Source: http://openjurist.org/575/f2d/907
Timestamp: 2016-05-05 17:03:03
Document Index: 365356296

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1034', '§ 1034', '§ 1034', '§ 2387', '§ 2387', '§ 2388', '§ 2201']

575 F2d 907 Huff v. Secretary of Navy | OpenJurist
575 F. 2d 907 - Huff v. Secretary of Navy HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 575 F.2d.
575 F2d 907 Huff v. Secretary of Navy 575 F.2d 907
188 U.S.App.D.C. 26
Private Frank L. HUFF et al.v.SECRETARY OF the NAVY et al., Appellants.
No. 76-1828.
Argued Oct. 19, 1977.Decided March 15, 1978.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 15, 1978.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court enjoining the enforcement at the Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni, Japan of certain Marine Corps and Navy regulations which require prior approval for the circulation by military personnel of, inter alia, petitions to members of Congress. 413 F.Supp. 863 (1976). The District Court declared the regulations violative of both the first amendment and 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1970) insofar as they apply to materials distributed on-base during off-hours and away from restricted or work areas. For the reasons appearing herein, and by reference to the statutory, as distinct from the constitutional, ground, we affirm the District Court's judgment insofar as it relates to petitions, and vacate it insofar as it extends to other materials unrelated to the petitioning process.
Were we considering the validity of this restraint under the first amendment, the next step in that consideration would be to examine the standards which guide commanders in deciding whether to authorize petitioning activities. In the civilian context the standards would have to be narrow, objective, and definite, see Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), and there would be "a heavy presumption against (the) constitutional validity" of the system of censorship implemented by the challenged regulations. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1246, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). However, "the different character of the military community and of the military mission . . . may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it," Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2563, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). Under this more lenient constitutional standard applicable to restrictions on first amendment rights within the military sphere, the presumption against prior restraints would not be as great as it is in the civilian context; and we would be required to undertake a careful balancing of competing first amendment interests and military requirements.
The Government has strenuously argued that this case is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). We respond to this argument at some length because we think it is based on important misconceptions about the scope of the holdings in that case. The major portion of the Greer opinion related to the holding that the absolute ban on political demonstrations at Fort Dix, New Jersey was constitutionally permissible, a holding not directly relevant to the statutory issue before us relating to petitioning Congress. However, Greer also held that the first amendment rights of the civilian plaintiffs were not violated by another regulation which prohibited them from distributing political campaign literature at the base without prior command approval. Because the plaintiffs in Greer had not presented their literature for prior approval, the Court did not face the issue of whether the regulation was constitutional as applied; rather, the Court held that the challenged regulation was not facially invalid, id. at 838-840, 96 S.Ct. 1211.
Id. at 831, 96 S.Ct. at 1214. The guidelines governing command refusal of requests to distribute were in all relevant aspects identical to those in the case before us, see id. at 831, 96 S.Ct. 1211 n. 2.
We find Greer neither controlling nor persuasive with respect to the issue of the validity of the regulations implementing a system of prior restraint on petitions at the Iwakuni Air Station. Most significantly, of course, the holding in Greer was constitutionally based. The Greer Court had no occasion to consider the validity of that prior restraint regulation under § 1034 because petitions to Congress were not involved in Greer. The Court's statement that "nothing in the Constitution . . . disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command," id. at 840, 96 S.Ct. at 1218 (emphasis added),20 is therefore fully consistent with our conclusion that prior restraints on all petitioning activities at a base such as Iwakuni is violative of § 1034.
We also note that, even if we were to decide the issue before us on constitutional grounds, it is not clear that Greer would be controlling. Careful study of the regulation at issue in Greer leaves uncertain the question of whether or to what extent it in fact restricts petitioning activities. Although petitions could conceivably be encompassed within the term "other writings," it is not at all clear that solicitation of signatures is encompassed by the specific activities proscribed: "distribution" or "posting." In any event, the Greer regulation is obviously not directed at petitioning activities in the significant way that the regulations in this case are. The Supreme Court has previously enunciated the judgment that a statute should not be struck down as facially invalid simply because it potentially touches upon constitutionally protected activity at the margin. Parker v. Levy, supra 417 U.S. at 760, 94 S.Ct. 2547. Thus the Court's decision to uphold the regulation in Greer need not imply that the regulation would be constitutional if applied to petitioning activities.
We must not lose sight of the fact that this case arises from events that occurred in a purely military environment. Both the Congress and the Supreme Court have long recognized that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). For example, the Congress has made it a felony to urge or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2387-2388 (1970). Similarly, the Court has often indicated its awareness of the military's need for "a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1330, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975); see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 848, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953) (plurality opinion). I mention these well-accepted propositions to illustrate my belief that legislative and judicial actions that seek to limit a military commander's disciplinary prerogatives should be only as intrusive as is necessary to accomplish the effect desired.
Our first President, who was intimately familiar with the horrors of armed conflict, once remarked that the most effective means of securing peace is to be prepared for war. This same theme was echoed by the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 76 S.Ct. 1, 5, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955) (emphasis added): "(I)t is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise." The Congress, too, has recognized the inseparability of the military's responsibility both to wage and to be prepared to wage wars, by imposing similar sanctions on those who attempt to cause insubordination by members of the military whether during peacetime or during war. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2387 (1970) with id. § 2388.
See Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299-300, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943); Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. VI 1976)
Allen v. Monger, 404 F.Supp. 1081 (N.D.Cal.1975) (Peckham, J.), appeal pending, 9th Cir. No. 76-125; Glines v. Wade, 401 F.Supp. 127 (N.D.Cal.1975) (Orrick, J.) appeal pending, 9th Cir. No. 76-1412. Both these decisions found the challenged regulations invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds, both facially and as applied. The only other decision which has directly passed upon the validity of prior restrictions on petitioning activity is Carlson v. Schlesinger, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 511 F.2d 1327 (1975). This court there upheld the regulations as applied in that case, which involved combat zone bases during the Vietnam war. However, the court did note that it "entertain(ed) significant doubts" about the facial validity of the regulations, id. at 325, 511 F.2d at 1333
See Allen v. Monger, supra 404 F.Supp. at 1090 (P 8); Glines v. Wade, supra 401 F.Supp. at 130-31. The District Court, however, properly phrased the question as whether "the very system of prior restraints . . . is unconstitutionally restrictive of First Amendment freedoms." 413 F.Supp. at 868
MAWO 5370.1A. Nearly identical guidelines are stated in the other regulations challenged on this appeal. See also Allen v. Monger, supra 404 F.Supp. at 1086 (P 10); Glines v. Wade, supra 401 F.Supp. at 131.
See 413 F.Supp. at 867-68
It may be that this statement is not even the basis for the holding of constitutional validity. In Greer those who sought to distribute materials were civilians, and the Court cited the "historically unquestioned power of (a) commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command" (Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)) in concluding that "respondents, therefore, had no generalized constitutional right to . . . distribute leaflets at Fort Dix." Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838, 96 S.Ct. at 1217
The presumption against prohibition of petitioning activities in made even stronger by provisions of the implementing regulations that require a commander who prohibits such activities to report this fact immediately to his superior officers. See J.A. at 60, 63. See also id. at 64. Since any of these superiors has the authority to reverse the commander's prohibition decision, there thus exists a further safeguard against arbitrary application of the regulations. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831-32 n.2, 840, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976).