Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/170/1038/503281/
Timestamp: 2020-06-06 02:40:14
Document Index: 673134916

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 2', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 4', '§ 1101', '§ 1326', '§ 1101', '§ 2']

United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ernesto Chavez-valenzuela, Also Known As Ernestochavez-quintero, Defendant-appellant, 170 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1999) :: Justia
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United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ernesto Chavez-valenzuela, Also Known As Ernestochavez-quintero, Defendant-appellant, 170 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1999)
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 170 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1999) March 26, 1999
USSG § 2L1.2(b) (1) (A) mandates a sentencing enhancement of 16 levels for unlawful reentry after a criminal conviction for an aggravated felony. However, Application Note 5 provides that if
On appeal, Chavez-Valenzuela contends that his "term of imprisonment" was 45 days, his actual time served. He analogizes "term of imprisonment" in Application Note 5 to "sentence of imprisonment" in USSG § 4A1.2(b). Although § 4A1.2(b) (1) defines "sentence of imprisonment" for purposes of computing criminal history as "the maximum sentence imposed," § 4A1.2(b) (2) specifically excludes any portion of the sentence that was suspended. Chavez-Valenzuela argues that the portion of his sentence not suspended, and therefore his "term of imprisonment," was forty-five days.
We disagree. As the government points out, the more appropriate definition of "term of imprisonment" can be found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (48), within the definitional section of Chapter 12--the "Immigration and Nationality" chapter of Title 8 which encompasses Chavez-Valenzuela's crime of illegal reentry under § 1326. § 1101(a) (48) provides:
In addition to this statutory definition, other circuits which have addressed the phrase "term of imprisonment" in the context of a prior version of § 2L1.22 have taken it to mean the sentence imposed, regardless of any suspension, rather than the time actually served. See United States v. Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Cordova-Beraud, 90 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 95 F.3d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1083, 117 S. Ct. 751, 136 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1997). Thus, we hold that Chavez-Valenzuela's "term of imprisonment" was the sentence imposed by the state court, not the 45 days he actually served.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) (2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument. Appellee's motion to publish the order and judgment filed on October 14, 1998, is granted
An indeterminate sentence is a "sentence to imprisonment for the maximum period defined by law, subject to termination ... at any time after service of the minimum period." United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 694 (5th ed.1979))