Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/906/1116/73023/
Timestamp: 2019-07-22 13:49:02
Document Index: 412702342

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2113', '§ 2', '§ 2113', '§ 2', '§ 2113', '§ 2', '§ 2113', '§ 2113', '§ 3742']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Robert Francis Hanley, Defendant-appellant, 906 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1990) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1990 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Robert Francis Hanley, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Robert Francis Hanley, Defendant-appellant, 906 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1990)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 906 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1990)
Argued May 3, 1990. Decided June 28, 1990
On January 13, 1989, Hanley and Rodney James Lemerand were indicted in the Western District of Michigan for the December 16, 1988 armed robbery of the Bark River Branch of the Northern Michigan Savings Bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Thomas Gene Lemerand and Mannebach pled guilty to armed bank robbery. Hanley and McRae were charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery and the commission of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. McRae was also charged in the superseding indictment with knowingly possessing and receiving stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On April 11, 1989, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hanley pled guilty to Count 2 of the first superseding indictment, armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).
The probation officer calculated Hanley's criminal offense level to be at level 24. Guidelines Sec. 2B3.1 provides a base criminal offense level of 18 for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). That level was increased by three levels because the amount of money involved in the robbery was between $50,001 and $250,000. Guidelines Sec. 2B3.1(b) (1) (D). A further three-level increase was warranted because a firearm was used during the offense. Guidelines Sec. 2B3.1(b) (2) (C). A two-level increase was then imposed because the tellers were restrained to facilitate the commission of the offense. Guidelines Sec. 2B3.1(b) (4) (B). Finally, a two-level decrease was warranted because of Hanley's acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Guidelines Sec. 3E1.1(a).
The probation officer then calculated Hanley's criminal history category to be IV based on nine points from five offenses committed by him before his 18th birthday. In arriving at nine points, the probation officer applied Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A) and calculated three of the offenses at one point each and two of them at two points each because of the lengthy commitment for those two crimes, resulting in an initial total of seven points. The probation officer added two more points to the initial total because the armed bank robbery offense to which Hanley pled guilty was committed within two years of his discharge from juvenile confinement, Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(e), resulting in a final prior offense level of nine points and a criminal history classification of category IV. This classification resulted in a sentencing range of 77 to 96 months, or six years, five months to eight years, in prison based on an offense level of 24 and a criminal history category of IV. Guidelines Ch. 5, Part A.
Hanley moved to have each of his prior juvenile convictions calculated at a level of one point for each offense, resulting in an initial criminal history score of 5 or a criminal history category of III. He based this argument on the contention that his two commitments to the Michigan Department of Social Services were not "confinements" as defined in Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A) and resulting in two points for each confinement over sixty days. Under Hanley's argument, his two point enhancement for committing an offense within two years of his release from juvenile facilities for a previous offense would also be disallowed because his juvenile detention would not constitute an imprisonment under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(e). Under Hanley's calculations, his sentencing range would be 63 to 78 months, or five years, three months to six years, six months, based on an offense level of 24 and a criminal history category of III. Guidelines Ch. 5, Part A.
The district court, after entertaining argument by the government and Hanley's counsel, concluded that "confinement" under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A) included a commitment to the Department of Social Services and that placement within a Department facility constituted an "imprisonment" within the contemplation of Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(e). The district court found Hanley's offense level to be level 24 and his criminal history to be category IV and sentenced Hanley to 78 months or six years, six months in prison.
Hanley maintains that juvenile commitment to a Department of Social Services facility is not a "confinement" within the meaning of that term in Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A). He claims that because a juvenile court adjudication is not a criminal conviction, subsequent placement following a juvenile court adjudication is not like incarceration, therefore, it is not a confinement. As a result of this allegedly erroneous categorization, Hanley received an incorrectly inflated criminal history category.
Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A) and (B). Thus, the guidelines clearly state that the prior incarceration provisions used for determining a defendant's criminal history category covers both adult and juvenile offenses.
On February 2, 1984, Hanley was arrested for conspiracy to break and enter his grandmother's home and for malicious destruction of property for kicking a hole in her door after she refused to allow him to enter her house. He received twelve months probation for the malicious property destruction charge; the conspiracy charge was dismissed. Hanley was thirteen years old at the time of this offense. This juvenile offense results in one criminal history point under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (B).
On October 3, 1984, at age fourteen, Hanley was arrested for assaulting his mother after she attempted to force him to go to school. He received a continuance of his probation for this offense which also results in one criminal history point under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (1) (B).
Twenty days later, Hanley was arrested for stealing his grandmother's 1970 Cadillac, which he subsequently wrecked, and for assaulting James Therrian following the accident. Following a November 2, 1984, hearing, Hanley was placed in the Shiloh Family Home in Marquette, Michigan. He remained in state custody until July 28, 1985. Due to the length of the confinement, this offense increases Hanley's criminal history score by two points. Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A).
Following his release, Hanley was arrested for public intoxication on August 28, 1985. He was fifteen years old. On September 3, 1985, Hanley was recommitted to state juvenile facilities which he left without permission on November 18, 1985. He was arrested and committed to state custody until May 6, 1987. This offense also increases Hanley's criminal history score by two points. Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A).
On August 11, 1987, following his discharge from Michigan juvenile confinement, Hanley assaulted a Delta County, Michigan Deputy Sheriff following an altercation between Hanley and his father. He pled guilty to simple assault and received six months probation. This offense raises the criminal history total by one point. Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (B).
The classification of a juvenile placement is a factual question to which the "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1989). The guidelines clearly state that the prior incarceration provisions cover both adult and juvenile offenses for the purpose of determining a defendant's criminal offense level. Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A). Most importantly, we recently addressed the issue raised by Hanley in United States v. Kirby, 893 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990), where we held that prior juvenile adjudications were to be considered under the guidelines and that the adjudication of delinquency by a Kentucky juvenile court with a subsequent commitment to the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources was "incarceration" under the guidelines. Under Kirby and the text of the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court and probation officer properly considered Hanley's juvenile commitments as "confinement" in determining his criminal history category under Guidelines Sec. 4A1.2(d) (2) (A). Similarly, Hanley's commitment to a juvenile facility constitutes an "imprisonment" for the purposes of applying the two-point enhancement provision in Guidelines Sec. 4A1.1(e).
Hanley fails the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. "First, the defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show prejudice by showing that the errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial." Flippins v. United States, 808 F.2d 16, 18 (6th Cir. 1987) (summarizing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). We reject Hanley's first allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel because Hanley's counsel may have wisely decided not to pursue suppression motions that would have likely been futile in view of the government's access to co-defendants' statements following their guilty pleas. As for Hanley's allegation of misinformation regarding "good time", it is significant that Hanley has never sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
As for Hanley's counsel's failure to delay the sentencing proceeding, the district court had complete information and considered Hanley's contentions. It is clear that Hanley's position was not prejudiced by his counsel's decision not to press for further delays regarding the "confinement" issue. Finally, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Flippins, 808 F.2d at 18. Hanley has not overcome this presumption.