Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/327/362/73685/
Timestamp: 2019-09-20 01:24:48
Document Index: 149505779

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2707', '§ 2707', '§ 2707', '§ 3612', '§ 3612', '§ 3612', '§ 2707', '§ 6672', '§ 2707', '§ 6672', '§ 6672', '§ 6672', '§ 6672', '§ 6672', '§ 2707']

Solomon Rosenberg, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 327 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1964) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1964 › Solomon Rosenberg, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee
Solomon Rosenberg, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 327 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1964)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 327 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1964)
Argued December 6, 1963
Decided January 29, 1964
Appellant's more substantial contention is based on the concluding sentence of § 2707(a), which provides that " [n]o penalty shall be assessed under this subsection for any offense for which a penalty may be assessed under authority of section 3612." Under this latter section, a 50% penalty is imposed for the filing of false and fraudulent returns. Insisting that the acts in question constitute an "offense for which a penalty may be assessed under authority of section 3612," Rosenberg argues that the 100% penalty imposed under § 2707(a) was improper.
Although this argument is not without force, we conclude it must be rejected since we believe it rests on an improper reading of the word "offense." Unlike the penalty of § 2707(a), § 3612 is directed only at the taxpayer itself, and in the present case could only be invoked against the defaulting corporation; thus, § 3612(d) specifically provides that the 50% penalty is to be added to the tax due. Since the tax was "due" from the corporation and not from Rosenberg personally, he is not directly punishable by § 3612. Section 2707, on the other hand, which penalizes " [a]ny person who willfully * * * attempts in any manner to evade or defeat" the excise tax, is not subject to a similar limitation. Thus, "any person" is explicitly defined to include "an officer or employee of a corporation * * * who as such officer * * is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs." Int.Rev.Code of 1939, § 2707(d).
Unlike the procedure required in the case of income taxes, a suit for refund of excise taxes may be commenced after only a portion of the tax has been paid. See Christie v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 709 (D.Ore.1959)
Rosenberg's argument would carry more weight with respect to § 6672, the successor section to § 2707(a) in the 1954 Code. Thus, § 6672 is limited in application to " [a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the tax imposed. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports on § 6672 emphasize that the change was not merely one of wording. Thus, after noting that § 6672 is "similar to certain sections of existing law", the Reports go on to point out the significant distinction: "However, the application of [§ 6672] is limited only to the collected or withheld taxes which are imposed on some person other than the person who is required to collect, account for and pay over, the tax." 1954 U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News pp. 4568, 5245 (emphasis supplied). The use of the word "however," to set § 6672 in contradistinction to the prior law, indeed, strongly suggests that § 2707(a) was not intended to carry the limitation urged by the appellant.