Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/360/730/390955/
Timestamp: 2020-01-26 14:42:19
Document Index: 150703704

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 1291', '§ 6', '§ 7', '§ 201', '§ 15', '§ 215', '§ 17', '§ 217', '§ 1292']

W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., Inc., Defendant.meinhard Commercial Corp., Respondent-appellee, 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1966 › W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., Inc., Defen...
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., Inc., Defendant.meinhard Commercial Corp., Respondent-appellee, 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 360 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1966) Argued April 26, 1966
John A. Hughes, Regional Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, New York City (Charles Donahue, Sol., Samuel Gorin and David Reines, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Labor, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
John F. LeViness, III, New York City (Harlan R. Harrison, Robert M. Callagy, and Pell, Butler, Curtis & LeViness, New York City, on the brief), for appellee.
As a general rule, it is true, the denying or vacating of a temporary restraining order is not appealable. Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2 Cir. 1964). But this is not always so. In the first place, the appellate court is not bound by what the parties or the District Court may call the order appealed from. That is not this case, for there is no doubt that the original ex parte order was a temporary restraining order. The order vacating it, therefore, though after a hearing, and contested, is an order vacating a temporary restraining order. Compare Austin; see also Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2 Cir. 1960). But there is another reason in some cases for appealability of the granting, denial, or vacating of a temporary restraining order. Where dismissing the appeal may moot the underlying case for an injunction, the appeal should be heard. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 776-778 (5 Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 850, 82 S. Ct. 933, 8 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1962); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 373-374 (5 Cir. 1964); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 229-230 (5 Cir. 1965). The rationale of these cases is that the matter is appealable not under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, dealing with injunctions, but rather under § 1291, under the collateral order doctrine, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).
The vacated order prohibited the sale in interstate commerce of certain sweaters, produced by Powell, and acquired by Meinhard, a factor, when it foreclosed its lien. The prohibition was grounded on an asserted violation of § 6 and § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206, 207, in that 86 employees of Powell were not paid wages for the weeks ending February 18, February 25, and March 5, 1966, so that the sale of the sweaters would be a violation of § 15(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215, if applicable, and enjoinable under § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217. Powell had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and was said to be insolvent The unpaid wages totalled $8425. Section 15 makes it unlawful for "any person * * * to * * * sell in commerce * * * any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 206 or section 207 of this title * * *"
The Secretary stresses the point that when the Congress desired to protect bona fide purchasers from the strict wording of the Act it found it easy to do so by amending the Act with appropriate safeguards. This would indeed be persuasive if there were indications that the present problem of the foreclosing secured creditor had been brought to the attention of the Congress. The argument loses force because this was apparently never done, and the Secretary's present contention is much weakened by the fact that since the enactment of the Act in 1938 neither he nor his predecessors appear to have so read the Act, in spite of the myriad of instances in which similar security titles must have been enforced.
I concur in the result. However, I believe the order under attack is not appealable. The majority's exception to the holding of Austin v. Altman, 332 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1964) would swallow up the rule denying appealability from denial or vacation of a temporary restraining order. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), a party is entitled to a temporary restraining order only upon proof of the threat of "immediate and irreparable injury," and such an order can last no longer than twenty days, unless the party restrained consents. Erroneous denial of a temporary restraining order, by hypothesis, leaves a plaintiff unprotected from immediate and irreparable injury; hence, mootness will ordinarily follow unless immediate corrective appellate action is sought or a motion for a preliminary injunction is pressed in the trial court. The latter course can be taken as quickly as circumstances require and allows the trial court to consider the matter on a fuller record with a clear right of appeal to the parties thereafter. I believe this is the procedure envisaged by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1).