Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150113_0000066.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-12-10 06:54:56
Document Index: 312808990

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1331', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 1915']

| Williams v. Cox
ALBERT WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,v.DR. COX, Supervisory Chaplain; FATHER O'NEAL, Chaplain; and UNKNOWN STAFF, Defendants.
JAMES E. GRAHAM, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the Federal Satellite Low Camp in Jesup, Georgia ("FSL Jesup"), filed a cause of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), contesting certain conditions of his confinement. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
In Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.
Plaintiff contends that he requested a work proscription from Defendants O'Neil and Cox in observance of the Feast of Shavout. Plaintiff also contends that these Defendants denied his requests. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants O'Neil, Cox, and "other unknown staff" placed a substantial burden on his right to practice the tenants of his faith. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. ("RFRA").
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment "requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation's people." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). Prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, including rights under the free exercise of religion clause; however, "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F.App'x 771, 774 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)).
The RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, forbids the government from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion"[1] unless the government can "demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). Although the Supreme Court has declared RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states, the RFRA still applies to acts of the federal government and its officials. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (stating that pursuant to RFRA, the federal government must demonstrate a compelling interest when substantially burdening the exercise of religion).
The above allegations, when read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, arguably state a claim under Bivens and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A against Defendants O'Neil and Cox for alleged violations of the First Amendment and the RFRA. A copy of Plaintiff's Complaint and a copy of this Order shall be served upon Defendants O'Neil and Cox, the Attorney General of the United States, and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia by the United States Marshal without prepayment of cost. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia may be personally served or served by registered or certified mail addressed to the civil process clerk at the office of the United States Attorney. Pursuant to that same rule, service may be perfected on the United States Attorney General by registered or certified mail. The answer of the Defendants shall be filed within sixty (60) days of receipt of such service. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(3)(B). If either Defendant elects to file a Waiver of Reply, then he must file either a dispositive motion or an answer to the complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing of said Waiver of Reply.
Plaintiff is instructed to advise the Court of the identity of "other unknown staff" within thirty (30) days of this Order. Plaintiffs failure to identify "other unknown staff' properly may result in the dismissal of "other unknown staff' from this cause of action.
Since the Plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis, service must be effected by the United States Marshal. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). In most cases, the marshal will first mail a copy of the complaint to the Defendants by first-class mail and request that the Defendants waive formal service of summons. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Local Rule 4.5. Individual and corporate defendants have a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons, and any such defendant who fails to comply with the request for waiver must bear the costs of personal service unless good cause can be shown for the failure to return the waiver. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Generally, a defendant who timely returns the waiver is not required to answer the complaint until sixty (60) days after the date that the marshal sent the request for waiver. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are hereby granted leave of court to take the deposition of the Plaintiff upon oral examination. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). The Defendants shall ensure that the Plaintiff's deposition and any other depositions in the case are taken within the 140-day discovery period allowed by this court's local rules. Local Rule 26.1(d)(i).
In the event Defendants take the deposition of any other person, they are ordered to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30 as set forth herein. As the Plaintiff will likely not be in attendance for such a deposition, the Defendants shall notify Plaintiff of the deposition and advise him that he may serve on the Defendants, in a sealed envelope, within ten (10) days of the notice of deposition, written questions the Plaintiff wishes to propound to the witness, if any. The Defendants shall present such questions to the witness seriatim during the deposition. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorneys, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendants or counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 5. "Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, [and] the file number." FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a caption or a certificate of service will be disregarded by the court and returned to the sender.
Plaintiff has the responsibility for pursuing this case. For example, if Plaintiff wishes to obtain facts and information about the case from Defendants, Plaintiff must initiate discovery. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26, et seq. Plaintiff does not need the permission of the court to begin discovery, and Plaintiff should begin discovery promptly and complete it within 140 days after the filing of the answer. Local Rule 26.1(d)(i).
Interrogatories are a practical method of discovery for incarcerated persons. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories may be served only on a party to the litigation, and, for the purposes of the instant case, this means that interrogatories should not be directed to persons or organizations who are not named as a Defendant. Interrogatories shall not be filed with the court. Local Rule 26.4. Interrogatories are not to contain more than twenty-five (25) questions. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). If Plaintiff wishes to propound more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories to a party, Plaintiff must have permission of the court. If Plaintiff wishes to file a motion to compel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, he should first contact the attorneys for the Defendants and try to work out the problem; if Plaintiff proceeds with the motion to compel, he should also file a statement certifying that he has contacted opposing counsel in a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); 37(a)(2); Local Rule 26.5. Plaintiff has the responsibility for maintaining his own records of the case. If Plaintiff loses papers and needs new copies, he may obtain them from the Clerk of Court at the standard cost of fifty ($.50) cents per page.
If Plaintiff does not press his case forward, the court may dismiss it for want of prosecution. FED. R. Civ. P.41; Local Rule 41.1.
It is the Plaintiff's duty to cooperate fully in any discovery which may be initiated by the Defendants. Upon no less than five (5) days' notice of the scheduled deposition date, the Plaintiff shall appear and permit his deposition to be taken and shall answer, under oath or solemn affirmation, any question which seeks information relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Failing to answer questions at the deposition or giving evasive or incomplete responses to questions will not be tolerated and may subject Plaintiff to severe sanctions, including dismissal of this case.
Under this Court's Local Rules, a party opposing a motion to dismiss shall file and serve his response to the motion within fourteen (14) days of its service. "Failure to respond shall indicate that there is no opposition to a motion." Local Rule 7.5. Therefore, if you fail to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court will assume that you do not oppose the Defendants' motion.
Your response to a motion for summary judgment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the motion. Local Rules 7.5, 56.1. The failure to respond to such a motion shall indicate that there is no opposition to the motion. Furthermore, each material fact set forth in the Defendants' statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by an opposition statement. Should the Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, you are advised that you will have the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. That burden cannot be carried by reliance on the conclusory allegations contained within the complaint. Should the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be supported by affidavit, you must file counter-affidavits if you desire to contest the Defendants' statement of the facts. Should you fail to file opposing affidavits setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial, the consequences are these: any factual assertions made in Defendants' affidavits will be accepted as true and summary judgment will be entered against the Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.