Source: https://m.openjurist.org/142/f3d/582
Timestamp: 2020-02-25 13:12:25
Document Index: 495188766

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 14', '§ 1983', '§ 5524', '§ 8541', '§ 8542', '§ 8545', '§ 8550', '§ 8545', '§ 8550']

142 F. 3d 582 - Sameric Corporation of Delaware Inc v. City of Philadelphia
142 F3d 582 Sameric Corporation of Delaware Inc v. City of Philadelphia
142 F.3d 582
SAMERIC CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, INC., Appellant,
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; Philadelphia Historical Commission,
an Agency of the City of Philadelphia; Edward A.
Montgomery, Jr.; Richard Tyler, Ph.D.; Chris Cashman;
David Brownlee, Ph.D.; David Hollenberg; Barbara Kaplan;
Joan Ferrera; and David Wismer, Individually and in Their
Official Capacities as Members of the Philadelphia
We exercise plenary review of the district court's grant of summary judgment. See City of Erie v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir.1997). We will affirm the summary judgment if, after a plenary review of the record, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence permits a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party, accepting its evidence as true and drawing all justifiable inferences from the evidence in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 2513.
Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but provides a remedy against state officials for violations of constitutional rights. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694-95 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). The initial inquiry in a section 1983 suit is (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law7 and (2) whether the conduct deprived the complainant of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.1995).
To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove that it was deprived of a protected property interest by arbitrary or capricious government action. See Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir.1993). Because the defendants conceded in the district court that Sameric had a property interest sufficient to invoke the protections of substantive due process, the only issue on this point is whether the City unconstitutionally deprived Sameric of that interest. A substantive due process violation is established if "the government's actions were not rationally related to a legitimate government interest" or " 'were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive.' " Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir.1991)); see also Independent Enters., Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 (3d Cir.1997) (government's deliberate and arbitrary abuse of authority violates substantive due process); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir.1988) (same). The former inquiry is a question of law for the court whereas, if there is a genuine dispute of fact, the latter is a question for resolution by the jury. See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 692.
(a) Has significant character, interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the City, Commonwealth or Nation or is associated with the life of a person significant in the past; or
Phila.Code § 14-2007(5). In addition, the ordinance announces the following purposes:
(.1) preserve buildings, structures, sites and objects which are important to the education, culture, traditions and economic values of the City; ...
Phila.Code § 14-2007(1)(b).
Relying on the first enumerated criterion and the first and fifth stated purposes, the district court found that the ordinance is "broad enough to protect the possible cultural and economic gains which could accrue from preserving a theater of this size." Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, at * 4. Thus, the court found that to the extent the Commission based its decision upon economic and cultural interests, it acted permissibly under the ordinance and noted that the ordinance was "not so narrow that it precludes historic designation based on either the size of the theater or its suitability as a performance venue." Id.
We agree with the district court to the extent that it found that the ordinance permits consideration of cultural and economic factors. The plain language of the ordinance clearly refers to such considerations, see Phila. Code § 14-2007(1)(b)(.1) & (.5), and the ordinance declares a broad public policy to preserve the "historic, architectural, cultural, [and] aesthetic" merit of buildings. See Phila. Code § 14-2007(1)(a). In addition, the ordinance requires that the Historical Commission be composed of individuals with diverse expertise, emphasizing the concern for the culture, economy, and development of the City.8 See Phila. Code § 14-2007(3). We, however, cannot agree that the ordinance permits designation based upon the potential value of the theater if converted to a live performance venue.
Under Pennsylvania law, " 'the power and authority to be exercised by administrative commissions must be conferred by legislative language clear and unmistakable. A doubtful power does not exist.' " United Artists' II, 635 A.2d at 622 (quoting Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 476 Pa. 302, 382 A.2d 731, 735-36 (1978)). Because we find that the plain language of the ordinance does not confer clear and unmistakable authority to designate a building based upon its potential, future cultural value, we hold that the Historical Commission does not possess such authority.
The enumerated purpose of the statute which relates most directly to the culture of the City, see Phila. Code § 14-2007(1)(b)(.1), speaks in terms of the present importance of the building to the City's culture. More importantly, the criteria enumerated in the ordinance conspicuously and consistently refer to the value of a building in the present tense. In particular, the first enumerated criterion for historic designation, upon which the City primarily relies, allows designation where the building "has significant ... value as part of the development ... of the City." Phila. Code § 14-2007(5)(a). The City argues that this criterion encompasses a designation where, as here, the Historical Commission finds that a building, if converted to a use for which it is suitable, would further a plan for the development of the City.
We disagree. While the "development" of the City necessarily refers to the future of the community, the ordinance only refers to the present value of a building, which is on its face limited to a consideration of the present condition of a building. The ordinance clearly permits the Historical Commission to consider the future in only one instance, which is not applicable here--the possibility that a building will yield important information. See Phila. Code § 14-2007(5)(i). Thus, the ordinance does not clearly permit the Historical Commission to consider potential uses of a building in evaluating its value.
In addition, our interpretation follows the lead of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of this ordinance. To our knowledge, the state court proceedings in this dispute, culminating in a decision by that court, have generated the only published judicial interpretation of this ordinance. It is axiomatic that the highest court of a state is the final arbiter of that state's law. See West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940). Thus, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the precise issue which we now consider, we give great weight to its interpretation of this ordinance in United Artists' II. We find that the district court's interpretation is inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the ordinance, namely that the Historical Commission has no authority to designate a building on the basis of its interior.
In United Artists' II, the court held that "[t]he Historical Commission is not explicitly authorized by statute to designate the interior of the building as historically or aesthetically significant." United Artists' II, 635 A.2d at 622. The court began its analysis by noting the "clear and unmistakable" language standard in Pennsylvania administrative law. See id. The court then turned to the language of the ordinance and found that the only reference to the interior of the building in Phila. Code § 14-2007 is in the subsection which imposes upon the owner of a historic building the duty of care. See id. Because the language in that section concerns the interior only for the express purpose of supporting the exterior, the court found that it was beyond the Historical Commission's authority to designate a building based upon its interior.9 See id.
We have held that evidence regarding the intentions of single member of a zoning board can create a genuine issue of fact as to the board's motive. See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the Twp. of W. Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 602 (3d Cir.1995) (evidence that one member of the zoning board acted for personal reasons was sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the board's decision was influenced by that member's personal interest, and thus acted with an improper motive). Thus, given the evidence of Commissioner Kaplan's motivation, we assume without deciding that this evidence creates a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the Historical Commission was motivated by the Boyd Theater's potential use and cultural value as performance space.
On this issue, at the outset we note that Sameric has not established, or for that matter even alleged, that the Historical Commission's decision to designate the building was motivated by personal gain, individuous discriminatory intent, or partisan political considerations, the presence of which we have found establish substantive due process claims based upon improper motive. See, e.g., DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 601 (personal financial interest); Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 697 n. 6 (economic motivation); Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129 (partisan political or personal reasons); see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir.1996) (alleging that the defendants were motivated by partisan politics in designating an area as historic as they intended to thwart plaintiffs' development project so that the mayor would not receive credit for the resulting economic benefits).
Rather, Sameric proffers that the City's improper motive was its ultra vires reliance on procuring live performance space for the community. As discussed above, we find that the City did exceed its authority to the extent that it based its decision upon such a motivation. This error, however, is only one of law, and such an error is not sufficient in itself to establish a substantive due process claim. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11, 64 S.Ct. 397, 402, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944); Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 684 (stating that federal courts are not in the business of granting federal "remedies for mere violations of state law"); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-18 (7th Cir.1988) (en banc) (holding that a violation of state law does not amount to a violation of due process).
We recognize that, to prove a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff need not establish in every case that the defendants sought to advance personal interests. See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 697 n. 6. We find, however, that Parkway Garage does not lend Sameric support beyond that point. In Parkway Garage, the plaintiff alleged that the City violated its substantive due process rights by prematurely and unjustifiably terminating its lease and closing the garage that the plaintiff managed on the property. See id. at 689-91. While the City contended that its actions were in furtherance of the public safety to avoid the imminent collapse of the plaintiff's parking garage, the plaintiff presented evidence that this alleged motivation was a pretext. See id. at 693-94. Rather, according to the plaintiff, the City was motivated economically because the property was more valuable to the City without the encumbrance of the plaintiff's lease. Thus, we held that if the plaintiff proved that the defendants were driven by the economic benefit to the City, such a motivation would establish an improper motive sufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim. See id. at 699.
There is no allegation here that the City sought to advance its direct economic position in designating the theater. Thus, this case differs fundamentally from Parkway Garage in which the City owned property involved in the case. Taken in the light most favorable to Sameric, the evidence supports an inference that the Historical Commission considered the potential uses of the Boyd Theater, which the Commission believed could fill a void in the community. There is not sufficient evidence, however, that the City was in a position to realize the type of direct economic gain alleged in Parkway Garage. Thus, we find that Sameric has not produced evidence of an "improper motive."10
As an independent basis for its substantive due process claim, Sameric also alleges that the City acted arbitrarily and irrationally in designating the Boyd Theater. Relying again on its interpretation of the ordinance, the district court concluded that because a designation as historic may be based upon its "significant interest or value to the development of the City," Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, at * 5, Sameric did not present evidence which creates a genuine issue of fact that the defendants lacked a rational basis for designating the Boyd Theater as historic. Sameric contends that because the district court based its holding on a misinterpretation of state law, we should reverse the grant of summary judgment. Again, although we agree that the district court erred in its interpretation of the ordinance, we find that Sameric has not produced sufficient evidence from which a jury could find arbitrary and irrational government conduct.
We have held that, in the context of a land-use decision, "the deliberate and arbitrary abuse of government power violates an individual's right to substantive due process." Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129 (declining to define the "outer limits of the showing necessary to demonstrate" arbitrary and irrational governmental action because the plaintiff adduced evidence that the decision was based upon "partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the merits of the application for the permits"); see also DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 601. Government conduct is arbitrary and irrational where it is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 692; Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 683; Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d Cir.1987).
Our review of a locality's land-use decision asks whether the locality "could have had a legitimate reason for its decision." Pace, 808 F.2d at 1034, 1035 (citing Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc) (holding that "federal judicial interference with a state zoning board's quasi-legislative decisions, like invalidation of legislation for 'irrationality' or 'arbitrariness,' is proper only if the governmental body could have no legitimate reason for its decision")). Thus, in Pace, we found that summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate because the township "could have had rational reasons for" its land-use decision relating to the property owner's development plan "and because th[e] complaint allege[d] no facts suggesting arbitrariness." Id. at 1036. In holding that the plaintiff in Pace did not allege sufficiently a substantive due process violation, we also noted that it did "not present a case involving actions aimed at this developer for reasons unrelated to land use planning." Id. at 1035.
In Pace, we cited with approval Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.1982), which we again find persuasive. In Creative Environments, the plaintiff alleged that the town frustrated the plaintiff's development plans by "distorting" state law. See id. at 829. The court held that the plaintiff did not establish a constitutional violation and noted that "[t]his would be true even were planning officials to clearly violate ... the state scheme under which they operate." Id. at 833 (footnote omitted). According to the court, the case was an average dispute between a property owner and the local zoning body and every developer's challenge to a land-use decision necessarily involves some claim that the board exceeded or abused its legal authority. See id.; see also Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of W. Orange, 209 N.J.Super. 499, 507 A.2d 1194, 1206 (App.Div.1986) ("Accordingly while the words 'arbitrary and capricious' may sound harsh, they are simply the standard of appellate review in particular cases.").
Because our substantive due process analysis does not depend on the legality vel non of the City's action under state law, our inquiry here is essentially the inquiry in which we would engage if the City's ordinance had provided explicitly for designation based upon the potential use of a building and such an ordinance was challenged on substantive due process grounds. In short, the proper inquiry is whether the City's decision to designate the Boyd Theater based upon its potential use and cultural value if converted to live performance space is rationally related to land-use planning.11
As suggested above, Sameric's allegations are very similar to those that the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found insufficient in Creative Environments. As did the plaintiff in that case, Sameric presents a claim in the nature of an average dispute between a property owner and local zoning officials. Thus, as we have in the past, we emphasize here our reluctance to substitute our judgment for that of local decision-makers, particularly in matters of such local concern as land-use planning, absent a local decision void of a "plausible rational basis." Pace, 808 F.2d at 1035. We decline to federalize routine land-use decisions. Rather, the validity of land-use decisions by local agencies ordinarily should be decided under state law in state courts. After all, surely it would be strange to hold that the City had no rational basis for designating the theater when the Common Pleas Court, the Commonwealth Court, and the district court all thought that its designation was valid.12
It is well established that, in cases involving land-use decisions, a property owner does not have a ripe, constitutional claim until the zoning authorities have had "an opportunity to 'arrive[ ] at a final, definitive position regarding how [they] will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.' "13 Id. at 1291 (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3119, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985)). Thus, we have held that property owners' constitutional claims based upon land-use decisions were premature where the owners or tenants were denied permits by the initial decision-makers but did not avail themselves of available, subsequent procedures. See Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970, 974-75 (3d Cir.1993) (owner was denied building permit by Development and Licensing Division, but did not appeal the denial to the Board of Adjustment or seek a variance); Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1289 (owner complained of the zoning officer's revocation of tenant's use permit where the tenant did not reapply, appeal to the zoning board, or seek a variance); Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 686 (holding that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe where it did not appeal the denial of a certificate of occupancy to the review board).
In both cases, we held that the claims were not ripe because the property owners or the tenant did not give the locality an opportunity to make a final determination regarding how to construe the applicable ordinances and apply them to the particular property. The same is true here, where Sameric claims that the local land-use decision was based on an erroneous application or interpretation of the local ordinance. In addition, as in Acierno and Taylor, the applicable ordinance explicitly subjects the initial decision to review by another body, which owes no deference to the initial decision-maker. See Acierno, 6 F.3d at 972, 976; Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1292-93.14 Thus, we find that the Department of Licenses' denial was not the City's final determination of Sameric's rights to a demolition permit under the ordinance.
Sameric also contends that Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.1995), where we refused to apply the finality requirement, applies here. We disagree. In Blanche Rd., we further explained the confines of these cases requiring a final decision by the local authority regarding a land-use decision. There, the plaintiff claimed that the local authority abused its power in a conspiracy to halt the development of its property because of the authority's distaste for its plan. After noting that Acierno involved a claim based upon the merits of the land-use decision, we found that the property owner's claim in Blanche Rd. was substantively different because it was not based on the township's adverse decision, but on its intentional and improper delay of the process. Inasmuch as an improper delay could result in damages notwithstanding the ultimate grant of a permit, we declined to apply the finality requirement because a review of the permit decisions was not necessary to resolve the dispute. See id. at 267-68.
We again stress the importance of the finality requirement and our reluctance to allow the courts to become super land-use boards of appeals. Land-use decisions concern a variety of interests and persons, and local authorities are in a better position than the courts to assess the burdens and benefits of those varying interests. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1291. Judicial review of the City's denial of Sameric's application for a demolition permit would be inappropriate because it would permit Sameric to have denied the City the opportunity to render a final decision regarding how to interpret and apply the ordinance. See id. at 1292.
Thus, we find that the district court properly held that the claim based upon the denial of the demolition permit was not ripe. Ordinarily, because a ripeness determination concerns the justiciability of a claim, which the district court should resolve on a motion to dismiss rather than on a motion for summary judgment, where this court finds that the district court properly held that the plaintiff's claim is not ripe, this court should vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the claim. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1290 (citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 508 (9th Cir.1990)); see also Acierno, 6 F.3d at 971. Here, however, we see no reason to disturb the grant of the summary judgment as Sameric's abandonment of its appeal from the denial of the demolition permit after it sold the property ensures that its claim based on the denial never can be ripe. Thus, in this case Sameric's claim with respect to the denial of the demolition permit is not simply "premature," see Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1287, rather, it never will ripen. We thus would require the parties to waste their time if we remanded the case for the district court to convert the summary judgment into an order of dismissal.
In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-78, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-48, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir.1996). Thus, because Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for personal injury is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5524 (West Supp.1997), Sameric's due process claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1985).
A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based. See de Botton v. Marple Twp., 689 F.Supp. 477, 480 (E.D.Pa.1988). According to the City, the very last date that a cause of action based upon the denial of the permit could have accrued was in 1988 when Sameric abandoned its appeal to the Board of License Review. Because Sameric did not institute this suit until 1995, the City concludes that the statute of limitations bars this action.
Sameric contends, however, that the "continuing wrong" doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations, renders its claim based upon the denial of the demolition permit timely. Under this doctrine, a federal cause of action based upon the defendant's continuing conduct is timely provided that the last act of that continuing conduct is within the period for the commencement of an action specified by the statute of limitations. See 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 101 F.3d at 324 (quoting Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991)). In applying the doctrine, this court focuses on the affirmative acts of the defendant. See id.
Sameric urges this court to find that its claim was tolled by its challenges to the designation of the theater in the state court. Sameric bases its argument largely on the district court's ruling, from which the City does not appeal, regarding the timeliness of its claims. The district court, ruling on a motion to dismiss in this case, held that Sameric's substantive due process claims based upon the designation of the theater were not barred by the statute of limitations. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95-7057, 1996 WL 47973 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 1996). The district court found that the cause of action accrued on April 14, 1987, the date on which the Historical Commission officially notified Sameric of the designation, but found that the "continuing wrong" doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See id. at * 3. The district court held that because Sameric was diligent in pursuing its claim with respect to the invalidity of the designation and the defendants continuously opposed Sameric's challenges in state court, the doctrine applied. Thus, Sameric's complaint, filed on November 8, 1995, was timely because it was filed within two years from the end of the state court litigation on November 9, 1993. See id. at * 4.
Although Sameric diligently objected to the designation of the theater in state court, it abandoned its appeal of the denial of the demolition permit sometime in 1988 after selling the theater to United Artists. In addition, Sameric instituted its state court proceedings challenging the historic designation of the Boyd Theater prior to the Historical Commission's denial of its application for a demolition permit.15 Thus, because the two claims are independent, application of the "continuing wrong" doctrine, as urged by Sameric, would be inappropriate here as its diligence did not relate to pursuing the permit. To the contrary, it abandoned its attempt to obtain the permit many years before it filed this action. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the "continuing wrong" doctrine does not apply to toll the running of the statute of limitations with respect to Sameric's claim based upon the denial of its permit application.
Sameric's complaint also alleges that the defendants' conduct deprived it of "the equal protection and [its] rights, privileges and immunities" guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution. App. 857. The defendants asserted a governmental immunity defense to these claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the "Act"), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 8541-8564 (West 1982 & Supp.1997). According to the district court, the individual defendants were immune under the Act because they did not consider factors outside of their authority. Again, although the district court based its analysis upon an erroneous interpretation of the ordinance, we affirm its conclusion.
The City is immune from Sameric's claims arising under the equal protection and civil rights sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the Act grants it immunity from claims for monetary damages except with respect to eight specific types of tortious conduct, none of which is applicable here. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8542(b) (specifying that liability may be imposed upon the local agency for damages resulting from the following acts: the operation of a motor vehicle; the care or custody of personal or real property of others in the possession of the agency; dangerous conditions resulting from trees, traffic controls or street lighting; dangerous conditions resulting from utility service facilities; dangerous condition of streets and sidewalks; and the care or custody of animals in the possession of the agency); Agresta v. Goode, 797 F.Supp. 399, 409 (E.D.Pa.1992). In fact, Sameric conceded during the district court proceedings that the Act barred the state constitutional claims asserted against the City. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 1997 WL 399374, at * 7.
We also find that the individual defendants are immune under the Act from Sameric's state constitutional claims. Under the Act, individual defendants are immune from liability for acts within the scope of their employment to the same extent as their employing agency, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8545,16 except that they are liable if their conduct amounts to actual fraud, crime, actual malice or willful misconduct. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8550.17 "Willful misconduct," as used in section 8550, requires evidence that the defendants actually knew that their conduct was illegal. See Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293-94 (1994); see also In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 938 F.Supp. 1264, 1271 (E.D.Pa.1996). Because there is insufficient evidence that the individual defendants actually knew that their conduct was illegal and no evidence at all that crime, fraud, or malice is implicated here, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants based upon immunity under the Act.
We use the term "building" throughout this opinion because this case involves a building. However, our discussion of the designation of a building under the ordinance also encompasses the designation of structures, objects, complexes of buildings, and districts which, for the most part, are treated equally under the ordinance
The theater was also known as the Sameric Theater
The district court held that Sameric was not entitled to a preliminary injunction to prevent the Historical Commission from considering the designation of the theater because Sameric was not subject to an immediate threat. According to the court, the convening of a hearing did not in itself pose a threat to Sameric. Further, the court found that the potential designation would not harm Sameric, as only the subsequent denial of a permit required by virtue of the designation would pose a threat to Sameric
Because Sameric sold its assets to United Artists in April 1988, the appellant was changed from Sameric to United Artists while the case was on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
The district court dismissed Sameric's procedural due process claims for failure to state a claim. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 95-7957, 1996 WL 47973, at * 4 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 1996). The district court held that Pennsylvania provided a judicial mechanism permitting Sameric to challenge the designation of the Boyd Theater. See id. In particular, the district court noted that the parties agreed that the state court action should be treated as an appeal of the designation. See id
In the alternative, the district court held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the federal claims because they were following their own reasonable interpretation of the ordinance. Given our conclusion that Sameric has not established a violation of a constitutional right, we need not consider the immunity issue. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (stating that in considering whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court first should consider whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right)
We note, however, that, in the context of land-use decisions, this court has recognized the importance of broadly granting immunity to members of local boards to allow them to make decisions without the threat of being sued by every disgruntled applicant. See Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 50 & n. 11 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Anastasio v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of W. Orange, 209 N.J.Super. 499, 507 A.2d 1194, 1208 (App.Div.1986)).
There is no dispute that the defendants herein are "persons" acting under color of state law. The City is subject to section 1983 liability for injuries caused by its official policies and customs, see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and actions by the Historical Commission, one of its agencies, constitute such official policies, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)
The ordinance requires that the Historical Commission be composed, inter alia, of the Director of Commerce, the Chairman of the City Planning Commission, a real estate developer, a representative from a community development corporation, and a representative from a community organization
Section 14-2007(8)(c) provides that
[t]he exterior of every historic building, structure and object and of every building, structure and object located within an historic district shall be kept in good repair as shall the interior portions of such buildings, structures and objects, neglect of which may cause or tend to cause the exterior to deteriorate, decay, become damaged or otherwise fall into a state of disrepair.
Our conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate in this case is not at odds with the notion that the determination of whether defendants were motivated by bias, personal interest, or other improper motive is, if there is a genuine dispute of fact, a question of fact for the jury. See Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 692, 697 n. 6. Here, we conclude that the particular motive which Sameric alleged is not improper as a matter of law
The majority of Sameric's brief on this issue is devoted to arguing that the City's action in designating the theater was without factual basis and therefore amounts to arbitrary and irrational government conduct. Thus, Sameric reviews the "extensive" evidence presented against designation to the Historical Commission
We recognize that there is evidence to suggest that the Boyd Theater is not as architecturally significant as the Designation Committee presented. There is also evidence from which a jury could infer that the Historical Commission was predisposed to designate the theater. This argument, however, focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence to support the designation based upon criteria other than the potential cultural value of the Boyd if converted to a live performance space. This is not the appropriate inquiry here.
Our conclusion does not necessarily mean that Sameric will not receive damages by reason of the historic designation of its property as it explains in its brief that it "has intervened[in the Common Pleas Court] for the purpose of seeking an assessment of damages as a result of the decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania" in United Artists' II. Of course, we hasten to add our opinion does not depend on whether Sameric makes a recovery in the state court
We again note that this finality requirement is not at odds with the notion that section 1983 claims are not subject to an exhaustion of remedies requirement. See Taylor, 983 F.2d at 1291 n. 10 (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 192-94, 105 S.Ct. at 3119-20)
We do not imply that our result would have been different if the administrative standard of review had been deferential
Sameric instituted its state court challenge to the designation on April 24, 1987, see app. 845, and the Historical Commission denied its permit application on December 2, 1987
Section 8545 states that
Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8545
Section 8550 states that the immunity, indemnity, and damage limitations of the Act do not apply
[i]n any action against a local agency or employee thereof for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8550