Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98656/fpc-vs-idaho-power-co
Timestamp: 2018-11-17 19:56:28
Document Index: 52729693

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 313', '§ 10', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 201', '§ 4', '§ 6', '§ 313', '§ 10', '§ 3', '§ 201', '§ 201']

Fpc Vs Idaho Power Co - Citation 98656 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Fpc Vs. Idaho Power Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98656
Case Number 344 U.S. 17
.....17 (1952) u.s. supreme court fpc v. idaho power co., 344 u.s. 17 (1952) federal power commission v. idaho power co. no. 12 argued october 20-21, 1952 decided november 10, 1952 344 u.s. 17 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit syllabus under § 4(e) of the federal power act, the federal power commission issued to a power company a license to construct, operate and maintain a hydroelectric project including a dam, power plant and transmission lines on public lands, subject to the condition that the company permit the interconnection of transmission facilities of the united states with the company's transmission lines and the transfer over those lines of energy generated.....
FPC v. Idaho Power Co. - 344 U.S. 17 (1952)
U.S. Supreme Court FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952)
1. When the Court of Appeals, by its second judgment, decided that the license should issue without the conditions, it usurped an administrative function. Pp. 344 U. S. 19 -20.
(a) The power of the Court of Appeals under § 313(b) "to affirm, modify, or set aside" an order of the Commission "in whole or in part" does not authorize it to exercise an essentially administrative function. P. 344 U. S. 21 .
(b) Whether the objective of § 10(a) of the Act may be achieved if the contested conditions are stricken from the Commission's order is an administrative, not a judicial, decision. P. 344 U. S. 21 .
2. When read in the context of §§ 4 and 10 of the Act, § 6, making each license subject to conditions prescribed by the Commission, authorizes the Commission to attach the conditions imposed
here, and that authority is not impaired by § 201(f) of Part II of the Act, providing that no provision of Part II shall apply to the United States. Pp. 344 U. S. 21 -24.
(a) Protection of the public domain, conservation of water power resources, development of comprehensive plans for waterways -- each might on the facts of a case be sufficient to authorize the grant of permission to a public utility company to use the public domain provided it agreed to use its excess capacity to transmit government power. P. 344 U. S. 23 .
(b) The powers conferred by Part II of the Act to regulate public utilities engaged in the interstate transmission and sale of electric energy cannot be construed as a repeal by implication of the powers conferred by Part I to regulate public lands or the use of navigable streams. Pp. 344 U. S. 23 -24.
3. A petition to this Court for certiorari, filed within 90 days after the Court of Appeals' second judgment, though more than 90 days after the first, was timely. Pp. 344 U. S. 19 -20.
The Federal Power Commission issued to respondent power company, under § 4(e) of the Federal Power Act, a conditional license to construct, operate and maintain a hydroelectric project. The Court of Appeals modified the Commission's order by striking out the conditions, and affirmed the order as thus modified. 89 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 189 F.2d 665. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 941. Reversed, p. 344 U. S. 24 .
Respondent petitioned for review of the Commission's order. The Court of Appeals held that the Commission had no authority to attach the condition. It entered a judgment that the Commission's order "be modified," and that the cause be remanded to the Commission "for the entry of an order in accordance with the opinion of this Court." That was on May 10, 1951. 89 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 189 F.2d 665. The Commission moved for a
First. If the court did no more by the second judgment than to restate what it had decided by the first one, Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264 , would apply, and the 90 days would start to run from the first judgment. But the court by the second judgment, undertook to modify the license. By the first judgment, it did no more than keep the Commission within the bounds set by its opinion. On remand, the Commission might have reissued the order without the contested conditions, or it might have withheld its consent to any license. It is the Commission's judgment on which Congress has placed its reliance for control of licenses. See §§ 6, 10(a), 10(g). When the court decided that the license should issue without the conditions, it usurped an administrative function. There doubtless may be situations where the provision excised from the administrative order is separable from the remaining parts or so minor as to make remand inappropriate. But the guiding principle, violated here, is that the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point, the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration. See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 .
The Court, it is true, has power "to affirm, modify, or set aside" the order of the Commission "in whole or in part." § 313(b). But that authority is not power to exercise an essentially administrative function. See Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364 , 305 U. S. 373 -374; Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608 . The nature of the determination is emphasized by § 10(a), which specifies that the project adopted
Whether that objective may be achieved if the contested conditions are stricken from the order is an administrative, not a judicial, decision. [ Footnote 1 ]
Second. The power of Congress over public lands, conferred by Art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution, is "without limitations," as we stated in United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16 , 310 U. S. 29 . The Court of Appeals, while recognizing that principle, held that Congress had not granted the Commission authority to condition the use of public lands by requiring a public utility to carry government power. It relied on § 201(f) of the Act, which says that "No provision in this Part shall apply to . . . the United States. . . ." The Part referred to is Part II of the Act, which set up a system of control over the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce. It granted the Commission authority, among other things, to direct a public utility to establish physical connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of other persons engaged
in order to secure such plan, the Commission shall have authority to require the modification of any project . . . before approval. [ Footnote 2 ]"
It is difficult for us to read § 201(f) as in any way affecting that power. Sections 201(f) and 202 deal with interconnections of facilities generally. They do not extend the new powers granted by Part II to government
An argument is made that the Commission's motion for clarification was untimely under the rules of the Court of Appeals governing petitions for rehearing. Assuming, arguendo, that the motion was a petition for rehearing within the meaning of those rules, it was entertained and considered on the merits, cf. Bowman v. Loperena, 311 U. S. 262 ; Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 317 U. S. 144 , 317 U. S. 149 , and the new judgment entered was erroneous.