Source: http://az.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20150423_0000403.DAZ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-03-23 00:19:46
Document Index: 376644047

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997', '§ 1997']

| Muhammad v. Arizona Department of Corrections
Muhammad v. Arizona Department of Corrections
Riki Rashaad Muhammad, Plaintiff,v.Arizona Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff Riki Rashaad Muhammad brought this pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officer III Barbara Ams, a counselor with the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. 25 at 2, 29). In his Second Amended Complaint, Muhammad set forth a threat-to-safety claim under the Eighth Amendment ( id. at 29-30).[1] Before the Court is Ams's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90).
In his Second Amended Complaint, Muhammad alleged that Ams knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to his safety, thereby exposing him to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Doc. 25 at 29-30). Muhammad claimed that Ams provided another inmate a page from a pre-sentence report in Muhammad's criminal case that contained confidential information about his involvement in the death of a two-year old child ( id. ).
Ams moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Muhammad did not suffer physical injury and he failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 90).[2]
Ams argues that Muhammad's claim is barred by the PLRA's requirement that a prisoner make "a prior showing of physical injury" (Doc. 90 at 4). Section 1997e(e) provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In Oliver v. Keller, the Ninth Circuit specified that "§ 1997e(e) applies only to claims for mental and emotional injury." 289 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2002). The appellate court therefore concluded that where an inmate has actionable claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive damages premised on constitutional violations and not on any alleged mental or emotional injuries, the claims are not barred by § 1997e(e). Id. at 630.
Muhammad does not seek recovery for "mental or emotional injury"; rather, he seeks damages for an alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights (Doc. 25 at 29, 31). Accordingly, his claim against Ams is not barred by § 1997e(e). See Greening v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument that the plaintiff's claim was barred by § 1997e(e)'s "physical injury" requirement and finding that because he did not seek recovery for mental and emotional injury but instead ...