Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/386/993/632420/
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 03:48:41
Document Index: 632878834

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 12', '§ 1342', '§ 2', '§ 1331', '§ 1365', '§ 1365', '§ 1365', '§ 1365', '§ 505', '§ 1365', '§ 313', '§ 1323', '§ 505', '§ 1365']

386 F.3d 993: Quebell P. Parker, Sandra Skypek, Charles Parker, Individually, As Attorneys in Fact for Quebell Parker, and in the Name of Quebell Parker, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, L.b. Recycling, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, J. Wayne Maddox, Individually and As the Successor in Interest to L.b. Recycling, Inc., Defendants-appellants :: US Court of Appeals Cases :: Justia
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386 F.3d 993: Quebell P. Parker, Sandra Skypek, Charles Parker, Individually, As Attorneys in Fact for Quebell Parker, and in the Name of Quebell Parker, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, L.b. Recycling, Inc., a Georgia Corporation, J. Wayne Maddox, Individually and As the Successor in Interest to L.b. Recycling, Inc., Defendants-appellantsUnited States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. - 386 F.3d 993
Martin Arthur Shelton, Donald D. Stack, Stack & Associates, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Mary Maclean Asbill, The Turner Environmental Law Clinic, Emory University Law School, Atlanta, GA, for Sierra Club, Amicus Curiae.
The plaintiffs, Quebell Parker ("Mrs. Parker"), Sandra Skypek, and Charles Parker, (collectively "the Parkers"), filed suit against the defendants, Scrap Metal Processors, Inc. ("SMP") and its predecessors in interest, alleging negligence, negligence per se, nuisance, trespass, violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and violations of various state environmental statutes. A jury returned a verdict against the defendants on all counts. The defendants appeal only the jury's determination that they are liable under the CWA and the RCRA, as well as the award of damages. We conclude that there was substantial evidence for the jury to find the defendants liable under the CWA and the RCRA, but reverse the damages award and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Mrs. Parker's family has owned the property at 9144 Washington Street, Covington, Georgia ("Parker property") for approximately the past fifty years. Mrs. Parker moved into the house located on that property in 1983 and lived there until medical problems forced her to move out in 1998. Since then, the house at 9144 Washington Street has remained vacant.2
The property adjoining the Parker property is 8194 Washington Street ("defendant property"), which was owned by L.B. Frix for many years. Throughout his ownership, Frix operated many businesses on the property, including a scrap metal yard/junkyard. Frix also leased the property to others. The record demonstrates that Frix allowed a junkyard to operate on the property beginning in the 1960s or 1970s. In approximately 1990, J. Wayne Maddox ("Maddox") took over the scrap metal operation from Frix and began operating a scrap metal yard on the defendant property. Thereafter, Maddox incorporated his business as L.B. Recycling, Inc. ("L.B.Recycling") and operated under that name. In 1994, Mr. Maddox acquired ownership of the defendant property.3 L.B. Recycling was dissolved in 1995, but Maddox continued to operate the business on the defendant property until he sold the scrap metal operation to SMP, a business run by Maddox's son, Jason Maddox, in 1999.4
The events that led the plaintiffs to file the instant suit began in February 1991. At that time, Maddox contracted with Laurence-David, Inc. to dispose of 1,000 drums of liquid waste. After learning of this contract, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") investigated the defendant property in June 1991. The EPA found approximately 600 metal, plastic, and fiber drums on the site, along with twenty-five petroleum underground storage tanks ("USTs"). According to EPA investigation reports, some of the drums appeared to have been crushed or were leaking. There were areas of stained soil and soil samples showed evidence of contamination from metals, petroleum products, solvents, and paint wastes. The EPA sampled eight drums; each contained chemicals and hazardous constituents at levels high enough to present an environmental threat. The EPA also tested three USTs; each contained explosive levels of petroleum vapors.
In 1993, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") inspected the defendant property for possible inclusion on the National Priorities Superfund List. The EPD found the property to be in much the same condition as it was in 1991 when the EPA investigated the site. Both the EPA and the EPD determined that the defendant property presented a likelihood of environmental contamination. The reports from each agency identified several hazardous constituents. No report, however, specifically mentioned the Parker property as potentially contaminated or affected.
In August 2001, Peachtree Environmental, Inc. ("Peachtree Environmental"), an environmental investigation company, examined the Parker property to determine whether it was contaminated. Soil samples from the Parker property tested positive for PCBs and heavy metals. Two of the five samples had PCB and lead levels above the legal limits in Georgia. The Parkers reported the presence of these hazardous substances to the EPD, which determined that the SMP facility was the likely source of the contamination. In December 2002, the EPD issued a consent order requiring Maddox and SMP to investigate and remedy the Parker property.7
The above facts were presented at a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendants liable for negligence, negligence per se, trespass, and nuisance. In addition, the jury found that the defendants violated the CWA and that the plaintiffs were entitled to contribution for corrective action under Georgia's Hazardous Site Response Act ("HSRA"), Ga. Code Ann. §§ 12-8-90 through 12-8-97. In light of these findings, the jury awarded punitive damages and attorneys' fees. The jury awarded the Parkers a total of $1.5 million.
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their RCRA and CWA claims. Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, and, thus, failure to raise the issue in the district court does not prevent a party from raising the issue on appeal. Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 n. 3 (11th Cir.2003). In addition, standing must exist with respect to each claim. See Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, we must determine whether the plaintiffs had standing under both the RCRA and the CWA. To demonstrate standing, they must meet three requirements:
First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an injury in fact&#x2014;a harm suffered by the plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be causation&#x2014;a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant. And third, there must be redressability&#x2014;a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury. This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.
The defendants' arguments with respect to standing under the CWA are almost identical to those raised with respect to standing under the RCRA. As under the RCRA, we reject these arguments. Mrs. Parker demonstrated an injury-in-fact by showing that water runoff originating on the defendants' property caused hazardous substances, such as PCBs and lead, to migrate onto the Parker property, where the substances contaminated the soil and eventually made their way to the stream. This injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' alleged failure to obtain or comply with their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. A favorable decision on the merits would adequately redress Mrs. Parker's injury because such a decision would require the defendants to obtain and comply with the required permit.11
The CWA allows states to implement their own permit programs after receiving EPA authorization, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), and Georgia has done so. The defendants argue that Georgia's program transforms the plaintiffs' CWA claims into state law claims, and, therefore, the claims do not arise under federal law. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged two CWA violations. First, they alleged that the defendants discharged a pollutant into waters of the United States without obtaining a NPDES permit. In response, the defendants contend that they obtained the required permit prior to the commencement of the plaintiffs' suit. Thus, according to the defendants, this violation is a wholly past violation over which we do not have jurisdiction. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Glazer v. Am. Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F.Supp. 1029 (E.D.Tex. 1995). Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants have not complied with the conditions of their permit. The defendants respond that the permit was obtained pursuant to state law, and we do not have jurisdiction over a violation of state law. Even assuming that the defendants are correct with regard to their first argument &#x2014;that we do not have jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' first claim regarding a discharge into United States' waters because it is a wholly past violation&#x2014;we conclude that we do have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the second claim&#x2014;that the defendants violated conditions of their permit. The plain language of the CWA and the relevant case law dealing with the CWA convince us that there is federal jurisdiction over citizen-suit claims that allege violations of a state-issued NPDES permit.
We begin our analysis with the language of the CWA citizen-suit provision, which provides that federal courts have jurisdiction over citizen suits alleging violations of the CWA. The CWA citizen-suit provision allows "any citizen" to sue "any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (emphasis added). In addition, the statute confers jurisdiction on the district courts for citizen suits to enforce "an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (emphasis added). The relevant question, then, is whether EPA-approved state permit conditions qualify as "an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter." Again, the text of the statute is revealing. "Effluent standard or limitation under this chapter" is defined to include "a permit or condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this title." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6). Section 1342(b), in turn, authorizes states to administer their own permit programs, and thereby issue state permits, after receiving EPA approval. Thus, a plain reading of this statute indicates that state permits and conditions fall within the effluent standards or conditions covered "under this chapter."13
We continue our analysis by looking at the relevant case law. First, we note that the Supreme Court appears to have rejected the defendants' contention&#x2014;that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over CWA citizen suits alleging a violation of an EPA-approved state permit condition. In EPA v. California, the Supreme Court stated that "a citizen may commence civil actions in district court `against any person... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent standard or limitation under this Act.'" 426 U.S. 200, 223-24, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1979 ed., Supp. IV)) (emphasis added). The Court then analyzed the meaning of "effluent standard or limitation," and noted that "[t]he reference in § 505(f)(6) [33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6)] to requirements applicable by reason of § 313 [33 U.S.C. § 1323]14 is to be read as making clear that all dischargers ... may be sued to enforce permit conditions, whether those conditions arise from standards and limitations promulgated by the Administrator or from stricter standards established by the State." Id. at 224, 96 S.Ct. 2022 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court apparently has incorporated state law standards under the CWA into federal environmental law for jurisdictional purposes.15
Second, the Supreme Court implicitly has held that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over cases that assert a violation of a state-issued NPDES permit. In Gwaltney, the plaintiff alleged that "petitioner `has violated ... [and] will continue to violate its NPDES permit.'" 484 U.S. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 376. The permit in question was issued by the Virginia State Water Control Board, which is Virginia's equivalent of the Georgia EPD&#x2014;it is in charge of Virginia's EPA-approved CWA program. Id. at 52-53, 108 S.Ct. 376. Thus, the issue in Gwaltney was almost identical to the issue here. After concluding that there is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over wholly past violations, the Court addressed whether a good-faith allegation that the defendants are continuing to violate a permit-condition confers jurisdiction over a citizen suit. The Court concluded: "[W]e agree that § 505 [33 U.S.C. § 1365] confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation." Id. at 64, 108 S.Ct. 376. The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could consider whether the complaint made such a good-faith allegation. Id. at 67, 108 S.Ct. 376. By so deciding, the Supreme Court implicitly decided that there is subject-matter jurisdiction over citizen suits that allege a violation of a state-issued NPDES permit as long as the violation is not wholly past.
Finally, most federal courts that have considered the matter have decided that there is federal jurisdiction over citizen suits brought pursuant to state-issued NPDES permits. In fact, with the exception of the Second Circuit in Atlantic States, we have not found, and the parties did not cite to us, any authority indicating that federal courts lack jurisdiction over CWA claims brought pursuant to EPA-approved state permits. On the other hand, however, several cases have specifically decided that there is federal question jurisdiction over such cases. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 985-90 (9th Cir.1995) (examining cases and legislative history and concluding that the grant of federal jurisdiction for CWA citizen suits includes a grant over suits alleging a violation of Oregon's water quality standards); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 953 F.Supp. 1541, 1552-53 (N.D.Ga.1996) (collecting cases and stating "the Clean Water Act expressly contemplates stricter state effluent and other limitations deemed necessary by the state to restore the integrity of the waters within the state, allows states to incorporate those limitations into a state-issued permit, and authorizes a citizen suit to enforce those limitations"); Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1572, 1581 (N.D.Ga.1995) ("The CWA authorizes citizen suits f