Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20170621_0023261.NY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2017-07-22 14:53:46
Document Index: 2138329

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 50', '§ 50', '§\n3813', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50', '§ 50']

| In re D.M.(Anonymous)
In re D.M.(Anonymous)
In the Matter of D. M. (Anonymous), an infant under the age of fourteen (14) by his mother and natural guardian,v.Center Moriches Union Free School District, appellant. Kerri-Anne M. (Anonymous), et al., respondents, Index No. 14828/15
& Fishlinger, Uniondale, NY (Kathleen D. Foley of
& Dean, PLLC (Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York, NY
[Scott T. Horn], of counsel), for respondents.
E. CHAMBERS, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX,
proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)
for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the Center
Moriches Union Free School District appeals from an order of
the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mayer, J.), dated February
3, 2016, which granted the petition.
that the order is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of
discretion, with costs, the petition is denied, and the
infant petitioner allegedly was injured in gym class on
September 5, 2014. On August 24, 2015, the petitioners
commenced this proceeding for leave to serve a late notice of
claim upon the Center Moriches Union Free School District
(hereinafter the School District) pursuant to General
Municipal Law § 50-e(5). In the order appealed from, the
Supreme Court granted the petition. We reverse.
determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of
claim, the court must consider whether (1) the school
district acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts
constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose
or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the injured child was an
infant at the time the claim arose and, if so, whether there
was a nexus between the infancy and the failure to serve a
timely notice of claim, (3) the petitioner demonstrated a
reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of
claim, and (4) the school district was substantially
prejudiced by the delay in its ability to maintain its
defense on the merits (see Education Law §
3813[2-a]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]; Horn v
Bellmore Union Free Sch. Dist., 139 A.D.3d 1006, 1007;
Matter of Saponara v Lakeland Cent. Sch. Dist., 138
A.D.3d 870, 870-871; Matter of Quinn v Wallkill Cent.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 131 A.D.3d 1063, 1063-1064).
Although "the presence or absence of any one factor is
not necessarily determinative" (Matter of Tonissen v
Huntington U.F.S.D., 80 A.D.3d 704, 705), "[t]he
first of these factors, actual knowledge of the essential
facts underlying the claim, is the most important"
(Matter of A.C. v West Babylon Union Free Sch.
Dist., 147 A.D.3d 1047, 1048; see Matter of Felice v
Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d 138,
contrary to the petitioners' contention, they failed to
establish that the School District "acquired actual
knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim"
within 90 days of the accident or a reasonable time
thereafter (General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]). Although a
medical claim form was prepared and submitted to the School
District four days after the accident occurred, it merely
indicated that the infant petitioner lacerated his eyebrow
and fractured his wrist when he fell after hanging from a
pull-up bar during physical education class. Where, as here,
"the incident and the injury do not necessarily occur
only as the result of fault for which [the School District]
may be liable" (Matter of Felice v Eastport/South
Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d at 147-148), the
School District's "knowledge of the accident and the
injury, without more, does not constitute actual knowledge of
the essential facts constituting the claim'"
(id., quoting General Municipal Law § 50-e[5];
see Matter of A.C. v West Babylon Union Free Sch.
Dist., 147 A.D.3d at 1048; Matter of Saponara v
Lakeland Cent. Sch. Dist., 138 A.D.3d at 871-872).
Rather, "[i]n order to have actual knowledge of the
essential facts constituting the claim, [a school district]
must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal
theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the
notice of claim" (Matter of Felice v Eastport/South
Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d at 148; see
Iglesias v Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 118 A.D.3d
785). Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the
medical claim form did not provide the School District with
actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the
petitioners' claims that, inter alia, it was negligent in
its ownership, operation, management, maintenance, and
control of the area where the accident occurred, that it was
negligent in its hiring, training, and supervision of its
employees and agents, or that its employees were negligent in
supervising the injured petitioner and responding to the
accident (see Matter of A.C. v West Babylon Union Free
Sch. Dist., 147 A.D.3d at 1048; Matter of Saponara v
the petitioners failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for
the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the
delay in filing the petition (see Matter of A.C. v West
Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 147 A.D.3d at 1048;
A.D.3d at 871; Matter of Hampson v Connetquot Cent. Sch.
Dist., 114 A.D.3d 790, 791). While the injured
petitioner here is an infant, the failure to serve a timely
notice of claim and the delay in seeking leave to serve a
late notice of claim were not the product of the infant
petitioner's infancy (see Matter of A.C. v West
A.D.3d at 871; Matter of Sparrow v Hewlett-Woodmere Union
Free Sch. Dist. [#14], 110 A.D.3d 905, 906).
as to the issue of substantial prejudice, the petitioners
presented no evidence or plausible argument that their delay
in serving a notice of claim did not substantially prejudice
the School District in defending on the merits (see
Matter of Newcomb v Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28
N.Y.3d at 466; Matter of A.C. v West Babylon Union Free
Sch. Dist., 147 A.D.3d at 1048). The assertion contained
in the affirmation of the petitioners' attorney which was
submitted in support of their motion, that the School
District was not substantially prejudiced by the delay in
serving a notice of claim, was conclusory and, without more,
inadequate to satisfy the petitioners' minimal initial
burden with respect to this factor (cf. Matter of Newcomb
v Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 N.Y.3d at
under the circumstances of this case, upon consideration of
the relevant factors (see General Municipal Law
§ 50-e[5]), the Supreme Court should ...