Source: https://ru.scribd.com/document/391566481/Conyers-v-Trump-Foreign-Emoluments-DOJ-Appeal-for-Certification-of-Judgment-to-Dismiss-102218-Case-1-17-cv-01154-EGS-10-22-18
Timestamp: 2020-01-23 20:59:31
Document Index: 697978713

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1292', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 1292', '§ 9', '§ 1292', '§1292', '§ 1292', '§ 3930', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 3931', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 1292', '§ 3930', '§ 3930', '§ 9', '§ 1292', '§ 1292']

In The United States District Court For The District Of Columbia | Standing (Law) | Interlocutory Appeal
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Senator RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendant. No. 17-cv-1154-EGS DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE COURT’S SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
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Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 1 of 24
DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF THE COURT’S SEPTEMBER 28, 2018 ORDER
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 2 of 24
A. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal Is Appropriate Because of the Exceptional
Circumstances of This Case. ......................................................................................................5
B. The Order Involves a Controlling Question of Law. .................................................................8
C. There is Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion as to Plaintiffs’ Standing to Sue. ........9
1. There is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to Coleman’s applicability to
this case. .............................................................................................................................10
2. Whether Plaintiffs lack adequate legislative remedies is a question about which
reasonable jurists could differ. ...........................................................................................15
3. There is substantial ground for difference of opinion whether the standing of other
plaintiffs is relevant............................................................................................................17
D. Certification Would Materially Advance the Termination of the Litigation. ..........................18
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 3 of 24
Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs.,
219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 5
620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) .................................................................................... 7, 8, 18
525 F.3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .............................................................................................. 5, 8
APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co.,
297 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2003) ................................................................................ 5, 8, 9, 18
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) .................................................................................................. 10, 11, 12
Campbell v. Clinton,
203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................. passim
542 U.S. 367 (2004) ............................................................................................................ 1, 2, 6
Chenoweth v. Clinton,
181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................. 10
568 U.S. 398 (2013) .................................................................................................................. 17
307 U.S. 433 (1939) ........................................................................................................ 3, 10, 12
Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers,
542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 6
Common Cause v. Biden,
909 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2012),
aff’d on other grounds, 748 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .............................................. 10, 12, 14
321 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D.D.C. 2018) .............................................................................................. 7
319 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D.D.C. 2018) ............................................................................................ 6
421 U.S. 491 (1975) .................................................................................................................. 17
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 4 of 24
671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................... 7
553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .................................................................................................. 11
840 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2012) .......................................................................................... 5, 8
874 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 7, 9
No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL 33142129 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2000)................................................. 9
462 U.S. 919 (1983) .................................................................................................................. 16
233 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2002) .............................................................................................. 8
921 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1990)...................................................................................................... 8, 9
Kucinich v. Bush,
236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) ................................................................................ 6, 7, 14, 15
273 U.S. 135 (1927) .................................................................................................................. 17
558 U.S. 100 (2009) ................................................................................................................ 2, 5
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,
317 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018) ........................................................................................ 4, 5, 8
Montesa v. Schwartz,
836 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2016)........................................................................................................ 8
733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................... 6
521 U.S. 811 (1997) ........................................................................................................... passim
Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc.,
643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 9
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 5 of 24
418 U.S. 208 (1974) .................................................................................................................. 17
418 U.S. 166 (1974) .................................................................................................................. 17
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 17
354 U.S. 178 (1957) .................................................................................................................. 17
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.................................................................................................... 1, 4, 16
16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2008) ....................... 4, 8, 9
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 6 of 24
Defendant, the President of the United States, respectfully seeks certification of this
Court’s September 28, 2018 Order, ECF No. 58, for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Plaintiffs, 201 Members of Congress, brought this suit alleging that the President has
violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the Constitution through his ownership interest in
companies that conduct business with foreign governments. Plaintiffs allege that they are injured
by the President’s alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments without first obtaining “the Consent
of Congress.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Despite recognizing that “this case implicates
separation-of-powers concerns,” Mem. Op. at 53, ECF No. 59, the Court held that Plaintiffs have
standing as Members of Congress because, in the Court’s view, the Foreign Emoluments Clause
“gives each individual Member of Congress a right to vote before the President accepts [any
foreign emoluments],” and the President deprived them of that right by not seeking consent. Id.
at 11. The Court’s ruling marks the first to recognize legislative standing by individual Members
of Congress since the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), and the
D.C. Circuit’s decisions interpreting Raines—all of which held that disputes between the
political branches are rarely, if ever, judicially cognizable under our constitutional scheme of
This Court should certify its September 28 Order for interlocutory appeal. The case
presents the extraordinary circumstance of a suit by Members of the Legislative Branch against
the sitting President of the United States for alleged violations of the Constitution. Not only does
the case raise significant separation-of-powers concerns, but the Supreme Court has emphasized
that “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive . . . is a matter that
should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding” in suits involving the President. Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has
cautioned, “the Executive’s constitutional responsibilities and status are factors counseling
judicial deference and restraint in the conduct of litigation against it,” and “occasion[s] for
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 7 of 24
constitutional confrontation between [] two branches [of the Government] should be avoided
whenever possible.” Id. at 385, 389–90 (citation omitted). Certifying the Court’s threshold
ruling for interlocutory review could avoid such confrontation.
Moreover, the Order clearly involves a “controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and resolving it on immediate appeal “may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The
threshold legal question of the standing of individual Members of Congress is controlling
because if the D.C. Circuit decides the issue in the President’s favor, this case would be
dismissed, thereby avoiding the need to address Plaintiffs’ novel Foreign Emoluments Clause
claim and preserving both the Court’s and the parties’ resources. And reasonable jurists could
disagree as to whether individual Members of Congress have standing to sue the President for
alleged violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Raines teaches that “[o]ur regime
contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts” than one that would permit the
Judiciary to resolve disputes between the political branches. 521 U.S. at 828. In holding that
even “a single Member of Congress could have standing to sue” because the President allegedly
nullified the Member’s vote by not seeking congressional consent (even if the Member would
vote to consent to the alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments), Mem. Op. at 33, the Court’s
Order is in substantial tension with, or at least is a novel interpretation of, Raines. Indeed, since
Raines, every court that has considered the issue has declined to find that individual Members of
Congress have standing to sue the President or Executive Branch agencies. Certification,
therefore, is warranted given the novelty of the Court’s interpretation and the significant
constitutional import of the Court’s ruling. As the Supreme Court has noted, a “district court[]
should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal” when its ruling “involves a new legal
question or is of special consequence.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–11
(2009). That is precisely the case here. 1
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 8 of 24
Plaintiffs bring this suit against the President, in his official capacity, alleging that he has
violated, and continues to violate, the Foreign Emoluments Clause because he allegedly receives
prohibited benefits from foreign governments through his ownership interests in companies that
transact business with foreign governments. See generally 1st Am. Compl., ECF No. 14. The
President moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs (1) lack standing to bring their
claims, (2) have no equitable cause of action under the Foreign Emoluments Clause because,
among other things, they have not alleged interests addressed by the Clause, (3) have failed to
state a claim under the Clause, and (4) cannot obtain the requested equitable remedies against the
President in his official capacity. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15; Statement of P. & A. in
Supp. (“MTD Mem.”), ECF No. 15-1. On September 28, 2018, the Court denied the motion in
part, finding that Plaintiffs have standing to sue. The remainder of the President’s motion
The Court’s finding of standing was based on its conclusion that the President’s alleged
actions constitute vote nullification—i.e., “treating a vote that did not pass as if it had, or vice
versa,” Mem. Op. at 32 (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000)—under
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and that such institutional injury may support standing
for individual Members of Congress. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the Foreign
Emoluments Clause gives each Member of Congress a right to vote on whether to consent to the
President’s alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments and that the President has deprived them
of that right because he “has neither sought plaintiffs’ consent prior to accepting prohibited
foreign emoluments, nor provided any information to Congress about them.” Mem. Op. at 31–
32. Because the President “has accepted prohibited foreign emoluments as though Congress had
provided its consent,” the Court reasoned, he has “completely nullified [Plaintiffs’] votes in the
past” and “will completely nullify their votes in the future for the same reason.” Id. at 32.
The Court distinguished Raines on the basis that the Raines plaintiffs “[did] not claim
that they have been deprived of something to which they are personally entitled” but were
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 9 of 24
claiming standing on the basis of their “loss of political power.” Id. at 16, 53. At the same time,
the Court recognized that Plaintiffs’ claim about the President’s failure to seek “the Consent of
Congress,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, is an “institutional claim.” Mem. Op. at 33. But that
does not pose an impediment to Plaintiffs’ claim of standing, the Court held, because Coleman
was brought by a bloc of individual legislators seeking to vindicate an institutional claim, and
Raines neither overruled Coleman nor held “that an institutional claim may be brought only by
the institution.” Id.
Although the Court acknowledged that “this case implicates separation-of-powers
concerns,” id. at 53, it held that Plaintiffs’ claims are nonetheless justiciable; the Court believed
that Plaintiffs lack adequate legislative remedies for their alleged injury, id. at 43–48, and that
this case is capable of resolution through the judicial process, id. at 48–54. Moreover, the Court
reasoned that if Plaintiffs do not have standing, then “it is unlikely that another plaintiff would.”
Id. at 55. Finally, the Court held that Plaintiffs had established the traceability and redressability
prongs of the standing analysis because Plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the President has
caused their alleged injury of vote nullification and that injunctive relief against him would
redress the injury. Id. at 56–57.
Courts may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if it involves “[1] a controlling
question of law [2] as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and [3] that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In determining whether to grant §1292(b) certification, the
Court should be mindful of § 1292(b)’s purpose to “inject an element of flexibility into the
technical rules of appellate jurisdiction” and should weigh, among other things, “[t]he difficulty
and general importance of the question presented” and “the significance of the gains from
reversal.” 16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930 (3d ed. 2008).
While courts in this District have stated that § 1292(b) certification must be justified by
exceptional circumstances, see, e.g., Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1,
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 10 of 24
4 (D.D.C. 2018), the Supreme Court has explained that “district courts should not hesitate to
certify an interlocutory appeal” when a decision “involves a new legal question or is of special
consequence.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 111. One court of appeals also has “emphasize[d]
the duty of the district court . . . to allow an immediate appeal to be taken when the statutory
criteria are met.” Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs., 219 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2000). Indeed, courts in
this Circuit have not hesitated to allow interlocutory appeal when the § 1292(b) criteria are met.
See, e.g., Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Molock,
317 F. Supp. 3d at 4; Howard v. Office of Chief Admin. Officer of U.S. House of Representatives,
840 F. Supp. 2d 52, 57 (D.D.C. 2012); APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 297 F. Supp.
2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
As explained below, this case presents the kind of extraordinary circumstance that
warrants interlocutory review and all three requirements of § 1292(b) are met here.
A. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal Is Appropriate Because of the
Exceptional Circumstances of This Case.
In this case, “exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of
postponing appellate review until after the entry of final judgment.” Am. Council of the Blind,
525 F.3d at 1265 (citation omitted). This is a suit by individual Members of Congress seeking to
adjudicate their contentions concerning the Foreign Emoluments Clause with respect to the
President. They ask the Judiciary to enjoin the sitting President from alleged constitutional
violations—i.e., accepting foreign emoluments without the consent of Congress. 1st Am.
Compl. at 57. The practical and political consequences of such a suit are readily apparent. And
the separation-of-powers concerns implicated by such inter-branch confrontations alone warrant
immediate appellate review of the threshold issue of whether the individual Members have
standing to sue. Although this Court found Raines not controlling, Raines at least teaches that in
a case involving inter-branch disputes, separation-of-powers principles counsel the Judiciary to
exercise extreme restraint. Indeed, Raines discussed “several episodes in our history” of
“analogous confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch”
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 11 of 24
that would have been resolved by the Judiciary if “claimed injury to official authority or power”
by either Branch alone conferred standing to commence litigation. 521 U.S. at 826–28. But as
the Court in Raines held, “[o]ur regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III
courts.” Id. at 828; see also Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he system of checks and balances [would be] replaced by
a system of judicial refereeship, if the officers of the political branches are deemed to have a
personal, ‘private’ interest in the powers that have been conferred upon them . . . by Constitution
or statute.”). Moreover, involvement of the Judiciary in an “interbranch controversy” “would
risk damaging the public confidence that is vital to the functioning of the Judicial Branch.”
Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J., concurring).
Thus, the Supreme Court has also taught that “occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation
between [] two branches [of the Government] should be avoided whenever possible.” Cheney,
542 U.S. at 389–90. The D.C. Circuit likewise has long recognized that separation-of-powers
considerations ordinarily require the Judiciary to stay its hands. See, e.g., Moore, 733 F.2d 946
(dismissing suit by Members of Congress as a matter of equitable discretion because of the
separation-of-powers problems it created); Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives
v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting stay pending appeal in a dispute over
compliance with Congressional subpoena by the former White House Counsel in part because
the “present dispute is of potentially great significance for the balance of power between the
Legislative and Executive Branches”). And judges in this Court similarly have adhered to that
principle. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 319 F. Supp. 3d 539, 541 (D.D.C. 2018) (dismissing the
President from suit challenging a presidential policy because “[s]ound separation-of-power
President directly”); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2002) (Members of
Congress had no standing to challenge the President’s unilateral termination of treaty; “it is
appropriate to defer to the political branches of government, out of respect for the traditional
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 12 of 24
restricted role of the judiciary in disputes between the Legislative and Executive Branches, and
in keeping with the Constitution’s separation of powers structure”).
Moreover, the fact that this Court is the first to interpret Raines to permit individual
Members of Congress to sue the President for alleged infringement of their asserted institutional
prerogative is extraordinary enough to warrant immediate appellate review. Cf. Cummings v.
Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (plaintiffs, who are seventeen Members of the
House Oversight Committee, did not have standing under Raines to sue to compel the production
of documents under statute conferring a right to certain information when requested by any seven
members of the Committee, because their injury was only “institutional,” not “personal,” and
because “Individual Members of Congress generally do not have standing to vindicate the
institutional interests of the house in which they serve”); Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 4
(Members of Congress had no standing under Raines to challenge the President’s unilateral
termination of treaty; observing that “[t]he question whether members of Congress have standing
to sue Executive Branch officials is neither novel nor unsettled”); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 51, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2009) (court found “extraordinary circumstances” warranting
§ 1292(b) certification where court made a novel interpretation and application of Supreme
Court precedent).
Equally counseling in favor of immediate appeal is the fact that this case involves novel
constitutional claims against the sitting President. See, e.g., In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 952–53
(6th Cir. 2017) (permitting interlocutory appeal of an order denying the President’s motion to
dismiss a “state-law claim that present[ed] a novel question” because of the apparent “practical
and political consequences of such a case”); see also Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426,
431 (11th Cir. 1982) (in case presenting “novel controversies” involving the rights of illegal
aliens and “the scope of the constitutional powers of Congress and the President to conduct
foreign affairs,” court of appeals issued writ of mandamus requiring district court to first resolve
the question of its jurisdiction and to certify that ruling for interlocutory appeal because the
jurisdictional question is a “controlling issue of national significance”); Al Maqaleh, 620 F.
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 13 of 24
Supp. 2d at 55 (in case involving habeas corpus rights of alien detainees held in a U.S. military
base in Afghanistan, granting § 1292(b) certification given the “novelty of the issues” and the
“extraordinary jurisdictional issue” in question). If the D.C. Circuit were to conclude on
interlocutory appeal that Plaintiffs lack standing, this case would come to an end, avoiding the
need to address the novel constitutional issue presented by Plaintiffs’ Foreign Emoluments
Clause claim and conserving judicial resources. See Am. Council of the Blind, 525 F.3d at 1265
(finding that the Secretary of Treasury had satisfied the “extraordinary circumstances”
requirement for interlocutory appeal because “[w]ere we to conclude that the Secretary should
have prevailed on summary judgment, our consideration of this matter would eliminate the need
for further proceedings and preserve judicial resources”).
And, as shown below, the Court may grant certification because all three statutory
B. The Order Involves a Controlling Question of Law.
Under § 1292(b), a controlling question of law is “one that would require reversal if
decided incorrectly or that could materially affect the course of litigation with resulting savings
of the court’s or the parties’ resources.” Molock, 317 F. Supp. at 4 (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc.
v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2002)). “Controlling questions
of law include issues that would terminate an action if the district court’s order were reversed.”
APCC Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 96; Howard, 840 F. Supp. at 55. Thus, issues of subject matter
jurisdiction are controlling questions of law because “reversal of the district court’s order would
terminate the action.” Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1990);
accord APCC Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 96; Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176, 194 (2d Cir.
2016) (reviewing on § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal whether plaintiffs had standing to bring an
Establishment Clause challenge); 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3931 (“Among the categories of
rulings that may be obviously suited for interlocutory appeal . . . are those rejecting . . .
challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction [and] justiciability . . . .”) (citations omitted).
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 14 of 24
Here, the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing to sue is a threshold issue of subject matter
jurisdiction that would be dispositive of this litigation if decided differently. It is thus a
controlling question of law under the first prong of § 1292(b).
C. There is Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion as to Plaintiffs’ Standing
As for the required “substantial ground for difference of opinion” under § 1292(b), it may
be established “where a court’s challenged decision conflicts with decisions of several other
courts.” APCC Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 97–98. A “novel issue” may also satisfy this element
of § 1292(b) without awaiting development of contradictory precedent if “fair-minded jurists
might reach contradictory conclusions.” Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th
Cir. 2011); see also In re Trump, 874 F.3d at 952 (same); Klinghoffer, 921 F.2d at 25
(interlocutory appeal appropriate where issues were “difficult and of first impression”). And, a
court may find a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” even where it is confident in the
correctness of its ruling. See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL
33142129, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2000) (“Although this Court firmly believes that the facts of
this case warrant a ruling in favor of application of the Federal Rules to jurisdictional discovery,
the Court recognizes that the arguments in support of the opposite conclusion are not
insubstantial.”). Moreover, “[t]he level of uncertainty required to find a substantial ground for
difference of opinion should be adjusted to meet the importance of the question in the context of
the specific case.” 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3930; see, e.g., APCC Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 98
(“certification may be justified even if there is a relatively low level of uncertainty” where, for
example, “‘proceedings that threaten to endure for several years depend on an initial question of
jurisdiction or the like’”) (quoting 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3930).
Here, there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to Plaintiffs’ standing to sue
because the Court has interpreted and extended Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent in a
novel way that warrants immediate review in the Court of Appeals.
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 15 of 24
1. There is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to Coleman’s
applicability to this case.
Central to the Court’s holding is its finding that Plaintiffs have alleged a cognizable
institutional injury in the form of “vote nullification” such as that recognized in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Mem. Op. at 31–32. In Coleman, a bloc of state senators, whose
votes would have been sufficient to defeat the state’s ratification of a Federal constitutional
amendment if the state’s Lieutenant Governor had not cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of
ratification, and who the state supreme court held had a right to challenge that action in state
court, were found to have standing to seek review in the Supreme Court on the basis that their
votes had been nullified. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441. Reasonable jurists could disagree about the
propriety of extending Coleman’s holding in the unique circumstances of that case to this very
First, Coleman has never been extended to confer standing on federal legislators in a suit
involving inter-branch conflicts. The D.C. Circuit has distinguished Coleman from Raines in
just this manner: “the federal constitutional separation of powers concerns that underlay . . .
Raines (and which [the D.C. Circuit] emphasized in Chenoweth [v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 113
(D.C. Cir. 1999)]) were not present [in] . . . Coleman.” Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22. In Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015),
where the state legislature was also found to have standing to sue, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the case before it “d[id] not touch or concern the question whether Congress has
standing to bring a suit against the President,” but “a suit between Congress and the President
would raise separation-of-powers concerns.” Id. at 2665 n.12. This Court itself has also
recognized the separation-of-powers problems that would arise if Coleman were extended to the
federal context, concluding in a suit involving conflict between the Senate and Members of the
House that the suit “raises fatal separation-of-powers concerns.” Common Cause v. Biden, 909
F. Supp. 2d 9, 24, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Raines’ discussion distinguishing Coleman on
this basis), aff’d on other grounds, 748 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because “[a] separation of
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 16 of 24
powers issue arises as soon as the Coleman holding is extended to United States legislators,”
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1977), there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion whether Coleman can appropriately apply to a suit by Members of
Congress against the President. 2
Second, the Coleman vote nullification theory was premised on the plaintiffs constituting
a sufficient proportion of the legislature to take legislative action. As the Supreme Court
explained in Raines, “Coleman stands (at most . . .) for the proposition that legislators whose
votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to
sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their
votes have been completely nullified.” 521 U.S. at 823 (emphasis added). The only other case
where the Supreme Court has found legislative standing for an institutional injury, Arizona State
Legislature, involved a lawsuit brought by the state legislature itself. 135 S. Ct. at 2664
(distinguishing Raines on the grounds that the “Arizona Legislature . . . is an institutional
plaintiff asserting an institutional injury, and it commenced this action after authorizing votes in
both of its chambers”) (emphasis added). Like Raines and unlike Coleman and Arizona State
Legislature, Plaintiffs here constitute a minority of each House of Congress and they lack
authorization from either entity to sue on its behalf. Although this Court interpreted these cases
to allow Plaintiffs standing here, finding that Coleman did not require any minimum number of
legislators to sue as a bloc and that Arizona State Legislature does not preclude individual
legislators from suing to vindicate an institutional interest, the Court’s ruling is at least an
extension of those cases. And reasonable jurists could disagree about whether such an extension
is warranted, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s prior refusal to extend Coleman. See
Raines, 521 U.S. at 826 (rejecting individual Members’ standing where upholding it “would
Notably, the state senators in Coleman were found by the state court to have standing to sue in
state court. The Supreme Court then held that they had standing to seek review in the Supreme
Court of the judgment that had been entered against them. Here, the individual federal
legislators seek to bring an action directly in federal court in the first instance. See MTD Mem.
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 17 of 24
require a drastic extension of Coleman”); Common Cause, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 24, 26 (rejecting
application of vote nullification as a basis for legislative standing where doing so would
“transform it from a narrow exception into a broader one”).
Third, the asserted injury in Coleman did not damage all members of the legislature
equally. The only members of the legislature in Coleman who had suffered any injury were the
state senators whose “votes not to ratify the amendment were deprived of all validity.” Raines,
521 U.S. at 822 (emphasis added). The state senators who had voted in favor of ratification had
not been injured at all. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ asserted injury is a “type of institutional
injury” (loss of an opportunity to cast a vote on whether to give or withhold consent) that
“necessarily damages,” if at all, “all Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress
equally.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. And that is precisely the type of “[w]idely dispersed” injury
that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed is insufficient to confer Article III standing. Ariz.
State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829). Reasonable jurists could
therefore disagree about whether Plaintiffs’ asserted injury in this case is in fact akin to the
asserted injury in Coleman.
Fourth, “vote nullification,” as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit,
hinged on the irreversible nature of the challenged action, which reasonable jurists could find
lacking here. Coleman involved state senators’ votes on a Federal constitutional amendment.
307 U.S. at 441. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Campbell, once the Federal constitutional
amendment was deemed ratified by the state, the senators had “no legislative remedy” to reverse
it in the future. 203 F.3d at 22–23. Similarly, in Arizona State Legislature, the challenged state
initiative would have removed redistricting authority from the legislature entirely and
“‘completely nullif[ied]’ any vote by the Legislature now or ‘in the future,’ purporting to adopt a
redistricting plan.” 135 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24).
In this case, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury similarly cannot be remedied
in the future, reasoning that “as soon as the President accepts a prohibited foreign emolument
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 18 of 24
without obtaining congressional consent, his acceptance is irreversible.” Mem. Op. at 32. 3 But
reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether such action is comparable to those in Coleman
and Arizona State Legislature, given that Congress still has the ability to vote on whether to
consent to the President’s alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments, even if post hoc. Under the
Court’s reasoning, legislators would have standing to challenge Presidential action whenever the
President allegedly acts without following prescribed constitutional or statutory procedures that
would have allowed Congress to weigh in first. The D.C. Circuit, however, has rejected such a
In Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the individual Members challenged
the President’s use of military forces in Yugoslavia without first obtaining congressional
authority, which the Members argued was required by the War Powers Clause of the
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Id. at 19, 23–24. The D.C. Circuit found that they
had no standing to sue, despite the fact that no legislative action could turn the clock back to the
time before the challenged military operations occurred without the requisite congressional
authorization. Although the Campbell plaintiffs also cast their injury in terms of vote
nullification, the D.C. Circuit rejected that characterization because the President was not acting
pursuant to a “defeated declaration of war or a statutory authorization” as if it had been passed.
Id. at 22. Rather, the Court found, the plaintiffs’ claim was essentially that the President had
“acted illegally . . . because he waged war in the constitutional sense without a congressional
delegation,” and such a claim was not “analogous to a Coleman nullification.” Id. at 22. In so
The history of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s application arguably refutes this finding. The
historical record is replete with examples of U.S. officials first accepting gifts from foreign
governments and then either seeking consent from Congress or obviating any Foreign
Emoluments Clause issue by depositing the gift or its proceeds with the Treasury. Def.’s MTD
Mem. at 32–33. Moreover, although the Court observed that past Presidents have “complied
with the Clause . . . by requesting an opinion from the Executive or Legislative Branch’s
advisory office as to whether the Clause applies,” Mem. Op. at 10–11, such a manner of
compliance would seem to give rise to a claim for legislative standing by any Member of
Congress under the Court’s reasoning because such advice does not constitute prior consent from
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 19 of 24
holding, the Court also rejected the argument that the “right to vote in the future” does not
remedy past deprivation of a voting opportunity; as the Court put it, Raines teaches that “if at
first you don’t succeed [in convincing your colleagues in Congress], try and try again.” Id. at 24.
Reasonable jurists thus could disagree whether the President’s failure to seek
congressional consent before his alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments is analogous to a
Coleman nullification. Indeed, one court has already concluded in an analogous context that
individual legislators did not have standing even where the President acted without obtaining
their prior consent as allegedly required by the Constitution. See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 9
(Members of Congress had no standing to challenge the President’s unilateral withdrawal from a
treaty, despite claim that “they have been divested of their constitutional role in treaty
termination,” because their “institutional injuries” were “no different” from those alleged in
Raines and Campbell). Although Plaintiffs cast their injury as being alleged nullification of their
interest in voting on whether to consent to the President’s alleged acceptance of emoluments, at
bottom, their complaint is simply that the President is violating the law—an allegation that has
never been thought to confer standing on an individual Member of Congress.
This Court’s further distinction that individual Members have standing when the injury is
attributable to the President as here and not to “any action taken or not taken by their
congressional colleagues,” Mem. Op. at 42, is also in substantial tension with Campbell and
Kucinich, where it was the President, not the plaintiffs’ colleagues in Congress, who caused the
alleged injury. At the least, the foregoing shows that the Court’s decision here represents an
extension of governing precedent. As the Court itself has previously recognized, the theory of
vote nullification applied in Coleman as a basis for standing is a “narrow” exception that would
not be applicable in a case that is “factually distinguishable” from Coleman. Common Cause,
909 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 20 of 24
2. Whether Plaintiffs lack adequate legislative remedies is a question about
which reasonable jurists could differ.
There is likewise substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether Plaintiffs
have adequate legislative recourse such that it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary to
intervene in the political branches’ dispute—assuming that the presence or absence of such
measures is relevant to the issue of standing by individual Members of Congress. Campbell
explained that there are many measures available to Congress in a dispute with the President,
which, even if imperfect and incapable of undoing past allegedly unlawful action, are adequate to
preclude legislative standing: “In this case, Congress certainly could have passed a law
forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign . . . . Of course, Congress always
retains appropriations authority and could have cut off funds for the American role in the
conflict.” Campbell, 203 F.3d at 23.
Although this Court reasoned that Congress cannot cut funding concerning the
President’s alleged emoluments violation, and rejected the relevance of legislative measures that
involve matters unrelated to the emoluments issue, Mem. Op. at 47, at least one judge in this
Court has held that all legislative tools that can be wielded during the political give-and-take
between the branches are relevant in determining the “adequacy” of legislative remedies. In
Kucinich, Judge Bates held that the plaintiffs there had adequate legislative remedies to address
their injury arising from the President’s unilateral treaty termination because Congress could,
among numerous other political options, “refuse to fund unrelated matters that were important to
the President, or even reduce budgets for the Executive Branch; the Senate could reject
presidential nominees, or could refuse to provide consent to enter into other treaties submitted by
the President.” 236 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
In any event, Congress can still vote on whether to consent or to withhold consent to the
President’s alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments, and as discussed above, Campbell has
held that the “right to vote in the future” could remedy the deprivation of an opportunity to vote
in the past. 203 F.3d at 24. Indeed, if the President’s past alleged violations cannot be
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 21 of 24
adequately remedied by congressional action now, it is not clear how this Court would be in a
better position to provide a remedy.
Reasonable jurists could also disagree as to whether Congress’s consent legislation would
provide an adequate remedy to Plaintiffs’ injury as they characterize it—that alleged injury being
the denial of an opportunity to vote on whether to consent or withhold consent. The Court found
that such legislation would not provide an adequate remedy because Plaintiffs do not allege “an
injury to their power to legislate on the issue of emoluments,” Mem. Op. at 53, and because the
suggested legislation would “plac[e] the burden on Members of Congress to convince a majority
of their colleagues to enact the suggested legislation” instead of “plac[ing] the burden on the
President to convince a majority of Members of Congress to consent,” as the Clause allegedly
requires, id. at 45. But whichever way the question of consent is put before Congress—whether
the President first approaches Congress to seek consent or whether an individual Member sua
sponte introduces a bill to provide consent—the legislative process is identical, as is a Member’s
opportunity to vote. Indeed, because the Foreign Emoluments Clause references only the
“Consent of Congress,” U.S. Const. art. I. § 9, cl. 8, the Constitution’s only requirement for the
manner of such consent is that it proceed through the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure” in Article I, sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution. INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Whether the end result of that legislative process is a private bill, a joint
resolution, or a generally applicable piece of legislation that governs the President’s receipt of
foreign emoluments does not change the nature of Plaintiffs’ alleged injury in this case, which is
the alleged deprivation of their right to vote on whether to consent or withhold consent to the
President’s alleged acceptance of foreign emoluments. Reasonable jurists could thus conclude
that, contrary to the Court’s suggestion, any of these options is a sufficient legislative remedy for
Finally, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ legislative remedies are circumscribed by
Congress’s lack of information of the President’s alleged acceptance of emoluments. Mem. Op.
at 46. But reasonable jurists could disagree as to that conclusion as well because Congress has
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 22 of 24
tools to carry out its legislative functions and does not require civil discovery to do so. See
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 504 (1975), Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200–01 (1957). To the extent Plaintiffs
are unable to use the available legislative tools because of a lack of support from their
colleagues, that is an intra-branch dispute, one in which the courts lack jurisdiction to intervene.
Cf. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 23 (no standing under Coleman where legislative remedies were
available but plaintiffs lacked legislative support to pass them).
3. There is substantial ground for difference of opinion whether the
standing of other plaintiffs is relevant.
Reasonable jurists similarly could disagree about whether the ability of another plaintiff
to bring this case has any bearing on the Court’s standing analysis. The Court held that it does,
citing the Raines Court’s observation that its decision did not “foreclose[] the [Line Item Veto]
Act from constitutional challenge” by some other plaintiff “who suffers judicially cognizable
injury as a result of the Act.” Mem. Op. at 19–20, 54–55 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829).
Reasonable jurists could conclude that this Court has erroneously extended Raines because the
ruling is in substantial tension with the Supreme Court’s long-standing guidance that “the
assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a
reason to find standing.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 420 (2013) (quoting
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 489 (1982)); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
(same); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigate [constitutional claims] gives support to the argument that
the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political
In sum, there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the Court’s finding of
legislative standing.
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 23 of 24
D. Certification Would Materially Advance the Termination of the Litigation.
Finally, the third prong of § 1292(b) is also met. “When there are substantial grounds for
difference of opinion as to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, courts regularly hold that
immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Al
Maqaleh, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (citation omitted). This is so because an early determination that
the Court lacks jurisdiction “would conserve judicial resources and spare the parties from
possibly needless expense if it should turn out that this Court’s rulings are reversed.” APCC
Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (“[I]n the event that it is ultimately found that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to litigate [this] case[], it would be far better for all concerned, including plaintiff[],
to have these matters resolved now, as opposed to sometime in the distant future.”). Reversal of
the Court’s September 28 Order would terminate this litigation for lack of jurisdiction,
conserving the parties and the Court’s judicial resources. There is accordingly little doubt that
certification would materially advance the termination of this litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, the President respectfully requests the Court grant this motion
and certify its September 28, 2018 Order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Case 1:17-cv-01154-EGS Document 60-1 Filed 10/22/18 Page 24 of 24
Dated: October 22, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
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