Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98415/klapprott-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-08-21 14:00:09
Document Index: 182800287

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 738', '§ 738', '§ 338', '§ 738', '§ 338', '§ 15', '§ 738']

Klapprott Vs United States - Citation 98415 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Klapprott Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98415
Case Number 335 U.S. 601
Appellant Klapprott
klapprott v. united states - 335 u.s. 601 (1949) u.s. supreme court klapprott v. united states, 335 u.s. 601 (1949) klapprott v. united states no. 42 argued october 20, 1948 decided january 17, 1949 335 u.s. 601 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit syllabus nine years after petitioner had been admitted to citizenship and granted a certificate of naturalization, the united states filed a complaint in a federal district court in new jersey under 8 u.s.c. § 738 to set aside the order and cancel the certificate. it alleged that his oath of allegiance was false; that subsequently, by writings and speeches, he had evidenced his loyalty to germany and disloyalty to the united states, and.....
Klapprott v. United States - 335 U.S. 601 (1949)
U.S. Supreme Court Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949)
Held: the judgments are reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with instructions to set aside the default judgment and grant petitioner a hearing on the merits of the issues raised by the denaturalization complaint. Pp. 335 U. S. 602 -608, 335 U. S. 615 -616. [This judgment modified, 336 U.S. 942.]
June 11. This Court reversed petitioner's New York conviction, Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478 , but he continued to be held in the District of Columbia jail until November 22, 1946.
First. Amended Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure became effective March 19, 1948. * That
Thus, it appears that statutes and rules have largely left for judicial determination the type of cases in which hearings and proof should precede default judgments. In this situation, it is the final responsibility of this Court to formulate the controlling rules for hearings and proof. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 , 318 U. S. 431 . For the following reasons, it seems peculiarly appropriate that a person's citizenship should be revoked only after evidence has established that the person has been guilty of prohibited conduct justifying revocation.
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 , 259 U. S. 284 . Because denaturalization proceedings have not fallen within the technical classification of crimes is hardly a satisfactory reason for allowing denaturalization without proof, while requiring proof to support a mere money fine or a short imprisonment.
Furthermore, because of the grave consequences incident to denaturalization proceedings, we have held that a burden rests on the Government to prove its charges in such cases by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 158 . This burden is substantially identical with that required in criminal cases -- proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The same factors that caused us to require proof of this nature as a prerequisite to denaturalization judgments in hearings with the defendant present apply at least with equal force to proceedings in which a citizen is stripped of his citizenship rights in his absence. Assuming that no additional procedural safeguards are required, it is our opinion that courts should not, in § 738 proceedings, deprive a person of his citizenship until the Government first offers proof of its charges sufficient to satisfy the
Fifth. The undenied allegations already set out show that a citizen was stripped of his citizenship by his Government, without evidence, a hearing, or the benefit of counsel at a time when his Government was then holding the citizen in jail with no reasonable opportunity for him effectively to defend his right to citizenship. Furthermore, the complaint in the denaturalization proceeding strongly indicates that the Government here is proceeding on inadequate facts, just as it did in the criminal cases it brought against petitioner. For if the Government had been able on a trial to prove no more than the particular facts it alleged in its denaturalization complaint, it is doubtful if its proof could have been held sufficient to revoke petitioner's citizenship under our holdings in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 ; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 ; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , 328 U. S. 659 , and see Rule 9(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. And all petitioner has asked is that the default judgment be set aside so that, for the first time, he may defend on the merits. Certainly the undenied facts alleged justify setting aside the default judgment for that purpose. Petitioner is entitled to a fair trial. He has not had it. The Government makes no claim that he has. Fair hearings are in accord with elemental concepts of justice, and the language of the "other reason" clause of 60(b) is broad enough to authorize the Court to set aside the default judgment and grant petitioner a fair hearing.
To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less precious than life or liberty -- indeed of one which today comprehends those rights and almost all others. [ Footnote 1 ] To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile
No such procedures could strip a natural-born citizen of his birthright or lay him open to such a penalty. I have stated heretofore the reasons why I think the Constitution does not countenance either that deprivation or the ensuing liability to such a punishment for naturalized citizens. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , concurring opinion 320 U. S. 165 ; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , dissenting opinion 328 U. S. 675 .
Those views of the substantive rights of naturalized citizens have not prevailed here. But the Schneiderman decision and Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 , required a burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases -- namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization. [ Footnote 2 ] This was, in itself and to that extent, recognition that ordinary civil procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other purely civil liabilities, do not suffice for denaturalization and all its consequences.
More than this it was not necessary to decide in the cases cited. No less should be required, in view of the substantial kinship of the proceedings with criminal causes, whatever their technical form or label. Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , dissenting opinion 328 U. S. 675 , 328 U. S. 678 .
Under our system, petitioner could not be convicted or fined for mail fraud, over-ceiling sales, or unlawfully possessing gasoline ration coupons upon a judgment taken by default, much less under the circumstances this record discloses to have been responsible for the default. Yet his basic right to all the protections afforded him as a citizen by the Constitution can be stripped from him, so it is now urged, without an iota of proof, without his appearance or presence in court, without counsel employed or assigned to defend that right, and indeed with no real opportunity on his part to prepare and make such a defense. The case thus goes far beyond the Court's ruling in Knauer v. United States, supra. And, in my opinion, it brings to clearer focus whether, beyond the matter of satisfying the burden of proof required by the Schneiderman and Baumgartner cases, the Knauer case rightly permitted denaturalization through the civil procedures there pursued. [ Footnote 3 ]
If, in deference to the Court's rulings, we are to continue to have two classes of citizens in this country, one secure in their status and the other subject at every moment to its loss by proceedings not applicable to the other class, cf. Schneiderman v. United States, supra, concurring opinion at 320 U. S. 167 , Knauer v. United States, supra, dissenting opinion at 328 U. S. 678 , I cannot assent to the idea that the ordinary rules of procedure in civil causes afford any standard sufficient to safeguard the status given to naturalized citizens. If citizenship is to be defeasible for naturalized citizens other than by voluntary renunciation or other causes applicable to native-born citizens, [ Footnote 4 ] the defeasance, it seems to me, should be surrounded by no lesser protections than those securing all citizens against conviction for crime. Regardless of the name given it, the denaturalization proceeding, when it is successful, has all the consequences and effects of a penal or criminal conviction except that the ensuing liability to deportation is a greater penalty than is generally inflicted for crime.
Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 , 259 U. S. 284 ; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 112 , and concurring opinion 320 U. S. 165 ; Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , dissenting opinion 328 U. S. 675 .
See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , 320 U. S. 125 , 320 U. S. 136 , 320 U. S. 153 -154, 320 U. S. 158 -159. At page 320 U. S. 158 , we said:
The concurring opinion in Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , 328 U. S. 674 , went upon the basis of satisfaction "beyond all reasonable doubt" concerning the proof of the grounds asserted for denaturalization.
In the view of those dissenting, as well as that of the majority in the Knauer case, the Government had satisfied fully the burden of proof required by the Schneiderman and Baumgartner decisions. See 328 U. S. 328 U.S. 654, 328 U. S. 675 .
See Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , dissenting opinion 328 U. S. 675 -676.
In May, 1942, the United States began proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against Klapprott under § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1158, 8 U.S.C. § 738 [ Footnote 2/1 ] to cancel his certificate of naturalization, issued in 1933, on the ground that he had taken a false oath of allegiance to procure the certificate. The complaint alleged that, at the time he took the oath, petitioner knew that he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and did not intend to renounce his allegiance to the German Reich; that petitioner "is and has been notoriously and openly one of the chief leaders and active members of the German-American Bund" and other organizations sympathetic to German Reich;
proceeding, to which the lawyer promised to attend, but which he neglected, allowing judgment to be entered by default. Because of the lengthy trial and exceedingly high bail in connection with the conspiracy charge, petitioner was still unable to take steps to have the judgment vacated. He was found guilty of the conspiracy [ Footnote 2/2 ] and committed to the Federal Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan. On January 30, 1944, pursuant to another indictment -- the "Sedition Case" [ Footnote 2/3 ] in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia -- he was transferred to the District of Columbia. He remained in custody throughout the trial of this case until November 21, 1946, when the indictment was dismissed. Petitioner was then released, but was immediately remanded to custody at Ellis Island for the purpose of deportation. From there, he began this attempt to have the judgment of denaturalization vacated.
If petitioner is entitled to relief from the default judgment, he must qualify under one or more of the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [ Footnote 2/4 ] I do not think that his petition or the affidavit
First. The Court assumes, as I think it must, that § 338 of the Nationality Act authorizes default judgments of denaturalization. So much is clear from the provisions in (b) of that section for notice by publication and in (c) for the denaturalization of one who has left the United States to establish a permanent residence elsewhere. The action authorized by the section is civil. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The general rule in civil actions is that notice places on the party to whom it is directed the responsibility to appear and defend or face the consequences. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for default judgments
The Court suggests under caption Second, however, that the presentation of evidence is a prerequisite to the entry of such a judgment, and that a default judgment entered without evidence is void, and therefore subject to vacation without a definite time limit under (4) of Rule 60(b). It points out that Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 , held that "clear and convincing" evidence is necessary to support a judgment of denaturalization. The holding in that case, however, must be viewed in its setting, i.e., a contested case. The case does not support the proposition that any evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, is required in an uncontested denaturalization proceeding. The general rule in civil actions is that none is necessary. Even though deportation is a most serious disaster to the deportee, it is founded here on uncontested allegations of adequate facts that must be taken as true. Although the committee which formulated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure twice made a hearing on evidence a requirement for the entry of a default judgment, Rule 55(b)(2) and (e), no such requirement was expressed for cases of this sort. Except for cases of the sort specified in (b)(2) and (e), and those where the amount of damages is in question, I think the meaning of the Rule is that a default is the equivalent of an admission of allegations which are well pleaded.
The suggestion of the Court in caption Fifth that the government's complaint does not state a cause of action seems unwarranted. Certainly the government is not required to plead all its evidence. Since the complaint alleged fraud, and specified in paragraph 6 thereof the circumstances constituting fraud, set out in the first paragraph of this dissent, I think Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , belies the suggestion that the complaint is defective.
Since the facts alleged amount to a showing of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect only, and since a definite time limit of one year is imposed on relief based on these grounds, the Rule cannot be said to contemplate a remedy without time limit based on the same facts. Otherwise, the word "other" in clause (6) is rendered meaningless. [ Footnote 2/6 ]
Conviction subsequently reversed in Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478 .
Cf. Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654 , 328 U. S. 671 ; Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 , 231 U. S. 27 -28; Sourino v. United States, 86 F.2d 309; United States v. Wezel, 49 F.Supp. 16, 17.
American citizenship other than when acquired by birth rests on a judicial judgment of naturalization. Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568 . Congress has explicitly defined the procedures for annulling such a judgment. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 ; Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9 ; § 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 601, now formulated in 54 Stat. 1158, 8 U.S.C. § 738. Neither in its terms nor on a fair interpretation of our naturalization laws has Congress indicated that such a judgment -- the certificate of naturalization -- cannot be annulled by default, that is, without active contest against such annulment, provided that ample opportunity has in fact, been afforded to a citizen to contest. This Court is not justified in adding a requirement to the cancelation proceedings that Congress has seen fit to withhold unless some provision of the Constitution so demands. The only possible provision on which an argument can be based that citizenship cannot be canceled by a default judgment is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I reject the suggestion that it offends due process for a judgment of naturalization obtained by fraud to be set aside if the defrauding alien is afforded ample opportunity to contest the Government's
But, in rejecting the contention that citizenship cannot be lost by a default judgment, one does not necessarily embrace the other extreme of assimilating a naturalization judgment to any other civil judgment. This Court has held that, because a naturalization judgment involves interests of a different order from those involved in other civil proceedings, the annulment of such a judgment is guided by considerations qualitatively different from those that govern annulment of ordinary judgments. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 ; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 . The considerations that set a contested proceeding for canceling a naturalization judgment apart from other suits to annul a judgment are equally relevant to a default judgment causing such cancelation. To be sure, the public interest in putting a fair end to litigation and in not allowing people to sleep in their rights has its rightful claim even in proceedings resulting in deprivation of citizenship. But because citizenship has such ramifying significance in the fate of an individual and of those dependent upon him, the public interest to be safeguarded in the administration of justice will not be neglected if courts look more sharply and deal less summarily when asked to set aside a default judgment for cancelation of citizenship than is required of them in setting aside other default judgments.
If the petitioner had paid no attention to the proceeding brought to revoke his citizenship, he would, in my opinion, have no ground for opening up the default judgment simply because, during all the years in question, he was incarcerated. Men can press their claims from behind prison walls, as is proved by the fact that perhaps a third of the cases for which review is sought in this Court come from penitentiaries. But Klapprott was not indifferent to the proceeding to set aside his citizenship. He took active measures of defense which were aborted through no fault of his own. To be sure, he did not follow up these efforts, but what he is saying in the motion made after his criminal cases were ended is, in substance, that he was so preoccupied with defending himself against the dire charges of sedition (the conviction for which this Court set aside in Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478 ) and the threat of deportation that the New Jersey cancelation proceeding naturally dropped from his mind after he had taken what he thought appropriate steps for his protection. The Government in effect demurred to this contention, and the District Court's action, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, practically ruled as a matter of law that the claim of Klapprott, even if true, affords no relief. It is to me significant that one of the two affirming judges of the Court of Appeals decided the case largely on a close reading of the old Rule 60(b), and that the other rested his case on laches, while this Court fails to draw on laches for the support of its conclusion.
Rule 60(b) now provides five grounds for relief from default judgments, and a sixth catch-all ground, "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." * The only one of the first five reasons to which Klapprott's conduct, as explicitly narrated, may plausibly be assigned is that of "excusable neglect," relief from which must be obtained within a year after a default judgment. But I think that, if the inferences fairly to be drawn from the circumstances narrated by Klapprott were found to be true, they would take his case outside of the characterization of "neglect," because "neglect," in the context of its subject matter, carries the idea of negligence and not merely of nonaction, and would constitute a different reason "justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." When a claim for citizenship is at stake, we ought to read a complaint with a liberality that is the antithesis of Baron Parke's "almost superstitious reverence for the dark technicalities of special pleading."