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Perry Vs United States - Citation 96191 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Perry Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96191
Case Number 294 U.S. 330
Appellant Perry
perry v. united states - 294 u.s. 330 (1935) u.s. supreme court perry v. united states, 294 u.s. 330 (1935) perry v. united states no. 532 argued january 10, 11, 1935 decided february 18, 1935 * 294 u.s. 330 certificate from the court of claims syllabus 1. a provision in a government bond for payment of principal and interest "in united states gold coin of the present standard of value" must be fairly construed, and its reasonable import is an assurance by the government that the bondholder will not suffer loss through depreciation of the medium of payment. p. 294 u. s. 348 . 2. the joint resolution of june 5, 1933, insofar as it undertakes to nullify such gold clauses in obligations of the united states.....
Perry v. United States - 294 U.S. 330 (1935)
U.S. Supreme Court Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)
Decided February 18, 1935 *
1. A provision in a Government bond for payment of principal and interest "in United States gold coin of the present standard of value" must be fairly construed, and its reasonable import is an assurance by the Government that the bondholder will not suffer loss through depreciation of the medium of payment. P. 294 U. S. 348 .
2. The Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, insofar as it undertakes to nullify such gold clauses in obligations of the United States and provides that such obligations shall be discharged by payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts, is unconstitutional. P. 294 U. S. 349 .
3. Congress cannot use its power to regulate the value of money so as to invalidate the obligations which the Government has theretofore
4. There is a clear distinction between the power of Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority and a power in Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under its constitutional authority. P. 294 U. S. 350 .
5. By virtue of the power to borrow money "on the credit of the United States," Congress is authorized to pledge that credit as assurance of payment as stipulated -- as the highest assurance the Government can give -- its plighted faith. To say that Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge is to assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise, a pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and convenience of the pledgor. P. 294 U. S. 351 .
6. When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. P. 294 U. S. 352 .
7. The right to make binding obligations is a power of sovereignty. P. 294 U. S. 353 .
8. The sovereignty of the United States resides in the people, and Congress cannot invoke the sovereignty of the people to override their will as declared in the Constitution. P. 294 U. S. 353 .
9. The power given Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United States is unqualified and vital to the Government, and the binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit pledged. P. 294 U. S. 353 .
10. The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legality and binding character of its contracts. P. 294 U. S. 354 .
11. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, declaring that "The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned," is confirmatory of a fundamental principle, applying as well to bonds issued after, as to those issued before, the adoption of the Amendment, and the expression "validity of the public debt " embraces whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations. P. 294 U. S. 354 .
12. The holder of a Liberty Bond, which was issued when gold was in circulation and when the standard of value was the gold dollar of 25.8 grains, nine-tenths fine, and which promised payment in gold of that standard, claimed payment after the Government, pursuant to legislative authority, had withdrawn all gold coin
(a) The fact that the Government's repudiation of the gold clause of the bond is unconstitutional does not entitle the plaintiff to recover more than the loss he has actually suffered, and of which he may rightfully complain. P. 294 U. S. 354 .
(b) The Court of Claims has no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages. P. 294 U. S. 355 .
(c) The question of actual loss cannot be determined without considering the economic condition at the time when the Government offered to pay the face of the bond in legal tender currency. P. 294 U. S. 355 .
(d) Congress, by virtue of its power to deal with gold coin as a medium of exchange, was authorized to prohibit its export and limit its use in foreign exchange, and the restraint thus imposed upon holders of such coin was incident to their ownership of it, and gave them no cause of action. P. 294 U. S. 356 .
(e) The Court cannot say that the exercise of this power was arbitrary or capricious. P. 294 U. S. 356 .
(f) The holder of a bond of the United States, payable in gold coin of the former standard, so far as concerns the restraint upon the right to export the gold coin or to engage in transactions of foreign exchange, is in no better case than the holder of gold coin itself. P. 294 U. S. 356 .
(g) In assessing plaintiff's damages, if any, the equivalent in currency of the gold coin promised can be no more than the amount of money which the gold coin would be worth to the plaintiff for the purposes for which it could legally be used. P. 294 U. S. 357 .
(h) Foreign dealing being forbidden, save under license, and the domestic market being not free, but lawfully restricted by Congress,
valuation of the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins, and this would involve a consideration of the purchasing power of the currency dollars. P. 294 U. S. 357 .
(i) Plaintiff has not attempted to show that, in relation to buying power, he has sustained any loss; on the contrary, in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of the amount which he demands would appear to constitute not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense, but an unjustified enrichment. P. 294 U. S. 357 .
Response to questions certified by the Court of Claims in an action on a Liberty Loan Gold Bond.
Plaintiff brought suit as the owner of an obligation of the United States for $10,000, known as "Fourth Liberty Loan 4 1/4% Gold Bond of 1933-1938." This bond was issued pursuant to the Act of September 24, 1917, § 1 et seq. (40 Stat. 288), as amended, and Treasury Department circular No. 121 dated September 28, 1918. The bond
First. The Import of the Obligation. The bond in suit differs from an obligation of private parties, or of states or municipalities, whose contracts are necessarily made in subjection to the dominant power of the Congress. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., ante, p. 294 U. S. 240 . The bond now before us is an obligation of the United States. The terms of the bond are explicit. They were not only expressed in the bond itself, but they were definitely prescribed by the Congress. The Act of September 24, 1917, both in its original and amended form, authorized the moneys to be borrowed, and the bonds to be issued, "on the credit of the United States" in order to meet expenditures needed "for the national security and defense and other public purposes authorized by law." Section 1, 40 Stat. 288, as amended by Act April 4, 1918, § 1, 40 Stat. 503. The circular of the Treasury Department of September 28, 1918, to which the bond refers "for a statement of the further rights of the holders of bonds of said series" also provided that the principal and interest "are payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value."
This obligation must be fairly construed. The " present standard of value" stood in contradistinction to a lower standard of value. The promise obviously was intended to afford protection against loss. That protection was sought to be secured by setting up a standard or measure of the government's obligation. We think that the reasonable import of the promise is that it was intended
Second. The Binding Quality of the Obligation. The question is necessarily presented whether the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113, is a valid enactment so far as it applies to the obligations of the United States. The resolution declared that provisions requiring "payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency" were "against public policy," and provided that "every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein," shall be discharged "upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts." This enactment was expressly extended to obligations of the United States, and provisions for payment in gold, "contained in any law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United States," were repealed. [ Footnote 1 ]
We do not so read the Constitution. There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority
The binding quality of the obligations of the government was considered in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 , 99 U. S. 718 -719. The question before the Court in those cases was whether certain action was warranted by a reservation to the Congress of the right to amend the charter of a railroad company. While the particular action was sustained under this right of amendment, the Court took occasion to state emphatically the obligatory character of the contracts of the United States. The Court said:
"The United States are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a state or a municipality or a citizen. [ Footnote 2 ] "
When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference, said the Court in United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377, 40 U. S. 392 , except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent. See also The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 74 U. S. 675 ; Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389 , 91 U. S. 396 . In Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 , 292 U. S. 580 , with respect to an attempted abrogation by the Act of March 20, 1933, § 17, 48 Stat. 8, 11, of certain outstanding war risk insurance policies, which were contracts of the United States, the Court quoted with approval the statement in the Sinking Fund Cases, supra, and said:
The argument in favor of the Joint Resolution, as applied to government bonds, is in substance that the government cannot, by contract, restrict the exercise of a sovereign power. But the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty. [ Footnote 3 ] In the United States, sovereignty resides in the people, who act through the organs established by the Constitution. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 2 U. S. 471 ; Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 3 U. S. 93 ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 404 -405; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , 118 U. S. 370 . The Congress, as the instrumentality of sovereignty, is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. The powers conferred upon the Congress are harmonious. The Constitution gives to the Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, an unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity its very life may depend. The binding quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged. Having this power to authorize the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligations.
The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts. While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists, and, despite infirmities of procedure, remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign. Lynch v. United States, supra, pp. 292 U. S. 580 -582.
Third. The Question of Damages. In this view of the binding quality of the government's obligations, we come to the question as to the plaintiff's right to recover damages. That is a distinct question. Because the government is not at liberty to alter or repudiate its obligations, it does not follow that the claim advanced by the plaintiff should be sustained. The action is for breach of contract. As a remedy for breach, plaintiff can recover no more than the loss he has suffered, and of which he may rightfully complain. He is not entitled to be enriched.
Plaintiff seeks judgment for $16,931.25, in present legal tender currency, on his bond for $10,000. The question is whether he has shown damage to that extent, or any actual damage, as the Court of Claims has no authority to entertain an action for nominal damages. Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331, 74 U. S. 338 ; Marion & R.V. Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280 , 270 U. S. 282 ; Nortz v. United States, ante, p. 294 U. S. 317 .
Plaintiff computes his claim for $16,931.25 by taking the weight of the gold dollar as fixed by the President's proclamation of January 31, 1934, under the Act of May 12, 1933 (48 Stat. 52, 53), as amended by the Act of January 30, 1934 (48 Stat. 342) -- that is, at 15 5/21 grains nine-tenths fine, as compared with the weight fixed by the Act of March 14, 1900 (31 Stat. 46) -- or 25.8 grains nine-tenths fine. But the change in the weight of the gold dollar did not necessarily cause loss to the plaintiff of the amount claimed. The question of actual loss cannot fairly be determined without considering the economic situation at the time the government offered to pay him the $10,000, the face of his bond, in legal tender currency. The case is not the same as if gold coin had remained in circulation. That was the situation at the time of the decisions under the legal tender acts of 1862 and 1863. Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 74 U. S. 251 ; Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 79 U. S. 695 ; Thompson v. Butler, 95 U. S. 694 , 95 U. S. 696 -697. Before the change in the weight of the gold dollar in 1934, gold coin had been withdrawn from circulation. [ Footnote 4 ] The Congress had authorized the prohibition of the exportation of gold coin and the placing of restrictions upon transactions in foreign exchange. Acts of March 9, 1933,
48 Stat. 1; January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 337. Such dealings could be had only for limited purposes and under license. Executive Orders of April 20, 1933, August 28, 1933, and January 15, 1934. That action the Congress was entitled to take by virtue of its authority to deal with gold coin as a medium of exchange. And the restraint thus imposed upon holders of gold coin was incident to the limitations which inhered in their ownership of that coin and gave them no right of action. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302 , 218 U. S. 310 -311. The Court said in that case:
The same reasoning is applicable to the imposition of restraints upon transactions in foreign exchange. We cannot say, in view of the conditions that existed, that the Congress having this power exercised it arbitrarily or capriciously. And the holder of an obligation, or bond, of the United States, payable in gold coin of the former standard, so far as the restraint upon the right to export gold coin or to engage in transactions in foreign exchange is concerned, was in no better case than the holder of gold coin itself.
Plaintiff demands the "equivalent" in currency of the gold coin promised. But "equivalent" cannot mean more than the amount of money which the promised gold coin would be worth to the bondholder for the purposes for which it could legally be used. That equivalence or worth could not properly be ascertained save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress had lawfully established. In the domestic transactions to which the plaintiff was limited, in the absence of special license, determination of the value of the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established parity of all currency and coins. And, in view of the control of export and foreign exchange, and the restricted domestic use, the question of value, in relation to transactions legally available to the plaintiff, would require a consideration of the purchasing power of the dollars which the plaintiff could have received. Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that, in relation to buying power, he has sustained any loss whatever. On
Mr. Justice Strong, who had written the opinion of the majority of the Court in the legal tender cases ( Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457), dissented in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. p. 99 U. S. 731 , because he thought that the action of the Congress was not consistent with the government's engagement, and hence was a transgression of legislative power. And, with respect to the sanctity of the contracts of the government, he quoted, with approval, the opinion of Mr. Hamilton in his communication to the Senate of January 20, 1795 (citing 3 Hamilton's Works, 518, 519), that
I do not doubt that the gold clause in the government bonds, like that in the private contracts just considered, calls for the payment of value in money, measured by a stated number of gold dollars of the standard defined in the clause, Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Belge d'Electricite [1934] A.C. 161, 170-173; Serbian and Brazilian Bond Cases, P.C.I.J., series A. Nos. 20, 21, pp. 32-34, 109-119. In the absence of any further exertion of governmental power, that obligation plainly could not be
While the government's refusal to make the stipulated payment is a measure taken in the exercise of that power, this does not disguise the fact that its action is to that extent a repudiation of its undertaking. As much as I deplore this refusal to fulfill the solemn promise of bonds of the United States, I cannot escape the conclusion, announced for the Court, that, in the situation now presented, the government, through the exercise of its sovereign power to regulate the value of money, has rendered itself immune from liability for its action. To that extent, it has relieved itself of the obligation of its domestic bonds, precisely as it has relieved the obligors of private bonds in Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., ante, p. 294 U. S. 240 .
In this posture of the case, it is unnecessary, and I think undesirable, for the Court to undertake to say that the obligation of the gold clause in government bonds is greater than in the bonds of private individuals, or that, in some situation not described, and in some manner and in some measure undefined, it has imposed restrictions upon the future exercise of the power to regulate the currency. I am not persuaded that we should needlessly intimate any opinion which implies that the obligation may so operate, for example, as to interpose a serious obstacle to the adoption of measures for stabilization of
There is no occasion now to resolve doubts, which I entertain, with respect to these questions. At present, they are academic. Concededly they may be transferred wholly to the realm of speculation by the exercise of the undoubted power of the government to withdraw the privilege of suit upon its gold clause obligations. We have just held that the Court of Claims was without power to entertain the suit in Nortz v. United States, ante, p. 294 U. S. 317 , because, regardless of the nature of the obligation of the gold certificates, there was no damage. Here it is declared that there is no damage because Congress, by the exercise of its power to regulate the currency, has made it impossible for the plaintiff to enjoy the benefits of gold payments promised by the government. It would seem that this would suffice to dispose of the present case, without attempting to prejudge the rights of other bondholders and of the government under other conditions which may never occur. It will not benefit this plaintiff, to whom we deny any remedy, to be assured that he has an inviolable right to performance of the gold clause.
Moreover, if the gold clause be viewed as a gold value contract, as it is in Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra, it is to be noted that the government has not prohibited the free use by the bondholder of the paper money equivalent of the gold clause obligation; it is the prohibition, by the Joint Resolution of Congress, of payment of the increased number of depreciated dollars required to make up the full equivalent, which alone bars recovery.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, MR. JUSTICE BUTLER, and I conclude that, if given effect, the enactments here challenged will bring about confiscation of property rights and repudiation of national obligations. Acquiescence in the decisions just announced
The clause is not new or obscure or discolored by any sinister purpose. For more than 100 years, our citizens have employed a like agreement. During the War between the States, its equivalent "payable in coin" aided
Gregory v. Morris, 96 U. S. 619 , 96 U. S. 624 -625 -- last of similar causes -- construed and sanctioned this stipulation. In behalf of all, Chief Justice Waite there said:
Furthermore, they furnish means for computing the sum payable in currency if gold should become unobtainable. The borrower agrees to repay in gold coin containing 25.8 grains to the dollar, and if this cannot be secured, the promise is to discharge the obligation by paying for each dollar loaned the currency value of that number of grains. Thus the purpose of the parties will be carried out. Irrespective of any change in currency, the thing loaned or an equivalent will be returned -- nothing more, nothing less. The present currency consists of promises to pay dollars of 15 5/21 grains; the government procures gold bullion on that
The certificates here involved -- series 1928 -- were issued under § 6, Act March 14, 1900, 31 Stat. 47, as amended. See U.S.C., Title 31, § 429. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
By Executive Orders, Nos. 6102, 6111, April 5, and April 20, 1933, the President undertook to require owners of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold
The Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. c. 6, pp. 337, 342 undertook to ratify preceding Presidential orders and proclamations requiring surrender of gold,
Four causes are here for decision. Two of them arise out of corporate obligations containing gold clauses -- railroad bonds. One is based on a United States Fourth Liberty Loan bond of 1918, called for payment April 15, 1934, containing a promise to pay "in United States gold coin of the present standard of value" with interest in like gold coin. Another involves gold certificates, series 1928, amounting to $106,300.
The fundamental problem now presented is whether recent statutes passed by Congress in respect of money and credits were designed to attain a legitimate end. Or whether, under the guise of pursuing a monetary policy, Congress really has inaugurated a plan primarily designed to destroy private obligations, repudiate national debts, and drive into the Treasury all gold within the country is exchange for inconvertible promises to pay, of much less value.
From 1792 to 1873, both the gold and silver dollar were standard and legal tender, coinage was free and unlimited. Persistent efforts were made to keep both in circulation. Because the prescribed relation between them got out of
The power to issue bills and "regulate values" of coin cannot be so enlarged as to authorize arbitrary action, whose immediate purpose and necessary effect is destruction of individual rights. [ Footnote 2/2 ] As this Court has said, a "power to regulate is not a power to destroy." Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 , 154 U. S. 398 . The Fifth Amendment limits all governmental powers. We are dealing here with a debased standard, adopted with the definite purpose to destroy obligations. Such arbitrary and oppressive action is not within any congressional power heretofore recognized.
The gold clauses in these bonds were valid, and in entire harmony with public policy when executed. They are property. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 , 292 U. S. 579 . To destroy a validly acquired right is the taking of property. Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, 80 U. S. 662 . They established a measure of value and supply a basis for recovery if broken. Their policy and purpose were stamped with affirmative approval by the government when inserted in its bonds.
The clear intent of the parties was that, in case the standard of 1900 should be withdrawn, and a new and less valuable one set up, the debtor could be required to pay the value of the contents of the old standard in terms of the new currency, whether coin or paper. If gold measured by prevailing currency had declined, the debtor would have received the benefit. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12th discloses a fixed purpose to raise the nominal value of farm products by depleting the standard dollar. It authorized the President to reduce the gold in the standard, and further provided that all forms of currency shall be legal tender. The result expected to follow was increase in nominal values of commodities and depreciation of contractual obligations. The purpose of § 43, incorporated by the Senate as an amendment to the House Bill, was clearly stated by the
Senator who presented it. [ Footnote 2/3 ] It was the destruction of lawfully acquired rights.
To carry out the plan indicated as above shown in the Senate, the Gold Reserve Act followed -- January 30, 1934. This inhibited the President from fixing the weight of the standard gold dollar above 60% of its then existing weight. (Authority had been given for 50% reduction by the Act of May 12th.) On January 31st, he directed that the standard should contain 15 5/21 grains of gold. If this reduction of 40% of all debts was within the power of Congress, and if, as a necessary means to accomplish that end, Congress had power by resolution to destroy the
The end or objective of the Joint Resolution was not "legitimate." The real purpose was not "to assure uniform value to the coins and currencies of the United States," but to destroy certain valuable contract rights. The recitals do not harmonize with circumstances then existing. The Act of 1900 which prescribed a standard dollar of 25.8 grains remained in force, but its command that "all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard" was not being obeyed. Our currency was passing at a material discount; all gold had been sequestrated; none was attainable. The resolution made no provision for restoring parity with the old standard; it established no new one.
Congress has power to coin money, but this cannot be exercised without the possession of metal. Can Congress authorize appropriation without compensation of the necessary gold? Congress has power to regulate commerce, to establish post roads, etc. Some approved plan may involve the use or destruction of A's land or a private way. May Congress authorize the appropriation or destruction of these things without adequate payment? Of
Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302 , supports the power of the Legislature to prevent exportation of coins without compensation. But this is far from saying that the Legislature might have ordered destruction of the coins without compensating the owners, or that they could have been required to deliver them up and accept whatever was offered. In United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 , 188 U. S. 471 , this Court said:
Congress brought about the conditions in respect of gold which existed when the obligation matured. Having made payment in this metal impossible, the government cannot defend by saying that, if the obligation had been met, the creditor could not have retained the gold; consequently
These bonds are held by men and women in many parts of the world; they have relied upon our honor. Thousands of our own citizens of every degree, not doubting the good faith of their sovereign, have purchased them. It will not be easy for this multitude to appraise the form of words which establishes that they have suffered no appreciable damage, but perhaps no more difficult for them than for us. And their difficulty will not be assuaged when they reflect that ready calculation of the exact loss suffered by the Philippine government moved Congress to satisfy it by appropriating, in June 1934, $23,862,750.78 to be paid out of the Treasury of the United States. [ Footnote 2/4 ] And see Act May 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 817, appropriating
These views have not heretofore been questioned here. In the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 , 99 U. S. 719 , Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the majority, declared:
And in the same cause ( 99 U. S. 731 -732), Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for himself, affirmed:
Can the government, obliged as though a private person to observe the terms of its contracts, destroy them by legislative changes in the currency and by statutes forbidding one to hold the thing which it has agreed to deliver? If an individual should undertake to annul or lessen his obligation by secreting or manipulating his assets with the intent to place them beyond the reach of creditors, the attempt would be denounced as fraudulent, wholly ineffective.
Under the challenged statutes, it is said the United States have realized profits amounting to $2,800,000,000. [ Footnote 2/5 ] But this assumes that gain may be generated by legislative fiat. To such counterfeit profits there would be no limit; with each new debasement of the dollar they would expand. Two billions might be ballooned indefinitely to twenty, thirty, or what you will.
Chief Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87, 10 U. S. 135 .
" Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed, when the funds therefor are made available, to establish on the books of the Treasury a credit in favor of the Treasury of the Philippine Islands for $23,862,750.78, being an amount equal to the increase in value (resulting from the reduction of the weight of the gold dollar) of the gold equivalent at the opening of business on January 31, 1934, of the balances maintained at that time in banks in the continental United States by the Government of the Philippine Islands for its gold standard fund and its Treasury certificate fund less the interest received by it on such balances."