Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/430/828/462928/
Timestamp: 2020-07-05 14:26:00
Document Index: 10531178

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 25', '§ 440', '§ 25', '§ 440', '§ 440', '§ 440', '§ 440', '§ 440', '§ 440', '§ 123', '§ 440', '§ 76']

Trail Builders Supply Company, Appellant, v. Phillip Reagan, a Minor by Edwin H. Reagan, His Father, Etc., et al., Appellees, 430 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970) :: Justia
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Trail Builders Supply Company, Appellant, v. Phillip Reagan, a Minor by Edwin H. Reagan, His Father, Etc., et al., Appellees, 430 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 430 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970) August 12, 1970
In this Florida diversity action the facts and circumstances of the case are detailed in our former opinion reported at 409 F.2d 1059. We concluded there to submit the legal question for decision to the Florida Supreme Court under § 25.031, Florida Statutes Annotated 1961, F.S.A., and Rule 4.61, Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A. See Gaston v. Pittman, 5 Cir., 1969, 405 F.2d 869.
Whether, under the law of Florida, an employer who has made payments of compensation and medical benefits to an injured employee under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act may also be liable for indemnity to a passively negligent third-party tortfeasor, who has been sued for damages by the injured employee, where it is alleged in the claim for indemnity that the employer's active negligence was primarily responsible for the injury, but the employer has invoked the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act (§ 440.11, Florida Statutes Annotated 1966). (See 410 F.2d 763.)
The Florida Supreme Court has now answered the question so certified in the affirmative. See Supreme Court of Florida opinion filed March 18, 1970 (Fla.) 1970, 235 So. 2d 482 (rehearing denied June 15, 1970) attached hereto as Appendix A.
TRAIL BUILDERS SUPPLY COMPANY,
a Florida corporation, Appellant, versus CASE No. 38,627-A PHILLIP REAGAN, a minor, by EDWIN H. REAGAN, his father and next friend, and EDWIN H. REAGAN, individually, and IDACO ENGINEERING AND EQUIPMENT CO., a corporation, Appellees.
This case is presented on Certificate as authorized by Fla.Stat., § 25.031, F.S.A., and Rule 4.61, Fla.App. Rules, 32, F.S.A., from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1969, 409 F.2d 1059, in an appeal from a decision of the trial court denying third party defendant's motion for summary judgment in a cross-claim action by third party plaintiff who was passively negligent in an action by an injured employee where the defendant employer's active negligence (third party defendant) was primarily responsible for the injury.
The Employer in its able argument and brief primarily relies upon the exclusiveness of the employee's remedy against his employer,1 citing, § 440.11, Florida Statutes,2 and arguing that since an employer, by compliance with the Act, agrees to endure absolute vicarious liability up to the limits of the Act, for injury or death to an employee, he is guaranteed that he will not be held to answer for damages in excess of the specified limits regardless of fault.3 It would follow, therefore, that he should not be subjected to additional liability merely because a third party tortfeasor enters the picture. To allow such impleading would permit indirectly what cannot be accomplished directly, i. e., the employee, through a third party "conduit" suing the employer for damages in excess of workmen's compensation benefits.
As was said in Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Driggers, Fla., 65 So. 2d 723, "One purpose of Workmen's Compensation Act is to make available promptly medical attention, hospitalization, and compensation commensurate with injuries sustained in course of employment, and to place upon industry served, and not on society, burden of providing for injured or killed workmen and their families".
In this enlightened legislation the question of negligence, fellow servant doctrine, assumption of risk or wrong doing on the part of an employer were removed. The Act was based primarily on the social responsibility of one to another. See Protecter Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342.
1. Permits the employee to sue a third party tortfeasor. § 440.39(1) F.S. 1967, F.S.A.
2. The employer is subrogated to the rights of the employee as against a third party to the extent of the compensation paid or to be paid. § 440.39(2) F.S. 1967, F.S.A.
3. If the employee recovers, the employer has a lien on the proceeds and can recover by way of equitable distribution all or a portion of the benefits conferred by the Act on the employee. § 440.39(3) F.S. 1967, F.S.A.
4. If the employee does not within one year sue the third party tortfeasor, then the employer may sue and get back all of the benefits the employer has paid the employee. § 440.39(4) F.S. 1967, F.S.A.
It will thus be seen that the employer is given additional rights against the third party tortfeasor which he would not have had but for the Act. Did it additionally bind the third party tortfeasor by granting immunity to the employer, thus resulting in a windfall to the latter to the detriment of the former? We fail to find such intent or language in F.S. § 440.11 F.S.A. Nothing indicates that Manufacturer is or should be prohibited from seeking indemnity from Employer. It is only the employer and employee, together with those claiming in lieu of the employee who are bound by this section. Other third parties are not bound. Manufacturer does not claim in lieu of or through Employee. Its claim is direct against Employer for an independent act of the latter which may result in damage to Manufacturer. The statute affects only the rights and remedies of the employer and the employee. A passive tortfeasor's direct common law right of indemnity against the active tortfeasor is not mentioned.4 If it had been the legislative intent to abolish such right, it should have been spelled out with specificity and particularity (30 Fla.Jur., Statutes § 123).
440.11 EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY — The liability of an employer prescribe in § 440.11 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death. * * * (Emphasis Supplied).
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. J. A. Jones Construction Co., 325 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1963); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1953); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State of Maryland, to Use of Schriefer, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1954); 2 Larson, § 76.21, Pg. 230; Smith v. Ryder Truck Rentals Inc., 182 So. 2d 422 (Fla.1966)