Source: http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20050721_0000155.NCA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-24 22:13:12
Document Index: 768123187

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1921', '§ 1921', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920', '§ 1920']

| LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics
LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics
LG ELECTRONICS, INC., PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT,v.BIZCOM ELECTRONICS, INC., COMPAL ELECTRONICS, INC., AND SCEPTRE TECHNOLOGIES, INC., FIRST INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER, INC. AND FIRST INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER OF AMERICA, INC.,Q-LITY COMPUTER, INC., QUANTA COMPUTER, INC., AND QUANTA COMPUTER USA, INC., DEFENDANTS AND COUNTERCLAIMANTS.
ORDER AMENDING CLERK'S AWARD OF COSTS AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR STAY OF AWARD OF COSTS
In separate motions, Plaintiff LG Electronics (LGE) moves for review of the Clerk's taxation of costs in favor of Defendants Bizcom Electronics, Inc., Compal Electronics, Inc., and Sceptre Technologies, Inc., (collectively, Compal), Defendants First International Computer, Inc., and First International Computer of America, Inc., (collectively, FIC), and Defendants Q-Lity Computer, Inc., Quanta Computer, Inc., and Quanta Computer USA, Inc., (collectively, Quanta), and for a stay of any award of costs pending appeal. Compal, FIC and Quanta oppose the motions. In addition, FIC and Compal separately move for review of the Clerk's taxation of costs. LGE opposes the motions. The matters were taken under submission on the papers.
After consideration of all the papers filed by the parties, the Court increases in part and decreases in part the Clerk's award of costs, as described below, and denies LGE's motion for a stay pending appeal.
LGE brought separate cases for patent infringement against Defendants, all third party computer manufacturers who purchase microprocessors and chipsets from Intel or its authorized distributors. In its November 20, 2004 Order addressing the parties' cross motions for summary adjudication, the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of their counter-claims of non-infringement of the '733, '645, and '379 patents and granted Defendants' motion for summary adjudication that claims of infringement of the '509 patent were barred by the LGE-Microsoft Agreement. On January 31, 2005, judgment was entered in favor of Defendants on LGE's infringement claims, and the Court denied as moot Defendants' remaining counter-claims. LGE has filed a notice of appeal.
Defendants, as the prevailing parties, filed Bills of Costs. Compal sought to tax $304,602.65 in costs; FIC sought to tax $139,274.03 in costs; and Quanta sought to tax $286,584.00 in costs. The Clerk awarded costs to Compal in the amount of $102,229.61, to FIC in the amount of $91,508.43, and to Quanta in the amount of $126,844.80. The objections of LGE, Compal and FIC are described in the discussion section below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) authorizes the Court to grant the prevailing party its costs. The determination of taxable costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and, more particularly, Local Rule 54-3, which specifically enumerates the standards for costs recoverable in this District. This Court may only tax costs explicitly authorized by § 1920. See Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987). Section 1920 permits the taxing of costs for various items, such as deposition transcripts and copying of papers, if they are "necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
I. Compal's Reasonable Costs
LGE and Compal have filed cross motions for review of the Clerk's taxation of costs. The Court does not address LGE's objections to costs that were in fact not taxed by the Clerk, including inter alia $111,664.51 for the cost of conversion of source code to .tif files, $32,532.67 for electronic legal research,*fn1 $1,718.79 for creating an attorney working set of opinions of counsel, and costs for Bates stamping and confidential labeling.
A. Fees for Service of Process by Private Process Server
Compal seeks an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs against LGE by $835.00 for costs related to personal service of filings upon opposing counsel by a private process service.
Civil Local Rule 54-3(a)(2) provides in relevant part, "Fees for service of process by someone other than the marshal acting pursuant to FRCivP 4(c), are allowable to the extent reasonably required and actually incurred." Private process servers' fees are properly taxed. Alflex, 914 F.2d at 178.
LGE argues that because none of the filings served (e.g., Defendants' Joint Opposition to Miscellaneous Administrative Request of LG Electronics, Inc.) is a subpoena or summons, costs for service are not properly taxed. LGE relies on Alflex, which noted that marshal's fees "are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1921 which provides, inter alia, for the collection of fees for serving a subpoena or summons." 914 F.2d at 178; see also Willis Corroon of Utah, Inc., v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 1998 WL 196472, *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1998) (noting "messenger fees for the filing of pleadings (rather than service of process) are not included" in § 1921).
Although Alflex is not directly on point, Compal has provided no contrary authority suggesting that "service of process" includes service of court documents other than a summons or subpoena. Instead, Compal notes that the expedited schedule under which filings often took place "frequently had the effect of requiring personal service in order to provide LGE's counsel adequate time to respond." This argument is not relevant to the question of whether taxable "service of process" includes service of all court documents. Therefore, the Court denies Compal's request for an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs for this personal service.
LGE seeks an order reducing the costs taxed for reproduction of documents produced to LGE, in response to LGE's discovery requests, on the grounds that charges incurred by defendants in response to a patent holder's discovery requests are not taxable. The total amount taxed in this category was $20,823.44. Compal, on the other hand, seeks an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs against LGE by $2,463.46 for certain copying costs that were not taxed. See Walker Decl., Ex. 6, Invoices Dated October 28 and November 27, 2002.
The cost of reproducing disclosure or formal discovery documents is allowable. Civ. Local R. 54-3(d)(2). Unlike the Local Rules, the two cases cited by LGE rely on contrary interpretations of § 1920 that are not binding on this Court. See Pehr v. Rubbermaid, 196 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Kan. 2000) (applying Tenth Circuit's interpretation of necessary copying costs); Fulton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Atlanta v. American Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 292, 299 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (relying on Georgia case for proposition that copying of discovery documents is not allowable). The Court concludes that Compal may recover its costs for reproduction of documents produced to LGE. Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request for an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs by $20,823.44.
The Court also grants Compal's request for an order increasing the taxation of costs for reproduction of documents excluded by the Clerk. See Hult Decl., Ex. 4, Oct. 28, 2002 and Nov. 27, 2002 Invoices. According to Compal, these invoices were also for reproduction of documents produced to LGE. This contention is supported by the Hult Declaration. However, Compal's $2,463.46 figure includes $581.90 in costs for Bates stamping and confidential labeling. The Court therefore deducts $581.90 from Compal's request, and increases the Clerk's taxation of costs by a total amount of $1,881.56.
Compal seeks an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs against LGE by $26,312.09 for costs of demonstrative aids to be used at trial, specifically a computer animation of the '509 patent and the technology it disclosed. The disputed $26,312.09 sum represents the costs charged by a computer graphics company for approximately 132 hours of staff time for nine employees, including producers, graphic artists, computer animators and a production assistant. Walker Decl. Ex. 1, Hult Decl. Ex. 5, Invoice No. 1763.
Section 1920(4) allows for the taxation of "[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case." Civil Local Rule 54-3(d)(5) more specifically provides that the cost of "preparing charts, diagrams, videotapes and other visual aids to be used as exhibits is allowable if such exhibits are reasonably necessary to assist the jury or the Court in understanding the issues at the trial." The Ninth Circuit has explained that "'exemplification and copies of papers' has been interpreted to include all types of demonstrative evidence, including photographs and graphic aids." Maxwell v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg, 862 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1988). However, permissible exemplification fees are narrowly construed "only for the physical preparation and duplication of documents, not the intellectual effort involved in their production." Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989). In other words, parties may not "shift their expert witness [or lawyer or lay witness] costs to plaintiffs under the guise of exemplification costs." Id.
LGE does not dispute that the computer animation would have been reasonably necessary to assist the jury in understanding the issues at the trial. Despite its reliance on Romero, LGE also does not dispute that the graphics professionals had no expertise in the substantive technology issues, but instead relied on the intellectual effort and direction of Compal and its attorneys and witnesses. Therefore, the Court agrees with Compal that the staff time of graphics professionals relates to the physical preparation of demonstrative exhibits rather than the disallowed intellectual effort.
LGE further relies on Kohus v. Toys R Us, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit, applying Sixth Circuit law, reasoned that a computer-animated video explaining issues in a patent case was more akin to a model than to charts or other visual aids, and therefore was not an exemplification or copy properly taxed under § 1920(4). 282 F.3d 1355, 1359-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 149 F.2d 476, 477-78 (6th Cir. 1945) (distinguishing drawings and charts, for which costs are allowable, from models and machines, for which costs are disallowed); Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P., v. MPW Indus. Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding videotape exhibits and computer animations are analogous to physical models and thus not "exemplifications" under circuit law); but see Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1361-62 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (arguing that Sixth Circuit authority, i.e. Swan, would allow the costs of preparing a computer-animated video); Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427-429 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that costs for sophisticated, multi-media presentation services involving the packaging and display of evidence are potentially compensable).
The holding in Cefalu and the dissent in Kohus are more in line with Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as Local Rule 54-3(d)(5)'s specific allowance of "videotapes and other visual aids." Clearly, the Ninth Circuit allows taxation of the increased costs associated with using modern technology for purposes traditionally permissible under § 1920(4). See, e.g., Maxwell, 862 F.2d at 770 (holding that costs of photographic materials are encompassed within "exemplification and copies of papers" category). In his dissent, Judge Dyk noted that Swan relied on a Ninth Circuit case which allowed costs for illustrative charts. 282 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Reinharts, Inc., v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 99 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1938)). Today, computer animations constructed by graphic artists are used to facilitate the jury's understanding of the evidence and are more similar to the "elaborate illustrative charts" allowed in Reinharts than to disallowed "models introduced by complainant as exhibits." 99 F.2d at 648. Therefore, the Court grants Compal's request for an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs by $26,312.09 for the physical production of computer-animated demonstratives.
D. Court Reporter's Fees for Copies of Transcripts
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $756.20 for fees of the court reporter for copies of transcripts and mailing fees.
Section 1920(2) allows for the taxation of court reporters' fees "for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case." The only normally allowable costs of reporters' transcripts are those "necessarily obtained for an appeal" and statements made by a judge from the bench to be reduced to a formal order prepared by counsel. Civ. Local R. 54-3(b). However, both pre-trial and trial transcripts may be deemed reasonably necessary if a case is unusually complex. Indep. Iron Works, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 677 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 922 (1963); see also Intermedics, Inc., v. Ventritex, Inc., 1993 WL 525879, *4 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (allowing taxation of costs of transcripts where contentious litigation fell within "that category of unusual suits where, in order to protect itself, a party reasonably could incur the expense of obtaining transcripts of all of the court proceedings"). Compal argues that hearing transcripts in this case fall within this latter, unusual category.
LGE relies on Willis Corroon, 1998 WL 196472 at *5 for the proposition that the hearing transcripts are not recoverable.
Willis Corroon is inapposite because that case was not unusually complex, as this one is. Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to decrease the taxation of costs for court reporters' transcripts and necessary related fees by $756.20.
E. Check Interpreters
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $7,800.00 for the additional costs of paying "check interpreters" hired by Compal's attorneys to assist them in depositions of Compal witnesses, where the parties had already hired an official translator.
Section 1920(6) provides generally for the taxation of "compensation of interpreters." Neither party cites any specific authority regarding the allowability of check interpreters.
However, the transcripts show that the check interpreters were used at times to clarify or to dispute the official translation. E.g., Walker Opp. Decl., Ex. 1, Depositions of William Wu, Andy Lee, Justin Wang, Joseph Ma and Jack Huang. LGE does not dispute Compal's assertion that both sides hired check interpreters. This indicates that the parties believed they were reasonably necessary.
The Court concludes that, in the context of this case, check interpreters fall within the category of interpreters and their costs are allowable under § 1920(6). Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to decrease the Clerk's taxation of costs for check interpreters.
F. Mediation and Discovery Master Fees
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $8,258.72 for the discovery master's fees and $1,562.50 for a master's mediation fees.
Local Rule 54-3(f) provides generally, "Fees to masters and receivers are allowable." However, the Ninth Circuit has approved a denial of costs for mediators' fees, noting that "nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides for the cost of a mediator." Sea Coast Foods, Inc., v. La-Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2001).
Based on the plain language of Rule 54-3(f), the Court concludes that the costs of the discovery master's fees are allowable. Calabrese v. Square D Co., 1998 WL 808849, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1998), is not persuasive here because it runs counter to this District's local rules and because it involved a court's specific prior intention to adjust responsibility for fees based on a "disparity of resources between the parties." However, in light of the Ninth Circuit's comment regarding the taxability of mediation fees, the Court grants that portion of LGE's motion and reduces the Clerk's taxation of costs by $1,562.50.
G. Scanning Trial Exhibits and Creating DVDs and CDs
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $1,569.62 for the cost of creating DVDs and CDs of video trial exhibits and by $1,603.75 for the cost of scanning Compal's trial exhibits, for a total reduction of $3110.75.
Compal argues that creation of DVDs and CDs was necessary in order to reproduce video exhibits that could not be reproduced in paper format. Similarly, Compal argues that the scanning of trial exhibits was reasonably necessary in order to allow the exhibits to be displayed on the audio-visual equipment that was to be used at trial.
These expenses fall within the general Local Rule provision allowing "the cost of reproducing trial exhibits" "to the extent that a Judge requires copies to be provided." See Civ. Local R. 54-3(d)(4). LGE has provided no authority suggesting that an exception should be made where the parties choose to use audio-visual equipment. Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce the Clerk's taxation of costs by $3,110.75.
II. FIC's Reasonable Costs
LGE and FIC have filed cross motions for review of the Clerk's taxation of costs. The Court does not address LGE's objections to costs that were in fact not taxed by the Clerk.
A. Demonstrative Exhibits
FIC seeks an order increasing the Clerk's taxation of costs against LGE by $24,472.12 for costs of the preparation of demonstrative exhibits to be used at trial, specifically graphics illustrating the '733 patent. These costs were incurred by the third party graphics professionals who produced the demonstrative exhibits. Lemieux Decl., Ex. B., Think Twice Invoices.
For the reasons described in Section I(C) above, the Court grants FIC's request for an increase in the Clerk's taxation of costs by $24,472.12.
B. Court Reporter Fees
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $176.73 for fees of the court reporter for inter alia obtaining transcripts of other hearings. For the reasons described in Section I(D) above, the Court denies LGE's request.
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $55,483.28 for three sets of copies of documents produced by FIC and its agents and a file copy for FIC. LGE also seeks to reduce the cost per page of of documents obtained by FIC from Intel to a rate of $.08 per page.
Because LGE has produced no relevant authority limiting copying costs to $.08 per page, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce costs awarded on that basis. However, FIC has not provided sufficient documentation to support its request that it be reimbursed for three sets of copies. In its opposition, FIC contends that only two sets of copies were produced, one for LGE and one for FIC's file, and that the fees for the third set were in fact fees for labeling the original documents. However, this contention is inconsistent with the Byerly Declaration submitted to the Clerk in support of FIC's bill of costs, which simply triples the $19,289.80 reproduction subtotal, "to reflect a pristine, unmarked copy of the production set, a working set for FIC, and the production set for the Plaintiff." Byerly Decl. ¶ 8. Furthermore, FIC's tripling of its reproduction costs is inconsistent with the costs taxed by the Clerk for the other Defendants, who generally recovered the cost of only one set of copies. See, e.g., Hult Decl., Ex. 4. Therefore, the Court grants LGE's request in part and reduces the Clerk's taxation of costs by $38,579.60.
D. Check Interpreters and Rush Translation
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $7,940.31 for the additional costs of hiring check interpreters and by $446.00 for the cost of a rush translation of a Request for International Judicial Assistance.
For the reasons described in Section I(E) above, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce costs awarded for the hiring of check interpreters.
LGE argues that FIC never presented the Request for International Judicial Assistance to Japanese authorities and therefore its translation was not necessary. FIC does not dispute that the Request for International Judicial Assistance was not necessary to this case. Therefore, the Court grants LGE's request in part and reduces the Clerk's taxation of costs by $446.00.
E. Deposition Costs
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $21,054.25 related to deposition transcripts and copies.
Fees for deposition transcripts and copies are properly taxed under § 1920. Alflex, 914 F.2d at 177. Local Rule 54-3(c)(1) specifically provides that the cost of an original and one copy of any deposition "taken for any purpose in connection with the case is allowable." FIC's request for deposition costs specifies the items claimed and is supported by a declaration that such items are correctly stated. This declaration is itself prima facie evidence of the facts recited. LGE's argument that additional documentation regarding the utility of depositions is necessary, without any rebuttal evidence showing that the depositions were in fact not needed, is not well-taken. Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce the costs awarded by the Clerk related to depositions.
III. Quanta's Reasonable Costs LGE Moves for Review of the Clerk's Taxation of Quanta's Costs
The Court does not address LGE's objections to costs that were in fact not taxed by the Clerk, including inter alia internal litigation copying costs.
A. Court Reporter Fees
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $176.73 for fees of the court reporter for inter alia preparing transcripts of other hearings. For the reasons described in Section I(D) above, the Court denies LGE's request.
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $10,262.02 taxed for an outside vendor's copying of Quanta documents; $3,867.77 taxed for demonstrative boards for the Markman hearing; and $33,757.55 taxed for internal copying.
LGE argues that the costs paid to the outside vendor should not be taxed because they are for copies of original documents possessed by Quanta. Attached to the Garnett Declaration, Quanta submitted invoices for all of its outside vendor photocopying as well as a table detailing which portions of those invoices were for photocopying of documents produced to LGE. Such photocopies are taxable, as explained in Section I(B) above. Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce the taxation of costs against it by $10,262.02 for outside vendor copying costs.
LGE argues that the demonstrative boards for the Markman hearing were unnecessary. Quanta could reasonably have believed that these visual aids were necessary to its presentation of the issues to the Court, and taxation of their costs is allowable under Local Rule 54-3(d)(5). Therefore, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce the taxation of costs against it by $3,867.77.
Finally, LGE argues that internal copying costs should not be taxed because Quanta has provided insufficient information about what those documents were, how many pages they involved, the cost per page, or the reason for copying them. In its brief, Quanta contends that all of these copying costs "were for copies of documents provided to the other parties [i.e., the other Defendants]" and "were therefore properly taxed as well." However, Quanta provides no authority for the proposition that all documents provided to co-defendants are taxable, nor any facts in support of its assertion that the reproduction of these documents was properly taxed. Moreover, the supporting Disbursement Inquiry suggests that the $33,757.55 represents all "internal photocopying costs billed to LGE v. Quanta, et al., Litigation." Garnett Decl., Ex. 4, Exemplification Costs: Alschuler Grossman Stein & Kahan's Internal Litigation Photocopying Costs. The invoices are therefore insufficient to support Quanta's bill of costs.
Therefore, the Court grants LGE's request to reduce costs awarded to Quanta for copying by $33,757.55.
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $17,439.75 for costs of the preparation of computer-animated demonstrative aids to be used at trial. The Clerk did not, in fact, tax this cost. For the reasons described in Section I(C) above, however, the Court increases the costs taxed against LGE by $17,439.75.
D. Discovery Master Fees
LGE seeks an order reducing the Clerk's taxation of costs against it by $8,559.00 for the Quanta's share of the discovery special master's fees. For the reasons described in Section I(F) above, the Court denies LGE's request to reduce costs awarded for the discovery master.
IV. Motion to Stay Award of Costs
LGE moves the Court to exercise its discretion to stay all further action regarding the award of costs pending its appeal of the underlying judgment to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Ishida Co., Ltd., v. Taylor, 2004 WL 2713067 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2004) (deciding motion for review of taxation of costs after affirmance by Federal Circuit). The Court declines to stay its review of the Clerk's taxation of costs; the issues involved may grow stale pending appeal. Rule 62(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appellant may obtain a stay of execution on the judgment of the district court after posting a supersedeas bond. "The posting of a bond protects the prevailing party from the risk of a later uncollectible judgment and compensates him for delay in the entry of final judgment." National Labor Relations Board v. Westphal, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1988). LGE may move for an order staying collection of the judgment for costs upon first posting a supersedeas bond.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Compal's motion for review of taxation of costs by increasing the Clerk's award by $1,881.56 for certain copying costs and by $26,312.09 for the production of computer animation for trial (Docket No. 942 in case 01-1375). The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part LGE's motion for review of taxation of costs awarded to Compal by decreasing the Clerk's award by $1,562.50 for the cost of a mediator and DENIES LGE's motion for a stay (Docket No. 930 in case 01-1375; Docket No. 919 in case 01-1594; Docket No. 880 in case 01-2187). The total of costs awarded to Compal is thus $128,860.76.
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part FIC's motion for review of taxation of costs by increasing the Clerk's award by $24,472.12 for the production of computer animation for trial (Docket No. 922 in case 01-1594; Docket No. 882 in case 01-2187). The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part LGE's motion for review of taxation of costs awarded to FIC by decreasing the Clerk's award by $38,579.60 for certain copying costs and by $446.00 for rush translation of a letter rogatory and DENIES LGE's motion for a stay (Docket No. 932 in case 01-1375; Docket No. 917 in case 01-1594; Docket No. 878 in case 01-2187). The total of costs awarded to FIC is thus $76,954.95.
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part LGE's motion for review of taxation of costs awarded to Quanta, by decreasing the Clerk's award to Quanta by $33,757.55 for copying and increasing the Clerk's award by $17,439.75 for the production of computer animation for trial, and DENIES LGE's motion for a stay (Docket No. 929 in case 01-1375; Docket No. 918 in case 01-1594; Docket No. 879 in case 01-2187). The total of costs awarded to Quanta is thus $110,527.00.