Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20130702_0001195.DAZ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-01-17 04:53:41
Document Index: 726448654

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Thomas v. Wilmot
Christian Ronnell Thomas, Plaintiff,v.Sheriff Wilmot, et al., Defendants.
On April 15, 2013, Plaintiff Christian Ronnell Thomas, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison-Florence West, in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an incomplete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In an Order dated May 29, 2013, the Court noted the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and granted Plaintiff 30 days to either pay the filing fee or file a complete Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. On June 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed a new Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5). The Court will grant the Application and dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
Plaintiff asserts two counts for violating his rights to basic necessities and for constitutionally adequate medical care. Plaintiff names as Defendants Yuma County Sheriff Wilmot, Extradition Transport of America, and employees of Extradition Transport of America Jane Doe Driver One and John Doe Driver Two. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff alleges the following in his Complaint: In 2005, Plaintiff injured his left Achilles tendon, which "disabled" him. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Around June 28, 2012, Plaintiff was extradited from Hampton City Jail and "driven around the country for more than 96 hours" in metal shackles and belly chains. ( Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that he is to be transported in hard plastic or leather-padded shackles and that his repeated complaints were ignored. Because Plaintiff was kept in the metal shackles for 96 hours without them being removed at any time, he suffered injuries to his wrist, "major pain a[nd] inflammation to [his] ankles and feet to the point [he] could hardly walk" and had blood in his stool. ( Id. at 3.) Also, during the 96-hour transport, Plaintiff was only allowed to use the restroom twice a day, and once had to urinate in a bottle to relieve himself. He further asserts that he was not "given any opportunity to do any hygienic processes" during those 96 hours and was "forced to eat, sleep and stay in a cramped, hot, muggy, smelly wanton state." ( Id. at 4.) He felt "like a kidnapped victim" and was "helpless, distressed, depressed, [and in] extreme anguish." ( Id. )
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Outlander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Negligence is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). Moreover, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
A. Defendants Wilmot, Jane Doe One and John Doe Two
Plaintiff sues Sheriff Wilmot and Extradition Transport of America drivers Jane Doe One and John Doe Two. While all three individuals may be sued under § 1983, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of them.
To state a claim against a defendant, "[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the official acted as a result of a policy, practice, or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant's position as the supervisor of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his individual capacity, "is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. In addition, where a defendant's only involvement in allegedly unconstitutional conduct is the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner's behalf to remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional behavior for purposes of § 1983. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); accord Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743, 765 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Stocker v. Warden, No. 1:07-CV-00589, 2009 WL 981323, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009); Mintun v. Blades, No. CV-06-139, 2008 WL 711636, at *7 (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 2008); see also Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006) (a plaintiff must allege that a supervisor defendant did more than play a passive role in an alleged violation or mere tacit approval thereof; a plaintiff must allege that the supervisor defendant somehow encouraged or condoned the actions of their subordinates).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support that Wilmot violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that Wilmot directly violated his constitutional rights, nor has he alleged that his rights have been violated under a policy or practice promulgated, endorsed, or condoned by Wilmot. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Wilmot and he will be dismissed.
Nor has Plaintiff alleged any specific facts against Jane Doe Driver One or John Doe Driver Two. Presumably, they were the drivers when Plaintiff was shackled and transported, but Plaintiff does not state that. Nor does he link any constitutional violation to either of them. He states that he complained repeatedly during his transport, but he does not allege to whom those complaints were directed, what he said, and what response, if any, he received. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against either Jane Doe Driver One or John Doe Driver Two and they will be dismissed.
B. Extradition Transport of America
Plaintiff sues Extradition Transport of America. While Plaintiff does not state any facts against this Defendant, presumably Extradition Transport of America is the entity responsible for transporting Plaintiff during the relevant time period since Plaintiff alleges the two drivers were employed by Extradition Transport of America. Claims under § 1983 may be directed at "bodies politic and corporate." Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89 (1978). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress intended municipal corporations and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Id. at 689-90. That proposition has been extended to corporations that act under color of state law. See Sable Commc's of Cal. Inc. v. P. Tel. & Tel Co., 890 F.2d 184, 189 (9th Cir. 1989) (willful joint participation of private corporation in joint activity with state or its agent taken under color of state law).
There are four ways to find state action by a private entity for purposes of § 1983: (1) the private actor performs a public function, (2) the private actor engages in joint activity with a state actor, (3) a private actor is subject to governmental compulsion or coercion, or (4) there is a governmental nexus with the private actor. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the public function test, "the function [performed by the private actor] must traditionally be the exclusive prerogative of the state." Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); see Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093; Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554-555 (9th Cir. 2002). A privately owned corporation that provides medical care to state inmates under contract with a state performs a public function that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.
To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional public function, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Wall v. Dion, 257 F.Supp.2d 316, 319 (D. Me. 2003); see also Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727 (4th Cir. 1999); Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990); Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989).
Extradition Transport of America does provide a traditional public function by transporting prisoners under contracts with various law enforcement agencies and may be sued. However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that Extradition Transport of America promulgated or endorsed a policy or custom that resulted in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Moreover, because there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, a defendant's position as the employer of someone who allegedly violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights does not make it liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that Extradition Transport of America promulgated or endorsed a policy or practice resulting in a violation of his rights, he fails to state a claim against it and Extradition Transport of America will be dismissed.
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not sufficient and will be dismissed.
(1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) is granted.