Source: http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Kirtsaeng_v_John_Wiley__Sons_Inc_No_11697_2013_BL_71417_US_Mar_19?1448915916
Timestamp: 2015-11-30 20:38:41
Document Index: 173098478

Matched Legal Cases: ['§109', '§109', '§602', '§109', '§109', '§602', '§106', '§106', '§109', '§109', '§602', '§ 106', '§ 107', '§ 109', '§\n106', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 107', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 104', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 8', '§ 106', '§ 107', '§ 107', '§\n108', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§\n602', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 107', '§\n109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§\n602', '§ 106', '§ 501', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 101', '§ 17', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 41', '§ 27', '§ 115', '§ 601', '§\n106', '§ 106', '§ 360', '§\n41', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 8', '§ 104', '§ 107', '§ 104', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§\n602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§\n109', '§ 8', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 501', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§\n109', '§ 109', '§ 8', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§\n109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 1146', '§ 554', '§ 17', '§\n13', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§\n602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 8', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§\n7', '§ 602', '§ 7', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§\n602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 106', 'art 2', 'art 3', '§\n44', '§\n44', 'art 4', '§ 44', 'art\n5', 'art 6', 'art 6', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 44', '§ 602', '§ 44', 'art 6', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 8', '§ 2', '§ 602', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 1', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§\n109', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 41', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 5', '§ 107', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§\n13', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§\n602', '§ 105', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', 'art 4', 'art 4', '§\n109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 601', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 105', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 13', '§ 109', '§ 104', '§ 104', '§ 202', '§ 101', '§ 104', '§ 13', '§ 44', 'art 4', '§ 44', '§ 44', '§ 602', '§ 602', 'art 6', '§\n109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 109', '§ 905', '§ 8', '§ 906', '§ 109', '§\n602', '§ 1', '§ 106', '§ 109', '§ 3', '§ 13', '§ 109', '§ 106', '§ 27', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 109', '§ 109', '§ 602', '§ 602', '§ 106', '§ 101', '§ 8']

Bloomberg Law - Document - Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 185 L. Ed. 2d 392, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 2013 ILRC 1487, 35 ILRD 648, 35 ITRD 1049, 41 Med. L. Rptr. 1441, 81 U.S.L.W. 4167 (2013), Court Opinion
133 S. Ct. 1351
185 L. Ed. 2d 392
106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001
11-697
2013 BL 72102
U.S.P.Q.2d ****
Concurring Opinion > Dissenting Opinion > Supreme Court of the United States
SUPAP KIRTSAENG, DBA BLUECHRISTINE99, PETITIONER v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
No. 11-697
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Argued October 29, 2012, Decided March 19, 2013, October TERM, 2012
[**396] [*1352] [***1002] Hide Headnotes
[1] Unfair methods of competition — Types of unfair acts — Copyrights — Infringement ►54.0551 ►54.0557 [Show Topic Path]
“First sale” doctrine set forth in 17 U.S.C. §109(a), which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title … is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord,” is properly given “nongeographical”
interpretation that permits application of doctrine to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, since language of Section 109(a) read literally says nothing about geography, and nongeographical interpretation provides each word of phrase “lawfully made under this title” with distinct purpose, since neither “under”
nor any other word in phrase means “where,” and reading “under this title” to mean “in conformance with the Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable” raises more linguistic problems than it resolves, since U.S. Congress, in enacting current version of Section 109(a), did not implicitly introduce geographical limitation that previously was lacking, since Congress, in enacting present copyright statute, sought to equalize treatment of copies manufactured in United States and those manufactured abroad, whereas “geographical”
interpretation of first sale clause would grant holder of U.S. copyright permanent control over American distribution chain with regard to copies printed abroad, but not copies printed in America, and since it is unlikely that Congress intended this or other consequences of geographical interpretation.
[2] Unfair methods of competition — Types of unfair acts — Copyrights — Infringement ►54.0551 ►54.0557 [Show Topic Path]
“First sale” doctrine set forth in 17 U.S.C. §109(a)
is properly given “nongeographical” interpretation that permits application of doctrine to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, since Section 109(a)
addresses issue previously governed by common law, and it must be presumed that U.S. Congress intended for statute to retain substance of common law, since nongeographical interpretation of Section 109(a)
accords with common law doctrine, pursuant to which one who gives or sells whole interest in chattel cannot place conditions on buyer's subsequent disposition of good, since it would be burdensome for courts to enforce restrictions on readily movable goods, and since geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional objectives, in that libraries, for example, would have to obtain permission before circulating books published abroad, and many products and items containing copyrightable software programs or packaging could not be resold without permission of copyright holders.
[3] Unfair methods of competition — Types of unfair acts — Copyrights — Infringement ►54.0551 ►54.0557 [Show Topic Path]
is properly given “nongeographical” interpretation that permits application of doctrine to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, even though 17 U.S.C. §602(a)(1)
states that importation, without copyright owner's permission, of copies of work that have been acquired abroad “is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies … under Section 106,” since precedent holds that first sale doctrine is limitation on scope of Section 106 exclusive distribution right, since legislative history of 1976 Copyright Act, particularly that pertaining to Section 109(a), reiterates importance of first sale doctrine and supports nongeographical interpretation, and since nongeographical interpretation of Section 109(a) will make it difficult for publishers to divide foreign and domestic markets, but there is no principle of copyright law suggesting that publishers are entitled to such rights.
[4] First sale doctrine applies to works lawfully made abroad, imported to United States. ►IP.1.6.6 [Show Topic Path]
The first sale doctrine, codified in 17 U.S.C. §109(a), applies to copies of works legally made overseas and imported into the United States without the permission of the copyright holder. The Second Circuit [34 ILR 723] erred in concluding that an individual who imported foreign-made editions of U.S. textbooks into the United States and then sold them on eBay could not avail himself of the first sale doctrine. Section 109(a) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [of the Copyright Act, which forbids distribution of a work without the copyright owner's permission], the owner of a particular copy … lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy ….”
(Emphasis added.) While the Second Circuit read the words “lawfully made under this title” as imposing a form of geographical limitation—holding that the words limit the first sale doctrine to particular copies “made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law,”
namely, copies “manufactured domestically,” not “outside of the United States”—a better reading of those words does not impose a geographical limitation. “[L]awfully made under this title” means made “in accordance with”
or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act, so §109(a)'s first sale doctrine applies to copyrighted works as long as their manufacture meets the requirements of American copyright law. In particular, the doctrine applies where, as here, copies are manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright owner. Section 109(a)'s language, its context, and the common-law history of the first sale doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation. The legislative history, on balance, also supports the non-geographical interpretation. Although 17 U.S.C. §602(a)(1) prohibits the importation into the United States of copyrighted works acquired abroad without the authorization of the copyright holder, that provision refers explicitly to the §106(3)
exclusive distribution right, and §106 is, by its terms, “[s]ubject to” various doctrines and principles, including, in particular, the first sale doctrine of §109. [Three justices dissent]
REGULATION OF MEDIA CONTENT
[5] Copyright — In general ►17.01 [Show Topic Path]
“First sale” doctrine, as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §109(a), which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title …
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord,”
is properly given nongeographical interpretation, such that doctrine may be applied to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, since language of Section 109(a)
read literally says nothing about geography, and nongeographical interpretation provides each word of phrase “lawfully made under this title”
with distinct purpose, by distinguishing copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, and setting forth standard of lawfulness, since term “under” means “subject to” and not “where,” in that works subject to protection under Title 17 in Section 104 include unpublished works “without regard to the nationality of domicile of the author,” and works “first published” in any nation that has signed copyright treaty with United States, since earlier language of provision also said nothing about geography, and was changed in order to exclude those who have lawfully obtained copy of copyrighted work but did not own copy, such as movie theater owner who leased copy of film and is not permitted to sell that copy, since Congress sought to equalize treatment of copies manufactured in United States and copies manufactured abroad, and geographical interpretation of first sale clause would grant holder of American copyright permanent control over American distribution chain with regard to copies printed abroad, but not copies printed in America, and since it is unlikely that Congress intended this or other related consequences of geographical interpretation.
[6] Copyright — In general ►17.01 [Show Topic Path]
is properly given nongeographical interpretation, such that doctrine may be applied to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, since canon of statutory interpretation requires presumption that Congress intended for statute that addresses issue previously governed by common law to retain substance of common law, and nongeographical interpretation of Section 109(a) accords with common law doctrine, pursuant to which one who gives or sells whole interest in chattel cannot place conditions on buyer's subsequent disposition of that good, since it would be burdensome for courts to enforce restrictions upon readily movable goods, and since geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional objectives such as promoting progress of science and useful arts, in that, for example, libraries would have to obtain permission before circulating books published abroad, and cars, microwaves, computers, and other items containing copyrightable software programs or packaging could not be resold without permission of holder of each piece of copyrighted software made abroad.
[7] Copyright — In general ►17.01 [Show Topic Path]
is properly given nongeographical interpretation, such that doctrine may be applied to copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad and imported into United States, even though 17 U.S.C. §602(a)(1)
states that importation into United States without copyright holder's permission of copies of work that have been acquired abroad is infringement of exclusive right to distribute copies under Section 106, since Section 602(a)(1) is not violated when U.S. copyright owner authorizes first sale, since congressional report accompanying Section 109(a) states that “where the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a particular copy … of a work, the person to whom the copy …
is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by … any …
means,” and “the copyright owner's exclusive right of public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns ‘a particular copy …
lawfully made under this title,'” but underscores that copies must have been “lawfully made under this title,” though not necessarily with copyright owner's authorization, which excludes resale of illegally pirated copy, and since nongeographical interpretation would make it difficult for publishers to divide foreign and domestic markets, but there is no principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are entitled to such rights.
[8] Rights in copyright; infringement — Right to distribute copies — First sale ►213.0903 [Show Topic Path]
International issues — In general ►220.01 [Show Topic Path]
[9] Rights in copyright; infringement — Right to distribute copies — First sale ►213.0903 [Show Topic Path]
[10] Rights in copyright; infringement — Right to distribute copies — First sale ►213.0903 [Show Topic Path]
International issues — Importation provisions ►220.13 [Show Topic Path]
The "exclusive rights" that a copyright owner has "to distribute copies . . .
of [a] copyrighted work," 17 U. S. C. § 106(3), are qualified by the
application of several limitations set out in §§ 107 through 122, including
the "first sale" doctrine, which provides that "the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose
of the possession of that copy or phonorecord," § 109(a). Importing a copy
made abroad without the copyright owner's permission is an infringement of §
106(3). See § 602(a)(1). In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza
Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U. S. 135, 145, this Court held that § 602(a)(1)'s
reference to § 106(3) incorporates the §§ 107 through 122 limitations,
including § 109's "first sale" doctrine. However, the copy in Quality King
was initially manufactured in the United States and then sent abroad and
Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., an academic textbook publisher, often
assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary (Wiley Asia) rights to
publish, print, and sell foreign editions of Wiley's English language
textbooks abroad. Wiley Asia's books state that they are not to be taken
(without permission) into the United States. When petitioner Kirtsaeng moved
from Thailand to the United States to study mathematics, he asked friends
and family to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book
shops, where they sold at low prices, and to mail them to him in the United
States. He then sold the [***1003] books, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept
Wiley filed suit, claiming that Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation and
resale of its books was an infringement of Wiley's § 106(3)
exclusive right to distribute and § 602's import prohibition. Kirtsaeng
replied that because his books were "lawfully made" and acquired
legitimately, § 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine permitted importation and
resale without Wiley's further permission. The District Court held that
Kirtsaeng could not assert this defense because the doctrine does not apply
to goods manufactured abroad. The jury then found that Kirtsaeng had
willfully infringed Wiley's American copyrights and assessed damages. The
Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that § 109(a)'s "lawfully made under
this title" language indicated that the "first sale" doctrine does not apply
to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad.
Held: The "first sale" doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work
lawfully made abroad. Pp. 7-33.
(a) Wiley reads "lawfully made under this title" to impose a geographical
limitation that prevents § 109(a)'s doctrine from applying to Wiley Asia's
books. Kirtsaeng, however, reads the phrase as imposing the non-geographical
limitation made "in accordance with" or "in compliance with" the Copyright
Act, which [****2] would permit the doctrine to apply to copies manufactured abroad
with the copyright owner's permission. Pp. 7-8.
(b) Section 109(a)'s language, its context, and the "first sale" doctrine's
common-law history favor Kirtsaeng's reading. Pp. 8-24.
[**397] (1) Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. "Under" can logically mean
"in accordance with." And a nongeographical [*1353] interpretation provides each
word in the phrase "lawfully made under this title" with a distinct purpose:
"lawfully made" suggests an effort to distinguish copies that were made
lawfully from those that were not, and "under this title" sets forth the
standard of "lawful[ness]" (i.e., the U. S. [**398] Copyright Act). This simple
reading promotes the traditional copyright objective of combatting piracy
and makes word-by-word linguistic sense.
In contrast, the geographical interpretation bristles with linguistic
difficulties. Wiley first reads "under" to mean "in conformance with the
Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable." Wiley then argues that
the Act "is applicable" only in the United States. However, neither "under"
nor any other word in "lawfully made under this title" means "where." Nor
can a geographical limitation be read into the word "applicable." The fact
that the Act does not instantly protect an American copyright holder from
unauthorized piracy taking place abroad does not mean the Act is
inapplicable to copies made abroad. Indeed, § 602(a)(2) makes
foreign-printed pirated copies subject to the Copyright Act. And § 104 says
that works "subject to protection" include unpublished works "without regard
to the [author's] nationality or domicile," and works "first published" in
nearly 180 nations that have signed a copyright treaty with the United
States. Pp. 8-12.
(2) Both historical and contemporary statutory context indicate that
Congress did not have geography in mind when writing the present version of
§ 109(a). A comparison of the language in § 109(a)'s predecessor and the
present provision supports this conclusion. The former version referred to
those who are not owners of a copy, but mere possessors who "lawfully
obtained" a copy, while the present version covers only owners of a
"lawfully made" copy. This new language, including the five words at issue,
makes clear that a lessee of a copy will not receive "first sale" protection
but one who owns a copy will be protected, provided that the copy was
"lawfully made." A nongeographical interpretation is also supported by other
provisions of the present statute. For example, the "manufacturing clause,"
which limited importation of many copies printed outside the United States,
was phased out in an effort to equalize treatment of copies made in America
and copies made abroad. But that "equal treatment" principle is difficult to
square with a geographical interpretation that would grant an American
copyright holder permanent control over the American distribution chain in
respect to copies printed abroad but not those printed in America. Finally,
the Court normally presumes that the words "lawfully made under this title"
carry the [****3] same meaning when they appear in different but related sections,
and it is unlikely that Congress would have intended the consequences
produced by a geographical interpretation. Pp. 12-16.
(3) A nongeographical reading is also supported by the canon of statutory
interpretation [***1004] that "when a statute covers an issue previously governed by
the common law," it is presumed that "Congress intended to retain the
substance of the common law." Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. ___, ___. The
common-law "first sale" doctrine, which has an impeccable historic pedigree,
makes no geographical distinctions. Nor can such distinctions be found in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, where this Court first applied
the "first sale" doctrine, or in § 109(a)'s predecessor provision, which
Congress enacted a year later. Pp. 17-19.
[*1354] (4) Library associations, used-book dealers, technology companies,
consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various ways in which a
geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional
copyright objectives, in particular "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts," Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For example, a geographical interpretation
of the first-sale doctrine would likely require libraries to obtain
permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were
printed overseas. Wiley counters that such problems have not occurred in the
30 years since a federal court
first adopted a geographical interpretation. But the law has not been
settled for so long in Wiley's favor. The Second Circuit in this case was
the first Court of Appeals to adopt a purely geographical interpretation.
Reliance on the "first sale" doctrine is also deeply embedded in the
practices of booksellers, libraries, museums, and retailers, who have long
relied on its protection. And the fact that harm has proved limited so far
may simply reflect the reluctance of copyright holders to assert
geographically based resale rights. Thus, the practical problems described
by petitioner and his amici are too serious, extensive, and likely to come
about to be dismissed as insignificant — particularly in light of the
ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. Pp. 19-24.
(c) Several additional arguments that Wiley and the dissent make in support
of a geographical interpretation are unpersuasive. Pp. 24-33.
654 F. 3d 210, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined, and in which SCALIA, J.,
joined except as to Parts III and V-B-1.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants "the owner of copyright under this
title" certain "exclusive rights," including the right "to distribute copies
. . . of the copy righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership." 17 U. S. C. § 106(3). These rights are qualified, however, by
the application of various limitations set forth in the next several
sections of the Act, §§ 107 through 122. Those [****4] sections, typically entitled
"Limitations on exclusive rights," include, for example, the principle of
"fair use" (§ 107), permission for limited library archival reproduction, (§
108), and the doctrine at issue here, the "first sale" doctrine (§ 109).
[**399] Section 109(a) sets forth the "first sale" doctrine as follows:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the section
that grants the owner exclusive distribution rights], the [*1355] owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . .
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or other wise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, even though § 106(3) forbids distribution of a copy of, say, the
copyrighted novel Herzog without the copyright owner's permission, § 109(a)
adds that, once a copy of Herzog has been lawfully sold (or its ownership
otherwise lawfully transferred), the buyer of that copy and subsequent
owners are free to dispose of it as they wish. In copyright jargon, the
"first sale" has "exhausted" the copyright owner's § 106(3) exclusive
What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad and then initially
sold with the copyright owner's permission? Does the "first sale" doctrine
still apply? Is the buyer, like the buyer of a domestically manufactured
copy, free to bring the copy into the United States and dispose of it as he
or she wishes?
To put the matter technically, an "importation" provision, § 602(a)(1),
[***1005] "[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of
the owner of copyright under this title, of copies . . . of a work
that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement
of the exclusive right to distribute copies . . . under section 106.
. . ." 17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
Thus § 602(a)(1) makes clear that importing a copy without permission
violates the owner's exclusive distribution right. But in doing so, §
602(a)(1) refers explicitly to the § 106(3) exclusive distribution right. As
we have just said, § 106 is by its terms "[s]ubject to" the various
doctrines and principles contained in §§ 107 through 122, including §
109(a)'s "first sale" limitation. Do those same modifications apply — in
particular, does the "first sale" modification apply — when considering
whether § 602(a)(1) prohibits importing a copy?
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc.,
523 U. S. 135, 145 (1998),
we held that § 602(a)(1)'s reference to § 106(3)'s exclusive distribution
right incorporates the later subsections' limitations, including, in
particular, the "first sale" doctrine of § 109. Thus, it might seem that, §
602(a)(1) notwithstanding, one who buys a copy abroad can freely import that
copy into the United States and dispose of it, just as he could had he
bought the copy in the United States.
But Quality King considered an instance in which the copy, though
purchased abroad, was initially manufactured in the United States (and then
sent abroad and sold). This case is like Quality King but for one important
fact. The copies at issue here were manufactured abroad. That fact is
important because § 109(a) says that the "first sale" doctrine applies to "a
particular [****5] copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title." And we must
decide here whether the five words, "lawfully made under this title," make a
critical legal difference.
[**400] Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the "first sale"
doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a
copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring that
copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining
permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who
purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently
resell it without the copyright owner's permission?
In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. We hold that the
"first [*1356] sale" doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made
Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., publishes academic textbooks. Wiley
obtains from its authors various foreign and domestic copyright assignments,
permissions — to the point that we can, for present purposes, refer to Wiley
as the relevant American copyright owner. See 654 F. 3d 210, 213, n. 6 (CA2
2011). Wiley often assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary, John
Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley's
English language textbooks abroad. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-48a. Each copy
of a Wiley Asia foreign edition will likely contain language making clear
that the copy is to be sold only in a particular country or geographical
region outside the United States. 654 F. 3d, at 213.
For example, a copy of Wiley's American edition says, "Copyright © 2008
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved. . . . Printed in the United
States of America." J. Walker, Fundamentals of Physics, p. vi (8th ed.
2008). A copy of Wiley Asia's Asian edition of that book says:
"Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd[.] All rights
reserved. This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa,
and the Middle East only and may be not exported out of these
territories. Exportation from or importation of this book to another
region without the Publisher's authorization is illegal and is a
violation of the Publisher's rights. The Publisher may take legal
action to enforce its rights. . . . Printed in Asia." J. Walker,
Fundamentals of Physics, p. vi (8th ed. 2008 Wiley Int'l Student
Both the foreign and the American copies say:
"No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means . . .
except as permitted under Sections 107 or 108 [***1006] of the 1976 United
States Copyright Act." Compare, e.g., ibid. (Int'l ed.), with
Walker, supra, at vi (American ed.).
The upshot is that there are two essentially equivalent versions of a
Wiley textbook, 654 F. 3d, at 213, each version
manufactured and sold with Wiley's permission: (1) an American version
printed and sold in the United States, and (2) a foreign version
manufactured and sold abroad. And Wiley makes certain that copies of the
second version state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into
the United States. Ibid.
Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United
States in 1997 to study mathematics [**401] at Cornell [****6] University. Ibid. He paid for
his education with the help of a Thai Government scholarship which required
him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on his return. Brief for Petitioner 7.
Kirtsaeng successfully completed his undergraduate courses at Cornell,
successfully completed a Ph. D. program in mathematics at the University of
Southern California, and then, as promised, returned to Thailand to teach.
Ibid. While he was studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his
friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition
English-language textbooks at Thai book shops, where they sold at low
prices, and mail them to him in the United States. Id., at 7-8. Kirtsaeng
would then sell them, reimburse his family and friends, and keep the profit.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a-49a.
[*1357] B
In 2008 Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for copyright
infringement. 654 F. 3d, at 213. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng's unauthorized
importation of its books and his later resale of those books amounted to an
infringement of Wiley's § 106(3) exclusive right to distribute as well as §
602's related import prohibition. 17 U. S. C. §§ 106(3) (2006 ed.), 602(a)
(2006 ed., Supp. V). See also § 501 (2006 ed.) (authorizing infringement
action). App. 204-211. Kirtsaeng replied that the books he had acquired were
"`lawfully made'" and that he had acquired them legitimately. Record in No.
1:08-CV-7834-DCP (SDNY), Doc. 14, p. 3.
Thus, in his view, § 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine permitted him to resell
or otherwise dispose of the books without the copyright owner's further
permission. Id., at 2-3.
The District Court held that Kirtsaeng could not assert the "first sale"
defense because, in its view, that doctrine does not apply to
"foreign-manufactured goods" (even if made abroad with the copyright owner's
permission). App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a. The jury then found that Kirtsaeng
had willfully infringed Wiley's American copyrights by selling and importing
without authorization copies of eight of Wiley's copyrighted titles. And it
assessed statutory damages of $600,000 ($75,000 per work).
654 F. 3d, at 215.
On appeal, a split panel of the Second Circuit agreed with the District
Court. Id., at 222. It pointed out that § 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine
applies only to "the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under
this title." Id., at 218-219 (emphasis added). And, in the majority's view,
this language means that the "first sale" doctrine does not apply to copies
of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. Id., at 221. A dissenting
judge thought that the words "lawfully made under this title" do not refer
"to a place of manufacture" but rather "focu[s] on whether a particular copy
was manufactured lawfully under" America's copyright statute, and that "the
lawfulness of the manufacture of a particular copy should be judged by U. S.
copyright law." Id., at 226 (opinion of Murtha, J.).
We granted Kirtsaeng's petition for certiorari to consider this question
in light of different views among the Circuits. Compare id., at 221 (case
below) ("first sale" doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside
the United States), with Omega S. A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
541 F. 3d 982, 986 (CA9 2008) ("first sale" doctrine applies [****7] to copies
manufactured [**402] outside the United States only if an authorized first sale
occurs within the United States),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 562 U. S. ___ (2010), and Sebastian
Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F. 2d 1093, 1098, n. 1 (CA3
1988) (limitation of the first sale doctrine to copies made within the
United States "does not fit comfortably within the scheme of the Copyright
Act").
We must decide whether the words "lawfully made under this title" restrict
the scope of § 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine geographically. The Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, Wiley, and the Solicitor General (as amicus) all
read those words as imposing a form of [***1007] geographical limitation. The Second
Circuit held that they limit the "first sale" doctrine to particular copies
"made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law," which (the Circuit
says) are copies "manufactured domestically," not "outside of the United
States." 654 F. 3d, at 221-222 (emphasis added). Wiley agrees that those
five words limit [*1358] the "first sale" doctrine "to copies made in conformance
with the [United States] Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is
applicable," which (Wiley says) means it does not apply to copies made
"outside the United States" and at least not to "foreign production of a
copy for distribution exclusively abroad." Brief for Respondent 15-16.
Similarly, the Solicitor General says that those five words limit the "first
sale" doctrine's applicability to copies "`made subject to and in compliance
with [the Copyright Act],'" which (the Solicitor General says) are copies
"made in the United States." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5
(hereinafter Brief for United States) (emphasis added). And the Ninth
Circuit has held that those words limit the "first sale" doctrine's
applicability (1) to copies lawfully made in the United States, and (2) to
copies lawfully made outside the United States but initially sold in the
United States with the copyright owner's permission. Denbicare U. S. A. Inc.
v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F. 3d 1143, 1149-1150 (1996).
Under any of these geographical interpretations, § 109(a)'s "first sale"
doctrine would not apply to the Wiley Asia books at issue here. And, despite
an American copyright owner's permission to make copies abroad, one who buys
a copy of any such book or other copyrighted work — whether at a retail
store, over the Internet, or at a library sale — could not resell (or
otherwise dispose of) that particular copy without further permission.
Kirtsaeng, however, reads the words "lawfully made under this title" as
imposing a non-geographical limitation. He says that they mean made "in
accordance with" or "in compliance with" the Copyright Act. Brief for
Petitioner 26. In that case, § 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine would apply to
copyrighted works as long as their manufacture met the requirements of
American copyright law. In particular, the doctrine would apply where, as
here, copies are manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright
owner. See § 106 (referring to the owner's right to authorize).
In our view, § 109(a)'s language, its context, and the common-law history
of the "first sale" doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical
interpretation. [****8] We also doubt that Congress would have intended to create
the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical
interpretation [**403] would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and
consumer activities. See Part II-D, infra. We consequently conclude that
Kirtsaeng's nongeographical reading is the better reading of the Act.
[1] [5] [8] The language of § 109(a) read literally favors Kirtsaeng's nongeographical
interpretation, namely, that "lawfully made under this title" means made "in
accordance with" or "in compliance with" the Copyright Act. The language of
§ 109(a)
says nothing about geography. The word "under" can mean "[i]n accordance
with." 18 Oxford English Dictionary 950 (2d ed. 1989). See also Black's Law
Dictionary 1525 (6th ed. 1990) ("according to"). And a nongeographical
interpretation provides each word of the five-word phrase with a distinct
purpose. The first two words of the phrase, "lawfully made," suggest an
effort to distinguish those copies that were made lawfully from those that
were not, and the last three words, "under this title," set forth the
standard of "lawful[ness]." Thus, the nongeographical reading is simple, it
promotes a traditional copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes
word-by-word linguistic sense.
The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic
difficulties. It [*1359] gives the word "lawfully" little, if any, linguistic work
to do. (How could a book be unlawfully "made under this title"?) It imports
geography into a statutory provision that says nothing explicitly about it.
And it is far more complex than may at first appear.
To read the clause geographically, Wiley, like the Second Circuit and the
Solicitor General, must first emphasize the word "under." Indeed, Wiley
reads "under this title" to mean "in conformance with the Copyright Act
where the Copyright Act is applicable." Brief for Respondent 15. Wiley must
then take a second step, arguing that the Act "is applicable" only in the
United States. Ibid. And the Solicitor General must do the same. See Brief
for United States 6 ("A copy is `lawfully made under this title' if Title 17
governs the [***1008] copy's creation and the copy is made in compliance with Title
17's requirements"). See also post, at 7 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) ("under"
describes something "governed or regulated by another").
One difficulty is that neither "under" nor any other word in the phrase
means "where." See, e.g., 18 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 947-952
(definition of "under"). It might mean "subject to," see post, at 6, but as
Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the word evades a uniform, consistent
meaning. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 245 (2010) ("`under' is
chameleon"); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991) ("under" has "many
dictionary definitions" and "must draw its meaning from its context").
A far more serious difficulty arises out of the uncertainty and complexity
surrounding the second step's effort to read the necessary geographical
limitation into the word "applicable" (or the equivalent). Where, precisely,
is the Copyright Act "applicable"? The Act does not instantly protect an
American copyright holder from unauthorized piracy [****9] taking place abroad. But
that fact does not mean the Act is inapplicable to copies made abroad. As a
matter of ordinary English, [**404] one can say that a statute imposing, say, a
tariff upon "any rhododendron grown in Nepal" applies to all Nepalese
rhododendrons. And, similarly, one can say that the American Copyright Act
is applicable to all pirated copies, including those printed overseas.
Indeed, the Act itself makes clear that (in the Solicitor General's
language) foreign-printed pirated copies are "subject to" the Act. §
602(a)(2) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (referring to importation of copies "the
making of which either constituted an infringement of copyright, or which
would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been
applicable"); Brief for United States 5. See also post, at 6 (suggesting
that "made under" may be read as "subject to").
The appropriateness of this linguistic usage is underscored by the fact
that § 104 of the Act itself says that works "subject to protection under
this title" include unpublished works "without regard to the nationality or
domicile of the author," and works "first published" in any one of the
States. §§ 104(a), (b) (2006 ed.) (emphasis added); § 101 (2006 ed., Supp.
V) (defining "treaty party");
U. S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 38A, International Copyright Relations
of the United States (2010). Thus, ordinary English permits us to say that
the Act "applies" to an Irish manuscript lying in its author's Dublin desk
drawer as well as to an original recording of a ballet performance first
made in Japan and now on display in a Kyoto art gallery. Cf. 4 M. Nimmer &
D. Nimmer, Copyright § 17.02, pp. 17-18, 17-19 (2012) (hereinafter Nimmer [*1360] on
Copyright) (noting that the principle that "copyright laws do not have any
extraterritorial operation" "requires some qualification").
The Ninth Circuit's geographical interpretation produces still greater
linguistic difficulty. As we said, that Circuit interprets the "first sale"
doctrine to cover both (1) copies manufactured in the United States and (2)
copies manufactured abroad but first sold in the United States with the
American copyright owner's permission. Denbicare U. S. A.,
84 F. 3d, at 1149-1150. See also Brief for Respondent 16 (suggesting that
the clause at least excludes "the foreign production of a copy for
distribution exclusively abroad"); id., at 51 (the Court need "not decide
whether the copyright owner would be able to restrict further distribution"
in the case of "a downstream domestic purchaser of authorized imports");
Brief for Petitioner in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S. A., O. T. 2010,
No. 08-1423, p. 12 (excepting imported copies "made by unrelated foreign
copyright holders" (emphasis deleted)).
We can understand why the Ninth Circuit may have thought it necessary to
add the second part of its definition. As we shall later describe, see Part
II-D, infra, without some such qualification a copyright holder could
prevent a buyer from domestically reselling or even giving away copies of a
video game made in Japan, a film made in Germany, or a dress (with a design
copyright) [****10] made in China, even if the copyright holder has granted
permission for the foreign manufacture, importation, and an initial
domestic sale of the copy. A publisher such as Wiley would be free to print
its books abroad, allow their importation and sale within the United States,
but prohibit students from later selling their used texts at a campus
bookstore. We see no way, [**405] however, to reconcile this
half-geographical/half-nongeographical interpretation with the language of
the phrase, "lawfully made under this title." As a matter of English, it
would [***1009] seem that those five words either do cover copies lawfully made abroad
or they do not.
In sum, we believe that geographical interpretations create more
linguistic problems than they resolve. And considerations of simplicity and
coherence tip the purely linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng's, nongeographical,
Both historical and contemporary statutory context indicate that Congress,
when writing the present version of § 109(a), did not have geography in
mind. In respect to history, we compare § 109(a)'s present language with the
language of its immediate predecessor. That predecessor said:
"[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or
restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
possession of which has been lawfully obtained." Copyright Act of
1909, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (emphasis added).
See also Copyright Act of 1947, § 27, 61 Stat. 660. The predecessor says
nothing about geography (and Wiley does not argue that it does). So we ask
whether Congress, in changing its language implicitly introduced a
geographical limitation that previously was lacking. See also Part II-C,
infra (discussing 1909 codification of common-law principle).
A comparison of language indicates that it did not. The
predecessor says that the "first sale" doctrine protects "the transfer of
any copy the possession of which has been lawfully obtained." The present
version says that "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or [*1361] phonorecord." What does this change in language
The language of the former version referred to those who are not owners of
a copy, but mere possessors who "lawfully obtained" a copy. The present
version covers only those who are owners of a "lawfully made" copy. Whom
does the change leave out? Who might have lawfully obtained a copy of a
copyrighted work but not owned that copy? One answer is owners of movie
theaters, who during the 1970's (and before) often leased films from movie
distributors or filmmakers. See S. Donahue, American Film Distribution 134,
177 (1987) (describing producer-distributer and distributer-exhibitor
agreements); Note, The Relationship Between Motion Picture Distribution and
Exhibition: An Analysis of the Effects of Anti-Blind Bidding Legislation, 9
Comm/Ent. L. J. 131, 135 (1986). Because the theater owners had "lawfully
obtained" their copies, the earlier version could be read as allowing them
to sell that copy, i.e., it might have given them "first sale" protection.
Because [****11] the theater owners were lessees, not owners, of their copies, the
change in language makes clear that they (like bailees and other lessees)
cannot take advantage of the "first sale" doctrine. (Those who find
legislative history useful will find confirmation in, e.g., House Committee
on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Supplementary Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law:
1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st [**406] Sess., pt. 6, p. 30 (Comm. Print 1965)
(hereinafter Copyright Law Revision) ("[W]here a person has rented a print
of a motion picture from the copyright owner, he would have no
right to lend, rent, sell, or otherwise dispose of the print without first
obtaining the copyright owner's permission"). See also Platt & Munk Co. v.
Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA2 1963) (Friendly, J.)
(pointing out predecessor statute's leasing problem)).
This objective perfectly well explains the new language of the present
version, including the five words here at issue. Section 109(a) now makes
clear that a lessee of a copy will not receive "first sale" protection but
one who owns a copy will receive "first sale" protection, provided, of
course, that the copy was "lawfully made" and not pirated. The new language
also takes into account that a copy may be "lawfully made under this title"
when the copy, say of a phonorecord, comes into its owner's possession
through use of a compulsory license, which "this title" provides for
elsewhere, namely, in § 115. Again, for those who find legislative history
useful, the relevant legislative report makes this clear. H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 79 (1976) ("For example, any resale of an illegally `pirated'
phonorecord would be an infringement, but the disposition of a phonorecord
legally made under the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 would
not").
Other provisions of the present statute also support a nongeographical
interpretation. For one thing, the statute phases out the "manufacturing
[***1010] clause," a clause that appeared in earlier statutes and had limited
importation of many copies (of copyrighted works) printed outside the United
States. § 601, 90 Stat. 2588 ("Prior to July 1, 1982 . . . the importation
into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a work
consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material . . . is
prohibited unless the portions consisting of such material have been
manufactured in the United States or Canada"). The phasing out of this
clause sought to equalize treatment of copies manufactured in America and
copies manufactured abroad. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 165-166.
[*1362] The "equal treatment" principle, however, is difficult to square with a
geographical interpretation of the "first sale" clause that would grant the
holder of an American copyright (perhaps a foreign national, see supra, at
10) permanent control over the American distribution chain (sales, resales,
gifts, and other distribution) in respect to copies printed abroad but not
in respect to copies printed in America. And it is particularly difficult to
believe that Congress would have sought this unequal treatment while saying
[****12] nothing about it and while, in a related clause (the manufacturing
phase-out), seeking the opposite kind of policy goal. Cf. Golan v. Holder,
565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 30) (Congress has moved from a
copyright regime that, prior to 1891, entirely excluded foreign works from
U. S. copyright protection to a regime that now "en-sure[s] that most works,
whether foreign or domestic, would be governed by the same legal regime"
Finally, we normally presume that the words "lawfully made under this
title" carry the same meaning when they appear in different but related
sections. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc.[**407] ,
510 U. S. 332, 342 (1994). But doing so here produces surprising
consequences. Consider:
(1) Section 109(c) says that, despite the copyright owner's
exclusive right "to display" a copyrighted work (provided in §
106(5)), the owner of a particular copy "lawfully made under this
title" may publicly display it without further authorization. To
interpret these words geographically would mean that one who buys a
copyrighted work of art, a poster, or even a bumper sticker, in
Canada, in Europe, in Asia, could not display it in America without
the copyright owner's further authorization.
(2) Section 109(e) specifically provides that the owner of a
particular copy of a copyrighted video arcade game "lawfully made
under this title" may "publicly perform or display that game in
coin-operated equipment" without the authorization of the copyright
owner. To interpret these words geographically means that an arcade
owner could not ("without the authority of the copyright owner")
perform or display arcade games (whether new or used) originally
made in Japan. Cf. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.,
883 F. 2d 275 (CA4 1989).
(3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copyright
owner's authorization, is allowed to perform or display a
copyrighted work (say, an audiovisual work) "in the course of
face-to-face teaching activities" — unless the teacher knowingly
used "a copy that was not lawfully made under this title." To
interpret these words geographically would mean that the teacher
could not (without further authorization) use a copy of a film
during class if the copy was lawfully made in Canada, Mexico,
Europe, Africa, or Asia.
(4) In its introductory sentence, § 106 provides the Act's basic
exclusive rights to an "owner of a copyright under this title." The
last three words cannot support a geographic interpretation.
Wiley basically accepts the first three readings, but argues that Congress
intended the restrictive consequences. And it argues that context simply
requires that the words of the fourth example receive a different
interpretation. Leaving the fourth example to the side, we shall explain in
Part II-D, infra, why we find it unlikely that Congress would have intended
these, and other related consequences.
[*1363] C
[2] [6] [9] A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a nongeographical
reading. "[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the common
law," we must presume that "Congress intended to retain the substance of the
common law." Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. ___, ___, n. 13 (2010) ([****13] slip [***1011] op.,
at 14, n. 13). See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779, 783
(1952) ("Statutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident").
The "first sale" doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable
historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common
law's refusal to permit restraints [**408] on the alienation of chattels. Referring
to Littleton, who wrote in the 15th century, Gray, Two Contributions to Coke
Studies, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1135 (2005), Lord Coke wrote:
"[If] a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or of any other
chattell . . . and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein
upon condition that the Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the
same, the [condition] is voi[d], be cause his whole interest . . .
is out of him, so as he hath no possibility] of a Reverter, and it
is against Trade and Traffic], and bargaining and contracting
betwee[n] man and man: and it is within the reason of our Author
that it should ouster him of all power given to him." 1 E. Coke,
Institutes of the Laws of England § 360, p. 223 (1628).
A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other
disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly "against Trade and
Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting." Ibid.
With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance
of leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or
otherwise disposing of those goods. American law too has generally thought
that competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of
the consumer. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 886 (2007) (restraints with "manifestly anticompetitive
effects" are per se illegal; others are subject to the rule of reason
(internal quotation marks omitted)); 1 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law ¶ 100, p. 4 (3d ed. 2006) ("[T]he principal objective of antitrust
policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave
competitively").
The "first sale" doctrine also frees courts from the administrative burden
of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable
goods. And it avoids the selective enforcement inherent in any such effort.
Thus, it is not surprising that for at least a century the "first sale"
doctrine has played an important role in American copyright law. See
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908); Copyright Act of 1909, §
41, 35 Stat. 1084. See also Copyright Law Revision, Further Discussions and
Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 4, p. 212 (Comm. Print 1964) (Irwin Karp of Authors' League of
America expressing concern for "the very basic concept of copyright law
that, once you've sold a copy legally, you can't restrict its resale").
The common-law doctrine makes no geographical distinctions; nor can we
find any in Bobbs-Merrill (where this Court first applied the "first sale"
doctrine) or in § 109(a)'s predecessor provision, which Congress enacted a
year later. See supra[*1364] , at 12. Rather, as the Solicitor General acknowledges,
"a straightforward application [****14] of Bobbs-Merrill" would not preclude the
"first sale" defense from applying to authorized copies made overseas. Brief
United States 27. And we can find no language, context, purpose, or history
that would rebut a "straightforward application" of that doctrine here.
The dissent argues that another principle of statutory interpretation
works against our reading, and points [**409] out that elsewhere in the statute
Congress used different words to express something like the non-geographical
reading we adopt. Post, at 8-9 (quoting § 602(a)(2) (prohibiting the
importation of copies "the making of which either constituted an
infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement
of copyright if this title had been applicable" (emphasis deleted))). Hence,
Congress, the dissent believes, must have meant § 109(a)'s different
language to mean something different (such as the dissent's own geographical
interpretation of § 109(a)). We are not aware, however, of any canon of
interpretation that forbids interpreting different words used in different
parts of the same statute to mean roughly the same thing. Regardless, were
there such a canon, the dissent's interpretation of § 109(a) would also
violate it. That is because Congress elsewhere in the 1976 Act included the
words "manufactured in the United States or Canada," 90 Stat. 2588, which
express [***1012] just about the same geographical thought that the dissent reads into
§ 109(a)'s very different language.
Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies,
useful Arts." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The American Library Association tells us that library collections contain
at least 200 million books published abroad (presumably, many were first
published in one of
the nearly 180 copyright-treaty nations and enjoy American copyright
protection under 17 U. S. C. § 104, see supra, at 10); that many others were
first published in the United States but printed abroad because of lower
costs; and that a geographical interpretation will likely require the
libraries to obtain permission (or at least create significant uncertainty)
before circulating or otherwise distributing these books. Brief for American
Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae 4, 15-20. Cf. id., at 16-20, 28
(discussing limitations of potential defenses, including the fair use and
archival exceptions, §§ 107-108). See also Library and Book Trade Almanac
511 (D. Bogart ed., 55th ed. 2010) (during 2000-2009 "a significant amount
of book printing moved to foreign nations").
How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to obtain
permission to distribute these millions of books? How can they find, say,
the copyright owner of a foreign book, perhaps written decades ago? They may
not know the copyright holder's present address. Brief for American Library
Association 15 (many books lack indication of place of manufacture; "no
practical [****15] way to learn where [a] book was printed"). And, even where
addresses can be found, the costs of finding them, contacting owners, and
negotiating may be high indeed. Are the libraries to stop circulating or
distributing or displaying the millions of books in their collections that
were printed abroad?
Used-book dealers tell us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas [*1365] Jefferson built commercial and personal libraries of foreign books,
American readers have bought used books published and printed abroad. Brief
for Powell's Books Inc. [**410] et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (citing M. Stern,
Antiquarian Bookselling in the United States (1985)). The dealers say that
they have "operat[ed] . . . for centuries" under the assumption that the
"first sale" doctrine applies. Brief for Powell's Books 7. But under a
geographical interpretation a contemporary
tourist who buys, say, at Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen copies of
a foreign book for American friends might find that she had violated the
copyright law. The used-book dealers cannot easily predict what the foreign
copyright holder may think about a reader's effort to sell a used copy of a
novel. And they believe that a geographical interpretation will injure a
large portion of the used-book business.
Technology companies tell us that "automobiles, microwaves, calculators,
mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers" contain copyrightable
software programs or packaging. Brief for Public Knowledge et al. as Amici
Curiae 10. See also Brief for Association of Service and Computer Dealers
International, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 2. Many of these items are made
abroad with the American copyright holder's permission and then sold and
imported (with that permission) to the United States. Brief for Retail
Litigation Center, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 4. A geographical
interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car, without the
permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of copyrighted
automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto
manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permission from their software
component suppliers, and Wiley did not indicate to the contrary when asked.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30. Without that permission a foreign car owner
could not sell his or her used car.
Retailers tell us that over $2.3 trillion worth of foreign goods were
imported in 2011. Brief for Retail Litigation Center 8. American retailers
buy many of these goods after a first sale abroad. Id., at 12. And, many of
these items bear, carry, or contain copyrighted "packaging, logos, labels,
and product inserts and instructions for [the use of] everyday packaged
goods from floor cleaners and health and beauty products to breakfast
cereals." Id., at 10-11. The retailers add that American sales of more
traditional copyrighted works, "such as books, recorded music, motion
pictures, [***1013] and magazines" likely amount to over $220 billion. Id., at 9. See
also id., at 10 (electronic game industry is $16 billion). A geographical
interpretation would subject many, if not all, of them to the disruptive
impact [****16] of the threat of infringement suits. Id., at 12.
Art museum directors ask us to consider their efforts to display
foreign-produced works by, say, Cy Twombly, René Magritte, Henri Matisse,
Pablo Picasso, and others. See supra, at 10 (describing how § 104 often
makes such works "subject to" American copyright protection). A geographical
interpretation, they say, would require the museums to obtain permission
from the copyright owners before they could display the work, see supra, at
15 — even if the copyright owner has already sold or donated the work to a
foreign museum. Brief for Association of Art Museum Directors et al. as
Amici Curiae 10-11. What are the museums to do, they ask, if the artist
retained the copyright, if the artist cannot be found, or if a group of
heirs [**411] is arguing about who owns which copyright? Id., at 14.
These examples, and others previously mentioned, help explain why Lord
Coke considered the "first sale" doctrine necessary [*1366] to protect "Trade and
Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting," and they help explain why
American copyright law has long applied that doctrine. Cf. supra, at 17-18.
Neither Wiley nor any of its many amici deny that a geographical
interpretation could bring about these "horribles" — at least in principle.
Rather, Wiley essentially says that the list is artificially invented. Brief
for Respondent 51-52. It points out that a federal court first adopted a
geographical interpretation more than 30 years ago. CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distributors, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (ED Pa. 1983), summarily
aff'd, 738 F. 2d 424 (CA3 1984) (table). Yet, it adds, these problems have
not occurred. Why not? Because, says Wiley, the problems
and threats are purely theoretical; they are unlikely to reflect reality.
See also post, at 30-31.
We are less sanguine. For one thing, the law has not been settled for long
in Wiley's favor. The Second Circuit, in its decision below, is the first
Court of Appeals to adopt a purely geographical interpretation. The Third
Circuit has favored a nongeographical interpretation. Sebastian Int'l,
847 F. 2d 1093. The Ninth Circuit has favored a modified geographical
interpretation with a nongeographical (but textually unsustainable)
corollary designed to diminish the problem. Denbicare U. S. A.,
84 F. 3d 1143. See supra, at 11-12. And other courts have hesitated to
adopt, and have cast doubt upon, the validity of the geographical
interpretation. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407 (SDNY 2009);
Red-Baron Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., No. 88-0156-A, [10 ITRD 2011], 1988 WL 167344,
*3 (ED Va. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F. 2d 275 (CA4 1989).
For another thing, reliance upon the "first sale" doctrine is deeply
embedded in the practices of those, such as booksellers, libraries, museums,
and retailers, who have long relied upon its protection. Museums, for
example, are not in the habit of asking their foreign counterparts to check
with the heirs of copyright owners before sending, e.g., a Picasso on tour.
Brief for Association of Art Museum Directors 11-12. That inertia means a
dramatic change is likely necessary before these institutions, instructed by
their counsel, would begin to engage in the complex permission-verifying
process that [****17] a geographical interpretation would demand. And this Court's
adoption of the geographical interpretation could provide that dramatic
change. These intolerable consequences (along with the absurd result that
the copyright owner can exercise downstream control even when it authorized
the import or first sale) have understandably led the Ninth Circuit, the
Solicitor General as amicus, and the dissent to
adopt textual readings of the statute that attempt to mitigate these harms.
Brief for United States 27-28; post, at 24-28. But those readings are not
defensible, for they require too many unprecedented jumps over linguistic
and other hurdles that in our view are insurmountable. See, e.g., post, at
26 ([**412] acknowledging that its reading of § 106(3) "significantly curtails the
independent effect of § 109(a)").
Finally, the fact that harm has proved limited so far may simply reflect
the reluctance of copyright holders so far to assert geographically based
resale rights. They may decide differently if the law is clarified in their
favor. Regardless, a copyright law that can work in practice only if
unenforced is not a sound copyright law. It is a law that would create
uncertainty, would bring about selective enforcement, [***1014] and, if widely
unenforced, would breed disrespect for copyright law itself.
[*1367] Thus, we believe that the practical problems that petitioner and his amici
have described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come about
for us to dismiss them as insignificant — particularly in light of the
evergrowing importance of foreign trade to America. See The World Bank,
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) (imports in 2011 18% of U. S. gross
domestic product compared to 11% in 1980), online at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS? (as visited Mar. 15,
2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The upshot is that
copyright-related consequences along with language, context, and
interpretive canons argue strongly against a geographical interpretation of
§ 109(a).
Wiley and the dissent make several additional important arguments in favor
of the geographical interpretation. First, they say that our Quality King
decision strongly supports its geographical interpretation. In that case
we asked whether the Act's "importation provision," now § 602(a)(1) (then §
602(a)), barred importation (without permission) of a copyrighted item
(labels affixed to hair care products) where an American copyright owner
authorized the first sale and export of hair care products with copyrighted
labels made in the United States, and where a buyer sought to import them
back into the United States without the copyright owner's permission.
523 U. S., at 138-139.
[3] [10] We held that the importation provision did not prohibit sending the
products back into the United States (without the copyright owner's
permission). That section says:
"Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a
work that have been acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to [****18] distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106." 17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(1) (2006 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added). See also § 602(a) (1994 ed.).
We pointed out that this section makes importation an infringement of the
"exclusive right to distribute . . . under 106." We noted that § 109(a)'s
"first sale" doctrine limits the scope of the § 106 exclusive distribution
right. We took as given the fact that the products at issue had at least
once been sold. And we held that consequently, importation of the
copyrighted labels does not violate § 602(a)(1). 523 U. S., at 145.
In reaching this conclusion we endorsed Bobbs-Merrill and its statement
that the copyright laws were not "intended to create a right which would
permit the holder of the copyright [**413] to fasten, by notice in a book . . . a
restriction upon the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of
copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired
full dominion over it." 210 U. S., at 349-350.
We also explained why we rejected the claim that our interpretation would
make § 602(a)(1) pointless. Those advancing that claim had pointed out that
the 1976 Copyright Act amendments retained a prior anti-piracy provision,
prohibiting the importation of pirated copies. Quality King, supra, at 146.
Thus, they said, § 602(a)(1) must prohibit the importation of lawfully made
copies, for to allow the importation of those lawfully made copies after a
first sale, as Quality King's holding would do, would leave § 602(a)(1)
without much to prohibit. It would become superfluous, without any real work
[*1368] We do not believe that this argument is a strong one. Under Quality King's
interpretation, § 602(a)(1) would still forbid importing (without
permission, and subject to the exceptions in § 602(a)(3)) copies lawfully
made abroad, for example, where (1) a foreign publisher operating as the
licensee of an American publisher prints copies of a book overseas but,
prior to any authorized sale, seeks to send them to the United States; (2) a
foreign printer or other manufacturer (if not the "owner" for purposes of §
109(a), e.g., before an authorized sale) sought to send copyrighted goods to
the United States; (3) "a book publisher transports copies to a wholesaler"
and the wholesaler (not yet the owner) sends them to the United States, see
Copyright Law Revision, pt. 4, at 211 (giving this example); or (4) a
foreign film distributor, having leased films for distribution, or any other
licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to send them to the United States.
See, e.g., 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.12[B][1][a], at 8-159 ("Section 109(a)
provides that the distribution right may be exercised solely with respect to
the initial disposition of copies of a work, not to prevent [***1015] or restrict the
resale or other further transfer of possession of such copies"). These
examples show that § 602(a)(1) retains significance. We concede it has less
significance than the dissent believes appropriate, but the
dissent also adopts a construction of § 106(3) that "significantly curtails"
§ 109(a)'s effect, post, at 26, and so limits the scope of that provision to
a similar, or even greater, degree.
In Quality King we rejected the "superfluous" argument for similar
reasons. But, when rejecting [****19] it, we said that, where an author gives
exclusive American distribution rights to an American publisher and
exclusive British distribution rights to a British publisher, "presumably
only those [copies] made by the publisher of the United States edition would
be `lawfully made under this title' within the meaning of § 109(a)."
523 U. S., at 148 (emphasis added). Wiley now argues that this phrase in the
Quality King opinion means that books published abroad (under license) must
fall outside the words "lawfully made under this title" and that we have
consequently already given those words the geographical interpretation that
it favors.
We cannot, however, give the Quality King statement the legal weight for
which Wiley argues. The language "lawfully made under this title" was [**414] not at
issue in Quality King; the point before us now was not then fully argued; we
did not canvas the considerations we have here set forth; we there said
nothing to suggest that the example assumes a "first sale"; and we there
hedged our statement with the word "presumably." Most importantly, the
statement is pure dictum. It is dictum contained in a rebuttal to a
counterargument. And it is unnecessary dictum even in that respect. Is the
Court having once written dicta calling a tomato a vegetable bound to deny
that it is a fruit forever after?
To the contrary, we have written that we are not necessarily bound by
dicta should more complete argument demonstrate that the dicta is not
correct. Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U. S. 356, 363 (2006)
("[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in
which the point now at issue was not fully debated"); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U. S. 602, 627-628 (1935) (rejecting, under stare
decisis, dicta, "which may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but which
are not controlling"). And, given the bit part that our Quality King
statement played in our [*1369] Quality King decision, we believe the view of stare
decisis set forth in these opinions applies to the matter now before us.
Second, Wiley and the dissent argue (to those who consider legislative
history) that the Act's legislative history supports their interpretation.
But the historical events to which it points took place more than a decade
before the enactment of the Act and, at best, are inconclusive.
During the 1960's, representatives of book, record, and film industries,
meeting with the Register of Copyrights to discuss copyright revision,
complained about the difficulty of dividing international markets. Copyright
Law Revision Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register of Copyrights
on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, p. 212 (Comm. Print 1963) (English editions of "particular" books
"fin[d]" their "way into this country"); id., at 213 (works "publi[shed] in
a country where there is no copyright protection of any sort" are put into
"the free stream of commerce" and "shipped to the United States"); ibid.
(similar concern in respect to films).
The then-Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, found these examples
"very troubl[ing]." Ibid. And the Copyright Office released a draft
provision that it [****20] said "deals with the matter of the importation for
distribution in the United States of foreign copies that were made under
proper authority but that, if sold in the United States, would be sold in
contravention of the rights of the copyright owner who holds the exclusive
right to sell copies in the United States." Id., pt. 4, at 203. That draft
version, without reference to § 106, simply forbids unauthorized
imports. It said:
"Importation into the United States of copies or records of a work
for the purpose of distribution to the public shall, if such
articles are imported without the authority of the owner of the
exclusive right to distribute copies or records under this title,
constitute an infringement of copyright actionable under section 35
[17 U. S. C. § 501]." Id., Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S.
Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 3, pp. 32-33 (Comm. Print 1964).
[**415] In discussing the draft, some of those present expressed concern about its
effect on the "first sale" doctrine. For example, Irwin Karp, representing
the Authors League of [***1016] America asked, "If a German jobber lawfully buys
copies from a German publisher, are we not running into the problem of
restricting his transfer of his lawfully obtained copies?" Id., pt. 4, at
211. The Copyright Office representative replied, "This could vary from one
situation to another, I guess. I should guess, for example, that if a book
publisher transports [i.e., does not sell] copies to a wholesaler [i.e., a
nonowner], this is not yet the kind of transaction that exhausts the right
to control disposition." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Office later withdrew the draft, replacing it with a draft, which, by
explicitly referring to § 106, was similar to the provision that became law,
now § 602(a)(1). The Office noted in a report that, under the new draft,
importation of a copy (without permission) "would violate the exclusive
rights of the U. S. copyright owner . . . where the copyright owner had
authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for distribution only
in that country." Id., pt. 6, at 150.
Still, that part of the report says nothing about the "first sale"
doctrine, about § 109(a), or about the five words,
"lawfully made under this title." And neither the report nor its
accompanying 1960's draft answers the question before us here. Cf. Quality
King, 523 U. S., at 145 ([*1370] without those five words, the import clause, via
its reference to § 106, imports the "first sale" doctrine).
[7] But to ascertain the best reading of § 109(a), rather than dissecting the
remarks of industry representatives concerning § 602 at congressional
meetings held 10 years before the statute was enacted, see post, at 13-16,
we would give greater weight to the congressional report accompanying §
109(a), written a decade later when Congress passed the new law. That report
"Section 109(a) restates and confirms the principle that, where
the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a particular copy
or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the copy or phonorecord
is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any
other means. Under this principle, which has been established by the
[****21] court decisions and . . . the present law, the copyright owner's
exclusive right of public distribution would have no effect upon
anyone who owns `a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title' and who wishes to transfer it to someone else or
"To come within the scope of section 109(a), a copy or phonorecord
must have been `lawfully made under this title,' though not
necessarily with the copyright owner's authorization. For example,
any resale of an illegally `pirated' phonorecord would be an
infringement but the disposition of a phonorecord legally made under
the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 would not." H. R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 79 (emphasis added).
Accord, S. Rep. No. 94-473, pp. 71-72 (1975).
This history reiterates the importance of the "first sale" doctrine. See,
[**416] e.g., Copyright Law Revision, 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and
Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, p. 66 (Comm. Print 1965) ("[F]ull
ownership of a lawfully-made copy authorizes its owner to dispose of it
freely"). It explains, as we have explained, the nongeographical purposes of
the words "lawfully made under this title." Part II-B, supra. And it says
nothing about geography. Nor, importantly, did § 109(a)'s predecessor
provision. See supra, at 12. This means that, contrary to the dissent's
suggestion, any lack of legislative history pertaining to the "first sale"
doctrine only tends to bolster our position that Congress' 1976 revision did
not intend to create a drastic geographical change in its revision to that
provision. See post, at 18, n. 13. We consequently believe that the
legislative history, on balance, supports the non-geographical
Third, Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical interpretation
will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers (and other
copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We concede that
is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge different prices for
the same book in different geographic markets. But we do not see how these
facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic principle of copyright law that
suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights.
The Constitution describes the nature of American copyright law by
providing Congress with the power to "secur[e]" to "[a]uthors" "for limited
[t]imes" the "exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [w]ritings." Art. I, § 8, [***1017] cl.
8. The Founders, too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right
to exclude competition. Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas [*1371] Jefferson 440, 442-443 (J.
Boyd ed. 1956) (arguing against any monopoly) with Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 id., at 16, 21 (J. Boyd
ed. 1958) (arguing for a limited monopoly to secure production). But the
Constitution's language nowhere suggests that its limited exclusive right
should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to charge
different purchasers different prices for the same book, say to increase or
to maximize gain. Neither, to our knowledge, did any Founder make any such
suggestion. [****22] We have found no precedent suggesting a legal preference for
interpretations of copyright statutes that would provide for market
divisions. Cf. Copyright Law Revision, pt. 2, at 194 (statement of Barbara
Ringer, Copyright Office) (division of territorial markets was "primarily a
matter of private contract").
To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the "first
sale" doctrine) limits copyright holders' ability to divide domestic
markets. And that limitation is consistent with antitrust laws that
ordinarily forbid market divisions. Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc.,
498 U. S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam) ("[A]greements between competitors
to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal"). Whether
copyright owners should, or should not, have more than ordinary commercial
power to divide international markets is a matter for Congress to decide. We
do no more here than try to determine what decision Congress has taken.
Fourth, the dissent and Wiley contend that our decision launches [**417] United
States copyright law into an unprecedented regime of "international
exhaustion." Post, at 18-23; Brief for Respondent 45-46. But they point to
nothing indicative of congressional intent in 1976. The dissent also claims
that it is clear that the United States now opposes adopting such a regime,
but the Solicitor General as amicus has taken no such position in this case.
In fact, when pressed at oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that
the consequences of Wiley's reading of the
statute (perpetual downstream control) were "worse" than those of
Kirtsaeng's reading (restriction of market segmentation). Tr. of Oral Arg.
51. And the dissent's reliance on the Solicitor General's position in
Quality King is undermined by his agreement in that case with our reading of
§ 109(a). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Quality King, O. T.
1996, No. 1470, p. 30 ("When . . . Congress wishes to make the location of
manufacture relevant to Copyright Act protection, it does so expressly");
ibid. (calling it "distinctly unlikely" that Congress would have provided an
incentive for overseas manufacturing).
Moreover, the exhaustion regime the dissent apparently favors would
provide that "the sale in one country of a good" does not "exhaus[t] the
intellectual-property owner's right to control the distribution of that good
elsewhere." Post, at 18-19. But our holding in Quality King that § 109(a) is
a defense in U. S. courts even when "the first sale occurred abroad,"
523 U. S., at 145, n. 14, has already significantly eroded such a principle.
For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting
Kirtsaeng's nongeographical interpretation of the words "lawfully made under
this title" are the more persuasive. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
It is so ordered[*1372] .
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, concurring.
I concur fully in the Court's opinion. Neither the text nor the history of
17 U. S. C. § 109(a) supports removing first-sale protection from every copy
of a protected work manufactured abroad. See ante[****23] , at 8-16, 28-31. I
recognize, however, that the combination of today's decision and Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U. S. 135
(1998), constricts the scope of § 602(a)(1)'s ban on unauthorized
importation. I write to suggest that any problems associated with that
limitation come not from our reading of § 109(a) here, but from Quality
King's holding that § 109(a) limits § 602(a)(1).
As the Court explains, the first-sale doctrine has played an integral part
in American copyright law for over a century. See ante, at 17-19;
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339 (1908). No codification of the
doctrine prior to 1976 even arguably limited its application to [***1018] copies made
in the United States. See ante, at 12. [**418] And nothing in the text or history of
§ 109(a) — the Copyright Act of 1976's first-sale provision — suggests that
Congress meant to enact the new, geographical restriction John Wiley
proposes, which at once would deprive American consumers of important rights
and encourage copyright holders to manufacture abroad. See ante, at 8-16,
That said, John Wiley is right that the Court's decision, when combined
with Quality King, substantially narrows § 602(a)(1)'s ban on unauthorized
importation. Quality King held that the importation ban does not reach any
copies receiving first-sale protection under § 109(a). See
523 U. S., at 151-152. So notwithstanding § 602(a)(1), an "owner of a
particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title" can import that copy
without the copyright owner's permission. § 109(a). In now holding that
copies "lawfully made under this title" include copies manufactured abroad,
we unavoidably diminish § 602(a)(1)'s scope — indeed, limit it to a fairly
esoteric set of applications. See ante, at 26-27.
But if Congress views the shrinking of § 602(a)(1) as a problem, it should
recognize Quality King — not our decision today — as the culprit. Here,
after all, we merely construe § 109(a); Quality King is the decision holding
that § 109(a) limits § 602(a)(1). Had we come out the opposite way in that
case, § 602(a)(1) would allow a copyright owner to restrict the importation
of copies irrespective of the first-sale doctrine.[fn1] That result would
enable the copyright owner to divide international markets in the way John
Wiley claims Congress intended when enacting § 602(a)(1). But it would do so
without imposing downstream
liability on those who purchase and resell in the United States copies that
happen to have been manufactured abroad. In other words, [*1373] that outcome would
target unauthorized importers alone, and not the "libraries, used-book
dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums" with
whom the Court today is rightly concerned. Ante, at 19. Assuming Congress
adopted § 602(a)(1) to permit market segmentation, I suspect that is how
Congress thought the provision would work — not by removing first-sale
protection from every copy manufactured abroad (as John Wiley urges us to do
here), but by enabling the copyright holder to control imports even when the
first-sale doctrine applies (as Quality King now prevents).[**419] [fn2]
At bottom, John Wiley (together with the dissent) asks us to misconstrue §
109(a) in order to restore § 602(a)(1) to its [****24] purportedly rightful function
of enabling copyright holders to segment international markets. I think John
Wiley may have a point about what § 602(a)(1) was designed to do; that gives
me pause about Quality King's holding that the first-sale doctrine limits
the importation ban's scope. But the Court today correctly declines the
invitation to save § 602(a)(1) from Quality King by destroying the
first-sale protection that § 109(a) gives to every owner of a copy
manufactured abroad. That would swap one (possible) mistake for a much worse
one, and make our reading of the statute only less reflective of
Congressional intent. If Congress thinks copyright owners need greater power
to restrict importation and thus divide markets, a ready solution is at hand
— not the one John [***1019] Wiley offers in this case, but the one the Court rejected
in Quality King.
[fn1] Although Quality King concluded that the statute's text foreclosed
that outcome, see 523 U. S., at 151-152, the Solicitor General offered a
cogent argument to the contrary. He reasoned that § 109(a) does not limit §
602(a)(1) because the former authorizes owners only to "sell" or "dispose"
of copies — not to import them: The Act's first-sale provision and its
importation ban thus regulate separate, non-overlapping spheres of conduct.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Quality King, O. T. 1996,
No. 96-1470, pp. 5, 8-10. That reading remains the Government's preferred
way of construing the statute. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44 ("[W]e think that we
still would adhere to our view that section 109(a) should not be read as a
limitation on section 602(a)(1)"); see also ante, at 32-33; post, at 21, n.
15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[fn2] Indeed, allowing the copyright owner to restrict imports irrespective
of the first-sale doctrine — i.e., reversing Quality King — would yield a
far more sensible scheme of market segmentation than would adopting John
Wiley's argument here. That is because only the former approach turns on the
intended market for copies; the latter rests instead on their place of
manufacture. To see the difference, imagine that John Wiley prints all its
textbooks in New York, but wants to distribute certain versions only in
Thailand. Without Quality King, John Wiley could do so — i.e., produce books
in New York, ship them to Thailand, and prevent anyone from importing them
back into the United States. But with Quality King, that course is not open
to John Wiley even under its reading of § 109(a): To prevent someone like
Kirtsaeng from reimporting the books — and so to segment the Thai market —
John Wiley would have to move its printing facilities abroad. I can see no
reason why Congress would have conditioned a copyright owner's power to
divide markets on outsourcing its manufacturing to a foreign country.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, and with whom JUSTICE
SCALIA joins except as to Parts III and V-B-1, dissenting.
"In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily
stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of
Congress." United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534,
542 (1940). Instead of adhering to the Legislature's design, the Court today
adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress' aim to
protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced,
foreign made copies of their copyrighted works. The Court's bold departure
from Congress' design is all the more stunning, for it places the United
States at the vanguard of the movement for "international exhaustion" of
copyrights — a movement the United States has steadfastly resisted on the
To justify a holding that shrinks to insignificance copyright protection
against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies, the Court
identifies several "practical problems." Ante, at 24. The Court's parade of
horribles, however, is largely imaginary. Congress' objective in [*1374] enacting
17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(1)'s importation prohibition can be honored without
generating the absurd consequences hypothesized in the Court's opinion. I
from the Court's embrace of "international exhaustion," and would affirm the
sound judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Because economic conditions and demand for particular goods vary across
the globe, copyright owners have a financial incentive to charge different
prices for copies of their works in different geographic regions. Their
ability to engage in such price discrimination, however, is undermined if
arbitrageurs are permitted [**420] to import copies from low-price regions and sell
them in high-price regions. The question in this case is whether the
unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies constitutes copyright
infringement under U. S. law.
To answer this question, one must examine three provisions of Title 17 of
the U. S. Code: §§ 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a)(1). Section 106 sets forth the
"exclusive rights" of a copyright owner, including the right "to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." § 106(3).
This distribution right is limited by § 109(a), [****25] which provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." Section 109(a) codifies the
"first sale doctrine," a doctrine articulated in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 349-351 (1908), which held that a copyright owner
could not control the price at which retailers sold lawfully purchased
copies of its work. The first sale doctrine recognizes that a copyright
owner should not be permitted to exercise perpetual control over the
distribution of copies of a copyrighted work. At some point — ordinarily the
time of the first commercial sale — the copyright
owner's exclusive right under § 106(3) to control the distribution of a
particular copy is exhausted, and from that point forward, the copy can be
resold or otherwise redistributed without the copyright owner's
Section 602(a)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V)[fn1] — last, but most critical, of
the three copyright provisions bearing on this case — is an importation ban.
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501."
523 U. S. 135, 143-154 (1998), the Court held that a copyright owner's right
to control importation under § 602(a)(1) is a component of the distribution
right set forth in § 106(3) and is therefore subject to § 109(a)'s
codification of the first sale doctrine. Quality King thus held [***1020] that the
importation of copies made in the United States but sold abroad did not rank
as copyright infringement [*1375] under § 602(a)(1). Id., at 143-154. See also id.,
at 154 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (Quality King "involve[d] a `round trip'
journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to places
abroad, then back again").[fn2]
Important to the Court's holding, the copies at issue in Quality King had
been "`lawfully [**421] made under [Title 17]'" — a prerequisite for application of
§ 109(a). Id., at 143, n. 9 (quoting § 109(a)). Section 602(a)(1), the Court
noted, would apply to "copies that were `lawfully made' not under the United
States Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country."
Id., at 147. Drawing on an example discussed during a 1964 public meeting on
proposed revisions to the U. S. copyright laws,[fn3] the Court stated:
"If the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States
distribution rights — enforceable under the Act — to the publisher
of the United States edition and the exclusive British distribution
rights to the publisher of the British edition, . . . presumably
only those [copies] made by the publisher of the United States
edition would be `lawfully made under this title' within the meaning
of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher
of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market
with a defense [****26] to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter,
to an action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the
copies)." Id., at 148.
As the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded, see
654 F. 3d 210, 221-222 (CA2 2011); App. to Pet. for Cert. 70a-73a,
application of the Quality King analysis to the facts of this case would
preclude any invocation of § 109(a). Petitioner Supap Kirtsaeng imported and
then sold at a profit over 600 copies of copyrighted textbooks printed
outside the United States by the Asian subsidiary of respondent John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. (Wiley). App. 29-34. See also ante, at 3-5 (opinion of the
Court). In the words the Court used in Quality King, these copies "were
`lawfully made' not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead,
under the law of some other country." 523 U. S., at 147. Section 109(a)
therefore does not apply, and Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation
constitutes copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).
The Court does not deny that under the language I have quoted from Quality
King[*1376] , Wiley would prevail. Ante, at 27. [**422] Nevertheless, the Court dismisses
this language, to which all Members of the Quality King Court subscribed, as
ill-considered dictum. Ante, at 27-28. I agree that the discussion was
dictum in the sense that it was not essential to the Court's judgment. See
Quality King, 523 U. S., at 154 (GINSBURG, J., concurring) ("[W]e do not
today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were
manufactured abroad."). But I disagree with the Court's conclusion that this
dictum was ill considered. Instead, for the reasons explained below, I would
hold, consistently with Quality King's dictum, that § 602(a)(1) authorizes a
copyright owner to bar the importation of a copy manufactured abroad for
sale abroad.
The text of the Copyright Act demonstrates that Congress intended to
provide copyright owners with a potent
remedy against the importation of foreign-made copies of their copyrighted
works. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 3, this case turns on the meaning
of the phrase "lawfully made under this title" in § 109(a). In my view, that
phrase is most sensibly read as referring to instances in which a [***1021] copy's
creation is governed by, and conducted in compliance with, Title 17 of the
U. S. Code. This reading is consistent with the Court's interpretation of
similar language in other statutes. See Florida Dept. of Revenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 52-53 (2008) ("under" in
11 U. S. C. § 1146(a), a Bankruptcy Code provision exempting certain asset
transfers from stamp taxes, means "pursuant to"); Ardestani v. INS,
502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991) (the phrase "under section 554" in the Equal
Access to Justice Act means "subject to" or "governed by" 5 U. S. C. § 554
(internal quotation marks omitted)). It also accords with dictionary
definitions of the word "under." See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary
1887 (5th ed. 2011) ("under" means, among other things, "[s]ubject to the
authority, rule, or control of ").
Section 109(a), properly read, affords Kirtsaeng no defense against
Wiley's claim of copyright infringement. The Copyright Act, it has been
observed time and again, does not apply extraterritorially. See United
Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U. S. 260, 264 (1908) (copyright
statute requiring that U. S. copyright notices [****27] be placed in all copies of a
work did not apply to copies published abroad because U. S. copyright laws
have no "force" beyond the United States' borders); 4 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Copyright § 17.02, p. 17-18 (2012) (hereinafter Nimmer) ("[C]opyright laws
do not have any extraterritorial operation."); 4 W. Patry, Copyright §
13:22, p. 13-66 (2012) (hereinafter Patry) ("Copyright laws are rigorously
territorial."). The printing of Wiley's foreign-manufactured textbooks
therefore was not governed by Title 17. The textbooks thus were not
"lawfully made
under [Title 17]," the crucial precondition for application of § 109(a). And
if § 109(a) does not apply, there is no dispute that Kirtsaeng's conduct
constituted copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).
The Court's point of departure is similar to mine. According to the Court,
the phrase "`lawfully made under this title' means made `in accordance with'
or `in compliance with' the Copyright Act." Ante, at 8. [**423] But the Court
overlooks that, according to the very dictionaries it cites, ante, at 9, the
word "under" commonly signals a relationship of subjection, where one thing
is governed or regulated by another. See Black's Law Dictionary 1525 (6th
ed. 1990) ("under" "[*1377] frequently" means "inferior" or "subordinate" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); 18 Oxford English Dictionary 950 (2d ed. 1989)
("under" means, among other things, "[i]n accordance with (some regulative
power or principle)" (emphasis added)). See also Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 2487 (1961) ("under" means, among other things, "in
. . . a condition of subjection, regulation, or subordination" and
"suffering restriction, restraint, or control by"). Only by disregarding
this established meaning of "under" can the Court arrive at the conclusion
that Wiley's foreign-manufactured textbooks were "lawfully made under" U. S.
copyright law, even though that law did not govern their creation. It is
anomalous, however, to speak of particular conduct as "lawful" under an
inapplicable law. For example, one might say that driving on the right side
of the road in England is "lawful" under U. S. law, but that would be so
only because U. S. law has nothing to say about the subject. The governing
law is English law, and English law demands that driving be done on the left
side of the road.[fn4]
The logical implication of the Court's definition of the word "under" is
that any copy manufactured abroad — even a piratical one made without the
copyright owner's authorization and in violation of the law of the country
where it was created — would fall within the scope of § 109(a). Any such
copy would have been made "in accordance with" or "in compliance with" the
U. S. Copyright Act, in the sense that manufacturing the copy did not
violate the Act (because the Act does not apply extraterritorially).
The Court rightly refuses to accept such an absurd conclusion. Instead, it
interprets § 109(a) as applying only to copies whose making actually
complied with Title 17, or would have complied with Title 17 had Title [***1022] 17
been applicable (i.e., had the copies been made in the United States). See
ante, at 8 ("§ 109(a)'s `first sale' doctrine would apply to copyrighted
works as long as their manufacture [****28] met the requirements of American
copyright law."). Congress, however, used express language when it called
for such a counterfactual inquiry in 17 U. S. C. §§ 602(a)(2) and (b). See §
602(a)(2) ("Importation into the United States or exportation from the
United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this
title, of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an
of copyright if this title had been applicable, is an infringement of the
exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106."
([**424] emphasis added)); § 602(b) ("In a case where the making
of the copies or phonorecords would have constituted an infringement of
copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is
prohibited." (emphasis added)). Had Congress intended courts to engage in a
similarly hypothetical inquiry under § 109(a), Congress would presumably
have included similar language in that section. See Russello v. United
States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) ("`[W]here Congress includes [*1378] particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'" (quoting United States
v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972) (per curiam); brackets in
original)).[fn5]
Not only does the Court adopt an unnatural construction of the § 109(a)
phrase "lawfully made under this title." Concomitantly, the Court reduces §
602(a)(1) to insignificance. As the Court appears to acknowledge, see ante,
at 26, the only independent effect § 602(a)(1) has under today's decision is
to prohibit unauthorized importations carried out by persons who merely have
possession of, but do not own, the imported copies. See 17 U. S. C. § 109(a)
(§ 109(a) applies to any "owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title" (emphasis added)).[fn6] If this is enough to avoid
rendering § 602(a)(1) entirely "superfluous," ante, at 26, it hardly
suffices to give the owner's importation right the scope Congress intended
it to have. Congress used broad language in § 602(a)(1); it did so to
achieve a broad objective. Had Congress intended [**425] simply to provide a
copyright remedy against larcenous lessees, licensees, consignees, and
bailees of films and other copyright-protected goods, see ante, at 13-14,
26, it likely would have used language tailored to that narrow purpose. See
2 Nimmer § 8.12[B][6][c], at 8-184.31, n. 432 ("It may be wondered whether .
. . potential causes of action [against licensees and the like] are more
than theoretical."). See also ante, at 2 (KAGAN, J., concurring) (the
Court's decision [***1023] limits § 602(a)(1) "to a fairly esoteric set of
applications").[*1379] [fn7]
The Court's decision also overwhelms 17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(3)'s exceptions
to § 602(a)(1)'s importation prohibition. 2 P. Goldstein, Copyright §
7.6.1.2(a), p. 7:141 (3d ed. 2012) (hereinafter Goldstein).[fn8] Those
exceptions permit the importation of copies without the copyright owner's
authorization for certain governmental, personal, scholarly, educational,
and religious purposes. 17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(3). Copies imported under these
exceptions "will often be lawfully made gray market goods [****29] purchased through
normal market channels abroad." 2 Goldstein § 7.6.1.2(a), at 7:141.[fn9]
But if, as the Court holds, such copies can in any event be imported by
virtue of § 109(a), § 602(a)(3)'s work has already been done. For example,
had Congress conceived of § 109(a)'s sweep as the Court does, what earthly
reason would there be to provide, as Congress did in § 602(a)(3)(C), that a
library may import "no more than five copies" of a non-audiovisual work for
its "lending or archival purposes"?
The far more plausible reading of §§ 109(a) and 602(a), then, is that
Congress intended § 109(a) to apply to copies made in the United States, not
to copies manufactured and sold [**426] abroad. That reading of the first sale and
importation provisions leaves § 602(a)(3)'s exceptions with real, meaningful
work to do. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a
cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence,
or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In the range of circumstances covered by the exceptions, §
602(a)(3) frees individuals and entities [*1380] who purchase foreign-made copies
abroad from the requirement they would otherwise face under § 602(a)(1) of
obtaining the copyright owner's permission to import the copies into the
United States.[***1024] [fn10]
The history of § 602(a)(1) reinforces the conclusion I draw from the text
of the relevant provisions: § 109(a) does not apply to copies manufactured
abroad. Section 602(a)(1) was enacted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976,
90 Stat. 2589-2590. That Act was the product of a lengthy revision effort
overseen by the U. S. Copyright Office. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder,
469 U. S. 153, 159-160 (1985). In its initial 1961 report on recommended
revisions, the Copyright Office noted that publishers had "suggested that
the [then-existing] import ban on piratical copies should be extended to bar
the importation of . . . foreign edition[s]" in violation of "agreements to
divide international markets for copyrighted works." Copyright Law Revision:
Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S.
Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 126 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961)
(hereinafter Copyright Law Revision). See Copyright Act of 1947, § 106,
61 Stat. 663 ("The importation into the United States . . . of any piratical
copies of any work copyrighted
in the United States . . . is prohibited."). The Copyright Office originally
recommended against such an extension of the importation ban, reasoning that
enforcement of territorial restrictions was best left to contract law.
Copyright Law Revision 126.
Publishing-industry representatives argued strenuously against the
position initially taken by the Copyright Office. At a 1962 panel discussion
[**427] on the Copyright Office's report, for example, Horace Manges of the American
Book Publishers Council stated:
"When a U. S. book publisher enters into a contract with a British
publisher to acquire exclusive U. S. rights for a particular book,
he often finds that the English edition . . . of that particular
book finds its way into this country. Now it's all right to say,
`Commence a lawsuit for breach [****30] of contract.' But this is expensive,
burdensome, and, for the most part, ineffective." Copyright Law
Revision Part 2: Discussion and Comments on Report of the Register
of Copyrights [*1381] on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 212 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1963).
Sidney Diamond, representing London Records, elaborated on Manges'
statement. "There are many situations," he explained, "in which it is not
necessarily a question of the inadequacy of a contract remedy — in the sense
that it may be difficult or not quick enough to solve the particular
problem." Id., at 213. "Very frequently," Diamond stated, publishers "run
into a situation where . . . copies of [a] work . . . produced in a foreign
country . . . may be shipped [to the United States] without violating any
contract of the U. S. copyright proprietor." Ibid. To illustrate, Diamond
noted, if a "British publisher [sells a copy] to an individual who in turn
ship[s] it over" to the United States, the individual's conduct would not
"violate [any] contract between
the British and the American publisher." Ibid. In such a case, "no
possibility of any contract remedy" would exist. Ibid. The facts of
Kirtsaeng's case fit Diamond's example, save that the copies at issue here
were printed and initially sold in Asia rather than Great Britain.
After considering comments on its 1961 report, the Copyright Office
"prepared a preliminary draft of provisions for a new copyright statute."
Copyright Law Revision Part 3: Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright
Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., V (H.
R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964). Section 44 of the draft statute addressed
the concerns raised by publishing-industry representatives. In particular, §
44(a) provided:
[i.e., the section providing for a private cause of action for
copyright infringement]." Id., at 32-33.
In a 1964 panel discussion regarding the draft statute, Abe Goldman, the
Copyright Office's General Counsel, left no doubt about the meaning of §
44(a). It represented, he explained, a "shif[t]" from the Copyright Office's
1961 report, which had recommended against using copyright law to facilitate
publishers' efforts to segment international markets. [***1025] Copyright Law Revision
Part 4: Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.
S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 203 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print
1964). Section 44(a), Goldman stated, would allow copyright owners to bring
infringement actions against importers of "foreign copies that were made
under proper [**428] authority." Ibid. See also id., at 205-206
(Goldman agreed with a speaker's comment that § 44(a) "enlarge[d]" U. S.
copyright law by ex tending import prohibitions "to works legally produced
in Europe" and other foreign countries).[fn11]
The next step in the copyright revision [****31] process was the introduction in
Congress [*1382] of a draft bill on July 20, 1964. See Copyright Law Revision Part
5: 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
III (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965). After another round of public
comments, a revised bill was introduced on February 4, 1965. See Copyright
Law Revision Part 6: Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on
the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., V (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965) (hereinafter
Copyright Law Revision Part 6). In language closely resembling the statutory
text later enacted by Congress, § 602(a) of the 1965 bill provided:
work for the purpose of distribution to the public is an
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501." Id.,
at 292.[fn12]
The Court implies that the 1965 bill's "explici[t] refer[ence] to § 106"
showed a marked departure from § 44(a) of the Copyright Office's prior
draft. Ante, at 29. The Copyright Office, however, did not see it that way.
In its summary of the 1965 bill's provisions, the Copyright Office observed
that § 602(a) of the 1965 bill, like § 44(a) of the Copyright Office's prior
draft, see supra, at 15-16, permitted copyright owners to bring infringement
actions against unauthorized importers in cases "where the copyright owner
had authorized the making of [the imported] copies in a foreign country for
distribution only in that country." Copyright Law Revision Part 6, at
149-150. See also id., at XXVI (Under § 602(a) of the 1965 bill, "[a]n
unauthorized importer could be enjoined and sued for damages both where the
copies or phonorecords he was importing were `piratical' (that is, where
their making would have constituted an infringement if the U. S. copyright
law could [**429] have been applied), and where their making was `lawful.'").
The current text of § 602(a)(1) was finally enacted into law in 1976. See
Copyright Act of 1976, § 602(a), 90 Stat. 2589-2590. The House and Senate
Committee Reports on the 1976 Act demonstrate that Congress understood, as
did the Copyright Office, just what that text meant. Both Reports state:
"Section 602 [deals] with two separate situations: importation of
`piratical' articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without
any authorization of the
copyright owner), and unauthorized importation of copies or
phonorecords that were lawfully made. The general approach of
section 602 is to make unauthorized importation an act of
infringement in both cases, but to permit the Bureau of Customs to
prohibit importation only of `piratical' articles." S. Rep. No.
94-473, p. 151 (1975) (emphasis added). [***1026] See also H. R. Rep. No.
94-1476, p. 169 (1976) (same).
In sum, the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 is hardly
"inconclusive." Ante, at 28. To the contrary, it confirms what the plain
text of the Act [*1383] conveys: Congress intended § 602(a)(1) to provide copyright
owners with a remedy against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made
copies of their [****32] works, even if those copies were made and sold abroad with
the copyright owner's authorization.[fn13]
Unlike the Court's holding, my position is consistent with the stance the
United States has taken in international-trade negotiations. This case bears
on the highly contentious trade issue of interterritorial exhaustion. The
issue arises because intellectual property law is territorial in nature, see
supra, at 6, which means that creators of intellectual property "may hold a
set of parallel" intellectual property rights under the laws of different
nations. Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO,
TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 333, 340-341 (2000) (hereinafter Chiappetta). There is no
on whether the sale in one country of a good incorporating protected
intellectual property exhausts the intellectual property owner's right to
control the distribution of that good elsewhere. Indeed, the members of the
World Trade Organization, "agreeing to disagree,"[fn14] provided in Article
6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I. L. M. 1197, 1200, that "nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of . . . exhaustion." See
Chiappetta 346 (observing that exhaustion of intellectual property rights
was "hotly debated" [**430] during the TRIPS negotiations and that Article 6
"reflects [the negotiators'] ultimate inability to agree" on a single
international standard). Similar language appears in other treaties to which
the United States is a party. See World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty, Art. 6(2), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17, p. 7 ("Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the freedom of
Contracting Parties to determine the conditions, if any, under which the
exhaustion of the right [to control distribution of copies of a copyrighted
work] applies after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the
original or a copy of the work with the authorization of the author."); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Art. 8(2), Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17, p. 28 (containing language nearly identical to Article 6(2) of
the WIPO Copyright Treaty).
In the absence of agreement at the international level, each country has
been left to choose for itself the exhaustion framework it will follow. One
option is a national-exhaustion regime, under which a copyright owner's
to control distribution of a particular copy is exhausted only within the
country in which the copy is sold. See Forsyth & Rothnie, Parallel Imports,
in The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy
429, 430 (S. Anderman ed. 2007) (hereinafter Forsyth & Rothnie). Another
option is a rule of international exhaustion, under which the authorized
distribution of a particular copy anywhere in the world exhausts the
copyright owner's distribution [*1384] right everywhere with respect to that copy.
See ibid. The European Union has adopted the intermediate approach of
regional exhaustion, under [****33] which the sale of a copy anywhere within the
European Economic Area exhausts the copyright owner's distribution right
throughout that region. See id., at 430, 445. Section 602(a)(1), in my view,
ties the United States to a national-exhaustion framework. The Court's
decision, in contrast, places the United States solidly in the
international-exhaustion camp.
Strong arguments have been made both in favor of, and in opposition to,
international exhaustion. See Chiappetta 360 ("[r]easonable people making
valid points can, and do, reach conflicting conclusions" regarding the
desirability of international exhaustion). International exhaustion subjects
copyright-protected goods to competition [***1027] from lower priced imports and, to
that extent, benefits consumers. Correspondingly, copyright owners profit
from a national-exhaustion regime, which also enlarges the monetary
incentive to create new copyrightable works. See Forsyth & Rothnie 432-437
(surveying arguments for and against international exhaustion).
Weighing the competing policy concerns, our Government reached the
conclusion that widespread adoption of the international-exhaustion
framework would be inconsistent with the long-term economic interests of the
United States. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Quality King,
O. T. 1997, No. 96-1470, pp. 22-26 (hereinafter
Quality King Brief).[fn15] Accordingly, the United States has steadfastly
"taken the position in international trade negotiations [**431] that domestic
copyright owners should . . . have the right to prevent the unauthorized
importation of copies of their work sold abroad." Id., at 22. The United
States has "advanced this position in multilateral trade negotiations,"
including the negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement. Id., at 24. See also D.
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis § 2.63, p. 199
(3d ed. 2008). It has also taken a dim view of our trading partners'
adoption of legislation incorporating elements of international exhaustion.
See Clapperton & Corones, Locking in Customers, Locking Out Competitors:
Anti-Circumvention Laws in Australia and Their Potential Effect on
Competition in High Technology Markets, 30 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 657, 664
(2006) (United States expressed concern regarding international-exhaustion
legislation in Australia); Montén, Comment, The Inconsistency Between
Section 301 and TRIPS: Counterproductive With Respect to the Future of
International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights? 9 Marq.
Property L. Rev. 387, 417-418 (2005) (same with respect to New Zealand and
Taiwan).
[*1385] Even if the text and history of the Copyright Act were ambiguous on the
answer to the question this case presents — which they are not, see Parts
II-III, supra[fn16] — I would resist a holding out of accord with the firm
position the United States has taken on exhaustion in international
negotiations. Quality King, I acknowledge, discounted the Government's
concerns about potential inconsistency with United States obligations under
certain bilateral trade agreements. See 523 U. S., at 153-154. See also
Quality [****34] King Brief 22-24 (listing the agreements). That decision, however,
dealt only with copyright-protected products made in the United States. See
523 U. S., at 154 (GINSBURG, J., concurring). Quality King left open the
question whether owners of U. S. copyrights could retain control over the
importation of copies manufactured and sold abroad — a point the Court
obscures, see ante, at 33 (arguing that Quality King "significantly eroded"
the national-exhaustion principle that, in my view, § 602(a)(1) embraces).
The Court today answers that question with a resounding "no," and in doing
so, it risks undermining the United States' credibility on the world stage.
While the Government has urged our trading [**432] partners to refrain from adopting
international-exhaustion regimes that could benefit consumers within their
borders but would impact adversely on intellectual-property producers in the
United States, the Court embraces an international-exhaustion rule that
could benefit U. S. consumers but would likely
disadvantage foreign holders of U. S. copyrights. This dissonance scarcely
enhances the United States' "role as a trusted partner in multilateral
endeavors." Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer[***1028] ,
515 U. S. 528, 539 (1995).
I turn now to the Court's justifications for a decision difficult to
reconcile with the Copyright Act's text and history.
The Court asserts that its holding "is consistent with antitrust laws that
ordinarily forbid market divisions." Ante, at 32. See also ante, at 18
(again referring to antitrust principles). Section 602(a)(1), however, read
as I do and as the Government does, simply facilitates copyright owners'
efforts to impose "vertical restraints" on distributors of copies of their
works. See Forsyth & Rothnie 435 ("Parallel importation restrictions enable
manufacturers and distributors to erect `vertical restraints' in the market
through exclusive distribution agreements."). See generally Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877 (2007) (discussing
vertical restraints). We have held that vertical restraints are not per se
illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, because such
"restraints can have procompetitive effects." 551 U. S., at 881-882.[fn17]
[*1386] B
The Court sees many "horribles" following from a holding that the § 109(a)
phrase "lawfully made under this title" does not encompass foreign-made
copies. Ante, at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). If § 109(a) excluded
foreign-made copies, the Court fears, then copyright owners could exercise
perpetual control over the downstream distribution or public display of such
copies. A ruling in Wiley's favor, the Court asserts, would shutter
libraries, put used-book dealers out of business, cripple art museums, and
prevent the resale of a wide range of consumer goods, from cars to
calculators. Ante, at 19-22. See also ante, at 2-3 (KAGAN, J., concurring)
(expressing concern about "imposing downstream liability on those who
purchase and resell in the United States copies that happen to have been
manufactured [**433] abroad"). Copyright law and precedent, however, erect barriers
to the anticipated horribles.[fn18]
Recognizing that foreign-made copies fall [****35] outside the ambit of § 109(a)
would not mean they are forever free of the first sale doctrine. As earlier
observed, see supra, at 2, the Court stated that doctrine initially in its
1908 Bobbs-Merrill
decision. At that time, no statutory provision expressly codified the first
sale doctrine. Instead, copyright law merely provided that copyright owners
had "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing,
copying, executing, finishing, and vending" their works. Copyright Act of
1891, § 1, 26 Stat. 1107.
In Bobbs-Merrill, the Court addressed the scope of the statutory right to
"ven[d]." In granting that right, the Court held, Congress did not intend to
permit copyright owners "to fasten . . . a restriction upon the subsequent
alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted
with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and had given a
satisfactory price for it." 210 U. S., at 349-350. "[O]ne who has sold a
copyrighted article . . . without restriction," the Court explained, "has
parted with all right to control the sale of it." Id., at 350. Thus, "[t]he
purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright,
may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it." Ibid.[***1029] Under the logic of Bobbs-Merrill, the sale of a foreign-manufactured copy
in the United States carried out with the copyright owner's authorization
would exhaust the copyright owner's right to "vend" that copy. The copy
could thenceforth be resold, lent out, or otherwise redistributed [*1387] without
further authorization from the copyright owner. Although § 106(3) uses the
word "distribute" rather than "vend," there is no reason to think Congress
intended the word "distribute" to bear a meaning different from the
construction the Court gave to the word "vend" in Bobbs-Merrill. See ibid.
(emphasizing that the question before the Court was "purely [one] of
statutory construction").[fn19]
Thus, in accord with Bobbs-Merrill, the first authorized distribution of a
foreign-made copy in the United States exhausts the copyright owner's
distribution right under § 106(3). After such an authorized distribution, a
library may lend, or a used-book dealer may resell, the foreign-made copy
without seeking the copyright owner's permission. Cf. ante, at 19-21.
For example, if Wiley, rather than Kirtsaeng, had imported into the United
States and then sold the [**434] foreign-made textbooks at issue in this case,
Wiley's § 106(3) distribution right would have been exhausted under the
rationale of Bobbs-Merrill. Purchasers of the textbooks would thus be free
to dispose of the books as they wished without first gaining a license from
This line of reasoning, it must be acknowledged, significantly curtails
the independent effect of § 109(a). If, as I maintain, the term "distribute"
in § 106(3) incorporates the first sale doctrine by virtue of Bobbs-Merrill,
then § 109(a)'s codification of that doctrine adds little to the regulatory
regime.[fn20] Section 109(a), however, does serve
as a statutory bulwark against courts deviating from Bobbs-Merrill in a way
that increases copyright owners' control over downstream distribution, and
legislative [****36] history indicates that is precisely the role Congress intended §
109(a) to play. Congress first codified the first sale doctrine in § 41 of
the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1084.[fn21] It [*1388] did so, the House
Committee Report on the 1909 Act explains, "in order to make . . . clear
that [Congress had] no intention [of] enlarg[ing] in any way the
construction to be given to the word `vend.'" H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1909). According to the Committee Report, § 41 was "not
intended to change [existing law] in any way." Ibid. The position I have
stated and explained accords with this expression of congressional intent.
In enacting § 41 and its successors, I would hold, Congress did not "change
. . . existing law," ibid., by stripping the word "vend" (and thus its
substitute "distribute") of the limiting construction imposed in
Bobbs-Merrill.
In any event, the reading of the Copyright Act to which I subscribe honors
Congress' [***1030] aim in enacting § 109(a) while the Court's reading of the Act
severely diminishes § 602(a)(1)'s role. See supra, at 10-12. My position in
no way tugs against the principle underlying § 109(a) — i.e., that certain
conduct by the copyright owner exhausts the
owner's § 106(3) distribution right. The Court, [**435] in contrast, fails to give
meaningful effect to Congress' manifest intent in § 602(a)(1) to grant
copyright owners the right to control the importation of foreign-made copies
of their works.
Other statutory prescriptions provide further protection against the
absurd consequences imagined by the Court. For example, § 602(a)(3)(C)
permits "an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or religious
purposes" to import, without the copyright owner's authorization, up to five
foreign-made copies of a non-audiovisual work — notably, a book — for
"library lending or archival purposes." But cf. ante, at 19-20 (suggesting
that affirming the Second Circuit's decision might prevent libraries from
lending foreign-made books).[fn22]
The Court also notes that amici representing art museums fear that a
ruling in Wiley's favor would prevent museums from displaying works of art
created abroad. Ante, at 22 (citing Brief for Association of Art Museum
Directors et al.). These amici observe that a museum's right to display
works of art often depends on 17 U. S. C. § 109(c). See Brief for
Association of Art Museum Directors et al. 11-13.[fn23] That provision
addresses exhaustion of
a copyright owner's exclusive right under § 106(5) to publicly display the
owner's work. Because § 109(c), like § 109(a), applies only to copies
"lawfully made under this title," amici contend that a ruling in Wiley's
favor would prevent museums from invoking § 109(c) with respect to
foreign-made works of art. Id., at 11-13.[*1389] [fn24]
Limiting § 109(c) to U. S.-made works, however, does not bar art museums
from lawfully displaying works made in other countries. Museums can, of
course, seek the copyright owner's permission to display a work.
Furthermore, the sale of a work of art to a U. S. museum may carry with it
an implied license to publicly display the work. See 2 Patry § 5:131, at
5-280 ("[C]ourts have noted the potential availability of an implied
nonexclusive licens[e] when the circumstances . . . demonstrate that the
parties [****37] intended that the work would be used for a specific purpose.").
Displaying a work of art as part of a museum exhibition might also qualify
as a "fair use" under 17 U. S. C. § 107. Cf. Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens
Ltd. Partnership, 619 F. 3d 301, 313-316 (CA4 2010) (display of copyrighted
logo in museum-like exhibition constituted "fair use").
[**436] The Court worries about the resale of foreign-made consumer goods
"contain[ing] copyrightable software programs or packaging." Ante, at 21.
For example, the Court observes that a car might be programmed with diverse
forms of software, the copyrights to which might be owned by individuals or
entities other than the manufacturer of the car. Ibid. Must a car owner, the
Court asks, obtain permission from all of these various copyright owners
before reselling her car? Ibid. Although this question strays far from the
one presented in this case and briefed by the parties, principles of fair
use and implied
license (to the extent that express licenses do not exist) would likely
permit the car to be resold without the copyright owners'
authorization.[***1031] [fn25]
Most telling in this regard, no court, it appears, has been called upon to
answer any of the Court's "horribles" in an actual case. Three decades have
passed since a federal court first published an opinion reading § 109(a) as
applicable exclusively to copies made in the United States. See Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc.,
569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (ED Pa. 1983), summarily aff'd, 738 F. 2d 424 (CA3 1984)
(table). Yet Kirtsaeng and his supporting amici cite not a single case in
which the owner of a consumer good authorized for sale in the United States
has been sued for copyright infringement after reselling the item or giving
it away as a gift or to charity. The [*1390] absence of such lawsuits is
unsurprising. Routinely suing one's customers is hardly a best business
practice.[fn26] Manufacturers, moreover, may be hesitant to do business with
software programmers taken to suing consumers. Manufacturers may also insist
that software programmers agree to contract terms barring such lawsuits.
The Court provides a different explanation for the absence of the untoward
consequences predicted in its opinion — namely, that lower court decisions
regarding the scope of § 109(a)'s first sale prescription have not been
uniform. Ante, at 23. [**437] Uncertainty generated by these conflicting decisions,
the Court notes, may have deterred some copyright owners from pressing
infringement claims. Ante, at 23-24. But if, as the Court suggests, there
are a multitude of copyright owners champing at the bit to bring lawsuits
against libraries, art museums, and consumers in an effort to exercise
perpetual control over the downstream distribution and public display of
foreign-made copies, might one not expect that at least a handful of such
lawsuits would have been filed over the past 30 years? The absence of such
suits indicates that the "practical problems" hypothesized by the Court are
greatly exaggerated. Ante, at 24.[fn27] They surely do not warrant
Congress' intent, expressed in § 602(a)(1), to grant copyright owners the
authority [****38] to bar the importation of foreign-made copies of their works. Cf.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6
(2000) ("[W]hen the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the
courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd —
is to enforce it according to its terms." (internal quotation marks
[***1032] VI
To recapitulate, the objective of statutory interpretation is "to give
effect to the intent of Congress." American Trucking Assns.,
310 U. S., at 542. Here, two congressional aims are evident. First, in
enacting § 602(a)(1), Congress intended to grant copyright owners permission
[*1391] to segment international markets by barring the importation of foreign-made
copies into the United States. Second, as codification of the first sale
doctrine underscores, Congress did not want the exclusive distribution right
conferred in § 106(3) to be boundless. Instead of harmonizing these
objectives, the Court subordinates the first entirely to the second. It is
unsurprising that none of the three major treatises on U. S. copyright law
embrace the Court's construction of § 109(a). See 2 Nimmer § 8.12[B][6][c],
at 8-184.34 to 8-184.35; 2 Goldstein § 7.6.1.2(a), at 7:141; 4 Patry §§
13:22, 13:44, 13:44.10.
Rather than adopting the very international-exhaustion rule the United
States has consistently resisted in international-trade negotiations, I
would adhere to the national-exhaustion framework set by the Copyright Act's
text and history. [**438] Under that regime, codified in § 602(a)(1), Kirtsaeng's
unauthorized importation of the foreign-made textbooks involved in this case
infringed Wiley's copyrights. I would therefore affirm the Second Circuit's
[fn1] In 2008, Congress renumbered what was previously § 602(a) as §
602(a)(1). See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act of 2008 (PROIPA), § 105(b)(2), 122 Stat. 4259. Like the Court,
I refer to the provision by its current numbering.
[fn2] Although JUSTICE KAGAN's concurrence suggests that Quality King erred
in "holding that § 109(a) limits § 602(a)(1)," ante, at 2, that recent,
unanimous holding must be taken as a given. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008) ("[S]tare decisis in respect to
statutory interpretation has `special force,' for `Congress remains free to
alter what we have done.'" (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989))). The Court's objective in this case should
be to avoid unduly "constrict[ing] the scope of § 602(a)(1)'s ban on
unauthorized importation," ante, at 1 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), while at the
same time remaining faithful to Quality King's holding and to the text and
history of other Copyright Act provisions. This aim is not difficult to
achieve. See Parts II-V, infra. JUSTICE KAGAN and I appear to agree to this
extent: Congress meant the ban on unauthorized importation to have real
force. See ante, at 3 (acknowledging that "Wiley may have a point about what
§ 602(a)(1) was designed to do").
[fn3] See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc.,
523 U. S. 135, 148, n. 20 (1998) (quoting Copyright Law Revision Part 4:
Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S.
Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 119 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964)
(hereinafter Copyright Law Revision Part 4) (statement of Harriet Pilpel)).
[fn4] The Court asserts that my position gives the word "lawfully" in §
109(a) "little, if any, linguistic work to do." Ante, at 9. That is not so.
My reading gives meaning to each word in the phrase "lawfully made under
this title." The word "made" signifies that the conduct at issue is the
creation or manufacture of a copy. See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1356 (1961) (defining "made" as "artificially produced by a
manufacturing process"). The word "lawfully" indicates that for § 109(a) to
apply, the copy's creation must have complied with some body of law.
Finally, the prepositional phrase "under this title" clarifies what that
body of law is — namely, the copyright prescriptions contained in Title 17
of the U. S. Code.
[fn5] Attempting to show that my reading of § 109(a) is susceptible to the
same criticism, the Court points to the now-repealed "manufacturing clause,"
which required "copies of a work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic
literary material . . . in the English language" to be "manufactured in the
United States or Canada." Copyright Act of 1976, § 601(a), 90 Stat. 2588.
Because Congress expressly referred to manufacturing in this provision, the
Court contends, the phrase "lawfully made under this title" in § 109(a)
cannot mean "manufactured in the United States." Ante, at 19. This argument
is a non sequitur. I do not contend that the phrases "lawfully made under
this title" and "manufactured in the United States" are interchangeable. To
repeat, I read the phrase "lawfully made under this title" as referring to
instances in which a copy's creation is governed by, and conducted in
compliance with, Title 17 of the U. S. Code. See supra, at 6. Not all copies
"manufactured in the United States" will satisfy this standard. For example,
piratical copies manufactured in the United States without the copyright
owner's authorization are not "lawfully made under [Title 17]." Nor would
the phrase "lawfully manufactured in the United States" be an exact
substitute for "lawfully made under this title." The making of a copy may be
lawful under Title 17 yet still violate some other provision of law.
Consider, for example, a copy made with the copyright owner's authorization
by workers who are paid less than minimum wage. The copy would be "lawfully
made under [Title 17]" in the sense that its creation would not violate any
provision of that title, but the copy's manufacturing would nonetheless be
unlawful due to the violation of the minimum-wage laws.
[fn6] When § 602(a)(1) was originally enacted in 1976, it played an
additional role — providing a private cause of action against importers of
piratical goods. See Quality King, 523 U. S., at 146. In 2008, however,
Congress amended § 602 to provide for such a cause of action in § 602(a)(2),
which prohibits the unauthorized "[i]mportation into the United States . . .
of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an
of copyright if [Title 17] had been applicable." See PROIPA, § 105(b)(3),
122 Stat. 4259-4260. Thus, under the Court's interpretation, the only
conduct reached by § 602(a)(1) but not § 602(a)(2) is a nonowner's
unauthorized importation of a nonpiratical copy.
[fn7] Notably, the Court ignores the history of § 602(a)(1), which reveals
that the primary purpose of the prescription was not to provide a remedy
against rogue licensees, consignees, and bailees, against whom copyright
owners could frequently assert breach-of-contract claims even in the absence
of § 602(a)(1). Instead, the primary purpose of § 602(a)(1) was to reach
third-party importers, enterprising actors like Kirtsaeng, against whom
copyright owners could not assert contract claims due to lack of privity.
See Part III, infra.
[fn8] Section 602(a)(3) provides:
"This subsection [i.e., § 602(a)] does not apply to —
"(A) importation or exportation of copies or phonorecords under the
authority or for the use of the Government of the United States or of any
State or political subdivision of a State, but not including copies or
phonorecords for use in schools, or copies of any audiovisual work imported
for purposes other than archival use;
"(B) importation or exportation, for the private use of the importer or
exporter and not for distribution, by any person with respect to no more
than one copy or phonorecord of any one work at any one time, or by any
person arriving from outside the United States or departing from the United
States with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such person's
personal baggage; or
"(C) importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly,
educational, or religious purposes and not for private gain, with respect to
no more than one copy of an audiovisual work solely for its archival
purposes, and no more than five copies or phonorecords of any other work for
its library lending or archival purposes, unless the importation of such
copies or phonorecords is part of an activity consisting of systematic
reproduction or distribution, engaged in by such organization in violation
of the provisions of section 108(g)(2)."
[fn9] The term "gray market good" refers to a good that is "imported outside
the distribution channels that have been contractually negotiated by the
intellectual property owner." Forsyth & Rothnie, Parallel Imports, in The
Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 429
(S. Anderman ed. 2007). Such goods are also commonly called "parallel
imports." Ibid.
[fn10] The Court asserts that its reading of § 109(a) is bolstered by § 104,
which extends the copyright "protection[s]" of Title 17 to a wide variety of
foreign works. See ante, at 10-11. The "protection under this title"
afforded by § 104, however, is merely protection against infringing conduct
within the United States, the only place where Title 17 applies. See 4 W.
Patry, Copyright § 13:44.10, pp. 13-128 to 13-129 (2012) (hereinafter
Patry). Thus, my reading of the phrase "under this title" in § 109(a) is
consistent with Congress' use of that phrase in § 104. Furthermore, § 104
describes which works are entitled to copyright protection under U. S. law.
But no one disputes that Wiley's copyrights in the works at issue in this
case are valid. The only question is whether Kirtsaeng's importation of
copies of those works infringed Wiley's copyrights. It is basic to copyright
law that "[o]wnership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any
material object in which the work is embodied." 17 U. S. C. § 202. See also
§ 101 ("`Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."). Given the distinction
copyright law draws between works and copies, § 104 is inapposite to the
question here presented. 4 Patry § 13:44.10, at 13-129 ("There is no
connection, linguistically or substantively, between Section[s] 104 and 109:
Section 104 deals with national eligibility for the intangible work of
authorship; Section 109(a) deals with the tangible, physical embodiment of
the work, the `copy.'").
[fn11] As the Court observes, ante, at 29, Irwin Karp of the Authors League
of America stated at the 1964 panel discussion that § 44(a) ran counter to
"the very basic concept of copyright law that, once you've sold a copy
legally, you can't restrict its resale." Copyright Law Revision Part 4, at
212. When asked if he was "presenting . . . an argument against" § 44(a),
however, Karp responded that he was "neutral on th[e] provision." Id., at
211. There is thus little reason to believe that any changes to the wording
of § 44(a) before its codification in § 602(a) were made in response to
Karp's discussion of "the problem of restricting [the] transfer of . . .
lawfully obtained [foreign] copies." Ibid.
[fn12] There is but one difference between this language from the 1965 bill
and the corresponding language in the current version of § 602(a)(1):
In the current version, the phrase "for the purpose of distribution to the
public" is omitted and the phrase "that have been acquired outside the
United States" appears in its stead. There are no material differences
between the quoted language from the 1965 bill and the corresponding
language contained in the 1964 bill. See Copyright Law Revision Part 6:
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision
of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
292-293 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965).
[fn13] The Court purports to find support for its position in the House and
Senate Committee Reports on the 1976 Copyright Act. Ante, at 30-31. It fails
to come up with anything in the Act's legislative history, however, showing
that Congress understood the words "lawfully made under this title" in §
109(a) to encompass foreign-made copies.
[fn14] Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 Mich. J. Int'l L.
333, 340 (2000) (hereinafter Chiappetta) (internal quotation marks
[fn15] The Court states that my "reliance on the Solicitor General's
position in Quality King is undermined by his agreement in that case with
[the] reading of § 109(a)" that the Court today adopts. Ante, at 33. The
United States' principal concern in both Quality King and this case,
however, has been to protect copyright owners' "right to prevent parallel
imports." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Quality King, O. T.
1997, No. 96-1470, p. 6 (hereinafter Quality King Brief). See also Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 14 (arguing that Kirtsaeng's interpretation
of § 109(a), which the Court adopts, would "subver[t] Section 602(a)(1)'s
ban on unauthorized importation"). In Quality King, the Solicitor General
urged this Court to hold that § 109(a)'s codification of the first sale
doctrine does not limit the right to control importation set forth in §
602(a). Quality King Brief 7-30. After Quality King rejected that
contention, the United States reconsidered its position, and it now endorses
the interpretation of the § 109(a) phrase "lawfully made under this title" I
would adopt. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6-7, 13-14.
[fn16] Congress hardly lacks capacity to provide for international
exhaustion when that is its intent. Indeed, Congress has expressly provided
for international exhaustion in the narrow context of semiconductor chips
embodying protected "mask works." See 17 U. S. C. §§ 905(2), 906(b). See
also 2 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 8A.06[E], p. 8A-37 (2012)
(hereinafter Nimmer) ("[T]he first sale doctrine under [§ 906(b)] expressly
immunizes unauthorized importation.").
[fn17] Despite the Court's suggestion to the contrary, this case in no way
implicates the per se antitrust prohibition against horizontal
"`[a]greements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize
competition.'" Ante, at 32 (quoting Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc.,
498 U. S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam)). Wiley is not requesting authority to
enter into collusive agreements with other textbook publishers that would,
for example, make Wiley the exclusive supplier of textbooks on particular
subjects within particular geographic regions. Instead, Wiley asserts no
more than the prerogative to impose vertical restraints on the distribution
of its own textbooks. See Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive
Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N. Y. U. Ann. Survey Am. L.
487, 488 (2011) ("vertical restraints" include "limits [on] the way a
seller's own product can be distributed").
[fn18] As the Court observes, ante, at 32-33, the United States stated at
oral argument that the types of "horribles" predicted in the Court's opinion
would, if they came to pass, be "worse than the frustration of market
segmentation" that will result from the Court's interpretation of § 109(a).
Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. The United States, however, recognized that this
purported dilemma is a false one. As the United States explained, the
Court's horribles can be avoided while still giving meaningful effect to §
602(a)(1)'s ban on unauthorized importation. Ibid.
[fn19] It appears that the Copyright Act of 1976 omitted the word "vend" and
introduced the word "distribute" to avoid the "redundan[cy]" present in
pre-1976 law. Copyright Law Revision: Report of the Register of Copyrights
on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
21 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961) (noting that the exclusive rights to
"publish" and "vend" works under the Copyright Act of 1947, § 1(a),
61 Stat. 652-653, were "redundant").
[fn20] My position that Bobbs-Merrill lives on as a limiting construction of
the § 106(3) distribution right does not leave § 109(a) with no work to do.
There can be little doubt that the books at issue in Bobbs-Merrill were
published and first sold in the United States. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 139 F. 155, 157 (CC SDNY 1905) (the publisher claiming copyright
infringement in Bobbs-Merrill was incorporated and had its principal office
in Indiana). See also Copyright Act of 1891, § 3, 26 Stat. 1107-1108
(generally prohibiting importation, even by the copyright owner, of
foreign-manufactured copies of copyrighted books); 4 Patry § 13:40, at
13-111 (under the Copyright Act of 1891, "copies of books by both foreign
and U. S. authors had to be printed in the United States"). But cf. ante, at
18 (asserting, without acknowledging the 1891 Copyright Act's general
prohibition against the importation of foreign-made copies of copyrighted
books, that the Court is unable to find any "geographical distinctions . . .
in Bobbs-Merrill"). Thus, exhaustion occurs under Bobbs-Merrill only when a
copy is distributed within the United States with the copyright owner's
permission, not when it is distributed abroad. But under § 109(a), as
interpreted in Quality King, any authorized distribution of a U. S.-made
copy, even a distribution occurring in a foreign country, exhausts the
copyright owner's distribution right under § 106(3). See 523 U. S., at 145,
n. 14. Section 109(a) therefore provides for exhaustion in a circumstance
not reached by Bobbs-Merrill.
[fn21] Section 41 of the 1909 Act provided: "[N]othing in this Act shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained."
35 Stat. 1084. This language was repeated without material change in § 27 of
the Copyright Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 660. As noted above, see supra, at 2,
17 U. S. C. § 109(a) sets out the current codification of the first sale
[fn22] A group of amici representing libraries expresses the concern that
lower courts might interpret § 602(a)(3)(C) as authorizing only the
importing, but not the lending, of foreign-made copies of non-audiovisual
works. See Brief for American Library Association et al. 20. The United
States maintains, and I agree, however, that § 602(a)(3)(C) "is fairly (and
best) read as implicitly authorizing lending, in addition to importation, of
all works other than audiovisual works." Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 30, n. 6.
[fn23] Title 17 U. S. C. § 109(c) provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions
of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either
directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to
viewers present at the place where the copy is located."
[fn24] The word "copy," as it appears in § 109(c), applies to the original
of a work of art because the Copyright Act defines the term "copies" to
"includ[e] the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed." §
[fn25] Principles of fair use and implied license may also allow a U. S.
tourist "who buys a copyrighted work of art, a poster, or . . . a bumper
sticker" abroad to publicly "display it in America without the copyright
owner's further authorization." Ante, at 15. (The tourist could lawfully
bring the work of art, poster, or bumper sticker into the United States
under 17 U. S. C. § 602(a)(3)(B), which provides that § 602(a)(1)'s
importation ban does not apply to "importation . . . by any person arriving
from outside the United States . . . with respect to copies . . . forming
part of such person's personal baggage."). Furthermore, an individual
clearly would not incur liability for infringement merely by displaying a
foreign-made poster or other artwork in her home. See § 106(5) (granting the
owners of copyrights in "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works" the
exclusive right "to display the copyrighted work publicly" (emphasis
added)). See also § 101 (a work is displayed "publicly" if it is displayed
"at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered" (emphasis added)). Cf. 2 Nimmer § 8.14[C][1], at 8-192.2(1)
("[A] performance limited to members of the family and invited guests is not
a public performance." (footnote omitted)).
[fn26] Exerting extensive control over secondary markets may not always be
in a manufacturer's best interest. Carmakers, for example, often trumpet the
resale value of their vehicles. See, e.g., Nolan, UD grad leads Cadillac
marketing, Dayton Daily News, Apr. 2, 2009, p. A8 ("Cadillac plays up its
warranty coverage and reliable resale value to prospective customers."). If
the transaction costs of reselling vehicles were to rise, consumers'
perception of a new car's value, and thus the price they are willing to pay
for such a car, might fall — an outcome hardly favorable to automobile
[fn27] It should not be overlooked that the ability to prevent importation
of foreign-made copies encourages copyright owners such as Wiley to offer
copies of their works at reduced prices to consumers in less developed
countries who might otherwise be unable to afford them. The Court's holding,
however, prevents copyright owners from barring the importation of such
low-priced copies into the United States, where they will compete with the
higher priced editions copyright owners make available for sale in this
country. To protect their profit margins in the U. S. market, copyright
owners may raise prices in less developed countries or may withdraw from
such markets altogether. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26;
Brief for Text and Academic Authors Association as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief
for Association of American Publishers as Amicus Curiae 37. See also
Chiappetta 357-358 (a rule of national exhaustion "encourages entry and
participation in developing markets at lower, locally more affordable prices
by eliminating them as risky sources of cheaper parallel imports back into
premium markets"). Such an outcome would disserve consumers — and especially
students — in developing nations and would hardly advance the "American
foreign policy goals" of supporting education and economic development in
such countries. Quality King Brief 25-26.
Direct History (10)
Case Analysis (45)
11-00697 (U.S.)
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