Source: http://openjurist.org/92/f3d/761
Timestamp: 2015-11-25 16:44:07
Document Index: 708203237

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 110505', '§ 3583', '§ 3583', '§ 9']

92 F3d 761 United States v. E St John | OpenJurist
92 F. 3d 761 - United States v. E St John HomeFederal Reporter, Third Series 92 F.3d
92 F3d 761 United States v. E St John 92 F.3d 761
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,v.Charles E. ST. JOHN, Appellant.
No. 95-3665.
Submitted March 12, 1996.Decided Aug. 19, 1996.
Kenneth E. Nelson, Kansas City, MO, argued, for appellant.
Bruce E. Clark, Kansas City, MO, argued, for appellee.
Charles E. St. John appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court1 for the Western District of Missouri revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 14 months imprisonment to be followed by 22 months supervised release. The district court also ordered St. John to pay the balance of the fine which had been originally imposed. For reversal, St. John argues the district court erred in imposing a revocation sentence that included both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) does not authorize supervised release upon revocation of supervised release and because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), which does authorize supervised release upon revocation of supervised release, was not in effect at the time the offenses were committed. St. John argues that application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) imposes an increased penalty and thus violates the ex post facto clause. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In December 1989 a federal grand jury indicted St. John for conspiracy to distribute dilaudid in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, seven counts of distribution of dilaudid in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). St. John pleaded guilty to the seven distribution counts and the firearms count, and in September 1990 the district court sentenced him to 63 months imprisonment, 36 months supervised release and a $4,000 fine. St. John completed his prison sentence and began serving his term of supervised release in May 1995. Almost immediately St. John violated the conditions of supervised release. Among other things, he repeatedly tested positive for illegal drug use, operated a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and was arrested for solicitation. The government filed a motion to revoke supervised release. In October 1995 the district court held a revocation hearing; St. John did not contest the allegations of the violations. The district court revoked supervised release and sentenced St. John to 14 months imprisonment to be followed by 22 months supervised release, for a total of 36 months, the length of the original term of supervised release. The district court did not explicitly state the statutory basis for its order. The practical effect of the revocation sentence is that St. John will serve in prison 14 of the 36 months of the original term of supervised release. The district court also ordered him to pay the balance of the fine originally imposed. This appeal followed.
St. John argues the district court erred in sentencing him to both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)2 does not authorize the imposition, upon revocation of supervised release, of both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release. St. John argues that, at the time he was originally sentenced in 1990, the only court to interpret § 3583(e)(3) had held that, because § 3583(e) was written in the disjunctive, a district court could revoke supervised release and either impose a term of imprisonment or modify the terms of the original supervised release, but not both. United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1990). St. John acknowledges that this court subsequently held § 3583(e)(3) authorized imposition of a revocation sentence including both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release, United States v. Schrader, 973 F.2d 623, 624-25 (8th Cir.1992), but he argues that due process prohibits imposition of a sentence based on case law decided after the offense was committed. St. John also acknowledges that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (effective Sept. 13, 1994),3 which Congress enacted in 1994 as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-322, § 110505, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796, 2017, specifically authorizes, upon revocation of supervised release, the imposition of both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release. However, St. John argues that, because § 3583(h) was enacted subsequent to his conviction and increases the penalty for the offenses, applying § 3583(h) to him would violate the ex post facto clause.
Article I, § 9, of the Constitution prohibits Congress from passing ex post facto laws. "[A]ny statute ... which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, ... is prohibited as ex post facto." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). "[T]o fall within the ex post facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present: first, the law 'must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment'; and second, 'it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.' " Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), citing Weaver v. Graham,