Source: http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/court-of-appeals/2010/4749.html
Timestamp: 2015-05-22 11:32:36
Document Index: 126824

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 37', '§ 102', '§ 102', '§ 119', '§\n37', '§\n37', '§ 108', '§ 113', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 37', '§ 108', '§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 57', '§ 37']

SC Department of Consumer Affairs v. Foreclosure Specialists, Inc. :: 2010 :: South Carolina Court of Appeals Decisions :: South Carolina Case Law :: South Carolina Law :: U.S. Law :: JustiaLog InSign UpFind a LawyerAsk a Lawyer Research the LawLaw SchoolsLaws & RegsNewslettersLegal MarketingJustia › U.S. Law › Case Law › South Carolina Case Law › South Carolina Court of Appeals Decisions › 2010 › SC Department of Consumer Affairs v. Foreclosure Specialists, Inc.
SC Department of Consumer Affairs v. Foreclosure Specialists, Inc.Annotate this CaseTHE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of AppealsSouth Carolina
Department of Consumer Affairs, Appellant,v.Foreclosure
Specialists, Inc., & Judson G. Decell, as an Individual, Respondents.Appeal from the Administrative Law Court
The Honorable Paige J. GossettOpinion No. 4749
Submitted June 16, 2010 – Filed September
29, 2010 AFFIRMEDCarolyn Grube Lybarker, of Columbia, for Appellant.Susan Foxworth Campbell, of Columbia, for Respondents.FEW, C.J.: The South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs filed a petition before the
Administrative Law Court (ALC) alleging Foreclosure Specialists, Inc. and its
alleged owner and operator Judson G. Decell (Respondents) violated the Consumer Credit Counseling Act.[1] The Department claimed Respondents engaged in "credit
counseling service" without having first obtained a license to do so. The
ALC granted the petition in part, issued a "cease and desist" order,
and imposed an administrative fine. However, the Department also requested an order requiring Respondents to "refund
all monies collected under contracts entered into with South Carolina consumers
after December 1, 2005." The administrative law judge ruled that
the ALC does not have the power to grant that relief. The Department appeals
this ruling. We affirm.The scope of the power of
the ALC is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40,
41 (2008) ("Determining the proper interpretation of a
statute is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of law de
novo.").We
frame the issue before us by reviewing, first, the statutes Respondents
violated, and second, the statutory power of the Department to seek, and the
ALC to grant, various forms of relief. The Consumer Credit Counseling Act (the
Act) was enacted in 2005. See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-7-101 (Supp. 2009). Pursuant to the Act, no person may engage in credit counseling service[2] without a license. Id. § 102. The required license is issued by the
Department of Consumer Affairs. See id. §§ 102, 104, 107(A).[3] The ALC found that Respondents violated the Act by engaging in credit
counseling service without a license. The
Act grants the Department administrative powers to address this type of
violation. Id. § 119. The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code (the
Code) also grants powers to the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. §§
37-6-101 to -113 (2002 & Supp. 2009). The Code provides that the
Administrator of the Department may file a petition before the ALC to seek
enforcement of administrative orders issued pursuant to section 37-7-119, or
otherwise to seek compliance with the Act. See S.C. Code Ann. §
37-6-108(A), (C) (Supp. 2009). The ALC has exclusive jurisdiction over such an
action for enforcement. Id. § 108(B). In addition to these
administrative powers, the Code provides that the Administrator may bring a
"civil action against . . . a person subject to this title to recover actual damages sustained and excess charges paid by
one or more consumers." Id. § 113(A). The
refund sought by the Department in this case is "actual damages sustained
and excess charges paid by one or more consumers." There is no statutory
authority to seek such relief except in a "civil action" under
section 37-6-113(A). The Department may bring a civil action in circuit court. This appeal requires us to determine whether the
Department may also bring a civil action in the ALC to recover the relief
provided for in section 37-6-113(A). The answer to that question will
determine whether the ALC has the power to grant to the Department the refund
it seeks from these Respondents. We conclude the Department has no statutory
authority to bring a civil action in the ALC, and thus the ALC was correct in
finding it did not have the power to grant the Department the refund it
requested.The
General Assembly amended the Consumer Protection Code in 2005.[4] The former version of section 37-6-108 provided "the Administrator may
obtain an order of the court for enforcement of its order in the court of
common pleas."[5] The circuit court's jurisdiction over such actions was exclusive.[6] The Administrator also had the right to bring a civil action before the 2005
amendments. The former version of section 37-6-113 set forth three different
types of civil actions the Administrator could bring, including "a civil
action against a creditor to recover actual damages sustained and excess
charges paid by one or more consumers . . . ."[7] Before 2005, there was no statutory authority for the Administrator to bring
any action in the ALC. It is apparent, therefore, that before the 2005
amendments, a civil action could be brought only in circuit court. With
the 2005 amendments, the Code now distinguishes between an "administrative
action," which must be brought in the ALC, from a "civil action."
See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-6-108(A); 37-6-113(C) (Supp. 2009). There is
nothing in the 2005 amendments that changes the procedure that a civil action
has to be brought in circuit court. Because the relief sought by the
Department in this case is available only in a civil action pursuant to section
37-6-113(A), and because a civil action must still be brought in circuit court,
the ALC was correct in ruling that it did not have the power to grant the
relief.Further,
when the General Assembly revised the Code in 2005 and created the administrative
action under section 37-6-108, it placed limitations on the power of the ALC. Under
subsection 37-6-108(F), "the administrative law
judge may not award damage[s] . . . to affected customers in these hearings."
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-108(F) (Supp. 2009). This subsection precludes the ALC
from granting the type of relief the Department requested.The
Department argues, however, that the ALC has inherent powers and equitable
powers through which it may grant the requested relief. Specifically, the
Department argues that two provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act,
sections 1-23-600(F) and 1-23-630(A), provide the ALC authority to grant the
requested relief as an equitable remedy. This argument fails for two reasons. First,
the refund sought by the Department in this case is legal, not equitable. Second,
the statutes do not provide what the Department contends. Section 1-23-600(F)
provides "a state agency authorized by law to
seek injunctive relief may apply to the Administrative Law Court for injunctive
or equitable relief pursuant to Section 1-23-630."
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(F) (Supp. 2009). Section 1-23-630(A)
provides that an administrative law judge "has
the same power at chambers or in open hearing as do circuit court judges and to
issue those remedial writs as are necessary to give effect to its jurisdiction." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-630(A) (2005). We do not believe it is necessary
for us to decide exactly what effect these statutes have on the power of the
Department or the ALC. The statutes do not grant the Department or the ALC
authority to exceed their statutorily granted powers. See generally Responsible Econ. Dev. v. S.C. Dep't of Health
& Envtl. Control, 371 S.C. 547, 553, 641 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2007) ("[R]egulatory
bodies . . . have only the authority granted them by the legislature."); see
also Randolf R. Lowell, South Carolina Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 152 (2d ed. 2008) ("The ALC has no authority to decide
civil matters or to award monetary damages in cases.").We hold that the
Administrative Law Court does not have the power to grant the Department of
Consumer Affairs a refund of fees paid by consumers for credit counseling
service when the provider of those services has violated the Consumer Credit
Counseling Act. An action for this relief is a civil action under section
37-6-113(A) of the South Carolina Code, and must be brought in circuit court. The decision of the ALC is affirmed.THOMAS and PIEPER, JJ., concur.[1] S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-7-101 to -122 (Supp. 2009).[2] This term is defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 37-7-101(3)
(Supp. 2009).[3] The Consumer Credit Counseling Act is enforced by the Department of Consumer Affairs. See also S.C.
Code Ann. § 37-7-101(9) (Supp. 2009).[4] Act No. 128, 2005 S.C. Acts 1507.[5] S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-108(1) (2002) (former version).[6] Id. § 108(4) (2002). Any doubt that this
"exclusive" jurisdiction provision referred to circuit court is
resolved by the same subsection, which provided that a "final judgment or
decree may be appealed in the manner provided by the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules." Appeals from the ALC filed before July 1, 2006, went to circuit
court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610
(2005) (former version); § 1-23-610 (Supp. 2009) (current version providing
appeal to court of appeals); Act No. 387, § 57, 2006 S.C. Acts 3132 (providing
effective date of amendment to be July 1, 2006). The Appellate Court Rules do
not apply in circuit court. The only appeal that could be governed by the
Appellate Court Rules before July 1, 2006, was from circuit court to the court
of appeals.[7] S.C. Code Ann. § 37-6-113(1) (2002) (former version).