Source: https://cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/w/index.php?title=Legal_review_of_cyber_weapons&diff=next&oldid=1875
Timestamp: 2020-08-15 20:46:36
Document Index: 721422827

Matched Legal Cases: ['Arts 23', 'Art 127', 'Art 144', 'Arts 6', 'Art. 7', 'Arts 23', 'Art 127', 'Art 144', 'Arts 6', 'Art. 7', 'Art 1']

Difference between revisions of "Legal review of cyber weapons" - International cyber law: interactive toolkit
Difference between revisions of "Legal review of cyber weapons"
Revision as of 12:37, 3 July 2019 (edit)
Revision as of 11:34, 28 November 2019 (edit) (undo)
(adding ICRC view from the 2019 Challenges report)
! scope="col" style="background-color:#ffffaa;"| [[Legal review of cyber weapons]]
|[[File:Legal review of cyber weapons.svg|left|frameless|200x200px]]Although IHL is primarily designed to govern situations of armed conflict, some of its rules also apply in times of peace,<ref>See, eg, Arts 23, 44, 47 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4825657B0C7E6BF0C12563CD002D6B0B&action=openDocument GC I]; Art 127 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E&action=openDocument GC III]; Art 144 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument GC IV]; Arts 6, para 1, and 83, para 1 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=openDocument AP I]; Art. 7 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=8BC1504B556D2F80C125710F002F4B28&action=openDocument AP III]. <!--[RA: CHECK CITES PLEASE].--></ref> including the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL, codified in Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and generally considered to reflect customary international law.<ref>Robin Geiss, ‘The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions’ in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), <i>The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary</i> (OUP 2015) 121-22.</ref> The obligation in turn implies a duty of each State to ensure that means of warfare available to it comply with the relevant rules of IHL.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 110, para 2.</ref> In addition, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I provides that “[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare,” States must determine whether its employment would be prohibited under any rule of international law.<ref>Article 36 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=openDocument AP I].</ref> It has been argued that the Article 36 obligation represents customary international law,<ref>See, eg, Duncan Blake and Joseph S. Imburgia, ‘[https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/airfor66&i=159 “Bloodless Weapons”? The need to conduct legal review of certain capabilities and the implications of defining them as “weapons”]’, (2010) 66 AFLRev 157, 163–64; see also, William H Boothby, <i>Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict</i> (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 342-43 (“For states that are not party to AP1, the implied obligation should not necessarily be expressed in the same terms as article 36, but its existence is attested to by the practice of certain states before the adoption of AP1”).</ref> but this view is not universally accepted.<ref>See, [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 110, para 2.</ref>
|[[File:Legal review of cyber weapons.svg|left|frameless|200x200px]]Although IHL is primarily designed to govern situations of armed conflict, some of its rules also apply in times of peace,<ref>See, eg, Arts 23, 44, 47 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=4825657B0C7E6BF0C12563CD002D6B0B&action=openDocument GC I]; Art 127 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E&action=openDocument GC III]; Art 144 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument GC IV]; Arts 6, para 1, and 83, para 1 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=openDocument AP I]; Art. 7 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=8BC1504B556D2F80C125710F002F4B28&action=openDocument AP III]. <!--[RA: CHECK CITES PLEASE].--></ref> including the obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL, codified in Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and generally considered to reflect customary international law.<ref>Robin Geiss, ‘The Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for the Conventions’ in Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (eds), <i>The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary</i> (OUP 2015) 121-22.</ref> The obligation in turn implies a duty of each State to ensure that means of warfare available to it comply with the relevant rules of IHL.<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 110, para 2; see also ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Recommitting to Protection in Armed Conflict on the 70th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions (October 2019) 28 (“In the ICRC’s view, the requirement to carry out legal review of new weapons ... flows from the obligation to
ensure respect for IHL under Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions.”).</ref> In addition, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I provides that “[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare,” States must determine whether its employment would be prohibited under any rule of international law.<ref>Article 36 [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=openDocument AP I].</ref> It has been argued that the Article 36 obligation represents customary international law,<ref>See, eg, Duncan Blake and Joseph S. Imburgia, ‘[https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/airfor66&i=159 “Bloodless Weapons”? The need to conduct legal review of certain capabilities and the implications of defining them as “weapons”]’, (2010) 66 AFLRev 157, 163–64; see also, William H Boothby, <i>Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict</i> (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 342-43 (“For states that are not party to AP1, the implied obligation should not necessarily be expressed in the same terms as article 36, but its existence is attested to by the practice of certain states before the adoption of AP1”).</ref> but this view is not universally accepted.<ref>See, [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 110, para 2.</ref>
To begin with, the mere fact of a weapon’s novelty or its reliance on new technology does not automatically mean that the weapon is illegal.<ref><!--[RA: PLEASE LOOK FOR MORE CITES]--> See, eg, [https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 US DoD Manual], para 6.2.1.</ref> Similarly, the lack of general practice by States in using the new weapon is irrelevant as to its legality under IHL.<ref>David Wallace, ‘[https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/TP%2011_2018.pdf Cyber Weapon Reviews under International Humanitarian Law: A Critical Analysis]’ (2018) Tallinn Paper No. 11, 9.</ref> Additionally, all States remain subject to the so-called Martens Clause,<ref>For a modern formulation of the Martens Clause, see [https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=6C86520D7EFAD527C12563CD0051D63C Art 1(2) AP I] (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”).</ref> which reinforces the notion that the lawfulness of a new means of warfare must be assessed under customary international law according to the principles of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.<ref>David Wallace, ‘[https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/TP%2011_2018.pdf Cyber Weapon Reviews under International Humanitarian Law: A Critical Analysis]’ (2018) Tallinn Paper No. 11, 9.</ref> In determining the weapon’s lawfulness, the State in question must therefore consider whether there is any specific prohibition under IHL that would bar the State from using it in practice.<ref>David Wallace, ‘[https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/TP%2011_2018.pdf Cyber Weapon Reviews under International Humanitarian Law: A Critical Analysis]’ (2018) Tallinn Paper No. 11, 10.<!--[ADD REF]--></ref> It is unsettled whether this consideration must take the form of a formal legal review approximating that required by Article 36 or whether it would suffice for the State to seek the advice of a legal advisor at the relevant level of command.<ref>See [https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524 Tallinn Manual 2.0], commentary to rule 110, para 4.</ref>
Revision as of 11:34, 28 November 2019