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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 9', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647', '§ 647']

KOLENDER V. LAWSON, 461 U. S. 352 (1983) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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KOLENDER V. LAWSON, 461 U. S. 352 (1983)
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O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 461 U. S. 362. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST J., joined, post, p. 461 U. S. 369. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a "credible and reliable" identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). [Footnote 1] We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appellant H. A. Porazzo, Deputy Chief Commander of the California Highway Patrol, appealed the District Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Lawson chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 455 U. S. 494, n. 5 (1982). As construed by the California Court of Appeal, [Footnote 4] § 647(e) requires that an individual chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 356
provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry detention. [Footnote 5] People v. Solomon, 33 Cal.App.3d 429, 108 Cal.Rptr. 867 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 357
(1973). "Credible and reliable" identification is defined by the State Court of Appeal as identification "carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." Id. at 438, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 873. In addition, a suspect may be required to "account for his presence . . . to the extent that it assists in producing credible and reliable identification. . . ." Id. at 438, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 872. Under the terms of the statute, failure of the individual to provide "credible and reliable" identification permits the arrest. [Footnote 6]
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hoffman Estates v. Flipide, Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926). Although the doctrine focuses chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 358
both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine
"is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."
Smith, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 574. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Id. at 415 U. S. 575. [Footnote 7]
Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible and reliable" identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest. An individual who police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime is entitled to continue to walk the public streets "only at the whim of any police officer" who happens to stop that individual under § 647(e). Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 382 U. S. 90 (1965). Our concern here is based upon the "potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties. . . ." Id. at 382 U. S. 91. In addition, § 647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 357 U. S. 126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 378 U. S. 505-506 (1964). [Footnote 8] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 359
Section 647(e) is not simply a "stop-and-identify" statute. Rather, the statute requires that the individual provide a "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity, and that provides "means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." Solomon, 33 Cal.App.3d at 438, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 872-873. In addition, the suspect may also have to account for his presence "to the extent it assists in producing chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 360
credible and reliable identification." Id. at 438, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 872.
It is clear that the full discretion accorded to the police to determine whether the suspect has provided a "credible and reliable" identification necessarily "entrust[s] lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.'" Smith, supra, at 415 U. S. 575 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 394 U. S. 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)). Section 647(e)
"furnishes a convenient tool for'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure,'"
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 310 U. S. 97-98 (1940)), and "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation." Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 415 U. S. 135 (1974) (POWELL, J., concurring in result). In providing that a detention under § 647(e) may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop, the State ensures the existence of "neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, 443 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 361
U.S. at 443 U. S. 51. Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement.
Appellants stress the need for strengthened law enforcement tools to combat the epidemic of crime that plagues our Nation. The concern of our citizens with curbing criminal activity is certainly a matter requiring the attention of all branches of government. As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939). Section 647(e), as presently construed, requires that "suspicious" persons satisfy some undefined identification requirement, or face criminal punishment. Although due process does not require "impossible standards" of clarity, see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 332 U. S. 7-8 (1947), this is not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical.
We conclude § 647(e) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute. [Footnote 10] Accordingly, the judgment of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 362
392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21. The Ninth Circuit then held that, although what Solomon articulated as the Terry standard differed from what Terry actually held, "[w]e believe that the Solomon court meant to incorporate in principle the standards enunciated in Terry." 658 F.2d 1366, n. 8. We agree with that interpretation of Solomon. Of course, if the Solomon court misread Terry and interpreted § 647(e) to permit investigative detentions in situations where the officers lack a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on objective facts, Fourth Amendment concerns would be implicated. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979).
In addition, the Solomon court appeared to believe that both the Terry detention and frisk were proper under the standard for Terry detentions, and since the frisk was more intrusive than the request for identification, the request for identification must be proper under Terry. See 33 Cal.App.3d at 435, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 870-871. The Ninth Circuit observed that the Solomon analysis was "slightly askew." 658 F.2d 1366, n. 9. The court reasoned that, under Terry, the frisk, as opposed to the detention, is proper only if the detaining officer reasonably believes that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, in addition to having an articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
I join the Court's opinion; it demonstrates convincingly that the California statute at issue in this case, Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970), as interpreted by California courts, is unconstitutionally vague. Even if the defect identified by the Court were cured, however, I would hold that this statute violates the Fourth Amendment. [Footnote 2/1] Merely to facilitate the general law enforcement objectives of investigating and preventing unspecified crimes, States may not authorize the arrest and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification or further information on demand by a police officer. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 363
It has long been settled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the seizure and detention or search of an individual's person unless there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime, except under certain conditions strictly defined by the legitimate requirements of law enforcement and by the limited extent of the resulting intrusion on individual liberty and privacy. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 394 U. S. 726-727 (1969). The scope of that exception to the probable cause requirement for seizures of the person has been defined by a series of cases, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), holding that a police officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, based on articulable facts, may detain a suspect briefly for purposes of limited questioning and, in so doing, may conduct a brief "frisk" of the suspect to protect himself from concealed weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 422 U. S. 880-884 (1975); Adam v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 407 U. S. 145-146 (1972). Where probable cause is lacking, we have expressly declined to allow significantly more intrusive detentions or searches on the Terry rationale, despite the assertion of compelling law enforcement interests.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 442 U. S. 214 (1979). [Footnote 2/2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 364
Terry and the cases following it give full recognition to law enforcement officers' need for an "intermediate" response, short of arrest, to suspicious circumstances; the power to effect a brief detention for the purpose of questioning is a powerful tool for the investigation and prevention of crimes. Any person may, of course, direct a question to another person in passing. The Terry doctrine permits police officers to do far more: if they have the requisite reasonable suspicion, they may use a number of devices with substantial coercive impact on the person to whom they direct their attention, including an official "show of authority," the use of physical force to restrain him, and a search of the person for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 19, n. 16; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 460 U. S. 498-499 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 446 U. S. 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). During such an encounter, few people will ever feel free not to cooperate fully with the police by answering their questions. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 53-55 (1978). Our case reports are replete with examples of suspects' cooperation during Terry encounters, even when the suspects have a great deal to lose by cooperating. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 392 U. S. 45 (1968); Florida v. Royer, supra, at 460 U. S. 493-495.
The price of that effectiveness, however, is intrusion on individual interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. We have held that the intrusiveness of even these brief stops for purposes of questioning is sufficient to render them "seizures" under the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 16. For precisely that reason, the scope of seizures of the person on less than probable cause that Terry chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Id. at 392 U. S. 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Failure to observe these limitations converts a Terry encounter into the sort of detention that can be justified only by probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 501 (opinion of WHITE, J.); id. at 460 U. S. 509-511 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 442 U. S. 216.
The power to arrest -- or otherwise to prolong a seizure until a suspect had responded to the satisfaction of the police officers -- would undoubtedly elicit cooperation from a high percentage of even those very few individuals not sufficiently coerced by a show of authority, brief physical detention, and a frisk. We have never claimed that expansion of the power of police officers to act on reasonable suspicion alone, or even less, would further no law enforcement interests. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 443 U. S. 52 (1979). But the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in effective law enforcement and the equally public interest in safeguarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary governmental interference forbids such expansion. See Dunaway v. New York, supra; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 878. Detention beyond the limits chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 366
California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions during a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 367
Terry encounter, any more than it could abridge the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions once a suspect has been taken into custody. To begin, the statute at issue in this case could not be constitutional unless the intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights it occasions were necessary to advance some specific, legitimate state interest not already taken into account by the constitutional analysis described above. Yet appellants do not claim that § 647(e) advances any interest other than general facilitation of police investigation and preservation of public order -- factors addressed at length in Terry, Davis, and Dunaway. Nor do appellants show that the power to arrest and to impose a criminal sanction, in addition to the power to detain and to pose questions under the aegis of state authority, is so necessary in pursuit of the State's legitimate interests as to justify the substantial additional intrusion on individuals' rights. Compare Brief for Appellants 18-19 (asserting that § 647(e) is justified by state interest in "detecting and preventing crime" and "protecting the citizenry from criminal acts"), and People v. Solomon, 33 Cal.App.3d 429, 436-437, 108 Cal.Rptr. 867, 872 (1973) (§ 647(e) justified by "the public need involved," i.e., "protection of society against crime"), with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 422 U. S. 884 (federal interest in immigration control permits stops at the border itself without reasonable suspicion), and California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 402 U. S. 456-458 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (state interest in regulating automobiles justifies making it a crime to refuse to stop after an automobile accident and report it). Thus, because the State's interests extend only so far as to justify the limited searches and seizures defined by Terry, the balance of interests described in that case and its progeny must control.
Second, it goes without saying that arrest and the threat of a criminal sanction have a substantial impact on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, far more severe than chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 368
we have ever permitted on less than probable cause. Furthermore, the likelihood that innocent persons accosted by law enforcement officers under authority of § 647(e) will have no realistic means to protect their rights compounds the severity of the intrusions on individual liberty that this statute will occasion. The arrests it authorizes make a mockery of the right enforced in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979), in which we held squarely that a State may not make it a crime to refuse to provide identification on demand in the absence of reasonable suspicion. [Footnote 2/5] If § 647(e) remains in force, the validity of such arrests will be open to challenge only after the fact, in individual prosecutions for failure to produce identification. Such case-by-case scrutiny cannot vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of persons like appellee, many of whom will not even be prosecuted after they are arrested, see ante at 461 U. S. 354. A pedestrian approached by police officers has no way of knowing whether the officers have "reasonable suspicion" -- without which they may not demand identification even under § 647(e), ante at 461 U. S. 356, and n. 5 -- because that condition depends solely on the objective facts known to the officers and evaluated in light of their experience, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 30; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 884-885. The pedestrian will know that to assert his rights may subject him to arrest and all that goes with it: new acquaintances among jailers, lawyers, prisoners, and bail bondsmen, firsthand knowledge of local jail conditions, a "search incident to arrest," and the expense of defending against a possible prosecution. [Footnote 2/6] The only response to be chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 369
expected is compliance with the officers' requests, whether or not they are based on reasonable suspicion, and without regard to the possibility of later vindication in court. Mere reasonable suspicion does not justify subjecting the innocent to such a dilemma. [Footnote 2/7]
"suggests that one who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question is nonetheless entitled to
Page 461 U. S. 370
attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."
Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 417 U. S. 756 (1974). The correlative rule is that a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 455 U. S. 497 (1982).
The upshot of our cases, therefore, is that, whether or not a statute purports to regulate constitutionally protected conduct, it should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is vague in all of its possible applications. If any fool would know that a particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute, if there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know is forbidden by the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 371
law, the enactment is not unconstitutional on its face, and should not be vulnerable to a facial attack in a declaratory judgment action such as is involved in this case. Under our cases, this would be true even though, as applied to other conduct, the provision would fail to give the constitutionally required notice of illegality.
I would agree with the majority in this case if it made at least some sense to conclude that the requirement to provide "credible and reliable identification" after a valid stop on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 372
supra at 455 U. S. 495. * But the statute is not vulnerable on this ground; and the majority, it seems to me, fails to demonstrate that it is. Suppose, for example, an officer requests identification information from a suspect during a valid Terry stop and the suspect answers: "Who I am is just none of your business." Surely the suspect would know from the statute that a refusal to provide any information at all would constitute a violation. It would be absurd to suggest that, in such a situation, only the unfettered discretion of a police officer, who has legally stopped a person on reasonable suspicion, would serve to determine whether a violation of the statute has occurred.
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 584 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). See id. at 415 U. S. 590 (BLACKMUN, J., joined by BURGER, C.J.,agreeing with WHITE, J., on the vagueness issue). Thus, even if, as the majority cryptically asserts, the statute here chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 373
implicates First Amendment interests, it is not vague on its face, however more strictly the vagueness doctrine should be applied. The judgment below should therefore not be affirmed, but reversed, and appellee Lawson remitted to challenging the statute as it has been or will be applied to him.
The majority finds that the statute
"contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification."
Ante at 461 U. S. 358. At the same time, the majority concedes that "credible and reliable" has been defined by the state court to mean identification that carries reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and that provides means for later getting in touch with the person. The narrowing construction given this statute by the state court cannot be likened to the "standardless" statutes involved in the cases cited by the majority. For example, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), involved a statute that made it a crime to be a "vagrant." The statute provided:
The statutes in Lewis v. City of New Orleans and Smith v. Goguen, supra, as well as other cases cited by the majority, clearly involved threatened infringements of First Amendment chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Page 461 U. S. 374
freedoms. A stricter test of vagueness was therefore warranted. Here, the majority makes a vague reference to potential suppression of First Amendment liberties, but the precise nature of the liberties threatened is never mentioned. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 (1965), is cited, but that case dealt with an ordinance making it a crime to "stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk . . . after having been requested by any police officer to move on,'" id. at 382 U. S. 90, and the First Amendment concerns implicated by the statute were adequately explained by the Court's reference to Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), and Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), which dealt with the First Amendment right to distribute leaflets on city streets and sidewalks. There are no such concerns in the present case.