Source: http://openjurist.org/515/us/39
Timestamp: 2017-08-16 15:35:51
Document Index: 497084597

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2241', '§ 2254', '§ 2241', '§ 2241', '§ 2241']

515 US 39 Garlotte v. Fordice | OpenJurist
515 U.S. 39 - Garlotte v. Fordice
515 US 39 Garlotte v. Fordice
515 U.S. 39
115 S.Ct. 1948
132 L.Ed.2d 36
Harvey F. GARLOTTE, Petitioner,
Kirk FORDICE, Governor of Mississippi.
A Mississippi trial court ordered that petitioner Garlotte serve, consecutively, a 3-year prison sentence on a marijuana conviction, followed by concurrent life sentences on two murder convictions. State law required Garlotte to serve at least 10 months on the first sentence and 10 years on the concurrent sentences. Garlotte unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction collateral relief on the marijuana conviction. By the time those proceedings ended, he had completed the period of incarceration set for the marijuana offense, and had commenced serving the life sentences. The Federal District Court denied his subsequent federal habeas petition on the merits, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals adopted the State's position that Garlotte had already served out the prison time imposed for the marijuana conviction and, therefore, was no longer "in custody" under the conviction within the meaning of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court rejected Garlotte's argument that he remained "in custody" because the marijuana conviction continued to postpone the date on which he would be eligible for parole.
(a) In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426, this Court allowed two prisoners incarcerated under consecutive sentences to apply for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to serve. Viewing consecutive sentences in the aggregate, the Court held that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is "in custody" under any one of them for purposes of the habeas statute. A different construction of the statutory term "in custody" will not be adopted here simply because the sentence imposed under the challenged conviction lies in the past rather than in the future. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540—in which the Court held that a habeas petitioner could not challenge a conviction after the sentence imposed for it had fully expired—does not control this case, for the habeas petitioner in Maleng, unlike Garlotte, was not serving consecutive sentences. Pp. __.
(b) Allowing a habeas attack on a sentence nominally completed is unlikely to encourage delay in the assertion of habeas challenges. A prisoner naturally prefers release sooner to release later, and delay is apt to disadvantage a petitioner—who has the burden of proof—more than the State. Moreover, under Habeas Corpus Rule 9(a), a district court may dismiss a habeas petition if the State has been prejudiced in its ability to respond because of inexcusable delay in the petition's filing. Pp. __.
To petition a federal court for habeas corpus relief from a state court conviction, the applicant must be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968), we held that the governing federal prescription permits prisoners incarcerated under consecutive state court sentences to apply for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to serve. We said in Peyton that, for purposes of habeas relief, consecutive sentences should be treated as a continuous series; a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution," we explained, "if any consecutive sentence [the prisoner] is scheduled to serve was imposed as the result of a deprivation of constitutional rights." Id., at 64-65, 88 S.Ct., at 1555.
On October 6, 1989, Garlotte filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, naming as respondent Kirk Fordice, the Governor of Mississippi.1 Adopting the recommendation of a federal magistrate judge, the District Court denied Garlotte's petition on the merits. App. 18.
Adopting the State's position, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Garlotte's habeas petition for want of jurisdiction. Ibid. The Courts of Appeals have divided over the question whether a person incarcerated under consecutive sentences remains "in custody" under a sentence that (1) has been completed in terms of prison time served, but (2) continues to postpone the prisoner's date of potential release.2 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 929, 130 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995), and now reverse.3
The federal habeas statute authorizes United States district courts to entertain petitions for habeas relief from state court judgments only when the petitioner is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968), we held that the statute authorized the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of two State of Virginia prisoners, Robert Rowe and Clyde Thacker. Rowe and Thacker were incarcerated under consecutive sentences; both sought to challenge sentences slated to run in the future. Virginia, relying on McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), argued that the habeas petitions were premature. Overruling McNally, we explained:
"[I]n common understanding 'custody' comprehends respondents' status for the entire duration of their imprisonment. Practically speaking, Rowe is in custody for 50 years, or for the aggregate of his 30- and 20-year sentences. For purposes of parole eligibility, under Virginia law he is incarcerated for 50 years. Nothing on the face of § 2241 militates against an interpretation which views Rowe and Thacker as being 'in custody' under the aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed on them. Under that interpretation, they are 'in custody in violation of the Constitution' if any consecutive sentence they are scheduled to serve was imposed as the result of a deprivation of constitutional rights." 391 U.S., at 64-65, 88 S.Ct., at 1555 (citations omitted).
Had the Mississippi trial court ordered that Garlotte's life sentences run before his marijuana sentence—an option about which the prosecutor expressed indifference—Peyton unquestionably would have instructed the District Court to entertain Garlotte's present habeas petition. Because the marijuana term came first, and Garlotte filed his habeas petition (following state court proceedings) after prison time had run on the marijuana sentence, Mississippi urges that Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (per curiam), rather than Peyton, controls.
Maleng recognized that we had "very liberally construed the 'in custody' requirement for purposes of federal habeas," but stressed that the Court had "never extended it to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from a conviction." Ibid. "[A]lmost all States have habitual offender statutes, and many States provide . . . for specific enhancement of subsequent sentences on the basis of prior convictions," ibid.; hence, the construction of "in custody" urged by the habeas petitioner in Maleng would have left nearly all convictions perpetually open to collateral attack. The Maleng petitioner's interpretation, we therefore commented, "would read the 'in custody' requirement out of the statute." Ibid.4
Unlike the habeas petitioner in Maleng, Garlotte is serving consecutive sentences. In Peyton, we held that "a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is 'in custody' under any one of them" for purposes of the habeas statute. 391 U.S., at 67, 88 S.Ct., at 1556. Having construed the statutory term "in custody" to require that consecutive sentences be viewed in the aggregate, we will not now adopt a different construction simply because the sentence imposed under the challenged conviction lies in the past rather than in the future.5
In holding that Garlotte was in custody for his expired marijuana conviction, the Court relies heavily on Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968). There, petitioners wished to challenge sentences that they had not yet begun to serve, claiming that they were nevertheless "in custody" under these sentences. Overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), we held that such challenges could proceed. Practical considerations drove us to adopt a rule permitting early challenges to convictions. Allowing challenges to sentences that had yet to commence might prevent stale claims from being brought years after the crime and trial. Peyton, 391 U.S., at 62-63, 88 S.Ct., at 1553-54. Recognizing that the first reason for finding the petitioners in Peyton "in custody" is not present here (and indeed may cut against the majority's conclusion), the Court relies on the second ground, namely that a prisoner serving time under consecutive sentences "is 'in custody' under any one of them for purposes of § 2241(c)(3)." Ante, at ___ (quoting id., 391 U.S., at 67, 88 S.Ct., at 1556).1
In my view, Peyton ought to be construed as limited to situations in which a habeas petitioner challenges a yet unexpired sentence. This would satisfy Peyton's policy concerns by permitting challenges to unserved sentences at an earlier time. More importantly, this interpretation would also make sense of Maleng v. Cook's proper insistence that the habeas statute does not permit prisoners to challenge expired convictions. 490 U.S. 488, 490-491, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 1924-25, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) ("We have interpreted the statutory language as requiring that the habeas petitioner be 'in custody' under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed"). The majority, however, relies upon broad language in one opinion to ignore language in another.2 Given the statute's text and the oddity of asserting that Garlotte is still serving time under the expired marijuana conviction, I would read Peyton narrowly. Accordingly, I dissent.