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Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB - 463 U.S. 147 (1983) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
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Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB - 463 U.S. 147 (1983)
Case	U.S. Supreme CourtEdward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147 (1983)Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRBNo. 81-1985Argued March 22, 1983Decided June 24, 1983463 U.S. 147CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
(a) The only publicity exempted from the secondary boycott prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer's product is "distributed by" the secondary employer. Here, the Board's analysis would almost strip the distribution requirement of any limiting effect, and diverts the inquiry away from the relationship between the primary and secondary employers and toward the relationship between the two secondary employers. It then tests that relationship by a standard so generous that it would be satisfied by virtually any Page 463 U. S. 148 secondary employer that a union might want consumers to boycott. Pp. 463 U. S. 155-156.
As a result of a labor dispute between respondent union and the H. J. High Construction Company (High), the union passed out handbills urging consumers not to trade with a group of employers who had no business relationship of any kind with High. The question presented is whether that handbilling is exempted from the prohibition against secondary Page 463 U. S. 149 boycotts contained in § 8(b)(4) [Footnote 1] of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), by what is known as the "publicity proviso" to that section. [Footnote 2]
High is a general building contractor retained by the H. J. Wilson Company (Wilson) to construct a department store in a shopping center in Tampa, Fla. Petitioner, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), owns and operates the center. Most of the 85 tenants in the mall signed a standard lease with DeBartolo providing for a minimum rent (which increases whenever a large new department store opens for business) plus a percentage of gross sales, and requiring the tenant to pay a proportionate share of the costs of maintaining the mall's common areas, to pay dues to a merchants' association, and to take part in four joint advertising brochures. Wilson signed a slightly different land lease agreement, but it also promised to pay dues to the Page 463 U. S. 150 merchants' association and to share in the costs of maintaining the common areas. Under the terms of Wilson's lease, neither DeBartolo nor any of the other tenants had any right to control the manner in which High discharged its contractual obligation to Wilson.
The union conducted its handbilling at all four entrances to the shopping center for about three weeks, while the new Wilson store was under construction. Without identifying High by name, the handbill stated that the contractors building Wilson's Department Store were paying substandard wages, and asked the readers not to patronize any of the stores in the mall until DeBartolo publicly promised that all construction at the mall would be done by contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits. [Footnote 3] The Page 463 U. S. 151 handbilling was conducted in an orderly manner, and was not accompanied by any picketing or patrolling. DeBartolo advised the union that it would not oppose this handbilling if the union modified its message to make clear that the dispute did not involve DeBartolo or any of Wilson's cotenants, and if it limited its activities to the immediate vicinity of Wilson's. When the union persisted in distributing handbills to all patrons of the shopping center, DeBartolo filed a trespass action in the state court and an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. The Board's General Counsel issued a complaint.
Complaint � 8(a). The complaint alleged that the object of the handbilling
Complaint � 8(b).
After the union filed its answer, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts and submitted the matter to the Board for Page 463 U. S. 152 decision. Without deciding whether the handbilling constituted a form of "coercion" or "restraint" proscribed by § 8(b)(4), the Board concluded that it was exempted from the Act by the "publicity proviso" and dismissed the complaint. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFLIO (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 252 N.L.R.B. 702 (1980). The Board reasoned that there was a "symbiotic" relationship between DeBartolo and its tenants, including Wilson, and that they all would derive a substantial benefit from the "product" that High was constructing, namely Wilson's new store. The Board did not expressly state that DeBartolo and the other tenants could be said to be distributors of that product, but concluded that High's status as a producer brought a total consumer boycott of the shopping center within the publicity proviso. [Footnote 4]
The Court of Appeals agreed. 662 F.2d 264 (CA4 1981). It observed that our decision in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), had rejected a narrow reading of the proviso, and that the Board had consistently construed it in an expansive manner. Finding the Board's interpretation consistent with the rationale of the National Labor Relations Act, it Page 463 U. S. 153 held that High was a producer and that DeBartolo and the other tenants were distributors within the meaning of the proviso. This holding reflected the court's belief that in response to the union's consumer handbilling, DeBartolo and the storekeepers would be able "in turn, to apply pressure on Wilson's and High." 662 F.2d at 271. Because the decision conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 545 (1981), we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. 904 (1982). [Footnote 5]
The publicity proviso applies to communications "other than picketing," that are "truthful," and that do not produce either an interference with deliveries or a work stoppage by employees of any person other than the firm engaged in the Page 463 U. S. 154 primary labor dispute. The Board and the Court of Appeals found that these three conditions were met, and these findings are not now challenged. The only question is whether the handbilling
In reaching that conclusion, we looked to the legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, which had simultaneously strengthened the secondary boycott prohibition and added the publicity proviso. We noted that a principal source of congressional concern had been the secondary boycott activities of the Teamsters Union, which, for the most part, represented employees of motor carriers who did not "produce" goods in the technical sense of the verb. The Teamsters' activities were plainly intended to be covered Page 463 U. S. 155 by the new prohibitions in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and we declined to hold that Congress, in using the word "produced," had intended to exclude the Teamsters entirely from the offsetting protections of the proviso.
We reject, however, the Board's interpretation of the extent of the secondary activity that the proviso permits. The only publicity exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer's product is "distributed by" the secondary employer. We are persuaded that Congress included that requirement to reflect Page 463 U. S. 156 the concern that motivates all of § 8(b)(4): "shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 341 U. S. 692 (1951). [Footnote 8] In this case, the Board did not find that any product produced by High was being distributed by DeBartolo or any of Wilson's cotenants. Instead, it relied on the theory that there was a symbiotic relationship between them and Wilson, and that DeBartolo and Wilson's cotenants would derive substantial benefit from High's work. That form of analysis would almost strip the distribution requirement of its limiting effect. It diverts the inquiry away from the relationship between the primary and secondary employers and toward the relationship between two secondary employers. It then tests that relationship by a standard so generous that it will be satisfied by virtually any secondary employer that a union might want consumers to boycott. Yet if Congress had intended all peaceful, truthful handbilling that informs the public of a primary dispute to fall within the proviso, the statute would not have contained a distribution requirement. [Footnote 9]
In this case, DeBartolo is willing to assume that Wilson distributes products that are "produced" by High within the meaning of the statute. Wilson contracted with High to receive the construction services that are the subject of the primary dispute, and the cost of those services will presumably be reflected in the prices of the products sold by Wilson. But the handbills at issue in this case did not merely call for a boycott of Wilson's products; they also called for a boycott Page 463 U. S. 157 of the products being sold by Wilson's cotenants. Neither DeBartolo nor any of the cotenants has any business relationship with High. Nor do they sell any products whose chain of production can reasonably be said to include High. Since there is no justification for treating the products that the cotenants distribute to the public as products produced by High, the Board erred in concluding that the handbills came within the protection of the publicity proviso.
Nevertheless, we do not reach the constitutional issue in this case. For, as we noted at the outset, the Board has not Page 463 U. S. 158 yet decided whether the handbilling in this case was proscribed by the Act. It rested its decision entirely on the publicity proviso. and never considered whether, apart from that proviso, the union's conduct fell within the terms of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). [Footnote 11] Until the statutory question is decided, review of the constitutional issue is premature.
"* * * *" "(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person. . . ."
"PLEASE DON'T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE" The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO is requesting that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of The Mall ownership's contribution to substandard wages.