Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/441/750/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-11-21 17:03:23
Document Index: 529506436

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 7', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 706', '§ 14', '§ 2000', '§ 626', '§ 633', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 706', '§ 14', '§ 626', '§ 14', '§ 633', '§ 14']

We hold that § 14(b) mandates that a grievant not bring suit in federal court under § 7(c) of the ADEA until he has first resorted to appropriate state administrative proceedings. We also hold, however, that the grievant is not required by § 14(b) to commence the state proceedings within time limits specified by state law. In light of these holdings, it is not chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners argue that § 14(b) mandates that in States with agencies empowered to remedy age discrimination in employment (deferral States) a grievant may not bring suit chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Congress intended through § 706(c) to screen from the federal courts those problems of civil rights that could be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant in "a voluntary and localized manner." See 110 Cong.Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). The section is intended to give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination, and thereby to make unnecessary resort to federal relief by victims of the discrimination. See Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (CA2 1971). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The contrary arguments advanced by respondent in support of construing § 14(b) as merely optional are not persuasive. Respondent notes first that, under Title VII, persons aggrieved must file with a state antidiscrimination agency before filing with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Under the ADEA, by contrast, grievants may file with state and federal agencies simultaneously. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) and 633(b). [Footnote 4] From this respondent concludes that the ADEA pays less deference to state agencies, and that, as a consequence, ADEA claimants have the option to ignore state remedies. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We consider now the consequences of respondent's failure to file a complaint with the Iowa State Civil Rights Commission. Petitioners argue that, since Iowa's 120-day age discrimination chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (emphasis added). By its terms, then, the section requires only that state proceedings be commenced 60 days before federal litigation is instituted; besides commencement, no other obligation is placed upon the ADEA grievant. In particular, there is no requirement that, in order to commence state proceedings and thereby preserve federal rights, the grievant must file with the State within whatever time limits are specified by state law. Rather, use of the word "commenced" strongly implies the opposite -- that state limitations periods are irrelevant -- since, by way of analogy, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even a time-barred action may be "commenced" by the filing of a complaint. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 3; Malotti v. Ford Motor Co., 418 F.Supp. 430, 434 (ED Mich.1976). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This has been the prevailing interpretation of § 14(b). See Nickel v. Shatterproof Class Corp., 424 F.Supp. 884 (ED Mich.1976); Magalotti v. Ford Motor Co., supra. [Footnote 7] It is also the prevailing interpretation of § 14(b)'s counterpart, § 706(c) of Title VII, which contains an identical definition of commencement. See Davis v. Valley Distributing Co., 522 F.2d 827, 831-833 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 429 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
U.S. 1090 (1977); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1232; Pinckney v. County of Northampton, 433 F.Supp. 373, 376 n. 1 (ED Pa.1976); McAdams v. Thermal Industries, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 156, 161 (WD la.1977); De Gideo v. Sperry-Univac Co., 415 F.Supp. 227, 229 (ED Pa.1976); see also White v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 581 F.2d 556, 562 n. 10 (CA5 1978) (en banc) (filing with EEOC tolls state limitations period for federal purposes); Ferguson v. Kroger Co., 545 F.2d 1034 (CA6 1976) (EEOC's negligent failure to refer charge to state agency within state limitations period does not foreclose federal claim). But see Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (CA3 1971).
It is also consistent with the purposes of § 14(b). Section 14(b) does not stipulate an exhaustion requirement. The section is intended only to give state agencies a limited opportunity to settle the grievances of ADEA claimants in a voluntary and localized manner, so that the grievants thereafter have no need or desire for independent federal relief. Individuals should not be penalized if States decline, for whatever reason, to take advantage of these opportunities. See Pacific Maritime Assn. v. Quinn, 465 F.2d 108 (CA9 1972). Congress did not intend to foreclose federal relief simply because state relief was also foreclosed. See Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 893. [Footnote 8] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The structure of the ADEA reinforces the conclusion that state procedural defaults cannot foreclose federal relief and that state limitations periods cannot govern the efficacy of the federal remedy. The ADEA's limitations periods are set forth in explicit terms in 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) [Footnote 9] and (e), [Footnote 10] not § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). Sections 626(d) and (e) adequately chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The strongest argument against this construction of the statute is that it would permit grievants to avoid state intervention chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We therefore hold that respondent may yet comply with the requirements of § 14(b) by simply filing a signed complaint with the Iowa State Civil Rights Commission. That Commission must be given an opportunity to entertain respondent's grievance before his federal litigation can continue. Meanwhile, the federal suit should be held in abeyance. If, as respondent fears, his state complaint is subsequently dismissed as untimely, respondent may then return to federal chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
My preference in this case would have been to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I am so inclined because I regard the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be a remedial statute that is to be liberally construed, and because chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court acknowledges that the "question of construction is close." Ante at 441 U. S. 755. But this is one of those cases that occasionally appears in the procedural area where it is more important that it be decided (in order to dispel existing conflict, see ante at 441 U. S. 760-761, and n. 7) than that it be decided correctly. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary