Source: https://openjurist.org/965/f2d/906
Timestamp: 2017-09-26 16:38:08
Document Index: 361308246

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 924', 'art, 783', 'art, 783', '§ 924', 'art, 783']

965 F2d 906 United States v. Mosley | OpenJurist
965 F. 2d 906 - United States v. Mosley
965 F2d 906 United States v. Mosley
965 F.2d 906
At an arranged meeting, Mosley gave Arter $3,200 and Arter gave Mosley eight ounces of cocaine, four sold outright and four on credit. Immediately thereafter, Mosley was arrested. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal court for possession of with intent to distribute eight ounces of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute the same under 21 U.S.C. § 846,1 and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
When the government's conduct during an investigation is sufficiently outrageous, the courts will not allow the government to prosecute offenses developed through that conduct. A defendant may challenge such conduct by means of the outrageous conduct defense, which is predicated on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The defense of outrageous conduct is distinct from the defense of entrapment in that the entrapment defense looks to the state of mind of the defendant to determine whether he was predisposed to commit the crime for which he is prosecuted. See Jacobson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 118 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). The outrageous conduct defense, in contrast, looks at the government's behavior. See United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir.1984).
No federal court has defined the requirements of the outrageous conduct defense with any degree of precision.4 Rather, the inquiry appears to revolve around the totality of the circumstances in any given case. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir.) ("Ultimately, every [outrageous conduct] case must be resolved on its own particular facts."), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.1986). However, as the name of the defense implies, to warrant dismissal of an indictment, the government's conduct with respect to that indictment must be outrageous. Outrageousness must be determined by reference to " 'the universal sense of justice.' " See Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. at 1643 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 304, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960)).
The cases make it clear that this is an extraordinary defense reserved for only the most egregious circumstances. It is not to be invoked each time the government acts deceptively or participates in a crime that it is investigating. Nor is it intended merely as a device to circumvent the predisposition test in the entrapment defense. See United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339, 1341-42 (10th Cir.1984) ("The outrageous governmental conduct defense is manifestly reserved for only 'the most intolerable government conduct,' ") (quoting Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608); Ryan, 548 F.2d at 789 ("the due process channel which Russell kept open is a most narrow one").
Government agents often need to play the role of criminals in order to apprehend criminals, and this role occasionally entails unseemly behavior. Wide latitude is accorded the government to determine how best to fight crime. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 435, 93 S.Ct. at 1644 (noting danger of "giv[ing] the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve"); see also United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 539 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 1084, 99 L.Ed.2d 242 and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991, 108 S.Ct. 1299, 99 L.Ed.2d 509 (1988).
The stringent nature of the test is demonstrated by the fact that although the defense has been raised many times, in only a small handful of those cases has the government's conduct actually been held to be outrageous. See Gamble, 737 F.2d at 857 (The outrageous conduct defense "is often raised but is almost never successful."). Compare Warren, 747 F.2d at 1342-43 & nn. 7-8 (listing numerous cases in which the outrageous conduct defense was rejected) with United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir.1978) (upholding outrageous conduct defense); United States v. Marshank, 777 F.Supp. 1507, 1524 (N.D.Cal.1991) (same); Gardner, 658 F.Supp. at 1577 (same); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744, 753 (N.D.Cal.1981) (same); and Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438 (remanding for factfinding to determine whether government conduct was sufficiently outrageous to warrant dismissal); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1296 (8th Cir.1984) (holding, as alternate ground for reversing conviction, that government conduct "approached" being sufficiently outrageous to sustain due process defense); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir.1971) (reversing on ground of non-entrapment government conduct, although not using "outrageous conduct" label). Cf. also United States v. Silva, 180 F.Supp. 557, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.1959) (directing verdict for defendant on grounds of government conduct, although not using "outrageous conduct" label).
One factor that has contributed to successful invocation of the outrageous conduct defense has been excessive government involvement in creating the prosecuted crime. Where the government essentially generates new crime for the purpose of prosecuting it or induces a defendant to become involved for the first time in certain criminal activity, as opposed to merely interposing itself in an ongoing criminal enterprise, such conduct has occasionally been held to be outrageous. See Twigg, 588 F.2d at 381 ("government agents generated new crimes by the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against him"); Gardner, 658 F.Supp. at 1576 (crime "would not have occurred but for the Government's assistance in manufacturing" it); Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. at 752 (government "went about putting persons into the business of crime for the first time"); see also Greene, 454 F.2d at 787 (government "involve[d] itself ... directly and continuously over ... a long period of time in the creation and maintenance of criminal operations"); Silva, 180 F.Supp. at 559-60 ("criminal conduct participated in by this defendant was the product of the creative activity of ... the Government informer").
Although no specific rule has been formulated to determine when the involvement of the government in a criminal enterprise becomes excessive, some general guidelines emerge. The government may not "engineer and direct the criminal enterprise from start to finish." See United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1983). However, it is not outrageous for the government to infiltrate an ongoing criminal enterprise. See, e.g., Nichols, 877 F.2d at 827. Similarly, it is not outrageous for the government to induce a defendant to repeat or continue a crime or even to induce him to expand or extend previous criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Cantwell, 806 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1986).
In order to induce a suspect to repeat, continue, or expand criminal activity, the government can suggest the illegal activity. See U.S. v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310 at 1313 (10th Cir.1983) (agent suggested selling food stamps). The government can provide supplies and expertise for the illegal activity. See United States v. Belzer, 743 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 788, 83 L.Ed.2d 781 (1985). Additionally, the government can act as both supplier and buyer in sales of illegal goods. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 485, 489-90, 96 S.Ct. at 1648, 1650.
A second factor that has contributed to successful invocation of the outrageous conduct defense has been government coercion to induce the defendant to commit the crime. Coercive conduct short of physically forcing a defendant to commit a crime has been held outrageous. In Bogart, for example, the defendant alleged that government agents held him in jail for six months on trumped-up charges and on excessive bail; the only way that the defendant could raise funds sufficient to make bail was by agreeing to a cocaine transaction initiated by an undercover agent. 783 F.2d at 1430. The defendant argued that he was coerced in that he was effectively required to participate in a cocaine deal in order to gain his freedom from a wrongful and pretextual incarceration. The court held that those facts, if proved, would constitute outrageous conduct. Id. at 1431. Cf. Silva, 180 F.Supp. at 557 (entrapment as a matter of law where informer got defendant addicted to drugs and then offered defendant a "fix" only if he would deliver drugs).
Very large financial inducements by government agents have also amounted to sufficient affirmative coercion to contribute to an outrageous conduct holding. In Batres-Santolino, for example, one factor noted by the court in holding the government's conduct outrageous was that the defendants were offered the chance to invest their profits from a cocaine deal in "legitimate" businesses that promised "a fortune"; access to these deals, however, was contingent upon going through with the cocaine transaction. 521 F.Supp. at 749.
However, coercion of any type must be particularly egregious before it will sustain an outrageous conduct defense. "[G]overnment agents may employ appropriate artifice and deception in their investigation." See Biswell, 700 F.2d at 1314 (citation omitted). They may make "excessive offers." See United States v. Lambinus, 747 F.2d 592, 595 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2143, 85 L.Ed.2d 500 (1985). Agents may even utilize "threats or intimidation [if not] exceeding permissible bounds." See Biswell, 700 F.2d at 1314.
R., Vol. IV, at 89-90. Another DCI agent testified that he knew of a person who bought four ounces from a man in Colorado for $4,000 (or $1,000 an ounce). R., Vol. V, at 181. There was no testimony on the market price for quarter- or half-pound quantities in Wheatland at the time and under the circumstances of Arter's offer. However, from the testimony on the price for other quantities, it does not seem that a price of $3,200 for four ounces in an eight ounce transaction is such an attractive price as to amount to outrageous coercion. Cf. United States v. Martinez, 749 F.2d 601, 604-05 (10th Cir.1984) (not outrageous for police to offer food stamps to allegedly poverty-level defendant at 40% of face value); United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1483, 1488 (10th Cir.1983) (offer of food stamps at 49% of face value not outrageous), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 789, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985); cf. also Lambinus, 747 F.2d at 595-96 (allegedly "ridiculously excessive offers" to trade merchandise for food stamps, in addition to repeated solicitation of the defendant and failure to follow USDA regulations for food stamp investigation, not outrageous).
Mosley is correct that the Fifth Amendment forbids amendment of an indictment by the court, whether actual or constructive. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a[n] ... infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury...." U.S. Const. amend V. In Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142-44, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1818-19, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a court cannot change the charging part of an indictment without violating the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 10, 7 S.Ct. at 786. In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), the Court made it clear that Bain 's prohibition applies even where the alleged amendment to the indictment is informal or constructive rather than formal. See id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273.
United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 428 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988).10
Mosley argues that the sentencing judge erred by concluding that he could not depart below the minimum sentence mandated for carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The judge clearly viewed the minimum as unduly harsh in Mosley's case and saw himself as having no discretion to depart below it. See R., Vol. VIII, at 16-20. Mosley directs our attention to United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1259-60 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 238, 116 L.Ed.2d 194 and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 239, 116 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991), where we held that it was an abuse of discretion where a judge had discretion to depart below a Guidelines sentence and desired to do so but believed he lacked such discretion.
It has alternatively been suggested that the outrageous conduct defense might rest upon the equitable supervisory power of the courts. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 500 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1655 n. 4, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because Mosley raises this defense under the Due Process Clause, we treat this defense as constitutional
The district court, in refusing to grant a jury instruction on outrageous conduct, stated, "I am not convinced that outrageous conduct is a defense in a criminal case." R., Vol. VII, at 85. However, in light of its earlier denial of Mosley's motion to dismiss for outrageous conduct on the merits, R., Vol. VI, at 54-55, it is probable that the court's later statement was directed solely at the propriety of submitting the defense to the jury as an affirmative defense. The district court correctly refused to submit the defense to the jury. Outrageous conduct may be the basis for a motion to dismiss to be presented to the court; it is not an affirmative defense to be presented to the jury. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497, 96 S.Ct. at 1653-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.1983) ("[I]t is well settled that this question [outrageous conduct] is for the court to decide."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 789, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985). Hence, it was not error for the district court to refuse to grant Mosley's requested jury instruction on outrageous conduct
The New York Court of Appeals suggested four factors that it deemed relevant to a determination of whether the government violated a defendant's (state constitutional) due process rights: (1) the government's role in creating the crime; (2) the illegality or immorality of the police conduct; (3) the defendant's reluctance or lack of predisposition to commit the crime; and (4) whether the investigation was designed to prevent further crime. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (1978). Our analysis below largely encompasses these factors. However, because our analysis extends beyond these four factors, we decline to adopt the Isaacson test, even though some federal courts have noted and even applied that test. See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 n. 7 (9th Cir.) (noting but not applying Isaacson test), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Gardner, 658 F.Supp. 1573, 1576-77 (W.D.Pa.1987) (applying Isaacson test but attributing it to Bogart ). In fact, Isaacson itself admonished that its four specified criteria "should be viewed in combination with all pertinent aspects and in the context of proper law enforcement objectives...." 378 N.E.2d at 83
These two factors are not necessarily exclusive. They appear to represent the primary contexts in which the defense has been successful to date, although other situations have arisen in which government conduct has been held to be outrageous. See, e.g., Marshank, 777 F.Supp. at 1524 (outrageous conduct where agents induced defendant's attorney to help investigate, interrogate, and arrest defendant)
Mosley directs our attention to United States v. Milestone, 626 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 319, 66 L.Ed.2d 148 (1980), which states that an alteration in an indictment is improper where it "tends to increase the defendant's burden at trial." Id. at 269. However, we do not read this statement in Milestone for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a change in the indictment that increases the defendant's burden where the change poses no risk that the defendant might be convicted of an offense that was not originally charged in the indictment. Milestone notes that the "increased burden" test serves to preserve "the notice function of the indictment." Id. Yet the notice function of an indictment is not impaired unless the defendant must defend against a charge that is not contained in the indictment. In fact, Milestone holds that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred in that case because the alleged amendment to the indictment did not "expand[ ] the issues the defendant was called upon to meet." Id