Source: http://cl.bna.com/cl/19981007/961309.htm
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 3742', '§ 3742', '§ 841', '§ 780', '§ 3742', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5']

Charles Floyd Russell,
No. 96-1309
No. 94-20072--Robert H. Cleland, District Judge.
Argued: September 8, 1997 Decided and Filed: September 23, 1998
Before: MERRITT, JONES, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges
ARGUED: Stevens J. Jacobs, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellant. Janet L. Parker, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
ATTORNEY, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stevens J. Jacobs, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellant. Janet L. Parker, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
ATTORNEY, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellee.
JONES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
MERRITT, J., joined. NORRIS, J. (pp. 15-16), delivered a
separate dissenting opinion.
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. Defendant Charles Floyd Russell appeals from the district court's
judgment sentencing him to the statutory minimum 60 months
imprisonment following his guilty plea to manufacturing
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1). Russell
argues that the district court erred in determining that 104
marijuana plants, rather than 96, were discovered during a
valid search of his residence and using that figure in
computing his sentence. In addition, Russell argues that the
court erred in denying various forms of relief from his
sentence, including an adjustment based upon acceptance of
responsibility, and also downward departures based upon both
the "safety valve" of the Sentencing Guidelines and Russell's
physical disability.See footnote 1
While we affirm the district court's determinations that Russell was not entitled to a downward
departure or adjustment to his sentence, for the following reasons, we nevertheless vacate the sentence imposed below
In 1993, informant James Morrow, who himself is deaf, provided police in Traverse City, Michigan with information
implicating Russell and several others concerning the
manufacture, use, and distribution of drugs in the local deaf
and hearing-impaired community. Using this information, the
police obtained and executed a state search warrant on March
4, 1993 at the home of Darren Bedwell and Bonnie Hart. That search recovered 36 marijuana plants, a quantity of
processed marijuana, and related paraphernalia. Based on
information given by Morrow, as well as the results of the
search from the Bedwell/Hart residence, the police
subsequently went to the home of Russell and his girlfriend,
Karen Merriman, to continue the search. Merriman (who is
also deaf) consented to the search of the premises, and the
police recovered processed marijuana, related paraphernalia,
and at least 104 marijuana plants.
Russell was eventually charged with a six-count indictment. He pleaded guilty to the charge of manufacturing marijuana
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).See footnote 2
In the plea agreement, Russell acknowledged that at least 104 marijuana plants were
attributed to him and that the minimum statutory sentence he
could receive was 60 months. However, Russell also reserved
the right to contest these conclusions during sentencing. In accordance with the plea agreement, the remaining counts in
the indictment were dismissed.
At sentencing, Russell made several challenges to his
presentence report, most of which he raises again before this
court on appeal. One such challenge was that the presentence
report was inaccurate inasmuch as it stated that 104 marijuana
plants were recovered from Russell's residence. Russell
argued that the correct number, 96 plants, was reflected in the
return of the search warrant. Nevertheless, the district court
found that 104 marijuana plants had been seized from
Russell's residence. Accordingly, the district court imposed
the mandatory minimum 60-month sentence upon Russell. The court also denied Russell's request to be sentenced within
the guideline range. Russell filed a timely appeal to this
Russell first challenges the district court's finding that 104 marijuana plants were discovered at his residence by the
police during their March 4, 1993 search. This court will give
due deference to a district court's application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to the factual situation found to exist
and will review such a decision only for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1991). A finding is clearly erroneous when
"although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365 (1948). All such findings of fact that are crucial to a determination of a
defendant's base offense level and criminal history category
must be based upon a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192, 1195 (6th Cir. 1993); accord United States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir.) (sentencing court's estimate of drugs must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence when court unable to
determine exact amount of drug quantities seized), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 285 (1994). "Where the amount of drugs involved is uncertain, the court is urged to 'err on the side of
caution' and only hold the defendant responsible for that
quantity of drugs which 'the defendant is more likely than not
responsible.'" United States v. Bingham, 81 F.3d 617, 625 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Baro, 15 F.3d at 568-69).
Additionally, a defendant may only appeal his sentence on
the grounds that it 1) was imposed in violation of law, 2) was
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
guidelines, 3) represented an upward departure from the
applicable guideline range, or 4) is a plainly unreasonable
sentence imposed for an offense for which there is no
sentencing guideline; the defendant may not appeal a sentence
within the prescribed guideline range. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Lively, 20 F.3d 193, 196-97 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lavoie, 19 F.3d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus, the court of appeals has jurisdiction over a defendant's
appeal "when that defendant identifies a specific legal error in
the formulation of his or her sentence, and alleges that the
sentencing guidelines have been incorrectly applied[.]" Lavoie, 19 F.3d at 1104.
In this case, Russell argues that the district court should
have imposed the sentence under the factual premise that
there were only 96 marijuana plants recovered from his
residence, not 104. Russell argues that the return of the
search warrant only lists 96 plants as having been recovered
from the search. The difference is of crucial importance in
this case--the 60-month mandatory minimum is effectuated
when a perpetrator is caught with "100 or more marijuana
plants regardless of weight[.]" See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). Had the district court determined that
only 96 marijuana plants been seized from Russell's
residence, Russell would have faced a significantly lower
sentence under the guidelines.
In arriving at its finding that 104 plants had been recovered,
the district court relied upon an incident report produced by
the police on the day of the search. The incident report noted that 96 plants were seized from the main portion of the rear
bedroom, and an additional eight plants were recovered from
the closet. The district court was persuaded to favor the
amount of plants recovered in the incident report over the
amount presented in the return of the search warrant report
because the former was more "lengthy and detailed" than the
latter. J.A. at 174.
Russell acknowledged that there was marijuana in both his
bedroom and his closet. He did not proffer testimony that the
total number of plants was indeed 96, but instead challenged
the reliability of the incident report. The government, in turn,
argues that due deference to the district court's factual
findings are appropriate in this case. Neither side brings a
single case to this court's attention involving the resolution of
the issue at hand: when the information contained in the
return of a search warrant conflicts with information
contained in an incident report, which should prevail?
We believe that the return of the search warrant bears the
more reliable number of the amount of marijuana plants
recovered at Russell's home and that the district court erred
when it favored the incident report. As a preliminary matter,
we note that Michigan specifically requires return inventories
of items seized pursuant to a search warrant. The relevant
statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
When an officer in the execution of a search warrant
finds any property or seizes any of the other things for
which a search warrant is allowed by this act, the officer,
in the presence of the person whose possession or
premises the property or thing was taken, if present, or in
the presence of at least 1 other person, shall make a complete and accurate tabulation of the property and
things so seized. The officer taking property or other things under the warrant shall forthwith give to the
person from whom or from whose premises the property
was taken a copy of the warrant and shall give to the
person a copy of the tabulation upon completion, or shall
leave a copy of the warrant and tabulation at the place from which the property or thing was taken. He shall file the tabulation promptly with the court or magistrate. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.655 (West 1998) (emphasis
added).See footnote 3
There are, of course, sound reasons why the inventory of the items seized should be verified. We have
previously observed that a primary purpose of the return
requirement is "to allow for proper identification of property taken by the police under the warrant and to protect the
owner's rights therein." United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). An obvious
corollary to protecting the owner's rights is that accurate
inventory of seized property also insulates the police against
false claims, thus giving even the police every incentive to
carefully account for every item taken from private premises. Moreover, return of the search warrant promotes the truth-
gathering process since it ensures that "the warrant and its
affidavit are available to counsel for inspection in preparation
for trial." Id. While Dudek interpreted the return statute of Ohio, we believe that the above purposes are applicable for
Michigan's counterpart statute as well.
A police incident report, on the other hand, is often crafted
with an eye towards prosecution of the defendant. While we
acknowledge that the district court has wide latitude in
considering facts at the sentencing stage, we are also mindful
that police investigative reports used against a defendant in a
criminal trial are generally regarded as unreliable and are
excluded as a matter of law as inadmissable hearsay at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B);See footnote 4
see also Paul F. Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence: Rules of Evidence for the
United States Courts and Magistrates 384.3 (1997) ("Congress indicated a dislike of the use of law enforcement
records against the accused in a criminal case by expressly
excluding such records used in such a way from the
government records rule."); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Congress was concerned about
prosecutors attempting to prove their cases in chief simply by
putting into evidence police officers' reports of their
contemporaneous observations of the crime."). While there
was no evidence whatsoever of any bad faith on the part of
the law enforcement officers regarding the discrepancy
between the two tallies, we also note that the incident report,
unlike the return of the search warrant, was not sworn and
presented to a judicial official.
Arguably, it could be said in this case that the government
was not using the report to prove its case against Russell at
all. Instead, the incident report can be said to have been
prepared as a disinterested, routine practice of the police to
record the number of plants recovered in a lawful seizure. Additionally, at least in this case, because the incident report
contains far more detail than the return of the search warrant,
it could be said to possess the stronger indicia of reliability
between the two documents. Indeed, the detailed nature of
the incident report was the primary basis upon which the
district court found that 104, not 96, plants were found at
Russell's residence.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the number of plants
seized is the very heart of the government's case against
Russell at issue. No officer with personal knowledge of the seizure testified to the veracity of the incident report. Cf. U.S. v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1996) (when author of government report personally testifies as to accuracy of
report, no hearsay problems in using report against criminal
defendant). On the other hand, pursuant to section 780.655,
two police officers swore to a magistrate that the material
contained in the return of the search warrant was a true and
correct tabulation of the items seized at Russell's residence. The government contends that the information contained in
the incident report is correct because it was corroborated by
supporting evidence. For example, the government notes that
the incident report was consistent with a state police
laboratory report which stated that two separate quantities of
marijuana were seized from separate locations in the
residence, thus supporting the incident report's statement that
96 plants were taken from Russell's bedroom and eight were
taken from Russell's closet. Additionally, Russell conceded
that marijuana was taken from his closet. However, neither
of these points is of any assistance in concluding how many
plants were taken from Russell's residence. Videotapes and
photographs taken at the scene were similarly unhelpful in
obtaining a definitive number of plants seized.
Given the tremendous importance of the factual findings to
Russell's sentence, we believe that the district court erred in
affording more credibility to the incident report. When an
incident report is inconsistent with information contained in
a return of a search warrant that has been presented to a
magistrate, we believe that the latter is the superior beacon of
reliability. To allow unverified incident reports to be the
basis for factual determinations at criminal proceedings when
contradicted by sworn returns would undermine confidence in
the reliability of the judicial system.
Having determined that application of the 60-month
statutory minimum sentence was not proper, we must remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 199-203 (1992).
Russell next contends that the district court erred in denying his request for an adjustment based upon acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.See footnote 5
Although Russell pleaded guilty and apparently cooperated with the police, the
district court denied Russell's request for an adjustment
because the court found that Russell had not been truthful
regarding an automobile incident involving Russell and
informant Morrow. On November 8, 1994, nineteen months
after the search of Russell's residence, Russell rammed his
vehicle into the rear of Morrow's vehicle in an apparent effort
to intimidate and harass Morrow. Russell testified (through
a sign-language interpreterSee footnote 6
) that Morrow was the instigator of the incident, and in any event, Russell was unaware at the
time that Morrow was the one who informed the police of
Russell's illegal activities.
The district court's finding regarding acceptance of
responsibility is entitled to great deference and is to be
reversed only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Surratt, 87 F.3d 814, 821 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Childers, 86 F.3d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1996). We cannot say that the district court's finding that Russell was untruthful in his
account of the incident was clearly erroneous. The district
court assessed Russell's testimony regarding the automobile
incident in light of the sworn grand jury testimony of Morrow
and a police officer trained in accident reconstruction, as well
as from photographs of the scene showing debris and skidmarks. The district court noted that Russell's account of
the incident was not consistent with the other surrounding
facts of the accident such as photographs, skid marks,
Morrow's testimony, and testimony of the officer at the scene. Further, at no point did Russell contend that the interpreting
of his testimony was inaccurate. Ultimately, the district court
concluded that the "evidence points at a minimum by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . to a version of this incident
which comports with Morrow's original report, that is that he
was rear-ended intentionally by Russell within the context of
being harassed." J.A. at 197 (Sentencing Transcript). Based
on this finding of witness intimidation, we cannot say that the
district court's decision to deny an adjustment based upon
acceptance of responsibility was improper.
Next, Russell contends that he should have been granted a
downward departure based upon U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, the so-
called "safety valve" provision, which enables a defendant to
be sentenced without regard to the statutory minimum
sentence if the defendant meets certain criteria. Because we
have determined that the district court erred in finding that
Russell qualified for the statutory minimum sentence, we find
Russell's § 5C1.2 arguments moot.
Finally, Russell argues he qualifies for a downward
departure based upon his deafness pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.4. The district court indicated that it is without
authority to consider § 5H1.4's effect on the case since the
court was imposing a statutory minimum sentence upon
Russell. However, since we hold that the statutory minimum
is inapplicable, section 5H1.4 must be addressed. The section states in part:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be
a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable
guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient, and less
costly than imprisonment.
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. (underline in original). Russell asserts that
his deafness coupled with his primary means of manual
communication qualifies as an "extraordinary physical
impairment." He argues that he can only converse with others
knowledgeable in sign language and would not be able to cry
for help if he faced attack by other inmates.
Again, the district court did not explicitly consider whether
Russell's disability triggers section 5H1.4. Courts may
examine a wide variety of circumstances in determining
whether a downward departure is warranted under§ 5H1. See United States. v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603-04, (2d Cir. 1990) (considering defendant's immature appearance,
sexual orientation, emotional fragility, and general
vulnerability as § 5H1 factors). We could remand the matter
to the district court for additional fact finding, but we think
doing such would serve no purpose. We do not believe that
deafness, without more, can ever serve as the basis for a
§ 5H1.4 downward departure.See footnote 7
Indeed, a review of the case law reveals that it is not
enough merely to have a disability to qualify for a downward
departure under § 5H1.4. Rather, as the guidelines explicitly state, the physical impairment must truly be "extraordinary." This court has previously denied § 5H1.4 relief to defendants,
holding that their disabilities were not "extraordinary physical
impairments." See United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1995) (HIV-positive status); United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 863-64 (6th Cir. 1991) (suicidal tendencies and heart problems). But see United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1995) (remanding to district court for additional factual finding on whether
defendant's diabetes, hypertension, ulcers, hypothyroidism,
and depression qualified for § 5H1.4 departure). Other courts
are in accord with the view that § 5H1.4 relief is extremely
difficult to obtain. See, e.g., Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d at 621 (legal blindness not an "extraordinary physical
impairment"); United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1991) (age, cancer, high blood pressure, fused right
ankle, amputated leg, drug dependency insufficient to justify
§ 5H1.4 relief), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009 (1992); Philips v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. N.Y. 1993) (denying § 5H1.4 request by blind prisoner).
In this case, the district court specifically recommended that
the United States Bureau of Prisons take Russell's disability
into consideration and place him at a facility that is equipped
to accommodate his needs. See J.A. at 57 (Judgment in a Criminal Case). Cf. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d at 620 (district court relied on Bureau of Prisons' ability to care for
defendant in finding that his disability was not an
extraordinary impairment under section 5H1.4). Russell does
not allege that the prison services have been inadequate to
accommodate his disability, nor does he allege that the prison
has failed to protect him against any attackers. Russell cites U.S. v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1992), as an example of a court granting a § 5H1.4 downward
departure for an extraordinary physical impairment. The
Eighth Circuit never specified the exact nature of Long's
disability, but affirmed the district court's section 5H1.4
downward departure based upon Long's "physical injuries"
and reports from doctors that Long's injuries would leave him particularly vulnerable to victimization and potentially fatal
injuries. Long, 977 F.2d at 1277-78. Based on these reports, the district court in Long concluded that "the imposition of a term of imprisonment could be the equivalent of a death
sentence for Mr. Long." Id. at 1278. We simply do not believe that Russell's deafness gives rise to the same
extraordinary situation present in Long. VII.
Russell is deaf. He uses American Sign Language, rather than vocal means, for communication purposes. Russell's attorney repeatedly refers
to Russell and others involved in this case as "deaf mutes." While this
term may be accurate as a matter of function, it is largely erroneous as a
matter of pathology. Most deaf persons have the ability to speak, but for
a variety of reasons choose not to do so. Also, because the term "deaf
mute" invokes images of helplessness and pity, it is considered offensive
among deaf persons. See generally Jo Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the Legal Community's Obligation to
Comply with the A.D.A., 8 J. L. & Health 155, 157-59 (1993-94) (recounting historical development of term "deaf mute"). Footnote: 2
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally---
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance[.]
We note that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also require a return to a magistrate following the execution of a federal search warrant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d). Rule 41(d) mandates that the federal return "shall be made promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory
of any property taken." Id.Footnote: 4
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth . . . (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel[.]
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (emphasis added).Footnote: 5
The government argues that because a statutory minimum sentence overrides any adjustments to a sentence, Russell's downward departure
arguments are academic. See United States v. Haun, 90 F.3d 1096, 1102 (6th Cir. 1996). Since we have determined that the district court erred in
applying the statutory minimum sentence in Russell's case, any Haun arguments are irrelevant.Footnote: 6
Russell's attorney insinuates that Russell's status as a "deaf mute" somehow bears relevance to the sincerity of his testimony. We are quite
convinced that deaf persons are fully capable of concocting untruthful
testimony to the same extent as persons who are not deaf. Footnote: 7
Our research has revealed only one other instance (an unpublished per curiam opinion) in which a defendant with a hearing impairment requested a downward departure under § 5H1.4. See United States v. Vanegas, No. 94-1969, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8588 (1st Cir. Apr. 13, 1995). The defendant in that case, however, was 57 years old and also
possessed a prostate condition as well as a hearing impairment. According to the First Circuit, the district court granted the downward
departure because of the defendant's "health and age." Id. at *2. As far as the record shows, neither Russell's health nor his age (he was 37 at the
time of sentencing) warrant any § 5H1.4 consideration.
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The
majority acknowledges that the district court has "wide
latitude in considering facts at the sentencing stage" and that
factual determinations, such as the one that now confronts us,
are subject to reversal by this court only when we are "left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." After careful review of the record before us, I have no
such firm conviction and therefore respectfully dissent from
that portion of the majority's opinion dealing with the number
of marijuana plants attributed to defendant.
The majority frames the issue before us in these terms:
"[W]hen the information contained in the return of a search
warrant conflicts with information contained in an incident
report, which should prevail?" My answer to this question
would be simply, It depends upon the circumstances. Certainly if the two documents are equally detailed and have
been compiled contemporaneously, the return would take
precedence because, as the majority points out, it is a sworn
document filed with a judicial official. However, as the
district court observed, in this case the incident report
contained considerably more detail and indicia of reliability
than the return:
There are 31 lines indicating various items typed on this
quote "Return and tabulation to consent search." There
is however, in the multi-page investigation report some
56 different items noted as being seized, far more than
are listed in the return and tabulation. I would conclude
that the return and tabulation that the defendant is relying
upon here is a summary and not an accurate one at that.
The accurate report appears to me to be . . . the lengthy
and detailed investigation report . . . and it clearly and
consistently indicates 96 plants from the room area of
that bedroom, 8 plants from the closet area of that bedroom, they're called plants, they're not called anything
There's a lot here that was seized that's not specifically
delineated on this return and tabulation, so I think that
there were 104 plants . . . .
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a calculation of the
amount of drugs at issue for sentencing purposes involves a
fact-based, case-by-case inquiry, which is precisely the kind
of determination which our cases have consistently held to be
the province of the district court. In this case, the district
court engaged in just such an exercise, weighing the relative
reliability of the evidence before it and finding that 104
marijuana plants were discovered at Russell's residence. Given the care taken by the district court, and in light of the
majority's concession that "there [is] no evidence whatsoever
of any bad faith on the part of the law enforcement officers
regarding the discrepancy between the two tallies," I cannot
conclude that the factual finding as to the number of
marijuana plants was erroneous, let alone clearly so.