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Letter Carriers Vs Austin - Citation 103469 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Letter Carriers Vs. Austin - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/103469
Case Number 418 U.S. 264
Appellant Letter Carriers
letter carriers v. austin - 418 u.s. 264 (1974) u.s. supreme court letter carriers v. austin, 418 u.s. 264 (1974) old dominion branch no. 496, national association of letter carriers, afl-cio v. austin no. 72-1180 argued november 14, 1973 decided june 25, 1974 418 u.s. 264 appeal from supreme court of virginia syllabus as part of its ongoing efforts to organize the remainder of letter carriers, appellant union, the carriers' collective bargaining representative in richmond, virginia, published a "list of scabs" in its newsletter, including the names of appellees, together with a pejorative definition of "scab" using words like "traitor." appellees brought libel actions. though recognizing that the case involved the.....
Letter Carriers v. Austin - 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
U.S. Supreme Court Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
As part of its ongoing efforts to organize the remainder of letter carriers, appellant union, the carriers' collective bargaining representative in Richmond, Virginia, published a "List of Scabs" in its newsletter, including the names of appellees, together with a pejorative definition of "scab" using words like "traitor." Appellees brought libel actions. Though recognizing that the case involved the publications of a labor union that were relevant to the union's organizational campaign, the trial court overruled appellants' motions to dismiss based on the ground that the publication had First Amendment and federal labor law protection. The court interpreted Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 , to permit application of state libel laws as long as the challenged statements were made with "actual malice," defined as being
1. Although Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra, held that federal labor law does not completely preempt the application of state laws to libels published during labor disputes, that decision recognized that federal law does preempt state law to the extent that the State seeks to make actionable defamatory statements in labor disputes published without knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Pp. 418 U. S. 270 -273.
2. Federal labor laws favor uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes. Pp. 418 U. S. 273 -279.
of speech. The partial preemption of Linn is thus equally applicable here. Pp. 418 U. S. 273 -279.
(b) The free speech protections afforded union organizing efforts extend to post-recognition organizing activity to the same degree as to pre-recognition activity. P. 418 U. S. 279 .
3. The trial court's instruction defining malice in common law terms was erroneous and reflected a misunderstanding of Linn, which adopted the "reckless or knowing falsehood" test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 . Pp. 418 U. S. 280 -282.
4. The state libel award arising out of the publication of the union newsletter here did not comport with the protection for freedom of speech in labor disputes recognized in Linn. The use of the epithet "scab," which was literally and factually true, and is common parlance in labor disputes, was protected under federal law. Publication of the pejorative definition was likewise not actionable, since the use of words like "traitor" cannot be construed as representations of fact and their use in a figurative sense to manifest the union's strong disagreement with the views of workers opposing unionization is also protected by federal law. Cf. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6 . Pp. 418 U. S. 282 -287.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 418 U. S. 287 . POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 418 U. S. 291 .
Appellant Old Dominion Branch No. 496 is a local union affiliated with the appellant National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO. At all times relevant to this case, the Branch was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective bargaining representative of letter carriers in the Richmond, Virginia, area in accordance with § 10 of Executive Order No. 11491, [ Footnote 1 ] governing labor-management relations in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Appellees, Henry M.
Austin, L.D. Brown, and Roy P. Ziegengeist, were letter carriers in Richmond who neither were members of the Union nor paid any dues or fees to the Union. [ Footnote 2 ]
"Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of a commission in the British Army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer. "
" Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class. "
June newsletter was published. [ Footnote 3 ] Appellants sought dismissal of the actions on the ground that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and under federal labor law. The trial judge recognized that this case involved the "publications of a labor union which [were] relevant to and in the course of a campaign to organize federal employees." App. 20. Nevertheless, he overruled the demurrers, interpreting this Court's decision in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966), to permit application of state libel laws in such circumstances as long as the statements were made with "actual malice." The judge defined "actual malice" in his instructions to the jury as follows:
App. 93. The jury returned a verdict awarding each of the appellees $10,000 in compensatory damages and $45,000 in punitive damages. [ Footnote 4 ]
A bare majority of this Court disagreed, however, and held that the NLRA did not completely preempt the application of state laws to libels published during labor disputes. The Court found that the exercise of state jurisdiction over such defamation actions would be a "merely peripheral concern" of the federal labor laws, within the meaning of Garmon, as long as appropriate substantive limitations were imposed to insure that the freedom of speech guaranteed by federal law was protected. Further, the Court recognized an " overriding state interest' in protecting [state] residents from malicious libels." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 61 . Mr. Justice Clark, writing the opinion for the Court, also pointed out that application of state law to libels occurring during labor disputes would not significantly interfere with the NLRB's role in considering arguable contemporaneous violations of the Act. As he observed, the Board has different substantive interests from state libel law, being concerned with the coercive or misleading nature of the statements, rather than their defamatory quality. And the NLRA and state laws provide quite different remedies: only state law can provide damages to compensate the libel victim; only the NLRB can order a new representation election if the libel is found to have substantially affected the outcome of an election.
383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 58 . This freewheeling use of the written and spoken word, we found, has been expressly fostered by Congress and approved by the NLRB. Thus, Mr. Justice Clark acknowledged that there was "a congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management," id. at 383 U. S. 62 , and noted that
Id. at 383 U. S. 60 .
The Court therefore found it necessary to impose substantive restrictions on the state libel laws to be applied to defamatory statements in labor disputes in order to prevent "unwarranted intrusion upon free discussion envisioned by the Act." Id. at 383 U. S. 65 . The Court looked to the NLRB's decisions, and found that,
Id. at 383 U. S. 61 . The Court therefore found it appropriate to adopt by analogy the standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). Accordingly,
In this case, of course, the relevant federal law is Executive Order No. 11491, rather than the NLRA. Nevertheless, we think that the same federal policies favoring uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes are applicable here, and that the same accommodation of conflicting federal and state interests necessarily follows. [ Footnote 5 ]
which is remarkably similar to the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. [ Footnote 6 ] Although several significant adjustments have been made to reflect the different structure and responsibilities of the governmental employer, [ Footnote 7 ] it is apparent that the Order adopted in large part the provisions and policies of the NLRA as its model. [ Footnote 8 ] Indeed, one of the primary purposes of the
"It is a cliche by now but, nonetheless, an embedded policy in labor relations that electioneering or campaigning has a broad tolerance. We do not encourage, nor do we prohibit, the exaggeration, the dissemination of half-truth or accusation. In sum, we leave it to the employee to decide. [ Footnote 9 ] "
We recognize that the Executive Order does not contain any provision corresponding to § 8(c) of the NLRA, [ Footnote 10 ] relied on in part by the Court in Linn. But the Court recognized that this section was primarily intended "to prevent the Board from attributing anti-union motive to an employer on the basis of his past statements." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 663 , n. 5 (emphasis added). A provision corresponding to § 8(c) was apparently thought unnecessary in the Executive Order because it directs the Government, as employer, to adopt a position of neutrality concerning unionization of its employees. [ Footnote 11 ] "Government
The primary source of protection for union freedom of speech under the NLRA, however, particularly in an organizational context, is the guarantee in § 7 of the Act of the employees' rights "to form, join, or assist labor organizations." [ Footnote 12 ]
NLRB v. Drivers Local 9, 362 U. S. 274 , 362 U. S. 279 (1960) (citations omitted). Vigorous exercise of this right "to persuade other employees to join" must not be stifled by the threat of liability for the overenthusiastic use of rhetoric or the innocent mistake of fact. Thus, the Board has concluded that statements of fact or opinion relevant to a union organizing campaign are
383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 661 . These considerations are equally applicable under the Executive Order. Section 1 of the Order guarantees federal employees these same rights. [ Footnote 13 ]
As noted, one of the primary reasons for the law's protection of union speech is to insure that union organizers are free to try peacefully to persuade other employees to join the union without inhibition or restraint. Accordingly, we think that any publication made during the course of union organizing efforts, which is arguably relevant to that organizational activity, is entitled to the protection of Linn. We see no reason to limit this protection to statements made during representation election campaigns. The protection of § 7 and § 1 is much broader. Indeed, Linn itself involved union organizing activity outside the election campaign context. We similarly reject any distinction between union organizing efforts leading to recognition and post-recognition organizing activity. Unions have a legitimate and substantial interest in continuing organizational efforts after recognition. Whether the goal is merely to strengthen or preserve the union's majority, or is to achieve 100% employee membership -- a particularly substantial union concern where union security agreements are not permitted, as they are not here, see n 2, supra --these organizing efforts are equally entitled to the protection of § 7 and § 1. [ Footnote 14 ]
This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Court's holding in Linn. The Linn Court explicitly adopted the standards of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and the heart of the New York Times test is the requirement that recovery can be permitted only if the defamatory publication was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 376 U. S. 280 . The adoption in Linn of the "reckless or knowing falsehood" test was reiterated time and again in the Court's opinion. See 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 61 , 383 U. S. 63 , 383 U. S. 65 .
Of course, the Court also said that recovery would be permitted if the defamatory statements were shown to have been made with malice. But the Court was obviously using "malice" in the special sense it was used in New York Times -- as a shorthand expression of the "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth" standard. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 376 U. S. 279 -280. Instructions which permit a jury to impose liability on the basis of the defendant's hatred, spite, ill will, or desire to injure are "clearly impermissible." Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 , 389 U. S. 82 (1967). "[I]ll will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times standard." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 , 403 U. S. 52 n. 18 (1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Accord, 379 U. S. S. 282Ă v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 , 379 U. S. 73 -74, 379 U. S. 77 -79 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U. S. 356 (1965); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 , 383 U. S. 84 (1966); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler,@ 398 U. S. 6 , 398 U. S. 9 -11 (1970). It is therefore clear that the libel judgments in this case must be reversed because of the court's erroneous instructions.
This, however, cannot be the end of our inquiry. The Court has often recognized that, in cases involving free expression, we have the obligation not only to formulate principles capable of general application, but also to review the facts to insure that the speech involved is not protected under federal law. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 376 U. S. 284 -285; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 391 U. S. 574 -575 (1968); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, supra, at 398 U. S. 11 .
"We must 'make an independent examination of the whole record,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 , 372 U. S. 235 , so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 376 U. S. 285 .
While this duty has been most often recognized in the context of claims that the expression involved was entitled to First Amendment protection, the same obligation exists in cases involving speech claimed to be protected under the federal labor laws. T his obligation, derived from the supremacy of federal labor law over inconsistent state regulation, Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945); Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 , 358 U. S. 295 -296 (1959), requires us to determine whether any state libel award arising out of the publication of the union newsletter involved here would be inconsistent with the protection for freedom of speech in labor disputes recognized in Linn.
be the basis of a state libel judgment. Rather than being a reckless or knowing falsehood, naming the appellees as scabs was literally and factually true. One of the generally accepted definitions of "scab" is "one who refuses to join a union," Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1961), and it is undisputed that the appellees had, in fact, refused to join the Branch. To be sure, the word is most often used as an insult or epithet. But Linn recognized that federal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point. Indeed, the Court observed that use of this particular epithet is common parlance in labor disputes, and has specifically been held to be entitled to the protection of § 7 of the NLRA. 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 661 .
We cannot agree. We believe that publication of Jack London's rhetoric is equally entitled to the protection of the federal labor laws. [ Footnote 15 ] The sine qua non of recovery for defamation in a labor dispute under Linn is the existence of falsehood. Mr. Justice Clark put it
quite bluntly: "the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 63 . Before the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must be a false statement of fact. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post at 418 U. S. 339 -340. But, in our view, the only factual statement in the disputed publication is the claim that appellees were scabs, that is, that they had refused to join the union.
Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293 , 320 U. S. 295 (1943). Such words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union's strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such an opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law. Here, too,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post at 418 U. S. 339 -340.
It is similarly impossible to believe that any reader of the Carrier' Corner would have understood the newsletter to be charging the appellees with committing the criminal offense of treason. [ Footnote 16 ] As in Bresler, Jack London's
This is not to say that there might not be situations where the use of this writing or other similar rhetoric in a labor dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were taken out of context and used in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, supra, at 398 U. S. 13 . But in the context of this case, no such factual representation can reasonably be inferred, and
the publication is protected under the federal labor laws. [ Footnote 17 ] Accordingly, the judgments appealed from must be
The Executive Order is plainly a reasonable exercise of the President's responsibility for the efficient operation of the Executive Branch. American Federation of Government Employees v. Hampton, 77 L.R.R.M. 2977 (DC), aff'd sub nom. Wolkomir v. Federal Labor Relations Council, 79 L.R.R.M. 2634 (CADC 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 350 F.2d 451 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); cf. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 , 413 U. S. 555 (1973). Moreover, the Executive Order finds express statutory authorization in 5 U.S.C. § 7301, which provides that "[t]he President may prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the executive branch." In view of the substantial federal interests in effective management of the business of the National Government and exclusive control over the conduct of federal employees, and this congressional authorization, we have no difficulty concluding that the Executive Order is valid, and may create rights protected against inconsistent state laws through the Supremacy Clause. See United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 , 315 U. S. 230 -232 (1942); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 -637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (CA5), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (CA3 1964).
Naumoff, supra, n. 8, at 103. Compare the similar language of the Board in Stewart-Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1953), quoted in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 , 383 U. S. 60 (1966).
Appellees argue that, rather than being entitled to the protection of Linn, the union's organizing efforts here were unlawful attempts to "coerce" them into joining the union in violation of § 19(b)(1) of the Order. But we would expect § 19(b)(1) to be interpreted in light of the construction the Court has given the parallel provision of the NLRA, § 8(b)(1)(A). In NLRB v. Drivers Local 69, 362 U. S. 274 (1960), the Court held that § 8(b)(1)(A) was "a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof." Id. at 362 U. S. 290 . MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN emphasized that there was no intention to restrict the use by unions of methods of peaceful persuasion, quoting Senator Taft's remarks during the debate on the Taft-Hartley Act:
Id. at 362 U. S. 287 -288.
It is true that the Executive Order provides that a union may not "interfere with" an employee in the exercise of his right to refrain from joining the union, as well as incorporating the wording of the NLRA making it unlawful to "restrain" or "coerce" an employee. The Court in Drivers Local 639 pointed out, however, that even the words "interfere with," which originally appeared in a draft of the Taft-Hartley Act, were intended to have a "limited application" and to reach "reprehensible practices" like violence and threats of loss of employment, but not methods of peaceful persuasion. Id. at 362 U. S. 286 . It seems likely that the Executive Order was similarly not intended to limit union propaganda or prohibit any other method of peaceful persuasion.
Linn, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 61 . It is for this reason that the Court in Linn held that, "[i]f the amount of damages awarded is excessive, it is the duty of the trial judge to require a remittitur or a new trial." Id. at 383 U. S. 65 -66 (emphasis added).
As the Court states, this case calls upon us to determine the extent to which state libel laws may be used to penalize statements expressed in the course of a labor dispute. In this instance, Virginia's libel laws were used to impose massive damages [ Footnote 2/1 ] upon a labor union for publicly expressing, during the heat of an organizational drive, its highly pejorative but not too surprising opinion of "scabs." I agree that this expression is protected, and that the judgments below cannot stand. Unlike the Court, however, I do not view the task of reconciling the competing state and federal interests in this area as a difficult one, nor do I view the federal interest as merely a matter of federal labor policy. I think that such expression is constitutionally protected, and I cannot agree that there might be situations "where the use of
I agree with the Court that federal labor policy, as manifested both in the NLRA and in Executive Order 11491, favors uninhibited, robust and wide open debate in labor disputes. I disagree with the Court, however, on the reach of that policy. I think that the preemptive effect of federal labor regulation is such that States are prohibited from interfering with those federally regulated relations by arming disputants in labor controversies with an arsenal of defamation laws. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 , 383 U. S. 69 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Though referring to this state of affairs as federal labor policy, I expressly reject any implication that the policy could be otherwise were Congress or the Executive to reassess the underlying considerations and attempt to reformulate the policy.
We said in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 , 310 U. S. 102 , that,
"[i]n the circumstances of our times, the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. [ Footnote 2/2 ]"
not think that discussion is free in the constitutional sense when it subjects the speaker to the penalty of libel judgments, in my view, the ability of Congress or the Executive to formulate any labor policy penalizing those who might "say naughty things during labor disputes" [ Footnote 2/3 ] is precisely nil. I believe the Framers did all the policymaking necessary in this area when they devised the constitutional framework which binds us all. As I stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post at 418 U. S. 356 -357, the First Amendment would prohibit Congress from passing any libel law, [ Footnote 2/4 ] and the limitation on labor policy formulation is but an example of the general restriction.
If the States were not limited to the same extent as the Federal Government in restraining discussion, the preemptive effect of federal labor regulations would be crucial. But I have always thought that the application of the First Amendment to the States through the Fourteenth [ Footnote 2/5 ] leaves the States as constitutionally impotent
as the Federal Government in enforcing such restrictions. This conclusion is compelled if freedom of speech is regarded, as I think it must be, as a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship within the meaning of that term in the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than some ephemeral right protected against state intrusion only to the extent a majority of this Court might view as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." [ Footnote 2/6 ] As I stated in my dissent to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post at 418 U. S. 358 -359:
Since labor disputes are " within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution,'" and since, in my view, the States and the Federal Government are equally bound to honor that guarantee, the fate of the libel award in this case is clear.
See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 , 383 U. S. 67 (Black, J., dissenting).
See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75 , 383 U. S. 90 (concurring). In explaining the constitutional history which led him to the same conclusion, Mr. Justice Black said of the Framers:
See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 , 283 U. S. 368 -369; cases compiled in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post at 418 U. S. 359 n. 8 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 .
in a "labor dispute" covered by the Act, unless those statements were made "with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. . . ." Id. at 383 U. S. 65 . Thus, the Court adopted as a rule of labor law preemption the constitutional standard of media liability for defamation originally enunciated for libel actions by public officials in New York Times Co., supra, and subsequently extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). In the instant case, the majority relies on the analogy to the NLRA to support its conclusion that Executive Order 11491 preempts the libel judgments in favor of these appellees because liability was not premised on the "knowing or reckless falsity" standard that Linn held applicable to defamatory statements made in a "labor dispute." I perceive no reason in law or in public policy for such a sweeping extension of New York Times. Linn is distinguishable on its facts and in its rationale, and the New York Times rule of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is therefore inapplicable to the case at hand. Linn involved a classic confrontation between union and management locked in combat during an organizational campaign. Linn was assistant general manager of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc. Pinkerton's employees were then the subject of an organizational campaign by the United Plant Guard Workers. In the course of that effort the union published a leaflet urging Pinkerton's employees to join the union and allegedly accusing Linn of "lying" to the employees and "robbing" them of pay increases. Linn sued the union for libel, but the trial court held that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. It found that Linn's complaint charged the union with conduct arguably constituting an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, and that
This Court disagreed with that reasoning. It recognized an " overriding state interest' in protecting [state] residents from malicious libels . . . ," 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 61 , and noted that federal labor law does not protect individuals against injury to reputation. Even where statements actionable as libel under state law would also constitute an unfair labor practice, the Board's interest would be limited to their coercive or misleading character, and the Board would be powerless to award damages or take any other step to redress the injury to the reputation of a defamed individual. The Court therefore held that the NLRA does not wholly preempt state libel law, even where the subject matter of the libel action might also constitute an unfair labor practice under the Act. Even in that circumstance, the States remain free to award damages for defamatory falsehoods published with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
The majority characterizes the union's actions as part of an ongoing organization campaign, ante at 418 U. S. 267 , and treats this situation as a "labor dispute" within the intendment of the Linn rule of partial preemption. But
As an alternative basis for its decision, the Court concludes that appellees are prohibited from recovering because there was no libel, indeed no falsehood of any kind, in the union's publication. According to the majority, the only factual allegation contained in the article was that appellees were "scabs," as that term is used in the labor movement, and that "naming the appellees as scabs was literally and factually true." Ante at 418 U. S. 283 . It is true, of course, that appellees were identified by name as "scabs" in the union newsletter, but it is also true that the use of the word "scab" was explicated by a long and vituperative article appearing immediately above appellees' names. The only fair way to read this article is to substitute each appellee's name for the word "scab" whenever it appears. So construed, the plain meaning and import of this publication was that appellees lacked character, that they had "rotten principles," and that they were traitors to their God, their country, their families, and their friends. Appellants make no attempt to prove the truth of these accusations, contending instead that they were mere hyperbole involving no statement of fact. The majority accepts this argument, in my view, erroneously.
I would hold that federal law does not prohibit appellees from recovering from appellant union for injury to reputation. I would reverse and remand for a new trial in accord with our decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., post, p. 418 U. S. 323 .