Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/982/1411/137010/
Timestamp: 2017-11-18 22:58:05
Document Index: 317815116

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 511', '§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 3663', '§ 3651', '§ 3663', '§ 512']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Edward Avery Herndon, Defendant-appellant, 982 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Tenth Circuit › 1992 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Edward Avery Herndon, Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Edward Avery Herndon, Defendant-appellant, 982 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 982 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1992)
In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988), the Supreme Court articulated a four-part standard for determining the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. Such evidence is admissible if: 1) the evidence is offered for a proper purpose; 2) the evidence is relevant; 3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and 4) upon request, the trial court instructs the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Id. at 691-92, 108 S. Ct. at 1502; cf. United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1992).
We preface our review by noting that in order to preserve an alleged error for appeal, a party must object timely and properly. United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838, 108 S. Ct. 123, 98 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1987). Herndon's failure to do so constitutes waiver of the issue unless there is plain error resulting in manifest injustice. United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1008 (10th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."). Consequently, we need not review the district court's compliance with Huddleston's requirements with exacting scrutiny.
Initially, Herndon correctly notes that the government bears the burden of articulating the precise basis upon which Rule 404(b) evidence is offered, and that the trial court must identify the specific purpose for which such evidence is admitted. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S. Ct. 848, 88 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1986). In Record, however, we were careful to add that "any error in failing to adhere to the Kendall requirements would be considered harmless if 'the purpose for admitting the other acts testimony is apparent from the record, and the district court's decision to admit was correct.' " Id. at 1375 n. 7 (quoting United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, supra. In Record the defendant not only objected at trial, but had earlier filed an unsuccessful motion in limine. Here, Herndon did neither. We now make explicit what Record impliedly recognized: Kendall's requirements apply only in the presence of a timely and proper objection at trial. To hold otherwise would place on the government and the trial court the additional and awkward burden of having to defend the defendant.
Herndon's next argument--that the similar acts evidence was irrelevant because the government failed to prove he was the one who altered the VINs on the items identified in the forfeiture count--ignores the language and result in Huddleston itself. There, the Supreme Court held that a trial court need not make a preliminary finding that the government proved the existence of the similar act by a preponderance of the evidence before submitting the similar acts evidence to the jury. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682, 108 S. Ct. at 1497. Rather, Rule 404(b) permits the admission similar acts evidence "if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act." Id. at 685, 108 S. Ct. at 1499. While Huddleston most directly concerned whether the similar acts occurred, the Court also rejected requiring that a preliminary finding be made as to whether the defendant committed the similar act. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689 n. 6, 108 S. Ct. at 1501 n. 6. Therefore, we must decide whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that Herndon altered the VINs on the items identified in count three. We believe there was. The evidence at trial clearly demonstrated that the items in count three were found on Herndon's property. Moreover, the government introduced an ammunition box seized from Herndon's front porch containing a number of specialized rivets, stencils, and stamps which could have been used to alter VINs. From this evidence, the jury could easily have inferred that Herndon was the person responsible for altering the VINs on the items in the forfeiture count.
Without elaboration, Herndon next argues that the prejudice resulting from the similar acts evidence substantially outweighed its legitimate probative value. However, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether the prejudice inherent in otherwise relevant evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 991, 108 S. Ct. 1084, 1299, 99 L. Ed. 2d 242, 509 (1988). In the absence of an objection by Herndon at trial and more specific allegations on appeal, we choose not to second guess the good judgment of the district court.
Finally, Herndon argues that, despite his trial counsel's failure to request one, the district court erred by not issuing a limiting instruction to the jury concerning its use of the similar acts evidence. This argument is without merit. A trial court need only give such an instruction "upon request." Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92, 108 S. Ct. at 1502; Record, 873 F.2d at 1376. As there was no request, there was no error.
In support of his argument, Herndon notes the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held that the Rule 11(f) requirement that a court must satisfy itself of a factual basis for the guilty plea is applicable to a defendant's stipulation to criminal forfeiture. See United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850, 107 S. Ct. 177, 93 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1986); United States v. Roberts, 749 F.2d 404, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S. Ct. 1770, 84 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1985). Herndon also cites United States v. Crumbley, 872 F.2d 975, 976 (11th Cir. 1989), as authority for "assuming without deciding that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) applies to forfeiture portion of plea agreement." Def. Br. at 22. Crumbley, however, has largely been overruled by United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992), which held:
The government argues for a literal interpretation of Rule 11. It says that the rule by its own terms applies only to pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. It notes that in each of the three cases Herndon cites, the stipulation to forfeiture occurred as part of a guilty plea, and thus fell properly within the scope of Rule 11. The government then cites cases from three other circuits which hold in accordance with Boatner that Rule 11 is inapplicable with respect to stipulations admitting facts conclusive of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1975);5 United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 708 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 710-11 (4th Cir. 1983).
The stipulation Herndon agreed to does not comport with the Supreme Court's definition of a guilty plea. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) ("A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.")7 In Herndon's case, at least one important event remained--the jury's verdict. This was a situation where both parties gambled on the outcome of the trial. Herndon risked his right to have the forfeiture issue tried to a jury on the chance that he would be found not guilty of the alteration counts. The government, on the other hand, chanced its opportunity to receive items that were clearly forfeitable under the statute based on its perception of the strength of the case against Herndon. In retrospect, Herndon should have passed on the bet.8
Herndon challenges his maximum fourteen-month sentence for count two calculated under the sentencing guidelines.11 The applicable guideline for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 511 is U.S.S.G. § 2B6.1 which provides a base offense level of eight. This provision continues: "If the retail value of the motor vehicles or parts involved exceeded $2,000, increase the offense level by the corresponding number of levels from the table in section 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit)." U.S.S.G. § 2B6.1(b) (1). The fraud table in section 2F1.1(b) (1) provides for the addition of two points to the base offense level when the loss involved exceeds $5,000, and for the addition of three points if the loss exceeds $10,000.
Herndon now argues that the district court erred in basing the guideline offense level on the value of the pickup truck at the time it was stolen rather than its value at the time he altered its VIN. The indictment alleged that the stolen pickup truck's VIN was removed and altered some four years after its theft. Because Herndon failed to object to the calculation of the offense level at his sentencing hearing, we review only for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir. 1990). However, basing a sentence on the wrong guideline range constitutes a fundamental error affecting substantial rights within the meaning of Rule 52(b). United States v. Lacey, 969 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1992); Smith, 919 F.2d at 124. We review the district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1458 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Haar, 931 F.2d 1368, 1377 (10th Cir. 1991).
Herndon objects for the first time that the district court's order of restitution exceeded its statutory authority. As discussed above, issues generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Again, we review only for plain error. The imposition of an illegal restitution order, however, constitutes plain error. United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991). While we review de novo the legality of a sentence of restitution, the district court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Teehee, 893 F.2d 271, 274 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the amount of restitution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rogat, 924 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 1637, 113 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1991).
The district court ordered Herndon to pay a total of $908 in restitution, $190 to the owner (Steven Ratcliff) and $718 to the insurer (Farmers Insurance Group) of the stolen 1985 GMC Sierra pickup truck identified in the first alteration count. The district court indicated that this amount would compensate them for only part of their loss.13 From the record, we gather that the district court ordered restitution for the loss suffered by the victims resulting from the theft of the truck. Herndon, invoking the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 110 S. Ct. 1979, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1990), argues that the district court should have ordered him to pay only the loss caused by his conduct that formed the basis for his conviction, namely, the physical damage caused by the alteration of the stolen pickup truck's VIN.
Hughey involved an interpretation of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. The district court in this case, however, could have based its restitution order on either the VWPA or the Federal Probation Act ("FPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473. The FPA applies to offenses committed before November 1, 1987. Although Herndon committed count one before this date, the district court did not specify which of the two statutes it used. We will assume the district court ordered restitution under the VWPA, and Herndon's reliance on Hughey is well-placed to this extent. United States v. Cook, 952 F.2d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 1991).
The VWPA allows the district court to sentence a defendant to pay restitution to "any victim of such offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (1). In Hughey, the Court held that the VWPA "authorize [s] an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction." 495 U.S. at 413, 110 S. Ct. at 1980. The question posed by this issue is the loss actually caused by Herndon's conduct.
This question would seem to be a factual one for the district court. The presentence report, the district court, and presumably the attorneys below all assumed that the damage resulting from Herndon's VIN alteration was the total value of the truck. According to a recent Tenth Circuit case, however, everyone may have jumped to a mistaken conclusion. In United States v. Diamond, 969 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1992), we held that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that a defendant's conduct resulted in a loss that would not have otherwise occurred.
The three considerations Herndon forwards are based upon several parts of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11:
The Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed, en banc, the underlying rationale of Terrack. See Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 839-41 (9th Cir. 1992)
But see id. 395 U.S. at 242-43 n. 4, 89 S. Ct. at 1712 n. 4 (" 'A plea of guilty is more than a voluntary confession made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need be advanced.... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.' ") (Citation omitted, emphasis added.)
We similarly reject Herndon's contention that the district court committed plain error by ordering forfeiture of the legitimately purchased pickup truck even though only its engine and transmission had altered VINs. Herndon makes a sensible argument that 18 U.S.C. § 512 by its terms allows forfeiture only of "such vehicle or part" with an altered VIN. Moreover, " [f]orfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of the law." United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226, 59 S. Ct. 861, 865, 83 L. Ed. 1249 (1939); see also United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille VIN: 6D47S7Q234771, 644 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir. 1981) ("As a general rule, forfeiture is not favored, and statutes providing for forfeiture are strictly construed.")
The government counters that Herndon completely changed the character of the legitimately purchased pickup truck when he added the altered engine and transmission. While this argument has some appeal, it does seem at variance with the language of the statute. Courts rely heavily on the text of a forfeiture statute in determining its scope. See, e.g., Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1978) (language of Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act allowing forfeiture of unreported currency in excess of $5,000 is not limited to the excess over $5,000). However, even if we disagree with the district court's approach in this case, and we note that the call is a close one, we cannot say that the district court committed plain error.
This has been the approach taken by several other courts of appeal which, in fairly strong language, have "suggested" that courts directly address the defendant before accepting a stipulation to guilt-proving facts. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933, 101 S. Ct. 1396, 67 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1981); United States v. Brown, 428 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S. Ct. 1426, 59 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1979)
The Fifth Circuit has recently addressed the interplay between sections 2B6.1 and 2F1.1 in the context of a defendant convicted of altering VINs and trafficking in motor vehicles with altered VINs. See United States v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 1152, 1158-59 (5th Cir. 1992). While the distinction between Thomas and this case--the additional trafficking convictions--is significant, the court's reasoning is nevertheless instructive. In upholding the defendant's sentence, the Thomas court rejected the argument that enhancement of section 2B6.1 offenses through the fraud and deceit table of section 2F1.1 is limited to retail value. As the court noted: "Nowhere in sections 2B6.1 or 2F1.1, or their Commentary, does it mention using only retail value in applying the loss table in section 2F1.1. Thomas, 973 F.2d at 1159 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Fifth Circuit recognized, as we do here, that the guidelines in this context do not speak in terms of absolutes
The Sixth Circuit has recently interpreted Hughey and the VWPA in a similar fashion. See United States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 250-252 (6th Cir. 1992)