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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 156', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 101', '§ 160', '§ 101', '§ 160', '§ 153', '§ 10', '§ 160', '§ 704', '§ 701', '§ 160']

NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers (full text) :: 484 U.S. 112 (1987) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers
NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers 484 U.S. 112 (1987)
U.S. Supreme CourtNLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112 (1987)National Labor Relations Board v. United Food & CommercialWorkers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIONo. 86-594Argued October 5, 1987Decided December 14, 1987484 U.S. 112CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
(a) The regulations' failure to provide for a judicially reviewable Board order on the General Counsel's postcomplaint, prehearing informal settlement decision is consistent with the NLRA, and entitled to deference. The language, structure, and history of the NLRA, as amended, clearly reveal that Congress intended to differentiate between "prosecutorial" determinations, which are to be made solely by the General Counsel, independent of the Board, and "adjudicatory" decisions, which are to be made by the Board, subject to judicial review. It is a Page 484 U. S. 113 reasonable construction of the NLRA to find that postcomplaint, prehearing settlement determinations are prosecutorial in nature, since, until a hearing is held, the Board has taken no action, and has therefore made no adjudication. Moreover, the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to file and withdraw complaints supports a reading that he or she also has final authority to dismiss a complaint in favor of an informal settlement before a hearing begins. The legislative history indicates a congressional intent to give the General Counsel final authority to handle all aspects of prosecutions, not merely the filing of complaints. The legislative history's silence regarding settlements does not indicate an intention to deny the Board the usual flexibility accorded an agency in interpreting its authorizing statute and in developing new regulations to meet changing needs, since Congress was aware of the importance of settlements to the administrative labor relations process. Pp. 484 U. S. 123-128.
2. The General Counsel's settlement determinations may not be judicially reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as final agency actions "for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," since APA review is unavailable where "statutes preclude judicial review." Although the NLRA does not contain language expressly precluding APA review, the NLRA's structure and history clearly establish the requisite congressional intent to do so. The NLRA is a comprehensive statute that exhaustively sets out the stages through which unfair labor practice charges must pass, and expressly provides for judicial review only as to Board orders. APA review of General Counsel settlement decisions would run directly counter to this scheme, and would be extremely illogical, since appeals would be to the district courts, would involve lengthy proceedings in an area where Congress felt speed of Page 484 U. S. 114 resolution to be necessary, and would provide a charged party with an incentive not to fulfill its settlement obligations until the proceedings were completed. Since postcomplaint, prehearing informal settlements represent a substantial portion of unfair labor practice charge dispositions, Congress could not have intended the potentially serious consequences that APA review would entail. Moreover, APA review would inevitably require the initial examination of the merits of charges to be made by federal courts, rather than the Board, as Congress intended. Pp. 484 U. S. 130-133.
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 484 U. S. 133.
In August, 1984, respondent, the United Food Workers, filed unfair labor practice charges with the Pittsburgh regional Page 484 U. S. 115 office of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The charges alleged that Charley Brothers, Inc., the owner of several grocery stores, and the United Steelworkers Union (Steelworkers), had committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining for and executing a collective bargaining agreement for a Charley Brothers store where the Steelworkers did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees. The Regional Director duly investigated the charges, and entered into settlement negotiations with Charley Brothers and the Steelworkers. No agreement was reached, and the Regional Director filed a formal complaint substantially incorporating respondent's charges.
On September 24, 1984, Vic's Market's, Inc. (Vic's), bought the relevant store, and the Regional Director filed a second complaint that reflected this fact. A hearing on the complaints was scheduled for December 4, 1984. However, shortly before the hearing was to begin, Vic's, Charley Brothers, the Steelworkers, and the Regional Director came to a tentative settlement agreement. The agreement called for the charged parties to take certain remedial action in return for dismissal of the complaint, but they were not required to admit that they had committed any unfair labor practice. [Footnote 1] The Regional Director invited respondent to join Page 484 U. S. 116 the agreement, but respondent refused, citing a number of purported deficiencies. [Footnote 2]
The Board argued that the petition for review should be dismissed on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to review an informal settlement that did not result in an order of the Board, and that was entered into before hearings began. Alternatively, the Board argued that the settlement should be sustained. The Court of Appeals, considering itself bound by its own precedent, [Footnote 3] concluded that it had jurisdiction, and, on the merits, held that the complaint should not have been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. 788 F.2d 178 (1986). We granted the Board's petition for a writ Page 484 U. S. 117 of certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. [Footnote 4] 479 U.S. 1029 (1987). We now reverse.
One of the major goals of the LMRA was to divide the old Board's prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions between Page 484 U. S. 118 two entities. [Footnote 5] The House passed a bill that would have created a separate agency, known as the "office of Administrator of the National Labor Relations Act," to prosecute unfair labor practice complaints. [Footnote 6] Under the House bill, the Board would have been retained to adjudicate the disputes. The Conference Committee did not go so far as to create a new agency. It did, though, determine that the General Counsel of the Board should be independent of the Board's supervision and review. To this end, the General Counsel is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is the
The methods and procedures for the resolution of unfair labor practice charges are set out in statutes and in regulations promulgated by the Board pursuant to congressional authority. § 156. A union, employer, or employee may bring an unfair labor practice charge to a regional office. Until such a charge is brought, the Board may take no enforcement action. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 421 U. S. 156 (1975). Once a charge is brought and investigated, the regional director may, in his discretion, dismiss it. Page 484 U. S. 119 Should this occur, the charging party may appeal to the General Counsel, but not to the Board. 29 CFR § 101.6 (1987). [Footnote 8] Alternatively, the regional director may enter into an "informal settlement" agreement with the charged party. Such an agreement provides that the charged party will take or refrain from taking certain action, in return for which the regional director agrees not to file a complaint. If the charging party refuses to consent to this informal agreement, it may appeal to the General Counsel, but again, there is no provision for review by the Board. § 101.7. [Footnote 9]
The regional director is authorized to withdraw a complaint on his own motion at any time before the hearing. Such a withdrawal may be appealed to the General Counsel, but no Board review is available. [Footnote 10] Page 484 U. S. 120
Because a Board order is part of all formal settlements, Board approval is required before such an agreement may be executed. The applicable regulations expressly allow an opportunity for a nonconsenting party to appeal to the General Counsel, and from there to the Board. §§ 101.9(c)(1) and (2). [Footnote 13] Ultimately, judicial review of the Board order is Page 484 U. S. 121 available. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). If the prehearing settlement is informal, an appeal is permitted to the General Counsel by a nonjoining party, but there is no provision for Board review. 29 CFR § 101.9(c)(3) (1987). [Footnote 14]
Once the hearing on the complaint begins, the Board's regulations do not permit the General Counsel to enter into an unreviewable settlement agreement, even if it is "informal." Rather, a nonconsenting party may challenge the settlement before the administrative law judge, and an appeal is available from the judge's determination to the Board. [Footnote 15] Judicial review is authorized from the Board's decision. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Page 484 U. S. 122
The dispute in the case before us is a narrow one. The parties agree that the General Counsel's approval of a determination not to file an unfair labor practice complaint is not subject to judicial review, whether or not it is the result of an Page 484 U. S. 123 informal settlement. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 148; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 386 U. S. 182 (1967). The parties also agree that any settlement that ultimately results in Board approval is subject to judicial review, even if the settlement is informal but entered into after the hearing commenced. The sole dispute is whether a postcomplaint, prehearing informal settlement is subject to judicial review.
We review the validity of the relevant regulations, promulgated pursuant to congressional authority, under the standards prescribed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 (1987). On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using "traditional tools of statutory construction." If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it. Id. at 480 U. S. 446-448. See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 842-843, and n. 9 (1984). However, where
Id. at 467 U. S. 843. Under this principle, we have traditionally accorded the Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 482 U. S. 42 (1987); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 Page 484 U. S. 124 U.S. 488, 441 U. S. 495, 497 (1979); Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 501 (1978). [Footnote 20]
"The conference agreement does not make provision for an independent agency to exercise the investigating and prosecuting functions under the act, but does provide that there shall be a General Counsel of the Board . . . [who] is to have the final authority to act in the name of, but independently of any direction, control, or review by, the Board in respect of the investigation of charges and the issuance of complaints of Page 484 U. S. 125 unfair labor practices, and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board."
Respondent would have us hold that, after a complaint is filed, all dispositions can only be deemed adjudicatory. It is true that the filing of a complaint is the necessary first step to trigger the Board's adjudicatory authority. However, until a hearing is held, the Board has taken no action; no adjudication has yet taken place. We hold that it is a reasonable construction Page 484 U. S. 126 of the NLRA to find that, until the hearing begins, settlement or dismissal determinations are prosecutorial. [Footnote 21]
Respondent asserts that, at the time the LMRA was passed in 1947, the practice of the Board was to delegate to Page 484 U. S. 127 an "anonymous committee" the resolution of appeals from determinations by regional directors not to file complaints. Respondent further argues that, once a complaint was filed, any final disposition was subject to Board approval. The conclusion respondent would have us draw from this is that Congress intended only to replace the "anonymous committee" with the General Counsel, and that the authority that the Board had retained prior to 1947 survived, and was carried forward in the LMRA amendments to the NLRA. [Footnote 22]
Moreover, the silence of the legislative history regarding settlements does not suggest that Congress was carrying forward the prior settlement structure. For Congress was Page 484 U. S. 128 aware that settlements constitute the "lifeblood" of the administrative process, especially in labor relations. [Footnote 23] Given their importance, we cannot attribute to Congress an intention to deny the Board the usual flexibility accorded an agency in interpreting its authorizing statute and in developing new regulations to meet changing needs. [Footnote 24]
Further, the structure of the Act, far from supporting respondent, leads inescapably to the conclusion that Congress distinguished orders of the General Counsel from Board orders. The statute describing the organization of the agency, Page 484 U. S. 129 in which the "on behalf of the Board" language appears, differentiates between the two independent branches. 29 U.S.C. § 153. The structure of § 10 of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 160) emphasizes the distinction. Section 10 specifies the procedure for adjudicating unfair labor practice charges. Subsection 10(f) provides that final decisions "of the Board" shall be judicially reviewable, and, in the context of the entire section, discloses Congress' decision to authorize review of adjudications, not of prosecutions. Fairly read, this may encompass any Board adjudication resolving an unfair labor practice complaint, whether by final order, consent decree, or settlement. But it plainly cannot be read to provide for judicial review of the General Counsel's prosecutorial function.
The history of the Act confirms the distinction between orders of the General Counsel and Board orders. In the House bill, the General Counsel was styled the "Administrator of the National Labor Relations Act," and headed a separate agency. The Conference Committee decided to place the General Counsel within the agency, but to make the office independent of the Board's authority. The Committee added the language "on behalf of the Board" to make it clear that the General Counsel acted within the agency, not to imply that the acts of the General Counsel would be considered acts of the Board. [Footnote 27] Page 484 U. S. 130
Respondent argues that, if the NLRA provides no judicial review of "prosecutorial" determinations, they may be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as final agency actions "for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. It is true that the General Counsel's decision was a "final" action, and that there is no other adequate remedy in a court. But review under the APA is unavailable of actions specified in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a), that is, (1) where "statutes preclude judicial review"; or (2) where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Subsection (1) applies in this case. Page 484 U. S. 131
To allow judicial review through the APA of the General Counsel's settlement determinations would run directly counter to the structure of the NLRA. Appeals from final orders or dispositions of the Board are expressly directed to the courts of appeals. Respondent nevertheless urges that the statute should be read to allow an APA suit, brought in the district court, to review final agency orders that are not adjudications. Such review would involve lengthy judicial Page 484 U. S. 132 proceedings in precisely the area where Congress was convinced that speed of resolution is most necessary. This case provides a good illustration of what Congress set out to avoid. Charges were filed by respondent in August, 1984. By January, 1985, the settlement had been reached and all administrative review was exhausted. However, the court proceedings took almost 15 months. [Footnote 29]
Finally, APA review of these settlements would inevitably require the federal courts, in the first adjudicatory instance, to examine the merits of unfair labor practice charges. Page 484 U. S. 133 However, Congress has made plain its unequivocal desire that, absent statutory direction to the contrary, such examinations be made first by the Board, or not at all. At least in the context of this statute, we are left with no doubt that Congress intended the right of judicial review on the merits of an unfair labor practice charge to be had only through the express provisions of the NLRA.
"* * * *" "It is my understanding that the conference is saying to the House at this time that those different sections, where they mention the Board, mean that it is the general counsel who shall have the power to proceed with the investigation, with the complaint, and shall have complete power over the attorneys who are prosecuting; that the Board shall not control him or have the right of review in any way. Is that correct?"
I join the Court's opinion, and write separately only to note that our decision demonstrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 842-843 (1984). Some courts have mistakenly concluded otherwise, on the basis of dicta in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 480 U. S. 446-448 (1987). See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Page 484 U. S. 134 NRC, 266 U.S.App.D.C. 381, 386, 824 F.2d 108, 113 (1987); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Brock, 259 U.S.App.D.C. 457, 460-461, 816 F.2d 761, 764-765 (1987); Adams House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d 587, 593-594 (CA9 1987). If the dicta of Cardoza-Fonseca, as opposed to its expressed adherence to Chevron, were to be applied here, surely the question whether dismissal of complaints requires Board approval, and thus qualifies for judicial review under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), would be "a pure question of statutory construction," rather than the application of a "standar[d] to a particular set of facts," as to which "the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency," 480 U.S. at 480 U. S. 446, 480 U. S. 448. Were we to follow those dicta, therefore, we would be deciding this issue conclusively and authoritatively, rather than merely "decid[ing] whether the agency's regulatory placement is permissible," ante at 484 U. S. 125. The same would be true, moreover, of the many other decisions alluded to by the Court in which "we have traditionally accorded the Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA," ante at 484 U. S. 123. Those cases, and this, are decided correctly only because "the statute is silent or ambiguous" with respect to an issue relevant to the agency's administration of the law committed to its charge -- which is the test for deference set forth in Chevron.