Source: http://www.tourolawreview.com/2013/10/party-sophistication-and-value-pluralism-in-contract-2/
Timestamp: 2013-12-21 18:33:18
Document Index: 6136100

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 229', 'art128', '§ 208', '§ 2', '§ 70', '§ 28']

By Meredith R. Miller / October 21, 2013 29 Law Review 659
This Article focuses on the first variant of pluralism—that which subcategorizes the world of contracts into types. Kreitner collects some of the prominent works in the group, which look to either the types of parties or types of contracts in an attempt to guide the doctrine.77
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I am thankful to former Dean Lawrence Raful for generous research support and to Nicholas Vitalo for diligent research assistance. Errors and omissions are mine alone.
Footnotes:Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 493 (2010). ↩Id. ↩Id. at 495. ↩See Stephen A. Smith, Contract Theory 59 (2004) (defining freedom of contract as “the idea, fundamental in the orthodox understanding of contract law, that the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law”). ↩Miller, supra note 1, at 503. ↩Id. at 508. ↩Id. at 495. ↩Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 349, 441 (1995) (“Contracts should be enforced because they ‘foster[] individual autonomy, promot[e] fair allocation of social benefits, and minimiz[e] the costs of transacting.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1817-18 (1991))). “Autonomy” is a word that is often used without definition. I use the term “autonomy” to broadly describe the value of individual choice in private ordering, free from government interference. I use the term “freedom of contract” interchangeably with “autonomy,” though I recognize that there may be room to argue that the two concepts overlap but are distinguishable. See Smith, supra note 4, at 139 (discussing the differences between “autonomy” and “freedom of contract”). ↩DiMatteo, supra note 8, at 376 n.150 (“Efficiency has long been an underlying norm of many of contracts’ foundational premises.”). “Efficiency” is intended to describe the economic principle of maximizing individual gains, which, in turn, should increase societal wealth. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 12 (4th ed. 2003); see also Smith, supra note 4, at 108-09 (discussing the theory of efficiency in contract law). ↩Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 77 (2006) (stating “fairness and equity. . . lies at the core of contract law”). ↩Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 839, 874 (1999) (“Contracts are born of the need for certainty.” (quoting Martin E. Segal, Foreseeability in a Fog: Uncertainty Over Pre-existing Duties Can Undermine Contracts, 82 A.B.A. J. 86 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ↩Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229 (1981). ↩Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 537-39 (6th ed. 2009). ↩Smith, supra note 4, at 130; Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 Ratio Juris. 194, 198 (2008); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican Response to Professor Shiffrin, 21 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 399, 408 (2008) (noting that efficiency and morality will never be harmonized); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 710-11 (2007). ↩Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 915, 915 (2012). ↩Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1031, 1036 (2010). ↩Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 533, 534 (2005). ↩C. Scott Pryor, Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 723 (2009). ↩See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory 8 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 138, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104987; Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1, 4 (2005); Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1483, 1485, 1498 (2005). ↩See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Robert A. Prentice, Blake D. Morant & Daniel D. Barnhizer, Visions of Contract Theory: Rationality, Bargaining, and Interpretation 4-5 (2007) (“Ultimately, contract theory should reflect the pragmatism of contract law. Contract law is a reflection of a continuing framework of compromises between competing values, interests, and norms. The authors hope that a richer and more worthwhile dialogue will be possible once the idea of a unified theory of contract law or the idea of a contract metaprinciple is rejected.” (citation omitted)); Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis of Critique of Contemporary Theories of Contract Law 2 (2d ed. 1998) (“Although I will insist that no unitary theory adequately captures the entire contract-law field, my message is not an ‘anti-theoretical counter-attack,’ but rather a pragmatic synthesis of the conceptual and the concrete.” (quoting Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1284 (1990))). Although I do not tackle it here, it is worth exploring whether, in this context, pluralism and pragmatism are different concepts and, if so, how they are different. ↩Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law 2 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 128, 2011), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/fp/art128. ↩See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 329, 333-34 (2007) (describing “value pluralism”). ↩Id. at 334 (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 171 (1969)) (internal quotation mark omitted), available at http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliberty.pdf. ↩Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 688 n.1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). “[P]luralism is a fairly basic intuition, captured by the idea that there is a multiplicity of justificatory principles applicable to a particular set of institutions or problems.” Kreitner, supra note 15, at 915. ↩Trakman, supra note 16, at 1064; Kraus, supra note 24 (describing how monist theories “purport to explain and justify contract law by rendering it coherent under a single explanatory/justificatory principle”). ↩Cf. DiMatteo et al., supra note 20. ↩See generally Kreitner, supra note 15 (discussing different theories of contract law). ↩Admittedly, this is an overstatement because many of the theories, in recognizing their own limitations, admit that some of contract doctrine may not be explained by a certain value. Kreitner, supra note 15, at 916 n.5. ↩Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 17 (1981); Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 749-53. ↩Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L.J. 1417, 1420 (2004). ↩See DiMatteo, supra note 8 (illustrating that economic theory is based on the principles of efficiency). ↩Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 319 (1986). ↩Miller, supra note 1. ↩Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted). I will set aside for now the argument made in that article that the concept of “sophistication” needs to be thoughtfully defined and deliberately applied. ↩Id. at 493 n.2. ↩Id. at 516-18 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to contract formation). ↩Id. at 502-04 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to contract interpretation). ↩Miller, supra note 1, at 505-08 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to reliance disclaimers). ↩Id. at 508-10 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to exculpatory clauses). ↩Id. at 510-12 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to economic loss rule, limitations on damages, and liquidated damages). ↩Id. at 512-14 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to mistake); id. at 505-08 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to claim of fraud). ↩Miller, supra note 1, at 494 (citing Green v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 5:08-cv-00198, 2008 WL 2622917, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. June 30, 2008)) (indicating that plaintiffs described themselves as “ ‘unsophisticated consumers’ who ‘did not understand the details of the transaction’ ”); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-cv-02443-JLK-MEH, 2008 WL 4452338, at *15 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (noting that the purchasers of cars “were likely relatively unsophisticated consumers with little bargaining power”); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002) (discussing how the homeowners were “not sophisticated or wealthy consumers with equal bargaining power”)). ↩Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 111 (Ronald K. L. Collins, ed., 2d ed. 1995). Gilmore observed that “the classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly breaks down in a protracted romantic agony.” Id. But, “[t]hen, the romantic energy having spent itself, there is a new classical reformulation—and so the rhythms continue.” Id. at 112; see also Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1443, 1483-84 (2008) (discussing Gilmore’s description of “alternating rhythms of classicism and romanticism” (quoting Gilmore, supra note 43) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ↩Id. ↩Bridgeman, supra note 43, at 1443. ↩Id. at 1461. ↩See id. at 1449 (stating that “rules are . . . binding because they are rules,” not because they are substantively justified). ↩Id. at 1472. ↩Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and Instrumentalism, Legal Theory Lexicon (May 22, 2005), http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043-formalism-and.html. ↩Id. ↩Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS Gentium 115, 116 (2006) (discussing that the realist era of contract began in mid-1900s). ↩See Bridgeman, supra note 43, at 1448 (explaining how the term “context insensitivity” may be used to describe “a case where the application of a rule leads to injustice for particular parties in their situation, . . . despite justification for the rule in most cases”). ↩Id. ↩Id. at 1445. ↩See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1529, 1530 (2002) (reviewing The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (stating that “developments [in contract law] reflect a new formalism”); see also Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Series, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/zpapers.cfm?abstract_id=200732 (indicating that a formalistic approach is preferred); Jay M. Feinman, Un-making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999) (observing a return to formalism in contracts scholarship). ↩John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 869, 891 (2002) (describing trend of neoformalism in contracts scholarship). Professor Murray did note that “[i]t seems unnecessary to refer to this school as ‘neoformalism’ notwithstanding differences between their rationale and the underlying philosophy of classical formalism. The results are essentially identical.” Id. at 892 n.115. ↩Charny, supra note 55. ↩Movsesian, supra note 55. ↩For example, courts have not abandoned the doctrine of unconscionability, with its focus on procedural and substantive fairness. The unconscionability doctrine allows courts to deny enforcement of a contract (or a term of a contract) when that contract (or a term thereof) is, on balance, procedurally and substantively unfair. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 208 cmt. c. (1981); U.C.C. § 2-303 cmt. 1 (2011). This standards-based doctrine survives to preserve the realists’ normative concerns. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 10, at 74 (stating that unconscionability serves to protect fairness). This is readily evidenced by the court’s frequent application of unconscionability to temper strict enforcement of adhesion contracts in the consumer context. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 757, 800-01 (2004) (indicating courts’ refusal to enforce an adhesion contract if the agreement is unconscionable). Moreover, courts have not rejected reliance-based theories, and they continue to interpret contracts contextually by reference to trade usage, course of performance, and course of dealing. See, e.g., Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 736 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel); Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1989) (referencing course of dealing); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 679-80 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying doctrine of promissory estoppel); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 654 F. Supp. 1419, 1429 (D. Del. 1987) (looking to the course of performance to interpret parties’ agreement); Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W.2d 23, 24-27 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel); Smith-Scharff Paper Co. v. P.N. Hirsch & Co. Stores, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (referencing course of dealing). Practical Products Corp. v. Brightmire, 864 P.2d 330, 333 (Okla. 1992) (discussing how general trade usage supplemented the terms contract); Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 459 A.2d 329, 332 (Pa. 1983) (looking to the course of performance to interpret parties’ agreement); Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., 770 P.2d 692, 696-97 (Wyo. 1989) (referencing trade usage). ↩Gilmore, supra note 43, at 112. ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 916. ↩Robinette, supra note 22, at 334. ↩Id. at 335. ↩Id. (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 167 (Oxford Univ. Press 1969)) (“It is a commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient organization nor social justice is compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty, and certainly not unrestricted laissez-faire; that justice and generosity, public and private loyalties, the demands of genius and the claims of society, can conflict violently with each other.”). ↩Id. at 336. ↩Id. ↩Robinette, supra note 22, at 335-36. ↩Id. ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 917. ↩Id. at 918. ↩Id. at 919. ↩Id. ↩Id. ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919. ↩Id. at 921; see generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contract Formalism, Scientism, and the M-Word: A Comment on Professor Movsesian’s Under-Theorization Thesis, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 23, 23 (2006). ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 922; see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726, 1728-29 (2008). ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919-20. ↩Id. ↩Leib, supra note 19, at 22 (responding to Markovits, supra note 30). ↩Id. ↩Id. at 21. ↩See id. at 3-4; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 546-47 (2003) (discussing the theory of literal interpretation of contracts between organizations). Indeed, Schwartz and Scott limit their “efficiency theory” of contract to those deals where both parties are obviously sophisticated. Id. at 545. They then draw a boundary line for these obviously sophisticated parties by stating that the following firms fall into the first category: “(1) an entity that is organized in the corporate form and that has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm.” Id. They draw this categorical line on the reasoning that “[t]hese economic entities can be expected to understand how to make business contracts.” Id. ↩Leib, supra note 19, at 22. ↩Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919-20. ↩Id. ↩Id.; see, e.g., Bix, supra note 14, at 199 (arguing that theories should be “localized to a particular jurisdiction and/or to particular sub-categories of Contract Law”); see also Oman, supra note 19, at 1484-85; Lipshaw, supra note 14, at 400. ↩Robert C. Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1972). ↩Jody Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 Phil. Issues 420, 420 (2001). ↩Id. ↩See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 296-97 (2005) (arguing that status-based dichotomies of “consumer versus non-consumer [and] merchant versus non-merchant . . . are false because small businesses do not fall cleanly into any of these categories”). ↩See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 139 (2005). ↩Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 77, 78 (2009). ↩See infra Part IV. ↩See generally Miller, supra note 1 (arguing that the courts should establish a definition for “sophistication,” and develop a proper mode of analysis for deciding when application of the term is proper). Indeed, in a 1972 article, Childres and Spitz observed: “[S]tatus analysis clears the way to rational, just decision-making in all the categories. Once it is made explicit that no single rule can be expected to operate across all status lines, we can get about the business of trying to create new categories and rules.” Childres & Spitz, supra note 87, at 31. ↩One treatise notes that “equity often deals a harsher hand to the more sophisticated party.” Richard A. Lord, 28 Williston on Contracts § 70:153 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983)). ↩See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 1995) (requiring strict compliance with express condition precedent to formation of sub-lease of commercial real estate). The court explained that “[i]f [sophisticated parties] are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the bargaining table.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 502 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 1986)). ↩Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The Gibsons are sophisticated business people and Cara’s Notions, Inc., dealt with Hallmark at arm’s length. Both parties to such a commercial contract have a duty to read the contract carefully and are presumed to understand it.”); see also 7 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts: Avoidance and Reformation § 28.38 (2002) (“The more sophisticated the party, the greater the burden to read.”). ↩AccuSoft Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[W]e do not consider it our place to ‘rewrite contracts freely entered into between sophisticated business entities.’ ” (quoting Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 856 (1st Cir. 1987))); LaSociete Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 44 F.3d 629, 637 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here . . . two sophisticated parties negotiate[] a commercial contract which was executed in the absence of fraud, duress, or any other form of unconscionability, we will not rewrite the contract in order to save a contracting party from its own poor decisions.”); Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 107 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (explaining when a contract is between two sophisticated parties involved in a complex transaction, the court will not rewrite the contract to circumvent the clear intent of the parties); Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 421. ↩660 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1995). ↩Id. at 416. ↩Id. ↩Id. ↩Id. ↩Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 416. ↩Id. at 417. ↩Id. ↩Id. at 417-18. ↩Id. at 419. ↩Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 421. ↩Id. at 418. ↩Id. ↩Id. at 421. ↩Id. at 417. ↩Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 421 (alteration in original) (quoting Maxton Builders, 502 N.E.2d at 189 (N.Y)). ↩Id. ↩Id. at 418-19, 421. ↩Id. at 421. ↩Id. ↩905 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 952 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 2011). ↩Id. at 77-78. The form of business entity is not specified in the court’s decision. ↩Id. at 78. ↩Id. at 78 n.1. ↩Id. ↩Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 78. ↩Id. ↩Id. at 77-79. ↩Id. at 78. ↩Id. at 78-79. I have criticized courts for generally failing to provide the reasons why they label a party sophisticated. Coincidentally, in this case, the appellate division did a good job of explaining this conclusion. Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 78 n.2. The court wrote:
↩Id. at 78-79. ↩Id. (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v. Holme, 824 N.Y.S.2d 210, 215 (App. Div. 2006)). ↩Arfa, 952 N.E.2d at 1004. ↩Miller, supra note 1, at 505-08. ↩See, e.g., Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001-02 (N.Y. 2011)). ↩Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 508 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). ↩Id. ↩Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 687. ↩Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 77-78. ↩632 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1994). ↩Id. at 508. ↩Id. at 509. ↩Id. ↩Id. ↩Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509. ↩Id. ↩Id. at 508-09. ↩Id. at 509. ↩Id. ↩Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509. ↩Id. ↩Id. The majority of the court did not mention that the mistake was “one of law, not fact”; although this point was raised by the dissent. Id. at 510 (Bryant, J., dissenting). ↩
Id. at 510-11. The dissent wrote:
Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 510-11 (citations omitted).
↩See id. at 509 (majority opinion). ↩Id. ↩Robinette, supra note 22, at 335 (quoting Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas 13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991)). ↩See Reilley, 632 N.E.2d 507; Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d 415; Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d 77. ↩Compare Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509 (allowing an unsophisticated buyer to rescind a contract for residential real estate), with Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (preventing the sophisticated buyer to rescind contract). ↩Kraus, supra note 88. ↩Id. ↩
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