Source: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170918_R44839_4a84ee85c15e71407d138402eeb87be15abe6746.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-10 06:05:46
Document Index: 596261987

Matched Legal Cases: ['§619', '§5491', '§5581', '§5481', '§1400', '§3502', '§801']

Notes: The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (FCA) would replace the CFPB with the newly created Consumer Law Enforcement Agency (CLEA). For more information on the roles, duties, and responsibilities of the federal financial regulators, see CRS Report R44918, Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework, by Marc Labonte.
A major difference between H.R. 10 as reported by the Financial Services Committee and the version that passed the House is that the reported version included a repeal of the Durbin Amendment and the version that passed the House did not. The Durbin Amendment caps interchange fees on debit transactions for banks with over $10 billion in assets. For more information, see CRS Report R41913, Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees, by Darryl E. Getter.
P.L. 111-203. For more information, see CRS Report R41350, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Background and Summary, coordinated by Baird Webel.
For more on bank failures, see CRS In Focus IF10055, Bank Failures and the FDIC, by Raj Gnanarajah.
For more on the Basel III regulations, see CRS Report R44573, Overview of the Prudential Regulatory Framework for U.S. Banks: Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act, by Darryl E. Getter.
This section was authored by Marc Labonte.
P.L. 111-203, §619. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar, What Companies Must Comply with the Volcker Rule?, David H. Carpenter.
This section was authored by Gary Shorter.
See CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1562, Labor Department Issues Final Rule on Fiduciaries and Investment Advice, by Jennifer A. Staman and Jon O. Shimabukuro.
CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1562, Labor Department Issues Final Rule on Fiduciaries and Investment Advice, by Jennifer A. Staman and Jon O. Shimabukuro.
This section was authored by Marc Labonte and Gary Shorter.
See CRS Report R44554, The Dodd-Frank Act: An Overview of the 2016 Incentive-Based Compensation Proposal, by Raj Gnanarajah and Gary Shorter.
See CRS Report R43262, The "Pay Ratio Provision" in the Dodd-Frank Act: Legislation to Repeal It in the 113th Congress, by Gary Shorter.
The types of tools prescribed for enhanced regulation of FMUs differ from those listed above for banks and nonbank financial firms. For more information, see CRS Report R41529, Supervision of U.S. Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems: Designation of Financial Market Utilities (FMUs), by Marc Labonte.
For more on OLA, see CRS Report R43801, "Living Wills": The Legal Regime for Constructing Resolution Plans for Certain Financial Institutions, by David H. Carpenter.
For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see CRS Report R40530, Insolvency of Systemically Significant Financial Companies (SSFCs): Bankruptcy vs. Conservatorship/Receivership, by David H. Carpenter.
This section was authored by David H. Carpenter.
See the "Federal Consumer Financial Protection Regulation Before the CFPB" section of CRS Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis, by David H. Carpenter.
CRS Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis, by David H. Carpenter.
12 U.S.C. §5491(b). A mortgage company has challenged the constitutionality of the CFPB's structure in a lawsuit that is currently before the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (granting petition for rehearing by full court and vacating the court's three-judge panel decision in the case). A discussion of the constitutionality of the CFPB's structure is outside the scope of this report. For more information on the case, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1680, UPDATE: D.C. Circuit Rules Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Structure is Unconstitutional, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey.
12 U.S.C. §§5581-87. The Bureau acquired rulemaking authority pursuant to most provisions of the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, which was enacted as Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C. §5481 note; Dodd-Frank Act §1400. For more information on Title XIV, see the "Mortgage Standards" section of CRS Report R41350, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Background and Summary, coordinated by Baird Webel.
This section was authored by Baird Webel and adapted from CRS In Focus IF10031, Introduction to Financial Services: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), by David H. Carpenter and Baird Webel.
These provisions originally appeared in H.R. 3189, which passed the House on November 19, 2015. For more information, see CRS Report R44273, Federal Reserve: Legislation in the 114th Congress, by Marc Labonte.
For more information on the Taylor Rule, see CRS In Focus IF10207, Monetary Policy and the Taylor Rule, by Marc Labonte.
For more information on financial regulations and cost-benefit analysis, see CRS Report R44813, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financial Regulator Rulemaking, by David W. Perkins and Maeve P. Carey.
For more information on CBA and independent regulatory agencies, see CRS Report R42821, Independent Regulatory Agencies, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Presidential Review of Regulations, by Maeve P. Carey and Michelle D. Christensen. The independent regulatory agencies are listed in statute at 44 U.S.C. §3502(5).
The Congressional Review Act was enacted on March 29, 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), Title II of P.L. 104-121, 110 stat. 868. The act is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§801-808. For more information on the act, see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis.
Since 1789, 37 of 44 Presidents have exercised their veto authority a total of 2,574 times. Congress has overridden these vetoes on 110 occasions (4.3%). For more information, see CRS Report RS22188, Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: In Brief, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
This report discusses agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes; for a report regarding court treatment of agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations, see CRS Report R43203, Chevron Deference: Court Treatment of Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes, by Daniel T. Shedd and Todd Garvey.
CRS Report R43203, Chevron Deference: Court Treatment of Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes, by Daniel T. Shedd and Todd Garvey. See, e.g., Mueller v. Reich, 54 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that when a statute is ambiguous "about all the court can do is determine whether the agency's action is rationally related to the objectives of the statute containing the delegation.").
For a discussion of the varying judicial standards of review that typically apply to different types of final agency actions, see the "Threshold Limitations on What Interpretations Qualify for Chevron Deference" section of CRS Report R43203, Chevron Deference: Court Treatment of Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes, by Daniel T. Shedd and Todd Garvey and the "Standards of Review" section of CRS Report R44356, The Good Cause Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking: Judicial Review of Agency Action, by Jared P. Cole.
For a general discussion of these issues, see the "Arguments for Consolidating Federal Consumer Financial Regulatory Powers" section of CRS Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal Analysis, by David H. Carpenter.