Source: http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=3713
Timestamp: 2020-08-07 12:53:37
Document Index: 125814479

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 181', 'Art.\n181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art.\t178', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art.\n181', 'Art.\t181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 158', 'Art. 178', 'Art.\t158', 'Art. 178', 'Art.\n181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181', 'Art. 181']

MOHD. USMAN MILITARY CONTRACTOR, JHANSI versus UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
1969 AIR 474	1969 SCR (2) 232
MOHD. USMAN MILITARY CONTRACTOR, JHANSI V. UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE [1968] RD-SC 230 (26 September 1968)
CITATION: 1969 AIR 474	1969 SCR (2) 232
D	1988 SC1172	(5)
Indian	Arbitration Act, 1940, ss. 8	and 20--Applications under--Whether subject to limitation	laid down, in Art. 181--Limitation Act, 1908--Effect	of--General Clauses Act, 1897, s. 8(1).
The	appellant entered into a contract	with	the Government of India. The contract contained an	arbitration clause.For certain supplies made under the contract	the appellant made representations to the Government	or payment	and	for arbitration of disputes.On	or about	July 10, 1958	Government refused	to refer the matter for arbitration. On July 11, 1961 the appellant flied an application in the Court of	the District Judge under ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for filing the arbitration agreement and for an order of reference of the disputes to an arbitrator appointed by the	court. The respondent contended that the application was barred by Limitation. The District Judge allowed the	application, holding that	there was no	limitation for	making	an application under ss. 8 and 20.	The defendant's appeal	was dismissed by the High Court as incompetent in	so far	as it challenged	the order under s. 8 but was allowed in so far as it challenged the order under s. 20. The High Court held that an application under s. 20 is governed 'by	Art.
181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. In coming to	this conclusion the	High Court took into account	the settled judicial view that the. operation of Art. 181 is limited to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. and reasoned as follows: Article 181 should be construed as if the words 'under	the Code' were added in it. The Arbitration	Act, 1940 repealed	paragraph 17 of the second schedule to	the Code and re-enacted it in s. 70 with minor modifications.
That being so s. 8(1)	of the General Clauses	Act,	1897 applied	and the implied reference in Art. 181 to paragraph 17 of the second schedule to the Code should be construed as a reference to s. 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Appeal against	the	High Court's judgment	was	filed	with certificate.
By	the Arbitration Act, 1940 the	Legislature amended Arts. 158 and	178 of the Limitation	Act and made	them applicable to the relevant proceedings under the Arbitration Act but no similar change was made in Art. 181. It is manifest that save as provided in Arts. 158 and 178 there would not be any limitation for other applications under the Act. Further there is nothing to indicate that for	the purpose	of limitation s. 20 of the 1940 Act should be regarded as a re-enactment of the corresponding provision of the Code and not of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899.	[236 D-G] In the circumstances it is not possible to construe the implied reference in Art. 181 to the Code of Civil Procedure as a reference to the Arbitration Act, 1940 or to hold	that Art. 181 applies to applications under that Act. The	rule of construction given in s. 8(1)of the General Clauses	Act cannot be applied, as it appears that the legislature had a 233 different intention. It follows that an application under ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is not governed by Art. 181. The Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for such an application. [236 G-H] The present application under ss. 8 and 20 was therefore not barred by limitation. [237 A] Bai	Manekbai v. Manekji Kavasji, [1880] I.L.R. 7 Born.
213, 214 Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidator	Dehra	Dun Mussourie Electric Tramway Company, (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 13, 20, Shah Mulchand & Co. v. Jawahar	Mills	Ltd. [1953] S.C.R.	351, 371, Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709 and Wazirchand Mahajan & Anr. v. Union of India, [1967] 1 S.C.R. 303, referred
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14	of 1968.
Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated December 12, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in F.A.F.O.	No. 401 of 1963.
R.M. Hazarnavis, K.L. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for	the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. By a contract, dated March 8, 1945,	the appellant agreed to supply meat to the Government of India.
The contract contained an arbitration clause for reference of disputes arising out of the contract to the officer named in the contract. The appellant claims that a	sum of	Rs.
8,38,994/10/6/- is due to him in respect of the supplies of meat made by him during the period between April 1, 1945 and March 31, 1946. He made representations to. the Government for payment and for arbitration of the disputes. On or about July 10, 1958 the Government refused to. refer	the matter	to. arbitration. On July 11,	1961 the appellant filed an application in the Court of the District Judge, Jhansi, under ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940	for filing	the arbitration agreement and for an order of reference of the disputes to an arbitrator appointed by	the Court. The respondent contended that the application	was barred	by limitation.	The District	Judge allowed	the application. He held that there was no period of limitation for making an application under ss. 8 and 20. The defendant filed an appeal against the order. The High Court dismissed the appeal as incompetent in so far as it challenged	the order under s. 8, and allowed it in so far as it challenged the order under s. 20. The High Court held that	the application was governed by	Art. 181 of	the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and was barred by limitation as it	was made more than three years after the disputes	had arisen.
The appellant	has filed this	appeal	after	obtaining a certificate from the High Court.
The point in issue is whether an application under s.
20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is governed by Art. 181 of the Indian L2Sup. CI 69--16 234 Limitation Act. Since the decision in Bai	Manekbai v.
Manekli Kavasji(1) it is well settled that the operation of Art. 181 is limited to applications under the Code of Civil	Procedure. In	that case Westropp,	C.J. after referring to the corresponding Art.	178 in	the second schedule to the	Limitation Act of 1877 observed:
"An examination of all the other articles in the	second schedule relating	to "applications", that is to say of the Third division	of that schedule, shows that	the applications therein contemplated are such as are made under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Hence it	is natural to	conclude that	the applications referred to in Article 178	are applications ejusdem	generis, i.e., applications under the Code	of Civil Procedure. The preamble of the Act, moreover, purports	to deal with 'certain applications' only, and not with all applications." This decision	was followed in numerous cases and	was approved in Hansraj Gupta v. Official Liquidator Dehra	Dun, Mussourie Electric Tramway Company(2). Having regard to these decisions, Das, J. said in Shah Mulchand & Co., v.
Jawahar	Mills Ltd. (3): "This long catena of decisions	may well be said to have as it were, added the word 'under	the Code' in the first column of that Article=." The Court held that the amendment of Arts. 15 8 and 178 and the insertion of the words "under the Arbitration Act, 1940" in place of the words "under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" did	not alter the settled meaning of Art. 181. To the same effect is the decision in Bombay Gas Ca.:	v. Gopal Bhiva.(4) Following these decisions the Court	held in Wazirchand Mahajan & Anr. v. Union of India(5) that an	application under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act,	1940 not being an application under the	Code of Civil	Procedure was	not governed by Art. 181.
The	High Court has come to the	conclusion that an application under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act is governed by Art. 181 for the following reasons: Article 181 should be construed as if the words "under the Code" were added in it.
The Arbitration Act,	1940 repealed paragraph	17 of	the second schedule to the Code and re-enacted it in s. 20	with minor modifications. That being so, s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act. 1897 applied and the implied reference in	Art.
181 to	paragraph 17 of the second schedule to the	Code should	be construed as a reference	to s.	20 of	the Arbitration Act, 1940. No different intention is to be found in the Arbitration Act, 1940 and there is nothing to indi- (1) [1880] I.L.R. 7 Bom. 213, 214.
235 cate that an application under s. 20 can be made at any time without any limitation.
The	argument that the implied reference in	Art.	181 to paragraph 17 of the second schedule to the Code should be construed as a reference to s. 20 of the Arbitration Act and not raised and considered in Wazirchand Mahalan's case(1).
Section 8 (1) of the General Clauses Act corresponds to the Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 vict. c. 63)	and runs as follows: "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former	enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed, shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to	the provision so reenacted."	The section embodies the rule of construction that where the provision of an	Act is	repealed and re-enacted with	or without modification, a reference to the repealed provision in	any other enactment should be regarded as a reference to	the provision re-enacted in the new form unless it appears that the legislature had a different intention.
The	Arbitration Act, 1940 was passed with	a view to consolidate and amend	the law relating to	arbitration.
Formerly the general law relating to arbitration was to be found in the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Paragraphs 1 to 16 of	the second schedule to the Code applied to all arbitrations in suits.
As to	arbitrations otherwise than in	suits,	the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899	applied to cases where, if	the subject-matter submitted to arbitration were the subject of a suit, the suit could be instituted in a Presidency town;
in other cases, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applied The Arbitration Act, 1940 repealed both the enactments.	It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu	and Kashmir, and save as provided in s.	47 applies to	all arbitrations. As to the provisions of the new Act under which applications can be made to Court, ss. 8, 14, 16, 28 and 30, correspond to provisions which are found in both the repealed enactments, ss. 5 and 9 correspond	to similar provisions in the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, and ss. 15 and 20	correspond to similar	provisions in	the second schedule to the Code and some sections such as sec. 11,	are entirely new.	In the circumstances, a question may arise whether the provisions of the new Act can be	regarded as reenactments of the repeated	provisions of	the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 or of the Code.	But for the purpose of this case we shall ,assume that s. 20 of the new Act is a re-enactment with (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 303.
236 modification of paragraph 17 of the second schedule to	the Code.We	shall also assume that Art. 181 of the Limitation Act as	construed by	the Courts should be	regarded as containing a reference to the Code	of Civil procedure including paragraph 17 of the second schedule thereof.	Even after making those two assumptions it appears to us that the implied reference in Art. 181 to the Code of Civil Procedure cannot	be construed as a reference to the Arbitration	Act, 1940.
Before their amendment by the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, Art. 158 of the Limitation Act applied to	applications "under	the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to set aside an award" and Art. 178 applied to applications. "under the same Code for the filing in Court of an award".The	Arbitration Act, 1940 amended Arts. 158 and 178. The amended Art.	158 applies to applications "under the Arbitration Act, 1940 to set aside an	award or to get an	award remitted	for consideration", that is to say, to application under ss. 16 and 30	of the Act.	The amended Art. 178	applies to applications "under the Arbitration Act, 1940 for the filing in Court of an award", that is to say to applications under s. 14	of the	Act. In amending Arts. 158 and 178 the legislature acted upon the view that the references to	the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the second schedule t9	the Limitation Act could not in the absence of the amendment be construed as references to. the Arbitration Act, 1940.	At the same time the legislature refrained from amending	Art.
181 and providing that the article will apply to other applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940. It	is manifest that the legislature intended that save as provided in articles 158 and 178 there would not be any limitation for other applications under the Act,	Take the case of an application under s. 28 of the Act for enlargement of	the time for making the award. A	similar application under paragraph 8 of the second schedule to the Code was governed by Art. 181,but a like application under s. 12 of the Indian Arbitration Act,1899 was not subject	to any period of limitation. There is	nothing to indicate that for	the purpose	of limitation	s. 20 of the	new Act should be regarded as a re-enactment of the corresponding provision of the. Code and not of the Indian	Arbitration Act, 1899. An application under s.	8 of the new Act corresponding to paragraph 5 of the second schedule to the Code and s. 8 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 stand on the same footing.
In the	circumstances, it is not possible to construe	the implied reference in Art. 181 to the Code of Civil Procedure as a reference to the Arbitration Act, 1940, or to hold that Art. 181 applies to applications under that Act. The rule of construction given in s. 8 (1) of the General	Clauses	Act cannot be applied, as it appears that the legislature had a different intention. It follows that an application under ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is	not 237 governed by Art. 181. The Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of	limitation for	such an application. It follows	that the present application under ss. 8 and 20 is not barred by limitation.
In conclusion we must observe that the appellant's claim relates to supplies during the period between April 1,	1945 and March 31, 1946. There is a serious contention whether the claim is barred by limitation. It will be the duty of the arbitrator	to consider this matter carefully and to decide whether or not the claim is so barred.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of	the High Court is	set aside and the order of the District.
Judge,	Jhansi,	is restored. In the circumstances of	the case, there will be no order as to costs in this Court.