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Zant v. Stephens (full text) :: 456 U.S. 410 (1982) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
U.S. Supreme CourtZant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982)Zant v. StephensNo. 81-89Argued February 24, 1982Decided May 3, 1982456 U.S. 410CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
The respondent was convicted of murder in a Georgia Superior Court. His sentencing jury found the following statutory aggravating circumstances: [Footnote 1] Page 456 U. S. 412
"(1) that the offense of murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital felony, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(1); (2) that the murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(1), supra; and, (3) that the offense of murder was committed by a person who had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or a place of lawful Page 456 U. S. 413 confinement, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(9)."
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), we upheld the Georgia death penalty statute because the standards and procedures set forth therein promised to alleviate to a significant degree the concern of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), that the death penalty not be imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner. We recognized that the constitutionality of Georgia death sentences ultimately would depend on the Georgia Supreme Court's construing the statute and reviewing capital sentences consistently with this concern. See 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 198, 428 U. S. 201-206 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, Page 456 U. S. 414 and STEVENS, JJ.); id. at 428 U. S. 211-212, 428 U. S. 222-224 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). Our review of the statute did not lead us to examine all of its nuances. It was only after the state law relating to capital sentencing was clarified in concrete cases that we confronted and addressed more specific constitutional challenges in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14 (1978), Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980).
Despite the clarity of the state rule we are asked to review, there is considerable uncertainty about the state law premises Page 456 U. S. 415 of that rule. [Footnote 3] The Georgia Supreme Court has never explained the rationale for its position. It may be that implicit in the rule is a determination that multiple findings of statutory aggravating circumstances are superfluous, or a determination that the reviewing court may assume the role of the jury when the sentencing jury recommended the death penalty under legally erroneous instructions. In this Court, the Georgia Attorney General offered as his understanding the following construction of state law: the jury must first find whet.her one or more statutory aggravating circumstances Page 456 U. S. 416 have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The existence of one or more aggravating circumstances is a threshold finding that authorizes the jury to consider imposing the death penalty; it serves as a bridge that takes the jury from the general class of all murders to the narrower class of offenses the state legislature has determined warrant the death penalty. After making the finding that the death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury then makes a separate finding whether the death penalty should be imposed. It bases this finding
The Georgia Supreme Court, under certain circumstances, will decide questions of state law upon certification from this Court. See Ga.Code § 24-4536 (Supp.1980). [Footnote 4] We invoke that statute to certify the following question: What are the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired by the invalidity of Page 456 U. S. 417 one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is, in all circumstances, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Page 456 U. S. 418 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 428 U. S. 231. Even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, however, I believe that respondent Stephens' sentence must be vacated and his case remanded to the Georgia state courts for resentencing.
"the premises of state law that support the conclusion that the death sentence in this case is not impaired Page 456 U. S. 419 by the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury."
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), this Court struck down death penalties imposed pursuant to a Georgia statute. Shortly thereafter, the Georgia Legislature enacted the current death penalty statute. This statute provides for a separate sentencing proceeding after the defendant has been found guilty of a capital offense. During the sentencing phase, the trial judge shall instruct the jury [Footnote 2/1] to consider "any of the [10] statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence." Ga.Code § 27-2534.1(b) (1978). The aggravating circumstances found Page 456 U. S. 420 by the judge to be warranted by the evidence are submitted to the jury in writing to be used during its deliberations. § 27-2534.1(c). If the jury recommends a death sentence, it "shall designate in writing . . . the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. Even if it finds that one or more aggravating circumstances has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is not required to impose the death penalty. See Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978). The jury's verdict to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 229 S.E.2d 376 (1976). The trial judge is bound by the jury's recommendation of sentence, whether that recommendation be life or death. Ga.Code §§ 26-3102, 27-2514 (1978).
428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 206 (emphasis added). JUSTICE WHITE, Page 456 U. S. 421 joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment, placed an even stronger emphasis on the role of the statutory aggravating circumstances:
446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 428-429. Section (b)(7), if construed broadly enough to encompass every murder, would Page 456 U. S. 422 be unconstitutional because it provides "no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id. at 428 U. S. 433. The plurality found it significant that this interpretation of § (b)(7) "may . . . have been one to which the members of the jury in this case subscribed," and that, if the jury did hold this view, "their preconceptions were not dispelled by the trial judge's sentencing instructions." Id. at 428 U. S. 429. Therefore, the jury was not given appropriate guidance, and the death sentence could not constitutionally be imposed.
631 F.2d 397, 406 (CA5 1980) (case below); See Stromberg v. Page 456 U. S. 423 California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). Since 1931, this Court has consistently declined to speculate about whether a particular jury would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of an unconstitutional instruction. See, e.g., id. at 283 U. S. 367-368. Accord, Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 397 U. S. 570-571 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 394 U. S. 585-588 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 354 U. S. 311-312 (1957). In light of this Court's consistent recognition that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment," Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 428 U. S. 305 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 455 U. S. 117-118 (1982) (O'CONNOR J., concurring), there is certainly no reason to engage in such speculation here. Yet the jury is not required to recommend death even if it finds that one or more aggravating circumstances have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, to adopt the bald pronouncement that,
Recognizing that settled law normally requires that sentences arguably imposed on the basis of unconstitutional instructions cannot stand, petitioner and several States in an Page 456 U. S. 424 amicus curiae brief [Footnote 2/3] attempt to distinguish the Stromberg line of cases by arguing that, as a matter of statutory construction, a jury's finding that 1 of the 10 aggravating circumstances has been established beyond a reasonable doubt is irrelevant to its ultimate conclusion that the death penalty should be imposed. Specifically, petitioner argues that the term "aggravating circumstance" actually has two entirely different meanings, with each meaning representing a separate task that a capital sentencing jury must perform. First, the jury must determine whether any of the 10 statutory "aggravating circumstances" has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. This, petitioner argues, is a threshold determination that only allows the jury to consider the death penalty, but has no impact on whether that penalty should be imposed. After reaching this threshold determination, the jury may consider any "evidence in aggravation" or mitigation in reaching its conclusion as to whether the death penalty should be imposed. According to petitioner, the jury performs this second task free of any influence from the very "legislative guidelines" that, by "focus[ing] the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," prevent the death penalty from being wantonly and freakishly imposed. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 206-207 (joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.).
Putting to one side both the plausibility and the constitutionality of petitioner's construction of the Georgia death penalty statute, [Footnote 2/4] it is patently obvious that this ex post facto attempt Page 456 U. S. 425 to avoid the clear mandate of Stromberg cannot possibly remedy the constitutional infirmity of respondent's sentence. This conclusion is compelled by this Court's decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979). In Sandstrom, a defendant was convicted of "deliberate homicide," which, under Montana law, required the State to prove that he "purposefully or knowingly" caused the death of the victim. Id. at 442 U. S. 512. At the close of all the evidence, the judge instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.'" Id. at 442 U. S. 513. The defendant objected to this instruction on the ground that it unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on the issue of intent. On direct appeal, the Montana Supreme Court conceded that shifting the burden of proof in a criminal case was unconstitutional. It nevertheless upheld the challenged instruction on the ground that, under its interpretation, the instruction only shifted the burden of production, rather than the burden of persuasion. Id. at 442 U. S. 513-514. In the proceedings before this Court, the State argued that the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the effect of the presumption was conclusive on this Court. Id. at 442 U. S. 516.
Id. at 442 U. S. 516-517 (emphasis added). Instead, this Court defined the relevant question as whether "a reasonable juror could well have been misled by the instruction." Id. at 442 U. S. 517. Even assuming the constitutionality of the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the presumption, Page 456 U. S. 426 an interpretation that this Court conceded might have been in the minds of "some jurors," the fact that
In my view, the case presently before the Court presents even a stronger case for rejecting the relevance of an ex post facto saving construction. By certifying this question to the Georgia Supreme Court, the majority concedes that this construction has never been explicitly adopted by the Georgia courts. It must also be acknowledged that petitioner's interpretation of the jury's role under the Georgia law is not the only, or even the most plausible, construction of the death penalty statute. A "reasonable juror" could fairly conclude Page 456 U. S. 427 that he or she was required to place special emphasis on the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances, and weigh them against each other and against any mitigating circumstances, when deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 428-429. Certainly several Members of this Court have operated under this assumption. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 197-198, 428 U. S. 221-222; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, at 446 U. S. 436-437 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment); Drake v. Zant, 449 U. S. 999, 1001 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Absent even a shred of evidence that respondent's trial judge and jury were cognizant of petitioner's asserted construction of the Georgia death penalty statute, a construction never acknowledged by any Georgia appellate court, we can only speculate whether "the verdict in this case was not decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance." 631 F.2d at 406. It is precisely to guard against such speculation that this Court has uniformly refused Page 456 U. S. 428 to uphold a conviction or sentence that might have been based even in part on an unconstitutional ground. [Footnote 2/7] See supra at 456 U. S. 423. Furthermore, in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 428 U. S. 189, this Court made clear that
I am in essential agreement with the views expressed by JUSTICE MARSHALL in Part II of his dissenting opinion, and Page 456 U. S. 429 with his conclusion that the death sentence was imposed under instructions that could have misled the jury. I would not hold, however, that the case must be remanded for resentencing by a jury.