Source: https://fullcirclecompliance.eu/the-daily-bugle-weekly-highlights-week-21-20-24-may-2019/
Timestamp: 2019-08-22 07:22:56
Document Index: 763963447

Matched Legal Cases: ['art 560', 'art 560', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 744', 'art 732', 'art 738', 'art 740', '§\u2009740', 'art 740', 'art 2', 'art 2', 'art 738', 'art 740', 'art 738', 'art 740', 'art 740', '§\u2009744', '§\u2009740', '§\u2009742', 'art 740', '§\u2009742', '§\u2009744', '§\u2009744', '§\u2009736', '§\u2009742', '§\u2009742', '§\u2009126']

The Daily Bugle Weekly Highlights: Week 21 (20 – 24 May 2019) – Full Circle Compliance
The Daily Bugle Weekly Highlights: Week 21 (20 – 24 May 2019)
EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, and Syria, Creates New Cyber-Attack Sanctions Regime; The Daily Bugle; Monday, 20 May 2019, Item #1;
Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Adds Huawei and 68 of its Non-U.S. Affiliates to Entity List; The Daily Bugle; Tuesday, 21 May 2019, Item #4;
Commerce/BIS Grants 90-Day Temporary General License to Sixty-Nine Entities; The Daily Bugle; Wednesday, 22 May 2019, Item #2;
State Imposes Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Entities and Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement; The Daily Bugle; Wednesday, 22 May 2019, Item #2;
Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Implements Certain Changes Made to WA Dual-Use List; The Daily Bugle; Thursday, 23 May 2019, Item #3;
Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Moves Venezuela from Country Group B to Country Groups D:1-4; The Daily Bugle; Friday, 24 May 2019, Item #1;
1. EU Amends Restrictive Measures Concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, and Syria, Creates New Cyber-Attack Sanctions Regime
(Source: Official Journal of the European Union, 17 and 20 May 2019.)
* Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/791of 16 May 2019 amending for the 302nd time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations
* Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States
* Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798of 17 May 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria
* Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States
* Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/806of 17 May 2019 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria
2. Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Adds Huawei and 68 of its Non-U.S. Affiliates to Entity List
(Source: Federal Register, 21 May 2019.) [Excerpts.]
FR 22961-22968: Addition of Entities to the Entity List
* SUMMARY: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) to the Entity List. The U.S. Government has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Huawei has been involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. BIS is also adding non-U.S. affiliates of Huawei to the Entity List because those affiliates pose a significant risk of involvement in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. Huawei will be listed on the Entity List under the destination of China. This final rule also adds to the Entity List sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates of Huawei located in twenty-six destinations: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, Germany, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and Vietnam.
* DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective May 16, 2019.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Director, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Phone: (949) 660-0144 or (408) 998-8806 or email your inquiry to: ECDOEXS@bis.doc.gov.
Under Sec. 744.11(b) (Criteria for revising the Entity List) of the EAR, persons for whom there is reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable facts, that the person has been involved, is involved, or poses a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and those acting on behalf of such persons may be added to the Entity List. Pursuant to Sec. 744.11(b) of the EAR, the ERC has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) has been involved in activities determined to be contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. To illustrate, Huawei has been indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on 13 counts of violating U.S. law (Superseding Indictment), including violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), by knowingly and willfully causing the export, reexport, sale and supply, directly and indirectly, of goods, technology and services (banking and other financial services) from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without obtaining a license from the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), as required by OFAC’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), and conspiracy to violate IEEPA by knowingly and willfully conspiring to cause the export, reexport, sale and supply, directly and indirectly, of goods, technology and services (banking and other financial services) from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without obtaining a license from OFAC as required by OFAC’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560). The Superseding Indictment also alleges that Huawei and an Iranian-based affiliate, working with others, knowingly and willfully conspired to impair, impede, obstruct, and defeat, through deceitful and dishonest means, the lawful government operations of OFAC.
Further, Huawei’s affiliates present a significant risk of acting on Huawei’s behalf to engage in such activities. Because the ERC has determined that there is reasonable cause to believe that the affiliates pose a significant risk of becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States due to their relationship with Huawei, this final rule also adds to the Entity List sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates of Huawei located in twenty-six destinations: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, Germany, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and Vietnam. Without the imposition of a license requirement as to these affiliated companies, there is reasonable cause to believe that Huawei would seek to use these entities to evade the restrictions imposed by its addition to the Entity List. As set forth in the Superseding Indictment filed in the Eastern District of New York, Huawei participated along with certain affiliates in the alleged criminal violations of U.S. law, including one or more non-U.S. affiliates. The Superseding Indictment also alleges that Huawei and affiliates acting on Huawei’s behalf engaged in a series of deceptive and obstructive acts designed to evade U.S. law and to avoid detection by U.S. law enforcement.
In light of the foregoing, Huawei and sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates of Huawei raise sufficient concern that prior review of exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of items subject to the EAR involving these entities, and the possible imposition of license conditions or license denials on shipments to these entities, will enhance BIS’s ability to prevent activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
(6) Gui’an New District Huawei Investment Co., Ltd., Guiyang, Guizhou, China;
(33) Xi’an Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Xi’an, Shaanxi, China;
(34) Xi’an Ruixin Investment Co., Ltd., Xi’an, Shaanxi, China; and
Shipments of items removed from eligibility for a License Exception or export or reexport without a license (NLR) as a result of this regulatory action that were en route aboard a carrier to a port of export or reexport, on May 16, 2019, pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to a foreign destination, may proceed to that destination under the previous eligibility for a License Exception or export or reexport without a license (NLR). …
3. Commerce/BIS Grants 90-Day Temporary General License to Sixty-Nine Entities
(Source: Federal Register, 22 May 2019.) [Excerpts.]
84 FR 23468-23471: Temporary General License
* SUMMARY: This final rule creates a 90-day temporary general license that partially restores the licensing requirements and policies under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to sixty-nine entities added to the Entity List on May 16, 2019.
* DATES: This rule is effective May 20, 2019, through August 19, 2019.
This final rule does not amend the Entity List, but modifies the license requirement for the sixty-nine entries added to the Entity List in the May 16, 2019, final rule entitled “Addition of Entities to the Entity List,” as described further below, by adding a temporary general license for the specified entities.
Addition of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Sixty-Eight Related Entities to the Entity List
BIS added Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) and sixty-eight of its non-U.S. affiliates to the Entity List on May 16, 2019. Details regarding the scope of the listing are in the final rule titled “Addition to the Entity List,” effective May 16, 2019, and scheduled to publish in the May 21, 2019, issue of the Federal Register. The sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates are also listed in Supplement No. 7 to part 744–Temporary General License.
This final rule amends the EAR by adding Supplement No. 7 to Part 744 to create a Temporary General License that returns in part the prior requirements through August 14, 2019. In this final rule, pursuant to Supplement No. 5 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), BIS is modifying the effect of the sixty-nine entries on the Entity List by adding a temporary general license to temporarily authorize, as specified below, engagement in transactions, involving the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items subject to the EAR to Huawei and its sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates subject to the conditions described below.
This temporary general license is effective from the date of this Authorization, May 20, 2019, through August 19, 2019.
This temporary general license does not relieve persons of other obligations under the EAR, including but not limited to licensing requirements to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) or elsewhere and/or the requirements of part 744 of the EAR. This authorization does not authorize any activities or transactions involving Country Group E countries (i.e., Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) or persons.
With the exception of the transactions explicitly authorized by this temporary general license, exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) continue to require a license pursuant to the license requirement set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 for Huawei and the sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates and will be reviewed under the license review policy for those entities.
This temporary general license allows, from May 20, 2019, through August 19, 2019, the following:
(1) Continued Operation of Existing Networks and Equipment: BIS authorizes engagement in transactions, subject to other provisions of the EAR, necessary to maintain and support existing and currently fully operational networks and equipment, including software updates and patches, subject to legally binding contracts and agreements executed between Huawei and third parties or the sixty-eight non-U.S. Huawei affiliates and third parties on or before May 16, 2019.
(2) Support to Existing Handsets: BIS authorizes engagement in transactions, subject to other provisions of the EAR, necessary to provide service and support, including software updates or patches, to existing Huawei handsets that were available to the public on or before May 16, 2019.
(3) Cybersecurity Research and Vulnerability Disclosure: BIS authorizes, subject to other provisions of the EAR, the disclosure to Huawei and/or the sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates of information regarding security vulnerabilities in items owned, possessed, or controlled by Huawei or any of the sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates when related to the process of providing ongoing security research critical to maintaining the integrity and reliability of existing and currently fully operational networks and equipment, as well as handsets.
(4) Engagement as Necessary for Development of 5G Standards by a Duly Recognized Standards Body: BIS authorizes, subject to other provisions of the EAR, engagement with Huawei and/or the sixty-eight non-U.S. affiliates as necessary for the development of 5G standards as part of a duly recognized international standards body (e.g., IEEE–Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; IETF–internet Engineering Task Force; ISO–International Organization for Standards; ITU–International Telecommunications Union; ETSI- European Telecommunications Standards Institute; 3GPP–3rd Generation Partnership Project; TIA–Telecommunications Industry Association; and GSMA, a.k.a., GSM Association, Global System for Mobile Communications). The licensing and other policies of the EAR regarding exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to Huawei and sixty-eight of its non-U.S. affiliates that were in effect prior to their addition to the Entity List on May 16, 2019, are available for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) for transactions eligible for the temporary general license established by this final rule. For example, the authority of NLR or alicense exception that was available on or before May 16, 2019, may be used pursuant to this temporary general license if the underlying export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) meets the temporary general license conditions and is limited in scope to the support of one or more of activities described in clauses 1-4 above.
This temporary general license does not relieve persons of other obligations under the EAR, including but not limited to licensing requirements to the PRC or elsewhere and/or the requirements of the part 744 of the EAR, such as those specified in Sec. Sec. [thinsp]744.2, 744.3 and 744.4 of the EAR. This temporary general license does not authorize any activities or transactions involving Country Group E countries or persons. For example, this temporary general license does not relieve persons of their obligations under General Prohibition 5 in Sec. [thinsp]736.2(b)(5) of the EAR which provides that, “you may not, without a license, knowingly export or reexport any item subject to the EAR to an end-user or end-use that is prohibited by part 744 of the EAR.” BIS strongly urges the use of Supplement No. 3 to part 732 of the EAR, BIS’s `Know Your Customer’ Guidance and Red Flags,” when persons are involved in transactions that are subject to the EAR.
Required Certification Statement and Change to EAR Recordkeeping Requirement …
Nazak Nikakhtar, Assistant Secretary for Industry and Analysis, Performing the Nonexclusive Functions and Duties of the Under Secretary for Industry and Security.
4. State Imposes Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Entities and Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement
(Source: Federal Register, 22 May 2019.)
84 FR 23627-23628: Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement
* AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State.
* SUMMARY: A determination has been made that a number of foreign persons have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
* DATES: The imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act described in this notice went into effect May 14, 2019.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 14, 2019, the U.S. Government applied the measures authorized in Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 109-353) against the following foreign persons identified in the report submitted pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Act:
– Abascience Tech Co., Ltd. (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Emily Liu [a.k.a. Emily Lau, Liu Baoxia] (Chinese individual);
– Hope Wish Technologies Incorporated (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co Ltd (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Li Fangwei [a.k.a. Karl Lee] (Chinese individual);
– Raybeam Optronics Co., Ltd (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Ruan Runling [a.k.a. Ricky Runling, Ricky Ruan] (Chinese individual);
– Shanghai North Begins (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Sinotech (Dalian) Carbon and Graphite Corporation (SCGC) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Sun Creative Zhejiang Technologies Inc (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– T-Rubber Co. Ltd (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Wuhan Sanjiang Import and Export Co Ltd (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Yenben Yansong Zaojiu Co Ltd (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Defense Industries Organization (Iran) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Gatchina Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Training Center (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
I – nstrument Design Bureau (KBP) Tula (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Moscow Machine Building Plant Avangard (MMZ Avangard) (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Army Supply Bureau (ASB) (Syria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
L – ebanese Hizballah (Syria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Megatrade (Syria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
– Syrian Air Force (Syria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; and
– Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSCR) (Syria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof.
The Act provides for penalties on foreign entities and individuals for the transfer to or acquisition from Iran since January 1, 1999; the transfer to or acquisition from Syria since January 1, 2005; or the transfer to or acquisition from North Korea since January 1, 2006, of goods, services, or technology controlled under multilateral control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category includes (a) items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists but falling below the control list parameters when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists, and (c) other items with the potential of making such a material contribution when added through case-by-case decisions. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 3 of the Act, the following measures are imposed on these persons:
Christopher A. Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation.
5. Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Implements Certain Changes Made to WA Dual-Use List
(Source: Federal Register, 23 May 2019.) [Excerpts.]
84 FR 23886-23899: Implementation of Certain New Controls on Emerging Technologies Agreed at Wassenaar Arrangement 2018 Plenary
* SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security maintains, as part of its Export Administration Regulations, the Commerce Control List (CCL), which identifies certain items subject to Department of Commerce’s jurisdiction. This final rule revises the CCL to implement certain changes made to the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies maintained and agreed to by governments participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement, or WA) at the December 2018 WA Plenary meeting. The Wassenaar Arrangement advocates implementation of effective export controls on strategic items with the objective of improving regional and international security and stability. This rule harmonizes the CCL with only the agreements on recently developed or developing technologies not previously controlled that are essential to the national security of the United States and warrant early implementation. The remaining agreements will be implemented in a separate rule.
* DATES: This rule is effective May 23, 2019.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions, contact Sharron Cook, Office of Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce at 202-482-2440 or by email: Sharron.Cook@bis.doc.gov.
– Category 3 (Electronics): Brian Baker at 202-482-5534.
– Category 5 (Information Security): Aaron Amundson or Anita Zinzuvadia 202-482-0707.
– Category 6 (Acoustic projector/transducer): Michael Tu 202-482-6462.
– Category 9×515 (Satellites): Michael Tu 202-482-6462.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: … The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar or WA) (http://www.wassenaar.org/​) is a group of 42 like-minded states committed to promoting responsibility and transparency in the global arms trade, and preventing destabilizing accumulations of arms. As a Participating State, the United States has committed to controlling for export all items on the WA control lists. The control lists, which include the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and the Wassenaar Arrangement List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, were first established in 1996 and have been revised annually thereafter. Proposals for changes to the WA control lists are reviewed by Participating States at expert group and annual plenary meetings. Participating States are charged with implementing the agreed list changes as soon as possible after approval. The United States’ implementation of WA list changes ensures U.S. companies have a level playing field with their competitors in other WA Participating States.
– Revises (4) ECCNs: 3A001, 5A002, 6A001 and 9A004.
– Added ECCNs: 3D005.
These discrete microwave transistors are subject to National Security (NS Column 1), Regional Stability (RS Column 1) and Anti-terrorism (AT Column 1) license requirements, except those being exported or reexported for use in civil telecommunications applications, as indicated on the Commerce Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. List-based license exceptions (Limited Value Shipment (LVS) and Group B Shipments (GBS) and Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), see part 740 of the EAR), are available for those discrete microwave transistors that are being exported or reexported for use in civil telecommunications applications that meet the criteria of the license exception and where none of the license exception restrictions of § 740.2 apply. Transaction-based license exceptions may be available depending on the transaction meeting the license exception criteria; see part 740 of the EAR.
ECCN 5A002 is amended in order to add a control on certain types of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. This rule adds paragraph 2.c of the Technical Notes that follow paragraph 5A002.a.4 to include a new paragraph addressing certain post-quantum asymmetric algorithms. This rule also revises paragraphs 5A002.a, a.4, paragraph 2 of the Technical Notes that follow paragraph 5A002.a.4, paragraph a.1.a.1.b in Note 2 to 5A002.a, and paragraph (4)(a) of Related Controls to 5A002, to replace the term `in excess of 56 bits of symmetric key length, or equivalent’ with `described security algorithm’. These changes are being made for technical accuracy since methods for establishing equivalence between modern classical and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are not settled. In addition, this rule revises the Nota Bene to Note 3 (the Cryptography Note) to specify that items that include post-quantum asymmetric algorithms described by paragraph 2.c of the Technical Notes are subject to the classification or self-classification reporting requirements for mass market items.
The WA introduced specific parameters for the export control of cryptography in 1998, along with a general Category 5—Part 2 exclusion for `mass market’ encryption products (Cryptography Note, Note 3), in recognition of the increasing use of cryptography in the public domain. While the structure of Category 5—Part 2 of the WA has evolved significantly since 1998, the algorithms addressed have remained unchanged.
One goal of PQC is to develop and deploy quantum-resistant algorithms well in advance of a potential attack from a quantum computer. As the threat of quantum computers grows nearer, cryptography researchers are developing algorithms and working towards standardizing algorithms that resist attack from existing known quantum algorithms (such as Shor’s Algorithm). PQC is currently in use in commercial products, but those algorithms are not covered by any WA controls. Because such algorithms are becoming increasingly common, this control is being added to ensure that there is consistent treatment and a level playing field between modern classical and post-quantum cryptography.
6A001 Acoustic Systems, Equipment, and “Components”
ECCN 6A001 is amended by moving the Note previously located below Item paragraph a.2.g.4 to below the introductory Item paragraph a.2 for better readability. This Note informs the public that Item paragraph a.2 “applies to receiving equipment, whether or not related in normal application to separate active equipment, and “specially designed” components therefor”. This rule also adds a Technical Note 2 after paragraph a.2.a to alert the public that underwater acoustic transducers designed to operate as passive receivers are hydrophones. This rule revises paragraph a.2.a.6 to add the parameter “and having a `hydrophone sensitivity’ better than −230 dB below 4 kHz”, to remove any transducers or hydrophones that are not of strategic concern.
This rule also corrects a License Exception LVS paragraph for 6A001.a.1.b.1 by reversing the frequency band range for the equipment from “30 kHz to 2 kHz” to read “2 kHz to 30 kHz”. All items in ECCN 6A001 are subject to national security (NS Column 2) and anti-terrorism (AT Column 1) license requirements as indicated in the Commerce Country Chart in Supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. License Exception Low Value Shipment (LVS) may be available depending on the operating frequency. License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) and transaction-based license exceptions may also be available depending on the circumstances of the transaction and the destination; see part 740 of the EAR.
9A004 Space Launch Vehicles and “Spacecraft”, “Spacecraft Buses”, “Spacecraft Payloads”, “Spacecraft” On-Board Systems or Equipment, and Terrestrial Equipment
Items specified in 9A004.g require a license for national security (NS Column 1) and anti-terrorism reasons (AT Column 1) as indicated on the Commerce Country Chart in Supplement no. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. There are no list-based license exceptions, but transaction-based license exceptions may be available; see part 740 of the EAR. …
Shipments of items removed from license exception eligibility or eligibility for export, reexport or transfer (in-country) without a license as a result of this regulatory action that were on dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting carrier, or en route aboard a carrier to a port of export, on May 23, 2019, pursuant to actual orders for exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) to a foreign destination, may proceed to that destination under the previous license exception eligibility or without a license so long as they have been exported, reexported or transferred (in-country) before July 22, 2019. Any such items not actually exported, reexported or transferred (in-country) before midnight, on July 22, 2019, require a license in accordance with this final rule. …
6. Commerce/BIS Amends EAR, Moves Venezuela from Country Group B to Country Groups D:1-4
(Source: Federal Register, 24 May 2019.) [Excerpts.]
84 FR 24018-24021: Revisions to Country Group Designations for Venezuela and Conforming Changes for License Requirements
* SUMMARY: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove Venezuela from Country Group B, which affords favorable treatment for certain exports of National Security-controlled items, and moves Venezuela to Country Group D:1, which lists countries of national security concern. This final rule makes these changes to the EAR to reflect current national security concerns related to Venezuela, e.g., the introduction of foreign military personnel and equipment into Venezuela, and to better protect U.S. national security. The changes in this final rule also better align the Country Group designations for Venezuela with other EAR national security-related provisions that already apply to Venezuela, e.g., the military end-use and end-user controls that apply to certain items for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) and provisions that are specific to countries subject to U.S. arms embargoes. In addition, this final rule adds Venezuela to Country Groups D:2-4, which list countries of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology concern, respectively.
* DATES: This rule is effective May 24, 2019.
* FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Foreign Policy Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-4252.
* SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: … In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement a decision to remove Venezuela from Country Group B, which affords favorable treatment for certain exports of National Security-controlled items, and moves Venezuela to Country Group D:1, which lists countries of national security concern (Supplement No. 1 to part 740). In addition, this final rule adds Venezuela to Country Groups D:2-4, which list countries of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology concern, respectively.
This final rule protects U.S. national security interests by making changes to the EAR to address current national security concerns related to Venezuela, e.g., the introduction of foreign military personnel and equipment into Venezuela, and better align the Country Group designation for Venezuela with other EAR national security related provisions that apply to Venezuela. For example, Venezuela is included in the military end-use and end-user control in § 744.21: Restrictions on certain `Military end uses’ in the People’s Republic of China or for a `Military end use’ or `Military end user’ in Russia or Venezuela. Venezuela is also already designated in Country Group D:5 as a U.S. Arms Embargoed Country, meaning that the general restrictions on the use of license exceptions in § 740.2(a)(12) for 9×515 and “600 series” items apply, along with the more restrictive license review policy for national security controlled items in § 742.4(b)(1)(ii) for 9×515 and “600 series” items.
The removal of Venezuela from Country Group B and its addition to Country Group D:1 will make exports and reexports to Venezuela and transfers within Venezuela ineligible for certain license exceptions set forth in Part 740. In addition, the national security licensing policy set forth in § 742.4(b) for Country Group D:1 countries will apply to those exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country). The U.S. Government has determined that the conduct of Venezuela raises sufficient concern that interagency review of proposed exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of national security controlled items subject to the EAR, previously eligible for certain license exceptions to Venezuela, and the possible imposition of license conditions or license denials on exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country), will enhance BIS’s ability to protect U.S. national security interests.
In addition, the U.S. Government has determined that Venezuela’s increasing dependence on countries in Country Groups D:3 and E merited its placement in Country Groups D:2-4.
In addition, Venezuela’s placement in Country Group D:1 will result in the imposition of restrictions on the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of certain microprocessors to military end uses and end users in Venezuela, pursuant to § 744.17: Restrictions on certain exports, reexports and transfers (in-country) of microprocessors and associated “software” and “technology” for `military end uses’ and to `military end users.’ Furthermore, restrictions on certain exports and reexports to vessels and aircraft located in Venezuelan ports or registered in Venezuela will become effective pursuant to § 744.7, Restrictions on certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels or aircraft. Finally, the addition of Venezuela to Country Group D:1 will expand the licensing requirements for reexports of the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-origin technology and software to Venezuela pursuant to § 736.2(b)(3), General Prohibition Three.
Prior to publication of this final rule, Venezuela was already included in Country Group D:5 and the license review policy under § 742.4(b)(1)(ii) continues to apply for items classified under 9×515 and “600 series” ECCNs for exports and reexports to Venezuela. Pursuant to § 742.4(b)(1)(ii), these license applications will continue to be “reviewed consistent with United States arms embargo policies in § 126.1” of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.