Source: https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/11/15/2010-28493/rules-of-practice-before-the-board-of-patent-appeals-and-interferences-in-ex-parte-appeals
Timestamp: 2016-07-02 09:31:02
Document Index: 610879690

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Federal Register | Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex Parte Appeals
Dates: The deadline for receipt of written comments on the proposed rulemaking is 5 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on January 14, 2011.
-69849 (23 pages)
Document Number: 2010-28493
Shorter URL: https://federalregister.gov/a/2010-28493 Related Topics
Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex Parte Appeals; Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable 7 actions from December 22nd, 2009 to September 2011
75 FR 69828
On January 20, 2009, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff instructed agencies via a memorandum entitled, “Regulatory Review,” (74 FR 4435 (Jan. 20, 2009)) to consider seeking comments for an additional 30 days on rules that were published in the Federal Register and had not yet become effective by January 20, 2009. On January 21, 2009, the Office of Management and Budget issued a memorandum entitled, “Implementation of Memorandum Concerning Regulatory Review,” (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/agencyinformation_memoranda_2009_pdf/m09-08.pdf) which provided agencies further guidance on such rules that had not yet taken effect. For such rules, both memoranda stated that agencies should consider reopening the rulemaking process to review any significant concerns involving law or policy that have been raised.
Purposes for Proposed Changes to the Current Rule Back to Top
One purpose of this proposed rulemaking is to ensure that the Board has adequate information to decide ex parte appeals on the merits, while not unduly burdening appellants or examiners with unnecessary briefing requirements. In particular, the goal of this proposed rulemaking is to effect an overall lessening of the burden on appellants and examiners to present an appeal to the Board. For example, statements of the status of claims, the status of amendments, the grounds of rejection to be reviewed on appeal, and the claims appendix would no longer be required in the appeal brief (Proposed Bd.R. 41.37) or in the examiner's answer. Because this information is already available in the Image File Wrapper, it is unnecessary for appellants or examiners to provide this information to the Board. Moreover, by eliminating these briefing requirements, the Office expects to reduce the number of non-compliant appeal briefs and the number of examiners' answers returned to the examiner due to non-compliance, which are a significant cause of delays on appeal. See USPTO, Top Eight Reasons Appeal Briefs are Non-Compliant, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/procedures/top_8_reasons_appeal_brf_dec09.pdf.
Brief Explanation of Proposed Changes to the Current Rule Back to Top
Discussion of Proposed Changes to the Current Rule Back to Top
Proposed rules are denominated as “Proposed Bd.R. x” in this supplementary information. The Board has jurisdiction to consider and decide ex parte appeals in patent applications (including reissue, design and plant patent applications) and ex parte reexamination proceedings.
Discussion of Proposed Changes to Specific Rules Back to Top
The ANPRM proposed to amend 41.31(a) to clarify that an appeal is taken to the Board by filing a notice of appeal. The Office received a comment that the changes proposed in the ANPRM, which would have deleted reference to the statutory conditions under which a right of appeal arises, lacked clarity. Specifically, the comment noted that it would promote efficiency to retain the specific statutory conditions for appeal in the rules to provide clarity to appellants and practitioners who might read only the rules and not the underlying statutes. Proposed Bd.R. 41.31 proposes to keep the language of sections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) found in the current rule, thus retaining the statutory conditions under which a right of appeal arises.
Pre-Appeal Brief Conference Effects: Actions in Response to Request for Pre-Appeal Brief Review Back to Top
Appeal Conference Effects: Actions in Response to Appeal Brief Back to Top
Prosecution reopened
Proposed Bd.R. 41.31(c) proposes to revise the current rule so that an appeal, when taken, would be presumed to seek review of all of the claims under rejection unless canceled by an amendment filed by the appellant. This proposed change, obviates the need for the majority of appellants who seek review of all claims under rejection to affirmatively state (in the notice of appeal and/or in the status of claims section of the appeal brief) which claims are on appeal. Rather, under Proposed Bd.R. 41.31(c), the Board would presume that an appellant intends to appeal all claims under rejection except for those that the appellant has canceled. This proposed change avoids the unintended cancellation of claims by the Office due to an appellant's mistake in the listing of the claims in either the notice of appeal or in the appeal brief. Under current practice, if an appellant incorrectly lists the claims on appeal, or is silent in the brief as to any of the claims under rejection, then the Office assumes that such claims are not on appeal, and notes that those non-appealed claims should be cancelled by the examiner. Ex parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (holding that when appellant does not appeal some of the claims under rejection and does not challenge the Examiner's rejection of these claims, then the Board will treat these claims as withdrawn from the appeal, which operates as an authorization for the Examiner to cancel those claims from the application). The proposed rule would avoid potential unintended cancellation of claims due to oversight or mistake by appellants in listing the claims on appeal. This proposed change would replace the Office's procedure under Ghuman and simplify practice for examiners by no longer requiring examiners to cancel non-appealed claims. Any appellant who wishes to appeal fewer than all rejected claims should file an amendment cancelling the non-appealed claims. If an appellant does not file an amendment cancelling claims that the appellant does not wish to appeal, but then also fails to provide any argument in the appeal brief directed to those claims, then the Board may simply affirm any rejections against such claims.
The Office received another comment that the rule proposed in the ANPRM seemed to conflict with § 556(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which guarantees the right to submit rebuttal evidence in agency proceedings and with case law from the Federal Circuit. As noted supra, the Proposed Bd.R. 41.40 in this NPRM provides appellants with procedures to file a petition to the Director under Rule 1.181 seeking review of the examiner's failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection and, consequently, if granted, have an opportunity to reopen prosecution and submit rebuttal evidence, consistent with the APA.
The ANPRM similarly proposed revising Bd.R. 41.35(b) to set forth when the Board's jurisdiction ends. The Office received no comments in response to this proposed change.
In response to some of the concerns raised by these comments, the proposed rule has narrowed the information required to be included in the statement of related cases in the appeal brief, as compared to the current rule, to limit the statement to appeals in cases which are owned by the same appellant(s) or assignee. The proposed rule removes the language in the prior proposed Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) regarding a continuing obligation to update this information. The proposed rule in this NPRM retains a default provision, originally proposed in the ANPRM, so that a statement that there are “no known related cases” is not required and that fact “may” be inferred from the absence of a statement. The proposed rule also no longer requires filing of copies of decisions in related cases. The narrowed scope of this proposed section, as compared to the current rule, lessens the burden on appellants from the statement that is currently required and addresses concerns raised in the comments received to the ANPRM.
The Office received one comment requesting that the rule should allow various formats based on USPTO provided models, including a columnar chart, which would provide more flexibility to appellants. This suggestion was not adopted because the formats received under the current rule vary widely, with some summaries containing little to no useful information. It is important to impose a specific format for this rule to ensure that the Board obtains the information that will be most useful. This requirement for a strict format has been offset with a lessening of the burden on appellants by requiring annotation only for those elements in dispute. Also, the proposed rule is more flexible than the current rule in that it allows citation to paragraph number, rather than limiting citations to page and line number of the specification.
The Office received another comment suggesting that if appellant does not identify structure for a § 112, ¶ 6 analysis, then “for purposes of the appeal” such limitations should not be limited to their corresponding structure under § 112, ¶ 6. In light of the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), in which the court held that the Office “may not disregard the structure disclosed in the specification corresponding to [means-plus-function] language when rendering a patentability determination,” the Board cannot ignore the structure corresponding to a means plus function limitation to decide an appeal. As a compromise, the proposed rule does not require appellant to provide claim mapping for a § 112, ¶ 6 limitation if that limitation is not in dispute.
The Office received another comment noting concern that the scope of the “waiver” is unclear, and noting that appellants should not be precluded from making arguments during continued prosecution based on a waiver set forth in a prior appeal. Several comments suggested that the waiver should be limited in applicability for “purposes of appeal only.” The proposed rule permits the Board to refuse to consider arguments not raised in the appeal brief, except as provided in Proposed Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52. This proposed language is substantially the same as the current Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii), which states that “[a]ny arguments or authorities not included in the brief or a reply brief filed pursuant to § 41.41 will be refused consideration by the Board, unless good cause is shown.” Proposed Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52 have provisions allowing certain new arguments for good cause in reply briefs, at oral hearing, or in requests for rehearing which ensure that appellants have a full and fair opportunity to be heard before the Board. The proposed rule clarifies that the Board's right to refuse consideration of arguments not raised is “for purposes of the present appeal” so as to clarify that such right of refusal does not extend to subsequent Board appeals in the same or related applications. See Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[P]recedent has long supported the right of an applicant to file a continuation application despite an unappealed adverse Board decision, and to have that application examined on the merits. Where the Patent Office has reconsidered its position on patentability in light of new arguments or evidence submitted by the applicant, the Office is not forbidden by principles of preclusion to allow previously rejected claims.” (internal citation omitted)).
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ix) and the ANPRM required appellants to include an evidence appendix with the brief. The Office received comments expressing concern that requiring inclusion of an evidence appendix including copies of documents already available to the Board in the Record is burdensome on appellants and does not improve efficiency at the Board. The proposed rule deletes the evidence appendix from the briefing requirements to address these concerns. The Office decided to assume the burden of locating copies of the evidence relied upon in the Record rather than requiring appellants to provide copies with their appeal brief. While it is no longer a requirement to include an evidence appendix, the Office strongly encourages and appreciates receiving copies of the evidence relied upon. This ensures that the Board is considering the proper evidence and avoids any confusion as to the particular evidence referenced in the appeal brief. In the alternative, the Board recommends that appellants clearly identify in the appeal brief the evidence relied upon using a clear description of the evidence along with the date of entry of such evidence into the Image File Wrapper.
The Office received a comment requesting that the rule make clear that any new ground of rejection raised in the examiner's answer must be approved by a Technology Center Director. This requirement is currently in the MPEP. See MPEP § 1207.03. The Office chose to include a requirement in the proposed rule that the Director must approve a new ground of rejection in the examiner's answer to make clear that the Office plans to continue this requirement for supervisory review of new grounds of rejection. The Director may choose to delegate this authority as appropriate.
To further address the desire for parity, the content requirements for appeal briefs have been significantly decreased so as not to create a disparity in the requirements between the brief and the answer. Content requirements for the examiner's answer were not included in the rule, because the Office needs to retain flexibility to add content requirements as needed by revision of the MPEP. However, the Office plans to continue to require that the examiner's answer contain a grounds of rejection section that would set forth any rejections that have been withdrawn and any new grounds of rejection, and the answer would further be required to contain a response to arguments section to include any response the examiner has to arguments raised in the appeal brief. See MPEP § 1207.02. The answer would no longer be required to restate the grounds of rejection. The Board would instead rely on the statement of the grounds of rejection in the Office action from which the appeal was taken (as modified by any subsequent Advisory Action or Pre-Appeal Brief Conference Decision).
The Office received several comments opposing an examiner's right to enter a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. While the Office agrees that the entry of new grounds of rejection in an examiner's answer should be a rare occurrence, the Office determined that the option to enter a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer should be retained in the proposed rule for those situations in which new evidence comes to light later in the prosecution. The proposed rule codifies the Office's standing procedure that requires supervisory approval of each new ground of rejection.
To avoid triggering a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer, the examiner is not required to use identical language in both the examiner's answer and the Office action from which the appeal is taken. It is not a new ground of rejection, for example, if the examiner's answer responds to appellant's arguments using different language, or restates the reasoning of the rejection in a different way, so long as the evidence relied upon is the same and the “basic thrust of the rejection” is the same. In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1303 (CCPA 1976); see also
In re Noznick, 391 F.2d 946, 949 (CCPA 1968) (no new ground of rejection made when “explaining to appellants why their arguments were ineffective to overcome the rejection made by the examiner”); In re Krammes, 314 F.2d 813, 817 (CCPA 1963) (“It is well established that mere difference in form of expression of the reasons for finding claims unpatentable or unobvious over the references does not amount to reliance on a different ground of rejection.” (citation omitted)); In re Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 1241 (CCPA 1946) (holding that the use of “different language” does not necessarily trigger a new ground of rejection).
The following examples are intended to provide guidance as to what constitutes a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. What constitutes a “new ground of rejection” is a highly fact-specific question. See, e.g.,
Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303 (finding new ground entered based upon “facts of this case” and rejecting other cases as controlling given “distinctive facts at bar”); In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1092 (CCPA 1970) (“[l]ooking at the facts of this case, we are constrained to hold” that a new ground was entered). If a situation arises that does not fall neatly within any of the following examples, it is recommended that the examiner identify the example below that is most analogous to the situation at hand, keeping in mind that “the ultimate criterion of whether a rejection is considered ‘new’ * * * is whether appellants have had fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection.”Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1302.
1. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from § 102 to § 103. If the examiner's answer changes the statutory basis of the rejection from § 102 to § 103, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184 (CCPA 1965), the Board affirmed an examiner's rejection under § 102 over a single reference. On appeal, the Solicitor argued that the Board's decision should be sustained under § 103 over that same reference. The court declined to sustain the rejection under § 103, holding that a change in the statutory basis of rejection would constitute a new ground of rejection, and observed that “the issues arising under the two sections [§§ 102 and 103] may be vastly different, and may call for the production and introduction of quite different types of evidence.”Hughes, 345 F.2d at 186-87. See also In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572 (CCPA 1971) (holding the Board's decision contained a new ground of rejection, wherein the examiner rejected the claims under § 102 based on applicant's failure to show prior discovery of utility, and wherein the Board affirmed the rejection based on obviousness of that utility under § 103).
2. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from § 103 to § 102, based on a different teaching. If the examiner's answer changes the statutory basis of the rejection from § 103 to § 102, and relies on a different portion of a reference which goes beyond the scope of the portion that was previously relied upon, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Echerd, 471 F.2d 632, 635 (CCPA 1973), the examiner rejected the claims under § 103 over a combination of two references. The Board then changed the ground of rejection to § 102 over one of those references, relying on a different portion of that reference for some claim limitations, and asserted that the remaining claim limitations were inherently present in that reference. The court held that the Board's affirmance constituted a new ground of rejection. Echerd, 471 F.2d at 635 (“[A]ppellants should have been accorded an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence as to the new assumptions of inherent characteristics.” (citation omitted)).
3. Citing new calculations in support of overlapping ranges. If a claim reciting a range is rejected as anticipated or obvious based on prior art that falls within or overlaps with the claimed range (see MPEP §§ 2131.03 and 2144.05), and the rejection is based upon range values calculated for the first time in the examiner's answer, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the examiner rejected the claims under § 103 based on overlapping ranges of particle sizes and size distributions. The Board affirmed the rejection, but included in its decision an Appendix containing calculations to support the prima facie case of obviousness. The court held the Board's reliance upon those values to constitute a new ground of rejection, stating that “the Board found facts not found by the examiner regarding the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, which in fairness required an opportunity for response.”Kumar, 418 F.3d at 1368 (citation omitted).
4. Citing new structure in support of structural obviousness. If, in support of an obviousness rejection based on close structural similarity (see MPEP § 2144.09), the examiner's answer relies on a different structure than the one on which the examiner previously relied, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927 (CCPA 1967), the examiner rejected claims to a chemical composition under § 103 based on the composition's structural similarity to a prior art compound disclosed in a reference. The Board affirmed the rejection under § 103 over that same reference, but did so based on a different compound than the one the examiner cited. The court held that the Board's decision constituted a new ground of rejection, stating, “Under such circumstances, we conclude that when a rejection is factually based on an entirely different portion of an existing reference the appellant should be afforded an opportunity to make a showing of unobviousness vis-a-vis such portion of the reference.”Wiechert, 370 F.2d at 933.
5. Pointing to a different portion of the claim to maintain a “new matter” rejection. If, in support of a claim rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, based on new matter (see MPEP § 2163.06), a different feature or aspect of the rejected claim is believed to constitute new matter, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Waymouth, 486 F.2d 1058, 1059 (CCPA 1973), the claims included the limitation “said sodium iodide * * * present in amount of at least 0.17 mg./cc. of said arc tube volume.” The examiner's rejection stated that the claimed “sodium iodide” constituted new matter because the specification was alleged only to disclose “sodium.” The Board affirmed the rejection, but did so on a “wholly different basis,” namely, that the specification failed to disclose the claimed “0.17 mg./cc.” volume limitation. Waymouth, 486 F.2d at 1060. The court held that the Board's rationale constituted a new ground of rejection, “necessitating different responses by appellants.”Id. at 1061.
1. Citing a different portion of a reference which goes no farther than, and merely elaborates upon, what is taught in the previously cited portion of that reference. If the examiner's answer cites a different portion of an applied reference which goes no farther than, and merely elaborates upon, what is taught in the previously cited portion of that reference, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the examiner rejected the claims under § 103 over a combination of references, including the English translation of the abstract for a Japanese patent. The examiner cited the English abstract for two claim limitations: (1) Mangosteen rind, and (2) fruit or vegetable juice. The Board affirmed the rejection under § 103 over the same references, but instead of citing the abstract, the Board cited an Example on page 16 of the English translation of the Japanese reference, which was not before the examiner. DBC, 545 F.3d at 1381. Importantly, the Board cited the Example for the same two claim limitations taught in the abstract, and the Example merely elaborated upon the medicinal qualities of the mangosteen rind (which medicinal qualities were not claimed) and taught orange juice as the preferred fruit juice (while the claim merely recited fruit or vegetable juice). Hence, the Example merely provided a more specific disclosure of the same two generic limitations that were fully taught by the abstract. The court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection because “the example in the translation goes no farther than, and merely elaborates upon, what is taught by the abstract.”DBC, 545 F.3d at 1382 n.5.
2. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from § 103 to § 102, but relying on the same teachings. If the examiner's answer changes the statutory basis of the rejection from § 103 to § 102, and relies on the same teachings of the remaining reference to support the § 102 rejection, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re May, 574 F.2d 1082 (CCPA 1978), a claim directed to a genus of chemical compounds was rejected under § 103 over a combination of references. The primary reference disclosed a species that fell within the claimed genus. Both the examiner and the Board cited the species to reject the claim under § 103. The court affirmed the rejection, but did so under § 102, stating that “lack of novelty is the epitome of obviousness.”May, 574 F.2d at 1089 (citing In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974)). Because the court relied on the same prior art species as both the examiner and Board, the court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection. May, 574 F.2d at 1089.
3. Relying on fewer than all references in support of a § 103 rejection, but relying on the same teachings. If the examiner's answer removes one or more references from the statement of rejection under § 103, and relies on the same teachings of the remaining references to support the § 103 rejection, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302 (CCPA 1976), the examiner rejected the claims under § 103 over four references. The Board affirmed the rejection under § 103, but limited its discussion to three of the references applied by the examiner. Id. The Board relied upon the references for the same teachings as did the examiner. The court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection. Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303 (“Having compared the rationale of the rejection advanced by the examiner and the board on this record, we are convinced that the basic thrust of the rejection at the examiner and board level was the same.”). See also
In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 495-96 (CCPA 1961) (Examiner rejected claims 28 and 29 under § 103 based upon “Whitney in view of Harth;” Board did not enter new ground of rejection by relying only on Whitney).
If the examiner's answer changes the order of references in the statement of rejection under § 103, and relies on the same teachings of those references to support the § 103 rejection, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 552 (CCPA 1946), the examiner rejected the claims under § 103 over “Foret in view of either Preleuthner or Seyfried.” The Board affirmed the rejection under § 103, but styled the statement of rejection as to some of the rejected claims as “Seyfried in view of Foret,” but relied on the same teachings of Seyfried and Foret on which the examiner relied. The court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection. Cowles, 156 F.2d at 554. See also In re Krammes, 314 F.2d 813, 816-17 (CCPA 1963) (holding that a different “order of combining the references” did not constitute a new ground of rejection because each reference was cited for the “same teaching” previously cited).
5. Considering, in order to respond to applicant's arguments, other portions of a reference submitted by the applicant. If an applicant submits a new reference to argue, for example, that the prior art “teaches away” from the claimed invention (see MPEP § 2145), and the examiner's answer points to portions of that same reference to counter the argument, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. In In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the claimed invention was directed to a process for sulfonating diphenyl sulfone at a temperature above 127° C. Id. at 1039. The examiner rejected the claims under § 103 over a single reference. The applicant submitted three additional references as evidence that the prior art teaches away from performing sulfonation above 127° C, citing portions of those references which taught lower temperature reactions. The Board affirmed the rejection, finding the applicant's evidence unpersuasive. On appeal, the Solicitor responded to the applicant's “teaching away” argument by pointing to other portions of those same references which, contrary to applicant's argument, disclosed reactions occurring above 127° C. The court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection because “[t]he Solicitor has done no more than search the references of record for disclosures pertinent to the same arguments for which [applicant] cited the references.”Hedges, 783 F.2d at 1039-40.
Proposed Bd.R. 41.41(a) proposes to revise the current rule to add a paragraph heading and to clarify that appellants may file only one reply brief and that such a reply brief must be filed within two months of either the examiner's answer or a decision refusing to grant a petition under Rule 1.181 to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer.
The ANPRM proposed to revise the current rule so that only the Chief Administrative Patent Judge had the authority to remand an application to the examiner. The Office received a wide range of comments regarding this proposed modification, some comments in direct contradiction with others. Two comments expressed the view that the Chief Administrative Patent Judge should not have sole authority over merits remands. However, another comment expressed the opposite view that allowing the Chief Administrative Patent Judge to issue remand orders would improve the appellate process before the Board. Another comment expressed the view that the Board should issue remands sparingly. Yet another comment expressed the distinct view that the remand power is an important tool for the Board to require an examiner to correct errors and that it promotes efficiency at the Board by freeing judges from doing the job of the examiner and allows the examiner to correct errors based on oversight. The comment further notes that if the panel could no longer remand an application, it would require the Board to force decisions into either an affirmance or reversal and would negatively impact the quality of the Board decisions. However, another comment was in favor of the proposed change, noting that the Board has used its remand power to avoid deciding cases on the merits and instead remanded cases to the examiner. The Office agrees with some of the comments noting that remands should be used sparingly. The Office's position is that Director-ordered remands would be used in most instances to correct errors in the appeal that prevent the Board from otherwise deciding the issues before it. The Board would decide the issues before it based on the rejections as presented by the examiner and the arguments made by appellant. This proposed rule would lead to more compact prosecution because it would provide an incentive for examiners to fully explain and articulate the rejections earlier in the prosecution.
Proposed Bd.R. 41.52(a)(2) proposes to delete the requirement of a showing of good cause for appellants to present new arguments based on a recent relevant decision of the Board or the Federal Circuit. This change is proposed because it is the Office's position that a new argument based on a recent relevant decision would inherently make a showing of good cause and thus the text of the current rule seemed redundant.
Therefore, these rule changes involve rules of agency practice and procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), and prior notice and an opportunity for public comment are not required pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) (or any other law). See Bachow Commc'ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 237 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rules governing an application process are “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” and exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirement); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the rules of practice promulgated under the authority of former 35 U.S.C. 6(a) (now in 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2)) are not substantive rules to which the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act apply); Fressola v. Manbeck, 36 USPQ2d 1211, 1215 (D.D.C. 1995) (“it is extremely doubtful whether any of the rules formulated to govern patent or trade-mark practice are other than ‘interpretive rules, general statements of policy, * * * procedure, or practice' ” (quoting C.W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and the Administrative Procedure Act, 38 Trademark Rep. 149, 153 (1948)).
Based on the Office's experience, it estimates that such an amendment canceling claims will only be filed in approximately 1% of appeals. The Board decided Ex parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) in May 2008. Of the approximately 2,056 reported Board decisions and orders issued in the remainder of FY 2008, only ten such decisions and orders cited Ghuman in noting that an appellant had withdrawn claims from appeal. In FY 2009 (October 2008-September 2009), of the approximately 5,612 reported Board decisions and orders, only twenty cited Ghuman in noting that an appellant had withdrawn claims from appeal. In FY 2010 (October 2009-September 2010), of the approximately 5,990 reported Board decisions and orders, only twenty-six cited Ghuman in noting that an appellant had withdrawn claims from appeal. While these numbers may not represent a precise indication of the numbers of appeals where appellants chose not to appeal all of the rejected claims, these figures are provided as an indication of the relatively small number of appeals in which appellants choose to appeal fewer than all of the rejected claims without canceling such unappealed claims prior to appeal. Based on this data, the Office found that approximately 0.41% of all appeals had Ghuman issues, i.e., where fewer than all of the rejected claims were appealed. For purposes of calculating additional cost to appellants from this proposed rule change, the Office rounded up to 1% and used this as a conservative (high) estimate for the number of amendments expected. As such, this proposed rule change will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Specifically, the Office has estimated that the proposed change to Bd.R. 41.31(c) will impose an increased burden of two hours time to a small subset of appellants (1%) who choose not to seek review of all claims under rejection by requiring such appellants to file an amendment canceling any unappealed claims, or otherwise have the Board treat all rejected claims as being on appeal. Additionally, the Office estimated that the proposed change to the briefing requirements in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (requiring appellants to place any claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup under a separate subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number) would result in 0.2 hours of added time for those appellants who choose to separately argue their claims. The estimates are based on the Office's expertise in patent prosecution practice. This increase in burden hours would not apply to all appeal briefs because some appellants choose to argue all of the claims rejected under a ground of rejection as a single group. However, since the Office does not track the number of appeals in which appellants argue all claims as a single group versus the number of appeals in which appellants argue some claims separately, for purposes of estimating the overall burden, the Office has applied this 0.2 hour increase to the estimate of all appeal briefs filed.
6. The proposed change to Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v) lessens the burden on appellant by limiting the summary of the claimed subject matter to require annotation only for “each limitation in dispute by appellant.” The proposed rule provides more flexibility than the current rule by allowing citation to paragraph number (instead of limiting citation to page and line number). The proposed rule similarly limits the requirement for a § 112, ¶ 6 summary to only those recitations “in dispute by appellant.” The proposed change also clarifies the current Office policy, which does not allow reference to the patent application publication in the summary of claim subject matter. Since improper reference to the patent application publication is a current cause of defective briefs, this rule change is proposed to reduce confusion.
Interested persons are requested to send comments regarding this information collection, including suggestions for reduction of this burden to: (1) The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, New Executive Office Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20503, Attention: Desk Officer for the Patent and Trademark Office; and (2) The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451, Attention: Linda Horner.
Proposed Amendments to the Regulatory Text Back to Top
2. Amend § 1.197 by revising the section heading and removing and reserving paragraph (a).
§ 1.197 Termination of proceedings.
PART 41—PRACTICE BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES Back to Top
4. Revise § 41.12 to read as follows:
§ 41.12 Citation of authority.
Subpart B—Ex parte Appeals Back to Top
5. Amend § 41.30 by adding a definition for “record” in alphabetical order to read as follows:
§ 41.30 Definitions.
6. Amend § 41.31 by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text, (b) and (c) to read as follows:
§ 41.31 Appeal to Board.
(c) An appeal, when taken, is presumed to be taken from the rejection of all claims under rejection unless cancelled by an amendment filed pursuant to §§ 1.121, 1.173, or 1.530 of this title. Questions relating to matters not affecting the merits of the invention may be required to be settled before an appeal can be considered.
7. Amend § 41.33 by revising paragraphs (c) and (d)(2) to read as follows:
§ 41.33 Amendments and affidavits or other evidence after appeal.
(c) All other amendments filed after the date of filing an appeal pursuant to § 41.31(a)(1) through (a)(3) will not be admitted except as permitted by §§ 41.39(b)(1) and 41.50(b)(1).
(2) All other affidavits or other evidence filed after the date of filing an appeal pursuant to § 41.31(a)(1) through (a)(3) will not be admitted except as permitted by §§ 41.39(b)(1) and 41.50(b)(1).
6. Revise § 41.35 to read as follows:
§ 41.35 Jurisdiction over appeal.
(1) The Director enters a remand order (See§ 41.35(c)),
(2) The Board enters a final decision (See§ 41.2 of this part) and judicial review is sought or the time for seeking judicial review has expired,
(5) Appellant fails to take any required action under §§ 41.39(b), 41.50(b), or 41.50(d), and the Board enters an order of dismissal, or
(6) Appellant reopens prosecution in response to a new ground of rejection entered in a decision of the Board (See§ 41.50(b)(1)).
(c) Remand ordered by the Director. Prior to the entry of a decision on the appeal by the Board (See§ 41.50), the Director may sua sponte order the proceeding remanded to the examiner.
8. Amend § 41.37 by:
(a) Timing and fee.* * *
(b) Failure to file a brief.* * *
(vii) Argument. The arguments of appellant with respect to each ground of rejection, and the basis therefor, with citations of the statutes, regulations, authorities, and parts of the Record relied on. The arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant. Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal. Each ground of rejection contested by appellant must be argued under a separate heading, and each heading shall reasonably identify the ground of rejection being contested (e.g., by claim number, statutory basis, and applied reference, if any). For each ground of rejection applying to two or more claims, the claims may be argued separately (claims are considered by appellants as separately patentable), as a group (all claims subject to the ground of rejection stand or fall together), or as a subgroup (a subset of the claims subject to the ground of rejection stand or fall together). When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone. Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately. Under each heading identifying the ground of rejection being contested, any claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number. A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.
(2) * * *See§ 1.116 of this title for treatment of amendments, affidavits or other evidence filed after final action but before or on the same date of filing an appeal and § 41.33 for treatment of amendments, affidavits or other evidence filed after the date of filing the appeal. Review of an examiner's refusal to admit an amendment or evidence is by petition to the Director. See§ 1.181.
(d) Notice of non-compliance.* * * If appellant does not, within the set time period, file an amended brief that overcomes all the reasons for non-compliance stated in the notification, the appeal will stand dismissed. Review of a determination of non-compliance is by petition to the Chief Judge. See§ 41.3.
(e) Extensions of Time.* * *
9. Amend § 41.39 by revising paragraph (a); adding a heading to paragraph (b) introductory text; revising the second sentence of paragraph (b)(2); and adding a heading to paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 41.39 Examiner's answer.
(b) Appellant's response to new ground of rejection.* * *
(2) * * * Such a reply brief must address as set forth in § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) each new ground of rejection and should follow the other requirements of a brief as set forth in § 41.37(c). * * *
10. Add § 41.40 to read as follows:
§ 41.40 Tolling of time period to file a reply brief.
(a) Timing. Any request to seek review of the primary examiner's failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 filed within two months from the entry of the examiner's answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection.
(c) Petition not granted and appeal maintained. A decision refusing to grant a petition under § 1.181 to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer will provide a two-month time period in which appellant may file only a single reply brief under § 41.41.
(e) Extensions of time. Extensions of time under § 1.136(a) of this title for patent applications are not applicable to the time period set forth in this section. See§ 1.136(b) of this title for extensions of time to reply for patent applications and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions of time to reply for ex parte reexamination proceedings.
11. Amend § 41.41 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b) and adding a heading to paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 41.41 Reply brief.
(a) Timing. Appellant may file only a single reply brief to an examiner's answer within two months from the date of either the examiner's answer, or a decision refusing to grant a petition under § 1.181 to designate a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer.
(b) Content. (1) A reply brief shall not include any new or non-admitted amendment, or any new or non-admitted affidavit or other evidence. See§ 1.116 of this title for amendments, affidavits or other evidence filed after final action but before or on the same date of filing an appeal and § 41.33 for amendments, affidavits or other evidence filed after the date of filing the appeal.
§ 41.43 [Removed]
12. Remove § 41.43.
13. Amend § 41.47 by revising paragraph (b) and revising the last sentence of paragraph (e)(1) to read as follows:
§ 41.47 Oral hearing.
(b) If appellant desires an oral hearing, appellant must file, as a separate paper captioned “REQUEST FOR ORAL HEARING,” a written request for such hearing accompanied by the fee set forth in § 41.20(b)(3) within two months from the date of the examiner's answer or on the date of filing of a reply brief, whichever is earlier.
14. Revise § 41.50 to read as follows:
(e) Extensions of time. Extensions of time under § 1.136(a) of this title for patent applications are not applicable to the time periods set forth in this section. See§ 1.136(b) of this title for extensions of time to reply for patent applications and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions of time to reply for ex parte reexamination proceedings.
15. Amend § 41.52 by revising the fourth sentence of paragraph (a)(1), paragraphs (a)(2) and (3), and adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:
(a)(1) * * * Arguments not raised, and evidence not previously relied upon, pursuant to §§ 41.37, 41.41, or 41.47 are not permitted in the request for rehearing except as permitted by paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section. * * *
(3) New arguments responding to a new ground of rejection designated pursuant to § 41.50(b) are permitted. (4) New arguments that the Board's decision contains an undesignated new ground of rejection are permitted.
16. Revise § 41.54 to read as follows:
§ 41.54 Action following decision.