Source: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v54/54-137.html
Timestamp: 2016-10-26 19:25:29
Document Index: 33173910

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7701', '§ 2425', '§ 7701', '§ 5596', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 1988', 'art,\n461', '§ 7701', '§ 7701', '§ 7701']

54:1594(137)AR - - NAGE Local R4-6 and Army, Fort Eustis, Virginia - - 1998 FLRAdec AR - - v54 p1594 | FLRA
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The decision of the Authority follows: 54 FLRA No. 137 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. _____ NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL R4-6 (Union) and U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORT EUSTIS, VIRGINIA (Agency) 0-AR-3000 _____ DECISION November 30, 1998 _____ Before the Authority: Phyllis N. Segal, Chair;
Donald S. Wasserman and Dale Cabaniss, Members. Decision by Chair Segal for the Authority. I. Statement of the Case This matter is before the Authority on an exception to an award of
exception. On remand from the Authority, the Arbitrator addressed the Union's
request for attorney fees and determined that the Union was entitled to
attorney fees in an amount equaling one-fourth of that which it requested. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Union has not
Accordingly, we deny the Union's exception. II. Background and Arbitrator's Award In National Association of Government Employees, Local R4-6 and U.S.
Department of the Army, Fort Eustis, Virginia, 52 FLRA 1522 (1997), the
Authority denied, in part, and granted, in part, the Union's exceptions to the
Arbitrator's initial award in this case. In the initial award, the Arbitrator
resolved the Union's grievance requesting 8 hours of administrative leave to
remedy the Agency's alleged violation of the parties' collective bargaining
agreement when it closed for 1 day and granted administrative leave to all
employees except the grievants. The Arbitrator found that the Agency violated
the parties' agreement, as alleged in the grievance, but determined that the
grievants should be granted only 2 hours of administrative leave to remedy
the violation. The Arbitrator also determined that the grievants were not
entitled to attorney fees because an award of leave did not constitute an award
of backpay under the Back Pay Act. On review, the Authority denied the Union's exceptions to the portion
of the Arbitrator's award granting the grievants 2 hours of leave.
However, the Authority found that the Arbitrator's determination that attorney
fees could not be awarded was contrary to the Back Pay Act. The Authority
remanded the award to the parties for submission to the Arbitrator for
consideration of the issue of attorney fees. On remand, the Arbitrator first found that the Union was the prevailing
party in the underlying arbitration because the grievance had been sustained.
Second, the Arbitrator found that an award of fees in this case was warranted
in the interest of justice because the Agency had disregarded the parties'
agreement in denying the grievants' administrative leave. Third, the Arbitrator
found that the fees were incurred by the Union pursuant to its retainer of
counsel. Finally, the Arbitrator, noting that the Agency did not challenge the
amount of fees claimed by the Union, found that the requested fee rate was
reasonable. However, the Arbitrator declined to award all of the attorney fees
sought at that rate by the Union. Specifically, the Arbitrator determined that
because he "sustained the grievance to the extent of one-fourth of the amount
claimed" -- 2 hours of administrative leave rather than 8 hours -- the Union
was entitled to only one-fourth of the attorney fees requested. Award at 2. In
making this determination, the Arbitrator quoted Texas State Teachers v.
Grievant Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 790 (1989) (Texas
State Teachers) (emphasis in original), in which the Supreme Court stated
that "the degree of the plaintiff's success in relation to the other
goals of the lawsuit is a factor critical to the determination of the size of a
reasonable fee[.]" See Award at 2. The Arbitrator concluded that
although the Union was entitled to attorney fees, a reasonable fee award in
this case was one-fourth of that sought by the Union. III. Positions of the Parties A. Union's Exception The Union claims that the award is deficient because it is inconsistent
with the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1). The Union
claims that nothing in section 7701(g)(1) or Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) case law permits an arbitrator to reduce an award of fees. The Union
argues that the grievants are the prevailing parties because they received some
relief, and therefore, the Union is entitled to the full amount of attorney
fees sought in connection with the grievance. The Union also claims that the
Arbitrator failed to "arrive at a fully articulated, reasoned decision on the
issue of reasonable attorney fees[.]" Exception at 5. B. Agency's Opposition The Agency claims that "there is nothing in [section] 7701(g)
which prohibits an arbitrator from reducing an attorney fee request because of
the limited degree of success obtained by the grievant." Opposition at 3
(emphasis in the original). The Agency asserts that the Union's argument--that
it is entitled to the entire fee request because the grievants are the
prevailing party--is misplaced. According to the Agency, the Arbitrator's
decision to reduce the fee award was based on his determination regarding the
"reasonableness" of the fee, which is a determination that is "separate and
distinct" from the "prevailing party" determination. Id. The Agency also argues that the award should be "set aside" in its
entirety. Id. at 6. Specifically, the Agency asserts that it agrees
with the Union that the Arbitrator failed to provide a fully articulated,
reasoned fee decision. In this respect, the Agency claims that the award is
deficient because the Arbitrator failed to articulate his finding that the
Union was the "prevailing party." Id. at 5. IV. Analysis and Conclusions A. The Agency's Exception Set Forth In Its Opposition Is
Dismissed In its opposition, the Agency requests that the Arbitrator's award be
"set aside" because the Arbitrator failed to fully articulate his finding that
the Union was the prevailing party. Id. at 6. Although the Agency
asserts that it is agreeing with the Union, the Agency is actually making a new
argument regarding the deficiency of the award. In this regard, the Union
disputes the adequacy of the Arbitrator's reasonableness determination, and the
Agency is challenging the adequacy of the Arbitrator's prevailing party
determination. Further, the Union is seeking to have the fee award increased,
and the Agency is seeking to have the award set aside in its entirety. Because
the Agency is asserting a separate and distinct ground for finding the award
deficient, the Agency's argument constitutes a separate exception to the award.
The time limit for filing an exception to an arbitration award is 30
days beginning on the date the award is served on the filing party. 5 C.F.R.
§ 2425.1. The Arbitrator's award was dated and served on the parties
on July 31, 1997. The Agency's exception contained in its opposition to the
Union's exception was filed on October 1, 1997, more than 30 days after the
Arbitrator's award was served on the parties. Consequently, the Agency's
exception to the Arbitrator's award is untimely, and we dismiss the exception.
See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, West Los Angeles Medical
Employees, Local 1061, 46 FLRA 853, 859-60 (1992)(dismissing as
untimely the Union's exception set forth in its opposition). B. The Award Of Attorney Fees Is Not Contrary To 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(g)(1) The Union's exception involves the award's consistency with law. Thus,
we review the questions of law raised by the Union's exception to the
Arbitrator's award de novo. See National Treasury
Revenue Service, 50 FLRA 330, 332 (1995). In applying a de
novo standard of review, the Authority assesses whether the arbitrator's
the arbitrator's underlying factual findings. See id. 1. The Statutory Requirements for Attorney Fees The threshold requirement for entitlement to attorney fees under the
Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, is a finding that the grievant was affected
by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action, which resulted in the
withdrawal or reduction of the grievant's pay, allowances, or differentials.
See U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Distribution Region East, New
Cumberland, Pennsylvania and American Federation of Government Employees, Local
2004, 51 FLRA 155, 158 (1995). Once such a finding is made, the Act
further requires that an award of fees must be: (1) in conjunction with an
standards established under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g), which pertains to
attorney fee awards by the MSPB. See id. The standards
established under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1), which apply in all
cases except those involving allegations of discrimination, are as follows:
reasonable; and (4) the fees must have been incurred by the employee.
See id. (citing American Federation of Government Employees,
Local 12 and U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., 38 FLRA 1240, 1248
(1990)). Because the Union challenges only the Arbitrator's determination
regarding whether the award of fees was reasonable, we do not consider the
other requirements of the Back Pay Act or section 7701(g)(1). See
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical Center, North Chicago, Illinois
and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2107, 52 FLRA
387, 398 n.9 (1996). 2. Consideration of a Grievant's Degree of Success In Determining
Reasonable Attorney Fees Is Not Inconsistent With 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(g) In U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dependents
Schools and Federal Education Association, 54 FLRA 773, 791-93 (1998)
(Dependents Schools), the Authority resolved an exception to an
arbitrator's award in which the agency contended that the amount of attorney
fees awarded was not reasonable under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g). As relevant
here, the Authority applied the Supreme Court's formulation of "reasonableness"
for attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988.(1) Id. at 791. In this regard, the Supreme Court
held in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (Farrar), that
the extent to which a plaintiff prevailed in the underlying litigation is the
most critical factor to consider in determining reasonable attorney fees.
See also Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 791-93 (finding
that the extent of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness
of the award). The Court stated "that if 'a plaintiff has achieved only partial
or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.'"
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (Hensley). The Supreme Court has also held
that, in cases involving a single successful claim, "[a] reduced fee award is
appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation as a whole." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440;
see also id. at 435-36. The Authority's application of the Supreme Court precedent in
Dependents Schools, 54 FLRA at 791, is consistent with decisions of the
MSPB. The MSPB, also applying this precedent, has held that in determining the
"reasonableness" of attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g), it is
necessary to consider whether a fee award should be reduced because the relief
ordered was significantly less than what was sought. See, e.g., Stein
v. United States Postal Service, 65 MSPR 685, 690 (1994)
(Stein). In this respect, the MSPB has stated that in circumstances
where the relief ordered is significantly less than that sought, "an award may
be reduced either by identifying the hours associated with unsuccessful claims
or by simply reducing it to account for the limited success." Id.
(citing Smit v. Department of the Treasury, 61 MSPR 612, 619 (1994)
(Smit)). The MSPB has also held that "when more than one claim for
relief is made and the claims involve a common core of facts or are based on
related legal theories, the fee determination should reflect the significance
of the overall relief obtained in relation to the hours reasonably expended."
Smit, 61 MSPR at 618-19. See also Heath v. Department of
Transportation, 66 MSPR 101, 105 (1995) (finding that in determining
whether a fee request should be reduced "the result [of the litigation] is what
matters"). In this case, the Arbitrator found that although the grievants did not
recover the full amount of leave sought in the grievance, the grievants had
prevailed within the meaning of section 7701(g)(1). The Arbitrator did not, as
asserted by the Union (Exceptions at 2), reduce the fees based on a finding
that the grievants did not prevail. Instead, he found that the degree of the
grievants' success affected what a "reasonable" fee award would be, and
determined that because the grievants received only one-fourth of what they
sought in the grievance, an award of the full fees requested would be
unreasonable. Award at 2. This is consistent with the Court's holding in
Farrar, 506 U.S. 103, decisions of MSPB, such as Stein, 65 MSPR
at 690, applying that holding to fees awarded under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g),
and the Authority's decision in Dependents Schools, 54 FLRA at 791-93
following that precedent.(2) Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Arbitrator's award of
attorney fees is not deficient as contrary to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g).
V. Decision The Agency's exception is dismissed as untimely. The Union's exception
is denied. FOOTNOTES: 1. The Authority has previously
determined that the standards set forth by the Supreme Court for applying
section 1988 are applicable to requests for attorney fees under the Back Pay
Act. See Department of the Air Force Headquarters, 832D Combat
Support Group DPCE, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, 32 FLRA 1084, 1100
(1988) (quoting the Supreme Court's statement that the standards set forth in
Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 are generally applicable to all cases in which
Congress has authorized fees to a "prevailing party"). 2. The Union does not assert that, even
if the Arbitrator does have authority to reduce the attorney fee award from the
amount the Union requested, the amount of fees awarded in this case is
unreasonable. Accordingly, we do not reach that issue. Federal Labor Relations Authority