Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100394/retail-clerks-vs-lion-dry-goods-inc
Timestamp: 2018-01-19 17:41:11
Document Index: 229572189

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 8', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 301', '§ 9', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 301']

Retail Clerks Vs Lion Dry Goods Inc - Citation 100394 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Retail Clerks Vs. Lion Dry Goods, Inc. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100394
Case Number 369 U.S. 17
Appellant Retail Clerks
Respondent Lion Dry Goods, Inc.
.....settlement agreement between an employer in an industry affecting interstate commerce and local labor unions representing some, but not a majority, of its employees. pp. 369 u. s. 18 -30. (a) the term "contracts," as used in § 301(a), is not limited to collective bargaining agreements concerning hours, wages and conditions of employment concluded in direct negotiations between employers and unions entitled to recognition as exclusive bargaining representatives of employees; it applies also to agreements, such as that involved here, between employers and labor organizations which importantly and directly affect the employment relationship. pp. 369 u. s. 23 -28. (b) the term "labor organization representing employees," as used in § 301(a), is not limited to.....
Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc. - 369 U.S. 17 (1962)
U.S. Supreme Court Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962)
1. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, which confers on federal district courts jurisdiction over suits "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting" interstate commerce, applies to a suit to enforce a strike settlement agreement between an employer in an industry affecting interstate commerce and local labor unions representing some, but not a majority, of its employees. Pp. 369 U. S. 18 -30.
(a) The term "contracts," as used in § 301(a), is not limited to collective bargaining agreements concerning hours, wages and conditions of employment concluded in direct negotiations between employers and unions entitled to recognition as exclusive bargaining representatives of employees; it applies also to agreements, such as that involved here, between employers and labor organizations which importantly and directly affect the employment relationship. Pp. 369 U. S. 23 -28.
(b) The term "labor organization representing employees," as used in § 301(a), is not limited to labor organizations which are entitled to recognition as exclusive bargaining agents of employees. Pp. 369 U. S. 28 -29.
2. This cause is not rendered moot by the fact that the local unions which commenced this litigation have since merged with another local union to form a new local union of the same international union, and petitioners' motion to add the new local union as a party is granted. P. 369 U. S. 19 , n. 2.
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, [ Footnote 1 ] provides that
of the national labor policy as expressed in § 301(a). 366 U.S. 917. We hold that the lower courts erred, and remand the cause for trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [ Footnote 2 ]
The petitioners, local unions of the Retail Clerks International Association, brought this action on the sole jurisdictional basis of § 301(a) and (b), seeking to compel respondents' compliance with two allegedly binding arbitration awards. Respondents are two department stores in Toledo, Ohio, covered by the Labor Management Relations Act. For some years prior to 1957, petitioners had been the collective bargaining representatives of respondents' employees, and had been parties to collective bargaining agreements with respondents. In November, 1957, negotiations for renewal contracts ended in impasse. A strike ensued against one of the respondents, Lasalle's, and continued until December 24, 1958; the dispute with the other respondent, Lion Dry Goods, continued during the whole of those 13 months, although no strike occurred. On December 24, 1958, the parties ended their dispute with the aid of the Toledo Labor-Management-Citizens' Committee (hereinafter, LMC), a local mediation and arbitration body. [ Footnote 3 ] Negotiations
by means of LMC mediation had produced a "Statement of Understanding" [ Footnote 4 ] satisfactory to all parties.
A few days later, the Locals wrote the LMC that "we herewith agree to the conditions and guarantees of the Statement of Understanding." The conditions to be performed by each side were performed, and the dispute was terminated. In a few months, however, new grievances arose, including the two that generated this case. First. The unions claimed under the Statement the right of access to the employees' cafeteria in order to communicate with employees during their non-working time. The stores claimed that Statement Ĺš 6 gave no right of access to the employees' cafeterias, for those are not "areas of the store which are open to customers." [ Footnote 5 ] Second. Two Lasalle's employees, salesladies in the men's furnishings department, had been fully reinstated except that the saleslady formerly assigned to sell men's shirts was assigned to sell men's sweaters, and the other saleslady, who had been selling sweaters, now was assigned to sell shirts. The Locals submitted these matters to the LMC under the procedure of Statement Ĺš 7; the stores and the Locals participated fully in the ensuing arbitration proceedings; and the award went to the Locals on both grievances. The stores' refusal to accede to those awards prompted this suit.
this was not one of them. [ Footnote 6 ] We interpret the District Court as holding that, to be within § 301(a), contracts must be "collective bargaining contracts, or agreements arrived at through collective bargaining," ibid.; and further,
must be with a union that is the recognized majority representative of the employees. The court found that the Statement of Understanding met neither test. [ Footnote 7 ] The Court of Appeals' brief affirmance, supra, fails to make clear whether it agreed with both of those limitations on § 301(a) or with only one, and, if so, which one.
"For the guidance and information of interested representatives of employers, employees, and the general public, the Bureau of Labor Statistics . . . shall maintain a file of copies of all available collective bargaining agreements and other available agreements and actions thereunder settling or adjusting labor disputes. [ Footnote 8 ]"
§ 301(a) at all, it supports the inference that "contracts" does include more than "collective bargaining agreements," at least as respondents would define them. Second. If "contracts," the subsequent words "or between any such labor organizations" are superfluous, for if there is a collective bargaining agreement between unions, it follows that, as to that agreement, one union is the employer and the other represents employees. See Office Employes Intern. Union v. Labor Board, 353 U. S. 313 . Congress was not indulging in surplusage: a federal forum was provided for actions on other labor contracts besides collective bargaining contracts. See, e.g., United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, 258 F.2d 743 (no-raiding agreement). But, it is urged, though Congress meant that labor organizations could sue one another in federal courts on other contracts between themselves, suits between employers and unions were still limited to actions on collective bargaining contracts: the provision for suits between labor organizations was inserted in Conference. [ Footnote 9 ] Differing House and Senate bills were reconciled in Conference. The House bill spoke of suits involving a violation of "an agreement between an employer and a labor organization or other representative of employees. . . ." The Senate bill read "contracts concluded as the result of collective bargaining between an employer and a labor organization. . . ." [ Footnote 10 ] It is urged that the Conference compromise upon the word "contracts" reflects a desire to use one word to cover both suits between employers and unions, and suits between unions. But it seems obvious that, had Congress intended any limiting differentiation, this would have been accomplished by retaining the Senate bill's phrasing for agreements between employers and
unions and then providing specifically for the application of the statute to "contracts between any such labor organizations." Third. A 1959 enactment, § 8(f), [ Footnote 11 ] explicitly contemplates contracts that would not fit respondents' concept of "collective bargaining agreements." It authorizes contracting with unions that represent persons not yet even hired by the employer. Such a contract might cover only hiring procedures, and not wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Nothing supports the improbable congressional intent that the federal courts be closed to such contracts.
Furthermore, the statute's purpose would be defeated by excluding such contracts from "contracts" cognizable under § 301(a). See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 . If this kind of strike settlement were not enforceable under § 301(a), responsible and stable labor relations would suffer, and the attainment of the labor policy objective of minimizing disruption of interstate commerce would be made more difficult. It is no answer that, in a particular case, the agreement might be enforceable in state courts; a main goal of § 301 was precisely to end "checkerboard jurisdiction," Seymour v. Schneckloth, 368 U. S. 351 , at 368 U. S. 358 . See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra.
Lastly, legislative history refutes the argument that Congress intended to omit agreements of the kind in suit from "contracts" falling within the purview of § 301(a). [ Footnote 12 ]
We need not decide whether or not this strike settlement agreement is a "collective bargaining agreement" to hold, as we do, that it is a "contract" for purposes of § 301(a). "Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined from the connection in which it appears." J.I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332 , 321 U. S. 334 . It is enough that this is clearly an agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them. It came into being as a means satisfactory to both sides for terminating a protracted strike and labor dispute. Its terms affect the working conditions of the employees of both respondents. It effected the end of picketing and resort by the labor organizations to other economic weapons, and restored strikers to their jobs. It resolved a controversy arising out of, and importantly and directly affecting, the employment relationship. Plainly, it falls within § 301(a).
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 , 353 U. S. 455 .
unions as exclusive bargaining agents. The question is only whether "Labor organization representing employees" in § 301(a) has a meaning different from "labor organization which represents employees" in § 301(b). In United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S. 299 , we rejected the argument that § 301(b) was limited to majority representatives. Neither the words, purpose, nor history of the statute suggests any reason for a different construction of the virtually identical words of subsection (a). Nor can "labor organization representing employees" in § 301(a) be read as differing from "any such labor organizations" in that subsection's very next phrase, and plainly, in suits between labor organizations, their right to recognition as exclusive representatives vis-a-vis employers has no relevance whatever.
"Members only" contracts have long been recognized. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197 . Had Congress thought that there was any merit in limiting federal jurisdiction to suits on contracts with exclusive bargaining agents, we might have expected Congress explicitly so to provide, for example, by enacting that § 301(a) should be read with § 9(a). Compare § 8(a)(3), § 8(a)(5), § 8(b)(3), § 8(b)(4), § 8(d). Moreover, § 8(f), the 1959 amendment considered supra, p. 369 U. S. 27 , contemplates contracting with unions that would not represent a majority. Lastly, if the federal courts' jurisdiction under § 301(a) required a preliminary determination of the representative status of the labor organization involved, potential conflict with the National Labor Relations Board would be increased, cf. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 18 ; Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, and litigation would be much hindered.
Respondents claim that the cause is moot, since, after the commencement of this action, the petitioners merged with Local 954 of the same International Union to form a new Local 954. Petitioners deny mootness, and move to add or substitute Local 954 as a party. The facts of the merger make this case indistinguishable from De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144 ; see also Labor Board v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U. S. 477 . We therefore hold that the case is not moot, and the petitioners' motion to add Local 954 as a party is granted.
See 1 and 2 N.L.R.B., supra, n 9, at 94, 151, 221, 279, 299, 336-367, 399-400, 409, 421-424, 436, 475 ( see id. at 441), 569-570, 873, 927, 993, 1013, 1014, 1037, 1043, 1044, 1065-1066, 1074, 1076, 1078, 1118, 1123-1124, 1128, 1133, 1145-1146, 1150, 1166, 1208, 1325, 1342-1343, 1446, 1456, 1461, 1483, 1488, 1497, 1524, 1539, 1543, 1557-1558, 1619, 1626, 1654. None of the many references to "collective bargaining contracts" evinces a consideration of the meaning or scope of that phrase.