Source: http://www.thehamiltonfirm.com/en/news/page/2/
Timestamp: 2019-11-14 01:38:57
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Blog | The Hamilton Firm - Part 2
The Hamilton Firm is pleased to announce that two of its four trial lawyers have again been recognized by Thomson Reuters Super Lawyers Magazine as among the state’s Top Rated Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Attorneys. Both Hubert Hamilton and Patrick Cruise have achieved Super Lawyer status for the current year, as published in Mid-South Super Lawyers, which recognizes top ranked attorneys in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement.
Hu Hamilton also has the unique distinction of again being recognized as a Top Rated Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Attorney in Georgia, as just announced by Georgia Super Lawyers. Mr. Hamilton is licensed in Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee.
The selections by Thomson Reuters are made by the research team at Super Lawyers. Each year, the team undertakes a multiphase selection process that includes a statewide survey of lawyers, an independent evaluation of candidates by the attorney-led research staff, a peer review of candidates by practice area and a good-standing and disciplinary check. Only five percent of attorneys are selected to the Super Lawyers list.
The Statute of Limitations is ONE YEAR:
For “injuries to the person”, T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A).
Exception: Where criminal charges are brought against the defendant, the period is extended to two years if listed conditions are met, C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2).
SOL tolled for minors, but statutes of repose will still apply, T.C.A. § 28-1-106.
In wrongful death cases, the cause of action accrues on the date of the negligent act or omission, which is NOT necessarily the date of death, Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 829 (1872).
One Year SOL is automatically extended 120 days by complying with the pre-suit notice requirements of T.C.A. § 29-26-121.
If the injury is not discovered within the one year period, the SOL can run from the date of discovery, T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(2).
Statutes of Repose:
Products Liability: Six years from date of injury, and within ten years from date the product was first purchased (exceptions for asbestos and silicone breast implants), T.C.A. § 29-28-103.
Construction deficiency causing injury: Four years after substantial completion, T.C.A. § 28-3-202, unless injury occurs during fourth year, T.C.A. § 28-3-203 adds 1 more year.
Medical malpractice cases: Three years, T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(3).
$750,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages:
Increases to $1,000,000 for “catastrophic loss or injury” (spinal cord injury resulting in paraplegia or quadriplegia, amputation of two hands or feet, 3rd degree burns over 40% of the body), T.C.A. § 29-39-102(d).
Caps do not apply where there was specific intent to injure; falsification, destruction or concealment of records; under the influence of drugs or alcohol; or conviction of felony T.C.A. § 29-39-102(h).
Modified comparative fault, Plaintiff must be less than 50% at fault, McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
A defendant is only liable for the percentage of the plaintiff’s damages caused by that defendant’s negligence,
Non-parties can be added within 90 days of answer alleging such other person to be at fault even if the statute of limitations has expired, T.C.A. § 20-1-119.
Liability Insurance is Not Discoverable in State Courts:
TRCP 26, Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259 (Tenn. 2008).
UM/UIM Coverage (policies issued in TN):
Does not stack, offset by liability limits.
Strict liability can be imposed on manufacturers and sellers under T.C.A. § 29-28-105.
Generally there must be an unsafe condition creating an unreasonable risk of harm, either created by the defendant, or that defendant knew or should have known about.
There is no real distinction between licensees and invitees under TN law. Social guests are owed a duty of reasonable care, Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1984).
Medical Malpractice (Health Care Liability):
Attorney’s fees are limited to one-third, T.C.A. § 29-26-120.
Collateral sources cannot be recovered except for privately purchased insurance benefits, T.C.A. § 29-26-119.
Experts must come from TN or a contiguous state (with exceptions) and must have been practicing in that profession or specialty within one year preceding date of injury or wrongful act, T.C.A. § 29-26-115(b).
Locality rule applies, T.C.A. § 29-26-115(a)(1).
Complicated pre-suit notice, good faith requirements, T.C.A. §§ 29-26-121, 122.
Governmental Tort Liability:
Tort claims against the State (T.C.A. § 9-8-307), and against counties and cities (T.C.A. §29-20-403) are capped at $300,000 per claimant/$1,000,000 per occurrence.
Claims against the State must be filed with the Claims Commission.
Scheme is a confusing “hybrid between the survival and wrongful death statutes”, T.C.A. § 20-5-102, 106, Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 497 (Tenn. 2017).
Suit can be filed by personal representative, parent, surviving spouse (or children or next of kin if no surviving spouse), T.C.A. § 20-5-106, 107.
Damages include pecuniary value and consortium damages for next of kin (capped by T.C.A. § 29-39-102 at $750,000, or $1,000,000 for parent leaving minor child), T.C.A. § 20-5-113, Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W. 2d 593 (Tenn. 1999)
Clear and convincing evidence, bifurcated trial, limitations on vicarious liability, capped at twice compensatory damages or $500,000, whichever is greater, subject to various exceptions including specific intent, falsifying records, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or conviction of felony, T.C.A. § 29-39-104.
Hospital liens are limited to one-third of the total recovery (T.C.A. § 29-22-101), and only include charges that were reasonable and necessary, West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corp., 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014)
By Injury & Disability Lawyers | Highway Safety | No Comments
By Injury & Disability Lawyers | Premises Liability, Uncategorized | No Comments
Effective immediately, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has said it will allow drivers to use personal conveyance status to get to the nearest safe parking spot/rest location after hours are exhausted by a shipper/receiver, or off-duty periods are interrupted by law enforcement. Will this expansion of the “personal conveyance” exemption be abused by some drivers? Probably, and so the logs and actual movements of tractor trailers should be carefully examined in any case where time and distance traveled before a wreck looks suspicious.
“The movement from a shipper or receiver to the nearest safe resting area may be identified as personal conveyance,” text of the clarification reads, “regardless of whether the driver exhausted his or her HOS, as long as the CMV is being moved solely to enable the driver to obtain the required rest at a safe location.” (p. 7)
The new interpretation of when it is legal to use a truck for personal conveyance allows use of personal conveyance whether the truck is loaded or not.
Generally, personal conveyance use has not been allowed for any move intended to further the direction of the current or next dispatch, and is intended as truly personal use of the truck, outside the stream of commerce. Further clarifying the change in personal conveyance interpretation, the agency noted it recognized that “the driver may not be aware of the direction of the next dispatch and that in some instances the nearest safe resting location may be in the direction of that dispatch. If the driver proceeds to the nearest reasonable and safe location and takes the required rest, this would qualify as personal conveyance.”
Any driver using personal conveyance should “annotate on the log if he/she cannot park at the nearest location and must proceed to another location.”
The Georgia State Supreme Court has unanimously upheld a $40 million award to the family of a four-year-old boy killed in 2012 when the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee in which he was riding was rear-ended and burst into flames, Chrysler Group LLC v. Walden, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 154 (3/15/18).
In 2015, the jury returned a verdict of nearly $150 million in favor of the parents, but the trial court suggested a remittitur to $40 million, which was accepted by the plaintiffs. The Jeep’s fuel tank had been placed near the back of the vehicle, which plaintiffs said made it vulnerable to rear-end collisions. Four-year-old Remington Walden was a rear seat passenger who was trapped in the Jeep and burned to death.
The Supreme Court said that “evidence showed that Chrysler had long known that mounting a gas tank behind the rear axle was dangerous. Evidence also showed that Chrysler’s placement of the gas tank behind the rear axle was contrary to industry trends, which favored placing tanks in front of the rear axle.”
Fiat Chrysler lawyers contended that the fire did not cause boy’s death, but blamed the driver of the pick-up truck that rear ended the Jeep. On appeal, the defendant contended it was prejudicial to allow testimony about Chief Executive Sergio Marchionne’s compensation, which totaled more than $68 million, into evidence at trial. They also denied there was a safety issue and claimed the vehicles were no more dangerous than comparable SUVs built at the time. However, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has linked more than 50 deaths to the Jeep fuel-tank issue.
Fiat Chrysler had to recall 1.56 million 2002-07 Jeep Liberty and 1993-2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee SUVs in June 2013 to address fire risks and they agreed to install trailer hitches to protect the gas tanks. The recall and a “customer satisfaction campaign” that covered the Jeep in the fatal Georgia crash occurred after CEO Marchionne held private talks with senior government officials in 2013.
The Supreme Court concluded “not that compensation evidence is always admissible to show the bias of an employee witness, or that it is never admissible, but that such evidence is subject to the Rule 403 analysis weighing the evidence’s unfair prejudice against its probative value.” And, “because Chrysler did not raise a Rule 403 objection to the compensation evidence at issue” the Court concluded “that under the particular circumstances of this case—where the jury’s evaluation of the bias and credibility of Chrysler’s CEO were central to the allegations in the case because the CEO was alleged to have specifically interjected himself in a federal safety investigation to the detriment of the plaintiffs—we cannot say that the prejudicial effect of the evidence so far outweighed its probative value that its admission was clear and obvious reversible error.”
Therefore, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale of the Court of Appeals, it affirmed its judgment, and upheld the $40 million award.