Source: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2015/20150807en.html
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 02:52:24
Document Index: 43387801

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 21', 'ART 21', 'art 21', 'ART 21', 'art 21', 'ART 21']

NRC: Event Notification Report for August 7, 2015
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Event Notification Report for August 7, 2015
51275 51276 51277 51278 51293 51294 51295 51296 51297
Agreement State Event Number: 51276
Licensee: AMERICAN PIPING INSPECTION, INC
License #: OK-27438-02
NRC Notified By: LIBBY McCASKILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ Notification Date: 07/30/2015
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY TRUCK (WITH CAMERA) STOLEN AND RECOVERED
The following report was received from the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:
"At about 0830 [CDT] American Piping Inspection, Inc., [license] OK-27438-02 (Tulsa, OK) reported to [the State of Oklahoma] that one of their radiography trucks was stolen and that there was a radiography camera on board. The truck has GPS and the company had tracked the truck to North Garnett Street in Tulsa, OK and the police were enroute.
[At approximately 0930 CDT], "the radiography camera was recovered by the company [American Piping Inspection, Inc]."
The thieves were in the truck when the police arrived. The thieves departed the scene on foot and were not apprehended. There was no apparent damage to the truck or the camera.
Device Model Number: Spec. G-60, containing 100 curies of IR-192.
Agreement State Event Number: 51277
Licensee: NEA BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
License #: ARK-0504-0212
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN Notification Date: 07/30/2015
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENT DELIVERED TO WRONG ADDRESS
"The Arkansas Radiation Control Program is making this immediate notification under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) and Arkansas Regulations RH-1501.c.1.A.
"On July 30, 2015, at 1349 [CDT], NEA Baptist Memorial Hospital, in Jonesboro, Arkansas Radioactive Material License Number ARK-0504-02120, reported that an Iridium-192 sealed source, approximately 10 Curies had been delivered to the wrong address. The source was in an unsecured location for approximately 23.5 hours. The source had been delivered by [common carrier] at 0900 [CDT] on July 29, 2015, to a clinic of a similar name as the hospital but at the wrong address. The source was delivered to the therapy department through the Hospital's receiving department this morning at 0830 [CDT].
"This concludes the available information at this time. The Licensee is investigating this event. The Arkansas Radiation Control Program continues to investigate this event under Arkansas Event Number AR-2015-010."
Agreement State Event Number: 51278
License #: WN-I0475
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS Notification Date: 07/30/2015
"A Troxler 3440 gauge used by Kleinfelder, Inc., license number WN-I0475, fell from the back of a truck onto the middle of the runway at Seatac airport. The only sign of damage was to the circuit board. The source rod was undamaged and still works. Reporting requirement WAC 246-221-250(2)(f)(ii) - Damage affects the integrity of the radioactive material or its container."
The gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241/Be. The damage is attributed to a failure to block and brace equipment.
Washington Incident Number WA-15-026
Part 21 Event Number: 51293
PART 21 REPORT - NOTIFICATION OF DEVIATION REGARDING HK CIRCUIT BREAKER PIVOT PIN
The following summary was excerpted from a facsimile received from ABB:
"This letter provides notification of a failure to comply with specifications associated with a pivot pin, part number 193610B00, used in HK circuit breakers. This pin is used as the pivot point for the arcing contacts. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4).
"Notifying individual: Jay Lavrinc, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Medium Voltage Service), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501, phone number: (843) 413-4727
"Identification of the Subject component: ABB part number 193610B00 pivot pin. This pivot in is used on new legacy HK circuit breakers and during HK breaker refurbishments. The pivot pin is also available as a component item, as part of HK breaker refurbishment kits, and as part of upper terminal contact assemblies.
"Nature of the deviation: During a breaker refurbishment at the ABB Florence facility, it was noted that a pivot pin cracked at the threads during installation. The peening operation performed on the threaded end of the pivot pin caused cracking due to brittle failure. Laboratory testing revealed that this particular pivot pin was made from an incorrect material. This pivot pin was purchased in April of 2015 and parts from this batch were used between 14 April and 28 May of 2015. There have been no field failures reported at this time.
a. Removed all remaining pivot pins from stock. (Action complete)
b. Contact primary vendor to investigate cause and correct on future orders. (Action Complete)
c. Added material verification to our Critical Characteristic cards for future orders. (Action Complete)
d. Upgrade of ABB's spectrometer to analyze this silicon bronze material on all future shipments. (Action Complete)
e. Obtained and tested, via qualified laboratory, a batch of pivot pins to supply to customers. (Action Complete)
f. Notification of the potential existence of this deviation to affected customers (Action to be completed the week of 10 August 2015)
"Affected Customers: Dominion (Surry Power Station); DTE Energy (Enrico Fermi Power Plant 2); Exelon Corporation (Limerick Generating Station); TVA (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant)
"Recommendations: If the part was installed in a breaker or assembly and the threaded end did not show signs of failure or fracture at installation, it is not considered to be part of the suspect population. ABB recommends that these pivot pins be visually inspected at the next convenient maintenance cycle. If the pivot pin is in their inventory as a component item or in a kit and was shipped in the time interval of the suspect material, it should be returned to ABB for replacement."
Part 21 Event Number: 51294
Licensee: ABB POWER T&D COMPANY, INC
License #: DPR-42 & DPR-
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SHARP
PART 21 REPORT - ABB 50H INSTANTANEOUS OVER CURRENT PROTECTION RELAY FAILURE
The following information was excerpted from a facsimile received from the Xcel Energy:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation, doing business as Xcel Energy, submits the attached initial notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect.
"If there is any question or if additional information is needed, please contact Dr. Glenn A. Carlson, P.E., at (651) 267-1755.
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Scott M. Sharp, Site Operations Director, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), Northern States Power Company - Minnesota, 1717 Wakonade Drive East, Welch, MN 55089
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: ABB Power T&D Company Inc., Relay, Overload, Overcurrent, 58/125VDC, Type: 50H, Cat.: 468S0475, 1.B.: 7.2.1.7-3
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: During bench testing to calibrate the relay, 125 VDC was applied to the relay with no noticeable effect. This was shop work on a spare relay and was not a plant installed piece of equipment. The relay protects against an instantaneous over current condition, which if undetected would cause substantial damage to the motor. This type of relay is installed in many locations; the failed relay was reserved to replace an existing relay protecting a Residual Heat Removal System pump motor. If the relay had been installed and required actuation during an accident, it would have resulted in major degradation in safety related equipment.
"The ABB 50H relays are installed in ten locations at PINGP. All of the 50H relays are installed on the Unit 2 safety-related buses. The equipment protected is 21 Aux Feedwater Pump, 21 Component Cooling Pump, 21 Residual Heat Removal Pump, 21 Safety Injection Pump, 21 Containment Spray Pump, 22 Safety Injection Pump, 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump, 22 Component Cooling Pump, 22 Containment Spray Pump, and 121 Cooling Water Pump. The failed relay was reserved to replace an existing relay protecting a Residual Heat Removal pump motor.
"PINGP Material Management has custody of the failed relay pending further investigation and notified the supplier of this notification by email on 8/6/2015.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: Continue bench testing relays prior to installation."
Power Reactor Event Number: 51295
NON-FUNCTIONAL EMERGENCY SIRENS
"At 1200 CDT, on August 6th, 2015, during the monthly test of Emergency Plan sirens in Saint Charles Parish (county), all sirens failed to actuate when required. There are a total 73 sirens of which 37 sirens are in Saint Charles Parish, which covers approximately 49 percent of the total population within the Waterford 3 10-mile emergency planning zone. The siren vendor is currently investigating to repair the issue.
"Waterford 3 still maintains 100 percent backup notification capabilities.
"The Saint John the Baptist Parish Sirens remain fully operational.
"The Saint Charles Parish Emergency Manager has been notified.
"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Waterford 3 and Saint Charles Parish Emergency Response Plans include back-up processes to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens."
Part 21 Event Number: 51296
Rep Org: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC
Licensee: CRANE NUCLEAR, INC
PART 21 - CRANE NUCLEAR PRESSURE SEAL VALVE WITH RETAINING RINGS
The following summary was excerpted from a facsimile received from Crane Nuclear:
"This letter provides interim notification of Crane Nuclear's investigation into ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section Ill Code design Pressure Seal Valve orders for yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings.
"The information required for this notification is provided below:
"Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Jason Klein, Sustaining Engineering Manager and Rosalie Nava, Director Safety and Quality, Crane Nuclear, 860 Remington Blvd., Bolingbrook, IL 60440
"Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect: Pressure Seal Valve orders may potentially have misclassified material and non-destructive examination requirements for Yokes with integral hub retaining ring designs.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: Crane Nuclear 'Classification of Valve Parts', Procedure 03-107, provides guidance for appropriate material and NDE requirements for processing valve and valve part orders. The procedure is based on the ASME Code Case N-62, which is ASME B&PV Section III, 2015 Edition, Non-Mandatory Appendix HH 'Rules for Valve Internal and External Items'. A yoke incorporating a threaded hub should be treated in the same manner as a threaded retaining ring requiring the material to be purchased Safety Related, ASME B&PV Section II, Part D materials, and required NDE (reference Category 3 valve items per N-62). However, yokes with integral hubs acting as retaining rings may have been processed to material requirements for a yoke per Procedure 03-107 and not a threaded retaining ring resulting in the incorrect material specification and non-destructive examination specified.
"Crane Nuclear has completed the sales orders search of the ASME Section III Code Pressure Seal Valve designs with retaining rings from 1992 to present. We identified a total of 112 orders that required review. Of these orders, three orders were supplied with non-compliant retaining ring material for the valve assemblies. The three orders are as follows:
"CNI SO# 24237-011, TVA, Browns Ferry, P.O. 00031943 - Quantity shipped = 1, Chapman, 8 inch, Figure L953, Class 900, ASME Class 2, 95 Ed., 96 Add., no N stamp
"CNI SO# 39501-01, Georgia Power, Hatch, P.O. SNG10016537 - Quantity shipped = 3, Crane, 3 inch, Figure 776U, Class 600, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., W71 Add.
"CNI SO# 39745-01, Southern California Edison, San Onofre, P.O. 4500456451 - Quantity shipped = 1, Aloyco, 4 inch, Figure N5247PSB, Class 900, ASME Class 3, 71 Ed., S73 Add.
"Crane Nuclear is currently investigating sales orders from 1968 to 1992. We require an additional 30-60 days to complete our review.
"Corrective action being taken by Crane Nuclear is to review documentation of the supplied material on the affected orders to determine if the yokes can be recertified as currently supplied, amend Crane Nuclear Procedure 03-107 to add figures reflecting configurations and clarify classifications, and train Engineering personnel by August 24, 2015.
"Crane Nuclear has notified the respective customers for the [three] orders that have been identified to date. Crane will notify the respective customers for any additional orders that are identified.