Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/497/496/220593/
Timestamp: 2020-05-30 05:45:49
Document Index: 101801319

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1343', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 2201', '§ 1343', 'Art. 6166']

Fred Arispe Cruz, Plaintiff-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections,defendant-appellee, 497 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1974 › Fred Arispe Cruz, Plaintiff-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections,d...
Fred Arispe Cruz, Plaintiff-appellant, v. W. J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections,defendant-appellee, 497 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 497 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974) July 19, 1974
The appellant Fred A. Cruz, then a Texas prison inmate, sued Dr. Beto, the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections in federal district1 court in May 1970, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and pecuniary relief. Jurisdiction was alleged under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1343, and Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983.2 The district court dismissed the petition without hearing. Cruz v. Beto, S.D. Tex. 1970, 329 F. Supp. 443. We affirmed per curiam, Cruz v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1971, 445 F.2d 801. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Cruz's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment and remanded the cause to the district court for a hearing and appropriate findings. Cruz v. Beto, 1972, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263.
Petitioner had been represented by counsel in this court and before the Supreme Court, but apparently was no longer. He responded to the district court's dismissal order by pro se 'motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and/or for Correction of Judgment or Order'; assertedly under Rules 59(a) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion urged that the proceedings were not mooted by Cruz's release from prison inasmuch as (1) the original complaint's demand for damages survived his release from confinement and (2) the complaint was filed as a class action, under Rule 23(b) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and plaintiff was entitled to a hearing to determine the propriety of the class action and his right to represent the class.3 This motion was denied below, again without a hearing by a minute entry which is set forth in the margin.4
Cruz's original petition was filed pro se, written on toilet paper. After the action was transferred to the Southern District of Texas, counsel6 volunteered and were granted leave to represent him. The Amended Complaint filed by such counsel sought relief for plaintiff and the class he purported to represent (1) by declaratory judgment, declaring that the regulations and customs of the Texas Department of Corrections deprived plaintiff and his class of equal protection and due process Fourteenth Amendment rights (a) by preventing their engaging in the free exercise and full enjoyment of the Buddhism religion including the right to hold religious services in prison, and to attend such services with other prisoners of the same faith; (b) by preventing them from conducting legal research in the privacy of assigned quarters including the right to have their own legal books and records available for study and research in said quarters; and (c) by preventing their receiving newspapers, magazines and educational material, while in isolation as opposed to solitary confinement; and (2) for injunctive relief as authorized by Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 restraining discrimination against plaintiff and his class for violation of the constitutional rights covered by the declaratory judgment.
Cruz's pro se petition also alleged jurisdiction under Title 28, U.S.C. § 2201, the federal declaratory judgment act, which is of course not a jurisdictional statute, but simply provides a remedy in cases where federal jurisdiction is otherwise present. On the prior appeal to this court and in the Supreme Court of the United States the case has been treated as a Sec. 1983 Civil Rights action, as to which jurisdiction attaches under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1343
See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin et al., 1974, U.S., 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732
The original pro se complaint, handwritten on toilet paper, does not suggest the convening of a three-judge court and does not, at least in recognizable terms, indicate that any decree is sought restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of a state statute, the complaint being addressed rather to prison customs and usages, and discriminatory treatment of Cruz and his class by prison officials. The first amended complaint, the dismissal of which led to the reversal and remand by the Supreme Court of the United States, Cruz v. Beto, 1972, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263, while asserting that the customs and regulations of the Texas Department of Corrections which discriminate against the plaintiff and his class were promulgated pursuant to Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Art. 6166j as amended, sought neither declaratory nor injunctive relief against the statute. It does not appear therefore that the relief sought under the present pleading is such as to require the convening of a three-judge district court. Title 28, U.S.C., 2281. See Sands v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. en banc 1973, 491 F.2d 417. After remand, should the issues be expanded so as to require that the action be presented to and decided by a statutory three-judge court under the teachings of Sands, supra, the district judge should take the necessary steps to have such a court convened