Source: https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=3390
Timestamp: 2019-12-15 01:00:00
Document Index: 34875057

Matched Legal Cases: ['§16', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 61', '§ 61', '§ 61']

John E. McKeown and Quick Food, Inc, d/b/a Steak and Play, Respondent,
Charleston County Board of Zoning Appeal, and Charleston County, Appellants.
Opinion No. 3390
Submitted June 4, 2001 - Filed September 17, 2001
County Attorney Samuel W. Howell, IV, and Deputy County Attorney Joseph Dawson, III, both of Charleston, for appellants.
James M. Griffin, of Columbia, for respondent.
CONNOR, J.: This appeal involves the enforcement of a local zoning ordinance. The Charleston County Zoning Board of Appeals (the "Board") denied a special exception request to serve alcohol by the Steak and Play restaurant. The circuit court reversed because the South Carolina Department of Revenue had already issued a beer and wine permit. The Board appeals. We reverse.
John McKeown and Quick Foods, Inc. ("Respondents"), do business as the "Steak and Play" located at 2284 Savannah Highway, Charleston, South Carolina. On February 23, 1999, the South Carolina Department of Revenue issued the business a "retail permit to sell beer and wine for consumption on and off the premises." The County of Charleston, however, refused to issue a certificate of occupancy because Quick Foods, Inc., had not received a special exception from the Board of Zoning Appeals to sell beer and wine at this location. The County thereafter granted Respondents a certificate of occupancy provided beer and wine not be sold until such time as Respondents applied for and received a special exception from the Board.
§16. Restaurants, Bars and Lounges Serving Alcoholic Beverages
[The church] is approximately 379 feet to the front of that building. State laws say 500 feet right there, and the last 7 or 8 years, we have kept liquor stores from going in there. . . . We don't want to see any place up there that serves liquor and beer.
Respondents appealed the Board's order. A hearing in the circuit court was held on November 29, 1999. Thereafter, on December 28, 1999, the circuit court judge filed his order vacating the Board's decision. The circuit court judge found the local ordinance criminalized an otherwise legal activity in this State and "[b]ecause there is an irreconcilable conflict between [the Board's actions and State law] the decision made by the Department of Revenue applying [S]tate law must prevail." Therefore, the judge concluded the "Charleston County Board of Zoning Appeals and Charleston County are permanently enjoined from enforcing Article 6.2.16 against the Petitioners at its business located at 2284 Savannah Highway, Charleston, South Carolina." The Board appeals.
1. Does Article 6.2.16 of the Charleston County Unified Development Ordinance directly conflict with the state laws applied by the South Carolina Department of Revenue for issuing the Steak and Play's alcohol permit?
2. Does Article 6.2.16 of the Charleston County Unified Development Ordinance criminalize or prohibit conduct that is specifically authorized under State law?
"Determining whether a local ordinance is valid is a two-step process. The first step is to determine whether the [county] had the power to adopt the ordinance. If no power existed, the ordinance is invalid. If the [county] had the power to enact the ordinance, the second step is to determine whether the ordinance is consistent with the Constitution and general law of the State." Bugsy's, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 87, 93, 530 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2000); accord Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 156, 480 S.E.2d 718, 719 (1997) (discussing analysis of validity of county ordinances).
Respondents have not challenged the County's power to adopt the ordinance. In any event, Charleston County is specifically authorized to regulate land uses and to promote "the public welfare in any other regard specified." S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-710(A)(5) & (8) (Supp. 2000). Because the County had the authority to enact its ordinance, we next must examine whether the ordinance is consistent with State law.
Wrenn Bail Bond Serv., Inc. v. City of Hanahan, 335 S.C. 26, 29, 515 S.E.2d 521, 522 (1999) (citation omitted). "As a general rule, 'additional regulation to that of [the] State law does not constitute a conflict therewith.'" Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 553, 397 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1990) (quoting Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S.C. 523, 536, 23 S.E.2d 735, 740 (1943)); see S.C. Code Ann. § 6-29-960 (Supp. 2000) (setting forth provisions for determining whether local zoning regulations or State law prevail when restrictions differ).
The Department of Revenue "has sole and exclusive power to issue all licenses, permits, and certificates" relating to beer and wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-70 (Supp. 2000). Before beer and wine permits are issued, several statutory requirements must be satisfied by the applicant, including the following:
(6) The location of the proposed place of business of the applicant is in the opinion of the [Department of Revenue] a proper one.
(7) The [Department of Revenue] may consider, among other factors, as indications of unsuitable location, the proximity to residences, schools, playgrounds, and churches.
S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-520 (Supp. 2000). (1)
The authority conferred on the Department of Revenue, however, is limited to the issuance and enforcement of licensing. In Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., the liquor store argued a local ordinance prohibiting the use of internally illuminated signs which were visible from any public right of way or beach was in direct conflict with the state statutory provision empowering only the South Carolina Alcohol Beverage Control Commission to regulate the operation of all retail liquor stores in the State. However, our Supreme Court found the store's contention was without merit because the statute was silent on the issue of illumination. The Supreme Court did "not interpret the language of the statute as diminishing the power conferred upon local governments to regulate land use." Fine Liquors, 302 S.C. at 552, 397 S.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained:
[I]n order for there to be a conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance "both must contain either express or implied conditions which are inconsistent or irreconcilable with each other. Mere differences in detail do not render them conflicting. If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict between them. Where no conflict exists, both laws stand."
Id. at 553, 397 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting McAbee v. Southern Ry., 166 S.C. 166, 169-70, 164 S.E. 444, 445 (1932).
Here, Charleston County's zoning ordinance prohibits establishments that serve beer or alcoholic beverages from locating within 500 feet of residential areas. The statutes under which the Department grants permits for the sale of beer and wine, specifically section 61-4-520, merely allows, but does not require, the consideration of "proximity to residences, schools, playgrounds, and churches." In regard to specific restrictions on distance from residential areas, the County's ordinance clearly speaks where State law is silent. The County's ordinance does not contain express conditions which are either inconsistent with or irreconcilable with State law. Because there is no conflict between State law and the County's ordinance, the ordinance is valid.
Although [Myrtle Beach] Ordinance 96-56 provides criminal penalties for its violation, it does not criminalize the operation of video game machines. It merely provides criminal penalties for violation of provisions of the zoning ordinance. So long as businesses comply with the requirements of the zoning ordinance, they can operate video game machines. Accordingly, unlike Martin [v. Condon], Ordinance 96-56 does not criminalize activity which is legal statewide.
1. The circuit court order and the parties' briefs refer interchangeably to Chapter 4, sections 61-4-10 to -1770 (entitled Beer, Ale, Porter, and Wine) and Chapter 6, sections 61-6-10 to -4720 (entitled Alcoholic Beverage Control Act) of Title 61. Because the permit at issue in this case is for the sale of beer and wine only, sections 61-4-500 to -620 control the application for the permit. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 61-4-500 to -620 (Supp. 2000).