Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/641/1354/25674/
Timestamp: 2020-07-13 21:55:45
Document Index: 725034614

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 411', '§ 921', '§ 402', '§ 902', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 921', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 410', '§ 902']

Lauretta L. Dobbins, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 641 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1981 › Lauretta L. Dobbins, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servic...
Lauretta L. Dobbins, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services,defendant-appellee, 641 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 641 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) Argued and Submitted Sept. 9, 1980. Decided April 20, 1981
Elbert Dobbins was a northern Alabama coal miner. He married the plaintiff-appellant in 1917. One morning in June, 1926, he was killed at the mine. He had been seated on tracks upon which loaded coal hoppers traveled, and was crushed when he could not scramble to safety from an onrushing coal car. Mrs. Dobbins, a seventy-nine year old widow who has never remarried, now seeks widow's benefits under the Act. §§ 411(a) and 412(a) (2) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(a) and 922(a) (2). Mrs. Dobbins would be eligible for benefits if at the time of her husband's death, he was "totally disabled," as defined by the Act, from pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis, known to laymen as black lung, is a chronic dust-caused malady which ultimately creates a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. § 402(b) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 902(b), 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(o).
In Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859, 93 S. Ct. 144, 34 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1972), the standard of review4 to be applied was stated:
The Supreme Court has held that "substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 216, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938), quoted in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971).
Recognizing that hard medical evidence would often be lacking, particularly where the miner had died some time ago, the Secretary created several presumptions of impairment which would entitle a claimant to recover benefits. One such presumption arises when it is shown that the miner has worked the requisite number of years in the mines, 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) (3) and (4), and proof is shown that the miner suffered from a totally disabling chronic respiratory impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) (1).
Mrs. Dobbins was able to establish that her husband satisfied the requirement of time in service to satisfy the first portion of this presumption. 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) (3) requires fifteen years' service in the mines. The ALJ apparently had some doubt as to whether this fifteen year provision was satisfied. A statement of the U. S. Steel Corporation disclosed that the deceased miner had worked at least 11 years in its mines. This was supplemented by the written affidavits already discussed. These affidavits indicate Mr. Dobbins began work in the mines at age thirteen or fifteen, and worked there until his death approximately twenty-five years later, albeit sporadically near the end of his life. The ALJ presented no further findings as to whether these affidavits were accepted or refuted. Reading the record as a whole, the Appeals Council conceded this longevity issue in its decision.5
U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2305, 2315 (1972) (emphasis added). The spirit of the legislation requires us to resolve doubts in favor of the miner's family. Where the events in question took place so long ago, proof may reasonably depend not only on company records, but upon lay testimony. Karpovich v. Mathews, 426 F. Supp. 1316, 1317 (E.D. Pa. 1977). While these affidavits and her lay testimony may well be insufficient when records exist from which dispositive proof can be advanced, that is not the case here.
For similar reasons, we find that Mr. Dobbins was suffering from a chronic respiratory impairment. The available evidence indicates that he was suffering from such a condition, or at least a "severe lung impairment," 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) (4), based on the testimony previously discussed. This case bears a striking resemblance to Lloyd v. Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1976), where the Secretary's determination that the plaintiff's lay testimony did not establish total disability was reversed. There, as here, the miner was killed by an accident, not pneumoconiosis, and was working in some capacity near the time of his death. The plaintiff in that case and her sister presented lay testimony regarding the deceased miner's physical condition during the last years of his life. They indicated that he exhibited the classic symptoms of miner's asthma, evidence similar to that presented here. In evaluating the testimony, the court stated:
413 F. Supp. at 1164-65 (emphasis added).
That is the crux of this case: the Administrative Law Judge, in his own words, found the plaintiff's evidence to be "not convincing" on the issue of total disability. He gave no reason for disbelieving the testimony of the plaintiff or her sister, nor did he confront them at the hearing with his skepticism and give them an opportunity to refute his doubts or to explain away what the Secretary now characterizes as "conflicts" in the evidence. An Administrative Law Judge is not required to believe the testimony of interested witnesses, even if not contradicted, Rennar v. Weinberger, 399 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (E.D.Okl.1975), but he has a correlative duty to make a specific finding of fact to that effect, Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931, 95 S. Ct. 1133, 43 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1975). He also has an obligation, in this non-adversary proceeding, to solicit testimony or steer the claimant to do so, if need be, in order to clarify the record on critical points.
413 F. Supp. at 1166-67 (footnote omitted).
413 F. Supp. at 1167.
A finding of total disability can be made upon medical evidence which is not available here.6 Instead, plaintiff had the burden of proving that due to pneumoconiosis the deceased's work in the mines did not constitute comparable and gainful work. This can be proven by declining earnings and poor job performance, as well as sporadic work activity on the part of the victim. 20 C.F.R. § 410.412(b) (1). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.422(c) and 410.426(a). That a miner was working in some capacity at the time of his death does not alone decide the issue of whether he was totally disabled. Although physically weakened, miners often struggle on to support their families. Congress clearly intended to benefit the survivors of miners who died while working:
Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972)
20 C.F.R. 410.414(b) (4) allows miners who worked "many years," but did not reach the fifteen year requirement established by (b) (3), to receive the presumption of impairment if he suffered from a "severe lung impairment." Clearly, Mr. Dobbins met this requirement even if he had only worked at the U.S. Steel Corporation mine
Section 411(c) (3) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (3) and 20 C.F.R. § 410.418 allows for an irrebuttable presumption of disability if "complicated pneumoconiosis" is clearly diagnosed. Obviously, that is inapplicable in this case. Nor can the medical presumption in 20 C.F.R. § 410.490, or the medical tests at 20 C.F.R. § 410.424 be applied here
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 97
30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1) (B) (i).
As a general rule, appellate courts will apply changes in laws that come into effect after an initial judgment, but before an appeal is decided. In fact, this presumption applies unless there is a clear indication to the contrary in the legislation, or when it becomes necessary to avoid manifest injustice. United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L. Ed. 103 (1801); Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S. Ct. 2006, 40 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1974).