Source: http://openjurist.org/413/f3d/1010/united-states-v-k-vo
Timestamp: 2013-12-12 10:59:04
Document Index: 403055914

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161']

413 F3d 1010 United States v. K Vo | OpenJurist
413 F. 3d 1010 - United States v. K Vo	Home413 f3d 1010 united states v. k vo
413 F3d 1010 United States v. K Vo 413 F.3d 1010
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Rick K. VO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 03-10699.
Filed June 27, 2005.
Peter C. Wolff, Jr., Federal Public Defender, and Michael A. Weight, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Honolulu, HI, for the defendant-appellant.
Edward H. Kubo, Jr., United States Attorney, and Thomas Muehleck, Assistant United States Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii; Alan C. Kay, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-02-00411-ACK.
Petitioner Rick Vo ("Vo") and his wife Brenda ("Brenda") were indicted for conspiring to possess more than fifty grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and for aiding and abetting each other in the possession of more than fifty grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Vos were arrested after an employee of Mail Boxes, Etc., notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") that a suspicious package had been dropped off for shipment to California by Federal Express. The shipping label stated that the shipment contained hair products and makeup, and the employee opened the box pursuant to store policy to ensure that it did not contain any aerosol products. Realizing that the package was suspicious (because it did not contain hair products but rather contained fifteen pounds of an unknown substance), the store clerk notified the FBI, and the FBI obtained a search warrant from a federal magistrate judge. The FBI discovered four gallon sized bags of a substance testing positive for methamphetamine. The Vos were arraigned and indicted in October 2002 for charges stemming from the methamphetamine possession. In April 2003, Brenda pleaded guilty to conspiracy. A jury convicted Rick Vo in May 2003 on one count, aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Vo raises three claims on appeal. First, Vo claims that the district court erred by denying his Speedy Trial Act motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. § 3161, because more than seventy days elapsed between the filing of the government's indictment and Vo's trial. Second, Vo claims that the district court erred by allowing Brenda, his wife, to testify about marital communications in violation of his marital communications privilege. Third, Vo argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of a thirteen-year-old drug conviction in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404(b). Finding no error, we affirm the conviction. Vo also submitted a Rule 28(j) letter regarding the upward enhancement of his sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines by the district court. Because Vo did not challenge his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds in the district court, we grant a limited remand pursuant to United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc).
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2004). The Act provides that certain "periods of delay shall be excluded ... in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). The list of excludable delays includes "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F); see, e.g., United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir.1995) (motion in limine); United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.1989) (motion to detain a defendant in pretrial confinement). "Congress intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day limitation all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is `reasonably necessary.'" Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986).
In this case there was a 215-day delay between the filing of the indictment and the filing of Vo's motion to dismiss. Of this period, Vo does not contest the exclusion of some 143 days, leaving more than 70 days that are not excludable. In this appeal he argues that the district court should not have excluded twelve days between October 10-21, 2002. If that period is excluded, then Vo's trial was held within the confines of the Speedy Trial Act. On the other hand, if those days count for Speedy Trial Act purposes, then Vo was not tried in a timely fashion and the Act requires that the court dismiss the indictment either with or without prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(2); see also United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.2004) ("If trial does not commence within the seventy-day limit, after setting aside excluded time, the court must dismiss the indictment.... Thus, failure to comply with the Act has grave consequences."); United States v. Hardeman, 249 F.3d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam) ("The Act's 70-day limit was therefore exceeded, see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), and the indictment against [defendant] must be dismissed.").1
Rick and Brenda Vo first appeared in district court, where the government moved for their detention, on October 7, 2002. The district court set a detention hearing for three days later, on October 10, and remanded them to the custody of the U.S. Marshal's Service. On October 9, the grand jury returned an indictment against the Vos. They appeared the following day to be arraigned and to request a continuance of the detention hearing from October 10 to October 21 to present additional information from the Pretrial Services Officer. The district court agreed to the continuance and set a trial date for December 10. On October 21, the district court held the detention hearing and granted the government's motion to detain the defendants.
Vo argues that the twelve days between October 10 through October 21, 2002, were not excludable from computation under the Act. He claims that, under United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir.1994), a motion that does not result in actual pretrial delay is unexcludable: "[Section] 3161(h)(1)(F) applies only when the delay in bringing the case to trial is the result of the pendency of a pretrial motion." Id. (emphasis in original).
We do not read Clymer to support Vo's argument. In Clymer the defendant had languished through a 522-day delay, which the government claimed was entirely excludable. The panel's opinion granted some of the excludable delay, but held that Clymer's motion to dismiss the indictment for outrageous government conduct, which the district court decided to refrain from ruling on until after the trial, did not constitute excludable delay under the Act. Id. at 831-32. We found that "[i]n effect, the district court denied the motion without prejudice to the filing of a renewed submission after the conclusion of the trial." Id. at 830. If we had held otherwise in Clymer, the government would have had carte blanche in the p