Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104960/howe-vs-smith
Timestamp: 2018-04-20 11:03:14
Document Index: 625679361

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5003', '§ 4002', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 4001', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 4082', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003', '§ 5003']

Howe Vs Smith - Citation 104960 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Howe Vs. Smith - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104960
Case Number 452 U.S. 473
Appellant Howe
howe v. smith - 452 u.s. 473 (1981) u.s. supreme court howe v. smith, 452 u.s. 473 (1981) howe v. smith no. 80-5392 argued april 28, 1981 decided june 17, 1981 452 u.s. 473 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit syllabus title 18 u.s.c. § 5003(a) authorizes the attorney general to contract with a state "for the custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal offenses in the courts of such state," when the director of the united states bureau of prisons certifies that proper and adequate federal "treatment facilities and personnel are available." petitioner was convicted in a vermont state court of first-degree murder arising out of the.....
Howe v. Smith - 452 U.S. 473 (1981)
U.S. Supreme Court Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 (1981)
Held: Section 5003(a) authorizes a transfer of a state prisoner to the federal system such as occurred in this case. Pp. 452 U. S. 479 -487.
state prisoners who are in need of some particular treatment. Pp. 452 U. S. 480 -482.
(b) Section 5003's legislative history reveals that it was enacted to deal with the simple and practical problem of permitting states to transfer their prisoners to federal custody in the same way that the Federal Government had, for some time, been placing prisoners in state custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4002. And nothing in the legislative history makes this case one of the "rare and exceptional cases" requiring a departure from the statute's plain language. Pp. 452 U. S. 483 -485.
(c) The contemporaneous and uniform construction of § 5003(a) by the Bureau of Prisons, the agency that proposed its enactment and is charged with its administration, has been that the statute authorizes contracts based on a broad range of purposes, including such a transfer as is shown by the record in this case. In the absence of any evidence of congressional objection, the agency's interpretation must be given great weight. Pp. 452 U. S. 485 -487.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 452 U. S. 487 . STEWART, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 452 U. S. 487 .
§ 5003 [ Footnote 1 ] in the absence of a prior determination that the prisoner who is being transferred has a need for specialized treatment available in the federal prison system.
In December, 1974, the Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Vermont announced that he would soon close the 187-year-old Windsor prison, the State's only maximum security facility, because Windsor had become inadequate in several respects. Rebidea v. Stoneman, 398 F.Supp. 805, 808, n. 7 (Vt.1975). In anticipation of that closing, the United States and Vermont entered into an agreement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a) by which the United States agreed to house in federal prisons up to 40 prisoners originally committed to the prisons of Vermont. [ Footnote 2 ] The contract recited that
that Howe was dangerous, and could not be integrated into a community-based program. The State relied on a psychiatric report describing Howe as a " dangerous person who could well repeat the same pattern of assaultive behavior toward women at any time in the future.'" Id. at 26. The hearing officer also found that Howe would be "highly resistant to treatment," and that he was an escape risk. Indeed, Howe had escaped from the maximum security wing of St. Albans while detained there prior to his trial.
The challenge here is not to the action of the State of Vermont in seeking to transfer the petitioner, but to the authority of the Federal Government, in the official person of the Attorney General, to receive and to hold him in a federal penitentiary. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) "no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." [ Footnote 3 ] The petitioner avers that he is being held by the federal authorities illegally, because neither § 5003 nor any other provision authorizes his detention. In particular, he argues that § 5003 has a narrow and limited thrust, that is, that a state prisoner may not be transferred to a federal institution except for an identified specialized treatment, and that, before any such transfer may be made, the Federal Government must conduct an inquiry and make an individualized determination that the transferee needs, and the federal facility can provide, that treatment. [ Footnote 4 ] On the other hand, the respondents contend that § 5003 is
As in every case involving the interpretation of a statute, analysis must begin with the language employed by Congress. Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424 , 449 U. S. 430 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330 , 442 U. S. 337 (1979). By its terms, § 5003(a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a state or territory
There is no special significance to the fact that the Director certifies the existence of " treatment facilities," as opposed to prison facilities generally. [ Footnote 5 ] First, the term "treatment facilities" is an appropriate general reference to the existing federal prison facilities. It is true, of course, that other terms may be used -- and, in fact, are used [ Footnote 6 ] -- to describe the federal prisons; that, however, does not belie the appropriateness of the term "treatment facilities" as a general reference to the federal penal system.
by virtue of § 5003(a), a state prisoner may be transferred to a federal prison only if that facility affords him specialized treatment found to be needed. However, § 5003(c) provides, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case, that all state prisoners in federal custody are subject to the same statutory and regulatory scheme that governs federal prisoners. [ Footnote 7 ] And that statutory and regulatory scheme contains provisions that would undermine § 5003(a) as that section is read by the petitioner. For example, by statute, federal prisoners may be transferred from one facility to another at the discretion of the Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b), and federal officials have discretion to decide which inmates have access to rehabilitation programs, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78 , 429 U. S. 88 , n. 9 (1976). It makes no sense to interpret § 5003 as forcing federal authorities to accept only a state prisoner who is in need of treatment at a particular facility when those same officials are free to transfer that same prisoner from the facility, thereby denying him access to the treatment program.
In sum, the plain language of § 5003(a) authorizes contracts not simply for treatment, but also for the custody, care, subsistence, education, and training of state prisoners in federal facilities. The certification requirement is simply a housekeeping measure designed to ensure that the federal system has the capacity to absorb the state prisoners. Nothing in the language of § 5003(a) restricts or limits the use of federal prison facilities to those state prisoners who are in need of some particular treatment. [ Footnote 8 ]
When the terms of a statute are unambiguous, our inquiry comes to an end, except "in rare and exceptional circumstances.'" TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , 437 U. S. 187 , n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 , 282 U. S. 60 (1930)). No rare and exceptional circumstances are present here; our reading of the statute is fully supported by the legislative history of § 5003.
Because the Attorney General, and through him the Bureau of Prisons, are charged with the administration of § 5003, their view of the meaning of the statute is entitled to considerable deference. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 , 416 U. S. 274 -275 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1 , 380 U. S. 16 (1965). Moreover, in this case, the Bureau's interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight, because it was the Bureau that drafted the legislation and steered it through Congress with little debate.
As I read 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a), quoted ante at 452 U. S. 475 , n. 1, it authorizes the Federal Government to take custody of state prisoners only "under certain conditions in a limited category of cases." [ Footnote 2/1 ] The history of the legislation indicates that it was intended to authorize the use of federal "treatment facilities," that would not otherwise be available to the States, for the custody and treatment of "those convicted State offenders
who are in need of treatment." [ Footnote 2/2 ] The language of the statute is consistent with this purpose. The requirement of a federal certification "that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel are available" surely is inconsistent with the view that nothing more than adequate prison accommodations are necessary to justify the transfer of a state prisoner to the federal system.
dangerous offender, together with the closing of Vermont's only maximum security facility, created a sufficiently unusual situation to cause his transfer to the federal system to fall within the limited category that the statute covers. [ Footnote 2/3 ] I therefore concur in the Court's judgment, but I do not share its opinion that Congress intended to give the Federal Bureau of Prisons carte blanche to rent out to the States any federal prison accommodations that may be available from time to time. [ Footnote 2/4 ]