Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/supreme-court/2011/2001736.html
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 122', '§\n122', '§ 122', '§ 122', '§ 122', '§ 122', '§\n122', '§ 123', '§ 121', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§\n129', '§ 129', '§ 129', '§ 43', '§\n129', '§ 129', '§\n129', '§ 122', '§\n81', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 122', '§ 3531', '§ 3', '§\n214', '§\n214', '§ 214', '§ 4', '§ 1530115545', '§\n3531', '§ 211', '§ 122', '§ 122', '§ 273', '§ 31', '§ 81', '§ 81', '§ 22', '§ 3531', '§ 3531', '§ 4', '§ 122']

Andrade v. NAACP, et al. :: July, 2011 :: Texas Supreme Court Decisions :: Texas Case Law :: US Case Law :: US Law :: Justia
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Justia.com Opinion Summary: Voters sued the Secretary of State arguing that her certification of the eSlate, a paperless direct recording electronic machine, violated the Election Code and the Texas Constitution. At issue was whether voters had standing to pursue complaints about an electronic voting machine that did not produce a contemporaneous paper record of each vote. The court held that because it concluded that most of the voters allegations involved generalized grievances about the lawfulness of government acts, and because their remaining claims failed on their merits, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment dismissing the case.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email IN
No. 09-0420
Esperanza Andrade, in Her
NAACP of Austin, Nelson
Linder, Sonia Santana,
and David Van Os,
Argued October 12,
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the
Technology is changing the way we vote. It has not eliminated
controversy about the way votes are recorded and verified. We must
decide whether voters have standing to pursue complaints about an
electronic voting machine that does not produce a contemporaneous
paper record of each vote. Because we conclude that most of the
voters' allegations involve generalized grievances about the
lawfulness of government acts, and because their remaining claims
fail on their merits, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and
render judgment dismissing the case.
Voters in different parts of the state utilize a number of
different voting systems, all of which must first be certified by
the Secretary of State.1
Tex. Elec.
Code § 122.001, .031. To
obtain certification, voting system manufacturers must submit an
application to a board of examiners appointed by the Secretary and
the Attorney General. Id. §
122.034.035. After the board prepares a
report, id. § 122.036, the Secretary conducts a
public hearing to provide interested persons an opportunity to
express their views about a particular system, id.
§ 122.0371. The Secretary reviews the report, considers public
input, and determines whether the system has satisfied the
applicable approval requirements. Id.
§ 122.038(a). If so, she certifies the system for use
in elections. Id. § 122.038(c).
For each application, she submits a report explaining whether the
system was approved. Id. §
122.039. Once a system is certified, local political
subdivisions may adopt it for use in elections. Id. § 123.001.
Following certification and adoption, additional testing is
required for direct recording electronic machines (DREs). DREs are
designed "to allow a direct vote on the machine by the manual touch
of a screen, monitor, or other device." Id. § 121.003(12). DREs store individual
votes and vote totals electronically, id., usually in
several places within the unit, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting
and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L.
Rev. 1711, 1724 (2005). Immediately after receiving a DRE
from a vendor, the election records custodian must perform a
hardware diagnostic test and a "public test of logic and accuracy."
Tex. Elec. Code § 129.021. The latter involves creating
a testing board that will then cast votes, verifying that each
contest can be voted and is accurately counted. Id. § 129.023. The test must evaluate, to the
extent possible, undervotes,
overvotes, straight-party votes, and
crossover votes. Id. It must also account for write-in and
provisional votes. Id. Notice of the test must be published
at least forty-eight hours in advance, and the test is open to the
public. Id. § 129.023(b). The
test is successful only if the actual results are identical to the
expected results. Id. §
129.023(d). Travis County conducts these tests before each
early voting period and election
The Secretary of State may prescribe additional testing.
Id. § 129.021(4). DREs must also
satisfy, to the extent possible, requirements applicable to other
electronic voting systems.3
Id. § 129.001(b).
In countywide polling place programs, the Secretary requires an
audit of each DRE before, after, and, if feasible, during each
election. Id. § 43.007(c). The
general custodian of election records must secure access control
keys or passwords to DREs, and use of such keys and passwords must
be witnessed and documented. Id. §
129.053. The DRE may not be connected to any external
communications network, including the Internet, nor are wireless
communications permitted (except under certain limited
circumstances). Id. § 129.054.
The general custodian of election records must create a contingency
plan in case of DRE failure. Id. §
129.056.
Copies of the program codes, operator manuals, and copies or units
of all other software and any other information, specifications, or
documentation required by the Secretary must be kept on file with
the Secretary. Id. § 122.0331(a).
The Secretary also requires that DREs meet or exceed the minimum
requirements established by the Federal Election Commission.
1 Tex.
Admin. Code §
81.61 (requiring compliance with FEC's Performance and Test
Standards for Punch Card, Mark Sense, and Direct Record Electronic
Voting Systems). Although DREs must provide contemporaneous
printouts of "significant election events,"4
there is no explicit statutory requirement that DREs provide a
contemporaneous paper record of each vote cast. Repeated efforts to
pass such legislation have failed, both at the federal5
and state6
The eSlate, a paperless DRE
manufactured by Hart Intercivic, is one
of a handful of DREs the Secretary has certified. See Voting Systems, Texas
Secretary of State, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/votingsystems.shtml.
Voters arriving at the polls in counties using the eSlate are given a unique access code. The voter
enters the code into the eSlate, which
then displays the ballot. Voters turn a dial to highlight their
ballot choice and then press "enter" to make a selection. After a
voter completes his selections, the eSlate displays a ballot summary page. If the
voter's choices are correctly displayed, the voter presses the
"cast ballot" button, and the vote is recorded. See Voter Instructions, Travis County,
http://www.co.travis.tx.us/county_clerk/election/eSlate/pdfs/English_Flyer_050923.pdf.
Travis County purchased the eSlate
system in 2001 and has used it since 2003.
The NAACP of Austin, its president Nelson Linder, Sonia Santana (a
Travis County voter), and David Van Os (a candidate for attorney
general) (collectively, the voters), sued Esperanza Andrade, the
Secretary of State,7
arguing that her certification of the eSlate violated the Election Code and our
constitution. The voters assert that the Secretary's failure to
require a contemporaneous paper record of an electronic vote
violates their statutory right to a recount and an audit, as well
as Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection, the purity
of the ballot box, and the right of suffrage. See
art. I, § 3, art.
VI, § 2(c), art. VI,
§ 4; Tex. Elec. Code §§ 122.001,
211.001. The voters sought a declaration that the
Secretary acted illegally and an injunction prohibiting the use of
paperless election systems without an independent paper ballot
The Secretary filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for
summary judgment, asserting that the voters lacked standing to
pursue their claims and that she was immune from suit. The trial
court denied the plea and motion, and a divided court of appeals
affirmed. 287 S.W.3d 240. We granted the
petition for review8
and now reverse. 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 562
(Apr. 9, 2010).
II. The voters have
standing to assert an equal protection claim.
Because the voters seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, and
because each voter seeks the same relief, only one plaintiff with
standing is required. See Barshop v.
Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925
S.W.2d 618, 627 (Tex. 1996).9
Accordingly, we examine whether Sonia Santana, a Travis County
resident and registered voter, has standing to pursue the claims
she asserts. We may look to the similar federal standing
requirements for guidance,10
and "[o]ur threshold inquiry . . . in
no way depends on the merits of the [voters'] contention that
particular conduct is illegal.'"11
Generally, a citizen lacks standing to bring a lawsuit challenging
the lawfulness of governmental acts.12
Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001). Thus,
"[s]tanding doctrines reflect in many
ways the rule that neither citizens nor
taxpayers can appear in court simply to insist that the government
and its officials adhere to the requirements of law." Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3531.10 (3d ed. 2008).
This pragmatic approach "ensures that there is a real need to
exercise the power of judicial review' in a particular case, and it
helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies no broader than
required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be
applied.'" Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441 (2007) (citations omitted). Based partly on the
notion of judicial self governance, this rule recognizes that other
branches of government may more appropriately decide "abstract
questions of wide public significance," particularly when judicial
intervention is unnecessary to protect individual rights.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
Originally characterized as prudential,13
the Supreme Court has more recently clarified that the "generalized
grievance" bar to standing is constitutional. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (holding
that a citizen raising "only a generally available grievance about
governmentclaiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest
in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does
the public at largedoes not state an Article III case or
controversy").14
The bar is based not on the number of people affecteda grievance
is not generalized merely because it is suffered by large numbers
of people. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:
Principles and Policies 91 (3d ed. 2006). As the Supreme
Court has noted, "[t]o deny standing to persons who are in fact
injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody." United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973). Thus, "where
a harm is concrete, though widely
shared, the Court has found injury in fact." FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (citation
Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the plaintiffs sue solely as
citizens who insist that the government follow the law.
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 91. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that citizens lacked standing
to sue for a violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting
members of Congress from serving in the executive branch.
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-27 (1974). It has also rejected
citizen standing in a case seeking to have parts of the CIA Act
declared unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution's
Statement and Accounts Clause. United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974). We have held
that a voter and citizen lacked standing to enjoin a purportedly
illegal executive order signed by the mayor. Brown,
53 S.W.3d at 304. The line between a
generalized grievance and a particularized harm is difficult to
draw,15
and it varies with the claims made.
We recognized the principle over a century ago, when we held that a
citizen could not, through litigation, challenge San Antonio's
decision to build city hall on what was then a military plaza.
City of San Antonio v. Strumburg, 7 S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. 1888) (holding
that "no action lies to restrain an interference with a mere public
right, at the suit of an individual who has not suffered or is not
threatened with some damage peculiar to himself"). And we have
stated the general proposition broadly, applying it to voters: "No
Texas court has ever recognized that a plaintiff's status as a
voter, without more, confers standing to challenge the lawfulness
of government acts." Brown, 53 S.W.3d at
302. Instead, "[o]ur decisions
have always required a plaintiff to allege some injury distinct
from that sustained by the public at large." Id. But we have
also been careful to suggest that challenges to the election
process may be different. Id. (noting that "[t]his Court has
never recognized standing on the basis of the resultsas opposed to
the processof an initiative election").
The Secretary urges a blanket rule that would ensure no voter ever
has standing to challenge a voting system. We think the Secretary
overreaches in that respect. The voters assert a denial of equal
protectiona claim voters often have
standing to bring. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206
(1962) (noting that voters have standing to bring equal protection
challenges to complain of vote dilution, and observing that "[m]any
of the cases have assumed rather than articulated the premise in
deciding the merits of similar claims").16
For example, the Supreme Court has permitted Virginia residents to
sue for a declaration that Virginia's poll tax was
unconstitutional. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that poll tax violated the equal
protection clause). It has allowed a Hawaii voter to challenge as
unconstitutional the state's ban on write-in candidates.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). It
has authorized a voter to challenge Tennessee's durational
residence requirement. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 (1972). Voters residing in
racially gerrymandered districts have standing to sue (although
voters residing outside those districts do not). United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45
(1995). A voter in Georgia may sue to enjoin that state's
allegedly unconstitutional county unit system as a basis for
counting votes. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375 (1963)
(holding that "appellee, like any
person whose right to vote is impaired, has standing to sue"
(citations omitted)). And Tennessee voters may sue to enjoin a
statute apportioning legislators among the state's ninety-five
counties. Baker, 369 U.S. at 206.
In Baker, the Supreme Court explained that voters had
standing to challenge a state's apportionment scheme
[t]he injury which
appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters
in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of
constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis
voters in irrationally favored counties. . . . It would not be
necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of impairment
of their votes by the [apportionment] will, ultimately, entitle
them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to
seek it. If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable
injury, they are among those who have sustained it. They are
asserting a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes,' not merely a claim of the right,
possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be
administered according to law . . . .'
369 U.S. at 208
(emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Tokaji, 73 Fordham L. Rev.
at 1752 (noting that "the use of voting machines disfavoring
identifiable groups of voters, defined by place of residence, is
constitutionally problematic" and noting that such claims are
analogous to the "one person, one vote" cases). While equal
protections claims involving the use of DREs have been largely
unsuccessful,17
none has been dismissed for lack of standing.18
The Secretary argues that because the voters have not shown that
their votes actually were miscounted, they have not sustained the
kind of concrete, particularized injury standing requires. But the
voters' equal protection complaint is that the eSlate is susceptible to fraud and prone to
malfunction, depriving them of the ability to determine whether
their votes were counted. They assert that it is less probable that
their votes will be counted than will the votes of residents of
other Texas counties or absentee voters in Travis County. It is not
necessary to decide whether the voters' claims will, ultimately,
entitle them to relief, in order to hold that they have standing to
seek it. "If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable
injury, they are among those who have sustained it." Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08. Because they assert "a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,
not merely a claim of the right, possessed by every citizen, to
require that the Government be administered according to law," the
voters have standing to pursue their equal protection claim.
The Secretary next asserts that equal protection claims rooted
solely in geographical distinctions are insufficient to confer
voter standing, citing our decision in Texas Department of
Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637,
646-647 (Tex. 2004). In that case, we held that a county resident
had no standing to bring an equal protection claim on behalf of a
class challenging the Department's purported failure to accord one
county the same treatment other counties received. We held that
state and federal equal-protection guarantees relate to "equality
between persons as such, rather than between areas, and . . .
territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite."
Id. at 646-47 (citation omitted).
We noted that when the State exercises governmental powers, it
necessarily draws distinctions between geographic areas, and if
citizens were entitled to equal treatment every time government
money was spent, almost every government program would be
unconstitutional. Id. at 647.
Although framed as a standing question, we ultimately held that the
claims failed as a matter of law. Id.
Sunset Valley's rule applies to equal protection claims
generally, but not to cases involving voting-related equal
protection claims. The latter are often based precisely on
disparate treatment among voters in different geographical areas.
See, e.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 ("[A] citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an
equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction."); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) ("Weighting the votes of
citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of
where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.");
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) ("[A]s nearly as is practicable[,] one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as
another's."); Gray, 372 U.S. at 381(1963) (invalidating
vote-counting method that weighted rural votes more heavily than
urban ones); see also ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir.
2008) (holding that voters had standing to bring equal protection
claim challenging voter-identification law due to claim of unequal
treatment of in-person voters (who had to show identification) and
absentee voters (who did not)); Tokaji,
73 Fordham L. Rev. at 1748 (noting that
"the [Supreme] Court has closely scrutinized certain election
practices which deny or dilute the right to vote, especially when
they disadvantage an identifiable group of voters based upon wealth
or place of residence").
The voters assert that they are forced to use the eSlate while other Travis County voters use an
absentee or paper ballot. They also complain that voters in other
parts of Texas are not forced to use the eSlate. Without examining the merits of the claim,
this disparity gives them standing to sue for an equal protection
violation. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05
(2000) ("Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the
state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value
one person's vote over that of another.").
III. The State's
regulatory interest justifies this reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restriction on the right to vote.
We turn then to the merits of the voters' equal protection
challenge, cognizant that the Secretary retains immunity from suit
unless the voters have pleaded a viable claim. See
art. I, § 3; City of Elsa v. M.A.L.,
226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that "suits for injunctive
relief' may be maintained against governmental entities to remedy
violations of the Texas Constitution" (quoting City of Beaumont
v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 149
(Tex. 1995))); see also Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-28 (Tex. 2004).
The voters assert two equal protections claims. Broadly, they
complain that voters who cast paper ballots have a greater level of
protection against fraud or system malfunction than DRE voters do.
The voters do not allege that DREs are less accuratethat they
suffer from higher error rates or lead to more invalid ballotsthan
other voting systems. Instead, they complain that DREs'
vulnerabilities make it more likely that votes will be manipulated
or lost. More narrowly, the voters make a recount-related claim.
Recounts of "regular paper ballots" are conducted manually, by a
counting team composed of three individuals. Tex.
Elec. Code §
214.001.002. One person reads the ballots;
the other two tally the votes. Id. §
214.002. Votes from DREs are recounted differently. A person
requesting a recount of electronic voting system ballots has three
choices: (1) an electronic recount using the same program as the
original count; (2) if the program is defective, an electronic
recount using the corrected program; or (3) a manual recount.
Id. § 214.042(a). The voters
assert that the paperless computerized voting systems only allow
for a retabulation of the votes cast
and recorded, which creates a disparity in the manual recount
methodology. Voters not required to use the DRE (absentee,
military, or those living in a Texas county that does not use the
eSlate) are granted the right to a hand
recount of votes, and the voters allege that this recount disparity
violates constitutional equal protection guarantees.
The right to vote is fundamental, as it preserves all other rights.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see
also Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("When the state legislature vests
the right to vote . . . in its people, the right to vote as the
legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote
and the equal dignity owed to each voter."). But that does not mean
states cannot regulate the franchise. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (holding that although voting is a fundamental right,
"[i]t does not follow . . . that the
right to vote in any manner . . . [is] absolute"); Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (noting that "the States have the power to impose voter
qualifications, and to regulate access to the
franchise").
Instead, the Supreme Court has explained that laws impacting the
right to vote must be evaluated on a sliding scale: when the law
severely restricts the right to vote, the regulation must be
narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. But when a
state election law provision imposes "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions'" upon voters' constitutional
rights, "the State's important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify' the restrictions."19
Id. at 433-34 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)) (noting
that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to
require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States
seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently").
So our initial determination depends on the severity of the burden
on the right to vote. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, one of three federal circuit courts to reject equal
protection challenges to DREs, has held that the use of paperless,
touchscreen voting systems does not
severely restrict the right to vote. Weber
v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2003). As
that court noted, DREs "bring[] about
numerous positive changes (increasing voter turnout, having greater
accuracy than traditional systems, being user-friendly, decreasing
the number of mismarked ballots, saving money, etc.)." Id. at 1106. That court held that, under
Burdick, the use of DREs was not subject to greater scrutiny
simply because the system may make the possibility of some kinds of
fraud more difficult to detect. Id. at 1106-07.
We cannot say that use of
paperless, touchscreen voting systems
severely restricts the right to vote. No balloting system is
perfect. Traditional paper ballots, as became evident during the
2000 presidential election, are prone to overvotes, undervotes,
"hanging chads," and other mechanical
and human errors that may thwart voter intent. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). Meanwhile, touchscreen voting systems remedy a number of these
problems, albeit at the hypothetical price of vulnerability to
programming "worms." The [DRE] does not leave Riverside voters
without any protection from fraud, or any means of verifying votes,
or any way to audit or recount. The unfortunate reality is that the
possibility of electoral fraud can never be completely
eliminated, no matter which type of
ballot is used. Cf. Hennings v.
Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Voting device
malfunction [and] the failure of election officials to take
statutorily prescribed steps to diminish what was at most a
theoretical possibility that the devices might be tampered with . .
. fall far short of constitutional infractions . . . ."). Weber
points out that none of the advantages of touch-screen systems over
traditional methods would be sacrificed if voter-verified paper
ballots were added to touchscreen
systems. However, it is the job of democratically-elected
representatives to weigh the pros and cons of various balloting
systems. So long as their choice is reasonable and neutral, it is
free from judicial second-guessing. In this instance, California
made a reasonable, politically neutral and non-discriminatory
choice to certify touchscreen systems
as an alternative to paper ballots. Likewise,
Riverside County in deciding to use such a system. Nothing
in the Constitution forbids this choice.
The Eleventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion. See Wexler v.
Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir.
2006). Specifically, in considering whether differing recount
mechanisms for DRE votes deprived DRE voters of equal protection,
the court noted that "the differences [in] procedures [were]
necessary given the differences in the technologies themselves and
the types of errors voters are likely to make in utilizing those
technologies." Id. at 1233. DRE
voters were less likely to cast ambiguous votes than were voters
using, say, optical scan ballots, on which a voter might leave a
stray pencil mark or circle a candidate's name rather than filling
in the appropriate bubble. Id. (noting
that DREs "do not record ambiguous indicia of voter intent that can
later be reviewed during a manual recount"); see also
Tokaji, 73 Fordham L.
Rev. at 1723 (noting that "it is not generally possible to
overvote with DRE voting
machines"). Moreover, the court noted that DREs had certain
benefits, making voting more accessible to disabled voters and
preventing some voter errors that were common with optical scan
machines. Thus, Florida's regulatory interests justified the manual
recount procedures and, "therefore, they do not violate equal
protection." Wexler, 452 F.3d at
Adopting the reasoning of Weber and Wexler, the
Georgia Supreme Court has also rejected an equal protection
challenge to that state's DRE system,20
as has the Superior Court of New Jersey.21
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recently affirmed a summary judgment in the Secretary's
favor, holding that the eSlate did not
violate voters' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. See Tex. Democratic Party v.
Williams, 285 Fed. App'x. 194, 195
(5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting
that district court properly applied Anderson and
Burdick balancing test to the constitutional claims raised),
cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 912
(2009); see also Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams, No.
A-07-CA-115-SS (W.D. Tex. August 16, 2007). In that case, voters
complained that the eSlate deprived
them of the ability to "emphasis vote"; that is, to cast a straight
party vote and then also again vote for a particular candidate
within that partyto make sure their votes count for these
particular candidates. The voters argued that, if they attempted to
emphasis vote, the eSlate would
de-select, rather than register a vote for, the individual
candidate. The trial court held that even assuming that the
eSlate impacted voters' ability to cast
emphasis votes, the use of DREs was constitutionally permissible.
See Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams, No. A-07-CA-115-SS
(W.D. Tex. August 16, 2007) (noting that the Secretary "made a
reasonable, politically neutral, and non-discriminatory choice to
certify the eSlate voting machines for
use in elections, and nothing in the Constitution forbids this
choice" (footnote omitted)).
We agree with the conclusions reached by those courts. DREs are not
perfect. No voting system is. We cannot say that DREs impose severe
restrictions on voters, particularly in light of the significant
benefits such machines offer. See, e.g., Weber, 347
F.3d at 1107; see also Tokaji,
73 Fordham L. Rev. at 1741, 1754 (noting
that "DREs can reduce uncounted votes and virtually eliminate the
racial gap' that tends to exist with other types of equipment,"
"have the potential to expand access for people with disabilities
and for voters with limited English proficiency," and "tend[] to considerably reduce the number of
uncounted votes"). As the Wexler court noted, different
recount methodologies are necessary for DREs because ambiguous
votesoften scrutinized during recountsare virtually eliminated. A
DRE with a voter-verified paper audit trail may provide more
security; it may not.22
But the equal protection clause does not
require infallibility. The Secretary made a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory choice to certify the eSlate, a decision justified by the State's
important regulatory interests. "[N]othing in the constitution forbids that choice."
Weber, 347 F.3d at
IV. The voters remaining
claims are barred, either because the voters have no standing to
assert them or because they are nonjusticiable.
A. Most of the voters'
Article VI, section 4 claims involve generalized grievances about
the lawfulness of government acts.
The voters' standing to pursue an equal
protection claim does not translate into standing for their
remaining claims. Instead, "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that
is sought." Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734
(2008)(citations and quotations
omitted). In additional to the equal protection clause, the voters
complain that the Secretary has violated two other constitutional
provisions. The first, article VI, section 4, states:
In all elections by the
people, the vote shall be by ballot, and the Legislature shall
provide for the numbering of tickets and make such other
regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and
preserve the purity of the ballot box; and the Legislature shall
provide by law for the registration of all voters.
Tex. Const. art.
VI, § 4.
This provision has four requirements: (1) votes shall be by secret
ballot, (2) ballots shall be numbered, (3) the Legislature shall
enact such other regulations as necessary to detect and punish
fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot box, and (4) the
Legislature may provide, by law, for the registration of voters in
all cities. Wood v. State ex rel. Lee, 126 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex.
1939).23
The voters complain that the Secretary
has violated the first three provisions.
First, they assert that the eSlate
deprives them of a secret ballot. These allegations differ from the
general thrust of the voters' claims, in that they do not complain
specifically about the lack of a contemporaneous paper record of a
vote cast. Instead, although the voters do not dispute that the
eSlate permits them to cast secret
ballots, they argue that the device is vulnerable to hackers,
compromising vote secrecy. They also complain that the eSlate's audio output, available for disabled
voters, can be overheard at a significant distance using only a
Second, the voters allege that the eSlate's lack of a paper ballot violates the
constitutional requirement that ballots be numbered. Although the
eSlate numbers ballots, the voters
contend that failing to require a paper ballot undermines the
framers' intent in drafting the numbering requirementa requirement
they claim was intended to secure the integrity of the election
Assuming, as we must, that these allegations are true, they amount
only to a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens. See, e.g.,
Landes v. Tartaglione, No. 04-3163, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22458, *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2004) (holding that voter lacked
standing to complain of electronic voting machines that might
malfunction or be tampered with), aff'd, 153 F. App'x
131(3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1040 (2006). The
voters' complaint that the lack of a contemporaneous paper record
violates the spirit of the constitution is the kind of
"undifferentiated, generalized grievance" about the conduct of
government that courts cannot adjudicate. Lance, 549 U.S. at 442. The voters' secret ballot allegations involve only
hypothetical harm, not the concrete, particularized injury standing
requires. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (Tex. 2008).
All voting systems are subject to criminal manipulation, but there
is no evidence or allegation that the eSlate has ever been manipulated in any Travis
County election. Nor is there any proof that a Travis County
disabled voter was deprived of the right to a secret ballot. In
fact, the evidence is to the contrary: Travis County adopted the
eSlate in part to comply with federal
regulations aimed at facilitating the participation of the disabled
in the voting process. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1530115545; see
also Tokaji, 73 Fordham L. Rev. at 1803 (noting that disabled voters
"have the most to gain from implementation of DRE systems"). Not
only does this last allegation fall within the generalized
grievance category,24
but it violates the prudential standing requirement that a
plaintiff "assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
The voters lack standing to bring these claims. See
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure §
3531.10 (noting that "absent a more direct individual injury,
violation of the Constitution does not itself establish
standing").25
Finally, the voters assert that the lack of a contemporaneous paper
record neither provides a means of detecting and punishing fraud,
nor preserves the purity of the ballot box. But we have held that
the "purity of the ballot box" provision requires only that the
Legislature pass laws as necessary to deter fraud and protect
ballot purity: "This constitutional provision is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Legislature," and "[i]t is not for the courts to attempt to direct what
laws the Legislature shall enact to comply with it." Wood,
126 S.W.2d at 9. The voters do not
complain that the Legislature has failed to do so; to the contrary,
they admit that it has. In the trial court, they alleged
"[p]laintiffs do not find fault with
the Code, or request that the Court rewrite it. The issue here is
with the Secretary's application of the discretion provided him
[sic] by the legislature." Without more, the voters have not
alleged a violation of article VI, section 4.
B. The voters agree that the Legislature has satisfied
article VI, section 2(c), and nothing more is required.
Article VI, section 2(c) provides that "suffrage shall be protected
by laws regulating elections and prohibiting under adequate
penalties all undue influence in elections from power, bribery,
tumult, or other improper practice." Tex.
art. VI, §
The voters' 2(c) claim is difficult to discern. As alleged in their
petition, the claim is derivative: they assert that the Secretary's
alleged failure to comply with article VI, section 4 violates
article VI, section 2(c) as well. In response to the Secretary's
jurisdictional plea and motion for summary judgment, the voters
mention 2(c) only in passing, and then only to state that
"[e]lections should be absolutely free from influences of power and
tumult." They assert that the Secretary's certification of easily
"hacked" machines destabilizes citizen confidence and weakens
Assuming all that is true, section 2(c)
requires only that the Legislature pass laws to eliminate improper
election practices. Cf. Wood, 126 S.W.2d
at 9. The voters do not dispute that the Legislature has
done so. Their complaint is solely with the Secretary's
certification of the DRE. Whatever the validity of that argument,
it does not state a claim for a violation of section
The Secretary then makes the curious argument that if part of what
the voters allege is truethat she does not have access to the
software and records used in the Travis County systemthe voters
have pleaded a claim for a violation of the Election
Code,26
which automatically results in a violation of section 2(c). She
suggests that a remand on this claim would be appropriate, so that
she may controvert this fact issue. She cites no authority for the
contention that a violation of the Election Code would violate
section 2(c), and the text of 2(c) does not support such an
argument. Moreover, the voters have not alleged a violation of
those sections of the Election Code. Even if they had, the
complaint amounts to a generalized grievance against governmental
conduct of which they do not approvea claim the voters lack
standing to assert, as more fully discussed below. Brown,
53 S.W.3d at 302.
The voters lack standing to pursue their Election
Code claims.
In addition to their equal protection recount claim, the voters
allege that the Secretary's certification of the eSlate deprives them of their statutory right to a
recount, which the Election Code defines as "the process conducted
under this title for verifying the vote count in an election."
Tex. Elec. Code § 211.002. Additionally, although their
live pleading is silent on the point, the voters assert on appeal
that the Secretary's certification of the eSlate violates the requirement that voting systems
be capable of providing records from
which the system's operation may be audited, and, therefore, the
Secretary acted outside her authority in certifying the system.
Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001, .032(a). Finally, although
the voters did not plead it, the court of appeals noted that the
voters' evidence supported a claim that the eSlate does not comply with statutory requirements
that the system operate "safely" and "accurately" and that it be
"safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation." Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001(a)(3), (4); 287 S.W.3d at 253 n.10.
The voters argue that Election Code section 273.081, which
authorizes injunctive relief for a person "who is being harmed or
is in danger of being harmed by a violation or threatened violation
of this code," gives them standing to pursue these claims.
Tex. Elec. Code § 273.081. That provision, however, does
not create standingit merely authorizes injunctive relief. As we
have noted, statutes like this, which permit "persons aggrieved,'
persons adversely affected,' [or] any party in interest,'" to
sue, still require that the plaintiff show how he has been injured
or damaged other than as a member of the general public. Scott
v. Bd. of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex.
1966).27
This is because "[s]uch suits are essentially private in character and
are for the protection of private rights." Id. at 56.
Here, the voters have made no showing that the Secretary's
certification harmed them other than as members of the general
public. Accordingly, for much the same reason their article VI
claims are barred, the voters lack standing to pursue their
Election Code complaints. Those allegations involve only
generalized grievances about the lawfulness of government acts.
See, e.g., Favorito, 684 S.E.2d
at 263 (holding that voters' arguments regarding accuracy of
recounts on DREs were "merely hypothetical and cannot serve as a
basis for declaratory relief"). A desire to have the government act
in conformance to the law is not enough,28
and the voters assert no concrete, particularized harm to justify
their claims here.29
See Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 302.
The voters raise legitimate concerns about system integrity and
vulnerability. But these are policy disputes more appropriately
resolved in the give-and-take of politics. Perhaps the Secretary
will decide, as California has, to de-certify certain
DREs.30
Perhaps the Legislature will require a contemporaneous paper record
of votes cast,31
or perhaps Texas will curtail or abandon DRE use
But we cannot say the Secretary's decision to certify this device
violated the voters' equal protection rights or that the voters can
pursue generalized grievances about the lawfulness of her acts.
"Vindicating the public interest (including the public
interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is
the function of [the Legislature] and the Chief Executive."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. We reverse the court of appeals'
judgment and render judgment dismissing the case. Tex. R. App. P.
60.2(c).
OPINION DELIVERED: July
The Secretary of State is the state's chief election officer.
Tex. Elec. Code § 31.001(a).
See Frequently Asked Questions About
eSlate, Travis
(all Internet materials as visited June 29, 2011 and available in
An "electronic voting system" is one in which "the ballots are
automatically counted and the results automatically tabulated by
use of electronically operated apparatus." Tex.
121.003(2). These can include optical scan
ballots, a technology familiar to many through its use in
standardized testing. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless
Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1711, 1721 (2005).
Admin. Code § 81.62(a).
"Significant election events" include error messages, the number of
ballots read for a given precinct, completion of reading ballots
for a given precinct, the identity of the input ports used for
modem transfers from precincts; users logging in and out from the
election system, precincts being zeroed, reports being generated,
diagnostics of any type being run, and change to printer status.
Id. § 81.62(b).
Neither the Voter Confidence and Increased
Availability Act of 2003, the Restore Elector Confidence in Our
Representative Democracy Act of 2004, the Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, nor the Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2009, all of which would have
required a voter-verified paper ballot, became law.
See Voter Confidence and Increased Availability Act of 2009,
H.R. 2894, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2894;
Voter Confidence and Increased Availability Act of 2009, S. 1431,
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1431;
Voter Confidence and Increased Availability Act of 2007, H.R. 811,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-811;
Restore Elector Confidence in Our Representative Democracy Act of
2004, S. 2313, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-2313;
Voter Confidence and Increased Availability Act of 2003, H.R. 2239,
108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-2239.
See Tex. S.B. 245, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); Tex. H.B. 3636,
81st Leg., R.S. (2009); Tex. H.B. 112, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); Tex.
H.B. 638, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); Tex. S.B. 1247, 80th Leg., R.S.
(2007); Tex. S.B. 1006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007); Tex. H.B. 3891,
80th Leg., R.S. (2007); Tex. H.B. 384, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007); Tex.
H.B. 123, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007); Tex. H.B. 65, 80th Leg., R.S.
(2007); Tex. S.B. 94, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005); Tex. H.B. 3083, 79th
Leg., R.S. (2005); Tex. H.B. 2259, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005); Tex.
H.B. 1289, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
The voters initially sued Roger Williams, who was then Secretary of
State. He was succeeded by Phil Wilson, who was automatically
substituted in Williams's stead.
Tex. R. App. P. 7.2(a). When Andrade succeeded Wilson,
she replaced him as the named party. The voters also sued the
Travis County Clerk, but the trial court dismissed her from the
case, and she is not a party to this appeal.
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the
justices of the court of appeals disagree on a material question of
law. Tex. Gov't Code
§ 22.225(c).
See also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (holding that the
presence of one party with standing satisfies case-or-controversy
requirement); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986)
(because union members had standing to challenge statute's
constitutionality, court "need not consider the standing issue as
to the Union or Members of Congress"); Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 264 n.9 (1977)
(holding that because "at least one individual plaintiff . . . has
demonstrated standing," court "need not consider whether the other
individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain the
suit"); Crawford v. Marion Cnty.
Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 181, 189 n.7 (2008); cf.
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc. v. Nueces Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 904 S.W.2d 621, 624
(Tex. 1995) (declining to address county's standing because no one
challenged it and because another party had standing).
Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
Federal law is in accord. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754
(1984) ("This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to
standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.").
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499
(holding that individuals lack standing "when the asserted harm is
a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by
all or a large class of citizens").
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 96 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that
"Lujan likely means that the bar against generalized
grievances will be treated as constitutional and not prudential in
the future").
See Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3531.10 n.26 (3d ed.
2008)(noting the "evanescent, almost
magical" distinctions in some such cases).
See also Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law 71, 91, 97 (stating that "[i]n general, a person who claims discrimination or
a violation of an individual liberty . . . will be accorded
standing"); Wright, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3531.10 n.62 (noting that "[o]rdinarily, courts do not even pause to confirm
standing in cases of this sort").
See, e.g., Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11th
Cir. 2006) (affirming judgment against voter (and others) who
alleged that DRE violated equal protection); Weber v.
Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2003) (same);
Favorito v. Handel, 684
S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (Ga. 2009) (same); Gusciora v. Corzine, No. MER-L-2691-04,
2010 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 2319, *332-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2010) (holding that State's certification of DREs did not
violate voters' equal protection or due process rights); see
also Tex. Democratic Party v. Williams, 285 Fed. App'x. 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
Secretary of State in case involving allegations that eSlate deprived voters of equal protection and due
process and violated the Election Code), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 912 (2009); Schade v. Md. State Bd. of Elections,
930 A.2d 304, 328 (Md. 2007) (holding that trial court correctly
denied voters'and candidates' requests
for preliminary injunction, as state board of elections acted
reasonably in certifying DREs that lacked a voter verified paper
audit trail). But see Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408-09
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs' claims that voting
machines violated two provisions (the "free and equal election"
provision and the "privileges and immunities clause") of the
Arizona Constitution survived Arizona rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss); Banfield v.
Cortes, 922 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2007) (refusing to dismiss electors' claims that secretary of
state had illegally certified DREs). 18
This is not suggest that the generalized
grievance bar does not apply to equal protection claims. It does,
and a plaintiff's failure to allege that he has been denied equal
treatment will deprive him of standing. United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743-44 (1995) ("The rule against
generalized grievances applies with as much force in the equal
protection context as in any other," and "only . . . those persons
who are personally denied equal treatment" will have standing
(quotations omitted)); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset
Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 647 (Tex. 2004) (holding that "the
generalized grievance bar to standing . . . also applies to
equal-protection claims like those asserted here").
"[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection
challenges under the Texas Constitution." Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, 95 S.W.3d 253,
266 (Tex. 2002).
Favorito v.
Handel, 684 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (Ga. 2009).
Gusciora v.
Corzine, No. MER-L-2691-04, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub.
One commentator suggests that requiring contemporaneous paper
records of DRE votes is problematic:
First, it relies on the false assumption
that paper-based systems are inherently more accurate and reliable
than paperless ones. Second, it disregards both long and recent
experience demonstrating the vulnerability of paper-based systems
to fraud and error. Third, it fails to comprehend the practical
problems in actually implementing a system that is capable of
printing out a contemporaneous paper record, yet preserves voter
privacy and election security.
Tokaji, 73
Fordham L. Rev. at 1780-81; see also
id. at 1736 (noting that "many election officials and some
civil rights advocates have opposed a contemporaneous paper record
requirement, arguing that it is unnecessary, burdensome, and likely
to discourage adoption of accessible voting technology").
At the time we decided Wood, our constitution limited this
fourth requirement to cities containing a population of ten
thousand inhabitants or more. Wood v. State
ex rel. Lee, 126 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. 1939). The
requirement is now applicable to "all voters."
art. VI, § 4.
Hays, 515 U.S. at 745.
See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("The proposition that all constitutional
provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens
are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no
boundaries.").
See Tex. Elec. Code
§ 122.002, .031.
See also Cox v. Perry, 138 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App.Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.) (noting that
plaintiff-candidate had no standing under section 273.081 to enjoin
alleged Election Code violation, because "[a]ny such harm, in our view, is not distinct from
harm to the general public").
Allen, 468 U.S. at 754.
Although we have analyzed these claims from the perspective of a
plaintiff (Sonia Santana) who is a voter, none of the remaining
plaintiffs has standing either. The court of appeals held that the
NAACP and its president, Nelson Linder, had standing because NAACP
members were registered voters and participants in Travis County
elections, as was Linder himself. 287 S.W.3d at
250-51. Their claims fail for the same reasons Santana's do.
The remaining plaintiff is David Van Os, a candidate for attorney
general in 2006. Van Os asserts only that as a former candidate, it
is important to him that every vote be accurately recorded and
verified. He also complains that, if he had to request a recount,
there would be no way to detect a malfunction. He does not complain
that he sought a recount and was unable to receive one. At most, he
has alleged a hypothetical harmone that does not give him standing
to pursue his claims.
See Stuart Pfeifer, Some Counties Might Sue Over E-Voting
Orders, Los Angeles Times, May 4,
2004, at B1 (describing secretary of state's decision to decertify
paperless Diebold DRE voting machines).
According to the voters, thirty states have statutes mandating
contemporaneous paper records of votes cast.
See The Pew Center on the States, Back to
Paper: A Case Study (2008) (detailing five states that
adopted DREs and then reversed course), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/EB21Brief.pdf