Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/240/642/564748/
Timestamp: 2019-01-21 09:29:28
Document Index: 791436598

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1252', '§ 1227', '§ 1251', '§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1251', '§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1227', '§ 1227']

Juozas Naujalis, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service and John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Respondents, 240 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001) :: Justia
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Juozas Naujalis, Petitioner, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service and John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Respondents, 240 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 240 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001)
Argued September 28, 2000Decided February 15, 2001
In October 1995, the United States filed an Order to Show Cause (Order) with the Immigration Court, charging that Naujalis was deportable, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (D) (the Holtzman Amendment),3 for assisting Nazi- directed persecution through his membership and service in the 2nd Battalion. The Order also charged that Naujalis was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A)4 for being inadmissible when he entered the United States because his service in the 2nd Battalion constituted voluntary assistance to the enemy (rendering him ineligible for a visa under Section 2 of the DPA), and membership or participation in a movement hostile to the United States (rendering him ineligible for a visa under Section 13 of the DPA).5 The Immigration Court held a merits hearing in April 1997, found that Naujalis was deportable under 8 U.S.C. §sec. 1227(a) (4) (D) and 1227(a) (1) (A), and ordered him deported to Lithuania.
Naujalis appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), arguing that he was not deportable under the Holtzman Amendment because he spent the month of October 1941 (and that entire winter) guarding a Minsk railway station, and thus never personally participated in any of the 2nd Battalion's atrocities. He also contended that he was not deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A) for providing voluntary assistance to the enemy (pursuant to Section 2 of the DPA) because his service in the 2nd Battalion was no longer voluntary when the Germans transported the 2nd Battalion at gunpoint from Lithuania to Minsk. Naujalis also challenged the Immigration Court's conclusion that he was ineligible for a visa under Section 13 of the DPA because, according to Naujalis, the 2nd Battalion was formed as a Lithuanian police force and not as a movement hostile to the United States.
The Board dismissed Naujalis's appeal, concluding that he was deportable under the Holtzman Amendment pursuant to United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998), in which this court held that Ciurinskas's membership and service in the same 2nd Lithuanian Battalion (without proof that he personally participated in atrocities) was sufficient to establish his assistance in persecution under Section 2(b) of the DPA.6 Id. at 734. The Board also noted that a finding of assistance in persecution is legally identical under the DPA and the Holtzman Amendment.7 See Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1986). And the Board concurred with the Immigration Court's conclusion that Naujalis was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A) because his membership and service in the 2nd Battalion constituted voluntary assistance to the enemy (according to Section 2 of the DPA), and membership in a movement hostile to the United States (according to Section 13 of the DPA). Naujalis, who is now 81 years old, appeals to this court.
The government has the burden of proof in deportation proceedings, and must establish the facts supporting deportability with clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that does not leave the issue in doubt. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). We review the Board's legal conclusions de novo, Sayaxing v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d 515, 519 (7th Cir. 1999), but we defer to the Board's factual findings, reversing them only if they lack the support of substantial evidence in the record. Malek v. I.N.S., 198 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Board's determination that a petitioner is deportable is conclusive unless evidence in the record would compel a reasonable adjudicator to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (B); I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).
Congress enacted the Holtzman Amendment in 1978 to ensure "that the United States is not a haven for individuals who assisted the Nazis in the brutal persecution and murder of millions of people." Schellong, 805 F.2d at 662. The Amendment provides for the deportation of aliens who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated" in Nazi-directed persecution of individuals because of their race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. United States v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 334 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000); 8 U.S.C. §sec. 1182(a) (3) (E) and 1227(a) (4) (D).
In support of the Board's conclusion that Naujalis's membership and service in the 2nd Battalion constituted assistance in persecution under the Holtzman Amendment, the Board cited the Fedorenko case for the principle that an individual's military service may qualify as assistance in persecution under the DPA without proof of the individual's personal involvement in atrocities. The Board then discussed the Ciurinskas case in which the defendant served in the same 2nd Lithuanian Battalion as Naujalis. According to the Board, this court in Ciurinskas concluded that "even if Ciurinskas had not personally participated in the killing actions in Byelorussia, his service in the persecutory unit, like that of a concentration camp guard, was sufficient to constitute assistance in persecution under the DPA." The Board also quoted Ciurinskas where this court stated that "We see little difference between being a concentration camp guard as Fedorenko was and being a member of a force dedicated to the extermination of large numbers of civilians as was Ciurinskas." Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d. at 734. The Board then concluded that "in light of the court's holding in [Ciurinskas], by which we are bound, we find that [Naujalis's] undisputed service in the [2nd Battalion], in and of itself, establishes his deportability under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (D)]." Naujalis contends that his case is different from the Ciurinskas case because unlike Ciurinskas (who falsely claimed that he was never stationed with the 2nd Battalion in Minsk), Naujalis admitted that he was in Minsk and distinguished his duties from the majority of 2nd Battalion members who participated in killing missions. In support of his contention, Naujalis claims that it is "inconceivable" that the Germans would have abandoned the "vital" railway station in Minsk while the 2nd Battalion and the German 11th Battalion were deployed on killing missions, and thus the Germans entrusted experienced soldiers like himself (not mere privates) to guard the station to ensure that munitions, tanks and artillery arrived at the Eastern Front. To further corroborate his claim, Naujalis identifies statements in the record made by other former 2nd Battalion members who affirmed that all of the soldiers participated in the killing operations unless they were guarding other facilities.
This is the current provision. The Order actually charged that Naujalis was deportable under Section 241(a) (4) (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (D). These provisions are now codified as INA Section 237(a) (4) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (D). For simplicity, we will refer only to the current provision: 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (D).
This is the current provision. The Order actually charged that Naujalis was also deportable under INA Section 241(a) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (A). These provisions are now codified as INA Section 237(a) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A). For simplicity, we will refer only to the current provision: 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A).
We note that although Naujalis never informed the DPC of his service in the 2nd Battalion, the United States chose not to charge him as ineligible for a visa pursuant to Section 10 of the DPA (and thus deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A)) for willfully making a misrepresentation to gain entry into the United States. See United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 1998).
Naujalis also raises several claims on appeal that he never received a "full and fair" hearing, but because his own admissions and assertions sufficiently establish that he assisted persecution and is deportable, we decline to address this issue. And because we conclude that Naujalis is deportable under the Holtzman Amendment, we reserve opinion on the Board's additional findings that he is deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1) (A).