Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/03-388/
Timestamp: 2013-12-06 14:25:45
Document Index: 767337422

Matched Legal Cases: ['§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136', '§136']

BATES v. DOW AGROSCIENCES LLC | Supreme Court | LII / Legal Information Institute
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[HTML] [PDF] BATES et al. <font i="1">v.
No. 03388.Argued January 10, 2005Decided April 27, 2005
Petitioner Texas peanut farmers allege that their crops were severely damaged by the application of respondents (Dow) Strongarm pesticide, which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered pursuant to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Petitioners gave Dow notice of their intent to sue, claiming that Strongarms label recommended its use in all peanut-growing areas when Dow knew or should have known that it would stunt the growth of peanuts in their soil, which had pH levels of at least 7.0. In response, Dow sought a declaratory judgment in the Federal District Court, asserting that FIFRA pre-empted petitioners claims. Petitioners counterclaimed, raising several state-law claims sounding in strict liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of express warranty. The District Court rejected one claim on state-law grounds and found the others barred by FIFRAs pre-emption provision, 7 U. S. C. §136v(b). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that §136v(b) expressly pre-empted the state-law claims because a judgment against Dow would induce it to alter its product label.
Held: 1. Under FIFRA, which was comprehensively amended in 1972, a manufacturer must obtain permission to market a pesticide by submitting a proposed label and supporting data to EPA, which will register the pesticide if it is efficacious, it will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on humans and the environment, and its label complies with the statutes misbranding prohibition. A pesticide is misbranded if its label, for example, contains a statement that is false or misleading, §136(q)(1)(A), or lacks adequate instructions or warnings, §§136(q)(1)(F), (G). A State may regulate the sale and use of federally registered pesticides to the extent that regulation does not permit any sales or uses prohibited by FIFRA, §136v(a), but [s]uch State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under [FIFRA], §136v(b). Though tort litigation against pesticide manufacturers was a common feature of the legal landscape in 1972, after this Court held in Cipollone
505 U. S. 504, that the term requirement in the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 included common-law duties, and therefore pre-empted certain tort claims against cigarette companies, courts began holding that §136v(b) pre-empted claims such as petitioners. Pp. 49.
2. FIFRAs pre-emption provision applies only to state-law requirements for labeling or packaging. §136v(b). While the Fifth Circuit was correct that requirements embraces both positive enactments and common-law duties, it erred in supposing that petitioners defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty claims were premised on requirements for labeling or packaging.
None of the common-law rules upon which these claims are based requires that manufacturers label or package their products in any particular way. The Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion by reasoning that a finding of liability on these claims would induce Dow to alter its label. This was error because the prohibitions of §136v(b) apply only to requirements. A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motives an optional decision is not a requirement. The proper inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of the common-law duty at issue, not for speculation as to whether a jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to change its label. Pp. 913.
3. Petitioners fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims, by contrast, are based on common-law rules that qualify as requirements for labeling or packaging, since these rules set a standard for a products labeling that Dow is alleged to have violated. While these common-law rules are subject to §136v(b), it does not automatically follow that they are pre-empted. Unlike the pre-emption clause in Cipollone,
§136v(b) prohibits only state-law labeling requirements that are in addition to or different from FIFRAs labeling requirements. Thus, §136v(b) pre-empts any statutory or common-law rule that would impose a labeling requirement that diverges from those set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations. It does not pre-empt a state-law requirement that is equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRAs labeling standards. This parallel requirements reading of §136v(b) finds strong support in Medtronic, Inc.
518 U. S. 470. Thus, although FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy to those injured as a result of a manufacturers violation of FIFRAs labeling requirements, nothing in §136v(b) precludes States from providing such a remedy. Dows contrary reading of §136v(b) fails to make sense of the phrase in addition to or different from. Even if Dow offered a plausible alternative reading of §136v(b), this Court would have a duty to accept the reading disfavoring pre-emption. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
514 U. S. 645. The long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the presumption against pre-emption, for Congress surely would have expressed its intention more clearly if it had meant to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation. Moreover, this history emphasizes the importance of providing an incentive to manufacturers to use the utmost care in distributing inherently dangerous items. Finally, the policy objections raised against this Courts reading of §136v(b) are unpersuasive. Pp. 1320.
4. Under the parallel requirements reading of §136v(b), a state-law labeling requirement must be equivalent to its federal counterpart to avoid pre-emption. State law need not, however, explicitly incorporate FIFRAs standards as an element of a cause of action. Because this Court has not received sufficient briefing on whether the Texas law governing petitioners fraud and failure-to-warn claims is equivalent to FIFRAs misbranding standards and any relevant regulations, it is up to the Fifth Circuit to resolve the issue in the first instance. Pp. 2021.
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia, J., joined.
Petitioners are 29 Texas peanut farmers who allege that in the 2000 growing season their crops were severely damaged by the application of respondents newly marketed pesticide named Strongarm. The question presented is whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U. S. C. §136
(2000 ed. and Supp. II), pre-empts their state-law claims for damages.
Pursuant to its authority under FIFRA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conditionally registered Strongarm on March 8, 2000, thereby granting respondent (Dow) permission to sell this pesticidea weed killer
in the United States. Dow obtained this registration in time to market Strongarm to Texas farmers, who normally plant their peanut crops around May 1. According to petitionerswhose version of the facts we assume to be true at this stageDow knew, or should have known, that Strongarm would stunt the growth of peanuts in soils with pH levels of 7.0 or greater.
Nevertheless, Strongarms label stated, Use of Strongarm is recommended in all areas where peanuts are grown, App. 108, and Dows agents made equivalent representations in their sales pitches to petitioners. When petitioners applied Strongarm on their farmswhose soils have pH levels of 7.2 or higher, as is typical in western Texasthe pesticide severely damaged their peanut crops while failing to control the growth of weeds. The farmers reported these problems to Dow, which sent its experts to inspect the crops.
Meanwhile, Dow reregistered its Strongarm label with EPA prior to the 2001 growing season. EPA approved a supplemental label that was for [d]istribution and [u]se [o]nly in the states of New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas, id.
, at 179, the three States in which peanut farmers experienced crop damage. This new label contained the following warning: Do not apply Strongarm to soils with a pH of 7.2 or greater. Id.
, at 181.
After unsuccessful negotiations with Dow, petitioners gave Dow notice of their intent to bring suit as required by the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(hereinafter Texas DTPA). In response, Dow filed a declaratory judgment action in Federal District Court, asserting that petitioners claims were expressly or impliedly pre-empted by FIFRA. Petitioners, in turn, brought counterclaims, including tort claims sounding in strict liability and negligence. They also alleged fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas DTPA. The District Court granted Dows motion for summary judgment, rejecting one claim on state-law grounds and dismissing the remainder as expressly pre-empted by 7 U. S. C. §136v(b), which provides that States shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It read §136v(b) to pre-empt any state-law claim in which a judgment against Dow would induce it to alter its product label. 332 F. 3d 323, 331 (CA5 2003). The court held that because petitioners fraud, warranty, and deceptive trade practices claims focused on oral statements by Dows agents that did not differ from statements made on the products label, success on those claims would give Dow a strong incentive to change its label. Those claims were thus pre-empted. Id.
at 331332. The court also found that petitioners strict liability claim alleging defective design was essentially a disguised failure-to-warn claim and therefore pre-empted. Id.
at 332. It reasoned: One cannot escape the heart of the farmers grievance: Strongarm is dangerous to peanut crops in soil with a pH level over 7.0, and that was not disclosed to them… . It is inescapable that success on this claim would again necessarily induce Dow to alter the Strongarm label. Id
, at 332333.
The court employed similar reasoning to find the negligent testing and negligent manufacture claims pre-empted as well. Id.
at 333.
This decision was consistent with those of a majority of the Courts of Appeals,
as well of several state high courts,
but conflicted with the decisions of other courts
and with the views of the EPA set forth in an amicus curiae
brief filed with the California Supreme Court in 2000.
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 542 U. S. ___ (2004).
Prior to 1910 the States provided the primary and possibly the exclusive source of regulatory control over the distribution of poisonous substances. Both the Federal Governments first effort at regulation in this area, the Insecticide Act of 1910, 36Stat.
331, and FIFRA as originally enacted in 1947, ch. 125, 61Stat.
163, primarily dealt with licensing and labeling. Under the original version of FIFRA, all pesticides sold in interstate commerce had to be registered with the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary would register a pesticide if it complied with the statutes labeling standards and was determined to be efficacious and safe.