Source: https://www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-journal/?durl=%2Fdivcom%2Fjn%2Fjnjournal01.nsf%2F8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829%2F2f3614f90a11faba8525821f0057a3e9
Timestamp: 2018-10-17 06:59:06
Document Index: 536892726

Matched Legal Cases: ['§924', '§924', '§924', '§924', '§327', '§1', '§924']

Florida Bar Journal – The Problem of Unpreserved Jury-Instruction Issues in Direct Criminal Appeals – The Florida Bar
With most IAOC claims, the appellate record will be insufficient to address the deficient-performance element because, without an explanation of the reasons for the challenged acts of counsel, we cannot determine whether they were reasonable. But the record sometimes contains, from counsel’s own mouth, an explanation for those actions.7 The reasonableness of counsel’s actions can also be objectively determined when they are clearly based on ignorance of basic facts (e.g., what exactly is the defendant charged with8) or relevant law.9
The first two elements intertwine. Counsel may believe there is good reason to let “error” occur (e.g., agreeing to a modification of a standard instruction because counsel believes it helps the defendant). Thus, whether something that drew no objection in the trial court was, from the defendant’s perspective, truly an error may depend on why counsel didn’t object. The second and third elements also intertwine to some degree; taken together, they ask whether it is possible that counsel knowingly and intentionally allowed the error to occur, either to sandbag or as what counsel believed was a reasonable trial tactic. For present purposes, the crucial point here is that, either way, the error was not the result of counsel’s mere negligence or ignorance of law.
Applying the invited-error rule in criminal appeals is problematic. To see why, start with a phrase seen in many Florida invited-error criminal cases: “[F]undamental error may be waived where defense counsel requests the erroneous instruction.”18 But fundamental error is harmful “[b]y its very nature”; if an error is not harmful, “it would not meet [the] requirement for being fundamental.”19 If fundamental error is harmful by its nature, how can it be waived? Put another way, if an error was waived, how can that error be said to be — or have ever been, before being waived — fundamental? By definition, the invitation comes before the “error” occurs; but the invitation authorizes the commission of the “error”; so in what sense did “error” ever really occur? Thus, “there is no error at all when a right has been waived,”20 which means an appellate court “need not decide whether [any ‘error’] was fundamental.”21
To see how this might occur, we must first note that “waiver,” defined as “the ‘intentional relinquishment...of a known right,’” is distinguished from “forfeiture,” which is merely a failure to “timely assert[] a right.”22 Forfeiture can be based on ignorance or negligence; one fails to assert a right because one either doesn’t know it exists or simply forgets to timely assert it. But waiver is based on knowledge (of the right) and intent (to relinquish that known right).
Although not noting this personal-waiver issue, Florida district courts say invited error occurs only if “counsel [is] aware of the omission, alteration, or incomplete instruction and affirmatively agree[s] to it”; and invited error does not occur if “there is no indication [counsel] knew that the omission was error and agreed to the omission.”28 But note the difference between 1) aware of omission, and 2) knew omission was error. Does the invited-error rule require only proof that counsel knew the facts, i.e., knew the precise wording in the challenged instruction? Or must it also be shown that counsel knew the wording in the instruction created a legal error? The latter seems more logical, given the definition of waiver and the anti-sandbagging purpose of the invited-error rule: If counsel didn’t know counsel was inviting/waiving the legal error, then counsel didn’t “intentionally inject [that error] into the trial” in an attempt to sandbag.29
Recent district court cases recognize that Florida law is unclear on these issues.31 Some courts find an error to be invited even in the absence of “bad motives of legal trickery”;32 some “even found waiver without any indication that counsel was aware the instruction contained the alleged error....”33 Thus, courts seem to be applying the terms “invited error” and “sandbagging” to two distinct situations: 1) cases in which counsel intentionally allows or injects error into the trial in order to create an appellate issue; and 2) cases like Armstrong, in which trial counsel waives an issue as a legitimate tactic but appellate counsel nonetheless raises that issue on appeal.
• Element Errors — Element errors concern the elements of an offense. There are two types, misstatements (the instruction erroneously defines, or misleads jurors regarding, an element); and omissions (the instruction entirely omits an element). With both types, the error is fundamental if the relevant element is disputed, and the flaw in the instruction “is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider to convict.”35
Many cases grant new trials on direct appeal on this type of unpreserved issue.36 All but one use the traditional paradigm. The exception here is Forget v. State, 782 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), in which the defendant was convicted of possessing both cocaine and drug paraphernalia, based on his possessing a pipe with cocaine residue. Trial counsel admitted to the jury that Forget possessed the pipe — thus admitting the paraphernalia charge — but argued that Forget wasn’t guilty of possessing the cocaine residue because the [s]tate didn’t prove Forget “knew the discolored material in the pipe was cocaine.”37 But counsel didn’t request an instruction — to which Forget was entitled, under then-extant law — that “the [s]tate must prove [Forget knew] of the presence of the substance [in the pipe] and the substance that he possessed was known to him to be cocaine.”38
The district courts have long recognized that errors in affirmative defense instructions can be fundamental, in three contexts: the prescription defense in drug-possession cases; the good-faith (claim of right, advice of counsel) defense in theft and robbery cases; and self-defense. The prescription cases and the good-faith cases are all omission error cases; the great majority of the self-defense cases are misstatement cases.
“Where a jury is not instructed on...a crucial defense, [the defendant] is deprived of a fair trial if the error divests [the defendant] of [the] sole [or] primary defense strategy and that defense is supported by evidence...that [is] not...weak....The justification for this rule follows logic. “An affirmative defense does not concern itself with the elements of the offense at all; it concedes them. In effect, an affirmative defense says, ‘Yes, I did it, but I had a good reason.’” [I]f a jury is not instructed [on an] affirmative defense, and that affirmative defense [is the defendant’s] sole or primary defense[,] then the jury, confining itself to the instructions provided by the court, would be required to convict.”45
Several recent misstatement-error cases found IAOC occurred because counsel failed to insure that a proper self-defense instruction was given. In one case, counsel, “obviously unaware of the law,” “repeatedly” (and erroneously) told the jury the defendant had to prove self-defense beyond reasonable doubt and agreed to an instruction to that effect.51 The court said “no possible strategy justif[ied] shifting the burden of proof to [the defendant] as to the only real issue”; and prejudice was shown because this “was [the defendant’s] only defense” and the facts were disputed.52 IAOC was also found in three cases where counsel obtained an instruction on the use of deadly force but didn’t ask for an instruction on nondeadly force. One court said nondeadly force was “the only self-defense instruction that fits the undisputed facts” and there was “no strategic reason for...counsel to request a[n] instruction that made it more difficult [to prove self-defense].”53 Two courts noted that, under the instruction given, “even if [the jury] believed [the defendant] acted in self-defense,” it had no “legal basis to [acquit].”54
These cases confirm what the Florida Supreme Court recently acknowledged: There is a “high correlation between errors that may be corrected as fundamental error...and errors that may be corrected as [IAOC] on direct appeal.”59 As Justice Wells noted in 2001, because a fundamental error is one that is “so serious that the trial judge should have sua sponte...correct[ed] it,” it “logically follows [that] counsel who did not object to such an egregious error must be [ineffective].”60 Similar statements are found in district court cases.61 Other recent district court cases recognize the overlap in the two paradigms when they hold that counsel’s inviting an error both waived a fundamental error claim and also proved the deficient-performance element of an IAOC claim.62
Some district court judges have expressed concern that recognizing unpreserved IAOC claims on direct appeal conflicts with §924.051(3), which allows appellate courts to address only issues that are either preserved or constitute fundamental error.63 Such concerns are unfounded. It is true that, in §924.051, the legislature did not expressly allow IAOC claims to be raised on direct appeal; but the legislature didn’t expressly forbid that either, despite the fact that the Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that some IAOC claims can be raised on direct appeal.64 Further, even if the legislature had expressly barred IAOC claims on direct appeal, that would probably infringe on the Florida Supreme Court’s state constitutional power to regulate practice and procedure in the courts.65 Matters of when and how to require preservation, and when, and on what basis, to grant relief on unpreserved issues, are within the court’s exclusive bailiwick.66
Finally, there is no conflict between §924.051 and the concept of granting relief on unpreserved IAOC claims. In allowing fundamental errors to be raised under §924.051, the legislature deferred to “the judicial[] definition of ‘fundamental error,’”67 which courts have defined as including errors that “amount to a denial of due process”68 or “so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public’s interest in our system of justice requires a new trial.”69 The right to effective counsel is a basic element of due process. Thus, an IAOC claim is a fundamental error claim, applied to a specific set of facts: Fundamental error occurred because the defendant was deprived of the basic due process right to effective counsel. And, when this occurs, it so damages the fairness of the trial that the public’s interest in our system requires a new trial.
1	Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
2	Armstrong v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991).
3	See Murphy v. International Robotic Systems, Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1016-17 (Fla. 2000); State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984), receded from on other grounds, Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 98 (Fla. 2000); Porter v. State, 356 So. 2d 1268, 1270-71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
4	See, e.g., Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 98.
5	Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984).
6	Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987).
7	E.g., Antunes-Salgado v. State, 987 So. 2d 222, 228-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
8	E.g., Romine v. State, 162 So. 3d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Hills v. State, 78 So. 3d 648, 650, 652-53 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
9	See Butler v. State, 84 So. 3d 419, 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (“[A] tactical or strategic decision is unreasonable if it is based on a failure to understand the law.”) (citation omitted); Antunes-Salgado, 987 So. 2d at 228-29.
10	Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So. 2d 850, 851-52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
11	Vaughn v. Progressive Ins. Co., 907 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
12	Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995).
13	State v. Smith, 240 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1970).
14	Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1026, 1030.
15	Bain v. State, 730 So. 2d 296, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
16	Gupton v. Village Key & Saw Shop, 656 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla. 1995).
17	E.g., Armstrong, 579 So. 2d at 735; Smith v. State, 76 So. 3d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Chambers v. State, 880 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Caldwell v. State, 920 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
18	Richards v. State, 128 So. 3d 959, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
19	Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369-70 (Fla. 2002).
20	United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
21	State v. Yegan, 221 P.3d 1027, 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
22	United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (emphasis added).
23	See 4 Fla. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law §327 (2016).
24	State v. Hargrove, 293 P.3d 787, 797 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).
25	Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.
26	Id. at 734-35.
27	Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
28	Van Loan v. State, 736 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (emphasis added); accord Beckham v. State, 884 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Fletcher v. State, 828 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Richardson v. State, 818 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
29	Armstrong, 579 So. 2d at 735 (emphasis added).
30	See, e.g., Burns v. State, 170 So. 3d 90, 93, n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
31	See Knight v. State, 2016 WL 4036091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Moore v. State, 114 So. 3d 486, 491-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), rev. dis., State v. Moore, 181 So. 3d 1186 (Fla. 2016). Caselaw from other jurisdictions is in similar conflict. See discussions in United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997); State v. Hargrove, 293 P.3d 787 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Rich, 3 A.3d 1210 (Md. 2010); and State v. Richard, 7 A.3d 1195 (N.H. 2010).
32	Caldwell, 920 So. 2d at 733.
33	Moore, 114 So. 3d at 492.
34	Some cases indicate that the invited-error rule may be based on an estoppel theory. E.g., Weber v. State, 602 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Estoppel is a different theory from waiver. Waiver focuses on the acts and mental state of the party seeking relief; estoppel is concerned with the effects that party’s acts had on the opponent. Under an estoppel theory, if error is invited (even if unintentionally), and one party must bear the burden of that error, the party responsible for the error is the logical candidate. See Progressive Exp. Ins. Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); SourceTrack, LLC v. Ariba, Inc., 958 So. 2d 523, 526-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); 22 Fla. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver §1 (2016). But if the counsel responsible for the error didn’t know error was being created, then neither a waiver nor sandbagging occurred. Here, again, we run into the problem of punishing the defendant (by barring the raising of an appellate issue) because trial counsel made a mistake. If counsel’s making that estoppel-creating mistake was unreasonable, then counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, which in turn proves half of an IAOC claim.
35	Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 369 (Fla. 2002); Garcia v. State, 901 So. 2d 788, 793-94 (Fla. 2005).
36	For recent examples, see Gammage v. State, 181 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Williams v. State, 145 So. 3d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
37	Forget, 782 So. 2d at 412.
38	Id. at 412, n.1.
39	Id. at 413.
41	Reed, 837 So. 2d at 369.
42	Garcia, 901 So. 2d at 793-94; Jones v. State, 857 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Goodman v. State, 839 So. 2d 902, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Blunt v. State, 831 So. 2d 770, 771-72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
43	Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449, 455 (Fla. 2008).
44	Id. at 456.
45	Ramirez v. State, 125 So. 3d 171, 176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing Ayotte v. State, 67 So. 3d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Glovacz v. State, 60 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); and McCoy v. State, 56 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)).
46	Shedd v. State, 137 So. 3d 456, 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Ramirez, 125 So. 3d at 175, n.1.
47	Thomas v. State, 526 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Rodriguez v. State, 396 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
48	Aversano v. State, 966 So. 2d 493, 495-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Hardman v. State, 217 So. 3d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Capiro v. State, 97 So. 3d 298, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
49	Jackson v. State, 179 So. 3d 443, 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (collecting cases).
50	Talley v. State, 106 So. 3d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).
51	Spicer v. State, 22 So. 3d 706, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
52	Id. at 708.
53	Marty v. State, 210 So. 3d 121, 125-26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
54	Michel v. State, 989 So. 2d 679, 681-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), accord McComb v. State, 174 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
55	Kruse v. State, 222 So. 3d 13, 16-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
57	Shells v. State, 642 So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
58	Muteei v. State, 708 So. 2d 626, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
59	Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 402, n.5 (Fla. 2016).
60	Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 2001) (Wells, C.J., concurring); see also Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 38 (Fla. 2008); Chandler v. State, 848 So. 2d 1031, 1046 (Fla. 2003).
61	E.g., Guarscio v. State, 64 So. 3d 146, 148-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Ross v. State, 726 So. 317, 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
62	Morgan v. State, 146 So. 3d 508, 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Johnson v. State, 133 So. 3d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Tuttle, 177 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2015); Hill v. State, 114 So. 3d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Berdecia v. State, 971 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); see also Garcia v. State, 143 So. 3d 1105, 1108, n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (similar to Morgan but granting relief on grounds of fundamental error).
63	See Elmore v. State, 172 So. 3d 465, 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); Monroe v. State, 148 So. 3d 850, 859-60, n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), quashed on other grounds, 191 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 2016); Seccia v. State, 720 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), remanded, 764 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 2000); Latson v. State, 193 So. 3d 1070, 1072-74 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Winkour, J., concurring).
64	E.g., Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987).
65	Fla. Const. art. V(2)(a).
66	See Leonard v. State, 760 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 2000) (construing §924.051(4) — which flatly says, without exception, that, “without expressly reserving [a] dispositive issue,” D “may not appeal” from a plea of guilty or no contest — “as codifying the existing limitations on what issues may be addressed on appeal [in such cases],” which means that, in plea-without-reservation cases, D can (still) raise the five issues listed in Rule 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
67	Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 95.
68	Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 704, n.7 (Fla. 1978).
69	Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1026.