Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/627/958/430102/
Timestamp: 2019-10-20 04:18:20
Document Index: 123993915

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254', '§ 1254']

Maria Socorro Guerrero De Reynoso and Jose Reynoso-gonzales,petitioners, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 627 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1980) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Ninth Circuit › 1980 › Maria Socorro Guerrero De Reynoso and Jose Reynoso-gonzales,petitioners, v. Immigration and Naturali...
Maria Socorro Guerrero De Reynoso and Jose Reynoso-gonzales,petitioners, v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Respondent, 627 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1980)
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 627 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1980) Argued and Submitted June 2, 1980. Decided Sept. 11, 1980
To be eligible for suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1), a deportable alien must show: (1) at least seven years continuous physical presence in the United States immediately before the filing of the application for suspension of deportation; (2) good moral character during that period; and (3) extreme hardship, resulting from deportation, to the alien, or to his spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United States, or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.1
In suspension of deportation proceedings, the alien has the burden of presenting evidence that establishes his or her eligibility for the discretionary relief provided by § 1254(a). Here the Reynosos satisfied the requirements of seven years continuous presence and good moral character. Evidence presented by them failed, however, to convince the immigration judge that they satisfied the third requirement of § 1254(a) (1), extreme hardship.
Recently our court, sitting en banc, decided Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), and Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980). Both cases involved the extreme hardship requirement of § 1254(a) (1). Wang was taken en banc to clear up the "confusion as to what an alien is required to show and what (evidence) the Board . . . is required to consider in cases where the questions are whether the alien is (1) eligible for and (2) merits suspension of deportation (under § 1254)." Wang v. INS, at 1344. In Wang the Board denied the aliens a hearing on suspension of deportation because they had not made the required prima facie showing of extreme hardship. This court reversed the Board's order and remanded for a hearing on the petitioners' eligibility for suspension of deportation.
Wang reminds us that § 1254 should be construed liberally to effectuate § 1254's ameliorative purpose. Wang v. INS, at 1345. Villena, on the other hand, cautions that " '(e)xtreme hardship' is not a fixed and inflexible term; a discretionary determination of extreme hardship must be based on the particular facts of each case." Villena v. INS, at 1357. Wang and Villena, read together, indicate that the barrier an alien must overcome to satisfy, prima facie, § 1254(a) (1)'s hardship requirement should not be set too high.
The Wangs also stated that deportation would cause both them and their children severe economic hardship. The Board's response was: "It is well settled that a mere showing of economic detriment is not sufficient to establish extreme hardship within the meaning of (§ 1254(a) (1))." Id. at 1348. This court cautioned that: "(I)t is necessary for the Board to consider the total potential effect of deportation on the alien and his family and that where a showing of economic hardship is combined with some other substantial hardship the Board should afford the alien a hearing on the issue of extreme hardship." Id. at 1349. We ended our discussion of extreme hardship on this note: "We do not preclude the possibility that upon further examination the Board, in the sound exercise of its discretion, may find that either hardship alone is extreme and warrants relief or that both combined are hardships sufficient to warrant relief." Id. (footnote omitted).
In examining these various items of claimed hardship, we pointed out that even though each item alone would not establish Villena's claim, each should nevertheless be weighed along with other facts in determining extreme hardship under § 1254(a) (1). Although we might not have reached the same conclusion as the Board, we could not say that the Board abused its discretion by denying suspension of deportation. Villena v. INS, at 1357-58. But we reached a different conclusion regarding the Board's denial of Villena's motion to reopen. We held that Villena alleged new facts which, if proved, would establish eligibility for relief and would affect the results of the proceedings. Accordingly, we concluded that the Board abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because Villena had set forth a prima facie case of eligibility. Id. at 1358.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) reads in part: