Source: https://casetext.com/case/geders-v-united-states
Timestamp: 2020-07-07 18:42:15
Document Index: 404771968

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Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 | Casetext Search + Citator
The Geders , Herring , and Brooks DecisionsThe dissenting opinion relies on Geders v. United States , 425…
Here we must determine the appropriate treatment of an order barring consultation during a brief, routine…
Full title:GEDERS v . UNITED STATES
96 S. Ct. 1330
holding that trial court's order prohibiting defendant from consulting with his attorney during an overnight trial recess violated the Sixth Amendment
Summary of this case from Aurelio v. Joyce
Argued December 1, 1975. Decided March 30, 1976.
A grand jury in the Middle District of Florida returned indictments charging petitioner and several codefendants with conspiracy to import and illegal importation of a controlled substance into the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 21 U.S.C. § 952 (a), and with possession of marihuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a). The charges grew out of plans for several of the defendants to fly about 1,000 pounds of marihuana from Colombia into the United States, plans that might have succeeded but for the fact that the pilot of the charter plane informed the United States Customs Service of the arrangements.
Petitioner's attorney objected, explaining that he believed he had a right to confer with his client about matters other than the imminent cross-examination, and that he wished to discuss problems relating to the trial with his client. The judge indicated his confidence that counsel would properly confine the discussion, but expressed some doubt that petitioner would be able to do so, saying: "I think he would understand it if I told him just not to talk to you; and I just think it is better that he not talk to you about anything." The judge suggested that counsel could have an opportunity immediately after the recess to discuss with his client matters other than the cross-examination, such as what witnesses were to be called the next day, and he indicated that he would grant a recess the next day so that counsel could consult with petitioner after petitioner's testimony ended. Counsel persisted in his objection, although he appropriately indicated that he would — as in fact he did — comply with the court's order.
"MR. BLASINGAME: Has this witness been instructed now that he is not to talk to anyone whatsoever, including his attorneys — or anyone — about this case at all?
"THE COURT: Well I don't know whether you requested that I so instruct another witness when there was a recess, to that effect; but you do — let's make this clear — you always have the right to talk to your client — but except for the accident — and `accident' means something over which you have no control — the cross-examination would have been right now and you would not have had an opportunity to talk to him.
"If you had requested the opportunity and this had been 2:00 o'clock — and if you had said `If the Court please, I would like to have a recess' — and then, outside the presence of the Jury, had said, `because I want to talk to my client'; what would I have said?
"MR. RINEHART: Well I would not —
"THE COURT: Well would you have talked to him? Would Page 84 you have had a right to confer with him? That is what I want to know.
"MR. RINEHART: If there were matters that I felt I had not brought out on Direct and that I should have covered —
"MR. RINEHART: Even before he is cross-examined. Sometimes we remember things we did not —
"THE COURT: Well I don't have any questions, Mr. Rinehart, about what you — I think you are a disciplined man. I think you are trained in the law. And I think if you should tell me, for instance, that you would not discuss this direct testimony with your client I would accept that statement without any qualification.
"THE COURT: I understand that. But your client, as far as I know, has not had any legal training; and I don't know anything about him other than what I have heard here today. And I don't Page 85 know that he is subject to that same instruction — that he would understand it.
"I think you might ask him right now — right here while we are here — what witnesses he thinks you ought to call in the morning.
When court convened the next morning, petitioner's attorney asked and received permission to reopen his direct examination of petitioner. The cross-examination which followed was finished in the morning; the judge then called the luncheon recess. Petitioner — whose testimony on redirect examination was yet to come — was permitted to confer with his attorney during the noon recess. The trial concluded the following day, and petitioner was convicted on all three counts; he was sentenced to concurrent three-year prison terms.
The Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction. United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1 (CA5 1974). On the point here at issue, the court held that petitioner's failure to claim any prejudice resulting from his inability to consult with counsel during one evening of the trial was fatal to his appeal. In so holding, the court relied on United States v. Leighton, 386 F.2d 822 (CA2 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968), dealing with a similar order applied to a noon recess, and rejected the Third Circuit's position that prejudice need not be shown, United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (1950), in a case involving an overnight recess. The Court of Appeals also disposed of several other claims of error. We granted certiorari limited to petitioner's claim that the order forbidding consultation with his attorney overnight denied him the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 421 U.S. 929.
Our cases have consistently recognized the important role the trial judge plays in the federal system of criminal justice. "[T]he judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law." Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933). A criminal trial does not unfold like a play with actors following a script; there is no scenario and can be none. The trial judge must meet situations as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary process. To this end, he may determine generally the order in which parties will adduce proof; his determination will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 74 (1895); United States v. Martinez-Villanueva, 463 F.2d 1336 (CA9 1972); Nelson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483, 487 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1060 (1970). Within limits, the judge may control the scope of rebuttal testimony, United States v. Chrzanowski, 502 F.2d 573, 575-576 (CA3 1974); United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (CA9), cert. denied sub nom. Lombera v. United States, 419 U.S. 858 (1974); may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974); County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U.S. 272 (1877); and may control the scope of examination of witnesses, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83 (1942). If truth and fairness are not to be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings.
The judge's power to control the progress and, within the limits of the adversary system, the shape of the trial includes broad power to sequester witnesses before, during, and after their testimony. Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893); United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (CA7 1974); United States v. Eastwood, 489 F.2d 818, 821 (CA5 1974). Wigmore notes that centuries ago, the practice of sequestration of witnesses "already had in English practice an independent and continuous existence, even in the time of those earlier modes of trial which preceded the jury and were a part of our inheritance of the common Germanic law." 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1837, p. 348 (3d ed., 1940). The aim of imposing "the rule on witnesses," as the practice of sequestering witnesses is sometimes called, is twofold. It exercises a restraint on witnesses "tailoring" their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; and it aids in detecting testimony that is less than candid. See Wigmore, supra, § 1838; F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 405 (C. Torcia ed., 1972). Sequestering a witness over a recess called before testimony is completed serves a third purpose as well — preventing improper attempts to influence the testimony in light of the testimony already given.
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. . . . [A defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-36 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-345 (1963). Other courts have concluded that an order preventing a defendant from consulting his attorney during an overnight recess infringes upon this substantial right. See United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (CA3 1950); People v. Noble, 42 Ill.2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969); Commonwealth v. Werner, 206 Pa. Super. 498, 214 A.2d 276 (1965). But see People v. Prevost, 219 Mich. 233, 189 N.W. 92 (1922).
United States v. Leighton, 386 F.2d 822 (CA2 1967), on which the Court of Appeals relied, involved an embargo order preventing a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day, a matter we emphasize is not before us in this case. See United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (CA5 1974); United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); see also Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122 (CA5), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915 (1957). Cf. Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966).
There are other ways to deal with the problem of possible improper influence on testimony or "coaching" of a witness short of putting a barrier between client and counsel for so long a period as 17 hours. The opposing counsel in the adversary system is not without weapons to cope with "coached" witnesses. A prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant as to the extent of any "coaching" during a recess, subject, of course, to the control of the court. Skillful cross-examination could develop a record which the prosecutor in closing argument might well exploit by raising questions as to the defendant's credibility, if it developed that defense counsel had in fact coached the witness as to how to respond on the remaining direct examination and on cross-examination. In addition the trial judge, if he doubts that defense counsel will observe the ethical limits on guiding witnesses, may direct that the examination of the witness continue without interruption until completed. If the judge considers the risk high he may arrange the sequence of testimony so that direct- and cross-examination of a witness will be completed without interruption. That this would not be feasible in some cases due to the length of direct- and cross-examination does not alter the availability, in most cases, of a solution that does not cut off communication for so long a period as presented by this record. Inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, counsel, and court personnel may occasionally result if a luncheon or other recess is postponed or if a court continues in session several hours beyond the normal adjournment hour. In this day of crowded dockets, courts must frequently sit through and beyond normal recess; convenience occasionally must yield to concern for the integrity of the trial itself.
There are a variety of ways to further the purpose served by sequestration without placing a sustained barrier to communication between a defendant and his lawyer. To the extent that conflict remains between the defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a long overnight recess in the trial, and the prosecutor's desire to cross-examine the defendant without the intervention of counsel, with the risk of improper "coaching," the conflict must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
The Court notes that this case does not involve an order barring communication between defendant and counsel during a "brief routine recess during the trial day." Ante, at 89 n. 2. That is, of course, true. I would add, however, that I do not understand the Court's observation as suggesting that as a general rule no constitutional infirmity would inhere in an order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney during a "brief routine recess." In my view, the general principles adopted by the Court today are fully applicable to the analysis of any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney, at least where that communication would not interfere with the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.
I would assume, however, that the Court's repeated reference to the length of the overnight recess in this case — 17 hours — is not intended to have any dispositive significance, and that the Court's holding is at least broad enough to cover all overnight recesses.
The only justification expressly considered by the Court in its opinion is the desire to avoid the risk of unethical counselling by an attorney. The Court holds that the fear of unethical conduct is not a sufficient ground for an order barring overnight communication between a defendant and his attorney, and the same would hold true absent the most unusual circumstances, I take it, for an order barring consultation between a defendant and his attorney at any time before or during the trial. If our adversary system is to function according to design, we must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his client. I find it difficult to conceive of any circumstances that would justify a court's limiting the attorney's opportunity to serve his client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted ethical standards. If any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney is to survive constitutional inquiry, it must be for some reason other than a fear of unethical conduct.
For the distinction between ethical and unethical counselling, see ante, at 90 n. 3.
holding that trial court's order barring defendant from consulting with defense counsel during an overnight recess deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
holding that a trial court's order that defendant not consult with his attorney during an overnight recess during trial violated the Sixth Amendment
holding that trial judge's order that counsel could not communicate with defendant during overnight recess in the middle of trial violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right
holding "an order preventing petitioner from consulting his counsel `about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct- and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."
holding that the right to counsel encompasses the right to confer with one's lawyer
holding that separating and preventing a defendant from consulting with his attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess during trial was a violation of the Sixth Amendment
Summary of this case from Hays v. Arave
holding that an order preventing defendant from consulting with his counsel during overnight recess between his direct and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment
holding that an order preventing a defendant from consulting with his attorney during a seventeen hour recess violated Sixth Amendment rights
holding that court's order prohibiting counsel from consulting with client during overnight recess violated Sixth Amendment
Summary of this case from United States v. Royal
holding order not to speak with counsel overnight while he was testifying was unconstitutional
holding "an order preventing petitioner from consulting his counsel `about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct-and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."
holding that defendant was unconstitutionally denied the effective assistance of counsel when he was ordered by the trial judge not to confer with counsel about anything during 17 hour recess between defendant's direct and cross-examination
Summary of this case from U.S. v. BIN LADEN
Summary of this case from State v. Cheetham
holding a trial court's order preventing the defendant from consulting with counsel about anything during overnight recess constituted denial of counsel
holding sequestering a testifying defendant and preventing him from consulting with his attorney during a trial recess violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
holding that court denied defendant effective assistance by preventing defense counsel and defendant from consulting during overnight recess
holding unconstitutional a ban on attorney-client consultation during overnight recesses
holding the "prosecutor's desire to cross-examine the defendant without the intervention of counsel" to prevent "the risk of improper 'coaching'" must yield to the "defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a long overnight recess in the trial"
holding that sequestration order that prevented defendant and attorney from conferring during a 17-hour overnight recess violated Sixth Amendment, and reversing without requiring prejudice to be shown
holding that 17-hour prohibition against conferring with counsel "about anything," after defendant concluded direct examination and before cross-examination by State began, violated Sixth Amendment; further explaining that abuse-of-discretion standard applies, because trial court "must meet situations as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary process"
holding that Sixth Amendment is violated where a court order prevented criminal defendant from consulting with attorney during 17-hour overnight recess between defendant's direct and cross examinations
Summary of this case from LA GARZA v. STATE
finding denial of right to counsel when trial court order prevented the defendant from consulting counsel about anything during an overnight recess between his direct and cross examinations
finding per se violation of right to counsel
Summary of this case from Watts v. Mahally
finding a Sixth Amendment violation where a defendant was ordered, during trial, not to consult counsel during a 17-hour overnight recess, in part because "[o]ur cases recognize that the role of counsel is important precisely because ordinarily a defendant is ill- equipped to understand and deal with the trial process without a lawyer's guidance"