Source: http://eulawradar.com/case-c-69815-davis-did-the-cjeu-in-digital-rights-ireland-intend-to-lay-down-mandatory-requirements-of-eu-law/
Timestamp: 2017-02-22 21:54:44
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Case C-698/15, Davis – did the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland intend to lay down mandatory requirements of EU law? | EU Law Radar
Posted on 7 January 2016 by admin	In 2006, the EU’s ‘data retention’ Directive 2006/24/EC required telecoms companies to store data traffic. In its Digital Rights Ireland judgment of 2014, the CJEU annulled the Directive because the Directive was incompatible with the EU Charter. Six national courts have subsequently declared their national data retention laws to be invalid. However, in other Member States legal uncertainty surrounds what the CJEU actually decided and the legal effects that flow from it. In that context, a Swedish court has already made a preliminary reference to the CJEU. Now, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has decided to make its own preliminary reference.
In 2002, the EU created a Directive governing privacy and electronic communications (OJ [2002] L201/37).
In 2006, the Directive was amended by the EU’s ‘data retention’ Directive 2006/24/EC (OJ [2006] L105/54). The Directive required telecoms companies to store data traffic.
However, in April 2014 the CJEU annulled the EU’s ‘data retention’ Directive by its Digital Rights Ireland judgment.
In response to the CJEU’s judgment, the United Kingdom enacted a new piece of legislation known as the 2014 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (“DRIPA”).
DRIPA covers communications data. That is to say, communications data displays who was communicating, when, from where, and with whom. Data can include the time and duration of a communication, the number or e-mail address of the originator and recipient. Sometimes, it can also include the location of the device from which the communication was made. The content of the communication is not recorded.
However, the legality of DRIPA was challenged in the courts. Among the litigants are people who are worried about DRIPA’s effect on the confidentiality of communications between people and their solicitors. Unusually for administrative law litigation, a couple of the litigants are even Members of Parliament. They are worried about the effect of DRIPA on the confidentiality of their communications with their constituents.
At first instance, the litigants booked some success. The Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court held DRIPA to be inconsistent with EU law. DRIPA was deemed to lack clear and precise rules governing access to, and the use of, communications data.
At the Court of Appeal of England and Wales
The starting point of the judges in the Court of Appeal was to recognise that though the content of communications were not being stored, communications data itself ‘can be highly revealing and informative and, as a result, highly intrusive into the privacy of users of communications services’.
They noted that a key issue in determining the legality of DRIPA was a correct understanding of the what the CJEU had decided in Digital Rights Ireland. The question was whether the CJEU had laid down mandatory requirements with which national legislation must comply.
In that context, the judges had heard the Home Secretary make three points to support her overall belief that the CJEU had not laid down any mandatory requirements on the Member States:
1) the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland did not impose mandatory requirements that must to be applied to national legislation;
2) the EU Charter does not apply to national rules governing access to communications data when access is by law enforcement agencies; and,
3) even if she were wrong on point 2 (with the effect that EU law could impose such requirements on national data access laws), then there was still nothing in the CJEU’s judgment to suggest that Articles 7 and 8 on the EU Charter governing privacy and data processing went beyond the scope of the fundamental right to privacy, as that right is enshrined in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. All Member States had to do was comply with Article 8(2) of the ECHR.
Before commenting on her legal submissions, the Court of Appeal recalled the salient passages of the CJEU’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland which largely corresponded to those at stake in the recently-made preliminary reference from a Swedish court (the Tele2 Sverige reference).
However, the judges of the Court of Appeal also took into account what the CJEU had said in the most recent ‘privacy’ judgment, Schrems.
94 In particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter (see, to this effect, judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238, paragraph 39)
After having taken this latest case law into account, and having heard the submissions made by two interveners, the Court of Appeal formed three broad points made by the Home Secretary.
In respect of point 1, the Court of Appeal was minded to believe that the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland did not lay down specific mandatory requirements in EU law. Rather, the Court of Appeal understood the CJEU to have been simply listing the protections that were absent from the EU’s ‘data retention’ Directive.
In respect of point 2, and access to data, the Court of Appeal thought that this too was not a mandatory requirement that was automatically applicable to national legislation. In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU had merely pointed out that there was no provision in the Directive requiring approved access. Again, the Court of Appeal felt fortified in its belief that there were no mandatory requirements in Digital Rights Ireland because the CJEU had provided no case law by way of support.
However, the Court of Appeal did seem to disagree with the Home Secretary on another aspect of point 2, namely, whether the EU Charter rules applied to national rules governing access to the data by national enforcement agencies.
In that context, the Court of Appeal noted that national data retention regimes and derogations for national enforcement agencies must comply with Article 15 of the e-Privacy Directive, and do so in accordance with the general principles of EU law – principles which do give effect to the EU Charter. Hence, the judges of the Court of Appeal were minded to find that national rules were indeed subject to EU law, including the EU Charter.
That said, the Court of Appeal remarked that the CJEU had not expressly discussed the topic of whether the EU Charter applied to national access rules. The Court of Appeal was also doubtful that the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland had intended to lay down mandatory requirements in relation to retained communications data.
Turning to point 3, about whether the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland went further than the requirements of Article 8(2) ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg court’s case law, the Court of Appeal thought not. On the ‘Strasbourg’ case law, the judges in the Court of Appeal reasoned that ‘Strasbourg’:
‘has not gone so far as to impose a general requirement of prior judicial or independent administrative approval as a necessary safeguard. Rather, its approach seems to be to review all aspects of the authorisation and oversight regime and to assess whether it provides overall sufficient protections to democratic freedoms’.
In that context, the Court of Appeal referred to a document written by David Anderson QC, “A Question of Trust, Report of the Investigatory Powers Review”, June 2015 at paragraphs 5.40 – 5.43.
Nevertheless, in light of the doubts surrounding the effect of the CJEU’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of Appeal decided to make a preliminary reference.
Having decided to make a preliminary reference, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales then requested the CJEU not only to deal with reference under the CJEU’s ‘expedited’ procedure but also to deal with it when hearing the Tele2 Sverige preliminary reference.
By way of further support to its request for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, the Court of Appeal also noted that what was at stake was an issue of general and wide-reaching importance. Although DRIPA would expire on 31 December 2016, the judgment in Digital Rights Ireland would remain central to the validity of all future legislation enacted by the Member States in this field.
In that context, the Court of Appeal also remarked that courts elsewhere in the EU had already been applying the CJEU’s Digital Rights Ireland judgment and declaring national legislation to be invalid. The body of case law was: (a) Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Decision G 47/2012 e.a. regarding data retention, 27 June 2014; (b) Slovenian Constitutional Court, Decision U-I-65/13-19, 3 July 2014; (c) Belgian Constitutional Court, Decision 84/2015, 11 June 2015; (d) Romanian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 440, 8 July 2015; (e) District Court of the Hague, Netherlands, Case No. C/09/480009/KG ZA 14/1575, Decision of 11 March 2015; and (f), Slovak Constitutional Court, Decision PL. US 10/2014, 29 April 2015.
In anticipation of the final wording of the questions, Lord Justice Lloyd Jones (who provided the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal), indicated that he would like to ask the CJEU two questions:
This post is based on the 23 November 2015 ‘Update’ to the EU Law Radar report on Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige.
The Curia website has not yet published the Questions that were eventually asked by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.
The UK’s latest proposed legislation, ‘The Investigatory Powers’ Bill, was presented to Parliament in November 2015 (Cmnd 9152). An overview of the proposed legislation was published on the BBC’s website in a post dated 5 November 2015. Last week, the BBC reported that ‘Tech giants raise concerns over UK draft surveillance bill’ (8 January 2016). The report mentions data encryption. Readers interested in that area might also look at the discussion which is ongoing in the Dutch Parliament.
On 1 February 2016, the President of Court has issued an Order to expedite the hearing of the Davis case. A version of the CJEU’s order ECLI:EU:C:2016:70 is reproduced below. The reproduction is not authentic. Only the versions of the document published in the ‘Reports of Cases’ or the ‘Official Journal of the European Union’ are authentic. The source of the reproduction is the Eur-Lex Europa web site. The information on that site is subject to a disclaimer and a copyright notice.
1 February 2016 ( )
The Grand Chamber is due to hear this case tomorrow on 12 April 2016. The dispute will be heard together with Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige.
The Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe is due on 19 July 2016.
There is another preliminary reference which is exploring the scope and impact of the CJEU’s judgment in Digital Rights Ireland; see further, Case C-207/16, Ministerio Fiscal.
The CJEU has renamed the Davis preliminary reference. The number of the case remains the same but it is now officially known as C‑698/15, Watson.
Update – 4 December 2016
The judgment of the Grand Chamber is due on 21 December 2016.
A version of the CJEU’s judgment in Case C‑698/15, Watson ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 is reproduced below. The reproduction is not authentic. Only the versions of the document published in the ‘Reports of Cases’ or the ‘Official Journal of the European Union’ are authentic. The source of the reproduction is the Eur-Lex Europa web site. The information on that site is subject to a disclaimer and a copyright notice.
(22) The prohibition of storage of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than the users or without their consent is not intended to prohibit any automatic, intermediate and transient storage of this information in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the electronic communications network and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is necessary for the transmission and for traffic management purposes, and that during the period of storage the confidentiality remains guaranteed. …
(26) The data relating to subscribers processed within electronic communications networks to establish connections and to transmit information contain information on the private life of natural persons and concern the right to respect for their correspondence or concern the legitimate interests of legal persons. Such data may only be stored to the extent that is necessary for the provision of the service for the purpose of billing and for interconnection payments, and for a limited time. Any further processing of such data … may only be allowed if the subscriber has agreed to this on the basis of accurate and full information given by the provider of the publicly available electronic communications services about the types of further processing it intends to perform and about the subscriber’s right not to give or to withdraw his/her consent to such processing. …
(30) Systems for the provision of electronic communications networks and services should be designed to limit the amount of personal data necessary to a strict minimum. …’
Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:2
Schrems, C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650
This entry was posted in International Conventions, Privacy and data processing, Procedural law and tagged access to data, c7, c8, charter, data processing, data retention, ECHR, privacy, proportionality, telecoms, validity by admin. Bookmark the permalink.	Recent Posts	Case C-681/16, Pfizer Ireland – Specific Mechanism suppresses drug circulation