Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/536/21/139353/
Timestamp: 2019-08-18 05:30:38
Document Index: 75969816

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841', 'art:\n21', '§ 841', 'art:\n21', '§ 841', '§ 2']

United States of America v. Peter A. Crusco and Phillip A. Cimmino.appeal of Phillip Cimmino, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Third Circuit › 1976 › United States of America v. Peter A. Crusco and Phillip A. Cimmino.appeal of Phillip Cimmino
United States of America v. Peter A. Crusco and Phillip A. Cimmino.appeal of Phillip Cimmino, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976)
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit - 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976)
Argued March 26, 1976. Decided May 27, 1976
This is another of the recurring appeals which stem from imprecise language used by the parties in the bargaining process preceding a guilty plea. Appellant Phillip A. Cimmino was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute Schedule I controlled substances and a second count of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 470.7 grams of heroin hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 841(b) (1) (A).1 Cimmino initially pleaded not guilty to both counts, but after four and a half years of pre-trial proceedings he was permitted to retract his plea and to plead guilty to Count II in exchange for a maximum sentence of seven years and the prosecution's promise to take no position on sentencing.
The district court sentenced Cimmino to six years' imprisonment with an additional three years' special parole as required by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A).2 Immediately upon sentencing, Cimmino sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he was misled as to the maximum sentence he faced and that the Government had broken its promise not to take a position on sentencing. The court denied his application and imposed sentence. Cimmino appealed his conviction to this court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Courts naturally look with a jaundiced eye upon any defendant who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing on the ground that he expected a lighter sentence. Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170, 174-175, 75 S. Ct. 182, 99 L. Ed. 210 (1954); Johnson v. Massey, 516 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1975); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973); Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). However, cases of disappointed but unfounded expectations must be carefully distinguished from those in which the defendant's expectations as to his sentence are predicated upon promises by the Government or statements from the court. United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 87 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S. Ct. 563, 46 L. Ed. 2d 405, 44 U.S.L.W. 3358 (1975); United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 588 (3d Cir. 1974).5
Where the record shows that "circumstances as they existed at the time of the guilty plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression," a defendant must be held to have entered his plea without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily. Mosher v. Lavallee,491 F.2d 1346, 1348 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906, 94 S. Ct. 1611, 40 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1974). In the instant case, there is sufficient objective proof on the record in statements by the Government and the district judge to support Cimmino's claim that he misunderstood the maximum sentence he faced.
Cimmino's guilty plea was accepted at a time when Rule 11 required that defendants be informed of the "consequences of the plea."6 This court in Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969), specified that this language required that the pleader be made aware of the "outer limits of punishment," at least as to the maximum period of incarceration possible. See also United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318, at 321 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Maggio, supra, 514 F.2d at 87. Our analysis of the interaction between the district judge and Cimmino prior to sentencing reveals that Cimmino was not unambiguously informed of the maximum punishment he faced. The failure, although inadvertent, to inform Cimmino that he faced a maximum of seven, not four, years of incarceration and a special parole term of not less than three years violates Rule 11's mandate that defendants be informed of the consequences of their plea. Failure to comply strictly with the rule entitles a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and to plead anew. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969).
The self-serving statement that it was fulfilling its part of the plea bargain and leaving the sentencing to the judge does not justify the Government's remarks even if the judge was not moved by them. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971), on which Cimmino largely relies, the United States Supreme Court was not swayed by the district judge's assurance that he was not influenced in his sentencing by the prosecutor's recommendation. The question facing the Santobello court and this court is whether the prosecutor fulfilled his promise when the guilty plea rested on it "in any significant degree." Id. at 262, 92 S. Ct. 495.
In view of the unkept plea bargain and of Cimmino's justifiable misunderstanding regarding the maximum sentence, the district court erred when it refused to permit Cimmino to withdraw his plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) provides that "to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."7
Where there is denial of due process, there is "manifest injustice" as a matter of law. United States v. McGahey, 449 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Thus, the court's discretion under Rule 32(d) is strictly curtailed whenever a constitutional violation is shown. United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 281 n. 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 850, 86 S. Ct. 96, 15 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1965); 8A Moore's Federal Practice P 32.07(4) at 32-108.1 (1975).
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1971) provides in pertinent part:
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) provides in pertinent part:
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1971) provides in pertinent part:
See also Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840, 75 S. Ct. 46, 99 L. Ed. 663 (1954); United States v. Shneer, 194 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1952)
(a) (ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:
The comments state that § 2.1(a) (ii) (4) "is consistent with the prevailing view that unkept plea agreements are a basis for withdrawal." Id. at 57.