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United States v. Donovan :: 429 U.S. 413 (1977) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 429 › United States v. Donovan
December 26 intercept order on the ground that failure to name them in the application and order of that date violated § 2518(1)(b)(iv), inter alia, and suppressed as to respondents Merlo and Lauer all evidence derived from both intercept orders on the ground that these two respondents had not been served with an inventory notice as required by § 2518(8)(d). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
1. Section 2518(1)(b)(iv) is not satisfied when the wiretap application identifies only the "principal target" (usually the individual whose phone is monitored) of the interception, but the Government is required to name all individuals who it has probable cause to believe are engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and whose conversations it expects will be intercepted over the target telephone. Neither the language and structure of Title III nor its legislative history supports the interpretation that Congress intended to remove from the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than that listed in the wiretap application. Pp. 429 U. S. 423-428.
2. Under § 2518(8)(d), the Government has a statutory responsibility to inform the issuing judge of the identities of persons whose conversations were overheard in the course of the interception, thus enabling him to decide whether they should be served with notice of the interception. Here the Government did not comply adequately with § 2518(8)(d), since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge. Pp. 429 U. S. 428-432.
3. Although the Government was required under § 2518(1)(b)(iv) to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco in the December 26 application, failure to do so under these circumstances did not warrant suppression under § 2518(10)(a)(i), since the identification in an intercept application of all those likely to be overheard in incriminating conversations does not play a "substantive role" with respect to judicial authorization of intercept orders and hence does not impose a limitation on the use of intercept procedures. Pp. 429 U. S. 435-437.
conversations, the intercept being lawful because the application provided sufficient information to enable the judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. Pp. 429 U. S. 435-436.
(b) There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended § 2518(1)(b)(iv)'s broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance," United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562, 416 U. S. 578. P. 429 U. S. 437.
4. Nor was suppression justified under § 2518(10)(a)(i) with respect to respondents Merlo and Lauer simply because the Government inadvertently omitted their names from the comprehensive list of all identifiable persons whose conversations had been overheard. Pp. 429 U. S. 438-439.
(a) There is nothing in the structure or legislative history of the Act to suggest that incriminating conversations are "unlawfully intercepted" whenever parties to those conversations do not receive discretionary inventory notice under § 2518(8)(d) as a result of the Government's failure to inform the court of their identities. P. 429 U. S. 438.
(b) Here, at the time inventory notice was served on the other identifiable persons, the intercept had been completed and the conversations had been "seized" under a valid intercept order, and the fact that discretionary notice reached 39, rather than 41, identifiable persons does not, in itself, mean that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. Pp. 429 U. S. 438-439.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, in all but Part II-A of which BURGER, C.J., joined, and in Parts I and II of which STEVENS, J., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 429 U. S. 440. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 429 U. S. 445. STEVENS, J., filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 429 U. S. 451.
On November 28, 1972, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for an order authorizing a wiretap interception in accordance with Title III. [Footnote 1] The application requested authorization to intercept
would place calls to and receive calls from various persons, three of whom were also named in the wiretap application. [Footnote 2] The affiant also stated that the Government's informants would refuse to testify against the persons named in the application, that telephone records alone would be insufficient to support a gambling conviction, and that normal investigative techniques were unlikely to be fruitful. Pursuant to the Government's request, the District Court authorized for a period of 15 days the interception of gambling-related wire communications of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, three named individuals other than the respondents, and "others, as yet unknown," to and from the four listed telephones. [Footnote 3]
During the course of the wiretap, the Government learned that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco were discussing illegal gambling activities with the named subjects. On December 26, 1972, the Government applied for an extension of the initial intercept order. [Footnote 4] This time it sought authorization to intercept gambling-related conversations of Kotoch, Spaganlo, Florea, two other named individuals, and "others as yet unknown," but it did not identify respondents Donovan, Buzzacco, and Robbins in this second application. [Footnote 5]
On February 21, 1973, the Government submitted to the District Court a proposed order giving notice of the interceptions to 37 persons, a group which the Government apparently thought included all individuals who could be identified as having discussed gambling over the monitored telephones. [Footnote 6] The District Court signed the proposed order, and an inventory notice was served on the listed persons, including respondents Donovan, Buzzacco, and Robbins. On September 11, 1973, after the Government submitted the names of two additional persons whose identities allegedly had been omitted inadvertently from the initial list, the District Court entered an amended order giving notice to those individuals. As a result of what the Government labels "administrative oversight," respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included in either list of names, and were never served with inventory notice. [Footnote 7]
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 513 F.2d 337 (1975). [Footnote 8] On the identification issue, the court held that the wiretap application must identify every person whose conversations relating to the subject criminal activity the Government has probable cause to believe it will intercept. Agreeing with the District Court that at the time of the December 26 application the Government had probable cause to believe that it would overhear Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco "committing the offense," the Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of evidence derived from
the December 26 order. On the notice question, it held that the Government has an implied statutory duty to inform the issuing judge of the identities of the parties whose conversations were overheard so that he can determine whether discretionary inventory notice should be required. [Footnote 9] Because the Government had failed to perform this duty with respect to Merlo and Lauer, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order suppressing evidence derived from both intercept orders. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to identify respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco in the December 26 application and to name respondents Merlo and Lauer in the proposed inventory notice orders was inadvertent or purposeful, since the mere fact of omission was sufficient to require suppression under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). [Footnote 10]
We turn first to the identification requirements of § 2518(1)(b)(iv). That provision requires a wiretap application to specify "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." In construing that language, this Court already has ruled that the Government is not required to identify an individual in the application unless it has probable cause to believe (i) that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and (ii) that the individual's conversations will be intercepted over the target telephone. United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974). The question at issue here is whether the Government is required to name all such individuals. [Footnote 11]
The United States argues that the most reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the statute is that the application must identify only the principal target of the investigation, who "will almost always be the individual whose phone is to be monitored." [Footnote 12] Brief for United States 18. Under this interpretation, if the Government has reason to believe that an individual will use the target telephone to place or receive calls, and the Government has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation, the individual qualifies as a principal target and must be named in the wiretap application. On the other hand, an individual who uses a different telephone to place calls to or receive calls from the target telephone is not a principal target even if the Government has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation. In other words, whether one is a principal target of the investigation depends on whether one operates the target telephone to place or receive calls. [Footnote 13]
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." That description is as applicable to a suspect placing calls to the target telephone as it is to a suspect placing calls from that telephone. It is true, as the United States suggests, that, when read in the context of the other subdivisions of § 2518(1)(b), an argument can be made that Congress focused in subdivision (iv) on the primary user of the target telephone. But it is also clear from other sections of the statute that Congress expected that wiretap applications would name more than one individual. For example, Title III requires that inventory notice be served upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (emphasis added). And § 2518(1)(e) requires that an intercept application disclose all previous intercept applications "involving any of the same persons . . . specified in the application" (emphasis added). It may well be that Congress anticipated that a given application would cover more than one telephone or that several suspects would use one telephone, and that an application for those reasons alone would require identification of more than one individual. But nothing on the face of the statute suggests that Congress intended to remove from the identification requirement those suspects whose intercepted communications originated on a telephone other than that listed in the wiretap application. [Footnote 14]
Nor can we find support in the legislative history for the "principal target" interpretation. Title III originated as a combination of S. 675, the Federal Wire Interception Act, which was introduced by Senator McClellan several months prior to this Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and S. 2050, the Electronic Surveillance Control Act of 1967, introduced by Senator Hruska a few days after the Berger decision. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968). Both bills required that wiretap applications include a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant and specification of the nature and location of the communication facilities involved. Although neither bill contained an express identification requirement such as that at issue here, both bills required the application to include a
"full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications . . . involving any person named in the application as committing, having committed, or being about to commit an offense."
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Controlling-Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 77, § 8(a)(3), and 1006, § 2518(4)(a) (1967) (emphasis added). Thus, even at this early stage, it was recognized that an application could identify several individuals, and there is no indication that the identification would be limited to principal targets. S. 917 combined the major provisions of S. 675 and S. 2050 and eventually was enacted. While it was pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Court decided Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). S. 917 was then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger, and the identification provision was added at that time. The Senate Report states that the requirements set forth in the various
subdivisions of 2518(1)(b), including the identification requirement at issue here, were intended to "reflect . . . the constitutional command of particularization." S.Rep. No. 1097, supra at 101, citing Berger v. New York, supra, at 388 U. S. 58-60, and Katz v. United States, supra at 389 U. S. 354-356. The United States now contends that, although it may be that Congress read Berger and Katz to require, as a constitutional matter, that the subject of the surveillance be named if known, Congress would hardly have read those cases as requiring the naming of all parties likely to be overheard. [Footnote 15] Brief for United States 226. But to the extent that Congress thought it was meeting the constitutional commands of particularization established in Berger and Katz, Congress may have read those cases as mandating a broad identification requirement. The statute that we confronted in Berger required identification of "the person or persons" whose communications were to be overheard. 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 59. And we expressly noted that that provision "[did] no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded. . . ." Ibid. Given the statute at issue in Berger and our comment upon it, Congress may have concluded that the Constitution required the naming, in a wiretap application, of all suspects rather than just the primary user. [Footnote 16]
In any event, for our present purposes, it is unnecessary to speculate as to exactly how Congress interpreted Berger and Katz with respect to the identification issue. It is sufficient to note that, in response to those decisions Congress included an identification requirement which, on its face, draws no distinction based on the telephone one uses, and the United States points to no evidence in the legislative history that supports such a distinction. Indeed, the legislative materials apparently contain no use of the term "principal target" or any discussion of a different treatment based on the telephone from which a suspect speaks. [Footnote 17] We therefore conclude that a wiretap application must name an individual if the Government has probable cause to believe that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investigation and expects to intercept the individual's conversations over the target telephone.
the application, and indicate whether communications were intercepted. [Footnote 18] Although the statute mandates inventory notice only for persons named in the application or the order, the statute also provides that the judge may order similar notice to other parties to intercepted communications if he concludes that such action is in the interest of justice. [Footnote 19] Observing that this notice provision does not expressly require law enforcement authorities routinely to supply the judge with specific information upon which to exercise his discretion, the United States contends that it would be inappropriate to read such a requirement into the statute, since the judge has the option of asking the law enforcement authorities for whatever information he requires.
parties are not specifically named in the court order. The Berger and Katz decisions established that notice of surveillance is a constitutional requirement of any surveillance statute. It may be that the required notice must be served on all parties to intercepted communications. Since legitimate interests of privacy may make such notice to all parties undesirable, the amendment leaves the final determination to the judge."
114 Cong.Rec. 14485-14486 (1968). [Footnote 20]
United States v Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 540 (1974). (Footnote omitted.) We agree with the Ninth Circuit that this allocation of responsibility best serves the purposes of Title III. [Footnote 21]
will be before the issuing judge, this policy does not meet the test set out in Chun. Moreover, where, as here, the Government chooses to supply the issuing judge with a list of all identifiable persons rather than a description of the classes into which those persons fall, the list must be complete. Applying these principles, we find that the Government did not comply adequately with § 2518(8)(d), since the names of respondents Merlo and Lauer were not included on the purportedly complete list of identifiable persons submitted to the issuing judge.
There is no basis on the facts of this case to suggest that the authorization orders are facially insufficient, or that the interception was not conducted in conformity with the orders. Thus, only § 2518(10)(a)(i) is relevant: were the communications "unlawfully intercepted" given the violations of §§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) and 2518(8)(d)? [Footnote 22]
Resolution of that question must begin with United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562 (1974). Those cases hold that
Id. at 416 U. S. 574-575. To the contrary, suppression is required only for a
United States v. Giordano, supra at 416 U. S. 527.
Giordano concerned the provision in Title III requiring that an application for an intercept order be approved by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General. Concluding that Congress intended to condition the use of wiretap procedures on the judgment of senior officials in the Department of Justice, the Court required suppression for failure to comply with the approval provision. Chavez concerned the statutory requirement that the application for an intercept order specify the identity of the official authorizing the application. The problem in Chavez was one of misidentification; although the application had in fact been authorized by the Attorney General, the application erroneously identified an Assistant Attorney General as the official authorizing the application. The Court concluded that mere misidentification of the official authorizing the application did not make the application unlawful within the meaning of § 2518(10)(a)(i), since that identification requirement did not play a "substantive role" in the regulatory system. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 578.
This case is unlike Giordano, where failure to satisfy the statutory requirement of prior approval by specified Justice Department officials bypassed a congressionally imposed limitation on the use of the intercept procedure. The Court there noted that it was reasonable to believe that requiring prior approval from senior officials in the Justice Department
416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 528. Here, however, the statutorily imposed preconditions to judicial authorization were satisfied, and the issuing judge was simply unaware that additional persons might be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. In no meaningful sense can it be said that the presence of that information as to additional targets would have precluded judicial authorization of the intercept. [Footnote 23] Rather, this case resembles Chavez, where we held that a wiretap was not unlawful simply because the issuing judge was incorrectly informed as to which designated official had authorized the application. The Chavez intercept was lawful because the Justice Department had performed its task of prior approval, and the instant intercept is lawful because the application provided sufficient information to enable the issuing judge to determine that the statutory preconditions were satisfied. [Footnote 24]
Finally, we note that nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play "a central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance." United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 578. Neither S. 675 nor S. 2050, the predecessor bills of S. 917, contained an identification provision. See supra at 429 U. S. 426. The only explanation given in the Senate Report for the inclusion of the broad identification provision was that it was intended to reflect what Congress perceived to be the constitutional command of particularization. This explanation was offered with respect to all the information required by § 2518(1)(b) to be set out in an intercept application. No additional guidance can be gleaned from the floor debates, since they contain no substantive discussion of the identification provision. [Footnote 25]
39, rather than 41, identifiable persons does not, in itself, mean that the conversations were unlawfully intercepted. [Footnote 26]
the suggestion we made in United States v. Chavez that
416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 580.
An inventory notice must be served within a designated period of time upon "the persons named in the order or the application." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). The inventory must give notice of the entry of the intercept order or application, state the disposition of the application, and indicate whether communications were or were not intercepted. Ibid. Upon the filing of a motion, the judge has discretion to make available the intercepted communications, the applications, and the orders. Ibid.
Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has concluded that an individual whose conversations probably will be intercepted by a wiretap must be identified in the wiretap application if the law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe the individual is committing the offense for which the wiretap is sought. United States v. Chiarizio, 525 F.2d 289, 292 (CA2 1975); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (CA4 1975), cert. pending, No. 74-1486; United States v. Doolittle, 507 F.2d 1368 (CA5), aff'd, en banc, 518 F.2d 500 (1975), cert. pending, Nos. 75-500, 75-509, 75-513; United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395 (CA8 1976), cert. pending, Nos. 75-1813, 76-169; United States v. Russo, 527 F.2d 1051, 1056 (CA10 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). See also United States v. Moore, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 235-236, 513 F.2d 485, 493-494 (1975) (interpreting D.C.Code § 23-547(a)(2)(D), which is almost identical to the provision at issue here).
A number of these courts have concluded, and respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco argue, that our decision in United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), resolved this identification issue. See United States v. Chiarizio, supra; United States v. Moore, supra. Although there is language in Kahn suggesting that wiretap applications must identify all such individuals, the identification question presented here was not before us in Kahn. The question in that case was whether a wiretap application had to identify a known user of the target telephone whose complicity in the criminal activity under investigation was not known at the time of the application. Kahn is a relevant, though not controlling, precedent.
At the time of the enactment of Title III, Congress did not have before it the view we expressed on this issue in United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 155 n. 15. The Fourth Amendment requires specification of "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In the wiretap context, those requirements are satisfied by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be seized. It is not a constitutional requirement that all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations be named. Specification of this sort
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 59.
That Congress may have so understood the constitutional requirement is also suggested by the portion of the Senate Report dealing with that provision of S. 917 that required the intercept order to "specify the identity, if known, of the individual whose communications are to be intercepted." The Senate Report merely cites West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894), which concerns the need for proper identification of the subject of an arrest warrant. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968). To the extent that Congress may have considered West to apply to wiretap orders, we have no reason to believe that Congress considered its applicability to extend only to those suspects using the target telephone.
The inventory notice must be served within a reasonable time, but not later than 90 days after the date the application for an intercept order was filed. On an ex parte showing of good cause, service of the inventory may be postponed.
In addition to these provisions for mandatory and discretionary inventory notice, the Government is required to supply the issuing judge with recordings of the intercepted conversations, which are to be sealed according to his directions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). These notice and return provisions satisfy constitutional requirements. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 355-356, and n. 16 (1967); Berger v. New York, supra at 388 U. S. 60.
The availability of the suppression remedy for these statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations, see nn. 15 and | 15 and S. 413fn19|>19, supra, turns on the provisions of Title III, rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 416 U. S. 524 (1974).
The concurring opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE contends that respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco lack standing even to seek suppression. Post at 429 U. S. 440-441. This contention rests on the ground that Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senators Long and Hart that would have added a fourth ground justifying suppression -- namely, that the person against whom the Government sought to introduce the evidence was not named in the court order. Since these three respondents would have been entitled to suppression under the rejected amendment, the concurring opinion concludes they cannot seek suppression here.
This view fails to recognize that § 2518(10)(a) establishing the suppression remedy provides alternative grounds on which one can seek suppression of evidence derived from a wiretap. Thus, the mere fact that Congress chose not to add a fourth alternative could not mean that it intended to prevent persons who would have been covered by that alternative from seeking suppression on one of the other grounds. As the Justice Department commented, in the same statement cited in the concurring opinion:
"The [Long and Hart] amendment is designed to limit the scope of electronic surveillance, but it accomplishes this purpose in an artificial manner. So long as a court order is validly obtained, evidence obtained under the order should be admissible against any person, not merely against the person named in the order."
No one suggests that the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "unknown" within the meaning of the statute, see United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143 (1974), requires suppression of intercepted conversations to which those individuals were parties. Though recognizing that the failure to identify such an "unknown" individual does not make unlawful an otherwise valid intercept order, respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco suggest that the opposite is true with respect to the failure to identify in a wiretap application individuals who are "known" within the meaning of the statute. Counsel for these respondents suggested at oral argument that this difference in result is justified by analogy to warrantless searches or arrests. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. Although law enforcement officials can often take action without a warrant when they have been unable to foresee the circumstances that eventually confronted them, they still must obtain a search or arrest warrant when their prior knowledge is sufficient to establish probable cause, and it is suggested that the same principle applies here. The major flaw in that reasoning is that this case does not concern warrantless action. Here, the omission on the part of law enforcement authorities was not a failure to seek prior judicial authorization, but a failure to identify every individual who could be expected to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations. That the complete absence of prior judicial authorization would make an intercept unlawful has no bearing on the lawfulness of an intercept order that fails to identify every target.
Even if we assume that Congress thought that a broad identification requirement was constitutionally mandated, it does not follow that Congress imposed statutory suppression under §§ 2515 and 2518(10)(a)(i) as a sanction for noncompliance. In limiting use of the intercept procedure to "the most precise and discriminate circumstances," S.Rep. No. 107, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 (1968), Congress required law enforcement authorities to convince a district court that probable cause existed to believe that a specific person was committing a specific offense using a specific telephone. This requirement was satisfied here when the application set forth sufficient information to indicate that the primary targets were conducting a gambling business over four particular telephones. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to declare an otherwise constitutional intercept order "unlawful" under § 2518(10)(a)(i) -- resulting in suppression under § 2515 -- for failure to name additional targets.
Moreover, respondents Merlo and Lauer were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the District Court's inventory orders. As noted earlier, the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers. See n 7, supra. And in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations.
I concur in the Court's judgment and in all except 429 U. S. I cannot agree, however, with the Court's construction of the identification provisions of § 2518(1)(b)(iv), since I believe the application for surveillance in this case complied with statutory requirements. However, the precise reach of the identification requirement is irrelevant, because respondents are foreclosed from seeking suppression in any event.
the application or. extension. [Footnote 2/1] In its comment on the proposal, the Department of Justice said:
"The amendment would permit intercepted communications to be used in evidence only against the persons named in the court order, not against other persons."
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) Consistent with the Justice Department's recommendation, the Senate rejected the result which respondents now seek.
Id. at 14751. Under these circumstances, the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining Congress' intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that area. The statutory provision before us requires the wiretap application to specify the "identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). (Emphasis supplied.) As the Court correctly indicates, the identification requirement
was carefully add in the wake of Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). That case involved the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring the naming of "the person or persons whose communications . . . are to be overheard." That very different statute plainly put Congress on notice that an identification provision could call, as did New York's, for the naming of multiple parties. Indeed, while requiring only the identification of "the person" whose communications are to be intercepted, Congress anticipated the obvious fact that interceptions effected pursuant to a single application and order could potentially affect a large number of persons. Standing to object to intercepted communications is conferred upon "[a]ny aggrieved person. . . ." § 2518(10)(a). In addition, a civil damages remedy is conferred upon "[a]ny person" whose communications are unlawfully intercepted or used in violation of the statute. Thus, in fashioning highly specific requirements with respect to wiretap applications, Congress failed to employ language found in other parts of the same statute and so carefully written into the state statute at issue in the Berger case.
The Court emphasizes, however, that the statute expressly recognizes that more than one person may be named in a wiretap application. Ante at 429 U. S. 425. That is indeed true. See §§ 2518(1)(e), (8)(d). But I would think this is all the more reason for focusing upon the precise language in the provision establishing explicit requirements for an application. Since Congress expressly contemplated that applications might contain more than one name, its failure in § 2518(1)(b)(iv) to require the naming of "any person" or "the persons" whose communications are to be intercepted must mean that an open-ended identification requirement was never intended. In other words, Congress reasonably foresaw that, for a variety of reasons, actual wiretap application might contain the names of more than one person. But Congress did not translate its recognition of what an application
Assuming that plain words of a statute might have to bow, in some circumstances, to compelling legislative history to the contrary, nothing of that kind is found here. As the Court observes, the earlier bills introduced in the Senate contained no identification provision at all. After Berger and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), were decided, the requirement was added in what was plainly an abundance of caution. For this Court in Berger flatly discounted any value in New York's broad identification requirement.
"It is true that the statute requires the naming of 'the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded. . . .' But this does no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded, rather than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized."
388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 59. (Emphasis supplied.) As shown by its rejection of the proposed suppression provision -- which obviously would have had the practical effect of increasing the number of persons identified in wiretap applications -- Congress correctly perceived little value in multiplying indefinitely the number of names to be set forth in wiretap applications and orders. This is particularly true since no Fourth Amendment values are served by a sweeping identification requirement. The Court has made clear:
"'The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only 'the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,' not the persons from whom things will be seized.'"
United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 415 U. S. 155 n. 15 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the statute, as it presently stands, comports entirely with Fourth Amendment requirements, and thus achieves the
express legislative purpose of "reflect[ing] the constitutional commands of particularization.'" Ante at 429 U. S. 427. Under those circumstances, it ill serves this Court to speculate that our coequal branch of Government, despite the clear teaching of the Constitution, incorrectly surmised "that the Constitution [may have] required the naming . . . of all suspects, rather than just the primary user." Ibid. In any event, if our own decisions have created confusion in the Congress, which is not surprising, nothing is gained by perpetuating that confusion in the face of Congress' clear intent to comply with this Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
In short, the Court has redrafted a statute passed by Congress to make it identical to a statutory provision found valueless by this Court a few years ago in the Berger case. This undertaking, unfortunately, is not entirely without consequence, notwithstanding the Court's refusal to approve suppression of the evidence here. Among other things, federal officers are potentially subject to a civil damages action, with compensatory damages of not less than $1,000, plus punitive damages, plus reasonable attorneys' fees. [Footnote 2/2] Nor is this federal remedy exclusive. State-provided damages remedies are not preempted. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). Damages awards aside, the Court's opinion -- albeit in dictum -- hints that suppression may indeed be in the offing if an intentional "violation" is shown. Finally, district judges will now be put to the task, at least in some cases, of determining whether probable cause exists with respect to each person listed in the application. § 2518(3)(d). Judges may well wonder why such burdens are imposed upon them for a gain which the Court found illusory in the Berger case.
The Court today holds that an application for a warrant to authorize a wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520, must name all individuals who the Government has probable cause to believe are committing the offense being investigated and will be overheard. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). It also holds that the Government must provide sufficient information to the issuing judge to allow him to exercise the discretion provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d). I fully agree with both of these holdings. The Court concludes, however, that, if the Government violates these statutory commands, it is nevertheless free to use the intercepted communications as evidence in a criminal proceeding. I cannot agree.
I continue to adhere to the position, expressed for four Members of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in United States v. Chavez, 416 U. S. 562, 416 U. S. 584-585 (1974), that Title III does not authorize
The Court has rejected that argument, however, see United States v. Chavez, supra; United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505 (1974), and nothing is to be gained by renewing it here. But even under the standard set forth
in Giordano and Chavez and reaffirmed by the Court today, ante at 429 U. S. 433-434, the evidence at issue here should be suppressed.
Title III requires that an application for a warrant to authorize wiretapping disclose "the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv). The Court properly rejects the Government's contention that this provision requires it to name only the "principal target" of an investigation. In doing so, the Court relies both on the plain language and legislative history of the section, which do not support the Government's position, and on the statutory context. Ante at 429 U. S. 424-428. Part of that context is the obvious assumption of other portions of Title III that wiretap applications will name more than one target. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(e), (8)(d). Another part is
"the fact that identification of an individual in an application for an intercept order triggers other statutory provisions. First, § 2518(1)(e) requires an intercept application to disclose all previous applications 'involving any of the same persons . . . specified in the application.' . . . Second, § 2518(8)(d) mandates that an inventory notice be served upon 'the persons named in the order or the application.'"
Ante at 429 U. S. 425 n. 14 (emphasis added).
Yet in determining whether the identification requirement "directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures," United States v. Giordano, supra at 416 U. S. 527, or plays a "substantive role" in the "regulatory system" established by Congress, United States v. Chavez, supra, at 416 U. S. 578, the Court ignores the requirement's function as a statutory "trigger." In its analysis, the Court focuses solely on whether a list of additional
names would affect a judge who must decide whether to issue a warrant. The Court reasons that, once the judge has concluded that the specific requirements of § 2518(3) [Footnote 3/1] have been met, the presence of additional names in the warrant application could not change his decision. Ante at 429 U. S. 435-436. Failure to provide those names is, therefore, insignificant.
The Court's reasoning is doubly flawed. First, a judge is not required to issue a warrant if the prerequisites of § 2518(3) are satisfied; he may do so. Once he determines that the § 2518(3) requirements have been met, he still must decide whether the invasion of privacy by the proposed wiretap is justified under the circumstances. [Footnote 3/2] Second, what is at issue here is more than a simple list of names. Section 2518(1)(e) requires that the Government disclose to the court the history of all prior applications to intercept the communications of anyone named in a warrant application.
A history of recent applications would at the least cause a judge to consider whether the application before him was an attempt to circumvent the restrictive rulings of another judge or to continue an unjustified invasion of privacy. [Footnote 3/3] The decision whether to issue the warrant would certainly be affected by such consideration. [Footnote 3/4]
It is true, as the Court notes, ante at 429 U. S. 436 n. 23, [Footnote 3/5] that there is no allegation in this case that, had the District Court been informed that the Government expected to overhear respondents Donovan, Buzzacco, and Robbins discussing illegal gambling activities, it would not have issued a warrant. But that fact is irrelevant to an analysis of the role of the naming requirement in the regulatory system established by Congress. In Giordano, the Court rejected the argument that the Attorney General's failure to authorize the application for a warrant could be disregarded because the Attorney General had later ratified the application, thus demonstrating that he would have approved it originally. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 523-524, n. 12. The important consideration was whether the requirement of high-level authorization was designed to play an important role, not whether it would have mattered in the particular case. The same analysis should be used here.
Moreover, even, where there is no prior interception or application to disclose, as is apparently the case here, the naming requirement plays a vital role in the system designed by Congress. For unless that requirement is complied with from the first interception, no judge will know that a later interception is not the first. In addition, the naming requirement triggers the mandatory notification provision of § 2518(8)(d), another important component of the congressional design. [Footnote 3/6]
The Court's discussion of the consequences of the Government's failure to comply with the notice provision of § 2518(8)(d) parallels its discussion of the naming requirement, and is similarly flawed. The Court does recognize that the notice provision was designed to assure the community that the wiretap technique is reasonably employed and that "Congress placed considerable emphasis on that aspect of the overall statutory scheme." Ante at 429 U. S. 439. But because notice occurs after the intercept is completed, and because notice is not itself "an independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure," the Court concludes that failure to notify does not render an interception "unlawful" under § 2518(10)(a)(i). Ante at 429 U. S. 439.
S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). See also id. at 105.
The Court's opinion implies that, if the violations of Title III considered here had been intentional, the result would be different. Ante at 429 U. S. 436 n. 23, 429 U. S. 439 n. 26. This must be so, for surely this Court would not tolerate the Government's intentional disregard of duties imposed on it by Congress. I also assume that, if the Government fails to establish procedures which offer reasonable assurance that it will strictly adhere to the statutory requirements, see ante at 429 U. S. 439-440, resulting failures to comply will be recognized as intentional. There is, therefore, reason to hope that the Court's admonition that the Government should obey the law will have some effect in the future.
"Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order . . . if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that -- "
Thus, this case is unlike United States v. Chavez. There, the Court concluded that the misidentification of the authorizing official as an Assistant Attorney General when the Attorney General had actually authorized the warrant application could not have affected the judge's decision to issue the warrant. 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 572.
See 429 U. S. infra.
Oral Argument - October 13, 1976
Opinion Announcement - January 18, 1977