Source: http://il.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180522_0001068.NIL.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-06-20 08:06:40
Document Index: 458040709

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 636', '§ 405', 'art, 416', 'art 404', 'art, 425', 'art, 395']

ARIEL JONES, Plaintiff,
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Ariel Jones's (“Plaintiff”) claims for Child's Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 9] is denied and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 11] is granted.
Plaintiff filed her applications in January 2013, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2005. (R. 97-98, 219-27.) Her applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (R. 239, 248.) After filing a written request for a hearing, Plaintiff appeared on March 3, 2015 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) where Plaintiff appeared represented by counsel. (R. 268-307.) A vocational expert, Grace Gianforte, was also present at the hearing and testified. (Id.) On June 25, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 11-27.) The Appeals Council (“AC”) denied review on July 20, 2016, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005); Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1994); (R. 5- 7.)
On June 25, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable written determination finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 11-27.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2005, her alleged onset date. (R. 16.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments of dysthymic disorder and decreased intellectual functioning. (R. 17.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medical equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926), (R. 22.)
Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to several limitations.[2] At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (R. 26.) At step five, based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed including cafeteria attendant, laundry sorter, and bakery racker. (R. 26-27.) Because of this determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Act. (R. 27.)
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ's analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her] conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning. . . .”); see Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005).
We review the ALJ's decision but we play an “extremely limited” role. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his ultimate conclusion, ” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's decision should be remanded because: (1) she failed to find that Plaintiff's mental impairments meet or equal the severity level of Listing 12.05; (2) she improperly weighed the objective medical evidence, and (3) her ...