Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/447/1041/462121/
Timestamp: 2019-09-15 16:41:53
Document Index: 760612248

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 9', '§ 717', '§ 717', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 9', '§ 4801', '§ 4802', '§ 9', '§ 4861', 'Art. 3', '§ 16', '§ 16', '§ 9']

Continental Casualty Company et al., Plaintiffs-appellants-cross Appellees, v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., et al., Defendants,thomas Jordan, Inc., Defendant-appellee-cross Appellant.texaco, Inc., Plaintiff-appellee-cross Appellant, v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., et al., Defendants,thomas Jordan, Inc., Defendant-appellant-cross Appellee.united Tugs, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant-cross Appellee, v. Continental Casualty Company et al., Defendants-appellees-cross Appellants, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › Fifth Circuit › 1971 › Continental Casualty Company et al., Plaintiffs-appellants-cross Appellees, v. Associated Pipe & Sup...
Continental Casualty Company et al., Plaintiffs-appellants-cross Appellees, v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., et al., Defendants,thomas Jordan, Inc., Defendant-appellee-cross Appellant.texaco, Inc., Plaintiff-appellee-cross Appellant, v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., et al., Defendants,thomas Jordan, Inc., Defendant-appellant-cross Appellee.united Tugs, Inc., Plaintiff-appellant-cross Appellee, v. Continental Casualty Company et al., Defendants-appellees-cross Appellants, 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971)
Rehearing Denied October 18, 1971
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED Lawrence K. Benson, Jr., Milling, Saal, Benson, Woodward & Hillyer, New Orleans, La., for Associated Pipe and Supply Co., Inc., and Thomas Jordan, Inc.
A bifurcated trial was held, dividing the issues, generally, into questions of law and factual issues on the merits of each claim. District Judge Fred T. Cassibry wrote two opinions, 279 F. Supp. 490; 310 F. Supp. 1207, which discuss the legal issues at length.
310 F. Supp. 1216, 1217.
" [I]t is the position of Texaco that the primary obligation of satisfying these current claims and demands and any others that may arise, as well as the full performance and satisfaction of all other obligations under the subject contract, rest entirely with the Offshore Gathering Corporation and its surety, Continental Casualty Company. Accordingly, Texaco, Inc. demands that all outstanding and future claims for labor and services performed, equipment rented, supplies or materials furnished or any other matter arising in connection with the above captioned contract be promptly and satisfactorily settled by Offshore Gathering Corporation and Continental Casualty Company." (Emphasis supplied.)
The district court drew a distinction between a "transmission" and a "gathering" pipeline and found this to be the latter. The district court found support in McGee v. Missouri Valley Dredging Co., La.App.1966, 182 So. 2d 764, where a transmission line was held not to be covered by the § 9:4861. The McGee court said the following in dictum:
182 So. 2d 764, 767.
Texaco objects to this reliance on McGee dictum, but the term "gathering" was not created by McGee. The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., exempts "the production or gathering of natural gas" from Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction. 15 U.S. C. § 717(b). Justice Black defined these terms in his dissenting opinion in Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 498, 518, 69 S. Ct. 1251, 93 L. Ed. 1499, "`Production' of gas [means] the act of bringing forth gas from the earth, and `gathering' [means] the act of collecting gas after it has been brought forth."12 Thus gathering pipelines are exempt from the Act's coverage even though they may lead into interstate transportation lines.
" [R]egardless of whether the pipeline is the only available method or not, it is the method that was used, and without some method of transporting production the wells could not be commercially operable. Of course, Texaco could begin to barge the oil away, but then the barges would be used in connection with the operation of the well. The statute recognizes this, and it gives a lien to ` [a]ny person who does any * * * barging * * * in connection with the operation of any oil * * * well or wells * * *.'"
279 F. Supp. 503.
There is no issue here of the validity of unrecorded liens asserted against unknowing, innocent third parties. Therefore, such cases as Mercantile National Bank v. J. Thomas Driscoll, Inc., 1940, 194 La. 935, 195 So. 497, and Pertuit v. Angelloz, La.App.1964, 164 So. 2d 125, which required liens to be filed under § 9:4862 to be effective against third parties, are not inconsistent with the result reached here. Those cases are a part of the body of Louisiana lien law which emphasizes the importance of filing liens in order to put third parties on notice that a claim may be made. But the owner and the surety of the contractor do not fall into the class of parties recognized by the law as persons who might be unaware of the work recently done and thus need notice.
The district court found, and we agree, that many of the delivered supplies came within the definition of "equipment" as used in L.S.A.-R.S. § 9:4869. The district court relied on Sandel & Lastrapes v. City of Shreveport, La.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 620, though that case did not interpret § 9:4861, for its definition of "equipment" as the "outfit necessary to enable contractors to perform the agreed services."
The statute uses the term "services" in two contexts. The first protects " [a]ny person who performs any labor or service" in connection with the drilling or operating of a well. The second comes in the following language:
The statutory language prior to the 1960 amendment was interpreted as excluding rentals of unmanned equipment. National Surety Corp. v. Highland Park Country Club, Inc., La.1960, 240 La. 747, 125 So. 2d 151. The statute was held to protect only those furnishers of machinery who perform work.
The district court found that United Tugs was a subcontractor and as such entitled to recover under the Private Works Act, § 9.4801.19 Its definition of "subcontractor" is found at 310 F. Supp. 1217.
310 F. Supp. at 1223.
Texaco's position is that any promises it made to pay United Tugs and Jordan were in reference to paying them out of the funds it retained from Offshore. The district court concluded that the evidence showed the promises were independent of the retainage, and thus unconditional. See 279 F. Supp. 490, at 505.25 This finding is not clearly erroneous.
" [O]n August 12th, at a time when Linebarger [contractor] * * * knew that Cart [subcontractor] was not properly performing the subcontract and was neglecting the work, Linebarger wrote the Bank that on September 15th Linebarger would owe Cart $16,000.00.
We decline Golden Meadow's invitation to re-examine the evidence. Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court of judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Though no express findings of fact were made for this claim, we cannot say on this record that the district court's dismissal of Golden Meadow's claim was clearly erroneous. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 1969, 395 U.S. 100, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129.
A detailed description is found in the district court's original opinion. 279 F. Supp. 490, at 493-495
"§ 4801 Privilege on Immovables for labor and materials; rank
"§ 4802 Contracts to be recorded; bond; time for filing privileges; cancellation of entries
It is also contended that the bond is conventional because it does not refer to § 9:4802. But while the Louisiana courts often take note that a bond refers to a statute, Monroe Hardware Co. v. Thompson, 1926, 162 La. 335, 110 So. 495; Lhote Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Dugue, 1905, 115 La. 669, 39 So. 803, neither the current statute nor any of its predecessors contain any requirement that the bond is to have reference to the statute under which it is given See, Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Owen, 1929, 10 La.App. 326, 121 So. 201.
The relevant portion of the letter is quoted at 279 F. Supp. 501
"§ 4861 Privilege for labor, services or supplies
This definition was followed in Saturn Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 10 Cir. 1957, 250 F.2d 61, which found the definition consistent with the Supreme Court's language in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 1945, 324 U.S. 581, 65 S. Ct. 829, 89 L. Ed. 1206 and Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 1947, 331 U.S. 682, 67 S. Ct. 1482, 91 L. Ed. 1742
Such imperative as was contained in the former title would be of dubious validity. Statute titles are required by Art. 3, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. They are intended as subject indicators, Succession of Pipitone, 1944, 204 La. 391, 15 So. 2d 801, but are not a part of the statutes, State ex rel. Thompson v. Department of City Civil Service, 1949, 214 La. 683, 38 So. 2d 385. Article 3, § 16 has been interpreted to mean that a statutory text broader than its title is invalid,Thompson, supra, but the converse is not true, i. e., a title may be broader than the statute. Even if it were to be assumed that the title phrase "notice of privilege to be filed" would cover a compulsory filing requirement, we are unable to find this compulsory language in § 9:4862. See, In re Lent, W.D. La. 1940, 34 F. Supp. 700.
National Materials Co. v. Guest, La. App.1933, 147 So. 771; Brown and Root, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 5 Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 65; Fuselier v. Hudson, La.App. 1957, 93 So. 2d 266
Hornsby v. Rives, La.App.1941, 2 So. 2d 532; Watson Bros. v. Jones, 1910, 125 La. 249, 51 So. 187
The litigants here debate at great length the importance of the element of pecuniary interest Texaco had in making its promises. While pecuniary interest may be a prerequisite for enforcing oral promises to pay the debts of another, Eunice Clinic & Hospital v. Baldwin, La. App.1936, 167 So. 868; Webb v. Shreveport Packing Co., Inc., La.App.1938, 180 So. 843; Rube v. Pacific Insurance Co., La.App.1961, 131 So. 2d 240; Custom Contract Co. v. Nims, La.App.1962, 145 So. 2d 374; Coen v. Toups, La.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 893, its presence does not necessarily transform the promise from conditional to unconditional,Brown & Root, supra; Gateway Barge Line, Inc. v. R. B. Tyler Co., La.App.1965, 175 So. 2d 867. But a decision on this issue is not necessary here, for we agree with the district court that Texaco's promises to pay were unconditional.
Appellants strenuously object that this conclusion, found in the original opinion, is not consistent with the finding that "Texaco officials did unequivocably [sic] promise United and Jordan that if they would let their equipment remain on the job, Texaco would see to it that United and Jordan were paid out of the retainage Texaco then had in its possession, which was due Offshore." 279 F. Supp. 490, at 504
F. Supp. at 1213
See Hebert v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App.1971, 245 So. 2d 563, where Act No. 315 of 1970 was denied retroactive application.