Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=6028
Timestamp: 2020-08-09 09:12:18
Document Index: 308086689

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 226', 'Art. 226', 'Art. 311', 'Art.\n14', 'Art. 309', 'Art.\n309', 'Art.\n132', 'Art. 309', 'Art.\n309', 'Art. 246']

I N SAKSENA versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
1976 AIR 2250	1976 SCR (3) 237 1976 SCC (4) 750
I N SAKSENA V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [1976] RD-SC 10 (23 January 1976)
CITATION: 1976 AIR 2250	1976 SCR (3) 237 1976 SCC (4) 750
R	1987 SC2310	(14)
Constitution of	India-Articles	245 &	246-Schedule seven-List 11	entry	41-interpretation of	legislative entries-subsidiary or	ancillary to	subject	covered by entries-Judicial function and legislative function-Whether legislature can	overrule a judicial pronouncement by a bare declaration-Whether can remove basis of judicial pronouncement,
The appellant was a District & Sessions Judge.	By a Memorandum dated 28-2-1963, the State Government raised the age of	compulsory retirement for Government servants to 58 years.	The said Memorandum,	however, empowered	the Government to retire a	Government servant after he attains the age	of 55 years. Thereafter, rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution were framed whereby the age of superannuation was raised to 58 years. However the clause empowering the	Government to retire a	Government servant after the age of SS years, was not incorporated in the said rules. The appellant was retired from service after he completed SS years and	before he completed 58 years. The challenge to	the said order of compulsory retirement succeeded in this Court. This court held on	23-1-1967 as under:
"The appellant will be deemed to have continued in the service of the Government in spite of that order.
As. however. the appellant attained the	age of 58 years, in	August, 1966, it is not possible now to direct that he should be put in service. But he will be entitled to such benefits	as may accrue now to him by virtue of	the success of the	writ petition.	The appellant	will get his	costs	from the State - throughout." Thereafter. an ordinance was promulgated which later on became an Act of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. The said Act validated the retirement of certain Government servants including the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.
The act	was made effective from 1st	March 1963 and It empowered the Government to retire a Government servant on his attaining the age of 55 years.
The appellant again filed	a Writ Petition in the High Court which was dismissed.
In an appeal the appellant contended before this Court:
1. The Act has been passed to overrule a decision of this Court which the legislature has no power to do.
2. The matter having once been decided by the Supreme Court was barred by the principle of res judicata.
3. The Act gives	naked power to the authorities to retire any employee after he attains the age of 55 years and provides no guidelines for the exercise OF the power.
4. A right of property being a judgment debt protected by Article 19(1)(f) of	the Constitution, the impugned Act could not have expropriated	without	providing for	any compensation. It is ultra vires Article 31(2) of	the Constitution.
5. The impugned, Act is ultra vires the Constitution since it seeks to validate the retirement of the appellant and others like him by changing their service conditions with retrospective effect. In doing so, the Legislature has over-stepped the limits of legislative power.
6. Even if the impugned Act is valid, on a proper construction it does`not vacate the decree of this Court.
238 Dismissing the appeal by	certificate under Article 132(1) and 133(1)(a) to ^
HELD: 1. The decree of this Court is not a money decree raising	a judgement debt. It is a	declaratory decree declaring that the order compulsorily retiring the appellant was invalid. The further declaration	that he would be entitled to such benefits as might accrue to him by virtue of the	success of the Writ Petition, was only incidental or anciliary, to the main	relief and will fall or stand with the same. [242 G-HI
2. The distinction between a Legislative	act and a Judicial act is well known though in some specific instances the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the rights of	the parties according to law enacted by the Legislature	is a judicial function. It is for the Legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions and to require the court to give effect to that law. The Legislature cannot by a bare	declaration, without more, directly	overrule, reverse or	override a judicial decision. It may at any time in exercise of the plenary powers	conferred on it by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic within its	legislative field, fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. Judgments in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976]	2 S.C.R, 347 and Hari	Singh	v. Military Estate Officer[1973] 1 S.C.R. 516 followed. [243 A-D]
3. In enacting the impugned Act the State Legislature derives its competence not only from	Article 309 but also from Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It is well settled that the entries in these legislative lists are to be construed in their widest possible	amplitude and	each general word used in such entries must be held to comprehend anciliary or	subsidiary matters. The Legislature	has legislative competence	not only to	change	the service conditions of Civil Servants with retrospective effect but also to	validate with	retroactive force invalid executive orders	retiring the	servants because such validating legislation must be regarded as subsidiary or anciliary to the power of legislation on the subject covered by Entry 41.
[245 A-D]
4. The impugned Act by introducing a legal fiction on giving the said memorandum statutory status with effect from its inception, effectively cures the defects from which this Memorandum and	the orders of retirement made there under were suffering.	Thus the said legislation removes or cures the defect which this	Court found in the Memorandum which was the	basis of the impugned orders of retirement. [246 A- B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 131 of 1971 and 350 of 1971.
(From the	Judgments and orders dated 2-5-1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos. 504 and 92 of 1967 respectively).
G. L. Sanghi, Bishamber Lal and M. Iyngar for the Appe llant (In CA 131/71).
M. N. Phadke, S.	S. Khanduja for the Appellant (In CA 350/71).
I. N. Shroff for the Respondent (In both appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. This appeal	on certificate	is directed against	a judgment of the	Madhya	Pradesh	High Court dismissing the	Appellant's writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
239 The appellant joined the service of	the State Government as a A subordinate Judge in the year 1936. On promotion, he was confirmed as District and Sessions Judge with effect from December 2, 1957. The appellant attained the age	of 55 years on August 22, 1965 which was the age of superannuation according to Fundamental Rule	56 (Ch	IX) governing the Civil Services of the State. But prior to that on February 28, 1963,	by a memorandum No. 433-259-1 (iii) /63, the State Government raised the age of compulsory retirement for	government servants to 58 years subject to certain exceptions. The material part	of the memorandum dated February 28, 1963, read as follows:
"5. Notwithstanding	anything contained in	the foregoing	paragraphs the appointing authority	may require a Government servant to retire after he attains the age of SS years on 3 months notice without assigning any reasons A Government servant may also after attaining the age of 55 years voluntarily retire after giving 3 months notice to the appointing authority.
6. These orders will	have effect from the	1st March 1963 .
7. Necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations will be issued in due course." Thereafter, by Government Notification dated November 29, 1963, F. R. 56 was amended on December	6, 1963 in exercise of the power	under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, raising the	age of compulsory retirement of the	State Civil Servants to 58 years with effect from March 1, 1963 but the clause	in the aforesaid Memorandum, empowering the	Government to retire servants above the age of 55 years by	giving them three months' notice was	not incorporated in the Rule.
Tn view of this memorandum, the appellant was allowed to continue in office	after he had attained the age of 55 years.
On September 11, 1963, the respondent passed an order retiring the	appellant from	service with	effect	from December 31, 1963. To impugn this order, the appellant filed a Writ	Petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution on	the ground that F. R. 56 as it stood after the amendment of November 29, 1963, (published on 6-12-1963) did not	contain any provision authorising the respondent to retire the appellant after the attainment of 55 years of age and that his retirement was contrary to Art. 311(2) and Art.
14 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment dated April 30, 1964.
The appellant came up in appeal to this Court. During the pendency of that appeal Saksena attained the age of 58 years. By its judgment	dated January	23, 1967, this Court quashed the impugned order of retirement holding that:
As, how ever, the	appellant attained the age of 58 years, in August, 240 1966 it is not possible now to direct that he should be put back in service. But he will be entitled to such benefits as may accrue now to him by virtue of	the success of	the writ petition. The appellant will get his costs from the State throughout." Before the	decision of that appeal (Civil Appeal No.
670 of	1965) however,	the Governor had promulgated	the Madhya Pradesh	(Age of	Compulsory Retirement)	Rules, 1965 under Art. 309 of the Constitution. These	Rules	were published in the Government Gazette of July 17, 1965. By a deeming clause,	these Rules were made effective from March 1, 1963. The age of retirement was thereby raised to 58 years and under r. 6 thereof, the appointing authority was empowered to retire a	Government Servant on his attaining the age	of 55	years on 3 months' notice without assigning any reason. By r. 8, the aforesaid memorandum, dated February 28, 1963, was	cancelled, and it was provided that notwithstanding the cancellation of that memorandum anything done or	any action taken in pursuance of the directions contained in that memorandum shall be	and shall always be deemed to have been done or to have	been taken under the relevant provisions of these Rules.
At the hearing of the earlier appeal, these Rules were not brought to the notice of this Court.
On February 10, 1967, after the judgment by this Court, the State promulgated an ordinance which was replaced on April 20, 1963 by the Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Sevak Anivarya Sevanivitrika Vidhi- manyatakaran Vidyayaktakaran Vidyeyak Adhiniyam 1967	(Act 5 of 1967) validating the retirement of certain	Government servants,	including that of	the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.
By virtue of this Act, the State is vested with a right not to	pay the	dues of the appellant from the date of his retirement (December 3, 1963 onwards.
Sections 2 and 5 of the Act, which are material for our purpose, read as follows:
"2. (1) The Madhya Pradesh	(Age of Compulsory Retirement Rules,	1965 replacing the provisions of the , Government of Madhya Pradesh General Administration Department Memorandum No. 1433-258-l(iii)/63, dated the 28th February 1963 (hereinafter referred	to as	the Memorandum) shall	be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 1st March 1963.
(2) Anything done or any action taken in pursuance of the directions contained in the memorandum shall be and shall always be deemed to have been done or taken under corresponding provisions of	the aforesaid rules as if the aforesaid rules were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken and shall now be called into 241 question in any court on the ground that the provisions of the A memorandum were not issued in	the form of rules made by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh under Art.
309 of the Constitution and could not therefore regulate the conditions	of service of Government servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State." "5. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of	any Court, all Government servants	serving in connection with the affairs of the State who	were compulsorily retired or	purported to	have	been compulsorily retired in accordance with the memorandum as replaced by the Madhya Pradesh (Age of Compulsory Retirement) Rules, 1965 referred to in Section 2 during the period beginning with 1st March, 1965 and ending on 15th July,	1965 shall be and shall always be deemed to have been	validly retired in accordance with	the condition of service applicable to them at the relevant time as if the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 had been in force at all material time when such retirement was ordered, as accordingly:
(a) all notices served on such	Government servants' after their completion of age of 55 years shall be deemed to be and to have been issued in accordance with the rules governing their conditions of service;
(b) no suit	or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any Court for any amount whatsoever as a payment towards salary for the	period beginning with the date on which a Government	servant	had	been compulsorily retired and ending	on the date of his attainment of age of 58 years.
c) no court	shall enforce	any decree or order directing the payment of any	such amount referred to in clause (b) above." In substance, and effect, this Act has made provisions of the	Compulsorily Retirement	Rules, 1965 applicable from March 1, 1963.
On November 10, 1967, the appellant again moved	the High Court by a writ petition	out of	which	the present appeal has arisen, challenging	the validity of this	Act, particularly of sections 2 and S extracted above.
Four contentions were raised by him before the	High Court: (1) that the Act has been passed to over-rule the decision of the Supreme Court which the legislature has no power to do, (2) that the statement of objects and Reasons attached to the Bill when it was introduced, indicates that its main object was to avoid	financial burden which would fall on the State on account of its having to pay arrears of pension etc. to a large number of officers who had	been retired under the said memorandum which was treated to be a rule and which the Supreme Court held was not an effective rule but merely an executive	instruction: (3) that	the matter having once been decided by the Supreme Court, was barred by the principle of res judicata and (4) 242 that the Rules give naked power to the authorities to retire any employee after he	has attained the age of 55 years by giving him three months' notice, and provide no guidelines for the exercise of this power.
The High Court negatived	these contentions, dismissed the writ ,, petition but granted a certificate under Art.
132 (1) and 133(1)(a) to (c) of the Constitution.
The contentions advanced before the High	Court	have been repeated before us with amplification and addition.
It is argued on behalf of the appellant: (i) that a right of property, being a judgment-debt, protected by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, had been created by this Court's decree dated January 30, 1967 in favour of the appellant and against the State. Since the impugned Act in effect, seeks to expropriate the appellant of that right without providing for any compensation, it is ultra vires Article 31(2) of the Constitution, (ii) The impugned Act is ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it seeks to validate the retirement of the appellant, and others like him, by changing their service conditions with retrospective effect. In so doing, the State legislature has overstepped the limits of legislative powers conferred on it by Article 309 of	the Constitution. Reliance has	been placed on the decision of this Court in	The State of Mysore v.
Padamanabhacharya etc.(1) (iii) The impugn ed Act encroaches upon the judicial field inasmuch as it over-rules and makes unenforceable the decision, dated January 30, 1967 of this Court in Civil Appeal	No. 670	of 1963 and in so doing, it offends Article	141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution, (iv) Even if	the impugned Act is valid, cls. (b) and (c) of s. 5 of the	Act, on	a proper construction, do not vacate	the decree of this Court, requiring the respondent to pay to the appellant the pecuniary benefits resulting from the success of his	earlier appeal	(C. A. 670/65) in this Court. Clause (b) of	s. S merely bars the maintenance or continuation of any proceeding	for any	amount as a payment towards salary.
The appellant is not seeking to maintain or	continue any execution proceeding in court,	for the recovery of	any amount towards salary, the decree being a declaratory one.
None of these contentions appears to be tenable.
A perusal	of this	Court's decree, dated January	30, 1967, (extracted above) would	show that it is not a money decree, raising a judgment-debt. It is a declaratory decree, declaring that	the respondents' order, dated September 11, 1963, compulsorily retiring the appellant r was invalid, and consequently the appellant would be deemed to have continued in service till he attained the age of 58 years. The further declaration that "he will be entitled	to such benefits as may accrue to him by virtue of the success of the	writ petition" was only incidental	or ancillary to the	main relief and will fall or stand with the same. This being the position, the decree did not create an indefeasible right -.
[1966] 1 S.C.R. 494.
243 of properly in favour of the appellant. We therefore do not find any A substance in the argument that the impugned Act seeks to acquire without payment of compensation property vesting	in	the appellant	and	is	consequently unconstitutional.
The distinction between a "legislative"	act and a "judicial" act	is well known, though in some specific instances the line which separates one category from	the other may not be easily discernible.	Adjudication of	the rights of the parties according to law enacted by	the legislature is	a judicial function. In the performance of this function,	the court interprets and gives effect to the intent and mandate of	the legislature	as embodied in the statute. On the other hand, it is for the legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions and to require the court to give effect to that law.
While, in	view of this distinction between legislative and judicial functions, the legislature cannot by a	bare declaration, without more, directly over-rule, reverse or over-ride a judicial decision,	it may, at any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Article 245 and	246 of	the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by	enacting a valid law on a topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing	with retrospective,	curative or	neutralising effect	the conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out by Ray	C.J. in	Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,(1) the rendering ineffective of judgments or orders	of competent courts and tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of	all validating Acts.
Such validating	legislation which removes the	causes	for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power.
In Hari Singh v. Military Estate officer,(2) a Bench of seven learned Judges of this	Court laid down that	the validity of a validating law is to be judged by two tests.
Firstly, whether the legislature possesses competence over the subject matter, and, secondly, whether by validation the legislature has removed the defect which the courts had found in the previous	law. To	these we may add a third .
Whether it is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
We have noticed already,	that the impugned provisions do not	offened Articles 19 and 31 or anything else in Part III of the Constitution.
We may now see whether the provisions	in question satisfy the first two tests. G Mr. Sanghi's argument is	that by virtue of the power conferred by Article 309, the	State	Legislature is	not competent to pass a	law validating	retrospectively an invalid order of retirement of a State civil servant, made by the	State Government, or render ineffective a decree of this Court declaring invalid such an order. The point sought to be made out	is that the legislative power conferred on the State legislature	by Article 309, is	confined to regulating the	recruitment and	conditions of service of me persons appointed to public services of the (1) [1976 2 S.C.R. 347.	(2) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 5-16.
244 State, and that the impugned	provisions not	being	such regulatory provisions, are ultra vires Article 309.
In Padmanabhacharya's case (supra), which is the sheet anchor of this contention, the Court	was considering	the scope of Article 309 in the context of Rule 294(a) Note 4, of the Mysore Service Regulations. There, the respondent was a teacher in a Government School. He was ordered to be retired from service with effect from	February 3, 1958 on attaining the age of 55 years. He challenged the validity of the order by a	writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court and contended that rule 294 (a) having been amended in April 1955, the normal age of superannuation was fixed at 58 years, instead	of 55 years. On behalf of the State, it was canvassed that	a notification of the Governor under Article 309 of	the Constitution, issued on March 25, 1959 had validated the action taken in retiring the respondent, and others upon their attaining the age of 55 years.
Wanchoo J.	(as he	then was), speaking for this Court held that such a rule cannot	be made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, but was cautious enough to add: ' `We are expressing no opinion as to the power of the legislature to make a retrospective provision under Article 309 of the Constitution wherein the appropriate legislature has been given the power to regulate the recruitment and	conditions of	service	of persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State by passing Acts under Art. 309 of the Constitution read with item	70 of List I of the Seventh Schedule or item 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The present rule has been made by the Governor under the proviso to Art.
309. That	proviso lays down that it shall be competent for the Governor or such person as he may direct in the - case of services and posts in connection with the affairs of	the State to	make rules regulating	the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services and posts until provision in that behalf is	made by or under an	Act by	the appropriate legislature. Under the proviso the Governor has the power to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to such services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State.	The question is whether the notification of March 25, 1959 can be said to be such a rule. We are of opinion that this notification cannot be said to be a rule regulating the recruitment	and conditions of service of	persons appointed to the services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State." From what	has been quoted above, it is clear that this Court advisedly	did not express any	opinion about	the competency of	the appropriate legislature to enact validating provisions of this	type concerning	the public servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State or the Central Government, as the case may be.
245 It is noteworthy that in enacting the impugned Act, the State A	legislature derives its competence not only	from Article 309, but also	from Entry 41 of List	II of	the Seventh Schedule. Indeed, within its allotted sphere, that is, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule the State legislature has, by virtue of Art. 246(3), exclusive, plenary powers of legislation.
Entry 41, List II, reads as under: B "41. State public services;	State Public Service Commission." It	is well settled that the	entries in these legislative lists in Schedule	VII are	to be	construed in their widest possible amplitude, and each general word used in such	Entries must be held	to comprehend ancillary or subsidiary matters. Thus considered, it is clear that the scope of Entry 41 is wider than the matter of regulating the recruitment and	conditions of	service of public servants under Article	309. The area	of legislative competence defined by Entry 41 is far more comprehensive than	that covered by the proviso to Article 309. By virtue of Articles 246, 309 and read with Entry	41, List II, therefore, the State legislature had legislative competence not only to change the service conditions	of State Civil Servants with retrospective effect but also to validate with retrospective force invalid	executive orders retiring the servants, because such validating legislation must be	regarded as subsidiary or ancillary to the power of legislation on the subject covered by Entry 41.
Thus the impugned provisions satisfy the	first test.
This takes us to the second test, whether the impugned legislation removes or cures the defect which this Court had found in the Memorandum which was the basis of the impugned orders of retirement. For reasons that follow, the answer to this question also must be in the affirmative.
The basis	of this	Court's decision dated January 30, 1967 in	Civil Appeal 670 of 1965 was	that the Government Memorandum dated February 28,	1963, in pursuance of which the impugned order on	retirement of I. N. Saksena had been passed on September 11, 1963, had not attained the status of a statutory rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, but was merely	an administrative instruction. This provision in the Memorandum empowering the Government to retire a	servant on his attaining the age of 55 years, after three months notice, was not incorporated in the statutory rules. On the other hand the amendment made with effect from March	1963 in Fundamental Rule 56, in exercise of its powers	under Article 309 by the Government under notification dated December 6, 1963, had raised the age of	retirement for	State Government servants from 55 to 58 years. I. N. Saksena had therefore, by virtue of this amended statutory rule a right to remain in service up to the age	of 58	years. This right could not be taken away by mere executive instructions embodied in the Memorandum. H Madhya Pradesh Act 5 of 1963 gives the said Memorandum the statutory status with effect from its very inception. By introducing 246 a legal	fiction the Act effectively cures the defect from which this Memorandum and the orders	of retirement	made thereunder were suffering.
Thus the second test was also satisfied. The conclusion is there fore inescapable that the impugned provisions were valid. Hence, the order, dated September 11, 1963, of Saksena's compulsory retirement became valid as the basis of this Court's judgment dated January 30, 1967 was removed.
There is no force	in the	fourth	contention of	Mr.
Sanghi.	Section 5, particularly Clauses (b) and	(c), effectively vacate the previous decree of this Court in favour	of Saksena. For removing doubts, these clauses declare that this Court's decree will not be enforceable by initiating proceedings in any court thereon, in future.
In the light of the above discussion, it is abundantly clear that in enacting the impugned provisions,	the legislature has	not exceeded the limits of its legislative powers nor encroached on the judicial field. We will close the discussion by noticing only one decision out of the many that had been cited at the bar.
In Piare Dusada and Ors. v. The King Emperor,(1) the Governor General by ordinance repealed the Special Criminal Courts ordinance II of	1942. There was a provision in the repealing-ordinance for confirmation	and continuance of sentences of Special Courts and retrial of pending case. The appellant therein had	been convicted and sentenced by Special	Criminal Court which was	held to have	no jurisdiction to try the case by an order of a court. Section 3(1) of the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) ordinance, 1943 conferred validity and full	effectiveness on sentences passed by Special Criminal Courts by conferring jurisdiction on them	with retrospective effect. The Federal Court held that by	promulgating the validating and repealing ordinance of 1943, the legislative authority had not attempted to do indirectly what	it could not do directly or	to exercise judicial power	in the	guise of legislation. It was further held that the ordinance was not invalid on the ground that the legislative	authority had	validated by retrospective legislation proceedings	held in courts which were void for want of	jurisdiction as there was nothing in	the Indian Constitution which precluded the legislature from doing so.
The ratio	of the	above decision	applies with greater force to the present case.
For all the foregoing reasons, we negative all	the contentions canvassed by Mr. Sanghi and dismiss this appeal leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1971 SARKARIA, J. For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 131	R of 1971 entitled I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this appeal fails and is dismissed	without	any order as to costs.