Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/387/397/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-07-25 04:47:47
Document Index: 464015966

Matched Legal Cases: ['arte 230', '§ 316', '§ 500', '§ 500', '§ 500', '§ 216', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 1', '§ 216', '§ 316', '§ 1', '§ 303', '§ 216', '§ 402', '§ 1002', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 1010', '§ 202', '§ 302', '§ 402', '§ 1002', '§ 202', '§ 302', '§ 1']

American Trucking Assns. v. A., T. & S.F. R. Co. (full text) :: 387 U.S. 397 (1967) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center Log In
› American Trucking Assns. v. A., T. & S.F. R. Co.
American Trucking Assns. v. A., T. & S.F. R. Co. 387 U.S. 397 (1967)
U.S. Supreme CourtAmerican Trucking Assns. v. A., T. & S.F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397 (1967)American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.No. 57Argued April 13 and 17, 1967Decided May 29, 1967*387 U.S. 397APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Pp. 387 U. S. 408-411. Page 387 U. S. 398
Pp. 387 U. S. 418-420. Page 387 U. S. 399
These three cases present the following question: does the Interstate Commerce Commission have authority to promulgate rules providing (1) that railroads which offer trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC or "piggyback") service to the Page 387 U. S. 400 public under open-tariff publications must make such service available on the same terms to motor and water common and contract carriers, and (2) that motor and water carriers may, subject to certain conditions, utilize TOFC facilities in the performance of their authorized service? Ex parte 230, Substituted Service -- Charges and Practices of For-Hire Carriers and Freight Forwarders (Piggyback Service), 322 I.C.C. 301 (1964).
"motor common and contract carriers water common and contract carriers, and freight forwarders may utilize TOFC service in the performance of all or any portion of their authorized service Page 387 U. S. 401 through the use of open-tariff TOFC rates published by a rail carrier."
"a freight-laden trailer secured to a flatcar, which in turn is coupled in a train being drawn by a locomotive Page 387 U. S. 402 over steel rails laid on the railroad's right-of-way. . . ."
Even prior to the New Haven case, beginning in 1939, in Substituted Freight Service, 232 I.C.C. 683, it was the Commission's position that a railroad could grant or deny TOFC service to common carriers by motor. [Footnote 3] Even if the railroad offered such service generally to the public, it could withhold it from for-hire motor carriers. Except for limited uses of rail open tariffs permitted by certain railroads, [Footnote 4] contract and common carriers by motor participated in piggyback service only by agreement, including through route-joint rate arrangements between a railroad and a trucker (see Plan V, infra), and railroad acceptance of trailers or containers of truckers, the shipment moving under motor carrier tariffs and the railroad's compensation being based upon a division of charges arrived at through negotiations between the carriers (Plan I, infra). These arrangements had to be voluntary, for it has been the prevailing view that the railroads, as common carriers, had no duty to service truckers under their open tariffs, and, although 216(c), 49 U.S.C. § 316(c), authorizes motor common carriers to establish through routes and joint rates with rail common carriers, the Commission had no power to compel such joint arrangements. Page 387 U. S. 403
While data are not available precisely to define the growth of traffic under the various plans, the evidence indicates that major growth has been primarily in the Page 387 U. S. 404 all-rail, open-tariff plans -- that is, plans under which traffic moves at rail rates and on rail billings. The Commission's summary of responses to piggyback questionnaires, contained in the Record, shows that virtually all of the reporting railroads participate in Plans II and III and about three-fourths participate in Plan IV. However, only "somewhat more than half" of the reporting railroads participate in trucker-rail arrangements under either Plan I or V, and traffic in Plan V (joint railroad-truck rates-through routes) "generally is extremely limited." A number of the largest railroads do not offer to move trailers or containers for motor carriers on motor carrier bills of lading and billing under regular motor carrier tariffs (Plan I), [Footnote 5] or offer it only for limited types of traffic such as automobiles, or only to their own subsidiaries. Over 80% of rail movement of motor carrier-rail piggyback is under Plan I. ICC Bur. of Econ., Piggyback Traffic Characteristics 21 (1966).
322 I.C.C. at 303. Proposed rules were furnished to participants, opportunity was given to all of them to file statements, and an examiners' report was filed. After exceptions and oral argument, the Commission rendered Page 387 U. S. 405 its decision on March 16, 1964. The Commission stated that "It is our purpose and our hope to encourage the growth of this transportation phenomenon." 322 I.C.C. at 322. The rules which it prescribed incorporate the basic principles here at issue: that "when TOFC service is offered by a rail carrier to the public generally," it should likewise be available to motor or water common or contract carriers, in lieu of their authorized transportation between service points, or to for-hire carriers. Id. at 336. These rules also include ancillary or implementing provisions which are not here at issue; for example, it is provided that the motor carrier must give notice in its tariff publication if TOFC is to be used, and the user of the water or motor carrier may specify "that in any particular instance TOFC service not be utilized" (49 CFR §§ 500.3(b), (c), (d) (Supp. 1967)), and that these carriers may tender and receive traffic, TOFC, only at points that they are authorized to serve. Id. § 500.3(e).
The three-judge District Court concluded that Rules 2 and 3 (and Rule 5, id. § 500.5, insofar as it amplified those Rules) exceeded the Commission's authority and set them aside. In substance it held that the Interstate Commerce Act did not forbid a railroad to refuse to carry the trailers or containers of a competing mode of carrier; that the structure and plan of the Act, as well as the specific absence of compulsory power to the Commission in § 216(c), which authorizes voluntary joint rates and through routes by motor and rail carriers, indicated that the ICC is not at liberty to require the railroads to provide TOFC service to competing modes; that provisions of the Act regulating freight forwarders impelled the same conclusions, and that the Commission's long history of support for the position which its rules now repudiate, as well as legislative history, compelled rejection of the rules now promulgated. We disagree. Page 387 U. S. 406
Section 1(4) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(4), provides that it shall be the duty of common carriers by rail to provide transportation "upon reasonable request therefor" and to establish just and reasonable rates. Section 2, 49 U.S.C. § 2, prohibits discriminatory rates or charges. Section 3(1), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1), forbids undue Page 387 U. S. 407 preferences or advantages, and undue or unreasonable prejudices or disadvantages to any person, area or particular description of traffic. The Act does not contain any provision expressly exempting traffic offered by carriers by motor vehicle from these broad common carrier obligations of the railroads. On the contrary, these sections of the Act, read in light of the historic obligations and duties of common carriers and the large number of decisions of the Commission, and of the courts in this country and in England, indicate, presumptively at least, that railroads may not offer the service of transporting trailers for other shippers and deny that service to motor carriers. [Footnote 6] Indeed, as we have observed, the Commission's Rule 2 is practically a paraphrase of § 2 of the Act. It provides that, if a rail carrier through its open-tariff publications offers TOFC services, it shall make the same available "to any person" at the same charge. It is, of course, of no consequence that the Act does not expressly command that the railroads furnish this service to motor carriers. Their obligation as common carriers is comprehensive, and exceptions are not to be implied. The fact that the person tendering traffic is a competitor does not permit the railroad to discriminate against him or in his favor. See ICC v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235 (1911) (unlawful for railroads to charge less-than-carload rates for carload shipments tendered by freight forwarders); ICC v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 225 U. S. 326 (1912) (lower rates Page 387 U. S. 408 on coal shipped by another railroad for its own use as fuel held unlawful). Cf. Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512 (1897). As this Court said in Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., supra:
"There is no language in the present Act which specifically commands that railroads must interchange their cars with connecting water lines. We cannot agree with the contention that the absence Page 387 U. S. 409 of specific language indicates a purpose of Congress not to require such an interchange. True, Congress has specified with precise language some obligations which railroads must assume. But all legislation dealing with this problem since the first Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 379, has contained broad language to indicate the scope of the law. The very complexities of the subject have necessarily caused Congress to cast its regulatory provisions in general terms. Congress has, in general, left the contents of these terms to be spelled out in particular cases by administrative and judicial action, and in the light of the Congressional purpose to foster an efficient and fair national transportation system. Cf. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 29, 274 U. S. 36; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 315 U. S. 373, 315 U. S. 376-377."
In Seatrain, this Court emphatically rejected the analysis upon which the District Court here essentially based its position -- that, since the Act regulates rail, motor, and water carriers separately, in Titles I, II, and III, the Commission may not compel the mutual furnishing of services and facilities other than as expressly directed. Recognizing that, in the case of water carriers (as distinguished from motor carriers), the Act specifically directs railroads to establish through routes with them, the Court held that this is not the end of the railroads' obligation or the limit of the Commission's power. On the contrary, the Court, relying on the National Transportation Policy (49 U.S.C. preceding § 1), held that the Act is designed "to provide a completely integrated interstate regulatory system over motor, railroad, and water carriers . . ." 323 U.S. at Page 387 U. S. 410 323 U. S. 618-619, and that the Commission therefore had powers commensurate with that goal. In this connection, the Court said:
In view of this, we cannot accept arguments based upon arguable inference from nonspecific statutory language, limiting the Commission's power to adopt rules which, essentially, reflect its judgment in light of current facts as to the proper interrelationship of several modes of transportation with respect to an important new development. For example, § 216(c), 49 U.S.C. § 316(c), authorizes the railroads to enter into voluntary arrangements for through routes and joint rates with motor carriers. There is no Commission power to compel the railroads to do so, and it is argued that from this we Page 387 U. S. 411 should derive a congressional intent that the ICC may not compel the railroads to furnish services to the motor carriers in any circumstances. There is no basis for this vast leap from a particular authorization to a pervasive prohibition. See our discussion of Seatrain, supra.
"Paragraph (d). . . prohibits unjust discrimination or undue prejudice or disadvantage. The committee Page 387 U. S. 412 has added a provision that this prohibition shall not be construed to apply to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description."
Accordingly, we are remitted to consideration of the provisions of the Act which, in the most general terms, require the railroads to perform as common carriers. It is not our duty, of course, to concern ourselves with a nice evaluation of the arguments as to whether the Commission pursued the course of wisdom in ordering the railroads to make piggyback service available to motor carriers if it is offered to others on open-tariff rates. It is our task to scrutinize the Commission's authority, not the substance of its exercise. We conclude that, in light of the mandate of the National Transportation Policy, the Commission had authority derived from the common carrier obligations of the railroads as reflected in §§ 1(4), 2, and 3(1) of the Act to promulgate Rule 2 requiring Page 387 U. S. 413 that any railroad offering TOFC service through its open-tariff publications must make that service available "to any person" on nondiscriminatory terms. We come, then, to Rule 3.
It is strenuously contended, however, that whatever may be the railroads' duty, common carriers by motor vehicle may not be authorized to substitute transportation by rail for the transportation by road which is the basis of their franchise -- except with the agreement of the railroad. It is this exception that saps the argument of some of its force, if not its fervor. One would assume that, if the motor carriers are not authorized by their franchise under the Act to substitute transportation by rail for transportation by road, they could not do so with the consent of the railroads. But neither the railroads, most of which, by agreement, provide Page 387 U. S. 414 TOFC service to some motor carriers, nor the freight forwarders take this position. Nor did the court below. None of them urges the invalidity of Plan I as presently in use, which provides for trucker utilization of TOFC service with the railroad's concurrence. [Footnote 7] As the District Court put it:
But, regardless of this, there is no adequate reason to construe the Act so as to deprive the Commission of the power to authorize the carriers by motor vehicle to use TOFC when that service is offered by railroads to the public on open tariff. The Interstate Commerce Page 387 U. S. 415 Act defines a "common carrier by motor vehicle" as "any person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in . . . transportation by motor vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 303(a)(14). This does not exclude joint arrangements with water carriers or rail carriers, which are expressly permitted by § 216(c) on a voluntary basis, and, according to the appellants and the District Court, it is not inconsistent with the use of open-tariff TOFC if the railroad is willing. Clearly, too, a trucker which utilizes a ferry to transport its trailer and its cargo is not violating the statute or its certificate. We may properly assume, therefore, that the Act cannot be construed to require that the trucker must always transport its cargo exclusively by road. Appellees and the District Court argue, however, that the following factors demonstrate that the Commission may not authorize motor carriers to use TOFC service on open tariffs: the long history of the Commission's construction and application of the Act contrary to its present position, the history of congressional consideration, and the provisions of the Act relating to freight forwarders.
"in which one common carrier service is substituted for another through the use of an Page 387 U. S. 416 open-tariff rate of the carrier performing the substituted service -- provided that proper notice is given in the tariff publication of the carrier using the substituted service."
It is true that the attention of the Congress had been called to the need for action to secure the relief which the Commission subsequently granted in its rules. In February, 1962, the American Trucking Associations, in the course of oral argument in Gordon's Transports, Inc. v. Strickland Transp. Co., 318 I.C.C. 395, sustained sub nom. Strickland Transportation Co. v. United States, 219 F.Supp. 618 (D.C.N.D.Tex.1963), apparently Page 387 U. S. 417 urged that motor carriers be allowed to utilize TOFC open tariffs. On April 5, 1962, President Kennedy sent a transportation message to Congress calling for legislative action to
H.R.Doc. No. 384, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5 (1962). Secretary of Commerce Hodges transmitted to Congress proposed legislation to implement the President's message. Hearings on S. 3242 and S. 3243 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 13 (19.62). See also Hearings on S. 1061 and S. 1062 before Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 3 (1963). Bills were introduced in 1962 and 1963. See S. 3242 and H.R. 11584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. 1062 and H.R. 4701, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). On June 29, 1962, the Commission instituted the present proceeding. It advised Congress of its action and of its intention to "resolve" the matter or, if it could not, to recommend appropriate legislation. Surface Transportation Subcommittee Hearings, supra, pt. 2, p. 801; Hearings on H.R. 4700 and H.R. 4701 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 32 (1963). Following this, requests came from the industry to Congress that it withhold legislative action pending the Commission's decision. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4700 and H.R. 4701, supra, pt. 1, p. 213; pt. 2, p. 991. We do not regard this as legislative history demonstrating a congressional construction of the meaning of the statute, nor do we find in it evidence of Page 387 U. S. 418 an administrative interpretation of the Act which should tilt the scales against the correctness of the Commission's conclusions as to its authority to prescribe the present rules. The advocacy of legislation by an administrative agency -- and even the assertion of the need for it to accomplish a desired result- -- is an unsure and unreliable, and not a highly desirable, guide to statutory construction. The possibility of its use to prove more than it means may, but should not, deter administrative agencies from seeking helpful clarification of authority or a fresh and specific congressional mandate. [Footnote 9]
a rail, motor vehicle or water carrier. § 402(a)(5), 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5). It cannot perform the physical transportation except in its terminal areas. § 410(h), 49 U.S.C. 1010(h). It assembles shipments, consolidates Page 387 U. S. 419 them, ships them by common carrier (usually a railroad), receives them and separates and distributes them to individual consignees. The Act specifically provides that no permit to engage in freight forwarding shall be issued to any common carrier by rail, motor vehicle or water. § 410(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1010(c). But a freight forwarder may be controlled by such a carrier, or under common control with it, and the Act specifically provides that the Commission may not for this reason deny a permit to the freight forwarder. Ibid.
Forwarders are presently permitted to utilize railroad open-tariff TOFC service. Movement of Highway Trailers by Rail, 293 I.C.C. 93, 111 (1954). They may even quote trailer-load rates in competition with truckers and with rails. Eastern Express, Inc. v. United States, 198 F.Supp. 256 (D.C.S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 369 U. S. 37 (1962). But railroads, within their terminal areas (§ 202(c), 49 U.S.C. § 302(c)), and truckers have also traditionally assembled, consolidated, and distributed cargo in connection with providing their authorized transportation services. The Act expressly exempts from the freight-forwarder provisions any person who performs these services -- which are similar to those of freight forwarders -- as a carrier subject to another part of the Act. § 402(a)(5), 49 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(5). The Page 387 U. S. 420 House Report on Part IV makes it clear that the Part does not apply
The controlling fact of the matter is that all piggyback service is, by its essential nature, bimodal. [Footnote 10] It partakes of both the railroad and the trucking functions. The proper allocation of these bimodal functions involves complex considerations. It is not and cannot be precise or mathematical. Railroads are not now confined to the Page 387 U. S. 421 rails. They operate trucks. They are permitted to assemble cargo and, if they so desire, to use their own trucks or subsidiary companies to do so. § 202(c), 49 U.S.C. § 302(c). Truckers are not now strictly confined to the highway. In the absence of congressional direction, there is no basis for denying to the ICC the power to allocate and regulate transportation that partakes of both elements, and there is no basis whatever for denying to the Commission the power to carry out its responsibilities under the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1, to
"the inherent advantages of each mode of transportation can be given freest play through the highest degree of coordination, and . . . encouragement of such coordination is Page 387 U. S. 422 in the public interest."