Source: http://openjurist.org/979/f2d/1042/united-states-v-doucette-iii
Timestamp: 2013-05-24 04:20:24
Document Index: 646275568

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 3742', '§ 924', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 924', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4']

979 F2d 1042 United States v. Doucette III | OpenJurist
979 F. 2d 1042 - United States v. Doucette III	Home979 f2d 1042 united states v. doucette iii
979 F2d 1042 United States v. Doucette III 979 F.2d 1042
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.James Thomas DOUCETTE, III, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-4994.
James Thomas Doucette, III, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the government failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, that his allegedly involuntary confessions were erroneously admitted, and that the district court made an improper upward departure in sentencing him to twenty-five years imprisonment. We reject these contentions and affirm.
Doucette appeals his conviction and sentence. He urges that the government's failure to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and the district court's erroneous admission of his allegedly involuntary confessions entitle him to a new trial. Doucette also contends that the district court made an improper upward departure in sentencing him to twenty-five years imprisonment. We find these objections meritless and affirm.
Doucette argues that the government violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 in failing to disclose certain evidence before trial. In particular, he complains that the government withheld the substance of his oral confession, a fingerprint card, penitentiary packets listing his prior convictions, and reports from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms confirming that the guns found in his possession were unregistered. Since the district court declined to exclude any of this evidence, Doucette maintains that his conviction must be reversed. We review alleged discovery errors for abuse of discretion and will order a new trial only where a defendant demonstrates prejudice to his substantial rights. United States v. Ellender, 947 F.2d 748, 756 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Garcia, 917 F.2d 1370, 1374 (5th Cir.1990).
We are not convinced that the government withheld any of the evidence in question. The government has represented that it did not receive the fingerprint card and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms reports until the day of the trial. When the government introduced these records at trial, Doucette's counsel was given an opportunity to review the documents and object to their receipt into evidence. The government was in possession of the oral statement and the penitentiary packets well before trial and the record indicates that defense counsel was invited to the U.S. Attorney's Office to examine this evidence. Doucette's counsel, however, failed to appear on the scheduled date or anytime thereafter. Rule 16 requires only that the government permit the defendant to inspect the materials covered by this provision.1 For this reason, there can be no violation of Rule 16 where, as here, the defendant's lack of diligence is the sole cause of his failure to obtain evidence made available by the government. See United States v. Lambert, 580 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir.1978); see also Ellender, 947 F.2d at 757 ("where the defendant's own lack of reasonable diligence is the sole reason for not obtaining the pertinent material, there can be no Brady claim") (citing United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir.1980)). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude this evidence.
A confession is voluntary if, under the "totality of the circumstances," the statement is the product of the accused's "free and rational choice." United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir.1990); Martinez v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.1980). "This Court must give credence to the credibility choices and findings of fact of the district court unless clearly erroneous." United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870, 110 S.Ct. 198, 107 L.Ed.2d 152 (1989). The ultimate issue of voluntariness, however, is a legal question, subject to de novo review. United States v. Menesses, 962 F.2d 420, 428 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Raymer, 876 F.2d at 386).
The district court, however, was "not convinced that the defendant used a firearm ... in committing the offense of robbery." Since the instant offense could not be characterized as a crime of violence, the career offender provision was inapplicable: "[T]he court will not consider the robbery in connection with the sentencing, which will also require the court not to consider the defendant as a career offender." The court instead found that a ten-year increase from the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years was appropriate under § 4A1.3, which authorizes upward departures where "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes." The court explained:
Doucette asserts that the district court's ten-year upward departure from the fifteen-year minimum sentence required by § 924(e) was "unsupported and unjustified," for the increase under § 4A1.3 "was based on the same reasoning mandating a minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)."4 The contention that an upward departure under § 4A1.3 from a sentence already enhanced pursuant to § 924 imposes an impermissible "double penalty" on a defendant's criminal history, however, is foreclosed by our precedents. United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 743 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 355, 121 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992); United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991). The Carpenter and Fields courts both held that an inadequate criminal history score may support an increase from the fifteen-year sentence supplied by § 924(e). In affirming the district court's upward departures, both courts stressed that fifteen years is only the required minimum sentence; the maximum term under § 924(e) is life. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 745; Fields, 923 F.2d at 362. For this reason, "[i]f the sentencing scheme enacted by Congress in § 924(e)(1) is to be given effect--that is, if sentences of more than fifteen years are ever to be imposed--then the guidelines must be read to allow sentences in excess of fifteen years to be imposed in appropriate cases." Id.
The district court's determination that a criminal history category of VI did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Doucette's past conduct is well-supported by the record.5 The presentence report indicates that Doucette received no criminal history points for three prior felony convictions (theft, bail jumping, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle) because the sentences were consolidated. See § 4A1.3(a) (courts may consider "prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category"). Moreover, Doucette's twenty-four criminal history points almost double the thirteen points sufficient to place him in Category VI. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998, 110 S.Ct. 554, 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). As in Carpenter and Fields, we find that the district court's upward departure on the basis of Doucette's criminal history was appropriate. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 745; Fields, 923 F.2d at 361.
"[O]nce a district court has stated appropriate reasons allowing departure, 'the precise length of the sentence [based on the departure] need not be justified.' " United States v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Geiger, 891 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1087, 110 S.Ct. 1825, 108 L.Ed.2d 954 (1990)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1318, 113 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991)). Rather, the sentence will be upheld so long as it is reasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2); Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1121, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 744; Fields, 923 F.2d at 361. The scope of our inquiry into the reasonableness of Doucette's sentence is quite limited, shaped by the admonition that " 'it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.' " Williams, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1121 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). Applying this standard, we affirm Doucette's sentence.
The district court added ten years to Doucette's fifteen year guideline sentence. This two-thirds increase exceeds the departures upheld in Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 745 (less than a one-third increase), and Fields, 923 F.2d at 361 (less than a one-seventh increase), but is significantly less than many other departures that have been affirmed by this court. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (5th Cir.) (sentence more than double the guideline maximum), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 568, 112 L.Ed.2d 574 (1990); Geiger, 891 F.2d at 514 (sentence more than four times greater than guideline maximum); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 606 (5th Cir.) (three times), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989). See also United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 710 (11th Cir.) (upholding a fifteen year departure from the fifteen year sentence required by § 924(e)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 370, 116 L.Ed.2d 322 (1991). Moreover, Doucette's twenty-five year sentence falls well within § 924(e)'s maximum penalty of life imprisonment. See Rogers, 917 F.2d at 169 ("Because Rogers' sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence provided by statute, he may not challenge the additional term the district court applied after its point of departure") (citing Geiger, 891 F.2d at 514). These considerations lead us to conclude that the district court's upward departure in sentencing Doucette was not unreasonable.
Rule 16(a)(1) provides:
There is a strong argument that the district court should have sentenced Doucette as an armed career criminal pursuant to § 4B1.4. This section applies to any defendant, such as Doucette, "who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)." § 4B1.4(a). Under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), Doucette's offense level would be 33. Since his criminal history category would remain VI, Doucette would be subject to a 235-293 months imprisonment. This guideline range is somewhat less than the 300 months imposed by the district court, but Doucette's sentence might be higher because § 4B1.4 does not preclude upward departures under § 4A1.3, the provision utilized by the district court
Section 4B1.4 became effective on November 1, 1990, one year before Doucette was sentenced. The rule is therefore applicable to this case. See, e.g., United States v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir.1992). The proceedings in the district court contain no references to this provision, however, and neither party has mentioned it in their briefs. For this reason, we consider Doucette to have waived whatever objections he might have had to the district court's failure to sentence him as an armed career criminal under § 4B1.4.
Doucette also contends that he was given no notice that the district court might increase his sentence on the basis of criminal history in violation of Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). The presentence report's reference to criminal history as a potential ground for upward departure, however, clearly satisfies the notice requirement set out in Burns. See --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2187
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