Source: https://casetext.com/case/radford-v-state-14
Timestamp: 2019-11-20 10:17:27
Document Index: 225931118

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 24', '§ 16', '§ 26', '§ 17', '§ 27', '§ 24', '§ 38']

Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50 | Casetext
251 Ga. 50 (Ga. 1983)
Supreme Court of GeorgiaMay 12, 1983
The charge is based upon OCGA § 24-4-22, and it has long been held by Georgia courts not to apply to criminal…
[Cits.]" Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 52 (4) ( 302 S.E.2d 555) (1983). The test is whether the evidence was…
In Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 51 (302 S.E.2d 555) (1983), the defendant was charged with two aggravated assaults and one murder, the crimes spanning three weeks.
DECIDED MAY 12, 1983. REHEARING DENIED JUNE 1, 1983.
1. Defendant contends the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the second count of aggravated assault and on the murder charge. As for the second assault, it is not essential for the state to locate bullets, bullet holes or expended shells to establish the crime of aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (Code Ann. § 26-1302). As for the murder, Clarington's testimony was corroborated by the blood samples and ballistics tests. The jury found Clarington's testimony to be credible and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find the evidence sufficient to allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the second assault and of the murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
The crimes and acts were so intertwined that some of the same evidence would be required at separate trials on each charge. Severance "lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge since the facts in each case are likely to be unique." Dingler v. State, 233 Ga. 462, 463 ( 211 S.E.2d 752) (1975). We find no abuse of discretion here. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss the indictment and to sever.
3. Defendant alleges there was no evidence to establish that either the first assault or the homicide occurred in Houston County. (Defendant did not seek to show that the offenses did not occur in Houston County.)
Witness Odom testified he found the murder victim on Jackson Street. Odom also testified Jackson Street is in Houston County. A resident of Jackson Street testified to seeing the cab pass and then hearing a shot. This is sufficient to establish venue in Houston County as to the murder. See Aldridge v. State, 236 Ga. 773, 774 ( 225 S.E.2d 421) (1976).
The prosecution used a map of the City of Warner Robins to show where each offense occurred and the proximity to defendant's home. Warner Robins is wholly within Houston County. See Hubbard v. State, 208 Ga. 472, 474 ( 67 S.E.2d 562) (1951). The evidence was sufficient to establish venue in Houston County.
4. Defendant asserts as error the failure of the district attorney to reveal exculpatory material after a general Brady motion. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ( 83 S.C. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) (1963). The information allegedly wrongly withheld was the first assault victim's failure to identify Clarington as the other person present. The situation here involves a general request for anything exculpatory. In response to this type of request, the prosecutor must disclose evidence which creates a reasonable doubt of guilt which did not otherwise exist. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-113 ( 96 S.C. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349) (1976); Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 463, 465 ( 298 S.E.2d 492) (1983).
5. Defendant asserts the prosecutor also failed to disclose exculpatory material in failing to identify two rebuttal witnesses who provided an alibi for Clarington at the time of the murder. Defense counsel was provided a list of all potential witnesses, including these two rebuttal witnesses, approximately four months before trial as required by OCGA § 17-7-110 (Code Ann. § 27-1403). This list did not disclose the subject of the witnesses' testimony.
Defendant is arguing, in essence, that not only must the district attorney disclose the names of witnesses but, to satisfy Brady, must also furnish a brief summary of their expected testimony. "Brady itself is not violated when Brady material is withheld from the defendant prior to trial and introduced by the state at trial." Chambers v. State, 250 Ga. 856 ( 302 S.E.2d 86) (1983), and cases cited. Moreover as discussed in Division 4, only material which creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt must be disclosed under the demand made here; while evidence that Clarington was at a food store purchasing ice cream, a pound cake, and bread at the time of the murder may thwart defendant's hope to point suspicion at another, such rebuttal evidence is not exculpatory and does not create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. This enumeration is without merit.
The requested charge is based on OCGA § 24-4-22 (Code Ann. § 38-119) and focuses on the defendant's failure to produce evidence favorable to the defense. This court has previously held the section inapplicable in criminal cases and violative of a defendant's right to be convicted by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sokolic v. State, 228 Ga. 788, 790 ( 187 S.E.2d 822) (1972); Mills v. State, 133 Ga. 155, 158 ( 65 S.E. 368) (1909).
Here we are faced with the situation where the defendant, not the prosecutor, is urging applicability of the charge. The charge, if given, would be more applicable to defendant than to the state and would apply to all the evidence on all counts, including the defendant's failure to testify. "This, undeniably, would fly in the face of justice and the right of defendant to remain silent as well as having an eroding effect on the state's burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown v. State, 150 Ga. App. 831, 832 ( 258 S.E.2d 641) (1979). The trial court acted properly in refusing to give the charge.
DECIDED MAY 12, 1983 — REHEARING DENIED JUNE 1, 1983.