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168 F3d 916 United States v. Wilson | OpenJurist
168 F. 3d 916 - United States v. Wilson	Home168 f3d 916 united states v. wilson
168 F3d 916 United States v. Wilson 168 F.3d 916
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Yolanda WILSON (97-1810) and Marlon Wilson (97-1695),Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 97-1695, 97-1810.
Argued Nov. 4, 1998.Decided Feb. 25, 1999.
Mark V. Courtade, Asst. U.S. Attorney (argued and briefed), Grand Rapids, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Marlon Wilson (briefed), Christopher P. Yates (argued and briefed), Federal Public Defenders Office, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant-Appellant Marlon Wilson.
Michael A. Faraone (argued and briefed), Lansing, MI, Yolanda "Lonnie" Wilson, Pekin, IL, for Defendant-Appellant Yolanda "Lonnie" Wilson.
Before: MERRITT and COLE, Circuit Judges; EDMUNDS*, District Judge.
In 1996, a jury convicted Defendants Yolanda ("Lonnie") and Marlon Wilson, husband and wife, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced the pair to 168 months and 360 months of incarceration, respectively. Both Yolanda and Marlon appeal their convictions and sentences.
Each Defendant raises three points of error. Yolanda claims that the district court erred (1) in admitting co-conspirator statements at trial; (2) in determining the amount of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes; and (3) in calculating her criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), by finding that she participated in the cocaine conspiracy while she was on probation. Marlon claims that the district court erred (1) in allowing a fatal variance between the conspiracy stated in the indictment and the proof at trial; (2) in determining the amount of cocaine attributable to him for sentencing purposes; and (3) in applying the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because the court included his previous conviction for burglary.
For the reasons set forth below, the district court is AFFIRMED on every issue, except the application of the career offender guideline to Marlon Wilson based on his previous conviction for burglary. In light of our holding on that issue, Marlon Wilson's sentence is VACATED. Accordingly, this matter is REMANDED for re-sentencing because Wilson's 1980 conviction for burglary should not have been regarded as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1).1
Between 1993 and 1996, in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Marlon and Yolanda Wilson operated a cocaine distribution network out of their residence and a warehouse. The Wilsons were large-scale distributors of cocaine shipped from Chicago, Illinois on a weekly basis. Among the people with whom they conducted business were Leon Merriweather, Kevin Freeman, and Derrick Farr, who were collectively part of the "Merriweather Group." The Merriweather Group obtained their cocaine and crack cocaine from several different suppliers in various cities, including New York City, Detroit, and Chicago. Their affiliation with Marlon and Yolanda dates back to 1994. The Merriweather Group's initial cocaine purchase was during the summer of 1994 for one kilogram. Subsequent purchases ranged from one-half to two kilograms. The Merriweather Group dealt mainly with Yolanda during 1994, however, Leon Merriweather testified that Marlon frequently assisted his wife.
On one occasion in 1994, the Wilsons were unable to immediately deliver the $50,000 worth of cocaine the Merriweather Group ordered. Marlon met with Leon Merriweather to assure him that the two kilograms would be delivered as promised, though later than originally anticipated. Because of the delayed delivery, the Merriweather Group stopped buying cocaine from the Wilsons for about one year. During this period, the Wilsons supplied cocaine to numerous other drug traffickers, including Michael Harris. Harris testified that he lived with the Wilsons from December 1995 until February 1996. During that time, he said he often saw the Wilsons obtain five or more kilograms of cocaine at a time from their suppliers in Chicago and Gary, Indiana, which they then distributed to the Merriweather Group and others. Harris further testified that they stored the cocaine in a warehouse at Diamond and Wealthy Streets in Grand Rapids, and that they also sold cocaine to their customers from the warehouse.
On February 15, 1996, simultaneous search warrants were executed at the residences of Merriweather and Farr, and at least seven other locations throughout Grand Rapids. Most of the warrants were executed in the neighborhoods surrounding the Wilsons' residence. The search of Merriweather's house yielded one-fourth of a kilogram of cocaine, $14,000 in cash, and three guns. The search at Farr's revealed cocaine, a gun, cash, two scales and several pieces of paper that appeared to have drug tabulations on them. Both Merriweather and Farr admitted that the seized cocaine came from Yolanda and Marlon Wilson.
Harris testified that after Marlon learned of the searches taking place throughout the neighborhood, he called Harris at the Wilson residence and told him to "get the stuff and move it," referring to the cocaine. Just as the police were arriving at the Wilson residence to execute another search warrant, Harris was heading toward the warehouse with approximately five ounces of cocaine which he took from Marlon's bedroom following Marlon's phone call. The police proceeded to execute the search warrant. Although the search did not reveal any drugs, cash, guns, or drug paraphernalia, it did uncover tabulations that the Drug Enforcement Agent later testified were consistent with drug notations and drug records that he had seen previously. When Yolanda was subsequently arrested, agents seized a business card from her purse bearing the Chicago Bulls logo on one side and drug tabulations consistent with the price of three kilograms of cocaine on the other side.
On August 29, 1996, a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Michigan returned an indictment against the Defendants, charging them with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.2 Merriweather and other members of the conspiracy agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. At trial, Merriweather and Farr both testified that they purchased cocaine from the Wilsons, and Merriweather and Harris testified to the amount of cocaine that the Wilsons received on a weekly basis. Merriweather testified that "at the height of things [Yolanda] told me that she was getting at least five [kilograms] a week." (J.A. 193).
The jury convicted both Yolanda and Marlon of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The Presentence Investigation Report incorporated testimony from Merriweather, who claimed he received at least one-half kilogram of cocaine every ten days from the Wilsons, with intermittent periods when he did not receive any. In relevant part, the report stated,
If the Court were to consider the statement of Leon Merriweather wherein he stated he dealt with the defendants from spring of 1994, until his arrest in February of 1996 (a total of 22 months), and the statement he received a half kilogram every ten days, this would equate to 33 kilograms. If the Court were to consider the fact that these "dry periods" equaled one-half of the time frame, then the Wilsons would still be responsible for approximately 16.5 kilograms of cocaine.... In determining what quantity of cocaine the defendants should be held accountable for, this officer considered the most conservative estimate of 16.5 kilograms of high purity cocaine.
(J.A. at 364).
The district court sentenced Yolanda to 168 months of incarceration, and Marlon to 360 months of incarceration. Both filed timely notices of appeal.
This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which states that the courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. Issues Raised by Yolanda Wilson
A. District Court's Admission of Co-Conspirator Statements
This court generally reviews for clear error the district court's conclusions with respect to whether co-conspirator statements may be properly admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir.1992)(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1098, 116 S.Ct. 827, 133 L.Ed.2d 769 (1996). In this case, however, counsel failed to raise at trial a timely objection to the co-conspirator testimony. If an evidentiary objection is not made at the time of the testimony, this court reviews the admission of the evidence for plain error. United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir.1996). An evidentiary decision may be reversed under the plain error doctrine "only in exceptional circumstances" and only when the error is so plain that the trial judge was "derelict in countenancing it." Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Before a district court may admit statements of a co-conspirator, three factors must be established: (1) that the conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) that the co-conspirator's statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United State v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir.1997)(citing Gessa, 971 F.2d at 1261). This three-part test is often referred to as an Enright finding. Cf. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir.1978). The party offering the statements bears the burden of proving these three factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Nevertheless, the district court may consider the hearsay statements themselves when inquiring into the existence of a conspiracy. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181, 107 S.Ct. 2775; see also Monus, 128 F.3d at 392.
The 1997 Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 801 codifies the holding in Bourjaily. The advisory committee note also explains:
The contents of the declarant's statement do not alone suffice to establish a conspiracy in which the declarant and the defendant participated. The court must consider in addition the circumstances surrounding the statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the statement was made, or evidence corroborating the contents of the statement in making its determination as to each preliminary question. Every court of appeals that has resolved this issue requires some evidence in addition to the contents of the statements.
Fed.R.Evid. 801 (advisory committee note).
Yolanda argues for the first time on appeal that the government has failed to show evidence of a conspiracy apart from the hearsay statements of her co-conspirators. In fact, however, substantial evidence supports the existence of a conspiracy. First, the co-conspirators made non-hearsay statements which reflect Yolanda's involvement in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. For example, on direct examination, Leon Merriweather testified that he saw five kilograms of cocaine in the trunk of Yolanda's car. Each kilogram was wrapped as a Christmas present. (J.A. 195-96). Derrick Farr also testified on direct examination that he saw cocaine at Yolanda's house and that he and Merriweather picked up two packages wrapped like Christmas presents from Yolanda's house. The packages each contained a kilogram of cocaine. (J.A. 255-56).
Second, the government offers documents taken from the Wilsons' home reflecting drug sales, and a business card with tabulations suggestive of drug transactions. Special Agent Peters testified on direct examination that documents found in Yolanda's house are consistent with drug tabulations he encounters as a Drug Enforcement Officer. (J.A. 221-34). The numbers on the documents suggest the prices of kilograms and half kilograms of cocaine. The initials on the documents are consistent with the initials of those involved in the conspiracy. Agent Peters testified that no explanation other than drug trafficking would account for the numbers and initials on the documents found in Yolanda's home. (J.A. 228). The district court's conclusion that a conspiracy existed, independent of co-conspirator hearsay, does not rise to the level of plain error. The district court is AFFIRMED on this issue.
B. District Court's Determination of the Amount of Cocaine Attributable to Yolanda
This court reviews the district court's factual findings that underlie the application of the sentencing guidelines for clear error. United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128, 131 (6th Cir.1995)(citing United States v. Garner, 940 F.2d 172, 174 (6th Cir.1991)). The district court's determination of the amount of drugs for which a defendant is responsible is a factual finding which must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1300-1301 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990).
The district court found that Yolanda was responsible for at least 16.5 kilograms of cocaine, which calls for a base offense level of 34. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). In support of her contention that she is not responsible for that amount of cocaine, Yolanda argues that some of the witnesses could not articulate the amount of cocaine she trafficked, and that co-conspirator Freeman's testimony conflicted with that of Merriweather's.3
Where there is no actual drug seizure, it is more difficult to determine the actual amount of cocaine each individual defendant in the conspiracy is responsible for handling. Application note 12 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 recognizes this problem:
Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. In making this determination, the court may consider the price generally obtained for the controlled substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled substances by the defendant, and the size or capability of any laboratory involved.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, application note 12.
Where there exists "jointly undertaken criminal activity," the base offense level is determined not only by acts committed by