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⭐The Veracity of Laws relating to Medical Malpractice in India Scope and Nature
The Veracity of Laws relating to Medical Malpractice in India Scope and Nature
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Candice Jade Bailey
1 2 The Veracity of Laws relating to Medical Malpractice in India Scope and Nature Aditya Singhal Publishing Partner: IJSRP Inc3 Preface The relationship between a doctor and his patient is considered sacred in India. A Doctor is compared to God. In recent times, instances of malpractice and negligence in the medical field have increased fourfold. The problem arises in ascertaining liability, whether the doctor was negligent or not is a very technical & subjective question, which is difficult to decide. There is always a possibility of alternate treatment but that does not make the doctor negligent for providing the first treatment. In this situation, a person who looses his life due to a treatment might not be eligible to get any compensation and his dependents are left in a dilemma. Further, the doctor will always try to play safe and order more procedures to avoid any liability, which in a way would create a burden on the economy. The existing legal framework does not provide to help & safeguard both the doctors and patients without compromising on the quality of healthcare or burdening the economy. This study is compiled with the help of a literary survey. The research methodology is essentially analytical method with support of empirical and descriptive method. The nature of study that I undertook involved a review of existing literature on the subject and will also involve empirical data collection. The work shall follow a definite scheme of action, wherein it would first define the topic, after which it would delve into the various aspects of the topic, while at the same time critically analyzing the relevant aspects. It includes latest statutes, bills, guidelines, draft legislation and case laws updated till April An attempt has been made to make the contents lucid yet exhaustive. I was fortunate to have Professor of Eminence and Chair Professor for Chair for Law Prof. M.K. Balachandran, Amity Law School, Delhi as my supervisor and mentor; his inputs helped create the path of this study, his patience and critical questioning throughout the process helped me immensely to reassert and understand the subject matter more thoroughly. I would like to extend my gratitude to my family and friends for their constant support and without whom I would not have been able to complete this study. Despite every possible care taken by the Author, some errors or omission might have crept in while preparing the study. The Author will be highly obliged if such errors or imperfections are brought to his knowledge. Any fruitful and constructive criticism is always welcome. Aditya Singhal Publication Partner: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (ISSN: )4 Copyright and Trademarks The mentioned author is the owner of this thesis and owns all copyrights of the Work. IJSRP acts as publishing partner and authors will remain owner of the content. Copyright 2015, All Rights Reserved No part of this thesis may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as described below, without the permission in writing of the Authors & publisher. Copying of content is not permitted except for personal and internal use, to the extent permitted by national copyright law, or under the terms of a license issued by the national Reproduction Rights Organization. Trademarks used in this thesis are the property of respective owner and either IJSRP or authors do not endorse any of the trademarks used. Publication Partner: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (ISSN: )5 Author I, Aditya Singhal, a final year law student at the Amity Law School (GGSIPU), Delhi have been an academically proficient student consistently maintaining my position at the top of the class through my academic years, for which I have been bestowed with several awards. In 5 years of LLB course, in addition to opting for wide-ranging electives, I have tried to widen my scope of subject understanding by working as an intern at a law NGO and training under senior IPR advocate, former Additional Solicitor General of India and High Court Judge. These experiences presented me with divergent intellectual and moral challenges that I have enjoyed to ruminate and solve. My desire to study law developed as early as my school days. I am working as a community service volunteer with the under-privileged made me question the structure, relevance and implementation of legal rights and framework in India. The urge to deploy legal remedies to develop an equitable society firmed my conscious decision of pursuing a bachelor s degree in law. The dismal record of legal recourse in India is something I continue to feel strongly about. My training in the field of law has helped to appreciate that the Indian legal system echoes the famous lines in Magna Carta To No One We Shall Sell, To No One We Shall Deny or Defer Right or Justice in its true sense. Steve Jobs, the great visionary and creative thinker, in an inspiring speech a few years ago at the Stanford Commencement address said, You can't connect the dots looking forward; you can only connect them looking backwards. So you have to trust that the dots will somehow connect in your future. By referring to dots Steve Jobs meant the varied experiences an individual acquires in the course of one s life. In concurrence with the views of the legend, I too strongly believe that every bit of knowledge imbibed, every experience acquired, how trivial it may seem at that point in life will eventually find its relevance. It is just a matter of time before one is able to connect the dots. Publication Partner: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (ISSN: )6 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CASES... I CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION... 1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM... 1 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY... 3 HYPOTHESIS... 3 METHODOLOGY... 3 The Nature of Demand... 4 The Expected Behavior of the Physician... 4 Product Uncertainty... 4 Information Asymmetry... 4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA... 5 The Constitution of India... 6 Directive Principles of State Policy... 6 The Indian Penal Code, The Indian Medical Council Act, The Consumer Protection Act... 9 Public Interest Litigation (PIL) CHAPTER II -EXPLORING POSSIBLE WAYS TO MAKE THE SYSTEM MORE EFFICIENT IMPROVING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT Decoupling of Liability Allocation of Burden of Proof in Medical Malpractice Cases Contracting over Malpractice Liability THE INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2013 AN ORDINANCE FURTHER TO AMEND THE INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL ACT, Critical Analysis of the IMC Amendments: THE CLINICAL ESTABLISHMENTS (REGISTRATION AND REGULATION) ACT, 2010 UNDER THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 26 Salient Features & Critical Analysis: THE NATIONAL HEALTH BILL, 2009 MOHFW, GOI WORKING DRAFT: VERSION JANUARY 09 (PENDING) CHAPTER III - AWARENESS AMONGST DOCTORS AND PATIENTS ANALYSIS: DOCTORS Publication Partner: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (ISSN: )7 ANALYSIS: PATIENT OUTCOME OF THE ANALYSIS CHAPTER IV - ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE LAW PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE STRICT LIABILITY VERSUS NEGLIGENCE RULE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM THE POINT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 59 EXTENSION OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT TO MEDICAL PROFESSION CHAPTER V - JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & NEGLIGENCE IN INDIA CHAPTER VI - CURRENT TRENDS RELATED TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN INDIA THE BOTCHED CAMPS THE UNIVERSAL HEALTH-CARE PLAN Key Policy Principles: Objectives: TRACKING THE MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN INDIA VIA NEWSPAPER REPORTS The Horrifying camps of Sterilization Overcharging to make Simple Medical Devices Fancy CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY ARTICLES BOOKS LEGISLATIONS NEWSPAPER PRIMARY RESEARCH SOURCE ANNEXURE I I/1: THE INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, I/2: THE NATIONAL HEALTH BILL, ANNEXURE - II II/1: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DOCTORS II/2: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PATIENTS Publication Partner: International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (ISSN: )8 TABLE OF CASES S.No. Name of the Case Citation Page No. 1. Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa and others v. State of Maharashtra and others 2. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee AIR (1996) SC (1957) 1 WLR Devika Biswas v. Government of India 4. Dr. Balram Prasad v. Dr. Kunal Saha and Ors 5. Dr. C.P. Sreekumar, M.S. (Ortho) v. S. Ramanujam 6. Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi SC - WP (Civil) No(s). 95/ (2014) 1 SCC (2009) 7 SCC (2002) 6 SCC Dr. Shiv Kumar Gautam v. Alima NCDRC - Revision Petition No. 586 of 1999 decided on Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Government of NCT of Delhi 97 (2004) 6 SCC 42 8,83 9. Eckersley v. Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR Hunter v. Hanley 1955 (1 st Division, Court of Session, Scotland) 11. Indian Medical Association v. V.P Shantha and Others 12. Mathew v. State of Punjab and Anr 13. Kusum Sharma and Ors. v. Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre and Ors (1995) 6 SCC 651 9,11,63, 75,101, 113 (2005) 6 SCC 1 80,91-93,95-97,101 (2010) 3 SCC I9 14. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta 15. Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee 16. Martin F. D'Souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq AIR (1994) SC (2009) 9 SCC (2009) 3 SCC 1 11, 93,99, Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal 18. Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel and Ors (1996) 4 SCC AIR 1996 SC Ramakant Rai v. Government of India 20. Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda and Anr 21. Scott v. London & St Katherine Docks Co. 22. State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram and Ors SC- WP (Civil) No. 209/ AIR (2008) SC (1865) 3 H & C (2005) 7 SCC 1 87, Thake v. Morris [1986] 1 All ER 497 (CA) Union of India v. Harish Bhalla & Others 25. V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital and Anr CW 7746/2000, (PIL) LPA No /2001 Delhi HC 22 (2010) 5 SCC ,99 II10 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Negligence can be generally defined as Conduct that is culpable because it falls short of what a reasonable person would do to protect another individual from foreseeable risks of harm. Tort law is the name given to a body of law that addresses, and provides remedies for, civil wrongs not arising out of contractual obligations. Tort liability performs two primary functions. First, by providing compensation it acts as a source of insurance. Second, by imposing sanctions on persons found negligent, it deters future negligent behaviour. Torts fall into three general categories: intentional torts, negligent torts and strict liability torts. Intentional torts are those wrongs which the injurer knew or should have known would occur through his actions or inactions. Negligent torts occur when the injurer's actions were unreasonably unsafe. Strict liability wrongs do not depend on the degree of carefulness adopted by the injurer, but are established when a particular action causes damage. According to the Indian law, cases of medical negligence fall under negligent torts. Medical negligence is a complicated subject, since medical treatments are inherently risky. A medical treatment always involves a basic risk that something might go wrong. In addition, human body of patients can react differently to the same treatment. There are occasions when patients are harmed as a consequence of their treatment or absence or even delay of it. In the case of Hunter v. Hanley 1, Lord President Clyde gave a concise and succinct definition of medical negligence, he said: The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of the doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would have been guilty of, if acting with reasonable care. In order to prove medical negligence under the negligence rule, the aggrieved patient must be able to establish to the satisfaction of the court that: (a) The doctor owed him a duty of care of a particular standard of professional conduct. (b) The doctor contravened the duty. (c) The patient suffered damage. (d) The doctor s conduct was the direct and the proximate cause of damage. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The legal purpose of compensation is on the one hand to redress for the non- pecuniary losses suffered and on the other hand satisfaction in the sense that the injurer is made to pay for his negligent action. However, these purposes of compensation are in some medical cases difficult to justify. For instance, medical science can keep people alive in a state of complete coma for many months or even years, with no hope of recovery. No (1 st Division, Court of Session, Scotland). 111 substitute pleasures need to be provided for those forgone, because the injured party is unable to enjoy any pleasures. Nevertheless, courts say that a person who is deprived of all the pleasures of life gets compensation for the fact of that deprivation. Thus, from an economic point of view, on the one hand the victim gets no utility from an award of damages in these cases and therefore would not need compensation. But on the other hand only full compensation has the deterrent effect on the injurer. Therefore, it is necessary to make the injurer pay full compensation to the victim. Another problem with compensation for pain and suffering is that, it is very difficult to calculate, because the relationship between the value of money what it will buy and damages awarded for pain and suffering cannot be measured in financial losses. Punitive damages are sometimes awarded to plaintiffs in addition to compensatory damages, i.e. over and above compensation for material and immaterial losses. These are only awarded in cases where injurers might escape liability or where harm is underestimated or where the injurers gains are socially illicit, because punishment and deterrence are supposed to lead to only full compensation. Thus, they also involve the danger of overcompensation and over deterrence, since the damage paid by the injurer exceeds the damage suffered by the victim. Although the term punitive damage implies punishment, the purpose of these damages is only partly punishment, but mainly deterrence. To decide on the quantum and type of remedy to be provided, the decision-makers i.e the Courts lack the perfect information that needs to be assumed. It is because of this that the negligence rule has come under severe criticism. Because courts lack perfect information about appropriate care, the standards applied in practice are unpredictable and possibly systematically biased. With uncertain legal standards, a negligence rule may not be able to convey to doctors the appropriate signals about the optimal level of care. A rule of strict liability in theory eliminates the need for courts to define due care. Thus, in the situation of judicial errors in appropriating liability level, the negligence regime is relatively more sensitive concerning the level of care adopted by the injurer (doctors or hospital authorities) and the appropriate level of care. The strict liability regime, on the other hand, does not suffer from such errors. There is, however, more chances of judicial errors concerning causality and damage assessment i.e. determining whether an injury was caused by medical care or by the underlying disease and the extent of damage. The argument to whether select negligence rule over strict liability in the area of medical liability is still a concern, despite the flaws in both the rules the courts have to conclude to bring stability and clarity by establishing a rule of law that provides for an appropriate remedy. 212 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY In this dissertation, I aim to analyze the Indian medical law to prevent malpractice. Foremost, it is of utmost importance to define the characteristic features of a medical services market. These characteristics give the medical market a distinct identity and hence necessitate a unique analysis of the negligence tort law pertaining to medical cases. Secondly, The legal framework and its impact over the years through a study of cases and the legal avenues will be analysed. Further the awareness of available remedies and the possible ways to make the system more efficient will tried to be put forward. HYPOTHESIS The relationship between a doctor and his patient is considered sacred in India. A Doctor is compared to God. In recent times, instances of malpractice and negligence in the medical field have increased fourfold. The problem arises in ascertaining liability, whether the doctor was negligent or not is a very technical & subjective question, which is difficult to decide. There is always a possibility of alternate treatment but that does not make the doctor negligent for providing the first treatment. In this situation, a person who looses his life due to a treatment might not be eligible to get any compensation and his dependents are left in a dilemma. Further, the doctor will always try to play safe and order more procedures to avoid any liability, which in a way would create a burden on the economy. The existing legal framework does not provide to help & safeguard both the doctors and patients without compromising on the quality of healthcare or burdening the economy. METHODOLOGY The dissertation will be compiled with the help of a literary survey. The research methodology will be essentially analytical method with support of empirical and descriptive method. The nature of study that I propose to undertake involves a review of existing literature on the subject and will also involve empirical data collection. The dissertation shall follow a definite scheme of action, wherein it would first define the topic, after which it would delve into the various aspects of the topic, while at the same time critically analyzing the relevant aspects. My entire dissertation is divided in to five chapters along with this introduction wherein the meaning, definition, explanation of the concept and will deal with the current legal framework in India regarding the malpractices in the medical field. I will give the details of all the statutory laws and the medical guidelines in this chapter. The second chapter of my dissertation deals with the possible ways to make the system more efficient. This chapter would deal with the pending and proposed laws that could change the system favorably and also other methods like health care insurance, guidelines and shared liability of the doctor & medical institution. The third chapter deals with empirical research using questionnaires filed by doctors and patients about their awareness and acceptance of the current malpractice law. Also it would try to look into what according to them is a possible solution to this problem. 313 The fourth chapter deals with the economic impact of the malpractice law. The doctors recommend more tests and procedures to avoid liability, a practice known as defensive medicine. To cover the future liabilities, the medical institutions and doctors take insurance, the burden of these expenses maybe shifted to the patients and result in a higher health care spending. The fifth chapter deals with the judicial pronouncements on medical malpractice and negligence in India. This chapter essentially deals with the justification and the grounds that formulate the rules regarding remedies and punishment in the medical malpractice law, i.e whether a hospital or a doctor would be responsible as laid down by the apex court. I will also try to look into the methodology of the courts in awarding compensation in various cases of mis-happening during a medical procedure. My dissertation will end with the sixth chapter that puts down various newspaper reports regarding the medical negligence situation prevalent in India. This chapter would end with the conclusion regarding my hypothesis. In this segment I will try to summarize how far the current legal framework is effective in the present situation vis-à-vis recent cases of medical malpractice and the possible positive steps to be taken to maintain the health care standards, minimise the effect on economics, provide adequate relief to patients and provide the doctors environment to work fearlessly. The Nature of Demand The most distinguishing feature of the demand for medical services is that it is not steady, as for food or clothing, but rather irregular and unpredictable. As a consequence of this it is difficult to become an informed shopper until it is too late. In addition, medical services, apart from preventive services, provide satisfaction only in the event of ill health, which is a deviation from the normal well-being. The Expected Behavior of the Physician The expected behavior of the sellers of medical care is distinct from that of businessmen, because medical care is a commodity for which the product and the activity of production are identical. As a result of this the consumer cannot test the product before consuming it, and hence the medical market has the innate characteristic of trust being built into it. Product Uncertainty The treatment in itself possesses a risk and 100 percent success is not guaranteed even if the doctor applies the highest level of care. There exist causation problems; in the sense that the fact that human body can react differently and unexpectedly to certain treatments has to be taken into account. Thus, a doctor cannot always guarantee the success of his treatment and should not be held liable for every bad or insufficient treatment result. Information Asymmetry The doctor-patient relationship is dominated by asymmetric information. First, the patient as a person not having medical knowledge has problems to gain insight in the treatment of the professional physician. It is difficult for the patient to follow the chain of causation. Since in hospitals a medical team of doctors, nurses, assistants etc. is involved in the treatment, it is hard to determine who contributed to the malpractice and to what extent. 414 Thus, the injury could have multiple causes. Especially in cases where the patient is unconscious or under anesthesia, he will not be able to ascertain who contributed to what extent to his injury. Furthermore, due to the complex hierarchical organization of a hospital the problem arises that the patient may not know the names of the persons and who is responsible for whom. Second, the reality that most medical information is technically complex is made worse by the fact that many illnesses do not repeat themselves, so that the cost of gaining the information is very high for every patient. It can be argued that the ideal way a patient could become fully informed would be by becoming a doctor, which is too improbable a situation. Third, only the physician himself can influence his own level of care, it belongs to his sphere of control, whereas the patient has no influence on the conduct of the physician, he has to rely on the knowledge and the qualification of the physician. As a consequence of the inherent information asymmetry in medical care, the patient will have severe difficulties in proving that the doctor acted negligently, i.e. violating the customary skills and practices of the profession. The next section outlines briefly the existing legal framework in India pertaining to cases of medical negligence. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA The legal framework of Indian law effecting the medical profession and to prevent malpractice must be introduced. In India, various legal avenues are available to an aggrieved patient to sue a healthcare professional. 1. Fundamental Rights (Part III of the Indian Constitution) 1.1. Article Article Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV of the Indian Constitution) 2.1. Article Article Article Indian Penal Code 2 (IPC) 3.1. Section Section Section Section Section Section Section 304-A 3.8. Section Act 45 of15 3.9. Section Indian Medical Council Act 3 (IMC) 5. Consumer Protection Act 4 (CPA) 6. Public Interest Litigation 5 (PIL) The Constitution of India The Constitution of India does not provide any special rights to the patient. In fact the patient s rights are basically indirect rights, which arise or flow from the relevant Articles which can be applied to cases of medical negligence. Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty : No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part: (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution. The right to constitutional remedies therefore allows Indian citizens to stand up for their rights against anybody even the Government of India Directive Principles of State Policy These provisions are not enforced by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. Article 41. 'Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases : The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective 3 Act 102 of Act 68 of Article 32 of The Constitution of India. 616 provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want. Article 42. Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief : The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health : The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purpose of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 The various sections of the Indian Penal Code that contain the law of medical malpractice in India are- Section 52. "Good faith": Nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention. Section 80. Accident in doing a lawful act : Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution. Section 81. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm : Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property. Section 88. Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's benefit : Nothing which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether expressed or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm. Section 90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception : A consent is not such a consent as it is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception, or by an insane person, or by a child. Section 92. Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent : Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the circumstances are such that 717 it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit. Section 304-A. Causing death by negligence : Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or both. This is the relevant provision under which a complaint against a medical practitioner for alleged criminal medical negligence is registered. Section 337. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others : Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Section 338. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal liberty of others : Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal liberty of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Up till as recently as 2005, medical practitioners could be held liable under civil and criminal negligence both. A land mark verdict in this regard was that of Dr Suresh Gupta v. Government of NCT of Delhi 6. It was felt by the jury that between civil and criminal liability of a doctor causing death of his patient, the court has a difficult task of weighing the degree of carelessness and negligence alleged on the part of the doctor. For conviction of a doctor for alleged criminal offence, the standard should be a proof of recklessness and deliberate wrong doing. To convict, a doctor, therefore the prosecution has to come out with a case of high degree of negligence on the part of the doctor. Mere lack of proper care, precaution and attention or inadvertence might create civil liability but not a criminal one. Supreme Court thus ruled that doctors should not be held criminally responsible unless there is prime facie evidence before the Court in the form of a credible opinion from another competent doctor, preferably a Government doctor in the same field of medicine supporting the charges of a rash and negligent act. Such a decision is expected to increase the quality of service in emergency cases, which the doctors feared to attend because of the chances of being charged under section 304 and 304-A IPC for criminal negligence. A doctor may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising - ordinary skill in the 6 (2004) 6 SCC 42. 818 medical profession. The limited application of criminal prosecution against a medical practitioner therefore rests on the credible opinion from another competent doctor. In reality, however it is often claimed that physicians usually hesitate to testify against each other giving rise to a situation which is judicially labeled as the conspiracy of the silence. Thus, under the existing law, it will be extremely difficult to hold a doctor criminally negligent. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 IMC Act came into force in 1956, confers powers to the Medical Council of India to discipline erring members of the medical profession. However, this act does not have any provision for the award of damages to the complainant, though it has enough powers to punish the medical practitioners. Section 24 of the Act, empowers the Council to remove the name of any person enrolled on a state medical register on the grounds of professional misconduct. The council, in addition prescribes standards of professional conduct, etiquette and code of ethics for medical practitioners. The medical councils are supposed to self regulate the medical profession by monitoring their skills, conduct and to provide for continuous education. The Consumer Protection Act Since the year 1996, cases of medical negligence have been brought under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, This was the result of the landmark judgment in the case of Indian Medical Association v. V.P Shantha and Others 7. This judgment resolved the questions regarding the definition of terms such as Deficiency, Consumer and Service with respect to the CPA s application to cases of medical negligence. The Supreme Court order did not accept the claim of medical professionals who argued that the doctor-patient relationship is similar to a master-servant relationship, which is a contract of personal service and should be exempted from CPA. The court in fact decreed that the doctor-patient relationship is a contract for personal service and it is not a master-servant relationship. It is also said that the doctor is an independent contractor and the doctor, like the servant, is hired to perform a specific task. However, the master or principal (the patient) is allowed to direct only what is to be done, and when. The how is left up to the specific discretion of the independent contractor (doctor). So, the doctor- patient relationship is a contract for personal service and as such, cannot be excluded from CPA. The Supreme Court however held that A determination about the deficiency in service under the CPA is to be made by applying the same test as is applied in an action for damages for negligence. The CPA however leaves outside its ambit services rendered free of charge by a medical practitioner attached to a hospital or nursing home. A payment of token amount for registration purpose only does not alter the position. 7 (1995) 6 SCC19 Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Any person can directly approach the High Court or the Supreme Court by filing a PIL when any grievances affecting the public at large are not properly redressed. PILs are usually resorted to when public health programmes are not implemented properly. Some of the most prominent judgments in the domain of health related issues have been a consequence of PILs. To cite an example, a Public Interest Litigation was filed in August, 2008 by Dr Kunal Saha at the Delhi High Court against the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) for their devious role with sub-standard HIV kits that were used in different Indian hospitals/blood banks during the second national AIDS control project between 1999 and The court issued notices after hearing the public interest litigation, seeking a CBI investigation of the defective HIV kits being used, which were potentially endangering transmission of the deadly AIDS virus to innocent patients through contaminated blood transfusion. 1020 CHAPTER II -EXPLORING POSSIBLE WAYS TO MAKE THE SYSTEM MORE EFFICIENT IMPROVING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 8 Since the year 1996, cases of medical negligence have been brought under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, This was the result of the landmark judgment in the case of Indian Medical Association v. V.P Shantha and Others 9. This judgment resolved the questions regarding the definition of terms such as Deficiency, Consumer and Service with respect to the CPA s application to cases of medical negligence. The Supreme Court order did not accept the claim of medical professionals who argued that the doctor-patient relationship is similar to a master-servant relationship, which is a contract of personal service and should be exempted from CPA. The court in fact decreed that the doctor-patient relationship is a contract for personal service and it is not a master-servant relationship. It is also said that the doctor is an independent contractor and the doctor, like the servant, is hired to perform a specific task. However, the master or principal (the patient) is allowed to direct only what is to be done, and when. The how is left up to the specific discretion of the independent contractor (doctor). So, the doctor- patient relationship is a contract for personal service and as such, cannot be excluded from CPA. The Supreme Court however held that A determination about the deficiency in service under the CPA is to be made by applying the same test as is applied in an action for damages for negligence. The CPA however leaves outside its ambit services rendered free of charge by a medical practitioner attached to a hospital or nursing home. A payment of token amount for registration purpose only does not alter the position. No legal act is fool proof and CPA too has some deficiencies that need to be corrected in the interest of consumers and to maximize social welfare. Some suggestions that could in fact make the Act robust are as follows- (i) It is evident from our analysis of cases of medical negligence appearing before the NCDRC that the average number of years spent on a case is close to 9.5 years. Though on paper, the Consumer Protection act is aimed at redressing the grievances of the consumer at the earliest; in reality this is clearly not being achieved. Hence, the process must be expedited. (ii) Over-ruling of decisions of both the state commission and district forum by the NCDRC 10 indicates that the apex court may approach the case differently and there exists a possibility that NCDRC may give a verdict different from the lower forum. The presence of such possibilities in fact lengthens the judicial process. Such a problem may be solved if the cases of medical negligence are heard in the presence of an expert included among the members on panel as directed in Martin D Souza s Case 11. This will 8 Act 68 of (1995) 6 SCC National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. 11 (2009) 3 SCC 1. 1121 aid understanding of the jury about technical medical terminology, while at the same time make the opinion of an expert available and hence make the verdict more credible. But the same directions were rejected in V.Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Specialty Hospital & Another.12 which in my opinion should be looked at again. (iii) It has been observed that in a large proportion of cases, the decision of district forum is overruled. This calls for a more diligent dealing of cases at this level, so that the need of taking the case further is reduced. In general, the aim must be to minimize the number of cases in which the decision of the lower courts is reversed by the NCDRC, to avoid unnecessary prolonged litigation. (iv) At present, CPA 13 does provide for a preliminary scrutiny of complaints before notice is sent to the respondent but the same is not effective, as the scrutiny is not done by medical experts. This is necessary so as to avoid CPA courts from being burdened with unnecessary complaints, and also to prevent undue harassments of respondents. This problem is well attested by our statistics. It was found that in only 23.6 percent of the cases was the plaintiff successful. A prior expert scrutiny may be able to increase this success rate. (v) Under CPA goods purchased and used for profit/commercial purpose are excluded from the act. This provision needs to be corrected because it excludes all medical equipment used in hospitals. Defective equipment in health care can cause harm to the consumer leading to complaint against doctors. However, as per the Act the manufacturer goes scot-free. (vi) Service hired free of cost is excluded from the ambit of CPA. This at one stroke excludes all government/municipal hospital doctors, giving rise to discrimination. This provision needs to be amended. Decoupling of Liability In suits between private individuals such as a doctor-patient medical malpractice case, liability usually is coupled. This is in the sense that, aside from the parties' litigation costs; a successful plaintiff receives what the defendant pays. A decoupled liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the damages to be paid by the defendant. But the question arises as to what is the rationale for decoupling liability and how with it introduce efficiency in the system? Consider any level of liability when liability is coupled. This level of liability will determine the incentive of the victim i.e. patient to sue (the higher the award, the greater the incentive) and the incentive of the injurer i.e. doctor to take care. The parties' behavior in turn will determine the level of social costs which are the sum of the injurer's cost of taking care, the victim's expected harm, and the parties' expected litigation costs S.C.R Consumer Protection Act. 1222 To explain the concept, consider decoupling liability, starting at the specified level of coupled liability. Raising the amount paid by the doctor will cause him to take more care. Lowering the amount awarded to the patient will reduce his incentive to sue. This in effect will cause the doctor to take less care (since he knows that the chances of a patient suing are now lower) - which is allowed until the doctors care is back to its level under coupled liability. Since the level of care is the same under this decoupled system and the original coupled system, so is the doctor s cost of taking care and the patient's expected harm. But since the victim is awarded less under the decoupled system, he will sue less often and, consequently, litigation costs will be lower, and this is achieved without sacrificing the injurer's incentive to exercise care. In this system, if the victim is awarded less than what the doctor pays, the government obtains the difference; if the victim is awarded more, the government provides the difference. Thus, starting from any level of coupled liability, there is always a decoupled system of liability that reduces social costs. An example of a version of decoupled liability is seen in the medical sector in Sweden. Patient compensation in Sweden is provided through the voluntary, contractual Patient Compensation Insurance 14 that provides compensation without proof of provider liability through an administrative mechanism. The discipline of medical providers is handled by a separate Medical Responsibility Board 15. Since the system is designed to provide compensation without regard to deterrence, it is often referred as the No-fault System. The system in some sense is close to the strict liability rule. In the system, two necessary conditions must be established for compensation under the PCI: (1) Proof of medical causation; and (2) An injury that could have been avoided. Thus, the criterion for compensability makes no reference to terms such as of fault, negligence, or medical error but the objective basis of the inquiry appears to be the same as under tort law. The MRB on the other hand, handles claims against medical providers that may be filed by either the public or the National Board of Health and Social Welfare (SOS). It also considers the revocation of licenses, the reissue of licenses after revocation, and restriction on authorization to prescribe drugs. The PCI is totally decoupled from the MRB, and the PCI information base on injuries is not systematically used to improve the quality of care. It is estimated that the No-fault System costs roughly 0.16% of health care costs in Sweden, while medical malpractice insurance premiums in the United States account for approximately 1% of health care expenditure more than a tenfold difference. 16 Although No-fault system reduces the length of judicial procedures, compensates victims of medical injuries without putting any blame on health care providers and maintains a broad reach of compensation with low overall costs, but when examined carefully, this system also has its own barriers when applied. The system provides 14 PCI under the Patient Insurance Act. 15 MRB under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 16 Danzon, Patricia M., The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Myths and Realities, International Review of Law and Economic, 1994 available at https://hcmg.wharton.upenn.edu/files. 1323 compensation conditional on medical causation but has no link to deterrence. It provides for less information and weaker incentives therefore for doctors to apply the required standard of care. The system also severely limits patient rights to pursue for litigation by reducing their probability of appealing to the court. Thus, the disclaimer is that choice of adoption of medical malpractice system should depend on the fact as to which system fits better for needs by taking into consideration the current judicial, social insurance and health care system of a country. The table below summarizes the features of the two systems- Compe nsation Scheme Administ rative Costs Benefits Awarded Equity in access to compensation Contribution to quality control/ deterrence Financing Effectiv eness Tort System Court Verdict Costly for both parties Unpredic table, higher payments especiall y for pain and suffering Difficult, costly to prove negligence, difficult to access the system Yes by judicial remedies, premiums, humiliation, defensive medicine Indirectly by liability premiums, directly by Insurers Costly, lengthy, unpredi ctable Nofault System For injuries that fit into injury treatme nt criteria and are avoidab le, PCI is liable Minimal, no litigation costs. 75% of economi c damages paid, noneconomi c damages payable for physical injuries Easy to file claims, no need of a lawyer if not appealed to court. Deterrence is not an issue. It controls amount of indemnities to detain health care costs. The county councils, liability premiums of private providers and copayment s for outpatient services. Predicta ble awards, easy access to system, less costly and short decision process. Allocation of Burden of Proof in Medical Malpractice Cases 17 The rule for burden of proof determines who, the plaintiff or defendant, be required to present evidence to the court. In context of medical malpractice cases, the rule determines whether the doctor or the patient must bring in the evidence. This is essentially a question of risk allocation, i.e. it dictates who, defendant or the plaintiff should bear the risk of not having sufficient evidence to present in the court. Generally, law determines who bears the burden of proof, but the courts can apply some special evidence rules depending upon 17 Wieland, Mariam, The Economic Analysis of German Medical Malpractice Law, 2001, available at Economics. 1424 the specific case. In general, the Indian law allocates the burden of proof to the plaintiff (i.e. the patient). The law requires a higher standard of evidence than otherwise to support an allegation of negligence against a doctor. The plaintiff first has to prove a malpractice, second damage and third the causal relation between the negligence and the damage caused. Thus, difficulties arise for the proof of negligence and especially for the proof of the causal relations. There are special evidence rules in malpractice cases which simplify the burden of proof in favour of the patients. One such principle is res ispa loquitur meaning that the thing speaks for itself. It is applicable in cases where the accident could not have happened without negligence and the circumstances conclusively show that the doctor and not any other person were negligent. In such circumstances no proof of negligence is required beyond the accident itself. In that case the plaintiff will get 100% of the damage as compensation. The defendant can rebut the court s presumption by presenting some proof that will at least shake the court s prima facie conviction. However, in a lot of medical malpractice cases the plaintiff will not succeed in convincing the judge to the necessary extent, because in the field of medicine there can always happen something unexpectedly due to the nature of the human body. Thus, the physician can often claim that the way the malpractice happened was an atypical chain of causation. Then, the burden of producing complete proof reverts to the plaintiff. Considering a reversal of burden of proof and its consequences. Reverse burden of proof means that instead of the patient being required to prove the evidence, the physician bears the entire burden of proof. It has to be examined, if economic reasons support this line of argumentation. At first sight a negligence rule with reversed burden of proof might seem to be simply the opposite of the usual negligence rule where the plaintiff has to prove only one efficient step to prevent the damage that the defendant did not undertake. However, in the case of reversed burden of proof the defendant is in a more hard position, since he has to prove that there was no other possible step, which he could have undertaken to prevent the damage. This means, first he has to search for all possible ways to prevent the damage (that any other doctor with ordinary skills could have taken) and then he has to prove that all these possible steps are not cost justified, whereas the plaintiff in the case of the usual negligence rule only has to search among the different damage prevention projects until he finds a cost justified one. Thus, the negligence rule with reversed burden of proof causes for the defendant a more difficult situation compared to the plaintiff in case of the usual negligence rule. Therefore, the former is not simply the opposite of the latter. Hence, even if the defendant is the cheaper information provider regarding collecting evidence, this does not automatically justify a reversed burden of proof. Since a reversed burden of proof causes immensely high information cost for the defendant, he has difficulties to defend himself and therefore he will only in very rare cases succeed. Thus, in general the economic effect of a reversed burden of proof resembles the effect of strict liability where the defendant has no possibility to exculpate himself. 1525 Physician The Cheapest Information Provider In the context of medical malpractice cases, generally the physician has an excess of information and therefore appears to be the cheaper information provider between the two parties involved here. He has the required scientific medical knowledge and is in a position to explain each step of the patient s treatment. Further, the physician has easy access to documents and experts to testify his arguments in court. Hence, it is evident that as compared to a patient, the physician would definitely face lower costs of providing information. However, if the physician committed a malpractice involving gross negligence since he violated fundamental rules of medicine, his costs of collecting and providing evidence in court will be a lot higher. This is because in such cases it is much more difficult for the physician to defend himself. Nevertheless, he should bear the burden of proof as he can provide the evidence at cheaper cost than the patient. Uncertainty over Causation In cases where it is not sure if a physician is the cause of the injury, the problem of uncertainty over causation arises. This is common in hospitals where a medical team performs together and the contributions of different persons to causation are hard to determine. A very common cited example of uncertainty over causation is the case of victim of a car accident who has to be operated urgently. Now, if the patient dies, it is sometimes not clear whether it was due to the negligence of the doctor or due to the injuries of the accident. Taking the case of reversed burden of proof with uncertainty over causation, we can further develop our basic model of minimization of social accident costs. The difference to the basic model lies in the fact that with uncertainty over causation, given negligence rule the cost of information or providing the evidence is very high. Given reversed burden of proof, it is assumed that for the physician exculpation will be impossible as under strict liability. So, he would have to bear the additional cost of accidents which in fact he did not cause, even though he cannot influence these amounts of damages by his level of care or activity. Contracting over Malpractice Liability 18 Contractual Liability refers to a scenario where patients and medical providers are themselves allowed to determine liability rules that govern their relationship by contract. As currently constituted, medical malpractice liability still does not adequately regulate patient safety. Proponents of contractual liability claim that it is the most optimal way of reforming the existing malpractice liability regime. In the following, we critically analyze whether allowing for contractual liability can bring greater efficiency to the system or not. Contractual Liability has two advantages over the current system. First, it places controls 18 Arlen, Jennifer, Contracting Over Malpractice Liability, UPenn Law Review, 2010, available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/46-arlen158upalrev pdf. 1626 over liability rules with patients and medical providers. This is a clear advantage since patients and physicians have better information about how much higher is the patient ready to pay for higher quality care and thus are better able to determine the liability rules that affect both patient safety and health costs. The rules that patients and physician would set would be socially optimum as long as they are well informed about the costs and benefits of malpractice liability and can contract voluntarily. Second, contractual liability is also superior to malpractice liability because it allows liability rules to vary across patients. Since all patients do not want the same quality of medical care, the ability to choose different levels of care would certainly be beneficial. Economists however claim that the fundamental premise of contractual liability proposals is not correct. Patients and medical providers do not have optimal incentives to contract over malpractice liability, even when patients are informed about the costs and benefits of imposing liability. One of the main problems faced by liability contracts that render it inefficient is the collective goods argument. Malpractice liability is needed not just to induce patientspecific, post-contractual investments in safety, it is also needed to induce physicians to invest in measures such as expertise and equipment whose benefits are collective (in that they apply to all patients) and durable (in that they reduce the risk of error for both existing and future patients). To provide optimal incentives, liability thus must ensure that patients obtain the full benefit of improving care that is collective and whose benefits extend to future patients. This requirement presents a problem for contractual liability. Patients negotiating individually over liability face excessive incentives to contract out of liability. This is because neither do they obtain the full benefit nor do they have to bear the full cost of a decision to impose or waive liability. The crux of the problem is that each physician determines his collective investments in care based on his total expected liability across all his patients. This creates a free-rider problem. Thus, a critical test of whether contractual liability is efficient is whether patients also benefit from imposing liability by contract when care is determined primarily by physician s pre-contractual investments in care. Then, the only incentive for the patients to impose optimal liability is that they obtain treatment from physicians with high pre-contractual investments in care. This is because only high quality physicians can agree to bear liability at a reasonable price. Low quality physicians cannot afford to bear liability at the same price as high quality physicians without incurring ruinous liability costs. The problem that arises then is that any patient who has selected a presumptively high-quality physician (based on the offer to bear liability) can be expected to immediately ask that physician to accept a liability waiver in return for a price reduction. The patient will seek this waiver because the waiver does not affect quality since that is determined by investments in care taken pre-contract. This renders contracting over liability inefficient, because low quality providers can mimic the contracts of high quality providers, knowing that patients will waive liability. As a result, patients will not value liability as a signal of pre-contractual quality and thus will waive optimal liability when the primary benefit of liability is to induce pre-contractual 1727 investments in care. These problems can be ameliorated - albeit not eliminated - through contractual liability executed collectively by patients with providers committing to make non-negotiable offers to bear liability or waive it. Nevertheless, this form of contractual liability is inefficient because it creates a new problem adverse selection that produces systematic incentives for patients to waive optimal malpractice liability. On average, patients who need extensive medical care can be expected to value higher cost, higher quality plans more than healthy patients. This implies that liability plans will be more expensive not only because per patient quality is higher, but also because average patient health care costs are higher. This pricing structure will force patients with average health care costs away from liability plans - even when it would be optimal for the vast majority of patients to impose liability because the price they must pay to impose liability includes not only the direct cost of liability, but also the added premium charged to patients with higher than average expected costs. Adverse selection thus will cause many patients to waive off liability. An accrediting body is an independent third party that measures and rates the regulations, safety guidelines, and practices of a service or business. In our context, hospital accreditation is a public recognition by National Healthcare Accreditation Body 19, of the achievement of accreditation standards by healthcare organizations, demonstrated through an independent external peer assessment of that organization s level of performance in relation to the standards. In India, the heath system currently operates within an environment of rapid social, economical and technical changes. Such changes raise the concern for the quality of health care. Hospital is an integral part of health care system. Accreditation would be the single most important approach for improving the quality of services supplied by the hospitals. Accreditation is an incentive to improve capacity of national hospitals to provide quality of care. National accreditation system for hospitals ensure that hospitals, whether public or private, national or expatriate, play there expected roles in national health system. The benefits of accreditation to patients include high quality of care and patient safety, respect and protection of the rights of patients along with regular evaluation of patient satisfaction. Accreditation to a hospital stimulates continuous improvement. It enables hospital in demonstrating commitment to quality care. It raises community confidence in the services provided by the hospital and also provides opportunity to healthcare unit to benchmark with the best. National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers is a constituent board of Quality Council of India 20, set up to establish and operate accreditation programme for healthcare organizations in India. NABH has been established with the objective of enhancing health system & promoting continuous quality improvement and patient safety. NABH provides accreditation to hospitals in a non- discriminatory manner regardless of their ownership, legal status, size and degree of independence. International 19 NABH is a constituent board of Quality Council of India. 20 QCI. 1828 Society for Quality in Healthcare 21 has accredited Standards for Hospitals developed by NABH, India. The approval of ISQua authenticates that NABH standards are in consonance with the global benchmarks set by ISQua. The hospitals accredited by NABH will have international recognition. NABH Standards has ten chapters incorporating 100 standards and individual standard has specific objective elements concerning Access, Assessment and Continuity of Care, Patient Right and Education, Care of Patient, Management of Medication, Hospital Infection Control, Continuous Quality Improvement, Responsibility of Management, Facility Management and Safety, Human Resource Management, Information Management System etc. Though accreditation of health care providers does provide a mean for achieving efficiency in the system of medical liability, but the process is very much in its nascent phase in India. Also, it needs to be pointed out that while minimum standards are to be mandatory, accreditation is to be of voluntary nature. In addition, the accreditation board while being supported by all stakeholders, including industry, consumers, government, has fully functional autonomy in its operation. It is though true that the health ministry has supported the initiatives towards accreditation, it is yet to give it greater importance. The ministry needs to give equal importance to both regulation and accreditation for the sake of quality healthcare. It should consider the fast changing nature of quality benchmarks in healthcare sector and make the accreditation system as dynamic as possible. The standards should be periodically revised and today's desirable standards should become tomorrow's minimum standards. That is the only way how there can be continuous up gradation of healthcare standards in the country. It must ensure that the link between the "National Board" that decides the minimum standards in healthcare and the "Accreditation Board" which prescribes multilevel standards for the same establishments should have strong linkages. The working relationship between these two bodies can result in periodic revision of mandatory standards. However, it cannot be denied that all kinds of "voluntary" quality up gradation options would remain only in urban India and will have no impact on thousands of rural healthcare establishments. But nevertheless, it is sure to benefit patients and health care providers alike. THE INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2013 AN ORDINANCE FURTHER TO AMEND THE INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL ACT, This Ordinance seeks to achieve the following objectives: The Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 was enacted for the purpose of reconstituting the Medical Council of India (Council) and to provide for the maintenance of the Indian Medical Register and for matters connected therewith. The Act was amended, inter alia, by the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 2010 superseding the Council for one year with effect from the 15th May, 2010 and providing for the constitution of a Board of 21 ISQua. 22 Annexure-I/1. 1929 Governors of not more than seven persons to exercise the powers and to perform the functions of the Council under the said Act. Subsequently, the term of the Board of Governors was extended to one year at a time by amending the Act in 2011 and 2012 and as per the provisions of the Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 2012 the Council has to be reconstituted within a period of three years from the date of its supersession, that is latest by the 14th May, The 2013 ordinance proposed to amend the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 to reconstitute the Council and review the composition of the said Council so as to give representation to Union territories and to remove the anomaly where States having larger number of medical colleges, but having formed a medical university, were having fewer seats in the Council as compared to States having fewer colleges affiliated to several Universities, by inserting a proviso in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section The Council's main functions as contained in the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 is to make recommendations to the Central Government in matters of recognition of medical qualifications, determining the courses of study and examinations required to obtain such qualifications, inspection of examinations and maintenance of register of medical practitioners, etc. By the amendment of the said Act in 1993, the power to grant permission for establishment of new Medical Colleges, increase in admission capacity or for starting new or higher course of study or training in the established colleges was entrusted to the Central Government from the respective State Governments. For this purpose, the Council became a recommendatory body to the Central Government for taking final decisions in these matters. After reviewing the working of the Council in this area, and the problems being faced, a need has been felt to empower the Central Government to give such directions to the Council wherever necessary on matters of policy and public importance and to ensure their proper compliance. 4. The Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013, inter alia, provides the following, namely: (a) To amend long title of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (Act) so as to make it more comprehensive; (b) To amend sub-section (2) of the section 3 of the Act so as to provide that no person shall hold the post of President or the Vice-President for more than two terms; (c) To amend section 13 of the Act relating to recognition of medical qualifications granted to a citizen of India by medical institutions not included in the First or Second Schedule so as to extend the benefit to the overseas citizen of India; (d) To amend section 14 of the Act relating to the medical practice by the persons having medical qualifications granted by medical institutions in any country outside India. It is proposed to provide that the practice by such persons shall be limited for a specified period in the institution to which they are attached; 2030 (e) To amend section 21 of the Act relating to the Indian Medical Register so as to provide that the biometric details of all persons enrolled on any State Medical Register shall be verified at the time of renewal of registration. (f) To provide for renewal that every medical practitioner whose name has been enrolled as such on the Indian Medical Register or State Medical Register shall be valid for a period of ten years from the date of such enrolment and thereafter, it may got be renewed; (g) To insert a new section 30A in the Act relating to resignation by the President, Vice- President and Members of the Council and the power of the Central Government to remove from the office the President, Vice-President or a Member; and (h) To insert a new section 33A in the Act relating to power of the Central Government to give directions to the Council in the matters of policy and for making any regulation. 5. The proposed amendments will make the composition of the Council compact, and representative, and empower the Central Government to discharge its functions effectively to ensure proper development of medical education in the country. Critical Analysis of the IMC Amendments: 23 The Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013 in the Parliament ignited a heated debate in some quarters of the medical community. While some doctors with political connection may find this Ordinance as a great opportunity to climb up the ladder to the Medical Council of India (MCI), others are deeply perturbed with the Ordinance for more reason than one. Ironically, most physicians practicing around the country perhaps are still unaware about what are at stake in this significant piece of the new medical legislation. In fact, barring a few exceptions, most SMCs and health universities have shown little or no interest to conduct an open and transparent MCI election, which must include all registered doctors practicing modern medicine. One has to wonder why these medical establishments are not keen to inform all physicians about this important MCI election being held in accordance to the Ordinance Unfortunately, there is no prescription in the Ordinance that can bring hope of a cure for the ailing medical system in India. The Ordinance 2013 is merely an old wine in a new bottle which makes one point abundantly clear that unscrupulous doctors and medical colleges with financial affluence and political connection that have been plundering our healthcare delivery system for a very long time have little to fear from the changes in law in this Ordinance. Nobody should be oblivious of the underlying facts of the genesis of Ordinance 2013, which started in 2010 with the revelation of a deep-rooted corruption inside the MCI. The 23 Dr Kunal Saha, Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Bill, 2013: No prescription for a corruption-free healthcare system, India Medical Times (An AalaTimes media venture), 2013 available at no-prescription-for-a-corruption-free-healthcare-system-by-dr-kunal-saha/. 2131 Ordinance 2013 has provided to amend the Indian Medical Council Act, which was enacted more than half a century ago with the primary aim to provide a platform for the maintenance of an uniform standard of medical education and to regulate ethical practice by doctors across India. The IMC Act, 1956 provided rules for the establishment of MCI as the central authority for control of medical education with exclusive power to approve or disapprove medical colleges and to take disciplinary action against the delinquent physicians for their unethical and negligent acts. The IMC Act, 1956 also stipulated formation of state medical council (SMC) that would issue licenses to bona fide medical graduates allowing them to practice modern medicine in the state. But what actually prompted the central government to introduce the make the Ordinance 2013 to provide an amendment in the 57-year old laws made under the IMC Act, 1956? The answer to this important question may still be vivid in our memory as it started just a little more than three years ago when one Dr Ketan Desai, then president of MCI, was caught red-handed (through a sting operation) by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 22nd April, 2010 while taking bribe from a private medical college allegedly in exchange of granting the MCI recognition. This was not the first time that the same Dr Desai came to the limelight for being involved with a shameful conduct as the top medical man in the country. In a writ petition; Union of India v. Harish Bhalla & Others 25, Delhi High Court dubbed MCI as a den of corruption and ordered Dr Desai to be removed from his post of MCI president on corruption charges in But Dr Desai made a remarkable return to the top of MCI when he was elected unopposed as the MCI president once again in a general body meeting held on 1st March, 2009 where nearly one hundred MCI members from across the nation took part but none opposed Dr Desai for the coveted post of MCI president despite his besmirched background. Rest is a dark history of Indian medicine as Dr Desai was arrested by the CBI in 2010 while still occupying the top post in MCI. Dr Desai s arrest by the CBI was highly publicized by the national and international media, which also brought endless ignominy to all doctors of the Indian origin. Under mounting public pressure, the union health ministry was eventually forced to dissolve the full body of elected members of MCI in May For the past more than three years, MCI has been functioning under a Board of Governors, established through an Ordinance with few hand-picked doctors chosen by the government. The sordid saga of Dr Desai undoubtedly put the health ministry in an embarrassing situation. But the undisputed fact remains that Dr Desai s incredible return as the MCI president in 2009 (with full support from every MCI member) and his eventual fall from the grace in 2010 took place under the same health ministry headed by Mr Ghulam Nabi Azad who is still the union health minister. The health ministry has since been under relentless pressure to re-establish a democratically elected body of the MCI. 24 IMC Act, Delhi High Court - (PIL) LPA No /32 The Ordinance 2013 was made by the UPA government seemingly to establish a new MCI by changing the old provisions of the IMC Act, 1956, to cleanse the healthcare system and to prevent unscrupulous medicos gaining entry to the MCI. In fact, the Ordinance 2013 has been touted by the government as a major benevolent Act to regain public trust on doctors and to stem the rot in the healthcare system. And as expected, several apparently populist provisions have been craftily included in this Ordinance. For example, the new Ordinance has proposed that president/vice-president of MCI may not hold office for more than two terms (Section 3.2). But nothing in the Ordinance 2013 can prevent the same doctor to return to the post of MCI president/vicepresident after taking a break as an ordinary member for a single term. What difference would it make if a depraved president like Dr Desai occupies the post of MCI president for two terms and then step aside for a single period only to regain the post of MCI president. Other gimmicks clearly aimed at hoodwinking ordinary people were also included in 2009, for e.g. the term of president/vice-president (Section 7.1) or regular member (Section 7.2) has been reduced by one-year time (from 5 years to 4 years) but with absolutely no restriction on the re-election (and re-nomination) of the same member over and over again. These trifling changes are clearly designed only for political purposes, which cannot have any impact on removing corruption from the MCI. Perhaps the biggest gimmicky change proposed in the Ordinance 2013 is the introduction of Section 30A.2f which provides the power to remove MCI president/vice-president or any regular member from his office if: in the opinion of the Central Government, (the MCI member) has so abused his position as to render his continuance in office detrimental to the overall public interest. The specific language used in this provision was framed clearly to counter allegation against inclusion of any dissolute doctor in the MCI. But the proposed provision falls flat on its face for a number of reasons because it leaves several lacunae for corrupt medicos to easily infiltrate the MCI. First, this law does nothing to prevent a doctor who has already been convicted or who is known to be involved with immoral activities from becoming a member or even president of MCI. In fact, if a new MCI body is established today in accordance to the Ordinance 2013, Dr Ketan Desai would be a member and possibly president of MCI once again without any problem whatsoever because the new provision has merely stated that a member/president/vice-president may be removed from MCI in future if he is found to have abused his official position in MCI. Despite the undisputed fact that Dr Desai had previously abused his position as MCI president for which he was arrested by CBI and removed from MCI in 2010, there is no bar for him to be elected as a new MCI member or even president of MCI again. In fact, if a new MCI is formed today, Dr Desai would be a member because he is also the lone member elected from the medical faculty in Gujarat University Senate and according to Section 3.1(b) of the Ordinance 2013; doctor elected from each University Senate would 2333 also be a member of MCI. Further, the proposed law under Section 30A.2f has also stipulated that a member may be removed from MCI but only if in the opinion of the Central Government it is found that the member has abused his official position. Why the Central Government should be the lone judge to decide whether any MCI member may have abused his official position when many of these members were nominated and not elected by the government. The health ministry always remained as a silent spectator when Dr Desai was condemned for serious charges of corruption and bribery. Dr Desai was removed from his post of MCI president in 2001 by Delhi High Court and in 2010, he was terminated from MCI after he was arrested and charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act by CBI. The health ministry did absolutely nothing to prevent Dr Desai from abusing his official position either in 2001 or Ironically, the Central Government has also provided no change in the Ordinance 2013 to curb doctors with tainted background from being elected or nominated as a member of MCI. In fact, with reports of gross mismanagement and corruption inside the health department appearing regularly in the news, the health ministry has no credibility left in the eyes of the ordinary people today. Moreover, Rule 10 of Central Civil Services Rules, has stipulated that a person working in any government agency would be suspended if he remains under police custody for a period of more than 48 hours and also during pendency of criminal proceedings in the court against him. A doctor-member should be removed from MCI if he is facing criminal trial or if he has been put behind bar for a period more than 48 hours. The law in the Ordinance 2013 that a member may be removed from MCI only when he is found guilty in the opinion of the Central Government is another self-serving devious ploy by the health ministry to shield the corrupt medicos. It is a common knowledge that corruption in healthcare has thrived with declining standard of medical education with rapid proliferation of shoddy private medical colleges in the recent years. MCI holds exclusive authority for the control of medical education including giving recognition to new medical colleges and to allow/disallow increase in the number of graduate and postgraduate seats in existing medical colleges across India. Many private medical colleges have been able to obtain green signal from MCI even without adequate infrastructure and medical faculties in the recent past. These private medical colleges are built with the primary motive to make huge financial profit through exorbitant capitation fee and other unethical means from the aspiring medical students. The owners and shareholders of these spurious private medical colleges have frequently obtained MCI recognition through external political influence or by bribing the officials/members of MCI. The recent arrest of Dr Desai by CBI bears a glaring proof of such deplorable activities by high-rank MCI members. Doctors who own private medical 26 Available at 2434 colleges should never be allowed to become the MCI members in order to avoid possible conflict of interests. Unfortunately, there is no provision in the Ordinance 2013 to exclude doctors who are involved with running the business of private medical colleges from becoming members of MCI. In fact, the number of members to be elected to MCI has been sharply increased under Section 3(1)b of the Ordinance 2013 that has stipulated that 1 doctor would be elected to MCI for every 10 medical colleges including the private medical colleges. Proprietors of some private medical colleges have already been elected as MCI members in some states under the new provision of the Ordinance Ironically, a new, populist provision has also been included in the Ordinance 2013 under Section 30A-2e which stipulates that a member should be removed from MCI if he has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially the exercise of his functions as such president, vice-president or other member. Perhaps the greatest damage that the Ordinance 2013 may inflict on the society is its direct threat to democracy in the medical community of India. The Ordinance 2013 has proposed to significantly increase the number of MCI members from different states who are elected not by their doctor-peers in the state but by the few members of each University Senate most of whom hail from non-medical and sometimes non-academic divisions of the school. The Ordinance 2013 has proposed that each University Senate may elect 1 doctormember for MCI for every 10 medical colleges (Section 3.1b). With numerous private medical colleges burgeoning all over the nation under a liberal recognition policy by the previous MCI, a large number of additional members would be elected for the next MCI from many states mostly by the non-medical voters of the Senate who possibly have little or no knowledge about the character or competency of the doctors contesting MCI election. Even if the number of MCI members had to be increased due to the proliferation of new medical colleges, why not let the registered doctors elect the most competent among their peers just the way members of SMCs are elected in India? Further, it cannot be justified to have equal representation in MCI from a large, reputed government medical college with hundreds of students compared to a small, private medical college under a deemed university built primarily to make financial profit. Also, instead of the large number of registered physicians, allowing a handful of Senate members to elect MCI members is more likely to be influenced by unwarranted external factors including bribery and corruption. Apart from increasing the number of elected MCI members from private medical colleges, the Ordinance 2013 has also proposed to increase the number of MCI members to be nominated by the Central Government. The newly proposed Section 3(1)aa in the Ordinance 2013 has stipulated that one member from the Union Territories will be nominated to the MCI by the Central 2535 Government although the criteria for such nomination of doctors are not mentioned anywhere in it. Why the government did not allow fellow doctors to elect their representative to MCI through a democratic process even if additional members had to be included from the Union Territories. There is little dispute that political influence might play a key role for obtaining nomination from the government to be a member of MCI under this new provision of law. By increasing the number of nominated position in the MCI, the health ministry has undoubtedly done a big favour to the Central Government to reap more political bargaining power in the coming years. In sum, the Ordinance 2013 is nothing but a colossal political gimmick in the name of transformation of the broken healthcare system in India. This was created to quell the increasing public outrage against maladministration and corruption in the central medical regulatory system. Although the Ordinance has emanated primarily from the premature disbandment of the last MCI following the precipitous arrest of then MCI president Dr Ketan Desai, which also exposed the deep-rooted corruption in the MCI, there is no genuine attempt to deter the corrupt practices indulged by many Machiavellian medical leaders in the past. THE CLINICAL ESTABLISHMENTS (REGISTRATION AND REGULATION) ACT, UNDER THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 28 Indian Public Health Standards National Rural Health Mission 29 was launched in the year 2005 to strengthen the Rural Public Health System and has since met many hopes and expectations. The Mission seeks to provide effective health care to the rural populace throughout the country with special focus on the States and Union Territories 30, which have weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure. Towards this end, the Indian Public Health Standards 31 for Sub-centres, Primary Health Centres 32, Community Health Centres 33, Sub-District and District Hospitals were published in January/ February, 2007 and have been used as the reference point for public health care infrastructure planning and up-gradation in the States and UTs. IPHS are a set of uniform standards envisaged to improve the quality of health care delivery in the country. The IPHS documents have been revised keeping in view the changing protocols of the existing programmes and introduction of new programmes especially for Non-Communicable Diseases. Flexibility is allowed to suit the diverse needs of the States and regions. These IPHS guidelines will act as the main 27 Act 23 of Available at 29 NHM. 30 UTs. 31 IPHS. 32 PHCs. 33 CHCs. 2636 driver for continuous improvement in quality and serve as the bench mark for assessing the functional status of health facilities. States and UTs should adopt these IPHS guidelines for strengthening the Public Health Care Institutions and put in their best efforts to achieve high quality of health care across the country. Particular guidelines for the following centers are provided under the public health standards: Sub Centers Primary Health Centre Community Health Centre Sub-district & Sub-divisional Hospital District Hospital Standard Treatment Guidelines provided under the Act: 1. Guidelines for Cardiovascular Diseases 2. Guidelines for Critical Care 3. Guidelines for Gastroenterological Diseases 4. Guidelines for Obstetrics and Gynaecology 5. Guidelines for Haemodialysis 6. Guidelines for Ophthalmology 7. Guidelines for ENT 8. Guidelines for Orthopaedics 9. Guidelines for Medicine (Respiratory) 10. Guidelines for Medicine (Non Respiratory Medical Conditions) 11. Guidelines for Paediatrics and Paediatrics Surgery 12. Guidelines for General Surgery 13. Guidelines for Interventional Radiology 14. Guidelines for Oncology 15. Guidelines for Organ Transplant - Liver 16. Guidelines for Urology 17. Guidelines for Laboratory Medicine 18. Guidelines for G. I. Surgery 19. Guidelines for Neurology 20. Guidelines for Endocrinology 21. Guidelines for Ayurveda Salient Features & Critical Analysis: 34 The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 has been facing a lot of criticism from the medical community for various reasons, some genuine others borne out of resistance to change and fear of regulatory controls. 34 Dr S K Joshi, Clinical Establishments Act, 2010: Salient Features & Critical Analysis, India Medical Times (An AalaTimes Media Venture), 2013 available at 07/10/clinical-establishments-act-2010-salient-features-critical-analysis-by-dr-s-k-joshi/. 2737 Salient Features: 1. The Act was enacted by the Central Govt under Article of the constitution for the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim (and also for implementation in the Union Territories). Other states have a choice of implementing this legislation or enacting their own legislation on the subject. 2. The purpose of the Act is to provide for the registration and regulation of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards of facilities and services, which may be provided by them. 3. The implementation is to be affected through a three-tier structure the Central Council, the State Council and the District Registering Authority. 4. The act will be applicable to all clinical establishments (hospitals, maternity homes, nursing homes, dispensaries, clinics, sanatoriums or institutions by whatever name called, that offer services for diagnosis, care or treatment of patients in any recognised system of medicine (Allopathy, Homeopathy, Ayurveda, Unani or Siddha), public or private, except the establishments run by the armed forces. 5. Registration is mandatory for all clinical establishments. No person shall run a clinical establishment unless it is registered and for that the establishment has to fulfil the following conditions: (a) The maintenance of minimum standards of facilities and services and staff, as prescribed; (b) Maintenance of records and submission of reports and returns as prescribed; (c) Undertaking to provide within the staff and facilities available such medical examination and treatment as may be required to stabilise the emergency medical condition of any individual brought to any such establishment; (d) The clinical establishment will charge the rates for each type of procedures and services within the range of rates determined and issued by the Central Govt in consultation with the State Govt; (e) The rates charged for each type of service/facility provided shall be displayed in local and English language conspicuously; (f) The establishment shall ensure compliance of the standard treatment guidelines as may be determined and issued by the Central or the State Govt; (g) The establishment shall maintain and provide electronic health records (EHR) and electronic medical records (EMR) of every patient as may be prescribed by the Central or the State Govt; (h) Every establishment shall maintain information and statistics in respect of all other applicable laws and rules, thereunder. 35 The Constitution of India. 2838 6. Procedure for Registration (a) The registration will be done by the District Registering Authority (District Health Officer). The Provisional Registration will be issued within ten days of submission of application as prescribed, without any inquiry or inspection. It will be renewable yearly. The establishments existing before commencement of the Act will have to apply within a year and those started after the commencement of the Act, within six months of the date of their establishment. The registration will be non-transferable. (b) Provisional registration will not be granted beyond two years from the date of notification of standards in case of establishments that existed before the notification of standards, and beyond six months of notification of standards in case of those established after the notification of standards. (c) Permanent registration will be granted for a period of five years, on submission of application along with fees and evidence of compliance with prescribed standards. The particulars of the applicant will be published for information of and objections, if any, by the public within 30 days. If objections are received, the same will be communicated to the clinical establishment for a response within 45 days. (d) Cancellation of Registration (Clause 32). The registration can be cancelled in case of any violation of the conditions or conviction of the manager under the Act, after the issue of a show cause notice. The Registering Authority also has the powers of inquiry and inspection or entry and search of the establishment. (e) Register of Clinical Establishments 36. The Registering Authority would be required to compile a register of clinical establishments in a digital format within two years and will supply to the state council a digital copy of every entry made in the register. The State Council in turn will provide the details to the Central Council so as to keep the records updated at all times. 7. Offences and Punishments (a) Running a clinical establishment without registration would be punishable with a fine of Rs 50,000 for the first offence, Rs 2 lakh for the second offence and Rs 5 lakh for the subsequent offence. 37 (b) Serving in an unregistered clinical establishment shall be punishable with a fine up to Rs 25,000. (c) Willful disobedience of any lawful direction or obstruction to lawful authority or refusal to submit any information asked for or giving false information knowingly, would be punishable with a fine up to Rs 5 lakh. 38 (d) In case of a contravention by a company (a hospital) the person in charge of operations/management, shall be liable for action The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, Section Ibid., Section Ibid., Section Ibid., Section39 (e) The provisions of Section 44 and punishments would be equally applicable to government departments. 40 Critical Analysis: 1. The old Acts for registration of hospitals / nursing homes in nine states (mentioned in the Schedule to the Act), make the registration mandatory only for the hospitals and nursing homes (not for the clinics, dispensaries or laboratories) to get registered with the state health authorities. Further, it was applicable only to the Allopathic establishments. Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha or Homeopathy establishments were not covered by them. The new Central Act is a blanket legislation making it mandatory for all establishments hospitals, nursing homes, private clinics, laboratories, blood banks, imaging centres etc, of all systems of medicine (including Homeopathy, Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha) public or private, to get registered by a common single Registering Authority called the District Registering Authority. It, however, exempts the establishments run by the Defence services from registration, for reasons not known. If some of the states are allowed to continue with their old legislations, then the private clinics / laboratories / imaging centres of all systems and hospitals / dispensaries of non-allopathic systems in those states will not be required to be registered in those states. This will defeat the purpose and will not be a desirable situation. 2. The Central and State Councils include the members from non-allopathic systems also (for dealing with non-allopathic establishments) but representation of non-allopathic systems is not mentioned in the District Registering Authority. 3. Conformity to the Standards: It will take time to lay down the standards for so many different types of establishments pertaining to different systems of medicine. Meeting the prescribed standards will have cost implications, which is one of the reasons for resistance by private clinics. Fear of inspector raj and undue harassment is another factor. Monitoring the compliance with standards by hundreds of thousands of establishments will require an army of officials. It will be difficult to ensure implementation of standards, which is known to be our weakest point. We enact beautiful legislations but they remain mostly on paper because we are very poor in enforcement of legislations. 4. Schedule of Charges for Services to be decided by the State: This is a provision, which may not be palatable to the clinical establishments at all. The state cannot and should not dictate the fees for various services/procedures. Even while conforming to the prescribed minimum standards, there may be a lot of difference between the standard of facilities and expertise provided by the establishments, catering to the different locations, clients, standards / tastes / expectations and paying capacity of clients. Every clinical establishment should have the right to determine the charges for the services provided by 40 Ibid., Section40 it. Government should not try to regulate the charges for services. 5. Standard Treatment Guidelines issued by the Central Govt: The standard treatment protocols, in principle, are a good idea as it helps ensure certain basic standards of treatment. But they can be acceptable only as long as they are limited to broad principles, life threatening emergencies (CPR, anaphylactic shock, poisoning, treatment of snake bite etc) or treatment of major public health problems (such as AIDS, malaria, pulmonary tuberculosis). Physicians should have adequate freedom to decide as per their learning and experience, which modality of treatment to use in which situation in broad compliance with the protocols practiced by the professional community nationally and internationally. 6. Maintenance of EHR and EMR of every patient as may be determined and issued by the Central or State Govt. It is a good idea, in principle, but a requirement, which is likely to be resented by the private clinics because of the added cost (of the system, software and the salary of the computer operator) as well as additional workload for busy clinicians. Besides, a large percentage of the physicians, especially those of the ISM (Indian Systems of Medicine), may not be computer savvy at all. 7. Fear of Scrutiny: What is perhaps worrying the physicians more is the fear of scrutiny and exposure of their professional inadequacies, shortcuts, poor facilities, and mistakes as well as the harassment caused by the inspecting officials. So far hundreds of thousands of private clinics, even nursing homes, have been operating all over the country, unknown and hence not subject to any scrutiny / inspection / questioning by anyone. Since they are not known or registered, there is no check over their facilities or standards and many of them go on giving care and treatment of dubious quality, often in utter disregard of the rules and regulations. Their fear is that once registered, they would no more be able to hide from the legal and professional scrutiny. 8. Publishing the particulars of the clinical establishment for public comments / objections / observations, after grant of provisional certificate, does not appear to be a sound idea. It is not clear what purpose will it serve. Firstly, the public will have no clue about the technical aspects / standards of the hospital especially in case of the establishments newly commissioned. Secondly, the local community or the rival establishments are unlikely to come forward with any meaningful comments. 9. Cancellation of Registration (Clause 32): Cancellation of registration in case of private clinics, diagnostic labs, nursing homes etc may be possible but in case of hospitals it may not be a practically feasible idea in view of a large number of patients admitted at different stages of treatment. In case of repeated violations and reckless disregard for the safety of patients, exemplary penalties, to the tune of a yearly profit amount and/or imprisonment for the trustees/ceo/coo (if found negligent), may be more practical. 10. Treatment of Emergency cases Life-saving treatment in the case of life-threatening emergencies has always been and will always remain the prime duty of every doctor, wherever, in whatever position or location. Shirking this responsibility or refusal to render necessary assistance in timely transportation of patient will be viewed as medical 3141 negligence liable to punishment. However, non-payment of medical bills of treatment of emergency cases is a point of serious and genuine concern of the medical community. The Act is silent on this aspect. The authorities concerned must redress the grievance to the satisfaction of medical professionals by putting in place a mechanism of ensuring problem free reimbursement of bills. The liability may be borne by the insurance agencies or by the government itself. Plus Points of the Act: In spite of the lacunae mentioned above, the Act is a positive development, the need for which was being felt since long. If it is implemented in all the states in the form, broadly in line with the Central Act and Rules, (a) It would act as the first ever factual census of the number, category, speciality and location of all the physicians and all the medical establishments of all the systems of medicine in the country. That would be a great achievement as it would be a great help in the countrywide planning and posting of physicians as well as healthcare establishments. Up to now the authorities do not know exactly how many of what category are available in which area. (b) Registration without any inquiry or inspection, on the basis of the documents submitted by the establishment, should be encouraging for many nursing homes / private clinics to come forward and get registered. This may be the biggest plus point of the Act. (c) It will also help isolate and identify the hundreds of thousands of quacks that are playing havoc with the lives of millions of people all over the country. (d) Once in place, the system of registration will necessarily help in improving the standards of healthcare establishments within a couple of years. It will also bring about some uniformity in the standards of care across the country. THE NATIONAL HEALTH BILL, 2009 MOHFW 41, GOI WORKING DRAFT: VERSION JANUARY 09 (PENDING) 42 The debates around securing the right to health for all in India are at a complex and sensitive stage. In India, we have gross inequity in health-care delivery. The huge inequity is evident, on the one hand, in flourishing international medical tourism, and high-technology biomedical interventions done cheaply, and, on the other, minimum levels of health care being unavailable to those unable to pay. 41 Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. 42 Annexure-I/2 also available at _Bill.pdf. 3242 The health status of people transcends the health-care sector, and the social determinants of health, such as food, water, sewerage, and shelter, still elude large numbers of the poorest citizens in India. Between the early 1990s, when the process of economic reforms began, and now, the yearly per head consumption of food grains in the country has drastically deteriorated. The latest National Family Health Survey provided grim evidence of very slow improvement in infant mortality, persistently low rates of child immunisation, and shocking rates of malnutrition. Inequity in social determinants of health and health care in a market-based system itself becomes a pathogenic factor that drives the engine of deprivation. Public awareness of the need to end inequities in the health status and health entitlements of the people is not new. As early as 1946, the Health Survey and Development Committee set forth a vision of health services in India based on equity, universality, and comprehensiveness of care. Actual progress in realising these goals, and particularly in achieving equity, has been extremely sluggish. These inequities are set to increase even further in the near future even as major investments are being projected and planned in the health sector from 0 9% to 3 0% of the gross domestic product. The stunted public health system is hardly geared up to absorb this increased allocation; already state governments are returning allocated money because of the inability to absorb increased allocations. 43 The Government of India took a landmark decision when it decided to introduce the National Health Bill, The bill recognizes health as a fundamental human right and states that every citizen has a right to the highest attainable standard of health and wellbeing. The constitution of India, under Articles 14, 15, and 21, recognizes the right to life as a fundamental right and places obligations on the Government to ensure protection and fulfillment of the right to health for all, without any inequality or discrimination. The basic tenets of the Bill include the peoples' right to health and healthcare, the obligations of the governments and private institutions, core principles/norms/standards on rights and obligations, the institutional structure for implementation and monitoring, and the judicial machinery for ensuring health rights for all. The bill provides itemized lists of the obligations of the central and state governments. Chapter III of this bill provides elaborate rights to health care, including terminal care, for everyone. A heartening point is that the bill guarantees that no person shall be denied care under any circumstances, including the inability to pay the requisite fee or charges. Prompt and necessary emergency medical treatment and critical care must be given by the concerned health care provider, including private providers. As per the bill, the health care provider, including the clinician, would be obligated to 43 Binayak Sen, Securing the right to health for all in India, The Lancet, Early Online Publication, 11 January 2011 available at 3343 provide all information to the patients regarding the proposed treatment (risks, benefits, costs, etc.) and any alternate treatments that may be available for the particular condition/disease. There is a clause in this chapter that demands that the user (i.e., the patient) respect the rights of the health care providers by treating them with respect, courtesy, and dignity and refrain from any abuse or violent or abusive behavior towards them or to the rights provided to them. The bill envisages the establishment of National- and State-level Public Health Boards to formulate national policies on health, review strategies, and ensure minimum standards for food, water, sanitation, and housing. These boards would also lay down minimum standards and draw up protocols, norms, and guidelines for diverse aspects of health care and treatment. The bill provides for elaborate mechanisms for monitoring at the government and community levels. There is a need to have wider discussion on the scope and activities of these monitoring agencies and regarding dispute resolution and redressal mechanisms listed in chapter V of the Bill. A comprehensive Act that covers the various aspects of health care rights, delivery and related matters has been a pressing need in this country for long. Several international and national agencies, as well as the Honorable Supreme Court of India, have drawn the attention of the Government to this issue. The Bill, once enacted, would have farreaching consequences on the Indian health scenario. It would demand greater levels of professionalism, standards of care, accountability, from the care providers and, besides, ensure protection for them. The Bill calls for greater official involvement of professional bodies like the Indian Academy of Neurology in the health care management in this country. 44 Strengths of the Bill: Its clarity in raising the fundamental health issues is indeed superb as it is based on a very clear health rights approach and ideas outlined in the ICESCR 45 It clearly articulates health as right and outlines the states obligations for fulfilling this right; It integrates bio-medical aspects of health with some vital socio-economic-cultural determinants like food, water, housing sanitation, hygiene, environment, etc other than bio-medical; It provides for user s rights as well as user s obligations/duties and addresses issues of consent, autonomy, privacy, medical records, etc; It has clearly delineated the role and responsibility of the state government and mentions of a clear cut grievance redressal mechanism. Weakness of the Bill: 44 Sanjeev V. Thomas, The National Health Bill 2009 and afterwards, Ann Indian Acad Neurol, 2009, available at /PMC International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 3444 The provisions in the Bill are so much so generalized that these may be fitted into the situation of any country or any community in this world; The Bill does not mention the health problems of any specific region or community; Instead of bottom-up approach, it recognizes the top-down approach of its framing and implementation; It does not adequately relate poverty nutrition health in operational terms; Instead of free health care, it mentions of affordable health care; which imply that this is not that much pro-poor; It does not mention that who would be the care givers - Government institutions or Private agencies? It is based on some superfluous promises and thus it will require a whole set of operational guidelines codified through bye- laws, rules and programmes to be operationalized; It would be very difficult to execute the provisions of the bill unless these are redefined carefully and clearly giving stress on the health of the poor and marginalized; 46 The Bill has been lying in cold storage with the chapter on financial memorandum yet to be completed. In a situation where the health needs of the people are dependent largely on the unregulated private sector, where there is gross underinvestment in health, where the rate of decline of either infant or maternal mortality has been slow, where there has been a resurgence in communicable diseases, the belief that a credible public health system is the need of the hour is getting increasing recognition. At this moment, public expenditure on health is very low. It is yet to reach the two to three per cent mark of gross domestic product. The proposed Bill is a small but significant step. At present, most of the State governments have reacted positively to it and do not perceive it as a threat to their own domains. What is required, however, is a matching financial commitment both by the Centre and the States in order to make the 1978 Alma Ata declaration of Health for All a reality. CHAPTER III - AWARENESS AMONGST DOCTORS AND PATIENTS 46 OXFAM India, One day State Consultation on National Health Bill 2009, available at : consultation _on_national_health_bill_report_2012. pdf. 3545 After detailed discussion of the laws relating to malpractice and negligence in medical field, we now move on to a newer dimension of understanding the approach and outlook prevalent towards the same in society. To impart more clarity, for this purpose two set of questionnaires were drafted. One set of questionnaires were sent out to Doctors with varying experience in medicine and the other questionnaire was sent to patients of varying age groups to help carry out research work. On an oath of confidentiality questionnaires were filled to reveal information, which have thrown startling results. This chapter begins with the survey conducted as regards the Doctors 47. To bring in clarity the answers has been put down in the form of pie charts. The questionnaires were answered by a group of ten doctors in total. They were segregated on the basis of their years of practice in the medical field and classification was 1 year, 1-3 years and 3-10 years of experience. The other set of questionnaires were sent out to a group of thirty patients 48. They were segregated on the basis of their age and classification was years, years and 50 years above. ANALYSIS: DOCTORS 47 Annexure-II/1. 48 Annexure-II/2. 3646 Chart 1 Chart 2 Chart 1 depicts that most of the doctors have not had any contact with a legal institution during their practice except one doctor with an experience of 7 years. Chart 2 depicts that doctors with less years of experience (<3 years) were either not aware or mostly aware about the framework regarding medico legal cases. Chart 3 Chart 3 depicts that most of the doctors do take special precautions when it comes to MLC cases and only one doctor with an experience of ten years was taking normal precaution just like other cases. 3747 Chart 4 Chart 5 Chart 4 depicts that all the doctors irrespective of their experience are in favor of an ethical practice. Chart 5 depicts that half of the doctors said as per the situation in hand they might ignore ethics of practice in order to save the patient. Where as most of the doctors with an experience of over 7 years were not in favor of ignoring ethics. The results indicate that those with 1-3 years of experience will not have any problems in ignoring ethics if it were to help the patients. Chart 6 Chart 6 depicts that most of the doctors are practicing as per the ethical norms whereas one doctor with an experience of one year said he is not. 3848 Chart 7 Chart 8 Chart 7 depicts that the doctors were of varied opinion on whether the dichotomy between saving lives and practicing as per ethics is useful for medical practice. Doctors with experience of over 7 years were of united opinion that it does not effect the practice. Chart 8 depicts the awareness among doctors about the Indian Medical Councils code of ethics and to the utmost shock forty percent of the doctors (experience of upto 3 years) were either not aware or had an incomplete knowledge of the same. Chart 9 Chart 9 depicts that in all the medical institution there is an ethical committee. 3949 Chart 10 Chart 10 depicts the knowledge of the doctors about various laws that affect their practice. Thirty percent were not aware of any laws and a very few had knowledge about applicability of Fundamental Rights, Indian Penal Code, Consumer Protection Act or the Directive Principles of State Policy. Chart 11 Chart 11 depicts that more than half of the doctors feel there is a need to modify the current ethics in the medical field and only a few were in acceptance of it in the present form. 4050 Chart 12 Chart 12 to a surprise depicts that half of the doctors are not aware as to what makes them negligent (mostly 1-3 years experience) and only the doctors with experience 7 years or more were fully aware about the same. Chart 13 Chart 14 Chart 13 depicts most of the doctors are taking some steps or the other to prevent a charge of negligence. Chart 14 depicts that the doctors had a varied response to the question on whether steps taken to prevent a negligence charge are a hindrance to your practice. The doctors with experience of more than 7 years were of the view that it does not have an impact whereas the experience bracket of 1-3 years found it to interfere with their practice. 4151 Chart 15 Chart 16 Chart 15 depicts that all the doctors are taking an informed consent from their patients before any procedure. Chart 16 depicts that most of the doctors are of the opinion that consent and proper documentation can help prevent a charge of negligence. Chart 17 Chart 18 Chart 17 depicts that only two doctors with an experience of over 7 years have insured themselves against medical liabilities whereas all others have simply chosen not to. Chart 18 depicts eighty percent of the doctors are of the opinion that inclusion of medical practice in Consumer Protection Act has made their practice defensive. 4252 Chart 19 Chart 20 Chart 19 depicts that all the doctors think that continuing medical education at regular intervals is necessary. Chart 20 depicts that spreading awareness and implementation of already established laws could help in elimination of medical malpractice in India as per the doctors. The last question for the doctors was to give any suggestions regarding the prevalence of medical malpractice in India, the suggestions are summed up below: 1.Better working environment will help eliminate negligence, as the doctors would be able to pay their cent percent attention to patients. 2.Better pay to doctors will prove to be an incentive to create that urge of giving their best. 3.Non-Interferance and Freedom to doctors in exercising their duties. 4.More time should be devoted to the subject of Laws and Ethics in the medical curriculum. 4353 ANALYSIS: PATIENT Chart 21 Chart 22 Chart 21 depicts that only sixty percent of the patients have health insurance. Chart 22 depicts that none of the patients had any knowledge about the framework regarding medico legal cases. Chart 23 Chart 24 Chart 23 depicts that from our sample, half of the patients have been admitted to the hospital for treatment besides regular check-ups. Chart 24 depicts that patients above the age of 29 years were not in favor of ignoring ethics, whereas patients below the age of 29 were inclined towards helping and saving the patient. 4454 Chart 25 Chart 26 Chart 25 depicts that most of the patients think that saving lives is of utmost priority. However patients above the age of 50 years prefer ethics. Chart 26 depicts that half of the patients were not clear whether they would force their doctor to adhere to ethical practice when their treatment is going on. Patients above the age of 29 years were still confident on ethical practice. Chart 27 Chart 27 Chart 28 Chart 27 depicts that seventy percent of the patients think that ethical practice means charging fair money and following proper procedures. Twenty percent of the patients who think that ethical practice is charging fair money are of years of age. Chart 28 depicts that eighty percent of the patients are aware about what is an informed consent. 4555 Chart 29 Chart 30 Chart 29 depicts that half of the patients who were hospitalized for treatment were informed properly about the procedures. Twenty percent of the patients said where an informed consent was taken it was so technical that they did not understand the pros & cons of the same. Chart 30 depicts that surprisingly ninety percent of the patients are not aware of the code of ethics. Chart 31 Chart 31 depicts the low level of information amongst patients, with ninety percent of them not being aware about presence of an ethical committee. 4656 Chart 32 Chart 32 depicts that seventy percent of the patients will complaint against their doctor irrespective whether their treatment is going on or not. Another twenty percent said they would wait till something goes wrong. Chart 33 Chart 34 Chart 33 depicts that sixty percent of the patients are not aware of what makes a doctor negligent. Only those above the age of fifty years were aware of the same. Chart 34 depicts that sixty percent of the patients will not give their consent even if it doesn t involve huge money. However, twenty percent were of the view that doctor knows the best and the remaining twenty percent indicated that they will give their consent if it is covered in their insurance. 4757 Chart 35 Chart 36 Chart 35 depicts that seventy percent of the patients think that consent and documentation are necessary in a medical treatment whereas thirty percent (mostly above the age of 50) rely on what the doctor says. Chart 36 depicts that the awareness among patients about the medical field being covered under the Consumer Protection Act is poor. To the utmost shock sixty percent of the patients do not have any information regarding the same. Chart 37 Chart 37 depicts that of the forty percent patients aware of the inclusion of medical services under the consumer protection act, only ten percent are aware of the procedure to file a complaint. It should be pointed out that a simple letter is sufficient to lodge a complaint in a consumer forum. 4858 Chart 38 Chart 38 depicts that spreading awareness is considered to be the most effective way of eliminating medical malpractice in India according to the patients. Stringent laws and its implementation is also seen as a positive step. It is good to note that the doctors expressed a similar view when asked the same question. The last question for the patients was to give any suggestions regarding the prevalence of medical malpractice in India, the suggestions are summed up below: 1.More Transparency to be introduced in the medical institutions regarding reports, procedures, billing and other related matters. 2.More Communication should be there between the Doctors and Patients. 3.Creating general awareness among masses regarding medical laws and ethics to build an informed class of patients. 4959 OUTCOME OF THE ANALYSIS From the information that has been collected out of this survey, we conclude that in India Doctors with less experience are not fully aware about various laws and guidelines related to medical practice. This state of affair is very alarming as the freshly designated medical practitioners are not in sync with the knowledge that might affect their whole career. This can also be seen by the fact that all the doctors were in favor of continuing medical education regarding laws and ethics. The other point that comes out of this survey is that very few doctors have insurance for medical liabilities. Of the others who do not possess such insurance it is because of their own choice. Also, they do not point out the lack of insurance providers Further, the doctors are trying to avoid medical liabilities by taking special precautions. These precautions are over and above their normal practice that is an extra burden and appears to affect their practice. It is for the authorities to realize that the Indian Medical Council should take some steps and ensure that every doctor has complete knowledge on the laws & code of ethics. This in my understanding would be the first step towards attaining a medical malpractice free India. From the Patients perspective we come to find that in India a lot of people do not even have a health insurance. This is true not for the elderly but the younger strata of society. This situation is alarming as the young would not have a regular source of income and savings to support themselves in case of any emergency. It was observed that the patients do not have knowledge about medico legal cases, the inclusion of medical services in consumer protection act, presence of an ethical committee in every hospital nor do they have any knowledge about the code of ethics as promulgated by Indian Medical Council. In such a scenario the patients are not aware on what makes the doctor negligent neither do they know about their legal rights and the remedies available to them. Further, it is observed that the patients trust their doctors a lot and do not want to interfere with their decisions about the treatment. There is also a fear to institute a complaint against the doctors as it is believed that it might lead to jeopardizing the treatment. The patients will only be willing to lodge a complaint if something goes wrong. With the patients, given that money plays an important factor for giving consent for various procedures and treatment, Insurance seems to be a very good option to counter this. Similarly to the need of spreading awareness about the laws by Indian Medical Council among doctors, there is also a need to create mass knowledge among the patients. They should be imparted with education about their legal rights and the remedies available to them. This will further help them to make informed decisions, ensure that the doctors follow the right procedure, keep them in the ambit of ethics and not be duped for money. 5060 CHAPTER IV - ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE LAW The primary function of tort law in the sphere of medical malpractice is to create incentives for efficient levels of care and hence to reduce the rate of inappropriate accidents to the number of accidents. Thus, all patient compensation systems aim towards two objectives: The doctor can be given an incentive to take special care and avoid making mistakes which may harm their patients and their reputation (the deterrence objective); and the cost of the harm can be transferred away from the patient (the compensation objective). All patient compensation systems attempt to deliver these objectives jointly with varying degrees of success, and with varying administration costs. PREVENTION AND DETERRENCE Deterrence concerns the allocation of resources to reduce the probability of accidents occurring and to reduce the loss in the event of an accident. Specific deterrence involves the direct prohibition or regulation of dangerous conduct or activities (e.g. by means of statutes or regulations) in order to reduce the number of injuries and injury-causing incidents, whereas general deterrence involves the use of compensation rules to provide indirect incentives to people to behave safely. Thus, tort law and medical malpractice law are supposed to provide general deterrence by inducing physicians and hospital organizations to prevent injuries. Optimal Incentives It is well known that beneficial activities can lead to costly outcomes ( harm, injury ). Such costly outcomes can be reduced if the beneficial activities themselves are cut down, or if those involved take care to avoid them. However, to the extent that care is also costly, people may need to be given incentives to provide it. One natural incentive is to make the person causing the harm liable for the costs involved, if he fails to supply care beyond a sufficient threshold (i.e. behaves negligently ). This potential attribution of fault provides a deterrent against insufficient care levels. As a consequence, tort rules will efficiently deter accident-causing behaviour if responsibility for the costs of injuries is imposed on those who can avoid or prevent accidents most cheaply. A physician and a hospital organization have several ways to prevent accidents, e.g. apply new technology, invest in a hygienic surrounding and in training of doctors and assistants and so on. As long as the patient follows the directions of the doctor, e.g. eat diet food, take pills regularly, in most of the cases he has no influence on the accident apart from the fact that he became ill and consulted the doctor. As a consequence, medical malpractice law should hold the physician responsible because he can avoid costs of injury at cheapest cost by investing in precaution. To induce him to invest in precaution he needs to receive the optimal incentives from the liability system. 5161 Efficient Level of Care In theory, the appropriate level of care should maximize the net gains to society from the beneficial activities involved: this means that the marginal social benefit from an extra care should equal its marginal cost. In other words, the extra benefit to society (in terms of reduction in injury rates and their associated costs) from an extra care should just equal the extra resource cost to society of the extra care itself. The notions of benefit and cost referred here are broader than simple monetary amounts. Minimizing Social Accident Costs To demonstrate the minimization of the accident cost, the basic model of minimizing social accident costs can be applied. First, the physician s care costs (c) are constantly increasing with undertaking more precaution. Second, the probability of a medical malpractice (p) decreases with a higher level of precaution. Thus, p=p(x) is a decreasing function of x. The expected cost of an accident depends on the probability that an accident occurs (p) and the loss (L), therefore the expected cost of accident equals p multiplied by L and is also a decreasing function of precaution (p(x)l). Third, the expected social cost of accident is the sum of the expected cost of accident and the cost of care, therefore it equals p(x)l + c. Finally, x* represents the efficient level of precaution the physician should take, because the expected social cost of accident curve has its minimum here. Figure 1 49 For a negligence rule, the courts have to define a legal standard of care (= due care level). If the injurer takes less than due care, he is liable. If the injurer takes due care or more, he 49 Basic Model. 5262 is not liable anymore. Therefore, according to the basic model, if the physician is liable his individual cost curve equals the expected social cost of accident, whereas if he is not liable his individual cost curve equals his cost of care. Thus, his expected individual cost reaches its minimum exactly at the due care level where his care cost are the lowest and where the due care level equals the efficient level of care. Consequently, a negligence rule provides the optimal incentives to take the efficient level of care and to minimize social accident cost, assuming that courts are well informed and that they apply a clear and precise legal standard of care requiring a fixed amount of precaution. This is important, since uncertainty about the due care level does not induce the physician to take optimal levels of precaution. However, it is difficult for the courts to set the due care level equal to the efficient level of care, since they are in practice not fully informed. If the due care level is set below the efficient level of care, the injurer will minimize his cost by taking the due care level. However, the injurer does not take the efficient level of care. On the other hand, if the due care level is set a little bit above the efficient level of care, the injurer minimizes his cost by taking due care which is not the efficient level of care either. If the level of care is set far too high, the injurer minimizes his cost by taking the efficient level of care. Thus, the efficient level of precaution which minimizes the social accident cost is only reached under a negligence rule if the level of due care is set equal to the efficient level of care or is set far too high. Optimal Compensation Compensation, as a purpose of medical malpractice law, involves the allocation of losses resulting from accidents that occur. For the malpractice system to work as an efficient deterrent to negligent behavior, physicians must encounter an expected loss sufficient to make them fully aware of their deficiencies, but not substantially above that level. Apart from material losses that are, at least in principle, measurable in terms of money, damages are awarded for certain immaterial losses. Damages for mental distress such as pain, suffering, discomfort, humiliation, indignity, and embarrassment, are awarded under the head of Immaterial losses or pain and suffering. If awards do, in cases where immensely high sums for pain and suffering are granted, exceed the losses suffered by claimants, and if there are too many successful claims then we have a problem of excessive liability. This means, damage paid by the physician must not exceed the damage suffered by the patient. At the same time, a tort system should at least provide full compensation for material losses as well as for immaterial losses, not more and not less, since the victim should be in the same position of wealth he was in before the accident happened. Therefore the theoretical aim of the tort system is to set the value of an award equal to the loss suffered (full compensation). Problems with Compensation for Immaterial Losses The legal purpose of such compensation is on the one hand to redress for the nonpecuniary losses suffered and on the other hand satisfaction in the sense that the injurer is made to pay for his negligent action. However, these purposes of compensation are in some medical cases difficult to justify. For instance, medical science can keep people alive in a state of complete coma for many months or even years, with no hope of 5363 recovery. No substitute pleasures need to be provided for those forgone, because the injured party is unable to enjoy any pleasures. Nevertheless, courts say that a person who is deprived of all the pleasures of life gets compensation for the fact of that deprivation. Thus, from an economic point of view, on the one hand the victim gets no utility from an award of damages in these cases and therefore would not need compensation. But on the other hand only full compensation has the deterrent effect on the injurer. Therefore, it is necessary to make the injurer pay full compensation to the victim. Another problem with perfect compensation for pain and suffering is that, it is very difficult to calculate, because the relationship between the value of money - what it will buy - and damages awarded for pain and suffering cannot be measured like in financial losses. Punitive Damages Punitive damages are sometimes awarded to plaintiffs in addition to compensatory damages, i.e. over and above compensation for material and immaterial losses. These are only awarded in cases where injurers might escape liability or where harm is underestimated or where the injurers gains are socially prohibited, because punishment and deterrence are supposed to lead to only full compensation. Thus, they also involve the danger of overcompensation and over deterrence, since the damage paid by the injurer exceeds the damage suffered by the victim. Although the term punitive damage implies punishment, the purpose of these damages is only partly punishment, but mainly deterrence. STRICT LIABILITY VERSUS NEGLIGENCE RULE The law, which currently applies to medical liability, sets negligence standard and is based on the principle of torts. As pointed out earlier, mostly the cases of medical negligence are of unilateral accidents where only the injurer (i.e the medical practitioner) may reduce the risk for accident by taking precautions. In this situation, if the applicable rule is strict liability, the injurer pays the damage in each case of accident. Therefore, the injurer, guided by his private considerations, takes all relevant social costs into account, internalizes the risk for damage and conducts himself professionally at socially optimal care and activity levels. When the applicable rule is negligence, however, if the court determines a negligence standard based on social optimum, the potential injurer should adopt precisely this level of care. He will not adopt a higher standard of care since exemption from liability has already been granted at an optimal level of investment, while any higher level of investment in precautions will necessarily entail higher costs. Conversely, the potential injurer will not adopt a lower level of care since he will be made to compensate any potential victim for any damage caused while the benefit of saving in precautions will be lower. In theory, the optimal level of care is achieved through the application of both rules but 5464 the two liability rules differ in terms of behavior directing differential effects on potential injurer and victim s payoffs and risks allocated between the two. The negligence system operates in practice very differently from this theoretical ideal, primarily because the decision-makers - courts, doctors, and patients lack the perfect information that is assumed by the models. It is because of this that the negligence rule has come under severe criticism. Because courts lack perfect information about appropriate care, the standards applied in practice are unpredictable and possibly systematically biased. With uncertain legal standards, a negligence rule may create nonoptimal deterrence incentives or may not be able to convey to doctors the appropriate signals about the optimal level of care. A rule of strict liability in theory eliminates the need for courts to define due care. Thus, in the context of judicial errors 50, the negligence regime is relatively more sensitive to judicial errors concerning the level of care adopted by the injurer and the appropriate level of care. The strict liability regime, on the other hand, does not suffer from such errors. It is, however, more sensitive to judicial errors concerning causality and damage assessment i.e determining whether an injury was caused by medical care or by the underlying disease and the extent of damage. An important advantage of strict liability is seen in its decentralisation or self-selection effect. If different doctors have different costs of care, the optimal level of care, which minimizes the sum of the costs of care and the expected damages, is different for each doctor and it decreases with increasing per unit costs of care. Under strict liability regime, every tortfeasor doctor has an incentive to minimize these costs as these are the costs of the society as well as their private costs. Such an efficient result is not reached under negligence rule, in which courts fix a due level of care according to the reasonable man standard. If this due level of care is somewhere in the middle between the optimal standard of a high and a low cost tortfeasor doctor, both of them get wrong incentives. Imperfect information further leads to longer periods of litigation accompanied by escalating litigation costs, inappropriate compensation, mismatch between claims and injuries as a result of which the negligence rule fails to achieve its central goals of compensation and deterrence. Nevertheless, despite its flaws, it can be argued that it is better to select negligence rule over strict liability in the area of medical liability. As pointed out earlier, medical treatment always involves a basic risk that something might go wrong, since the human body of each patient can react differently to a certain treatment because of prior medical conditions. A contract over a medical treatment is not comparable to a contract over the purchase of a good or a service, where the seller guarantees that he will deliver a perfect good and otherwise the buyer can claim compensation. By contrast, a physician cannot guarantee the success of his treatment. Therefore the physician should not be held strictly liable without the possibility of exculpation, because he cannot bear the risk for every injury resulting from the basic risk of a medical treatment and which might happen although he took a high level of care. Thus, under a rule of strict liability he would be 50 Errors in deciding the appropriate level of care and correctness of doctor s decision. 5565 over deterred. However, in malpractice cases which do involve negligence, he should be held liable and thereby receive the correct deterrent signal to give him the optimal incentive to take more precaution. A negligence rule requires the difficult decision of the court whether the behavior of the defendant is considered negligent or not. Thus, compared to a rule of strict liability, a negligence rule leads to higher administrative or litigation costs. On the other hand, strict liability does not allow the defendants exculpation and will therefore result in more claims, since the rule gives every victim who suffers harm caused by the injurer s activity the right to recover. Taking this into account, a negligence rule may lead to lower total administrative costs. To put it simply, a negligence rule results in fewer claims that are more complicated to settle, whereas a rule of strict liability results in more claims that are simpler to settle. The superiority of the negligence rule over strict liability in the context of medical liability can also be argued on the basis that the former generates more information about the due and the efficient level of care. It requires the court to look into issues relevant for conveying the information needed by the market through the way of investigations: Has the doctor acted optimally, including appropriate professional up-to-datedness? Has the hospital acted optimally, for example, in purchasing the appropriate medical gear? The negligence mechanism thus ensures that the courts provide the market invaluable information focused on exposing the hidden actions and qualities of the doctor. On the other hand, a strict liability rule dispenses with such investigations, thus conveying much less information to the market. Negligence rule indirectly motivates the doctors and hospitals to adjust the appropriate medical procedures through time. A similar argument can be put forward for medical cases of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is the liability of a principal for a damage caused by its agent. If the agent causes damage to a third party, the third party may file a damage claim against the principal. In cases of medical negligence, the doctor serves as the principal; a medical student, nurse or any other staff may serve as an agent, while the third party is the patient who incurs damage. Alternatively, the hospital may serve as the principal, the doctor as the agent and the patient as the third party. An agent may hide her type from the principal, which might lead to a higher probability of damages post hiring (hidden information) or it might choose a low level of care for personal benefits at the expense of the principal (hidden action). If the cases of medical liability are governed by the negligence rule, then the doctor or the hospital obtains information about the negligent behavior of its employee. The principal can possibly write a contingency contract under which the agent is made to face the consequences if it has caused damage. In contrast, for the principal agent problem under a strict liability rule, any causation of damage by the agent triggers the liability of the principal. Thus this rule generates no information about the agents negligence in court proceedings. In the cases of medical negligence often the terminology of multiple tortfeasor gains relevance. This is due to the fact that often doctors act together in a team or at least more than one health care professional is involved in a case of medical diagnosis and treatment. Under the rule of negligence, the injurers will act optimally together only if due level of 5666 care is optimally determined. This is because, if one doctor fails to take the due level of care, then he will be held liable for the total amount of the accident loss. A rational doctor will assume that the other rational colleague has decided to exercise efficient precaution, and that being true; it is optimal for him to also exercise the optimal care level. Thus negligence rule ensures optimal incentives being generated for a group of doctors acting collectively. While a comparison of the two liability rules over various issues may not produce a clear winner in general, but in the area of medical liability it would not be wrong to conclude that the negligence rule is the appropriate liability regime, which can be justified by sound economic rationale. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE Although not compulsory in India, usually every medical practitioner should have a liability insurance known as Professional Liability/Indemnity Insurance, which covers negligent malpractice resulting in an injury of a patient. Malpractice insurance has an important social value because it spreads risks and thereby protects the physician against the financial catastrophe that could result from even a single large finding against him. In this way, insurance supports the well functioning of the health system. Another benefit of such insurance is that, it creates certainty for risk-averse physicians. When people are risk averse, they prefer lower certain income rather than higher uncertain income. Hence, physicians prefer spending on these insurance premiums rather than bearing the risk of having to pay incalculable damages in case of an injury to the patient. But, medical malpractice insurance has a disadvantage too. With an insurance cover, since a physician does not suffer a monetary loss from having to pay compensation (apart from the insurance premium); he simply passes on his liability to the insurance company. Thus, even if the liability system has a deterrent effect on the physician, it could be neutralized by the insurance system. The physicians thus may not take appropriate care, which they would have taken if they had to face any unforeseen liability themselves. In particular, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection emerge which need to be considered in this context. The Problems of Moral Hazard Moral hazard means when the behavior of the insuree changes after the purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or size of the loss increases. This occurs as a consequence of unequal information between the insurer and the insuree. In the context of medical negligence, this means that after getting insurance a doctor would have no incentive to undertake the efficient level of care. This would lead to higher chances of negligence or greater loss to the patient. The root cause of such a problem is the fact that the insurer does not know the exact riskiness of the doctor and hence his insurance premiums are too not tied to the expected liability of the doctor. High-risk insurees try to hide information to get a premium lower than their actual risk requires, whereas low-risk insurees mostly do not have the possibility to signal that their actual risk requires a lower premium. Since, premiums are usually set for an entire 5767 specialty group in a given region; the premiums are set according to an average risk level of the entire group. Thus, the high-risk insurees end up paying lower premiums and the low- risk insurees pay a higher premium than what their actual risk requires. Also, because a physician with a record of frequent negligence bears no larger share of the burden than his colleagues with excellent records, a physician might get the incentive to take fewer precautions, because he gets no benefit out of taking care. The Problems of Adverse Selection Adverse selection occurs when in ignorance of differences among policyholders; an insurer attracts those of above-average risk. This may occur if low-risk insurees drop out of the market rather than paying premiums designed to cover average risk. An insurer who raises rates may attract the worst risks and end up with higher claim costs and lower profits. A physician might not take the efficient level of care, because he does not have to pay the damages himself. When he takes fewer precautions, damages might be more frequent or larger than without the insurance. As a consequence, to cover his costs, the insurer will raise premiums. The low risk insurees will leave the insurance, because they pay too high a premium compared to their actual risk. Finally, only the high risk insurees will stay in the insurance pool. The consequences of moral hazard and adverse selection can be illustrated by a simple example. For instance, a physician could avoid an unexpected loss of Rs 1000 by spending Rs 100 for the insurance. If the premiums are set for a group of 100 physicians, his own premium will rise, as a result of the mishap, by only Rs 10 (and so will that of 99 other physicians). The individual physician is thus assessed only one tenth of what it would have cost him to prevent the injury. Therefore, the physician might not take the efficient level of care, because he does not have to pay the damages himself. Further suppose, after ten mishaps, the premiums double to Rs 200 for all the physicians. As a result, the low-risk physicians who haven t committed any of the ten mishaps but are compelled to pay higher insurance premiums may prefer to drop out of the market. This leaves only the high risk physicians in the market, and hence gives rise to the problem of adverse selection. Overcoming these Problems In particular, malpractice insurance rarely requires co-payment in the form of deductibles or coinsurance, and premiums are not generally experience-rated i.e based on prior claims experience. If the physician had to pay an own contribution for each case of malpractice in the form of a deductible or co-insurance, he would face the monetary loss and thereby get an incentive to take a higher level of care to prevent future accidents. Furthermore, he would also get the incentive to take more care, if the premium for the next period might be higher when it is based on the bad claims experience of the last period. Some insurance companies may respond to a persistent record of adverse claims by imposing restrictions on coverage or ultimately by nonrenewal of the contract for the next period. However, this strict policy could also lead to defensive responses, like a refusal to take high risk patients. 5868 Although being sued does not seem to affect the physician, since the insurance policy covers negligent malpractice, the doctor nevertheless bears uninsurable costs of time (opportunity cost), in addition to anxiety and threat to reputation (medical service as an experience good). These costs might be equivalent to a high sum per claim and thus, could act as a per claim deductible. Thus, especially the risk of reputational loss lessens the moral hazard and adverse selection problems to some extent. Therefore, the tort liability system and medical malpractice insurance should work as complements; the insurance system should support the deterrent objective of law, instead of neutralizing the incentives given by law. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FROM THE POINT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY Defensive Medicine In a world where the efficient level of care is observable and known to everyone, i.e individuals and courts, it is straightforward that negligence liability would produce socially optimal levels of care and hence would serve its purpose of deterrence efficiently. However, common sense that many physicians in the world buy malpractice liability insurance, tells us that these conditions are far fetched and that, in practice, problems of information disproportionateness prevent such a result. For example, courts cannot determine precisely what care a doctor has taken, while it is often the case that opinions differ as to what constitutes an appropriate standard of care. This can have numerous implications for the successful operation of a negligence tort law system. One of the most important implications here is that if the care-threshold and courts abilities to apply it are unpredictable or physicians are extremely risk-averse (i.e. they are worried about mistakenly being found liable), they may over-invest in care. In the medical context, this is what is known as defensive medicine. The term defensive medicine has been used differently in various literatures. Some subdivide it into positive and negative defensive medicine. Positive defensive medicine means including extra tests or procedures conducted primarily to reduce liability. On the other hand negative defensive medicine includes procedures or patients avoided by a physician out of fear of liability. However, more recent literature generally uses defensive medicine only to refer to those extra tests and procedures undertaken out of fear of liability. The study by Localio 51 et al tries to link the incidence of caesarian deliveries in New York State in 1984 to physician malpractice premiums, on the grounds that caesarians are a lower risk method of delivery than vaginal birth. Having controlled for the clinical risk of caesarian delivery, patient socioeconomic status and physician/hospital characteristics, they find that the odds of a caesarian are three times more likely in high premium areas. 51 Troyen A. Brennan, Identification of Adverse Events Occurring during Hospitalization: A Cross- Sectional Study of Litigation, Quality Assurance, and Medical Records at Two Teaching Hospitals in Annals of Internal Medicine established by American College of Physicians, Volume 112, No.3, 1 st February 1990 available at 5969 They interpret this as evidence of defensive practices. In a series of three papers, Kessler and McClennan, using data on heart treatments in 1984, 1987 and 1990, estimated that reforms aimed at relaxing tort decreased expenditure on heart treatments by between 5% and 9% over the period. Given that the authors control for the outcomes of treatments, this can be interpreted as evidence of defensive medicine under tort: the same cases, with the same results, received less treatment expenditure under the reformed torts. 52 The above examples make it clear that over compensation and over deterrence can lead to the problem of defensive medicine. Where non-negligent physicians are held liable or where they have to pay more than full compensation, they will increase their level of precaution. In order to reduce the probability of liability, a physician may use superfluous tests and treatments. These payments which are not necessary from an efficiency point of view, represent a cost to the society. Thus, a physician tends to demonstrate a level of care so painstaking that neither a patient nor a jury would be likely to make the error of calling him negligent. But this immunity is bought at a cost to the society far in excess of its anticipated benefits. Thus, it is not efficient if physicians are over deterred and are induced to apply defensive medicine. Hence, when assessing a negligence rule for medical negligence we should ideally be able to compare the deterrence benefits of such a rule, with the defensive costs that it may induce in practice. Therefore, a necessary condition for the adoption of negligence-based compensation is that it should provide net deterrence benefits. Impact of Malpractice Tort Laws on Health Care Spending Broadly speaking, medical malpractice laws affect the overall health care spending in two ways: by disturbing the prevailing malpractice insurance premiums and by affecting the extent of defensive medicine used by physicians. Some analysts argue that tort laws which result in easier and higher compensation paid to the injured would lead to higher overall spending for health care. Firstly, it would increase the number and size of average award paid by malpractice insurers to claimant and, thus, increases premiums for malpractice insurance. Further, the rise in insurance premiums leads to insurers and individuals paying higher for health care services. Secondly, such tort laws would increase health care spending by escalating the intensity and volume of health care services provided. This effect is based on the premise that if laws are molded in favor of patients, then the perceived threat among physicians would rise and hence, drive them to deliver additional medical services in the form of higher defensive medicine. Understanding such impacts of tort laws on health care spending has gained even more importance recently, since malpractice cases and insurance premiums for the physician s liability insurance are increasing, especially in the U.S. where specialists tend to speak of a malpractice crises or a liability crises. 52 Fenn, Paul, Alastair Gray, Neil Rickman and Robert Young, Deterrence and Liability for Medical Negligence: Theory and Evidence, 19 th Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Athens, 2002 available at Fenn,%20Grey,%20 Rickman%20&%20Young.pdf. 6070 In the US from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s malpractice claim frequency (number of claims per 100 physicians) increased at more than 10 percent a year; claim severity (average payment per claim) increased at roughly twice the rate of general inflation. According to this development, insurers increased their premiums for the liability insurance, e.g. from 1982 to 1984 premiums increased as much as 45 percent. In some states, malpractice insurance was temporarily not available at any price as insurance carriers left the states (Olsen 1999). Consequently, such a crisis involves the danger that some physicians might leave the market and that the whole health system might be affected. The main reasons behind such a development are the fact that in the US, increasing levels of compensation was paid for immaterial losses and punitive damages. This is also evident from the increased number of damages and by a higher litigation rate. This led to the problem of overcompensation and over deterrence, adding further to the crises. This so-called crises not only acts as a drain on the resources of the economy (in the form of unduly high health care spending), but also endangers the mere existence of the health care system. Thus, taking cues from the problems faced by the US health care system, the Indian malpractice laws must be applied so that the aim of providing justice to the injured patient does not lead to the problem of liability crises. Positive Externalities - Should A Doctor Be Liable To Pay Less? 53 According to legal principles, a doctor who negligently breaks a patient s leg should pay the same damages as a driver who negligently breaks a pedestrian s leg. According to economic principles, however, the driver should pay more than the doctor. Non-negligent drivers impose risk on others without being liable for it. When liability externalities are negative such as in the case of driving, liability should increase beyond full compensation to discourage the activity. Unlike pedestrians, patients contract with doctors for treatment and willingly submit to the risk of harm. Imperfections in medical markets cause some kinds of doctors to convey more positive than negative externalities on their patients. Doctors often create benefits for patients that exceed their fees in total and at the margin. Increasing liability for these doctors would discourage an activity that needs encouragement. Higher damages for doctors will cause them to perform fewer treatments that risk liability and discourage them from specializing in fields with high risk of liability. Lowering damages will decrease these undesirable effects and benefit patients. Figure 2: Optimal Damages for Drivers and Doctors 53 Cooter, Robert D. and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?, Journal of Tort Law (University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 313), Vol. 1, 2006 available at 6171 The figure above depicts this idea. The line in the above figure represents optimal damages as a percentage of full compensation. For activities like driving, incentives are optimal under a rule of strict liability when damages equal 100% of the victim s harm. For a negligence rule, however, incentives for drivers' activity are optimal when damages exceed 100% of the victim s actual harm. For activities with positive externalities like medical care, incentives are optimal when damages are less than 100% of the victim s actual harm. For these activities, optimal damages fall as the rule of liability shifts from negligence to strict liability. Unlike drivers, doctors usually have a contractual relationship with an injured patient. The contract may include a price that encompasses some, but not all, of the benefits to the patient, in which case we have price greater than benefit. Thus, economic efficiency requires reducing the doctor s liability below the victim s actual harm, which current legal rules do not incorporate. This analysis may however be criticized as undermining one of the major goals of tort law, which is compensation. However, excessive liabilities discourage doctors from undertaking risky treatment and encourage them to engage in defensive medicine, the price of which is ultimately borne by the patient. It may be in the best interest of the potential victim i.e. the patients here, to provide for a part of the compensation by themselves. EXTENSION OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 54 TO MEDICAL PROFESSION The Consumer Protection Act was enacted by the Indian parliament in the year This Act created Consumer Councils and other forums to settle consumer disputes. At present, there are 604 District Forums, 35 State Commissions with apex body as a National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in the country. The Act seeks to promote and protect the various rights of consumer. Under Consumer Protection Act the definition of a consumer is extremely wide. Any person purchasing goods or indulging in the use of these goods is termed a consumer. Service under CPA means service of any description which is made available to potential users, but does not include rendering of any service free of cost or under contract of a personal service. It was only in year 1996 that the Supreme Court of India 55 held that the services rendered 54 Act 68 of Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC72 by a medical practitioner are to be included and covered under the definition of services as per section 2(1)(0) of the Consumer Protection Act. It is true in theory, that this provision under the Consumer Protection Act has enlarged the scope of the subject. But what essentially remains to be analyzed is whether the inclusion of medical services in the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act has enhanced or limited economic efficiency in the system, in reality. The inclusion of the medical services under the Consumer Protection Act is justified on several grounds. Firstly, a patient seeks a doctor's service for professional reasons. In this relationship a patient cannot control or dominate the relationship. In case of masterservant relationship a servant can be hired or fired at the master's will. Is a patient in a position to do such hiring and firing? To claim that this is true would mean ignoring the socio-economic realities of society. So, the doctor-patient relationship is a Contract for personal service. Hence, it is not a contract of personal service or master-servant relationship, how the proponents who are against the inclusion of medical malpractice cases in the CPA claim it to be. Secondly, the consumer of the health care industry cannot be excluded from the Act for it is not only doctors who are involved in the health care delivery but, the pharmaceutical industry, the medical equipment companies and other ancillary industries who are also equally involved. If the patient is not taken as a consumer then these other sectors involved in health care can also escape the provisions of Consumer Protection Act. Thirdly, Consumer Protection Act aims at simplification of procedures for seeking redressal of grievances of patients. The process can be initiated without any cost or without any court fee. It is thus aimed at securing speedy and inexpensive redressal of grievances. Lastly, it marks the growth of consumerism in the country. On the other hand, bringing medical services under the cover of CPA has generated an element of suspicion and mistrust which has marred the age-old doctor-patient relationship. While the consumer seems to be of the view that doctors have become overcautious, doctors appear to be afraid of frivolous and vexatious litigation. It is claimed that this has resulted in situation where treatment costs have gone up due to defensive medicine practices and doctors are afraid of taking risky cases for fear of litigation. This has been named the Doctor-Patient Mistrust Syndrome. In principle, a district consumer forum 56 consists of: a person who is, or has been or is qualified to be a District Judge, who shall be its President, two other members who shall be persons of ability, integrity and standing and have adequate knowledge or experience of or shown capacity in dealing with problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration, one of whom shall be a woman. It is evident from the experience of the members of the district consumer courts, that they need not have background knowledge of medicine/medical practice. The interpretation and decisions regarding the closely related terms such as negligence, rashness, malpractice, misjudgement and misadventure in medical practice may pose severe problems in consumer forums constituting non-medical members. Often, a creation of a system of statutory advisory panel is suggested, which is largely impractical given the 56 Composition of District Forum - Section 10 of The Consumer Protection Act,73 large number district, state and national level courts that exist under the Consumer Protection Act. Thus, the highly technical orientation of medical field reflects a weakness in the efficient application the act. It is often voiced by the medical community that bringing them in the ambit of CPA has labeled them as traders and Patients as clients. The Medical Council of India in principle does not allow doctors to be traders. The traders can advertise, solicit, can employ commission agents, put up large sign boards and bargain the price for selling the goods. Medical council of India prohibits doctors from doing any such act. The rights of patients as consumers of health care industry have been practically nonexistent in our country for a long period of time. Most of the basic rights of a patient such as right to know about his condition, right to participate in treatment decisions, right to have discussion with the doctor(s) which are recognised all over the world are alien to patients in India even today. The Consumer Protection Act serves not only the purpose of enlightening the patients but it also ensures effective implementation of patients' rights. At the same time, it also cannot be accepted that the application of the act is devoid of any limitations and is economically efficient. It is riddled with weaknesses which restrain the system from achieving efficiency. This is attested by an exercise I undertook of analyzing CPA which is explained below. An analysis of the application of the Consumer Protection Act to cases of medical negligence was attempted, by analyzing relevant cases on which verdict was announced by the apex consumer body of NCDRC during the years of The total number of cases that reached a verdict during the period was 184. After a thorough study of all cases, the cases were quantified on various parameters such as- (i) Plaintiff in the case - doctor or patient (ii) Reason for filing of case (iii) Date of filing (iv) Date of verdict (v) Whether negligence of doctor was proved or not (vi) Compensation paid (vii) Party paying the compensation Doctor, Hospital or Both (viii) Impact of medical treatment on patient- Hurt, Disabled or Death (ix) First appealed in which court (district, state or NCDRC) and the verdict and compensation announced (x) Compensation Claimed (xi) Medical specialty (xii) State in which the lapse in treatment occurred (xiii) Over-ruling of decisions (regarding liability of doctor and compensation) of state commission and district forum by NCDRC 6474 It is important to mention here certain facts which facilitated my quantification of cases- (a) An exhaustive list of cases pertaining to medical negligence was created. The two sources of information were the NCDRC office at Janpath, New Delhi and the legal site manupatra.com (b) A search for the exact phrase of Medical Negligence and words Doctors+Hospital+Medical+Negligence enabled me to build an exhaustive list of cases. (c) There were 9 cases on which verdict had not been given, since these were sent back to the lower court for re-consideration. Precisely, they were not counted in the total number of cases. (d) At present, in accordance with the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, a case can be filed before the District Consumer Forum for claims up to Rs 20 lakhs, State Commission up to Rs 1 crore, and National Commission above Rs 1 crore. (e) Since the date of filing for every case was unavailable, the date of injury was used a proxy. Since the Consumer Protection Act defines a statute of limitation of two years, this is a reasonable proxy. The results obtained are summarized in the graphs 57 below- As depicted by the graph 1, there is no evident trend in the number of cases. The number of cases which reached a verdict in the year 2007 far exceeds those in any previous year. The number of cases for the year 2008 are however an underestimation, since the last case was available till the eight month of the year. But, incorporating this consideration may not affect our conclusion of no evident trend in the above statistics. 57 Graph 1 Number of Cases for which verdict was announced by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. 6575 Graph 58 above depicts the average compensation per year was calculated for the cases which did prove the liability of doctor for a given year. As in the earlier graph 1, the average compensation per year also fails to indicate a trend. There is a wide held belief that the compensation being paid by the Consumer Forum in the cases of medical negligence has risen in the last few years. Such a belief is however not attested by our data. 58 Graph 2 Average Compensation per successful case yearly. 6676 It is often claimed that the Consumer Forums are pro-consumers or patients, and hence over the years the courts have adopted a stricter outlook towards doctors. From the graph above 59 it is evident that the percentage of cases for which the doctor was held liable has risen since 2001 but the years 2005 and 2007 are significant departures from this trend. Thus, an increasing trend of doctors being held negligible does not go through our analysis. The damages when negligence in a case is established could be dictated to be paid by the doctor, hospital or by both parties jointly. The graph above 60 indicates that for all years the share paid out by the doctor and doctor-hospital combined is above 60%. The hospitals alone are held responsible for medical negligence to a smaller extent. 59 Graph 3 Percentage of cases in which Doctor was held liable. 60 Graph 4 Payment of Compensation by Party. 6777 For all the cases together over the period examined, I find that the success rate for the plaintiff which could either be the doctor or the patient, is a mere percent as depicted in the graph 61 above. Thus, it would not be wrong to conclude that most cases appearing before NCDRC are disposed in the favour of the opposite party and not the plaintiff. The average compensation paid out was Rs 4 lakhs. In addition, the average number of years of the judicial process is close to 9.54 years. The basic reason for extending medical service to Consumer Protection Act of guaranteeing speedy judgments does not seem to be fulfilled. If we disaggregate the cases on the basis of the plaintiffs, as depicted in graph 62 above, we find that 66 percent of the cases appearing before NCDRC were filed by patients, while 26 percent were filed by doctors or medical institutions. The remaining 8 percent of cases were filed both ways, i.e both the doctors and patients filed the case. The doctor filed to prove themselves non- negligent and patients for enhancement of compensation. Despite the higher number of cases being filed by the patients, the success rates of the two parties are quite close. While the success rate for patients is 24.8 percent, the success rate of the doctors is 20.8 percent. When the cases are filed both ways, in 35.7 percent of the cases the patient is successful in enhancing the compensation, while in 42.8 percent of the cases both the parties were unsuccessful. In the remaining, 21.4 percent of the cases the doctor is successful to prove that he was not negligent. Hence, this graph reiterates the conclusion of the previous graph that the success rate of plaintiff (whether it may be the doctor or the patient) is low. 61 Graph 5 Success Rate, Average Compensation and Average number of years for judgment. 62 Graph 6 Party by which cases filed and success rates. 6878 Moving to the origin of the cases, it is found that maximum numbers of cases that come before NCDRC are those which were first filed before the state commission. The number of cases coming via the district court and state commission is close to 28 percent and those coming directly to the apex body are also almost an equal percent as depicted by graph 63 above. We are trying to analyze in how many cases the NCDRC reverses the same decision that was passed by the two lower courts. This will be indicative of the individual standing of 63 Graph 7 Source of Case. 6979 the decisions of NCDRC. It is found that in 17.6 percent of the cases the NCDRC overruled the same decision that was given by both the district and state commission. Further, in 13.3 percent of the cases were such that the patient was unsuccessful in both the lower courts but was granted compensation with the doctor being held negligent by NCDRC. In 21.1 percent of the cases the doctor who was held negligent by the lower courts was abstained from negligence by the NCDRC. This tells me that the probability of NCDRC overruling similar decisions of the lower courts is small. 64 Looking at specifically the cases in which the NCDRC over-ruled the decision of the State Commission, it is found that in only 18 percent of the cases the decision was reversed. Among the cases in which the decision was over-ruled, 43.5 percent of the cases now went in favour of the patient while 56.5 percent of the cases went in favour of the doctor. Hence, a patient is comparatively less probable to prove the doctor negligent if he has not been able to do so in front of the state commission. Also, there is a very small probability for the decision of the state commission to be reversed by NCDRC Graph 8 NCDRC overruling both state commission and district forum. 65 Graph 9 NCDRC overruling state commission. 7080 In contrast, NCDRC over-ruled the decision of the district forum in almost 38.5 percent of the cases that approached it. Out of these, the probability of the case going in favour of the doctor or the patient is the same. Nevertheless, there is indeed a greater likelihood of decision of the district forum being reversed by the NCDRC. 66 In totality, taking all the verdicts of the district forum and state commission, I find that in 28.9 percent of the cases NCDRC over-ruled either DF or SC. 66 Graph 10 NCDRC overruling district forum. 7181 For changes in compensation, it was found that out of total cases that were successful (i.e patient being compensated) in both state commission and NCDRC, in close to threefourth of the cases the compensation remained same. In percent of the cases, compensation was enhanced while in only 7.84 percent of the cases were compensation reduced Graph 11 Changes in compensation for cases, which were successful in NCDRC and the State Commission. 7282 Moving now to the medical specialty, it is found that the specialties of orthopaedics, gynaecology, obstetrics, cardiology have the most number of cases. This is true since these are the relatively more risky medical specialties. In term of average compensation paid out cancer leads all other medical specialties, followed by obstetrics, gynaecology, surgery etc. This is indicative of the fact that the medical fields which can lead to death or permanent damage are more likely to face higher liabilities in terms of compensation paid. 68 Disaggregating cases on the basis of the impact of the medical treatment, it is found that in 50 percent of the cases of medical negligence filed, the patient had lost his life. In 20 percent of the cases the patient became disabled and in the remaining 30 percent he suffered some harm or loss, either of mental or physical agony. The average compensation paid out, is in line with the strength of the degree of impact. Maximum compensation is given in the case of death which is close to Rs 4.1 lakhs, followed by Rs 4 lakhs for disability and the least of Rs 3.6 lakhs for sustaining any harm Graph 12 Cases by Medical Specialty and Compensation. 69 Graph 13 Impact on patient and average compensation. 7383 On the basis of the state in which the case of medical negligence occurred, a region based analysis has been undertaken. The maximum numbers of cases were for South India followed by North, West, East and Central regions. But the highest average compensation was paid for the cases of North India. The average compensation of the South, East and West region is almost at par, while that if the Central region is distinctly lower Graph 14 Number of cases and average compensation state wise. 74 View more
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