Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19791213-829078
Timestamp: 2017-07-28 19:55:25+00:00
Document Index: 62802599

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 8", "l'article 27"]

A., B., C., et D. c. REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche A., B., C., et D. c. REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Requêtes jointes ; RecevablesNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 8290/78Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1979-12-13;8290.78 Analyses : (Art. 35-1) EPUISEMENT DES VOIES DE RECOURS INTERNESParties : Demandeurs : A., B., C., et D.Défendeurs : REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNETexte : APPLICATION / REQU ETE NÂ° 8290/78 A ., B ., C . and D . v/the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN Y
A ., B ., C . et D . c/REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGN E DECISION of 13 December 1979 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1979 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©te
Article 8 of the Convention : The recording of the applicant's telephone conversations, all fburnalisrs, with the office of a lawyer suspected and later on accused ofpmmoring rerrorism, constitutes an interference with the exercice of the right to respect for their private life and their correspondance . Even though no selection has been made amongst the recordings and they have only been destroyed after the lawyer's trial, it constituted a measure necessary for the protection of national security and for the prevention of crime . Article 25 of the Convention : A person whose telephone conversations have been tapped can claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention even if the records are subsequently destroyed because they became obsolete.
Article 8 de fe Convention : L'enregistrement des conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques des requÃ©rants, journalistes, avec le cabinet d'un avocat soupConnÃ© et plus tard accusÃ© de favoriser le terrorisme, constitue une ingÃ©rence dans l'exercice de leur droit au respect de leur vie privÃ©e et de leur correspondance. Alors mÃªme qu'aucun tri n'a Ã©tÃ© effectuÃ© parmi les enregistrements et que ceux-ci n'ont Ã©tÃ© dÃ©truits qu'aprÃ¨s la fin du procÃ¨s de l'avocat, il s Ã¢gissait d'une mesure nÃ©cessaire Ã© la protection de la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale et Ã la prÃ©vention des infractions pÃ©nales .
Article 25 de /a Convention : S Ã¢gissant d'Ã©coures tÃ©lÃ©phoniques, une personne Ã©coutÃ©e peut se prÃ©tendre victime d'une violation de la Convention mÃªme si les enregistrements ont Ã©tÃ© ultÃ©rieurement dÃ©truirs comme Ã©tant devenus inutiles .
1/ranÃ§ais : voir p . 181 )
The applicants are German citizens . MM . A . B . and C . are living in Hamburg : Mr D . is living in DÃ¼sseldorf . They are rep ? resented before the Commission by Mr Senfft and Pertners, lawyers in Hamburg . The applicants A ., B . and D . are editors with the German magazine "Stern" . The applicant C . was employed in the news se rvice of "Stern" magazine . The applicants complain that their telephone conversations with a Hamburg law firm have been tapped and recorded . According to the documents submittÃ©d by the applicants the Investigating Judge of the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) approved on . . . April 1975 a provisional order made by the Federal Attorney-General (Generalbundesanwalt) on . April 1975 to the effect that the telephone lines of Mr G . and partners, lawyers in Hamburg, should be tapped and recorded until . . May 1975 . Mr G . was suspected of having supported a criminal association (Sec . 129 of the Criminal Code) . The Investigating Judge specified that conversations relating to the normal course of the law practice and which were obviously not related to any criminal acts of the suspects should not be recorded, or should be erased immediately . It is stated in the reasons of the decision that it followed from numerous documents which had been seized that G . had taken active and decisive part in the setting up and running of an information centre which served to exchange information between detained persons convicted or suspected of terrorist activities as well as between these detainees and their defence counsel . Furthermore, it served to spread among the public terrorist ideas aimed at violent revolution . The applicants had telephone conversations with the law firm during the time of surveillance and these conversations were partly recorded . The applicants came to know of the su rv eillance and requested the Federal Attorney-General to destroy all recordings and documents relating to telephone conversations they had with Mr G .'s law firm . The request was referred to the competent trial court, i .e . the Hanseatic Cou rt of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), as the indictment against Mr G . had been filed in the meantime . The Federal Attorney-General informed the court that all telephone conversations had been recorded automatically and that he had not had anything erased in order to avoid the possible accusation of having subsequently manipulated the evidence obtained . Furthermore he stated that the police officers in charge of the su rveillance had to the best of their ability tried to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant conversations when they had the recording transcribed . Some conversations were thus not recorded in writing at all and others were recorded fully or summarily and marked to be of no importance . - 177-
On . . . May and . . June 1977 respectively, the Hanseatic Court of Appeal rejected the requests on the ground that the question which records and notes were still relevant to the criminal proceedings against Mr . G . and thus covered by the Order of the Federal Court's Investigating Judge authorising telephone tapping, could only be determined at the end of these criminal proceedings, when all evidence including statements of witnesses could be assessed by the trial court . The importance of the records could, according to the Court, only be valued after the hearing of witnesses at the trial . The applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against the Orders of . . . . . . May and . . . June 1977 . This appeal was rejected on . . . February 1978 by a group of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) . The Court referred to its decision of . . . January 1978 by which it had already rejected Mr G .'s constitutional appeal . Mr G . had also complained of the Hanseatic Court's rejection of his request that irrelevant evidence obtained by the tapping of his telephone lines be destroyed . The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the Hanseatic Court's decisions did not violate any constitutional rights because they were not in any way arbitrary but were based on a factual evaluation which led the Hanseatic Court to the conclusion that the documents in question might still be of importance . But even assuming that all or part of the recorded conversations were irrelevant to the criminal proceedings the Hanseatic Court's decisions were not arbitrary because there was the risk that some documents which were now considered irrelevant might nevertheless turn out to be of importance in the end . Furthermore, the sifting of the evidence obtained by the secret telephone surveillance would require much time and considerably delay the criminal proceedings . It was therefore justified to leave to a greater stage of the proceedings the decision which documents were to be destroyed .
COMPLAINT S The applicants submit that their telephone conversations with Mr G . or his collaborators were obviously not related or of importance to the criminal proceedings pending against Mr G . They conclude that the recording of these conversations was not cover ed by the Investigating Judge's Orde r authorising secret surveillance . They allege a violation of Article 8 of th e Convention .
THE LA W 1 . The applicants complain that their telephone conversations with the law firm of Mr G . and Partners has been recorded in writing and that th e
authorities refused to destroy these records, although their contents did not, so it is alleged, relate to the criminal activities of which G . was suspected . The applicants have lodged a Constitutional Appeal against the decisions of the Hanseatic Court of Appeal rejecting their requests to destroy the recordings . They have thus, as was not contested by the respondent Government, exhausted domestic remedies . They also respected the six months time limit IArt . 26 of the Convention l as the final decision, i .e . that of the group of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court, was given on . . . February 1978, while the application was lodged on 26 July 1978 . 2 . The records in question have in the meantime been destroyed and the respondent Government therefore argue that the applicants can no longer be considered as victims of the alleged violation . However, the records were not destroyed becuase the applicants so requested, but because the criminal proceedings against G . were terminated and the records were no longer needed . The applicants have therefore not received satisfaction with regard to their complaint that their telephone conversations should not have been recorded at all, ot that they should at least have been destroyed earlier . Consequently the applicants still have to be considered as victims although the records in question no longer exist . 3 . The applicants have invoked Article 8 .1 of the Convention and the respondent Government have not contested that their " private life" and "correspondence" were interfered with . Indeed, the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights have found, in the matter Klass and Others v . Federal Republic of Germany, that these notions also cover telephone conversations Isee the Court's Judgment of 6 September 1978, para . 411 . The respondent Government submitted that the measures in question were justified under paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention . The applicants have not disputed that the decision authorising the tapping of the telephones of G . and Partners was in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society for the purposes stated in paragraph 2 of Article 8 . They have pointed out, however, that according to the order in question, i .e . that of the Federal Court's investigating judge given on . . . April 1975, telephone conversations relating to the normal course of the law practice and which were obviously not related to any criminal acts of the suspect should not have been recorded, or should have been erased immediately . They submit that this order was not respected by the officials charged with the telephone tapping and that also the applicants' telephone conversations with G . or his partners were recorded and written out although they did not relate to any criminal acts .
The Commission first notes that in fact the Federal Attorney-General admitted in his report of . . January 1977 to the Hanseatic Court of Appeal that all telephone calls arriving at G .'s law firm were automatically recorded on sound carriers and no erasures had been effected, in order to avoid any suspicion of subsequent manipulation . This practice was clearly in contradiction with the directives given by the investigating judge in the Order of . . April 1975 which limited the scope of the secret surveillance . However, the fact that the authorities charged with the telephone tapping generally did not fully respect the directives given to them-however regrettable this may be-does not by itself constitute a violation of the Convention, in particular of Article 8 .1 . The Commission took into consideration that the Hanseatic Court of Appeal rejected the applicants' request to destroy the records of the telephone conversations with G . and his partners and thereby approved the action of the prosecuting authority . The same was done by the Federal Constitutional Court which rejected the applicants' Constitutional Appeals . It cannot in these circumstances, be found that the records in question were not covered by German law, in other words, that the measures of surveillance did not comply with the conditions and procedures laid down by the legislation Icf . 100a and 100b of the Code on Criminal Procedure - StPO) . The Commission further examined whether the records were made in pursuance of one or more of the purposes of Article 8 .2 of the Convention . Undisputedly, the law authorising secret surveillance, and in the present case, the surveillance of G .s law firm, was aimed at the protection of public safety or the prevention of disorder or crime, because there were reasons to suspect G . of supporting a criminal association and he was later convicted (with regard to the legislation on secret surveillance cf . the judgment in the Klass Case, op . cit ., para . 46) . The applicants contest, however, that in their case the records of the telephone conversations were necessary for that purpose . The Commission notes in this respect that the records have in the meantime-since G .'s conviction -been destroyed and have not been used for any other purpose then remaining available as possible evidence in the proceedings against G . The Commission further notes that according to the Hanseatic Court of Appeal (Decisions of . . . May and . . . June 1977) a definite answer with regard to the question 'which records would finally be relevant in G .'s case' could only be given at the end of the criminal proceedings against G . after a global assessment of all evidence obtained, inlcuding statements of witnesses made during the trial . Taking into account that the criminal activities of which G . was suspected included, according to the investigating judge's Order of . . . April 1975, the spreading of terrorist propaganda aimed at incitement to violent revolution, that the applicants contacted G .'s law firm in their capacity as journalists, the Commission considers that in th e
circumstances the reasoning of the German authorities for keeping the evidence was not unjustified or arbitrary . The Commission therefore concludes that the keeping of the records until G .'s conviction became final was necessary for the protection of national security and the prevention of crime . It should be added that the measures in question have not been shown to have in any way restricted or negatively affected the applicants in the carrying out of their professional activities . It cannot therefore be found that they were out of proportion in relation to the legitimated aims pursued . An examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been submitted does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and in particular in Article 8 . It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 .2 of the Convention .
EN FAIT Les requÃ©rants sont des ressonissants allemands . MM . A ., B . et C . sont domiciliÃ©s Ã Hambourg ; M . D . rÃ©side Ã DÃ¼sseldorf . Ils sont reprÃ©sentÃ©s devant la Commission par MM . Senfft et Cie, avocats Ã Hambourg . Les requÃ©rants A ., B . et D . sont titulaires d'une rubrique dans la revue allemande Â« Stern Â» . Le requÃ©rant C . est employÃ© au service reportage de la mÃªme revue . Les requÃ©rants se plaignent que leurs conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avec un cabinet d'avocats de Hambourg aient Ã©tÃ© Ã©coutÃ©es et enregistrÃ©es . Selon les documents prÃ©sentÃ©s par les requÃ©rants, le juge d'instruction de la Cour FÃ©dÃ©rale IBundesgerichtshofl a entÃ©rinÃ© le . . . avril 1975 une ordonnance provisoire Ã©mise le . . . avril 1975 par le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral fÃ©dÃ©ral IGeneralbundesanwaltl aux termes de laquelle les lignes tÃ©lÃ©phoniques de MM . G . et Cie, avocats Ã Hambourg, seraient mises sur table d'Ã©coute e t
enregistrÃ©es jusqu'au . . . mai 1975 . Me G . Ã©tait soupÃ§onnÃ© d'avoir favorisÃ© une association de malfaiteurs (Art . 124 du Code pÃ©nal) . Le juge d'instruction prÃ©cisa que les conversations concernant la pratique juridique normale du cabinet et n'ayant manifestement aucun lien avec un acte dÃ©lictueux des suspects ne devaient pas Ãªtre enregistrÃ©es ou alors devaient Ãªtre immÃ©diatement effacÃ©es . Il Ã©tait indiquÃ© dans les motifs de la dÃ©cision que, selon de nombreux documents saisis, G . avait jouÃ© un rÃ´le dÃ©cisif dans la crÃ©ation et le fonctionnement d'un centre d'informations oÃ¹ s'Ã©changeaient des renseignements entre dÃ©tenus condamnÃ©s pour activitÃ©s terroristes ou soupÃ§onnÃ©s de telles activitÃ©s ainsi qu'entre ces dÃ©tenus et leurs avocats . Le centre servait en outre Ã rÃ©pandre dans le public des idÃ©es terroristes visant Ã une rÃ©volution par la violence . Les requÃ©rants ont eu pendant la durÃ©e de l'Ã©coute des conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avec le cabinet en question et ces conversations ont Ã©tÃ© partiellement enregistrÃ©es . Ayant appris l'existence de cette Ã©coute, ils demandÃ©rent au Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral fÃ©dÃ©ral de dÃ©truire tous les enregistrements et documents liÃ©s aux conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques qu'ils avaient eues avec le cabinet G . Cette demande fut transmise Ã la juridiction compÃ©tente, Ã savoir la cour d'appel de Hambourg (Oberlandesgericht) car, entre temps, G . avait Ã©tÃ© inculpÃ© . Le Procureur fÃ©dÃ©ral informa la cour que toutes les conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avaient Ã©tÃ© automatiquement enregistrÃ©es et que rien n'avait Ã©tÃ© effacÃ© pour Ã©viter de pouvoir Ã©tre accusÃ© d'avoir manipulÃ© les renseignements recueillis . Il indiqua en outre que les inspecteurs de police chargÃ©s de l'Ã©coute avaient fait de leur mieux, en transcrivant les renseignements, pour essayer de distinguer les conversations pertinentes de celles qui ne l'Ã©taient pas . Certaines conversations ne furent donc pas transcrites alors que d'autres le furent en entier ou en rÃ©sumÃ©, d'autres enfin portant la mention Â« sans importance Â» . Les . . . mai et . . . juin 1977 respectivement, la cour d'appel de Hambourg rejeta les requÃªtes au motif que le point de savoir quels enregistrements et quelles transcriptions concernaient l'action pÃ©nale intentÃ©e contre G . et relevaient donc bien de l'ordonnance du juge d'instruction fÃ©dÃ©ral autorisant l'Ã©coute tÃ©lÃ©phonique ne pourrait Ãªtre tranchÃ© qu'8 l'issue du procÃ©s pÃ©nal, lorsque la juridiction de jugement aurait apprÃ©ciÃ© les preuves recueillies et, notamment, les tÃ©moignages . La cour estimait en effet que l'importance des enregistrements ne pourrait Ãªtre Ã©valuÃ©e qu'aprÃ¨s audition des tÃ©moins au procÃ¨s .
Les requÃ©rants formÃ¨rent un recours constitutionnel contre les ordonnances des . . . mai et . . . juin 1977 . Ce recours fut rejetÃ© le . . . fÃ©vrier 1978 par un collÃ©ge de trois juges de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale (Bundesverfassungsgericht) . La Cour se rÃ©fÃ©rait Ã son arrÃªt du . . . janvier 1978 qu i - 182 -
dÃ©boutait dÃ©jÃ G . de son recours constitutionnel . G . s'Ã©tait Ã©galement plaint du rejet par la cour d'appel de Hambourg de sa demande visant Ã obtenir la destruction des informations recueillies par l'Ã©coute, sur ses lignes tÃ©lÃ©phoniques, des appels qui n'avaient rien Ã voir avec l'affaire . La Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale dÃ©clara que les dÃ©cisions de la cour d'appel de Hambourg n'enfreignaient aucun droit inscrit dans la Constitution puisqu'elles n'Ã©taient nullement arbitraires mais au contraire fondÃ©es sur une apprÃ©ciation des faits l'ayant amenÃ©e Ã conclure que les documents en question pourraient encore se rÃ©vÃ©ler importants . Mais en supposant mÃªme que tout ou partie des conversations enregistrÃ©es fussent sans rapport avec la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, les dÃ©cisions de la cour d'appel n'avaient rien d'arbitraire puisque certains des documents considÃ©rÃ©s sur le moment comme sans importance risquaient nÃ©anmoins de se rÃ©vÃ©ler importants en dÃ©finitive . En outre, passer au crible les renseignements obtenus par l'Ã©coute tÃ©lÃ©phonique secrÃ©te, aurait pris beaucoup de temps et retardÃ© considÃ©rablement le dÃ©roulement de la procÃ©dure . Aussi Ã©tait-il justifiÃ© de remettre Ã plus tard le choix des documents Ã dÃ©truire .
GRIEF S Les requÃ©rants font valoir que leurs conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avec Me G . et ses collaborateurs n'avaient manifestement aucun lien ni aucune importance au regard de l'action pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre G . Ils en concluent que leur enregistrement n'Ã©tait pas autorisÃ© par l'ordonnance du juge d'instruction permettant l'Ã©coute . Ils allÃ©guent en consÃ©quence une violation de l'article 8 de la Convention .
EN DROI T 1 . Les requÃ©rants se plaignent que leurs conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avec le cabinet d'avocat de MM . G . et Cie . aient Ã©tÃ© enregistrÃ©es et transcrites et que les autoritÃ©s se refusent Ã dÃ©truire ces enregistrements bien que, selon eux, leur contenu ne concerne pas les activitÃ©s criminelles dont G . Ã©tait soupÃ§onnÃ© . Les requÃ©rants ont formÃ© un recours constitutionnel contre les arrÃªts de la cour d'appel de Hambourg rejetant leur demande de destruction des enregistrements . Ils ont donc Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, ce que, d'ailleurs, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur ne conteste pas .
Ils ont Ã©galement observÃ© le dÃ©lai de 6 mois lart . 26 de la Convention) puisque la dÃ©cision dÃ©finitive c'est-Ã -dire celle du collÃ©ge des trois juges de l a _18S_
Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale, a Ã©tÃ© rendue le . . . fÃ©vrier 1978, et que leur requÃªte a Ã©tÃ© introduite le 26 juillet 1978 . 2 . Les enregistrements incriminÃ©s ayant Ã©tÃ© dÃ©truits entre temps, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient qu'en consÃ©quence les requÃ©rants ne peuvent plus se considÃ©rer comme victimes de la violation qu'ils allÃ©guent . Toutefois, les enregistrements n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© dÃ©truits parce que les requÃ©rants le demandaient mais parce que, la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale contre G . ayant pris fin, ils n'Ã©taient plus nÃ©cessaires . Les requÃ©rants n'ont donc pas reÃ§u satisfaction quant Ã l'objet de leur requÃªte, selon laquelle leurs conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques n'auraient pas dÃ» Ãªtre enregistrÃ©es ou du moins qu'elles auraientd0 Ã©tre dÃ©truites plus tÃ´t . Aussi, les requÃ©rants ont-ils toujours le caractÃ©re de victimes mÃªme si les enregistrements en question n'existent plus . 3 . Les requÃ©rants ont invoquÃ© l'article 8, paragraphe 1 de la Convention et le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur n'a pas contestÃ© qu'il y ait eu ingÃ©rence dans leur Â« vie privÃ©e n et dans leur a correspondance Â» . De fait, la Commission et la Cour europÃ©ennes des Droits de l'Homme ont constatÃ©, dans l'affaire Klass et autres contre la RÃ©publique FÃ©dÃ©rale d'Allemagne, que ces notions recouvrent Ã©galement les conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques . IVoir l'ArrÃ¨t rendu par la Cour le 6 septembre 1978, par . 41) .
Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient que les mesures en question Ã©taient justifiÃ©es au regard de l'article 8, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Les requÃ©rants n'ont pas contestÃ© que la dÃ©cision autorisant l'Ã©coule des conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques de G . et Cie fÃ»t prÃ©vue par la loi et nÃ©cessaire dans une sociÃ©tÃ© dÃ©mocratique aux objectifs prÃ©cisÃ©s au paragraphe 2 de l'article B . Ils ont toutefois soulignÃ© que, conformÃ©ment Ã l'ordonnance en question, celle qu'avait Ã©mise le . . . avril 1975 le juge d'instruction de la Cour fÃ©dÃ©rale,les conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques concernant la pralique juridique normale du cabinet et n'ayant manifestement aucun lien avec les actes criminels du suspect n'auraient pas d0 Ãªtre enregistrÃ©es ou auraient d0 Ãªtre immÃ©diatement effacÃ©es . Ils soutiennent que cette ordonnance n'a donc pas Ã©tÃ© respectÃ©e par les agents de police chargÃ©s de l'Ã©coute tÃ©lÃ©phonique et que les conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques des requÃ©rants avec G . ou ses collaborateurs ont Ã©tÃ© enregistrÃ©es et transcrites alors mÃªme qu'elles ne concernaient aucun acte criminel . La Commission relÃ©ve tout d'abord qu'en fait, le Procureur gÃ©nÃ©ral fÃ©dÃ©ral a reconnu dans son rapport du . . . janvier 1977 Ã la cour d'appel de Hambourg que tous les appels tÃ©lÃ©phoniques arrivant au cabinet juridique de G . Ã©taient automatiquement enregistrÃ©s sur bandes et que rien n'en Ã©tait effacÃ© pour Ã©viter ultÃ©rieurement tout soupÃ§on de manipulation . Cette pratique Ã©taient manifestement en contradiction avec les instructions donnÃ©es par le juge d'instruction dans l'ordonnance du . . . avril 1975, qui limitait le champ de la surveillance clandestine . Toutefois, quelque regrettable qu'i l
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soit, le fait que d'une maniÃ¨re gÃ©nÃ©rale, les autoritÃ©s chargÃ©es de l'Ã©coute tÃ©lÃ©phonique n'aient pas pleinement respectÃ© les instructions qui leur avaient Ã©tÃ© donnÃ©es, ne constitue pas en soi une violation de la Convention, notamment de son article 8, paragraphe 1 . La Commission a pris en considÃ©ration le fait que la cour d'appel de Hambourg a rejetÃ© la demande des requÃ©rants de dÃ©truire les enregistrements de leurs conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques avec G et ses collaborateurs, approuvant par lÃ©-mÃ©me l'action du parquet . II en alla de mÃ©me de la Cour constitutionnelle fÃ©dÃ©rale, qui les a dÃ©boutÃ©s de leurs recours constitutionnels . Dans ces conditions, on ne saurait en conclure que les enregistrements en question n'Ã©taient pas prÃ©vus par la loi allemande, autrement dit que les mesures de surveillance ne satisfaisaient pas aux conditions et aux procÃ©dures fixÃ©es par le lÃ©gislateur (cf . 100a et 100b du Code de ProcÃ©dure pÃ©nale - StP01 . La Commission a examinÃ© en outre si les enregistrements avaient Ã©tÃ© faits conformÃ©ment Ã un ou plusieurs des objectifs Ã©numÃ©rÃ©s Ã l'article 8, paragraphe 2 de la Convention . Incontestablement, la loi autorisant l'Ã©coute clandestine et, en l'occurrence, la surveillance du cabinet juridique de G ., visait bien Ã la protection de la sOretÃ© publique ou Ã la prÃ©vention des infractions pÃ©nales, puisqu'il y avait des raisons de soupÃ§onner G . de favoriser une association de malfaiteurs et que G . fut ultÃ©rieurement condamnÃ© sur ce chef (Sur la lÃ©gislation concernant l'Ã©coute clandestine, cf . l'arrÃ©t rendu dans l'affaire Klass, op . cit, para . 461 . Les requÃ©rants contestent toutefois que, dans leur cas, l'enregistrement des conversations tÃ©lÃ©phoniques ait Ã©tÃ© nÃ©cessaire Ã l'objectif prÃ©citÃ© . La Commission relÃ©ve Ã cet Ã©gard que, dans l'intervalle, c'est-Ã©-dire depuis la condamnation de G ., les enregistrements ont Ã©tÃ© dÃ©truits et n'ont pas Ã©tÃ© utilisÃ©s dans un autre but, ce qui montre bien qu'ils sont demeurÃ©s disponibles comme d'Ã©ventuels Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve dans l'action intentÃ©e contre G . La Commission relÃ©ve en outre que, selon la cour d'appel de Hambourg IdÃ©cisions des . . . mai et . . . juin 1977), la rÃ©ponse dÃ©finitive Ã la question Â« de savoir quels enregistrements seraient finalement utiles dans l'affaire G Â» ne pouvait Ãªtre donnÃ©e qu'9 l'issue de la procÃ©dure pÃ©nale dirigÃ©e contre G ., aprÃ©s Ã©valuation de l'ensemble des Ã©lÃ©ments recueillis, y compris les dÃ©clarations des tÃ©moins au procÃ©s . Compte tenu de ce que, parmi les activitÃ©s criminelles dont G . Ã©tait soupÃ§onnÃ© figurait, selon l'ordonnance prise par le juge d'instruction le . . . avril 1975, la diffusion de propagande terroriste incitant Ã une rÃ©volution par la violence, et Ã©tant donnÃ© que les requÃ©rants ont pris contact avec le cabinet d'avocat de G . en leur qualitÃ© de journalistes, la Commission estime que, dans ces conditions, les motifs donnÃ©s par les autoritÃ©s allemandes pour conserver ces moyens de preuve n'Ã©taient ni injustifiÃ©s ni arbitraires . La Commission en conclut donc que conserver les enregistrements jusqu'Ã la condamnation dÃ©finitive de G . Ã©tait bien nÃ©cessaire Ã la protection de la sÃ©curitÃ© nationale et Ã la prÃ©vention des infractions pÃ©nales .
. - 185 -
II convient de relever que les mesures incriminÃ©es ne paraissent nullement avoir restreint ou lÃ©sÃ© l'exercice des activitÃ©s professionnelles des requÃ©rants . On ne saurait donc en conclure qu'elles Ã©taient disproportionnÃ©es aux objectifs lÃ©gitimes qu'elles visaient . L'examen par la Commission de ce grief, tel qu'il a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©, ne fait donc pas apparaÃ®tre une violation des droits et libertÃ©s consacrÃ©s par la Convention, notamment en son article B . Il s'ensuit que la requÃ©te est manifestement mal fondÃ©e, au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2 de la Convention .
Par ces motifs, la Commission DECLARE LA RE Q UETEIRRECEVABLE .
- 186-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/12/1979Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page