Source: http://www.wiwb.uscourts.gov/judges-info/opinions?page=25
Timestamp: 2018-11-14 02:36:10
Document Index: 547075493

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 105', '§ 523', '§507', '§ 1322', '§ 1325', '§ 1325', '§ 523', '§ 523', '§ 523', '§ 523', '§ 1738', '§ 940', '§ 348', '§ 365']

DISCH (Unpublished) 02/11/2003
Case No. 02-10821-7
11 U.S.C. § 105 -- Power of court
11 U.S.C.§ 523(a) -- Execptions to discharge
PARTY CONCEPTS V. AMERICAN GREETINGS (Unpublished) 06/26/2002
Case No. 01-34625-11
Defendants filed a motion to compel the production of all documents pertaining to a stock purchase agreement and a supply agreement, the former of which was the focus of a breach of contract action against defendant. These documents contained a memorandum from counsel marked "attorney-client communication." Defendants argued that plaintiff had waived any attorney-client privilege by disclosing it to defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) allows a court to limit discovery to the actual claims or defenses pled in a case. The court also has discretion under Fed. R. Civ P. 26(b)(2)(iii) to limit discovery if it determines that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . ." This court determined that even though the attorney-client privilege was waived, discovery is not compelled. Defendants' motion to compel is denied.
Fed. R. Evid. Rule 26(b)(1) -- Discovery Scope and Limits -- In General
Fed. R. Evid. Rule 26(b)(2) -- Discovery Scope and Limits -- Limitations
GREEN, MICHELLE (Unpublished) 03/28/2002
Case No. 01-34494-13
HOMMERDING (Unpublished) 03/07/2002
Case No. 01-30061-13
11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1) -- Priorities
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)
GAUSEWITZ (Unpublished) 02/22/2002
Case No. 01-34926-13
TOMAS-HAARSTICK (Unpublished) 12/07/2001
Case No. 01-34821-7
This case involves hypothetical discharge and its procedural requirements. Plaintiff filed an adversary complaint to determine whether a debt was dischargeable and the debtor answered. But the plaintiff filed the initial complaint thinking it was against debtor’s husband who has a similar first name as debtor. Plaintiff amended the complaint by adding allegations against debtor’s husband and objecting to the hypothetical discharge of his tortious debt. However, plaintiff did not seek the debtor’s or court’s consent before amending the complaint. In addition, the plaintiff did not name debtor’s spouse on the amended complaint. The time limit to object to debtor’s discharge had since passed. Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding contending that any complaint seeking to deny debtor’s spouse’s hypothetical discharge is now time barred. Plaintiff responded by filing a motion to enlarge the time within which to bring the action under § 523(a)(6), which motion in itself is untimely but which was considered as a motion to further amend the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). It was determined that the motion to amend the complaint to name debtor’s spouse as a defendant is granted
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(a) -- Amendments
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 15(c)(3)
SASOPA (Unpublished) 08/06/2001
Case No. 98-35054-7
In 1996 debtor physically attacked plaintiff. Debtor was charged with aggravated battery with intent to cause substantial bodily harm and pled guilty. In 1998 plaintiff commenced an intentional tort action against debtor. Prior to judgment being rendered debtor filed her chapter 7 petition staying the tort action. Plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding seeking summary judgment arguing that as a result of the guilty plea in the criminal action, debtor was collaterally estopped from contesting the willful and malicious nature of the injury that gave rise to the debt. The court denied the summary judgment motion. The parties agreed to lifting the stay to permit the state tort action to proceed to judgment, which was subsequently entered. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment for a second time contending that the tort judgment supports collateral estoppel and bars debtor from contesting the willful and malicious nature of her debt for purposes of § 523(a)(6). This court determined that she was correct and granted her motion for summary judgment.
11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6) -- Nondischargeability - willful and malicious injury
28 U.S.C. § 1738 -- State and Territorial statutes and judicial proceedings: full faith and credit
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(5)
REIGLE (Unpublished) 07/31/2001
Case No. 00-34495-7
Debtors challenged claim of First American Credit Union (“FACU”). At issue is whether a car pledged as security for a direct loan also secured a credit card debt by virtue of a dragnet clause in the loan contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment based on stipulated facts. Debtors made three arguments: that FACU never explained the meaning of the dragnet clause in the contract; that they did not read the dragnet clauses and had no intention of pledging the car as security for the credit card debt, and that the dragnet clauses in the Rules and car loan contract "were in boilerplate fine print." FACU countered that the dragnet clauses were customary and ordinary provisions and that debtors’ intent to pledge the car as security interest for the credit card debt is evident from the fact that debtors received the Rules and signed the car loan contract, both of which included dragnet clauses. FACU further argued that it had no obligation to explain the meaning or effect of the dragnet clauses to debtors. It was determined that the intent of debtors to grant FACU a security interest in the car for other debts is evident from the clear language of the dragnet clauses in the Rules and the car loan contract.
HAHN (Unpublished) 07/27/2001
Case No. 98-36236-7
This adversary proceeding was brought by the trustee against Farmers Bank to determine the validity of Farmers Bank’s security interest in proceeds from crop support contracts between debtors and the USDA. The parties reached a stipulated resolution. In exchange, Farmers Bank released its claim on proceeds that had been paid to the estate and the trustee agreed to assist Farmers Bank in securing unpaid proceeds that the USDA had refused to pay. The USDA was then joined. The USDA argued that the PFC contracts were rejected and deemed that rejection a breach of the PFC contracts, which entitled the USDA to treat the contracts as void. The trustee and Farmers Bank argued that the PFC contracts were abandoned in the chapter 11 case, leaving nothing to be rejected either before or after the case was converted. The PFC contracts were abandoned by a proper order in the chapter 11 case. That abandonment removed the contracts from the chapter 11 estate and ended the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over them. The abandoned status of the contracts was not altered by the conversion of the case to chapter 7. The effect of abandonment was to return all parties to the PFC contracts to their legal positions prior to the bankruptcy filing.
11 U.S.C. § 348 -- Conversion
11 U.S.C. § 365 -- Executory contracts\