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United States Vs New Mexico - Citation 104340 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104340
Case Number 438 U.S. 696
united states v. new mexico - 438 u.s. 696 (1978) u.s. supreme court united states v. new mexico, 438 u.s. 696 (1978) united states v. new mexico no. 77-510 argued april 24, 25, 1978 decided july 3, 1978 438 u.s. 696 certiorari to the supreme court of new mexico syllabus the united states, in setting aside the gila national forest from other public lands, held to have reserved the use of water out of the rio mimbres only where necessary to preserve the timber in the forest or to secure favorable water flows, and hence not to have a reserved right for aesthetic, recreational, wildlife preservation, and stockwatering purposes. that this was congress' intent is revealed in the limited purposes for which the national forest.....
United States v. New Mexico - 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
The United States, in setting aside the Gila National Forest from other public lands, held to have reserved the use of water out of the Rio Mimbres only where necessary to preserve the timber in the forest or to secure favorable water flows, and hence not to have a reserved right for aesthetic, recreational, wildlife preservation, and stockwatering purposes. That this was Congress' intent is revealed in the limited purposes for which the national forest system was created and in Congress' deference to state water law in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and other legislation. While the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 was intended to broaden the purposes for which national forests had previously been administered, Congress did not intend thereby to reserve additional water in forests previously withdrawn under the 1897 Act. Pp. 438 U. S. 698 -718.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 438 U. S. 718 .
The Rio Mimbres rises in the southwestern highlands of New Mexico and flows generally southward, finally disappearing in a desert sink just north of the Mexican border. The river originates in the upper reaches of the Gila National Forest, but during its course, it winds more than 50 miles past privately owned lands and provides substantial water for both irrigation and mining. In 1970, stream adjudication was begun by the State of New Mexico to determine the exact rights of each user to water from the Rio Mimbres. [ Footnote 1 ] In this
The question posed in this case -- what quantity of water, if any, the United States reserved out of the Rio Mimbres when it set aside the Gila National Forest in 1899 -- is a question of implied intent, and not power. In California v. United States, ante at 438 U. S. 653 -663, we had occasion to discuss the respective authority of Federal and State Governments over waters in the Western States. [ Footnote 2 ] The Court has previously concluded that whatever powers the States acquired over their water as a result of congressional Acts and admission into the Union, however, Congress did not intend thereby to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated water in the future for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn from the public domain for specific federal purposes. Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 , 207 U. S. 577 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 , 373 U. S. 597 -598 (1963); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U. S. 128 , 426 U. S. 143 -146 (1976).
Recognition of Congress' power to reserve water for land which is itself set apart from the public domain, however, does not answer the question of the amount of water which has been reserved or the purposes for which the water may be used. Substantial portions of the public domain have been withdrawn and reserved by the United States for use as Indian reservations, forest reserves, national parks, and national monuments. And water is frequently necessary to achieve the purposes for which these reservations are made. But Congress has seldom expressly reserved water for use on these withdrawn lands. If water were abundant, Congress' silence would pose no problem. In the arid parts of the West, however, claims to water for use on federal reservations inescapably vie with other public and private claims for the limited quantities to be found in the rivers and streams. This competition is compounded by the sheer quantity of reserved lands in the Western States, which lands form brightly colored swaths across the maps of these States. [ Footnote 3 ]
the President the power to reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve "appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose o the reservation. " Cappaert, supra, at 426 U. S. 138 (emphasis added). See Arizona v. California, supra at 373 U. S. 595 -601; United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U. S. 520 , 401 U. S. 522 -523 (1971); Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 , 424 U. S. 805 (1976). While many of the contours of what has come to be called the "implied reservation of water doctrine" remain unspecified, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress reserved "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more." Cappaert, supra at 426 U. S. 141 . See Arizona v. California, supra at 373 U. S. 600 -601; District Court for Eagle County, supra at 401 U. S. 523 . Each time this Court has applied the "implied reservation of water doctrine," it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that, without the water, the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated. [ Footnote 4 ]
jurisdiction with respect to allocation of water. Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law. [ Footnote 5 ] See California v. United States, ante at 438 U. S. 653 -670, 438 U. S. 678 -679. Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.
(Emphasis added.) [ Footnote 6 ] The agencies responsible for administering the federal reservations have also recognized Congress' intent to acquire under state law any water not essential to the specific purposes of the reservation. [ Footnote 7 ]
The State District Court referred the issues in this case to a Special Master, who found that the United States was diverting 6.9 acre-feet per annum of water for domestic residential use, 6.5 acre-feet for road-water use, 3.23 acre-feet for domestic recreational use, and .10 acre-foot for "wildlife" purposes. [ Footnote 8 ] The Special Master also found that specified
The quantification of reserved water rights for the national forests is of critical importance to the West, where, as noted earlier, water is scarce and where more than 50% of the available water either originates in or flows through national forests. [ Footnote 9 ] When, as in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully appropriated, federal reserved water rights will frequently require a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and private appropriators. This reality has not escaped the attention of Congress, and must be weighed in determining what, if any, water Congress reserved for use in the national forests.
The United States contends that Congress intended to reserve minimum instream flows for aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation purposes. An examination of the limited purposes for which Congress authorized the creation of national forests, however, provides no support for this claim. In the mid- and late 1800's, many of the forest on the public domain were ravaged, and the fear arose that the forest lands might soon disappear, leaving the United States with a shortage both of timber and of watersheds with which to encourage stream flows while preventing floods. [ Footnote 10 ] It was in answer to these fears that, in 1891, Congress authorized the President to
The Creative Act of 1891 unfortunately did not solve the forest problems of the expanding Nation. To the dismay of the conservationists, the new national forests were not adequately attended and regulated; fires and indiscriminate timber cutting continued their toll. [ Footnote 11 ] To the anguish of Western settlers, reservations were frequently made indiscriminately. President Cleveland, in particular, responded to pleas of conservationists for greater protective measures by reserving some 21 million acres of "generally settled" forest land on February 22, 1897. [ Footnote 12 ] President Cleveland's action drew immediate and strong protest from Western Congressmen who felt that the "hasty and ill-considered" reservation might prove disastrous to the settlers living on or near these lands. [ Footnote 13 ]
" No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use
The legislative debates surrounding the Organic Administration Act of 1897 and its predecessor bills demonstrate that Congress intended national forests to be reserved for only two purposes -- "[t]o conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people." [ Footnote 14 ] 30 Cong.Rec.
967 (1897) (Cong. McRae). See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 , 220 U. S. 515 (1911). National forests were not to be reserved for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife preservation purposes. [ Footnote 15 ]
30 Cong.Rec. 966 (1897) (Cong. McRae). Administrative regulations at the turn of the century confirmed that national forests were to be reserved for only these two limited purposes. [ Footnote 16 ]
Any doubt as to the relatively narrow purposes for which national forests were to be reserved is removed by comparing the broader language Congress used to authorize the establishment of national parks. [ Footnote 17 ] In 1916, Congress created the National Park Service and provided that the
National Park Service Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 535, § 1, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 ed.). [ Footnote 18 ]
(Emphasis added.) If, as the dissent contends, post at 438 U. S. 722 , Congress in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 authorized the reservation of forests to "improve and protect" fish and wildlife, the 1934 Act would have been unnecessary. Nor is the dissent's position consistent with Congress' concern in 1934 that fish and wildlife preserves only be created "with the approval of the State legislatures."
As the dissent notes, in creating what would ultimately become Yosemite National Park, Congress, in 1890, explicitly instructed the Secretary of the Interior to provide against the wanton destruction of fish and game inside the forest and against their taking "for the purposes of merchandise or profit." Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 2, 26 Stat. 651. Congress also instructed the Secretary to protect all "the natural curiosities, or wonders within such reservation, . . . in their natural condition." By comparison, Congress, in the 1897 Organic Act, expressed no concern for the preservation of fish and wildlife within national forests generally. Nor is such a concern found in any of the comments made during the legislative debate on the 1897 Act. Cf. also H.R. 119, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 Cong.Rec. 6410 (1896). [ Footnote 19 ]
purpose for which Congress did create the national forest system. [ Footnote 20 ]
90 N.M. at 413, 564 P.2d at 618. While we conclude that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 was intended to broaden the purposes for which national forests had previously been administered, we agree that Congress did not intend to thereby expand the reserved rights of the United States. [ Footnote 21 ]
The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 establishes the purposes for which the national forests " are established and shall be administered." (Emphasis added.) The Act directs the Secretary of Agriculture to administer all forests, including those previously established, on a multiple-use and sustained-yield basis. H.R. 10572, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1960). In the administration of the national forests, therefore, Congress intended the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 to broaden the benefits accruing from all reserved national forests.
H.R.Rep. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1960). As discussed earlier, the "reserved rights doctrine" is a doctrine built on implication, and is an exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in other areas. Without legislative history to the contrary, we are led to conclude that Congress did not intend in enacting the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 to reserve water for the secondary purposes there established. [ Footnote 22 ] A reservation of additional water could mean a substantial loss in the amount of water available for irrigation and domestic use, thereby defeating Congress' principal purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flow. Congress intended the national forests to be administered for broader purposes after 1960, but there is no indication that it believed the new purposes to be so crucial as to require a reservation of additional water. By reaffirming the primacy of a favorable water flow, it indicated the opposite intent.
While Congress intended the national forests to be put to a variety of uses, including stockwatering, not inconsistent with the two principal purposes of the forests, stockwatering was not, itself, a direct purpose of reserving the land. [ Footnote 23 ] If stockwatering could not take place in the Gila National Forest, Congress' purposes in reserving the land would not be defeated. Congress, of course, did intend to secure favorable water flows, and one of the uses to which the enhanced water supply was intended to be placed was probably stockwatering. But Congress intended the water supply from the Rio Mimbres to
be allocated among private appropriators under state law. 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1976 ed.). [ Footnote 24 ] There is no indication in the legislative histories of any of the forest Acts that Congress foresaw any need for the Forest Service to allocate water for stockwatering purposes, a task to which state law was well suited.
In Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908), the Court was faced with two questions. First, whether Congress, when it created the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation by treaty, impliedly guaranteed the Indians a reasonable quantity of water. And second, whether Congress repealed this reservation of water when it admitted Montana to the Union one year later "upon an equal footing with the original States." In answering the first question, the Court emphasized that the reservation was formed to change the Indians' "nomadic and uncivilized" habits and to make them into "a pastoral and civilized people." Id. at 207 U. S. 576 . Without water to irrigate the lands, however, the Fort Belknap Reservation would be "practically valueless" and "civilized communities could not be established thereon." Ibid. The purpose of the Reservation would thus be "impair[ed] or defeat[ed]." Id. at 207 U. S. 577 . In answering the second question, the Court concluded that
In Arizona v. California, the Court only had reason to discuss the Master's finding that the United States had reserved water for use on Arizona Indian reservations. Arizona argued that there was "a lack of evidence showing that the United States, in establishing the reservations, intended to reserve water for them." 373 U.S. at 373 U. S. 598 . The Court disagreed:
Id. at 373 U. S. 599 -599. The Court also pointed to congressional debate that indicated that Congress had intended to reserve the water for the reservations. Id. at 373 U. S. 599 .
In Cappaert, Congress had given the President the power to reserve "objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government." American Antiquities Preservation Act, 34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976 ed.). Pursuant to this power, the President had reserved Devil's Hole as a national monument. Devil's Hole, according to the Presidential Proclamation, is " a unique subsurface remnant of the prehistoric chain of lakes which, in Pleistocene times, formed the Death Valley Lake System'"; it also contains
426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 132 . As the Court concluded, the pool was reserved specifically to preserve its scientific interest, principal of which was the Devil's Hole pupfish. Without a certain quantity of water, these fish would not be able to spawn, and would die. This quantity of water was therefore impliedly reserved when the monument was proclaimed. Id. at 426 U. S. 141 . The Court, however, went on to note that the pool
" to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber,"
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 , 220 U. S. 515 -516 (1911). See also Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523 (1911).
"All waters within the boundaries of national forests may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the State wherein such national forests are situated, or under the laws of the United States and the rules and regulations established thereunder. "
In the same Act in which Congress first authorized the national forest system, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 18, 26 Stat. 1101, Congress provided for rights-of-way through the "public lands and reservations " for purposes of irrigation,
" Provided, That no such right of way shall be so located as to interfere with the proper occupation by the Government of any such reservation, . . . and the privilege herein granted shall not be construed to interfere with the control of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority of the respective States or Territories. "
" Provided, That the charges for water coming in whole or part from reservoir sites used or occupied under the provisions of this Act shall always be subject to the control and regulation of the respective States and Territories in which such reservoirs are in whole or part situate."
As we noted in California v. United States, ante at 438 U. S. 661 , it
It was their belief that, at least under the 1891 Act, the States had exclusive control of the distribution of water on public lands and reservations. Ante at 438 U. S. 661 -662, and n. 16.
I agree with the Court that the implied reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress' general policy of deference to state water law. See ante at 438 U. S. 699 , 438 U. S. 701 -702, 438 U. S. 705 . I also agree that the Organic Administration Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 11, cannot fairly be read as evidencing an intent to reserve water for recreational or stockwatering purposes in the national forests. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
H.R.Rep. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1960), quoted ante at 438 U. S. 714 -715; accord, S.Rep. No. 1407, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1960). See also Note, New Mexico's National Forests and the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 16 Natural Resources J. 975, 991-992 (1976).
"[T]he Court not surprisingly attempts to keep this provision in the background, addressing it only . . . in a footnote," United States v. Sotelo, 436 U. S. 268 , 436 U. S. 283 (1978) (REHNQUIST,
Ante at 438 U. S. 707 n. 14 (emphasis in original). [ Footnote 2/2 ] The Court then concludes that Congress did not mean to "improve and protect" any part of the forest except the usable timber and whatever other flora is necessary to maintain the watershed. This, however, is not what Congress said.
Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 2, 26 Stat. 651. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Similarly, the bill introduced by Representative McRae in the 54th Congress, upon which the Court relies in construing the statute, ante at 438 U. S. 707 -708, n. 14, directed the Secretary
animals, bird, and wildlife"); Act of Mar. 29, 1944, § 1, 58 Stat. 132, 16 U.S.C. § 583 (1976 ed.) (authorizing the Secretary to establish sustained yield units "in order to provide for a continuous and ample supply of forest products; and in order to secure the benefits of forests in maintenance of water supply, regulation of stream flow, prevention of soil erosion, amelioration of climate, and preservation of wildlife. . . . ") (Emphasis supplied.) [ Footnote 2/4 ]
the timber and flora. Insofar as the Court holds otherwise, the 55th Congress is maligned and the Nation is the poorer, and I dissent. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
Contrary to the Court's intimations, cf. ante at 438 U. S. 711 -713, I see no inconsistency between holding that the United States impliedly reserved the right to instream flows and what the Court views as the underlying purposes of the 1887 Act. The national forests can regulate the flow of water -- which the Court views as "the very purpose for which Congress did create the national forest system," ante at 438 U. S. 711 -712 -- only for the benefit of appropriators who are downstream from the reservation. The reservation of an instream flow is not a consumptive use; it does not subtract from the amount of water that is available to downstream appropriators. Reservation of an instream flow therefore would be perfectly consistent with the purposes of the 1897 Act as construed by the Court. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
I express no view as to the effect of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq. (1976 ed.), on the United States' reserved water rights in national forests that were established either before or after that Act's passage. Although the Court purports to hold that passage of the 1960 Act did not have the effect of reserving any additional water in then-existing forests, see ante at 438 U. S. 713 -715, this portion of its opinion appears to be dicta. As the Court concedes, "[t]he United States does not argue that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 reserved additional water for use on the national forests." Ante at 438 U. S. 713 n. 21. Likewise, the State argues only that
Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 413, 564 P.2d 615, 618 (1977), quoted ante at 438 U. S. 713 , appears to mean nothing more than that the 1960 Act did not give the United States additional reserved water rights with a priority date of before 1960 -- a proposition with which I think we all would agree. Cf. ante at 438 U. S. 713 -714, n. 21. But there never has been a question in this case as to whether the 190 Act gave rise to additional reserved water rights with a priority date of 1960 or later in the Gila National Forest.
In fact, the Court appears to show some ambivalence as to whether, in its view of the 1897 Act, national forests are to be reserved for two purposes, or only one. See ante at 438 U. S. 711 -713.
The Act cited is entitled "An act to set apart certain tracts of land in the State of California as forest reservations. " 26 Stat. 650 (emphasis supplied). Yosemite National Park was not carved out of the forest reserved by the 1890 Act until 1905. See Act of Feb. 7, 1905, 33 Stat. 702-703, 16 U.S.C. § 46 (1976 ed.). A portion of the land reserved by the 1890 Act remained a forest reserve and was designated the Sierra National Forest.