Source: https://openjurist.org/993/f2d/228/mba-v-us-immigration-and-naturalization-service
Timestamp: 2020-03-31 20:37:29
Document Index: 297531696

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1252', '§ 1251', '§ 1251', '§ 1254', '§ 1101', '§ 3', '§ 1105', '§ 1252', '§ 3', '§ 1362', '§ 242', '§ 1254', '§ 1001', '§ 1182', '§ 1101', '§ 1101', '§ 371']

993 F2d 228 Mba v. US Immigration & Naturalization Service | OpenJurist
993 F. 2d 228 - Mba v. US Immigration & Naturalization Service
993 F2d 228 Mba v. US Immigration & Naturalization Service
Clement Ugo MBA, Petitioner,
No. 92-2472.
Submitted: March 18, 1993
Decided: April 27, 1993
In October 1987 Mba received an Order to Show Cause charging him with deportability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252b(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992). Mba was represented by counsel at the initial deportation hearing, where he admitted that he had entered the United States as a non-immigrant student and married Logan, but denied the remainder of the allegations. The deportation hearing continued on February 10, 1988; Mba essentially admitted the facts of the remaining allegations in the Show Cause order, but asserted that he did not know that arranged marriages were unlawful under immigration laws.
The immigration judge reasoned that willful failure by a nonimmigrant to provide full and truthful information to the INS constituted a failure to maintain status under the Act. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(9) (West 1970) (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1)(C)(i) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992).* Accordingly, the immigration judge ordered Mba deported to Nigeria.
The immigration judge denied Mba's request for voluntary departure, finding that Mba was statutorily precluded from that privilege based on his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The immigration judge opined that Mba's conviction involved willful and unlawful misrepresentations to the INS, thereby precluding him from demonstrating the good moral character required to establish eligibility for voluntary departure under the Act. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a)(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f)(3) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992).
Mba appealed the February 1988 deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Mba's retained counsel filed a notice of appeal and requested an extension of time to file a brief. The Board granted the extension of time, but Mba's attorney never filed a brief. On September 25, 1992, the Board summarily dismissed Mba's appeal in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a) (1992). Mba timely appealed, asserting that he was unaware that his attorney had failed to file a brief on his behalf.
We must uphold the factual findings supporting the Board's determination of deportability if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(a)(4) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(4) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 281-84 (1966); Mortazavi v. INS, 719 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1983). To reverse the Board's decision under the substantial evidence standard, an alien "must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find" in his favor. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 60 U.S.L.W. 4130, 4132 (U.S. 1992). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966).
The Board dismissed Mba's appeal in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a), which authorizes the Board to summarily dismiss any appeal where the appellant fails to specify the reasons for his appeal in his notice of appeal. Mba's counsel was granted an extension of time in which to file a brief setting forth the details of the appeal. Mba asserts that he retained and continued to pay his attorney throughout 1992, believing that his attorney was preparing a brief on Mba's behalf. Mba later learned, however, that his attorney never filed a brief with the Board and was actually involved in disciplinary proceedings before the District of Columbia Bar between 1988 and 1991.
The Act specifically provides an alien with the right to representation at deportation proceedings by counsel of his choosing, at his own expense. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988); 8 U.S.C.A.s 1252(b)(2) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992). Moreover, courts have held that the Fifth Amendment entitles an alien to due process at a deportation hearing, and that incompetence of counsel may result in a denial of that due process right. Mantell v. INS, 798 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986); RiosBerrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985).
Mba's main argument is that his attorney's failure to file a brief prejudiced his right to obtain voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. Mba claims that had his attorney filed a brief with the Board, he might have been granted voluntary departure under 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1992), and 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(e)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
However, the immigration judge reasoned that Mba's conspiracy conviction stemmed from the crime of willfully and unlawfully misrepresenting a material fact to the INS, which is a crime of moral turpitude. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements are crimes or acts constituting moral turpitude). Therefore, the immigration judge correctly found that Mba was ineligible for voluntary departure, because his offense involved moral turpitude and therefore precluded him from satisfying one of the criteria for voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1254(a)(1); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f)(3) (alien who has been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude is not considered a person of good moral character).
The Board based its summary dismissal on Mba's counsel's failure to specify the reasons for the appeal. 8 C.F.R.s 3.1(d)(1-a). Even if Mba or his counsel had filed a brief, however, we find that the Board could properly have affirmed the immigration judge's deportation order and denial of Mba's application for voluntary departure. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the immigration judge's order, and because Mba was not entitled to voluntary departure anyway, Mba failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to perfect his appeal.
Voluntary departure is not available to an alien convicted of a crime of moral turpitude for which the maximum possible penalty is more than one year, regardless of the sentence actually imposed on the alien See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(2), 1254(a)(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1992). The maximum possible penalty for Mba's offense of conviction was five years. 18 U.S.C. § 371