Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20060421_0000687.SIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-02-23 20:56:28
Document Index: 535673511

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 922', '§ 1', '§ 841', '§ 2255']

DONALD E. MASON, PETITIONER/DEFENDANT,
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1 of the indictment); one count of possession with intent to distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (Count 4 of the indictment); one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (Count 5 of the indictment); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (Count 6 of the indictment). On January 21, 2005, Petitioner, in an amended judgment, was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment (240 months on Count 1, 151 months on each of Counts 4 and 5, and 120 months on Count 6, to be served concurrently), ten years supervised release, a fine of $1,000, a special assessment of $400, and Petitioner was required to forfeit assets and property as specified in the plea agreement. No appeal was filed and Petitioner filed this section 2255 motion on March 24, 2006.
Defendant's waiver of his right to appeal or bring collateral challenges shall not apply to: 1) any subsequent changes in the interpretation of the law by the United States Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which is declared retroactive by those Courts, and which renders the Defendant actually innocent of the charges covered herein, and 2) appeals based upon the Sentencing Guidelines amendments which are made retroactive by the United States Sentencing Commission (see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10). The Government reserves the right to oppose such claims for relief. . . . .
The Defendant waives any challenges to the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Defendant waives any right to have facts that determine his offense level under the Guidelines be alleged in an indictment and be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant agrees that facts that determine his Sentencing Guideline offense will be found by the Court at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.
Plea agreement at ¶ II-14 (Doc. 54, criminal case).
In this case, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: 1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel advised him to waive his right to challenge the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, 2) that the Seventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005) represents a change in the interpretation of the law of the Circuit regarding what constitutes "cocaine base" and thereby renders Petitioner actually innocent of possession of "crack cocaine," and 3) that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. Grounds 1 and 3 do not fall under either of the two exceptions to the waiver listed above.
Petitioner attempts to couch Ground 2 in terms that would render it reviewable here, however his attempt fails because Edwards does not represent a change in the interpretation of the law. In Edwards the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding in United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 1995), that "cocaine base" as used in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) means "crack." As such, Edwards does not render Petitioner "actually innocent" of possession of crack cocaine. Consequently, there is no basis in the record for avoiding this waiver.
Because the waiver provisions of the plea agreement are enforceable, Petitioner has waived any right to bring this Section 2255. Accordingly, Petitioner's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is ...