Source: https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/260-f-3d-1160-598446522
Timestamp: 2019-11-21 00:45:41
Document Index: 261889534

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 253', '§ 35', '§ 34']

260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), 99-36173, City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp. - Federal Cases - Case Law - VLEX 598446522
Docket Nº: 99-36173, 99-36219
Party Name: CITY OF AUBURN; CITY OF BREMERTON; CITY OF DES MOINES; CITY OF FEDERAL WAY; A MUNICIPALITY; CITY OF LAKEWOOD; CITY OF MEDINA; CITY OF OLYMPIA; CITY OF PUYALLUP; CITY OF RENTON; CITY OF SEATAC; CITY OF TACOMA; CITY OF TUKWILA; CITY OF UNIVERSITY PLACE; CITY OF VANCOUVER, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES-CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. QWEST CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLAN
1. At 247 F.3d at 980, section II.C.1, second paragraph: Replace sentence reading: "A number of courts have held that various requirements imposed by local ordinances constitute a prohibition within the meaning of § 253(a)." with "A number of courts have held that certain requirements imposed by local ordinances constitute a prohibition within the meaning of § 253(a)."
2. At 247 F.3d at 981, section II.C.1, third paragraph: Replace sentence reading:
"The ordinances at issue in the present case include several features that have the effect of prohibiting the provision of telecommunications services." with "The ordinances at issue in the present case include several features that, in combination, have the effect of prohibiting the provision of telecommunications services."
"Taken together, these requirements 'have the effect of prohibiting' Qwest and other companies from providing telecommunications services, see City of Dallas, 52 F.Supp.2d at 770, and create a substantial and unlawful barrier to entry into and participation in the Counterclaim Cities' telecommunications markets."
"The Sixth Circuit noted that a regulation that allows denial of a franchise does not alone constitute a prohibition within the meaning of § 253(a). See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a fee requirement is not preempted by § 253(a)). As in City of Austin, 975 F.Supp. at 939, our conclusion is based on the variety of methods and bases on which a city may deny a franchise, not the mere franchise requirement, or the possibility of denial alone. See TCG Detroit, 206 F.3d at 624 (citing City of Austin with approval)."
6. At 247 F.3d at 981-82, section II.C.2, first paragraph: Delete first two sentences, and replace with: "Of course, a franchise requirement per se is not preempted by the Telecom Act. Only regulations that do not fall within a safe harbor provision, such as § 253(c), are preempted."
This case presents issues of first impression concerning the relationship between various Washington municipalities and a major telecommunications provider, Qwest Corporation. We are called upon to decide (1) whether an ambiguous tariff filed with the state utilities commission trumps the common law and statutory rule that the utility company, rather than the municipality, bears the expense for a facility relocation made necessary by right-of-way improvements, and (2) whether state law and
the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempt certain city ordinances that establish a franchise system to manage telecommunications facilities in rights-of-way. We conclude that the tariff does not require the municipalities to shoulder the relocation costs, and that the ordinances are preempted.
After this appeal was filed and partially briefed, the Washington legislature passed major telecommunications legislation, entitled, "An Act relating to the use
of city or town rights of way by telecommunications and cable television providers." Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6676 ("ESSB 6676"). The parties agree that ESSB 6676, codified at W ASH. REV. CODE ("RCW") §§ 35.99.010 et seq., supersedes Qwest's tariff and prospectively imposes the cost of relocating telecommunications facilities in city streets on the utility company.3 Therefore, the question before us is limited to who bears the costs of relocation prior to the effective date of the new statute. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000).
We begin with the principle--with which both parties agree--that under Washington common law, the utility must pay the cost of relocation if required by public necessity. This stems from the conditional nature of a utility's right to have facilities in the public right-of-way. When the government allows a telecommunications company to place facilities in that right-of-way, the facilities' presence is contingent on the company's cooperation with maintenance and improvement of the street. 12 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 34.74.10 (3d ed. 1970) ("it is generally held that the municipality may require a change in the location of pipes or other...