Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98581/united-states-vs-williams
Timestamp: 2018-02-23 11:04:29
Document Index: 722680703

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 242', '§ 241', '§ 1621', '§ 1621', '§ 3731', '§ 242', '§ 241', '§ 242', '§ 1621', '§ 3231', '§ 1538', '§ 241']

United States Vs Williams - Citation 98581 - Court Judgment | LegalCrystal
LegalCrystal Citation legalcrystal.com/98581
Case Number 341 U.S. 58
united states v. williams - 341 u.s. 58 (1951) u.s. supreme court united states v. williams, 341 u.s. 58 (1951) united states v. williams no. 134 argued january 8, 1951 decided april 23, 1951 341 u.s. 58 appeal from the united states district court for the southern district of florida syllabus in a prosecution for violation of what is now 18 u.s.c. § 242, arising out of the alleged beating of persons to coerce confessions, and for conspiracy against fourteenth amendment rights of citizens in alleged violation of what is now 18 u.s.c. § 241, appellee williams was convicted and the other three appellees were acquitted of the substantive offenses, and the jury was unable to agree on a verdict on the conspiracy.....
United States v. Williams - 341 U.S. 58 (1951)
U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951)
1. The conviction of Williams on the charge of beating the victims did not bar, as double jeopardy, his prosecution for perjury in testifying falsely that he had not beaten them. P. 341 U. S. 62 .
2. That the other appellees had been acquitted of the substantive offense of aiding and abetting Williams in abusing the victims did not bar, on the ground of res judicata, their subsequent prosecution for perjury in testifying that they had not seen Williams beating them. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 , distinguished. Pp. 341 U. S. 63 -65.
3. Testifying falsely in the first trial on the conspiracy charges constituted perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 even though, on appeal, it was determined that the later indictment for conspiracy was defective. Pp. 341 U. S. 65 -69.
(a) In the trial of the first conspiracy charges, the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter (an alleged violation of a federal conspiracy statute) and of the parties, and therefore was a "competent tribunal" within the requirement of the perjury statute. Pp. 341 U. S. 65 -66.
(b) The circumstance that ultimately it is determined on appeal that the indictment is defective does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine the case presented by the indictment. P. 341 U. S. 66 .
(c) Where the court in the proceedings in which the alleged perjury occurred had jurisdiction to render judgment on the merits in those proceedings, defects developed dehors the record or in the procedure, sufficient to invalidate any judgment on review, do not bar a conviction for perjury. Pp. 341 U. S. 67 -69.
The District Court dismissed an indictment of appellees for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 93 F.Supp. 922. On direct appeal to this Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, reversed, p. 341 U. S. 69 .
"to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate [under color of state law, four citizens of the United States] in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges secured . . . and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [ Footnote 1 ]"
The other four counts of the indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 242, charged that Williams, Bombaci, Ford, and another not here involved, as police officers acting under state laws, committed substantive crimes by subjecting four persons to deprivation of certain "of the rights, privileges and immunities secured . . . and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," [ Footnote 2 ] and that Yuhas and another willfully aided and abetted in the commission of these substantive offenses.
In the prior trial, during which this indictment charges perjury was committed, Williams was found guilty by a jury of the substantive offenses. His conviction is affirmed today. See No. 365, Williams v. United States, post, p. 341 U. S. 97 . The jury found Bombaci and Ford not guilty of these offenses and Yuhas not guilty of aiding and abetting in the commission of these offenses. However, the jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to the four counts which charged conspiracy. Later, a new indictment
was presented which framed once again the conspiracy charges, and this time the appellees in this case were found guilty. The perjury charges not before us are not based on the proceedings in the second conspiracy trial. On appeal from the conviction in the second trial, and before the trial for perjury, the Court of Appeals quashed the conspiracy indictment and reversed. So far as here important, the basis for the reversal was that § 241 did not apply to the general rights extended to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment. 179 F.2d 644, 648. This Court today affirms the Court of Appeals. No. 26, United States v. Williams, decided today, post, p. 341 U. S. 70 .
I. Former Jeopardy. -- The conviction of Williams at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. "It is only an identity of offenses which is fatal." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 , 328 U. S. 644 , and cases cited. The trial court does not cite any authority for a contrary position, and appellees concede that the ground for dismissal cannot be sustained. It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. Appellees' brief treats Williams' conviction as grounds for estoppel or res judicata.
II. Res Judicata. -- Though former jeopardy by trial for the substantive crimes is not available as a defense against this perjury indictment, it could be that acquittal on the substantive charges would operate "to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict determined though the offenses be different." Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 , 332 U. S. 578 .
Petitioner in the Sealfon case was acquitted of a conspiracy charge of defrauding the United States of its governmental function of conserving and rationing sugar. One item of evidence was a letter to an alleged co-conspirator said to furnish a basis for getting sugar illegally. On another indictment for uttering false invoices for the same sugar involved in the conspiracy, Sealfon moved to quash on the ground of res judicata. The motion was denied, and Sealfon was convicted. The test of the soundness of the motion was whether the "verdict in the conspiracy trial was a determination favorable to petitioner of the facts essential to conviction of the substantive offense." 332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 578 . We thought the acquittal of conspiracy determined that Sealfon did not conspire with Greenberg, the only alleged co-conspirator. Admittedly, Sealfon wrote a certain letter.
332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 580 . The core of the two cases was the same. As the first trial cleared him of sending the letter pursuant to a corrupt agreement, that fact was res judicata. A like basis for res judicata does not exist here.
of abuse and aiding and abetting the abuse. Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693, was cited. [ Footnote 3 ] 93 F.Supp. 922.
We do not think the facts bring any of these defendants within the protection of res judicata, as recently expounded in Sealfon. Aiding and abetting means to assist the perpetrator of the crime. [ Footnote 4 ] The substantive former
III. The counts in this indictment which charge that perjury was committed in the first conspiracy trial rely on the same facts to prove the perjury as are detailed above to support the counts of the indictment which charge perjury in the trial of the substantive counts. The trial court in the present case dismissed the counts for perjury committed in the first trial of the conspiracy charge for a different reason than that it gave for dismissal of the other perjury counts. In the first trial, no verdict was reached by the jury on the conspiracy counts. The trial court in this case, however, relying upon the determination of the Fifth Circuit in the second conspiracy trial, Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 644 (now affirmed here, No. 26, United States v. Williams, post, p. 341 U. S. 70 , decided today), ruled that the former conspiracy indictment did not state an offense, and consequently perjury could not have been committed. The Court said it reached this conclusion because the court that tried the conspiracy indictment had "no jurisdiction." Evidently, the trial court was led to this conclusion by the requirement of the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, that there must be a "competent tribunal" before a false statement in perjurious.
the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. [ Footnote 5 ] Hence, it had jurisdiction of the subject matter, to-wit, an alleged violation of a federal conspiracy statute, and, of course, of the persons charged. This made the trial take place before "a competent tribunal": a court authorized to render judgment on the indictment. The circumstance that ultimately it is determined on appeal that the indictment is defective does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine the case presented by the indictment.
This was held as to a civil proceeding in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 . In that case, a suit in a federal district court for damages against federal officers for violation of plaintiff's rights to due process in arrest and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was held to give the district court jurisdiction sufficient to call for judgment on the merits, even though that judgment should dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 327 U.S. at 327 U. S. 682 . "Jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy, and includes questions of law, as well as of fact." Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 , 263 U. S. 305 . Even the unconstitutionality of the statute under which the proceeding is brought does not oust a court of jurisdiction. Chicot County District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 , 308 U. S. 376 . See also Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 ; M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192.
It is true that there are certain essential facts that must exist to give any power to a court. Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 , 147 U. S. 173 . As the existence of those facts are so plainly necessary, e.g., process, examples of decisions are rare. Absence of such facts makes the
proceedings a nullity. Such a case was Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 . We there held that the Federal Government, in the exercise of its plenary power over bankruptcy, had ousted state courts of all independent power over farmer bankrupts. Therefore any subsequent orders in the state courts were void. 308 U.S. at 308 U. S. 440 -444. In a criminal case, we have said that a person convicted by a court without jurisdiction over the place of the crime could be released from restraint by habeas corpus where there were exceptional circumstances such as a conflict of jurisdiction between the state and the Federal Government. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19 , 306 U. S. 27 . The kind of judicial controversies presented for adjudication in the cases cited above in this paragraph were not cognizable by the respective courts. It is absence of such basic facts of jurisdiction that has led courts to say that false testimony in the proceedings is not punishable as perjury. Where perjury charges arise from alleged false statements by the defendant in former trials, whether, in that former trial he was also a defendant or only a witness, the same distinctions appear. Where the court of the first trial had no jurisdiction of the kind of judicial controversies presented for adjudication, a number of courts have held that false testimony in those proceedings is not punishable as perjury. [ Footnote 6 ] So, in a case where the court had general jurisdiction of the kind of prosecution, larceny less than felony, but not of the particular proceeding, larceny as a felony, there was no perjury. Johnson v. State, 58 Ga. 397. But where the court in the trial where the alleged perjury occurred had jurisdiction to render judgment on the merits in those proceedings, defects developed dehors the record [ Footnote 7 ] or in the procedure, sufficient to invalidate any
judgment on review, [ Footnote 8 ] do not make a subsequent conviction for perjury in the former trial impossible.
One can find inconsistent and indeed conflicting rulings among the cases, even from the same jurisdictions, perhaps attributable to the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the heterogeneous situations that occur. The line is narrow and often wavering between errors in the proceedings and lack of jurisdiction. Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.), § 1538. Here, however, we have a federal statute enacted in an effort to keep the course of justice free from the pollution of perjury. We have a court empowered to take cognizance of the crime of perjury and decide the issues under that statute. The effect of the alleged false testimony could not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case, but the federal statute against perjury is not directed so much at its effects as at its perpetration -- at the probable wrong done the administration of justice by false testimony. That statute has led federal courts to uphold charges of perjury despite arguments that the federal court at the trial affected by the perjury could not enter a valid judgment due to lack of diversity jurisdiction, [ Footnote 9 ] or due to the unconstitutionality of the statute out of which the perjury proceedings arose. [ Footnote 10 ]
Where a federal court has power, as here, to proceed to a determination on the merits, that is jurisdiction of the proceedings. The District Court has such jurisdiction. [ Footnote 11 ] Though the trial court or an appellate court may
To be present at a crime is not evidence of guilt as an aider or abettor. Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442 , 150 U. S. 447 , 150 U. S. 450 . Cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 332 U. S. 587 . The instructions at the trial of the substantive crimes followed this rule. E.g.,
Boehm v. United States, 123 F.2d 791, 809. Cf. Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 , 303 U. S. 6 ; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 , 258 U. S. 186 , 258 U. S. 189 ; Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 ; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 , 330 U. S. 289 -295.
The validity of § 241 has been repeatedly upheld. E.g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 , 238 U. S. 386 ; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 , 144 U. S. 293 ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 , 110 U. S. 667 .