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CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO SAVE OUR VILLAGE v. Pomona College, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. | FindLaw
CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO SAVE OUR VILLAGE v. Pomona College, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
CITIZENS' COMMITTEE TO SAVE OUR VILLAGE, Ray Fowler, Robert Stafford, John C. McCarthy, and Charles Chase, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF CLAREMONT, Defendant and Respondent. Pomona College, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
No. B083336.
Carlyle W. Hall, Jr.,Gus T. May, Lisa Weil, Hall & Associates, Brent N. Rushforth and Frank P. Angel, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants. Best, Best & Krieger and Wynne S. Furth, Meredith A. Jury, Ontario, for defendant and respondent City of Claremont. Sidley & Austin and James M. Harris and Ronald C. Cohen, Los Angeles, for real party in interest and respondent Pomona College. Robert G. Lane, Los Angeles, amicus curiae in support of respondent Pomona College.
This appeal relates only to the proceedings pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). (Pub.Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seq.) All issues relating to alleged dedication for public use are the subject of another appeal pending before this Court and are not considered herein.
For a period exceeding eighty-five (85) years, real party in interest, Pomona College (hereinafter “College”), has owned a 57,000 square foot parcel of unimproved land on the west side of its campus. (Hereinafter “subject property”.) The subject property was and is essentially vacant, except for unimproved footpaths and some natural and some planted vegetation. The parties' descriptions of this vegetation range from natural wilderness to plantings in accord with a landscape plan perhaps designed by a master architect. During this eighty-five (85) year period, College has permitted public access to the subject property for passive recreational uses such as strolling, bird watching, picnicking, drawing or sketching and quiet relaxation.
The subject property is within the limits of respondent City of Claremont. (Hereinafter “City”.) It is now and, since 1929, has been zoned for educational development, which permits the construction of large academic buildings. It is surrounded on all sides by suburban development. The subject property has never been designated as a public park or open space, nor has it been, listed as, or eligible to be listed as, “historic” by any governmental agency at any level, including City's General Plan.
In late 1990, College proposed building a three-story, sixty-two (62) foot high educational structure on the subject property to be known as the “Hahn Building.” (Hereinafter “three-story project”.) Plans were submitted to City and the review process began. City staff prepared an initial study specifically finding, inter alia, that the three-story project would have no impact on historic resources and concluding that a mitigated negative declaration (hereinafter “MND”) was appropriate.
Public comment and hearings continued on City staff's initial study. Citizens, including appellants, appeared during this review process and voiced their opposition. The only objections raised were to the height of the three-story project. There were no comments about, or issues raised regarding, the impact of the three-story project on any historical resources.
The aforementioned historical treatises suggest that the Samuel Parsons & Company firm was consulted about and paid a fee (donated by College trustee George Marston) to prepare some form of landscape and access “layout” for the subject property; and that a “Mr. Cook” or “Mr. Cooke” of the Parsons firm was the individual who prepared the “layout” and was the onsite consultant. It must be noted at this point that the said historical treatises disclose all of the information appellants rely upon in what appellants refer to as “ancient documents” supporting their claim of historical significance.
College completely redesigned the Hahn Building as a two-story, forty-five (45) foot high structure. (hereinafter “two-story project”.) In September, 1991, College submitted a new application and its redesigned plans to City for the review process. Generally speaking, the same cast of commentators participated in the second round of review as in the first. Appellant Charles Chase entered the process in opposing the two-story project.
The written notice accompanying the initial study stated that “failure to file objections ․ during the public review period or at the public hearing may constitute a waiver of rights to object to the environmental determination at a later date.”
The public access/passive recreation issue was directly addressed during the administrative public hearings and in the mitigated negative declaration resulting therefrom:
“The project has been designed to preserve the ability of the public to diagonally cross through the site ․[, and] the center of the site will remain open for public use․ The proposed project will add benches and seating area and low level security lighting in order to encourage use of the area ․ [;] the project does not appear to impinge on any official public open space or college recreational facilities. As the site is in private ownership and as the pedestrian circulation through the site has been retained, it is found that there will not be a significant impact on the recreational opportunities with the incorporation of the following mitigation measure.”
City and College agreed to Mitigation measure I:
“The pedestrian paths through the site and courtyard area as shown on the site plan approved by the architectural commission will remain open to the public without fences or gates. This area may be closed to pedestrians only during construction activities. Prior to issuance of a certificate of occupancy a document agreeing to this and binding on the college shall be approved by the city attorney and recorded by the applicant.”
At the bottom of the Judgment Granting the Peremptory Writ of Mandate, the trial judge inserted: “Whether the respondent reopens proceedings for the taking of additional evidence is entirely left up to the respondent, GCO”. The judge explained on the record that this notation was merely confirming the City Council's discretion to receive or not receive additional evidence on rehearing, and specifically left open any challenge for an abuse of that discretion.
In July, 1993, appellants' filed their second petition for writ of mandate, which proceeded on two causes of action: (1) a challenge to the merits of the negative declaration and (2) a claim that City Council's refusal to reopen public hearings was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, i.e. that City Council arbitrarily refused to consider appellants' claim of historically significant landscape design.
Appellants contend the applicable standard of review requires this court to make an independent review of the administrative record. If such review indicates substantial evidence giving rise to a “fair argument” in favor of appellants' position, the judgment should be reversed and preparation of a formal EIR compelled.
Although only the “fair argument” standard is discussed below, the disposition of this appeal is the same under either standard.
A proposed negative declaration shall be prepared for a project subject to CEQA when the initial study identifies potentially significant effects, but (1) revisions in the project plans or proposals made or agreed to by the applicant before the proposed negative declaration is released for public review would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effects would occur; and, (2) there is no substantial evidence before the agency that the project as revised may have a significant effect on the environment. (Pub.Resources Code, §§ 21064.5, 21080(c); 14 Cal.Code Regs., § 15070(b).)
Appellants did not and do not now challenge the adequacy of the mitigation measures imposed by City and agreed to by College. Appellants are, therefore, foreclosed from challenging the adequacy of the mitigation measures not challenged during the administrative proceedings. (Resource Defense Fund v. Local Agency Formation Comm. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 886, 894, 236 Cal.Rptr. 794; Coalition for Student Action v. City of Fullerton (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1194, 1198, 200 Cal.Rptr. 855; Pub.Resources Code, § 21177(a).)
Appellants' claim that they raised a fair argument regarding historical resources thereby requiring an EIR, not an MND. In determining this issue, the appellate court must look to the administrative record and decide whether or not there is substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project may have a significant adverse impact upon the environment. If such substantial evidence exists, or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, preparation of an EIR is mandatory. Consideration is not to be given contrary evidence supporting the preparation of a negative declaration. (City of Carmel–By–The–Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 229 at 244–245, 227 Cal.Rptr. 899; Friends of “B” Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 988, 165 Cal.Rptr. 514.)
The determination of whether or not evidence is “substantial” is in itself a weighing process. The court does not look only to the evidence relied upon by appellants to the exclusion of all contrary evidence. Evidence that rebuts, contradicts or diminishes the reliability or credibility of appellants' evidence is properly considered. The absence of supporting evidence is properly considered.
“Because our focus is on the fair argument [issue], we must assess both the evidence in favor of the significant environmental impact and the evidence to the contrary—only then can we properly decide if the agency's conclusion regarding the fair argument question is supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. [Citation.]” (City of Antioch v. City Council of the City of Pittsburg (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1325, 1331, 232 Cal.Rptr. 507; Pub.Resources Code, § 21080(d).)
The California Supreme Court has provided clear, definitive guidance to the meaning of “substantial evidence” as used in CEQA. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court, et al. (1955) 9 Cal.4th 559, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268.) “We conclude that the substantial evidence standard of review prescribed by the statute is analogous to the substantial evidence standard of review applied by appellate courts to evaluate the findings of fact made in trial courts.” (Western States Petroleum Assn., supra, at pp. 565, 570–572, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 888 P.2d 1268.)
The so-called “fair argument” test requires the existence of substantial evidence giving rise to the fair argument. “․ [A] public agency must prepare an EIR whenever substantial evidence supports a fair argument that a proposed project ‘may have a significant effect on the environment.’ [Citations].” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of the University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1123, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 231, 864 P.2d 502. (Emphasis added.) “․ [S]ince the preparation of an EIR is the key to environmental protection under CEQA, accomplishment of the high objectives of that act requires the preparation of an EIR whenever it can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that the project may have significant environmental impact.” (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 75, 118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66.) (Emphasis added.)
There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicating that landscaping work pursuant to the Parsons' layout was completed. (There is one reference in mid–1900s fund raising correspondence to the effect that some work of some nature was underway pursuant to said layout.) There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that any specific plan of landscaping was maintained or continued during the intervening ninety (90) years. (There is evidence that, over the intervening years, trees have died and been replaced and that the landscaping of the subject property has been supplemented and changed.) Finally, there is no credible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that landscaping in accordance with the alleged Parsons' plan is in existence at the present time.
Appellants rely heavily upon a written letter report dated June 14, 1993, prepared by one Emmet Wemple, a landscape architect of considerable reputation and experience. Citing precisely the same mid–1900s information relied upon by appellants, Mr. Wemple opines that Samuel Parsons & Co. prepared a landscape plan for the subject property; that the plan was in fact executed; that the planned landscaping has been maintained over the intervening ninety (90) years; and, that, at present, the landscaping of the subject property largely represents the Parsons' plan. The opinions expressed by Mr. Wemple rise only to the level of reliability and credibility as the evidence constituting the foundation for those opinions.
Assuming arguendo that the landscaping of the subject property is of the extraordinary historical significance advocated by appellants, it is dumbfounding that the record for the period between 1905 and the present is utterly silent with respect thereto. It is reasonable to expect that, if appellants were correct, there would be considerable public touting of the subject property as a point of community and College pride and attraction. Yet, there is only silence—for ninety (90) years.
The operative words in the so-called fair argument standard are “substantial evidence.” The historical evidence, or inferences therefrom, relied upon by appellants is not substantial.
“Argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, evidence which is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, ․, is not substantial evidence. Substantial evidence shall include facts reasonable assumptions predicated upon facts and expert opinion supported by facts.” Pub.Resources Code, § 21080(e).
Appellants attempt to bridge the ninety (90) year gap between the dates of the ancient documents and the present with speculation and conjecture regarding the actual planting, maintenance, continuation and existence of planned landscaping. “․ [S]peculative possibilities are not substantial evidence of environmental impact. [Citation.]” (Citizen Action to Serve All Students v. Thornley (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 748, 756, 272 Cal.Rptr. 83.)
We conclude that there is no substantial evidence in light of the whole administrative record that the proposed Hahn Building project would have a significant effect upon any historical resource. (See: Pub.Resources Code, § 21080(d).)
The “new” information submitted by appellants at the June 14, 1993 City Council meeting related primarily to the public dedication issues, which were irrelevant to the environmental issues before City Council. (The “new” information regarding potential Parsons & Co. involvement, which is the heart of appellants' historical resource argument, was first available to appellants two years and several public hearings earlier.)
We conclude that City Council did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellants' “new evidence” was irrelevant and/or untimely with respect to the issues addressed by the MND, including historical resource issues.
“․ [A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive—(harassment or delay)—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally without merit. [Citation.]” In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650–651, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 646 P.2d 179; Code Civ.Proc., § 907.
Amicus curiae, University of Southern California, argues that the subject property is not an “historical resource” as a matter of law because it is not listed, determined to be eligible for listing, or found to be historically significant, by any level of government. Appellants raise interesting arguments in opposition. We leave this intriguing issue for future resolution, since it is not essential to our decision herein.
STOEVER, Associate Justice.* FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.