Source: http://absurdiav.blogspot.com/2012/06/failure-to-designate-75-disciplinary.html
Timestamp: 2017-12-16 12:52:05
Document Index: 454035978

Matched Legal Cases: ['§75', '§75', '§75', '§75', '§75', '§75']

Failure to designate the §75 disciplinary action hearing officer in writing is a fatal procedural defect | Employment Law
Arthur v Soares, 2012 NY Slip Op 04255, Appellate Division, 3rd Dept.
The Albany County District Attorney, P. David Soares, filed disciplinary charges pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law against one of his subordinates, D. Richard Arthur, then serving as the office’s Director of Administration.
The Hearing Officer found Arthur guilty of the charges and recommended that he be terminated from his position. Soares adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation and dismissed Arthur from his position. Arthur file a petition pursuant to Article 78 seeking a court order vacating Soares' action.
The Appellate Division annulled Soares' decision, finding “the record evinces that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction.” and directed that Arthur be reinstated to his former position with back pay and benefits.*
The court noted that Civil Service Law §75(2), provides that a hearing on employee disciplinary charges "shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body in writing for that purpose" [emphasis supplied].
It is well settled, said the Appellate Division, that absent "a written delegation authorizing a deputy or other person to conduct the hearing," the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to conduct the §75 disciplinary hearing, citing Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 385, among other decisions.
Significantly, the Appellate Division, Third Department had earlier ruled that the requirements of Civil Service Law §75(2) could be satisfied by a written record of such designation such as the minutes of a board meeting at which a resolution was adopted appointing the hearing officer or a letter to the hearing officer advising him or her that the official designation has taken place. In contrast, the court observed that “correspondence to the hearing officer that does not reference the official designation is insufficient, as is written notice to the [accused] of the hearing officer's identity.”
The Appellate Division found that there was no evidence in the record on appeal that the appointing authority had ever designated the Hearing Officer in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. The court specifically noted that reference to the designation of the hearing officer in the notice of charges sent to Arthur is not sufficient in the absence of any evidence of the written designation itself.”**
In addition, the employee’s failure to object to the absence of such written designation “is of no moment, inasmuch as this jurisdictional defect cannot be waived,” said the court, citing Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1095. This clearly implies that the individual being disciplined has no duty to inform the appointing authority of this procedural defect.
As the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, his determination and Soares’ adoption thereof are nullities and Arthur, said the court, “must be restored to his former position with back pay and benefits.”
The court also noted that while courts employ the substantial evidence standard of review in resolving challenges to Civil Service Law §75 determinations, the disciplinary hearing officer does not review an employer's disciplinary actions taken against a public employee "to determine whether those actions were undertaken based upon substantial evidence," as occurred in Arthur's disciplinary proceeding; rather," it remains the responsibility of the hearing officer to weigh the evidence and resolve credibility determinations."
Further, said the court, "administrative findings of fact must be made in such a manner that the parties may be assured that the decision is based on the evidence in the record, uninfluenced by extralegal considerations, so as to permit intelligent challenge by an aggrieved party and adequate judicial review."
* The Appellate Division also held that the hearing officer “did not properly weigh the evidence, and failed to adequately detail the specific factual findings and hearing evidence relied upon.”
** Such notice to the accused has been deemed to satisfy the statutory mandate when the appointing authority separately issues a written resolution incorporating the notice by reference (Scharf v Levittown Union Free School Dist., 294 AD2d 508, lv denied 98 NY2d 613).
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04255.htm