Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/740/862/233977/
Timestamp: 2017-11-25 05:49:10
Document Index: 489614278

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1961', '§ 2518', '§ 1962', '§ 1961', '§ 1962', '§ 1962', '§ 2', '§ 1962', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 7201', '§ 1962', '§ 2', '§ 7206', '§ 1962', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 371', '§ 7201', '§ 2', '§ 7201', '§ 242']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fabio Alonso, Pedro Izaguirre, Robert Derringer, Julioojeda, Defendants-appellants, 740 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1984) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 1984 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fabio Alonso, Pedro Izaguirre, Robert Derringer, Ju...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fabio Alonso, Pedro Izaguirre, Robert Derringer, Julioojeda, Defendants-appellants, 740 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1984)
US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 740 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1984)
Fabio Alonso, Pedro Izaguirre, Julio Ojeda and Robert Derringer, defendants-appellants, were charged along with other Dade County, Florida homicide detectives in a forty-count indictment alleging conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, substantive RICO violations, various drug related crimes, civil rights violations and infractions of the federal income tax laws. After a four month trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, a jury found the appellants guilty of a number of charges, acquitted them of others and was unable to reach a verdict on certain counts against Derringer.1 On appeal, the appellants allege numerous errors during the trial. We affirm.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (c). Based on the application, the district court may grant an ex parte order if it determines that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous ...." Id. at Sec. 2518(3) (c).
These statutory requirements are designed to insure that wiretapping is neither "routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation," United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1827, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 353 (1974), nor "resorted to in situations where traditional techniques would suffice to expose the crime." United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S. Ct. 977, 983 n. 12, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225, 236 n. 12 (1974). Yet, "it is not necessary to show a comprehensive exhaustion of all possible techniques." United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir. 1978).2 See also United States v. Matya, 541 F.2d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S. Ct. 1101, 51 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1977) (wiretapping not required only as a last resort).
Hyde, 574 F.2d at 867 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913, 95 S. Ct. 1568, 43 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1975)). There need not be an exhaustive recitation of the progress of the investigation, excluding every possible line of inquiry. The former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hyde held that " [i]t is enough if the affidavit explains the prospective or retroactive failure of several investigative techniques that reasonably suggest themselves." Id.
The affidavit in this case satisfies the statutory requirements. The affiant considered the efficacy of numerous alternatives. Those investigatory methods already tried by the FBI had failed and others presented little likelihood of success or were too dangerous. The affidavits must be read in a "practical and commonsense fashion," United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 224 n. 14 (8th Cir. 1974), and the district court is clothed with broad discretion in its consideration of the application. United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Muhammad v. United States, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S. Ct. 1682, 52 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1977). The order will not be overturned "simply because defense lawyers are able to suggest post factum some investigative technique that might have been used and was not." Hyde, 574 F.2d at 867.
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1244, 59 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1979) (footnote omitted).
An element of the offense of conspiracy to violate RICO is the membership of the defendant in an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). An enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The two parts of the statutory definition identify distinct types of enterprises, "those that are recognized as legal entities and those that are not." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528, 69 L. Ed. 2d 246, 254 (1981).
We find this argument unpersuasive. The indictment charged that the homicide section was an enterprise as defined by the statute. There was no election of one part of the definition of an enterprise over another. In United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S. Ct. 739, 74 L. Ed. 2d 960 (1983), cited by the appellants, the indictment expressly alleged an enterprise of persons "associated in fact." The indictment here contains no such limiting phraseology. The first two paragraphs refer to the Florida constitution and county ordinances. That does not mean that the government is restricted to proving that the homicide section constituted a legal entity. We will not imply a choice of theories by the government without a clearer indication of intent.5
The court summarized the government's burden under a RICO conspiracy in United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 102 S. Ct. 1451, 71 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1982).
Id. at 1186-87 n. 4 (emphasis in original). More recently, this court held that a RICO conspiracy does not require even proof of the commission of an overt act. United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 2349, 80 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1984).
In other instances, however, the requisite agreement may be proved without any substantive RICO convictions. The detectives were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which requires evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity.6 Izaguirre essentially contends because of his acquittal on the substantive RICO counts, the government failed to prove he agreed to participate in a pattern of racketeering activity.
That proposition was rejected in United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1984). "The statutory language itself imposes no requirement that the defendant must agree to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs only by personally committing two predicate acts." Id. at 1529 (footnote omitted). To make out a pattern of racketeering activity in a RICO conspiracy, the government must either show the defendant agreed to participate in an enterprise with the objective of violating a substantive RICO provision,7 or prove that he personally agreed to commit two or more predicate acts. Id. at 1531. In a RICO conspiracy, therefore, the agreement and not the actual commission of the substantive crimes is necessary to a conviction. There is no contention that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of his agreement either to commit at least two predicate acts or to become involved in the enterprise with the objective of violating a substantive RICO provision, so we need not address that question. We hold only that conviction of substantive RICO offenses is not an absolute prerequisite to conviction under the RICO conspiracy provisions.
Based on the thefts of money from the property room of the police station, Izaguirre was indicted for violating the civil rights of Arvilla Needles, Armando Fiallo, Jr. and Roy Tateishi. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242.8 On appeal, Izaquirre challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of these charges. The standard of review in this circuit is whether "a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B en banc) aff'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 2398, 76 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1983) (footnote omitted).9 We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942), and make all inferences and credibility choices in support of the jury verdict. United States v. Prows, 728 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Rojas, 731 F.2d 707, 710 (11th Cir. 1984).
Izaguirre initially contends the government failed to prove that Stacy Needles owned the money taken from the property room at the police station. Izaguirre placed the $33,700.00 in the police property room designating Stacy Needles as the owner. Transcript at 7,381-82. Yordy Hernandez, to whom Izaguirre later claimed the money belonged, stated that he never claimed the money himself or through Roy Rodriguez. Id. at 12,265. In fact, Hernandez said "that the money man was Stacy Needles." Id. Needles was the driver of the car in which the currency was located. The money was to be used by Needles and his associates to purchase marijuana. Zatrapalek testified that he spoke with Izaguirre and " [s]ince the money was never claimed, they were going to invent a character ... to collect the money from the property room, utilizing Roy Rodriguez as the attorney." Id. at 7,873. There was sufficient evidence to prove that Needles was the owner of the money in the property room.
Derringer, on the other hand, stated that Carlos Fernandez, who later took the money from the property custodian, arrived during the raid and indicated that he was a relative of Fiallo's and was the rightful owner of the money. Id. at 12,617. Derringer's testimony was directly contradicted by Zatrapalek. According to Zatrapalek, Izaguirre approached him with a scheme to remove the funds. Id. at 8,042. Izaguirre proposed Fernandez as the logical choice because he could not be traced. Id. at 8,047. Both Fernandez' wife and Armando Fiallo, Jr. denied there was any relationship between Fernandez and Fiallo. Id. at 7,402, 7,729. Finally, Izaguirre admitted he had met Fernandez previously. Id. at 12,228. The resolution of the conflicting evidence was a credibility choice for the jury. United States v. Baxter, 733 F.2d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1984).
There was also ample evidence that Armando Fiallo, Jr. had an interest in his father's estate. He was the only child of Armando Fiallo, Sr., who died intestate. Id. at 7,729. Because Mrs. Needles and Armando Fiallo, Jr. possessed ownership interests in the funds expropriated by Izaguirre, "the victims were entitled to have the status of the seized property determined by due process." United States v. McClean, 528 F.2d 1250, 1255 (2d Cir. 1976).11
During his closing argument, the prosecutor first told the jury: "You can prevent the corruption from spreading. You can convict on the evidence that you heard ...." Transcript at 14,290. This statement allegedly constituted an impermissible appeal to the passion of the jury. The test in this circuit for evaluating the prosecutor's comments is "(1) whether the remarks were improper and (2) whether they prejudicially affected substantive rights of the defendants." United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1361 (11th Cir. 1983). In United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S. Ct. 3542, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1391 (1983), this court held that " [a]ppeals to the jury to act as the conscience of the community, unless designed to inflame the jury, are not per se impermissible." In that case, the prosecutor also urged the jury to halt the spread of corruption.12 Even assuming the statements were improper, we, like the court in Kopituk, find that they did not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendants.
Transcript at 14,288. Since there was no objection to this comment, we evaluate it under the plain error standard. United States v. Rojas, 731 F.2d 707, 710 (11th Cir. 1984). In reviewing the prosecutor's closing argument for prejudice, we "may consider the district court's jury instruction and the strength of the evidence against each defendant." United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1031, (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit B), cert. denied sub nom. Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S. Ct. 2965, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1354 (1982) (quoting United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1981)). Here, the district court instructed the jury that arguments were not evidence. Transcript at 14,311-12. In view of this instruction and the substantial evidence against the appellants, the comment did not constitute plain error.
A criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him and to reveal possible bias is basic to a fair trial. McKinzy v. Wainwright, 719 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1983). This court recently held,
United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 1984). The right to cross-examine, however, is not unlimited. Once there is sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, further questioning is within the district court's discretion. Kopituk, 690 F.2d at 1337.
Another reason advanced by the appellants to support the additional cross-examination was the need to rebut Zatrapalek's statement during direct examination that he had not been involved in certain criminal activities prior to his transfer to the homicide section. Even if we assume the district court erred in limiting further questioning, it does not require reversal. To constitute an abuse of discretion, "appellants must show that the restrictions imposed upon their cross-examination were clearly prejudicial." United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 909 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S. Ct. 349, 58 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1978) (quoting Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 1971)).
The appellants urge that an Allen charge was not necessary or warranted because the jury had not suggested any further impasse after the district court reread a portion of its earlier jury instructions. The timing of an Allen charge is within the trial court's discretion. United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1978). In Scruggs, the district court also gave an Allen charge sua sponte. That was not reversible error, however, the court held, because " [w]e have never required the trial judge to wait for requests from counsel or from the jury before giving the charge." Id. The jury here had been deliberating for a week and had earlier indicated some difficulties in reaching verdicts on all the defendants. There was no abuse of discretion in waiting until three days later to give the Allen charge.
Transcript at 14,585-86. The district court based this part of the charge on United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1970).
Although much criticized,16 the pattern Allen charge routinely has been upheld by the appellate courts. United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1975). Nonetheless, because of its potential coercive effect, close scrutiny is demanded of any modification of the accepted language. In making this determination, "the court looks 'to the language employed and that language's impact, under the circumstances, on the finders of facts.' " United States v. Blevinal, 607 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, 100 S. Ct. 1315, 63 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1980) (quoting United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 329 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1975)).
After a thorough examination of the course of the jury's deliberations, as well as the content of the instructions as a whole, we fail to find any coercive impact. The earliest verdicts after the court gave the challenged charge were reached five days later. The jury did not formulate its judgment in Derringer's case until over a week after the Allen charge was read to it. In fact, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on all the charges against Derringer, further undermining the assertion that the jury was unduly influenced into reaching a verdict. See United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S. Ct. 1602, 80 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1984).17 This does not mean that we uniformly approve of departures from the standard Allen charge, nor do we express any opinion on the use of such additional language in other cases. We merely hold that, under these facts, there was no coercion of the jury in this case.
Fabio Alonso was convicted of conspiring to conduct and conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1963; unlawfully arresting persons under color of state law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242; conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846; and income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201. He was acquitted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Alonso received a total sentence of ten years in prison
Pedro Izaguirre was found guilty of conspiring to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963; three counts of unlawfully appropriating property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242; and income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7206. He was acquitted of substantive racketeering, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy to defraud the government, tax evasion and two counts of unlawfully appropriating property. Izaguirre was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison.
Julio Ojeda was convicted of conspiring to conduct and conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1962(d), 1963; two counts of unlawfully arresting persons under color of state law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242; two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1); unlawfully appropriating property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242; conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. § 371; and two counts of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201. He was acquitted on two counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess marijuana and quaaludes, and two counts of unlawfully appropriating property. Ojeda received sentences aggregating fourteen years imprisonment.
Robert Derringer was convicted of unlawfully appropriating property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 242; and income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201. He was acquitted of two counts of unlawfully appropriating property, two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess marijuana and quaaludes with intent to distribute. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the substantive charges of racketeering, conspiracy to conduct an enterprise through racketeering, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, unlawful appropriation of property, unlawfully arresting persons under color of state law and conspiracy to defraud the government. Derringer was sentenced to six years imprisonment. Charles Rivas, Thomas Gergen, Steven McElveen and Raymond Eggler were acquitted of all charges and are not involved in this appeal.
The appellants contend that United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638 (11th Cir. 1983) compels exclusion of this extrinsic offense evidence. The defendant's use of marijuana was held to be inadmissible in his prosecution for mail fraud. The court determined that the evidence was irrelevant to any issue other than the defendant's character. Here, the enterprise concentrated mostly on trafficking in cocaine. As such, Reed is distinguishable from this case
In that case, " [i]t is enough that the defendant agreed to the commission of two predicate acts." Id. at 1531. He need not agree to commit them personally
18 U.S.C. § 242 provides, in part:
In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as precedent all decisions of Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
See e.g. United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Flores-Amaya v. United States, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S. Ct. 1125, 51 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1977); United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., specially concurring)