Source: https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-1/20-power-and-duties-of-the-houses.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 10:20:11
Document Index: 553572950

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 72', '§ 2895', '§ 2910', '§ 645', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 836', '§ 840']

Powers and Duties of the Houses :: Article I. Legislative Department :: US Constitution Annotated :: Justia
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Each House, in judging of elections under this clause, acts as a judicial tribunal, with like power to compel attendance of witnesses. In the exercise of its discretion, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of a witness to procure his testimony, without previous subpoena, if there is good reason to believe that otherwise such witness would not be forthcoming.400 It may punish perjury committed in testifying before a notary public upon a contested election.401 The power to judge elections extends to an investigation of expenditures made to inﬂuence nominations at a primary election.402 Refusal to permit a person presenting credentials in due form to take the oath of office does not oust the jurisdiction of the Senate to inquire into the legality of the election.403 Nor does such refusal unlawfully deprive the state that elected such person of its equal suffrage in the Senate.404
For many years the view prevailed in the House of Representatives that it was necessary for a majority of the members to vote on any proposition submitted to the House in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement for a quorum. It was a common practice for the opposition to break a quorum by refusing to vote. This was changed in 1890, by a ruling made by Speaker Reed and later ember but not voting would be counted in determining the presence of a quorum.405 The Supreme Court upheld this rule in United States v. Ballin,406 saying that the capacity of the House to transact business is “created by the mere presence of a majority,” and that since the Constitution does not prescribe any method for determining the presence of such majority “it is therefore within the competency of the House to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.”407 The rules of the Senate provide for the ascertainment of a quorum only by a roll call,408 but in a few cases it has held that if a quorum is present, a proposition can be determined by the vote of a lesser number of members.409
The Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law. . . .”415 The Constitution provides that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,”416 and the Senate has enacted a cloture rule417 requiring a supermajority vote (60 votes) to close debate on any matter pending before the Senate. Absent the invocation of cloture or some other means of ending debate, matters can remain before the Senate indefinitely. The practice of preventing closure is known as a filibuster. Although no provision of the Constitution expressly requires that the Senate or House act by majority vote in enacting legislation or in exercising their other constitutional powers, the framers of the Constitution were committed to a majority rule as a general principle.418 These facts have given rise to disagreement as to the constitutionality of the filibuster as applied to judicial nominees— disagreement over whether the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate means the majority of the Senate and not a super-majority. The constitutionality of the filibuster has been challenged in court several times, but those cases have never reached the merits of the issue.419 More recently, the Senate interpreted its rules to require only a simple majority to invoke cloture on most nominations.420
400 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).
401 In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890).
402 6 Cannon’sprecedents Of The House Of Representatives §§ 72–74, 180 (1936). Cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921).
403 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929).
404 279 U.S. at 615. The existence of this power in both houses of Congress does not prevent a state from conducting a recount of ballots cast in such an election any more than it prevents the initial counting by a state. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
405 Hinds’ Precedents Of The House Of Representatives §§ 2895–2905 (1907).
406 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
407 144 U.S. at 5–6.
408 Rule V.
409 4 Hinds’ Precedents Of The House Of Representatives §§ 2910–2915 (1907); 6 Cannon’sprecedents Of The House Of Representatives §§ 645, 646 (1936).
410 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). The Senate is “a continuing body.” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181–82 (1927). Hence its rules remain in force from Congress to Congress except as they are changed from time to time, whereas those of the House are readopted at the outset of each new Congress.
411 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
412 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
413 338 U.S. at 87–90.
414 338 U.S. at 92–95.
415 Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
416 Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
417 Rule XXII, par. 2.
418 See, e.g., Federalist No. 58, p. 397 (Cooke ed.; Wesleyan Univ. Press: 1961) (Madison, responding to objections that the Constitution should have required “more than a majority . . . for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision,” asserted that such requirements would be inconsistent with majority rule, which is “the fundamental principle of free government”); id., No. 22, p. 138–39 (Hamilton observed that “equal suffrage among the States under the Articles of Confederation contradicts that fundamental maxim of republican government which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail”).
419 See, e.g., Common Cause v. Biden, 748 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. United States Senate, 432 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1998). The constitutionality of the filibuster has been a subject of debate for legal scholars. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. Pal. Rev. Pennumbra 245 (2010).
420 159 Cong. Rec. S8416–S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013).
421 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
422 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
423 166 U.S. at 669–70. See 2 J. Story, Commentaries On The Constitution Of The United States § 836 (1833).
424 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
425 395 U.S. at 506–12.
426 2 J. Story, Commentaries On The Constitution Of The United States § 840 (1833), quoted with approval in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).
427 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892).
428 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911). See the dispute in the Court with regard to the application of Field in an origination clause dispute. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990), and id. at 408 (Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment). A parallel rule holds in the case of a duly authenticated official notice to the Secretary of State that a state legislature has ratified a proposed amendment to the Constitution. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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