Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/190897573/Tuaua-v-United-States-DC-Circuit-US-Reply-in-Support-of-Summary-Affirmance
Timestamp: 2017-10-23 19:45:23
Document Index: 417726270

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1402', '§ 1403', '§ 1404', '§ 1405', '§ 1406', '§ 1407', '§ 1408', '§ 1101', '§ 3', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 101', '§ 1101', '§ 308', '§ 1408', '§ 101', '§ 1101']

Tuaua v. United States (DC Circuit), US Reply in Support of Summary Affirmance | United States Nationality Law | Territories Of The United States
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Description: Tuaua v. United States is a federal lawsuit brought by Leneuoti Tuaua, the Samoan Federation of America, and others born in American Samoa who believe that so long as American Samoa is a part of th...
Tuaua v. United States is a federal lawsuit brought by Leneuoti Tuaua, the Samoan Federation of America, and others born in American Samoa who believe that so long as American Samoa is a part of the United States, people born in American Samoa have a right to U.S. citizenship under the Constitution. Plaintiffs are represented by Neil Weare, President of We the People Project, a national organization dedicated to achieving equal rights and representation for the nearly 5 million Americans living in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia; Arnold & Porter, LLP, an international law firm; and Charles V. Ala'ilima, a prominent American Samoan attorney.
USCA Case #13-5272
Document #1469429
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 13-5272 (C.A. No. 12-1143) LENEUOTI FIAFIA TUAUA, et al., v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., APPELLEES’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE In their opposition to the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, Appellants fail to demonstrate why the District Court’s June 26, 2013 decision dismissing their complaint was not plainly correct. The District Court properly concluded that Appellants failed to state a claim and summary disposition is appropriate in this case because the “merits of this appeal are so clear as to make summary affirmance proper.” Walker v. Washington, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); accord Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Each of Appellants’ Appellees. Appellants,
arguments raised in their opposition fails to disturb the central fact underpinning the District Court’s opinion: no relevant authority supports the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution confers automatic citizenship on those
born in American Samoa to non-U.S. citizen parents. Thus, summary affirmance should be granted. I. Appellants’ Claim That Their Complaint Presented Issues of First Impression Not Only Distorts the Record But Is Inaccurate
Appellants’ leading argument in support of their attempt to avoid summary disposition hinges on dicta from the oral argument conducted before the District Court. Appellants claim that the District Court’s comment that, “[W]e get a lot of cases of first impression around here,” demonstrates the unique and complex nature of Appellants’ complaint. (See App. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 3.) But Appellants fail to provide the context for this quote – a colloquy between the District Court and counsel for the Government noting the fact that no court to address the issue upon which Appellants built their complaint has found in Appellants’ favor. (See id., Ex. A at 6:6-14.)1 The entire colloquy reflects the District Court’s acknowledgment that if it chose to grant the relief Appellants The transcript reads: THE COURT: Have the courts ever done this? MR. KELLY: Your Honor, no -THE COURT: Have the federal courts ever declared someone or some group of people the rights to citizenship when Congress hadn’t acted? MR. KELLY: No, your Honor. No court has ever done what the Plaintiffs are asking the Court here to do. THE COURT: Well, we get a lot of cases of first impression around here. (App. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. Aff., Ex. A, at 6:6-14.) 2
requested, the District Court would be contravening every other federal court to address this exact issue. The District Court reinforces this acknowledgment in its Memorandum Opinion, stating: In short, federal courts have held over and over again that unincorporated territories are not included within the Citizenship Clause, and this Court sees no reason to do otherwise! (Mem. Op., R.24 at 14.) Thus, the colloquy quoted by Appellants and their related argument that their complaint raised an issue of first impression is directly contradicted by the context of the quote and the District Court’s opinion. Similarly, Appellants cite to American Petroleum Institute v. E.P.A., 72 F.3d 907, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1996), implying that this Court held in that case that issues of first impression are “not appropriate for summary disposition.” Again, Appellants argue by sound bite and do not provide any context. The partial quote lifted by Appellants is from this Court’s examination of a disputed fee petition seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees for time spent on a summary reversal motion which the Government vigorously disputed; the Court was not setting forth binding precedent based on its examination of the merits of the motion. See id. The entire quote’s context makes clear that this Court was discussing the specific issues raised in that single case, explaining: Despite petitioners’ assertion, however, it is clear that the issue of the legality of the ROR, which petitioners challenged immediately upon its 3
promulgation, was one of first impression and was not appropriate for summary disposition, as it required an extensive review. Id. Here, though, Appellants present a legal theory that is contradictory to a plain reading interpretation of the Constitution, has been expressly addressed by Congress, and has been found wanting by every federal court to examine it. Thus, summary disposition is appropriate. Next, Appellants contend that the fact that the District Court welcomed oral argument and briefing from amicus curiae weighs in favor of denial of summary affirmance. (App. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. Aff. at 3-4.) This argument is
inherently contradictory. Appellants seem to contend that the District Court’s expenditure of resources to build a full record, granting of multiple opportunities to the parties to assert and support all of their arguments, and careful crafting of a lengthy opinion providing its reasoning should preclude summary disposition. But Appellants’ pleading did not present any novel legal theories; rather, it merely attacked the stamp placed on American Samoans’ passports using arguments rejected by every court to address them. In fact, the only thing novel about Appellants’ complaint is that their pleading asked the District Court to determine by judicial fiat a status for American Samoans that Congress had expressly declined to provide, that the people of American Samoa’s representative opposed as endangering the fa’a Samoa or Samoan way of life, and which every other 4
federal court had deemed unavailable to identically situated persons.
universal rejection of Appellants’ arguments counsels in favor of summary disposition, not against it. II. Appellants’ Arguments Against Summary Disposition Were Thoroughly Addressed by the District Court’s Opinion and Appropriately Found Wanting
Appellants’ opposition next argues that this Court should not grant summary affirmance because of their counsel’s and law professors’ interpretation of the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment and their own interpretation of contemporaneous Supreme Court precedent. As the District Court rightly noted, Appellants’ argument falls flat in light of the fact that the Supreme Court’s most direct interaction with the issue in this case came after the cases cited by Appellants in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 312 (1901). The Supreme Court has also suggested that automatic, birthright citizenship is not the type of fundamental right applicable to unincorporated territories. Id. at 251, 282; see also Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 639 n.1 (1954); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998). Further, as the District Court correctly noted, every single federal court to address the exact arguments raised by Appellants below and rehashed in their opposition has found them wanting. (Mem. Op., R.24 at 12 (“But in the century since Downes and the Insular Cases were decided, no federal court 5
has recognized birthright citizenship as a guarantee in unincorporated territories. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has continued to suggest that citizenship is not guaranteed to people born in unincorporated territories.”).)2 This uniformity makes sense in light of both the plain language of the Amendment, as well as the willingness by Congress to act when unincorporated territories express a desire for automatic citizenship, performing a duty expressly granted to Congress in the Constitution. See Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (allowance of a territory’s admission as a state into the Union); see also Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress’s duty to make rules and regulations for the territories). Specifically, Congress affirmatively acted to bestow automatic, birthright citizenship on: (1) Puerto Rico, 8 U.S.C. § 1402; (2) the Panama Canal Zone during its period as a U.S. territory, 8 U.S.C. § 1403; (3) pre-statehood Alaska, 8 U.S.C. § 1404; (4) preSee also Nolos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2010) (person born in Philippines during period which it was unincorporated U.S. territory not automatically U.S. citizen); Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Lacap v. INS, 138 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); Rabang v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 130 (1995) (same); Licudine v. Winter, 603 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-34 (D.D.C. 2009) (same); Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 813-14 (3d Cir. 2007) (Congress within its authority to determine U.S. Virgin Islands was unincorporated and therefore person born there was not automatic citizen who could vote in U.S. presidential election); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2012) (persons born or who lived in the Northern Mariana Islands during the period that it was unincorporated U.S. territory not birthright citizens nor did their residence in the islands during that period count towards naturalization).
statehood Hawaii, 8 U.S.C. § 1405; (5) the U.S. Virgin Islands, 8 U.S.C. § 1406; and (6) Guam, 8 U.S.C. § 1407. On the other hand, Congress expressly addressed American Samoa’s status in 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29), which designates American Samoa as an “outlying possession” of the United States3 where persons born to non-U.S. citizen parents on or after its date of acquisition are nationals, but not U.S. citizens at birth. And, as amicus curiae demonstrated below, there is good reason for this special status as American Samoans wish to continue the fa’a Samoa, a way of life so important that its preservation is mandated by the American Samoan constitution. See Const. of Am. Samoa, art. I, § 3, available at http://faleomavaega.house.gov/american-samoa/historical-
documents/revised-constitution-of-american-samoa (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). Thus, as all federal courts to address Appellants’ arguments have rejected them, as the Constitution and Congress’s intent in this area are clear and express, and the constitution of American Samoa explicitly protects the Samoan way of life (particularly its system of communal property ownership) which would be directly
The term “outlying possession” of the United States is contrasted with “State” under the law. In fact, INA § 101(a)(36), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(36) specifies that the term “State” includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Further, INA § 101(a)(38), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) defines the term “United States” as the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands. 7
affected by the judicial fiat Appellants demand, the decision of the District Court was plainly correct and should be summarily affirmed. III. Appellants’ Attempted Reliance on King and Boumediene To Support Their Arguments Was Correctly Rejected by the District Court
Appellants’ final arguments are that this Court’s decision in King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975), mandated an express finding each time this Court considered issues related to the rights of American Samoans, and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), addressing the availability of the writ of habeas corpus for detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, applies to Appellants’ request for automatic, birthright citizenship. First, Appellants stretch this Court’s decision in King too far. As discussed in the Government’s motion, in King, this Court examined whether the imposition of a jury trial requirement (recognized as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court) based on the non-jury conviction of a U.S. citizen in American Samoa would be impractical and anomalous. 520 F.2d at 1147. This Court did not make the broad, sweeping holding that Appellants suggest, namely that any claim of an alleged violation of a constitutional right in American Samoa requires specific findings by the District Court, but rather limited its discussion to the right to a jury trial. Cf. id. But in their reliance on this Court’s decision in King, Appellants
ignore the limits of the holding, as well as this Court’s subsequent decision in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 384-86 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and the District Court’s analysis of that decision’s effects on Appellants’ claims. The District Court did not sidestep Appellants’ arguments, but rather correctly applied the holding in Hodel as reinforcing the doctrine that, based on the Congressional determinations set forth in INA § 308(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) and INA § 101(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29), those born on American Samoa to non-U.S. citizen parents are U.S. nationals, but not U.S. citizens by virtue of birth on American Samoa. Finally, the District Court directly addressed Appellants’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene should somehow confer automatic, birthright citizenship on American Samoans born to non-citizen parents. In fact, the District Court correctly reviewed all of the dicta to which Appellants pointed, but also explained that the Supreme Court in Boumediene noted that the Insular Cases “devised . . . a doctrine that allowed [the Court] to use its power sparingly and where it would most be needed. This century old doctrine informs our analysis in the present matter.” Id. at 759. The District Court correctly held that the Boumediene decision, providing detainees captured during the war on terror with a vehicle to challenge the terms of their confinement, in no way affected whether
Congress’s granting of U.S. national, but not U.S. citizen status to persons born to non-U.S. citizens in American Samoa is proper. Thus, Appellants’ complaint failed to state a claim and the District Court’s dismissal was plainly correct.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons and for those expressed in the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, the District Court’s judgment should be summarily affirmed. RONALD C. MACHEN JR. United States Attorney R. CRAIG LAWRENCE Assistant United States Attorney /s/ Wynne P. Kelly WYNNE P. KELLY Assistant United States Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of December 2013, the foregoing Reply in Support of Appellees’ Motion for Summary Affirmance has been served by this Court’s Electronic Case Filing System (“ECF”) on all counsel of record.
/s/ Wynne P. Kelly WYNNE P. KELLY Assistant United States Attorney Judiciary Center Building 555 Fourth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 252-2545 wynne.kelly@usdoj.gov
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