Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/104298/califano-vs-aznavorian
Timestamp: 2017-12-15 19:38:25
Document Index: 325330886

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 6', '§ 785', '§ 1614', '§ 1382', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 1611', '§ 205', '§ 205', '§ 1611']

Califano Vs Aznavorian - Citation 104298 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
Califano Vs. Aznavorian - Court Judgment
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/104298
Decided On Dec-11-1978
Case Number 439 U.S. 170
Appellant Califano
Respondent Aznavorian
.....blind, and disabled are to be paid for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the united states, held to be constitutional as having a rational basis and not to impose an impermissible burden on the freedom of international travel in violation of the fifth amendment. that section, which merely has an incidental effect on international travel ( kent v. dulles, 357 u. s. 116 ; aptheker v. secretary of state, 378 u. s. 500 ; and zemel v. rusk, 381 u. s. 1 , distinguished), clearly effectuates the basic congressional decision to limit ssi payments to residents of the united states. moreover, § 1611(f) may represent congress' decision simply to limit payments to those who need them in the united states. while these justifications for the.....
Califano v. Aznavorian - 439 U.S. 170 (1978)
U.S. Supreme Court Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978)
Section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act, which provides that no benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for the needy aged, blind, and disabled are to be paid for any month that the recipient spends entirely outside of the United States, held to be constitutional as having a rational basis and not to impose an impermissible burden on the freedom of international travel in violation of the Fifth Amendment. That section, which merely has an incidental effect on international travel ( Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 ; and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 , distinguished), clearly effectuates the basic congressional decision to limit SSI payments to residents of the United States. Moreover, § 1611(f) may represent Congress' decision simply to limit payments to those who need them in the United States. While these justifications for the legislation may not be compelling, its constitutionality, in contrast to the standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, does not depend on compelling justifications. Pp. 439 U. S. 174 -178.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL and BRENNAN, JJ., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 439 U. S. 178 .
"after an individual has been outside the United States for any period of 30 consecutive days, he shall be treated as remaining outside the United States until he has
Page 439 U. S. 172
been in the United States for a period of 30 consecutive days. [ Footnote 1 ]"
Aznavorian pursued her administrative remedies without success. She then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking judicial review of the Secretary's decision. [ Footnote 2 ] Asserting that the suspension of her benefits denied her due process, equal protection, and the right of international travel, all as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, she sought declaratory relief and the benefits
Page 439 U. S. 173
which had been denied because of her visit to Mexico. [ Footnote 3 ] She moved for certification of a plaintiff class including all persons denied SSI benefits because of international travel. The Secretary moved for summary judgment.
The District Court first considered the motion for class certification. It concluded that a class action was not barred by the Social Security Act because the class would be limited to those who had presented unsuccessful claims to the Secretary. Because the requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 were otherwise satisfied, it certified the class. [ Footnote 4 ] 440 F.Supp. 788, 792-794.
The District Court ordered the Secretary to provide notice of its decision to all class members who were receiving benefits at the time of the order or would have been receiving benefits except for § 1611(f). It also ordered the Secretary to pay benefits to those members of the class whose benefits had been
Page 439 U. S. 174
suspended because of § 1611(f), but who, in fact, continued to be actual residents of the United States. Because its order was limited to persons who were still needy within the meaning of the SSI program, the court believed that its order did not violate the sovereign immunity of the United States. 440 F.Supp. at 802-803.
The Secretary raises two questions on his appeal. [ Footnote 5 ] First, he contends that § 1611(f) does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Second, he urges that, in any event, the District Court's award of retroactive monetary relief is barred by sovereign immunity. Aznavorian's cross-appeal takes the position that the District Court erred in awarding monetary relief only to those class members who were eligible for SSI benefits on the date of its order. Because we conclude that § 1611(f) does not violate the Constitution, there is no occasion to consider the remedial issues raised by the appeal and cross-appeal.
"The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional challenge to a law providing for
Page 439 U. S. 175
governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. . . . In enacting legislation of this kind, a government does not deny equal protection"
" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S. 485 ."
"To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must be judged 'is not a toothless one,' Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 , 427 U. S. 510 . But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality."
Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 , 429 U. S. 185 . See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 ; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 , 430 U. S. 210 ; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 ; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 ; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 .
The freedom to travel abroad has found recognition in at least three decisions of this Court. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 , the Secretary of State had refused to issue a passport to a person because of his links with left-wing political groups. The Court held that Congress had not given the Secretary discretion to deny passports on such grounds. Although the holding was one of statutory construction, the Court recognized that freedom of international travel is "basic in our scheme of values," and an "important aspect of the
Page 439 U. S. 176
citizen's liberty.'" Id. at 357 U. S. 126 , 357 U. S. 127 . Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 , dealt with § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 785, which made it a criminal offense for a member of the Communist Party to apply for a passport. The Court again recognized that the freedom of international travel is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Congress had legislated too broadly by restricting this liberty for all members of the party. In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 , the Court upheld the Secretary's decision not to validate passports for travel to Cuba. The Court pointed out that "the fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circumstances be inhibited." Id. at 381 U. S. 14 .
Aznavorian urges that the freedom of international travel is basically equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate travel, recognized by this Court for over 100 years. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 , 211 U. S. 97 ; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 , 179 U. S. 274 ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 43 -44; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 48 U. S. 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). But this Court has often pointed out the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of interstate travel.
"The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified, United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 , 383 U. S. 757 -758 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 , 403 U. S. 105 -106 (1971). By contrast, the 'right' of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such, this 'right,' the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process."
(Citations omitted.) Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1 , 435 U. S. 4 n. 6. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 643 n. 1 (concurring opinion). Thus, legislation which is said to infringe the freedom
Page 439 U. S. 177
to travel abroad is not to be judged by the same standard applied to laws that penalize the right of interstate travel, such as durational residency requirements imposed by the States. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 , 415 U. S. 254 -262; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 405 U. S. 338 -342; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 394 U. S. 634 .
Unlike cases involving the right of interstate travel, this case involves legislation providing governmental payments of monetary benefits that has an incidental effect on a protected liberty, similar to the legislation considered in Califano v. Jobst, supra. There, another section of the Social Security Act was challenged because it "penalized" some beneficiaries upon their marriage. The Court recognized that the statutory provisions "may have an impact on a secondary beneficiary's desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others," 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 5 , but nonetheless upheld the constitutional validity of the challenged legislation. [ Footnote 6 ]
It is to be noted that Aznavorian does not question the constitutional validity of the basic decision of Congress to limit SSI payments to residents of the United States, as provided in § 1614(a)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act, as
Page 439 U. S. 178
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B). The statutory provision in issue, § 1611(f), clearly effectuates this basic congressional decision. Certainly, the longer a person is out of the country, the greater the possibility that he is no longer a resident. The 30-day period provided in § 1611(f) is no more arbitrary than any similar time period would be. The additional provision of § 1611(f) that, once a person has been outside the country for 30 consecutive days or more, he will not be eligible for SSI payments until he has spent 30 consecutive days in the United States, simply adds assurance that the beneficiary's residency here is genuine. Moreover, as the Secretary argues, Congress may simply have decided to limit payments to those who need them in the United States. The needs to which this program responds might vary dramatically in foreign countries. The Social Security Administration would be hard-pressed to monitor the continuing eligibility of persons outside the country. And, indeed, Congress may only have wanted to increase the likelihood that these funds would be spent inside the United States. These justifications for the legislation in question are not, perhaps, compelling. But its constitutionality does not depend on compelling justifications. It is enough if the provision is rationally based. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S. 487 . Section 1611(f) meets that test. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.
The Secretary's jurisdictional statement also claimed that a class action could not be maintained under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act. That question was raised, but not decided, in Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524 . While not abandoning his position, the Secretary has chosen not to argue the question in this case. The question is pending in Califano v. Elliott, No. 77-1511, cert. granted, post, p. 816. It is conceded that Aznavorian, as an individual, met the jurisdiction requirements of § 205(g).
In contrast to the monetary benefits legislation upheld in the Jobst case, a state law that burdened the freedom to marry was held constitutionally invalid later the same Term in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 .
We concur in the Court's conclusion that § 1611(f) of the Social Security Act is constitutional. We do not, however, understand the Court to imply that welfare legislation not involving a fundamental interest or suspect classification is subject to a lesser standard of review than the traditional rational basis test. To sustain classifications in welfare legislation
Page 439 U. S. 179
that are "arbitrary," ante at 439 U. S. 174 , so long as they are not "wholly irrational," ante at 439 U. S. 177 , would be inconsistent with the settled principle that the "standard by which [welfare] legislation . . . must be judged is not a toothless one.'" Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 , 429 U. S. 185 (1976), quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 , 427 U. S. 510 (1976).