Source: https://trellis.law/ca/issue-type/dangerous-condition-of-public-property-173
Timestamp: 2020-07-15 04:53:54
Document Index: 149448509

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 830', '§ 8351', '§ 830', '§ 437', '§835', '§ 830']

“[A] dangerous condition of public property... as set out in Government Code Sec. 835 consists of the following elements:
a dangerous condition of public property;
a foreseeable risk, arising from the dangerous condition, of the kind of injury the plaintiff suffered;
actionable conduct in connection with the condition, i.e., either negligence on the part of a public employee in creating it, or failure by the entity to correct it after notice of its existence and dangerousness;
a causal relationship between the dangerous condition and the plaintiff's injuries; and
compensable damage sustained by the plaintiff.”
(Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 757-758.) Because governmental liability is limited and statutory, every fact material to the existence of the claim must be specifically pleaded. (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.)
A dangerous condition is a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used. (Gov. Code, § 830.)
“A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by a dangerous condition of public property unless the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition and the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.” (Fuller v. Department of Transportation (Aug. 20 2019, B287689) __Cal. App. 2nd__ citing Gov. Code, § 8351; Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1099, 1105.)
“Section 830, subdivision (a) defines ‘dangerous condition’ to mean ‘a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.’” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465 citing Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 810.) “Property is not dangerous if it is safe when used with due care and the risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th at 439.)
“‘[W]hether a given set of facts and circumstances creates a dangerous condition is usually a question of fact and may only be resolved as a question of law if reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion.’” Id. “Liability is not imposed where the danger is apparent to a reasonable person exercising due care, as a matter of law.” (Mathews v. City of Cerritos (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380.) “The presence of railroad tracks is an open and obvious danger that any reasonable person would know is dangerous.” (Christoff v. Union Pac. R. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 126.) “A public entity is not liable where the injured party ignores the notice provided by the condition itself.” (Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 132.)
Although public entities may be held liable for injuries occurring to reasonably foreseeable users of the property, even when the property is used for a purpose for which it is not designed or which is illegal, liability may ensue only if the property creates a substantial risk of injury when it is used with due care. Whether a condition creates a substantial risk of harm depends on how the general public would use the property exercising due care, including children who are held to a lower standard of care. (§ 830.) The standard is an objective one; a plaintiff’s particular condition... does not alter the standard.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1466.)
“Although public entities may be held liable for injuries occurring to reasonably foreseeable users of the property, even when the property is used for a purpose for which it is not designed or which is illegal, liability may ensue only if the property creates a substantial risk of injury when it is used with due care.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 citing generally Acosta v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 208, 210-211, 213; Torkelson v. City of Redlands (1961) 198 Cal. App. 2d 354, 359-360....) “Whether a condition creates a substantial risk of harm depends on how the general public would use the property exercising due care, including children who are held to a lower standard of care” (Id., citing Sec. 830.)
“The negligence of a plaintiff-user of public property... is a defense which may be asserted by a public entity; it has no bearing upon the determination of a ‘dangerous condition’ in the first instance... If, however, it can be shown that the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not ‘dangerous’ within the meaning of section 830, subdivision (a).” (Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 122, 131.)
Defenses for the Public Entity
“The negligence of a plaintiff-user of public property... is a defense which may be asserted by a public entity; it has no bearing upon the determination of a ‘dangerous condition’ in the first instance.... If, however, it can be shown that the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not ‘dangerous’ within the meaning of section 830(a).” (Fredette, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 131.)
Useful Rulings on Dangerous Condition of Public Property
YUZON VS CONTRA COSTA
HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of YUZON FILED BY CONTRA COSTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT * TENTATIVE RULING: * Defendant Contra Costa Community College District’s demurrer to Plaintiff Zion Yuzon’s complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff failed to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action for Dangerous Condition of Public Property. According to the Declaration of Ethan...
..235 CA4th 385, 388.) “In passing upon the sufficiency of a pleading, its allegations must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) “However, because under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particul...
Falconcrest Homeowners' Association, a California Non-Profit Mutual Benefit Corporation vs City of Stockton, a California Municipal Corporation
TENTATIVE RULING This action arises from damages sustained to the Plaintiff’s asphalt driveway, roadways and parking area as a result of a leaking water pipe owned and maintained by the Defendant, CITY OF STOCKTON. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Nuisance; (2) Negligence; (3) Dangerous Condition of Public Property; (4) Breach of Easement; (5) Trespass; and...
..of the FAC is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND for Plaintiff to allege the statutory basis for negligence; 2. Defendant’s Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action of the FAC is SUSTAINED WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND for Plaintiff to attach a copy of the easement to the SAC or include the specific terms of the easement which Plaintiff alleges Defendant has breached; and 3. Defendant’s Demurrer t...
Guerrero vs. Department of Transportation
DEF State of California Motion for Summary Judgment and/or AdjudicationThe motion of defendant State of California, by and through the Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”), for summary judgment in this action against plaintiff Mathew Guerrero is granted. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections, which are not in compliance with CRC 3.1354 and are not sufficiently directed at discreet portions of de...
..he dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and [4] (a) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) [t]he publi...
RITA DAVIDSON VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES ET AL
Davidson v. City of Los Angeles, et al. The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant City of Los Angeles, filed on 7/25/2019, is DENIED. Defendant has not established that it is entitled to judgment in its favor on the first cause of action for dangerous condition of public property based on the material facts proffered. Cal. Code Civil Procedure § 437c(p)(2). Plaintiff was injured when a ceilin...
..ident was caused by an employee of a contractor of a tenant of the City, not an employee of the City of itself. Thus, the City argues that it cannot be held liable under Government Code section 815.2. Second, the City argues that Plaintiff cannot establish each of the elements under Government Code section 835. EVIDENCE The City presents undisputed evidence establishing the following facts: The...
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRE CASES
TENTATIVE RULINGS MOTION: Demurrers and Motions to Strike HEARING DATE: October 15, 2019 CASE NUMBER: JCCP4965 CASE NAME: Southern California Fires Cases MOVING PARTIES: (1) Defendant and Cross-Defendant Montecito Water District (“MWD”); (2) Cross-Defendants County of Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (“FCWCD”) (collectively, “County”); (3) C...
..otions. The first set consists solely of Defendant and Cross-Defendant Montecito Water District’s (“MWD”) demurrer and motion to strike Plaintiffs’ First Amended Master Complaint. The second set consists of numerous demurrers and motions to strike—collectively filed by MWD, Cross-Defendants County of Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (“FCWCD”) (co...
Recent Rulings on Dangerous Condition of Public Property
Demurrer / Motion To Strike (46)
Motion Hearing (Civil) (35)
Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) (85)
Trial Readiness Conference (Civil) (26)
Benny C. Osorio (20)
Dennis J. Landin (152)
Jacqueline M. Stern (16)
Jon R. Takasugi (48)
Katherine Bacal (14)
Kristin S. Escalante (27)
Laura A. Seigle (80)
Marc D. Gross (47)
Michelle Williams Court (32)
Ralph C. Hofer (20)
Randolph M. Hammock (23)
Robert B. Broadbelt (30)
Ronald L. Styn (24)
Stephen I. Goorvitch (53)
Steve K. Austin (20)
Theresa M. Traber (62)
Timothy Taylor (60)
El Dorado County, CA (22)
Los Angeles County, CA (1,200)
San Diego County, CA (261)
Santa Barbara County, CA (96)
Ventura County, CA (103)
Plaintiff alleges a dangerous condition of public property and negligence in the complaint in relation to a trip-and-fall that occurred on May 23, 2017. On November 8, 2018, Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles filed a cross-complaint against Roes 1 through 10 seeking indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief. On February 7, 2020, the Court granted Defendants James P. Argyropoulos’ and Peter J. Argyropoulos 2013 Irrevocable Trust’s motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff.
Law Governing Trivial Defect Calabasas’s contention is that the subject sidewalk was, at most, a trivial defect and not a dangerous condition of public property. A “dangerous condition” is a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner which is reasonably foreseeable. Ordinarily, the existence of a dangerous condition is a question of fact.
ELISEO PLACIDO-LOPEZ VS SAN MIGUEL AUTO REPAIR, ET AL.
Moving Burden “[A] landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the inspection of his commercial property and to remove a dangerous condition, which includes a dog, from the premises, if he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care would have known, the dog was dangerous and usually present on the premises.” Portillo v. Aiassa (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.
LORI ANN MANBY VS CITY OF REDONDO BEACH ET AL
entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or¿ (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”¿ Moving Defendant argues summary judgment must be granted against Plaintiff with regard to Plaintiff’s dangerous condition of public property cause of action for two reasons.
BACKGROUND This action arises out of a trip and fall on a public sidewalk. On June 13, 2018, Plaintiff Anita Herreman filed a complaint against the City of Los Angeles (the “City”), American Builders Supply, RJ’s Construction Tools & Supply and RJ’s Demolition & Disposal (collectively “RJ’s Construction”), and Cutler Steel for premises liability and actual notice of dangerous condition of property pursuant to Government Code §§835(b), 835.2(a).
This is an action alleging a dangerous condition on school property, arising from an incident on September 5, 2017 during which the plaintiff minor, a special education student, "went through a defective and dangerous glass door" at 3401 Clairemont Dr. in San Diego, "which shattered," causing him "severe injuries." Although the complaint was filed in September of 2018, summons was improvidently issued as no guardian ad litem was appointed until April of 2019. ROA 42.
EUSTOLIA HERNANDEZ VS SAM'S WEST, INC., ET AL.
But once again, these statements do not address Plaintiff’s allegation that the way the milk cartons were displayed constituted a dangerous condition and posed an unreasonable risk for harm to persons acting in a reasonably foreseeable manner. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant has not met its moving burden to establish Plaintiff cannot prove a dangerous condition existed.
The complaint alleges a dangerous condition of public property for a slip-and-fall that occurred on December 6, 2016. On February 26, 2019, Defendant/Cross-Complainant City of Los Angeles, acting by and through Defendant Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, filed a Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 10 seeking equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment, and declaratory relief.
., and John Wilson, Jr. filed a complaint against State of California-CALTRANS, City of Redondo Beach, County of Los Angeles, and Margo Bronstein for (1), (2) dangerous condition of public property—personal injury and wrongful death, (3) loss of consortium, and (4) negligence. On December 28, 2015, plaintiffs filed a FAC. Plaintiffs allege that on December 17, 2014, a group of eleven people were leaving a Christmas performance at St.
On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting causes of action against District, Royal, APM, Nazerian, G&Y and Does 3-100 for: Dangerous Condition of Public Property Negligence Negligent Hiring/Retention/Supervision and/or Training On November 27, 2019, District and Thompson filed a cross-complaint, asserting causes of action against Royal, APM, Nazerian, G&Y and Zoes 1-25 for: Express Contractual Indemnity Equitable Indemnity on a Comparative Fault Basis Apportionment
Government Code section 835 states:¿“Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public
employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
condition (Id.)
Allegations Plaintiff Liwen Hsu Togi (“Plaintiff”) alleges that on March 3, 2017, she fell as a result of a dangerous condition while on her way to work. She alleges that Defendants were the possessors, controllers, managers, designers, maintainers, inspectors, supervisors, and owners of the portion of public sidewalk, parkway, and trees abutting the real property at 1013 Mound Avenue, South Pasadena, California 91030.
See Lopez (1985) 40 C3d 780, 795 (negligence against a public entity must be pled with particularity). Plaintiff never identifies a prior specific incident which put, or should have put, Regents on notice of Hang’s unfitness and/or dangerous propensities. (See FAC ¶¶47, 48, 92); Brenner (2003) 113 CA4th 434, 439 (dangerous condition claim cannot rely on general allegations that the condition was dangerous, but must explain the manner in which the condition is dangerous).
Kaur commenced this action by filing her complaint in which she asserts the first cause of action for dangerous condition of public property against the California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) and the second cause of action for dangerous condition of public property against Does 1–25. Additionally, Kaur asserts a third cause of action for negligence against Morris and his employer, defendant McCarthy Building Companies, Inc. (“McCarthy”).
, or (b) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in time to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”
In the alternative, the Court grants summary judgment based upon Defendant’s evidence that the staircase presented no dangerous condition. A “dangerous condition” is a condition of public property that “create[s] a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” (Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
Plaintiffs argued that the defendant was liable for “failing to correct, warn of, or otherwise protect [plaintiff prospective buyer] from the dangerous condition of the diving board.” (Id. at p. 446).
In addition, a plaintiff suing for premises liability has the burden of proving that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition in time to correct it, or that the owner was “able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal. 4th at p. 1206, quoting Girvetz v. Boys' Market, Inc. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829.)
The plaintiff included additional facts in a separate statement alleging that the vehicle struck a different object, which was an additional basis for dangerous condition liability. (Id. at p. 1252.) The court held that the additional fact shifted the alleged dangerous condition to a portion of public property not remotely referenced in the amended complaint and predicated liability on a different condition. (Id. at p. 1258.) Here, Plaintiff’s complaint identifies only an April 2016 work injury.
All but one are purely legal issues, and the requested discovery does not relate to Defendant’s argument that there was no dangerous condition of public property. Neither the motion nor the reply establish that the requested discovery is necessary in order to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the Court continues the hearing on this motion to the same date as the motion for summary judgment: October 9, 2020, at 1:30 p.m.
Plaintiff’s complaint includes a count against Defendant for maintaining a dangerous condition on public property. (Complaint at Prem.L-4.) FAMILY CLEANERS is not a public entity and does not own public property. FAMILY CLEANERS’s motion to strike is granted without leave to amend. The following portions of Plaintiff’s complaint are stricken: the punitive damages prayer on page 3, paragraph 14(a)(2) and Premises Liability Count Three at paragraph Prem.L-4.
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