Source: https://m.openjurist.org/625/f2d/1313
Timestamp: 2020-07-04 22:52:17
Document Index: 658741777

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 657', '§ 1903', '§ 657', '§ 657']

625 F2d 1313 Osh Oshd Burkart Randall Division of Textron Inc v. Marshall U S | OpenJurist
625 F. 2d 1313 - Osh Oshd Burkart Randall Division of Textron Inc v. Marshall U S
625 F2d 1313 Osh Oshd Burkart Randall Division of Textron Inc v. Marshall U S
625 F.2d 1313
8 O.S.H. Cas.(BNA) 1467, 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 24,505
BURKART RANDALL DIVISION OF TEXTRON, INC., a corporation,
Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, U. S. Department of Labor,
Plaintiff filed this action the following day, August 3, 1978, and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of the warrant. That prohibition was extended during the proceedings below. In the district court, plaintiff argued that while a relaxed probable cause standard is appropriate when a warrant is sought for an inspection to be conducted pursuant to a reasonable legislative or administrative plan, inspections induced by employee complaints must be judged according to the criminal probable cause standard. According to plaintiff, OSHA's warrant application fell far short of meeting this standard. Alternatively, plaintiff argued that even if relaxed, administrative probable cause was all OSHA need show in this case, such a showing had not been made as illustrated by OSHA's failure to satisfy even the minimal requirements of reasonableness and informant reliability established by the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1). Finally, plaintiff argued that the warrant, even if properly issued, was overbroad in scope because it authorized an inspection of the entire premises when the probable cause, if any, related to limited portions of Burkart's facility.
The district court initially agreed with Burkart. In an order entered January 8, 1979, the court enjoined execution of the warrant because the warrant application failed to show that the proposed inspection was pursuant to a reasonable administrative or legislative plan and failed to give any indication of the reliability of the employee-informants. OSHA filed a motion to amend this judgment in light of our decision of January 2, 1979 in In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co, 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). The district court granted the motion and found that, under Gilbert & Bennett, the warrant application need not demonstrate the reliability of the informant. On this basis it ruled that its initial order had been in error in imposing such a requirement and accordingly found the warrant supported by probable cause. Burkart appeals from this order, raising the arguments described above.
Section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a),2 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enter and inspect workplaces in order to carry out the purposes of the Act. Although section 8(a) itself does not indicate whether warrants are necessary for such inspections, after Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), it is clear that a nonconsensual OSHA inspection may be conducted pursuant to section 8(a) only if a warrant is first obtained. Such a warrant is to issue only upon a showing of some degree of probable cause; precisely what degree is required in particular cases has been the topic of much post-Barlow's litigation and is the issue before us in this case. See, e. g., The Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1130 (3d Cir. 1979).
Whether the Secretary proceeds to secure a warrant or other process, with or without prior notice, his entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular (establishment)." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. (523), at 538, 87 S.Ct. (1727), at 1736 (15 L.Ed.2d 930.)
436 U.S. at 320-21, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 (footnote omitted). The parties agree, for purposes of this appeal, that under Barlow's, when a warrant is sought for an inspection to be conducted pursuant to a legislative or administrative plan, probable cause is to be judged according to the relaxed or flexible standard of administrative probable cause establish in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). Burkart argues, however, that application of this standard is inappropriate where the warrant is sought on the basis of "specific evidence of an existing violation," such as the employee complaints in this case. Because of the particularized suspicion, individualized focus and greater potential for harassment in the employee complaint situation, Burkart asserts that traditional criminal probable cause should be required to justify issuance of a warrant.
This court addressed and rejected precisely this contention in In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979).3 In Gilbert & Bennett, the employer argued that the Barlow's language quoted above should be interpreted to mean
Id. at 1338. This court disagreed with that argument, placing great weight upon the specific statement of the Barlow's Court that "(p)robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required." Barlow's, supra, 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824, quoted in Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 589 F.2d at 1338.4 We also relied upon the Supreme Court's citation of See and Camara to find that administrative probable cause is the proper standard in employee complaint cases:
Plaintiff urges that we reject this position in this case, arguing that it is based on a misinterpretation of the Barlow's opinion and that the "better reasoned view" counsels adherence to traditional probable cause for all but administrative plan inspections. Plaintiff contends that Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), demonstrates that the administrative probable cause standard is to apply only when a warrant is sought pursuant to an administrative plan.5 Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Tyler supports precisely the position taken by this court in Gilbert & Bennett. The Tyler Court summarized its ruling as follows:
In summation, we hold that an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches. See Camara, 387 U.S., at 534-539, 87 S.Ct., at 1739-1740; See v. Seattle, 387 U.S., at 544-545, 87 S.Ct., at 1733-1736; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., ante, (436 U.S.) at 320-321, 98 S.Ct., at 1824-1825. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such investigations is admissible at trial, but if the investigating officials find probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and require further access to gather evidence for a possible prosecution, they may obtain a warrant only upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.
436 U.S. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 1951 (citation omitted). Administrative probable cause is sufficient, under Tyler, even where officials conduct an inspection which is individualized in focus and in response to a particular event there, a fire on the premises to be inspected. Criminal probable cause is required only when the investigation changes from purely administrative to criminal in nature. In this OSHA inspection case, unlike Tyler, there was no possibility of criminal action. Tyler therefore permits the issuance of a warrant upon a showing of administrative, rather than criminal, probable cause.
The administrative probable cause standard requires that any inspection be reasonable: the public interest in the inspection must outweigh the invasion of privacy which the inspection entails. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-36, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Marshall v. North American Car Co., 476 F.Supp. 698, 703 (M.D.Pa.1979). In determining whether this standard was satisfied in this case, we may consider only the evidence before the Magistrate at the time of application for the inspection warrant. See Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 589 F.2d at 1342. Where a warrant application is based upon an employee complaint, it is not absolutely necessary that the complaint itself be provided to the Magistrate. North American Car, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 704. However, a conclusory statement in the application that employee complaints have been received by OSHA, without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1979). The application must at least inform the Magistrate of the substance of the employee complaints, so that the Magistrate may exercise independent judgment as to whether an inspection is justified, rather than acting as a mere rubber stamp validating the decision already reached by the Secretary. Weyerhaeuser Co., supra, 592 F.2d at 378.
In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of Marsan Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1557, 1559 (N.D.Ind.1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff also argues that the warrant application is fatally deficient in terms of detail and specificity. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites cases holding inadequate to establish administrative probable cause applications which state only that a complaint has been received giving OSHA reason to believe an inspection is necessary. See, e. g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 452 F.Supp. 1375, 1379-80 (E.D.Wis.1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1979); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F.Supp. 533, 536 (E.D.Wis.1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 12, 13 (7th Cir. 1978). These cases, however, do not advance the inquiry in this case. The warrant application at issue here went beyond the conclusory statement that complaints had been received: it described the contents of the complaints. As this court stated in Weyerhaeuser, supra, only a "few additional facts" need be added to a conclusory application to "satisfy the 'specific evidence' manner of establishing probable cause." 592 F.2d at 378 (footnote omitted). The application before us contains more than a "few additional facts" and is not properly compared to the boilerplate applications presented in Weyerhaeuser and Northwest Airlines. On the contrary, it is comparable in terms of specificity and detail to the warrant applications upheld in Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 589 F.2d at 13399 and Marsan Co., supra, 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1559.
Plaintiff raises two other objections to the issuance of the inspection warrant in this case. Burkart seems to argue that the warrant is invalid because it is based upon employee complaints which are not in writing and signed by the complainant10 as provided in section 8(f)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1).11 Section 8(f)(1) does not, however, prescribe minimum requirements for acceptance of an employee complaint by OSHA. Rather, it identifies a particular set of circumstances under which OSHA must inspect in response to an employee complaint. We can find no indication in the Act or in judicial interpretations of section 8(f)(1) that OSHA may not determine that an inspection is justified on the basis of an informal employee complaint. Indeed, one court has noted that OSHA
Dravo Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC (BNA) 2057, 2059 (W.D.Pa.1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978).12 While we need not decide whether OSHA must inspect in response to all complaints, we can find no basis for holding that only those complaints which comply with section 8(f)(1) may form the basis for an OSHA inspection. In light of this lack of support, Burkart's section 8(f) (1) argument must fail.
Finally, Burkart asserts that the warrant application fails to satisfy the Barlow's requirement of "specific evidence of an existing violation," 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824 (emphasis added), because the information contained in it is stale. The employee complaints here were received by OSHA approximately six months and five months prior to issuance of the warrant. The district court took note of this lapse of time but concluded that it did not render the information stale because
Burkart-Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, No. 78-4286 (S.D.Ill. July 9, 1979), memo. op. at 3. Burkart challenges this determination.
In In the Matter of the Inspection of Central Mine Equipment Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1185 (E.D.Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 7 OSHC (BNA) 1907 (8th Cir. 1979), a warrant for an OSHA inspection was upheld despite the fact that it was based on information at least eight months old. Id. at 1189. The district court there held that although an eight month time lapse would make stale information offered in support of a criminal warrant, it would not do so for purposes of an OSHA warrant where "it is reasonable to believe that the violations of the health and safety standards yet remain on the subject premises." Id.13 In this case, the conditions alleged in the employee complaints are not of a type that will likely disappear through mere passage of time; affirmative action to correct them appears necessary. We therefore agree with the district court that the nature of the alleged conditions makes reasonable the conclusion that violations of the Act remained on Burkart's premises at the time of the warrant application. The information contained in the application is thus not stale.
Burkart's final argument is that even if probable cause to issue an inspection warrant was shown in this case, the warrant which in fact was issued is invalid because it authorizes an overly broad inspection. The warrant authorized an inspection not limited to the areas identified in the employee complaints but rather extending to Burkart's entire Cairo, Illinois facility. Burkart contends that the overly broad warrant permits OSHA to search areas of the facility for which no probable cause has been shown, in clear violation of Fourth Amendment principles. Such a general inspection is, according to Burkart, impermissible where probable cause is established, as in this case, by specific evidence of hazardous or unhealthy conditions within an employer's facility. In addition, a general inspection based upon employee complaints is said to violate section 8(f)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1).
* There is substantial judicial support for Burkart's Fourth Amendment argument. Although no federal court of appeals has yet expressly ruled on the issue,14 many of the district courts which have confronted it have concluded that inspection warrants issued in response to specific employee complaints must be limited in scope, if possible, to the subject matter of the complaints. See, e. g., Marshall v. North American Car Co., 476 F.Supp. 698, 706-07 (M.D.Pa.1979); Marshall v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1851, 1854 (W.D.Okl.1979); In the Matter of the Inspection of: Central Mine Equipment Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1185, 1189-90 (E.D.Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 7 OSHC (BNA) 1907 (8th Cir. 1979).15 These courts acknowledge, however, that a general inspection of an employer's entire workplace will usually be permissible where probable cause is established by a reasonable legislative or administrative plan. See North American Car, supra, 476 F.Supp. at 706; Trinity Industries, supra, 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1854; Central Mine Equipment, supra, 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1190 n. 7. The theory underlying these cases appears to be that the scope of an inspection must not exceed the scope of the evidence used to establish probable cause to conduct the inspection.
A number of district courts have adopted the contrary position, holding that once probable cause is established on the basis of an employee complaint, OSHA may inspect the entire premises of the subject employer. See, e. g., In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of Marsan Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1557, 1559 (N.D.Ind.1979); Dravo Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC (BNA) 2057, 2060 (W.D.Pa.1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 5 OSHC (BNA) 1375, 1375-76 (N.D.Ill.1977), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979).16 These courts maintain that an inspection limited to the substance of the employee complaints will not advance the broad remedial purposes of the Act because employers will be able to present "sanitized" areas to OSHA inspectors while concealing violations of the Act elsewhere on the premises. Marsan Co., supra, 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1559. The requirement that nonconsensual inspections be conducted pursuant to warrants issued upon probable cause protects against possible "fishing expeditions" by OSHA inspectors and adequately safeguards employers' interests. Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 5 OSHC (BNA) at 1375. Furthermore, considerations of administrative efficiency and of minimizing disruptions of employers' operations indicate that a general inspection may be preferable to a number of separate, limited inspections.
In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Wisconsin Steel, No. 79 C 4284 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 28, 1979), memo. op. at 2-3.
The ultimate requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that any proposed search or inspection be reasonable. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). The factors which convinced us in Gilbert & Bennett that it is reasonable to conduct a general inspection of a facility selected for scrutiny under an administrative plan operate at least as strongly in the context of employee complaint inspections.18 The statute which the inspections are intended to implement is a broad remedial measure designed to ensure that employees are provided with safe workplaces. In the employee complaint situation, there is probable cause to believe that a particular workplace is not entirely safe. The purpose of the Act is best served in such a case by inspecting the entire facility:
In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 5 OSHC (BNA) 2024, 2025 (N.D.Ill.1977).
Balanced against the implementation of the statute's purpose is the employer's interest in avoiding invasion of its privacy and disruption of its operations. See In the Matter of Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc., 6 OSHC (BNA) 1663, 1666-67 (D.R.I.1978), vacated on other grounds, 592 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1979).19 That interest, however, is adequately protected by the requirement that a nonconsensual inspection be conducted only pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral Magistrate after a showing of probable cause. The warrant requirement ensures that OSHA inspectors do not conduct mere "fishing expeditions," Chicago Magnet Wire, supra, 5 OSHC (BNA) at 2025, and apprises the employer of the inspection's scope, a function emphasized by the Supreme Court in Barlow's, supra, 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1825, and this court in Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 589 F.2d at 1343.20 The interposition of a neutral Magistrate between inspectors and employers guarantees that inspectors will not exercise unbridled discretion as to when and where to inspect and provides assurances to employers that the inspection is authorized by statute, is permissible under the Constitution, and will be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, to require that OSHA demonstrate probable cause as to every part of the employer's facility
would render meaningless the Supreme Court pronouncement in Barlow's that the Secretary's "entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises," 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824, and would defeat the federal interest in providing workers with safe working places.
In addition to its Fourth Amendment argument, Burkart contends that the Act itself, in section 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1), prohibits general inspections in response to employee complaints. Section 8(f)(1) requires that, in response to certain employee complaints, OSHA conduct a "special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (1). Plaintiff argues, in effect, that "special inspection" means "limited inspection." We cannot accept this interpretation. As noted in Part III, supra, we do not read section 8(f)(1) as a limitation upon the Secretary's ability to inspect; rather, we read it as a description of particular circumstances under which the Secretary must inspect. Similarly, nothing in the Act indicates that "special" means "limited." Indeed, section 8(f)(1) states that the inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 8. The only part of section 8 which arguably pertains to the scope of inspections is section 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2), which authorizes inspection of an employer's entire workplace. In addition, the Secretary's own regulation implementing section 8 of the Act states:
29 C.F.R. § 1903.11(b). This interpretation of the Act is entitled to deference from the courts and will be given controlling weight as long as it is a reasonable, even if not the most reasonable, construction of the statute. See The Budd Co. v. O.S.H.R.C., 513 F.2d 201, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63 L.Ed.2d 154 (1980). This regulation is a reasonable construction of the statute. Accordingly, we hold that section 8(f)(1) of the Act does not require that OSHA conduct inspections in response to employee complaints limited in scope to the substance of the complaints.
This court recently addressed an overbreadth challenge to a general warrant secured pursuant to a neutral administrative plan. In the Matter of Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). In approving the general warrant, we noted that "(b)ecause the exact location of violations cannot be known prior to entering the establishment, a narrow, restricted warrant would severely defeat the purposes of the Act." Id. at 1343. We were concerned that employers might maintain sanitized areas for inspection while concealing serious violations. Id. The same considerations do not apply where the specific complaints inform OSHA of the precise location of likely violations. OSHA remains free to protect against selective sanitization by inspecting at another time pursuant to a reasonable administrative plan. The balance between the employer's privacy interest and OSHA's statutory mandate is thus preserved.
It is not anomalous to permit general inspections where probable cause is supplied by a neutral plan but to limit inspections where probable cause is supplied by particularized employee complaints. Rather, the dichotomy is merely a recognition of the notion inherent in the fourth amendment that the scope of a warrant shall be tailored to the showing of probable cause. Underlying Gilbert & Bennett is Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), which established that the flexible probable cause standards of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), are satisfied by the promulgation of a neutral administrative inspection plan. The adoption of an administrative plan presupposes some general finding and determination of necessity to inspect within a particular industry, which serves as a basis for a general warrant. Specific employee complaints, on the other hand, may certainly, as here, supply a sufficient level of cause as to the subjects of those complaints. They may also provide sufficient cause for areas proximate in space and quality to the subjects of the complaint. Furthermore, where complaints are of such quality or in such quantity to indicate a reasonable likelihood that violations exist throughout a facility, a general warrant may be appropriate. In other cases, where the quality or quantity of complaints indicates a reasonable likelihood that violations exist in other specific areas of a facility, a warrant tailored to cover those areas in addition to the areas complained of may be appropriate. But where, as here, the magistrate lacks specific information regarding plant layout and the relation of that layout to the complaints, issuance of a general warrant to inspect all areas is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. Such issuance implies that the magistrate found sufficient cause in areas of which he had no knowledge. Consideration of the statute's remedial purpose and of administrative convenience, while certainly substantial, cannot supply probable cause, even under the most flexible standard, where it does not otherwise exist. The employee complaints that initiated this general warrant mentioned only unsanitary rest rooms, eating areas, and inadequate fire escapes all in the press department. I believe the absolute constitutional limit of the warrant in this case, if it is to be broadened beyond the press department, would be to authorize inspection only of facilities similar to those set forth in the employee complaints, i. e., rest rooms, eating areas, and areas relating to fire safety.
Plaintiff argues that this clear statement was intended by the Barlow's Court to apply only to inspections conducted pursuant to a legislative or administrative plan. The Court's intention can, in plaintiff's view, be discerned from the sentence following the language quoted in the text. This sentence begins: "For purposes of an administrative search such as this, . . . " 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824. Since Barlow's involved an administrative plan inspection, plaintiff argues that this language indicates that relaxed probable cause standards were intended to be applied only to such inspections. The sentence cited by plaintiff goes on, however, to state that probable cause to conduct such an administrative search may be established either by specific evidence of an existing violation or by a showing of a reasonable legislative or administrative plan. Thus, the more logical interpretation of the Court's language is that criminal probable cause is not required for either an employee complaint or administrative plan inspection
436 U.S. at 507, 98 S.Ct. at 1949. This language must be considered limited to the context of fire investigations. As one commentator noted, it
Id. at 91 n. 178. Even if Tyler is considered relevant in the context of an OSHA inspection, Tyler 's holding, quoted in the text, infra, demonstrates that administrative probable cause is the appropriate standard as long as the investigation, even though not programmatic, retains its noncriminal character. See 436 U.S. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 1951.
Plaintiff's citation of In re Brickner, 453 F.Supp. 91 (E.D.Wis.1978), similarly does not advance its position. Brickner involved an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to enter property not belonging to an indebted taxpayer in order to seize property of the taxpayer in satisfaction of his liability. As the Brickner court found, this situation is far removed from "an administrative or regulatory type search." Id. at 93. The situation in Brickner differs so substantially from the OSHA inspection involved in this case that Brickner is not a useful guide to the proper interpretation of Barlow's.
See, e. g., Marshall v. W & W Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1979); Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. North American Car Co., 476 F.Supp. 698, 703 (M.D.Pa.1979); Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1182, 1184 (W.D.Okl.1979); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 5 OSHC (BNA) 2024, 2025 (N.D.Ill.1977). Cf. In re Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1377, 1381 (10th Cir. 1978); U. S. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1977), reinstated after remand, 579 F.2d 1011, 1012 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 836, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979)
There appears to be some confusion as to whether both or only one of the complaints was unwritten. Brief of Defendants at 4 n. 3. It is clear that at least one complaint was oral; therefore, the effect of 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) is a relevant concern regardless of which view of the record is correct
See also Aluminum Coil Anodizing Corp., 1973-1974 OSHD (CCH) P 17,185 (OSHRC 1974), in which the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ruled that the Secretary may conduct inspections on the basis of complaints not in compliance with section 8(f)(1)
In In the Matter of the Inspection of: Central Mine Equipment Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1907 (8th Cir. 1979), the Eighth Circuit commented on the issue even though it did not decide it. The court noted that a general inspection was permissible when conducted pursuant to an administrative plan but suggested that Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), required that inspections conducted pursuant to employee complaints be limited in scope to the substance of the complaints. 7 OSHC (BNA) at 1907-08 n. 1. As discussed in Part II, supra, we believe that Tyler has limited applicability in the context of OSHA inspections. Furthermore, the passages from Tyler cited by the Eighth Circuit do not deal with the scope of administrative inspections but rather with the balancing process to be used in determining whether probable cause exists in particular cases. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the scope of an OSHA inspection should be one of a number of factors entering into this balancing process, and strongly suggested that scope be limited whenever possible. Id. As discussed in the text, infra, we do not believe that this position is consistent with the broad remedial purposes of the Act or with the Supreme Court's opinion in Barlow's, supra
Plaintiff cites U. S. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), reinstated after remand, 579 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979), in support of its limited scope argument. Consolidation Coal did not consider the statute involved in the present case. In addition, it involved, not a purely administrative inspection, but a search of company offices and seizure of records resulting in criminal prosecutions of the company and some of its officers. Consolidation Coal is not, therefore, closely analogous to the instant case.
See also Whittaker Corp. v. OSHA, 6 OSHC (BNA) 1492, 1494-95 (M.D.Pa.1978), appeal dismissed, 594 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1979); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Urick Property, 472 F.Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (W.D.Pa.1979). Cf. Marshall v. Wollaston Alloys, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 1102, 1104 (D.Mass.1979); Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F.Supp. 978, 982 (W.D.La.1979)
See also In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 5 OSHC (BNA) 2024, 2024-25 (N.D.Ill.1977); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Wisconsin Steel, No. 79 C 4284 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 28, 1979), memo. op. at 2-3. In another case, Marshall v. Berwick Forge & Fabricating Co., 474 F.Supp. 104 (M.D.Pa.1979), the court permitted a general inspection in response to employee complaints but suggested that, had there been fewer alleged violations and a less extensive record of past violations, it would have limited the scope of the inspection. Id. at 113. Nonetheless, only fifteen per cent of the facility was implicated in the complaints and a general inspection was still permitted
A number of courts have cited this portion of the Gilbert & Bennett opinion as support for their conclusion that general inspections are permissible in response to employee complaints. See, e. g., In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of: Wisconsin Steel, No. 79 C 4284 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 28, 1979); In the Matter of: Establishment Inspection of Marsan Co., 7 OSHC (BNA) 1557 (N.D.Ind.1979). In fact, one of the cases this court cited in support of its finding in Gilbert & Bennett that a general inspection is permissible pursuant to an administrative plan, was a case upholding such inspections in response to employee complaints. See Dravo Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC (BNA) 2057 (W.D.Pa.1977), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1373 (3d Cir. 1978), cited in Gilbert & Bennett, supra, 589 F.2d at 1343
Indeed, in his dissent in Barlow's, Justice Stevens observed that the warrant requirement established by the Supreme Court in that case did not purport to limit the scope of inspections more strictly than the Act itself did in section 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2). As Justice Stevens read the majority opinion, the warrant was intended simply to apprise the employer of the inspection's scope, not to limit it. Barlow's, supra, 436 U.S. at 335-36, 98 S.Ct. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting)