Source: https://openjurist.org/111/f3d/140/king-airway-company-v-routt-county-new-west-federal-savings-and-loan-association
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 12:24:10
Document Index: 255706286

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 60', '§ 1821', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 1441', '§ 1441']

111 F3d 140 King Airway Company v. Routt County New West Federal Savings & Loan Association | OpenJurist
111 F. 3d 140 - King Airway Company v. Routt County New West Federal Savings & Loan Association
111 F3d 140 King Airway Company v. Routt County New West Federal Savings & Loan Association
97 CJ C.A.R. 563
KING AIRWAY COMPANY, a joint venture; Osprey Development
Corporation, as successor-in-interest to Osprey, Inc.; King
Coal Investment Company, a Colorado limited partnership;
Airway Investment Company, a Colorado limited partnership, Plaintiffs,
ROUTT COUNTY, Colorado, Public Trustee of, Defendant,
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, as
successor-in-interest to American Savings and Loan
Association, a California corporation,
Reid ROSENTHAL, Counter-Defendant-Appellant.
Reid L. Rosenthal appeals the district court's denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment in favor of New West Federal Savings & Loan Association and the court's entry of summary judgment in favor of New West. We reverse and remand.
On February 10, 1994, Rosenthal filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment, alleging that in May 1991 he was involved in a Colorado state court action filed by Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), as conservator of Topeka Savings, a federally chartered savings and loan institution. According to Rosenthal, he entered into a settlement agreement with RTC which released him from "all claims, known or unknown, which related to or arose 'out of ... Rosenthal's dealings with RTC.' " Appellant's append. I at 41. Rosenthal further alleged a Colorado state court construed the RTC agreement on January 28, 1994, as releasing him from all claims RTC may have had against him. Rosenthal alleged "all rights of [American Savings] arising under the 1986 Stipulation were held by the RTC in May of 1991, when Mr. Rosenthal was released by the RTC from all claims." Id. Rosenthal argued the RTC agreement prohibited the federal district court from entering judgment against him and in favor of New West, and that the state court's order in the Topeka Savings litigation was binding upon the federal district court and New West.
New West moved for summary judgment on February 13, 1995, arguing Rosenthal' § 60(b)(6) motion could be resolved as a matter of law because the RTC agreement covered only claims arising out of the Topeka Savings case. New West also filed a motion for protective order staying discovery pending resolution of its motion for summary judgment. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Rosenthal argued (1) New West had failed to demonstrate it was the successor to American Savings' claims against him; (2) New West was controlled by the FSLIC Resolution Fund (FRF); (3) New West was an "accounting device" with no separate legal existence; (4) the FRF was managed by FDIC on behalf of RTC; (5) any monies recovered by New West would be placed in the FRF and would in turn benefit RTC; and (6) the RTC agreement barred New West's claims against Rosenthal.
On March 10, 1995, Rosenthal filed a motion to compel discovery, asking that the court order New West to produce various documents demonstrating how it became successor-in-interest to the assets of American Savings and outlining its relationship with RTC and FRF. On April 26, 1995, Rosenthal filed an affidavit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) for additional discovery on issues related to New West's motion for summary judgment. In particular, he asked for discovery as to (1) "[t]he ultimate beneficiary of any recovery by New West on any of the claims against Rosenthal"; (2) "[w]ho or what really owns the claims against Rosenthal"; (3) "[t]he nature of the legal 'existence' (if any) of New West"; and (4) "[t]he precise nature of the relationships, contractual and otherwise, between New West and FSLIC, FSLIC's successor (FRF), and RTC." Appellant's append. 3 at 616-17.
We normally review denial of a 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 727 (10th Cir.1993). But where a district court permits the parties to engage in discovery and then "base[s] its denial ... not on discretionary factors, but rather on ... conclusions of law," as it did in this case, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. " 'A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.' " Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). In the context of this case, because the district court and the parties treated the pending motion as one for summary judgment, we shall do so as well. In so doing, we must decide "whether the evidence ... is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); United States v. City and County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1512 (10th Cir.1996).
Before directly addressing Rosenthal's collateral estoppel argument, it is necessary to briefly review the history and relationship of the FSLIC, the RTC, the FDIC, and the FRF. Prior to August 9, 1989, FSLIC was a corporate body and agency of the United States under the control of FHLBB. FSLIC was responsible for insuring depository accounts of eligible financial institutions (apparently including American Savings), and also acted as conservator and/or receiver for failed financial institutions when necessary. On August 9, 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub.L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. FIRREA abolished the FSLIC, created the FRF, and placed most of the assets and liabilities of FSLIC in the FRF. 12 U.S.C. § 1821a. The FRF was placed under the control of FDIC. Finally (for our purposes), FIRREA created the RTC and placed it under the control of FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b). The RTC operated under limited authority solely to resolve FSLIC-insured institutions declared insolvent between January 1, 1989, and July 1, 1995. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3). It was funded separately by the Resolution Funding Corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(a). On December 31, 1995, the RTC dissolved and FDIC took over its remaining responsibilities. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(m).
Turning now to Rosenthal's collateral estoppel argument, we note there is no evidence indicating RTC ever owned or otherwise held the claim against Rosenthal for breaching the amended stipulation with American Savings. In fact, RTC was not in existence at the time of the transfer of assets from American Savings to Federal American in September 1988 or at the time Federal American's assets were transferred to other entities in December 1988. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Starkey, 41 F.3d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir.1995) (noting RTC created on August 9, 1989). Although Rosenthal attempts to create a connection with RTC by arguing RTC had some administrative involvement with New West and would indirectly benefit from any recovery New West made on the claim, these arguments fail to demonstrate RTC had any specific interest in the claim (i.e., that RTC ever owned the claim). Accordingly, we conclude the RTC agreement does not encompass the claim at issue here and reject Rosenthal's collateral estoppel argument. See generally Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Colo.1994) (outlining requirements for establishing collateral estoppel).1
The closer question is whether New West presented sufficient evidence to allow the district court to conclude, as a matter of law, that it was the real party in interest. Under Colorado law, "[t]he real party in interest is the party who, by virtue of the substantive law, has the right to invoke the aid of the court to vindicate the legal interest in question." Steiger v. Burroughs, 878 P.2d 131, 135 (Colo.App.1994). Here, New West submitted the affidavit of Kathleen Malone, assistant corporate secretary for New West, in an effort to demonstrate it was the real party in interest. Malone generally alleged New West was the owner of the claim against Rosenthal. Notably, however, the affidavit did not trace the specific path of the claim from American Savings to New West, nor did New West submit sufficient documentation to support Malone's general allegations. More troubling is the fact that some of the evidence in the record on appeal appears to controvert certain of Malone's statements. In particular, there is evidence in the record indicating two entities not mentioned in Malone's affidavit (C.B. Savings and Loan Association and American Real Estate Group) received some of Federal American's assets. In light of these discrepancies, we conclude the district court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of New West when there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether New West was in fact the owner of the claim against Rosenthal at the time default judgment was entered.
We also conclude Rosenthal should have been given the opportunity to engage in limited discovery on the real party in interest question prior to the ruling on New West's summary judgment motion. Although the district court did not expressly address Rosenthal's Rule 56(f) request for additional discovery, it effectively denied that request by granting New West's motion for summary judgment. We therefore review the court's denial for abuse of discretion. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.1995).