Source: http://www.state.in.us/judiciary/opinions/previous/archive/04130501.bed.html
Timestamp: 2015-10-07 17:34:02
Document Index: 303980892

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 308', '§ 9', '§ 31', '§ 31', '§ 210']

Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court, No. 79D02-9707-DR-164 The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, Judge
1. In consideration of all promises contained in his agreement, the parties shall release all claims and rights which either ever had, now has or might hereafter have against the other by reason of their former relationship as Husband and Wife, or otherwise, excepting all of the claims and rights of each party created and outstanding against the other pursuant to the terms of this agreement. It is the intent hereof that each party hereby accepts the provisions of this agreement in full release and settlement of any and all claims and right [sic] against the other. It is the further agreement of the parties that the provisions of this agreement shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, the heirs, executors, administrators, and personal representatives of the parties hereto unless otherwise provided herein. . . . 3. This is an agreement to settle all property and spousal maintenance rights between Husband and Wife in the event a dissolution shall be entered by the Court. . . .
Id. at 13, 14 (emphasis added). In March of 2002, the former wife petitioned the trial court to increase the amount of her monthly maintenance award. Granting the former husband's motion to dismiss the petition, the trial court noted that the maintenance provision was payable beyond the husband's death and thus found that it was not modifiable "because it was based upon an agreement of the parties and exceeded the powers of the Court in the absence of the parties' agreement." Id. at 45 (citing Voigt v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 1996)). In Voigt, this Court held that "a court has no statutory authority to grant a contested petition to modify a maintenance obligation that arises under a previously approved settlement agreement if the court alone could not initially have imposed an identical obligation had the parties never voluntarily agreed to it." Id. at 1280 (emphasis added). We expressly reserved, however, "the question whether a court may modify a maintenance obligation that originated in a settlement agreement but that rested on a groundincapacity, caregiving, or rehabilitationon which the court could have ordered the same maintenance in the absence of agreement." Id. at 1280 n.13. Asserting that the present case falls within the issue reserved in Voigt, the former wife contends that the trial court did have the authority to make the maintenance award agreed to by the parties. She acknowledges Indiana decisions holding that a maintenance obligation terminates with the death of the obligor, but asserts that this applies only where an agreement or decree is silent, thus implying that a trial court may impose a maintenance obligation that continues after the death of the obligor. The former husband argues that maintenance payments may not be continued after the death of the payor. In Hicks v. Fielman, 421 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), the parties' agreement required the husband to pay a gross sum "alimony judgment" in fixed monthly installments, but which were to cease upon the wife's death or remarriage. Observing that this constituted a judgment of "periodic alimony: maintenance," id. at 722, the court stated: "Unless an agreement or decree calling for maintenance clearly says otherwise, maintenance payments can not accrue after the death of the person liable for them." Id. at 720. It later explains: "[T]he obligation to pay periodic alimony ceases with the death of the person liable for it. This seems to be the general rule when the decree allowing alimony does not provide that payments shall continue after the death of the payor." Id. at 722. Hicks was cited in Brown v. Guardianship of Brown, 775 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that a "claim for maintenance after the death of her former husband could not as a matter of law succeed because the decree awarding such maintenance did not provide that the payments would continue after the death of the payor." Id. at 1166. Like Hicks, the obligation to pay spousal support in Brown did not include any requirement that such payments survive the obligor's death. The court in Brown thus concluded, "an obligation to pay periodic spousal support, such as in this case, ceases with the death of the person liable for it." Id. at 1167. Indiana case law thus does not prohibit a maintenance obligation from surviving the death of the obligor where the decree so provides. Furthermore, maintenance for a spouse's incapacity, lasting beyond the death of the obligor, is authorized by statute. Where a spouse is incapacitated such that the spouse's ability of self-support is materially affected, a court "may find that maintenance for the spouse is necessary during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court." Ind. Code § 31-15-7-2(1) (emphasis added). The duration of this authorized maintenance obligation is expressly measured by the period of the recipient's incapacity and not by the lifetime of the obligor.
See footnote Here, the parties' settlement agreement explicitly directs the husband to pay monthly maintenance to the wife "for the remainder of her life." Appellant's App'x. at 11. In add
ition, the agreement provisions are "binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and personal representatives of the parties." Id. at 13. It is undisputed that this maintenance obligation rested on the wife's incapacity. Thus, if the parties' settlement agreement provided only that maintenance be paid to the wife for the remainder of her life, the court could have ordered the same maintenance in the absence of agreement and such facts would present the question reserved in Voigt.
See footnote The maintenance agreement in this case, however, goes beyond merely requiring pa
yment for the lifetime of the former wife: it also prohibits future modification claims. The agreement provides that the agreement settles all "spousal maintenance rights" and releases "all claims and rights which either ever had, now has or might hereafter have against the other by reason of their former relationship as Husband and Wife." Because Indiana Code § 31-15-7-3 provides that spousal maintenance authorized by statute may be modified, the trial court lacked the authority to order maintenance payments that were not subject to modification. Thus lacking the power on its own to order non-modifiable spousal maintenance, the trial court lacked authority to thereafter modify the maintenance obligation created by the previously approved settlement agreement. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d at 1280. Transfer having previously been granted, we affirm the trial court order dismissing the petition for modification of maintenance.
Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. Shepard, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion in which Rucker, J., joins. Shepard, C.J., concurring in result.
Our legislature was fairly muscular on this last point. The uniform act featured a provision for maintenance when a spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs [and] is unable to support himself through appropriate employment. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 308 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998). The Indiana Civil Code Study Commission tendered the act to our legislature with a similar provision.
See footnote The General Assembly elected instead what the Court of Appeals later called a more restrictive provision authorizing maintenance when a spouse is physically or mentally incapacitated. Pub. L. No. 297 § 9(c), 1973 Ind. Acts 1585, 1590.
Even during the days of alimony, the rule was that periodic alimony payments made to support a former spouse (as opposed to alimony provided in lieu of a share of property) term
inated upon the death of the obligee. See, e.g., 1949 Ind. Acts ch. 120, s. 3, p. 313; White v. White, 167 Ind. App. 459, 338 N.E.2d 749 (1975). And from the earliest cases under the 1973 act to the most recent ones, the Court of Appeals has said unless the divorce decree clearly says otherwise, the maintenance ends when the obligor dies. See, e.g., Brown v. Guardianship of Brown, 775 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Hicks v. Fielman, 421 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); White v. White, 167 Ind. App. 459, 471, 338 N.E.2d 749, 756 (1975).
Footnote: While not addressed and answered in Voigt, the question is clearly resolved by statute. As noted above, the statutory authorization for incapacity maintenance provides that such an order is "subject to further order of the court." Ind. Code § 31-15-7-2(1). Moreover, Indiana Code § 31-15-7-3 expressly declares that provisions of an order for maintenance authorized by statute "may be modified or revoked" upon specified grounds, one of which is "a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable." Footnote: The court may grant maintenance only if it finds (1) that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks suff
icient income and property to provide for his reasonable financial needs and (2) that the spouse seeking support is unable to support himself through employment . . . Report of the Civil Code Study Commission, Proposed Dissolution of Marriage Act § 210 (1970).