Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/213/339/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-19 23:39:02
Document Index: 284559101

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3198', '§ 25', '§ 2339', '§ 1', '§ 2935', '§ 3198']

Boquillas Land and Cattle Co. v. Curtis (full text) :: 213 U.S. 339 (1909) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
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Boquillas Land and Cattle Co. v. Curtis 213 U.S. 339 (1909)
U.S. Supreme CourtBoquillas Land and Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909)Boquillas Land and Cattle Company v. CurtisNo. 133Argued April 7, 1909Decided April 19, 1909213 U.S. 339APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
Under § 3198, Rev.Stat. of Arizona of 1887, the common law doctrine of riparian rights does not now obtain in that territory, and, as held by the supreme court of the territory, the doctrine of appropriation was recognized and to some extent in force prior to and since 1833 in the State of Sonora, now a part of that territory. Page 213 U. S. 340
The facts are stated in the. opinion. Page 213 U. S. 342
This is a bill in equity, brought by the appellant to prevent the defendants from withdrawing water from the San Pedro River, and from building for that purpose a dam and ditch upon and through the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff owns a tract extending on both sides of the river for about 14 1/2 miles and reaching back from the river for a mile and one-eighth on each side. In derives its title from a grant of the State of Sonora in 1833, confirmed by a decree of the court of private land claims on February 14, 1899, and a patent from the United States in pursuance of the decree, dated December 14, 1900. By reason of disputes before the date of the patent and wrongful disputes since, the plaintiff has not made actual use of all the waters of the river, although they are not sufficient to irrigate all the plaintiff's land that admits of irrigation. It has constructed no dams, canals, or the like, and has not taken the water except for watering stock and other similar uses of Page 213 U. S. 343 it in its natural flow. The defendants threaten and intend to build a dam, as alleged, in place of one built in 1903, but washed out, and to build and rebuild a ditch through land of the plaintiff to another ditch already established, and to divert the water through the same to land of theirs on the north. They set up no title, except that they have been the first to appropriate the water. The plaintiff claims as riparian owner, and argues that, as such, it has a right that cannot to taken from it by simple appropriation. The territorial court of first instance and the supreme court dismissed the bill (89 P. 504), and the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
This is the statement of the territorial court, and we know nothing to control it. It is not met by arguments as to the general character of Mexican law, or by inference from the situation and nature of the grant. The same doctrine seems to be implied by the Howell Code, c. 55, § 25, which we shall refer to again. Page 213 U. S. 344
The opinion that we have expressed makes it unnecessary to decide whether lands in the arid regions, patented after the act of March 3, 1877, c. 107, 19 Stat. 377, are not accepted subject to the rule that, priority of appropriation gives priority of right by virtue of that act, construed with Rev.Stat. § 2339. The Supreme Court of Oregon has rendered a decision to that effect on plausible grounds. Hough v. Porter, 98 P. 1083. See further Act of March 3, 1891, c. 561; Page 213 U. S. 345 United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 174 U. S. 704-706; Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 188 U. S. 553. So it is unnecessary to consider how far, if at all, the defendants represent an appropriation of the water before the patent was granted. For that reason, we have not set forth the details found by the court below as to the dams, ditches, and use of water, going back to 1877.
In the first place, this is merely the adoption of a general system as against another general system (the Spanish-Mexican) that had been in force and that was repealed by § 1. If there were nothing more in the Code, it would be going a great way to say that such a broad phrase forbade the courts to hold that the common law was adaptable, and established the English rule of riparian rights only for English conditions, as suggested by Nave, J., below. It might be argued, with force, that an amendment inserting the words, "So far only as is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical condition of the territory, and the necessities of the people thereof," merely expressed what was implied before. Rev.Stat. 1887, § 2935. And the like might be urged with regard to § 3198 of the Revised Page 213 U. S. 346 Statutes of 1887, which, in terms, enacted or declared that "the common law doctrine of riparian water rights" should not obtain. But we are not left to rely upon reasonable implications and argument, for other parts of the original Code are express upon the point. Therefore we need not consider whether, in any event, the statute could be supposed to confer property rights not previously possessed and not subject to legislative change. Compare Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 191 U. S. 387, and Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154, 194 U. S. 160.
and the chapter is to be enforced from the day of publication. There are many more details, but we have recited enough to show that the interpretation given by the court below to the general adoption of the common law by the Howell Code, and Page 213 U. S. 347 the qualifications imposed upon it, were correct. They simply follow what has been understood to be the law for many years. Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 371.