Source: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/02/02-9525.htm
Timestamp: 2019-01-17 23:38:16
Document Index: 197481356

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1158', '§ 1231', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1158', '§ 1252', '§ 1158', '§ 1654', '§ 309']

02-9525 -- Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft -- 02/11/2003
| Keyword | Case | Docket | Date: Filed / Added | (25545 bytes) (22420 bytes)
ERDENEBILEG TSEVEGMID,
No. 02-9525
(No. A76-916-000)
Petitioner Erdenebileg Tsevegmid, a native and citizen of Mongolia, seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), affirming the immigration judge's denial of Mr. Tsevegmid's requests for asylum and for withholding of removal. We dismiss the petition for review with respect to asylum and deny the petition with respect to withholding of removal.(1)
On February 16, 1999, the INS received Mr. Tsevegmid's application for asylum and withholding of removal.(2) His requests for relief relied on his highly-visible membership in the Mongolian United Movement, a human rights group. He asserted that he had been beaten by three or four young people and that the attack was attributable to his Mongolian United Movement activities. If he returned to Mongolia, he would again become active in the Mongolian United Movement and would be placed in a life-threatening situation.
Mr. Tsevegmid, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for review in this court and a request for a stay of deportation pending appeal. We entered an order temporarily staying the removal of Mr. Tsevegmid, until February 13, 2003. We now address Mr. Tsevegmid's appellate issues.(3)
"An alien who fears persecution if deported has two possible means of relief: asylum and withholding of deportation." Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 462 (10th Cir. 1996).(4) The asylum statutory provisions are codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158; the withholding of removal provisions are in § 1231(b)(3). Although the two forms of relief serve comparable purposes and present similar factual issues, there are significant distinctions between them. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419 (1999). Asylum provides general relief, whereas withholding of removal applies only to a given country or countries. Asylum allows an alien to remain in the United States and apply for permanent resident status after one year, whereas withholding of removal does not. Id. Additionally, the standard of proof for withholding is higher than the standard of proof for asylum. An alien is not entitled to withholding without a showing that there is a clear probability of persecution due to his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 430 (1984). This is more demanding than the "well-founded fear" standard applicable to an asylum claim. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443-44 (1987). A final difference is that asylum is discretionary, while withholding of removal is mandatory upon proof of eligibility, with certain exceptions not applicable to this case. Id. at 443-44 & n.28. We turn first to our review of the asylum denial.
Our sister courts of appeals have uniformly reached literal interpretations of the statutory language and concluded that they lack jurisdiction to review a determination related to the timeliness of an asylum application. See Fahim v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that court has no jurisdiction to review a determination on either the timeliness of an asylum request or whether an alien has established extraordinary circumstances to warrant waiver of time limit); Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 1158(a)(3) precludes judicial review of a determination that an asylum application was untimely); Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he meaning of § 1158(a)(3) is clear: Congress intended to bar judicial review of decisions made under § 1158(a)(2)"). See also Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 433 (10th Cir. 1999) (using § 1158(a)(3) as an example of language which serves to "preclude direct review by any court of certain discretionary decisions made by the Attorney General").
Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms or adopts an immigration judge's decision, this court reviews the judge's analysis as if it were the BIA's. See, e.g., Li v. Ashcroft, 312 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002); Mousa v. INS, 223 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2000). The BIA's findings of fact are conclusive unless the record demonstrates that "'any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.'" Fahim, 278 F.3d at 1218 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(4)(A)-(B)).
To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant has the burden of demonstrating "a clear probability of persecution" attributable to "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, the immigration judge found that Mr. Tsevegmid had not shown past persecution in that he had not linked the attack on his person to political motives. Furthermore, there was no probability of future persecution:
[i]f [Mr. Tsevegmid] has no idea who this group was that might have attacked him, but if it was a group operating outside the government, he certainly has not shown the government is unwilling or unable to protect him, and it does not appear that it was the government itself.
The petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. This court's temporary stay pending appeal is dissolved. Mr. Tsevegmid's motion for a stay of removal relating to his wife is DENIED for lack of standing and his motion for appointment of attorney is DENIED.
2. Mr. Tsevegmid's wife and son entered the United States as nonimmigrant visitors authorized to remain until February 4, 1999, then overstayed their visas. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A), a "spouse or child . . . of an alien who is granted asylum . . . may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum . . . be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien." The wife and son's asylum request was encompassed within Mr. Tsevegmid's application.
3. Mr. Tsevegmid's wife and son are not parties to the appeal in this court. A litigant may bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of others. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing that "parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel"); see also Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (stating that parent had right to represent self, but not children).
4. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act's provisions for deportation (renamed "removal") and judicial review of orders of removal. Because petitioner's removal proceedings were commenced after the April 1, 1997, effective date of IIRIRA, this case is governed by IIRIRA's permanent rules. See IIRIRA § 309(a), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-625.
URL: http://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2003/02/02-9525.htm.