Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/96621/armstrong-paint-varnish-works-vs-enamel-corp
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 23', '§ 16', '§ 4', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 5', '§ 1', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 16', '§ 23', '§ 16', '§ 23', '§ 5', '§ 29', '§ 5', '§ 240']

Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works Vs Nu Enamel Corp - Citation 96621 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works Vs. Nu-enamel Corp. - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/96621
Case Number 305 U.S. 315
Appellant Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works
Respondent Nu-enamel Corp.
armstrong paint & varnish works v. nu-enamel corp. - 305 u.s. 315 (1938) u.s. supreme court armstrong paint & varnish works v. nu-enamel corp., 305 u.s. 315 (1938) armstrong paint & varnish works v. nu-enamel corp. no. 51 argued november 7, 8, 1938 decided december 5, 1938 305 u.s. 315 certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit syllabus 1. a registrant under the trade mark act of march 19, 1920, of the name nu-enamel, for enamels and kindred products, brought suit in the federal district court to enjoin infringement by a competitor who was using in the sale of enamels the name nu-beauty enamel. the bill alleged, inter alia, that, in the trade, the name nu-enamel had come to mean the.....
Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp. - 305 U.S. 315 (1938)
U.S. Supreme Court Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938)
(1) It being conceded by the answer that the name Nu-Enamel had come to mean plaintiff and its products, and that it distinguished plaintiff's goods from others of the same class, no evidence or finding was needed to establish these facts. P. 305 U. S. 322 .
(2) By virtue of the adoption of the procedural provisions of the Trade Mark Act of 1905 by the 1920 Act, the district court and the circuit courts of appeals had original and appellate jurisdiction, respectively, of suits at law or in equity respecting trademarks registered in accordance with the provisions of the latter Act and arising under it, and this Court was given jurisdiction by certiorari the same as in patent cases. P. 305 U. S. 323 .
(3) The allegation of registration under the 1920 Act, unless plainly unsubstantial, is sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction of the merits. P. 305 U. S. 324 .
(4) The district court having properly acquired jurisdiction of the suit for interference with the exclusive right to use the trademark, then, though the issue of infringement fail because the trademark was not registerable, the court still has jurisdiction to determine, on substantially the same facts, the issue of unfair competition. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 . P. 305 U. S. 324 .
(5) As applied to enamels, the mark Nu-Enamel is descriptive, but registerable nevertheless under paragraph (b) of the Trade Mark Act of 1920. P. 305 U. S. 329 .
of the mark by a competitor seeking to palm off its goods as those of the plaintiff, and had a cause of action against such a one either for infringement of the mark or for unfair competition. P. 305 U. S. 335 .
(7) Upon the record of this case, the competitor's use of the name Nu-Beauty Enamel was unfair, and infringed the plaintiff's trademark Nu-Enamel. P. 305 U. S. 336 .
2. The federal Trade Mark Act of 1920 does not vest any new substantive rights, but it does create remedies in the federal courts for protecting the registrations, and authorizes triple damages for infringement. P. 305 U. S. 324 .
3. Trade marks registered under the 1920 Act may be attacked collaterally. P. 305 U. S. 322 .
4. The significant distinction between the Acts of 1905 and 1920 is the omission in the latter of the provision in the earlier act making the registration of a trademark prima facie evidence of ownership. P. 305 U. S. 323 .
5. The remedies afforded registrants under the 1920 Act are available only to "owners." Ownership must be established by proof; actual and exclusive use, short of a secondary meaning, is insufficient. P. 305 U. S. 335 .
6. Section 1(b) of the Trade Mark Act of 1920 permits registration of marks used for one year in interstate commerce which were not registerable under the Act of 1905, "except those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 5" of the Act of 1905. Held that the phrase "except those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 5" does not apply to the provisos of paragraph (b) other than the first thereof. P. 305 U. S. 331 .
7. The legislative history and administrative interpretation of a statute have weight when choice is nicely balanced. P. 305 U. S. 330 .
8. A construction of a statute which preserves its usefulness is to be preferred to another which does not. P. 305 U. S. 333 .
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. [ Footnote 1 ] That court held the trademark nondescriptive, valid, and infringed. It was of the opinion that the mark had acquired a secondary meaning. It found that the petitioner's conduct enabled merchants to palm off the Armstrong product for "Nu-Enamel," and concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction of the issue of unfair competition. We granted certiorari on account of the importance in trademark law of the issues of the descriptive character of the mark and the effect of its acquired meaning under the Trade-Mark Act of 1920.
Federal Trade-Mark Act of 1920. The registration of "Nu-Enamel" does not create any substantive rights in the registrant. [ Footnote 2 ] Trademarks registered under the 1920
The act forbids the unauthorized use of the registered mark in foreign and interstate commerce, and adopts the procedural provisions of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. [ Footnote 3 ] Through the inclusion of these procedural sections, the lower Federal courts are given original and appellate jurisdiction of "all suits at law or in equity respecting trademarks registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act, arising under the present Act," and this Court was given jurisdiction for certiorari "in the same manner as provided for patent cases." [ Footnote 4 ] Section nineteen of the 1905 act, vesting power to grant injunctions in trademark cases, is applicable also to proceedings under the 1920 act. By § 23, former remedies in law and equity are left available. The significant distinction between the two acts is the omission in the 1920 act of the provision of § 16 of the earlier act making the registration of a trademark prima facie evidence of ownership.
While the Act of 1920 does not vest any new substantive rights, it does create remedies in the Federal courts for protecting the registrations, and authorizes triple damages for infringement. [ Footnote 5 ] As a consequence of these remedial provisions, when a suit is begun for infringement, bottomed upon registration under the 1920 act, the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction. Unless plainly unsubstantial, the allegation of registration under the act is sufficient to give jurisdiction of the merits. In this case, the trial court concluded that the invalidity of the trademark divested it of jurisdiction over unfair competition. This was erroneous. [ Footnote 6 ] Once properly obtained, jurisdiction of the one cause of action, the alleged infringement of the trademark, persists to deal with all grounds supporting it, including unfair competition
with the marked article. [ Footnote 7 ] The cause of action is the interference with the exclusive right to use the mark "Nu-Enamel." If it is a properly registered trademark, a ground to support the cause of action is violation of the Trade-Mark Act. If it is not a properly registered trademark, the ground is unfair competition at common law. The facts supporting a suit for infringement and one for unfair competition are substantially the same. They constitute and make plain the wrong complained of -- the violation of the right to exclusive use.
In the Oursler case, there was a valid copyright which was held not infringed. Here, the trial court determined the trademark was invalid. The Oursler case held that, where the causes of action are different, the determination that the federal cause fails calls for dismissal. [ Footnote 8 ] But where there is only one cause of action, we do not consider that the holding of the invalidity furnishes any basis for a distinction between this and the Oursler case. Registration of "Nu-Enamel" furnished a substantial ground for federal jurisdiction. That jurisdiction should be continued to determine, on substantially the same facts, the issue of unfair competition. [ Footnote 9 ]
Registration of Descriptive Mark under 1920 Trade-Mark Act. Even though, under the facts alleged and the admission that respondent's mark has acquired a secondary meaning, the Federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner is chargeable with unfair competition, it becomes necessary to determine whether registration of "Nu-Enamel" is permissible or impermissible under the Act of 1920 in order that it may be known whether § 4, the basis of the prayer in the bill for triple damages, is applicable. [ Footnote 10 ] Section 1(b) of the 1920 act permits registration of the marks used for one year in interstate commerce which were not registerable under the Act of 1905 "except those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 5" of the Act of 1905. That section is set out below. [ Footnote 11 ] The point raised is whether the phrase
It seems clear that the mark "Nu-Enamel" is descriptive of a type of paint long familiar to manufacturers, [ Footnote 12 ] with the addition of the adjective new, phonetically spelled or misspelled. Obviously this slight variation from the orthographic normal is not unusual. Numerous
That the mark is descriptive of paint enamels does not bar it from registration as to them under the 1920 act. This has been the construction of the Patent Office. [ Footnote 13 ] To
construe (b) of the 1920 act to bar names, descriptive marks. and merely geographical terms would make the subsection useless. The obvious purpose of its inclusion was to widen the eligibility of marks. A dictum has expressed [ Footnote 14 ] a view contrary to that of the Patent Office.
"when choice is nicely balanced." [ Footnote 15 ] We construe section 1(b) of the 1920 act to be applicable to the categories expressed in § 5 of the Act of 1905 under (a) and (b), including the first proviso but not to include the other provisos of (b). This conclusion is fortified by the addition
of the proviso to § 1(b) of the 1920 act, relating to identical trademarks. The proviso in § 5(b) of the 1905 act refusing registration to identical marks in much the same language was construed in Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 , as not permitting the registration of such marks when used for ten years under the fourth -- now fifth -- proviso of that section. We think that Congress, in adopting the corresponding proviso in subsection (b) of the 1920 act, must be taken to have adopted the accepted construction of the similar proviso of the 1905 act. If the language of the 1920 act had been intended to exclude from registration all the classes excluded by the provisos of section five of the 1905 act, it would have been unnecessary to include this proviso. [ Footnote 16 ]
reasonable intention and literal meaning occurred. We have refused to nullify statutes, however hard or unexpected the particular effect, where unambiguous language called for a logical and sensible result. [ Footnote 17 ] Any other course would be properly condemned as judicial legislation. However, to construe statutes so as to avoid results glaringly absurd has long been a judicial function. [ Footnote 18 ] Where, as here, the language is susceptible of a construction which preserves the usefulness of the section, the judicial duty rests upon this Court to give expression to the intendment of the law.
Remedies. [ Footnote 19 ] Registration under the 1920 act conferred no substantive rights in the registered mark, but it does permit suits in the Federal courts to protect rights otherwise acquired in the marks. The 1905 act, § 1,authorizes the "owner" to obtain registration of eligible trademarks; § 2, requires the applicant to make oath that he "believes himself . . . to be the owner of the trademark;" § 5 refers to the "owner of the mark;" § 16 then declares that "the registration of a trademark under the provisions of this Act shall be prima facie evidence of ownership;" § 23 reserves all remedies at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by the wrongful use of his trademark would have had without the Act of 1905.
and all other marks not registerable under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, with the exceptions discussed in the preceding section of this opinion, in bona fide use by the proprietor thereof for one year in commerce other than intrastate. Section 4, [ Footnote 20 ] which protects the trademark, is substantially the same as § 16 of the 1905 act, except for the omission of the prima facie presumption of ownership. It is the owner who has the rights of action under this act, unaided by any presumption from registration. The owner, on the other hand, is not limited in any way by the Act, as § 23 of the Act of 1905 is made specifically applicable. This section preserves the legal and equitable remedies to an aggrieved owner. The Committee on Patents in the Senate was quite positive that the effect of the act on domestic rights was nil. [ Footnote 21 ] The registrant acquires, by the acceptance of his mark under the 1920 act, the right to proceed in the Federal courts against infringers, and to recover triple damages if he can establish his ownership of the trademark at common law.
its goods from others of the same class. But a mark which is descriptive is not a good trademark at common law. [ Footnote 22 ]
It was said in Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., [ Footnote 23 ] that names registered under the last proviso of § 5 of the 1905 act became technical trademarks upon valid registration under that act. Assuming that descriptive terms in this respect would be analogous to proper names, there are clear distinctions between the acts. The 1920 act does not define "trademark" to include any mark registered under its terms, as does § 29 of the 1905 act. Remedies are afforded registrants under the 1920 act, but these remedies are for "owners," and actual and exclusive use, short of a secondary meaning, [ Footnote 24 ] does not qualify a registrant under the 1920 act as an owner. That ownership must be established by proof. [ Footnote 25 ] Unless this ownership is established, no rights of action under the 1920 act for infringement exist. Here, we have a secondary meaning to the descriptive term "Nu-Enamel." This establishes, entirely apart from any trademark act, the common law right of the Nu-Enamel Corporation to be free from the competitive use of these words as a trademark or tradename. [ Footnote 26 ] As was pointed out in the Davids Co. case, in considering the ten-year clause of the 1905 act, this right of freedom does not confer a monopoly on the use of the words. It is a mere protection against their unfair use as a trademark or tradename by a competitor seeking
The rights of Nu-Enamel Corporation to be free of the competitive use of "Nu-Enamel" may be vindicated also through the challenge of unfair competition, as set out in the bill. The remedy for unfair competition is that given by the common law. The right arises not from the trademark acts, but from the fact that "Nu-Enamel" has come to indicate that the goods in connection with which it is used are the goods manufactured by the respondent. When a name is endowed with this quality, it becomes a mark, entitled to protection. The essence of the wrong from the violation of this right is the sale of the goods of one manufacturer for those of another. [ Footnote 27 ]
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., ante, p. 305 U. S. 111 , note 3; Charles Broadway Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 F. 706, 713, 714; Sleight Metallic Ink Co. v. Joseph P. Marks, 52 F.2d 664, on rights it is "as though there had been no registration," p. 665; Neva-Wet Corp. v. Never Wet Processing Corp., 277 N.Y. 163, 13 N.E.2d 755, 759; Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Reese, 24 F.Supp. 69, 72.
Secs. 17 and 18, Fed. Trade-Mark Act of February 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 728, 729; §§ 5 and 6, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 827, 828; § 240(a) of the Judicial Code confirms this jurisdiction. Street & Smith v. Atlas Mfg. Co., 231 U. S. 348 , 231 U. S. 352 ; cf. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506 , 166 U. S. 513 .
Although we determine later that "Nu-Enamel" is registerable under the 1920 act, it seems appropriate to discuss jurisdiction of unfair competition on a different assumption, so that the conclusion of the trial court, corrected but not discussed by the appellate court, will not become a precedent on issues of jurisdiction in trademark law. Cf. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 , 289 U. S. 240 .
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 .
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 , 289 U. S. 248 .
Two cases cited in the Oursler opinion deal with trademarks: Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick Co., 201 U. S. 166 , and Elgin Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 . They are there treated as out of line with the cases holding that facts supporting substantial federal and nonfederal questions give jurisdiction to federal courts. Both state categorically that, without a lawfully registered trademark, a federal court loses jurisdiction when the jurisdiction depends on the trademark act.
Where diversity of citizenship exists, the issue does not arise. Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526 . While the diversity is not made plain in the opinion, it appears in the record. No. 32, 1923 Term, Vol. 13, Transcripts of Record 1689.
"This is the plain meaning of the law, as it was undoubtedly the intention to continue to deny registration to those marks prohibited registration by paragraphs or schedules (a) and (b) of section 5 of the act of February 20, 1905. In other words, my view is that register (b) provided by the recent act is not intended for any trademark registerable under any part of the act of February 20, 1905, nor for registration of any mark not registerable as specified in paragraphs or schedules (a) and (b) of section 5 of that act. The doubt will be relieved and a rational construction of the law will be subserved by considering the reference in the recent act to 'paragraphs (a) and (b)' of section 5 of the amended act of February 20, 1905, as meaning schedules a and b, rather than paragraphs strictly and as comprising the following matters specified as not registerable, viz.: "
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 , 294 U. S. 96 .
The variations between the two provisos have been treated in practice as immaterial. 277 O.G. 181, 182. Cf. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 , 233 U. S. 467 .
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 , 242 U. S. 485 ; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 , 282 U. S. 58 -59; Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351 , 304 U. S. 359 .
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 , 287 U. S. 446 , et seq., and cases cited; United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 .
Since neither party has relied upon state law, we do not consider any effect it might have on our conclusions. Cf. Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., ante, p. 305 U. S. 111 .
Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526 , 265 U. S. 528 ; Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 220 U. S. 446 , 220 U. S. 453 ; Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 , 179 U. S. 673 .
233 U. S. 233 U.S. 461, 233 U. S. 466 , 233 U. S. 468 -470.
Cf. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 220 U. S. 446 , 220 U. S. 461 . The language in that case, denying to a descriptive term the effect of a trademark, is inapplicable for the reason that the descriptive term had not acquired a secondary meaning.
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 , 233 U. S. 470 -471.
Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 , 179 U. S. 674 .