Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/410/614/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-10-23 00:00:24
Document Index: 606600532

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 602', 'Art. 602', '§ 2281', 'Art. 602', 'Art. 602', 'Art. 602', 'Art. 602']

LINDA R. S. V. RICHARD D., 410 U. S. 614 (1973) - US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON-LINE
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LINDA R. S. V. RICHARD D., 410 U. S. 614 (1973)
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Held: Although appellant has an interest in her child's support, application of Art. 602 would not result in support, but only in the father's incarceration, and a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Pp. 410 U. S. 616-619.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 410 U. S. 619. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 410 U. S. 622.
Appellant, the mother of an illegitimate child, brought this action in United States District Court on behalf of herself, her child, and others similarly situated to enjoin chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the "discriminatory application" of Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, but that court dismissed the action for want of standing. [Footnote 1] 335 F.Supp. 804 (ND Tex.1971). We postponed consideration of jurisdiction until argument on the merits, 405 U.S. 1064, and now affirm the judgment below.
The Texas courts have consistently construed this statute to apply solely to the parents of legitimate children, and to impose no duty of support on the parents of illegitimate children. See Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.1966); Beaver v. State, 96 Tex.Cr.R. 179, 256 S.W. 929 (1923). In her complaint, appellant alleges that one Richard D. is the father of her child, that Richard D. has refused to provide support for the child, and that, although appellant made application to the local district attorney for enforcement of Art. 602 against Richard D., the district attorney refused to take action for the express chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
reason that, in his view, the fathers of illegitimate children were not within the scope of Art. 602. [Footnote 2]
Recent decisions by this Court have greatly expanded the types of "personal stake[s]" which are capable of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 405 U. S. 738 (1972). Although the law of standing has been greatly changed in the last 10 years, we have steadfastly adhered to the requirement that, at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing, [Footnote 3] federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction. [Footnote 4] See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 407 U. S. 166-167 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 392 U. S. 101 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 204 (1962). Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 408 U. S. 13 (1972).
Applying this test to the facts of this case, we hold that, in the unique context of a challenge to a criminal statute, appellant has failed to allege a sufficient nexus chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 262 U. S. 488 (1923) (emphasis added). See also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). As this Court made plain in Flast v. Cohen, supra, a plaintiff must show
Id. at 392 U. S. 102.
Here, appellant has made no showing that her failure to secure support payments results from the nonenforcement, as to her child's father, of Art. 602. Although the Texas statute appears to create a continuing duty, it does not follow the civil contempt model whereby the defendant "keeps the keys to the jail in his own pocket," and may be released whenever he complies with his legal obligations. On the contrary, the statute creates a completed offense with a fixed penalty as soon as a parent fails to support his child. Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the "direct" relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated, which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of standing, is absent in this case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 401 U. S. 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 369 U. S. 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Appellant does have an interest in the support of her child. But given the special status of criminal prosecutions in our system, we hold that appellant has made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State's criminal laws. The District Court was therefore correct in dismissing the action for want of standing, [Footnote 5] and its judgment must be affirmed. [Footnote 6]
It is, of course, true that "Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render advisory opinions," Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 405 U. S. 732 n. 3 (1972). But Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 409 U. S. 212 (1972) (WHITE, J., concurring); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 390 U. S. 6 (1968).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 740. That observation is fully applicable here. As the District Court stated,
Obviously there are serious difficulties with appellant's complaint insofar as it may be construed as seeking to require the official appellees to prosecute Richard D. or others, or to obtain what amounts to a federal child support order. But those difficulties go to the question of what relief the court may ultimately grant appellant. They do not affect her right to bring this class action. The Court notes, as it must, that the father of a legitimate child, if prosecuted under Art. 602, could properly raise the statute's underinclusiveness as an affirmative defense. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949). Presumably that same father would have standing to affirmatively seek to enjoin enforcement of the statute against him. Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968). The question then becomes simply: why should only an actual or potential criminal defendant have a recognizable interest in attacking this allegedly discriminatory statute and not appellant and her class? They are not, after all, in the position of members of the public at large who wish merely to force an enlargement of state criminal laws. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). Appellant, her daughter, and the children born out of wedlock whom chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
If a State were to pass a law that made only the murder of a white person a crime, I would think that Negroes as a class would have sufficient interest to seek a declaration that that law invidiously discriminated against them. Appellant and her class have no less interest in challenging their exclusion from what their own State perceives as being the beneficial protections that flow from the existence and enforcement of a criminal child support law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The standing issue now decided by the Court is, in my opinion, a difficult one with constitutional overtones. I see no reason to decide that question in the absence of a live, ongoing controversy. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70 (1955). Gomez now has beclouded the state precedents relied upon by both parties in the District Court. Thus, "intervening circumstances may well have altered the views of the participants," and the necessity for resolving the particular dispute may no longer be present. Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U. S. 414, 390 U. S. 453-454 (1968). Under these circumstances, I would remand the case to the District Court for clarification of the status of the litigation.