.m. Mr Vassiliou, former President of the Republic of Cyprus
10.15 a.m. Departure for Paphos
1 p.m. Lunch hosted by Mr Leptos, businessman
8 p.m. Dinner hosted by Mr Galanos
Representation of the Cypriot political parties
a. Representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus
Following elections held on 19 May 1991 the representation of the political parties is as follows:
—De mocratic Rally (DISY)19 seat—
—Pr ogressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)18 seats—
—De mocratic Party (DIKO)11 seats—
—So cialist Party (EDEK) 7 seats—
—Li beral Party 1 seatto
total 56 seats
Have no representation in the House of Representatives:
—De mocratic Socialist Reform Movement (ADISOK-New Left)—
—Fr ee Democrats Partyb.
b. Representation of political parties in the "Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"4
Following the elections held on 12 December 1993 the representation of the political parties is as follows:
—Na tional Unity Party17 seats—
—De mocratic Party15 seats—
—Re publican Turkish Party13 seats—
—Co mmunal Liberation Party 5 seatsto
Have no representation:
—Ne w Cyprus Party—
—Un ity and Sovereignty Party—
—Na tionalist Struggle Party A
Historical background (1960-92)
1. In order to better understand the Cypriot conflict, it is necessary to outline the recent history of the Republic of Cyprus. The agreements signed in Zurich and London in 1959 between representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and the two Cypriot communities paved the way for the independence of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960. Although the agreements provided for privileged relations between the new republic and Greece and Turkey, they expressly ruled out either the union of the island with another state or its division.
2. Under the 1960 Constitution, both the Greek and Turkish communities were to participate in all institutions of the Republic of Cyprus. Seventy per cent of seats in the House of Representatives were reserved for the Greek Cypriot community and 30% for the Turkish Cypriot community. Two separate Communal Chambers, one for the Greek Cypriots and the other for the Turkish Cypriots, were set up and their responsibilities included religion, education and culture.
3. The first difficulties in implementing the constitution emerged within months of the declaration of independence. The two communities accused each other of violating the 1959 agreements and the 1960 Constitution. At the same time, part of the Greek Cypriot population continued to champion the idea of uniting Cyprus with Greece (Enosis).
4. At the end of November 1963, President Makarios put forward thirteen proposals to amend the 1960 Constitution, triggering a crisis whose effects can be felt to this day. The amendments were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community who had not been constitutionally consulted and who felt that they called into question the delicate balance between the two communities which had been established by the Zurich and London agreements. 5. Clashes between the two communities in 1963 and at the beginning of 1964 prompted the United Nations Security Council to discuss the Cyprus issue. In March 1964, it adopted Resolution 186 in which it decided to dispatch a United Nations peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) to Cyprus, where it has remained to the present day. At the same time, the Security Council asked the Secretary General to act as mediator between the parties.
6. The incidents that occurred in Cyprus in the period from 1964 to 1967 did much to foster a climate of mistrust between the two communities. Reports by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security Council at the time described clashes between the two communities which had particularly serious economic and material repercussions for the Turkish Cypriot community. Following Archbishop Makarios' proposals for constitutional changes, the Turkish Cypriot community ceased to play a part in the bodies provided for in the 1960 Constitution and gradually established its own administration in the parts of the island where Turkish Cypriots were in a majority. A description of the developments which lead to setting up such Turkish Cypriot administration is contained in the Secretary General's report of 29 July 1965 (S/6569).
7. Over the same period, between 1964 and 1967, the size of the Greek military contingent stationed in Cyprus increased considerably, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and notwithstanding the provisions of the Zurich and London agreements. This Greek military presence did much to fuel suspicion in the Turkish Cypriot community. The bilateral agreements reached by Greece and Turkey in December 1967 and January 1968 did, however, make it possible to repatriate the majority of the Greek armed forces based on the island. This step improved the communities' trust in one another and paved the way for the resumption of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations some months later.
8. The coup d'�tat of 15 July 1974, which was organised by the military junta in power in Greece, carried out by the National Guard that was run by Greek officers, and backed by Greek Cypriots who openly supported Enosis, sparked a "veritable tragedy" in the words of President Makarios. Following the coup, officers of the Greek military regime installed Mr Sampson as President of the Republic. It was only with the aid of the British Government and the UNIFICYP that President Makarios was able to leave the island safely and reach New York, where he addressed the United Nations Security Council on 19 July 1974.
9. On 20 July 1974, the Turkish Government intervened militarily in Cyprus, exercising rights which it had been accorded under the guarantee treaty of 1960, but without consulting the two other guarantor powers. Some days later, the fall of the military regime in Greece deprived Mr Sampson of the Greek support. The constitutional breach in Cyprus was then redressed and, in the absence of President Makarios, Mr Clerides took office as acting President. From 25 to 30 July 1974, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom met in Geneva to discuss the restoration of peace and the constitutional set-up in Cyprus, pursuant to Resolution 353 of the United Nations Security Council. A second conference, attended by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegations, was held in Geneva at the beginning of August 1974 while the fighting continued in Cyprus. Following the breakdown of talks on 14 August 1974, Turkey unilaterally decided to send a second wave of troops to Cyprus, which occupied the northern third of the island. This led to a de facto division of the island into two parts separated by a demarcation line. Almost the whole of the Greek Cypriot community became concentrated in the southern part and almost all the Turkish Cypriot community in the northern part. Nearly a third of the population was displaced by the conflict.
10. On 13 February 1975, representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community proclaimed the northern part of the island the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus which, in 1983, was renamed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).5 This unilateral and illegal declaration of independence was condemned by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 367 (1975) and 541 (1983). With the sole exception of Turkey, the international community refused to recognise the new republic and continues not to do so.
11. In spite of efforts by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the declaration of independence by the northern part of Cyprus has made intercommunal dialogue more difficult. Following the adoption by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 367 (1975) on 12 March 1975, new attempts were made to solve the problem through a series of talks between the two communities. The two high-level agreements reached in Nicosia in 1977 and 1979, in the presence of the United Nations Secretary General, set out the framework for a solution to the Cyprus question on a federal basis. It must be noted that the second high-level agreement referred to the return of the town of Famagusta to its owners, a problem still unsolved and closely related to the "confidence-building measures" proposed by Mr Boutros Ghali. With his arrival at the helm of the United Nations in January 1992, negotiations took on a new momentum, which might allow us to look to the future with a little more optimism. APPENDIX IV
Reports by the Secretary General of the United Nations on his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus
—re port of 03.04.1992, No. S/23780—
—re port of 21.08.1992, No. S/24472—
—re port of 19.11.1992, No. S/24830—
—re port of 01.07.1993, No. S/26026—
—re port of 14.09.1993, No. S/26438—
—re port of 04.03.1994, No. S/1994/262—
—re port of 04.04.1994, No. S/1994/380—
—re port of 30.05.1994, No. S/1994/629 AP
1. Although the "set of ideas" proposed by Mr Boutros Ghali on 21 August 1992 and endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 774 seems to be taking a back seat at the moment, I would like to give an outline of this package as to my mind it could well form the basis for an agreement on Cyprus.
2. The "set of ideas" laid down a series of general objectives. The overall framework agreement constituted an integrated whole that was designed to result in a new partnership and a new constitution for Cyprus, governing relations between the two communities. The agreement also recognised that Cyprus was the common home of the two communities and that their relationship was not one of majority and minority. The settlement of the Cyprus question was based on the existence of a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship comprising two politically equal communities. While political equality would not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, any constitutional amendment would require the approval of both communities. The federal government would not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community and its functions and powers were designed to ensure the effective participation of the two communities. The two communities would have to undertake to acknowledge each other's identity and integrity and to achieve a new relationship based on mutual respect, friendship and co-operation.
3. The agreement also provided for a series of guiding principles, notably:
—th e bi-communal and bi-zonal federation would be established freely by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and would comprise one territory composed of two politically equal federated states;—
—th e federal constitution, approved by the two communities in separate referenda, could only be amended with the approval of both federated states;—
—th e federal republic would have one indivisible sovereignty;—
—th e federal constitution would safeguard the identity, integrity and security of each community; —
—th e federal republic would be secular;—
—th e federal republic would maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey and would continue its membership of the Commonwealth.4.
4. The "set of ideas" also dealt with the constitutional aspects of the federation. Accordingly it set out the powers and functions to be vested in the federal government, notably with regard to foreign affairs, the central bank, international trade, the federal budget, defence and the federal judiciary and the police. It was also proposed to create a parliament comprising a lower house and an upper house. The lower house would have a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio and the two communities would have equal representation in the upper house. All laws would have to be passed by a majority in each house. The federal executive would consist of a federal president, a federal vice-president and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice-president would symbolise the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities. To facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the initial eight years, the president and vice-president would also be the heads of their respective federates states. The Council of Ministers would be composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ministers in a 7:3 ratio. The federal judiciary would consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house.
5. All universally recognised fundamental rights and freedoms would be enshrined in the federal constitution.
6. The "set of ideas" also provided for measures to guarantee the security of the federal republic and proposed supplementing the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance with provisions guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of the federal republic. While it remained a long-term objective, the demilitarisation of the federal republic might make headway through a gradual, balanced and concerted reduction in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot military forces, as well as the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces not provided for in the Treaty of Alliance. Once the framework agreement had been approved by the two communities, an interim monitoring committee would be established, composed of representatives of the three guarantor powers, the two communities and the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Cyprus. It would be responsible for monitoring respect of the undertaking entered into by the two parties.
7. Delimiting the borders of the federated states would require the two communities to make territorial adjustments.
8. The framework agreement attached particular importance to the fate of displaced persons, whose claims would be dealt with completely impartially. The "set of ideas" provided for resettlement or compensation measures which should make it possible to satisfy the persons concerned.
9. As the development of a balanced economy is one of the objectives of the Federal Republic, it was necessary to set up a programme to correct the economic imbalance between the two communities, notably through special measures to promote the development of the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community.
10. The "set of ideas" also made provision for a series of transitional arrangements to be implemented in the period following signature of the overall framework agreement on Cyprus and the entry into force of the new federal constitution.
Resolution 939 (1994)
adopted by the Security Council at its 3412th meeting,
on 29 July 1994
Recalling its relevant resolutions on Cyprus;
Welcoming the report of the Secretary General of 30 May 1994 (S/1994/629) and his letter of 28 June 1994 (S/1994/785), concerning his mission of good offices;
Reaffirming, in this context, that the confidence-building measures, while not an end in themselves, nor a substitute for the wider political process, would offer significant benefits to both communities and would facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement;
Recalling the acceptance in principle by both parties of the confidence-building measures, and welcoming the acceptance by the leader of the Greek Cypriot community of the 21 March 1994 "Draft ideas for implementing the package of confidence-building measures" (S/1994/785, annex), and welcoming also the considerable progress towards agreement made by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, as described in the Secretary General's letter of 28 June 1994;
Noting that there is now a substantial measure of agreement on the substance of the confidence-building measures and the modalities for their implementation, but also noting with concern that neither leader is yet prepared to proceed to their implementation on the basis outlined in the Secretary General's letter of 28 June 1994;
Having studied the options and ideas for future action set out in paragraphs 57 to 62 of the Secretary General's report of 30 May 1994,
1. Reiterates that the maintenance of the status quo is unacceptable;
2. Reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession;
3. Requests the Secretary General to begin consultations with members of the Council, with the guarantor powers, and with the two leaders in Cyprus with a view to undertaking a fundamental and far-reaching reflection on ways of approaching the Cyprus problem in a manner that will yield results, and reiterates its call to the parties to demonstrate their commitment by co-operating fully to this end;
4. Urges, in this context, the parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary General and his Special Representative to achieve agreement on the modalities for implementing the confidence-building measures at the earliest possible time;
5. Also requests the Secretary General to submit a report by the end of October 1994 including a programme for achieving an overall solution to the issues involved in the Cyprus problem following his consultations referred to in paragraph 3 above and on progress made towards the implementation of the confidence-building measures;
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be assessed.
Reference to committee: See Resolutions 816 (1984) and 963 (1991).
Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 2 December 1994.
Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 2 December 1994 by 28 votes to 0 and 1 abstention.
Members of the committee: Mr Reddemann (Chairman), Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman (Vice-Chairperson), Lord Finsberg (Vice-Chairman), MM. �lvarez-Cascos, Antretter, B�rsony, Baumel, Bergqvist, Bernardini, Bj�rn Bjarnason, Bj�rck, Bokov, B�chel, E�rsi, Fassino, Fogaš, Galanos, Gjellerod, Gricius, G�ner, Mrs Haller, Mrs Halonen, MM. Hardy, Irmer, Iwinski, Kalus (Alternate: Bachna), Kaspereit, Kelam, Kelchtermans, Kenneally, K�nig, La Loggia, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Machete, Martins, Masseret, Mimaroǧlu, Muehlemann, Pahor, Panov, Mrs Papandreou, MM. Pavlidis, Pozzo, de Puig, Radulescu Botica, Schieder (Alternate: Fuhrmann), Seeuws, Severin, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Špaček, Mrs Suchocka, MM. Thoresen, Vella, N... (Andorra).
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen amd Ms Chatzivassiliou.
1 1Reference to these entities in no way implies any recognition thereof by the Rapporteur. The only state recognised by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus.
2 1Reference to these entities in no way implies any recognition thereof by the Rapporteur. The only state recognised by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus. 3 1This reference to the TRNC does not imply any recognition by the Rapporteur. The only state recognised by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus.
4 1Reference to these entitities in no way implies any recognition thereof by the Rapporteur. The only state recognised by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus.
5 1Reference to these two entities in no way implies any recognition thereof by the Rapporteur. The only state recognised by the Council of Europe is the Republic of Cyprus.