Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/5251233/Homeland-Security-Motion-to-Dimiss-in-Hiu-Lui-Ng-Case
Timestamp: 2019-08-17 13:14:48
Document Index: 604857180

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 517', '§ 1231', '§ 1252', '§ 1231', '§ 2241', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§ 1231', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§\n1252', '§ 1231', '§ 1252', '§ 1252', '§\n1231']

Homeland Security Motion to Dimiss in Hiu Lui Ng Case | Removal Proceedings | Complaint
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2011 02 22 CheerAppeal Petition for Certiorari
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 1 of 15
HIU LUI NG, )
v. ) C.A. No. 07-290ML
MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF )
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,)
RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
COMES NOW, Respondents, Michael Chertoff, Secretary, United
States Department of Homeland Security, Alberto Gonzales,
Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, John
Torres, Director, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), and Bruce Chadbourne, Boston Field Office
Director, Office of Detention and Removal Operations, ICE, and
moves to dismiss Petitioner’s claims against the Respondents for
failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for
lack of subject mater jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and
See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (providing for the appearance of the
Department of Justice “to attend to the interests of the United
States in a suit pending in a court of the United States”).
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 2 of 15
/s/ Dulce Donovan
401-709-5000
401-709-5017 (fax)
Email: dulce.donovan@usdoj.gov
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 3 of 15
Respondents2 )
RESPONDENTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Petitioner, Hui Lui Ng, seeks relief from his detention,
which he says is “unconstitutional”. Petition at 6. However,
Petitioner has been detained pending execution of his final order
of removal only since July 19, 2007,3 well within the
presumptively lawful six-month detention limit allowed by the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)
(recognizing six months as a presumptively reasonable period of
in a suit pending in a court of the United States”).
See Petition, p.5 (asserted that petitioner was arrested and
detained by DHS officers on July 19, 2007).
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 4 of 15
post-final order detention within which to allow the government
to accomplish an alien's removal).
Because Petitioner at present has been now detained not even
one month pending execution of his removal order, much less for
the Zadvydas approved six-month period or even the 90-day removal
period indicated in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), Petitioner’s
detention remains lawful. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to state
any claim of unlawful detention upon which relief may be granted.
Also, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to enjoin removal in this case, though
Petitioner enjoys an automatic administrative stay of removal
pending the New York, New York, Immigration Judge’s determination
of Petitioner’s motion to reopen. Further, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2)(B)(ii), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to review the custody decision of the United States Immigration
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 5 of 15
On August 6, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus with Emergency Order to Show Cause within Three
Days Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Et Seq. On August 8, 2007, the
Court conducted a conference in which Petitioner’s counsel
indicated that he would forward a request for bond to the
Hartford, Connecticut office of ICE. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court scheduled another hearing for August 10, 2007.
Subsequently, the request for a setting of a bond was sent to the
Hartford, Connecticut office of ICE. Ex. 1. On August 9, 2007,
Petitioner’s request for bond was denied by ICE. Ex. 2.
A. Law Governing Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a
In assessing the legal sufficiency of Petitioner’s
allegations pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is limited to
review of the pleadings. Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d
20, 23 (1st Cir. 1990). “The accepted rule [is] that a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 6 of 15
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations,
draw all reasonable inferences in the claimant's favor, and
determine whether the Complaint sets forth sufficient facts to
support the challenged claims, Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000); LaChapelle v.
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998). The
court, however, need not credit conclusory allegations or indulge
unreasonably attenuated inferences. Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118
F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1997); Ticketmaster-NY, Inc. v. Alioto, 26
F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994).
In deciding Respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state claim, the Court may consider Respondents’ exhibits
submitted in conjunction with the motion without converting the
instant motion to a motion for summary judgment. “[D]ocuments
the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; . . .
official records; . . . documents central to . . . [the] claim;
or . . . documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint,"
are not matters outside of the pleadings such as to require
conversion of a motion into a summary judgment motion.
Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)(emphasis added)).
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 7 of 15
B. Law Governing Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
“The district courts of the United States are ‘courts of
limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.’” In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d
1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007). Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows a party to seek dismissal of an action
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If jurisdiction
is challenged, the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden of
establishing it. Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st
Cir. 1995). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), the court is required to construe the allegations in
the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Aversa v.
United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996).
Matters outside the pleadings can be presented to and
considered by the court in ruling upon a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gonzales v. United
States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir. 2002); Dynamic Image Techns.,
Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2000); Miller v.
George Arpin & Sons, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 961, 966 n. 8 (D.R.I.
1997) (“A court may consider affidavits, deposition testimony,
and other extra-pleading material to determine whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists.”). "District courts have wide
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 8 of 15
discretion to determine which procedures to employ in resolving
the jurisdictional issue." Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Montle, 964
F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1992).1
C. Petitioner is Lawfully Detained by Respondent Pending
Execution of His Order of Removal.
Petitioner raises no challenge to his final administrative
order of removal,11 but instead petitions for an order releasing
him from custody and for an order staying his removal from the
United States. Petition at 14.
The Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
recognized six months as a presumptively reasonable period of
Even if this were a motion to dismiss for failure to state
claim, the documents attached hereto could be considered by the
Court without converting the instant motion to a motion for
summary judgment. “[D]ocuments the authenticity of which are not
disputed by the parties; . . . official records; . . . documents
central to plaintiffs' claim; or . . . documents sufficiently
referred to in the complaint," are not matters outside of the
pleadings such as to require conversion of a motion into a
summary judgment motion. Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001)
(quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)
Nor could he in the district court, after enactment of the REAL
ID Act of 2005. Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir.
2005) (“The plain language of these [REAL ID Act] amendments, in
effect, strips the district court of habeas jurisdiction over
final orders of removal, including orders issued prior to
enactment of the Real ID Act. . . . Congress has now
definitively eliminated any provision for [habeas]
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 9 of 15
to accomplish an alien's removal, and said that, “for the sake of
uniform administration in the federal courts, we recognize that
period”. Id. at 701. The Court further held:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to
remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-removal
confinement grows, what counts as the "reasonably
foreseeable future" conversely would have to shrink.
This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that
every alien not removed must be released after six
months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in
confinement until it has been determined that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
Id. at 2505 (emphasis added).
In Akinwale v. Ashcroft, et al., 287 F.3d 1050 (11th Cir.
2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that six months post-final order
detention must have elapsed before the filing of a habeas
petition, and that, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the
alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess
of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 1052 (emphasis added).
In Lema v. USINS, 214 F.Supp.2d 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2002), even
where post-order detention had exceeded six months, the district
The mere fact that six months has passed since
petitioner was taken into INS custody does not satisfy
his burden. While an alien’s detention will no longer
be presumed to be reasonable after six months, there is
nothing in Zadvydas which suggests that the Court must
or even should assume that any detention exceeding that
length of time is unreasonable. Rather, the passage of
time is simply the first step in the analysis.
Petitioner must then provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 10 of 15
In the instant case, Petitioner has not been detained
pending execution of his removal order for over six months or
even 90 days, and in fact asserts on petition he has been
detained only since July 19, 2007. Petition at 5. Therefore,
Petitioner remains lawfully detained pending continuing efforts
to execute his removal order.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the petition for
failure to state a claim of unlawful detention.
D. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Enjoin Removal.
The Petitioner also seeks a stay of execution of his removal
order. Petition at 14. However, under the amendments to the
immigration statute made by the REAL ID Act of 2005,111 this Court
now incontrovertibly lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin
Pursuant to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)1111 “no
See The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, (H.R. 1268),
which includes the REAL ID Act of 2005 (“RIDA”), Division B of
Title VII of H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005), Pub. L. No. 109-13,
B, 119 Stat. 231.
Amendments made by Section 106(a)(3) RIDA to INA section 242(g):
242(g) EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.--Except as provided in this
section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory
or nonstatutory) including section 2241 of title 28, United
1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from
the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this Act.
(Amended language emphasized).
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 11 of 15
court shall have jurisdiction to review any cause or claim . . .
rising from the decision or action of the Attorney General to . .
. execute removal orders against any alien . . . .” (emphasis
added). See also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee et al., 525 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (“AADC”) (“[t]here was
good reason for Congress to focus special attention on, and make
special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General’s
discrete acts of ‘commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing], [and]
execut[ing] removal orders . . . . [Because] [a]t each stage
the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor . . . .
Section 1252(g) seems clearly designed to give some measure of
protection to ‘no deferred action’ and similar discretionary
determinations, providing that if they are reviewable at all,
they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds of
judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that
Congress has designed”) (emphasis added).
Section 106(a)(3) of The Real ID Act of 2005 made important
amendments to INA section 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), clarifying
inter alia that a district court lacks habeas corpus jurisdiction
to enjoin removal of an alien from the United States:
242(g) EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.--Except as provided in
this section and notwithstanding any other provision of
law (statutory or nonstatutory) including section 2241
of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas
corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such
title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising
from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this Act.
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address
Petitioner’s “Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal”, and such a
motion for stay may be made only to the circuit court in a
pending case there. Tejada v. Cabral, 424 F.Supp.2d 296, 298 (D.
Mass. 2006)(Young, D.J.) (“Congress made it quite clear that all
court orders regarding alien removal -- be they stays or
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 12 of 15
permanent injunctions -- were to be issued by the appropriate
court of appeals.”). (Emphasis added).
Moreover, pending the New York, New York, Immigration
Judge’s determination of Petitioner’s administrative motion to
reopen, there is an automatic stay of removal in effect. See
1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Should Petitioner’s motion to reopen be
denied by the Immigration Judge, Petitioner may appeal that
decision administratively to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), and may seek a discretionary stay of removal from that
body pending appeal. If Petitioner is dissatisfied with any
decision from the BIA, he may file a petition for review of that
BIA determination in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion for stay of
removal in this case.
E. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(B)(ii) to review discretionary
administrative determinations relating to custody in
In addition, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review discretionary administrative determinations relating to
custody in removal proceedings. Judicial review of certain
administrative discretionary decisions is expressly barred by
Under recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) made by the REAL ID Act of 2005,11111 section
See The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
(H.R. 1268), which includes the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B
of Title VII of H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005), Pub. L. No. 109-
13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, (“RIDA”).
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 13 of 15
242(a)(2)(B)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), now
provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” the
discretionary determination of the Department of Homeland
Security to deny Petitioner’s release request.
Congress has unequivocally eliminated habeas corpus review
of all discretionary decisions specified by statutory provisions
as committed to the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security, relating to immigration matters,
“regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made
in removal proceedings”. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
RIDA sections 101(f)(1) and (2) and RIDA section
106(a)(1)(A)(ii) amended INA section 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B), to provide:
242(a)(2)(B) DENIALS OF DISCRETIONARY RELIEF.-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory
or nonstatutory) including section 2241 of title 28,
United States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,
and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and
regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action
is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review-
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the
authority for which is specified under this title to be
in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security other than the granting
of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.
Because the decision of ICE to continue detention of
Petitioner was made under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6),
which provides that an alien determined to be “unlikely to comply
with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period”, that decision is a “decision or action of the Attorney
General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 14 of 15
which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of
the Attorney General or the Secretary of homeland security”. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)(emphasis added).
Accordingly, pursuant to INA section 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to review ICE’s August 9, 2007, discretionary
decision denying Petitioner’s request for release on bond. Cf.
St. Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 202 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[t]he
scope of habeas review is not the same as the scope of statutory
judicial review in the courts of appeal. . . . if a statute makes
an alien eligible to be considered for a certain form of relief,
he may raise on habeas the refusal of the agency to even consider
him. But he may not challenge the agency's decision to exercise
or not exercise its discretion to grant relief”).
The petition, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(2)(B)(ii) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
review the custody decision of ICE to continue Petitioner’s
detention pending his removal from the United States.
Because the petition has failed to state any claim of
unlawful detention and because this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, this action should be dismissed and all other
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 15 of 15
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of August, 2007, I
caused the within Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting
Memorandum to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the
using the CM/ECF System, and the following participant has
received a copy electronically.
Steven D. Dilibero, Esq.
130 Dorrance Street
(401) 709-5017 (fax)
Email: ly.nguyen@usdoj.gov
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2-2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 1 of 2
RE: Hiu Liu NG
A73 558 364
May this correspondence serve as our formal request for a setting of bond as it relates to Hiu Liu Ng
(A73 558 364). Our reason for this request are based upon the following:
1. Hiu Liu NG has been in the United States for over fifteen (15) years. He has been a resident of
New York, New York since February 6, 1992.
2. Hiu Liu NG married Ms. Lin Li Qu, a U.S. citizen, on February 9, 2001. Hiu Liu NG and his wife
have two children, both born in the United States. Their first child is Raymond Ng; he was born on
November 20, 2004 in New York. Their second child, Johnny Ng, is only nine-months-old; he was
born on October 16, 2006, also in New York. In addition, due to his long presence in the United
States, most of his friends and relatives are American citizens, living in the U.S.
3. Hiu Liu NG is gainfully employed by J&M Computer Consulting, Inc., a company owned by his
wife. Hiu Liu NG graduated from high school and college in the United States. He has an associate
degree in applied science of electronics engineering technology, and he has received a certificate of
excellence awarded by Microsoft. As a qualified systems engineer, the Hiu Liu NG has much to
4. Hiu Liu NG and his wife are owners of real property in Whitestone, New York. Hiu Liu NG
dutifully has been making timely mortgage payments. They also maintain a bank account and
have a sufficient amount of savings so that Hiu Liu NG will not become a public charge.
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2-2 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 2 of 2
5. Due to the length of time Hiu Liu NG has been in the United States, together with the fact that his
wife and children reside within the United States, and that Hiu Liu NG is gainfully employed in the
United States, Hiu Liu NG possess substantial ties to the community and is not a risk for flight.
6. Removing Hiu Liu NG from the United States will no doubt cause severe economical and emotional
hardship for his family. His wife depends on him to run the computer company for financial
support. His children, still in their tender years, certainly need the Hiu Liu NG’s moral guidance
7. Considering the above positive factors, Hiu Liu NG has substantial ties to the United States, and
the release of him is clearly warranted.
Whereby, based upon the circumstances surrounding this case as listed above, please consider
setting Hiu Liu NG’s bond in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).
Thank you for your assistance and consideration, and I await your reply.
Steven D. DiLibero, Esquire
SDD/crb
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2-3 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:07-cv-00290-ML-LDA Document 2-3 Filed 08/10/2007 Page 2 of 2
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