Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/487/131/case.php
Timestamp: 2020-01-27 03:00:06
Document Index: 645745126

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 893', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1997', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 893', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1988', '§ 1983']

(a) Unlike the lack of statutes of limitations in the federal civil rights laws -- which has led to borrowing state law limitations periods for personal injury claims -- the absence of any federal notice of claim provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such a state law provision into the federal civil rights scheme. Notice of claim rules are neither universally familiar nor in any sense indispensable prerequisites to litigation, and there is thus no reason to suppose that Congress intended federal courts to apply such rules, which significantly inhibit the ability to chanrobles.com-red
(e) Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, which held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court, is not inapplicable to this state court suit on the theory, asserted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that chanrobles.com-red
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 487 U. S. 153. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,joined, post, p. 487 U. S. 156. chanrobles.com-red
On July 4, 1981, Milwaukee police officers stopped petitioner Bobby Felder for questioning while searching his neighborhood for an armed suspect. The interrogation proved to be hostile, and apparently loud, attracting the attention of petitioner's family and neighbors, who succeeded in convincing the police that petitioner was not the man they sought. According to police reports, the officers then directed petitioner to return home, but he continued to argue, chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 135
and allegedly pushed one of them, thereby precipitating his arrest for disorderly conduct. Petitioner alleges that, in the course of this arrest, the officers beat him about the head and face with batons, dragged him across the ground, and threw him, partially unconscious, into the back of a paddy wagon, face first, all in full view of his family and neighbors. Shortly afterwards, in response to complaints from these neighbors, a local city alderman and members of the Milwaukee Police Department arrived on the scene and began interviewing witnesses to the arrest. Three days later, the local alderman wrote directly to the chief of police, requesting a full investigation into the incident. Petitioner, who is black, alleges that various members of the Police Department responded to this request by conspiring to cover up the misconduct of the arresting officers, all of whom are white. The Department took no disciplinary action against any of the officers, and the city attorney subsequently dropped the disorderly conduct charge against petitioner.
Nine months after the incident, petitioner filed this action in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court against the city of Milwaukee and certain of its police officers, alleging that the beating and arrest were unprovoked and racially motivated, and violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sought redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [Footnote 1] as well as attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The officers moved to dismiss chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 136
the suit based on petitioner's failure to comply with the State's notice of claim statute. That statute provides that no action may be brought or maintained against any state governmental subdivision, agency, or officer unless the claimant either provides written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury, or demonstrates that the relevant subdivision, agency, or officer had actual notice of the claim and was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice. Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1)(a) (1983 and Supp.1987). [Footnote 2] The statute further provides that the party seeking redress must also chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 137
The trial court granted the officers' motion as to all state law causes of action, but denied the motion as to petitioner's remaining federal claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of its earlier decisions holding the notice of claim statute inapplicable to federal civil rights actions brought in state court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed. 139 Wis.2d 614, 408 N.W.2d 19 (1987). Passing on the question for the first time, the court reasoned that, while Congress may establish the procedural framework under which claims are heard in federal courts, States retain the authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules and procedures that govern actions in their own tribunals. Accordingly, a party who chooses to vindicate a congressionally created right in state court must abide by the State's procedures. Requiring compliance with the notice of claim statute, the court determined, does not frustrate the remedial and deterrent purposes of the federal civil rights laws, because the statute neither limits the amount a plaintiff may recover for violation of his or her civil rights nor precludes the possibility of such recovery altogether. Rather, the court reasoned, the notice requirement advances the State's legitimate interests in protecting against stale or fraudulent claims, facilitating prompt settlement of valid claims, and identifying and correcting inappropriate conduct by governmental employees and officials. Turning to the question of compliance in this case, the court concluded that the complaints lodged with the local police by petitioner's neighbors, and the letter submitted to the police chief by the local alderman, failed to satisfy the statute's actual notice standard because these communications neither recited the facts giving chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 138
No one disputes the general and unassailable proposition relied upon by the Wisconsin Supreme Court below that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts. By the same token, however, where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, the "federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice." Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294, 338 U. S. 296 (1949). The question before us today, therefore, is essentially one of preemption: is the application of the State's notice of claim provision to § 1983 actions brought in state courts consistent with the goals of the federal civil rights laws, or does the enforcement of such a requirement instead "stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'"? Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 402 U. S. 649 (1971) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 312 U. S. 67 (1941)). Under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, "[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law," for "any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield." Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 369 U. S. 666 (1962). Because the notice of claim statute at issue here conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 1983, and because its enforcement in such actions will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in § 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, we conclude that the state law is preempted when the § 1983 action is brought in a state court. chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 139
Any assessment of the applicability of a state law to federal civil rights litigation, therefore, must be made in light of the purpose and nature of the federal right. This is so whether the question of state law applicability arises in § 1983 litigation brought in state courts, which possess concurrent jurisdiction over such actions, see Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 457 U. S. 506-507 (1982), or in federal court litigation, where, because the federal civil rights laws fail to provide certain rules of decision thought essential to the orderly adjudication of rights, courts are occasionally called upon to borrow state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Accordingly, we have held that a state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise subject to suit under § 1983 is preempted, even where the federal civil rights litigation takes place in state court, because the application of the state immunity law would thwart the congressional remedy, see Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 444 U. S. 284 (1980), which of course already provides certain immunities for state officials. See e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976). Similarly, in actions brought in federal courts, we have disapproved the adoption of state statutes of limitation chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 140
that provide only a truncated period of time within which to file suit, because such statutes inadequately accommodate the complexities of federal civil rights litigation, and are thus inconsistent with Congress' compensatory aims. Burnett, supra, at 468 U. S. 50-55. And we have directed the lower federal courts in § 1983 cases to borrow the state law limitations period for personal injury claims because it is
Although we have never passed on the question, the lower federal courts have all, with but one exception, concluded that notice of claim provisions are inapplicable to § 1983 actions brought in federal court. See Brown v. United States, 239 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 356, n. 6, 742 F.2d 1498, 1509, n. 6 (1984) (en banc) (collecting cases); but see Cardo v. Lakeland Central School Dist., 592 F.Supp. 765, 772-773 (SDNY 1984). These courts have reasoned that, unlike the lack of statutes of limitations in the federal civil rights laws, the absence of any notice of claim provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the federal civil rights scheme. Because statutes of limitation are among the universally familiar aspects of litigation considered indispensable to any scheme of justice, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to create a right enforceable in perpetuity. Notice of claim provisions, by contrast, are neither universally familiar nor in any sense indispensable prerequisites to litigation, and there is thus no reason to suppose that Congress intended federal courts to apply such rules, which "significantly inhibit the ability to bring federal actions." 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 354, 742 F.2d 1507.
While we fully agree with this near-unanimous consensus of the federal courts, that judgment is not dispositive here, where the question is not one of adoption, but of preemption. chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 141
Nevertheless, this determination that notice of claim statutes are inapplicable to federal court § 1983 litigation informs our analysis in two crucial respects. First, it demonstrates that the application of the notice requirement burdens the exercise of the federal right by forcing civil rights victims who seek redress in state courts to comply with a requirement that is entirely absent from civil rights litigation in federal courts. This burden, as we explain below, is inconsistent in both design and effect with the compensatory aims of the federal civil rights laws. Second, it reveals that the enforcement of such statutes in § 1983 actions brought in state court will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court. States may not apply such an outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal rights in their courts.
As we noted above, the central purpose of the Reconstruction-Era laws is to provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal rights by state actors. Section 1983 accomplishes this goal by creating a form of liability that, by its very nature, runs only against a specific class of defendants: government bodies and their officials. Wisconsin's notice of claim statute undermines this "uniquely federal remedy," Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 239, in several interrelated ways. First, it conditions the right of recovery that Congress has authorized, and does so for a reason manifestly inconsistent with the purposes of the federal statute: to minimize governmental liability. Nor is this condition a neutral and uniformly applicable rule of procedure; rather, it is a substantive burden imposed only upon those who seek redress for injuries resulting from the use or misuse of governmental authority. Second, the notice provision discriminates against the federal right. While the State affords the victim of an intentional tort two years to recognize the compensable chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 142
nature of his or her injury, the civil rights victim is given only four months to appreciate that he or she has been deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Finally, the notice provision operates, in part, as an exhaustion requirement, in that it forces claimants to seek satisfaction in the first instance from the governmental defendant. We think it plain that Congress never intended that those injured by governmental wrongdoers could be required, as a condition of recovery, to submit their claims to the government responsible for their injuries.
Wisconsin's notice of claim statute is part of a broader legislative scheme governing the rights of citizens to sue the State's subdivisions. The statute, both in its earliest and current forms, provides a circumscribed waiver of local governmental immunity that limits the amount recoverable in suits against local governments and imposes the notice requirements at issue here. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the statutory limits on recovery are preempted in federal civil rights actions, Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis.2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983), and thus recognizes that partial immunities inconsistent with § 1983 must yield to the federal right, it concluded in the present case that the notice and exhaustion conditions attached to the waiver of such immunities may nevertheless be enforced in federal actions. The purposes of these conditions, however, mirror those of the judicial immunity the statute replaced. Such statutes "are enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants," Civil Actions, at 564, and enable those defendants to "investigate early, prepare a stronger case, and perhaps reach an early settlement." Brown v. United States, supra, at 353, 742 F.2d 1506. Moreover, where the defendant is unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement, the Wisconsin statute forces claimants to bring suit within a relatively short period after the local governing chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 143
body disallows the claim, in order to "assure prompt initiation of litigation." Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis.2d 1, 22, 308 N.W.2d 403, 413 (1981). To be sure, the notice requirement serves the additional purpose of notifying the proper public officials of dangerous physical conditions or inappropriate and unlawful governmental conduct, which allows for prompt corrective measures. See Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Wis.2d 574, 580, 334 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1983); Binder v. Madison, 72 Wis.2d 613, 623, 241 N.W.2d 613, 618 (1976). This interest, however, is clearly not the predominant objective of the statute. Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that the requisite notice must spell out both the amount of damages the claimant seeks and his or her intent to hold the governing body responsible for those damages precisely because these requirements further the State's interest in minimizing liability and the expenses associated with it. See Gutter, supra, at 10-11, 308 N.W.2d at 407 (statute's purpose cannot be served unless the claim demands a specific sum of money); Pattermann v. Whitewater, 32 Wis.2d 350, 355-359, 145 N.W.2d 705, 708-709 (1966) (distinguishing notice-of-injury from notice of claim requirement).
In sum, as respondents explain, the State has chosen to expose its subdivisions to large liability and defense costs, and, in light of that choice, has made the concomitant decision to impose conditions that "assis[t] municipalities in controlling those costs." Brief for Respondents 12. The decision to subject state subdivisions to liability for violations of federal rights, however, was a choice that Congress, not the Wisconsin Legislature, made, and it is a decision that the State has no authority to override. Thus, however understandable or laudable the State's interest in controlling liability expenses might otherwise be, it is patently incompatible with the compensatory goals of the federal legislation, as are the means the State has chosen to effectuate it. chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 144
This burdening of a federal right, moreover, is not the natural or permissible consequence of an otherwise neutral, uniformly applicable state rule. Although it is true that the notice of claim statute does not discriminate between state and federal causes of action against local governments, the fact remains that the law's protection extends only to governmental defendants, and thus conditions the right to bring suit against the very persons and entities Congress intended to chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 145
subject to liability. We therefore cannot accept the suggestion that this requirement is simply part of
While respondents and amici suggest that prompt investigation of claims inures to the benefit of claimants and local governments alike by providing both with an accurate factual picture of the incident, such statutes "are enacted primarily for the benefit of governmental defendants," and are intended to afford such defendants an opportunity to prepare a stronger case. Civil Actions, at 564 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. United States, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 354, 742 F.2d 1506. Sound notions of public administration may support the prompt notice requirement, but those policies necessarily clash with the remedial purposes of the federal civil rights laws. In Wilson, we held that, for purposes chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 146
of choosing a limitations period for § 1983 actions, federal courts must apply the state statute of limitations governing personal injury claims, because it is highly unlikely that States would ever fix the limitations period applicable to such claims in a manner that would discriminate against the federal right. Here, the notice of claim provision most emphatically does discriminate in a manner detrimental to the federal right: only those persons who wish to sue governmental defendants are required to provide notice within such an abbreviated time period. Many civil rights victims, however, will fail to appreciate the compensable nature of their injuries within the 4-month window provided by the notice of claim provision, [Footnote 3] and will thus be barred from asserting their federal right to recovery in state court unless they can show that the defendant had actual notice of the injury, the circumstances giving rise to it, and the claimant's intent to hold the defendant responsible -- a showing which, as the facts of this case vividly demonstrate, is not easily made in Wisconsin.
Finally, the notice provision imposes an exhaustion requirement on persons who choose to assert their federal right in state courts, inasmuch as the § 1983 plaintiff must provide the requisite notice of injury within 120 days of the civil rights violation, then wait an additional 120 days while the chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 147
governmental defendant investigates the claim and attempts to settle it. In Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 (1982), we held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, deemed that decision inapplicable to this state court suit on the theory that States retain the authority to prescribe the rules and procedures governing suits in their courts. 139 Wis.2d at 623, 408 N.W.2d at 23. As we have just explained, however, that authority does not extend so far as to permit States to place conditions on the vindication of a federal right. Moreover, as we noted in Patsy, Congress enacted § 1983 in response to the widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or punish wrongdoers. Patsy, supra, at 457 U. S. 503-505; see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 276-277, 471 U. S. 279. Although it is true that the principal remedy Congress chose to provide injured persons was immediate access to federal courts, Patsy, supra, at 457 U. S. 503-504, it did not leave the protection of such rights exclusively in the hands of the federal judiciary, and instead conferred concurrent jurisdiction on state courts as well. 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 506-507. Given the evil at which the federal civil rights legislation was aimed, there is simply no reason to suppose that Congress meant "to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary," id. at 457 U. S. 504, yet contemplated that those who sought to vindicate their federal rights in state courts could be required to seek redress in the first instance from the very state officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated their injuries. [Footnote 4] chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 148
Second, our decision in Patsy rested not only on the legislative history of § 1983 itself, but also on the facts that, in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 353, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, Congress established an exhaustion requirement for a specific class of § 1983 actions -- those brought by adult prisoners challenging the conditions of chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 149
their confinement -- and that, in so doing, Congress expressly recognized that it was working a change in the law. Accordingly, we refused to engraft an exhaustion requirement onto another type of § 1983 action where Congress had not provided for one, not only because the judicial imposition of such a requirement would be inconsistent with Congress' recognition that § 1983 plaintiffs normally need not exhaust administrative remedies, 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 508-512, but also because decisions concerning both the desirability and the scope and design of any exhaustion requirement turn on a host of policy considerations which "do not invariably point in one direction," and which, for that very reason, are best left to "Congress' superior institutional competence." Id. at 457 U. S. 513. "[P]olicy considerations alone," we concluded, "cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent." Ibid. While the exhaustion required by Wisconsin's notice of claim statute does not involve lengthy or expensive administrative proceedings, it forces injured persons to seek satisfaction from those alleged to have caused the injury in the first place. Such a dispute resolution system may have much to commend it, but that is a judgment the current Congress must make, for we think it plain that the Congress which enacted § 1983 over 100 years ago would have rejected as utterly inconsistent with the remedial purposes of its broad statute the notion that a State could require civil rights victims to seek compensation from offending state officials before they could assert a federal action in state court.
Finally, to the extent the exhaustion requirement is designed to sift out "specious claims" from the stream of complaints that can inundate local governments in the absence of immunity, see Nielsen, 112 Wis.2d at 580, 334 N.W.2d at 245, we have rejected such a policy as inconsistent with the aims of the federal legislation. In Burnett, state officials urged the adoption of a 6-month limitations period in a § 1983 action in order that they might enjoy "some reasonable protection chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 150
from the seemingly endless stream of unfounded, and often stale, lawsuits brought against them." 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 54 (internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted). Such a contention, we noted,
However equitable this bitter-with-the-sweet argument may appear in the abstract, it has no place under our Supremacy Clause analysis. Federal law takes state courts as it finds them only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not "impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws." Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 298-299; see also Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 486 U. S. 336 (1988) (state rule designed to encourage settlement cannot limit recovery chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 151
in federally created action). States may make the litigation of federal rights as congenial as they see fit -- not as a quid pro quo for compliance with other, uncongenial rules, but because such congeniality does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress' goals. As we have seen, enforcement of the notice of claim statute in § 1983 actions brought in state court so interferes with and frustrates the substantive right Congress created that, under the Supremacy Clause, it must yield to the federal interest. This interference, however, is not the only consequence of the statute that renders its application in § 1983 cases invalid. In a State that demands compliance with such a statute before a § 1983 action may be brought or maintained in its courts, the outcome of federal civil rights litigation will frequently and predictably depend on whether it is brought in state or federal court. Thus, the very notions of federalism upon which respondents rely dictate that the State's outcome-determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right in state court.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 326 U. S. 109 (1945). Accordingly, federal courts entertaining state law claims against Wisconsin municipalities are obligated to apply the notice of claim provision. See Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909, 911 (CA7 1985). Just as federal courts are constitutionally obligated to apply state law to state claims, see Erie, supra, at 304 U. S. 78-79, so too the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a constitutional duty "to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law [are] protected." Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 317 U. S. 245 (1942). chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 152
Finally, in Wilson, we characterized § 1983 suits as claims for personal injuries because such an approach ensured that chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 153
the same limitations period would govern all § 1983 actions brought in any given State, and thus comported with Congress' desire that the federal civil rights laws be given a uniform application within each State. 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 274-275. A law that predictably alters the outcome of § 1983 claims depending solely on whether they are brought in state or federal court within the same State is obviously inconsistent with this federal interest in intrastate uniformity.
"[i]f [a federal Act] be available in a state court to found a right, and the record shows a lapse of
Page 487 U. S. 154
time after which the [A]ct says that no action shall be maintained, the action must fail in the courts of a State as in those of the United States."
It has since been assumed that Wilson v. Garcia governs the timeliness of § 1983 suits brought in state, as well as federal, court. See, e.g., Russell v. Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 374-375, and n. 8 (Alaska 1987); Ziccardi v. Pennsylvania Dept. of General Services, 109 Pa.Commw. 628, 634-635, chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 155
527 A.2d 183, 185-186 (1987); Walker v. Maruffi, 105 N.M. 763, 766-769, 737 P.2d 544, 547-550 (App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 707, 736 P.2d 985 (1987) (table); Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P.2d 1337, 1338-1339 (Utah 1987); 423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 486-487; 503 N.E.2d 63, 69-70 (1986), appeal dism'd, 481 U.S. 1008 (1987); Fuchilla v. Layman, 210 N.J.Super. 574, 582-583, 510 A.2d 281, 286 (1986), aff'd, 109 N.J. 319, 537 A.2d 652 (1988); Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 311, 715 P.2d 978, 981, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 907 (1986); Frisby v. Board of Education of Boyle County, 707 S.W.2d 359, 361, (Ky.App.1986); Vanaman v. Palmer, 506 A.2d 190 (Del.Super.1986); Hanson v. Madison Service Corp., 125 Wis.2d 138, 141, 370 N.W.2d 586, 588 (App.1985).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court likewise assumed that Wilson v. Garcia governed which statute of limitations should apply to petitioner's § 1983 claim. [Footnote 2/2] The court then effectively truncated the applicable limitations period, however, by dismissing petitioner's § 1983 suit for failure to file a notice of claim within 120 days of the events at issue, as required by Wis.Stat. § 893.80 (1983 and Supp.1987). [Footnote 2/3] Hence, petitioner was allowed only about four months in which to investigate whether the facts and the law would support any claim chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 156
against respondents (or retain a lawyer who would do so), and to notify respondents of his claim, rather than the two or three years that he would have been allowed under Wisconsin law had he sought to assert a similar personal injury claim against a private party. It is also unlikely that any other State would apply a 120-day limitations period -- or, indeed, a limitations period of less than one year -- to such a personal injury claim. [Footnote 2/4] This reflects a generally accepted belief among state policymakers that individuals who have suffered injuries to their personal rights cannot fairly be expected to seek redress within so short a period of time.
436 U. S. 593 (1978). Disregarding this self-evident principle, the Court today holds that Wisconsin's notice of claim statute is preempted by federal law as to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in state court. This holding is not supported by the statute whose preemptive force it purports to invoke, or by our precedents. Relying only on its own intuitions about "the goals of the federal civil rights laws," ante at 487 U. S. 138, the Court fashions a new theory of preemption that unnecessarily and improperly suspends a perfectly valid state statute. This Court has said that "unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws." Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.,@ 485 U. S. 495, 485 U. S. 501 (1988). Today's exercise departs not only from that unquestionable proposition, but even from the much more obvious principle that unexpressed approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.
Wisconsin's notice of claim statute, which imposes a limited exhaustion of remedies requirement on those with claims against municipal governments and their officials, serves at least two important purposes apart from providing municipal defendants with a special affirmative defense in litigation. First, the statute helps ensure that public officials will receive prompt notice of wrongful conditions or practices, and thus enables them to take prompt corrective action. Second, it enables officials to investigate claims in a timely fashion, thereby making it easier to ascertain the facts accurately and to settle meritorious claims without litigation. These important aspects of the Wisconsin statute bring benefits to governments and claimants alike, and it should come as no surprise that 37 other States have apparently adopted similar notice of claim requirements. App. to Brief for International City Management Association et al. as Amici Curiae 1a-2a. Without some compellingly clear indication that Congress has forbidden the States to apply such statutes in their own courts, there is no reason to conclude that they are "preempted" by federal law. Allusions to such vague concepts chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 158
as "the compensatory aims of the federal civil rights laws," ante at 487 U. S. 141, which are all that the Court actually relies on, do not provide an adequate substitute for the statutory analysis that we customarily require of ourselves before we reach out to find statutory preemption of legitimate procedures used by the States in their own courts.
State courts may now entertain § 1983 actions if a plaintiff chooses a state court over the federal forum that is always available as a matter of right. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 444 U. S. 283, and n. 7 (1980). Abandoning the rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction over § 1983 actions, and thus restoring the tradition of concurrent jurisdiction, however, "did not leave behind a preemptive grin without a statutory cat." Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., supra, at 485 U. S. 504. Congress has never given the slightest indication that § 1983 was meant to replace state procedural rules with those that apply in the federal courts. The majority does not, because it cannot, cite any evidence to the contrary. chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 159
For similar reasons, Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294 (1949), which is repeatedly quoted by the majority, does not control the present case. In Brown, which chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 160
arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), this Court refused to accept a state court's interpretation of allegations in a complaint asserting a federal statutory right. Concluding that the state court's interpretation of the complaint operated to "detract from substantive rights' granted by Congress in FELA cases," the Court
Ante at 487 U. S. 144-145. This theory, however, is untenable. First, the statute erects no barrier at all to a plaintiff's right to bring a § 1983 suit against anyone. Every plaintiff has the option of proceeding in federal court, and the Wisconsin statute has not the slightest effect on that right. Second, if a plaintiff chooses to proceed in the Wisconsin state courts, those courts stand ready to hear the entire federal chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 161
cause of action, as the majority concedes. See ante at 487 U. S. 145. Thus, the Wisconsin statute "discriminates" only against a right that Congress has never created: the right of a plaintiff to have the benefit of selected federal court procedures after the plaintiff has rejected the federal forum and chosen a state forum instead. The majority's "discrimination" theory is just another version of its unsupported conclusion that Congress intended to force the state courts to adopt procedural rules from the federal courts.
"Borrowing" cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which the Court cites several times, have little more to do with today's decision than does Erie. Under that statute and those cases, we are sometimes called upon to fill in gaps in federal law by choosing a state procedural rule for application in § 1983 actions brought in federal court. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U. S. 42 (1984). The congressionally imposed necessity of supplementing chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 162
federal law with state procedural rules might well caution us against supplanting state procedural rules with federal gaps, but it certainly offers no support for what the Court does today.
139 Wis.2d 614, 630, 408 N.W.2d 19, 26 (1987) (citations omitted). It has not been suggested that petitioner tried to comply with this requirement but encountered difficulties in doing so. Indeed, it would have been easier to file the required notice of claim than to file this lawsuit, which petitioner proved himself quite capable of doing. Far from encountering "difficulties" in complying with the notice of claim statute, petitioner never tried. chanrobles.com-red
Page 487 U. S. 163