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Common Criteria Security Target For XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2 Platinum Edition - PDF
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1 Common Criteria Security Target For XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2 Platinum Edition Version February Citrix Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
2 Summary of Amendments Version February 2011 First released version. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 2 of 55
3 0. Preface 0.1 Objectives of Document This document presents the Common Criteria (CC) Security Target (ST) to express the security and evaluation requirements for the Citrix XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2 Platinum Edition product. The product is designed and manufactured by Citrix Systems Inc. ( The Sponsor and Developer for the evaluation is Citrix Systems Inc. and the assurance level is EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.2). 0.2 Scope of Document The scope of the Security Target within the development and evaluation process is described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CC]. In particular, a Security Target defines the IT security requirements of an identified TOE and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements [CC1, Section C.1]. Security Functional Requirements (SFRs), as defined in [CC2], are the basis for the TOE IT security functional requirements expressed in this Security Target. These requirements describe the desired security behaviour expected of a TOE and are intended to meet the security objectives as stated in this Security Target. Security Functional Requirements express security requirements intended to counter threats in the assumed operating environment of the TOE, and cover any identified organisational security policies and assumptions. 0.3 Intended Readership The target audience of this ST are consumers, developers, certifiers and evaluators of the TOE; additional information can be found in [CC1, Section 6.2]. 0.4 Related Documents Common Criteria 1 [CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 3, July For details see Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 3 of 55
4 [CC2] [CC3] [CEM] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 3, July Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB , Version 3.1 Revision 3, July Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, CCMB , Version 3.1, Revision 3, July Developer documentation [CCECG] Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Citrix XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2, Document code: February :28: Significant Assumptions None. 0.6 Outstanding Issues The following issues are awaiting resolution: None. 0.7 Abbreviations Acronym AD Meaning Active Directory CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation EAL ICA IMA IT MMC OSP PIN PP SAR SFP Evaluation Assurance Level Independent Computing Architecture Independent Management Architecture Information Technology Microsoft Management Console Organisational Security Policy Personal Identification Number Protection Profile Security Assurance Requirement Security Function Policy Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 4 of 55
5 Acronym SFR SG SID SSO ST STA TLS TOE TSF WI Meaning Security Functional Requirement Secure Gateway Security Identifier Single Sign-On Security Target Secure Ticket Authority Transport Layer Security Target of Evaluation TOE Security Functionality Web Interface 0.8 Glossary Term Administrator Assurance Clipboard Transfer Meaning A person working on behalf of the application publishing system owner, who is responsible for administering access of users to applications (and associated data). It is the administrator s responsibility to configure the system (both XenApp and Windows) such that access is allowed as intended. Administrators can make use of administration tools to configure the system and manage Users. Administrators have physical access to the server component of the TOE. Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC1] The transfer of data using cut, copy and paste operations, between a XenApp application session and the local Windows clipboard on an endpoint device connected to that application session. Delivery Services Console The Delivery Services Console (DSC) provides the administration interface to the XenApp Server, providing administrators with a number of management functions. The DSC is used to set up and monitor servers, Server Farms, published resources, and sessions. Endpoint device Evaluation Assurance Level A device used by a user to gain access to their permitted published applications. The evaluated configuration of XenApp defines the endpoint device to be a PC as described in section An assurance package, consisting of assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined assurance scale. [CC1] Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 5 of 55
6 Term ICA Protocol ICA Server IMA IPSec License Server Online Plug-In Operational Environment Organisational Security Policy Permitted Published Applications Personal Identification Number Protection Profile Published Applications Secure Gateway Meaning The protocol that the Online Plug-in uses to present input (keystrokes, mouse clicks, etc) to XenApp for processing. ICA Servers use it to format application output (display, audio, etc) and return it to the endpoint device. The ICA Server runs published applications and makes them available to authorised users (via the Online Plug-in on the user s endpoint device) in application sessions. ICA Servers can be grouped to form Server Farms. IMA provides an intelligent interface between the XenApp server-side subsystems, and between the server components and components of the operating system. It resolves queries and requests relating to user authentication, enumeration, resolution and session management. IMA is a part of an ICA Server, and includes the Data Collector. A set of standard extensions to the Internet Protocol that provides authenticated and encrypted communications with data integrity and replay protection. A server that validates licenses for Citrix products. The Online Plug-in (formerly known as the ICA Client) allows the user access to published applications on an ICA Server, as if they were running locally. It sends inputs from the keyboard, mouse, etc on an endpoint device and receives screen updates from the ICA Server. (In the TOE, this is the Online Plug-in web version of the Online Plug-in.) The environment in which the TOE is operated. [CC1] A set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed (or presumed to be imposed) now and/or in the future by an actual or hypothetical organisation in the operational environment. [CC1] The set of published applications to which an authorised User has been granted access. (See also Published Applications) The data used to authenticate the holder of a smartcard to that card when using smartcard login. An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type. [CC1] The applications that administrators can configure to be accessible by authorised Users. The definition also includes data and resources associated with a given application (e.g. data defining the initial configuration or appearance of an application). Different authorised Users may have access to different sets of applications (see Permitted Published Applications). The Secure Gateway is used to establish authenticated connections between Online Plug-ins and ICA Servers, and provides secure channels that protect confidentiality and integrity of data sent between Online Plug-ins and ICA Servers. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 6 of 55
7 Term Secure Ticket Authority Security Assurance Requirement Security Attribute Security Function Policy Security Functional Requirement Security Identifier Security Objective Security Target Server Farm Single Sign-On Component Target of Evaluation TOE Security Functionality Transport Layer Security (TLS) TSF Data Web Interface Web Interface Management Console Meaning The Secure Ticket Authority generates and validates tickets that allow an Online Plug-in to gain access to an ICA Server (via the Secure Gateway) to run a published application for a particular authenticated user. A description of how assurance is to be gained that the TOE meets the SFRs. [CC1] A property of subjects, users (including external IT products), objects, information, sessions and/or resources that is used in defining the SFRs and whose values are used in enforcing the SFRs. [CC1] A set of rules describing specific security behaviour enforced by the TSF and expressible as a set of SFRs. [CC1] A translation of the security objectives for the TOE into a standardised language. [CC1] A unique value that is used to identify a security principal (such as a user) or security group in Windows operating systems. A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified organisation security policies and/or assumptions. [CC1] An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE. [CC1] A Server Farm is a group of ICA Servers that can be managed as a single entity, and provides a load balancing capability. A component providing additional functionality that can be used in conjunction with other XenApp components to provide a single sign-on and application password management capability. There are no claims relating to the SSO functionality in the scope of evaluation, but the evaluated configuration includes the presence of this component. A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance. [CC1] A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs. [CC1] A protocol providing server authentication, data stream encryption and message integrity checks for a TCP/IP connection. Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. [CC1] A server component providing an interface for Users to authenticate themselves, in order to gain access to their permitted published applications. A console interface that allows administration activities at the Web Interface. This component can be used to configure the type of authentication required for users (username/password or smartcard/pin). Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 7 of 55
8 Term XenApp Server XML Service Meaning A collection of one or more of the following components running on one or more physical servers: Secure Ticket Authority, ICA Server (including IMA), DSC, XML Service. The XML Service is used by the Web Interface to retrieve the list of permitted published applications for a user, and the identity of the least loaded server (on which to run a selected application for a user). Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 8 of 55
9 Table of Contents 0. Preface Objectives of Document Scope of Document Intended Readership Related Documents Significant Assumptions Outstanding Issues Abbreviations Glossary ST Introduction ST and TOE Reference Identification TOE Overview Usage and major features of the TOE TOE Type TOE Description Endpoint Device Components Server Components Other Components Component Interaction TOE Boundaries Physical Boundary Logical Boundary Summary of items out of scope of the TOE Required non-toe hardware/software/firmware CC Conformance Security Problem Definition Assets Users and Subjects Threats Organizational Security Policies Assumptions Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 9 of 55
10 4. Security Objectives Security Objectives for the TOE Security Objectives for the Environment Security Objectives Rationale T.Attack_Application T.Access_Application T.Intercept T.Spoof T.Attack_Configdata OSP.Crypto OSP.Endpoint_Resource A.Physical A.Config_Endpoint A.Operations_Security A.Third_Party_SW A.Published_Desktop A.Application Extended Component Definition Extended Security Requirement Conformance with External Cryptographic Accreditation Secure Channel Operation IT Security Requirements Conventions Security Functional Requirements Authentication Authorisation Communications Security Assurance Requirements Security Requirements Rationale O.Auth_User O.Auth_Server O.Application O.Secure_Data_Transmission O.TLS-TOE O.Endpoint_Resource O.Use_FIPS O.Config_Apps SFR Dependencies Analysis Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 10 of 55
11 7. TOE Summary Specification User Authentication User Access Control Membership of user s permitted application set Inter-Component Authentication and Encryption Clipboard Transfer Client Drive Mapping Figures / Tables Figure 1: Deployment diagram of the TOE Figure 2: TOE logical structure Table 1 Threats/OSP/Assumptions addressed by Security Objectives Table 2 Security Assurance Requirements Table 3 Summary of Objectives/SFRs Rationale Table 4 Analysis of SFR dependencies Table 5 Summary of SFRs satisfied by TOE Functions Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 11 of 55
12 1. ST Introduction 1.1 ST and TOE Reference Identification TOE Reference: ST Reference: XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2 Platinum Edition CIN4-ST-0001 ST Version: 1-0 ST Date: 7 February 2011 Assurance Level: ST Author: EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 Flaw Reporting Procedures SiVenture 1.2 TOE Overview Usage and major features of the TOE The TOE is Citrix XenApp 6.0 for Windows Server 2008 R2 Platinum Edition (abbreviated in this document to XenApp ). XenApp provides users (endpoint device users) with secure access to applications and information, allowing multiple users to log on and run applications in separate, protected sessions. Applications (word processors, spreadsheets or any other type of application) are made available to users in a process known as publishing the applications, which is carried out by XenApp Administrators. The published applications that are available to a user (the user s permitted published applications ) are assigned on the basis of user identity. Users access their permitted published applications (and associated data) via an Online Plugin that resides on their local endpoint device. Keystrokes, mouse clicks and screen updates relating to the application sessions open in the Online Plug-in are sent between the user s endpoint device and the remote ICA Server on which the published application runs. To the user of the endpoint device it appears as if the application is running locally on their endpoint device. Because applications run on the server and not on the endpoint device, users can connect from any platform 2. Communication between the endpoint and server components is secured 2 The endpoint device included in the evaluated configuration is defined in section Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 12 of 55
13 using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS provides server authentication, encryption of the data stream and message integrity checks, and thus enables secure delivery of an application within a LAN, WAN or across the Internet. Client drive mapping can be enabled by an administrator, such that data storage devices on an endpoint device appear as network objects in Windows, making them available to the user s permitted published applications. If configured by an administrator, users are permitted to transfer information between a published application and a Windows clipboard on the client ( clipboard transfer ). XenApp provides the following security features: Authentication of users: endpoint device users are authenticated before access is granted to published applications. Authentication can be by username/password or by smartcard/pin. User Access Control: XenApp administrators can assign user access to published applications. This is achieved by associating a user s Active Directory account with published applications. Control over use of endpoint device resources: centralised control policies, set by a XenApp administrator, determine whether an endpoint device user can access local endpoint device resources such as clipboard transfer and local storage devices (through client drive mapping). Secure communications: high performance, standards-based encrypted transmissions are used for communications between server components (IPSec) and between the endpoint device and server components (TLS). The TOE is described in more detail in section TOE Type XenApp is an access control system which provides remote, secure access to applications and information, allowing multiple users to run applications in separate, protected sessions. 1.3 TOE Description The XenApp TOE is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1 below. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 13 of 55
14 Firewall Secure Gateway Firewall XenApp Servers Endpoint Device (with Online Plug-in) Web Interface Active Directory Single Sign-On component License Server Figure 1: Deployment diagram of the TOE The TOE comprises the following configuration of XenApp: A physical deployment of all the XenApp Server version 6.0 components 3 (ICA Server, XML Service and Secure Ticket Authority, with Hotfixes XA600W2K8R2X64002 & XA600W2K8R2X64021 (as described in [CCECG]), including at least two physical instances of the ICA Server component operating as a Server Farm Secure Gateway version 3.2 Web Interface version 5.4 Online Plug-in 4 version The evaluated configuration uses the Secure Gateway to provide an encrypted channel 5 between an Online Plug-in and the ICA Server on which its application session is running (the TOE invokes FIPS validated Windows functions to provide the cryptographic 3 The versions of the components in a XenApp Server is defined by the version number of the TOE as a whole (i.e. version 6.0). However, the three components identified in the list below (Secure Gateway, Web Interface, and Online Plug-in) are also available with their own separate version numbers. Hence, for clarity the version numbers of these items included in the TOE are given here. 4 Note that this is the Online Plug-in web version of the Online Plug-in, which gives access to applications from a web interface. A version of the Online Plug-in giving access from either a web interface or a desktop is also available from Citrix, but is not the version used in the TOE. 5 As can be seen in Figure 2, this channel is in fact in two parts: the Online Plug-in communicates with the Secure Gateway using TLS, and the Secure Gateway communicates with the ICA Server using IPSec. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 14 of 55
15 functions for this secure channel; these Windows functions are not themselves part of the TOE). Communication also occurs between a Web Browser and Web Server (the communication is encrypted using HTTPS over TLS). Communication within the Server Component is secured using IPSec provided by Windows. The evaluated configuration also includes operation of the TOE either with or without the use of the Single Sign-On/Password Management (v4.8) feature, although there are no claims relating to the Single Sign-On/Password Management functionality in the scope of evaluation. The License Server is required for operation of the TOE, but is not itself part of the TOE, and is not in the scope of evaluation. The logical components of the TOE are shown in Figure 2, and each component is described in more detail in sections below. The way that the components interact in order to offer published applications to a user is then described in section Figure 2 also shows physical boundaries for some of the components. As noted above, XenApp Server components may be distributed in various ways across physical servers. However, the Online Plug-in and web browser are both located on the same endpoint device, and separate physical servers must be used to host the Secure Gateway and the combination of web server, Web Interface and the Web Interface Management console. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 15 of 55
16 Firewall Firewall CIN4-ST-0001 Online Plug-in ICA(TLS) Secure Gateway Secure Ticket Authority ICA Server ICA Server ICA Server Web Browser HTTPS(TLS) Web Server IMA (including IMA Data (including IMA Collector*) Data (including Collector*) Data Collector) Endpoint Device Web Interface DSC Web Interface Management Console XML Service XenApp Server HTTPS protected by TLS, environment communication ICA Protocol protected by TLS Various proprietary protocols protected by IPsec TOE management console connection DSC Delivery Services Console TOE component Component provided by environment Physical platform Components that are part of a XenApp Server. Multiple instances of XenApp Server components exist within a server farm. Figure 2: TOE logical structure Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 16 of 55
17 1.3.1 Endpoint Device Components Online Plug-in The Online Plug-in allows the user access to published applications on an ICA Server, as if they were running locally (note that this is the Online Plug-in web version of the Online Plug-in). The Online Plug-in intercepts and sends key strokes, mouse clicks, etc. from the local operating system and communicates them to the ICA Server. It receives screen updates in return, which it passes to the local operating system for display. Traffic between the Online Plug-in and the ICA Server (which travels via the Secure Gateway) is encrypted to protect confidentiality and integrity Endpoint Web Browser The presence of a third party web browser is required on the endpoint device (in the evaluated configuration, Internet Explorer version 8.0 is used), which provides the communications channel to the Web Interface. Users access a list of their permitted applications from within their web browser, and click on links to launch published applications Server Components ICA Server The ICA Server is the XenApp component that runs published applications and may exist as one or more instances on one or more physical servers 6. The ICA Server runs on the Windows Server operating system. XenApp Administrators install and publish the applications that are to be deployed by an ICA Server. ICA Servers can be grouped together to form a Server Farm. A Server Farm is a group of ICA Servers that is managed as a single entity. Server Farms provide a flexible and robust way of deploying applications to users, allowing applications to be run on the least loaded server at the time of the access request Web Interface The Web Interface gives users access to published applications. A user logs on to Web Interface using a web browser, and is presented with a dynamically created web page containing a list of links to the applications that they are authorised to launch (the user s permitted published applications). When the user selects an application from the Web page, the Web Interface generates the ICA file that the Online Plug-in on the endpoint device needs to connect to the ICA Server via the Secure Gateway. 6 Each instance of the ICA Server runs on a separate physical server; a physical server hosts at most one ICA Server. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 17 of 55
18 Web Server The Web Server is used to communicate information about a user from the endpoint device web browser for use in authenticating the user and generating a web page showing a user s permitted published applications. The web server is a third-party component (in the evaluated configuration, Microsoft IIS is used) Secure Gateway The Secure Gateway permits users authenticated by Web Interface to access resources on an internal network and provides a link between two encrypted data tunnels (using TLS and IPSec protocols that invoke FIPS140-2 validated cryptographic functions provided by the operating system) for client-server communications Secure Ticket Authority (STA) The Secure Ticket Authority generates and validates tickets that allow an Online Plug-in to gain access through the Secure Gateway to an ICA Server to run a published application for a particular authenticated user. The STA is called first by Web Interface to request an STA ticket for the least loaded ICA Server when a user has selected an application from the list of permitted published applications. The Online Plug-in, having received the STA ticket, presents it to the Secure Gateway with a request to connect to the specified published application. The Secure Gateway then sends the ticket to the STA for validation before initiating a session on the least-loaded ICA Server associated with the ticket XML Service The XML Service is used by the Web Interface to retrieve the list of permitted published applications for a user, and the identity of the least loaded server (on which to run a selected application for a user), both of which are obtained by the XML Service from IMA IMA (including Data Collector) IMA acts as an intelligent interface between the XenApp Server components of the TOE, and between the XenApp Server components and components of the Windows operating system. It is involved with authentication, session management and connections across the network. IMA contains the Data Collector, which is a dynamic data store containing frequentlyupdated data (such as server loading, which identifies the least-loaded server at any point), and also contains a persistent data store containing more static information (such as the list of published applications). IMA locates the least-loaded ICA Server hosting a requested application and requests and communicates the logon ticket that is associated with a user. The logon ticket is used for identification and authentication of that user during subsequent communication between the endpoint device and the ICA Server. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 18 of 55
19 Delivery Services Console (DSC) The Delivery Services Console (DSC) provides the administration interface to a XenApp Server farm (via IMA), presenting administrators with a number of management functions. An administrator uses the Delivery Services Console to monitor and manage: configuration data available published applications users access permissions for published applications central control policies for clipboard transfer and client drive mapping general server, Server Farms and user session details. Client drive mapping and clipboard transfer policies for each individual endpoint user are controlled by administrators. When enabled by an administrator, client drive mapping can be further controlled (i.e. allowed or prevented) by each individual endpoint user for their own sessions. The DSC is a snap-in to the Microsoft Management Console Web Interface Management Console Web Interface Management is a console interface that allows administration activities at the Web Interface. This component can be used by administrators to configure the type of authentication required for users to the Web Interface (username/password or smartcard/pin). The Web Interface management console resides on the same physical server as the Web Interface, and is a snap-in to the Microsoft Management Console Other Components Smartcards Smartcards can be used to provide secure access to published applications and data. The TOE can be configured to use smartcards to: Authenticate users to Web Interface Authenticate users to XenApp. The role of the TOE in this process is limited to conveying requests and responses between the smartcard and the operating system (including user authentication credentials collected and sent to the smartcard), and reacting appropriately to the authentication result from the operating system. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 19 of 55
20 Firewalls Firewalls are used to restrict access to the server component to a specific port and, in some configurations (including the evaluated configuration), within the server component to limit allowed protocols and connections. These firewalls are not in the scope of the evaluation Component Interaction The interactions between the various components are as follows (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the interactions involved and how the various communications paths are protected): 1 An endpoint user uses a web browser to view the Web Interface Login page. If the Web Interface has been configured to use username and password authentication, then the user enters their credentials, which are sent as a standard HTTPS POST request. If the Web Interface has been configured to use smartcard authentication then the user will be prompted to enter their smartcard PIN. 2 The Web Interface reads the user s information and passes it to the XML Service for validation if the Web Interface has been configured to use username and password for authentication. If the Web Interface has been configured to use smartcard authentication then the web server validates the user s smartcard credentials using TLS with client authentication and identifies the associated AD user account. In both the smartcard and username/password cases, the list of SIDs representing the AD user account is passed back from the operating system to the Web Interface and is used to request a list of applications from the XML Service. 3 The XML Service retrieves a list of applications that the user can access and returns it to the Web Interface. These applications comprise the user s permitted published application set and are configured by the administrator. 4 Web Interface uses the web server to send back a web page containing hyperlinks to the applications in the user s application set. 5 The user initiates the next step by clicking one of the hyperlinks in the web page. The web browser sends a request to the web server to retrieve the ICA file for the selected application. The web server passes the request to Web Interface. 6 The Web Interface contacts IMA via the XML Service, requesting information about the least-loaded server in the Server Farm (which IMA requests from the Data Collector). IMA returns the IP address of the least loaded ICA Server. 7 The Web Interface requests a logon ticket from the least-loaded server via the XML Service. The selected server generates a logon ticket and returns the logon ticket to the Web Interface via the XML Service. Note - logon tickets are only generated and used for username/password login (i.e. they are not applicable to smartcard login). 8 The Web Interface contacts the Secure Ticket Authority and requests an STA ticket. The least-loaded ICA Server IP address is included in the request. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 20 of 55
21 9 The Secure Ticket Authority stores the request data, then generates and returns an STA ticket to the Web Interface. 10 The Web Interface sends a customized ICA file via the web server to the web browser that contains the Secure Gateway fully-qualified domain name, logon ticket (if applicable) and STA ticket. 11 The web browser receives the ICA file and passes it to the Online Plug-in. 12 The Online Plug-in receives the ICA file and connects to the Secure Gateway. This connection makes use of TLS to ensure data confidentiality and integrity is maintained. The confidentiality and integrity of information on the user s machine is protected by authentication of the Secure Gateway through the use of TLS. 13 The Online Plug-in sends the Secure Gateway the STA ticket. 14 The Secure Gateway contacts the Secure Ticket Authority server and gives it the STA ticket. 15 The Secure Ticket Authority validates the STA ticket and returns the stored IP address of the ICA Server that contains the requested application. 16 The Secure Gateway initiates an ICA session with the least-loaded ICA Server according to the IP address received from the Secure Ticket Authority. If the ICA Server has been configured to use smartcard authentication then the user will be prompted to enter the smartcard in order to authenticate to the server. If the ICA Server has not been configured to use smartcard authentication, then the ICA Server authenticates the user using the logon ticket data as the credentials. 17 The Secure Gateway forwards all ICA traffic between the ICA Server and the Online Plug-in. 1.4 TOE Boundaries Physical Boundary The physical boundary of the TOE is defined by the physical boundaries around each of the physical components on which the TOE components shown in Figure 2 are installed, and therefore encompasses: The Endpoint Device, containing the Online Plug-in A physical server hosting the Secure Gateway A physical server hosting the Web Interface (and the Web Interface management console) Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 21 of 55
22 A number of physical servers hosting the XenApp Server components; these may be distributed across physical servers in various ways (guidance on appropriate distribution of the components is given in [CCECG]) Logical Boundary The logical boundary is shown by the smaller blue boxes in Figure 2 (the yellow boxes surrounding these components indicate separate physical server/client platforms on which these logical components are installed). It should be noted that while the (endpoint device) Web Browser and (server) web server lie within the physical boundary of the TOE because they are installed on the same client and server platforms as some TOE components, they do not form part of the logical boundary of the TOE Summary of items out of scope of the TOE The items out of scope of the TOE include the Microsoft components on which Citrix XenApp components are installed as detailed in section XenApp 6.0 Platinum Edition includes licenses entitling the use of a number of products and components. In the evaluated configuration only the following components are in scope: XenApp Server Online Plug-in (note that this is the Online Plug-in web version of the Online Plug-in) Secure Gateway Web Interface. The four components listed above provide the functionality identified in section The evaluated configuration also includes operation either with or without the use of the Single Sign-On feature, although there are no claims relating to the Single Sign-On functionality in the scope of evaluation. All other products and components supplied as part of the Platinum Edition (including, for example, the Access Gateway product and SmartAuditor component, and including other versions of the Online Plug-in), and hence all additional functionality supplied by these other products and components, are out of scope. The evaluated configuration covers only the publishing of applications; streaming of applications, VM-hosted applications, and publishing of desktops or other content 7 is excluded from the evaluated configuration. 7 Publishing content refers to the addition of content URLs (i.e. URLs linked to items other than XenApp published applications) to the list of permitted published applications that is presented to a XenApp user by Web Interface (cf. steps 3-4 in section 1.3.4) Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 22 of 55
23 1.4.4 Required non-toe hardware/software/firmware The context for the lists of non-toe items given below can be found in section 1.3. As shown in the deployment configuration in Figure 1, the following non-toe items are required: Firewalls Active Directory Citrix License Server. Other requirements for non-toe software are identified for each of the TOE components below Endpoint device The endpoint device is a PC with one of the following operating systems: Microsoft Windows 7, Ultimate edition, 32 & 64-bit versions Microsoft Windows Vista SP1, Ultimate edition, 32 & 64-bit versions In evaluated configurations Endpoint users will run a TLS-enabled web browser (i.e. Internet Explorer 8.0) this is not included in the TOE XenApp Server TOE Requirements The term XenApp Server indicates a physical server containing one or more of the following components of XenApp: ICA Server (including IMA) Delivery Services Console XML Service Secure Ticket Authority. For the purposes of this Security Target, the TOE is characterised in terms of these logical component roles, which may be deployed across physical servers in a variety of ways. Guidance on appropriate physical deployments is given in [CCECG]. In the evaluated configuration, the Single Sign-On component (shown in Figure 1 and discussed in sections 1.3 and 1.4.3) will be present on one of the XenApp physical servers. In the evaluated configuration, a XenApp Server requires a physical server running Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (Enterprise edition, 64-bit) and Microsoft IIS 7.5. Two further software components need to be installed on the ICA Server in the evaluated configuration: Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 23 of 55
24 Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Express Edition is installed as the data store (the product also supports other editions), and the Citrix Access Suite License Server must be installed in order to successfully license the product. These four components form part of the environment for the TOE Secure Gateway In the evaluated configuration, the Secure Gateway requires a physical server running Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (Enterprise edition, 64-bit) Web Interface In the evaluated configuration, the Web Interface requires the following software: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (Enterprise edition, 64-bit) Microsoft IIS 7.5. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 24 of 55
25 2. CC Conformance As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3], this TOE conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Revision 3. The methodology applied for the evaluation is defined in [CEM]. The TOE is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant, and meets the requirements of EAL2, augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This ST does not claim conformance to any PPs. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 25 of 55
26 3. Security Problem Definition 3.1 Assets The assets to be protected by the TOE are as follows: Published Applications Published Application Data Application Transfer Data Configuration Data The published applications made available by the TOE. Protection of confidentiality and integrity is required. Application data in transit between the Online Plug-in (on the endpoint device) and the ICA Server that hosts the relevant application session. Protection of confidentiality and integrity is required. Application data that may be transferred between the ICA Server and a connected endpoint device during an application session, by means of clipboard transfer or client drive mapping 8. Protection of confidentiality is required, in the sense that such data transfers (in either direction) should only be possible if an administrator has configured the global policy to allow the transfer 9. Configuration data, whether stored or in transit between the endpoint device and server components, and between server components (comprising the Secure Gateway, Web Interface, Web Interface Management, and XenApp Server components). This data is used to control user sessions (e.g. logon tickets, STA tickets, lists of permitted published applications, identification and authentication data). Protection of confidentiality and integrity is required. 3.2 Users and Subjects The following define the users and IT systems. The subjects are interpreted as those processes representing the defined users and external systems. 8 The property being protected for this asset is the ability to move data between the application session in an ICA Server and resources on the endpoint client. If such a transfer takes place then the same data will at some point also be considered as Published Application Data (i.e. while it is in transit on a communication channel). 9 Protection against transfers from the endpoint device to the application session on the ICA Server could also be viewed as an integrity requirement (protecting the ICA Server). Whether viewed as confidentiality or integrity however, the underlying requirement for the TOE (as is described in OSP.Endpoint_Resource) is to provide the ability for an administrator to control the ability to transfer data between endpoint device resources and an application session. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 26 of 55
27 Endpoint User Administrator Endpoint device A user who has been granted access to the TOE. An endpoint user would access applications through an endpoint device. An administrator manages users access to published applications. An administrator is responsible for the configuration of the components of the TOE and the operational environment, and is likely to have physical access to the TOE server components. A device used by a user to gain access to the TOE. It consists of a PC, laptop, PDA or similar desktop appliance. To enable access, the endpoint will be running the Client component of the TOE. Endpoint User and Administrator are of course roles, and some individuals may be able to act in both roles. However, in the remainder of this document the term user refers to an Endpoint User. The Administrator and Endpoint User roles are disjoint: individuals operating in an Administrator role only carry out administration actions and do not connect to published applications. 3.3 Threats The TOE (in some cases with the support of the operational environment) is intended to address the following threats. T.Attack_Application T.Access_Application T.Intercept T.Spoof T.Attack_Configdata An attacker may gain access to published applications or published application data. An endpoint user may gain unauthorised access to published applications or published application data. An attacker may intercept communication channels. This may lead to compromise of published application data or configuration data (including a user s authentication credentials). An attacker may cause communications between an endpoint and a server to be redirected, such that users of the TOE may incorrectly believe they are accessing the TOE when they are not. This may lead to compromise of published applications, published application data, or configuration data (including a user s authentication credentials). An attacker or endpoint user may make unauthorised modifications to configuration data. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 27 of 55
28 3.4 Organizational Security Policies OSP.Crypto Cryptographic functions shall be validated to FIPS level 1. OSP.Endpoint_Resource In order to limit the potential exposure of application transfer data, an administrator must be able to control: the ability to cut, copy and paste clipboard data between a XenApp application session and the endpoint device clipboard the ability to access local drives (including USB drives) on the endpoint device. 3.5 Assumptions A.Physical A.Config_Endpoint A.Operations_Security A.Third_Party_SW TOE servers are installed in an environment such that only administrators can gain physical access to the TOE servers. The endpoint device operating system is securely configured, including appropriate file and registry protection, according to [CCECG] and any additional requirements that may arise from the risks in a specific user s deployment environment. Where keys and other secret data are generated and stored outside the TOE, they are managed in accordance with the level of risk. Trusted third party software is operating correctly and securely. Trusted third party software is defined as: Microsoft IIS Web Browsers used to connect Windows Server (including Active Directory) SQL Server Firewall software. A.Published_Desktop A.Application Administrators will not publish the Desktop or other Content 10 Administrators will ensure that applications are published and configured such that they do not act in a malicious manner. Specifically, published applications will not 10 See footnote 7. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 28 of 55
29 maliciously interact with other applications nor will they maliciously affect published application data or configuration data. This includes maintaining the security state of the published applications according to the user s risk environment (e.g. by applying relevant patches). It shall not be possible to break out of applications, and hence gain direct access to operating system functions or other applications. Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 29 of 55
30 4. Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE O.Auth_User O.Auth_Server O.Application O.Secure_Data_Transmission Endpoint users must be successfully identified and authenticated before being granted access to the published applications (and their associated published application data). TOE server components must authenticate themselves to client endpoints before communication of sensitive data. Users must be granted access only to applications for which they have been authorised. The confidentiality and integrity of both published application data and configuration data, must be maintained during transmission (i) (ii) (iii) between pairs of TOE server components between the Secure Gateway and the Online Plug-in on an endpoint device between the web browser on an endpoint device and the web server. Application note The requirements of O.Secure_Data_Transmission are linked to other requirements as follows: OE.IPSec requires the deployed configuration to use IPSec between pairs of TOE server components (to achieve (i) above). OE.Encryption ensures the use of FIPS140-2 validated cryptographic functions when providing IPSec (and is a requirement on the environment because the IPSec protocol implementation and its cryptographic functions are provided by Windows) O.TLS-TOE requires the TOE to use TLS between the Secure Gateway and Online Plug-ins (to achieve (ii) above). O.Use_FIPS ensures that, when TLS is implemented by the TOE for this link, the TSF invokes the relevant cryptographic functions in Windows in accordance with their FIPS140-2 validation OE.TLS-Config requires the TOE deployment to be configured so that the client web browser and the web Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 30 of 55
31 O.TLS-TOE O.Endpoint_Resource server use TLS. OE.Encryption ensures the use of FIPS140-2 validated cryptographic functions when using TLS (and, as noted for the use of IPSec above, is a requirement on the environment because the TLS protocol implementation and its cryptographic functions are provided by Windows 11 ). The TOE shall ensure that all communication between the Online Plug-in and the Secure Gateway uses the TLS protocol. In order to limit the potential exposure of application transfer data, an administrator must be able to control: the ability to cut, copy and paste clipboard data between a XenApp application session and the endpoint device clipboard the ability to access local drives (including USB drives) on the endpoint device. O.Use_FIPS O.Config_Apps Application note TOE components must invoke FIPS level 1 validated cryptographic functions in accordance with the conditions of the validation. The published applications must only be configurable by administrators. Published applications must be configured by administrators such that it is not possible for users to break out of the application to gain access to the underlying operating system of the ICA Server on which the application is running. 4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment The following objectives relate to the server components of the TOE: OE.Config_Server The operating systems of the server components must be securely configured according to [CCECG], including appropriate file protection, and any additional requirements that may arise from the risks in a specific user s deployment environment. 11 Note: the TOE implements the TLS protocol for the link between Online Plug-in and Secure Gateway, and uses FIPS validated cryptographic functions provided by the Windows cryptographic API to do so. The link between the web browser on an endpoint device and the web server uses the Windows implementation of TLS, which also makes use of FIPS validated cryptographic functions, Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 31 of 55
32 OE.Config_TP_SW Trusted third party software must be securely configured according to [CCECG], and any additional requirements that may arise from the risks in a specific user s deployment environment. Trusted third party software is defined as: Microsoft IIS Web Browsers used to connect Windows Server (including Active Directory) SQL Server Express Firewall software. OE.Published_Desktop OE.Application OE.Authenticate OE.Server_Physical OE.Admin_Users Only applications may be published; desktops and other content must not be published and hence available to endpoint users. Applications must be published and configured such that they do not act in a malicious manner. The published applications must not maliciously interact with other applications nor maliciously affect published application data or configuration data. This includes maintaining the security state of the published applications according to the user s risk environment (e.g. by applying relevant patches). Also they must be configured so that it shall not be possible to break out of applications, and hence gain direct access to operating system functions or other applications. Endpoint users must be authenticated by the underlying operating system on the relevant platform. Authentication requirements in the operating system shall be configured according to [CCECG] and the risks in the operational environment. The operational environment shall ensure that only administrators are able to gain physical access to the TOE servers. Configuration data on server components must be accessible only to authorised administrators. The following objectives relate to the endpoint devices: OE.Config_Endpoint Application note The endpoint device operating system must be securely configured, including appropriate file protection and registry protection, according to [CCECG] and any additional requirements that may arise from the risks in a specific user s deployment environment. Implementing the access controls on endpoint devices will be based on the risk environment in which they are deployed, Ver 1-0 APB 7 February 2011 Page 32 of 55
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