Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/660/184/42160/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 03:12:16
Document Index: 357053506

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291', '§ 1291']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Gabriel Robert Caggiano, Defendant-appellee (81-5002).united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Raymond Baszner (81-5021), Nigel Winfield (81-5022),defendants-appellants.raymond Baszner, Petitioner, v. United States District Court, Western District of Tennessee,western Division, at Memphis, (81-5182), Respondent, 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1982) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Sixth Circuit › 1982 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Gabriel Robert Caggiano, Defendant-appellee (81-50...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Gabriel Robert Caggiano, Defendant-appellee (81-5002).united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Raymond Baszner (81-5021), Nigel Winfield (81-5022),defendants-appellants.raymond Baszner, Petitioner, v. United States District Court, Western District of Tennessee,western Division, at Memphis, (81-5182), Respondent, 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1982)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1982) Argued June 15, 1981. Decided Sept. 17, 1981. Rehearings and Rehearings En Banc Denied Oct. 23, 1981. Certiorari Denied Jan. 11, 1982. See 102 S. Ct. 1015
The weight of authority is that in civil cases an order granting a motion to disqualify is immediately appealable as a final order under § 1291 while an order denying a motion to disqualify is not appealable under § 1291. General Electric Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 1318, 63 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980), and Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440-441 (2nd Cir. 1980) (en banc) vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S. Ct. 911, 66 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1981), holds that orders granting disqualification are appealable and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 896, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981), holds that orders denying such motions are not appealable under § 1291. See cases collected in United States Code Service 28 U.S.C. § 1291 Note 72, entitled Disqualification of Counsel and Note 72 in its May 1981 Cumulative Supplement.
As to orders in criminal cases, in Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 403, 77 S. Ct. 1332, 1338, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1442 (1957), the Supreme Court stated:
In United States v. Calandra, 455 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1972), we held that an order entered in an independent plenary proceeding is appealable by the government under § 1291. We relied on United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 69 S. Ct. 824, 93 L. Ed. 1042 (1949), and Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 49 S. Ct. 118, 73 L. Ed. 275 (1929).
In United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom., Woodruff v. United States, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S. Ct. 2168, 48 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1976), the government, in an opinion written by Judge Murrah, was permitted to appeal under § 1291 from an order of the district court denying the motion of the United States Attorney under Rule 48(a) to dismiss criminal proceedings and appointing private special prosecutors to continue prosecuting the case. In reviewing the merits, the court held that the district court had abused its discretion in entering the order denying the government's motion and in appointing a private special prosecutor to replace the United States Attorney.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949), is applicable here. It was recently applied by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra, 449 U.S. 896, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981). Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, stated inter alia :
Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, we held that a "small class" of orders that did not end the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a shareholder's derivative action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff in such a suit to post security for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final judgment on the merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be posted. We held that the Court of Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court's order constituted a final determination of a claim "separable from, and collateral to," the merits of the main proceeding, because it was "too important to be denied review," and because it was "too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., (337 U.S.) at 546 (69 S. Ct. at 1225). Cohen did not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a "practical rather than a technical construction." Ibid. See, e. g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413-414 (46 S. Ct. 144, 145, 70 L. Ed. 339) (1926); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee Railroad Co., 2 Black 524, 530-531 (17 L. Ed. 347) (1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 203 (12 L. Ed. 404) (1848); Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 6, 15 (10 L. Ed. 33) (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of final "collateral orders" in these terms: "(T)he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra (437 U.S. 463) at 468 (98 S. Ct. 2454 at 2458, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351) (footnote omitted). See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (97 S. Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651) (1977).
Even prior to the ABA Opinion 342, it was recognized that disqualification of an entire government department, because of a conflict of interest of a government attorney arising from his former employment, would not be appropriate. United States v. Standard Oil Company, 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 n. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1955, Judge Kaufman) (dictum).
We have no jurisdiction over the appeal of defendants-appellants Baszner and Winfield as the order denying their motion to disqualify from which they appeal is not a final appealable order as to them under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934, 99 S. Ct. 1277, 59 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1979).7 This is also an inappropriate case for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and the petition is hereby dismissed.
United States v. Caggiano, 624 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., United States v. Baszner, 449 U.S. 879, 101 S. Ct. 226, 66 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1980)
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 896, 101 S. Ct. 669, 66 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the denial of a motion to disqualify in a civil case was not appealable under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. The Court, however, not having been presented with the issue, expressed no opinion on the question of whether an order denying a motion to disqualify in a criminal case would be appealable under § 1291. 101 S. Ct. at 672, n. 8