Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v51/51-129.html
Timestamp: 2014-12-18 18:33:38
Document Index: 762095753

Matched Legal Cases: ['§\n2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§\n7103', '§ 7103', '§ 7103', '§ 16', '§ 2423', '§\n2423', '§ 7105', '§ 6311']

51:1572(129)CA - - VA Medical Center, Ashville, NC &amp; AFGE Local 446 - - 1996 FLRAdec CA - - v51 p1572 | FLRA.GOV
FLRA.gov will be offline from 5am - 5pm Sunday, December 21, 2014 for maintenance. The eFiling application will remain available via this link: FLRA.gov/eFiling. We apologize for any inconvenience. Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 51:1572(129)CA - - VA Medical Center, Ashville, NC & AFGE Local 446 - - 1996 FLRAdec CA - - v51 p1572 [ v51 p1572 ] 51:1572(129)CA
The decision of the Authority follows: 51 FLRA No. 129 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL
CENTER ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA (Respondent) and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL 446, AFL-CIO (Charging Party/Union) AT-CA-30876 _____ DECISION AND ORDER July 19, 1996 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair; Tony Armendariz
filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent to the attached decision of the
Administrative Law Judge. The Union filed a brief in support of the General
Counsel's exceptions and also requested a more inclusive remedy.(2) The General Counsel filed an
opposition to the Respondent's exceptions and the Respondent filed an
opposition to the Union's exception. The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated section 7116(a)(1)
when it unilaterally discontinued the past practice of granting employees
4 hours of administrative leave for their birthdays without providing the
Union notice and an opportunity to bargain on the impact and implementation of
the change. The Judge granted the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment and
found a violation based on: (1) the Respondent's failure to answer the
complaint; and (2) the Respondent's admission, in its brief, that it had
failed to meet its bargaining obligations. The Judge recommended a
status quo ante remedy, which restored the practice and
provided that affected employees be made whole for lost administrative leave
during a specified time frame. No exceptions were filed to the Judge's finding of a violation. The
exceptions and the oppositions concern the Judge's recommended remedy only.
Upon consideration of the Judge's decision and the entire record, we
adopt the Judge's findings and conclusions that the Respondent violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. However, we find that a status
quo ante remedy is not appropriate in this case. Instead, we
order the parties to bargain and to give retroactive effect to the agreement
they reach. II. Judge's Decision The Judge's decision, which fully sets forth the facts and the basis
for his finding of a violation, is attached. As the only matters before us
relate to the Judge's remedy, only those portions of his decision are described
here. The Judge recommended a status quo ante remedy,
which would restore the practice of providing administrative leave for
employees' birthdays and make affected employees whole for lost leave during a
specified time frame. In recommending this remedy, the Judge applied the
criteria set forth in Federal Correctional Institution, 8 FLRA 604
(1982) (FCI).(3) The Judge determined, however, that it would be inequitable
to require the Respondent to grant the full amount of administrative leave lost
by employees based on his conclusion that if the complaint had issued in 1993,
rather than April 1994, impact and implementation bargaining would not have
extended beyond 1993.(4) Instead, the Judge ordered that the Respondent: Grant four hours administrative leave to each employee in the Medical
Administration Service whose birthday has occurred before the date of this
Order during the calendar year 1994, and after the date of the Order, grant
each employee in the Medical Administration Service four hours administrative
leave whose birthday occurs after the date of the Order until good faith
bargaining on the impact and implementation of the discontinuance of that
practice has been completed. Judge's Decision at 10. In finding this remedy appropriate, the Judge rejected the Respondent's
argument that granting administrative leave for an employee's birthday was
contrary to the FPM and an Agency regulation that "mirrors"
the FPM.(5) Id. at 7. The Judge
found that the FPM provided discretion to management to grant administrative
leave for brief periods of time. III. Position of the Parties A. Respondent The Respondent states that a status quo ante
remedy is not proper where the past practice is illegal. The Respondent argues
that FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11-5 and FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 630,
subchapter 11-5, give agencies discretion to grant administrative leave only in
circumstances where there is a Government or civic interest. The Respondent
cites various Comptroller General (CG) and Authority decisions in support of
its view that administrative leave for matters involving personal convenience
or personal reasons has always been found to contravene the FPM. The Respondent also contends that the Judge's status quo
ante remedy violates management's right to assign.(6) According to the Respondent, the
Authority has determined that proposals requiring agencies to grant
administrative leave violate the right to assign work because the proposals
eliminate management's authority to approve or disapprove leave. In opposition to the Union's request to expand the remedy to include
all bargaining unit employees, the Respondent states that not all bargaining
unit employees are covered by either the complaint or the Judge's
decision.(7) The Respondent argues that the Authority does not consider
exceptions involving matters not covered by the complaint or contentions
presented for the first time in the exceptions and should not do so here. B. General Counsel In its opposition to the Respondent's exceptions, the General Counsel
argues that the Respondent offered no case law or other law, rule, or
regulation that prohibits it from exercising its discretion to grant a short
period of administrative leave in connection with employees' birthdays. In its exceptions, the General Counsel contends that the Judge exceeded
his discretion and applied a standard not found in FCI when he limited
the make whole remedy to a specified time frame rather than making that remedy
effective from the date of the violation. The General Counsel requests that the
Authority order a remedy that restores administrative leave to all bargaining
unit employees from the implementation of the change in December 1992 through
the completion of bargaining. C. Union The Union supports the General Counsel's requested relief and, in
addition, requests that the same relief be granted to all bargaining unit
employees employed by the Respondent, not simply those in the Medical
Administration Service. In support of its request, the Union cites the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, which provides that all employees shall be
treated fairly and equitably. IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. The Respondent Had Discretion Under the FPM to Grant Brief
Periods of Excused Absence in Connection With Employee Birthdays FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11 provided guidance to agencies in
granting excused absences, commonly called administrative leave.(8) By its terms, chapter 630 was
"not intended to be a comprehensive index of all instances in which excused
absence may be granted[.]" FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11-1. Instead, it set
forth illustrative examples of the situations for which administrative leave
could be granted. Id., subchapter 11-6. Generally speaking, such leave
could be granted in limited circumstances that were directly related to the
agency's mission, enhanced the development of skills of an employee, or were
officially sponsored or sanctioned by the head of an agency. Id.,
subchapter 11-3. In addition, agencies had the authority to grant excused
absences "in limited circumstances for the benefit of the agency's mission or a
Governmentwide recognized and sanctioned purpose." Id.,
subchapter 11-5. As relevant here, subchapter 11-6(c), entitled "Agency
Determinations," provided that "Agencies generally determine the situations in
which they will excuse employees from duty." That provision then recited
"examples of recurring situations which may warrant excused absence
. . . ." Other than its general argument that the practice of granting
administrative leave for employee birthdays was illegal under the FPM, the
Respondent points to no specific portion of the FPM that clearly
established that the practice was unlawful. Moreover, our examination fails to
disclose any express language in the FPM precluding the use of leave for such a
purpose. Rather, it is evident from the language of the FPM that agencies had
discretion in determining when the use of administrative leave was appropriate.
The situations described in the FPM were presented as "guidance" offered to
agencies for use in determining the situations in which employees would be
excused from duty and expressly were "not intended to be a comprehensive index
of all instances" for which leave could be granted. FPM chapter 630, subchapter
11-1. As such, they were illustrative examples only, and there is no indication
that they described the universe of situations in which administrative leave
would be appropriate. Accordingly, the fact that leave for employee birthdays
was not listed among these examples is not dispositive of whether agencies had
the discretion to grant brief absences for that purpose. To support its position, the Respondent cites various Comptroller
General decisions in which the use of administrative leave was found not to be
appropriate.(9) However, none of those decisions
involved the granting of administrative leave for use in connection with
employee birthdays. Moreover, other decisions support a conclusion that
administrative leave could be authorized in circumstances like those in this
case. A dispositive factor appears to be whether the agency had originally
approved or disapproved the leave at issue. For example, in Matter of: A
Christmas Case, 64 Comp. Gen. 171 (1984), an installation commander
granted the afternoon of December 23 off as a holiday good-will gesture.
Subsequently, the civilian personnel officer determined that the release of
employees contravened the FPM. On review, the Comptroller General upheld the
installation commander's decision. In so doing, the CG relied on the agency's
discretion to grant administrative leave. The CG noted, among other things,
that the "listing [in the FPM] is not exclusive nor does it purport to usurp
the discretion of agency heads or installation commanders to make grants of
short periods of administrative leave in appropriate cases." Id.
at 172. In other decisions, the CG looked to the "broad framework" of the
FPM in upholding agency grants of administrative leave for such activities as
participating in a medical study, Matter of: Department of Housing and Urban
Development Employee--Administrative Leave, 67 Comp. Gen. 126 (1987),
and providing services to a Federal credit union, Matter of: Administrative
Leave--Federal Employees Providing Advice and Support to Federal Credit
Unions, 63 Comp. Gen. 542 (1984). In the former case, the Comptroller
General found leave appropriate after expressly stating that none of the
examples in the FPM was applicable to the particular situation for which the
employee sought administrative leave. The Authority also has interpreted these same FPM provisions to find
that, as agencies have discretion to grant administrative leave to their
employees in certain situations for brief periods of time, management can
negotiate over how it will exercise that discretion. See National
Tobacco and Firearms, 41 FLRA 1106, 1126 (1991) (BATF),
petition for review dismissed, 953 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1992); U.S.
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.
and National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, Local 46, American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 48 FLRA 1269, 1276 (1993). The
Authority has found grants of administrative leave to be appropriate, or a
negotiable condition of employment, in a variety of situations including: time
off in connection with blood donation, American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1345 and U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Fort
Carson, et al., 48 FLRA 168, 182 (1993); leave for employees who are
prevented from performing duties due to circumstances beyond their control,
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2902 and U.S. Department
of the Army, Army Garrison, Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, 44 FLRA 3 (1992)
(Provision 1); periods of holiday shutdown, National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 2119 and U.S. Department of the Army, Rock Island Arsenal,
Rock Island, Illinois, 42 FLRA 993 (1991); and participation in
counseling and/or treatment sessions relating to an agency's drug testing
program, BATF, 41 FLRA at 1126-27.(10) In sum, our review of the FPM and the decisions interpreting those
provisions leads us to conclude that the Respondent had discretion under the
FPM to grant administrative leave for employee birthdays.(11) We are persuaded by the
foregoing analysis that: (1) OPM gave agencies discretion to determine
when administrative leave was appropriate and provided illustrative guidance to
assist the agencies in their deliberations; and (2) agencies were expected
to exercise their judgment in determining the situations for which
administrative leave was appropriate.(12) In reaching our result in this case, we note, as did the
Comptroller General in upholding the grant of time off as a holiday good-will
gesture, that "[t]he controlling issue here is not the prudence of the release
from duty order, but rather, the validity and effect of that order."
64 Comp. Gen. at 172. Our conclusion should not be read as finding
prudent a practice that provides administrative leave for employee
birthdays. B. A Retroactive Bargaining Order Is Appropriate to Remedy the
Unfair Labor Practice We find, for the reasons explained below, that a status
quo ante remedy is not appropriate in the circumstances of this
case.(13) The purpose of a status
quo ante remedy is to place parties, including employees, in the
positions they would have occupied had there been no unlawful conduct.
E.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., 44 FLRA
988, 996-97 (1992); U.S. Department of the Air Force, Griffiss Air Force
Base, Rome, New York, 37 FLRA 570, 580 (1990) (Griffiss Air
Force Base), enforced, 949 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In this
case, however, it is not possible to do so because it is not possible to
recreate events that have already transpired. That is, the employee birthdays
for which administrative leave was not granted have already occurred.
Accordingly, it is not possible, at this time, to provide time off so that
those employees can commemorate past birthdays. It is well established that the Authority has broad discretion under
the Statute to fashion appropriate remedies for unfair labor practices.
National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 910 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (en banc). In addition, as the criteria enumerated in
FCI are not all-inclusive, the Authority may rely on "other things" in
determining whether, in any given situation, such a remedy is appropriate.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C., 48 FLRA
313, 329 (1993) (citing FCI, 8 FLRA at 606), petition for
review denied sub nom. FDIC v. FLRA, No. 93-1694 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 22, 1994). In exercising that discretion, the Authority will not
order remedies that are meaningless, as a status quo ante
remedy would be in this case. E.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Customs Service, Washington, D.C., 38 FLRA 770, 797-98 (1990). On the other hand, we do not countenance any disregard of bargaining
obligations required by the Statute. There is no question that the Respondent's
failure to notify the Union of the termination of the practice deprived the
Union of an opportunity to bargain before employees were disadvantaged and at a
time when negotiations would have been more meaningful. Indeed, the Respondent
admits that it failed to meet its bargaining obligations. Agency's Brief
at 4. In our view, a bargaining order that gives retroactive effect to the
agreement reached by the parties is appropriate. Such an order permits the
parties to determine--through negotiations--the best way to provide relief for
employees who were adversely affected by the Respondent's unlawful refusal to
bargain. As the Authority stated in Griffiss Air Force Base, a
retroactive bargaining order "is designed to remedy the effects of [an] unfair
labor practice[] on individual employees, a fundamental purpose of the
Statute." 37 FLRA at 582. In directing the parties to bargain, we
expect that the Respondent will make every effort to redress employees who were
harmed by the Respondent's unlawful conduct. We further expect that if the
parties cannot reach agreement they expeditiously will seek assistance from the
Federal Service Impasses Panel.(14) V. Order Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Regulations and section
7118 of the Statute, the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center,
Asheville, North Carolina, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Unilaterally discontinuing the practice of granting employees
administrative leave for their birthdays without notifying the American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 446, AFL-CIO, the exclusive
representative of bargaining unit employees, and affording it an opportunity to
bargain on the impact and implementation of the change. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
Local 446, AFL-CIO, bargain concerning the impact and implementation of the
discontinuation of the practice of granting employees administrative leave for
their birthdays, and apply retroactively the results of such bargaining. (b) Post at the Medical Center, copies of the attached Notice on forms
forms, they shall be signed by the Director of the Medical Center, and shall be
material. (c) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Regulations, notify
the Regional Director, Atlanta Regional Office, Federal Labor Relations
Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this Order as to
what steps have been taken to comply. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY The Federal Labor Relations Authority has found that the Department of
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Asheville, North Carolina violated the
and abide by this notice. We hereby notify bargaining unit employees that: WE WILL NOT unilaterally discontinue the practice of granting employees
bargain on the impact and implementation of the change. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
Employees, Local 446, AFL-CIO, bargain concerning the impact and implementation
of the discontinuation of the practice of granting employees administrative
leave for their birthdays, and apply retroactively the results of such
bargaining. _______________________(Agency) Dated:____________ By:_______________________ (Signature)
address is: Marquis Two Tower, Suite 701, 285 Peachtree Center Ave., Atlanta,
GA 30303-1270, and whose telephone number is: (404) 331-5212. APPENDIX The relevant portions of Subchapter 11, entitled "Excused Absence"
provided as follows: 11-1 Summary. This subchapter provides guidance on the granting of
excused absence. It is not intended to be a comprehensive index of all
instances in which excused absence may be granted, but rather to serve as a
guide for the administration of such requests. . . . . . . . 11-3 Policy/Guidance - Excused absence may be granted in limited
circumstances which should-- a. be directly related to the employing agency's mission; b. enhance the professional development or skills of the employee
in his or her current position; or c. be officially sponsored/sanctioned by the head of the employing
agency. . . . . 11-6 Procedures. The following guidelines are offered for agencies to
use when administering the granting of excused
absence. . . . a. Registration and Voting. . . . b. Military Funerals. . . . c. Agency Determinations. Agencies generally determine the
situations in which they will excuse employees from duty. The following are
examples of recurring situations which may warrant excused absence and for
which agencies may have a written policy or may delegate decisions to
supervisors. (1) Blood Donation. Employees who make blood donations may be
granted excused absence to travel to the donation site and/or to
recover. (2) Taking examinations. Employees who take examinations required
by their present positions, including reexaminations, may be granted excused
absence. (3) Tardiness and Brief Absences. Unless an agency establishes a
minimum charge of less than 1 hour, or establishes a different minimum
charge through negotiations, the minimum charge for leave is 1 hour and
additional charges are in multiples thereof. Absence from duty of less than an
hour and tardiness may be excused when reasons appear to be adequate to the
supervisor under procedures prescribed by the agency. Otherwise, the absence
may be compensated for by additional work time or may be charged against any
earned compensatory time or may be charged to annual leave, leave without pay
(with the employee's consent), or absence without leave, as appropriate. (See 5
CFR 630.205) (4) Conferences or Conventions. Employees may be granted excused
absence to attend conferences or conventions when attendance will serve the
best interests of the Federal service. Excused absence may be restricted to
those situations in which the employee is an official representative of the
agency or is a contributor on the agenda. (5) Special Events. Individual employees may be granted excused
absence to participate in civil activities which the Government is interested
in recognizing or encouraging. Agency heads should make these decisions on a
case-by-case basis. (6) Physical Fitness. Excused absence may be granted for short
periods for participating in officially sponsored and administered physical
fitness programs. . . . (7) Volunteer Activities. Employees may be granted excused
absence for short periods of time to participate in volunteer activities that
are (a) mission-related, (b) officially sponsored or sanctioned by the
employing agency, or (c) enhance the professional development and/or skills of
employees in their current
positions. . . .
Member Armendariz' separate opinion: I write separately to state my agreement with the Respondent's
contention that it was required to change its past practice of granting
employees 4 hours of time off with pay for their birthdays because that
practice was not authorized by Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) chapter 630,
subchapter 11, and, therefore, was illegal.(1) Under the FPM, an agency may grant administrative leave
(2) in limited circumstances which
should: (1) be directly related to the agency's mission; (2) enhance
the professional development or skills of employees in their current position;
or (3) be officially sponsored/sanctioned by the agency head. FPM chapter
630, subchapter 11-3. Agency heads have authority to grant administrative leave
in limited circumstances for the benefit of the agency's mission or a
Government-wide recognized and sanctioned purpose. Id., subchapter 11-5.
The granting of administrative leave is restricted to the general circumstances
described in the FPM. National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 2119 and U.S. Department of the Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Rock
Island, Illinois, 49 FLRA 151, 158 (1994) (Rock Island Arsenal).
Thus, in order to find that administrative leave is consistent with
FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11, the purpose for which the leave is sought
must bear some relationship to the situations described in subchapter 11 for
which an excused absence may be appropriate. Id. I fail to see how a past practice of granting employees administrative
leave for their birthdays is consistent with the foregoing principles. If
administrative leave for employees' birthdays is permissible under the FPM, it
is difficult to envision an event for which administrative leave would not be
permissible. Moreover, if an agency's authority to grant administrative leave
is so open-ended as to permit employees to take time off with pay for their
birthdays, it is not clear why it was necessary for OPM to provide guidance in
the first place regarding the circumstances for which administrative leave was
appropriate.(3) In my view, interpreting the FPM
provisions in this manner renders them meaningless.(4) Consequently, I would find that the Respondent's practice of granting 4
hours of administrative leave for employees' birthdays was not authorized by
the FPM.(5) Based on that finding and consistent with my dissent in General
Services Administration, National Capitol Region, Federal Protective Service
Division, Washington, D.C., 50 FLRA 728, 742 (1995), reversed and
remanded sub nom. General Services Administration v. FLRA, No.
95-1498 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 1996), I would not order a status
quo ante remedy in this case because such a remedy would be
inconsistent with applicable Government-wide regulation. However, as it is
undisputed that the Respondent violated the Statute by failing to bargain over
the impact and implementation of its decision to cancel the practice of
granting administrative leave for employees' birthdays, a remedy is warranted.
See id. at 741. In the circumstances of this case, I believe
that an order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from its unlawful
conduct and to post a notice would constitute a meaningful remedy and I would
so order. See, for example, 56th Combat Support Group (TAC),
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, 44 FLRA 1098, 1104 (1992).(6) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20424-0001 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER, ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA Respondent and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 446,
AFL-CIO Charging Party Case No. AT-CA-30876 Ms. Bonnie J. Eareckson For the Respondent Linda J. Norwood, Esquire For the General Counsel Mr. John B. Roten, Sr. For the Charging Party Before: WILLIAM B. DEVANEY Administrative Law Judge DECISION Statement of the Case The Complaint and Notice of Hearing in this case issued on April 18,
1994, and was served by certified mail on Respondent on April 18, 1994,
addressed to Mr. Philip Lenowitz, Labor Relations Specialist, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Medical Center, Asheville, North Carolina 28805-2087. The
Complaint alleged that in December, 1992, Respondent ". . . discontinued the
past practice of granting time off with pay for birthdays for employees in the
Medical Administration Service" without providing the Charging Party, the
exclusive representative, "notice and an opportunity to bargain on the impact
and implementation of the change in past practice." The Complaint stated,
inter alia, that: "If the Respondent does not file an answer, the
Authority will find that the Respondent has admitted each allegation. . . .";
and that, "An answer filed by mail must be mailed and postmarked by May 16,
1994. . . ." No answer was filed and on June 13, 1994, General Counsel filed
with the Regional Director a Motion for Summary Judgment. By Order dated June
13, 1994, the Regional Director for the Atlanta Region, pursuant to §
2423.22(b) of the Authority's Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 2423.22(b), referred
the Motion for Summary Judgment to the Chief Administrative Law Judge and by
Order dated June 22, 1994, the Chief Administrative Law Judge gave all parties
further notice of the referral of General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment
and notified all parties that, "Any pleadings or briefs . . . must be filed in
this office by July 7, 1994. The record will then be closed. . . ." The American Federation of Government Employees, Local 446, AFL-CIO,
the Charging Party (hereinafter "Union"), filed a response, entitled "Pre
Hearing Brief for Motion for Summary Judgment", dated June 27, 1994, and
received on July 6, 1994. Attached to the Union's response, as Exhibit (C), is
a letter the Union had sent to the Regional Director on June 22, 1994, in
which the Union urged that a status quo ante remedy should
be sought. On June 27, 1994, General Counsel, pursuant to § 2423.22(a) of
the Authority's Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 2423.22(a), filed an
Amendment to her Motion for Summary Judgement to request a status
quo ante and make whole order. By Order also dated June 27, 1994,
the Regional Director referred General Counsel's Amendment to Motion for
Summary Judgment to the Chief Administrative Judge, which was received on July
1, 1994. On July 5, 1994, Respondent changed the designation of its
representative in this matter from Mr. Philip Lenowitz to Ms. Bonnie J.
Eareckson and on the same date filed "Agency Brief" which was received on July
5, 1994, in response to the Order of June 22, 1994. Respondent's position
is that the practice in the Medical Administration Service of permitting four
hours of absence from duty for an employee's birthday, ". . . was illegal and
necessarily stopped." (Agency Brief, p.4) and concludes, "Accordingly, the
Agency requests that the Judge find the issuance of a cease and desist order
and a notice posting as sufficient remedy in the instant case." (id.,
p.5). No further response having been filed, the record was closed and the
matter duly assigned to the undersigned for decision. Findings of Fact 1. The Complaint was duly served on Respondent and no Answer to the
Complaint was ever filed. It is true that Respondent replied twice in
connection with the investigation of the charge, first, on May 20, 1993, and
second on August 23, 1993, (Agency Brief, Attachments Tabs 1 and 2); but
the presentation of evidence and views during the course of the investigation
of a charge, pursuant to § 2423.7 of the Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R.
§ 2423.7, is no substitute for an answer, required by § 2423.13
of the Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R. § 2423.13. In its Brief, Respondent
has stated no good cause why, in view of its failure to answer or otherwise
plead, the allegations of the Complaint should not be admitted. To the
contrary, Respondent admits the gravamen of the Complaint as follows: "The
Agency regrettably agrees that it did, indeed, fail to meet its obligation to
negotiate impact and implementation with the exclusive representative . . ."
(Agency Brief, p.4). Accordingly, the following are material admitted facts, as
set forth in the Complaint: a. The American Federation of Government Employees, Local 446,
AFL-CIO (the Union), is a labor organization under 5 U.S.C. §
7103(a)(4). b. The Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center, Asheville,
North Carolina (Respondent), is an agency under 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3).
c. The Regional Director for the Atlanta Region of the Federal Labor
Relations Authority issued the Complaint and Notice of Hearing in this case on
April 18, 1994. The return receipt was signed by an agent of the Respondent and
received by the Atlanta FLRA office on April 26, 1994. d. The Union is the exclusive representative of a unit of employees
appropriate for collective bargaining at the Respondent. e. During the time period covered by this complaint, the following
persons occupied the position opposite their names: James A. Christian Medical Center Director Jeff Moffitt Chief, Medical Administration Service Lynn Hardin Assistant Chief, Medical Administration Service f. During the time period covered by this complaint, the persons
named in paragraph e were supervisors or management officials under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7103(a)(1) and (11). g. During the time period covered by this complaint, the persons
named in paragraph e were acting on behalf of the Respondent. h. In December 1992, the Agency discontinued the past practice of
granting time off with pay for birthdays for employees in the Medical Adminis-
tration Service. i. The Respondent implemented the change described in paragraph h
without providing the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain on the
impact and implementation of the change in past practice. 2. In her Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
June 13, 1994, General Counsel had stated, in part, as follows: "In the instant case, management had a practice of allowing employees
to take time off from work on their birthdays. Counsel for the General Counsel
does not contend this practice was appropriate under government-wide
regulations. On the contrary, this practice does not seem to fit into any of
the allowable categories for administrative time. . . "As a remedy, the General Counsel requests a cease and desist order
and a notice posting signed by the Respondent's Center Director. . . ."
(Memorandum In Support, p.3, June 13, 1994). 3. In her Memorandum In Support of the Amended Motion for Summary
Judgment, dated June 27, 1994, General Counsel states, in part, as follows:
"In its original brief, the General Counsel requested that, as a
remedy, the deciding official issue a cease and desist order and a notice
posting, signed by the Respondent's Center Director and posted all official
bulletin boards at the Center. However, subsequent to filing this brief, the
Charging Party requested that Counsel for the General Counsel consider a
status quo ante and make whole remedy. After researching the issue
more, Counsel for the General Counsel believes the Charging Party's request has
merit and now requests that the Judge consider granting a status quo
ante and make whole order in this matter." (Memorandum In Support of
Amended Motion, p.1, June 27, 1994). 4. Respondent had stated in its letter of May 20, 1993, during the
investigation of the of the charge that the Chief of its Medical Administration
Service, Mr. Jeff Moffitt, had granted four hours administrative leave on
employees' birthdays; and that no other Service Chief at the Medical Center
had, ". . . granted such an 'award.'" (Agency Brief Attachment, Tab 2). Conclusions By its failure to answer the Complaint, Respondent admitted that it
discontinued the past practice of granting time off with pay for employees in
its Medical Administration Service and Respondent, both by its failure to
answer, by which it admitted the allegation of the complaint that it
implemented the discontinuance of that past practice without providing the
Union notice an opportunity to bargain on the impact and implementation of the
change in past practice, and by its admission in its response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, that agreed, ". . . that it did, indeed, fail to meet its
obligation to negotiate impact and implementation . . . " (Agency Brief, p.4),
made it clear that by uni- laterally implementing the change in past practice
it had violated §§ 16(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute as alleged.
Moreover, Respondent, ". . . requests . . . the issuance of a cease and desist
order and a notice posting . . . ." (Agency Brief, p.5). Accordingly, there
being no disputed facts, this case is appropriate for decision on General
Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. The only question to be resolved is the remedy, i.e., whether
there should be a status quo ante and make whole remedy or
merely a cease and desist order with posting, and the remedy available turns,
in the first instance, on whether the past practice in Medical Administration
Service of granting fours hours pay for an employee's birthday was illegal.
Respondent asserts the practice was illegal, inter alia, because,
(a) "Excused absence, by its historic use, is a nonroutine granting of a
limited amount of time during duty hours for such purposes as excusing
tardiness, voting and registration . . ." (Agency Brief, p.1); (b) that, ". . .
the granting of time off from duty for an employee's birthday fails to meet the
criteria prescribed in VA Directive MP-5, Part I, Chapter 630, section 21 . . .
entitled 'Excused Absences'. This directive prescribes that: (1) The activity
is considered to be of substantial benefit to the VA in accomplishing its
general mission or one of its specific functions, or (2) The activity will
clearly enhance an employee's ability to perform the duties of the position he
or she presently occupies or may be expected to prospectively occupy . . ."
(Agency Brief, p.2); or (c) that the granting ". . . four (4) hours of absence
from duty on the birthday itself or . . . on a day during the week of his/her
birthday . . . is very similar to the granting of holidays . . . [and] holidays
are so designated only by Federal statute or Executive Order. Accordingly, no
local authority at this facility is empowered to designate a holiday." (Agency
Brief, p.3). Respondent's arguments are interesting but they do not establish that
the practice of granting four hours administrative leave for an employee's
birthday was illegal. Aside from its general acceptance, does the granting of
authorized absence for voting and registration benefit the VA in accomplishing
its mission or enhance an employee's ability to perform his or her duties?
Perhaps, perhaps not. What "activity is considered to be of substantial benefit
to the VA in accomplishing its general mission", or what "activity will clearly
enhance an employee's ability to perform" his or her duties, is not set in
concrete and different people could well have different views. I do not know
what Respondent's practice has been, but I am aware that other Departments and
Agencies regularly grant excused absence from duty for a variety of activities
such as: Christmas parties; awards ceremonies; welcoming the arrival a new
Department or Agency official; etc., which are not examples specifically
enumerated in MP-5, Part I, Chapter 630. Necessarily, there is an area of
discretion left to determine what is considered to be of substantial benefit in
accomplishing VA's mission and the exercise of discretion, however much another
might disagree, does not make a decision to grant excused absences
unlawful. As noted above, General Counsel initially concluded that the practice
of allowing time off for an employee's birthday, ". . . does not seem to fit
into any of the allowable categories for administrative time. . . ."; but
following Charging Party's request that General Counsel consider a
status quo ante and make whole remedy, concluded that she
". . . believes the Charging Party's request has merit. . . ." and asserts
that, ". . . the Authority has found that management may use its discretion to
grant short periods of administrative leave. . . ." (General Counsel's
Memorandum In Support of Amendment of Motion for Summary Judgment, p.2).
National Treasury Employees Union, 41 FLRA 1106 (1991), rev'w
dismissed, 953 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1992), was a negotiability case
which, in part, involved the Union's proposal that employees participating in
the Employee Assistance Program for counseling and/or treatment be granted
administrative leave. The Agency asserted, inter alia, that the
proposal conflicted with a Government-wide regulation, ". . . Federal Personnel
Manual Supplement 990-2, chapter 630, subchapter 11-5, attachment 2, indicates
the usual absences for which administrative leave may be granted. While the
Agency admits that the listing is not exhaustive, the Agency argues that '"a
grant of administrative leave for an extended period of time is not appropriate
unless it is in furtherance of an agency function.'" (41 FLRA at 1123). The
Authority stated, "The Authority has consistently construed those portions of the
Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) concerning administrative leave (chapter 630,
subchap. 11-5, and FPM Supplement 990-2, chap. 630, subchap. S 11-5) as
providing that the head of an agency has discretion to grant administrative
leave to employees of the agency in certain situations for brief periods of
time. . . ." (id. at 1126). See, also National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2119,
42 FLRA 993, 996-998 (1991); National Federation of Federal Employees,
21 FLRA 1105, 1114, (1986). On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that
inasmuch as the VA regulation (MP-5, Part I, Chapter 630), which mirrors FPM
Manual, Chapter 630 subchapter 11-5 and FPM Supplement 990-2, Chapter 630
subchapter S 11-5, provides discretion to management to grant administrative
leave for brief periods of time, the practice of granting four hours
administrative leave for an employee's birthday was not illegal. Where management's right to change a condition of employment is not
questioned, as in the present case, in order to justify a return to the
status quo ante to remedy a failure to bargain over the
impact and implementation of the change, ". . . the Authority will, on a case-by-case basis, 'carefully
balanc[e] the nature and circumstances of the particular violation against the
degree of disruption in government operations that would be caused by such a
remedy.' Federal Correctional Institution, 8 FLRA 604, 606 (1982)
(FCI). Under the criteria set forth in FCI, the Authority
what degree, a status quo ante remedy would disrupt or
impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency's operations. Id.
at 606." Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C. 48 FLRA
No. 27, 48 FLRA 313, 329 (1993). Here, Respondent gave the Union no notice of the termination of the
practice and afforded no opportunity to bargain on the impact and
implementation of the change. Respondent's action was unilateral. The employees
of the Medical Administration Service lost no pay, but each suffered the loss
of four hours administrative leave, a significant benefit. Respondent has not
suggested, much less shown, that a status quo ante remedy
would either disrupt or impair the efficiency and effective- ness of its
operations. To the contrary, Respondent states only, ". . . The Agency feels
that this remedy is inappro- priate and requests the Judge also consider that
the Agency attempted to show fairness when it did not retroactively charge
leave to those employees when it discontinued the illegal practice at issue.
Further, the charging party has failed to show that the Agency truly harmed
either the employees or the labor organization." (Agency Brief, p.4). For
reasons set forth above, the practice was not illegal and, clearly, both the
employees, who suffered the loss of a benefit granted them, and the Union,
which was deprived of its statutory right to negotiate the impact and
implementation of the change of an established condition of employment, were
truly harmed. A status quo ante remedy is appropriate
and necessary to fully remedy Respondent's failure and refusal to give the
Union notice and an opportunity to negotiate the impact and implementation of
its discontinuance of an established practice in Medical Administration
Service. While a status quo ante remedy is appropriate in
this case, I do not believe it should be retroactive to December, 1992. The
Charge was filed on May 7, 1993, but the Complaint did not issue until April
18, 1994. Under the circumstances, it would be inequitable to require
Respondent to grant administrative leave lost by employees in the Medical
Administration Service both for 1993 and 1994, since, had the Complaint issued
in 1993 with the same failure to answer, etc., impact and implementation
bargaining, realistically, would not have extended beyond 1993. Accordingly,
Respondent will be ordered to grant 4 hours administrative leave to each
employee in its Medical Administrative Service for each employee's birthday
which occurred before the date of the Order herein in calendar year 1994, and
after the date of this Order until good faith bargaining on the impact and
implementation of the discontinuance of the practice has been completed. General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment, as amended, is granted
and it is recommended that the Authority adopt the following: ORDER Pursuant to § 2423.29 of the Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R.
hereby ordered that the Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center,
Asheville, North Carolina, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Failing and refusing to provide the American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 446, AFL-CIO (hereinafter, "Local 446"), the
exclusive representative of certain of its employees, with prior notice of
changes in the conditions of employment of employees in the bargaining unit
represented by Local 446. (b) Refusing to bargain with Local 446 concerning discontinuance of the
practice in its Medical Administration Service of granting administrative leave
for birthdays. (c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining or
Statute: (a) Upon request of Local 446, negotiate concerning the impact and
implementation of Respondent's termination of the practice in the Medical
Administration Service of granting administrative leave for birthdays. (b) Reinstate the practice in the Medical Administration Service of
granting four hours administrative leave for each employee's birthday and
maintain that practice until completion of good faith bargaining on the impact
and implementation of the discontinuance of that practice. (c) Grant four hours administrative leave to each employee in the
Medical Administration Service whose birthday has occurred before the date of
this Order during the calendar year 1994, and after the date of the Order,
grant each employee in the Medical Administration Service four hours
administrative leave whose birthday occurs after the date of the Order until
good faith bargaining on the impact and implementation of the discontinuance of
that practice has been completed. (d) Post at its facilities at the Medical Center, Asheville, North
Carolina, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be furnished by the Federal
the Director of the Medical Center, and shall be posted and maintained for 60
defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Regulations, 5 C.F.R. §
2423.30, notify the Regional Director, Atlanta Region, Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 122, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3102,
been taken to comply herewith. ___________________________WILLIAM B. DEVANEY Administrative
Law Judge Dated: September 30, 1994 Washington, DC NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to provide the American Federation of
exclusive representative of our employees, with prior notice of changes in the
conditions of employment of employees in the bargaining unit represented by
Local 446. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Local 446 concerning discontinuance
of the practice in our Medical Administration Service of granting
administrative leave for birthdays. WE WILL, upon request of Local 446, negotiate concerning the impact and
implementation of our termination of the practice in the Medical Administration
Service of granting administrative leave for birthdays. WE WILL reinstate the practice in the Medical Administration Service of
granting four hours administrative leave for each employee's birthday and WE
WILL MAINTAIN that practice until completion of good faith bargaining on the
impact and implementation of the discontinuance of that practice. WE WILL GRANT four hours administrative leave to each employee in the
this Order during the calendar year 1994, and after the date of this Order, WE
WILL GRANT each employee in the Medical Administration Service four hours
administrative leave whose birthday occurs after the date of this Order until
that practice has been completed. ______________________________ (Activity) Dated: _________ By: ______________________________ (Signature)
Director of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Atlanta Region, whose
address is: 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 122, Atlanta, Georgia
30309-3102, and whose telephone number is: (404) 347-2324. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) Authority's Footnotes Follows: 1. Member Armendariz' separate opinion
appears at the end of this decision. 2. Although the Union's brief was not
entitled as an exception, it was filed during the time period for filing timely
exceptions to the Judge's decision and will be considered as such. 3. FCI states, in relevant
part: [T]he appropriateness of a status quo ante
remedy must be determined on a case-by-case basis, carefully balancing the
nature and circumstances of the particular violation against the degree of
disruption in government operations that would be caused by such a remedy.
Accordingly, in determining whether a status quo ante
remedy would be appropriate in any specific case involving a violation of the
duty to bargain over impact and implementation, the Authority considers, among
other things[:] (1) whether, and when, notice was given to the union by
the agency concerning the action or change decided upon; (2) whether, and
when, the union requested bargaining on the procedures to be observed by the
agency in implementing such action or change and/or concerning appropriate
arrangements for employees adversely affected by such action or change;
(3) the willfulness of the agency's conduct in failing to discharge its
impact experienced by adversely affected employees; and (5) whether, and
to what degree, a status quo ante remedy would disrupt or
impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency's
operations. 8 FLRA at 606 (footnote omitted). 4. The General Counsel notes that the
delay in issuing the complaint was due to the vacancy in the General Counsel's
position, which prevented the issuance of any complaints. 5. The relevant provisions in the FPM
relating to administrative leave were abolished as of December 31, 1994.
The Judge's decision issued, and the parties' briefs to the Authority were
filed, before that date. 6. The Respondent did not specify
whether it was referring to the right to assign employees or assign work.
However, as all the Authority decisions cited by the Respondent concerned the
assignment of work under section 7106(a)(2)(B) of the Statute, we assume that
the Respondent's arguments involve that management right only. 7. The complaint covers employees in
the Respondent's Medical Administration Service only. The Union represents a
broader unit of the Respondent's employees. 8. Subchapter 11 is set forth in
the Appendix. As noted above, see note 5, that provision was
abolished effective December 31, 1994. It is unnecessary to decide whether
the abolishment of the FPM can be applied retroactively under the holding in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1501-05
(1994) because the result we reach in this case would be the same regardless of
whether the FPM was applied. See U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service and National Treasury Employees Union,
51 FLRA 310, 319-20 n.9 (1995). As we explain below, the Respondent had
discretion while the FPM was in effect to grant brief periods of excused
absence in connection with employee birthdays and no basis is argued or
apparent on which to conclude that such discretion was eliminated by
abolishment of the FPM. 9. In the cases cited the Comptroller
General determined that the use of administrative leave for the following
activities was not appropriate consistent with the FPM: 40 hours of leave
for a civilian employee to participate in a chess tournament as a
representative of the military installation to which the employee was assigned
(B-17062, Aug. 4, 1972); leave in the amount of 14-31 days for employees
to prepare for bar examinations (B-156287, Feb. 5, 1975); slightly more
than 3 weeks of leave for an employee to participate in Pan American games
as a member of a team representing the United States (B-185128, Dec. 3,
1975); 2 days of leave for an employee who was prevented from returning to
work following a vacation due to snow conditions at the vacation site
(B-193389, Nov. 29, 1978); and leave for excess travel time to a training
site occasioned by employees' use of privately owned vehicles rather than
common carrier, which was deemed more advantageous by the agency (56 Comp.
Gen. 865 (1977)). 10. The Authority also has stated that
proposals seeking administrative leave "must bear some relationship to the
situations described in subchapter 11," National Federation of Federal
Rock Island, Illinois, 49 FLRA 151, 158 (1994), or that administrative
leave was "restricted to the circumstances described in the FPM[,]"
International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots and U.S. Department
of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C., 47 FLRA 218, 223
(1993). Consistent with our decision in this case, and the line of Authority
precedent cited in the text above, we find that there was no basis in either
the FPM or Comptroller General decisions interpreting the FPM provisions to
limit the ability of agencies to determine the appropriate uses of
administrative leave. Authority decisions to the contrary will no longer be
followed. See also American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field Operations Locals and Social
Security Administration, 25 FLRA 622 (1987) (Proposal 3), petition
for review denied sub nom. AFGE, AFL-CIO, National Council of SSA Field
Operations Locals v. FLRA, 836 F.2d 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1988); American
Administration Medical Center, New York, New York, 22 FLRA
710 (1986) (Proposal 7), aff'd as to other matters sub nom.
AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 2094 v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11. No one disputes that the amount of
leave that would be granted--4 hours per employee birthday--is consistent
with the requirement in the FPM that excused absences be granted for brief
periods of time. Cf. American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 3804 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Madison
Region, 21 FLRA 870, 898 (1986) (provision that would have given
each employee 8 days of administrative leave found contrary to FPM
because, in part, the period of time for which the leave was sought did not
constitute "a brief period of absence from duty for appropriate reasons which
is within the Agency's discretion to grant."). 12. Because, in our view, the meaning
of the FPM is not ambiguous, we see no need to further delay resolution of the
issues raised in this case by requesting an advisory opinion from OPM regarding
its interpretation of the regulations pertaining to excused absences. First, as
explained above, the regulations clearly gave agencies the right to determine
the situations for which employees would be excused from duty. Second, the
regulations are no longer in effect. 13. As the complaint alleged a failure
to bargain over the impact and implementation of the discontinuation of the
leave policy, it was appropriate for the Judge to apply FCI. Generally,
when management changes a condition of employment without fulfilling its
obligation to bargain over the decision to make the change, a
status quo ante remedy is ordered, in the absence of
special circumstances. E.g., Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 41 FLRA 272, 279 (1991), enforced, 977 F.2d
1493 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 14. In view of our disposition of this
case, we need not discuss further the Respondent's assertion that the Judge's
status quo ante remedy violates management's right to
assign work. We also deny the Union's request that the remedy be extended to
the entire bargaining unit because: (1) only a limited number of
bargaining unit employees, rather than the entire unit, had been granted
administrative leave in connection with their birthdays; and (2) the
complaint alleged an unlawful termination of the policy in the Respondent's
Medical Administration Service, the only organizational component in which the
policy apparently existed. See FDIC, 48 FLRA at 328;
Department of the Air Force, 343RD Combat Support Group, Eielson Air Force
Base, Alaska, 39 FLRA 609, 616 (1991) (Member Talkin dissenting).
Member Armendariz' separate Opinion Footnotes Follow: 1. Although FPM chapter 630,
subchapter 11 was abolished on December 31, 1994, I believe that it
applies in this case, consistent with the principles set forth in U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Little Rock,
Arkansas, 51 FLRA 216, 224-25 (1995), citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1501-05
(1994). 2. The term "administrative leave" is
not officially recognized in statute or Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
regulation; however, it refers to an excused absence from duty without loss of
pay and without charge to leave. FPM chapter 630, subchapter 11-7(a). "Excused
absence" is an absence from duty, administratively authorized, without loss of
pay and without charge to leave. Id. at subchapter 11-7(b). 3. The numerous decisions of the
Comptroller General addressing administrative leave do not appear to be
entirely consistent with each other. In any event, I do not read those
decisions as providing agencies an open-ended authority to grant administrative
leave that includes the circumstances in this case. 4. If I thought that there was any
ambiguity in the FPM with regard to whether it authorized agencies to grant
employees time off for their birthdays, I would seek OPM's views on this issue,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7105(i), before making such a determination.
Even though the FPM is no longer in effect, OPM remains empowered under 5
U.S.C. § 6311 to regulate the leave system governing Federal
employment. At the very least, it would appear to be the appropriate course of
action to obtain OPM's view on this issue before determining, as my colleagues
do, that it is legal for an agency to have a practice of granting employees
administrative leave for their birthdays. 5. The decisions of the Authority
considering questions related to administrative leave have applied the FPM
provisions to approve grants of administrative leave which are consistent with
the limitations set forth therein and to disapprove grants that are not.
Contrary to my colleagues' discussion in note 10 of their decision, I do not
believe that those decisions are in error and I would continue to follow them.
In my view, they support the conclusion that the practice of granting
administrative leave for employees' birthdays is inconsistent with the FPM.
6. A cease and desist order and a
notice posting was the remedy initially sought by the General Counsel in its
motion for summary judgment. At that time, the General Counsel did not contend
that the Respondent's practice of granting administrative leave for employees'
birthdays was appropriate under Government-wide regulations and stated that,
"[o]n the contrary, this practice does not seem to fit into any of the
allowable categories for administrative time." General Counsel's memorandum in
support of its motion for summary judgment at 3. However, because "[e]ven
decisions to halt illegal practices require notice and the opportunity to
bargain the impact and implementation of the decision[,]" id., the
General Counsel sought a cease and desist order and a notice posting.
Subsequently, the Charging Party requested that the General Counsel consider a
status quo ante and make whole remedy. On consideration of
that request and after further research, the General Counsel filed an amendment
to its motion for summary judgment and took the position that the Respondent's
past practice was legal. For the reasons stated above, I believe that the
General Counsel's initial position was the correct one.