Source: http://www.calblogofappeal.com/page/2/
Timestamp: 2020-01-20 18:44:08
Document Index: 353856964

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 657', '§ 1285', '§ 1294', '§ 1', '§ 1280', '§ 1086', '§ 895', '§ 1086', '§ 425', '§ 659', '§ 660', '§ 659', '§ 664', '§ 128']

The California Blog of Appeal | California Appeals Attorney Greg May on Practice and Developments in the State's Appellate Courts | Page 2
Jargon-filled, academic writing has no place in your briefing on appeal — but does it have its place?
Posted on September 11, 2015 by Greg May
Ben Balter via Compfight
Maybe so, according to Professor Cass Sunstein of Harvard Law School, if this abstract for his article summarizes it accurately:
Many people, including many lawyers and judges, disparage law reviews (and the books that sometimes result from them) on the ground that they often deal with abstruse topics, of little interest to the bar, and are sometimes full of jargon-filled, excessively academic, and sometimes impenetrable writing. Some of the objections are warranted, but at their best, law reviews show a high level of rigor, discipline, and care; they have a kind of internal morality. What might seem to be jargon is often a product of specialization, similar to what is observed in other fields (such as economics, psychology, and philosophy). Much academic writing in law is not intended for the bar, at least not in the short-term, but that is not a problem: Such writing is meant to add to the stock of knowledge. If it succeeds, it can have significant long-term effects, potentially affecting what everyone takes to be “common sense.”
Professor Sunstein’s paper is called In Praise of Law Reviews (And Jargon-Filled, Academic Writing), and is available as a free download at the Social Science Research Network.
Filed Under: Legal Writing | 1 Comment
“Close” counts in horseshoes and hand grenades, but not when it comes to identifying “new” evidence in a new trial motion
Posted on September 10, 2015 by Greg May
Annie & John via Compfight
For purposes of a new trial motion, evidence is considered “newly discovered” if the party seeking the new trial “could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced [the evidence] at trial.” (Code Civ. proc., § 657, subd. 4.) Suppose the evidence is available just a few days before trial, but expert analysis can’t be completed until afterward?
That’s easy, you day. It’s trial, for crying out loud! You get your expert on it right away!
Let’s see if your answer is the same under the facts of Shiffer v. CBS Corp., case no. A139388 (1st Dist., Sept. 8, 2015), an asbestos exposure case, in which the new trial motion was filed after the defendant prevailed on its summary judgment motion rather than after a trial. In opposition to the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff’s proffered evidence of his “bystander” exposure to asbestos during the installation of piping insulation at a power plant, but it was considered inadequate.
When plaintiff moved for a new trial, he proffered a new declaration from one of his experts, dated two weeks after the summary judgment hearing, that asserted a new theory of “re-entrainment” exposure (asbestos fibers re-entering the air upon being disturbed). The expert based his analysis on two documents plaintiff had received in discovery about a month prior to the summary judgment hearing and the deposition testimony of one of defendant’s experts, who was deposed about the documents four days before the hearing. The expert had signed his original declaration in opposition to summary judgment between the time plaintiff received the documents and the deposition of defendant’s expert, which plaintiff’s expert apparently did not attend.
That’s a tight timeline, to be sure, if the opinion could only be proffered after the deposition of the defense expert, but all of the information necessary for the revised opinion was in plaintiff’s hands prior to the hearing, and that is enough for the court to find that there is no new evidence here. The court cited a case holding that “depositions conducted on [the] eve of summary judgment do not generate new facts.”
The plaintiff knew very well that the use of asbestos has caused significant damage and now just wants to prove this in the case . While researching more about asbestos I came across a Asbestos removal Perth website and saw how it has taken the initiative of completely removing the use of asbestos from various places. This form of an initiative is extremely good as they know the significant amount of damage it causes to a person’s health and are now helping various people get rid of asbestos before it affects them.
The court states there was “no justification for the delay,” but does not detail any argument by which plaintiff tried to justify it. One presumes that plaintiff argued that the documents received a month before the hearing did not allow for the supplemental opinion without the testimony of the defense expert, given just days before the hearing. But even if the plaintiffs could establish this, it seems like the court would have found the plaintiff had enough lead time, for the court also notes that the transcript of the deposition taken just days before the hearing was only 37 pages long.
Lesson learned: Don’t put off discovery to the last minute, especially when opposing a summary judgment motion. Had these depositions been conducted just a week or two earlier, plaintiff’s expert likely would have been able to formulate his conclusions prior to the hearing. If you do get jammed on discovery, at least get the rough transcripts to your experts. And, finally, why not have your expert attend the deposition of his counterpart? Yes, it will cost a few dollars, but they would have been dollars well spent in this case.
Filed Under: New Trials, Post-Trial Practice | 1 Comment
No appeal from order vacating partial arbitration award
Posted on September 9, 2015 by Greg May
One of the frustrations for parties forced to arbitrate their claims rather than pursue them in court is the unavailability of a direct route of appeal from the arbitration award. Generally, the only way to get out from under an adverse award is to petition the superior court to vacate the award (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285 et seq.), and then only on very limited grounds such as fraud, corruption, or misconduct by the arbitrator, generally unrelated to the substantive merits of the decision. If you’re on the other side — i.e., you were the prevailing party in the arbitration — you can take some comfort from the fact that if the loser in arbitration successfully gets the award vacated, you can appeal that order, unless it includes an order for a rehearing in arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (c).)
But that’s not always the case. In a decision late last year, Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 619, the Court of Appeal held that when the arbitration award that is vacated fails to dispose of all arbitrable issues, the order vacating the partial award is not appealable. The appellant had procured a “clause construction award” that construed the arbitration clause to allow arbitration of class and representative claims but left the merits of those claims to later hearings. Respondent successfully petitioned the trial court to vacate the award, and the appeal followed.
After some interesting discussion about the degree to which the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) governs California arbitration procedure, the court finds that appealability of the order is governed by California state law rather then the FAA, and turns next to to the language in the California Arbitration Act. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) Noting the plain language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1294, subdivision (c), that an aggrieved party may appeal from an “order vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered,” and further noting that no rehearing was ordered, the court notes that the issue presented is “whether the trial court’s order in this case vacated an arbitration ‘award.’ ”
If that seems like a slam dunk, think again. The CAA provides that an “award” must “include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy.” Since the order in this case concerned only clause construction and left other issues for future hearings, there was no appeal from the order vacating the “award.”
This closely parallels the requirement that a superior court judgment be “final,” resolving all issues among the parties, in order to be appealable. The court notes that the same policy reasons underscoring this “one final judgment” rule also support requiring a final arbitration award as a condition of appeal from an order vacating it. Without such a limitation, the court reasons, all manner of interim arbitration awards could result in appeal from orders vacating them, defeating arbitration’s intended role as “a quick and efficient form of alternative dispute resolution.” Moreover, says the court, it would be anomalous to allow appeal from orders vacating arbitration awards when no appeal would lie from their counterparts in a civil action.
The obvious question left unanswered by Judge is whether the superior court has jurisdiction to hear a petition to confirm or vacate an interim award in the first place. The court explicitly noted the issue was left hanging, since it had no occasion to decide it, but opined that a superior court’s jurisdiction in such a case is doubtful, and implicitly encouraged the appellant to file a motion fore reconsideration in the trial court upon remand. (232 Cal.App.4th at p. 634, fn. 12.) From what I can tell from the somewhat cryptic online docket for the superior court, it looks like the appellant did just that, and the motion is still under consideration as of this writing. Another trip to the Court of Appeal in the near future seems likely.
Filed Under: ADR, Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Arbitration
Construction defect case demonstrates a “two-fer” on grounds for obtaining review by petition for writ of mandamus
Posted on August 28, 2015 by Greg May
I frequently get calls from prospective clients who are “rarin’ to go” on a writ petition to challenge a trial court ruling that has them outraged but is not immediately appealable. That “rarin’ to go” attitude usually does not last beyond the point where I tell them that more than 90% of writ petitions are summarily dismissed without the petitioner ever being heard on the merits. That news usually significantly diminishes the will to petition the Court of Appeal, even as it intensifies the prospect’s outrage, as the prospect feels aggrieved not just by the trial court ruling but also by the fact that the odds of any recourse are so slim.
That’s because writ review in the Court of Appeal is discretionary. Even before convincing the appellate court the trial court erred, the petitioner must convince the appellate court that its petition should be heard on the merits. One can do this by demonstrating that an appeal after final judgment would afford inadequate relief (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), that the ruling threatens disclosure of privileged documents (or otherwise rings a bell that cannot be unrung), or that the issue presented is one of first impression on which the trial courts require guidance or which is important to a state industry.
In McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court, case no. F069370 (5th Dist., Aug. 27, 2015), the Court of Appeal spells out plainly two reasons it granted review in a construction defect case in which homeowners sued their contractor. The contractor sought a stay of the action until the plaintiffs complied with the prelitigation procedures of the Right to Repair Act (the “Act,” Civ. Code, §§ 895 et seq.), which requires the plaintiffs to “give notice of the claimed defects to the builder and engage in a nonadversarial prelitigation procedure, which affords the builder an opportunity to attempt to repair the defects.” Plaintiffs broke off negotiations regarding a stay, dismissed their statutory cause of action under the Act, and asserted that they were not obligated to comply with the prelitigation procedures of the Act to pursue their remaining common law causes of action. The contractor moved for a stay of proceedings pending compliance with the prelitigation procedures and, when the trial court denied it, petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its ruling and grant the motion for a stay.
Before holding that the plaintiffs were still required to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures despite dismissing their only cause of action asserted under the Act, the court gave a very clear statement of why it granted review on the merits. First, the contractor had “no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) The court points out that if the contractor were forced to wait for a final judgment to challenge the ruling, it would lose the benefits of any stay it was entitled to pending compliance with prelitigation procedures, even if it prevailed on appeal. Second, the issue presented could escape review entirely if not heard in a writ proceeding, despite being “an issue of first impression, which is of interest to builders, home buyers, their attorneys, and others.” Though the court did not mention the fact, two building trade associations submitted Amicus briefs on behalf of the contractor, demonstrating the importance of the issue to a major industry.
Kudos to the court for being so straightforward in explaining why it reviewed the petition on the merits. Too often, writ opinions are ambiguous on the point.
Filed Under: Mandamus/Prohibition, Writ Practice, Writ Review
Sixth District Court of Appeal offers the legislature some advice on amending the anti-SLAPP statute
Posted on August 27, 2015 by Greg May
A different kind of SLAP (Photo courtesy of Gabe via Compfight)
If you just lost your appeal, handled by attorneys at a high-powered law firm, with fees approaching – oh, heck, who knows, but three lawyers billing at a “BigLaw” firm have to run up a pretty hefty bill on a case potentially worth billions of dollars – you might not be happy with language in the introduction of the opinion characterizing your appeal as “utterly without merit” and noting that the court declined imposing sanctions only because the court did “not wish to further delay the long-overdue trial of the merits of [the] action.”
That’s exactly how the court opened its opinion in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp., case no. H039507 (6th Dist. Aug. 27, 2015). If you guessed that the case is an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), give yourself a gold star. (Or maybe not — I mentioned anti-SLAPP in the title of this post, after all.)
The opinion is a good read if, like many, you believe that use of the anti-SLAPP statute has gotten out of hand. Indeed, the opinion cites another case’s reference to the “explosion of anti-SLAPP motions.” There’s simply too much in the opinion to try to summarize it here, so I’ll refer you to it for the nitty-gritty, and note just a few highlights.
On what does the Court of Appeal blame this explosion? The availability of immediate appeal when the motion is denied, that’s what:
A major reason for this explosion is that the statute rewards the filer of an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion with what one court has called a “free time-out” from further litigation in the trial court.The statute does this by entitling the unsuccessful movant to immediately appeal the denial of such a motion—even one like Oracle’s, which wholly lacks merit, attacks only a small part of the plaintiff’s case, and is heard nearly two years into the lawsuit, and on the day before a scheduled trial. Such an appeal automatically stays all further trial proceedings on causes of action “affected by the motion.” This means that however unsound an anti-SLAPP motion may be, it will typically stop the entire lawsuit dead in its tracks until an appellate court completes its review.
(Footnotes and citations omitted.)
The court argues that the anti-SLAPP “cure” is worse than the disease it was meant to address — the filing of meritless suits designed to chill participation in the public arena. “It is as if a city had decided to cure an illness afflicting a few of its residents by lacing the water supply with a chemical that would indeed cure those sufferers, but would sicken a larger number of previously healthy citizens.”
The opinion closes with the court’s recommendation for amendment of the anti-SLAPP statute:
In this regard, we offer the suggestion that one simple fix might substantially reduce the motivation to abuse the anti-SLAPP procedure: Limit the right to interlocutory appeal to denials, and allow them only where the motion (1) is filed within the allotted 60 days, and (2) would—if granted—dispose of the entire action. Where either of those conditions is lacking, the motion can rarely if ever achieve any real saving of time or money, and an appeal can only have the opposite effect. Such an amendment would limit invocation of the statute to cases where it may serve its stated purpose and greatly reduce its tactical utility in many if not most of the situations where it is now being most sorely abused.
As a “BigLaw” refugee, my favorite part of the opinion is the court’s lament that sanctions for frivolous appeals are not a very good deterrent against abuse of the anti-SLAPP statute:
But a prompt dismissal, even of a frivolous appeal, is not always feasible. In this case, HP’s motion to dismiss the appeal was supported by four volumes of exhibits, which Oracle answered with another five volumes, with the result that the motion essentially duplicated the appeal itself. Top-drawer legal representation, such as both parties have engaged here, can obscure the core frivolousness of an appeal beneath layers of artful obfuscation which only the most painstaking examination can peel away. And where the stakes are high enough—as they certainly are here, judging from the multi-billion-dollar figures put forward by HP’s experts on damages—the threat or even the certain prospect of sanctions may not alter the economic calculus that makes an anti-SLAPP motion, and ensuing appeal, so attractive.
(Emphasis added.) Sounds like Maybe Oracle got its money’s worth after all.
One last thing. Remember how it looked like Oracle had dodged the bullet of having to pay Hewlett-Packard’s attorney fees, since the Court of Appeal declined to impose sanctions? If I were Oracle, I wouldn’t quite count on it.
Filed Under: Anti-SLAPP, Appeals, Courts, Sanctions | 1 Comment
Friday Appellate Humor
Posted on August 21, 2015 by Greg May
Here’s the graphic from a good New Yorker cartoon about appeals:
Click the image for the punchline
To avoid exceeding fair use, I’ve left off the punchline. Here’s a clue: there’s only one judge on the bench, so you know this cartoon depicts the trial court instead of the appellate court.
To see the punchline, click here or click the image. If you have any ideas for your own punchline, why not share them in the comments?
Some technical help for e-filing in the Court of Appeal
Posted on August 20, 2015 by Greg May
This week, the Second District Court of Appeal published a terrific guide for creating electronic documents. (PDF link) The guide is broken down into a section on briefs and a section on appendices, and is meant as a technical guide, not a set of rules for filing. It is thus helpful regardless of the district your appeal is in.
The guide provides the nitty-gritty detailed steps, with illustrations, for creating, editing, and formatting documents for electronic filing, including instructions for safely and securely redacting information, adding bookmarks, and making scanned documents text-searchable, among other things. Unfortunately, instructions on hyperlinking have been deferred to a future edition.
I wouldn’t quite call it Electronic Filing for Dummies, though it will be helpful even for those who don’t know a PDF from a DOC and think Adobe Acrobat is a circus performer. I consider myself pretty tech-savvy on PDF creation and manipulation, and I still learned from it.
I think the guide will be particularly helpful for solos, who don’t always have the staff to handle the tech side of things and must rely on a DYI approach. However, the use of Adobe Acrobat, the PDF application used in the guide, can be cost-prohibitive for solos on a budget (though I believe it is now available through a monthly subscription). Keep in mind that there are alternative, less expensive PDF applications that can probably do everything you need for electronic filing, including PDF Pen for the Mac and Nitro Pro for the PC. (I have used both, but I am not endorsing either of them. Both offer free trials, so you can be sure they do what you need before purchasing.) I use Acrobat now because it came free with my Fujitsu ScanSnap scanner (an awesome piece of hardware).
Don’t forget that e-filing practices are not uniform throughout the state. Always check the particular procedures for your district. But this guide should help you no matter where you practice.
Filed Under: Announcements, e-Filing, Legal Technology
The Court of Appeal Time Machine – Interest Calculations on Modified Judgments
Posted on August 19, 2015 by Greg May
Still from The Time Machine (1960)
If you obtained a judgment against your former client for over $7.7 million, and had the court of appeal knock it down to around $1.7 million, and the trial court entered judgment in that reduced amount 14 months after the date of the original judgment, you would want interest to run on the judgment — even from the reduced amount — from the date of the original judgment, right? Of course you would. After all, 14 months of interest at a simple 10% on the $1.7 million amount is nearly $200,000. That’s not pocket change. (Well, not for me, anyway.)
But in Chodos v. Borman, case no. B260326 (2d Dist. August 18, 2015), the trial court ordered that interest on the judgment was to run only from the date of entry of the later judgment entered after the original appeal. That’s $200,000 up in smoke. Chodos, the judgment creditor, appealed.
And wins. The Court of Appeal points out that whether interest runs from the date of the original judgment or the date of the later judgment depends on whether its disposition in the original appeal amounted to a reversal of the judgment (in which case interest would run from the later judgment only) or merely a modification of the judgment (in which case the interest would run from the date of the original judgment).
Well, that should be an easy question, right? After all, the court knows what it did in the last appeal. But let’s just say it was not obvious to everyone. The trial court got it wrong.
As in many areas of the law, one must look past the form of the Court of Appeal’s prior opinion and identify its substance. The court had phrased its disposition in the prior appeal as a reversal:
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a new judgment based on that portion of the special verdict form that awarded the attorney a $1.8 million lodestar amount based on the jury’s finding of a reasonable hourly rate of $1,000 and a reasonable number of hours expended on the two divorce cases and the Marvin action of 1,800. As it did in the original judgment, the trial court shall make adjustments to the $1.8 million award by adding the amount of $24,921 and deducting the amount of $107,000.
Despite the use of the word “reversed,” however, the disposition was really a mere modification of the judgment. It directed the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of the original prevailing party in a reduced amount, rather than returning the case to theatrical court for any further hearings on the amount of the judgment.
Thus, appellant is able to “return” to the date of the original judgment via the Court of Appeal Time Machine, and watch the interest accrue from that date.
Filed Under: Decision on Appeal, Judgment | Tagged: interest, judgments | 1 Comment
The standard of review on appeal regarding enforceability of arbitration clauses
Posted on August 18, 2015 by Greg May
As I’ve mentioned before, the standard of review is not always clear. One sometimes has to “drill down” past the obvious, and the “abuse of discretion” standard is full of nuance. The parties’ briefs may even fight over which is the correct standard of review to apply, or the cases may be split on the issue. Sometimes, where the standard is in dispute, it doesn’t matter, because the outcome is the same under either standard.
There is no question as to what standard of review applies in yesterday’s decision in Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc., case no. A142219 (1st Dist., August 17, 2015), but the case nonetheless has a lesson in careful application of the standard of review. The appeal was from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. The court begins its discussion of the standard of review by announcing “There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a motion to compel arbitration.”
Well, if there is no uniform standard, how do you decide what standard applies to your case? It’s hard to answer that question any more succinctly than the court, so I’ll let the court do it:
If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard. [Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.
In this case the trial court made factual findings based on at least some material disputed evidence. From those findings, the trial court concluded that Home’s Agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and should not be enforced. Accordingly, [t]o the extent there are material facts in dispute, we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts when supported by substantial evidence; we presume the court found every fact and drew every permissible inference necessary to support its judgment.
Some easy examples are cited in one of the cases cited in Carlson. In Robertson v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, the order denying the motion to compel arbitration was based on the trial court’s conclusion that the arbitration agreement violated a statute. Since this presented a purely legal question of statutory interpretation, review was de novo. Robertson cited Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416 as an example where review for substantial evidence was appropriate, because the order in that case was based on the trial court’s factual finding that the parties never reached agreement on arbitration.
Craig suggests that this analysis is apparently required whenever the validity of an arbitration clause is at issue on appeal, not just on appeals from orders denying a motion to compel arbitration. Craig was an appeal from a final judgment confirming an arbitration award after a motion to compel arbitration had been granted. Yet, Robertson cited to it as an example of how to apply the standard of review.
Filed Under: Arbitration, Standard of Review, Statutory Construction
Mandatory E-filing comes to the Third District Court of Appeal
Posted on August 12, 2015 by Greg May
Details here. The court has adopted a new Local Rule 5 covering e-filing procedures, which become effective September 14. It looks like documents need to be filed through the proprietary TrueFiling system. If you have an appeal pending in the third district now, make sure you register for the e-filing system promptly.
Filed Under: Announcements, Appellate Procedure, Courts, Legal Technology
How hanging out with the wrong crowd might doom your appeal of your criminal conviction
Don’t be too alarmed at the title of this post. I’m not saying that the Court of Appeal will take the character of your known friends into account when deciding your appeal. I’m referring to convictions arising out allegations that members of a small group participated in a crime together. If there is no direct evidence that a particular defendant did any particular act, might being one of the group on the scene be enough to convict?
That all depends on what the defendant did with the group and what the group did. In In re Kevin F. (People v. Kevin F.), case no. A140445 (1st Dist., August 10, 2015), the court found the evidence supported a robbery conviction despite the absence of any direct evidence that the defendant himself assaulted the victim or took any of his property.
The defendant (referred to as “Minor” in the opinion) was with a group of three or four men that struck up a conversation with the victim on a commuter train and then, while walking with the victim afterwards, jumped him and stole several items after they entered a dark alley. The victim could identify which in the group had grabbed and held him while the others punched, but he could not identify who landed which punches and could not even say with certainty that all of them participated in the assault. He could say only that he believed all of them participated because he was “being punched in different directions.” The victim testified that he heard all of the men speaking but he could not tell who said what. The victim pursued the group as they ran away. When he caught up to them, the man who had held the victim took a threatening posture and told the victim, “I have a knife,” after which all of the group ran off. After the assault, the police drove the victim around the neighborhood to see if he recognized anyone. He identified Minor as part of the group that robbed him, but the police found no weapons or any of the victim’s property on Minor.
Now, you might be saying to yourself, how could Minor’s conviction be upheld if nobody testified that he actually took part in the assault or that he took any of the victim’s property? The answer starts with the standard of review as explained by criminal lawyer London Ontario based Phillip Michaels:
“Our review of [Minor’s] substantial evidence claim is governed by the same standard applicable to adult criminal cases. [Citation.] ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “[O]ur role on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, “it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) An appellate court may not reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
The “substantial evidence” threshold doesn’t seem real hard to meet, does it? As you might expect, appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction are notoriously hard to win.
Here, the court finds there is substantial evidence supporting a conviction, because there is evidence that: Minor was in the group that the victim met on the train; Minor introduced himself to the victim; Minor was still with the group when it got off the train, and waited outside a liquor store while the victim purchased cigarettes; Minor was with the group when it entered the alley with the victim; the victim was punched from several directions and thus “believed” everyone in the group punched him; no one in the group told the others to stop; Minor fled with the group after the robbery. Thus, “[The victim’s] testimony that Minor was with the group before, during and after the attack, along with [his] testimony about the attack itself (i.e., the young men punched him from different directions, and no one left or tried to stop the others), allows a reasonable inference that Minor participated in the attack.”
Alternatively, the court in Surrey, Ontario finds that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Minor aided and abetted the robbery. Even if the finder of fact did not believe that Minor actually struck the victim or took any of his property, the court finds that it is reasonable to believe that Minor acted as a lookout to facilitate the robbery because he was with the group the entire time and did not state any objection to the assault and robbery.
Now, it might be that Minor did not assault the victim or take any of his property. He might have wanted no part of the assault and robbery, perhaps even been too scared to move or say anything during the crime, and so frightened of being associated with it (or of having to testify against his friends) that he ran off with the group rather than wait around for the police. But such alternate views do not come into play in substantial evidence review. The question is not whether a factfinder could go wither way based on the evidence. The question is whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, even if a reasonable factfinder could go either way.
In short, when any crime is committed in a group — at least, when committed in a small group of 3 to 6 people — it probably won’t matter that there is no direct evidence that a particular defendant did any specific act. So long as there is evidence that the defendant was part of the group and remained with the group before, during and after the crime, and did not object during the crime, the court is likely to find substantial evidence to support the conviction.
Filed Under: Appellate Procedure, Criminal Law, Standard of Review
Are records on appeal from the Los Angeles Superior Court about to get better?
The headline is not a dig at anyone at the Los Angeles Superior Court (LASC). It refers to the impact of the statewide court budget crunch, which led many courts to stop providing court reporters as a matter of course. Faced with having to engage court reporters on their own, some litigants were foregoing the expense, at risk of having records inadequate to prosecute their appeals.
As a result, parties are appealing decisions without the reporter’s transcript that they would have been able to order under the old system. That can spell trouble for an appeal.
Last Friday, the LASC announced that it is hiring court reporters. Actually, I can’t tell from the announcement whether they are looking for multiple reporters or just trying to fill a single vacant position. Here’s hoping that it’s the former, and that this is a sign of things to come.
UPDATE (4/13/16): According to the 2015 edition of the California Litigation Review*, which hit my mailbox this week. published by the Litigation Section of the California State Bar, the court is “hiring court reporters again,” suggesting the court is restaffing in preparation for providing reporters again. Let’s hope.
*Published by the Litigation Section of the California State Bar.
Filed Under: Announcements, California Courts, Record on Appeal | 1 Comment
Posted on August 10, 2015 by Greg May
Regular readers will note a different look to the blog, which I implemented over the weekend. I actually liked the old look better, but my WordPress upgrade “broke” the Headway theme I used to create it. So, I’ve used a stock WordPress theme, which I was able to customize only in color and font choice. I’ll get back to a custom look once I figure out the new version of Headway, but that may be several months from now.
Upgrading my WordPress installation has significant “back end” benefits for me (most notably, better backup capabilities and comment spam prevention), but also has several benefits for readers. The broken commenting function has been restored, so readers can once again comment on my posts. Take advantage of it! (Look for the “Leave a comment” link to the right of the post categories underneath the social media icons that are under each post.) The social media icons are also new, and make it very easy for readers to share posts via LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, etc. Printing functionality is also greatly improved. Clicking the printer icon in the icon row below a post will create a printer-friendly version of the post.
Readers who currently subscribe via RSS or email should watch for an announcement later this month about changes to the subscription service. I will try to make that as seamless as possible.
Apparently, the law library of the future is going to be one big Kindle
Posted on August 7, 2015 by Greg May
The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute has just published a short essay by Professor Ronald E. Wheeler of Suffolk University Law School, titled “Is This the Law Library or an Episode of the Jetsons?”
The big takeaway: the library is going to resemble a super-advanced Kindle and its patrons will look like they are parts of the Borg Collective:
It will include technologies that we know about and technologies that are beyond our imaginations. Things like retinal and holographic displays are predicted to be in use in the next 5 to 10 years. Lawyers, law professors, and other law library patrons will be browsing touchable, holographic shelves to select volumes instead of walking through the stacks of physical libraries. Intelligent,robotic, personal assistants will be providing clerical and other kinds of support to library researchers. Law library patrons won’t carry around smartphones or tablets. Instead they will work on skin-embedded screens with fingernail displays, brain mapping, brain uploading, and DNA storage.
I encourage you to click the article title above to read Professor Wheeler’s view about what this technology means for how we must adapt our teaching, practicing, and researching of the law. Some, he notes, will have to overcome their thinking that electronic resources are less “scholarly” than print resources.
I will admit to some trepidation over technology, including the use of electronic briefs in appeals and the use of laptops in classrooms, but I’m no Luddite. I have concerns about how technology, or at least the misuse of technology, might undermine legal practice and scholarship. Still, I must admit that a general resistance to change and plain old nostalgia influence my thinking. Will today’s younger generation, seemingly so eager to embrace change, have the same nostalgia for their own “good old days” technology? Even the lawyers trained on the technology Professor Wheeler describes might lament the more advanced, “newfangled” technology that displaces the technology they used at the beginnings of their careers.
By the way, I stole that Kindle joke from an exceptionally funny Portlandia skit. Since it’s Friday afternoon, and we probably all deserve a laugh, here it is:
Filed Under: Legal Education, Legal Research, Legal Technology
California Supreme Court invites your comment on proposed changes to publication rules involving cases accepted for review
Posted on July 30, 2015 by Greg May
I expect that in this age of electronic research, most lawyers have experienced the frustration of finding the “perfect” case, only to learn it is unpublished and therefore could not be cited as precedent. (See rule 8.1115(a), Cal. Rules of Court.) Even in the “old days,” when research was limited to hard copy books, you could still find the perfect cases whisked out from under you, either because it was later disapproved or, more frustratingly, had been accepted for review by the Supreme Court, which has the effect of automatically de-publishing the case. (See rule 8.1105(e)(1), Cal. Rules of Court.)
That may change. Yesterday, the Supreme Court posted for comment some proposed changes to this scheme.The upshot is that there would be a 180-degree change in the rule, so that published cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court would remain published, with a notation that the case has been accepted for review.
Where things get interesting is in the related issue of the precedential effect of such cases. If cases on review remain published, should they have the same precedential value they had prior to being accepted for review? That’s one proposal (but it also has a provision that the Supreme Court could explicitly limit the precedential value of the decision. The second proposal is that such decisions would not be binding and could be cited only for persuasive value.
The proposal generated quite a bit of buzz on the Los Angeles County Bar Association Appellate Courts Section listerv yesterday. The “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” caucus seemed to win the day.
Of course, not everyone agrees that the current system “ain’t broke.” There is an organization dedicated to advocacy for publication of all Court of Appeal opinions. Several years ago, a law firm even sued the Supreme Court over its publication rules.
The issue of the precedential value of cases accepted for review is of concern beyond the appellate community, of course. Published decisions of the Court of Appeal, regardless of the district in which the decision was rendered, are binding on trial courts statewide. Where there are conflicting appellate court decisions, a trial court is free to choose which it will apply.
Since conflicts among the Court of Appeal often generate review by the Supreme Court, trial courts are forced under the current rules not to rely on the more recent decision and treat the earlier one as binding. Someone on the listserv pointed out yesterday that this is unfair, and I tend to agree. After all, where review is granted because of a conflict between two cases, the Supreme Court is likely to disapprove one or the other of them rather than reconcile them. In other words, since the fate of both cases lies in the balance, why should one have greater precedential value than the other?
If you wish to offer the Supreme Court your comments on the proposal, you must do so by September 25, 2015.
Update: Horrendously embarrassing typo in headline fixed!
Filed Under: Announcements, California Supreme Court, Stare Decisis
The appellate angle in Marriage of Davis
Posted on July 23, 2015 by Greg May
Family law attorneys are buzzing this week about Monday’s unanimous Supreme Court decision in Marriage of Davis, case no. S215050 (July 20, 2015). The Metropolitan News-Enterprise summed up the holding this way: “A married person cannot be considered separated, and thus permitted to keep his or her earnings as separate property, while continuing to live with his or her spouse[.]” The court itself referred to its ruling as a “bright-line” rule.
Not so fast, folks. My friend Claudia Ribet has a column in today’s Daily Journal (link requires subscription) discussing the subtleties in the decision and concurring opinion, concluding that it may not even reduce litigation over the “separate and apart” issue very much.
I’ll leave that debate to the family law attorneys for now. If you are looking for a family law lawyer visit ramsdenlaw.com.au/family-law/.
I, of course, am interested in what this decision teaches us about approaching appeals. The obvious lesson is this: an appellant needs to carefully consider the standard of review and, if at all possible, frame an issue on appeal subject to de novo review, in which the appellate court reviews the ruling without any deference to the trial court’s ruling or rationale, as if the case was being decided anew.
As the Supreme Court notes at the outset of its analysis, the date of separation “is normally a factual issue to be reviewed for substantial evidence.” However, the appellant raises an issue of statutory interpretation of Family Code section 771, subdivision (a), thus invoking the more favorable de novo standard of review, and prevails. Contact a divorce attorney in Scottsdale AZ if you want to get compassionate, attentive, and personalized client service throughout each case.
In this case, it probably was not too hard for appellant to realize how to latch onto an issue subject to de novo review, since the trial court’s decision went against a court of appeal opinion establishing separate residences a “threshold requirement” of living “separate and apart” for purposes of the statute. Voilà! De novo review of statutory interpretation.
It’s not always that easy. For more difficult cases, see this post and this one.
Filed Under: Appellate Procedure, Community Property, Family Law, Standard of Review
Congrats and thank you to the new TEN Networks Blog (and welcome, TEN members!)
The TEN Networks, Inc. launched its blog last week, and the editors graciously designated The California Blog of Appeal as one of its Member Blogs of the Month, along with with Elderupdates.com, the blog of Encino elder law attorney Brian Shepphard.
The TEN Networks is the umbrella organization for two business networking groups: The Esquire Network, a fantastic attorney group with a unique meeting structure, of which I am an enthusiastic member; and The Executive Network, which is open to other professionals. I encourage you to check them out.
Finally, how fortuitous (divine?) that TEN’s new blog would honor this one around the time I made my shameless plea for nominations for 2015 Legal Blog of the Year!
Filed Under: Announcements, Blogging
Shameless request for nominations
Posted on July 17, 2015 by Greg May
Expert witness service The Expert Institute is taking nominations for entries in its 2015 Best Legal Blog Contest.
OK, here comes the shameless part.
Whether you are a years-long fanatical subscriber to this blog whose first action every morning upon waking is to grab your iPhone off your nightstand and check your RSS reader to see if there are any updates to this blog, or someone who just came across this blog yesterday, give some thought to nominating this blog. If you do, you should nominate it in the “niche” category. (If Best Blog By A Guy Who Does The Best He Can With The Time He Has Blogging About Things Like Appellate Procedure, Legal Research, Legal Writing, Technology in the Law, Significant Substantive Developments In The Law, And Court News Off-And-On Since 2007 is not a niche, I don’t know what is.)
To reach the contest nomination page, click the image above or the second link in this post. Or click here, here, here, or here. Or, if you like, here.
I’ll even let you click there to nominate other blogs. Just this once.
Update (8/19/15): Time is running out. I got an email this morning advising that nominations must be in no later than than the “end of the day” on Friday, August 21, 2015.
Filed Under: Announcements, Appellate Blogs, Blogging | 1 Comment
Overcoming the abuse of discretion standard on appeal of an attorney fee award: what did the trial court actually do?
Posted on July 16, 2015 by Greg May
Respondents use the “abuse of discretion” standard for all it’s worth when defending against appeals, and they should. Often, it’s one heck of a shield. But there are limits to relying on this standard of review, and the Court of Appeal will reverse in appropriate circumstances.
One such example is last week’s decision in McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co., case no. G049722 (4th Dist., July 10, 2015). Plaintiff rejected one settlement offer in this “lemon law” case, but settled a few months later. The settlement was entered as a judgment. It required Ford to buy back the “lemon” automobile and allowed the plaintiff the option of accepting payment of $15,000 for attorney fees or instead roll the dice with a fee motion. Plaintiff moved for nearly $48,000 in attorney fees, and appealed when the trial court awarded only $28,350.
The trial court explained its award by noting that it deemed all of the fees incurred following the plaintiff’s rejection of an initial settlement offer to be unreasonable, because the only difference in the initial offer and the settlement entered into was the provision allowing him to file an attorney fee motion. To the trial court, this indicated that the 42 hours billed to the case following the plaintiff’s rejection of the earlier settlement offer “amounted to ‘plaintiffs’ counsel exaggerating the amount of their fees to increase their prized fees.'” (Gee, attorneys concerned about getting paid. Who’d of thunk it?)
The Court of Appeal reverses, finding fault with the trial court’s reason for limiting the fee award. Its analysis is helpful to anyone facing the daunting “abuse of discretion” standard of review.
First, the Court of Appeal notes that the trial court erred as a matter of law in characterizing the differences between the initial settlement offer and the eventual settlement, because (1) the trial court was wrong about the first offer not including an option for plaintiff to accept $15,000 or make a fee motion; the settlement and prior offer were actually identical in this regard; and (2) there were many other material differences not noted by the trial court. “The trial court’s erroneous comparison of Ford’s initial compromise offer with the offer McKenzie later accepted fatally undermines its conclusion that the entire amount of hours billed by McKenzie’s counsel in the wake of that initial offer was unjustified.”
Second, the Court of Appeal demonstrates the limits of its duty to indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the ruling:
Ford counters by first emphasizing our obligation to indulge all inferences in favor of the trial court’s ruling, and pointing out the trial court is not required to explain in detail the basis of its fee decision. Ford urges us to construe the court’s reduction of McKenzie’s fee as reflecting an assessment of the usual lodestar factors considered in determining fee amounts — e.g., the complexity of the case, the expertise of McKenzie’s counsel, and the early stage at which the case was settled — and a resulting determination that $28,350.08 was simply an overall “reasonable” fee for the work performed.
However, while we could certainly do that in the absence of any specific analysis provided by the trial court, we cannot ignore the court’s reasoning when detailed in the order. In this case, the court was quite explicit in explaining the basis for reducing McKenzie’s fees — rather than imposing a general reduction on the fees requested from the outset, on the basis the rates charged by McKenzie’s counsel were too high or the overall time claimed was unreasonable given the complexity of the case, the court characterized its reduction as “based on redaction of fees for duplicated and unnecessary services and billing performed after defendant’s service of its CCP Section 998 offer.” The court awarded McKenzie 100 percent of the fees he requested for the period before Ford’s initial offer, but found the entirety of “the subsequent billing was unreasonable” and excised that specific portion of the fees from McKenzie’s award. When the court states its reasons explicitly, we cannot infer its exercise of discretion rested on a wholly different basis.
(Italics did not appear in the trial court analysis and were added by the Court of Appeal.)
In short, what the court actually did is what matters for the abuse of discretion standard. As the court points out, it may be impossible to know what the court actually did. Had the record in McKenzie not made clear the basis of the court’s exercise of discretion, plaintiff probably would have been sunk on appeal, unless there was no rational basis for the amount of the award.
Having the trial court’s analysis in the record made all the difference in this case. Keep that in mind when your next fee motion approaches.
Filed Under: Appellate Procedure, Attorney Fees, Standard of Review
The deadline for filing the memorandum and affidavits in support of a motion for new trial is not jurisdictional
Posted on July 10, 2015 by Greg May
Some parties try to make jurisdictional issues out of non-jurisdictional ones. You can hardly blame them, given the fatal nature of jurisdictional defects.
One recent attempt — but ultimately an unsuccessful one — was in Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1294, in which the appellant (Sharp) claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial. That’s a somewhat surprising contention, seeing as how the respondent timely filed her notice of intention to move for a new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a)) and the court granted the motion within the 60-day jurisdictional deadline (Code Civ. Proc., § 660) on a ground stated in that notice.
With those two conditions satisfied, where did the appellant look for a lack of jurisdiction? At the respondent’s interim filing of her supporting memorandum and affidavits, that’s where. Unlike most motions, the initial filing in a motion for new trial is not a notice of motion and a supporting memorandum (plus affidavits, if any). Instead, all the moving party has to file is a notice of intention to move for a new trial, specifying the statutory grounds on which the motion will be made and whether the motion will be made upon affidavits, or the minutes of the court, or both. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a).) The supporting memorandum and affidavits are not due until later, and it was the untimeliness of that filing that the appellant attacked in Kabran.
Unfortunately, appellant Sharp came armed mostly with authorities holding that an untimely filing of the notice of intention precludes jurisdiction to grant a new trial. Sharp claimed that two of the cases supported applying the same rule to the deadline for filing the motion, memorandum, and affidavits, but the Court of Appeal rejects that characterization of the cases. It finds that the first “did not involve any issue concerning the filing of the supporting motion and affidavits.” (Emphasis added.) It concludes that the other case, Erikson v. Weiner (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1663, is on point but but runs counter to a long string of cases by which “[i]t has long been held that the time limits for filing affidavits and counteraffidavits for new trial motions, though ‘strict’ [citations], are not jurisdictional.” (Emphasis in original.) The court offers a more detailed criticism of Erikson, but I’ll leave that to your reading of Kabran.
Filed Under: Jurisdiction, New Trials
Egregious attorney misconduct at trial leads to reversal on appeal
Posted on July 9, 2015 by Greg May
When I was a young lawyer, a mentor told me to practice as if the rules will always be strictly enforced against me and my client, yet never enforced against the other side. I always took that as a bit of rhetorical flourish meant to emphasize careful compliance with the rules and to be ready for anything from the other side, but my mentor’s admonition appears to have been manifest in the trial leading up to Martinez v. State of California Dept. of Transportation, case no. G048375 (4th Dist., June 12, 2015, certified for publication July 7, 2015). The misconduct paid off in the short term by getting a defense verdict, and it even survived a mid-trial motion for mistrial and a new trial motion, but it was a short-lived victory, as the Court of Appeal reverses.
Here’s how the Court of Appeal summed it up:
Generally, what happened is this: Defendant’s attorney Karen Bilotti would ask a question in clear violation of the trial court’s in limine orders [i.e., orders precluding certain evidence at trial]. The question would usually have the effect of gratuitously besmirching the character of plaintiff Donn Martinez. An objection from Martinez’s counsel would follow. The trial court would sustain the objection. Bilotti would then ask the same question again. The trial court would sustain the objection again. And the same thing would happen again. And again. And again. And again.
While Judge Di Cesare showed the patience of Job – usually a virtue in a judge – that patience here had the effect of favoring one side over the other. He allowed Bilotti to emphasize irrelevant and inflammatory points concerning the plaintiff’s character so often that he effectively gave CalTrans an unfair advantage. Imagine a football game in which the referee continually flagged one team for rule violations, but never actually imposed any yardage penalties on it. That happened here and requires reversal.
The court even gives a tally of the misconduct: eight improper statements during opening argument, ten references during cross reference of plaintiff to the off-limits subject of his prior termination from a school district, another 13 forbidden references to the termination — 12 of them after sustained objections! — during cross-examination of plaintiff’s wife, and five improper statements during closing arguments. Counsel also sprinkled Nazi references liberally because the plaintiff’s motorcycle bore a logo for Set Free ministries — a religious organization that ordained plaintiff after a year of bible study — that included a Nazi-style helmet.
The court also summarizes the misconduct by type and, noting that appellant claimed there was even more misconduct, writes: “But we see no reason to go further. Suffice it to say we found enough to establish attorney misconduct at least five pages ago.”
Of course, the misconduct alone is not enough for reversal. Before the court can reverse, it must find that the misconduct was prejudicial. That’s not hard for the court to do in this case. See the case for more dateline the nature of the misconduct and why it was prejudicial, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial.
The court’s characterization of the trial judge as “patient” has to be the understatement of the year. The trial judge denied a mid-trial motion for mistrial, and even after the attorney continued in her misconduct after that, the trial judge refused to grant a new trial motion after the defense verdict.
The reversal on appeal is not the only adverse consequence of the misconduct. The Court of Appeal also orders the clerk to send a copy of the opinion to the State Bar, “notifying it the reversal of the judgment is based solely on attorney misconduct.”
Reference: Alex Spiro.
Filed Under: Attorneys, Ethics, New Trials | 1 Comment
Don’t give up when your motion to dismiss an appeal is summarily denied
Posted on July 2, 2015 by Greg May
The term “summary denial” sounds pretty bad when you are the party seeking relief. It has an air of finality. Sheesh, not even a hearing on the merits!
But a summary denial is not final in every context. This was recently pointed out in Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, in which the respondent moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The court summarily denied the motion. After the appeal was fully briefed, however, the court advised the parties to be prepared to address the timeliness of the appeal at oral argument, heard argument, and ultimately granted the motion. While I am sure the respondent would have preferred such a ruling prior to briefing the appeal on the merits, I doubt he minded too much that he was put through that time and expense. A win is a win.
At the point in its opinion that it mentioned its summary denial, the court added this footnote: “Of course, a summary denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal does not ‘preclude later full consideration of the issue, accompanied by a written opinion, following review of the entire record and the opportunity for oral argument.’ [Citations.]”
Of course? Maybe people steeped in appellate procedure are familiar with this principle, but I think it would come as a surprise to most people. Now you know, and now you, too, can say of course.
Filed Under: Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Dismissal | 1 Comment
How the nature of your appellate challenge can affect whether your appeal is dismissed for failure to obey trial court orders
Posted on June 30, 2015 by Greg May
The disentitlement doctrine allows a court of appeal to dismiss an appeal as a sanction for the appellant’s refusal to comply with trial court orders that remain in force while the appeal is pending. The lesson to be learned from today’s decision in Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc., case no. B256198 (2d Dist., June 30, 2015) comes from its discussion of how the right kind of appellate challenge to a trial court order — specifically, a jurisdictional challenge — can serve as a defense to the imposition of a dismissal sanction under the disentitlement doctrine. Unfortunately for the defendant-appellant in Ironbridge, calling a challenge a jurisdictional one does not make it so. The Court of Appeal characterizes the defendant’s challenge as a non-jurisdictional one, and dismisses the appeal for the defendant’s violation of the trial court order from which it appealed.
A settlement reached by the parties required defendant to issue plaintiff shares in the defendant corporation, and to issue plaintiff additional shares in the event the value of the shares decreased. The court approved the stipulation and retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms. About six months later, plaintiff applied ex parte for an order compelling the defendant to transfer additional shares to plaintiff and enjoining defendant from issuing shares to anyone else until it until it did so. The court ordered defendant to issue the additional shares within 24 hours and not to issue shares to anyone else until it complied.
In the defendant’s appeal, plaintiff moved to dismiss under the disentitlement doctrine, providing SEC filings showing that defendant had transferred more than 8 million shares to third parties in violation of the injunction. Defendant filed a “paltry” 1-1/2 page opposition to the motion citing “no authority whatsoever,” contending that the order was in excess of the trial court’s authority in that (1) the trial court could not enjoin issuance of shares to third parties because there was no such prohibition in the settlement, and (2) the court could not compel the issuance of shares to plaintiff on an ex parte basis.
The Court of Appeal isn’t buying it. The court acknowledges that “[a] person may refuse to comply with a court and raise as a defense to the imposition of sanctions that the order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and therefore invalid,” but notes also that a person “may not assert as a defense that the order merely was erroneous.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) It finds that the defendant’s challenge falls into the latter category.
First, the court notes that a trial court has continuing power to enforce a stipulated judgment entered in settlement of a case (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6) and the power to “compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process” in proceedings before it (Code Civ. Proc. § 128, subd. (a)(4)). Combined, those powers gave the trial court “authority to fashion orders to enforce compliance with a stipulated judgment.” Though the court does not state so explicitly, its point seems to be that the prohibitory injunction against issuance of shares to third parties was was a permissible coercive measure to enforce the settlement regardless of whether the stipulated judgment addressed such transfers.
The defendant’s challenge to the ex parte nature of the order is dispatched more easily. The settlement itself authorized the court to enforce the settlement on an ex parte basis.
Here, the parties requested that the court retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. The stipulation also provided that it could be enforced on an ex parte basis. There is no question that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and that the parties expressly authorized the court to enforce the settlement on an ex parte basis. We find no procedural irregularity or other defect that would support a credible claim that the order was either void or voidable. Defendant’s appeal merely challenges the order as erroneous.
The lesson here, of course, is that if you are unable or unwilling to comply with a trial court order that remains in force pending an appeal from it, you had better be sure that you have a serious jurisdictional challenge to make against it. Do not convince yourself that your challenge on the merits is a jurisdictional one just because you do not want to obey the order, because the Court of Appeal will look beyond the label on your argument. Absent a solid jurisdictional challenge, disobedience of the trial court order can put your entire appeal at risk.
UPDATE: For those interested in reading more about the disentitlement doctrine, see the article referenced at Southern California Appellate News.
Filed Under: Appellate Procedure, Dismissal, Jurisdiction, Sanctions | 1 Comment
No judicial notice for a law of physics, but for a different reason than you might expect
Posted on June 24, 2015 by Greg May
I had to take the “high track” physics courses as part of my electrical engineering major curriculum at Canoe U. In fact, I liked my physics classes more than my engineering classes, and regret to this day I did not major in physics. So the discussion in Bermudez v. Ciolek, case no. G049510 (2d Dist., June 22, 2015), in which the court refuses to take judicial notice of a law of physics, caught my eye.
Bermudez is an automobile accident case, in which defendant Ciolek was the driver of a car that collided with a second car driven by defendant Heacox, which in turn struck plaintiff, who was on the sidewalk. Though the jury found both drivers negligent, it found only Ciolek liable for plaintiff’s damages.
Ciolek contended on appeal that these findings were inconsistent, i.e., that Heacox’s neglignce must have been a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries because, absent such negligence, the second vehicle’s ricochet would have been different. Ciolek contended, in the words of the court, that the jury’s findings were irreconcilable “because they ignore the laws of physics by which our universe is governed.”
In support, Ciolek requested that the court take judicial notice of the law of conservation of momentum. Here is an apparent excerpt from Ciolek’s brief, which attached equations and examples:
The law of conservation of momentum provides that in a collision, momentum is conserved; the combined momentum of two colliding objects going into the collision must equal the momentum coming out of it. The momentum of an object equals its mass multiplied by its velocity; velocity is a vector, which in turn is composed of both speed and direction.
Here is a simple demonstration of the principle:
Instinctively, how this principle would have affected the collision sounds like expert witness territory to me. Sure enough, the lack of expert testimony on the issue at trial plays a part in the court’s decision not to take judicial notice, but the basis for its ruling is far more fundamental and needs to be kept in mind by every appellant . . . and you don’t need to know a lick of physics to understand it:
Ciolek’s argument is certainly interesting. Of course, it is not the argument she made at trial. At trial, she claimed Heacox was the sole cause of the collision (and therefore the harm to Bermudez). Ciolek did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the law of conservation of momentum and to instruct the jury on its meaning. Ciolek did not ask her accident reconstruction expert to evaluate and opine on the effect of Heacox’s speed on the ricochet. [Footnote.] Faced with a result she did not expect (though it was consistent with the result requested by Bermudez’s counsel and Heacox’s counsel in their closing arguments), Ciolek now suggests the jury reached an illogical verdict based on the supposed common sense of the law of conservation of momentum.
We reject Ciolek’s request to essentially retry the case on appeal and we deny her request for judicial notice as irrelevant to the issues before us. “It is a firmly entrenched principle of appellate practice that litigants must adhere to the theory on which a case was tried. Stated otherwise, a litigant may not change his or her position on appeal and assert a new theory. To permit this change in strategy would be unfair to the trial court and the opposing litigant.” (Brown v. Boren (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316.) It would be fundamentally unfair to both Heacox and Bermudez to grant a retrial to Ciolek because she wants the chance to try a different theory the second time around.
In short, shifting gears at the appellate level is not allowed. It’s surprising that Ciolek would make an argument like this, given that the appellate court did not even deem this a close call.
Filed Under: Appellate Procedure, Judicial Notice, Waiver of Issues | 1 Comment
My blog post on reading briefs from a screen is now an article (and welcome, Citations readers!)
Posted on June 4, 2015 by Greg May
Your humble appellate blogger working on his next article
A special welcome to anyone arriving here after reading my article in the June issue of Citations, the Ventura County Bar Association’s monthly publication. Maybe “iPad Judges” are Not Such a Good Idea is my adaptation of my post last month of the same name, citing studies showing that readers tend to comprehend and retain material better when reading from paper than from a screen. (The article is also scheduled to run this month in the Appellate Law Journal from Counsel Press.)
I’ve since posted some comments on a related issue: whether laptops help or hurt students in the classroom.
It is about time I get back to blogging about the law. Don’t be a stranger!
(By the way, if you still have your paper copy of Citations, make sure you check out the back cover. [No, it’s not about me.])
Filed Under: Articles by Greg May, Legal Technology | 3 Comments
The blog will be down for maintenance starting later today
Posted on May 29, 2015 by Greg May
I’ll be taking the blog offline some time this afternoon or this evening to update some of the software on the back end. I don’t know if it will be down for a few hours or a few days — it all depends on how smoothly things go. Wish me luck and pray that I don’t hopelessly screw everything up.