Source: http://www.ultimatecivics.org/index.php/2012-04-18-18-45-51/energy-democracy/people-s-petition-to-ban-dispersants
Timestamp: 2013-12-11 19:27:15
Document Index: 109243949

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1321', '§ 1321', '§7', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§ 300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§300', '§2732', '§2732', '§300']

People's Petition to Ban Dispersants
Home Programs Education & Democracy Energy & Democracy People's Petition to Ban Dispersants Model ordinance to ban dispersants Alaska Democracy Initiative A Pledge for the Alaska Constitution Read the Pledge Background on the Pledge Curricula Rethinking Democracy! High School Curriculum University Organizing for Change (for community groups) Value Based Community Organizing Manual Events UC Events Move to Amend events Press Gershon Cohen - Bio Riki Ott - Bio Photos Exxon Pipeline Spill: Media Advisory Resources What Can I Do? Archived News Links Reading Video Gallery Webinars Salon Curriculum Registration Democracy Crisis Corporate Power Timeline Oil Spill & Petrochemical Resources Donate About Us Mission Ultimate Civics History Our Staff Board & Advisors Contact Us People's Petition to Ban Dispersants	UPDATE: The US EPA responded to the People's Petition to Ban Dispserants. To read the EPA response, download the pdf file by clicking HERE.
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20460
PETITION FOR RULEMAKING Under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G) and the Administrative Procedures Act Title 5. Sec. 553(e)
The Clean Water Act requires the President to prepare a National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) that includes, among other things, a schedule identifying dispersants, chemicals, and other products that may be used under the NCP; the waters in which such dispersants, chemicals, and other products may be used; and the quantities of dispersants, chemicals, and other products that can be used safely in such waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G). Responsibility for the Product Schedule was delegated to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Immediately and unconditionally prohibit use of any products that contain human health hazards and/or proprietary (CBI) chemicals within all special maritime and territorial waters of the United States, including and extending from the upper intertidal zone (18 USC §7); Require notification 72 hours in advance of intentional releases of products on the Schedule to the public at the national, state, and local levels; and
Establish updated toxicity criteria for products listed on the NCP Product Schedule under controlled laboratory conditions, including realistic field scenarios and appropriate test species known to be sensitive to the substances being tested; Require updated toxicity testing, under controlled laboratory conditions, including realistic field scenarios and appropriate test species known to be sensitive to the substances being tested, of products prior to listing, and as a condition of retention of products already listed, on the NCP Product Schedule; and
Require public disclosure of a product’s ingredients as a condition of placement, or retention, on the NCP Product Schedule. Of foremost concern are the NCP regulations and test protocols that allowed the unprecedented and widespread application of at least 1.8 million gallons of two primary products––the dispersants Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A––during the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. Massive releases of toxic products in the public commons, including the air people breathe and the oceans and coasts where people swim, recreate, and harvest seafood, must require definitive demonstration that all alternatives have more negative side effects. America’s oceans and coasts support multi-billion dollar recreational and commercial fishing industries and tourism, as well as diverse cultures. These concerns have been illustrated by data collected both before and after the BP disaster, validated by science done after the BP disaster, and include the emerging evidence of widespread, adverse environmental and human health impacts in the impacted Gulf states.
Adverse effects of crude oil exposure on health of response workers, fishermen, residents of oiled communities, and others are well known and established. The American Petroleum Institute published one of the earliest literature reviews in 1985.1 After the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, Dr. Robert Rigg, a former Alaska medical director for Standard Alaska (BP), warned, “It is a known fact that neurologic changes (brain damage), skin disorders (including cancer), liver and kidney damage, cancer of other organ systems, and medical complications––secondary to exposure to––working unprotected in (or inadequately protected) can and will occur to workers exposed to crude oil and other petrochemical by-products. While short-term complaints, i.e., skin irritation, nausea, dizziness, pulmonary symptoms, etc., may be the initial signs of exposure and toxicity, the more serious long-term effects must be prevented.” He recommended pulling cleanup crews “off the beaches—and out of the Sound—[to] avoid further tragedy in the form of human suffering, illness and disease…”2 In 1993, the industry Marine Spill Response Corporation, newly formed under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, addressed the chemical aspects of occupational health and marine oil-spill response but significantly limited the review to exposures to crude oil only, not oil spill response products.3 The authors of the 1993 review then independently completed a second review in 1999 to update their earlier report, eloquently stating, “Mists and aerosols containing polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are, in principle, a cancer risk…” 4. The authors also noted, “Although there are frequent references to toxicity in connection with dispersants, these invariably seem to refer to ecotoxicity. Human hazard does not appear to be an issue.” The authors found few data on the latter subject and again limited their review to crude oil exposures.
Since the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, scientists have established that oil spills and even short-term exposure can cause long-term harm to wildlife and ecosystem function. Chronic impacts from exposure to particulate oil or polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in wildlife include: endocrine abnormalities and reproductive problems, immune system dysfunction, genotoxic effects, stunted or slowed growth and skeletal deformities, and disruption of behavioral and social functions critical for survival, among others.7 Crude Oil and Dispersant Impacts to Ecosystem Health and Human
Arguments for or against dispersant use remained unchanged for nearly forty years and are focused almost exclusively on potential harm to wildlife. Notably, the arguments are mostly subjective. The so-called “environmental trade-offs” of dispersant use have been the subject of spirited scientific debates for four decades––and still are for good reason.9 The use of dispersants does not represent a science-based, quantifiable “tradeoff” but can amount to convenient political expedience. Further, the main pro-dispersant argument––that is, to break up the oil, making it more accessible to microbial bacteria and hence speeding remediation–­–remains an untested assumption in the field for a range of oils. It was well established that bacterial degradation is the main natural pathway for removing crude oil from the environment, especially the less complex hydrocarbons (alkanes and “light ends” or smaller aromatic compounds).10 However, the toxicity of dispersants on these oil-eating bacteria populations largely was unknown before the BP disaster. The oil industry has a strong and expedient bias towards dispersant use instead of mechanical oil recovery equipment, despite known health risks from dispersants––and the fact that the stated priorities of the federal government are to use mechanical containment or recovery as the primary line of defense against oil spills in the United States and to minimize oil spill impacts on human health and the environment. The state of scientific knowledge on adverse impacts of oil and dispersants pre-dating the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout is best summarized in two documents released shortly after the disaster. ScienceCorps.org released a comprehensive report on the health hazards of crude oil and the known ingredients of the Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A.11 The report stated that chemicals in these dispersants were known to be neurotoxins, mutagens, teratogens (able to disturb the growth and development of an embryo or fetus), and carcinogens. Further, Corexit 9527A contains 2-butoxyethanol, a toxic solvent and human health hazard that ruptures red blood cells, causing hemolysis (bleeding) and liver and kidney damage. The authors, a medical doctor and toxicologist, also warned that dispersants and crude oil contain many ingredients that target the same organs in the body and, further, that Corexit dispersants may act as an oil delivery system, facilitating the entry of oil into the body, into cells, which can damage every organ system in the body.
A scientific consensus statement elaborated upon the health risks of using the Corexit dispersants: "The properties that facilitate the movement of dispersants through oil also make it easier for them to move through cell walls, skin barriers, and membranes that protect vital organs, underlying layers of skin, the surfaces of eyes, mouths, and other structures." The consensus document concluded, "Corexit dispersants, in combination with crude oil, pose grave health risks to marine life and human health and threaten to deplete critical niches in the Gulf food web that may never recover."12
Have “PAH concentrations consistently in excess of the IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health) limits (80 mg/m3),”15 as stated by NIOSH and OSHA16;
Behave as an absorption accelerant upon contact with wet human skin, facilitating far more efficient dermal absorption of oil; in these tests, presence of oil and dispersant on human skin was demonstrated with ultraviolet light, which was not visible under natural light conditions.20 Are toxic to the two main species of bacteria known to biodegrade crude oil in situ.21
A. Stated intent and purpose of oil spill response under the NCP EPA clearly states, “Mechanical containment or recovery is the primary line of defense against oil spills in the United States.” Further, EPA also states, “Chemical and biological methods can be used in conjunction with mechanical means for containing and cleaning up oil spills” (emphasis added; http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/learning/oiltech.htm).
Yet during the nation’s largest and longest maritime spill, the USCG authorized massive use of dispersants daily over nearly three months––creating the clear appearance that chemical warfare was the primary line of defense against oil spills. The March 2012 Dispersant Use Initiative, a document intended to guide and plan research needs and decision-making in future spills and a document produced by the Interagency Coordinating Committee for Oil Pollution Research authorized under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, indicates plans to continue and expand dispersant use in future oil spills as a primary line of defense.36
B. Efficacy test protocol Pursuant to its responsibility under the Clean Water Act, EPA promulgated regulations in Subpart J of the NCP. The regulations establish a standard of effectiveness that each dispersant must attain in very specific laboratory conditions in order to be listed on the schedule, but require only minimal toxicity testing, permit claims of proprietary trade secrets or “confidential business information” (CBI) that limit public disclosure of a product’s ingredients, and set no criteria for worker or public safety or health. 40 CFR §300.900-300.920 (2010). The laboratory conditions represent quite unrealistic field scenarios: dispersant efficacy and toxicity tests are conducted with full-strength salinity (36 ppt), synthetic seawater prepared with distilled water. 40 CFR §300, App. C, 2.3.1 (2003). It is quite reasonable to expect that similar tests performed in the presence of particulate organic matter (POM) including bacteria, would yield different results. The micelles that form in the absence of POM, i.e., in the standard test conditions, are lipophilic, but readily bond to organic matter. When there is nothing to bond to, the micelles remain dispersed. However, in the presence of POM, micelles tend to clump together, which could explain the flocculent oily material that settled in near shore runnels and on the ocean bottom or that formed large subsurface plumes after dispersant application in the Gulf.
Finally with regards to the efficacy test protocol, dispersants are not tested on a specific crude to be dispersed, but rather on two standard reference oils, Prudhoe Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude. 40 CFR §300, App. C, 2.3.2. The test results are averaged (§300, App. C, 2.5.19), and the minimum acceptable performance criterion is 45 percent (§300.915.7)––i.e., more than half the oil remains undispersed, allowing both significant oil and significant dispersants to impact the environment and human health. We request that the minimum acceptable performance criterion be revised to at least 70 percent (70 percent + 5 percent), with dispersants of 90% efficacy directed to replace stocks of lesser performance dispersants. Further, we request that efficacy tests be conducted on a range of petroleum and refined products that might actually be spilled other than, and in addition to, the two standard test oils, and that they be conducted for a range of realistic field scenarios (i.e., brackish water, high algal load, etc.).
Despite the uncertainties involved with extrapolating test results from laboratory tests to field conditions, the regulations do not include a process to remove or delist products from the NCP Product Schedule that: (1) do not perform in the field as anticipated under controlled laboratory conditions; (2) prove to create, or are considered as likely to create given composition, unacceptable health risks for workers, the public, or the environment; or (3) were discontinued by the manufacturer but are still listed on the Schedule and stockpiled for disaster response. Arguments for removing products under the first two scenarios have been presented earlier, however the third scenario also has merit. In the case of Inipol EAP 22 (“Inipol”), the product was widely field-tested during the Exxon Valdez spill response, despite inadequate laboratory toxicity and efficacy tests––and strong public opposition based on its chemical composition.38 Inipol contains 2-butoxyethanol (as does the dispersant Corexit 9527A), an industrial solvent for oil and grease and a known human health hazard, and the surfactant laurel phosphate. Even though Inipol was listed as a “bioremediation” product and applied liberally on beaches (104,510 gallons39), it was widely observed in the field to act as a dispersant. Meanwhile, BAT (Bioremediation Application Team) workers suffered symptoms characteristic of exposure to Inipol and 2-butoxyethanol, as listed in the MSDS filed by Exxon.40 Former workers self-reported many of these same symptoms as chronic conditions in a pilot health survey of EVOS workers, conducted fourteen years after the spill.41 Exxon discontinued Inipol production in the mid 1990s. However, the product remains listed for spill response even though EPA states the product is no longer manufactured.42 Listing products that are no longer manufactured leaves the public and environment to bear the risk and liability should the manufacturers, or others, choose to rid their stockpiles of this hazardous product––conveniently during spill response. Clearly, this is an unacceptable scenario from the public’s perspective.
Currently, only EPA may remove a product from the NCP Product Schedule, but not for any of the aforementioned reasons. Instead, EPA may remove products only if EPA cannot verify test results [§300.920(a)(2)], or if the liability disclaimer statement or label is not “conspicuous” or “fully reproduced”, or if there is any “other improper attempt to demonstrate the approval of the product by any NRT or other U.S. Government agency” § 300.920(e). We request EPA to establish a formal public process, and to give the Administrator more authority, to delist or remove products on the Schedule by establishing a new section as follows:
proves to create, or gives the perception of creating, unacceptable health risks for workers, the public, or the environment; or was discontinued by the manufacturer but is still listed on the Schedule and stockpiled for disaster response.
Quite bluntly, we do not believe that human health should be considered a “tradeoff” for dispersant use––ever, but especially in light of the long history of cavalier and superficial treatment of ecological “tradeoffs.” The oil industry and federal government have used “tradeoffs” to continue using dangerous products without any scientific justification. In the case of human health “tradeoffs,” justification is impossible. Yet the two main dispersants stockpiled in the United States for use on future spills are Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A––the very dispersants that were known to be harmful to ecosystems and humans before the BP disaster, and that proved to do so after the disaster. These two dispersants are stockpiled in coastal communities around the contiguous United States and in Alaska and Hawaii.44 Most are owned either by the U.S. Coast Guard regional strike teams or the major national Oil Spill Response Organizations. But, ironically, the federal government shields itself from any liability for use of these, and other, dangerous oil spill response products. We request that EPA immediately removes Corexit 9500 and Corexit 9527A from the NCP Product Schedule under the newly established Removal Section §300.925 (g)(1-4).
As part of preauthorization planning authorized under the Clean Water Act [40 CFR §300.910 (a)], Regional Response Teams (RRT) have adopted voluntary restrictions on dispersant use in shallow water equal to or less than ten meters deep and within three miles of the coast (near shore environment), following recommendations by the National Research Council45 and driven by public concern before the BP disaster. Voluntary restrictions and even outright voluntary bans do not work because the U.S. Coast Guard, as On Scene Commander (OSC) during spill response, is given ultimate authority to preempt the EPA Administrator and all other federal agencies under the Clean Water Act to “direct appropriate actions to mitigate or remove the release of hazardous substances.” CFR 40 §300.415(b) and §300.415(c). Under the NCP, the OSC can use any product, listed or not, “when, in the judgment of the OSC, the use of the product is necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life” (emphasis added). §300.910 (e). The BP disaster is the latest example of industry and the U.S. Coast Guard ignoring the EPA Administrator’s request to find less toxic alternatives and to use less of the Corexit products. However, EPA’s authority was undermined well before the disaster: All five of the impacted Gulf states have plans that allow dispersant use on a case-by-case basis­ within the near shore environment. Louisiana even has an expedited approval process for dispersant use in near shore environments––but exempts biologically rich and sensitive inland bays and estuaries from the expedited process.46
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 established two Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) demonstration programs in Alaska after the Exxon Valdez oil spill with the understanding that, if successful, these councils could be expanded into other regions. 33 USC §2732. The councils, especially the Prince William Sound RCAC, have been highly successful in combating industry and government complacency and in increasing oil spill prevention and response measures. Such councils are already authorized under OPA90; they need to be established in practice in every region. 33 USC §2732(a)(1)(2)(J). One way of establishing such councils is to require their presence within the RRTs and to give them authority under the NCP. There is overwhelming evidence from the BP disaster that dispersant use significantly enhanced the harm to people and the environment than the oil release alone; that the harm to the environment occurred in shallow near shore environments and open ocean environments from the littoral to the pelagic to the benthic zones; and that the harm to human populations occurred near the coast and some distance inland––i.e., significant distances from where dispersant use was officially reported, indicating transportation via interaction with hydrologic cycles, physical oceanography, and geomorphology.
Given this evidence, it is now abundantly clear to us that: 1) voluntary bans do not work; 2) restricting dispersant use in shallow waters is not sufficient to protect human health or the environment; and 3) citizen input in the planning process and during disaster response is necessary to ensure protection of people as well as the environment. Therefore, we request that EPA establishes a new section §300.910 as follows:
Require public disclosure of a product’s ingredients as a condition of placement, or retention, on the NCP Product Schedule. Submitted by,
Suna'q Tribe of Kodiak Tribal Member and
Susan Connolly Resident, Marshall, MI Elizabeth Cook
Citizen AdvocateAlabama Coast United
Bonny L. Schumaker, Ph.D. President and Founder, On Wings Of Care, Inc. Susan D. Shaw
Yupi'aq Biologist
6 The Exxon Valdez oil spill (EVOS) was referenced but only for psychological disorders, which were not included as acute health effects. The Corexit dispersants 9500 and 9527A, and other products, were used during the EVOS disaster response; for a list of acute and chronic adverse health impacts among response workers, see: Annie O’Neill, Self-Reported Exposures And Health Status Among Workers From The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Cleanup, MS Thesis, Yale University Dept. of Epidemiology and Public Health, 2003, available at http://www.rikiott.com/pdf/oneill_thesis.pdf.
7 Charles Peterson, Stanley Rice, Jeffrey Short, Daniel Esler, James Bodkin, Brenda Ballachey, and David Irons, “Long-term Ecosystem Responses to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” 2003; 302:2082–2086. See also and in Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myths: The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Dragonfly Sisters Press, Cordova, AK: 2004), available at: www.rikiott.com.