Source: https://casetext.com/case/hedgepeth-v-wash-metro-area-transit-auth
Timestamp: 2019-06-20 13:49:33
Document Index: 409897173

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 1983', '§ 35', '§ 1983', '§ 1983', '§ 35', '§ 35', '§ 16', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 1']

Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth, 386 F.3d 1148 | Casetext
Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth
386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
ReadReadAttorney AnalysesAnalyses1lockCiting BriefsBriefs9lockCiting CasesCiting Cases29
Hedgepethv.Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia CircuitOct 26, 2004
On April 9, 2001, Ansche's mother Tracey Hedgepeth brought this action as Ansche's next friend in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named WMATA, its General Manager, the arresting officer, and the District of Columbia as defendants. It alleged that Ansche's arrest violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, because adults eating in the Metro were not arrested. The complaint also alleged that the arrest was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement policies leading to Ansche's arrest, and expungement of Ansche's arrest record.
The complaint also sought damages from the arresting officer in his individual capacity. That claim has been dismissed and is not before us on appeal.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit, 284 F.Supp.2d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2003). Addressing the equal protection claim, the court applied "the highly deferential rational basis test," id. at 156, because it found that age is not a suspect class, id. at 152-53, and that there is no fundamental right to be free from physical restraint when there is probable cause for arrest. Id. at 155. The court then ruled that both the District's no-citation policy for minors and WMATA's zero-tolerance policy survived rational basis review. Id. at 156-58. The district court next rejected Ansche's Fourth Amendment claim, relying on Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), for the proposition that "`[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.'" 284 F.Supp.2d at 160 (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354, 121 S.Ct. at 1557-58). Given that it was undisputed that Ansche had committed the offense in the presence of the arresting officer, the district court concluded it was "without discretion or authority to reject the standards enunciated" in Atwater, despite the minor nature of the offense and the harshness of the response. 284 F.Supp.2d at 160. Hedgepeth now appeals.
We are confronted at the outset with two jurisdictional objections. First, Ansche's complaint seeks only prospective relief, and — even in the absence of WMATA's change in policy — we are not willing to indulge the assumption that she will violate D.C. CODE § 35-251(b) in the future and thereby again be subject to the policies about which she complains. This suggests the lack of an ongoing case or controversy under Article III. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (plaintiff subject to illegal arrest procedure lacked standing to seek prospective relief because he made no showing that he was likely to be arrested and subjected to illegal procedure again); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) ("Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief").
At several points in the proceedings, plaintiff's counsel referred to a request for damages from the District. See, e.g., Transcript of June 19, 2003 Summary Judgment Hearing at 32-33, 109. The Second Amended Complaint, however, contains no such demand. While that complaint concludes with the standard request for "such other relief . . . as this Court deems just and proper," id. at 7, and while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a court shall award a party relief to which it is entitled even if the party has not demanded it, the law is settled in this circuit that "Rule 54(c) `comes into play only after the court determines it has jurisdiction.'" NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. United States Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968, 975 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, even if damages could be awarded pursuant to judicial discretion under Rule 54(c), the possible availability of such relief would not establish standing or defeat mootness objections.
The answer to both objections is found in the precise relief sought by Ansche. In the complaint, Ansche sought not only declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the no-citation and zero-tolerance policies, but also the expungement of her arrest record. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 32(c). She clarified in her summary judgment papers that this last request included a judicial declaration deeming her allegedly unlawful arrest a "detention." See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Feb. 21, 2003) at 23. Such an order would relieve Ansche of the burden of having to respond affirmatively to the familiar question, "Ever been arrested?" on application, employment, and security forms. This court has approved such relief in the past. See Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Ansche accordingly has Article III standing, and her effort to secure such relief has in no way been affected by WMATA's policy change.
WMATA also argues that, as a state-level governmental entity with sovereign immunity, it is not a "person" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Ansche, however, has also named as a defendant WMATA's General Manager in his official capacity, and "[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because `official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'" Id. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 2312 n. 10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)).
This action is justiciable with respect to both the District of Columbia and WMATA. Although each tries to blame the other, Ansche alleges that neither defendant's policies alone would suffice to cause the alleged violation: but for WMATA's zero-tolerance policy, there likely would have been no enforcement of § 35-251(b) against Ansche; but for the fact that District of Columbia law did not authorize citations to minors, the zero-tolerance enforcement of § 35-251(b) would not have required Ansche's arrest. Cf. Machesney v. Larry Bruni, 905 F.Supp. 1122, 1134 (D.D.C. 1995) ("ordinarily when two tortfeasors jointly contribute to harm to a plaintiff, both are potentially liable to the injured party for the entire harm") (internal quotation marks omitted).
It would be inaccurate to refer to the District's law as one of "mandatory arrest." The statute itself says a minor violating the law " may be taken into custody." D.C. CODE § 16-2309(a)(2) (2001) (emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute allows an officer discretion to warn or even to look the other way. The arrest provision only becomes mandatory when paired with a zero-tolerance enforcement policy.
This court has noted in passing that youth is not a suspect classification. See United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); see also Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Other circuits have reviewed classifications based on youth under a rational basis standard. See Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1990); Douglas v. Stallings, 870 F.2d 1242, 1247 (7th Cir. 1989); Williams v. City of Lewiston, 642 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981). We agree with the conclusions of these circuits.
Although Ansche is correct that the Supreme Court cases applying rational basis review to classifications based on age all involved classifications burdening the elderly, see Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2003), she has presented us with no persuasive reasons to conclude that classifications burdening children should be treated differently. Heightened scrutiny is reserved for classifications based on factors that "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Youth is not such a factor — young age is quite often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution itself attests. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (minimum age for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President). Minimum age requirements for voting, marriage, driving, drinking, employment, and the like cannot be dismissed as reflecting "prejudice and antipathy" toward the young. Youth is not "so seldom relevant" to legitimate state concerns that we should assume that any law singling out the young is probably the result of anti-youth animus. Youth is more often relevant than old age, which we know does not trigger heightened scrutiny.
Ansche alternatively argues that her equal protection claim is subject to heightened scrutiny because the challenged classification burdens a fundamental right. It has been pointed out often enough that, in considering such a claim, much turns on the level of generality at which the asserted fundamental right is defined. Compare Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538 (plurality opinion) ("We think that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to be on the streets at night without adult supervision.") with id. at 557 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the contested right should be defined more abstractly . . . first without regard to age, and second without regard to the manner in which it is exercised").
The Court in Atwater undertook a two-step inquiry in addressing the plaintiff's argument that a warrantless arrest for a fine-only offense was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It first concluded that Atwater's argument that such arrests were not supported by the common law at the Founding, "while by no means insubstantial," ultimately failed. Id. at 327, 121 S.Ct. at 1543-44. The Court then declined the plaintiff's invitation "to mint a new rule of constitutional law" based on a balancing of competing interests and an assessment according to "traditional standards of reasonableness." Id. at 345-46, 121 S.Ct. at 1552-53. Reasoning that "the standard of probable cause `applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations,'" the Court concluded that "if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." Id. at 354, 121 S.Ct. at 1557-58 ( quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)).
In addition, the "very fact that [ Fourth Amendment] law has never jelled the way Atwater would have it" led the Court to doubt "whether warrantless misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention." 532 U.S. at 351-52, 121 S.Ct. at 1555-56. The Court enumerated a number of protections, both constitutional and practical, that it thought obviated the need for reasonableness scrutiny above and beyond probable cause. Id. at 351-53, 121 S.Ct. at 1555-57. The Court concluded that "[t]he upshot of all these influences, combined with the good sense (and, failing that, political accountability) of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement officials, is a dearth of horribles demanding redress." Id. at 353, 121 S.Ct. at 1556-57 (emphasis added). The Atwater Court even cited WMATA's decision in this case to change its policy, and to provide for citations in lieu of arrest for "subway snackers," as an example of the efficacy of the "practical and political considerations" supporting the absence of a need for a reasonableness balancing beyond probable cause. Id. at 353 n. 23, 121 S.Ct. at 1557 n. 23.
Moreover, insisting on the exercise of discretion by an arresting officer would be an unfamiliar imperative under the Fourth Amendment. "The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials. . . ." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (footnote omitted). See also Whren, 517 U.S. at 817-18, 116 S.Ct. at 1776-77 (requirement of individualized suspicion "necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained"); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580-81, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) ("To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers."); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193-94, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) ("The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals."). It is the high office of the Fourth Amendment to constrain law enforcement discretion; we see no basis for turning the usual Fourth Amendment approach on its head and finding a government practice unconstitutional solely because it lacks a sufficient role for discretionary judgment.