Source: http://openjurist.org/971/f2d/1206/united-states-v-chalkias
Timestamp: 2013-12-05 06:26:07
Document Index: 370962075

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161', '§ 3161']

971 F2d 1206 United States v. Chalkias | OpenJurist
971 F. 2d 1206 - United States v. Chalkias	Home971 f2d 1206 united states v. chalkias
971 F2d 1206 United States v. Chalkias 971 F.2d 1206
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Elizabeth CHALKIAS (91-3528); Hendrick Gil (91-3783); andMercedes Rodriguez (91-3773), Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 91-3528, 91-3773, 91-3783.
Submitted and Argued April 7, 1992.Decided July 30, 1992.Certiorari Denied in No. 91-3773,Oct. 13, 1992. See 113 S.Ct. 351.
Bradley D. Barbin (briefed and argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Columbus, Ohio, for U.S.
Steven S. Nolder (briefed and argued), Columbus, Ohio, for Mercedes Rodriguez.
Dennis C. Belli (argued and briefed), Columbus, Ohio, for Hendrick Antonio Gil.
Michael T. Gunner (briefed), Gunner & Banchefsky, Hilliard, Ohio, for Elizabeth S. Chalkias.
Before: MARTIN and RYAN, Circuit Judges; and WILHOIT, District Judge.*
Defendant Hendrick Gil appeals his jury convictions and sentences for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and traveling in interstate commerce to carry on a business enterprise involving cocaine. Defendant Mercedes Rodriguez appeals the sentences imposed upon her jury convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine, distribution of over 500 grams of cocaine, and maintaining a residence for the unlawful storage and distribution of cocaine. Defendant Elizabeth Chalkias appeals the sentence imposed pursuant to her plea of guilty for maintaining a residence for the unlawful storage and distribution of cocaine. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
In 1990, the Columbus, Ohio Police Department Narcotics Bureau and the Franklin County, Ohio Sheriff's Department Special Investigations Bureau began investigating a suspected cocaine pipeline between New York City and Columbus. The investigation was soon joined by the Drug Enforcement Administration and the United States Attorney's Office. As the investigation progressed, the evidence suggested that a New Yorker named Hendrick Gil was the ringleader. A sealed federal criminal complaint was prepared against Gil alleging conspiracy to distribute cocaine and on November 7, 1990, Gil was arrested pursuant to the complaint. On the same day, Elizabeth Chalkias was interviewed at a hotel room that investigators had determined was being utilized by Gil. Traces of cocaine and $1,800.00 in cash were found in the hotel room. Subsequently, Chalkias began cooperating with investigators. It was the theory of the United States at trial that Chalkias was a woman who had been "corrupted" by Gil into assisting with his drug activities.
Based in part on information provided by Chalkias, a Federal Grand Jury returned a fifteen-count indictment against seventeen defendants, including Gil, Chalkias and Mercedes Rodriguez, Gil's cousin and a suspected drug courier. Gil was named in seven counts of the indictment, Rodriguez in three and Chalkias in four. In exchange for an agreement by the United States not to prosecute her further, Chalkias pled guilty to one count of maintaining a residence for the unlawful storage and distribution of cocaine. Gil and Rodriguez pled not guilty to all counts and went to trial.
On April 29, 1991, after an eleven day trial, the jury found Gil guilty of four of the seven counts in which he was named. During the course of the trial, one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of distribution of cocaine were dismissed against Gil and the jury found Gil not guilty on another count of possession with intent to distribute. Rodriguez was found guilty on all counts of which she was charged.
Gil was sentenced to two 300 month terms of imprisonment upon the conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise counts, a 240 month term upon the count of possession with intent to distribute, and a sixty month term upon the count of traveling in interstate commerce, to be served concurrently. Rodriguez was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment on each of the counts of her conviction, to be served concurrently. Chalkias was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment.
II. Alleged Trial Errors:
Gil alleges that the indictment against him should have been dismissed by the District Court for failure to comply with the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Section 3161(c)(1) of this Act requires that a defendant be tried within seventy days from the later of the filing date of the information or indictment, or the date the defendant first appears before a judicial officer of the court in which the charges are pending. The seventy day deadline for trial is not absolute. Under § 3161(h)(1)-(9), certain delays are "excluded in computing the time within which ... the trial of any such offense must commence." "Excludable delays" include a delay resulting from pretrial motions, § 3161(h)(1)(F), delay of up to thirty days during which time any proceeding concerning the defendant is under advisement by the court, § 3161(h)(1)(J), delay resulting from the joinder for trial with a co-defendant whose time for trial has not run, § 3161(h)(7), and delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on the basis that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the need for a speedy trial, § 3161(h)(8)(A).
On December 14, 1990, Gil was arraigned, yet his trial did not commence until April 15, 1991, 122 days later. Based on this delay, Gil alleged a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The District Court found that all the days between December 15, 1990 and April 15, 1992 were excludable, and the motion was denied. Gil appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.
It is undisputed that the first day of the seventy day Speedy Trial period was December 15, 1991. United States v. Blackmon, 874 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 859, 110 S.Ct. 168, 107 L.Ed.2d 125 (1989); United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 326 (6th Cir.1988). The District Court recognized that on November 21, 1990, Gil filed a motion for discovery, on January 2, 1991 he filed a motion to compel discovery, and on January 18, 1991, he filed a motion for severance. The United States responded to these motions on January 30, 1991, at which time the matters stood fully submitted and were taken under advisement by the District Court.1 Pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(F) of the Speedy Trial Act, the District Court excluded all the days between November 21, 1990 and January 30, 1991 as delay resulting from pretrial motions.
Gil argues that a motion for discovery is not a pre-trial motion within the meaning of the Speedy Trial Act because Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contemplates extra-judicial discovery. The only time an actual motion is required, says Gil, is if the government fails to comply with a defendant's discovery request. The implied conclusion of Gil's argument is that his discovery "motions" were not formal motions, but rather were discovery requests directed to the United States, and thus, those motions did not create excludable delay.
This is not a new argument before the Court. In Mentz, the defendant made a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The United States filed no objection to the motion and the District Court did not rule on the motion until the first day of the trial. We found that the District Court had treated the motion merely as a pro forma request for discovery directed at the government, and we concluded that the motion did not "toll the speedy trial clock" under § 3161(h)(1)(F). Mentz, 840 F.2d at 329.
The circumstances in Mentz do not exist in the present case. Gil's two motions for discovery elicited a response from the United States and, on March 1, 1991, a ruling from the District Court. It is clear that neither the United States nor the District Court treated Gil's motions as requests directed toward the government, but rather as full-fledged motions that required disposition well in advance of the trial date.
In such situations, § 3161(h)(1)(F) allows the exclusion of "all time that is consumed in placing the trial court in a position to dispose of a motion." Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 331, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 1877, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). Section 3161(h)(1)(F) is not predicated on the propriety of a motion under the criminal discovery rules. Whether Gil's motions were, in fact proper, is now irrelevant. It would be improper manipulation of the Speedy Trial Act to allow Gil to file two "motions" which elicited a response and a ruling, and then claim on appeal that for purposes of the Act, these "motions" should not have been treated as such.
In the alternative, Gil argues that the delay allegedly caused by the government in providing discovery, which in turn caused him to file the motions for discovery, should not inure to the government's benefit by creating an excludable delay. However, it was necessary for the District Court to exclude days from the Speedy Trial period only to facilitate the continuance of the originally scheduled trial date. The trial date was continued, not at the request of the government, but at the request of Gil's co-defendants. Any exclusion which allowed the trial to be continued inured to the benefit of those requesting the continuance, and not to the benefit of the United States. We reject Gil's arguments and conclude that the days from December 15, 1990 through January 30, 1991 were properly excluded.
The District Court went on to exclude the days from January 30, 1991 through March 1, 1991 pursuant to § 3161(h)(1)(J), as delay during which Gil's motions were taken under advisement. The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to "exclude automatically" the thirty days after a motion is taken under advisement by a District Court. Henderson, 476 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. at 1877. We therefore find that this period was properly excluded.
The last co-defendant to be arrested in this case, Garret Boyer, was arraigned on January 4, 1991. Shortly after his arraignment, Boyer and three other co-defendants moved for a continuance of the trial date, which was at that time scheduled for February 4, 1991. The motion was in part based on co-defendants' need for additional time to prepare for trial. In accord with the "ends of justice" exception of § 3161(h)(8), the District Court concluded that the need for a continuance outweighed the interests of a speedy trial. Thus, the continuance was granted and all the days from February 4, 1991 through April 15, 1991 were excluded from the Speedy Trial calculation.
When a District Court excludes the period that a trial is continued pursuant to the "ends of justice" exclusion, we examine whether the District Court set forth, on the record, proper justification for the continuance. United States v. Crane, 776 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Richmond, 735 F.2d 208, 214-215 (6th Cir.1984). Under § 3161(h)(8)(B), the Act specifies certain factors that a District Court may, and may not consider in making the determination of whether to grant an ends of justice continuance.
Upon granting the continuance requested by Gil's co-defendants, the District Court recognized the complexity of the case, the fact that numerous defendants and counts were involved, the prior delay in pre-trial discovery, and the fact that counsel for one of the defendants had been retained only one week before the originally scheduled trial date. These findings were made a part of the record in
the District Court's order granting