Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190319_0001977.NTX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2020-06-07 04:23:54
Document Index: 758969746

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2241', '§ 636', '§ 1349', '§ 3624', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3624', '§ 3621']

FindACase™ | Molina v. M. Underwood
Molina v. M. Underwood
HECTOR OSCAR MOLINA BOP Register No. 49473-177, Petitioner,
Petitioner Hector Oscar Molina, a federal prisoner, in custody at Volunteers of America - Hutchins at the time he initiated this action, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “immediately recalculate [his] sentence in accordance with the First Step Act's amendment of the Good-Time Provision.” Dkt. No. 3 at 8. This resulting action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade. The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should summarily dismiss the habeas petition.
Molina was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; in November 2018, he was sentenced to 40 months of imprisonment; and, at the time of his sentencing, the Court ordered that Molina “receive credit for time in federal custody from June 21, 2016.” United States v. Molina, No. 3:15-cr-163-K (01) (N.D. Tex.), Dkt. No. 274. BOP records available online reflect that his current projected release date is May 28, 2019.
The basis for Molina's request for relief appears to be that “[t]he First Step Act, enacted December 21, 2018, amended 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) to change the manner in which good time credits are calculated by increasing the maximum allowable days from 47 to 54 per year.” Schmutzler v. Quintana, Civ. A. No. 5:19-046-DCR, 2019 WL 727794, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2019). While
Because the relief that Molina seeks under the First Step Act has not yet taken effect, it plainly appears that he is not entitled to relief pursuant to his habeas petition. Cf. In re U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Dep't of Justice, __ F.3d__, No. 18-50512, 2019 WL 1198107, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2019) (“Confusion sometimes arises ... when a defendant requests that the district court award credit for time served [prior to the date his federal sentence commences] and the court purports to grant or deny this request at sentencing. Because the district court lacks the authority to award or deny credit, the BOP is not bound by its decision. The sentencing court does ‘retain residual authority' to consider a defendant's time in custody. If the court determines that the BOP will not credit a defendant's prior time served, the court can reduce the defendant's sentence under § 5G1.3(b) or § 5K2.23 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. But the district court must calculate the defendant's final sentence itself; it cannot simply order the BOP to award credit.” (citations omitted)).
And, to the extent that Molina asserts equal protection and due process claims, see Dkt. No. 3 at 6,
[t]he law is clear that inmates are not a suspect class. As to the question of fundamental rights, the good time credit statute merely authorizes the BOP to offer prisoners the benefit of a reduced sentence in exchange for good behavior. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). It therefore does not implicate any fundamental right implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The BOP's policy of calculating good time credits is therefore subject only to rational basis review.
Perez v. Zenk, No. 04-CV-5069 (CBA), 2005 WL 990696, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2005) (citation omitted); cf. Handley v. Chapman, 587 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2009) (“‘The Due Process Clause does not itself confer a liberty interest in a sentence reduction for completion of an RDAP.' In granting eligibility for early release, the BOP has broad discretion that precludes the possibility of a liberty interest in early release under § 3621. Without a liberty interest, there is no procedural due process claim.” (citing Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2007); footnote omitted)).
The Court should summarily dismiss Petitioner Hector Oscar Molina's petition for writ of habeas ...