Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/444/707/case.html
Timestamp: 2017-01-21 19:42:12
Document Index: 87294091

Matched Legal Cases: ['§ 7602', '§ 7604', '§ 7602', '§ 7602', '§ 7602', '§ 7601', '§ 6201', '§ 6301', '§ 7602', '§ 7602']

United States v. Euge (full text) :: 444 U.S. 707 (1980) :: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center Log In
› United States v. Euge
United States v. Euge 444 U.S. 707 (1980)
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980)United States v. EugeNo. 78-1453Argued November 26, 1979Decided February 20, 1980444 U.S. 707CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
(b) This Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that, if the claimed summons authority is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the Internal Revenue Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing congressional policies. Pp. 444 U. S. 714-716. Page 444 U. S. 708
The United States sued in the District Court seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service summons requiring respondent to appear and provide handwriting exemplars. Enforcement was denied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 587 F.2d 25 (1978) (en banc), and we granted certiorari. [Footnote 1] 441 U.S. 942. We now hold that Congress Page 444 U. S. 709 has empowered the IRS to compel handwriting exemplars under its summons authority conferred by 26 U.S.C. § 7602.
The United States commenced this action under 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a). The District Court held that the summons should be enforced, ordering respondent to provide 10 handwriting exemplars of 8 different signatures. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the summons authority vested in the Internal Revenue Service under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 does not Page 444 U. S. 710 authorize the IRS to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars. [Footnote 2]
The question Page 444 U. S. 711 presented here is whether this power to compel a witness to "appear," to produce "other data," and to "give testimony," includes the power to compel the execution of handwriting exemplars. We conclude that it does, for several reasons. While the language may not be explicit in its authorization of handwriting exemplars, the duty to appear and give testimony, a duty imposed by § 7602, has traditionally encompassed a duty to provide some forms of nontestimonial, physical evidence, including handwriting exemplars. Further, this Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that, if the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congressionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax Code, that authority should be upheld absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies. The authority claimed here is necessary for the effective exercise of the Service's enforcement responsibilities; it is entirely consistent with the statutory language; and it is not in derogation of any constitutional rights or countervailing policies enunciated by Congress. Page 444 U. S. 712
"[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. . . . We have often iterated the importance of this public duty, which every person within Page 444 U. S. 713 the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform when properly summoned."
See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). In Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 388 U. S. 266-267 (1967), handwriting was held, "like the . . . body itself" to be an "identifying physical characteristic," subject to production. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), this Court again confirmed that handwriting is in the nature of physical evidence which can be compelled by a grand jury in the exercise of its subpoena power. See also United States v. Mullaney, 32 F. 370 (CC Mo. 1887). Page 444 U. S. 714
Congress certainly could have narrowed the common law testimonial duty in enacting § 7602, and thus we do not rely solely on the common law meaning of the statutory language. Section 7602 does not, by its terms, compel the production of handwriting exemplars, and therefore, a narrower interpretation of the duty imposed is not precluded by the actual language of the statute. A narrower interpretation is precluded, however, by the precedents of this Court construing that statute. As early as 1911, this Court established the benchmarks for interpreting the authority of the Internal Revenue Service Page 444 U. S. 715 to enforce tax obligations in holding that
379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 53-54. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the Court refused to hold that the summons authority could not be used whenever there was a potential that the civil investigation might later lead to criminal prosecution. In construing the scope of the summons authority, the Court emphasized that it refused to draw the line in a manner that would "stultify enforcement of federal law." Id. at 400 U. S. 536. Finally, in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141 (1975), the Court upheld the Service's authority to issue a John Doe summons to a bank in order to discover the identity of an individual unknown to the Service. The Court reasoned that, absent that construction, "no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted," and thus "[s]ettled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress." Id. at 420 U. S. 150. There is thus a formidable line of precedent construing congressional intent to uphold the claimed enforcement authority of the Service if authority is necessary for the effective enforcement of the Page 444 U. S. 716 revenue laws and is not undercut by contrary legislative purposes. [Footnote 9]
Applying these principles, we conclude that Congress empowered the Service to seek, and obliged the witness to provide, handwriting exemplars relevant to the investigation. First, there is no question that handwriting exemplars will often be an important evidentiary component in establishing tax liability. The statutory framework, as reviewed in the numerous precedents recited supra, imposes on the Secretary of the Treasury, and the IRS as his designate, a broad duty to enforce the tax laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a). Congress has legislated that the Secretary is "required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this title. . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a). Under § 6301, the Secretary "shall collect the taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws." In order to fulfill these duties, the Service will often need to determine whether a particular name is an alias of a taxpayer. One effective method for resolving that issue is through the use of handwriting exemplars. [Footnote 10] As we recognized in Bisceglia, the IRS does have a need for investigative devices which assist them in ascertaining the identity of tax Page 444 U. S. 717 evaders. In Bisceglia, we held, in language relevant to this case:
There is certainly nothing in the statutory language, [Footnote 11] or in the legislative history, [Footnote 12] precluding the interpretation Page 444 U. S. 718 asserted by the Service. Nor is there any constitutional privilege of the taxpayer or other parties that is violated by this construction. Compulsion of handwriting exemplars is neither a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protections, United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19 (1973), nor testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). The compulsion of handwriting exemplars has been the subject to far less protection than the compulsion of testimony and documents. [Footnote 13] Since Congress has explicitly established an obligation to provide the more protected forms of evidence, it would seem curious had it chosen not to impose an obligation to produce a form of evidence tradition has found it less important to protect. [Footnote 14] Page 444 U. S. 719
26 U.S.C. § 7602. The Court holds today that this authority to compel "testimony" includes authority to compel the creation of handwriting exemplars. [Footnote 2/1] Page 444 U. S. 720 The Court, however, is unable to point to anything in the statutory language or legislative history that even suggests that the obligation to "give testimony" includes an obligation to create a handwriting exemplar. Indeed, the Court concedes, as it must, that a handwriting exemplar is a kind of nontestimonial physical evidence. [Footnote 2/2] Certainly, Congress has the power to authorize the Service to compel the creation of exemplars, but it has not chosen to do so in § 7602. [Footnote 2/3] Accordingly, I dissent.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is rooted in "the basic stream of religious and political principle[,] . . . reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state," In re Gault, 387 Page 444 U. S. 721 U.S. 1, 387 U. S. 47 (1967), and embodies the "respect a government -- state or federal -- must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 460 (1966). I continue to believe, then, that