Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/100560/plumbers-union-vs-borden
Timestamp: 2018-02-22 09:04:16
Document Index: 656459130

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 8', '§ 7', '§ 157', '§ 301', '§ 303', '§ 185']

Plumbers Union Vs Borden - Citation 100560 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Plumbers' Union Vs. Borden - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/100560
Case Number 373 U.S. 690
Appellant Plumbers' Union
Respondent Borden
..... this case presents one facet of the recurrent problem of defining the permissible scope of state jurisdiction in the field of labor relations. the particular question before us involves consideration and application, in this suit by a union member against a local union, of the principles declared in international assn. of machinists v. gonzales, 356 u. s. 617 , and san diego building trades council v. garmon, 359 u. s. 236 . i the respondent, h. n. borden, who was then a member of the shreveport, louisiana, local of the plumbers union, arrived in dallas, texas, in september, 1953, looking for a job with the farwell construction company on a particular bank construction project. farwell's hiring on this project was done through union referral,.....
Plumbers' Union v. Borden - 373 U.S. 690 (1963)
U.S. Supreme Court Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963)
Held: the conduct of petitioner that was the subject matter of the suit was arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, and the State Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , followed. International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 , distinguished. Pp. 373 U. S. 691 -698.
This case presents one facet of the recurrent problem of defining the permissible scope of state jurisdiction in the field of labor relations. The particular question before us involves consideration and application, in this suit by a union member against a local union, of the principles declared in International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 , and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 .
Subsequently, he brought the present suit against the Dallas local, petitioner here, and the parent International, [ Footnote 1 ] seeking damages under state law for the refusal to refer him to Farwell. He alleged that the actions of the defendants constituted a willful, malicious, and discriminatory interference with his right to contract and to pursue a lawful occupation; that the defendants had breached a promise, implicit in the membership arrangement, not to discriminate unfairly or to deny any member the right to work; and that the defendants had violated certain state statutory provisions. [ Footnote 2 ]
This Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , that, in the absence of an overriding state interest such as that involved in the maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board in cases in which the activity that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. [ Footnote 3 ] This relinquishment of state jurisdiction,
the Court stated, is essential "if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted," 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 245 , and is as necessary in a suit for damages as in a suit seeking equitable relief. Thus, the first inquiry, in any case in which a claim of federal preemption is raised, must be whether the conduct called into question may reasonably be asserted to be subject to Labor Board cognizance.
In the present case, respondent contends that no such assertion can be made, but we disagree. [ Footnote 4 ] The facts, as alleged in the complaint and as found by the jury, are that the Dallas union business agent, with the ultimate approval of the local union itself, refused to refer the respondent to a particular job for which he had been sought, and that this refusal resulted in an inability to obtain the employment. Notwithstanding the state court's contrary view, if it is assumed that the refusal and the resulting inability to obtain employment were in some way based on respondent's actual or believed failure to comply with internal union rules, it is certainly "arguable" that the union's conduct violated § 8(b)(1)(A), by restraining or coercing Borden in the exercise of his protected right to refrain from observing those rules, and § 8(b)(2), by causing an employer to discriminate against Borden in violation of § 8(a)(3). [ Footnote 5 ] See, e.g.,
Radio Officers' Union, etc. v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17 ; Local 568, Hotel Employees, 141 N.L.R.B. No. 29; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 524 A-B, 141 N.L.R.B. No. 57. As established in the Radio Officers case, the "membership" referred to in § 8(a)(3) and thus incorporated in § 8(b)(2) is broad enough to embrace participation in union activities and maintenance of good standing, as well as mere adhesion to a labor organization. 347 U.S. at 347 U. S. 39 -42. And there is a substantial possibility in this case that Borden's failure to live up to the internal rule prohibiting the solicitation of work from any contractor [ Footnote 6 ] was precisely the reason why clearance was denied. Indeed this may well have been the meaning of the business agent's remark, testified to by Borden himself, that "you have come in here wrong, you have come in here with a job in your pocket."
It may also be reasonably contended that, after inquiry into the facts, the Board might have found that the union conduct in question was not an unfair labor practice, but rather was protected concerted activity within the meaning of § 7. This Court has held that hiring hall practices do not necessarily violate the provisions of federal law, Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667 , and the Board's appraisal of the conflicting testimony might have led it to conclude that the refusal to refer was due only to the respondent's efforts to circumvent a lawful hiring-hall arrangement, rather than to his engaging in protected activities. The problems inherent in the operation of union hiring halls are difficult and complex, see Rothman, The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall Arrangements, 48 Va.L.Rev. 871, and point up the importance of limiting initial competence
We need not and should not now consider whether the petitioner's activity in this case was federally protected or prohibited, on any of the theories suggested above or on some different basis. [ Footnote 7 ] It is sufficient for present purposes to find, as we do, that it is reasonably "arguable" that the matter comes within the Board's jurisdiction.
Respondent urges that, even if the union's interference with his employment is a matter that the Board could have dealt with, the state courts are still not deprived of jurisdiction in this case under the principles declared in International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 . Gonzales was a suit against a labor union by an individual who claimed that he had been expelled in violation of his contractual rights and who was seeking restoration of membership. He also sought consequential damages flowing from the expulsion, including loss of wages resulting from loss of employment and compensation for physical and mental suffering. It was recognized in that case that restoration of union membership was a remedy that the Board could not afford, and indeed that the internal affairs of unions were not, in themselves, a matter within
the Board's competence. [ Footnote 8 ]
The Court then went on to hold that, in the presence of admitted state jurisdiction to order restoration of membership, the State was not without power "to fill out this remedy" by an award of consequential damages, even though these damages might be for conduct that constituted an unfair labor practice under federal law. The Taft-Hartley Act, the Court stated, did not require mutilation of "the comprehensive relief of equity." 356 U.S. at 358 U. S. 621 .
We need not now determine the extent to which the holding the Garmon, supra, qualified the principles declared in Gonzales with respect to jurisdiction to award consequential damages, for it is clear in any event that the present case does not come within the Gonzales rationale. The suit involved here was focused principally, if not entirely, on the union's actions with respect to Borden's efforts to obtain employment. No specific equitable relief was sought directed to Borden's status in the union, and thus there was no state remedy to "fill out" by permitting the award of consequential damages. The "crux" of the action ( Gonzales, 356 U.S. at 356 U. S. 618 ) concerned Borden's employment relations, and involved conduct arguably subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
Nor do we regard it as significant that Borden's complaint against the union sounded in contract, as well as in tort. It is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction. Rather, as stated in Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 246 ,
49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. We do not deal here with suits brought in state courts under § 301 or § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 158, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187, which are governed by federal law and to which different principles are applicable. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 .
While I dissented in International Association v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 , I fail to see how that case can fairly be distinguished from this one. Both Gonzales and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , were written by the same author, who had no difficulty in reconciling them. And they were decided before Congress reentered the labor relations field with the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. 73 Stat. 519. Yet the Court points to no indication that Congress thought Gonzales had incorrectly interpreted the balance it had struck between state and federal jurisdiction over these matters.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, involved a controversy between union and employer in the classical case for National Labor Board jurisdiction. Suits for damages by individual employees against the union or the employer fall in the category of Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 . As a matter of policy, there is much to be said for allowing the individual employee recourse to conventional litigation in his home town tribunal for redress of grievances. Washington, D.C., and its administrative agencies -- and even regional offices -- are often distant and remote and expensive to reach. Under today's holding, the member who has a real dispute with his union may go without a remedy. *
See, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra; Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U. S. 1 . When the basic dispute is between a union and an employer, any hiatus that might exist in the jurisdictional balance that has been struck can be filled by resort to economic power. But when the union member has a dispute with his union, he has no power on which to rely. If Gonzales -written in the spirit of Moore -- is to survive, this judgment should be affirmed.