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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 3', '§ 3553', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3742', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 991', '§ 5', '§ 3553', '§ 3553', '§ 845', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 2', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 924', '§ 2', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 3', '§ 1', '§ 841', '§ 2', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 5', '§ 3', '§ 994', '§ 3553', '§ 1001']

United States of America, Appellant, v. Kelvin Harrington, 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › D.C. Circuit › 1991 › United States of America, Appellant, v. Kelvin Harrington
United States of America, Appellant, v. Kelvin Harrington, 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991) Argued Sept. 6, 1991. Decided Oct. 25, 1991
In sentencing Kelvin Harrington for narcotics offenses, the district court departed downward from the sentencing range indicated by the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("guidelines," cited as "U.S.S.G."). Harrington's potential for rehabilitation from drug addiction, the trial judge held, was a mitigating circumstance not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission in promulgating the guidelines. See United States v. Harrington, 741 F. Supp. 968 (D.D.C. 1990). The government appeals the sentence. We conclude that Harrington's post-offense rehabilitation is the type of conduct properly considered in determining whether he is eligible for a reduction in sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (acceptance of personal responsibility for one's criminal conduct).1 We therefore vacate the sentence imposed by the district court and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(b) (introductory policy statement on departures); id. § 5K2.0 (policy statement on grounds for departures). In deciding whether the Sentencing Commission adequately accounted for a particular circumstance, "the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The determination whether a particular factor is an appropriate ground for departure "involves a question of statutory interpretation" over which this court exercises "plenary review." United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 115 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1991).
Once a factor is established as "a legally permissible basis for departure," however, we accord "broad deference to the district court's judgment as to the appropriateness of considering th [e] factor, and we will uphold the departure so long as it is reasonable." Id. at 1345 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (4)). Fact findings underlying the sentencing court's decision to depart will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 1345-46 (citing United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S. Ct. 177, 107 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1989)). [292 U.S.App.D.C. 92] B. Harrington's Sentence
Harrington, 741 F. Supp. at 976.2 The court found that Harrington "is an addict who has demonstrated that he is amenable to successful drug treatment in prison which is likely to curb any criminal propensities." Id. at 977. This determination rested on several grounds: "uncontroverted expert opinion ... that successful treatment of Harrington's addiction is likely and that future criminal activity by him is unlikely"; the corroborative conclusions regarding drug treatment of prisoners contained in Understanding Drug Treatment, an Office of National Drug Control Policy White Paper issued in June 1990; the positive evaluations of Harrington's participation in drug treatment programs during his pretrial release and post-trial incarceration; and the court's own "observations of Harrington on his several court appearances before and during the jury trial and during the sentencing proceedings." Id. at 976-77. The court consequently departed downward from Harrington's guidelines sentencing range of 97-121 months and imposed the statutory minimum prison term of 60 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Id. at 976-78.
Federal courts of appeals that have faced claims of post-offense drug rehabilitation as a basis for downward departure have resolved the issue under one or the other of two arguably applicable guidelines provisions, section 3E1.1 or section 5H1.4. The First and Fourth Circuits regarded evidence of successful drug treatment between arrest and sentencing as post-offense conduct within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which permits a two-level reduction in offense level " [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a);3 see United States v. Sklar, [292 U.S.App.D.C. 93] 920 F.2d 107, 115-17 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 986-87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 112, 112 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1990). A two-level reduction in Harrington's case would yield a sentencing range of 76-97 months, in contrast to the unreduced 97-121 months range, and the 60 months the district court imposed.
The Third and Ninth Circuits considered post-arrest drug rehabilitation under the rubric "Specific Offender Characteristics," governed by Chapter 5, Part H of the guidelines, rather than as post-offense conduct demonstrating acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1. See United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 2274, 114 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1991). Both circuits interpreted section 5H1.4, see supra note 2, "to mean that dependence upon drugs, or separation from such a dependency, is not a proper basis for a downward departure from the guidelines." Id. at 133; Martin, 938 F.2d at 164 (quoting Pharr). The Ninth Circuit in Martin emphasized the Commission's recommendation that drug treatment be a required component of post-incarceration supervised release. That recommendation, the Ninth Circuit said, was a clear indication of "intent that rehabilitation from drug abuse be factored into post-sentencing supervised release and not be recognized as a ground for departure." Id.6
Pharr's post-offense rehabilitative conduct, the Third Circuit held, was not within the ambit of section 3E1.1. Id. at 131. The appellate court reasoned that section 3E1.1 was intended to credit a defendant for "either accepting responsibility for the offense for which he is being sentenced or mitigating the effects of his criminal activity." Id. Pharr's efforts to overcome substance abuse did not manifest acceptance of responsibility "for selling stolen treasury checks," the court observed, nor was his entrance into a drug rehabilitation program an "attempt [ ] to rectify the harm he caused." Id. Rather, Pharr's drug rehabilitation attempt qualified as " [s]elf-improvement," and thus was "not the type of conduct contemplated by the acceptance of responsibility provisions of the guidelines." Id. The appeals court in Pharr regarded Van Dyke as "clearly distinguishable" on its facts "since Van Dyke's drug rehabilitation efforts were directly related to the crime for which he was being sentenced." Id. at 132. The Third Circuit expressly reserved "the issue of whether drug rehabilitation can be considered acceptance of responsibility for section 3E1.1 purposes in sentencing a defendant for a drug-related offense," and "offer [ed] no indication as to how [it] would rule if that issue were squarely before" the court. Id.
Amicus Curiae7 distinguishes the decisions of the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits by stressing the presence in Harrington of "scientific findings of likelihood of successful treatment." Brief of Amicus Curiae at 10. To predicate unlimited departure from the guidelines on expert testimony as to the defendant's potential for successful rehabilitation or propensity for recidivism, however, is troubling. Defendants without access to the psychiatric evaluation afforded Harrington might be similarly situated, yet unable to make the case that he did for leniency. The disparate sentences that could result would in turn frustrate one of the prime objectives Congress had in view when it established the Commission and directed it to develop the guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (asserting purpose of "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities"). Reliance on "scientific" predictions, moreover, could potentially transform sentencing under the guidelines into a battle of experts, with the prosecution seeking to prove that the defendant is not likely to succeed in drug treatment and is, indeed, a poor candidate for rehabilitation.
The sole court of appeals decision cited in support of downward departure based on drug rehabilitation, as here ordered by the district court, is United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1989). In Maddalena, the Sixth Circuit remanded a case [292 U.S.App.D.C. 95] for resentencing because the sentencing judge "incorrectly believed that he lacked any authority to consider defendant's mitigating circumstances as well as the discretion to deviate from the guidelines." Id. at 818.8 Because the guidelines expressly authorize deviation from a sentencing range upon finding aggravating or mitigating circumstances inadequately considered by the Sentencing Commission, id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0), the appeals court remanded, "instructing the [sentencing] judge that he may, but need not consider the defendant's efforts to stay away from drugs as a basis for departing from the guidelines." Id. The Sixth Circuit did not refer to section 3E1.1 (acceptance of responsibility) or to section 5H1.4 (precluding downward departure for drug dependence) in its Maddalena analysis of the downward departure issue.
The district court in Harrington relied on Maddalena as support for the proposition "that a successful effort to overcome an addiction is a mitigating factor not considered by the Sentencing Commission." Harrington, 741 F. Supp. at 976; see also Pharr, 916 F.2d at 132; Sklar, 920 F.2d at 116; Martin, 938 F.2d at 163 (all citing Maddalena). The government persuasively argues, however, that Maddalena is distinguishable from Harrington, and from the decisions in Sklar, Pharr, Van Dyke, and Martin. See Brief for Cross-Appellant at 45-47. Unlike each of these cited cases, Maddalena did not concern post-offense rehabilitative efforts as a basis for downward departure from the guidelines. See supra note 8. Maddalena may stand for no more than a determination by the Sixth Circuit that a district court has discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in an individual defendant's background in deciding whether to impose a sentence outside the guideline range. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1294, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding for resentencing without deciding whether youthful defendant's "particular history," notably his exposure to domestic violence, "warrant [s] or permit [s]" downward departure from guidelines).
The case that appears to lend the strongest support for Harrington's position and the sentence imposed on him by the district court is United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Following his arrest on charges of selling $10 worth of crack to an undercover agent, Rodriguez "accomplished an impressive rehabilitation" in which he overcame his drug addiction, remained drug-free for nearly two years, reunited with his wife and children, assumed "the full responsibilities of the role of husband, father and provider," obtained employment, and took courses to improve his employment opportunities. Id. at 1119. The district court considered it "senseless, destructive and contrary to the objectives of the criminal law" to sentence Rodriguez to jail, and concluded that the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines permit downward departure "by reason of the personal characteristics of the offender." Id.
The court in Rodriguez stated that Congress, in passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, intended to reduce sentencing disparities, but not to eliminate consideration of the personal characteristics of the offender. Id. at 1119-20. The court stressed the statutory direction that a sentence should be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary ... to provide just punishment ... [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (C); see Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. at 1120. This direction, the court said, "unquestionably envisions more severe sentences for defendants considered more likely to commit further crimes and less severe sentences for those unlikely to commit crimes." Id.
Upon review of the guidelines, the Rodriguez court concluded that the Sentencing [292 U.S.App.D.C. 96] Commission had adopted an approach "somewhat different from what the statute anticipated." Id. at 1121. While " [t]he statute anticipated categorizing [both] offenses and offenders allowing departure only by reason of a circumstance 'not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission,' " id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)), the Commission "categorized offenses but not offenders" and "expressly acknowledged the need in the 'atypical' case for invocation of the departure power to give appropriate effect to personal characteristics." Id.; see U.S.S.G., Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(b) (introductory policy statement on departures). In the Rodriguez court's view, the Sentencing Commission "expressly invited a freer exercise of departure than it would approve if it had attached scheduled values to the personal characteristics of the defendant." 724 F. Supp. at 1121.
No federal appellate court has adopted the Rodriguez court's analysis, however, and we are mindful of the extraordinary setting of that case. Rodriguez was convicted of a far less serious offense than was Harrington and had accomplished an arguably more impressive rehabilitation. The sentencing instructions for Rodriguez, moreover, were anomalous. The statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 845(a), required no term of imprisonment, but specified that imprisonment, if imposed, had to run for at least one year. The guidelines called for a minimum term of eight months. Without a departure, the judge would have been obliged to send Rodriguez to jail, though the statute did not so require, for a year's term, though the guidelines permitted four months less. See Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. at 1119. Rodriguez thus does not seem to us a model properly followed in Harrington's case.
Recognizing that Congress and the Commission have not squarely addressed the issue we face, we find in the decisions of our sister circuits the most cogent discussion in Sklar, 920 F.2d at 115-17, and we follow the lead of that First Circuit judgment. We therefore hold that post-offense but pretrial drug rehabilitation effort may justify a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. We leave open the possibility that, "on rare occasion," a further reduction might be in order, "but only when and if the rehabilitation is 'so extraordinary as to suggest its presence to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the acceptance of responsibility reduction.' " Sklar, 920 F.2d at 116 (citation omitted); see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (a sentencing "court may depart from the guidelines, even though the reason for departure is taken into consideration in the guidelines (e.g., as a specific offense characteristic or other adjustment), if the court determines that, in light of unusual circumstances, the guidelines level attached to that factor is inadequate"); see also United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (question of whether defendant's exposure to domestic violence is proper basis for departure left open for district court's consideration on remand).
The district court, therefore, legitimately may take into account that Harrington, although he admitted only purchasing drugs for personal use, see supra note 9, engaged pretrial in notable rehabilitative efforts, which continued throughout the year between conviction and sentencing. That conduct, we hold, may be found demonstrative of an acceptance of responsibility warranting a sentence reduction. Because the district court did not evaluate Harrington's rehabilitative efforts under section 3E1.1, the applicable guideline, we vacate the sentence and remand for reconsideration of the appropriate sentence. See United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (guidelines "accord 'great deference' to the sentencing judge who 'is in a unique position to evaluate defendant's acceptance of responsibility' ") (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 5)).
We are told that the Guidelines are fair because they ensure "uniformity" in sentencing. Equally guilty persons receive equally stringent sentences, so it is said. See, e.g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A(3), p.s. (Nov. 1990) ("U.S.S.G."). But, as we have come to learn, the Guidelines are rigid in formulation and, thus, often produce harsh results that are patently unfair because they fail to take account of individual circumstances that might militate in favor of a properly "tailored" sentence. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 135-140 (1990) ("1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT") (criticizing "undue rigidity" of Guideline sentencing and recommending reforms); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 915-24 (1991) (criticizing unfairness and disparities created by Guidelines); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1938, 1953-54 (1988) (criticizing Guidelines' failure to allow adequate consideration of offender characteristics).
The first "game" to be played under the Guidelines occurs in connection with the charging decision. The confluence of the Guidelines' restriction of judicial discretion and the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences for many drug crimes2 has placed enormous power in the hands of the AUSA,3 effectively "replac [ing] judicial discretion over sentencing with prosecutorial discretion." United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring). Consider the case of a defendant who is charged with possessing [292 U.S.App.D.C. 99] ten grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute--an offense carrying a Guideline sentence of 63-78 months for a defendant with no criminal record, and a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (9); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (iii) (1988). If the prosecutor elects to add a weapons charge in connection with the drug offense, the Guideline range goes to 78-97 months and the mandatory minimum rises to ten years. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (1); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1988). The prosecutor also may choose to assert certain subsidiary facts which will affect the sentence,4 such as committing the offense at or near a school, or distributing to a minor--both of which add at least two offense levels (a minimum enhancement of 19 months in my hypothetical). See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a) (1). The only way for the defendant to escape these lengthy minimum terms is to cooperate with the government in the hope that his assistance will be "substantial" enough to induce the prosecutor to make a motion for downward departure, see id. § 5K1.1; that decision, however, rests in the prosecutor's discretion.5
[292 U.S.App.D.C. 100] Yet another glitch in the process is the Probation Officer, the person assigned to "characterize" the defendant so that "points" for upward and downward adjustments can be assigned pursuant to the Guidelines. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (2) (B). Under the Guidelines, the Probation Officer acts as both investigator and fact-finder.7 Enormous potential power rests in his or her hands, for how the Probation Officer chooses to characterize the defendant may add years of confinement to a jail term. For example, the Probation Officer may find that the defendant was a ring-leader in the offense (which adds four offense levels, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)); that he abused a position of trust (adding two levels, see id. § 3B1.3); that he obstructed justice (adding two levels, see id. § 3C1.1); or that he is not truly contrite (foreclosing the possibility of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1).8
Perhaps most importantly, the Probation Officer determines and evaluates the defendant's "relevant conduct"--that is, conduct (often uncharged) that is related to, but not part of, the offense for which conviction has been sought. See id. § 1B1.3. This determination can have a substantial impact on the applicable Guideline range. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 943 F.2d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding sentence that was more than doubled as result of uncharged, "relevant" conduct); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119 (concluding that departure from 27-33 month Guideline range to 210-262 month range would be reasonable, based primarily upon defendant's relevant conduct).
Ironically, Harrington might have avoided the need for a downward departure by playing the Guideline game more skillfully. Had his counsel been more cunning, the prosecutor more amenable, or the Probation Officer of a different stripe, the rules might have been bent a little and the departure question effectively mooted. For example, had the prosecutor (perhaps in response to a plea offer) deleted the words "five grams or more" from the second count of the indictment, the five-year mandatory minimum would not have applied, [292 U.S.App.D.C. 102] see21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (B) (iii), and Harrington's offense level would have been reduced by between two and 14 levels, depending upon what lesser amount was charged. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). But because the discretion to depart from the Guidelines was exercised publicly by the District Court, instead of behind closed doors at the U.S. Attorney's Office, reversal results.
The inequity wreaked in this case is endemic to the Guideline system. The appellate cases show a disparity between the relative ease of upward departure and the niggardly application of downward adjustments. The courts of appeals seem quick to find aggravating factors "unusual" enough to warrant upward departure, while mitigating factors are often rejected as "adequately considered" by the Sentencing Commission. Compare United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1990) (upward departure justified by defendant's use of aliases, disciplinary problems while incarcerated and repeated misconduct on public trolley) and United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 50-52 (1st Cir.) (upholding sentence four times greater than Guideline range based on defendant's status as important drug supplier, use of adolescent couriers, and other factors), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S. Ct. 177, 107 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1989) with United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir.) (reversing downward departure based on defendant's pregnancy; "We think the Commission was fully aware that some convicted female felons are pregnant at the time of sentencing."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 353, 112 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1990) and United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 509-11 (6th Cir.) (reversing downward departure predicated upon defendants' reputation in community, first offender status and remorse, despite district court's finding that "incarceration would serve no useful purpose"), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S. Ct. 127, 112 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1990). The instant case illustrates the point.
The decision that we reach today is probably the correct one under the existing legal regime. Our result, however, is somewhat strained, and it encounters dissent among other courts. We attempt to find a middle ground between the wholehearted acceptance of drug rehabilitation as a ground for departure, see United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), and its complete rejection, see United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163-64 (9th Cir. 1991). Yet, because the relevant inquiry is whether the Sentencing Commission "considered" drug rehabilitation--presumably a "yes" or "no" proposition--our compromise approach is perhaps less than ideal. Moreover, I am troubled by the fact that our holding will benefit addicts who accomplish the laudable and difficult task of rehabilitation no more than they would have benefitted had they demonstrated sincere contrition to the Probation Officer; indeed, for those rehabilitated addicts who would otherwise qualify for credit under the "acceptance of responsibility" Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, our decision today holds no benefit at all.
I join the result because it is as good as any other result, and better than most, under our existing system. I am bound by the system, because Congress established it, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. NO. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987-2040 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.), and the Supreme Court has upheld it, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). Nonetheless, I tend to agree with the many judges who have spoken out against the Guidelines--they are indeed a bit of a farce.
For judicial criticism of the Guidelines, see, for example: United States v. Hill, 943 F.2d at 877 (8th Cir. 1991) (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that doubling of sentence resulting from Guidelines' consideration of uncharged conduct violates due process);
United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041, 1043-45, 1047 (6th Cir. 1991) (Merritt, C.J.) [292 U.S.App.D.C. 103] (holding that Guideline procedure for determining sentencing range violates enabling statute; where Guidelines produce sentence "greater than necessary" to comply with purposes of sentencing, district court may depart freely), reh'g granted, decision and judgment vacated by Order (Sept. 26, 1991);
United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1991) (Oakes, C.J.) (expressing concern that under Guidelines, defendants who plead guilty may be unaware of enhancements resulting from relevant conduct rules);
United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 583 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, J.) (noting with concern transfer of discretion from district judge to prosecutor under Guidelines), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 141, 116 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1991);
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (noting possible due process violation in Guidelines' transfer of power to prosecutor, which permits "manipulation of ... charge and sentencing");
United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 354-55 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that government's unguided discretion in deciding whether to make § 5K1.1 motion violates due process), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1989) (Merritt, J., concurring) (finding Guidelines consistent with due process by concluding that they "should not be viewed as mandatory sentencing rules" and that district courts retain "wide range of discretion" to depart);
United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38, 641 (E.D. Wash. 1990) (McNichols, C.J.) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional as applied and criticizing shift of discretion from judges to prosecutors);
United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1364-67 (D.D.C. 1989) (Greene, J.) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional on due process grounds based upon transfer of unreviewable discretion to prosecutor), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 268, 116 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1991);
United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (Mihm, J.) (striking § 5K1.1 as unconstitutional on due process grounds), overruled by United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Leval, J.) (criticizing Guidelines' lack of consideration of offender characteristics);
United States v. Donatiu, 720 F. Supp. 619, 624 n. 2 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (Rovner, J.) (characterizing Guidelines as "faulty legislation"), aff'd, 922 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1477-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (Letts, J.) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional due to limitations on sentencing discretion), overruled by United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303, 1310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Sweet, J.) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional as denying due process right to individualized sentence by judge), overruled by United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc) (Aronovitz, J., concurring) (finding Guidelines unconstitutional on due process grounds), overruled by United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Brittman, 687 F. Supp. 1329, 1349-54 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (Eisele, C.J., writing for all judges of Eastern District except Judge Reasoner) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional due, in part, to transfer of sentencing discretion to prosecutors), rev'd, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865, 110 S. Ct. 184, 107 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1989);
United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en banc) (striking Guidelines as violative of right to individualized sentencing), overruled by United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990); [292 U.S.App.D.C. 104] United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 817-19 (W.D. Pa.) (Ziegler, J.) (same), rev'd, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095, 109 S. Ct. 2442, 104 L. Ed. 2d 998 (1989).
I do not agree that presentence drug rehabilitation efforts may be considered under the rubric of "Acceptance of Responsibility," U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, so to justify a two-level offense reduction, nor that " 'extraordinary' " rehabilitation, Maj.Op. at 962 (quoting United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 116 (1st Cir. 1990)), may support further reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. I also disagree that Application Note 2 to section 3E1.1 permits acceptance of responsibility reductions for defendants such as Harrington.
I would follow the Third and Ninth Circuits in concluding that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4--which states that " [d]rug dependence ... is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines"--clearly indicates that the Sentencing Commission considered and rejected drug rehabilitation as a basis for downward departure. See United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1990). I cannot imagine that the Commission explicitly rejected the notion of drug dependence as a reason for downward departure without implicitly rejecting the companion concept of drug rehabilitation. After all, rehabilitation is not relevant unless one is dependent. See Martin, at 163; Pharr, 916 F.2d at 133. And the Commission's recommendation that addicted defendants be sentenced to supervised release with participation in drug treatment programs after incarceration, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, is a further indication that the Commission considered and rejected rehabilitation as a sentencing factor. See Martin, at 163.
The majority fails to confront section 5H1.4, merely stating without explanation that "the Commission ha [s] not squarely addressed the issue we face." Maj.Op. at 962. The district judge thought that the Commission's "rejection of addiction as a sentencing factor is no indication of its consideration of susceptibility to successful treatment for drug addiction," United States v. Harrington, 741 F. Supp. 968, 976 (D.D.C. 1990), which, as I indicate above, I think is fallacious. It is not clear to me whether the majority agrees or disagrees with the district judge on this point.
The majority's holding permits, even encourages, the very "battle [s] of experts" the majority wishes to avoid. Maj.Op. at 960. Leaving open the possibility for unlimited downward departure for " 'extraordinary' " rehabilitation invites expert testimony as to whether the defendant's rehabilitation efforts are in fact exceptional--particularly since the majority does not define extraordinary rehabilitation.
Finally, the majority's reading of Application Note 2 as not precluding acceptance of responsibility reductions for defendants who, like Harrington, maintain their innocence and proceed to trial is dubious. The note makes clear that defendants who put the government to its burden of proof will qualify for a reduction only " [i]n rare situations." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Application Note 2. Presentence drug rehabilitation efforts are anything but rare, as the district court below recognized. See Transcript of Sentencing, June 27, 1990, at 11 ("The Court: [speaking to defendant Harrington] ... If I do this ..., and you don't keep on doing what you're doing now, you are going to ruin the chance not only for yourself but for thousands and thousands of people who might have a chance [like yours]...." (emphasis added)).
The Harrington trial judge saw an "obvious negative pregnant" in section 5H1.4 p 2 that conveyed this message: "successful treatment for drug abuse could lead to a reduced propensity to commit crime and thereby reduce the need for the longer periods of incarceration contemplated by the Guidelines with respect to drug law violations." Harrington, 741 F. Supp. at 975-76. In the district court's view, the "Sentencing Commission's rejection of addiction as a sentencing factor is no indication of its consideration of susceptibility to successful treatment for drug addiction, rather, the negative pregnant tends to confirm the opposite reading of the Guidelines and the official comments." Id. at 976.
The official commentary to this "Acceptance of Responsibility" provision lists several examples of conduct appropriately considered in determining whether a defendant qualifies for the reduction, including "voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations." Id., comment. (n. 1(a)). According to the Commission, the section 3E1.1 reduction "recognizes legitimate societal interests. For several reasons, a defendant who clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the offense by taking, in a timely fashion, one or more of the actions listed [in the commentary] (or some equivalent action) is appropriately given a lower offense level than a defendant who has not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility." Id., comment. (background). The Commission also acknowledged the "unique position" of the sentencing judge "to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility," and stated that " [f]or this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review." Id., comment. (n. 5)
The First Circuit stressed that "merited downward departures for rehabilitation [beyond a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction] are likely to be few and far between," and concluded that "Sklar's successful completion of a residential substance abuse program," which was a required condition of his pretrial release, "seem [ed] insufficiently out of the ordinary to jettison [the] rule" that "efforts to overcome ... drug addiction ... will ordinarily not support a downward departure." Sklar, 920 F.2d at 116-17
The Commission's prescription in section 5H1.4 p 2 that drug treatment follow incarceration comports with the congressional instruction that "the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment." 28 U.S.C. § 994(k). While Congress thus rejected imprisonment as a means to achieve rehabilitation, it also recognized "correctional treatment" as a proper goal of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (D) (directing sentencing court to consider four sentencing goals, including "to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner"). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367, 109 S. Ct. 647, 652, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989) (Sentencing Reform Act "rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation ... and ... states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent and incapacitative goals")
We granted the motion of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. ("NACDL") to appear as amicus curiae and brief the sentencing issue raised in the government's appeal. NACDL is represented by the same counsel appointed to appear as amicus curiae in the district court. See Harrington, 741 F. Supp. at 971
The defendant in Maddalena pled guilty to armed robbery and requested a downward departure from the sentencing range based on "his [pre-offense] efforts to stay away from drugs." Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 817. Maddalena "was aware of his drug dependency [,] made a conscious effort to deal with his problem," and had "managed to live a drug-free life for nine years." Id. at n. 1
These mandatory minimum sentences were enacted in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. NO. 99-570, §§ 1001-1009, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-8 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). The mandatory minimums have met with strenuous criticism by judges and commentators. See 1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 133-34 (noting near universal judicial opposition to mandatory minimum sentence provisions and urging their repeal). Even the Sentencing Commission seems to agree. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33-34 (1991) (concluding that mandatory minimums may create unwarranted sentencing disparity)
See United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 n. 46 (D.D.C. 1989) ("It is a singularly unimaginative prosecutor who, with the use of these two instruments [the Guidelines and the mandatory minimums], is unable to dictate with almost unfailing precision exactly what the sentence will be."), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 268, 116 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1991)
Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
Some have questioned the competence of Probation Officers to fulfill this role. See, e.g., 1990 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 138 (" [T]here is a growing concern among judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers that the new sentencing regime imposes on these officers responsibilities as independent investigators and fact-finders--recommending decisions and legal judgments as to the application of rules to factual situations--for which they may not be particularly well trained or well suited.")
If the defendant tells the truth about the crime, the probation officer will add up the points differently. If the defendant denies the allegations, he or she may get a stiffer sentence for "obstruction;" if the defendant refuse [s] to talk at all, he or she could preclude credit for accepting responsibility for the crime.
Chief Judge McNichols of the Eastern District of Washington made this point forcefully in United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash. 1990). Noting that before the Guidelines, "disparities were controllable and tolerable because decisions were public and reviewable," he points out that under the current regime
The Second Circuit recently increased the burden imposed upon AUSAs by the Guidelines in United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1991), ruling that if AUSAs are unwilling to engage in direct "sentence bargaining," they should calculate and inform the defendant of his likely Guideline range prior to agreeing to a plea, in order to avoid unfair surprise