Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19781009-829578
Timestamp: 2017-07-24 04:51:14+00:00
Document Index: 210593519

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6", "l'article 6"]

Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8295/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-10-09;8295.78 Analyses : (Art. 13) DROIT A UN RECOURS EFFECTIF, (Art. 34) RECOURS, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLE, (Art. 6-1) SECURITE NATIONALE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA CORRESPONDANCE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA VIE FAMILIALE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DE LA VIE PRIVEE, (Art. 8-1) RESPECT DU DOMICILE, (Art. 8-2) DEFENSE DE L'ORDRE, (Art. 8-2) INGERENCE, (Art. 8-2) NECESSAIRE DANS UNE SOCIETE DEMOCRATIQUE, (Art. 8-2) PREVENTION DES INFRACTIONS PENALESParties : Demandeurs : X.Défendeurs : ROYAUME-UNITexte : APPLICATION/REQUÃTE NÂ°8295/78 X . v/the UNITED KINGDO M -X . c/ROYAUME-UN I DECISION of 9 October 1978 on the admissibility of the applicatio n DÃCISION du 9 octobre 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the Convention : The right to choose freely one's defence counsel is not an absolute one . The fact that a particufar .fawyer, is not allowed, given his personal interest in a case, to repmsent an accused person does not violate this provfsion . .. ,
Competence ratione personae of the Commission : Does the decision of an organ of the English Bar I Professiona/ Conduct Committee of the Bar Senate) entail the internationaf responsability of the United Kingdom ? (Question not pursued)
Article 6, paragraphe 3, fitt. (c) de la Convention : Le droit de choisir son dÃ©fenseur n'est pas absolu . L'interdiction faite Ã un avocat dÃ©terminÃ©, . vu son intÃ©rÃªt personnel Ã l'affaire, de reprÃ©senter un accusÃ© ne viole pas cette disposition . CompÃ©tence ratione personae de la Commission : La dÃ©cision d'un organe du Barreau anglais IProfessionaf Conduct Committee of the Bar Senate) engaget-elle la responsabilitÃ© internationale du Royaume-Uni ?(Question non rÃ©solue )
Summa ry of the relevant fact
I franÃ§ais : voir p. 244)
The applicant accompanied by his wife, was caught one night when painting a slogan on a wall protesting against the manner in which his son had been treated in a civil dispute.
Being prosecuted for causing criminaf damage, he wanted to be represented by his son, who ts a barrister. However the Professional Conduc t - 242 -
Committee of the Bar Senate opposed this for reasons of professiona/ ethics in view of the persona/ interest which the applicant's son had in the case. The applicant defended himse/f in person. He complains to the Commisstbn that he was not assisted by the counsel of his choice.
THE LAW (Extract ) 1 . The applicant alleges a breach of Article 6 13) Icl, entailing the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, by the decision of the Professional Conduct Committee of the Bar Senate, which held that it would be improper for Dr . Y . to defend the applicant, his father, in view of Dr . Y .' personal involvement in the subject-matter of the charge . Article 6 (3) (c) guarantees to everyone charged with a criminal otfence the right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require " The Commission does not consider that it is called upon to decide whether this decision of the Bar Senate Committee in the present case incurs the responsibility of the State . It suffices to note that the decision was against Dr . Y . who could neveriheless have lawfully represented the applicant before the criminal courts although he may have incurred disciplinary sanctions afterwards for failing to respect this professional ruling . The Commission notes however that the decision of the Committee does not appear to be unreasonable for the "personal involvement" in question was not the filial relationship as such, but the fact that the applicant was being tried on a charge intimately tied to Dr . Y .' own grievance . Insofar as the CommitteÃ© s decision had practical repercussions on the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the Commission has considered the question whether the domestic court incurred the responsibility of the State under Article 6(31 Icl in failing to take up the question of the applicant's representation by his son . There would appear to be no domestic remedy against this failure as the criminal courts would not interfere with the organisation of the legal profession and professional rulings of this nature . Their duty is only to ensure that the defence is adequately conducted . The Commission therefore leaves aside the fact that at the present stage the applicant has noi exhausted available domestic remedies by appealing against his conviction and sentence, as this specific matter could not constitute a valid ground of appeal .
The Commission refers to its previous jurisprudence that the right to legal representation of one's own choosing ensured by Article 6(3) (c) is not of an absolute nature . In dismissing application No . 5923/72 (X . v . Norway, 3 Decisions and Reports, p . 43) the Commission referred to certain generally applicable principles established in previous cases concerning representation at appeal proceedings . In examining questions under Article 6(3 ) (c) the Commission takes "account of the treatment of the defence as a whole rather than the position of the accused taken in isolation" with "particular regard to the principle of equality of arms as included in the concept of a fair hearing" . Thus Article 6(3 ) (c) "guarantees that proceedings against the accused will not take place without adequate representation for the defence, but does not give the accused the right to decide himself in what manner his defence should be assured" (Ibid . p . 44) . Considering the applicant's defence as a whole thÃ©refore, the Commission notes that he was given an ample opportunity to present his own case . The restriction imposed on the applicant's choice of representation was limited to excluding his son on reasonable grounds of professional etiquette . The applicant could have chosen any other barrister to represent him but apparently made no effort to do so . An examination of the trial transcript does not disclose any disadvantege to the defence or unfairness in this respect . The Commission finds therefore that the exclusion of the applicant's son from representing the applicant at his trial does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 ( 2) of the Convention .
. It fol ows that this part of the application is manifestly il -founde d . . .
Le requÃ©rant, accompagnÃ© de sa femme, fut surpris une nuit en train de peindre :sur un mur un slogan protestant contre la maniÃ¨re dont avait Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© un procÃ¨s civil auquel son fils Ã©tait partie . Poursuivi pÃ©nalement pour dommages B/apropriÃ©tÃ©, il voulut se fair e reprÃ©senter par son fils, qui est avocat . Toutefois l'Ordre des avocats s'y opposa pour des raisons d'Ã©thique professionnelle, Ã©tant donnÃ© l'intÃ©r2t personnel indirect du fils du requÃ©rant dans Paffaile de son choix.
Ã la Commission de n Ã¢voir pu Ãªtre assistÃ© par le dÃ©fenseur .lsepaint . .
_2qy_
EN DROIT (Extrait ) 1 . Le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue une violation de l'article 6 par . 3 (c), entratnant la responsabilitÃ© du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, par suite de la dÃ©cision du Professional Conduct Committee of the Bar Senate (ComitÃ© de conduite professionnelle du Conseil de l'ordre des avocats) qui avait jugÃ© dÃ©placÃ© que le D' Y . dÃ©fende le requÃ©rant, son pÃ©re, en raison de l'implication personnelle du D l Y . dans les circonstances qui Ã©taient Ã la base de l'accusation . L'article 6, par . 3 (c) garantit Ã tout accusÃ© le droit de Â« se dÃ©fendre luimÃªme ou avoir l'assistance d'un dÃ©fenseur de son choix et, s'il n'a pas les moyens de rÃ©munÃ©rer un dÃ©fenseur de pouvoir Ãªtre assistÃ© gratuitement par un avocat d'office, lorsque les intÃ©rÃ©ts de la justice l'exigent Â» . La Commission ne s'estime pas appelÃ©e Ã se prononcer sur la question de savoir si cette dÃ©cision du comitÃ© de l'Ordre engage la responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat dans le cas prÃ©sent . Il suffit de noter que la dÃ©cision visait le D , Y ., lequel aurait nÃ©anmoins pu reprÃ©senter lÃ©galement le requÃ©rant devant les tribunaux pÃ©naux, sauf Ã encourir des sanctions disciplinaires par la suite pour n'avoir pas respectÃ© cette rÃ©gle professionnelle . La Commission note cependant que la dÃ©cision du comitÃ© n'apparait pas dÃ©raisonnable car Â« l'implication personnelle Â» dont il s'agit n'Ã©tait pas la relation de filiation, mais le fait que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait jugÃ© sur un chef d'accusation Ã©troitement liÃ© Ã des griefs personnels du Dr Y . Dans la mesure oÃ¹ la dÃ©cision du comitÃ© a eu des rÃ©percussions pratiques sur la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale contre le requÃ©rant, la Commission a examinÃ© la question de savoir si le tribunal a engagÃ© la responsabilitÃ© de l'Etat au titre de l'article 6, par . 3 (c) en ne se saissisant pas de la question de la reprÃ©sentation du requÃ©rant par son fils . Il apparait qu'il n'existait aucun recours interne contre pareille omission Ã©tant donnÃ© que les tribunaux pÃ©naux ne s'immiscent pas dans l'organisation de la profession d'avocat et les rÃ©gles professionnelles de cette nature . Leur devoir est seulement de s'assurer que la dÃ©fense est correctement assurÃ©e . La Commission peut donc nÃ©gliger le fait qu'9 l'heure actuelle le requÃ©rant n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes dont il disposait, en interjetant appel contre sa condamnation, Ã©tant donnÃ© que le grief en question ne pouvait guÃ©re constituer un motif d'appel . La Commission renvoie Ã sa prÃ©cÃ©dente jurisprudence, selon laquelle le droit Ã Ãªtre assistÃ© par un dÃ©fenseur de son choix, garanti par l'article 6, par . 3 (c) n'a pas un caractÃ©re absolu . En rejetant la requÃªte NÂ° 5923/72 (X . c . NorvÃ¨ge, DÃ©cisions et Rapports NÂ° 3, p . 441 la Commission s'est rÃ©fÃ©rÃ©e Ã certains principes d'application gÃ©nÃ©rale Ã©tablis Ã l'occasion d e
requÃªtes prÃ©cÃ©dentes concernant la reprÃ©sentation dans des procÃ©dures de recours . En examinant les questions qui surgissent sur le terrain de l'article 6, par . 3 Icl, la Commission tient Â« compte de l'ensemble de la situation faite Ã la dÃ©fense plutÃ´t qÃ»e de la position du seul accusÃ© n et se rÃ©fÃ©re Â« tout particuliÃ©rement au principe de l'Ã©galitÃ© des armes contenu dans la,notion de procÃ©s Ã©quitable Â» . Ainsi, l'article 6, par . 3(c) Â« interdit qu'une procÃ©dure pÃ©nale se dÃ©roule sans une reprÃ©sentation appropriÃ©e de la dÃ©fense"mais ne garantit pas pour autant Ã -l'accusÃ© le droit de dÃ©cider lui-mÃ¨me de quelle maniÃ©re sa dAfense sera assuiÃ©e x (Ibid . p . 45) . .. . . . .Envisageant en consÃ©quence la dÃ©fense du requÃ©rant dans son ensemble, la Commission constate que celui-ci a eu amplement l'occasion de faire valoir ses moyens la rÃ©striction apportÃ©e au choix de son dÃ©fenseur s'est limitÃ©e Ã exclure son fils pour des motifs raisonnables d'Ã©thique professionnelle . Le requÃ©rant aurait pu choisir tout autre avocat pour le reprÃ©senter mais n'a apparemment faitaucune tentative dans ce sens . Un examen du compte-rendu du procÃ©s ne rÃ©vÃ©lÃ© aucun dÃ©savantage pour la dÃ©fense ou injustice Ã cet Ã©gard . La Commission estime donc que l'exclusion du fils du requÃ©rant comme reprÃ©sentant du requÃ©rant Ã son procÃ©s ne rÃ©vÃ©le aucune apparence de violation de l'anicle 6, par . 3 (c) de la Convention . .
Il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃ¨te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e . 2 de la Convention . ,ausendl'rtic27,pa
-246-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 09/10/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page