Source: https://openjurist.org/524/us/417/clinton-v-city-of-new-york
Timestamp: 2018-03-24 23:47:58
Document Index: 517150329

Matched Legal Cases: ['§1396', '§968', '§1042', '§1042', '§692', '§4722', '§968', '§968', '§968', '§968', '§968', '§968', '§691', '§691', '§691', '§691', '§691', '§3', '§7', '§691', '§4722', '§691', '§7', '§4', '§2', '§7', '§7', '§7', '§692', '§1', '§691', '§1396', '§691', '§1042', '§1701', '§968', '§2807', '§2807', '§2807', '§2807', '§1', '§692', '§691', '§1555', '§3', '§7', '§691', '§252', '§902', '§691', '§900', '§252', '§902', '§691', '§968', '§2', '§2072', '§7', '§2072', '§2072']

524 US 417 Clinton v. City of New York | OpenJurist
524 U.S. 417 - Clinton v. City of New York
524 US 417 Clinton v. City of New York
William J. CLINTON, President of the United States, et al., Appellants,
Argued April 27, 1998.
* We begin by reviewing the canceled items that are at issue in these cases.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, authorizes the Federal Government to transfer huge sums of money to the States to help finance medical care for the indigent. See 42 U.S.C. §1396d(b). In 1991, Congress directed that those federal subsidies be reduced by the amount of certain taxes levied by the States on health care providers.1 In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) notified the State of New York that 15 of its taxes were covered by the 1991 Act, and that as of June 30, 1994, the statute therefore required New York to return $955 million to the United States. The notice advised the State that it could apply for a waiver on certain statutory grounds. New York did request a waiver for those tax programs, as well as for a number of others, but HHS has not formally acted on any of those waiver requests. New York has estimated that the amount at issue for the period from October 1992 through March 1997 is as high as $2.6 billion.
In §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended §1042 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer the recognition of gain if they sell their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives.4 The purpose of the amendment, as repeatedly explained by its sponsors, was "to facilitate the transfer of refiners and processors to farmers' cooperatives.''5 The amendment to §1042 was one of the 79 "limited tax benefits'' authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and specifically identified in Title XVII of that Act as "subject to [the] line item veto.''6
On the merits, the District Court held that the cancellations did not conform to the constitutionally mandated procedures for the enactment or repeal of laws in two respects. First, the laws that resulted after the cancellations "were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress.'' Id., at 178.11 Moreover, the President violated Article I "when he unilaterally canceled provisions of duly enacted statutes.'' Id., at 179.12 As a separate basis for its decision, the District Court also held that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government.'' Ibid.
The special section authorizing expedited review evidences an unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of the Act. Subsection (a)(2) requires that copies of any complaint filed under subsection (a)(1) "shall be promptly delivered'' to both Houses of Congress, and that each House shall have a right to intervene. Subsection (b) authorizes a direct appeal to this Court from any order of the District Court, and requires that the appeal be filed within 10 days. Subsection (c) imposes a duty on both the District Court and this Court "to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a).'' There is no plausible reason why Congress would have intended to provide for such special treatment of actions filed by natural persons and to have precluded entirely jurisdiction over comparable cases brought by corporate persons. Acceptance of the Government's new-found reading of §692 "would produce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended.'' Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3251-3252, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982).14
We are also unpersuaded by the Government's argument that appellees' challenge to the constitutionality of the Act is nonjusticiable. We agree, of course, that Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual "Cases'' and "Controversies,'' and that "the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.'' Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990).15 Our disposition of the first challenge to the constitutionality of this Act demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respecting the constitutional limits on our jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views as promptly as possible. But these cases differ from Raines, not only because the President's exercise of his cancellation authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the dispute, but more importantly because the parties have alleged a "personal stake'' in having an actual injury redressed rather than an "institutional injury'' that is "abstract and widely dispersed.'' 521 U.S., at ----, 117 S.Ct., at 2322.
In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Government argues that the appellees are not actually injured because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the claims are advanced by the wrong parties. We find no merit in the suggestion that New York's injury is merely speculative because HHS has not yet acted on the State's waiver requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by §4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly concluded that the State, and the appellees, "suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that law.'' 985 F.Supp., at 174. The self-evident significance of the contingent liability is confirmed by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory attention, and that the President selected for cancellation only this one provision in an act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes-at-Large. His action was comparable to the judgment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion dollar damages claim. Even if the outcome of the second trial is speculative, the reversal, like the President's cancellation, causes a significant immediate injury by depriving the defendant of the benefit of a favorable final judgment. The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.16
We also reject the Government's argument that New York's claim is advanced by the wrong parties because the claim belongs to the State of New York, and not appellees. Under New York statutes that are already in place, it is clear that both the City of New York17 and the appellee health care providers18 will be assessed by the State for substantial portions of any recoupment payments that the State may have to make to the Federal Government. To the extent of such assessments, they have the same potential liability as the State does.19
The Snake River farmers' cooperative also suffered an immediate injury when the President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants. Three critical facts identify the specificity and the importance of that injury. First, Congress enacted §968 for the specific purpose of providing a benefit to a defined category of potential purchasers of a defined category of assets.20 The members of that statutorily defined class received the equivalent of a statutory "bargaining chip'' to use in carrying out the congressional plan to facilitate their purchase of such assets. Second, the President selected §968 as one of only two tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 that should be canceled. The cancellation rested on his determination that the use of those bargaining chips would have a significant impact on the Federal budget deficit. Third, the Snake River cooperative was organized for the very purpose of acquiring processing facilities, it had concrete plans to utilize the benefits of §968, and it was engaged in ongoing negotiations with the owner of a processing plant who had expressed an interest in structuring a tax-deferred sale when the President canceled §968. Moreover, it is actively searching for other processing facilities for possible future purchase if the President's cancellation is reversed; and there are ample processing facilities in the State that Snake River may be able to purchase.21 By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 1093-1094, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971); 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 13-14 (3d ed. 1994) ("The Court routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy the [Article III "injury-in-fact' requirement] . . . . It follows logically that any . . . petitioner who is likely to suffer economic injury as a result of [governmental action] that changes market conditions satisfies this part of the standing test'').
Appellees' injury in this regard is at least as concrete as the injury suffered by the respondents in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 100 S.Ct. 2232, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980). In that case, we considered whether a rule that generally limited water deliveries from reclamation projects to 160 acres applied to the much larger tracts of the Imperial Irrigation District in southeastern California; application of that limitation would have given large landowners an incentive to sell excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price for irrigated land. The District Court had held that the 160-acre limitation did not apply, and farmers who had hoped to purchase the excess land sought to appeal. We acknowledged that the farmers had not presented "detailed information about [their] financial resources,'' and noted that "the prospect of windfall profits could attract a large number of potential purchasers'' besides the farmers. Id., at 367, n. 17, 100 S.Ct., at 2241, n. 17. Nonetheless, "even though they could not with certainty establish that they would be able to purchase excess lands'' if the judgment were reversed, id., at 367, 100 S.Ct., at 2241, we found standing because it was "likely that excess lands would become available at less than market prices,'' id., at 368, 100 S.Ct., at 2241. The Snake River appellees have alleged an injury that is as specific and immediate as that in Yellen. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-78, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629-2633, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).22
As with the New York case, the Government argues that the wrong parties are before the Court-that because the sellers of the processing facilities would have received the tax benefits, only they have standing to challenge the cancellation of §968. This argument not only ignores the fact that the cooperatives were the intended beneficiaries of §968, but also overlooks the self-evident proposition that more than one party may have standing to challenge a particular action or inaction.23 Once it is determined that a particular plaintiff is harmed by the defendant, and that the harm will likely be redressed by a favorable decision, that plaintiff has standing-regardless of whether there are others who would also have standing to sue. Thus, we are satisfied that both of these actions are Article III "Cases'' that we have a duty to decide.
A cancellation takes effect upon receipt by Congress of the special message from the President. See §691b(a). If, however, a "disapproval bill'' pertaining to a special message is enacted into law, the cancellations set forth in that message become "null and void.'' Ibid. The Act sets forth a detailed expedited procedure for the consideration of a "disapproval bill,'' see §691d, but no such bill was passed for either of the cancellations involved in these cases.24 A majority vote of both Houses is sufficient to enact a disapproval bill. The Act does not grant the President the authority to cancel a disapproval bill, see §691(c), but he does, of course, retain his constitutional authority to veto such a bill.25
The effect of a cancellation is plainly stated in §691e, which defines the principal terms used in the Act. With respect to both an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit, the cancellation prevents the item "from having legal force or effect.'' 2 U.S.C. §§691e(4)(B)-(C) (1994 ed., Supp. II).26 Thus, under the plain text of the statute, the two actions of the President that are challenged in these cases prevented one section of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and one section of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 "from having legal force or effect.'' The remaining provisions of those statutes, with the exception of the second canceled item in the latter, continue to have the same force and effect as they had when signed into law.
In both legal and practical effect, the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. " [R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.'' INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785-2786, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II assign responsibilities to the President that directly relate to the lawmaking process, but neither addresses the issue presented by these cases. The President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . .'' Art. II, §3. Thus, he may initiate and influence legislative proposals.27 Moreover, after a bill has passed both Houses of Congress, but "before it become[s] a Law,'' it must be presented to the President. If he approves it, "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.'' Art. I, §7, cl. 2.28 His "return'' of a bill, which is usually described as a "veto,''29 is subject to being overridden by a two-thirds vote in each House.
At oral argument, the Government suggested that the cancellations at issue in these cases do not effect a "repeal'' of the canceled items because under the special "lockbox'' provisions of the Act,31 a canceled item "retain[s] real, legal budgetary effect'' insofar as it prevents Congress and the President from spending the savings that result from the cancellation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.32 The text of the Act expressly provides, however, that a cancellation prevents a direct spending or tax benefit provision "from having legal force or effect.'' 2 U.S.C. §§691e(4)(B)-(C). That a canceled item may have "real, legal budgetary effect'' as a result of the lockbox procedure does not change the fact that by canceling the items at issue in these cases, the President made them entirely inoperative as to appellees. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provides a tax benefit, and §4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer relieves New York of its contingent liability.33 Such significant changes do not lose their character simply because the canceled provisions may have some continuing financial effect on the Government.34 The cancellation of one section of a statute may be the functional equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of the section is not canceled.
This passage identifies three critical differences between the power to suspend the exemption from import duties and the power to cancel portions of a duly enacted statute. First, the exercise of the suspension power was contingent upon a condition that did not exist when the Tariff Act was passed: the imposition of "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable'' import duties by other countries. In contrast, the exercise of the cancellation power within five days after the enactment of the Balanced Budget and Tax Reform Acts necessarily was based on the same conditions that Congress evaluated when it passed those statutes. Second, under the Tariff Act, when the President determined that the contingency had arisen, he had a duty to suspend; in contrast, while it is true that the President was required by the Act to make three determinations before he canceled a provision, see 2 U.S.C. §691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Finally, whenever the President suspended an exemption under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute. In contrast, whenever the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a limited tax benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment.35 Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy Article I, §7.
The Government's reliance upon other tariff and import statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same reasons.36 Some of those statutes authorized the President to "suspen[d] and discontinu[e]'' statutory duties upon his determination that discriminatory duties imposed by other nations had been abolished. See 143 U.S., at 686-687, 12 S.Ct., at 502-503 (discussing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, §4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat. 308).37 A slightly different statute, Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, §2, 4 Stat. 425, provided that certain statutory provisions imposing duties on foreign ships "shall be repealed'' upon the same no-discrimination determination by the President. See 143 U.S., at 687, 12 S.Ct., at 503; see also id., at 686, 12 S.Ct., at 502-503 (discussing similar tariff statute, Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224, which provided that duties "are hereby repealed,'' " [s]uch repeal to take effect . . . whenever the President'' makes the required determination).
The cited statutes all relate to foreign trade, and this Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President has "a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.'' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S.Ct. 216, 221, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936). "Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries.'' Ibid.38 More important, when enacting the statutes discussed in Field, Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President.39 The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in Article I, §7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no moment. Although Congress presumably anticipated that the President might cancel some of the items in the Balanced Budget Act and in the Taxpayer Relief Act, Congress cannot alter the procedures set out in Article I, §7, without amending the Constitution.40
First, we express no opinion about the wisdom of the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act. Many members of both major political parties who have served in the Legislative and the Executive Branches have long advocated the enactment of such procedures for the purpose of "ensur[ing] greater fiscal accountability in Washington.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-491, p. 15 (1996).41 The text of the Act was itself the product of much debate and deliberation in both Houses of Congress and that precise text was signed into law by the President. We do not lightly conclude that their action was unauthorized by the Constitution.42 We have, however, twice had full argument and briefing on the question and have concluded that our duty is clear.
Second, although appellees challenge the validity of the Act on alternative grounds, the only issue we address concerns the "finely wrought'' procedure commanded by the Constitution. Chadha, 462 U.S., at 951, 103 S.Ct., at 2784. We have been favored with extensive debate about the scope of Congress' power to delegate law-making authority, or its functional equivalent, to the President. The excellent briefs filed by the parties and their amici curiae have provided us with valuable historical information that illuminates the delegation issue but does not really bear on the narrow issue that is dispositive of these cases. Thus, because we conclude that the Act's cancellation provisions violate Article I, §7, of the Constitution, we find it unnecessary to consider the District Court's alternative holding that the Act "impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government.'' 985 F.Supp., at 179.43
* The Court's unrestrained zeal to reach the merits of this case is evident in its disregard of the statute's expedited-review provision, which extends that special procedure to " [a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected by [the Act],'' §692. With the exception of Mike Cranney, a natural person, the appellees-corporations, cooperatives, and governmental entities-are not "individuals'' under any accepted usage of that term. Worse still, the first provision of the United States Code confirms that insofar as this word is concerned, Congress speaks English like the rest of us: "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the wor[d] "person' . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals. '' 1 U.S.C. §1 (emphasis added). And doubly worse, one of the definitional provisions of this very Act expressly distinguishes "individuals'' from "persons.'' A tax law does not create a "limited tax benefit,'' it says, so long as
* I agree with the Court that the parties have standing, but I do not agree with its ultimate conclusion. In my view the Line Item Veto Act does not violate any specific textual constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit Separation of Powers principle. Consequently, I believe that the Act is constitutional.
* Viewed conceptually, the power the Act conveys is the right kind of power. It is "executive.'' As explained above, an exercise of that power "executes'' the Act. Conceptually speaking, it closely resembles the kind of delegated authority-to spend or not to spend appropriations, to change or not to change tariff rates-that Congress has frequently granted the President, any differences being differences in degree, not kind. See Part IV-C, infra.
* The relevant similarities and differences among and between this case and other "nondelegation'' cases can be listed more systematically as follows: First, as I have just said, like statutes delegating power to award broadcast television licenses, or to regulate the securities industry, or to develop and enforce workplace safety rules, the Act is aimed at a discrete problem: namely, a particular set of expenditures within the federal budget. The Act concerns, not the entire economy, cf. Schechter Poultry Corp., supra, but the annual federal budget. Within the budget it applies only to discretionary budget authority and new direct spending items, that together amount to approximately a third of the current annual budget outlays, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 18; see also Budget 303, and to "limited tax benefits'' that (because each can affect no more than 100 people, see 2 U.S.C. §691e(9)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II)), amount to a tiny fraction of federal revenues and appropriations. Compare Analytical Perspectives 73-75 (1997) (listing over $500 billion in overall "tax expenditures'' that OMB estimated were contained in federal law in 1997) and Budget 303 (federal outlays and receipts in 1997 were both over $1.5 trillion) with App. to Juris. Statement 71a (President's cancellation message for Snake River appellees' limited tax benefit, estimating annual "value'' of benefit, in terms of revenue loss, at about $20 million).
Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, Pub.L. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793, 42 U.S.C. §1396b(w).
App. to Juris. Statement 63a-64a (Cancellation No. 97-3). The quoted text is an excerpt from the statement of reasons for the cancellation, which is required by the Line Item Veto Act. See 2 U.S.C. §691a (1994 ed., Supp. II).
Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 amended 26 U.S.C. §1042 by adding a new subsection (g), which defined the sellers eligible for the exemption as follows:
H.R.Rep. No. 105-148, p. 420 (1997); see also 141 Cong. Rec. S18739 (Dec. 15, 1995) (Senator Hatch, introducing a previous version of the bill, stating that it "would provide farmers who form farmers cooperatives the opportunity for an ownership interest in the processing and marketing of their products''); ibid. (Senator Craig, cosponsor of a previous bill, stating that " [c]urrently, farmers cannot compete with other business entities . . . in buying such [processing] businesses because of the advantages inherent in the tax deferrals available in transactions with these other purchases''; bill "would be helpful to farmers cooperatives''); App. 116-117 (Letter from Congresspersons Roberts and Stenholm (Dec. 1, 1995)) (congressional sponsors stating that a previous version of the bill was intended to "provide American farmers a more firm economic footing and more control over their economic destiny. We believe this proposal will help farmers, through their cooperatives, purchase facilities to refine and process their raw commodities into value-added products. . . . It will encourage farmers to help themselves in a more market-oriented environment by vertically integrating. If this legislation is passed, we are confident that, 10 years from now, we will look on this bill as one of the most beneficial actions Congress took for U.S. farmers'').
§1701, 111 Stat. 1101.
App. to Juris. Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97-2). On the day the President canceled §968, he stated: "Because I strongly support family farmers, farm cooperatives, and the acquisition of production facilities by co-ops, this was a very difficult decision for me.'' App. 125. He added that creating incentives so that farmers' cooperatives can obtain processing facilities is a "very worthy goal.'' Id., at 130.
See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law §2807-c(18)(e) (Supp.1997-1998) ("In the event the secretary of the department of health and human services determines that the assessments do not . . . qualify based on any such exclusion, then the exclusion shall be deemed to have been null and void . . . and the commissioner shall collect any retroactive amount due as a result . . . . Interest and penalties shall be measured from the due date of ninety days following notice from the commissioner''); §2807-d(12) (1993) (same); §2807-j(11) (Supp.1997-1998) (same); §2807-s(8) (same).
As the District Court explained: "These laws reflected the best judgment of both Houses. The laws that resulted after the President's line item veto were different from those consented to by both Houses of Congress. There is no way of knowing whether these laws, in their truncated form, would have received the requisite support from both the House and the Senate. Because the laws that emerged after the Line Item Veto are not the same laws that proceeded through the legislative process, as required, the resulting laws are not valid.'' 985 F.Supp., at 178-179.
" Unilateral action by any single participant in the law-making process is precisely what the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses were designed to prevent. Once a bill becomes law, it can only be repealed or amended through another, independent legislative enactment, which itself must conform with the requirements of Article I. Any rescissions must be agreed upon by a majority of both Houses of Congress. The President cannot single-handedly revise the work of the other two participants in the lawmaking process, as he did here when he vetoed certain provisions of these statutes.'' Ibid.
Although in ordinary usage both "individual'' and "person'' often refer to an individual human being, see, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1152, 1686 (1986) ("individual'' defined as a "single human being''; "person'' defined as "an individual human being''), "person'' often has a broader meaning in the law, see, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §1 ("person'' includes "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals'').
Justice SCALIA objects to our conclusion that the Government's reading of the statute would produce an absurd result. Post, at __-__. Nonetheless, he states that ""the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.''' Post, at __ (quoting this Court's Rule 11). Unlike Justice SCALIA, however, we need not rely on our own sense of the importance of the issue involved; instead, the structure of §692 makes it clear that Congress believed the issue warranted expedited review and, therefore, that Congress did not intend the result that the word "individual'' would dictate in other contexts.
To meet the standing requirements of Article III, " [a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
Because the cancellation of the legislative equivalent of a favorable final judgment causes immediate injury, the Government's reliance on Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 1059, 130 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1995) (per curiam), is misplaced. That case involved a challenge to a California statute that would have imposed limits on welfare payments to new residents during their first year of residence in California. The statute could not become effective without a waiver from HHS. Although such a waiver had been in effect when the action was filed, it had been vacated in a separate proceeding and HHS had not sought review of that judgment. Accordingly, at the time the Anderson case reached this Court, the plaintiffs were receiving the same benefits as long term residents; they had suffered no injury. We held that the case was not ripe because, unless and until HHS issued a new waiver, any future injury was purely conjectural. 513 U.S., at 559, 115 S.Ct., at 1060 ("The parties [i.e. the plaintiffs and California, but not HHS] have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural''). Unlike New York in this case, they were not contingently liable for anything.
The Government relies on Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), to support its argument that the State, and not appellees, should be bringing this claim. In Warth we held, inter alia, that citizens of Rochester did not have standing to challenge the exclusionary zoning pract
ices of another community because their claimed injury of increased taxation turned on the prospective actions of Rochester officials. Id., at 509, 95 S.Ct., at 2210-2211. Appellees' injury in this case, however, does not turn on the independent actions of third parties, as existing New York law will automatically require that appellees reimburse the State.
The Government argues that there can be an Article III injury only if Snake River would have actually obtained a facility on favorable terms. We have held, however, that a denial of a benefit in the bargaining process can itself create an Article III injury, irrespective of the end result. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2303, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). In that case an association of contractors challenged a city ordinance that accorded preferential treatment to certain minority-owned businesses in the award of city contracts. The Court of Appeals had held that the association lacked standing "because it failed to allege that one or more of its members would have been awarded a contract but for the challenged ordinance.'' Id., at 664, 113 S.Ct., at 2302. We rejected the Court of Appeals' position, stating that it "cannot be reconciled with our precedents.'' Ibid. Even though the preference applied to only a small percentage of the city's business, and even though there was no showing that any party would have received a contract absent the ordinance, we held that the prospective bidders had standing; the "injury in fact'' was the harm to the contractors in the negotiation process, "not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.'' Id., at 666, 113 S.Ct., at 2303.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), are distinguishable, as each of those cases involved a speculative chain of causation quite different from the situation here. In Allen, parents of black public school children alleged that, even though it was the policy of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools, the IRS had "not adopted sufficient standards and procedures'' to enforce this policy. Allen, 468 U.S., at 739, 104 S.Ct., at 3318. The parents alleged that the lax enforcement caused white students to attend discriminatory private schools and, therefore, interfered with their children's opportunity to attend desegregated public schools. We held that the chain of causation between the challenged action and the alleged injury was too attenuated to confer standing:
The term "cancel,'' used in connection with any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, means "to rescind.'' 2 U.S.C. §691e(4)(A). The entire definition reads as follows:
See 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1555, p. 413 (1833) (Art. II, §3, enables the President "to point out the evil, and to suggest the remedy'').
" In constitutional terms, "veto' is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, §7, of the Constitution.'' INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925, n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2771, n. 2, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed.1979)).
33 Writings of George Washington 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); see also W. Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities and Its Limitations 11 (1916) (stating that the President "has no power to veto part of a bill and let the rest become a law''); cf. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *154 ("The crown cannot begin of itself any a
lterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses'').
The lockbox procedure ensures that savings resulting from cancellations are used to reduce the deficit, rather than to offset deficit increases arising from other laws. See 2 U.S.C. §§691c(a)-(b); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, pp. 23-24 (1996). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates the deficit reduction resulting from each cancellation of new direct spending or limited tax benefit items and presents its estimate as a separate entry in the "pay-as-you-go'' report submitted to Congress pursuant to §252(d) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (or "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act''), 2 U.S.C. §902(d). See §691c(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 23. The "pay-as-you-go'' requirement acts as a self-imposed limitation on Congress' ability to increase spending and/or reduce revenue: if spending increases are not offset by revenue increases (or if revenue reductions are not offset by spending reductions), then a "sequester'' of the excess budgeted funds is required. See 2 U.S.C. §§900(b), 901(a)(1), 902(b), 906(l). OMB does not include the estimated savings resulting from a cancellation in the report it must submit under §§252(b) and 254 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. §§902(b), 904. See §691c(a)(2)(B). By providing in this way that such savings "shall not be included in the pay-as-you-go balances,'' Congress ensures that "savings from the cancellation of new direct spending or limited tax benefits are devoted to deficit reduction and are not available to offset a deficit increase in another law.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-491, at 23. Thus, the "pay-as-you-go'' cap does not change upon cancellation because the canceled item is not treated as canceled. Moreover, if Congress enacts a disapproval bill, "OMB will not score this legislation as increasing the deficit under pay as you go.'' Ibid.
Thus, although "Congress's use of infelicitous terminology cannot transform the cancellation into an unconstitutional amendment or repeal of an enacted law,'' Brief for Appellants 40-41 (citations omitted), the actual effect of a cancellation is entirely consistent with the language of the Act.
For example, one reason that the President gave for canceling §968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act was his conclusion that "this provision failed to target its benefits to small-and-medium size cooperatives.'' App. to Juris. Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97-2); see n. 8, supra. Because the Line Item Veto Act requires the President to act within five days, every exercise of the cancellation power will necessarily be based on the same facts and circumstances that Congress considered, and therefore constitute a rejection of the policy choice made by Congress.
Cf. 143 U.S., at 688, 12 S.Ct., at 503 (discussing Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, §2, 14 Stat. 4, which permitted the President to "declare the provisions of this act to be inoperative'' and lift import restrictions on foreign cattle and hides upon a showing that such importation would not endanger U.S. cattle).
Indeed, the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892), so limited its reasoning: "in the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign governments, . . . to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations.'' Id., at 691, 12 S.Ct., at 504.
See also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) ("Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of an Executive'').
The Government argues that the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072(b), permits this Court to "repeal'' prior laws without violating Article I, §7. Section 2072(b) provides that this Court may promulgate rules of procedure for the lower federal courts and that " [a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.'' See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10, 61 S.Ct. 422, 425, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) (stating that the procedural rules that this Court promulgates, "if they are within the authority granted by Congress, repeal'' a prior inconsistent procedural statute); see also Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 664, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 1644, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (citing §2072(b)). In enacting §2072(b), however, Congress expressly provided that laws inconsistent with the procedural rules promulgated by this Court would automatically be repealed upon the enactment of new rules in order to create a uniform system of rules for Article III courts. As in the tariff statutes, Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular event-here, the promulgation of procedural rules by this Court.
Cf. Taft, The Presidency, supra n. 30, at 21 ("A President with the power to veto items in appropriation bills might exercise a good restraining influence in cutting down the total annual expenses of the government. But this is not the right way'').
See Bowsher, 478 U.S., at 736, 106 S.Ct., at 3192-3193 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons'').