Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/981/752/21635/
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 13:20:31
Document Index: 694458207

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 183', '§ 16', '§ 1292']

In the Matter of the Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984)corporation and Hornbeck Offshore Operators, Inc., Forexoneration from or Limitation of Liability, As Owners Andowners Pro Hac Vice of the M/v H.o.s. Goliath.hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corporation, Hornbeck Offshoreoperators, Inc., the Embassy of the Republic Oftunisia and the Office of Cereales Ofthe Republic of Tunisia, Appellees, v. Coastal Carriers Corporation, Claimant-appellant, 981 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1993) :: Justia
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In the Matter of the Complaint of Hornbeck Offshore (1984)corporation and Hornbeck Offshore Operators, Inc., Forexoneration from or Limitation of Liability, As Owners Andowners Pro Hac Vice of the M/v H.o.s. Goliath.hornbeck Offshore (1984) Corporation, Hornbeck Offshoreoperators, Inc., the Embassy of the Republic Oftunisia and the Office of Cereales Ofthe Republic of Tunisia, Appellees, v. Coastal Carriers Corporation, Claimant-appellant, 981 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1993)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 981 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1993)
Jan. 6, 1993. Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1993
Before JONES and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and PRADO1 , District Judge.
In November 1989, Tunisia voyage-chartered a barge and tow from Coastal, to transport wheat from California to Tunisia; and, in turn, Coastal chartered the tow from Hornbeck. The Coastal/Hornbeck towage agreement contained an arbitration clause, providing that " [s]hould any dispute arise between [them], the matter in dispute shall be referred to [arbitration]".
We have appellate jurisdiction under § 16(a) (1) (A) of the FAA, which provides: "an appeal may be taken from ... an order ... refusing a stay of any action under Section 3 of this title". 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1) (A).5 Coastal contends that the district court erred in denying the stay, asserting that the arbitration clause is broadly worded to encompass the indemnity/contribution dispute. We review de novo the district court's order. See Neal v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990).
The FAA "is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration". Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983). Section 3 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 3, provides for a stay of legal proceedings whenever the issues in a case are within the reach of an arbitration agreement. Midwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Commonwealth Constr. Co., 801 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1986).6 This provision is mandatory: "If the issues in a case are within the reach of the agreement, the district court has no discretion under section 3 to deny the stay". Id.
This circuit distinguishes between broad and narrow arbitration clauses. If the clause is broad, the action should be stayed and the arbitrators permitted to decide whether the dispute falls within the clause. Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil, 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1983)). On the other hand, if the clause is narrow, the matter should not be referred to arbitration or the action stayed, unless the court determines that the dispute falls within the clause. Id. " [W]henever the scope of an arbitration clause is fairly debatable or reasonably in doubt, the court should decide the question of construction in favor of arbitration." Mar-Len of La., Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1985). Moreover, " [t]he weight of this presumption is heavy". Id. at 636.
We have held that arbitration clauses containing the "any dispute" language, such as the one presently before us, are of the broad type. See Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1144 (clause governed "any dispute or difference between the parties"); Mar-Len, 773 F.2d at 634 (clause governed "any dispute ... with respect to the interpretation or performance of" the contract); Neal, 918 F.2d at 38 (clause governed "any and all disputes" between the parties). As noted in Sedco, " [i]t is difficult to imagine broader general language than that contained in the ... arbitration clause, 'any dispute' ...". 767 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Caribbean Steamship Co., S.A., v. Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret, 598 F.2d 1264, 1266 (2d Cir. 1979)).
The arbitration clause in issue, nearly identical to that in Sedco, is broad. Therefore, the district court should have granted the stay under § 3 and permitted the arbitrators to decide, among other things, whether the contribution/indemnification dispute falls within it. See Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1148 (" [a]bsent allegations of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, arbitration must proceed when an arbitration clause on its face appears broad enough to encompass the party's claims") (quoting Life of America Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Tunisia presents additional bases in support of the denial of the stay, including waiver, estoppel, and ripeness. Because it is not a party to the arbitration clause in issue, however, its claims against Hornbeck are unaffected by any stay granted under § 3. See Matter of Talbott Big Foot, Inc., 887 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1989) ("the mandatory stay provision of the Act does not apply to those who are not contractually bound by the arbitration agreement"). Accordingly, we do not address its contentions regarding the § 3 stay.7 We note, however, that on remand, it will lie within the district court's discretion to stay the claims between the nonarbitrating parties pending outcome of the arbitration simply as a means of controlling its docket. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 20 n. 23, 103 S. Ct. at 939 n. 23; Matter of Talbott, 887 F.2d at 614.
The Act provides that the liability of a shipowner for any damage arising from a maritime casualty which is occasioned without the privity or knowledge of the shipowner shall not exceed the value of the vessel at fault together with her pending freight. 46 U.S.C.App. § 183(a). When the shipowner files the action, the limitation court stays all related claims against the owner pending in any forum, and requires all claimants to timely assert their claims in the limitation court. Magnolia Marine Transport Co., Inc. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992)
Despite the plain wording of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1) (A), enacted in 1988, Hornbeck contests jurisdiction, relying on the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, as applied in Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Line, 294 U.S. 454, 456-58, 55 S. Ct. 475, 476-77, 79 L. Ed. 989 (1935). That doctrine was forcefully "repudiat [ed]" by the Supreme Court in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279-88, 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-43, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1988), and, in any event, addressed appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), not the FAA. See also Turboff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 867 F.2d 1518, 1519-20 (5th Cir. 1989)