Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/93390/marine-railway-coal-co-inc-vs-united-states
Timestamp: 2017-08-23 04:31:52
Document Index: 173742031

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 250', '§ 250', '§ 238', '§ 250', '§ 250', '§ 1']

Marine Railway and Coal Co Inc Vs United States - Citation 93390 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Marine Railway and Coal Co., Inc. Vs. United States - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/93390
Case Number 257 U.S. 47
Appellant Marine Railway and Coal Co., Inc.
.....& trust co. v. district of columbia, 224 u. s. 491 . 5. the original title of maryland, to which the united states succeeded in the district of columbia, extended at least to the low water mark or the virginia side of the potomac river. p. 257 u. s. 63 . page 257 u. s. 48 see maryland v. west virginia, 217 u. s. 1 , 217 u. s. 45 -46; id., 217 u. s. 577 -578, and morrii v. united states, 174 u. s. 196 . 6. the maryland title was not affected by later charters granted by james i to virginia. p. 257 u. s. 63 . 7. a grant made by the governor of virginia to one howsing in 1669, with a boundary "extending down potomack river by various courses 3152 po. making a s. wtly line to a pokecory," etc.,.....
Marine Railway & Coal Co., Inc. v. United States - 257 U.S. 47 (1921)
U.S. Supreme Court Marine Railway & Coal Co., Inc. v. United States, 257 U.S. 47 (1921)
1. The jurisdiction of this Court to review judgments of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia "in cases in which the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue" (Jud.Code § 250, cl. 1) attaches to a case originating in the Supreme Court of the District in which the issue concerned the territorial limits of that court's jurisdiction. P. 257 U. S. 62 .
2. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia being a court of general jurisdiction, there is no occasion to limit the natural scope of Jud.Code, § 250, cl. 1, after the manner in which the similarly worded § 238, applicable to the district courts of the United States, has been confined to cases in which their jurisdiction as federal courts is involved. P. 257 U. S. 62 .
3. A certificate of the question of jurisdiction is not necessary, under Jud.Code § 250, supra, where the issue was clearly made by plea, and a certificate could add nothing to the record. P. 257 U. S. 62 .
4. Quaere whether the rule construing the sixth clause of Jud.Code § 250, as conferring jurisdiction only when the law drawn in question, is of general application throughout the United States, as distinguished from one local to the District, would apply in a case involving a statute fixing the boundary of the District. P. 257 U. S. 62 . Cf. American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491 .
5. The original title of Maryland, to which the United States succeeded in the District of Columbia, extended at least to the low water mark or the Virginia side of the Potomac River. P. 257 U. S. 63 .
See Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S. 1 , 217 U. S. 45 -46; id., 217 U. S. 577 -578, and Morrii v. United States, 174 U. S. 196 .
6. The Maryland title was not affected by later charters granted by James I to Virginia. P. 257 U. S. 63 .
7. A grant made by the Governor of Virginia to one Howsing in 1669, with a boundary "extending down Potomack River by various courses 3152 po. making a S. Wtly line to a pokecory," etc., and "including several small creeks or inlets," held consistent with as well as subordinate to the Maryland grant, merely following the line of the stream, and not intended to include an indentation or cove. P. 257 U. S. 63 .
8. The grant made by Virginia to the United States of territory formerly included in the District of Columbia and its regrant by the United States did not enlarge Virginia's rights as they were originally. P. 257 U. S. 63 .
9. The compact entered into between Virginia and Maryland in 1785 to regulate commerce, which provided, inter alia, that the Potomac should be a common highway for purposes of navigation and commerce to the citizens of both states, and gave the citizens of each full property in the shores of the river adjoining their lands, with wharfing and fishing rights, did not settle the question of boundary between the states. P. 257 U. S. 63 .
10. The arbitration of boundary between Virginia and Maryland, the award in which was accepted by those states in 1878 and assented to by the United States (Act of March 3, 1879, c.196, 20 Stat. 481) fixing the line at low water mark on the Virginia side of the Potomac drawn from headland to headland, did not involve or affect the boundary as between Virginia and the District of Columbia. P. 257 U. S. 64 .
11. The filling in and adverse occupation of land originally below low water mark on the Virginia side of the Potomac under an erroneous claim that the Virginia line included a cove in which the land was situated by extending from headland to headland gave no prescriptive right, as against Maryland or the United States, to land lying in the cove and below low water next to the areas so filled, even though the claim was supported by Virginia statutes. P. 257 U. S. 65 .
12. The description of the District of Columbia in the Revised Statutes relating thereto, June 22, 1874, § 1, as "including the River Potomac in its course through the District," imports an assertion by Congress that the title of the United States embraces the whole river, and the jurisdiction of the District over the river seems to have been exercised without dispute. P. 257 U. S. 65 .
to apply the decision in American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491 , to such a case.
The question of the jurisdiction of the trial court and that of the merits very nearly coalesce, as the original title at least, of Maryland and its jurisdiction were founded upon the same facts, and as the United States succeeded to the rights of Maryland by the grant of the District completed in 1791. That the original title of Maryland extended at least to low water mark on the Virginia side it now is too late to deny, in view of the decisions in Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S. 1 , 217 U. S. 45 -46, 217 U. S. 217 U.S. 557, 217 U. S. 578 , and Morris v. United States, 174 U. S. 196 . An attempt to throw doubt upon these authorities and upon the effect of the charter of Charles I, June 30, 1632, granting Maryland to Lord Baltimore ( ad ulteriorem dicti Fluminis Ripam et eam sequendo, etc., 217 U.S. 217 U. S. 25 ), "to the farther bank of the said [Potomac] River and following it," by the charters of James I to Virginia and especially by the terms of a grant from the Governor of Virginia to Howsing in 1669 must fail. The latter grant is subordinate to the former, and is not inconsistent with it as the language is "extending down Potomac River by various courses 3152 po. making a S. Wtly line to a pokecory," etc. The implication of the words "by various courses" that the grant follows the line of the stream is not changed by the words "including several small creeks or inlets." The land in question is situated upon an indentation, called Battery Cove, but the place is not a creek or inlet. The former decisions of the court must be followed so far as they go.
The only important aspect of the last mentioned suggestion is in connection with a claim of prescriptive right. The land behind the filling of the United States is made land, and the fillings on the Alexandria side go below the original low water mark. In this case, however, there is no attempt to disturb the long maintained possession of such extensions, whether originally warranted or not. The only question before us is of the rights of the United States to fill land that hitherto has been under water. The plaintiff in error seeks to exclude it by force of what already has been done and the claims of right that have been made in connection with it. If the taking possession of land under a deed purporting to convey more than the portion actually occupied, no doubt, within reasonable limits, the sovereign power might give to it the effect of adverse possession of the whole, as against other subjects of the same power. Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U. S. 375 , 232 U. S. 377 -378. But the effect of filling in upon the edge of a stream as against a different power is another matter. Such acts in themselves import no claim beyond the land thus occupied. Maryland and the United States are not called upon to scrutinize the discourse of those in Virginia even if in statutory form. Except so far as actually occupied, the seizing of the land remains in the party that has the title.
Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333 , 102 U. S. 369 . Still more is this true as against independent sovereign rights.