Source: http://www.nelfonline.org/docket/category/scotus
Timestamp: 2018-07-16 00:38:53
Document Index: 673813352

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1681', '§ 2601', '§ 1640', '§ 1692', '§ 227', '§ 1132', '§ 2710', '§ 2000', '§ 2000', '§ 1614', '§ 1', '§ 3287', '§ 3731', '§ 399', '§ 399', '§ 399']

Category: SCOTUS - New England Legal Foundation
Arguing that Article III’s “Case or Controversy” Requirement bars a plaintiff from suing in federal court for the technical violation of a statute that has not caused any concrete harm.
​This case was a putative consumer class action pending before the United States Supreme Court on the merits. The plaintiff and putative class representative, Thomas Robins, sought statutory damages in federal court under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”), for a technical violation of that statute that has not caused him any harm. (In particular, Robins alleged that the defendant, Spokeo, Inc., a website operator that provides users with information about other individuals, published false (but favorable!) information about him, such as by misstating his educational level and financial status.) FCRA permits recovery for the bare violation of a statutory right. The case thus raises a constitutional separation of powers issue long familiar to NELF: does Article III of the United States Constitution, which limits the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies,” confer standing on a plaintiff who alleges a violation of a federal statute but who does not allege any resulting injury? Can Congress create standing in the federal courts that otherwise would not exist by legislative fiat? The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement as mandating “injury in fact”—i.e., a “concrete” and “particularized” harm that is “actual or imminent.” Clapper v. Amnesty Internat’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). Despite this clear constitutional requirement of injury in fact, the Ninth Circuit in this case denied the motion to dismiss of defendant Spokeo, Inc., a website operator that provides users with information about other individuals. The lower court concluded that, because FCRA allows a plaintiff to recover statutory damages for the bare violation of a statutory right, the statutory violation is itself an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III.
Notably, NELF briefed the same standing issue in the Supreme Court in 2011, in Edwards v. First American Corp., a case also arising from the Ninth Circuit. (And the Ninth Circuit in this case has based its decision primarily on its Edwards decision.) In Edwards, the Supreme Court granted certiorari but then dismissed the case without reaching the merits, on the basis that certiorari had been improvidently granted. While the Court did not explain its decision, it may have been due to the unique procedural posture of that case. Therefore, this pressing issue of Article III standing, in the absence of any actual injury, remains unresolved. (NELF has also briefed the same issue at the state statutory level, in particular under Mass. G. L. 93A before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent–A–Car Co., 445 Mass. 790 (2006)). Moreover, there are several federal statutes, like the ones at issue here and in Edwards (the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.), that allow plaintiffs to recover statutory damages (and reasonable attorney’s fees) without proving any concrete harm.* Therefore, the issue of Article III standing is of great significance to businesses in our region and the country as a whole. A business’s broad exposure to liability for statutory damages and attorney’s fees under these numerous laws is compounded by the class action mechanism, which is the procedural vehicle of choice for many consumers and employees (and their attorneys) suing under such statutes. Putative class members arguably need only show the bare, classwide violation of a common statutory right to obtain class certification. Businesses are thereby exposed to potential liability for vast, aggregated sums of statutory damages and high attorney’s fees, often resulting in a large settlement on a claim in which no class member has been injured.
NELF, joined by Associated Industries of Massachusetts, argued, on behalf of Spokeo, that Article III requires dismissal of Robins’ complaint because it fails to allege any injury in fact. “Injury in law” under FCRA, based on the bare violation of a statutory right, cannot satisfy Article III’s requirement that the violation must cause some concrete harm. Congress cannot create an injury in fact. It can only provide a private remedy to redress an injury in fact. Therefore, the injury-in-fact requirement under Article III is not satisfied merely because Congress has authorized an award of statutory damages for the violation of a statutory right. A federal court must always exercise independent review of a federal statute, along with the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint invoking that statute, to determine whether the plaintiff has identified a concrete harm resulting from the violation of a statute. In short, the Article III inquiry to determine an injury in fact “has nothing to do with the text of the statute relied upon.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). As the Court has emphasized, “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing . . . .” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997). Simply put, statutory standing to sue in federal court does not automatically create constitutional standing under Article III. In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit and other federal circuit courts have apparently disregarded this key precedent and have also misinterpreted other Supreme Court precedent as equating statutory standing with Article III standing. Certiorari should therefore be granted to resolve the confusion among the lower courts on this crucial issue and clarify that injury in fact is not coextensive with injury in law.
NELF initially filed an amicus brief supporting the defendant, Spokoe Inc’s petition for certiorari. When certiorari was granted in April, 2015, NELF filed an amicus brief on the merits in the case. On Monday, May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision, agreeing with NELF, 6-2, that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had not demonstrated a concrete injury. Rather than dismissing the case, however, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower courts for a determination whether the plaintiff could demonstrate a concrete injury resulting from the alleged breach of the FCRA.
Although the Supreme Court did not dismiss the case outright, as NELF had argued it should do, this is nonetheless this is a victory for the principles underlying NELF’s brief—namely separation of powers and the federal judiciary’s exclusive authority to determine whether standing exists. In short, Congress cannot create standing in federal court for the mere breach of a statutory requirement that Congress has enacted.
*See, e.g., the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B)); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B); the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); and the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1).
Supporting the Lower Court’s Decision that, in a Constructive Discharge Case Brought Under Title VII, the Administrative Filing Period Begins to Run With the Last Allegedly Wrongful Act By the Employer, Not When the Employee Chooses to Resign.
​The question presented in this case was, in a claim of constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., does the administrative limitations period begin with the last discriminatory or retaliatory act of the employer before the employee resigns, or does it begin instead with the employee’s resignation? A constructive discharge claim can be understood as “an aggravated case” of discrimination or retaliation, in which the employee resigns and then alleges that the employer committed acts of discrimination or retaliation that were so severe that the employee reasonably felt compelled to quit. For employers, and thus of great importance to many of NELF’s supporters, the crucial difference between a constructive discharge claim and the underlying claim of discrimination or retaliation is remedial. The prevailing employee can recover not only for the employer’s discrimination or retaliation but also for his own act of resigning, as if it were a termination for damages purposes. Thus, the prevailing constructive-discharge plaintiff can recover back pay, and possibly front pay, along with any other (economic and non-economic) damages attributable to the employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, and punitive damages.
An employee suing under Title VII for any claim must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing or initiating contact with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within a specified period of time. Failure to do so will most likely bar the employee from suing in court. In particular, a private-sector employee must file his charge of discrimination or retaliation with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A federal employee, such as the employee in this case, must initiate contact with an EEOC counselor for potential settlement “within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (emphasis added). The parties in this case have focused on the italicized language as the applicable regulatory provision. As with a statute of limitations, the purpose of this filing deadline is to require employees to act promptly in enforcing their rights, to protect employers from having to defend old claims, and to provide employers with certainty and repose that, after a date certain, they will not have to defend their actions in litigation.
NELF argued, in its amicus brief on the merits, that in a claim for constructive discharge, as with most any other claim of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, the administrative limitations period begins with the employer’s last discriminatory or retaliatory act, not with the employee’s resignation in response to that conduct. This is required by the plain language of the limitations provision applicable to federal-sector employees under the EEOC regulation, and by Title VII’s general provision applicable to both private-sector and state employees. And the Court has already interpreted Title VII’s limitations provision as focusing on the employer’s challenged conduct, not on the injurious consequences to the employee. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). Ricks should apply here because the relevant language in the EEOC regulation is synonymous with Title VII’s limitations provision, and because neither provision treats constructive discharge claims differently from the “traditional” discrimination claim discussed in Ricks.
Moreover, NELF pointed out that the Court has observed that Congress would have been well aware of constructive discharge claims when it enacted Title VII. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141-42 (2004). And yet Congress made no special allowance concerning the timeliness of constructive discharge claims. Therefore, Congress should be deemed to have rejected any differential treatment for the filing of constructive discharge claims by private-sector and state employees under Title VII. And the EEOC, in turn, should be deemed to have followed suit with its similarly worded provision for federal employees.
Suders also held that, in a constructive discharge claim under Title VII, the employee’s decision to resign is not an action imputed to the employer. Instead, the resignation remains a separate act of the employee. Therefore, the resignation is not an “alleged unlawful employment practice” under Title VII or a “matter alleged to be discriminatory” under the EEOC regulation. While the employer may indeed be liable in damages for the employee’s resignation as if it were a termination, Suders carefully distinguished the employer’s monetary liability from any vicarious liability for the employee’s resignation. The employer is liable in damages for the employee’s reasonable resignation simply because the resignation is a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s proven wrongful conduct.
After all, Suders explained that a constructive discharge claim is merely “an aggravated case” of discrimination or retaliation. A constructive discharge claim is a dependent claim that rides “piggyback” on the underlying claim of discrimination or retaliation. The only difference between a constructive discharge claim and the underlying claim of discrimination or retaliation is the severity of the employer’s wrongful conduct, and hence the applicable measure of damages. There is no reason, therefore, why the limitations period should be any different for the constructive discharge claim merely because the employee is seeking additional remedies that would not apply in the underlying claim of discrimination or retaliation.
Finally, Suders teaches that a constructive discharge claim is an objective inquiry, asking whether the employee’s resignation was a reasonable response to the employer’s challenged conduct. The facts necessary to determine such reasonableness are generally established once the employer has taken official action against the employee, or when a supervisor or co-worker has committed the last in a series of related acts of harassment against the employee before he resigns. At that moment in time, the employee is most likely on notice that resignation may be the only reasonable response to the employer’s allegedly severe conduct. Therefore, this inquiry focuses on the severity of the employer’s disputed conduct. It does not concern the particular timing of each employee’s resignation. Accordingly, the employer’s conduct should begin the limitations period, not the employee’s subsequent resignation in response to that conduct.
On May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision. Disagreeing with NELF’s conclusion, the Court held that because “the matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive discharge claim is an employee’s resignation, the limitations period for such actions begins running only after an employee resigns. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which, while he agreed with the Court’s conclusion, he pointed out the problems with the majority’s conclusion and suggested a slightly different framework of analysis. Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter.
Directv, Inc. v. Imburgia, et al.
Arguing that, in an Arbitration Agreement Falling Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a Reference to State Law with Respect to the Enforceability of a Class Arbitration Waiver Does Not Displace the Federal Arbitration Act’s Mandate to Enforce Such a Waiver.
At issue in this Supreme Court case was whether, in an arbitration agreement falling under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (“FAA”), a reference to state law with respect to the enforceability of a class arbitration waiver displaced the FAA’s mandate to enforce such a waiver.The arbitration provision at issue was in satellite television provider DIRECTV’s customer agreement in 2007 with Amy Imburgia. The agreement required binding arbitration of any future disputes and also prohibited class-wide procedures. However, while the arbitration provision recited that it “shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” it also stated that enforcement of the class action waiver, and indeed of the entire arbitration provision, would depend on the law of each customer’s state: “If, however, the law of your state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this entire [arbitration agreement] is unenforceable.” Id. (emphasis added).
The California Court of Appeals interpreted “the law of your state” as referring to the law of California without regard to the preemptive force of federal law and read the 2007 contractual language as intending to oust the FAA’s mandate to enforce the class arbitration waiver, as announced four years later in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). On that basis, the California court invalidated the class arbitration waiver under the California law that bars class action waivers in consumer actions and, giving effect to the arbitration agreement’s so-called “jettison” clause, voided the entire arbitration agreement, in essence forcing the parties to litigate in court.
From NELF’s point of view, the case raised one central issue: Did the parties to the disputed agreement intend to elevate state law over the FAA on the subject of class arbitration waivers? NELF argued that reference to “the law of your state” in the 2008 agreement was never intended to oust the FAA in favor of state law. Rather, it reflected the understanding, current in 2007, that, under the FAA, the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements was governed by state law. That is, the 2007 agreement was intended to comply with the FAA as then understood. This understanding, however, was dispelled by the Supreme Court in 2011 in Concepcion, which held that state law cannot impede the enforcement of class arbitration waivers under the FAA. NELF argued that, since “the law of your state” was not intended to oust the FAA, and since “the law of your state” cannot, after Concepcion, impede enforcement of the class arbitration waiver, DIRECTV’s motion to compel arbitration of Imburgia’s individual claims should have been allowed.
In its decision of December 14, 2015, a six-member majority of the Court agreed with NELF and enforced the class arbitration waiver, although for slightly different but nonetheless compelling reasons. In a skillful opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the FAA preempts the lower court’s opinion, which singles out arbitration agreements for unfavorable treatment and interprets “the law of your state” as referring presumptively to invalid state law. The Court explained that, since the FAA limits the states to applying general contract law principles to arbitration agreements, “the law of your state” must be interpreted under California general contract law. The Court observed that, as an empirical matter, California cases interpreting such contract language (along with cases from every other state) read “the law of your state” as referring presumptively to the valid law of a state. This means that “the law of your state” in this pre-Concepcion agreement evolves with the times and reflects any intervening changes made by a state Legislature, a state supreme court, or, as in this case, any pronouncements of controlling federal law by the Supreme Court under the Supremacy Clause, as announced in Concepcion.
Therefore, once the Court in Concepcion held that the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule (which had effectively invalidated all class arbitration waivers in California consumer form agreements and had required the availability of class arbitration), “the law of your state” no longer included the invalidated Discover Bank rule. Thus, the class arbitration waiver in the pre-Concepcion agreement at issue must be enforced under the FAA, and the jettison clause is never reached.
Notably, the Court explained that, while indeed the FAA allows parties to apply any body of law, even preempted state law, to their arbitration agreements, this is not what “the law of your state” means on its face. To override the presumptive meaning of “the law of your state,” then, parties would have to refer expressly to preempted state law in their arbitration agreements (an unlikely but nonetheless enforceable contract clause).
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. et al. v. United States ex. rel. Carter
Arguing the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act does not apply to civil qui tam claims brought under the False Claims Act
Note: In what we believe is a NELF first, during the hearing of this case on January 13, 2015, Supreme Court Associate Justice Sotomayor specifically referred to NELF’s amicus brief, when she asked the attorney for the Petitioner whether he was “adopting the argument of the New England [Legal] Foundation, the amic[us] brief?” Counsel indicated that this was the case.
In this case the Supreme Court considered whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (“Suspension Act”), a criminal code provision of the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), that suspends, during and for five years after times of armed conflict, the statute of limitations for “offenses involving [contractor] fraud . . . against the United States,” also applied to civil qui tam actions brought under the FCA. The FCA, first enacted during the Civil War, provides both criminal and civil remedies against federal government contractor fraud. On the civil side, the FCA encourages private whistleblowers (“relators”) to bring suit on behalf of the Government (“qui tam” actions); if successful, a civil qui tam plaintiff is awarded a share of the government’s damage award (between 15% and 30%). Such civil qui tam claims under the FCA are subject to a six-year limitations period. 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit in this case concluded that the Suspension Act applies to both criminal and civil claims of contractor fraud against the Government. Consequently, the lower court allowed the plaintiff-relator’s otherwise untimely qui tam FCA claim to proceed on the merits against defendants Halliburton Company, KBR, Inc., Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., and Service Employees International, Inc. (collectively “KBR”).
Since the vast majority of claims under the FCA are brought as civil claims initiated by qui tam plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit’s extension of the Suspension Act to civil as well as criminal cases under the FCA would likely have had enormous consequences for companies doing business with the federal government if it had been upheld by the Supreme Court.
NELF submitted an amicus brief in support of KBR, arguing that the Fourth Circuit had erred and showing, based on an extensive analysis of the Suspension Act’s legislative history, the source of its mistake. The lower court had misunderstood a crucial part of the Suspension Act’s statutory history. Prior versions of the Suspension Act, enacted in 1921 and 1942, had applied to offenses that were “now indictable under existing statutes.” I.e.,i.e, their coverage was retrospective only, applying to crimes, still timely, that had already occurred when those 1921 and 1942 statutes took effect. In 1944, however, Congress, made the Suspension Act prospective as well, by deleting the phrase “now indictable under existing statutes.” However, the Fourth Circuit, along with virtually every other court and commentator, misinterpreted this 1944 amendment. In particular, the lower court concluded that Congress’ removal of the phrase “now indictable” in 1944 expanded the meaning of the word “offenses” to include non-indictable, civil claims. NELF demonstrated compellingly that, to the contrary, when Congress removed the phrase “now indictable” in 1944, it simply extended the Suspension Act to future offenses of contractor fraud. (Congress also preserved other language in the 1944 Suspension Act to make it clear that the 1944 statute applied to past timely offenses as well.) By no means did the 1944 amendment affect in any way the exclusively criminal meaning of the word “offense.”
In its unanimous decision issued on May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court agreed with NELF’s arguments in the case. In an opinion that largely parallels NELF’s brief, the Court held that the Act only applies to criminal offenses under the FCA.
Minority Television Project, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.
Arguing that the Federal Statutory Ban on Paid Commercial Advertising on Public Television Stations Violates the First Amendment
At issue in this case, before the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, was whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution allows Congress to ban the broadcasting of paid commercial advertisements on public television, at 47 U.S.C. § 399b(a)(1) (“section 399b(a)(1)”). Federal law defines a commercial advertisement as a paid message that promotes the sale of goods or services by a for-profit entity. The petitioner, Minority Television Project, owns a small, independent public television station whose unique programming serves the multi-cultural, educational needs of underrepresented members of the community in the San Francisco Bay Area, such as African-Americans, individuals living with HIV/AIDS, and various neighborhoods in which English is a second language. The station has been unable to obtain any federal funding through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
In this case, the FCC had determined that the petitioner had violated the statutory ban on commercial advertising by airing corporate acknowledgements that the FCC found to be commercial advertisements. (Federal law permits the broadcasting of “enhanced” corporate acknowledgements.) Minority TV does not now dispute that these corporate acknowledgements were commercial advertisements under Congress’s and the FCC’s criteria. (It should be noted, however, that Minority TV, in compliance with the Public Broadcasting Act, did not interrupt regular programming when it aired these advertisements.) As a result, the FCC fined Minority TV $10,000. Minority paid the fine but also filed suit in federal district court for the Northern District of California, alleging that § 399b(a)(1) violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest in preserving the educational content of programming on public broadcast stations.
In its brief supporting Minority Television’s petition for certiorari, NELF argued that the Court should grant certiorari and decide that public television stations have a First Amendment right to broadcast paid commercial advertisements, subject to reasonable, content-neutral limits, to supplement the funding of their educational speech. The educational mission of an independent public station such as the petitioner could be endangered if that station is denied the right to seek additional revenue from the limited broadcasting of commercial advertisements.
NELF argued that § 399b(a)(1)) is a content-based and speaker-based restriction on protected speech that cannot survive scrutiny under the First Amendment. The FCC argues that the ban is necessary to preserve the educational content of programming on public television. But the Government’s fears are both implausible and impermissibly paternalistic. Indeed, this Court has held that the First Amendment rejects the rationale, offered here by the FCC, that the fundraising-related speech of a nonprofit corporation must be regulated for its own benefit. Moreover, the FCC has ignored the many obvious and fundamental differences between a for-profit, commercial station and a nonprofit, public station. These key differences would prevent public stations from abandoning their educational mission if they were allowed to supplement their revenues with commercial advertisements. The FCC has confused the commercial source of the funding with the non-commercial purpose and use of that funding --i.e., to assist in the broadcasting of educational programs that serve the needs of the community.
The FCC has also disregarded the fact that viewers contribute substantially to public television and, therefore, exert a strong influence over programming decisions. The FCC has further disregarded the uniquely charitable, non-commercial role assumed by public television’s corporate supporters. Corporations have long contributed to public television, even though they have never been allowed to promote their products or services as they would on commercial television. Clearly, corporations support public television because of its unique programs, and not because of the audience ratings or marketing opportunities that those programs may offer. Allowing commercial advertisements on public television would simply encourage current corporate supporters to contribute more money, and it could also attract new corporate support to public television. Finally, available empirical evidence, including the factual record in this case, shows that the limited use of commercial advertisements on public television has not influenced programming decisions.
Section 399b(a)(1) fails First Amendment scrutiny for the additional reason that the Government has drawn an arbitrary, content-based line between permissible, “enhanced” corporate underwriting statements and impermissible commercial advertisements. The FCC has allowed enhanced corporate underwriting statements for over thirty years. These statements closely resemble commercial advertisements because they are an implied promotion of a company’s products or services. And yet there is no indication whatsoever that resulting corporate contributions have exerted any commercializing influence on the programming content of public television.
It strains credulity to conclude that the mere addition of some expressly promotional language to these enhanced corporate underwriting statements would somehow transform public television into commercial television. To the contrary, permitting promotional language to enter these corporate statements could attract much-needed additional support for underfunded public stations, such as the petitioner, and allow them to fulfill their charitable mission.
The long use of enhanced corporate underwriting statements also defeats the FCC’s argument that commercial advertisements would cause viewers to abandon their support of public television. The available evidence indicates that viewer support has not diminished, and has actually increased, during the past 30 years of these corporate statements. Viewers would therefore be likely to tolerate the limited appearance of commercial advertisements as a necessary inconvenience for the funding of the programs that they value so highly on public television.
And, even if viewers reacted negatively to commercial advertisements, the First Amendment should permit public station managers to respond intelligently to the situation, such as by withdrawing the advertisements, reducing their frequency, or toning down their promotional content. Conversely, the First Amendment should prohibit the Government from substituting its judgment about the wisdom of commercial advertisements for that of public stations and their viewers. Free and robust debate on this public issue cannot take place with such governmental interference.
Finally, to the extent that the FCC has identified a substantial interest in regulating commercial advertisements on public television, the Government could implement less restrictive, content-neutral limits, rather than banning commercial advertisements altogether. Such reasonable restrictions would allow public stations to benefit from additional funding, while maintaining the educational purpose and character of public television. Such restrictions would also remove the Government from the undesirable role of evaluating the content of public broadcasters’ speech. For example, the Government could limit the percentage of a public station’s revenue that is derived from commercial advertisements, to preserve the current diversity of funding sources for public television.
Unfortunately, the Court denied certiorari on June 30, 2014.