Source: http://me.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190129_0000055.DME.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-03-29 09:35:56
Document Index: 525063912

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 802', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254']

AMENDED [1] RECOMMENDED DECISION ON 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION
In this action, Petitioner Raymond Bellavance, Jr., seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner contests the Maine Law Court's decision to deny discretionary review following the post-conviction court's denial of Petitioner's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in connection with the testimony of a potential defense witness, whom the State called to testify at trial. In addition, Petitioner asserts claims based on the state court's denial of his post-conviction claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. (Petition at 7-8.)[2]
Following a jury trial in December 2011, Petitioner was convicted of one count of arson (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 802(1)(A) or (1)(B)(2), based on an incident that occurred in June 2009. State v. Bellavance, 2013 ME 42, ¶ 1, 18, 65 A.3d 1235. (State v. Bellavance, No. AUGSC-CR-2010-00230, Judgments and Commitments.)[3] Petitioner appealed from the conviction, and he requested leave to appeal from the sentence. Bellavance, 2013 ME 42, ¶ 18 & n.2. The Sentence Review Panel denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal from the sentence. Id. ¶ 18 n.2.
In his appeal from the conviction, Petitioner argued “that the court effectively deprived him of his right to counsel when it permitted the testimony of an anticipated defense witness who decided, mid-trial, to testify for the prosecution in exchange for a promise of immunity.” Id. ¶ 1. The Law Court determined that the prosecution did not violate Rule 16 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure in the efforts to obtain the testimony; that “the court provided [Petitioner] with adequate opportunity to prepare for [the] changed testimony;” and that Petitioner did not “establish[] that he suffered sufficient prejudice to show that the court abused its discretion by not permitting him additional time to prepare for [the] testimony.” Id. ¶¶ 26-28. The Law Court concluded Petitioner's “Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.”[4] Id. ¶ 29. Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. (Petition at 3; Response, ECF No. 5 at 2.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court may apply to a federal district court for writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” On federal habeas claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, the federal court may not grant relief unless (1) the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, pursuant to section 2254(d)(2).[5]
On the review of a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1), “[i]t is settled that a federal habeas court may overturn a state court's application of federal law only if it is so erroneous that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents.'” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508-09 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are thus subject to a “‘doubly deferential'” standard of review, in deference to both the state court and defense counsel. Woods v. Etherton, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)). State court determinations of fact “shall be presumed to be correct, ” and “[t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A review of the record reveals that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), to rebut the presumption of correctness of the facts set forth in the Law Court's decision on appeal. Petitioner has not demonstrated the Law Court's decision was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts, ” under section 2254(d)(2). To the contrary, the Law Court's reasoning is sound and is supported by the record. As the Law Court observed, the trial court afforded Petitioner sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for Mulkern's testimony. Because the trial court's decision was not unreasoned or arbitrary, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Morris. Petitioner's claim therefore fails under section 2254(d)(1).
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