Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US7428749?ie=ISO-8859-1&dq=6,044,471
Timestamp: 2015-01-29 12:22:52
Document Index: 302325029

Matched Legal Cases: ['arty 18', 'arty 18', 'arty 18', 'arty 18', 'arty 18', 'art 18', 'arty 18', 'arty 18']

Patent US7428749 - Secure delegation using public key authorization - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign inAdvanced Patent SearchPatentsA client is impersonated to a plurality of servers using a middle-tier server. A common nonce associated with each of the plurality of servers is obtained and the common nonce is provided to the client. The common nonce signed by the client is received at the middle-tier server and provided as a signature...http://www.google.com/patents/US7428749?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US7428749 - Secure delegation using public key authorizationAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS7428749 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 09/921,536Publication dateSep 23, 2008Filing dateAug 3, 2001Priority dateAug 3, 2001Fee statusPaidAlso published asUS7694329, US7698736, US20030028773, US20090055902, US20090055916Publication number09921536, 921536, US 7428749 B2, US 7428749B2, US-B2-7428749, US7428749 B2, US7428749B2InventorsJohn R. McGarvey, David Kuehr-McLarenOriginal AssigneeInternational Business Machines CorporationExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (24), Non-Patent Citations (4), Referenced by (3), Classifications (21), Legal Events (4) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetSecure delegation using public key authorizationUS 7428749 B2Abstract A client is impersonated to a plurality of servers using a middle-tier server. A common nonce associated with each of the plurality of servers is obtained and the common nonce is provided to the client. The common nonce signed by the client is received at the middle-tier server and provided as a signature for transactions from the client to the plurality of servers so as to authenticate the client to the plurality of servers.
1. A method of impersonating a client to a plurality of servers, comprising:
obtaining by a middle tier server, a common nonce that is created based at least in part upon a pre-nonce contribution from each of a plurality of back-end servers, wherein the common nonce is generated front an entity other than the client that the middle tier server is to impersonate or the plurality of back-end servers that the middle tier server is to interact with on behalf of the client;
receiving by the middle tier server, a request from the client for a transaction with at least one of yhe plurality of back-end servers;
providing the common nonce from the middle tier server to the client;
receiving the common nonce signed by the client with the client's digital signature at the middle-tier server; and
impersonating the client by the middle tier server interacting with a selected one of the plurality of back-end servers for implementation of the client request on behalf of the client by providing the signed common nonce and the client request from the middle tier server to at least one of the plurality of back-end servers so as to authenticate the client to the plurality of servers for implementation of the client request on behalf of the client.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the common nonce comprises:
obtaining the pre-nonce contributions from the plurality of servers;
combining the pre-nonce contributions to provide a single pre-nonce token; and
providing the common nonce based on the pre-nonce token.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of providing the common nonce comprises reducing the pre-nonce token to provide the common nonce.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the step of reducing the pre-nonce token to provide the common nonce comprises the step of hashing the pre-nonce token utilizing a one-way hash function so as to provide the common nonce.
5. The method of claim 4 wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
receiving the signed common nonce, the common nonce and the pre-nonce token;
hashing the received pre-nonce token;
comparing the hashed pre-nonce token to the common nonce;
indicating that the client is not authenticated if the hashed pre-nonce token is different from the common nonce.
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of combining the pre-nonce contributions to provide a single pre-nonce token comprises concatenating the pre-nonce contributions.
7. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of obtaining pre-nonce contributions comprises the steps of:
requesting a pre-nonce contribution from each of the plurality of servers; and
receiving the pre-nonce contribution from the plurality of servers.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein requesting a pre-nonce contribution comprises sending authenticated requests to the plurality of servers.
9. The method of claim 8, further comprising the step of encrypting the authenticated requests sent to the plurality of servers.
10. The method of claim 8, wherein the authenticated requests include at least one of an identification of a source of the request, a time stamp and a random number.
11. The method of claim 2, wherein the pre-nonce contributions include at least one of an identification of a server of the plurality of servers and a random number.
12. The method of claim 11, wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of;
receiving the pre-nonce token;
determining if the pre-nonce token includes a random number associated with the at least one if the plurality of servers; and
indicating that the client is not authenticated if the hashed pre-nonce token does not include the random number associated with the at least one of the plurality of servers.
13. The method of claim 12, wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
associating an expiration with the random number associated with the at least one of the plurality of servers; and
indicating that the client is not authenticated if the pre-nonce token does not include a random number associated with the at least one of the plurality of servers which has not expired.
14. The method of claim 2, wherein the pre-nonce contributions are signed with a signature corresponding to a server from which the pre-nonce contribution was obtained, the method further comprising incorporating the signatures in the pre-nonce token.
15. The method of claim 2, wherein the pre-nonce contributions are signed with a signature corresponding to a server from which the pre-nonce contribution was obtained, the method further comprising authenticating signatures of the pre-nonce contributions and rejecting pre-nonce contributions for which the digital signature is not authentic.
receiving a transaction identification from a trusted server of the plurality of servers; and
associating the transaction identification with the common nonce.
17. The method of claim 16, further comprising the step of tracking use of the common nonce based on the transaction identification.
associating an expiration time with a pre-nonce contribution; and
determining if the pre-nonce contribution has expired based on its associated expiration time.
receiving the common nonce at a server of the plurality of servers;
determining a pre-nonce contribution associated with the received common nonce; and
accepting the received common nonce if the associated pre-nonce contribution has not expired.
20. The method of claim 2, wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
receiving a client certificate;
determining if the client certificate is trusted; and
indicating that the client is not authenticated if the client certificate is not trusted.
21. The method of claim 2 wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
receiving the signed common nonce and a client certificate;
determining if the signature of the signed common nonce corresponds to a signature of the client certificate; and
indicating that the client is not authenticated if the signature of the signed common nonce does not correspond to the signature of the client certificate.
22. The method of claim 1 wherein the step of obtaining a common nonce comprises the stops of:
obtaining the common nonce from a party trusted by the middle-tier server and the plurality of servers, the common nonce being signed by the trusted party; and verifying the signature of the common nonce is the signature of the trusted party.
23. The method of claim 22, wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
24. The method of claim 22, wherein at least one of the plurality of servers carries out the steps of:
combining the pre-nonce contributions from the plurality of back-end servers into a pre-nonce token;
hashing the pre-nonce token by the middle-tier server to generate the common nonce; and
providing the pre-nonce token to the selected one of the plurality of back-end servers; wherein:
the selected back-end server hashes the pre-nonce token using the same hashing technique used by the middle-tier server and compares it to the verified common nonce thus authenticating both the client and the middle-tier server the selected back-end server.
FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to authentication and more particularly to authentication of a client when delegation is utilized to access a server.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Networked computer applications are often deployed using a �tiered� model. In this model, the originator of a request for a unit of work (also referred to as a �principal�) typically initiates that work via a client program (first tier), which then communicates to a web server, or similar second tier server (also referred to as a middle-tier server), which itself communicates, on behalf of the request originator, to other middle-tier servers and/or to third or fourth tier servers such as database servers or other resource managers. When the request is processed by the resource managers, they, typically, evaluate whether the request originator has been authenticated and whether they are authorized to perform the unit of work. The resource managers, typically, also record access by the originator of the request in appropriate audit logs.
Such a tiered approach to networked applications may create a need for the secure propagation of security credentials of the request originator through each of the tiers of the application. In such propagation of secure credentials, the request originator delegates to the middle-tier servers the authority to access other servers on their behalf. Thus, the secure propagation of the credentials of the request originator (the requesting �principal�) may be referred to as �delegation� or �impersonation.�
One conventional approach for asynchronous message based authentication is to create a digital signature for the message. The digital signature is based on a public/private key pair. An example of such a digital signature approach to authentication is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication. In PKI, typically, a nonce, which may, for example, be a 60 bit random number, is generated by a party, such as a server, and provided to the client. The client signs the nonce with its digital signature and returns the signed nonce to the server. Typically, the server evaluates the digital signature of the client by decrypting the signed nonce with the public key of the client, which may be obtained from a certificate associated with the client, and comparing the decrypted nonce to the nonce originally sent. If the nonces are the same, the signature is authentic. In such a manner, the server may be assured of the authenticity of the client. This manner of authenticating the client is used in a variety of computer protocols, including Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS).
One difficulty with such a PKI authentication procedure is that it may be difficult to provided delegation of client authentication in certain circumstances. For example, a request from a principal through a client may pass through a middle-tier server which, in response to the request, accesses multiple third or fourth tier servers (also referred to as back-end servers). In such a case, the middle-tier server may need to authenticate the principal or the client to multiple back-end servers. Such a delegation of authentication may difficult in light of the multiple servers for which the client may need authentication.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Embodiments of the present invention provide methods, systems and computer program products for a middle-tier server to impersonate a client to a plurality of servers. A common nonce associated with each of the plurality of servers is obtained and the common nonce is sent to the client. The common nonce is digitally signed by the client and is received at the middle-tier server and provided as a signature for transactions from the client to the plurality of servers so as to authenticate the client to the plurality of servers.
In further embodiments of the present invention, obtaining a common nonce is provided by generating a common nonce based on information obtained from each of the plurality of servers. In such embodiments, generating the common nonce may be accomplished by obtaining pre-nonce contributions from the plurality of servers, combining the pre-nonce contributions to provide a single pre-nonce token and providing the common nonce based on the pre-nonce token. The common nonce may be provided by reducing the pre-nonce token to provide the common nonce. Furthermore, the pre-nonce contributions may be combined to provide a single pre-nonce token by concatenating the pre-nonce contributions. Also, the pre-nonce token may be reduced to provide the common nonce by hashing the pre-nonce token utilizing a one-way hash function so as to provide the common nonce.
In additional embodiments of the present invention, obtaining pre-nonce contributions may be provided by requesting a pre-nonce contribution from each of the plurality of servers and receiving the pre-nonce contributions from the plurality of servers. The request for a pre-nonce contribution may be provided by sending authenticated requests to the plurality of servers. Additionally, the authenticated requests may be sent to the plurality of servers may be encrypted. The authenticated request may include at least one of an identification of a source of the request, a time stamp and a random number.
In still further embodiments of the present invention, the pre-nonce contributions include at least one of an identification of a server of the plurality of servers and a random number. Furthermore, the pre-nonce contributions may be signed with a signature corresponding to a server from which the pre-nonce contribution was obtained. In such embodiments, the signatures may be incorporated in the pre-nonce token.
In yet further embodiments of the present invention, the pre-nonce contributions are signed with a signature corresponding to a server from which the pre-nonce contribution was obtained. In such embodiments, the signatures of the pre-nonce contributions are authenticated and the pre-nonce contributions for which the digital signature are not authentic are rejected.
In still further embodiments of the present invention, a transaction identification is received from a trusted server of the plurality of servers and the transaction identification associated with the common nonce. Use of the common nonce may be tracked based on the transaction identification.
In additional embodiments of the present invention, an expiration time is associated with a pre-nonce contribution and it is determined if the pre-nonce contribution has expired based on its associated expiration time. In such embodiments, the common nonce may be received at a server of the plurality of servers and a pre-nonce contribution associated with the received common nonce is determined. The received common nonce is accepted if the associated pre-nonce contribution has not expired.
In yet additional embodiments of the present invention, at least one of the plurality of servers receives a client certificate, determines if the client certificate is trusted and indicates that the client is not authenticated if the client certificate is not trusted. Furthermore, the signed common nonce and a client certificate may be received and it is determined if the signature of the signed common nonce corresponds to a signature of the client certificate. The client is not authenticated if the signature of the signed common nonce does not correspond to the signature of the client certificate. The signed common nonce and the pre-nonce token may also be received and the received pre-nonce token hashed. The hashed pre-nonce token is compared to the common nonce and the client is not authenticated if the hashed pre-nonce token is different from the common nonce. The pre-nonce token may also be received at one of the plurality of servers where it is determined if the pre-nonce token includes a pre-nonce contribution from the receiving server. For example, if such contributions are digitally signed before they are contributed, the receiving server may verify its signature. The client is not authenticated if the pre-nonce token does not include the random number associated with the receiving server. Additionally, an expiration may be associated with the random number associated with the at least one of the plurality of servers and the client is not authenticated if the pre-nonce token does not include a random number associated with the at least one of the plurality of servers which has not expired.
In still further embodiments of the present invention, the common nonce is obtained by obtaining the common nonce from a party trusted by the middle-tier server and the plurality of servers. The common nonce is signed by the trusted party. The signature of the common nonce is verified the signature of the trusted party. In further embodiments, at least one of the plurality of servers receives a client certificate and determines if the client certificate is trusted The client is not authenticated if the client certificate is not trusted. The signed common nonce and a client certificate may also be received and it determined if the signature of the signed common nonce corresponds to a signature of the client certificate. The client is not authenticated if the signature of the signed common nonce does not correspond to the signature of the client certificate.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1A is a block diagram illustrating a system incorporating embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 1B is a block diagram illustrating a system incorporating alternative embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a more detailed block diagram of a data processing system according to embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a middle-tier server according to embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating operations for common nonce generation according to embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 6 is a more detailed flowchart of operations of a middle-tier server according to further embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 7 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a back-end server according to embodiments of the present invention;
FIG. 8 is a flowchart of operations of a middle-tier server according to alternative embodiments of the present invention; and
FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating operations of a back-end server according to alternative embodiments of the present invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention now will be described more fully hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which illustrative embodiments of the invention are shown. This invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art.
Various embodiments of the present invention will now be described with reference to the figures. As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art in light of the present disclosure, while embodiments of the present invention are described primarily with reference to PKI, embodiments of the present invention may also provide for authentication of messages utilizing other security protocols which utilize a nonce.
FIG. 1A illustrates a network configuration where multiple back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 are accessed by a middle-tier server 14 in which embodiments of the present invention may be incorporated. As seen in FIG. 1A, a principal may use a client data processing system 10 to access a server, such as the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. Thus, the client 10 and the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 are endpoints respectively for requesting and providing a work unit. The servers between these endpoints may be referred to as �middle-tier servers.� In the exemplary system illustrated in FIG. 1A, the client 10 communicates with one or more middle-tier servers 14 to access the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. The exemplary single middle-tier server 14 is delegated authority by the client 10 to act on its behalf in accessing the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 through the use of a common nonce as described herein.
As is further seen in FIG. 1A, the middle-tier server 14 requests a pre-nonce contribution from each of the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. In response to these requests, the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 send pre-nonce contributions to the middle-tier server 14. The middle-tier server combines the pre-nonce contributions from the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 and creates a common nonce. The nonce is provided to the client 10 for use by the client 10 in accessing the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. To authenticate itself, the client 10 signs the nonce with its digital signature and returns the signed nonce to the middle-tier server which provides the signed nonce to the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 when access of these servers on behalf of the client 10 is desired.
As illustrated in FIG. 1A, the signed nonce may be provided to the backend servers 20, 22 and 24 as part of an authenticated request packet which may include, for example, the signed nonce, the request from the client, the pre-nonce token and/or the client certificate. Furthermore, as illustrated by the dashed lines in FIG. 1A, the back-end server 20 may, optionally, forward the authenticated request packet to other servers, such as the back-end server 24. Thus, further downstream chaining of the delegated authority may also be provided.
FIG. 1B illustrates an alternative embodiment of the present invention where the common nonce is provided by a trusted third party 18 such that the common nonce may be authenticated as being from the trusted third party 18 by each of the middle-tier server 14 and the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. Such a common nonce may be generated by the trusted third party 18. The nonce may be, but is not required to be, generated based on input from the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. The nonce from the trusted third party 18 is provided to the client 10 for use by the client 10 in accessing the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24. To authenticate itself, the client 10 signs the nonce with its digital signature and returns the signed nonce to the middle-tier server which provides the signed nonce to the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 when access to these servers on behalf of the client 10 is desired.
As with the embodiments illustrated in FIG. 1A, in the embodiments illustrated in FIG. 1B the signed nonce may be provided to the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 as part of an authenticated request packet which may include, for example, the signed nonce, the request from the client, the pre-nonce token and/or the client certificate. Furthermore, as illustrated by the dashed lines in FIG. 1B, the back-end server 20 may, optionally, forward the authenticated request packet to other servers, such as the back-end server 24. Thus, in the embodiments illustrated in FIG. 1B further downstream chaining of the delegated authority may also be provided.
While FIGS. 1A and 1B are illustrated as having a single client 10 and a single middle-tier server 14 and three back-end servers 20, 22 and 24, other combinations, including multiple clients and/or servers, may also be provided. Thus the present invention should not be construed as limited to the configurations of FIGS. 1A and 1B but is intended to cover all configurations capable of carrying out the operations described herein.
FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a data processing system 230 suitable for providing a client, a middle tier server, a trusted third party and/or a back-end server in accordance with embodiments of the present invention. The data processing system 230 typically includes input device(s) 232 such as a keyboard or keypad, a display 234, and a memory 236 that communicate with a processor 238. The data processing system 230 may further include a speaker 244, and an I/O data port(s) 246 that also communicate with the processor 238. The I/O data ports 246 can be used to transfer information between the data processing system 230 and another computer system or a network. These components may be conventional components such as those used in many conventional data processing systems which may be configured to operate as described herein.
As shown in FIG. 3, the memory 236 may include several categories of software and data used in the data processing system 230: the operating system 352; the application programs 354; the input/output (I/O) device drivers 358; and the data 356. As will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, the operating system 352 may be any operating system suitable for use with a data processing system, such as OS/2, AIX or System390 from International Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, N.Y., Windows95, Windows98 or Windows2000 from Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Wash., Unix or Linux configured to support an TCP/IP-based protocol connection. The I/O device drivers 358 typically include software routines accessed through the operating system 352 by the application programs 354 to communicate with devices such as the I/O data port(s) 246, the data storage 235 and certain memory 236 components. The application programs 354 are illustrative of the programs that implement the various features of the data processing system 230 and preferably include at least one application which supports operations according to embodiments of the present invention. Finally, the data 356 represents the static and dynamic data used by the application programs 354, the operating system 352, the I/O device drivers 358, and other software programs that may reside in the memory 236.
As is further seen in FIG. 3, the application programs 354 may include a nonce processing module 360. The nonce processing module 360 may carry out the operations described herein for management, generation and/or use of common nonces for accessing multiple servers. The data portion 356 of memory 236, as shown in the embodiments of FIG. 3, may include nonce values 364 and, in certain embodiments, pre-nonce values 362. The nonce values 364 and the pre-nonce values 362 may be utilized by the nonce processing module 360 as described herein for authentication of a client to multiple servers.
While the present invention is illustrated, for example, with reference to the nonce processing module 360 being an application program in FIG. 3, as will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, other configurations may also be utilized while still benefitting from the teachings of the present invention. For example, the nonce processing module 360 may also be incorporated into the operating system 352, the I/O device drivers 358 or other such logical division of the data processing system 230. Thus, the present invention should not be construed as limited to the configuration of FIG. 3 but is intended to encompass any configuration capable of carrying out the operations described herein.
Operations according to embodiments of the present invention, including operations of the middle-tier server 14 and the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 will now be described with reference to the exemplary network diagram of FIGS. 1A and 1B and the flowcharts of FIGS. 4 through 9. However, as will be appreciated by those of skill in the art, the networks illustrated in FIGS. 1A and 1B are exemplary only. Embodiments of the present invention may be utilized in other network configurations.
As seen in FIG. 4, a middle-tier server 14 according to embodiments of the present invention provides a common nonce to the client 10 which may be used to access to each of the plurality of back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 (block 400). Such a common nonce may be generated by the middle-tier server 14 (FIG. 1A) or provided by a trusted third party 18 (FIG. 1B) or other server. In either case, the middle-tier server 14 sends the common nonce to the client 10 requesting access to one or more of the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 (block 405). The middle-tier server 14 receives back from the client 10 the common nonce signed with the digital signature of the client 10 (block 410). The middle-tier server 14 uses the signed common nonce to access the one or ones of the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 on behalf of the client 10 by providing the signed common nonce to the back-end servers for authentication (block 415).
FIGS. 5 through 7 illustrate operations carried out by the middle-tier server and/or the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 in the embodiments illustrated in FIG. 1A where the common nonce is generated by a middle-tier server. Alternatively, the operations could be carried out by the trusted third part 18 of FIG. 1B or other server to generate the common nonce which is provided to the middle-tier server 14.
FIG. 5 illustrates operations for the generation of a common nonce according to embodiments of the present invention. As seen in FIG. 5, a request is sent to the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 to request a pre-nonce contribution from the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 (block 500). The request may, for example, include an identification of the requestor, such as the middle-tier server 14, a timestamp and/or a random number associated with the requestor. The random number may, like a nonce, be a 60 bit value. The request may, optionally, be provided over an encrypted link and may utilize authentication by the requestor and/or the receiving server. Furthermore, the request may be provided to one or more of the back-end servers which may obtain and provide pre-nonce contributions for other of the back-end servers.
In response to the request, pre-nonce contributions are received from the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 (block 505). As described above, the pre-nonce contributions may be received directly from each server or from other servers acting on behalf of the back-end servers. Thus, a pre-nonce contribution is received for each of the back-end servers. Such pre-nonce contributions may, for example, include an identification of the back-end server associated with the pre-nonce contribution and/or a random number associated with the back-end server. The random number may, like a nonce, be a 60 bit value. Optionally, the pre-nonce contributions may include a signature associated with the server. As described below, the back-end server could also maintain a list of random numbers it has provided as a pre-nonce contribution and associate an expiration time with corresponding numbers.
When pre-nonce contributions have been received from all of the back-end servers associated with the common nonce being generated (block 510), a pre-nonce token is created based on all of the received pre-nonce contributions (block 515). Such a pre-nonce token may, for example, be created by concatenating the received pre-nonce contributions. Preferably, such concatenation is done in a predefined manner. The common nonce is generated from the pre-nonce token by, for example, reducing the pre-nonce token to a 60 bit value (block 520). Such a reduction may, for example, be provided by a one-way hash function, such as the SHA or MD5 hash functions, which hash the n-bit pre-nonce token to the 60 bit nonce length of PKI to provide the common nonce.
Optionally, a transaction identification could also be obtained from a trusted back-end server. The transaction identification could be associated with the common nonce and even incorporated into the common nonce generation procedure through the concatenation process. The transaction identification could be utilized to provide an audit trail for tracking usage of the common nonce.
FIG. 6 illustrates operations for use of the common nonce for impersonation of the client 10 according to embodiments of the present invention. As seen in FIG. 6, the middle-tier server 14 receives a request from the client 10 for a transaction with one or more of the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 (block 600). The middle-tier server 14 sends the common nonce to the client 10 (block 605) which signs the common nonce with its digital signature and returns the signed common nonce as its signature to the middle-tier server 14. The middle-tier server receives the signed common nonce (block 610) and sends the pre-nonce token, client certificate, common nonce and client signature to the back-end server to authenticate the client to the back-end server (block 615). Additionally, as described above, optionally, the middle-tier server 14 may track use of the common nonce (block 620), for example, by use of the transaction identification and creation of a log file or other such tracking mechanism.
FIG. 7 illustrates operations of a back-end server upon receipt of the information from the middle-tier server 14. As seen in FIG. 7, the back-end server receives the information from the middle-tier server 14 (block 700) and determines if the certificate received from the middle-tier server 14 is from a trusted client (block 705). Such a determination may be made using conventional PKI techniques. If the certificate is not from a trusted client (block 705), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 740). If the certificate is from a trusted client (block 705), it is determined if the signature corresponds to the certificate signature (block 710). Such a determination may be made using conventional PKI techniques for verification of a signature based on a ticket. If the signature does not correspond to the certificate signature (block 710), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 740).
If the signature corresponds to the certificate signature (block 710), the pre-nonce token is hashed using the same hash technique utilized by the middle-tier server (block 715) and the results are compared to the common nonce (block 720). If the results are not the same as the common nonce (block 720), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 740). If the results are the same as the common nonce (block 720), the pre-nonce token is evaluated to determine if it contains the random number provided by the back-end server as part of its pre-nonce contribution (block 725). While not illustrated in FIG. 7, if the random number is optionally signed as described above, the digital signature may be evaluated to determine if it is the digital signature of the back-end server. If the signature does not correspond to that of the back-end server the information would be rejected as not authenticated. Returning to FIG. 7, if the random number provided by the back-end server is not present in the pre-nonce token (block 725), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 740).
Optionally, if the random number is present in the pre-nonce token (block 725) and the random numbers provided by the back-end server have expirations which are tracked by the back-end server, it may be determined if the random number has expired (block 730). If the random number has expired (block 730), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 740). If the random number has not expired (block 730), the information is accepted as an authenticated client impersonated by the middle-tier server 14 (block 735).
FIGS. 8 and 9 illustrate operations according to alternative embodiments of the present invention where the common nonce is obtained from the trusted third party 18. As seen in FIG. 8, the common nonce may be generated by sending a request from the middle-tier server 14 to the trusted third party 18 (block 800). The common nonce and signature of the trusted third party are received (block 805) and it is determined if the signature is authentic (block 810). If the signature is not authentic (block 810), the common nonce is rejected (block 820). If the signature is authentic (block 810), the common nonce is accepted (block 815). The common nonce may be used by the middle-tier server 14 to impersonate the client 10 as described with reference to FIG. 6 with appropriate revision to the information provided to the back-end server so as to provide the signature of the client and the signature of the trusted third party to the back-end server.
FIG. 9 illustrates operations of the back-end server according to alternative embodiments of the present invention. The back-end server receives the information from the middle-tier server 14 (block 900) and determines if the certificate received from the middle-tier server 14 is from a trusted client (block 905). Such a determination may be made using conventional PKI techniques. If the certificate is not from a trusted client (block 905), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 930). If the certificate is from a trusted client (block 905), it is determined if the signature corresponds to the client certificate signature (block 910). Such a determination may be made using conventional PKI techniques for verification of a signature based on a ticket. If the signature does not correspond to the certificate signature (block 910), the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 930).
If the signature corresponds to the client certificate signature (block 910), it is determined if the third party certificate is from a trusted third party (block 915). If not, the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 930). If the third party certificate is from a trusted third party (block 915), the signature of the common nonce is evaluated to determine if it corresponds to the signature from the trusted third party certificate (block 920). If not, the information is rejected as not authenticated (block 930). If the signature of the common nonce corresponds to the signature of the trusted third party certificate (block 920), the information is accepted as an authenticated client impersonated by the middle-tier server 14 (block 925).
While the present invention has been described, in part, with reference to the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24, as will be appreciated by those of skill in the art in light of the present disclosure, the back-end servers 20, 22 and 24 are illustrative of resource managers in general. Accordingly, embodiments of the present invention may be utilized to securely access resource managers of differing types. The resource managers may include, for example, security policies for carrying out some or all of the operations described above for authentication of requests to access a resource managed by the resource manager.
The flowcharts and block diagrams of FIGS. 1A, 1B and 2 through 9 illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products for authentication according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flow charts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the blocks may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be understood that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustrations, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
Furthermore, in the drawings, certain operations/acts and or blocks which have been indicated as optional are shown in dashed lines. The presence or lack of such a dashed line shall not, however, be construed as requiring any of the elements of the figures other than those necessary to provide the functions, operations and/or acts specified in the claims set forth below.
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