Source: https://www.scribd.com/doc/43698619/CCPOA-Supplemental-Brief-1-DCA
Timestamp: 2016-02-08 05:16:41
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Matched Legal Cases: ['art 1', 'art 1', '§ 220', '§ 220', '§ 224', 'art 1']

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StudiosDynamiteIDW PublishingKingstone ComicsMarvel ComicsSpace Goat ProductionsTop Cow ComicsTop Shelf ProductionsValiant Comics ZenescopeDifficultyBeginnerIntermediateAdvancedMixedInstrumentBrassDrums & PercussionGuitar, Bass, and FrettedPianoStringsVocalWoodwindsGenreClassicalCountryFolkJazz & BluesMovies & MusicalsPop & RockReligious & HolidayStandardsP. 1CCPOA Supplemental Brief, 1 DCACCPOA Supplemental Brief, 1 DCA|Views: 1,296|Likes: 0Published by Jon OrtizCCPOA's Nov. 19 filing to the 1st District Court of Appeal refutes Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's contention that "self-directed furloughs" are covered by the California Supreme Court's furlough ruling.CCPOA's Nov. 19 filing to the 1st District Court of Appeal refutes Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's contention that "self-directed furloughs" are covered by the California Supreme Court's furlough ruling.More info:Categories:Types, Business/Law, Court FilingsPublished by: Jon Ortiz on Nov 23, 2010Copyright:Attribution Non-commercialAvailability:Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.download as PDF, TXT or read online from ScribdFlag for inappropriate content|Add to collectionSee moreSee lesshttps://www.scribd.com/doc/43698619/CCPOA-Supplemental-Brief-1-DCA11/23/2010pdftextoriginal﻿On Petition for Writ of Mandate Challenging Order and Writ of Mandate of Alameda Superior Court, Case No.RG-09-441544 Honorable Frank Roesch Department 31 (510) 268-5105 , . No. A127292 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION 2 CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Real Party in Interest, vs. ARNOLD SCHW ARZENEGGER, in his capacity as Governor of the State of California, et al., Defendants/Petitioners. JOHN CHIANG, in his capacity as the Controller of the State of California Defendant/Real Party in Interest REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CCPOA)S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 'I Gregg McLean Adam, No. 203436 Jonathan Yank, No. 215495 Gonzalo C. Martinez, No. 231724 CARROLL, BURDICK & McDONOUGH LLP 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: 415.989.5900 Facsimile: 415.989.0932 Email: gadam@cbmlaw.com Attorneys for Real Party in Interest California Correctional Peace Officers' Association Daniel M Lindsay, No. 142895 CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION 755 Riverpoint Drive, Suite 200 West Sacramento, CA 95605-1634 Telephone: 916.372.6060 Facsimile: 916.340.9372 E-Mail: dan.lindsay@ccpoa.org No. A127292 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION 2 CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Real Party in Interest, vs. ARNOLD SCHW ARZENEGGER, in his capacity as Governor of the State of California, et al., Defendants/Petitioners. JOHN CHIANG, in his capacity as the Controller of the State of California Defendant/Real Party in Interest On Petition for Writ of Mandate Challenging Order and Writ of Mandate of Alameda Superior Court, Case No. RG-09-441544 Honorable Frank Roesch Department 31 (510) 268-5105 REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CCPOA'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF Gregg McLean Adam, No. 203436 Jonathan Yank, No. 215495 Gonzalo C. Martinez, No. 231724 CARROLL, BURDICK & McDONOUGHLLP 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: 415.989.5900 Facsimile: 415.989.0932 Email: gadam@cbmlaw.com Attorneys for Real Party in Interest California Correctional Peace Officers' Association DanielM. Lindsay, No. 142895 CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL PEACE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION 755 Riverpoint Drive, Suite 200 West Sacramento, CA 95605-1634 Telephone: 916.372.6060 Facsimile: 916.340.9372 E-Mail: dan.lindsay@ccpoa.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) I INTRODUCTION 1 II PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS FOUND THAT THE LEGISLATURE APPROVED THE TWO-DAY FURLOUGHS PROGRAM BASED ON THE FACIAL CHALLENGES BEFORE IT AND SUBJECT To THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE ......... 6 A. Professional Engineers Found the Governor Had No Authority to Furlough State Employees, but Deemed the Legislature As Having Approved Two-Day Furloughs in the February 2009 Budget Acts, Subject to the Single Subject Rule 8 B. The Governor's Third Furlough Day Was Not Approved by Professional Engineers And Was Expressly Rejected by the Legislature 10 C. The Trial Court's Factual Findings in CCPOA's AsApplied Challenge Distinguish This "Self-Directed" Program Case from the Two-Day Furlough Program Considered in Professional Engineers 12 III THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT RATIFY AN HOURLY WAGE REDUCTION AND COULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED SUCH AUTHORITY TO DEFENDANTS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE 15 A. The Legislature Did Not Consider Or Approve A Program That Reduced Hourly Wages Because Defendants' Implementation Plan Expressly Stated The Program Would Not Have That Effect 16 B. The Legislature Did Not Delegate Authority to Executive Officials to Adjust the Hourly Wages of Unit 6 Employees .... 17 CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -1- TABLE OF CONTENTS ( continued) Page(s) C. Had The Legislature Attempted To Delegate Authority To Agency Officials To Adjust Hourly Rates, That Would Be An Expansion of Defendants' Substantive Authority, Violating The Single Subject Rule 19 IV THE "SELF-DIRECTED" FURLOUGHS IMPOSED ON UNIT 6 WERE NOT RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURE BECAUSE SUCH RA TIFICATION WOULD ALSO VIOLATE THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE By ABROGATING EXISTING STATUTES NOT CONSIDERED IN PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS , ............•.......... 22 A. The Only Statutes Professional Engineers Deemed Applicable to Furloughs Constrained Executive Action, Not Legislative Action 24 B. Self-Directed Furloughs Are an Unauthorized Reduction Of Unit 6 Employees' Hourly Rates Violating Section 19826 25 C. The "Self-Directed" Furloughs Were Not Approved Because They Would Violate Labor Code Sections 212, 223, and 1171, et seq 27 D. The Labor Code Provisions at Issue Apply to the State as Employer and Defendants Have Waived any Contrary Argument 29 V CONCLUSION 34 CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -11- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) State Cases Association for Retarded Citizens-California v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Ca1.3d 384 21,23 Bearden v. Us. Borax, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.AppAth 429 34 California Lab. Federation v. Occupational Safety & Health Stds. Bd. (Ist Dist., Div. 2 1992) 5 Cal.AppAth 985 22,27 CCPOA v. State of California (Aug. 18,2010) 188 Cal.AppAth 646 30 City of Oakland v. Hassey (1st Dist. 2008) 163 Cal.AppAth 1477 32 In re Retirement Cases (1 st Dist. 2003) 110 Cal.AppAth 426 32 ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1985) 37 Ca1.3d 859 23 Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Ca1.4th 747 30 Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers' Assoc. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 115 Cal.AppAth 866 32 Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Ca1.4th 105 32 People v. Cole (2006) 38 Ca1.4th 964 34 CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -111- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187 23 Professional Engineers v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Ca1.4th 989 passim Social Services Union, Local 535 v. Board of Supervisors of Tulare County (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 279 32 Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Ca1.3d 211 30 State Statutes Government Code section 19824 4, 17,25,26 section 19826 2,4, 8, 9, 24, 25 Labor Code Division 2, Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 1 31,32,33,34 section 201 33,34 section 202 33, 34 section 212 25,27,29, 30, 35 section 219 33,34 section 220 31, 32, 33, 34 section 221 33 section 223 25,27,28,29, 30, 33 section 224 32, 33 section 226 33, 34 section 227.3 32 section 230.3 33, 34 section 1021.5 27 section 1171, et seq 25,27,29, 30 CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -lV- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ( continued) Page(s) 2008 Revised Budget Act Senate Bill3X 2(Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 2) enacted February 19, 2009 passim 2009 Budget Act Senate Bi113X 1 (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 1) enacted February 19, 2009 passim 2009 Revised Budget Act Assembly Bill4X 1 (Stats. 2009, 4th Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 1) enacted July 24,2009) 2,3, 10, 11, 12, 15,21 Constitutions California Constitution article IV, section 9 19 Legislative History Assem. Com. on Budget, Analysis of Assem. Bill. 4X 1 (2009-2010 4th Ex. Sess.), as amended July 23,2009 11 Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2410 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), 885 Stats. 2000 33 Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bi114X 1 (2009-2010 4th Ex. Sess.), as amended July 23,2009 11,21 CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -v- I INTRODUCTION CCPOA disagrees with Defendants' position that Professional Engineers v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Ca1.4th 9891 also decides this case in their favor. On the contrary, the facts and circumstances of this case distinguish it from the time-off-without-pay furloughs program upheld in Professional Engineers. Moreover, the reasoning of the Supreme Court, when applied to the time-on-without-pay "self-directed" program applied to Unit 6, dictates that the trial court's decision must be upheld. Professional Engineers considered facial challenges by three unions to the Governors' authority to implement the two-day-a-month furloughs program. As relevant here, the Supreme Court held that the Governor lacked authority to unilaterally implement a furloughs program that reduced state employees' work hours and pay by two-days per month. (Professional Engineers at pp. 64-65.) But the court ruled that the Legislature remedied that illegal executive action by (1) subsequently adopting appropriations reductions in the 2008 Revised Budget Act2 1 The page numbers cited herein are to the Slip Opinion. 2 Three budget acts are relevant to disposition of this case. The first two, the 2008 Revised Budget Act (Senate Bill3X 2 [Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 2]) and the initial 2009 Budget Act (Senate Bill3X 1 [Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 1]) (both enacted February 19,2009) were examined in Professional Engineers and are referred to hereinafter as CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -1- equivalent to the savings attributed to the furloughs program by the Governor and (2) providing "that the two-day-a-month furloughs program is a permissible means by which the specific [budgetary] reductions ... may be implemented." (Id. at p. 78.) Importantly, for purposes of this case, in finding for Defendants, the Professional Engineers court harmonized the Legislature's actions with the constitutional "single subject rule" by finding that the Legislature did "not substantively amend or change any existing statutory provision or expand or restrict the substantive authority of [the Governor or] any state agency .... " (See id. at p. 77.) This case is different. The trial court here considered an as- applied challenge to a significantly-different, so-called "self-directed" program and, based on the extensive factual record before it, found that Defendants' failure to pay employees for actual hours worked violated Government Code Section 19826 ("Section 19826") and various provisions of the Labor Code. (AA 7:1689-1694.) Specifically, the trial court found as a factual matter that the program effected a de facto reduction in the hourly wages of Unit 6 members because they were required to work on furlough days but had their pay reduced as though they did not. (AA "the February 2009 Budget Acts." The third budget act, the 2009 Revised Budget Act (Assembly Bill4X 1 [Stats. 2009, 4th Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 1 ]) (enacted July 24, 2009), was not considered in Professional Engineers. CBM-SF\sF496024.4 -2- 7:1689-1690.) In other words, this case does not involve actual furloughs, which Defendants themselves defined as "a temporary leave of absence without pay during a prescribed time for an employee." (AA 6:1432 [Feb. 11,2009 Memorandum to CDCR employees].) Defendants' position that the various budget acts cured the illegalities found by the trial court with respect to the "self-directed" program for Unit 6 employees fails for at least the following four reasons: 1. The Legislature did not authorize Defendants to withhold pay from state employees for actual time worked. Nor did it reduce the hourly rate of Unit 6 employees. (While legitimate savings were reaped from the many Unit 6 employees who were timely permitted to take their furlough days [i.e., did not work on furlough days], this case concerns those who were not permitted to take the time off.) The Legislature did not consider or approve reducing the hourly wages of Unit 6 employees because Defendants' furloughs-implementation memoranda expressly stated that the furloughs program would not reduce hourly wages. Yet, as the trial court found, the Unit 6 "self-directed" program, as implemented, did effect a de facto reduction in hourly wages for many employees. 2. The Legislature itself never approved a third furlough day, nor did Professional Engineers, and the legislative history of the 2009 Revised Budget Act makes plain that the Legislature considered and rejected the Governor's three-day a month furloughs program. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -3- 3. There was no delegation by the Legislature to DPA or CDCR officials to effectuate an hourly wage reduction or to require Unit 6 employees and supervisors to work unpaid on furlough days. a. Even if the Legislature had contemplated delegating such power to DP A and CDCR, that expansion of substantive authority in a budget act would have violated the single subject rule. (See Professional Engineers at p. 77 ["the budget bill ... may not constitutionally be used to grant authority to a state agency that the agency does not otherwise possess"] [internal quotations and citations omitted].) b. Because no such delegation in a budget act could have passed constitutional muster, Defendants' reduction of Unit 6 employees' pay without reduced work hours violated Section 19826 and the Labor Code, as the trial court found. 4. Components of the furloughs program that may be deemed ratified by the Legislature are limited to those that may be harmonized with the constitutional single subject rule, because the Legislature was acting through a budget bill. Professional Engineers did not consider whether specific iterations of Defendants's furlough plan, such as the "self-directed" plan for Unit 6, might violate or abrogate Government Code Section 19824 (which requires monthly payment of wages for all hours worked) or the Labor Code statutes at issue in this case. The court's reasoning, however, CBM-SF\sF496024.4 -4- makes clear that because the Legislature ratified the two-day furloughs program in budget acts it could not abrogate these statutes or sanction their violation. (See Professional Engineers at p. 77 ["the budget bill ... may not constitutionally be used to ... substantively amend and change existing statut[ory] law"] [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Equitable considerations also distinguish this case from Professional Engineers. It is one thing for the Supreme Court to rule narrowly, during a fiscal crisis, that Defendants did not have to pay state employees who did not work. (If Professional Engineers had not found implicit legislative approval for the furloughs, the State may have been compelled to pay employees for days on which they did not work.) But it is altogether another thing to read Professional Engineers to permit the state employer to withhold payment from those who did work. The trial court reached the right decision legally and equitably, and this Court should affirm. If Defendants' overbroad position is adopted, this Court would have to read the budget acts as not only reducing appropriations, but also as repealing or vitiating the sections of the Government Code and Labor Code that provide wage and hour protections to those Unit 6 employees who were compelled to work unpaid for up to three days per month. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -5- II PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS FOUND THAT THE LEGISLATURE ApPROVED THE TWO-DAY FURLOUGHS PROGRAM BASED ON THE FACIAL CHALLENGES BEFORE IT AND SUBJECT To THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE The reasoning in Professional Engineers as applied to the facts of this case requires that the trial court decision be affirmed. The Legislature's approval of the two-day furloughs program in a budget act is necessarily limited by the constitutional single subject rule. The Court in Professional Engineers acknowledged this in narrowly approving a furlough plan that it viewed as consistent with the single subject rule because such program did not "grant authority to a state agency that the agency does not otherwise possess or to substantively amend and change existing statut[ory] law." (Professional Engineers at p. 77 [internal quotation and citations omitted].) As noted above, Professional Engineers was a facial challenge to the two-day furlough program decided on a limited factual record. (See Professional Engineers at pp. 2-3, 8-10.) Few, if any, of the issues raised in the present case were briefed or before the Supreme Court. As CCPOA explained in its prior briefing, this case does not challenge the Governor's authority to implement furloughs. Instead, CCPOA challenges the manner of implementation of the Unit 6 "self-directed" program to the extent it CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -6- resulted in employees receiving no pay for actual hours worked or payment in the form of a furlough credit with no cash value.' In light of the facts of this case, the most relevant components of Professional Engineers are not that the two-day furloughs program was validated ex post by the Legislature. Rather, the components of the Supreme Court's decision that are relevant here are those that: (1) held that the Governor had no authority to unilaterally furlough or otherwise reduce employee salaries; (2) reaffirmed established limits on what the Legislature can accomplish in a budget act consistent with the constitutional single subject rule; and (3) found that the two-day furlough program before it did not run afoul of the single subject rule because it did not grant "authority to a state agency that the agency does not otherwise possess or to substantively amend and change existing statut[ ory] law." (Professional Engineers at p. 77 [internal quotation and citations omitted].) 3 Thus this case only concerns Unit 6 employes who could not timely take furlough days. (See, e.g., Defs.' AOB at p. 10 [relying on statistical evidence to argue "over 20,800 CDCR BU 6 employees have used 50% or more of their accumulated furlough hours"].) CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -7- A. Professional Engineers Found the Governor Had No Authority to Furlough State Employees, but Deemed the Legislature As Having Approved Two-Day Furloughs in the February 2009 Budget Acts, Subject to the Single Subject Rule In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court found that the Governor had no authority to unilaterally implement the furloughs program (Professional Engineers at pp. 3; id. at pp. 26-27 [rejecting Governor's constitutional authority to impose furloughs]; id. at pp. 40-60 [rejecting Governor's authority under certain Government Code statutes]; id. at pp. 65-68 [rejecting Governor's authority pursuant to relevant MOUs]), and further found that the furloughs program violated Government Code Section 19826 (id. at pp. 57-60; id. at 60 ["the authority or lack of authority of the Governor or the DP A unilaterally to institute the [two-day furloughs] program must be determined under the provisions of section 19826"]). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the February 2009 Budget Acts remedied the Governor's ultra vires actions by approving the two-day furlough program of reduced hours and commensurate reductions in pay as a permissible means to implement the Legislature's reduction in appropriations for employee compensation. (See id. at p. 78.) In particular, the court construed the budget acts as approving such reductions through the "then-existing furlough plan." (Id. at p. 72).4 4 Although Professional Engineers once mentions "self-directed" furloughs CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -8- Although the court had found that Government Code Section 19826 was violated when the Governor implemented the furloughs program (id. at pp. 60, 64-65), it explained that the Legislature's subsequent acceptance of the two-day furlough program did not violate that statute, because Section 19826 does not constrain legislative action relating to state employee salaries. (See id. at pp. 78-79 ["Section 19826 places no limitation upon the Legislature's authority to increase or reduce the payor salaries of state employees, and section 3.90 [of the 2008 Revised Budget Act] represents an exercise of the Legislature's reserved authority over state-employee compensation"] [italics omitted].) Professional Engineers further found that the Legislature's acceptance of the two-day furlough plan in the February 2009 Budget Acts did not violate the single subject rule because it did not "substantively amend or change any existing statutory provision or expand or restrict the substantive authority of any state agency. . . . In particular, section 3.90 of the ... Budget Act does not alter the provisions of Government Code section 19826 or purport to grant the Governor or the DP A authority to impose unpaid furloughs unilaterally .... " (Id. at pp. 77-78.) Thus, (Professional Engineers at p. 9), the decision makes clear that the court understood such "self-directed" furloughs at face value-i.e., time offwith a reduction in pay where an employee used his or her furlough day within the same month. CBM ·SF\SF496024.4 -9- Professional Engineers found that the Legislature's acceptance of the two- day furloughs program was lawful, because the program did not violate the single subject rule-that is, the approved program did not amend or contravene existing statutes, or grant the executive branch additional authority. B. The Governor's Third Furlough Day Was Not Approved by Professional Engineers And Was Expressly Rejected by the Legislature Defendants acknowledge that the legality of the third furlough day was not decided by Professional Engineers, but they maintain that the court's rationale nonetheless validates the third furlough day.' That argument, however, is flatly contradicted by the legislative history of the 2009 Revised Budget Act. There, the Legislature unequivocally rejected the Governor's proposal to add a third furlough day. Professional Engineers read Section 3.90 of the various budget acts as legislative directives on how "reductions in [ appropriations for] employee compensation are to be achieved." (See, e.g., Professional Engineers at pp. 12-15 [examining Section 3.90 of, respectively, 2008 Revised Budget Act, 2009 Budget Act, and 2009 Revised Budget Act].) 5 The third furlough day was not at issue in the cases decided by Professional Engineers, all of which predated the implementation of the first two furlough days. In the instant case, CCPOA amended its complaint to include a challenge to the third furlough day. (AA 2:476-494.) CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -10- But unlike the February 2009 Budget Acts at issue in Professional Engineers, the legislative history of the 2009 Revised Budget Act makes plain that the Legislature did not intend therein for appropriation reductions in employee compensation to be achieved through a salary cut or a third furlough day: Employee Compensation. Rejects the Governor's proposal to reduce salaries bv five percent - therebv maintaining a two-dav furlough (or all employees. [/p] Assumes some savings that will be achieved if proposed labor agreements are not ratified by the Legislature. General Fund savings are estimated at $60 million in 2008-09 and $150 million in 2009-10. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bi1l4X 1 (2009-2010 4th Ex. Sess.), as amended July 23,2009, page 13, par. 4 [italics and emphases added], hereafter "Senate Floor Analysis A.B. 4X 1; see CCPOA's Motion to Take Judicial Notice.")? (See also Professional Engineers at pp. 72-73 [relying on enate and Assembly floor analyses to construe 2008 Revised Budget Act].) 6 The Assembly floor analysis also supports this reading of the 2009 Revised Budget Act, although it appears to contain a scriveners' error. That analysis summarizes the Senate's amendments to the 2009 Budget Act as "Reflect[ing] $850 million in savings achieved by the Governor's executive order two additional furlough days." (Assem. Com. on Budget, Analysis of Assem. Bill. 4X 1 (2009-2010 4th Ex. Sess.), as amended July 23,2009, par. 14; see CCPOA's Motion to Take Judicial Notice.) The Governor's July 1,2009 executive order only proposed one additional furlough day (See AA 5:1038), and thus the Assembly analysis is best understood as reflecting the Senate's intention to achieve "savings" through "two. .. furlough days." CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -11- Simply stated, the Legislature itselfrejected a third furlough day. Professional Engineers at p. 73 found that legislative floor analyses of the February 2009 Revised Budget Acts contained tacit approval of the two- day furlough program. Whereas, conversely, the" floor analyses of the 2009 Revised Budget Act shows clear rejection of the third furlough day. Thus, Defendants' argument that Section 3.90 (as amended by Section 552) reflected legislative approval of the third furlough day has no merit. 7 c. The Trial Court's Factual Findings in CCPOA's AsApplied Challenge Distinguish This "Self-Directed" Program Case from the Two-Day Furlough Program Considered in Professional Engineers The trial court's factual findings'' regarding the Unit 6 "self- directed" program fundamentally distinguish this case from the furloughs program examined in Professional Engineers.' Specifically, the 7 Although the Legislature reduced appropriations for employee compensation in the 2009 Revised Budget Act, Defendants ignore that such reduced appropriations could be achieved by other means of reducing employee compensation. Although those means are not specified, the legislative history described above makes it clear that the Legislature rejected achieving those savings through a 5% a salary reduction or by adding a third furlough day. (See Department of Personnel Administration v. Superior Ct. ( Greene) (1992) 5 Cal.App .4th 155 [Legislature's reduced appropriations for employee compensation does not constitute legislative - approval of 5% salary rate reduction for represented state employees].) 8 As noted in CCPOA's prior briefing, the trial court's factual findings are entitled to substantial weight. (See Opp. Brief at pp. 7-8 [noting "the trial court already weighed th[ e] evidence, and its factual determinations are entitled to substantial deference"] [citing cases].) 9 Defendants misrepresent the relief granted by the trial court. The trial CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -12- Legislature could not approve the "self-directed" program through a budget act because to do so would require repeal or vitiation of the numerous Government and Labor Code sections requiring timely and full payment of wages for hours worked. , First, as CCPOA summarized in its Opposition Brief, the trial court weighed the evidence before it and found that correctional employees worked the same hours under the "self-directed" program but were paid 13.5%) less. (Opp. Brief at pp. 2, 15-19; AA 7: 1689-1690 ["[h]ere, all correctional employees have had their salaries reduced, but few have seen their hours reduced by a concomitant amount, either when viewed overall or within a pay period"].) Second, the trial court found that the "self-directed" program unlawfully deferred employee compensation into the future through the use of furlough credits. (See AA 7: 1692- 1694 [finding the furloughs program "reduced the wages of employees with the promise of time off at some later undetermined date"]; AA 7: 1687- 1688.) Thus, although Defendants expressly stated that its program did not reduce the hourly rate, the trial court found, as a factual matter, that hourly wages were reduced because pay was reduced across the board, regardless of whether an employee was able to take furlough days off. court issued a writ of mandate directing Defendants to pay, prospectively, Unit 6 employees for all hours worked. (AA 7:1761.) It did not direct CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -13- (See AA 7: 1692-1693 ["for those pay periods in which an employee works more hours than those for which he or she is compensated at the regular rate of pay, that constitutes a reduction in salary [rate]"].) In its prior briefing, CCPOA presented a hypothetical describing how the "self-directed" program worked in practice for Unit 6: Correctional Officers A and B both have their salaries reduced the same 13.5%. Officer A takes her three furlough days off; Officer B cannot. But whether Officer B takes two, one or no furlough days off, her salary is effectively reduced as though she worked three fewer days, thus reducing her average hourly rate. (See Opp. Brief at p. 28 [further noting that "this hypothetical occurs for at least 85%" of Unit 6 employees].) This example demonstrated that, under the "self-directed" program for Unit 6, employee hourly rate of pay fluctuated on a month-to-month basis. But the full implication of this hypothetical only comes to light after Professional Engineers: CDCR officials charged with deciding whether affected employees can take 0, 1, 2, or 3 furlough days thereby control employees' hourly rates of pay." As explained below, while the Legislature could, in the February 2009 Budget Acts, approve an existing furloughs program (i.e., time off) as Defendants to stop using self-directed furloughs. 10 The employee who can take all three furlough days per month will retain hislher hourly rate of pay; whereas the employee who takes two furloughs days in a month will have a lower hourly rate, with the employees who take CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -14- a means of achieving budgetary savings, it could not substantively expand the executive branch's authority and/or amend or repeal existing statutes. III THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT RATIFY AN HOURLY WAGE REDUCTION AND COULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED SUCH AUTHORITY TO DEFENDANTS WITHOUT VIOLATING THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE Professional Engineers confirmed that only the Legislature can reduce wage rates or the total compensation of represented employees. (Professional Engineers at pp. 28-35 [discussing Greene, supra,S Cal. App.4th 155]). Yet, as the trial court found, the consequence of the Unit 6 "self-directed" program was an hourly wage rate reduction. (AA 7: 1692- 1693.) The Legislature, however, did not actually approve such a reduction in the February 2009 Budget Acts because Defendants always maintained that the furloughs program would not reduce employees' hourly rate of pay. Moreover, the Legislature did not and could not have constitutionally delegated any salary-adjusting authority to CDCR (or DP A) through any budget act. one or no furlough days per month will have a yet lower hourly rate of pay. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -15- A. The Legislature Did Not Consider Or Approve A Program That Reduced Hourly Wages Because Defendants' Implementation Plan Expressly Stated The Program Would Not Have That Effect Professional Engineers deemed the Legislature to have approved the existing furloughs program in the February 2009 Budget Acts. A reduction of state employees' hourly wages, however, was not before the Legislature when it considered those acts. (Id. at p. 68.) The "Governor's furlough plan" defined a furlough as "a temporary leave of absence without pay during a prescribed time for an employee." (AA 6:1432 [Feb. 11,2009 Memorandum to CDCR employees]; AA 7:1434 ["The employee's base salary rate will not change-the actual payment will be reduced by the equivalent of two days."].) Defendants have maintained throughout this litigation, with reference to their furloughs memoranda, that affected "[e]mployees' wage rates or salary ranges have not been reduced as a result of the self-directed furloughs. A furlough only constitutes a reduction in hours worked, not a reduction in the wage rate paid for that work." (See AA 5:1219 [Defs.' Trial Court Opp. Brief]; Defs.' Opening Brief ("AOB") atp. 20; Defs.' Replyatp. 7.) The furloughs memoranda, through which the "Governor's furlough plan" was implemented, have invariably provided that the "self- directed" program reduced employees' work hours and pay by two (and later three) days. (AA 6:1428, 1432; AA 5:1039-1042 [July 2,2009 DPA CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -16- Memo re third furlough day]; AA 6:1450-1454 [July 8, 2009 Memo to CDCR employees re third furlough day].) Employees unable to use furlough days in a given month were paid with "furlough credits" to be used as time off in the future. (AA 6:1426-1428, 1450-1454.) Defendants assert that furlough credits maintain the hourly rate. (RT 30-3].) But this argument disregards Section 19824's requirement (discussed below at Section IV.B.) that employees be paid monthly for all preceding hours worked. (AA 1218-1220; see also AOB p. 20.) Thus, notwithstanding Defendants' broad reading of Professional Engineers, the Legislature's approval of the "Governor's furloughs plan" in the February 2009 Budget Acts could only encompass (1) a reduction in hours worked by employees and (2) a commensurate reduction in pay-in accordance with the furloughs program Defendants proposed and purported to implement-and could not reasonably have included approving reduced and fluctuating hourly rates for employees who are unable to take timely furlough days. - B. The Legislature Did Not Delegate Authority to Executive Officials to Adjust the Hourly Wages of Unit 6 Employees The Legislature's approval of the "Governor's furlough plan" in the February 2009 Budget Acts did not delegate authority to agency officials to adjust Unit 6 members' wage rates. Under the Unit 6 "self- directed" program, employees could take furlough days off only with the CBM -SF\SF496024A -17- approval of their supervisors. (See AA 6:1426,1432, 1444, 1450; 5:1039 [supervisors determine whether Unit 6 employees take furlough days].) Such requests were (and are) routinely denied. (See AA 7:1689-90; AA 3:602,634-708 and AA 4:936-994; see especially AA 3:663,670-671, 681, 687-688 and AA 4:937,954,956,960,966-968 [documenting denials of requests to use furlough days].) Yet, because Unit 6 salaries were uniformly reduced by 13.5% regardless of whether individual supervisors allowed employees to take 0, 1, 2, or 3 furlough days off, hourly rates were necessarily reduced and varied (a) from month-to-month and (b) among otherwise similarly-situated employees. For example, in CCPOA's hypothetical involving Correctional Officers A and B (see, supra, Part II.C; Opp. Brief at p. 28), under the "self-directed" program applied to Unit 6, both officers have their takehome salaries reduced by 13.5%, but only Officer A is able to take her three furlough days off. Officer B is allowed to take two, one or no furlough days off, but her salary is reduced as if she had taken three furlough days, thus reducing her average hourly rate. The Legislature nowhere delegated its sole power to effectuate changes in employee salary rates to such agency officials, nor could it. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -18- c. Had The Legislature Attempted To Delegate Authority To Agency Officials To Adjust Hourly Rates, That Would Be An Expansion of Defendants' Substantive Authority, Violating The Single Subject Rule Under the reasoning of Professional Engineers, if the "self- directed" program Defendants implemented had reduced Unit 6 employees' hours commensurate with the reduction in their wages, the Legislature's approval in the February 2009 Budget Acts would have cured the illegalities. Equally, if Defendants' "self-directed" program had proposed to reduce hourly rates uniformly for Unit 6, the Legislature's approval might also be deemed as having remedied an otherwise illegal executive action. But Defendants' "self-directed" program did not reduce hours commensurately with wages for thousands of Unit 6 employees; nor did it effectuate a uniform reduction in hourly pay. What it did, as described above, was create an unlawful procedure whereby employees' hourly rates are adjusted on a monthly basis through the discretionary decisions of DP A and CDCR officials. Such a delegation of legislative authority cannot be achieved through a budget act due to the single subject rule. The single subject rule is embodied in article IV, section 9 of the California Constitution and provides: "A statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." "[T]he budget bill may deal only with the one subject of appropriations to support the annual budget, CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -19- and thus may not constitutionally be used [1.] to grant authority to a state agency that the agency does not otherwise possess or [2.] to substantively amend and change existing statut[ory] law." (Professional Engineers, at p. 77 [internal quotations, brackets, and citations omitted].) In particular, Professional Engineers found that the February 2009 Budget Acts' approval of the two-day furloughs program avoided constitutional infirmities because it did not "purport to grant the Governor or the DP A" any additional authority-it merely approved an already-implemented reduction in work hours as a permissible means of meeting a reduction in appropriations. (ld. at pp. 78, 80 ["The Legislature exercised its own authority to ratify furloughs, and did not need to expand or modify preexisting executive authority in order to do so"]; id. ["section 3.90 [of the Budget Act] ... should not be interpreted to expand or modify the Governor's or the DPA's authority, under preexisting statutes, in a manner that would raise constitutional questions under the single subject rule"]') If, as Defendants advance, the Legislature approved the "selfdirected" program for Unit 6, such approval would constitute a delegation of legislative authority to CDCR officials to change state employee wage rates. As Justice Corrigan explained in her concurring opinion: "The Legislature has retained considerable authority over matters of state employee compensation, but is not free to disregard statutory restrictions and grant agencies new authority in a budget bill." (Concurring CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -20- Professional Engineers at p. 1.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has flatly rejecfed such expansions of agency authority in a budget act. (See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens-California v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Ca1.3d 384,394-395 [rejecting agency's interpretation of certain language in 1992 Budget Act as instructing director of agency to offer spending guidance to regional developmental centers because such reading would violate the single subject rule since, under existing statutory scheme, the agency's authority did not extend to control over developmental centers' operations or the violation].) Relatedly, the legislative history of the 2009 Revised Budget Act demonstrates that when the Legislature contemplates that "statutory changes" are necessary to implement a budget act, it will provide for such changes through trailer bills. (See Senate Floor Analysis A.B. 4X 1, pp. 1- 2 ["Below by major subject area, are some of the significant reductions that are reflected in this bill. Statutory changes needed to activate some of these reductions are typically in one of the several budget trailer bills"] [italics added].) Having established that Defendants had no authority to effectuate an hourly wage reduction, and that the Legislature could not have delegated such authority to DP A or CDCR in a budget act, such reduction necessarily violated the statutes at issue in this case. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -21- IV THE "SELF-DIRECTED" FURLOUGHS IMPOSED ON UNIT 6 WERE NOT RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURE BECAUSE SUCH RATIFICATION WOULD ALSO VIOLATE THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE By ABROGATING EXISTING STATUTES NOT CONSIDERED IN PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS Since the Legislature did not approve an hourly rate reduction- not directly and not by delegating such authority to any agency- Defendants' argument that the Legislature ratified the "self-directed" program runs afoul of the single subject rule because it would mean the Legislature impliedly amended or repealed the statutes at issue here. "[T]he Legislature may not use the Budget Act to expressly or impliedly amend or repeal existing substantive statutes." (See California Lab. Federation v. Occupational Safety & Health Stds. Bd. (1st Dist., Div. 2 1992) 5 Ca1.AppAth 985,990.) Whether a budget act, effects an amendment of existing law ... is . determined not by title alone, or by declarations in the new act that it purports to amend existing law. On the contrary, it is determined by an examination and comparison of its provisions with existing law. If its aim is to ... reach situations which were not covered by the original statute, the act is amendatory, even though in its wording it does not purport to amend the language of the prior act. (Id. 990-991 [internal citations and quotations omitted] [italics added].) This Court has recognized that the budget act is particularly susceptible to such misuse. (See id. 991 ["[t]he Budget Act is a complex measure whose passage is essential, and as such is particularly susceptible to abuse"].) CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -22- Animated by those concerns, our courts have consistently rejected construing the budget act as impliedly amending or repealing existing law. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 994-996 [holding that provisions in 1990 and 1991 Budget Acts purporting to impose an hourly rate cap on attorneys' fees statute violated the single subject rule because such provisions impermissibly amended the statute's "reasonable fee" cap]; Association for Retarded Citizens-California, supra, 38 Ca1.3d at pp. 394- 395; Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1200-1201 [holding the 1986 Budget Act violated the single subject rule because it contained restrictive language regarding the use of family planning funds which was in effect an impermissible amendment to the Family Planning Act]; cf. ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1985) 37 Ca1.3d 859, 864-866 [refusing to construe Proposition 13 as rolling back unit taxation of public utility property to 1976 assessments because such an interpretation would (1) violate the single subject rule because Proposition 13 only applies to real property taxation, and (2) "would pro tanto impliedly repeal" specific constitutional provision requiring unit taxation be based on annual assessment]. ) Moreover, as noted above, when the Legislature anticipates "statutory changes" are necessary to implement a budget bill, such changes CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -23- are included in trailer bills, and Defendants do not point to any trailer bills amending or repealing the statutes at issue in this case. A. The Only Statutes Professional Engineers Deemed Applicable to Furloughs Constrained Executive Action, Not Legislative Action As previously explained, the Professional Engineers court held that the Legislature's ratification of the "Governor's furlough plan" did not violate the single subject rule because it did not "alter the provisions of Government Code section 19826 or purport to grant the Governor or DPA authority to impose unpaid furloughs unilaterally." (Professional Engineers at p. 78.) Specifically, the court found that Section 19826 did not constrain the Legislature's actions because that statute only limits the authority of the executive branch to adjust salaries-not the Legislature's authority. (Id. at pp. 78-79 ["Section 19826 places no limitation upon the Legislature's authority to increase or reduce the payor salaries of state employees"] [italics original]; see also Section 19826 ["Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the department shall not establish, adjust or recommend a salary range" for represented state employees] [italics added].) Because Section 19 826(b) reflects a reservation of legislative authority, a reduction in appropriations for employee salaries by the Legislature necessarily neither abrogated nor amended that statute. Notably, the Supreme Court did not consider whether the single subj ect rule would prevent the Legislature, in a budget bill, from approving CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -24- actions violating or overriding the statutes before this Court: Government Code section 19824 (requiring payment for all hours worked at the end of each month) and Labor Code Sections 212 (requiring payment in cash or negotiable equivalent), 223 (requiring payment at the full legally-required hourly rate), and 1171, et seq. (requiring payment of at least the minimum wage for each hour worked). Unlike Section 19826(b), these statutes do not contain reservations oflegislative power. Thus, Professional Engineers' determination that Section 19826 did not prevent the Legislature from approving in a budget bill "real" furloughs (time off commensurate with a pay reduction) cannot be extended to authorize any action-executive or legislative-that would amend or abrogate these substantive statutes because of the single subject rule. B. Self-Directed Furloughs Are an Unauthorized Reduction Of Unit 6 Employees' Hourly Rates Violating Section 19826 The Legislature never authorized the reduction of Unit 6 employees' hourly wages and, consistent with the single subject rule, cannot have authorized Defendants to do so. The reasoning of Professional Engineers makes clear that the Supreme Court did not therein consider the legality of a "self-directed" program-like that Defendants imposed on Unit 6 employees-where employees are unable to take furlough days off in the same month accrued, but have their pay reduced as if they had. First, the Supreme Court found CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -25- that, in the facial challenges before it, "the mandatory furlough program did not alter an affected state employee's hourly rate of pay." (Professional Engineers at p. 59 [italics original].) This is a significant distinction from the instant case because the trial court found that the "self-directed" program reduced hourly wages. (AA 7:1692.) The Court in Professional Engineers also was not confronted with a potential violation of Section 19824, which requires that state employee salaries be paid monthly. (See Government Code section 19824.) Although the court cited Section 19824 in a footnote quoting from Greene, which explained that the statute "governed the frequency of pay" for state employees (see Professional Engineers at p. 31 n.18), the court did not address the effect of the statute on Defendants' "self-directed" program because it was unnecessary to do so when considering the Governor's twoday furloughs plan where employees' work hours and pay were reduced in the same month. The reasoning of Professional Engineers cannot support a finding of legislative approval of a "self-directed" program that required employees to work their full schedules while reducing their pay and providing furlough credits to be taken in the future. Legislative ratification of such a program would violate the single subject rule, because it would require the implied repeal or vitiation of Section 19824' s mandate that employees be paid their full salaries for all hours worked at the end of each pay period. CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -26- C. The "Self-Directed" Furloughs Were Not Approved Because They Would Violate Labor Code Sections 212, 223, and 1171, et seq. The Court in Professional Engineers also did not consider the Labor Code statutes at issue here, nor whether approval of the "self- directed" program would impact these mandates in violation of the single subject rule. Substantively, because the trial court found there was a de facto reduction in the hourly rate of pay, Labor Code sections 212, 223 and 1171, et seq. are violated for the reasons explained in CCPOA's briefs. (See Opp. at pp. 28-36 [Lab. C. section 223]; id. at pp. 37-43 [Lab. C. section 1171, et seq.]; id. at pp. 47-49 and Sur-Reply at pp. 1-5 [Lab. C. section 212].) The Legislature cannot, in a budget bill, take away or substantively limit rights it created. (See California Lab. Federation, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 995-996 ["the Legislature is presumptively free to limit attorney's fee awards under section 1021.5. What the Legislature may not do is grant a substantive right to fees, as it has done in section 1021.5, and then retract or impair the right thus granted through amendments masquerading as Budget Act provisions"] [italics in original].) . Professional Engineers does not change the reasons why the trial court correctly ruled in CCPOA's favor on the Labor Code claims. As explained above, in the various budget acts, the Legislature did not purport to amend any statutes or sanction their violation; nor could it do so consistent with the constitutional single-subject rule. Defendants' facile CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -27- reading of Professional Engineers ignores these important constitutional limitations and does not explain how the Legislature could endorse the "self-directed" program when that program violates existing statutes. Defendants argue the trial court's analysis regarding Labor Code section 223 and the applicable wage rates was invalidated by Professional Engineers+' Defendants are mistaken. Although it is true the Legislature exercised its authority not to fully fund the MOUs of the three unions in that case (see Professional Engineers at pp. 68-69), the de funding described in Professional Engineers involved a reduction in take-home salary, not a reduction in hourly rate or wage scales. (See, e.g., id. at p. 59 ["the mandatory furlough program did not alter an affected state employee's hourly rate of pay"] [italics in original].) This confirms the court did not address hourly rates of pay, but rather take-home pay because the furlough program the court considered was one where employees took two days off and received two days less pay. In sum, the Legislature's defunding of the MODs left intact the pre-existing hourly rates and wage scales and merely reduced take-home pay to reflect the two-day furlough program. Unit 6's wage scales, as described in the Opposition Brief at pp. 30-33 are both statutory and contractual. The Legislature, as described CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -28- above, did not change these rates when it approved the two-day furlough program. The reasoning of Professional Engineers also does not change the nature or the value of these hourly rates because the court contemplated a program of time off commensurate with a reduction in pay. Simply stated, even though the Legislature approved a two-day furlough of state employees, it did not change the hourly rate for employees who were required to work. To the extent employees were unable to take furlough days and, thus, worked their full schedules, Defendants are obligated to pay these employees for their work and at their full hourly rate. 12 D. The Labor Code Provisions at Issue Apply to the State as Employer and Defendants Have Waived any Contrary Argument Defendants argue that Labor Code section 223 does not apply to the state employer-resurrecting a previously-abandoned argument that falls outside the scope of this Court's request for supplemental briefing. Regardless, Defendants are incorrect. 11 In their Supplemental Brief, Defendants do not further dispute that the self-directed furloughs program violates Labor Code Sections 1171, et seq. and 212. 12 CCPOA noted in its prior briefing that the previous wage scales remained in effect "absent a new legislative enactment." (Opp. Brief at p. 32.) The Legislature'S defunding of the MOUs is not such an enactment because, as explained above, the de funding was to reflect commensurate reductions in work hours and consequent take home pay. CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -29- First, Defendants' argument is waived because it was not adequately raised and supported in their opening brief. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Ca1.3d 211,216 n.4 [noting argument raised before trial court but not on appeal "may therefore be deemed waived"]; see also Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Ca1.4th 747, 761 nA [appellate courts may properly refuse to consider arguments raised for the first time on reply].) (See also Opp. Brief at p. 29 [noting Defendants do not contest Labor Code section 223 applies to state employer]; Defs.' Reply Brief at p. 11 [acknowledging Labor Code inapplicability argument was not made in opening brief].) Furthermore, Defendants' argument is beyond the scope of this Court's briefing request. (See October 7,2010 Request ["additional briefing addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision may be submitted"],) This Court should also reject Defendants' reliance on Division 4's decision in CCPOA v. State of California (Aug. 18,2010) 188 Cal.AppAth 646. First, that decision did not decide that Labor Code section 223 does not apply to the State Employer.l'' Next, Defendants' overbroad reading of that decision is at odds with settled law of this district 13 Notably, Defendants do not argue that, after CCPOA v. State of California, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th 646, Labor Code sections 1171, et seq. and 212 do not apply to the state employer, and thus effectively concede they do apply. CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -30- and this division. As relevant here, Division 4 opined that certain exemptions found in Labor Code section 220 did not make "the entirety of chapter 1 [of the Labor Code] to be generally applicable to public entities." (Id. at p. 653; id. at p. 654 ["These specific exemptions cannot, by implication, be read as making chapter 1 generally applicable to public entities"].) Labor Code section 220 is found in Division 2, Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Labor Code (hereafter, "Chapter 1, Article 1"). The distinction between Chapter and Article is important." Subdivision (a) of section 220 exempts State employees from certain provisions - all found, like 220 itself, within Chapter 1, Article 1: § 220. Public employees (a) Sections 201.3, 201.5, 201.7,203.1,203.5,204, 204a, 204b, 204c, 204.1,205, and 205.5 do not apply to the payment of wages of employees directly employed by the State of California. .., The detailed list of exemptions in section 220, subdivision (a) should be read to mean that the other provisions in Chapter 1, Article 1 do apply to State employees.f "[W]here exceptions to a general rule are specified by 14 Division 4 did not consider the following arguments, including the legislative history expanding Labor Code liability for the state, in part because the issue was not fully briefed. (See id. at p. 654.) 15 In cases decided under the directly analogous language of section 220, subdivision (b) (covering employees of counties and other political CBM-SF\sF496024,4 -31- statute, other exceptions are not to be presumed unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned." (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Ca1.4th 105, 116.) Here, this rule means that the Court should not presume that State employees are exempt from sections in Article I that are not listed in subsection 220( a), "unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned." As a general matter, the legislative intent was to narrow, over time, the State's exemptions from Chapter 1, Article 1. Until ten years ago, section 220, subdivision (a) exempted the State from far more of Article 1 provisions than it does now: all sections from 200 to 211 and from 215 to 219. (See Stats. 1937, c. 90, p. 200, § 220.) But Assembly Bi112410 amended section 220 to provide far fewer State exemptions, as shown in the current subdivision (a). The stated purpose of this amendment was to apply additional provisions of Chapter 1, Article 1 to the State: subdivisions), courts including this District regularly recognize the application to public employees of Article 1 provisions not specifically exempted. See, e.g., Social Services Union, Local 535 v. Board of Supervisors of Tulare County (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 279,287 ("the Labor Code expressly authorizes agreements between public employees and their employers for payment of health care costs through payroll deductions (Lab. Code, § 224)"); In re Retirement Cases (1st Dist. 2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 426,474 (Labor Code section 227.3 prevents forfeiture of public employees' paid leave benefits); Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers' Assoc. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 866, 872 (applying Labor Code section 227.3); City of Oakland v. Hassey (1st Dist. 2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1499-1501 (applying Labor Code CBM-SF\sF496024.4 -32- Existing law prescribes requirements respecting employer payment of wages, including timely payment thereof, that are applicable to all employers, other than the state, counties, cities, and other municipal corporations .... This bill would delete specified exemptions for the state as an employer from these provisions. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2410 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), 885 Stats. 2000, emphasis added; see CCPOA's Motion to Take Judicial Notice.) Reinforcing this conclusion, other individual provisions in Chapter 1, Article 1 exempt the State partially. These include sections 201, 202,219,226 and 230.3.16 The Legislature must have understood the provisions of Article 1 to apply to the State as a threshold matter, or it would have had no reason to specify these partial exemptions. In summary, Reading AB 2410 together with the plain language of Section 220 dictates a conclusion that the provisions of Division 2, Part 1, Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Labor Code apply to the State employer unless sections 221, 223, and 224). 16 See the following sections of the Labor Code: -- 219, subd. (b) ("The state employer does not VIolate this section by authorizing employees .... "); -- 226, subd. (h) ("This section does not apply to the state ... , except that if the state .... "); and -- 230.3, subd. (c) ("Subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply to any public safety agency .... "). CBM -SF\sF496024.4 -33- (1) Section 220 expressly says they do not, or (2) a partial exemption exists elsewhere. This conclusion is reinforced by applying two standard rules of statutory construction: (1) "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (Bearden v. Us. Borax, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.AppAth 429,437 ["if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary"]); and (2) "avoid, if possible, interpretations that render a part of a statute surplusage" (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Ca1.4th 964,980-981)- i.e., unless the provisions of Chapter 1, Article 1 apply to the State, there would be no purpose in Labor Code section 220(a) or in the partial exemptions found in Labor Code sections 201,202,219,226 and 230.3. V CONCLUSION For all these reasons, this Court should reject Defendants' facile reading of Professional Engineers. This case is different, and involves a discrete group of Unit 6 employees who worked but were not paid because they were not permitted to take furlough days off. Thus, although Professional Engineers provides much guidance, it does not resolve the central issue of this case, approve the Governor's imposition of a third furlough day, or address the interplay of Government and Labor Code statutes at issue here with the constitutional single subject rule. Its reasoning, however, confirms that the trial court reached the right result-a CBM-SF\sF496024.4 -34- writ of mandate commanding Defendants to pay Unit 6 employees for hours worked-both legally and equitably. Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's order and issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate, deny Defendants' request for a writ of mandate, and remand for further proceedings. This Court should further reverse only that part of the trial court's order relating to Labor Code section 212, and require it to enter a new order finding for CCPOA on that claim as well. Dated: November 19, 2010 CARROLL, BURDICK & McDONOUGH LLP By ~nAdam Jonathan Yank , Gonzalo C. Martinez Attorneys for Real Party in Interest California Correctional Peace Officers' Association CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -35- WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Rule 8 .204( c) of the California Rules of Court, I certify that the attached brief contains 7,912 words, as determined by the computer program used to prepare the brief. Dated: November 19, 2010 CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -1- California Correctional Peace Officers' Association v. Arnold Schwarzenegger, et al., California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 2, No. A127292 PROOF OF SERVICE BY UNITED PARCEL SERVICE (UPS) - NEXT DAY I declare that I am employed in the County of San Francisco, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within cause; my business address is 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400, San Francisco, CA 94104. On November 19, 2010, I served the enclosed: REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CCPOA'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF on the parties in said cause (listed below) by enclosing a true copy thereof in a prepaid sealed package, addressed with appropriate United Parcel Service shipment label and, following ordinary business practices, said package was placed for collection (in the offices of Carroll, Burdick & McDonough LLP) in the appropriate place for items to be collected and delivered to a facility regularly maintained by United Parcel Service. I am readily familiar with the Firm's practice for collection and processing of items for overnight delivery with United Parcel Service and that said package was delivered to United Parcel Service in the ordinary course of business on the same day. Ross C. Moody, Esq. California Attorney General's Office 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Counsel for Defendant/Real Party in Interest, John Chiang in his capacity as the Controller of the State of California (415) 703-1376 Fax (415) 703-1234 David W. Tyra, Esq. Kristianne T. Seargeant, Esq. Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 Counsel for Defendants/Petitioners Arnold Schwarzenegger, State of California; California Department of Personnel Administration; California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; California Department of Mental Health; California Department of Juvenile Justice (State Defendants/Petitioners) (916) 321-4500 Fax (916) 321-4555 Linda A. Mayhew, Esq. Will M. Yamada, Esq. Department of Personnel Administration 1515 S Street, North Building, Suite 400 Sacramento, CA 95811-7258 Co-Counsel for State Defendants/Petitioners (916) 324-0512 Fax (916) 323-4723 CBM-SF\SF496024.4 -1- JeffR. Rieger, Esq. Reed Smith, LLP 1999 Harrison Street, Suite 2400 Oakland, CA 94612 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant CalPERS (510) 466-6870 Fax (510) 273-8832 Alameda County Superior Court U.S. Post Office 201 - 13th Street Oakland, CA 94612 Supreme Court of California Office of the Clerk, First Floor 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Four copies by hand delivery I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on November ,2010, at San Francisco, California. CBM -SF\SF496024.4 -2- More From This UserPML 2012029Jon OrtizPML 2012029Local 1000 Officers' Pay Proposal PP 1Jon OrtizLocal 1000 Officers' Pay Proposal PP 1CCPOA Tentative MOU memoJon OrtizCCPOA Tentative MOU memoDymally-Alatorre Bilingual Services Act AuditJon OrtizDymally-Alatorre Bilingual Services Act AuditCalPERS Retirements Through October 2010Jon OrtizCalPERS Retirements Through October 2010Seiu Ratification Vote CountsJon OrtizSeiu Ratification Vote Counts