Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98938/united-states-vs-lindsay
Timestamp: 2017-12-13 05:50:29
Document Index: 141769244

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 714', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 713', '§ 4', '§ 714']

United States Vs Lindsay - Citation 98938 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
United States Vs. Lindsay - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98938
Decided On Jan-18-1954
Case Number 346 U.S. 568
Respondent Lindsay
united states v. lindsay - 346 u.s. 568 (1954) u.s. supreme court united states v. lindsay, 346 u.s. 568 (1954) united states v. lindsay no. 94 argued december 1-2, 1953 decided january 18, 1954 346 u.s. 568 certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit syllabus section 4(c) of the commodity credit corporation charter act of june 29, 1948, as amended, 15 u.s.c. § 714b(c), bars suits by or against the corporation unless brought "within six years after the right accrued on which suit is brought." the government sued these private parties in 1952 to recover on a claim growing out of the alleged delivery of damaged wool to the corporation in 1945. held: the government's claim "accrued".....
United States v. Lindsay - 346 U.S. 568 (1954)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S. 568 (1954)
Held: The Government's claim "accrued" on the date a right to sue came into existence, rather than on the date the Act became effective, and the suit is barred. Pp. 346 U. S. 568 -571.
On February 29, 1952, the United States filed the complaint in this case against Lindsay and the other respondents alleging that, on February 26, 1945, Lindsay had delivered damaged wool to the Government in violation of an agreement with the Commodity Credit Corporation, a wholly owned corporate agency of the United States. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the Government's seven-year-old claim was barred by the six-year time limit in § 4(c) of a 1948 Act, as amended. [ Footnote 1 ] That section provides that
It is true that courts have sometimes given "accrued" the meaning the Government here suggests, but we are unable to agree that the word has thereby taken on an established technical meaning which Congress must have had in mind when it used "accrued" in this Act. The legislative history fails to show that such a meaning was suggested to Congress before the Act was passed. Moreover, many of the decisions that gave "accrued" this special meaning did so to avoid possible constitutional questions should the statutes be interpreted in a way that would destroy private rights. See, e.g., 84 U. S. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. But no constitutional question is raised by applying this six-year time limit to preexisting claims of the Government. Congress has unquestioned power to bar recovery on Government claims if it sees fit. And we agree with the court below that we need not now decide whether § 4(c) can be applied to preexisting claims brought by private persons against the Government. But see Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 , 292 U. S. 581 ; Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 115 , 300 U. S. 119 ; Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 91-92.
to avoid retroactivity. Cases are cited in which particular provisions have been deemed so inequitable and unfair when applied retrospectively that this Court has refused to impute to lawmaking bodies a purpose to bring about such results. [ Footnote 2 ] But we cannot say that any consequences of retroactive application of the time limit here call on us to hold that Congress did not intend this statute to take effect according to the natural meaning of its words. The Government has used the Commodity Credit Corporation in business transactions since 1933. Probably many claims have accrued in the intervening years. Maybe others, like this one, are for comparatively small amounts. All, whether large or small, could have been sued on as they arose. We think that Congress might well have believed it wise to bar all stale claims by the Government against its agents and others who dealt with it in the past. For and against such a view, arguments can be made that are based on common notions of fairness and justice. In this situation, it seems better to leave this statutory problem with Congress, rather than for us to stretch the word "accrued" beyond its ordinary meaning. Cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304 , 325 U. S. 316 .
United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399; Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141 ; Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 ; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327 ; United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U. S. 160 ; United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1 ; Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529 ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190 ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306 ; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 How. 776.
Prior to the passage of the Act in question, a Delaware corporation of the same name as the federal agency created by the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948 existed and operated. 15 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 713. It had claims and obligations which were unaffected by their transfer to the present corporation by the Charter Act. The earlier Delaware corporation was a wholly owned agency of the United States without statutory limitation, state or federal, on its right to sue upon its claims. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414 , and cases cited. Therefore, up to the time of the enactment of § 4(c), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. III) § 714b(c), there was no compelling reason, beyond the desire for prompt and proper administration, for the United States to file its suits.
As the corporation had played a major part since its organization in 1933 in the purchase, storage, and financing of American agricultural products, large claims had accumulated in its favor and against it over the years. S.Rep. No. 1022, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. If the problem here presented was res integra, the existence of old claims, not then barred by limitation, would lead me to interpret the words, "brought within six years after the right accrued," * as prospective only to avoid imputing to Congress unreasonable and arbitrary destruction of valid claims for and against the corporation. This conclusion would follow from the principle that statutes of limitation "must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government." Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456 , 264 U. S. 462 ; Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 640 , 274 U. S. 650 .
94 Cong.Rec. A4409. The precedents in this Court on the interpretation of statutes establishing limitations by the definition of "accrued" without exception give the word prospective meaning. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1 ; Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 266 U. S. 435 ; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 How. 776.