Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/370/114/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 19:58:10
Document Index: 220583967

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', 'art, 253', '§ 903', 'art, 253', '§ 903', '§ 903', '§ 903']

Section 3(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides that compensation shall be paid only for injuries occurring on navigable waters "and if recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." [Footnote 1] In each of these cases, the petitioner is a Deputy Commissioner who based an award of compensation under the Act on findings that the employee was engaged at the time of his injury in the work of completing the construction of a vessel afloat on navigable waters. [Footnote 2] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Before the Longshoremen's Act was passed, this Court has sustained the validity of a state workmen's compensation statute as applied to injuries suffered by an employee engaged in the completion of a launched vessel under construction on navigable waters, Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, but had made clear that state compensation statutes could not constitutionally be applied to injuries to employees engaged in repair work on completed vessels on navigable waters. [Footnote 3] The court below interpreted § 3(a) as adopting this distinction, and so set aside both awards, thus holding that a shipyard worker's right to compensation under the Act, if his injury is incurred on a vessel, depends not only on whether the vessel is on navigable waters, but also on whether the vessel was under repair, rather than under construction. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the interpretation of § 3(a) in the administration of the Act. 368 U.S. 946. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgments of the District Courts sustaining the awards.
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of § 3(a) would, if correct, have the effect of excepting from the Act's coverage not only the injuries suffered by employees while engaged in ship construction, but also any other injuries -- even though incurred on navigable waters, and so within chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the reach of Congress -- for which a state law could, constitutionally, provide compensation. But the Court of Appeals' interpretation is incorrect. The history of the Act, and of § 3(a) in particular, contravenes it; and our decisions construing § 3(a) have rejected it. Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters, [Footnote 4] whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law.
The Longshoremen's Act was passed in 1927. The Congress which enacted it would have preferred to leave to state compensation laws the matter of injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters within state boundaries. However, in 1917, this Court had decided in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, that the New York Compensation Act could not, constitutionally, be applied to an injury sustained on a gangplank between a vessel and a wharf. [Footnote 5] It was held that the matter was outside state cognizance, and exclusively within federal maritime jurisdiction, since to hold otherwise would impair the harmony and uniformity which the constitutional grant to the Federal Government of the admiralty power was meant to assure. While the Court acknowledged chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
257 U.S. at 257 U. S. 242. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, the problem which confronted Congress in 1927 had two facets. One was that the failure of Congress' chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There emerges from the complete legislative history [Footnote 9] a congressional desire for a statute which would provide federal compensation for all injuries to employees on navigable waters; in every case, that is, where Jensen chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
might have seemed to preclude state compensation. The statute's framers adopted this scheme in the Act because they meant to assure the existence of a compensation remedy for every such injury, [Footnote 10] without leaving chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Emphasis supplied.) The Chairman of the Senate Committee perceived that to create an exemption for "employment of local concern" threatened to perpetuate the very uncertainties of coverage that Congress wished to avoid. [Footnote 11] The danger was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We are not privy to the Committee deliberations at which it was decided to drop the "local concern" language from § 3 and substitute the language now in the statute. We think it a reasonable inference that the Committee concluded that the exemption for "employment of local chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The action of the House Committee, when S. 3170 as revised in the Senate came before it, discloses similar preoccupations. The House Committee rewrote § 3 to omit both the original "local concern" language and the Senate substitute. [Footnote 12] A parliamentary obstacle on an unrelated issue led to the House Committee's finally accepting the Senate version. [Footnote 13]
In the first place, the contours of the "local concern" concept were and have remained necessarily vague and chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Finally, there would have been no imaginable purpose in carving the area of "local concern" out of the federal coverage except to leave the greatest possible number of cases exclusively to the States. The price of such an objective would have included the adoption of whatever seemingly anomalous distinctions the courts might have chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We conclude that Congress used the phrase "if recovery . . . may not validly be provided by State law" in a sense consistent with the delineation of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable waters. By that language, Congress reiterated that the Act reached all those cases of injury to employees on navigable waters as to which Jensen, Knickerbocker, and Dawson had rendered questionable the availability of a state compensation remedy. [Footnote 14] Congress brought under the coverage of the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Act all such injuries whether or not a particular one was also within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law. [Footnote 15]
Our previous decisions under the Act are entirely consistent with our conclusion. In Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244, an employee of a seller of small boats, maritime supplies and outboard motors, hired primarily as a janitor and porter, was drowned when a boat in which he was riding capsized on the James River off Richmond, Virginia. The boat belonged to a customer of his employer, and he and a fellow employee were testing one of the employer's outboard motors for which the boat owner was a prospective purchaser. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 116 F.2d 789, had held that the employee's work was "so local in character" that Virginia could validly have included it under a state workmen's compensation act, and so had set aside an award to the employee's dependents under the Longshoremen's Act. This Court reversed. We noted that
in the light of § 3(a). 314 U.S. at 314 U. S. 248. The Court held that § 3(a) did not exclude coverage under the Act, saying:
"There can be no doubt that the purpose of the Act was to provide for federal compensation in the area which the specific decisions referred to [in the Senate Report -- Jensen, Knickerbocker, and Dawson] placed beyond the reach of the states. The proviso permitting recovery only where compensation 'may not validly be provided by State law' cannot be read in a manner that would defeat this purpose."
314 U.S. at 314 U. S. 249-250. We thus held that whatever may be § 3(a)'s "subtraction from the scope of the Act," id. at 314 U. S. 249, the Act's adoption of the Jensen line between admiralty and state jurisdiction as the limit of federal coverage included no exception for matters of "local concern."
In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, a structural steel worker engaged in dismantling a bridge across a navigable river was cutting and stowing dismantled steel in a barge when he fell into the river from the barge and was drowned. His dependents sought compensation under the state act, and this Court held that it could be applied. The result was not predicated on the ground that the employment was "maritime, but local," and so outside the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. Rather, the Court viewed the case as in a "twilight zone" where the applicability of state law was "extremely difficult" to determine, and resolved the doubt, of course, in favor of the constitutionality of the application of state law. At the same time, the Court indicated that compensation might also have been sought under the Longshoremen's Act, and that an award under that Act in the very same circumstances would have been supportable, pointing out that the Act adopts "the Jensen line of demarcation." 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 256. The conclusion that the Longshoremen's Act might have applied without regard chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The issue in Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U. S. 366, was whether compensation was available under the Longshoremen's Act for the death of an employee killed while engaged in the repair of a vessel which was then physically located on land, but on a marine railway. Since a marine railway was considered to be a "dry dock," the injury satisfied § 3(a)'s requirement that it occur "upon . . . navigable waters," defined in § 3 as "including any dry dock." At the same time, since the injury did, in a physical sense, occur on land, there is little doubt that a state compensation act could validly have been applied to it. See State Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed an award of compensation under the Federal Act in a per curiam opinion.
"Before the Parker case was decided . . . this court, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 804, announced the view that the federal compensation laws should be liberally construed to cover every case where the injury occurred on navigable waters and where, within the rule of [Jensen], . . . the action would have been on admiralty. In that case, we said:"
We turn finally to a question raised only in Donovan v. Avondale Shipyards. The employer contends that the employee accepted benefits under the Louisiana State Compensation Act, and that this constitutes an election of remedies which bars prosecution of his claim under the Longshoremen's Act. Compensation payments may be made under the Louisiana Compensation Act without a prior administrative proceeding. Before the federal claim was filed, Avondale made payments to the employee for some two years and three months at the maximum rate provided by the Louisiana statute. The employee accepted the checks which bore a notation on their face that they were payments of compensation under the state act. In addition, Avondale advanced a substantial sum to the employee to be credited against future compensation payments. Avondale also paid medical expenses for the employee's account in excess of the maximum liability imposed by the Louisiana statute. In the compensation order entered by Deputy Commissioner Donovan under the Longshoremen's Act, the full amount of all payments made by the employer was credited against the award, and no impermissible double recovery is possible. We hold that the acceptance of the payments does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the Longshoremen's Act. Nothing in the statute requires a contrary result. And we agree that the circumstances do not support a finding of a binding election to look solely to the state law for recovery. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Lawson, 149 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
F.2d 853; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968; Western Boat Building Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409. [Footnote 16]
See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479; Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449. See also Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222, 281 U. S. 230-232.
The constitutionality of the New York statute in other respects was sustained at the same Term. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. The validity of the Washington and Iowa statutes was also upheld. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210.
See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479; Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449.
See, e.g., State Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59.
"The committee deems it unnecessary to comment upon the modern change in the relation between employers and employees establishing systems of compensation as distinguished from liability. Nearly every State in the Union has a compensation law through which employees are compensated for injuries occurring in the course of their employment without regard to negligence on the part of the employer or contributory negligence on the part of the employee. If longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of State compensation laws, there would be no occasion for this legislation; but, unfortunately, they are excluded from these laws by reason of the character of their employment, and they are not only excluded, but the Supreme Court has more than once held that Federal legislation can not, constitutionally, be enacted that will apply State laws to this occupation. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149; Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219)."
"Mr. BROWN. Unless there is something in connection with admiralty law which qualifies it, I should say it is a very vague thing, and we can not understand what it means. The phrase 'of no direct relation to navigation and commerce' is another questionable proposition, whether the coverage of this bill might not apply to a man on the docks. Some of my friends seem to think that it would not apply to the man on the docks, that the State laws now apply, and it was said in the same decision [the witness referred to Rohde, supra, but the quoted language is found in Nordenholt, supra, note 7 at 259 U. S. 276]:"
The Department was not foreclosed in the instant cases from changing an interpretation of the statute which was clear error. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180.
I seriously doubt whether statutory language as clear as that in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), could ever be ignored in the name of effectuating the supposed "Congressional desire." Be that as it may, this particular statutory language chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was the culmination of a series of events beginning with this Court's decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, which held that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act court not constitutionally be applied to a stevedore unloading a vessel on navigable waters, because to do so would impair the uniformity of the general maritime law. Within five months after the Jensen decision, Congress passed legislation which attempted to give injured maritime employees "the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State." 40 Stat. 395. This legislation was declared unconstitutional as an invalid attempt to delegate federal power to the States. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149. A second statute, 42 Stat. 634, similar in approach to the first, was declared invalid in Washington v. Dowson & Co., 264 U. S. 219.
Meanwhile, the Court was backing away somewhat from Jensen by recognizing that, where the general employment and particular activities connected with an injury or death were local in character, though maritime in nature, state law could provide redress without disturbing the uniformity of the general maritime law. The maritime but local doctrine, first applied in connection with a state wrongful death statute, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, provided the basis for holding that a state compensation act could be applied to a worker chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
engaged in the construction of a new vessel which, while uncompleted, was afloat on navigable waters. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469. [Footnote 2/1]
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 84. Similar statements were made by those who spoke during the committee hearings on the proposed legislation. [Footnote 2/2] Several witnesses pointed out that the statute applied to but two categories of workers, longshoremen and those involved in ship repair, [Footnote 2/3] the classes of employees denied relief under state compensation acts by the Jensen case and the decisions which followed it. [Footnote 2/4] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) can hardly be deemed a question of first impression. In the thirty-five years since its enactment, this provision has been before the Court many times. The Court has consistently said that the Act does not apply to injuries on navigable waters where a State can constitutionally provide a compensation remedy. All the commentators have agreed. [Footnote 2/5] And the administrators of the Act have so held, specifically with respect to new ship construction. [Footnote 2/6]
In order to avoid the harsh results which the uncertainties of this statutory provision could sometimes produce, the Court, in Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, developed the theory of the twilight zone. There, we reversed a decision of the Washington Supreme Court, 12 Wash.2d 349, 121 P.2d 365, which had held that a State could not constitutionally make a compensation award to the widow of a workmen drowned in a navigable river while dismantling a drawbridge. Relying on the language of § 903(a), the Court pointed out that "Congress made clear its purpose to permit state compensation protection whenever possible. . . ." Id. at 317 U. S. 252-253. The Court went on to note that harbor workers and longshoremen were clearly protected by the Federal Act, but that
It was noted that both the Federal Act and the state compensation statute "show clearly that neither was intended to encroach on the field occupied by the other." Id. at 317 U. S. 255. Since this "jurisdictional dilemma" made it difficult for an injured worker to determine on which side of the line his particular case fell, the result in some cases had been that he obtained no compensation at all. In this "twilight zone" where the facts of a given case might place an injured worker on either side of the line, the Court held that it would give great weight to the administrative findings in cases brought under the Federal Act, and to the presumption of constitutionality in cases arising under state statutes. Because of this presumption of constitutionality, the claimant in Davis was allowed her state remedy. [Footnote 2/7]
Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U. S. 272. Today, the Court simply removes these 'terms' from the Act. [Footnote 2/8]"
During this same period, the Court consistently held that the principles of Jensen prohibited the application of state compensation laws to workers engaged in the repair of existing vessels. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449; Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479.
The Court's opinion places heavy reliance on Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244. I cannot understand why. For, in Parker, the Court recognized that the proviso in § 903(a) was "a subtraction from the scope of the Act." Id. at 314 U. S. 249. The Court today holds to the contrary. Moreover, any possible doubt as to the basis of the Parker decision was resolved in Davis, where the Court explained Parker in terms of the twilight zone rule. 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 257.