Source: https://de.scribd.com/document/2710029/Sowells-v-Dillion-County-Detention-Center-et-al-Document-No-5
Timestamp: 2020-04-03 10:17:54
Document Index: 635765405

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1230', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1915', '§ 636']

Sowells v. Dillion County Detention Center et al - Document No. 5 | Complaint | Pro Se Legal Representation In The United States
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. 1 Complaint filed by James Curtis Sowells Objections to R&R due by 12/18/2006. Signed by Judge Bristow Marchant on 11/29/06. (ahen, ) 0:2006cv03284 South Carolina District Court
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0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 1 of 7
James Curtis Sowells, ) C/A No. 0:06-3284-CMC-BM
Dillon County Detention Center; )
Captain Johnny Sapp; )
All Subordinates Correction Officers; and )
Judge NFN Davis, )
This is a civil rights action filed pro se by a detainee at the Dillon County Detention Center.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the conditions at the jail are unhygienic and overcrowded and
that he has endured “pain and suffering”as a result of the poor conditions and his having to be
housed in close proximity to other sick detainees. Additionally, Plaintiff complains that certain
legal mail of his was opened by a corrections officer named “Flodge”, and that this officer told him
that he (the officer) could open legal mail whenever he wanted to. Finally, Plaintiff complains
about the amount of his bond, and names the Dillon County judge who decided the amount of bail
as a Defendant in this case. He seeks compensatory damages and declarative and injunctive
of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § § 1915, 1915A, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th
Cir. 1995)(en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d
948 (4th Cir. 1979). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 2 of 7
drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district
development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n.7 (1980);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Even
under this less stringent standard, however, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary
dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The requirement of liberal
construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts
which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of
Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387(4th Cir. 1990).
First, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal as to all named Defendants insofar
as it alleges unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Dillon County Detention Center
because none of the allegations contained in the Complaint have been asserted against or tied
to any named Defendant. Although Plaintiff’s allegations are serious, he completely fails to allege,
within the body of his Complaint, how any of the named Defendants are involved in or responsible
for the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement to which he has been subjected. The
Defendant Sapp is not mentioned anywhere in the Complaint except in the caption on the first
page, nor Plaintiff does allege anywhere in the Complaint that Sapp or any other Defendant
personally played any part in allowing the conditions at the detention center to deteriorate or that
he (Plaintiff) reported the allegedly unconstitutional conditions to any named Defendant. Moreover,
there are no allegations that any Defendant was aware of the allegedly unconstitutional activities
of any individual employee(s) or official(s). Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege any “pervasive
and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source . . . “ nor has he alleged that any
Defendant’s “corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or ‘tacit authorization of the
offensive [practices],’”), as required to state a viable claim of supervisory liability in § 1983 cases.
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 3 of 7
See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 370-75 (4th Cir. 1984); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir.
Even though this Court is required to liberally construe pro se pleadings, it is well settled
that federal courts performing their duties of construing pro se pleadings are not required to be
"mind readers" or “advocates” for state prisoners or pro se litigants; see Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978); and where there are no allegations of responsibility specifically naming any Defendant,
there is nothing for this Court to liberally construe. Under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, more specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court should dismiss an action filed
by a prisoner which “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” and since there are no
allegations of any wrongdoing in connection with Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement on the part
of any named Defendant, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted
with regard to any Defendant. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996)(statute allowing
dismissal of in forma pauperis claims encompasses complaints that are either legally or factually
baseless); Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir. 1990)(dismissal proper
where there were no allegations against defendants).
Furthermore, the Defendants Dillon County Detention Center and “All Subordinates
Correction Officers” are not even proper party Defendants, because they are not “persons” who
can be held liable for constitutional violations. In order to state a claim for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,1 an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he or she was injured by “the
Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil
cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color
of state law. See Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). The purpose of section 1983 is
to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. See McKnight v. Rees,
88 F.3d 417(6th Cir. 1996)(emphasis added).
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 4 of 7
deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States]
Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Monroe v. Page, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (2002). It is well settled that inanimate objects such as
buildings, facilities, and grounds do not act under color of state law. See Allison v. California Adult
Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969)(California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not
"person[s]" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D.
Va. 1999)(“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,’ and therefore not amenable to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301(E.D.
N.C. 1989)(“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is not a person amenable
to suit.”). Additionally, use of the term “staff” or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants,
without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a “person”
as required in section 1983 actions. See Martin v. UConn Health Care, 2000 WL 303262, *1 (D.
Conn., Feb 09, 2000); Ferguson v. Morgan, 1991 WL 115759 (S.D. N.Y. Jun 20, 1991).
Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal insofar as it names the Dillon County
Detention Center and “All Subordinate Corrections Officers” as party Defendants.
Additionally, the Complaint is also subject to summary dismissal insofar as it alleges a
constitutional violation resulting from a correction officer’s opening of Plaintiff’s “legal” mail, as
Plaintiff has named no Defendant who could be held responsible for such a violation. The only
person mentioned in connection with the mail-related allegations, “Flodge,” is not named a
Defendant in this case. His/her name is not listed on the first page of the Complaint in the
caption, nor is his/her name listed on the second page in the section of the complaint form
specifically designated for a list of Defendants. In the absence of a any potentially liable
Defendant, the Complaint fails to state any viable § 1983 claim arising from the way Plaintiff’s mail
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 5 of 7
has been handled, and it should be dismissed insofar as it seeks to raise such a claim.
Finally, the Complaint is frivolous and fails to state any viable § 1983 claim against the
Defendant Judge Davis based on the amount of bail set in Plaintiff’s criminal case. The setting
of bail is a uniquely judicial function, and it is well settled that judges are entitled to immunity from
liability resulting from such activities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987)(a
suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81
(4th Cir. 1985)("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for
damages arising out of his judicial actions."); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226
(1991)(immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even
allowed); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991)(safeguards built into the judicial system tend to
reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)(absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather
than a mere defense to liability"). Therefore, Judge Davis is entitled to dismissal as a party
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint in this
case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez;
Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 & n. * (4th Cir.
1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d at 74; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner
cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). Plaintiff may, of course, file
a new case containing more specific allegations and naming proper party Defendants, if he
chooses to do so. He can obtain proper forms for the filing of federal civil rights actions from the
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 6 of 7
0:06-cv-03284-CMC Date Filed 11/29/2006 Entry Number 5 Page 7 of 7
Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time
calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case
rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976); Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F.
Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993).
During the period for filing objections, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written
objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections.
Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are
made and the basis for such objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992); Oliverson v. West Valley
City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467 (D. Utah 1995). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right
to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir.
1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does
not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions
of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object
to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on
appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. See Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991);
see also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.)(party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did
not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard,, the court stated that general, non-specific
objections are not sufficient:
A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would
a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby
making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes
judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * * *
We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination
without explaining the source of the error.
Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the court held that the appellant, who proceeded
pro se in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district
Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no
issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends
on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.
See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989)("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"; which
involved a pro se litigant); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1984)("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger
de novo review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the parties of the consequences of a failure to file specific,
written objections. See Wright v. Collins; Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989). Filing by mail
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:
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