Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/924/454/224351/
Timestamp: 2019-10-16 22:22:46
Document Index: 294072292

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 812', '§ 812', '§ 2', '§ 991', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 991', '§ 3553']

United States of America, Appellee-cross-appellant, v. Leonard Joyner, Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee,jose Valentin, Defendant-appellee, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Second Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellee-cross-appellant, v. Leonard Joyner, Defendant-appellant-cross-app...
United States of America, Appellee-cross-appellant, v. Leonard Joyner, Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee,jose Valentin, Defendant-appellee, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991) Argued Sept. 27, 1990. Decided Jan. 24, 1991
Joyner pled guilty to a count charging him with distributing two vials of crack within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (C), 845a(a) (1988). Valentin pled guilty to a count charging him with the same offense by selling five vials of crack; he also pled to one count charging possession of eight vials of crack with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a) (1), (b) (1) (C).
The Sentencing. The Probation Department recommended a base offense level of 30 for both Joyner and Valentin, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c) (7), concluding that the weight of the crack contained in the 586 vials seized from Rodriguez, 39 grams, should be counted for purposes of applying the "relevant conduct" guideline, Sec. 1B1.3. Judge Mukasey accepted this recommendation, finding that the 586 vials were part of the same course of conduct as the particular offenses to which defendants pled guilty. He reduced the base offense level by 2 levels for acceptance of responsibility, Sec. 3E1.1, and by 3 additional levels for role in the offense, finding that defendants' roles fell between "minor" and "minimal," Sec. 3B1.2. Placing Joyner in Criminal History Category II and Valentin in Category I yielded sentencing ranges at offense level 25 of 63-78 months for Joyner and 57-71 months for Valentin.
I am going to depart downward with respect to both defendants because I agree with one of the comments that defense counsel made [, which] is that the result of applying the guidelines in this case is to achieve something which is way out of kilter with any offense that was committed here. It would, among other things, disserve one of the ends that the guidelines are supposed to serve, which is proportionality of sentence. If I were to follow the guidelines in this case, the result, compared to the 90 months I gave the two people [Rodriguez and Gonzalez] who in my view were the most responsible and obviously responsible for what went on here, the disparity, though, would be enormous. I am not going to do that.
Before considering Judge Mukasey's application of the "relevant conduct" guideline, section 1B1.3, we face a technical issue of interpretation of that guideline, which is complicated by a 1989 amendment to the pertinent guideline commentary. Subsection (a) (1) of section 1B1.3 provides that the base offense level shall be determined on the basis of "all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable" that occurred during, in preparation for, or to avoid detection for the offense of conviction. Subsection (a) (2) provides that for a category of offenses that includes drug offenses the base offense level shall also be determined on the basis of "all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction" (emphasis added). Thus, subsection (a) (2) incorporates (a) (1)'s phrase "all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable." See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, comment. (note 2).
Conduct "for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable," as used in subsection (a) (1), includes conduct that the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused. (Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2.)
Joyner contends that the 1989 change in the commentary cannot be applied to his offense, which occurred on December 11, 1988, because it creates a more stringent version of the "relevant conduct" guideline in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. He reads the pre-1989 version as limiting the "foreseeability" standard to conspiracy offenses. We disagree. The pre-1989 commentary explained that "conduct for which the defendant is otherwise accountable" includes, in the case of conspiracies, foreseeable conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy. It did not exclude such conduct in the case of joint activity undertaken in concert with others, in the absence of a conspiracy charge. The 1989 revision of the commentary made clear that the foreseeability standard applied, whether or not a conspiracy was charged, i.e., it applied to all activity undertaken in concert with others. The Commission stated that the purpose of this amendment was "to clarify the definition of conduct for which the defendant is 'otherwise accountable,' " id., a statement entitled to "considerable deference." United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1988). Since the guideline itself at all times covered conduct for which the defendant was "otherwise accountable," we see no reason why the Commission may not aid our interpretation of this somewhat imprecise phrase by making clear that it covers reasonably foreseeable acts undertaken in furtherance of any jointly undertaken activity. See United States v. Hewitt, 902 F.2d 1082, 1084 & n. 1 (2d Cir. 1990).
What remains uncertain, however, is whether the foreseeability standard was inserted into the commentary to make clear that the normal limits on the scope of vicarious liability in the criminal law would also apply to punishment or to impose, for purposes of punishment, some narrower restriction within those normal limits. If the Commission wished to reflect, for purposes of punishment, only the limits of criminal law responsibility, it could have simply said that no acts or omissions will be considered "relevant conduct" unless the facts showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 250, that the defendant could have been held criminally responsible for such acts or omissions. The Commission may have thought that the standard of "reasonable foreseeability" created a narrower test, see Wilkins and Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C.L.Rev. 495, 510-13 (1990), but, if that was its view, it was mistaken. Under the most expansive doctrine of vicarious criminal responsibility, the Pinkerton doctrine, which holds a defendant liable for some substantive offenses committed by his co-conspirators, liability is imposed only if the substantive offense is "in furtherance of the conspiracy" and can be "reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 1184-85, 90 L. Ed. 1489 (1946). Thus, when the Commission offers as an example of conduct for which a defendant is not "otherwise accountable" for purposes of punishment--importation of subsequent shipments of marijuana not reasonably foreseeable by a defendant who had agreed to offload only a single shipment, U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, comment. (note 1, illustration e) (November 1, 1989), it is reflecting only the normal limits of criminal responsibility.
With this understanding of the "relevant conduct" guideline in mind, we have no doubt that Judge Mukasey was entitled to find that Joyner was "otherwise accountable" for Rodriguez's possession of the 586 vials of crack inside the restaurant. Though acknowledging that Joyner was merely "a dime bag seller on the street," he was entitled to conclude that Joyner was "ready, willing and able and desirous of selling as many of those dime bags as he can get rid of in as short a time as he can." Though Joyner's motivation, as he contended, may have been only to secure enough crack to support his own addiction, he nonetheless was properly found to be "otherwise accountable" for Rodriguez's possession of the entire quantity available for sale that day as an act that was "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme" as the offense of conviction, in furtherance of that scheme, and reasonably foreseeable. See United States v. Schaper, 903 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Copeland, 902 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Paulino, 873 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1989). As Copeland makes clear, the relevant conduct guideline applies, in appropriate circumstances, to quantities of narcotics possessed by co-defendants.
The Government's cross-appeal primarily challenges the lawfulness of Judge Mukasey's decision to make a downward departure to the extent that the departure rested on a perceived disparity between the guideline ranges applicable to Joyner and Valentin and those applicable to their co-venturers, Rodriguez and Gonzalez. A "disparity" usually results because offenders in similar circumstances are given significantly different sentences, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366, 109 S. Ct. 647, 651, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989), and reducing "unwarranted" disparities of this sort was a principal objective that Congress required the Sentencing Commission and sentencing judges to achieve, see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (1988). However, the term may also be applied, as Judge Mukasey used it in this case, to the imposition of similar sentences upon offenders in significantly different circumstances. See also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Sec. 16-1 at 993-94 (1978) (noting similar dual aspects of Equal Protection Clause). In this case, the sentencing judge was concerned that sentencing without a downward departure would create a disparity of the latter type.
The departure standard--existence of "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)--does not confer on sentencing judges "unbounded" discretion to depart from applicable guideline ranges, United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 585 (2d Cir. 1990), and we review de novo the legal issue of whether a factor was permissibly relied on as grounds for a departure, United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1990).
Whether disparity resulting from differences in applicable guideline ranges among co-defendants in a single case permits a departure raises a fundamental issue in the administration of the sentencing guidelines. The Commission has reported that this circumstance has been given as a reason for a downward departure in five instances in 1988 and in nineteen instances in 1989. See United States Sentencing Commission, 1988 Annual Report 42 (Table XII) (1989); id. 1989 Annual Report 50 (Table IX) (1990). Despite the frequency of departures to alter disparity among co-defendants, the lawfulness of reliance on this factor has rarely been litigated. Recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentencing judge's authority to depart downward to lessen differences among sentences of co-defendants, but restricted the significance of its ruling by holding that the circumstance justifying leniency for the co-defendants--cooperation--did not apply to the defendant whose departure was challenged by the Government.2 United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1990).
Congress specified as a purpose of the Sentencing Commission establishing policies and practices that "avoid [ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct," 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988) (emphasis added), and required the Commission to give "particular attention" to the objective of "reducing unwarranted sentence disparities," id. Sec. 994(f) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sentencing judge is required to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (1988) (emphasis added). The method chosen by Congress to avoid unwarranted disparities is a guideline system that prescribes appropriate sentencing ranges for various combinations of facts concerning an offense and an offender and permits a sentencing judge to depart from the recommended range in unusual circumstances. Departure authority, though not designed to prevent a sentencing judge from exercising "discretion, flexibility or independent judgment," United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d at 604, is nonetheless a device for implementing the guideline system, not a means of casting it aside. See United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting downward departure made to ameliorate Commission's judgment that punishment for cocaine base offenses should exceed those for cocaine). This authority must be exercised according to the statutory standard.
Apart from adjusting the disparity among co-defendants, Judge Mukasey also grounded departure on circumstances peculiar to each appellant--Joyner's physical condition distinct from his use of drugs3 and Valentin's adjustment since the offense. Both circumstances, he concluded, were present to a degree not considered by the Commission. The Government's cross-appeal does not challenge reliance on these circumstances. However, the Government urges that the departure was improper, both because of its extent and because it was made without adequate consideration of analogous guideline levels. See United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring consideration of analogous offense levels for section 5K departures); United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring consideration of analogous criminal history categories for section 4A departures). Appellants reply that the use of analogous offense levels and criminal history categories is appropriate only as a caution in determining the extent of upward departures and has no place in downward departures.
Though use of the guideline table as an analogy for gauging the extent of departures was initiated in the context of upward departures in Cervantes and Kim, see United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 413-14 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989), we believe that approach has some, though perhaps limited, relevance to downward departures. The various levels determined by the Commission to be normally appropriate for various types of offense conduct can serve as a useful analogy for a judge considering how far to depart, up or down, in a case where the judge concludes that aggravating or mitigating circumstances concerning the offense warrant a departure. On the other hand, most downward departures will likely be occasioned by unusual circumstances concerning the defendant, rather than the offense, and it will rarely be the case that the guideline table offers much in the way of a helpful analogy for assessing how much a departure to make for such personal circumstances. If the guidelines supply a useful analogy, however, it will normally be appropriate to consider it.
Though Valentin did not appeal, his appellee's brief, submitted in opposition to the Government's cross-appeal, asserts that, in the event this Court should uphold the Government's challenge to the downward departure, he joins the arguments advanced by Joyner in Joyner's appeal. An appellee may seek to uphold a judgment on any ground supportable in the record, but must take a cross-appeal to secure more relief than that granted by the District Court. United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S. Ct. 560, 563, 68 L. Ed. 1087 (1924). It is not clear how this principle applies to a defendant who wishes to assert the correctness of a judgment imposing a sentence that resulted from a downward departure by contending that, if the departure is improper, the sentence is nonetheless correct because the sentencing judge erred in determining the applicable guideline range. Since we reject Joyner's contentions, we will assume, without deciding, that Valentin is entitled to assert them
In United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S. Ct. 2622, 110 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1990), the sentencing judge departed downward both to reflect the defendant's cooperation with the Government and to lessen the difference between the defendant's applicable guideline range and the sentences of co-defendants. The defendant appealed, complaining that the departure was too limited. The Government, evidently believing that the departure was justified by the defendant's cooperation, took no cross-appeal. Though the Fourth Circuit's opinion can be read to approve a departure to lessen disparity among co-defendants, the issue was not adjudicated
The Commission's policy statement notes that " [p]hysical condition" is not "ordinarily" relevant to a departure decision, U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.4, implying that it may be relevant on rare occasion