Source: https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/nedlloyd-lines-bv-v-superior-court-seawinds-ltd-31331
Timestamp: 2020-08-07 19:10:44
Document Index: 36113080

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 187', '§ 187', '§ 188', '§ 187', '§ 187', '§ 102', '§ 452', '§ 1638', '§ 1636', '§ 187', '§ 188', '§ 205', '§ 1114', '§ 5811', '§ 477', '§ 1', '§ 1105', '§ 1105', '§ 187', '§ 187', '§ 188', '§ 452', '§ 453', '§ 136', '§ 589', '§ 452', '§ 454', '§ 1', '§ 1105', '§ 1105', '§ 187']

Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (Seawinds Ltd.) - 3 Cal.4th 459 S015917 - Mon, 08/31/1992 | California Supreme Court Resources
Home > Opinions > Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (Seawinds Ltd.)
Citation 3 Cal.4th 459
Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (Seawinds Ltd.)
Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (Seawinds Ltd.) (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 330; 834 P.2d 1148
[No. S015917.
No appearance for Respondent. [3 Cal.4th 462]
In March 1983, Nedlloyd and other parties (including an Oregon corporation, a Hong Kong corporation, a British corporation, three individual residents of California, and a resident of Singapore) entered into a contract with Seawinds to purchase shares of Seawinds's stock. The contract, which was entitled "Shareholders' Agreement in Respect of Seawinds Limited," stated that its purpose was "to establish [Seawinds] as a joint venture company to carry on a transportation operation." The agreement also provided that Seawinds would carry on the business of the transportation [3 Cal.4th 463] company and that the parties to the agreement would use "means reasonably available" to ensure the business was a success.
After complying with our direction, the Court of Appeal denied Nedlloyd's first writ petition and discharged the alternative writ. In a published [3 Cal.4th 464] opinion, the Court of Appeal upheld the application of California law to Seawinds's claims. We granted Nedlloyd's petition for review.
We have not previously considered the enforceability of a contractual choice-of-law provision. [1] We have, however, addressed the closely related issue of the enforceability of a contractual choice-of-forum provision, and we have made clear that, "No satisfying reason of public policy has been suggested why enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely and voluntarily by parties who have negotiated at arm's length." (Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 495-496 [131 Cal.Rptr. 374, 551 P.2d 1206] (Smith).) The forum selection provision in Smith was contained within a choice-of-law clause, and we observed that, "Such choice of law provisions are usually respected by California courts." (Id., at p. 494.) We noted this result was consistent with the modern approach of section 187 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws (Restatement). (17 Cal.3d at p. 494.) Prior Court of Appeal decisions, although not always explicitly referring to the Restatement, also overwhelmingly reflect the modern, mainstream approach adopted in the Restatement. (Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 432, 435-436 [235 Cal.Rptr. 464] [explicit reference to Rest. § 187]; Hall v. Superior Court (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 411, 417 [197 Cal.Rptr. 757] [no explicit reference]; Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 790, 794-795 [181 Cal.Rptr. 340] [no explicit reference]; Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 280, 287 [135 Cal.Rptr. 230] [explicit reference to Rest. § 187].) fn. 1
[2] We reaffirm this approach. In determining the enforceability of arm's-length contractual choice-of-law provisions, California courts shall [3 Cal.4th 465] apply the principles set forth in Restatement section 187, which reflects a strong policy favoring enforcement of such provisions. fn. 2
More specifically, Restatement section 187, subdivision (2) sets forth the following standards: "The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either [¶] (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or [¶] (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." fn. 3 [3 Cal.4th 466]
Briefly restated, the proper approach under Restatement section 187, subdivision (2) is for the court first to determine either: (1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for the parties' choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, that is the end of the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties' choice of law. fn. 4 If, however, either test is met, the court must next determine whether the chosen state's law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California. fn. 5 If there is no such conflict, the court shall enforce the parties' choice of law. If, however, there is a fundamental conflict with California law, the court must then determine whether California has a "materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue ...." (Rest., § 187, subd. (2).) If California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state, the choice of law shall not be enforced, for the obvious reason that in such circumstance we will decline to enforce a law contrary to this state's fundamental policy. fn. 6 We now apply the Restatement test to the facts of this case. [3 Cal.4th 467]
[3] As to the first required determination, Hong Kong-"the chosen state"-clearly has a "substantial relationship to the parties." (Rest., § 187, subd. (2)(a).) The shareholders' agreement, which is incorporated by reference in Seawinds' first amended complaint, shows that Seawinds is incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong and has a registered office there. The same is true of one of the shareholder parties to the agreement-Red Coconut Trading Co. The incorporation of these parties in Hong Kong provides the required "substantial relationship." (Id.,) com. f [substantial relationship present when "one of the parties is domiciled" in the chosen state]; Carlock v. Pillsbury Co. (D.Minn. 1988) 719 F.Supp. 791, 807 ["A party's incorporation in a state is a contact sufficient to allow the parties to choose that state's law to govern their contract."]; Hale v. Co- Mar Offshore Corp. (W.D.La. 1984) 588 F.Supp. 1212, 1215 [same effect].)
Moreover, the presence of two Hong Kong corporations as parties also provides a "reasonable basis" for a contractual provision requiring application of Hong Kong law. "If one of the parties resides in the chosen state, the parties have a reasonable basis for their choice." (Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enterprises, Inc., supra, 802 F.2d 1143, 1147.) The reasonableness of choosing Hong Kong becomes manifest when the nature of the agreement before us is considered. A state of incorporation is certainly at least one government entity with a keen and intimate interest in internal corporate affairs, including the purchase and sale of its shares, as well as corporate management and [3 Cal.4th 468] operations. (See Corp. Code, § 102 [applying California's general corporation law to domestic corporations].)
We next consider whether application of the law chosen by the parties would be contrary to "a fundamental policy" of California. We perceive no fundamental policy of California requiring the application of California law to Seawinds's claims based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The covenant is not a government regulatory policy designed to restrict freedom of contract, but an implied promise inserted in an agreement to carry out the presumed intentions of contracting parties. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 689-690 [254 Cal.Rptr.211, 765 P.2d 373] (Foley) ["When a court enforces the implied covenant it is in essence acting to protect 'the interest in having promises performed' [citation]-the traditional realm of a contract action-rather than to protect some general duty to society which the law places on an employer without regard to the substance of its contractual obligations to its employee."].)
When two sophisticated, commercial entities agree to a choice-of-law clause like the one in this case, the most reasonable interpretation of their actions is that they intended for the clause to apply to all causes of action arising from or related to their contract. Initially, such an interpretation is supported by the plain meaning of the language used by the parties. [5] (See fn. 7.) The choice-of-law clause in the shareholders' agreement provides: "This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance [3 Cal.4th 469] with Hong Kong law and each party hereby irrevocably submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction and service of process of the Hong Kong courts." (Italics added.) fn. 7
Our conclusion in this regard comports with common sense and commercial reality. When a rational businessperson enters into an agreement establishing a transaction or relationship and provides that disputes arising from the agreement shall be governed by the law of an identified jurisdiction, the logical conclusion is that he or she intended that law to apply to all disputes arising out of the transaction or relationship. We seriously doubt that any rational businessperson, attempting to provide by contract for an efficient and business-like resolution of possible future disputes, would intend that the laws of multiple jurisdictions would apply to a single controversy having its origin in a single, contract-based relationship. Nor do we believe such a [3 Cal.4th 470] person would reasonably desire a protracted litigation battle concerning only the threshold question of what law was to be applied to which asserted claims or issues. Indeed, the manifest purpose of a choice-of-law clause is precisely to avoid such a battle.
Justice Mosk long ago cogently observed that, "Given two experienced businessmen dealing at arm's length, both represented by competent counsel, it has become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to draft a written contract that will produce predictable results in court. The written word, heretofore deemed immutable, is now at all times subject to alteration by self-serving recitals based upon fading memories of antecedent events. This, I submit, is a serious impediment to the certainty required in commercial transactions." (Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto (1968) 69 Cal.2d 525, 532 [72 Cal.Rptr. 785, 446 P.2d 785] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
Applying the test we have adopted (see pt. I, ante, at pp. 464- 466.), we find no reason not to apply the parties' choice of law to Seawinds's cause of [3 Cal.4th 471] action for breach of fiduciary duty. As we have explained, Hong Kong, the chosen state, has a "substantial relationship to the parties" because two of those parties are incorporated there. Moreover, their incorporation in that state affords a "reasonable basis" for choosing Hong Kong law. (See pt. II.B.1., ante, at pp. 467- 468].)
Seawinds's action is now proceeding based on its first amended complaint, which will be the focus of further proceedings applying Hong Kong law to resolve the parties' differences. Therefore, the judgments of the Court of Appeal in the consolidated proceedings (Court of Appeal Nos. A049718 and A050535) are reversed, and the matters are remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial [3 Cal.4th 472] court to reconsider its ruling on Nedlloyd's demurrer to Seawinds's first amended complaint in light of applicable Hong Kong law. Lucas, C. J., Arabian, J., and George, J., concurred.
The problem with the majority's approach is that it ignores controlling California law. On demurrer, a pleading must be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The accepted rule of contractual construction on demurrer is that "[w]here a written contract is pleaded by attachment to and incorporation in a complaint, and where the complaint fails to allege that the terms of the contract have any special meaning, a court will construe the language of the contract on its face to determine whether, as a matter of law, the contract is reasonably subject to a construction sufficient to sustain a cause of action ...." (Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hospitals (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 743, 749-750 [200 Cal.Rptr. 605]; accord Beck v. American [3 Cal.4th 473] Health Group Internat., Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1555, 1561 [260 Cal.Rptr. 237].) In this case, the language of the incorporated contract easily can be read to apply only to contractual causes of action: "This agreement shall be governed ... by Hong Kong law."
In my view, the majority's mistaken construction of the choice-of-law clause is clear when the language used in the present contract is compared, as Nedlloyd urges us to do, with the language construed by this court in Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491 [131 Cal.Rptr. 374, 551 P.2d 1206]. In that case, this court determined that claims for unfair competition and intentional interference with advantageous business relationships were governed by a choice-of-forum clause as " 'actions or proceedings instituted by ... [Smith] under this Agreement with respect to any matters arising under or growing out of this agreement ....' " (Id. at p. 497, italics in the original.) In contrast to the language used by Nedlloyd and Seawinds in their agreement, the contractual language, "arising under or growing out of this agreement," which was used in Smith, explicitly shows an intent to embrace related noncontractual claims, as well as contractual claims. Although similar language was readily available to them, the sophisticated parties in the present case did not draft their choice-of-law clause to clearly encompass related noncontractual causes of action. fn. 2 Therefore, on demurrer and in the absence of parol evidence, I cannot fairly construe the contractual language at issue here to be consistent with the interpretation proposed by Nedlloyd and adopted in the majority opinion. To do so would violate the statutory canon of contract interpretation that "[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity." (Civ. Code, § 1638.)
Finally, the majority's rule effectively subordinates the intent of the contracting parties to the need for predictability in commercial transactions. The majority strikes this balance despite the fact that our Legislature has commanded otherwise. Under California law, "[a] contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, § 1636.) In contrast to this legislative command, the majority conclusively presumes that choice- of-law clauses entered into between or among commercial entities apply to related noncontractual causes of action regardless of whether the intent of the parties or the contract language (as in this case) shows otherwise. I believe that the departure by the majority from [3 Cal.4th 474] established California law is unwarranted and is unnecessary to further the goals of predictability in the enforcement of contracts and protection of the justified expectations of contracting parties. These goals can be adequately protected within the framework of the current law governing contractual interpretation by enforcing choice-of-law clauses in a manner consistent with the language of the contract and the intent of the parties.
Defendants and petitioners Nedlloyd Lines B.V., Royal Nedlloyd Group N.V., and KNSM Lines B.V. (hereafter collectively Nedlloyd) are interrelated shipping companies based in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Plaintiff and real party in interest Seawinds Limited (hereafter Seawinds) is a shipping company that was incorporated in Hong Kong in late 1982, with its principal place of business in Redwood City, California. [3 Cal.4th 475]
The trial court ruled broadly that "California law shall apply in this case." But the court sustained Nedlloyd's demurrer with leave to amend as to all three causes of action, ruling that: (1) the first cause of action should be split into two causes of action; (2) the second cause of action had not alleged a sufficient special relationship; and (3) "no controlling interest sufficient to [3 Cal.4th 476] establish a fiduciary relationship" had been alleged in the third cause of action.
As will be explained, in substance two distinct issues are before us: (1) whether the choice-of-law clause requires the application of Hong Kong law to the implied covenant cause of action; and (2) whether the choice-of-law clause requires the application of Hong Kong law to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. I will discuss each issue separately. [3 Cal.4th 477]
Seawinds' second theory of liability in the amended complaint is breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In its demurrer, Nedlloyd asserted that this theory of liability fails because Hong Kong law governs the contract and, unlike California law, does not recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, this theory of liability does present a choice-of-law issue, but only if, as Nedlloyd asserts, there is a material difference between the relevant law of Hong Kong and California. (See Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 580 [114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666]; Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 99, 105 [186 Cal.Rptr. 740]; New Linen Supply v. Eastern Environmental Controls, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 810, 817, fn. 2 [158 Cal.Rptr. 251].)
Under California law, every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373].) This implied covenant requires "that neither party do anything which will deprive the other of the benefits of the agreement" (Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) [3 Cal.4th 478] 36 Cal.3d 752, 768 [206 Cal.Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 1158]), and its breach ordinarily gives rise to contract remedies (ibid.).
If Hong Kong law governs the contract, as Nedlloyd contends, Seawinds must show that business efficacy, as Hong Kong courts understand that concept, requires that a good faith term applicable to Seawinds be implied into the contract. But if California law governs the contract, as Seawinds contends, the contract must be deemed to include an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, there appears to be a material difference between Hong Kong and California law, necessitating a choice-of-law analysis. [3 Cal.4th 479]
Although this court has not directly addressed the enforceability of a choice-of-law provision in a contract, the issue has been the subject of a number of appellate court decisions. When a contract specifies the parties' choice of law, California courts have enforced the contractual choice-of-law clause, subject to two qualifications. First, the chosen state must bear some substantial relationship to the parties or the contract, or there must be some other reasonable basis for the parties' choice. Second, application of the chosen state's law must not violate a strong policy of California law. These standards have been adopted, with some variations in language and emphasis, by the overwhelming majority of California decisions. (See Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 432, 435-436 [235 Cal.Rptr. 464] [strong policy and substantial relationship]; Hall v. Superior Court (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 411, 417 [197 Cal.Rptr. 757] [strong policy]; Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 790, 794 [181 Cal.Rptr. 340] [strong policy and substantial relationship]; Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp., supra, 137 Cal.App.3d 99, 108 [substantial relationship]; Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 280, 287 [135 Cal.Rptr. 230] [strong policy and substantial relationship]; Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 668, 673 [97 Cal.Rptr. 811] [strong policy and substantial relationship]; Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp. (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 11, 18, 20 [38 Cal.Rptr. 376] [strong policy].) The federal appellate courts, in applying California conflicts law, have also adhered to these rules. (Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enterprises, Inc. (9th Cir. 1986) 802 F.2d 1143, 1146-1147 [strong policy and substantial relationship]; S. A. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 641 F.2d 746, 749 [same]; Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pa. Mortg. Trust (9th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 915, 917 [same]; Foreman v. George Foreman Associates, Ltd. (9th Cir. 1975) 517 F.2d 354, 357 [strong policy].)
The "substantial relationship" and "strong policy" standards of California law are similar to the approach of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, section 187, subdivision (2). fn. 6 Although some California courts have [3 Cal.4th 480] referred to this part of the Restatement Second with approval, they have never expressly adopted it. fn. 7
As noted above, this court has not previously and directly determined the enforceability of a choice-of-law clause in a contract. The court has, however, considered the related problem of contractual forum selection clauses. In Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 496 [131 Cal.Rptr. 374, 551 P.2d 1206], the court held that forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect in the court's discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable. Citing section 187 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, the court observed in passing that "choice of law provisions are usually respected by California courts." (17 Cal.3d at p. 494.) In following the general approach [3 Cal.4th 481] of the Restatement Second, California courts are within the jurisprudential mainstream. fn. 8
Thus, contractual choice-of-law analysis recognizes both the parties' interest in autonomy and the interest of a state in applying its own law to contracts that have a substantial connection to that state. Accordingly, California cases recognize that the ability of parties to select the law that governs a contract should be limited to situations in which the state of the chosen law [3 Cal.4th 482] has some substantial connection to the parties or the transaction, or to situations in which the parties have some other reasonable basis for their choice, and in which enforcement of the chosen law will not defeat an important policy of the law of the state that would otherwise apply. (See, e.g., Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 794. Gamer v. duPont Glore Forgan, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287- 289.)
As noted above, the purpose of requiring that the parties or the contract have some substantial relationship to the chosen state is to assure that the parties have not selected the chosen state's law to avoid the application of the law of a particular state to their transaction by stipulating to the law of a state that has no interest in having its law applied. (See Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co. (1927) 274 U.S. 403, 408 [71 L.Ed. 1123, 1126-1127, 47 S.Ct. 626]; Mencor Enterprises, Inc. v. Hets Equities Corp., supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 437 [235 Cal.Rptr. 464]; see generally Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp., etc. v. Hutcheson-Ingram (5th Cir. 1981) 642 F.2d 744, 750-751.) The "substantial relationship" requirement guards against purposeful evasion of a state's laws. fn. 9
In this case, the "substantial relationship" requirement is satisfied. The shareholders' agreement, which is incorporated as a part of Seawinds's amended complaint, shows that Seawinds itself is incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong and has a registered office there. Moreover, one of the nine shareholders that is a party to the agreement (Red Coconut Trading Co.) [3 Cal.4th 483] also is incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong and has a registered office there. "If one of the parties resides in the chosen state, the parties have a reasonable basis for their choice." (Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enterprises, Inc., supra, 802 F.2d at p. 1147.)
As I have explained, California's rule that application of the chosen law must not violate a strong policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply is similar to the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws' "fundamental policy" rule. That rule provides that the law of the state chosen by the parties will be applied unless "application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of [section] 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." (Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 187, subd. (1)(b).) Under section 188 of the Restatement Second, the state of the applicable law is the state that has "the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties ...." (Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 188, subd. (1).) [3 Cal.4th 484]
First, I assess the strength of the state's interest in enforcing the legal rule at issue in this particular case. As mentioned earlier, California law deems every contract to contain an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Our state's law has long recognized this obligation (see, e.g., Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. etc. Mfg. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 771 [128 P.2d 665]); it has also been adopted by the Restatement Second of Contracts (Rest.2d Contracts, § 205) and by the majority of American jurisdictions (see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 683 [hereafter Foley]). California courts have enforced the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a variety of circumstances, including insurance contracts, employment contracts, contracts to sell real property, and ordinary commercial contracts. This court observed in Foley: "Initially, the concept of a duty of good faith developed in contract law as 'a kind of "safety valve" to which judges may turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of law and specific contract language.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 684.)
This court has also recognized, however, that breach of the implied covenant has legal significance that varies with the context of the contract. For example, this court has held that breach of the covenant of good faith by [3 Cal.4th 485] an insurer gives rise to tort remedies, which may include punitive damages. (Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-819 [169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141] (hereafter Egan).) On the other hand, we have declined to extend tort remedies for breach of the implied covenant to breaches of employment contracts. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654.)
This case concerns a contract between multiple sophisticated business entities engaged in transoceanic shipping; the shareholders' agreement is not [3 Cal.4th 486] a standard form contract, but on its face is drawn to meet the particular needs of the parties, who contemplated large-scale capital investment; commercial advantage was the entire motive behind the contract; and Seawinds seeks damages of $50 million in lost profits for the alleged breaches of the contract's express terms and the implied covenant. Under these circumstances, I have no difficulty concluding, even at the pleading stage, that California's interest in enforcing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is considerably less compelling here than in those contexts in which the covenant acts to protect parties with little bargaining power who seek advantages other than profit.
Nedlloyd argues that the needs for predictability and protection of the justified expectations of the parties possess even greater force in the international business context. The United States Supreme Court has endorsed this position in a closely related context, stating that a choice-of-forum provision is "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction." (Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. (1974) 417 U.S. 506, 516 [41 L.Ed.2d 270, 279, 94 S.Ct. 2449]; accord The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (1972) 407 U.S. 1, 9, 15-16 [32 L.Ed.2d 513, 519-520, 523-524, 92 S.Ct. 1907].) As the high court has observed: "The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. ... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms ...." (The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., supra, 407 U.S. at p. 9 [32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 519-520.) Similarly, due respect by California courts for contractual choice-of-law provisions will assist California's resident businesses and industries to expand and prosper. [3 Cal.4th 487]
Accordingly, consideration of the pertinent factors in this context leads me to conclude that California has no substantial interest in applying its law to Seawinds' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [3 Cal.4th 488]
As I have mentioned, one of the consolidated proceedings before this court involves a ruling on a demurrer to the original complaint, while the other arises from a ruling on a demurrer to the amended complaint. In its demurrer to the original complaint, Nedlloyd contended that if Hong Kong law applied, both the implied covenant and the fiduciary duty causes of action failed. In its demurrer to Seawinds' amended complaint, Nedlloyd renewed its argument that Hong Kong law applied to the breach of implied covenant cause of action, but did not renew the contention that Hong Kong law applied to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. The amended complaint superseded the original complaint (see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 1114, p. 532), and a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider the sufficiency of a superseded pleading (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884 [92 Cal.Rptr. 162, 479 P.2d 362]; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 311 [70 Cal.Rptr. 849, 444 P.2d 481]).
Nevertheless, the question whether Hong Kong law applies to the fiduciary duty cause of action was properly before the trial court and the Court of Appeal, and was ruled on by those courts. The parties dispute the issue in this court; if the issue is not addressed in this proceeding, it is virtually certain it will be raised again. Inevitably, resolution of the question whether Hong Kong law governs the fiduciary duty cause of action will be required at some stage in these proceedings. Thus, it is procedurally appropriate to consider the issue here, and doing so serves the interests of judicial efficiency. (See Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 256-257 [53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265].) But, because the original complaint has been superseded by the amended complaint, I will analyze the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action as pleaded in the amended, not the original, complaint.
In its amended complaint, Seawinds set forth two bases on which Nedlloyd owed it a fiduciary duty. First, Seawinds alleged that Nedlloyd was the controlling shareholder of the corporation, though not a majority shareholder, and actually exercised control. Second, Seawinds alleged that it "at all times reposed special trust and confidence in Nedlloyd," relying on [3 Cal.4th 489] Nedlloyd's expertise in the shipping industry, and Nedlloyd accepted this trust and confidence and undertook to act on Seawinds' behalf. fn. 12
California law, however, is to the contrary. In Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co. (1969) 1 Cal.3d 93, 109-111 [81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464], this court held that majority or controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders and to the corporation itself. (See Heckmann v. Ahmanson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 119, 133, fn. 7 [214 Cal.Rptr. 177]; 12B Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1984 rev.) § 5811, pp. 155-156.)
As I noted earlier, the choice-of-law clause of the shareholders' agreement provides, in its entirety: "This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Hong Kong law and each party hereby irrevocably [3 Cal.4th 490] submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction and service of process of the Hong Kong courts." The parties dispute whether, under our precedents, this clause encompasses noncontractual causes of action.
Nedlloyd contends that the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action comes within the choice-of-law clause, relying on Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 491, 497 (Smith). There, this court held that a forum- selection clause in a contract was valid with respect to the contractual cause of action. Turning to the tort causes of action, Justice Richardson wrote for the court: "Smith contends that the clause is limited in its application to breach of contract actions and should not apply to the tort counts in Smith's complaint. These counts (unfair competition and intentional interference with advantageous business relationships) arose directly out of Smith's contractual relationship with [the defendant] and reasonably may be interpreted as falling within the clause which provides for a Pennsylvania forum to litigate 'Any actions or proceedings instituted by ... [Smith] under this [a]greement with respect to any matters arising under or growing out of this agreement. ...' " (Ibid., original italics.)
Because the choice-of-law clause in the parties' contract is ambiguous regarding whether it was intended to govern noncontractual causes of action, Seawinds should have alleged in the complaint its interpretation of the clause. (E.g., Beck v. American Health Group Internat., Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1555, 1561 [260 Cal.Rptr. 237] [" ' "if the instrument is ambiguous, the pleader must allege the meaning he ascribes to it" ' "]; accord, [3 Cal.4th 491] Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hospitals (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 743, 749-750 [200 Cal.Rptr. 605]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 477, p. 514.) Seawinds did not do so.
In an earlier part of this opinion, I have emphasized the particular need for predictability and protection of the parties' justified contractual expectations in the commercial context. Until today, California law governing contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions served that need. Sophisticated commercial parties who desired choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions to control all related contractual and noncontractual aspects of their relationship could achieve their aim by using clauses that resembled those this court enforced in Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d 491, governing "any [3 Cal.4th 492] matters arising under or growing out of the agreement." Other sophisticated parties who desired more narrow clauses could draft specific clauses suited to the parties' needs in the expectation that those clauses would be enforced as they were intended.
It is not at all difficult to foresee situations in which contracting parties intend a choice-of-law clause such as the one at issue here to govern only contractual causes of action. A party could demonstrate such intent by showing, for example, that the scope of the choice-of-law clause was a subject of negotiation, and that early drafts of the parties' agreement contained a choice-of-law clause similar to the clause in Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d 491, while the final version, after negotiation, more resembled the clause at issue here. Such documentary evidence of negotiation that successively narrowed the scope of the clause would strongly indicate that the parties intended the clause to apply only to contractual causes of action.
It is unrealistic to conclude that the choice-of-law clause in this case is not ambiguous. Certainly, reasonable minds may differ as to whether the clause [3 Cal.4th 493] in this case, which states only that "[t]his Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Hong Kong law ...," should be interpreted to cover noncontractual causes of action. Indeed, the ambiguity in the scope of this clause proceeds not so much from its language as from its context. Taken without reference to context, the clause is unambiguous, but not in the manner suggested by the majority. Because the clause refers only to "this Agreement," and not, like the similar clause at issue in Smith, to "matters arising under or growing out of this agreement. ...' " (Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 497 (italics in original)), it appears on its face not to apply to noncontractual causes of action.
Even under circumstances in which the ambiguity arises more from context than language, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the meaning the parties intended. The majority mistakenly assumes that, because the term "this Agreement" means to four members of this court "this Agreement and all related controversies," it could reasonably have no different meaning to the parties or anyone else. Outside of the choice-of-law area, however, the courts of this state have rejected such a narrow view of meaning. As Chief Justice Traynor put it in the landmark case of Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 38- 39 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 40 A.L.R.3d 1373] (Pacific Gas): "[T]he meaning of a writing '... can only be found by interpretation in light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended. ...' [Citations.]"
Under the majority's approach, "contractual obligations flow, not from the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used certain magic words." (Pacific Gas, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 38.) The majority's primitive "magic words" approach is inconsistent with statutory rules of contract interpretation. [3 Cal.4th 494]
The majority's approach is also inconsistent with the approach taken by Justice Richardson in his thoughtful opinion for this court in Smith, supra, 17 Cal.3d 491. There, Justice Richardson interpreted the meaning of a choice-of-forum clause by focusing on the particular language chosen by the parties, as the language reflects the parties' intent. Without admitting it, the majority has abandoned this traditional and sound approach.
­FN 1. Federal courts applying California's conflicts law have also adhered to this approach. (Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enterprises, Inc. (9th Cir. 1986) 802 F.2d 1143, 1146-1147; S. A. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 641 F.2d 746, 749; Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pa. Mortg. Trust (9th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 915, 917.) The mainstream nature of this approach is further reflected by a recent study indicating that 15 states other than California follow the general approach of the Restatement Second. (Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law (1988) 74 Iowa L.Rev. 165, 190-191.)
­FN 2. There may be an exception to application of the Restatement approach. Choice-of-law issues arising from contracts subject to the Uniform Commercial Code are governed by California Commercial Code section 1105, subdivision (1), which provides that, subject to specified exceptions, the parties may choose the law of a state having a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. This "reasonable relation" test appears to be similar to the "substantial relationship" test we adopt from the Restatement. (See official code com. to U. Com. Code § 1-105 [Deering's Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1105 (1986 ed.) p. 10; 23A West's Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1105 (1964 ed.) p. 37].) Neither party to this action, however, contends that California Uniform Commercial Code section 1105 applies to their contract. We therefore need not and do not determine whether and to what extent, if any, the Commercial Code and Restatement approaches are different.
­FN 3. Subdivision (1) of section 187 of the Restatement states: "(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue." As comment c to section 187, subdivision (1) explains: "The rule of this Subsection is a rule providing for incorporation by reference and is not a rule of choice of law. The parties, generally speaking, have power to determine the terms of their contractual engagements. They may spell out these terms in the contract. In the alternative, they may incorporate into the contract by reference extrinsic material which may, among other things, be the provisions of some foreign law. ... [M]ost rules of contract law are designed to fill gaps in a contract which the parties could themselves have filled with express provisions." (Rest., § 187, subd. (1), com. c, p. 563.) The record in this case does not indicate that the parties incorporated by reference extrinsic material in the form of Hong Kong law in order to fill a gap in their contract. Subdivision (1) therefore is not at issue, and we need not and do not further consider its potential application or scope.
­FN 4. As noted above, a different result might obtain under Restatement section 187, subdivision (1), which appears to allow the parties in some circumstances to specify the law of a state that has no relation to the parties or their transaction. The Restatement gives these two illustrations: "4. In State X, A establishes a trust and provides that B, the trustee, shall be paid commissions at the highest rate permissible under the local law of state Y. A and B are both domiciled in X, and the trust has no relation to any state but X. In X, the highest permissible rate of commissions for trustees is 5 per cent. In Y, the highest permissible rate is 4 per cent. The choice-of-law provision will be given effect, and B will be held entitled to commissions at the rate of 4 per cent. [¶] 5. Same facts as in Illustration 4 except that the highest permissible rate of commissions in X is 4 per cent and in Y is 5 per cent. Effect will not be given to the choice-of-law provision since under X local law the parties lacked power to provide for a rate of commissions in excess of 4 per cent and Y, the state of the chosen law, has no relation to the parties or the trust." (Rest., § 187, subd. (1), com. c., illus. 4 & 5, p. 564; italics added.)
­FN 5. To be more precise, we note that Restatement section 187, subdivision (2) refers not merely to the forum state-for example, California in the present case-but rather to the state "... which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties." For example, there may be an occasional case in which California is the forum, and the parties have chosen the law of another state, but the law of yet a third state, rather than California's, would apply absent the parties' choice. In that situation, a California court will look to the fundamental policy of the third state in determining whether to enforce the parties' choice of law. The present case is not such a situation.
­FN 6. There may also be instances when the chosen state has a materially greater interest in the matter than does California, but enforcement of the law of the chosen state would lead to a result contrary to a fundamental policy of California. In some such cases, enforcement of the law of the chosen state may be appropriate despite California's policy to the contrary. (S. A. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co., supra, 641 F.2d 746, 749.) Careful consideration, however, of California's policy and the other state's interest would be required. No such question is present in this case, and we thus need not and do not decide how Restatement section 187 would apply in such circumstances.
­FN 7. As we have noted, the choice-of-law clause states: "This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Hong Kong law ...." (Italics added.) The agreement, of course, includes the choice-of-law clause itself. Thus the question of whether that clause is ambiguous as to its scope (i.e., whether it includes the fiduciary duty claim) is a question of contract interpretation that in the normal course should be determined pursuant to Hong Kong law. (S. A. Empresa, etc. v. Boeing Co., supra, 641 F.2d 746, 751 [interpreting choice-of-law clause pursuant to law chosen by the parties]; McGill v. Hill (1982) 31 Wn.App. 542 [644 P.2d 680, 683].) The parties in this case, however, did not request judicial notice of Hong Kong law on this question of interpretation (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (f)) or supply us with evidence of the relevant aspects of that law (Evid. Code, § 453, subd. (b)). The question therefore becomes one of California law. (Com'l Ins. Co. of Newark v. Pacific-Peru Const. (9th Cir. 1977) 558 F.2d 948, 952; Rest., § 136, subd. (2), com. h. p. 378.)
­FN 1. I agree with the majority that the scope of the choice-of-law clause in this contract is a question that would ordinarily be determined under Hong Kong law. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 469.) I further agree with the majority that, since the parties neither produced any evidence of Hong Kong law relating to this subject nor requested judicial notice of any such law, we may apply California law to ascertain the scope of the clause. (Ibid.)
­FN 2. Despite the majority's artfully crafted argument, the words "governed by" do not assist in defining what causes of action the choice-of- law clause was intended to address. Rather, the parties defined the scope of their choice-of-law clause by choosing the phrase "[t]his agreement."
­FN 1. Seawinds did not, however, purchase its own shares.
­FN 2. The complaint named Nedlloyd Lines B.V. as the first defendant, and alleged alter ego relationships between it and Royal Nedlloyd Group N.V. and KNSM Lines B.V. According to the complaint, Royal Nedlloyd Group N.V. owns 100 percent of both Nedlloyd Lines B.V. and KNSM Lines B.V.
­FN 3. The Court of Appeal at first denied the writ petition summarily. This court then granted Nedlloyd's petition for review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ.
­FN 4. Because a demurrer raises only questions of law (Code Civ. Proc., § 589), trial courts ordinarily do not consider evidence in connection with a demurrer. But a court may consider matters subject to judicial notice when ruling on a demurrer, and foreign law is subject to judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (f)). In taking judicial notice, a court may rely on "the advice of persons learned in the subject matter ... whether or not furnished by a party." (Evid. Code, § 454, subd. (a)(1); see Estate of Chichernea (1967) 66 Cal.2d 83, 86, fn. 2 [57 Cal.Rptr. 135, 424 P.2d 687]; City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 231 [123 Cal.Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250]; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 840, 852 [176 Cal.Rptr. 874].)
­FN 5. The clause provides: "Each Shareholder agrees that he or it will at all times: [¶] (a) use all means reasonably available to him or it ... so as to insure that the Company [Seawinds] shall implement the provisions of this agreement ...; and [¶] (b) cooperate in good faith and execute such further documents and take such other action as may be reasonably required in order to give full effect to the provisions and intent of this agreement."
­FN 6. There is an exception. Choice- of-law issues arising from contracts that are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code are governed by California Uniform Commercial Code section 1105, which provides in pertinent part that, subject to certain exceptions, the parties may choose the law of a state having a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. Neither party contends that California Uniform Commercial Code section 1105 applies in this case. The California Uniform Commercial Code's "reasonable relation" test is in any event similar to the "substantial relationship" test I apply. (See official code com. to U. Com. Code § 1-105 [Deering's Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1105 (1986 ed.) p. 10; 23A West's Ann. Cal. U. Com. Code, § 1105 (1964 ed.) p. 37].)
­FN 7. Section 187 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws provides:
­FN 8. According to one recent study, fifteen states, not including California, follow the general approach of the Restatement Second; nineteen states adhere to the first Restatement, under which the court applies the law of the place where the contract was made, regardless of the parties' choice; three states and the District of Columbia employ a "center of gravity" approach; three states use a "governmental interests" approach or some variant; and in nine states the rule is unclear. (Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law (1988) 74 Iowa L.Rev. 165, 190-191.) The parties do not urge this court to adopt any of the three other general approaches that have found some favor in the courts; I deem the general approach adopted by the California courts and the Restatement Second to be the most appropriate, because it is the only framework that accords any substantial weight to the parties' choice, as I discuss below.
­FN 9. As an alternative, a party seeking enforcement of a contractual choice-of-law clause may also show that there is, in the language of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, some "other reasonable basis for the parties['] choice ...." (Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 187, subd. (2)(a).) Comment f to section 187 of the Restatement Second provides this illustration:
­FN 10. Seawinds argues that these contacts are shown by a declaration of its managing director, Bengt Henriksen. As noted earlier, evidentiary submissions are not cognizable at the pleading stage. This is true even when, as here, the evidentiary submissions are contained in a declaration that was part of the record in a prior lawsuit. Accordingly, I decline to consider Henriksen's declaration.
­FN 11. California leads the United States in exporting, accounting for one out of every seven export dollars. "In 1991, California exported over $63 billion in goods .... California ports handled two-way trade valued at nearly $175 billion." (Cal. State World Trade Com., 1991 Cal. Trade Highlights, p. 1.) Between 1987 and 1990, exports increased by an average of 20 percent per year. Exports represented "approximately 60 percent of the state's real economic growth in 1991." (Ibid.) Foreign investment in California exceeded $60 billion in 1989 (the latest year for which figures are available), and total employment in California attributable to foreign investment was 496,400 in 1989. (Id. at p. 2.)
­FN 12. In the original complaint, Seawinds alleged only that "the [s]hareholders' [a]greement created a fiduciary relationship" between it and Nedlloyd.
­FN 13. Nedlloyd also contends that the "internal affairs" doctrine compels a decision in its favor on the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. The doctrine's status in California is doubtful; it has been criticized as inconsistent with the state's general approach to resolving conflict-of-laws questions. (Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 216, 224 [187 Cal.Rptr. 852].) But even assuming the internal affairs doctrine should be followed in California, resolution of the issue under that doctrine would require a determination whether California or Hong Kong has a "more significant relationship" to the parties under section 306 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws. This question is essentially factual, and thus ill-suited to resolution at the pleading stage. For this reason, and because Nedlloyd failed to raise the internal affairs doctrine in the trial court or in the Court of Appeal, I decline to address it here.
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal denied a petition for peremptory writ of mandate. The court consolidated this related matters with case #S019540, and limited review to an issue concerning the effect to be given the parties' contractual choice of law clause.
Mon, 08/31/1992 3 Cal.4th 459 S015917 Review - Civil Original Proceeding closed; remittitur issued
NEDLLOYD LINES v. S.C. (SEAWINDS, LTD.) (S019540)
LEVINE v. S.C. (BRECHTEL) (S027756)
NEDLLOYD LINES v. S.C. (SEAWINDS, LTD.) (S044295)
SEAWINDS, LTD. v. NEDLLOYD LINES (S049873)
1 Nedlloyd Lines B.V. (Petitioner)
Represented by Charles S. Donovan
595 Market St., #2000
2 Royal Nedlloyd Group N.V. (Petitioner)
3 Knsm Lines B.V. (Petitioner)
4 Seawinds Limited (Real Party in Interest)
5 San Mateo Count Superior Court (Respondent)
Jul 11 1990 Granted & Transferred to CA 1/1
Jun 4 1990 Petition for review filed
By Petrs., Nedlloyd Lines B.V., in San Francisco
Jun 6 1990 Received:
Ptrs' "Supplement to Ptn for Review"
CA Record - 1 Expand'G file & 2 Separate Vols. [Appendices].
Jun 22 1990 Answer to petition for review filed
RPI Seawinds Limited
Jul 2 1990 Reply to answer to petition filed
By Petitioners Nedlloyd Lines, Etal.
Jul 11 1990 Review granted; transferred to CA 1/1 to issue alt. writ
Feb 12 1991 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Feb 13 1991 Received premature petition for review
Ptrs Nedlloyd Lines Nedlloyd Group & Knsm Lines B.V.
Mar 4 1991 Case start: Petition for review filed
Petitioners Nedlloyd Lines,Royal Nedlloyd Group, Knsm Lines B.V.
Mar 12 1991 Received:
CA Record - 1 Red Exp file w/4 Loose briefs
Apr 18 1991 Let an alternative writ of mandate issue
Issue to be argued before this court shall be limited to whether & to what extent the law of Hong Kong, chosen in the parties' agreement, should be applied in ruling on the demurrers. This cause is ordered consolidated with Supreme Court case S019540. Alternative writ to be issued, served and filed on or before 4-14-91. Return due 5-13-91. Votes: Lucas C.J., Broussard, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian & Baxter JJ.
Apr 18 1991 Case consolidated with:
S019540
Apr 23 1991 Alternative writ issued
Apr 29 1991 Alternative writ filed with proof of service
May 13 1991 Filed document entitled:
Demurrer to Petn for Writ of Man/Prohib by RPI
Memorandum of Points/Authorities in support of Demurrer to Petn (RPI)
May 20 1991 Opening brief on the merits filed
Petitioners Nedlloyd Lines B.V., Royal Nedlloyd Group N.V. & Knsm Lines B.V.
Jun 18 1991 Answer brief on the merits filed
by real party in interest Seawinds, Ltd.
Jul 8 1991 Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
by petitioners Nedlloyd Lines
Sep 3 1991 Application for Stay
Ptrs Nedlloyd Lines - Req for Immediate Stay of Discovery
RPI's Opposition to Req for Stay
Ptrs reply to Opposition to Stay request
Sep 26 1991 Application for stay denied
Filed 9-3-91 denied.
Thursday, June 4, 1992, 9 A.M. - L.A. (Cons w/S019540)
May 22 1992 Received:
Ptr's "Supplemental brief on the merits" (Add'l Authorities)
Aug 31 1992 Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
remanded with instructions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate. Majority Opinion by Baxter, J. -- joined by Lucas C.J., Arabian & George JJ. Concurring & Dissenting Opinion by Panelli, J. -- joined by Mosk, J. C&D Opinion by Kennard, J.
Receipt for Remittitur from CA 1 (Julie)
Charles S. Donovan (Walsh Donovan Lindh & Keech)
SCOCAL, Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (Seawinds Ltd.) , 3 Cal.4th 459 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/nedlloyd-lines-bv-v-superior-court-seawinds-ltd-31331) (last visited Friday August 7, 2020).