Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/173/9/548122/
Timestamp: 2019-11-17 22:36:43
Document Index: 100355164

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332', '§ 332']

Town of Amherst, New Hampshire, Defendant, Appellant, v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff, Appellee, 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1999 › Town of Amherst, New Hampshire, Defendant, Appellant, v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.,...
Town of Amherst, New Hampshire, Defendant, Appellant, v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff, Appellee, 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999) Heard March 1, 1999. Decided March 30, 1999
On December 8, 1997, Omnipoint filed the present lawsuit against the town asserting that Amherst's delay violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under this statute, the FCC licenses carriers to provide wireless telephone service on a competitive basis. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c). Rate regulation by states is precluded, unless special circumstances are shown. See id. § 332(c) (3). However, the statute preserves state and local authority over the placement and construction of facilities, id. § 332(c) (7) (A), subject to five limitations, id. § 332(c) (7) (B).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (emphasis added). Amherst does not dispute that Omnipoint's service is a "personal wireless service." Id. § 332(7) (c).
Three of the four remaining limitations are pertinent here: the local government must act on placement or construction applications "within a reasonable period of time"; the denial of a request "shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record"; and anyone adversely affected by any final action "or failure to act" by local government that is inconsistent with the limitations may seek review in "any court of competent jurisdiction" and "[t]he court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis." 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c) (7) (B) (ii), (iii), (v).
Later, after Omnipoint further amended its complaint, Amherst cross-moved for summary judgment. In July 1998, a hearing was held in the district court on the cross-motions. Within six weeks, the district court issued a 47-page memorandum opinion analyzing the issues in detail and concluding that the town had violated the requirement that the local regulation "shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services." 47 U.S.C. § 332(7) (B) (i) (II); see Omnipoint Communications Enters., Inc. v. Town of Amherst, No. 97-614-JD (D.N.H. filed Aug. 21, 1998). The district court rejected Omnipoint's claim that the Board had unreasonably delayed decision, and it did not resolve the question of whether the denial was based on substantial evidence. Id.
The statutory provision before us, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7), is a deliberate compromise between two competing aims--to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless telephone service and to maintain substantial local control over siting of towers.3 There are already two circuit decisions and several dozen district court decisions addressed to one or more of the half-dozen recurring issues under the statute. One of those issues, and the ground for the district court's injunction in this case, is Congress' mandate that no "regulation" of siting is permitted that has "the effect of prohibiting" service. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (i) (II).
Our own appraisal, which is de novo on summary judgment, is more agnostic. The very breadth and vagueness of the criteria that permit the Board to deny requests also give the Board some flexibility in deciding whether to grant them. Equally important, the strictures of New Hampshire and Amherst law are preempted, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, if they are read and applied so as effectively to preclude personal wireless service. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, supra, at 207-08 (affirming "preemption" in the "limited circumstances" described in the provision). The minutes reflect that the Board more or less understands this, and so would the New Hampshire state courts. Wenners v. Great State Beverages, Inc., 140 N.H. 100, 663 A.2d 623, 625-26 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1119, 116 S. Ct. 926, 133 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1996).
Below, Omnipoint pressed an alternative ground that the district court did not reach, namely, a claim that the Board's actions were unsupported by substantial evidence. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (7) (B) (iii). Something should be said about this claim in the interests of expedition since Omnipoint remains free on remand to renew its request for summary judgment on this issue. The substantial evidence question would ordinarily be resolved (one way or the other) on the record before the district court and require no trial.7
As already noted, the substantial evidence requirement is centrally directed to those rulings that the Board is expected to make under state law and local ordinance in deciding on variances, special exceptions and the like. In a number of cases, courts have overturned denials of permits, finding (for example) that safety concerns and aesthetic objections rested upon hollow generalities and empty records. See, e.g., Iowa Wireless Servs., L.P. v. City of Moline, 29 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921-23 (C.D. Ill. 1998); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331-33 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The substantial evidence test, which we have recently described in some detail, involves some deference but also has some bite. See Penobscot Air Servs., Ltd. v. FAA, 164 F.3d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1999).
Compare AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1998), and National Telecomm. Advisors, LLC v. Board of Selectmen of West Stockbridge, 27 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287-88 (D. Mass. 1998), with PrimeCo Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1062-66 (N.D. Ill. 1998) and OPM-USA-Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1327 (M.D. Fla .1997)
While prepared to tolerate some delay, Congress made clear in two different provisions that it expected expeditious resolution both by the local authorities and by courts called upon to enforce the federal limitations. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c) (7) (B) (ii), 332(c) (7) (B) (V); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, supra, at 209