Source: https://el.b-ok.org/book/3504425/b87cf3
Timestamp: 2019-12-11 11:39:04
Document Index: 190339394

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 14', 'Art. 17', 'Art. 31', 'Art.\n136', 'arty81', 'Art. 5']

Cambodian Constitutional Law | Hor Peng, Kong Phallack, Jörg Menzel | download
Κύρια Cambodian Constitutional Law
Hor Peng, Kong Phallack, Jörg Menzel
The Cambodian Constitution is of significant importance and relevance for all Cambodian citizens, as it covers varying aspects of their lives. It is due to the Constitution’s high importance that Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) Cambodia, in cooperation with the editors of this book, decided to write this introduction on the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom and thus, to create a comprehensive source of information on Cambodian constitutional law. The book provides an overview of the Constitution as well as comparisons and analyses. It aims at giving basic and helpful information to the reader and at encouraging further academic discussion of Cambodian law.
Εκδότης: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Cambodia
ISBN 13: 978-99249-134-0-5
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Introduction to Cambodian Law
Enumeration of convex polyominoes: a generalization of the Robinson-Schensted correspondence and the dimer problem [PhD thesis]
Freedom, justice and solidarity are the basic principles underlying the work of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). KAS is a
political foundation, closely associated with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). As co-founder of the CDU and
the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad
Adenauer (1876-1967) united Christian-social, conservative and
liberal traditions. His name is synonymous with the democratic
reconstruction of Germany, the firm alignment of foreign policy
with the trans-atlantic community of values, the vision of a unified Europe and an orientation towards the social market economy.
In our European and international cooperation with more than
70 offices abroad and projects in over 120 countries, we make a
unique contribution to the promotion of democracy, the rule of
law and a social market economy.
The office in Cambodia has been established in 1994. KAS in Cambodia
is mainly operating in the following fields: Administrative Reform
and Decentralization, Strengthening Political Parties and Parliaments,
Legal Reform, Media Development, Political Education and Social
Market Economy, as well as Foreign Policy Consultancy.
FOREWORD............................................................................................................................................................................................v
EPILOGUE............................................................................................................................................................................................... vi
PREFACE................................................................................................................................................................................................ vii
INTRODUCTION TO CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.................................................................................................................................... 1
1 CAMBODIA FROM CIVIL WAR TO A CONSTITUTION TO CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Jörg MENZEL........................................................................................................................................................................................5
2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA:
THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND INTERPRETATION
HOR Peng............................................................................................................................................................................................41
3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAMBODIA’S CONSTITUTIONS
YAN Vandeluxe...............................................................................................................................................................................53
4 THE 1993 CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
MEAS Bora..........................................................................................................................................................................................69
5 TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SOTH Sang Bonn..........................................................................................................................................................................87
6 THE KING OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA:
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF THE KING
HOR Peng........................................................................................................................................................................................ 105
7 THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
Norbert FEIGE.............................................................................................................................................................................. 111
8 THE SENATE OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
YAN Vandeluxe........................................................................................................................................................................... 137
9 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND POWERS OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT
Hisham MOUSAR .................................................................................................................................................................... 157
10 CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL:
ELECTION, STRUCTURE, PROCEDURE, AND COMPETENCIES
TAING Ratana ............................................................................................................................................................................ 189
11 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN CAMBODIA:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON AND IMPLICATION FOR REFORM
Kai HAUERSTEIN ..................................................................................................................................................................... 219
12 ADMINISTRATION:
THE CONSTITUTION AS A GUIDING FRAMEWORK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
THENG Chan-Sangvar........................................................................................................................................................ 247
13 STATE FINANCE MANAGEMENT OF CAMBODIA
Atichbora LONG......................................................................................................................................................................... 269
14 PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION LAW: LIBERAL MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY
Chandara KHUN...................................................................................................................................................................... 285
15 FUNCTIONS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF CAMBODIAN POLITICAL PARTY LAW
Denis SCHREY & Nathalie LAUER............................................................................................................................. 305
16 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION:
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
Daniel HEILMANN................................................................................................................................................................... 339
17 INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN CAMBODIA
SOK Socheat................................................................................................................................................................................... 357
18 FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CAMBODIA
KONG Phallack ......................................................................................................................................................................... 389
19 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION:
Raymond LEOS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 439
20 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN CAMBODIAN CRIMINAL LAW
Jeudy OEUNG & Sophary NOY .................................................................................................................................... 461
21 ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM
KUONG Teilee............................................................................................................................................................................... 489
22 LABOR RIGHTS AND TRADE UNIONS
CHEA Sophal ............................................................................................................................................................................... 511
23 LABOR RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
LY Vichuta....................................................................................................................................................................................... 537
24 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS THEORY AND PRAXIS
IN THE CAMBODIAN CONTEXT
Sang-Bonn SOTH...................................................................................................................................................................... 557
25 RIGHT TO EDUCATION
HANG Chuon Naron............................................................................................................................................................. 579
26 THE INFLUENCE OF FRENCH LEGAL CONCEPTS
ON THE CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1993
Jean-Luc GREGORCZYK.................................................................................................................................................... 595
27 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE FROM JAPAN:
EMPHASIZING CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT ON “PRIVATE LAW”
Hiroshi KIYOHARA ............................................................................................................................................................... 609
28 ESTONIAN EXPERIENCE: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
Tanel KERIKMÄE & Sandra SÄRAV ........................................................................................................................ 627
ANNEX 1—THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA.................................................. 651
iv | Cambodian Constitutional Law
The current Cambodian Constitution is the supreme law of the Kingdom of Cambodia,
enshrining values such as the rule of law, human rights, democracy and power separation deep into the Kingdom’s legal and political system. Its relevance and importance for
ordinary Cambodian citizens covers varying aspects, ranging from freedom of religion,
expression and access to information to fundamental rights such as labor, economic,
women’s and social rights as well as the right to education and institutional protection.
Furthermore, the Constitution regulates Cambodia’s state organization by identifying roles
and responsibilities of the country’s institutions, the electoral system and political parties.
It is due to the Constitution’s significant importance that Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Cambodia, in cooperation with the editors of this book, decided to create a comprehensive source of information on Cambodian constitutional law. As there is, to-date, only
a limited number of English publications on the Cambodian Constitution available, we
believe that this book serves as a useful guide into the different areas covered by the
Constitution. Its comprehensive coverage will be a unique contribution to the academic
field of international analysis and research on Cambodia´s Constitution.
One particular aim of the book has been to motivate Cambodian scholars to academically engage with legal questions and contribute with their articles towards the analysis
and evaluation of Cambodian Constitutional Law.
We would like to express our gratitude to those who have made this publication possible. A special appreciation is directed towards Jörg Menzel, who initiated this book and
assured its feasibility. Additionally, we would like to thank all authors for their contributions and Martina Mayr for her successful efforts to finalize this book.
Phnom Penh, July 2016
(September 2011 until January 2016)
We dedicate this book to our esteemed former colleague and friend Dr. Jörg Menzel, who
has initiated the idea of this first comprehensive English academic work on “Cambodian
Constitutional Law”. Dr. Menzel died too early at the age of 51 on April 09th 2016 in Istanbul.
Dr. Menzel became an internationally recognized expert on constitutional, administrative and international legal aspects of transformation processes in developing and emerging
countries. The impressive portfolio of his consulting and academic lectures involved not
only Cambodia and the South East Asian region, but also extended to other world regions.
His heart bet for South East Asia, especially for Cambodia. As an international key
advisor to the Cambodian Senate between 2003-2010 he not only promoted the ongoing
internal legal reform process of the Senate to support its development into a recognized
and more assertive Second Legislative Chamber in Cambodia, but also build capacity for
the in-house legal and research departments of the National Assembly, the Senate, the
Cambodian Government as well as for Cambodian Law Students.
The core legal literature on Cambodian Law available in English today has been the
result of Dr. Menzel’s ceaseless efforts to promote a culture of legal academic work and
legal discourse in Cambodia and the region.
The Law Talks initiated by Dr. Menzel in cooperation with Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
in 2006 are until today the only regular dialogue between legal scholars and practitioners
on diverse aspects of legal developments in Cambodia.
Throughout his career Dr. Menzel convinced his audience with his comprehensive
and profound legal knowledge and his unique ability to transfer and apply international
and European legal concepts and approaches to constitutional, administrative and legal
reform processes in Cambodia and other South East Asian Countries in a humble, collaborative and culturally sensitive manner, always bearing in mind the insufficiencies and
historical highs and lows of the own Western legal systems and the diverse legal history
and culture of SE Asian countries.
For the Cambodian counterparts Dr. Menzel has been a source of inspiration for their
work as well as a motivator and mentor for the development of their own professional
The KAS Cambodia Office as well as all partners, colleagues and Cambodian friends
will miss Dr. Menzel very much. We are grateful to his commitment to the development
of the Rule of Law in Cambodia and to Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung over the last 15 years.
Our thoughts and prayers are with him and with his family.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Cambodia
vi | Cambodian Constitutional Law
This book is initiated to introduce the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia.
It is a collective effort by Cambodian and foreign authors to provide an overview of the
Constitution as well as comparisons and analyses. From our knowledge this is currently
the only Handbook on the Cambodian Constitution written in English. The aim of this
publication is to provide a helpful guide, not only for foreign readers, but also for Cambodians, especially for those who choose to study law.
As it would be too ambitious to provide a comprehensive overview on all issues covered by the Constitution in a single publication, we aimed at providing basic information. All chapters have been written recently but as legal developments in Cambodia are
dynamic and fast-paced some information might be outdated soon after writing. Law
is like a river, always flowing and changing and any attempt to describe it can only be
temporary. Generally, as with any academic legal book, neither editors nor authors can
guarantee the full accuracy of the provided information. We can only assure that we have
tried to state the law as accurately as possible. As editors we have tried to ensure that
important topics of the Constitution are covered, but the authors are solely responsible
for the content of their chapters.
The editors wish to express a special thank you to Ms. Martina Mayr for her valuable
work and extensive contributions which made the completion of this publication possible. We also thank the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, its former Country Representative Mr.
Denis Schrey, its current Country Representative, Mr. Rene Gradwohl and all their staff
for the strong and patient support of this project. Furthermore, we thank the numerous
authors, who despite other obligations spent their valuable time and energy to write their
chapters. Finally, we hope that the readers of this book find the information provided
helpful and that it will encourage further academic discussion of Cambodian law within
As editors, we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to Jörg Menzel, who passed
away in April 2016, before the publication of this Handbook. We wish him Rest in Peace.
Phnom Penh, May 19, 2016
viii | Cambodian Constitutional Law
Due to the untimely loss of Jörg Menzel, the initiator and one of the editors of this book,
we were not able to retrieve his article “Introduction to Cambodian Constitutional Law
from a Comparative Perspective”, which was intended to serve as introductory chapter of
this book. His expertise in this subject matter is unmatched and it would be presumptuous to write his article instead.
However, due to his previous publications, we were able to identify two articles, which
address the subject matter separately. The first article, titled Cambodia – From Civil War,
To Constitution, to Constitutionalism?1, provides an introduction to Cambodian Constitutional Law. The other article, titled Constitutionalism in South East Asia: Some Comparative Perspectives2, provides a comparative view on other South East Asian Constitutions.
The editors decided to reprint Cambodia – From Civil War, To Constitution, to Constitutionalism? in this book as this publication provides a comprehensive introduction to
Cambodian Constitutional Law. The other article can be accessed and downloaded online, please refer to the respective footnote above.
The purpose of this preface is to provide a short introduction, how the reader can use
these two articles as a guide for an introduction to Cambodian Constitutional Law from
1 Jörg Menzel, Constitutionalism in South East Asia, Volume 2 Reports on National Constitutions, Eds.
Claus Peter Hill, Jörg Menzel, 2008, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Singapore.
2 Jörg Menzel, Constitutionalism in South East Asia, Volume 3, Cross Cutting Issues, Eds. Claus Peter
Hill, Jörg Menzel, 2008, Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, Singapore. The article can be accessed and
downloaded through the following link: www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20986-1522-1-30.pdf?110815045024
Introduction Chapter 1 | 1
The first article3, published in 2008, includes an introduction to the Cambodian Constitution. Even though the article is more than eight years old, the publication is still relevant
and (with some minor changes) up-to-date. We reviewed the article with regards to recent
changes. The following table provides an update on events since 2008.
Page 4 Issue
49 Constitutional
Amendment of the CC in 2014 to make the National
Election Committee an independent body
53 Election of Councils
Indirect election, Art. 14 Law on Administrative
Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities,
Districts and Khans (2008)
54 Commissions of the
10 Commissions
62 Penal Code
Promulgated 2009
67 Commune Elections
67 National Elections
Except 2013
In the title of this publication Jörg Menzel implies the question whether Cambodia arrived
at a constitutionalist state. He draws a historical line from a state at civil war, where – in
practice – the prevailing Constitutions were irrelevant, to a state with a new liberal Constitution on paper, to a constitutional state in practice. A constitutionalist state, he infers,
should not only outline constitutional principles on paper, but has the mandate to operationalize the normative aspects of these principles, and – most importantly – should
respect these principles.
The article provides a short overview of the constitutional history and the making of
the Cambodian Constitution. He further outlines the core elements of the Constitution,
the system of government, fundamental rights, judicial review, the legal system, rule of
law, as well as Cambodia’s place in the world.
3 Ibid Vol. 2
4 Jörg Menzel, Constitutionalism in South East Asia, Volume 2, Reports on National Constitutions, Eds.
2 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
Introduction to Cambodian Constitutional Law from a Comparative Perspective
The Cambodian Constitution from a Comparative Perspective
The article From Civil War to Constitution to Constitutionalism? does not provide a detailed comparative perspective. Jörg Menzel briefly concludes that the core elements of a
liberal Constitution such as democracy, fundamental rights, rule of law, and separation of
powers were influenced by other countries, but also acknowledges distinct Cambodian
elements.5 His article concludes,
“The Cambodian Constitution, as every constitution, can be put into a variety of comparative perspectives. It can be compared and analysed in the context of its historical
precedents, regional or global constitutional developments and last but not least, with
other states facing similar problems of transition to democracy. Cambodia’s current
constitution draws heavily from the past, in particular from Cambodia’s first constitution of 1947 and the immediate predecessor of 1989, but is also influenced by foreign
developments. The making of this constitution comes at a time of major constitutional
change in many states, be it in Southeast Asia or globally. Since the end of the 1980s
there has been a clear worldwide trend towards strengthening of constitutional order,
democracy, fundamental rights and rule of law. Transition is, however, a difficult process and Cambodia has a particularly long way to go after the complete breakdown of
civilized statehood in the 1970s. In addition it should be acknowledged that the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and comprehensive fundamental rights protection, hardly had any consolidated stronghold in Southeast Asia at the beginning of
the 1990s, nor does it have today. A fair assessment of development in Cambodia must
take this regional context into account.”6
In Constitutionalism in South East Asia: Some Comparative Perspectives 7 Jörg Menzel provides us with a framework as well as criteria for comparing Constitutions. Assessment
criteria are constitutional core principles, such as the separation of powers, rule of law,
basic human rights, democracy, etc. These criteria determine the level of Constitutionalism in a given country. Constitutionalism requires a certain level of depth and substance,
as well as a common understanding of what these core elements mean and how to assess them in terms of achievement/performance. A comparative view as well as common
understanding helps to establish a baseline for constitutionalism, comparing for example,
constitutional elements in Germany with those in France and Cambodia.
5 Ibid, Jörg Menzel, p. 13.
6 Ibid, Jörg Menzel, p. 29.
7 Jörg Menzel, Constitutionalism in South East Asia, Volume 3, Cross Cutting Issues , Eds. Claus Peter
Hill, Jörg Menzel, 2008, Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, Singapore.
Introduction Chapter 1 | 3
However, Jörg Menzel was sensitive enough to point out,
“Constitutionalism may be on the rise worldwide but it develops differently from state to
state. There may be a tendency to more similarity in constitutions around the world, but,
as Cheryl Saunders has rightly pointed out, this tendency should not be overestimated.
There is no universal “model constitution” and it would not be a good idea to develop
one. Comparative constitutional law, which is as much on the rise as constitutionalism, examines the similarities and differences. For the time being, comparative law in
general (comparing legal systems, traditions etc.) and comparative constitutional law
are not yet well-integrated disciplines. Only recently has comparative constitutional law
been included in some general comparative law handbooks. As the field is relatively new
(or re-awakened after a long sleep), inevitably there is debate about benefits, risks and
methodology. One of the traditional shortcomings in comparative constitutional law has
been its euro-centrism, but there is increasing awareness of interesting and important
constitutional developments in all corners of the world and the internet has revolutionized access to information about developments even in formerly remote jurisdictions.” 8
This article by Jörg Menzel provides further reference to the reader regarding frameworks
and Jörg Menzel’s view on how Cambodia compares with other countries in South East
Asia. We understand that this is an insufficient substitute for what Jörg Menzel would have
written and contributed to this book. His fierce intellect complemented by his humorous
and sensitive writing will be dearly missed.
8 Ibid, Jörg Menzel, p. 11.
4 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW | CHAPTER
FROM CIVIL WAR TO A CONSTITUTION
TO CONSTITUTIONALISM?
I. Introduction.............................................................................................................. 7
II. A Short Constitutional History................................................................................ 8
1. The Pre-Colonial Time, “Angkor” in Particular......................................................... 8
2. French Protectorate ...........................................................................................................................9
3. Kingdom of Cambodia............................................................................................ 10
4. Republic of Cambodia............................................................................................. 12
5. Democratic Kampuchea.......................................................................................... 13
6. People’s Republic of Cambodia.............................................................................. 14
7. State of Cambodia.................................................................................................... 15
III. The Making and Development of the Constitution............................................. 16
1. The Paris Agreements.............................................................................................. 16
2. Constitution Making................................................................................................. 17
3. Constitutional Amendments.................................................................................... 18
IV. General Overview and Characterisation............................................................... 19
1. Core Elements of the Constitution.......................................................................... 19
2. The Concept of a Rigid Constitution and the “Additional Constitution”............... 20
V. System of Government........................................................................................... 21
1. Monarchy................................................................................................................. 21
2. Government............................................................................................................. 22
3. Parliament................................................................................................................ 23
VI. Fundamental Rights............................................................................................... 24
1. The Constitutional Concept of Fundamental Rights.............................................. 24
2. Fundamental Rights and State Practice................................................................... 26
3. Institutions of Fundamental Rights Protection....................................................... 27
VII. Judicial Review........................................................................................................ 27
1. The Constitutional Council as a Constitutional Court............................................ 27
2. Towards a Decade of Jurisprudence....................................................................... 29
3. The 2007 Decision on Children’s Rights................................................................. 30
Chapter 1 | 5
VIII. Legal System and the Rule of Law......................................................................... 31
1. Cambodia and the Global Legal Traditions............................................................ 31
2. The Laws of Cambodia .......................................................................................... 32
3. Application and Enforcement of the Law............................................................... 33
4. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal..................................................................................... 34
IX. Cambodia and the World........................................................................................ 35
1. National Sovereignty and Internationality.............................................................. 35
2. The Rank of International Law............................................................................... 37
X. Concluding Remarks .............................................................................................. 38
Selected Bibliography............................................................................................ 40
6 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
Jörg MENZEL *
The current Constitution of Cambodia of 1993 is the fifth constitution since the first written constitution was adopted in 19471. The concepts followed in these constitutions could
not be more diverse, but they hardly give an impression of the dramatic history that
unfolded during this time in a country which has a record of centuries of great ancient
history, but which is nowadays mostly associated with the absolute terror of the Khmer
Rouge regime that lasted less than four years between 1975 and 1979.
The following report attempts to give an overview of the historical developments and
current constitutional structures in Cambodia, which have only rarely been discussed in
academic literature so far. This article argues that the adoption of the 1993 constitution
has been a big step in the direction towards liberal democracy, but that one and a half
decades later constitutionalism is still more concept than reality in the political and legal
system of Cambodia.
* Associate Professor, University of Bonn, Germany; Legal Advisor, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
1 Constitution of 1993. This constitution has been amended a number of times, but with the amendment
of 1999 a new chapter (on the Senate) was included, which changed the numbers of articles from
article 99 onward. Article numbers quoted here are according to the current “post-1999” version. For
a useful collection of the historic constitutions of Cambodia see Raoul M. Jennar, The Cambodian
Constitutions (1953-1993), Bangkok 1995 (White Lotus Press). Jennar lists six constitutions altogether,
treating the extensive amendments of the constitution of 1981 in 1989 effectively as the adoption of
a new constitution. For a French language collection of the historic 20th century constitutions see
Kim Y (ed.), Collection Droit Khmer. Droit Constitutionnel, 1947-1993, Phnom Penh 1997.
Chapter 1 | 7
II. A Short Constitutional History
No country’s constitutional system can be understood without some knowledge of its
historical background. In Cambodia, this trivial wisdom is probably even more important
to keep in mind than in many other places. Cambodia is in many respects stricken by its
past, with visions of ancient grandeur and in the horrors of its recent history. However,
whereas the general history of the country is quite well researched2, its constitutional or
legal history is not3. The following can only offer some glimpses.
1. The Pre-Colonial Time, “Angkor” in Particular
There is some uncertainty, as to the existence of a “state” in the era of Funan (beginning
in the first century AD). Funan was considered a state by contemporary Chinese reports,
but these are questioned in recent historical research which suggests that it was probably only a loose alliance of towns4. Knowledge is not better regarding “Chenla”, which
seemingly emerged with the decline of Funan. The leaders in Pre-Angkorian times are
sometimes (not always) called “kings”, but from what we know their “kingdoms” typically were small and unstable.
It is not disputed, however, that Cambodia achieved statehood and was an absolute
monarchy in the Angkorian time, which is generally considered to have started in the
early 9th century. At its peak time, the capital area of Angkor was probably the most
populous city worldwide. Angkor Wat, the main temple complex built in the first half of
the twelfth century, is considered to be the largest sacral building complex in the world.
The Empire of Angkor was an absolute monarchy with the king at the top holding legislative, executive and judicial control5. There is some discussion about how “divine” the
kings were supposed to be but undoubtedly they exercised very earthly powers. Showcasing strong power was therefore a necessity and religious symbolism sometimes seems
2 For “general histories” see John Tully, A Short History of Cambodia, Chiang Mai 2006 (Silkworm
Books) and David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 2007 (Westview Press).
3 For a short outline with a legal/constitutional focus Laksiri Fernando, Khmer Socialism, Human Rights
and UN Intervention, in: Alice Tay (ed.), East Asia – Human Rights, Nation Building, Trade, BadenBaden 1999 (Nomos Verlag), pp. 441-497; see also Claude-Gilles Gour, Institutions Constitutionelles
et Politiques du Cambodge, Paris 1965 (Dalloz), pp. 17-87.
4 Michael Vickery, Society, Economics, and Prehistostory in Pre-Angkor Cambodia. The 7th and 8th
Centuries, Tokyo 1998 (The Toyo Bunko); Tully (note 2), p. 9. Knowledge is not better for the later
“state” called Chenla, in respect to which even its precise location is unclear.
5 For the Angkorian society with some information on political and legal structures see Ian Mabett /
David Chandler, The Khmers, Oxford 1995 (Blackwell Publishers); Charles Higham, The Civilization
of Angkor, London 2003 (Orion Books). The most cited source with some information on the
political and legal system is the report by a Chinese visitor, who spent a year in Angkor between
1296 and 1297. The report contains some information on law (chapter 14), but does not elaborate
on the constitutional system. For a new edition of this important report see Zhou Daguan, A Record
of Cambodia. The Lands and its People, translated with an introduction and notes by Peter Harris,
Chiang Mai 2007 (Silkworm Books).
8 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
Cambodia from Civil War to a Constitution to Constitutionalism?
to merge with state symbolism. The Bayon Temple in Angkor, built in the time of Jayarvarman VII, is famous for the hundreds of faces watching and listening in every direction;
probably symbolizing a divine ruler as a perfect “Big Brother” of its time6. There was,
however, no intergenerational constitution in the sense that succession to the throne was
effectively regulated. The Angkor Empire was plagued not only by external, but also by
internal violent power struggles, assassinations and violent regime change. There is some
discussion about the extent of totalitarianism of this system, but it seems evident that it
was based on a massive amount of collective labour. Significant parts of the population
are reported to have been slaves7.
However, knowledge about the legal system during the Angkor period is limited. There
seems to be an understanding that Indian texts played an important role. Interestingly,
some of the main problems during that time seem similar to current concerns. Land conflicts are reported to be among the most common legal disputes and according to some
historians deforestation contributed to the decline of Angkor. Although the role of the
Khmer kingdom was of reduced strength after the end of the Angkor period because of
the rise of neighbouring powers and internal struggles, the principle of monarchy prevailed until the French takeover of the country in 1863.
2. French Protectorate 8
The French takeover has been labelled as “gun boat diplomacy”, not escalating in actual
violence, but probably not without coercion9. There is, however, a common perception
among historians that the French takeover rescued Cambodia from the risk of vanishing between more powerful and chronically invasive neighbours, Siam and Vietnam (the
Khmer saw themselves “between the tiger and the crocodile”). In fact, the Cambodian
King had asked France for protection as early as 185310. When taking control by treaty
with King Norodom, France did not formally and fully colonize Cambodia, but gave it
the status of a protectorate11. During its time as a protectorate, the Cambodian monar6 For the “Big Brother“-Interpretation of the Bayon Temple see also Mabett/Chandler (note 5), p. 207;
the “meaning” of the Bayon is highly controversial, however, see recently Joyce Clark (ed.), Bayon.
New Perspectives, Bangkok 2007 (River Books).
7 See Daguan (note 5), Chapter 9; Fernando (note 3); pp. 446-448; John Tully, France on the Mekong.
A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia 1863-1953, Lanham / New York / Oxford 2002 (University
Press of America), pp. 36-38; on the remaining relevance of slavery in the 19th century see Tully (2),
8 The period of the French protectorate is comprehensively described and analyzed by Tully, (note
7); see also Milton E. Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia, Bangkok 1997
(White Lotus; reprint of the original edition 1969) .
9 See Tully (note 7), p. 3.
10 Tully (note 7). p. 13.
11 Tully (note 7), p. 18, speaks of a “de facto colony”. From the perspective of constitutional and legal
history the difference between “colony” and “protectorate” is noteworthy, however, and it had relevant,
practical consequences at least in the early times of French rule in Cambodia.
Chapter 1 | 9
chy was not abolished, but was limited by French control. Whereas France initially did
not interfere much in the internal government of Cambodia with the treaty of 1863 being a protection against such interferences, it pressured the king (with open threat to use
force12) to accept substantial reforms in 1884 and cede much of his power13. The treaty
amendment was followed by a devastating revolt, but slavery was formally abolished and
French power was increased. Following the crowning of King Sisowath in 1904 attempts
to reform the legal system intensified14 and French control over the government was
tightened. In 1913, a Consultative Council was established, whose main purpose was to
exercise some control over the king’s rule. Apart from this, France did not promote any
representative political institutions before the Second World War15.
In 1941, France handpicked the new king for the country, eighteen year old Norodom
Sihanouk16, apparently assuming that the underage man would be easy to control in the
further process. Sihanouk, however, quickly developed an ambition for politics and power. He declared Cambodia’s independence when Japanese forces temporarily took over
control in Cambodia during World War II17, immediately reversing inter alia, the French
decision to introduce the Latin script in Cambodia. After the French regained control in
1945, King Sihanouk continued in office (and the Khmer script remained untouched). Sihanouk first pressured for more autonomy in internal affairs and finally went on a “royal
crusade” to achieve complete independence from France in 1953.
3. Kingdom of Cambodia
King Sihanouk substantially influenced the process that led to the adoption of the country’s first written constitution in 194718. A Constituent Assembly to advise the king on the
Constitution was elected in a general election in 1946, the first democratic election ever
held in Cambodia. The Democratic Party, which won a landslide victory in this election,
successfully pushed for strong democratic elements in the constitution. In substance, the
original Constitution of 1947, to a large extent modelled on the French constitution of
12 Compare Tully (note 2), p. 75: “on bayonet point”.
13 Article 2 of the Treaty reads: “His Majesty the King of Cambodia accepts all the administrative, judicial,
financial, and commercial reforms which the French government shall judge, in future, useful to
make their protectorate successful.” Prince Norodom Sihanouk stated in 1972: “From 1884 to 1945,
our kings were nothing more than what the Khmer people called ‘parrots’ , trained to say ‘Bat, Bat’
(yes), quoted in Tully (note 2), p. 135.
14 Tully (note 2), pp. 142-143.
15 Fernando (note 3), p. 454.
16 For the life of Sihanouk see the first volume of his autobiography “Shadows over Angkor”, edited
by Julio A. Jeldres, Phnom Penh 2005 (Monument Books), covering the years until 1991, as well as
Milton Osborne, Sihanouk. Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness, Chiang Mai 1994 (Silkworm Books).
17 For an analysis of this short period of „independence“ compare David Chandler, The Kingdom of
Cambodia, March-October 1945, in: David Chandler, Facing The Past, Chiang Mai 1996 (Silkworm
Books), pp. 165-188.
18 For a French language analysis of the constitutional system of this time Gour (note 3).
10 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
the 4th republic, provided the model of a parliamentary monarchy. The king was head of
state, but not head of the government. He had, however, extensive emergency powers,
which should have become very relevant in practice. Apart from an elected National Assembly there was a Council of the Kingdom as a second chamber. The Constitution also
provided for Popular Assemblies and a National Council. There was no special Constitutional Court or Constitutional Council. The Constitution also provided for a catalogue
of fundamental rights.
In subsequent political history, the Democratic Party won the elections held in 1947
and 1951, but Sihanouk removed the elected government with the help of French troops,
dissolved parliament and took over direct control in 1952. His “democratic” approach of
1946 was replaced by a concept that Sihanouk himself later described as, the “original
form of guided democracy”19, whereas others have labelled it as “authoritarian”. The young
king maintained that “those following democracy in Cambodia are either bourgeois or
princes …. The Cambodian people are children. They know nothing about politics. And
they care less.”20 Formally, the Constitution of 1947, which was subject to a total number
of nine amendments with major changes in 1956 and 1960, remained the Cambodian
basic law until 1970.
Sihanouk resigned as King in 1955 in order to lead the country as Prime Minister of
his party that controlled all seats in the National Assembly after the elections in 1955.
When his father, who had been installed as king, died in 1960, Sihanouk took the role of
a “Head of State”21 and put his mother in formal charge of the regency (without making
her the “Queen” in a formal sense). Be it as King (1946-1955), Prime Minister (1955-1960)
or Head of State (1960-1970), Sihanouk dominated Cambodian politics until 1970, when
he was removed from office by forces within his own government which opposed his
position on the issue of the Indochina War.
19 Memoirs, p. 59.
20 Cited in David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History. Politics, War, and Revolution since
1945, Chiang Mai 1991 (Silkworm Books), p. 72.
21 See Article 122 of the Constitution (as amended in 1960).
Chapter 1 | 11
4. Republic of Cambodia
Sihanouk was removed from office as Head of State through a parliamentary non-confidence vote on March 18, 1970, initiated by United States backed Prime Minister, General
Lon Nol and Deputy Prime Minister, Sirik Matak in 197022. On October 9, 1970, Cambodia was declared a republic23. General Lon Nol, who allegedly never recovered his full
intellectual capacities after a stroke in 1971 and who was strongly influenced by spiritual
ideas and advisors, declared himself President in March 1972 and dissolved parliament.
A new constitution was put to referendum, accepted with 97.5 % of the votes and than
promulgated on May 10, 1972. The constitution contained a catalogue of fundamental
rights and prescribed a presidential model of government, a bi-cameral parliament, a catalogue guaranteeing human rights and a “Constitutional Court”24. This constitution, fairly
distinct from earlier and later constitutions in Cambodia, never came into full effect and
did not get much attention inside or outside of Cambodia. An increasingly barbaric war
was raging, the United States tried to bombard Cambodia back to the stone age25, corruption was out of control26 and the government lost control of more and more parts of
the country. When the Khmer Rouge finally took Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, Lon Nol
had already left the country, but nearly all officials of his government and administration
not able or willing to leave, were killed.
22 The removal of Sihanouk was accepted by a parliamentary secret vote of 89 - 3. Sihanouk immediately
criticized his removal as a coup d’état, a view which was more than two decades later officially
endorsed by the Cambodian Constitutional Assembly on 14 June 1993. The extent of US-involvement
in the “coup” is a matter of discussion, see for example Tully (note 2), pp. 154-155.
23 For a history of the Khmer Republic comparatively sympathetic to the regime see Justin Corfield,
Khmer Stand Up! A history of the Cambodian Government 1970-1975, Melbourne 1994.
24 The notion that this was a European-style Constitutional Court Stephen P. Marks, The New Cambodian
Constitution: From Civil War to a Fragile Democracy, 26 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 43-110
(1994), p. 53, is misleading, however, as in substance this “court” was more a French style Constitutional
Council. Compare also supra VII.
25 There have been reasonable suggestions that United States bombardments in Cambodia until August
1973, which according to estimates killed between 150.000 and 750.000 people, amount to severe
violations of international law. The most famous criticism is William Shawcross, Sideshow. Kissinger,
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, London 1991 (The Hogarth Press); for a legal analysis see
Nicole Barrett, Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of Customary International Law:
The U.S. Bombardment of Cambodia and Laos, 32 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 429 (2001).
26 On the corruption within the Khmer Republic system (commonly called the system of “bonjour”)
see for example Tully (note 2), pp. 165-6.
12 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
5. Democratic Kampuchea
The Khmer Rouge implemented the most extreme version of communism ever adopted
in the 20th century27. The rule of terror opened with a range of drastic measures, among
which was the execution of all leaders of the former regime, the abolition of money, and
the worst being the evacuation of all towns including the capital Phnom Penh, which
harboured maybe up to three million inhabitants and internally displaced people at the
time28. People were moved to the countryside, where they were labelled as “new people”
and subjected to the most severe forced labour.
The Khmer Rouge basically abolished any notion of law in Cambodia. In a literal
sense the most lawless state in recent world history was established. As historian David
Chandler put it: “There is no evidence that any judges held office in DK or that there was
a legal system in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979”29. The only law adopted during the
reign of the Khmer Rouge was the Constitution of 1946, a crude text of twenty-one articles
which remained widely unknown in Cambodia and basically had the function of documenting the full statehood of the Khmer Rouge Cambodia to the outside world30. Head
of State, Khieu Samphan, allegorically declared that this constitution was “not the result
of any research of foreign documents, nor [was it] the fruit of any research by scholars.
In fact, the people – workers, peasants, and revolutionary army – wrote the constitution
with their own hands.”31 A “People’s Representative Assembly”, which was part of the
institutional system prescribed by the constitution (Article 5), was dubiously “elected”
once and met only once in 1946. Courts were not operating, although the existence of
“People’s Courts” was stipulated in the constitution (Article 9). The constitution mentioned
27 For historical analysis see e.g. Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 2nd edition, Chiang Mai 2002
(Silkworm Books); Michael Vickery, Cambodia 1975-1982, Chiang Mai 1984 (Silkworm Books); Craig
Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, Boulder 1984 (Westview Press); Elisabeth
Becker, When the War was Over. Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, New York 1986 (Simon
& Schuster); Karl D. Jackson (ed.), Cambodia 1975-1978. Rendezvous with Death, Princeton 1989
(Princeton University Press); for biographies of Pol Pot see David Chandler, Brother Number One.
A Political Biography of Pol Pot, Revised Edition, Chiang Mai 2000 (Silkworm Books); Philip Short,
Pol Pot. The History of a Nightmare, London 2004 ( John Murray Publishers).
28 According to one document, the following eight measures were announced by Pol Pot immediately
in time of victory: „1. Evacuate all people from all towns. 2. Abolish all markets. 3. Abolish Lon
Nol regime currency, and withhold the revolutionary currency that had been printed. 4. Defrock all
Buddhist monks, and put them to work growing rice. 5. Execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime
beginning with the top leaders. 6. Establish high-level cooperatives throughout the country, with
communal eating. 7. Expel the entire Vietnamese minority population. 8. Dispatch troops to the
borders, particularly the Vietnamese border. (cited in Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot came to Power,
London 1985 (Verso), p. 415/6).
29 Chandler (note 20), p. 262.
30 For a discussion at that time see David Chandler, The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, 79
Pacific Affairs (1979), p. 505.
31 Quoted in: Chandler (note 20), p. 262.
Chapter 1 | 13
some fundamental rights, among which the “right to work” and the statement that there
was to be “absolutely no unemployment” (Article 12) seems most ironical in a state that
effectively had become an oversized labour camp.
According to the most common estimate around 1.7 million people lost their lives due
to system related reasons under the Khmer Rouge regime32, with intellectuals of all kind
being particularly targeted. Around 14,000 people were tortured and killed in the central
prison “S 21” (“Tuol Sleng”) alone, without any legal procedure 33.
6. People’s Republic of Cambodia
After a short war between Vietnam and Cambodia in 1978/79, Vietnam occupied Cambodia34 and a Vietnamese backed government took control. Cambodia’s development in the
decade to follow was not only hampered by structural problems of the political system,
but also by international isolation and an ongoing civil war with the Vietnamese backed
government on one side and a coalition of resistance forces (Khmer Rouge, Royalists
etc.) on the other. Cambodia was seeking its own identity but was still a place of internal
and external struggles. A socialist constitution was adopted in 198135. A long preamble
emphasized the friendship with Vietnam and Laos, at the same time blaming the United
States and China for the developments that lead to the disastrous “Pol Pot – Ieng Sary
– Khieu Samphan Clique”. The political system was typically socialist in the Soviet and
Vietnamese model, with a single party playing a major role. Some fundamental rights and
the system of a state run economy were stipulated. Chapter VII of the constitution was
dedicated to the “local people’s revolutionary committees”, whereas chapter VIII defined
the role of the judiciary, without stipulating the concept of independence of the courts.
32 The varying estimates are discussed by Ben Kiernan, The Demography of Genocide in Southeast
Asia, The Death Tolls in Cambodia 1975-79, and East-Timor, 1975-80, 35 Critical Asian Studies 585597 (2003).
33 The absurdity of S-21 is well documented; see David Chandler, Voices from S-21. Terror and
History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison, Chiang Mai 2000 (Silkworm Books), updated summary in: Judy
Ledgerwood (ed.), Cambodia Emerges from the Past, 2002 (Northern Illinois University), pp. 16-37;
for the memories of one of the reportedly seven survivors see Vann Nath, A Cambodian Prison
Portrait. One Year in Khmer Rouge’s S-21, Chiang Mai 1998 (Silkworm Books); for an investigation
into the life of S-21 Commander Kaing Guek Eav (“Duch”) see Nic Dunlop, The Lost Executioner. A
Story of the Khmer Rouge, London 2005 (Bloomsbury Publishing).
34 The legality of the Vietnamese action is still under discussion. Whereas the USA, most Western states,
China and local neighbours such as Thailand called it an illegal invasion, Vietnam mainly argued
that it acted in self defence, but also indicated the notion of a humanitarian intervention. For a
justification see Gary Klintworth, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in international law, Canberra
1989 (Australian Government Publishing Service).
35 For an extensive study on the “people’s republic” see Evan Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer
Rouge. Inside the Politics of State Building, New Haven & London 2002 (Yale University Press).
This book is indispensable for an advanced understanding of Cambodian politics and law today.
Another good and somewhat more favorable account is Margaret Slocomb, The People’s Republic
of Kampuchea. The Revolution after Pol Pot, Chiang Mai 2003 (Silkworm Books).
14 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
In reality, the criminal justice system worked with hardly any legal foundations and arbitrary arrests were common during the people’s republic time. These were evidenced last
but not least by numerous appeals of the then Minister of Justice, to end these practices36.
7. State of Cambodia
The “winds of change” in the Socialist block resulted in a reduction of Soviet assistance
for Vietnam in the second half of the 1980s, which was then not able to sustain its intensive engagement in Cambodia. Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk started to
engage in negotiations. Attempts at constitutional reform culminated in a fundamental
amendment to the constitution in 1989. The abolishment of socialism was symbolized in
the change of the state’s name to “State of Cambodia”, leaving a decade of being a “People’s Republic” behind. The state was once again re-named, this time to “State of Cambodia”. The peace process and attempts to overcome international isolation culminated
in the Paris Agreements of 1991, a comprehensive international treaty that was designed
to settle internal conflict and external interference in Cambodia37.
Part of the Paris Agreements was the installation of a “United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia”, widely know by its acronym UNTAC. During its eighteen month’s
mandate, given by the UN-Security Council38, UNTAC employed up to 22,000 foreign
personnel in Cambodia and consumed a budget of around 1.6 billion dollars, the largest
and most expensive UN peace building mission until that time. UNTAC’s main responsibility was to provide a neutral environment for free and fair elections in 1993. Legally
the United Nations obtained supreme authority in Cambodia during the mission of UNTAC. The government of the State of Cambodia (SOC) continued to be in control of the
country. Whereas UNTAC was not able to prevent the re-emergence of the Khmer Rouge
insurgency in Cambodia39, and produced a range of serious problems for Cambodian
36 See Gottesman (note 35), p. 255, citing Minister of Justice Uk Bunchheuan with a statement made in
1987: “We should impose some punishment on people who hold power and have violated the law.
Now, we take the rights of the citizens and the lives of the citizens as pieces in a game for us all to
play. We want to arrest people and do whatever we want to them. If we want to release them, we
can. If not, we can.” Reports about arbitrary arrests were also published by Amnesty International
37 See generally Steven Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AJIL 1-41 (1993).
38 Resolution 745 of 1992.
39 For a critical assessment see for example Serge Thion, Watching Cambodia, Bangkok 1993 (White
Lotus), Chapter 10 (“United Nations Traditional Apathy in Cambodia”).
Chapter 1 | 15
society, it was somewhat successful in the sense that arguably free and fair elections to a
Constituent Assembly were held in 199340. The balance sheet might be mixed, but UNTAC
certainly had better results than some other UN missions that would follow in the 1990s41.
III. The Making and Development of the Constitution
1. The Paris Agreements
Constitution making in Cambodia was requested to be a comparatively quick affair in
1993 as the Paris Agreements required adoption of the constitution within three months
after the election of the Constitutional Assembly42. The main direction of a Cambodian
Constitution was already given as well. The Paris Agreements provided guidance in Annex 5, basically prescribing the supremacy of the constitution and a concept of liberal,
human rights and rule of law based democracy:
“(1.) The constitution will be the supreme court of the land. It may be amended only
by a designated process involving legislative approval, popular referendum, or both.
(2.) Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special measures to assure the protection
of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a declaration of fundamental
rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions,
due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without compensation, and freedom from racial,
ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. It will prohibit the retroactive application
40 The UN Security Council endorsed the elections as basically free and fair. For an analysis of the
mission see e.g. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, New York 1995
(Oxford University Press); Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate,
Boulder 1995; Lucy Keller, UNTAC in Cambodia – from Occupation, Civil War and Genocide to Peace,
9 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 127-178 (2005).
41 For general analysis on United Nations Peace Building and Transitional Authority Activities with
multiple references to Cambodia see e.g. Michael W. Doyle / Nicholas Sambanis, Making War &
Building Peace. United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton 2006 (Princeton University Press) and
David Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State
Building, Oxford 2004 (Oxford University Press).
42 For descriptions of the process see Marks (note 24), pp. 56-64; MacAlister Brown / Joseph J. Zasloff,
Cambodia. Confounds of the Peacemakers 1979-1998, Ithaca & London 1998 (Cornell University
Press), p. 199; Raoul Jennar, International Co-operation in the Drafting of the 1993 Constitution,
in: Faculty of Law and Economics / Nagoya University, International Symposium “Constitutionalism
in Cambodia”, Phnom Penh 2003, pp. 27-36 Say Bory, Constitutional Changes in Cambodia in the
context of international relations, presentation at the Asian Forum of Constitutional Law, Nagoya,
September 22/23.
16 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
of criminal law. The declaration will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved
individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
(3.) The constitution will declare Cambodia’s status as a sovereign, independent and
neutral State, and the national unity of the Cambodian people.
(4.) The constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy,
on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide a
full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.
(5.) An independent judiciary will be established, empowered to enforce the rights provided under the constitution.
(6.) The constitution will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
constituent assembly.”
These benchmarks were drawn from the Namibian Constitution-Making in 1982 and were
also used in Bosnia Herzegovina in the beginning of the 1990’s43. It seems therefore that
these criteria are emerging as the necessary nucleus of a modern constitutional state. The
Paris Agreements are part of a general development towards a right to good governance
and democracy44. The constitution making process in post-conflict countries is immediately affected by this development, if it takes place in the context of United Nation’s involvement. Cambodia is a remarkable example of this phenomenon, given the fact that
a range of parties to the Paris Agreements do not fulfil the aforementioned criteria for a
constitution in their own systems.
2. Constitution Making
The elections for the Constituent Assembly had provided the Royalist FUNCINPEC Party,
under Prince Norodom Ranaridhh (a son of former King Sihanouk), with a majority, followed by the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) of Prime Minister Hun Sen as the second
strongest force. As CPP controlled basically all state institutions and was not prepared to
give up control, difficult negotiations were predictable. The relevant draft for a constitution was in the end not prepared by the Constitutional Assembly, but by a small committee consisting of twelve members appointed by the Assembly45.
43 See Ratner (note 37), p. 27.
44 See the groundbreaking article by Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AJIL 46, 90-91 (1992); comprehensively Gregory H. Fox / Brad R. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance
and International Law, Cambridge 2000 (Cambridge University Press).
45 Six FUNCINPEC, five CPP, one BLDP (Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party).
Chapter 1 | 17
Despite massive criticism by the media and NGOs about the secrecy surrounding the
deliberations46 they remained widely confidential. The committee had no spokesperson and members were not allowed to speak publicly about the process. Even the other
members of the Constituent Assembly were not informed about the drafting process in
detail! Foreign influence was blocked from the beginning of the work of the committee47
and the draft for a “bill of rights” prepared by the UNTAC Human Rights Component
was not even disseminated to the members of the Constitutional Assembly48. In the end
there were two options, one republican (seemingly favoured by CPP) and one monarchic
(seemingly favoured by FUNCINPEC)49. Hun Sen and Ranaridhh travelled to consult with
former King Sihanouk in Pyong Yang (North Korea) and afterwards a draft constitution,
reviving a constitutional monarchy, was put for open debate in the National Assembly.
Within five days of discussion (September 15 to 19, 1993) this constitution was adopted
with 113 votes in favour, 5 against and 2 abstentions.
Since 1993 the Constitution has been amended repeatedly. A first amendment in 1994
related to Article 28, allowing the king to delegate his duty of signing laws, to the acting
head of state in case of illness and hospitalization abroad. The most important amendment was made in 1999, when, in order to overcome the difficulties after the elections of
1998, a Senate was created. Another amendment in 2001 affected some provisions about
the king. In 2004, again ending a post-election-stalemate, an “additional law to the Constitution” was adopted which allows the amendment of constitutional rules after elections outside the procedure of constitutional amendment50. This law did not amend the
constitutional text itself, but amended it in substance. In 2005, mainly in reaction to an
ongoing boycott of parliament sessions by the opposition, quorums for parliament sessions were lowered, and in 2006 the unusual two-thirds majority for the parliamentary
confidence vote on the government was abolished in favour of the internationally more
“normal” absolute (“fifty plus one”) majority principle. Finally, in January 2008 the provisions on the administration levels (Articles 145, 146) were slightly amended.
46 Phnom Penh Post, August 13-26, 1993 and August 27-September 9, 1993.
47 Brown/Zasloff (note 42), p. 195, suggest, however, that a draft of French professor Claude Gilles
Gour, who was working in behalf of Norodom Ranaridhh, was most close to the constitution finally
48 Brown/Zasloff (note 42), p. 193-194.
49 Marks (note 24), 63; on the Monarchy-Republic-question see also Brown/Zasloff (note 42), pp. 197199.
50 Law of July 8, 2004. Whereas originally such amendments needed at least a two/third majority in
parliament they can, after amendment of the law in 2006, now be conducted with the absolute
majority of votes.
18 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
The number of amendments of the constitution since its adoption in 1993 (seven including the additional law) is not exceptionally high by international standards. Constitutions that are taken seriously occasionally need amendments and there is no general rule
that constitutions should be amended as rarely as possible. It is not so much the number
of amendments which seem problematic in Cambodia, but the occasions and their means
of adoption. Each of the amendments, as well as the “additional law”, were more or less
a spontaneous reaction to political crisis or situations51. In no case has there been any
public debate. Furthermore, there has not been and there is not currently, any substantial
debate about constitutional reform in Cambodia.
IV. General Overview and Characterisation
1. Core Elements of the Constitution
The Constitution, as it stands in early 2008, is based on the principles of democracy, fundamental rights, rule of law and separation of power52. Although details are not always
carefully drafted and therefore numerous uncertainties in interpretation remain53, the
constitution undoubtedly follows the concept of a liberal democracy. It is influenced not
only by the benchmarks of the Paris Agreements, but also by historical constitutions in
Cambodia (particularly the 1947 monarchic Constitution as well as the immediate precedent of 1989) and other sources. Despite certain foreign influences (constitutions as diverse as those of Japan, France, Germany, the United States, the Philippines, Thailand and
even Zimbabwe were reportedly taken into account54), the constitution has been rightly
described as being “distinctly Cambodian”55.
51 See also Say Bory (note 42), p. 8.
52 For overviews on the Cambodian Constitution see Marks (note 24); Maurice Gaillard (dir.), Droit
Constitutionel Cambodgien, Phnom Penh 2005 (Edition Funan); Jörg Menzel, Cambodia, in: Gerhard
Robbers (ed.), Encyclopedia of World Constitutions, Vol. I, New York 2006 (Facts on File), pp. 150-156;
H. Suresh, Comments on the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Legal Reforms on Cambodia
Series. Monograph No. 1, Hong Kong 2001; a basic textbook is Matthew Rendall, The Constitution
and Government of Cambodia, Phnom Penh 1999.
53 It should be noted that, from a comparative perspective, technical weaknesses in constitutions are
fairly normal around the world, as constitutions are often drafted under extreme time pressure and
as they often contain vague political compromises on controversial issues. Some imprecision might
not be negative at all, as it keeps the constitution open for a dynamic interpretation in time.
54 See Say Bory, (note 42), p. 3. Professor Say Bory was involved in the drafting process.
55 See Brown/Zasloff (note 42), p. 200, citing two Louis Aucoin and Dolores Donovan, two American
law professors who served as advisors in Cambodia during that time.
Chapter 1 | 19
From a comparative perspective the Cambodian Constitution is medium sized with
158 fairly short articles in sixteen chapters, encompassing the fundamentals of the state,
institutions and fundamental rights, and prescribes the major policies56. The most remarkable concept of the original version of the constitution, from a comparative constitutional
law perspective, was the establishment of a two-third majority for a vote of confidence
in favour of the incoming Prime Minister, which gave the constitution a somewhat “consensual” flavour. As mentioned, this peculiarity was abandoned in 2006.
2. The Concept of a Rigid Constitution
and the “Additional Constitution”
The Cambodian Constitution is a normative constitution from its textual concept. Article
150 stipulates the supremacy of the constitution in plain words. Every law and every state
action shall conform to the provisions of the constitution. A Constitutional Council is established to ensure that this supremacy prevails in practice. The constitution itself tries
to put barriers to its amendments by prohibiting amendments “affecting the system of
liberal multi-party democracy and the regime of Constitutional Monarchy” (Article 153)57,
thereby also describing a set of core principles of this constitution.
The rules of constitutional amendment were significantly compromised, however,
when in 2004 an additional law to the constitution was adopted, which, outside the procedure for constitutional amendment, opened the door for de facto amendments of the
constitution after National Assembly elections, by Members of the new National Assembly.
The law was, despite strong arguments suggesting unconstitutionality, not declared void
by the Constitutional Council, which argued that after its adoption it had constitutional
rank and was not subject to control by the Constitutional Council58. Its irregularity has
been further increased by an amendment of the law adopted in 2006, which allows for
such de facto amendments after elections with an absolute majority of votes (instead of
the two-thirds normally necessary for constitutional amendments). Because of the “additional constitution”, the rigidity of the original constitution is now to a certain extent
periodically suspended after national elections.
56 The chapters are as follows: I. Sovereignty; II. The King; III. The Rights and Obligations of Khmer
Citizens; IV. On Policy; V. Economy; VI. Education, Culture and Social Affairs; VII. The National
Assembly; VIII. The Senate; IX. The Assembly and the Senate; X. The Royal Government; XI. The
Judiciary; XII. The Constitutional Council; XIII. The Administration; XIV. The National Congress; XV.
Effects, Revisions and Amendments of the Constitution; XVI. Transitional Provisions.
57 Similar “eternity clauses“ can be found in other constitutions around the world, particularly in countries
with experiences of cruel dictatorship, see e.g. Article 79 (3) of the German Constitution.
58 Decision of September 2, 2004, Dec. No. 060/002/2004. The case might be regarded as a strong
reminder about the limits of constitutionalism in current Cambodia, but at the same time it seems
remarkable that the “additional law-solution”, as doubtful from a constitutional perspective as it
may be, is still based on an attempt to formally legitimize the procedure, preferring a doubtful legal
construction over open breach of the constitution on a kind of “emergency” argument.
20 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
V. System of Government
The institutional system of the Cambodian Constitution is quite standard for a bi-cameral
constitutional monarchy nowadays: the King is Head of State with mainly symbolic functions; the Government (Council of Ministers) is headed by a Prime Minister; legislation lies
with Parliament, which consists of a National Assembly and a Senate; the constitutionality of laws shall be guaranteed by a Constitutional Council. Apart from these “standard”
institutions the Constitution provides for two kinds of congresses. The “Congress” is the
common gathering of National Assembly and Senate and it shall “resolve important questions of the nation” (Arts. 116-117). A “National Congress” has Khmer citizens as participants and it shall adopt recommendations for consideration by the National Assembly and
Senate (Arts. 147-149). For both congresses no implementing legislation has been adopted
and none have been put into practice yet59. Whereas these congresses can therefore be
neglected for the time being and the Constitutional Council will be discussed in the next
chapter, some remarks may be made here regarding king, government and parliament.
As mentioned above, re-establishment of the monarchy seemingly was among the controversial topics during the making of the constitution. The sensitivity of the issue is revealed
by the fact that not only is the principle of “constitutional monarchy” immune to constitutional amendment (Article 153), but also Article 7 according to which “the king shall
reign but not govern” (Art. 17). Despite these “eternity-clauses” protecting the monarchy
(and limiting it at the same time) there was from the beginning occasional speculation
on whether the monarchy would be upheld after the end of the reign of King Sihanouk.
But when Sihanouk, in 2004, declared his definite wish to resign, another problem was
on the table first. The constitution stipulates that the office of the king is for a lifetime
(Article 7 (2)) and does not mention the possibility of resignation. The Prime Minister
accordingly first stated that King Sihanouk legally could not retire, but later changed his
mind and King Sihamoni (a son of King Sihanouk and Queen Monique) was crowned in
a three day long ceremony October 28-30, 2004. Tensions between the throne and the
office of the Prime Minister seemingly have become less since then, as the new king adheres more strictly to a principle of non-interference in politics.
59 In the case of the National Congress this seems to be a violation of the Constitution, as it clearly
provides that this Congress shall meet on a yearly basis. It seems that these are simply “forgotten”
institutions of the constitution.
Chapter 1 | 21
Constitutionally, the king has probably more rights than the general clause “the king
of Cambodia reigns but does not govern” suggests. One of the powers which are of significant political relevance is the right to grant amnesty (Article 27) and currently there
is an uncertainty and controversy on whether the king is free in this decision to grant
amnesty or if he can only act on the recommendation of the government60.
The status and function of the Royal Government (“Council of Ministers”) resembles that
of governments in parliamentary systems around the globe, if one simply bases the analyses on the constitutional text. The candidate for the office of Prime Minister, chosen by
the chairman of the National Assembly from the winning party, as well as his candidates
for the government, requires a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. The constitution does not have much to say about the government: the chapter on government
contains only nine articles, compared to twenty-four articles in the chapter regarding the
king. The particular strength of the Office of the Prime Minister is also not apparent from
the constitutional provisions, but it has a clear legal basis in the Law on the Organization
and Functioning of the Council of Ministers (1994), which stipulates in Article 9 that the
Prime Minister “manages and gives out commands on all activities of the executive in
all fields”. Apart from this law it is mainly a question of the political culture and present
political situation in Cambodia, in which current Prime Minister Hun Sen is commonly
labelled as the “strong man” of the country61, a “title” which he has occasionally personally endorsed62. This strongman-position is not only intra-governmental, but also applies to the other constitutional institutions. Generally the government is comparatively
strong as many laws regulating their conduct are either not in place. Legislation itself is
proposed almost exclusively by the government and parliament rarely questions, rejects
or modifies proposed legislation in the process. Judicial control of government action is
also a theoretical concept.
60 This discussion is interesting as it offers insights into the nature of the criminal justice system itself:
As the constitution does not mention any right of the government / prime minister to substantially
decide on amnesties, such a right might only derive from the provision that the king shall not “govern”.
Qualifying amnesties as part of “governing” seems indeed to be quite realistic in Cambodia, given the
fact that many politicians in the country have been sentenced and subsequently pardoned in recent
history for reasons that critics qualified as “political”. Such a line of argument seems to contradict,
however, to the concept of a non political criminal justice and judicial system as stipulated in the
61 For criticism see e.g. Duncan McGargo, Cambodia: Getting Away With Authoritarianism?, 16 Journal
of Democracy 98-112 (2005); Steve Heder, Hun Sen’s Consolidation. Death or Beginning of Reform?,
Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, pp. 113-131.
62 See Harish C. Mehta / Julie B. Mehta, Hun Sen, Strongman of Cambodia, Singapore 1999 (Graham
Brash), p. 261.
22 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
There is no regulation and no control whatsoever on the size of the government. Cabinet had around 260 members after the establishment of a new government in 2004, making it one of the biggest cabinets in the world. In addition to the Prime Minister, Deputy
Prime Ministers, Senior Ministers, Ministers and Secretaries of States, there are, according
to some estimates, around a thousand governmental Advisors, which often equal in rank
with Ministers. Administratively, the country consists of provinces, districts, communes
and villages. Commune councils are directly elected by the people since the first commune elections in 2002. Officials on the other levels have traditionally been appointed,
but according to current draft legislation (as of February 2008) there shall be indirectly
elected councils on the district and province levels in the future. Decentralization and
public service reform are officially top priorities in the field of administrative reform63.
The bi-cameral Cambodian parliament consists of a National Assembly and Senate64. The
current 123 members of the National Assembly are elected in a national election for a
five year mandate, whereas the current 61 Senators are mostly indirectly elected by Commune Council and National Assembly members for a six year mandate. Candidates are
appointed exclusively by political parties and although the constitution promises freedom of individual mandate, election laws for the National Assembly and Senate stipulate
loss of mandate in the case of loss of party membership. This is particularly significant
as party structures in Cambodia are traditionally fairly autocratic with no available remedies against expulsion under the Law on Political Parties65. Repeatedly there have been
expulsions of members from the National Assembly as well as from the Senate66. Fur-
63 On Decentralization see generally Caroline Rusten / Kim Sedara / Eng Netra / Pak Kimchoueun, The
Challenges of Decentralisation Design in Cambodia, Phnom Penh 2004 (Cambodia Development
Resource Institute); Robert B. Oberndorf, Law Harmonization in Relation to the Decentralisation
Process in Cambodia, Phnom Penh 2004 (Cambodia Development Resource Institute).
64 The Law of Parliament consists mainly of the respective constitutional provisions, election laws for
National Assembly and Senate, Laws on the Statute of its members and the International Regulations
of both houses.
65 The Law on Political Parties (1997) requests the political parties to establish by-laws which, inter
alia, shall contain rules regarding admission and expulsion of members (Article 10 (a)(4)), but no
grounds for expulsion are listed, nor are there remedies.
66 In practice, members of the National Assembly and the Senate have repeatedly been expelled from
their parties and removed from their mandates over the years. The most famous case was the removal
of former FUNCINPEC Minister of Finance, Sam Rainsy, from the National Assembly in 1995. Three
CPP Senators lost their membership in the Senate after expulsion from their political party in 2001,
after the Senate had, with a majority, rejected the controversial law on Aggravating Circumstances for
Felonies. Whereas the legality of the Senators’ removal at the time was controversial, it is now clarified
in the election laws for National Assembly and Senate that loss of party membership implicates loss
of mandate as a member of parliament.
Chapter 1 | 23
thermore, immunity of members of the National Assembly has been lifted on a number
of occasions, partly allowing for criminal prosecutions that were labelled as politically
motivated by critics.
Laws can be proposed by parliament, but in practice nearly all laws are drafted within
the government and then sent to parliament for adoption. Draft laws are first discussed
and adopted in the National Assembly and are then reviewed by the Senate within (normally) four weeks. The Senate cannot finally veto any law, but only send it back to the
National Assembly with recommendations, which can than either change the draft law or
simply overrule the Senate’s objections. National Assembly and Senate have some legal
possibilities to monitor government activities and they are involved in some appointments
of other public officials. National Assembly and Senate have viarious (currently nine) commissions as well as influential permanent committees. The President of the Senate serves
as Acting Head of State in case of absence or illness of the king.
Overall there is widespread opinion (even among the parliamentarians themselves)
that the functions of parliament (National Assembly and Senate alike) are not fully developed yet in substance67.
VI. Fundamental Rights
1. The Constitutional Concept of Fundamental Rights
As already mentioned, fundamental rights play a prominent role in the constitution. The
constitutional chapter on rights starts with an embracement of the international human
rights in Article 31 (1):
“The Kingdom of Cambodia recognizes and respects human rights as stipulated in the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants
and conventions related to human rights, women’s and children’s rights. “
The precise legal relevance of this clause is subject to considerable uncertainty. Whereas
human rights organisations are mostly of the opinion that this provision lifts human rights
treaties into the rank of constitutional law, the Cambodian Government has been inconsistent with its statements, by sometimes insisting on the necessity for a transformation
by national legislation (dualist theory), and sometimes recommending immediate application by courts. The Cambodian Constitutional Council, in a decision of June 19, 2007, has
stipulated that the international conventions ratified by Cambodia (like the Child Rights
Convention) are to be taken into account when applying national law 68.
67 See also Hor Peng, The Reform of Parliament in Cambodia: Towards Effective Working Parliament
in Terms of Strong Representation, PhD study (unpublished), Nagoya 2005.
68 On this decision see supra VII.
24 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
The fundamental rights granted by the Cambodian Constitution itself mostly resemble
a traditional rights catalogue, mixing liberal, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
The wording is an obvious mixture of provisions of earlier Cambodian constitutions and
modern influences. Part of the Right to Life is the abolishment of the death penalty (Article 32), which is remarkable in the Southeast Asian context where the death penalty is
still applied (but which had already been introduced by the 1989 constitutional amendments69). An obvious deficit from a general perspective is that many fundamental rights
seem only to be granted to “Khmer Citizens” and there are indications that the choice of
words is designed to allow discrimination particularly of people of Vietnamese descent70.
Apart from this it has been criticised that the fundamental rights catalogue would emphasize the limits of fundamental freedoms too much. In the very beginning of the chapter
on fundamental rights (Art. 31 (2)) we find a general limitation:
“The exercise of personal rights and freedom by any individual shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. The exercise of such rights and freedoms shall be
in accordance with the law.”
Seemingly broad restrictions are also made possible in some specific provisions. Particular wide is Article 41 (1):
“Khmer citizens shall have freedom of expression of their ideas, freedom of information, freedom of publication and freedom of assembly. No one shall exercise these rights
to infringe upon the honour of others, or to affect the good customs of society, public
order and national security.”
Although some restrictions of fundamental freedoms in general and the freedom of expression are inevitable in any society, one might argue that such restrictions, as in Article
40, are broad by international standards71. They are, however, in line with a certain tradition of Southeast Asian constitutional thinking, which emphasizes community obligations
and suggests that individual freedoms (particularly political freedoms) can be effectively
traded off against economic and social development.
In this context of Asian (Southeast-Asian) values it seems consequential that the whole
chapter containing fundamental rights is titled “The Rights and Obligations of Khmer Citizens” and that it contains a range of obligations of citizens as well as rights (Articles 47,
49, 50). Despite such particularities, it is widely acknowledged from an overall perspective
69 See Constitution of the State of Cambodia (1989), Article 35 (9).
70 See Marks (note 24), p. 70-73. Earlier English translations suggest that even the right to life, personal
freedom and security (Article 32 [1]) are only attributed to Khmer Citizens, but this is a mistake in
translation as the Khmer version speaks of “everybody” insofar.
71 Compare also the ICCPR, Article 19, allowing restrictions on the freedom of opinion and expression if
they are “provided by law and are necessary (a) for the respect of the rights or reputation of others;
Chapter 1 | 25
that the catalogue on civil rights is in line with standards not only in the Asian world, but
also from a Western perspective72. In parts, the agenda is decisively modern and in line
with modern rights language. Women’s and children’s rights are properly stipulated as is
protection from exploitation at work etc. Environmental rights are still missing, however,
maybe because environmental degradation was not as visible as a problem in the Cambodia of 1993, as it is today.
2. Fundamental Rights and State Practice
Cambodia’s problem in the sphere of fundamental rights is not located on the paper of
the constitution, but in the political and legal reality. International organisations, as well
as national non-governmental organisations, have continuously criticised the Cambodian
human rights record since the adoption of the constitution73. A culture of human rights
seems not to be established yet74. The Cambodian Government unsurprisingly does not
accept that criticism, partly claiming that positive developments are not sufficiently taken
into account by the numerous reports, and partly insisting that progress takes time and
Cambodia is still recovering from a decades long conflict situation. In the case of press
freedom, it also claims that freedom in Cambodia is more advanced than most Southeast
Asian countries. However, the list of problems is long. With regard to the media it cannot
be ignored, for example, that critical and independent reporting has no place in Cambodian Television yet. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of assembly and demonstration has been largely suspended for years after riots against the Thai Embassy following
accusations that a young female Thai singer had insulted Cambodians75. Excessive use
of force by police, violations of the rights of the accused in criminal procedure and inhuman prison conditions, are all well reported. Domestic violence, particularly against
women, is an ongoing problem despite the adoption of a special law and children’s rights
have been widely disregarded in criminal procedure as has their treatment in prison76.
Problems of forced land eviction have been in the focus of national and international hu72 Fernando (note 3), p. 494.
73 For numerous reports see the websites of the Cambodian Office of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://cambodia.ohchr.org), where yearly general reports as
well as numerous thematic reports and statements can be accessed. Further information is available
e.g. at the websites of the State Department of the United States, Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch. Important sources of information are also the regular reports of national human rights
NGOs like ADHOC (http://www.adhoc-chra.org) and LICHADO (http://www.lichadho.org).
74 See also Terence Duffy, Towards a Culture of Human Rights in Cambodia, 16 Human Rights Quarterly
82-105 (1994).
75 The constitutionality of the pre-constitutional and Law on Demonstrations (1991) has been confirmed
by the Constitutional Council in its decision of October 4, 2004 (Case No. 062/004/2004). The court
did not address, however, the fact that the practice of the authorities does evidently not reflect the
state of the law, as it has to be interpreted in the light of the constitution.
76 On prison conditions generally see LICHADO, Prison Conditions in Cambodia 2005 & 2006: One
day in the life … ( January 2007).
26 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
man rights organizations for years77. Social rights promised by the constitution still are in
sharp conflict with the reality of one of the lowest life expectancies in the region, insufficient healthcare, low quality educational facilities etc. This problem, however, is hardly
specific to Cambodia, but is shared by nearly all developing countries which endeavour
to guarantee social rights in their constitutions.
3. Institutions of Fundamental Rights Protection
From an institutional perspective the protection of fundamental rights is still in its infancy.
Most effective for the time being is the work of NGOs and international organisations.
Cambodian Courts, on the other hand, rarely take rights into account. In the National
Assembly and the Senate there are commissions that can be petitioned by people with
human rights complaints, but government ministries often do not even answer requests
from these commissions for explanation about certain events. The Prime Minister has appointed a governmental human rights advisor, but there is no independent human rights
commission, as in a number of other ASEAN states. Cambodia has also not signed the
first additional protocol to the ICCPR and therefore individual complaints are impossible
at an international level for the time being.
1. The Constitutional Council as a Constitutional Court
As mentioned earlier the Constitution clearly stipulates the supremacy of the constitution. The Constitutional Council78 is the main organ of judicial review. The Constitutional Council is basically an institution inspired by the French constitutional tradition, but
also takes up elements of a constitutional court. The Constitution seems to borrow from
the Constitution of 1972. However, the “Constitutional Court” stipulated there was much
less a court than today’s “Constitutional Council”. And whereas the Constitutional Court
under the 1972 Constitution actually never materialized, the establishment of the current Constitutional Council finally took place five years after adoption of the constitution
(raising the question if laws adopted in between were constitutional at all79). The Con77 See most recently Amnesty International, Rights Razed. Forzed Evictions in Cambodia, February 11,
78 The official website of the Constitutional Council with decisions in Khmer, French and English (from
2004) is http://www.ccc.gov.kh/english/history.php. For an early French language analysis on the
Constitutional Council see also Jeanne Page, Le Conseil Constitutionnel du Cambodge, Annuaire
international de justice constitutionnel, Vol. 17 (2001), p. 75.
79 See Matthew Granger, King’s Advisor Bemoans Lack of Constitutional Council, Phnom Penh Post,
October 6, 1998.
Chapter 1 | 27
stitutional Council has nine members, who are regularly appointed for a nine year term.
Constitutional Council members do not need to have a legal background, but require a
high level qualification. There is a minimum age of 45 years but no maximum age80. The
competences of the court are enumerated in Articles 136, 140 and 141. The Constitutional
Council is responsible for deciding on:
• disputes on the election of the members of the National Assembly and Senate (Art.
136 (2)),
• the constitutionality of the internal regulations of the National Assembly and the Senate
as well as other organisational laws before promulgation (Article 140 (2)),
• the constitutionality of other laws already adopted by parliament but before promulgation
on the request of the King, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly
or the Senate, 1/10 of the members of the National Assembly or ¼ of the members
• the constitutionality of laws after promulgation on the request of the King, the Prime
Minister, the President of the National Assembly or the Senate, 1/10 of the members
of the National Assembly or ¼ of the members of the Senate or the courts,
• the decision of the Ministry of Interior not to register a political party81.
• the Constitutional Council shall be consulted by the king on all proposals to amend
the constitution (Article 143) and
• it gives advisory opinions based on its competence to interpret the constitution (Article
136 (1))82.
The overview clearly shows that the Cambodian Constitutional Council combines functions of the French model of a constitutional council with those of real constitutional
courts83. It makes ex ante and ex post control of laws possible and even allows courts
80 In summer 2007, one member retired at the remarkable age of 103 years!
81 Law on Political Parties (1997), Article 25.
82 One might doubt that Article 136 (1) of the Constitution really provides jurisdiction. It seems more
appropriate to understand this provision as an introductory statement on the general function of
83 For qualification as a constitutional court see Graham Hassall / Cheryl Saunders, Asia-Pacific
Constitutional Systems, Cambridge 2002 (Cambridge University Press), p. 179.
28 | Cambodian Constitutional Law
to refer cases to the Constitutional Council if the constitutionality of a law is in doubt84.
This function of checking laws after adoption and on occasion of their application in the
courts, clearly exceeds the French model of a Constitutional Council.
2. Towards a Decade of Jurisprudence
From a practical point of view, cases about election dispute have dominated the Council’s work, but the right to make a request to the Constitutional Council has also been
used repeatedly by Presidents of the National Assembly and Senate, as well as groups of
parliamentarians. It seems fair to assess that the Constitutional Council has been careful
not to provoke the government so far85. Only rarely has it declared provisions in a law
to be unconstitutional86, and in no case has it challenged the government on a politically
sensitive issue. The ascetic style of drafting decisions, hardly offering any reasoning but
only presenting results, contributes to the insignificant impact it has had so far on legal
The “visibility” of the Constitutional Council is also reduced by having no dissenting
votes and its members are not allowed to speak publicly about cases. This in itself might
not be a negative concept, given the fact that the court still has to establish itself as an
authority. Only in a very few cases has the Constitutional Council delivered a thorough
reasoning. One such case was an election control case of 1998 87, another one was in respect of the Law on Communal Administration88. In 2006, a law on the status of members
of the National Assembly, which seems to contain a significant restriction on parliamentary immunity89, was declared constitutional on the basis that the law is only supposed
84 The same concept is to be found in Germany, see Article 100 (1) of the German Constitution. The law
on the Constitutional Council has limited this right to the Supreme Court, however, it is a restriction
which seems questionable as the constitution simply states that “the courts” may refer cases to the
Constitutional Council. Until now no cases have yet been referred by the courts to the Constitutional
Council. An interesting question could arise if the constitutionality of Cambodian laws becomes a
topic at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (Khmer Rouge Tribunal), see Scott
Worden, An Anatomy of the Extraordinary Chambers, in: Jaya Ramji and Beth van Schaack (eds.),
Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice, Lewiston 2005 (Edwin Mellen Press), pp. 171-220, at 204-205.
85 UN-Special Representative on Human Rights of December 2006 (http://cambodia.ohchr.org), paragraph
86 See Decision of May 28, 1999 (Dec. No. 07/99), regarding a provision in the law on the formation
of the Minister of Womens’ and Veterans’ Affairs that required the minister to be a woman, decisions
of January 28, 2000 (Dec. No. 035/001/2000) and of August 28, 2000 (Dec. No. 037/003/2000),
regarding the establishment of the National Audit Authority; Decision of February 12, 2001 (Dec. No.
040/002/2001), regarding the unconstitutionality of a death penalty in the Law on the Extraordinary
87 Decision of July, 17, 1998 (Docket No. 03).
88 Decision of January, 15, 2003 (Dec. No. 050/001/2003).
89 Art. 5 of the Law on the Status of the Members of the National Assembly: “The members of the
National Assembly shall not use their immunity to violate the credit of other individuals, good custom
of society, public order, and national security.”
Chapter 1 | 29
to raise awareness of the parliamentarians, but that they would not be deprived of any
constitutionally guaranteed immunity90. It should be acknowledged that this decision at
least indicates some willingness to enforce constitutional values91.
3. The 2007 Decision on Children’s Rights
On July 10, 2007, the Constitutional Council has, again in only a few words, stated clearly
that judges have to consider not only the constitution, but also international human rights
treaties ratified by Cambodia when applying the law92. The decision has been applauded
by the UN Human Rights watchdog in Cambodia as well as by local NGOs. It is indeed
“good news” in the sense that it clarifies a most relevant problem in Cambodian law,
which seemingly disallowed reduced penalties for children in case of certain felonies. At
the same time, the case illustrates the obvious carefulness of the Constitutional Council.
The decision is short and vague. The whole reasoning is as follows:
“The Constitutional Council …
–– Understands that [although] article 8 modifies article 7093 of UNTAC law, it does not
affect [undermine] the rights and interests of children. The provision of article 8 of the
law on aggravating circumstances above is not unconstitution