Source: https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed149831
Timestamp: 2018-12-11 09:34:15
Document Index: 641328545

Matched Legal Cases: ['EWCA ', 'UKSC ', 'UKSC ', 'EWCA ', 'EWCA ', 'UKHL ', 'EWCA ']

Family Law Week: KW & Others v Richmond Metropolitan BC [2015] EWCA Civ 1054
This was the second successful appeal of a decision by Mostyn J in a Court of Protection case. The judgment applies the Supreme Court's definition of "deprivation of liberty" within the Court of Protection and also addresses the ambit and procedure of consensual appeals made pursuant to CPR r.52 and PD52A.
First decision – Mostyn J
The initial application was made by Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council for directions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including a declaration of whether a care package provided to a 52 year old woman, KW, amounted to a "deprivation of her liberty" within the meaning of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"). This application was heard by Mostyn J.
The appropriate test to be applied by the court in determining whether a person is subjected to a deprivation of liberty is set out by the Supreme Court in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and P and Q v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] 1 AC 896 ("Cheshire West"). By majority decision the Supreme Court in Cheshire West held that the correct test to determine whether a mentally incapacitated person is being deprived of his or her liberty is whether they are under 'continuous supervision and control of those caring for them and are not free to leave.' If there is a deprivation of liberty, then it has to be authorised either by a court or by procedures known as the deprivation of liberty safeguards.
KW, as a consequence of a brain injury suffered during surgery in 1996, had severe cognitive and mental health problems, epilepsy and physical disability. She lived in her property, held under a tenancy from a housing association, and had carers in situ 24 hours a day on 7 days each week. KW was ambulant with the use of a wheeled Zimmer frame. She operated under a delusion that it was still 1996 and she was living at her old home with her three small children (now all adult). There was a finding that, "Her delusions are very powerful and she has a tendency to try to wander off in order to find her small children…[Her carers] attend to her every need in an effort to make her life as normal as possible. If she tries to wander off she will be brought back."
Mostyn J concluded that KW was not subjected to a deprivation of her liberty by the circumstances of her care. He referred to, and purported to apply, Cheshire West, though he also considered another definition of 'liberty,' given by J.S. Mill. Ultimately Mostyn J distinguished KW's case from Cheshire West on the facts. He justified his decision on the basis of his finding that KW was not "in any realistic way being constrained from exercising the freedom to leave, in the required sense, for the essential reason that she does not have the physical or mental ability to exercise that freedom."
KW appealed the order of Mostyn J. She sought a finding that she was deprived of her liberty in the circumstances of her care at home. The local authority did not oppose the appeal and a consent order, drafted by the parties, was made by the Court of Appeal. It was supported by a 'Statement of reasons' pursuant to CPR, PD52A at para 6.4, which stated that the judge had erred in law when he found that KW was not under a deprivation of liberty. It was returned to Mostyn J, who requested that the application be reserved to him and listed the matter for directions.
Second hearing before Mostyn J
When the parties appeared in front of Mostyn J at the first post-appeal directions hearing they expected him to give effect to their consent order which they understood to state that KW was under a deprivation of liberty and which listed a review hearing.
However, Mostyn J did not alter his initial decision about deprivation of liberty. He made criticism of the ambiguity of the order, which stated: "to the extent that the restrictions in place pursuant to the Care Plan are a deprivation of KW's liberty, such deprivation of KW's liberty is hereby authorised." Mostyn J held that this conditional language did not expressly declare that KW was under a deprivation of liberty, but rather authorised the deprivation to the extent that it existed.
Mostyn J also held that the decision of the Court of Appeal had been ultra vires since it was procedurally incorrect to conduct an appeal on the merits of a first instance decision utilising the procedure for appeals by consent (Section 6 CPR PD 52A). Where an appeal is launched on the basis of an attack on the merits of a decision, Mostyn J thought that there should be a full hearing and judgment on the appeal by the appellate court. Applied to KW's decision, he ordered that a review hearing could only be triggered "if the restrictive changes proposed amount to a bodily restraint."
This order was itself appealed, this time on the basis that Mosytn J was wrong to hold the Court of Appeal's decision to be ultra vires and had also misconstrued the Court of Appeal's first order in finding that they had not made a declaration that KW was under a deprivation of liberty.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The Master of the Rolls gave the judgment of the Court. He accepted the drafting of the deprivation of liberty order (which had been taken from a precedent, though not universally used) was ambiguous and held that in future cases the undoubtedly preferable wording would be:
"P is deprived of his or her liberty as a result of arrangements in the Care Plan and these are lawful".
However, the Court of Appeal's meaning had been clear from the context of the order – it had made a finding that KW was deprived of liberty.
The Master of the Rolls denied that the Court of Appeal's first decision was ultra vires or procedurally impermissible. Rule 52.11 FPR and PD52A provides that the court may set aside or vary an order of the lower court without determining the merits of the appeal, if (i) the parties consent and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are good and sufficient reasons for taking this course. There is specific provision for this exercise to be performed on paper. He accepted there were cases in which the appellate court would choose to give judgment even where an appeal was lodged by consent. But that was not an automatic requirement, nor the legitimate expectation of the judge whose decision was under review. And in this case there had been no such need. Mostyn J's first judgment did not raise any issue of law. The basis of the appeal was that he had failed to apply Cheshire West to the facts properly.
The Court of Appeal said at para 27:
"There is no reason to restrict…the wide discretion conferred by para 6.4 to allow an appeal by consent without a hearing followed by a decision on the merits. The words "good and sufficient reasons" are very wide. Further, we reject the notion that the judge whose decision is under appeal has any entitlement to a decision on the merits. In deciding whether to make a consent order without a decision on the merits, the appeal court is only concerned with the interests of the parties and the public interest. The interests of the judge are irrelevant."
Case No: B4/2015/1272
KW (BY HER LITIGATION FRIEND), AND OTHERS Appellant
ROCHDALE METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL Respondent
1. KW is aged 52. She is severely mentally incapacitated. As a result of brain injury that she suffered during surgery in 1996, she was left with cognitive and mental health problems, epilepsy and physical disability. She was discharged from hospital into a rehabilitation unit and thence to her own home with support 24 hours a day.
2. The present position is that she is only just ambulant with the use of a wheeled Zimmer frame. In a judgment given on 18 November 2014 ("the first judgment"), Mostyn J said:
3. The first judgment was given in the context of a hearing in the Court of Protection to determine an application by Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council, being the local authority responsible for KW's care, for directions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. One of the questions was whether she was subject to a "deprivation of liberty" within the meaning of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"). If there is a deprivation of liberty, then it has to be authorised either by a court or by procedures known as the deprivation of liberty safeguards. In P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and P and Q v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19, [2014] 1 AC 896 ("Cheshire West") the majority in the Supreme Court held that, in cases involving the placement of mentally incapacitated persons, the test to be applied in determining whether they are being deprived of their liberty is whether they are under continuous supervision and control of those caring for them and are not free to leave.
4. Mostyn J purported to apply the test required by Cheshire West, although it is clear from para 19 of the first judgment that he did not agree with it. He said at para 17 that it was impossible to see how the protective measures in place for KW could linguistically be characterised as a "deprivation of liberty". Quoting from JS Mill, he said that the protected person was "merely in a state to require being taken care of by others, [and] must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury". At para 25, he said that he found that KW was not "in any realistic way being constrained from exercising the freedom to leave, in the required sense, for the essential reason that she does not have the physical or mental ability to exercise that freedom".
5. For this reason, he felt able to distinguish the case of MIG on the facts (she was one of the parties in Cheshire West). The order of the court (issued on 14 January 2015) declared at para 5 that it was in KW's best interests to reside at the address at which she was residing and to receive a package of care in accordance with her assessed needs. Para 6 recited: "That package of care does not amount to a deprivation of liberty within the terms of article 5 of the [Convention]".
6. KW appealed to the Court of Appeal. Her principal ground of appeal was that the judge erred in concluding that KW was not being deprived of her liberty in her home. Section 5 of the notice of appeal stated that the part of the order which the appellant wished to appeal was "the decision that KW is not deprived of her liberty at home". Section 8 stated that the order that the appellant was seeking was that "KW is deprived of her liberty at home".
7. The respondent did not oppose the appeal. A consent order was made by this court on 30 January 2015 in these terms:
8. Attached to the order was the following:
9. On 2 February 2015, Mostyn J directed that the case should be reserved to him. On 3 February, he directed that a hearing should take place for:
10. The parties appeared before him on 2 March. They expected that he would give effect to the consent order which, it was common ground, had decided that any review hearings would be conducted on the basis that KW was being deprived of her liberty at home. Contrary to their expectations, however, the order that the judge made was that:
11. In order to understand how this surprising decision was made, it is necessary to examine the reserved judgment of Mostyn J ("the second judgment") which he gave on 13 March in a little detail. But before we do so, we need to refer to the relevant procedural rules.
12. CPR 52.11 provides:
13. Section 6 of CPR PD 52A provides:
14. In the second judgment, the judge said that para 6.4 of the PD cannot be used to determine an appeal on the merits (para 12) and the procedure could not be used "to overthrow on the merits the central basis of a first instance decision particularly where that involved a clear statement of legal principle in relation to the facts as found" (para 13). He said that the limited researches he had conducted in the field of family law revealed that, where a merits based decision had been reached at first instance which all parties agreed should be set aside on appeal, there is a hearing and a judgment (para 14). He added: "the judge whose decision is being impugned is surely entitled to no less, and there is a plain need to expose error so that later legal confusion does not arise". He then cited examples of cases where that had happened. The researches of counsel had not revealed any case where a fully reasoned decision has been overturned on the merits by consent and without a judgment.
15. At para 20, he said:
16. And then:
17. The principal ground of appeal is that the judge misinterpreted the consent order when he said that the Court of Appeal had not decided that KW was being deprived of her liberty.
18. We accept that (i) nowhere does the order explicitly state that there was a deprivation of liberty; and (ii) the use in para 2 of the order of the words "to the extent that the restrictions in place pursuant to the Care Plan are a deprivation of KW's liberty, such liberty is hereby authorised" might suggest that the court was not deciding that the restrictions were in fact a deprivation of liberty. But read in their context, that is clearly not the correct interpretation for at least two reasons. First, para 2 must be read in the light of para 1, which governs the whole order. Para 1 states that the appeal is allowed. The remaining paragraphs set out the court's directions consequential upon the allowing of the appeal. When read together with section 6 of the notice of appeal, the order that the appeal was allowed necessarily involved the court deciding that KW's care package does involve a deprivation of liberty. The words "to the extent that" etc are perhaps unfortunate, but they cannot detract from what allowing the appeal necessarily entailed. These words were derived from para 11 of the Model Re X Order which had been published on the Court of Protection website and which practitioners had been encouraged to use. We were told by counsel that this form of words is not universally used. We understand that the form of words more often used is along the lines of: "P is deprived of his or her liberty as a result of arrangements in the Care Plan and these are lawful". This is undoubtedly preferable to the earlier version.
19. Secondly, para 2 must also be read in the light of the consequential orders set out at paras 3 to 5 of the consent order. The reviews there provided for are clearly reviews of the kind contemplated where there is a deprivation of liberty.
20. It follows that the judge was wrong to hold that it had not been decided by this court that KW was being detained by the state within the terms of article 5. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed.
21. Was the judge right to say that the Court of Appeal took "a procedurally impermissible route" so that its decision was "ultra vires"? It is important that we comment on this statement in view of the general importance of the point and the fact that the judge's comments have apparently given rise to considerable degree of public interest. We acknowledge that, despite these comments, the judge did say that the rule of law depends on first instance judges "complying scrupulously with decisions and orders from appellate courts". And, as we have said, that is what he purported to do.
22. An order of any court is binding until it is set aside or varied. This is consistent with principles of finality and certainty which are necessary for the administration of justice: R (on the application of Lunn) v Governor of Moorland Prison [2006] EWCA Civ 700, [2006] 1 WLR 2870, at [22]; Serious Organised Crime Agency v O'Docherty (also known as Mark Eric Gibbons) and another [2013] EWCA Civ 518 at [69]. Such an order would still be binding even if there were doubt as to the court's jurisdiction to make the order: M v Home Office [1993] UKHL 5; [1994] 1 AC 377 at 423; Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97 at 101-103. It is futile and, in our view, inappropriate for a judge, who is called upon to give effect to an order of a higher court which is binding on him, to seek to undermine that order by complaining that it was ultra vires or wrong for any other reason.
23. In any event, the judge was wrong to say that the consent order was ultra vires because it was made by a procedurally impermissible route.
24. The issue turns on the true construction of para 6.4 of PD 52A. Rule 52.11 provides that the appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court (a) was wrong or (b) was unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings of the lower court. It is concerned with the "hearing of appeals" which is done by way of a review or, in certain circumstances, a re-hearing. What is envisaged by rule 52.11 is a hearing which leads to a decision on the merits. To use the language of the first sentence of para 6.4 of the practice direction, this is what an appellate court normally does when allowing an appeal.
25. The use of the word "normally" in this sentence presages a departure from rule 52.11 in specified circumstances. The word "normally" followed by the use of the word "however" in the following sentence makes it clear that what follows specifies the circumstances in which the court may depart from the norm. The second sentence states that the court may set aside or vary the order of the lower court without determining the merits of the appeal, but only if (i) the parties consent and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are good and sufficient reasons for taking this course. That such a decision will be made on paper is clear from the heading to para 6.4 and the words of the third sentence. It is true that the second sentence speaks of setting aside or varying the order under appeal, whereas the first sentence (faithful to rule 52.11) speaks of allowing an appeal. But we do not consider that there is any significance in this difference of language. Rule 52.10 provides inter alia that the appeal court has power to "(2)(a) affirm, set aside or vary any order or judgment made or given by the lower court". These words are picked up precisely in para 6.4 which sets out the powers that the appeal court has when allowing an appeal.
26. The appeal court, therefore, has a discretion to allow an appeal by consent on the papers without determining the merits at a hearing if it is satisfied that there are good and sufficient reasons for doing so. What are good and sufficient reasons? The answer will depend on the circumstances of the case, but we think that it would be helpful to provide some guidance. If the appeal court is satisfied that (i) the parties' consent to the allowing of the appeal is based on apparently competent legal advice, and (ii) the parties advance plausible reasons to show that the decision of the lower court was wrong, it is likely to make an order allowing the appeal on the papers and without determining the merits. In such circumstances, it would involve unnecessary cost and delay to require the parties to attend a hearing to persuade the appeal court definitively on the point.
27. At para 14 of his judgment, the judge said that, where a merits based decision has been reached at first instance which all parties agree should be set aside on appeal, para 6.4 requires there to be a hearing and a judgment. He added: "The judge whose decision is being impugned is surely entitled to no less, and there is a plain need to expose error so that later legal confusion does not arise". We disagree. Para 6.4 does not require a decision on the merits in every case where there has been a decision on the merits in the lower court. There is no reason to restrict in this way the wide discretion conferred by para 6.4 to allow an appeal by consent without a hearing followed by a decision on the merits. The words "good and sufficient reasons" are very wide. Further, we reject the notion that the judge whose decision is under appeal has any entitlement to a decision on the merits. In deciding whether to make a consent order without a decision on the merits, the appeal court is only concerned with the interests of the parties and the public interest. The interests of the judge are irrelevant.
28. We accept, however, that there will be cases where it may be in the interest of the parties or the public interest for the court to make a decision on the merits after a hearing even where the parties agree that the appeal should be allowed. Mostyn J referred to cases in the field of family law. For example, in Bokor-Ingram v Bokor-Ingram [2009] EWCA Civ 27, [2009] 2 FLR 922, the parties by consent asked the court to allow an appeal, set aside the order below and make a revised order. Thorpe LJ said:
29. The fact that the decision of the lower court in that case was causing difficulty led the appellate court to conclude that there were not "good and sufficient reasons" for departing from the normal procedure of conducting a hearing and giving a decision on the merits.
30. An example from a different area of law is Halliburton Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd [2006] [EWCA] Civ 185. The lower court had held that a certain patent was invalid. Following the issue of appeal proceedings, the case was settled. The Court of Appeal was asked to make a consent order for the restoration of the patent to the register without deciding the merits of the appeal. The court decided that it had to hear the merits on the grounds that, for a patent to be restored to the register, what was needed was a decision reversing the order for revocation and showing that the previous decision was wrong. Here too (but for a very different reason), the appellate court considered that a decision on the merits was needed.
31. Mostyn J's first judgment did not raise any issue of law. It is true that his criticism of Cheshire West (what he describes in para 20 of the second judgment as his "jurisprudential analysis") raised a question of law. But this question has been settled by the Supreme Court relatively recently. The judge's analysis was, and could be, of no legal effect. It was irrelevant. Indeed, he purported to apply Cheshire West to the facts of the case. The basis of the appeal was that he had failed to apply Cheshire West to the facts properly. The public interest in the first judgment has focused on his criticisms of Cheshire West. Unlike Bokor-Ingram, the decision of the lower court in the present case should have caused no difficulty for practitioners or judges in the field. It was a decision on the facts which, with benefit of the advice of counsel and solicitors, the parties agreed was wrong. The Court of Appeal must have taken the view that the parties had advanced plausible reasons for contending that the judge's decision was wrong, so that there were good and sufficient reasons for allowing the appeal without deciding the merits. In our view, it was clearly right to do so.
32. This litigation has an unfortunate history. The judge has twice made decisions which have been the subject of an appeal to this court. On both occasions, the parties have agreed that the appeal must be allowed. This has led to considerable unnecessary costs to the public purse and unnecessary use of court time. We regret to say that it is the judge's tenacious adherence to his jurisprudential analysis leading to his conclusion that Cheshire West was wrongly decided that has been at the root of this. He says at para 26 of the second judgment that "the law is now in a state of serious confusion". Even if Cheshire West is wrong, there is nothing confusing about it.
33. In our view, the judge's passionate view that the legal analysis of the majority in Cheshire West is wrong is in danger of distorting his approach to these cases. In the light of the unfortunate history, we are of the opinion that the review should be conducted by a different judge, who need not be a high court judge,
34. For the reasons that we have given, this appeal is allowed.