Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/481/828/case.html
Timestamp: 2018-04-26 22:36:18
Document Index: 87789959

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 180', '§ 138', '§ 137', '§ 1105', '§ 1252', '§ 1105', '§ 1326', '§ 1202', '§ 1202', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 242', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1326', '§ 1101']

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, (full text) :: 481 U.S. 828 (1987) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center
Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 481 › United States v. Mendoza-Lopez › Case
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 481 U. S. 842. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 481 U. S. 846.
The District Court ruled that respondents could collaterally attack their previous deportation orders. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, CR 85-L-06 (Feb. 28, 1985). It rejected their claims that they were not adequately informed of their right to counsel. It found, however, that respondents had apparently failed to understand the Immigration Judge's explanation of suspension of deportation. [Footnote 4] The District
Id. at 113. [Footnote 5]
In United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169 (1952), we left open whether the validity of an underlying order of deportation may be challenged in a criminal prosecution in which that prior deportation is an element of the crime. [Footnote 7] Today, we
The first question we must address is whether the statute itself provides for a challenge to the validity of the deportation order in a proceeding under § 1326. Some of the Courts of Appeals considering the question have held that a deportation is an element of the offense defined by § 1326 only if it is "lawful," [Footnote 9] and that § 1326 therefore permits collateral
Nor does the sparse legislative history contain any evidence that Congress intended to permit challenge to the validity of the deportation in the § 1326 proceeding. Before § 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections imposed criminal penalties upon aliens who reentered the country after deportation: 8 U.S.C. § 180(a) (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that any alien who had been "deported in pursuance of law" and subsequently entered the United States would be guilty of a felony; 8 U.S.C. § 138 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that an alien deported for prostitution, procuring, or similar immoral activity, and who thereafter reentered the United States, would be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty; and 8 U.S.C. § 137-7(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1952), which stated that any alien who reentered the country after being deported for subversive activity would be guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third, more severe penalty. [Footnote 10] See H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-220 (1952).
The Immigration and Nationality Act does include sections that limit judicial review of deportation orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a provides that, outside of enumerated exceptions, the procedures prescribed by Title 28 of the United States Code for review of federal agency orders "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation." The enumerated exceptions permit an alien to challenge a deportation order, the validity of which has not previously been judicially determined, in a criminal proceeding against the alien for violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(d) or (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6), and any alien held in custody
Our cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent
imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 327 U. S. 121-122 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 321 U. S. 444 (1944); cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 395 U. S. 196-197 (1969). [Footnote 15] This principle means, at the very least, that, where the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense. [Footnote 16] The result of those proceedings may subsequently be used to convert the misdemeanor of unlawful entry into
Having established that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review, the question remains whether that occurred in this case. The United States did not seek this Court's review of the determination of the courts below that respondents' rights to due process were violated by the failure of the Immigration Judge to explain adequately their right to suspension of deportation or their right to appeal. Pet. for Cert. 7. The United States has asked this Court to assume that respondents' deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair in considering whether collateral attack on the hearing may be
The United States asserts that our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), answered any constitutional objections to the scheme employed in § 1326. In Lewis, the Court held that a state court conviction, even though it was uncounseled and therefore obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), could be used as a predicate for a subsequent conviction under § 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), which forbade any person convicted of a felony from receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm. We do not consider Lewis to control the issues raised by this case. The question in Lewis was whether Congress could define that "class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms," 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 67, by reference to prior state felony convictions, even if those convictions had resulted from procedures, such as the denial of
It is precisely the unavailability of effective judicial review of the administrative determination at issue here that sets this case apart from Lewis. The fundamental procedural defects of the deportation hearing in this case rendered direct review of the Immigration Judge's determination unavailable to respondents. What was assumed in Lewis, namely the opportunity to challenge the predicate conviction in a judicial forum, was precisely that which was denied to respondents here. Persons charged with crime are entitled to have the factual and legal determinations upon which convictions are based subjected to the scrutiny of an impartial judicial officer.
One judge dissented on the ground that a challenge to the propriety of a previous deportation order may never be asserted in a criminal proceeding under § 1326. 781 F.2d at 113-114.
See, e.g., United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (CA9 1975) ("A material element of the offense defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a lawful deportation"); United States v. Bowles, supra, at 749 ("When Congress made use of the word deported' in the statute, it meant `deported according to law'"). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in deciding this case, noted that other courts had permitted collateral attack on the ground that "a material element of the offense prohibited by 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a `lawful' deportation," and stated that it "agree[d] with this rationale." 781 F.2d at 112. The court does not appear to have relied entirely on the statute in ruling that the propriety of the deportation could be reviewed in the § 1326 proceeding, since it then continued:
Ante at 481 U. S. 831; see also United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, p. 8 (Neb., Feb. 28, 1985). Respondents did not claim that the judge failed to explain adequately their rights to appeal, or that their waivers of these rights were, as we are told today, "not considered or intelligent." Ante at 481 U. S. 840.
In affirming the District Court's decision in this case, the Court of Appeals did not at all address the question whether respondents knowingly waived their rights to appeal, but instead
The District Court, in deciding whether respondents were adequately apprised of their ability to apply for suspension of their deportations, concluded that the Immigration Judge complied with the technical notice requirements of 8 CFR § 242.17 (1987). Given that suspension of deportation is provided only as a matter of legislative grace and entrusted to
United States v. Landeros-Quinones, No. CR85-L-06, p. 9 (Neb., Feb. 28, 1985). Respondents indicated their understanding of this arrangement. Moreover, the Immigration Judge informed respondents that they were entitled to be represented by counsel, and made certain that they received a list of the free legal services available to them. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge asked respondents whether they wished to accept his ruling that they were deportable, appeal the ruling, or reserve decision, and respondents each stated that they accepted the judge's ruling. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that respondents' deportation proceedings violated the dictates of the Due
When respondents were deported from the United States in October, 1984, they were specifically warned that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 made it a felony for them to reenter the United States illegally. Two months later, they were apprehended in the United States and charged with violating § 1326. Respondents assert that, even if their reentry was illegal, they cannot lawfully be punished for violating § 1326, because the proceedings in which they were originally deported violated the Due Process Clause. [Footnote 2/1] I agree with the
I think it clear that Congress may constitutionally make it a felony for deportees -- irrespective of the legality of their deportations -- to reenter the United States illegally. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980) (Congress may constitutionally make it a felony for convicted felons -- irrespective of the legality of their convictions -- to deal in or possess firearms). [Footnote 2/2] The sole ground upon which the Court attempts to distinguish Lewis is that, in this case, respondents were completely foreclosed from obtaining "effective judicial review" of their deportations, while in Lewis, the felons could
Even if I believed the availability of "effective judicial review" to be relevant, I would still dissent, because review was available here. It is true, as the Court notes, that the District Court found that respondents' waivers of any appeal from the Immigration Judge's deportation order were "not the result of considered judgments," App. to Pet. for Cert.
Moreover, in concluding that the Immigration Judge's acceptance of respondents' unconsidered waivers effectively denied respondents their rights to appeal, the Court completely ignores the possibility that, notwithstanding their waivers and the fact that they had been deported, respondents could still have appealed their deportations on the ground that the deportations were unlawful and the waivers were unlawfully secured, cf., e.g., Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 959 (CA9 1977), or could have brought other collateral challenges to their deportations. I express no view on the question whether such suits would have been permissible under the applicable statutes, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(g), but merely note that a negative answer to that question is a necessary, and entirely unexplained, component of the Court's holding. [Footnote 2/3]