Source: http://nc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20140528_0000668.WNC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-11 06:04:27
Document Index: 618562863

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 148', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

| Alston v. Solomon
Alston v. Solomon
MARCUS ALSTON, Plaintiff,v.GEORGE T. SOLOMON, DAVID MITCHELL, NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendants.
Plaintiff is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina and he is presently confined in the Lanesboro Correctional Institution. In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights have been violated through unreasonable searches and seizures following his transfer to Lanesboro Correctional in December 2013.[1] Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to several searches and seizures and placed in restraints for 48 hours and was not permitted to use the restroom and was deprived of his property for a couple of weeks. Plaintiff asserts that he filed a grievance against Unit Manager Marshall for harassment, discrimination and the use of excessive force. Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Chapmen and other officers confronted him while he was in the shower and retaliated against him for filing the complaint against Marshall by removing property from his cell and assaulting him. (Doc. No. 1: Complaint at 13). In his claim for relief, Plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
After considering the record in this matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for two reasons. First, it appears from this record that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and second, Plaintiff has not presented any allegations that could state a claim for relief against any of the named defendants.
Plaintiff is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina and as such his pro se § 1983 complaint must satisfy to the mandatory requirements of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") which provides that a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to the commencement of a civil action under § 1983. The PLRA provides, in pertinent part that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
[A]n inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by the defendant. That exhaustion is an affirmative defense, however, does not preclude the district court from dismissing a complaint where the failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint, nor does it preclude the district court from inquiring on its own motion into whether the inmate exhausted all administrative remedies. Anderson , 407 F.3d at 683.
In North Carolina, State prisoners must complete a three-step administrative remedy procedure (ARP) in order to exhaust their administrative remedies. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-118.1 to 148-118.9 (Article 11A: Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure); Moore v. Bennette , 517 F.3d 717, 721 (4th Cir. 2008). In Plaintiff's complaint, he blankly states that he has exhausted his administrative remedies however in a document attached to his complaint he only includes evidence that he may have participated in the first step of the ARP.[2] In his complaint, Plaintiff contends that he completed the ARP on March 26, 2014, however his first-step grievance is dated March 17, 2014, and there is no indication that Plaintiff ever received a response to this first grievance and certainly no evidence that he proceeded to appeal any response.
Based on the record before the Court, it appears that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his § 1983 complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed without prejudice to his ability to refile the complaint and submit proof that he has fully exhausted his state administrative remedies.
As an additional ground for dismissal, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because he has presented no allegations that Defendants Solomon or Mitchell participated in, or knew about any of the alleged searches or assaults. Plaintiff's effort to assign liability to these defendants rests only on the unstated assumption, that one, they are supervisors of the officers named in the complaint, and two that they knew of, condoned, or disregarded actions that were taken by the named officers. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's effort to assign liability to these defendants rests on a theory of respondeat superior, it must fail. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint against Defendants Solomon and Mitchell will be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiff names the North Carolina Department of Public Safety as a defendant. Section 1983, by its own terms, applies only to "persons" acting under color of state law. By suing the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Plaintiff has effectively sued the State of North Carolina. However, neither the State nor its agencies constitute "persons" subject to suit under Section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's suit for monetary damages against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger v. Owens , 352 F.3d 842, 844 (4th Cir. 2003).
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff's § 1983 complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
2. Plaintiff's motion for class certification is DENIED. (Doc. No. 2).
3. Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel is DENIED. (Doc. No. 4).