Source: https://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/42-u-s-c-%C2%A712181/
Timestamp: 2020-04-09 00:51:04
Document Index: 609719796

Matched Legal Cases: ['§12181', '§12181', '§12181', '§12182', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§12181', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§12181', '§12182', '§12181', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§12181', '§12181', '§36', '§36', '§36', '§12181']

42 U.S.C. §12181
Common Misperceptions About Internet Accessibility and ADA Compliance
February 18, 2020 by William Goren Leave a Comment
The idea for today’s blog entry comes to me from Richard Hunt. I recently saw an article talking about Internet accessibility that was full of errors. I sent it along to Richard. I originally wondered if we shouldn’t send a letter to the person who wrote it detailing all the errors. However, we decided that it just wouldn’t be worth our time. Richard gave me the idea that it might make for an interesting blog on common misperceptions of Internet accessibility compliance. I thought that was a great idea. Also, my friend and colleague, Robin Shea, frequently does quizzes on labor and employment issues. I always enjoy taking them. With all that in mind, here goes.
The ADA requires all electronic and information technology to be accessible to persons with disabilities. True/false
DOJ has regulations dealing with Internet accessibility. True/false
DOJ is still working on Internet accessibility regulations. True/false
If for some reason DOJ is not working on Internet accessibility regulations, the business gets a pass since it has no clue how to comply with the ADA. True/false
WCAG 2.1 is binding on any Internet site. True/false
The ADA applies to all businesses operating for public benefit. True/false
For an Internet site to be ADA compliant, the site must allow a person with a disability to browse the site effectively. True/false
The denial of cert. in Robles v. Domino’s really changed the lay of the land for Internet accessibility litigation. True/false
Full compliance with WCAG 2.1 is ADA compliance. True/false
If a website works for a screen reader, it will work for voice dictation users and vice a versa. True/false
Membership organization do not have to worry about accessibility of their website to nonmembers. True/false
Since it’s unclear how to comply with the ADA with respect to Internet sites, a business does not have to worry about complying.
False. The ADA, as we already know, breaks down into several different titles with each having different rules. Title I applies to employers of 15 or more. Title II applies to nonfederal governmental entity regardless of size. Title III applies to places of public accommodations as set forth in 42 U.S.C. §12181(7). So, the answer is theoretically an overstatement and is false. It is considerably more complicated than that. As a matter of preventive law, you certainly want to aim for this.
False. Under the Obama administration, regulations were proposed. However, those regulations quite literally disappeared under the Trump administration.
False. DOJ despite congressional pressure from members of both parties, DOJ has put the regulations on inactive status.
False. This question goes to what we call the primary jurisdiction doctrine. As we have discussed before, such as here, most courts are rejecting this. This doctrine says that before an entity has to do something, there should be regulations first. In general, the courts are not buying this argument.
False. WCAG is a voluntary set of guidelines. Under the Obama administration, DOJ was using it with respect to settling Internet site accessibility cases. Today, you do see private parties using WCAG 2.1 as the basis for settling Internet accessibility cases. That said, this is a completely voluntary standard even though as a practical matter it would be fair to say that WCAG 2.1 is the gold standard. Even so, that is quite a bit different than saying that WCAG 2.1 is binding on anyone.
False. The ADA applies to all places of public accommodations as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 12181(7). That is a quite different animal than saying the ADA applies to all businesses operating for public benefit.
False. The legal standard is meaningful accessibility. Of course, we don’t really know what that means.
False. Despite the media coverage of this case, which we discussed here, it didn’t change anything. The game changer is the South Dakota v. Wayfair decision from the United States Supreme Court, which we discussed here. People may not realize the importance of this decision because the decision on its face had nothing to do with the ADA. However, it does not take a rocket scientist so to speak to see just how critical that decision is for Internet accessibility litigation.
False. WCAG 2.1 AA may be the gold standard but the legal standard is meaningful accessibility. It is entirely possible you could be complying with WCAG 2.1 AA and still run into a user that does not have meaningful access to the site.
False. In general, if an Internet site works for a screen reader, it will work for voice dictation users as well but not always. So, be sure to get your site tested for both screen readers and voice dictation users. Also, don’t forget about the deaf and hard of hearing with respect to any videos. Finally, keep in mind you might have an individual who uses more than one of the technologies at the same time. For example, a hard of hearing individual who uses voice dictation technology.
True, such as we discussed here. However, all it takes is for a membership organization to be faced with a plaintiff that could be a member of that organization who cannot meaningfully access their Internet site to torpedo this defense.
False. This is the due process defense. The courts are not buying it. That is, you still have to comply with the ADA, it is just that you have the flexibility for figuring out how since there are no regulations on point. So, due process doesn’t work.
How Did You Do (In Honor of the Upcoming Baseball Season).
11-12: Major Leaguer
9-10: AAA ball player
7-8: AA ball player
6 and below: Single A ball player
Filed Under: General Tagged With: 42 U.S.C. §12181, ADA, ADA attorney, ADA compliance, ADA compliance attorney, ADA compliance expert witness, ADA consultant, ADA consulting, ADA consulting expert, ADA litigation consulting, deaf, DOJ, DOJ regulations, due process, Electronic and information technology, hard of hearing, inactive status, Internet accessibility, Internet accessibility regulation, meaningful accessibility, membership organizations, places of public accommodation, Primary jurisdiction, Robles v. Domino's, screen readers, South Dakota v. wayfair, standing, title I, title II, title III, voice dictation, WCAG 2.1
Readily Achievable Defense Even After Alteration?
October 22, 2019 by William Goren 1 Comment
Before getting started on our blog entry of the week, good luck to the Houston Astros and the Washington Nationals in the World Series starting tonight. Turning to the blog entry of the week, I really really struggled with what to blog on this week. It wasn’t for lack of cases in my pipeline, I have about a dozen, I just couldn’t figure out what to blog on. Ultimately, I decided on a case my colleague, Richard Hunt, has previously talked about in his blog, which you can find in my blog roll. I decided there was something in that case I wanted to address specifically, and so here goes. The case is Smith v. Golden China of Red Wing, Inc., which can be found here, a decision from the District Court of Minnesota decided on July 22, 2019. As usual, the blog entry is divided into categories, and they are: facts; court’s reasoning; and thoughts/takeaways. Of course, the reader is free to focus on any or all of the categories.
Plaintiff is a Minnesota resident suffering from arthrogryposis and uses a wheelchair for mobility. On May 25, 2017, plaintiff along with a paralegal from a law firm drove around testing businesses in the Red Wing area for ADA compliance. He visited Golden China during this trip and noted there were no fully compliant accessible parking spaces. Plaintiff requires fully compliant accessible parking spaces to safely transfer between his car and wheelchair. He did not attempt to exit the vehicle and use the ramp to enter the restaurant building. Rather, he determined based upon his experience, he would not have been able to enter the premises and dine or order on an independent basis and was deterred from attempting what would have been an unsafe and futile act.
As far as being able to return to the restaurant, he did allege he was in the area often and would go to the restaurant if family or friends patronized it. His brother lives in Winona, and he also is in the area when he visits Treasure Island Casino.
Also, it turns out that while the facility predates the ADA, the parking lot had been resurfaced in 2001-2002. In particular, the parking lot was constructed in the 1970s. In 2001 or 2002, the restaurant resurfaced the parking lot. That resurfacing cost about $7000 or $8000 and did not involve regrading the parking lot. The old surface was scratched up to create a better bonding surface, and a new layer was put on top. They also restriped the parking lot every few years when the paint faded away. During the summer they filled potholes in the parking lot.
Plaintiff brought suit with respect to several ADA violation, including: 1) signage indicating accessible space was posted too low to the ground; 2) an insufficient number of accessible parking spaces; 3) insufficient striping for accessible spaces; 4) the accessible space lacked an adjacent access aisle; and 5) the ramp near the reserved parking space had impermissible slopes and landing. The court decided that only one accessible parking space was needed per the applicable standards. Also, Golden China fixed everything except for the ramp having impermissible slopes and landing. So, the court dismissed all of those claims as moot. With respect to the ramp having an impermissible slope and landing, Golden China argued fixing it would put it out of business. Further, it had no obligation to undertake such repairs (it had put out for bid what it would take to repair the slope), because such repairs, which would require $29,000-$39,000 worth of construction, was not readily achievable and would put them out of business.
Plaintiff has standing to bring the suit because he has shown an intent to return. In particular, his brother lives in Winona. He also visits the Treasure Island Casino, which is nearby. Both of those allegations sufficiently show a threat of future harm.
Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), defines discrimination as a failure to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities where such removal is readily achievable. Further, if removal is not readily achievable, failure to make such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable is also discrimination.
The resurfacing of the parking lot was an alteration. An alteration is a change to a place of public accommodation or commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of the building or facility or any part thereof. Normal maintenance are not alterations unless it affects the usability of the building or the facility. 28 C.F.R. §36.402(b)(1).
The 2010 ADAAG specifically defines alteration as including the resurfacing of circulation paths or vehicular ways and is persuasive authority.
While the resurfacing has not been done in nearly two decades, the resurfacing nevertheless was an alteration.
28 C.F.R. §36.304(d)(3) requiring any noncomplying facilities in existence before March 15, 2012, to comply with the ADA where readily achievable was initially published and approved on September 15, 2010.
28 C.F.R. §36.402(a), which requires noncomplying facilities altered after January 26, 1992, to comply to the maximum extent feasible was published and approved on July 26, 1991.
§36.304 and 36.402 contradict each other. Since they contradict each other with respect to facilities in existence before March 15, 2012 and altered after January 26, 1992, the regulation issued and approved at the later date, allowing for a readily achievable defense, prevails.
It is up to the plaintiff to present a sufficient showing barrier removal is readily achievable. Plaintiff does that by presenting evidence of: 1) a specific design to remove the barriers allege; 2) the cost of removal or the proposed remedy; and 3) the effect on the finances and operation of the facility.
Under 28 C.F.R. §36.304(a), readily achievable is something that is easily accomplished and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.
Considerations of whether something is readily achievable are stated in 42 U.S.C. §12181(9), and include: 1) the nature and cost of the action needed; 2) the overall financial resources of the facility, the number of persons employed there, and the impact of such action on the operation of the facility; 3) the overall financial resources of the facility and its size (including number of employees, and number type and location of facility); and 4) the type of operation of the covered entity.
Since the start of litigation in 2017, Golden China has suffered a net loss even despite a decrease in rent.
Defendants have provided significant evidence that bringing the ramp into compliance with the applicable ADAAG standard would cost between $29,000 and $39,000, which is money they do not have.
This court adopts the deterrence theory of standing. As we know from this blog entry, standing is a bit all over the place. Some courts are less flexible than others, particularly with respect to the intent to return.
I am a bit surprised that an appeal was not filed for two reasons. First, the court holds that readily achievable is something that the plaintiff has to prove up. Other courts, such as here, take a very different approach. Second, it is just not obvious a readily achievable defense exist even after alterations are done. I get that the two regulatory provisions are in apparent contradiction with each other, but one wonders if it necessarily follows that readily achievable is a defense after alterations are done. As mentioned below, it would be very interesting to research how DOJ has looked at this over the years and what position they took on the matter.
With respect to the current status of the case, the parties are fighting over whether the defendant should be awarded attorney fees. It is really hard for a defendant to get attorney fees. Seems to me that this case was never a slam dunk case for the defendant. Accordingly, an attorney fees petition may well prove unsuccessful. If it does prove successful, certainly worth an appeal.
Resurfacing a parking lot is an alteration. We have previously discussed when an alteration occurs in this blog entry.
This decision opens up another avenue of defense for title III entities with existing facilities and alterations made prior to March 15, 2012. Those entities may be able to argue that even if the alterations were not done right or the path of travel to those alterations were not done the way they were supposed to be, they still may have a readily achievable defense.
It would be interesting to research what DOJ guidances, technical assistant memorandums, etc. over the years with respect to the contradiction between 28 C.F.R. §36.304(a) and 28 C.F.R. §36.402. If there is discussion by DOJ over the years on this, then the question will become whether that discussion, assuming they took a definitive position, would be given credibility by the courts per this blog entry.
Title III entities should be aware that readily achievable is a moving target. It very much depends upon the financial resources of the entity involved. Sometimes, places of public accommodation with considerable resources will have significant repairs deemed readily achievable. So, it just depends.
The allegations of inaccessibility made by the plaintiff in this case are quite typical for drive-by plaintiffs. Another typical allegation would be if the plaintiff had gone inside, you likely would have seen an allegation that the pipes underneath the bathroom sink were not insulated. At any rate, because these allegations are so typical, places of public accommodation may want to focus on the particular items and monitor them accordingly.
The case did not deal with standing for testers.
Case illustrate the point that if you fix the allegations, those claims become moot.
Does the restaurant now have an obligation to post signage saying that the slope of the ramp is not to ADAAG standards if they don’t want to run the risk of a personal injury suit?
Why would a person with a disability do this kind of work if they are not getting paid? Well, if not supposed to happen this way, but in Florida and in Georgia there are allegations that attorneys in those two States did pay the person with the disability a fee for what they did. That action is not ethical, but the allegations are that it happens. More charitably, the ADA went into effect in 1990, and people have had 30 years to comply. It just doesn’t seem to be happening. So, a person with a disability may make it their mission.
Lastly, one more week to vote for my blog in the lexblog contest here.
Filed Under: General Tagged With: 2010 ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. §36.304, 28 C.F.R. §36.402, 42 U.S.C. §12181, 42 U.S.C. §12182, access aisle, accessible parking space, ADA, ADA attorney, ADA compliance, ADA compliance attorney, ADA compliance expert witness, ADA consultant, ADA consulting, ADA consulting expert, ADA litigation consulting, affirmative defense, alteration, architectural barriers, Deterrence, drive-by plaintiff, existing facilities, impermissible slopes and landings, insufficient striping, Kisor v. Wilkie, Minnesota, moot, mooting, mootness, parking lot, path of travel, ramps, readily achievable, regrading, restriping, resurfaced, serial plaintiff, signage, Smith v. Golden China of Red Wing, standing, title III, treasure Island Casino, usability
Are Plasma Centers Places of Public Accommodations?
September 11, 2019 by William Goren 1 Comment
Previously, we have discussed here and here whether a plasma center is a place of public accommodation under title III. That discussion shows there is already a split in the Circuit Courts on the issue. On August 30, 2019, the Third Circuit weighed in on this in Matheis v. CSL Plasma Inc., A published decision. They came down in favor of a plasma center as a place of public accommodation. The facts in this case are pretty straightforward. Here, you have a retired police officer with PTSD who routinely and safely donated plasma roughly 90 times in 11 months. When he obtained a service dog, the plasma center refused to allow him to donate blood arguing that anybody who had a service dog for PTSD was automatically prohibited from donating blood because they must have extreme anxiety too severe to undergo safely the donation process. The retired police officer loses on summary judgment and appeals to the Third Circuit. The blog entry is divided into the categories of court’s reasoning and takeaways. I imagine the reader will want to read the whole thing.
42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(F) says that a place of public accommodation includes, “a laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barbershop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a healthcare provider, hospital, or other service establishment (emphasis mine).
The question is whether a plasma center is an, “other service establishment.”
It notes that the 10th Circuit and the 5th Circuit have reached opposite conclusions.
The court spent considerable time attacking the Fifth Circuit opinion (see ¶ ¶ 6-10 of this section of the blog entry, below). With respect to the 10th Circuit opinion finding that a plasma center is a place of public accommodation, the court notes the following from the 10th Circuit opinion: 1) “service,” has a broad, common definition- i.e. conduct or performance assisting or benefiting someone or something; 2) “establishment,” also has a broad, common definition, i.e. a place of business; 3) giving the term “service establishment,” the ordinary meaning of its components does not result in ambiguity nor does it result in anything irrational. After all, plasma donation centers are places of business assisting or benefiting those who wish to provide plasma for medical use-whether for altruistic reasons or for pecuniary gain-by supplying personnel and medical equipment necessary to accomplish that goal.
The 10th Circuit has the better view.
No support exists for the Fifth Circuit’s statement that donors do not benefit from the act of donating. That is simply not the case, donors receive money, a clear benefit, to donate plasma.
The argument that secondary profit motive can dictate a finding a plasma center is not a place of public accommodation doesn’t wash. After all, a bank, which is explicitly a place of public accommodation also has a secondary profit motive.
Businesses offering services to the public convey something of economic value in return for something else of economic value. That value is often money, but it doesn’t have to be. Money is just one proxy for economic value, and economic value is fungible.
Banks and customers often exchange services not fitting simply into a money for service model. A pawnshop is another example. A recycling center is yet another example. Both pawnshops and recycling centers have been held to be subject to the ADA.
Providing services means providing something of economic value to the public. It simply doesn’t matter whether that economic value is paid for with money or something else of value.
Failure to accommodate cases turn on three questions: 1) whether the requested accommodation to the program was reasonable; 2) whether the requested accommodation was necessary to assure meaningful access; and 3) whether it would represent a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that the desired accommodation is reasonable and necessary, while the defendant bears the burden of showing that it would fundamentally alter the nature of the program.
Title III entities are required by 28 C.F.R. §36.302 to modify policies, practices, or procedure to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.
A service animal used by a person with a disability is reasonable under the ADA as a matter of law so long as no DOJ regulation supersedes it.
A plaintiff does not need to show intentional discrimination in order to demonstrate a violation of title III of the ADA. Accordingly, McDonnell-Douglas simply does not apply. The only question is whether the defense established an exception permitting a plasma donation center to deny an individual with a disability his or her use of a service animal. If no exceptions apply, then the use of a service animal is a reasonable accommodation and plaintiff prevails.
28 C.F.R. §36.208 permits places of public accommodation to deny anyone services who poses a direct threat to others. However, the direct threat exception requires an individualized assessment to determine the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policy, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.
Safety requirements per 28 C.F.R. §36.301(b) have to be based upon actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.
The defendant simply has not made its case that its policy of excluding donors with service dogs is based upon anything other than mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities. There isn’t any medical justification or other scientific evidence backing up the defense’s conclusion that all those person having severe anxiety will put staff, other donors, or themselves at risk when donating plasma.
The defense fails to explain why the plaintiff, who has managed his PTSD for nearly 2 decades and safely donated plasma roughly 90 times, should only be considered safe to donate when he renounces the new service animal that helps him better manage his PTSD.
We now have two Circuits taking the position that a plasma center is a place of public accommodation. We have one taking the position that it is not. A Circuit Court split is one of the reasons the United States Supreme Court agrees to hear cases. As I have mentioned previously, people with disabilities do very well at the Supreme Court outside of the employment context. Here, you have a person who donated blood successfully 90 times without a service dog. He is also a retired police officer. Finally, this is not an employment case. Even with the current configuration of the United States Supreme Court, I like the chances of the plaintiff at the Supreme Court should this case get appealed to the Supreme Court.
In the case involving South Dakota, which we discussed here, the Supreme Court has already signaled that it would be open to broadly construing what is a place of public accommodation.
This decision is published, and so, no restrictions exist on citing it as precedent.
This case contains a nice description of what failure to accommodate cases turn on.
This case also has a very nice explanation of the burden of proof. Too often, the burden of proof explanation gets overly legalistic, which is not the case here.
This opinion says McDonnell Douglas doesn’t apply to title III cases.
Blanket exclusions are always a bad idea. The ADA operates on an individualized analysis.
As a matter of preventive law, don’t get stuck on whether a particular business is specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. §12181(7) when trying to determine if the business is a place of public accommodation. For that matter, as a matter of preventive law, unless you want to chew up a lot of money in litigation, which may or may not be successful, I wouldn’t get stuck on whether it is a physical place either. The question is whether what is going on is of the kind listed in any of the categories in 42 U.S.C. §12181(7).
Filed Under: General Tagged With: 28 C.F.R. §36.208, 28 C.F.R. §36.301, 28 C.F.R. §36.302, 42 U.S.C. §12181, Actual risks, ADA, ADA attorney, ADA compliance, ADA compliance attorney, ADA compliance expert witness, ADA consultant, ADA consulting, ADA consulting expert, ADA litigation consulting, banks, burden of proof, direct threat, donating blood, economic value, Establishment, failure to accommodate, Fifth Circuit, fundamental alteration, generalizations, intentional discrimination, Matheis v. CSL plasma Inc., McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. green, other service establishment, pawnshop, place of public accommodation, Plasma center, PTSD, reasonable accommodations, reasonable and necessary, reasonable modification, recycling center, safety requirements, secondary profit motive, service, Service animal, service dog, South Dakota v. wayfair Inc., speculation, stereotypes, Tenth circuit, title III
Expect Every ADA Case in Litigation to Litigate Causation April 6, 2020