Source: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/935/430/283134/
Timestamp: 2020-04-02 20:11:10
Document Index: 713912142

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 908', '§ 921', '§ 908', '§ 921', '§ 921', '§ 902', '§ 908']

Cna Insurance Company, Carrier, Petitioner, v. Harry Legrow, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensationprograms, United States Department of Labor, Respondents, 935 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1991) :: Justia
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Federal Courts › Courts of Appeals › First Circuit › 1991 › Cna Insurance Company, Carrier, Petitioner, v. Harry Legrow, and Director, Office of Workers' Compen...
Cna Insurance Company, Carrier, Petitioner, v. Harry Legrow, and Director, Office of Workers' Compensationprograms, United States Department of Labor, Respondents, 935 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1991)
US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit - 935 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1991) Heard Nov. 9, 1990. Decided June 5, 1991
CNA Insurance Company, as Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) insurance carrier for the employer, Taylor Associates (hereafter collectively Taylor), petitions for review of a Decision and Order of the Benefits Review Board (Board). The Board reversed the holding of the ALJ that (1) claimant Harry W. Legrow sustained a 50 percent permanent partial disability, and that (2) Taylor was entitled to relief for preexisting disability under Sec. 8(f) of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 908(f). The Board found that (1) Legrow sustained a permanent total disability, and (2) Taylor was not entitled to relief under Sec. 8(f). Taylor brings this appeal under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). We affirm.
Legrow filed a timely claim for LHWCA disability benefits against Taylor and CNA. After a formal hearing, the ALJ found that (1) Legrow had sustained not a total permanent, but a 50 percent permanent partial disability, and (2) Taylor qualified for relief under Sec. 8(f) of the LHWCA. See 33 U.S.C. § 908(f). On appeal taken by the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, the Board reversed these two findings. The Board held (1) that Taylor, failing to sustain its burden of showing the availability of suitable alternative employment for Legrow, did not overcome the presumption of total permanent disability. Further, the Board found (2) that Taylor was not entitled to Sec. 8(f) relief because it did not make the requisite showing that Legrow had a preexisting back disability which contributed to the disability resulting from the 1984 injury.
33 U.S.C. § 921(c) provides the jurisdictional grant for court appellate review. Reversal is warranted only if either the ALJ's findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, or if the decision is contrary to law. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (3). Our review of this case, therefore, requires that we independently examine the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings, as well as the legal correctness of the Board's conclusions. See Randall v. Comfort Control, Inc., 725 F.2d 791, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Stevenson v. Linens of the Week, 688 F.2d 93, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982). We may reverse the Board if we determine that it erred in finding that the evidence underlying the ALJ's finding did not constitute substantial evidence. Air America, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 597 F.2d 773, 778, 780 (1st Cir. 1979). This is a pure question of law whereby we make certain that the Board adhered to its statutory standard of review of the ALJ.
The definition of "disability" under the LHWCA encompasses a recognition of the potential economic as well as the medical effects of an injury. See id. at 777; C & P Telephone Co. v. Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Disability is the "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." 33 U.S.C. § 902(10).
A three-part test has been established to determine whether a claimant qualifies for a total disability award. A claimant makes a prima facie case of total disability by showing he cannot perform his former job because of job-related injury. The burden then shifts to the employer to establish that suitable alternative employment is readily available in the employee's community for individuals with the same age, experience, and education as the employee. The employer meets its burden only by proving that "there exists a reasonable likelihood, given the claimant's age, education, and background, that he would be hired if he diligently sought the job." New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner, 661 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord Trans-State Dredging v. Benefits Review Board, 731 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1984). A claimant can rebut the employer's showing of suitable alternative employment with evidence establishing a diligent, yet unsuccessful, attempt to obtain that type of employment. Rogers Terminal v. Director, OWCP, 784 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1986).
The employer has the burden of showing, not only the availability, but also the suitability of employment opportunities for the claimant. Focusing on this aspect, the Board correctly concluded that neither job constituted suitable employment. See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Lewis, 572 F.2d 447, 450-51 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding claimant's current employment unsuitable because it was not consistent with his physical limitations). We need not, therefore, engage in any factual speculation, because the employer falls short of the threshold of evidence that it must present to overcome Legrow's proof of total disability and the legal presumption in Legrow's favor.
Alternatively, Taylor, relying on Air America, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 597 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1979), asserts that the well-established burden of showing suitable employment should not apply to this case. In Air America, the claimant contracted tropical sprue while working as a pilot in Southeast Asia, a disease which left him with varying degrees of numbness in his limbs and extremities. As a result, he could no longer work as a pilot. He did, however, possess a wide range of skills that made him employable in a variety of fields. We observed that if "medical impairment affects only a specialized skill that is necessary in [the claimant's] former employment, his resulting inability to perform that work does not necessarily indicate an inability to perform other work, not requiring that skill, for which his education and work experience qualify him." Id. at 779.
Taylor also takes issue with the second part of the Board's decision reversing the ALJ's conclusion--based on the record of Legrow's previous back injuries--that Taylor is entitled to relief under Sec. 8(f) of the LHWCA. Section 8(f) serves to limit an employer's liability when an employee who is partially disabled subsequently injures himself, and the preexisting condition contributes to a greater level of permanent disability. See 33 U.S.C. § 908(f); General Dynamics Corp. v. Sacchetti, 681 F.2d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1982). It does so by putting a 104-week ceiling on the length of the period that an employer must make compensation payments for the contemporary injury and establishing a special fund to pay out the remaining compensation owed to the employee. See C & P Telephone Co., 564 F.2d at 510.
In this case, the Board correctly determined that the ALJ could not find that the employer met its burden to show that Legrow had a preexisting permanent partial disability. The fact that Legrow previously sustained back injuries does not, standing alone, establish that he had a preexisting permanent partial disability. See Director, OWCP v. Belcher Erectors, 770 F.2d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Director, OWCP v. Campbell Industries, Inc., 678 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104, 103 S. Ct. 726, 74 L. Ed. 2d 951 (1983). Legrow resumed regular physical labor after recovering from each of his previous back injuries. He performed his job duties without any medical restrictions, continuing medical treatment, or medication. Moreover, the Board could determine that the ALJ's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ arrived at its finding that Legrow had a preexisting disability without explaining why it ignored the contrary uncontroverted evidence of Legrow's complete recovery from previous injuries. Since his conclusion neither comports with the applicable legal standard nor finds support in substantial evidence, we agree with the Board's reversal of the ALJ on this ground. See Randall, 725 F.2d at 798 (ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting uncontroverted evidence).
The employer next must show that, but for the preexisting injury, the claimant would not have been rendered totally disabled by the work-related injury. See Maryland Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, OWCP, 618 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1980). Taylor not only failed to show that Legrow had a preexisting injury, it did not show that the preexisting injury, combined with the final 1984 work-related injury, would, or did, create a greater degree of disability. The Board's reversal of Sec. 8(f) relief, therefore, must stand.