Source: https://m.openjurist.org/564/f2d/112
Timestamp: 2019-12-14 17:03:38
Document Index: 295515992

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1331', '§ 1331', '§ 14', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1331', '§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1331']

564 F. 2d 112 - Gagliardi v. Flint F Flint
564 F2d 112 Gagliardi v. Flint F Flint
564 F.2d 112
Helen GAGLIARDI
Robert FLINT, Joseph F. O'Neill, Frederick Ruffin, Francis
O'Shea and the City of Philadelphia.
Appeal of Robert FLINT and City of Philadelphia.
Nor can McCullough v. Redevelopment Authority of Wilkes-Barre, supra, be passed off as a mere Rule 12(b)(1) ruling. Judge Garth, the author of McCullough, was as aware, we may be sure, as was Judge Adams in Alderman, that the Redevelopment Authority was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Yet his review of the merits of an equal protection challenge in an action against a municipality occupies seven pages of the Federal Reporter, and concludes:
Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, supra, also was a review of a dismissal on the merits, in which the district court relied on Monroe v. Pape, supra. In reversing to permit an amendment of the complaint, we expressly noted that such an amendment could make the case justiciable under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Rotolo panel split over the applicability of special pleading rules in civil rights cases, but it was unanimously of the view that a cause of action against a municipality could be implied from the Fourteenth Amendment, since all three panel members recognized that § 1983 was inapplicable. Certainly the panel was not reversing for the futile exercise of inviting a second dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on a slightly different ground.
As to Skehan, I can only say, as the author of the court's in banc opinion, that there was never any doubt in my mind as to what was intended. We remanded in that case for a determination of the corporate status of Bloomsburg State College. If it were part of the state government, we said, the Eleventh Amendment was a bar to the suit. If it had a separate corporate existence, it could be sued. The suggestion that we were merely dealing with "jurisdiction" in the Rule 12(b)(1) sense is extreme. We were not reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal, and our remand certainly was not for the purpose of inviting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We were not, I hope, playing games with the litigants.
The City contends that this circuit's rule, that causes of action against municipalities may be implied from the jurisdictional grant in § 1331 and the Fourteenth Amendment, was overruled by the Supreme Court in Aldinger v. Howard, supra. However, as Justice Rehnquist states: "All that we hold (in Aldinger ) is that where the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction over a municipal corporation is not diversity of citizenship, but is a claim of jurisdiction pendent to a suit brought against a municipal officer within § 1343, the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against municipal corporations under the cognate provisions of § 1983 is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of pendent-party jurisdiction." Aldinger, supra, 427 U.S. at 17 n.12, 96 S.Ct. at 2422. The key to that holding is that a federal court should not readily exercise pendent jurisdiction to entertain a non-federal claim against a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists. That Aldinger v. Howard casts no doubt upon our conclusion in Skehan, that the fact that a municipality is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 is not significant for purposes of § 1331 jurisdiction, is amply confirmed by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). He writes:
The question of whether the Board's arguments should prevail, or whether as respondent urged in oral argument, we should, by analogy to our decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619) (1971), imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations contained in § 1983, is one which has never been decided by this Court. Counsel for respondent at oral argument suggested that it is an extremely important question and one which should not be decided on this record. We agree with respondent.The Board has raised this question for the first time in a document filed after its reply brief in this Court. Were it in truth a contention that the District Court lacked jurisdiction, we would be obliged to consider it, even as we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740, (96 S.Ct. 1202, 1204, 47 L.Ed.2d 435) (1976); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, (29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126) (1908). And if this were a § 1983 action, brought under the special jurisdictional provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 which requires no amount in controversy, it would be appropriate for this Court to inquire, for jurisdictional purposes, whether a statutory action had in fact been alleged. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra. However where an action is brought under § 1331, the catch-all federal question provision requiring $10,000 in controversy, jurisdiction is sufficiently established by allegation of a claim under the Constitution or federal statutes, unless it "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction . . ." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, (66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939) (1946); Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249, (71 S.Ct. 692, 694, 95 L.Ed. 912) (1951).
Certainly the Fourteenth Amendment allegation in the case sub judice was not immaterial or made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. Indeed, it is the foundation of the action against the individual defendant as well as the City.3 And the Supreme Court's explicit statement that it has never addressed the interrelationship between §§ 1983 and 1331 upon the question of municipal liability in no way affects the law of this circuit. Nevertheless, we are asked to hold that despite the impressive list of authorities discussed above, the allegations of a cause of action based directly under the Fourteenth Amendment against a municipal corporation for damages in excess of $10,000 is too patently insubstantial to sustain the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the related state law claims. This, we think, is asking more than can reasonably be expected. See Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1977).
One of the City's contentions is that there is no § 1331 jurisdiction over a claim against a municipal corporation for a federal common law tort. That contention is completely foreclosed by the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-108, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), holding that there is § 1331 jurisdiction in the federal district courts to entertain a federal common law nuisance cause of action for pollution of interstate waters. If the Supreme Court can imply a federal common law cause of action for the abatement of nuisance merely from the fact of § 1331 jurisdiction and its role as interstate umpire in a federal system, then implying a tort cause of action from § 1331 jurisdiction and an express constitutional provision would seem to be an a fortiori case. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). To hold for the City, overruling our prior case law, we would have to predict that the Supreme Court, having recognized a federal common law remedy for the tort of water pollution of an interstate waterway, would draw the line at recognizing a federal common law remedy for bodily injury or death at the hands of a state agent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an outcome is conceivable, but would require that we attribute to the Justices a rather peculiar hierarchy of values, in which clean water is entitled to greater protection by federal law than is human life. The massive potential liabilities which may be imposed on municipal corporations by virtue of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee liabilities which may require enormous construction projects for water treatment facilities dwarf by comparison the liabilities which might be imposed by virtue of a City's respondeat superior liability for constitutional torts of its servants. The latter liabilities, moreover, can be feasibly insured against, while the former almost certainly cannot.
Although Illinois v. City of Milwaukee is a more recent instance of the recognition of a federal common law remedy against a municipal corporation, the development occurred much earlier in Fourteenth Amendment cases. In Home Telephone & Telegraph Company v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 33 S.Ct. 312, 57 L.Ed. 510 (1912), for example, the Court entertained a suit against a municipal corporation for injunctive relief against an ordinance establishing a confiscatory tariff. The City would, however, distinguish between prospective equitable relief and the recovery of money damages. In making this distinction it can draw no comfort from the holdings in Monroe v. Pape and City of Kenosha v. Bruno. These cases held that municipal corporations were not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 and that there is no § 1343(3) jurisdiction over them for any purpose.4 They were in effect immunized from federal civil process for actions under § 1983. But as Illinois v. City of Milwaukee shows, municipal corporations clearly are suable when the jurisdictional elements of § 1331 are met. Thus, if there is a distinction between prospective equitable relief and money damages, it is a distinction without "jurisdictional" significance, using "jurisdiction" in the Monroe v. Pape sense of absolute immunity from suit. Rather, it is a distinction going solely to whether a § 1331 claim for money damages states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
There is, however, no question that as a matter of federal substantive law there is a cause of action against municipal corporations for money damages for Fourteenth Amendment violations. In deciding appeals from the state courts, the Supreme Court has recognized such a cause of action and has held that state courts must recognize it. E. g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 645-49, 31 S.Ct. 654, 55 L.Ed. 890 (1911); Chicago B. & O. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). These cases involved the recovery of money damages for unconstitutional taking of property. They establish that federal common law does encompass the remedy of recovery of money damages. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that federal common law can impose such a remedy on state courts of general jurisdiction, but lacks the capacity to do so in the lower federal courts. Lower federal courts have not recognized such an anomalous distinction. They have frequently entertained suits against municipal corporations for the recovery of money damages for uncompensated takings of property or takings of property without due process of law.5 The City's proposed distinction between money damage remedies and prospective equitable relief could not be accepted unless we were ready to assume that all these courts were so clearly in error that their holdings should be regarded as frivolous or insubstantial.6
365 U.S. at 191, 81 S.Ct. at 486 (footnote omitted).14
Congress was perfectly well aware in 1871 that municipal corporations were regularly being sued for money damages in the federal courts under the only significant lower federal court jurisdiction then extant, the diversity jurisdiction. In a series of cases beginning at least as early as Commissioner of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 539, 16 L.Ed. 208 (1859), and extending to Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 17 L.Ed. 520 (1864), the Court fashioned a "general" common law of negotiability of municipal bonds, enforced by the entry of money judgments against municipalities.15 And in Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376, 16 L.Ed. 735 (1861), the Court held that in aid of the enforcement of its judgment a federal court could, pursuant to § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,16 issue a writ of mandamus against municipal officials to levy and collect taxes to pay that judgment.17 The state courts of Iowa resisted this development vigorously,18 and attempted to enjoin municipal officials from making any such levy. In Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 18 L.Ed. 768 (1868),19 the Court rebuked this effort, holding that no state process could bar the effectiveness of federal court mandamus in aid of the execution of a federal court judgment. And a year later in Supervisors v. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 175, 19 L.Ed. 162 (1869), the Court approved the appointment of a United States Marshal as a commissioner to levy taxes in order to satisfy a federal court judgment against a municipal corporation.
One other argument that is sometimes advanced against implying remedies directly from the Fourteenth Amendment is that by the enactment of a statutory remedy Congress deliberated on the problem of implementing the Fourteenth Amendment and expressly determined to occupy the field and to limit the scope of federal relief. This is, of course, a suggestion that by the enactment of § 1983 Congress intended to eliminate the existing federal law of remedies. If that was the case, then Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), perhaps the most frequently cited case in federal jurisprudence, was wrongly decided, for it did not rely on § 1983, which was not then thought to be applicable to property claims. Ex parte Young approved the issuance of injunctive relief, claimed directly under the Fourteenth Amendment, to prevent the unlawful taking of a utility's property by state enforcement of confiscatory rates. Its authority has never been doubted. A preemption approach would be an innovation turning our back on seventy years of established case law.
I join in the affirmance of the order denying the appellants' motion for a new trial, not only because, as Judge Rosenn's opinion demonstrates, federal jurisdiction was based on a nonfrivolous claim against the municipality, but also for the reason that the claim asserted was demonstrably meritorious. I agree that the district court properly decided the pendent state law claim, however, in preference to deciding even a meritorious Fourteenth Amendment claim. That has been the preferred course since, responding to the political furor over Ex parte Young, supra, the Court decided Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451, 53 L.Ed. 753 (1909).
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976), does not require a different result. Aldinger holds only that a city may not be joined as a pendent party to an action when there is no independent source of federal jurisdiction over the claims against the city. In the instant case, however, we are concerned with the decision of pendent claims where substantial federal claims against the city provide an independent ground of federal jurisdiction. Aldinger does not speak to this situation at all. See generally, Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 127 (1977)
We cannot accept the proposition, urged by our brother Gibbons, that we have expressly held a fourteenth amendment cause of action can be asserted against municipal corporations which are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Judge Gibbons relies on Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); McCullough v. Redev. Auth. of Wilkes-Barre, 522 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1975); and Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983, 95 S.Ct. 1986, 44 L.Ed.2d 474 (1975), on remand, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976). In none of these cases, however, was the issue whether a cause of action may be implied presented to the court. On the contrary, each of the three cases directed the challenge only to the district court's "jurisdiction." Given the clear holding of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), that federal question jurisdiction, as opposed to a federally recognized right to relief, is created by the mere allegation of matters in controversy, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, it is not surprising that in Skehan, McCullough, and Rotolo, we spent few words on the jurisdictional challenges. The very brevity of our discussion in those cases belies any intention whatsoever on our part to decide the highly complex and controversial policy issues which Judge Gibbons now discerns in our past, pithy pronouncements. In our view, neither Skehan, McCullough, nor Rotolo decided or even purported to decide the question whether a damage remedy may be implied from the fourteenth amendment
We believe that the concurrence also misreads Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 496 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 95 S.Ct. 77, 42 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974). Alderman was an equity suit by several discharged employees of the Housing Authority against the Authority as well as against Stein, its chairman, alleging that their discharge violated the first and fourteenth amendment. Since Stein was clearly a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we have no occasion to consider whether the Authority was also a proper section 1983 defendant. In fact, we expressly stated that the cause of action was brought under section 1983 and that jurisdiction was founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Id. at 167 n.13. Thus, it was section 1983, not the fourteenth amendment itself, which provided plaintiffs in Alderman with their cause of action for deprivation of their first and fourteenth amendment rights. Notwithstanding Judge Gibbons' bold assertion that Alderman was brought directly under the fourteenth amendment (presumably with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331), the case is simply irrelevant to the position which he strives to reach in this case.
See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 n.50, 81 S.Ct. 473, 486, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) ("a municipal corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning of § 1983"); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973)
Other Circuits have also recognized suits for damages against municipalities under the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School District, 511 F.2d 633, 635 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975). Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732-35 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 527 F.2d 736 (1975) (en banc); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F.Supp. 557, 558 (N.D.Ill.1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F.Supp. 155, 156-57 (N.D.Ill.1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F.Supp. 647, 649-51 (N.D.Cal.1974); cf. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-16, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Matherson v. Long Island State Park Commission, 442 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F.Supp. 990, 991-93 (N.D.Ill.1975); Perry v. Linke, 394 F.Supp. 323, 324-26 (N.D.Ohio 1974); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F.Supp. 223, 228-31 (D.Conn.1974); Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F.Supp. 402 (1976). See generally Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922 (1976); Hunt, Suing Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw.U.L.Rev. 770 (1975); Note, Implying A Damage Remedy Against Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action As An Obstacle to Extension Of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 Md.L.Rev. 123 (1976)
The substance of the claims which can be alleged against individuals under the courts' § 1343(3) jurisdiction and against individuals or corporate entities under its § 1331 jurisdiction are, of course, the same. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542-52, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972)
E. g., City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1972); Miller v. County of Los Angeles, 341 F.2d 964, 966-67 (9th Cir. 1965); Lowe v. Manhattan Beach School District, 222 F.2d 258, 259-60 (9th Cir. 1955); Foster v. Herly, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964); Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 144 (6th Cir. 1968); Traylor v. City of Amarillo, Texas, 492 F.2d 1156, 1157 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1974); Haczela v. City of Bridgeport, 299 F.Supp. 709, 712 (D.Conn.1969); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F.Supp. 1267 (E.D.Mich.1973); Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F.Supp. 367 (E.D.Mich.1970); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F.Supp. 647 (N.D.Cal.1974)
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the State is a denial by that State of a right secured to the owner by that instrument. 166 U.S. 235, 241 (, 17 S.Ct. 581, 586).
The dispute over the incorporation theory as a limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment did not surface until fifty years later. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the incorporation doctrine as it relates to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. See generally Damages Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 922, 945-51 (1976); Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. 131 (1972)
See Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. at 188-191, 81 S.Ct. 473
In Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709-10, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1796, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), the Court commented further on its interpretation of the legislative history of the Sherman amendment:
Accord Weber v. Lee County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 210, 18 L.Ed. 781 (1868); Walkley v. City of Muscatine, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 481, 18 L.Ed. 930 (1868); United States ex rel. Moses v. City Council of Keokuk, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 514, 18 L.Ed. 933 (1868); United States ex rel. Thomas v. City Council of Keokuk, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 518, 18 L.Ed. 918 (1868)