Source: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/mar1999/gr_130872_1999.html
Timestamp: 2019-03-20 08:11:08
Document Index: 656281958

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 171', 'Art. 171', 'Art. 171', 'Art. 171', 'Art. 171', 'Art. 171']

G.R. No. 130872
G.R. No. 130872	March 25, 1999
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners,
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, father and son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. 1 They now seek a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red 2 won as KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz, did not run as candidate in this electoral exercise as he was no longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit fixed by law.
a)	imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of FIVE (5) YEARS, ELEVEN (11) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional to a maximum of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor FOR EACH OF THE ABOVE CASES;
. . . . when, therefore, accused MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ entered the name of his son, the accused LENLIE LECAROZ, in the payroll of the municipality of Sta. Cruz for the payroll period starting January 15, 1986, reinstating accused LENLIE LECAROZ to his position in the Sangguniang Bayan, he was deliberately stating a falsity when he certified that LENLIE LECAROZ was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The fact is that even accused LENLIE LECAROZ himself no longer attended the sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz, and starting with the payroll for January 16 to 31, 1986, did not personally pick up his salaries anymore.
The accused MAYOR's acts would fall under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 171.	Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary public who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
Likewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused LENLIE LECAROZ, was able to draw salaries from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered. This constitutes Estafa . . . . the deceit being the falsification made, and the prejudice being that caused to the municipality of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque for having paid salaries to LENLIE LECAROZ who was not entitled thereto.
There is no justifiable reason why accused MAYOR LECAROZ should have reinstated his son LENLIE in the municipal payrolls from January 16, 1986 to January 31, 1987, yet he did so. He could not have had any other purpose than to enable his son LENLIE to draw salaries thereby. This conclusion inescapable considering that the very purpose of a payroll is precisely that — to authorize the payment of salaries. And LENLIE LECAROZ did his part by actually drawing the salaries during the periods covered, albeit through another person whom he had authorized.
By the facts proven, there was conspiricy in the commission of Estafa between father and son.
However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It found that Red was neither authorized to sit as member of the SB because he was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal council. On this basis, the court a quo concluded that Mayor Lecaroz was legally justified in not allowing Red to assume the position of Kagawad.
On 1 October 1994 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed by the accused. This prompted herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that the Sandiganbayan erred:
First, in holding that Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assembly woman Carmencita Reyes on 27 September 1985, and in concluding that the tenure of accused Lenlie Lecaroz as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired;
Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which they, had been convicted required criminal intent and malice as essential elements;
Sec. 7.	Term of office. — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataan barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure as president fo their respective association and federation.
Sec 1.	All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does, not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. 8 The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, 9 otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assembly woman Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 673314 on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that, members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were convicted, i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code, are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice. 19 If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. Was criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitioners' conviction? It does not so appear in the case at bar.
First.	When Jowil Red showed up at the meeting of the Sanggunian on 7 January 1986, what he presented to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz was a mere telegram purportedly sent by Imee Marcos-Manotoc informing him of his supposed appointment to the SB, together with a photocopy of a "Mass Appointment." Without authenticated copies of the appointment papers, Red had no right to assume office as KB representative to the Sanggunian, and petitioner Mayor Lecaroz had every right to withhold recognition, as he did, of Red as a member of the Sanggunian.
Second.	It appears from the records that although Red received his appointment papers signed by President Marcos in January 1986, he forwarded the same to Mayor Francisco Lecaroz only on 23 April 1986 during which time President Marcos had already been deposed and President Aquino had already taken over the helm of government. On 25 March 1986 the Freedom Constitution came into being providing in Sec. 2 of Art. III thereof that —
Sec. 2.	All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise, provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation of their successors if such appointment is made within a period of one (1) year from February 26, 1986. (emphasis supplied).
It is informed, however, that until replaced by the Office of the President or by this Ministry the appointive members of the various Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall continue to hold office and to receive compensation due them under existing laws, rules and regulations.
The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG Circulars virtually confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry. Explicit therein was the caveat that newly elected KB Federation Presidents could not assume the right to represent their respective associations in any Sanggunian unless their appointments were authenticated by then President Aquino herself. Truly, prudence impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.
Third.	Petitioners presented six (6) certified copies of opinions of the Secretaries of Justice of Presidents Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino concerning the doctrine of holdover. These consistently expressed the view espoused by the executive branch for more than thirty (30) years that the mere fixing of the term of office in a statute without an express prohibition against holdover is not indicative of a legislative intent to prohibit it, in light of the legal principle that just as nature abhors a vacuum so does the law abhor a vacancy in the government. 23 Reliance by petitioners on these opinions, as, well as on the pertinent directives of the then Ministry of Interior and Local Government, provided them with an unassailable status of good faith in holding over and acting on such basis; and,
Fourth.	It is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and respected in the community, would deliberately blemish his good name, and worse, involve his own son in a misconduct for a measly sum of P23,675.00, such as this case before us. As aptly deduced by Justice Del Rosario. 24
If I were to commit a crime, would I involve my son in it? And if I were a town mayor, would I ruin my name for the measly sum of P1,894.00 a month? My natural instinct as a father to protect my own son and the desire, basic in every man, to preserve one's honor and reputation would suggest a resounding NO to both questions. But the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that precisely because they were father and son and despite the relatively small amount involved, accused Mayor Francisco Lecaroz conspired with Lenlie Lecaroz to falsify several municipal payrolls for the purpose of swindling their own town of the amount of P1,894,00 a month, and the majority has found them guilty. I find disconhfort with this verdict basically for the reason that there was no criminal intent on their part to falsify any document or to swindle the government.
In ascribing malice and bad faith to petitioner Mayor Lecaroz, the Sandiganbayan cited two (2) circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent. It pointed out that the name of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term had finally ended, and that the reinstatement of Lenlie Lecaroz by Mayor Francisco Lecaroz in the payroll periods from 15 January 1986 and thereafter for the next twelve and a half (12-1/2) months was for no other purpose than to enable him to draw salaries from the municipality. 29 There is however no evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Mayor Francisco Lecaroz himself caused the name of Lenlie Lecaroz to be dropped from the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986. On the contrary, it is significant that while Lenlie Lecaroz' name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of January 1986, yet, in the payroll for the next quincena accused Lenlie Lecaroz was paid for both the first and second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the month which would have been the case if he was actually "dropped" from the payroll for the first fifteen (15) days and then "reinstated" in the succeeding payroll period, as held by the court a quo.
From all indications, it is possible that the omission was due to the inadequate documentation of Red's appointment to and assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which was later rectified in the succeeding payroll. This however cannot be confirmed by the evidence at hand. But since a doubt is now created about the import of such omission, the principle of equipoise should properly apply. This rule demands that all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not a crime should be resolved in favor of the accused. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 30
When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was making not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as member of the Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position. This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any "misrepresentation" of this kind cannot constitute the crime of false pretenses. 31 In People v. Yanza 32 we
ruled —
Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to be inexact or erroneous — not entirely groundless — we are all of the opinion that she may not be declared guilty of falsification, specially because the law which she has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other provisions), punishes the making of untruthful statements in a narration of facts — emphasis on facts . . . . Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment; but she could not be held thereby to have intentionally made a false statement of fact in violation of Art. 171 above-mentioned.
Finally, contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in this case. The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son Lenlie Lecaroz and that as a consequence thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally acceptable indicia, for they are the very same acts alleged in the Information as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together however, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of 7 October 1994 and Resolution of 1 October 1997 of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ are ACQUITTED of all the thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents (Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916). The bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are cancelled and released. Costs de oficio.
1	Crim. Cases Nos. 13904-13916, People v. Francisco M. Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz, assigned to the First Division, Sandiganbayan.
2	Also referred to in the records as "Joel Red."
3	Rollo, p. 68.
4	TSN, 23 October 1991, p. 30.
5	Id., pp. 32-33.
6	State v. Simon, 26 P. 170, 20 Or. 365, 377.
7	Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 397, pp. 257-258.	See Nuevo v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12 (1946).
8	46 Corpus Juris 964, 968.
9	See Note 7.
10	See Duldulao v. Ramos, 91 Phil. 261 (1952).
11	Johnson v. Collins, 464 P.2d 647, 11 Ariz. App. 327.
12	State ex rel. Barnes v. Holbrook, 70 A.2d 556, 136 Conn. 312.
13	Foley v. McNab, 248 N.Y.S.2d 354, 42 Misc.2d 460.
14	"An Act to Amend Section 21, Title I, Book I of the Revised Administrative Code, and Section 41, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, Granting Members of Both Houses of the Congress of the Philippines the General Authority to Administer Oaths, and for Other Purposes."
15	Smith v. County Engineering of San Diego County, 72 Cal. Rptr. 501, 266 C.A. 2d 645.
16	Tappy v. State ex rel. Byington, 82 So. 2d 161.
17	Kreidler v. State, 24 Ohio St. 22.
19	People v. Beronilla, 96 Phil. 566 (1955).
20	People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 49 (1924).
21	Records, p. 119, Annex "I-1."
22	Id., pp. 101-102, Annex "F."
23	Rollo, pp. 135-247, Annexes "D" to "I."
24	Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Del Rosario; Rollo, p. 167, Annex "A-2."
25	Mendiola v. People, G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85, 96.
26	No. L-16934, 31 July 1964, 11 SCRA 584.
27	G.R. No. 60898, 29 September 1983, 124 SCRA 867.
28	No. L-46930, 10 June 1988, 162 SCRA 88.
29	Decision, pp. 20-23, Annex "A."
30	See Note 20.
31	22 Am. Jur. 454, cited in People v. Yanza, 107 Phil. 888 (1960).
33	Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Bk. II, 1981 Rev. Ed., p. 222, citing Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 6th Ed., Vol. II, p. 216.
34	Magcusi v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13.