Source: http://www.courts.state.me.us/opinions_orders/opinions/2003_documents/03me68ti.htm
Timestamp: 2014-03-07 23:12:37
Document Index: 575134867

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3101', '§ 3101', '§ 3101', '§ 3103', '§ 3', '§ 4', '§ 3102', '§ 3103', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3103', '§ 3', '§ 3103', '§ 3101', '§ 3103', '§ 3', '§ 3102', '§ 2701', '§ 2701', '§ 8']

TISDALE v. RAWSON
Decision: 2003 ME 68
Docket: Ken-02-635
[¶1] Brian Rawson appeals from a judgment
entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) substituting Bruce Tisdale for the Piney Heights
Road Association (Association) to cure the Association's lack of capacity,
affirming the District Court's determination that the Association properly
assessed Rawson for 1999 and 2000 pursuant to the Private Ways Act, 23 M.R.S.A.
§§ 3101-3105 (1992 & Supp. 2002), finding that the Association's
assessment method does not violate the Maine Constitution, and awarding
attorney fees. Rawson contends the
Superior Court erred by (1) substituting Tisdale for the Association; (2) not
finding the Association's assessment is a tax that violates the Maine
Constitution; (3) concluding the Association's 1999 assessment is valid; and
(4) approving the attorney fees request without supporting documentation. Tisdale concedes that the Association
did not properly assess road fees for 1999, and we find no error with respect
to the 2000 assessment. We, therefore,
vacate in part the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to the Superior
Court to remand to the District Court for entry of a corrected judgment. I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The Association is an unincorporated
organization formed by landowners in Monmouth to raise and collect funds to
maintain several private roads benefiting their properties. Prior to 1999, the Association was not
organized pursuant to the Private Ways Act and did not make mandatory
assessments. The Association
assessed its members on a $100 per parcel basis until 1998. In 1998, the Association changed to a
per unit assessment method, with a "unit" corresponding to each separate
residence on a landowner's property. The rationale for a per unit assessment method was that this method best
reflects each landowner's impact on the Association's roads. The basic yearly charge was set at $100
per unit. [¶3] In July of 1999, the Association's
landowners met and voted to organize pursuant to the Private Ways Act. The Act enables landowners to organize
under its terms in order to utilize the Act's assessment authority. See
23 M.R.S.A. § 3101 (Supp. 2002).[1] The Act authorizes member landowners to
determine the cost of repairing roads, assess landowners the cost of the
repairs, select assessors and a road commissioner to make assessments and
collect the assessed fees, and authorizes the road commissioner to contract for
repair work. See id.
§§ 3101, 3103.[2]
Association's members elected assessors pursuant to section 3103 and elected
Tisdale as the Association's Road Commissioner pursuant to section 3101. Tisdale, as Road Commissioner, was
primarily responsible for collecting assessments. See id. § 3103 (Supp. 2002). The Association's members
also agreed, at the July meeting, to increase year-round residents' per unit
assessments thirty-five dollars in 2000 to pay for winter sanding and plowing.
[¶5] Rawson owns two properties benefited by
the Association's roads. Rawson
maintains five units on these two properties, including: his home, two
apartments within his home, a separate rental unit on the same lot, and a
fourth rental unit on his second lot. Rawson was assessed and received bills for 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 2000, Rawson was billed a total of
$1,675; this charge consisted of unpaid assessments of $100 per unit for his
five units in 1998 and 1999, and $135 on each of his five units in 2000. [¶6] When Rawson failed to pay the fees due,
the Association filed suit in Small Claims Court to collect the 1998, 1999, and
2000 assessments. The Association
sought its assessed charges, accrued interest, and attorney fees expended to
collect the assessments. The
District Court heard testimony from the parties concerning the Association's
prior assessments, the landowners' decision to organize under the Act, the
election of assessors and a road commissioner, the Association's past and
current assessment method, and the facts leading to the suit to enforce the
assessments made upon Rawson for 1998 through 2000. The parties entered in evidence as exhibits the
Association's 2000 warrant and a map of the properties benefited by the
roads. Rawson represented himself
[¶7] The District Court (Augusta, Anderson,
J.) found that the Association properly
followed the Act's procedures and its assessment method had a rational
basis. The court entered a
judgment in favor of the Association, for the 1998 through 2000 assessments,
attorney fees expended to collect the assessment, and costs. [¶8] Rawson retained counsel, filed his
notice of appeal to the Superior Court, and requested permission to supplement
the record pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76F(b) with the Association's July 1999
meeting minutes. Rawson reasoned
that the court should allow him to supplement the record because he represented
himself before the District Court and was unaware that the meeting minutes were
legally significant. The Superior
Court agreed that the information was necessary to determine if the Association
had met statutory requirements and granted the request. The court ordered "all records,
minutes, acknowledgments, oaths, etc. must be filed with the court as part of
the record." [¶9] The court's order resulted in a
significant expansion of the record, including entry of: (1) the Association's
written application to the notary to call a meeting pursuant to the Act; (2)
the Association's warrant notifying affected landowners of the July 1999
meeting; (3) a notary's return indicating compliance with the Act's notice
requirements; (4) the July 1999 meeting minutes; (5) the Assessors'
certification of assessment resulting from the 1999 meeting; (6) the
Association's 2000 assessment warrant; (7) the Assessors' 2000 certificate of
assessment; (8) the July 2000 meeting minutes; (9) the Assessors' certification
of assessment following the 2000 meeting; (10) the Association's 2001
assessment warrant; (11) the Assessors' 2001 certificate of commitment; (12)
the Assessors' 2001 certificate of assessment; and (13) the July 2001 meeting
[¶10] After a hearing, the Superior Court
found the Association, as an unincorporated entity, lacked capacity to sue in
its own name and substituted Tisdale for the Association to correct the error. The court also found the Association
had (1) properly followed the Act's notice and process procedures; (2) used a
proper assessment method within the meaning of section 3103's "in proportion to
ownership interest"; and (3) improperly assessed charges for 1998 because it
was not incorporated and, pursuant to P.L. 1997, ch. 682, § 3, was not
authorized to use the Act's assessment procedures prior to July 1, 1999.[3]
[¶11] The Superior Court vacated the District
Court's 1998 assessment award and substituted plaintiffs, but otherwise
affirmed the court's judgment. Rawson thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, which the
Superior Court denied. This appeal
[¶12] When the
Superior Court acts in its appellate capacity, we review the decision of the
District Court directly for abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not
supported by the evidence. Franklin
Printing v. Harvest Hill Press, 2002 ME
116, ¶ 5, 801 A.2d 1004, 1006. A. Supplementing the Trial Court Record
[¶13] We begin with
the Superior Court's order permitting Rawson to supplement the record developed
by the District Court. Rawson
made a request to the Superior Court to supplement the record pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 76F(b).[4] The Superior Court granted the request,
allowing Rawson to supplement the record with a considerable amount of
information that was not before the District Court. The court reasoned that the information was necessary to
determine whether the Association had met statutory requirements.
[¶14] The Superior
Court, in these circumstances, may correct or modify a properly settled record
through Rule 76F(b). Rule 76F(b)
was not intended, however, to give litigants the opportunity to create a record
on appeal by entering new evidence to aid the appellate court's analysis of the
issues before it. An appellate
court must limit its review to the record developed by the trial court. See Sturtevant v. Town of Winthrop, 1999 ME 84, ¶ 9, 732 A.2d 264, 267 (limiting review of
sufficiency of evidence to the record developed by trial court). An omission refers to the inadvertent
omission of documentary presentation of evidence otherwise presented to the
court, rather than evidence that the parties neglected to offer in any fashion. The Superior Court, acting in its
appellate capacity, erred by allowing Rawson to supplement the record because
this evidence was not entered to correct an omission, misstatement, or other
mistake affecting the record. B. Substitution of Plaintiffs
[¶15] Rawson next asserts that the Association has no capacity to sue due to its unincorporated status, and that the court erred by substituting Tisdale for the Association. Generally, an unincorporated association does not have capacity to sue or be sued in its own name, absent specific statutory authorization. Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1202-03 n.1 (Me. 1982) (citing 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 4.4 at 67 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth at ---)). The Association is unincorporated, and the Act does not authorize it to sue, thus Rawson correctly asserts that the Association lacks capacity to sue him in its own name. See id. The Superior Court recognized this limitation and substituted Tisdale as the real party in interest to correct the limitation. [¶16] The court's substitution was not
erroneous. Section 3102 authorizes
landowners to bring suit to enforce an assessment properly made by an
association against a landowner that is "neglecting to pay." See
23 M.R.S.A. § 3102 (Supp. 2002).[5] Section 3103 grants a road commissioner
broad assessment collection authority, and does not restrict a road
commissioner from employing judicial process to collect properly assessed
fees. See id. § 3103. Tisdale is both a landowner and the Association's Road Commissioner,
thus he has standing to bring this suit. See id. [¶17] Moreover, M.R. Civ. P. 17(a) authorizes
a court to substitute an incorrectly named plaintiff with the real party in
interest.[6] The pertinent language of Rule 17(a),
adopted from the corresponding federal rule, directs courts to allow a
"reasonable time" after objection to allow ratification by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest. See M.R. Civ. P.
17(a); 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth at 349. This provision of Rule 17(a) prevents forfeiture when the
determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable
mistake has been made. See 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth at 349; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory
committee's note on 1966 amendments; see also Royal Coachman Color Guard v. Marine
Trading & Transp., Inc., 398 A.2d 382,
384 (Me. 1979) (finding unincorporated association could be substituted with
real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a), and remanding to the District
Court to permit substitution of a real party in interest or ratification of the
association as plaintiff). [¶18] In the federal courts, Rule 17(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been interpreted to allow liberal
substitution of plaintiffs when the change is "merely formal" in nature. Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront
Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir.
1997) ("A Rule 17(a) substitution of plaintiffs
should be liberally allowed when the change is merely formal and in no way
alters the original complaint's factual allegations as to the events or the
participants."). Most federal
courts, following the advisory committee's note to Rule 17(a), limit the rule's
application to circumstances when an understandable mistake has been made or
when the correct party is difficult to determine. E.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 308
(5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
[¶19] Tisdale was a
participant in the assessment collection process and represented the
Association before the District Court. Substituting Tisdale for the Association is merely a formal change that
does not alter in any way the factual allegations pertaining to events or
participants involved in this suit. See Advanced
Magnetics, Inc., 106 F.3d at 20. Prosecuting
the case in the Association's name, moreover, was an understandable mistake to
which Rule 17(a) can be applied. See Royal
Coachman Color Guard, 398 A.2d at 384. The Superior
Court, therefore, did not err by substituting Tisdale as the real party in
interest. See Advanced
Magnetics, Inc., 106 F.3d at 20;
Royal Coachman Color Guard, 398 A.2d at
384. C. The
Association's Assessment Method
[¶20] Rawson contends that the Association's
assessments are a "tax" that violates article IX, section 8 of the Maine
Constitution because the Association failed to apportion and assess amounts
equally according to a property's "just value."[7] A tax is generally understood as a
charge to support government, which legislatures use to raise funds for public
purposes or to accomplish some governmental end. Brewer Brick Co. v. Inhabitants of Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 70 (1873) (citations omitted); Bd.
of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d
998, 1004 (Me. 1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
[¶21] The Association's assessments pay for
the maintenance costs of private roads benefiting only private landowners
within the Association. The
assessments serve neither a public purpose nor a governmental end, thus the
assessments are not taxes and are not subject to constitutional
requirements. See Brewer Brick
Co., 62 Me. at 70.
Association's 1998 and 1999 Assessments
[¶22] Rawson contends that the Association's
1998 and 1999 assessments violate P.L. 1997 ch. 682, § 3 and the Act's
assessment procedures. Whether the
Association was eligible to complete assessments in 1998 and 1999 requires
application of the Act, and such application of a statute is a question of law
that we review de novo. DaimlerChrysler
Servs. N. Am., LLC v. State Tax Assessor,
2003 ME 27, ¶ 7, 817 A.2d 862, 864.
[¶23] At oral argument, counsel for Tisdale
conceded that the Association was not incorporated when it made its 1998
assessment and that no warrant was issued for the 1999 assessment. Prior to July 1, 1999, only landowners
who were members of a road association incorporated as of March 1998 were
authorized to make assessments pursuant to the Act. See P.L. 1997, ch.
682, § 3. Landowners organized
pursuant to the Act must also follow a mandatory warrant procedure to make
assessments. See 23 M.R.S.A. § 3103 ("[The assessor] shall deliver their assessment with a warrant for its
collection to the commissioner.") (emphasis added).
Association was unorganized in 1998, thus the Superior Court correctly
concluded that the Association could not utilize the process set forth in the
Act to assess fees for that year. See P.L. 1997, ch. 682, § 3. In 1999, as was conceded at oral argument, the Association
failed to follow the Act's warrant procedure to collect the assessment, making
that assessment invalid. See 23 M.R.S.A. § 3103. The District Court erred, therefore, by awarding the
Association its 1998 and 1999 assessments. E. Attorney
[¶25] In light of our determination that the 1998 and 1999
assessments are invalid, the attorney fee award must be vacated. Upon remand, the District Court shall
determine what, if any, attorney fees Tisdale may recover for enforcement of
the 2000 assessment.
the Superior Court permitting the substitution of Bruce Tisdale for the
Association is affirmed. The
balance of the judgment of the Superior Court is vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for
remand to the District Court for entry of judgment consistent with this
Aglaia David, Esq. (orally)
Curtis Webber, Esq. (orally)
Auburn, ME 04212-190
Section 3101 provides, in part:
§ 3101. Call of meetings; repairs Except as provided in this section, when 4 or more parcels of land are benefited by a private way or bridge as an appurtenant easement or by fee ownership of the way or bridge, the owners of any 3 or more of the parcels, as long as at least 3 of the parcels are owned by different persons, may make written application to a notary public to call a meeting, who may issue a warrant setting forth the time, place and purpose of the meeting, copies of which must be posted at some public place in the town and mailed to the owners of all the parcels benefited by the way at the addresses set forth in the municipal tax records, at least 30 days before such time. When so assembled, they may choose a commissioner, to be sworn, and they may determine what repairs are necessary and the materials to be furnished or amount of money to be paid by each owner for the repairs and the manner of calling future meetings. [2]
Section 3103 provides:
§ 3103. Contracts for repair;
assessments The owners, at a meeting held under section 3101, may authorize a contract to be made for making and keeping the way or bridge in repair by the year or for a less time; may raise money for that purpose and choose assessors to assess it on the owners in proportion to their interests, who shall deliver their assessment with a warrant for its collection to the commissioner. The warrant must be in substance such as is prescribed for collection of town taxes. The commissioner shall collect the same as town taxes are collected, and be liable for neglect of duty as town collectors are for similar neglects.
P.L. 1997, ch. 682, § 3 provides:
Sec. 3. Application. Before July 1, 1999, only owners who are members of road associations incorporated as of March 1998 may utilize the process set forth in this Act.
Rule 76F(b) provides, in pertinent part:
If anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the District Court judge, either before or after the record is transmitted to the Superior Court, or the Superior Court, on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk. [5]
Section 3102 provides:
§ 3102. Commissioner's duties;
neglect of owners to pay The commissioner chosen under section
3101, with respect to the way or bridge, has the powers of a road
commissioner. If any owner, on
requirement of the commissioner, neglects to furnish that owner's proportion of
labor, materials or money, the same may be furnished by the other owners and
recovered of the owner neglecting to pay in a civil action, together with costs
of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. The commissioner's apportioning of the cost of repairs to the road
undertaken pursuant to the provisions of section 3101 may not exceed 1% of an
individual owner's property valuation in any calendar year. Section 3102's reference
to "powers of a road commissioner" is addressed by 23 M.R.S.A. § 2701
(1992). Section 2701 provides, in
§ 2701. Powers and duties The road commissioner, under the direction of a majority of the selectmen, shall have charge of the repairs of all highways and bridges within the towns and shall have authority to employ the necessary personnel and equipment and purchase material for the repair of highways and bridges. The road commissioner shall give bond to the satisfaction of the selectmen and be responsible to them for the expenditure of money and discharge of his duties generally.
Rule 17(a) states, in pertinent part:
Me. Const. art. IX, § 8 states, in pertinent part:
Section 8. All
taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this State, shall
be apportioned and assessed equally according to the just value thereof.