Source: http://openjurist.org/335/f3d/1207
Timestamp: 2013-12-04 18:24:24
Document Index: 528535148

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

335 F3d 1207 Bryan v. Mullin | OpenJurist
335 F. 3d 1207 - Bryan v. Mullin	Home335 f3d 1207 bryan v. mullin
335 F3d 1207 Bryan v. Mullin 335 F.3d 1207
Robert Leroy BRYAN, Petitioner-Appellant,v.Mike MULLIN, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.
Robert A. Nance of Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis (F. Andrew Fugitt, with him on the briefs), Oklahoma City, OK, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, MURPHY, HARTZ, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges.*
Robert Leroy Bryan was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first degree malice murder and sentenced to death. See Bryan v. State (Bryan I), 935 P.2d 338 (Okla.Crim.App.1997). After the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied his state petition for post-conviction relief, see Bryan v. State (Bryan II), 948 P.2d 1230 (Okla.Crim.App.1997), Bryan filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court, alleging, inter alia: (1) the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his conviction for first degree malice murder; (2) counsel labored under a conflict of interest; (3) counsel was ineffective at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial because counsel failed to present mental health evidence; and (4) he was incompetent to stand trial. The district court denied relief. A panel of this court unanimously concluded that Bryan was not entitled to relief on his evidence-sufficiency, conflict of interest, and competency claims. See Bryan v. Gibson (Bryan III), 276 F.3d 1163, 1166-68, 1172-75, 1168-72 (10th Cir.2001); id. at 1179, 1180 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The panel, although divided, further held that trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance during either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial by failing to present mental health evidence. Compare id. at 1172-79 (panel majority), with id. at 1182-85 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).1
A majority of the active judges of this court ordered the case reheard en banc and requested that the parties brief whether trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to present evidence of Bryan's mental illness "during either the guilt or penalty phases of the trial."2 Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and submissions, we vacate that portion of the panel opinion addressing Bryan's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, see id. at 1175-79, and affirm the denial of habeas relief for the reasons set out below. We do not reconsider as an en banc court the panel's denial of habeas relief as to Bryan's evidence-sufficiency, competency, or conflict of interest claims. See id. at 1166-68, 1168-72, 1172-75. Accordingly, all remaining portions of the panel opinion remain undisturbed.
Police located additional evidence in Bryan's bedroom tying Bryan to the murder. They discovered a roll of duct tape of the same type as pieces found near Inabel's body and on the pillowcase over her head. An expert testified that the edges of the tape taken from Bryan's bedroom matched the edges of one of the pieces of tape near Inabel's body. Police also found ammunition in Bryan's bedroom consistent with the type of ammunition used to kill Inabel and consistent with a bullet in the rental car. A metallurgy study indicated that all the bullets—the one that killed Inabel, the one in the rental car, and the ones in the Bryan home—were manufactured at the same time and could have come from the same box.
After Bryan was charged in 1993 with Inabel's murder, Bryan's family hired Raymond Munkres to represent Bryan. At the arraignment, Munkres expressed serious doubt as to Bryan's competency and made an oral motion for a competency determination. A jury trial on the question of Bryan's competency was eventually held on December 30, 1993. Because it was beyond the financial resources of Bryan's family, Munkres did not present any medical testimony at the hearing. Instead, Munkres adduced the testimony of Mike Jackson, an individual who volunteered his services to Munkres as an investigator. The essence of Munkres' presentation at the competency hearing was that Bryan was incompetent because the version of events he described surrounding the murder had no basis in reality, but that Bryan nonetheless sincerely believed in the veracity of his version of events. The jury concluded that Bryan had failed to demonstrate that he was incompetent to undergo further criminal proceedings.3
On direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ("OCCA"), Bryan asserted that Freeman was ineffective during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial because he failed to present evidence of Bryan's mental illness.4 Contemporaneously with the filing of his opening brief on direct appeal, Bryan filed an application for an evidentiary hearing, supported by affidavits, seeking a hearing on the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for "failure to utilize available evidence of [Bryan's] mental illness at any point in the trial." The OCCA did not specifically reject Bryan's request for an evidentiary hearing; it did so implicitly, however, when it proceeded to the merits of Bryan's ineffective assistance claims without an evidentiary hearing and denied him relief. See Bryan I, 935 P.2d at 363.
In the instant § 2254 habeas corpus petition, Bryan asserted the same claims of ineffective assistance he asserted in state court. The federal district court granted Bryan an evidentiary hearing, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and denied relief. Although the respondent contended before the district court that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because "there is plenty of information in the record before this Court to make that determination," he did not raise the propriety of that hearing before this court. Accordingly, the panel declined to address the question whether the district court should have granted Bryan an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1172 n. 6 (citing Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1174 n. 9 (10th Cir.2001) (declining to consider propriety of district court's grant of an evidentiary hearing when such hearing had already taken place and respondent had not challenged on appeal district court's decision to grant hearing)).
Section 2254(e)(2) provides that "[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant" satisfies one of the two exceptions set out in § 2254(e)(2)(A) or (B). If, however, the petitioner did not "fail[ ] to develop the factual basis of [his] claim in State court," id., § 2254(e)(2) is not applicable and a federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or required under pre-AEDPA standards. Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir.1998). Under those standards, Bryan is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "so long as his allegations, if true and not contravened by the existing factual record, would entitle him to habeas relief." Id. See generally Medina v. Barnes, 71 F.3d 363, 369-71 (10th Cir.1995) (discussing at length pre-AEDPA standard for obtaining an evidentiary hearing).
In his supplemental brief before the en banc court, the respondent does not dispute that Bryan diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his claims of ineffective assistance in state court.5 Instead, he argues that the evidentiary hearing was inappropriate because Bryan's allegations "are contravened by the existing record." Respondent's Brief at 19. Notably, however, the respondent does not identify those portions of the state court record which allegedly contravene the allegations of ineffective assistance set out in Bryan's § 2254 habeas petition. Instead, he broadly asserts that the trial record contained sufficient information to allow the OCCA to decide the merits of Bryan's claims without an evidentiary hearing and that, in light of that record, the decision of the OCCA rejecting Bryan's claims of ineffective assistance is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable interpretation of governing Supreme Court precedent.6
[I]neffective assistance claim[s] present[ ] a mixed question of law and fact. Because our analysis of this claim primarily involves consideration of legal principles, we review this claim de novo. Further, we note that because the state court did not hold any evidentiary hearing, we are in the same position to evaluate the factual record as it was. Accordingly, to the extent the state court's dismissal of [petitioner's ineffective assistance claim] was based on its own factual findings, we need not afford those findings any deference.
Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254 (citations omitted).7 But see Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 953 (5th Cir.2001) (specifically rejecting Miller approach and holding instead that even where a petitioner was denied a full and fair hearing, federal court is obligated to apply the deferential review standards set out in § 2254(d) and (e)).8 In these circumstances, this court accepts the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and reviews de novo whether counsel's performance was legally deficient and whether the deficiencies prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir.1995).
Thus, this court must analyze whether Bryan has adduced sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel provided constitutionally adequate assistance during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan's capital trial. In so doing, we recognize the "need to apply even closer scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a capital case." Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted).
In his brief before the panel,9 Bryan contended that Freeman should have presented evidence of his mental illness during the trial's guilt stage in support of either an insanity defense or in support of a second-degree murder instruction. In particular, Bryan relies on a report prepared by Dr. Murphy for the defense in May of 1994 which indicates that "Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question ... his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged." Bryan asserts that this evidence, when coupled with the interview performed by Dr. Smith, evidence derived from CAT and SPECT scans of Bryan's brain, and the Eastern State Hospital records, casts doubt on his ability to form an intent to kill.
Bryan's arguments regarding the viability of a guilt-phase insanity defense are completely at odds with the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court. To assert an insanity defense, "Oklahoma ... requir[es] the defendant to show that at the time of the crime he suffered from a mental disease or defect rendering him unable to differentiate between right and wrong, or unable to understand the nature and consequences of his actions." James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 553 (10th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). Despite the statements in Dr. Murphy's May 1994 report relied upon so heavily by Bryan, Freeman testified unequivocally that both Drs. Murphy and Smith told him that Bryan was not legally insane and that he relied on the doctors' opinions in formulating his trial strategy.10 Freeman's testimony in this regard was fully corroborated by testimony provided by Hess at the federal evidentiary hearing. Hess specifically testified there was no medical evidence indicating that Bryan did not understand the consequences of his actions and no medical evidence that would provide a defense during the guilt phase of the trial. Instead of presenting a viable defense based on medical evidence during the guilt phase of the trial, Hess' strategy was to utilize the guilt phase to lay the foundation for a mitigation case at the penalty phase.11 Accordingly, Freeman lacked the medical evidence necessary to present an insanity defense at the guilt stage of Bryan's trial.12
Significantly, Bryan did not want his attorney to present evidence suggesting he was mentally ill13; he was also apparently unwilling to accept a guilty plea to avoid a possible death sentence.14 This court must presume that Bryan was competent to rationally assist defense counsel at trial, as he was adjudicated competent at the retrospective competency hearing. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1169-72. "The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181 (collecting cases for this proposition). "Although trial counsel has an independent duty to investigate and make a case in [defense], counsel also has to be responsive to the wishes of his client." Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181; see also Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 1247-48 (10th Cir.1999) (concluding counsel's decision to acquiesce to petitioner's wishes that attorney not present any mitigating evidence during penalty phase was not deficient performance). Additionally, the prosecution's case, although strong, was almost entirely circumstantial. See Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 461-62 (10th Cir.1999) (holding defense counsel's innocence-based defense was reasonable strategy in light of circumstantial nature of prosecution's case). There was evidence admitted at trial indicating that Bryan's physical condition had so deteriorated at the time of the murder, due to his diabetes, that he was physically incapable of carrying out this crime.
Accordingly, based on the record before this court, it appears that Freeman had two options during the guilt phase of the trial. He could put the prosecution to its burden of proof, as he was specifically instructed to do by Bryan. Or, alternatively, he could present a non-viable insanity defense, as foundation for a mitigation case during the penalty phase, the very strategy that led to Bryan's termination of Munkres15 and Hess. Freeman's decision to follow the former course—after meeting with the medical experts, reviewing all of the additional medical evidence, consulting with Bryan on numerous occasions, and noting the circumstantial nature of the prosecution's case and the evidence of Bryan's deteriorated health—is not objectively unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.").
This court finds Bryan's arguments unconvincing on several levels. First, Freeman's testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing relied upon by Bryan in support of his claim that Freeman did not understand the relevance of Bryan's mental health evidence is presented out of context and is clearly insufficient to overcome the strong presumption that Freeman "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, Hess clearly testified that he discussed with Bryan his preferred strategy of utilizing mental health evidence during both the guilt and penalty phases of Bryan's trial, with a focus on the penalty phase and preventing a sentence of death, and that Bryan had vigorously rejected the use of mental health evidence and terminated him. Accordingly, Bryan was certainly apprised of the benefits of using mental health evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase and rejected that strategy. Freeman was well aware of this history, having spent an extensive amount of time with Bryan16 and having met with Hess to discuss the case and the available mental health evidence. Finally, the only testimony adduced at the federal evidentiary hearing on the question demonstrates that the use of mental health evidence during the penalty phase would not have been effective following a guilt phase defense of actual innocence. See infra n. 22. Accordingly, Freeman's decision not to employ medical evidence, viewed from "his perspective at the time" of the trial, is not objectively unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Relying on limited portions of Freeman's testimony at the evidentiary hearing held by the district court, Bryan argues that Freeman did not understand the potential usefulness of mental health evidence during the penalty phase, instead thinking that such evidence was irrelevant unless it demonstrated insanity or lack of competence. A review of Freeman's statements in context, however, confirms the district court's conclusion that "[t]rial counsel's decision not to present evidence of Petitioner's organic brain syndrome and mental illness [at the penalty phase] was clearly a strategic one."17
For instance, Bryan notes at the evidentiary hearing, Freeman responded affirmatively to the following cross-examination question: "So you saw no use for the experts' mental testimony, except to prove either insanity or incompetence, right?" When read in context, however, it is clear that Freeman is referring only to the guilt stage of the trial.18 Furthermore, Bryan simply misreads the transcript in asserting Freeman testified that he thought the testimony of the medical experts "would not have been relevant at all." Instead, when read in context, Freeman was indicating that it was the opinion of Bryan's parents that was irrelevant to his determination not to mount an insanity defense during the guilt phase of the trial, not the opinions of the medical experts.19 Nor can it be asserted that Freeman thought that he was ethically prohibited from presenting mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Instead, taken in context, Freeman's testimony reflects the fact that he had no medical evidence supporting a guilt-phase insanity defense and that he was fearful that any testimony by Dr. Murphy during the second stage would do more harm than good.20
Accordingly, when viewed as a whole, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing simply does not support Bryan's assertion that Freeman suffered under a misapprehension as to the propriety of adducing mental health evidence short of an insanity diagnosis during the penalty phase of the trial. Instead, the testimony set out above demonstrates a concern with two considerations. First, Freeman was concerned that testimony by either Dr. Smith or Dr. Murphy might play into the prosecution's case that Bryan was a continuing threat to society. See Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1277-78 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that mental health evidence like that at issue here has the possibility of being a "two-edged sword").21 Second, Freeman was concerned that an about-face during the penalty phase might compromise Bryan in the eyes of the jurors.22 Bryan has simply not pointed to any evidence in the record sufficient to overcome the "strong presumption" that Freeman's decision not to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial was a strategic decision. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.23
Having determined that Freeman's decision not to present mental health evidence during the penalty phase was strategic, this court moves on to the question whether that strategic decision was reasonable when viewed from Freeman's perspective at the time of the trial. See id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Perhaps most importantly, Bryan did not want Freeman to present any psychiatric evidence, was adamant about pursuing an innocence defense during the guilt phase of his trial, and had apparently refused to even consider a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence. See, e.g., Romano, 239 F.3d at 1181; Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259, 1278 (10th Cir.2000); Wallace, 191 F.3d at 1247-48. This court must presume that Bryan was competent to make that determination. See Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1169-72. Furthermore, the record reveals that Hess specifically discussed with Bryan his proposed strategy of utilizing mental health evidence during the first stage of the trial as a foundation for a strong mitigation case during the penalty phase of the trial, asserting that this was the only viable strategy to save Bryan's life.24 In response, Bryan terminated Hess and hired Freeman. Freeman, well aware of this history after having met with Hess to discuss the case, and well aware that no medical expert would support a guilt-phase insanity defense, complied with Bryan's informed strategic choice and put the government to its proof at trial.
It is worth emphasizing again what was stated above: "Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although this strategy limited Bryan's options during the penalty phase, it was not objectively unreasonable for Freeman to utilize an innocence defense during the guilt phase for those reasons set out above. Furthermore, in light of the testimony of Hess, Wilson, and Freeman regarding the need for consistency between guilt and penalty phase presentations, and the possibility that Dr. Murphy's testimony during the second stage could have supported the prosecution's argument that Bryan constituted a continuing threat to society, it was not unreasonable for Freeman to utilize a mercy approach during the penalty phase.25 Bryan has simply not overcome the strong presumption set out in Strickland that Freeman provided objectively reasonable assistance during the penalty phase of the trial.26
Judges Michael W. McConnell and Timothy M. Tymkovich joined the court after oral argument in the instant case and did not participate in this decision
As to Bryan's argument that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of the trial, Judge Henry simply indicated as follows: "I believe that counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase, but I will concentrate on Mr. Bryan's best argument: that he received unreasonably ineffective assistance in the all-important `second' or `sentencing phase.'"Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1180 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In his supplemental brief before theen banc court, Bryan focuses exclusively on the question whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present potentially mitigating mental health evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. He does not address at all whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial.
This competency hearing failed to comply with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court's decision inCooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996), because Bryan was required to prove his incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence. See Bryan I, 935 P.2d at 347. Accordingly, a retrospective competency hearing was conducted in 1996 utilizing the proper preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; Bryan was also found competent during this proceeding. See id.; Bryan III, 276 F.3d at 1168-72.
On direct appeal to the OCCA, Bryan was represented by William Luker of the OIDS
See Wi