Source: http://nj.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180327_0000903.DNJ.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2018-04-19 15:36:42
Document Index: 251955320

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', 'art.\n3', '§ 1915', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 1915', '§ 1983']

JAMES PRITCHETT, Plaintiff,
James Pritchett, Plaintiff Pro Se
1. Plaintiff James Pritchett seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint: (a) will be dismissed with prejudice in part, (b) will be dismissed without prejudice in part, and (c) will be permitted to proceed in part.
3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (a) dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against CCCF; (b) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims as to overcrowding, water, rodents, and food, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii); and (c) allow the Complaint to proceed as to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim for inadequate medical care.
6. Because the Complaint has not sufficiently alleged that a “person” deprived Plaintiff of a federal right, the Complaint does not meet the standards necessary to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks $50, 000 in monetary damages from CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Complaint § V.) The CCCF, however, is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, the claims against it must be dismissed with prejudice. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983). Given that the claims against the CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice, the claims may not proceed and Plaintiff may not name the CCCF as a defendant.
B. CLAIMS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FROM OVERCROWDING: DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim of allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement in relation to overcrowding at CCCF, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
11. With respect to the alleged facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, the Complaint states: “Sleep on the floor.” Complaint § III(C).
12. Plaintiff states that these events occurred “Jan 2015[, ] July 2015.” Id. § III(B).
13. Plaintiff contends that he suffered “a fungus on my feet and legs” from these events. Id. § IV.
14. With respect to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks “50, 000” in compensation from these events. Id. § V.
15. Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does not set forth sufficient factual support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;16. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 Fed.Appx. 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (&ldquo;[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no &lsquo;one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.&#39;&rdquo; (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (&ldquo;Hubbard II”) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.”). Some ...