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Timestamp: 2017-10-20 19:49:13
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10']

IN RE LABOR BOARD, 304 U. S. 486 (1938) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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Original application by the National Labor Relations Board for writs of mandamus and prohibition directed to the judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The cause was submitted by the respondents, Hon. Joseph Buffington, Hon. J. Warren Davis, and Hon. J. Whitaker Thompson, Circuit Judges, upon their return to the rule to show cause. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
April 8, 1938, the Board, in a cause pending before it, issued an order directing the Republic Steel Corporation to desist from certain unfair labor practices and to take certain affirmative action. April 18, Republic filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals a petition for review alleging that the order violated the constitutional guarantee of due process because it was entered without an opportunity to Republic to support its contentions by argument or brief, and thus the Board had denied it the hearing to which it was entitled. On the same day, Republic requested of the Board a transcript of the entire record of its proceedings, and the General Counsel of the Board chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The rules of the Board extend to any party the right, within a reasonable period after the close of a hearing, to present oral argument before the trial examiner and, with his permission, to file briefs. They further provide that the Board may decide a cause with or without allowing the parties to present oral argument before the Board itself or to submit briefs to the Board. It is the Board's practice to grant leave to submit briefs to it or to make oral argument before it whenever so requested, but the rules do not expressly state that such a request may be made or that the request, if made, will be granted. No such request was made by Republic, and no brief was received or oral argument heard before the entry of the order of April 8, 1938. The rules also provide for hearing before a trial examiner of causes initiated by the filing of charges before a regional director unless the cause is transferred for hearing before the Board in Washington. If the hearing is before an examiner, he is to render an intermediate report containing findings of fact and recommendations as to the disposition of the cause, which are to be served upon the parties, and they are entitled to take exceptions to the intermediate report. In cases initiated by charges filed with the Board in Washington, or transferred for hearing before the Board, it may direct the trial examiner to prepare an intermediate report, but the rules do not require that such a report shall be prepared or served, or that the Board shall serve its own proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The complaint against Republic was initiated by charges filed with the Board. The Board did not direct the trial examiner to prepare an intermediate report, and none was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
April 30, 1938, Republic moved the Circuit Court of Appeals for a stay of the Board's order and, upon the hearing of the motion, the Board advised the court that it was considering vacating the order. May 3, upon ex parte application of Republic, the court issued a rule, returnable May 13, requiring the Board to show cause why it should not file in the court a certified transcript of the record of the proceedings against Republic, and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
May 21, the judges filed their return admitting the allegations of the petition, except those as to the rules and practice of the Board, and its determination to vacate the orders in the Republic and other cases, which it chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As is indicated by our action on the motion of the Board for leave to file, and by the return to the rule, the question is solely of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals. This question is to be answered in the light of § 10(d)(e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, the pertinent portions of which are in the margin. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Board's proceedings are administrative in character. Its final action is subject to judicial review in the manner specified in the act. Subsection (d) of § 10, in plain terms, invests the Board with authority at any time before the transcript shall have been filed in court to modify or set aside its order in whole or in part. The purpose of the provision obviously is to afford an opportunity to correct errors or to consider new evidence which would render the order inadequate or unjust. The words used are "[u]ntil a transcript of the record . . . shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided," the Board may vacate or modify. The following subsections, (e) and (f), and those to which we turn for the connotation of the qualifying phrase. Subsection (e) grants the Board resort to a court for the enforcement of its order. That enforcement is to be obtained by filing a petition for enforcement and filing a certified chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Counsel for Republic urge, in support of the Circuit Court's action, that the words "as hereinafter provided" in subsection (d) refer to the filing of the transcript required in an enforcement proceeding initiated by the Board authorized by subsection (e), but cannot have reference to a proceeding for review initiated by any other party before the Board pursuant to subsection (f). The words of the statute do not warrant this construction. Two filings are required by subsection (f), the first of a petition, the second of a transcript. After prescribing the second, the act provides that, "[u]pon such filing, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e)." The reference clearly is to the filing of the transcript, and not to the filing of the petition. The contention chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Jurisdiction, as the term is to be applied in this instance, is the power to hear and determine the controversy presented, in a given set of circumstances. A court has jurisdiction, in another use of the term, to examine the question whether that power is conferred upon it in the circumstances disclosed, but, if it finds such power is not granted, it lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, and must refrain from any adjudication of rights in connection therewith. Since the statute empowers the Board, before the filing of a transcript, to vacate or modify its orders, certainly it does not confer jurisdiction upon the reviewing court to prohibit the exercise of the granted power. It is obvious that Congress intended to confer no jurisdiction upon the reviewing court to prevent the Board from seasonably vacating or modifying its order so as to make it comport with right and justice. The act plainly indicates that the purpose was to give the court full and exclusive jurisdiction to review the Board's order in the respects indicated by the act once the transcript of the Board's proceedings is before it. It is equally plain that the court is to have no power to prevent the Board from vacating or modifying its order prior to such plenary submission of the cause. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The investiture of a court with jurisdiction to review an order on the merits only upon the filing of a transcript exhibiting the Board's final action is not a denial of due process, as suggested by counsel. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The case is not here as if on writ of certiorari or appeal for review of error alleged to have been committed by the lower court. This is an application for the writs of mandamus and prohibition to command and restrain action by the judges named. These may not be granted unless the lower court was plainly without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case or the particular issue. In re New York & P.R. S.S. Co., 155 U. S. 523, 155 U. S. 531; 220 U. S. 208; Ex parte Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 255 U. S. 273, 255 U. S. 275. Precisely, the question is whether, on the facts here disclosed, the court was without power to consider and decide upon the corporation's application for an order directing the Board to certify and file a transcript of the record and restraining in the meantime any other action by it. The decision just announced answers affirmatively, and that is the basis on which the Court commands vacation of the order of the lower court and prohibits it from reviewing the order of the Board without first giving it a reasonable opportunity to vacate its order -- that is, without giving the Board more time to proceed under § 10(d). Obviously jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals attached upon the filing of the corporation's petition for review and service of a copy on the Board. Any other construction of § 10(f) would let the Board, by refusing to certify a transcript of proceedings before it, prevent judicial review of its orders. Congress did not so intend. While the statute expressly requires the person aggrieved to file a certified transcript, it impliedly, but not less plainly, commands the Board to certify the record. This Court's decision rests on the statement that, as the term is to be applied in this instance, jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the controversy presented in a given set of circumstances. If the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the corporation's motion, writs of mandamus and prohibition may not be granted, for they are not available for correction of mere error, or even abuse of discretion. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178, 287 U. S. 203-204 38 U. S. 408; 55 U. S. 13; Ex parte Railway Co., 101 U. S. 711, 101 U. S. 720; In re Hawkins, Petitioner, 147 U. S. 486, 147 U. S. 490; In re Atlantic City Railroad, 164 U. S. 633, 164 U. S. 635; In re James Pollitz, 206 U. S. 323, 206 U. S. 331; cf. Ex parte Simons, 247 U. S. 231, 247 U. S. 240. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
April 18, the corporation filed in the circuit court of appeals its petition to have the Board's order adjudged invalid. The petition charges that, in violation of the corporation's rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Board ordered the corporation to reinstate persons not alleged in the complaint to have been unlawfully discharged or discriminated against by the corporation, and so directed notwithstanding the corporation had never been accorded or offered a hearing or opportunity of making defense as to the asserted rights of those persons; that the Board made the order without affording the corporation opportunity to present its case by argument, orally or upon brief. It alleges that, under the terms of the order, about five thousand persons may claim reinstatement, petitioner is required to reinstate or pay them as specified, the average wage is $6.50 per day. And it asserts that to defer reinstatement pending decision by the court as to validity of the order would chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
April 18, the day on which the corporation filed petition for review, the Board, consistently with the corporation's claim as to its duty under the Act, agreed promptly to certify the transcript and to file it in court. April 22, the corporation filed an application for stay and temporary relief. Its application cited § 10(g), which declares that commencement of proceedings under § 10(f) shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Board's order. It stated: the purpose of the application was to prevent irreparable loss and denial of review. If, pending final determination of the case, petitioner should fail to make reinstatements in accordance with the order, its potential weekly liability would exceed $95,000. On that basis the corporation sought suspension of the portion of the order that relates to reinstatement or payment of wages so that, if it should be upheld, the corporation's liability to reinstate or to pay would commence ten days after the final decree of the court. In a brief submitted in support of its motion, the corporation maintained that the order is invalid because the corporation was not afforded a fair and full hearing and because the order is one for reemployment, and not for reinstatement, and that, unless the stay be granted, the corporation will suffer irreparable financial losses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In these circumstances, the court did not lack jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy presented by chanroblesvirtualawlibrary