Source: http://openjurist.org/663/f2d/724/mooney-v-brunswick-corporation
Timestamp: 2016-10-28 20:08:49
Document Index: 25559529

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 103', '§ 112', '§ 1', '§ 251', '§ 282', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 103']

663 F2d 724 Mooney v. Brunswick Corporation | OpenJurist
663 F. 2d 724 - Mooney v. Brunswick Corporation HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 663 F.2d.
663 F2d 724 Mooney v. Brunswick Corporation 663 F.2d 724
212 U.S.P.Q. 401
George M. MOONEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.BRUNSWICK CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-2410.
Argued Feb. 26, 1981.Decided Oct. 27, 1981.
Brunswick's success in producing a one piece ratchet clutch and bevel gear unit prompted Mooney to institute this action. Specifically, Mooney charged that Brunswick wilfully and deliberately infringed Claim 4 of his gear structure patent and Claim 1 of his method patent through the manufacture, sale and use of its own one piece ratchet clutch and bevel gear unit. Brunswick denied any infringement and challenged the validity of both patents on grounds of obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103), and inadequate description (35 U.S.C. § 112). In a commendably thorough opinion, the district court concluded that Claim 4 of gear structure patent was obvious to one skilled in the art and therefore invalid. Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 489 F.Supp. 544 (E.D.Wis.1980). The court also determined that defendant's method of producing its own one piece ratchet clutch and bevel gear units was sufficiently distinct to preclude infringement of Claim 1 of Mooney's method patent. On appeal, Mooney seeks review of the district court's rulings both as to validity and to infringement.
Reissue proceedings were originally designed to enable a patent holder to remedy inadvertant mistakes in patent drawings and specifications. Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 60 S.Ct. 961, 84 L.Ed. 1204 (1940). The procedure was amended in March of 1977, however, to permit patent owners to obtain a ruling from the Patent Office on the pertinence of additional prior art which was not cited in the original patent application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1980). If the Patent Office determines that the patent is not defective or invalid in light of the additional prior art, the reissue application is rejected. If, however, the patent is defective, the reissue application is allowed and the owner of the patent must surrender it to the Patent Office in return for a corrected Reissue Patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
All patents enjoy a general presumption of validity which can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1979). See Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091, 96 S.Ct. 887, 47 L.Ed.2d 103 (1976). On this appeal, Mooney maintains that this presumption of validity was strengthened when the Patent Office approved his patent through rejection of a reissue application. After examining the record, we conclude, as did the district court, that irregularities in the reissue proceedings in the instant case diminished rather than enhanced the presumption of validity of Mooney's gear structure patent.7
The district court found several serious irregularities in the reissue procedures involved in the present case. Most importantly, the court concluded that the opposition statements filed with the Patent Office were not properly considered by the examiner. Although the statements were never entered in the record and acknowledged by the Patent Office in accordance with applicable regulations, testimony at trial revealed that the examiner did have the opposition statements in his possession. Mooney argues that we must therefore assume the examiner considered the merits of these statements. Since the examiner never cited the statements in his final evaluation, however, we must conclude, as did the district court, "that they were not considered or alternatively they were not considered relevant by the examiner." Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 555. In either case, the statements were not apparently accorded their proper weight and this irregularity diminishes the effect of the reissue procedure.
Although the interviews in the instant case may have been to a considerable degree innocent in purpose, we believe that the proceeding may have been somewhat tainted by them. The purpose of the rule prohibiting interviews between the examiner and the parties involving discussion of patentability is to make the procedure more reliable and to permit the examiner to make an independent evaluation of the merits of the application. Any information which the examiner needs to consider should be submitted with the application or included in supplemental filings. It is not appropriate for a representative of the patentholder (or for that matter, of an opposing party) to discuss patentability with the examiner before the first Office Action. We therefore conclude that the district court properly determined that the "effect of this defect as well as the other(s) raised by defendant is to diminish any presumption of validity that would attach in the consideration of the prior art revealed under the reissuance procedure." Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 554.
Even in the absence of a fortified presumption of validity, Mooney claims that the district court erred in concluding that the one piece ratchet clutch and bevel gear unit would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the patent was issued. In reviewing a district court's determination of obviousness, we must examine (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claim at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966); Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979); Centsable Products, Inc. v. Lemelson, 591 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840, 100 S.Ct. 79, 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979). As to these matters, the findings of the district court should be sustained unless clearly erroneous. See La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971).
The first step in resolving a question of obviousness involves a consideration of all the prior art. See New York Scaffolding Co. v. Liebel-Binney Construction Co., 254 U.S. 24, 41 S.Ct. 18, 65 L.Ed. 112 (1920). The prior art includes any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions and patents which pertain to, but pre-date, the invention in question. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
In the instant case, Mooney's original patent application for the gear structure unit referenced only one piece of prior art, the Kaufmann patent (U.S. Patent No. 2,289,288). The Kaufmann patent described a clutch and bevel gear with recessed sloping ratchet teeth and radially engaging faces originally used in washing machines. Although the gear unit was actually manufactured in two pieces, the diagram accompanying the patent discloses a one piece unit. Regardless whether this disclosure occurred by design or by accident, we agree with the district court that the Kaufmann patent suggests a gear unit sufficiently similar to the unit designed by Mooney that the Kaufmann patent must be considered relevant prior art. See Application of Meng, 492 F.2d 843 (C.C.P.A.1974); Application of Seid, 161 F.2d 229 (C.C.P.A.1947).
We believe that the references relied upon by the district court contained sufficient enabling disclosures for the purpose of serving an invalidating function in this case. "It is well settled that a publication must contain sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention described in the patent before the patent will be invalidated by the prior art publication." Ortho, 534 F.2d at 93 (emphasis supplied). But it is also generally known, as found by the district court, that fabrication of a one piece gear unit would have to proceed by one of the various well-known metal-working methods, e. g. forging, casting or machining. Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 560. Further, the structure patent here in issue may be invalidated for obviousness in light of the prior art even though the means of manufacture disclosed in the prior art publication is not the same as that claimed by the patent holder. Application of Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 315 (C.C.P.A.1979). The district court specifically found that four prior art patents and drawings revealed a one piece gear unit similar to plaintiff's design. Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 556-58, 561. These examples of prior art, in relation to the level of skill then existing in the mechanical gear design field, were considered in detail by the district court when it held that the use of a one piece gear unit construction was obvious to those possessing ordinary skill in the art. The prior art patents and drawings relied on by the district court evince sufficient enabling disclosures (in light of the common knowledge of methods of metal fabrication) for that court to have properly relied on them for purposes of invalidation. Cf. Application of Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A.1979) (prior patent on analogous chemical compound contained sufficient enabling disclosure when new compound is made by atom substitution which is obvious to those skilled in art); Application of Collins, 462 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A.1972) (existing metal working techniques, when considered with prior art patent, disclosed method to make new heat exchanger). See also In re Donohue, 632 F.2d 123, 125-26 (C.C.P.A.1980) and In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681-82 (C.C.P.A.1980) (enabling disclosures sufficient for 35 U.S.C. § 102).10
As noted in Payne, it is not necessary that the prior art disclose precisely the same means of manufacture of the one piece gear unit as that employed for the current invention because the prior art is to be considered together with the ordinary skill possessed by practitioners in the field (including their general knowledge of methods of manufacture-in this case, metal-working methods). The enabling disclosure requirement has been only uncertainly and relatively recently imported into the analysis of obviousness claims, not as a matter of statutory construction but rather by way of analogy to the anticipation defense of 35 U.S.C. § 102, see Application of Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (C.C.P.A.1968). We therefore decline to give this requirement the overly rigorous interpretation urged by plaintiff.
Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 560. After examining the record and the thoughtful analysis of the district court, we believe that the district court made a proper assessment of the level of skill in the art.
Once the court has established the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claim at issue and the level of skill in the art, it must determine whether the invention was obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the patent was issued. Here, the district court noted that the prior art disclosed one and two piece gears which were virtually identical to the unit described in Claim 4 of Mooney's patent. Although Mooney's one piece gear unit was stronger and more durable than the gears referenced in the prior art, the court concluded that this condition merely reflected the value and importance of one piece construction. Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 560-62. See Enterprise Railway Equipment Co. v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 95 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1938). The record is also replete with the testimony of experts provided by both parties that it would be obvious, when faced with a weakness in the brazings of a two piece gear unit, to make the transition to a stronger one piece unit. As a result, the district court concluded that Claim 4 was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103, because it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art "to make a one piece bevel gear with ratchet clutch teeth." Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 561.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in concluding that the process used by Brunswick to manufacture its one piece ratchet clutch and bevel gear did not infringe on plaintiff's method patent. In order to prove infringement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant engaged in the "unauthorized performance of substantially the same process steps in substantially the same way to accommodate substantially the same result." International Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 400 (Ct.Cl.1969). See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1881). It is not enough that the defendant produce the same result. Infringement occurs only when both the method and the result are substantially the same. See Linde Air Products Co. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co., 167 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1948), modified, 336 U.S. 271, 69 S.Ct. 535, 93 L.Ed. 672 (1949), adhered to on rehearing, 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950).
A. Forgings
B. Method of Cutting the Ratchet Teeth
Both plaintiff and defendant referenced numerous other prior art patents before the patent examiner and the district court. The examiner considered most of these patents as part of the plaintiff's reissue application. The district court considered those prior art patents which the examiner failed to reference on the reissue application, finding that they were either irrelevant or relevant only to a very limited extent. Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 555-58
Mooney makes a similar argument in suggesting that the court applied the wrong test to determine obviousness. See discussion infra at 736-737. Based primarily on expert testimony, the district court concluded that it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art "to make" a one piece gear. The thrust of Mooney's argument, however, is that a one piece gear could not have been obvious in the absence of a method for producing such a gear. In fact, the district court noted that "... it was the method of producing the gear and not the gear which was in fact unobvious." Mooney, 489 F.Supp. at 561
This conclusion about the adequacy of the enabling disclosures is buttressed by an analysis of the special factors relied on in cases where enabling disclosures in prior art publications have been held insufficient to render the publications adequate to invalidate subsequent inventions for obviousness. In Ortho, for example, the prior art consisted solely of a magazine article describing an unsuccessful attempt to prepare a similar chemical compound. 534 F.2d at 93; cf. Application of Brown, 329 F.2d 1006 (C.C.P.A.1964) (prior art disclosing unsuccessful attempts to manufacture insufficient to constitute enabling disclosure). The prior art and publications relied on in the instant case, however, reveal successful efforts at utilizing one piece gear unit designs. In Application of Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 271-72 & n.6, 274-75 (C.C.P.A.1968), unchallenged affidavits from experts declared that the chemical compound described in the application could not be made prior to the time of patent application, and thus, the prior art failed to contain sufficient enabling disclosures. Plaintiff in this case, on the other hand, failed to rebut the testimony of the defendant's experts that it was obvious to make a one piece gear unit, given the state of the existing skill and art
Although the case has been questioned in other contexts, see In re Le Grice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A.1962), the Supreme Court stated in Cohn v. U. S. Corset Co., 93 U.S. 366, 377, 23 L.Ed. 907 (1876):
See also General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 17 F.2d 90 (D.Del.1927), modified, 28 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656, 49 S.Ct. 180, 73 L.Ed. 565 (1928).