Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/alabama/almdce/2:2011cv00043/44812/15
Timestamp: 2016-10-23 06:35:44
Document Index: 100333810

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1381', '§ 405', '§ 636', '§ 404', 'art, 427', 'art, 98']

MEMORANDUM OPINION that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is AFFIRMED; that a separate judgment will issue for Cargill v. Astrue (CONSENT) :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
Cargill v. Astrue (CONSENT)
MEMORANDUM OPINION that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is AFFIRMED; that a separate judgment will issue. Signed by Honorable Judge Wallace Capel, Jr on 12/9/2011. (cc, )
HELEN CARGILL,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv0043-WC
Plaintiff Helen Cargill applied for supplemental security income payments under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Her applications were
denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing
decision in which he found Plaintiff not disabled from the date of her application through the
date of the decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the
Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner).1 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131
(11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the Court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings
and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s
Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #9); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #10). Based on the
Court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income
case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title
II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d
Plaintiff was forty-three years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. Tr. 17.
Plaintiff completed the eleventh grade and has a nurse’s assistant certificate. Tr. 17.
Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience was as a “home attendant,” “poultry worker,”
“packer,” and “child care worker.” Tr. 31. Following the administrative hearing, and
employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since July 7, 2006, the application date.” (Step 1) Tr. 14. At Step 2, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: “morbid obesity, mild
degenerative disc disease with sacroiliitis, degenerative joint disease of the left knee,
hypertension, mild osteoarthritis of the hands, major depressive disorder, and malingering.”
Tr. 14. The ALJ then found that “[t]he claimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments . . . .” (Step 3)
Tr. 14. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of medium
work . . . in that the claimant can sit 6 ½ hours, 3 hours at one time; stand
4 ½ to 5 hours, 1 ½ to 2 hours at one time; and walk 4 ½ to 5 hours, 1 ½ to
2 hours at one time, in an 8-hour day. She can frequently lift a maximum
of 20 pounds and occasionally lift a maximum of 35 pounds. She can
frequently carry a maximum of 25 pounds and occasionally carry a
maximum of 40 pounds. She can frequently use her hands for simple
grasping and fine manipulation. She can occasionally use her left hand for
pushing and pulling of arm controls but never use her right hand for
pushing and pulling of arm controls. She can occasionally use her feet for
pushing and pulling of leg controls. She can occasionally reach overhead
but never stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, climb or balance. She can
occasionally work at activities involving exposure to marked changes
in temperature and humidity but never work at activities involving
protected heights, being around moving machinery, and driving automotive
equipment. She experiences a moderate degree of pain. Mentally, she
has no inability to respond appropriately to supervisors, no inability to
respond appropriately to co-workers, mild inability to respond appropriately
to customers or other members of the general public, mild inability to use
judgment in simple one or two step work-related decisions, marked inability
to use judgment in detailed or complex work-related decisions, mild
inability to deal with changes in a routine work setting, no inability to
understand, remember and carry out simple one and two step instructions,
marked inability to understand, remember and carry out detailed or
complex instructions, mild inability to maintain attention, concentration
or pace for periods of at least two hours, no inability to maintain social
functioning, no inability to maintain activities of daily living, and no
episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.
Tr. 16. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work. (Step
4) Tr. 31. Despite this finding at Step 4, the ALJ went on to Step 5, where he found that
capacity,” and based on the testimony of the VE, “there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Tr. 32. The VE testified
that given all these factors the individual would be able to perform the requirements of
representative occupations such as: “Day Worker,” “Counter Clerk,” and “Electronics
Worker.” Tr. 32. The ALJ then asked the VE to “assume the same hypothetical individual
but who was restricted to a light residual functional capacity with a sit/stand option. The
[VE] testified that such an individual could still perform the claimant’s past relevant work
as a home attend[ant] as she performed it, as a child care worker as normally performed in
the national economy and as performed by the claimant, and as a Packer as she performed
it.” Tr. 33. The VE identified the following occupations as examples: “Counter Clerk,”
“Electronics Worker,” and “Self-Service Station Attendant.” Tr. 33. Accordingly, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . since July 7, 2006, the date the
application was filed.” Tr. 33.
Plaintiff presents only one issue for this Court’s consideration in determining whether
the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence: whether “the ALJ failed to elicit
a reasonable explanation for the inconsistencies between vocational testimony and the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) as required by SSR 00-4p.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12)
at 7. “The Commissioner responds that the [VE’s] testimony was not inconsistent with the
DOT and the ALJ reasonably relied upon the testimony.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. #13) at 6.
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Commissioner’s decision should be reversed, because the
ALJ failed to address the inconsistencies between [the] vocational [expert’s] testimony and
the [DOT] . . . as required by SSR 00-4p.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 7.5 Specifically, Plaintiff
In relevant part, Social Security Ruling 00-4p states:
When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE or VS evidence and
the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict
before relying on the VE or VS evidence to support a determination or decision
about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level, as part of the
adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the
record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.
Neither the DOT nor the VE or VS evidence automatically “trumps” when there is
claims “the ALJ erred in failing to elicit a reasonable explanation from the vocational expert
for the apparent conflict between the reasoning levels” of the jobs identified by the VE. Id.
First, it should be noted that, assuming a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the
DOT, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the ALJ’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation
does not, in and of itself, lead to reversal. The Eleventh Circuit has stated, “when the VE’s
testimony conflicts with the DOT, the VE’s testimony ‘trumps’ the DOT. We so hold
because the DOT ‘is not the sole source of admissible information concerning jobs.’” Jones
v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). After the issuance of
SSR 00-4p, the Eleventh Circuit, albeit in an unpublished opinion, held:
Even assuming that an inconsistency existed between the testimony of the
vocational expert and the DOT, the ALJ did not err when, without first
resolving the alleged conflict, he relied on the testimony of the vocational
expert. Our precedent establishes that the testimony of a vocational expert
‘trumps’ an inconsistent provision of the DOT in the Circuit.
Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 246 F. App’x 660, 662 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Jones, 190
F.3d at 1229-30). Thus, were the Court to assume there are inconsistencies between the VE’s
testimony and the DOT, it does not immediately warrant reversal of the ALJ’s decision.
Addressing Plaintiff’s argument, this Court finds there is no inconsistency between
the VE’s testimony and the DOT. According to Plaintiff, the VE’s testimony is inconsistent
with the DOT because the VE indicated that Plaintiff can perform her past work as a home
Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000).
attendant and child care worker, but the DOT indicates these occupations entail a reasoning
level of “3” and “the ALJ clearly limits [Plaintiff] to jobs which entail a reasoning level of
‘1.’” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at 8-9. Plaintiff bases her argument on her conclusion that the
ALJ’s RFC determination is an absolute restriction to jobs with a reasoning level of “1.”
Essentially, Plaintiff argues that the jobs the VE indicated Plaintiff can perform exceed her
abilities. Plaintiff reasons that because “the ALJ’s RFC only addresses ‘simple, one and two
step instructions’ and ‘detailed or complex instructions’” and the ALJ found Plaintiff “had
a marked inability with the latter but no inability with the former,” then the ALJ “thereby
restrict[ed] [Plaintiff] to ‘simple, one and two step instructions.’” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. #12) at
8. However, Plaintiff’s reasoning ignores the range of jobs involving more than “simple, one
and two step instructions,” but that would still require less than “detailed or complex
instructions.” This Court is not convinced that Plaintiff’s reasoning demonstrates the VE’s
testimony is inconsistent with the DOT.
Moreover, this Court finds that the VE did identify any inconsistencies between
Plaintiff’s past jobs as she performed them and as they are described in the DOT. At the
hearing, the VE classified Plaintiff’s past work pursuant to the DOT and noted the following
The DOT lists that job [of home attendant] as a medium, semi-skilled. . . .she
functioned in the light, unskilled range. She has also worked as a poultry
worker, which is light, unskilled work both as performed and as listed. She’s
worked as a packer. She functioned at the sedentary, unskilled range. I could
not find a sedentary description of packer in the DOT, but I know there are
some out there. She has also worked as a childcare worker, which is light,
unskilled both as performed and as listed.
Tr. 31; Tr. 60. The ALJ then asked the VE “[d]oes the record including the claimant’s
testimony indicate that the jobs claimant performed in the past 15 years [were] performed by
her as they are generally performed in the national economy and consistent with the DOT?”
Tr. 60-61. The VE responded, “[t]here’s some differences with home attendant. She didn’t
provide the whole spectrum of duties there as described in the DOT. And then the exertional
differences for packer is another difference.” Tr. 61.6 Because the VE identified instances
in which Plaintiff’s performance of the job differed from the DOT description and still
opined that Plaintiff would be able to perform her past work, the ALJ reasonably relied on
his testimony and, in doing so, his determination that Plaintiff could perform her past work
was not in conflict with the DOT.7
The ALJ discussed this part of the VE’s testimony in his opinion, indicating “[p]ursuant
to SSR 00-4p, the [VE’s] testimony is consistent with the information in the [DOT]. He did note
some differences in that a Packer typically lifts [or] carries less weight and the claimant did not
do the full duties of a home attendant. She perform[ed] that job at the light exertional level
whereas the [DOT] classifies this as a medium job.” Tr. 31.
See Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 (Dec. 4, 2000) (“A VE . . . may be
able to provide more specific information about jobs or occupations than the DOT.”); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1560(b)(2) (2011) (“A vocational expert or specialist may offer relevant evidence within
his or her expertise or knowledge concerning the physical and mental demands of a claimant’s
past relevant work, either as the claimant actually performed it or as generally performed in the
national economy.”); see also Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A VE’s
recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony. Thus, no
additional foundation is required.”). Moreover, “an ALJ may rely solely on the VE’s testimony”
to support his finding. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed is further undercut
because the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled at both Step 4, see Tr. 31, and
Step 5, see Tr. 33. After having already determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at Step
4, the ALJ went a step further in the sequential evaluation process8 and again determined
that Plaintiff is not disabled because there are jobs available in the national economy
which she can perform.9 Thus, even if this Court were to find that the ALJ erred in
finding that Plaintiff could return to her past work, any error committed in Step 4 was
cured when he found that Plaintiff is not disabled at Step 5.10 Thus, the ALJ’s disability
determination is legally sound and is not subject to reversal.
In his opinion, the ALJ states, “[g]enerally, a finding that the claimant can perform her
past relevant work ends the disability analysis, but the undersigned [ALJ] has decided to proceed
to the next step.” Tr. 31.
In discussing Step 5, the ALJ’s opinion noted for the second time that, “[p]ursuant to
SSR 00-4p, the [VE’s] testimony is consistent with the information contained in the [DOT].” Tr.
33; see also Tr. 31.
Moreover, as the Commissioner points out, Plaintiff’s counsel was given the
opportunity to question the VE and did not raise the issue of any inconsistencies between the
VE’s testimony and the DOT. Tr. 66; Def.’s Brief (Doc. 13) at 7. See Cammon v. Astrue, 2009
WL 3245458 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2009) (the ALJ did not err when she relied on the testimony of
the VE where the ALJ had no reason to believe that there was any conflict between the VE
testimony and the DOT and counsel did not question the VE about any alleged conflict.);
Bucholtz v. Barnhart, 98 F. App’x 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Although the ALJ has a duty to
question a VE about any inconsistencies with the DOT and resolve that conflict before relying on
the VE’s testimony, . . . counsel has the responsibility for raising the issue if the ALJ does not.”).