Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/103459/dorszynski-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2019-07-20 22:31:09
Document Index: 66212071

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5005', '§ 5010', '§ 2', '§ 844', '§ 2', '§ 844', '§ 844', '§ 3651', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5007', '§ 5017', '§ 5017', '§ 5021', '§ 5021', '§ 5021', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5005', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5010', '§ 5', '§ 2']

Dorszynski Vs United States - Citation 103459 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Dorszynski Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103459
Case Number 418 U.S. 424
Appellant Dorszynski
dorszynski v. united states - 418 u.s. 424 (1974) u.s. supreme court dorszynski v. united states, 418 u.s. 424 (1974) dorszynski v. united states no. 73-5284 argued march 20, 1974 decided june 26, 1974 418 u.s. 424 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit syllabus in sentencing a youth offender as an adult under other applicable penal statutes, § 5010(d) of the federal youth corrections act requires a federal district court to "find" that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the act, but does not require that such "finding" be accompanied by supporting reasons. pp. 418 u. s. 431 -444. (a) section 5010(d)'s requirement of a "no benefit" finding is not to be.....
Dorszynski v. United States - 418 U.S. 424 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974)
In sentencing a youth offender as an adult under other applicable penal statutes, § 5010(d) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act requires a federal district court to "find" that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the Act, but does not require that such "finding" be accompanied by supporting reasons. Pp. 418 U. S. 431 -444.
(a) Section 5010(d)'s requirement of a "no benefit" finding is not to be read as a substantive standard that must be satisfied to support a sentence outside the Act, for such a reading would not comport with the intent of the Act, as manifested by its legislative history, to increase federal trial judges' sentencing options, or with the traditional doctrine that the sentencing function is exclusively vested in the trial court and is not reviewable if within the terms of the statute. It therefore follows that requiring a statement of supporting reasons to accompany a "no benefit" finding would limit the trial court's sentencing discretion, since it would only serve to facilitate appellate review of sentencing, contrary to the intent of the Act. Pp. 418 U. S. 436 -442.
(b) Section 5010(d)'s "no benefit" finding requirement was designed to insure that the sentencing judge deliberately exercised discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act, such a finding making it clear that the judge was not only aware of the Act's existence, but also of the youth offender's eligibility for treatment thereunder. Once it is made clear that the judge has considered the option of the Act's treatment and rejected it, no appellate review is warranted. Pp. 418 U. S. 442 -443.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,. in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and STEWART, JJ., joined, post, p. 418 U. S. 445 .
We granted certiorari, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973), to resolve a conflict in the Circuits concerning whether, in sentencing a youth offender under other applicable penal statutes, § 5010(d) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., requires a federal district court first to make an explicit finding, supported by reasons on the record, that the offender would not benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c) of § 5010. The Court of Appeals held that such a finding may be implied from the record, 484 F.2d 849 (CA7 1973). Three Circuits have taken that position, [ Footnote 1 ] and three Circuits have required an explicit finding accompanied by supporting reasons. [ Footnote 2 ] We conclude that, while an express finding of no benefit must be made on the
On October 19, 1971, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs made arrangements with petitioner's codefendant, whose case is not before this Court, to purchase approximately 1,000 tablets of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) the following day. At the appointed hour on October 20, 1971, the undercover agent was shown approximately 1,000 LSD tablets in the possession of petitioner's codefendant, who transferred the tablets to the agent. The exhibition and transfer took place in an automobile being driven by petitioner. After the tablets were transferred to the agent, but before money had changed hands, petitioner and his codefendant were arrested. The complaint upon which the arrest warrant for petitioner issued charged him with knowingly and intentionally possessing approximately 1,000 tablets of LSD, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). [ Footnote 3 ] Subsequent to petitioner's release on his own recognizance, his counsel informed the District Court that petitioner intended to plead guilty to the charge, and requested the completion of a presentence report prior to the plea, as authorized by Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 32(c).
plea, and sentence. The Government filed a one-count information charging petitioner and his codefendant with a misdemeanor offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). The Government informed the court that the maximum sentence petitioner and his codefendant, who were first offenders under § 844(a), could receive was one year in prison, a fine of $5,000, or both; the court was also advised that, since petitioner might have been under the age of 26, see n 9, infra, he "may also be subject to the Federal Youth Corrections Act." [ Footnote 4 ] App. 6. Petitioner, who was 19
years old at the time of the proceeding, and had had no prior criminal record, pleaded guilty, as did his codefendant. After inquiry as prescribed by Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 11 to determine whether there was a basis, in fact, for petitioner's guilty plea, and whether it was entered voluntarily with understanding of its nature and consequences, [ Footnote 5 ] the District Court accepted the plea.
Since petitioner desired to be sentenced at this proceeding, the District Court recessed to consider the presentence report, which petitioner's counsel had already read. After recess and before sentencing, petitioner was given his right to allocution, and petitioner's counsel requested the court that petitioner "be placed . . . on probation under the Youth Corrections Act." App. 13. See n 4, supra. Petitioner then received a split sentence which remitted him to the custody of the Attorney General for one year, to serve 90 days' confinement "in a jail-type or treatment" institution, although the judgment mentions only a "jail-type" institution; the execution of the remainder of the sentence was suspended, and petitioner was placed on probation for two years upon release from custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3651. [ Footnote 6 ] At no time during the proceeding, including
The sole issue in this case is the validity of the sentence imposed by the District Court. Petitioner contends that, before any adult sentence may be imposed § 5010(d) requires, first, that the sentencing judge find explicitly that the convicted defendant would receive no benefit from treatment under the Act and, second, that the sentencing judge must explain the reasons for his finding. We begin with the general proposition that, once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end. [ Footnote 7 ] Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 357 U. S. 393 (1958); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 , 334 U. S. 741 (1948); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 , 284 U. S. 305 (1932). Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the sentence imposed here was permitted under § 5010(d) of the Act.
The Federal Youth Corrections Act has been accurately described as the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing. United States v. Coefield, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 209, 476 F.2d 1152, 1156 (1973). The Act is in substantial part an outgrowth of recommendations made by the Judicial Conference of the United States more than 30 years ago. [ Footnote 8 ] The principles and procedures contained in the Conference recommendations were, in turn, largely based on those developed since 1894 for a system of treatment of young offenders in England, known as the Borstal system. See Criminal Justice Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, and Criminal Justice Act of 161, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 39. Statistics available at the time of the Conference study revealed the two principal motivating factors behind the enactment of the Act: first, the period of life between 16 and 22 years of age was
The objective of these options represented a departure from traditional sentencing, and focused primarily on correction and rehabilitation. All persons under 22 years of age at the time of conviction were made eligible for probation or treatment under the Act, [ Footnote 9 ] the latter defined
probation officers providing the supervision. [ Footnote 10 ] 18 U.S.C. §§ 5007, 5017, 5019. Conditional release was mandatory after a period of time fixed by the statutory formula. 18 U.S.C. § 5017. See n 4, supra. The Division was further authorized to order the unconditional discharge of committed persons after a fixed period of treatment, and was required unconditionally to discharge them within a period also fixed by statutory formula. 18 U.S.C. § 5017. A powerful tool available to the Division was its discretion to discharge committed persons unconditionally before it was required to do so, for, upon such discharge, the conviction upon which the sentence rested would be automatically set aside. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a). See n 5, supra. Similarly, if the sentencing judge chose the second alternative created by the Act, i.e., placement of the youth offender on probation under its provisions, the judge himself could exercise his discretion to discharge the offender from probation unconditionally. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b). See n 6, supra. This, too, would result in the automatic setting aside of the offender's conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b).
The foregoing describes the new options of treatment and probation made available to the federal sentencing court under the Act. [ Footnote 11 ] Our concern is not with the operation
To the same effect is the statement made by Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips, the Chairman of the Conference subcommittee which gave particular attention to the treatment of youth offenders. See n 8, supra. In response to the statement of Senator Kilgore, sponsor of S. 2609, that the bill "takes nothing" (in terms of sentencing) "away from the court," Judge Phillips replied: "That is correct; it is purely optional." Hearings 69. Earlier, Judge Phillips had said of the bill: "That is merely a flexibility, and it is not a command that he send the boys up," to which Senator Kilgore replied: "I agree with you on that. . . ." Id. at 67. To the extent other testimony and the debates addressed the question of sentencing discretion under the Act, they invariably reflected the same view, [ Footnote 12 ] as did the House
Report, quoted above, and the Department of Justice, which recommended enactment of S. 2609 and noted that the bill "would not deprive the court of any of its present functions as to sentencing." S.Rep. No. 1180, pp. 111. The Senate Report's language was identical to that of the Department of Justice. [ Footnote 13 ] Id. at 1. The legislative history
To construe § 5010(d)'s requirement of a "no benefit" finding to circumscribe that discretion would be incompatible with a clear congressional intent; such a construction would also be at odds with traditional sentencing doctrine. The intent of Congress was in accord with long-established authority in the United States vesting the sentencing function exclusively in the trial court. [ Footnote 14 ]
limit, the trial court's sentencing discretion. [ Footnote 15 ] In short, we hold that the discretion vested in a district judge under § 5010(d) is essentially the same as the. traditional discretion vested in the court, for example, to impose the minimum sentence on a first offender or a larger sentence on a recidivist. If the failure of a court to sentence a particular youth offender under the Act appears "too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation under the guise of construction," Blockburger, supra, at 284 U. S. 305 , since "[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment . . . , [t]hese are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore, supra, at 357 U. S. 393 .
Although well established doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when sentencing discretion is not exercised at all. Yates v. United States, 356 U. S. 363 , 356 U. S. 366 -367 (1958); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 972 (CA6 1971); United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940, 945 (CA4 1969). See also n 7, supra. The requirement of the "no benefit" finding was designed to insure that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act. Such a finding would make unmistakably clear that the sentencing judge was not only aware of the existence of the new Act, but also knew that the youth offender before him was eligible because of his age for the treatment it provided to accomplish its important purpose.
There is no contention here that the District Court relied upon improper or inaccurate information. United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972). Petitioner contends he was denied due process because he was deprived of his claimed right to be sentenced under the Act, without a reasoned explanation on the record for the asserted deprivation. We need not address this contention, for it was not raised before the District Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. Phillips Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376 , 361 U. S. 386 n. 12 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 , 347 U. S. 129 -130 (1954); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17 , 347 U. S. 37 n. 35 (1954).
The Court is today called upon to construe the provision of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq., defining the circumstances under which a youth offender may be sentenced as an adult. The Youth Corrections Act (YCA) provides a comprehensive sentencing scheme for offenders between the ages of 18 and 22, affording trial judges four options for sentencing such offenders. The judge may suspend imposition or execution of sentence and place the offender on probation. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a). Alternatively, the judge may sentence the offender for treatment and supervision at a special youth facility, to be discharged in no more than 6 years, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), or he may commit the offender to a youth institution for a term which may exceed 6 years, up to the maximum period authorized by law for the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c). [ Footnote 2/1 ] Finally, the judge may sentence the offender as an adult, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d), which provides that:
ante at 418 U. S. 444 , but I find that holding patently inconsistent with the Court's assertion that a sentencing judge need only be aware of the applicability of the Act and choose to reject it in order to satisfy the clear admonition of § 5010(d). As construed by the Court, the "no benefit" finding is not a finding at all.
I find no basis in either the language or history of the YCA to support the Court's observation that the Act was intended to "preserve unfettered" the discretion of the sentencing judge. Ante at 418 U. S. 437 . The YCA was the product of more than 10 years of study by various groups, and was modeled after the English Borstal system, which had achieved substantial success in rehabilitating young offenders. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The initial legislative proposal, an American Law Institute model Act, removed the power to sentence eligible offenders from the trial judges altogether and reposed that power in a correctional authority. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Not surprisingly, that proposal
brought swift and sharp criticism from the judges, whose power was to be sharply curtailed. The next proposal, by the Judicial Conference, involved shared sentencing powers between trial judges and correctional authorities. [ Footnote 2/4 ] It met with similar criticism. The 1949 proposal, which was finally enacted into law, retained sentencing power in the trial judge. As the Court today points out, the drafters of the Act repeatedly emphasized that the legislation " does not interfere with the [sentencing] power of the judge. . . .'" Ante at 418 U. S. 437 .
But even the very first Judicial Conference proposal contained a provision specifically requiring the trial judge to make a finding that a youth offender would not benefit from treatment, and should not be committed under the Act, before sentencing him under any other penalty provisions. [ Footnote 2/5 ] This finding requirement was adapted from the similar Borstal provision which disallows a sentencing court to
"impose imprisonment on a person under twenty-one years of age unless . . . no other [Borstal] method of dealing with him is appropriate. . . . [ Footnote 2/6 ]"
The finding requirement is an integral part of the YCA scheme. The stated premise of the Act is that young people between the ages of 18 and 22, especially, are promising subjects for rehabilitation. [ Footnote 2/7 ] The purpose of the legislation was, for those offenders,
H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950). [ Footnote 2/8 ] It is clear that, from its very inception, the youth corrections program was intended to establish among the goals judges could consider in sentencing eligible offenders, one as paramount -- that of rehabilitation. [ Footnote 2/9 ] And, in this limited sense, the sentencing discretion of trial judges is necessarily circumscribed in regard to youth offenders. The finding requirement of § 5010(d) effectuates this policy by permitting eligible offenders to be deprived of the rehabilitative treatment provided under the Act only where they would not benefit therefrom.
offenders would] eventually have to [be] sentence[d as adults], or less." Hearing on S. 895 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1943). The House Report concluded that, even given the instances in which YCA rehabilitative treatment would fail, "more than 70 percent [of eligible youth offenders] can be rehabilitated" under the Act. H.R.Rep. No. 2979, supra, at 10. The panoply of treatment options [ Footnote 2/10 ] available under the Act is but further evidence that the YCA program was intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to deal with all but the "incorrigible" youth.
This congressional intent finds clear expression in the words of the statute. Section 5010(d) does not say the sentencing court must merely consider the treatment option provided by the Act; it says in the most uncompromising terms that the court must find the youth "will not benefit" from YCA treatment as a prerequisite to imposing an adult sentence. The use of the words "shall find" emphasizes the mandatory nature of that finding. The specific quality of the finding is underscored by § 5010(e), which provides for an eligible offender to be temporarily committed for observation and study for the purpose of providing the sentencing court with a report on the particular question defined by § 5010(d) -- whether the youth offender would benefit from treatment under the Act. [ Footnote 2/11 ]
United States v. Waters, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 291, 437 F.2d 722, 724 (1970). The legislative history relied on by the Court merely emphasizes this point -- that the Act was intended to be another sentencing alternative available to the trial Judge, and that the decision as to whether it should be employed in a particular case remains a decision committed to his discretion. That history is not, however, inconsistent with what seems to me the plain meaning of the words of the statute -- that the sentencing Judge's discretion is circumscribed by the affirmative finding requirement of § 5010(d). [ Footnote 2/12 ] The YCA "provides a preferred sentencing alternative" which must be used in sentencing a youth unless the facts of the individual case meet the statutory requirement --
unless, in the language of § 5010(d), the court finds that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. [ Footnote 2/13 ] Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d at 337; United States v. Waters, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 29293, 437 F.2d at 725-726. Every Court of Appeals which has considered the issue, except the court below, has agreed that the manner in which the sentencing judge exercises his discretion is thus limited. Brooks v. United States, 497 F.2d 1059 (CA6 1974); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133 (CA2 1974) (en banc); United States v. Schenker, 486 F.2d 318 (CA5 1973); United States v. Coefield, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 476 F.2d 1152 (1973) (en banc); Cox v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970 (CA3 1973); see United States v. MacDonald, 455 F.2d 1259, 1265 (CA1 1972); [ Footnote 2/14 ] cf. Small v. United States, 304 A.2d 641 (DC Ct.App. 1973).
must be explicit, the Court notes that "[t]o hold that a no benefit' finding is implicit each time a sentence under the Act is not chosen would render § 5010(d) nugatory." Ante at 418 U. S. 444 . Despite these protestations, the Court today renders the finding requirement of § 5010(d) a nullity. By holding that the Act was intended to preserve "the unfettered sentencing discretion of federal district judges," ante at 418 U. S. 437 , and that sentencing judges need only have "considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it," ante at 418 U. S. 443 , the Court effectively reads the unambiguous mandate of a "no benefit" finding out of the Act. A mere parroting of the statutory language is hardly an affirmative finding. The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the sentencing judge need not mean what he says when he pronounces the "no benefit" litany. Although the Court requires him to go through the charade of saying that the offender would not benefit from treatment under the Act, it apparently does not require that the judge actually find no benefit, but only that he be aware of the Act and reject it. I think it remarkable that this Court should approve such an empty and duplicitous ritual.
record, a statement which makes clear that he considered the provisions of the Act, weighed the treatment option available, and decided in light of his familiarity with the offender that he would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. [ Footnote 2/15 ]
The Borstal system, which provided the model for the youth corrections scheme in general and the requirement of § 5010(d) in particular, envisions a trial judge stating his reasons for sentencing an eligible offender as an adult. [ Footnote 2/16 ] Similarly, most of the Courts of Appeals which
have faced the issue have required a statement of reasons as a necessary concomitant of the § 5010(d) finding. A unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a near-unanimous en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit [ Footnote 2/17 ] have found a statement of reasons supporting the "no benefit" finding to be " essential to a knowledgeable administration of the Act. . . .'" United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d at 1139; United States v. Coefield, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 210, 476 F.2d at 1157. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has, more recently, held that a statement of reasons accompanying adult sentencing is
Brooks v. United States, 497 F.2d at 1063. Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently remanded a case for consideration of whether treatment under the Act would be beneficial to the offender, and specifically ordered the trial judge to state the reasons for his conclusion. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d at 337. In fact, the court below is the only Court of Appeals to specifically disavow a requirement of reasons for a § 5010(d) sentence. [ Footnote 2/18 ]
Moreover, an articulation of reasons may actually contribute to the offender's rehabilitation by avoiding any feeling that his sentence was arbitrary. [ Footnote 2/19 ] As MR. JUSTICE (then Judge) STEWART observed:
Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (CA6 1958). If reasons were articulated for the sentencing decision, an offender would be less apt to perceive his fate as being arbitrarily determined. [ Footnote 2/20 ] Reasoned decisions may even enhance the legitimacy of the sentencing process as perceived by the general public, for, as noted by the Report of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice:
take the position that he need not explain why he selects a particular sentence. . . . [ Footnote 2/21 ]"
Although these considerations apply to sentencing decisions generally, [ Footnote 2/22 ] I do not mean to suggest that reasons are required in any other sentencing context. Contrary to the majority's accusations, my view of the Act does not require wholesale abandonment of "traditional sentencing doctrine." Ante at 418 U. S. 440 . We are concerned here with only a limited, albeit important, area of sentencing for which Congress has established special rules. Congress' urgent concern for the rehabilitative potential of young offenders and the specific-finding requirement of § 5010(d) make the need for reasons particularly compelling in this context. Requiring a statement of reasons would encourage trial judges to direct their attention to the crucial questions of benefit and treatment, to take a hard look at the relevant factors, and to focus on value judgments inherent in their sentencing decision. See United States v. Phillips, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 479
United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d at 1139. Accord, United States v. Coefield, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 210, 476 F.2d at 1157. But the Act clearly intended that the ultimate sentencing decision remain with the trial judge. That decision should not pass by abdication to the correctional authorities who prepare the § 5010(e) study. Thus, where a trial judge secures a § 5010(e) report, he should adopt its reasons as his own only after assuring himself of the adequacy of the report and propriety of its recommendation. [ Footnote 2/23 ]
I see no reason to reach here the issue of appellate review of the District Court's imposition of an adult sentence. I believe that the Youth Corrections Act provides a preferred sentencing alternative which can only be abandoned on the basis of a finding that an eligible offender will not benefit from treatment under the Act. The District Court imposed sentence on the assumption that the YCA was not a preferred disposition and no finding was required. The Court today finds the District Court's sentence invalid only for failure to make the required "no benefit" finding. Under either the Court's view or my own, the appellate review question is clearly not yet presented by this case. [ Footnote 2/24 ]
For a general discussion of the value of a statement of the reasons underlying the imposition of sentence, see United States v. Phillips, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 479 F.2d 1200 (1973); United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (CA2 1973); United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1172 (CA2 1973); American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 5.6(ii) and commentary (b), pp. 270-271 (Approved Draft 1968); id. Appellate Review of Sentences § 2.3(c) and commentary (e), pp. 45-47 (Approved Draft 1968); M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences, Law Without Order 39-49 (1972); R. Goldfarb & L. Singer, After Conviction 191-195 (1973); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 1281, 1292-1293 (1952); Youngdahl, Remarks Opening the Sentencing Institute Program, 35 F.R.D. 387, 388 (1964); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 , 395 U. S. 726 (1969); Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541 , 383 U. S. 561 (1966).