Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/809/1291/385745/
Timestamp: 2019-10-14 23:04:40
Document Index: 447995881

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 371', '§ 1341', '§ 1962', '§ 1963', '§ 1512', '§ 13412', '§ 1341', '§ 3713', '§ 1962', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1341', '§ 1961', '§ 1961', '§ 1963', '§ 1963']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fred W. Garver, Larry R. Mohr, Defendants-appellants, 809 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Seventh Circuit › 1987 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fred W. Garver, Larry R. Mohr, Defendants-appellant...
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Fred W. Garver, Larry R. Mohr, Defendants-appellants, 809 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 809 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987) Argued June 11, 1986. Decided Jan. 15, 1987. As Amended Jan. 16, 1987
Appellants Fred W. Garver and Larry R. Mohr appeal their convictions for conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371, mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and for violating the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Garver also appeals his concurrent three-year sentences for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud as well as his sentence to a concurrent six year term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) for violation of the RICO statute. We affirm.
Initially, Garver and Mohr assert that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by their co-conspirators pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 801(d) (2) (E) arguing that the government failed to prove at the pre-trial Santiago hearing that they were members of a criminal conspiracy. Neither defendant identifies the particular statements he claims were improperly admitted in evidence at trial. In United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978), this court stated that Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence "requires a preliminary determination by the trial judge as to the admissibility of the declaration of a co-conspirator." Id. at 1131. The court went on to state that " [u]nder Rule 104 the competence of a co-conspirator's declaration justifying its admissibility depends upon whether or not the existence of the conspiracy has been sufficiently established, and whether under Rule 801(d) (2) (E) the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. In United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 985 (7th Cir. 1983), we stated that " [a] statement is admissible under this rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d) (2) (E) ] only when the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence, independent of the statement itself, that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) that the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy." Since Garver and Mohr do not contend that the government failed to demonstrate at the Santiago hearing that a conspiracy existed and that the statements made by their co-conspirators were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, we need only consider whether the government established at the Santiago hearing that Garver and Mohr were members of a criminal conspiracy. "The law is clear that ' [o]nce the Government proves the existence of a conspiracy, the Government need only offer "slight evidence" to prove that an individual was a member of the conspiracy.' " United States v. Williams, 798 F.2d 1024, 1046 (7th Cir. 1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting) quoting United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985).
As already noted, once a criminal conspiracy has been established, the government need only present "slight evidence" in order to prove a particular individual's participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Williams, 798 F.2d 1024, 1046 (7th Cir. 1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting). A review of the record thus reveals that the government produced more than slight evidence that Garver and Mohr participated in a criminal conspiracy. The government established that Garver and Mohr worked together to funnel money to Rawlings with the intention of bribing him to illegally reduce the Maryland Street Garage assessment. Moreover, the evidence introduced at the Santiago hearing proved that Garver and Mohr represented Merchants Plaza, and that Garver made payments to Magnuson who in turn bribed Marion County Assessor Corsaro to illegally reduce the Merchants Plaza property assessment. We hold that the evidence submitted at the Santiago hearing demonstrated that Garver and Mohr were involved in an illegal conspiracy to bribe tax authorities to lower the tax assessments on the Merchants Plaza and the Maryland Street Garage, and therefore established a proper basis for the admission of their co-conspirators' statements in evidence at trial.
Mohr next contends that the trial court erred in permitting the government to introduce government exhibits 32, 32a, copies of a letter written by attorney Lester Irons to C. Perry Griffith, the president of the Maryland Street Garage Corporation, asking Griffith to have a check issued to Garver, and 32b, a letter from Griffith to Garver forwarding the check to Garver. In his letter to Griffith, Exhibit 32, Irons writes that "I will see that it [the check] is delivered to Larry Mohr and that we get a receipt from him." Irons continues in the letter to state that " [a]s I understand it, Garver and Mohr were the only ones working on this particular project." Mohr argues that this letter should not have been admitted in evidence since the government had in its possession two FBI 302 statements containing an interview with Edward Delaney wherein Delaney states that Irons told him that Irons did not know whether or not Mohr was involved in representing the Maryland Street Garage. In his reply brief Mohr states that "it is true that the Defendant Mohr did not specifically allege prosecutorial misconduct." Mohr's argument seems somewhat unclear in that he appears to argue that the exhibits are inadmissible because FBI reports containing an interview with Delaney contradict Iron's letter. This argument goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. The government points out that Mohr had the opportunity to call Delaney as a witness and for some reason chose not to do so.
"The district court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and thus we will reverse the court's evidentiary rulings only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion." United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1424 (7th Cir. 1984). "The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether proferred evidence should be admitted and in general in the 'absence of a significant showing of unfair prejudice, evidence with substantial probative value should not be excluded.' " Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, 748 F.2d 740, 747 (2nd Cir. 1984) quoting United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 644 (2nd Cir. 1983). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly permitted the government to introduce evidence relating to the payment of fees and distribution of fees at trial because the evidence was relevant in demonstrating how Garver and Mohr conspired to commit mail fraud and Garver and Mohr have not demonstrated that such evidence unfairly prejudiced their trial.
Garver and Mohr argue that the trial court erred in denying their respective motions for severance maintaining that they should not have been tried with Claude Magnuson. Counts 1-4 and 7 of the indictment charged that Garver, Mohr and Magnuson committed mail fraud, conspired to commit mail fraud and violated the RICO statute. Count 5 of the indictment charged Magnuson with witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, while Count 6 of the indictment charged only Garver and Mohr with mail fraud. Magnuson was acquitted on Count 5 of the indictment.
In United States v. Dounias, 777 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1985), we stated that " [t]he decision to grant or deny severance is left to the judgment of the trial court and we will not reverse this decision absent a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 350. We went on to state that " [i]n order to meet this burden the defendant must show that the joint trial resulted in actual prejudice." Id. We also note that there is a "policy of judicial economy which 'favors [the] joint trial of defendants where largely the same evidence would be admitted in separate trials of each defendant.' " Id. quoting United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1424 (7th Cir. 1984). In United States v. Giangrosso, 779 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1985), we stated that "the defendant must demonstrate 'more than the fact that a separate trial offer [s] ... a better chance for acquittal.' " Id. at 379, citing United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1983). " 'The general rule is that the persons jointly indicted should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases.' " United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1982) quoting United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1974).
Garver and Mohr argue that they were prejudiced because they were tried with Magnuson who was also charged with witness tampering, Count 5. Since Magnuson was found not guilty of the crime charged in Count 5, the government argues that " [n]o prejudice could have inhered from evidence presented on that count."
Garver additionally claims that " [f]rom the onset of the trial there were antagonistic defenses that surfaced between the defendant Magnuson and the defendant Garver." Garver fails to specify which of his defenses were "antagonistic" to Magnuson's defenses. The government points out that Garver and Magnuson presented "no defenses, other than a flat denial of guilt."
Garver and Mohr finally argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for conspiracy, mail fraud and violation of the RICO statute. In evaluating, the defendants' claims, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original).
Mohr initially maintains that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment. Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment alleged that Mohr committed mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13412 through his participation in the payment of bribes to public Bayt and Corsaro in order to secure reduction in the 1979 permanent assessment of Merchants Plaza. Mohr asserts that his conviction on Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment should be reversed because Bayt and Corsaro could not identify Mohr at trial. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Mohr was a member of Midwest Appraisers, Inc. as was Garver and Rawlings. Midwest Appraisers, Inc. was employed by PRT to secure a reduction in the 1979 Merchant's Plaza permanent assessment. Garver gave a check to Magnuson the proceeds of which Magnuson used to bribe Bayt. When Midwest Appraisers, Inc. received its fee for securing the reduction of the Merchants Plaza assessment from PRT, Mohr helped launder the funds and distribute money to fund the enterprise through his bank. Mohr not only had knowledge of the conspiracy to bribe Bayt and Corsaro but actively participated in the same.
"To prove a violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the evidence must show a scheme, intent to defraud, and the use of the mails." United States v. Silva, 781 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1986). In United States v. Silva, we noted that "the conspiracy doctrines applicable to multimember fraud scheme provided guidance as to how the first prong of the mail fraud statute should be interpreted." Id. We stated that " [a]lthough mere association with conspirators is, standing alone, insufficient to prove participation in the conspiracy, a single act is enough evidence if the circumstances permit the inference that the act was 'intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy.' " Id. at 109. The evidence demonstrated that Mohr distributed the fees generated from the illegal reduction of the Merchants Plaza permanent assessment as prearranged and proved that Mohr intended to participate in a scheme to defraud the citizens of Marion County, Indiana of the unbiased services of Bayt and Corsaro.
Mohr next argues that the evidence was not sufficient at trial to support his conviction on Count 1 of the indictment, conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3713 , Count 2, mail fraud in connection with the payment of bribes for the partial reassessment of Merchants Plaza, and Count 6, mail fraud in connection with the Maryland Street Garage assessment. Mohr states that his convictions on Counts 1, 2, and 6 rests solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Rawlings. In United States v. Silva, 781 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1986), we stated " [t]he appellant who argues an evidentiary sufficiency challenge bears a 'heavy burden' to show that the record contains no evidence from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 108. The jury found Rawlings' testimony to be credible since it convicted Mohr of the charges. In addition, the jury considered documentary evidence of Mohr's participation in the bribery conspiracy since the government introduced extensive evidence as to the distribution of fees derived in part from Mohr's illegal activities. We are convinced that the evidence presented at trial, specifically Rawlings' testimony and the documentary evidence corroborating his testimony, established that Larry Mohr committed the crimes charged in the indictment. We affirm Mohr's convictions because, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear that any rational trier of fact could have found that Mohr committed the offenses charged in the indictment. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Both Garver and Mohr contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict them of Count 7 of the indictment, a violation of the RICO statute arguing that the government failed to prove "a 'pattern of racketeering activity' " which is an element of the RICO statute. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), states:
Section 1961 of the act defines "racketeering activity" as "any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (B). The statute further states that " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
The evidence presented at trial to support the defendants' conviction of four separate counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 committed between 1978 and 1979 was sufficient to establish the "pattern of racketeering" pursuant to the RICO statute because the definitional section of that statute plainly states that racketeering activity is "any act which is indictable ... under ... title 18, United States Code ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (B). The prosecution presented evidence at trial proving that Garver and Mohr were guilty on counts 2-4 and 6 of the indictment charging them with mail fraud. Since, as we have already held, the evidence was sufficient to convict Garver and Mohr of four counts of mail fraud, it is obvious that Garver and Mohr committed a series of acts "indictable ... under ... title 18, United States Code ... section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (B), and thus participated in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Mohr also contends that there is no direct evidence that he agreed with each of his co-conspirators to bribe public officials and that he only participated in a legitimate business. In United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1981), we stated that " [t]he nature of racketeering connections to an otherwise legitimate business suggests that elements outside a company may assist in obtaining the company's illegal goals." Id. at 679. "The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders and outsiders--those merely 'associated with' an enterprise--who participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978). Mohr's contention is meritless because the government proved that Mohr participated in the bribery conspiracy through his laundering of funds and distribution of fees.
Garver also appeals his concurrent three year sentences on Counts 1-4 and 6 of the indictment and concurrent six-year term on Count 7 for violation of the RICO statute. Garver specifically states that his six year sentence for violating the RICO statute was too harsh. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a),4 Garver could have received a twenty year sentence. In United States v. Willard, 445 F.2d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1971), we stated:
Id. at 816. See also United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 1980). In his brief, Garver does not point out any gross abuse on the part of the trial judge in sentencing him. Because the record fails to indicate any abuse of discretion on the part of the court in sentencing Garver and since Garver's sentence was within the statutory limits, we hold that Garver's sentence was not excessive.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) states: