Source: https://casetext.com/case/state-of-washington-seattle-title-trust-co-v-roberge
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 23:23:49
Document Index: 194263814

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3']

Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 | Casetext
Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge
ReadReadAttorney AnalysesAnalyses0Citing BriefsBriefs0Citing CasesCiting Cases304
Seattle Trust Co.v.Roberge
U.S.Nov 19, 1928
Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin
Id., at 530, 37 S.Ct. at 191. The last of the three cases, Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.…
holding unconstitutional a zoning ordinance that gave certain landowners the unlimited right to prevent a trustee from using its land for a proposed home
holding that the exercise of private legislative authority over another person deprives that person of liberty without due process of law
holding that an ordinance restricting an owner's use of its property by requiring consent of neighboring landowners for that use, which was otherwise an acceptable use of the property and not an issue of public safety, was an unconstitutional delegation of power to neighboring landowners and, further, noting it was “not suggested that the [owner's] proposed [use] would be a nuisance” to neighboring landowners
Summary of this case from High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON.
Argued October 11, 12, 1928. Decided November 19, 1928.
1. Zoning measures must find their justification in the police power exerted in the public interest; unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions may not be imposed upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities. P. 120. 2. A trust company owning and maintaining, as trustee, a philanthropic home for old people in a residential district, sought to replace the structure with a larger one for the same purposes, but was denied a permit under a zoning ordinance providing that such a building should be permitted "when the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet of the proposed building." The denial was based upon the sole ground that such consent had not been obtained, there being nothing to show that the building and its use would constitute a nuisance or be otherwise objectionable in the community or conflict with the public interest or the general zoning plan. Held: (1) That the condition requiring consent of property owners was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 121. (2) The condition being void, the trustee was entitled to a permit. P. 123. 144 Wn. 74, reversed.
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, which affirmed the dismissal of an action for a writ of mandate to compel the Superintendent of Building of the City of Seattle to issue a permit to the relator, the plaintiff in error.
A comprehensive zoning ordinance (No. 45382) passed in 1923 divided the city into six use districts and provided that, with certain exceptions not material here, no building should be erected for any purpose other than that permitted in the district in which the site is located. § 2. The land in question is in the "First Residence District." The ordinance permitted in that district single family dwellings, public schools, certain private schools, churches, parks, and playgrounds, an art gallery, private conservatories for plants and flowers, railroad and shelter stations. § 3 a. And, upon specified conditions, it also permitted garages, stables, buildings for domestic animals, the office of physician, dentist or other professional person when located in his or her dwelling (§ 3 b), fraternity, sorority and boarding houses, a community clubhouse, a memorial building, nurseries, greenhouses, and buildings necessary for the operation of public utilities. § 3 c. It declared that the section should not be constructed to prohibit the use of vacant property in such district for gardening or fruit raising, or its temporary use for fairs, circuses, or similar purposes. § 3 e. By an ordinance (No. 49179) passed in 1925, § 3 c was amended by adding: "A philanthropic home for children or for old people shall be permitted in First Residence District when the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building."
(1) Single Family Dwellings. Page 119 (2) Public Schools.
(b) In a First Residence District, buildings and uses such as are ordinarily appurtenant to dwellings shall be permitted, subject to the limitations herein provided. A garage in a first residence district shall not occupy more than seven per cent (7%) of the area of the lot, and the business of repairing motor vehicles shall not be conducted therein. In the case of a private stable, the written consent must be obtained of the owners of fifty (50) per cent of the property within a radius of two hundred (200) feet of the proposed building. The number of animals, not counting sucklings, in a private stable shall not exceed one for every two thousand (2,000) square feet contained in the area of the lot on which such building is located. Not more than one appurtenant building having a floor area of not to exceed thirty (30) square feet which is used for the housing of domestic animals or fowls shall be permitted on any lot in the First Residence District, except that a building of greater area or a greater number of buildings shall be permitted when the written consent Page 120 shall have been obtained of the owners of fifty (50) per cent of the dwellings within two hundred (200) feet of the proposed building; provided that such consent shall not be required if the number of said dwellings is less than four (4). The office of a physician, dentist, or other professional person when located in his or her dwelling, also home occupations engaged in by individuals within their dwellings shall be considered as accessory uses, provided that no window display is made or any sign shown other than one not exceeding two (2) square feet in area and bearing only the name and occupation of the occupant. The renting of rooms for lodging purposes only, for the accommodation of not to exceed six (6) persons, in a single family dwelling shall be considered an accessory use.
Subsequently the trustee, without having obtained consents of other landowners in accordance with the provisions just quoted, applied for a permit to erect the new home. It is the superintendent's official duty to issue permits for buildings about to be erected in accordance with valid enactments and regulations. He denied the application solely because of the trustee's failure to furnish such consents. Then the trustee brought this suit in the superior court of King County to secure its judgment and writ commanding the superintendent to issue the permit; and it maintained throughout that the ordinance, if construed to prevent the erection of the proposed building, is arbitrary and repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. That court held that the amended ordinance so construed is valid and dismissed the case. Its judgment was affirmed by the highest court of the State. 144 Wn. 74.
The trustee concedes that our recent decisions require that in its general scope the ordinance be held valid. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183. Is the delegation of power to owners of adjoining land to make inoperative the permission, given by § 3(c) as amended, repugnant to the due process clause? Zoning measures must find their justification in the police power exerted in the interest of the public. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, 387. "The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Nectow v. Cambridge, supra, p. 188. Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 594. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513. Norfolk Ry. v. Public Service Comm'n, 265 U.S. 70, 74. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535. Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 412, 415. Tyson Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 442.
The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is properly within the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed by the record make it clear that the exclusion of the new home from the first district is not indispensable to the general zoning plan. And there is no legislative determination that the proposed building and use would be inconsistent with public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The enactment itself plainly implies the contrary. The grant of permission for such building and use, although purporting to be subject to such consents, shows that the legislative body found that the construction and maintenance of the new home was in harmony with the public interest and with the general scope and plan of the zoning ordinance. The section purports to give the owners of less than one-half the land within 400 feet of the proposed building authority — uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative action — to prevent the trustee from using its land for the proposed home. The superintendent is bound by the decision or inaction of such owners. There is no provision for review under the ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound by any official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee to their will or caprice. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 368. The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396.