Source: https://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1
Timestamp: 2018-01-21 02:52:38
Document Index: 254966634

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2510', '§ 2520', '§ 2702', '§ 2702', '§ 2702', '§ 2702', '§2711', '§ 2707', '§ 2511', '§ 2511', '§ 251', '§ 251', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 605', '§ 1801', '§ 1801', '§ 1809', '§ 1810', '§ 6', '§ 402', '§ 403', '§ 2702', '§ 2702', '§ 251', '§ 605', '§ 1809', '§ 2511']

In Re: National Security Telecommunications Records Litigation (relates to MCI & Verizon D's, Bready v Maryland, Chulsky v Cellco, & Riordan v Verizon)
123456789 t0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PETER D. KEISLER Assistant Attorney General CARL J. NICHOLS Deputy Assistant Attorney General JOSEPH H. HUNT Director, Federal Programs Branch ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO Special Litigation Counsel tony.coppolino@usdoj.gov ANDREW H. TANNENBAUM Trial Attorney andrew.tannenbaum@usdoj.gov U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20001 Phone: (202) 514-4782/(202) 514-4263 Fax: (202) 616-8460/(202) 616-8202 Attorneys for the United States of America IN THE UNITED STATES DISTINCT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION IN RE NATIONAL SECU~TY AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS LITIGATION This Document Relates to: (1) All Actions Against the MCIand Verizon Defendants in the Master MCI and Verizon Consolidated Complaint, Dkt. 125; (2) Bready, et al. v. Verizon Maryland(06-06313); (3) Chulsky at at. v. Celleo Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless (06-06570); and (4) Riordan, et al. v. Verizon Communications (06-3574) )))))))))))))))))) MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY AND STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Hon. Vaughn R. Walker Date: June 21, 2007 Time: 2:00 pm Courtroom: 6 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 1 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) INTRODUCTION ....................................................... t 0-J) BACKGROUND ......................................................... 7 A. (U) The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Verizon .........................7.. B. (U) The United States’ State Secrets Privilege Assertion ................9. (U) ARGUMENT . . . . ...................................................... 12 I. CtJ) WHERE STATE SECRETS ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE A CASE, THE MATTER MUST BE DISMISSED .............................1.3.... A. (U) The State Secrets Privilege Bars Use of Privileged Information Regardless of a Litigant’s Need ..................................1.8. B. (U) Where the State Secrets Are Central to the Resolution of a Case or Needed to Litigate the Claims and Defenses, the Case Cannot Proceed ................................................. 15 C. (U) The Court in Hepting Misapplied the Standard of Review and Failed to Determine the Consequences of the Government’s Privilege Assertion ..................................................... 17 1. (U) The Court’s Application of the Standard of Review in Hepting Was Erroneous .................................... 17 2. (U) The Court Failed to Assess the Consequences of the State Secrets Privilege in Hepting ............................20 II. (U) THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPERLY ASSERTED THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE ......................2..5.... III. (U) INFORMATION SUBJECT TO THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IS NECESSARY TO ADJUDICATE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AND, THUS, THIS ACTION CANNOT PROCEED ...............................2.5.... Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 2 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11234567 .89 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) Whether or Not MCI/Verizon Has a Relationship with the NSA is a State Secret Necessary to Decide This Case ......................... 26 (U) The Totten Doctrine Requires Dismissal of this Action Protect Whether or Not MCI/Verizon Has a Relationship with the NSA ................................................ 26 (U) The State Secrets Privilege Also Requires Dismissal of this Action to Protect Whether or Not MCI/Verizon Assisted the NSA in the Alleged Activities .............................3..7 (U) Whether or Not Plaintiffs Have Standing Cannot be Established or Refuted Without the Disclosure of State Secrets and Harm to National Security ............................................... 36 (U) Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Standing Because The State Secrets Privilege Forecloses Litigation Over Whether They Have Been Subject To Surveillance ........................4..0. (U) Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Standing On The Basis of a "Dragnet" Theory of Surveillance .........................4..6. (U) Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge Alleged Collection of Communication Records Information Cannot be Adjudicated Without State Secrets ...................................... 47 (U) The Disclosure of Facts Concerning the Alleged NSA Intelligence Activities is Required to Adjudicate Plaintiffs’ Claims on the Merits ......48 (U) Plaintiffs’ Claims as to Alleged Warrantless Content Surveillance Cannot be Adjudicated Without Disclosing State Secrets ............................................. 48 (U) Plaintiffs’ Challenge to Alleged Communication Records Collection Cannot be Adjudicated Without Disclosing State Secrets ................................................. 51 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 3 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 I0 11 12 13 t4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) STATUTORY PRIVILEGE CLAIMS HAVE ALSO BEEN PROPERLY RAISED IN THIS CASE ............................................... 54 CONCLUSION ......................................................... 57 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 4 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases ~ICLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) ............................3... /lfshar v. Department of State, 702 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .......................34 Barefordv. General Dynamics Corp, 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) ............. 6, 17, 35 Blackv. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1154 (1996) .......................................15 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) ............................................5.5. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) ...............................28, 55 DaimlerChtysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006) ............................37 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ..............................13 Directot; Office of Workers’ Comp. Prog~’ams v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122 (1995) ..........................42 Edmonds v. U.S. Department of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) aff’d, 161 Fed. Appx. 6, 045286 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005) ...........................................16, 22, 34 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) .........................37 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v. Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984) ................................ passim Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ................................51 El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) aff’d2007 WL 625130 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007) ...............................6 El-Masri v. United States, __.F.3d __ 2007 WL 625130 (4th Cir. 2007) ............passim Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 5 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Fitzgerald v. Penthouse hTt’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) ..................passim Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. t990) ................................5.4 Halkin v. Hehns, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ..............................p.assim Halkin v. Hehns, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ...............................p.a. sshn Hayden v. Nat’l Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C: Cir. 1979) ....................54 Hepting. v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2006) .......................p.a.ssim In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .................................13 Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d t 159 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998) ....................................passim Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) ..........................................3..9 Linderv. Nat’l Security Agency, 94 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........................54 Lz~jan v. Defenders of~Vildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................36 Molerio v. FederalBureau of Investigation, 749 F. 2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .... .......... 51 MilitatyAudit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d at 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .....................20 Maxwellv. First National Bank of Matyland, 143 F.R.D. 590 (D. Md. 1992) ....... 6, 16, 22 Northrop Corp. v. McDonnellDouglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ........... 15 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) .......................................3.7 People for the American Way Foundation v. National Security Agency, 462 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2006) .....................................5..5. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) ..............................38 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary -Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 6 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 t6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rainesv. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) ...........................................3.7 $terlh~gv. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005) ........................... 16, 21, 22, 51 $melt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................38 ;mith v. MatTland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) ......................................... 53 ;nepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) ......................................55 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) .........................................p..assim Terkel v. AT&TCorp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) ....................p.a. ssim The Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Nat’l Security Agency, 610 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ........................ 54 Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Va. 2000) .............................1..4 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) ................................... passim United States v. Burr; 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) ............................1.3 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) ......................................13 United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1987) .................................42 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) .................................. passim VernoniaSch. Dist. v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) ................................53 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ..........................................3.7 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii 454 U.S. 139 (1981) ................................................... 29 Zuckerbraun v. United States, 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991) .................... 21, 23, 39 United States ex rel. Ross v. LaVallee, 341 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1965) ................... 43 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 7 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d113456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Statutes 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 18 U.S.C. 47 U.S.C. 47 U.S.C. 47 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. 50 U.S.C. § 2510(11) ........................................................ 42 § 2520(a) ......................................................... 42 § 2702(a) ......................................................... 42 § 2702(a)(1) ........................................................ 8 § 2702(a)(2) ........................................................ 8 § 2702(a)(3) ........................................................ 8 §2711(1) ......................................................... 42 § 2707(c) ........................................................ 42 § 2511(1)(a) ........................................................ 8 § 2511(1)(c) ........................................................ 8 § 251 l(1)(d) ....................................................... 8 § 251 l(3)(a) ........................................................ 8 § 605 .......................................................... 8, 43 § 605(a) .......................................................... 43 § 605(e)(3)(A) ..................................................... 43 § 1801(f) ......................................................... 42 § 1801(k) ......................................................... 42 § 1809 ............................................................ 8 § 1810 ........................................................... 42 Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note ................................... 54, 55, 56 Section 102A(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) ......................................5.4 Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 8 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) INTRODUCTION~ (U) For the second time in this MDL proceeding, the United States is asserting the state secrets privilege in actions before this Court to preclude the disclosure of information concerning alleged classified intelligence activities of the National Security Agency (NSA), including information confirming or denying whether a telecommunications company has assisted the NSA with any such alleged activities. Plaintiffs in these actions allege that the Verizon Defendants ("Verizon"), including the MCI Defendants ("MCI"), have unlawfully provided the NSA with access to the content of Plaintiffs’ communications as well as with records related to Plaintiffs’ communications]-(U) In May 2006, the United States asserted the state secrets privilege and filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in Hepting. v. AT&Z 439 F. Supp. 2d 934 ~.D. Cal. 2006)---a case raising allegations against AT&T substantially similar to those made against Verizon in these cases. The Court’s order denying the Government’s motions in HepthTg is now ~ (U) Classification markings in this memorandum are in accordance with the marking system described in the In Camera, Ex Parte Classified Declaration ofLt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director, Nation~l Security Agency ("b~ Camera Alexander Decl.’). 2 (U) See Master Consolidated Complaint Against MCI Defendants and Verizon Defendants, Dkt.125 (hereafter "Master Verizon Compl."); see also Riordan, et al. v. Verizon Communications (MDL 06-3574); Bready, et al. v. Verizon Matyland (MDL 06-06313); Chulsky et al. v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon~, Wireless (MDL 06-06570) (separate complaints pending in the MDL against Verizon entities). For a list of all actions against the MCI and Verizon Defendants that have been consolidated in the Master MCI and Verizon Consolidated Complaint, see MDL Status Report of AT&T and Bel! South Corporation, Dkt. 197, at 10-11. Any reference to "Verizon" or "Verizon Defendants’ in this brief includes all Verizon Defendants and entities in all cases brought in this MDL, see Dkt. 61-1 (Join~,Case Management Statement) at 2, n.4. In particular, unless otherwise indicated, "Verizon’ or ."Verizon Defendants" also specifically includes the MCI Defendants, which are now a part of Verizon, even though "MCI" may at times be referenced separateIy. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 9 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d113456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2O 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 pending before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. We respectfully disagree with the Court’s decision in Hepting, as we set forth herein. And, as we argued in seeking to stay proceedings related to Verizon, the Hepting appeal may resolve, or at least will substantially impact, the same issues in the Verizon cases. Nonetheless, we respectfully request that the Court, having permitted these actions to proceed, approach the facts, law, and arguments presented by the United States with a fresh perspective. The Court is not foreclosed from reaching a different result here and, for the reasons we set forth below, it should dismiss all cases against the Verizon Defendants. (U) As in Hepting, the Plaintiffs here allege that, after the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the President authorized two distinct intelligence gathering activities, involving: (1) the surveillance of the content of their communications, and (2) the collection of records about their communications. With respect to their content surveillance claim, Plaintiffs note that the President authorized the NSA to intercept the content of international communications to or from the United States (i.e., "one-end" foreign communications) reasonably believed to involve members or agents of al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist organizations--a program acknowledged by the President and referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program or TSP. See, e.g., Master Verizon Compl. ¶¶ 139-141. Significantly, however, Plaintiffs do not claim that they were subject to the Terrorist Surveillance Program or otherwise injured by it. Instead, they allege that the NSA’s content surveillance activities go well beyond the TSP and extend to the interception of millions of domestic and international communications made by ordinary Americans and transmitted by MCI and Verizon. See, e.g., id. ¶ 165 ("the NSA intercepts millions of communications made or received by people inside the United States, and uses powerful computers to scan their contents for particular names, numbers, words, or phrases"). (U) The Court in Hepting recognized that the United States has denied these allegations of a so-called "content dragnet" of domestic communications. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -2-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 10 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 996. Thus, Plaintiffs’ content surveillance claim in this case (as in Hepting) boils down to an unfounded and highly speculative allegation that they do not believe that the President authorized only a limited surveillance program directed at certain al Qaeda-related international communications. Moreover, they demand the opportunity to determine through discovery what the NSA has actually done with any alleged assistance of the Verizon Defendants. As set forth below, such an inquiry cannot be accomplished without disclosing state secrets and thereby causing grave harm to the national security. In particular, we disagree with the Court’s conclusion in HepthTg that discovery into whether a statutory certification was provided in connection with the TSP could be conducted without revealing state secrets. Such discovery in these cases would either confirm or deny whether Verizon or MCI assisted with the TSP, a fact that the Director of National Intelligence has concluded cannot be disclosed without causing ~xceptionally grave harm to the national security. In addition, even apart from the relationship issue, the process of"proving a negative"--that Plaintiffs’ content dragnet allegations are false---could not occur without disclosing what the NSA does and does not do. That process would clearly implicate classified and highly sensitive facts, including operational facts ~onceming the TSP that would demonstrate that the program was in fact limited to al Qaedarelated one-end foreign communications. (U) With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim that the Verizon Defendants have provided the NSA with records concerning their communications, this case presents the same issue already resolved by this Court in Hepting and by two other courts, each of which upheld the Government’s state secrets privilege assertion and declined to allow any discovery into such allegations. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 997-98; Terkel v. AT&TCorp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2006); ACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 765 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (appeal pending). While we believe that the proper course in Hepting should have been to dismiss those claims, as the courts in Terkel and A CL U did, nothing warrants this Court from deviating from Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -3-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 11 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 its conclusion in Hepting that information confirming or denying an alleged communications records program cannot be disclosed without causing harm to the national security. In particular, the Government still has not officially confirmed or denied the existence of any alleged records programs, and no statements drawn from the public record can waive the Government’s ~rivilege assertion as to this matter. (U) Accordingly, the Director of National Intelligence, in conjunction with the Director ~fthe NSA, has asserted the state secrets privilege and statutory privileges to protect against the disclosure of several categories of information put at issue in these cases, including: (1) whether or not MCI and/or Verizon had any involvement in the alleged activities--a dragnet of content surveillance or the provision of communication records; (2) whether or not Plaintiffs have been subject to any of the alleged activities; and (3) other information concerning any alleged NSA intelligence activities, sources, or methods, including (a) facts demonstrating that the TSP was limited to al Qaeda-related international communications and that the NSA does not undertake the dragnet of content surveillance that Plaintiffs allege; and (b) facts that would tend to confirm or deny the existence of the alleged communications records activities. (U) In assessing the Government’s privilege assertion and motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, we ask the Court to keep in mind two central aspects of the state secrets privilege that we believe were not properly applied in Hepting. First, in deciding a state secrets ~rivilege assertion, the proper standard of review is whether the United States has put forward easonable grounds to conclude that disclosure or confirmation 0fthe information at issue would harm national security. The Court is required to lend the "utmost deference" to the Executive’s iudgment on the matter. As set forth herein, the DNI and NSA Director amply demonstrate that disclosure of this privileged information risks exceptionally grave harm to the national security and, thus, that it must be excluded from further proceedings in this litigation. See United States Reynolds, 345 U.S. t (1953). For the Court to find otherwise, it must conclude that the ublic Memorandum of the United States a Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -4-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 12 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Director of National Intelligence’s judgment about the harm of disclosure has no reasonable basis--a conclusion that we respectfully submit would be entirely unfounded. (U) Second, the state secrets privilege requires a court to consider whether the matter can proceed by examining the role that state secrets would play in further proceedings. That is, a court must ~’look ahead" to whether the privileged information would be needed to litigate the various issues that will arise at future stages of the case--not merely whether the case can proceed past the pleadings stage. Because privileged information would be central to adjudicating all issues in this action--including fundamental questions regarding the Court’s iurisdiction, as well as a variety of merits issues, well-established authority requires that these cases must be dismissed at the outset. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.), cert. ~lenied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998). As set forth in more detail below, information within all of the zategories of the Government’s privilege assertions is required to litigate each one of Plaintiffs’ zlaims. (U) With respect, we submit that the Court in Hepting incorrectly limited its review of Ihe state secrets privilege to whether allegations concerning AT&T’s assistance to the NSA zould proceed past the pleading stage and misapplied the standard of review under the state secrets privilege by not addressing the particular national security harms identified by the DNI in that case. Instead, because of the very harms associated with litigating these cases, the sole purpose of which is to disclose highly classified activities, the Court must assess now whether Plaintiffs’ claims can ultimately be litigated. They cannot. The alleged relationship between the NSA and a telecommunications carrier is a key threshold issue that cannot be decided without :lisclosing state secrets. But wholly apart from that issue, classified information concerning NSA sources and methods are essential to adjudicate every issue in this case. In particular, facts zoncerning whether or not Plaintiffs have actually been subject to the alleged surveillance activities would be necessary to address their standing but could not be disclosed without harm Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Iudgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -5-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 13 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 to national security. Likewise, even assuming arguendo that a relationship exists, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims could not be fully adjudicated without resort to state secrets, including operational facts tending to prove that the TSP was narrowly limited and facts confirming or denying the existence of a records program. For these reasons, as set forth further below, the proper application of the state secrets privilege requires the dismissal of this case. REDACTED TEXT] (U) The United States is mindful that the denial of a forum for the resolution of disputes an be a "drastic remedy." Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int 7, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985). But it is well established that "the state secrets doctrine finds the greater public good--ultimately the less harsh remedy--to be dismissal." Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir. 1992); Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1167. This is the "required result" even where allegations of unlawful or unconstitutional actions are at issue. Halkin v. Hehns (Halkin II), 690 F.2d 977, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ma:nvell v. First National Bank of Maryland, 143 F.R.D. 590, 598 (D. Md. 1992) (successful invocation of state secrets privilege and other statutory privileges "may defeat worthy claims"). The Plaintiffs’ interests are not the 3nly ones at stake, and proceeding to litigate this dispute would lead to a harsh result of another kind--one that could potentially cause harm to the security of all Americans. See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("private interests must give way to the national interest in preserving state secrets"), aff’d 2007 WL 625130 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007). Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -6-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 14 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 t0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) BACKGROUND A. (U) The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Verizon (U) All of the Complaints against the Verizon Defendants now before the Court challange intelligence activities that were allegedly authorized by the President after the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, although Plaintiffs specifically refer to statements by the President, Attorney General, and Deputy Director of National Intelligence concerning the Terrorist Surveillance Program, they allege a program much broader than the TSP. See, e.g., Master Verison Compl. ¶¶ 139-141; Bready Compl. ¶ 13; Chulsky Compl. ¶¶ 25-27; and Riordan Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14; see also Chulsky Compl. ¶¶ 19-20 (alleging that pursuant to a secret executive order issued by President Bush following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NSA, with the assistance of the Verizon Defendants, intercepted all wireless telephone calls and internet communications occurring within the United States without a court order). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that MCI and Verizon participated "in an illegal federal government program to intercept and analyze vast quantities of American’s telephone and electronic communications and records." See Master Verizon Compl. ¶ 3. They also allege, inter alia, that "the NSA intercepts millions of :ommunications made or received by people inside the United States, and uses powerful :omputers to scan their contents for particular names, numbers, words, or phrases." Id. ¶ 165. Plaintiffs further allege that the Verizon Defendants "have intercepted and continue to provide Ihe government with direct access to all or a substantial number of the communications Iransmitted through their key domestic telecommunication facilities, including direct access to streams of domestic, international, and foreign telephone and electronic communications." Id 168. None of the Plaintiffs allege that they communicate with individuals the Government has ~’ason to believe are members or agents ofal Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Thus, at issue in their content surveillance allegations is the whether the President after 9/11 in fact authorized the alleged content dragnet of millions of domestic communications, notwithstanding Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -7-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 15 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 t0 11 12 13 14 15 16 t7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the Government’s denial. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 996. (U) The Plaintiffs also allege that, since about October 2001, MCI and Verizon have disclosed to the NSA "call detail records" of all or substantially all of their customers, see Master Compl. 1 169, and also disclosed or provided to the NSA direct access to databases of stored telephone and electronic communications records. See id. 11 171; 173-76. (U) Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under various federal and state statutory provisions. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that the Verizon Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(1) and/or (a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3); t8 U.S.C. §§ 251 l(1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d), and (3)(a); 47 U.S.C. § 605; 50 U.S.C. § 1809, by knowingly disclosing to the Government the conter;t of communications and records concerning those communications without the Government having first obtained a warrant or court order and without providing the Defendants a certification under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(ii) that a warrant or order was not required. See Master Verizon Complaint 11 201-52. Plaintiffs also allege that the Verizon Defendants violated their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments by acting as instruments of the Government inthe acts of interception, disclosure, and divulgence alleged. See id. 11 254-62.3(U) Viewed as a whole, Plaintiffs’ multiple statutory and constitutional claims against the Verizon Defendants raise three essential issues for resolution: (1) Whether MCI and/or Verizon intentionally assisted the NSA in the collection of communication content and/or communication record 3 (U) The Bready, Chulsky, and Rim’dan cases raise substantially similar claims under the Maryland, New Jersey, and California constitutions and state law. In sum, the Plaintiffs in these cases allege that the Verizon Defendants have granted the NSA direct access to databases of communications i,n, its domestic telecommunications facilities to allow the NSA to undertake alleged "data mining operations, and that the Verizon Defendants also provide the NSA with access to their customer records. See Chulsky Compt. 11 21-23; Bready Compl. I 13; 16-21; 35-71; Riordan Compl. 11 14-23. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary .Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -8-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 16 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 information? (2) Whether the named Plaintiffs have been aggrieved by any alleged actions taken against them by the Defendants.5 (3) Whether the NSA’s alleged collection of communication content or records, if true, was unlawful.6 B. (U) The United States’ State Secrets Privilege Assertion. (U) In response to the allegations raised in these lawsuits against Verizun, the Director of National Intelligence, supported by the Director of the National Security Agency, has asserted the state secrets privilege, and both officials have asserted statutory privileges, to protect against the disclosure of several categories of information described herein, including: A. (U) Information regarding the specific nature of the al Qaeda terrorist threat; B. (U) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether Verizon/MCI has assisted the NSA with any alleged intelligence activities; C. ~) Information that may tend to confirm or deny whether the Plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged NSA intelligence activities that may be at issue in this matter; and D. (U) Information concerning any NSA intelligence, activities, sources, or methods, including: (1) (U) Infomaation concerning the scope and operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, including information that may be needed to demonstrate that the TSP was limited to one-end foreign al Qaeda communications and that the NSA does not otherwise engage in the content surveillance dragnet that the Plaintiffs allege; and 4 (U)~,See Master Verizon Compl. ¶I 203,218, 230, 237-38, 245,256; Bready Compl. ¶I 40, 46, 5~, 60, 68; Chulsky Compl 11 66-68, 72; Riordan Compl. 11 14, 23. ~ (U) See Master Compl. I¶ 212, 213,226, 233,250, 251,261; Bready Compl. 11 41, 42, 47, 48, 54, 55, 61, 62, 69 70 Chulsky Compl. 1 74, 81; Riordan Compl. ¶I 23, 28-29;38-39. ~ (U) See Master Compl. 11 205-10, 219, 220, 232, 238, 246-49, 256; Bready Compl. ¶I 40, 46, 60, 65, 68; Chulsky Compl. 11 68, 70, 71 88; Riordan Compl. I¶ 18, 37. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -9-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 17 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (2) (U) Information that would tend to confirm or deny whether the NSA collects large quantities of communication records information as Plaintiffs allege. ~’ee Public Declaration of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, ¶ 11 and ~ublic Declaration ofLt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, 11. REDACTED TEXT] (U) Through these privilege assertions, the DNI and NSA Director have set forth lore than reasonable grounds to demonstrate that disclosure of the privileged information at issue would harm national security. (U) Alleged Verizon-NSA Relationship: The DNI and NSA Director have asserted privilege over facts that would tend to confirm or deny whether MCI and Verizon have assisted the NSA with any particular alleged intelligence activity. See Public McConnetl Deck ¶ 13; Public Alexander Decl. ¶ 14. The DNI has concluded that the disclosure of any information that would tend to confirm or deny an alleged classified intelligence relationship between the NSA and MCI/Verizon would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security. See Public McConnell Decl. ¶ 13. In the DNI’s judgment, confirming or denying such allegations, for instance, would reveal to foreign adversaries whether or not the NSA utilizes particular intelligence sources and methods and, thus, either compromise actual sources and methods or disclose that the NSA does not utilize a particular source or method. See Public McCormell Decl. ¶ 13. The harms to national security that would result from such a disclosure are amply demonstrated by the DNI and NSA Director in their in camera, exparte submissions and are certainly reasonable when weighed against the broad national security interests in detecting and ~reventing another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States. ~ublic Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -10-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 18 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 REDACTED TEXT] (U) Application of Alleged Intelligence Activities to Plaintiffs: The DNI and NSA Director have also asserted privilege as to information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Plaintiffs have been subject to any alleged intelligence activities. See Public McCormell Decl. ¶ 14; Public Alexander Decl. ¶ 15. In particular, efforts to prove whether specific individuals were targets of alleged NSA activities would either reveal who is subject to investigative interest--helping that person to evade surveillance---or who is not--revealing the scope of intelligence activities as welt as secure channels for communication, and potentially revealing actual targets in other cases. See id. [REDACTED TEXT] (U) b~formation Concerning the AllegedActivities: Finally, the DNI and NSA Director have asserted privilege over information concerning the alleged intelligence activities themselves. See Public McConnell Decl. ¶ 15-17; Public Alexander Deck ¶ 16-18. As already noted, disproving Plaintiffs’ allegation of a content surveillance dragnet would require demonstrating what the United States is doing. Such an inquiry would entail proving publicly that the acknowledged TSP is not a dragnet of domestic conmaunications, i.e., that it operates as the President and Attorney General have described, thereby revealing specific intelligence sources and methods about the TSP that the DNI and NSA Director have explained must be protected, as well as any other NSA intelligence methods that might confirm the President’s assurances. See Public McConnell Decl. ¶ 15-16; Public Alexander Decl. ¶ 16-17. [~DACTED TEXT] Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -11-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 19 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 t4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) Likewise, to litigate the lawfulness of the alleged communications records program, whether or not it exists would have to be publicly aired, thereby disclosing intelligence sources and methods as to what the NSA is--or is not~oing to detect terrorist attacks. See Public McConnell Decl. 1 17; Public Alexander Decl. 1 18. REDACTED TEXT] (U) Finally, because the Plaintiffs’ claims arise from allegations that the NSA began to ndertake certain intelligence activities after the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda, see, e.g., Master Verizon Compl. 11 139-141; Bready Compl. 1 13; Chulsky Compl. 11 18-20; 25-27; and Riordan Compl. 11 1, 14, the DNI has asserted privilege over sensitive intelligence information about the al Qaeda threat. See Public McConnell Decl. 1 12. If the Government were required to defend the lawfulness of a particular intelligence activity (for example, the acknowledged Terrorist Surveillance Program), specific information about the threat that the activity seeks to address--the severity and exigency of the threat, and the nature and scope of enemy tactics that the NSA seeks to counter--would all be relevant evidence, but not available. (U) ARGUMENT (U) The resolution of these cases against the Verizon Defendants is governed by clear ~rinciples. If the Government shows that the confirmation or denial of whether Verizon has issisted the NSA reasonably could be expected to cause harm to the national security, the case must be dismissed. If the facts needed to adjudicate the question of Plaintiffs’ standing, such as whether or not they are subject to the alleged surveillance activities, cannot be disclosed without reasonable danger of harm to the national security, the case must be dismissed. If facts concerning the existence and operation of intelligence sources and methods are needed to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the case must be dismissed. As set forth below, the Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -12-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 20 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 United States has demonstrated that each of these categories of information is needed to decide this case, but the disclosure of that information reasonably would cause harm to the national security. In these circumstances, the Court must grant the United States’ motion. I. (U) WHERE STATE SECRETS ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE A CASE, THE MATTER MUST BE DISMISSED. A. (U) The State Secrets Privilege Bars Use of Privileged Information Regardless of a Litigant’s Need. (U) The ability of the executive to protect military or state secrets from disclosure has been recognized from the earliest days of the Republic. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Kasza, 133 F.3d 1159. "Although the state secrets privilege was developed at common law, it performs a function of constitutional significance" because the privilege derives from the President’s Article II powers to conduct foreign affairs and provide for the national defense. El-Masri v. United States, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 625130, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974)). The Supreme Court has also clearly recognized that the protection of national security information is within the "Executive’s constitutional mandate," see id. (citing Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)). Thus the state secrets privilege has a "firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition to its basis in the common law of evidence." Id. (U) (1) Procedural Requirements: As a procedural matter, "[t]he privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private 7w’ty." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 (emphasis added); see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1 t65. "There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by the officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8 footnotes omitted). Thus, the responsible agency head must personally consider the matter and i~rmally assert the claim of privilege. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -13-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 21 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) (2) infortnation Covered: The privilege protects a broad range of state secrets, including information that would result in "impairment of the nation’s defense capabilities, disclosure of intelligence-gathering methods or capabilities, and disruption of diplomatic relations with foreign Governments." Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v. Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984) (footnotes omitted); accord Kasza, 133 F.3d at t 166 ("[T]he Government may use the state secrets privilege to withhold a broad range of information;"); see also Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 990 (state secrets privilege protects intelligence sources and methods involved in NSA surveillance). In addition, the privilege extends to protect information that, on its face, may appear innocuous but which in a larger context could reveal sensitive classified information. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly 1Tnnocuous information can be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate. Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). "Accordingly, if seemingly innocuous information is part of a classified mosaic, the state secrets privilege may be invoked to bar its disclosure and. the court cannot order the Government to disentangle this information from other classified information." Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. (U) (3) Standard of Review: An assertion of the state secrets privilege "must be accorded the ’utmost deference’ and the court’s review of the claim of privilege is narrow." Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. Aside from ensuring that the privilege has been properly invoked as a procedural matter, the sole determination for the court is whether, "under the particular circumstances of the case, ’there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.’" Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Reynolds’, 345 U.S. at 10); see also h~ re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 989); Tilden v. Tenet, 140 F. Supp. 2d 623,626 (E.D. Va. 2000). Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary ludgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -14-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 22 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 t6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) In addition, in assessing whether to uphold a claim of privilege, the court does not balance the respective needs of the parties for the information. Rather, "[o]nce the privilege is properly invoked and the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable danger that national security would be harmed by the disclosure of state secrets, the privilege is absolute[.]" Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; see also In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d at 1287 n.2 (state secrets privilege "renders the information unavailable regardless of the other party’s need in furtherance of the action"); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395,399 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (state secrets privilege "cannot be compromised by any showing of need on the part of the party seeking the information"); Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 57 ("When properly invoked, the state secrets privilege is absolute. No competing public or private interest can be advanced to compel disclosure of information found to be protected by a claim of privilege."). The court may consider the necessity of the information to the case only in connection with assessing the sufficiency of the Government’s showing that there is a reasonable danger that disclosure of the information at issue would harm national security. Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of ~rivilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot )vercome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.7 B. (U) Where the State Secrets Are Central to the Resolution of a Case or Needed to Litigate the Claims and Defenses, the Case Cannot Proceed. (U) Once the court has upheld a claim of the state secrets privilege, the evidence and information identified in the privilege assertion is "completely removed from the case," Kasza, 7 (U) Judicial review of whether the claim of privilege has been properly asserted and supported does not require the submission of classified information to the court for in camera, exparte review. Nonetheless, the submission of classified declarations for in camera, exparte review is "unexceptional" in cases where the state secrets privilege is invoked. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1169 (citing Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1154 (1996). Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -15-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 23 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 t5 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 t33 F.3d at 1166, and the Court must undertake a separate inquiry to determine the consequences of this exclusion on further proceedings. (U) First, the case must be dismissed if the state secrets "will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters." See Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1241-42. In such circumstances, as the court held in Kasza the "very subject matter" oftbe action is a state secret and "the cour~ should dismiss the plaintiffs action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege." Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1 t66 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n. 26).3 Even if some information about a government activity is publicly acknowledged, the very subject matter of the case can be a state secret. The Fitzgerald case provides a good example. At issue there was an alleged libel that the plaintiff, who worked on a secret Navy program for training marine mammals, sought to use his expertise for personal profit. See 776 F.2d at 1237. After determining that certain facts concerning the program were state secrets which must be protected, the Fourth Circuit went on to analyze whether the case could proceed. Even though the existence of the program at issue was publicly known, see id. at 1242-43 (public declaration of the Secretary of the Navy describing marine mammal program), classified aspects of how the program operated would have been inherently at issue in any adjudication of the alleged libel and, thus, the Court held that the "very subject of this litigation is itself a state secret." Id. at 1243. (U) Second, even if the very subject matter of an action is not a state secret, if the plaintiff cannot make out a primafacie case in support of its claims absent the excluded state secrets, the case must be dismissed. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; Halkin II, 690 F.2d at 998-99 Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1240-:41 (dismissing case where "the parties’ ability to prove the truth ol 8 (U) See also El-Masri, 2007 WL 625130 at *10; Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 345 (4th ~ir. 2005); Edmonds v. U.S. Department of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-82 (D.D.C. 2004), affd, 161 Fed. Appx. 6, 045286 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 2005) (pet-curiamjudgment), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 734 (2005); Maxwell, 143 F.R.D. at 598-99. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary ludgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -16-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 24 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 1t 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 falsity of the alleged libel" either risked or depended on the disclosure of state secrets). And if the privilege "’deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant.’" Kasza, t33 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141). (U) Thus, there are two issues for the Court to decide. First, granting his judgment the "utmost deference," has the Director of National Intelligence demonstrated that there is at least a reasonable danger that disclosure of the privileged information will cause harm to the national security? Second, is the privileged information needed to litigate this case? As set forth below, the answer to both questions is clearly yes, and dismissal is therefore required. C. (U) The Court in Hepting Misapplied the Standard of Revie~v and Failed to Determine the Consequences of the Government’s Privilege Assertion. (U) Before the state secrets privilege is applied in this case, some observations about the Court’s application of the privilege to the substantially similar issues raised in Hepting are in order. We do not critique the Court’s decision in Hepting as an affront to the Court. But application of that decision wilt obviously be central to the Court’s consideration of this case, and we do disagree fundamentally with the Court’s approach in that case, which is now on appeal. We specifically take issue with two aspects of the Court’s approach in Hepting--(1) its application of the state secrets standard of review; and (2) its decision not to assess the zonsequences of excluding privileged information in that case--and we respectfully request that Ihe Court reassess its application of the privilege under the facts and circumstances presented here. (U) The Court’s Application ofthe Standard ofReview in Hepting Was Erroneous. (U) In Hepting, the Court observed that "[t]he first step in determining whether a piece of information constitutes a ’state secret’ is determining whether that information is actually Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -17-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 25 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ’secret.’" Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 986. The Court went on to infer from various public statements by AT&T and the Government that "for all practical purposes [they] already disclosed that AT&T assists the government in monitoring communication content." Id. at 991-92. Specifically, the Court referred to statements by AT&T that it has classified contracts with the United States, employees with security clearances, and is willing to assist on national security matters when ask, see id. at 992, as well as statements by the Government acknowledging the existence of the TSP to target one-end foreign at Qaeda-related communications, see id. The Court then concluded that "it is inconceivable that [the terrorist surveillance program] could exist without the cooperation of telecommunication carriers"and, further, that AT&T must have assisted the NSA because of its size and significance in the market. See id. (U) We respectfully submit that the Court’s analysis did not reflect a proper application of the standard of review. Whether information must be protected under the state secrets 9rivilege turns on whether the Government has reasonably demonstrated that there is a easonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will harm national security. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. The Court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the most senior members of the intelligence community. As the Fourth Circuit recently held, deference to the Government’s judgment as to when confirmation or disclosure of information ~vould reasonably endanger national security is appropriate "not only for constitutional reasons, but for practical ones: the Executive and the intelligence agencies under his control occupy a position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive information." El-Masri, 2007 WL 625130, at *9 (emphasis added). (U) It is not apparent that the Court in Hepting considered the reasons proffered by the Director of National Intelligence as to why the alleged NSA-AT&T relationship could not be confirmed or denied without harm to national security. Certainly, the Court did not conclude Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary ludgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -18~ Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 26 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that the DNI’s prediction of harm to national security was unreasonable, nor did it expressly reject the privilege assertion. Rather, the Court appeared to avoid assessing the harms of disclosure identified by the DNI through its own analysis of statements by AT&T and the Government and conclusions that it drew from these statements.9 That method of analysis, we respectfully submit, was improper. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (granting utmost deference to Executive’s assessment of danger to national security); El-Masri, 2007 WL 625130, at *9 (same). REDACTED TEXT] (U) Notably, cases in which the state secrets privilege has been upheld have rejected the ontention that certain information is "not a secret" because it could readily be deduced from other information. For example, in Kasza itself, the widow of an individual who worked at a classified government facility argued it was absurd to assert privilege over the very existence of hazardous waste at that facility. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. Yet the Government’s assertion of privilege over this fact was upheld despite the existence of reliable public facts demonstrating that fact (for example, the health conditions of plaintiffs who worked at the facility, which 9 (U) The Court’s reliance in part on statements made by a private party in attempting to decide whether information is properly protected under the privilege was not appropriate. The state secrets privilege belongs to the Government and only the Government can waive it. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7; see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. Notably, the Supreme Court has consistently preserved the secrecy of alleged classified relationships even where the private party to that relationship itself purported to disclose the central secret in a lawsuit against the United States. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Totten, 92 U.S. 105. As to statements by the Government acknowledging of the TSP, whether they have any bearing on whether other facts are properly protected under the state secrets privilege must be assessed by looking to whether there is a reasonable danger of harm to national security if the Government confirms or denies the information. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -19-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 27 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 t9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 would be well l~nown to family, friends, and physicians). Indeed, the court in Kasza found that the privilege could protect unclassified information that might, in combination with other facts, reveal classified information. See id. at 1168. Similarly, in Halkin 11, the court upheld the Government’s state secrets privilege assertion over whether they had been subject to surveillance in the face of Plaintiffs’ contention that information placed in the public domain by former CIA officials in books reviewed in advance for classification by the CIA had disclosed particular facts about their allegations. See Halkin IL 690 F.2d at 994. Also, in the recent El-Masri decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Government’s state secrets privilege assertion as to facts concerning an alleged CIA rendition program despite the fact that the plaintiff would have been a witness to his alleged detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement, and had spoken ~ublicly about those issues. See 2007 WL 625130, at *9. In each of these cases, the court :xamined the reasons advanced by the Government as to why disclosure of information as to which privilege was asserted would cause harm to national security, and did not attempt to ascertain whether something was a secret by taking judicial notice of purportedly reliable public sources. As the D.C. Circuit observed in Halkin I1: Whatever the truth may be, it remains either unrevealed or unconfirmed. We cannot assume, as appellants would have us, that the CIA has nothing left to hide. To the contrary, the record before us suggests that the CIA still has something to hide or that it wishes to hide from our adversaries the fact that is had nothing to hide. ~ee id. at 995, n.63 (citing ivlilitaryAudit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d at 714, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 981). 2. (U) The Court Failed to Assess the Consequences of the State Secrets Privilege in Hepting. (U) We respectfully submit that the second major flaw in the Hepting decision is its failure to assess all of the consequences of the state secrets assertion. The Court instead decided ust one issue (whether AT&T’s alleged assistance to the NSA was "secret"), applied the "very ;abject matter" doctrine incorrectly to that issue, and thereby inappropriately deferred deciding Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -20-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 28 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 t7 18 !9 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 whether the case could nonetheless proceed. (U) The "very subject matter" inquiry concerns whether the "central facts"--i.e., "those facts that are essential to prosecuting the action or defending against it"--are state secrets. EliVlasri, 2007 WL 625130, at * I0 (emphasis added). It is clear from precedent that the "central facts" or "very subject matter" of a civil proceeding, for pu.rposes of [a] dismissal analysis, are those facts necessary to litigate it--not merely to discuss it in general terms. ld. In Kasza, for example, the Nihth Circuit held that the "very subject matter" of the case was a state secret because the specific information needed to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims was ~rotected by the privilege assertion. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170. Similarly, in Fitzgerald v. 9enthouse Int ’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985), the court held that the very subject matter of that case was a state secret "due to the nature of the question presented in this action and the proof required by the parties to establish or refute the claim." Id. at 1237 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Zuckerbraun v. United States, 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991), a case concerning whether a missile defense system aboard a U.S. Navy frigate malfunctioned, the very subject matter of the case was a state secret because facts central to proceeding, including how the system worked, were not available. See id. at 547-48.~° (U) The Court’s effort in Hepting to distinguish these cases as involving "classified details about either a highly technical invention or a classified relationship," see Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 993-94, misses their key point: if state secrets are essential to deciding a case, the very subject matter of the case is a state secret and the case must be dismissed. ~0 (U) Similarly, in Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 (4thCir. 2005), a case concerning whether a former CIA officer had been discriminated against on the basis of race, the "very subject matter" in that case was a state secret because facts concerning the officers assignments and CIA operations were essential to decide the case. And in Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 111 (D. Conn. 1991), the subject matter of the case--a patent dispute over a cryptographic device--was a state secret because the evidence needed to decide the case was privileged. Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -21-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 29 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) To be sure, the various consequences of the state secrets privilege outlined in Kasza are cut from the same cloth and ask essentially the same question: are state secrets needed to decide the case? Indeed, courts have merged the "very subject matter" and "evidentiary" impacts of the privilege and have ruled that because certain evidence is essential to make a primafacie case or a defense, the very subject matter of the case is a state secret. Indeed, in Kasza, the Ninth Circuit observed that "In]or only does the state secrets privilege bar [plaintiff] from establishing her prima facie case on any of her eleven claims, but any further proceedings in this matter would harm national security." See 133 F.3d at 1170]~ (U) The impact a privilege assertion has on a particular case would not be known until the court considers how the privileged information relates to the evidence needed to resolve the case. "[O]nce the state secrets privilege has been properly invoked, the district court must consider whether and how the case may proceed in light of the privilege." Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1243; El-Masri, 2207 WL 625130, at * 5 ("the ultimate question to be resolved is how the matter should proceed in light of the successful invocation of the privilege."). This inquiry requires the Court to "look ahead" to evaluate whether privileged evidence is needed to decide the elements of particular ctaims.~’-If state secrets are needed to decide a particular claim, then ~ (U) See also Farnsworth Cannon, hw. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. t980) (en bane) ("It is evident that any attempt on the part of the plaintiffto establish a prima facie case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that the overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of its state secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this litigation."); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547-48 (state secrets needed to address all factual questions related to defendants’ liability rendering the "very subject matter" a state secret because "there is no evidence available for appellant to establish a prima facie case."); Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1242, 1244 (outlining elements of defamation claim and testimony needed to address them in concluding that the very subject matter is a state secret). ~’-(U) See also El-Masri, 2007 WL 625130 at *9 (prospective assessment of what state secrets would be needed as evidence if civil action were to proceed); Sterling v. Tenet, 4t 6 F.3d at 346-47 (same); Edmonds v. U.S. Department of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 79-81 (same); Ma.~t,ell, PubLic Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -22-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 30 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d11 23456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 wholly apart from the "very subject matter" issue, the Court must enter summary judgment against the Plaintiffs since the evidence needed to adjudicate the merits is unavailable. See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1 t76 (affirming entry of summary judgment for the United States on state secrets privilege grounds); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547 (where effect of state secrets privilege assertion is to prevent plaintiff from establishing a primafacie case, summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate on the ground that either the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof, lacks sufficient evidence to carry that burden, or that the exclusion of evidence precludes the defendant from establishing a valid defense). (U) Again, with respect, the Hepting decision erred both substantively and procedurally in failing to assess the consequences of the Government’s privilege assertion there. The substantive flaw was the Court’s conclusion that the "very subject matter"ofHepting was not a state secret because it read public disclosures by the Government and AT&T to" indicate that AT&T is assisting the government to issue some kind of surveillance program." Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 994. But that conclusion improperly focuses on "whether the general subject matter of the case can be described without resort to state secrets," not on the correct inquiry of "whether an action can be litigated without threatening the disclosure of such state secrets." El-Masri, 2007 WL 625130, at * 8 (first emphasis added). Even if it was proper to infer from public ;tatements whether AT&T assisted the NSA with some kind of surveillance program, the Court ;till had to decide whether the actual claims in that case, which challenge specific alleged tctivities, could be litigated to conclusion without disclosing the privileged information and causing the harms to national security identified by the DNI.~3 143 F.R.D. at 599 (same); Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. at 108. ~3 (U) The Court’s decision to defer assessing the impact of the state secrets privilege until after discovery was especially inappropriate where the discovery cited by the Court concerned the very subject matter of the case as to which the Goverrmaent asserted privilege--whether the Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -23-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 31 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (U) The procedural flaw in the Court’s application of the state secrets privilege is that it did not decide the consequences of excluding privileged evidence in the case. The Court’s discussion of whether the "very subject matter" in Hepting is a state secret was limited to just one aspect of the case--the alleged AT&T-NSA relationship. Whether the NSA and a telecommunications carrier had an alleged relationship is certainly a central issue in Hepting and here. But even if there was no claim in Hepting concerning whether or not a telecommunications carrier had a relationship with NSA, and the Plaintiffs had filed suit just against the Government in challenging the alleged intelligence activities, the very subject matter of the case would still be a state secret. Other matters as to which the DNI has asserted privilege render the very subject matter of this case (and Hepting) a state secret. For example, facts concerning whether or not the Plaintiffs were subject to the alleged activities are essential to deciding this case--indeed, if that evidence cannot be discovered, the case would have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Halkin I and II, supra. Similarly, facts concerning any alleged intelligence activities are needed to decide the merits of the claims, including facts demonstrating that the TSP was limited to al Qaeda-related international communications; demonstrating that the NSA does not undertake the dragnet of content surveillance that Plaintiffs allege; and confirming or denying whether the NSA is collecting communication records information as alleged. Proceeding in this case therefore requires, at the outset, that the Court assess (1) the validity of the privilege assertion as to all of the information discussed by the DNI and NSA Director, and (2) the full impact of excluding that information from future proceedings in the case. NSA had a relationship with AT&T and, in that context, provided certifications for the alleged intelligence activities. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (referring to discovery order in Section 1 (G)(3) of decision at page 996). ;Public Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary ludgment, MDL No. 06-1791-VRW -24-Case M:06-cv-01791-VRW Document 254 Filed 04/20/2007 Page 32 of 32Document hosted at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=7c5bc974-be3c-47c8-8d9b-61e4535e45d1