Source: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt06/AccesstoJustice.php
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 01:57:39
Document Index: 655919853

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 104', 'art. 5', 'art. 90', 'art. 17', 'art. 11', 'art. 6', 'art. 14', 'art. 9', 'art. 7', 'art. 5', 'art. 12', 'art. 7', 'art. 6', 'art. 10', 'art. 7']

Congressional-Executive Commission on China - 2006 Annual Report: VII(c)--Access to Justice
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2006 ANNUAL REPORTVII. Development of the Rule of Law and Institutions of Democratic Governance
VII(c) Access to Justice
Access to Justice and International Human Rights Standards | The Chinese Judicial System | Access to Legal Representation | Constitutional Review | Judicial and Adminstrative Review of State Action | Citizen Petitioning
International human rights standards require effective remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Despite these guarantees, Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in seeking remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights and constitutionally protected freedoms. External government and Communist Party controls continue to limit the independence of the Chinese judiciary. Party officials control the selection of top judicial personnel in all courts, including the Supreme People's Court, China's highest judicial authority. Since 2005, the government has restricted the efforts of private lawyers and human rights defenders who challenge government abuses. The All China Lawyers Association issued a guiding opinion that restricts the ability of lawyers to handle cases involving large groups of people. Local Chinese authorities have imposed additional restrictions on lawyer advocacy efforts.
The constitutional and administrative mechanisms in Chinese law that allow citizens to challenge government actions do not provide effective legal remedies, and Chinese citizens seldom use them. Chinese citizens rarely submit proposals to the National People's Congress for constitutional and legal review because the review process lacks transparency and citizens cannot compel review. Administrative court challenges to government actions have not increased since 1998. Provincial authorities report an overall decline between 2003 and 2005 in applications for administrative reconsideration, and the total numbers of such applications in major Chinese municipalities is a few hundred per year.
Chinese law also permits citizens to petition government officials directly to redress their grievances through the xinfang ("letters and visits") system. Official news media report that Chinese citizens presented 12.7 million petitions to county-level and higher xinfang bureaus during 2005, in contrast to the 8 million total court cases handled by the Chinese judiciary during the same period. Local officials are disciplined more severely for high incidences of petitioning. Absent alternative political or legal channels to check the power of local officials and obtain redress, this punishment structure provides an incentive for Chinese citizens to take their grievances to the streets in order to force local officials to act. But this punishment structure also gives local authorities an interest in suppressing mass petitions and preventing petitioners from approaching higher authorities. A December 2005 study of the xinfang system by a U.S. NGO found that some local authorities have resorted to "rampant violence and intimidation" to abduct or detain petitioners in Beijing and force them to return home.
The Supreme People's Court 2004-2008 court reform program imposes stronger external and internal controls that may further weaken the independence of courts and judges. The court reform program, however, also sets some positive long-term goals for judicial reform in the areas of court financing, adjudication, retrial procedures, and juvenile justice. Party efforts to address growing social unrest have resulted in new government programs to strengthen institutions that assist citizens with legal claims and disputes. Official Chinese statistics show that the number of government legal aid centers rose from 2,774 in 2003 to 3,081 in 2005. The total number of cases handled by these centers rose from about 166,000 in 2003 to an estimated 250,000 in 2005, or roughly 3 percent of all cases handled by the Chinese courts in 2005.
Access to Justice and International Human Rights Standards
Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in seeking remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights and constitutionally protected freedoms. Party and government controls limit the independence of Chinese courts and weaken the ability of individual judges to decide cases fairly. The government restricts lawyer advocacy efforts, particularly in politically sensitive cases. Although Chinese law provides citizens with Constitutional, judicial, and administrative mechanisms to challenge official violations of their rights, these mechanisms do not provide effective legal remedies.
International human rights standards require effective remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that all parties to the ICCPR ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated "have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."1
The Chinese Judicial System
External government and Communist Party controls continue to limit the independence of the Chinese judiciary. Party officials control the selection of top judicial personnel in all courts, including the Supreme People's Court (SPC), China's highest judicial authority. Party interests guide judicial reform efforts. SPC President Xiao Yang has linked official efforts to improve the funding and professionalization of rural Chinese courts to the core Party goals of establishing a "harmonious society" and "increasing the Party's governance capacity."2 In January 2006, the Party's Political and Legislative Affairs Committee issued a circular directing courts to improve enforcement efforts "under the leadership of local Party committees," apparently in response to the Party's broader effort to address mounting social unrest.3
The SPC's 2004-2008 reform program imposes stronger external controls on courts.4 The program directs courts to permit officials from local procuratorates to participate in adjudication committees, the highest authorities within Chinese courts. Since the procuratorate represents the government in cases pending before the courts, this directive raises issues of judicial independence and conflict of interest.5 The program also directs local officials to strengthen court mechanisms for receiving criticism and recommendations from local people's congresses (LPCs). The Chinese Constitution grants the standing committees of LPCs the authority to supervise local courts,6 and court procedures facilitate the intervention of LPC delegates in individual cases.7
The SPC also announced stronger internal controls over Chinese courts that may weaken the independence of individual judges to decide cases fairly. The SPC's 2004-2008 program requires that Chinese courts implement responsibility systems for individual judges and judicial panels.8 These systems discipline judges for a range of errors, including reversals by a higher court for legal errors.9 Chen Youxi, Vice President of the Constitutional and Human Rights Committee of the All China Lawyers Association, noted that because such systems "have a direct impact on personal interests such as bonuses and benefits of those trial judges with high rates of overturned cases," trial judges "commonly resort to seeking advance guidance from higher courts before making a decision, and run to appeals courts to convince them not to overturn their verdicts."10 Such systems encourage judges to violate the principles of openness and transparency in judicial decisionmaking.11 In November 2005, Chi Qiang, the president of the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, announced the abolition of his court's responsibility system, and said that his court will attempt to move toward a disciplinary system that sanctions judges for illegal behavior rather than "incorrect" outcomes.12 The wider adoption of such innovative local reforms remains in doubt, however, given the SPC's requirement that courts implement responsibility systems.
Some local Party officials have called for a degree of judicial independence, even as they press for strengthened controls over courts.13 State-controlled news media announced in January that Jiangxi provincial Party officials had issued a decision pressing local Party committees to strengthen their controls over the selection of court personnel. The decision, however, also called on local Party officials to support judicial independence and guard against local protectionism. The decision warned local Party committees against organizing court personnel to participate in campaigns to enforce administrative decisions or to attract investment in the local economy.14
The SPC's 2004-2008 court reform program sets some positive long-term goals for judicial reform. The SPC announced that it will consolidate and reclaim the death penalty review power from provincial-level high courts, and will require court hearings to resolve death penalty appeals [see Section III(b)--Rights of Criminal Defendants and Suspects]. The program also proposes steps to implement other positive reforms,15 including:
Court financing. Local governments influence courts through their control over judicial funding and appointments, and use this influence to protect local interests. The program directs court officials to explore national financing for court operations. Court adjudication committee system. Adjudication committees include court presidents and other administrative personnel and are the highest authorities in Chinese courts. They are often the vehicle for outside pressure to reverse individual decisions. The program directs committees to adopt more open decisionmaking procedures and to guarantee that experienced judges are able to serve on adjudication committees. Retrial procedures. Chinese court decisions often lack finality, as the result of extensive use of retrial procedures with vague rules and few limitations. [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--Fairness of Criminal Trials and Appeals for the impact that this has had on criminal trials.] The program directs officials to clarify the criteria, limits, jurisdiction, and procedures for granting retrial. Officials have drafted two proposed judicial interpretations that seek to address some of these questions.16
Advisory opinion system. Lower courts often rely on advisory opinions from higher courts for specific guidance on how to decide pending cases. This system undermines judicial fairness by separating actual court decisions from trials and by making subsequent appeals (to the same entity that responded to the request for review) no more than a formality. The program directs courts to limit use of advisory opinions to general questions of law rather than determinations of fact. Use of official authentication conclusions and expert testimony. The program directs court officials to implement a 2005 National People's Congress decision that forbids courts from establishing for-profit authentication centers to provide expert testimony. The Ministry of Justice issued relevant implementing measures in September 2005.17
Juvenile justice system. China currently has 2,400 juvenile tribunals.18 The program directs courts to improve their work in handling criminal, civil, and administrative cases affecting the rights of juveniles. It also provides for the establishment of experimental juvenile courts. Access to Legal Representation
Communist Party efforts to address growing social unrest have resulted in government programs to strengthen institutions that assist citizens with legal claims and disputes. To help reduce the number of citizen protests and mass petitions, provincial and municipal Party committees have directed local officials to improve legal aid and mediation efforts.19 Minister of Justice Wu Aiying said in February that: [We must] bring into play the professional strengths of lawyers in resolving disputes. [We must] take further steps to organize and guide lawyers, basic legal service workers, and legal aid personnel to actively participate in the work of handling mass incidents and citizen petitions involving legal issues. [We must] actively explore methods and measures that press parties to settle out-of-court and in non-litigation forums, in order to better resolve disputes and prevent them from escalating.20
Central government officials also are strengthening the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) presence at the local level, particularly in western China and at the level of township governments. MOJ offices guide the work of local mediation committees, run government legal aid programs that provide pro bono legal representation to citizens who meet designated criteria, and supervise and license Chinese lawyers.21 In 2005, Chinese authorities set the goal of ensuring that 91 percent of Chinese townships had a MOJ office by the end of 2006.22 Chinese authorities designated 7.4 billion yuan (US$920 million) to improve housing and work conditions for township court, justice, and public security bureaus in western China from 2004 to 2008.23 The MOJ has made the strengthening of township mediation and legal aid programs part of its effort to implement the Party's "new socialist countryside" campaign.24
Chinese authorities have expanded the scope of government legal aid efforts. Official Chinese statistics show that the number of government legal aid centers rose from 2,774 in 2003 to 3,081 in 2005. The total number of cases handled by these centers rose from about 166,000 in 2003 to an estimated 250,000 in 2005, or roughly 3 percent of all cases handled by the Chinese courts in 2005.25 In July 2005, the All-China Environment Federation and the State Environmental Protection Administration announced the creation of a joint legal aid program for the victims of environmental pollution.26 In September 2005, the Shanghai People's Congress issued a decision clarifying the eligibility of migrant workers for legal aid in cases of labor disputes, occupational injuries, and domestic violence.27 In May, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) announced that 669 of its legal staff would be permitted to acquire bar licenses and provide increased legal services to workers [see Section V(c)--Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights].
At the same time that it has promoted efforts to expand legal assistance to citizens, the government also has restricted the efforts of private lawyers and human rights defenders who challenge government abuses [see Section IV--Introduction; Section V(b) --Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--Access to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense]. The MOJ's "2006 Report on the Policy for Development of China's Legal Profession" emphasized its role in "guiding" the legal profession and the need for all lawyers to "serve the harmony and stability of society."28 The All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) issued a guiding opinion that went into effect on March 20 and restricts the ability of lawyers to handle cases involving representative or joint litigation by 10 or more litigants, or cases involving both litigation and non-litigation efforts.29 The guiding opinion further instructs law firms to assign only "politically qualified" lawyers to conduct the initial intake of these cases, and to obtain the approval of at least three law firm partners before taking them on.30 Lawyers who handle mass cases must accept supervision and guidance by judicial administration departments, attempt to mitigate conflict, and propose mediation as the method for conflict resolution.31 Local lawyers' associations may sanction any lawyer or law firm that fails to follow these guidelines and causes a "negative impact."32
Local Chinese authorities have imposed additional restrictions on lawyer advocacy efforts. The Henan Provincial Justice Bureau has issued an opinion that forbids lawyers from using the news media and engaging in various other activities when handling "major, sensitive, mass" cases.33 The opinion says that lawyers in Henan province cannot "use the media to stir things up or create a negative impact on domestic or international public opinion." It prohibits lawyers and law firms from publishing commentary to affect the outcome of a case or the mood of the public, and warns them not to establish contact with foreign organizations or news media in violation of disciplinary rules. The Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau has also issued an opinion that requires lawyers to seek instruction from the Justice Bureau before they handle "major, difficult, and sensitive" cases.34
The National People's Congress (NPC) wields exclusive power to amend the Constitution and to enact and amend national laws, particularly through its Standing Committee (NPCSC). The NPC is the only governmental body with the power to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement. Chinese courts do not have the power either to apply constitutional provisions in the absence of concrete implementing legislation or to strike down laws or regulations that are inconsistent with the Chinese Constitution.35 In December 2005, the NPCSC enacted new procedures that require the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate to submit judicial interpretations to the NPCSC within 30 days of promulgation.36 At least one Chinese scholar has said that these new procedures represent an NPC move to rein in the SPC and to ensure that the SPC does not erode the NPC's power as China's sole legislator and interpreter of the Constitution.37 The NPC supervises both the SPC, China's highest judicial authority, and the State Council, China's executive authority, but the NPC remains subject to tight Party control [see Section VII--Development of the Rule of Law and the Institutions of Democratic Governance].
Some scholars have suggested removing the power of constitutional review from the NPC and vesting it in a "dedicated judicial agency,"38 but the government has ruled out establishing a specialized court to review the constitutionality of laws and administrative regulations.39 Senior government and Party leaders have warned officials to guard against the promotion of "Western-style constitutional reform."40 They also reject adopting a "Western separation of powers,"41 and insist that any restraint on the central government's power must not diminish the leadership of the Communist Party.42
Under Article 90 of the Legislation Law, Chinese citizens may propose NPCSC review of whether or not a State Council regulation violates the Constitution or any national law.43 The Chinese government has taken some limited steps to formalize the constitutional and legal review system. For example, the NPCSC announced in 2004 the formation of a new Legislation Review and Filing Office (LRFO) to assist its Legislative Affairs Commission in reviewing regulations that may conflict with the Constitution and national laws.44 In December 2005, the NPCSC amended the "Working Procedures for the Filing and Review of Administrative Rules, Local Rules, Autonomous Region and Special Purpose Regulations, and Special Economic Zone Rules" (Legislation Procedures).45 The Legislation Procedures stipulate three phases for constitutional and legal review: consultation between the NPCSC and the formulating agency; NPCSC submission of a written request to the formulating agency that it revise or rescind the legislation; and, if the formulating agency does not accept the request, consultation within the NPCSC to determine whether or not to rescind the legislation. The amendments include a new provision authorizing the special committees of the NPC to review laws and regulations on their own initiative, with a deadline of two months for formulating agencies to respond to NPCSC special committee requests that a regulation be revised or rescinded.
Chinese citizens rarely submit proposals to the NPCSC for constitutional and legal review because the review process lacks transparency and citizens cannot compel review.46 During the run-up to the annual plenary sessions of the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Chinese authorities shut down the Aegean Sea (Aiqinhai) Web site, as well as four other sites that had complained on behalf of local workers.47 The Web site operators sought relief through the constitutional and legal review system in April 2006.48 As of September 2006, the NPCSC had not yet responded to the request for review. To address these problems, some Chinese legal experts have called for requiring the LRFO to notify those seeking review whether or not it will accept their proposal, and to provide explanations to those whose proposals it rejects.49 Others have suggested that the NPCSC report each year to the full NPC, describing the previous year's constitutional review work.50 Some legal experts in China also have advocated that the NPCSC establish a dedicated Constitutional Commission staffed by scholars, judges, and lawyers.51
NPC special committees and other central government agencies have the power to compel the NPCSC to act on their applications,52 but they have an interest in maintaining the national status quo and not creating conflicts among themselves.53 Thus, they have little incentive to request review of national laws, State Council regulations, or other central government agencies' rules on major issues relating to civil or human rights.54 Citizens may only offer proposals to the LRFO, which stands between them and the NPCSC and lacks the power to issue binding decisions that would resolve disputes.55 In addition, unlike other laws that compel State Council departments, courts, and local governments to act on citizens' applications and lawsuits,56 the Legislation Law merely provides that the NPCSC may react to citizens' proposals "if necessary." Finally, the government is not required to inform citizens whether or not it will act on a proposal, and the 2005 amendments to the Legislation Procedures revised the provision concerning government notification to a citizen that a review is complete, making such notification voluntary.57
The NPCSC has enacted and amended laws and regulations that protect citizens from government abuses in response to public pressure58 and new legislative mandates,59 but it has never rescinded a law or administrative regulation in direct response to a citizen proposal.60 The primary purpose of the constitutional and legal review system is to safeguard the unity of China's legal system rather than to give citizens an effective remedy by a competent national tribunal.61 The system is based on the constitutional and legal presumption that the NPC and its Standing Committee are paramount,62 and therefore not subject to checks, balances, or oversight.63 The China Law Society's Democracy and Law Times summarized the situation as follows: As a system, constitutional review comprises proposal, acceptance, review, determination, and resolution. If it lacks any one of these, then the constitutional review system is not complete. Although the meaning of citizens having been granted the right to submit proposals for constitutional review is very important, if all they have is the right of proposal, and do not have the right of acceptance, review, determination, and resolution, then the right of proposal exists in name only. This also explains the reason why so few citizens propose constitutional review.64
Judicial and Administrative Review of State Action
Chinese law provides methods for citizens to seek a remedy when they believe the government has violated their rights. These methods allow Chinese citizens limited legal recourse against individual officials or local governments that exceed their authority.65 Under the Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL), Chinese citizens may submit an application to State Council departments for administrative review of specific government actions that violate their legal rights and interests.66 Under the Administrative Procedure Law (APL), citizens may file a lawsuit in a people's court to challenge government actions.67 Under the State Compensation Law, citizens may request compensation for illegal government acts along with an ARL or APL action, or present them directly to the relevant government bureau.68 Some local Party disciplinary committees are also experimenting with procedural changes that grant cadres in specific cases the ability to mount a defense, present evidence, and receive a hearing on the charges against them.69
These methods, however, do not allow Chinese citizens to challenge administrative regulations that violate constitutional or legal rights. Article 12 of the APL forbids courts from accepting citizen challenges of administrative rules and regulations that have "general binding force." Article 7 of the ARL allows citizens to apply to administrative agencies for review of the legality of decrees70 of State Council departments and local people's governments at or above the county level, and any provisions enacted by town or township people's governments.71 The ARL does not, however, allow reconsideration of State Council rules or regulations.72
Citizens are making only limited use of laws that protect their rights by granting judicial and administrative review of government actions. For example, Hubei provincial authorities report an overall decline between 2003 and 2005 in applications for administrative reconsideration, from 3,468 to 3,336.73 Total numbers of such applications in major Chinese municipalities is a few hundred per year.74 Administrative court challenges to government actions have not increased since 1998. In 2005, first-instance administrative law cases totaled 95,707, nearly twice the 52,596 reported in 1995, but a decline from the 101,921 recorded in 2001. This decline parallels a similar stagnation in citizens using the judiciary generally. In 2005, the Chinese judiciary handled 4.3 million first-instance civil cases, down from 4.73 million reported in 2001, and only slightly higher than the 4 million recorded in 1995.75
Chinese laws that grant judicial and administrative action to citizens to protect their rights do not provide mechanisms to compel effective judicial or government review. When the government shut down the Aegean Sea Web site, along with four other Web sites, in March 2006, authorities cited Article 5 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Provisions),76 which grant the State Council Information Office (SCIO) the authority to license Web sites that report and comment on politics, economics, fast-breaking social events, and military, foreign, social, and public affairs. The operators of the closed Web sites believed that the Provisions violated their constitutional and legal rights,77 but they had no way to compel judicial or other government review of the Provisions. Government authorities were acting under the authority of the Provisions when they shut down the Web sites, and so the issue was whether the Provisions violated the Constitution, a national law, or a State Council regulation. Administrative review under the ARL could not provide the Web site operators an effective remedy because the Provisions are "department rules," and a 2005 State Council decision (Decision) explicitly provides for the licensing authority granted to the SCIO.78 Because citizens may not use the administrative reconsideration system to question the constitutionality or legality of State Council regulations (such as the Decision) or State Council department rules (such as the Provisions), the Web site operators would be unlikely to obtain effective relief based on an application for administrative reconsideration attacking the Provisions directly.
The ARL provides that citizens who do not accept an administrative reconsideration decision may file a lawsuit with a people's court under the APL.79 Like the ARL, however, the APL explicitly prohibits constitutional or legal review of State Council departments' rules.80 A court could refuse to enforce the Provisions if they conflicted with a national law or a State Council regulation,81 but since the SCIO's licensing authority is derived from the Decision, a court would lack the authority to declare the Provisions unconstitutional or illegal.82
Citizen Petitioning
Since the 1950s, xinfang ("letters and visits") offices have provided a channel outside court challenges for citizens to appeal government decisions and present their grievances.83 Under the new national Regulations on Letters and Visits (RLV) issued in January 2005, citizens may "give information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge complaints" to xinfang bureaus of local governments and their departments.84 Individual petitioning may be as simple as one dissatisfied citizen visiting multiple xinfang bureaus within government agencies. Collective or mass petitioning may involve organized demonstrations, speeches, or marches of hundreds or thousands of people seeking to present their grievances, despite an official prohibition on such activities.85 Official news media report that Chinese citizens presented 12.7 million petitions to county-level and higher xinfang bureaus during 2005,86 in contrast to the 8 million total court cases handled by the Chinese judiciary during the same period.87 The total number of petitions increased each year from 1993 to 2004.88 Petitioning is common even within the judiciary. Chinese courts handled four million petitions in 2005, a number roughly equal to the total number of civil court cases for the year.89
Authorities launched an implementation campaign for the RLV in 2005 aimed at reducing the number of citizen petitions. The government tasked the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) with coordinating official responses to citizen petitions, required local MPS heads to meet personally with petitioners in a May-to-September campaign, and increased propaganda efforts pressing local officials to resolve citizen petitions.90 Chinese authorities have ordered the nationwide adoption of responsibility systems that discipline local officials who fail to prevent mass petitions.91 Concerned about the rising number of mass petitions, central Party officials have set a goal to decrease the number during 2006.92 Party and government officials have called for strengthening xinfang institutions in conjunction with stronger efforts to maintain social order.93
Chinese authorities and state-run news media report that official measures to address citizen petitions in 2005 were a major policy success,94 but official statistics provide conflicting support for this claim. Official statistics show total citizen petitions declined for the first time in 12 years, from 13.7 million in 2004 to 12.7 million in 2005.95 Although officials reported a 90 percent success rate in resolving petitions,96 scholars commissioned by the government to study the issue say that only 0.2 percent of petitions filed receive a response.97 Official news media report that government and Party xinfang bureaus at the county level and above have handled some 917,000 petitions since the beginning of the campaign, but this represents less than a tenth of the total number of petitions received in 2005 by xinfang bureaus. Since MPS rules issued in August 2005 provide for disciplining local MPS officials who fail to prevent collective petitions, MPS officials may be suppressing petitioners or misreporting their numbers rather than resolving the underlying problems.98
The 2005 RLV requires local governments to adopt official xinfang responsibility systems, and some local governments have done so.99 These systems punish local officials more harshly for mass petitions that reach higher-level authorities, depending on the numbers of petitioners involved and the level of government that they reach.100 Absent alternative political or legal channels to check the power of local officials and obtain redress, this punishment structure provides an incentive for Chinese citizens to take their grievances to the streets in order to force local officials to act.101 But this punishment structure also gives local authorities an interest in suppressing mass petitions and preventing petitioners from approaching higher authorities. A December 2005 NGO study of these systems found that some local authorities have resorted to "rampant violence and intimidation" to abduct or detain petitioners in Beijing and force them to return home.102 The report alleges that Beijing police often ignore such abductions or detentions and sometimes assist with abductions.103
The government uses harsh measures to repress petitioners during high-profile national events. In March 2006, a senior MPS official confirmed that MPS officials would engage in mass roundups to "strongly encourage" those "people without proper professions, fixed places of residence, or stable incomes who have been hanging around Beijing for a long time" to leave the capital before the annual plenary session of the National People's Congress (NPC).104 Other repressive measures include:
During the annual NPC plenary session in March 2006, authorities detained AIDS activist Hu Jia for 41 days without legal formalities and without notifying his family [see Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--Arbitrary Detention]. Hu had attempted to submit petitions on behalf of AIDS victims to central government officials during high-profile conferences [see Section V(g)--Public Health--HIV/AIDS]. In December 2005, Beijing police arrested several hundred petitioners who gathered outside the offices of China Central Television to present their grievances on "Popularize Law Day." In December 2005, Shanghai police arrested over 200 petitioners who sought to present their grievances to municipal Party officials and were gathered outside a building in which the local Party branch was holding a conference. In November 2005, police in a number of cities arrested or detained dozens of petitioners before an official visit by U.S. President George W. Bush.105
Chinese court officials are pursuing reforms to the process of handling citizen petitions that may weaken the ability of individual judges to decide cases according to law. The Supreme People's Court (SPC) announced in November 2005 that it will require Chinese courts to establish procedures to resolve citizen petitions about judicial decisions. Trial judges will be responsible for responding to parties who visit the court and raise complaints about judgments, and their record for handling such complaints will be made part of their performance reviews.106 Similarities between the SPC announcement and the RLV suggest that the central government seeks to implement a common set of reforms for addressing citizen petitions to both the courts and local governments.107 The SPC reforms may encourage Chinese litigants to resort to post-decision petitioning rather than appeals to reverse verdicts, increase pressure on Chinese trial judges to alter verdicts to satisfy persistent petitioners, and weaken the finality of judgments.108
Notes to Section VII(c)--Access to Justice
1 The accompanying general comment notes that this language does not necessarily require a judicial remedy, but that "[i]n relation to civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted that judicial remedies for violations are essential" and "[a]dministrative remedies should be accessible, affordable, timely, and effective. An ultimate right of judicial appeal from administrative remedies . . . would also often be appropriate." General Comment No. 9.<www.unhchr.ch>
China has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have previously stated on three separate occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law, in statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour, and in a January 27, 2004 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly.<www.bjreview.com.cn>
2 "Supreme People's Court Maps Future Judicial Reforms in Five Year Reform Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 7-9.<www.cecc.gov>
3 Zong Bian, "Central Political and Legal Affairs Committee Issues Circular Calling For Increased Attention To Resolving the Problem of Enforcement of Court Decisions" [Zhongyang zhengfawei tongzhi yaoqiu jiada lidu qieshi jiejue zhixing nan], China Court Net (Online), 23 January 06.<��������ί֪ͨҪ��Ӵ�������ʵ���ִ���� | www.cecc.gov> Similarities between the circular and an October joint Party and State Council opinion suggest that they are part of a coordinated effort. The circular also directs local Party committees for the comprehensive management of public security to coordinate efforts at enforcing court judgments and to include the quality of enforcement work in the responsibility systems used to evaluate the performance of local officials. The national Political and Legislative Affairs Committee and the Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security prepared a December 2005 Party and State Council joint opinion to stem social unrest and to reduce the number of "mass incidents" such as riots, demonstrations, or collective petitions directed at government authorities. "Communist Party, State Council Order Stronger Controls Over Society," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 14-15.<�а졢���ת�����������뿪չƽ���������� | www.cecc.gov> The Political and Legislative Affairs Committee circular directive to coordinate with the local CCMPS branches suggests that this enforcement campaign may be a specific effort to implement the earlier joint opinion. 4 "Supreme People's Court Maps Future Judicial Reforms in Five Year Reform Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 7-9.<www.cecc.gov>
5 Ibid.<www.cecc.gov>
6 PRC Constitution, art. 104. 7 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 81. 8 Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008) [Renmin fayuan di er ge wu nian gaige gangyao (2004--2008)], issued 26 October 05.<����Ժ�ڶ�������ĸ��Ҫ(2004��2008) | www.cecc.gov>
9 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 81. 10 "Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court Abolishes Responsibility System for Wrongly Decided Cases, Believes It Impedes Fairness" [Beijing di yi zhongji fayuan quxiao cuo'an zhuijiu zhi renwei you'ai gongping], The First, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 21 November 05.<������һ�м���Ժȡ��?׷���� ��Ϊ�а���ƽ | www.cecc.gov>
11 Ibid.<������һ�м���Ժȡ��?׷���� ��Ϊ�а���ƽ | www.cecc.gov>; "Beijing Court Announces Reform of Judicial Disciplinary System," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 3. 12 "Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court Abolishes Responsibility System for Wrongly Decided Cases, Believes It Impedes Fairness," The First.<������һ�м���Ժȡ��?׷���� ��Ϊ�а���ƽ | www.cecc.gov>
13 Decision of the Jiangsu Party Committee on Further Strengthening the Work of the Courts and Procuratorate [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang fayuan jianchayuan gongzuo jueding], issued 12 August 04;<�ٽ�˾������ ά��˾��Ȩ������ʡί��̨������ǿ���칤�� | www.court.gov.cn> Decision of the Yancheng City Party Committee on Further Strengthening the Work of the Courts and Procuratorate [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang fayuan jianchayuan gongzuo jueding], issued 4 November 04.<�γ���ί�᳹��ʵʮ�������ȫ�ᾫ���ٿ�����ר�ⲿ���һ����ǿ��Ժ���Ժ���� | www.jsfy.gov.cn>
14 Jiangxi High People's Court (Online), "Party Committee Issues 'Decision on Taking Further Steps To Strengthen the Work of Courts and Procuratorates' " [Sheng wei xia fa "guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang fayuan jianchayuan gongzuo de jueding"];<ʡί�·������ڽ�һ����ǿ��Ժ���Ժ�����ľ����� | www.jxfy.gov.cn> "Jiangxi Party Authorities Support Judicial Independence, but Under Party Control," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 12.<www.cecc.gov>
15 "Supreme People's Court Maps Future Judicial Reforms in Five Year Reform Program," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 7-9;<www.cecc.gov> Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008).<����Ժ�ڶ�������ĸ��Ҫ(2004��2008) | www.cecc.gov> These reform plans parallel those announced in earlier SPC work reports and media analysis. See CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 87-88. 16 "Supreme People's Court Comes Out With Judicial Interpretation Promoting Reform of Adjudicatory Supervision" [Zuigaofa ni chutai sifa jieshi tuidong shenpan gaige], Defense Lawyer (Online), 28 November 05.<��߷����̨˾�������ƶ����мල�ĸ� | www.xingbian.cn>
17 "Justice Ministry Takes Steps To Improve the Independence of Expert Factual Determinations," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 12.<www.cecc.gov>
18 "The Rise In Youth Crime Is Startling" [Weichengnianren fanzui sheng fu jingren wo guo yunniang jian shaonian fayuan ping], Xinhua (Online), 13 March 05.<δ�����˷�������� �ҹ��������귨Ժ�� | news.xinhuanet.com>
19 Ningbo City Party Committee Decision Regarding the Construction of a Ningbo Ruled By Law [Zhonggong Ningbo shiwei yu jianshe fazhi Ningbo de jueding], issued 27 April 06;<�й�������ί���ڽ��跨�������ľ��� | www.cnnb.com.cn> Henan Provincial Party Committee and Henan Provincial Government Circular Regarding the "Program for the Construction of a Peaceful Henan" [Henan shengwei shengzhengfu guanyu "Pingan Henan jianshe gangyao" de tongzhi], issued 26 April 06.<����ʡίʡ�������ڡ�ƽ�����Ͻ����Ҫ����֪ͨ | www.cecc.gov>
20 Ministry of Justice (Online), Wu Aiying, "Provide Strong and Effective Legal Guarantees to Build a Harmonious Socialist Society" [Wei goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui tigong qiang you li de falu baozhang], 8 February 06.<Ϊ������������г����ṩǿ�����ķ��ɱ��� | www.legalinfo.gov.cn>
21 Ministry of Justice (Online), "Introduction to Judicial Administration Work" [Sifa xingzheng gongzuo jieshao], 24 March 03;<˾������������� | www.legalinfo.gov.cn> CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 75-78. 22 Li Qing and Huang Hun, "Construction of Local Judicial Bureaus Moves Into High Tide, Every Level of Government and Every Area Experience Success" [Sifa suo jianshe xian gaochao ge de ge ji jun you gaozhao], Legal Daily (Online), 16 May 05.<˾�������Ƹ߳� ���ظ������и��� | www.legaldaily.com.cn>
23 "Standing Committee of the State Council Reviews and Approves in Principle the 'Construction Plan for West-Central China Area Basic-Level Police Stations, Town and Township Judicial Offices and People's Courts' " [Guowuyuan changwuhuiyi shenyi bing yuanze tongguo "zhongxibu diqu jiceng paichusuo, xiangzhen sifasuo, renmin fating jianshe guihua"], Department of Guiding Grassroots Work (Online), 7 February 06.<����Ժ����������鲢ԭ��ͨ���������������ɳ�������˾��������ͥ����滮�� | www.legalinfo.gov.cn>
24 "Ministry of Justice Sets 'Four Targets' for Serving the Construction of the Socialist Countryside" [Sifabu ding "sixiang renwu" fuwu shehui zhuyi xin noncun jianshe], Xinhua (Online), 5 May 06.<˾���������������񡱷������������ũ�彨�� | news.xinhuanet.com>
25 Consultations increased from 1.9 million in 2003 to 2.66 million in 2005. "In One Year Over 430,000 People Assisted by China's Legal Aid System" [Yi nian yuanzhu 43 wan duoming qunzhong wo guo falu yuanzhu zhidu jiancheng tixi], Xinhua (Online), 1 January 06;<һ��Ԯ��43�����Ⱥ�� �ҹ���Ԯ���ƶȽ�����ϵ | news.xinhuanet.com> CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 76-77. 26 Ministry of Justice (Online), "All-China Environmental Federation to Provide Legal Aid to Pollution Victims" [Zhonghua huanbao lianhehui biaoshi wei wuran shouhaizhe tigong falu yuanzhu], 24 July 05.<�л��������ϻ��ʾ Ϊ��Ⱦ�ܺ����ṩ���ɾ��� | www.legalinfo.gov.cn>
27 Shanghai Municipality Decisions on Legal Aid [Shanghai shi falu yuanzhu ruogan guiding], issued 9 May 06, art. 5.<�Ϻ��з���Ԯ�����ɹ涨 | news.sina.com.cn> Article 6 provides that applicants seeking legal aid may obtain a statement proving economic need either from authorities in their place of hukou registration or actual place of residence. This appears to allow migrant applicants greater access to legal assistance in their actual place of residence. Provincial regulations issued before the 2003 National Regulations on Legal Aid had made access to legal aid conditional on local hukou status. CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 63. 28 2006 Report on the Policy for Development of China's Legal Profession [2006 nian Zhongguo lushi ye fazhan zhengce baogao], issued 16 January 06;<2006���й���ʦҵ��չ���߱��� | www.cecc.gov> "ACLA, Justice Bureau Opinions Restrict Lawyer Involvement in Sensitive, Mass Cases," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 4-5.<www.cecc.gov>
29 Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature [Zhonghua quanguo lushi xiehui guanyu lushi banli qunti xing anjian zhidao yijian], issued 20 March 06, sec. I(1);<�л�ȫ����ʦЭ�������ʦ����Ⱥ���԰���ָ����� | www.cecc.gov> "ACLA, Justice Bureau Opinions Restrict Lawyer Involvement in Sensitive, Mass Cases," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 4-5.<www.cecc.gov>
30 Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature, sec. III(2)-(3).<�л�ȫ����ʦЭ�������ʦ����Ⱥ���԰���ָ����� | www.cecc.gov>
31 Ibid., sec. I(2)-(3).<�л�ȫ����ʦЭ�������ʦ����Ⱥ���԰���ָ����� | www.cecc.gov>
32 Ibid., sec. IV(8).<�л�ȫ����ʦЭ�������ʦ����Ⱥ���԰���ָ����� | www.cecc.gov>
33 "ACLA, Justice Bureau Opinions Restrict Lawyer Involvement in Sensitive, Mass Cases," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 4-5;<www.cecc.gov> "Henan Justice Bureau Bans Lawyers From Using Media in Sensitive Cases," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 5-6;<www.cecc.gov> "Henan Justice Bureau Establishes a Rule for Lawyers: No Stirring Up of Sensitive Cases" [Henan sifating wei lushi ding "guiju" mingan anjian jin chaozuo], Henan Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 10 April 06.<����˾����Ϊ��ʦ������ء� ���а������� | news3.xinhuanet.com>
34 "ACLA, Justice Bureau Opinions Restrict Lawyer Involvement in Sensitive, Mass Cases," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 4-5;<www.cecc.gov> "Shenyang Lawyers Must Seek Advisory Opinions When Handling Sensitive Cases" [Shenyang lushi chengban mingan anjian xu qingshi], Legal Daily (Online), 19 April 06.<������ʦ�а����а�������ʾ | www.legaldaily.com.cn>
35 PRC Constitution, arts. 62, 67, 128. 36 Working Procedures for the Filing and Review of Judicial Interpretations [Sifa jieshi beian shencha gongzuo chengxu], issued 16 December 05; "NPC Standing Committee Establishes Constitutional Review System for Regulations and Judicial Explanations" [Renda changweihui jianli fagui he sifa jieshi beian shencha zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 19 December 05.<�˴�ί�Ὠ�������˾�����ͱ�������ƶ� | www.xhby.net>
37 CECC Staff Interview. 38 "The NPC Revises Constitutional Review Procedures, Review Processes Should Draw Lessons from Foreign Countries' Experiences" [Renda xiuding weixian shencha chengxu shencha caozuo xu jiejia waiguo jingyan], Southern Metropolitan News (Online), 21 December 05;<�˴��޶�Υ�������� ��������������� | www.southcn.com> "Constitutional Review and the Strengthening of Judicial Power" [Hexianxing shencha yu sifaquande qianghua], China Social Science, Vol. 2, 2002;<�����������˾��Ȩ��ǿ�� | www.fawang.net> Zhu Xiaoqing, "Legal Research Must Be Based on China's Situation" [Faxue yanjiu ya lizu yu zhongguo shiji], Seeking Truth, 16 March 06.<��ѧ�о�Ҫ�������й�ʵ�� | www.qsjournal.com.cn>
39 "NPC Explains Constitutional Review System, Any Citizen Can Petition for Constitutional Review" [Renda jie weixian shenchazhi, renhe gongmin ke tiqing weixian shencha], Beijing News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 December 04;<�˴���Υ������� �κι��������Υ����� | news.xinhuanet.com> "My Country Implements the Constitution by NPC Supervision, Constitution Still Cannot Be the Basis of Litigation" [Wo guo you renda jiandu xianfa shishi, xianfa reng buneng chengwei susong genju], People's Daily (Online), 1 December 04.<�ҹ����˴�ල�ܷ�ʵʩ �ܷ��Բ��ܳ�Ϊ���ϸ�� | www.people.com.cn>
40 See Zhu Xiaoqing, "Legal Research Must be Based on China's Situation," which states: "We absolutely may not use 'the Constitution may be studied and amended' as an excuse to wittingly or unwittingly take the constitutional systems of certain Western countries as our example, or to question or censure our country's constitutional system."<��ѧ�о�Ҫ�������й�ʵ�� | www.qsjournal.com.cn>
41 Ibid.;<��ѧ�о�Ҫ�������й�ʵ�� | www.qsjournal.com.cn> Cheng Xiangqing, "A Discussion of Perfecting National People's Congress Supervision System" [Lun wanshan renda jiandu zhidu], People's Daily (Online), 15 July 04.<�������˴�ල�ƶ� | www.people.com.cn>
42 Zhu Xiaoqing, "Legal Research Must be Based on China's Situation."<��ѧ�о�Ҫ�������й�ʵ�� | www.qsjournal.com.cn>
43 PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 90.<�л����񹲺͹������� | www.cecc.gov>
44 "New NPC Body to Address Law Conflicts," China Daily (Online), 21 June 04.<www.chinadaily.com.cn> China's state-run media has said this system is justified because "the issues raised by the State Council and the other five types [of government agencies] are more important," and because the large number of proposals that could be submitted by average citizens necessitated a "filtering procedure" before they were forwarded to the NPCSC. "National People's Congress Standing Committee Clarifies Constitutional Review Procedure" [Quanguo renda mingque weixian shencha chengxu], Beijing News (Online), 20 December 05.<ȫ���˴���ȷΥ�������� | news.thebeijingnews.com> One Chinese scholar, however, has characterized this "government first, citizens second" approach as "giving one the feeling that the state is above the people, more important than the people, and seems inconsistent with nature of a socialist country." Wang Zhenmin, "China's Constitutional Review System" [Zhongguo weixian shencha zhidu] (Beijing: China Law and Politics University Publishing, 2004), 130. 45 Working Procedures for the Filing and Review of Administrative Rules, Local Rules, Autonomous Region and Special Purpose Regulations, and Special Economic Zone Rules [Xinzheng faqui, difangxing fagui, zizhi tiaoli he danxing tiaoli, jingji tequ fagu beian shencha gongzuo chengxu], issued 16 October 00.<�������桢�ط��Է��桢��������͵������������汸����鹤������ | www.cecc.gov>
46 Ding Aiping and Fei Zhiming, "Constitutional Review Takes a Big Step Forward" [Weixian shencha you xiang qian mai chule yi bu], Democracy and Legal System Times (Online), 17 April 06.<Υ���������ǰ������һ�� | www.mzyfz-news.com.cn> See also, Luo Jing, "The Structure and Weaknesses of China's Press Legal System" [Woguo xinwen lingyu falu tixide goucheng yu quexian], The Journalist Monthly (Online), 1 February 06,<�ҹ�������������ϵ�Ĺ�����ȱ�� | xwjz.eastday.com> which says that the absence of means for redress is the reason no cases have been filed by "people suing the government" in the area of media control, and that even if someone wished to file such a law suit, there is no law on which such a suit could be based; "Chinese Media, Scholars Criticize Lack of Legal Protections for Journalists," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 15.<www.cecc.gov>
47 "Groups Petition Government To Review Constitutionality Of Internet News Rules," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 6.<www.cecc.gov>
48 See "Legal Expert: Improve Legislative Filing and Review, Safeguard the Unity of the Nation's Legal System" [Faxue zhuanjia: wanshan fagui beian shencha weihu guojia fazhi tongyi], China Youth Daily (Online), 22 December 05, which quotes Cai Dingjian as saying: "Currently our country's local protectionism and departmental protectionism commonly causes a lack of unity laws and regulations, and legislative conflicts lead to citizens' rights suffering harm."<��ѧר�ң����Ʒ��汸����� ά����ҷ���ͳһ | zqb.cyol.com> See also Tong Dahuan, "How To Realize 'Procedural Rule by Law' " ["Chengxu fazhi" ruhe shixian], China Economic Times (Online), 22 December 05;<"�����Ρ����ʵ�� | www.sh.xinhuanet.com> "Heilongjiang's Compulsory Marriage Examination is Not Illegal," [Heilongjiang qianzhi hun jian bing bu weifa], Procuratorate Daily (Online), 1 August 05, 5 (citing Tai Qianhong: "Furthermore it is difficult bring about social groups and citizens submitting suggestions, and this is also significantly related to the fact that the current constitutional review mechanism is imperfect, and procedures are difficult to operate.");<����ǿ�ƻ�첢��Υ���෴��һЩ�ط�ʵ�С���Ը��족ǡǡ��Υ���� | www.jcrb.com> Cheng Xiangqing, "A Discussion of Perfecting National People's Congress Supervision System" ("[O]ur nation's constitutional supervision duty has never been effectively exercised. One reason for this is that the constitutional review mechanisms and procedures continues to need improvement.");<�������˴�ල�ƶ� | www.people.com.cn> "Several Problems with the National People's Congress' Constitutional Review Procedures" [Guanyu quanguo rendachangweiyuanhui fagui beian shencha gongzuode jige wenti], People's Daily (Online), 15 July 04.< ����ȫ���˴�ί�ᷨ�汸����鹤���ļ������� | people.com.cn>
49 "I think they should conclude each case with a formal written judgment supported by adequate reasons, instead of solving the problem behind close doors.' " "New NPC Body to Address Law Conflicts," China Daily (Online) (quoting Wang Zhenmin);<www.chinadaily.com.cn> Sun Ruizhuo, "Three Suggestions Regarding the 'Constitutional Review' Procedure" [Dui "weixian shencha" chengxu de san dian jianyi], Da He Bao, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 21 December 05;<��ӱ����ԡ�Υ����顱�������㽨�� | opinion.people.com.cn> "Legal Expert: Improve Legislative Filing and Review, Safeguard the Unity of the Nation's Legal System" (citing Cai Dingjian as suggesting that the government tell the citizens within a fixed time whether or not an application for review has been accepted, whether or not they are launching a review, the specific process of the review, or if it is rejected, the reason for not accepting it);<��ѧר�ң����Ʒ��汸����� ά����ҷ���ͳһ | zqb.cyol.com> Tong Dahuan, "How to Realize 'Procedural Rule by Law,' " China Economic Times.<"�����Ρ����ʵ�� | www.sh.xinhuanet.com>
50 "National People's Congress Standing Committee Clarifies Constitutional Review Procedures," Beijing News (Online), (citing Jiang Mingan, director of the Beijing University Constitutional and Administrative Law Research Center).<ȫ���˴���ȷΥ�������� | news.thebeijingnews.com>
51 "Constitutional Law Expert: Establishing a Constitutional Review Agency is an Important Step" [Xianfa xue quanwei zhuanjia: chengli weixian shencha jigou shi zhongda jinbu], China Youth Daily (Online), reprinted in the People's Daily (Online), 22 June 04, quoting Han Dayuan, China People's University Law School Vice Dean, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Constitutional Law Association Vice-President: [T]he general consensus with our country's constitutional community is that the National People's Congress Standing Committee should establish a dedicated Constitutional Commission, with rank at least equal to that of the NPC's specialist commission, and appoint authoritative legal scholars, experienced judges, and experienced lawyers to the specialist committee to serve as review commissioners. It would then directly review whether laws and regulations were unconstitutional or illegal, and report directly to the NPC Standing Committee, after which review procedures would be launched, and this method is relatively more suited to our country's situation.<�ܷ�ѧȨ��ר�ң�����Υ���������ش�� | www.people.com.cn>
See also, "Experts Suggest The National People's Congress Establish a Constitutional Commission" [Zhuanjia jianyi quanguo renda zengshe xianfaweiyuanhui], China Youth Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 3 December 05.<ר�ҽ���ȫ���˴������ܷ�ίԱ�� | news.xinhuanet.com>
52 PRC Legislation Law, arts. 90 and 91.<�л����񹲺͹������� | www.cecc.gov>
53 "Beneath the conflict of legislation lies the conflict of interests of different departments and local administrations and, in a word, power distribution." "New NPC Body to Address Law Conflicts," (quoting Wang Zhenmin);<www.chinadaily.com.cn> Cai Dingjian, "China Takes a Step Forward in Constitutional Review" [Zhongguo xian weixian maijin], Southern Weekend (Online), 22 December 05 (saying China's legal system is characterized by local and departmental protectionism);<�й���Υ��������� | www.nanfangdaily.com.cn> "Heilongjiang's Compulsory Marriage Examination is Not Illegal," Procuratorate Daily (Online) (quoting Tai Qianhong: "[S]tate agencies rarely submit suggestions for reviewing laws and regulations, and this is because a given state agency is often the law enforcement entity, and the law or regulation is often connected with their own interests.");<����ǿ�ƻ�첢��Υ���෴��һЩ�ط�ʵ�С���Ը��족ǡǡ��Υ���� | www.jcrb.com> Fu Dalin, "Using Openness and Gamesmanship to Prevent 'Legislative Balkanization' " [Yi gongkai he boyi fangzhi "lifa geju"], Guangming Daily (Online), 28 March, 06: [S]ituations arise where there are fights between legal standards. Looking into the reason, it is basically because it is very easy for agencies to influence the legislative process, and when legislating some administrative agencies "fight for what is in their interests, oppose what is against their interests, drag their feet in what is in others' interests, and refuse anything that divides their interests," this creates a situation of administrative legislation separatism that is unjust and unharmonious.<�Թ����Ͳ��ķ�ֹ��������ݡ� | www.gmw.cn>
54 "Legal Expert: Improve Legislative Filing and Review, Safeguard the Unity of the Nation's Legal System," China Youth Daily (Online), quoting Cai Dingjian: [O]ur country's legislative filing and review system primarily reviews whether local regulations and administrative regulations conflict with the Constitution and laws. . . . It is related to a constitutional review system, but it has a major difference, as the core of modern constitutional review systems will resolve whether the laws formulated by national legislative bodies are unconstitutional, and it safeguards the authority of law and the rights of citizens. Legislative filing and review systems do not include reviewing problems of NPC formulated laws conflicting with the Constitution. . . .<��ѧר�ң����Ʒ��汸����� ά����ҷ���ͳһ | zqb.cyol.com>
55 Zhang Qianfan, "A Symbol of the Beginning of China's Constitutional Government Era" [Zhongguo xianzheng shidai kaishi de biaozhi], Legal Daily (Online), 28 June 04;<�й�����ʱ��ʼ�ı�־ | www.legaldaily.com.cn> "Constitutional Law Expert: Establishing a Constitutional Review Agency Is an Important Step," China Youth Daily (Online), (quoting Han Dayuan: "the Legislation Review and Filing Office is an agency subordinate to the Legislative Affairs Commission, and does not have any practical authority to rescind unconstitutional or illegal laws and regulations.");<�ܷ�ѧȨ��ר�ң�����Υ���������ش�� | www.people.com.cn> "National People's Congress Standing Committee Clarifies Constitutional Review Procedures," Beijing News (Online) (citing Jiao Hongchang).<ȫ���˴���ȷΥ�������� | news.thebeijingnews.com>
56 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, enacted 29 April 99, art. 17;<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov> PRC Administrative Procedure Law, enacted 4 April 89, art. 11.<�л����񹲺͹��������Ϸ� | www.cecc.gov>
57 Compare original Legislation Procedures article 13 ("After legislative review work has been completed, the NPCSC General Office shall be responsible for notifying in writing the work unit or individual who raised the review request or review proposal") with amended Legislation Procedures article 14 ("After legislative review work has been completed, the NPCSC General Office may, as necessity dictates, notify in writing the government agencies or social organization, business enterprise, organization, or citizen who raised the review request or review proposal.")<�������桢�ط��Է��桢��������͵������������汸����鹤������ | www.gx-law.gov.cn><�������桢�ط��Է��桢��������͵������������汸����鹤������ | www.cecc.gov>
58 Ding Aiping and Fei Zhiming, "Constitutional Review Takes a Big Step Forward" ("Even though unconstitutional and illegal laws and regulations are commonplace, the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee has yet to rescind a single law or regulation. Soon after three academics petitioned regarding the Sun Zhigang incident, the State Council abolished the custody and repatriation measures, but it did not begin constitutional review procedures, nor did it provide any feedback to the public or the petitioners regarding the situation.").<Υ���������ǰ������һ�� | www.mzyfz-news.com.cn>
59 For example, officials have said that Chinese legislators replaced earlier regulations with the Public Order Administration Punishment Law to comply with the requirements of the Legislation Law. PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law, issued 28 August 05;<�л����񹲺͹��ΰ����?���� | www.cecc.gov> "National People's Congress Legislative Affairs Commission Report on the Results of the Consideration of the 'Draft People's Republic of China Public Order Administration Punishment Law' " [Quanguo renda faluweiyuanhui guanyu "zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhi'an guanli chufa fa (cao'an)" shenyi jieguode baogao], enacted 28 August 05.<ȫ���˴���ίԱ����ڡ��л����񹲺͹��ΰ����?�������ݰ�����������ı��� | www.npc.gov.cn>
60 Liu Wuhou, "Hoping That Constitutional Review Procedures Will Commence as Soon as Possible," [Qidai weixian shencha chengxu jinkuai qidong], Jiangnan Times, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 23 December 05;<�ڴ�Υ�������򾡿���������ʣ� | www1.people.com.cn> Liao Weihua, "Experts Suggest Establishing a Special Constitutional Committee" [Zhuanjia jianyi she xianfa zhuanmen weiyuanhui], Beijing News (Online), 21 September 04. 61 The 2005 amendment to Legislative Procedures added the phrase " . . . in order to safeguard the unity of the nation's legal system." See also, "Legal Expert: Improve Legislative Filing and Review, Safeguard the Unity of the Nation's Legal System," China Youth Daily (Online) (quoting Cai Dingjian: "[I]ts primary goal is to safeguard the unity of the nation's legal system.").<��ѧר�ң����Ʒ��汸����� ά����ҷ���ͳһ | zqb.cyol.com>
62 PRC Constitution, arts. 62, 67; PRC Legislation Law, arts. 90-91;<�л����񹲺͹������� | www.cecc.gov> Cheng Xiangqing, "A Discussion of Perfecting National People's Congress Supervision System" ("Our country's system differs from the three powers separation implemented in Western countries, in that we implement a system whereby all power belongs to the people through the People's Congress. . . . Our country's Constitution stipulates that the sacred duty of supervising the implementation of the Constitution lies only with the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee.").<�������˴�ල�ƶ� | www.people.com.cn>
63 China's leaders have nevertheless acknowledged that unrestrained power leads to abuse and corruption, and that mechanisms are required to ensure citizens have a means to achieve redress of violations of their constitutional and legal rights. See, e.g., Zhu Xiaoqing, "Legal Research Must Be Based on China's Situation" ("[E]very country believes that, if power is not subject to restraint and supervision, it must lead to corruption");<��ѧ�о�Ҫ�������й�ʵ�� | www.qsjournal.com.cn> Cheng Xiangqing, "A Discussion of Perfecting National People's Congress Supervision System" ("History, both ancient and modern, foreign and domestic, proves that if those who hold power are not restrained, they will necessarily abuse their authority and become corrupt.");<�������˴�ල�ƶ� | www.people.com.cn> Hu Jintao, "Speech in the Capital Commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of the Constitution" [Zai shoudu gejie jinian zhonghua renmingongheguo xianfa gongbu shixing ershi zhou nian dahui de yanjiang], Guangming Daily (Online), 4 December 02 ("As a result of problems with flawed laws and systems and the ill-adapted quality of law enforcement personal, there remain many problems of laws not being complied with, laws not being strictly enforced, and violations of law not being prosecuted, and there continues to exist some unconstitutional situations at different levels. We must expeditiously study and implement constitutional supervision mechanisms and further clarify constitutional supervision procedures in order to redress all violations of the Constitution.").<���׶���������л����񹲺͹��ܷ�����ʩ�ж�ʮ�������ϵĽ��� | www.gmw.cn>
64 Ding Aiping and Fei Zhiming, "Constitutional Review Takes A Big Step Forward."<Υ���������ǰ������һ�� | www.mzyfz-news.com.cn>
65 Under the national Regulations on Letters and Visits (RLV), citizens may "give information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge complaints" to xinfang (letters and visits) bureaus of local governments and their departments. Regulations on Letters and Visits [Xinfang tiaoli], issued 10 January 05, arts. 3, 6. The Law on Administrative Supervision allows citizens to file complaints of illegal behavior of government officials with Ministry of Supervision (MOS) officials.<�л����񹲺͹�������취 | www.mos.gov.cn> PRC Law on Administrative Supervision, enacted 9 May 97, art. 6. Party discipline bureaus handle similar accusations regarding Party members' violation of Party discipline. Regulations on Intra-Party Supervision [Dangnei jiandu tiaoli], issued 17 February 04, arts. 8, 25-26. None of the above channels allows citizens to challenge the underlying legality of regulations. 66 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, enacted 29 April 99, arts. 6, 14.<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov> The Chinese administrative law system speaks in terms of "concrete" acts, which refer to actions by a government official or agency against a specific target with regard to a specific matter. "Abstract" acts refer to universally binding documents issued by administrative agencies to regulate behavior. 67 Ibid., art. 14;<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov> PRC Administrative Procedure Law, arts. 2, 11.<�л����񹲺͹��������Ϸ� | www.cecc.gov>
68 PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, art. 9.<�л����񹲺͹����⳥�� | www.cecc.gov>
69 Shaanxi Provincial Party Disciplinary Commission and Bureau of Supervision (Online), "Record of Jinhua Open Hearing of Party and Government Disciplinary Violations" [Jinhua gongkai shenli dangji zhengji anjian jishi], 24 March 05.<�𻪹������?�����Ͱ�����ʵ | www.qinfeng.gov.cn>
70 Defined as "regulatory documents below the level of rules" [Guizhang yixiade guifanxing wenjian]. See National People's Congress (Online), "Explanation Regarding the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People's Republic of China" [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng fuyi fa shiyi], 18 October 00.<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨���� | www.npc.gov.cn> "Rules" are defined in article 2 of the Regulation for Filing Local and Administrative Rules [Fagui guizhang bei'an tiaoli], issued 14 December 01, as "Those rules [guizhang] formulated by State Council ministries and commissions, the People's Bank of China, the Auditing Administration, and subordinate agencies having executive administration capacity in accordance with laws and State Council's administrative regulations [xinzheng fagui], decisions, and orders within the scope of their authority pursuant to the Regulation on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules.<������±������� | www.cecc.gov> Article 6 of the Regulation on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules [Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli], issued 16 November 01, states that the names of rules generally include "provisions" [guiding] and "measures" [banfa], but not "regulations" [tiaoli].<�����ƶ��������� | www.cecc.gov>
71 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, art. 7.<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov>
72 National People's Congress, "Explanation Regarding the Administrative Reconsideration Law."<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨���� | www.npc.gov.cn>
73 Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (Online), "2005 Analytical Report on Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation in Hubei Province" [2005 nian Hubei sheng xingzheng fuyi ji xingzheng yingsu qingkuang fenxi de baogao], 29 March 06.<2005�����ʡ�������鼰����Ӧ����������ı��� | www.chinalaw.gov.cn>
74 Ibid. 75 2006 Supreme People's Court Work Report, 11 March 06; 1995 Law Yearbook of China [1995 Zhongguo falu nianjian] (Beijing: China Law Yearbook Press, 1995), 958.<�������Ժ�������� | www.legaldaily.com.cn>
76 Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xiaoxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05.<������������Ϣ�������涨 | www.cecc.gov>
77 The groups claimed that the Provisions granting the SCIO the authority to license Web sites violated article 35 of the Constitution, and various provisions of the PRC Administrative Licensing Law, issued 27 August 03.<�л����񹲺͹�������ɷ� | www.cecc.gov> "Petition on Behalf of the Aegean Sea Web Site Et. Al. to Repeal Rules on the Administration of Internet News Information Services" [Aiqinhai shijian weixian shencha shenqing daibiao tuan deng], Signature Net, issued 28 March 06.<Ҫ�󳹵׷ϳ�����������Ϣ�������涨�� | www.cecc.gov>
78 Decision of the State Council Establishing Administration Examination and Approval Matters That Must Remain Subject to Administrative Licensing [Guowuyuan dui quexu baoliu de xingzheng shenpi xiangmu sheding xingzheng xuke de jueding daohang], issued 29 June 04.<����Ժ��ȷ�豣��������������Ŀ�趨������ɵľ������� | www.cecc.gov>
79 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, art. 5.<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov>
80 PRC Administrative Procedure Law, art. 12(2) states that "people's courts shall not accept actions initiated by citizens, legal persons or other organizations concerning any of the following matters: administrative rules and regulations, or decisions and orders with general binding force formulated and promulgated by administrative organs."<�л����񹲺͹��������Ϸ� | www.cecc.gov> PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, art. 7 stipulates that "rules of departments and commissions under the State Council, and local people's governments" are excluded from administrative reconsideration review.<�л����񹲺͹��������鷨 | www.cecc.gov>
81 PRC Administrative Procedure Law, arts. 52 and 53 state that, in adjudicating administrative disputes, people's courts shall "rely upon" national laws and State Council and local regulations, and shall "refer to" the rules of State Council ministries, commissions, and local governments.<�л����񹲺͹��������Ϸ� | www.cecc.gov>
82 Wang Zhenmin, "China's Constitutional Review System" ("But if the Legislation Law is strictly implemented, [Article 90] in fact clearly negates the constitutional review power of the Supreme People's Courts and the lower level courts, and requires that, if the Supreme People's Court runs into a situation where a rule or regulation is unconstitutional, it must temporarily suspend adjudication proceedings and apply to the NPCSC to undertake constitutional review of the rule or regulation . . . ."). 83 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 95-98; Carl Minzner, "Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions," 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 115-6 (2006). 84 Regulations on Letters and Visits, arts. 3, 6. 85 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 95. 86 "The Growth of Xinfang Cases Has Been Turned Back" [Wo guo xinfang zongliang chixu pansheng shitou huo ezhi shangfang geng quxiang lixing], China National Radio (Online), 29 April 06.<�ҹ��ŷ���������������ͷ����� �Ϸø��������� | www.cnr.cn>
87 SPC Work Report, 11 March 06.<�������Ժ�������� | www.legaldaily.com.cn> Note that since 2005, the SPC work report has included "executed" (zhixing) cases in its annual computations of judicial cases, raising the total numbers of cases handled by the Chinese judiciary by 2 million a year. CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 177, endnote 9. 88 Zhou Zhanshun, Director of the State Bureau of Letters and Calls stated in a 2003 interview that the total number of petitions received had risen regularly since 1993. "Director of the State Bureau for Letters and Calls: 80 Percent of Petitioners Are Justified," Outlook, reprinted in the China Internet Information Center (Online), 20 November 03.<����ŷþ־ֳ���80%�Ϸ��е��� | www.china.org.cn> In 2006, Chinese authorities noted that the total number of petitions had declined in 2005 for the first time in 12 years. "The Growth of Xinfang Cases Has Been Turned Back," China National Radio.<�ҹ��ŷ���������������ͷ����� �Ϸø��������� | www.cnr.cn>
89 SPC Work Report, 11 March 06.<�������Ժ�������� | www.legaldaily.com.cn>
90 "In the Past Three Months, Public Security Organs Have Resolved 163,000 Xinfang Problems from the Masses" [Guoqu 3 ge yue gongan jiguan jiejue qunzhong xinfang wenti 16.3 wan qi], People's Daily (Online), 18 August 06.<��ȥ3���¹�����ؽ��Ⱥ���ŷ�����16.3���� | legal.people.com.cn>
91 Provisions on the Letters and Visits Work of Public Security Agencies [Gongan jiguan xinfang gongzuo guiding], issued 18 August 05, arts. 8, 38(5).<www.cecc.gov>
92 "Communist Party, State Council Order Stronger Controls Over Society," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 14-15.<�а졢���ת�����������뿪չƽ���������� | www.cecc.gov> Party leaders have set a 2006 goal to decrease the number of "mass incidents" such as strikes, marches, demonstrations, or collective petitions directed at government authorities. Ibid. 93 "Communist Party, State Council Order Stronger Controls Over Society," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 14-15.<�а졢���ת�����������뿪չƽ���������� | www.cecc.gov>
94 "The Growth of Xinfang Cases Has Been Turned Back," China National Radio;<�ҹ��ŷ���������������ͷ����� �Ϸø��������� | www.cnr.cn> "In the Past Three Months, Public Security Agencies Have Resolved 163,000 Xinfang Problems of the Masses," People's Daily.<��ȥ3���¹�����ؽ��Ⱥ���ŷ�����16.3���� | legal.people.com.cn>
95 "The Growth of Xinfang Cases Has Been Turned Back," China National Radio.<�ҹ��ŷ���������������ͷ����� �Ϸø��������� | www.cnr.cn> Official statistics also report a 20.7 percent decline in the number of collective petitions to national xinfang authorities and a 22.5 percent decrease in the number of collective petitioners approaching provincial xinfang authorities. Ibid. Chinese courts recorded a 5 percent decline in the total number of petitions in 2005. SPC Work Report, 11 March 06.<�������Ժ�������� | www.legaldaily.com.cn>
96 Reports state that authorities closed out 92.6 percent of those received, and successfully resolved more than 90 percent of the conflicts examined. "A Look Back at the New Xinfang Regulations" ["Xinfang tiaoli": changtong youxu kai yanlu wushi gaoxiao jie min you], People's Daily (Online), 2 May 06.<���ŷ������ͨ������· ��ʵ��Ч������ | legal.people.com.cn>
97 Zhao Ling, "Xinfang Reform Triggers Controversy" [Xinfang gaige yinfa zhengyi], Southern Weekend (Online), 18 November 04. 98 Provisions on the Letters and Visits Work of Public Security Agencies, arts. 8, 38(5).<www.cecc.gov>
99 Regulations on Letters and Visits, art. 6.<�ŷ����� | www.cecc.gov>
100 For example, the xinfang responsibility system adopted in February 2006 by the Ningnan county government in Sichuan province provides that local authorities receive a warning if 10 or more petitioners from their jurisdiction collectively petition provincial or higher authorities, if 20 or more petitioners collectively petition prefectural authorities, or if 30 or more petitioners do so at the county level. If petitioners present three or more collective petitions within a year to provincial or national officials, local officials lose eligibility for promotion or other awards. Ningnan County Party and Government Xinfang Responsibility System [Zhonggong ningnan xian wei ningnan xian renmin zhengfu guanyu luoshi xinfang gongzuo zeren zhi he zeren zhuijiu zhi de shishi yijian], issued 27 February 06.<�й�������ί ��������������������ʵ�ŷù��������ƺ�����׷���Ƶ�ʵʩ��� | nn.lsz.gov.cn> See also Implementation Details For The Municipal 2005-2007 Xinfang Evaluation System [Guanyu yinfa "2005-2007 nian quan shi jijian jiancha xinfang jubao gongzuo mubiao guanli kaoping xize" de tongzhi], issued 2 August 05;<����ӡ����2005��2007��ȫ�мͼ����ŷþٱ�����Ŀ����?��ϸ�򡷵�֪ͨ | www.rglz.gov.cn> Lujiang County Trial Regulation on Implementing Xinfang Responsibility System [Lujiang xian shixing xinfang gongzuo guocuo zeren zhuijiu zhi de zanxing guiding], issued 9 December 05.<®����ʵ���ŷù����������׷���Ƶ����й涨 | www.ljxf.gov.cn>
101 Minzner, "Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions," 156-58, 172-74. 102 Human Rights Watch, "China: Rampant Violence and Intimidation Against Petitioners," 8 December 05.<www.hrw.org>
103 Human Rights Watch, " 'We Could Disappear at Any Time'--Retaliation and Abuses Against Chinese Petitioners," December 2005, 47.<www.cecc.gov>
104 "Ministry of Public Security Issues Notice Regarding the Situation of Preventing Serious Public Security Incidents, and Ensuring the Supervision of Public Security" [Gonganbu tongbao yufang zhongda zhi'an zaihai shigu, baozhang gonggong anquan ducha qingkuang], China Internet Information Center (Online), 2 March 06. See also "Official Discloses Use of Mass Roundups During NPC, CPPCC Sessions," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 5.<������ͨ��Ԥ���ش��ΰ��ֺ��¹ʡ����Ϲ�����ȫ������� | www.cecc.gov> At the same time, Chinese authorities raided an area in Beijing where petitioners live and detained more than 400 people. Ibid. 105 "U.S. NGO Reports That Official Abuse of Petitioners Is Rampant in China," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 7-8.<www.cecc.gov>
106 "Supreme People's Court To Strengthen Handling of Citizen Petitions by Trial Judges," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2005, 6.<www.cecc.gov>
107 The 2005 Regulations on Letters and Visits require county-level and township governments to establish "leadership reception days" where petitioners may individually approach government leaders regarding the resolution of their grievances. Regulations on Letters and Visits, art. 10.<�ŷ����� | www.cecc.gov> The regulations also require local governments to adopt responsibility systems that make officials' success in handling these petitions a component of their regular performance evaluations. Ibid, art. 7. 108 "Supreme People's Court to Strengthen Handling of Citizen Petitions by Trial Judges," CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2005, 6.<www.cecc.gov>
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