Source: http://openjurist.org/642/f2d/981
Timestamp: 2014-10-22 01:43:20
Document Index: 168367272

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1601', '§ 1604', '§ 226', '§ 9', 'art. 2924', '§ 1614', '§ 108']

642 F2d 981 Skinner v. W T Grant Company | OpenJurist
642 F. 2d 981 - Skinner v. W T Grant Company	Home642 f2d 981 skinner v. w t grant company
642 F2d 981 Skinner v. W T Grant Company 642 F.2d 981
Alvin SKINNER, and all others similarly situated,Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.W. T. GRANT COMPANY, Defendants,Federal Financial Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 79-3026.
Russell & Derussy, Patrick D. Breeden, John M. Holahan, Keith A. Rodriguez, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Harry S. Hardin, III, Howard E. Sinor, Jr., New Orleans, La., Robert V. Atmore, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant-appellee.
In 1973, Alvin Skinner brought this class action on behalf of New Orleans customers of W. T. Grant, alleging violations of the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Louisiana usury laws.1 In 1975, Grant filed a Chapter XI petition leading to reorganization proceedings in the Southern District of New York. During those proceedings, the Bankruptcy Trustee assigned the company's accounts receivable, including those of its New Orleans customers, to Federal Financial Corp., the appellee. Skinner, in turn, joined Federal Financial as a second defendant, alleging that Federal Financial had assumed Grant's potential liability.
Skinner appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Federal Financial. The court held that the company did not assume Grant's potential liability either by operation of law or under the terms of the contract. We agree with the district court that Federal Financial did not assume the potential liability by operation of law, but reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings because the contract of sale provided that Federal took the accounts subject to counterclaims such as those asserted by Skinner and his class.
In his original complaint, Skinner alleged that Grant had engaged in deceptive practices and imposed excessive finance charges in violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the "Truth in Lending Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., Regulation "Z" promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604, see 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. (1980), and the Louisiana usury laws, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 9:3501 (West 1951) and La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2924 (West 1952). While this case was pending, Grant commenced Chapter XI proceedings. On October 18, 1976, Federal Financial Corp., then a 5-day old corporation, entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of all of Grant's accounts receivable, including those of Skinner and the other members of the potential class. The Bankruptcy Court authorized the sale on November 17, 1976. On October 1, 1977, Skinner amended his complaint to assert the class's claims against Federal as assignee of the accounts receivable.
Arguing that it had not assumed Grant's potential liabilities, Federal Financial countered with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Federal Financial, rejecting Skinner's claim that Federal Financial assumed liability by operation of Section 115 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1614; Section 68 of the old Bankruptcy Act (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 108); the Louisiana law of compensation, see La.Civ.Code Ann. arts. 2207-08 (West 1952) or under the terms of Federal Financial's purchase agreement with Grant.2 Finding no just reason for delay, the district court certified this appeal under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b), which provides for appeal when judgment is entered as to some but not all parties or claims.
On appeal, Skinner challenges the Rule 54(b) certification as well as the district court's decision on the merits. We turn first to the question of certification.
We may vacate the district court's Rule 54(b) certification only if we find that the district court abused its discretion. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956); Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1978). In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Rule 54(b) certification should occur only in the "infrequent harsh case" a