Source: https://www.cloisters.com/prevent-duty-part-3-british-values-human-rights-and-handling-due-regard-duty-in-practice/
Timestamp: 2019-03-19 01:24:15
Document Index: 542000279

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 3', 'art 3', 'art. 10', 'art. 10', '§ 99', '§ 53', '§ 73', '§ 106']

Prevent Duty Part 3: British Values, Human Rights and handling “due regard” duty in practice - Cloisters
By Cloisters - Human Rights | August 16, 2016
In this third article Declan O’Dempsey looks at the concept of “British Values” in the context of the Prevent Duty. It appears in the definition of “extremism” in the Guidance. British values are mentioned in the Guidance. However only examples are given of what constitute British values. In a post Brexit discussion these values have taken on a more important aspect. To what extent is tolerance a British Value?
What are Fundamental British Values (FBV)?
2. Public officials may only interfere with a citizen’s personal liberty and property where authorised by the common law or by statute.
The rule of law is also cited as a fundamental British value. However what that means needs to be drawn out explicitly in this context. In Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807 the defendants claimed authority under a warrant from the Secretary of State to break into the plaintiff’s house and take some papers which were said to be seditious. The plaintiff sued in trespass. It is the classic common law’s commitment to the constitutional principle of the rule of law.
“In the case of Wilkes, a member of the Commons House, all his books and papers were seized and taken away; we were told by one of these messengers that he was obliged by his oath to sweep away all papers whatsoever; if this is law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country; our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law. The defendants have no right to avail themselves of the usage of these warrants since the Revolution,…we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society; for papers are often the dearest property a man can have.”
Certain human rights will form part of fundamental values because they have the status of customary international law or because they are part of the treaty obligations of the UK which can be brought into account when considering a duty to have due regard. In Stuart Bracking & Ors v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions[1] the Court of Appeal used an international convention to inform the content of a due regard duty. The obligation was under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). There was no evidence that regard had been had to the specific obligations under the UNCRPD. Elias LJ stated that these international obligations which the UK has undertaken with respect to the disabled ought to inform the scope of the public sector equality duty with respect to the disabled. So the details of the international obligation can help the court to find a sense of what “due” regard will look like in a particular case.
In the context of the Prevent Duty therefore a number of different international human rights may be germane. The following are recognised in international law as necessary to allow persons to enjoy a dignified existence:
– physical integrity (embodied in international conventions such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR (art 3));
– liberty;
– freedoms of expression and thought. This freedom which is important at common law in particular is relevant to the Duty.
‘Political human rights’ include:
– freedom of political participation and voting rights (UDHR (1948) Article 21).
– International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) Article 25.
– Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .
‘Economic and social rights’ include:
– ability to work (right to work – Article 23 UNDHR. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment); and
– ability to participate in society – see the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966; TS 6 (1977); Cmnd 6702)) Article 21 UDHR and Article 25 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both stipulate the right to vote and to be elected ‘at periodic and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage’ and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors, and that everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his or her country.
The guidance provided by Universities UK deals with the catalogue of criminal offences which universities need to take into account in relation to issues of free speech and the Prevent Duty. Clearly there is no obligation to uphold illegal free speech which would amount to a criminal offence.
However apart from inciting substantive offences such as terrorism, the criminal law is more specific about ‘speech and conduct’ offences.
There is already a series of acts which (without the Prevent Duty) would be legitimate for the university not to support whilst supporting free speech. Incitement to any of the following would be illegal.
– belonging, or professing to belong, to an organisation proscribed by the secretary of state;
– inviting support (other than money or other property) for a proscribed organisation;
– addressing a meeting (of three or more persons) with the purpose of encouraging support for a proscribed organisation or to further its activities;
– wearing an item of clothing or wearing, carrying or displaying any article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that you are a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.
Defamation and malicious falsehood and the civil law rights under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 need to be taken into account in relation to the Prevent Duty. However these do not, in my view, create any greater burden on the universities under the Prevent Duty.
Thus the Article 10 rights of a person seeking to put forward extremist views tending to draw people into terrorism can lawfully be curtailed by the Prevent Duty in general terms.
However that does not assist the university much. This is because the restriction may be valid in one case but not in another depending on whether the expression created a greater or lesser risk of drawing people into terrorism and whether there were ways in which that risk could be mitigated.
(b) These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. Whilst it must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, in the “interests of national security” or for “maintaining the authority of the judiciary”, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog”.
(c) The adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), implies the existence of a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (art. 10).
The term ‘others’ relates to other persons individually or as members of a community.
In relation to the approach to derogations from the right of free expression the case notes that as to “protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”, if a state invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.
Thus the Court has suggested that there are situations where the content of what is being said can amount to a reason to supress expression. However the Prevent Duty could only lead to this result if there was a specific an individualised threat to public order arising out of the expression. In the UK the criminal law will cover most if not all such situations.
Using Article 17 of the ECHR
What is the best way of considering whether free expression is being used responsibly so as to attract the protection of the ECHR? Whilst instruments such as the ICCPR are useful for seeing how the right of free expression is to be treated, I suggest, in that context a more widely useful and better talisman for the decision maker is probably Article 17 of the ECHR.
Although this was not incorporated directly in the UK law, it states that rights under the ECHR may not be manipulated to undermine the aims of the Convention. It is a very useful interpretive tool. Article 17 was included because a person or a group of persons might attempt to rely on the rights enshrined in the Convention to derive the right to conduct activities intended to destroy these rights (Ždanoka v Latvia ([GC], no. 58278/00, § 99, ECHR 2006-IV)).
A “remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values” is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17 (see Lehideux and Isorni v France, 23 September 1998, § 53, Reports 1998-VII, and Garaudy v France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX).
The logic of this is clear. This is what gives substance to the idea of responsible free expression and prevents that concept from becoming a general brake on the right of free expression in cases where what is expressed is not liked by the state.
Examples of the application of this principle in relation to extremist expression can be found in Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v Germany (dec.), no. 31098/08, §§ 73-74 and 78, 12 June 2012, and Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v Russia, nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06, §§ 106-13, 14 March 2013.
In looking at whether Article 17 can operate, the authority can look at the general tenor and content of the body of expression being restricted:
– Do they run counter to the fundamental values of the Convention and of democracy, namely justice and peace, tolerance etc?
– It is permissible to consider whether freedom of expression is being used for ends which are contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention (Witzsch v Germany (dec.), no. 4785/03, 13 December 2005, Norwood above and Pavel Ivanov v Russia ((dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007).
Posted in Blogs and tagged Declan O'Dempsey, Human Rights, Public Law