Source: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20041026_1bvr091100en.html
Timestamp: 2016-05-24 13:46:47
Document Index: 43220045

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 53', '§ 55', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 67', '§ 71', '§ 73', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 4', 'arts 17', '§ 7', '§ 53', '§ 19', '§ 55', 'sui generis', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 66', '§ 67', '§ 71', '§ 73', '§ 7', '§ 74', '§ 1', '§ 7', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 73', '§ 53', '§ 55', '§ 92', '§ 23', '§ 65', '§ 71', '§ 63', '§ 63', '§ 2', '§ 90', '§ 67', '§ 53', '§ 55', '§ 90', '§ 1', '§ 4', '§ 65', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 73', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 67', '§ 74', '§ 65', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 4', '§ 74', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 53', '§ 55', '§ 65', '§ 73', '§ 7', '§ 4', '§ 7', '§ 74', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 7', '§ 65', '§ 74', '§ 74', '§ 65', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 67', '§ 74', '§ 67', '§ 67', '§ 4', '§ 28', '§ 4', '§ 2', '§ 65', '§ 63', '§ 63', '§ 63', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 63', '§ 65', '§ 65', '§ 67', '§ 73', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 73', '§ 74', '§ 73']

Bundesverfassungsgericht - Decisions - Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional complaint against Brandenburg Higher Education Act unsuccessful
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Order of 26 October 2004 - 1 BvR 911/00
H e a d n o t e s to the order of the First Senate of 26 October
2004 – 1 BvR 911/00 – – 1 BvR 927/00 – – 1 BvR 928/00 – The conferment by statute of decision-making
powers on monocratic management bodies of universities is
compatible with Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz – GG), provided that those powers are
substantively limited and at the same time it is
sufficiently ensured organisationally that their exercise
does not result in any structural threat to academic
Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the
Basic Law contains no prohibition on attaching consequences
to the evaluation of academic quality in the allocation of
resources. The legislature’s decision to allocate resources
in the university sector partly on a performance-oriented
basis is constitutionally unobjectionable if it is
sufficiently ensured that performance is evaluated in a
manner which is appropriate from an academic point of
Decision regarding the constitutionality of
the participatory and supervisory powers of university
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT – 1 BvR 911/00 – – 1 BvR 927/00 – – 1 BvR 928/00 – IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE In the proceedings on the constitutional complaints I. 1. of the Law Faculty of the University of
Potsdam, represented by its dean, Professor Dr. Detlev W. Belling, August-Bebel-Straße 89, 14482 Potsdam, 2. of Professor Dr. K., - authorised agent of the first complainant:
Professor Dr. Eckart Klein, Heideweg 45, 14482 Potsdam –
– 1 BvR 911/00 –, II. of the Philosophy Faculty I of the
University of Potsdam, represented by its dean, Professor Dr. Norbert
Franz, August-Bebel-Straße 89, 14482 Potsdam, - authorised agent:
– 1 BvR 927/00 –, III. 1. of the Law Faculty of the European
University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), represented by its dean, Professor Dr. Dr. Uwe Scheffler, Große Scharrnstraße 59, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), 2. of Professor Dr. P., 3. of Professor Dr. Dr. S., 4. of Professor Dr. W., 5. of Professor Dr. J., – 1 BvR 928/00 – against § 1.3, § 2.7, § 53.1
sentences 2 and 3, § 55.3 sentence 2,
§ 63.1 sentence 2, 63.2, 63.3
sentence 1, § 65.1 sentences 3 and 4
nos. 2 to 5, 65.2 and 65.4, § 67.3
sentence 1 no. 1, § 71.3, § 73.1
sentence 1, 73.2 sentences 2 and 3, 73.3
sentence 1 of the Act on the Higher Education
Institutions of the Land Brandenburg (Brandenburg Higher
Education Act (Gesetz über die Hochschulen des Landes
Brandenburg – Brandenburgisches Hochschulgesetz – BbgHG)
of 20 May 1999 (Law and Ordinance Gazette
(Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt – GVBl) I p. 130), now in
the version promulgated on 6 July 2004 (Law and Ordinance
Gazette I p. 394), the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional
Court, with the participation of Justices Papier (President) Jaeger, Haas, Hömig, Steiner, Hohmann-Dennhardt Hoffmann-Riem, and Bryde, on 26 October 2004 held as follows: The constitutional complaints are rejected as
unfounded. G r o u n d s : A. 1 The complainants – faculties and professors of
two Brandenburg universities – directly object to provisions
of the Brandenburg Higher Education Act which altered the
organisational structures of the universities of the
Land (state) Brandenburg. I. 2 Brandenburg higher education law was reformed
by the Amending Statute (Novelle ) of 20 May
1999 (Act on the Higher Education Institutions of the
Land Brandenburg < Brandenburg Higher Education Act – BbgHG>, Law
and Ordinance Gazette I p. 130). It is intended to strengthen
the autonomy of the universities, whose management and
decision-making structures are reformed and evaluation and
performance-related allocation of resources introduced (see
the Land Government bill, Landtag printed paper (LTDrucks) 2/5977,
p. 1 et seq. and explanatory memorandum,
p. 1 et seq.). With the Amending Statute, the Act
follows a guiding principle which has been applied with
similar objectives in numerous amending statutes reforming
the higher education acts of the Länder (states). This is a reform of the organisational structures,
which is above all characterised by a strengthening of the
management bodies. The collegial bodies retain policy and
supervisory powers. Further key points of that guiding
principle are the integration of personnel from outside the
universities by university councils, new public control
systems (overall budgets, agreements on targets), evaluation
and performance-oriented allocation of resources. 3 The relevant provisions were amended (albeit
not significantly for decision-making) by the First Act
amending the Brandenburg Higher Education Act (Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Brandenburgischen
Hochschulgesetzes ) of 22 March 2004 (Law and
Ordinance Gazette I p. 51). Since the promulgation
of the amended version on 6 July 2004 (Law and Ordinance
Gazette I p. 394), they have had the following
wording: 4 § 1 5 Scope; designations 6 (1) and (2) … 7 (3) The Land Government may,
by agreement with the relevant committee of the Landtag , establish, amalgamate or close, by
ordinance, universities and sites of universities in order to
ensure a balanced structural development of universities. 8 (4) … 9 § 2 10 Legal status; supervision; state financing 11 (1) … 12 (2) The universities shall fulfil the tasks,
including where these are state matters, by means of a single
administration. State matters are the personnel, budget and
finance administration of the universities and the levying of
fees. 13 (3) to (6) … 14 (7) The state financing of universities shall
be geared to the levels of performance achieved in teaching
and research and in the training of the new generation of
academics. Here, progress with regard to fulfilling the
gender equality mandate is to be taken into account as
well. 15 § 4 16 Freedom of teaching, research and study in
science and the arts 17 (1) Freedom of teaching shall cover, in the
context of the teaching tasks to be fulfilled, the
organisation of classes, seminars and lectures as regards
their content and methodology and the right to express expert
scientific and artistic opinions. Decisions of university
bodies concerning teaching are permissible in so far as they
relate to the organisation of teaching activity and to the
drawing up and observance of study and examination
regulations; they must not impair freedom within the meaning
of sentence 1. 18 (2) Freedom of research shall cover, in
particular, the formulation of questions, the principles of
methodology and the evaluation of the result of the research
and its dissemination. Decisions of university bodies
concerning research are permissible in so far as they relate
to the organisation of research activity, the promotion and
coordination of research projects and to the building up of
research focuses. They must not impair freedom within the
meaning of sentence 1. Sentences 1 to 3 shall apply to
artistic development projects and to practice of the
arts. 19 (3) Freedom of study shall cover, without
prejudice to the study and examination regulations, in
particular, the free choice of classes, seminars and
lectures, the right, within a course of study, to decide on
areas of study according to one’s own choice, and the
formation and expression of scientific and artistic opinions.
Decisions of university bodies concerning study are
permissible in so far as they relate to the organisation and
lawful and proper conduct of teaching and study activity and
to ensuring a lawful and proper course of study. 20 (4) Exercise of the rights mentioned in
paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not release the holder of rights from
the obligation to comply with the rules governing the
organisation of communal life at the university. 21 § 7 22 Evaluation of teaching 23 (1) The evaluation of teaching shall promote
quality development and quality assurance in the field of
teaching. It shall enable competition with other universities
and their centres and departments and be taken into account
in the performance-oriented allocation of resources. The
students shall participate in the evaluation of teaching. The
universities shall determine the evaluation procedure by
statute. 24 (2) The dean, in collaboration with the faculty
council, shall evaluate the centres and departments of the
faculty and shall draw up a teaching report at two-year
intervals which shall be submitted to the president. 25 (3) The president, in collaboration with the
senate, shall evaluate the faculties and central units and
departments taking into account the teaching reports and at
shall draw up a combined teaching report two-year intervals
which shall be submitted to the member of the Land Government responsible for the universities. 26 (4) The teaching reports and combined teaching
reports shall contain in particular: 27 1. the presentation of the data relevant to the
assessment of the situation and development of teaching and
study and their evaluation 28 2. the measures taken and envisaged in order to
improve the quality of teaching and study. 29 The teaching reports and combined teaching
reports shall aid in the evaluation to be carried out
regularly by outside experts. 30 (5) The universities may set up a joint
evaluation agency which shall support the universities in the
evaluation. 31 § 53 32 Private lecturers (Privatdozent(inn)en ) 33 (1) Any person who is able to produce the
teaching qualification in accordance with § 19.1
sentence 2 may be given authority to conduct classes,
seminars and lectures independently at the university
(authority to teach). The president shall decide, upon
application by the habilitated person, on the content and
scope of the authority to teach. It may be conferred where
the applicant’s teaching activity can be expected to
represent a sensible addition to the teaching provision
offered by the university, and where no reasons exist which
statutorily preclude an appointment as professor. 34 (2) and (3) … 35 § 55 36 Contract lecturers (Lehrbeauftragte ) 37 (1) and (2) … 38 (3) The teaching contract creates a public-law
legal relationship sui generis with the
university; it does not create an employment relationship. It
shall be awarded by the dean for a maximum period of two
semesters. … 39 (4) … 40 § 63 41 Land university council 42 (1) A Land university council
shall be formed for the state universities. It shall support
the universities in the discharge of their tasks and in their
cooperation with the relevant member of the Land Government. In order to advise him or her and
the universities, it shall set up a university council for
the respective university. Further details shall be laid down
by the rules of procedure of the Land university council. 43 (2) The Land university
council shall 44 1. advise the presidents and senates on policy
matters, 45 2. participate in the decision-making on the
development plans of the universities in order to ensure a
balanced structural development of the universities, 46 3. give recommendations on budget planning to
the relevant member of the Land Government
and 47 4. propose, in consultation with the senate,
candidates for the election of presidents. 48 (3) To enable it to discharge its tasks, the
Land university council shall have a
comprehensive right to obtain information from the presidents
and the senates. It shall not be entitled to inspect
personnel files. 49 (4) … 50 (5) Upon the proposal of the member of the
Land Government with responsibility for the
universities, after hearing the views of the universities and
in consultation with the relevant committee of the Landtag , the Minister-President shall appoint the
members of the Land university council. This
shall comprise 10 persons, at least one third of whom shall
be female. Their term of office shall be four years. 51 (6) … 52 § 65 53 President 54 (1) The president shall manage the university
on his or her own authority and responsibility and shall
represent it externally. He or she shall render account to
the senate, annually and upon the latter’s reasoned request,
for the performance of his or her tasks. The president shall
be responsible for all the tasks of the university in so far
as this Act does not specify otherwise. He or she shall be
responsible, in particular, for: 55 1. the preparation of concepts for the
development of the university, 56 2. the establishment and dissolution of
faculties, central departments and operating units and of
courses of study after hearing the views of the senate, 57 3. the coordination of the activities of the
faculties and central departments, in particular in regard to
teaching and research, 58 4. the evaluation of research in the faculties
and central departments, on the basis of the research
reports 59 5. the preparation and management of the budget
and the performance-related allocation of resources and
posts, for limited periods, to the faculties and central
facilities according to the results of the evaluation and 60 6. the preservation of order and the exercise
of proprietary powers. 61 … 62 (2) The president shall be elected for a
temporary period by the senate on the basis of the election
proposal of the Land university council and
appointed by the member of the Land Government with responsibility for the universities. Should
no candidate be elected in either the first or the second
ballot, a third ballot shall be held between the candidates
who have received the most votes in the second ballot, in
which whoever receives the most votes shall be elected. 63 (3) Any person who holds a degree and can be
expected, on the basis of responsible professional activity
over several years, in particular in science, business,
administration or the administration of justice, to be equal
to the duties of the office may be appointed president. The
president shall exercise his or her office as their principal
occupation. His or her term of office shall be six years. He
or she may be re-elected. 64 (4) The president may be voted out of office by
the senate by a majority of two thirds of its members; the
vote to remove him or her from office may not take place
until six months have elapsed after the president’s taking up
of office. Before initiating a procedure for voting the
president out of office, the senate shall communicate in
writing to the Land university council the
reasons for desiring a vote to remove him or her from office
and shall give the president the opportunity to express his
or her views on the reasons for desiring a vote to remove him
or her from office. He or she may be voted out of office only
by the senate’s electing, on the proposal of one or more of
its members, a successor and requesting the member of the
universities to dismiss the president. Provided that the
procedure for voting to remove the president from office is
lawfully conducted, the member of the Land Government with responsibility for the universities must
comply with the request and, in accordance with subsection 3,
appoint the elected person. The pension of the president
voted out of office, who has the status of a civil servant
for a fixed term, shall be governed by § 66.6 of the
Civil Service Benefits Act (Beamtenversorgungsgesetz ). If the president voted out
of office was a professor at the same university before
taking up office, he or she shall, upon his or her
application, be taken on as a professor at that university.
If the president voted out of office was not a professor at
the same university before taking up office, he or she may,
upon his or her application, be taken on in a legal position
in the Land service which is comparable to
that which or she occupied at the time of his or her
appointment. The application shall be made within three
months from being voted out office. Upon being taken on, the
status of civil servant for a fixed term shall be terminated
by dismissal; this shall not apply where the president was
re-elected and would have retired had he or she not been
re-elected. 65 (5) and (6) … 66 § 67 67 Senate 68 (1) The senate shall be responsible for: 69 1. the adoption of the university’s
constitutional system and other statutes, in so far as they
are not to be adopted by the faculties, and the opinion on
the statutes of the faculties, 70 2. the decision on fundamental questions
concerning teaching, research, study and examinations and
concerning the training of the new generation of academics in
science and the arts, 71 3. the decision on the development plan of the
university, 72 4. the election and voting out of office of the
president and 73 5. the decision on the proposals of the
faculties for the appointment of university lecturers. 74 (2) The senate shall supervise the president in
regard to the fulfilment of his or her tasks. In
particular, 75 1. it shall discuss the president’s report and
statement of account and shall decide whether he or she
should be granted discharge, 76 2. it shall adopt an opinion on the draft
budget. 77 … 78 (3) The following shall be members of the
senate: 79 1. six representatives of the university
lecturers’ group, 80 2. two students, 81 3. two representatives of the academic staff
group 82 4. one other staff member. 83 (4) … 84 § 71 85 Faculty 86 (1) and (2) … 87 (3) The establishment and dissolution of
faculties shall be notified to the relevant member of the
universities. 88 § 73 89 Election and tasks of the dean 90 (1) The dean and vice-dean shall be elected on
the proposal of the president of the faculty council. In
addition to the majority of the members of the faculty
council, the election of the dean shall also require the
majority of the university lecturers on the faculty council.
If on this basis no dean is elected in either the first or a
second ballot, the majority of the university lecturers shall
suffice for the decision in a third ballot. For a vote to
remove from office, sentence 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis , with the proviso that the majority
of the members must be two thirds. 91 (2) The dean shall manage the faculty and
represent it within the university. He or she shall be
responsible for all the functions of the faculty, in so far
as this Act does not provide otherwise. He or she shall, in
particular, be responsible for the organisation of studies
and examinations and the coordination of research and
teaching. … 92 (3) The dean shall allocate resources and posts
to the departments and centres out of the resources available
to the faculty, taking into account the result of the
evaluation of teaching and research. At the same time as the
teaching report under § 7.2, he or she shall submit the
research report to the president. 93 § 74 94 Functions of the faculty council 95 (1) The faculty council shall be responsible
for: 96 1. the adoption of the faculty’s statutes, 97 2. the decision on the structural and
development planning of the faculty, 98 3. the decision on appointment proposals, 99 4. the decision on habilitations, 100 5. cooperation in the evaluation and
coordination of teaching and research in the faculty and 101 6. the election and voting out of office of the
dean and his or her deputy. 102 (2) The faculty council shall supervise the
dean in regard to the performance of his or her tasks. In
particular, … it shall discuss the dean’s report and
statement of account and decide whether he or she should be
granted discharge. In order to carry out its supervision, the
faculty council shall have a comprehensive right to obtain
information from the dean. II. 103 By their identically worded constitutional
complaints, the complainants claim that the contested
provisions violate their fundamental right under Article 5.3
sentence 1 of the Basic Law. [They argue as follows:] 104 1. The constitutional complaints are
admissible with or without prior legal redress from the
non-constitutional courts. 105 As a result of the academically inappropriate
reform of the organisational structures at the universities,
the Act alters the legal position of the complainants to
their detriment, irrespective of any implementing measures.
These are structural impairments of academic freedom which do
not first find concrete expression in individual measures.
The new organisational structures result directly from the
Act. 106 2. The president’s exclusive right of proposal
for the election of the faculty managements in conjunction
with their extended, academically relevant powers interferes
with the independence of the faculties in violation of
academic freedom. 107 It is also unconstitutional that the
complainants are excluded from the conferment of authority to
teach. 108 The powers conferred solely on the president
for the coordination of the faculties’ activities, for
evaluation and allocation of resources to the faculties and
for the dissolution of faculties also violate the
complainants’ academic freedom. The broadly formulated
coordinating power could be used to control research. It is
not appropriate from an academic point of view to exclusively
confer that power on the president. The same also applies to
the academically relevant power of evaluation. Since there
are no clear criteria, the president, who is only partially
technically competent, is assigned unfettered discretion
which is not open to judicial review. The senate’s rights to
exercise supervision, obtain information and undertake
verification do not constitute an adequate involvement of the
research fields concerned. In addition, there is the lack of
involvement of the faculties or the senate in the
performance-related allocation of resources. The performance
orientation is constitutionally problematic, since no
assessment criteria which are appropriate from an academic
point of view have yet been developed. Finally, the power to
dissolve faculties constitutes a disproportionate means of
bringing pressure to bear and, together with the other powers
of the president, although the continued existence of the
faculties is not protected by fundamental rights, represents
a violation of or at least an interference-like threat to
academic freedom. 109 The complainants also view the decisive
participation of the Land university council
in the development plans of the universities and in
appointing the universities’ management as a violation of
their academic freedom. The complainants argue that the
Land university council is a non-academic
body lacking adequate democratic legitimacy and
insufficiently subject to parliamentary control. They further
argue that the Land legislature violates the
autonomy of the universities when it grants an external body
substantial involvement in the appointment of universities’
management. It is true that the senate is allowed to elect
the president; however, since the Land university council is not obliged to propose several
candidates, that right to decide is de facto worthless. The senate’s ability to vote the president out of
office does not make up for those defects. The unclear
involvement of the Land university council
in the decision on the universities’ development plans is
designed as a right of codetermination. However, the members
of the Land university council do not have
sufficient legitimacy for that academically relevant
task. 110 The complainants take the view that a further
violation of the complainants’ rights under Article 5.3
sentence 1 of the Basic Law arises from the fact that the
representation of each individual faculty on the senate is
not guaranteed. However, that is necessary because the senate
is the only central collegial body of the university with an
academically pluralistic composition and thus represents the
only opportunity for the various faculties to be involved in
academically relevant decisions and supervisory powers at the
central level. 111 With regard to the restructuring of the
faculties, the complainants argue that the subsidiary
comprehensive competences of the dean and his powers to
coordinate research and teaching, allocate resources and
posts and award teaching contracts go far beyond technical
and executive matters and should therefore be conferred on
the faculty council as the place of the collegial,
cooperative exercise of fundamental rights. Because of the
limited assignments of competences to the faculty council,
the dean has, through his subsidiary comprehensive
competence, the ability to exert influence on numerous
matters relevant to research. In the sphere of awarding
resources and posts, which is vital to research, the
collegial principle must not be displaced by a hierarchical
and monocratic power of allocation. The shaping of the
academic profile of a faculty by teaching contracts also
forms part of the core of academically relevant matters. 112 The closure of universities by ordinance,
provided for in § 1.3 BbgHG, contravenes the Basic Law.
Although it is true that the complainants are not entitled to
rely on that contravention, the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) is
nevertheless not precluded from extending the examination to
include it. III. 113 The Government of the Land Brandenburg, the German Rectors' Conference (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz ), the German Association
of University Professors and Lecturers (Deutscher Hochschulverband ), the Association of
Higher Education Institution Lecturers (Hochschullehrerbund ) and the Education and Science
Trade Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und
Wissenschaft ) have made statements on the constitutional
complaints. 114 1. The Land Government
contends that the constitutional complaints are largely
inadmissible. In particular, the complainants’ fundamental
rights are not by the possibility of the closure of
universities and faculties, and the complainant university
lecturers’ fundamental rights are not affected by the
conferment of authority to teach and the award of teaching
contracts. 115 The Land Government takes the
view that the constitutional complaints are, for the
remainder, unfounded. The contested provisions satisfy the
criteria to be derived from academic freedom for
organisational provisions relating to universities. No
guarantee of the university as an institution or of any
academic right of self-government is to be inferred from the
fundamental right. As long as the core sphere of academic
activity is not affected, the legislature is entitled to
regulate the organisation of universities as it sees fit. 116 As regards the expanded powers of the
president, sufficient account has already been taken of
conceivable constitutional requirements concerning
participation in the conferment of authority to teach through
the decisive influence of the faculties on the teaching
qualification decision. The president’s fall-back competence
is a consequence of the “science management” model and
constitutionally unobjectionable. In view of the systematic
and constitutional limits of its concrete expression and
exercise which have to be taken into account, the power to
evaluate and to allocate resources on the basis of the
evaluation results does not create too wide a margin of
discretion for the president. The faculties are sufficiently
involved. The president’s right of proposal for the election
of the dean and vice-dean is unobjectionable, because the
group of candidates is restricted to the university lecturers
belonging to the faculty and the final right of approval
remains with the faculty. 117 On the basis of the principle of cooperation
alone, a state-established, participatory body such as the
Land university council is constitutionally
unobjectionable. 118 As regards the composition of the senate,
having regard to the principle of representation, academic
freedom is also guaranteed where not every faculty is
represented by a university lecturer. 119 As to the expanded powers of the dean, the
Land Government submits that the power to
award teaching contracts is now regulated in a more relevant
way. The academic activity of the university lecturers
belonging to the faculty is not affected. As regards the
dean’s fall-back competence, it must and can be interpreted
in conformity with academic requirements, as in the case of
that of the president. Academic freedom does not require
collegial decision-making competence beyond the matters
assigned to the faculty council. The dean’s coordinating
powers to be exercised in cooperation with the faculty must
also be interpreted as meaning that they do not allow
substantive encroachments upon the core sphere of academic
activity. The dean’s power to allocate resources and posts is
circumscribed by the required orientation towards the
evaluation results and a consequence of the “science
management” model. The faculty council is sufficiently able
to exert influence on the evaluation itself. A
further-reaching co-decision power is not imperative.
Regardless of that, the individual holder of a professorship
is able to secure his basic provision of funds required by
academic freedom through the courts. The state’s influence on
the allocation of resources is adequately compensated for by
the procedure provided for. 120 2. The German Rectors' Conference that the
universities need their management structures modernising in
order to be able successfully to use their autonomy
responsibly and also internationally. An administration by
management lay persons, shaped solely by the collegial
principle, does not fulfil that need. The present
constitutional complaints, by contrast, seek to tie the state
down to a traditional university model. That is precluded by
the legislature’s freedom as to choice of model; the
legislature is even under a duty to shape academic life in
keeping with the times. 121 The involvement of the Land university council in the universities’ development plans is
regarded by the Conference of Higher Education Institution
Rectors as merely a supporting one. It is also restricted to
only the one aspect, that of a balanced structural
development, which extends beyond the individual university.
Even construed as a power of co-decision, it is nevertheless
legitimate, since Article 5.3 of the Basic Law certainly
allows non-academic shares of control, so long as academic
posts are not seized. The right of proposal for the election
of the president does not create a command structure, but
implements a principle of cooperation. 122 The strengthening of the management functions
is necessary. The previous model of university organisation
led to relevant decision-making powers being retained by the
state and to repeated state intervention. The resultant
deficit of autonomy should be reduced by the strengthening of
the management level, in order to increase capacity for the
successful acquisition of a more clearly differentiated image
in relation to competitors. 123 In the election of the faculty management, a
cooperation mechanism is being established which takes into
account the fact that the faculties are part of an overall
corporation and in that respect the deans also have an
obligation to the overall well-being of the university. The
faculty management is subject to the supervision of the
faculty council and can be voted out of office at any
time. 124 The evaluation of research as the basis for
the allocation of resources is no more irrational and
academically alien than the previous system. For the
evaluation of teaching, § 7 BbgHG contains procedural
rules which are already standard to a large extent. 125 3. The German Association of University
Professors and Lecturers considers the constitutional
complaints to be admissible and well founded. With regard, in
particular, to the allocation of resources, a threat to the
fundamental right already exists by reason of the
organisational structure itself. 126 Article 5.3 of the Basic Law protects an area
of freedom for the universities, which, in conjunction with
the state’s rights of influence, results in a joint power of
control. The Brandenburg Higher Education Act strengthens
only superficially the autonomy of the universities; in
reality, it imposes its will on the universities. The Act
ignores the special features which distinguish universities
from commercial enterprises. In the areas directly affecting
research and teaching, such as, for example, the conferment
of teaching authority or the allocation of resources, the
management must be committed to scholarship and not to
managership. 127 The substantial release of the president from
the traditional involvement of the senate is said to be
unconstitutional. The senate retains no adequate
decision-making powers. The power of the president to
evaluate research and teaching is especially problematical,
in particular because there are no statutory criteria for
this. The power to confer teaching authority is also open to
objection, particularly as it is not restricted to persons
habilitated by the faculty concerned and leaves the technical
definition of authority to teach to the president. 128 With only six professor representatives, no
adequate representation of all faculties on the senate
exists. The position of the deans is also said to be framed
unconstitutionally; the reform removes the collegial
structure of the faculty. 129 4. The Association of Higher Education
Institution Lecturers has made it known that it agrees in
substance with the constitutional complaints. 130 5. In the opinion of the Education and Science
Trade Union, it is not objectionable that certain
qualification requirements for the members of the Land university council are not regulated. The
members have adequate democratic legitimacy through the
appointment procedure. A power to remove them also exists
without express statutory provision. 131 The appointment of the president as such is
not an academically relevant matter. Through the intervention
of the Land university council, direct state
influence is rather being retracted. Constitutionally, the
senate’s comprehensive powers of verification are said to be
decisive. An alteration of the structures of collegial and
monocratic management in the direction of university
management is permissible. No requirement for exclusive
designation of management bodies by the university itself can
be inferred from Article 5.3 of the Basic Law. 132 The university management’s right of proposal
for the election of the faculty management is said to be
constitutionally tenable. The arrangement improves the
cooperation between the university and the faculties. The
academic relevance of its management and coordinating powers
is taken into account in the fact that the faculty management
has to be elected from the group of professors on the faculty
council. The coordinating power of the university management
is a typical cross-faculty management function; the previous
collegial competence has not proved successful. 133 The power of evaluation of the university
management must be interpreted in conformity with the
constitution. It cannot be a substantive evaluation of
scientific results, but an evaluation of productivity and of
acceptance in the scientific community. 134 No entitlement to a presence for all the
faculties on the senate can be inferred from the Basic Law.
What is called for is not primarily specialist and technical,
but academic policy expertise. 135 The relationship between faculty management
and faculty council has been developed within the framework
of Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. The fall-back
competence of the faculty management does not give cause to
fear consequences for the core sphere of academic activity.
The responsibility of the faculty management for the
coordination of teaching is permissible; there should be no
interference with the freedom of teaching as a result of it.
There are possibilities of legal redress against
encroachments in individual cases, and conflicting
constitutional positions must be taken into account. In
research, coordination is primarily the responsibility of the
scientists concerned in each case. Limited scope therefore
remains for the coordinating competence of the faculty
management. The involvement of the faculty council is
guaranteed. The allocation of resources is decisively
controlled by the right to basic provision of funds and the
faculty development plan and is subject to adequate
supervision. Monocratic competence makes it possible to take
priority-setting decisions, which experience shows are not
taken by collegial bodies. IV. 136 The Federal Constitutional Court requested the
Government of the Land Brandenburg to
provide information on which criteria form the basis of
research evaluation at the universities, where those criteria
originate, whether there are procedures for establishing them
within each university or across universities and who is
involved in them and, where relevant, how. It was also asked
what percentage of resources and posts in the universities
and the faculties are allocated subject to evaluation and
whether there are plans or tendencies to alter that
percentage in the future. 137 The Brandenburg Ministry for Science, Research
and Culture has informed the Court that the discussion on the
criteria has not yet concluded. At present, the principal
factors taken into account at the universities are the
attraction of external funding, the number of doctorates and
habilitations and the nature and number of publications. At
the art colleges and universities of applied sciences
(Fachhochschulen ), criteria such as
interdisciplinary orientation, collaborative partnerships,
patents and awards and honours also play a part. Procedures
for establishing criteria do not yet exist everywhere. As a
rule, the presidency establishes the criteria on the basis of
consultations with an internal body (senate, plenary meeting
of university lecturers or research commission). In future,
recommendations by inter-university/college academic
institutions and tried and tested procedures will be
followed. 138 As far as the allocation of funds to the
universities in Brandenburg is concerned, a model has been
developed with the participation of the universities, which
envisages 78% of the available budget total for a
task-related provision of finance and basic appropriation
covering exceptional situations, 2% for structural
development by agreements on targets and 20% for
performance-related appropriations. The external funding
criterion is used as a directly research-related indicator in
that connection. At present, within the universities, only a
small proportion of the resources are allocated on a
performance-related basis, the rest being allocated on a
needs-oriented basis and to fulfil commitments to provide
equipment; however, in future the performance-related
proportion will follow the inter-university/college
model. B. 139 The constitutional complaints of the
complainant professors are admissible only in regard to
§ 63.2 no. 4, § 65.1 sentence 4 nos. 3 to 5, 2 and
4, § 73.1 sentence 1, 73.2 sentence 2 and 73.3 sentence
1 BbgHG. The constitutional complaints of the complainant
faculties are, in addition, admissible in regard to
§ 53.1 sentences 2 and 3 and § 55.3 sentence 2
BbgHG. For the remainder, the constitutional complaints are
inadmissible. I. 140 In part, the submissions of the complainants
do not satisfy the requirements which § 92 in
conjunction with § 23.1 sentence 2 phrase 1 of the
Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz – BVerfGG) lays down
with respect to the grounds of a constitutional
complaint. 141 With regard to the provisions on the
subsidiary comprehensive competence of the university
management (§ 65.1 sentence 3 BbgHG) and on the
obligation to notify in the case of establishment and
dissolution of faculties (§ 71.3 BbgHG), in relation to
the support function of the Land university
council and to its power to issue recommendations on budget
planning to the Ministry and its right to obtain information
(§ 63.1 sentence 2, 63.2 no. 3, 63.3
sentence 1 BbgHG), the complainants do not make out an
adequate case for a violation of fundamental rights.
Likewise, no threat to the academic freedom of the
complainants as a consequence of the advisory power of the
Land university council (§ 63.2
no. 1 BbgHG) has been demonstrated. 142 Nor do the complainants state why the
parameters laid down in § 2.7 BbgHG for the state
financing of universities infringe Article 5.3 sentence 1 of
the Basic Law regardless of the configuration of the
university’s internal evaluation and resource allocation
procedure. II. 143 In part, the constitutional complaints are
inadmissible for lack of any possibility of a violation of
the complainants’ fundamental rights (§ 90.1
BVerfGG). 144 1. This applies to the constitutional
complaints of the professors with regard to the provision of
§ 67.3 sentence 1 no. 1 BbgHG concerning the composition
of the senate. It is true that effective protection of
academic freedom requires adequate precautions under
organisational law (see Decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts – BVerfGE) 35, 79 <121>).
However, the fundamental right of academic freedom does not
prescribe any specific form of organisation for academic
activity (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <116>). The only criterion
for a form of university organisation which is compatible
with the constitution can be whether free academic activity
is possible and can be safely pursued under it (see BVerfGE
35, 79 <117>). No threat to free academic activity lies
in the possible non-representation of individual faculties on
the senate. Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law does not
guarantee any entitlement to the representation of a faculty
on the senate. 145 2. Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic
Law does not protect the complainant university lecturers
against the university management’s deciding on the
conferment of teaching authority (§ 53.1 sentence 2 and
3 BbgHG) and the faculty management’s deciding on the award
of teaching contracts (§ 55.3 sentence 2 BbgHG).
The complainants’ academic freedom is not impaired by the
conferment of teaching authority on and award of teaching
contracts to other persons. Their own research and teaching
are not affected by that, either directly or indirectly via
the composition of relevant bodies. III. 146 The constitutional complaints are also, in
part, inadmissible from the point of view of subsidiarity
(§ 90.2 sentence 1 BVerfGG). Under that provision, a
constitutional complaint is not admissible where the holder
of fundamental rights can reasonably obtain legal redress by
bringing the matter before the non-constitutional courts (see
BVerfGE 97, 157 <165> with further references). That is
the case here in a number of respects. 147 1. In so far as the complainants complain that
§ 1.3 BbgHG enables the closure of a university by
ordinance, it must be determined, if necessary by proceedings
before the non-constitutional courts, such as by way of the
judicial review of the constitutionality of laws under
§ 4 of the Brandenburg Administrative Court Act
(Brandenburgisches
Verwaltungsgerichtsgesetz ), whether rights of the
complainants are thereby violated. The same applies in so far
as the power of the university management to dissolve
faculties under § 65.1 sentence 4 no. 2 BbgHG is
contested. 148 2. Legal redress through the
non-constitutional courts is also available in so far as the
complainants contest the participation of the Land university council in development planning. What
influence the participatory power of the Land university council may have on the academic
freedom of the complainants depends on whether it is a power
of co-decision or only a right of participation. § 63.2
no. 2 BbgHG is open to and in need of interpretation in that
regard. The determination as to which interpretation should
be preferred under ordinary law is primarily a matter for the
non-constitutional courts (see BVerfGE 79, 1 <24>; 86,
382 <386-387>; 93, 85 <94>; 97, 157 <165>).
The complainants can also reasonably be expected to wait and
see whether the provision is implemented in a manner which
restricts the scope of the senate’s decision-making power,
and if necessary institute legal proceedings before the
non-constitutional courts. IV. 149 In regard to the remaining contested
provisions, the complainants are personally, presently and
directly affected (see BVerfGE 1, 97 <100 et seq.>).
Faculties also are entitled to invoke academic freedom (see
BVerfGE 68, 193 <207>; 75, 192 <196>; 93, 85
<93>). 150 The protection of fundamental rights under
Article 5.3 of the Basic Law may also be invoked in relation
to organisational provisions (see BVerfGE 35, 79
<108>). The decisive factor determining whether the
complainants are directly affected by an organisational
provision is the threat to fundamental rights caused by an
organisational structure which is academically
inappropriate. 151 Such a possibility exists in relation to the
reform of the management body elections at university and
faculty level, because it is there that academically relevant
decisions must be taken, and also in regard to the transfer
of powers of coordination and resource allocation and the
transfer of subsidiary comprehensive competence from the
collegial bodies to the management bodies; academically
relevant decision-making powers are thereby transferred. The
responsibility of the university’s management for the newly
introduced evaluation of research and teaching, in
conjunction with its responsibility for the
evaluation-oriented allocation of resources, is also
academically relevant. C. 152 In so far as they are admissible, the
constitutional complaints are unfounded. The contested
provisions are compatible with the academic freedom
guaranteed by Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. I. 153 1. In addition to an individual freedom,
Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law contains an
objective fundamental provision that determines values
(wertentscheidende Grundsatznorm ) which
regulates the relationship of science, research and teaching
to the state (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <112>; established
case-law). That value decision includes the taking of
responsibility by the state, which considers itself to be a
civilised nation, for the idea of free academic activity and
the state’s involvement in its realisation (see BVerfGE 35,
79 <114>). The state must accordingly make provision
for efficient institutions of free academic life and ensure,
by appropriate organisational measures, that the individual
fundamental right of free academic activity remains inviolate
so far as is possible taking into account the other
legitimate functions of the academic institutions and the
fundamental rights of the various parties concerned (see
BVerfGE 35, 79 <115>; 85, 360 <384>; 93, 85
<95>). 154 2. For the individual holder of the
fundamental right under Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic
Law, there arises from that value decision a right to such
state measures, including those of an organisational nature,
which are indispensable for the protection of his or her
freedom secured as a fundamental right, because it is those
measures that enable him or her to pursue free academic
activity at all in the first place (see BVerfGE 35, 79
<116>). That freedom is not only guaranteed in the
interests of his or her development as an academic, but also
in the interests of an academia serving the well-being of the
individual and society (see BVerfGE 47, 327 <370>).
Academic freedom therefore does not protect against
restrictions which are unavoidable for the individual holder
of fundamental rights by reason of his or her collaboration
with other holders of fundamental rights in academic life
(see BVerfGE 35, 79 <122, 128>; 47, 327
<369-370>; 51, 369 <379>; 55, 37
<68-69>). 155 Academia is a sphere of autonomous
responsibility in principle free from outside control (see
also BVerfGE 35, 79 <113>; 47, 327 <367>; 90, 1
<12>). That freedom is also based on the notion that an
academia free from ideas of social utility and political
expediency serves the state and society best in the end (see
BVerfGE 47, 327 <370>). The processes, practices and
decisions in the search for knowledge, in its interpretation
and transmission, which are based on academic autonomy,
constitute the core sphere of academic activity (see BVerfGE
35, 79 <112>; 47, 327 <367>; 90, 1
<11-12>). In order to safeguard that sphere, Article
5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law not only guarantees freedom
from state commands and prohibitions, but obliges the state
to protect and promote and grants to those engaged in
academic activity a share in public resources and in the
organisation of academic life (see BVerfGE 35, 79
<115>). 156 Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic
Law requires university organisation and thus also the
formation of intention in relation to university organisation
to be regulated in such a way that free academic activity is
possible and can be safely pursued in the university (see
BVerfGE 35, 79 <116-117>; 54, 363 <389 et
seqq.>). The share of the holder of the fundamental right
in the organisation of academic life is therefore not an end
in itself. On the contrary, it serves to protect that holder
from academically inappropriate decisions and is accordingly
guaranteed as a fundamental right only to the extent
necessary for that purpose. The guarantee is restricted, for
every academic, to such decisions concerning the organisation
of universities as may jeopardise his or her own freedom to
research and to teach (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <116-117,
127-128>). 157 The universities and their subdivisions are
protected, in exactly the same way as the university
lecturers, against decisions concerning the organisation of
universities only in so far as such decisions may jeopardise
the fulfilment of their task of making free academic activity
possible. 158 3. The constitutional review of the
compatibility of organisational provisions with Article 5.3
sentence 1 of the Basic Law must focus on whether free
academic activity and task fulfilment are structurally
jeopardised by those provisions. Decisions which violate
academic freedom in individual cases can never be completely
precluded by organisational provisions (see BVerfGE 35, 79
<124>). On the other hand, however, the respective
holder of the fundamental right is protected by the
possibility of legal counter-measures. In order to determine
whether a provision creates structures which may have
jeopardising effects, the overall organisational framework of
the university with its varying possibilities of influence
and control must be considered. In that connection, account
must also be taken of the degree of importance of the
decision to be taken in each case for free academic activity
and task fulfilment. Since most decisions relating to
university organisation of may, even if they do not directly
affect the core sphere of academic activity, have an indirect
effect on academic activity on account of the reliance of
those engaged in academic activity on publicly provided and
organised academic life (see BVerfGE 61, 260 <279-280>,
clarifying BVerfGE 35, 79 <123> in that respect), a
merely hypothetical threat is not sufficient. 159 4. So long as the legislature ensures such
degree of organisational self-determination for the holders
of the fundamental right as is sufficient for that purpose,
it is free to regulate academic life as it sees fit, in order
to bring into a reasonable balance the varying tasks of the
academic institutions and the interests of all parties
involved in them, in discharge of its responsibility for
society as a whole (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <116, 120>; 47,
327 <404>; 93, 85 <95>). The parliamentary
legislature is better suited to that task than the holders of
academic freedom, who are oriented towards special interests.
In that regard, it is not tied either to traditional
organisational structures of higher education or to their
individual elements. The legislature is not only free to
develop and try out new models and control systems (see
BVerfGE 47, 327 <404>: "science management"); on the
contrary, it is even obliged to observe existing forms of
organisation critically and reform them in keeping with the
times (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <117>). In that connection,
specifically in regard to the suitability of new forms of
organisation, it has a prerogative of assessment and a margin
of prognosis (see BVerfGE 50, 290 <332-333>; 88, 203
<262>). 160 In particular, the legislature is free to
shape the nature and manner of the participation of the
holders of the fundamental right, so long as the structures
sufficiently ensure free teaching and research. It can, for
example, provide for direct or representative participation
in decisions, direct or indirect exertion of influence,
rights to decide, veto, be involved or be heard, rights of
supervision, to obtain information or of verification,
depending on what organisational structures appear to the
legislature to be suitable for an efficient administration of
academia. The participation of those engaged in academic
activity, required in order to safeguard the academic of
organisational decisions concerning universities, does not
have to take place along the lines of traditional
self-government in every case. Institutions outside of the
universities may also help, on the one hand, to limit state
control in a manner which safeguards academic freedom and, on
the other, to counter the risk of reinforcement of status quo
interests in the case of pure self-government. II. 161 The admissibly contested provisions satisfy
those constitutional criteria. 162 1. The strengthening of the powers of the
monocratic management bodies of the universities and
faculties does not lead to a structural threat to academic
freedom. No precedence for collegial bodies over monocratic
management bodies follows from Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the
Basic Law for the constitution of the self-government of
universities. Matters which are subject to the
self-government of the holders of the fundamental right must
not, in any case, be assigned for decision to either
collegial or monocratic management bodies (see BVerfGE 57, 70
<95>). A decision-making power for monocratic
management bodies is also permissible in academically
relevant matters, provided that their activity is limited in
terms of content and subject to organisational safeguards in
such a way that any structural threat to academic freedom is
precluded. That is the case here. 163 a) The coordinating competence of the
management bodies (§ 65.1 sentence 4 no. 3,
§ 73.2 sentence 3 BbgHG) is constitutionally
unobjectionable. It is not primarily directed towards the
unilateral taking of decisions, but is conducive to the
necessary coordination between the various subdivisions of
the university and within the faculty. 164 In so far as the management bodies, in
exercise of their coordinating power, take decisions because
a consensus among those concerned by the decision cannot be
established or cannot be established in time, they must
observe the parameters in § 4.1 and 4.2 BbgHG. It is
thereby ensured that the coordinating power may not be used
to impair freedom of teaching or research (see also
§ 4.4 BbgHG). No rights to issue instructions in
academically relevant matters, which go beyond the extent
determined by the necessity of collaboration with other
holders of the fundamental right (see BVerfGE 35, 79 <122,
128>; 51, 369 <379>; 57, 70 <94>), are
associated with the coordinating competence. The observance
of those limits is open to review by the non-constitutional
courts in individual cases. 165 Moreover, the collegial bodies have rights of
supervision and to obtain information vis-à-vis the
management bodies at university and faculty level
(§ 67.2, § 74.2 BbgHG), as well as the right to
vote them out of office (§ 65.4, § 73.1
sentence 4 BbgHG). In addition, at faculty level, an
express power for the faculty council to participate in
matters concerning the coordination of teaching and research
is provided (§ 74.1 no. 5 BbgHG). 166 b) Nor does any structural risk to academic
freedom follow from the subsidiary fall-back competence of
the faculty managements (§ 73.2 sentence 2 BbgHG).
The exercise of that competence is limited not only by
explicit other competences, in particular the competences of
the faculties, listed in § 74.1 BbgHG, but also by
§ 4.1 and 4.2 BbgHG. Those competences may not be used
to impair freedom of teaching and research. Safeguards also
result from the supervisory and verification rights of the
faculty councils under § 74.2 BbgHG and the ability to
vote the management out of office under § 73.1 sentence
4 and § 74.1 no. 6 BbgHG. 167 c) The conferment of teaching authority by the
university management and the award of teaching contracts by
the faculty management are also compatible with academic
freedom (§ 53.1 sentence 2, § 55.3
sentence 2 BbgHG). By virtue of their powers to obtain
information, exercise supervision and vote out of office, the
collegial bodies have sufficient possible ways in which to
prevent decisions which are inadequate from an academic point
of view. 168 2. The competence of the management bodies to
evaluate teaching and research and to take results into
account in the allocation of resources under § 65.1
sentence 4 no. 4 and 5 and under § 73.3
sentence 1 BbgHG is compatible with Article 5.3
sentence 1 of the Basic Law on an interpretation in
conformity with the constitution. 169 a) However, for science as a sphere of
autonomous responsibility, which must not be characterised by
mere notions of social utility and political expediency (see
BVerfGE 47, 327 <370>), that competence holds more than
merely insignificant risks. The pressure which may be caused
by its exercise to follow externally set evaluation criteria
could lead to developments in the wrong direction. The
criteria used for the evaluation must leave sufficient room
for specifically academic orientations. That requirement
applies irrespective of whether such criteria are set
externally or within the university; where they are set
externally, however, there exists an increased risk of
disregard for concerns which are appropriate from an academic
point of view, such as by use of the evaluation to achieve
non-academic purposes. Evaluation criteria assume increased
importance where the allocation of public funds is linked to
the evaluation results, because the members of the university
are reliant on public academic activity and its
resources. 170 However, no prohibition on the evaluation of
academic quality or on attaching to that evaluation
consequences in the allocation of resources can be inferred
from Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. Research
carried out and research projects have always been evaluated,
not only in tests and qualification procedures, but also in
appointment procedures and in the award of external funding.
Evaluation in the context of resource allocation within the
university is equally permissible. Any resource allocation,
including allocation by self-governing bodies which is not
linked to an evaluation, can be exposed to non-academic
influences. The legislature’s intention to control allocation
decisions as rationally as possible and also, in the
interests of making more effective use of resources, on a
performance-oriented basis is constitutionally
unobjectionable where there is evaluation of work carried out
and expected to be carried out in research which is
appropriate from an academic point of view. 171 b) In order to avoid any potential for control
which is academically inappropriate, appropriate
participation by representatives of the academic world in the
procedure for establishing the evaluation criteria is
indispensable for the purpose of ensuring that criteria are
appropriate from an academic point of view. In that
connection, regard must also be had to the fact that those
criteria can and, where necessary, must be different in the
various disciplines. In addition, cross-disciplinary
differences must be taken into account, such as in regard to
an abstract and theoretical piece of basic research with an
(uncertain) long-term return as against an application- and
demand-oriented academic activity with a short-term focus. An
evaluation based solely or very substantially on a single
criterion, such as external funding attracted, would not meet
that requirement. In so far as the attraction of external
funding serves as a criterion, this must not be external
funding acceptance of which creates incentives for contract-
and result-oriented research. 172 c) The evaluation criteria are not specified
in detail in the Brandenburg Higher Education Act. As regards
the evaluation of teaching, § 7.1 sentences 1 and 2
BbgHG does at least mention the objectives pursued by
evaluation. Apart from the general prohibition on impairments
of freedom of research under § 4.2 sentence 3
BbgHG, which must also be observed in this connection, the
criteria for the evaluation of research are not predetermined
in the Act. 173 In any event, at the present stage of
discussion, trial and only gradual development of proven
practices of academic evaluation at local, national and
international level, the legislature is constitutionally not
yet obliged to establish such criteria. Instead, within its
margin of assessment and prognosis, it can establish a model
in which the evolution of such criteria continues to be left
to an intra-university process. That process is framed by
provisions of the Brandenburg Higher Education Act, and in
the final analysis there is no structural risk to the
possibility of engaging freely in academic activity. However,
in that regard the legislature is under a duty to monitor
and, if necessary, remedy defects as soon as risks to
academic freedom arise, for example, through the use of
criteria which are academically inappropriate(see BVerfGE 95,
267 <314> with further references). 174 aa) The evaluation of teaching takes place by
a procedure satisfying the constitutional requirements of
Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. Thus, in § 7.2
BbgHG, the departments and centres of the faculty are
evaluated by the faculty management in collaboration with the
faculty council, and the faculty management regularly draws
up a teaching report. The involvement of the faculty council
in the evaluation in the faculty is established in
§ 74.1 no. 5 BbgHG. The students must also continue be
involved in teaching evaluation (§ 7.1 sentence 3
BbgHG). The university management in turn evaluates, in
collaboration with the senate and taking into account the
teaching reports, the faculties and regularly draws up a
combined teaching report (§ 7.3 BbgHG). The teaching and
combined teaching reports contribute towards the regular
evaluation by external experts; evaluation agencies, set up
on a cross-university basis, can support the universities in
the evaluation (§ 7.4 sentence 2, and § 7.5
BbgHG). 175 bb) The evaluation of research by the
university management (§ 65.1 sentence 4 no. 4 BbgHG)
and at faculty level (§ 74.1 no. 5 BbgHG) is
regulated in less detail in the Act. At faculty level, the
research evaluation takes place in collaboration with the
faculty council (§ 74.1 no. 5 BbgHG). The basis of
the evaluation of research at university level is formed, in
accordance with § 65.1 sentence 4 no. 4 BbgHG,
by the research reports which are drawn up at faculty level
by the faculty management (§ 73.3 sentence 2
BbgHG). It follows from § 74.1 no. 5 BbgHG that the
faculty council also has a participatory right in relation to
the research reports. The faculties are thus necessarily also
involved in regard to research evaluation at the level of the
university. 176 Account must, in addition, be taken of the
general powers of the senate and the faculty council to
exercise supervision and obtain information, powers which are
also effective in the context of the evaluation by the
management bodies, and of their ability to vote the
university and faculty managements out of office. Moreover,
it is not the university management but the senate which is
responsible under § 67.1 no. 2 BbgHG for establishing
the evaluation criteria. On an interpretation in conformity
with the constitution, because of the considerable importance
of those criteria for academic freedom, their establishment
is a fundamental question within the meaning of that
provision. 177 The necessary incorporation of academic
expertise is ensured through the participation of the senate.
There is therefore no structural risk of academically
inappropriate decisions by reason of the competence
arrangements for the evaluation of research. The legislature
is at present not obliged, by virtue of its margin of
assessment and prognosis, to formalise that involvement any
further. It is however required to monitor and, if necessary,
remedy defects in the arrangements for the organisation of
evaluation which are chosen within that margin. 178 d) The allocation of competences with regard
to the evaluation-oriented allocation of resources likewise
does not meet with any far-reaching constitutional
objections. 179 aa) The exercise of the competences by the
management bodies is limited by the structural and
development planning of the faculties, which has to be
adopted by the faculty council (§ 74.1 no. 2 BbgHG), by
the university development plan to be adopted by the senate
(§ 67.1 no. 3 BbgHG) and by the evaluation results,
taking into account the teaching and research reports. The
senate is also involved through its right to express its
views on the draft budget (§ 67.2 sentence 2 no. 2
BbgHG). In addition to the above, there are also the powers
of the collegial bodies to obtain information and exercise
supervision and verification in this connection. 180 bb) A further limitation results from the
guarantee of freedom of research in § 4.2 BbgHG. In
particular, in the case of basic research which is not
directly “marketable” and which it is hardly reasonable to
evaluate in the short term, areas protected by a basic
provision of funds must remain. When the available funds are
allocated, the human and physical resources which make it
possible for scientific research and teaching to be conducted
at all in the first place must in any case be assigned (see
BVerfGE 43, 242 <285>; 54, 363 <390>; Federal
Constitutional Court, First Chamber of the First Senate,
order of 15 September 1997 – 1 BvR 406/96 and
1 BvR 1214/97 –, NVwZ-RR (Neue
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, Rechtsprechungs-Report )
1998, p. 175). 181 It is true that, in contrast to other
Land acts (see, for example, § 28.2
sentence 2 phrase 2 of the Act on the Universities
in the Land Baden-Württemberg (Gesetz über die Universitäten im Lande
Baden-Württemberg ), in the version promulgated on
1 February 2000 <Law Gazette
(GBl) p. 208>), the Brandenburg Higher Education
Act contains no express provisions on the guarantee of a
reasonable share in the available physical and human
resources. However, Article 5.3. sentence 1 of the Basic Law
and also the ordinary-law guarantee of freedom of research in
§ 4.2 BbgHG require that the possibility of academic
work for any holder of the fundamental right continues to
exist even where resources are allocated on the basis of
evaluation results. 182 3. The provisions on appointment to the
university management office are likewise compatible with
Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic Law. 183 Since the university management has to fulfil
not only self-government functions but also, to an increasing
extent, state functions (see § 2.2 BbgHG), its
appointment is the joint responsibility of the state and the
university. The responsibility of the state is safeguarded,
in particular, by the appointment by the minister of the
candidate chosen by the senate (see § 65.2 sentence 1
BbgHG). By virtue of the decisions to be taken by the
university management, the appointment is in any event
indirectly academically relevant, and therefore a sufficient
influence must be preserved for the holders of academic
freedom. However, the state is not obliged by Article 5.3
sentence 1 of the Basic Law to restrict the influence exerted
from outside the university on the act of appointment of a
person selected by the university. 184 a) The right of proposal of the Land University council for the election of the
university management (§ 63.2 no. 4 BbgHG) does not
infringe Article 5.3 sentence 1 of the Basic
Law. 185 The organisation of a sphere of freedom
protected by fundamental rights by means of the involvement
of independent bodies, in order to keep the organisation of
the sphere of freedom free from state control, certainly, but
under public control, is constitutionally unobjectionable.
Specifically in the sphere of academic freedom, the
curtailment of the traditionally hierarchically oriented
instruments of control may be conducive to the fundamental
right. Within its wide margin when shaping an organisation of
university activity which safeguards decisions that are
academically appropriate, the legislature, which enjoys
democratic legitimacy, can therefore, in the course of
framing the university, pursuant to Article 5.3 of the Basic
Law, also choose forms of organisation which are free from
ministerial control and more strongly protective of the
independence of academia from the state. The provisions of
the Brandenburg Higher Education Act on the Land university council keep within that
framework. 186 The legislature has adequately regulated the
composition, appointment and tasks of the Land university council. The latter is appointed by
the Minister-President on the proposal of the relevant
minister after hearing the views of the universities and in
consultation with the relevant committee of the Landtag (§ 63.5 sentence 1 BbgHG). Its tasks
(§ 63.2 BbgHG) are mainly of an advisory and
recommendatory nature. 187 The right of proposal for the election of the
university management does admittedly go beyond that.
However, that right is constitutionally and substantively
integrated into the appointment to the university management
office in which the state and the university act in
collaboration. The Land university council
exercises the right of proposal in consultation with the
senate (§ 63.2 no. 4 BbgHG). In substance, it is bound
in its proposal by Article 33.2 of the Basic Law and by
§ 65.3 sentence 1 BbgHG. Moreover, § 63.2 no. 4 and
§ 65.2 BbgHG are premised on a proposal which includes
more than one candidate. 188 Furthermore, the universities retain a
significant influence in the election and the responsible
minister retains the final decision-making power. The senate,
as a collegial body, on which the majority of places are
filled by university lecturers, elects the university
management in accordance with § 65.2 and § 67.1 no.
4 BbgHG and has available to it, under 65.4 BbgHG, the power
to vote it out of office again. If the senate does not
consider a person proposed by the Land university council to be suitable to manage the university in
such a way that free academic activity is safely possible
there, it is free not to elect him or her. If it elects a
proposed person, he or she is also, in its assessment,
suitable for the office. Should something change in that
regard in the view of the senate, a vote to remove him or her
from office is possible. Removal from office by a two-thirds
majority vote is envisaged by the legislature as a last
resort for the resolution of conflicts between the senate and
the university management (see the Land Government bill, Landtag printed paper
(LTDrucks) 2/5977, explanatory memorandum, p. 23). An
escalation which can no longer be overcome by less drastic
conflict resolution mechanisms can generally be discounted.
The requirement of a two-thirds majority takes reasonable
account of the exceptional character of the situation and is
therefore not over-restrictive in its formulation. 189 b) Nor does any structural threat to academic
freedom result from the fact that a blockade situation
between the Land university council and the
senate could arise in the event of a conflict with regard to
the appointment of the management body. It is true that
academic freedom requires that the efficiency of the
university’s operation be safeguarded (see BVerfGE 35, 79
<124>). However, a possibility of blockade which is
conceivable only in the abstract does not threaten the
efficiency of the university’s operation. The margin of
assessment and prognosis enjoyed by the legislature in the
organisation of universities allows it to choose an
organisational structure designed for reciprocal cooperation.
The pressure for consensus which therefore exists among the
parties involved is constitutionally unobjectionable in the
absence of indications that a threat of structural blockades
could arise. 190 4. Finally, the right of proposal of the
university management for the election of the faculty
managements (§ 73.1 sentence 1 BbgHG) is also compatible
with academic freedom. No right for the faculties to appoint
the faculty management exclusively themselves results from
academic freedom. The faculties are not only basic units of
teaching and research, but also part of the university, to
which the faculty managements are likewise responsible. 191 In view of the role of the faculty council as
a collegial body, no structural threat to academic freedom
exists by reason of the right of proposal of the university
management. The faculty management is elected by the faculty
council as a collegial body on which the majority of places
are filled by university lecturers, in which process, in
council, a majority of the university lecturers are required
for a successful election (§ 73.1 sentences 1 and 2
BbgHG). Moreover, the faculty council has available to it a
right of supervision and a comprehensive right to information
(§ 74.2 BbgHG) as well as the ability to vote the
faculty management out of office (§ 73.1 sentence 4,
§ 74.1 no. 6 BbgHG). Furthermore, the right of proposal
for election is limited to those university lecturers who are
members of the faculty (§ 73.1 sentence 1
BbgHG). Papier Judge Jaeger has left office and is therefore unable to sign. Papier Haas Hömig Steiner Hohmann-Dennhardt Hoffmann-Riem Bryde Languages availableDeutsch
ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2004:rs20041026.1bvr091100Suggested Citation:GFCC, Order of the First Senate of 26 October 2004 - 1 BvR 911/00 - paras. (1-191),http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041026_1bvr091100en.htmlSee also Press ReleaseNo. 104/2004 of 26 November 2004Please note that only the German versions are authoritative.
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