Source: http://www.ecases.us/case/c789153/united-states-v-david-lee-oliver/
Timestamp: 2020-07-02 12:56:50
Document Index: 105081499

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3553', '§ 3', '§ 3']

United States v. David Lee Oliver, Sixth Circuit, US Court of Appeals Cases, Federal Courts, COURT CASE
For the reasons set forth below, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005), we conclude that the district court plainly erred by increasing Oliver's sentence pursuant to the federal sentencing guidelines in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, we VACATE Oliver's sentence and REMAND for re-sentencing. As to the other errors raised by the defendant, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
On appeal Oliver has raised four claims: (1) that the district court erred in failing to suppress evidence recovered from his residence; (2) that the district court erred in permitting the jury to consider his flight from CAP as evidence of his guilt; (3) that the district court erred in imposing a sentence enhancement because his flight from CAP did not constitute obstruction of justice; and (4) that the district court's sentencing determination was unconstitutional pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2005 WL 50108.
Because Oliver failed to object to the admission of the flight evidence at trial, we can only reverse on a showing of "plain error" by the district court. See United States v. Burnette, No. 99-6342, 2001 WL 1254912, *4 (6th Cir. Oct.10, 2001); United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1136 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 925, 118 S. Ct. 324, 139 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1997); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). "A `plain error' is an error that is clear or obvious, and if it affects substantial rights, it may be noticed by an appellate court." United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 830 (6th Cir.1996). Our authority to remedy a "plain error" is discretionary. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). We "should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. at 736, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (citation omitted).
"Flight evidence comes in as an admission of guilt by conduct." Dillon, 870 F.2d at 1126. Courts, however, have "consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials" of flight evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483, n. 10, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). Thus, before a jury may be permitted to consider flight as evidence of guilt, the district court must determine that the flight evidence has genuine probative value. Dillon, 870 F.2d at 1126. In order to ensure that the flight evidence has probative value, we employ a four-step analysis. Id. at 1127. For evidence of flight to be of probative value, four inferences must be drawn: "(1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged." Id. (citation omitted). "All four inferences must be `reasonabl[y] support[ed]' by the evidence." Id. (citation omitted).
As to the first inference, there must be evidence that there was flight by the defendant. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S. Ct. 147, 58 L. Ed. 2d 149 (1978) (noting that there must be more evidence of flight than mere "conjecture and speculation"). In this case, the first inference presents no analytical challenge. Remaining in CAP was a condition of Oliver's release on bond pending trial. Oliver left CAP without the permission of the facility staff. He did not return to CAP for nearly five weeks and admitted to police that he had no intention of returning to CAP. Therefore, Oliver's actions represented flight from custody.
Oliver also asserts for the first time on direct appeal that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2005 WL 50108, the district court's sentencing determination violated the Sixth Amendment.1 Specifically, Oliver argues that the district court's application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on judge-found fact violates the mandates of Booker. We review both claims and conclude that the case must be remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with Booker.
We may review the validity of Oliver's Sixth Amendment claim based on Booker despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not issue its decision in Booker until after the district court issued a sentencing determination for Oliver. See Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108 at *29 (noting that the case's Sixth Amendment holding and its interpretation of the federal sentencing guidelines apply to all cases pending on direct review). As Oliver failed to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence in district court, however, we can only reverse on a showing of "plain error" by the district court. Calloway, 116 F.3d at 1136; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). We read the Supreme Court's decision in Booker as encouraging us to review cases like Oliver's which are currently pending on direct appeal for "plain error" where the Sixth Amendment issue was not raised before the district court. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108 at *29 (noting that the majority expects reviewing courts to apply the case's holding to currently pending appeals and apply prudential doctrines such as the plain-error test in reaching their decisions). "We therefore turn to apply here Rule 52(b) as outlined in Olano. Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.' If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
In applying the first prong of the plain-error test we must determine whether an error occurred. The Supreme Court in Booker concluded that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), does apply to sentencing pursuant to the federal sentencing guidelines. Thus, Booker made applicable to the federal sentencing guidelines the Supreme Court's past holding that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt" or else the Sixth Amendment is violated. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108 at *15.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The Seventh Circuit remanded the case for re-sentencing. The Supreme Court then granted the government's petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the district court for re-sentencing consistent with its opinion. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108 at *29. Given this outcome, we must conclude that the district court erred in sentencing Oliver pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The second prong of the plain-error test is satisfied under Supreme Court precedent. A "plain error" is one that is clear or obvious. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770. The critical question in this case is when the error must be plain. While the error is certainly plain post-Booker, it may not have been so clear to the district court at the time of sentencing. See generally United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) (majority holding that the federal sentencing guidelines did not violate the Sixth Amendment), overruled by Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108. The Supreme Court made clear in Johnson that an error need not always be obvious at the time of the district court's determination in order to be considered plain. "[W]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of the appeal [] it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544. Here, at the time of sentencing it was uncontested that mandatory federal guideline sentencing enhancements based on judge-found fact presented no Sixth Amendment concerns; however, by the time of appellate consideration, the law changed, and it is now evident that the district court's sentencing determination was in clear violation of Booker. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Johnson, we conclude that the second part of the plain-error test is therefore satisfied.
As to the third prong of the plain-error test, we must consider whether the district court's "plain error" affects Oliver's substantial rights. We have held in the past that a sentencing error affects substantial rights where it causes the defendant "to receive a more severe sentence." United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 629 (6th Cir.2004); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (an error affects substantial rights if the error affects the outcome of the district court proceedings). In this case, the district court's sentencing determination unconstitutionally increased Oliver's sentence beyond that which was supported by the jury verdict and Oliver's criminal history. As a result Oliver arguably received a sentence that was longer than his sentence would have been absent a Sixth Amendment violation. We must therefore conclude that this sentencing error affected Oliver's substantial rights.
Finally, we must consider whether the "plain error" at sentencing "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-37, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (internal quotation and citation omitted). A sentencing error that leads to a violation of the Sixth Amendment by imposing a more severe sentence than is supported by the jury verdict "would diminish the integrity and public reputation of the judicial system [and] also would diminish the fairness of the criminal sentencing system." United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir.2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted).3 We therefore conclude that the district court plainly erred by applying the federal sentencing guidelines as mandatory rather than advisory and thereby sentencing Oliver beyond the sentencing range which the jury verdict and Oliver's criminal history supported.
Having concluded that the district court's sentencing determinations in this case plainly violate the Sixth Amendment, we need not consider whether such an error was harmless. See Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 2005 WL 50108 at *29 (noting that the harmless-error doctrine ought to be applied on appellate review only in cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation). We also note in passing that such an analysis for harmless error would be unnecessary based on the relationship between the plain-error and harmless-error standards. An error may be harmless only where the government is able to prove that none of the defendant's substantial rights have been affected by the error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). We have already concluded in this case, however, that the error affected Oliver's substantial rights. Thus, the Sixth Amendment violation cannot be shown by the government to be a harmless error.
In Booker the Supreme Court was faced with the challenge of determining how to remedy potential Sixth Amendment violations created by the mandatory sentencing enhancements under the federal sentencing guidelines. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded that the proper remedy was to sever the statutory provisions which make the federal guidelines mandatory in nature, thereby rendering the guidelines effectively advisory. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ at ___, 2005 WL 50108 at * 16. The Court emphasized, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) remains binding on the federal courts. Id. at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738. Section 3553(a) includes a list of factors which federal courts must consider when determining the proper sentence post-Booker. Among these is § 3553(a)(4) which instructs sentencing courts to consider the applicable federal sentencing guideline range when determining the appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); see also Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (noting that the federal sentencing guidelines are but one of many statutory concerns that federal courts must take into account during sentencing determinations). Thus, as a matter of guideline interpretation, we will briefly address Oliver's claim that his flight from CAP did not qualify as an obstruction of justice under the federal sentencing guidelines.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides for a two-level sentence enhancement if the defendant "willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction." Application Note 4 of this Guideline is a non-exhaustive list of the types of conduct which qualify as an obstruction of justice and includes "escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing ..." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(e) (2004). Absconding from a halfway house qualifies as escape from custody for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.4 See, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 281 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Swanson, 253 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1007, 122 S. Ct. 490, 151 L. Ed. 2d 402 (2001); United States v. Draper, 996 F.2d 982 (9th Cir.1993). Oliver's flight from CAP may thus be considered an obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.5
Oliver's brief did not initially raise the claim that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment as the brief was submitted prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in eitherBlakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), or United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (Jan. 12, 2005). Prior to our oral argument, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Blakely. In response, on July 21, 2004, Oliver submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) advising us that Blakely constituted a supplemental authority pertaining to Oliver's sentencing challenge. At oral argument, Oliver's appellate counsel again asserted that Oliver's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment under Blakely. Oliver also submitted a second Rule 28(j) letter following the Supreme Court's decision in Booker, arguing that based on that decision his case should be remanded for re-sentencing.
We note that the Supreme Court concluded inUnited States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002), that the type of Apprendi violation raised by Cotton did not meet the fourth prong of the "plain error" test where the evidence upon which the judge based his sentencing determination was "overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted." Id. at 633, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Cotton is nonetheless distinguishable and does not control our analysis in this case.
The outcome in Cotton was premised on the determination that an Apprendi violation could not be remedied through re-sentencing. Instead, the evidence underlying the judge-found facts could be considered only if the facts had been originally charged in the indictment and found by the jury. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627, 122 S. Ct. 1781. Thus, the Court posited that a "real threat" to "fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings" existed if it permitted such cases to be remanded under "plain error" review as defendants "involved in large-scale drug operations" would receive less severe punishments than "the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence" supported. Id. at 633-34, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case such concerns are unwarranted as the district court judge may still consider the evidence of flight during re-sentencing. The district court must simply consider this evidence in a manner consistent with Booker. There is no concern that Oliver will be granted a windfall if we permit "plain error" review. Given that primary concern of the Supreme Court in Cotton is not present here, we conclude that its analysis of the fourth prong of the "plain error" test is distinguishable and inapplicable.
The Supreme Court's decision in Booker eliminates the mandatory nature of the federal sentencing guidelines, thereby giving district courts additional discretion as to both the factors which they may consider at sentencing and the length of imprisonment to be imposed. Provided that a district court judge metes out a sentence which constitutes a reasonable application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentence may diverge from the applicable guideline range. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738. Thus, even if we conclude that the evidence is "overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted" we cannot know the length of imprisonment that the district court judge would have imposed pursuant to this evidence following Booker. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We would be usurping the discretionary power granted to the district courts by Booker if we were to assume that the district court would have given Oliver the same sentence post-Booker. A failure to remand this case to the district court for re-sentencing would therefore "seriously affect[] the fairness [and] integrity" of our judicial proceedings following the Supreme Court's decision in Booker. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
On these grounds Cotton is distinguishable, and the Supreme Court's fourth prong analysis in Cotton is not controlling here. Our conclusion is consistent with Booker, which noted the importance of "plain error" review but did not reference Cotton. Booker, ___ U.S. ___ at ___, 125 S. Ct. 738.
Oliver asserts that his flight does not qualify as an obstruction of justice within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because he never "missed any scheduled judicial proceedings" or actively hid from law enforcement. Appellant's Br. at 24. Oliver is correct in asserting that in some cases where the two-level enhancement was applied defendants have missed court proceedings or actively evaded captureSee, e.g., United States v. Pasek, No. 02-8085, 2003 WL 21437211 (10th Cir. June 23, 2003) (after his escape the defendant stole a car and committed bank robbery). In these cases, however, courts have focused not on a defendant's actions after the defendant has absconded, but rather on the mere fact of flight from custody. Whether an obstruction of justice enhancement was properly applied did not hinge on whether a court date was missed or a crime was committed during flight. See Pasek, 2003 WL 21437211 at * 3 ("[t]hat the sentencing hearing was not delayed by [Defendant's] escape ... is of no avail to Defendant"). That these factors are immaterial to an obstruction of justice determination is evidenced by the fact that the sentence enhancement can be imposed even where the district court determines that the defendant merely attempted to escape from custody. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(e) (2004); see also United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1218 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 889, 120 S. Ct. 211, 145 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1999) (upholding two-level obstruction of justice enhancement for attempted escape).
DocketNumber： 03-2126
Citation Numbers： 397 F.3d 369
United States v. Swanson , 253 F.3d 1220 ( 2001 )
United States v. German Hernandez-Miranda , 601 F.2d 1104 ( 1979 )
United States v. Richard Blake Draper , 996 F.2d 982 ( 1993 )
United States v. Lonnie Ray Wiseman , 172 F.3d 1196 ( 1999 )
Heriberto Navarro-Camacho v. United States , 186 F.3d 701 ( 1999 )
United States v. Scottie Ray Hurst , 228 F.3d 751 ( 2000 )
Cassaundra Hayes v. United States , 281 F.3d 724 ( 2002 )
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