Source: https://openjurist.org/633/f2d/232/the-guardians-association-of-the-new-york-city-police-department-inc-v-civil-service-commission-of-c
Timestamp: 2017-10-22 07:15:54
Document Index: 459472034

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 703', '§ 703', '§ 2000', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1982', '§ 706', '§ 2000', '§ 706', '§ 1607', '§ 703', '§ 703', '§ 703', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 10', '§ 17', '§ 10', '§ 17', '§ 602', '§ 603', '§ 601', '§ 1981', '§ 1983', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981']

633 F. 2d 232 - The Guardians Association of the New York City Police Department, Inc v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York
23 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 677,
Unlike the seniority system in Teamsters, the merit system in the instant case does not measure what it purports to measure. The failing of the department's hiring system is therefore not that it perpetuates the effects of past discrimination, but rather that it perpetuates discrimination. It is one thing to utilize a system that locks in the effects of past discriminatory hiring decisions; it is a very different thing to lock in a discriminatory method of making hiring decisions. Once it has been determined that an examination has a disproportionate impact on minority groups and that it is not job-related, one cannot logically characterize a system of hiring solely on the basis of the results of the test as a "merit" system for whatever the test does measure it does not have merit: it does not measure fitness for the job in question, which is surely the only logical meaning of the term "merit" in the hiring context. Section 703(h) makes sense only if the term "bona fide merit system" is understood to refer to merit in areas related to the necessities of the business, not "merit" in the abstract. Nothing in Teamsters implies that by labelling a non-job-related system of employee selection a "merit" system, an employer can avoid the command of Title VII that it henceforth select its workforce in a non-discriminatory fashion. Compare California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S.Ct. 814, 821, 63 L.Ed.2d 55 (1980) (upholding seniority system):
Therefore, again assuming arguendo that the merit system language of § 703(h) applies to pre-employment testing, we must agree with those courts that have applied the Griggs impact and job-relatedness standards to test the bona fides of a challenged "merit" hiring system. See Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., supra, 472 F.Supp. at 1323-26; League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F.Supp. 873, 910 n.28 (C.D.Cal.1976) ("Suffice it to say that a system which relies on discriminatory devices not based on a business necessity is not a 'bona fide' 'merit' system. . . . The Act does not give rights with one hand and take them away with the other.") But cf. United States v. City of Chicago, No. 73C 661 (N.D.Ill., Oct. 17, 1979) (where post-employment "merit system" promotion list developed from pre-Act test was challenged, burden on plaintiffs to show lack of job-relatedness). Defendants have cited no case in which § 703 has been held to immunize post-Act hiring on the basis of an eligibility list reflecting performance on pre-Act discriminatory examinations. In the absence of any guideposts pointing that way, we decline to blaze a trail in that direction.39
The parties have referred us to no case in which compensatory relief has been awarded under Title VI, nor has my own research disclosed any.45 In fact, I have located only three cases that address the issue. In Rendon v. Utah State Department of Employment Security Job Service, 454 F.Supp. 534 (D.Utah 1978), the court held squarely that Title VI does not provide a plaintiff with a private cause of action for damages in an employment discrimination action, while noting in contrast that "in proper instances private parties can indeed maintain an action under Title VI in a role that could loosely but accurately be described as that of private attorneys general," citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), inter alia.
In Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F.Supp. 842 (D.Neb.), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1975), the district court took a different view, expressing the opinion, in dictum, that a private action for damages might be maintained under Title VI. Accord, Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 FEP Cas. 1138 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 1978) (dictum). In affirming the district court's judgment for the defendants in Gilliam, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove the employment discrimination she had alleged, the Eighth Circuit did not discuss the question of remedies. In Chambers v. Omaha Public School District, 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976), another employment discrimination suit brought under Title VI, inter alia, the action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Noting that "(t)he issue of whether a monetary judgment can be obtained under Title VI has not been definitively resolved," the court expressed "no view on the propriety of permitting money judgments in § 2000d actions." Id. at 225 n.2.
It appears then that in the sixteen years since the passage of Title VI, those courts that have either assumed or held that a private action may be brought under the statute have uniformly granted only declaratory or injunctive relief aimed at bringing defendants into compliance with Title VI, in effect focusing on the correction of present wrongs and the prevention of future violations and as a practical matter leaving past injuries unredressed. See, e. g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (defendants ordered to admit plaintiff excluded from medical school under admissions system held violative of Title VI; compensation for wrongful delay of presumably lucrative practice not discussed and apparently not sought). In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), a class suit against school officials in which non-English-speaking Chinese students sought relief from allegedly unequal educational opportunities, plaintiffs urged no specific remedy on the courts. Relying solely on Title VI, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of relief below, suggesting by implication that the appropriate relief would be prospective and corrective rather than compensatory:
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979), and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed. 146, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that resort to the usual methods of statutory construction is appropriate in determining whether Congress intended to create a statutory cause of action. While the factors set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), may be relevant to the required analysis,49 they are useful primarily insofar as they give us insight into the determinative question of congressional intent. CETA Workers' Organizing Committee v. City of New York, 617 F.2d 926, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1980). But cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
One must consider the consequences, then, if private litigants seeking compensation are permitted to rush in where agencies fear to tread. One possible result would be a complete reassessment, by applicants for federal assistance, of the risks and benefits entailed in accepting federal funds. As things stand now, recipients face only two risks should they fail voluntarily to operate their programs in a discrimination-free manner-enforced compliance or termination of funding. There is no express provision in the statute for the recapture of funds that may have been spent in a non-complying manner and I know of no case in which an agency has attempted to force the return of funds given to a recipient during a period of non-compliance. See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F.Supp. 92, 100 (D.D.C.), aff'd as modified, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 n.3 (D.C.Cir.1973) (en banc). If private actions for compensation are recognized, however, recipients would expose themselves to the additional risk of having to respond in damages, after the federal funds have been spent, even though they lacked any intention to discriminate, as in the instant case, and even though they have never received agency notice of non-compliance or been given a chance to achieve compliance with the help of the agency responsible. If potential recipients who, given the chance, might have operated discrimination-free programs are dissuaded from participation, federal agencies will be significantly hampered in their ability to carry out programs which Congress itself has chosen to authorize and fund. Cf. Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 115 (D.Conn.1979) (no private cause of action for damages under Education for Handicapped Children Act of 1975; implication of such a remedy would thwart purpose of legislation by deterring participation by potential recipients because of potential liability).
In describing this question as "unsettled," we are aware that it has been answered by this Court in the past. It is undisputed that before 1976, in employment discrimination cases brought under § 1981 inter alia, we did not require proof of purposeful discrimination.60 See, e. g., Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 73, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). However, in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court subsequently pulled the legal rug out from under these decisions. Before Washington v. Davis, we had approached § 1981 with the belief that the Constitution itself prohibited conduct having a discriminatory impact as well as purposefully discriminatory conduct. Now that our constitutional premise has been declared erroneous, we must of course reconsider our statutory conclusion.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet decided the "exact applicability" of § 1981, New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, supra, 440 U.S. at 583-84 n.24, 99 S.Ct. at 1364 n.24, in the few years since Washington v. Davis was handed down a number of courts have addressed the issue.61 Many, adopting the interpretation urged upon us today by defendants, have held that discriminatory purpose must be pleaded and proven in actions brought under § 1981. See, e. g., Crawford v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 614 F.2d 1300, 1309 (5th Cir. 1980); Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1979); Grigsby v. North Mississippi Medical Center, Inc., 586 F.2d 457, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1978); Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978); Chicano Police Officer's Association v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977); Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service, 488 F.Supp. 723 (D.N.J.1980); Harris v. White, 479 F.Supp. 996, 1002 (D.Mass.1979) (citing Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1979)); Ball v. Ridgeway Enterprises, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 456, 461 (S.D.Tex.1979); Louisville Black Police Officers Organization, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 21 EPD P 30,330 (W.D.Ky. Sept. 18, 1979); Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.Ohio 1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.Supp. 949 (D.Md.1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F.Supp. 490, 493-94 (E.D.Mo.1977), aff'd, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986, 99 S.Ct. 579, 58 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978); Ortiz v. Bach, 14 FEP Cas. 1019 (D.Colo.1977); see also Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 692 (6th Cir. 1979), pet. for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S.1980); Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976) (equating § 1981 with constitutional standard in suit alleging discriminatory selective law enforcement); Walker v. Robbins Hose Co., 465 F.Supp. 1023, 1044 (D.Del.1979) (although unnecessary to decide issue because intentional discrimination found, view that § 1981 requires proof of racially discriminatory purpose "more persuasive."). Accord, NAACP v. City of Corinth, 83 F.R.D. 46, 62 (N.D.Miss.1979); Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 479 F.Supp. 11, 21 (N.D.Ga.1979). Also compare Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 472 F.Supp. 1304, 1316 (E.D.Pa.1978), and Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F.Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D.Pa.1977) (intent standard) with Pennsylvania v. Local 542, 469 F.Supp. 329 (E.D.Pa.1978) (impact standard).
To date only a few courts have adopted the contrary view espoused by plaintiffs. See, e. g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C.Cir.1977) (dictum);62 Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F.Supp. 133 (N.D.Ind.1977), rev'd, in part, on other grounds, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979) (no discussion of impact of Washington v. Davis on § 1981 analysis). Cf. Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 474 F.Supp. 1256, 1264 (D.Conn.1979) (Newman, J. ) (relief denied under § 1981 where plaintiffs failed to make out prima facie case of discriminatory impact under Title VII). Although Davis v. County of Los Angeles is the case most frequently cited for the proposition that discriminatory impact is sufficient, in our view Davis sheds very little light on the intended scope of § 1981. Without discussing the language or history of the statute the Davis majority simply announced that since § 1981 and Title VII both prohibit discrimination in employment and since similar remedies are available under the two statutes, the court would continue to interpret them to prohibit the same types of conduct until the Supreme Court explicitly directs otherwise.
The legislative history of § 1981 fails to convince us that the intent of the statute is more subtle than its language and structure would indicate. Section 1981 traces its origins back to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and has ties with both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Its evolution has been traced and the significance of its history has been debated elsewhere and we will not burden this already lengthy opinion by repeating what we cannot improve upon. See, e. g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976); id. at 192, 96 S.Ct. at 2605 (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968) (§ 1982 case shedding light on background of 1866 Act). It is sufficient to say that plaintiffs have been unable to cite and we have been unable to find anything in the legislative history to indicate that either the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which enacted the 1866 Act over a presidential veto, or the later congresses that subsequently re-enacted the provision understood the law to prohibit anything other than the racially motivated refusal to treat whites and non-whites in the same, neutral manner.65
In this connection, the Court below should consider Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), which discusses in detail the issues which surround the award of retroactive seniority to plaintiffs asserting a claim under Title VII. In Franks, the Court-in ruling that an award of retroactive seniority was appropriate under the circumstances of the case at hand-observed that:
In contrast to its treatment of the Mortgage Advisors Act in Transamerica, the Supreme Court has examined Title VI without even hinting that private rights of action thereunder would depend for their existence on distinctions among the remedies sought. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court analyzed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 by comparing it with the virtually identical language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The unmistakable import of the finding of a private right of action unlimited as to remedy under Title IX is that the same conclusion would be reached if the issue of the existence of a private right under Title VI were presented. Significantly the Court did not distinguish among the kinds of remedies sought or available under Title IX, saying simply that "petitioner may maintain her lawsuit." Id. at 717, 99 S.Ct. at 1968. The petitioner's action sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief in the district court; that court indicated in its Opinion that monetary relief would be inappropriate. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D.Ill.1976). The Seventh Circuit affirmed without comment on the district court's distinction among the remedies sought. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976).
Judge Carter's holding that the substantive standard for illegal employment discrimination under Title VI is the "impact" standard of Title VII rather than the "intent" standard of the Constitution, Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 466 F.Supp. 1273, 1287 (S.D.N.Y.1979), appears to be contradicted by Bakke. Justice Powell concluded that "Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287, 98 S.Ct. at 2747. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun agreed with that assessment in unequivocal language. Id. at 325, 328, 98 S.Ct. at 2768. Justice Brennan, speaking for himself and the other three Justices stated: "In our view, Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies." Id. at 328, 98 S.Ct. at 2768. A majority of the Court thus seems to take the position that conduct is not actionable under Title VI unless it is actionable under the Constitution, which under its current construction imposes an "intent" standard. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).
Plaintiffs-appellees ("plaintiffs") are The Guardians Association of the New York City Police Department, Inc., The Hispanic Society of the New York City Police Department, Inc., and Oswaldo Perez and Felix E. Santos, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Defendants-appellants ("defendants") are the Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, the Department of Personnel of the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and various officials representing these three institutions, individually and in their official capacities. The Civil Service Commission prescribes rules for implementing New York's civil service laws. The personnel department prepares and administers the police department's entry examinations. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 431 F.Supp. 526, 531 (S.D.N.Y.1977) ("Guardians II")
In both Guardians I and Guardians II plaintiffs attacked the department's minimum height requirement as well as its use of the challenged examinations. Plaintiffs contended that the 5' 7 minimum, dropped by the department in 1973, had, while it was in effect, disqualified a disproportionate number of Hispanics in the pool of potential applicants. Although it had earlier determined that the height requirement was unlawful under Title VII, Guardians II, 431 F.Supp. at 550-51, after remand the district court held that a court challenge to the height requirement was barred because as to this particular employment practice there had been no timely filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 466 F.Supp. 1273, 1278, n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.1979) ("Guardians III"). See note 7, infra. Perhaps because all class members took the challenged examinations and were on that ground alone held entitled to relief, Guardians III, 466 F.Supp. at 1280 n. 10, no appeal was taken from this ruling. We therefore express no view on the substantive or procedural issues raised by plaintiffs' challenge to the minimum height requirement. Regarding the propriety of taking the height requirement into account in fashioning a remedy, see section VI of this opinion
The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to a private action under Title VII. See § 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1087 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980). The parties agree that the 300 day limitation period, the longer of the two limitation periods established by § 706(e), is applicable in the instant case
A charge filed on behalf of the Guardians Association on May 23, 1975, was held by the district court to encompass a claim of discriminatory refusal to hire. Guardians III, 466 F.Supp. at 1278. Particularly in light of the liberality with which such charges are to be construed, Silver v. Mohasco Corp., supra, 602 F.2d at 1090-91, we will not disturb this finding. On appeal, defendants do not challenge the district court's ruling giving the entire plaintiff class the benefit of this filing. See Guardians III, 466 F.Supp. at 1278 n. 6, citing Acha v. Beame, 438 F.Supp. 70, 76 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 985 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1973).
As was noted above, this Court vacated the original preliminary injunction in June of 1977, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977), without reaching the merits of the appeal and directed Judge Carter to reconsider the case in light of International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)
Defendants do not claim that the hiring process, viewed as a whole, ameliorated any disproportionate impact created by the written examinations. We therefore need not decide today whether, under Title VII, selection procedures must be judged in isolation from one another or whether an employer's entire hiring process must be judged by its end results. Compare Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 474 F.Supp. 1256, 1260-61 (D.Conn.1979) (holding that plaintiffs may not challenge disproportionate impact of written exam that forms only one part of hiring process the end result of which is not disproportionate; "number of Blacks hired as a percentage of the Black applicants is roughly the same as that for Whites") with Guardians II, 431 F.Supp. at 540. See Uniform Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C). The Uniform Guidelines are discussed in note 16, infra
As a detailed account is available in the district court's published opinion, Guardians III, 466 F.Supp. 1273, we summarize only so much of Judge Carter's comprehensive treatment of the evidence upon which he relied as is necessary to make clear why his finding of disproportionate impact must stand
We see no justification for holding plaintiffs to an unrealistic standard regarding the "completeness" of their statistical showing. As Judge Weinfeld observed in Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commission, 360 F.Supp. 1265, 1270 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973), "where public employment practices are under challenge defendants usually have superior access to relevant statistical data than plaintiffs and . . . the latter will often be dependent on the efforts and good faith of the former." For this reason it is not inappropriate to expect a public employer to come forward with evidence on the disparate impact issue even where the plaintiffs' showing has been somewhat modest
Despite defendants' protestations this case is not like New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-85, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1365, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), where, of the two crucial statistics relied on to establish the discriminatory impact of a particular employment practice, one was substantially overinclusive and the other substantially underinclusive. In Beazer, the problem was not that it was necessary to make estimates and projections from incomplete data but rather that there was no information in the record from which the required estimates and projections could properly be derived
The courts in this Circuit have recognized three methods of demonstrating the job-relatedness of an employment examination. As the Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2051 n.13, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the professional testing standards developed by the American Psychological Association ("APA") accept the same three methods:
"(T)he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups." Washington v. Davis, supra, 426 U.S. at 239, 96 S.Ct. at 2047, citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 602 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 2403, 60 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1980), and cases cited therein
Whether the lists were in fact completely canvassed prior to December 15, 1973, and whether certain appointments were deferred until 1974 solely for reasons unrelated to rank on the discriminatory lists are questions of pure fact and our scope of review is therefore quite limited. Defendants have failed even to reveal at what point in the proceedings below, if ever, they went so far as to specify for Judge Carter the precise nature of these nonculpable factors, cryptically alluded to as a "variety." Nor have we been told what evidence, if any, was offered below to support the bold assertion that but for these alleged other factors, all members of the plaintiff class would have been hired by 1973, although any such evidence has presumably been in the possession of the department for seven years. Compare Acha v. Beame, 438 F.Supp. 70, 76 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978), another employment discrimination suit involving the NYPD in which the City defendants submitted "uncontradicted proof" that certain plaintiffs declined offers of employment.
Because the plaintiff class is composed exclusively of applicants who were ultimately, albeit belatedly, successful in obtaining employment, we express no view on issues of concern only to those applicants who failed the challenged examinations and were never placed on an eligibility list. See Gautam v. First National City Bank, 425 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 1241, 59 L.Ed.2d 470 (1979) (timeliness of EEOC filing in refusal to hire case).
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977), concerned a flight attendant who was forced to resign in 1968 because of the airline's no-marriage policy. Evans was rehired in 1972, after the policy had been dropped, but United refused to credit her with seniority accrued during her earlier service. The Supreme Court held that United was entitled to treat the forced resignation as lawful after Evans failed to file a timely charge with the EEOC in 1968, explaining that "(a) discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed." Id. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889. Since the seniority system in itself was not discriminatory, the Court rejected Evans' contention that a continuing violation had been demonstrated. "(T)he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists." Id. (emphasis in original)
We have found nothing in the legislative history of § 703(h) that would support plaintiffs' interpretation. As the Supreme Court has noted, the section was added to the bill in response to fears that Title VII would destroy existing seniority rights. Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 350-53, 97 S.Ct. at 1862-63; Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. at 758-62, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1261-63, 47 L.Ed.2d 444. During the debate preceding the adoption of § 703(h) Senators Clark and Case-the "bipartisan captains" responsible for Title VII-placed an interpretative memorandum in the Congressional Record dealing with the seniority issue. The memorandum stated that as it was, before the addition of § 703(h), Title VII would not affect established seniority rights. The final sentence of the memorandum read:
In Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976), employees and patrons of the defendant organization sued under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983, alleging discrimination in employment and in delivery of services. Declaratory and injunctive relief was upheld on appeal but the district court's initial award of back pay, 372 F.Supp. 126 (N.D.Miss.1974), was vacated. On remand the district court again held that certain defendants would be liable for money damages, 424 F.Supp. 1242 (N.D.Miss.1976). Although the matter is not free from doubt, it appears from the various opinions in Wade that back pay was awarded under §§ 1981 and 1983 rather than under Title VI
Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979), comparing § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with § 17(a). As to the former, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Supreme Court had, in implying a private cause of action, "simply explicitly acquiesced in the 25-year old acceptance by the lower federal courts of an implied action under § 10(b)." In contrast, the Justice stated, "(t)here is no similar history of longstanding lower court interpretation in this case. Indeed, only one other court in the 45-year history of the 1934 Act has held that a private cause of action for damages is available under § 17(a)." Id. at 577-78 n.19, 99 S.Ct. at 2490 n.19. Cf. New York Telephone Company v. New York State Department of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 519, 99 S.Ct. 1328, 59 L.Ed.2d 553 (1979) ("A longstanding practice 'is not something to be lightly cast aside,' " quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 678, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1416, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970).)
Should an agency fail to carry out its responsibilities under § 602, relief is available. Under § 603, any person aggrieved may, in appropriate circumstances, obtain judicial review of agency action under Title VI. See Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968) (timing of action); Hardy v. Leonard, 377 F.Supp. 831 (N.D.Cal.1974) (dismissed as moot); see generally, Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.Cir.1973) (en banc)
As noted by Judge Coffrin, infra, the district court in Cannon held an action for money damages to be beyond the scope of Title IX. This determination was apparently not challenged on appeal, and therefore neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court had occasion to address the issue of the availability of such a remedy under the statute. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F.Supp. 1257 (N.D.Ill.1976).
In light of my determination that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for compensatory relief under Title VI, it is not necessary to consider the many troublesome questions that implication of such a remedy would pose. For example, it is not clear what causal relationship between the violation of § 601 and the alleged injury a plaintiff would be required to demonstrate. In the instant case we have been informed that the NYPD receives funds from the departments of Labor, Justice and Housing and Urban Development, but Judge Carter made no findings indicating what specific NYPD programs have been funded by these agencies. If no federal money goes for salaries or hiring, have plaintiffs made out a case? While plaintiffs have alleged that the NYPD discriminated against them in hiring, there is no allegation that any federal program was itself administered in a discriminatory fashion. Is such an allegation necessary? See Coates v. Illinois State Board of Education, 559 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1977) (no private cause of action under Title VI where no allegation that specific actions under the federally funded program caused specific discriminatory effects); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F.Supp. 498, 502 (D.N.M.1970) (no cause of action under Title VI; "no claim that the federal programs . . . have in any way been discriminatorily administered."). See also Hupart v. Board of Higher Education, 420 F.Supp. 1087, 1104 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (no cause of action under Title VI where program to which plaintiffs were denied admission "was not funded by federal monies until after the discrimination had occurred."). But cf. Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F.Supp. 377, 382-84 (D.D.C.1976).
Judge Carter concluded, without discussion, that the same showing is required under § 1981 (and § 1983) as is required to make out a claim of discrimination under the Constitution. Guardians II, 431 F.Supp. at 534. Consequently, having found that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate discriminatory intent, the district court held that Washington v. Davis, supra, precluded relief under the Constitution, and by extension, under §§ 1981 and 1983. When plaintiffs' § 1981 claim was revived on remand, Judge Carter, noting that the issue was sub judice before the Supreme Court, declined to reconsider his earlier ruling. Guardians III, 466 F.Supp. 1276 n.4, citing Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 437 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 3087, 57 L.Ed.2d 1132 (1978), subsequently vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). See note 54 supra
Two of these cases centered on the pre-1972 conduct of municipal defendants and Title VII was therefore unavailable to the plaintiffs. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333, 1334 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420, 423 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 73, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976), Title VII was apparently available but was not pleaded
Guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the correct interpretation of § 1981 has been eagerly awaited ever since Washington v. Davis took the lower courts by surprise in its definition of discrimination for constitutional purposes. Hopes for an early dispelling of the doubts engendered by Washington v. Davis were recently dashed when the high court vacated and remanded, on grounds of mootness, the case of County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). Certiorari had been granted to consider, inter alia, "whether the use of arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusionary in operation, but not purposefully discriminatory, violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . ." 440 U.S. at 627, 99 S.Ct. at 1381; 437 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 3087, 57 L.Ed.2d 1132 (1978). The determination of mootness, of course, precluded consideration of this issue
Judge Wallace emphasized that he was addressing the § 1981 issue only to express his disagreement with the majority. Taking the position that the case could have and should have been decided solely under Title VII, the dissent characterized the majority's discussion of § 1981 as "wholly unnecessary" as well as "incorrect." 566 F.2d at 1347 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (alluding to majority opinion, 566 F.2d at 1341 n.14.) Dissenting from the Supreme Court's subsequent vacatur of Davis on mootness grounds, Justice Stewart agreed, terming decision of the § 1981 issue "completely unnecessary." 440 U.S. at 635, 99 S.Ct. 1385 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, although viewing the matter as "not free from doubt" and conceding that the basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision "is not clear," thought otherwise, concluding that "the decision of the Court of Appeals seems to have been based on a conclusion that independent violations of § 1981 had occurred." 440 U.S. at 640 n.5, 99 S.Ct. at 1388 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
In discussing the frequently cited court of appeals opinion in Davis we express no view concerning its precedential weight, if any, within the Ninth Circuit, in view of the Supreme Court's subsequent vacatur of that decision on grounds of mootness, nor do we hazard a prediction as to that court's future stance on the § 1981 issue. Compare County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. at 634 n.6, 99 S.Ct. at 1384 n.6 with id. at 646 n.10, 99 S.Ct. at 1391 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Williams v. City and County of San Francisco, 483 F.Supp. 335, 344 (N.D.Cal.1979).
Our disposition of the intent vs. impact issue renders unnecessary any discussion of the timeliness of plaintiffs' § 1981 claim. We also need not address, and we therefore express no opinion on, the question of the applicability of § 1981 to charges of discrimination against Hispanics. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. at 2189; Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); Ridgeway v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 466 F.Supp. 595, 597 (N.D.Ill.1979)