Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1069436.html
Timestamp: 2019-12-10 22:41:07
Document Index: 709991466

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u20021', '§\u2002453', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002144', '§\u2002453', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002871', '§\u2002876', '§\u2002455', '§\u2002455']

Before: DAVID R. THOMPSON, ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, and JAY S. BYBEE, Circuit Judges. Philip Gordon, Boise, ID, for appellant Russell Laroy Holland. Alan G. Burrow & George W. Breitsameter, Boise, ID, for appellee United States of America.
We are confronted with a narrow question: When does a judge have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 455 to recuse himself sua sponte in response to threats made against him, his family members or associates? Because the issue was not raised before the trial court, we review for plain error. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Ortiz, 362 F.3d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.2004).1 In Noli v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 860 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir.1988), we held that “[f]ailure to move for recusal at the trial level ․ does not preclude raising on appeal the issue of recusal under § 455.” Id. “ ‘Nonetheless, if no motion is made to the [trial court] judge ․ a party will bear a greater burden on appeal in demonstrating that the judge ․ [erred] in failing to grant recusal under section 455.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir.1980)); see also Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885(9th Cir.1991).
We begin with the general proposition that, in the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse himself, a judge has a duty to sit in judgment in all cases coming before him. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972); Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 598-99 (5th Cir.2004); United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.2000); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.1995). The duty inheres in the “judicial Power” with which we are vested. See U.S. Const. art III, § 1. It is reflected in our oath, by which we have obligated ourselves to “faithfully and impartially discharge and perform [our] duties” and to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.” 28 U.S.C. § 453. Without a duty to sit, we could recuse ourselves for any reason or no reason at all; we could pick and chose our cases, abandoning those that we find difficult, distasteful, inconvenient or just plain boring. Our mythic Justice, represented by a blindfolded figure wielding a balance and a sword, hears all cases coming before her, giving no preference-whether in priority or result-to the station or economic status of such persons. We are duty-bound to sit in all cases-not just the ones we would like to hear-except those in which our “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also id. § 455(b)(enumerating circumstances requiring recusal).
The question before us, however, is different. Here we must decide when a judge must recuse himself sua sponte in response to threats even if he would prefer to continue his work on the case. Here, Holland contends that under 28 U.S.C. § 455, the district judge should have recused himself sua sponte after receiving his threatening phone calls.
Section 455(a) of Title 28 reads: “Any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In 1974 Congress amended the statute to replace the subjective test of the previous version of the statute with an objective test based on public perception.3 The Supreme Court discussed this change in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., explaining that, “The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists.” 486 U.S. 847, 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have restated § 455(a) and ask “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir.1993) (articulating a similar standard). “Section 455(a) asks whether a reasonable person perceives a significant risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.” In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir.1990). The “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,” but rather is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” Id. at 386. The standard “must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993.
Disqualification under § 455(a) is necessarily fact-driven and may turn on subtleties in the particular case. Consequently, “the analysis of a particular section 455(a) claim must be guided, not by comparison to similar situations addressed by prior jurisprudence, but rather by an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of the particular claim at issue.” United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir.1999); see also Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178. In general, the conscientious judge should also bear in mind that § 455 is limited by the “extrajudicial source” factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of trial. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Put differently, the judge's conduct during the proceedings should not, except in the “rarest of circumstances” 4 form the sole basis for recusal under § 455(a). Id. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147.5
Applying these general principles to situations where the judge receives a threat, suggests a three-step process for evaluating whether recusal is required under § 455. First, the judge must evaluate the threat itself to determine how much risk there is that it may be carried out and how much harm there would be if it were. In deciding whether recusal is appropriate, the judge may wish to consider the following factors:
(2) The defendant's demeanor and the context of the threat. Was the threat made in a fit of passion or intended as a joke? Does the judge believe that the defendant is serious in carrying out the threat? Does the judge have any prior dealings with the defendant that make the threat more or less likely to be carried out?
(3) The perceived purpose of the threat. Was the threat made in open court or did the judge become aware of the threat only through the fortuity of a law enforcement investigation? Does the judge believe it is an attempt to force recusal and manipulate the judicial system?
The final factor is, perhaps, the most important. Not every threat made against a judge should force recusal. If so, defendants could readily manipulate the system, threatening every jurist assigned on the “wheel” until the defendant gets a judge he preferred. Also, the defendant could force delays, perhaps making the cases against him more difficult to try, perhaps putting witnesses at greater risk. Such blatant manipulation would subvert our processes, undermine our notions of fair play and justice, and damage the public's perception of the judiciary.6 We agree with the Eighth Circuit that “recusal is not automatic on the mere basis of the judge's knowledge of the threat.” United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 817(8th Cir.2006).
The second step is for the judge to determine whether he can be truly impartial when trying case. If he feels he cannot hear the case without bias, on account of the threat, then the judge has a duty to recuse himself irrespective of how it looks to the public. Section 455 of Title 28 requires recusal where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 144 (addressing recusal upon motion by a litigant); Code of Conduct for United States Judges Canon 3 (2000) (imposing upon judges a duty to recuse themselves where they are either impartial or when their impartiality may reasonably be questioned). This step is highly personal in nature and requires each judge in such a situation to set aside emotion and thoughtfully examine his ability to impartially “administer justice without respect to persons.” 28 U.S.C. § 453. If he feels there is a risk of prejudice, it is incumbent on him to recuse himself from the case; failure to do so would amount to an abdication of duty and be in clear derogation of the solemn promise he made when he took his oath of office.
The third step in evaluating whether recusal is required is to apply the “objective” standard articulated in Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194. The standard requires recusal if a reasonable third-party observer would perceive that there is a “significant risk” that the judge will be influenced by the threat and resolve the case on a basis other than the merits. The reasonable third-party observer is not a “partly informed man-in-the-street,” but rather someone who “understand[s] all the relevant facts” and has examined the record and law. LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 496 (2d Cir.2007); see also Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178(“The reasonable person in this context means a well-informed, thoughtful observer, as opposed to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); but see In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001, 1002 (7th Cir.2005) (“We must bear in mind that these outside observers are less inclined to credit judges' impartiality and mental discipline than the judiciary itself will be.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The “objective” standard is a check to avoid even the “appearance of partiality,” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860, 108 S.Ct. 2194, and insure that the judge's decision is reasonable to an informed observer.
Although the Supreme Court has explained the § 455 standard in objective terms, a threat to the judge's person or family necessarily involves the judge's personal sentiment. The judge must take into account his own perception of the situation and personal feelings and ask himself if there is a significant risk that the threat will influence his decision. Put differently: Would a reasonable person understanding the judge's perspective accept the judge's decision to recuse (or not to recuse) himself? If the judge cannot, in good faith, answer “yes,” then he should revisit his analysis under the first two steps. If it is a close case, the balance tips in favor of recusal. United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349(6th Cir.1993).
These considerations are, necessarily, deeply personal to the judge. Only the judge himself, viewing the threats in context, can differentiate between threats that the author intended to be taken seriously and those made to anger or to manipulate the system. And, only the judge can determine whether he took them seriously or dismissed them. Although § 455 requires an objective standard on recusals, only the judge-who is the sole person in possession of all the relevant facts-must decide whether a reasonable person should be concerned with risk that the threats will taint the proceedings or create a perception of partiality.
Additionally, the judge carefully considered Holland's extensive (and curious) history of making threats. Holland was before the district court to plead guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 871, making “knowingly and willful” threats against the President of the United States. Section 871 does not require proof of the defendant's capacity, or evidence that the defendant has taken any affirmative steps, to carry out such threats. Holland's current legal troubles also involved mailing threatening letters to: (1) a state court judge (he later mailed another letter apologizing for the threats); (2) to the prosecutor involved in a prior criminal proceeding; and (3) the President of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. When initially confronted with the letter to the President, Holland told an Idaho Department of Corrections lieutenant assisting the Secret Service that he did not want to remain in state custody any longer and that he wanted to go to federal prison instead. He thought he could get to federal prison by committing a federal crime. Holland also threatened a jail nurse in an apparent attempt to be transferred to the prison's medical facility and threatened his former defense lawyer in an attempt to get him to mail a second letter from Holland threatening the President. There is no evidence in the record that Holland took any steps in furtherance of any of his threats.
Holland directs our attention to a comment the district court made suggesting that Appellant's threats should be taken seriously. The court stated, “As I pointed out to him, many of his crimes are violent and assaultive in nature. So contrary to what he says, if he is given the opportunity, he has the ability to carry out his threats.” Holland argues that this statement suggests that the district court may have taken the threats seriously, which would weigh in favor of recusal.8 However, there is compelling evidence that the district court dealt with Holland in an even-handed manner. It considered his motions, allowed Appellant to speak freely at sentencing, and treated him in a courteous manner. When reviewing the situation as a whole, we cannot conclude that a reasonable person in possession of all the facts would determine that the district court based its sentence on anything but the merits of the case. Consequently, we find no plain error in the district court's decision not to recuse itself sua sponte under § 455. The judgment is
3. The prior version of the statute read, in part, “Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest ․ or is so related or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (emphasis added). The 1974 amendment removed the subjective “in his opinion” and replaced it with an “objective” test designed to “promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988); see also S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp. 6351, 6355.