Source: http://murderpedia.org/male.S/s/solomon-christopher.htm
Timestamp: 2017-09-20 03:58:33
Document Index: 525376954

Matched Legal Cases: ['art. 37', '§2', '§7', '§7', '§7', '§2', '§2']

Christopher Solomon | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers
Solomon, Christopher Julian 999311 01/30/1980
06/04/1999 19 10
09/19/1997 17 Bowie
5' 9" 157 Brown
Orange California Laborer
On 09/19/1997, during the nighttime in Texarkana, Solomon and two co-defendants robbed and fatally shot an adult white male.
The victim was attending to a disabled vehicle when Solomon stopped his vehicle.
One of the co-defendants approached the victim with a 25-caliber handgun.
They attempted to rob the victim of money and jewelry, but the victim resisted.
He was shot 1 time in the head. Solomon and his co-defendants fled the scene in their vehicle.
Murphy, Julius
1999 of a capital murder committed on September 19, 1997. (1) Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 37.071 §§2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. (2) Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. points of error. We will affirm.
While the trial court gave the jury an accomplice as a matter of fact instruction regarding Davis, that instruction was not raised by the evidence. Even if the instruction had been raised by the evidence, the jury would have been free to believe that Davis was not in fact an accomplice. Because Davis was not an accomplice, her testimony could be used as corroboration. At least two facts revealed in Davis's testimony linked appellant to the crime: 1) appellant formed the idea of robbing Erie and goaded Murphy into committing the robbery, and 2) appellant commanded Wood to hand the gun to Murphy.
Appellant also errs in contending that we should ignore Young's testimony. Appellant implicitly concedes that Young was not an accomplice but believes the testimony should be ignored on the ground that Young lacked credibility as a witness. But the credibility of a witness is an issue for the jury to decide, and we have held in the past that credibility attacks on a witness do not defeat the corroborating effect of the witness's testimony. (9) Moreover, appellant's contention amounts to an attempt to superimpose a legal or factual sufficiency review upon the accomplice witness standard - a contention we rejected in Cathey v. State. (10)
Finally, appellant erroneously assumes that the evidence connecting him to the robbery did not also connect him to the murder. We have previously held a defendant's presence at the scene and participation in the underlying offense to be sufficient to connect him to the capital murder for accomplice-witness rule purposes. (11) Young's testimony that appellant said he intended to "jack" the victim was some evidence connecting appellant to the robbery and placing him at the scene of the capital murder. Point of error two is overruled.
: we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat to society. (13)
We have outlined a non-exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining whether a defendant constitutes a continuing threat to society:
In the present case, Wood testified that appellant told Murphy to kill the victim because "that's how I got caught the last time." That statement by appellant was strongly probative of future dangerousness. Appellant claims that the statement was not corroborated. Even if we were to indulge in the questionable assumption that the accomplice-witness rule had any application to the punishment phase of a trial, (16) Wood's testimony regarding the offense on trial was adequately corroborated in the guilt phase. In his brief, appellant contends that corroboration should not only connect the defendant to the offense but also connect the defendant to a particular state of mind when the victim was killed. The law imposes no such requirement.
Moreover, Davis testified that appellant goaded Murphy into committing the robbery, and she confirmed the last part of the statement related by Woods concerning getting "caught the last time." In addition, Young testified that appellant formed the intent to rob Erie before stopping alongside the victim's car. So, the evidence shows that appellant planned the crime in advance. Further, evidence that appellant bragged about the chambered shell and bragged about keeping five dollars as a souvenir show an absence of remorse. Evidence showing a lack of remorse constitutes some support for a finding of future dangerousness. (17)
Regarding the fourth factor, the State showed that appellant had committed several prior offenses. In 1996, he shot at a house because a friend would not sell embalming fluid for him. In 1997, appellant shot at another person. In June of 1997, appellant and another person committed a carjacking and threatened to kill the car's owner if he called the police. For that incident, appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, and he was on bond for that offense when he committed the offense before us. This sequence of crimes shows an escalating pattern of violence that constitutes some evidence of future dangerousness. (18) In addition, committing the offense while on bond is a significant fact showing a bold and dangerous disrespect for the law. It is similar to committing an offense while on parole - which we have held has some tendency to show future dangerousness. (19)
[PROSECUTOR]: Christina, let me just ask you this question. You were in the car that night. Who was the person in that car responsible for Mr. Erie getting robbed, in your opinion?
[DAVIS]: In my opinion?
[DAVIS]: Chris.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That calls for a legal conclusion. Object to that. Invading the province of the jury.
[PROSECUTOR]: The defendant was?
[DAVIS]: Yes. To me, it was.
Appellant contends that Davis improperly rendered a lay opinion on the ultimate issue of the case and engaged in mere speculation as to appellant's mental state.
In Fairow v. State (20) we discussed the admissibility, under the predecessor of the current rule (21), of lay testimony concerning the culpable mental state with which an act is committed. We said,
[W]hile a witness cannot possess personal knowledge of another's mental state, he may possess personal knowledge of facts from which an opinion regarding mental state may be drawn. The jury is then free to give as much or as little weight to the opinion as it sees fit. Therefore, we conclude that once the proponent of the opinion establishes personal knowledge of the facts underlying the opinion, he has satisfied the perception requirement of Rule 701. This is so even if the opinion concerns culpable mental state.
Christina Davis had personal knowledge of the events in the car, and her testimony that appellant was responsible for the robbery was based upon that knowledge.
The second requirement of Rule 701 is that the opinion be helpful to the trier of fact to either understand the witness's testimony or determine a fact in issue. Christina's testimony here was no more than a shorthand rendition of the facts. The trial court could have properly found that her testimony was helpful to a clear understanding of her testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and there was no error in admitting it.
But even if we were to assume arguendo that the trial court erred in permitting Davis to express the opinion given here, admission of this testimony would be harmless. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) provides that a nonconstitutional error "that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded." We have determined that substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence "if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect." (22) In the present case, the jury had already heard all of the facts upon which Davis's conclusion was based. Davis did not purport to be an expert or otherwise to be in a position to possess information not already related to the jury. The opinion here added little, if any, weight to Davis's testimony. Under the circumstances, we have a fair assurance that the evidence in question did not influence the jury or had but slight effect. Point of error four is overruled.
We agree that the photographs were relevant only as victim impact evidence; the evidence had no other apparent purpose. We must therefore address the legal principles relevant both to photographs and to victim impact evidence. Contrary to appellant's claims, we have held that victim impact evidence is relevant, "in the context of the mitigation special issue, to show the uniqueness of the victim, the harm caused by the defendant, and as rebuttal to the defendant's mitigating evidence." (24) Part of showing a victim's uniqueness is to humanize the victim for the jury. (25) Although we have in the past referred only to humanizing the victim, some humanizing of the family members accomplishes that purpose by impressing upon the jury that real people were in fact harmed by the victim's death. This humanizing effect is normally accomplished by the live testimony of a family member, but in the present case, most of the close family members did not testify; so, here, the photographs had the effect of humanizing the victim's family. Rather than just hear that the victim had a family, the jury was given pictures of the family members. Those pictures showed the family members as being more than just names.
The real question, then, is whether the probative value of the photographs was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. (26) We generally consider the following factors in any prejudice versus probative value analysis:
(2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, but nevertheless indelible way;
(4) the proponent's need for the evidence. (27)
In the present case, the probative value of the evidence was relatively low. While having some tendency to humanize the victim by humanizing his family, the photos were not particularly strong evidence of this or of the victim's death's impact on family members. But the photos' potential to impress the jury in an irrational, but indelible way was also low. The primary danger of unfair prejudice from victim impact testimony is its tendency to encourage the jury to engage in "measuring the worth of the victim compared to other members of society." (28) The photos of the family members did nothing to encourage the jury to make such comparisons; nothing in those photos singled out the victim or his family as being different from other families. The photo of the victim in his sailor's uniform may have had some slight tendency to encourage comparisons, but the uniform simply reflected the victim's occupation, which, under the circumstances, does not appear to be unduly prejudicial. In addition, the photographs were not gruesome nor were they designed to shock the jury or cause an extreme emotional reaction based upon irrelevant facts. (29)
Regarding the third factor, there were seven photographs presented within three pages of testimony; so, the length of time needed to present the evidence was short. Finally, the State had some need for the testimony. The State did not procure testimony from the victim's wife and children. The photographs were the only exposure the jury had to these close members of the victim's family. After considering the relevant factors, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion in determining that the photographs' probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Point of error nine is overruled.
, (30) appellant contends that he is entitled to such an instruction if he is charged with conspiracy liability for the offense under Texas Penal Code §7.02(b) and the evidence "raises a question whether the offense actually committed was perpetrated in furtherance of the felony, or was one which should have been anticipated by the Defendant."
§7.02(b) sets forth the theory of conspiracy liability:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose, and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.
In accordance with the law of conspiracy liability, the trial court gave instructions in the abstract and application portions of the guilt-innocence jury charge tracking the statutory language:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose, and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy. Capital murder, murder, robbery, and attempted robbery are felonies.
day of September, 1997, in Bowie County, State of Texas that Julius Jerome Murphy, did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, JASON ERIE, by shooting him with a firearm, and the said Julius Jerome Murphy was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery of JASON ERIE, and if you further find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that acting with intent to promote the commission of the robbery of JASON ERIE, the said CHRISTOPHER JULIAN SOLOMON, acted with intent to promote, or assist, the commission of the robbery of JASON ERIE, by encouraging, soliciting, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid Julius Jerome Murphy in the commission of the said robbery, if any, and that the shooting of JASON ERIE, by Julius Jerome Murphy, if there was such, was done in furtherance of the conspiracy to rob JASON ERIE, if any, and was an offense that should have been anticipated as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, then you will find the Defendant guilty of Capital Murder.
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant CHRISTOPHER JULIAN SOLOMON, of Capital Murder.
Appellant argues that these instructions were not enough to cover the "independent impulse" issue and contends that the trial court should have submitted the following additional instruction:
If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about September 19, 1997, Julius Murphy, in the course of committing robbery of Jason Erie, murdered Jason Erie, and that the evidence raises a question as to whether the murder of Jason Erie was perpetrated in furtherance of the robbery, or that the murder should have been anticipated by Defendant Christopher Solomon, you will find the Defendant, Christopher Solomon, not guilty of capital murder.
With little explanation, we held in Mayfield that a defendant was entitled to an "independent impulse" instruction in a conspiracy liability case when raised by the evidence. (31) That holding, however, is no longer viable in light of our more recent decision in Giesberg v. State. (32) In Giesberg, we held that defendants were not entitled to a defensive instruction on "alibi" because alibi was not an enumerated defense in the penal code and the issue was adequately accounted for within the general charge to the jury. (33) Because alibi was merely a negation of elements in the State's case, its inclusion would be superfluous, and in fact, would be an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence. (34) Likewise, there is no enumerated defense of "independent impulse" in the Penal Code, and appellant's proposed defensive issue would simply negate the conspiracy liability element of the State's case. All that is required, then, is for the appropriate portions of the jury charge to track the language of §7.02(b). To the extent that Mayfield holds to the contrary, it is overruled. Point of error one is overruled.
2. Article 37.071 §2(g). Unless otherwise indicated all future references to Articles refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4. Article 38.14.
5. Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)(citing Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
6. Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000).
7. Id. at 462-463.
8. Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1102 (2000).
9. Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026 (1999).
10. See Cathey, supra.
11. Cook, 858 S.W.2d at 470.
12. The issue, found in Article 37.071, §2(b)(1), asks: "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
13. Jackson v. State, 33 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
14. Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
15. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
16. We have specifically held the accomplice-witness rule to be inapplicable to extraneous offenses presented during the punishment phase. Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 911 (1992).
17. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131 (2000); Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
18. Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 247; Jackson, 33 S.W.3d at 838.
19. Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 854.
20. 943 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
21. Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides:
22. Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 243 (quoting Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
23. Berry v. State, 995 S.W.2d 699, 702 n. 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937, 939 n. 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
24. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999).
26. Rule 403 provides:
27. Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 240.
28. Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 262.
29. See Reese, 33 S.W.2d at 242 (photograph of fetus in a casket played on jury's sympathies based upon facts that should not have been relevant to its decision).
30. 716 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
31. Id. at 515.
32. 984 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1147 (1999).
33. Id. at 248-251.
34. Id. at 250.
35. Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919 (1993).
36. Skinner v. State, 956 S.W.2d 532, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1079 (1998).
37. Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 273.
38. Appellant did not request such an instruction.
39. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 516-517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997).