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Document Index: 790811963

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 544', 'art. 1780', 'art. 23', 'Art. 6', 'Art. 21', 'Art. 19', 'art. 846', 'art. 223', '§ 242', 'art. 226', '§ 242', 'art. 903', '§ 903', 'art. 906', '§ 226', 'art. 226']

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Louisiana Law Review Volume 35 | Number 5 Special Issue 1975 Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine Vera Bolgár Repository Citation Vera Bolgár, Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine , 35 La. L. Rev. (1975) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol35/iss5/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at DigitalCommons @ LSU Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons @ LSU Law Center. For more information, please contact sarah.buras@law.lsu.edu . " id="pdf-obj-0-2" src="pdf-obj-0-2.jpg">
Vera Bolgár, Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine, 35 La. L. Rev. (1975) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol35/iss5/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at DigitalCommons @ LSU Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons @ LSU Law Center. For more information, please contact sarah.buras@law.lsu.edu.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SWITZERLAND:
A SURVEY OF A RECENT CHAPTER IN LEGAL DOCTRINE
Vera Bolgdr*
In the development and the clarification of the doctrine of the abuse of rights French scholarship occupies the key posi- tion. It was through the writings of the most authoritative protagonist of the doctrine, Louis Josserand,' that the prob- lems attending the consequences of any abusive exercise of rights were given renewed attention and exerted consider- able influence on contemporary doctrine as well as on the
The basic principle seems simple and irrefutable. It pro- vides that whoever abuses his legal rights should be held liable for the consequences of such abuse. Nevertheless, the reactions to this principle gave rise to a controversy that went beyond the simple causes and effects of the abuse of rights and eventually came to touch upon the then prevalent
notions on
the nature and the functions of law. Perhaps it
was not by chance that the controversy arose and reached its most violent forms in France, in the country where any re- striction on individual freedom of action or on the intangibil-
* Research Associate in Comparative Law, University of Michigan School
of Law; Visiting Professor, University of Toledo, College of Law; Former Sec- retary, American Journal of Comparative Law.
1. L. JOSSERAND, DE L'ABUS DES DROITS (1st ed. 1905); L. JOSSERAND,
L'ESPRrr DES DROITS ET DE
LEUR RELATIVIT19: THItORIE
DITE DE L'ABUS DES
DROITS (lst ed. 1927); L. Josserand, kvolutions et actualitsin CONFItRENCES DE DROIT CIVIL (1936); L. Josserand,A propos de la relativit des droits, 1929 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE IGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE [REV. CRIT. L!EG. ET JURISPR.]
277; 2 L. JOSSERAND,
DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRAN(CAIS
428 (3d
ed. 1938). Abbreviations for French reports are the following: Cass. civ.: Chambre
civile de la Cour de Cassation; Cass. comm.: Chambre commerciale de la Cour de
Cassation;
Cass.req.: Chambre des requites de la Cour de Cassation; D.: Dalloz,
Recueil pbriodique et critique de jurisprudence, de lgislation et de doctrine; D.H.: Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurisprudence; D.-P.: Dalloz, Recueil p~riodique et critique de jurisprudence, de legislation et de doctrine; D.-S.:
Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, de doctrine, de jurisprudence et de lgislation; Gaz.-Pal.:
ity of individual'rights was considered a violation of the rev-
olutionary mystique of liberty 2 as
embodied in the Declara- Code Napoleon. Or was it
altogether by chance that the abusive exercise of rights, as it were their d~tournement, by private individuals came into the
focus of interest through the parallel scrutiny of the French Conseil d'Etat into the d~tournement de pouvoir as exercised by the public authorities?
of Jos-
serand's
theories, at
marked one of the most radical, changes: in the ideas on the
nature and the functions of law, and the effects of this change were reflected in the ensuing. controversies. Briefly, what Josserand voiced was the vindication of the gradual process that shifted the importance of individual rights from their
private, autonomous domain into thesocial field, and trans-
the exercise of these very rights into social functions. 4
Hence the controversy on the abuse of rights turned around
the old and the new: represented by those who held-that
there. can be
no abuse of rights if they were exercised within
the limits of the law that granted these rights--le droit cesse oit lVabus commence 5 .- and by those who held that any exer-
R. SAVATIER,
DROIT CIVIL AU
DROIT PUBLIC 7 (1945).
3. The similarity between the d~tournement de pouvoir within individual
rights and within the functions of public officials is, however, merely one of
surface. In checking whether a public authority has exceeded the limits of its power as set down by law the administrative courts merely examine whether
such action conformed to the public interest that, in its turn, sets the limits of
such power. The examination
is altogether objective and has nothing to do with
morals or equity, which, on the other hand, are the determining factors in qualifying individual actions as abusive of rights. Cf. 1 R. DAVID, LE DROIT
FRANQAIS: LES DONNtES FONDAMENTALES 179 (1960); English translation in R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 201 (M.
Kindred transl. 1972) [hereinafter cited as David]. 1 R. SAVATIER, TRAITP, DE LA
RESPONSABILITIt CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN(AIS 53 (2d
ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as
SAVATIER]; Conseil d'htat, Judgment of February 27, 1903, S.1905:3.17, note Hauriou. On an exhaustive treatment of the jurisprudence of the Conseil d'ktat, in particular under the abuse of rights theory, see LOUIS DUBOUIS, LA
THkORIE DE L'ABUS DE DROIT ET LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE (1962),
especially with a view to d~tournement de pou)'oir at 184 ff.
4. Next to Josserand the most famous exponent of this view was Lbon
Duguit. See L. DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GtNtRALES DU DROIT PRIVA
DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLON (lst ed. 1912). See also DAVID at 179.
5. "The law stops where abuse begins." This is a famous quotation taken
from 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITP,LtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 871 (11th ed.1939).
See also his note at D.1902.2.329; cf. 1 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC,
THtORIQUE
RESPONSABILITt
ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN
cise of rights which is contrary to the social functions of these
rights constitutes abuse. 6 The chief
protagonist of the first
theory, besides Planiol, was Georges Ripert, who feared that the emphasis on the social as against the individual orienta- tion of law will gradually deprive the individual of his subjec- tive rights. For the first school, abuse of rights involved ac-
tions which, even though exercised within the limits of the law, are contrary to morals; but carrying this thought further it also held that the judicial scrutiny of the morality of indi-
vidual actions would
introduce an arbitrary element into the
jurisprudence of the courts. 7 In essence, this is the same theory that governed the highly individualistic system of Roman law. Under its guiding principles no action exercised within the limits of a legally stated right could be construed as abuse; 8 nevertheless, this principle was tempered in time by the exceptio doli generalis
and specialis, under which the defendant could allege plain- tiffs fraud, on the one hand, and by the possibly first formu- lation of a theory on the abuse of rights, under which Gaius enjoined the mistreatment of slaves and upheld the functions of spendthrift guardians, on the other: male enim nostro iure uti non debemus 9 -we should not exercise our rights wrong- fully.
hand, Dean
Ripert's
interest in the doctrine of abuse of rights emerged concur- rently with the renewed interest in civil liability and, in par- ticular, with the extension of its field of application,' 0 was justified by later developments. Planiol's views were upheld with respect to certain rights within which individual au- tonomy remained either absolute or discretionary;" but
LICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 627 (5th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as
ET TUNc].
6. See text at note 4, supra.
7. G. RIPERT, LA RhGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 195 (3d ed.
1935) [hereinafter cited as RIPERT]; Ripert,Abus ou relativit des droits, 49 REV.
CRIT. LPG. ET JURISPR.
8. DIGEST 50.17.55 (Ulpian): nullus videtur dolofacere qui auo iure utitur;
also D.50.155.1 (Paulus): non videtur vim facere qui iure suo utitur.
9. GAIUS INST. 1.53; cf. G. CORNIL, LE DROIT PRIVt 102; MAZEAUD ET TUNC
10. RiPERT at 169; Appleton,
Notre ensiegnment du droit romain: ses en-
nemis et sea dfauts, in MtLANGES DE DROIT ROMAIN DtDItS X GEORGES CORNIL
73 (1926).
Rouast, Les droits discr~tionnaireset les droits contr6l6s, 42 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.] 1 (1944). 2 G. RIPERT ET J. BOULANGER, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL D'APR9S LE TRAITIt DE PLANIOL (1957)
1018 LOUISIANA
beyond this restricted category, Josserand's theory on the relativity of rights became the widely accepted view, under
which the relativity of rights was equated with their socially equitable exercise. 1 2 It was at this point that contact was made between the theories of abuse of rights and civil liabil- ity; the determining factor in both fields became the motive of fault that induced a particular individual action, and as a further step, entailed the reparation of damages which arise through such fault. It made no difference whether the dam- age was caused through actions involving the abuse of rights or through actions involving negligence or delict. 13 These ideas were equally reflected in French legislation.
autonomy, the right of
ownership, was already given its limitations at the time of its original formulation,' 4 since the legislator stated as early as
1804 that the owner's absolute rights are limited by law.
In the following years, provisions were codified which established the requirement of good faith in the dissolution of partnerships, 5 providing also for the restitution of damages arising either through the unilateral rescission of contracts's
the "abusive
of a labor contract"; 7
nation of the abuse.' 8
law imposed on the courts the determi-
Further provisions impose limitations on the owner's right with respect to leasing his property for private habitation, 9
[hereinafter cited as RIPERT ET BOULANGER] at 368 lists the following rights
of abuse, i.e., they are discretionary: the parents'
right to consent or to oppose the marriage of their children, the paternal rights over the children, the right of testation, the rights of ownership (for its reser-
vations, however, see note 14 infra) as well as the right not to enter into contracts. On the judicial approval of this last right, see Ppernay, February 28, 1906, and Lille, November 12, 1906, D.1908.2.73, note Josserand; Aix, December 21, 1910, D.1911.2.385, note Planiol.
12. SAVATIER
624, 633.
14. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 544: Ownership is the right to enjoy and to
dispose of things (choses) in the most absolute manner, provided they are not
used in a manner as prohibited by law or by regulations (translation by author); cf. RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 366.
15. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 1869-70.
16. Law of December 17, 1890 amending FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1780.
17. LABOR CODE Bk. I, art. 23 as modified by Law of July 19, 1928.
18. Art. 6(2) of Law of November 16, 1942; cf.,
CASS. civ., December 15, 1936,
Gaz. Pal. 1937.1.177; Paris, June 7,1937, Gaz. Pal. 1937.2.404; MAZEAUD ET TUNC
at 631.
19. Art. 21 of Law of September 1, 1948 (D.1949.93) which penalizes the
OF RIGHTS IN
for commercial use, 20 or for farming 2 1 -in these instances equally imposing on the courts the examination whether this
exercised abusively, i.e.,
with the intent to harm. 22
The Code of Civil Procedure lays down limitations on the right
to bring actions by imposing a fine on the dilatory or abusive
exercise of this right. An instructive illustration of the legislator's acceptance of the theory that law should be considered in its social- functional aspects was given by the 1965 reforms of the laws relating to marriage and marital property. For instance, arti-
cle 223 of the Code Civil that recognized the husband's right
of refusal to the
wife's exercise of
a profession, unless this
version. 25
abused, 24 was radically changed in its new reformed
However, in the development of the doctrine of the abuse of rights it was not the legislator but the courts who played the decisive part. At first they elaborated the original limita- tions on ownership, and interpreted as an abusive exercise of
ownership rights such exercise as was motivated
tent to cause harm, 26 or when the damages which arose from
owner who refuses to lease his house to a family with many children; here the
abuse of the right not to contract is the reason for the penalty; cf. MAZEAUD ET
TUNC at 632.
Art. 19 of Decree of September 30, 1953 (D.1954.185).
Code Rural art. 846, modified by Law of September 5, 1947; for pres-
ent legislation, see MAZEAUD ET TUNC at 632, 637.
MAZEAUD ET TUNC at 637.
FRENCH CODE PRO. Civ. arts. 453, 471. Under these articles there is a
jurisprudence constante; cf. CASS. CIV., March 9, 1949, Gaz. Pal. 1949.1.245;
1950.1.183;
D.H.1951.258. For further
decisions, see RIPERT ET BOULANGER at
366-67;
SAVATIER at 83.
Paris, December 7, 1940. Gaz. Pal. 1941.1.11; cf. MAZEAUD ET TUNC at
FRENCH CIV. CODE (new) art. 223: "The wife has the right to exercise a
profession without the consent of the husband, and she may at all times, for the
requirements of this profession, alienate or enter into obligations on her own with respect to her own property" (translation by author).
The French courts apply different principles to controversies arising
from this particular right than do the English courts who would qualify these
cases as falling within the law of nuisance. AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUC-
TION TO FRENCH LAw 219 (3d ed. F. H. 1967); RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 366.
Lawson, A. E. See also cases
Anton & L. Neville Brown in notes 38, 39, infra; also
Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.1856.2.199 involving an owner who reduced the neighbor's spring waters by diverting them through his own land. For a similar
case in the Common Law,
see The Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] A.C.587
(H.L.) discussed by Albert Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 993, 995.
such exercise were far in excess of the advantages gained by
The parallels in the development of the doctrines of the abuse of rights and civil liability are particularly evident in the jurisprudence of the courts; indeed, their implementation is the exclusive work of jurisprudence, strikingly similar to the developments in the Common Law. The French courts have built the standing practice on the abuse of rights-in the ab- sence of a general legislative rule-upon a few scattered provi- sions and their successive amendments under the guiding prin- ciple that the damages caused through the abusive exercise of
rights, which they qualified as "fault,"
should be repaired by
the party who abused his rights. As regards the doctrine of civil
liability, the courts had not much more to go on. In
title IV, chapter II of the Code Civil, on "delicts and quasi-
delicts," three terse provisions provide for the reparation of damages caused either directly or vicariously by the party at fault, and these three provisions were the foundations of the entire system of modern legal principles that constitute the
French law of civil liability. In the determination of the presence or the absence of
abuse of rights in given fact situations, however, the courts
operate in a narrower
field than the one governed by civil
liability. The central feature of both fields is the restitution of
damages caused by the party at fault: under the rules of civil
liability, the courts
inquire whether it was caused through
imprudence, negligence or a quasi-delictual behavior-in other words, whether the action violated not merely the rules of law but also the rules of equity; 29 whereas under the ac- cepted doctrine of the abuse of rights, the fault which caused the damage may only arise within the limits of those rights which by their nature may allow a certain causation of
27. The courts follow the formulation of the Court of Cassation, CAss. CIV.,
February 18, 1907, D.1907.1.385, 387, note Ripert: "attenduqu'un industriel qui, par l'exploitation de son usine, cause aux voisins un prejudice, excdant la mesure des obligations ordinaires du voisinage, est en faute s'il n~glige lea precautions qu'il y auraitlieu de prendre pour pr~venir ces inconv nients." For the legislative and jurisprudential elaboration of such animus nocendi or fault in the French-inspired law of Quebec, see Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France
and Quebec, 34 LA.
993, 995.
28. A glance of the large amount of case-law printed under articles 1382,
1383 in the pocket edition
of the CODE CML (Dalloz, Petits Codes, 1971-72)
illustrates this body
of law; see also MAZEAUD
633, 646.
29. SAVATIER at 50.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN EUROPE
harm. 30 Consequently, abuse of rights may only arise in con-
nection with damages
caused through the
exercise of these
particular rights; in the examination of damages caused by
other means the
concern the courts. 3 1 Among the rights within which "there exists a codified permission to do harm," 3 2 are those, for in-
stance, which govern ownership, 3 3 contracts, 3 4 business com- petition; 3 5 such are also the procedural rights which au- thorize the initiation of actions or their appeal. 3 6 In deciding situations involving these particular rights the courts merely examine whether these were exercised within the legally au- thorized limits of their purpose or whether they were abused, on the one hand, or whether they were exercised for the exclusive purpose of causing harm, on the other. It might be of interest to cite a few decisions in detail which illustrate the position of the courts with respect to
down by the Court of Colmar, 37 in which the court stated that
the limits of the right of ownership are set by a serious and legitimate interest, and therefore they do not authorize mis- chievous actions (in the case, the erection of a chimney) which are not justified by reasons of utility and are destined to damage the interests of third parties. In the Affaire Clement-Bayard 3 8 the Court of Cassation :had no difficulty in finding abuse of the right of property since the owner of a field adjacent to the hangar for zeppelins used by Messrs. Clement-Bayard erected a wooden structure topped with metal spikes for the purpose of impeding the operations of the zeppelins. Similarly within the field of ownership, the Court of Cassation upheld the liability of the owners and awarded damages which arose through their use of electrical machinery on the grounds that "even the legiti- mate exercise of the rights of ownership will generate liabil-
at 51-52.
32. SAVATIER at 51.
33. See notes 26, 27 supra.
34. CASS. cIv., May 7, 1902, Gaz. Pal. June 1902; CASS. CIV., May 4,1942, Gaz.
Pal. August 15-18, 1942; Seine, December 16, 1919, D.1920.2.33, note Ripert; cf.
RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 368.
35. RIPERT ET BOULANGER at 367; SAVATIER at 64.
36. See note 23 supra.
37. Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.1856.2.9.
38. CASS. REQ., August 3, 1915, S.1920.1.300, D.P.1917.1.79.
1022 LOUISIANA
ity if the resulting inconvenience to third parties goes beyond
the ordinary obligations towards neighbors." In controversies affecting shareholders' rights, the Court of Cassation adopts a restrictive interpretation to alleged abuses of rights and tends to uphold the validity of decisions voted upon either by the board of directors or by the general assembly. For example, by reversing a decision of the Court of Appeal the Court saw no abuse of rights in a measure voted upon by the board of directors of a company by which transfers of shares were subjected to the agreement of the board. 40 The Court held that this measure did not abuse the provisions of the controlling law since these touch merely on the shareholders' freedom to vote but not on their freedom of acquisition. Similarly, the Court upheld the validity of a deci- sion brought by the general assembly of a limited liability company 4 that settled the remuneration of the managers and denied recourse to the courts for contesting the decision. In the opinion of the Court, unless there is evidence of action that is either violative of procedure or abusive of sharehold-
ers' rights, the courts may not substitute their decisions for those of the general assembly. Finally, a decision of the Court of Appeal of Ghent should be noted since it is an excellent illustration of the judicial implementation of the abuse of rights doctrine. 4 2 The con- troversy arose under the rights of eminent domain of the township of Courtrai. The town started construction of public roads which ran through private lands without the prelimi- nary measures of expropriation. The Court rejected the re- quest of appellants, the owners of the land, for the restitution of the fences and for the demolition of the constructions erected by the town, on the grounds that even though Cour- trai committed an abuse of its rights of eminent domain, the
39. CASS. civ., May 29, 1937, S.1937.1.244, D.H.1937.393, also in H. CAPI-
TANT, LES GRANDS
ARR]PTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE
380 (6th ed. 1973).
40. CASS. CIV., October 22, 1956, D.1957.J.177, note Ripert.
41. CASS.
D.S.1972.1.559,
Orengo.
decision treats a problem that has not as yet been explicitly decided by the
courts. For a similar case see Douai, February 11, 1972, D.S.1972.J.279.
42. Even though this case was decided by a Belgian court, it is mentioned
here since the Belgian law is also governed by the Code Napolbon (with sub-
sequent Belgian modifications). In addition, the discussion of the decision is one
of the most frequently cited publications on the French principles of abuse of
rights; cf. Ghent, November 20, 1950, 7 REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE
BELGE 270 (1953) with note by A. De Bersaques, "L'abus de droit," at 272.
damages which the town would incur through the imposition of specific performance would exceed by far the harm done through its violation of appellants' rights of ownership. In the continuing jurisprudence of the French courts, their final achievement in the implementation of the abuse of rights doctrine was the segregation of that particular kind of fault that was committed through the abusive exercise of a right. Even though the bases for awarding the damages which arise through the abuse remain similar to those applied in the field of civil liability for damages which arise through fault, nevertheless, "by baptizing this particular
fault as abuse," the courts have proved that even within the exercise of a right there may exist the motive of fault. If their jurisprudence had not added anything new to the Code in this respect, it has nevertheless revealed the wealth of its sub-
The developments in Germany with respect to the doc-
trine of abuse of rights were all in all similar to the develop-
German Civil Code was promulgated roughly one century
French Code Civil;"
ideas within this span of time, from the strictly individualistic towards the social-functional aspects of law-which affected legal thought in Germany as well-had its definite impact on the principles that lay at the foundations of the German code. In particular, there was less resistance towards embodying in
the code a provision that reflects the acceptance of a doctrine under which the unrestricted exercise of individual rights
may be limited, if such exercise
means the abuse of these
very rights. Nevertheless, the then still prevailing ideas of liberalism were evident in the drafting stages of the code,
since the Senate expressed criticism towards the inclusion of
43. MAZEAUD ET TUNc at 646.
44. The German BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (B.G.B.) was promulgated in
1896 and came into force on January
1, 1900-the first product of the law of the
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (reports of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court (civil matters); RG, RGZ: Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (reports of decisions of the civil divisions of the former German Supreme Court).
1024 LOUISIANA
that would restrict the exercise of individual
rights on grounds of fraud. 4 5 The reasoning of the Senate was
in essence similar to the French reasons
doctrine of abuse of
put forth against the
rights, 4 6 namely, that the judicial deter-
mination of fraud would obscure the limits between the rules
of objective positive law and the rules of subjective morals. 4 7
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the French Commis- sion de Revision du Code Civil, which rejected the inclusion of
an article on abuse of rights in the preliminary
Code, 48 the German drafters inserted into the Code an article on the abuse of rights, which provides for the unequivocal
out for the only
exercise of rights that was carried
purpose to cause harm. 4 9
In addition to this explicit, positive provision, two further articles of the code indirectly affect the doctrine of the abuse of rights: article 242, that lays down the general provision on good faith-Treu und Glauben-in the execution of obliga- tions, and article 826 that provides for the restitution of dam- ages caused by actions that are contra bonos mores. 50 The legislative history of the right of ownership, consid-
ered by liberal philosophy as the practically unrestricted power in the exercise of individual rights, illustrates in the
German example the gradual shifting of importance from the private-individual to the social domain. In the first draft, the
formulation of the rights
French idea of fixing these
the rights of disposal in
mani~re la plus absolue; 51 in the final version, which became
provision, the manner of the exercise of these
This provision would have incorporated the Roman principle of the
exceptio doli, under which defendant could claim that plaintiff acted fraudu-
lently. For German law, see L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, LEHRBUCH
DES BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 1440 (Halbband/II, 5th ed.
Nipperdey 1960) [hereinafter cited as ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF];
BORGERUCHEN
SCHULDVERHALTNISSE § 242 at 743 (11th ed. 1961).
at 169.
Cf. RIPERT at 195.
The suggestion for inclusion came from Raymond Saleilles. Cf. RIPERT
BGB art. 226.
Cf. ENNECCERUS,
KIPP AND WOLFF at
1443; T. SOERGEL
BERT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, ALLGEMEINER TEIL § 242, Note III [here-
inafter cited as SOERGEL-SIEBERT].
The German wording in the first draft was "nach Willkuir," arbitrarily,
with full authority; cf. 0. PALANDT, BiURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 993 (12th ed.
1954) [hereinafter cited as PALANDT].
discretion. ' 5 2 Moreover,
French restrictions on ownership are limited by the code to existing laws and regulations, the German code adds to these restrictions the rights of third parties. This idea was already
present in the Weimar Constitution, promulgated in 1919, which proclaimed the obligatory nature of ownership as well as its exercise for the public interest. 53 The post-World War II Constitution, the Bonn Basic Law, repeats this idea, but adds renewed emphasis to the social functions of ownership by declaring that its exercise should serve equally for the benefit
of the community. These legislative developments, however, were already anticipated by the German courts: as early as 1902, the Supreme Court declared that the strict principles of owner-
ship, which were taken from Roman
law, were already alien
contemporary legar ideas; 55 also in establishing the obliga-
tion for the security of transfers of ownership, the court
stated that ownership creates not merely rights but also obli- gations. 56
law sets restrictions equally on
the obligations which arise in connection with the rights of ownership. Thus, various articles of the Civil Code regulate
toleration of nuisance
concerned, and list in detail the kinds of such nuisances:
emission of gaseous substances, of odors, smoke, soot, heat, noise, shocks, etc. These may be tolerated only to the extent
that does not impair the regular use of the property; con-
trariwise, the owner is entitled to ask for injunction
case such nuisance is the consequence of unavoidable
economic activities, to ask for damages.
A further protection for the owner is the presumption of his freedom over the disposal and use of his property; this has the important procedural consequence that the burden of proof is shifted to the party who requests the limitations of
owner's rights. 58
52. "nach Belieben"; cf. BGB art. 903.
53. Article 153.111 of Weimar Constitution.
54. 14.11 of
Bonner Grundgesetz; cf. PALANDT, note to § 903 at 966.
55. 52 RG 376 (1902).
56. RG 121 (1916); cf. PALANDT at 966.
57. BGB art. 906.
58. 3 L. ENNECCERUS, T. KIPP AND M. WOLFF, LEHRBUCH DES BURGER-
174-75;
Wolff-Ludwig
Raiser 1957). See also SOERGEL-SIEBERT § 226 at 988 n.26.
1026 LOUISIANA
With respect to the development of the doctrine of the abuse of rights, eventually two theories gained ground, called
the "external" and the "internal" theories.
some similarities to those French views that stress the exer- cise of rights as against the nature of the right, and maintain that there can be no abuse of rights only an abuse of their
exercise if this is contrary to morals. 6 0 In line with this reason- ing, the German "external" abuse of rights theory holds that all restrictions are uniquely directed against the owners of the rights and affect merely the exercise of rights and leave the nature of the right intact; as it were, they affect the right only externally. 6 1 The "internal" theory, on the other hand, insists that the right itself, its immanent nature, controls its very exercise. 62 It was this latter theory that was taken over by the governing doctrine 63 and was influential in the implementation
courts of the various features of abuse. 6
In essence, in the elaboration of the doctrine of abuse of rights, the German courts did not have many more codified provisions available for assistance than were available to the
French courts. In addition to article 226 which is fairly re-
strictive in scope (limiting the
purpose to cause
harm, i.e.,
only to malicious action), there are two broad general provi- sions in the Code which stipulate the requirement of good faith and the conformity with bonos mores in the exercise of rights. Since these provisions offer no more than general guidelines, the courts had to interpret the incidence of abuse
UNZULAISSIGKEIT
AUSOBUNG
[hereinafter cited as SIEBERT].
text at notes 5-7, supra.
In the German wording, this process is the idussere Rechtsbeschrdn-
kung, which
the Aussentheorie; SIEBERT at 83; ENNECCERUS,
KIPP, AND
In the German wording, Innentheorie; cf. SIEBERT at 85; ENNEC-
KIPP AND
The fundamental idea that the exercise of each and every right is
limited as a matter of course by the content of these rights has already been formulated by Otto v. Gierke, 1 DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 319 (1895). Gierke's admirable elaboration of the social functions of law that sets at the same time the limits of its abuse, whether the abuse occurs through the use, the
misuse, or the non-use of a right, is a forerunner of all the later theories.
See the leading opinion handed down by the German Federal Supreme
Court in the judgment of July 12, 1951, 3 BGHZ 94, 103 (1951) in which the court rejected the defense that the incriminated action was carried out under the provisions of a statute on the grounds that any implementation of a statute that
is contrary to its nature and original purpose qualifies as abuse of rights. Cf. also Judgment of January 27, 1954, 12 BGHZ 157 (1954).
in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each particu- lar case; this meant that they had to examine whether the contested exercise of a right was truly malicious and as such constituted an abuse of rights or whether, even though not malicious, it was nevertheless violating the general require- ments of good faith or morals. While judicial interpretation had to move within the broad limits of these general rules, nevertheless certain typi- cal situations emerged in the course of time which, in turn,
served as the bases for certain typical rules. These rules may be summarized as follows:
(a) all exercise of rights is abusive if grossly inequitable
under the circumstances, or is
carried out with no regard for
of other parties; 6 5
(b) no exercise of rights will be given legal recognition if
these rights were
laws or in
bad faith; 6
(c) no exercise of rights will be given legal recognition if
it is contrary to former conduct; 6 7 and finally,
65. 150 RGZ
286 (1936)
(cancellation
termination); Judgment of February 19, 1951, 1 BGHZ 186 (1951) (use of
formal advantages given
substantive justifications);
ment of February 21, 1952, 5 BGHZ 186 (1952) (petition for divorce based on the malicious deception of the wife considered abuse of rights if held forth by petitioner for the only purpose to have the marriage dissolved in order to
marry another woman). Cf. ENNECCERUS, KiPp AND WOLFF at 1444, n.32; App. Celle, Judgment of July 7, 1950, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 317
66. Judgment of October 6, 1953, 10 BGHZ 319 (1953) (abusive exercise of
banking rights if bank's defense is the knowledge of client of a reservation for the transfer of funds during exceptional circumstances); Judgment of February 24, 1954, 12 BGHZ 328 (1954) (it violates the rules of good faith if plaintiff requests continued high payments from company which were
awarded to him during the National Socialist period); Judgment of March 31, 1954, 13 BGHZ 67 (1954) (the German Federal Railways, which as a legal entity are identical with the former German Reich Railways, may not avail themselves of their rights of redemption against land bought second-hand from a Jewish owner in 1942); Judgment of May 29, 1954, id. at 346 (a decision in which the Court examines under the guidelines of good faith whether the request for a pension of a former corporation executive under the National Socialist regime would be justified had employment contract been signed under normal circumstances). Cf. ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND WOLFF at 1444.
67. Judgment of January 28, 1938, 67 JURIsTIsCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 860
(1938), even though contract for services provided for rescission at will, the
circumstances of a given case might prevent the validity of such rescission
(elaboration
of the venire contrafactum proprium rule); cf. ENNECCERUS, Kipp
AND WOLFF at 1444, n.36.
if carried out
ciously for the only purpose to cause
harm. 6 8
enunciated in article 226, the codified provision on the abuse
of rights. It is also the one that affects the exercise of
which lie outside the scope of the Civil Code, for instance, rights which govern family relations, successions, or even commercial transactions or business competition. 9 Under the German doctrine of the abuse of rights, simi- larly to French doctrine, the nature of abuse is conditioned by the nature of those rights in which there is a codified permis- sion to do harm, as for instance, in the rights of business competition or industrial property. However, if the exercise of these rights goes beyond the codified permission, or is exclu- sively motivated by malice, it will qualify as abuse of rights. However, because of such close interaction between legally
permitted abuse and malicious abuse, the judicial determina- tion of abuse of rights is a complicated process in which the
court examines the facts and circumstances of the case and, in addition, also the intent of the parties. 69 a The burden of proof
is on the party who alleges the malicious intent. On the other hand, the courts give relief even in the absence of malicious intent if the exercise of a right violates the good faith and good
down in BGB art. 226, under the title, the
prohibition of chicane, the abuse of rights. It was not included, without any discussion, in the Civil Code; indeed, in the first draft it was destined merely as a
protective provision for the rights of ownership until incorporated eventually
as one of the general provisions. (Cf. text
48 and 51). The leading
decision on chicane was handed down by the Supreme Court in the Judgment of
December 3, 1909,72 RGZ 251(1910), that qualified as gross abuse ofthe rights of ownership a father's prohibition to his son against visiting the grave of his mother which was situated on the father's property; ENNECCERUS, KIPP AND
WOLFF 1446, n.45 (citing further
other hand, contrary
doctrine and practice, the
German doctrine of the abuse of rights excludes the procedural rights (the French voies de recours) from the domain of abuse of rights. Cf. note 23,
supra. In the leading opinion of the German Supreme Court, Judgment of
10, 1940,
162 RGZ 65 (1940)
all actions carried
out under the rules
of civil procedure are governed exclusively by the rules of procedure; hence their validity is to be determined by other principles than those which are laid down in the Civil Code, cf. SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 989 (4). 69a. Thus, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Miinster held the State Rheinland-Westfalen liable for abuse of rights for the violation of the Law on the Protection of Mothers when notice of dismissal to an employee was given one month before the birth of her child. The State argued that the Law was not applicable to her case; cf. Judgment of July 11, 1951, 30 DEUTSCHE RICHTER- ZEITUNG (Heft 1, 1952).
morals provisions; in these cases, however, the judgment is not based on abuse of rights alone but equally on the parties' behavior that violated the moral standards set by articles 242 and 826.70 In the standing jurisprudence of the German courts, arti- cle 226 is treated restrictively; 7 1 indeed, the general attitude of the courts is to deny relief in situations which involve merely allegations of abuse of rights. 7 2 The dominant concern is the equitable compromise of conflicting interests and the consideration of those specific social functions which should be assured by the regular exercise of rights; hence the courts invalidate merely the results of such actions on grounds of abuse which are contrary to the social purposes and goals
inherent in these rights. With respect to the influence of the principles established by the theory of the "internal" abuse of rights, controversies involving business partnerships offer good illustration. In a
case which involved the striking from the commercial register of a limited liability company, on the grounds that its regis- tration as such constituted an abuse of rights under the perti- nent sections of the commercial laws because the company was essentially a one-man corporation, the court rejected the request. It held that the purpose of the law was to create a legal entity through commercial registration, and this pur- pose has been achieved. The court went on to state that the
subsequent transfer of the
shares to one owner did not de-
stroy the legal entity, and even though such transfers are not altogether justifiable in theory they are harmless to the
economy and indeed quite necessary in practice. Since the purpose of the law was not violated through the registration,
the legal entity thereby created should be recognized. The same principle was followed by the court in holding
70. SOERGEL-SIEBERT
at 986.
71. For an early decision, cf. Judgment of February 3, 1915, 86 RGZ 191
(1915); SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 986.
72. Judgment of July 13, 1954, 14 BGHZ 294 (1954) (not considered as
abuse of rights if members of an undertakers' trade union were denied access
to burial grounds which belong to a Church); DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG
643 (1936) (invalidation of easements where the owner of the land had other means of entry); cf. also SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 990; further decisions in Com-
ment on refusals to recognize abuse of rights, 8 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 373
73. SOERGEL-SIEBERT at 989.
74. Judgment of October 9, 1956, 21 BGHZ 378 (1956); similar reasoning in
Judgment of July 12, 1956, 21 BGHZ 242 (1956).
the only member of a limited
company's debts. 75 The court
upheld the validity of the com-
pany since it was registered under the provisions and in ac-
of the law; however, it went
beyond the text of the law and held that it would violate the rules of good faith if the purpose of the law-in this case the
reliance on the separation of the company's assets from those of its members-is abused. The court referred to a prior deci-
sion 76 which stated that no legal entity should be given rec- ognition if used contrary to the purposes of the law.
refused to permit
transfer of a company's assets from West
Germany, 77 and held that such measures of uncompensated expropriation would be contrary to the legal nature and the
social purposes of a legal entity. Added reasons for refusal were the possible extraterritorial effects that would be in- volved in the transfer. In other decisions, the court qualified the following ac-
tions as abuses of rights: a father's eviction of his son-under the provisions of the Law on Homesteads-from the farm on
years; 78
refusal-under the rules on parental rights-to the marriage of his daughter on the ground that the future husband had a
different religion; 7 9 while in another case it
violation of good faith if the defense of an arbitral award is
brought up in judicial proceedings. 8 0
The treatment of the Swiss developments in the field of abuse of rights was left to the last, not because of the al- phabetical sequence of the countries discussed, but because of the excellent synthesis offered by the Swiss jurisdiction of the implementation of this doctrine.
Even though Swiss legal science and practice
by German and French law-for
instance, Swiss
75. Judgment of November 29, 1956, 22 BGHZ 226, 230 (1957).
76. 169 RGZ
248 (1943).
77. Judgment of January 30, 1956, 20 BGHZ 4 (1956).
78. 15,
1967, 47 BGHZ
184 (1967).
79. Judgment of September 25, 1956, 21 BGHZ 340 (1956).
80. 1968, 50
of May 20,
BGHZ 191 (1969).
this instance the
court discussed the rules on estoppel by conduct if it violates the accepted
principles of good faith.
courts frequently
decisions in support of their
judgments,"' and Swiss legal scholars consult German and French theories in the elaboration of their views-Swiss law naturally possesses its own unique national characteristics which are equally evident in the implementation of the doctrine
of the abuse of rights. The most outstanding of these is the famous article 1 of
the Swiss Civil Code which, as an unprecedented measure, gives quasi-legislative functions to the courts by authorizing the judges to substitute their own interpretation where the
text of the law or the accepted custom is silent or inadequate. In addition, article 1 states that in the execution of this
the judge should
lator. 8 2 The next article contains the rule on abuse of rights. 8 3
In line with the spirit of article 1, this provision contains equally the authorization of the judge to apply the law in
accordance with his own interpretation; this authorization
implicit in the structure as well as in the wording of the text.
In structure, the article is built around the provision on good
69.2.102,
mutual, and frequently the consequence
of personal relations between the
scholars of the three countries. Examples
are found in the EUGEN HUBER
ARCHIV with
respect to the preliminary
drafts of the SwISS CIVIL CODE; for
instance, Rudolf Stammler made a few suggestions to Huber on the formula-
tion of the introductory provisions of the Code. Cf. Merz, Annotations to Article 2, Swiss Civil Code, in 1 LIvER, MEYE<