Source: http://www.google.es/patents/US20110161672
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 18:20:30
Document Index: 743382552

Matched Legal Cases: ['art.\n5', 'art.\n17', 'art.\n25', 'art.\n36', 'art.\n39', 'art.\n57', 'art.\n68']

Patente US20110161672 - Provisioning, upgrading, and/or changing of hardware - Google Patentes
In some embodiments a secure permit request to change a hardware configuration is created. The secure permit request is sent to a remote location, and a permit sent from the remote location in response to the permit request is received. The hardware configuration is changed in response to the received...http://www.google.es/patents/US20110161672?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatente US20110161672 - Provisioning, upgrading, and/or changing of hardware
Número de publicación US20110161672 A1
Número de solicitud US 12/655,579
Fecha de prioridad 31 Dic 2009
También publicado como CN102667802A, DE112010005069T5, US8966657, WO2011081890A2, WO2011081890A3
Número de publicación 12655579, 655579, US 2011/0161672 A1, US 2011/161672 A1, US 20110161672 A1, US 20110161672A1, US 2011161672 A1, US 2011161672A1, US-A1-20110161672, US-A1-2011161672, US2011/0161672A1, US2011/161672A1, US20110161672 A1, US20110161672A1, US2011161672 A1, US2011161672A1
Inventores Alberto J. Martinez, William A. Stevens, Jr., Purushottam Goel, Ernie Brickell
Cesionario original Martinez Alberto J, Stevens Jr William A, Purushottam Goel, Ernie Brickell
Citas de patentes (37), Otras citas (1), Citada por (21), Clasificaciones (17), Eventos legales (1)
US 20110161672 A1
creating a secure permit request to change a hardware configuration;
sending the secure permit request to a remote location;
receiving a permit sent from the remote location in response to the permit request; and
changing the hardware configuration in response to the received permit.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure permit request and the permit protect privacy of a user of the hardware.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure permit request and the permit protect privacy of the hardware.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the hardware configuration is a hardware configuration of a chipset or a chipset part.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein one or more cryptographic keys are used to ensure secure communication with the remote location.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein a unique key has been permanently included in the hardware during manufacturing of the hardware, and the unique key is used to ensure secure communication and permit authentication with the remote location.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the unique key is uniquely programmed into the hardware during manufacturing by randomly blowing fuses in the hardware during manufacturing.
8. The method of claim 6, wherein the unique key is not accessible by software running outside of the hardware.
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the permit includes a unique signature from the remote location.
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising validating the received permit prior to changing the hardware configuration.
11. The method of claim 1, further comprising validating the received permit using a public key which corresponds to a private signing key located at the remote location.
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the remote location is a secure and trusted location.
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the changing of the hardware configuration is performed without any physical change to the hardware.
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the permit is a secure permit and/or a signed permit.
15. The method of claim 1, wherein transaction information is bound inside the permit such that future returns or exchanges can be enabled.
16. The method of claim 1, wherein once a permit is signed for a particular hardware part it cannot be used on another hardware part.
17. The method of claim 1, wherein software running outside of the hardware cannot emulate the functionality of software running inside the hardware.
18. The method of claim 1, further comprising performing an override during a boot and/or initialization process, and changing the hardware configuration in response to the override.
19. The method of claim 1, wherein the secure permit request is not uniquely identifiable.
20. The method of claim 1, wherein the identity of the hardware and/or the user of the hardware is not determinable from the secure permit request.
21. The method of claim 1, further comprising generating a random value and generating the secure permit request in response to the random value.
receiving from a remote location a secure permit request to change a hardware configuration at the remote location;
sending a secure permit to the remote location in response to the permit request, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration.
23. The method of claim 22, wherein the secure permit request and the permit protect privacy of a user of the hardware.
24. The method of claim 22, wherein the hardware configuration is a hardware configuration of a chipset or a chipset part.
25. The method of claim 22, wherein one or more cryptographic keys are used to ensure secure communication and permit authentication with the remote location.
26. The method of claim 22, wherein the permit includes a unique signature.
27. The method of claim 22, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration without any physical change to the hardware.
28. The method of claim 22, wherein the permit is a secure permit and/or a signed permit.
29. The method of claim 22, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration in response to an override operation performed during a boot and/or initialization process.
30. The method of claim 22, wherein the secure permit request is not uniquely identifiable.
31. The method of claim 22, wherein the identity of the hardware and/or the user of the hardware is not determinable from the secure permit request.
32. The method of claim 22, wherein the secure permit request has been created at the remote location in response to the random value.
33. The method of claim 22, further comprising using a private signing key that corresponds to a public key located at the remote location to help in validation of the permit at the remote location.
34. The method of claim 22, wherein transaction information is bound inside the permit such that future returns or exchanges can be enabled.
35. The method of claim 22, wherein once a permit is signed for a particular hardware part it cannot be used on another hardware part.
36. The method of claim 22, wherein software running outside of the hardware cannot emulate the functionality of software running inside the hardware.
a hardware device having a hardware configuration that may be remotely configured, the hardware device including a controller to create a secure permit request to change the hardware configuration, to send the secure permit request to a remote location, to receive a permit sent from the remote location in response to the permit request, and to change the hardware configuration in response to the received permit.
38. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the hardware device is a chipset or a chipset part.
39. The apparatus of claim 37, further comprising one or more cryptographic keys to ensure secure communication and permit authentication with the remote location.
40. The apparatus of claim 37, further comprising a unique key permanently included in the hardware device, wherein the unique key is used to ensure secure communication and permit authentication with the remote location.
41. The apparatus of claim 40, wherein the unique key comprises randomly blown fuses in the hardware device.
42. The apparatus of claim 40, wherein the unique key is not accessible by software running outside of the hardware device.
43. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the permit includes a unique signature from the remote location.
44. The apparatus of claim 37, the controller further to validate the received permit prior to changing the hardware configuration.
45. The apparatus of claim 37, the controller further to validate the received permit using a public key which corresponds to a private signing key located at the remote location.
46. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the remote location is a secure and trusted location.
47. The apparatus of claim 37, the controller to change the hardware configuration without any physical change to the hardware.
48. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the permit is a secure permit and/or a signed permit.
49. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein transaction information is bound inside the permit such that future returns or exchanges can be enabled.
50. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein once a permit is signed for a particular hardware device it cannot be used on another hardware device.
51. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein software running outside of the hardware device cannot emulate the functionality of software running inside the hardware device.
52. The apparatus of claim 37, the controller to perform an override during a boot and/or initialization process, and to change the hardware configuration in response to the override.
53. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the secure permit request is not uniquely identifiable.
54. The apparatus of claim 37, wherein the identity of the hardware and/or the user of the hardware is not determinable from the secure permit request.
a server to receive from a remote location a secure permit request to change a hardware configuration at the remote location, to send a secure permit to the remote location in response to the permit request, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration.
56. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the hardware configuration is a hardware configuration of a chipset or a chipset part.
57. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein one or more cryptographic keys are used to ensure secure communication and permit authentication with the remote location.
58. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the permit includes a unique signature.
59. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration without any physical change to the hardware.
60. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the permit is a secure permit and/or a signed permit.
61. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the permit is to allow the remote location to change the hardware configuration in response to an override operation performed during a boot and/or initialization process.
62. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the secure permit request is not uniquely identifiable.
63. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the identity of the hardware and/or the user of the hardware is not determinable from the secure permit request.
64. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein the secure permit request has been created at the remote location in response to the random value.
65. The apparatus of claim 55, the server to use a private signing key that corresponds to a public key located at the remote location to help in validation of the permit at the remote location.
66. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein transaction information is bound inside the permit such that future returns or exchanges can be enabled.
67. The apparatus of claim 55, wherein once a permit is signed for a particular hardware part it cannot be used on another hardware part.
68. The method of claim 55, wherein software running outside of the hardware cannot emulate the functionality of software running inside the hardware.
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Clasificación de EE.UU. 713/176, 709/221, 713/168, 713/150
Clasificación internacional H04L9/00, G06F15/177, H04L9/32, G06F21/00
Clasificación cooperativa H04L63/06, H04L63/08, H04L9/3249, G06F21/57, H04L2209/56
Clasificación europea H04L9/32, H04L63/08, G06F21/57, H04L63/06