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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 547', '§ 552', '§ 2510', '§ 1254', '§ 0', '§ 518', '§ 1', '§ 401', '§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 516', '§ 518', '§ 9', '§ 518', '§ 518', '§ 516', '§ 518']

UNITED STATES V. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL CO., 485 U. S. 693 (1988)
US Supreme Court Decisions - On-Line> Volume 485 > UNITED STATES V. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL CO., 485 U. S. 693 (1988)
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No. 87-65
(b) This case is one "in which the United States is interested," within the plain meaning of § 518(a). The action was initiated, and continues to be litigated here, in order to further the United States' unique sovereign interest in vindicating the authority of its Judiciary. The rationale underlying Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 -- which affirmed the inherent authority of federal courts to appoint private attorneys to prosecute disobedience of court orders in order to assure the Judiciary an independent means of vindicating its authority -- does not necessitate the special prosecutor's appearance before this Court. Nor does Young create an exception to 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 547, and therefore to the similar provisions of § 518(a). Unlike § 518(a), both § 516 and § 547 give the Attorney General exclusive control chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 694
over litigation involving the United States "except as otherwise [provided or authorized] by law." Young simply acknowledges an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of the statutory provisos. Pp. 485 U. S. 700-705.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 485 U. S. 708. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,joined, post, p. 485 U. S. 708. KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The United States seeks reinstatement of a judgment of contempt against a newspaper and its executive editor for chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 695
On November 8, 1985, Raymond J. Patriarca, son of Raymond L. S. Patriarca, by then deceased, filed suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), its Director, the Department of Justice, the Attorney General of the United States, the Providence Journal Company (Journal), and WJAR Television Ten (WJAR), seeking to enjoin further dissemination of logs and memoranda compiled from 1962 to 1965 during the course of illegal electronic surveillance, see Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F.2d 1010, 1013 (CA1 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980), of the plaintiff's father. The complaint, as amended, was based on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. IV), and the Fourth Amendment, and alleged that the FBI had improperly released the logs and memoranda to the Journal and WJAR pursuant to a FOIA request following the death of the senior Patriarca. The summons, complaint, and a motion for a temporary restraining order were served on the Journal on November 12, 1985. The next day, counsel for the various parties gathered for a conference with the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. During that conference, of which, apparently, there is no transcript, the Chief Judge entered a temporary restraining order barring publication of the logs and memoranda and set a hearing for Friday, chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 696
November 15. [Footnote 1] Counsel for both the Journal and the federal defendants objected to the order.
Patriarca, however, declined to prosecute the contempt motion, [Footnote 3] and the District Court decided not to ask the United States Attorney to pursue the matter, because of his representation of the federal defendants in the underlying civil action. [Footnote 4] Invoking Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 697
the District Court appointed William A. Curran of the Rhode Island Bar as "prosecuting attorney with full authority to prosecute" the pending contempt motion. App. 237-238. On Curran's application, the District Court then ordered respondents to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt. Id. at 31-32.
Respondents appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment of contempt. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1986). The court found that the temporary restraining order was "transparently invalid" under the First Amendment, and thus its constitutionality could be collaterally challenged in the contempt proceedings. Id. at 1353. According to the court, none of the grounds asserted in support of the order, including FOIA, Title III, and the Fourth Amendment, provided even a colorable basis for the prior restraint ordered by the District Court. chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 698
Before we can decide whether respondents could properly be held in contempt for violating the District Court's subsequently invalidated restraining order, we must consider respondents' motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari. It appears that the manner in which this unusual case reached us departed significantly from established practice. After the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of contempt and, sitting en banc, modified the panel's opinion, the special prosecutor sought authorization from the Solicitor General to file a petition here for a writ of certiorari. By letter dated July 2, 1987, the Solicitor General denied that authorization. See App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 1a-2a (SG Letter). Respondents argue that, without this permission, the special prosecutor cannot proceed before this Court. While denying authorization to the special prosecutor to file or to appear on behalf of the United States, the Solicitor General questioned whether our recent decision in Young v. United States ex rel. chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 699
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), rendered such authorization unnecessary in a case concerning a criminal contempt charge prosecuted by private counsel appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). See SG Letter. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2. We find no such implication in our decision in Young, and we conclude that the special prosecutor lacks the authority to represent the United States before this Court. Because he is not a party entitled to petition for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), we must dismiss the heretofore-granted writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction. [Footnote 5]
Page 485 U. S. 700
and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments, and . . . settlement thereof."
28 CFR § 0.20 (1987). Thus, unless this is a case other than one "in which the United States is interested," § 518(a), it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the Solicitor General or his designee. Cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522, 170 U. S. 524-525 (1898); @ 74 U. S. 458 (1869).
The present case clearly is one "in which the United States is interested." The action was initiated in vindication of the "judicial Power of the United States," U.S.Const., Art. III, § 1 (emphasis added), and it is that interest, unique to the sovereign, that continues now to be litigated in this Court. The special prosecutor seeks to reinstate a judgment of criminal contempt in a federal court, including a possible prison sentence for the individual defendant and a substantial fine for the newspaper defendant. The fact that the allegedly criminal conduct concerns the violation of a court order instead of common law or a statutory prohibition does not render the prosecution any less an exercise of the sovereign power of the United States. Indeed, just last Term, in a case much like the present one, involving a prosecution for criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), [Footnote 6] we flatly stated: "Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action represent the United States. . . ." Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. at 481 U. S. 804 (emphasis added). See also Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 221 U. S. 445 (1911) ("[P]roceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant. . . ."). chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 701
"The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as
Page 485 U. S. 702
essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other branches."
When, as here, a district court's judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal, a special prosecutor may decide to seek a writ of certiorari on the basis of his professional judgment that the court of appeals' decision merits review. See generally this Court's Rule 17. Sometimes, as apparently occurred here, the special prosecutor and the Solicitor General will disagree with respect to whether the case presents issues worthy of review by this Court. That kind of disagreement actually arises on a regular basis between the Solicitor General and attorneys representing various agencies of the United States. [Footnote 7] But that disagreement does not interfere chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 703
with the Judiciary's power to protect itself. In this very case, before the consent of the Solicitor General ever became relevant, members of the Judiciary had decided that the District Judge erred in adjudging the defendants in contempt. Where the majority of a panel of a court of appeals or perhaps, as here, a majority of an en banc court, itself has decided in favor of the alleged contemnor, the necessity that required the appointment of an independent prosecutor has faded and, indeed, is no longer present. [Footnote 8]
When, on the other hand, a district court has adjudged a party in contempt, and the appellate court has affirmed, a special prosecutor has little need of the services of this Court to fulfill his or her duties. It is only if the contemnor petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari that the Solicitor General need be consulted and his authorization or participation obtained to oppose the petition and defend the judgment. Under such circumstances, if the Solicitor General declines to authorize a defense of the judgment, and if § 518(a) prevented the special prosecutor from proceeding, the independent ability of the Judiciary to vindicate its authority might appear to be threatened: both courts would have agreed that the contemnor had disobeyed an order of the court, but the Executive's judgment to the contrary would threaten to undermine those judicial decisions. This threat, however, is inconsequential, for it is this Court, a part of the Judicial Branch, that must decide whether to exercise its discretion to review chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 704
the judgment below, and it is well within this Court's authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that judgment. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (order appointing amicus curiae in support of judgment); United States v. Fausto, 480 U.S. 904 (1987) (same).
Young neither expressed nor implied any such special consideration for a judicially initiated contempt proceeding. Both statutes implicated but not discussed in Young provide for the Attorney General's exclusive control over specified litigation except as otherwise provided or authorized by law. A fair reading of Young indicates that a federal court's inherent authority to punish disobedience and vindicate its authority is an excepted provision or authorization within the meaning of §§ 516 and 547. The "power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts,'" and was not first recognized by this chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 705
Court in Young; rather, it "`has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law.'" Young, 481 U.S. at 481 U. S. 795, quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 266 U. S. 42, 266 U. S. 65-66 (1924). Thus, contrary to the Solicitor General's intimation, Young did not read an exception into §§ 516 and 547; instead, Young is consistent with the plain language of the provisos to those sections. Section 518(a), by way of vivid contrast, contains no such proviso. [Footnote 9] chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 706
Under the procedures set out in Young, it seems evident that the majority of contempt cases will be prosecuted by the United States Attorney. See 481 U.S. at 481 U. S. 801. Under the special prosecutor's interpretation of § 518(a), whereby a chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 707
contempt citation initiated by a district court is not a case "in which the United States is interested," the United States Attorney would be free to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court without the authorization of the Solicitor General. We need not speculate how a United States Attorney would resolve the conflict between his duty "to the preservation of respect for judicial authority," United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-39.318 (1984), and his duty to his superiors at the Department of Justice, [Footnote 10] because we reject out of hand the interpretation of § 518(a) that creates the potential for such a conflict. Similarly, if the United States Attorney concluded that a court of appeals' decision reversing a judgment of contempt did not merit further review, and declined to file a petition with this Court, it would seem to follow from the Solicitor General's interpretation that the district judge could then appoint another special prosecutor solely for purposes of seeking certiorari and, if the writ were granted, litigating the case before this Court. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 9, n. 7. But surely neither the force of historical practice nor the necessity of protecting the dignity of the district court -- whose judgment of contempt has been reversed on appeal -- warrants attributing such power to the district judge.
We conclude that a criminal contempt prosecution brought to vindicate the authority of the Judiciary and to punish disobedience of a court order is a suit "in which the United chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 708
States is interested," within the meaning of § 518(a), regardless of who is appointed by the district court to prosecute the action. [Footnote 11] In this case, the special prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of certiorari without the authorization of the Solicitor General, and thus without authorization to appear on behalf of the United States. Absent a proper representative of the Government as a petitioner in this criminal prosecution, jurisdiction is lacking and the writ of certiorari, heretofore granted, is now dismissed.
A statute enacted by the First Congress in 1789 created the office of Attorney General of the United States and described chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 709
Most litigation in which the United States is interested is, of course, conducted by the Executive Branch of the Government. Orderly administration requires that such litigation be conducted under the supervision and direction of a single office. Congress therefore wisely granted the Attorney General broad enough authority to accomplish that mission. It is unlikely, however, that, when this statute was enacted, Congress foresaw the possibility that matters such as judicial contempts, see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987), legislative contempts, see 19 U. S. 543-544 (1940) (citation omitted); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207 (1986); O'Connor v. United States, 479 U. S. 27 (1986); California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U. S. 272, 479 U. S. 284 (1987); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank,@ 485 U. S. 351 (1988).
33 Annals of Cong. 434 (1818). The Speaker retained William Wirt to defend the suit, which established the congressional power of legislative chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 711
contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, supra. Although Wirt was then serving as Attorney General, Congress nonetheless deemed it necessary to retain Wirt in his private capacity and to pay him $500 to defend the suit. See American State Papers, Misc. Vol. 2, p. 932 (1834) ("A statement of the sums paid to William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States, beyond his salary, for services not required of him by law"). Had Congress read "in which the United States shall be concerned" to extend beyond the interests of the Executive Branch, the Attorney General would already have been obliged to "prosecute" or "conduct" the suit in the Supreme Court, and no separate retainer agreement would have been necessary. Indeed, the House Committee on the Judiciary later explained that payment above and beyond the Attorney General's salary was proper because it was provided
Id. at 931. chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 712
On numerous occasions since Anderson v. Dunn, Congress has seen fit to retain private counsel to represent its interests. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655 (1929); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986). Similarly, the interests of the Federal Judiciary, which are certainly interests chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 713
of the United States as well, have been represented in litigation in this Court by private counsel on several occasions. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90 (1967); Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U. S. 74 (1970); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987). Yet, from the time of Anderson v. Dunn until today, we have heard argument in these cases without bothering to determine whether or not the Solicitor General approved of their participation in the litigation. In addition, we have frequently appointed counsel -- sometimes designated as "amicus curiae," but nevertheless fully authorized to argue cases in which the United States is interested, see, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926); Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (appointing counsel), 461 U. S. 574 (1983) -- without asking for the approval of the Solicitor General before taking such action. Moreover, despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 516 contains language similar to that found in § 518(a), [Footnote 2/2] we have confirmed the power of the Judiciary to appoint counsel to conduct litigation in which the United States is interested. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., supra.
The language is mandatory. In any case in which the United States is interested, the Solicitor General shall argue an appeal in the Supreme Court. Of course, and quite properly so, the Solicitor General does nat seek certiorari in every chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 714
case adversely affecting an interest of the United States. Instead, the Solicitor General acts strategically, choosing the most important cases and the cases in which the United States is most likely to prevail. In thus separating the wheat from the chaff, the Solicitor General makes a series of judgments as to what is in the United States' interest. As an executive officer, [Footnote 2/3] the Solicitor General may reasonably weigh and consider the interests of the executive agencies. When faced with a difference of view between the Executive Branch and a coordinate branch of government, however, the Solicitor General faces a conflict of interest that undeniably would be intolerable if encountered in the private sector. In essence, he or she is asked to resolve conflicting interests between clients. Common sense dictates that Congress did not intend to create such a conflict in the Office of the Solicitor General. [Footnote 2/4] Moreover, and even more compellingly so, it is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to abdicate to the Solicitor General and the Department of Justice the function of determining what is in the interest of the Congress or the Judiciary. Certainly, Congress did not intend that these executive offices be charged with weighing competing executive and congressional or judicial interests, with authority -- absent further legislation [Footnote 2/5] -- to deny Congress and the Judiciary access to this Court. chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 715
"[Title] 28 U.S.C. 518(a), like the other statutes that vest the Attorney General with exclusive control over chanrobles.com-red
Page 485 U. S. 716
litigation, applies to cases in which the United States is "interested" by virtue of the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Executive Branch -- the Branch in which the Attorney General serves. Cf. ICC v. Southern Ry. Co., 543 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir.1976) (Section 516 not only centralizes responsibility for the conduct of public litigation, but enables the President, through the Attorney General, to supervise the various policies of the executive branch')."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Response to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 13.
"The appointments heretofore made, and the compensation heretofore and now allowed, have had reference only to the existing constitution of the office, and the duties belonging to it, as already stated."