Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96940/united-states-vs-algoma-lumber-co
Timestamp: 2017-12-12 08:39:59
Document Index: 128297787

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 145', '§ 250', '§ 2103', '§ 81']

United States Vs Algoma Lumber Co - Citation 96940 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Algoma Lumber Co. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96940
Case Number 305 U.S. 415
united states v. algoma lumber co. - 305 u.s. 415 (1939) u.s. supreme court united states v. algoma lumber co., 305 u.s. 415 (1939) united states v. algoma lumber co. no. 245 argued december 16, 1938 decided january 3, 1939 * 305 u.s. 415 certiorari to the court of claims syllabus 1. contracts for the sale to a lumber company of timber on unallotted land of the klamath indian reservation, executed by the superintendent of the klamath indian school for and on behalf of the klamath indians, pursuant to § 7 of the act of june 25, 1910, and under regulations and with the approval of the secretary of the interior, the moneys received under the contracts being deposited pursuant to statutory requirement in the united.....
United States v. Algoma Lumber Co. - 305 U.S. 415 (1939)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415 (1939)
Decided January 3, 1939 *
against the United States to recover alleged overpayments made under such contracts was therefore not within'the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. P. 305 U. S. 421 .
2. Likewise, contracts for the sale on similar terms of timber on restricted allotted lands, entered into by individual allottees as prescribed by § 8 of the Act of 1910, the payments thereunder being deposited by the Superintendent in private state banks and credited on his own books to the allottees according to their respective interests, were not obligations of the United States enforceable in the Court of Claims. P. 305 U. S. 423 .
3. Exercise of its plenary power to take appropriate measures to safeguard the disposal of property of which the Indians are the substantial owners does not necessarily involve the assumption of contractual obligations by the Government. Their assumption is not to be presumed in the absence of any action taken by the Government or on its behalf indicating such a purpose. P. 305 U. S. 421 .
4. Receipt by the Treasury of the United States, of payments made to the Superintendent for the use and benefit of the Indians, even though payment was made under protest, gave rise to no contract for repayment implied in fact on the part of the United States, and did not make suit therefor cognizable in the Court of Claims. P. 305 U. S. 423 .
5. Infirmities, if any, in the contracts of the lumber companies with the Indians could not impose on the United States a liability which the contracts do not purport to undertake in its behalf. P. 305 U. S. 423 .
6. By the Treaty with the Klamath Tribe of February 17, 1870, the United States acquired no beneficial ownership in the tribal lands or their proceeds, and, whatever the nature of the legal interest acquired by the Government as the implement of its control, substantial ownership remained with the tribe as it existed before the treaty. P. 305 U. S. 420 .
The petitions for certiorari challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in terms sufficiently broad to raise the question, not considered below or argued here, whether, assuming the contracts were obligations of the United States, as the court below held, suits to recover the overpayments are upon quasi contracts or contracts "implied in law" not within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Claims by § 145(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 250(1). [ Footnote 1 ] Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338 ;
United States v. Minnesota Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212 ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 287 . But the question chiefly discussed in brief and argument before us is whether the contracts in suit are obligations of the United States so as to give rise to claims founded upon them within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. As determination of this question is decisive of the case, we do not consider whether, even if the contracts were obligations of the United States, the claims are for the recovery of unjust enrichment upon contracts "implied in law," not within the jurisdiction of the court.
The Klamath Reservation was set apart as tribal lands under the Treaty with the Klamath Tribe of February 17, 1870, 16 Stat. 707, from lands immemorially possessed by them. See United States v. Klamath Tribes, 304 U. S. 119 , 304 U. S. 121 . Under the provisions of the treaty and established principles applicable to land reservations created for the benefit of the Indian tribes, the Indians are beneficial owners of the land and the timber standing upon it and of the proceeds of their sale, subject to the plenary power of control by the United States, to be exercised for the benefit and protection of the Indians. United States v. Klamath Tribes, 304 U. S. 119 ; cf. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432 ; Mott v. United States, 283 U. S. 747 ; Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U.S.
358, 301 U. S. 375 ; United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111 , 304 U. S. 116 . The United States acquired no beneficial ownership in the tribal lands or their proceeds, and however we may define the nature of the legal interest acquired by the government as the implement of its control, substantial ownership remained with the tribe as it existed before the treaty. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, supra, 304 U. S. 116 .
The action of Congress in authorizing the sale of the timber, and the contracts prescribed under its authority by departmental regulations and approved by the Secretary, are to be viewed as the means chosen for the exercise of the power of the government to protect the rights and beneficial ownership of the Indians. The means are adapted to that end. Neither the United States nor any officer purporting to act on its behalf is named a party to the contract By its terms, the contract is declared to be entered into "between the Superintendent of the Klamath Indian School, for and on behalf of the Klamath Indians, party of the first part" and the Lumber Company, "party of the second part." It is thus, on its face, the contract of the Klamath Indians executed by the Supreintendent, acting as their agent. The form of the contract and the procedure prescribed for its execution and approval conform to the long established relationship between the government and the Indians under which the government has plenary power to take appropriate measures to safeguard the disposal of property of which the Indians are the substantial owners. Exercise of that power does not necessarily involve the assumption of contractual obligations by the government. Their assumption is not to be presumed in the absence of any action taken by the government or on its behalf indicating such a purpose. See In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222 , 148 U. S. 227 ; Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354 , 248 U. S. 359 . In this, as in any other case of a written contract, those who are parties to and bound
Before the Act of 1910, the Act of February 16, 1889, 25 Stat. 673, had given the President authority, from year to year, under such regulations as he might prescribe, to authorize the Indians on reservations or allotments to sell dead timber, standing or fallen, on such reservations. The contracts authorized were to be those of the Indians, and not of the United States. See Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279 . [ Footnote 2 ]
the reservations under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. It did not command departure from the earlier practice of selling the timber by contracts entered into between the Indians and the purchasers, and it seems clear that, in prescribing that the contracts be entered into with the Indians, the Secretary adhered to this practice, but with the added safeguard that the contracts were to be effected for them through the agency of the Superintendent who, for many purposes, acts as the agent of the Indians. See United States v. Sinnott, 26 F. 84, 86; cf. 52 U. S. Ross, 11 How. 362, 52 U. S. 374 .
We do not stop to inquire whether the government could confer authority upon him to execute contracts binding upon the Indians, or whether the Act of 1910 dispensed with the formalities required of contracts with the Indians by R.S. § 2103, 25 U.S.C. § 81, omitted in the case of the present contracts. See Green v. Menominee Tribe, 233 U. S. 558 . Infirmities, if any, in respondents' contracts with the Indians could not impose on the United States a liability which the contracts do not purport to undertake in its behalf.
In some instances, Congress has passed special acts conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to entertain suits brought against the Indians on their contracts. 35 Stat. 444; 36 Stat. 287; see Green v. Menominee Tribe, 233 U. S. 558 ; cf. 26 Stat. 636; 27 Stat. 86; 35 Stat. 457; 36 Stat. 287.