Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/78581390/1132-1
Timestamp: 2018-03-24 03:14:24
Document Index: 614071475

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 103', '§ 102', '§ 102']

1132-1 | Laches (Equity) | Prejudice (Legal Term)
Case 1:00-cv-00792-SLR Document 1132-1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) RAMBUS INC., ) ) Defendant. ) ) ) RAMBUS INC., ) ) Counterclaim Plaintiff, ) v. ) ) MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICRON ) ELECTRONICS, INC., and MICRON SEMI- ) CONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC., ) ) Defendants. )
C.A. No. 00-792 (SLR)
RAMBUS INC.’S REPLY BRIEF TO ADDRESS NEWLY-RAISED ISSUES IN MICRON’S RESPONSE REMAND BRIEF MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP Mary B. Graham (#2256) Rodger D. Smith II (#3778) 1201 N. Market Street P.O. Box 1347 Wilmington, DE 19899-1347 (302) 658-9200 mgraham@mnat.com rsmith@mnat.com Rollin A. Ransom Michelle B. Goodman SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 896-6600 Attorneys for Rambus Inc.
OF COUNSEL: Gregory P. Stone MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 683-9100 Charles W. Douglas Thomas K. Cauley, Jr. Brian A. McAleenan SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP One South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 853-7000 January 17, 2012
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................1 I. II. MICRON’S PROSECUTION LACHES DEFENSE HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED. .............................................................................................1 MICRON’S DEFENSE OF “DERIVATION UNDER 35 U.S.C 102(f)” HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED. ..............................................................4
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 460 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................3 Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003)..................................................................................................5 Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..............................................................................................4, 5 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2009) .......................................................................................3 Nelson v. Original Smith & Wesson Bus. Entities, No. 10-35562, 2011 WL 3855852 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011) ...................................................1, 3 Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Infineon”) .............................................................................5 RULES AND STATUTES 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) ....................................................................................................................1, 4, 5
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INTRODUCTION In its Response Brief (D.I. 1126), Micron impermissibly makes new assertions of prejudice, not just for the first time in this briefing cycle, but for the first time in this litigation. Specifically, Micron newly claims that Rambus’s implementation of its document retention policy somehow compromised Micron’s defenses of prosecution laches and “derivation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).” (D.I. 1126 at 9-10.) Micron had never asserted prejudice to these defenses – not in the briefing that it submitted in 2008 (see D.I. 1084, D.I. 1087), not in the September 17, 2008 oral argument before this Court, not in its Federal Circuit brief (available at 2009 WL 3044556), not in either of the two Federal Circuit arguments that were held, and not in its opening brief on remand (see D.I. 1123). Because neither of these prejudice arguments has been properly presented, the Court should decline to address them. In all events, Rambus has moved for leave to submit this reply brief to provide the Court with Rambus’s response to these new arguments in the event that the Court decides to consider them, notwithstanding their untimeliness. arguments. ARGUMENT I. MICRON’S PROSECUTION LACHES DEFENSE HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED. Micron’s new contention that its prosecution laches defense has been prejudiced (D.I. 1126 at 9) necessarily fails because Micron has no viable prosecution laches defense. Nelson v. Original Smith & Wesson Bus. Entities, No. 10-35562, 2011 WL 3855852, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011) (requirement that “one of [the adverse party’s] underlying, viable claims was prejudiced by the alleged spoliation”) (emphasis added). Micron elected to pursue this defense in related litigation in California, and then affirmatively abandoned it during the course of a trial These assertions of prejudice are as meritless as Micron’s other prejudice
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in that action. Micron cannot claim prejudice as to a defense that it has voluntarily abandoned. As the Court is aware, related litigation is pending between Rambus and Micron in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On July 31, 2007, the parties submitted a Joint Case Management Conference Statement (the “Joint CMC Statement”) to the California court in which they identified their claims and defenses to be included in a trial scheduled for January 2008. See Ex. A (Joint CMC Statement, Case Nos. CV 00-20905 RMW, C 05-00334 RMW, and C 06-00244 RMW (N.D. Cal.)). In Attachment 2 of the Joint CMC Statement, Micron informed the California court that its prosecution laches defense was within the scope of the January 2008 trial, and stated that the defense would be “completely resolved” by that trial. Id. at Attachment 2, 6:4-9; see also Ex. A at 2:2 (noting that listed claims and defenses – including prosecution laches – would be “resolved in their entirety” during the January 2008 trial, in contrast to other claims and defenses “in which Micron alleges a spoliation element that will not be adjudicated in January”). On January 11, 2008, after Micron and Rambus had completed their trial before this Court – during which Micron made no argument that it suffered prejudice as to its prosecution laches defense – Micron re-affirmed that it intended to present its prosecution laches claim in the California trial. See Ex. B (Joint Pretrial Statement for January 29, 2008 Trial, Case Nos. CV 00-20905 RMW, C 05-00334 RMW, and C 06-00244 RMW (N.D. Cal.)) at 2:17, 2:24-25. And, just as in this Court, Micron made no assertion in the California action that it had been prejudiced in connection with its prosecution laches argument. On the contrary, Micron advised the California court that it would forgo virtually any argument of prejudice in the January 2008 trial, in exchange for the ability to present its claims (including both the prosecution laches defense and its JEDEC-related claims) in a consolidated trial with other DRAM manufacturers.
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See Ex. C (Dec. 13, 2007 Hearing Tr., Case Nos. CV 00-20905 RMW, C 05-00334 RMW, and C 06-00244 RMW (N.D. Cal.)) at 28:7-29:10 (noting that Micron had agreed to exclude spoliationrelated arguments from the January 2008 trial “to retain the consolidated proceeding”). The consolidated trial commenced on January 31, 2008. At the close of Micron and the other DRAM manufacturers’ case-in-chief, Rambus moved for judgment as a matter of law on, among other things, the prosecution laches defense. See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In response, Micron and the other
manufacturers explicitly abandoned prosecution laches, advising the court that they did not “intend to proceed with the prosecution laches part of the case.” Id. The court specifically recognized abandonment of the prosecution laches defense in its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. Id. (manufacturers “did not put on evidence relevant to their prosecution laches defenses” and subsequently withdrew it). This history confirms that Micron’s newly manufactured claim of prejudice as to its prosecution laches defense has no merit – Micron could not possibly be prejudiced with respect to a defense so weak that it presented no evidence or argument to support it, and then affirmatively abandoned it. In re Bridge Info. Sys., Inc., 460 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) (party abandons a defense by failing to offer any evidence in support). In sum, Micron elected to have its prosecution laches defense tried in the California action; it advised both Rambus and the California court that the prosecution laches defense would be “completely resolved” in that trial; and the prosecution laches defense was, in fact, completely resolved when Micron abandoned it at trial. Micron has no viable prosecution laches defense, and therefore cannot claim spoliationrelated prejudice in connection with it. Nelson, 2011 WL 3855852, at *3.
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MICRON’S DEFENSE OF “DERIVATION UNDER 35 U.S.C 102(f)” HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED. Micron also asserts that its defense of “derivation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f)” may have
been prejudiced. (D.I. 1126 at 10.) As with prosecution laches, Micron never mentioned this defense before now. Of particular importance, Micron did not identify this defense in its
complaint, in its reply to Rambus’s counterclaims, or in its interrogatory responses attached to its responsive remand brief, which ostensibly specify all of Micron’s invalidity defenses. See, e.g., D.I. 735 at 16 (asserting invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 solely on obviousness and anticipation grounds); Appendix to Micron’s Response Remand Brief, Vol. 1, Ex. 1, at 4-22 (filed under seal on Dec. 21, 2011) (setting forth bases for invalidity defenses). Micron cannot assert prejudice as to a defense it has not preserved, and certainly not for the first time here. In all events, Micron’s claim of prejudice fails. As Micron acknowledges, derivation under § 102(f) requires a showing of both “prior conception of the invention by another and communication of that conception to the patentee.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The first prong of this test – prior conception of the invention by another – does not depend on documents internal to Rambus; on the contrary, documents reflecting conception of the invention “by another” would necessarily be found in the files of that other party. And on the facts of this case, the second prong of this test –
communication of that conception to the patentee – likewise does not depend on internal Rambus documents. Micron asserts that Rambus may have derived its inventions “from MIPS and/or JEDEC standards.” (D.I. 1126 at 10.) As to MIPS, it is undisputed that Professor Farmwald worked for MIPS prior to forming Rambus with Professor Horowitz. (Tr. 1195:5-1199:24.) It is therefore self-evident that Farmwald had access to the MIPS material with which he was involved during his employment. And as to derivation from “JEDEC standards,” the fact and
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extent of Rambus’s participation in JEDEC is likewise undisputed, as is the public nature of the resulting JEDEC standards. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Infineon”).1 Micron’s newfound derivation defense fails for other reasons as well. It is well-
established that “the communication [of the previously-conceived invention] must be sufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the patented invention.” Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Gambro Lundia, 110 F.3d at 1578. On this score, the report of Micron’s own expert, Joseph McAlexander, actually refutes Micron’s claim: nowhere does McAlexander opine that any MIPS reference, standing alone, renders any of the claims of the patents-in-suit either anticipated or obvious, much less that any MIPS reference would enable one of ordinary skill to make any of the patented inventions. See D.I. 1128-2 (Appendix to Micron’s Response Remand Brief, Vol. 2, Ex. 2 at Exs. A-H). Moreover, McAlexander does not even reference JEDEC, much less assert that any JEDEC standard is invalidating. Because Micron cannot prove – much less by clear and convincing evidence – that disclosure of any previously-conceived invention would have permitted one of ordinary skill in the art to make the inventions claimed in Rambus’s patents, Micron’s derivation claim necessarily fails.2 For all of these reasons, there can be no prejudice as to a § 102(f) defense, even assuming Micron had actually preserved it.
In any event, Rambus submitted its original patent application in 1990, some three years before JEDEC first published its SDRAM standard. Infineon, 318 F.3d at 1084, 1085. Accordingly, Rambus cannot have derived its inventions from a later-published JEDEC standard.
To the extent Micron’s “derivation” defense is based on its assertion that MIPS, rather than Rambus, owns the inventions at issue (e.g., D.I. 1126 at 8-9), this assertion is addressed – and refuted – in Rambus’s earlier briefing. See, e.g., D.I. 1130 at 20 n.9; D.I. 1086 at 17-18.
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Mary B. Graham (#2256) Rodger D. Smith II (#3778) 1201 N. Market Street P.O. Box 1347 Wilmington, DE 19899-1347 (302) 658-9200 mgraham@mnat.com rsmith@mnat.com Attorneys for Rambus Inc. OF COUNSEL: Gregory P. Stone MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 (213) 683-9100 Charles W. Douglas Thomas K. Cauley, Jr. Brian A. McAleenan SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP One South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60603 (312) 853-7000 January 17, 2012
Rollin A. Ransom Michelle B. Goodman SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 896-6600
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