Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2:2011cv01890/643942/105
Timestamp: 2017-03-28 21:51:34
Document Index: 767536607

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997']

ORDER: The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Ams's Motion for Summary Judgment 90 for Muhammad v. Arizona Department of Corrections et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings Log In
ORDER: The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Ams's Motion for Summary Judgment 90 . Motion for Summary Judgment 90 is denied without prejudice. Within 10 days from the date of this Order, Defendant Ams may file a new motion for summary judgment limited to the exhaustion issue. See order for additional details. Signed by Senior Judge Stephen M McNamee on 4/23/2015.(LMR)
No. CV 11-1890-PHX-SMM (LOA)
Plaintiff Riki Rashaad Muhammad brought this pro se civil rights Complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer III Barbara Ams, a counselor with
the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. 25 at 2, 29).
Amended Complaint, Muhammad set forth a threat-to-safety claim under the Eighth
Amendment (id. at 29-30).1 Before the Court is Ams’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 90).
In his Second Amended Complaint, Muhammad alleged that Ams knew of, and
disregarded, an excessive risk to his safety, thereby exposing him to a substantial risk of
harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 25 at 29-30). Muhammad claimed that
Ams provided another inmate a page from a pre-sentence report in Muhammad’s criminal
All other claims and Defendants have been dismissed (Doc. 76).
case that contained confidential information about his involvement in the death of a two-
year old child (id.).
Ams moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Muhammad did not suffer
physical injury and he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 90).2
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and
that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit
The Court issued an Order with the Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154
F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), which informed Muhammad of his obligation to
respond to the motion and the requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
(Doc. 94).
477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and
Ams argues that Muhammad’s claim is barred by the PLRA’s requirement that a
prisoner make “a prior showing of physical injury” (Doc. 90 at 4). Section 1997e(e)
provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In Oliver v.
Keller, the Ninth Circuit specified that “§ 1997e(e) applies only to claims for mental and
emotional injury.” 289 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2002). The appellate court therefore
concluded that where an inmate has actionable claims for compensatory, nominal or
punitive damages premised on constitutional violations and not on any alleged mental or
emotional injuries, the claims are not barred by § 1997e(e). Id. at 630.
Muhammad does not seek recovery for “mental or emotional injury”; rather, he
seeks damages for an alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights (Doc. 25 at 29,
31). Accordingly, his claim against Ams is not barred by § 1997e(e). See Greening v.
Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that the plaintiff’s
claim was barred by § 1997e(e)’s “physical injury” requirement and finding that because
he did not seek recovery for mental and emotional injury but instead sought declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief for alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations,
the claim was not barred).
Ams’s request for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.
1172. The ultimate burden, however, rests with the defendant. Id. Summary judgment is
appropriate if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner,
shows a failure to exhaust. Id. at 1166, 1168; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
If summary judgment is denied, disputed factual questions relevant to exhaustion
should be decided by the judge; a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
exhaustion. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170-71. But if a court finds that the prisoner exhausted
administrative remedies, that administrative remedies were not available, or that the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be excused, the case proceeds to the
merits. Id. at 1171.
Ams previously moved to dismiss Muhammad’s claim on the ground that he failed
to exhaust administrative remedies (Doc. 67).
Pleadings, Ams argued that Muhammad admitted in his amended pleading that he did not
exhaust remedies and that his reason for failing to exhaust—that he feared retaliation—
was meritless (id. at 4). The Court construed Ams’s motion as one under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and found that when taking the allegations in Muhammad’s
Second Amended Complaint as true—specifically, that he feared retaliation if he
attempted to grieve his claim against Ams—it could not conclude that he failed to
exhaust because it is possible that remedies were rendered unavailable (Doc. 77 at 4).
See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion not required when
circumstances render administrative remedies “effectively unavailable”).
therefore denied the motion.
In her Motion for Judgment on the
Ams raises the same argument for nonexhaustion in her pending Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 90). She asserts that in his deposition, Muhammad testified
that his fear of retaliation was not based on any specific facts tied to Ams or any other
prison official (id. at 5-6).
insufficient to show that remedies were not available and summary judgment should
therefore be granted (id. at 6-7).
According to Ams, Muhammad’s generalized fear is
As set forth above, Ams bears the initial burden to show that there was an
available administrative remedy for Muhammad to pursue his complaint. Albino, 747
F.3d at 1169, 1172. Nowhere in her motion or separate Statement of Facts does Ams
describe the grievance procedure available to Muhammad at the time his claim arose, and
the only evidence she proffers is an excerpt from Muhammad’s deposition (see Docs. 90-
91; Doc. 91, Ex. 1). Ams also failed to present any evidence of the available grievance
procedure in her prior motion to dismiss on the same ground (see Doc. 67).
In Wyatt v. Terhune, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendants’ documents were
insufficient because, although their proffered affidavit described the inmate appeals
process, it failed to present specific information regarding the plaintiff’s appeals. 315
F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Albino, 747 F.3d 1162.
In other words, the defendants’ evidence showed only that there was a grievance process.
See id. Here, Ams fails to make that initial showing. She does not present an affidavit or
any evidence of the inmate grievance process available at the prison. See Brown, 422
F.3d at 937 (evidence demonstrating available relief in the grievance process includes
“official directives that explain the scope of the administrative review process; [and]
documentary or testimonial evidence from prison officials who administer the review
process . . . .”). As such, there is no evidence that there was a grievance process
available, what it was, or whether it addressed situations where inmates feared retaliation
at the initial grievance level.
As a result, the Court does not reach the parties’ arguments regarding
Muhammad’s retaliation fears if he attempted to grieve a claim against Ams. Because
Ams fails to meet her initial burden to show that there was an available administrative
remedy, the request for summary judgment for failure to exhaust will be denied without
The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Ams’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90).
Defendant Ams’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90) is denied
Within 10 days from the date of this Order, Defendant Ams may file a new
motion for summary judgment limited to the exhaustion issue.