Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1193657.html
Timestamp: 2020-08-04 12:35:18
Document Index: 572127655

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2002841', '§\u2002841', '§\u2002841', '§\u2002841', '§\u2002841', '§\u2002841', '§\u2002841']

Two major questions are presented. First, the district court's finding of drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), which was made at sentencing under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, was error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it increased the statutory maximum sentence beyond that which the jury's findings could support. We do not notice that error on plain error review, however, because the Apprendi error did not affect Garcia's substantial rights. See United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir.2000).
With the advantage of hindsight that the district court did not enjoy, we now conclude that the district court erred by finding at resentencing that Garcia conspired to distribute 450 grams of methamphetamine. This finding “increase [d] the penalty for [Garcia's conviction on count one] beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. Had the district court sentenced Garcia on count one solely on the basis of the facts as found by the jury, the statutory maximum for his crime would have been 20 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (maximum for distribution of an unspecified quantity of methamphetamine, a controlled substance in Schedule II). Instead, Garcia was sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (applicable to distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine) which prescribes a statutory sentence of “not ․ less than 10 years or more than life” and a possible fine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Thus, the judge's finding, made under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, increased the statutory maximum penalty to which Garcia was exposed from twenty years to life, in violation of the constitutional rule recognized by Apprendi. See Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058-59.
Because Garcia did not object to the district court's making these sentencing findings, however, we may not grant him relief unless the Apprendi error was “plain.” See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1059-60. Under this standard, Garcia must prove that: (1) there was “error”; (2) the error was “plain”; and (3) the error affected “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If these conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice the forfeited error only if (4) the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Garcia satisfies the first two of these requirements; the district court erred under Apprendi, and the error was “plain” at the time of Garcia's appeal. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); Nordby, 225 F.3d at 1058-59.
Garcia founders on the third prong, however, because he cannot show that the Apprendi error prejudiced him. At resentencing, Garcia was sentenced to 168 months in prison. This term is substantially less than the twenty-year prescribed statutory maximum to which Garcia was subject under the facts as found by the jury. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). There is no reason to believe that Garcia would have been sentenced to a lesser term had his sentence been imposed under that provision. To the contrary, the judge sentenced him to the minimum permitted by the Guidelines. Thus, although the district court's finding of drug quantity increased the prescribed statutory maximum penalty to which Garcia was exposed from twenty years to life, that increase had no effect upon the sentence that Garcia actually received.
We need not decide here whether the constitutional rule recognized by Apprendi prohibits the increase in prescribed statutory minimum penalty to which Garcia was exposed because of the district court's finding. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2360-61 & n. 13; id. at 2379-80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2385-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Garcia's case, the prescribed statutory minimum penalty increased from no minimum penalty on the facts as found by the jury, see § 841(b)(1)(C), to ten years on the facts as found by the judge at sentencing, see § 841(b)(1)(A). We assume for the purpose of decision that Apprendi prohibits such an increase; even so, Garcia was not prejudiced by the error. The district court's application of the sentencing guidelines, which we affirm below, produced a sentencing range of 168-210 months. This entire sentencing range exceeded the higher statutory minimum applied by the district court. For this reason, any Apprendi error could not have affected Garcia's sentence or his “substantial rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770.