Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/115/487/case.html
Timestamp: 2016-07-02 00:25:22
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1', '§ 1', '§ 43', '§ 42', '§ 6', 'art. 1', '§ 4', '§ 18', 'art. 20', '§ 16', '§ 12', '§ 1342', '§ 1996', '§ 21']

Kurtz v. Moffitt :: 115 U.S. 487 (1885) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Kurtz v. Moffitt 115 U.S. 487 (1885)
U.S. Supreme CourtKurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885)Kurtz v. MoffittSubmitted October 14, 1885Decided November 23, 1885115 U.S. 487IN ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND
A writ of habeas corpus was issued on April 8, 1885, by and returnable before a judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco in the State of California, addressed to John Moffitt and T. W. Fields, citizens of that state, upon the petition of Stephen Kurtz, a citizen of Pennsylvania, alleging that he was by them unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty inasmuch as they had arrested him as a deserter from the army of the United States, and had no warrant or authority to arrest him, and were not officers of the United States. Moffitt and Fields, at the time of entering their appearance in that court, filed a petition to remove the case into the circuit court of the United States because the parties were citizens of different states and because the suit involved a question Page 115 U. S. 488 arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to-wit, the question whether a person who is not an officer of the United States has authority to arrest a deserter from the army of the United States. The court ordered the case to be so removed.
"First. It appears by said return that the defendants were not officers of the United States, but are police officers of the municipality of San Francisco, and as such they have no authority to arrest or detain the plaintiff, and as such officers they have been and are prohibited from arresting or detaining Page 115 U. S. 489 the plaintiff as a deserter from the United States Army by a rule of the police department which was in force at the time of the arrest of the plaintiff and still is in force, which rule was and is as follows: 'Police officers are prohibited from arresting deserters from the United States Army or navy without a warrant.'"
The superior court, upon a hearing, ordered the writ of habeas corpus to be dismissed and Kurtz remanded to custody, and entered judgment accordingly, and he sued out a writ of error from this Court to reverse that judgment, that court being the highest court of the state in which a decision on the merits of the case could be had. See Robb's Case, 64 Cal. 431, 433, and 111 U. S. 111 U.S. 624; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. Page 115 U. S. 494
In order to justify the removal of a case from a state court into the circuit court under this act, it is not enough that it arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States or that it is between citizens of different states, but it must be a "suit of a civil nature at law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars." 18 Stat. 470. A writ of habeas corpus sued out by one arrested for crime is a civil suit or proceeding brought by him to assert the civil right of personal liberty, against those who are holding him in custody as a criminal. Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 556. To assist in determining whether it is, within the meaning of the act of 1875, a "suit at law or in equity where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars," it will be convenient to refer to the use and interpretation of like words in earlier acts defining the jurisdiction of the national courts.
to be revised by this Court on writ of error or appeal. Page 115 U. S. 495 1 Stat. 84. The Act of April 2, 1816, c. 39, § 1, provided that no cause should be brought to this Court by appeal or writ of error from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia "unless the matter in dispute in such cause shall be of the value of one thousand dollars or upwards, exclusive of costs." 3 Stat. 261.
In Lee v. Lee, 8 Pet. 44, decided in 1834, a petition to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia set forth that the petitioners were entitled to their freedom, and were held in slavery by the defendant. He pleaded that they were not entitled to their freedom as they had alleged. Upon that plea issue was joined, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant, and the petitioners sued out a writ of error. A preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Court was overruled and the judgment below considered on the merits and reversed. The ground of the decision upon the question of jurisdiction appears to have been that the single matter in dispute between the parties was the freedom or slavery of the petitioners -- to the petitioners, the value of their freedom, not to be estimated in money; to the defendant, claiming to be their owner, the pecuniary value of the slaves as property, which, if he had been the plaintiff in error, might have been ascertained by affidavits. 8 Pet. 33 U. S. 48.
"In order, therefore, to give us appellate power under this section, the matter in dispute must be money, or some right the value of which in money can be estimated and ascertained. . . . The words of the act of Congress are plain and unambiguous. They give the right of revision in those cases only where the rights of property are concerned and where the matter in dispute has a known and certain value which can be proved and calculated in the ordinary mode of Page 115 U. S. 496 a business transaction. There are no words in the law which by any just interpretation can be held to extend the appellate jurisdiction beyond those limits and authorize us to take cognizance of cases to which no test of money value can be applied. Nor indeed is this limitation upon the appellate power of this Court confined to cases like the one before us. It is the same in judgments in criminal cases, although the liberty or life of the party may depend on the decision of the circuit court. And since this Court can exercise no appellate power unless it is conferred by act of Congress, the writ of error in this case must be dismissed."
5 How. 46 U. S. 120-121.
"that in order to give this Court jurisdiction under the 22d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the matter in dispute must Page 115 U. S. 497 be money, or some right the value of which could be calculated and ascertained in money."
The Act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, conferring power upon the judges of the national courts to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases of persons restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States, expressly gave an appeal to this Court from the judgment of a circuit court in such cases. 14 Stat. 385. Shortly after the passage of that act, Mr. Justice Nelson refused to allow an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York upon a writ of habeas corpus issued under the 14th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, because no appeal was provided by law in the case of a habeas corpus issued under that act, and the appeal given by the act of 1867 was confined to cases begun under it. In re Henrich, 5 Blatchford 414, 427. And within two years afterwards it was determined by this Court that independently of the act of 1867 (which was repealed by the Act of March 27, 1868, c. 34; 15 Stat. 44), this Court (except in a small class of cases of commitments for acts done or omitted under alleged authority of a foreign government, as to which provision was made by the Act of August 29, 1842, c. 257; 5 Stat. 539) had no jurisdiction by direct appeal to revise the judgments of inferior courts in cases of habeas corpus, but could only do so by itself issuing writs of habeas corpus and certiorari under the general powers conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Ex Parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318 and 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 506; Ex Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85. See also Ex Parte Royall, 112 U. S. 181; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564.
Section 1909 of the Revised Statutes, substantially reenacting provisions of earlier acts and providing that writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the supreme courts of certain territories shall be allowed to this Court in the same manner and under the same regulations as from the circuit courts of the United States, "where the value of the property or the amount in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars, except that a writ of error or appeal shall be allowed" to this Court from the decisions of the courts or judges of the territory Page 115 U. S. 498 "upon writs of habeas corpus involving the question of personal freedom," clearly implies that writs of habeas corpus would not be included if not specially mentioned. See also Potts v. Chumasero, 92 U. S. 358; Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U. S. 578, 106 U. S. 580.
By the common law of England, neither a civil officer nor a private citizen had the right, without a warrant, to make an arrest for a crime not committed in his presence except in the Page 115 U. S. 499 case of felony, and then only for the purpose of bringing the offender before a civil magistrate. 1 Hale, P.C. 587-590; 2 Hale, P.C. 76-81; 4 Bl.Com. 292, 293, 296; Wright v. Court, 6 D. & R. 623; S.C. 4 B. & C. 596. No crime was considered a felony which did not occasion a total forfeiture of the offender's lands or goods or both. 4 Bl.Com. 94, 95; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 114 U. S. 423. And such a forfeiture did not follow upon conviction by a court-martial of a crime not punishable by the courts of common law. Co.Litt. 391a; Clode's Military Forces of the Crown 176.
From 1708, the English Mutiny Acts have repeatedly, if not uniformly, contained provisions by which persons reasonably suspected of being deserters might be apprehended by a constable and taken before a justice of the peace and the fact of their desertion established to his satisfaction before their surrender to the military authorities. Stats. 7 Anne, c. 4, § 43, and 10 Anne, c. 13, § 42; 9 Statutes of the Realm, 58, 576; Clode on Military Law 93, 209; Tytler on Military Law (3d ed.) 200. By the recent acts, provision is made for their apprehension by a military officer or soldier if a constable cannot be immediately met with, and it is at least an open question whether a man whom a military officer causes to be apprehended as a deserter and delivered to an officer of the guard without having him brought before the civil magistrate may not maintain an action against the officer who causes his arrest, Page 115 U. S. 500 although he cannot sue the officer of the guard if it is the duty of the latter under the articles of war to receive and hold all prisoners so delivered to him by a military officer. Wolton v. Gavin, 16 Q.B. 48, 81; Wolton v. Freese, 16 Q.B. 81, note.
In the United States, the line between civil and military jurisdiction has always been maintained. The Fifth Article of Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," expressly excepts "cases arising in the land or naval forces," and leaves such cases subject to the rules for the government and regulation of those forces which, by the eight section of the First Article of the Constitution, Congress is empowered to make. Courts-martial form no part of the judicial system of the United States, and their proceedings, within the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be controlled or revised by the civil courts. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65; Ex Parte Mason 105 U. S. 696; Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564. Congress has never conferred upon civil officers or magistrates or private citizens any power over offenders punishable only in a military tribunal. Section 1014 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "For any crime or offense against the United States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States," or commissioner of a circuit court, or by any judge, mayor, justice of the peace, or magistrate of any state where he may be found,
and that "copies of the process shall be returned as speedily as Page 115 U. S. 501 may be into the clerk's office of such court," manifestly applies to proceedings before the civil courts only. From the very year of the declaration of independence, Congress has dealt with desertion as exclusively a military crime, triable and punishable, in time of peace, as well as in time of war, by court-martial only, and not by the civil tribunals, the only qualification being that since 1830, the punishment of death cannot be awarded in time of peace. Articles War, September 20, 1776, § 6, art. 1, 2 Journals Congress, 347, continued in force by the Act of September 29, 1789, c. 25, § 4; 1 Stat. 96; Acts March 16, 1802, c. 9, § 18; April 10, 1806, c. 20, art. 20; January 11, 1812, c. 14, § 16; January 29, 1813, c. 16, § 12; 2 Stat. 136, 362, 673, 796; May 29, 1830, c. 183, 4 Stat. 418; Rev.Stat. § 1342, arts. 47, 48.
and by article 48, every soldier who deserts "shall be tried by a court-martial and punished, although the time of his enlistment may have elapsed previous to his being apprehended and tried." The provisions of §§ 1996 and 1998, which reenact the Act of March 3, 1865, c. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490, and subject every person deserting the military service of the United States to additional penalties -- namely forfeiture of all rights of citizenship and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit -- can only take effect upon conviction by a court-martial, as was clearly shown by Mr. Justice Strong, when a judge of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn.St. 112, and has been uniformly held by the civil courts as well as by the military authorities. State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; Severance Page 115 U. S. 502 v. Healey, 50 N.H. 448; Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N.Y. 420; Winthrop's Digest of Judge Advocate General's Opinions 225.
"Resolved, that the commanding officer of any of the forces in the service of the United States shall, upon report made to him of any desertions in the troops under his orders, cause the most immediate and vigorous search to be made after the deserter or deserters, which may be conducted by a commissioned or noncommissioned officer, as the case shall require; that if such search should prove ineffectual, the officer commanding the regiment or corps to which the deserter or deserters belonged shall insert in the nearest gazette Page 115 U. S. 503 or newspaper an advertisement descriptive of the deserter or deserters, and offering a reward, not exceeding ten dollars for each deserter who shall be apprehended and secured in any of the gaols of the neighboring states; that the charges of advertising deserters, the reasonable extra expenses incurred by the person conducting the pursuit, and the reward shall be paid by the secretary at war, on the certificate of the commanding officer of the troops."
The army regulations derive their force from the power of the President as commander in chief, and are binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority. United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556. Whether they could, in time of peace and without the assent of Congress, confer authority upon civil officers or private citizens to enforce the military law need not Page 115 U. S. 504 be considered, because the regulations in question cannot be construed as undertaking to confer such authority. They do not command or authorize any civilian to arrest or detain deserters, but merely direct the payment of a reward for every deserter actually brought in, and justify the military officers in paying the reward and receiving and holding the deserter.
Sections 836, 837, 849 of the Penal Code of California of 1872, affirming the authority of a peace officer, without a warrant, or a private person, to make an arrest "for a public Page 115 U. S. 505 offense committed or attempted in his presence" as well as in cased of felony, and requiring the person arrested to be taken forthwith before a magistrate evidently have in view civil offenses only, and if they could be construed to include such offenses against the United States, certainly do not include offenses which are not triable and punishable except by court-martial.