Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/418/1136/544428/
Timestamp: 2018-10-22 07:27:34
Document Index: 509767207

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 36', '§ 5', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 36', '§ 841', '§ 36', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 846', '§ 841', '§ 841', '§ 924', '§ 3742', '§ 856']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jerry Joseph Higdon, Jr., Defendant-appellant, 418 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Eleventh Circuit › 2005 › United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jerry Joseph Higdon, Jr., Defendant-appellant
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Jerry Joseph Higdon, Jr., Defendant-appellant, 418 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - 418 F.3d 1136 (11th Cir. 2005)
In this case, Jerry Joseph Higdon, Jr. appealed his convictions and sentences for: (1) two counts of distribution of "ice" methamphetamine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute "ice" methamphetamine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (2) a drive-by shooting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 36(b). The defendant's lengthy sentence was, in large part, the product of receiving consecutive sentences for each of his drug and drive-by-shooting convictions. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).1
This Court has repeatedly followed the prudential rule that new issues not raised in opening briefs will not be considered by the court. See e.g., United States v. Sears, 411 F.3d 1240, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1294 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ardley, 273 F.3d 991, 991-95 (11th Cir. 2001) (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (collecting cases); United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000).2 Thus, this Court, consistent with this rule, denied Higdon's motion and refused to consider his belated attempt to raise a Blakely issue in supplemental briefing.3 Unhappy with this Court's prior decisions, the dissent criticizes this Court's application of its well-established prudential rule to cases involving United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005).
As in Sears, Verbitskaya, Day, Dockery, Ardley, and others, this Court properly denied Higdon's motion to file a supplemental brief raising a Blakely (now Booker) claim based on our circuit's long-standing rule that issues not raised in a party's initial brief will not be considered. This Court's prudential rules apply evenly to all appellants, whether the government or the defendant. Moreover, the requirement that issues be raised in opening briefs "serves valuable purposes, as do all of the procedural default rules, which is why we regularly apply them. See generally Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (11th Cir. 1988)." United States v. Ardley, 273 F.3d at 991 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
The dissent's main argument is that, under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), this Court is required to allow all defendants to raise, for the first time, a Booker-type issue at any point in the direct appeal process, regardless of whether the issue was in the defendant's initial brief on appeal. It is the dissent's apparent belief that retroactivity rules always trump any prudential rule. I submit that nothing in Griffith, or any other Supreme Court decision, requires (or even suggests) this result.
In Griffith, the defendant timely raised the error in issue at trial and the appellate level, and in that context the United States Supreme Court concluded that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases ... pending on direct review or not yet final...." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S. Ct. at 716. "The Griffith holding, however, applies only to defendants who preserved their objections throughout the trial and appeals process." Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d at 1340 n. 18 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316-20, 107 S. Ct. at 709-11).4
It is clear that Supreme Court precedent does not mandate that rules of retroactivity trump all procedural rules. Indeed, Supreme Court case law clearly indicates that rules of retroactivity are subject to procedural rules. For example, in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58 n. 4, 105 S. Ct. 1065, 1069 n. 4, 84 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that " [a]s we hold, if a case was pending on direct review at the time Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981)] was decided, the appellate court must give retroactive effect to Edwards, subject, of course, to established principles of waiver, harmless error, and the like."
Similarly, as discussed later, in Booker itself, the Supreme Court stated that although courts are to apply its holding to cases on direct review, "we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the `plain-error' test." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. Booker clearly implied that "plain error" (which applies to issues not raised in the trial court) is only one of a number of prudential doctrines; the rule that issues not timely raised on appeal are waived or abandoned is certainly another.
Further, this Court's prudential rules do not result in any manifest injustice. Criminal defense attorneys were well aware of Apprendi's potential impact on the sentencing guidelines even after our Sanchez decision, and before the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and Booker. In fact, in United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004), United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 971, 123 S. Ct. 1775, 155 L. Ed. 2d 530 (2003), United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1294 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 950 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2002), defense counsel asserted before both the district court and this Court that their client's rights to a jury trial were violated when the district court enhanced their sentences with extra-verdict enhancements not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. These Apprendi-type arguments about federal sentencing enhancements were made in those cases before Blakely and despite adverse precedent in Sanchez.
The dissent also notes that Higdon has not "waived" the issue because he "could not have intentionally relinquished or abandoned a right that our own precedent flatly denied him at the time his initial brief was filed." The dissent argues that a litigant should be able to raise a new issue based on an intervening Supreme Court decision at any time in the direct appeal process even if the defendant had not preserved the issue. However, the dissent's position is not only flawed, but internally inconsistent. In effect, the dissent recognizes that procedural default of an issue should be enforced at the trial level and result in plain-error review on appeal, but that this Court is powerless to enforce its own prudential rules if an issue is not raised in the opening brief on appeal. As Judge Carnes stated in Ardley: "If the retroactivity doctrine requires that we address issues that have been procedurally defaulted on appeal, why does it not require that we address full bore those issues that have been procedurally defaulted at trial instead of limiting our review to plain error?" Ardley, 273 F.3d at 993 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). That is, " [t]he retroactivity doctrine either trumps the procedural default doctrine or it does not. Our position, which is consistent, is that it does not." Id.
As noted earlier, in Booker, the Supreme Court instructed courts to "apply today's holdings—both the Sixth Amendment holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act—to all cases on direct review." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the fact that Booker was to be applied to cases on direct review did not mean "that every sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment violation [or] that every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing." Id. In fact, the Supreme Court directed courts to "apply ordinary prudential doctrines [including], for example, whether the issue was raised below...." Id. Therefore, the Booker Court has already rejected the very essence of the argument the dissent is making. If the position that retroactivity trumps ordinary prudential rules were correct, the Supreme Court would not have said in Booker itself that ordinary prudential rules were to be applied.
Lest there be any doubt about the constitutionality of this Court's approach, the Supreme Court has applied its own prudential rules to foreclose the ability of defendants to raise Blakely claims. In Pasquantino v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ n. 14, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781 n. 14, 161 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2005), issued after Booker, the petitioners argued "in a footnote that their sentences should be vacated in light of Blakely...." However, "Petitioners did not raise this claim before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari." Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781 n. 14. Although the petitioners failed to previously raise the issue, " [t]his omission was no fault of the defendants, . . . as the petition in this case was filed and granted well before the Court decided Blakely. Petitioners thus raised Blakely at the earliest possible point: in their merits briefing." Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1783 n. 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that the petitioners raised their Blakely claim at the earliest possible moment after that decision was released, the Supreme Court applied its prudential rules and declined to address the issue. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781 n. 14.
The dissent makes a great deal out of the fact that, in its view, this Court is the only circuit to apply its prudential rules in such a way to Booker-pipeline cases. First, as the dissent acknowledges, the Fifth Circuit has declined to consider certain, untimely Booker claims. In United States v. Lewis, 412 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Taylor, 409 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit concluded that "absent extraordinary circumstances" it would not consider Blakely/Booker claims raised for the first time in a reply brief, petition for certiorari or in a petition for rehearing.
On May 9, 2003, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama convicted Jerry Higdon of two counts of distribution of five or more grams of "ice" methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), one count of possession with the intent to distribute five or more grams of ice in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and one count of drive-by shooting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 36(b).1 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B), each of the three drug offenses carried a minimum term of imprisonment of five years and a maximum term of forty years. Drive-by shooting was punishable by up to twenty-five years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 36(b) (1).
The PSI also recommended that the offense level be increased four levels because Higdon "was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive," U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), two levels because he obstructed justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and two levels because he possessed a dangerous weapon during the course of his offenses, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1). Higdon objected to the PSI's characterization of his role in the offense, arguing that he was in fact entitled to a two-level reduction because he played a minor role in the offense. He also objected to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and to the PSI's recommendation that he not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
On June 24, 2004, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Id. at 2537-38. In so holding, the Court clarified the rule it had announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."):
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. Dissenting in Blakely, Justice O'Connor observed that the Washington Guidelines and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were, in all significant respects, virtually indistinguishable. Id. at 2548-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Then, as expected, in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755-56, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), the Court extended Blakely to the Federal Guidelines. To remedy the Federal Guidelines' constitutional defect, the Court excised the statutory provision that made the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 756-57.5 Now, the Guidelines are "effectively advisory," and although a sentencing court must "consider Guidelines ranges," it may "tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well." Id. at 757.
Prior to Blakely, this and every other circuit had unequivocally upheld the Guidelines against Blakely-type challenges. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2547 n. 1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Apprendi does not apply to judge-made determinations pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines."). Thus, it "comes as little surprise" that Higdon did not make such a claim in his opening brief. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 546 nn.3-4 (6th Cir. 2005). Within a month of the Blakely decision, however, Higdon filed a "motion for leave to file supplemental argument" and an accompanying brief asserting that his sentence was unconstitutional under Blakely. The panel denied that motion, citing United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, reh'g en banc denied, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2542, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2005). The panel then affirmed Higdon's convictions and sentences without addressing the merits of his Blakely claim.
The Supreme Court has clearly held "that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987). In this circuit, however, this principle only applies if the defendant timely raised the issue in his initial brief on appeal—even in a case in which the "new rule" was not announced until after that brief was filed. Levy, 379 F.3d at 1242. This rule dates to United States v. Ardley, 242 F.3d 989, reh'g en banc denied, 273 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001), which refused to consider a defendant's Apprendi-based challenge even though the Supreme Court had remanded his case to us for reconsideration in light of Apprendi. Id. at 990. Compare with Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197, 116 S. Ct. 600, 603, 133 L. Ed. 2d 571 (1996) (" [A] GVR order both promotes fairness and respects the dignity of the Court of Appeals by enabling it to consider potentially relevant decisions and arguments that were not previously before it." (emphasis added)). The bar this rule imposes is absolute: claims such as Higdon's are effectively barred on both direct appeal and collateral review, and they cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Levy, 391 F.3d at 1334 n. 3 (Hull, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); Ardley, 273 F.3d at 993-94 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). We are apparently the only circuit to apply the prudential issues-not-briefed-are-waived rule in such a strict fashion. See Levy, 391 F.3d at 1345-48 & nn.15-17 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
First, it unjustifiably limits the principle of Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review or not yet final." Id. at 328, 107 S. Ct. at 716 (emphasis added). Second, by [conflating the terms "waiver" and "forfeiture," it] unduly limits our scope of review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). [6 ] Third, it continues a circuit split that finds this court standing alone. Fourth, it sends a clear message to appellate counsel that they should brief every colorable claim—even those claims that are squarely foreclosed by our own precedent—or else risk costing their clients the benefit of a favorable intervening decision. As a result, counsel will be tempted to be less discriminating in selecting issues to be argued on appeal, and briefs will necessarily be less specific and clear, which will in turn significantly hinder the fair and efficient administration of justice in this circuit.
In Levy, I observed that "the eleven other federal circuits that have been presented with claims like [the one at issue in this case] have all considered the merits of those claims." Id. at 1347-48; see id. at 1345-48 & nn. 15-17 (collecting cases). Post-Booker, it continues to be clear that our approach is contrary to that of every other circuit. For example, in United States v. Washington, 398 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit held that " [a]lthough appellate contentions not raised in an opening brief are normally deemed to have been waived, the Booker principles apply in this proceeding because the [Supreme] Court specifically mandated that we `must apply [Booker] ... to all cases on direct review.'" Id. at 312 n. 7 (citation omitted) (quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769). The court then vacated the defendant's sentence as plain error under Booker. Id. at 312.
In United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit held that the defendants had not "waived" their Booker claims " [b]ecause neither Booker nor Blakely had been decided when [they] were sentenced or when [their] briefs were due [on appeal], and because neither [defendant had] taken any affirmative steps manifesting an intention to relinquish or abandon Booker rights." Id. at 546. Indeed, the court remarked that the defendants' failure to raise Booker-type claims at trial or on appeal " [came] as little surprise given the prior statements of [the Sixth Circuit] that Apprendi did not invalidate the federal Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 546 n. 3. The court then vacated the defendants' sentences as plain error under Booker. Id. at 550.
In United States v. Macedo, 406 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit considered a Blakely/Booker claim first advanced in a petition for rehearing:
Despite the government's arguments to the contrary, Macedo has not waived [his Blakely/Booker] argument by failing to argue [it] on appeal. In a direct appeal, a defendant might preserve his Blakely and Booker arguments by raising them in subsequent filings. See United States v. Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 591 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Although [the defendant] did not raise the issue of constitutionality in his brief, he made notice of the Blakely and Booker decisions in a subsequent filing and raised the issue during argument. In light of the uncertainty surrounding this issue and the questionable constitutionality of [the defendant's] sentencing enhancement, we do not find that [the defendant] has waived his right to challenge the validity of the district court's sentencing enhancement"); see also United States v. Pree, 384 F.3d 378, 396 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Given the precedent in this circuit prior to Blakely, we think it would be unfair to characterize [the defendant] as having waived a challenge to the validity of her sentencing enhancement."). Macedo has done so here by virtue of filing a petition for rehearing.
Macedo, 406 F.3d at 789. The court then remanded the defendant's case pursuant to its decision in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005). Macedo, 406 F.3d at 790.7
In United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173,(10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth Circuit stated,
The Supreme Court decided [Blakely] and [Booker] during the pendency of Defendant's appeal. We must apply the holdings in Blakely and Booker to all cases in which a defendant properly raised an issue under either case. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. Defendant properly raised her Sixth Amendment issues in a supplemental brief. Compare United States v. Lindsey, 389 F.3d 1334, 1335 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2004).
Most recently, in United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), the en banc Ninth Circuit observed that "Booker explicitly stated that its holding applies to all cases pending on direct appeal." Id. at 1083. The court, therefore, held that " [e]ven where the briefs filed by the parties do not raise a Booker objection, . . . the issue may be raised and should be considered." Id. All eleven judges on the Ameline en banc panel apparently agreed with this holding.
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322, 107 S. Ct. at 713 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n. 16, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 2590 n. 16, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982) (citation omitted)).
Several months prior to Griffith, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), the Court had established a new, more defendant-friendly test for evaluating claims that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges were motivated by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 96-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24. The only question in Griffith was whether Batson's holding should apply to Griffith's case even though it constituted a "clear break" with prior Supreme Court precedent. The Court answered this question in the affirmative and abandoned its old "clear break exception" to retroactivity.10 It observed that Batson and Griffith "were tried in [the same state court] approximately three months apart," that the "same prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges at the trials," and that " [i]t was solely the fortuities of the judicial process that determined the case [the Supreme Court] chose initially to hear on plenary review." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327, 107 S. Ct. at 715. The Court reasoned that "it hardly comports with the ideal of administration of justice with an even hand, when one chance beneficiary—the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new principle—enjoys retroactive application, while others similarly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old doctrine." Id. (quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 2347, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The second problem created by the current circuit split involves the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) itself. One of the primary purposes of the SRA was to "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6); see also Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 104 (1998) ("Reduction of `unwarranted sentencing disparities' was a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984."). Indeed, district courts are to take this goal into account every time they impose a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6). Under the new, post-Booker sentencing model, this court must also consider this goal when reviewing sentences for reasonableness. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769; McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) ("District judges must [apply the Guidelines] as guidelines, with appellate review to determine whether that task has been carried out reasonably.").
No other circuit holds that defendants like Higdon have "waived" their Blakely/Booker claims. Consequently, whereas most similarly situated defendants in other circuits will be resentenced under the new advisory-guideline model, all such defendants in our circuit will be stuck with their old, mandatory-guideline sentences. This is problematic because the new model may result in significantly different sentences in many cases. See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1286-89 & nn. 8-12 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). To state the obvious, then, this will create sentencing disparity. Moreover, this sort of sentencing disparity is "unwarranted" because it is based on nothing more than the fact that our circuit has applied an unexceptional appellate waiver rule in an unusually harsh manner, whereas other circuits have had the good sense not to do so. And, needless to say, our Ardley/Levy rule has nothing to do with a defendant's criminal history or conduct, which the SRA identify as the guideposts for identifying "similarly situated" defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6).
I join Judge Tjoflat's opinion and dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in this case for the reasons explained in my dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004). This proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance, see Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) (2), similar to that presented in Levy—whether a criminal defendant has waived his claim under Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), on direct review because he did not raise it in his initial appellate brief, when the law of this Circuit had already specifically rejected such a claim at the time the initial brief was filed. See Levy, 391 F.3d at 1351 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).
I believe, as I did in Levy, that this Circuit is applying its procedural bar rules in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution pursuant to Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987), and inconsistent with the goals of efficiency and conservation of judicial and parajudicial resources that our procedural bar rules serve. See Levy, 391 F.3d at 1351-52, 1356 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). Moreover, I think this Circuit incorrectly deems Higdon's Blakely/Booker claim as "waived." Waiver requires intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. See id. at 1352-54 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). Higdon could not have intentionally relinquished or abandoned a right that our own precedent flatly denied him at the time his initial brief was filed. Id. Any "failure" on Higdon's part in raising the claim in his initial brief was dictated by our own precedent, and thus his Blakely/Booker claim cannot fairly be considered "waived." Id.
In Nealy, this Court explained this rule, as follows:
Although this Court does not consider Booker-type issues not raised in any way in a party's initial brief, we have liberally construed what it means to raise a Booker-type issue. See United States v. Dowling, 403 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) (evaluating whether a Blakely/Booker claim was made by reviewing whether a defendant: (1) referred to the Sixth Amendment; (2) referred to Apprendi or another related case; (3) asserted his right to have the jury decide the disputed fact; or (4) raised a challenge to the role of the judge as factfinder with respect to sentencing factors). This is consistent with how we have applied our prudential rule in other contexts and "liberally read briefs to ascertain the issues raised on appeal." See United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Further, the Griffith Court did not require that a dissimilarly situated defendant—one who did not preserve his objection below or on appeal—would somehow benefit from a new constitutional rule. Rather, Griffith concluded that retroactive application of new rules on direct appeal was necessary in order to "treat [] similar situated defendants the same." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at 713. Defendants who have not preserved a claim of error are not similarly situated to those who have.
The dissent emphasizes that Rule 52(b) provides that plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The dissent argues that the Ardley/Levy rule thus has the effect of repealing Rule 52(b) because the Ardley/Levy rule allows for no exceptions. This is incorrect. For example, our Court has addressed claims of Booker error although they were not raised in the defendant's opening brief where the government has conceded the error. See United States v. Dacus, 408 F.3d 686, 687 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Although we ordinarily refuse to consider an argument not raised in an initial brief, we consider the argument that Dacus's sentence was erroneous under Booker because both parties have joined the issue without objection." (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, if a defendant timely raises a Sixth Amendment or Blakely issue in the opening brief, as many defendants did even prior to Booker, this Court has routinely applied plain error review under Rule 52(b). See e.g., United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 407 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 404 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005).
The long laundry list of objections predicted by the dissent in Ardley has not materialized in the trial courts because of the contemporaneous-objection rule. If defendants were going to raise a long list of objections, they would already be doing that so the issues could receive full de novo, and not just plain-error, review. See Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 676 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Plain error review is an extremely stringent form of review." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The Supreme Court's post-Booker remand orders do not affect application of our prudential rules. Since Booker, the Supreme Court has remanded over a hundred of our Circuit's cases with the same, or similar, form order: "The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)." Some of those cases were ones in which this Court applied its prudential rules and refused to consider defendant's belated efforts to raise Blakely/Booker claims. See, e.g., Levy v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2542, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2005); Sears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1348, 161 L. Ed. 2d 97 (2005); Dockery v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1101, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1063 (2005). In Ardley, Judge Carnes explained why we do not read anything into these remands:
Higdon was found not guilty of conspiring to distribute ice methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a) (1), on an additional substantive count of distribution of ice in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), on an additional substantive count of possession with the intent to distribute ice in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1), and on three counts of using a firearm in relation to the charged drug crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) (1) (A) (ii), (iii), and (B) (i), respectively
The Court also excised 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which provided for de novo review of departures from the applicable guideline range. Appellate courts now review sentences only for reasonableness See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-66.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that " [a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention." By its terms, the rule not only authorizes an appellate court to consider errors not brought to the trial court's attention, but also permits the appellate court to consider errors not raised by the parties on appeal, i.e., to raise issues sua sponte. See, e.g., Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1955) ("The words `the court' refer to the court which notices the error and the clear meaning of the sentence is that a court may notice plain or prejudicial error although not brought to the attention of the court noticing the error. . . . The manifest intent of the rule is to permit courts sua sponte to notice error. . . ."), op. adhered to on reh'g en banc, 235 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1956) (en banc); 3A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3d § 856 ("Ordinarily Rule 52(b) is invoked by counsel who, in preparing an appeal, discover what they consider to be an error to which no objection was taken below. The rule is not so limited, however, and the appellate court may take notice of an error on its own motion though it is never put forward by counsel."). The Ardley/Levy rule, therefore, has the effect of depriving panels of this court of discretion Rule 52(b) expressly confers. This effective limited repeal of Rule 52(b) has no basis in Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, the inflexibility of our rule is obviously inconsistent with the case-by-case approach to plain-error analysis Olano requires. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-37, 113 S. Ct. at 1776-79.
[T]he government ... argues that the defendant has waived the Blakely/Booker argument by failing to raise it in his initial brief on appeal. While we have often reiterated that issues raised only in a reply brief or at oral argument are generally considered waived, we will exercise our discretion to consider new issues under exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, the parties' briefs were submitted prior to a substantial change in the applicable law wrought by the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and Booker. This change constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" in which we will permit new issues to be raised, and we accordingly accepted supplemental briefing from both sides. Likewise, in our recent decision in United States v. Serrano-Beauvaix, 400 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005), another panel of this court considered the merits of a Booker argument not raised in appellant's opening brief.
United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476, 487-88 (1st Cir. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted).
In United States v. Cramer, 396 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit refused to consider a Blakely/Booker claim first raised in a Rule 28(j) letter. Id. at 962 n. 3. The court explained that although Rule 28(j) "provides a method whereby a party may supplement cited authorities after filing briefs or after oral argument," "a party may not raise arguments for the first time in a Rule 28(j) letter." Id. Accordingly, because the defendant failed to request "permission to file a supplemental brief properly raising the Blakely issue," the court "refuse [d] to consider the matter." Id. Thus, the court all but explicitly stated that it would have considered the issue had it been raised in a properly filed supplemental brief. Then, in United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit did, in fact, consider a Blakely/Booker claim first raised in a properly filed supplemental brief. Indeed, it may be that the Eighth Circuit will now consider even claims raised in 28(j) letters. On March 22, the Cramer panel vacated its original opinion and authorized supplemental briefs on the Booker issue. United States v. Cramer, 396 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2005).
Post-Booker, the Fifth Circuit has held that "absent extraordinary circumstances" it will not consider Blakely/Booker claims first raised in a reply brief, a petition for rehearing, or a petition for certiorari. United States v. Lewis, 412 F.3d 614, 615 (5th Cir. 2005) (reply brief); United States v. Taylor, 409 F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider a claim first raised in a petition for certiorari and citing Ardley among other cases); United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 260, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2005) (refusing to consider a claim first raised in a petition for rehearing and citing Ardley and Levy among other cases). In each of these cases, the court has first determined that the defendant could not pass the plain-error test and then held that, a fortiori, he/she could not establish "extraordinary circumstances." As a result, the Fifth Circuit has not yet been pressed "to determine what constitutes `extraordinary circumstances.'" Lewis, 412 F.3d at 615. (While the First Circuit applies a similar rule that "issues raised only in a reply brief or at oral argument are generally considered waived" and will only be considered "under exceptional circumstances," it has held that Blakely and Booker standing alone constitute an "exceptional circumstance." Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d at 487. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's "extraordinary circumstances" rule may well turn out to require little more than that the defendant establish plain error.)
Although the Fifth Circuit's rule appears similar to our Ardley/Levy rule, the two rules differ in practice in at least two quite important respects. The first is that the Fifth Circuit actually reviews the defendant's claim for plain error before determining whether the defendant can establish "extraordinary circumstances." In contrast, " [t]his Court has simply determined that no manifest injustice results if it declines to consider untimely Booker claims on appeal." Ante, at 1139 n. 5. That is, the presence or absence of reversible plain error is irrelevant to our rule. See. e.g., United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261, 1262-63.
The second practical difference between its rule and ours is that the Fifth Circuit is far less likely to find that a defendant has "waived" the Booker issue. For example, in United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit stated,
To be clear, I do not agree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Lewis, Taylor, and Hernandez-Gonzalez, and, moreover, I am not sure that those cases are consistent with prior Fifth Circuit precedent, see, e.g., United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This case is on remand from the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of [Apprendi]. Apprendi was decided after this Court affirmed [the defendant's] convictions and sentences on direct appeal, and the arguments presented herein were not presented to the district court or this Court on initial appeal. We have, therefore, carefully considered the record in light of [the defendant's Apprendi-based] arguments on remand and the plain error standard of review." (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, as a practical matter, even that circuit has not gone so far was we have in Ardley, Levy, and progeny.
Pre-Griffith, "where the Court ... expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be `a clear break with the past,' it almost invariably [went] on to find such a newly minted principle nonretroactive." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549, 102 S. Ct. at 2587 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030, 1033, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1969)).
Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc in Levy, Judge Hull argued that Griffith did not require us to address the defendant's Blakely claim because a defendant who failed to include such a claim in his opening brief—even when his opening brief was due before Blakely was decided—was not "similarly situated" to a defendant who had included such a claim. Levy, 391 F.3d at 1330-31. I obviously disagree, but even assuming this to be true, it must be clear that defendants sentenced in the Eleventh Circuit who did not raise Blakely/Booker claims in their opening briefs on appeal are, in all relevant respects, similarly situated to defendants sentenced in other circuits who did not raise Blakely/Booker claims in their opening briefs on appeal.
I in no way mean to suggest that the principle of Griffith is violated every time there is a discernible circuit split as to how a new rule is to be applied to cases pending on direct review. For example, the circuits are currently split as to how the plain-error doctrine applies to Booker errors. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 562-63 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The phrase `three-ring circus' (referring to the three-way circuit split) has been used to describe the federal circuits' disparate handling of Booker pipeline cases. Such a phrase is descriptive [.] [N]onetheless, it is probably more appropriate to characterize the split as a three-ring circus with twelve unique acts each attempting to dazzle us with its compelling logic."). Obviously, some circuits are wrong and others are right, but this differential application of Booker does not implicate Griffith. The instant case, however, involves an eleven-to-one circuit split as to whether new rules should be applied at all to a distinct, easily identifiable subset of cases pending on direct review. Because Griffith demands equal treatment of similarly situated defendants whose cases are still in the pipeline when a new rule is announced, the very fact that our court is the only court that will not apply a new rule to cases such as this one is in itself inconsistent with Griffith.
In the concluding footnote of its recent opinion in Pasquantino v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 161 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2005), the Supreme Court stated, "Petitioners argue in a footnote that their sentences should be vacated in light of [Blakely]. Petitioners did not raise this claim before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari. We therefore decline to address it." Id. at 1781 n. 14. Also in a footnote, the dissent responded that " [t]his omission was no fault of the defendants . . ., as the petition in this case was filed and granted well before the Court decided Blakely." Id. at 1783 n. 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, the defendants had "raised Blakely at the earliest possible point: in their merits briefing." Id. I will not expend significant space trying to decipher these dueling footnotes, but two points are worth making briefly.
First, the question on which certiorari was granted in Pasquantino was "whether a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute," Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1771; the case had nothing to do with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The majority's footnote was thus squarely in line with Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a), which states that " [o]nly the questions set out in the petition [for certiorari], or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court." Of course, this rule is similar to our own rule regarding issues not raised in the appellant's opening brief, but it goes without saying that the Supreme Court operates quite differently than we do. The Supreme Court exists to decide issues, not to correct errors, and its rule against considering questions not presented in the petition for certiorari is necessary to "maintain the integrity of the process of certiorari. The Court decides which questions to consider through well-established procedures," and permitting the parties "to alter these questions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart this system." Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 646, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1649, 118 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1992). The policies underpinning the Ardley/Levy rule are, to say the least, of a considerably lesser magnitude.
Second, assuming that the Pasquantino footnote means something, I do not think that it undermines my position. The Pasquantino Court "decline [d] to consider" the Booker issue because the defendants had not raised it "before the Court of Appeals or in their petition for certiorari." Higdon, of course, has raised the issue "before the Court of Appeals" in the form of a motion to file a supplemental brief, which we denied. I have no doubt that he will also include the issue in his petition for certiorari. Therefore, Higdon is not in the same position as the defendants in Pasquantino, and the footnote does not suggest that his Booker claim is waived.