Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/97002/united-states-vs-american-trucking-assns-inc
Timestamp: 2016-12-08 17:12:51
Document Index: 680075763

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 18', '§ 13', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 204', '§ 202', '§ 1301', '§ 213', '§ 351', '§ 215', '§ 228', '§ 1', '§ 251', '§ 210', '§ 152', '§ 1253', '§ 662', '§ 790', '§ 902', '§ 22', '§ 151']

United States Vs American Trucking Assns Inc - Citation 97002 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Save as PDF Add a Tag Add a Note Semantics Visualize United States Vs. American Trucking Assns., Inc. - Court Judgment	LegalCrystal Citationlegalcrystal.com/97002CourtUS Supreme CourtDecided OnMay-27-1940Case Number310 U.S. 534AppellantUnited StatesRespondentAmerican Trucking Assns., Inc.Excerpt:
united states v. american trucking assns., inc. - 310 u.s. 534 (1940)
1. the power of the interstate commerce commission under the motor carrier act, 1935, § 204(a), to establish reasonable requirements with respect to the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of motor carriers is confined to those employees whose duties affect safety of operation. pp.
310 u. s. 546
310 u. s. 553
2. When acceptance of the literal meaning of words in a statute leads to results which are absurd or futile or plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation, the legislative purpose will be followed. P.
3. Even though, superficially, the meaning of statutory words appears plain, aids to their interpretation may be resorted to in pursuit of the purpose. P.
4. To accept literally the word "employee" in § 204(a) of the Motor Carrier Act would place upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the function of regulating the qualifications of large numbers of employees whose duties do not affect safety of operation, contrary to the settled practice of Congress, evinced in other Acts, with respect to regulation of hours and qualifications of transportation employees, and contrary to the policy of most of the States, as shown by Acts in force when the federal Act was passed. P.
5. Indication of any intention of Congress, by § 204(a), to grant the Interstate Commerce Commission other than the customary power to secure safety is absent from the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act. P.
6. The construction of § 204(a) by the Interstate Commerce Commission and by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor as relating solely to safety of operation is of great weight. P.
After detailed consideration, the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, was passed. [
] It followed generally the suggestion of form made by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation. [
] The difficulty and wide scope of the problems raised by the growth of the motor carrier industry were obvious. Congress sought to set out its purpose and the range of its action in a declaration of policy which covered the preservation and fostering of motor transportation in the public interest, tariffs, the coordination of motor carriage with other forms of transportation and cooperation with the several states in their efforts to systematize the industry. [
While efficient and economical movement in interstate commerce is obviously a major objective of the Act, [
] there are numerous provisions which make it clear that Congress intended to exercise its powers in the non-transportation
phases of motor carrier activity. [
] Safety of operation was constantly before the committees and Congress in their study of the situation. [
of service for "employees whose functions in the operation of motor vehicles make such regulations desirable because of safety considerations." [
] A few months after this determination, the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted. [
] Section 7 of this act limits the workweek at the normal rate of pay of all employees subject to its terms, and § 18 makes the maximum hours of the Fair Labor Standards Act subject to further reduction by applicable federal or state law or municipal ordinances. There were certain employees excepted, however, from these regulations by § 13(b). It reads as follows:
This exemption brought sharply into focus the coverage of employees by Motor Carrier Act, 204(a). Clerical, storage and other non-transportation workers are, under this or the Fair Labor Standards Act, dependent upon the sweep of the word employee in this act. The Commission again examined the question of its jurisdiction, and, in Ex parte No. MC-28, [
] again reached the conclusion that its power under
of transportation or inherent in that industry strikes us as an enlargement of our jurisdiction unwarranted by any express or implied provision in the act, which vests in us all the powers we have. [
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor arrived at the same result in an interpretation. [
"with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of all employees of common and contract carriers except employees whose duties are related to safety of operations; (3) to disregard its report and order in Ex parte MC-28. [
] The Commission reaffirmed its position, and denied the petition. The appellees petitioned a three-judge district court to compel the Commission to take jurisdiction and consider the establishment of qualifications and hours of service of all employees of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. [
] The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division was permitted to intervene. [
] The district court reversed the Commission, set aside its order, and directed it to take jurisdiction of the appellees' petition. 31 F.Supp. 35. A direct appeal to this Court was granted. [
In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. [
] There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. To take a few words from their context, and, with them thus isolated, to attempt to determine their meaning certainly would not contribute greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly in
a law drawn to meet many needs of a major occupation. [
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient, in and of themselves, to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases, we have followed their plain meaning. [
] When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. [
] Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole," [
] this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. [
] When aid to construction of
the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, [
] however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination." [
] The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body of public servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another body, the legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat, but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion. [
] Emphasis should be laid, too, upon the necessity for appraisal of the purposes as a whole of Congress in analyzing the meaning of clauses or sections of general acts. A few words of general connotation appearing in the text of statutes should not be given a wide meaning, contrary to a settled policy, "excepting as a different purpose is plainly shown." [
and safety only. The Hours of Service Act [
] imposes restrictions on the hours of labor of employees "actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train." The Seamen's Act [
] limits employee regulations under it to members of ships' crews. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has authority over hours of service of employees "in the interest of safety." [
] It is stated by appellants in their brief with detailed citations, and the statement is uncontradicted, that, at the time of the passage of the Motor Vehicle Act, "forty states had regulatory measures relating to the hours of service of employees," and every one "applied exclusively to drivers or helpers on the vehicles." In the face of this course of legislation, coupled with the supporting interpretation of the two administrative agencies concerned with its interpretation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Wage and Hour Division, it cannot be said that the word "employee," as used in § 204(a), is so clear as to the workmen it embraces that we would accept its broadest meaning. The word, of course, is not a word of art. It takes color from its surroundings, and frequently is carefully defined by the statute where it appears. [
legislative history of the Act of any discussion of the desirability of giving the Commission broad and unusual powers over all employees. The clause in question was not contained in the bill as introduced. [
] Nor was it in the Coordinator's draft. [
] It was presented on the Senate floor as a committee amendment following a suggestion of the Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Commission, Mr. McManamy. [
and the debates contain no indication that a regulation of the qualifications and hours of service of all employees was contemplated; in fact, the evidence points the other way. The Senate Committee's report explained the provisions of § 204(a)(1), (2) as giving the commission authority over common and contract carriers similar to that given over private carriers by § 204(a)(3). [
] The Chairman of the Senate Committee expressed the same thought while explaining the provisions on the floor of the Senate. [
] When suggesting the addition of the clause, the Chairman of the Commission's Legislative Committee said: ". . . it relates to safety." [
] In the House, the member in charge of the bill characterized the provisions as tending "greatly to promote careful operation for safety on the highways," and spoke with assurance of the Commission's ability to "formulate a set of reasonable rules . . . including therein maximum labor-hours
service on the highway." [
] And, in the report of the House Committee, a member set out separate views criticizing the delegation of discretion to the Commission and proposing an amendment providing for an eight-hour day for "any employee engaged in the operation of such motor vehicle." [
"contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new. [
Furthermore, the Commission's interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which suggested the provisions' enactment to Congress. [
". . . until the Congress shall have given us a more particular and definite command in the premises, we shall limit our regulations concerning maximum hours of service to those employees whose functions in the operation of motor vehicles make such regulations desirable because of safety considerations. [
Senate at least was aware of the Commission's investigation of its powers even before its interpretation was announced. [
] Under the circumstances, it is unlikely indeed that Congress would not have explicitly overruled the Commission's interpretation had it intended to exempt others than employees who affected safety from the Labor Standards Act.
Appellees call our attention to certain pending legislation as sustaining their view of the congressional purpose in enacting the Motor Carrier Act. We do not think it can be said that the action of the Senate and House of Representatives on this pending transportation legislation throws much light on the policy of Congress or the meaning attributed by that body to § 204(a). Aside from the very pertinent fact that the legislation is still unadopted, the legislative history up to now points only to a hesitation to determine a controversy as to the meaning of the present Motor Carrier Act, pending a judicial determination. [
One amendment made to the then pending Motor Carrier Act has relevance to our inquiry. Section 03(b) reads as set out in the note below. [
] The words, "except
operation or standards of equipment," italicized in the note, were added by amendment in the House after the passage of S. 1629 in the Senate with the addition of the disputed clause to § 204(a)(1) and (2). [
] It is evident that the exempted vehicles and operators include common, contract and private carriers. It seems equally evident that, where these vehicles or operators were common or contract carriers, it was not intended by Congress to give the Commission power to regulate the qualifications and hours of service of employees other than those concerned with the safety of operations.
S.Doc. No. 152, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., Regulation of Transportation Agencies, p. 350.
p. 25 for discussion of the preliminary steps of motor carrier regulation. Hearings on Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers, H.R. 5262 and H.R. 6016, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings on S. 1629, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 202;
Maurer v. Hamilton, supra;
Regulation of Transportation Agencies,
Highway and Safety Regulations, p. 32; Hearings on S. 1629,
pp. 122-123, 184.
Cf. Securities Exchange Comm'n v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., ante,
Story, J., in
1 Peters 46,
Pennington v. Coxe,
2 Cranch 33,
6 U. S. 59
James v. Milwaukee,
16 Wall. 159,
83 U. S. 161
18 Wall. 272,
85 U. S. 301
United States v. Stone & Downer Co.,
274 U. S. 239
Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & M. Co.,
289 U. S. 165
289 U. S. 169
Lincoln v. Ricketts,
297 U. S. 373
297 U. S. 376
Foster v. United States,
303 U. S. 118
303 U. S. 120
Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of their Policy by the English Courts, 35 Columbia Law Review 519; Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harvard Law Review 863; Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harvard Law Review 886; R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments, 14 Indiana Law Journal 199, 309, 324; Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule, 25 Washington University Law Quarterly 2.
Taft v. Commissioner,
304 U. S. 359
Helvering v. City Bank Co.,
296 U. S. 89
284 U. S. 231
284 U. S. 237
Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co.,
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co.,
230 U. S. 84
230 U. S. 199
Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp.,
305 U. S. 332
284 U. S. 176
196 U. S. 14
Popovici v. Agler,
Maurer v. Hamilton, supra,
309 U. S. 612
309 U. S. 615
Committee on Ministers' Powers Report (Cmd. 4060, 1932), p. 135.
295 U. S. 174
295 U. S. 188
295 U. S. 191
Keifer & Keifer v. RFC,
306 U. S. 394
Ozawa v. United States, supra.
That the word "employees" is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning is apparent from an examination of recent legislation. Thus, the Social Security Act specifically provides that "The term
employee' includes an officer of a corporation" (42 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(6)), while the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically exempts "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity. . . ." (29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)). In the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, Congress expressly recognized the variable meaning of employee even when defined at length and used only in a single act: " . . . `employee' (except when used in phrases establishing a different meaning) means . . ." (45 U.S.C. § 351(d)). In a statute permitting heads of departments to settle claims up to $1,000 arising from the negligence of "employees of the Government," Congress gives recognition to the fact that the term is not, on its face, all-inclusive by providing: "`Employee' shall include enlisted men in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps." (31 U.S.C. §§ 215, 216.)
the varying definitions of "employees" in the following statutes: Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 228a(b)(c); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(7); Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 251(f); Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 210; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); Maritime Labor Relations Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1253(c); Classification Act of 1923 (Civil Service), 5 U.S.C. § 662; U.S. Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 790; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902; Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. § 22; Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151(5).
Where the term "employee" has been used in statutes without particularized definition, it has not been treated by the courts as a word of definite content.
269 U. S. 520
(consulting engineers performing services for states, municipalities, and water districts held not to be "employees" under statute exempting "officers and employees under . . . any State, . . . or any local subdivision thereof" from the income tax);
(mineral surveyor, appointed by the surveyor but paid by private persons, is within prohibition of statute prohibiting "employes in the General Land Office" from purchasing public land);
Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Railway Employees' Dept.,
93 F.2d 340 (furloughed railroad workers entitled to priority in rehiring held "employees" within meaning of Railway Labor Act), discussed in 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1299;
Latta v. Lonsdale,
107 F. 585 (attorney not "employee" within meaning of statute giving "employees" preference against assets of insolvent corporations);
Vane v. Newcombe,
132 U. S. 220
(contractor who built lines for telegraph company not "employee" within statute giving employees liens against corporate property);
Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills,
86 F.192 (same);
cf. United States v. Griffith,
55 App.D.C. 123; 2 F.2d 925 (War Department clerk receiving disability compensation held employee of government within common law rule of the District of Columbia that employee of a litigant cannot be a member of jury);
see also Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co.,
Louisville, E. & St.L. R. Co. v. Wilson,
Campbell v. Commissioner,
87 F.2d 128;
Burnet v. Jones,
50 F.2d 14;
Burnet v. McDonough,
46 F.2d 944.
the testimony of Mr. McManamy in Hearings on S. 1629 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 122, 123:
303 U. S. 310
"Paragraph (1) of section 34 of the bill is based on the provisions of subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 204(a) of the Motor Carrier Act. In the original draft, there was inserted at the beginning of the paragraph the clause 'in order to promote safety of operations,' thus making clear that the Commission's power to regulate qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees is confined to those who have anything to do with safety of operation. This is a question with respect to which considerable doubt seems to have arisen under the wording of the present law. Upon the strenuous objection of the truckers claiming conflict between this law and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the bill [
the committee amendment] restores the law to the present provisions of the Motor Carrier Act."
"(b) Nothing in this part,
except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment
shall be construed to include (1) motor vehicles employed solely in transporting school children and teachers to or from school; or (2) taxicabs, or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide taxicab service, having a capacity of not more than six passengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed termini; or (3) motor vehicles owned or operated by or on behalf of hotels and used exclusively for the transportation of hotel patrons between hotels and local railroad or other common carrier stations; or (4) motor vehicles operated, under authorization, regulation, and control of the Secretary of the Interior, principally for the purpose of transporting persons in and about the national parks and national monuments; or (4a) motor vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and used in the transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof, or in the transportation of supplies to his farm; or (4b) motor vehicles controlled and operated by a cooperative association as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act, approved June 15, 1929, as amended; or (5) trolley busses operated by electric power derived from a fixed overhead wire, furnishing local passenger transportation similar to street railway service; or (6) motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products thereof); or (7) motor vehicles used exclusively in the distribution of newspapers; nor, unless and to the extent that the Commission shall from time to time find that such application is necessary to carry out the policy of Congress enunciated in section 202, shall the provisions of this part,
apply to: (8) The transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or municipalities, except when such transportation is under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment to or from a point without such municipality, municipalities, or zone, and provided that the motor carrier engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or irregular route or routes in interstate commerce is also lawfully engaged in the intrastate transportation of passengers over the entire length of such interstate route or routes in accordance with the laws of each State having jurisdiction; or (9) the casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business."