Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19781213-797577
Timestamp: 2017-04-27 15:11:02+00:00
Document Index: 233657310

Matched Legal Cases: ['arrêt ', "l'article 272", "l'article 282", "l'article 55", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 42", "l'article 5", "l'article 55", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 27", "l'article 5", "l'article 5", "l'article 27", "l'article 5", "l'article 26", 'in fine', "l'article 27", "l'article 5", "l'article 6", "l'article 55", "l'article 26", 'in fine', "l'article 27"]

BONAZZI c. ITALIE
Page d'accueil > Résultats de la recherche BONAZZI c. ITALIE
Type d'affaire : DecisionType de recours : Partiellement recevable ; partiellement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 7975/77Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1978-12-13;7975.77 Analyses : (Art. 14) DISCRIMINATION, (Art. 34) VICTIME, (Art. 6-1) ACCES A UN TRIBUNAL, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : BONAZZIDéfendeurs : ITALIETexte : APPLICATION/REQUETE NÂ° 7975/77 Edgardo BONAZZI v/ITALY Edgardo BONAZZI c/ITALI E DECISION of 13 December 1978 on the admissibility of the application DÃCISION du 13 dÃ©cembre 1978 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃ©t e
Artic% 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention : Detention "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law". Period of detention on remand on the basis of an arrest warrant, whose lawfulness under domestic law is doubtful (complaint declared admissiblel . Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Convention : Failure by the appeal courts to decide on an appeal against an arrest warrant (complaint declared admissible) . Article 6, paragraph I of the Convention : Agitated atmosphere surrounding a criminal trial, but unbiased behaviour of the court . Manifestly ill-founded. Article 26 and Article 5 paragraph 3 of the Cbnvention : The person who, while complaining of the length of his detention on remand has not applied for release, has not exhausted domestic remedies . . . Article 26 and Article 5, paragraph 5 of the Convention : In a State where -like in Italy-Arricle 5, paragraph 5/s directly applicable, it provides a/egal basis which has to be taken into consideration in respect of the exhaustion of domesric remediÃ©s, if the complaint is, based on a detention which has been considered inlawful.
Article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : DÃ©tention a selon les voies lÃ©gales u . PÃ©riode de dÃ©tention provisoire subie en exÃ©cution d'un mandat d'arrÃ©t dont la rÃ©gularitÃ© en droit interne est douteuse (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
Article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention : Omission par les juridictions de recours de se prononcer sur un recours contre un mandat d'arrÃªt (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
Article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention : AtmosphÃ©re d'agitation entourant un procÃ©s pÃ©nal mais comportemenr impartial du tribunal . DÃ©faut manifeste de fondement. Article 26 et article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention : N'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes celui qur ; alors qu'il se plaint de la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tenrion provisoire, n'a pas demandÃ© sa mise en libertÃ© . Article 26 et article 5, paragraphe 5 de la Convention : Dans un Etat oÃ¹ - comme en Italie - il est directement applicable, l'arncte 5, paragraphe 5, fournit une base juridique dont il doit Ãªtre tenu compte quant Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes, lorsque le grief se fonde sur une dÃ©tention qui a Ã©tÃ© jugÃ©e irrÃ©guliÃ©re.
I English : seep. 184 )
Les faits de la cause, tels qu'ils ont Ã©tÃ© exposÃ©s par le requÃ©rant, peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit : 1 . Le requÃ©rant, Edgardo Bonazzi, ressortissant italien, nÃ© en 1950, ouvrier, est actuellement dÃ©tenu dans la prison de Padoue . Pour la procÃ©dure devant la Commission il est reprÃ©sentÃ© par MaÃ®tre Marco Bezicheri, avocat Ã Bologn e 2 . Le 26 aoÃ»t 1972, le requÃ©rant se prÃ©senta spontanÃ©ment Ã un poste de police de Rome, dÃ©clarant avoir tuÃ© la nuit prÃ©cÃ©dente, Ã Parme, le jeune Mariano Lupo . La victime Ã©tait un militant du groupement extra-parlementaire de gauche, Â« Lotta continua n, alors que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait militant d'un mouvement d'extrÃªme droite . Dans ses dÃ©clarations le requÃ©rant affirma avoir Ã©tÃ© attaquÃ© par Mariano Lupo et ses amis devant un cinÃ©ma de la banlieue oÃ¹ il avait rendez-vous avec la caissiÃ¨re du cinÃ©ma . Celle-ci, feignant pour le requÃ©rant des sentiments d'amitiÃ©, Ã©tait en rÃ©alitÃ© l'amie de Lupo, dontelle partageait les idÃ©es, ce qui fut dÃ©couvert par la suite . Lorsque le requÃ©rant se vit attaquÃ©, il aurait sorti de sa poche un couteau Ã cran d'arrÃªt et l'aurait brandi devant son attÃ¢quant le plus direct, Mariano Lupo . Le requÃ©rant dÃ©clara qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de tuer Lupo, ni de le blesser, mais seulement de lui faire peur et de le dissuader de ses propos . Cependant Lupo se jetant sur le requÃ©rant, ne se serait pas aperÃ§u du couteau avant d'Ã©tre frappÃ© au coour . La victime ne serait pas tombÃ©e 8 terre immÃ©diatement, ce qui aurait poussÃ© le requÃ©rant Ã prendre la fuite, en profitant du fait que trois de ses amis, qui se trouvaient assis Ã la terrasse d'un cafÃ© tout prÃ©s du cinÃ©ma, Ã©taient venu s
Ã son secours . Le requÃ©rant quitta aussitÃ´t Parme pour Rome, oÃ¹ le lendemain il se constitua prisonnier A la police, lorsqu'il apprit que Lupo Ã©tait mort . 3 . Le mÃªme jour (26 aoÃ»t 1972), le juge d'instruction auprÃ©s du Tribunal de Parme dÃ©livra un mandat d'arrÃªt Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant du chef de meurtre aggravÃ© avec prÃ©mÃ©ditation . Des mandats d'arrÃªt du chef de complicitÃ© de meurtre furent dÃ©livrÃ©s Ã©galement contre les amis du requÃ©rant . Le juge d'instruction renvoya en jugement le requÃ©rant du mÃ©me chef, en l'accusant d'avoir organisÃ© l'agression avec ses complices dans le but prÃ©cis de tuer Lupo . L'ouverture des dÃ©bats devant la Cour d'Assises fut fixÃ©e pour le mois de janvier 1974 . Toutefois le procÃ©s ne put avoir lieu B cause des manifestations organisÃ©es par des groupes gauchistes, menaÃ§ant gravement l'ordre public . Le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral de la RÃ©publique auprÃ¨s de la cour d'appel de Bologne, suivant la procÃ©dure prÃ©vue aux articles 55 et suivants du Code de ProcÃ©dure, demanda Ã la Cour de cassation le transfert du procÃ©s devant les tribunaux d'une autre ville pour des raisons d'ordre public . La Cour de cassation accueillit la demande du Procureur et dÃ©cida le renvoi Ã la Cour d'Assises d'Ancdne . Le procÃ©s s'ouvrit en mai 1975 . Par arrÃªt du 30 juillet 1975 la Cour reconnut le requÃ©rant coupable d'homicide involontaire par imprudence la omicidio preterintenzionale Â») avec des circonstances attÃ©nuantes prÃ©dominant sur les circonstances aggravantes . II fut condamnÃ© Ã une peine de 11 ans et 8 mois de dÃ©tention . Cet arrÃªt fut attaquÃ© tant par le requÃ©rant, qui affirmait avoir agi en Ã©tat de lÃ©gitime dÃ©fense, que par le MinistÃ©re public, qui soutenait l'accusation de meurtre . Le requÃ©rant fait Ã©tat de pressions exercÃ©es par les extrÃ©mistes de gauche pendant toute la durÃ©e du procÃ¨s ; le Palais de Justice et la salle des audiences auraient Ã©tÃ© constamment assiÃ©gÃ©s : les inculpÃ©s, leurs avocats et mÃªme certains magistrats auraient fait l'objet d'injures et de menaces . Peu avant que le dÃ©lai maximum prÃ©vu par la loi pour la dÃ©tention 4 prÃ©ventive n'expire (le 26 aoÃ¹t 1975) le requÃ©rant demanda sa mise en libertÃ© immÃ©diate en faisant valoir que, suivant le Code de ProcÃ©dure pÃ©nale larticles 272 et suivants), l'Ã©chÃ©ance des dÃ©lais de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive est de 3 ans lorsqu'une condamnation en appel n'est pas encore intervenue . La Cour d'Assistes d'AncÃ´ne, statuant sur cette demande, ordonna le 25 aoÃ»t 1975 la mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant 8 dater du 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 en constatant l'expiration du dÃ©lai, mais ordonna en mÃªme temps une nouvelle arrestation du chef d'homicide involontaire par imprudence pour les mÃªmes faits . La Cour se fondait sur la disposition de l'article 272 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale autorisant l'Ã©mission d'un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt dans le cas de dange r
de fuite et se rÃ©fÃ©rait Ã cet Ã©gard Ã la tentative du requÃ©rant de s'Ã©vader de la prison de Piacenza, le 16 septembre 1973 . La dÃ©cision de la Cour d'Assises fut attaquÃ©e par le requArant devant la Cour de cassation sur la base des moyens suivants : a) la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne Ã©tait incompÃ©tente en raison du fait que les assises Ã©taient .closes-au moment oÃ¹ elle avait dÃ©cernA le nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt ; bl la rAvocation de la mise en IibertA dans le cas d'un danger de fuite n'est prÃ©vue que dans l'hypothÃ©se oÃ¹ ce danger se manifeste de faÃ§on concrÃ¨te dans la pÃ©riode qui suit la IibAration et non dans le cas d'une tentative d'Ã©vasion accomplie au moment oÃ¹ l'inculpÃ© est en prison dans l'attente d'Ãªtre jugÃ© . La dÃ©cision de la Cour d'Assises tut Ã©galement attaquÃ©e par le MinistÃ¨re Public . La Cour de cassation par dÃ©cision du 3 fÃ©vrier 1976 annula pour incompÃ©tence la dÃ©cision de la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne et renvoya l'affaire Ã la Chambre d'Instruction de la cour d'ippel d'AncBne . Celle-ci, le 8 mars 1976, ordonna l'Alargissement du requÃ©rant pour expiration du dÃ©lai maximum pour la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive (articles 272 et 279 du C .P .P .) et, eri application de l'article 282 CPP l'assigna Ã rÃ©sidence dans la commune de Spoleto (Italie centrale) . Cependant, peu avant cette dÃ©cision de la Cour de cassation, le Procureur de la RÃ©publique auprÃ©s du Tribunal de Piacenza avait dÃ©livr0 le 3 dÃ©cembre 1975 un mandat d'arrÃªt (signifiA au requÃ©rant le 23 dÃ©cembre 1975) pour la tentative d'Ã©vasion du 16 septembre 1973 .D'aprÃ©s la loi italienne, il s'agissait d'un mandat d'arrÃªt facultatif . Il fut dÃ©cernA Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant et d'un autre co-inculpA, qui Ã©tait introuvable . 5 . L'avocat du requArant dans ses plaidoiries devant la Cour d'Assises d'appel Avoqua l'arrÃªt prononcÃ© par la Cour d'Assises d'appel de Salerno - confirmA par la Cour de cassation - dans une affaire qui avait eu grand retentissement dans l'opinion publique italienne, l'affaire Marini . Giovanni Marini, un jeune anarchiste, avait frappÃ©-de trois coups de couteau, dont un mortel, un jeune Ã©tudiant appartenant Ã un mouvement d'extrÃªme droite, Carlo Falvella . La Cour d'assises d'appel de Salerno considÃ©ra que Marini n'avait pas eu l'intention de tuer et le condamna du chef d'homicide par imprudence Ã neuf ans de dÃ©tention . L'avocat du requÃ©rant argumenta que si Marini qui avait frappÃ© troi s fois avec son couteau n'avait pas Ã©tA considÃ©rÃ© comme responsable d'homicide volontaire, Ã plus forte raisonâ¢il fallait reconnaÃ®tre et confirmer que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait responsable d'homicide par imprudence . Une condamnation pour homicide volontaire aurait impliquÃ© - selon la thÃ©se de l'avocat du requArant - une discrimination basÃ©e sur l'idÃ©ologie politique .Cet argument fut rejetÃ© par la cour d'appel .
Par arrÃªt du 15 juin 1976, la Cour d'assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne dÃ©clara le requÃ©rant coupable de meurtre (omicidio volontariol et le condamna Ã la peine de 14 ans, 8 mois et 15 lours de dÃ©tention .
L'arrÃªt contenait Ã©galement un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt Ã l'encontre du requÃ©rant du chef des dÃ©lits portÃ©s Ã sa charge . Peu avant le prononcÃ© de cet arrÃªt, le 14 mai 1976, le dÃ©fenseur d'u n .6 co-inculpÃ© du requÃ©rant, M . Ringozzi, s'Ã©tait adressÃ© Ã la Cour de cassation par l'entremise du Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral d'AncÃ´ne pour demander le transfert (rimessione) du procÃ©s Ã une cour siÃ©geant dans une autre ville, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 55 du code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Cette demande a Ã©tÃ© envoyÃ©e Ã la Cour de cassation par le Procureur GÃ©nÃ©ral le 20 mai 1976 . Les autres co-inculpÃ©s, donc Ã©galement le requÃ©rant, se sont associÃ©s par tÃ©lÃ©gramme Ã cette demande de transfert . 7 . Le 18 juin 1976, la Chambre d'instruction de la cour d'appel de Bologne accorda au requÃ©rant la libertÃ© provisoire pour la tentative d'Ã©vasion . 8 . Le requÃ©rant se pourvut en cassation contre l'arrÃªt du 15 juin 1976, en s'Ã©levant d'une part contre le mandat d'arrÃªt y contenu, d'autre part contre la condamnation du chef de meurtre volontaire . En ce qui concerne le mandat d'arrÃªt, le requÃ©rant souligna qu'il s'agissait d'une mesure qui se situait en dehors et au-dessus de la loi elle-mÃ«me . Il invoqua la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation (cf . Cassation PÃ©nale Â« Massimario n 1973, 364 ) En ce qui concerne sa condamnation pour meurtre, le requÃ©rant rÃ©affirma ne pas avoir eu l'intention de tuer et Ã©voqua l'analogie avec l'affaire Marini suscitÃ©e . Dans un mÃ©moire complÃ©mentaire datÃ© du 5 uctobre 1976 le requÃ©rant demanda Ã la Cour de cassation de dÃ©clarer la nullitÃ© du procÃ©s d'appel et s'Ã©leva contre les pressions exercÃ©es par les extrÃ©mistes de gauche envers les juges et les avocats, ainsi que contre le comportement du PrÃ©sident de la Cour d'assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne . 9 . En ce qui concerne le nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt contenu dans la dÃ©cision du 15 juin 1976, le requÃ©rant introduisit aussi, en date du 11 novembre 1976, une demande auprÃ©s de la Chambre d'instruction de la Cour d'assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne pour qu'elle ordonne son Ã©largissement immÃ©diat en faisant valoir que l'Ã©mission d'un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt qui annule l'effet de l'Ã©chÃ©ance des termes de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, n'est prÃ©vue par aucune disposition de la loi italienne . Il concluait Ã l'inexistence juridique du mandat contenu dans l'arrÃ¨t du 15 juin 1976 .
Par une ordonnance du 29 novembre 1976, la Cour d'assises d'appel dÃ©clara qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de dÃ©cider sur cette demande 1Â« non luogo a - 173 -
provvedere sulla istanza nl et ordonna que le dossier fÃ»t transmis Ã la Cour de cassation pour raison decompÃ©tence . .â¢ Par une ordonnance datÃ©e du 26 octobre 1976, la Cour de cassation avait auparavant rejetÃ© la demande de transfert prÃ©sentÃ©e par le dÃ©fenseur de M . Ringozzi, aprÃ¨s que celui-ci eÃ»t prÃ©sentÃ© un nouveau mÃ©moire en date du 8 octobre 1976 . La Cour avait estimÃ© que le procÃ©s d'appel s'Ã©tait dÃ©roulÃ© de faÃ§on rÃ©guliÃ©re, sans qu'il y ait eu de dÃ©sordres marquants . 10 La Cour de cassation dÃ©bouta le requÃ©rant par arrÃ¨t du 20 janvier 1977 . En ce qui concerne les griefs portant sur le mandat d'arrÃªt, la Cour a observÃ© que la question deâ¢nullitÃ© soulevÃ©e par le requÃ©rant faisait l'objet d'une procÃ©dure sÃ©parÃ©e en chambre du Ã§onseil . Pour ce .qui est du moyen relatif Ã la nullitÃ© du procÃ¨s d'appel la Cour, tout en affirmant qu'il s'agissait d'un moyen tardif, en abordal'examen et dÃ©clara ce moyen mal fondÃ© . Le griefs du requÃ©rant concernent la violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, litt . (a), paragraphes 3 et 4, et de l'article 6, paragraphe .l, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant se plaint, d'abord, d'avoir Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu contra legem depuis le 26 aoÃ»t 1975 jusqu'au 20 janvier 1977 II en infÃ¨re une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, litt . lal . Il allÃ¨gue ensuite que la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive n'a pa s respectÃ© le caractÃ¨re raisonnable prÃ©vu Ã l'article 5, paragraphe 3 Pour ce qui est de la violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 4, le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue que la Cour de cassation ne s'est prononcÃ©e que le 3 fÃ©vrier 1976 sur le recours introduit contre l'ordonnance du 25 ao0t 1975 par laquelle la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne avait ordonnÃ© une nouvelle arresiation aprÃ©s l'expiration des dÃ©lais maximums prÃ©vus par la loi . Il se plaint Ã©galement qu'aucune juridiction ne s'est jamais prononcÃ© sur son recours contre le mandat d'arrÃªt contenu dans l'arrÃ¨t du 15 juin 1976 de la CÃ´ur d'Assises d'appel . A tous ces Ã©gards, le requÃ©rant revendique son droit Ã une rÃ©paration . En ce qui concerne la violation de l'article 6, paragraphe 1, le requÃ©rant allÃ©gue ne pas avoir Ã©tÃ© jugÃ© d'une faÃ§on indÃ©pendante et impartiale . A cet Ã©gard, il fait notamment une comparaison entre son procÃ©s et le procÃ¨s contre l'anarchiste Marini qui, accusÃ© d'avoir frappÃ© de trois coups de couteau un militant de droite, n'a Ã©tÃ© reconnu coupable que d'homicide involontaire par imprudence et ce d'aprÃ¨s une dÃ©cision de la mÃ©me section de la Cour de cassation . Le requÃ©rant allÃ¨gue que tant la Cour d'Assises que la Cour d'Assise s d'appel ont Ã©tÃ© l'objet de pressions dela part de Â« gauchistes n . II se plaint de ce que le PrÃ©sident de la Cour d'Assises d'appel : - aurait publiquement dÃ©clarÃ© que le procÃ©s devrait Ãªtre conclu avant le jour fixÃ© pour les Ã©lections politiques ;
- aurait conseillÃ© aux avocats de la dÃ©fense de ne pas se prÃ©senter Ã l'audience afin d'Ã©viter toute occasion d'incidents ; - aurait interrompu l'avocat du requÃ©rant, au cours de ses plaidoiries, lorsque certains points Ã©taient susceptibles d'irriter les Â« gauchistes n .
PROCÃDURE SUIVI E La Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© le 10 dÃ©cembre 1977, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 42, paragraphe 2 b) de son RÃ©glement intÃ©rieur de porter la requÃªte Ã la connaissance du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur et d'inviter ce dernier Ã lui prÃ©senter par Ã©crit ses observations sur la recevabilitÃ© . Ces observations sont parvenues Ã la Commission le 18 mars 1978 . Elles ont Ã©tÃ© aussitÃ´t communiquÃ©es au conseil du requÃ©rant qui a Ã©tÃ© invitÃ© Ã formuler ses observations en rÃ©ponse . Ces derniÃ¨res, comprenant deux mÃ©moires, sont parvenues Ã la Commission les 20 mai et 12 juin 1978 . Le 3 octobre 1978 la Commission a dÃ©cidÃ© d'inviter les parties Ã une audience sur la recevabilitÃ© et sur le fon d
Cette audience a eu lieu le 8 dÃ©cembre 1978 . ARGUMENTATION DES PARTIE S Les thÃ©ses exposÃ©es par les parties tant par Ã©crit qu'oralement peuvent se rÃ©sumer comme suit :
A . LE GOUVERNEMENT DEFENDEU R 1.
Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© des griefs liÃ©s Ã la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant larucle 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention l
1 . DÃ©lai de six mois En ce qui concerne la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention comprise entre le 26 aoÃ¹t 1975 et le 3 dÃ©cembre 1975, le Gouvernement soutient que le grief du requÃ©rant est tardif . En effet, la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive au sujet de cene pÃ©riode est l'ordonnance rendue le 8 mars 1976 par la Chambre d'instruction de la cour d'appel d'AncÃ´ne - Ã la suite de l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour de cassation qui avait ordonnÃ© l'Ã©iargissement du requÃ©rant . Cette dÃ©cision est antÃ©rieure de plus de six mois Ã la date d'introduction de la requÃ¨te . 2 . Bien-fondÃ© Le Gouvernement soutient que les griefs du requÃ©rant tirÃ©s de la prÃ©tendue illÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive sont, en ce qui concerne la pÃ©riode 261aoÃ¹t 1975- 3 dÃ©cembre 1975, irrecevables Ã©galement pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement .
Quant aux griefs relatifs Ã la pÃ©riode 3 dÃ©cembre 1975 - 20 janvier 1977, ils sont aussi dÃ©nuÃ©s de fondement . En effet, la premiÃ¨repÃ©riode de dÃ©tention, celle allant du 26 aoÃ¹t 1975 au 3 dÃ©cembre 1975, est couverte par le mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© le 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 par la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne . La deuxiÃ©me pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention allant du 3 dÃ©cembre 1975 Ã¢u 18 juin 1976 est couverte par le mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© par le Procureur de la RÃ©publique de Piacenza . En ce qui concerne la troisiÃ¨me pÃ©riode comprise entre le 18 juin 1976 et le 20 juin 1977, le requÃ©rant a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©tenu en vertu d'un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© le 15 juin 1976 par la Cour d'Assises d'appel d'Ancbne : D'aprÃ©s le GouvÃ«rnement donc, l'ensemble de cette pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention est Â« totalement couverte par des mesures restrictives de la libertÃ© prises par des organes judiciaires et, par consÃ©quent, les violations de l'article 5 de la Convention dont se plaint le requÃ©rant n'existent pas Â» . Dans cet ordre d'idÃ©es, le Gouvernement ajoute qu'on ne peut pa s soutenir que les violations dÃ©coulent d'erreurs commises par des organes judiciaires dans l'adoption de mesures restrictives, telles que le mandat d'arrÃªt du 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 . L'erreur - prÃ©cise le Gouvernement - fut Â« palliÃ©e par les voies de recours internes, puisque la Cour de cassation avait accueilli le recours de l'accusÃ© et transmis les actes Ã la section d'instructiÃ´n de la cour d'appel d'AncÃ´ne, qui, par sa dÃ©cision du 8 mars 1976, ordonna la mise en libertÃ© de l'accusÃ© Â» . Quant aux autres mesures restrictives de la libertÃ© elles s'avÃ©rent prises Â« en pleine lÃ©gitimitÃ© de pouvoiis par les organes jjidiciaires compÃ©tents n . Pour ce qui est de la dÃ©tention comprise entrele 18 juin 1976 et le 20 janvier 1977, le Gouvernement ajoute encore que l'aggravation de la qualification juridique de l'infraction retenue par la Cour d'Assises d'appel dans sonarrÃ©t a entraÃ®nÃ©, conforrnÃ©ment aux dispositions pertinentes de la loi italienne, une prolongation du dÃ©lai maximum de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Le Gouvernement observe enfin que Â« Ã©tant survÃ©nu l'arrÃ©t'condamnant le requÃ©rant Ã une peine bien plus longue que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, toutÃ© question sur la lÃ©gitlmitÃ© de ladite dÃ©tention est de fait dÃ©passÃ©e, la durÃ©e de cette derniÃ©re Ã©tant calculÃ©e dans celle de la peine in(ligÃ©e n . . ' Il .
Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© des griefs tirÃ©s du caractÃ¨re prÃ©tenduemen t
inÃ©quitable de la procÃ©dure ( a rt icle 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention l Le Gouvernement soutient que cette partie de la requÃªte est irrecevable pour non-respect du dÃ©lai de six mois . A titre subsidiaire, le Gouvernement soutient que ce grief est, en tout Ã©tat de cause, manifestement mal-fondÃ© . 1 . DÃ©lai de six mois . Le Gouvernement observe que les griefs du requÃ©rant se rapportent Ã la prÃ©tendue partialitÃ© des juges Ã cause de l'atmosphÃ©re qui aurait existÃ© Ã - 176-
Anc6ne en particulier au cours du dÃ©roulement du procÃ©s de premier degrÃ© . Il souligne que le moyen prÃ©vu par le droit italien dans ce cas est la demande de transfert pour cause de suspicion lÃ©gitime 1Â« rimessione per legittimo sospetto Â»I prÃ©vue par l'article 55 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Or, la Cour de cassation s'est prononcÃ©e sur la demande prÃ©sentÃ©e par le requÃ©rant sur la base de cette disposition le 26 octobre 1976 . La requÃªte Ã la Commission n'ayant Ã©tÃ© introduite le 8 juillet 1977, il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois . Le Gouvernement observe, Ã cet Ã©gard, que l'arrÃªt rendu par la Cour de cassation le 20 janvier 1977 ne peut pas Ãªtre pris en considÃ©ration pour le calcul du dÃ©lai de six mois . En effet, ainsi qu'il ressort du texte de cette dÃ©cision, d'une part le pourvoi du requÃ©rant sous cet aspect Ã©tait tardif . D'autre part, par ce pourvoi, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© que les dÃ©bats et la dÃ©cision de deuxiÃ©me degrÃ© soient annulÃ©s par la Cour de cassation Ã©tant donnÃ© que la Cour d'assises d'appel n'avait pas suspendu le procÃ©s dans l'attente de la dÃ©cision sur la demande de transfert pour cause de suspicion . Or, une telle demande ne trouve aucun fondement dans le droit italien, car seule la Cour de cassation peut dÃ©cider de la suspension d'un procÃ©s pour cause de suspicion lÃ©gitime .
2 . Bien-fondÃ© En ce qui concerne les allÃ©gations du requÃ©rant ayant trait au caractÃ©re prÃ©tendument inÃ©quitable du procÃ¨s qui s'est dÃ©roulÃ© devant la Cour d'assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne, le Gouvernement se rÃ©fÃ©re aux arguments dÃ©veloppÃ©s par la Cour de cassation dans son ordonnance du 26 octobre 1977 . Le Gouvernement rappelle notamment que la Cour de cassation avait estimÃ© que les manifestations s'Ã©tant dÃ©roulÃ©es au cours du procÃ©s devant la Cour d'assises d'appel pouvaient Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ©es comme normales compte tenu du retentissement politique de l'affaire . Il souligne que le requÃ©rant n'a apportÃ© aucun Ã©lÃ©ment permettant de conclure Ã la partialitÃ© des juges d'appel . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur examine ensuite l'argument du requÃ©rant selon lequel son procÃ©s aurait Ã©tÃ© inÃ©quitable en ce qu'il aurait reÃ§u un traitement diffÃ©rent de celui iÃ©servÃ© Ã un autre accusÃ© de meurtre, ayant une idÃ©ologie politique opposÃ©e . A cet Ã©gard le Gouvernement fait notamment valoir que Â« les situations sont diffÃ©rentes et il n'est pas possible d'affirmer qu'une peine Ã©gale doit Ãªtre infligÃ©e Ã des accusÃ©s de crimes semblables Â» . Par consÃ©quent il est impossible, selon le Gouvernement, de dÃ©duire Â« la partialitÃ© des juges du requÃ©rant sur la base d'un Ã©lÃ©ment tellement inconsistant et subjectif n .
B . LEREQUÃRAN T
Quant Ã la recevabilitÃ© des griefs liÃ©s Ã li dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant (article 5, paragraphe 1 de la Convention )
Le requÃ©rant soutient que sa dÃ©tentuon prÃ©ventive comprise entre le 26 aoÃ»t 1975 et le 20 janvier 1977 doit Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme illÃ©gale .Ilav ncequelaCourdecas ationarecon uparsadÃ©cisond u 3 fÃ©vrier 19761'illÃ©galitÃ© du mandai d'arrÃ©t dÃ©livrÃ©le 25 ao0t 1975 par la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne Il en infÃ©re que sa dÃ©tention comprise entre le 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 et le 3 dÃ©cembre 1975 Idate Ã laquelle le Procureur de la RÃ©publique auprÃ©s du Tribunal de Piacenza dÃ©livra Ã son encontre un mandat d'arrÃ¨t du chef de tentative d'Ã©vasion) aurait Ã©tÃ© basÃ©e sur un mandat illÃ©ga l En ce qui concerne la pÃ©riode de dÃ©tention qui fait suite au mandat contenu dans ParrÃ©t de la Cour d'Assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne du 15 juin 1976, le requÃ©rant observe que le Gouvernement n'a formulÃ© aucun argument convaincant quant Ã sa lÃ©galitÃ© . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir qu'en droit italien l'Ã©largissement pour expiration du dÃ©lai maximum prÃ©vu par la loi doit Ãªtre Â« automaGque Â» . Dans le cas du reqÃ»Ã©rant ce dÃ©lai expirait le 26 aoÃ»t 1975 toute la dÃ©tention postÃ©rieureÃ cette date Ã©tait, par consÃ©quent, Â« sine titulo Â» . Le requÃ©rant a, en particulier, contestÃ© l'argument du Gouvernement selon lequel l'aggravation de la qualification .juridique de l'infraction portÃ©e Ã la charge du requÃ©rant justifiait la prolongation du dÃ©lai maximum de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Se basant sur une jurisprudence constante des . Sections Unies de la Cour de cassation, il affirme qu'une telle prolongation est exclue dans l'hypothÃ©se oÃ¹ un inculpÃ© a dÃ©jÃ© Ã©tÃ© libÃ©rÃ© pour expiration du dÃ©lai maximum Comme tel Ã©tait le cas du requÃ©rant, delui-cr en dÃ©duit l'illÃ©galitÃ© du mandat d'arrÃªt du 15 juin 1976 Le requÃ©rant conteste, enfin, l'affirmation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur selon laquelle le problÃ©me posÃ© par la prÃ©tendue illÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention serait en tout cas Ã©liminÃ© par le fait que la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive a Ã©tÃ© imputÃ©e sur la durÃ©e de la peine infligÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant se rÃ©fÃ©re Ã cet Ã©gard Ã la jurisprudence de Ia Cour en la matiÃ©re et notamment Ã l'arrÃ©t dans l'affaire Ringeisen . Quant Ã la .I recevabilitÃ© des griefs tirÃ©s du caractÃ¨re prÃ©tendument inÃ©quitable de la procÃ©dure larticle 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention l DÃ©lai de six mois Le requÃ©rant conteste l'affirmation du Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur .selon laquelle la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, en ce qui concerne ce grief, serait constituÃ©e par l'ordonnance de la Cour de cassation du 26 octobre 1976 . II affirme que dans son pourvoi en cassation il a allÃ©guÃ© la nullitÃ© du jugement d'appel en raison des pressions exercÃ©es par des a gauchistes x sur l e
tribunal, ainsi que de certains comportements du PrÃ©sident de la Cour d'Assises d'appel . Il souligne notamment que la Cour de cassation a compÃ©tence pour connaitre de ce moyen . Selon le requÃ©rant, il s'ensuit que la date de la dÃ©cisioninterne dÃ©finitive est celle de l'arrÃ¨t de la Cour de cassation du 20 janvier 1977 . En rÃ©ponse aux autres arguments avancÃ©s par le Gouvernement le requÃ©rant, qui estime avoir Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours internes, soutient : - que les moyens de son pourvoi en cassation sont parvenus Ã la Cour dans le dÃ©lai prÃ©vu par la loi ; - que ces moyens portaient prÃ©cisÃ©ment sur la nullitÃ© du jugement d'appel pour les motils susmentionnÃ©s et non pas, ainsi que le Gouvernement le prÃ©tend, sur une question de procÃ©dure . La Cour de cassation aurait interprÃ©tÃ© de cette derniÃ©re faÃ§on le mÃ©moire du requÃ©rant et ce faisant en aurait dÃ©tormÃ© le sens . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur fait sienne, selon le requÃ©rant, cette fausse interprÃ©tation de la Cour de cassation .
Bien fandA Le requÃ©rant affirme que les pressions exercÃ©es sur la Cour d'assises d'appel ont rendu objeclivement impossible un dÃ©roulement serein du procÃ©s et ont portÃ© atteinte au devoir d'impartialitÃ© qui incombe aux juges . Il souligne notamment les rÃ©percussions nÃ©gatives de la campagne de presse visant Ã faire apparaÃ®tre sa culpabilitÃ©, ainsi que les graves dÃ©sordres qui ont suivi le prononcÃ© du jugement de premier ressort . En ce qui concerne la procÃ©dure devant la Cour de cassation le requÃ©rant soutient qu'une comparaison entre l'affaire Marini et la prÃ©sente affaire est en mesure de montrer que les mÃªmes juges lc'est-Ã©-dire la premiÃ©re Section de la Cour de cassationl ont fait preuve de deux attitudes tout Ã fait diffÃ©rentes : de bienveillance et de clÃ©mence envers M . Marini, de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© empreinte de prÃ©vention envers le requÃ©rant .
EN DROI T Le requÃ©rant se plaint que sa dÃ©tention comprise entre le 26 aoÃ¹t 1975 1 et le 20 janvier 1977 n'a pas Ã©tÃ© conforme aux prescriptions de la loi italienne . Il allÃ©gue, partant, une violation de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Les griefs du requÃ©rant ne portent, en fait, que sur deux pÃ©riodes de dÃ©tention, celle comprise entre le 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 et le 3 dÃ©cembre 1975 et celle allant du 18 juin 1976 au 20 janvier 1977 . 2 . La Commission a examinÃ©, en premier lieu, la dÃ©tention entre le 25 aoÃ¹t 1975 - date Ã laquelle la Cour d'assises d'AncÃ´ne ordonna la mis e
en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant pour expiration du dÃ©lai maximum et en mÃªme temps dÃ©cerna Ã son encontre un nouveau mandat d'arrÃ©t pour les mÃªmes faits et le 3 dÃ©cembre 1975, date Ã laquelle le requÃ©rant fut frappÃ© d'un mandat d'arrÃ©t pour tentative d'Ã©vasion . Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que la Cour de cassation, en annulant le mandat d'arrÃªt du 25 aoÃ»t 1975, par ordonnance du 3 fÃ©vrier 1976, a reconnu l'illÃ©galitÃ© de la dÃ©tention basÃ©e sur ledit mandat . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur affirme que la requÃ©teest tardive Ã cet Ã©gard, puisqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© soumise Ã la Commission plus de six mois aprÃ©s la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, qui serait constituÃ©e en l'espÃ©ce par l'ordonnance du 3 fÃ©vrier 1976 de la Cour de cassation . . La Commission relÃ©ve que le requÃ©rant s'est pourvu en cassation afin de faire constater la nullitÃ© du mandat d'arrÃªt du 25 aoÃ»t 1975 et le caractÃ©re irrÃ©gulier de la dÃ©tention . La Cour de cassation a accueilli sa demande . La Commission est d'avis qu'en constatant la nullitÃ© dudit mandat, la Cour 'a constatÃ© Ã©galement le caractÃ©re irrÃ©gulier de la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant . Celleci n'avait donc pas Ã©tÃ© Â« rÃ©guliÃ©re Â» au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . La Commission estime que le requÃ©rant avait alors la possibilitÃ© de demander rÃ©paration du prÃ©judice subi en application de l'article 5, paragraphe 5, de la Convention . Il aurait pu faire valoir son droit Ã rÃ©paration sur la base mÃªme de la Convention, qui 'a force de loi dans le systÃ¨me juridiQÃe italien . Or, il y a lieu de remarquer qu'en l'espÃ©ce le requÃ©rant n'a soulevÃ© ni formellement ni mÃªme en substance devant les juridictions internes son droit Ã rÃ©paration . Au demeurant, ni l'examen de l'affaire telle qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e ni mÃ©me l'examen d'office auquel la Commission a procÃ©dÃ© n'ont permis de dÃ©celer aucune circonstance particuliÃ©re qui aurait pu dispenser le requÃ©rant, selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus en la matiÃ©re, de soulever ce point devant les tribunaux internes . Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et que sa requÃ¨te doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©esur ce point conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . 3 . La Commission a ensuite examinÃ© la dÃ©tention entre le 18 juin 1976 - date Ã laquelle la Chambre d'instruction de la Cour d'appel de Bologne a accordÃ© au requÃ©rant la libertÃ© provisoire suite Ã son inculpation pour tentative d'Ã©vasion = et le 20 janvier 1977, date Ã laquelle la Cour de cassation a rejetÃ© le pourvoi du requÃ©rant et en a confirmÃ© la condamnation du chef d'homicide volontaire . La dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant pendant cette pÃ©riode Ã©tait consÃ©cutive au mandat d'arrÃªt contenu dansl'arrÃ©t du 15 juin 1976 de la Cour d'Assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne .
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Le requÃ©rant fait valoir que l'Ã©mission d'un nouveau mandat d'arrÃªt qui annule l'effet de l'Ã©chÃ©ance du dÃ©lai maximum de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive, n'est prÃ©vue par aucune disposition de la loi italienne . Le Gouvernement conteste la thÃ©se du requÃ©rant et demande Ã la Commission de rejeter cette partie de la requÃ¨te pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Il fait notamment valoir sur le mandat d'arrÃªt contenu dans l'arrÃªt suscitÃ© du 15 juin 1976 Ã©tait justifiÃ©, aux termes de la loi, par l'aggravation de la qualification juridique du dÃ©lit et par la prolongation du dÃ©lai maximum de dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive qui en dÃ©coule . La Commission relÃ©ve que la question de savoir si le mandat d'arrÃªt dÃ©cernÃ© le 15 juin 1976 par la Cour d'Assises d'appel d'AncÃ´ne Ã©tait conforme Ã la loi italienne et si la dÃ©tention consÃ©cutive Ã ce mandat Ã©tait donc rÃ©guliÃ©re, au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 de la Convention, soulÃ©ve des problÃ©mes complexes . Elle estime dÃ©s lors, que ce grief ne peut Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement et que sa solution doit relever d'un examen au fond . 4 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive a dÃ©passÃ© les limites raisonnables . Il invoque Ã cet Ã©gard l'article 5, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . En l'espÃ©ce, le requÃ©rant n'a pas prouvÃ© avoir demandÃ© sa mise en libertÃ© provisoire et avoir recouru jusqu'en cassation contre les Ã©ventuelles dÃ©cisions de rejet de ses demandes . Par consÃ©quent, il n'a pas Ã©puisÃ© les voies de recours dont il disposait en droit italien . De plus, ni l'examen de l'affaire telle qu'elle a Ã©tÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e ni mÃªme l'examen d'office auquel la Commission a procÃ©dÃ© n'ont permis de dÃ©celer aucune circonstance particuliÃ©re qui aurait pu dispenser le requÃ©rant, selon les principes de droit international gÃ©nÃ©ralement reconnus en la matiÃ¨re, d'Ã©puiser les voies de recours internes . Il s'ensuit que le requÃ©rant n'a pas satisfait Ã la condition relative Ã l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes et que sa requÃªte doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e, sur ce point, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . 5 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint que la Cour de cassation ne se prononÃ§a que le 3 fÃ©vrier 1976 sur le recours introduit contre l'ordonnance du 25 ao0t 1975 par lequel la Cour d'Assises d'AncÃ´ne avait ordonnÃ© une nouvelle arrestation aprÃ©s expiration du dÃ©lai maximum prÃ©vu par la loi . Il invoque l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention . Dans la prÃ©sente affaire la dÃ©cision de la Cour de cassation qui constitue, quant Ã ce grief particulier, la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, fut rendue le 3 fÃ©vrier 1976 alors que la requÃªte fut soumise Ã la Commission le 8 juillet 1977, c'est-Ã -dire plus de six mois aprÃ©s la date de cette dÃ©cision . Le requÃ©rant n'a donc pas respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois prÃ©vu Ã l'article 26 in fine de l a - 181 -
Convention . En outre, l'examen de l'affaire ne permet de discerner aucune circonstance particuliÃ©re qui ait pu interrompre ou suspendre le cours dudit dÃ©lai Il s'ensuit que la requÃªte est tardive Ã cet Ã©gard et doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 27, paragraphe 3, de la Convention . Le requÃ©rant se plaint qu'aucune juridiction ne s'est jamais prononcÃ©e 6 sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention consÃ©cutive au mandat d'arrÃ©t contenu dans l'arrÃ©t du 15 juin 1976 de la Cour d'Assises d'appel . II Invoque Ã©galement l'article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Convention . La Commission constate que, dans l'Ã©tat actuel du dossier, aucun e dÃ©cision de la Cour d'Assises ou de la Cour de cassation ne semble avoir statuÃ© sur le fond du recours introduit par le requÃ©rant afin 'de faire prononcer l'illÃ©galitÃ© dudit mandat d'arrÃªt . La Commission estime dÃ¨s lors, que ce grief ne peut Ãªtre rejetÃ© pour . dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement et que sa solution doit relever d'un examen au fond . 7 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint de ne pas avoir bÃ©nÃ©ficiÃ© d'un procÃ©s Ã©quitable . Il s'Ã©lÃ©ve contre l'atmosphÃ¨re qui a entourÃ© le dÃ©roulement des dÃ©bats devant la Cour d'Assises et la Cour d'Assises d'appel . II fait Ã©gajement valoir que la Cour de cassation aurait manifestÃ© envers lui une attitude de sÃ©vÃ©ritÃ© empreinte de prÃ©vention en raison de ses opinions politiques . A tous ces Ã©gards le requÃ©rant invoque l'article 6, paragraphe 1, de la Convention . Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur affirme que pour autant .que les griefs du requÃ©rant se rapportent Ã la procÃ©dure devant la Cour d'Assises d'appel, la requÃ©te est tardive puisqu'elle a Ã©tÃ© soumise Ã la Commission plus de six mois aprÃ¨s la date de la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive qui serait constituÃ©e, en l'espAce, par l'ordonnance du 26 octobre 1976 par laquelle la Cour de cassation a rejetÃ© la demande du requÃ©rant et d'autres co-inculpÃ©s visant au transfert du procÃ¨s conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 55 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale . Pour autant que le requÃ©rant vise le jugement de la Cour de cassation, le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur affirme que la requÃ©te doit Ãªtre rejetÃ©e sur ce point pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . La Commissionne saurait suivre la thÃ¨se ci-dessus du Gouvernement 8 dÃ©fendeur selon laquelle l'ordonnance de la Cour de cassation rejetant la demande de transfert devrait Ãªtre considÃ©rÃ©e comme la dÃ©cision interne dÃ©finitive, au sens de l'article 26 in fine de la Convention . Elle considÃ©re en effet que le requÃ©rant en soulevant devant la Cour de cassation, dans le cadre de son pourvoi, les moyens relatifs Ã l'atmosphÃ©re qui a entourÃ© le procÃ©s devant la Cour d'Assises d'appel, avait la possibilitÃ© d'atteindre par l'annulation de l'arrÃªt attaquÃ© le but qu'il visait . En effet il incombait au requÃ©rant de se pourvoir en cassalion contre la prÃ©tendue partialitÃ© des juge s
de la Cour d'Assises d'appel et ce afin d'obtenir un redressement de sa situation, dans le cadre de l'Ã©puisement des voies de recours internes . 9 . Le requÃ©rant ayant en substance allÃ©guÃ© devant la Cour de cassation la prÃ©tendue partialitÃ© de la Cour d'assises d'appel, la Commission a donc examinÃ© la question de savoir si ce grief est ou n'est pas manifestement mal fondÃ© . II est tout d'abord Ã noter que la Cour de cassation s'Ã©tait dÃ©j2 prononcÃ©e sur les conditions dans lesquelles le procÃ¨s d'appel s'Ã©tait dÃ©roulÃ© et que, en se basant sur les Ã©lÃ©ments fournis par la dÃ©fense mÃªme de M . Ringozzi, elle avait constatÃ© pour ce qui est de ce procÃ©s que son Â« dÃ©roulement a Ã©tÃ© rÃ©gulier, ne serait-ce qu'9 la faveur des mesures de prÃ©caution prises par le PrÃ©sident, sans qu'il y ait eu de dÃ©sordres marquants u . En ce qui concerne le comportement des juges, la Commission relÃ©ve qu'aucun Ã©lÃ©ment n'a Ã©tÃ© fourni par le requÃ©rant B la Cour de cassation elle-mÃªme, de nature Ã prouver que les juges ont Ã©tÃ© partiaux . Le fait que la Cour d'assises d'appel ait modifiÃ© la qualification juridique de l'infraction et aggravÃ© la peine Ide onze ans environ Ã quatorze ans environ) ne peut en l'espÃ©ce Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme preuve de partialitÃ© . Quant aux griefs soulevÃ©s contre la Cour de cassation elle-mÃªme, tirÃ©s de la comparaison avec le jugement rendu par la mÃ©me section de la Cour de cassation dans une autre affaire pÃ©nale, la Commission estime qu'une telle comparaison est dÃ©pourvue de toute pertinence . Dans ces conditions, il s'ensuit que cette partie de la requÃªte est dÃ©nuÃ©e de fondement et doit @ire rejetÃ©e au sens de l'article 27, paragraphe 2, de la Convention . Par ces motifs, la Commissio n 1 . DÃCLARE RECEVABLE et retient la requÃªte, tout moyen de fond Ã©tant rÃ©servÃ©, pour autant que le requÃ©rant se plaint du caractÃ©re prÃ©tendument irrÃ©gulier de sa dÃ©tention provisoire entre le 18 juin 1976 et le 20 janvier 1977 larticle 5, paragraphe 1, de la Conventionl et pour autant qu'il se plaint qu'il n'a pas Ã©tÃ© statuÃ© Ã bref dÃ©lai sur la lÃ©galitÃ© de sa dÃ©tention (article 5, paragraphe 4, de la Conventionl . 2 . La DÃCLARE IRRECEVABLE pour le surplus .
(TRANSLATION ) THE FACTS The facts of the application as presented by the applicant may be summarised as follows : 1 . The applicant, Edgardo Bonazzi, an Italian national and a workman by profession was born in 1950, is at present detained in Padua prison . In the proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Mr Marco Bezicheri, a lawyer practising in Bologna . 2 . On 26 August 1972 the applicant gave himself up at a Rome police station stating that he had killed the young Mariano Lupo at Parma on the previous night . Thevictim was an active supporter of the extraparliamentary group "Lotta continua" and the applicant an active supporter of a movement belonging to the extreme right . . In his statement the applicant alleged that he was attacked by Mariano Lupo and his friends in front of a suburban cinema where he had a rendez-vous with the lady cashier . This lady, who pretended to be kindly disposed to the applicant, was in fact Lupo's girlfriend and shared his ideas, as later became apparent . When the applicant found himself attacked he took a flick knife out of his pocket and brandished it in front of his nearest assailant, Mariano Lupo . It was not his intention to kill or wound Lupo but only to frighten him and make him keep quiet . However Lupo threw himself on the applicant without seeing the knife and was wounded in the heart . The victim did not fall to the ground immediately and this led the applicant to escape taking advantage of the fact that 3 of his friends, who were sitting on the terrace of a cafÃ© close to the cinema, had come to his assistance . The applicant immediately left Parma for Rorime where the next day ; hearing that Lupo was dead, he gave himself up to the police . On the same day (26 August 1972) the investigating judge of Parm a .3 Regional Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant for premeditated murder . Arrest warrants for aiding and abetting were also issued against the applicant's friends . The investigating judge committed the applicant for trial on that same charge accusing him of having organised the attack with his complices with the express purpose of killing Lupo . The hearing was fixed to commence before the Court of Assize in January 1974 . However the trial could not begin on account of demonstrations organised by leftist groups which constituted a serious threat to public order .
The Attorney General attached to the Bologna Court of Appeal made an application under Articles 55 et seq of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Court ot Cassation for the trial to be transferred to the courts of another town on grounds of public order . The Court of Cassation accepted the Attorney General's request and decided to remit the case to the Ancona Court of Assize . The trial commenced in May 1975 . In its judgement of 30 July 1975 the Courr found the applicant guilty of manslaughter lomicidio preterintenzionalel and that the mitigating circumstances outweighted the aggravating circumstances . He was sentenced to 11 years and 8 months imprisonment . The judgment was appealed, both by the applicant who claimed to have been acting in self-defence and by the prosecution which maintained the murder charge . The applicant points out the pressures exercised by left wing extremists throughout the proceedings ; the courthouse and courtroom were constantly besieged ; the accused, their counsel and even some judges had been subjected to insults and threat s 4 . Shortly before the maximum statutory period for detention on remand expired ( 26 August 1975) the applicant applied for immediate release on the ground that under Articles 272 et seq of the Code of Criminal Procedure the period ot detention on remand shall not exceed 3 years if the accused has not yet been convicted on appeal . On this application the Ancona Court of Appeal, finding that the period had expired on 25 August 1975, ordered the applicant's release on that day but at the same time ordered a new arrest for manslaughter on the same facts . The court based its decision on Article 272 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorises the issue of a new arrest warrant if there is danger of the accused's absconding, and referred in this respect to the applicant's attempt to escape from Piacenza prison on 16 September 1973 . The applicant appealed against this decision to the Court of Cassation on the following grounds : lal the Ancona Court of Assize had no jurisdiction because the assizes were over when it issued the new arrest warrant ; Ibl the revocation of release on account of the danger of the accused's absconding is only conceivable where such a danger actually materialises in the period after release but not in the case of an attempt to escape at a time when the accused is in prison awaiting trial . The prosecution also appealed against the Court of Assize's decision . By a decision of 3 February 1976 the Court of Cassation set aside the Ancona Court of Assize's decision for lack of jurisdiction and sent the case to the Investigation Chamber of the Ancona Court of Appeal . On 8 March 1976 that Court ordered the applicant's release on the ground that the maximum period of detention on remand lArticles 272 and 279 of the Cod e
of Criminal Procedure) had expired and, by virtue of Article 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered him to reside in the district of Spoleto (central Italy) . However, shortly before the Court of Cassation's decision, the Public Prosecutor attached to Piacenza Regional Court had issued an arrest warrant on 3 December 1975 Iwhich was served on the applicant on 23 December 1975) for his attempted escape of 16,September 1973 . Under Italian law this was an optional arrest warrant : It was issued against the applicant and another co-accused who could not be found . 5. In his address to the Assize Court of Appeal the applicant's counse l relied on the judgment of the Salerno Assize Court of Appeal, confirmed by the Ãourt of Cassation, in a case which had aroused great interest in Italian public opinion, the Marini case . Giovanni Marini, a young anarchist, had struck a young student, belonging to an extreme rightist movement, Carlo Palvella, 3 times with a knife, one of which blows proved fatal . The Salerno Assize Court of Appeal held that Marini had not intended to kill and sentenced him to 9 years imprisonment for slaughter . The applicant's counsel argued that if Marini, who had struck 3 blows with his knife, had not been held guilty of intentional homicidethere was an even stronger case for recognising and confirming that theapplicant was only guilty of manslaughter . To convict him of murder would, according to his counsel's argument, amount to a discrimination based on political ideology . This argument was rejected by the Court of Appea l
By its judgment of 15 June 1976 the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal declared the applicant guilty of murder lomicidio vo/ontariol and sentenced him to 14 years 8 months and 15 days imprisonment . The judgement also contained a fresh arrest warrant against the accuse d on these counts
6 . Shortly after thisjudgment was given on 14 May 1976 counsel representing Mr Ringozzi, one of the applicant's co-accused, applied to the Court of Cassation through the Attorney General in Ancona for the trial to be transferred (rimessione) to a court sitting in another town under Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . This application was sent to the Court of Cassation by the Attorney General on 20 May 1976 . The other co-accused, including the applicÃ¢nt, associated thernselves with this application for transfer by sending a telegram .7 . On 18 June 1976 the Investigating Chamber of the Bologna Court o f Appeal granted the applicant release on bail on the charge of attempting to escape .
B. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against the judgment of 15 June 1976 complaining both of the arrest warrant embodied therein and also of his conviction for murder . As regard the arrest warrant the applicant argued that it was a measure completely devoid of legal foundation and relied on previous decisions of the Court of Cassation (cf . "Massimarid" Cassazione Penale 1973, 364) . As regards his conviction for murder he repeated that he had not intended to kill and relied on the precedent of the Marini case mentioned above . In a supplementary memorial dated 5 October 1976 the applicant requested the Court of Cassation to quash the appeal proceedings and complained of the pressure exercised by left wing extremists on the judges and cousel and also of the conduct of the President of the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal . 9 . With regard to the new arrest warrant contained in the decision of 15 June 1976 the applicant also made an application, on 11 November 1976, to the Investigating Chamber of the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal to order his immediate release on the ground that the issue of a new arrest warrant, which annulled the effect of the termination of the statutory period of detention on remand, was not justified by any provision of Italian law . He argued that the arrest warrant contained in the judgment of 15 June 1976 was legally non-existent . By an order of 29 November 1976 the Assize Court of Appeal stated that it was not required to make a decision on this application ("non luogo a provvedere sulla rstanza") and ordered the file to be sent to the Court of Cassation for reasons of jurisdiction . By an order dated 26 October 1976 the Court of Cassation had previously rejected the application for transfer submitted by Mr Ringozzi's counsel after he had filed a new memorial on 8 October 1976 . The Court held that the appeal proceedings had been properly conducted and that there had been no serious disturbances . The Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal by a judgment 10 of 20 January 1977 . As regards the complaints relating to the arrest warrant, the Court observed that the question of nullity raised by the applicant was being dealt with in separate proceedings in chambers . With regard to the grounds alleging the nullity of the appeal proceedings, the Court, although stating that the application was out of time, examined the matter and declared this ground ot appeal ill-founded .
The applicant alleges violations of Article 5 (1) (a), (3) and (4) and of Article 6 (1) of the Convention - 187-
He complains firstly that he was illegally detained from 26 August 1975 to 20 January 1977 and alleges that this amounts to a violation of Article 5(1)(a) . He further alleges that his detention on remand did not comply with the reasonable time requirement in Article 5(3) . With regard to theviolation of Article 5(4),the applicant alleges that the Court of Cassation only decided on 3 February 1976 on his appeal against the Order of 25 August 1975 by which the Ancona Courtof Assize ordered a new arrest after the expiration Ã´f the maximum statutory periods . He also complains that no court has given a decision on his appeal against the arrest warrant contained in the Assize Court of Appeal judgment of 15 June 1976 . With regard to all these matters the applicant claims his right to compensation . As regards the violation of Article 6 (1) the applicant alleges that h e was not tried in an independent and- impartial manner . In this respect he compares his trial with that of the anarchist Marini who was accused of having struck a right wing extremist three times with a knife and was only found guilty of manslaughter by a decision of the same section of the Court of Cassation . The applicant alleges thatboth the Court of Assize and the Assiz e Court of Appeal were subjected to pressure by "leftists" . He complains that the President of the Assize Court of Appea l - stated in public that the trial should be completed before the day fixed for the political elections ; - advised defence counsel not to appear at the trial in order to avoid any possibility of incidents ; . . - interrupted the applicant's counsel during his addresses when certain points might have angered the "leftists" .
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSIO N On 10 December 1977 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 121 (b ) of its Rules of Procedure to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and request the latter to submit its written observations on admissibility . These observations reached the Commission on 18 March 1978 . They were immediately sent to the applicant's counsel, who was requested to submit his observation in reply . The latter, consisting of two memorials, reached the Commission on 20 May and 12 June 197 8
On 3 October 1978 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and the merits . This hearing to k place on 8 December 1978 . SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S The arguments submitted by the parties both in writing and orally ma y be summarised as follows . THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMEN T :A
1 . Admissibility of the complaints connected with the applicant's detention IArticle 5 (1) of the Convention ) Six months' period The Government argues that the applicant's complaint with respect to his imprisonment between 26 August 1975 and 3 . December 1975 is out of time . The final domestic decision for this .period of imprisonment was the Order of 8 March 1976 by the Invetigating Chamber . of the Ancona Court of Appeal -following the Court ot Cassation's judgment- which ordered the applicant's release . This decision was given more than 6 months before the date the application was lodged . 2 . The merits The Government argues that the applicant's complaints regarding the alleged illegality of his detention on remand during the period 26 August 1975 to 3 December 1975 are also inadmissible as they are manifestly ill-founded . The sameapplies to the complaints concerning the period 3 December 1975 to 20 January 1977 . The first period of detention from 26 August 1975 to 3 December 1975 is covered by the arrest warrant issued by the Ancona Court of Assize on 25 August 1975 . The second period from 3 December 1975 to 18 June 1976 is covered by the arrest warrant issued by the Public Prosecutor in Piacenza . And during the third period, between 18 June 1976 and 20 June 1977, the applicant was imprisoned under a new arrest warrant issued by the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal on 15 June 1976 . According to the Government, the whole of this period of detention was, therefore, "entirely covered by detention orders issued by the judicial authorities and accordingly the violations of Article 5 of the Convention of which the applicant is complaining do not exist" . Following the same reasoning the Government adds that it cannot be maintained that the alleged violations are based on errors committed by the judicial authorities when making the detention orders such as the arrest warrant of 25 August 1975 . The error -the Government stipulates- was "rectified by the domestic remedies, as the Court of Cassation allowed th e
accused's appeal and transferred the files to the Investigation Section of the Ancona Court of Appeal, which, by its decision of 8 March 1976, ordered the accused's release" . The other detention orders appeared on examination to have been made "in the lawful exercise of their powers by the competent judicial authorities" . The Government further adds that as regards the period of detention between 18 June 1976 and 20 January 1977, the adoptionof a more serious classification of the accused's offence in the judgment of the Assize Court of Appeal entailed a prolongation of the maximum period of detention on remand in accordance with the relevant provisions of Italian law . Finally, the Government submits that, "with the judgment sentencing the applicant to imprisonment for a period far longer than his detention on remand, any : questions as to the legality of this detention are iri fact superseded since account was taken of the period of detention in calculating the sentence imposed" . Admissibility of the complaints based o n the aÃleged unfaimess of th e .I
proceedings IArticle 6 111 of the Convention ) The Government maintains that this part of the applicationis inadmissible for failure to observe the six months' time limit . Alternatively, the Government maintains that this complaint is anyway manifestly ill-founded .
Six months' perio d The Government notes that the applicant's complaints relate to the alleged bias of the judges caused by the atmosphere prevailing in Ancona . In particular during the trial at first instance . It is stressed that the remedy provided by Italian law in this case was an application for transfer on grounds of justifiable suspicion of bias 1"rimessione per legittimo sospetto"1 under Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . The Court of Cassation gave judgment on the application submitted b y the applicant on the basis of this provision on 26 October 1976 . As the application to the Commission was not lodged until 8 July 1977 it follows that the applicant has not observed the six months' time limit . The Government comments that the judgment given by the Court o f Cassation on 20 January 1977 could not be taken into consideration in calculating the six months' period . Firstly, as appeared from the text of'that decision, the applicant's appeal on this point was out of time . Secondly, in this appeal the applicant had requested that the proceedings and decision on the appeal should be set aside by the Court of Cassation because the Assize Court of Appeal had not stayed the proceedings pending the decision on the application for transfer on grounds of justifiable suspicion ot bias ._190
2 . The merits On the applicant's allegation that the proceedings before the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal were unfair, the Government refers to the reasoning of the Court of Cassation in its Order of 26 October 1977 . The Court of Cassation considered that the demonstrations which .took place during the trial before the Assize Court of Appeal could be considered as normal in view of the political notoriety of the case . The applicant had not brought any evidence to show that the appeal court judges were biased . The respondent Government then consider the applicant's argument that his trial was unfair because he was treated differently from another person accused of murder who professed the opposite political views . It is argued that "the situations are different and it is not possible to maintain that the same sentence must be imposed on persons accused of similar crimes" . It is, accordingly, impossible to infer "that the applicant's judges were biased on the basis of such inconsistent and subjective evidence" .
THE APPLICAN T 1.
Admissibility of the complaints concerning the applicant's detention IArticle 5 (1) of the Convention )
The applicani argues that his detention on remand from 26 August 1975 to 20 January 1977 should be considered as illegal . The Court of Cassation, by its decision of 3 February 1976, recognised the illegality of the arrest warrant issued by the Ancona Court of Assize on 25 August 1975 . It follows from this that his detention between 25 August and 3 December 1975 (the date when the Public Prosecutor attached to Piacenza Regional Court issued an arrest warrant against him for attempted escapel was based on an illegal warrant . The applicant comments that the Government has put forward no convincing arguments to support the legality of the period of detention following the arrest warrant contained in the judgment of the Ancona Court of Appeal of 15 June 1976 . He submits that in Italian law release on the expiration of the maximum statutory period should be "automatic" . In his case the time limit expired on 26 August 1975 : the entire period of detention after that date was accordingly sine titulo . The applicant disputes in particular the Government's contention that the fact that a more serious charge was brought against him justified the prolongation of the maximum period of detention on remand . Relying on the established precedents of the Full Court of Cassation he alleges that such prolongation cannot occur when an accused has already been released becaus e
the maximum period has expired . As this was the position in his own case he concludes that the arrest warrant of 15 June 1976 was illegal . Finally he disputes the respondent Government's statement that the problem raised by the alleged illegality of his detention was at all events disposed of by the fact that the period of delention on remand was taken into accourit in calculating the length of the sentence imposed . In this connection he refers to the decisiohs of the Court on this subject, and in particular the judgment in the Ringeisen case . II . Admissibility of complaints based on the alleged unfair nature of the proceedings (Article 6 (1) of thÃ© Convention ) 1 . Six months' perio d The applicant disputes the respondent Government's statement that the final domestic decision on this complaint was thi ; Court of Cassation's Order ot 26 October 1976 . In his appeal to the Court of Cassation he had alleged the nullity of the appeal judgment on account of the pressures exercised by the "IefGsts" on the court and complained of certain conduct of the President of the Assize Court of Appeal . The Court of Cassation .had jurisdiction to hear this ground . It followed that the date of the final domestic decision was that of the Court of Cassation's judgment of 20 January 1977 . In reply to the other arguments put torward by the Government, the applicant, who considers that he has exhausted the domestic remedies, maintains :
- that the grounds of his appeal on cassation reached the Court within the statutory time limit : â¢ - that these grounds related to the nullity of the appeal judgment for the above-mentioned reasons and not, as the Government maintain, to a question ol procedure . The Court of Cassation had interpreted his memorial in this way and in doing so misinterpreted its meaning . Accoding to the applicant the respondent Government is adopting this incorrect interpretation ofthe Court of Cassation ' 2 . The merits The applicant asserts that the presssures exercised on the Assize Cour t of Appeal made it impossible to hold the trial in a .calm atmosphere and affected the due impartiality of the judges . He particularly stresses the negative repercussions of the press campaign directed to making him appear guilty, and theserious disturbances which followed the giving of the judgment at first instance
With regard to the procedure before the Ãoun of Cassation, a comparison between the Marini case and his own shows that the same judges (i .e . the first Section of the Court of Cassation) has adopted two entirely different attitudes : benevolence and clemency with regard to Mr Marini and severity and prejudice in his own case .
THE LA W 1 . The applicant complains that his detention from 26 August 1975 to 20 January 1977 was not in accordance with the provisions of Italian law and accordingly, alleges a violation of Article 5 (1) of the Convention . The applicant's complaints in fact only relate to 2 periods of detention, that between 25 August and 3 December 1975, and that from 18 June 1976 to 20 January 1977 . The Commission first examined the detention between 25 August 197 5 .2 (date when the Ancona Court of Assize ordered the applicant's release on account of the expiration of the maximum period and at the same time issued a new arrest warrant against him on the same facts) and 3 December 1975, when a arrest warrant was issued against the applicant for attempted escape . The applicant argues that the Court of Cassation by setting aside the arrest warrant of 25 August 1975 by its order of 3 February 1976 recognised the unlawfulness of the detention based on that warrant . The respondent Government maintains that the application is out of time in this respect because it was lodged with the Commission more than 6 months after the date of the final domestic decision, which, in the present case, was the Court of Cassation's order of 3 February 1976 . The Commission notes that the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation to establish the nullity of the arrest warrant of 25 August 1975 and the illegal nature of his detention . The Court of Cassation allowed his application . The Commission is of the opinion that by deciding that the arrest warrant was void the Court also found that the applicant's detention was illegal . Thts detention was therefore not "lawful" within the meaning of Article 5 111 of the Conventio n The Commission considers that the applicant could then by virtue of Article 5 (5) of the Convention have claimed compensation on the basis of the Convention itself, which has the force of law in the Italian legal system . However, it should be observed that in the present case the applicant did not raise before the Italian courts either formally or even in substance his right t o
compensation . Moreover, neither an examination of the case as it has been submitted, nor an examination, ex officio, by the Commission, has revealed any special circumstances which might have absolved the applicant according to the geherally recognised rules of international law, relevant to this question, from raising this point before the domÃ©stic courts . It follows that the applicant has not complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of the domestic remedies and that this part of his application must be rejected by virtue of Article 27 13) of the Convention . The Commission then examined the detention between .3 18 June 197 6 -thÃ© date when the Investigating Chamber of the Bologna Court of Appeal released the applicant on bail after he was charged with attempted escapeand 20 January 1977 when the Court of .Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal and confirmed his conviction for murder . The applicant's detention during this period was by virtue of thÃ© arrest warrantcontained in the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal's judgment of 15 June 1976 . The applicant argues that the issue of a new arrest warrant, which cancels the effect of the expiration of the maximum period of detention on remand, is not prescribed by any provision of Italian law . The Government disputes the applicant's submission and requests the Commission to reject this part of the application as manifestly ill-founded . It argues that the arrest warrant contained in the above cited judgment of 15 June 1976 was justified, under the Act, by the fact that the applicant was now charged with a more serious crime and the consequent extÃ©nsion of the maximum period of delention on remand . The Commission observes that the question whether the arrest warrant issued on 15 June 1976 by the Ancona Assize Court of Appeal was in accordance with Italian law and whether the detentionunder this warrant was therefore lawful within the meaning of Article 5 11) of the Convention raises complex problems . It, therefore, considers that this complaint cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and that its solution must depend on an examination of the merits . ' 4 . The applicant complÃ¼ns that the period of his' detention on remand exceeded reasonable limits and relies in this respect on Article 5 131 of the Convention . In the present case the applicant has not shown that he applied for bai l and appealed against the possible rejection of his application tip to the Court of Cassation . He has, therefore, not exhausted the remedies available to him in Italian lavi . Moreover, neither an examination of the case as submitted, nor an ex officio examination by the Commission, has revealed any special circumstance which might, according to the generally recognised rules o f
international law relating to this subject, have absolved the applicant from exhausting the domestic remedies . It follows that the applicant has not complied with the conditio n relating to the exhaustion of the domestic remedies and that ihis part of his application must be rejected under Article 27 (3) of the Convention . 5 . The applicant complains that the Court of Cassation only reached a decision on 3 February 1976 on his appeal against the order of 25 August 1975 by which the Ancona Court of Assize ordered his renewed arrest after the expiration of the maximum statutory period . He invokes Article 5 141 of the Convention . In ihe present case the Court of Cassation's decision which, as regards this particular complaint constitutes ihe final domestic decision, was given on 3 February 1976 ; but the application was lodged with the Commission on 8 July 1977, i .e . more than six months after the date of this decision . The applicant has accordingly not complied with the six month time limit laid down in Article 26 in line of the Convention . Moreover, an examination of the case has not revealed any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of this period . It follows that the application is out of time in this respect and must be rejected under Article 27 131 of the Convention . 6 . The applicant complains that no court ever decided on the lawfulness of his detention under the arrest warrant contained in the judgment of the Assize Appeal Court of 15 June 1976 . Here again, he relies on Article 5 (4) of the Conventio n The Commission finds that, on the present state of the file, there appears to be no decision of the Court of Assize or of the Court of Cassation dealing with the merits of the application made by the applicant to have the said arrest warrant declared illegal . It accordingly considers that this complaint cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and that its solution must depend on an examination of the merits . 7 . The applicant complains of an unfair trial and, in particular, of the atmosphere surrounding the proceedings before the Court of Assize and the Assize Court of Appeal . He also alleges that the Court of Cassation adopted a severe and prejudiced attitude towards him on account of his political opinions . In all these respects, he relies on Article 6 (1) of the Convention . The respondent Government states that, insofar as the applicant's complaint relates to the proceedings before the Assize Court of Appeal, th e
application is out of time because it was lodged with the Commission more than six months after the date of the final domestic decision . In the present case this was the order of 26 October 1976 by which the Court of Cassation rejected an application by the abplicant and the other co-accused for the proceedings to be transferred in accordancÃ© with Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . In so far as the applicant is referring to the judgment of the Court of Cassation, the respondent Government maintains ihat the application should be rejected on this point'as being manifestly ill-founded . 8 . The Commission finds itself unable to accept the respondent Government's argument that the Court of Cassation's order, rejecting the application for transfer, must be considered as the final domestic decision within the meaning of Article 26 rn /ine of the Convention . It considers that, by raising before the Court of Cassation, as part of his appeal, grounds relating to the atmosphere during the proceedings before the Assize Court of Appeal, the applicant might have achieved his purpose by having the judgment complained of set aside . In fact the applicant's proper course was to appealto the Court of Cassation against the alleged bias of the judges of the Assize Court of Appeal in order to rectify his situation by exhausting the domestic remedies . 9 . As the applicant did in substance plead the alleged bias Ã´f the Assize Court of Appeal before the Court of Cassation the Commission has accordingly examined the question whether this complaint is or is not manifestly ill-founded . It must first be noted that the Court of Cassation had already stated its opinion on the conditions in which the appeal took place, on the basis of evidence by Mr Ringozzi's defence counsel, and found that "the trial was conducted in a proper manner, even if this was due to the precautions taken by the President of the Court, and no serious disturbances occurred" .Asregardstheconductofthejudges,theCom is iohobservestha t no evidence, tending to prove that the judges were biased, was furnished by the applicant to the Court of Cassation . The fact that the Assize Court of Appeal altered the charge and increased the sentence (from about 11 years to about 14 years) cannot, in the present case, be regarded as a proof of bias As to the complaints against the Court of Cassation itself, based on a comparison with the judgment given by the same Section of the Court of Cassation in another criminal case, the Commission considers that such a comparison is totally irrelevant .
In these circumstances it follows that this part of the application is without foundation and must be rejected under Article 27 121 of the Convention . For these reasons, the Commissio n DECLARES the application ADMISSIBLE and retains the application without in any way prejudging its merits, insofar as the applicant complains of the allegedly unlawful nature of his detention on remand between 18 June 1976 and 20 January 1977 (Article 5 111 of the Convention) and insofar as he complains that a court had not speedily decided on the lawfulness of his detention (Article 5 (4) of the Conventionl ;
2 . DECLARES the remainder of the application INADMISSIBLE .
- 197-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 13/12/1978Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page