Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/293/155/case.php
Timestamp: 2017-10-16 22:02:57
Document Index: 120766973

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4530', '§ 31', '§ 597', '§ 564', '§ 4511', '§ 837', '§ 2174', '§ 34', '§ 1', '§ 713', '§ 713', '§ 65', '§ 4612', '§ 65', '§ 713', '§ 713']

The statute is set forth at large in opinions of this Court. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 264 U. S. 383; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367, 287 U. S. 371. It gives to "any seaman" injured in the course of his employment and, in case of the death of such seaman, to his personal representatives, a cause of action similar to that given by the statutes of the United States to railway employees. In the enforcement of the statute, a policy of liberal construction announced at the beginning has been steadily maintained. Early in the history of the act, the question came up whether it gave a remedy to stevedores. We decided that it did. "It is true that for most purposes, as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not seamen.'" International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 272 U. S. 52. Nonetheless, verbal niceties were bent to the overmastering purpose of the act to give protection to workers injured upon ships. "Words," we said, "are chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There are contexts in which the word seaman is held to exclude the master, or even any officer. See, e.g., R.S. § 4530, as amended by § 31 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (46 U.S.C. § 597); also 46 U.S.C. §§ 564, 568, 570, 592, 594, 658, reenacting R.S. §§ 4511, 4515, 4517, 4525, 4527 4561, as from time to time amended. There are other contexts in which it takes them in. 28 U.S.C. § 837; also R.S. § 2174; In re Scott, 250 F.6d 7, 648; The Balsa, 10 F.2d 408; The Burns Bros., No. 31, 29 F.2d 855. The respondent points to statutes that develop the antithesis between a seaman and those over him. See citations, supra. They do not carry us very far, any more than the contrast that exists for many purposes between a seaman and a stevedore. In a broad sense, a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the sea. It is enough that what he does affects "the operation and welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage." The Buena Ventura, 243 F.7d 7, 799, where a wireless operator was brought within the term. In a narrow sense, the term is chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
United States v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 209, 213-214, Fed.Cas. No. 16,740 (Story, J.); cf. The Buena Ventura, supra, 243 F.7d 9 (Hough, J.); The Bound Brook, 146 F.1d 0, 164; United States v. Huff, 13 F.6d 0. What concerns us here and now is not the scope of the class of seamen at other times and in other contexts. Our concern is to define the meaning for the purpose of a particular statute which must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained. Congress knew that men employed upon a ship were without a remedy in damages for negligence beyond their cure and maintenance, unless the injury was a consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship or a defect in her equipment. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 247 U. S. 384; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra. This restriction upon remedies was applicable to ordinary seamen, but applicable also to officers and even to the master. The George, 1 Sumn. 151, Fed.Cas. No. 5,329 (Story, J.); The Balsa, supra.
Story, J., in The George, supra, at p. 155. Cf. the rule in Great Britain under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, No. 48, § 34). The old measure of recovery was the same for all aboard, the highest and the lowest. The new measure was not designed to narrow the protected class while broadening the damages. We chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The scheme of legislation becomes symmetrical and consistent when the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 is read in the light of another act in pari materia -- the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 1 et seq., adopted in 1927. This act expressly excludes from its "coverage" a "master or member of a chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri rested its opinion on § 713 of Title 46, c. 18 of the U.S.Code, which, for the purpose of construction, defines a master and a seaman, as well as other terms. [Footnote 2] With a few verbal changes, § 713 is a reenactment of § 65 [Footnote 3] of the Act of June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. 277), which was chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
then known as § 4612 of the Revised Statutes. In the compilation of the Code, some of the provisions for the protection of seamen contained in the Act of 1872 were placed in Title 46, which relates to shipping, and particularly in Chapter 18 of that title, which relates to "Merchant Seamen." They had previously been reenacted, as parts of the Revised Statutes, along with § 65. The Acts of 1915 and 1920 were placed in the same chapter and title, and were thus brought into contiguity with the sections carried over from the Act of 1872. Very clearly, the change of location did not work a change of meaning. The rule of construction laid down in § 713 must be confined to those sections of the chapter which were contained in the Act of 1872, or in the equivalent provisions of the Revised Statutes, before the Code had rearranged them. The compilers of the Code were not empowered by Congress to amend existing law, and doubtless had no thought of doing so. As to that, the command of Congress is too clear to be misread. 44 Stat. Part I, 1. [Footnote 4] To this it must be added that § 713, even in its relation to the sections fairly within its range, is "directed to extension, not to restriction." Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., supra at chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The case for the respondent reduces itself to this -- that, by express or implied antithesis, the word "seaman" is used in many statutes to designate a class of mariners exclusive of the master. It is also true, however, that, in these same statutes, a seaman excludes a stevedore. A goodly number of the statutes where the antithesis is sharpest lay a duty upon the master to be performed for the seamen under him. In laws so framed, there is no room for construction. A goodly number in addition give a remedy to seamen for wages wrongfully withheld, or define terms of payment that agreement may not vary. In respect of dealings of that order, the maritime law, by inveterate tradition, has made the ordinary seaman a member of a favored class. He is a "ward of the admiralty," often ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection against himself as well as others. The master, on the other hand, is able in most instances to drive a bargain for himself, and then, when the bargain is made, to stand upon his rights. Discrimination may thus be rational in respect of remedies for wages. The Bethulia, 200 F.8d 6; The Putnick, 291 F.9d 2. It is neither rational nor just if extended to remedies for bodily wounds. At such times, master and seaman are approximately equal. Congress did not mean that the master, any more than the seaman, should be left without a remedy if wounded in his body, or that his dependents were to be helpless if the wounds resulted in his death.
See Grimberg v. Admiral Oriental S.S. Line, 300 F.6d 9; The Sea Lark, 14 F.2d 201; Kuhlman v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 20 F.2d 465; Rogosich v. Union Dry Dock & Repair Co., 67 F.2d 377, and cf. The Buena Ventura, 243 F.7d 7, 799: