Source: http://www.chanrobles.com/usa/us_supremecourt/339/763/case.php
Timestamp: 2019-07-17 08:17:26
Document Index: 29705232

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2243', '§ 903', '§ 4', '§ 454', '§ 21', '§ 8', '§ 2', '§ 126']

Twenty-one German nationals petitioned the District Court of the District of Columbia for writs of habeas corpus. They alleged that, prior to May 8, 1945, they were in service of German armed forces in China. They amended to allege that their employment there was by civilian agencies of the German Government. Their exact affiliation is disputed, and, for our purposes, immaterial. On May 8, 1945, the German High Command chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petition alleges, and respondents denied, that the jailer is subject to their direction. The Court of Appeals assumed, and we do likewise, that, while prisoners are chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A rule to show cause issued, to which the United States made return. Thereupon the petition was dismissed on authority of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188.
The obvious importance of these holdings to both judicial administration and military operations impelled us to grant certiorari. 338 U.S. 877. The case is before us only on issues of law. The writ of habeas corpus must be granted "unless it appears from the application" that the applicants are not entitled to it. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes. Absence of support from legislative or juridical sources is implicit in the statement of the court below that "The answers stem directly from fundamentals. They cannot be found by casual reference to statutes or cases." The breadth of the court's premises and solution requires us to consider questions basic to alien enemy and kindred litigation which for some years have been beating upon our doors. [Footnote 1]
Modern American law has come a long way since the time when outbreak of war made every enemy national chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
an outlaw, subject to both public and private slaughter, cruelty, and plunder. But even by the most magnanimous view, our law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, [Footnote 2] nor between resident enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments.
With the citizen we are now little concerned, except to set his case apart as untouched by this decision and to take measure of the difference between his status and that of all categories of aliens. Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor diminished the importance of citizenship, nor have they sapped the vitality of a citizen's claims upon his government for protection. If a person's claim to United States citizenship is denied by any official, Congress has directed our courts to entertain his action to declare him to be a citizen "regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad." 54 Stat. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903. This Court long ago extended habeas corpus to one seeking admission to the country to assure fair hearing of his claims to citizenship, @ 208 U. S. 467.
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. During his probationary residence, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
this Court has steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation except upon full and fair hearing. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460; Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm'r, 273 U. S. 103; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33. And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the person and property of resident aliens important constitutional guaranties -- such as the due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
(Italics supplied.) 118 U. S. 118 U.S. 356, 118 U. S. 369. And in The Japanese Immigrant Case, the Court held its processes available to
189 U.S. 86, 189 U. S. 101.
It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien's status. The security and protection enjoyed while the nation of his allegiance remains in amity with the United States are greatly impaired when his nation takes up arms against us. While his lot is far more humane chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
12 U. S. 161. See also 61 U. S. 249. Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187, 92 U. S. 194. And this without regard to his individual sentiments or disposition. The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568, 176 U. S. 571. The alien enemy is bound by an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The United States does not invoke this enemy allegiance only for its own interest, but respects it also when to the enemy's advantage. In World War I, our conscription act did not subject the alien enemy to compulsory military service. 40 Stat. 885, c. XII, § 4. The Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 454(a), exempts aliens who have not formally declared their intention to become citizens from military training, service and registration, if they make application, but if so relieved, they are barred from becoming citizens. Thus, the alien enemy status carries important immunities, as well as disadvantages. The United States does not ask him to violate his allegiance or to commit treason toward his own country for the sake of ours. This also is the doctrine and the practice of other states comprising our Western Civilization. [Footnote 5]
The essential pattern for seasonable Executive constraint of enemy aliens, not on the basis of individual prepossessions for their native land, but on the basis of political and legal relations to the enemy government, was laid down in the very earliest days of the Republic and has endured to this day. It was established by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798. 1 Stat. 577, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 21. And it is to be noted that, while the Alien and Sedition Acts of that year provoked a reaction which helped sweep the party of Mr. Jefferson into power in 1800, and though his party proceeded to undo what was regarded as the mischievous legislation of the Federalists, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
this enactment was never repealed. [Footnote 6] Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security. This is in keeping with the practices of the most enlightened of nations, and has resulted in treatment of alien enemies more considerate than that chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The resident enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment, and deportation whenever a "declared war" exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy Act. Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will not inquire into any other issue as to his internment. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160. [Footnote 7] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 317 U. S. 75.
But the nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have been this qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy. Our law on this subject first emerged about 1813, when the Supreme Court of the New York had occasion, in a series of cases, to examine the foremost authorities of the Continent and of England. It concluded the rule of the common law and the law of nations to be that alien enemies resident in the country of the enemy could not maintain an action in its courts during the period of hostilities. Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. 183; Jackson ex dem. Johnston v. Decker, 11 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Johns. 418; Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 70, 74-75. This Court has recognized that rule, 81 U. S. 236; 85 U. S. 105, and followed it, Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510, and it continues to be the law throughout this country and in England. [Footnote 8]
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the prisoner will be produced before the court. This is the crux of the statutory scheme established by the Congress; [Footnote 9] indeed, it is inherent in the very term "habeas corpus." [Footnote 10] And though production of the prisoner may be dispensed with where it appears on the face of the application that no cause for granting the writ exists, Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 312 U. S. 284, we have consistently adhered to and recognized the general rule. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188, 335 U. S. 190-191. To grant the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The prisoners rely, however, upon two decisions of this Court to get them over the threshold -- Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, and In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1. Reliance on the Quirin case is clearly mistaken. Those prisoners were in custody in the District of Columbia. One was, or chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Despite this, the doors of our courts have not been summarily closed upon these prisoners. Three courts have considered their application and have provided their counsel opportunity to advance every argument in their chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
support and to show some reason in the petition why they should not be subject to the usual disabilities of nonresident enemy aliens. This is the same preliminary hearing as to sufficiency of application that was extended in Quirin, supra, Yamashita, supra, and Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U. S. 197. After hearing all contentions they have seen fit to advance and considering every contention we can base on their application and the holdings below, we arrive at the same conclusion the Court reached in each of those cases, viz.: that no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears.
"First. The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, applies to 'any person.' Second. Action of Government officials in violation of the Constitution is void. This is the ultimate essence of the present controversy. Third. A basic and inherent function of the judicial branch of a government built upon a constitution is to set aside void action by government officials, and so to restrict executive action to the confines of the constitution. In our jurisprudence, no Government action which is void under the Constitution is exempt from judicial power. Fourth. The writ
And if the Fifth be held to embrace these prisoners because it uses the inclusive term "no person," the Sixth must, for it applies to all "accused." No suggestion is advanced by the court below or by prisoners of any constitutional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals has cited no authority whatever for holding that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and whatever their offenses, except to quote extensively from a dissenting opinion in In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 327 U. S. 26. The holding of the Court in that case is, of course, to the contrary.
If this Amendment invests enemy aliens in unlawful hostile action against us with immunity from military trial, it puts them in a more protected position than our own soldiers. American citizens conscripted into the military service are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights, and, as members of the military establishment, are subject to its discipline, including military trials for offenses against aliens or Americans. Cf. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U. S. 695; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684. Can there be any doubt that our foes would also have been excepted but for the assumption "any person" would never be read to include those in arms against us? It would be a paradox indeed if what the Amendment denied to Americans it guaranteed to enemies. And, of course, it cannot be claimed that such shelter is due them as a matter of comity for any reciprocal rights conferred by enemy governments on American soldiers. [Footnote 11] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The decision below would extend coverage of our Constitution to nonresident alien enemies denied to resident alien enemies. The latter are entitled only to judicial hearing to determine what the petition of these prisoners admits: that they are really alien enemies. When that appears, those resident here may be deprived of liberty by Executive action without hearing. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160. While this is preventive, rather than punitive, detention, no reason is apparent why an alien enemy charged with having committed a crime should have greater immunities from Executive action than one who it is only feared might at some future time commit a hostile act.
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view. Cf. 182 U. S. Bidwell, 182 U.S. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, 327 U. S. 312, 327 U. S. 313-314. And we have held in the Quirin and Yamashita cases, supra, that the Military Commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against the laws of war. [Footnote 12]
327 U. S. 327 U.S. 1, 327 U. S. 8. "We consider here only the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged." Ibid.
"That capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to is an old customary rule, since enacted by Article 35 of the Hague Regulations. [Footnote 13] Any act contrary to a capitulation would constitute an international delinquency if ordered by a belligerent Government, and a war crime if committed without such order. Such violation may be met by reprisals or punishment of the offenders as war criminals."
Law of Nations, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We can only read "(b)" to mean either that the presence of the military forces of the United States in China at the times in question was unconstitutional, or, if lawfully there, that they had no right under the Constitution to set up a Military Commission on Chinese territory. But it can hardly be meant that it was unconstitutional for the Government of the United States to wage a war in foreign parts. Among powers granted to Congress by the Constitution is power to provide for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, Art. I, § 8, Const. It also gives power to make rules concerning captures on land and water, ibid., which this Court has construed as an independent substantive power. @ 12 U. S. 126. Indeed, out of seventeen specific paragraphs of congressional power, eight of them are devoted in whole or in part to specification of powers connected with warfare. The first of the enumerated powers of the President is that he shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. Art. II, § 2, Const. And, of course, grant of war power includes all that is necessary and proper for carrying these powers into execution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Certainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation -- even by a citizen -- which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region. China appears to have fully consented to the trial within her territories, and, if China had complaint at the presence of American forces there, China's grievance does not become these prisoners' right. The issue tendered by "(b)" involves a challenge to conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively responsible. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103.
These prisoners do not assert, and could not, that anything in the Geneva Convention makes them immune from prosecution or punishment for war crimes. [Footnote 14] Article 75 thereof expressly provides that a prisoner of war may be detained until the end of such proceedings and, if necessary, until the expiration of the punishment. 47 Stat. 2021, 2055.
The petition, however, makes two claims in the nature of procedural irregularities said to deprive the Military Commission of jurisdiction. One is that the United States was obliged to give the protecting power of Germany chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The District Court dismissed this petition on authority of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188. The Court of Appeals considered only questions which it regarded as reserved in that decision and in Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283. Those cases dealt with persons both residing and detained within the United States and whose capacity and standing to invoke the process of federal courts somewhere was unquestioned. The issue was where.
Since, in the present application, we find no basis for invoking federal judicial power in any district, we need chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
From January, 1948, to today, motions for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court, and applications treated by the Court as such, on behalf of over 200 German enemy aliens confined by American military authorities abroad were filed and denied. Brandt v. United States and 13 companion cases, 333 U.S. 836; In re Eichel (one petition on behalf of three persons), 333 U.S. 865; Everett v. Truman (one petition on behalf of 74 persons), 334 U.S. 824; In re Krautwurst, and 11 companion cases, 334 U.S. 826; In re Ehlen et al., and In re Girke et al., 334 U.S. 836; In re Gronwald et al., 334 U.S. 857; In re Stattmann, and 3 companion cases, 335 U.S. 805; In re Vetter, and 6 companion cases, 335 U.S. 841; In re Eckstein, 335 U.S. 851; In re Heim, 335 U.S. 856; In re Dammann, and 4 companion cases, 336 U.S. 922-923; In re Muhlbauer, and 57 companion cases, covering at least 80 persons, 336 U. S. 964; In re Felsch, 337 U.S. 953; In re Buerger, 338 U.S. 884; In re Hans, 339 U.S. 976; In re Schmidt, 339 U.S. 976; Lammers v. United States, 339 U.S. 976. And see also Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789.
". . . In the primary meaning of the words, an alien friend is the subject of a foreign state at peace with the United States; an alien enemy is the subject of a foreign state at war with the United States. 1 Kent, Comm. p. 55; 2 Halleck, Int.L. (Rev.1908) p. 1; Hall, Int.Law (7th Ed.) p. 403, § 126; Baty & Morgan, 'War: Its Conduct and Legal Results,' p. 247; 1 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 310; Sylvester's Case, 7 Mod. 150; The Roumanian, 1915, Prob.Div. 26; aff'd, 1916, 1 A.C. 124; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 437 [438,] 448; 61 U. S. 249; The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568, 176 U. S. 571; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561; so all the lexicographers, as, e.g.,@ Webster, Murray, Abbott, Black, Bouvier. . . ."
". . . In 1798, the 5th Congress passed three acts in rapid succession, "An Act concerning Aliens," approved June 25, 1798 (1 Stat. 570), "An Act respecting Alien Enemies," approved July 6, 1798 (1 Stat. 577), and "An Act in addition to the act, entitled An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,'" approved July 14, 1798. [1 Stat. 596.] The first and last were the Alien and Sedition Acts, vigorously attacked in Congress and by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as unconstitutional. But the members of Congress who vigorously fought the Alien Act saw no objection to the Alien Enemy Act. [8 Annals of Cong. 2035 (5th Cong., 1798).] In fact, Albert Gallatin, who led that opposition, was emphatic in distinguishing between the two bills and in affirming the constitutional power of Congress over alien enemies as part of the power to declare war. [Id. at 1980.] James Madison was the author of the Virginia Resolutions, and, in his report to the Virginia House of Delegates the ensuing year after the deluge of controversy, he carefully and with some tartness asserted a distinction between alien members of a hostile nation and alien members of a friendly nation, disavowed any relation of the Resolutions to alien enemies, and declared,"
"The courts, in an unbroken line of cases from Fries' Case [Case of Fries, C.C.D.Pa.1799, 9 Fed.Cas. at pages 826, 830 et seq., No. 5,126], in 1799 to Schwarzkopf's case [United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 1943, 137 F.2d 898] in 1943, have asserted or assumed the validity of the Act and based numerous decisions upon the assumption. [Brown v. United States, 1814, 8 Cranch 110; De Lacey v. United States, 1918, 249 F.6d 5, L.R.A.1918E, 1011; Grahl v. United States, 1919, 261 F.4d 7; Lockington's Case, 1813, Brightly, N.P., Pa. 269, 283; Lockington v. Smith, C.C.D.Pa. 1817, 15 Fed.Cas. page 758, No. 8,448; Ex parte Graber, D.C.N.D.Ala.1918, 247 F.8d 2; Minotto v. Bradley, D.C.N.D.Ill.1918, 252 F.6d 0; Ex parte Fronklin, D.C.Miss.1918, 253 F.9d 4; Ex parte Risse, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1919, 257 F.1d 2; Ex parte Gilroy, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1919, 257 F.1d 0.] The judicial view has been without dissent."
"All merchants, if they were not openly prohibited before, shall have their safe and sure conduct to depart out of England, to come into England, to tarry in, and go through England, as well by land as by water, to buy and sell without any manner of evil tolles by the old and rightful customs, except in time of war; and if they be of a land making war against us, and be found in our realm at the beginning of the wars, they shall be attached without harm of body or goods, until it be known unto us, or our chief justice, how our merchants be entreated who are then found in the land making war against us, and if our merchants be well intreated there, theirs shall be likewise with us."
Not only is United States citizenship a "high privilege," it is a priceless treasure. For that citizenship is enriched beyond price by our goal of equal justice under law -- equal justice not for citizens alone, but for all persons coming within the ambit of our power. This ideal gave birth to the constitutional provision for an independent judiciary with authority to check abuses of executive power and to issue writs of habeas corpus liberating persons illegally imprisoned. [Footnote 2/1]
This case tests the power of courts to exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction on behalf of aliens, imprisoned in Germany, under sentences imposed by the executive through military tribunals. The trial court held that, because the persons involved are imprisoned overseas, it had no territorial jurisdiction even to consider their petitions. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal on the ground that the judicial, rather than the executive, branch of government is vested with final authority to determine the legality of imprisonment for crime. 84 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 174 F.2d 961. This Court now affirms the District Court's dismissal. I agree with the Court of Appeals, and need add little to the chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
First. In 339 U. S. 682-683; Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 317 U. S. 71. [Footnote 2/2] Therefore, 339 U. S. and lends no support whatever to the Court's holding that the District Court was without jurisdiction.
Moreover, the question of whether the petition showed on its face that these prisoners had violated the laws of war, even if it were relevant, is not properly before this Court. The trial court did not reach that question, because it concluded that their imprisonment outside its district barred it even from considering the petition; its doors were "summarily closed." And, in reversing, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected requests that it consider the sufficiency of the petition, properly remanding the cause to the District Court for that determination -- just as this Court did in the Hood and Kawato cases, supra. The Government's petition for certiorari here presented no question except that of jurisdiction, and neither party has argued, orally or in briefs, that this Court should pass on the sufficiency of the petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Despite these objections, the Court now proceeds to find a "war crime" in the fact that, after Germany had surrendered these prisoners gave certain information to Japanese military forces. I am not convinced that this unargued question is correctly decided. The petition alleges that, when the information was given, the accused were "under the control of the armed forces of the Japanese Empire," in Japanese-occupied territory. Whether obedience to commands of their Japanese superiors would, in itself, constitute "unlawful" belligerency in violation of the laws of war is not so simple a question as the Court assumes. The alleged circumstances, if proven, would place these Germans in much the same position as patriotic French, Dutch, or Norwegian soldiers who fought on with the British after their homelands officially surrendered to Nazi Germany. There is not the slightest intimation that the accused were spies, or engaged in cruelty, torture, or any conduct other than that which soldiers or civilians might properly perform when entangled in their country's war. It must be remembered that legitimate "acts of warfare," however murderous, do not justify criminal conviction. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 317 U. S. 30-31, we cautioned that military tribunals can punish only "unlawful" combatants; it is no "crime" to be a soldier. See also Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158, 100 U. S. 169; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 97 U. S. 605-606. Certainly decisions by the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning applicability of that principle to these facts would be helpful, as would briefs and arguments by the adversary parties. It should not be decided by this Court now without that assistance, particularly since chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The contention that enemy alien belligerents have no standing whatever to contest conviction for war crimes by habeas corpus proceedings has twice been emphatically rejected by a unanimous Court. In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, we held that status as an enemy alien did not foreclose
Id. 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 25. This we did in the face of a presidential proclamation denying such prisoners access to our courts. Only after thus upholding jurisdiction of the courts to consider such habeas corpus petitions did we go on to deny those particular petitions upon a finding that the prisoners had been convicted by a military tribunal of competent jurisdiction for conduct that we found constituted an actual violation of the law of war. Similarly, In Re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, we held that courts could inquire whether a military commission, promptly after hostilities had ceased, had lawful authority to try and condemn a Japanese general charged with violating the law of war before hostilities had ceased. There we stated:
Id. at 327 U. S. 9. That we went on to deny the requested writ, as in the Quirin case, in no way detracts from the clear holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction is available even to belligerent aliens convicted by a military tribunal for an offense committed in actual acts of warfare.
If the opinion thus means, and it apparently does, that these petitioners are deprived of the privilege of habeas corpus solely because they were convicted and imprisoned overseas, the Court is adopting a broad and dangerous principle. The range of that principle is underlined by the argument of the Government brief that habeas corpus is not even available for American citizens convicted and imprisoned in Germany by American military tribunals. While the Court wisely disclaims any such necessary effect for its holding, rejection of the Government's argument is certainly made difficult by the logic of today's chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
opinion. Conceivably, a majority may hereafter find citizenship a sufficient substitute for territorial jurisdiction, and thus permit courts to protect Americans from illegal sentences. But the Court's opinion inescapably denies courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject to our occupation government abroad, even if he is neither enemy nor belligerent, and even after peace is officially declared. [Footnote 2/3]
When a foreign enemy surrenders, the situation changes markedly. If our country decides to occupy conquered territory either temporarily or permanently, it assumes the problem of deciding how the subjugated people will be ruled, what laws will govern, who will promulgate them, and what governmental agency of ours will see that they are properly administered. This responsibility immediately raises questions concerning the extent to which our domestic laws, constitutional and statutory, are transplanted abroad. Probably no one would suggest, and certainly I would not, that this nation either must or should attempt to apply every constitutional chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
provision of the Bill of Rights in controlling temporarily occupied countries. But that does not mean that the Constitution is wholly inapplicable in foreign territories that we occupy and govern. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.
Though the scope of habeas corpus review of military tribunal sentences is narrow, I think it should not be denied to these petitioners and others like them. We control that part of Germany we occupy. These prisoners were convicted by our own military tribunals under our own Articles of War, years after hostilities had ceased. However illegal their sentences might be, they can expect no relief from German courts or any other branch of the German Government we permit to function. Only our own courts can inquire into the legality of their imprisonment. Perhaps, as some nations believe, there is merit in leaving the administration of criminal laws chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Conquest by the United States, unlike conquest by many other nations, does not mean tyranny. For our people "choose to maintain their greatness by justice, rather than violence." [Footnote 2/4] Our constitutional principles are such that their mandate of equal justice under law should be applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only over thirteen colonies. Our nation proclaims a belief in the dignity of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or where they happen to live. Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot, in my judgment, be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress. I would hold that our courts can exercise it whenever any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we govern. [Footnote 2/5] Courts should not for any reason abdicate this, the loftiest power with which the Constitution has endowed them.
The Court indicates that not even today can a nonresident German or Japanese bring even a civil suit in American courts. With this restrictive philosophy compare Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69; @see also 42 U. S. 249.
See the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U. S. 197, 338 U. S. 199.