Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/521/356/70188/
Timestamp: 2019-06-26 06:16:36
Document Index: 618886184

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 841']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Johnny King, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Turley Smith, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Cleveland Clay, Defendant-appellant, 521 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1975) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Johnny King, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Turley Smith, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Cleveland Clay, Defendant-appellant, 521 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1975)
US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - 521 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1975)
(1) unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 59.5 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1);
(2) unlawful sale and distribution and aiding and abetting in the sale and distribution of approximately 59.5 grams of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1);(3) unlawful conspiracy to distribute 1/8 kilogram of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Appellant Clay's sole claim on appeal is that the government, by furnishing him with an incomplete summary of statements by government agents before trial, in effect was guilty of withholding evidence useful and necessary to his defense within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and thus deprived him of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Clay claims that had he known that the testimony of government agents would link him to the alleged offenses, he would not have waived his right to jury trial.
Finally, appellant Smith has contended that his convictions for possession with intent to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin, in violation of § 841(a) (1), cannot both stand because the former offense is lesser and included within the latter. Although appellant Clay has not raised this issue on appeal, we consider its applicability to his convictions on counts one and two as well, since neither the district court nor Clay had the benefit of our decision in United States v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334, 1975. In Stevens, Supra, we quoted with approval the language of United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1975), that where possession of heroin is not shown to exist separately from the moment in which it is transferred to the government agent, but a single act is proof of the two offenses, it was not the intent of Congress that the defendant be punished twice for the single act. We thus remanded the case to the district court for vacation of one of the two sentences imposed for the violations of § 841(a) (1). This was so even though the sentences imposed for the separate violations were to run concurrently.
Here it appears that as to appellant Smith there was no proof of possession separate from the act of transferring the heroin to the government agent. We thus remand the case to the district court for vacation of one of the two concurrent sentences imposed for his violation of § 841(a) (1).
The sentence, not the pronouncement of guilt either by the jury or by the court, is the final judgment in a criminal case. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S. Ct. 481, 1 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1957) and Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206 at 210, 53 S. Ct. 325, 77 L. Ed. 702 (1933). To fail to enter a final judgment (i. e. sentence) with reference to one count of an indictment would leave the unresolved count pending for an indefinite period of time.
Although I have found no cases discussing this particular point, the Supreme Court in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955), reversed the defendant's conviction in a similar situation. The Court in Bell Held that the lower court erred in permitting two convictions to be based on a single transaction. As a result of its determination that Congress did not intend to permit dual punishment for one transaction, the Court held that the single transaction was not a proper basis for the prosecution of more than one offense. Although the Court did not discuss the proper remedy, I read its reversal as requiring the overturning of the improper second conviction.