Source: https://casetext.com/case/moore-v-meads-fine-bread-co
Timestamp: 2019-12-09 06:25:54
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Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co, 348 U.S. 115 | Casetext
348 U.S. 115 (1954)
Moorev.Mead's Fine Bread Co.
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In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954), the plaintiff sold bread locally, in competition with Mead's, a firm with bakeries in several States. Moore alleged that Mead's sold bread in his town at a price lower than that which it charged for bread delivered from its in-state plant to customers in an adjoining State. The Tenth Circuit held that Mead's activities were essentially local, and that if § 2(a) applied to them it would exceed Congress' commerce power.
Summary of this case from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.
reinstating jury verdict for plaintiff in damage suit under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a
Summary of this case from Elkins v. Gober
In Mead's, however, one of the discriminatory sales, the profits from which subsidized the local price-cutting campaign, was "in commerce" within the meaning of the Act.
Summary of this case from Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.
Argued November 17, 1954. Decided December 6, 1954.
Petitioner sued respondent for treble damages for violations of § 2 of the Clayton Act and § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. Petitioner was engaged in a purely intrastate bakery business. Respondent sold bread both locally and interstate, and, in the course of such business, maintained prices in interstate transactions but cut prices in intrastate transactions in petitioner's locality, thus driving petitioner out of business. There was ample evidence to support a finding of a purpose to eliminate a competitor. Held: Such practices are included in the scope of § 2 of the Clayton Act and § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, and a judgment for petitioner is sustained. Pp. 115-120.
This is a suit for treble damages, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S. c. § 15, brought for violations of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a), and of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a. The jury found for petitioner; the Court of Appeals reversed, 208 F.2d 777; and we granted certiorari, 347 U.S. 1012, because of the importance of the question of law presented.
The case first reached the court of Appeals on from a dismissal of the action at the close of plaintiff's case. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was precluded by petitioner's own illegal acts which initiated the alleged price discrimination. 184 F.2d 338. We granted a petition for certiorari, vacated that judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, 340 U.S. 211. See Moore v. Mead Service Co., 340 U.S. 944. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals receded from its former position, reversed the judgment dismissing the complaint, and remanded the case for trial. 190 F.2d 540.
For some months, petitioner and respondent were in competition in Santa Rosa. There is evidence that, on the threat of petitioner to move his bakery to another town, the local Santa Rosa merchants agreed to purchase petitioner's products exclusively. Respondent, labeling that action a boycott, cut the wholesale price of bread in Santa Rosa from 14 cents to 7 for a pound loaf and from 21 cents to 11 cents for a pound-and-a-half loaf. The Mead companies did not cut the prices of bread in any other town; and respondent did not cut its prices of bread in Farwell, Texas.
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a), provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, . . . to sell . . . goods in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States; or, to sell . . . goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
Those sections on their face seem to cover the instant case. Respondent is engaged in commerce, selling bread both locally and interstate. In the course of such business, it made price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate transactions and cutting the price in the intrastate sales. The destruction of a competitor was plainly established, as required by the amended § 2(a) of the Clayton Act; and the evidence to support a finding of purpose to eliminate a competitor, as required by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, was ample.
Respondent contends that the so-called boycott justified its price cutting. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214, we said, "If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured." We need not pursue the matter, for respondent obtained a charge on this phase of the case as to which it cannot complain. The District Court charged the jury that respondent would not be liable if the price cutting was "for the purpose of regaining its own market or of reestablishing competition and not to destroy competition or to eliminate a competitor."
The Court of Appeals read the antitrust laws as reaching local transactions only where: (1) the local restraint has an effect on the free flow of interstate trade or commerce ( e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111); or (2) the restraint on or the monopoly of local trade is effected through the utilization of interstate mechanisms ( e. g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143); or (3) local prices are fixed by the use of interstate commercial transactions ( e. g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293); or (4) the discriminatory sales are to purchasers who compete in interstate commerce ( e. g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726); or (5) interstate commerce is in some other way used to destroy competition or is injured or impaired as a result of unlawful acts.