Source: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/the-draft-ukeu-renegotiation-deal-is-it.html
Timestamp: 2017-03-24 04:05:24
Document Index: 98761430

Matched Legal Cases: ['CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ', 'CJEU ']

EU Law Analysis: The draft UK/EU renegotiation deal: is it 'legally binding and irreversible'? EU Law Analysis
The draft UK/EU renegotiation deal: is it 'legally binding and irreversible'? Steve Peers
The draft deal on renegotiation
of the UK’s EU membership has already caused great controversy: both from those
(mostly in the UK) who think it does not go far enough, and those (mostly in
the rest of the EU) who think it goes too far in revising EU law to satisfy the
objections of one Member State. These issues are mainly substantive, and I have
addressed some of them in an earlier post about the immigration aspects
of the draft deal. I’ll write later about the remaining substantive issues,
although I will touch on some in this blog post. There’s already an analysis of the proposed ‘red card’ for national parliaments by Katarzyna Granat here.
Yet in addition to concerns about
the substance of the deal, there are doubts about its legal nature. In
particular, is the deal ‘legally binding and irreversible’, as David Cameron
had pledged? The answer is complicated, because there are several different
parts of the deal, taking different legal forms. For each part, the legal
status depends on several different factors: when the text would be adopted;
who would have to approve it; whether the EU courts have power to overturn it,
and whether they are likely to do so; and whether the text could be repealed or
amended in future. (I am assuming throughout that by ‘irreversible’, David
Cameron meant irreversible without the UK’s
consent).
This blog post answers that question,
looking first at the legal form of the agreement. Next, I suggest ways in which
the draft deal could be made more legally secure. Then I examine, based on
prior experience, whether the EU can be ‘trusted’ to implement the draft deal.
Finally, I provide, in one table, my assessment indication of the extent to
which each of the parts of the draft deal are ‘legally binding and irreversible’,
based on the factors mentioned above. Legal form of the main deal
The draft deal takes the form of
six draft legal texts: a Decision of
the EU Member States’ Heads of State and Government (the ‘draft Decision’); a Statement of the Heads of State and
Government (which consists of a draft
Council Decision); a Declaration
by the European Council: and three declarations by the Commission. Implicitly, it also includes
three planned EU legislative proposals, all dealing with the free movement of
EU citizens (the emergency brake on benefits, EU citizens’ non-EU family
members and export of child benefit), which are referred to in these texts. The
UK government is also likely to table some domestic legislation linked to the
renegotiation deal: I consider that prospect briefly (and propose some further national
laws which the UK might consider) below. The basic legal form of the deal,
and even some of the proposed text, corresponds with suggestions I made back in
May 2014, as supplemented in May 2015 and June 2015. However,
the text falls short in some respects of what I suggested there; that’s a
substantive issues, so more on that in a later blog post. I’ve integrated the
main relevant points from those previous posts into this one, for the reader’s
One important point before we
continue: while the title of the deal refers to the UK only, none of the actual
text of the deal applies solely to the UK. So it would apply to all Member
States. That means it’s possible, for instance, that a proposal which the UK supports could be stymied by other
Member States’ national parliaments (via the Council), using the proposed new
‘red card’. It is possible, however, that the UK would be the only Member State
aiming to implement some parts of the proposed deal, in particular the ‘emergency
brake’ on benefits; and of course some of the existing opt-outs referred to in
the draft deal only apply to the UK and one or two other Member States. Let’s begin with the easiest parts
of the draft deal: the planned EU
legislation. We know the legal effect of EU legislation, once it’s adopted:
it’s binding and directly applicable (in the case of the two planned
Regulations), or binding as to the result to be achieved, leaving national
authorities the choice of form and methods (in the case of the planned
Directive). (See the definitions of EU legislation set out in Article 288 TFEU). The more difficult question here is the process. Can it be
guaranteed that the proposals will: (a) be made; (b) be adopted; (c) not be struck
down by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU); and (d) not revoked? It’s up to the Commission to make
proposals. The draft Decision of Member States can’t bind the Commission (more
on that below), but the draft deal includes two declarations by the Commission,
announcing its intention to make these proposals. For those proposals to be
adopted, they must be approved by the Council (by a qualified majority) and the
European Parliament (by a majority of the vote, under most variants of the EU
legislative process). Again, the draft Decision of Member States can’t bind the
Council or the European Parliament. But the Council is made up of Member
States’ ministers, and in the draft deal the Member States commit themselves to
supporting two of these three proposals (on child benefit and the emergency
brake). It’s odd that there’s no parallel commitment as regards the third
proposal (on EU citizens’ non-EU family members), but this may be a drafting
oversight. The timing of these measures depends on how soon they would be
adopted, although the Commission declares that it will table them after a
‘Remain’ vote.
The deal foresees that the law
creating an ‘emergency brake’ for EU workers’ in-work benefits would
subsequently have to be implemented following a UK request to use it. This
would need a proposal from the Commission and a vote by the Council (by
qualified majority). There would be no role for the EP at that stage. A draft
Commission declaration states that the Commission is willing to make this
implementing proposal; there is no commitment from the Member States to support
it. Again, this might possibly be a drafting oversight. The timing would follow
the adoption of the legislation on this topic: it would likely take at least
one month for the UK’s request to be approved. So the real question is whether
to trust the Commission and Council
(ie the Member States); although it’s also notable that the Member States
haven’t committed themselves to support all aspects of the draft deal in this
area, but only some of it. I’ll return to that question of trust below, as
regards the deal in general. But it doesn’t even arise as regards the European
Parliament (EP) or the CJEU, as they are not
bound by the deal. It remains to be seen whether the EP will object to some
or all of the legislative plans (this might become clearer closer to the
referendum date). The position of the CJEU would only be clear if a legal
challenge reached it. That would most likely follow from a challenge by an
individual to the implementation of the new legislation, after it’s adopted,
via the national courts. So it would be some years away. I made an initial
assessment of the validity of the planned changes in the separate post
on free movement issues; I have summarised my views in the table below.
Leaving aside the question of
Court challenges, could the legislation be revoked or amended, after it was
adopted? In principle, that is possible, using the same legislative procedure:
proposal from the Commission, qualified majority in the Council, and support
from the EP. So the UK could not veto this taking place. But implicitly the
Commission’s commitment to make these proposals, and Member States’ commitment
to support at least two of them, suggest this is not going to happen. Again,
this comes back to a question of trust. The draft deal also refers to
Commission plans to issue ‘guidance’ on aspects of EU free movement law. This
concerns part of the rules on EU citizens’ non-EU family members (part of those
rules would be covered by a new law). There would also be ‘guidance’ on the
issue of criminality of EU citizens. For the latter point, the Commission’s
declaration states that it will ‘examine the threshold’ relating to expulsion of
criminal EU citizens when the EU citizens’ Directive is revised in future. This
is too imprecise to regard as a commitment. Next, the draft Council decision on Eurozone governance. This measure can be adopted by the
Council itself, as part of its powers to govern its own activity. It does not
need to be proposed by the Commission, or agreed by the European Parliament. It
is similar to an existing Council decision, which provides for delays in
the vote if a sufficient number of Member States have qualms about them. Protocol 9 to the Treaties says that any changes to such rules must be discussed by consensus;
arguably that means that the Decision could not be amended or repealed without the UK’s consent. Technically the draft Decision should take the form of an amendment to the existing Decision, to make sure that Protocol 9 applies to it too. Since the draft Decision would not amend the rules of the Treaty on the
adoption of legislation, but only provide for a delayed vote, it seems very
unlikely that the CJEU would annul it. In fact, it’s not even clear who
would challenge it: the Commission and Member States would support it as part
of the deal; there seems little reason why an individual would challenge it in
the national courts; and it would be hard for an individual to find a
procedural route to challenge it in the courts anyway (the CJEU has ruled
that procedural rules of the Council don’t give rise to individual rights).
That only leaves the European Parliament, and this Decision doesn’t appear to
be at the top of their concerns about the draft deal. Finally, as for timing,
the intention in the draft deal is to adopt the Decision once a ‘Remain’ vote was notified, with no
further action necessary. The draft deal calls for a possible Treaty amendment in future on this point. Finally, the main part of the deal:
the draft Decision of Heads of State and Government. It takes the form of five
sections, dealing first of all with the UK’s four main negotiating objectives:
the Eurozone (section A); competitiveness (section B); sovereignty (section C);
and EU free movement (section D). Section E includes rules on dispute
settlement and entry into force. First of all, it should be noted
that the draft Decision is not EU law as such; it’s international law. It’s often
described as a proposed act of the European
Council, which is the EU institution consisting of Heads of State and
Government. But that’s simply not correct: it’s a proposed act of the Heads of State and Government as such,
not the European Council (or any other EU institution). That distinction might
sound like hair-splitting to non-lawyers, but it has practical legal
consequences. While the draft Decision is not
described as a treaty, it could be regarded as a ‘treaty in simplified form’ (see the broad definition of a treaty in Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
Certainly the intention is to register it as an international treaty (see
Articles 77-80 of that Convention). This form of legal act is not new to the
EU: it was used in 1992, to encourage Danes to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty, and in 2008, to encourage Irish people to ratify the Lisbon
Treaty. That’s why I predicted that it would be used again in this case. What are the distinctions between
this draft Decision and EU law? First of all, while the draft Decision would be
binding if adopted (as confirmed by the draft conclusions of the
European Council), since binding effect inherently follows from its status as a
treaty, it would be binding under international
law, not EU law. Secondly, the draft Decision would not as such change EU
law, although other elements of the
overall deal would: the planned legislation on free movement issues, and the
Council Decision on Eurozone issues. The draft Decision also contains rules on
the application of EU law in practice (namely, Member States’ voting in Council
after a ‘red card’ is issued by national parliaments) and a commitment to amend
the Treaties in future, as regards the Eurozone governance and ‘ever closer
union’ issues. (The latter commitment is in square brackets, indicating that it
is still a topic of discussion). Indeed, the draft Decision could
not change EU law as such, without following the formal procedures to that
effect. I have discussed the issue of amending EU secondary law above, but the
same is true of EU primary law (the
Treaties). The prior Decisions did not change the EU Treaties, and they could
not, because the CJEU had ruled that the Treaties could only be amended using
the procedure set out within them, in the Defrenne II judgment. Like the prior decisions, the draft Decision specifies that it does not amend EU as such, but interprets it.
However, the draft Decision can include legal obligations for Member
States as a matter of international law, as long as this does not conflict with
EU law. In the event of any conflict, the primacy of EU law means that the
latter takes precedence over the Decision. But is there any conflict? This is a substantive question, and in any
event where the draft deal calls for EU secondary law measures to be adopted
(the free movement legislation, the Eurozone Decision) the real question is
whether those measures would themselves breach the Treaties if adopted. I will
examine whether there is any conflict with the Treaties as regards
competitiveness and sovereignty in a subsequent post, but I will comment on one
here: the commitment of Member States to block Council decision-making if a
‘red card’ is pulled by national parliaments, on the condition that national
parliaments’ concerns are not addressed.
Andrew Duff has argued
that this breaches EU law, because it infringes the powers of the European
Parliament in decision-making. In my view, this is clearly incorrect. A
decision by the Council to stop discussing proposed EU legislation does not
alter the Parliament’s role. It’s always
open to the Council to stop discussing proposed legislation if there is
insufficient interest in a proposal or for any other reason, and it’s not rare
for it to do so. Every year, the Commission withdraws proposals because it has
given up hope that the Council will ever agree to them (for the most recent
such decision, see here). The EP can block proposed legislation too,
where the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ applies; it just does so less
frequently than the Council. A subtler argument is that this
clause in the Decision in effect amends the Treaty (and so is therefore
inapplicable due to the conflict with EU law) because it introduces a new voting rule in the Council without
amending the Treaty to that effect. It’s more problematic than the new rule on delaying Council voting as regards
Eurozone issues, since that latter rule doesn’t block the adoption of a proposal,
and follows an existing secondary law precedent. However, as with a comparable clause in the ‘fiscal compact’
treaty, an agreement by Member States
to coordinate their voting in Council does not amend the Treaties, whether it
takes the form of an informal agreement (as it more often does) or a formal
treaty to that effect. Even if this rule did breach EU law, how could the
primacy of EU law be enforced in this
context anyway? By a national court, or the CJEU, telling a Member State to vote a way it didn’t want to vote in the Council?
This would be an unprecedented incursion into the relationship between national
governments and national parliaments, which the Treaties recognise (in the Protocol
on national parliaments) is a matter for national law alone to regulate. As for the Treaty amendment
process, it’s correct to say (as Andrew Duff does) that that the Treaty gives a role to the Commission and EP. But let’s not overstate that role: neither
of them can block Treaty amendments, in most cases. The only exception is
Treaty amendments which solely concern more majority voting, or more powers for
the EP. Yes, the EP can block those
Treaty amendments; but that’s about as likely as the Pope opening an abortion
clinic. Otherwise, the EP’s sole power is
to insist that there has to be a fully-fledged ‘Convention’, with delegates
from the EU institutions, national parliaments and national governments, to
discuss proposed Treaty amendments. But the EP can’t set the agenda for the
Convention, or determine its outcome. Anyway, that outcome is not binding upon
the Member States, which then hold an Inter-Governmental Conference to
negotiate the final text – which the EP cannot reject. In short, the most the
EP can do is to force everyone to hold more meetings. What would actually happen, if a ‘Convention’
is established? The last Convention, in 2002-3, had a broad agenda, and in
practice the EP was able to steer it toward a highly integrationist conclusion.
But any Convention convened in (say) 2017 would now include a lot more national
parliamentarians critical of the EU, from every perspective. They might well
want to drive the Convention towards a stronger version of the proposed ‘red
card’, as well as repatriation of powers from the EU. Anyway, the wording of
the Treaty suggests that the agenda of the Convention is limited to the issues originally
tabled for Treaty amendment. So the real impediment to Treaty
amendments is not at the EU level. Rather, it’s the risk of rejection in
national parliaments (and occasionally referendums), with a further long-stop
risk of rejection by national constitutional courts. It’s impossible to guess at
this point what would happen to the Treaty amendments foreseen by the draft
Decision at national level. So there is no legal certainty that those Treaty
amendments would definitely be approved.
On the other hand, the draft Decision
itself does not need national parliamentary approval, at least as a matter of
EU law (whether some Member States’
law might require it is a separate question). Nor does it need any sort of
approval from any of the EU’s institutions – although the planned legislation
referred to in the Decision does, of course, need those institutions’
involvement. Since it’s not part of EU law, the validity of the draft Decision
could not be challenged directly before the CJEU, although it is possible that
a national court could ask whether national implementation of EU based on the
draft Decision was in conflict with EU law. As for the timing, the intention
is to adopt this draft Decision before the referendum, and then it would come
into force automatically as soon as a ‘Remain’ vote (if there is one) was
notified. The Decision would be irreversible in the sense that the UK government
would have to consent to amend it or repeal it; this is explicitly confirmed by
the draft European Council conclusions. There is no provision for a
Member State to denounce it, or any other indication that it’s possible to do
so; therefore it is subject to the general rule in Article 56 of the Vienna
Convention that a treaty cannot be denounced in the absence of a clause to that
effect. The distinction between the draft
Decision and EU law does mean that there is a gap in the Decision’s
enforceability. Section E refers to bringing a dispute between Member States
about the application of the Decision before the European Council. But unlike
the fiscal compact Treaty, there is no provision on bringing a dispute before
the CJEU, which could then impose fines. So despite the binding nature of the
draft Decision, there would not be a clear mechanism for making it stick. This
brings us back to the issue of trust, discussed further below. Finally, some commentators on the
previous blog posts raised the question of whether Heads of State and
Government could still act outside the framework of the EU Treaties, given that
the Treaty of Lisbon upgraded the status of the EU institution in which they
meet – the European Council. In my view, that change in EU law did not transfer
the capacity of Heads of State and Government to act to the European Council,
except where the Treaty amendments did that expressly (for instance, as regards
appointments to the European Central Bank). This follows from the principle of ‘conferred
powers’ set out in the Treaties: in the absence of any power for the European
Council to adopt anything like the draft Decision, it can’t adopt it. How can the draft deal be made more legally secure?
Some comments on the draft
renegotiation deal expressed doubt that it would go ahead. There are several
possibilities for increasing the likelihood that it would do so. As regards the draft legislation,
the Commission could agree to propose its draft comments before the referendum,
or at least publish drafts of its planned proposals informally for comment. The
European Parliament could vote in principle on whether it would be prepared to
agree to legislation as described in the draft deal. The draft deal could
commit to making Treaty amendments on more issues, particularly the ‘red card’
clause and the planned legislation which is most vulnerable to legal challenge:
the ‘emergency brake’ on migrants’ benefits. The Council Decision on Eurozone governance could be adopted before the referendum already, with the proviso that it comes into force automatically once a 'Remain' vote (if there is one) is notified. As noted above, it should take the form of an amendment to the existing Council decision on voting, to ensure that Protocol 9 to the Treaties applies to it. As regards planned Treaty
amendments, the potential text of the planned new amendments could be drawn up
in advance, although their approval would be dependent upon the EU Treaty
amendment process. Again, the European Parliament might indicate in advance
whether it would insist on a ‘Convention’ being held or not. Finally, as
regards the issue of ‘competitiveness’, the Commission could draw up a list of legislation
that it plans to propose or repeal – although that’s more about being more precise than legally secure, as any proposals for new
legislation (or repeal or amendment of existing law) would have to go through the
EU legislative process.
Can the EU be trusted? As noted already, the EU has
agreed draft Decisions like this one twice before, as regards Ireland and
Denmark. It promised a Treaty amendment to Ireland, and delivered it in the
form of a protocol several years later. It didn’t expressly promise a
Treaty amendment to Denmark, but delivered one anyway, as part of the Treaty of
Amsterdam (it’s since been amended). It’s sometimes suggested that the EU
tricked Denmark because the CJEU later ignored the Danish opt-out of EU citizenship.
But this is a myth: the fact is that Denmark never opted out of EU citizenship. The 1992 Decision on Denmark simply
contained clarifications relating to the meaning of EU citizenship (see Section
A of that decision), not any form of opt-out. Another Treaty amendment (in the
form of a protocol), relating to the legal effect of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, was promised to the Czech Republic if it ratified the
Treaty of Lisbon. In this case, there was no Decision of Member States’ Heads
of State and Government, but the draft Protocol and the promise were set out in
conclusions of the European Council. The Protocol was subsequently formally proposed, but it was not pursued after a new Czech government withdrew the previous government’s request. It’s possible that the Czech government
decision was influenced by the European Parliament, which had voted against the draft Protocol. But as noted above, the EP does not have a veto over Treaty amendments: indeed, even after the EP's objection, the Council recommended that the Treaty amendment process get underway. The most the EP can do to stop Treaty amendments is to demand that a 'Convention' be established to discuss them. But remember: the Convention process does not give the EP any kind of veto over
a Treaty amendment either. It’s merely an obligation to hold meetings. Ultimately
a subsequent Inter-Governmental Conference decides what the final text of those
Treaty amendments will be. I sympathise with anyone who rolls their eyes at the
thought of attending meetings. But if the Czech government had really wanted to
insist upon the adoption of its Protocol, it would have got it in the end. For those who really don’t trust
the EU to deliver on the renegotiation package, there’s one further option to
consider. But that brings me neatly to the issue of domestic legal changes in
the UK. Domestic UK law In his Chatham House speech last
year, David Cameron raised the prospect of new UK legislation to limit the
effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and to safeguard UK
sovereignty. I commented on his plans at the time, although it was only possible
to make a preliminary assessment in the absence of a text. According to press reports, he is committed to going ahead with these changes. Again, there’s
no point commenting further until there is a draft text. Instead I have two suggestions
for further domestic law changes. The first is a substantive point, which I’ll elaborate
upon in a later blog post. Currently the European Communities Act is the legal basis for the adoption of secondary UK
legislation on the implementation of EU law. But these measures often go beyond the minimum
legal requirements of EU law (a process known as ‘gold-plating’); and some object to regulating any more than EU law strictly requires. In my view, the Act should simply
be amended to prevent ‘gold-plating’ taking place at all. The EU should not be
getting the blame (or, from the opposing point of view, the credit) for regulation that it
does not require Member States to adopt. If the UK government wishes to adopt
more regulation than the EU requires, let it table a Bill for a new Act of
Parliament, or use the secondary legislative powers conferred by a different
Act of Parliament, to do that.
Secondly, can the UK take any
unilateral action to ensure that the EU keeps its promises? Obviously, the UK
can’t pass a law commanding other Member States to give effect to the
renegotiation deal. What it can do is
state what its reaction will be if they don’t.
Any new Act of Parliament addressing the renegotiation deal could therefore
state that the UK government will report regularly on the implementation of the
deal. If the key aspects of the deal are not in fact implemented for any
reason, and there is no prospect that they will be, it would, as I’ve argued before,
be reasonable to argue for another referendum. These two suggestions – or some
variation thereof – might well appeal to those Conservative politicians who are
torn between supporting the ‘Remain’ side and appealing to the Eurosceptic wing
of their party. It’s the closest they can come to having their cake and eating
it too. Overview: is the draft deal legally secure? The following table lists the
binding elements of the draft deal and summarises how binding they are from
various perspectives. This assessment is based on the assumption that the draft
of February 2, 2016 would be adopted as it stands; it might have to be updated
if that draft is amended before adoption. Decision of
Heads of State and Government (in general)
Binding: in international law
In force: after Remain vote notified
Further approval needed: No, unless national law
requires parliamentary approval in some States CJEU vulnerability: Zero; although CJEU might
disagree with some interpretations of EU law
Reversible without UK consent: No
amend treaty Binding: in international law
Further approval needed: Yes, from national
parliaments and possibly electorates; Commission, European Parliament have non-binding role in Treaty revision CJEU vulnerability: Zero; although challenges under
national constitutions are possible Reversible without UK consent: No
apply ‘red card’ Binding: in international law
Further approval needed: No CJEU vulnerability: Low Reversible without UK consent: No
Decision on voting on financial issues Binding: in EU law
In force: after adoption, on date that Remain vote is notified
Further approval needed: Council has to adopt; no
role for anyone else CJEU vulnerability: low Reversible without UK consent: No (arguably)
on free movement issues (3 measures)
Binding: in EU law
In force: after proposals tabled and adopted Further approval needed: Yes. Commission proposals
(political commitment to make them); Council approval (political commitment
from Member States to support 2 proposals); European Parliament (position
unknown) CJEU vulnerability: Low-medium for 2 proposals
(family members, child benefit); High for emergency brake
Reversible without UK consent: Yes
Photo credit: www.ukrep.be
Barnard & Peers: chapter 2, chapter 3
EU reform,
red card,
UK renegotiation,
Andrew Duff10 February 2016 at 09:43Thank you, Steve Peers, for another clear and stimulating contribution to the Brexit debate. I will be writing a full critique of the Cameron negotiation if and when we have a final package deal. So just four points here.1. It is precisely because of the existence of Protocol 9 that the French, in particular, are worried about a UK veto on eurozone law making. I am not sure the deal on euro/non-euro is as 'done' as you infer. And I would point out that Protocol 9 speaks only of elevation to the European Council for a 'preliminary discussion' before the ordinary legislative procedure continues. 2. You are right, of course, that the Council can change its own rules of procedure as it so chooses - but only if the new rules elaborate or build on EU primary law and do not contradict it. If an objection came to the CJEU about an abuse of the ordinary legislative process as a result of this intergovernmental Decision (either with respect to financial business or, more generally, involving the new-style 'red card'), we know which way the Court would jump.3. We disagree still about the potential power of the Commission, European Parliament and national parliaments in the treaty revision process. Only one thing is certain about a Convention, and that is that a Convention is very unpredictable. And it is improbable, in my view, that an IGC would clash openly with the considered and consensual view of a majority of the Convention. IGCs themselves can cause surprises, especially after one or more significant changes of government (NB 2017). And one should not underestimate that some national parliaments - notably, the Bundestag - are forceful players in the EU decision-making processes of their own governments. National parliaments have not yet been heard on Brexit.4. Lastly, on the Czech Protocol. It is not narcissistic of me, I hope, to put on record the very great interest that the Czech government(s), parliament and media displayed on the outcome of the Duff Report (which recommended No to Klaus's attempt to join Protocol 30). We could not veto the proposal, as you say, but we played a significant part in changing Czech opinion about the virtues of following Tony Blair's spurious 'opt-out' from the Charter. Today the European Parliament is neither disinterested nor uninterested in the outcome of the Brexit frolic. ReplyDeleteRepliesSteve Peers10 February 2016 at 10:04Thanks for your comments, Andrew. To take the points in turn: 1. The draft doesn't call for a veto on Eurozone law-making. I tried to make clear that I am writing *as if* the deal were done, and I can only analyse the current draft - of course I recognise that the final text might differ. In my view Protocol 9 is deliberately ambiguous as to whether the 'consensus' to be reached in the European Council is legally binding or not. That's why I was cautious and do not argue that the decision would definitely be irreversible or would certainly survive a CJEU challenge. 2. In fact I think the Court would jump in the opposite direction than you think it would - given its deference in recent years to 'patch-ups' over EMU and benefits issues. I can't quite see the logistics of how the discontinuation of discussion of a proposal in the Council would be challenged. How is that a reviewable act? You refer to changes in the Council's rules of procedure, but the draft Decision does not mention that possibility. 3. Are you arguing that the EP and Commission have a veto in ordinary treaty revision proceedings? In point 4 you admit that the EP doesn't. Or is your point that the EP and Commission have informal influence beyond their formal role? I agree that the Convention is likely to influence the IGC, but a decent chunk of Giscard's text was ditched. And my point is that federalists should be careful what they wish for - I can easily imagine a strong national parliamentary block at a 2017 Convention pushing for red cards and/or limiting EU competences. 4. I don't doubt that you had an influence on the Czech government's decision to withdraw its request, considering also the change of government there. But somehow I suspect the current EP will not be as successful in any efforts it may make to dissuade the UK Conservative government from wanting to see any commitment to Treaty change implemented. DeleteReplyAnonymous22 February 2016 at 07:50How was this detailed analysis produced on 10th February 2016 when the text wasn't available until 19th February 2016?ReplyDeleteRepliesSteve Peers22 February 2016 at 09:46The analysis is of the draft as published on 3rd February. DeleteReplyAdd commentLoad more...
Blog contributors Would you like to write for this blog? Search This Blog
EU sanctions against non-EU countries: the CJEU wi...
Freedom of expression and liability for Internet c...
The final UK/EU renegotiation deal: legal status a...
The final UK renegotiation deal: immigration issue...
Mutual trust – blind trust or general trust with e...
The draft UK/EU renegotiation deal: is it 'legally...
The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What could ...
Free at last? Detention, the European Arrest Warra...
Live. Die. Repeat. The ‘Privacy Shield’ deal as ‘G...
The draft renegotiation deal: A genuine red card? ...
The draft renegotiation deal: EU immigration issue...
The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next? About the editor
I'm a Professor of EU and Human Rights Law at the University of Essex. Follow me on Twitter: @StevePeers
See my academia.edu profile: https://essex.academia.edu/StevePeers View my complete profile
240 jobs available in Liverpool Visas and Immigration department for processing EU casework
The Right to Religious Freedom and the Threat to the Established Order as a Restriction Ground: Some Thoughts on Account of the Achbita Case
Unilever. Accepting CSR jurisdiction against mother companies not the High Court’s cup of tea.
The UK and sickness insurance for mobile citizens: An inequitable mess for Brexit negotiators to address
Ill-Treatment of Migrants in Greek Law Enforcement – Are the Strasbourg Court Judgments the Tip of the Iceberg?
Down with the ‘Bogeyman’: Why Protests and Marches Against Trump Are Missing the Target
A Fulminating Wedding
EU 6.0 - by EU Issue Tracker	EU 6.0 Will Be Back Soon In a New Form – Stay Tuned!