Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/92620/southern-pacific-co-vs-jensen
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Southern Pacific Co Vs Jensen - Citation 92620 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Southern Pacific Co. Vs. Jensen - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/92620
Case Number 244 U.S. 205
southern pacific co. v. jensen - 244 u.s. 205 (1917) u.s. supreme court southern pacific co. v. jensen, 244 u.s. 205 (1917) southern pacific company v. jensen no. 280 argued february 28, 1916 restored to docket for reargument november 13, 1916 reargued january 31, february 1, 1917 decided may 21, 1917 244 u.s. 205 error to the supreme court, appellate division, third judicial department, of the state of new york syllabus the federal employers' liability act applies only where the injury occurs in railroad operations or their adjuncts, and cannot be extended to interstate maritime transportation merely because the vessel in the case is owned and operated by an interstate carrier by railroad. the.....
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen - 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
U.S. Supreme Court Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
Work performed by a stevedore on board a ship in unloading her at wharf in navigable waters is maritime; his employment for such work and injuries suffered in it are likewise maritime, and the rights and liabilities arising from such work, employment, and injuries are clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 .
A stevedore engaged on an interstate ship in unloading her at wharf in navigable waters in New York was accidentally injured and killed, and an award of compensation was made against the shipowner by the New York Workmen's Compensation Commission under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act ( New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 ), and affirmed by the courts of that state. Held that the act as applied to such a case was in conflict with the Constitution, and to that extent invalid.
In New York C. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 , we held the statute valid in certain respects, and, considering what was there said, only two of the grounds relied on for reversal now demand special consideration. First. Plaintiff in error, being an interstate common
The First Federal Employers' Liability Act (June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, chap. 3073) extended in terms to all common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and, because it embraced subjects not within the constitutional authority of Congress, was declared invalid. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 . The later act is carefully limited, and provides that
Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country. Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 ; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 , 141 U. S. 14 . And further, that, in the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the federal courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 , 130 U. S. 557 ; Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552 .
In view of these constitutional provisions and the federal act, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied. A lien upon a vessel for repairs in her own port may be given by state statute, The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 579 -580; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 ; pilotage fees fixed, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Ex Parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 80 U. S. 242 , and the right given to recover in death cases, The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 ; La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95 , 210 U. S. 138 . See The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 106. Equally well established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress or affect the general maritime law beyond certain limits. They cannot authorize proceedings in rem according to the course in admiralty, The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 534 ; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 ; nor create liens for materials used in repairing a foreign ship, The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185 . See Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552 . And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation at the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution itself. These purposes are forcefully indicated in the foregoing quotations from The Lottawanna.
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465 , 125 U. S. 507 -508; Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438 , 170 U. S. 444 ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 . And the same character of reasoning which supports this rule, we think, makes imperative the stated limitation upon the power of the states to interpose where maritime matters are involved.
The work of a stevedore, in which the deceased was engaging, is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime, and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 , 234 U. S. 59 -60.
Exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is vested in the federal district courts, "saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." The remedy which the compensation statute attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court, and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 571, 71 U. S. 572 ; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644 ; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 531 -533; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 , 167 U. S. 623 . And finally, this remedy is not consistent with the policy of Congress to encourage investments in ships, manifested in the Acts of 1851 [9 Stat. 635, chap. 43] and 1884 (Rev.Stats. 4283-4285; § 18, Act of June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57), which declare a limitation upon the liability of their owners. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96 , 222 U. S. 104 .
There is no doubt that the saving to suitors of the right of a common law remedy leaves open the common law jurisdiction of the state courts, and leaves some power of legislation at least, to the states. For the latter, I need do no more than refer to state pilotage statutes, and to liens created by state laws in aid of maritime contracts. Nearer to the point, it is decided that a statutory remedy for causing death may be enforced by the state courts, although the death was due to a collision upon the high seas. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 93 U. S. 104 ; Knapp, S. & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638 , 177 U. S. 646 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 409 . The misgivings of Mr. Justice Bradley were adverted to in The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , and held at least insufficient to prevent the admiralty from recognizing such a state-created right in a proper case, if indeed they went to any such extent. La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95 , 210 U. S. 138 .
The statute having been upheld in other respects, New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 , I should have thought these authorities conclusive. The liability created by the New York act ends in a money judgment, and the mode in which the amount is ascertained, or is to be paid, being one that the state constitutionally might adopt, cannot matter to the question before us if any liability can be imposed that was not known to the maritime law. And as such a liability can be imposed where it was unknown not only to the maritime, but to the common law, I can see no difference between one otherwise constitutionally created for death caused by accident and one for death due to fault. Neither can the statutes limiting the liability of owners affect the case. Those statutes extend to nonmaritime torts, which, of course, are the creation of state law. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S.
96, 222 U. S. 104 . They are paramount to, but not inconsistent with, the new cause of action. However, as my opinion stands on grounds that equally would support a judgment for a maritime tort not ending in death, with which admiralty courts have begun to deal, I will state the reasons that satisfy my mind.
No doubt there sometimes has been an air of benevolent gratuity in the admiralty's attitude about enforcing state laws. But of course there is no gratuity about it. Courts cannot give or withhold at pleasure. If the claim is enforced or recognized, it is because the claim is a right, and if a claim depending upon a state statute is enforced, it is because the state had constitutional power to pass the law. Taking it as established that a state has constitutional power to pass laws giving rights and imposing liabilities for acts done upon the high seas when there were no such rights or liabilities before, what is there to hinder its doing so in the case of a maritime tort? Not the existence of an inconsistent law emanating from a superior source -- that is, from the United States. There is no such law. The maritime law is not a corpus juris -- it is a very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea. The nearest to anything of the sort in question was the rule that a seaman was entitled to recover the expenses necessary for his cure when the master's negligence caused his hurt. The maritime law gave him no more. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 , 189 U. S. 175 . One may affirm with the sanction of that case that it is an innovation to allow suits in the admiralty by seamen to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the master, and to apply the common law principles of tort
Now, however, common law principles have been applied to sustain a libel by a stevedore in personam against the master for personal injuries suffered while loading a ship. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 , and The Osceola recognizes that in some cases, at
least, seamen may have similar relief . From what source do these new rights come? The earliest case relies upon "the analogies of the municipal law," The Edith Godden, 23 F. 43, 46, sufficient evidence of the obvious pattern, but inadequate for the specific origin. I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common law judge could not say, "I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense, and shall not enforce it in my court." No more could a judge, exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty, say, "I think well of the common law rules of master and servant, and propose to introduce them here en bloc. " Certainly he could not in that way enlarge the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts and cut down the power of the states. If admiralty adopts common law rules without an act of Congress, it cannot extend the maritime law as understood by the Constitution. It must take the rights of the parties from a different authority, just as it does when it enforces a lien created by a state. The only authority available is the common law or statutes of a state. For from the often-repeated statement that there is no common law of the United States, Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 33 U. S. 658 ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92 , 181 U. S. 101 , and from the principles recognized in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, having been unknown to the maritime law, the natural inference is that, in the silence of Congress, this Court has believed the very limited law of the sea to be supplemented here, as in England, by the common law, and that here that means, by the common law of the state. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 93 U. S. 104 . Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 61 U. S. 598 . So far as I know, the state courts have made this assumption without criticism or attempt at revision from the beginning to this day -- e.g., Wilson v. MacKenzie, 7 Hill 95; Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N.Y. 1, 11;
Kalleck v. Deering, 161 Mass. 469. See Ogle v. Barnes, 8 T. R. 188; Nicholson v. Mounsey, 15 East, 384. Even where the admiralty has unquestioned jurisdiction, the common law may have concurrent authority and the state courts concurrent power. Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118 . The invalidity of state attempts to create a remedy for maritime contracts or torts, parallel to that in the admiralty, that was established in such cases as The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, and The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, is immaterial to the present point.
The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi -sovereign that can be identified, although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact. It always is the law of some state, and if the district courts adopt the common law of torts, as they have shown a tendency to do, they thereby assume that a law not of maritime origin, and deriving its authority in that territory only from some particular state of this Union, also governs maritime torts in that territory, and, if the common law, the statute law has at least equal force, as the discussion in The Osceola assumes. On the other hand, the refusal of the district courts to give remedies coextensive with the common law would prove no more than that they regarded their jurisdiction as limited by the ancient lines, not that they doubted that the common law might and would be enforced in the courts of the states as it always has been. This Court has recognized that, in some cases, different principles of liability would be applied as the suit should happen to be brought in a common law or admiralty court. Compare The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1 , with Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674 , 150 U. S. 691 . But hitherto it has not been doubted authoritatively, so far as I know, that even when the admiralty had a rule of its own to which it adhered, as in Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552 , the state law, common or statute,
It might be asked why, if the grant of jurisdiction to the courts of the United States imports a power in Congress to legislate, the saving of a common law remedy, i.e., in the state courts, did not import a like if subordinate power in the states. But leaving that question on one side, such cases as Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , and Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, supra, show that it is too late to say that the mere silence of Congress excludes the statute or common law of a state from supplementing the wholly inadequate maritime law of the time of the Constitution, in the regulation of personal rights, and I venture to say that it never has been supposed to do so, or had any such effect.
As to the specter of a lack of uniformity, I content myself with referring to The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , 207 U. S. 406 . The difficulty really is not so great as in the case of interstate carriers by land, which,
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 408 , and cases cited. The conclusion that I reach accords with the considered cases of Lindstrom v. Mutual Steamship Co., 132 Minn. 328; Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, and North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 163 P.199, as well as with the New York decision in this case. 215 N.Y. 514.
This dissent is confined to that part of the prevailing opinion which holds that the Workmen's Compensation Act of New York, as applied by the state court to a fatal injury sustained by a stevedore while engaged in work of a maritime nature upon navigable water within that state, conflicts with the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in civil cases upon the district courts of the United States, and is to that extent invalid. Except for the statute, an action might have been brought in a court of admiralty. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 , 234 U. S. 62 . No question is raised respecting the jurisdiction of the state court over the subject matter. But plaintiff in error contends, and the prevailing opinion holds, that it was a violation of a federal right for the state court to apply the provisions of the local statute to a cause of action of maritime origin, because, by the Constitution of the United States, admiralty jurisdiction was conferred upon the federal courts.
It should be stated at the outset, that the case involves no question of penalties imposed by the New York act, but affects solely the responsibility of the employer to make compensation to the widow, in accordance with its provisions, which are outlined in New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 , 243 U. S. 192 -195.
That this view is in harmony with the general purpose of the Constitution seems to me equally plain. At this late date, it ought not to be necessary to repeat that the object of the framers of that instrument was to lay the foundations of a government, to set up its framework, and to establish merely the general principles by which it was to be animated; avoiding, as far as possible, any but the most fundamental regulations for controlling its operations, and these usually in the form of restrictions. Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 2 U. S. 308 ; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 326 .
The object was to enumerate, rather than to define, the powers granted. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 189 , 22 U. S. 194 ; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 48 U. S. 549 ; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 , 188 U. S. 346 . To delineate only the great outlines of the judicial power, leaving the details to Congress, while providing for the organization of the legislative department and the mode in which and the restrictions under which its authority should be exercised. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 37 U. S. 721 . The reason for adopting general outlines only was well expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 407 :
The declaration of Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking for this Court in New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 47 U. S. 390 , that the lodging by the Constitution of the entire admiralty power in the federal judiciary, and the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, with its saving of common law remedies, left the concurrent power of the courts of common law and of admiralty where it stood at common law, was not a chance remark. It has been so ruled in many other cases, to which I shall refer hereafter. The principles and history of the common law were well known to the framers of the Constitution and the members of the first Congress; it was from that system that their terminology was derived, and the provisions of the Constitution and contemporaneous legislation must be interpreted accordingly.
The statement that there is no common law of the United States ( Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 33 U. S. 658 ; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 , 124 U. S. 478 ) is true only in the sense that the Constitution neither of its own force imposed, nor authorized Congress to impose, the common law or any other general body of laws upon the several states for the regulation of their internal affairs. As was pointed out in Smith v. Alabama (p. 124 U. S. 478 ):
Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 454 -456, Benedict, Admiralty, §§ 118-165. Upon the outbreak of the war, questions of prize law became acute, and the colonial Congress, by resolutions of November 25, 1775, passed in the exercise of the war power ( 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 54, 80 [argument of counsel -- omitted]), made appropriate recommendations for the treatment of prizes of war, but remitted the jurisdiction over such questions to the courts of the several colonies, reserving to itself only appellate authority. This system continued until the year 1780 (after the submission of the Articles of Confederation, but before their final ratification), when the Congress established a court for the hearing of appeals from the state courts of admiralty in cases of capture. The opinions of this Court are reported in 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 1-42, and numerous cases decided without opinion, as well as some of those decided by committees of the Congress prior to the establishment of the court, are referred to in the late Bancroft Davis' "Federal Courts Before the Constitution," 131 U.S., Appendix, xix.-xlix. The weak point of this system was the want of power in the central government to enforce the judgment of the appellate tribunal when it chanced to reverse the decree of a state court. There were some curious cases of conflicting jurisdiction, illustrated by Doane v. Penhallow (1787), 1 Dall. 218, 1 U. S. 221 ; Penhallow v. Doane (1795), 3 Dall. 54, 79 [argument of counsel -- omitted], 86 [argument of counsel -- omitted], and United States v. Peters (1809), 5 Cranch 115, 9 U. S. 135 -137.
The grant of judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction never has been construed as excluding the jurisdiction of the courts of common law over civil causes that, before the Constitution, were subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty and the common law courts. The first Congress did not so construe it, as the saving clause in the Judiciary Act conclusively shows. And, assuming that the states, in the absence of legislation by Congress, would be without power over the subject matter, this saving clause, still maintained upon the statute book, is a sufficient grant of power. Jurisdiction in prize cases, as has been shown, springs out of the possession of a prize of war. Civil proceedings in rem, to be mentioned hereafter, are based upon the maritime lien, where possession in the claimant is neither necessary nor usual as is the case with common law liens. With these exceptions, both resting upon grounds peculiar to the forum of the admiralty, concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of common law in civil cases of maritime origin always has been recognized by this Court. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 47 U. S. 390 ; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 458 ; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644 -645; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 78 U. S. 32 ; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 78 U. S. 187 -188; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 ; Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118 ; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 , 139 U. S. 262 .
at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act. It includes statutory changes. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 -534; Knapp, S. & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638 , 177 U. S. 644 . Those remedies which were held not to be common law remedies, within the saving clause, in The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 71 U. S. 427 , 71 U. S. 431 ; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 71 U. S. 571 -572; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644 ; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 , and The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 , 167 U. S. 623 , provided for imposing a lien on the ship by proceedings in the nature of admiralty process in rem, and it was for this reason only that they were held to trench upon the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The distinction was noticed in Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 78 U. S. 189 , and again in Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638 , 177 U. S. 642 . In the latter case, it was pointed out (p. 177 U. S. 644 ) that the reservation of a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it was not confined to common law actions, but included remedies without action, such as a distress for rent or for the trespass of cattle; a bailee's remedy by detaining personal property until paid for work done upon it or for expenses incurred in keeping it; the lien of an innkeeper upon the goods of his guests, and that of a carrier upon things carried; the remedy of a nuisance by abatement, and others. The most recent definition of the rule laid down in The Hine v. Trevor and other cases of that class is in Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303 .
The decisions of this Court show that the courts of admiralty in many matters are bound by local law. The doubt expressed by Mr. Justice Bradley in Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 , 130 U. S. 558 , as to whether a state law could have force to create a liability in a maritime case at all, was laid aside in The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 , and definitely set at rest in The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , 207 U. S. 404 . The fact is that, long before Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., it had been recognized that state laws might not merely create a liability in a maritime case, but impose a duty upon the admiralty courts of the United States to enforce such liability. Thus, while it was recognized that, by the general maritime law, a foreign ship, or a ship in a port of a state to which she did not belong, was subject to a suit in rem in the admiralty for repairs or necessaries, the case of a ship in a
port of her home state was governed by the municipal law of the state, and no lien for repairs or necessaries would be implied unless recognized by that law. The General Smith (1819), 4 Wheat. 438, 17 U. S. 443 ; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 571 , 88 U. S. 578 . Conversely, it was held in the case of Peyroux v. Howard (1833), 7 Pet. 324, 32 U. S. 341 , that a libel in rem in the admiralty might be maintained against a vessel for repairs done in her home port where a local statute gave a lien in such a case. To the same effect, The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 , 148 U. S. 12 . As elsewhere pointed out herein, where a state statute conferred a lien operative strictly in rem, it was uniformly held not enforceable in the state courts, but only because it trenched upon the peculiar jurisdiction of the admiralty, and therefore was not a "common law remedy" within the saving clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 71 U. S. 427 , 71 U. S. 431 ; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 71 U. S. 571 -572; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 644 ; Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 ; The Glide, 167 U. S. 606 , 167 U. S. 623 .
Under these decisions and others to the same effect, the substance of the matter is that a state may, by statute, create a right to a lien upon a domestic vessel, in the nature of a maritime lien, which may be enforced in admiralty in the courts of the United States, but a state may not confer upon its own courts jurisdiction to enforce such a lien, because the federal jurisdiction in admiralty is exclusive. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 , 148 U. S. 12 , and cases cited. But a lien imposed not upon the rem, but upon defendant's interest in the res, may be made enforceable in the state courts. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303 , 237 U. S. 307 , and cases cited.
The Roanoke, 189 U. S. 185 , 189 U. S. 194 , 189 U. S. 198 , while approving The General Smith, Peyroux v. Howard, The Lottawanna, and The J. E. Rumbell, supra, gave a negative answer to the very different question whether a state could, without encroaching upon the federal jurisdiction, create a lien
In the present case, there is no question of lien, and, I repeat, no question concerning the jurisdiction of the state court; the crucial inquiry is, to what law was it bound to conform in rendering its decision? Or, rather, the question is the narrower one: do the Constitution and laws of the United States prevent a state court of common law from applying the state statutes in an action in personam arising upon navigable water within the state, there being no act of Congress applicable to the controversy? I confess that, until this case and kindred cases submitted at the same time were brought here, I never had supposed that it was open to the least doubt that the reservation to suitors of the right of a common law remedy had the effect of reserving at the same time the right to have their common law actions determined according to the rules of the common law, or state statutes modifying those rules. This Court repeatedly has so declared, at the same time recognizing fully that the point involves the question of state power. In United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 16 U. S. 388 , the Court, by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, said:
In Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 , the Court, by Mr. Justice Clifford, said (p. 83 U. S. 534 ):
In Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 88 U. S. 395 -396, the Court, by Mr. Justice Miller, said:
And see The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1 , 137 U. S. 10 ; Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674 , 150 U. S. 691 ; Benedict, Admiralty, § 201.
In the prevailing opinion, great stress is laid upon certain expressions quoted from The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 574 ; but it seems to me they have been misunderstood, because read without regard to context and subject matter. That was an admiralty appeal, and involved the question whether, by the general maritime law, as accepted in the United States, there was an implied lien for necessaries
"That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted was most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' But by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the law thus adopted? The Constitution does not define it. It does not declare whether it was intended to embrace the entire maritime law as expounded in the treatises, or only the limited and restricted system which was received in England, or lastly, such modification of both of these as was accepted and recognized as law in this country. Nor does the Constitution attempt to draw the boundary line between maritime law and local law; nor does it lay down any criterion for ascertaining that boundary. It assumes that the meaning of the phrase 'admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of 'cases in law and equity,' or of 'suits at common law,' without defining those terms, assuming them to be known and understood. "
The expression on page 88 U. S. 575 respecting the uniform operation of the maritime law was predicated only of the operation of that law as administered in the courts of admiralty, for it is not to be believed that there was any purpose to overrule Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 395, decided at the same term and only about two months before The Lottawanna by a unanimous court, including Mr. Justice Bradley himself, in which it was held that, where there was concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of common law and the courts of admiralty, each court was at liberty to adopt its own rules of decision. Moreover, the principal question at issue in The Lottawanna was whether the case of The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438, should be overruled, in which it had been held that, in the absence of state legislation imposing the lien, a ship was not subject to a libel in rem in the admiralty for repairs furnished in her home port. The general expressions referred to relate to that state of the law -- the absence of state legislation, as well as of legislation by Congress -- and, upon this, the decision in The General Smith was upheld (p. 88 U. S. 578 ). But in proceeding to discuss the subordinate question whether there was a lien under the state statute, it was held (p. 88 U. S. 580 ):
And again (p. 88 U. S. 581 ):
Again, in Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552 , which, like The Lottawanna, was a proceeding in admiralty, the court, in quoting the declarations contained in that case respecting the general operation of the maritime law throughout the navigable waters of the United States, was dealing only with its application in the courts of admiralty. This is plain from what was said as a preface to the discussion (p. 179 U. S. 557 ):
adjudication in cases such as the present than in cases arising on land and affecting the liability of interstate carriers to their employees. And, although the Constitution contains an express grant to Congress of the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, nevertheless, until Congress had acted, the responsibility of interstate carriers to their employees for injuries arising in interstate commerce was controlled by the laws of the states. This was because the subject was within the police power, and the divergent exercise of that power by the states did not regulate, but only incidentally affected, commerce among the states. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 93 U. S. 103 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 54 . It required an act of Congress (Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149) to impose a uniform measure of responsibility upon the carriers in such cases. So, it required an act of Congress (the so-called Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595, c. 3591) to impose a uniform rule of liability upon rail carriers for losses of merchandise carried in interstate commerce. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491 , 226 U. S. 504 . In a great number and variety of cases, state laws and policies incidentally affecting interstate carriers in their commercial operations have been sustained by this Court, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress. Among them are: laws requiring locomotive engineers to be examined and licensed by the state authorities, Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 , 124 U. S. 482 ; requiring such engineers to be examined for defective eyesight ( Nashville, C. & St.L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 , 128 U. S. 100 ); requiring telegraph companies to receive despatches and transmit and delivery them diligently, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650 ; forbidding the running of freight trains on Sunday, Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 , 163 U. S. 304 , 163 U. S. 308 ; regulating the heating of passenger cars, New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S.
628; prohibiting a railroad company from obtaining by contract an exemption from the liability which would have existed had no contract been made, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 , 169 U. S. 136 -137; a like result arising from rules of law enforced in the state courts in the absence of statute ( Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 , 191 U. S. 488 , 191 U. S. 491 ); statutes prohibiting the transportation of diseased cattle in interstate commerce, Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613 , 169 U. S. 630 , 169 U. S. 635 ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 , 187 U. S. 147 , 187 U. S. 151 ; statutes requiring the prompt settlement of claims for loss or damage to freight, applied incidentally to interstate commerce, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122 ; even since the passage of the Carmack Amendment, Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412 , 234 U. S. 417 , 234 U. S. 420 ; statutes regulating the character of headlights used on locomotives employed in interstate commerce, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 ; Vandalia R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U. S. 255 . All these cases affected the responsibility of interstate carriers. Until now, Congress has passed no act concerning their responsibility for personal injuries sustained by passengers or strangers, or for deaths resulting from such injuries, so that these matters still remain subject to the regulation of the several states. We have held recently that even the anti-pass provision of the Hepburn Act (34 Stat. 584, 585, c. 3591, § 1) does not deprive a party who accepts gratuitous carriage in interstate commerce with the consent of the carrier, in actual but unintentional violation of the prohibition of the act, of the benefit and protection of the law of the state imposing upon the carrier a duty to care for his safety, Southern P. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601 , 227 U. S. 612 .
has been recognized from the beginning of our government under the Constitution. As to pilotage regulations, it was recognized by the first Congress (Act of August 7, 1789, chap. 9, § 4, 1 Stat. 53, 54), and this Court, in many decisions, has sustained local regulations of that character. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 53 U. S. 320 ; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 69 U. S. 459 ; Ex Parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 80 U. S. 241 ; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572 ; Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332 , 195 U. S. 341 ; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U. S. 187 , 225 U. S. 195 .
It is settled that a state, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, may construct dams and bridges across navigable streams within its limits, notwithstanding an interference with accustomed navigation may result. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 27 U. S. 252 ; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 ; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 , 107 U. S. 683 ; Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205 , 113 U. S. 208 ; Hamilton v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S. 280 ; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1 , 125 U. S. 8 ; Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365 ; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473 , 199 U. S. 478 .
So, as to harbor improvements, Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 , 102 U. S. 697 ; improvements and obstructions to navigation, Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543 , 119 U. S. 548 ; Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621 , 177 U. S. 625 ; Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410 , 188 U. S. 427 ; inspection and quarantine laws, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 203 ; wharfage charges, Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 ; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559 , 105 U. S. 563 ; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 , 107 U. S. 702 ; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444 , 121 U. S. 447 ; tolls for the use of an improved waterway, Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S. 288 , 123 U. S. 295 .
So of provisions fixing the tolls for transportation upon an interstate ferry, Port Richmond &c.; Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317 , 234 U. S. 331 , or upon vessels plying between
two ports located within the same state, Wilmington Transportation Co. v. California Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 151 , 236 U. S. 156 .
Indeed, with respect to injuries that result in death, it already is settled that, although the general maritime law, like the common law, afforded no civil remedy for death by wrongful act ( The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 ; The Alaska, 130 U. S. 201 , 130 U. S. 209 ), yet a right of action created by statute is enforceable in a state court although the tort was committed upon navigable water ( Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U. S. 533 ; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 93 U. S. 104 ), and the liability arising out of a state statute in such a case will be recognized and enforced in the admiralty ( The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 ), although not by proceeding in rem unless the statute expressly creates a lien ( The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335 , 145 U. S. 347 ).
In Sherlock v. Alling, supra, which was an action in a state court and based upon a state statute to recover damages for a death by wrongful act occurring in interstate navigation, it was contended that the statute could not be applied to cases where the injury was caused by a marine tort without interfering with the exclusive regulation of commerce vested in Congress. The Court, after declaring that any regulation by Congress, or the liability for its infringement, would be exclusive of state authority, proceeded to say, by Mr. Justice Field (93 U.S. 93 U. S. 104 ):
deducible from the cases is that, in matters of commercial law and general jurisprudence not subject to the authority of Congress, or where Congress has not exercised its authority, and in the absence of state legislation, the federal courts will exercise an independent judgment and reach a conclusion upon considerations of right and justice generally applicable, the federal jurisdiction having been established for the very purpose of avoiding the influence of local opinion; but that, where the state has legislated, its will, thus declared, is binding, even upon the federal courts, if it be not inconsistent with the expressed will of Congress respecting a matter that is within its constitutional power. The doctrine concedes as much independence to the courts of the states as it reserves for the courts of the Union. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 , 107 U. S. 33 -34; East Alabama Ry. Co. v. Doe, 114 U. S. 340 , 114 U. S. 353 ; Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439 , 115 U. S. 446 ; Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356 , 116 U. S. 362 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 , 149 U. S. 372 ; Folsom v. Ninety-six, 159 U. S. 611 , 159 U. S. 625 ; Stanly County v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437 , 190 U. S. 444 ; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349 , 215 U. S. 357 , 215 U. S. 360 .
In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 , 149 U. S. 372 , the Court had under review the judgment of a circuit court of the United States in an action by a locomotive fireman injured through negligence of the engineer. The cause of action arose in the State of Ohio, and the question presented was whether the engineer and the fireman were fellow servants. Under the decisions of the Ohio courts, they were, but this Court held that, as there was no state statute, the question should not be treated as a question of local law, to be settled by an examination merely of the decisions of the state court of last resort, but should be determined upon general principles, the courts of the United States being under an obligation to exercise an independent judgment. The Court, by Mr. Justice Brewer, said (149 U.S. 149 U. S. 378 ):
In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 , 169 U. S. 136 -137, the doctrine was concisely stated by Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the Court, as follows (169 U.S. 169 U. S. 136 ):
The effect of the present decision cannot logically be confined to cases that arise in interstate or foreign commerce. It seems to be thought that the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States has limits coextensive with the authority of Congress to regulate commerce. But this is not true. The civil jurisdiction in admiralty in cases ex contractu is dependent upon the subject matter; in cases ex delicto, it is dependent upon locality. In cases of the latter class, if the cause of action arise upon navigable waters of the United States, even though it be upon a vessel engaged in commerce wholly intrastate, or upon one not engaged in commerce at all, or (probably) not upon any vessel, the maritime courts have jurisdiction. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 452 ; The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black 574, 66 U. S. 578 -579; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 636 -640; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629 , 109 U. S. 632 ; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 , 141 U. S. 15 -17. It results that, if the constitutional grant of judicial power to the United States in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is held by inference to make the rules of decision that prevail in the courts of admiralty binding proprio vigore upon
I may remark, in closing, that there is no conflict between the New York Workmen's Compensation Act and the acts of Congress for limiting the liability of shipowners (Rev.Stats. §§ 4283-4285; Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 53, 57). So long as the aggregate liabilities of the owner, including that, under the New York law, do not amount to as much as the interest of the owner in the vessel and freight pending, the act of Congress does not come into play. Where it does apply, it reduces all liabilities proportionally, under whatever law arising; the liability under the New York law, along with the others. Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 , 130 U. S. 552 , 130 U. S. 558 ; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , 207 U. S. 406 ; Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96 , 222 U. S. 104 -105.