Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97323/swift-co-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2018-03-21 07:05:22
Document Index: 255172042

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 1', 'art, 250', '§ 510', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 226', '§ 15', '§ 15']

Swift and Co Vs United States - Citation 97323 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/97323
Decided On May-04-1942
Case Number 316 U.S. 216
swift & co. v. united states - 316 u.s. 216 (1942) u.s. supreme court swift & co. v. united states, 316 u.s. 216 (1942) swift & co. v. united states no. 595 argued march 6, 9, 1942 decided may 4, 1942 316 u.s. 216 appeal from the district court of the united states for the northern district of illinois syllabus 1. transportation by railroad of livestock in carload lots to public stockyards includes unloading into suitable pens. § 15, interstate commerce act. p. 316 u. s. 223 . 2. whether the use of stockyard facilities for egress of livestock to the public street after unloading is a part of the transportation service for which charges may reasonably be made, is a question to be decided by the.....
Swift & Co. v. United States - 316 U.S. 216 (1942)
U.S. Supreme Court Swift & Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 216 (1942)
1. Transportation by railroad of livestock in carload lots to public stockyards includes unloading into suitable pens. § 15, Interstate Commerce Act. P. 316 U. S. 223 .
2. Whether the use of stockyard facilities for egress of livestock to the public street after unloading is a part of the transportation service for which charges may reasonably be made, is a question to be decided by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exercise of its judgment upon the facts of each particular case, and not for decision according to any fixed rule of law. P. 316 U. S. 225 .
(1) In determining the reasonableness of the practice, the Commission properly considered its evolution, including the history of dealings between the packers and the stockyards company, and considered the effect of the existing and proposed practices on the interests of the carriers, the public and other shippers. P. 316 U. S. 225 .
(2) A finding by the Commission that the practice is reasonable is supported by evidence, and is therefore conclusive on this Court. P. 316 U. S. 231 .
of practices or charges of the stockyards company beyond that point. P. 316 U. S. 231 .
(4) Insofar as the stockyards company is an agency in transportation, it is subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and to the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Insofar as it performs stockyards services, it is subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act and to regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture. P. 316 U. S. 232 .
Swift & Company and Omaha Packing Company, its wholly owned subsidiary, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a complaint against the common carriers by railroad which served the Chicago Union Stock Yards, operated by the Union Stock Yard & Transit Company. [ Footnote 1 ] They were later joined by Armour & Company
as intervenor to constitute the interest referred to herein as the packers. Although Armour sought no relief, it was allowed to intervene because it was at the time litigating in the courts a similar complaint, which was later passed on by this Court in Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195 . The complaint in this case concerned practices of the Union Stock Yard & Transit Company and charges collected by it from the packers, but the Yard Company was not a party to the proceedings. The packers sought a revision of the Yard Company's practices, which they said were part of the carrier-shipper relation, through the exercise of the Interstate Commerce Commission's jurisdiction over the railroads and over transportation.
The complaint charged that the packers shipped over lines of defendant carriers from various points of origin throughout the United States to Chicago, Illinois, what are known as "direct shipments" of livestock. "Direct shipments" refers to livestock consigned directly to a packer at the Union Stock Yards, as distinguished from a shipment consigned to a commission merchant at the Stock Yards for sale. [ Footnote 2 ] Direct shipments are generally of livestock which has been purchased by the packer or its buyers at country points or at markets other than
Chicago. On arrival, the cars containing the livestock are placed at unloading or chute pens of the Yard Company by the railroad employees, and the stock is then unloaded and placed in the pens by employees of the Yard Company. For this unloading service, the Yard Company is paid at published tariff rates [ Footnote 3 ] by the railroads, which absorb the charge out of their line-haul rates.
The Yard Company, however, under tariffs filed with the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Packers and Stockyards Act, [ Footnote 4 ] imposes upon the packers a schedule of charges known as yardage charges, which vary from ten cents to forty-five cents per head of stock. The packers say that they desire none of the services, such as weighing, watering, feeding, or holding, which yardage charges compensate, and desire only to move their stock immediately from the unloading pens to the public streets without payment of the yardage charges. Contending that it is their legal right so to obtain delivery, the packers made sufficient demand upon the Yard Company and upon the railroad companies for immediate and free delivery of their stock from the unloading pens. This was refused, and yardage charges have been paid to the Yard Company under protest. The packers demanded from the Commission relief by way of reparation and asked the Commission to establish rules and practices under which they may obtain delivery to themselves by the railroads of
Appellants Swift and Omaha then brought suit in a district Court of three judges for a decree permanently suspending and annulling the order of the Commission and for a remand of the complaint for decision in accordance with principles of law to be determined by the court. Appellant Armour intervened and participated in the trial. The railroads which had been named as defendants before the Commission also intervened, as defendants, in the District Court. After hearing, the District Court held without opinion that the Commission's findings were properly supported by evidence; that the findings made by the Commission were adequate to support its conclusion; that the practices complained of were not unreasonable, and that the Commission did not have jurisdiction of the yardage charges. It dismissed the packers' complaint, and appeal was taken to this Court. [ Footnote 5 ]
The packers' contention that they are entitled as a matter of absolute right to delivery of their livestock from the unloading pens without payment of yardage charges is based upon the decision of this Court in Covington Stockyards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128 , and the subsequently enacted § 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
139 U.S. at 139 U. S. 135 -136.
After the enactment of § 1(3), this Court decided Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397 , which arose before the enactment of § 15(5), set forth below. The propriety of an additional charge for the unloading of livestock at the Chicago Union Stock Yards was in issue, and it was said:
"That the yards are, in effect, terminals of the railroads is clear. They are in fact used as terminals, and necessarily so. Whether the unloading in the yards was a part of transportation was not a pure question of law to be determined by merely reading the tariffs. Compare Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285 , 259 U. S. 294 . The decision of the question was dependent upon the determination of certain facts, including the history of the Stock Yards and their relation to the line-haul carriers; the history of the unloading charge at these yards, and
the action of the parties in relation thereto. If there was evidence to sustain the Commission's findings on these matters, its conclusion that the collection of the extra charge from the shippers was an unreasonable and unlawful practice must be sustained. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 232 U. S. 199 , 232 U. S. 221 ; Los Angeles Switching Case, 234 U. S. 294 , 234 U. S. 310 -311."
Id. at 286 U. S. 409 -410.
In the subsequent case of Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 , it was pointed out that, in appropriate circumstances, the Commission might properly find that the carriers' duty to deliver livestock ended with delivery into suitable pens at the Chicago Union
Our most recent decision bearing on the Commission's power to determine when transportation ends with reference to shipments of livestock to the Chicago Union Stock Yards is Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195 , rendered in the controversy over the propriety of yardage charges made in circumstances precisely similar to those of the present case, by virtue of which Armour & Co. intervened in the present litigation. There, it was held by a unanimous Court that Armour's complaint in the federal District Court should be dismissed, since primary jurisdiction was lodged in the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it was said that the facts alleged in the complaint revealed that
312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 200 . By way of illustration, the opinion detailed several questions which would arise, and among them was the following:
312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 197 . Finally, it was said that,
312 U.S. at 312 U. S. 200 , 201.
Thus, it is seen that, before the enactment of § 15(5), whether transportation included unloading was a question of fact for the determination of the Commission. Adams v. Mills, supra. Section 15(5) changed this, but it did not alter the situation with respect to yardage services, Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, and whether they are included in transportation is therefore a question to be decided by the Commission upon the facts of each particular case, and not by mechanical application of a fixed rule of law, as contended by the appellants. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra; Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., supra. Otherwise, we erred in requiring "primary resort" to the Commission in the Armour case with respect to the question where transportation ended. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285 . The propriety of the yardage charges in the present case was a question for decision by the Commission in the exercise of its judgment, and not for decision according to any fixed rule of law.
of the practice complained of, as well as the effect of existing and proposed practices on the interest of the carriers, the public, and other shippers. Adams v. Mills, supra, at 286 U. S. 409 et seq.; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, at 295 U. S. 198 et seq.; Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., supra, at 312 U. S. 201 . Neither the railroads nor the Stock Yards exist for the benefit of the packers alone. Their patronage is large and important, but neither in the regulation of the carriers nor in the regulation of the Stock Yards are they entitled to facilities or treatment that will ignore the existence of other interests. The Stock Yards are not only a facility for the transportation of direct shipments from points of country origin to the packers; they also are an important factor in the entire animal industry of the United States. The Commission found that the direct shipments of livestock transported by rail to the packers at Chicago have exceeded 30,000 carloads annually for several years, but that the total annual average rail movement to the Stock Yards was 94,629 carloads.
"the evidence fails to disclose how, as a practical matter, an annual volume of 30,000 carloads of livestock could be discharged into and handled through the public streets of Chicago. [ Footnote 6 ]"
Thus, for more than seventy years the responsibility of the railroads in respect of direct shipments consigned to the packers has ended with the unloading service. The packers, from that point on, have negotiated their own arrangement with the Yard Company. More recently, of course, the Stock Yards have passed under public regulation, and discrimination or rebating of the kind once practiced is no longer possible. The Commission finds that it was the attitude of the packers that their patronage was a thing of value to the Stock Yards, and they proposed to sell that patronage to the Yard Company. The Packers and Stockyards Act having made private arrangements of this kind unlawful, [ Footnote 7 ] the packers now contend that the carriers must protect them against yardage charges on their direct shipments.
not resulted, and does not result, in an unreasonable practice. There is evidence to support the determination, and the decision of the administrative body charged with making it is therefore conclusive on this Court. [ Footnote 8 ]
If the Yard Company is in the dual position of being at once the agent of the carriers for the unloading of the stock and the principal in rendering any subsequent services, so is it under dual regulatory schemes and authorities. Insofar as it is an agency in transportation, it is subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and to the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Insofar as it performs stockyard services, it is subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, and to the regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture. The statutes clearly disclose an intention that jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture over stockyard services shall not overlap that of the Commission over transportation. [ Footnote 9 ] The boundary between the two is the place where transportation ends, and, in this case, that is established to be the unloading pens.
Other phrases of the general problem of the present case have been considered in Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397 ; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 ; Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 213 ; Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195 .
Covington Stockyards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128 , which arose prior to the Interstate Commerce Act, applied that
principle to the delivery of livestock at stockyards. This Court after stating that a carrier of livestock has no right "to make a special charge for merely receiving or merely delivering such stock, in and through stockyards provided by itself," added (pp. 139 U. S. 135 -136):
So far as I am aware, the Covington case has never been overruled. As recently as 1939, we approved it. For we stated in Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 213 , 308 U. S. 219 , after reviewing §§ 1(3) and 15(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act:
"Without the aid of these statutes, the transportation of livestock by rail was held to begin with its delivery to the carrier for loading onto its cars, and to end only after unloading for delivery or tender to the consignee at the place of destination. Covington Stockyards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128 , 139 U. S. 136 . The same rule has been repeatedly applied since the statute was adopted. Erie R. Co. v. Shuart, 250 U. S. 465 , 250 U. S. 468 ; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 , 295 U. S. 198 , and cases cited; Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 470 ; 2 Hutchison, Carriers, 3d ed. § 510."
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193 , did not alter that rule. As stated by the majority in that case (295 U.S. p. 295 U. S. 200 ):
And the majority added (p. 201 U. S. 201 ):
Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. v. United States, supra, p. 308 U. S. 219 . That is amply supported by the reasons given by the majority itself for setting aside the Commission's order in the Atchison case:
295 U.S. pp. 295 U. S. 201 -202. And Armour & Co. v. Alton R. Co., 312 U. S. 195 , did not weaken the rule
I do not agree that Congress has left to the Commission the power to eliminate free egress from this particular transportation service. Whatever may have been the scope of the authority of the Commission prior to the Transportation Act of 1920 ( Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397 ), it should be noted that Mr. Justice Brandeis, the author of Adams v. Mills, joined in the dissenting opinion in the Atchison case which repudiated the notion that the transportation service in this type of shipment was completed at the unloading pens. Furthermore, as stated in the dissenting opinion in the Atchison case, it is clear that Congress itself provided a rule in § 15(5) of that Act which placed on the Commission the duty and the authority
To say that carriers need not furnish facilities for delivery and immediate removal of livestock by the consignee without extra charge is to give § 15(5) an interpretation which is not only "ingenious" ( Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, p. 205, dissenting opinion), but which is also quite oblivious of the crying abuses which § 15(5) was designed to correct. The words "all necessary service of unloading and . . . delivery" of livestock at public stockyards must be taken to include all services at a terminal incidental to obtaining delivery of the livestock. And delivery "into suitable pens" must be taken "to mean pens to which the consignees may gain unimpeded access for the purpose of removing their stock." Id., p. 206. As stated by Commissioner Eastman in Hygrade Food Products Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 195 I.C.C. 553, 559, pens are not "suitable" within the meaning of § 15(5) where they do not "permit of reasonable opportunity to accept delivery and remove the livestock from the premises after notice of arrival." Otherwise, the purpose of § 15(5) in removing "an old evil" is defeated, and "a crop of new ones" is sanctioned
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. at p. 295 U. S. 6 , 206, dissenting opinion.
The legislative history of § 15(5) was reviewed in the dissenting opinion in the Atchison case. 295 U.S. at pp. 295 U. S. 207 -208. The mandate contained in § 15(5) originated with the American National Live Stock Association (59 Cong.Rec. 674) and the National Live Stock Shippers' League. Hearings, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. 4378, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. I, pp. 139-141. The proposal was not vague. It was that there be
42 Stat. 169, 7 U.S.C. § 226. The boundary between the Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture is not the place where the transportation ends, but the time when the transportation service is completed. It is not completed until the consignee has unimpeded access to the station for the purpose of removing the livestock. That view is supported by Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. v. United States, supra, where the stockyards argued that their loading and unloading services were subject to regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture, and not by the Commission. We held that loading and unloading services were "common carrier services placed under the authority of the Commission by the Interstate Commerce Act." 308 U.S. p. 308 U. S. 221 . And we defined the scope of those services in terms of the rule of the Covington case. Id., p. 308 U. S. 219 . To call the withholding of the stock until an additional fee is paid a stockyard "service" is indeed incongruous. It is to forget over half a century of history. It is to take away part of the protection which Congress afforded shippers by § 15(5). It is to interpret § 15(5) not liberally, as a remedial provision, but strictly against the stock raisers for whose ultimate benefit it was passed. For years, the carriers and stockyards persistently sought to dignity this type of tribute
295 U.S. p. 295 U. S. 201 . It is that dictum which has haunted this litigation and which largely shaped the ruling of the Commission in the instant case. For the Commission proceeded from the premise that there was "no difference in principle" between the Atchison case and this one, and that this Court had stated in the earlier case "that the obligation of the line-haul carriers ceased when the animals were placed in the unloading pens." 238 I.C.C. 179, 189, 190, 196. But the Commission was under no such compulsion. Commissioner Alldredge was quite right when he pointed out in his dissenting opinion that the Commission misconstrued the opinion of this Court in the Atchison case. 238 I.C.C. pages 197, 198. Hence, the conclusion of the Commission reached, in large measure under the compulsion of that erroneous assumption, should not be given the weight normally due findings and conclusions of such an expert body.
* It will not do to say that, if the rule of the Covington case applied, we erred in requiring primary resort to the Commission in the Armour case. There were several questions relating to complex transportations involved in that case which required primary determination by the Commission. They included possible readjustments of rate schedules, possible refunds to shippers, and definition of the boundaries of the station named in the tariff. The statement in the Armour case that the statute did not mark the point where the transportation service was completed "under all circumstances and conditions and in all cases" (312 U.S. p. 312 U. S. 200 ) is borne out by the Atchison case where the consignee, as we have noted, sought free delivery in cars switched into its plant and the use of an overhead runway from holding pens to its plant. Clearly a determination of the precise facts concerning the characteristics and use of a particular station was necessary before a correct application of the applicable rule of law could be made.