Source: http://www.google.com/patents/US7669233?dq=system+for+measuring+web+traffic&ei=Lg8FT__TIIr-sQKzxaGRCg
Timestamp: 2014-07-12 18:24:50
Document Index: 284624243

Matched Legal Cases: ['arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104', 'arty 104']

Patent US7669233 - Methods and systems for secure transmission of identification information ... - Google PatentsSearch Images Maps Play YouTube News Gmail Drive More »Sign in<nobr>Advanced Patent Search</nobr>PatentsMethods and systems are provided for generating a party static token to be used in combination with a party dynamic token for identifying a party to a host system. Identification information that identifies the party to the host system is received. Such identification information includes a host dynamic...http://www.google.com/patents/US7669233?utm_source=gb-gplus-sharePatent US7669233 - Methods and systems for secure transmission of identification information over public networksAdvanced Patent SearchPublication numberUS7669233 B2Publication typeGrantApplication numberUS 11/067,306Publication dateFeb 23, 2010Filing dateFeb 25, 2005Priority dateSep 10, 1999Fee statusPaidAlso published asCA2557663A1, EP1730866A2, EP1730866A4, US20050228755, WO2005084293A2, WO2005084293A3Publication number067306, 11067306, US 7669233 B2, US 7669233B2, US-B2-7669233, US7669233 B2, US7669233B2InventorsDavid Grace, Paul TurgeonOriginal AssigneeMetavante CorporationExport CitationBiBTeX, EndNote, RefManPatent Citations (49), Referenced by (3), Classifications (17), Legal Events (4) External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, EspacenetMethods and systems for secure transmission of identification information over public networksUS 7669233 B2Abstract Methods and systems are provided for generating a party static token to be used in combination with a party dynamic token for identifying a party to a host system. Identification information that identifies the party to the host system is received. Such identification information includes a host dynamic token and a host static token. A false host dynamic token that differs from the host dynamic token is generated. The host dynamic token and the false host dynamic token are encrypted. In addition, information that uniquely identifies the party dynamic token is encrypted. The party static token is produced from a combination of the encrypted host dynamic token, the encrypted false host dynamic token, and the encrypted information that uniquely identifies the party dynamic token.
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS This application is a nonprovisional of, and claims the benefit of the filing date of, U.S. Provisional Patent Appl. No. 60/548,824, entitled �METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR SECURE TRANSMISSION OF IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION OVER PUBLIC NETWORKS,� filed Feb. 27, 2004 by David Grace and Paul Turgeon, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated by reference for all purposes.
This application is a continuation-in-part application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/086,793, entitled �SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PERFORMING SECURE REMOTE REAL-TIME FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OVER A PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE WITH STRONG AUTHENTICATION,� filed Mar. 1, 2002 by Paul Turgeon, which is a continuation-in-part application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/394,143, entitled �SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROVIDING SECURE SERVICES OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE NETWORKS USING A REMOVABLE, PORTABLE COMPUTER-READABLE STORAGE MEDIUM AT A NETWORK ACCESS DEVICE,� filed Sep. 10, 1999 by Paul Turgeon, the entire disclosures of both of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties for all purposes.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION This application relates generally to information security. More specifically, this application relates to methods and systems for secure transmission of identification information over public networks.
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Embodiments of the invention provide methods and systems that permit secure transmission of identification information over public networks. The identification information includes a party static token and a party dynamic token, which are tokens provided by a party when access to a host system is desired. The combination of the party static token and the party dynamic token are used to generate a host static token and a host dynamic token, which are used by the host system to confirm the party's identity. In the event that a party supplies an incorrect party dynamic token, the methods and systems result in the host system being supplied with an incorrect host dynamic token so that security protocols implemented by the host system may still be used.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION Embodiments of the invention enable connections to be established between a party and a host system over a public network by providing for secure transmission of identification information over the public network. As used herein, a �public network� is intended to refer to a network that permits access to a group of parties that belong to a common community. For example, in some embodiments, the public network could correspond to a network such as the Internet, in which the common community essentially includes the entire world. In other instances, though, the common community could be more restrictive, such as corresponding to an academic community at a university, with the public network being the network accessible to the members of that academic community.
As used herein, �tokens� refer generically to identification information that is used in gaining access to a secure host system. The identification information has at least two components, one of which is a �static token,� and the other of which is a �dynamic token.� The static token is a generally fixed identifier that corresponds uniquely to the party 104, or in some instances to a related group of parties. For example, in one embodiment, the static token could comprise a user identification, commonly referred to in the art as a �userid.� Each distinct userid could identify a distinct party, although is some instances multiple parties might sometimes share a common userid such as where a project team might establish a userid for accessing materials related to a project, such as where members of a family share a common family userid, and the like. The dynamic token is associated with the static token, with that association being used to confirm the validity of the combination in providing access to the host system 112. For example, in the case where the static token is a userid, the associated dynamic token could be a password. In some instances, particularly in cases where a single static token is used to identify a related group of parties, a plurality of dynamic tokens could be associated with each static token, perhaps with each associated dynamic token identifying one of the parties. For example, a common userid could have several valid passwords associated with it, each of which is known to only one of a group of parties and therefore identifies that party from the group. In other embodiments, such as in the context where the host system is a financial host system, the static token could correspond to a primary account number (�PAN�), with the dynamic token corresponding to a personal identification number (�PIN�). In still other embodiments, the static and dynamic tokens may take still other forms.
Thus, as illustrated in FIG. 2B, there are two phases that may be involved in providing the secure transmission methods and systems�conveying relevant tokens to the party 104, shown schematically above the dotted line, and using the relevant tokens for obtaining access to the host system 112, shown schematically below the dotted line. In conveying the relevant tokens to the party 104, the host system 112 initially provides the identifying host static token 240 and host dynamic token 244 to the token preparer 208. The token preparer 208 generates the party static token 248 and party dynamic token 252, such as in accordance with the method described in detail in connection with FIG. 3 below. When a party wishes to obtain access to the host system 112, a supplied party static token 248′ and party dynamic token 252′ are intercepted with the public-network intercept 212. The public-network intercept 212 extracts the host static token 240′ and host dynamic token 244′ for transmission to the host system 112, such as in accordance with the method described in detail in connection with FIG. 5 below.
The preparation of the party static token includes a number of encryption techniques performed with one or more symmetric-key encryption algorithms. Such symmetric-key algorithms are such that one of the encryption key and decryption key may be calculated from the other; in many such algorithms, the encryption and decryption keys are simply the same. Symmetric-key algorithms include stream ciphers, in which plaintext is converted to ciphertext one bit (or byte) at a time, and block ciphers, which operate on blocks of plaintext. Many examples of such symmetric-key algorithms are well know to those of skill in the art and include, merely by way of example, the Data Encryption Standard (�DES�), the triple Data Encryption Algorithm (�3DEA�), and the Advanced Encryption Standard (�AES�), among others.
At block 312, a symmetric-key algorithm using first keys designated �A� is used by the token preparer 208 to encrypt the host dynamic token 244. Similarly, at block 316 the false host dynamic token 404 is also encrypted with a symmetric-key algorithm, which may conveniently use the same keys �A.� If no party dynamic token 252 was provided by the host system 112 at block 304, one may be generated by the token preparer 208 at block 320. Such generation may be performed in concert with the party 104, such as by using a party dynamic token 252 requested by the party 104, or may be performed randomly by the token preparer 208, perhaps in conformity with formatting requirements specified by the host system 112 and/or party 104.
At block 328, the token preparer 208 generates a �natural� party dynamic token. This token is referred to as the �natural� party dynamic token because it is determined in accordance with a specified algorithm from a specific seed value 412, which may be generated randomly. In one embodiment, the specified algorithm may comprise a symmetric-key algorithm using second keys designated �B.� This algorithm is applied to the random seed value 412, with all or a specific portion of the result being extracted to define the natural party dynamic token. A mapping between the natural party dynamic token and the party dynamic token 252 is defined at block 332 by determining a party dynamic token complement 408 from the party dynamic token 252 and the natural party dynamic token. Determining a complement may be performed in any mathematically unique way. For example, if the party dynamic token and natural party dynamic token are both 6-digit numbers, the complement could be defined as the difference between them. A similar complement could be defined for alphabetic or alphanumeric tokens. Also, while such difference calculations are conveniently simple, alternative embodiments could use more complicated complement definitions.
The combination of the party dynamic token complement 408 and the random seed value 412 are encrypted at block 336 using a symmetric-key algorithm with third keys designated �C.� The combination of the party dynamic token complement 408 and the random seed 412 could be a simple concatenation of those two quantities or could be a more complicated combination in different embodiments.
The party static token 248 is generated at block 340 by encrypting a combination of the encrypted result from block 336, the encrypted host dynamic token 244, the encrypted false host dynamic token 404, and the host static token 240. This combination, which may be formed by a simple concatenation of the quantities or by a more complicated combination, is encrypted using a symmetric-key algorithm with fourth keys designated �D.�
Example The generation of the party tokens in accordance with FIG. 3 may be illustrated with a simplified example. For these purposes of illustration, suppose that at block 304, the host system 112 provides the token preparer 208 with a host static token SH=SMITH and a host dynamic token DH=1234. At block 308, the token preparer generates a false host dynamic token D H=9876, which is different from DH and in this instance happens to be of a similar format to DH. At block 312, the host dynamic token is encrypted with first symmetric keys �A� to produce
and at block 316, the false dynamic token is encrypted with first symmetric keys �A� to produce
At block 320, the token preparer 208 generates the party dynamic token randomly to produce DP=2468. At block 324, a random seed value is generated by the token preparer 208 to produce S=629663. Generation of the natural party dynamic token at 328 may be performed by encrypting the seed S with second symmetric keys �B� and extracting the four digits at the 3rd-6th most significant positions:
E C [S⊕C P ]=E C[629663⊕5787] =EC[6296635787]=9820003628.
when the combination is produced by concatenation. Formation of the party static token SP at block 340 may then proceed by combining the identified quantities and encrypting the combination with fourth keys �D�:
S P =E D [E A [D H ]⊕E A [ D H ]⊕E C [S⊕C P ]⊕S H ] =ED[827395⊕662883⊕9820003628⊕SMITH]=E D[8273956628839820003628SMITH]=726B2626FZ28463KR8650025LP03.
The structure of the tokens in embodiments of the invention includes information for which efforts are taken to maintain secrecy of the information, as well as information which is considered to be �clear� and for which no significant secrecy efforts are made. The following table provides a comparison of such secrecy protocols for an exemplary prior-art structure and for the tokens of the invention. In particular, the exemplary prior-art structure corresponds to the PAN/PIN structure discussed previously and commonly used in financial applications. The PAN identifies a financial account and is a prior-art example of a static token, while the customer PIN is a private code used by a customer to access the financial account and is a prior-art example of a dynamic token. In such an example, the �PIN offset� is a complement that is used to map a natural PIN to the customer PIN.
FIG. 5 provides a flow diagram that illustrates methods by which the party tokens may be used by the party 104 to acquire access to the host system 112. Such access may be acquired in different embodiments by interfacing with the public-network intercept 212 directly through the public network or by transmitting the identification information through an intermediary system 216. Thus, in a case where the access is achieved directly with the public-network intercept 212, the party 104 connects to the public-network intercept 212 with a public-network access device 204 at block 504. Exchange of information between the public-network intercept 212 and the public-network access device 204 is routed over the public network 108. At block 508, the party 104 indicates a desire to access the host system 112 to the public-network intercept 212. This could be done, for example, by identifying a universal resource locator (�URL�) in an embodiment where the public network 108 comprises the Internet and the network access device comprises a computer interfaced with the Internet. At blocks 512 and 516 respectively, the party 104 provides the party static token 248 and the party dynamic token 252 to the public-network intercept 212. This could comprise downloading the structurally more complicated static party token 248 from a local data store of the public-network access device 204 to the public-network intercept 212, while entering simpler dynamic party token 252 from the party's memory over a user interface.
Irrespective of whether the transmission occurs directly, as for blocks 504-516, or indirectly, as for blocks 552-568, the public-network intercept 112 is provided with both the static and dynamic party tokens 248 and 252. The component elements of the party static token 248 are extracted by the public-network intercept 212 at block 520 by decrypting the static party token 248 with the fourth symmetric keys �D.� The component element that includes the party dynamic token complement 408 and seed value 412 is decrypted at block 524 using the third symmetric keys �C� to extract those components. At block 528, the decrypted seed value 412 is used to generate a natural party dynamic token in the same fashion that was described in connection with block 328 of FIG. 3. Specifically, an encryption algorithm that uses second keys �B� may be applied to the seed value, and a specific portion of the result extracted to define the natural party dynamic token. The resulting natural party dynamic token is combined with the decrypted party dynamic token complement 408 at block 532, with a check being performed at block 536 whether the result of that combination matches the party dynamic token 252 that was received.
A match of the result with the party dynamic token 252 confirms the identity of the party 104. In response, the public-network intercept 212 decrypts the host dynamic token 244 with the first symmetric keys �A� at block 540. The decrypted host dynamic token 244 is then transmitted with the host static token 240, which was recovered at block 520, to the host system 112. If the result from block 532 instead fails to match the party dynamic token 252 when checked at block 536, the public-network intercept 212 decrypts the false host dynamic token 404 with the first symmetric keys �A� at block 572. This decrypted false host dynamic token 404 is then transmitted to the host system 112 with the host static token 240 at block 576.
Example The extraction of identification information and its use in establishing or denying a connection between the party 104 and the host system 112 as outlined in FIG. 5 is illustrated with the simplified example discussed previously in connection with FIG. 3. Irrespective of whether the information is transmitted directly from the public-network access device 204 or through an intermediary system 216, the public-network intercept receives the party static token SP=726B2626FZ28463KR8650025LP03 and the party dynamic token DP=2468 at block 520. Decryption of the part static token SP at block 520 with the fourth symmetric keys �D� results in extraction of the encrypted host dynamic token EA[DH], the encrypted false host dynamic token EA[ D H], the encrypted combination of seed value and party dynamic token complement EC[S⊕CP], and the host static token SH:
D D ⁡ [ S P ] = D D ⁡ [ 726 ⁢ B2626FZ28463KR8650025LP03 ] = 827395 ⊕ 662883 ⊕ 9820003628 ⊕ SMITH . At block 524, the combination of the seed value S and party dynamic token complement CP is identified with the appropriate element and decrypted with the third symmetric keys �C� to identify the individual elements:
D C ⁡ [ E C ⁡ [ S ⊕ C P ] ] = D C ⁡ [ 9820003628 ] = 629663 ⊕ 5787. The seed value S is used at block 528 to generate the natural party dynamic token DP (nat) using the algorithm that includes encryption with the second symmetric keys �B� and extraction of specific resulting digits:
The description of the methods in connection with FIGS. 3 and 5 correspond to the case where a single valid host dynamic token 244 is associated with each host static token 240. In other embodiments, the method may accommodate multiple host dynamic tokens 244 for each host static token 240 in those instances where multiple parties may share a host static token 244 but be identified individually by a respective one of a plurality of host dynamic tokens 244. In such instances, token preparer 208 could receive the plurality of host dynamic tokens 244 at block 304 of FIG. 3, with the false host dynamic token 404 generated at block 308 being different from each of the plurality of valid host dynamic tokens 244. Each of those host dynamic tokens 244 may then be encrypted using the first symmetric keys �A� at blocks 312, with other blocks in FIG. 3 being performed as previously described with each host dynamic token 244 to determine a respective plurality of party dynamic token complements 408. This plurality of dynamic token complements may then be combined and encoded with the seed value 412 as described in connection with block 336. The resulting structure of the party static token 248 as shown in FIG. 4 would then be modified so that it includes a plurality of encrypted host dynamic tokens 244 instead of the single one shown, and with data block 416 including a corresponding plurality of party dynamic token complements 408 instead of the single one shown. Use of the tokens in FIG. 5 would then be modified so that a plurality of results are determined at block 532, corresponding to each of the plurality of party dynamic token complements 408. The check at block 536 would be performed to determine whether any of the results match the party dynamic token 252, with the corresponding host dynamic token 244 being decrypted and transmitted to the host system at blocks 540 and 544 if one does. The host system 112 may then respond as it expects, including with provisions that may be included with its security protocol 116, by determining whether a received host static token is accompanied by any of the host dynamic tokens it has identified as valid.
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