Source: https://casetext.com/case/rice-v-fox-broadcasting-co-2
Timestamp: 2019-11-23 02:45:41
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Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co, 330 F.3d 1170 | Casetext
330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003)
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United States Court of Appeals, Ninth CircuitMay 29, 2003
See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirming grant of summary…
Id. (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)); Narell v. Freeman,…
holding that because the plaintiff's video “only sold approximately 17,000 copies between 1986 and 1999,” it could not be considered “widely disseminated” despite some evidence of national publicity
Summary of this case from Loomis v. Cornish
holding that claims about a television show made in the course of the show were part of the show itself, and were therefore not commercial advertising within the meaning of the Lanham Act
holding that inverse-ratio rule did not apply, even though the alleged copier was also a former distributer of the work allegedly copied, because "[h]ere, there is no such concession of access as most of Rice's claims are based purely on speculation and inference."
Summary of this case from Gallagher v. Lions Gate Entm't Inc.
Nos. 01-56582, 01-56846.
James H. Wynn, Lord, Bissell Brook, Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the appellees/cross-appellants. Jeffrey S. Kravitz was on the briefs.
Robert E. Rice owns the copyright to a home video entitled The Mystery Magician that was created in 1986 and reveals how to perform several well-known magic tricks and illusions. Rice created and registered the script for The Mystery Magician and signed an agreement with International Creative Management ("ICM") for the purpose of commercially exploiting the video. In February 1986, ICM negotiated a ten-year exclusive video distribution deal on Rice's behalf with CBS/Fox Video Westinghouse. At the end of the contract, Rice entered into agreements with other entities to continue distribution of The Mystery Magician. Between 1986 and 1999, approximately 17,000 copies of The Mystery Magician were sold worldwide.
Rice believed that the inspiration behind Fox's series was The Mystery Magician. As a result Rice brought suit against individuals and entities associated with production of the Specials ("Defendants"). Rice asserted a claim for infringement under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and California Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.
In order "[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (citation omitted). The latter element may be established by showing that the works in question "are substantially similar in their protected elements" and that the infringing party "had access" to the copyrighted work. Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
The existence and validity of Rice's copyright in The Mystery Magician is not in dispute. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1048 (C.D.Cal. 2001).
To determine whether two works are substantially similar, a two-part analysis — an extrinsic test and an intrinsic test — is applied. Id. at 1073. "For summary judgment, only the extrinsic test is important." Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994). "[A] plaintiff who cannot satisfy the extrinsic test necessarily loses on summary judgment, because a jury may not find substantial similarity without evidence on both the extrinsic and intrinsic tests." Id.
As we have previously stated, the extrinsic test is an objective measure of the "articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In applying the extrinsic test, we must distinguish between the protectable and unprotectable material because a party claiming infringement may place "no reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from unprotectable elements." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, Rice goes even further and argues that The Mystery Magician himself is subject to copyright protection. While characters are ordinarily not afforded copyright protection, see Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954), characters that are "especially distinctive" or the "story being told" receive protection apart from the copyrighted work. See Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Corp., 900 F.Supp. 1287,1295-96 (C.D.Cal. 1995).
Rice claims that The Mystery Magician character warrants copyright protection because it visually depicts a graphical character. In addition, Rice points to testimony by an expert in the field stating that he is unaware of any audiovisual production besides The Mystery Magician and the Specials that features the theme of a masked magician wearing a disguise to shield himself from possible repercussions by the magic practitioner community.
We are not persuaded, however, that the magician revealing the tricks in The Mystery Magician is somehow sufficiently delineated to warrant copyright protection. Characters that have received copyright protection have displayed consistent, widely identifiable traits. See, e.g., Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow and Co., Inc., 33 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1215 (C.D.Cal. 1998) (Godzilla); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 900 F.Supp. at 1297 (James Bond); Anderson v. Stallone, 1989 WL 206431, *7 (C.D.Cal. 1989) (Rocky Balboa). In contrast, the magician depicted in Rice's work has appeared in only one home video that sold approximately 17,000 copies. Moreover, the magician is dressed in standard magician garb — black tuxedo with tails, a white tuxedo shirt, a black bow tie, and a black cape with red lining — and his role is limited to performing and revealing the magic tricks. Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1036. Thus, we must reject Rice's claim that the magician in his video is an "especially distinct" character differing from an ordinary magician in a manner that warrants copyright protection.
In support of his claim, Rice points to the dialogue in the respective works. The opening monologues in both The Mystery Magician and the Specials explain that the secrets of magic tricks are closely guarded. In addition, both closing monologues express a desire to inspire children. However, as the district court correctly noted, the actual dialogue in these segments is quite different, and any generic parallels in overall tone do not rise to the level of substantial similarity. Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1058.
Undeterred, Rice also points to the fact that both works involve a magician performing an illusion as if it were a normal performance, but then re-performing the same illusion and explaining to the audience how it was done. But, as mentioned repeatedly, there is simply no copyright protection afforded to the idea of revealing magic tricks. Furthermore, the sequencing of first performing the trick and then revealing the secrets behind the trick is subject to the limiting doctrines of merger and scenes a faire.
While Rice does point to other alleged similarities in plot, they merely restate his earlier claims concerning characters, settings, and dialogue.
As we have stated before, "[g]eneral plot ideas are not protected by copyright law; they remain forever the common property of artistic mankind. Nor does copyright law protect `scenes a faire,' or scenes that flow naturally from unprotectable basic plot premises." Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1074 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this particular case, there are only a finite number of ways to reveal the secrets behind magic tricks, and the perform and reveal sequence is the most logical "expression" of this idea.
The actual magic tricks and sequence of revelation in the two works are also quite different. Of the four installments of the Specials, only the first one shares any illusions in common with The Mystery Magician. Further comparison shows that of the eleven tricks depicted in the first installment, five are in common with The Mystery Magician, but even these are performed in a completely different order. Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1038.
Because disclosure of the secrets behind magic tricks does not receive copyright protection, and the perform and reveal sequence is also unprotectable, there is no substantial similarity in plot and sequence of events between the two works.
We also note that there are extensive differences in production value between the two works. It is beyond dispute that the Specials are more elaborate, have more specials effects, possess a larger cast, and are generally more visually appealing. Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1039.
The next step in evaluating Rice's claim for infringement is to examine the degree of access that defendants had to The Mystery Magician. Under the "inverse ratio rule," we "require a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of access is shown." Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990). However, even under our duty to construe inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party for purposes of summary judgment, see Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1044, Rice's evidence as to proof of access is insufficient to trigger the inverse ratio rule. We note that in other circumstances where we have applied the rule, see, e.g., Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361-62; Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1075, concession of access by the defendant to the plaintiff's copyrighted work was a prominent factor in our analysis.
Rice also claims that defendants were very much aware of The Mystery Magician through a very complex and intricate web of inferences. Rice claims that he gave copies of The Mystery Magician to Stephen Marks, his agent at ICM, and that Marks sent a copy of the video to Fox in 1987 as part of an attempt to procure a television special. Rice next claims that on visits to Marks at ICM he would often chat with Steve Wohl, a fellow agent at ICM, and that Wohl repeatedly told Rice that he "loved" the idea behind The Mystery Magician and that it would be a "smash hit." Because Wohl was Bruce Nash's agent, Rice infers from this relationship that Nash, who was an active participant along with Darnell in developing the Specials, had access to The Mystery Magician and draws a "thread" for the copying from Wohl to Nash, and finally to Darnell.
ICM and Wohl became the agent for defendant Nash of Nash Entertainment in 1989.
Nevertheless, Rice cites to Metcalf for the proposition that "[t]he cumulative weight of . . . similarities allows the [plaintiff] to survive summary judgment." 294 F.3d at 1074. In Metcalf, the plaintiff submitted his idea and script for a movie to the defendants who rejected the project, but subsequently produced a television series dealing with very similar issues. Both works involved overburdened county hospitals in innercity Los Angeles with mostly black staffs. Both dealt with poverty and urban blight, and featured very similar characters and plot developments. The court in Metcalf found the common elements and totality of similarities to raise a triable factual question of substantial similarity, even if the similarities when considered individually were unprotectable. Id. at 1073-74.
But here we are not presented with the same pattern of generic similarities as in Metcalf. And even more important, our decision in Metcalf was based on a form of inverse ratio rule analysis: the plaintiff's case was "strengthened considerably by [defendants'] concession of access to their works." Id. at 1075. In Metcalf, the writer and producer of the allegedly infringing work conceded that they had read the plaintiff's work. Here, there is no such concession of access as most of Rice's claims are based purely on speculation and inference. Because we are not confronted with the same totality of similarities and the same degree of access, this case is readily distinguishable from Metcalf.
The Metcalf court did not explicitly state that it was applying the inverse ratio rule; however, as noted above, the court found defendants' access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work to be an important factor in its substantial similarity analysis.
Under Fed.R.Evid. 702: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. . . ." In addition, we have recognized that "[t]he extrinsic test often requires analytical dissection of a work and expert testimony." Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 485.
Rice's federal false advertising claim is based on several alleged false statements and misrepresentations made by defendants in reference to the Specials. In order to prove a claim for false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), a claimant must establish:
See Cook, Perkiss, and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Here, the alleged false advertisements are a statement by the host of the Specials that "tonight, for the first time on television," we will reveal the incredible secret of sawing a woman in half, and statements contained on the jacket cover for the videotape version, including: "Magic's Biggest Secrets Finally Revealed," " Never Before has a magician dared to reveal the dark secrets behind the world's mystifying illusions," and "You've Always Wondered How They . . . Saw a woman in half . . . Now for the first time, you'll learn the secrets behind these and many, many more tricks and illusions." Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1047-48 (emphasis in original).
Defendants first argue that these alleged false statements are not even advertising, and therefore do not fall within the purview of the Lanham Act. We have previously held that representations constitute commercial advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act if they are:
Coastal Abstract Serv. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999). The statements contained on the video jacket readily satisfy this four-part criteria.
The alleged false statements made by the host, however, do not meet this test. The core notion of commercial speech is "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The claim that " tonight, for the first time on television . . ." was part of the show itself, and was not made in promotion or marketing of the Specials. Accordingly, it is not actionable as commercial advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act.
As for the alleged false statements contained on the video jacket, the question remains whether such statements were even material. The test is whether the "deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision. . . ." Cook, Perkiss, and Liehe, Inc., 911 F.2d at 244. The videotapes of the Specials were not sold in retail stores. Instead, a toll-free phone number appeared after the broadcasts on Fox inviting viewers to call and order a copy. As such, the videotape jacket could not be observed by potential consumers, and therefore could not influence the purchasing decision. While there is some evidence in the record that the videotapes were available for purchase over the Internet, the video jacket was never depicted on any of the websites. Accordingly, because there is no evidence that a potential consumer could view the offending videotape jacket prior to purchase, any deception relating to advertisement of the videos must be immaterial.
Because any false statements made by the host during the Specials do not constitute advertising, and any false statements made on the video jacket are immaterial, the district court erred in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on Rice's Lanham Act claim.
Accordingly we need not address defendants' additional arguments that the statements are in fact true, or alternatively merely constitute puffery.
As to Rice's state law claim, the California Unfair Business Practices Act defines unfair competition as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. . . ." Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200. Rice concedes that his unfair competition claim under § 17200 is dependent on his false advertisement claim under the Lanham Act: "The parties agree that they rise and fall together." Rice, 148 F.Supp.2d at 1068.
Because we conclude that the district court erred in not granting summary judgment to defendants on Rice's federal false advertising claim, we further conclude that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Rice's state unfair competition claim as well.
Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965 F.Supp. 1398, 1406-07 (E.D.Cal. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, independent of whether Rice's § 17200 claim "rise[s] and fall[s]" with his Lanham Act claim, Rice has not satisfied this threshold for a § 17200 claim because there is no evidence of a reasonable consumer being misled by defendants' alleged false statements.