Source: http://openjurist.org/49/us/48
Timestamp: 2016-02-10 01:11:47
Document Index: 422053644

Matched Legal Cases: ['Art. 170', 'art. 30', 'art. 374', 'art. 41', 'art. 44', 'art. 3', '§ 2', 'art. 7', '§ 16', '§ 1']

49 US 48 Francis Surgett Apellant v. Peter M Lapice and Edward Whittlesey | OpenJurist
49 U.S. 48 - Francis Surgett Apellant v. Peter M Lapice and Edward Whittlesey Homethe United States Reports 49 U.S. (8 How.)
49 US 48 Francis Surgett Apellant v. Peter M Lapice and Edward Whittlesey 49 U.S. 48
8 How. 48
12 L.Ed. 982
FRANCIS SURGETT, APELLANT,v.PETER M. LAPICE AND EDWARD WHITTLESEY.
On the 20th of May, 1836, Surgett made application to enter the lands in controversy, which had been taken up by Whittlesey and Sparrow, and by Whittlesey. At the same time, he made a tender of the purchase-money, which was refused by the receiver, in consequence of the following indorsement upon the application by the register:——
On the 3d of December, 1841, Surgett filed his answer, in which he denied altogether that the petitioners had any title to the lands, but claimed that the title was in himself. The answer then proceeds thus:—'Respondent pleads in reconvention that he himself is the true and lawful owner of so much of the said lands claimed by the plaintiffs, as are embraced in the aforesaid back concessions claimed by him, and prays that he may be decreed to be the legal owner thereof, that the certificates granted by the commissioners of the land office to Sparrow and Whittlesey, or either of them, may be avoided and annulled; and that, if patents have already issued in their favor for said lands, the plaintiffs may be decreed to convey all their right, title, and interest, by virtue of said patents, to your respondent; that he may be quieted in his title and possession thereof, and may recover judgment against said plaintiffs for the sum of one thousand dollars damages, sustained by him in consequence of their illegal pretensions, and for general relief in the premises.'
On the 7th of April, 1845, the Circuit Court passed the following decree:——
The points raised by the counsel for the respective parties were the following:——
All these principles have been extended and applied in their utmost latitude, and with additional illustrations, to Louisiana. See Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet., 655; S. C., 13 Id., 368; Ex parte Poultney, 12 Id., 474; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 13 Id., 404.
Code of Practice, Louisiana, sections treating of Petition and Citation, Art. 170 to 207; of Conservatory Acts, 208, 209; of Sequestration, 269 to 283; of Injunction, 296 to 309; of Appearance and Answer, 316 to 329; of Exceptions, 330 to 346; of Interrogatories, 347 to 356; of Incidental Demands, 362 to 364; of Intervention, 389 to 394; of Parties to Suits, 101; of Amendments, 419 to 440; of Trial which is regularly on hearing before the court and only allowed by jury sub modo, 476 to 492 and 493 et seq.
For the appellant it will be maintained, that the decree below was erroneous, for the following reasons:——
5. As to the objection made by the judge of the Circuit Court, namely, that the act of 1832 was not applicable to lands which had at that time been already offered for sale, it is submitted,——
Additional point of the appellees:——
On the 2d point. Livingston v. Herman, 9 Mart. (La.), 713; 2 Cond. R., 40; Thompson v. Schlatter, 13 La., 119; McDonogh v. Millaudon, 3 How., 693; U. S. v. King, 3 Id., 773; Code of Practice of La., p. 8, art. 30, p. 90, art. 374, 10, art. 41 and 43, p. 12, art. 44; Vidal v. Duplantier, 7 La., p. 45 (8 N. S., 105); Poultney v. Cecil, 8 La., 422; 7 How., 846; Constitution of U. S., art. 3, § 2, and art. 7 of Amendments; Act of Congress of 24th Sept., 1789, ch. 20, § 16 (1 Stat. at L., 82); Act of 26th May, 1824, ch. 181, § 1 (4 Id., 62); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet., 433, 446; Livingston v. Story, 9 Id., 632; Minor v. Tillotson, 2 How., 392; Phillips v. Preston, 5 Id., 278, 289.
On the 10th point also, 9 La., 57:
17th. The appellees will also contend that the petitory action instituted by the appellant in this case cannot be maintained on the equitable title set up by him. United States v. King, 7 How., 846; S. C., 3 Id., 773.
But as several cases have been dismissed from this court because they were brought here by appeal instead of a writ of error, it is insisted that this rests on the same grounds of those that have been dismissed, and the case of the United States v. King, (3 and 7 How., 773 and 844) has been much relied on to show that this cause cannot be brought here by appeal. But that was not an action of title to quiet the plaintiff in possession of his land, but was a petitory action brought by the United States to recover land which was in the possession of the defendant, and to which the United States claimed a legal title. The suit was in the nature of an ejectment in a court of common law, and was therefore strictly an action at law, and in no respect analogous to a proceeding in equity to remove a cloud from the title of a party who not only holds the legal title, but is also actually in possession of the land in dispute; and as the United States cannot be sued in reconvention, if the defendant had claimed an equitable title in that case, it would have been no defence, because he could not make the United States a defendant, and himself a plaintiff, by a suit in reconvention. The whole proceedings were necessarily proceedings at law, and could therefore be removed by writ of error only, and not by appeal. And substantially of the same character were all the cases relied on by counsel to dismiss this appeal; none of them resembled the case before us in any material degree,—certainly not enough to govern it,—and the jurisdiction is consequently sustained.
2. We come in the next place to discuss the merits; and here some general considerations present themselves. On the first settlement of Lower Louisiana, the nature of the country imposed on the governments who successively held it a peculiar policy in granting land to individual proprietors; the Mississippi River overflowed its banks annually, and to overcome this impediment to cultivation, and to reclaim the back lands, heavy embankments had to be thrown up on the sides of the river, so as to keep the water at flood-tide within the channel; and these embankments had to be connected and continuous for a great distance, otherwise the whole country would be submerged; and the king's domain was resorted to as a means of securing the country from overflow, and of reclaiming it to a great extent; and individual proprietors were relied on to do that which, in other countries at all similarly situated, was a great national work; and it is matter of surprise how much the policy accomplished with such feeble and questionable means. The grants were not not large, and fronted on the river only to the extent of from two to eight arpens as a general rule, and almost uniformly extended forty arpens back; to these front grants the Spanish government reserved the back lands, to another depth of forth arpens; and although few if any grants were made of back lands in favor of front proprietors, still they were never granted by the Spanish government to any other proprietor, but used for the purpose of obtaining fuel and for pasturage by the front owners, so that, for all practical purposes, they were the beneficial proprietors;—subject to the policy of levees, and of guarded protection to front owners. We took possession of Lower Louisiana in 1804. In 1805, commissioners were appointed, according to an act of Congress, to report on the French and Spanish claims in that section of country, and by the act of April 21st, 1806, it was made a part of their duty 'to inquire into the nature and extent of the claims which may arise from a right, or supposed right, to a double or additional concession on the back of grants or concessions heretofore made,' previous to the transfer of government, 'and to make a special report thereon to the Secretary of the Treasury, which report shall be by him laid before Congress, at their next ensuing session. And the lands which may be embraced by such report shall not be otherwise disposed of, until a decision of Congress shall have been had thereon.'
The township where the land in dispute is situated was offered for sale, according to the President's proclamation, in November, 1829; and as Surgett first offered to make his entry in 1836, it is insisted that, after the lands in the township were offered at public sale, no entry founded on a preference right was allowable at the land office; and such was the opinion of the court below, and is one of the reasons assigned for rejecting Surgett's claim. The act of 1832 provides, that the claimant shall deliver his notice of claim to the register of the proper land office, stating the extent and situation of the tract he wishes to purchase, and shall make payment; but it has this proviso,—that all notices of claim shall be entered, and the money be paid thereon, at least three weeks before such period as may be designated by the proclamation of the President for the sale of the public lands in the township where such claim may be situated; and all claims not so entered shall be liable to be sold as other public lands. The proviso was an exception to a general law giving a right of entry; it was prospective, having reference to future public sales, and not to lands that had been previously offered, and remained unsold; Surgett could not comply with the condition, nor had it any application to such a case as his claim presents.
The court below rejected Surgett's claim to enter the back land on another ground. The acts of Congress securing the preference contain an exception,—'that the right of pre-emption shall not extend so far in depth as to include lands fit for cultivation bordering on another river, creek, bayou, or water-course.' And the question is, To what description of water-course did the legislature refer? The enacting clause provides that every person who owns a tract of land 'bordering' on any river, creek, bayou, or water-course, shall have the right of pre-emption to the back land. The act of 1811 has been construed, in the department of public lands, for nearly forty years, to mean that those owners whose lands fronted on a navigable stream were only provided for; and that the word 'border,' both in the enacting clause and in the exception, meant to front on a navigable water-course; that is to say, such waters as are described in the third section of the act of February 20th, 1811, by which Louisiana was authorized to form a state constitution and government, by which act the River Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, or into the Gulf of Mexico were declared to be common highways and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said state, as to other citizens of the United States.
How far the powers of the court below extended to contradict the public surveys and records of the land office, we refrain from discussing in this case, as the parties on the one side and on the other affirmatively appealed to a court of justice to decide the fact, whether the bayou was of the description contemplated by the acts of Congress, and a water-course on which lands could front. It is between two and three miles long, and drains swamps, and a shallow pond, or rather lagoon; its greatest width is from seventy to eighty feet from bank to bank, and the channel in part is some fifteen feet deep from the top of its banks; but at no time of the year has it any claims to be a navigable stream, being nearly dry for a greater portion of the year, having no running water, or any water in it, except stagnant pools; it is an ordinary drain of the Mississippi swamp, and of shallow ponds. Near its mouth, at the Mississippi River, there is a levee,—and so there is one near to the pond, at its farther end from the river; both levees being on lands granted to Surgett. Before the lower levee was constructed, there had been a mill for grinding erected on the bayou, which gave it the name it bears; the flow of water was then from the Mississippi River through this outlet to the swamp, in times when the river was high. But it was never fit for any purpose, as a channel 13 Otto, 163; s. c. 2 Morr. Tr., 351. could be carried on by water. The ground of defence must therefore fail, that the lands entered by Sparrow and Whittlesey bordered on a bayou, and were within the exception of the act of 1832.