Source: http://blog.aklandlaw.com/2014/04/articles/ceqa/appellate-court-shuts-out-trial-court-in-ceqaesa-double-header-under-deferential-standard-of-review/
Timestamp: 2017-10-20 23:34:06
Document Index: 284160285

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 2', '§ 2052', '§ 2058', '§ 2061', '§ 2061', '§ 2080', '§ 86', '§ 1532', '§ 2061', '§ 2061', '§ 2053', '§ 21091', '§ 15088', '§ 2081', '§ 2081']

Appellate Court Shuts Out Trial Court in CEQA/ESA Double Header under Deferential Standard of Review | Land Use Law Blog
Home » Appellate Court Shuts Out Trial Court in CEQA/ESA Double Header under Deferential Standard of Review
By Abbott & Kindermann on April 3, 2014
In a lengthy and unanimous reversal of the trial court on ESA and CEQA issues in Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish and Game, et al. (March 20, 2014, BS131347) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, the second appellate district, Division Five, roundly upheld the Department of Fish and Wildlife’s (“department”) certification of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) assessing the effects of a resource management plan, conservation plan, streambed alteration agreement and two incidental take permits, in tandem with approval of each plan and issuance of the associated incidental take permits. The EIR related to general planning and conservation steps resulting from Los Angeles County’s prior approval of a 12,000 acre specific plan and neighboring 1500 acre conservation area in Ventura County. In its textured opinion, the appellate court relied heavily on facts in the trial court record to perforate all arguments raised by the Plaintiffs and Respondents Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Santa Clara River, Santa Clarita Organization for Planning and the Environment, California Native Plant Society, and Wishtoyo Foundation/Ventura Coastkeeper.
One novel issue raised in the case involved a challenge to a mitigation measure that recommended the herding and transportation of a fully protected species, the stickleback fish, and a claim that such mitigation constituted a prohibited take of the species under the California Endangered Species Act (“CESA”). The appellate court deftly resolved potentially conflicting language in a trio of CESA code sections to conclude that conservation mitigation measures which including herding and transporting live species, did not constitute a take of the species.
This summary addresses key issues in the published portion of the decision in the order as presented in the opinion:
D. CESA and Stickleback Take Issues
E. Cultural Resources Analyses
G. EIR’s Steelhead Smolt and Water Quality Analysis Deemed Adequate
H. Spineflower Mitigation and Incidental Take Based on Substantial Evidence
The trial court ruled that the department abused its discretion in six aspects: First, the EIR failed to adequately discuss the impact of dissolved copper discharged from the project area on steelhead smolt. Second, the department’s analysis of the spineflower mitigation measures was legally impermissible because there was no substantial evidence that the mitigation matters were adequate. Third, the EIR’s section of a baseline for assessing the cumulative impacts of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions was inappropriate. Fourth, the trial court ruled that the EIR’s assessment of the project’s impact on Native-American cultural resources was not supported by substantial evidence. Fifth, the department failed to prevent the taking of the stickleback. Sixth, the trial court ruled the department unduly relied upon the specific plan and failed to conduct an independent review of project impacts. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions and a judgment was entered in plaintiffs’ favor.
The ESA inquiries were: 1) did the proposed mitigation constitute a taking because it involved herding and transporting a fully protected species? 2) is the mortality of a fully protected species required in order for a take to have occurred? and 3), can conflicting ambiguous language in the ESA be reconciled to allow trapping and transportation of fully protected species if performed for conservation purposes? The appellate court answered the first two questions in the negative and the final question in the affirmative.
Mandatory mitigation requirements were designed to insure that no stickleback take would occur. The mitigation measures were attached to the department’s factual findings of fact and were discussed in the EIR. The opinion described this numbered mitigation in great detail. For example, BIO-43 set forth requirements for preconstruction surveys by qualified biologists. Construction within aquatic habitats would only occur when it was determined that juvenile fish were not present. BIO-44 required the developer to prepare a “Stream Crossing and Diversion Plan” to protect stickleback during construction. BIO-44 further required that if stickleback were present and spawning has not occurred, they were to be relocated prior to streambed diversion or any crossing of the stream by herding. A [federal wildlife service] staff member or his or her agents “shall” relocate the fish to suitable habitat outside the [project] area (including those areas potentially subject to high turbidity). BIO-44, as in the case of other mitigation measures, was subject to specified monitoring requirements. BIO-45, identified standards for stream diversion bypass channels. No construction of diversion channels is to commence if surveys indicate that: gravid fish are present; spawning has recently occurred; or juvenile fish are present in the construction areas. “During any stream diversion or culvert installation activity, a qualified biologist(s) shall be present and shall patrol the areas within, upstream and downstream of the work area. The biologists shall inspect the diversion and inspect for stranded fish or other aquatic organisms. Under no circumstances shall the . . . stickleback be collected or relocated, unless [federal wildlife service] personnel or their agents implement this measure. Any event involving stranded fish shall be recorded and reported to [the department] and [the federal wildlife service] within 24 hours.”
The department and the USACE jointly concluded that the implementation of the mitigation measures would avoid take of the stickleback. The department’s conclusion that no take of the stickleback would occur was based upon multiple scientific studies. One of the leading authorities in the field of stickleback protection prepared a technical discussion of issues, including relocation of the stickleback. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that the very mitigation methods were an illegal taking under Fish and Game Code Section 86.
The appellate court reflected on the legislative history and plain meaning of the statutes in the CESA. First, the endangered species act was originally adopted in 1982. (Stats. 1984, ch. 1240, § 2, pp. 4243-4249.) When originally adopted, the endangered species act did not permit the department to authorize a take of a protected animal. Fish and Game Code section 2081 was adopted in 1997. (Stats.1997, ch. 567, § 2, pp. 3440-3441.) Fish and Game Code section 2081, subdivision (b) now permits the department to issue incidental take permits under specified circumstances. Such permits may be issued if the take is incidental to otherwise lawful activity.
Second, the term take is defined in Fish and Game Code section 86, ‘“Take’ means hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill.” (See Rep. prepared for Sen. Com. on Natural Resources on Assem. Bill No. 3309 (1983-1984, Reg. Sess.) as amended Jun. 26, 1984, p. 4 [“For the purpose of these provisions, ‘take’ would be defined as the usual acts to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill and would additionally embrace acts to harass, harm, shoot, wound, destroy, trap, or collect, which would conform to federal law.”].)
Third, ESA provisions however, allow alive trapping and transplantation carried out for purposes of conservation. The court recognized that the endangered species act reflects state policy to conserve and protect endangered species. (Fish & Game, Code § 2052.) State agencies are obligated to seek to conserve endangered species and further the purposes of the endangered species act. (Fish & Game, Code § 2058.) Conserving a species has as its goal the use of methods and procedures which are necessary to make a species no longer in need of the protections of the endangered species act. (Fish & G. Code, § 2061.) Among the legislatively approved conservation methods is the use of live trapping and transplantation. (Fish & G. Code, § 2061.)
Fourth, the endangered species act prohibits the taking of endangered species. Fish and Game Code section 2080 states in part, “No person shall . . . take . . . any species . . . that the commission determines to be an endangered species . . . , or attempt any of those acts, except as provided in this chapter . . . .” Nevertheless, the chapter allows live trapping and transportation to conserve species under section 2061. Therefore, the court was able to conclude that an approved conservation action to herd and transplant the stickleback is exempt and not a take of species.
ESA and CEQA are Conjoined and The Mitigation Measure Did Not Result in a Take
The appellate court summarized legislative history of the 1984 revisions to the ESA honing in on one important purpose of the new statutory language: to provide more careful deliberation during CEQA review, including the provision of greater protections for species through consultation and mitigation. The role of mitigation requirements imposed by the department is specifically discussed in Fish and Game Code section 2052.1.
The court concluded, “Thus, the endangered species act is tethered to the California Environmental Quality Act. We construe them together. (Baker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 434, 446; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387.)”
Consequently, the ESA and CEQA are intended to work in tandem to identify impacts and employ mitigation protective of species. A legislatively sanctioned means of conservation is trapping and transplantation. Therefore, a well-crafted mitigation measure directing such conservation strategy is within the paradigm of both statutory schemes to protect and conserve species. The ESA specifies requirements for mitigation measures and in this case the department imposed extensive requirements on the developer. Because the court found that no take would occur, analysis of whether the EIR could have been lawfully certified without the incidental take permit was unnecessary.
CEQA Exhaustion Exemption Re Stickleback Take
No plaintiff sufficiently directly raised any issue concerning whether a take was expected to occur which violated the endangered species act. However, the take issue was raised in a comment letter. An exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule in the EIR preparation context arises when the issue is presented to the lead agency by a non-litigant. Here the take issue was raised by a Dr. Baskin, a non-litigant, during the comment period. Thus, the appellate court held it could now be asserted by plaintiffs (Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilroy (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 911, 920; Galante Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1118-1121) and therefore was not forfeited.
Mortality is Not a Prerequisite to a Taking
One of the defendant’s arguments was that a take can only occur if an endangered species is killed. The court disagreed based on case law and statutory support. In Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at page 507, our Supreme Court explained: “Central to [endangered species act] is its prohibition on the taking of an endangered or threatened species. (Fish & G. Code, § 2080.) To ‘take’ in this context means to catch, capture or kill. (Fish & G. Code, § 86.)” (See Watershed Enforcers v. Department of Water Resources, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.) The court disagreed with the argument that a take must always involve mortality on the part of an endangered species, citing Fish and Game Code section 86, which uses the disjunctive, to describe a take; to “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill” not merely mortality. Moreover, Fish and Game Code section 86 includes an attempt to “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill” not merely completing any of the proscribed conduct. Thus, the court rejected the department’s position that a take can only occur when there is mortality.
The court also viewed the issue through the federal courts’ discussions of a take under the federal Endangered Species Act. “16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) defines ‘take’ as any action that, inter alia, ‘harms’ wildlife. While Congress did not define ‘harm,’ it explicitly intended the term ‘take’ to be construed broadly: ‘Take’ is to be ‘defined in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can “take” or attempt to “take” any fish or wildlife.” S.Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995. [¶] It is clearly conceivable that one can inflict great harm on a protected species by creating an imminent threat of harm to that species and no mortality has occurred. In concluding, the court held that nothing in the judicial interpretation of the federal Endangered Species Act imposes the strict mortality requirement asserted by the department and the developer in the present case.
Mortality Will Not Result From the Proposed Mitigation Strategy
Acknowledging that mortality of a stickleback would be a taking and concluding that this was a “very close question” the court found that there was substantial evidence no death would occur given the extraordinary measures taken by the department to ensure the sticklebacks’ safety. The extensive mitigation measures coupled with expert’s findings, constituted substantial evidence that no deaths would result.
Ambiguity in Statutory Language Still Weighs in Favor of the Department’s Mitigation
The court considered subtle ambiguities arising in Fish and Game Code Sections 86 (definition of “take”); 5515 (prohibiting take or possession of fully protected species); and 2061 (live trapping and transportation techniques approved for conservation purposes). When the pertinent provisions of the Fish and Game and Public Resources Codes are construed together however, the appellate court concluded that no unlawful take would occur. This is largely an issue of statutory interpretation and construing all provisions of a statutes as a whole: “The statutory language is not read in isolation, however. Rather, we consider its terms ‘in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia (2013) 58 Cal.4th 175, 186.)
Fish and Game Code section 2052 expressly states it is this state’s policy to conserve endangered species, which includes “the use of, all methods or procedures” necessary to bring any endangered species to the point that it no longer needs protection. (Fish & G. Code, § 2061.) Among the methods and procedures which may be used to conserve a species are “live trapping” and “transplantation.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2061.) Further, “reasonable and prudent alternatives” shall be developed by the department and the project proponent which are consistent with conserving an endangered species. (Fish & G. Code, § 2053.) Fish and Game Code section 2055 expressly requires state agencies to “conserve endangered species” and utilize their authority to further the purposes of the endangered species act. Thus, because 2061 expressly permits the use of live trapping and transplantation if done for purposes of conservation and CESA intends for CEQA to take advantage of these options in mitigation measures, sections 86, 5515 and 2061 can thus be harmonized and the mitigation strategy is permissible.
The appellate court agreed that all Native American issues were forfeited and not preserved for presentation in the mandate petition. Section 21117, subdivision (a) states, “An action or proceeding shall not be brought pursuant to Section 21167 unless the alleged grounds for noncompliance with this division were presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination.” The exact issue raised in a mandate petition must have been presented to the lead agency during the comment period. (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 614, 623; Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 535-536.) In order for the comments to preserve the right to utilize an EIR, they must be raised during the comment period. The lead agency, although it has the discretion to do so, is not obligated to respond to untimely comments. (§ 21091, subd. (d)(1); Guidelines, § 15088, subd. (a); Gray v. County of Madera (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1110.) Court of Appeal authority holds a failure to exhaust administrative remedies contention is reviewed de novo. (Sierra Club v. City of Orange, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 535; Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 865, 873.)
G. The EIR’s Steelhead Smolt and Water Quality Analysis not Deficient
H. Spineflower Incidental Take and Mitigation- Supported by Substantial Evidence
Substantial Evidence That Take Was Incidental to An Otherwise Lawful Activity
In addition, the foregoing constituted substantial evidence that the take was incidental to an otherwise lawful activity; the impacts of the spineflower take have been minimized and fully mitigated; the spineflower mitigation requirements are capable of successful implementation; the incidental take permit is consistent with the provisions of California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 783.0 et seq.; and there is adequate funding to support the spineflower mitigation measures. (Fish & G. Code, § 2081, subd. (b)(1)-4).) In addition, the court was clear that there was substantial evidence that the incidental take permit would not jeopardize the spineflower’s continued existence; the department used the best scientific and other information reasonably available to determine that the spineflower’s continued existence would not be jeopardized; and the department utilized such information to evaluate the adverse impacts of the taking on the spineflower species ability to survive in light of population trends, other threats and further reasonably foreseeable impacts. (Fish & G. Code, § 2081, subd. (c).)
Other Allegations Regarding Spineflower
The Petition and Ruling Based on the Abuse of Discretion Standard
Insofar as plaintiffs contend the incidental take permit should not have been issued (as distinguished from an attack on the EIR), the court was clarion that such a challenge was without merit. The applicable standard of review of an agency regulatory decision such as issuance of an incidental take permit is one of abuse of discretion. ‘“Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” [Citations.]’ (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry[, supra,] 7 Cal.4th [at p.] 1236.)” (Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry And Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 478-479.) The court briefly concluded that all of the foregoing analysis as it relates to the EIR applied equally to the issuance of the incidental take permit. In sum, no abuse of discretion occurred as to issuance of the incidental take permit.