Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_States_v._Smith_(499_U.S._160)/Opinion_of_the_Court
Timestamp: 2013-12-07 16:35:03
Document Index: 29747348

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2679', '§ 2680', '§ 1089', '§ 1089', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2680', '§ 2679', '§ 5', '§ 5']

United States v. Smith (499 U.S. 160)/Opinion of the Court - Wikisource, the free online library
United States v. Smith (499 U.S. 160)/Opinion of the Court
< United States v. Smith (499 U.S. 160)
United States v. Smith by Thurgood Marshall
663157United States v. Smith — Opinion of the CourtThurgood Marshall
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Liability Reform Act or Act) limits the relief available to persons injured by Government employees acting within the scope of their employment. For persons so injured, the Act provides that "[t]he remedy against the United States" under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) "is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Subject to certain exceptions, the FTCA permits a person injured by a Government employee acting within the scope of his or her employment to seek tort damages against the Government. One exception bars such recovery for injuries sustained outside the country. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). This case presents the question whether a person injured abroad by a military physician, and whom the FTCA foreign-country exception therefore precludes from suing the Government, may nonetheless seek damages from the particular Government employee who caused the injury. We hold that the Liability Reform Act bars this alternative mode of recovery.
* In 1982, while working on the medical staff of the United States Army hospital in Vicenza, Italy, Dr. William Marshall served as attending physician to Hildegard Smith during the delivery of her son Dominique. At this time, Ms. Smith's husband, Marcus Smith, was an Army Sergeant stationed in Italy. According to the Smiths, Dominique was born with massive brain damage. In 1987, the Smiths, who are respondents in this Court, sued Dr. Marshall in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The Smiths alleged that Dr. Marshall's negligence during the delivery caused Dominique's injuries. [1]
The Government intervened and sought to have itself substituted for Dr. Marshall as the defendant pursuant to the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089. The Gonzalez Act provides that in suits against military medical personnel for torts committed within the scope of their employment, the Government is to be substituted as the defendant and the suit is to proceed against the Government under the FTCA. See §§ 1089(a), (b). The Government also argued that, because the action arose overseas, the FTCA exception excluding recovery for injuries sustained abroad, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), precluded Government liability. Consequently, the Government concluded, the action should be dismissed. The District Court granted the Government's motion for substitution and dismissed the action. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a-18a. [2]
In 1988, while respondents' appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Liability Reform Act as an amendment to the FTCA. Congress took this action in response to our ruling in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988), which held that the judicially created doctrine of official immunity does not provide absolute immunity to Government employees for torts committed in the scope of their employment. In Westfall, we ruled that such official immunity would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to whether "the contribution to effective government in particular contexts" from granting immunity "outweighs the potential harm to individual citizens." 484 U.S., at 299, 108 S.Ct. at 583. The Liability Reform Act establishes the absolute immunity for Government employees that the Court declined to recognize under the common law in Westfall. The Act confers such immunity by making an FTCA action against the Government the exclusive remedy for torts committed by Government employees in the scope of their employment. [3]
On appeal in the present case, the Government relied on this new statute to support the District Court's dismissal of respondents' action. [4] The Government argued that the Liability Reform Act essentially had the same effect as that which the District Court had found to result from the Gonzalez Act. Because Dr. Marshall's alleged malpractice occurred in the scope of his employment, the Government argued, respondents' action should proceed against it as an FTCA action. [5] The Government further contended that, because of the FTCA exception under § 2680(k) barring recovery for injuries occurring overseas, the District Court's ruling dismissing the suit should be affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that neither the Gonzalez Act nor the Liability Reform Act required substitution of the Government as the defendant in this suit or otherwise immunized Dr. Marshall from liability. See 885 F.2d 650 (1989). [6] With respect to the Liability Reform Act, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the Act renders a suit against the Government under the FTCA the exclusive remedy for employment-related torts committed by Government employees, the Act applies only when the FTCA in fact provides a remedy. Because § 2680(k) of the FTCA precludes any remedy against the Government in cases arising from injuries incurred abroad, the Ninth Circuit concluded that respondents' tort claim against Dr. Marshall was not barred by the Liability Reform Act. Id., at 654-655.
We granted certiorari, 496 U.S. 924, 110 S.Ct. 2617, 110 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over whether the Liability Reform Act immunizes Government employees from suit even when an FTCA exception precludes recovery against the Government. [7] We conclude the Act does confer such immunity and therefore reverse.
Section 5 of the Liability Reform Act states that "[t]he remedy" against the Government under the FTCA "is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages . . . against the employee" and then reemphasizes that "[a]ny other civil action or proceeding for money damages . . . against the employee . . . is precluded." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). The central question in this case is whether, by designating the FTCA as the "exclusive remedy," § 5 precludes an alternative mode of recovery against a Government employee in cases where the FTCA itself does not provide a means of recovery.
Two provisions in the Liability Reform Act confirm that § 5