Source: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/golan-reply.html
Timestamp: 2015-06-30 14:28:31
Document Index: 474723463

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 301', '§ 104', '§ 8', '§ 109', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 5', '§ 8', '§ 4']

LAWRENCE GOLAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs are individuals who pursue and promote the arts in this country. This lawsuit challenges two amendments to the Copyright Act. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304), extends the term of future and existing copyrights by another 20 years, thus preventing any work from entering the public domain in this country due to the expiry of term until the year 2019. Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109(a), goes a step further: it removes thousands of works from the public domain and retroactively grants them copyrights, thereby depriving the public of its ability  and right  to freely use materials that were, for many years, open to all. These laws have greatly harmed plaintiffs artistic endeavors, and their ability to perform, teach, and disseminate works to the public. Despite the Constitutions requirement that terms be limited, the government takes the extreme view that Congresss copyright power is unlimited and the exercise of its power immune from all constitutional challenge, regardless of whether it harms artistic pursuits or damages the public domain as plaintiffs allege in their Complaint. Indeed, the position now advanced by the government is much more extreme than the principal authority on which it relies, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the first case to consider the constitutionality of the CTEA. In Eldred, while the court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, concluded that Congress could extend the term of copyrights both prospectively and retrospectively to subsisting copyrights, the court still recognized that Congress could not revive copyrights for works in the public domain. Id. at 377. But now, the government argues not only is there no restraint for extending the terms of existing and future copyrights, the government repudiates even the restriction on Congresss power recognized in Eldred. The government does not stop there. It even claims that this Court has absolutely no authority to review plaintiffs challenges because they involve policy debate reserved exclusively for Congress. In the governments view, Congress has carte blanche authority to enact any copyright law. And it is this Courts duty to just apply and enforce settled law enacted by Congress. Govt Mem. 2. The government, however, is simply mistaken. This case is not about policy. It is about interpreting and applying the Constitution. Of course, [i]t is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). And that is particularly true for copyright and patent laws, which derive their creation from Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution. That Clause, as the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, imposes limits on Congresss grant of power. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). And the Tenth Circuit has recognized these limits as well. See, e.g., Blish, Mize & Silliman Hardware v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., 236 F.2d 913, 915 (10th Cir. 1956); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Industr., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834-39 (10th Cir. 1993). These limits are both implicated and violated here.
The governments motion to dismiss must, therefore, be rejected. Contrary to the governments argument, the issue is not whether plaintiffs Complaint proves that a constitutional violation has occurred on the merits. That issue must wait for trial. The only issue on this motion to dismiss is whether the Complaint states a colorable legal claim that Congresss grant and exercise of power is subject to constitutional review. It clearly does. A colorable claim is simply one that is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous. Bernstein v. U.S. Dept of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Plaintiffs have alleged more than sufficient legal grounds and allegations of harm to satisfy the liberal standards of pleading. Sutton v. Utah State School for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.) (emphasis added). Given the importance of the constitutional challenges they raise, plaintiffs should not be deprived of an opportunity to develop a complete factual record to illuminate the full extent of the many harms created by the challenged laws and to contest the (spurious) historical and economic claims asserted by the government in support of these laws. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (factual findings provide the underpinnings of the legal issues for constitutional challenge). The governments motion should be denied. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 19, 2001, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of two laws that do great damage to the public domain, the CTEA and Section 514 of the URAA. The CTEA adds 20 more years of copyright protection both prospectively and retrospectively to subsisting works. For works published before 1978, the renewal term is extended from 47 to 67 years, thus giving a total term of protection of 95 years. For works created in 1978 or later, the CTEA extends the term of copyright from the life of the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years. For works created in 1978 or later that are works-made-for-hire (or anonymous or pseudonymous works), the CTEA extends the term from 75 to 95 years from the year of publication or from 100 to 120 years from the year of creation, whichever comes first. Pub. L. No. 105-298. The CTEA depletes the supply of works from the public domain by preventing any work from entering the public domain for 20 years until the year 2019, at the earliest. The URAA is even more sweeping: it removes thousands of works from the public domain and deprives the public of its free access to these public domain works. To get a sense of the sheer number of works removed from the public domain by the URAA alone, one need look no further than the thousands of Notices of Intent to Enforce (NIEs) restored copyrights filed in the Copyright Office after the enactment of the URAA. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47. Numerous NIEs have been filed for music, films, paintings, books, literary works, photographs, and other artistic works. And these NIEs do not tell the full story, since they are entirely optional: no registration is even required for copyright restoration. Id. ¶ 46. But for the CTEA and URAA, thousands of more works would be available in the public domain. This wholesale depletion of works from the public domain significantly harms plaintiffs, as well as artistic pursuits in this country.
Lead plaintiff Lawrence Golan is the Director of Orchestral Studies, Conductor, and Professor of Conducting at the University of Denvers Lamont School of Music. Compl. ¶ 6. Golan is an acclaimed conductor and violinist, whose professional mission is to bring classical music to new audiences, both young and old. At the University of Denver, Golan teaches students in orchestral music and conducting. He conducts the schools Lamont Symphony Orchestra, which has 67 student members and which performs 6 free symphonic concerts and 1 opera each year in Denver. Id. ¶ 49. Golans ability to select and teach many great classical works has been severely hampered by the CTEA and URAA. Id. ¶¶ 55-57. The extension and restoration of copyrights make many works  which either had been or would have been in the public domain already, and thus free for all to use and copy  simply cost prohibitive. Id. For orchestral works, a copyright allows the copyright holder to exact considerable control over the dissemination of material. Copyrighted works are not sold; they are rented and for a single performance. Each time an orchestra wants to perform a copyrighted work, the orchestra must rent it and then return it back to the copyright holder. Id. ¶ 54. Under this rental scheme, an orchestra with a limited budget (like Lamont Symphony) simply cannot afford the rental of many copyrighted works. That is why the availability of works in the public domain is vital to Golans ability to teach his students.
Because of the CTEA and URAA, however, Golan has much fewer materials from the public domain to teach his students than he had before. Just this past semester, Golan was forced to forgo teaching several notable works  including Shostakovichs Symphony No. 5 and Prokofievs Symphony No. 1  because the URAA has revived copyrights in these formerly public domain works. Had the URRA not been enacted, Golan would have been able to teach his students these important foreign works, which he believes are important for their education and training. Id. ¶ 57. Other musicians around the country have experienced these same harms. Plaintiffs Richard Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings, for example, have been harmed by the CTEAs 20-year extension and the URAAs removal of works from the public domain. Kapp is the renowned conductor of the Philharmonia Virtuosi, which he founded in 1968. Kapps orchestra performs between 60 to 80 public performances each year in places worldwide. Id. ¶¶ 7, 61. Kapp also founded ESS.A.Y Recordings, a record label that records and sells classical music to the public. Id. ¶ 8. The CTEA, however, keeps numerous important classical works from the post World War I era from entering the public domain. These works  written by such luminaries as Ravel, Stravinsky, and Jean Sibelius  would have entered the public domain soon or already, had it not been for the 20-year retrospective extension of their copyrights. Id. ¶ 64. In practical terms, this means that Kapp must pay hundreds of dollars simply to rent the copyrighted music for a single performance of works that would have been available for purchase at a modest price had those works entered the public domain (as they should have under pre-CTEA law). Id. ¶ 65. The URAA has increased even more dramatically the costs of formerly public domain works. These works, which were once available to all for purchase at a relatively low price, now costs Kapp hundreds of dollars simply to rent. Id. ¶ 67. Copyright restoration has also imposed royalty costs on Kapp and ESS.A.Y Recordings for their prior recording of Stravinskys sextet Apollon Musagete. When Kapp recorded this work, it was in the public domain. Kapp chose this work to record specifically because no royalties would have to be paid. But, now, with copyright restoration in the work, royalties are required. The retroactive copyright here destroys Kapps reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id. ¶ 71. Because of copyright restoration, Kapp and ESS.A.Y recordings have started to forgo recording foreign works subject to copyright restoration altogether. Id. ¶ 72. It is now even more costly for Kapps orchestra to perform Peter and the Wolf (by Prokofiev) for young children in New York because this work, which is a favorite among children, has been removed from the public domain and restored to copyright protection. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. The impact of the CTEA and the URAA has been just as severe on plaintiff Symphony of the Canyons, which is a not-for-profit community orchestra based out of Kanab, Utah. Kortney Stirland is the conductor of the Symphony of the Canyons, whose members range in age from 12 to 70 years old. Id. ¶ 73. Because of its limited budget, nearly 80 percent of the music Symphony of the Canyons performs is public domain works. Id. ¶ 74. Symphony of the Canyons greatly anticipated the entry of the works of George Gershwin (such as Rhapsody in Blue, Concerto in F, Cuban Overture, and I Got Rhythm) and Aaron Copland (such as Piano Concerto) into the public domain. Many of these works would have been in the public domain soon or already, had it not been for the CTEA. Because the copyrights to these works have been prolonged for another 20 years, Symphony of the Canyons cannot afford to rent or perform the music. Id. ¶ 75. Many members of the Symphony of the Canyons will get no opportunity to learn or play these important American works. To wait another 20 years for them might as well be forever. The challenged laws have also harmed plaintiffs Ron Hall and John McDonough, who sell public domain films to the public. Id. ¶¶ 78, 84. Because of the CTEA, they cannot sell whole classes of silent and early sound films from 1923 on  such as Harold Lloyds Safety Lost (1923), which was selected by the American Film Institute as one of the Top 100 Most Thrilling Movies ever made. Id. ¶¶ 81, 87. Nor will plaintiffs be able to add any more new public domain works (i.e., works whose copyrights have just expired and thus just entered the public domain) for sale until the year 2019. This loss of supply of new works to the public domain is devastating to plaintiffs. Just imagine maintaining a business that can sell no new products for at least 20 more years. Plaintiffs have also been severely harmed by the URAA. Because of the URAA, whole stockpiles of their foreign titles (including classic movies by Alfred Hitchcock and other renowned directors) have been rendered valueless because they are subject to the exclusive control of the restored copyright holder. Id. ¶¶ 78-90. Because the URAA even purports to abrogate the first sale doctrine (which allows a purchaser of a copyrighted work the right to sell or rent that particular copy), 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), plaintiffs cannot even sell or rent the copies of the works that they now own. Compl. ¶ 41. The CTEA and URAA also impair plaintiffs ability to preserve old films (which are made on material that deteriorates over time). Many old films are orphan works because the copyright holders no longer exist, much less care for the preservation of the works. Id. ¶ 89. And perhaps the greatest loss of all is to the American public, which can enjoy much fewer artistic and literary works from the public domain. Id. ¶¶ 35-48, 60, 77, 89-90. These many harms to plaintiffs and the public provide the underpinnings of plaintiffs constitutional challenge. ARGUMENT
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) extends the term of U.S. copyrights, future and subsisting, by another 20 years. It marks the eleventh time in the past 40 years that Congress has extended the term of copyrights.
[FN 1] Though just enacted in 1998, the CTEA has already kept numerous works published in 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926 from entering the public domain. These works were created during the important post World War I era, and include some of the finest works from this country and abroad, such as George Gershwins Rhapsody in Blue and Harold Lloyds film classic Safety Lost. When coupled with the 10 previous term extensions, the CTEA has effectively prevented works published in 1923 through 1945 from entering the public domain. But for these repeated extensions, many of these works would have already entered the public domain  and thus be free for the publics unlimited use. Now, the public must wait until at least the year 2019, if not more. In its brief, the government goes to great lengths to justify this dramatic expansion of the term of copyrights. It invokes international harmonization, posits a national tradition of such copyright term extensions dating back to the First Congress, and asserts that copyright terms  and indeed copyright law as presently written  are beyond challenge under the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. It fails to discuss relevant and contrary authorities from the Supreme Court, and fails even to cite contrary authorities from the Tenth and other circuits. The Government even adopts a more extreme position than the one it advanced to the Supreme Court in its brief opposing the petition for certiorari in Eldred v. Reno.
There is a stopping point to all these arguments. And that is the Constitution. As shown below, the CTEAs 20-year extension of the term of copyrights cannot be justified under the Constitution: it violates the limits on Congress imposed by the Copyright Clause, as well as the First Amendment and substantive due process. Plaintiffs have alleged more than adequate legal grounds in their challenge of the CTEA in Counts 1 through 3. The governments motion should be denied. A. The CTEA Violates the Copyright Clause
The CTEA extends the terms of copyrights both prospectively to future copyrights for works produced after the CTEA became effective and retrospectively to copyrights that were already in existence. Pub. L. No. 105-298 (1998). In Count 1, Plaintiffs challenge is limited to the CTEAs retrospective extension of the terms of copyrights already in existence before the CTEA. This retrospective extension violates three separate limitations of the Copyright Clause.
[FN 2] Compl. ¶¶ 91-100.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This Clause is unique among the grants of power in Article I in setting forth not only the grant of power, but also the means by which the grant of power is to be exercised. Congress is given the power to do Y by means of X. Specifically, Congress is granted the power to promote progress by means of securing limited copyrights to authors. Congress cannot go beyond either the grant of power or the specified means. The CTEAs retrospective extension, however, violates both. It does not promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts  which, under the law of the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit (and directly contrary to the D.C. Circuit), imposes limits on what Congress may do. Nor does it satisfy the requirement of securing for limited Times copyrights to authors. It also violates the constitutional requirement of originality. Although the government relies heavily on Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), that is not the law of this Circuit. Tenth Circuit case law does not support the Eldred decision or the governments argument (which cites only one Tenth Circuit case and just in passing in its entire brief, Govt Mem. 10).
The standard of review for plaintiffs challenge to the CTEAs retrospective extension is, as explained below, whether (1) the CTEAs retrospective extension promotes progress, (2) whether it is for limited Times in light of the grant of power, and (3) whether it satisfies the originality requirement. Contrary to the governments apparent assumption, rational basis review is not the standard for the Copyright Clause. If it were, then there could be no originality requirement  which is contrary to the Supreme Courts ruling in Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). There, in interpreting the Copyright Clause, the Court held that originality (some modicum of creativity) is a constitutional requirement to obtain a copyright. Id. at 346-48. The Court looked not to the possible benefits of allowing compilations of fact to be copyrighted, but to whether it in fact promoted progress. Id. at 350 (originality requirement is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art). 2. The CTEA Does Not Promote the Progress of Science
Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. That Clause is, as the Supreme Court has repeated, both a grant of power and a limitation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (emphasis added). A central limitation is imposed by the words [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. By these words, Congresss power is qualified and limited to the promotion of advances in the useful arts and progress of science. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
[FN 3] This is, as the Court admonished, 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
But the government proposes here to do just that, to ignore the text of the Constitution and turn the phrase to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts into mere surplusage. To justify this extreme position, the government relies principally on Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehg en banc denied, 255 F.3d 849 (2001), in which the D.C. Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the constitutionality of the CTEA. (A petition for certiorari is pending in the case, No. 01-618.) In the governments view, as long as the term of copyright has a finite number  10, 100, or presumably even 1,000 years  Congress can do whatever it wants. Govt Mem. 6-7. Under the Clause, Congress may extend the terms of already existing copyrights, regardless of whether it promotes the Progress of Science, because in the governments (and D.C. Circuits view) the express purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause imposes no limit on Congresss power. Id. at 9. The law of the D.C. Circuit, however, is clearly not the law of the Tenth Circuit. Under the settled law of the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court  both of which the government wholly ignores  the phrase to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts imposes limits on Congresss power. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added); Blish, Mize & Silliman Hardware v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., 236 F.2d 913, 915 (10th Cir. 1956).
[FN 4] These limits include both express limits imposed by the text of the Copyright and Patent Clause, and implied limits emanating therefrom, such as the requirement of originality. See Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
[FN 5] The Tenth Circuit has adopted the approach of Graham in recognizing that to promote the Progress of Science imposes limits on Congress. Indeed, even before the Supreme Court decided Graham, the Tenth Circuit foreshadowed the position eventually adopted by the Court. In Blish, Mize & Silliman Hardware Co. v. Time Saver Tools, Inc., 236 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1956), the Tenth Circuit held that Congress did not  and indeed could not  enact a patent law that abrogated or diminished the standard of patentability that had been long recognized by courts. As the Court of Appeals explained, that concept is inherent in the constitutional purpose To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. Id. at 915 (emphasis added). That is precisely the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Graham, when it stated: Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge from the public domain are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added). Thus, Congress is forbidden from giving a patent for simple (and obvious) advancements to existing inventions because it would not promote the useful arts. And the reason is manifest: giving patents to inventions that are obvious does not build upon the existing knowledge at all; the public already has the know-how to build the obvious.
Since Time Saver Tools and Gates Rubber are the law of this Circuit, the governments argument (based on Eldred) here is simply foreclosed. As the Tenth Circuit long ago recognized, there are limits on the grant of power to Congress that are inherent in the words To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To find these limits one need look no further than the text of the Constitution.
[FN 6] As Judge Sentelle argued in dissent in Eldred, the text of Article I, section 8, imposes limits on what Congress may do. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part). Thus, the same language that serves as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power also serves to limit that power. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (interpreting § 5 of the 14th Amendment). In determining those limits, as Judge Sentelle explained, courts should follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and start with first principles. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381. The governing first principle in Lopez and in the matter before us is that [t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. Id. Accordingly, in Lopez, the Court looked to the text of the Commerce Clause in order to define the outer limits of Congresss commerce power. 514 U.S. at 553 (limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause). The Court rejected the governments arguments that would, if accepted, render Congresss power limitless. Id. at 564. In a system of enumerated powers, there must be a stopping point to what Congress may do. Although Lopez involved a commerce clause challenge, the same type of analysis should apply here. Both the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause are grants of power under Article I, § 8. While each clause gives Congress discretion to enact laws, that discretion is subject to the textual limitations built into the particular clause. Indeed, the Copyright Clause presents an even stronger textual basis for discerning those limits because it, unlike other grants, expressly defines the goal of its grant  to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.
[FN 7] Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824) (If * * * there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially when the objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction.). As Judge Sentelle further explained, this concept of outer limits to enumerated powers applies not only to the Commerce Clause, but to all enumerated powers, including the Copyright Clause. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381. Just as in Lopez, a court must examine the extension of congressional authority to areas beyond the core of the enumerated power with a goal of determining whether the rationale offered in support of such an extension has any stopping point * * *. Id. (emphasis added). A court must reject views that have no stopping point and that give Congress essentially unlimited power. Here, that is undeniably the case. The governments proffered justifications give Congress unfettered discretion. In the governments own words: Congress alone must determine what best promotes artistic progress, and the decision on how best to effectuate copyright protection is committed by the Constitution to Congress alone. Govt Mem. 9. But this is plainly incorrect. As Judge Sentelle explained in Eldred:
The government purports to find a national tradition of extending the terms of subsisting copyrights dating all the way back to the First Congress and first Copyright Act. Govt Mem. 2, 14-15. But that argument is wrong on both the facts and the law, and does not provide a legitimate ground for dismissal. First, it is simply false to characterize the first Copyright Act as an extension of copyright terms. As the Supreme Court has already stated: Congress * * * by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right * * *, created it. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (the Congress did not sanction an existing right, but created a new one). Before the Copyright Act of 1790, there were no federal statutory copyrights that could be extended for the simple reason that none existed until the Act. The Copyright Act of 1790 thus can tell us nothing about extensions of copyright terms because the creation of a new federal right does not amount to an extension of a subsisting copyright. In Eldred, the government conceded as much, asserting in its brief to the D.C. Circuit: No court has ever equated extending a subsisting copyright to granting a new copyright. Govt Eldred Brief of Appellee at 35.
Second, the historical background to both the Copyright Act of 1790 and the Copyright Clause demonstrate that the First Congresss intent in granting copyrights to works already printed was to limit, not to extend, the term of all copyrights. By subjecting all works to federal copyright, the first Copyright Act could effectively limit the potentially perpetual term of common law copyrights. The government misunderstands the significance of common law copyright to the development of our federal copyright law. The creation of our federal copyright system occurred closely following the resolution of an important debate in England over the Statute of Anne (1710) and its effect on common law copyrights, which were considered to be perpetual. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing the Framers reliance on development of copyright law in England and the Statute of Anne in drafting Copyright Clause); Walterscheid, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. at 318-347. In Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769 K.B.), the English court held that common law copyright was perpetual and survived publication as well as the Statute of Anne. That decision, however, was overruled in Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774). The House of Lords held that the Statute of Anne divests the author of any common law copyright upon publication of the work. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 4.13, at 4-13 to 4-14; Walterscheid, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. at 344. This limited statutory copyright thus was meant to encourage creativity and ensure that the public would have free access to information by putting an end to the continued use of copyright as a device of censorship. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1260. This debate undoubtedly influenced the drafter