Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/1274523/US-Treasury-chapter400-370
Timestamp: 2017-06-29 13:11:12
Document Index: 349820742

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7213', '§ 1030', '§ 1030', '§ 7213', '§ 7213', '§ 7431', 'ART. 370']

US Treasury: chapter400-370 | Internal Revenue Service | Credit History
US Treasury: chapter400-370Uploaded by TreasuryRelated InterestsInternal Revenue ServiceCredit HistoryComputer SecurityOnline Safety & PrivacySearch And SeizureRating and Stats0.0 (0)Document ActionsDownloadShare or Embed DocumentEmbedView MoreCopyright: Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate contentOFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 CHAPTER 400 - INVESTIGATIONS (400)-370Strategic Enforcement Division
370.1 Overview. This Section includes the following information regarding TIGTA-Office of Investigations (OI), Strategic Enforcement Division (SED): SED-Cincinnati • • • • • SED-Cincinnati Operations Mission Unauthorized Access (UNAX) Violations Audit Trail Lead Analysis System (ATLAS) Collateral Services from SED-Cincinnati Requests for SED-Cincinnati Assistance
Computer Investigative Support Program • • • • • • Computer Investigative Support (CIS) Program Mission CIS Program Structure CIS Laboratories CIS Agent Duties Computer Related Investigations Procedures for Requesting CIS Program Support
System Intrusion Network Attack Response Team • • • • • System Intrusion Network Attack Response Team (SINART) Mission SINART Structure and Services IRS Computer Security Incident Response Center (CSIRC) Responsibilities SINART Responsibilities Requesting SINART Assistance
370.1.1 Acronyms Table. 370.2 SED-Cincinnati Mission. SED-Cincinnati, located in Cincinnati, Ohio, is a coordinated effort between auditors, special agents (SA) and computer programmers who provide pro-active investigative referrals to TIGTA Field Divisions and assistance to SA’s in their investigations. SEDCincinnati uses computer technology, forensic data analysis, and other techniques to identify potential criminal violations. In addition to forensic database analysis, SEDCincinnati also: Operations Manual 1 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 • • • • •
Provides testimony/evidentiary guidance and advice during criminal and administrative proceedings; Advises Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSA) on the evidentiary significance of database analysis results; Maintains liaison with other law enforcement agencies and professional forensic organizations in order to stay current on the latest technological advances and methodologies in computer database analysis and reporting; Initiates Proactive Investigative Initiatives from information developed during successful investigations or UNAX analysis; and Maintains unassigned fictitious identities.
SED-Cincinnati is assigned the primary responsibility to detect and investigate suspected unauthorized accesses to, and/or misuse of, taxpayer data. In order to fulfill this mission, SED-Cincinnati develops proactive programs designed to detect fraud and misuse of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) computer data, systems, and operations. SED consolidates information contained in the field divisions’ Quarterly Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act Worksheets to create an annual agency report for submission to the Department of Treasury Data Integrity Board. 370.3 UNAX Violations. A UNAX violation is generally defined as the willful unauthorized access or inspection of taxpayer records. 26 U.S.C. § 7213A prohibits any federal or state employee from willfully inspecting any tax return or return information without authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B) prohibits the intentional unauthorized or exceeding authorized access to any information stored on a government-owned computer. Potential UNAX violations are identified through a variety of both internal, IRS, and external sources. TIGTA personnel may receive reports of potential UNAX violations from: • • • • • • Internal automated detection systems; IRS management; IRS employees; Taxpayers; Tax practitioners; and Other outside sources.
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 Agents and auditors may also develop UNAX allegations during the course of assigned investigations or audits. 370.3.1 Reporting Potential UNAX Violations. UNAX allegations involving the following employees, regardless of their source, must be reported as follows: If... A TIGTA employee. Then... Report UNAX allegation directly to the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC)-Special Inquiries and Intelligence Division (SIID). Report UNAX allegation directly to the SAC-SIID. Report UNAX allegation directly to the SAC-SIID.
A GS-15 or above IRS employee. An IRS employee in the International (U.S. Competent Authority) function and is located in Washington, DC or U.S. embassies abroad. An IRS employee in the International (U.S. Competent Authority) function and is located in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands. An IRS employee in the International (U.S. Competent Authority) function and is located in Guam or the American Samoa Islands.
Report UNAX allegation to the SACAtlanta Field Division.
Report UNAX allegation to the SAC-San Francisco Field Division.
UNAX allegations involving all other IRS employees will be reported directly to the SACField Division responsible for servicing the duty station of the subject of the allegation. 370.3.2 Investigating Potential UNAX Violations. For UNAX allegations within the jurisdiction of SAC-SIID, the SAC-SIID makes a determination whether or not to conduct the investigation in SIID or to send the information to the appropriate SAC-Field Division for investigation. For UNAX allegations within the jurisdiction of a SAC-Field Division, the SAC-Field Division will determine if the information warrants initiation of an investigation. If the UNAX allegation does warrant initiating an investigation, the Assistant Special Agent-inCharge (ASAC) will ensure the assigned agent will, at a minimum: Operations Manual 3 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 • •
Initiate an investigation using the appropriate UNAX violation code; and Prepare a SED-Cincinnati Request for Assistance (Form OI 7550) using procedures set forth in text 370.6 of this Section and forward the form to SEDCincinnati via electronic mail communication. SED-Cincinnati will do a preliminary review to determine if a full UNAX analysis is warranted; • If an indication of UNAX is established, SED-Cincinnati will initiate a preliminary investigation, conduct the appropriate record checks, and refer any credible allegations to the SAC-SIID or SAC-Field Division, as appropriate, for further investigation. The referral document will be a Memorandum of Interview or Activity (Form OI 2028-M). If no indication of UNAX is found, SED-Cincinnati will refer the allegation back to the SAC-SIID or SAC-Field Division, as appropriate, for further investigation by an agent. If subsequent investigative steps reveal an indication of UNAX, SED-Cincinnati will complete a full UNAX analysis as described above.
Review pertinent data obtained from SED-Cincinnati analysis; Interview apparent UNAX victims; Review any Taxpayer Data Access forms (IRS Form 11377) completed by the subject of the investigation for investigative leads; Complete all other investigative leads on current as well as former employees, witnesses and third parties, and the subject’s supervisor prior to referral to the AUSA for a prosecutive determination even if a “Blanket Declination” is available; Ensure that all of the above leads are timely documented on Chronological Case Worksheet (Form OI 6501); Timely forward the final Report of Investigation (ROI) involving current IRS employees to the appropriate IRS office as listed in Section 250.12.1 of this chapter. Obtain concurrence from the U.S. Attorney’s (USA) office to forward an ROI pending criminal action; Ensure that Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) timely and accurately reflects the UNAX source codes, UNAX violation codes, and the resulting criminal and/or administrative disposition codes; If the investigation results in an indictment or information involving a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), Title 26 U.S.C. § 7213, or Title 26 U.S.C. § 7213A, provide the SAC-Operations with the following information: • • A copy of the indictment or information; Address of the clerk of court where the indictment or information is filed; 4 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 • Name, SSN, and last known address of the affected taxpayer; and
The SAC-Operations will provide the information to the IRS Office of Privacy, which will notify the affected taxpayer(s) pursuant to the notification provision of 26 U.S.C. § 7431(e). See Section 290.7.1 of this chapter for information on this reporting requirement. 370.4 Audit Trail Lead Analysis System (ATLAS). SED-Cincinnati receives data from ATLAS, which identifies employees who have made possible unauthorized accesses to taxpayer data. Potential UNAX violations identified through SED-Cincinnati analysis of ATLAS data will be referred, via the PARIS Lead Screen, to the SAC of the Field Division responsible for servicing the duty station of the subject of the allegation. The Lead Screen will contain an associated electronic file (Form OI 2028-M) that details the results of SEDCincinnati’s analysis. The receiving office will: • • • Initiate the appropriate investigation by bridging the lead from the Lead Screen to the Investigation Screen in PARIS within 15 days of receipt; Conduct an investigation in accordance with the guidelines delineated in text 370.3.2 of this Section; and Coordinate directly with the SED-Cincinnati analyst regarding any additional analysis or clarification relating to the referred lead.
370.5 Collateral Services from SED-Cincinnati. SED-Cincinnati maintains access to electronic data files that enhance UNAX and fraud detection and/or support field investigative efforts. The five most frequently requested files available through SED-Cincinnati include: • Auto Track – A database compiled from public records that includes names, data of birth, social security number, current addresses, previous addresses, driver’s license information, liens, judgments, bankruptcies, property ownership, corporate affiliations, Uniform Commercial Code filings, telephone listings, relatives, associates, and neighbors; Pacer On-line – Payment and Claims Enhanced Reconciliation. This system gives access to Treasury Checks that have been negotiated. SED can obtain information about the checks (payee name, payment date, payment amount, address or banking information about returned or cancelled payments), request online digital images through Treasury Financial Management Services (the quality of which is as if the original check was photocopied) of 5 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 negotiated checks for all payments that were issued by IRS. The Pacer database contains checks dated 10/01/97 and later; Centralized Authorization File (CAF) – The CAF contains information regarding the type of authorization that taxpayers have given representatives for various and specific tax periods. The CAF can be used to determine whether an individual claiming to be a representative of a taxpayer is authorized to represent or act on the taxpayer’s behalf, or to receive requested information. CAF requests should be submitted in accordance with the guidelines delineated in Section 140.11 of this chapter; Consumer Credit Reports – SED-Cincinnati utilizes a third party source to obtain consumer reports from Equifax. The request for a consumer credit report must be accompanied by a completed Authorization for Release of Credit Reports Pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Form OI 2760) that includes the signature of the subject of the report. Consumer credit report requests should be submitted in accordance with the guidelines delineated in Section 60.3 of this chapter; and Preparer Inventory Files (PIF) – The PIF contains information regarding the listed preparer of a taxpayer’s individual and/or business tax return. The Individual Master file information includes processing year, district office, taxpayer identification number (TIN), tax return data and some tax return dollar amount fields. The Business Master File information includes everything in the Individual Master file with the exception of the dollar amount fields.
Additional electronic files and records that are available through SED-Cincinnati are outlined in Exhibit (400)-370.1. All file requests should be submitted following the guidelines listed in text 370.6 of this section. 370.6 Requests for SED-Cincinnati Assistance. Most requests for SED-Cincinnati Assistance must be documented on a Form OI 7550 and include the case or complaint number, if applicable, and be approved by the requesting agent’s SAC. Exceptions to the use of the Form OI 7550 include: • • • CAF extract (SAC approved memorandum required – see Section 140.11); Consumer Credit Report (signed consent form required); and Entity SSN (SAC approval required – see Section 180.8.2).
Use Form OI 7550 to request assistance for: • • UNAX analysis; and Data extracts and analysis. 6 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 After approval, SA’s should send Form OI 7550 and any attachments to SED-Cincinnati via electronic mail communication at *tigtasedcintiassistance@tigta.treas.gov. If SED-Cincinnati determines that the request does not involve an UNAX issue, does not require SED-Cincinnati analysis, or could be completed by the requestor, SEDCincinnati personnel will work with the requestor to ensure that they are able to complete the task. 370.7 Computer Investigative Support Program Mission. The CIS Program is tasked with providing computer investigative support and advice involving the search/seizure of computers and computer related media; the processing of seized media; assistance on Internet related crimes and investigations; and any other computer related issues deemed appropriate. The CIS Program also: • • Maintains an investigative computer research and reference facility to enhance technical expertise in the investigative use of computers; and Formulates and conducts computer investigative training for TIGTA employees.
The CIS Program provides technical assistance to TIGTA-OI personnel during investigations. This assistance includes, but is not limited to: • • • • • • Assisting in the development/preparation of search warrants and subpoenas regarding the search and seizure of computers, computer media and related equipment; Providing on-site support during the execution of any warrants or seizures, and during any related subject/witness/third party interviews; Providing computer analysis; Testifying on the evidentiary content of seized items as needed/necessary. Conducting Internet research; and Providing technical assistance and support to TIGTA-OI personnel on all investigative matters relating to TIGTA’s investigative mission.
370.8 CIS Program Structure. The CIS Program is comprised of a Deputy Special Agent-in-Charge (DSAC) who is located in Lanham, Maryland, and GS-1811, CIS agents. The CIS Group is under the direction of the SAC-SED. Presently, there are CIS agents assigned to offices in Dallas, Texas; Los Angeles, California; Lanham, Maryland; and Nashville, Tennessee. Each CIS agent is provided equipment to be used within their respective computer laboratories. The SAC-SED maintains a current inventory of all equipment assigned to CIS agents. Operations Manual 7 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 Evidence provided to a CIS agent or CIS laboratory will be maintained in accordance with the rules and regulations concerning the maintenance of evidence as described in Section 190.2 of this chapter. Agents should be familiar with encountering and obtaining electronic evidence. In addition to consultation with a CIS agent, a case agent can obtain additional guidance on conducting computer investigations, to include Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines for searching and seizing computers, at www.cybercrime.gov. In addition, each CIS agent is required to maintain a record of all evidence that is brought into his or her laboratory. Each record will contain a unique 14 character tracking number, identified as follows: • • • The first character will be an alpha character designating the location of the specific laboratory: D – Dallas; L - Los Angeles; N – Nashville; or W – Lanham; The next 9 characters will be numeric characters, and will reflect the case number associated with the evidence submitted for analysis; and The last four characters are numeric characters that are numbered sequentially by fiscal year for each piece of evidence. For example: “D xxxxxxxxx 0001” represents D – Dallas, xxxxxxxxx – 9 digit case number, and 0001 – 4 digit sequential number. 370.9 CIS Laboratories. A national CIS computer laboratory will be maintained in the Washington, DC area and is presently located in the New Carrollton Federal Building in Lanham, Maryland. This laboratory will include unique equipment available to CIS Program personnel on an asneeded basis. Each CIS agent will maintain a laboratory within his or her post of duty (POD). Current technology will determine the equipment needs of each office. Each laboratory will contain a locked evidence storage area. 370.10 CIS Agent Duties. Each CIS agent is responsible for assisting investigative personnel with: • • • • Developing probable cause to seize computer equipment and related media; Drafting affidavits in support of search warrants; Developing intelligence on the computers anticipated to be on-site during any such seizures/warrants; Briefing the search team on technical and other issues regarding the computer to be seized; 8 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 • • • • Assisting in related subject and third party interviews; Participating in the search warrant; Seizing and preserving evidence, computer equipment and media, as specified in the search warrant; and Providing relevant training to agents in the field divisions.
Each CIS agent is responsible for performing or arranging for the timely analysis of electronic media brought into their individual laboratories. The CIS agent performs analysis and at the conclusion of the analysis, the CIS agent provides a Computer Investigative Support Program Forensic Examination Report (Form OI 7570) to the SAC/DSAC of SED for review/approval. The approved report will be distributed to the assigned case agent. Each CIS agent may conduct Internet related research for on-going investigations for TIGTA personnel. The CIS agent will prepare a Form OI 2028-M regarding any research conducted. When a TIGTA office becomes aware of electronic harassment or Internet-related threats directed against the IRS or one of its employees, SED assistance should be requested as soon as possible. Once SED is notified, the SAC or DSAC-SED will assign a CIS agent to act as a technical advisor to assist the assigned TIGTA office during an investigation. Each CIS agent serves as a technical computer advisor to the TIGTA-OI offices located within their area of responsibility. Currently, CIS agent locations and areas of responsibility are: CIS Agent in Los Angeles San Francisco Field Division Phoenix Group Seattle Group CIS Agent in Nashville Atlanta Field Division Chicago Field Division New Orleans Group CIS Agent in Dallas Dallas Field Division (except the New Orleans Group) Denver Group Operations Manual 9 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007
CIS Agent in Washington DC New York Field Division Washington Field Division Operations Division SIID 370.11 Computer Related Investigations. The CIS Program provides support and assistance as follows: • • • • Computer seizures; Computer analysis; Computer harassment/threat cases; and Internet research.
In any investigation involving a computer, the CIS agent should be consulted early in the investigation to discuss possible computer related issues and available assistance. It is important to note that: • • The success of any data recovery/analysis and resulting potential prosecution is dependent on the actions of the individual who initially discovers a computer incident; The ideal situation when confronted with such a circumstance is to isolate the suspect computer from additional use or possible tampering. The entire workstation or office is a potential crime scene, not just the computer itself. All computer equipment should be handled with care; In the event of a suspected computer incident, care must be taken to preserve evidence in its original state. Merely opening a file on a computer/system changes it. Once the file is changed, it is not original evidence, and may be inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings. Opening a file also alters the computer generated time and date showing when the file was last accessed/created, and could make it more difficult to determine who committed the violation or even when it occurred; Computer disks, CD-ROMs, tape storage media, and additional hard drives found in the area of the suspect computer need to be protected and isolated. Do not allow anyone access to the storage media or the computer involved as individuals with extensive computer knowledge can develop programs that, with a few keystrokes, will destroy all magnetic data on a hard drive; 10 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 • The initial responder may be called to testify concerning measures that were taken during the initial computer/system shutdown or isolation. The S/A should take detailed notes, photographs, sketches, and video recordings during the scene processing. This will also help to ensure the appropriate evidentiary chain of custody; The initial responder to a situation should secure the scene and immediately contact a CIS agent for further guidance and assistance; and Initial interviews of potential witnesses and/or suspects may be enhanced by consultation with a CIS agent.
370.12 Procedures for Requesting CIS Program Support. An agent, who is assigned an investigation relative to electronic media, computers, hand-held computing devices, fax machines, wizards, etc., should request needed CIS assistance as soon as possible. Early CIS involvement will: • • • Ensure a proper legal basis for any subsequent seizure; Ensure the proper seizure of electronic media; and Ensure the proper processing/documentation of original evidence.
The assigned agent should complete a Computer Investigative Support Program Request for Assistance (Form OI 7560) to request CIS Program assistance. Requests should be approved by the assigned agent’s SAC and forwarded via electronic mail communications to *TIGTA Inv SED SINART-CIS Assistance@tigta.treas.gov. The SAC or DSAC-SED will coordinate the assignment of each request to the appropriate CIS agent. All emergency contacts and requests should be followed-up with a Form OI 7560 along with all pertinent documentation to the *TIGTA Inv SED SINART-CIS Assistance mailbox within 24 hours. The Form OI 7560 should include, at a minimum: • • • • • • • • • The date the Form OI 7560 is submitted; The name of the assigned agent’s SAC or ASAC, his/her telephone number; The assigned agent’s name, office telephone number, cellular or pager number and office location; The case title and the complaint or case number; Describe the type of investigation or any other pertinent information; Describe any evidence/items submitted for forensic examination; Describe the type of support or assistance requested; Describe the goal/intent of the request; and Indicate the anticipated date of a search warrant or the date a forensic examination is needed.
Once the request for CIS assistance has been approved, the assigned case agent should ensure that the CIS agent is part of the investigation "team" as it relates to: Operations Manual 11 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 •
Providing critical information to the development of an investigative plan. The CIS agent provides input that may impact legal issues, decisions to seize or copy evidence, and the acquisition of additional support, equipment and supplies; Determining, in coordination with the SAC or DSAC-SED and the assigned case agent, the equipment and the number of additional CIS agents needed to conduct the search warrant. The decision as to the equipment and number of agents will be based upon: • • • • • • • • • • The number of computers involved; The type of computers involved; The location of the computers within the overall search site; The type, topology and operating system of any computer network involved; The size and nature of date storage media, and the existence of any "back-up" media; The level of cooperation expected from the computer owner and their degree of sophistication; Any remote connectivity issues; The type of software involved; The nature of any computer security, passwords or encryption in place; and The CIS agent should be available to the AUSA to discuss the computer aspects of the search warrant.
During the course of a computer examination, the CIS agent will be in contact with the assigned case agent to discuss the findings and determine if there are any additional leads or evidence requiring attention. If there are no additional requests concerning the examination, the CIS agent will prepare and submit a report of findings utilizing Form OI 7570 to the SAC or DSAC SED for review. The approved report will be forwarded to the assigned case agent, through his/her SAC or ASAC. 370.13 System Intrusion Network Attack Response Team Mission. SINART was formed to ensure an effective computer incidence prevention and response capability for all IRS and TIGTA information systems, hardware, telecommunications, networks, Internet sites, and vendor-supplied software products. SINART is a co-operative initiative between the IRS and the TIGTA. Working closely with IRS CSIRC, SINART’s mission is to promote the security and integrity of all IRS
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 computer systems by providing technical support and conducting criminal investigations. Mission essentials include: • • • • Adding to the capability within the IRS to monitor systems without interfering with operations to identify vulnerabilities; Reporting, documenting and tracking all suspected incident investigations; Assist with the identification of appropriate response strategies; and Supporting a joint operation with IRS that acts as a central point for reporting and analysis, sharing response efforts, and providing investigative support, as appropriate.
370.14 SINART Structure and Services. The SINART is comprised of a DSAC who is located in Lanham, Maryland, and GS1811, special agents and GS-2210, IT Specialist (InfoSec). The SINART group is under the direction of the SAC-SED. Primary services provided by SINART include: • • • • • • • • • • Network incident response and incident analysis; Assist AUSA/case agents with prosecution of complex network investigations; Preserve electronic evidence “chain of custody”; Provide technical advice on obtaining Court Orders, Search Warrants and Subpoenas associated with network investigations; Conduct/assist with interviews relative to network related investigations; Education and training; Electronic intelligence collection concerning network vulnerability; Vulnerability identification; Research and development; and Recommending improvements and system enhancements.
370.15 IRS Computer Security Incident Response Center Responsibilities. The CSIRC is responsible for initiating and leading the first response to suspicious incidents. They determine and deploy the appropriate safeguards for the IRS Enterprise network. They monitor the security over internal and external system connections and report all incidents and /or suspected attacks to the SINART. 370.16 SINART Responsibilities. The SINART is responsible for the identification and investigation of all incidents or alleged incidents of attacks or intrusions against the IRS computer network. The SINART recommends preventive, recovery, or mitigation strategies for internal or external vulnerabilities or attacks. The SINART also provides expert advice for network security issues and for proposed network security procurements. Operations Manual 13 Chapter 400
OFFICE OF TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION DATE: April 1, 2007 370.17 Requesting SINART Assistance. In order to meet SINART’s mission of promoting the security and integrity of all IRS and TIGTA computer systems, all incidents or alleged incidents should be reported to the SINART as soon as possible so appropriate action can be taken. SED has implemented a duty agent schedule and a reporting process to insure that assistance and support are provided in a timely and effective manner. This process is to be utilized by all internal and external sources of referrals. 370.17.1 Requests for Emergency Assistance. To report an incident or an event to the SINART or to contact an agent immediately regarding a possible computer event or intrusion, call the SINART duty pager: 877-749-7204 and leave a number where you can be contacted. All emergency contacts and requests should be followed-up with a Form OI 7560 along with all pertinent documentation to the *TIGTA Inv SED SINART-CIS Assistance mailbox within 24 hours. 370.17.2 Request Non-Emergency Assistance or Support. To request non-emergency SINART support, the assigned case agent should complete a Form OI 7560. Requests should be approved by the assigned agent’s SAC and forwarded via electronic mail communications to *TIGTA Inv SED SINART-CIS Assistance@tigta.treas.gov. Agents should provide as much information as possible, including any pertinent documents, as this will help determine an appropriate level of action to be taken by the SINART.
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