Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/102629/colonnade-catering-corp-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-03-27 09:19:53
Document Index: 300244916

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5146', '§ 7342', '§ 5121', '§ 5146', '§ 7606', '§ 7342', '§ 5146', '§ 5146', '§ 7342']

Colonnade Catering Corp Vs United States - Citation 102629 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize Colonnade Catering Corp. Vs. United States - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/102629CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnFeb-25-1970Case Number397 U.S. 72AppellantColonnade Catering Corp.RespondentUnited StatesExcerpt:.....s. 72fn2|>2 of the majority opinion, affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. under 26 u.s.c. § 5146(b), agents may enter to inspect "any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises." the time when this may be done is fixed as "during business hours." section 7606 of 26 u.s.c. set forth in
s. 72fn2|>note 2 of the majority opinion, provides that agents may enter any building where taxable articles are kept, "so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects."
the government agents needed neither a warrant nor these statutes to secure entry to this place of business, since it was as open as any business establishment that seeks to sell goods and..... Judgment:
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States - 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
Congress, which has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures respecting the liquor industry, has made it an offense under 26 U.S.C. § 7342 for a liquor licensee to refuse admission to federal inspector, a sanction that precludes forcible entries without a warrant. Pp.
Petitioner, a licensee in New York authorized to serve alcoholic beverages and also the holder of a federal retail liquor dealer's occupational tax stamp, 26 U.S.C. § 5121(a), brought this suit to obtain the return of seized liquor and to suppress it as evidence. The District Court granted the relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. 410 F.2d 197. The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted, 396 U.S. 814, to review the decision in light of
It is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) [
] and in 26 U.S.C. § 7606 [
] that the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate has broad authority to enter and inspect the premises of retail dealers in liquors. [
] And in case of the refusal of a dealer to permit the inspection, it is provided in 26 U.S.C. § 7342:
359 U. S. 366
insofar as it permitted warrantless searches or inspections under municipal fire, health, and housing codes. The dictum that the provision for a fine on refusal to allow inspection made the use of force improper when there was no warrant was not disturbed, and the question is whether that dictum contains the controlling principle [
] for this case.
The Government, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment bans only "unreasonable searches and seizures," [
] relies heavily on the long history of the regulation of the liquor industry during pre-Fourth Amendment days, first in England and later in the American Colonies. It is pointed out, for example, that, in 1660, the precursor of modern-day liquor legislation was enacted in England [
] which allowed commissioners to enter, on demand, brewing houses at all times for inspection. Massachusetts had a similar law in 1692. [
] And in 1791, the year in which the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress imposed an excise tax on imported distilled spirits and on liquor distilled here, [
] under which law federal officers had broad powers to inspect distilling premises and the premises of the importer [
] without a warrant. From these and later laws and regulations governing the liquor industry, it is argued that Congress has been most solicitous in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud, and, to that end, has repeatedly granted federal agents power to make warrantless searches and seizures of articles under the liquor laws.
The Court recognized the special treatment of inspection laws of this kind in
We agree that Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand. The general rule laid down in
387 U. S. 545
-- is therefore not applicable here. In
we reserved decision on the problems of "licensing programs" requiring inspection, saying they can be resolved "on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness."
387 U. S. 546
Where Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply. We said in the
reflects this Nation's traditions that are strongly opposed to using force without definite authority to break down doors. We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspection. As respects that industry, and its various branches including retailers, Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures. Under the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a warrant. It resolved the issue not by authorizing forcible warrantless entries, but by making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the inspector.
And see United States v. Frisch,
140 F.2d 660, 662.
The controlling statutes, set out in notes
S. 72fn2|>2 of the majority opinion, affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. Under 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b), agents may enter to inspect "any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises." The time when this may be done is fixed as "during business hours." Section 7606 of 26 U.S.C. set forth in
person aggrieved by an
search and seizure may move the district court . . . for the return of the property . . . so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was
seized without warrant. . . ."
The majority, far from finding this search unreasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth Amendment, holds only that it was not authorized by 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606(a), [
] and that, therefore, the liquor must be returned. While these statutes do not in express terms authorize forcible breaking and entering to seize liquor kept in
violation of federal law, it is perfectly clear that they do not, in express terms, declare such seizure illegal, and, in my opinion, those provisions impliedly authorize exactly the type of official conduct involved here. I am confident that, when Congress said that federal liquor agents could search without a warrant and further provided for fines if the owner refused to permit such a search, [
] it also intended to authorize forcible entry and seizure if that became necessary. I do not think Congress needed to speak any more clearly than it already has. Since I cannot conclude that this search and seizure was illegal under either the Fourth Amendment or any Act of Congress, but was, to the contrary, carried out pursuant to congressional authorization, I would affirm the judgment below and hold that petitioner was not entitled to a return of the liquor.
397 U. S. 73
nn. 1, 2.
26 U.S.C. § 7342,