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Peters v. Hobby (full text) :: 349 U.S. 331 (1955) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› Peters v. Hobby
Peters v. Hobby 349 U.S. 331 (1955)
U.S. Supreme CourtPeters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)Peters v. HobbyNo. 376Argued April 19, 1955Decided June 6, 1955349 U.S. 331CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
(c) While loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of criminal sanctions, the limitation on the Board's review power to adverse determinations was in keeping with the deeply rooted principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable, while a verdict of acquittal is not. Pp. 349 U. S. 344-345. Page 349 U. S. 332
Reversed. Page 349 U. S. 333
The basic facts are undisputed. Petitioner is a professor of medicine, specializing in the study of metabolism at Yale University. For several years prior to 1953, because of his eminence in the field of medical science, he was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency. On April 10, 1953, the functions of the Federal Security Agency were transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, headed by respondent Hobby. Petitioner's duties required his presence in Washington from four to ten days each year, when called upon by the Surgeon General, to render advice concerning proposals to grant federal assistance to various medical research institutions. This work was not of a confidential or sensitive character, and did not entail access to classified material. Petitioner was compensated at a specified per diem rate for days actually worked. Page 349 U. S. 334 At the time of his removal, petitioner was employed under an appointment expiring on December 31, 1953.
In January, 1949, Joseph E. McElvain, Chairman of the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty of the Federal Security Agency, notified petitioner that derogatory information relating to his loyalty had been received. Accompanying McElvain's letter was a detailed interrogatory Page 349 U. S. 335 relating to petitioner's associations and affiliations. Petitioner promptly completed the form and returned it. Shortly thereafter, McElvain advised petitioner that the Agency Board had determined that no reasonable grounds existed for belief that petitioner was disloyal.
On April 1 and 2, 1952, the Agency Board conducted a hearing on petitioner's case in New Haven, Connecticut. The sources of the information as to the facts bearing on the charges were not identified or made available to petitioner's counsel for cross-examination. The identity of one or more of the informants furnishing such information, but not of all the informants, was known to the Board. The only evidence adduced at the hearing was presented by petitioner. He testified under oath that he had never been a member of the Communist Party, and also testified concerning the other charges against him. He did not Page 349 U. S. 336 refuse to answer any question directed to him. Petitioner's testimony was supported by the testimony of eighteen other witnesses and the affidavits and statements of some forty additional persons. On May 23, 1952, McElvain notified petitioner that the Agency Board had determined that, on all the evidence, there was no reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty.
Thereafter, on April 6, 1953, petitioner was advised by the Loyalty Review Board that it had determined to conduct a "post-audit" of the Agency Board's determination and, to this end, "hold a hearing and reach its own decision." [Footnote 3] The hearing was held on May 12, 1953, in New Haven, before a panel of the Board consisting of respondents Hessey, Amen, and King. Once again, as at the previous hearing, the only evidence adduced was presented by petitioner. In his own testimony, petitioner denied membership in the Communist Party, discussed his political beliefs and his motives for engaging in the activities and associations which were the subject of the charges, and answered all questions put to him by the Board. In support of petitioner's testimony, five witnesses stated their long acquaintance with petitioner and their firm conviction of petitioner's loyalty. [Footnote 4] In addition to this evidence, the record before the Board contained information supplied by informants whose identity was not disclosed to petitioner. The identity of one or more, but not all, of these informants was known to the Board. The information given by such informants had not been given under oath. The record also contained the evidence adduced by petitioner at the previous hearing. On this record, the Board determined that "on all the Page 349 U. S. 337 evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Peters' loyalty to the Government of the United States."
"The imposition of the penalty of ineligibility for government service Page 349 U. S. 338 constituted a violation of the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws by punishing the plaintiff by declaring him ineligible to serve the Government without a judicial trial or a fair administrative hearing. . . ."
From a very early date, this Court has declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 553. See Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129, 329 U. S. 136. Applying this rule to the instant case, we must at the outset determine whether petitioner's removal and debarment were effected in accord with Executive Order 9835. On consideration of this question, we conclude that the Loyalty Review Board's action was so patently in violation of the Executive Order -- in fact, beyond the Board's delegated jurisdiction under the Order -- that the constitutionality of the Order itself does not come into issue. [Footnote 6] Page 349 U. S. 339
The authority thus conferred on the Loyalty Review Board was limited to "cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency. . . ." And, even as to these cases, the Loyalty Review Board was denied any power to undertake review on its own motion; only the employee recommended for dismissal, or his department or agency, could refer such a case to the Loyalty Review Board. Page 349 U. S. 340
Acting under subsection (b), the Board promulgated detailed regulations, effective December 14, 1947, elaborating its powers under the Order. [Footnote 7] The regulations Page 349 U. S. 341 distinguished between two types of proceedings in individual cases. The first dealt with appeals from adverse decisions. [Footnote 8] The second, described in Regulation 14, claimed for the Board a very different function. [Footnote 9] As amended on January 22, 1952, Regulation 14 provided: [Footnote 10]
"(c) If a panel reviews a record on post-audit and reaches the conclusion that the determination made below does not fully recognize that it is of 'vital importance' as set forth in Executive Order 9835 'that persons employed in the Federal service be Page 349 U. S. 342 of complete and unswerving Loyalty to the United States,' then the panel may call up the case for a hearing, and after such hearing may affirm or reverse the original determination or decision. Nevertheless, it must always be remembered that, while it is important that maximum protection be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, equal protection must be afforded loyal employees from unfounded accusations of disloyalty."
This regulation, however, is valid only if it is "not inconsistent with the provisions of this order." The Board's "post-audit" function, when used to survey the operation of the loyalty program and to insure a uniformity of procedures in the various loyalty boards, might well be justified under the Board's powers to "Advise all departments and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty" and "Coordinate the employee loyalty policies and procedures of the several departments and agencies." But the regulation did not restrict the "post-audit" function to advice and coordination. Rather, it purported to allow the Board "to call up for review any case . . . even though no appeal has been taken," and to hold a new hearing and "after such hearing [to] affirm or reverse the original determination or decision." The Board thus sought to do by regulation precisely what it was not permitted to do under the Order. Although the Order limited the Board's jurisdiction to appeals from adverse rulings, the regulation asserted authority over appeals from favorable rulings as well; and, although the Order limited the Board's jurisdiction to appeals referred Page 349 U. S. 343 to the Board by the employee or his department or agency, the regulation asserted authority in the Board to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. To this extent, the regulation must fall. See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U. S. 607, 322 U. S. 616-618, and Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284, 347 U. S. 296-297.
"(1) that there should be established an independent over-all centralized authority acting solely for and on behalf of the President in the matter of the removal of disloyal employees; or (2) that the original hearing in loyalty cases should be within the employing agency, subject to a right of appeal to a centralized Page 349 U. S. 344 agency established with a power to review de novo; or (3) that the over-all agency be established with advisory powers only."
While loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of criminal sanctions, the limitation on the Board's review power to adverse determinations was in keeping with the deeply rooted principle of criminal law that a Page 349 U. S. 345 verdict of guilty is appealable, while a verdict of acquittal is not. [Footnote 19] This safeguard was one of the few, and perhaps one of the most important, afforded an accused employee under the Order. Its effect was to leave the initial determination of his loyalty to his co-workers in the department -- to his peers, as it were -- who knew most about his character and his actions and his duties. He was thus assured that his fate would not be decided by political appointees who perhaps might be more vulnerable to the pressures of heated public opinion. To sanction the abrogation of this safeguard through Regulation 14, in the face of the Order's language and the Commission's report, would be to sanction administrative lawlessness. Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must, of course, be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that authority. Compare United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390, 201 U. S. 398.
It is urged, however, that the President's failure to express his disapproval of Regulation 14 must be deemed to constitute acquiescence in it. From this, it is contended that the President thus impliedly expanded the Loyalty Review Board's powers under the Order. We cannot indulge in such fanciful speculation. Nothing short of explicit Presidential action could justify a conclusion that the limitations on the Board's powers had been eliminated. No such action by the President has been brought to our attention. There is, in fact, no evidence that the President even knew of the Board's Page 349 U. S. 346 practice prior to April 27, 1953, three weeks after the Board had notified petitioner of its intention to "hold a hearing and reach its own decision." And knowledge of the practice can hardly be imputed to him in view of the relatively small number of cases -- only 20 -- in which the Board reversed favorable determinations over its 6-year life. [Footnote 20] On April 27, 1953, the President issued Executive Order 10450, revoking Executive Order 9835 and establishing a new loyalty program. [Footnote 21] Executive Order 10450, by its own terms, did not take effect until 30 days later, on May 27, 1953. Although petitioner's case was heard and determined by the Loyalty Review Board during this 30-day period, and hence was not subject to Executive Order 10450, the Government contends that § 11 evidences knowledge and approval of Regulation 14. [Footnote 22] Page 349 U. S. 347 Section 11, however, did no more than recognize that cases under Regulation 14 might be pending on the effective date, and authorize their determination thereafter. And, even as to these cases, § 11 did not authorize the Board to recommend dismissal; at most, the Board could remand the cases to the departments or agencies for reconsideration. With respect to cases determined prior to the effective date -- such as petitioner's -- § 11 surely affords no basis for divining a Presidential intention to authorize the Board to disregard its previously defined jurisdictional boundaries. Particularly is this so where, as here, substantial rights affecting the lives and property of citizens are at stake. This Court has recognized that "a badge of infamy" attaches to a public employee found disloyal. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 191. The power asserted by the Board to impose such a badge on petitioner cannot be supported on so tenuous a theory as that pressed upon us.
The Board's order of debarment, however, was not limited to "the competitive service," but extended to all federal employment. [Footnote 24] Page 349 U. S. 348 And, although such a "final determination" could be made only by the employing agency, the Board did not wait for respondent Hobby to act on its recommendation. Petitioner's debarment was made effective on May 18, 1953, four days before the Chairman of the Board wrote petitioner of the Board's determination and nearly four weeks before the Department took action to remove petitioner from his position. The Board's haste can be understood only in terms of its announced intention to deprive agencies of all discretion to determine whether the Board's recommendations should be accepted. [Footnote 25]
There only remains for consideration the question of relief. Initially, petitioner is entitled to a declaratory judgment that his removal and debarment were invalid. Page 349 U. S. 349 He is further entitled to an order directing the respondent members of the Civil Service Commission to expunge from its records the Loyalty Review Board's finding that there is a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's loyalty, and to expunge from its records any ruling that petitioner is barred from federal employment by reason of that finding. His prayer for reinstatement, however, cannot be granted, since it appears that the term of petitioner's appointment would have expired on December 31, 1953, wholly apart from his removal on loyalty grounds.
I would prefer to decide this case on the constitutional questions discussed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS or on some of the other constitutional questions necessarily involved. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. See my dissents in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 341 U. S. 579-581; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 445-453. See also my concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 341 U. S. 142-149. I agree that it is generally better for this Court not to decide constitutional questions in cases which can be adequately disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds. See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 36 U. S. 553. But this generally accepted practice should not be treated as though it were an inflexible rule to be inexorably followed under all circumstances. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 343 U. S. 584-585. Here, as in the Youngstown case, I think it would be better judicial practice to reach and decide the constitutional issues, although I agree with the Court that the Presidential Order can justifiably be construed Page 349 U. S. 350 as denying the Loyalty Review Board the power exercised in this case. For this reason, I join the opinion of the Court. But I wish it distinctly understood that I have grave doubt as to whether the Presidential Order has been authorized by any Act of Congress. That order and others associated with it embody a broad, far-reaching espionage program over government employees. These orders look more like legislation to me than properly authorized regulations to carry out a clear and explicit command of Congress. I also doubt that the Congress could delegate power to do what the President has attempted to do in the Executive Order under consideration here. And, of course, the Constitution does not confer lawmaking power on the President. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579.
Dr. Peters was condemned by faceless informers, some of whom were not known even to the Board that condemned Page 349 U. S. 351 him. Some of these informers were not even under oath. None of them had to submit to cross-examination. None had to face Dr. Peters. So far as we or the Board know, they may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus Oates, who revel in being informers. They may bear old grudges. Under cross-examination, their stories might disappear like bubbles. Their whispered confidences might turn out to be yarns conceived by twisted minds or by people who, though sincere, have poor faculties of observation and memory.
Confrontation and cross-examination under oath are essential if the American ideal of due process is to remain a vital force in our public life. We deal here with the reputation of men and their right to work -- things more precious than property itself. We have here a system where government with all its power and authority condemns a man to a suspect class and the outer darkness without the rudiments of a fair trial. The practice of using faceless informers has apparently spread through a vast domain. It is used not only to get rid of employees in the Government, but also employees who work for private firms having contracts with the Government. [Footnote 2/1] It Page 349 U. S. 352 has touched countless hundreds of men and women, and ruined many. It is an un-American practice which we should condemn. It deprives men of "liberty" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, for one of man's most precious liberties is his right to work. When a man is deprived of that "liberty" without a fair trial, he is denied due process. If he were condemned by Congress and made ineligible for government employment, he would suffer a bill of attainder, outlawed by the Constitution. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303. An administrative agency -- the creature of Congress -- certainly cannot exercise powers that Congress itself is barred from asserting. See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 341 U. S. 144-146. [Footnote 2/2]
Those who see the force of this position counter by saying that the Government's sources of information must be protected if the campaign against subversives is to be successful. The answer is plain. If the sources of information need protection, they should be kept secret. But, once they are used to destroy a man's reputation and deprive him of his "liberty," they must be put to the test of due process of law. The use of faceless informers is wholly at war with that concept. When we relax our standards to accommodate the faceless informer, we violate our basic constitutional guarantees and ape the tactics of those whom we despise. Page 349 U. S. 353
Executive Order No. 9835 was issued by the President on March 21, 1947. By this order, he established the Loyalty Review Board and granted to it certain rulemaking powers. Part III, § 1, subd. b, Exec. Order No. 9835. The Review Board's first promulgation of regulations pursuant to this power included the original of Regulation 14, which provided that the Board had the right "on its own motion" to review the decisions of the department or agency loyalty boards "even though no appeal has been taken." 13 Fed.Reg. 255 (adopted December 17, 1947). Thus, from the very outset, the procedure followed by the Review Board in reviewing these cases was part of the loyalty program. Furthermore, from 1948 through 1952, in each of the Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission, the results of the Review Board's post-audit actions under Regulation 14 were unmistakably recorded. [Footnote 3/1] These reports were submitted to the President pursuant to statutory requirement. [Footnote 3/2] In addition to stating annual data on general post-audit reviews (more than 5,000 in 1952), the reports clearly indicated that the Board was rehearing cases on its own motion, such as the present, Page 349 U. S. 354 where the decision of the agency loyalty board had been favorable to the employee. [Footnote 3/3] The Court places emphasis on the number of cases so handled, but this hardly seems relevant in view of the fact that the reports indisputably conveyed to any reader the fact of what the Board was doing, whether in one case or 100.
The Court in this case is reviewing a Presidential Order and rules made thereunder. I do not find it as easy as does the majority to analogize such review to judicial review of congressional Acts and administrative interpretation of such Acts. Certain differences are immediately apparent. The Executive Branch is traditionally free to handle its internal problems of administration in its own way. The legality of judicial review of such intra-executive operations as this is, for me, not completely free from doubt. However, construing the Loyalty Order as the Court does, like a statute, the contemporaneous construction of the Order by the Review Board in promulgating Regulation 14, and the action of the President in allowing the regulation and practices thereunder to continue after having notice from the Civil Service Commission reports, lead me to conclude that the Board, by Regulation 14, Page 349 U. S. 355 correctly interpreted the Presidential intention conveyed by Executive Order 9835. Such reasonable interpretation, promptly adopted and long continued by the President and the Board, should be respected by the courts. That has been judicial practice heretofore. [Footnote 3/4]
Undoubtedly the President had knowledge and approved of the Regulation. This is shown by his specific recognition of such cases in his own 1953 Order. [Footnote 3/5] That Order, while not controlling Dr. Peters' case directly, since it did not become effective until after the Review Board had heard his case, recognized that the Review Board had been and could review decisions which had been favorable to an employee. This action by the President amounts to approval of the practice of the Review Board under Regulation 14. I am therefore compelled to conclude that the action of the Review Board in rendering its advisory recommendation in this case was not invalid. Page 349 U. S. 356
I agree that the Review Board's letter of May 22, 1953, may have been erroneous. Under Civil Service Rule V, § 5.101(a), [Footnote 3/6] federal employees found disqualified for federal employment because of a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty are barred from the federal competitive service for three years. This "final determination" as to loyalty is and can be made only by the head of a department or agency on recommendation of a loyalty board. [Footnote 3/7] Page 349 U. S. 357 When the head of a department acts on the Review Board's recommendation, § 5.101(a) becomes effective. The Review Board, acting as an agency of the Civil Service Commission, then notifies the employee of his disqualification. Assuming that the Review Board was not notified of any "final determination" prior to the letter of May 22, it was sent erroneously. However, it amounted to no more than a nullity, and Dr. Peters lost nothing. It is undisputed that, on June 12, 1953, the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, a subordinate of Secretary Hobby, "notified plaintiff of his separation from his position as Special Consultant." [Footnote 3/8] This was the notification which effectively separated him from government service, and which is the basis for his complaint for wrongful discharge.
"* * * *" "2. The head of each department and agency shall appoint one or more loyalty boards, . . . for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee of such department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of the proceedings before such boards."
"* * * *" "3. A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employing department or agency or to such person or persons as may be designated by such head, under such regulations as may be prescribed by him, and the decision of the department or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation."