Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/979/259/383757/
Timestamp: 2019-12-07 11:19:37
Document Index: 177082062

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 11', '§ 34', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983']

Emma Rivera, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Paul Murphy, Defendant, Appellee, 979 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1992) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1992 › Emma Rivera, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Paul Murphy, Defendant, Appellee
Emma Rivera, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Paul Murphy, Defendant, Appellee, 979 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1992)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 979 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1992) Heard Oct. 6, 1992. Decided Nov. 10, 1992
This appeal arises out of an action brought by Emma Rivera against Paul Murphy, a Boston Police officer, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 12, § 11I, and for state law tort claims, including: assault and battery; false arrest; false imprisonment; malicious prosecution; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and, negligence. Rivera alleged she suffered physical and emotional injuries when Murphy subjected her to a warrantless arrest for possession of cocaine in violation of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 94C, § 34. Murphy moved for summary judgment on the ground that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he had probable cause to make the arrest from which the alleged violations and torts arose. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). The district court granted the motion for summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim and six of the seven pendent state law claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991). This court's review of a district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Hoffman v. Reali, 973 F.2d 980, 984 (1st Cir. 1992); Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1992); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). On appeal, as below, we must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115. In the absence of a dispute over the underlying material facts, a defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of law and is reserved for plenary review by this court. Hoffman, 973 F.2d at 984 (citations omitted). We begin by setting out the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Rivera.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the remaining defendant, Officer Murphy, filed a motion for summary judgment. Murphy attached an affidavit to the memorandum in support of this motion, stating in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court announced the general rule of qualified immunity in Harlow, when it stated that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738. See also Hunter v. Bryant, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991) (per curiam); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S. Ct. at 3039-40. Officer Murphy is entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Rivera. Hunter, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 537. This is not a stringent test. Indeed, "[t]he qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.' " Hunter, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S. Ct. at 537 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 341, 106 S. Ct. at 1097, 1096).1 The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity "so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable." Ricci v. Urso, 974 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Prokey, 942 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991); Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985).
Under the Fourth Amendment,2 the right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the person gives rise to a requirement that arrests be supported by probable cause. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 224, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). As the Court explained in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963):
Id. at 479, 83 S. Ct. at 413 (citations omitted). The probable cause test is an objective one, for, as the Supreme Court noted in Beck, "[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Beck, 379 U.S. at 97, 85 S. Ct. at 229. Therefore, we have stated that probable cause exists when " 'the facts and circumstances within [the police officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.' " United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S. Ct. at 225 (1964)). Finally, in reviewing any determination regarding the sufficiency of cause to effect an arrest we must "consider the totality of circumstances to evaluate the government's demonstration of sufficient '[p]robability ... of criminal activity.' " United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)).
In order to have probable cause for a Terry stop (a minimal intrusion relative to arrest), a police officer must have "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts," could create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a brief detention of an individual. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Here, Officer Murphy recounts no such "specific and articulable facts." If he could not have met the standard for such a brief investigatory detention of Rivera, he certainly does not meet the requirements for a full-blown arrest. Absent any specific and articulable observations, it cannot be said that it was even arguable as to whether Murphy had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest.
The experience and training of a police officer are, of course, factors to be considered in the determination of probable cause, but, the "relevance [of such experience and training] in a particular case must be sufficiently conveyed so that ... it 'can be understood by the average reasonably prudent person.' " Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure 575 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977)). See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 & n. 2, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640-41 & n. 2, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-86, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2581-83, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975); see also Maguire, 918 F.2d at 258. Were we to affirm the district court's ruling below, we would give license to police officers to make unwarranted arrests, and retain qualified immunity from civil suits so long as they asserted that they thought they had probable cause to make the arrest based on their "observations, training and experience." Creating such a talisman would effectively transform the police officer into a judge, and the court into a rubber stamp.
Even had the court been correct in its grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, it would not have been proper to grant summary judgment on the pendent state law claims. Rather, in this case, the court should have dismissed the pendent claims over which the court no longer had jurisdiction, thereby allowing the plaintiff to pursue the action in state court where it was first brought. As the Supreme Court stated in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1987):
Under [United Mine Workers v.] Gibbs [383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966) ], a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.
Id. at 350, 108 S. Ct. at 619 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). See also Cullen v. Mattaliano, 690 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1988) ("it is the settled rule in this Circuit that in a non-diversity case, where pendent state claims are joined with a federal cause of action and that federal cause of action is the subject of a successful summary judgment motion, the pendent state claims should be dismissed."). Id. at 99.
The court had federal question jurisdiction to hear the § 1983 claim and therefore had jurisdiction to hear pendent state law claims which "derive[d] from a common nucleus of operative fact" and were "such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1988).
The law provides immunity for such reasonable errors because "officials should not err always on the side of caution" out of a fear of civil suit. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3020, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984)