Source: http://dc.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190925_0001193.DDC.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-07-08 21:19:12
Document Index: 548327025

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1602', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 1608', '§ 1605', '§ 1608', '§ 1330', '§ 1605', '§ 1605', '§ 27', '§ 27', '§ 1605', '§ 1608']

FindACase™ | Salzman v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Salzman v. Islamic Republic of Iran
SALZMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
On September 4, 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers detonated explosives at a pedestrian mall on Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem, Israel. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 260–61 (D.D.C. 2003). Among the nearly two hundred injured were Diana Campuzano, Avi Elishis, and Gregg Salzman (“the Campuzano plaintiffs”). Id. In 2000, the Campuzano plaintiffs filed suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”), the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”), the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and three Iranian officials (“the Campuzano defendants”) under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Id. The Campuzano plaintiffs alleged that the Campuzano defendants were liable for their injuries because they had provided material support to Hamas to carry out the attack. Id. The Court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Campuzano plaintiffs’ claims and found that the defendants were liable. Id. at 269. Accordingly, on September 10, 2003, the Court entered a default judgment against Iran and the other defendants and awarded the Campuzano plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 270–79; see also Dkt. 52, Civ. No. 00-2328.
More than fourteen years later, nine immediate family members of the Campuzano plaintiffs, who were not parties to the Campuzano suit, filed this action against Iran, the MOIS, and the IRGC under the FSIA, seeking damages for their “pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium; severe emotional distress and mental anguish; and loss of solatium” as a result of the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries. Dkt. 2 at 15, 16 (Amd. Compl. ¶ 83, Prayer). Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed the MOIS and the IRGC as defendants, see Dkt. 26; Minute Order (Jul. 18, 2019) (Order of Dismissal), but they continue to press their claims against Iran. Iran, in their view, is liable for their injuries under the “terrorism exception” to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, because the Ben Yehuda Street attack would not have occurred “but-for Iran’s ‘provision of material support or resources’” to Hamas, Dkt. 21 at 10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). The matter is now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion seeking entry of a default judgment against Iran. Dkt. 21. For the reasons described below, the Court will enter a default judgment against Iran and will award Plaintiffs compensatory damages.
Plaintiffs in this case are nine family members of the Campuzano plaintiffs: Stanley and Roberta Salzman (the parents of Gregg Salzman), Lee Salzman (the brother of Gregg Salzman), Ramiro and Mabel Campuzano (the parents of Diana Campuzano), Jorge Campuzano (the brother of Diana Campuzano), Brenda Elishis (the mother of Avi Elishis), the estate of David Elishis (the late father of Avi Elishis), and Sara Walzman (the sister of Avi Elishis). Dkt. 21 at 7. Plaintiffs are all U.S. citizens. Id.; Dkt. 28; Dkt. 33. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint seeks compensatory damages for “pecuniary loss and loss of income; loss of guidance, companionship and society; loss of consortium; severe emotional distress and mental anguish; and loss of solatium.” Dkt. 2 at 15 (Amd. Compl. ¶ 83). They also allege that Defendants’ conduct “warrant[s] an award of punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).” Id. (Amd. Compl. ¶ 87). In their motion for default judgment, however, Plaintiffs seek only solatium damages. See Dkt. 21 at 13–16.
Even in a garden variety suit, the entry of a default judgment is “not automatic” and requires the exercise of sound discretion. See Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Devashish Hospitality, LLC, 322 F.R.D. 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2017); Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co., Inc., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Court must-at a minimum-satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“A default judgment rendered in excess of a court’s jurisdiction is void.”); Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6 (explaining that the Court must “satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant.”). In cases brought against a foreign state, however, the Court’s discretion to enter a default judgment is even more narrowly circumscribed. By statute, no federal or state court may enter a default judgment against a foreign state or instrumentality “unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This is the same standard that applies to default judgments against the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d). See Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs must, accordingly, carry the burden of showing that the Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and they must establish their right to recover by producing evidence satisfactory to the Court. To establish subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the “terrorism exception” to the FSIA applies-that is, they must show that they seek money damages from a foreign state for personal injury or death caused by a covered act of terrorism or “the provision of material support or resources for such an act;” (2) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act of terrorism (or because of the act) and remained so designated at the time the suit was brought (or shortly before suit was brought); and (3) “the claimant or the victim was, at the time” of the act of terrorism, “a national of the United States, ” a member of the U.S. military, or an employee (or contractor) of the United States acting within the scope of her employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a). To establish personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must show that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over their claims and that Iran was served in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). And, to establish a right to recover, Plaintiffs must offer evidence showing that they satisfy either (1) each of the elements of the cause of action set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) or (2) each of the elements of a common law tort cause of action. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 809.
In a case, such as this, in which Plaintiffs allege that a foreign state materially supported acts of terrorism, the district court must determine “how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide.” Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But the Court must do so in light of Congress's purpose in enacting § 1605A-that is, to “compensate the victims of terrorism . . . [so as to] punish foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts and [to] deter them from doing so in the future, ” id. at 1048 (citation omitted)-and the difficulty in obtaining “firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony . . . from an absent and likely hostile sovereign, ” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785.
This case comes before the Court in a unique posture. Because Plaintiffs are seeking damages for loss of solatium, their injuries stem from the same terrorist attack that injured the Campuzano plaintiffs, and their claims present-at least at the threshold-the same essential questions posed in the Campuzano case: that is, whether Iran provided “material support” to Hamas and whether that support was the proximate cause of the injuries the Campuzano plaintiffs suffered. The Campuzano court made extensive findings of fact regarding the Ben Yehuda Street attack, the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries, and Iran’s relationship to Hamas. See Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 261–68. The Court then concluded, based on those factual findings, that Iran was liable for the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at 270. Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Campuzano. Dkt. 21 at 10–11. The Court declines to do so.
Plaintiffs’ principal argument why the liability determinations in Campuzano are binding on this Court-that “Iran would be collaterally estopped from re-litigating th[ose] determinations, ” Dkt. 21 at 11-is incorrect. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 175 F.Supp.2d 13, 17–19 (D.D.C. 2001) (explaining why offensive collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments entered under the terrorism exception to the FSIA); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e (1982) (“In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent or default, none of the issues [are] actually litigated.”); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 413–14 (noting the “general rule that issue preclusion attaches only ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment’” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982))).
Plaintiffs’ fallback contention that the Court should adopt the findings of fact from Campuzano, moreover, fares no better. See Weinstein, 175 F.Supp.2d at 20 (“[F]indings of fact made during this type of one-sided [FSIA] hearing should not be given a preclusive effect.”). Although prior decisions in this district “have . . . frequently taken judicial notice of earlier, related proceedings, ” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010), that does not mean that the Court should simply accept the facts found in the earlier opinion, which would amount to an exercise of collateral estoppel. The Court may, however, “review evidence considered in” the prior proceeding “without necessitating the re-presentment of such evidence.” Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F.Supp.2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010).
Because Plaintiffs did not provide the Court with the evidence upon which the Campuzano decision was premised, and because only a portion of that evidence is available in the Campuzano docket, the Court held a telephonic conference with counsel on August 28, 2019, and explained that it could not, based on the then-existing record, adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims. Minute Order (Aug. 28, 2019). In response, Plaintiffs have now filed with the Court the essential evidence from the Campuzano case. Dkt. 30; Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32. Upon review of that evidence, the Court concludes that it can take judicial notice of the evidence admitted and relied upon in the Campuzano case and can-based on the Court’s independent assessment of that evidence (but with the benefit of the guidance offered by the Campuzano decision)-adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims.
Stanley Salzman, Lee Salzman, Roberta Salzman, Ramiro Campuzano, Mabel Campuzano, and Jorge Campuzano filed this case on November 16, 2017. Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.). On November 20, 2017, they amended their complaint to add Brenda Elishis (both individually and as the administratrix of the estate of her late husband, David Elishis) and Sara Walzman as plaintiffs. Dkt. 2 at 1 (Amd. Compl.). The Clerk first attempted to effect service on Defendants on December 1, 2017. See Dkt. 7, 8. After that attempt failed, the Clerk requested the Department of State to serve Defendants through diplomatic channels. Dkt. 12 at 1. The summons, amended complaint, and notice of suit were delivered to the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the assistance of the Foreign Interest Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran because the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran. See Dkt. 17 at 1. The State Department, however, requested that the Foreign Interest Section serve only one defendant: “the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Id. at 11. After the return of service was filed on May 15, 2018, id. at 1–12, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit in support of default against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dkt. 18. Relying on Plaintiffs’ affidavit, the Clerk entered default against Iran on July 9, 2018. Dkt. 20 at 1. Plaintiffs then moved for entry of a default judgment against Iran on July 26, 2018, Dkt. 21, and subsequently requested that the other two defendants, which had not yet been served, be dismissed from the case, Dkt. 26. On July 18, 2019, the Court dismissed the MOIS and the IRGC as Defendants. Minute Order (July 18, 2019).
Because Plaintiffs’ claims relate to an attack that occurred almost 22 years ago, the Court initially stayed the action, pending a decision by the D.C. Circuit on the question of whether the ten-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b) is subject to forfeiture by a defaulting foreign state. Minute Order (Aug. 20, 2018). After the D.C. Circuit answered that question in the affirmative, see Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 923 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2019), the Court lifted the stay and scheduled a status conference to address further proceedings in the action, Minute Order (May 10, 2019). On August 26, 2019, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit evidence sufficient to show that they were U.S. nationals at the time of the Ben Yehuda Street attack. Minute Order (Aug. 26, 2019). Shortly thereafter, the Court informed Plaintiffs’ counsel during a telephonic status conference that the then-existing factual record was, in the Court’s view, deficient. Minute Order (Aug. 28, 2019). Plaintiffs then, in response, supplemented the record with the essential evidence that had been offered and admitted in the Campuzano case. Dkt. 30; Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32. Other evidence from the Campuzano case is available in the docket in that action, Civ. No. 00-2328, and the Court has reviewed that evidence-i.e., the testimony of witnesses that was offered at the hearing-as well.
Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of a default judgment is now ripe for adjudication. In lieu of holding an evidentiary hearing, the Court will rely on Plaintiffs’ declarations submitted in this case, the testimony presented at the Campuzano evidentiary hearing, and the evidence from the Campuzano case that Plaintiffs have re-filed in this matter. See Kim, 774 F.3d at 1047 (explaining that “FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide, requiring only that it be ‘satisfactory to the court.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)); see also Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F.Supp. 3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that “[c]ourts may rely on uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by affidavits” as evidence to support an entry of default judgment); Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F.Supp. 3d 145, 157 (D.D.C. 2017); Weinstein, 175 F.Supp.2d at 20.
B. The Ben Yehuda Street Terrorist Attack
Plaintiffs’ suit arises out of the Ben Yehuda Street attack, which took place on September 4, 1997. Three suicide bombers packed their bombs with “nails, screws, pieces of glass, and chemical poisons” in order to maximize “pain, suffering, and death.” Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 261 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Middle East Overview, available at https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/terrorism/1997Report/mideast.html (last accessed Sept. 25, 2019); see also Dkt. 30-2 at 15 (Paz Expert Report ¶¶ 81-82); Trial Tr. at 8–9, Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003), No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). The attack killed five people and wounded “nearly two hundred others.” Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 261 (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Middle East Overview); see also Trial Tr. at 8–9, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Eventually two Hamas operatives, Muadh Said Bilal and Omar Abdel Rahman al-Zaban, were arrested and charged with carrying out the bombing. Dkt. 30-2 at 13 (Paz Expert Report ¶¶ 69–70); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13 (Shaked Expert Report ¶ 27); see also Trial Tr. at 25, 29–31, 40–41, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Both were convicted for murder, attempted murder, and membership in Hamas. Dkt. 30-2 at 13 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 80); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13 (Shaked Expert Report ¶ 27); see also Trial Tr. at 40, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Hamas also claimed responsibility for the bombing. Dkt. 30-2 at 13–16 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 83); Dkt. 30-3 at 8 (Clawson Expert Report ¶ 28); Dkt. 30-4 at 12–13 (Shaked Expert Report); see also Trial Tr. at 9, 27–29, 53, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42).
The Ben Yehuda Street attacks inflicted serious physical injuries on each of the Campuzano plaintiffs. Diana Campuzano suffered, inter alia, permanent damage to her vision, sulfuric-acid inflicted burns, a “destroyed” upper sinus cavity, and a massive skull fracture. See Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 263; see also Trial Tr. at 10–11, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 41); Dkt. 21-1 at 8–10 (R. Campuzano Decl. ¶¶ 25–32). She suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and, even two decades later, she cannot concentrate properly, remains uncomfortable in crowds, and is easily frustrated. See Id . at 11 (R. Campuzano Decl. ¶ 35). Avi Elishis was eighteen at the time of the bombing. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 264 (citing Trial Tr. at 84 (ECF 42)). But see Dkt. 21-4 at 1 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶ 3) (stating that Avi was seventeen). His body was embedded with shrapnel, and Avi also suffered first- and second-degree burns, which required months of painful treatment. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 264; see also Trial Tr. at 89–91, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 21-4 at 4–7 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶¶ 12–18, 23–28). Since the bombing, Avi has lived in constant physical and emotional pain. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 264; see also Dkt. 21-4 at 8 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶ 29). Gregg Salzman sustained burns and permanent nerve damage to his upper lip stemming from a shrapnel wound as a result of the attack. See Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 265 (citing Trial Tr. at 111– 18 (ECF 42)); see also Dkt. 21-7 at 2–3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 10–12). He also suffers from PTSD and “constant physical pain.” Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 265 (citing Trial Tr. at 123– 24 (ECF 42)); Dkt. 21-7 at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 12–13, 19).
C. Iran’s Provision of Material Support to Hamas
Hamas, “an Islamic militant terrorist organization, ” has long had “a close relationship” with Iran. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262; see also Trial Tr. at 17, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42) (“By 1992, . . . Iran form[ally] recognized Hamas as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and it became the only Palestinian organization to establish what they called an embassy in Tehran.”); Dkt. 30-2 at 5 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 29). At the Campuzano evidentiary hearing, four experts testified regarding Iran’s provision of material support to Hamas and its role in the Ben Yehuda Street Attack: Dr. Bruce Tefft (retired CIA officer and counterterrorism expert), Dr. Rueven Paz (researcher and former member of the Israeli General Security Service), Ronni Shaked (researcher and former member of the Israeli General Security Service), and Patrick Clawson (deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy).[1] See Trial Tr. at 6, 44, 60, 74–75, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); see also Dkt. 30-2 (Paz Expert Report); Dkt. 30-3 (Clawson Expert Report); Dkt. 30-4 (Shaked Expert Report); Dkt. 32-1 (Tefft curriculum vita); Dkt. 32 (Tolchin Decl. ¶ 2) (noting that Bruce Tefft testified at the hearing but did not submit an expert report). The plaintiffs also offered the videotaped deposition of Yigal Presler, a counterterrorism advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262 (citing Ex. 56, Presler Dep. Tr. at 12); see also Trial Tr. at 82, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 31-1 at 10–16 (Presler Dep.). The Court relies on their uncontroverted and credible testimony to find the following facts and to conclude that Iran provided both economic assistance and terrorist training to Hamas and that the Ben Yehuda Street attack could not have occurred without that support.
With respect to economic assistance, by 1992, Iran was providing Hamas $30 million a year. Trial Tr. at 17, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); see also Dkt. 30-3 at 7–19 (Clawson Expert Report); Dkt. 30-2 at 9–11 (Paz Expert Report). Iran’s financial contributions to Hamas between 1990 and 1995 totaled “over $100 million.” Trial Tr. at 17, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). This support was channeled through the MOIS, Iran’s intelligence service, and the IRGC. Dkt. 30-3 at 9 (Clawson Expert Report ¶ 32); Trial Tr. at 21, 71, 81, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Indeed, “Iranian government support for terrorism is an official state policy, and the approval of high-ranking Iranian political figures . . . was necessary for Iranian agencies such as the MOIS to support Hamas with training and economic assistance.” Dkt. 30-2 at 10 (Paz Expert Report ¶ 50); see also Dkt. 30-3 at 6, 10 (Clawson Expert Report); Trial Tr. at 34, 50–53, 80–81, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Iran “encourage[ed] and push[ed] Hamas to carry out such attacks [as the Ben Yehuda Street attack] as a [matter of] policy.” Trial Tr. at 34, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Based on the extensive evidence and testimony proffered in the Campuzano case and re-filed in this case, the Court finds that Iran provided Hamas substantial financial support to assist and to encourage Hamas to engage in terrorist attacks, like the attack at issue here.
The Court also finds, crediting that same evidence, that Iran provided training and assistance that was foreseeably used to carry out the Ben Yehuda Street attack. The IRGC, the “action arm or paramilitary arm” of MOIS, provided “all terrorist type[s] of training” at its base in Bekka Valley, Lebanon. Trial Tr. at 13–14, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42). Of particular relevance here, the IRGC trained Hamas members, including the Hamas operative Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, who organized, planned, and executed a number of attacks, including the Ben Yehuda Street attack. Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at 262; see also Trial Tr. at 50–51, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42); Dkt. 30-2 at 11–15 (Paz Expert Report); Dkt. 30-4 at 13–15 (Shaked Expert Report). Because the Ben Yehuda Street bombings required “highly trained” operatives to build the bombs, recruit the suicide bombers, and plan the operation, see Trial Tr. at 20, 29–30, Campuzano, No. 00-cv-2328 (ECF 42), and because nothing in the record suggests that those operatives received sufficient training from other sources, the Court finds that the bombing could not have occurred without Iranian sponsorship, see, e.g., Dkt. 30-4 at 16 (Shaked Expert Report ¶ 39) (That attack was “carried out under the direction of Mahmoud Abu Hanoud using the full gamut of terrorism training acquired by him from his Iranian instructors, ” and “[i]t is highly unlikely that lacking Abu Hanoud’s organization and logistical training three Hamas operatives could have successfully infiltrated the heavily guarded environs of the Ben Yehuda Street mall in downtown Jerusalem carrying explosive laden briefcases”).
D. Plaintiffs’ Injuries
Learning of the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries, tending to them, and dealing with their lasting effects imposed significant hardships on Plaintiffs. Eight of the nine family members have submitted declarations detailing their mental anguish and emotional suffering. See Dkt. 21-7 (S. Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-8 (R. Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-9 (L. Salzman Decl.); Dkt. 21-1 (R. Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-2 (M. Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-3 (J. Campuzano Decl.); Dkt. 21-4 (B. Elishis Decl.); Dkt. 21-6 (S. Walzman Decl.). Plaintiff Brenda Elishis also seeks damages as the admistratrix of the estate of David Elishis, her late husband. See Dkt 21-4 at 7–10 (B. Elishis Decl. ¶¶ 29, 33–34). Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ declarations, the Court makes the following findings of fact regarding the effect of the Campuzano plaintiffs’ injuries on each family member:
1. Stanley Salzman
Stanley Salzman (“Stanley”) is Gregg Salzman’s father. Dkt. 21-7 at 1 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 1). After the attack, Gregg Salzman called his father and told him that he’d been in a bombing. Id. at 2 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). Stanley could not immediately travel to Israel, but, when he was able to eventually visit, he witnessed Gregg “in great pain, ” with “burned skin” wrapped in bandages. Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 8–10). He “couldn’t watch” as Gregg underwent the “painful and bloody process” of having his bandages changed “multiple times every day.” Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 11). “Shrapnel from the bomb [also] ripped up Gregg’s face and damaged a nerve in his face, ” leaving him with “tremendous pain from this nerve injury” to this day. Id. at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 12). “[T]he thought that Gregg could have been killed, ” moreover, continues to make Stanley “terrified.” Id. at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 15).
Stanley also attested that he had to support Gregg financially for many years because Gregg was unable to sustain a career due to his mental health and physical injuries. Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 13–14). This included providing Gregg with “a place to live” and “help[ing] with . . . his bills, medical expenses, and student loans.” Id. (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 14). The financial stress of supporting Gregg resulted in Stanley having to twice refinance his own home. Id. at 3 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 14). Gregg caused tensions in Stanley’s marriage, which contributed to his divorce. Id. at 3–4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 17). After Stanley’s other son Lee got divorced- also in part because of the “Gregg issue, ” see Dkt. 21-9 at 3 (L. Salzman Decl. ¶¶ 12–13)-Lee moved in with Stanley. Dkt. 21-7 at 3–4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 17). To accommodate Lee, Stanley moved into the basement. Id. Today, Stanley has a lingering “feeling of sorrow.” Id. at 4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 19). He “wish[es]” that he could do something to stop Gregg’s pain, and it “pains [him] that [he] cannot make [Gregg’s] pain go away.” Id. at 4 (S. Salzman Decl. ¶ 19).
2. Roberta Salzman
Roberta Salzman (“Roberta”) is Gregg Salzman’s mother. Dkt. 21-8 at 1 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 1). “As a mother, ” it was “devastating” for Roberta to hear that Gregg was “in a bombing.” Id. at 3 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 9). She was “frightened to the core” to hear that “other people sitting next to Gregg were killed and more severely maimed, ” and that Gregg was only alive “because of a twist of fate.” Id. (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 9).
Roberta and Gregg had a difficult relationship for many years, but it was just beginning to improve around the time of the bombing. Id. at 2 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). “Due to the injuries Gregg suffered, ” however, it became difficult to continue improving the relationship. Id. at 2 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). Although she has been able to improve her relationship with Lee, she has not been able to do the same with Gregg. Id. (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 6). Had it not been for the bombing, Roberta “very much believe[s]” that she “would have been able to make a lot of progress” in her relationship with Gregg. Id. (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 7). She feels as though the “terrorists who attacked Gregg robbed Gregg” and her of the “chance to grow closer” and she will “forever lament” that. Id. at 2 (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ 7).
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally, Roberta stated that Gregg &ldquo;was never able to start a true career, &rdquo; despite having graduated from chiropractic school a year before the bombing. Id. at 3 (R. Salzman Decl. &para; 11). It &ldquo;breaks [her] heart&rdquo; to know that Gregg &ldquo;has been in pain constantly for years and there is no cure or relief for it.&rdquo; Id. (R. Salzman Decl. ¶ ...