Source: https://casetext.com/case/dist-28-u-mine-wkrs-v-wellmore-coal
Timestamp: 2019-03-23 15:19:28
Document Index: 10484608

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Dist. 28, U. Mine Wkrs. v. Wellmore Coal, 609 F.2d 1083 | Casetext
Dist. 28, U. Mine Wkrs. v. Wellmore Coal
609 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1979)
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Dist. 28, U. Mine Wkrs.v.Wellmore Coal
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth CircuitNov 15, 1979
The appellant labor organizations brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three coal companies and a railroad seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as a result of the appellees obtaining a number of temporary injunctions in state court resulting in the restriction of appellants' picketing activity. The district court granted appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that neither the actions of the state courts that issued the injunctions, nor the actions of the appellees in seeking same, impermissibly restricted appellees' First Amendment rights. Concluding that dismissal was appropriate for the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.
The appellees are Wellmore Coal Corporation, JAD Coal Company, Inc., A. J. Lambert and Elmer R. Lambert (doing business as Lambert Coal Company), and Norfolk and Western Railway (hereinafter the "companies"). The record reveals that in December, 1977, the companies secured from various state courts in southwest Virginia four ex parte injunctions restricting the activities of the unions. This action followed shortly thereafter. Jurisdiction was properly invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
Although the union originally sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, the state court's injunctions having long since expired, monetary damages would now be the only suitable remedy.
The unions raise two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erroneously considered matters outside the pleadings in deciding the motion to dismiss, and (2) the Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the injunctions were not offensive to the First Amendment. Succinctly stated, the unions assert that the court below not only improperly treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, but also that the court misapplied the applicable law to the merits of the unions' cause of action. Because we have concluded that the companies did not act under color of state law, we find it unnecessary to address either of the issues raised by the unions. In order to prevail on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in a case premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must satisfy the trial court that there is no set of facts which will support an allegation that he or it (1) acted under color of state law, and (2) deprived plaintiff of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws." In the instant case, we need only consider the first step in the analysis. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Baldwin v. Appalachian Power, 556 F.2d 241 (4th Cir. 1977).
The "under color of state law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has generally been considered to be equivalent to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).
Few federal provisions have generated as much litigation as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defining the contours of state action therefore is a task that confronts all federal courts with increasing frequency. The precise question is whether the companies, in all traditional respects private actors, assumed the mantle of the state by invoking the judicial processes of the state courts. We hold that resort to state judicial process does not, in the circumstances before us, transform an otherwise private entity into an arm of the state for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In a case somewhat similar to the instant appeal this court has addressed the scope of state action. In Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1978), we held that appellants former husband had not "acted with the requisite [degree of] state action" by bringing suit in state court, after the two had been divorced, to determine title to a parcel of real estate acquired during their marriage. Id. at 405. The per curiam opinion in Wilkins offered no analysis of the state action question with respect to the former husband. Evidently the panel saw no need to dwell on a question the answer to which was so readily apparent.