Source: https://lundinonchapter13.com/Content/Section/42.2
Timestamp: 2019-12-12 08:17:26
Document Index: 336866069

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§ 42.2 Consequences of Failure to File Required Information, Including “Automatic Dismissal”
Cite as: Keith M. Lundin, Lundin On Chapter 13, § 42.2, at ¶ ____, LundinOnChapter13.com (last visited __________).
BAPCPA imposes many new and changed duties and filing requirements on Chapter 13 debtors.1 To put teeth in these requirements, BAPCPA also imposes on Chapter 13 debtors new consequences and penalties for noncompliance.
For example, any failure to file or provide a tax return required by BAPCPA is likely to draw a motion to dismiss the Chapter 13 case that can only be defeated by a substantial showing of circumstances beyond the control of the debtor.2 A failure to file the proper certification and rent deposit with respect to a prepetition eviction will leave the debtor with no automatic stay and, probably, no place to live.3 A Chapter 13 debtor who fails to cooperate with an audit by the U.S. trustee faces criminal prosecution.4 A Chapter 13 debtor who fails to pay a postpetition domestic support obligation won’t confirm a plan,5 won’t get a discharge6 and will be a candidate for dismissal at any time during the case.7 The debtor who fails to complete an instructional course concerning personal financial management will not be granted a discharge.8
Perhaps the strangest new consequence imposed by BAPCPA for the failure of a Chapter 13 debtor to perform a statutory duty is in new § 521(i)(1):
[I]f an individual debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information required under [§ 521](a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the case shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day after the date of the filing of the petition.9
As mentioned above,10 § 521(a)(1) requires a Chapter 13 debtor to file a list of creditors11 and, unless the court orders otherwise, the following other documents:
A schedule of assets and liabilities;12
A schedule of current income and current expenditures;13
A statement of financial affairs;14
A § 342(b) certificate;15
Copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received by the debtor from an employer within 60 days of the petition;16
A statement of monthly net income;17
A statement of any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures over the 12-month period following the petition.18
The consequence described in § 521(i)(1) applies when a Chapter 13 debtor fails to file “all of the information required under [§ 521](a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition.” The list of required documents includes most of the schedules, the statement of affairs and several new statements, and the whole of that list runs to more than two dozen pages in the Official Bankruptcy Forms. The “information” contained in all of the filings required by § 521(a)(1) is an enormous quantum difficult or impossible to describe with precision.
For example, if a debtor fails to schedule a current expenditure for utilities but schedules liabilities showing prepetition debts for electricity, telephone and the like, has the debtor provided the “information” required by the schedule of current expenditures? If the statement of affairs shows that the debtor has the same job as last year and states the debtor’s total income for last year from that job, is the “information” that would be contained in “payment advices or other evidence of payment” received within 60 days before the petition filed or not filed? Would the omission of pet food from Schedule J to Official Form 6 produce an irreversible automatic dismissal when Fido is revealed at Line 31 on Schedule B?
What does Congress mean that the Chapter 13 case “shall be automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day” if a Chapter 13 debtor fails to file all of the information required by § 521(a)(1)? The next subsection, § 521(i)(2), provides that any party in interest “may request the court to enter an order dismissing the case.”19 This certainly suggests that automatic dismissal does not involve the entry of a court order.
If there is no court order when a Chapter 13 case is automatically dismissed by § 521(a)(1), how will anyone know that the Chapter 13 case has been dismissed? When a party in interest requests entry of an order of dismissal under § 521(i)(2), will the debtor or any other party in interest have an opportunity to contest entry of the order? Section 521(i)(2) mandates that the court “shall enter an order of dismissal not later than five days” after a request for an order memorializing an automatic dismissal. How can notice be given and a reasonable opportunity to object when the order of dismissal must be entered within five days of the request? Can anyone spell d-u-e p-r-o-c-e-s-s?
New § 521(i)(3) states that “upon request of the debtor made within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition” the court “may allow the debtor an additional period of not to exceed 45 days” to file the information required by § 521(a)(1) “if the court finds justification.”20 The additional 45 days allowed by § 521(i)(3) is only available on request of the debtor made within 45 days after the petition. But there is no statutory time limit on when the bankruptcy court can “order[ ] otherwise” under § 521(a)(1)(B) with respect to any of the information requirements in § 521(a)(1). If the 45 days in § 521(i)(3) have passed without a request for extension from the debtor, it appears that the bankruptcy court can still relieve the debtor of a filing requirement under § 521(a)(1)(B). What becomes of an “automatic” dismissal in the interim?
Interim Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) provides that most of the documents required by § 521(a)(1)(B) must be filed with the petition or within 15 days thereafter.21 The Interim Rule states that any extension of time for the filing of schedules, statements and other documents “may be granted only on motion for cause shown.”22 Would an extension of time under Interim Rule 1007(c) have any effect on the statutory time periods in § 521(i)(1) and (3)? An extension of time under Interim Rule 1007(c) would not extend the 45-day deadline to avoid automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1). Would an extension for “cause” under Interim Rule 1007(c) be the equivalent of a court finding of “justification” for purposes of § 521(i)(3)?
Section 521(i)(4) contains this curiously worded exception to the automatic dismissal just described:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, on the motion of the trustee filed before the expiration of the applicable period of time specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3), and after notice and a hearing, the court may decline to dismiss the case if the court finds that the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the information required by [§ 521](a)(1)(B)(iv) and that the best interests of creditors would be served by administration of the case.23
What does it mean that the bankruptcy court “may decline to dismiss” a Chapter 13 case that was “automatically dismissed” on the 46th day after a debtor failed to file information required by § 521(a)(1)? If the trustee’s motion must be filed before the expiration of the 45-day period specified in § 521(i)(1), how will the trustee know whether the debtor has or is going to fail to file all of the information required by § 521(a)(1)? Put another way, how would the Chapter 13 trustee figure out what cases in which to file the motion contemplated by § 521(i)(4) when the decision for § 521(i)(1) purposes has to be made before the deadline for filing required information has passed?
What would be the “applicable period of time” for a trustee’s intercession under § 521(i)(2)? A party in interest can request the entry of an order dismissing the case at any time after the 45 days has passed and the court must enter the order within five days of the request. To make sense of § 521(i)(4) in the § 521(i)(2) context, the trustee must request that the bankruptcy court not enter an order dismissing the Chapter 13 case within the (maximum) five days before the bankruptcy court is required to enter that order. To give meaning to all three subsections—§ 521(i)(1), (2) and (4)—it must be true that automatic dismissal means something different from entry of an order of dismissal, else declining to enter the order on a trustee’s timely motion is stripped of its statutory meaning.
If the debtor moves within 45 days and the court allows additional time to file the information required by § 521(a)(1)—the possibility described in § 521(i)(3)—what then is the “applicable period of time” within which the trustee must file a motion asking the court not to dismiss the case? It makes sense that the trustee at least would have whatever additional period the debtor has to file the information required by § 521(a)(1). Once again, the trustee won’t know until after expiration of the additional period whether the debtor is or isn’t in compliance with § 521(a)(1).
Notice that the trustee can make a timely request that the court decline to dismiss the case in response to the request of any party in interest for an order of dismissal under § 521(i)(2) and (4). Such a request from a party in interest could come at any time—days, months or even years after the 45th day after the petition. Until an order of dismissal is actually entered on the request of a party in interest, the trustee has a statutory right to defeat whatever effect an “automatic” dismissal has on the Chapter 13 case.
And what is this fixation in § 521(i)(4) with the information required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv)? You will recall that § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) requires the debtor to file copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received from an employer within 60 days of the petition.24 Section 521(i)(4) says on timely motion of the trustee, the bankruptcy court can decline to dismiss a Chapter 13 case that has been automatically dismissed if the debtor attempted in good faith to file the information that was in the payment advices and the best interests of creditors would be served by administration of the case. What if the automatic dismissal was triggered by the debtor’s failure to file a schedule of assets or a statement of affairs? If the debtor made a good-faith effort to file payment advices, are other sins of omission under § 521(a)(1) forgiven?
What happens in a Chapter 13 case when the debtor fails to file all of the information required by § 521(a)(1) within 45 days of the petition and no party in interest moves for an order of dismissal? If the docket sheet is consulted, there is a pending Chapter 13 case after an automatic dismissal that is not memorialized by a court order. If the debtor continues to make payments and case administration proceeds through confirmation and distributions to creditors, good arguments can be made that the passage of time eventually generates an estoppel or some other equitable interference to any request for an order dismissing the case under § 521(i)(2). It could be relevant whether the party requesting the order knew or should have known that required information had not been filed within 45 days of the petition. These issues are likely to arise when automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) is raised by a creditor months or years into a Chapter 13 case as a defense or shield to some undesirable event and a review of court filings reveals that information required by § 521(a)(1) was not filed months or years earlier.
If a timely request of the debtor for an extension of time under § 521(i)(3) is no longer possible—which will often be the case because the debtor won’t know that automatic dismissal is in play until after a request by a party in interest for an order of dismissal—is the debtor’s available response a motion to reinstate the case or a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9023 or 9024 for relief from the nonexistent “order” of dismissal? If dismissal was automatic, there is no order of dismissal with respect to which a motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would lie. It seems dangerous for the debtor to wait until after an order of dismissal is entered under § 521(i)(2) and then to move for relief from that order. Can a bankruptcy court relieve the debtor of the effect of an automatic dismissal based on “excusable neglect” or “surprise” under Bankruptcy Rule 9024? One reported decision granted a Chapter 13 debtor Rule 60 relief from an order of dismissal based on excusable neglect when the debtor’s former counsel failed to file payment advices that the debtor delivered to counsel.25
It would be prudent not to even speculate how a debtor appeals from the automatic dismissal of a Chapter 13 case. Of course, the appeal period under Bankruptcy Rule 8002 is counted from the date of entry of a judgment, order or decree.26 A notice of appeal filed before entry of the judgment or order is sometimes treated as if it was filed on the date of the subsequent entry of the judgment or order.27 If a party in interest requests an order dismissing a Chapter 13 case that was automatically dismissed on the 46th day after the petition, arguably the appeal period would be counted from the date of entry of the dismissal order, notwithstanding that “automatic” dismissal was effective at an earlier date. If no such order has been entered, it is not obvious that appellate review of the automatic dismissal is available under the current bankruptcy rules. There is no Interim Rule addressing this aspect of practice under BAPCPA.
Based on software and recommendations from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, it is likely that many bankruptcy courts will establish “internal” procedures for tracking the documents filed in consumer bankruptcy cases to identify cases in which “information” is missing after the 45-day period in new § 521(i). It is quite likely that some bankruptcy courts will enter “administrative orders” dismissing bankruptcy cases in which a judgment is made by an employee of the clerk’s office that “information” is missing.
The implications here are troubling. The baffling concept of “automatic” dismissal does not contain an imperative that bankruptcy courts enter orders. In fact, it suggests just the opposite—that something has happened in a bankruptcy case that does not require court action. That automatic dismissal is unfamiliar and of uncertain content does not compel bankruptcy judges or court clerks to fill the voids in the absence of ordinary adversary process. To what liability are clerk’s office personnel exposed if a mistaken judgment is made whether “information” required by § 521(a)(1) is present somewhere in a bankruptcy file? Bankruptcy judges step out of the independent role of the judiciary when an order dismissing a case is entered without a motion by a litigant. There are too many difficult questions of statutory construction in the truly strange language of new § 521(i) for bankruptcy clerks or bankruptcy judges to jump in the direction of entering orders without meaningful procedural predicates.
There are alternatives to the internal monitoring and “administrative orders” advocated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. For example, some courts by local rule will permit debtors to file a “certificate of compliance” stating that the information required by § 521(a)(1) was filed within the 45 days permitted by § 521(i). When such a certificate is filed in a bankruptcy case, a rebuttable presumption arises (of the sort found in Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f)) that automatic dismissal is not appropriate under § 521(i). A party that disagrees can overcome the presumption after notice and a hearing in the bankruptcy court. In this manner, the § 521(i) issue is joined by opposing litigants and bankruptcy judges stay in their traditional role as judges. The clerk’s office is not exposed to any risk for attempting the judgments that underlie the automatic dismissal in § 521(i).
This alternative is presented only to suggest that the enigmatic provisions of new § 521(i) demand judicial attention in the usual way—through contest in open court, not through invisible administrative procedures.
Somewhat perversely, it can be argued that the new provision for automatic dismissal in § 521(i) invalidates inconsistent rules or orders in individual cases that require a consumer debtor to file the “information” in § 521(a) earlier than 45 days after the petition. Of course, there are various Bankruptcy Rules that require debtors to file information described in § 521(a)(1) either with the petition or within 15 days after the petition.28 And it is not uncommon that bankruptcy courts or clerks’ offices issue “notices of deficiency” or similar documents to alert debtors that papers are missing. Some bankruptcy courts monitor whether missing documents are filed and some action, including a “show cause” order or order of dismissal, results upon noncompliance. These practices may be inconsistent with the 45-day automatic dismissal now provided in § 521(i).
Honest and complete information is undeniably important in Chapter 13 cases. Most of the information required by § 521(a)(1), as amended by BAPCPA, is useful if not necessary to administration of a Chapter 13 case. Automatic dismissal as misconceived by BAPCPA in § 521(i) is a fatally flawed remedy for a debtor’s failure to file all of the information required by § 521(a)(1). Sane creditors will not act as if a pending Chapter 13 case was actually dismissed automatically without first requesting an order of dismissal from the bankruptcy court.
The problems with automatic dismissal under § 521(i) have quickly come to roost with respect to payment advices in Chapter 13 cases. Detailed elsewhere,29 unless the court orders otherwise, Chapter 13 debtors are required by § 521(a)(1) to file copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received from an employer within 60 days of the petition.30 Because this filing requirement is in § 521(a)(1), failure of a Chapter 13 debtor to file “all of the information” required with respect to payment advices triggers automatic dismissal on the 46th day after the petition. There are many traps in the interaction of § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and § 521(i)(1).
First, counsel has to know where to “file” payment advices or other evidence of payment. Because the payment advices filing requirement is in subpart (B) of § 521(a)(1), bankruptcy courts can “order[ ] otherwise” with respect to this filing requirement. By general order or local rule, many bankruptcy courts have directed that payment advices and other evidence of payment in Chapter 13 cases are “filed” with or “provided” to the Chapter 13 trustee. In such a district, failure to file payment advices with the court does not excite automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) if the debtor provided payment advices to the trustee consistent with local practice.31 In contrast, in a bankruptcy court that has not ordered otherwise, filing payment advices with the trustee does not satisfy § 521(a)(1) and does not prevent automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1).32
Assuming you correctly determine where to file, the imperative becomes that what you filed contains all “information” that would be found in “all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition.” Defining “information” in this context requires some care and imagination.
For example, in In re Luders,33 consistent with local rule, the debtors filed payment advices with the trustee for most of the 60-day period before the petition, but three pay stubs were missing. The trustee filed notice of failure to comply with § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) together with a request that the case be “automatically dismissed.” Wondering out loud what the proper procedure is for “automatic dismissal,” the bankruptcy court found the “year-to-date” information on the filed pay stubs revealed all of the missing payment information, precluding automatic dismissal:
[F]ailure to afford the debtors an opportunity to be heard would have adverse consequences to the debtors because refiling their petition would trigger the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) or (4) . . . . [T]he debtors could move the court to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the case. Using either approach results in time and expense to the debtors and potential confusion to creditors as to the status of the case. Equity dictates that the certification by the Trustee of noncompliance and the notice of a hearing thereon did not trigger automatic dismissal. This court can consider the merits of debtors’ position that there was sufficient information in the timely filed payment advices to meet the statutory requirements. . . . The pay stubs submitted to the Trustee, along with the year-to-date totals found on these pay stubs, constitute “other evidence of payment” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). Therefore, the case is not to be dismissed under 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).34
In contrast, consider the joint debtors in In re Cloud.35 Mrs. Cloud did not receive any payment advices during the 60 days before the petition. Mr. Cloud received payment advices and was required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) to file payment advices for the 60-day period between March 3 and May 1, 2006. The 45th day after the petition was June 16, 2006.
On June 6, Mr. Cloud filed payment advices for April 30 through May 27, 2006. In November 2006, Mr. Cloud filed payment advices for March 5 through April 29. Without discussion whether the timely filed payment advices for the period April 30 through May 27 included the “information” late-filed in November, the bankruptcy court concluded that Mr. Cloud “failed to timely file copies of his payment advices . . . . As a result, the bankruptcy case as to William Cloud was automatically dismissed by operation of statute effective June 17, 2006.”36 Because Mrs. Cloud had no payment advices, her case was not dismissed.
The statutory requirements in § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and § 521(i)(1) are not the same. It is one thing to require a Chapter 13 debtor to file “copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment.”37 It is quite another story altogether to automatically dismiss a Chapter 13 case when the “information” that would be found in those payment advices is missing. Luders demonstrates that bankruptcy courts must afford debtors an opportunity to prove that the “information” was filed even if all payment advices were not. Cloud demonstrates that debtors are at risk of automatic dismissal based on missing pay stubs and cannot count on bankruptcy courts to inquire whether the “information” has been filed when the pay stubs have not.
Procedural issues abound in this § 521(i)(1) context. The Luders court acknowledged the absence of clear logic how notices, hearings and the like fit into the “automatic” dismissal described in § 521(i)(1); yet the facts that emerged in Luders after inquiry illustrate why debtors must be given an opportunity to prove that automatic dismissal didn’t happen. Some rule making in this area would be useful, but it has to be admitted that it is hard to describe the rule that would straighten out the mess that is automatic dismissal under § 521(i).
Payment advices are not all there is in § 521(a)(1) that can trigger automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1). In In re Latovljevic,38 an incarcerated debtor who failed to file various documents, including Form B22C, failed to satisfy duties in § 521(a)(1) and the Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed under § 521(i)(1). In contrast, the bankruptcy court in In re Guidry39 pointed out that the requirement to file certain tax returns not later than seven days prior to the § 341 meeting of creditors40 was in § 521(e)(2), not in § 521(a)(1), so automatic dismissal under § 521(i) did not apply and a motion to dismiss must be filed. 41
There is a final twist created by BAPCPA with respect to conversion or dismissal before confirmation based on failure of the debtor to file documents. Under § 1307(c)(9), “only on request of the United States trustee,” the court may convert or dismiss a Chapter 13 case based on the failure of the debtor to file “within 15 days, or such additional time as the court may allow,” the “information required by paragraph (1) of section 521.”42
The cross-reference to “paragraph (1) of section 521” in § 1307(c)(9) does not make sense after BAPCPA. There is no “paragraph (1) in section 521.” Prior to BAPCPA, the reference to “paragraph (1) of § 521” meant § 521(1) and captured the debtor’s duty to file a list of creditors, schedules of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and expenditures and a statement of financial affairs. After BAPCPA, those items are spread out in § 521(a)(1)(A) and (B) and combined with many new debtor filing duties.
One guess is that the failed cross-reference in § 1307(c)(9) should be read as a reference to paragraph “(a)(1)” of § 521—the long list of filing duties as amended by BAPCPA.43 This reading is a bit awkward because § 521(a)(1) is the same cross-referenced list of filing duties that triggers automatic dismissal on the 46th day after the petition if information is missing under § 521(i). Only the U.S. trustee can raise the ground for conversion or dismissal in § 1307(c)(9) and, on the U.S. trustee’s motion, the debtor has 15 days or such other time as the court allows, in which to file the information required by § 521(a)(1). Inconsistently, § 521(i) mandates automatic dismissal on the 46th day after the petition if the information required by § 521(a)(1) has not been filed. Dismissal is the only option in § 521(i); dismissal or conversion is allowed on the U.S. trustee’s motion under § 1307(c)(9).
Are § 1307(c)(9) and § 521(i) inconsistent? If the U.S. trustee has filed a motion under § 1307(c)(9), does that motion interrupt automatic dismissal under § 521(i)? Under § 521(i)(3), on timely request of the debtor, a court can allow up to 45 additional days to file the information required by § 521(a)(1). Under § 1307(c)(9), there is no statutory limit to the additional time a court can allow a debtor when the U.S. trustee moves for conversion or dismissal based on the same ground—missing information under § 521(a)(1). There is no case trustee intervention with respect to a U.S. trustee’s motion under § 1307(c)(9) as there is in § 521(i)(4) with respect to automatic dismissal. Section 1307(c)(9) could be interpreted as a significant limitation on the bewildering new concept of automatic dismissal.
1 See § 387.1 [ New Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List ] § 42.1 Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List for a list of new duties and filing requirements.
2 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(e) and 1308(b), discussed in § 393.1 [ Consequences of Failure to File or Provide Tax Returns ] § 42.8 Consequences of Failure to File or Provide Tax Returns.
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) and (l), discussed in § 382.1 [ Certification and Rent Deposit ] § 36.35 Certification About Eviction Judgment and Rent Deposit.
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 586(f), discussed in § 396.1 [ Audits by U.S. Trustee ] § 42.11 Audits by U.S. Trustee.
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(8), discussed in § 498.1 [ Domestic Support Obligations Must Be Current ] § 113.3 Domestic Support Obligations Must Be Current.
6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), discussed in § 545.1 [ New Domestic Support Obligation Certification ] § 156.4 Domestic Support Obligation Certification.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(11), discussed in §§ 529.1 [ New Grounds for Conversion after BAPCPA ] § 141.4 Cause for Conversion Added or Changed by BAPCPA and 540.1 [ New and Changed Grounds for Dismissal ] § 152.3 Cause for Dismissal Added or Changed by BAPCPA.
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1), discussed in § 546.1 [ Instructional Course Requirement ] § 156.5 Instructional Course Requirement.
9 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).
10 See § 387.1 [ New Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List ] § 42.1 Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List.
11 See §§ 34.3 [ List of Creditors and Addresses ] § 36.4 List of Creditors and Addresses and 374.1 [ List of Creditors—DSOs and § 342 Considerations ] § 36.5 List of Creditors—DSOs and § 342 Considerations.
12 See §§ 35.5 [ Schedule D—Secured Claims ] § 36.11 Schedule D—Secured Claims–35.7 [ Schedule F—Unsecured Claims ] § 36.13 Schedule F—Unsecured Claims.
13 See § 35.10 [ Schedules I and J—Income and Expenditures ] § 36.16 Schedules I and J—Income and Expenditures.
14 See § 36.1 [ Statement of Financial Affairs ] § 36.22 Statement of Financial Affairs.
15 See § 375.1 [ Certificate of § 342(b) Notice ] § 36.33 Certificate of § 342(b) Notice after BAPCPA.
16 See § 376.1 [ Payment Advices ] § 42.3 Payment Advices.
17 See § 377.1 [ Statement of Monthly Net Income ] § 36.17 Statement of Monthly Net Income.
18 See § 378.1 [ Statement of Anticipated Increase in Income or Expenditures ] § 36.18 Statement of Anticipated Increase in Income or Expenditures.
19 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2).
20 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(3).
21 Interim Bankr. R. 1007(c).
22 Interim Bankr. R. 1007(c).
23 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(4).
24 See § 376.1 [ Payment Advices ] § 42.3 Payment Advices.
25 In re Weinraub, 351 B.R. 779, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[T]he prejudice to the Debtor of the Dismissal Order . . . is substantial. . . . The neglect . . . appears to stem from counsel’s negligence. . . . [T]heir attorney failed to file the payment advices given to him by the Debtors nor did he file a chapter 13 plan or a motion to extend the deadline to file. . . . The failure to file any of the above, led to the dismissal . . . . [I]t is excusable neglect on the part of the Weinraubs to believe that documents given to their counsel would be filed in a timely fashion.”).
26 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).
27 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a).
28 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(c).
29 See § 376.1 [ Payment Advices ] § 42.3 Payment Advices.
30 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), discussed in § 376.1 [ Payment Advices ] § 42.3 Payment Advices.
31 In re Luders, 356 B.R. 671 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006) (Consistent with local rule, debtors filed payment advices with Chapter 13 trustee.); In re Barajas, No. 06-10598-B-13, 2006 WL 3254483, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (Failure to file payment advices did not require automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) because general order in Eastern District of California provided that payroll information “shall not be filed with the court, but rather provided to the trustee not later than seven days before the first date set for the meeting of creditors.”).
32 See In re Rubio, No. 06-50065, 2006 WL 2792213, at *2–*3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006) (Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed on 46th day when debtor failed to file “employee records” until 90 days after petition; that debtor may have submitted payment advices to former case trustee does not change outcome. “Debtor stated that he had submitted the payment advices to the former trustee of this case. Debtor did not file the payment advices with the Court. . . . Debtor has not provided any support for the position that the Trustee may receive filings as an agent of the Court. . . . Filing must be done with the clerk’s office. . . . The only discretion given to judges in this matter is to permit filing with the judge, but even then, papers must be forwarded to the clerk. . . . Although the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Court may order that payment advices not be filed, the Court did not do so in this case. The Bankruptcy Code provides that if the advices must be filed, and they are not, then the case is automatically dismissed. Thus, by operation of law, this case was dismissed.”).
33 356 B.R. 671 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2006).
34 356 B.R. at 673–74.
35 356 B.R. 544 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006).
36 356 B.R. at 545.
37 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).
38 343 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006).
39 354 B.R. 824 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
40 See § 390.1 [ Tax Return Duties Seven Days before First Scheduled Meeting of Creditors ] § 42.5 Tax Return Duties Seven Days before First Scheduled Meeting of Creditors.
41 In re Guidry, 354 B.R. 824, 832–33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (“Under the revised Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s failure to provide a tax return prior to the § 341 meeting of creditors has no immediate consequence. Congress mandated that the failure to provide a number of documents (those identified in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)), would result in the automatic dismissal of a bankruptcy case effective as of the 46th day after the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i). However, the requirement that a tax return be provided is not contained within § 521(a)(1). Instead, it is set forth in § 521(e)(2). . . . A motion to dismiss must be filed in order for the Court to consider dismissing a case on these grounds. However, § 521(e)(2)(B) allows a debtor to defeat a motion to dismiss if the debtor demonstrates that the failure to provide the return was due to circumstances beyond the debtor’s control. . . . If the debtor opposes the motion to dismiss, the Court must set and hold a hearing on the motion. Inasmuch as the confirmation hearing is to occur within 20-45 days after the § 341 meeting, the confirmation hearing will often occur prior to the dismissal hearing.”).
42 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(9), discussed in § 529.1 [ New Grounds for Conversion after BAPCPA ] § 141.4 Cause for Conversion Added or Changed by BAPCPA.
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1), discussed in § 387.1 [ New Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List ] § 42.1 Filing Requirements and Other Duties: A List.
Community Bank, N.A. v. Riffle, 617 F.3d 171, 175, 177 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2010) (Pooler, Hall, Livingston) (Adopting "payment-focused" interpretation and rejecting "document-focused" interpretation of § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and citing Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 18, 2008) (Nugent, Brown, Rasure), year-to-date and other income information filled in gaps created by missing pay advices to preclude automatic dismissal under § 521(i). Acknowledging that § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) "lacks a plain meaning," Second Circuit rejects a document-focused interpretation that would require the debtor to file all payment advices received in the 60 days before the petition. Instead, court adopts payment-focused interpretation that can be satisfied by filing either copies of all pay advices received within 60 days or "'copies of . . . other [credible] evidence of [such] payment received . . . by the debtor from any employer.'" Debtor filed the last pay advice before the bankruptcy petition—which included earnings and deductions for that last pay period and for year-to-date—together with a "Sales Earnings Report," which showed gross earnings for an even longer period. These documents "'create[d] a very clear picture as to the amount of income [the] [d]ebtor[s] received in the sixty days prepetition' . . . and thus met their obligations under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv)." That § 521(i)(1) mandates automatic dismissal only in the event the debtors fail to file "all of the information required" "suggests a statutory emphasis on the filing of information relevant to the debtors' petition rather than a requirement for specific documents."), aff'g No. 07-22372, 2008 WL 203341, at *3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2008) (Ninfo) ("In the Rochester Division of the Western District of New York, this Court has indicated . . . it would enter orders on motions dismissing cases pursuant to Section 521(i)(1)[(B)] where a debtor filed no payment advices or other evidence of payment within the forty-five-day period . . . even when it has been asserted that it was attorney error . . . and . . . whenever a debtor filed some payment information within the applicable forty-five-day period, a determination would have to be made as to whether that was sufficient 'other evidence of payment' to constitute 'all of the information required' under Section [521(a)](1)(B)(iv). . . . [A]ll parties-in-interest should presume that in a case where some payment information was filed, if within thirty days after the expiration of the applicable forty-five-day period provided for in Section 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), no party-in-interest . . . has filed a motion or application pursuant to Section 521(i)(2) for an order confirming the automatic dismissal of the case . . . that the payment information filed by the debtor was sufficient other evidence of payment . . . so that the automatic dismissal provisions were not triggered.").
Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (Lipez, Selya, Howard) (Bankruptcy court has discretion under § 521(a)(1)(B) to excuse filing of documents after 45-day deadline has expired—avoiding "automatic dismissal" required by § 521(i). "The term 'automatic dismissal' is something of a misnomer. Typically, dismissal under this provision takes place at the instance of a 'party in interest.' . . . Dismissal is, therefore, hardly 'automatic.' . . . With Congress's core purpose in mind, we are reluctant to read into the statute by implication a new limit on judicial discretion that would encourage rather than discourage bankruptcy abuse. . . . [M]issing information may or may not be required, in a practical sense, depending upon what is deemed material by the court . . . . We do not decide today whether bankruptcy courts possess unfettered discretion to waive the disclosure requirements ex post. Where, however, there is no continuing need for the information or a waiver is needed to prevent automatic dismissal from furthering a debtor's abusive conduct, the court has discretion to take such an action."); rev'g 376 B.R. 382, 386-87 (D.P.R. 2007) (Gelpi) (After conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, bankruptcy court does not have discretion to retroactively excuse debtor from failing to file all payments advices within 45 days of Chapter 13 petition; debtors' motion to dismiss must be granted because case was automatically dismissed under § 521(i) on 46th day. "Because allowing the Bankruptcy Court to retroactively relieve the debtors from filing the required information under Section (a)(1)(B) would render the automatic dismissal provision in § 521(i)(1) meaningless, the court will not adopt this minority view. . . . [A] major goal of Congress in enacting the BAPCPA was to replace judicial discretion with specific statutory standards and formulas. . . . Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law when it excused the debtors from filing their payment advices more than 45 days after the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition. . . . BAPCPA left the court with no discretion to fashion any reasonable or equitable solution. . . . Section 521(i)(4) provides the only statutory basis upon which the court may decline to enter an order of dismissal. . . . The trustees in this case did not take advantage of this provision. They did not move the Bankruptcy Court to retain the case after the debtors moved to dismiss it.").
In re Daniel, No. CO-08-068, 2009 WL 382434, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2009) (unpublished) (Michael, Nugent, Karlin) (Without reaching question whether case was "automatically" dismissed, when debtor did not file payment advices within 45 days of petition as extended by court order, case was appropriately dismissed (sua sponte). "[T]here is nothing in the record before us that would contradict the bankruptcy court's finding that Daniel failed to file the 'payment advice' information required under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). The statute is clear that, if such information is not timely filed, the case is subject to dismissal, whether 'automatic' or by court order. The bankruptcy court's conclusion that this case was subject to dismissal under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) is correct.").
Soto v. Doral Bank (In re Soto), 491 B.R. 307, 312-15 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. May 8, 2013) (Haines, Feeney, Hoffman) (Applying Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (Lipez, Selya, Howard), failure to provide payment advices triggered automatic dismissal under § 521(i) and debtor offered no evidence of circumstances that would justify the exercise of discretion otherwise. Section 521(a) and (i) are not in conflict with § 1307(c)(9) and bankruptcy court appropriately dismissed case without separate notice and hearing. "Post-BAPCPA, courts 'have struggled to create procedures to implement the novel concept of "automatic" dismissal.' . . . [T]he First Circuit adopted an approach to automatic dismissal which gives the bankruptcy court limited discretion in certain circumstances . . . . [Section] 521(i) does not compel dismissal of the case . . . where 'the missing information has become irrelevant or extraneous.' . . . [T]he 45-day deadline prescribed by § 521(i)(1) expired . . . a full seven months before the bankruptcy court dismissed the case. The record discloses no evidence that the debtors provided to the trustee the payment advices required by that section, either before or after the expiration of the statutory deadline. . . . [D]ebtors never moved under § 521[(i)](3) to enlarge the 45-day deadline established in § 521(i)(1). Nor did they attempt to demonstrate the presence of either of the factors which, in this circuit, would justify the exercise of the court's discretion to deny dismissal, namely: (1) that they attempted in good faith to supply the missing information; or (2) the information was no longer necessary. . . . [U]nder the standard articulated in Acosta-Rivera, the court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the debtors' case. . . . The debtors' argument that § 1307(c)(9) preempts § 521(a), thereby imposing a requirement for notice and a hearing prior to dismissal, is also unavailing. . . . 'When the circumstances specified by § 521(i)(1) exist in a case, § 521(i)(1) must be viewed as a more specific statutory provision than § 1307(c) and as making dismissal mandatory notwithstanding § 1307(c) (even though § 1307(c) is not expressly mentioned in § 521(i)(1)).'").
Wilcox v. Anderson (In re Wilcox), No. 10-32828, 2011 WL 3347772, at *2-*5 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2011) (unpublished) (Cornish, Brown, Karlin) (Pro se debtor's failure to timely file list of creditors required by § 521(a)(1)(A) is fatal to motion to set aside dismissal pursuant to § 521(i) notwithstanding that names and addresses of creditors were in filed schedules. Clerk's office issued "Deficiency Notice" advising debtor of failure to file documents, including list of creditors, and requiring documents to be filed by October 1, 2010. Debtor filed schedules and statement of affairs on October 1 but did not file a separate creditor list. Names and addresses of creditors were within the schedules that were filed. Trustee moved to dismiss. Bankruptcy court clerk dismissed case pursuant to § 521(i)(1). "We do not read § 521(i)(1) as eviscerating the form requirements of the documents required by § 521(a)(1). . . . A § 521(a)(1)(A) creditor list, unlike § 521(a)(1)(B) filings, must be filed in every case. Section 521(a)(1)(B) filings, which include a debtor's schedules, need not be filed if the bankruptcy court 'orders otherwise.' . . . A debtor's schedules cannot satisfy the debtor's duty to file a list of creditors . . . . [Section] 521(a)(1), together with Rule 1007 and Local Rule 1007-1, required the Debtor to file a separate list of creditors in conformance with the 'mailing matrix' specifications provided by the Utah bankruptcy court clerk . . . . His failure to do so until only after he was notified of the dismissal was fatal to his case. . . . A 'mailing matrix' is a critical part of the functioning of the bankruptcy court system, ensuring that notice of the bankruptcy proceedings is given to all interested parties.").
Simon v. Amir (In re Amir), 436 B.R. 1, 25 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010) (Boswell, McIvor, Rhodes) (Citing Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (Lipez, Selya, Howard), and Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. June 18, 2009) (Nelson, Kleinfeld, Smith), "bankruptcy courts have the authority to waive § 521(a)(1)'s filing requirements if enforcing those requirements would create an abuse of the bankruptcy process." Chapter 7 debtor waived claim that preconversion Chapter 13 petition should have been automatically dismissed under § 521(i) when the debtor failed to file payment advices required by § 521(a)(1). Debtor waited 10 months after filing of case to raise § 521(i) issue. Debtor participated extensively in litigation before and after conversion, and § 521(i) issue was not raised until Chapter 7 trustee pursued recovery of property. "There is no proof that Amir's payment advices will have any impact at this stage of the case except to allow Amir to further a pattern of abuse.").
Randle v. Enmark (In re Randle), No. EC-07-1349-DCMo, 2008 WL 8448825, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 30, 2008) (unpublished) (Dunn, Carroll, Montali) (Citing Tennant v. Rojas (In re Tennant), 318 B.R. 860 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2004) (Montali, Perris, Brandt), and without discussion of § 521(i), failure to timely file master address list of creditors required by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a)(1) is cause for dismissal. "Although § 1307(c)(9) speaks in terms of a dismissal on this basis only upon motion by the U.S. Trustee, we previously have held that in the absence of a motion by the U.S. Trustee, § 105(a) authorizes the bankruptcy court to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to comply with § 521(1).").
Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Mar. 18, 2008) (Nugent, Brown, Rasure) (Because "year-to-date" information on filed payment advices easily permitted calculation of numbers on payment advice that was not filed, case was not automatically dismissed. "[Y]ear-to-date payment information may be credible 'other evidence of payment received,' even though the evidence is not technically in the form of separate payment advices for each relevant pay period. . . . Due to the timing of issuance of Debtor's pay checks and passage of the new year, the year-to-date information on his fourth pay stub covered only two paychecks—the paychecks for the third and fourth pay periods. As such, it was a simple mathematical calculation to determine the amounts that were listed on Debtor's missing third pay stub by subtracting the fourth pay period amounts from the year-to-date information. . . . Because the pay stubs and year-to-date information supplied by Debtor created a very clear picture as to the amount of income Debtor received in the sixty days prepetition, Debtor satisfied § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv)."), rev'g, 371 B.R. 509, 516-17 (Bankr. D. Utah July 12, 2007) (Year-to-date information cannot cure failure to file a payment advice that was received during 60-day period; automatic dismissal results without constitutional defects. Sixty-day payment advice period extended from November 24, 2006, to January 23, 2007. Debtor provided payment advices for December 5, December 20, 2006, and January 20, 2007, pay dates. The January 5, 2007, pay advice was received by the debtor and was not filed, and debtor did not have the missing pay advice and was unable to obtain a copy from the employer. Court first determined that year-to-date information on the January 20 payment advice was not sufficient "other evidence of payment" for § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) purposes because only the actual payment advice received by the debtor on January 5 would satisfy the statute. Accordingly, the case was automatically dismissed on the 46th day. With respect to the debtor's constitutional challenge to automatic dismissal: "With neither the right of access to file for bankruptcy relief nor the discharge of debts in bankruptcy having constitutional significance, the Court simply cannot see how dismissal of Miller's bankruptcy case automatic or not—deprives him of any federally protected interest. . . . Even if some federally protected property interest were found to exist, Miller received constitutionally adequate notice of the proceedings. . . . [Section] 521(i)(1) requires the exercise of judicial decision-making power to determine compliance and cannot be delegated to a clerk . . . . The Court wholly agrees and has never delegated such authority. . . . [I]t is indeed the clerk's office that issues Notices of Dismissal once § 521(i)(1) has been found to be applicable. But the underlying determination is always made by the Court.").
Svigel v. Stewart (In re Svigel), Nos. WY-07-020, 06-20499, 2007 WL 1747117, at *2 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. June 18, 2007) (unpublished) (Dismissal under § 521(i)(1) and § 1307(c)(1) reversed and remanded for bankruptcy court to consider whether year-to-date information satisfies § 521(i)(1). Bankruptcy court dismissed Chapter 13 petition filed on September 28, 2006, when debtor filed payment advices for September 16 through September 30 and for October 1 through October 15. "[T]he bankruptcy court erred in not considering whether the year-to-date pay stubs could meet the requirements of 'other evidence' under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).").
In re Fuentes-Padilla, 534 B.R. 77, 84-86 (D.P.R. June 3, 2015) (Gelpi) (Applying Segarra-Mirance v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (Lipez, Selya, Howard), bankruptcy court appropriately dismissed Chapter 13 case on 49th day pursuant to § 521(i) when required documents were not filed; motion for 30-day extension of time filed within 14 days provided in Bankruptcy Rule 1007 did not extend 45-day deadline in § 521(i). "[T]he debtors in this case did not demonstrate the presence of either of the Acosta-Rivera factors . . . : (1) that they attempted in good faith to supply the missing information; or (2) the information was no longer necessary. . . . [T]he time period provided by Rule 1007(c) and section 521(i) coexist and are not mutually exclusive. . . . [T]he bankruptcy court's notice of defective filing merely two (2) days after the filing of the petition gave them fair warning as to both provisions and the consequence of non-compliance. . . . [W]ithin the fourteen (14) day period, debtors requested an additional thirty (30) days to complete the petition . . . . [T]he only extension of time filed by debtors, requesting additional time to file the schedules and statements, was filed within the period provided by Rule 1007(c) . . . . The deadline to file the requisite schedules and statements is governed by Rule 1007, not section 521. . . . Section 521(i)'s forty-five (45) day time-frame in no way replaces the deadlines established by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. . . . [T]he bankruptcy court's dismissal . . . , pursuant to section 521(i), was warranted given that forty-five (45) days from the filing of the petition had elapsed and debtors' petition remained incomplete and without proper justification of its defectiveness. . . . Section 521(i)(3) clearly provides that an extension of time must be requested within section 521(i)'s forty-five (45) day period.").
In re Quezada, No. 13-638 (EGS), 2013 WL 6698728, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2013) (Sullivan) (Dismissal was appropriate if not automatic when debtor failed to submit copies of all payment advices received within 60 days of the petition. "Mr. Quezada did not file all of the financial documents that must be submitted within fifteen days of filing a bankruptcy petition. He never submitted 'copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition.' . . . This may lead to dismissal 'on request of the United States trustee,' 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(9), and dismissal is 'automatic [ ]' when the information is not submitted within forty-five days after the petition was filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1). . . . [D]ismissal would have been automatic because, by the time the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition, sixty-nine days had elapsed since the petition had been filed. . . . Mr. Quezada did not file a Chapter 13 plan within fourteen days of the date on which his petition was filed, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1321 . . . . This, too, is grounds for dismissal of the petition 'on request of . . . the United States trustee.' 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(3)[.]").
Miller v. Marshall, 457 B.R. 684 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2011) (Guzman) (Although events at hearing were ambiguous, bankruptcy court must have extended the 45 days in § 521(i) when it gave the debtor an additional week to file required documents as permitted by § 521(i)(3).), aff'd, No. 12 C 02566, 2013 WL 5213366 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2013) (Tharp).).
In re Miller, No. 10 C 4432, 2011 WL 940044, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2011) (Holderman) (Dismissal order is appropriate when "unreasonably suspicious and evasive" debtor failed to file schedules or plan within 45 days of petition. "[A] debtor in a voluntary Chapter 13 case generally has only forty-five days after the filing of the petition to file the required information under § 521(a) before the case is automatically dismissed. 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1). . . . Once this statutory deadline has passed, 'any party in interest may request the court to enter an order dismissing the case.' 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2).").
CFCU Cmty. Credit Union v. Swimelar (In re Brickey), No. 6:07-CV-00341 (LEK), 2008 WL 189929, at *4-*7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008) (Kahn) ("[B]y the plain language of the statute, the operation of the automatic dismissal is conditional upon the non-occurrence of either of the events specified in §§ 521(i)(2) or 521(i)(4). . . . [A] request under § 521(i)(2) is '[s]ubject to paragraph (4).' Paragraph (4) allows the Trustee to request that the court not dismiss the case. If, in fact, the case had already been automatically dismissed by virtue of § 521(i)(1), there would be no sense to the language allowing a motion asking the court to 'decline to dismiss the case.' . . . [I]f a case is automatically dismissed pursuant to § 521(i)(1) without a court order, then essentially the case would be automatically dismissed based on a debtor's failure to file required documents before there has been a judicial determination that the debtor has, in fact, failed to file those documents. This is problematic . . . . [I]f a debtor fails to provide the information required by § 521(a)(1)(B) within forty-five days after the filing of the petition, the case shall be dismissed, 'subject to,' or conditional upon, either a request for a dismissal order under § 521(i)(2), or a timely motion by the trustee under § 521(i)(4). . . . [A]fter the forty-fifth day post-petition, upon satisfying itself that there has been non-compliance with § 521(a)(1), a court may issue a dismissal order on its own initiative under § 521(i)(1). Such a sua sponte dismissal order would give effect to the statute's requirement of an automatic dismissal. Because a court order will be entered into the docket, the parties would have notice of the court's action and an opportunity to move for reconsideration or take an appeal. . . . [P]ursuant to § 521(i)(1), an interested party . . . may request an order of dismissal pursuant to § 521(i)(2). If such a request is made, a condition specified in § 521(i)(1) has occurred, thereby precluding a § 521(i)(1) 'automatic dismissal.' . . . Provided that the court is satisfied that the debtor has not timely filed the requisite § 521(a)(1) documents, and the trustee has not made a timely § 521(i)(4) motion, the court is required to grant the request for dismissal. In this regard, the court has no discretion over the matter and, thus, dismissal is 'automatic.' . . . [I]f the debtor requests an extension of time, or the trustee moves pursuant to § 521(i)(4), a court's discretion is restricted by the statute. . . . [A] court has limited ability to grant extensions of time. . . . [T]he statute imposes time restrictions upon the filing of a § 521(i)(4) motion. . . . [A]bsent any requests for an order under § 521(i)(2) or extensions of time under § 521(i)(3), the motion must be filed within 45 days of the filing of the petition. . . . [I]f a request is made and granted under § 521(i)(3), the trustee's motion must be made within this newly extended period of time. . . . [I]f an interested party makes a request for an order, the trustee must make a § 521(i)(4) motion within five days of the request. . . . [T]he trustee may file a § 521(i)(4) motion within the longer of: (1) 45 days after the filing of the petition; (2) any extended period of time under § 521(i)(3) (not to exceed 45 days); or (3) five days after the filing of a request under § 521(i)(2)." With respect to whether the debtor attempted in good faith to file the information required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv): "the 'last two pay statements' . . . were not filed '[d]ue to an inadvertent error by counsel.' . . . It appears that counsel's error consisted of confusing of the payment advices requirement with the requirement for calculation of current monthly income. . . . It, therefore, follows that Brickey did make a good faith effort to file the necessary payment advices. She attempted to file all payment advices she believed were required."), aff'g, In re Brickey, 363 B.R. 59, 64-66 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007) (On creditor's motion for order under § 521(i)(2) confirming that Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed based on failure to file all required payment advices and response within five days by debtor and trustee under § 521(i)(4), debtor made good-faith effort to file payment advices and denying motion would be in best interests of creditors in light of plan that would pay 84% of unsecured claims. Debtors filed 32 pages of payment advices covering parts of six months before petition but omitted two pay periods immediately before petition. One debtor had retired and was receiving disability and did not have payment advices. Other debtor omitted two payment advice statements and filed missing statements two days after creditor's motion under § 521(i)(2). Payments advices filed did not contain year-to-date totals covering entire 60-day prepetition period. "[T]he only statutory basis for denying the dismissal of a case, which the Court may consider, is that provided in Code § 521(i)(4) . . . . [I]t appears that Congress considered it important to allow the trustee an opportunity to file a motion . . . . Under [§ 521(a)(2)], a party in interest may request that the Court enter an order dismissing the case as a result of the debtor's failure to comply with the filing requirements of Code § 521(a)(1), and the Court is required to enter such a 'comfort' order not later than five days after the request if noncompliance with the filing requirements is found by the Court. However, Code § 521(i)(2) is 'subject to' paragraph (4). Thus, the trustee is expressly given the opportunity to prevent dismissal of the case by filing a motion within the 'applicable period' of five days of said request, provided that the request is based solely on the debtor's failure to comply with Code § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), and the trustee is able to establish both a good faith effort on the part of the debtor to comply with the statute and that denying the request would be in the best interests of the creditors. Admittedly, if a party in interest never requests a 'comfort' order under Paragraph 2, the five day window is never opened for the trustee to make such a motion. Congress could have limited the Trustee . . . . Instead, it saw fit to afford the Trustee a 'third bite at the apple' in the event that a party in interest requests the Court to enter a comfort order dismissing the case. . . . [T]here is an argument to be made that it would be . . . absurd for a chapter 13 case to successfully proceed to confirmation, after which the debtor continued to make payments for several months or years under the terms of the plan, only to have a party in interest later request and be granted dismissal of the case, retroactively to the 46th day of the case, based on the debtor's failure to comply with Code § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). Under those circumstances, the chapter 13 trustee should be entitled to file the motion asking that the court deny dismissal of the case pursuant to Code § 521(i)(4). . . . [I]t is comparable to a motion filed by a party in interest pursuant to Code § 362(d) asking that the Court retroactively annul the automatic stay. Code § 521(i)(4) appears to authorize the Court to 'annul' the automatic dismissal provided for in Code § 521(i)(1) under very limited circumstances and only when it is the debtor's failure to file evidence of payment received by the debtor from an employer within the 60 day prepetition period that is at issue. Those 'limited circumstances' include the requirement that the motion must be made by the trustee; the motion must be made within the applicable period of time specified in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of Code § 521(i); and that the trustee is able to establish that it would be in the best interest of the creditors not to dismiss the case.).
In re Hall, No. A-06-CA-843-SS, 2007 WL 9701439 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2007) (Sparks) (Chapter 13 case was appropriately dismissed under § 521(e)(2) and/or automatically under § 512(i)(1) when debtor failed to file all information required by § 521(a)(1) and failed to file required tax return.).
In re Marcott, No. 15-13052 ta13, 2016 WL 690915, at *4-*6 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2016) (Thuma) (Because Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income is not required by § 521(a)(1), failure to file the CMI statement within 45 days of the petition does not trigger automatic dismissal. Debtor failed to file Official Form 122C-1 before 45-day automatic dismissal deadline in § 521(i). Bankruptcy court entered an order dismissing the case. Debtor moved to set aside dismissal. "The Dismissal Order was entered because Debtor did not file a CMI Statement. The assumption underlying the dismissal was that § 521(a)(1) requires Chapter 13 debtors to file the statement. . . . [Section] 521(a)(1)(B)(ii)[] requires 'a schedule of current income and current expenditures.' This subsection . . . has always been understood to require the information on Schedules I and J. . . . [Section] 521(a)(1)(B)(v) . . . requires 'a statement of the amount of monthly net income . . . . '[M]onthly net income' is not 'current monthly income.' . . . [I]t seems reasonable to conclude that Congress would have used the same phrase in § 521(a)(1)(B)(v) had it intended to refer to current monthly income. It did not. Instead, it used 'monthly net income,' which i[s] not defined and appears nowhere else in the Code. . . . Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(6) implements those portions of Chapter 13 . . . that require calculation of current monthly income . . . . [Section] 521(a)(1) does not require Chapter 13 debtors to file a CMI Statement. Rather, the requirement comes from Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(6). Section 521(i)'s 'automatically dismissed' mandate does not apply. . . . The current policy of the Court, implemented by the Clerk's Office in 2005, is to 'auto-dismiss' Chapter 13 cases if the debtor does not file a CMI Statement within 45 days of the petition date. . . . [T]hat policy was based on the mistaken belief that § 521(a)(1) requires Chapter 13 debtors to file a CMI Statement. This case should not have been 'auto-dismissed[.]'").
In re Deaurora, No. 14-41976-EJC, 2015 WL 2084901, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2015) (Coleman) (Automatic dismissal did not occur under § 521(i) when debtor filed an inaccurate statement of financial affairs; other consequences attach but not automatic dismissal. "Section 521 requires the Debtor to file a statement of financial affairs, which the Debtor did sixteen days after the petition date. True, the Debtor failed to file all of the required documents by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c)'s fourteen-day deadline; however, that rule does not require automatic dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(9). . . . [Section] 521(i)(1) does not provide for a case's automatic dismissal if a document is filed with inaccurate information. Other law controls such situations. Even if Mr. Good is correct that the information provided in the Debtor's original statement of financial affairs is incorrect (or worse), that has no bearing on the Debtor's compliance with § 521(i)(1).").
In re Baker, No. 14-37087-H3-13, 2015 WL 1515287, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2015) (Paul) (Seventh petition was automatically dismissed under § 521(i) on 46th day when debtors failed to timely file required documents. "Debtors failed to timely file schedules, the statement of financial affairs, Form B22C, and payment advices. Under Section 521(i)(1) . . . dismissal of the instant [case] is automatic, and is effective on the 46th day after the date of filing of the petition.").
In re Ball, No. 12-12721-TMD, 2013 WL 2383662, at *3-*4 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 30, 2013) (Davis) (Bankruptcy court is without discretion under § 521(i) to reinstate case dismissed when debtor failed to file payment advices or to seek extension of time within 45 days of petition; that counsel participated in the failure to timely file pay advices is no defense and subjects counsel to review of fees. Counsel admitted that the debtor timely sent required documents but counsel failed to forward pay advices and tax returns to the trustee until 63 days after the petition. An order for "Summary Dismissal of Case" was entered by the court based upon the trustee's certification that documentation was not timely filed. "[O]nce the § 521(i) deadline has passed, the statutory language mandating that the 'case shall be automatically dismissed,' leaves little discretion with the courts. . . . [S]ome courts have managed to find a way around this seemingly absolute language, when faced with situations where they judged that the dismissal would amount to an abuse of the bankruptcy process—for instance, when dismissal is sought, opportunistically, by the debtor. . . . [This] is not a case in which the proverbial 'bad faith' debtor is exploiting § 521(i) opportunistically to have a case dismissed.").
In re Jacobs, No. 13-12-14163-TA, 2013 WL 364299 (Bankr. D.N.M. Jan. 30, 2013) (Thuma) (In fourth "tag team" bankruptcy by debtor and nonfiling spouse, motion for extension of time to file documents required by § 521(i)(1) and (i)(3) filed 44 days after petition was timely, but debtor offered no justification for extension; case dismissed.).
In re Olejnik, No. 09-76714-AST, 2010 WL 4366183 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010) (Trust) (Incompletely filed case automatically dismissed under § 521(i)(1) was not closed after full administration and cannot be reopened under § 350(b); applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), cause for reopening to consider retroactive stay relief included that debtor failed to disclose real property subject to foreclosure.).
In re Wallace, No. 10-81205C-13D, 2010 WL 3584981, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2010) (unpublished) (Stocks) ("Confusion" by a new employee in counsel's office will not excuse dismissal mandated by § 521(i) when debtor did not file schedules and statement of financial affairs within 45 days of petition. "Section 521(i) is a component of a strict statutory regimen . . . . That statutory regimen does not include reinstatement of a case that has been dismissed pursuant to section 521(i). Such a dismissal is statutory in nature and is not subject to being vacated or avoided based upon a party's mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.").
In re Ruffin, No. 10-71681-AST, 2010 WL 2731021, at *1-*2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010) (unpublished) (Trust) (Pro se debtor was not entitled to Bankruptcy Rule 9023 relief from order that automatically dismissed Chapter 13 case when debtor failed to correct filing deficiencies in notices issued by clerk's office and reinstating case would be "a vacuous act" since debtor exceeded debt limitations for Chapter 13. "[T]he Court issued a deficiency notice, advising Debtor that he had failed to file a number of documents required to be filed by a chapter 13 debtor. . . . [T]he Court issued a Final Notice of Section 521 Deficiencies . . . . [O]n April 30, 2010, this Court issued an Order directing the Clerk's Office to dismiss this case due to the Debtor's failure to comply with Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . . [T]his case was automatically dismissed. . . . Debtor asserted his inability to file his required documents was due to 'caring for and transporting my elderly and sick mother and going for several tests and treatments.' . . . [T]he Debtor has pointed to no facts which were overlooked by this Court in its Dismissal Order that would cause the Court to reconsider dismissal of this case.").
In re Bopp, No. 10-00121, 2010 WL 2363626 (Bankr. D.D.C. June 8, 2010) (unpublished) (Teel) (Motion to vacate dismissal order was denied when case was dismissed for failure to file necessary documents under § 521(a); dismissal was automatic under § 521(i), but 180-day bar to refiling would be amended from order unless creditors objected.).
In re Emory, No. 10-01205-8 RDD, 2010 WL 2178759 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 21, 2010) (unpublished) (Doub) (Automatic dismissal is appropriate under § 521(i) when required documents were not filed, notice of deficiencies from court warned debtors and counsel of possible dismissal and debtors neither filed required documents nor moved to extend time for filing under § 521(i)(3).).
In re Ferro, No. 09-80415-G3-13, 2009 WL 4602042, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2009) (Paul) (Self-employed debtor who did not receive payment advices during 60 days before petition is in "technical compliance" with § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), and it is appropriate to vacate dismissal order that resulted when debtor did not file form response attached to form order warning debtor of deficiency for failing to file payment advices. In every case in the district in which documents required by § 521 have not been filed, court enters an "'Order: Possible Future Dismissal of Case.'" Attached to that order is a form response which the notice instructs debtors to file if they do not have an employer during the 60 days before the petition. Debtor was self-employed and did not receive pay advices during 60 days before petition but did not file the form response. Case was dismissed. "Debtor is in technical compliance with Section 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), because he has not received payment advices. However, Debtor is in violation of this court's order. . . . The court will not hold against Debtor his counsel's poor work in failing to file the response in the form required. However, counsel is cautioned in the future, a response stating merely that a debtor has filed certain documents will be considered insufficient to avoid dismissal of the case for failure of a debtor to file payment advices.").
In re Wassah, 417 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009) (Craig) (Failure to file documents required by § 521(a) and (i) cannot be remedied after the time periods have expired and automatic dismissal has occurred absent extraordinary circumstances under Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009), and Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009); difficulty determining amount of debt is not an extraordinary circumstance.).
In re Lee, No. 09-00406, 2009 WL 2778225 (Bankr. D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (Teel) (Section 521(i) makes dismissal mandatory when debtor did not timely move to extend deadline and failed to file required documents no later than 45 days after commencement of case.).
In re Taylor, No. A09-63120-PWB, 2009 WL 6499346, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2009) (Bonapfel) (Chapter 13 case is not automatically dismissed on creditor's motion under § 521(i)(2) when hearing is necessary to determine whether debtor is self-employed and thus excused from payment-advice-filing requirement in § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). "With respect to the pay advice requirement, two exceptions to 'automatic dismissal' may exist: (1) the court may exercise its ability to 'order [ ] otherwise' and excuse the filing of pay advices . . . (2) upon motion of the trustee, the court may decline to dismiss the case if the court determines that the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the pay advices and that administration of the case would serve the best interests of the creditors. . . . To the extent that the Debtor was exclusively self-employed for the 60 days preceding the bankruptcy filing, the pay advice requirement would appear to be inapplicable. . . . The Court has the discretion to determine whether information is 'required' under § 521(a)(1), even when such inquiry occurs after the 45 day deadline. . . . Accordingly, the Court shall schedule a hearing to determine whether it is necessary for the Debtor to file 'copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days . . . from any employer of the debtor' or whether, to the extent the Debtor was exclusively self-employed during this time period, the Court may 'order otherwise' and excuse this filing requirement.").
In re Adams, No. 08-04577-8-JRL, 2008 WL 4560719, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2008) (Leonard) (When debtors left blank Line 17 of Schedule I and Line 19 of Schedule J, case was automatically dismissed under § 521(i) on 46th day after petition because no statement of reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures was filed; motion to set aside dismissal was granted when amended schedules filed after § 521(i) deadline indicated that blanks were intentional because debtors did not anticipate any change in income or expenditures. Bankruptcy case was filed on July 8, 2008 and "the court sent the debtor a deficiency notice for failing to disclose any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures as provided for on line 17 of Schedule I and line 19 of Schedule J." The court's notice warned of automatic dismissal under § 521(i). Case was automatically dismissed on August 25, 2008 and also on August 25— one day after deadline fixed by court—debtors filed amendment indicating that they did not anticipate any change in income or expenditures. "Section 521(a)(1) requires that the debtor file 'a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures over the 12-month period following the date of the filing of the petition[.]' . . . Failure by a Chapter 13 debtor to file all of the information required under § 521(a)(1) within 45 days after the petition date will result in an automatic dismissal. . . . Here, the debtors' case was automatically dismissed when they failed to disclose any anticipated change in income or expenditures. However, the debtors' amended schedules revealed that the debtors' counsel apparently omitted this information because they anticipate no change in income or expenditures. On these facts, the court is unwilling to deem this a noncompliance with § 521 that would be fatal to the case.").
In re Nuttall, No. 08-04092-8-JRL, 2008 WL 4372807, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2008) (Leonard) (Bankruptcy court lacks authority to reconsider automatic dismissal except as provided in § 521(i)(4); when debtor failed to file schedules by deadline as extended and trustee did not file motion to prevent automatic dismissal, case was automatically dismissed. "[Section] 521(i)(4) is the only provision that gives the court authority to decline to enforce the automatic dismissal. . . . [Section] 521(i)(4) does not apply here because the trustee failed to file a motion challenging dismissal of the debtors' case before expiration of the 45-day period. As a result, the court finds no authority in which to set aside the automatic dismissal.").
In re Williams, No. 08-80292, 2008 WL 5157461, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2008) (Cornish) (Distinguishing Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008), a "cover sheet" that listed "monthly income" filed with one bank statement did not satisfy payment advices requirement in § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and filing actual pay stubs more than 45 days after petition could not prevent dismissal. "[B]ankruptcy courts in the Tenth Circuit have adopted a somewhat flexible standard for determining whether 'other evidence of payment' submitted by debtors will satisfy their disclosure obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). However, Debtors did not meet the base level of 'other evidence' in a timely fashion herein. . . . There is no information regarding withholding, benefits, hours worked, gross pay, or similar information that would be found on a typical pay stub. There is no summary chart or year-to-date information fled that is remotely similar to the information found sufficient in [Miller] . . . . Although Debtors did ultimately file payment advices covering most of the sixty[-]day period, they did not do so until after the Trustee filed this Motion to Dismiss and after the forty-five days had expired. The Court does not find the Debtors' actions to be a good faith attempt to file the required information[.]".).
In re Scott, No. 08-21447, 2008 WL 5440422, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. July 28, 2008) (Lindquist) (Failure to file required documents triggered automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1)—effected by clerk's notice of dismissal; motion to reinstate based on "excusable neglect" has no foundation in § 521(i)(1) and bankruptcy court has no discretion to allow reinstatement. "After the expiration of the specified periods set [forth] in § 521(i)(1), there are no exceptions, no excuses, only dismissal and the consequences that flow therefrom.").
In re Ober, 390 B.R. 60 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2008) (Bucki) (Confirmation prior to conversion precludes Chapter 7 trustee from asserting that case was automatically dismissed when debtor failed to file payment advices during Chapter 13 case. Debtor failed to file all payment advices required by § 521. Plan was confirmed. A year later, debtor voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. Chapter 7 trustee moved to dismiss under § 521(i). Citing Taylor v. Sturgell, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2161, __ L. Ed. 2d __ (2008), "with respect to the enforcement of the automatic dismissal provisions of section 521(i), the current trustee in Chapter 7 represents the same interests on whose behalf the Chapter 13 trustee was previously obliged to act. Because the earlier trustee could have asserted that the case had been automatically dismissed prior to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan, the final confirmation order operates now to preclude the Chapter 7 trustee from asserting a dismissal under section 521(i).").
In re Evans, No. BK 07-72142-CMS-13, 2008 WL 2428931 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. June 12, 2008) (Stilson) (Dismissal is mandatory under § 521(i) when debtor filed schedules 47 days after petition and filed some payment advices 77 days after petition; trustee did not interpose a motion to stop dismissal, and bankruptcy court must enter order of dismissal not later than five days after creditor's motion under § 521(i)(2).).
In re Cummisky, No. 08-01579-8-JRL, 2008 WL 6045992, at *1 & n.1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2008) (Leonard) (In a Chapter 13 case filed on March 7, 2008, bankruptcy court sets deadline of July 1, 2008, for debtors to file Schedule I "in order to avoid the automatic dismissal provision of 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1)." Debtors did not file Schedule I because income had gone down during the CMI calculation period when one of the debtors terminated employment due to pregnancy. Debtors filed a motion "to set an alternative date for determining debtors' 'current monthly income'" under § 101(10A)(A)(i). The bankruptcy court set a new six-month period of January 1, 2008, to June 30, 2008, and set a new deadline for filing Schedule I, excusing the debtors from the requirement in § 521(a)(1)(B).).
In re White, No. 07-03870-NPO, 2008 WL 682422, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Mar. 7, 2008) (Olack) (Deficiency notice and show cause order are dismissed with respect to failure to schedule domestic support obligation when, after hearing, debtor did not owe prepetition, matured DSO and postpetition unmatured DSOs are not allowable claims, are not paid through Chapter 13 plan and need not be scheduled. Clerk of bankruptcy court issued "deficiency notice" when debtor did not list a DSO creditor but disclosed a monthly DSO expense on Schedule J. Court issued order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed when debtor did not comply with deficiency notice. "[T]he Debtor does not owe a prepetition, matured DSO. Accordingly, the DSO recipient need not be listed in the Debtor's bankruptcy schedules. To that end, [the debtor's attorney] will not be required to amend the Debtor's schedules to include the DSO recipient. However, in that the Debtor will be responsible for DSOs as they mature postpetition, he is required to disclose on Schedule J the monthly amount of the DSO, and to list the DSO recipient's name and address on the chapter 13 plan so that the Trustee may make certain required disclosures to the recipient. See § 1302(b)(6) and (d).").
In re Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2008 WL 270263, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008) (Rhoades) (On creditor's Rule 59 motion for relief from "Order Evidencing Automatic Dismissal," bankruptcy court is without authority under § 521 to condition automatic dismissal that debtor is prohibited from refiling for six months. Debtor filed naked petition to stop foreclosure. Debtor failed to file schedules, statements and other required documents. Bankruptcy court entered an "Order Evidencing Automatic Dismissal of Chapter 13 Case of Individual Debtor(s) Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1)." Creditor moved to amend that order under Rule 59 to dismiss case with prejudice to refiling for six months. "[T]here is no question that the Debtor failed to submit all of the information required by § 521(a)(1) or that grounds existed for automatic dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § [521](i)(1). Section 105(a) does not empower the Court to vacate a dismissal that has occurred by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1), alter the statutory penalty of 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1), or 'judicially legislate perceived shortcomings in existing law.' . . . Congress has determined that the penalty for failure to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) is the dismissal of the case and limitations on the applicability of the automatic stay in any bankruptcy case filed within a year of the dismissal. . . . '[A]n automatic statutory dismissal is not the kind of action contemplated by [Federal Rule 59(e)] and therefore cannot form the basis for any relief under [Federal Rule 59(e)]. Even if it were, however, [Federal Rule 59(e)] could not be used to bypass the strict statutory scheme established by § 521(a)(1) and (i).'").
In re Mayfield, No. 07 B 8005, 2008 WL 161781 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2008) (Hollis) (Debtor's failure to file Form B201 within 45 days after petition did not result in automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) because attorney's signature on petition satisfied § 342(b) requirement.).
In re New, No. 07-75092, 2008 WL 7872884, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2008) (Massey) (Bankruptcy court cannot vacate dismissal order that resulted under § 521(i) when debtor failed to submit all pay advices received during 60 days prior to petition. Bankruptcy court dismissed case on motion of a creditor pursuant to § 521(i). Debtor then moved to vacate dismissal order. "[S]ection 521(i)(3) provides the only means by which a debtor who has not complied with section 521(a)(1) may avoid automatic dismissal as of the 46th day following the petition date. That section would be meaningless if a debtor could reopen the case more than 46 days after the petition date for the purpose of doing what should have been done within the first 46 days. The Debtor's argument that the court could 'order otherwise' fails because such an order must precede the filing of a motion to dismiss. Once such a section 5[2]1(i) motion is filed and if the facts support the motion, the court has no discretion to order otherwise. Debtor's argument that he filed some of the pay advices and could file the missing ones is no help to him because he was required to file all of the advices he received within 46 days of the petition date.").
In re Jones, No. 07-00621, 2008 WL 78752, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2008) (Teel) (Pro se debtor's motion for 90-day extension to file documents required by § 521(a)(1) is treated as motion under § 521(i)(3) and is limited to a 45-day extension; based on debtor's statement that "she suffers from a debilitating disease and that she needs an attorney," court grants extension.).
In re Gough, No. 07-00554, 2008 WL 78753, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2008) (unpublished) (Teel) (Failure to file documents required by § 521(a)(1) within 45 days of petition triggers § 521(i) and deprives bankruptcy court of discretion to deny request for order of dismissal; until request for order of dismissal, case is not dismissed and confirmation would be res judicata with respect to whether automatic dismissal occurred. "[Section] 521(i)(1) . . . does not direct that when § 521(i)(1) is triggered, the case stands automatically dismissed as of the 46th day . . . the command is expressly made subject to, and its meaning clarified by, a procedure under § 521(i)(2) which requires that not later than 5 days after a party in interest requests the entry of an order dismissing a case described in § 521(i)(1), the court shall enter 'an order dismissing the case' (not an order, analogous to one under 11 U.S.C. § 362(j), confirming that the case was already dismissed). In other words, if the 45-day period has not been enlarged, the statute makes a failure by the 45th day to file the required documents a point of no return after which dismissal cannot be avoided. Effective as of the 46th day, the court is deprived of discretion to deny a request to dismiss the case. Instead, dismissal is automatically required ('the case shall be automatically dismissed'), with an order of dismissal to be entered under § 521(i)(2) within 5 days of a request being made for dismissal based on § 521(i)(1) having been triggered. If the statute contemplated that the case is to stand automatically dismissed effective upon § 521(i)(1) being triggered on the 46th day, no order of dismissal would be necessary. Accordingly, a case does not stand dismissed unless and until the order of dismissal contemplated by § 521(i)(2) is entered. Prior to the expiration of the 45-day period, the trustee or the debtor could have filed a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(3) or § 521(i)(4) to enlarge the 45-day period, but no one filed such a motion. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2), the court is required pursuant to the trustee's having moved for dismissal based on § 521(i)(1), to enter an order of dismissal within 5 days of her filing her motion if she is still pursuing that motion. . . . Section 521(i)(1) is not jurisdictional: if a plan is confirmed, that will be binding on all creditors and will be res judicata with respect to the issue of whether the case was required to be automatically dismissed.").
In re McQueen, No. 07-03011-8-JRL, 2007 WL 6370888, at *1-*2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2007) (Leonard) (To avoid automatic dismissal in § 521(i)(1), court grants debtor's motion to strike Schedule I filing, excuses debtor from Schedule I filing requirement and resets calculation period to determine CMI under § 101(10A)(A)(i) when disability income received during six months before petition is no longer available. "Excusing the debtor from the Schedule I filing requirement would, as the debtor requests, permit the court to set a six-month time period other than the six-month period prior to his bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(ii). However, excusing the debtor from this requirement might arguably subject him to the automatic dismissal provision of 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) . . . . [T]here is a solution . . . . The court strikes the debtor's original Schedule I and Form B22C and hereby grants the debtor permission to re-file both documents[.]").
In re Irons, 379 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2007) (Isgur) (Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed on the 45th day when the debtor failed to file schedules, a statement of financial affairs, Form B22C and payment advices; if court has any discretion to vacate statutory dismissal, this is not an appropriate case in which to do so. "Mr. Irons filed this case on October 22, 2007. . . . On October 23, 2007, this Court issued an order setting forth Mr. Irons' deficiencies . . . . The October 23, 2007 order advised Mr. Irons that his case would be automatically dismissed if he failed to comply. His § 521 filing deficiencies included the failure to file his schedules A-J, statement of financial affairs, Form B22C and payment advices. Mr. Irons missed the 15 day deadline, without seeking any extension. He then waited to file his schedules and his statement of financial affairs until November 24, 2007. No pay advices were filed until December 5, 2007. Mr. Irons completely failed to timely file a Form B22C and this case was automatically dismissed by statute, with the dismissal effective December 6, 2007. On December 7, 2007, the Court issued an order confirming the statutory dismissal." Separate hearing is scheduled to determine whether to discipline counsel.).
In re Wojda, 371 B.R. 656, 660 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) (Request for dismissal under § 521(i)(2) requires a motion served on the debtor and trustee; letter to court is not sufficient; because five filed payment advices contained information that would have been included had debtor filed payment advices for all nine paychecks received during 60 days before petition, case was not automatically dismissed under § 521(i). "'[S]ections 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and 521(i)(1) are less than fully congruous.' While the first section requires a filing of 'evidence,' the latter provision links dismissal to a failure to file 'information.' Even if I were to find that the debtor had failed to file complete evidence of his receipt of payment from an employer, dismissal only results upon the failure to file the underlying information. In the present instance, where 'year to date' totals show no variance from a pattern of weekly payments, the filed payment advices provide all of the 'information' that would have been included in any missing advises. Accordingly, section 521(i)(1) does not compel a dismissal of this case.").
In re Carroll, No. 07-50098, 2007 WL 7023832, at *2-*3, *2 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 5, 2007) (Dalis) (Requirement in Interim Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) that payment advices be filed with the petition or within 15 days after the petition is not inconsistent with 45-day automatic dismissal in § 521(i); clerk of bankruptcy court has judicial immunity from debtor's claim that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by dismissing the Chapter 13 case when debtor failed to file payment advices within the Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) deadline. "A debtor may be required, consistent with § 521(i)(1), to file payment advices earlier than 45 days after the filing of the petition, and upon failure to file, be subject to a court-ordered dismissal of the case. . . . Section 521(i)(3) provides that if a debtor moves for an extension of time within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the court may allow the debtor up to 45 additional days to file the payment advices to avoid an automatic dismissal. . . . Section 521(i)(3) prescribes a time limit beyond which a court may not consider a request for extension of time, not a time period during which such a motion must be allowed. . . . [Section] 521(i)(4) provides that the court may decline to dismiss the case 'on the motion of the trustee filed before the expiration of the applicable period of time.' . . . [Section] 521(i)(4) provides a time limit beyond which a court may not entertain a motion by the trustee, not a time period during which a court must entertain such a motion." In a note: "The Debtor's case was subject to dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(9), regardless of any effect of Interim Rule 1007(c) on the operation of § 521(i). . . . [I]t is reasonable to conclude that the unchanged reference to § 521(1), a subsection that no longer exists following BAPCPA, is a drafter's oversight and that the required 'information' includes payment advices under § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).").
In re Hoshan, No. 07-11889bif, 2007 WL 1892476 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 29, 2007) (Sua sponte dismissal under § 1307(c)(1) and (3) based on debtor's failure to file briefing certificate, mailing matrix, schedules, statement of financial affairs, statement of current monthly income and plan did not require hearing because adequate notice of deficiencies was mailed and debtor had ample opportunity to correct deficiencies; motions for relief from order of dismissal rather than effort to correct deficiencies supported denial of relief from order dismissal.).
In re Reynolds, 370 B.R. 393, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. June 5, 2007) (Although debtor failed to file payment advices for one month required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), earnings statement for end of period contained "year-to-date" information that satisfied 60-day requirement; Chapter 13 case not automatically dismissed by § 521(i). Chapter 13 case was filed on February 18, 2007. Debtor filed earnings statements for December 4, 2006, through December 17, 2006, and for January 29, 2007, through February 11, 2007. Chapter 13 trustee requested hearing regarding automatic dismissal. "The pay stub filed by the Debtor the pay period ending February 11, 2007, contained information showing the total amount of income received by the Debtor for the period from January 1, 2007, through February 11, 2007. . . . Debtor has complied with § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), and [the trustee] has been provided with sufficient 'other evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition.'").
In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 599-602 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (Over objections of Chapter 7 trustee and others, court reluctantly concludes that debtor's failure to file documents during Chapter 13 case prior to conversion requires automatic dismissal under § 521(i). Abusive second Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed on 46th day because debtor failed to file required documents. Debtor is a party in interest for purposes of order confirming that case was dismissed under § 521(i)(2). Automatic dismissal conditioned that debtor is prohibited from refiling under Title 11 for two years. "[T]he only basis on which the court can decline to enter the order of dismissal if requested is if the trustee files a motion within five days after a party-in-interest makes such a request and the court finds debtor in good faith attempted to file his pay advices and the best interest[s] of creditors would be served by administration of the case. . . . [T]he Trustee did not act within five (5) days . . . . The Court is unable to find anything in the statute that gives this Court the discretion to not enter an order reflecting this case was automatically dismissed on the 46th day after the petition date. . . . [T]he Debtor is not precluded from seeking an order of dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2). . . . This case is the poster child for a bad faith debtor. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in [Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1105 (2007)], this court concludes that when a debtor seeks an order confirming the dismissal of his case under § 521(i)(2) by reason of his own defalcation under § 521(a)(1), it is legitimate for the Court to inquire into the motivation and/or good faith (or lack thereof) of the debtor in seeking such order; and, in the event the debtor is acting in bad faith, to properly condition such dismissal so that the debtor is not rewarded by his own malfeasance.").
In re Luders, 356 B.R. 671, 673-74 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2006) (Automatic dismissal not appropriate when, consistent with local rule, debtors provided trustee fewer than all payment advices for 60 days before petition but "year-to-date" information could be used to calculate missing payment information; debtors must be afforded opportunity for hearing when trustee files notice of automatic dismissal. Debtors filed payment advices with trustee for most of 60-day period before petition, but three pay stubs were missing. From filed pay stubs, missing information could be calculated. Trustee filed notice of debtor's failure to comply with § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) together with request that case be automatically dismissed. "[F]ailure to afford the debtors an opportunity to be heard would have adverse consequences to the debtors because refiling their petition would trigger the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) or (4) . . . . [T]he debtors could move the court to vacate the order of dismissal and reinstate the case. Using either approach results in time and expense to the debtors and potential confusion to creditors as to the status of the case. Equity dictates that the certification by the Trustee of noncompliance and the notice of a hearing thereon did not trigger automatic dismissal. This court can consider the merits of debtors' position that there was sufficient information in the timely filed payment advices to meet the statutory requirements. . . . The pay stubs submitted to the Trustee, along with the year-to-date totals found on these pay stubs, constitute 'other evidence of payment' sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). Therefore, the case is not to be dismissed under 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).").
In re Cloud, 356 B.R. 544, 545-46 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2006) (Debtor who timely filed only part of payment advices required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) was automatically dismissed on 46th day after petition. In Chapter 13 case filed on May 2, 2006, payment advices for 60-day period between March 3 and May 1, 2006, were required to be filed by June 16, 2006, by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). On June 6, debtor filed copies of payment advices for April 30 through May 27, 2006. In November, debtor filed a "Payment Advice Certification" together with payment advices for March 5 through April 29, 2006. Debtor's spouse filed Certification that she did not receive any payment advices during 60 days before petition. "William Cloud failed to timely file copies of his payment advices as required by Section 521(a)(1)(B)(iv). As a result, the bankruptcy case as to William Cloud was automatically dismissed by operation of statute effective June 17, 2006. . . . The Chapter 13 case as to Ruth Cloud is not dismissed.").
In re Kelly, No. 06-71019-JB, 2006 WL 6591613 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2006) (Bihary) (Failure to file schedules and statement of financial affairs required by § 521(a)(1) within 45 days of petition triggers automatic dismissal effective on 46th day.).
In re Guidry, 354 B.R. 824, 832-33 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2006) (By local rule and "initial order" in every Chapter 13 case, IRS is required to send a tax transcript to the trustee, the debtors and debtor's counsel not later than seven days before initial date set for § 341 meeting; because "initial order" was not served on IRS, noncompliance is excused, but in future cases, noncompliance is "not an option." "Under the revised Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's failure to provide a tax return prior to the § 341 meeting of creditors has no immediate consequence. Congress mandated that the failure to provide a number of documents (those identified in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)), would result in the automatic dismissal of a bankruptcy case effective as of the 46th day after the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i). However, the requirement that a tax return be provided is not contained within § 521(a)(1). Instead, it is set forth in § 521(e)(2). . . . A motion to dismiss must be filed in order for the Court to consider dismissing a case on these grounds. However, § 521(e)(2)(B) allows a debtor to defeat a motion to dismiss if the debtor demonstrates that the failure to provide the return was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control. . . . If the debtor opposes the motion to dismiss, the Court must set and hold a hearing on the motion. Inasmuch as the confirmation hearing is to occur within 20-45 days after the § 341 meeting, the confirmation hearing will often occur prior to the dismissal hearing. . . . By requiring the IRS to provide a tax transcript prior to the § 341 meeting of creditors in chapter 13 cases, the Court has attempted to insure that chapter 13 cases will be considered in an orderly manner and within the time frame mandated by Congress.").
In re Barajas, No. 06-10598-B-13, 2006 WL 3254483, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (unpublished) (Lee) (Failure to file payment advices did not require automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) because general order in Eastern District of California provided that payroll information "shall not be filed with the court, but rather provided to the trustee not later than seven days before the first date set for the meeting of creditors." Trustee indicated that payroll information had been provided; therefore, automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1) was not applicable.).
In re Rubio, No. 06-50065, 2006 WL 2792213, at *2-*3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006) (unpublished) (Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed on 46th day when debtor failed to file "employee records" until 90 days after petition; that debtor may have submitted payment advices to former case trustee does not change outcome. "Debtor stated that he had submitted the payment advices to the former trustee of this case. Debtor did not file the payment advices with the Court. . . . Debtor has not provided any support for the position that the Trustee may receive filings as an agent of the Court. . . . Filing must be done with the clerk's office. . . . The only discretion given to judges in this matter is to permit filing with the judge, but even then, papers must be forwarded to the clerk. . . . Although the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Court may order that payment advices not be filed, the Court did not do so in this case. The Bankruptcy Code provides that if the advices must be filed, and they are not, then the case is automatically dismissed. Thus, by operation of law, this case was dismissed.").
In re Weinraub, 351 B.R. 779, 782-83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2006) (Debtor granted Rule 60 relief from order of dismissal based on excusable neglect when former counsel failed to file payment advices. "[T]he prejudice to the Debtor of the Dismissal Order . . . is substantial. . . . The neglect . . . appears to stem from counsel's negligence. . . . [T]heir attorney failed to file the payment advices given to him by the Debtors nor did he file a chapter 13 plan or a motion to extend the deadline to file. . . . The failure to file any of the above, led to the dismissal . . . . [I]t is excusable neglect on the part of the Weinraubs to believe that documents given to their counsel would be filed in a timely fashion.").
In re Landers, No. 06-22265, 2006 WL 4862340, at *1-*2 (Bankr. D. Utah Sept. 11, 2006) (Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and (i)(1) because payment advice for one two-week pay period was not timely filed notwithstanding that debtor did not recall receiving that payment advice. "[Section] 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) deals only with objective facts; nowhere does it rely on a debtor's subjective belief as to what that debtor has done. . . . [T]he Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor did in fact receive a payment advice on or about April 30 but that such payment advice was not filed within 45 days of the petition date. The Debtor is paid bi-weekly, he had no breaks in his employment during the relevant time frame, and he always received payment advices from his employer for each bi-weekly paycheck. The Debtor also testified only that he could not recall receiving a payment advice for the April 30 pay period, not that he never received one. There is simply no evidence upon which the Court could make a factual finding that no payment advice was received for the April 30 pay period. Moreover, there is no statutory basis for the Court to make a determination that the Debtor's belief is controlling rather than the facts of whether qualifying payment advices were received and filed with the Court. . . . [T]he Debtor's case was automatically dismissed under § 521(i)(1).").
In re Miller, No. 06-11566, 2006 WL 4719400 (Bankr. D. Md. June 9, 2006) (Upon "notice to the debtor" filed by Chapter 13 trustee stating that debtor failed to comply with local rule that required copies of all payment advices be provided to trustee at least seven days before meeting of creditors, Chapter 13 case is dismissed under § 521(i)(1).).
In re Latovljevic, 343 B.R. 817 (May 9, 2006) (Flatley) (Incarcerated debtor who failed to file documents, including Form B22C, failed to satisfy duties in § 521(a)(1), and case was subject to automatic dismissal under § 521(i); grounds also exist to dismiss under § 1307(c)(3) and (9) based on the failure to file a plan and the failure to file documents required by § 521(a)(1).).
In re Williams, 339 B.R. 794 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2006) (Debtor's motion to reconsider dismissal denied when cases had been dismissed due to failure to file papers required by § 521(a)(1) within 45 days of petition. Court had no discretion to enlarge time since debtor did not seek enlargement within 45 days.).
In re Reyes, No. 05-80225, 2006 WL 4847230, at *1-*2 (Bankr. D. Utah Feb. 21, 2006) (Chapter 13 case was automatically dismissed because debtors did not file payment advices within 45 days of petition; that debtors were unable to get copies of payment advices within 45 days does not excuse failure to move for an extension within the 45-day period. "[R]equests for extension of the time in which to file papers required by § 521(a)(1) must be made within the 45-day window before the automatic statutory dismissal of § 521(i)(1) becomes effective . . . . [T]he Debtor[s] did not file their Response until . . . 20 days too late—and only following the Court's issuance of the Order to Show Cause. Although the Debtors allege that they have shown a 'good faith attempt' to file all required papers, good faith is irrelevant to the issue of automatic statutory dismissal. . . . [I]t was clearly not beyond their control to file a timely extension request under § 521(i)(3). . . . BAPCPA give[s] the Court no discretion in cases such as this one to extend the time for filing papers required under § 521(a)(1) when no timely request has been made. Automatic dismissal is the only result.").