Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/460/1217/580622/
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 18:49:08
Document Index: 180775352

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1407', '§ 20', '§ 5', '§ 1407', '§ 20', '§ 9', '§ 1407', '§ 20', '§ 3866', '§ 1407', '§ 1407', '§ 20', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 10', '§ 1407', '§ 3861']

In Re Phenylpropanolamine (ppa) Products Liability Litigation,* Shantell Allen, on Behalf of Allen, Vera, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.leon Anderson, Jr., et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.leslie Ackel, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.bridgett Arrington, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.calvin Mcgriggs, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Delaco Company, et al., Defendants-appellees.betty Clinton, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Delaco Company, et al., Defendants-appellees.donna Sasseen, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ide Interstate Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees.elizabeth Page, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee.marie Riley, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wyeth, Obo Itself and Its Unincorporated Division, Wyeth Consumer Healthcare, Fka Whitehall-robins Healthcare Formerly Known As American Home Products Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees. Andkeva K. Alford, on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Henry Dexter, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, Andeddie Bullock, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wyeth, Obo Itself and Its Unincorporated Division, Wyeth Consumer Healthcare, Fka Whitehall-robins Healthcare Formerly Known As American Home Products Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees, Andnovartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, et al., Defendants.bobby Holmes, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee.melody Mcdaniel, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees.samantha Samuels, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 2006 › In Re Phenylpropanolamine (ppa) Products Liability Litigation,* Shantell Allen, on Behalf of Allen,...
In Re Phenylpropanolamine (ppa) Products Liability Litigation,* Shantell Allen, on Behalf of Allen, Vera, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.leon Anderson, Jr., et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.leslie Ackel, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.bridgett Arrington, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees.calvin Mcgriggs, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Delaco Company, et al., Defendants-appellees.betty Clinton, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Delaco Company, et al., Defendants-appellees.donna Sasseen, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Ide Interstate Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees.elizabeth Page, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee.marie Riley, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wyeth, Obo Itself and Its Unincorporated Division, Wyeth Consumer Healthcare, Fka Whitehall-robins Healthcare Formerly Known As American Home Products Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees. Andkeva K. Alford, on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Henry Dexter, et al.,* Plaintiffs-appellants, Andeddie Bullock, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wyeth, Obo Itself and Its Unincorporated Division, Wyeth Consumer Healthcare, Fka Whitehall-robins Healthcare Formerly Known As American Home Products Corporation, et al., Defendants-appellees, Andnovartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, et al., Defendants.bobby Holmes, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee.melody Mcdaniel, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., et al., Defendants-appellees.samantha Samuels, et al., Plaintiffs-appellants, v. Bayer Corporation, Defendant-appellee, 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006)
Argued and Submitted February 7 and 8, 2006. **
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Damon A. Kirin, Murray Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, for plaintiffs-appellants Allen, Anderson, Clinton, Riley, Holmes and Samuels; Michael J. Miller, Miller & Associates, Alexandria, VA, for plaintiff-appellant Hill.
As a result, lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts throughout the country against pharmaceutical companies by persons claiming injury for ingestion of a product containing PPA. On motion of plaintiffs in one such action in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation found that fourteen actions then pending in several district courts were rooted in complex core questions concerning the safety of PPA and that centralization was necessary to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig. No. 1407, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L.2001). Accordingly, on August 28, 2001, the Panel designated the Western District of Washington as the appropriate forum for MDL 1407, and ordered the PPA actions to be transferred and assigned to Hon. Barbara Jacobs Rothstein for pretrial consolidation and coordination.3 Id. at 1380.
At the court's direction, the parties submitted an agreed-upon Case Management Order (CMO) 1, which set out basic procedures and a master framework for discovery. Among other things, this order, filed January 29, 2002, states that " [a] party's failure to either produce a relevant document or identify same as withheld pursuant to a privilege may be viewed by the Court as an infraction of its orders, justifying appropriate sanctions." CMO 1 at ¶ VIII. It also provides that notice by the court to Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel and Defendants' Liaison Counsel of any matter or ruling relating to all actions would be considered as notice to all MDL 1407 parties, and that service on Liaison Counsel would constitute service on all plaintiffs' and all defendants' counsel, respectively. Id. at ¶ III C, D.
There were approximately 439 cases in the MDL when CMO 6 was entered; eight months later, there were more than 1,500 plaintiffs in 736 cases either in, or pending transfer to, MDL 1407. The court found that despite the efforts of the Defendants' and the Plaintiffs' Steering Committees, many plaintiffs had failed to comply with CMO 6's requirement to complete a Plaintiff's Fact Sheet. Therefore, the court entered CMO 10 on November 22, 2002 "to provide for the timely completion of discovery." CMO 10 provides that the one-year period for completion of discovery would not begin to run until a substantially complete PFS and accompanying authorizations were provided to defendants, and that no case would be considered for remand until the plaintiff had complied with the discovery requirements set forth in the court's prior orders, the court had determined that the discovery obligations of the plaintiff had been completed, and defendants had sufficient time to complete case-specific discovery. It also states that " [n]othing in this Order shall prevent defendants from seeking additional remedies or sanctions against any plaintiff for failure to comply with the discovery obligations set out in prior CMOs, on a case-by-case basis."
A minute entry documenting the July 31, 2003 status conference and indicating that " [t]he court instructed the Defendants to diligently pursue filing motions to dismiss for failure to comply with CMO 6, 13, and 15" was posted on the district court's electronic docketing system, PACER/CMECF, on August 7, 2003 as "Document 1922," and a few months later on the court's public MDL website. See W.D. Wa. PPA Litig. Website, http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/mdl.
We review for abuse of discretion. "Although it is preferred, it is not required that the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has considered these factors and we may review the record independently to determine if the district court has abused its discretion." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended); Malone, 833 F.2d at 130; Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). "`Dismissal is a harsh penalty and is to be imposed only in extreme circumstances.' Nevertheless, we will overturn a dismissal sanction only if we have a definite and firm conviction that it was clearly outside the acceptable range of sanctions." Malone, 833 F.2d at 130 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423) (internal citation omitted).
Expeditious resolution of litigation. As the first of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects, the public has an overriding interest in securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Orderly and expeditious resolution of disputes is of great importance to the rule of law. By the same token, delay in reaching the merits, whether by way of settlement or adjudication, is costly in money, memory, manageability, and confidence in the process. We defer to the district court's judgment about when delay becomes unreasonable "because it is in the best position to determine what period of delay can be endured before its docket becomes unmanageable." Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994).
Court's need to manage its docket. "District courts have an inherent power to control their dockets. In the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, default or dismissal." Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831. "It is incumbent upon us to preserve the district courts' power to manage their dockets" without being subject to endless non-compliance with case management orders. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. Rule 16, the central pretrial rule, authorizes a court to manage cases so that disposition is expedited, wasteful pretrial activities are discouraged, the quality of the trial is improved, and settlement is facilitated. It recognizes "the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (12). The goal is to get cases decided on the merits of issues that are truly meritorious and in dispute. Subsection (f) puts teeth into these objectives by permitting the judge to make such orders as are just for a party's failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, including dismissal. Rule 37(b) (2) (C) allows dismissal for failure to comply with discovery plans and orders, and Rule 41(b) permits dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with any order of court. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that dismissal "must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976) (per curiam). So have we. See Allen v. Exxon Corp. (In re the EXXON VALDEZ), 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996). This factor is usually reviewed in conjunction with the public's interest in expeditious resolution and, as with the first factor, we give deference to the district court "since it knows when its docket may become unmanageable." In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1452.
Risk of prejudice to the defendant. "A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case." Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Malone, 833 F.2d at 131; In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453. Failing to produce documents as ordered is considered sufficient prejudice. Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412. Late tender is no excuse. See, e.g., In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453; Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1993). The law also presumes prejudice from unreasonable delay. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976)); Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991) (as amended) (presuming from elapsed time that defendants' ability to defend a case has been prejudiced). The presumption may be rebutted and if there is a showing that no actual prejudice occurred, that fact should be considered when determining whether the district court exercised sound discretion. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1452-53 (quoting Anderson, 542 F.2d at 524). A plaintiff may proffer an excuse for delay that, if "anything but frivolous," shifts the burden of production to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice; if it does, the plaintiff must persuade the court that the claims of prejudice are illusory or relatively insignificant in light of his excuse. Id. at 1453 (quoting Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1980)); Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998) (reiterating that the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show at least some actual prejudice only after the plaintiff has given a non-frivolous excuse for delay). In this circumstance prejudice, delay, and excuse all inform the district court's discretion. Prejudice normally consists of loss of evidence and memory, In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1453; it may also consist of costs or burdens of litigation, although it may not consist of the mere pendency of the lawsuit itself, Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). That the case is "an involved, complex case increases the prejudice from the delay. Early preparation and participation are essential in such circumstances." Anderson, 542 F.2d at 525 (citation omitted). The district court's finding of prejudice "deserves `substantial deference' because' the district court is in the best position to assess prejudice.'" Computer Task Group, Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Anheuser-Busch v. Natural Bev. Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 354) (9th Cir. 1995)).
Availability of less drastic sanctions. "`The district court abuses its discretion if it imposes a sanction of dismissal without first considering the impact of the sanction and the adequacy of less drastic sanctions.'" Malone, 833 F.2d at 131-32 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 1986)).5 Factors that indicate whether a district court has considered alternatives include: "(1) Did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less drastic sanctions and explain why alternative sanctions would be inadequate? (2) Did the court implement alternative methods of sanctioning or curing the malfeasance before ordering dismissal? (3) Did the court warn the plaintiff of the possibility of dismissal before actually ordering dismissal?" Id. at 132. While helpful and encouraged, explicit discussion of alternatives is not necessary for a dismissal order to be upheld. Id. Warning that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself meet the "consideration of alternatives" requirement. Estrada v. Speno & Cohen, 244 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001); Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1413; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Although a warning is not always required, Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1413; Malone, 833 F.2d at 132; Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 353, we focus more closely on the lack of warning and absence of consideration of less drastic alternatives when the dismissal is sua sponte rather than in response to a noticed motion. See Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1992). Compare In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1455, and Morris, 942 F.2d at 652 (rejecting a warning requirement in a case involving a noticed motion to dismiss), with Oliva, 958 F.2d at 274 (reversing a dismissal because the court sua sponte dismissed a case without considering alternative sanctions or giving a warning), and Hamilton v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a case because it failed to warn prior to dismissal). However, for the prior implementation of a lesser sanction to be a persuasive factor, it must have occurred after the plaintiff's violation of a court order. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999); Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643.
This procedure was meant to "assure uniform and expeditious treatment in the pretrial procedures in multidistrict litigation." Id. at 1901. Without it, "conflicting pretrial discovery demands for documents and witnesses" might "disrupt the functions of the Federal courts" as they nearly had in the electrical equipment company cases. Id. at 1899. One of the Panel's first rulings described the alternative as "multiplied delay, confusion, conflict, inordinate expense and inefficiency." In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 495 (J.P.M.L.1968). It was thought that consolidation and central coordination would avoid these dangers and would yield significant benefits of economy and speed. As a former Executive Attorney to the Panel and the Executive Editor of the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation wrote: "Implicit in Section 1407 is the assumption that the transferee judge will, as did the judges in the electrical equipment company cases, establish a national unified discovery program to avoid delay, repetition and duplication and to insure that the litigation is processed as efficiently and economically as possible." John T. McDermott, "The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation," 57 F.R.D. 215, 217 (1973).
Transfer proceedings may be commenced either on the Panel's own initiative or — as in MDL 1407 — by motion of any party. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c). The Panel analyzes each group of cases in light of the statutory criteria and the primary purposes of the MDL process to determine whether transfer is appropriate. See In re Food Lion, Inc., F.L.S.A. Effective Scheduling Litig., 73 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Federal Judicial Center, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.131 at 220 (4th Ed.2004) (citing In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.L.1968)); MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 5.16 (noting that factors considered by the Panel also include the progress of discovery, docket conditions, familiarity of the transferee judge with the relevant issues, and the size of the litigation). A transfer is effective when the order of transfer is "filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the transferee district." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c). When the transfer becomes effective, "the jurisdiction of the transferor court ceases and the transferee court has exclusive jurisdiction." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.131 at 220; see also MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL, § 9.1 (explaining that upon transfer of the litigation "the divestment of [the transferor court's] jurisdiction is complete"). A transferee judge exercises all the powers of a district judge in the transferee district under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and "may make any pretrial order that the transferor court might have made in the absence of a transfer." Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 578-79 (1978); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (authorizing the transferee judge to "exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions"). This includes authority to decide all pretrial motions, including dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), motions to strike an affirmative defense, and motions for judgment pursuant to a settlement. See Weigel, 78 F.R.D. at 582-83; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.131 at 222; 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3866, 618 (2d ed.1986); In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1532-33 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 118 S. Ct. 956, 140 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1998) (noting that "the transferee court is empowered to dispose of the cases transferred to it by means of summary judgment or dismissal"); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.—Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 367-68 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that " § 1407 empowers transferee courts to enter a dispositive pretrial order terminating a case").
Once pretrial proceedings are completed in the MDL, the Panel remands individual cases to the district court in which the action was originally filed for trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ("Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district court from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated...."). When remand occurs depends upon the circumstances of the litigation and the recommendation of the transferee court. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 at 225 (noting that " [t]he Panel looks to the transferee court to suggest when it should order remand, but that court has no independent authority to ... remand"). In MDL 1407, for instance, Judge Rothstein entered CMO 17 on November 18, 2003, superseded by CMOs 17A, B, and C, that detailed the procedures and conditions she would consider before determining that a case was "ripe for remand." These conditions included completion of discovery permitted by CMOs 1, 6, 6A, 10, 13, 13A, and 15. After an MDL action is remanded, the transferor court resumes exclusive jurisdiction over further proceedings. Id. at 226.
A district judge charged with the responsibility of "just and efficient conduct" of the multiplicity of actions in an MDL proceeding must have discretion to manage them that is commensurate with the task. The task is enormous, for the court must figure out a way to move thousands of cases toward resolution on the merits while at the same time respecting their individuality. The court is also confronted with substantial legal questions, such as, in MDL 1407, FDA issues, Daubert7 motions, questions of joinder and federal jurisdiction, class certification, timeliness of claims, and causation. For it all to work, multidistrict litigation assumes cooperation by counsel and macro-, rather than micro-, judicial management because otherwise, it would be an impossible task for a single district judge to accomplish. Coordination of so many parties and claims requires that a district court be given broad discretion to structure a procedural framework for moving the cases as a whole as well as individually, more so than in an action involving only a few parties and a handful of claims. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit put it, a district court must be able to "uncomplicate matters" and counsel must, for their part, "collaborate with the trial judge from the outset in fashioning workable programmatic procedures, and thereafter alert the court in a timely manner as operating experience points up infirmities warranting further judicial attention." Massaro v. Chesley (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.), 111 F.3d 220, 229 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 10 at 7 ("Fair and efficient resolution of complex litigation requires at least that (1) the court exercise early and effective supervision (and, where necessary, control); (2) counsel act cooperatively and professionally; and (3) the judge and counsel collaborate to develop and carry out a comprehensive plan for conduct of pretrial . . . proceedings.").
Pretrial plans will necessarily vary with the circumstances of the particular MDL. However, the district judge must establish schedules with firm cutoff dates if the coordinated cases are to move in a diligent fashion toward resolution by motion, settlement, or trial. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172, 110 S. Ct. 482, 107 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1989). As happened in MDL 1407, the multidistrict process contemplates involvement of representative counsel in formulating workable plans. Once established in consultation with counsel, time limits and other requirements must be met and, "when necessary, appropriate sanctions are imposed ... for derelictions and dilatory tactics." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 10.13 at 13." Close judicial oversight and a clear, specific, and reasonable management program, developed with the participation of counsel, will reduce the potential for sanctionable conduct because the parties will know what the judge expects of them.... Although sanctions should not generally be a management tool, a willingness to resort to sanctions, sua sponte if necessary, may ensure compliance with the management program." Id. at § 10.151 at 15.
Rule 37 sanctions, including dismissal, may be imposed where the violation is "`due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.'" Fair Hous., 285 F.3d at 905 (quoting the standard articulated in United States v. Kahaluu Constr. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 603 (9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). "Disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the litigant's control meets this standard." Fair Hous., 285 F.3d at 905; Virtual Vision, Inc. v. Praegitzer Indus., Inc. (In re Virtual Vision, Inc.), 124 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 1997). Our review of the record indicates that failure to comply with CMO 6 was not outside Allen's or Anderson's control. See In re Virtual Vision, 124 F.3d at 1145 (holding that a litigant's failure to advise counsel of his whereabouts and failure to keep abreast of the status of his case indicates a lack of due diligence); W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the faults and defaults of the attorney may be imputed to, and their consequences visited upon, his or her client"); Malone, 833 F.2d at 134 (same); Anderson, 542 F.2d at 526 (same); see also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962). Thus, dismissal was an available sanction.
Alford 12
Johnson was served with a blank PFS on February 3, 2004, which meant that her completed Fact Sheet was due on March 19, 2004. On March 17, 2005, Johnson sought an extension until April 19, 2004, which the district court granted. Johnson timely submitted her PFS on April 19, 2004, but she did not submit the required authorization forms that were necessary to obtain her medical records and financial documents. On June 8, 2004, an omnibus motion was filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) seeking the sanction of dismissal, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (C), for actions where the plaintiffs had failed to provide a timely, completed PFS. On June 14, 2004, six days after the motion was filed and nearly two months after the authorizations were due, Johnson supplemented her PFS with the required authorizations.
Johnson and Alford argue that dismissal was too harsh a sanction, but our review of the record indicates that failure to comply with CMO 6 was not outside Johnson's and Alford's control. See W. Coast Theater, 897 F.2d at 1523 (holding that "the faults and defaults of the attorney may be imputed to, and their consequences visited upon, his or her client"); Malone, 833 F.2d at 134 (same); Anderson, 542 F.2d at 526 (same); see also Link, 370 U.S. at 633, 82 S. Ct. 1386.
Alford differs from Allen in that the district court did not explicitly discuss the Malone factors. However, the court had gone through the Malone factors in its foundational analysis of failure to comply with CMO 6 in early rulings such as Allen, and we assume that Judge Rothstein, one of the most experienced district judges in the country, understood the dismissal factors as they applied to MDL 1407. In any event, considering the record in light of those factors ourselves, we conclude that the district court had discretion to dismiss the Johnson and Alford actions. The first two factors strongly support the court's decision. As we have discussed, this was complex, multidistrict litigation involving thousands of plaintiffs who claimed to have suffered PPA-related injury. " [T]he weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the docket...." Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring). Here, given the size and complexity of MDL 1407, the docket-managing factor is weighted heavily in favor of dismissal.
Prejudice from unreasonable delay is presumed. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1452-53. Failure to produce documents as ordered is sufficient prejudice, whether or not there is belated compliance. Id. at 1453 (taking action after the defendant's motion to dismiss was pending does not excuse taking no action before); Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that last-minute tender of documents does not cure prejudice or restore other litigants on a crowded docket to the opportunity to use the courts); see also Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1413 n. 6 (recognizing that refusal to produce evidence presumptively shows that an asserted claim or defense is meritless). The risk of prejudice is exacerbated where each delay potentially affects the discovery and remand schedule in hundreds of other cases. Although a plaintiff's excuse for default or delay is relevant, the district court found Alford and Johnson's explanation unavailing. We defer to this finding, which is not clearly erroneous. Computer Task Group, 364 F.3d at 1116 (holding that appellate court owes deference to the district court's finding that excuses are not credible). We also note that CMO 15, which counsel maintained was consuming his time, itself states that " [n]othing in this Case Management Order shall delay the production of Plaintiff Fact Sheets by plaintiffs named in multiple plaintiff cases." CMO 15, ¶ 3. Therefore, the prejudice factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The availability of less drastic sanctions was not discussed by the district court, nor did Johnson or Alford propose any. They maintain that to the extent they were in violation of CMO 6, no lesser sanction was imposed before proceeding directly to dismissal. While true as to them individually, CMO 10 reflects the court's awareness of widespread non-compliance with CMO 6 and consideration of alternative measures to remedy it. Although the court did not individually warn Johnson and Alford of the possibility of dismissal for failure to comply, the text of CMO 1, and of Rules 37(b) (2) and 41(b), give notice that dismissal is a possible sanction for failure to obey pretrial discovery orders. Valley Eng'rs, 158 F.3d at 1056-57. Also, the district court warned all MDL 1407 plaintiffs that any case where plaintiffs failed to comply with discovery orders would be dismissed; other cases had been dismissed for failure to comply with CMO 6, see, e.g., Allen v. Bayer, No. 04-35370; Anderson v. Bayer, No. 04-35562, and this, too, amounted to a warning that similar conduct would result in a similar sanction. See Valley Eng'rs, 158 F.3d at 1057. In addition, the court had instructed defendants diligently to pursue filing motions to dismiss for failure to comply with CMO 6 before Alford and Johnson let the dead-line go by. Although composed of hundreds of actions, MDL 1407 was a unified proceeding for pretrial purposes so its MDL-wide rulings applied to all parties. Further, in accordance with CMO 6's compliance plan, Defense Liaison Counsel's April 13, 2004 letter advised Alford that she was in default of CMO 6 obligations and warned that appropriate relief would be requested unless complete responses were forthcoming within 30 days (the extra time frame allowed by CMO 6 for compliance after warning). These warnings satisfy this factor in this case. See, e.g., Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (recognizing that a warning can satisfy the "consideration of alternatives" requirement); Malone, 833 F.2d at 132 & n. 1 (noting that a warning is an alternative sanction, and that case law suggests that warning a plaintiff that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can suffice).
Page admitted that there were "absences" and "failing [s] in Plaintiff's fact sheet" and that Bayer was "certainly entitled to complete answers to the questions on the fact sheet." She conceded that Bayer "certainly was within its rights" to seek dismissal under CMO 19 and that she had committed "error in failing to transmit" the supplemental Fact Sheet to Bayer. She accepted "responsibility for that delay." Nevertheless, Page tried to excuse the delay by arguing that the revised PFS had been completed some time prior to the motion to dismiss, but had simply not been given to Bayer because "counsel ... inadvertently forgot to send those responses." Page argued that the errors and omissions in the original PFS were merely technical. In light of that inadvertence, Syed's absence from the country, and the alleged mildness of the omissions, Page argued that dismissal was too harsh a sanction. The district court found that Page's excuses were not a reasonable justification for the delay and that Bayer had been prejudiced.
Page now argues that the district court erred as a matter of law because her original PFS was "complete in all respects" as defined by CMO 19. Even if Page had not waived this issue by failing to raise it in district court, Page conceded that Bayer was within its rights to seek dismissal for violation of CMO 19, that there were absences and failings in her PFS, and that she failed to transmit the supplemental Fact Sheet to Bayer. Page also maintains that Bayer had answers to the PFS's requests for technical information in other forms, but we rejected a similar argument in Computer Task Group. 364 F.3d at 1117. The reason is that " [a]n important purpose of discovery is to reveal what evidence the opposing party has, thereby helping determine which facts are undisputed — perhaps paving the way for a summary judgment motion — and which facts must be resolved at trial." Id. Finally, it is not without significance that Page never sought a protective order or other relief from her discovery obligations.
* Bayer, the lead defendant in Holmes's case, contends that the Holmes appeal is untimely. We address this first, as our jurisdiction depends upon the filing of a timely notice. We believe that Holmes filed on time. Holmes brought a motion for reconsideration within 10 days of the district court's entry of judgment, thereby tolling his time to file a notice of appeal. He then filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This comports with the rules and gives us jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (4) (A) (vi); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (7); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992).
Although the district court did not explicitly consider the availability of less drastic sanctions, it is apparent from the record that progressive sanctions had been considered. The court had tried in CMO 10 to compel compliance with CMO 6 by deferring the start of a one-year discovery period until the PFS was completed; when that didn't work, it entered CMO 19 requiring submission of a PFS complete in all respects and providing for a warning program that the defense followed in these actions. In each of these cases, letters were sent giving notice of deficiencies, affording Riley, Samuels, Holmes, and McDaniel successive opportunities to comply with the court's orders, and warning of dismissal under CMO 19 should the deficiencies not be corrected. There is no reason the court should have believed that any of these parties would comply in the future. In addition, the text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) gives notice that dismissal is a possible sanction for failure to obey discovery orders; CMO 1 warns that failure to produce required documents will be treated as an infraction of a court order justifying appropriate sanctions; and the district judge advised all MDL 1407 parties on July 31, 2003 that any case that had not complied with her discovery orders would be dismissed. As Judge Rothstein explained, "the time has come to figure out which of these cases are real and which of them aren't. And if discovery hasn't been complied with, there's a strong presumption on my part that the case should be dismissed." Further, these dismissals were entered only after the parties had been given an opportunity to explain delay and urge alternative sanctions. In light of the number and clarity of warnings, the court's findings that these parties ignored the warnings, and the progression of CMOs 6, 10, and 19, this factor supports dismissal. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262.
CMO 15 applied to numerous cases that joined unrelated claims of multiple plaintiffs who allegedly took a PPA-containing product without specifying which product was ingested or which manufacturer caused their injuries. The court found as to all such actions that the threshold requirements for permissive joinder under Rules 20 and 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that multiple plaintiffs may "assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action," could not be met because the multiple-plaintiff cases did not seek relief arising from the same transaction or occurrence. Thus, severance of the individual plaintiffs was proper. In addition, the court noted that under Rule 21(b), " [t]he court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice." Accordingly, it ordered individual new complaints, which would relate back to the date of the original complaint, to be filed within 30 days in all cases that contained multiple plaintiffs.
McGriggs 18
The McGriggs plaintiffs were dismissed because they filed severed complaints between August 9 and August 19, five weeks after the June 29, 2003 deadline set by CMO 15. On August 26, at least a week after the McGriggs plaintiffs filed their severed complaints, the district court entered CMO 15A, which provided for dismissal with prejudice of all jointly filed complaints, including the complaints of those like the McGriggs plaintiffs, for whom a timely severed complaint had not been filed by the June 29 deadline. Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) and 41(b) provide notice that dismissal is a possible sanction for failure to obey pretrial discovery orders, see Valley Eng'rs, 158 F.3d at 1056-57, CMO 15 gave no explicit warning. And although the district court orally admonished plaintiffs that failure to file severed complaints could result in dismissal, it did so only on July 31, 2003 — more than a month after the June 29, 2003 deadline had passed.
The McGriggs plaintiffs comprise two subsets: the McGriggs plaintiffs and the Harris plaintiffs ("the McGriggs plaintiffs"). The district court's Malone analysis is inadequate with respect to both subsets because the court did not acknowledge that the initial multiparty complaint each subset filed was already detailed, identifying Bayer as the only defendant in the case of the McGriggs subset, and Delaco (and Delaco's successor) in the case of the Harris subset. These original multiparty complaints made clear, respectively, that Alka Seltzer Plus Cold and Bayer, and Dexatrim and Delaco (and Delaco's successor), were the sole drugs and defendants at issue, and the original complaints alleged specific harms suffered by each plaintiff on precise dates. Although the McGriggs and Harris plaintiffs were necessarily subject to the global application of CMO 15, they rightly argue that filing severed complaints (which they did do, a month and a half late) did not provide the court or defendants with any information they did not previously have. This cannot be said of the Ackel and Arrington plaintiffs, who were also dismissed with the McGriggs plaintiffs, because their original multiparty complaints were not so specific. Whereas "the practical effect of [the] failure on the part of [the Ackel and Arrington plaintiffs] to file severed complaints specifying the products ingested and the manufacturers causing injury ... [was to] prevent [ ] the cases from moving forward," supra p. 1245, no evidence suggests the McGriggs plaintiffs' late compliance caused any such delay.
Fundamentally, the McGriggs plaintiffs' delay in providing information they had already given did not cause prejudice sufficient to warrant dismissal (as opposed to a different kind of sanction), especially in view of the public policy favoring resolution on the merits. "It is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere technicalities." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962). In Malone, Exxon, Adriana and Morris, we approved of the harsh punishment of dismissal because we had "no doubt" about the clearly substantiated, prejudicial effect of the parties' egregious conduct. See Malone, 833 F.2d at 131; In re the EXXON VALDEZ, 102 F.3d at 433 ("The appellants' total failure to respond to discovery and the time consumed by attempting to secure compliance prejudiced appellees.") (emphasis added); Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412 ("Here, the repeated failure of Adriana to appear at scheduled depositions compounded by their continuing refusal to comply with court-ordered production of documents constitutes an interference with the rightful decision of the case.") (emphasis added); Morris, 942 F.2d at 652 (plaintiffs' two-year failure to move toward disposition on the merits where they unnecessarily delayed, failed to respond to correspondence, failed to appear at meetings and misrepresented intentions prejudiced defendants and obstructed resolution of their claim on the merits). But defendants who must show actual prejudice — as here, where the McGriggs plaintiffs proffered a serious excuse — may not make this showing by mere assertion.19
by failing to provide clear answers to interrogatories, giving contradictory responses, making frivolous objections, filing frivolous motions [,] failing to provide the information [the opposing party] sought [,] ... fail [ing] to pay one of the monetary sanctions [,] ... failing to produce important financial documents and "throwing up a series of baseless smoke screens [that] [took] the form of repeated groundless objections and contradictory excuses," which were "absurd" and "completely unbelievable."
On that egregious record, we upheld the district court's finding that the defendant's "over-all disruptive discovery practice regarding the interrogatories and requests to produce was done willfully and intentionally to stall and prevent [the plaintiff] from conducting meaningful discovery," and that it "ha [d] clogged the Court's docket, protracted th [e] litigation by years, and made it impossible for [the plaintiff] to proceed to any imaginably fair trial." Id. Under these circumstances, we held that the "failure to produce documents as ordered ... is considered sufficient prejudice." Id.
a warning, a formal reprimand, placing the case at the bottom of the calendar, a fine, the imposition of costs or attorney fees, the temporary suspension of the culpable counsel from practice before the court, ... dismissal of the suit unless new counsel is secured [,] ... preclusion of claims or defenses, or the imposition of fees and costs upon plaintiff's counsel ....
In sum, although we grant additional deference to a district court administering a MDL proceeding, due process and fundamental fairness may not be sacrificed to provide assembly-line justice. The McGriggs plaintiffs "retain [ed] their individual identities," In re Career Academy Antitrust Litig., 57 F.R.D. 569, 570 (E.D.Wisc.1972), when they were involuntarily transferred to MDL 1407, and their arrival in the litigation did not "change the [ir] rights [as] parties." In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161, 176 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan R.R., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97, 53 S. Ct. 721, 77 L. Ed. 1331 (1933)). Because the district court failed to provide the McGriggs plaintiffs the individualized consideration to which they were entitled, we reverse its dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Sasseen 22
Sasseen's Affirmation was due on December 15, 2003, which she concedes is a deadline she did not meet. On February 3, 2004, Defendants' Liaison Counsel filed a motion to dismiss eleven cases, of which Sasseen's was one, pursuant to Rule 37(b) (2) (C) and Rule 41(b). Sasseen's February 9, 2004 response included an untimely Affirmation, which listed the same products and defendants set forth in her complaint.
More than 3300 actions were eventually listed on the docket in MDL 1407 See Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Distrib. of Pending MDL Dockets (as of Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/ Pending_MDLs/PendingMDL-January-06.pdf; http://www.jpml.uscourts. gov/Pending_MDLs/pending_mdls.html.
Malone notes that " [a]lternative sanctions include: `a warning, a formal reprimand, placing the case at the bottom of the calendar, a fine, the imposition of costs or attorney fees, the temporary suspension of the culpable counsel from practice before the courts, . . . dismissal of the suit unless new counsel is secured . . . preclusion of claims or defenses, or the imposition of fees and costs upon plaintiff's counsel. . . ." Id. at 132 n. 1 (quoting Titus v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 749 n. 6 (3rd Cir. 1982)). Giving another chance following a failure to comply is also a sanction, albeit a lenient one. Id.
The judges who coordinated the electrical engineering cases contributed their experience to the Manual on Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, which was developed in tandem with the proposed legislation that ultimately became § 1407. 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3861 (2d ed.1986).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993) (setting standards for admissibility of expert opinions).
A great number of MDL 1407 plaintiffs complied with the court's orders, and their cases moved forward with relative speed. In some instances, settlement resulted See In re Phenylpropanalomine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 553 (W.D.Wa.2004) (certifying class and approving settlement for plaintiffs alleging injury due to ingestion of Dexatrim). In others, remand for trial. Remand procedures were adopted November 18, 2003, see CMO 17, http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/mdl, and the district court recommended remands in the first wave of cases in March, 2004. Id.
The Clinton appeals are before Judges Leavy,
We elsewhere,supra p. 1233, cite Fair Housing of Marin, 285 F.3d at 905, and In re Virtual Vision, 124 F.3d at 1143, for the proposition that " [d]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside the litigant's control meets th [e predicate] standard [of fault]." However, not all disobedient conduct is of the same order, and a conclusory assertion of prejudice will not show why the disobedient conduct in Fair Housing and Virtual Vision is analogous to conduct under review. Although the McGriggs plaintiffs' late filings were not outside their control, their behavior is not comparable to the parties' abusive behavior in Fair Housing and Virtual Vision. See, e.g., Virtual Vision, 124 F.3d at 1143-44.
The dissent suggests that we err in reversing dismissal of the McGriggs plaintiffs and Sasseen, No. 04-35884, infra p. 1252, because if every MDL plaintiff ignored a CMO simply because he thought it superfluous, "the very purpose of the MDL ... would be subverted." (Dissent at 1253.) As we explain above, we do not condone the noncompliance of the McGriggs plaintiffs or Sasseen. We hold only that dismissal — as opposed to another, more appropriate sanction — is not warranted under the circumstances they present.