Source: https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/3:2010cv08151/544849/15
Timestamp: 2018-03-24 16:25:19
Document Index: 572679478

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1367', '§ 1983']

ORDER that Defendants' 12 Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED for Garzon v. Bullhead City, City of et al :: Justia Dockets & Filings
Justia Dockets & Filings Ninth Circuit Arizona Arizona District Court Garzon v. Bullhead City, City of et al Filing 15
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) City of Bullhead, a municipal corporation;) Rodney Head, in his individual and official) capacities as Chief of Police and Jane Doe) Head, as husband and wife; Brian) Williamson, in his individual and official) capacities as Deputy Chief of Police and) Donna Williamson, as husband and wife;) Paul Holstine, in his individual and official) capacities and Patricia Holstine, as) husband and wife; Charles English, in his) individual and official capacities and Jane) Joe English, as husband and wife; Tim) Ernster, in his individual and official) capacities as City Manager of Bullhead) City and Jane Doe Ernster, and husband) and wife; John Does I-X; ABC) Partnerships I-X; Black Corporations I-X,) ) ) Defendants. ) ) Raul Garzon, No. CV-10-8151-PHX-GMS ORDER 23 24 Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s Second 25 Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) filed by Defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the 26 motion is granted. 27 28 BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges the following. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff 1 Raul Garzon has been employed as a Sergeant by the Bullhead City Police Department since 2 1994. In 2008, Defendant Alex English–a police officer working under the supervision of 3 Plaintiff–filed a formal complaint against Plaintiff with the Department. The Complaint 4 alleged that Plaintiff had had an affair with English’s ex-wife. The City of Bullhead initiated 5 an Internal Affairs investigation into the alleged affair, and Defendant Sergeant Paul Holstine 6 was assigned as the investigator. Plaintiff was concerned that Holstine would not be an 7 impartial investigator because Plaintiff had dated Holstine’s wife at an earlier time when both 8 were single. Plaintiff was further concerned because, in 2004, Holstine falsely accused 9 Plaintiff of accepting money from a drug suspect. Because of these past incidents involving 10 Holstine, Plaintiff wrote to Assistant Chief of Police Brian Williamson, requesting that a 11 different, impartial investigator be assigned to his case. Assistant Chief Williamson denied 12 this request. 13 During his investigation, Holstine verbally abused, cursed at, and lied to, Plaintiff. 14 On October 28, 2008, Plaintiff wrote to Chief of Police Rodney Head alleging that Holstine 15 was treating him unfairly. Chief Head did not respond to Plaintiff’s concerns, and Holstine 16 was allowed to continue the investigation. Holstine’s investigation found no evidence of the 17 alleged affair, however, at the conclusion of the investigation, Holstine accused Plaintiff of 18 lying about sending an email to Mary English, the ex-wife of Officer English. 19 Based on Holstine’s investigation, Chief Head and Assistant Chief Williamson 20 decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff had a pre-termination hearing at which 21 Chief Head sustained his decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. City Manager Tim 22 Ernster subsequently upheld Chief Head’s determination. On April 3, 2009, Plaintiff 23 appealed his termination, and in November 2009, his case was reviewed by a hearing officer. 24 The hearing officer issued a written decision rebuking Defendants and reinstating Plaintiff 25 to his former position with back pay. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint alleging 26 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 27 emotional distress, and defamation. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 28 DISCUSSION -2- 1 I. Motion to Dismiss 2 A. Legal Standard 3 To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 4 Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a 5 “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations 6 sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 7 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations 8 . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 9 Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 10 550 U.S. at 570). When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 11 12(b)(6), “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 12 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). 13 However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of 14 truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient 15 to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 16 B. Analysis 17 “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must [allege] 18 that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 19 and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. 20 Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999). “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of 21 substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 22 conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 23 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). “It is well settled that section 1983 ‘imposes liability for 24 violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising 25 out of tort law.’” Johnson v. Barker, 799 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker, 26 443 U.S. at 146). 27 In Count I of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites to three different 28 constitutional violations committed by Defendants to establish Defendants’ liability under -3- 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff first alleges that his “constitutionally protected liberty interest 2 in his reputation” was violated by Holstine’s “false and defamatory statements of and about 3 Plaintiff.” (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 92–93). This allegation is not sufficient to sustain a claim that 4 Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected liberty interest was violated. The Supreme Court has 5 held that “[a]ny harm or injury to [reputation], even where as here inflicted by an officer of 6 the State, does not result in a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ recognized by state 7 or federal law”. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). 8 Plaintiff also alleges that he lost his “constitutionally protected property interest in his 9 job . . . without due process of law.” (Id. at ¶ 96). Plaintiff maintains that he was entitled to 10 “some kind of hearing before being terminated–a right to oral or written [sic] charges against 11 [him], an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present their side[] 12 of the story.” (Id. at ¶ 97). Plaintiff alleges that he was denied these due process rights 13 because his “pre-termination hearing was a constitutionally deficient sham proceeding.” (Id. 14 at ¶ 98). However, “the failure to provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination 15 stage, of itself, does not create liability, so long as the decisionmaker at the post-termination 16 hearing is impartial.” Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 Although Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Holstine and Chief Head were not impartial during 18 his pre-termination proceedings, Plaintiff does not allege that the post-termination hearing, 19 in which he was reinstated to his former position with back pay, was conducted by someone 20 other than an impartial decisionmaker. Thus, Plaintiff states no due process claim regarding 21 his “constitutionally protected property interest in his job” to this extent. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 96). 22 Plaintiff finally alleges that his “rights to procedural and substantive due process were 23 also violated” throughout the investigation and disciplinary proceedings because Defendants 24 failed to adhere to Bullhead City’s policies and procedures. (Id. at ¶ 99). Although he cites 25 several police department policies, Plaintiff only provides the language for Bullhead City 26 Police Department Policy AR 3–3 (3.06), which provides that “[t]he use of threats, offensive 27 language, promise of reward, or any denial of an employee’s rights is prohibited. Imposition 28 of punishment not in accordance with the provisions of this regulation is also prohibited.” -4- 1 (Id. at ¶¶ 99–100). Nevertheless, to establish a due process claim, “under § 1983, [plaintiffs] 2 must [allege] that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 3 United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am. 4 Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 49–50. Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants failed to follow 5 their own policies is not sufficient to allege that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a right 6 protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. As a general rule, a violation of 7 state law or procedures does not lead to liability under § 1983. Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 8 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998). 9 Plaintiff fails to allege enough facts to state a claim to relief because even viewing the 10 facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint in the light most favorable to him, none of the three violations 11 alleged by Plaintiff establish that he was deprived of any rights secured by the Constitution 12 or laws of the United States as required to state a § 1983 claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 13 570. As Plaintiff has had three opportunities to properly bring a § 1983 claim, this Court, in 14 its discretion, dismisses Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice 15 and denies Plaintiff leave to amend or re-plead. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 16 (1962) (finding that “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 17 allowed” is grounds for denying leave for a Plaintiff to amend his complaint). 18 Generally, federal courts do not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state 19 law claims when the federal claim is dismissed. See Carlsbad Tech. Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 20 S.Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009) (holding that a district court has discretion in exercising 21 supplemental jurisdiction when the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original 22 jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim 23 upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and his remaining claims of false 24 light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation are all 25 state law claims, this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s state law claims, without prejudice, for lack 26 of jurisdiction. 27 28 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. -5- 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims of false light invasion 2 of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation are dismissed without 3 prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 4 5 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to terminate this action. DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -6-