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The Use of Palestinian Children in the Al-Aqsa Intifada | Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs
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Filed Under: International Law, Israel, Palestinians, Terrorism, The Middle EastShare:FacebookTwitterGooglePrintEmail No. 441 November 2000
Question: What do you feel when you pray [for the souls of the martyrs]? Sabri: I feel the martyr is lucky because the angels usher him to his wedding in heaven…. Question: Is it different when the martyr is a child? Sabri: Yes, it is. It’s hard to express it in words. There is no doubt that a child [martyr] suggests that the new generation will carry on the mission with determination. The younger the martyr — the greater and the more I respect him…. Question: Is this why the mothers cry with joy when they hear about their sons’ death? Sabri: They willingly sacrifice their offspring for the sake of freedom. It is a great display of the power of belief. The mother is participating in the great reward of the Jihad to liberate Al-Aqsa.42
1. Palestinian sources have dubbed the current disturbances the “Al-Aqsa intifada.” Intifada is the Arabic word for “uprising” or “shaking off” and Al-Aqsa is the mosque in Jerusalem which observant Moslems regard as their third holiest site, after Mecca and Medina. See Lamia Lahoud, “Fatah Calls for Intifada Despite Summit,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 17, 2000. The current Al-Aqsa intifada should be distinguished from the earlier intifada, which began in December 1987, had practically disappeared by the time of the Gulf War in January 1991, and ended with the commencement of the Oslo peace process in mid-1993. 2. Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251 [Wye River Memorandum], art. II (C) 4. 3. Karen Laub, “12 Palestinians Killed in Clashes,” AP, Sept. 30, 2000. 4. Jerusalem Post staff and AP, “UN Condemns Israel’s ‘Excessive Force,’” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000, at 2. 5. Bob Simon (CBS News), “Children on the Front Lines,” 60 Minutes II, Oct. 24, 2000, visited Oct. 26, 2000, http://cbsnews.cbs.com/now/story/0,1597,243723-412,00.shtml. It is clear that these casualties harm Israeli interests both locally and abroad. Locally, they stoke the calls for revenge and internationally they serve to generate sympathy and support for Palestinian objectives. 6. Ze’ev Schiff, “Getting the Numbers Straight,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2000. 7. Evaluation of the Use of Force in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank: Medical and Forensic Investigation, A Report by Physicians for Human Rights, November 3, 2000. http://www.phrusa.org/fresearch/forensics/israel/Israel_force_2.html. 8. Schiff, “Getting the Numbers Straight.” 9. Palestine Red Crescent Society, visited Nov. 5, 2000, http://www.palestinercs.org. 10. Dale Gavlak, “Arabs Condemn Israel But Still Call for Peace,” UPI, Oct. 21, 2000. Ironically, Arafat’s frequent calls, directly and indirectly, for the annihilation of Israel violate the Genocide Convention, which criminalize not only acts of genocide but also incitement to commit genocide in articles II, III and IV. Louis Rene Beres, “Arafat, Genocide and International Law,” beres@polsci.purdue.edu. 11. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes Now Deliberate Warfare,” USA Today, Oct. 23, 2000. 12. UN Security Council Res. 1322 (Sep. 28, 2000). 13. According to two former observers with the peace-keeping force in Hebron, the Palestinians in that city rioted every Friday, after the Muslim prayer service. These riots always took place at “Police Junction.” Interview with Daniel Gunderson, observer with the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), in Jerusalem (Nov. 6, 1977); interview with Harald Bugge, TIPH observer, in Jerusalem (Nov. 11, 1997). Despite the PA-appointed mayor’s repeated claims that he was unable to stop the weekly Friday demonstrations, an unidentified TIPH observer noted that it “has become painfully obvious to TIPH that the mayor is fully capable of stopping things when it is to his advantage to do so.” 14. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes.” Ironically, those very weapons were provided to them to maintain order against terrorism and incitement, under the interim peace agreements that Arafat signed. 15. Herb Keinon, “Israel to the UN: Keep Palestinians from Using Kids as Shields,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 8, 2000 at 1. 16. IDF Spokesman’s Office, Oct. 31, 2000. 17. See IDF Chief of Staff General Shaul Mofaz, Israel Radio interview, Oct. 25, 2000. 18. IDF Spokesman’s Office, “The ‘Ebb and Flow’ Conflict Divided According to Incident Characteristic 29/09-29/10/2000,” Oct. 31, 2000; Margot Dudkevitch, “3209 Violent Incidents in West Bank in October,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2000 at 3. Another report gave the figure of 780 shooting incidents in the previous month. Arieh O’Sullivan, “Gil Missile Used for First Time Against Beit Jallah,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2000 at 2. 19. Elsewhere the figure for bombing incidents was given as 52. O’Sullivan, “Gil Missile.” 20. IDF Spokesman, “Ebb and Flow”; Dudkevitch, “3209 Violent Incidents.” Some have claimed that stone-throwing is a purely symbolic act. Nothing could be further from the truth. It often causes serious injury and occasionally even death. Thus one of the Israeli fatalities was hit in the chest by a large rock that was thrown at his car near the Arab village of Jisr e-Zarka on the highway between Haifa and Tel Aviv, two of Israel’s largest cities. David Rudge, “2 Israeli Arabs Killed in Nazareth Clashes,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000 at 1. 21. Ibid. 22. IDF Spokesman’s Office, “Netzarim Incident,” Oct. 10, 2000; visited Oct. 24, 2000. http://www.idf.il/english/news/netsar.stm. 23. This is a very serious matter indeed, as the protection offered to the wounded and those who tend to them hangs in the balance. Thus article 21 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 provides: “The protection to which fixed medical establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.” The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, art. 21. 24. Jack Kelley, “Street Clashes”; Margot Dudkevitch, “Stepped-up Clashes, Attacks Reported Throughout Territories,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 2, 2000 at 2. 25. Dudkevitch, “3209 Violent Incidents.” 26. Ibid. 27. Clinton Bailey, “Settlements or Security?,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 2000 at 8. 28. Kelley, “Street Clashes.” 29. Lecture by Colonel Raanan Gissin, IDF Spokesman’s Office, Jerusalem, Oct. 21, 2000. 30. Mike Hanna, Jerusalem Bureau Chief, CNN, Oct. 31, 2000. 31. “Diary,” Israel Radio’s News Magazine, Oct. 26, 2000. 32. Daoud Kuttab, “A Profile of the Stonethrowers,” 17 J. of Palestine Studies, no. 3 (Spring 1988):15, 18. 33. William V. O’Brien, Law and Morality in Israel’s War With the PLO (New York: Routledge, 1991), 249. 34. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s Measures in the Territories and Human Rights (1990) 29; see also IDF Spokesman, “Ricochets: Children as Instruments of the Intifada,” quoting Intifada Leaflet (1990), Nov. 16, May 17, 1991 at 1. 35. Matthew Dorf, “Palestinian Children’s Show Sparks Anger in Washington,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Aug. 17, 1998. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Michael Widlanski, “Special Report: Voice of Palestine Coverage of Peres-Arafat Agreement and Follow-up Announcement,” Israel Resource News Agency, http:\\www.israelbehindthenews.com, Jerusalem, Nov. 2, 2000. 39. George Will, “The Downfall of Israel?,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 16, 2000. 40. IRIS, “The Palestinians in Their Own Words,” Palestinian Quote Sheet #50, Oct. 16, 2000. 41. Ibid. 42. “PA Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine Discusses the Intifada,” Al-Ahram Al-Arabi (Egypt), Oct. 28, 2000, via MEMRI, Nov. 8, 2000. 43. John F. Burns, “Palestinian Summer Camp Offers the Games of War,” New York Times, Aug. 3, 2000 at 1; Steven Gross, Director of International Child Services, Hadassah Wizo Canada Research Institute, unpublished manuscript, (n.d.). 44. See video entitled “Jihad for Kids,” Jerusalem, Peace for Generations, 1998. 45. Gross, unpublished manuscript. 46. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). 47. Lamia Awwad, “Ministry Reopens Schools After Week-Long Closure,” Jerusalem Times, Oct. 13, 2000. 48. See Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, “CMIP Launched in Congress,” CMIP Newsletter, no.1, Sept. 1998. 49. Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, CMIP Newsletter. 50. Ethan Bronner, “The World: Blueprint; Filling in Peace’s Details is the Painful Part,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1998 at 1. 51. Ibid. 52. Alan Baker, Legal Advisor to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Using Children in Conflict (Melbourne: AIJAC, n.d.). 53. Margot Dudkevitch, “Arafat: Rocket Attacks Won’t Stop Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Jerusalem Post, Nov. 1, 2000 at 1. 54. Sam Kiley, “A Deadly Game,” The Times, Oct. 19, 2000. 55. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI). 56. Yasser Arafat, Letter to Yitzhak Rabin, Sept. 9, 1993, Judith Wrubel, ed., Peacewatch: The Arab-Israeli Peace Process and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994) at 77. 57. Yitzhak Rabin, Letter to Yasser Arafat, Sept. 9, 1993. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sep. 1993. 58. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622, art. XII [Cairo Agreement]. 59. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept., 28, 1995, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 557 Preamble [Oslo II]. It is interesting that here, as elsewhere in the interim agreements, incitement is grouped with terrorism as an evil to be combated. 60. Oslo II, art. XXII(1), (2). 61. Ibid. 62. Oslo II, Annex 1, art. IV(f). 63. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and Related Documents, Jan. 17, 1997, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 650, Note for the Record, art. 2(b) [Hebron Protocol]. 64. Wye River Memorandum; see Justus Reid Weiner, “Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, (forthcoming). 65. Wye River Memorandum, Section II, A(3). 66. Editorial, “No Apologies for Curriculum,” Jerusalem Times. 67. Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, CMIP Newsletter. 68. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Nov. 4, 1999, art. 8(a) [Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum]. 69. Margot Dudkevitch, “IDF: Palestinians Offer $2,000 for ‘Martyrs,’” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 6, 2000 at A3; cf. Tom Zeller, “Sticks and Stones: A Deadly Brand of Child’s Play,” New York Times, Oct. 8, 2000. 70. Chris Hedges, “The Glamour of Martyrdom,” New York Times, Oct. 29, 2000. 71. Kiley, “Deadly Game.” 72. Lamia Lahoud, “Palestinians Disappointed in Results of Cairo Parley,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000. 73. Gerald Steinberg, “Child Sacrifice is Palestinian Paganism,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 27, 2000 at 10. 74. Gross, unpublished manuscript. 75. O’Brien, Law and Morality. 76. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI). 77. Al Hayat-Al Jadida, Oct. 27, 2000, from Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem. 78. Simon, “Children on the Front Lines.” 79. Ibid. 80. George Abu Al-Zulof, “Children Not Put on the Front Line,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 31, 2000 at 9. 81. The absurdity of this claim is readily seen. “Teenagers and younger kids marched off to the Ayosh junction, where territory controlled by the Palestinians meets up with land controlled by Israel….The Ayosh junction is way out of town; youths have to hike to the soldiers.” Trudy Rubin, “The Children’s Crusade,” (Philadelphia) Inquirer, Oct. 25, 2000. 82. The Tanzim are an armed militia of Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO. Virtually unknown prior to the Al-Aqsa intifada (possibly because Arafat was required to disarm all such militias under the interim peace agreements), they have taken a leading role in the shooting. The Tanzim, which have been shooting from Beit Jallah into the Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo (see Margot Dudkevitch, “Foreign Ministry Helps Hundreds of Christian Families Flee PA Areas,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000 at 1), rejected the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement which President Clinton engineered to stop the violence. Its leader, Marwan Barghouti, defiantly referred to this agreement as “an Israeli agreement” and threatened to “accelerate the intifada, not stop it.” Barghouti attributed the group’s recent use of Hizbullah’s yellow flag and photos of Hizbullah Sheikh Nasrallah in demonstrations as displays of admiration for Hizbullah’s kidnapping of Israelis. Lamia Lahoud, “Tanzim Vow to Continue Intifada,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18, 2000. Hamas has also thrown in its lot with the statement of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, its founder and spiritual leader, who told a cheering crowd of thousands, “[w]e will never give up on any part of historic Palestine. Resistance will continue to either victory or martyrdom.” Hatem Lutfi, “Yassin: Hamas Forces Ready for Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Jerusalem Times, Oct. 13, 2000. Yassin praised the release of senior Hamas members from PA jails where they had been held for planning and participating in terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. The PA’s sudden release of Hamas senior leaders and bomb-makers prompted warnings that Arafat has given the green light for renewed suicide attacks. David Zev Harris and Herb Keinon, “Hamas Political Leader: All Israelis are Legitimate Targets,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 12, 2000; see Jonathan Krashinsky, “IDF: Senior PA Officials Involved with Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 17, 2000 at 4. 83. Charles Krauthammer, “Fight Back or Die,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30, 2000 at 8. 84. Steinberg, “Child Sacrifice.” 85. Ibid. The utility of child soldiers has been addressed in the media: “Children ‘become in a very cynical way the best raw material to fashion into efficient, ruthless, unquestioning tools of war,’ Olara Otunnu, the UN special representative for children and armed conflict, said in an interview. ‘Because they are impressionable, they’re like a vessel. Whatever you want to shape them into, they’ll be shaped.’” Tina Susman and Geoffrey Mohan, “A Generation Lost to War,” Newsday.com, http://www.newsday.com/news/childwar/wchild1.htm . 86. Huda Al-Husseini, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), Oct. 27, 2000, translated by MEMRI, “Arab Journalist Decries Palestinian Child-Soldiers,” Special Dispatch no. 146, Nov. 1, 2000. 87. al-Ayyam, October 26, 2000 (MEMRI). 88. Palestine Ministry of Information, “Daily Press Review,” Nov. 7, 2000, citing Al-Hayat Al-Jadida http://www.pna.org/mininfo/press/eps_0711.htm. 89. Simon, “Children on the Front Lines.” 90. David and Leah Ortiz, “Latest Update,” Oct. 25, 2000, ldortiz@attglobal.net. 91. Annex to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [Hague Regulations]. 92. See, e.g., Oslo II, art. XIV. 93. Generally live ammunition is aimed below the waist. Kelley, “Street Clashes.” 94. Telephone interview with Colonel Raanan Gissin, IDF Spokesman’s Office, Jerusalem, Nov. 8, 2000. 95. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 28 [Fourth Geneva Convention]. 96. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38, (1989). This Convention has been ratified by 191 states, making it the most widely ratified human rights instrument ever. UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Additional Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 53/128,E/ CN.4/2000/71, Feb. 9, 2000, art. 2(6). The UN Security Council has also adopted Resolution 1261 which “strongly condemns…recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law.” UN Sec. Council Res. 1261 (1999), art. 3, 8, 13. 97. Baker, Using Children in Conflict. 98. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38, (1989). 99. Marta Santos Pais, “The Convention on the Rights of the Child,” in the United Nations’ Manual on Human Rights Reporting 292, 414 (1997). The Council of Delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross has endorsed a plan of action to promote the principles of non-recruitment and non-participation in armed conflicts of children under the age of 18. This plan places blame as follows: “Responsibility for using children as soldiers lies with all of the adults who accept or encourage children to participate in armed conflict. These are parents and other adults from the child’s community, local commanders accepting children in their ranks, and peer groups glorifying the ‘free lifestyle’ of the soldiers.” ICRC Council of Delegates, Plan of Action Concerning Children in Armed Conflict, Objective 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 (1995), http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/8ec4e051a8621595c12564670032d7ef/9bcae5853. 100. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 36, (1989). 101. Baker, Using Children in Conflict. 102. The PLO maintains diplomatic relations of various types with over a hundred different governments even though it does not meet the standard indices of state sovereignty as set forth in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. See James Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?,” 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307; Ruth Lapidoth and N.K. Calvo-Goller, “Les Elements Constitutifs de L’Etat et la Declaration du Conseil National Palestinien du 15 Novembre 1988,” R.G.D.I.P. 777 (1992) (French original). But see Francis A. Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine,” 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 301; M. Flory, “Naissance d’un Etat Palestinien,” R.G.D.I.P. 385 (1989) (French original); Tal Becker, International Recognition of a Unilaterally Declared Palestinian State: Legal and Policy Dilemmas (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2000). This has been recognized by the senior Palestinian peace negotiator and the senior deputy to Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, who referred to the DOP by stating that, “[W]e do not claim that we signed an agreement that created an independent Palestinian state; none of the provisions of the Declaration of Principals make such a claim.” Mahmoud Abbas, Through Secret Channels (Redding, UK: Garnet, 1997), 218. 103. Similarly, in response to the PA’s declaration that it would adhere to the Geneva conventions of 1949 and the subsequent two protocols, the Swiss Federal Council stated that “it was not in the position to decide whether the letter constituted an instrument of accession,” and deferred from making a decision “due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of the state of Palestine.” Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949 and additional protocols of June 8, 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, DD/JUR 98/820-CPS 32 (Dec. 31, 1998). 104. Lamia Lahood, “Fatah Promises Intifada Against Israeli Settlements,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 2000. 105. Elie Weisel, Transcript of Speech, New York, Oct. 27, 2000. 106. The USA Today reporter noted that as dusk approached and the television crews left the Ramallah junction where hundreds of children had been hurling rocks and Molotov cocktails at the IDF all day long, the children also dispersed. The Israeli officer on the scene commented, “The kids only want to die when the TV cameras are on so they can get the sympathy of the world….They’ll be back tomorrow, as soon as the media arrives.” Kelley, “Street Clashes.” 107. Prime Minister Barak stated: “there is an understanding in the Arab world that Arafat and the PA, in their decision not to reach an agreement with us that was within reach, but rather to choose the path of violence, have taken upon themselves a heavy responsibility that changes the character of the [peace] process. At the moment the PA and Arafat have chosen the path of conflict in an attempt to make us fold and to get us to surrender our vital interests through force.” Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, “Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa: Current Peace Process Over,” Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2000. Arafat’s violent course even threatens regional stability thanks to his successful appeals for mass protests in Arab countries.
Tags: Al-Aqsa, Arafat, Executive Summary, international law, intifada, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian children
About Justus Reid Weiner
Justus Reid Weiner is a human rights lawyer and Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He is the author of numerous professional publications. Weiner also lectures widely in various countries, and was a visiting Assistant Professor at Boston University School of Law. He is a member of the New York and Israel Bar. Previously, he practiced law as an associate in the litigation department of the international law firm White & Case in New York City. Weiner also served as a senior attorney at the Israel Ministry of Justice, specializing in human rights and other facets of public international law.
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