Source: https://openjurist.org/48/f1d/363
Timestamp: 2017-10-22 03:24:16
Document Index: 538546364

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 4', '§ 11', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', 'art. 4', '§ 3']

48 F1d 363 | OpenJurist
48 F. 363 -
48 F1d 363
JOHNV. FARWELL CO. V.HATHEI8.
the practice in equity, and have no place whatever on the law side of this court. Hurt v. HollinglfWorth, lOOU. S. 100. Indeed, the present application itself proceeds upon practice in equity. The petitioner is entitled to and seeks to enforce an equity. The issues in the casaon the docket are between the Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company and the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company; With the issueS-'that is, whetherlhe defendant shall pay certain damages to plaintiff-the petitioner has no direct concern. It is directly interested in the principle upon which such damages would be allowed or refused, as it is in every case analogous to its own. The counsel for the petitioner insists that he has a direct immediate interest in this suit, and that its prosecution in its present shape may preclude his client entirely. The action is upon a tort from its nature indivisible. Arecovery in an action upon it precludes any other. The petitioner stands precisely in the same plight as the plaintiff. The plaintifrs suit may preclude it. If this position be correct, it may demonatrate that the plaintiff has no standing in court. If it does not do this, it at least shows that the petitioner has a strong equity, which will be protected on the other side of this court, which cannot be protected on this side of the court. And, in order to obtain the wishes of the petitioner, the Pelzer Manufacturing Company must be a party to such a proceeding. Being such party, its rights must also be considered, and, if the equities are equal, the legal right will turn the scale. Let the petition be dismissed without prejudice. The motion to amend is refused also, without prejudice.
(Circuit Court, D. Minl1.eBota, Third DiviBion.l)ecember 10, 1891.).
BTATUTES-ENAOTlolBNT AND APPROVAL-"BIlSSION" OP LBGISLATuRE DEPINED.
Canst. Minn. art. 4, § 11, providing that within three days after the adjoummen\ of the legislature the governor may approve, sigo, and fI.le in the office of the secretary of litate "any act passed during the last three days of the session, and the same shall become law, "meaos the last three davs of for bUliiness, and does not iucinde Sunday; aod hence a bill passed on Satul'day was within the provistcw, though the adjournment did not occur until the following Tuesday.
At Law. Action by the John V. Farwell Company against John Matheis, and Theodore· Draz, garnishee. On motion to discharge the garnishee. Granted. Edward P. Sanborn, for garnishee. Howard L. Sntuh and LuBk, Bunn &.Hadley, opposed.
NELSON, J .. The defendant, Matheis, made an assignment under the insolvent laws of .the state of Minne50tato Theodore Draz, assignee. The plaintiff seeks to reach by garnishment proceedings the property held under the assignment; and the assignee, setting up the facts of the assignment,and the possession of the property, and presenting the; deed'
vol.,48.
thereOf,asks to be discharged. ' It is claim.ed that the deed of assign. mentis void for the reason, among others, that chapter 30, Laws Minn. 1889,' authorizing a statutory assignment, never became a law, and ought not to be in the statute book. It appears from the official records that chapter 30 was house file 1,318, and that after having passed the house it was received in the senate and passed Saturday, April 20, 1889. The legislature adjourned April 23d. Tuesday, and the same day the governor indorsed upon the bill the words, "Approved April 23,1889," and filed it with the secretary of state, April 25th, two dHys after the adjournment of the legislature. rrhe last clause of section 11, art. 4, of the constitution of the state of Minnesota, declares that "the governor may approve, sign, and file in the office of the secretary of state, within three days after the adjournment of the legislature, any act passed during the last three days of the session, and the same shall become a law." This act did become a law nnles/! Sunday is counted as one of the three days of the sessioB'j within the meaning of tbj,s'provision of section 11, art. 4. The correct construction of this clause depends upon the definition of the WortV'.session" as therein used. The prime definition of this word, when applied,to a legislative body; is the actual sitting of the members ofsuchbodyfor the transaction, of bU,siness. It also may be used to deuotethe teqn during which the legislaturemeet daily for business, and also the space of time between the first meeting and the adjournment. The context affords the light for determining the meaning of the word "sessian" when used in the constitution. In section 19, art. 4, the meaning of the word "sessions" is manifest: "Each house shall be open to the public during the sessions thereof, except in such cases as in their opinion may require secrecy." "Session" here means the actual assembly of the members for business. Section 1, art. 4, fixes tlle limit of the session of the legislature. The. context shoWs that the word "session" is here used to denote the space of time between the meeting and the adjOtlrnment of the legislature. In section 11; art. 4, which relates to the pa.ssage. of bills, by. the two houses of the legislature, and the formalities necessary to eriactlaws, the context determines the meaning of the W,ord "session " to be the,actual sitting of the members of the legislature. Such construction of ,the constitution is in accordance with its ttfte spirit 'arid intent to carry into effect the will of an enlightened people by whom it was adopted. Sunday is non dies for work, even in a legislature; and, if business is ever.transacted on Sunday, no record of it is kept as being. performed on that day. The "last three day!:> of the session," in section 11, means working days, when the legislature is in actual session for the transaction of business. The journals of the two houses show this·. ,It appears from them that Saturday, April 20, 1889, when chapter 30 passed the senate, was the seventy-eighth day of the sessidn,ahdtlNtt,the, Jegislature:adjotiru'ed6nTuesday, April 23, 188\); the eightieth day:O{ the session; Sunday ndt being a day of the session. In my chapter 30 was dulypassed:and approv,ed ,by the governor in time,an:dbecam,e'alaw. It is unnecessal1Y the other quesJfhegarnisheeis discharged, and :it is so ordered. llions
UNITED STATES 'II. MICHIGAN CENT. R. CO.
UNITED STATES 'D. MICHIGAN CENT. (Oircuit CoUTt, N. D. New York.
IMMIGRATION-ALIEN CONTRACT LABOR LAW.
December 10, 1891.)
A railroad company which knowingly employs at its office in New York, near the Canadian border, a person who resides in Canada, and comes daily to his work in the United States. is not engaged in assisting or encouraging the "importatilln or migration" of an alien, within the meaning of the alien contract labor law. Act Congo Feb. 26, 1885, § 3.
At Law. Action to recover the penalty for a violation of the alien ..:ontract labor law. Judgment for defendant. John E., Smith, for the United States. l)aniel H. McMillan, for defendant. W AI.LACE, J. This is an action to recover lhepenalty imposed by section 3 of. the act of congressof February 26, 1885, entitled" An act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the Dfutrict of Columbia." Briefly stated, the facts are these: . The defendant, a Michigan corporation, operates a railway between Chicago and Buffalo, the route of which, between the states of Michigan and New York·.is throagh Canada. It has an officest Suspension Bridge, in New York. One Blount applied at that office for employmeJ?;tas a clerk, and was engaged by the defendant at wages of $50 permooth, but for DO stated. period. He continued in the employ of the defendant for several months. Before the e:xpiration of the first month the ficers (!)f the defendant ascertained that Bl9unt was an alien,residing in Cana,da, and having a family there, and; that he.came from his home morning to the office of the defendant, and·· after performing his day's work returned home each night. Nevertheless defendant retained him in its. service. The defendant's liability under the act of congress is precisely the sameSI;l though it had made a new contract with Blount abthe beginning of his second month of service, with ftlll kMwledge of the fa.cts. At the end <>fthe first month the existing contract between them was at end, and thel'eafter there was an implied contract of the same tenor. The statute, by section 1, makes it unlawful for any person or tion. to prepay the tranE\portatiQn, or in any way assist or encourage the importlltiQll or migration, of any foreigner into the United States under contraot or ,e;l:pre!;ls. or.implied, made previous totha importation. or ;migl'ation of sucn,foreignerj and1 by section 3, declares that for every violation of the provisiopg, of section 1, the person or corp<;>i1at4on violating the same, by knowingly encouraging the migration or tion of an alien to perform labor or service of any kind under contract or agreement, expressed or implied, made with the alien previous to his a resident or citizen of the United States, shall forfeit and pay t r such offense the sum of $1,000. Notwithstanding the defendant