Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20190702_0003095.NTX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-09-18 13:37:57
Document Index: 684539867

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 405', '§ 404', 'art, 405', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 309', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', '§ 404', 'art, 415', '§ 416']

FindACase™ | Callie W. v. Berryhill
Callie W. v. Berryhill
CALLIE W., [1] Plaintiff,
Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c) seeking judicial review of the unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) regarding her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). (ECF No. 1 at 1; Tr. 12). After considering the pleadings, briefs, and administrative record, the undersigned recommends that United States District Judge Reed O'Connor AFFIRM the Commissioner's decision.
Plaintiff applied for DIB on October 27, 2015, alleging disability based on anxiety, depression, fibromyalgia, migraines, history of breast cancer, and obesity. (ECF No. 16 at 2). The Commissioner initially denied her application on February 1, 2016 and again upon reconsideration on May 9, 2016. (Tr. 12). Plaintiff timely filed a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 25). She attended the hearing before ALJ Daniel Curran on April 10, 2017 in Dallas, Texas and testified. (Id. at 12). Also present were her non-attorney representative, Sean Sullivan, and a vocational expert (“VE”). (Id.). On July 18, 2017, the ALJ rendered a decision finding that she was not disabled. (Id. at 12-25).
Specifically, the ALJ employed the statutory five-step analysis and established during step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2015. (Tr. 14). At step two, the ALJ determined that she had the severe impairments of fibromyalgia, migraines, status post-malignant neoplasm of the breast, obesity, anxiety, and affective disorder. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ found that her impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p). (Id.). The ALJ concluded that she retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). (Id. at 17-23). At step four, the ALJ determined that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. (Id. at 23). And at step five, the ALJ decided that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform. (Id. at 24-25).
The Appeals Council denied review on July 10, 2018. (Tr. 1-3). Therefore, the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision and is properly before the Court for review. Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Commissioner's ‘final decision' includes the Appeals Council's denial of [a claimant's] request for review.”).
According to her pleadings, testimony at the administrative hearing, and administrative record, Plaintiff was forty-seven years old on the alleged disability onset date of June 1, 2015, and forty-nine years old at the time of the administrative hearing. (ECF No. 16 at 3; Tr. 12). She completed a high school education, and her employment history includes work as an order puller, inspector, and warehouse coordinator. (ECF No. 16 at 3). She asserts that her physical and mental impairments render her disabled under the SSA.
To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to disability benefits, the Commissioner employs a sequential five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” means work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002). Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1100-03 (5th Cir. 1985). Third, disability exists if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the claimant's medical status alone does not constitute a disability, the impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience. Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). “The claimant bears the burden of showing that [he] is disabled through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the Commissioner must show that there is other substantial work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). Before proceeding to steps four and five, the Commissioner must assess a claimant's RFC-“the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ failed to properly consider all of her functional limitations in determining her RFC; (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence; (3) the ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE did not reasonably incorporate her physical limitations; and (4) the ALJ's failure to ...