Source: https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/category/election-law/
Timestamp: 2020-01-28 14:36:57
Document Index: 81061053

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 6', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 20', '§ 2', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6', '§ 6']

Election Law Archives - New York Appellate Digest
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Election Law, Municipal Law
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY VALIDATED 25 SIGNATURES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO RUN IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court properly validated signatures which had been declared invalid by the Oneida County Board of Elections, allowing the Democratic candidate for Oneida County Executive to run in the upcoming election:
The designating petition had been invalidated by respondent Board of Elections of County of Oneida (Board), which determined in response to objections filed by James Genovese (respondent) that the designating petition contained 22 fewer valid signatures than required. After a hearing, Supreme Court validated 25 signatures that had been invalidated by the Board and thus ordered that petitioner be declared a duly qualified candidate of the Democratic Party for County Executive. …
With respect to the merits, we reject respondent’s contention that the court erred in validating the signatures at lines 2 through 4 and lines 6 and 7 of page 28 of the designating petition. Each of those signatures had listed by them the same street address, but no apartment numbers were included even though testimony at the hearing established that there are “maybe 60 [to] 70” apartments at that address. We nonetheless conclude that the designating petition adequately set forth the “residence address” of those signers within the meaning of Election Law § 6-130 “by indicating each signer’s respective street address”… , and that an apartment number is not a required component of a residence address for purposes of section 6-130 … .
… The signatures at line 8 of page 17 and line 8 of page 6 were properly validated based on the testimony of the signers identifying their signatures … . The court validated the other three signatures by crediting the testimony of “subscribing witnesses attesting to the identity of [the signers]” … , i.e., testimony that the subscribing witnesses either personally knew the signer or required the signer to present identification before signing … .
… Respondent also contends that the subscribing witness for page 90 of the designating petition engaged in fraud by attesting in his subscribing witness statement that the signer listed at line 8 signed her name in his presence, when in fact her son signed for her pursuant to a power of attorney. In view of the court’s determination to credit the testimony of the subscribing witness, however, we conclude that the record fails to establish that the subscribing witness statement was false, i.e., that the listed signer did not sign the designating petition herself … . Matter of Hennessy v Board of Elections of County of Oneida, 2019 NY Slip Op 06450, Fourth Dept 9-4-19
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-09-04 12:44:502020-01-24 05:53:24SUPREME COURT PROPERLY VALIDATED 25 SIGNATURES ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH HAD BEEN INVALIDATED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, THEREBY ALLOWING THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE FOR COUNTY EXECUTIVE TO RUN IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS (FOURTH DEPT).
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-09-04 12:25:372020-01-24 05:53:24PROPOSED 2019 ELECTION REFERENDUM REGARDING PUBLIC EDUCATION OFFICIALS IN THE CITY OF ROCHESTER IS IMPERMISSIBLY ADVISORY AND WAS PROPERLY DECLARED VOID (FOURTH DEPT).
TOWN LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT PETITIONER FROM RUNNING FOR TOWN JUSTICE IN TWO DIFFERENT TOWNS SIMULTANEOUSLY (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department determined the Town Law did not prohibit simultaneously running for Town Justice in two different towns:
At issue is the portion of Town Law § 20 (4) providing that “[n]o person shall be eligible to hold more than one elective town office.” Petitioner interprets this to mean that no person may hold more than one elective office, even if those offices are in separate towns. Bacon [respondent] asserts that this language prohibits a person from holding more than one elective office only within the same town. Because the quoted language is ambiguous and both proffered interpretations are reasonable, we must view the language in the context of the whole statute … . …
Viewing the prohibition in context, Town Law § 20 makes provision for town offices for each town, by class, and contains no other language suggesting that one person cannot fulfill elective town offices in more than one town. Moreover, the prohibition is contained in the same sentence as a provision allowing a town board to consolidate its own town offices and positions, strongly suggesting that the entire subdivision (4) of Town Law § 20 refers to what is permitted in an individual town. …
We further agree with Supreme Court that the offices of town justice in separate towns are not incompatible offices. …Serving as town justice in two separate towns involves jurisdiction over separate, defined geographic town boundaries and each town court thereof (see Town Law § 2). Moreover, the Legislature has expressly recognized that one person may, under certain circumstances, serve as town justice in more than one town (see UJCA 106 [2]; 106-a, 106-b). Although those circumstances are not present here, these statutes indicate the Legislature’s view that no conflict exists to prevent a person from serving as town justice in two towns simultaneously. Matter of Nichols v Bacon, 2019 NY Slip Op 06434, Third Dept 8-29-19
August 29, 2019 /by Bruce Freeman
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-08-29 16:48:512020-01-24 05:45:57TOWN LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT PETITIONER FROM RUNNING FOR TOWN JUSTICE IN TWO DIFFERENT TOWNS SIMULTANEOUSLY (THIRD DEPT).
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-05-31 12:43:262020-01-24 05:46:05THE CANDIDATE SIGNED THE SUBSCRIBING WITNESS STATEMENT WHICH INDICATED EACH VOTER SIGNED THE DESIGNATING PETITION IN HIS PRESENCE, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE, DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PROPERLY INVALIDATED BASED UPON THE CANDIDATE'S PARTICIPATION IN FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY (THIRD DEPT).
PERSONS WHO SIGNED A DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH WAS DEEMED NULL AND VOID COULD VALIDLY SIGN A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BALLOT PETITION (THIRD DEPT).
The Third Department, reversing the Board of Elections, determined that the persons who signed a designating petition which was deemed null and void could validly sign a subsequent opportunity to ballot petition:
In general, when a qualified voter signs a designating petition and, on a subsequent date, signs an opportunity to ballot petition, the voter’s signature on the later opportunity to ballot petition is invalid (see Election Law § 6-134 [3]…). However, where, as here, a qualified voter signs a designating petition that is subsequently invalidated or deemed “null and void” by operation of law (Election Law § 6-146 [1]), the voter is permitted to sign an opportunity to ballot petition subsequent to the invalidation of the designating petition … . “A contrary holding would deprive persons who signed a designating petition later held invalid from exercising the separate right given to them by the Election Law to request the opportunity to write in the name of a candidate of their choice” … . Matter of Stack v Harrington, 2019 NY Slip Op 04314, Third Dept 5-31-19
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-05-31 12:30:442020-01-24 05:46:06PERSONS WHO SIGNED A DESIGNATING PETITION WHICH WAS DEEMED NULL AND VOID COULD VALIDLY SIGN A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BALLOT PETITION (THIRD DEPT).
Civil Procedure, Election Law
PETITIONER DID NOT LIVE IN THE TOWN WHERE THE CHALLENGED CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DESIGNATING PETITIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK THE RESPONDENT CANDIDATES’ ANSWER BASED UPON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE VERIFICATION AND DENIALS (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the respondent candidates’ answer should not have been stricken based upon alleged defects in the verification and denials and petitioner did not have standing to contest the designating petition because she did not reside in the town where the single challenged candidate was running for office:
CPLR 3026 provides that “[p]leadings shall be liberally construed” and that “[d]efects shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced.” Here, we conclude that petitioner did not establish substantial prejudice from any alleged defect in the verification, and thus candidate respondents’ answer should not have been stricken on that ground … . Moreover, “the CPLR does not provide for the striking of improper denials” … .
Furthermore, we note that candidate respondents properly raised standing as an affirmative defense in their April 24 answer, and we agree with candidate respondents that petitioner lacked standing to commence this proceeding pursuant to Election Law article 16. A condition precedent to commencing a proceeding as an objector pursuant to section 16-102 is compliance with the requirements of section 6-154, including that the objector be a “voter registered to vote for such public office” (§ 6-154 [2]).
Here, petitioner served her specifications of objections upon Vickman and upon the chairwoman and the secretary of the Party only, and not on any of the other candidate respondents listed on the authorization. Petitioner, however, lacked standing to challenge the designating petition of Vickman or to challenge the authorization as it pertained to Vickman, who was running for public office in the Town of Farmersville, because petitioner was not a resident of that town … . Matter of Augostini v Bernstein, 2019 NY Slip Op 04312, Fourth Dept 5-30-19
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-05-30 13:23:162020-01-24 05:53:36PETITIONER DID NOT LIVE IN THE TOWN WHERE THE CHALLENGED CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DESIGNATING PETITIONS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE STRUCK THE RESPONDENT CANDIDATES' ANSWER BASED UPON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE VERIFICATION AND DENIALS (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined respondent candidate’s designating petition should not have been invalidated on the ground that the she did not live at the address provided on the petition:
The record reflects that respondent was actively engaged in renovating the property at the address provided on the designating petitions, that respondent signed a temporary lease for a property also located within the relevant voting district, and that respondent intended on permanently residing at the property listed on the designating petitions once renovations were complete. Indeed, Supreme Court expressly noted that it did not “question . . . the integrity of [respondent’s] testimony in saying that [it was] her intention to live [at the address].” Notwithstanding the fact that the address listed on the designation petitions was not respondent’s current residence and thus did not comply with Election Law § 6-132, “[w]here, as here, there is no proof of any intention on the part of the candidate or of those who have solicited signatures on his [or her] behalf to mislead or confuse, and no evidence that the inaccuracy did or would lead or tend to lead to misidentification or confusion on the part of those invited to sign the petition or seeking to verify his [or her] qualification,” the petition should not be invalidated … . Matter of McNiel v Martin, 2019 NY Slip Op 04305, Fourth Dept 5-30-19
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2019-05-30 13:21:512020-01-24 05:53:37ALTHOUGH THE CANDIDATE'S RESIDENCE WAS BEING RENOVATED AND SHE TEMPORARILY LIVED ELSEWHERE SHE INTENDED TO RETURN TO THE RESIDENCE WHICH WAS INDICATED ON THE DESIGNATING PETITION, THE DESIGNATING PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (FOURTH DEPT).
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