Source: http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/azattorneymag/201304/?pg=66
Timestamp: 2020-07-06 16:21:30
Document Index: 759769808

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 13', '§ 15', '§ 15', '§ 20', '§ 12', '§ 552', '§ 13']

based on a preponderance of the evidence, because the standard of proof on independent review is less demanding, and in conducting such review the Arizona Supreme Court does not defer to prior findings or decisions in a given case, or necessarily afford evidence the same weight it received at trial. Arizona law or A.R.S. § 13-753(K)( 3) defines mental retardation as a condition bearing three hallmarks: “[ 1] significantly sub-aver-age general intellectual functioning meaning “a full scale intelligence quotient [IQ] of 70 or lower,” existing concurrently with [ 2] significant impairment of adaptive behavior, and [ 3] onset of these conditions occurring before the defendant reaches the age of eighteen.” In explaining and applying the statute in this case in which there was compelling new evidence of the defendant actually having severe adaptive skills deficits, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “a diagnosis of mental retardation, as statutorily defined, does not require a complete absence of adaptive skills.” Moreover, it found that although the defendant certainly, at some level, knew the difference between right and wrong related to the homicide, the record was replete with examples of his inability, in keeping with his mental age, to understand and process information, to communicate effectively, to reason abstractly and learn from mistakes or experiences, and to control his actions. State v. Grell, CR-09-0199-AP, 1/9/13.
A.R.S. § 15-901.01 Requires the Legislature to Provide for Annual Inflationary Increases in Each Component of the Revenue Control Limit, Including the Base Level. In June 2000, the legislature convened in a special session and adopted Senate Bill 1007, which proposed a 0.6 percent sales tax hike to provide additional funding for public educational institutions and ( 2) imposed financial and academic accountability requirements on K- 12 schools. The Legislature determined that certain portions of the bill, including the inflation adjustment provision, would become effective only if approved by the voters, which then occurred. Under the approved proposition, now codified in A.R.S. § 15-901.01, “the legislature shall increase the base level or other com-
ponents of the revenue control limit by two percent.” That statute requires the Legislature to provide for annual inflationary increases in each component of the revenue control limit, including the base level. Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Doug Ducey, 1 CA-CV 11-0256, 1/15/13.
Escorting a Person from Premises Does Not Necessarily Absolve Dram Shop Liability. Bars have a duty to exercise reasonable care in serving alcohol. Dram shop liability turns on whether the bar fulfilled its duty to exercise affirmative, reasonable care in serving intoxicants to patrons who might later injure themselves or an innocent third party, on or off the premises. The fact that a bar employee in a hotel bar escorts a hotel guest back to the guest’s room after the guest has become intoxicated does not establish, as a matter of law, that the hotel bar exercised reasonable care. McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 1 CA-CV 10-0863, 1/10/13.
The Doctrines of Replacement and Equitable Subrogation Only Exist Up to the Amount Paid to Release a Senior Lien. Under the doctrine of replacement, if a senior mortgage is released of record and, as part of the same transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the same priority as its predecessor. The doctrine of equitable subrogation is similar in that a later lender can pay off the first and superior loan, allowing the later lender to be substituted into the priority position of the primary lienholder, regardless of the existence of a recorded intervening lien. However, to avoid prejudice to junior lienholders, replacement and equitable subrogation only exist up to the amount paid to release the senior lien. Brimet II, LLC v. Destiny Homes Marketing LLC, 1 CA-CV 11-0732, 1/8/13.
Courts Must Determine
Whether Rule 77(f) Applies
Before Imposing Rule 68(g)
Sanctions. The determination
whether a sanction under Arizona
Rule of Civil Procedure 68(g)
should be imposed after an arbitra-
tion hearing “shall be made by ref-
erence to the judgment ultimately
entered, whether on the award … or
after an appeal of the award pursuant
to Rule 77.” Accordingly, a trial
court must first review the judgment
after the appeal of an arbitration
award, compare it to the arbitration
award pursuant to Rule 77(f),
impose any appropriate sanctions
under that rule, and then consider
the imposition of any Rule 68(g)
sanctions. Bradshaw v. Jasso-Barajas,
1 CA-CV 12-0085, 1/8/12.
A.R.S. § 20-259.03 Does Not Bar Payment of Wrongful-Death Benefits from an Underinsured Motorist Policy to a Person Who Is Defined In the Policy as a Surviving Insured But Who Is Not a Named Insured Under the Policy. Arizona Revised Statute Section 20-259.03 provides, “Notwithstanding any other law, in the case of the death of an insured who is covered under the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages of a motor vehicle liability policy, recovery for wrongful death is limited to any party who is qualified to bring a wrongful death action pursuant to § 12-612 and who is also a surviving insured under the same coverages of the policy.” That statute does not bar an insurer from paying wrongful-death underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits to anyone other than a named insured. The statute instead allows an insurer to pay wrongful-death UIM benefits to any eligible claimant that the insurer has chosen to define as a surviving insured under the same coverage of the policy. State Farm v. White, 1 CA-CV 12-0063, 1/3/2013.
Appraiser May Be Liable to
Third Parties for Negligent
Misrepresentation Despite
Provision in Appraisal Stating
that Appraisal Is Not Intended to
Be Relied Upon by Third Parties.
Arizona follows the RESTATEMENT
(“RESTATEMENT”) to determine
when an appraiser owes a duty to
third parties. An appraiser’s liability
is limited to a loss suffered “by the
person or one of a limited group of
persons for whose benefit and guid-
ance [the appraiser] intends to sup-
ply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it”
and extends only to those transac-
tions “that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the
recipient so intends.” RESTATEMENT
§ 552( 2). The appraiser need not
know the identity of the third-party
recipient at the time he supplies the
information, as long as the third
party falls within a distinct group or
class of persons the appraiser
intends to reach and influence with
the information. If, on the other
hand, the appraiser and the named
recipient of the information regard
the identity of the recipient as
“important and material” and
the appraiser “understands that his
liability is to be restricted to the
named person” only, then the
appraiser owes a duty to the named
recipient only. Whether a duty exists
depends on the specific circum-
stances and relationships between
the parties. If Appraiser intended to
supply his appraisal to Lenders, or
knew that Borrowers intended to
supply it to Lenders, then Appraiser
may owe a duty to Lenders. This is
true even if an appraisal states it is
not intended to be used, transferred
or relied upon by any person other
than its specified recipient. Belen
Loan Investors LLC v. Bradley, 2
CA-CV 2011-0153, 12/21/12.
The State has subject-matter jurisdiction over a defendant’s sexual exploitation of a minor case based on his possession of unlawful visual depictions even where it does not prove a criminal offense had been committed against a minor during the creation of those depictions. Under A.R.S. § 13-108 the state of Arizona has jurisdiction over a criminal offense if “[c]onduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs within the state. Section 13-3553(A) provides that a person commits sexual exploitation of a minor by knowingly: ( 1) recording, filming, photographing, developing or duplicating any visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in exploitive exhibition or other sexual conduct; or ( 2) distributing, transporting, exhibiting, receiving, selling, purchasing, electronically transmitting, possessing or exchanging any visual depiction in which a minor is engaged in