Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/227/382/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-12-11 15:22:27
Document Index: 386268502

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 35', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 18', '§ 30', '§ 16', '§ 17', '§ 15']

This is a suit upon a joint and several bond executed by the defendant in error as surety for the Vandegrift Construction Company. In the circuit court, a nonsuit was ordered, and the order was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals on the ground that the plaintiff, by its own act, had made performance of the condition impossible. 180 F.6d 1. The facts are these:
A power dam at Comerio Falls was to be completed in one year and the greater part of the electric apparatus chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
§ 35. Finally, the ordinance is to "take effect immediately upon the acceptance by the grantee of the terms and conditions hereof, as above provided." Section 38. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"duly perform within the said period of three (3) years, all other terms and conditions in said ordinance required to be performed by the principal within the said period. * "
The principal failed to do within the year the work required by § 15 to be completed in that time, as has been stated, and, a little more than two months after the year elapsed, in July, 1904, the executive council passed an ordinance amending §§ 15, 18, and 30 of the former one, the amendment being approved by the President on August 2. The time allowed in § 15 was extended to January 1, 1905, provided that the number of men employed on or before August 7 should be not less than 250, and that the number should be increased up to 500 or thereabouts, the intent expressed being that as many men should be engaged as was necessary to complete the work, and provided that the men should be paid weekly, and provided further that, upon failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the amendment, the franchise should be subject to immediate forfeiture. The requirement in § 18 as to the power dam at Comerio Falls, etc., also was extended to January 1, 1905. Finally, to the provision in § 30 as to amendment, &c., of the concession, there was added the express requirement of the approval of the Governor of Porto Rico and of the President of the United States, and the statement that it was subject to the power of Congress to annul or modify the same. This amendment seems to have been sought and accepted chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After some hesitation, we have come to the conclusion that the court was right. It is true that the bond is to be read in connection with the original ordinance, and that the latter contained terms that were not complied with. But the ordinance only required a bond for the full completion of the work within three years, and in accordance with the conditions therein contained and the plans. Section 34. In the ordinance, the only condition properly so called, the only fact that warranted a revocation of the grant apart from the general power to repeal, was, by § 16, a failure to have the whole railway in operation, as required by § 17. There was no forfeiture for falling short of the requirements in §§ 15 and 16 as to the progress to be made in one and two years. The bond in like manner has for its principal condition the completion of the work within chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This, perhaps, affords the plaintiff its strongest argument. But this is a residuary clause to cover matters that may have escaped consideration. The building of the road and works already have been dealt with, and this clause as to "other" terms hardly can be supposed to have reference to them. If it does, however, it would seem to us that the limitation of time should be construed as looking to the end of the three years, and allowing that period, rather than distributively, and as meaning from time to time during three years. The same considerations that apply to the construction of the principal condition apply to this, and it appears to us that the provision for the cancellation of the bond upon certificate showing the completion of the work, "and upon the full compliance with the terms of this ordinance to the satisfaction of the executive council," is not enough to change what we understand to be the import of the instrument upon its face. Finally, the proviso that no extension of the time or times limited for chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If our construction of the bond is right, it does not need much argument to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, seeing that, within three years, it took the franchise back. It was said at the bar, though not admitted, that the principal had given up work. But there had been no repudiation of the contract, and the plaintiff could not accelerate the forfeiture simply on the ground that it was likely to come about. If, within the time allowed for performance, the plaintiff made performance impossible, it is unimaginable that any civilized system of law would allow it to recover upon the bond for a failure to perform. 2 Bl.Com. 340, 341; @ 31 U. S. 745-746.