Source: http://pa.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19840928_0040226.C03.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2016-10-22 21:56:32
Document Index: 734476476

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2000', '§ 1981', '§ 2000', '§ 1653', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981', '§ 1981']

| Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co.
Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co.
VIVIAN B. GOODING, APPELLANTv.WARNER-LAMBERT COMPANY, ALBERT H. GRADDIS AND BETTY K. ADAMS, EXECUTRIX FOR ROBERT R. ADAMS, APPELLEES
Weis, Becker, Circuit Judges, and Oliver, District Judge*fn*
On November 27, 1979, the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter on the first complaint, the discrimination-in-promotion complaint, determining that there was not probable cause to believe that the allegations made in the complaint were true.*fn1 Thereafter, on February 21, 1980, appellant filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The complaint alleged issuance of the right-to-sue letter, and set out in detail the basis for her discrimination-in-promotion claim. The complaint also detailed the factual basis for appellant's second EEOC complaint, the retaliatory discrimination complaint, even though the EEOC had not yet issued a right-to-sue letter for that complaint. On July 30, 1980, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on appellant's retaliatory discrimination charge without a determination of probable cause.*fn2
After discovery, Warner-Lambert moved for dismissal, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), of that portion of appellant's complaint relating to the retaliatory discrimination claim. The motion alleged that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII lawsuit, that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires a plaintiff to specifically allege the jurisdictional basis of the lawsuit in the complaint, and that appellant's complaint did not specifically allege issuance of the second right-to-sue letter. Appellant responded that she had specifically alleged the facts underlying her retaliatory discrimination charge in the complaint, thereby making the absence of an allegation that the second right-to-sue letter had been issued irrelevant. She also argued that the district court should have granted her leave to amend her complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, to allege the issuance of the second right-to-sue letter. Warner-Lambert opposed this argument on the ground that the statutory time limit for filing a Title VII suit is 90 days, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), that 90 days had elapsed since issuance of the second right-to-sue letter before leave to amend was requested, and that therefore appellant was time-barred from amending her complaint.
On January 4, 1983, the district court granted Warner-Lambert's 12(b)(1) motion as to the retaliatory discrimination claim, holding that pleading the issuance of a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII suit in federal court. The court denied plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to allege the issuance of the second right-to-sue letter, on the ground that the amendment was time-barred. It therefore ordered that the counts of the complaint alleging retaliatory discrimination be dismissed with prejudice.*fn3
The case was re-assigned to another district judge, and on July 7, 1983, Warner-Lambert moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b) on the remaining counts, which alleged discrimination in promotion. The court granted the motion on the ground that plaintiff had adduced no evidence to support her claim. Plaintiff appealed, challenging both the dismissal of her retaliatory discrimination claim and the grant of summary judgment against her on the discrimination in promotion claim.*fn4
A. The Retaliatory Discrimination Claim
Appellant's original complaint in the district court alleged in detail the facts underlying both her claims of racial discrimination based on Warner-Lambert's failure to post the Patent Administrator job, and her claim of retaliatory discrimination after the filing of her first EEOC complaint. As we have noted above, the district court dismissed those portions of the complaint dealing with retaliatory discrimination because appellant failed to specifically allege the issuance of the second right-to-sue letter in her complaint. The court considered this failure a "jurisdictional bar" to its hearing that claim. We hold that this was error.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) states:
This Rule is consistent with the general philosophy contained in the Federal Rules: highly technical pleading rules, which only serve to trap the unwary practitioner, are eschewed in favor of a system of notice pleading. Rule 8(a)(1) requires only a "short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." The district court concluded that issuance of a right-to-sue letter is a "jurisdictional" prerequisite to suit in federal court, and, therefore, since Gooding had not alleged issuance of the letter, her complaint did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.
In Zipes v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the filing of a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires." 455 U.S. at 393. We believe that the same is true of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter; such a letter is not a "jurisdictional" requirement in the constitutional sense, but rather a statutory requirement designed to give the administrative process an opportunity to proceed before a lawsuit is filed. See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1982); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir. 1982) (Kravitch, J., concurring), rehearing en banc denied, 685 F.2d 1383, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S. Ct. 729, 74 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1983). The requirement was fulfilled by issuance of the second right-to-sue letter on July 30, 1980. Therefore, appellant's failure to allege the issuance of the right-to-sue letter, which was not issued until after the complaint was filed, did not render the complaint deficient under Rule 8(a). The court at no time lacked "jurisdiction over the subject matter," and therefore dismissal of the retaliatory discrimination claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) was incorrect.*fn5
The record also makes clear that the district court's decision not to grant plaintiff leave to amend her complaint was based solely on its conclusion that the failure to allege the issuance of a right-to-sue letter was a jurisdictional defect. However, regardless of its erroneous understanding of the jurisdictional issue, we believe that the district court abused its discretion in not giving plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs that "leave (to amend) shall be freely given when justice so requires."*fn6 It is a sound and established policy that procedural technicalities should not be used to prevent Title VII claims from being decided on their merits. Berg v. Richmond Unified School District, 528 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 158, 54 L. Ed. 2d 375, 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977); Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 1975). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Given this policy, and the fact that the plaintiff's compliant adequately alleged the basis of her claim, thus eliminating any possibility of prejudice to the defendants, it was an abuse of discretion not to grant leave to amend in this case. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, 83 S. Ct. 227 (1962).
In addition to Title VII, appellant brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging the same substantive claims. The district court, in its order of January 4, 1983, also dismissed appellant's § 1981 claim, stating that a plaintiff should not be able to bypass Title VII procedures by including a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Warner-Lambert virtually concedes this was error. The avenues of relief available under Title VII and § 1981 are independent. The filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's administrative machinery are not a prerequisite for maintaining a section 1981 suit. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975). Therefore, appellant's § 1981 claim should not have been dismissed because of the failure to allege the issuance of a second right-to-sue letter for the retaliation claims.
C. The Discrimination in Promotion Claim
cases of openings or reassignments caused by reorganizations, mergers, acquisitions or consolidation.*fn7
Under these circumstances, appellant has failed to carry her burden of rebutting appellee's "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for not posting the position. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Even if appellant's allegations are sufficient to make out a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, they are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment once an employer has presented a rebuttal supported by sufficient affidavits. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 481 F. Supp. 295, 311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Because appellant has failed to present evidence that Warner-Lambert had a discriminatory motivation in failing to post the Patent Administrator job, there is no disputed issue of material fact and summary judgment was appropriate. The district court order of July 7, 1983, must therefore be affirmed.*fn8
Having determined that a plaintiff need not plead the issuance of a right-to-sue letter to maintain a suit in federal court, and having held that it was error for the district court to grant Warner-Lambert's Rule 12(b)(1) motion on the retaliatory discrimination claim, we will reVerse that part of the district court's January 4, 1983, order that dismissed appellant's retaliatory discrimination claim.*fn9 We will affirm the district court's order of July 7, 1983, which granted Warner-Lambert's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination in promotion claim.