Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/404/138
Timestamp: 2019-09-17 19:17:25
Document Index: 345500485

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 10', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 158', '§ 64', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 2283', '§ 14', '§ 64', '§ 9', '§ 7', '§ 64', '§ 8']

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. NASH-FINCH COMPANY, dba Jack and Jill Stores. | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
404 U.S. 138 (92 S.Ct. 373, 30 L.Ed.2d 328)
Argued: Oct. 19, 1971
A union which had begun organizing respondent company's employees charged the company with unfair labor practices. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint, whiuch a Trial Examiner sustained, recommending that respondent be ordered to cease and desist from such practices. Before the NLRB acted, the union picketed respondent's stores and respondent, contending that the union's action violated state law, sought and obtained an injunction from a state court limiting the union's picketing activities. Subsequently the NLRB issued an order accepting the Trial Examiner's recommendations and then brought this action in District Court to restrain enforcement of the state court injunction on the ground that it regulated conduct governed exclusively by the National Labor Relations Act. The District Court held that it was precluded from granting relief by 28 U.S.C. 2283, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court proceedings except as authorized by Act of Congress 'or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.' The court rejected the contention that the NLRB was within the exception recognized in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267, for suits brought by the United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that for purposes of § 2283, the NLRB is 'an administrative agency of the United States, and is not the United States.' Held:
The question is whether the National Labor Relations Board may, through proceedings in a federal court, enjoin a state court order which regulates peaceful picketing governed by the federal agency. The District Court, 320 F.Supp. 858, rejected the Board's contention that it is within the exception to § 2283, 1 recognized in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267, as respects suits brought by the United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 434 F.2d 971. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 402 U.S. 928, 91 S.Ct. 1524, 28 L.Ed.2d 862.
It is suggested that this federal injunction was 'in aid' of the jurisdiction of the federal court since the suit is in the District Court by reason of 28 U.S.C. 1337 which grants jurisdiction over 'any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce.' In Capital Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 501, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887, an employer invoked the aid both of a state court and of the federal Board against picketing. The Board sought a federal court injunction under § 10(l) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(l), which specifically allows it wherever an unfair labor practice respecting a secondary boycott or picketing violative of § 8(b) (4) or § 8(b)(7) of the Act is involved. We ruled that the state injunction 'restrains conduct which the District Court was asked to enjoin in the § 10(l) proceding.' Id., at 505, 74 S.Ct., at 702. We held that under those circumstances an injunction by the federal court was 'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction' over commerce, because the federal court to exercise its jurisdiction 'freely and fully' must 'first remove the state decree.' Id., at 506, 74 S.Ct., at 703.
In the instant case the company did not file any charges with the Board which claimed that the union's picketing violated § 8(b)(4) or § 8(b)(7) of the Act, 73 Stat. 542 and 544, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4) and § 158(b)(7).
It has long been held that the Board, though not granted express statutory remedies, may obtain appropriate and traditional ones to prevent frustration of the purposes of the Act. We held in In re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U.S. 486, 496, 58 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 82 L.Ed. 1482, that even in the absence of an express statutory remedy, the Board might petition for writ of prohibition against premature invocation of the review jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 561, 84 L.Ed. 738, we held that the Board had implied authority to institute contempt proceedings for violation of court decrees enforcing orders of the Board. In Nathanson v. National Labor Relations Board, 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23, we found an implied authority of the Board to file claims in bankruptcy covering the sums included in its back-pay awards. The claims were not given priority under § 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, but this was because 'the United States (was) collecting for the benefit of a private party,' id., at 28, 73 S.Ct., at 82, not as suggested, post, at 28, because the Board's juridical status was something less than that of the United States. 2
'The statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts. This policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest. The frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state court proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C. 2283 would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. 2283 alone.' Id., at 225—226, 77 S.Ct., at 290—291.
In Leiter, the United States brought suit under the authority of the Attorney General. Here it is the Board that moved to prevent 'irreparable injury to a national interest.' The Board is the sole protector of the 'national interest' 3 defined with particularity in the Act. Leiter, of course, was initiated by the Attorney General; but underlying the controversy were federal agencies in the Department of the Interior responsible for administration of the public lands. The fact that the moving party was a federal agency, not the Attorney General, was considered irrelevant in Bowles v. Willingham, supra, where the Administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act sued to enjoin a state court from interfering with orders of the federal agency. An exception from the general ban on federal injunctions against state court action was implied by reason of the fact that the method of review of the orders of the federal agency was in the Emergency Court of Appeals. But there was no suggestion that suit by or against the Administrator was not a suit of the United States. 4 The purpose of § 2283 was to avoid unseemly conflict between the state and the federal courts where the litigants were private persons, not to hamstring the Federal Government and its agencies in the use of federal courts to protect federal rights. We can no more conclude here than in Leiter that a general statute, limiting the power of federal courts to issue injunctions, had as its purpose of frustration of federal systems of regulation. See Brown v. Wright, 4 Cir., 137 F.2d 484, 488. The frustration of superior federal interests by the general language of § 2283 cannot reasonably be imputed. See National Labor Relations Board v. Sunshine Mining Co., 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 757, 762; National Labor Relations Board v. New York State Labor Relations Board, D.C., 106 F. Supp. 749, 752; National Labor Relations Board v. Industrial Commission, D.C., 84 F.Supp. 593, aff'd, 172 F.2d 389.
The fact that the Board is given express authority to seek enforcement of its orders in some sections of the Act 5 is not persuasive that the Act expresses a policy to bar the Board from enforcing the national interests on other matters. The instances where the Board is given explicit authority to seek the aid of federal courts are not exclusive examples, as we have already shown. They are only particularized instances of specific enforcement devices relating to specified orders, not a denial by implication that the Act and the Board would not be entitled to federal aid or protection in other instances, as illustrated by In re National Labor Relations Board, supra; Amalgamated Workers v. Edison Co., supra; and Nathanson v. National Labor Relations Board, supra. The exclusiveness of the federal domain is clear; and where it is a public authority that seeks protection of that domain, the way seems clear. For the Federal Government and its agencies, the federal courts are the forum of choice. For them, as Leiter indicates, access to the federal courts is 'preferable in the context of healthy federal-state relations.' 352 U.S., at 226, 77 S.Ct., at 291.
* The National Labor Relations Board here sues in federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a state court injunction against picketing. 1 Title 28 U.S.C. 2283 bars such injunctions except in specified situations. One exception permits injunctions by a federal court which are 'necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.' The majority rightfully concedes that this exception is inapplicable here. A state court injunction in no way interferes with the Board's admitted power to prevent unfair labor practices or to secure federal injunctions in those situations specifically identified by Congress. Capital Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 501, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887 (1954), amply protects the Board's power to enjoin state court proceedings where an unfair labor practice is in progress and the jurisdiction of a federal court might later be invoked, but no such Board adjudication was occurring here concerning the picketing. Capital Service is not controlling.
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267 (1957), held that the restrictions of § 2283 do not apply to the Federal Government. The Board identifies itself with the United States and therefore asserts that § 2283 is inapplicable to it. I cannot agree. The juridical status of the Board is not perfectly congruent with that of the United States. For example, although it may file claims for back pay in bankruptcy proceedings, it does not enjoy the priority accorded to debts owing to the United States. Nathanson v. National Labor Relations Board, 344 U.S. 25, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952). 2 Leiter Minerals had nothing to do with the circumstances in which an agency such as the NLRB should be treated as the United States; nor does that case purport to modify the rule of Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85, 61 S.Ct. 485, 487, 85 L.Ed. 595 (1941), that the intention of Congress to bestow the privileges and immunities of the United States on a federal agency must be clearly manifest. 3 The authority of the Federal Government to secure an injunction in Leiter Minerals was implied under the judicial rule that a statute that divests pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign in the absence of explicit language. 352 U.S., at 224, 77 S.Ct., at 290. In the instant case, however, we deal with a statutorily defined agency creaed after the passage of § 2283 and possessing certain specified injunctive powers. The Board can claim no residual sovereignty such as that which was held in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272—273, 67 S.Ct. 677, 685 686, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947), to exempt the United States Government from the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and by a familiar rule of statutory construction, the enumeration of its injunctive powers should be held to preclude the existence of other powers. 4 In light of the congressional disinclination to authorize anything more than extremely limited interferences with state court proceedings by federal courts, and in view of this Court's reluctance to approve such interference by way of the equitable powers of federal courts, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43—45, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750—751, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1742, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), implicit exceptions from § 2283 are at best suspect.
Congress' swift overruling of the Court's decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601 (1957), by passage of NLRA § 14(c), 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. 164(c) should make the Court approach with great caution the creation of another 'vast no-man's land, subject to regulation by no agency or court.' Id., at 10, 77 S.Ct., at 603. The NLRA was not enacted in a void and its strictures presuppose a certain degree of state authority and regulation:
The basis of our decision in Nathanson was that '(t)he priority granted by (§ 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. 104(a)(5)) * * * was designed 'to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public burthens and discharge the public debts." 344 U.S., at 27—28, 73 S.Ct., at 82. Because there was 'no function * * * of assuring the public revenue' and '(t)he beneficiaries of the claims (were) private persons,' id., at 28, 73 S.Ct., at 82, we found it inappropriate to apply the priority for claims owing the United States and, instead, gave the claims the same 'treatment tha(t) other wage claims enjoy(ed).' Id., at 29, 73 S.Ct., at 83. The suggestion that Nathanson is a stronger case for equating the status of the Board to that of the United States disregards both the policies of the Bankruptcy Act upon which we relied in that decision and the federal pre-emption which inheres in the present case.
Congress has vested the Board with broad powers to seek injunctive relief in the district courts. Section 10(l), 29 U.S.C. 160(l), for example, gives the Board power to obtain an injunction where an investigation produces reasonable cause to believe that a charge of secondary boycott or illegal picketing activity is true. Section 10(j), 29 U.S.C. 160(j), provides a similar basis of power for other unfair labor practices. 'In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person' during 'hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of (its) powers' under §§ 9 and 10, 29 U.S.C. 159 and 160, the Board may seek injunctive relief from a district court requiring compliance. 29 U.S.C. 161(2).
In Nathanson, as here, the Board was attempting to protect the § 7 rights of private parties. If anything, the situation in Nathanson was a much stronger one for equating the status of the Board to that of the United States, since there the Board was seeking to enforce a back pay award (by filing a proof of claim against the employer, who had become a bankrupt, and asserting that its back pay order was entitled to the priority of a debt owing the United States under § 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 104(a)(5)) which it had assessed after adjudicating the employer guilty of a § 8 unfair labor practice. The Board was thus clearly discharging a designated statutory function, as distinguished from the instant case where the Board's jurisdiction to evaluate the disputed picketing in an unfair labor practice proceeding is totally unclear. The Court held, however, that '(i)t does not follow that because the Board is an agency of the United States, any debt owed it is a debt owing the United States' under the Bankruptcy Act, 344 U.S., at 27, 73 S.Ct., at 82, and it disallowed the asserted priority on the ground that the function of the precedence given the United States under the Bankruptcy Act was to insure the collection of claims that had accrued to the fisc. The majority's attempt to distingush Nathanson is less than convincing.
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