Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/660/1078/42233/
Timestamp: 2019-10-15 11:18:04
Document Index: 783077229

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 423', '§ 423', '§ 416', '§ 423', '§ 414', '§ 416', '§ 423', '§ 1382', '§ 423']

Alice M. Oldham, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Humanservices, Defendant- Appellee, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1981 › Alice M. Oldham, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Humanservices...
Alice M. Oldham, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Humanservices, Defendant- Appellee, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981)
Before FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr. and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and SCOTT** , District Judge.
Prior to discussing the precise issue raised on appeal, it is important to take cognizance of the limited role of this Court in reviewing decisions of the Secretary pertaining to disability claims. "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ...." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1422, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 846 (1971); Laffoon v. Califano, 558 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1977). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, supra, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. at 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 852; Warncke v. Harris, 619 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1980). If supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary's findings are conclusive, and the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, even if the reviewing court finds the evidence preponderates toward a wholly different finding. Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980). Conflicts in the evidence, including medical opinions, are to be resolved by the Secretary, not by the courts. Laffoon v. Califano, supra, at 254-55.
It is also important to note that, although the Secretary's decision must be supported by substantial evidence, the burden is upon the claimant to prove disability. Kirkland v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913, 94 S. Ct. 255, 38 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1973); Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971); Aldridge v. Celebrezze, 339 F.2d 190, 191-92 (5th Cir. 1964). The burden is a heavy one, so stringent that it has been described as bordering on the unrealistic. Johnson v. Harris, 612 F.2d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Finch, 440 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1971).
First, the claimant must show that he or she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment by reason of a medically determinable physical impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A). Additionally, it must be shown that the disability is of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to perform his or her previous work but cannot, considering his or her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A). This is true regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which claimant resides, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether the claimant would be hired if he or she applied. Id.
An individual is entitled to the establishment of a period of disability and to disability insurance benefits in any month only if he or she enjoys fully insured status as defined in Section 216(i) (3) and Section 223(c), and has had not less than 20 quarters of coverage during the 40-quarter period ending with the quarter in which disability occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (3); 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)
An individual is considered "fully insured" for purposes of establishing a period of disability and obtaining disability benefits when he or she has not less than one quarter of coverage (whenever acquired) for each calendar year elapsing after 1950 (or, if later, the year in which he or she attained age 21) up to the year in which disability is established. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (3); 42 U.S.C. § 423(c).
Although the record establishes that claimant continued to meet the "20/40" requirement, see note 1, supra, until recently, she ceased to occupy the status of a "fully insured individual" at the conclusion of the last quarter in 1975. In his decision entered February 24, 1977, the ALJ found that Mrs. Oldham had a total of 24 quarters of coverage at the time she terminated her employment in February 1975. Thus, under Section 214(a), read in conjunction with Sections 216(i) (3) and 223(c), her fully insured status ended on December 31, 1975, that is, following the elapse of 24 calendar years after 1950
The ALJ had limited the inquiry to whether claimant Strickland was capable of returning to one of her former occupations. Apparently because he determined that she was so capable, he did not consider it necessary to reach the question of whether she was capable of engaging in any substantial gainful employment as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a) (3) (B) (Supplemental Security Income provisions), which parallels 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) (Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits). See text, supra