Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/720/248/425234/
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 22:18:43
Document Index: 488327848

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 955', '§ 955', '§ 955', '§ 955', 'Art. 2', '§ 89', '§ 89']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Gsaac Gorge Pinto-mejia, Orlando Espinosa Sanchez, Jorgeeliecer Cordoba- Lezcano, Luis Ancizar Castenad-garjales,luis Alfonso Barker-michel, Carlos Osorio-alvarez, Luisfrancisco Mayorga, Jose Felix Angulo-quinones, Robertonunez-riasco, Blas Enrique Vargas-rios, Euclidezvello-garcia, Defendants- Appellants, 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1983 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Gsaac Gorge Pinto-mejia, Orlando Espinosa Sanchez,...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Gsaac Gorge Pinto-mejia, Orlando Espinosa Sanchez, Jorgeeliecer Cordoba- Lezcano, Luis Ancizar Castenad-garjales,luis Alfonso Barker-michel, Carlos Osorio-alvarez, Luisfrancisco Mayorga, Jose Felix Angulo-quinones, Robertonunez-riasco, Blas Enrique Vargas-rios, Euclidezvello-garcia, Defendants- Appellants, 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 720 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1983) Argued April 26, 1983. Decided Oct. 14, 1983. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Feb.15, 1984. *
Before KEARSE, PIERCE and PECK,** , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Gsaac Gorge Pinto-Mejia and ten codefendants appeal from judgments entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Henry Bramwell, Judge, convicting them of one count of possessing with intent to distribute approximately twenty tons of marijuana on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981). The judgments were entered following defendants' agreement, consented to by the government and the court, to plead guilty on that count on the condition that they be allowed to challenge on appeal the lawfulness of the seizure by the United States Coast Guard of the marijuana from the hold of the vessel.1 The defendants contend here that the judgments should be reversed and the indictment dismissed because (1) the vessel was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and hence the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the Coast Guard's boarding, search, and seizure of the vessel violated defendants' rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Although we find no merit in the second ground, we conclude that a question remains as to the jurisdictional ground and we remand for further proceedings.
Each member of the RICARDO's crew was charged in a two-count indictment with violating 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) and with conspiring to violate that provision, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955c. Section 955a(a) makes it unlawful for "any person on board a ... vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas" to possess a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture or distribute it. In 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d), "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is defined to "include [ ] a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958." Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 ("Convention on the High Seas"), provides as follows:
A question as to the court's jurisdiction to try a defendant may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b). Accordingly, in ruling in particular cases that a defendant who has pleaded guilty has waived his right to appeal or that his conditional plea has preserved only the specifically mentioned issues and waived all others, we have taken care to specify that the waiver applies only to defects that are "non-jurisdictional." E.g., United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Spada, 331 F.2d 995, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 865, 85 S. Ct. 130, 13 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1964)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843, 86 S. Ct. 89, 15 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1965). Since it is a responsibility of the appellate court no less than of the trial court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the trial court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S. Ct. 42, 43, 53 L. Ed. 126 (1908), and since the stipulation is construed infra to preserve issues of fact and law arising from the stopping and boarding of the RICARDO as well as the seizure of marijuana, we will entertain on appeal defendants challenge to the court's jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the stipulation's preservation of the right to appeal "only" the lawfulness of the Coast Guard's "seizure" of the marijuana from the hold of the RICARDO, defendants have proceeded to challenge the lawfulness not only of the seizure itself but also of the Coast Guard's stopping and boarding of the vessel. The government properly notes that the defendants have no Fourth Amendment right to challenge only the seizure. As crew members of the RICARDO having no proprietary interest in the vessel's cargo and having no legitimate expectation of privacy in its cargo hold, defendants have no personal rights to vindicate in challenging the Coast Guard's search of the cargo hold or the seizure of the marijuana, and such a challenge would be rejected on that ground. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 419 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979).
The district court cited four factors that led it to conclude that the RICARDO "at the very least, ... when seized, was a vessel 'assimilated to a stateless vessel,' and at best, ... was a vessel without nationality." (9/30 Tr. at 30.) The first two factors--that when first sighted the RICARDO was flying no flag, and that after being sighted the RICARDO changed course and headed away from the United States mainland--are, by themselves, wholly inadequate to support a finding of statelessness. The third factor--that flags of several states were found aboard the RICARDO--also is inconclusive. The RICARDO was observed flying only the Venezuelan flag, and its crew claimed that it was of Venezuelan nationality.8 There was no evidence that it at any time "sail [ed] under" any flag other than that of Venezuela, using those other flags "according to convenience" within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the High Seas. Further, Ensign Willis testified that he did not consider it unusual to find flags of several countries on the RICARDO because it is common practice for a ship of one nationality to fly the flag of another country, in addition to that of its own country, upon entering the foreign country's port. Thus, the finding of the flags of several states aboard the RICARDO did not provide a sound basis for concluding that the RICARDO was assimilated to a ship without nationality.
At the hearing the district court ruled that the Venezuelan Certificate did not qualify as an absence of public record, and we believe this ruling was correct. What is envisioned by Rule 803(10) is a statement that, after a diligent search of the records regularly kept by a public office or agency, a certain record, entry, report, etc., has not been found. United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1983). From such a statement the factfinder may infer that an event that normally would be reflected in the public record did not occur. Instead of a certification of an absence of record, the Venezuelan Certificate is principally a potpourri of descriptions of existing records (e.g., confirming that the RICARDO had been registered in Venezuela), speculation (stating that the RICARDO "evidently sailed clandestinely from Venequelan [sic] port"), description of official action ("the Maritime Authority has found grounds for the expiration of [the RICARDO's] registration"), and statement of legal conclusion ("in view of the expiration of its registration, as of May 21, 1980, [the RICARDO] could not invoke the Venezuelan nationality to protect its status under any circumstance, particularly in situations involving a crime or infraction"). Only after the descriptions of existing records, speculation, past government actions, and legal conclusion does the Venezuelan Certificate make a statement that could possibly be construed, in part, as certifying the absence of a record: it states that " [r]einstatement" of the RICARDO's status as a Venezuelan vessel "would have required the renewal of its documents, after justifying its absence and receiving a favorable decision from the Venezuelan authorities, something that did not ever take place." Assuming that this means that there is no record of a request for reinstatement, a statement that Venezuelan records reveal no application for reinstatement is virtually meaningless standing alone. Its significance depends on the Certificate's earlier statements, most particularly on that describing the Venezuelan authority's revocation of the RICARDO's registration: without knowing of the revocation, one cannot draw an inference of nonregistration from a failure to seek reinstatement. Hence we regard the Venezuelan Certificate as inappropriate for receipt in evidence under Rule 803(10), and we reject the government's attempt to invoke that rule on this appeal.
An examination of the Certificate reveals that both as a whole and in pertinent part the Certificate runs afoul of Rule 803(8) (C)'s exclusion of "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" against defendants in criminal cases.
First, we note that the Certificate, made by the District Director General of Water Transportation, does not fit within either part (A) or part (B) of Rule 803(8), as it sets forth neither the activities of an office or agency nor matters observed by the District Director General. Rather, the Certificate purports to report the factual findings of the District Director General as a result of his investigation into the RICARDO's status in his "exercis [e of] the attributes conferred upon him by law." Further, the very part of the Certificate on which the court focused for its finding that the RICARDO's Venezuelan registration had expired, i.e., the statement that "the Maritime Authority has found grounds for the expiration of its registration" "as of May 21, 1980," indicates that the Maritime Authority made an investigation resulting in its finding that grounds existed for the revocation of the registration. We thus conclude that neither the Certificate as a whole nor the part of the Certificate disclosing the revocation of registration was admissible against the defendants under Rule 803(8) (C). Further, since the reason for Rule 803(8)'s nonauthorization of the use of investigative findings against defendants in criminal cases is to avoid abridgment of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(8) (C) advisory committee note; United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 69-84 (2d Cir. 1977), admission of such investigative findings against defendants in criminal cases is also not authorized by Rule 803(24), the "catchall" exception for trustworthy hearsay. Id. at 78.
Nor do we see that the contents or circumstances of the Certificate should inspire any particular confidence in its trustworthiness. The Certificate contains obvious speculation as to the RICARDO's "evident [ ]" "clandestine [ ]" movement, and has an aura of eagerness to deny the RICARDO the ability to "invoke the Venezuelan nationality to protect its status ... in situations involving a crime or infraction." Most importantly, the Certificate, which does not identify the "Maritime Authority" that apparently revoked the RICARDO's registration, also does not state when that Authority took its action, and there is nothing to indicate that the finding of grounds for expiration was not made after the Coast Guard intercepted the RICARDO and inquired as to its registration. If the Maritime Authority's action did precede the Coast Guard's involvement with the RICARDO, one might expect the Certificate to contain a plain statement that the RICARDO was unregistered in Venezuela on June 27 when it was boarded by the Coast Guard. The absence of such a straightforward statement and the silence of the Certificate as to the date of the Authority's action are circumstances suggesting that the Certificate lacks the trustworthiness necessary to support its admission as proof that the RICARDO was stateless on June 27.
First, we note that in enacting statutes, Congress is not bound by international law. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316, 34 S. Ct. 429, 431, 58 L. Ed. 617 (1914); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 458, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1888). If it chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law. As long as Congress has expressly indicated its intent to reach such conduct, "a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). Accord, United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 165, 74 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1982).
Our review of the language and history of Sec. 955a et seq. persuades us that, assuming that the RICARDO was stateless, Congress intended these sections to reach the conduct of the defendants in this case. In Sec. 955a(h), Congress expressly stated its intention to reach acts committed "outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." In addition, in the legislative history of Sec. 955a, there is evidence that Congress had as a primary goal the ability to reach stateless possessors of narcotics who could not be proved to have intent to distribute the narcotics in the United States. The Senate Report accompanying H.R. 2538, which noted the technical amendments the Senate Committee made to the bill before it was enacted as Sec. 955a, stated that "the bill [was] intended to address acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." S.Rep. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2785. Experts who testified at the hearing on H.R. 2538 noted that many drug traffickers responsible for transporting drugs that ended up in the United States were able to travel with impunity over the high seas because of the then-existing requirement that the traffickers intend to distribute the drugs in the United States before being subject to prosecution there. The difficulty of proving intent allowed many such traffickers to go free, although their wares were in fact intended to be distributed in the United States. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979) ("Hearings ") (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration); id. at 65, 68 (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern District of Florida). Section 955a was enacted to close this loophole. Thus, the House of Representatives Report accompanying H.R. 2538 observed that United States jurisdiction was to be extended to "vessels without nationality on the high seas," and that " [a]ny person on board such a vessel, of either U.S. or foreign citizenship, is prohibited from ... possessing with the intent to ... distribute any controlled substance." H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The Report noted that " [t]he intent to distribute need not be within the United States. Moreover, the intent element may be inferred by proof of a presence of a large quantity of the narcotic or dangerous drug, giving rise to the inference of trafficking," id. at 10, and that "it would not be necessary to prove that the vessel or the controlled substance was bound for the United States," id. at 12. Congress's explicit intention, therefore, was to extend the reach of Sec. 955a to foreigners on stateless vessels on the high seas who possess large quantities of narcotics that they may or may not intend for distribution in the United States.
One of the basic principles of international law is that "all nations have an equal and untrammelled right to navigate on the high seas." United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 748, 74 L. Ed. 2d 967 (1983); see Convention on the High Seas Art. 2. With this right, of course, comes responsibility. To preserve all nations' freedom to travel on the high seas and to avoid conflict among nations, Article 2 of the Convention provides that each state must exercise its right "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."
In light of these principles and Congress's manifest intentions, courts have agreed uniformly that stateless vessels on the high seas are, by virtue of their statelessness, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1382-83 (construing Sec. 955a); United States v. Howard-Arias, supra, 679 F.2d at 371 (same); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1979) (construing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S. Ct. 2162, 64 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S. Ct. 664, 62 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1980); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); see United States v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir.) (implicitly construing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892, 101 S. Ct. 250, 66 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1980). As the court in Marino-Garcia put it,
We find inapposite the authorities invoked by defendants in their effort to show that a nexus must exist before the United States may exercise jurisdiction over a stateless vessel on the high seas. The nexus requirement has been applied only to a vessel that is registered with, and is flying the flag of, one state to whose jurisdiction it has submitted. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18, 28, 33, 34 (1965). In such cases, international law requires the state seeking to assert jurisdiction to show a nexus between it and the foreign vessel that is sufficient to justify supplanting the flag state's normally "exclusive jurisdiction" granted by Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. Only a limited number of such nexuses have been found to be sufficient to warrant permitting a state to assert jurisdiction over another state's vessel. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States Secs. 18 (vessel engaged in illegal activity intended to have an effect in the state), 33 (vessel engaged in an activity that threatens the state's security or governmental functions), 34 (vessel engaged in a universally prohibited activity, such as piracy) (1965). See United States v. Marino-Garcia, supra, 679 F.2d at 1380-82. But we find no authority in international law for requiring any nexus where the ship otherwise would be subject to the jurisdiction of no state.
Since the district court found, implicitly if not explicitly, that the Coast Guard's stopping and boarding of the RICARDO did not amount to an arrest of the defendants, probable cause for the Coast Guard's action was not required. See United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1981). Rather, since the stopping and boarding constituted an investigatory stop, those actions were lawful if the Coast Guardsmen were " 'aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant [ed] suspicion' that the individual ... was, or [was] about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975)). To determine whether an officer's suspicion was reasonable, the "totality of the circumstances" must be considered, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), and "due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
In addition, defendants Nunez-Riasco and Angulo-Quinones contend that their sentences were unduly harsh. We find in their contentions no basis for reversal. " 'The rule is well settled that a United States Court of Appeals is without power to review or revise a sentence which is within permissible statutory limits,' " United States v. Lo Duca, 274 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1960) (quoting Roth v. United States, 255 F.2d 440, 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819, 79 S. Ct. 31, 3 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1958)), in the absence of an indication that the sentence has been based on improper considerations or incorrect information, see, e.g., United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S. Ct. 54, 46 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1975). The sentences imposed were below the possible maximum terms allowed by statute, and no improper consideration or misinformation has been called to our attention
We shall assume that the district court, which approved the conditional plea agreement, also so understood, for without court approval, the reservation agreement would be ineffective. See, e.g., United States v. Sykes, 697 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Mann, 451 F.2d 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
We find inapposite the cases relied on by the government to support its contention that it adequately established the RICARDO's statelessness, since each case involved fraudulent or dual claims of nationality. See, e.g., United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (vessel registered in Honduras, but crew claimed her nationality was "Miami, Florida"); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979) (vessel displayed Bahamian flag, but crew claimed vessel was of British nationality), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S. Ct. 664, 62 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1980)