Source: http://openjurist.org/593/f2d/1275/lee-v-flintkote-company
Timestamp: 2017-01-18 02:55:35
Document Index: 76444501

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1652', '§ 1332', '§ 1257', '§ 1257', '§ 11', '§ 28', '§ 573']

593 F2d 1275 Lee v. Flintkote Company | OpenJurist
593 F. 2d 1275 - Lee v. Flintkote Company HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 593 F.2d.
593 F2d 1275 Lee v. Flintkote Company 593 F.2d 1275
John M. LEE et al., Appellants,v.FLINTKOTE COMPANY.
Argued Dec. 6, 1977.Decided Jan. 11, 1979.
We do not mean to imply that application of District of Columbia law is mandated by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In the first place, Congress, when enacting the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.L.No.91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970), did not amend the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), to include the District of Columbia within its ambit. Had Congress wished the Rules of Decision Act to govern in situations such as the one before us, it could easily have revised the act after the fashion of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1976), which denominates the District of Columbia a "state" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 395, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 1675, 36 L.Ed.2d 342, 350 (1973) ("(w)e are entitled to assume that in amending § 1257 (of Title 28), Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to equate the District code and state statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said so expressly, and not left the matter to mere implication"). Secondly, the constitutional considerations discussed in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, supra, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. at 822, 82 L.Ed. at 1194 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general' . . .") have no force in this context, for the District, unlike the states, has no reserved power to be guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. Cf. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 452-453, 2 L.Ed. 332, 335 (1805)
D.C.Code § 11-102 (1973). Indeed, were we not to yield a measure of deference to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, two courts neither of which could review the other's decisions would engage independently in the process of formulating the local law of the District. That would subvert the dual aims of Erie : discouraging forum shopping and promoting uniformity within any given jurisdiction on matters of local substantive law. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, supra, 304 U.S. at 74-77, 58 S.Ct. at 820-822, 82 L.Ed. at 1192-1193. As we have heretofore observed, "it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court." Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 180 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 312, 554 F.2d 1165, 1171 (1977), quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 14 L.Ed.2d 8, 14 (1975). See Williams, District of Columbia Reorganization, 1970, 59 Geo.L.J. 477, 494-495 (1971); Note, An Erie Doctrine for the District of Columbia, 62 Geo.L.J. 963 (1974).
Boomhower, Inc. v. Lavine, 151 F.Supp. 563, 567 (D.D.C.1955); Tonn v. Philco Corp., 241 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C.App.1968); Kinney v. McNabb, 44 App.D.C. 340, 343 (1916). See also D.C.Code, § 28:2-202 (1973). " '(T)he parol evidence rule requires that "(w)hen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing." ' The consequences which the law attaches to a written contract are as much a part of it as the terms it sets forth, and the legal effect of the contract can no more be changed or modified by parol evidence than it could have had it been made express. The law ascribes to the contractual obligation of two or more a joint character unless the contract makes evident an intention that a several performance is to be indulged. That legal incident of the option in suit cannot be abrogated by recourse to evidence extrinsic to the contract." Clayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., 171 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 95, 518 F.2d 1026, 1033 (1973), quoting Murray v. Lichtman, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 252, 339 F.2d 749, 751 (1964), in turn quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573 (1960) (footnotes omitted)
United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 34, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 48, 518 F.2d at 441; Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L. B. Meadows & Co., 318 F.Supp. 1339, 1343 (E.D.N.Y.1970); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 56.15(3) (2d ed. 1948)
We need not enter the debate, however, for whatever merit this critique may have, we are constrained by controlling precedent. See, E. g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970). See also cases cited Supra notes 34-36. Indeed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) expressly provides that the materials on file must "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment . . . ." And as the Advisory Committee has explained:
E. g., Barham v. Barham, 33 Cal.2d 416, 202 P.2d 289, 293 (1949); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill.2d 272, 154 N.E.2d 683, 689 (1958); Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (1951); Young v. Schriner, 190 Va. 374, 57 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1950)
Compare White Co. v. White Motor Co., 159 App.Div. 716, 144 N.Y.Supp. 960, 961 (1st Dep't 1913). Cf. J. C. Millett Co. v. Distillers Distrib. Corp., 258 F.2d 139, 141 (9th Cir. 1958)