Source: https://www.calattorneysfees.com/2015/10/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-01-24 12:32:58
Document Index: 447905640

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 425', '§ 128', '§116', '§ 362', '§ 1032', '§ 1032']

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY'S FEES : October 2015
Posted at 03:36 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts, Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Reasonableness Of Fees: $55,000 Fee Recovery Was Not Exorbitant In Action Where Plaintiff Recovered $47,000 In Compensatory Damages Against Defendant Guarantor
No Proportionality Required Under Civil Code Section 1717.
In Cannon v. Hohenberg, Case No. H040497 (6th Dist. Oct. 27, 2015) (unpublished), defendant guarantor lost a case to the prevailing plaintiff where a contractual fees clause was involved. The lower court awarded about $55,000 in fees even though plaintiff only recovered $47,000 in compensatory damages.
No problem, the reviewing court said, no proportionality was required under Civil Code section 1717. Fees award affirmed on appeal.
Posted at 03:25 PM in Cases: Reasonableness of Fees | Permalink | Comments (0)
SLAPP: $8,315 Fee Recovery To Plaintiff Prevailing On SLAPP Motion Under Frivolous Standard Reversed On Appeal
Reason … Trial Judge Did Not Provide Adequate Specification Of Reasons For Granting Fees To Plaintiff.
Nunez v. Pennisi, Case No. H039910 (6th Dist. Oct. 27, 2015) (published) is a good reminder to plaintiffs winning SLAPP motions and obtaining infrequent fee recovery because the SLAPP motion was frivolous: make sure the lower court makes an adequate record for fee recovery below.
Here, the defense lost a SLAPP motion in a malicious prosecution action against plaintiff, with the lower court assessing fees against the defense based on CCP §§ 425,16(c) and 128.5. On appeal, the appellate court found that there was justifiable basis for denying the SLAPP motion but that a prior procedural ruling gave enough minimal merit such that the trial court failed to procedurally justify the fee award by specifying the circumstances for awarding fees against the defense. Reversed and remanded for a “re-do” on this issue, with the lesson being to SLAPP prevailing plaintiffs—make sure the lower court makes a record for you in proceedings at the trial level in line with CCP § 128.5.
Posted at 03:22 PM in Cases: SLAPP | Permalink | Comments (0)
Striking Fees Was Not Discrete Proceeding Allowing For Recovery.
In Cooper v. Lavely & Singer, Case No. B261936 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Oct. 22, 2015) (unpublished), L&S won the merits of an arbitration case, but Cooper was successful in striking an arbitrator fee award in post-confirmation proceedings although the rest of the merits award stood. Cooper then moved for recovery of contractual fees for the fee strike victory, a request denied by the lower court. The Second District affirmed, finding that the ruling on just the fee issue in the post-confirmation arbitration proceeding was not a discrete proceeding win entitling Cooper to recovery of fees. In doing so, the reviewing court relied heavily on Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc., 206 Cal.App.4th 515 (2012), must reading in this area.
Posted at 03:11 PM in Cases: Arbitration, Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Routine Costs Do Include Privately Retained Reporters Who Transcribe Court Hearings.
In Kim v. Park, Case No. A139056 (1st Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 23, 2015) (unpublished), plaintiff was awarded $107,450 in fees and $22,318.45 in costs after obtaining rescission of a purchase of a business, with the fees being awarded based on a contractual fees clause in the purchase agreement. Plaintiff won because the court determined the business was not worth its purchase price such that plaintiff gained the greater recovery, even though giving some credit adjustments were made in favor of defendants (the sellers).
The defense challenges did not change the result on appeal.
A prevailing party can still recover fees even though the contract has been rescinded. (Hastings v. Matlock, 171 Cal.App.3d 447, 463 (1985).) Counsel declarations of work effort and dollars expended suffice for fee substantiation at the state court level. (Trustees of Cent. States v. Golden Nugget, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1538, 1558-1559 (C.D. Cal. 1988).) Finally, the costs of a privately retained court reporter for a court hearing is an allowable routine costs, a determination which is very timely given that many courts do not automatically provide reporters at hearings anymore.
Posted at 09:20 PM in Cases: Costs, Cases: Prevailing Party, Cases: Section 1717, Cases: Substantiation of Reasonableness of Fees | Permalink | Comments (0)
Special Fee Shifting Statute: Small Claims Fee Recovery, Unless Matter Is Frivolous, Is Capped At $150 For De Novo Hearing Win
We Predicted This Result In Our February 19, 2014 Post On The Issue.
Way back in February 19, 2014, we did a post on small claims fee recovery, predicting that the $150 cap for fee recovery for a small claims fee litigant winning after a superior court de novo hearing would “trump” a contractual Civil Code section 1717 clause allowing for more fees (keeping in mind that more can be awarded if the superior court believes the de novo hearing was pursued in bad faith).
We can now report that the Fourth District, Division 1 has agreed with our analysis in Dorsey v. Superior Court, Case No. D067836 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 22, 2015) (published). There, prevailing tenants were awarded over $10,000 in attorney’s fees after winning a superior court de novo hearing based on a contractual fees clause. The losing side appealed, arguing that CCP §116.780(c) capped the fee recovery amount at $150.
After a careful review of the legislative history behind the small claims statute, the appellate court agreed that section 116.780(c) did indeed trump the contractual fees clause. A writ petition was granted overturning the higher fee award.
Family Law: Attorney’s Fees Provision In Settlement Agreement Trumped Attempt To Obtain Family Code Section 271 Sanctions
Parties’ Bargain Prevailed, With Fees Only Relating To Litigation To Two Specific Motions—Sweeping Away Prior Sanctions Awards.
Family law practitioners should read In re Marriage of Reed, Case Nos. B253728/B255233 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Oct. 21, 2015) (unpublished). Briefly summarized, it held that a specific settlement agreement clause on fee recovery blunted any recovery of prior Family Code section 271 sanctions because the language only allowed fee recovery for further litigation of two different motions before the family law judge. The case obviously enforced the parties’ bargain, containing a nice discussion of use of intent and extrinsic circumstances factors in construing contractual language.
Posted at 08:58 PM in Cases: Family Law | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 08:55 PM in Cases: Trespass | Permalink | Comments (0)
In The News . . . . Governor Brown Vetoes AB465, Which Would Have Barred Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agreements Starting After 2016
He Cites Conflict With Federal Law As Basis For His Veto.
As reported in our September 20, 2015 post, AB465—backed by labor unions--was a California bill designed to end mandatory workplace arbitration, applicable to agreements, modifications, renewals, or extensions on or after January 1, 2016. Among other things, it also had a proposed discretionary fee-shifting provision to a prevailing plaintiff seeking to enforce the proposed legislation if enacted.
AB465 passed the Legislature, but recently was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown. In doing so, he called the bill “a far-reaching approach that has been consistently struck down in other states” for conflicts with federal law [we presume the Federal Arbitration Act],” according to a quote in an October 12, 2015 article carried in The Orange County Register by Juliet Williams (Associated Press).
Posted at 06:32 PM in News | Permalink | Comments (0)
Bankruptcy: Schwartz-Tallard Opinion Result Holds Up On En Banc Hearing.
Debtor Can Obtain Fee Recovery For Successfully Prosecuting Suit For Damages For Automatic Stay Violation.
In earlier posts of April 17, 2014, August 29, 2015, and December 22, 2014, we posted on In re Schwartz-Tallard, where the Ninth Circuit determined that 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) authorized attorney’s fees recovery from debtor’s prosecution of a suit for damages redressing the violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay. We can now report that the Ninth Circuit has adhered to this ruling in an en banc decision published on October 14, 2015, linked here.
Posted at 05:55 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts | Permalink | Comments (0)
Net Fee Award To Plaintiff Was $3,709.19, Because She Won (Getting Fees) and Employer Won (Getting Fees).
Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc., Case No. B255578 (2d Dist., Div. 5 Oct. 14, 2015) (partially published) is an interesting decision which recognizes two things: (1) fee recovery can be determined after offsetting “dueling” fee-shifting statutes; and (2) costs awards under statutes do not necessarily depend on CCP § 1032 routine cost restrictions.
In this one, former employee recovered on her Equal Pay Act claims but her former employer prevailed on her overtime/wage claims, with both sets of claims having prevailing party fee-shifting implications. (Note to readers—the lower court found that an amendment to Labor Code section 218.5, the overtime/wage claims, did not apply retroactively to this case, a determination not challenged from that we see.) In the end, the lower court found that employee’s fee claims were too excessive, but awarded some fees, and then award employer some fees, resulting in a net fee award of $3,709.19 to employee, who appealed.
No different result on appeal.
The appellate court agreed that “dueling” fee-shifting statutes could be offset against each other as far as fee awards to different prevailing parties depending on the claims. Simply because a plaintiff combined claims should not preclude the defense from recovering its fees on plaintiff’s wage claims. Secondarily, the reviewing court found that Labor Code section 218.5 did allow costs to the prevailing party, which meant the defense was entitled to them and should not be held to the more restrictive routine costs prevailing party definition under CCP § 1032.
Posted at 04:34 PM in Cases: Prevailing Party | Permalink | Comments (0)
Probate: Trustee, In His Personal Capacity, Not Entitled To Attorney’s Fees Under Settlement Agreement Only Benefitting The Trust
Trustee Was Not Being Pursued In His Personal Capacity.
The lesson from Secrest v. Vaughn, Case No. D066702 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Oct. 9, 2015) (unpublished) is clear: how a settlement agreement fees clause is worded and who the parties are in this agreement are crucial in determining whether there is fee entitlement to a prevailing trustee.
In this one, a trustee and beneficiary entered into a settlement agreement with the fees clause, an agreement the trustee signed in his capacity as a trust fiduciary. The fees clause allowed the court to decide whether a party prevailed for purposes of obtaining a fee recovery. Upon a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the lower court found that trustee was not personally liable for his action as trustee but did award beneficiary fees for prevailing on a trust management claim given she was a party to the settlement. Trustee, personally, moved to recover postjudgment fees of $45,272.75, a request denied by the lower court on the basis that the fees clause covered trustee in his representative capacity not his personal capacity (the latter status being under which he claimed a right to fees).
The appellate court agreed with the trial court. Although trustee could have been held personally liable on the contract, he is protected from personal liability if the agreement was properly arranged in the trustee’s fiduciary capacity in the course of trust administration. (Stoltenberg v. Newman, 179 Cal.App.4th 287, 293-295 (2009).) Here, the beneficiary’s petition was directed against trustee in a fiduciary duty, such that he individually did not stand in the shoes of trustee qua fiduciary and there was no indication that trustee, individually, was a third-party beneficiary of the fees clause.
Posted at 04:51 PM in Cases: Probate | Permalink | Comments (0)
Posted at 12:51 PM in Cases: Bankruptcy Efforts, Cases: Section 1717 | Permalink | Comments (0)
Implied Covenant/Modification Claim Arose Out Of Note And Deed Of Trust.
In Bergman v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case No. E060148 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 30, 2015) (unpublished), borrower won an implied breach of covenant claim, based on a loan modification, against lender, receiving $250,000 in compensatory damages on this and a separate fraud claim. Borrower then moved to recover fees based on entitlement clauses in the note and deed of trust, a request granted by the lower court—although it only awarded $188,100 out of a requested $454,772.23.
The fee award was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court determined that the fees provisions in the note and deed of trust encompassed contractual implied covenant claims, such that the fee award was proper. (Smith v. Home Loan Funding, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1337 (2011).)
Posted at 12:46 PM in Cases: Deeds of Trust | Permalink | Comments (0)
Probate: $96,077.14 For Excessive Fees/Expenses By Dual Trustee/Trust Attorney Affirmed On Appeal
Not Pretty Facts At All ….. But Surcharge Sustained.
Conservatorship of Moore, Case No. B253538 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Sept. 30, 2015) began in a not so pretty way, not involving particularly pretty facts: “Retained counsel for an elderly person suffering from dementia must safeguard the well-being of the person and his or her financial resources. As we shall explain, here the attorney did neither. The probate court expressly indicated that counsel put his own financial interests ahead of the interests of his client. It surcharged counsel. We agree with the probate court's ruling and its rationale. We commend it. We affirm the judgment.”
What happened here was that a trustee/trust attorney was surcharged for $96,077.14 in fees and expenses as being unreasonable and excessive in nature. The appellate court agreed. The “client” trustor was 82 years olds, with dementia. So, arguments that he approved the fees did not resonate on appeal, where the focus was on the fees being reasonable but double barreled in nature—reasonable in general and reasonable as to the trust. (Donahue v. Donahue, 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 263 (2010).) The appellate court did not have difficulty in sustaining that the dementia-ridden trustor could not approve fees and many of the activities were spent on needlessly proving that the trustor was suffering from elder symptoms. Also, with respect to block billing, no problem that the lower court only surcharged for 5% on these entries given it was hard to decipher between trustee, attorney, and personal advisor services.
Beyond that, the appellate court sent the opinion to the State Bar for consideration on whether further action was necessary as to the attorney.
Posted at 12:42 PM in Cases: Probate | Permalink | Comments (0)