Source: https://m.openjurist.org/360/us/287
Timestamp: 2019-08-20 21:01:37
Document Index: 740703443

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 90', '§ 90', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 2103', '§ 2103', '§ 90', '§ 1', '§ 6', '§ 12']

360 US 287 V Hon Edward G Baker As Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York | OpenJurist
360 U.S. 287 - V Hon Edward G Baker As Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
360 US 287 V Hon Edward G Baker As Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
79 S.Ct. 1157
3 L.Ed.2d 1234
ANONYMOUS NOS. 6 AND 7, Appellants,
Hon. Edward G. BAKER, as Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Argued March 25, 1959.
On January 21, 1957, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department, acting pursuant to § 90 of the State Judiciary Law, 29 N.Y.Laws Ann. § 90 (McKinney 1948), and in response to a petition of the Brooklyn Bar Association charging 'ambulance chasing' and related unethical practices among segments of the Kings County Bar,1 ordered an investigation into these alleged conditions by an Additional Special Term of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Arkwright presiding.2
Appellants, licensed private detectives and investigators, but not attorneys, appeared before the Special Term pursuant to witness subpoenas, accompanied by counsel. The presiding justice, acting upon the authority of an appellate decision made during the course of this same Inquiry, M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 A.D.2d 790, 170 N.Y.S.2d 535, leave to appeal denied, 4N.Y .2d 676, 173 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 149 N.E.2d 538, informed appellants that their counsel would not be allowed in the hearing room while they were being questioned, but that they would be free to consult with him at any time during their interrogation. Solely because of that limitation upon the participation of counsel, appellants thereafter refused to answer all manner of questions put to them. Their conviction for contempt, carrying a sentence of 30 days' imprisonment, followed.3 The Appellate Division affirmed, Application of Anonymous No. 6, 6 A.D.2d 719, 176 N.Y.S.2d 227, and the New York Court of Appeals, finding that 'no substantial constitutional question is involved,' dismissed ensuing appeals. 4 N.Y.2d 1034, 1035, 177 N.Y.S.2d 687, 152 N.E.2d 651. Appellants, proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2),4 then appealed to this Court, and we postponed further consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 358 U.S. 891, 79 S.Ct. 151, 3 L.Ed.2d 119.
Dealing first with the question of our jurisdiction, we think it clear that this appeal must be dismissed. It is predicated on the ground that the state courts held valid under the Federal Constitution § 90, subd. 10 of New York's Judiciary Law (see Note 6, infra), said to be the basis of the Special Term procedure here attacked. However, it appears that the federal constitutionality of § 90, subd. 10 was never 'drawn in question' or passed upon in the state courts; the Appellate Division, from whose decision the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, simply relied on the earlier cases of M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, supra, and S. Anonymous v. Arkwright, 5 A.D.2d 792, 170 N.Y.S.2d 538, which in turn appear not to have involved such an adjudication. In these circumstances we must hold that we lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2). Nevertheless, treating the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, we grant the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2103, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2103.
Customarily the proceedings at Special Term are conducted in private, for reasons which Mr. Justice Cardozo explained in the Karlin case as follows (248 N.Y. at pages 478—479, 162 N.E. at page 492):
By analogy to grand jury proceedings counsel are not permitted to attend the examination of witnesses called in such an investigation, cf. People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 485, 2 N.E. 615, 626—627,5 although the New York courts have held that the Special Term may in its discretion permit such attendance where it appears that the witness himself is a target of the inquiry. See M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, supra, 5 A.D.2d at page 791, 170 N.Y.S.2d at page 538.
These practices have received legislative approval, evidenced by § 90, subd. 10 of the State Judiciary Law, quoted in the margin,6 and by the Legislature's refusal in 1958 to amend the State Civil Rights Law, 8 N.Y.Laws Ann. § 1—242 (McKinney 1948), so as to require that counsel be allowed to attend the interrogation of witnesses in proceedings of this character.7
Thus, what we have here in the Appellate Division's order that the Inquiry be private8 and in the Special Term's exclusion of counsel from the hearing room is not a procedural innovation by a particular court or judge in a particular case, but an expression of established state policy. We are now asked to declare that policy unconstitutional.
To do so would not only necessitate our ignoring the weighty considerations which support New York's policy, but would require us to limit state power in this area of investigation far beyond anything indicated by this Court's past 'right to counsel' decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although we have held that in state criminal proceedings, which these are not, M. Anonymous v. Arkwright, supra, a defendant has an unqualified right to be represented at trial by retained counsel, Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4, we have not extended that right to the investigation stages of such proceedings. See Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523; See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448. Again, while it has been decided that there is a constitutional right to counsel in a criminal contempt proceeding, growing out of a state investigation, conducted before a judge sitting as a 'one-man grand jury,' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 500, 92 L.Ed. 682,9 we have held that a witness examined in a state investigation conducted in private is not constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel while being interrogated. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376.
In the Groban case we upheld the constitutionality of an Ohio statute10 which, as construed by the Ohio courts, authorized the Fire Marshal to exclude from the hearing room counsel representing those summoned to testify before him in an investigation into he causes of a fire. We there said (352 U.S. at pages 332—333, 77 S.Ct. at page 513):
The Groban case is controlling here and requires rejection of appellants' constitutional claims. As did Ohio in Groban, New York has a privilege against self-incrimination, N.Y.Const., Art. I, § 6, which was freely exercised by other witnesses in this investigation,11 and was fully available to these appellants. Moreover, the circumstance that this investigation was conducted by an experienced judge, rather than an administrative official, and the fact that appellants throughout their interrogation were freely given the right to consult counsel, notwithstanding his exclusion from the hearing room, make the constitutional claim here far less tenable than that found wanting in Groban.
Appellants seek to escape from Groban by arguing that they were summoned before the Special Term not as mere witnesses but with an eye to their future prosecution. This contention rests upon an informal 'off the record' conversation which appellants and their counsel had with an assistant on the Inquiry's staff some four months before appellants were actually examined. In response to counsel's inquiry as to 'what was wanted of his clients in this matter,' the assistant made the replies set forth in the margin.12 We think that the role in which these appellants were summoned to the Inquiry is to be judged by the actions of the Special Term, not by the statements of a subordinate staff member, evidently motivated by nothing more than a desire to avoid a plea of self-incrimination which would have blocked the Inquiry from obtaining possibly helpful information. The record shows that the Special Term, aware of the claims as to this occurrence, which it caused to be fully explored in the presence of appellants and their counsel, repeatedly assured appellants that they were before the Inquiry solely as witnesses.13 That they might later be faced with criminal charges, adds nothing to their present constitutional claim. In re Groban, supra, 352 U.S. at pages 332 333, 77 S.Ct. at pages 512—513.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S.Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376, decided two years ago, upheld as constitutional the action of a state fire marshal in compelling persons suspected of burning a building to testify about the fire in secret and without benefit of the presence of their counsel. Four of us dissented on the ground that such secret inquisitions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case the Court upholds the action of a state judge in compelling testimony from persons suspected of getting statements of defendants in negligence cases under false pretenses and later 'tampering' with these statements.* I think it violates due process for a judge no less than for a fire marshal to compel testmon y to be given incommunicado. In fact it was Star Chamber judges who helped to make closed-door court proceedings so obnoxious in this country that the Bill of Rights guarantees public trials and the assistance of counsel. And secretly compelled testimony does not lose its highly dangerous potentialities merely because it represents only a 'preliminary inquisition * * * whereby the court is given information that may move it to other acts thereafter.' (248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.W. 492.) Nor does this record justify a holding that this inquisition adopted the mantle of secrecy and barred counsel from the room out of tender solicitude for the reputation of the defendants in this contempt case. Doubtless the defendants' lawyer and the defendants themselves are at least as capable and perhaps as much interested in saving their reputations as the judge who is sending them to jail.
The naked, stark issue here is whether a judge, who must actually try cases in public—or any other government official for that matter—can consistently with due process compel persons to testify and perhaps to lay the groundwork for their later conviction of crime, in secret chambers, where counsel for the State can be present but where counsel for the suspect cannot. In upholding such secret inquisitions the Court once again retreats from what I conceive to be its highest duty, that of maintaining unimpaired the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S.Ct. 1081; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 S.Ct. 1040. Here as in Groban my answer would be that no public official can constitutionally exercise such a dangerous power over any individual. I would therefore reverse this conviction.
A proposed bill would have added to the Civil Rights Law a new § 12—a, providing as follows: 'Right of representation by counsel of persons clle d as witnesses in certain inquiries and investigations. Any person called as a witness by or Before any * * * judicial investigating committee, * * * or before any judge, * * * authorized or directed to conduct any inquiry or investigation, whose testimony may tend to involve himself or any other person in any subsequent criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution or in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding for professional misconduct, * * * or the revocation or suspension of any license to engage in a profession, trade or business, shall have the right to be accompanied by his counsel who shall be entitled on behalf of his client to (a) object to the jurisdiction of the * * * inquiry * * * and to argue briefly thereon; (b) to confer privately with his client to advise him of his legal rights whenever his client requests such a conference; (c) to object to procedures deemed by him to violate his client's legal rights; and (d) question the witness on his behalf, at the conclusion of his direct testimony, on any matter relevant to the subject of the inquiry or investigation, subject to such reasonable limitations as may be imposed by the officer presiding at such inquiry or investigation.'