Source: http://openjurist.org/660/f2d/124/lewis-v-reagan
Timestamp: 2017-02-21 07:36:30
Document Index: 262256727

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 11', '§ 552', '§ 555', '§ 556', '§ 552', '§ 1491']

660 F2d 124 Lewis v. Reagan | OpenJurist
660 F. 2d 124 - Lewis v. Reagan HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 660 F.2d.
660 F2d 124 Lewis v. Reagan 660 F.2d 124
Barbara LEWIS and Colonel James Wimberley Lewis, Etc.,Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.Ronald REAGAN, President of the United States, et al.,Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-2271
Judicial relief is not normally available for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). "The rule has been most frequently applied in equity where relief by injunction was sought." Id. at 51 n. 9, 58 S.Ct. at 463 n. 9. The exhaustion requirement avoids premature interruption of the administrative process and allows the administrative agency to utilize its discretion, apply its expertise, correct its own errors, and handle its business expeditiously. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 616 F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980). As this court stated in Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1974), "(e)xhaustion is required in part because of the possibility that administrative review might obviate the need for judicial review. That the administrative process might not have this effect is not usually a reason for bypassing it."
Appellant has wholly failed to demonstrate that her administrative remedy is inadequate. Numerous decisions have upheld the constitutionality of status-review proceedings either identical or substantially similar to the proceedings challenged here. See, e. g., Hopper v. Carter, 572 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1978); Townsend v. Carter, 476 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D.Tex.1979); Darr v. Carter, 487 F.Supp. 526 (E.D.Ark.1980), aff'd., 640 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1981). See also the unpublished opinions cited in Darr v. Carter, 487 F.Supp. at 528. As the court of appeals noted in Darr, "(t)he status-review procedure evidences an awareness of the requirements of due process and a sensitivity to the particular needs of the parties likely to be involved." 640 F.2d at 166.
The FOIA gives district courts the power "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). It has been a matter of some debate whether Congress, by specifying the remedies available to an FOIA complainant, meant to preclude district courts from exercising their traditional equitable powers to enjoin agency proceedings. See Mezires, Stein & Gruff, 2 Administrative Law, § 11.02(3) (1981). In Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 20, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 1038, 39 L.Ed.2d 123, 137 (1974), the Supreme Court expressly declined to resolve this question. The Court noted, however, that "(w)ith the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by § 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court." Id. Accordingly, most courts addressing the question have held that district courts do have the power to enjoin agency proceedings pending resolution of FOIA claims. See, e. g., Columbia Packing Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495, 500 (1st Cir. 1977); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950, 94 S.Ct. 1474, 39 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); St. Elizabeth's Hospital v. NLRB, 407 F.Supp. 1357, 1358 (N.D.Ill.1976); Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F.Supp. 39, 41 (S.D.N.Y.1974); United Telephone Company of Pa. v. FCC, 375 F.Supp. 992, 995 (M.D.Pa.1974). We too now hold that a district court has jurisdiction to enjoin agency action for violation of an FOIA claim.
There remains the question whether the district court was obliged to exercise its injunctive powers in the instant case. It is well established that courts should interrupt the orderly flow of administrative proceedings only under extraordinary circumstances, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1370, and that such intervention requires a clear showing of irreparable injury, Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. at 25, 94 S.Ct. at 1040. No showing of irreparable injury or other extraordinary circumstance has been made here. Mrs. Lewis claims she cannot adequately represent herself and her missing husband without access to all the information she has requested under the FOIA.6 The court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB rejected a comparable claim, declaring:
Current Air Force procedures are set forth in AF Reg. 35-43. This regulation was promulgated in response to McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F.Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y.) (3-judge court), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 987, 95 S.Ct. 297, 42 L.Ed.2d 261 (1974), which held that the procedures then used under 37 U.S.C. §§ 555 and 556 violated the Due Process Clause
If the Secretary adopts the board's recommendation and evidence subsequently arises that the finding of death was erroneous, the Secretary may reconsider his determination and change or modify it. 37 U.S.C. § 556(d). Thus, should any source provide reliable information that Colonel Lewis survives, the Secretary may reinstate his missing status. Should Colonel Lewis return, he would be reinstated with all back pay and allowances. 37 U.S.C. § 552; see Crone v. United States, 538 F.2d 875, 882 (Ct.Cl.1976); Hopper v. Carter, 572 F.2d at 88; Darr v. Carter, 640 F.2d at 166 n.3. Finally, factual errors or legal defects in the review process are subject to judicial review in the Court of Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491. See Crone v. United States, supra