Source: http://openjurist.org/973/f2d/107
Timestamp: 2016-05-04 00:29:35
Document Index: 73169255

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3731', '§ 2255', '§ 11', '§ 2255', '§ 1071', '§ 1071', '§ 1072', '§ 2255']

973 F. 2d 107 - Laaman v. United States HomeFederal Reporter, Second Series 973 F.2d.
The government pursued an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988) only as to Curzi.2 The government abandoned any collateral estoppel argument on appeal. 867 F.2d at 37 n. 1. The First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 46. Unlike the district court, it did not evaluate the legality of the order to exit and the protective sweep separately, regarding the sweep as planned in advance. Id. at 39-40. The court of appeals noted that the officers (1) had missed a "golden opportunity" to arrest Williams when he went to his car outside the Cleveland Residence at 8:30 a.m., id. at 40, and (2) thereafter "also abjured the option of ordering Williams alone to exit, instead ordering all occupants to leave the premises." Id. at 40 n. 4. The court ruled that no exigent circumstances were presented, because a search warrant could have been obtained in the interval between 8:30 a.m., when Williams' presence at the Cleveland Residence was confirmed by his brief visit to his car, and 10:15 a.m., when the occupants were ordered to exit the premises. Id. at 42-43. The court deemed the failure to obtain a search warrant "inexcusable," id. at 43, and refused to consider the government's argument of inevitable discovery because it had not been made below. Id. at 43-44. The court agreed with the district court's rulings as to the applicability of Steagald, id. at 39, and the inadequacy of the affidavit supporting the search warrant, shorn of the fruits of the prior illegalities. Id. at 45-46.
Having secured this victory in the First Circuit, petitioners moved pursuant to § 2255 for an order vacating or setting aside their sentences here on the grounds that: (1) their convictions were obtained by the use of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the failure of appellate counsel for Laaman and Curzi to appeal the Entry Ruling3 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and (3) the failure of trial counsel for Williams to join in the challenge to the Entry Ruling, see supra note 1, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See 773 F.Supp. at 538. The district court denied the petitions, ruling that: (1) Laaman and Curzi deliberately bypassed appellate review of the Fourth Amendment claim for which they now contend (see supra note 3), id. at 538-39; (2) Williams waived any suppression claim, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), by failing to join in the trial motion by Laaman and Curzi, id. at 539-40; (3) petitioners' Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review, id. at 540-41; and (4) none of the petitioners' counsel performed ineffectively on appeal or at trial. Id. at 541-45.
If any estoppel were operative, it might more appropriately have inhibited the district court in Massachusetts from deciding the suppression issue differently from the prior decision here solely because a new argument was advanced, and a new precedent invoked, on the identical issue in Massachusetts. Collateral estoppel does not turn upon a determination that a prior ruling was correctly rendered, or that all possibly relevant arguments were made and authorities cited in the initial proceeding, but rather upon a recognition that an issue tendered for resolution in a later litigation has been finally determined in a prior adjudication after a full and fair opportunity for litigation in which the issue was actually litigated and necessary to the prior decision. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 562 n. 16 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1683, 114 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991); In re Lewisville Properties, Inc. (Gray v. Cauble), 849 F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir.1988); Kunzelman v. Thompson, 799 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir.1986); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948, 107 S.Ct. 1608, 94 L.Ed.2d 794 (1987); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).
More specifically, a prior decision by another court on a motion to suppress is not ordinarily reconsidered in the absence of substantial new evidence or extraordinary circumstances. See United States v. Kaye, 432 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C.Cir.1970) (per curiam) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191, 196 (4th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935, 83 S.Ct. 882, 9 L.Ed.2d 766 (1963); United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 746-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873, 79 S.Ct. 111, 3 L.Ed.2d 103 (1958); Mayo v. United States, 425 F.Supp. 119, 121-22 (N.D.Ill.1977). See generally 4 Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 11.2(g) (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.1991). But see United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d 446, 450-51 (8th Cir.) (acknowledging binding force of prior Tenth Circuit ruling suppressing evidence because of warrants' lack of particularity, but allowing admission of evidence because of law enforcement officers' objectively reasonable reliance upon same warrants), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828, 110 S.Ct. 95, 107 L.Ed.2d 59 (1989).
In any event, whether or not the district court in the District of Massachusetts should have accorded preclusive effect to the prior rulings in this circuit regarding suppression of the evidence seized from the Cleveland Residence, we regard those rulings as an extraordinary circumstance that relieves us of any obligation to give binding effect to the First Circuit determinations. We note also our recent observation that "as a general matter, collateral estoppel is less liberally applied in criminal cases than in civil actions, because 'considerations peculiar to [the criminal process] may outweigh the need to avoid repetitive litigation.' " Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F.2d 1090, 1096 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 417 N.E.2d 518, 521-22, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 228 (1980) (alteration in Pinkney)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991). We accordingly turn to the merits.
This conclusion moots many of the arguments advanced here and issues addressed in the ruling by Judge Glasser from which this appeal is taken. Specifically, we need not and do not consider: (1) whether appellate counsel for Laaman and Curzi procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the Steagald issue on direct appeal here;4 (2) whether the failure of Williams' counsel to join in the suppression motion directed to the Entry Ruling at trial resulted in a waiver under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3); (3) whether petitioners' Fourth Amendment claims are cognizable on § 2255 review on their own merits, apart from providing a basis for a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e., whether the authority of Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 89 S.Ct. 1068, 22 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969), survived Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)); or (4) the adequacy of the performance of any counsel on behalf of petitioners.
In Steagald, furthermore, nothing occurred to provide any independent authorization for the search of the premises at issue. Here, by contrast, when petitioners came out of the Cleveland Residence and Williams was recognized, the other petitioners were subject to arrest, at a minimum,5 for harboring a fugitive. See 18 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988); United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387, 390 (8th Cir.) (§ 1071 violated by any physical act of providing assistance, including food, shelter, and other assistance to aid in avoiding detection and apprehension), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 3009, 120 L.Ed.2d 883 (1992); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir.1984) (same), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 1404, 84 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 528-29 (9th Cir.1976) (same as to cognate 18 U.S.C. § 1072 (1988)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073, 97 S.Ct. 810, 50 L.Ed.2d 790 (1977). We held in United States v. Donaldson, 793 F.2d 498, 501-02 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056, 107 S.Ct. 932, 93 L.Ed.2d 983 (1987), that in such circumstances the premises of the arrestee could be searched as a valid incident of the arrest to locate the harbored fugitive, and that the Steagald rule was inapplicable. In Donaldson, to be sure, the fugitive had not yet been apprehended, while in the present case Williams came out of the Cleveland Residence together with Laaman and Curzi. Donaldson nonetheless provides considerable support for Judge Glasser's ruling, 618 F.Supp. at 1392-93, that the arresting officers were entitled to sweep the premises to determine whether other members of the UFF remained undetected.
In any event, assuming that Steagald applies to invalidate the initial sweep and the Cross Affidavit must therefore be evaluated without regard to the evidence thus uncovered, we conclude that the remaining information in the Cross Affidavit adequately established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for the Cleveland Residence. When an application for a search warrant includes both tainted and untainted evidence, the warrant may be upheld if the untainted evidence, standing alone, establishes probable cause. See United States v. Oakley, 944 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1508, 117 L.Ed.2d 646 (1992); United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S.Ct. 507, 107 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989); Curzi, 867 F.2d at 45; Levasseur, 816 F.2d at 43; Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 849 (citing United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed.2d 106 (1982)); United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 1212, 75 L.Ed.2d 450 (1983); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 992-94 (2d Cir.1977) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 732, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978); United States v. Adames, 485 F.Supp. 965, 971 (E.D.N.Y.1980) (collecting cases), aff'd mem., 652 F.2d 55 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Epstein, 240 F.Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y.1965). To suppress evidence under such circumstances would "put the police (and society) not in the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, but in a worse one." Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2535, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 25, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)).
Admittedly, our conclusion is directly at odds with that of the First Circuit. Cf. Curzi, 867 F.2d at 46. There, the court deemed Williams' presence to be "manifestly inadequate to carry the day," concluding that:A suspect's presence at a dwelling not reasonably thought to be his abode or the abode of a criminal confederate, without more, is too tenuous a connection to establish a meaningful relationship between the suspect and the contents of the house.
[M]ore than thirty paragraphs in the Cross Affidavit recited detailed information.... about the appellants' criminal activities, about previous discoveries of weapons, ammunition, dynamite and other materials at houses abandoned by the appellants, and about the then-recent sightings of explosives, weapons, and other evidence in the particular places to be searched.... Those paragraphs provided more than enough "independent and lawful information ... to support [a finding of] probable cause."
The government contends that Williams joined in this motion, pointing out that the notice of the suppression motion was filed on behalf of "the defendants," and that a defense lawyer asserted at the hearing on the motion that it was made on behalf of "all defendants." Williams responds that the primary supporting affidavit makes clear that as to Williams, the motion to suppress related only to evidence seized from his vehicle. We agree with Williams
The charges against Laaman, who had been sentenced to fifty-three years imprisonment in the prior Second Circuit litigation, were dropped. See 867 F.2d at 37 n. 1. Although Williams, whose prior sentence was forty-five years, was not a beneficiary of the suppression ruling, he too was never tried in the District of Massachusetts. The appeal was pursued, however, as to Curzi, whose prior sentence was fifteen years. She is currently released on parole
As noted supra, petitioners contended on direct appeal to this court that the search warrant was impermissibly premised upon the Cross Affidavit, which was materially false and misleading, see 816 F.2d at 43-44, but did not challenge the district court's Entry Ruling that (1) the protective sweep was valid, and (2) the weapons and cannister were subject to seizure under the "plain view" doctrine. See id. at 42
The district court addressed this issue under the "deliberate bypass" standard, see 773 F.Supp. at 538-39, but we have since displaced that rule with a "cause and prejudice" test for determining whether a federal defendant waived a claim under § 2255 by failing to raise it on direct review. See Campino v. United States, 968 F.2d 187, 189-190 (2d Cir.1992)
There were outstanding warrants for Laaman's arrest