Source: http://www.flra.gov/decisions/v47/47-007-4.html
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Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 2423', '§ 2423', '§ 552', '§\n552', '§\n552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552', '§ 552']

47:0110(7)CA - - Transportation, Washington, DC and FAA, New England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, CT and National Air Traffic Controllers Association Y90 Local - - 1993 FLRAdec CA - - v47 p110 | FLRA.GOV
Authority Chairman and Members Find Types of Cases, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Office of the General Counsel Regional Offices, Guidances, Policies, Manuals, ULP Process, Forms, Representation, ADR Services, and Training.Federal Service Impasses Panel Find Jurisdiction, Statute, Work Schedules Act, Biographical Data, and Contact Information.Solicitor, Administrative Law Judges, IG & Others Find General Information about these Offices and Contact Information.training & alternative dispute resolutionFind FLRA Training Information and ADR Services. 47:0110(7)CA - - Transportation, Washington, DC and FAA, New England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, CT and National Air Traffic Controllers Association Y90 Local - - 1993 FLRAdec CA - - v47 p110 Other Files: ALJ's Decision [ v47 p110 ] 47:0110(7)CA
The decision of the Authority follows: 47 FLRA No. 7 FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. and FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION NEW ENGLAND REGION BRADLEY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER WINDSOR LOCKS, CONNECTICUT (Respondents) and NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION Y90 LOCAL, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO (Charging Party) 1-CA-10020 DECISION AND ORDER March 9, 1993 Before Chairman McKee and Members Talkin and
filed by the Respondent U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
(DOT) to the attached decision of the Administrative Law Judge. The General
Counsel and Charging Party filed oppositions to the exceptions. The General
Counsel also filed a cross-exception. The Respondent filed an opposition to the
General Counsel's cross-exception. The General Counsel filed a motion to strike
certain portions of DOT's opposition to the General Counsel's
cross-exception. The complaint alleges that Respondent Federal Aviation Administration,
New England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower (Bradley ATCT), Windsor
Locks, Connecticut (FAA) violated section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (the Statute) by refusing to
provide the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Y90 Local, MEBA/NMU,
AFL-CIO (NATCA), with an unsanitized copy of the list of names used by FAA for
the random drug testing of its employees on August 29, 1990, at Bradley ATCT.
The complaint also alleges that DOT violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
Statute by prohibiting FAA from disclosing to NATCA an unsanitized copy of the
list of names used by FAA for the random drug testing of its employees on
August 29, 1990. The Judge concluded that because the record established that FAA
refused to provide the information to NATCA pursuant to DOT policy and
instructions and that FAA had no discretion in the matter, FAA did not violate
section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute. However, the Judge also
concluded that, by preventing FAA from complying with its obligations under
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, DOT unlawfully interfered with FAA's
collective bargaining relationship with NATCA and, thereby, violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. Pursuant to section 2423.29 of our Rules and Regulations and section
hearing and find that no prejudicial error was committed. We affirm those
adopt the Judge's findings, conclusions, and recommended Order only to the
extent consistent with this decision. II. Background The facts of this case are not in dispute and are set out fully in the
Judge's decision. The facts will be referenced only as needed to resolve the
issues raised by the parties' exceptions, opposition, cross-exceptions, and
opposition to cross-exceptions. III. Administrative Law Judge's Decision The Judge concluded that under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, NATCA
was entitled to the complete list of names used by FAA for the random drug
testing of its employees on August 29, 1990, including the names of
employees not in the bargaining unit. The Judge stated that because the record
established that FAA deleted the names of employees not in the unit pursuant to
DOT policy and instructions and that FAA had no discretion in the matter, he
was "constrained to conclude that FAA did not violate the Statute because its
actions were ministerial in nature." Judge's Decision at 11. The Judge
concluded, however, that DOT violated section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
Statute by unlawfully interfering with the FAA's collective bargaining
relationship with NATCA by preventing FAA, at Bradley ATCT, from complying with
its obligations under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. Specifically, the Judge found that the annotated random drug testing
list requested by NATCA, including the names of the nonunit employees, was
necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation of
subjects within the scope of bargaining, within the meaning of section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute. The Judge stated that it is not disputed that the
list requested by NATCA was maintained by DOT and FAA in the regular course of
business; was reasonably available; and does not constitute guidance, advice,
counsel, or training provided for management officials or supervisors, relating
to collective bargaining. The Judge noted the Respondents' argument that the Privacy Act
prohibits disclosure of the names of nonunit employees that appeared on the
drug testing list. The Judge also noted the Respondents' reliance on the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) notice concerning routine uses for certain
records maintained in systems of records governed by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a. See Office of Personnel Management, Privacy Act of 1974:
Publication of Notices of Systems of Records and Proposed New Routine Uses, 55
Fed. Reg. 3802 (1990). The Judge stated that the Authority analyzed the Privacy Act's
application to information requested under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute in
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, New
England Region, Burlington, Massachusetts, 38 FLRA 1623, 1630-32 (1991)
(FAA Burlington). The Judge stated that in FAA Burlington the
Authority discussed section (b)(2) of the Privacy Act, which allows disclosure
of information if disclosure is required by the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA). The Judge also stated that in FAA
Burlington, the Authority recognized that the FOIA provides that records
must be disclosed, upon request, unless the records are subject to a specific
exemption, and that exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA provides that information
contained in personnel files may be withheld if disclosure would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The
Judge noted that the Authority held that in determining whether the disclosure
of information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, the
individual's right of privacy must be balanced against the public's interest in
disclosure. The Judge applied that balancing test, as set forth in FAA
Burlington, and found that the public's interest in the disclosure of the
names of the nonunit employees and supervisors whose names were on the drug
testing list outweighed the personal privacy interests of the employees and
supervisors involved. The Judge also found that the names, as they appeared on
the list, were necessary for NATCA adequately to perform its representational
duties and that disclosure of the names to NATCA promoted important public
interests. Moreover, the Judge concluded that even if disclosure of the random
drug testing list is prohibited under exception (b)(2) of the Privacy Act, it
is authorized under exception (b)(3), which permits disclosure of information
for a "routine use." The Judge noted that 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7) confines
routine use disclosures to ones that are compatible with the purpose for which
the information is collected. The Judge also noted that, in addition to the
requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7), the use must be within the uses
described under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D). The Judge found that
the subject lists were compiled by DOT to make sure that the random drug tests
were administered in a truly random and equitable manner. Thus, the Judge
concluded that the release of the requested list to NATCA, so that it could
ensure that the drug testing was administered in a fair and equitable manner,
is fully consistent with the purposes for which the list was collected. The Judge rejected the Respondents' argument that disclosure of the
data is prohibited by the "routine use" notice published by OPM. The Judge
stated that the Authority balances and reconciles the interests of the parties
under the Privacy Act, the FOIA, and the Statute, and determines the
applicability of OPM's interpretation and application of the Privacy Act and
its (b)(3) "routine use" exception. The Judge concluded that under Authority
precedent, NATCA was entitled to the list it requested, containing both the
names of unit members and nonunit members. The Judge stated, however, that if
the Authority determines that OPM is the appropriate agency to interpret and
reconcile the Privacy Act, the FOIA, and the Statute, and that OPM's
interpretation and application of the Privacy Act and the (b)(3) "routine use"
exception is controlling, he would be compelled to conclude that NATCA was not
entitled to the requested list because the OPM notice provides that the records
requested by NATCA are disclosable as a routine use only pursuant to an order
of a court of competent jurisdiction to defend a challenge against an adverse
personnel action. The Judge found that the record established that FAA deleted the names
of employees not in the unit pursuant to DOT policy and instructions, that FAA
had no discretion in this matter, and that FAA's action in denying NATCA's
request for the data was ministerial. Therefore, the Judge concluded that FAA
did not violate section 7116(a)(1), (5), and (8) of the Statute. However, the
Judge found that DOT unlawfully interfered with its subordinate activity's
collective bargaining relationship with NATCA, and its agent NATCA Y90 Local,
by preventing FAA from complying with its obligations under section 7114(b)(4)
of the Statute. Accordingly, the Judge concluded that DOT violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. The Judge recommended that DOT be ordered to
direct FAA to furnish NATCA the complete list of names used by FAA to
administer its random drug testing at Bradley ATCT on August 29, 1990, and that
in the future, upon request by NATCA, DOT furnish the complete lists used in
its random drug testing of employees. IV. Positions of the Parties A. DOT's Exceptions DOT excepts to the Judge's conclusion that DOT violated section
7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by preventing FAA from fulfilling its
obligation under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute to furnish information to
the Union. DOT asserts that its directive to FAA concerning release of the drug
testing list was consistent with the Privacy Act and Government-wide
regulations that prohibit disclosure of the list. DOT argues that the Judge
erroneously relied on the Authority's interpretation of the Privacy Act to find
that disclosure was required in this case. DOT asserts that in FLRA v. U.S.
Department of Treasury, Financial Management Service, 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Financial Management Service), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1055 (1990), the court held that the Authority is not entitled to deference in
its interpretation of the Privacy Act and the FOIA. DOT argues that the
Authority has no special authority or expertise to interpret or apply
Government-wide regulations promulgated by other Federal agencies contrary to
the plain meaning of those regulations. DOT maintains that it is bound by OPM's
regulations concerning the maintenance and release of medical records. DOT
contends, therefore, that it did not violate section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the
Statute by requiring FAA to comply with law and OPM's Government-wide
regulation. DOT also excepts to the Judge's conclusion that the drug testing list
must be disclosed under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute because disclosure is
permitted under exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act and exemption (b)(6) of the
FOIA. DOT argues that the Judge's "conclusion and application of the (b)(3)
exception as defined in the Privacy Act is on its face incorrect and a
misreading of the law itself." DOT's Exceptions at 6. DOT states that OPM has
established in its regulation the routine uses for the drug testing lists. DOT
asserts that "[o]nly the OPM has statutory and regulatory authority to
authorize routine use exceptions to the disclosure of protected personnel
records under its jurisdiction." Id. DOT challenges the Judge's findings that: (1) the public interest in
facilitating collective bargaining outweighed employees' privacy interests; and
(2) because the list would not be widely disseminated, disclosure of the list
to NATCA would not have a stigmatizing effect on employees. DOT argues that the
Judge's findings are without legal foundation and contrary to established
public employment policies. According to DOT, the Judge was bound by the
principles stated in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (Reporters
Committee) governing an agency's determinations as to the release of
information under FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). DOT maintains that the
Judge erroneously considered the public interest embodied in the Statute when
he balanced the public interest in disclosure of the list against the
employees' privacy interest. DOT asserts that even if the Judge applied
Reporters Committee to the facts of this case "the end result would be
nondisclosure due to the [U]nion's 'public interest' falling outside the zone
of the FOIA and any nonconsensual disclosure being a clearly 'unwarranted
invasion of privacy.'" Id. at 12. DOT also contends that the Judge's decision is arbitrary, capricious,
and in disregard of OPM regulations for the implementation and maintenance of
systems of records. DOT maintains that drug testing lists are classified as
employee medical records and are specifically prohibited from nonconsensual
disclosure except for routine use "u," which only allows disclosure pursuant to
a court order. DOT argues, therefore, that disclosure of the list is contrary
to the OPM routine use notice and OPM regulations. Finally, DOT excepts to the Judge's decision because, according to DOT,
the Judge failed to consider or address DOT's alternative disclosure of
information in response to the Union's request. DOT concedes that it "limited
its subordinate FAA to only release a 'sanitized' list that excluded the names
of the [nonunit] employees and other Privacy Act protected information."
Id. at 15. DOT asserts, however, that it did not completely ignore the
Union's request for information. DOT states that it offered to provide the
Union the names of all employees in the alternative format of an alphabetical
listing of employees who were eligible for testing that was drawn from the same
data base at the same time that the drug testing list requested by the Union
was drawn. DOT acknowledges that the alphabetical listing "does not respond to
the Union's alleged need . . . to know who was not tested and to determine
whether . . . or not the entries on the list under 'reasons for not tested'
were 'really true.'" Id. DOT argues that the Judge's finding that the
documents were releasable as a compatible routine use without first addressing
whether the Union's representational needs were met by DOT's alternative
information was inconsistent with OPM's Privacy Act regulations. B. General Counsel's Opposition and Cross-Exception The General Counsel accepts the Judge's rulings and findings of fact
and agrees with the Judge's analysis of NATCA's need for the drug testing list.
The General Counsel agrees with the Judge's application of the balancing test
under exemption (b)(6) of the FOIA. Further, although the General Counsel does
not rely on the routine use exception to the Privacy Act, the General Counsel
does not object to the Judge's consideration of the exception and his
conclusion that disclosure is supportable as a routine use. The General Counsel
also agrees with the Judge's conclusion that DOT unlawfully interfered with the
bargaining relationship between FAA and NATCA, in violation of the Statute.
In the General Counsel's cross-exception, the General Counsel disagrees
with the Judge's alternative conclusion that, if the Authority determines that
OPM's interpretation of the Privacy Act and the routine use exception is
controlling, disclosure of drug testing lists may be proscribed by OPM's
routine use notice. The General Counsel argues, for the reasons expressed in
U.S. Department of the Navy, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, 37 FLRA 515, 539-41 (1990) (Portsmouth), application
for enforcement denied, 941 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1991) (FLRA v.
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard), that the Authority should not defer to OPM's
determination of routine uses. The General Counsel states that the Authority
considered the implications of Financial Management Service and
Reporters Committee and has continued to follow the approach articulated
in Portsmouth. The General Counsel argues that Portsmouth and its progeny
"answer the Respondent's argument for narrowly construing the 'public interest'
under the FOIA to exclude any consideration of the purposes served by the
Statute." General Counsel's (GC's) Brief at 4-5. The General Counsel maintains
that DOT and the Judge are mistaken in reading OPM's routine use notice as
prohibiting the disclosure of the random drug testing list. The General Counsel
asserts that routine use "u," referred to by DOT, "doesn't restrict the
disclosure of all records relating to drug testing, but only those records that
contain 'the results of a drug test.'" Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). The
General Counsel also asserts that it is "not evident that 'the results of a
drug test' includes 'lists of who has been tested, who failed to report for
testing, and related documents[.]'" Id. (emphasis omitted). The General
Counsel also contends that the disclosure of the entries on the drug testing
lists does not constitute an unwarranted intrusion upon personal privacy,
because the entries do not indicate the "'results of a test'" and employees are
aware they are all subject to random drug testing. Id. at 11. According
to the General Counsel, DOT "exaggerates the scope" of routine use "u."
Id. at 12. The General Counsel argues that routine use "u" must be read
consistent with the "established policy of protecting the confidentiality of
'the results of a drug test.'" Id. C. NATCA's Opposition and Cross-Exception NATCA states that it joins the General Counsel's opposition and
cross-exception. NATCA argues, for the reason stated in its brief and for the
reasons set forth in the General Counsel's brief, that the decision of the
Judge should be affirmed, as modified, consistent with the General Counsel's
cross-exception. NATCA asserts that the "Respondent's exceptions are premised
in large part on [Respondent's] own and/or OPM's definition of annotated random
drug test[ing] lists as 'medical records.'" NATCA's Brief at 1. NATCA also
asserts that "[t]he annotations on the lists, if any, do not contain any
information of a medical nature about the named individuals." Id. at 2.
NATCA states that on the "extremely rare occasions" when an annotation concerns
medical information about an individual on the list, "NATCA would have no
objection to the medical information being sanitized from the list." Id.
NATCA argues that "[c]haracterization of the annotated drug testing lists as
employee medical records . . . impermissibly expands the scope of that term so
as to attempt to justify Respondent's failure to release the lists to NATCA."
Id. NATCA also argues that Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 252
NLRB 368 (1980) (Johns-Manville), which was cited by DOT to support its
position that the random drug testing list should not be provided NATCA, is
distinguishable from this case. NATCA states that in Johns-Manville, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the employer was not required
to release information that identified employees as having certain medical
conditions because the NLRB found that there was "'a legitimate aura of
confidentiality in the identities of those individuals who have been identified
as having a certain medical disorder.'" Id. at 3 (quoting
Johns-Manville, 252 NLRB at 368) (emphasis omitted). NATCA argues that
the instant case is distinguishable because "no medical condition or disorder
of any FAA employee will be revealed on the requested lists." Id.
(footnote omitted). D. DOT's Opposition to Cross-Exceptions DOT asserts that the Judge correctly determined the meaning of the
regulatory prohibition against disclosure of the list requested by NATCA, but
chose to disregard it and rely on the Authority's policy. DOT argues that as
the Judge's interpretation and application of the prohibition in the OPM notice
is consistent with OPM's interpretation and application of the notice, the
General Counsel's cross-exception should be denied. DOT asserts that the OPM
notice is binding on the Agency and the Authority in any determination
concerning the release or retention of personnel records. DOT also asserts that
only OPM has the authority and expertise to determine how Government personnel
records are classified and retained. DOT states that in an official interpretation of the regulatory
prohibition on nonconsensual disclosure of annotated drug testing lists, "OPM
has confirmed . . . that the prohibition on nonconsensual disclosure of records
includes any listing that shows, '. . . any reasons why an
employee, although scheduled for testing, may not in fact have actually been
tested.[']" DOT's Opposition at 4 (quoting Opposition, Attachment No. 1;
emphasis supplied by DOT). DOT also states that OPM noted that, in its view,
there is "'no Privacy Act prohibition against release of mere listings of
employee[s] who have been called randomly from the agency's total employee
population for drug testing." Id. (quoting Opposition, Attachment No.
1). DOT states that, in accordance with OPM's interpretation of its
regulation, DOT has notified NATCA that it "will cease releasing any
'annotated' [drug] test[ing] list with the names of unit or [nonunit]
employees, but will release (after completion of the testing) a 'clean' copy of
the original test[ing] list." Id. (emphasis in original). DOT states
that NATCA "can now have a complete list of all the names (unit or
[nonunit]) of employees who were to be called for testing on a particular date
and location." Id. (emphasis in original). DOT states that it recognizes
that under its revised policy "the Union will still not have the names of
employees and the particular reasons why the employees (unit or [nonunit]), who
were scheduled for testing, but, in fact, were not tested on that day."
Id. According to DOT, "[s]uch information . . . , as the OPM has
confirmed, is prohibited from disclosure by the Privacy Act and an explicit
[G]overnment-wide regulation." Id. E. General Counsel's Motion to Strike Portions of DOT's Opposition
to Cross-Exceptions The General Counsel moves to strike certain attachments to DOT's brief
in opposition to the General Counsel's cross-exception and DOT's arguments
based on those attachments. The General Counsel asserts that the attachments
are not part of the record and did not exist at the time of the hearing before
the Judge. The General Counsel maintains that DOT could have obtained the
documents at the time of the hearing and submitted them as evidence before the
Judge. The General Counsel requests that the documents be stricken from DOT's
opposition to the General Counsel's cross-exception because DOT has not
justified its failure to obtain the documents and submit them as evidence in
the hearing before the Judge. In the alternative, the General Counsel requests
that if the Authority denies the motion to strike, in whole or in part, the
General Counsel be given an opportunity to address the merits of DOT's
arguments in connection with the new documents. V. Analysis and Conclusions A. Motion to Strike Section 2429.5 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations provides: The Authority will not consider evidence offered by a party, or any
issue, which was not presented in the proceedings before the Regional Director,
Hearing Officer, Administrative Law Judge, or arbitrator. The Authority may,
however, take official notice of such matters as would be
proper. Consistent with this provision, we will not consider the attachments to
DOT's opposition to the General Counsel's cross-exception. Attachment No. 1,
dated February 20, 1992, is OPM's response to DOT's request for an
interpretation of OPM's routine use notice as to the Employee Medical File
System of records published at 55 Fed. Reg. 3855 (1990). Attachment No. 2 is an
updated version of DOT's Drug Testing Guide (a version of which was submitted
as Agency Exhibit 3 at the hearing before the Judge). Attachment No. 3 is DOT's
letter dated February 28, 1992, informing NATCA of DOT's new policy, based on
OPM's February 20, 1992, interpretation concerning the release of annotated
drug testing lists. In our view, Attachment No. 1 could have been obtained by DOT prior to
the hearing before the Judge inasmuch as the routine use notice was published
by OPM in February 1990, over 1 year before the date of the hearing. However,
DOT did not request OPM's interpretation and, correspondingly, did not develop
its policy based on that interpretation until after the Judge issued his
decision in this case. Attachment No. 2 was developed by DOT approximately 1
month before the Judge issued his decision in this case. Thus, like Attachments
Nos. 1 and 3, it was not in existence prior to the close of the unfair labor
practice hearing. If DOT deemed these attachments relevant to the issues in this case,
DOT could have requested an interpretation from OPM in a more timely manner and
sought permission from the Judge to make the attachments concerning that
interpretation a part of the record in this case. Further, to the extent that
the attachments were not available prior to the close of the hearing before the
Judge, the Authority's Rules and Regulations provide procedures by which the
Respondents could have sought to introduce the attachments as evidence.
See 5 C.F.R. § 2423.19(k) (the Judge presiding at an unfair
labor practice hearing has authority to grant motions to reopen hearings); 5
C.F.R. § 2423.22(a) (motions made after a hearing opens and before a case
is transmitted to the Authority must be made in writing to the Judge). As DOT does not justify its failure to obtain the attachments prior to
the close of hearing before the Judge or to seek permission from the Judge to
reopen the hearing to submit the attachments, and as there is no basis in
Authority precedent for concluding that we should otherwise take official
notice of the attachments, we will not consider them here. See U.S.
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. and Internal
Revenue Service, Salt Lake City, Utah, 40 FLRA 303, 308-09 (1991). We note that the previous version of Attachment No. 2, submitted by the
Agency at the hearing before the Judge as Exhibit 3, was made a part of the
record in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that the General Counsel's
motion to strike DOT's Drug Testing Guide is considered to encompass the
earlier version of that document, we deny the General Counsel's motion that it
be struck from the record. B. Merits In agreement with the Judge, we conclude that DOT prevented FAA from
complying with its obligations under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute and,
thereby, unlawfully interfered with FAA's collective bargaining relationship
with NATCA, in violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute. We also
agree with the Judge's conclusion that FAA had no discretion in determining
whether it would comply with NATCA's request for information and, therefore,
did not violate section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of the Statute by following
DOT's directives. However, contrary to the Judge, we conclude that disclosure
of the drug testing list is not authorized under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3),
which permits disclosure as a routine use. 1. The Drug Testing List Was Necessary The Respondent does not except to the Judge's finding that the drug
testing list was "necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and
negotiation of subjects within the scope of bargaining within the meaning of
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute." Judge's Decision at 7. However, we note the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v.
FLRA, 952 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (NLRB v. FLRA), where the court
concluded that an agency need not disclose certain requested information to a
union unless the union has a "'particularized need' for such information."
Id. at 534. The court also held that the Statute requires the Authority
to consider "countervailing interests" against disclosure. Id. at 531.
Subsequently, the court issued its decision in Department of the Air Force,
Scott Air Force Base v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Scott
AFB), where, based on NLRB v. FLRA, the court determined that the
Authority ordered disclosure of certain requested information "without
adequately explaining the 'necessity' of the requested information" under
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. Scott AFB, 956 F.2d
at 1224. The court held that the Authority had failed to consider the
"countervailing interests against disclosure." Id. We do not decide whether NLRB v. FLRA and Scott AFB apply
in the circumstances of this case. However, even if we were to apply NLRB v.
FLRA and Scott AFB here, those decisions would not provide a basis
to overrule the Judge's conclusion that the requested information is necessary
within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. In this regard, the Judge found that "NATCA did need the entire list
used for the random testing in order to make sure persons excused for specific
reasons were in fact unavailable for testing and thus, that the random drug
testing program was being fairly administered." Judge's Decision at 7 (footnote
omitted). The Judge also found that "[p]olicing and ensuring that drug testing
programs are performed fairly and equitably is a very important and fundamental
duty of a union in representing employees" and that "[i]n ensuring that
management is acting fairly and equitably, a union may have to examine how
supervisors and [nonunit] employees are treated, with relation to employees in
the unit represented by the union." Id. These findings
demonstrate that, in the absence of the requested information, the Union would
be unable to determine whether the Respondent is selectively enforcing the drug
testing program and to assess whether grounds exist for a grievance under the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, DOT has not identified any asserted countervailing
interest against disclosure beyond its interest in maintaining confidentiality
in the drug testing process and no other arguable countervailing interest is
apparent to us. Compare American Federation of Government Employees,
AFL-CIO, Local 446 and U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service,
Blue Ridge Parkway, Asheville, North Carolina, 43 FLRA 836, 906-10
(1991) (agency's interest in maintaining internal security precluded
negotiation of proposal requiring the disclosure of all statistical data
pertaining to drug testing and proposal requiring disclosure of information
relating to the selection of employees for drug testing); American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, National Border Patrol Council and
National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council and U.S. Department of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 42 FLRA 599, 620-21,
628-31 (1991) (petition for review dismissed as to certain proposals because
the Authority was unable to determine whether disclosure of drug testing
information would interfere with agency's interests in maintaining security of
computer software and equipment used for random selection of employees for drug
testing). Even assuming that the Respondent's asserted concerns about
employees' right to confidentiality in the drug testing process would
constitute a countervailing interest weighing against disclosure, that concern
does not outweigh the Union's demonstrated need for the requested information.
In our view, the Respondent's concern about employees' right to confidentiality
in the drug testing process is addressed in the Judge's analysis of the
information request under the Privacy Act. As noted below, the Judge
determined, and we agree, that the Privacy Act does not preclude disclosure of
that information. In view of the Union's clear and demonstrated need for the information
to determine whether the Respondent is selectively enforcing the drug testing
program and to assess whether grounds exist for a grievance under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, we find that the information is necessary,
within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute, despite the asserted
employees' privacy interests and DOT's concern for the confidentiality of
employee medical records. Therefore, even if we were to apply NLRB v.
FLRA and Scott AFB, those decisions would not provide a basis to
overrule the Judge's conclusion that the requested information is necessary
within the meaning of section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. 2. Alternative Disclosure DOT contends that the Judge's decision is deficient because the Judge
failed to consider or address DOT's alternative disclosure of information in
response to NATCA's request. We conclude that DOT's exception does not provide
a basis for reversing the Judge's decision. The Judge rejected the Respondents' contention that they complied with
section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute when they supplied the drug testing list with
an alphabetical listing of employees and the names of nonunit employees
deleted. The Judge found that "NATCA did, with sufficient clarity, describe the
list it wished and the reasons it wanted the list." Judge's Decision at 10. The
Judge also found that the Respondents did not provide the information requested
by NATCA and that their failure to provide the information was not due to any
misunderstanding concerning what NATCA was requesting. The Judge concluded that
NATCA was entitled to the complete drug testing list and that the Respondents
failed to provide that information. Thus, the Judge considered the Respondents'
alternative disclosure of information and found that the information provided
by the Respondents was insufficient and did not satisfy NATCA's information
request. Further, DOT acknowledges that the information provided NATCA "does
not respond to the Union's alleged need . . . to know who was not tested and to
determine whether . . . or not the entries on the list under 'reasons for not
tested' were 'really true.'" DOT's Exceptions at 15. Therefore, we conclude
that the Judge addressed the issue of DOT's alternative disclosure of
information. 3. Disclosure of the List Is Consistent with Law We reject DOT's contentions that the Judge incorrectly applied
Authority precedent interpreting the Privacy Act and the FOIA. As stated by the
Judge, we have analyzed the Privacy Act's application to information requested
under section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute and we have set forth the factors to be
considered in determining whether information subject to the Privacy Act must
be disclosed to an exclusive representative pursuant to section 7114(b)(4) of
the Statute. See FAA Burlington, 38 FLRA at 1630-32;
Portsmouth, 37 FLRA at 537-41.(1) The Judge examined NATCA's request for information under the
standards set forth in our decisions interpreting section 7114(b)(4), the
Privacy Act and the FOIA, and appropriately relied on those decisions to reach
his conclusions in this case. Consequently, we find that the Judge did not
commit any error in his Privacy Act analysis. At the outset, we note that NATCA has not requested employees' test
results. Therefore, NATCA's information request is not inconsistent with
section 503(e) of Public Law 100-71, 101 Stat. 471 (1987), which provides:
"The results of a drug test of a Federal employee may not be disclosed without
the prior written consent of such employee[.]" See also
Administration Council and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington,
D.C., 41 FLRA 1104, 1132 (1991). We also note that NATCA's information
request does not cover information about an employee's medical condition. NATCA
states that "no medical condition or disorder of any FAA employee will be
revealed on the requested list[]." NATCA's Opposition at 3 (footnote omitted).
NATCA also states that to the extent that the list includes information
concerning the medical condition of an employee, "NATCA would have no objection
to the medical information being sanitized from the list." Id. at 2.
We have reviewed the Judge's analysis of the Union's information
request under section (b)(2) of the Privacy Act and exemption (b)(6) of the
FOIA. We agree with the Judge that employees, including nonunit employees, have
personal privacy interests in the drug test list, but we conclude, as did the
Judge, that those interests are outweighed by the public interest embodied in
the Statute. As noted above, the information requested by the Union does not
reveal the results of employees' drug tests. Rather, the list only reveals
whether an employee was available for testing, whether an employee was tested,
and if an employee was not tested, the reason that the employee was not tested.
See Judge's Decision at 8. Inasmuch as all employees are subject to
testing under the Respondent's random drug testing program without regard to
cause or suspicion and "have an equal statistical chance of being selected for
testing within a specified time frame," disclosure of a random drug test list
would not disclose information that is stigmatizing. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3
at III-2. Moreover, there is no indication in the Agency's drug testing policy
that the documents requested by the Union in this case would be covered by a
claim of confidentiality. See id. at V-1. The fact that an employee has been selected for random drug testing
should not be considered a particularly private matter because the public is
already well aware of the Government's practice of administering random drug
tests to employees. See National Treasury Employees Union and U.S.
Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 41 FLRA 1241, 1252 (1991)
(DOE), petition for review filed No. 91-1514 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24,
1991) (an employee's privacy interests in his or her notice of a drug test
"appear to be minimal, particularly with respect to random drug testing"). In
addition, the Federal employee status of the individuals tested further
diminishes the employees' privacy interests in the drug test list because of
the corresponding public interest in knowing how public employees are
performing their jobs. See, for example, Stern v. FBI, 737
F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Respondent's privacy interests argument is diminished by
the fact that the Respondent released the names of bargaining unit employees on
the annotated random drug testing list. Whether an employee is a member of the
bargaining unit is not relevant to considering whether an employee's privacy
rights, protected by the Privacy Act, have been abridged. Therefore, inasmuch
as the Respondent determined that the names of bargaining unit employees on the
random drug testing list could be disclosed under the Privacy Act, the names of
nonbargaining unit employees may also be disclosed. We agree with the Judge that, on balance, the public interest inherent
in the Union's discharge of its obligations under the Statute to monitor and
administer the collective bargaining agreement, including the parties'
agreement concerning the implementation of the Respondent's drug testing
program, outweighs the employees' personal privacy interest in preventing
disclosure of information about their appearance for a drug test to the
exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees. See Judge's
Decision at 8. See also United States Department of
Veterans Affairs, Regional Office, San Diego, California, 44 FLRA 312,
316 (1992) (VA, Regional Office). Similarly, under the public interest test identified by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772, we find that
there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure of the information
requested by the Union in this case. See FAA, Atlantic City
Airport, 43 FLRA at 202 (union sought transcript of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission hearing to determine whether agency had violated
parties' agreement by not following the procedures in their merit promotion
plan; the Authority concluded that disclosure would open to public scrutiny the
manner in which the Agency administers its selection process and whether that
process is administered in a fair and evenhanded manner and that, therefore,
the public interest outweighed the limited privacy interest of a single
employee). In particular, the requested information pertains to the decisions
the Respondent makes and the actions the Respondent takes in testing employees
for illegal drug use. Disclosure of the information would open to "public
scrutiny" what the Respondent is "up to" in its drug testing program.
See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 772-73. Disclosure of the information will enable the public to assess, for
example, whether the Respondent is implementing its drug testing program
consistent with applicable law, regulation, and the collective bargaining
agreement. See, for example, VA, Regional Office, 44 FLRA
at 316; FAA, Atlantic City Airport, 43 FLRA at 202-03. See
generally Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S.
602, 613-34 (1989) (discussing the Government's and the public's interests in
drug testing programs). The information also will enable the Union to detect
whether the Respondent's administration of its drug testing program is free of
discriminatory practices. For example, if certain groups of bargaining unit
employees were randomly selected more frequently than other employees, some
further examination of the Respondent's random selection process may be in
order. If further examination resulted in the discovery of irregularities in
the random selection process, such results, achieved as a consequence of the
Union's efforts, clearly would inure to the public's benefit. Moreover, the random drug test list enables the Union to monitor
certain aspects of the drug testing program which can only be monitored by
direct employee contacts. Without the names of those employees, there would be
no way to communicate directly with employees to verify that the basis upon
which the drug test was ordered was truly random selection, and whether the
Respondent followed its drug testing procedures as required. Thus, disclosure
of the random drug test list is in the public interest because it facilitates
the overall monitoring of the Respondent's drug testing program. Balancing the employees' limited privacy interest in the list against
the strong public interest in the disclosure of the drug test list, we find, in
agreement with the Judge, that disclosure of a copy of the list to the Union
would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Therefore, disclosure of a copy of the list to the Union is not prohibited by
the Privacy Act. Further, as stated below, the Respondent's exception to the
Judge's conclusion that disclosure of the drug testing list is authorized under
exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act, does not establish that the Judge's
decision is contrary to the Privacy Act. 4. Routine Use DOT excepts to the Judge's conclusion that disclosure of the drug
testing list is authorized under exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act, which
permits disclosure of information as a "routine use." Relying on our decision
in Portsmouth, the Judge found that release of the list to NATCA is
fully consistent with the purposes for which the list was collected. The Judge
also found, however, in the alternative, that if OPM's routine use notice
concerning its Medical File System of Records, which includes records relating
to drug testing, is found controlling by the Authority, then the list could not
be disclosed under the routine use exception because the OPM notice precludes
disclosure. We find that disclosure of the drug testing list to NATCA is not
authorized as a routine use under OPM's routine use notice concerning Employee
Medical File System Records. Therefore, we reject the Judge's conclusion that
disclosure of the drug testing list is authorized under exception (b)(3) of the
Privacy Act and adopt the Judge's alternative analysis that the drug testing
list is not disclosable to NATCA as a routine use. Consequently, we deny the
General Counsel's and NATCA's cross-exceptions to the Judge's alternative
analysis. "Routine use disclosures are confined to 'ones that are "compatible
with the purpose for which [the information] was collected," 5 U.S.C. §
552a(a)(7); . . . [and] within the uses "described under" 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e)(4)(D).'" Portsmouth, 37 FLRA at 537 (quoting Financial
Management Service, 884 F.2d at 1453-54). As the Judge found, release
of the drug testing list to NATCA is fully consistent with the purposes for
which the list was collected. Thus, disclosure of the list is consistent with 5
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7). However, disclosure of the drug testing list
must also be within the uses described under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(e)(4)(D), as published in the Federal Register. Under OPM's routine use notice, records resulting from the testing of
Federal employees for the use of illegal drugs under Executive Order 12564 are
contained in the system of records entitled "Employee Medical File System
Records." 55 Fed. Reg. 3855. The OPM notice provides: "With the exception
of Routine Use 'u,' none of the other Routine Uses identified for [the Employee
Medical File System of Records] are applicable to records relating to drug
testing under Executive Order 12564." Id. at 3856. Routine use "u"
provides that the records and information in the Employee Medical File System
of Records may be used "[t]o disclose the results of a drug test of a Federal
employee pursuant to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction where
required by the United States Government to defend against any challenge
against any adverse personnel action." Id. at 3857. Because the release to an exclusive representative of drug testing
records that are maintained by OPM in its Employee Medical File System Records
is not provided for under routine use "u," release of that information to NATCA
is not within the uses described under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D).
Therefore, we conclude, consistent with the Judge's alternative analysis, that
OPM's routine use notice concerning its Medical File System of Records does not
authorize disclosure of the drug testing list to NATCA as a routine use. We take no position as to whether, as the General Counsel and NATCA
contend, drug testing lists are inappropriately characterized as medical
records. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), agencies are required to
"publish in the Federal Register . . . a notice of the existence and character
of [a] system of records" which includes, among other things "each routine use
of the records contained in the system[.]" OPM has established, by notice and
regulation, that "records created when an employee undergoes a drug screening
test under an agency plan implementing Executive Order 12564" are included in
the Employee Medical File System of records. Federal Personnel Manual (FPM)
Supplement 293-31, subchapter S6-7(a). See also 55 Fed. Reg.
3802, 3855 (1990). FPM Supplement 293-31 is a Government-wide regulation within
the meaning of section 7117(a) the Statute. American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1808 and U.S. Department of the Army,
Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, California, 42 FLRA 542, 556 (1991). See
55 Fed. Reg. 3855 (OPM/GOVT-10, Employee Medical File System Records, which
includes records resulting from the testing of an employee for use of illegal
drugs, is a "Government-wide system"). We have no authority to review the
validity of those Government-wide regulations. See American
Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA, 794 F.2d 1013, 1015 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1986). We note that our conclusion in this case is distinguishable from our
decisions in FAA Burlington and Portsmouth, which concerned
routine use disclosures under a different system of records. In those cases, we
concluded that disclosure of the requested personnel records was authorized
under exception (b)(3) of the Privacy Act, which permits disclosure of
information as a "routine use." We found that release of the personnel data was
fully consistent with the purposes for which the data was collected and
that release of the data was consistent with the routine use notice published
by OPM concerning personnel records. See FAA Burlington, 38 FLRA
at 1632; Portsmouth, 37 FLRA at 540-41.(2) 5. Summary The Judge determined, and we agree, that the Privacy Act does not
preclude disclosure of the annotated drug testing list and that the Respondent
was required to provide NATCA with that information pursuant to section
7114(b)(4) of the Statute. We note particularly that the Union does not seek
the results of drug tests. Rather, the Union only seeks the annotated list of
employees called for random drug testing. Therefore, NATCA's information
request is consistent with section 503(e) of Public Law 100-71. Accordingly, in agreement with the Judge, we conclude that DOT
prevented FAA from complying with its obligations under section 7114(b)(4) of
the Statute and, thereby, unlawfully interfered with FAA's collective
bargaining relationship with NATCA, in violation of section 7116(a)(1) and (5)
of the Statute. We also agree with the Judge's conclusion that FAA had no
discretion in determining whether it would comply with NATCA's request for
information and, therefore, did not violate section 7116(a)(1), (5) and (8) of
the Statute by following DOT's directives. However, contrary to the Judge, we
conclude that disclosure of the drug testing list is not authorized under 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). VI. Order Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Directing the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region,
Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, Connecticut (FAA) to refuse
to furnish the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Y90 Local,
MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of certain of its employees,
the complete list used by FAA in administering its random drug testing on
August 29, 1990, or with any such lists as may be used for such purposes in the
future, and are requested by the exclusive representative. (b) Interfering with the bargaining relationship between the Federal
Aviation Administration, New England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower,
Windsor Locks, Connecticut and the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association, Y90 Local, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO. (c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights assured them by the
Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute. 2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the
Statute: (a) Direct the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region,
Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, Connecticut to furnish the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Y90 Local, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO, the
exclusive representative of certain of its employees, with the complete list
used by FAA in administering its random drug testing on August 29, 1990, or
with any such lists as may be used for such purposes in the future, and are
requested by the exclusive representative. (b) Post at its facilities at the Federal Aviation Administration, New
England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, Connecticut,
where bargaining unit employees represented by the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association, Y90 Local, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO, are located, copies of
Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be signed by the Secretary,
Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., and shall be posted and
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such notices are not
Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Boston Region, Federal Labor
to what steps have been taken to comply. The allegations of the complaint against the Federal Aviation
Administration, New England Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor
Locks, Connecticut, are dismissed. NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AS ORDERED BY THE FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY AND TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT: WE WILL NOT direct the Federal Aviation Administration, New England
Region, Bradley Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, Connecticut (FAA), to
refuse to furnish the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Y90 Local,
MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO, the exclusive representative of certain of our employees,
with the complete list used by FAA in administering its random drug testing on
August 29, 1990, or with any such lists as may be used for such purpose in the
future, and are requested by the exclusive representative. WE WILL NOT interfere with the bargaining relationship between the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, Bradley
Air Traffic Control Tower, Windsor Locks, Connecticut and the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, Y90 Local, MEBA/NMU, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL direct the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region,
exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of certain of our employees, with
future, and are requested by the exclusive representative. ____________________________(Activity) Dated:___________ By:_____________________________ (Signature)
99 Summer Street, Suite 1500, Boston, MA 02110, and whose telephone number is:
(617) 424-5730. FOOTNOTES: (If blank, the decision does not
have footnotes.) 1. Authority decisions based on
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard have been enforced in United States Courts of
Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. FLRA v. United States
Department of the Navy, Navy Ships Parts Control Center, 966 F.2d 747
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc); FLRA v. United States Department of
Defense, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 975 F.2d 1105
(5th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3534 (U.S.
Jan. 21, 1993) (No. 92-1223); FLRA v. United States Department of
the Navy, Navy Resale and Services Support Office, Field Support Office,
Auburn, Washington, 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992) (petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc pending). A panel
for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also enforced a decision based
on Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; the court subsequently vacated the panel's
decision and granted a petition for rehearing en banc. FLRA v.
United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Ocean Service, 954 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1992),
vacated, petition for reh'g en banc granted (4th Cir. Apr.
22, 1992). However, applications for enforcement of such decisions were denied
by United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits. FLRA v. United States Department of Veterans
Affairs, Washington, D.C. and United States Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Center, Newington, Connecticut, 958 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1992);
FLRA v. Department of the Navy, Naval Resale Activity, Naval Air
Station-Memphis, Millington, Tennessee, 963 F.2d 124 (6th Cir.
1992); FLRA v. United States Department of the Navy, Navy Exchange, Naval
Training Station, Naval Hospital, Great Lakes, Illinois, 975 F.2d 348
(7th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. United States Department of Defense, Army and Air
Exchange Service, Dallas, Texas, No. 90-9561 (10th Cir. Jan. 20,
1993). We respectfully adhere to our determination in Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard that agencies are required to provide exclusive representatives
with requested names and home addresses of bargaining unit employees pursuant
to section 7114(b)(4) of the Statute. 2. In addition, we no longer follow
Portsmouth insofar as it rejects OPM's interpretation of the relevant
routine use statement. In Department of Veterans Affairs, Medical and
Regional Officer Center, Fargo, North Dakota and National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 225, 46 FLRA 1243 (1993) (VA, Fargo) application
for enforcement filed, No. 93-1219 (8th Cir. Jan. 27, 1993), we noted
that, on September 17, 1992, OPM published Federal Personnel Manual (FPM)
Letter 711-164 which confirmed its previous interpretation of a routine use
statement providing, among other things, that home addresses of unit employees
are not authorized for release to labor unions in situations where the unions
have adequate alternative means of communicating with the employees. In VA,
Fargo, we also noted that in National Treasury Employees Union and U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
Washington, D.C., 46 FLRA 234, 243 (1992), we concluded that the FPM Letter
would govern interpretation of the routine use statement. We stated that we
would no longer follow <