Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/374-u-s-449-606617866
Timestamp: 2020-05-27 08:55:31
Document Index: 103590752

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 212', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 212', '§ 212', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 101']

374 U.S. 449 (1963), 248, Rosenberg v. Fleuti - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 606617866
Docket Nº: No. 248
Citation: 374 U.S. 449, 83 S.Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.2d 1000
Party Name: Rosenberg v. Fleuti
374 U.S. 449 (1963)
83 S.Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.2d 1000
1. This Court ought not to pass on the constitutionality of § 212(a)(4), as applied to respondent, unless such adjudication is unavoidable, and there is a threshold question as to whether respondent's return to this country from his afternoon trip to Mexico in 1956 constituted an "entry" within the meaning of § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, so as to subject him to deportation for a condition existing at that time, but not at the time of his original admission before the 1952 Act became effective. Pp. 451-452.
2. It would be inconsistent with the general ameliorative purpose of Congress in enacting § 101(a)(13) to hold that an innocent, casual and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders was "intended" as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status, so as to subject him to the consequences of an "entry" into the country on his return. Pp. 452-462.
Mexico in 1956, the judgment below is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration of the application of that section in the light of this opinion. Pp. 462-463.
[83 S.Ct. 1806] MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted in order to consider the constitutionality of § 212(a)(4) as applied to respondent Fleuti. 371 U.S. 859. Upon consideration of the case, however, and in accordance with the long established principle that "we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable," Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105; see also Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129; Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U.S. 77; Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384; we have concluded that there is a threshold issue of statutory interpretation in the case, the existence of which obviates decision here as to whether § 212(a)(4) is constitutional as applied to respondent.
August, 1956, constituted an "entry" within the meaning of § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13), such that Fleuti was excludable for a condition existing at that time even though he had been permanently and continuously resident in this country for nearly four years prior thereto. Section 101(a)(13), which has never been directly construed by this Court in relation to the kind of brief absence from the country [83 S.Ct. 1807] that characterizes the present case,1 reads as follows:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him. or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such exception.
exception to the term "entry" created by the statute. Whether the 1956 return was within that exception is crucial, because Fleuti concededly was not excludable as a "psychopathic personality" at the time of his 1952 entry.2
The definition of "entry," as applied for various purposes in our immigration laws, was evolved judicially, only becoming encased in statutory form with the inclusion of § 101(a)(13) in the 1952 Act. In the early cases, there was developed a judicial definition of "entry" which had harsh consequences for aliens. This viewpoint was expressed most restrictively in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, in which the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, upheld deportation of an alien who, after 24 years of residence in this country following a lawful entry, was held to be excludable on his return from "a brief visit to Cuba," id. at 423. The Court stated that
the word "entry" . . . includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States, whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one.
Id. at 425.3 Although cases in the lower courts applying the
strict reentry doctrine to aliens who had left the country for brief visits to Canada or Mexico or elsewhere were numerous,4 many courts applied the doctrine in such instances with express reluctance and explicit recognition of its harsh consequences,5 and there were a few instances in which district judges refused to hold that aliens who had been absent from the country only briefly had made "entries" upon their return.6
the alien would be subjected without means of protecting himself to the forfeiture of privileges which may be, and often are, of the most grave importance to him.
Ibid. If there were...