Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/413/927/36467/
Timestamp: 2020-08-14 06:28:58
Document Index: 308779691

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 462', '§ 6', '§ 1', '§ 456', '§ 1626', '§ 1', '§ 456', '§ 460']

United States of America, Appellee, v. Irwin Ira Messinger, Appellant, 413 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1969) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1969 › United States of America, Appellee, v. Irwin Ira Messinger, Appellant
United States of America, Appellee, v. Irwin Ira Messinger, Appellant, 413 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1969)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 413 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1969) Argued June 25, 1969
Jerome C. Ditore, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Vincent T. McCarthy, U. S. Atty. for the Eastern District of New York, of counsel), for appellee.
Irwin Ira Messinger appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York convicting him, after a trial without a jury, on one count of refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces, in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. IV 1965-68).
In January 1965, appellant was sent a current information questionnaire. It did not specifically request information relating to conscientious objection but it did state: "You may attach any additional information you believe should be brought to the attention of the local board." Appellant responded to the questionnaire, indicating that he intended to become a part-time student, but he made no statement pertaining to conscientious objection. On April 21, 1965, he was classified 2-S, the student deferment classification.
At the end of December 1965, appellant completed another current information questionnaire in which he made no mention of conscientious objection. At the same time, he executed a dependency questionnaire in which he stated: "I very much want to finish my schooling before going into the service." He testified at trial that he intended this sentence to be understood in its ordinary meaning of unrestricted military service and that its representation was false because, in view of his opposition to war, he did not intend to serve in the armed forces.
On January 25, 1966, the appeal board affirmed appellant's 1-A classification. On February 9, 1966, the local board received a letter from appellant stating that he was a "full time matriculated night student * * * taking 13 credits." The following week appellant was mailed an order to report for induction on March 2, 1966. The local board, acting on its own motion, then rescinded this order and classified him 1-S(c), a classification which permits a registrant to finish the school term during which he was ordered for induction.
In May 1966, appellant executed another current information questionnaire in which he again failed to mention any claim to conscientious objector status. He was reclassified 1-A in June and wrote to request a "personal appeal" on the ground that he would be a full-time student in the fall. After appellant had appeared personally before the local board, it affirmed the 1-A classification. On August 16, 1966, the appeal board upheld the local board's classification. The classification was appealed to the national selective service appeal board which affirmed the local board's action on October 13, 1966.
"I would like to request a conscientious objector form due to the fact that I will not be getting my student deferment. I felt it would be no need to express my beliefs regarding this matter of fighting and war if I had my student deferment. That is the reason I had never requested this status before, but now it is necessary for me to do so."
An F.B.I. summary of a letter written by appellant to Adelphi College on August 25, 1966, states: " [O]nly at the time of writing of this letter did the registrant begin to realize that his life would be ruined if he had to go into the Army."1
"I am by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and I am further conscientiously opposed to participation in noncombatant training and service in the Armed Forces."
He attributed these views to his Jewish background and asserted that he had acquired them "starting some ten years ago."
"I would like to repeat what was stated in SSS Form 150 [the conscientious objector form]; that is I was a conscientious objector to war and killing since I can remember but had not gone through the trouble of filing Form SSS 150 before because I thought I would have my student deferment.
"When I saw that I would not be granted a student deferment, I filed SSS Form 150. I am telling the truth about being a pacifist and would like to be given a chance to prove it."
Under the procedure then in effect,2 the appeal board would tentatively determine the validity of a claim to conscientious objector, 1-O, status. If it decided against the registrant, his file was sent to the Justice Department for its advisory recommendation. The Justice Department would make an inquiry and hold a hearing "on the character and good faith of the conscientious objections of the registrant." It would send its recommendation to the appeal board and to the registrant. The appeal board would review the file sent by the local board, the Justice Department recommendation and any reply to that recommendation made by the registrant. The appeal board would decide without hearing oral testimony or argument; it would not issue an opinion and would record its decision simply by classifying the registrant.3
Appellant's file reached the appeal board in January 1967. It tentatively determined that the 1-A classification was appropriate and referred the matter to the Justice Department which directed the F.B.I. to make the required inquiry. Prior to the hearing, a resume of the F.B.I. report was given to appellant and the report was given to the hearing officer. Appellant sent the hearing officer a letter to "explain and refute some of the points" in the resume. Appellant's selective service file was forwarded to the hearing officer. After holding the hearing on August 29, 1967, the hearing officer wrote a two-page report in which he found appellant to be sincere in his assertions of conscientious objection. However, in making the recommendation of the Justice Department to the appeal board, the chief of the Department's conscientious objector section refused to accept the hearing officer's conclusion as to appellant's sincerity and found him to be insincere. In reaching this conclusion, he relied on appellant's long delay in asserting his conscientious objector claim, the fact that appellant's sincerity was questioned throughout the F.B.I. resume of its inquiry, the evidence that appellant felt his life "would be ruined" if he had to go into the Army and evidence that appellant's beliefs were politically, rather than religiously, motivated.
In Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59, 80 S. Ct. 1554, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1569 (1960), the Supreme Court considered the status of the hearing officer's report under the procedure pursuant to which appellant's conscientious objector claim was processed. It concluded that "the hearing officer's report is but intradepartmental * * * and * * * is not the recommendation of the Department. * * * It is but part of the whole process within the Department that goes into the making of the final recommendation to the appeal board." Id. at 63, 80 S. Ct. at 996. Moreover, both the statute and the regulations speak of the recommendation of the Department of Justice, rather than of the recommendation of its hearing officer. Thus, in making its recommendation, the Justice Department was not barred from reversing its hearing officer.
Appellant claims that the recommendation misstated the applicable law as to qualification for conscientious objector status by describing the beliefs needed to qualify in a manner inconsistent with United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965), which affirmed United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963). While this contention is correct, we find that the misstatement of law did not prejudice appellant. The recommendation was based on the Department's finding that appellant's alleged beliefs were not sincerely held. The Department did not conclude that appellant's beliefs, if sincerely held, would not qualify him for conscientious objector status. Thus we do not have the situation arising in Jakobson and in United States v. Englander, 271 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the Department concluded that the registrant's beliefs were insincere but improperly concluded that, if sincerely held, they would not qualify him for classification as a conscientious objector. There the convictions were reversed because it was not known whether the appeal board had based its decision on the improper standards used by the Department in finding that the registrant's alleged beliefs were not such as to justify granting conscientious objector status. Moreover, here two of the three appeal board members testified that they found appellant to be insincere in the beliefs underlying his conscientious objector claim. Such testimony follows precisely the procedure recommended in Jakobson for resolving any ambiguity in the appeal board's action. 325 F.2d at 417.
"As a matter of fact, no mention of conscientious objection was made until long after the registrant had been originally classified 1-A, found acceptable for service, and ordered to report for induction."
Appellant claims that this statement conveyed to the appeal board that, "having exhausted all administrative remedy and having been ordered for induction, [he] stood at the induction station and there for the first time urged his conscientious objections."
A court may overturn a classification made by the selective service system only if the classification has "no basis in fact." See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 380-381, 75 S. Ct. 392, 99 L. Ed. 428 (1955); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-123, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567 (1946); United States v. Gearey, 379 F.2d 915, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959, 88 S. Ct. 335, 19 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1967); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808, 810-811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884, 81 S. Ct. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1960).4 Under this very limited scope of review, the appeal board's decision must stand. The evidence of insincerity — appellant's long delay in raising his claim, together with his explanation that it would have been too much "trouble" for him to do so, his feeling that his "life would be ruined" if he had to serve in the military, and evidence that his opposition to war was based on political, rather than religious, feelings — provides a "basis in fact" for the appeal board's decision.5
Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-613, as amended by the 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, § 1(q), 65 Stat. 75, 86, codified at 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (1964). The regulations relating to this procedure were codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.25-.27 (1949, 1957, 1963)
In 1967, the law was amended to eliminate consideration of a conscientious objector claim by the Department of Justice. Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100, 104, codified at 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV 1965-68)
The "basis in fact" standard of review was made statutory by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. See 50 U. S.C.App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. IV 1965-68)
The fact that some of the evidence referred to in the recommendation did not otherwise appear in appellant's selective service file did not prevent reliance on it by the appeal board. See United States v. Purvis,supra, 403 F.2d at 559.