Source: http://blog.internetcases.com/tag/copyright/page/10/
Timestamp: 2019-01-20 16:20:25
Document Index: 723982155

Matched Legal Cases: ['§512', '§512', '§512', '§512', '§504', '§109', '§3009']

Copyright | Chicago technology lawyer Evan Brown - Page 10
Google Book Search case settles
Three years after it was filed, much of that time existing in apparent dormancy, the copyright infringement case filed by the Authors Guild against Google Book Search (f/k/a Google Print) has settled. (Thanks to Greg Beck for alerting me to this via a post he put up on Twitter.)
Here is a page with all kinds of information about the settlement. It’s a complicated proposed agreement, so it will take some time to understand it. There is sure to be plenty of commentary from others in the blogosphere over the next day or so.
It’s good to see this resolved. Almost three years ago I was on a panel discussion at the John Marshall Law School talking about the fair use implications of the case. You can download the MP3 of that talk here.
This entry was posted in Copyright and tagged authors guild, Copyright, fair use, google book search on October 28, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
My friend Kevin Thompson over at Cyberlaw Central reminded me this morning in this post that President Clinton signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ten years ago today. Tempus fugit. It’s interesting to reflect on how this critical piece of legislation has affected (I think fostered) the growth of the online infrastructure with its safe harbor provisions found at 17 U.S.C. 512.
Simply stated, the DMCA at section 512 gives safe harbor protections to providers of interactive computer services (like ISPs and websites hosting user generated content) from liability when users upload content that infringes on another’s copyright rights. To sail its ship into the safe harbor, the provider has to take certain affirmative steps, like registering an agent with the Copyright Office, terminating the accounts of repeat infringers, and, most importantly, responding appropriately to “takedown notices” sent by copyright owners identifying infringing content on the provider’s system.
A big factor in the problem is the sheer volume of user generated content that’s put online. How can an operator like YouTube, who gets hours of new content loaded to its servers every minute, reasonably be expected to give meaningful review to every takedown notice that comes its way? It can’t.
Like any ten-year old, the DMCA shows signs of maturity. It has withstood a decade of scrutiny, all the while giving service providers peace of mind, along with relatively efficient mechanisms for copyright owners to get infringing material taken down quickly. But also like a ten-year-old, the challenging years of adolescence — and the accompanying rudimentary changes — are around the corner. It’ll still be the DMCA, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see some transformation going on as user generated content becomes less a novelty and more a standard.
Birthday cake photo courtesy of Flickr user “juverna” via this Creative Commons license.
This entry was posted in Copyright, DMCA and tagged Copyright, DMCA, safe harbor on October 28, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Subpoena to university in P2P case must give time to notify parents
Plaintiff record companies, using Media Sentry, found the IP address of a John Doe file-sharing defendant, and filed suit against Doe in federal court for copyright infringement. As in any case where a defendant is known only by his or her IP address, the record companies needed some discovery to ascertain the name and physical address matching that IP address. But the federal rules of procedure say that without a court order, a party cannot seek discovery until the parties have conferred pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
So the record companies sought the court order allowing them to issue a subpoena to Doe’s Internet service provider prior to the 26(f) conference. The court granted the order, but with a caveat.
This entry was posted in Anonymity, Copyright, Electronic Discovery, Litigation and tagged Anonymity, Copyright, p2p, subpoena on September 10, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
One of the things that a person sending a takedown notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has to swear to is that he or she “has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). If the sender of the takedown notice makes a knowingly material misrepresentation as to whether the law authorizes the use of the material, the party whose content is taken down can sue under 17 U.S.C. §512(f). This serves as a backstop against DMCA takedown abuses.
Suppose that the complained-of work may be protected by fair use. If the sender is deliberately ignorant of that possibility, can that result in a misrepresentation that runs afoul of 512(f)? That question had not been answered before today, when the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California said “yes.”
The case is Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 07-3783. You may have heard of this case before, as it’s the one where the mom filmed her daughter dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” and uploaded that to YouTube, only to have it removed after a Universal DMCA takedown notice. Lenz sued under §512(f) and Universal moved to dismiss.
In its motion to dismiss, Universal contended that copyright owners cannot be required to evaluate the question of fair use prior to sending a takedown notice because fair use is merely an excused infringement of a copyright rather than a use authorized by the copyright owner or by law.
But the court disagreed. “[T]he fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of a copyright. Accordingly, in order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with ‘a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,’ the owner must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the copyright.” The court went on to say that “[a]n allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”
Because Lenz’s complaint contained allegations of this nature, it was detailed enough to pass Twombly muster [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —-, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)], and the case moves forward.
The practical effect of this decision is that one sending a DMCA takedown notice without considering whether the person who posted the content is making a fair use, does so at his or her peril. Let’s be clear — the decision does not mean that sending a takedown notice in a situation where it turns out to be a fair use will automatically result in a finding of §512(f) misrepresentation. But it does add another implicit item on the checklist of the takedown notice sender.
This entry was posted in Copyright, DMCA, Fraud/Misrepresentation and tagged Copyright, DMCA, misrepresentation on August 20, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Statutory damages for copying competitor’s catalog on website
Silver Ring Splint Co. v. Digisplint, Inc., 2008 WL 2478390 (W.D.Va. June 18, 2008)
Silver Ring and Digisplint are competitors in a niche industry, each producing and selling fine jewelry quality finger splints made of gold and sterling silver. Silver ring sued Digisplint for copyright infringement alleging that Digisplint copied text from Silver Ring’s 1994 catalog, and posted that text on Digisplint’s website.
Before trial, the court awarded summary judgment to Silver Ring on the question of liability for copyright infringement. The question of damages proceeded to trial. Finding that “nearly identical and very similar text comprise[d] substantial portions of both [works],” and that the similarities were “obvious and persuasive,” the court awarded Silver Ring $30,000 in statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1). It found that Digisplint’s copying was willful, and although Digisplint reaped no profits from the infringement, the award was to serve as a deterrent to future conduct of the sort.
Digisplint had filed a counterclaim pursuant to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) over Silver Ring’s registration of digisplint.com. The court found in favor of Digisplint on this claim, and entered an injunction against any further registration of a confusingly similar domain name. But because Silver Ring registered the domain name in 1998, prior to the enactment of the ACPA, Digisplint was entitled to no money damages, only an injunction.
This entry was posted in Copyright, Cybersquatting and tagged acpa, Copyright, Cybersquatting, infringement, statutory damages on June 30, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Priority Records sued Candy Chan for copyright infringement, claiming she used iMesh to download and trade music files. The record company withdrew the suit when Ms. Chan told them it was her daughter that traded the files. The daughter became a defendant too, but that case was thrown out on a procedural issue.
Ms. Chan tried to recover her attorney’s fees in the copyright lawsuit against her, but the court denied the request. So she filed her own lawsuit against Priority Records, its law firm, and Settlement Support Center, alleging abuse of process and violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
This entry was posted in Copyright, Uncategorized and tagged abuse of process, Copyright, file sharing, riaa, rico on June 26, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Auction of promo CDs covered under first sale doctrine
UMG Recordings v. Augusto, —F.Supp.2d —-, 2008 WL 2390037 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2008)
Some record companies create promotional CDs that they distribute to music industry insiders before an album is released. These promo CDs bear the following language:
Troy Augusto is not an industry insider, but he bought copies of promo CDs in record stores and online, and he resold those copies on eBay. Record label UMG sent a notice to eBay under eBay’s Verified Rights Owner program (“VeRO”) and got Augusto’s account suspended. UMG also sued Augusto for copyright infringement. Augusto counterclaimed under Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), claiming that UMG knowingly misrepresented to eBay that the auctions infringed UMG’s copyrights.
Both sides moved for summary judgment on whether Augusto had infringed, and Augusto also moved for summary judgment on the DMCA misrepresentation claim. The court granted Augusto’s motion as it related to infringement, but denied it as to misrepresentation.
The court found that Augusto’s conduct was protected by the first sale doctrine. This principle is codified at 17 U.S.C. §109(a) and provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under [Title 17 of the United States Code]… is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” To invoke the first sale doctrine, Augusto had to show that (1) the CDs were lawfully manufactured with UMG’s authorization, (2) UMG transferred title to the CDs, (3) Augusto was the lawful owner of the CDs, and (4) Augusto disposed of, but did not reproduce, the CDs.
In this case, it was undisputed that the CDs were lawfully manufactured by UMG and that Augusto did not reproduce them. The remaining elements, i.e., that UMG transferred title to the CDs and Augusto was the lawful owner of them, hinged on the question of whether the mailing of the CDs to the industry insiders resulted in a transfer of title.
The court found that title to the CDs passed because the language on them did not create a valid license, and the recipients were entitled to treat the CDs as gifts pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §3009.
In determining that the purported license was invalid, the court found that a significant hallmark of a license — an intent to regain possession — was missing. Further, the absence of any recurring benefit to UMG (the recipients were under no obligation to promote the music) suggested the distribution was a mere gift or sale, and not a license.
Moreover, the only benefit to UMG in having the provision enforced as a license would be to restrain trade, which would run contrary to century old Supreme Court precedent.
The court determined that the CDs were, under the Postal Reorganization Act, a gift. Under that act, if one mails unordered merchandise to a consumer without the consumer’s consent, the merchandise may be treated as a gift, and the consumer may dispose of it as he or she sees fit. Despite UMG’s argument to the contrary, the court held that industry insiders receiving the promo CDs were consumers. The court further held (rejecting UMG’s argument) that the Postal Reorganization Act did not apply only to merchandise for which payment was requested.
In rejecting Augusto’s DMCA Section 512(f) claim that UMG misrepresented the fact of infringement when it demanded eBay remove the auctions, the court found that UMG had a subjective good faith belief in its assertions. Under the holding of Rossi v. MPAA, 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), this subjective good faith belief could not constitute a Section 512(f) misrepresentation.
This entry was posted in Copyright and tagged augusto, cd, Copyright, first sale doctrine, umg on June 19, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
This entry was posted in Copyright and tagged Copyright, motley crue, photos, pinter, toma, umg, universal music group on June 18, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).
Employee Binney was fired from her job because she claimed a copyright in the company’s website and catalogs (which she had helped create) and also because she took the hard drive of her work computer home with her over the weekend without asking. After she was terminated, she sought unemployment benefits. Her employer contested the claim.
The administrative body in charge of determining unemployment benefits found that Binney was terminated for employee misconduct and therefore not entitled to receive anything. Binney appealed that decision to a trial court, which affirmed the denial. She then appealed to the state appellate court, which reversed, and found that that given Binney’s position and responsibilities in the company and the reasonableness of her conclusions as to ownership of copyright, her actions did not rise to the level of misconduct that warranted a denial of benefits. [Internet Cases coverage of that decision.]
As for the alleged misconduct of taking the hard drive home, the supreme court found that although the employer had no policy on removing hard drives, that did not contradict the administrative body’s finding that the employer did not authorize the hard drive’s removal. So there was competent evidence in the record that the removal was unauthorized, and corresponding misconduct in having removed it.
And as for claiming copyright in the website and materials, the supreme court similarly found that a determination of misconduct was supported by the record. Whether Binney believed in good faith that she had a personal copyright interest in the materials was irrelevant. She never asked for nor received permission to assert a personal claim on the company’s property by including the copyright statements, so in doing so, she engaged in misconduct.
This entry was posted in Employment and tagged benefits, Copyright, Employment, hard drive, north carolina, unemployment on June 15, 2008 by Evan Brown (@internetcases).