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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2255', '§ 2255', 'art, 28', '§ 2255', '§ 2243', '§ 2255', '§ 2254', '§ 2184', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2241', '§ 2254', '§ 2254', '§ 2255', '§ 2254']

Stone Vs Powell - Citation 103916 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Stone Vs. Powell - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103916
Case Number 428 U.S. 465
stone v. powell - 428 u.s. 465 (1976) u.s. supreme court stone v. powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976) stone v. powell no. 74-1055 argued february 24, 1976 decided july 6, 1976 * 428 u.s. 465 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit syllabus respondent in no. 74-1055, was convicted of murder in state court, in part on the basis of testimony concerning a revolver found on his person when he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordinance. the trial court rejected respondent's contention that the testimony should have been excluded because the ordinance was unconstitutional and the arrest therefore invalid. the appellate court affirmed, finding it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of the.....
Stone v. Powell - 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
U.S. Supreme Court Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
Decided July 6, 1976 *
Held: Where the State, as in each of these cases, has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context, the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal as compared to the substantial societal costs of applying the rule. Pp. 428 U. S. 474 -495.
(a) Until these cases, this Court has had no occasion fully to examine the validity of the assumption made in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 , that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , to require exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. Pp. 428 U. S. 480 -481.
(b) The Mapp majority justified application of the exclusionary rule chiefly upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct, and though preserving the integrity of the judicial process has been alluded to as also justifying the rule, that concern is minimal where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner who has already been given the opportunity for full and fair consideration of his search and seizure claim at trial and on direct review. Pp. 428 U. S. 484 -486.
(c) Despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons; in various situations, the Court has found the policies behind the rule outweighed by countervailing considerations. Pp. 428 U. S. 486 -489.
(d) The ultimate question of guilt or innocence should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Application of the exclusionary rule, however, deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. Though the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity, in part through nurturing respect for Fourth Amendment values, indiscriminate application of the rule may well generate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. Pp. 428 U. S. 489 -491.
officers from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentives to disregard it. Though the Court adheres to that view as applied to the trial and direct appeal stages, there is no reason to believe that the effect of applying the rule would be appreciably diminished if search and seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Even if some additional deterrent effect existed from application of the rule in isolated habeas corpus cases, the furtherance of Fourth Amendment goals would be outweighed by the detriment to the criminal justice system. Pp. 428 U. S. 492 -494.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 428 U. S. 496 . BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 428 U. S. 502 . WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 428 U. S. 536 .
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder in June, 1968, after trial in a California state court. At about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Bernardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an altercation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed, Powell shot and killed Parsons' wife. Ten hours later, an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance, [ Footnote 1 ] and in the search incident to the arrest discovered a .38-caliber revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder.
In December, 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 507 F.2d 93. The court concluded that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, [ Footnote 2 ] that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and that, although exclusion of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes. Id. at 98. After an independent review of the evidence, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence was not harmless error, since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's accomplices. Id. at 99.
search of his home. The District Court concluded that the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). 388 F.Supp. 185, 19194 (1974). [ Footnote 3 ] The court also rejected the State's contention that, even if the warrant was invalid, the search was justified because of the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the exigent circumstances of the situation -- danger to Peak and search for bombs and explosives believed in possession of the NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry, as the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and further concluded tat the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless
search. Id. at 194-202. [ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 513 F.2d 1280 (1975).
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respective state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their petitions for certiorari. 4 22 U.S. 1055 (1975). [ Footnote 5 ] We now reverse.
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum [ Footnote 6 ] was included in the first
But the limitation of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e.g., In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded, [ Footnote 7 ] this
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases [ Footnote 8 ] until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 , in 1915. In Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for murder had been dominated by a mob. After the State Supreme Court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the Federal District Court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, however, that, if a habeas corpus court found that the State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. Id. at 237 U. S. 333 -336.
In the landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 , 344 U. S. 482 -487 (1953), the scope of the writ was expanded still further. [ Footnote 9 ] In that case and its companion case, Daniels v. Allen, state prisoners applied for federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the trial courts had erred
in failing to quash their indictments due to alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the highest court of the State had rejected these claims on direct appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E.2d 99, and this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U.S. 943 (1951). Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In Daniels, however, the State Supreme Court, on direct review, had refused to consider the appeal because the papers were filed out of time. This Court held that, since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a ground that would have barred direct review of his federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 458 , 486.
This final barrier to broad collateral reexamination of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963). [ Footnote 10 ] Noia and two codefendants had been convicted
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent state proceedings, they were able to establish that their confessions had been coerced, and their convictions therefore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a subsequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipulated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but the District Court followed Daniels in holding that Noia's failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See United States v. Fay, 183 F.Supp. 222, 225 (SDNY 1960). The Court of Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and that he be released from custody or that a new trial be granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, narrowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal court may refuse to consider the merits of federal constitutional claims. [ Footnote 11 ]
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the Federal Courts of Appeals had concluded that collateral review of search and seizure claims was inappropriate on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus. [ Footnote 12 ] The primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not
394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 224 . See Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 368 F.2d 822 (1966).
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search and seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 225 , citing, e.g., 392 U. S. DeForte, 392
394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 226 . Although, in recent years, the view has been expressed that the Court should reexamine the substantive scope of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review of search and seizure claims
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring), [ Footnote 13 ] the Court, without discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). [ Footnote 14 ]
in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure, since those Amendments were held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. [ Footnote 15 ] Until these cases, we have not had occasion fully to consider the validity of this view. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra at 412 U. S. 249 n. 3; Cardwell v. Lewis, supra at 417 U. S. 596 , and n. 12. Upon examination, we conclude, in light of the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that this view is unjustified. [ Footnote 16 ] We hold, therefore, that
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. [ Footnote 17 ]
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 , 379 U. S. 481 -485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 , 359 U. S. 363 -365 (1959), and was intended to protect the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 630 (1886), from searches under unchecked general authority. [ Footnote 18 ]
192 U. S. 585 (1904). [ Footnote 19 ] In Weeks, the Court held that the defendant could petition before trial for the return of property secured through an illegal search or seizure conducted by federal authorities. In Gouled, the Court held broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S. 304 -305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks, the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment is
Id. at 338 U. S. 27 -28. The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as "an essential ingredient of [that] right." 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 29 . The full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and, a little more than a decade later, the exclusionary rule was held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Decisions prior to Mapp advanced two principal reasons for application of the rule in federal trials. The Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial process. 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 222 . [ Footnote 20 ] But even in that context, a more pragmatic ground was emphasized:
Id. at 364 U. S. 217 . The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule to the States on several grounds, [ Footnote 21 ] but relied principally upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 658 .
Although our decisions often have alluded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 , 422 U. S. 536 -539 (1975), they demonstrate the limited role of this justification in the determination whether to apply the rule in a particular context. [ Footnote 22 ] Logically extended, this justification would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandonment of the standing limitations on who may object to the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings need not abate when the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 , 420 U. S. 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a defendant, even though its introduction is certain to result in conviction in some cases. Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence. [ Footnote 23 ]
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post- Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any "[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , 381 U. S. 637 (196). Instead,
United States v. Calandra, supra at 414 U. S. 348 . Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra at 422 U. S. 538 -539; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 28 -29 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, supra at 381 U. S. 636 -637; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 , 382 U. S. 416 (1966).
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra, supra at 414 U. S. 348 . [ Footnote 24 ] Thus, our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury by such extension against the potential contribution to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through deterrence of police misconduct:
414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 351 -352 (footnote omitted).
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of competing policies. In that case, the public interest in determination of truth at trial [ Footnote 25 ] was deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by application of the rule.
The balancing process at work in these cases also finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist only when the Government attempts to use illegally obtained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S. 491 -492 (1963). See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 , 362 U. S. 261 (1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view that the "additional benefits of extending the . . . rule" to defendants other than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed by the
Alderman v. United States, supra at 394 U. S. 174 -175. [ Footnote 26 ]
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are well known: [ Footnote 27 ] the focus
of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. [ Footnote 28 ] Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in his dissent in Kaufman:
394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 237 . Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process, and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. [ Footnote 29 ] Thus,
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately, it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. [ Footnote 30 ] These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search and seizure claim was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state courts. [ Footnote 31 ]
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, [ Footnote 32 ] we have assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long-term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system. [ Footnote 33 ]
We adhere to the view that these considerations support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered may add marginally to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to believe, however, that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search and seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. [ Footnote 34 ] Nor is there reason to assume that any specific disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review would be enhanced if there were the further risk that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incarceration of the defendant. The view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal. [ Footnote 35 ] Even if one rationally could assume that
In sum, we conclude that, where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, [ Footnote 36 ] a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. [ Footnote 37 ] In this context, the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist with special force. [ Footnote 38 ]
In support of the vagueness holding, the court relied principally on Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where we invalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object. . . ." Id. at 405 U. S. 156 -157, n. 1. Noting the similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see n 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F.2d at 95-97. Petitioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but, in view of our disposition of the case, we need not consider this issue.
The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he had said should be used against the police. See 388 F.Supp. at 189 n. 1. In concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N.W.2d 480, 487-488. See also id. at 754, 199 N.W.2d at 495 (concurring opinion). The District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 413 n. 3; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 109 n. 1, and concluded probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, a contention that we have several times rejected, see, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560 , 401 U. S. 565 n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 378 U. S. 109 n. 1, and need not reach again here.
Prior to 1889, there was, in practical effect, no appellate review in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote because of the practice of single district judges' holding circuit court. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed.1973); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 79-80, and n. 107 (1927). Pressure naturally developed for expansion of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 , 100 U. S. 376 -377 (1880); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441, 473, and n. 75 (1963).
There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 84, 105 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, supra, n 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 421 , and n. 30 (1963); id. at 372 U. S. 457 -460 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 , 332 U. S. 178 (1947). For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id. at 332 U. S. 178 -179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333 , 417 U. S. 345 -346, and n. 15 (1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted " a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,'" id. at 417 U. S. 346 , quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424 , 368 U. S. 428 (1962).
In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28 U.S.C. § 2243." 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 438 . More recently, in Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), holding that a state prisoner who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual prejudice, we emphasized:
"This Court has long recognized that, in some circumstances, considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 425 -426."
Id. at 425 U. S. 539 .
In Newsome, the Court focused on the issue whether a state defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal, and did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 287 n. 4. Similarly, in Cardwell and Cady, the question considered here was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and in neither case was relief granted on the basis of a search and seizure claim. In Cardwell, the plurality expressly noted that it was not addressing the issue of the substantive scope of the writ. See 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 596 , and n. 12.
As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 231 , 239, the Kaufman majority made no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that search and seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVollee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas relief on the basis of a search and seizure claim, and in that case, as well as in Warden, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented to the Court in the petition for writ of certiorari. Moreover, of the other numerous occasions cited by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN s dissent, post at 428 U. S. 518 -519, in which the Court has accepted jurisdiction over collateral attacks by state prisoners raising Fourth Amendment claims, in only one case -- Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560 (1971) -- was relief granted on that basis. And in Whiteley, as in Mancusi, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented in the petition for certiorari. As emphasized by Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised in the petition. 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 239 , and n. 7.
The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255. Our decision today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the application of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the supervisory role of this Court over the lower federal courts, cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960), see infra at 428 U. S. 484 , the rationale for its application in that context is also rejected.
The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. New York, where the Court, emphasizing that the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd ] virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony against himself," 192 U.S. at 192 U. S. 598 , adhered to the common law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise competent evidence was acquired. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. 329 (1841).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 12 -13 (1968); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S. 391 -392, 232 U. S. 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 , 277 U. S. 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 277 U. S. 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in state criminal trials. See id. at 367 U. S. 656 ; id. at 367 U. S. 666 (Douglas, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Black adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , 338 U. S. 39 (1949) (concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amendment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 661 (concurring opinion). See n 19, supra.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 , 422 U. S. 538 (1975) (emphasis omitted).
Cases addressing the question whether search and seizure holdings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 , 394 U. S. 249 -251, 253-254, and n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , 381 U. S. 636 -637 (1965) Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80 , 393 U. S. 81 (1968). The "attenuation of the taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 491 -492; Amsterdam, supra, n 24, at 389-390.
See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 , 347 U. S. 136 (1954); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 , 403 U. S. 411 (1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2184a, pp. 51-52 (McNaughton ed.1961); Amsterdam, supra, n 24, at 388-391; Friendly, supra, n 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and sources cited therein; Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961); Wright. Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 Tex.L.Rev. 736 (1972).
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty. The Court in Fay v. Noia described habeas corpus as a remedy for "whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints," and recognized that those to whom the writ should be granted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged." 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 401 , 372 U. S. 441 . But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.
The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research was unavailable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 218 . And the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still inconclusive. Compare, e.g., Oaks, supra, n 27; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e.g., Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky.L.J. 681 (1974). See United States v. Janis, ante at 428 U. S. 450 -452, n. 22; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 475 n. 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw.U.L.Rev. 740 (1974).
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective institutional settings within which federal judges and state judges operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 341 -344 (1816). Moreover, the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search and seizure claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems. In sum, there is
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds . . then at lest [for many]. . . ." Post at 428 U. S. 517 . It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation of the habeas statutes," post at 428 U. S. 515 ; as a "harbinger of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes," post at 428 U. S. 516 ; as "rewrit[ing] Congress' jurisdictional statutes . . . and [barring] access to federal courts by state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority" of the Court, post at 428 U. S. 522 ; and as a "denigration of constitutional guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect" of constitutional rights, post at 428 U. S. 523 .
With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is misdirected. Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, rather than a personal constitutional right, see supra at 428 U. S. 486 , and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding. As Mr. Justice Black recognized in this context,
See n 31, supra. Respondents contend that, since they filed petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time to apply for certiorari has now passed, any diminution in their ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 , 375 U. S. 422 -423 (1964). We reject these contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief.
I concur in the Court's opinion. By way of dictum, and somewhat hesitantly, the Court notes that the holding in this case leaves undisturbed the exclusionary rule as applied to criminal trials. For reasons stated in my dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 , 403 U. S. 411 (1971), it seems clear to me that the exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to demonstrate its flaws. The time has come to modify its reach, even if it is retained for a small and limited category of cases.
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. "
116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 623 . (Emphasis added.) In Weeks, the Court emphasized that the Government, under settled principles of common law, had no right to keep a person's private papers. The Court noted that the case did not involve "burglar's tools or other proofs of guilt. . . ." 232 U.S. at 232 U. S. 392 . (Emphasis added.)
Despite this anomaly, the exclusionary rule now rests upon its purported tendency to deter police misconduct, United States v. Janis, ante p. 428 U. S. 433 ; United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974), although, as we know, the rule has long been applied to wholly good faith mistakes and to purely technical deficiencies in warrants. Other rhetorical generalizations, including the "imperative of judicial integrity," have not withstood analysis as more and more critical appraisals of the rule's operation have appeared. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665 (1970). Indeed, settled rules demonstrate that the "judicial integrity" rationalization is fatally flawed. First, the Court has refused to entertain claims that evidence was unlawfully seized unless the claimant could demonstrate that he had standing to press the contention. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969). If he could not, the evidence, albeit secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is admissible. Second, as one scholar has correctly observed:
Oaks, supra, at 669. Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking that the exclusionary rule, a purely judge-created device based on "hard cases," serves the purpose of deterrence. Notwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect. In the face of dwindling support for the rule, some would go so far as to extend it to civil cases. United States v. Janis, ante p. 428 U. S. 433 .
The Court's opinion today eloquently reflects something of the dismal social costs occasioned by the rule. Ante at 428 U. S. 489 -491. As MR. JUSTICE WHITE correctly observes today in his dissent, the exclusionary rule constitutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials." Post at 428 U. S. 538 . He also suggests that the rule be substantially modified
Ante at 428 U. S. 494 . To be sure, my Brethren are hostile to the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, as today's decision in United States v. Janis, ante p. 428 U. S. 433 , confirms. But these cases, despite the veil of Fourth Amendment terminology employed by the
Court, plainly do not involve any question of the right of a defendant to have evidence excluded from use against him in his criminal trial when that evidence was seized in contravention of rights ostensibly secured [ Footnote 2/1 ] by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, they involve the question of the availability of a federal form for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights. Today's holding portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and I dissent.
The Court's opinion does not specify the particular basis on which it denies federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of Fourth Amendment violations brought by state prisoners. The Court insists that its holding is based on the Constitution, see, e.g., ante at 428 U. S. 482 , but in light of the explicit language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ Footnote 2/2 ] (significantly
construction; "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States," or that " considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice,'" ante at 428 U. S. 478 n. 11, [ Footnote 2/3 ] are sufficient
Much of the Court's analysis implies that respondents are not entitled to habeas relief because they are not being unconstitutionally detained. Although purportedly adhering to the principle that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "require exclusion" of evidence seized in violation of their commands, ante at 428 U. S. 481 , the Court informs us that there has merely been a "view" in our cases that
Ante at 428 U. S. 480 -481. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Applying a "balancing
test," see, e.g., ante at 428 U. S. 487 -489, 428 U. S. 489 -490, 428 U. S. 493 -494, the Court then concludes that this "view" is unjustified, and that the policies of the Fourth Amendment would not be implemented if claims to the benefits of the exclusionary rule were cognizable in collateral attacks on state court convictions. [ Footnote 2/5 ]
the necessary scope and function of habeas relief. Indeed, the Court reaches its result without explicitly overruling any of our plethora of precedents inconsistent with that result or even discussing principles of stare decisis. Rather, the Court asserts, in essence, that the Justices joining those prior decisions or reaching the merits of Fourth Amendment claims simply overlooked the obvious constitutional dimension to the problem in adhering to the "view" that granting collateral relief when state courts erroneously decide Fourth Amendment issues would effectuate the principles underlying that Amendment. [ Footnote 2/6 ] But, shorn of the rhetoric of "interest balancing"
Under Mapp, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state court must exclude evidence from the trial of an individual whose Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by a search or seizure that directly or indirectly resulted in the acquisition of that evidence. As United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974), reaffirmed,
"evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. [ Footnote 2/7 ]"
When a state court admits such evidence, it has committed a constitutional error, and, unless that error is harmless under federal standards, see, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), it follows ineluctably that the defendant has been placed "in custody in violation of the Constitution" within the comprehension of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In short, it escapes me as to what logic can support the assertion that the defendant's unconstitutional confinement obtains during the process of direct review, no matter how long that process takes, [ Footnote 2/8 ]
Ante at 428 U. S. 486 , quoting United States v. Calandra, supra at 414 U. S. 348 . Although my dissent in Calandra rejected, in light of contrary decisions establishing the role of the exclusionary rule, the premise that an individual has no constitutional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded from all use by the government, I need not dispute that point here. [ Footnote 2/9 ] For today's holding is not logically defensible even under Calandra. However the Court reinterprets Mapp, and whatever the rationale now attributed to Mapp's holding or the purpose ascribed to the exclusionary rule, the prevailing constitutional rule is that unconstitutionally seized evidence cannot be admitted in the criminal trial of a person whose federal constitutional rights were violated by the search or seizure. The erroneous admission of such evidence is a violation of the Federal Constitution -- Mapp inexorably means at least this much, or there would be no basis for applying the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings -- and an
The Court, assuming without deciding that respondents were convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence erroneously admitted against them by the state trial courts, acknowledges that respondents had the right to obtain a reversal of their convictions on appeal in the state courts or on certiorari to this Court. Indeed, since our rules relating to the time limits for applying for certiorari in criminal cases are nonjurisdictional, certiorari could be granted respondents even today and their convictions could be reversed despite today's decisions. See also infra at 428 U. S. 533 -534. And the basis for reversing those convictions would of course have to be that the States, in rejecting respondents' Fourth Amendment claims, had deprived them of a right in derogation of the Federal Constitution. It is simply inconceivable that that constitutional deprivation suddenly vanishes after the appellate process has been exhausted. And as between this Court on certiorari and federal district courts on habeas, it is for Congress to decide what the most efficacious method is for enforcing federal constitutional rights and asserting the primacy of federal law. See infra at 428 U. S. 522 , 428 U. S. 525 -530. The Court, however, simply ignores the settled principle that, for purposes of adjudicating constitutional claims, Congress, which has the power to do so under Art. III of the Constitution, has effectively
cast the district courts sitting in habeas in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
defendant was not accorded "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim in the state courts." Ante at 428 U. S. 469 . See also ante at 428 U. S. 480 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring); ante at 428 U. S. 482 , 428 U. S. 486 , 428 U. S. 489 -490, 428 U. S. 493 -494, and n. 37. But this "exception" is impossible if the Court really means that the "rule" that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on habeas is constitutionally based. For if the Constitution mandates that "rule" because it is a
ante at 428 U. S. 493 , is it not an equally "dubious assumption" that those same police officials would fear that federal habeas review might reveal that the state courts had denied the defendant an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on his claim that went undetected at trial and on appeal? [ Footnote 2/11 ] And to the extent the Court is making the unjustifiable assumption that our certiorari jurisdiction is adequate to correct "routine" condonation of Fourth Amendment violations by state courts, surely it follows a fortiori that our jurisdiction is adequate to redress the "egregious" situation in which the state courts did not even accord a fair hearing on the Fourth Amendment claim. The "exception" thus may appear to make the holding more palatable, but it merely highlights the lack of a "constitutional" rationale for today's constriction of habeas jurisdiction.
The Court adheres to the holding of Mapp that the Constitution "require[d] exclusion" of the evidence admitted at respondents' trials. Ante at 428 U. S. 481 . However,
the Court holds that the Constitution "does not require" that respondents be accorded habeas relief if they were accorded "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [their] Fourth Amendment claim[s]" in state courts. Ante at 428 U. S. 482 ; see also ante at 428 U. S. 495 n. 37. Yet once the Constitution was interpreted by Mapp to require exclusion of certain evidence at trial, the Constitution became irrelevant to the manner in which that constitutional right was to be enforced in the federal courts; that inquiry is only a matter of respecting Congress' allocation of federal judicial power between this Court's appellate jurisdiction and a federal district court's habeas jurisdiction. Indeed, by conceding that today's "decision does not mean that the federal [district] court lacks jurisdiction over [respondents'] claim[s]," ibid., the Court admits that respondents have sufficiently alleged that they are "in custody in violation of the Constitution" within the meaning of § 2254, and that there is no "constitutional" rationale for today's holding. Rather, the constitutional "interest balancing" approach to this case is untenable, and I can only view the constitutional garb in which the Court dresses its result as a disguise for rejection of the longstanding principle that there are no "second class" constitutional rights for purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction; it is nothing less than an attempt to provide a veneer of respectability for an obvious usurpation of Congress' Art. III power to delineate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
to deny habeas relief to prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States" as a matter of judicial "discretion" -- a "discretion" judicially manufactured today contrary to the express statutory language -- because such claims are "different in kind" from other constitutional violations in that they "do not impugn the integrity of the factfinding process,'" ante at 428 U. S. 479 , and because application of such constitutional strictures "often frees the guilty." Ante at 428 U. S. 490 . Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas statutes to deny relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional violations, based on this Court's vague notions of comity and federalism, see, e.g., ante at 428 U. S. 478 n. 11, is the actual premise for today's decision, and, although the Court attempts to bury its underlying premises in footnotes, those premises mark this case as a harbinger of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes that plainly does violence to congressional power to frame the statutory contours of habeas jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2/12 ] For we are told that
incarceration," ante at 428 U. S. 492 n. 31, and that "the ultimate question [in the criminal process should invariably be] guilt or innocence." Ante at 428 U. S. 490 ; see also ante at 428 U. S. 491 n. 30; ante at 428 U. S. 490 , quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 , 394 U. S. 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). We are told that the "policy arguments" of respondents to the effect that federal courts must be the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional rights, and that our certiorari jurisdiction is inadequate to perform this task, "stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights"; the Court, however, finds itself
Ante at 428 U. S. 493 -494, n. 35. Finally, we are provided a revisionist history of the genesis and growth of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Ante at 428 U. S. 471 -482 (Part II). If today's decision were only that erroneous state court resolution of Fourth Amendment claims did not render the defendant's resultant confinement "in violation of the Constitution," these pronouncements would have been wholly irrelevant and unnecessary. I am therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims -- for example, of double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations,
and use of invalid identification procedures [ Footnote 2/13 ] -- that this Court later decides are not "guilt-related."
To the extent the Court is actually premising its holding on an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254, it is overruling the heretofore settled principle that federal habeas relief is available to redress any denial of asserted constitutional rights, whether or not denial of the right affected the truth or fairness of the factfinding process. As MR JUSTICE POWELL recognized in proposing that the Court reevaluate the scope of habeas relief as a statutory matter in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 251 (concurring opinion), "on petition for habeas corpus or collateral review filed in a federal district court, whether by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or federal prisoners under § 2255, the present rule is that Fourth Amendment claims may be asserted and the exclusionary rule must be applied in precisely the same manner as on direct review." This Court has on numerous occasions accepted jurisdiction over collateral attacks by state prisoners premised on Fourth Amendment violations, often over dissents that as a statutory matter such claims should not be cognizable. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 , 420 U. S. 291 -292, and nn. 8, 9 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Harris
v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967). Consideration of the merits in each of these decisions reaffirmed the unrestricted scope of habeas jurisdiction, but each decision must be deemed overruled by today's holding. [ Footnote 2/14 ]
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 424 (1963). This Court's precedents have been
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 225 . Some of those decisions explicitly considered and rejected the "policies" referred to by the Court, ante at 428 U. S. 491 -492, n. 31. E.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); Fay v. Noia, supra; Kaufman v. United States, supra. There were no "assumptions" with respect to the construction of the habeas statutes, but reasoned decisions that those policies were an insufficient justification for shutting the federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims in light of such countervailing considerations as
394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 225 -226, as well as the fundamental belief
Id. at 394 U. S. 226 . See generally, e.g., Fay v. Noia, supra; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963). As Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented from many of the cases initially construing the habeas statutes, readily recognized, habeas jurisdiction as heretofore accepted by this Court was
"not only concerned with those rules which substantially affect the factfinding apparatus of the original trial. Under the prevailing notions, Kaufman v. United States, supra at 394 U. S. 224 -226, the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards. "
United States, 394 U. S. 244 , 394 U. S. 262 -263 (1969) (dissenting) (emphasis supplied). The availability of collateral review assures "that the lower federal and state courts toe the constitutional line." Id. at 394 U. S. 264 .
"[H]abeas lies to inquire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial, where the petitioner remains 'in custody' because of the judgment in that trial, unless the error committed was knowingly and deliberately waived or constitutes mere harmless error. That seems to be the implicit premise of Brown v. Allen, supra, and the clear purport of Kaufman v. United States, supra. . . . The primary justification given by the Court for extending the scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is that it provides a quasi -appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional mark."
Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 , 401 U. S. 685 -687 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.). See also Brown v. Allen, supra at 344 U. S. 508 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("[N]o binding weight is to be attached to the State determination. The congressional requirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration of what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right"); Fay v. Noia, supra at 372 U. S. 422 . In effect, habeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to unconstitutional actions by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard to ensure that rights secured under the Constitution and federal laws are not merely honored in the breach. "[I]ts function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints." Id. at 372 U. S. 401 -402. "[T]he historical role of the writ of habeas corpus [is that of] an effective and imperative remedy for detentions contrary to fundamental law." Id. at 372 U. S. 438 .
from judicial proceedings in which constitutional rights were denied has been deemed "contrary to fundamental law," and all constitutional claims have thus been cognizable on federal habeas corpus. There is no foundation in the language or history of the habeas statutes for discriminating between types of constitutional transgressions, and efforts to relegate certain categories of claims to the status of "second-class rights" by excluding them from that jurisdiction have been repulsed. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Today's opinion, however, marks the triumph of those who have sought to establish a hierarchy of constitutional rights, and to deny for all practical purposes a federal forum for review of those rights that this Court deems less worthy or important. Without even paying the slightest deference to principles of stare decisis or acknowledging Congress' failure for two decades to alter the habeas statutes in light of our interpretation of congressional intent to render all federal constitutional contentions cognizable on habeas, the Court today rewrites Congress' jurisdictional statutes as heretofore construed, and bars access to federal courts by state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority of my Brethren. But even ignoring principles of stare decisis dictating that Congress is the appropriate vehicle for embarking on such a fundamental shift in the jurisdiction of the federal courts, I can find no adequate justification elucidated by the Court for concluding that habeas relief for all federal constitutional claims is no longer compelled under the reasoning of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman.
The Court, focusing on Fourth Amendment rights as it must to justify such discrimination, thus argues that habeas relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional claims is not mandated, because such claims do not affect the "basic justice" of a defendant's detention, see ante at 428 U. S. 492 n. 31; this is presumably because the "ultimate goal" of the criminal justice system is "truth and justice." E.g., ante at 428 U. S. 490 , and 428 U. S. 491 n. 30. [ Footnote 2/16 ] This denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally mandated procedures, relegated by the Court to the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect and support for their constitutional rights. Even if punishment of the "guilty" were society's highest value -- and procedural safeguards denigrated to this end -- in a constitution that a majority of the Members of this Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities under the Constitution forged by the Framers, and this Court's sworn duty is to uphold that Constitution,
and not to frame its own. The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution are not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure that the "guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather, every guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to curtail those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously guilty. Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason be denied at the trial itself. What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication of such rights on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights at trial? To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless, and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. [ Footnote 2/17 ] "The history of American freedom
is, in no small measure, the history of procedure," Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 , 324 U. S. 414 (1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), and, as Mr. Justice Holmes so succinctly reminded us, it is "a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 , 277 U. S. 470 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
assigned responsibility to shoulder the ultimate burden of adjudging whether detentions violate federal law, and today's decision substantially abnegates that duty. The Court does not, because it cannot, dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied federal law, [ Footnote 2/18 ] and does not controvert the fact that federal habeas jurisdiction is partially designed to ameliorate that inadequacy. Thus, although I fully agree that state courts "have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law," and that there is no "general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States," ante at 428 U. S. 494 n. 35, I cannot agree that it follows that, as the Court today holds, federal court determination of almost all Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners should be barred, and that state court resolution of those issues should be insulated from the federal review Congress intended. For, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly framed the issue in rejecting similar contentions in construing the habeas statutes in Brown v. Allen, supra:
344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 499 -50 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 344 U. S. 506 .
344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 508 -510 (emphasis supplied).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 498 -499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). To the extent state trial and appellate judges faithfully, accurately, and assiduously apply federal law and the constitutional principles enunciated by the federal
courts, such determinations will be vindicated on the merits when collaterally attacked. But to the extent federal law is erroneously applied by the state courts, there is no authority in this Court to deny defendants the right to have those errors rectified by way of federal habeas; [ Footnote 2/19 ] indeed, the Court's reluctance to accept Congress' desires along these lines can only be a manifestation of this Court's mistrust for federal judges. Furthermore, some might be expected to dispute the academic's dictum seemingly accepted by the Court that a federal judge is not necessarily more skilled than a state judge in applying federal law. See ante at 428 U. S. 494 n. 35. For the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution proceeds on a different premise, and Congress, as it was constitutionally empowered to do, made federal judges (and initially federal district court judges) "the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 , 389 U. S. 247 (1967).
safety demands identification. See ante at 428 U. S. 469 n. 1. It is no crime in a free society not to have "identification papers" on one's person, and the statute is a palpable effort to enable police to arrest individuals on the basis of mere suspicion and to facilitate detention even when there is no probable cause to believe a crime has been or is likely to be committed. See 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 168 -170. Without elaborating on the various arguments buttressing this result, including the self-incrimination aspects of the ordinance and its attempt to circumvent Fourth Amendment safeguards in a situation that, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), would, at most, permit law enforcement officials to conduct a protective search for weapons, I would note only that the ordinance, due to the Court's failure to address its constitutionality today, remains in full force and effect, thereby affirmatively encouraging further Fourth Amendment violations. Moreover, the fact that only a single state judge ever addressed the validity of the ordinance, and the lack of record evidence as to why or how he rejected respondent's claim, gives me pause as to whether there is any real content to the Court's "exception" for bringing Fourth Amendment claims on habeas in situations in which state prisoners were not accorded an opportunity for a full and fair state court resolution of those claims; that fact also makes irrelevant the Court's presumption that deterrence is not furthered when there is federal habeas review of a search and seizure claim that was erroneously rejected by "two or more tiers of state courts." Ante at 428 U. S. 491 .
Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948). Yet the Court today, by refusing to reaffirm our precedents, see ante at 428 U. S. 473 n. 3, even casts some doubt on that heretofore unquestioned precept of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
"an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 , 378 U. S. 109 n. 1. A contrary rule would, of course, render the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment meaningless."
n. 8. Of course, for the Court strongly to reiterate the fundamentality of this principle would only highlight the Nebraska Supreme Court's distortion of the Fourth Amendment in an emotionally charged case, and thereby accentuate the general potential for erroneous state court adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims. [ Footnote 2/20 ]
non -jurisdictional would dictate that respondents are at least free to file out-of-time certiorari petitions; under the Court's "direct review" distinction delineated today, we would still have authority to address the substance of respondents' eminently and concededly meritorious Fourth Amendment claims. Of course, federal review by certiorari in this Court is a matter of grace, and it is grace now seldom bestowed at the behest of a criminal defendant. I have little confidence that three others of the Brethren would join in voting to grant such petitions, thereby reinforcing the notorious fact that our certiorari jurisdiction is inadequate for containing state criminal proceedings within constitutional bounds, and underscoring Congress' wisdom in mandating a broad federal habeas jurisdiction for the district courts. In any event, since we are fully familiar with the records in these cases, respondents are owed at least review in this Court, particularly since it shuts the doors of the district courts in a decision that marks such a stark break with out precedents on the scope of habeas relief; indeed, if the Court were at all disposed to safeguard constitutional rights and educate state and federal judges concerning the contours of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in various situations, it would decide these cases on the merits, rather than employ a procedural ruse that ensures respondents' continued unconstitutional confinement.
I say "ostensibly" secured both because it is clear that the Court has yet to make its final frontal assault on the exclusionary rule, and because the Court has recently moved in the direction of holding that the Fourth Amendment has no substantive content whatsoever. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, post at 428 U. S. 567 -569 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein.
See also, e.g., ante at 428 U. S. 486 ("The decision in Kaufman [v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969),] is premised on the view that implementation of the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration of search and seizure claims upon collateral review of state convictions"); ante at 428 U. S. 489 ("The answer [to the question whether Fourth Amendment claims may be raised by state prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings] is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims"); ante at 428 U. S. 493 ("[T]he additional contribution, if any, of the consideration of search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. . . . The view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal"); ante at 428 U. S. 494 -495 ("In this context, the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist with special force").
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969), argued that, in light of his view of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, Fourth Amendment claims should not, as a matter of statutory construction, be cognizable on federal habeas. However, he never made the suggestion, apparently embraced by the Court today, that such claims cannot, as a constitutional matter, be entertained on habeas jurisdiction, even though Congress fashioned that jurisdiction at least in part to compensate for the inadequacies inherent in our certiorari jurisdiction on direct review. Cf. ante at 428 U. S. 481 n. 15, and 428 U. S. 490 . Indeed, Kaufman did not ignore the dissenting Justices' arguments; rather, it noted that habeas jurisdiction, apart from any effect on police behavior, serves the independent function of "insur[ing] the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional rights are at stake." 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 225 . See also infra at 428 U. S. 519 -522. As to the argument that our prior cases do not resolve the issue decided today because "only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised in the petition," see ante at 428 U. S. 481 n. 15, that claim is only valid to the extent the issue is one of construing congressional intent as to when, with respect to cases properly within the district court's power to grant relief, habeas relief should nevertheless be denied as a matter of discretion. But, to the extent a person against whom unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted at trial after a full and fair hearing is not "in custody in violation of the Constitution," there would be no jurisdiction even to entertain a habeas petition, see n. 2, supra, and such subject matter jurisdiction questions are always open -- and must be resolved -- at any stage of federal litigation. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908); Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(h). It borders on the incredible to suggest that so many Justices for so long merely "assumed" the answer to such a basic jurisdictional question.
See also 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 351 , noting "inadmissibility of the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search victim."
It is unnecessary here to expand upon my reasons for disagreement, which are stated fully in my dissents in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 355 -367, and United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 , 422 U. S. 550 -562 (1975).
The Court's arguments respecting the cost/benefit analysis of applying the exclusionary rule on collateral attack also have no merit. For all of the "costs" of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas should already have been incurred at the trial or on direct review if the state court had not misapplied federal constitutional principles. As such, these "costs" were evaluated and deemed to be outweighed when the exclusionary rule was fashioned. The only proper question on habeas is whether federal courts, acting under congressional directive to have the last say as to enforcement of federal constitutional principles, are to permit the States free enjoyment of the fruits of a conviction which by definition were only obtained through violations of the Constitution as interpreted in Mapp. And as to the question whether any "educative" function is served by such habeas review, see ante at 428 U. S. 493 , today's decision will certainly provide a lesson that, tragically for an individual's constitutional rights, will not be lost on state courts. See infra at 428 U. S. 530 -533.
Another line of analysis exposes the fallacy of treating today's holding as a constitutional decision. Constitutionally, no barrier precludes a state defendant from immediately seeking a federal court's injunction against any state use of unconstitutionally seized evidence against him at trial. However, equitable principles have operated to foreclose cutting short the normal initial adjudication of such constitutional defenses in the course of a criminal prosecution, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 , 380 U. S. 485 n. 3 (1965), subject to ultimate federal review either on direct review or collaterally through habeas. See also, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). Moreover, considerations of comity, now statutorily codified as the exhaustion requirement of § 2254, and not lack of power, dictate that federal habeas review be delayed pending the initial state court determination. But delay only was the price,
Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 420 (1963); see id. at 372 U. S. 417 -426. The Court today, however, converts this doctrine dictating the timing of federal review into a doctrine precluding federal review, see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 , 425 U. S. 542 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); such action is in keeping with the regrettable recent trend of barring the federal courthouse door to individuals with meritorious claims. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 (1976). Although the federal courts could have been the forum for the initial "opportunity for a full and fair hearing" of Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners that the Court finds constitutionally sufficient, nonconstitutional concerns dictated temporary abstention; but having so abstained, federal courts are now ousted by this Court from ever determining the claims, since the courts to which they initially deferred are all that this Court deems necessary for protecting rights essential to preservation of the Fourth Amendment. Such hostility to federal jurisdiction to redress violations of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, despite congressional conferral of that jurisdiction, is profoundly disturbing.
Others might be claims of official surveillance of attorney-client communications, government acquisition of evidence through unconscionable means, see, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), denial of the right to a speedy trial, government administration of a "truth serum," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963), denial of the right to jury trial, see Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618 , 427 U. S. 627 n. 3 (1976), or the obtaining of convictions under statutes that contravene First Amendment rights when a properly drawn statute could have been applied to the particular defendant's conduct.
My Brother WHITE's hypothesis of two confederates in crime, see post at 428 U. S. 536 -537, fully demonstrates the type of discrimination that Congress clearly sought to avoid if, out of the full universe of constitutional rights, certain rights could be vindicated only by resort to this Court's certiorari jurisdiction.
The Court also notes that "attention . . . [is] diverted" when trial courts address exclusionary rule issues, ante at 428 U. S. 490 , and with the result that application of the rule "often frees the guilty." Ibid. Of course, these "arguments" are true with respect to every constitutional guarantee governing administration of the criminal justice system.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 , 277 U. S. 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also id. at 277 U. S. 483 , 277 U. S. 485 .
Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 , 357 U. S. 313 (1958). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 635 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S. 392 -394 (1914)
Boyd v. United States, supra at 116 U. S. 635 .
These considerations were powerfully articulated in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 , 344 U. S. 491 -494 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Cf. also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 432 -433; England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 , 375 U. S. 415 -417 (1964).
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 497 -499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). "The meritorious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those few claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities." Id. at 344 U. S. 498 .
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 , 386 U. S. 555 (1967). The officer is also excused from liability for "acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid, but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." Ibid. There is little doubt that, as far as civil liability is concerned, the rule is the same under federal law where the officer mistakenly but reasonably believes he has probable cause for an arrest. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court announced generally that officers of the executive branch of the government should be immune from liability where their action is reasonable "in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief." Id. at 416 U. S. 247 -248. The Court went on to say:
Id. at 416 U. S. 241 -242 (footnote omitted). The Court has proceeded on this same basis in other contexts. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975).